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ENGLAND'S POLICY. 
 
Printed hy Tf/mhnl/ d' Spears. Edinburgh 
 
 FOR 
 
 EDINBURGH 
 LONDON 
 
 . MACNIVEN & WALLACE 
 SIMPKIN, MARSHALL & CO. 
 HAMILTON ADAMS & CO. 
 
ENGLAND'S Policy 
 
 ITS TRADITIONS AND PROBLEMS 
 
 BY 
 
 LEWIS SBRGEANT 
 
 AUTHOR OF " NEW GREECE," ETC. 
 
 EDINBURGH 
 MACNIVEN AND WALLACE 
 
HTHE time is past when an apology would have been 
 thought necessary from one who, neither a minister 
 nor an ambassador, and without the craftsmanship of a 
 specialist, took it in hand to write about foreign policy. 
 There are no sealed books for the student of history; and 
 (in England at any rate) statesmen and diplomatists 
 are now among the first to summon the na4:ion to open 
 council. 
 
 A portion of the chapter on ' The European Concert 
 (1880-1)' was written for and circulated by the Greek 
 Committee in the spring of last year. It is embodied 
 here in a slightly modified shape ; and the same remark 
 applies to three pages in the tenth chapter, which were 
 originally printed in a more fugitive form. 
 
 Li. b. 
 
 Burlington Cottage^ Tumham Green, 
 November 1881. 
 
 Erratum. — Page 48, 2 lines from bottom, for Montagu read 
 
 Montague. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 I. THE BASES OF POLICY, 
 II. WHIG TKABITIONS, 
 III. TOEY TRADITIONS, 
 lY. THE NATIONAL TEADITION, . 
 V. CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY, 
 YL PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY, 
 VII. LATER WHIG POLICY (1859-66), 
 VIII. DEVELOPMENTS (1868-74), 
 IX. DIVAGATIONS (1874-80), 
 X. THE NEW DEPARTURE, 
 XL THE EUROPEAN CONCERT (1880-1), 
 XII. DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY, . 
 XIIL DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY, 
 SUMMARY, 
 APPENDIX, 
 INDEX, .... 
 
 PAGE 
 1 
 
 23 
 
 54 
 79 
 
 102 
 142 
 
 169 
 
 189 
 211 
 
 228 
 257 
 
 285 
 
 308 
 339 
 355 
 397 
 
I. 
 
 THE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 It would be instructive if we could recall in succes- 
 sion the more important statesmen who have from 
 age to age controlled the relations of England with the 
 various countries of the world, that we might enquire of 
 them their several ideas on the subject of foreign policy. 
 Divere:ent methods of attainino- the same ends — ends 
 absolutely opposed to each other — this or that State 
 selected as our natural friend or our natural enemy, 
 according to the personal convictions of the speaker or 
 the circumstances of the time in which he lived — 
 chicanery and honesty, double-dealing and morality, 
 guile and straight-forwardness alternately held up as the 
 best mode of success : it would be a quaint medley that 
 we should hear from the lips of Walsingham and Crom- 
 well, of Arlington, Ashley, and Danby, of Harley and 
 St John, of Walpole and Chatham and Pitt, of Castle- 
 reagh and Canning, of Palmerston, Russell, and the men 
 of our own generation. 
 
 The variety of opinions would indeed be no matter 
 for surprise. So long as it extended only to the aims 
 thought natural and necessary by English statesmen, to 
 definitions of the relative patriotism of various epochs, 
 and to the details of foreign policy as interpreted by 
 different Ministers, it would be entirely reasonable. 
 The wisdom of to-day becomes the folly of to-morrow. 
 The enemy of one age is the ally of the next. Our 
 
 A 
 
2 THE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 fathers poured out millions of money, and the blood of 
 half-a-dozen armies, for an object which we deem either 
 worthless or unattained. If the aims of diplomacy, or 
 mediation, or war, were identical in every period, or 
 even based on the same principles and lines of action, 
 politics might be discussed as an exact science, and the 
 business of a Foreim Office miofht be learned out of a 
 primer. Whether this is to happen to us or not is a fair 
 question for surmise ; but in the meantime we are ex- 
 posed to the chance of being dragged with every reaction 
 iind alternation of party government along diverging 
 paths of policy. 
 
 Clearly the lack of a settled policy in our relations 
 with other countries is a main cause of the timidity of 
 moral purpose occasionally displayed by modern states- 
 men. If the policy were agreed upon, accepted by the 
 nation and its rulers, and plain before the face of every 
 Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, we should not 
 often see a departure from honest and straightforward 
 principles. The more we can reduce our foreign affairs 
 to a system, by settling what we wish to achieve and 
 clinging to our resolution with constant firmness, the 
 sooner shall we be able to rely upon an undeviating 
 course of action on the part of those to whom we 
 entrust the destinies of the empire. 
 
 It does not appear to be necessary that we should 
 withdraw the functions of the Foreign Office from the 
 control of rival political parties, or that we should hand 
 over to a permanent Department the responsibility 
 which is now borne in turn by Liberal and Conservative 
 Secretaries and Under-Secretaries. What we really 
 need is the establishment of fixed principles, the stereo - 
 t5rping of our definitions and axioms, and the limitation 
 of the problems which it solely concerns us to solve. 
 
THE BASES OF POLICY. 3 
 
 Let all this be determined and registered in the public 
 opinion of the country, and it will be a matter of com- 
 paratively slight importance whether Whig or Tory has 
 his hand on the helm. Substitute the laws and for- 
 mulas of navigation for the caprice, or ignorance, or 
 obstinacy of the captain, and the ship will sail as 
 straight as winds and currents allow. 
 
 But it is objected that these winds and currents are 
 perpetually changing ; that fresh combinations of cir- 
 cumstances introduce fresh perplexities every year ; that 
 problems arise which cannot be solved by stereotyped 
 rules ; that we must needs leave to Ministers of the day 
 so much discretion as would carry them, on emergenc}^, 
 to opposite extremes of pohcy. Given a Bolingbroke 
 and a Walpole, a Castlereagh and a Canning, a Beacons- 
 field and a Gladstone, and place them in the midst of 
 identical complications, their policy would still be 
 deeply contrasted, or diametrically opposed, however 
 clear the rules which might have been drawn up for 
 their guidance. 
 
 It is true to a certain extent, but chiefly because we 
 approach the consideration from our historical English 
 point of view. We do not wish to sink the differences 
 between the genius of one statesman and the genius of 
 another. We cannot afibrd to reject the astuteness of the 
 clever intriguer because, in the long run, we prefer 
 the moral courage of the internationalist. If we have a 
 dangerous enemy we are glad to find a statesman who 
 can beat him, in any way not absolutely shameful — 
 though we are more proud of the man who can make the 
 danger disappear by open and straightforward means. 
 This is the judgment which we might expect, in nineteen 
 cases out of twenty, from honourable and candid critics 
 who confine themselves to the historical standpoint, and 
 
4 THE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 do not contemplate any change in the conditions by 
 which our foreign aflfairs have hitherto been limited. 
 
 But there is another point of view from which we may 
 approach the subject. Grant that Englishmen must 
 regard Enghsh policy as the developed product of Eng- 
 lish history, and effect no change of method save that 
 which comes by continuous evolution : there is never- 
 theless a possibility of hastening the process of evolution 
 by dispensing with useless links in the chain. And it 
 may help us to recognise and dispense with such links if 
 we compare with our own the foreign policy of nations 
 which are, like ourselves, on the high road of liberty. 
 
 The United States of America, with a constitution not 
 yet a century old, and cut off from the comj)lications 
 which are a source of constant peril to the European 
 Powers, have no elaborate foreign policy. The Monroe 
 doctrine, with the volume of tradition modifying or 
 amplifying it, is the main basis on which the Americans 
 have built their diplomatic system. It is essentially 
 a system of defence, and no American Government has 
 ever crossed the limits first assigned to the development 
 of the Republic, save in the way of welcoming a new 
 State into the Union. The States have never been 
 nationally aggressive. There have been aggressive 
 parties more or less powerfully represented at Washing- 
 ton ; but there are no aggressive traditions, because the 
 Government and the common sense of the people at 
 large have always frowned on attempted innovations of 
 this kind. Of course we have heard menaces in reofard 
 to Canada. There have been times when it has seemed 
 very probable indeed that we might have to defend the 
 borders of our North American dependency against 
 encroachment from the south. But the danger has 
 never been a real one : it has been brewed for us by 
 
THE BASES OF POLICY. 5 
 
 braggart newspapers, by the malice of emigrant Irish- 
 men, or as a counter-irritant to braggadocio on our own 
 side of the Atlantic. The responsible Government has 
 scarcely so much as played it against us in the contro- 
 versies which were once so frequent between England 
 and the States, but which were happily brought to an 
 end at Geneva. The United States mi2:ht be dad to 
 receive the Canadians coming to them of their own free 
 will ; but there is no respectable section of the people 
 who would dream of recommendino- the forcible annexa- 
 tion of the territory. 
 
 The people of the United States are in fact anything 
 but an aggressive people, though they are fully resolved 
 at all cost and hazard to hold their borders intact, to 
 exclude foreign nations from the zone of their legitimate 
 influence, and to exact whatever redress or reparation 
 for wrong the principles of international equity may 
 give them. And it is not, as some have urged, the 
 mere geographical position of the country which keeps 
 it from aggression. The Canadian frontier is vulnerable 
 enough, and there are or have been many incitements to 
 an encroaching policy in this direction. Spain has a 
 frontier in Cuba on which Americans have often fixed 
 greedy eyes ; but there has been no approach to aggres- 
 sion upon that island. The case between the States and 
 Mexico, more than a quarter of a century ago, was 
 sufficiently serious ; and when the Government at 
 Washington was permanently in the hands of Southern 
 politicians no doubt the States were more aggressively 
 disposed than they have been since the Civil War. But 
 the great fact to dwell upon is that the people of the 
 Republic, natural-born Americans and naturalised immi- 
 grants, are averse from aggressive designs, bent on 
 minding their own business within their own borders, 
 
6 THE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 and devoted to a policy of material and moral .self- 
 defence. 
 
 It has not been so with every Eepublic. Rome was 
 aggressive under consuls and caesars alike. The first 
 French Republic, though trained to love of arms by 
 the unjustifiable attacks of a conspiracy of despots, was 
 also inflamed by the ardour of proselytism, and ultimately 
 fell by aggression. The South American Republics 
 are anarchical simply because they will not rest satis- 
 fied with internal development. But the Republic of 
 North America is like none of these ; and it diff'ers 
 from them in two important respects. First, its internal 
 development is so active and rapid that its energies 
 would in any case be exhaustively employed at home ; 
 and secondly, the race-character of the people disposes 
 it against military enterprises abroad. It has not the 
 '' imperial instincts " of Rome, bred and nursed to 
 war. It has not the imperial enterprise of the soldier- 
 colonists of Greece. It has not the proselytising spirit 
 of the neo- Latin Republic. It is essentially English : if 
 possible Teutonic-English with the Norman element 
 struck out : and (however explained) it is not aggres- 
 sive. 
 
 If it would not be safe to lay stress on the non-aggres- 
 sive race-character of the American people, all the more 
 weight may be given to the other argument. It is im- 
 possible that a State which is being fed by immigration 
 at the rate of something like half a million every year, 
 and which has superabundant room for this enormous 
 mcrease, should at the same time be contemplating 
 encroachment on neighbouring territories, or wanton war 
 with any foreign Power. Half a million immigrants 
 imply say five millions sterling of capital — a hundred 
 thousand industrious labourers, wage-earners, tax-payers. 
 
THE BASES OF POLICY. 7 
 
 productive citizens. The phenomenon is absolutely with- 
 out a precedent. The constancy and increasing volume 
 of this stream of organic wealth render it of more value to 
 the United States than all their mines of gold and silver. 
 The busy hive, in which the drones are few and the inter- 
 necine contests rare, is seething with vigorous life and 
 activity ; all haste to be rich, no one shuns labour or 
 remits exertion, a man's capital are his sinews and his 
 strong resolution ; every career is open, the Presidency 
 itself is a goal for honest endeavour, spade or tongue or 
 pen is a sword in the hand of our new soldier of fortune. 
 In this mart of industry the poor immigrant breathes 
 more freely than he was wont to breathe in the country 
 that gave him birth. His bowed back straightens, the 
 lines of care are smoothed out of his brow, his eyes look 
 boldly into the eyes of his fellows, he forgets the bitter- 
 ness that made him an exile, and for the first time tread& 
 the earth in all the pride of honourable citizenship. 
 Judge whether such a man would exchange the peaceful 
 and well-requited labour of his new nationality for 
 the wars, the grinding taxation, the still unabolished 
 feudalisms of Europe. 
 
 Now we are brought round again to the consideration 
 which led us to seek this comparison between the old 
 world and the new — between the old and the new Eng- 
 land. Surely we have something to learn from the child 
 whom we drove out into the wilderness, and who has- 
 become a mighty nation. This, if nothing else, seems to 
 be made clear by the history of the United States, that 
 the craving for a foreign policy of adventure, and to some 
 extent the very necessity for a foreign policy, is reduced 
 to a minimum by the accumulation of internal interests, 
 by the regularity of internal development, and by elevat- 
 ing as much as possible the dignity and responsibility of 
 
8 THE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 the citizen. No doubt the circumstances of the two 
 countries are widely different. America has vast tracts 
 waiting for cultivation ; England is thronged, if not 
 over-populated. The institutions of America are new and 
 easily adaptable ; the institutions of England are old, 
 ingrooved, and scarcely to be modified without a revolu- 
 tionary effort. America started fair a hundred years ago, 
 and is isolated from the great military nations ; England 
 lias the traditions and inherited complications of two, or 
 five, or eight centuries, more or less potent over us at the 
 present day. We could not if we would put ourselves in 
 the place of tlie Republic ; and indeed the foreign 
 policy which suffices for the Republic might not satisfy 
 the requirements of an ancient monarchy, situate close 
 to the continent of Europe, and having vulnerable mem- 
 bers over the greater part of the globe. 
 
 Much is to be said on both sides ; but take the 
 parallel as far as it will go, and recognise the significance 
 which it unquestionably possesses. England, though in 
 one sense part of Europe, is still cut off from the Con- 
 tinent by twenty miles of sea, and the political impor- 
 tance of its geographical position is not to be overlooked. 
 Our statesmen have perhaps too often regarded this 
 position as giving us a certain influence or control over 
 European politics, and enabling us to intervene at 
 pleasure without committing ourselves too deeply. There 
 is another aspect of our insularity — it enables us (and 
 has enabled us a hundred times) to shut ourselves out 
 from Continental broils, and to go on our way in peace 
 when a contiguous frontier would almost inevitably have 
 <lrawn us into war. It is a serious question for English- 
 men at the end of the nineteenth century whether they 
 ought not finally to cling to this latter interpretation, 
 iind to look upon the twenty miles of sea as absolving 
 
THE BASES OF POLICY. 9 
 
 them from the worst extravagances of competitive arma- 
 ment, and from nine-tenths of the old policy of diplo- 
 matic intrigue. 
 
 This consideration, and others issuing from or co- 
 ordinate with it, claim the most serious attention of 
 English statesmen. The contraction of our responsi- 
 bilities abroad and the simplification of our foreign 
 policy in the sense just indicated are plainly de- 
 manded by the interests and inclinations of Englishmen. 
 Would it not be a legitimate change for us to make at 
 this crisis of our national development ? Would it not 
 materially hasten the process of evolution by which our 
 policy is shaped and guided ? Might we not in this 
 manner dispense with certain useless links in the chain, 
 as already suggested ? 
 
 The men of this generation are visibly to all eyes 
 forging the hinge of the great door which opens on a 
 heroic future for Eugiand. The people which has within 
 a single decade given so many evidences of a moral 
 courage not hitherto familiar in this country is made for 
 better things than any yet achieved by its ancestors ; but 
 the way to these better things is not a mere prolongation 
 of the way heretofore pursued by statesmen and diploma- 
 tists. It is not the same system which fought to retain the 
 States in 1775-81 and bowed to the Geneva arbitration 
 in 1872. It is not the same system which generated the 
 Crimean War and arrested the quarrel with Russia in 
 1876-78. It is not the same system which piled up our 
 monstrous Indian Empire and relinquished ill-gotten 
 gains in Afghanistan. It is not the same spirit or the 
 same order of statesmen or the same English public 
 opinion which grasped at petty handfuls of soil in every 
 quarter of the world, paying for them uncounted gold 
 and invaluable English lives, and which in 1881, to the 
 
10 TEE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 horror of the war-making classes and the joy of a 
 million peace-loving men, restored the liberties of the 
 Boers. 
 
 A change has come over us and a transformation : it 
 behoves us to see it and welcome it, and be in harmony 
 Avith it. The classes that made war, that fought indubi- 
 tably well and bravely, profiting some little by promo- 
 tions and decorations and contracts, will make war no 
 longer. The classes (claiming to be the nation) which 
 had never yet been able to make or keep peace have laid 
 their hands upon the leash of the war-dogs, and it will 
 go hard with them before they slip the noose again. 
 
 Most of these changes, and these demonstrations of 
 altered opinion, have come about since the extension of 
 the franchise in 1867. Household suifrage admitted to 
 the exercise of the vote seven or eight hundred thousand 
 men, and perhaps at this moment a million and a half 
 take part in the election of representatives who would 
 not, save for that Act, have had the right to do so. 
 Political education has been stimulated amongst these 
 and many others depending upon them, so that the 
 nation is vastly more intelligent and powerful in the 
 mass than it was when we went to the Crimea, or when, 
 with incomprehensible wrongheadedness, we gave aid 
 and encouragement to the slave-holding States, and 
 thereby laid up for ourselves the adverse judgment at 
 Geneva. By means of this reform and this political 
 education, assisted by the wholesome teaching of many 
 newspapers, tracts, public meetings and organizations, 
 the public opinion of England has been renewed and re- 
 invigorated. That which is called especially by men 
 who fear it the democracy, which may hereafter come 
 to be recoonised as the soundest and steadiest section of 
 the English people, has been made the potential master 
 
THE BASES OF POLICY. 11 
 
 of this country, within and without, and in respect of 
 ever)rthing controlled by the Ministers whom it controls. 
 The democracy — if it is to be so called — the democracy 
 which another reform or two may make worthy of that 
 name will break with many old traditions of home and 
 foreign policy : with all bad and let us hope no single 
 good tradition which it imports the nation to revere and 
 keep. Happy is the man who, in spirit, will be at one 
 with this England of the coming years — who will trust 
 and not fear the developed strength and conscience of a 
 people intrepid in justice and unconquerable in moral 
 resolution. 
 
 Not only has the policy of England beyond the seas 
 not been uniform in all ages, but it has varied with dif- 
 ferent Ministers, as well as at different epochs, and has, 
 for easily assignable reasons, undergone more notable 
 transformations than the policy of any other country in 
 the world. An explanation sufficient without seeking a 
 second is that a consistent and vigilant foreign policy was 
 least necessary for an insular State, with frontiers barely 
 and rarely assailable, and a population more given to 
 commercial enterprise than greedy of war or military 
 renown. The less imperative the need for action beyond 
 the boundary, so much the less fixity of purpose and 
 sameness of diplomacy from age to age. For France 
 there has always been a Germany, and for Germany a 
 France ; for Russia, always weaker neighbours, and for 
 Spain and Italy stronger. England, on the other hand, 
 has had to pick and choose her object; now France, now 
 Spain, now Holland, now Russia, and always for the 
 greater part of two centuries one or more barbarian peoples 
 in retreat (as it has been said) before the advancing tide 
 
12 THE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 of our civilisation. But these were concerns of our 
 own creation rather than inevitable and indispensable 
 struggles ; and the classes actually engaged in creat- 
 ing them, in conducting the intrigues, in raising and 
 dispensing the taxes required by such a policy, in leading 
 the armies and dividing the spoils, were the classes into 
 whose power the government of England had fallen. 
 
 For a few centuries after the Norman incursions it 
 was the kings and their favourites, displacing the council 
 of wise men whose moot or parliament had once been 
 potent with the English kings. Then it was the barons, 
 who gained ascendency over the monarchs, not entirely 
 losing it under the Tudors. Next it was for a time the 
 Stuart kino's, with slio;ht and uncertain control from the 
 House of Commons. Then again the great nobles, in- 
 cautiously enriched by Henry the Eighth and his succes- 
 sors, curtailed the prerogative of the Crown, and took the 
 authority of the State into their own hands. But from 
 first to last, if we except the short period of the Common- 
 wealth, it was never the people of England in the mass 
 who, by their own voice and the pronunciation of their 
 own opinion, declared when and against whom they were 
 to fight, how much and for what purpose they were to be 
 taxed. The nominal representation of the shires and 
 boroughs had been most nearly genuine when the king's 
 prerogative was least disputed. It becxime the veriest 
 delusion and farce when the aristocracy had contrived 
 to clip the wings of this prerogative. Down to the third 
 decade of the present century a majority of votes in the 
 House of Commons was under the absolute control of 
 some two hundred individuals ; and this petty clique of 
 monstrously rich and practically irresponsible men swayed 
 the whole fortunes and destinies of England in the sacred 
 and maligned name of the people. 
 
THE BASES OF POLICY. 13 
 
 He who would form a notion of the varying foreign 
 policies pursued by our later kings and aristocratic rulers, 
 and especially of the main lines of policy followed during 
 the past two hundred years down to our own times, may 
 turn at once to the pages of English history dealing with 
 the Restoration and Revolution of the seventeenth cen- 
 tury. Of that which went before it is enough if he re- 
 member the exploits of the Plantagenet kings, barons, 
 and common soldiers in France, the dealings of Walsing- 
 ham and other Ministers of Elizabeth with the Protestants 
 on the Continent, the account rendered by her sailors of 
 the Catholic armada, the more than kingly imperious- 
 ness of Cromwell with the enemies of his country, and 
 the deadly blow which he struck at the Spanish empire 
 in the New World. 
 
 With such pictures as these in his mind the student 
 of history, opening his book at the reign of the second 
 Charles, and reading how the successor of Edward Plan- 
 tagenet craved gifts and pensions from the successor of 
 his captive French king — how the sons of Blake's invin- 
 cibles cowered before the masthead broom of insult- 
 ing Hollanders — how English Puritans sought refuge 
 with the descendants of Elizabeth's protegees — will find 
 himself at a new starting-point in the relations of his 
 country with the European States. A world of difference 
 exists between 1570 and 1670, and even between 1655 
 and 1665. Political morality had been succeeded by a 
 political debauch : Charles the Restored took vengeance 
 on his father's judges by cynically wiping out the record 
 of English fame and influence, writing in its place a 
 record of shameless dependence and corruption. 
 
 And yet so true to nature is the working of historic 
 law that the royal lackey who begged money from Louis 
 the Fourteenth in order to rid himself of the constitu- 
 
14 THE BASES OF POLICY, 
 
 tional control of his subjects was actually (as it turned 
 out) laying thereby the foundation of a policy which was 
 to become traditional with a great English party. One of 
 liis strongest objects seems to have been to secure freedom 
 of indulgence for his vicious passions; and whilst he was 
 sporting with one or other of his mistresses, or simulating 
 l)elief in the religion of his people, his Ministers were 
 building upon his very follies and crimes a system by 
 which honest men were able to make their country 
 respected. 
 
 The foreign policy which liad its origin in the reign 
 of Charles was a policy founded upon French alliance. 
 To the king this alliance commended itself on various 
 grounds — first because in his exile he had received 
 hospitality and encouragement from Louis ; secondly 
 because the Grand Monarque found it answer his 
 purpose to continue his pecuniary aids to his English 
 cousin as long as the latter sued for them ; thirdly 
 because Charles and his brother were plotting against 
 the liberties of the people, and relied upon French help 
 in this treacherous enterprise ; fourthly because they 
 were both Romanists at heart even before they had 
 formally done obeisance to the Pope ; and for other 
 reasons in addition. Of the king's Ministers, some were 
 already inclined to a closer union with France ; others 
 were drawn in the same direction by royal favour and 
 insistance : whilst others were unalterably averse in mind 
 to the policy which Charles desired to establish. The 
 opinion of the country, so far as it could be known, was 
 reflected by this last section — by Ashley, by the Presby- 
 terians and the Country Party. The king soon dis- 
 covered tliat England would not endure a return to 
 Catholicism, that it had no sympathy with the designs 
 of France, that it was as much disposed as it had been 
 
THE BASES OF POLICY. 15 
 
 for a hundred years past to exclude French influence 
 from Flanders, and that it preferred the friendship of 
 Holland, and even of Spain, to any temptation which 
 Louis the Fourteenth could hold out. 
 
 The intrigues of Charles the Second and his subservient 
 Ministers cover them with deserved contempt. It is 
 scarcely accurate to say of them that they had any 
 distinct foreign policy, beyond that of making England 
 dependent upon France, and selling the support of this 
 country to the champion of despotic power and Roman 
 religion. Even this policy could not be consistently 
 maintained in face of the popular tendencies which set 
 in the very opposite direction. Arlington was secretly 
 a Catholic like the king, and he was responsible for the 
 shameful Treaty of Dover, whereby Louis was to give 
 Charles a pension of a million pounds a year, and 
 Charles was to proclaim his religion and to declare war on 
 Holland. But yet it was the same Arlington who, less 
 than two years before, had formed the Triple Alliance with 
 Holland and Sweden, for the express purpose of curbing 
 France. Danby again, selected by Charles as his go- 
 between and tool, did much dirty work for his royal 
 master, to the length of oflering in Charles's name to 
 betray the allies of England ; and yet we find Danby 
 himself forced by English public feeling to declare war 
 against France. 
 
 It is difficult to imagine that by any possibility what- 
 ever a tradition founded in so much baseness and turpi- 
 tude could be continued and developed into a serviceable 
 and even honourable policy. It is only in a limited 
 sense that the continuity of the tradition can be main- 
 tained ; but the Tories of the eighteenth centmy could 
 not divest themselves of the inheritance which descended 
 to tliem from the second Charles and the second James. 
 
16 THE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 Another tradition of English statesmanship took root^ 
 in the reign of Charles ; and this also, like the first, was 
 generated in corruption. It is a melancholy fact that 
 the high moral purport of Ashley Lord Shaftesbury 
 should have been marred and tainted by crimes whicli 
 forbid us to regard him with genuine admiration. Ash- 
 ley hated and opposed the intrigues of the degraded 
 monarch. He was the champion of English liberties, 
 the defender of Protestantism ; he vindicated Parlia- 
 mentary rule and upheld the constitution. But the 
 means whicli he adopted in his heroic struggle with the 
 king and the court were often morally indefensible, and 
 the natural consequence of their immorality was their 
 eventual want of success. The religious intolerance of 
 his Petitioners, with the crimes committed by him and 
 them in the name of religion, produced a reaction 
 directly favourable to Charles. His encouragement of 
 Monmouth as a pretender was so ill-advised that the 
 Abhorrers gained the sympathies of the people, and the 
 succession of the Duke of York was assured by the very 
 acts intended to exclude him from the throne. 
 
 Ashley overreached himself in subtlety ; and yet it is 
 not altogether to his discredit that he should have pre- 
 ferred even the king's bastard as a candidate for the 
 crown to the Prince of Orange, from whose countrymen 
 England had suffered much humiliation. In a rei^fn 
 
 o o 
 
 crowded with paradoxes there is no paradox more 
 strange than that Charles and Danby, who sold their 
 country for French gold, should have contrived the 
 marriage of William with Mary of York, whilst Ashley, 
 the progenitor of the Whig party, set up the puppet 
 Monmouth. 
 
 From the defeat and flight of Ashley to the flight 
 and deposition of James the Second — a period of seven 
 
THE BASES OF POLICY. 17 
 
 years — the Stuarts were again practically despots in 
 England, and thus the attitude of the two political 
 parties was emphasized before the inauguration of the 
 struggle which awaited them in William's reign. The 
 Abhorrers of the past, the Tories of the future, were 
 marked out as men who could endure a Charles and 
 flatter a James. Their opponents were the men who 
 could tolerate neither of these tyrants — who sympathized 
 with Argyle and Monmouth, who abominated the trucu- 
 lent despotism of James the Papist, and learned to pray for 
 the advent of William. It was inevitable that in such 
 circumstances the principles of the early Whigs should 
 have been displayed rather in their treatment of the 
 foreign relations of the country than in domestic afiairs. 
 The task of securing civil and religious freedom at home 
 was inseparably connected with the task of promoting 
 the same cause on the Continent. At any rate, so far 
 as the Prince of Orange was able to assist the plans of 
 the friends of liberty in England, he did it for a price, 
 as his part of the contract struck between himself and 
 his English sponsors. These in their turn had engage- 
 ments to fulfil towards William ; and so far as they 
 accepted the views and aided the designs of the Dutch 
 Prince they committed themselves to a definite policy in 
 Europe . . . and to a great deal more. 
 
 Here, it may be said, was the origin of the Whig tradi- 
 tion in foreign afiairs. Of course the Whigs were lineally 
 descended from men of a similar cast in former reigns — 
 earlier than the Petitioners, and it may be earlier than 
 the Protestant statesmen of the reign of Elizabeth. But 
 their tradition as it existed and was developed in the 
 eighteenth century may be accurately dated from the 
 contract entered into between the Prince of Orange and 
 the English Parliament in 1688-9. 
 
18 THE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 By this contract England gained much ; but the price 
 which it had to pay for its acquisitions was extravagant, 
 exorbitant, and (as the result has shown) almost in- 
 tolerably burdensome. From the accession of William to 
 the throne war on the Continent, and particularly with 
 France, was chronic. The people of this country were 
 perpetually drawn into complications which they need 
 never have touched — many of which would never have 
 arisen but for the initiation assumed by the English 
 Government. The expenditure on these wars and ma- 
 chinations of William and his successors was enormous, 
 and rose at last to a monstrous and scandalous pile of 
 debt which neither we nor our children's children can 
 hope to be rid of. And the responsibility for war and 
 debt alike rests not with the nation as a whole, but with 
 the monarchs, the lords, the Commons representing so 
 small a fraction of the people of Great Britain. 
 
 If the contract with William had been the only means 
 by which Parliamentary government could be secured, 
 and if there had been no other conceivable mode of 
 acquiring civil and religious freedom, the price would 
 have been worth paying. But it was not so. England 
 would have broken her chains without William of 
 Orange. Before he landed, before he was invited to 
 land by Whigs and Tories, Nonconformists and High 
 Churchmen, the masses of the people were seething witJi 
 rage at the tyrannies of James. A little more and they 
 would have rebelled again, as they had rebelled half a 
 century back ; the Bloody Assize would have been for- 
 gotten — or remembered only as a spur to stern determina- 
 tion. The cheers of the soldiers at Hounslow for the 
 acquittal of the bishops — at the moment when the un- 
 popular king was riding through the camp — showed 
 how high the tide had risen, and how fast it was flowing 
 
THE BASES OF POLICY. 19 
 
 towards its mark. A little more and all England Avould 
 have been a camp, and a new Cromwell might have been 
 found to establish a new and a more stable Common- 
 wealth. How much we might have gained, how much 
 more rapidly and surely we might have advanced to 
 the goal of popular freedom if there had been greater 
 courage and enterprise amongst the peers who brought 
 William over ! Or even if William were a necessity — 
 if it be urged that his marriage with Princess Mary had 
 made him a natural and legitimate candidate for the 
 crown — how incalculably would all generations of Eng- 
 lishmen have been profited by a larger measure of politi- 
 cal foresight amongst the Whigs, by greater shrewdness 
 and resolution during the first few years of his reign ! 
 
 It is diflScult to say what William would have done if 
 the peers and Parliament had set their faces against his 
 designs, and begun by refusing to declare war on Louis 
 for his recognition of James as still king of England. He 
 might have returned to the Hague, and left the country 
 to its own devices. And then there might have been 
 disorder, bloodshed, civil war. But at any rate we 
 should have escaped the vast evils which flowed from 
 the grafting of the Dutch foreign policy upon the old 
 stock of English statecraft. 
 
 It is a suggestive fact that the two foreign policies 
 which were traditional in England during the eighteenth 
 century, and which alternated with the change of parties 
 to the no small confusion of our relations towards other 
 States, were both conferred upon us by France. In plain 
 terms and rough outline it may be said that the attitude 
 of this country before the nations of the world was 
 decided by its sentiments for the time being in regard to 
 
20 THE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 its neighbour on the Continent. One man, Louis the 
 Fourteenth, had more to do with the shaping of our 
 policy for something like a century and a half than any 
 individual English statesman, or than any current of 
 genuine English feeling in the epoch when the afore- 
 said traditions were created. 
 
 In view of the unquestionable existence, more or 
 less occult, of a national or popular tradition, side by 
 side with the philogallic and antigallic theories, it is 
 well to mark that these two theories which led England 
 into ruinous wars, and all but destroyed her with a 
 gigantic debt, were not in reality the offspring of English 
 national sentiment, but rather of royal emergencies and 
 aristocratic intrigues. It is true that the people like 
 their rulers were swept along by gusts of passion favour- 
 able and unfavourable to France. It is true, and yet 
 more significant, that religious feeling, common to noble 
 and peasant, to Parliament and mob alike, had vast 
 influence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
 upon our relations with the Continent. It is true that 
 French wars were sometimes popular in England, so far 
 as one might judge the mood of the unrepresented and 
 half-articulate classes. But there are few of these con- 
 flicts which we should be justified in describing as 
 people's wars ; and certainly not one from the Eestora- 
 tion downwards was a war of the people in the same 
 sense that all were wars of monarchs and unrepresenta- 
 tive Parliaments. 
 
 Perhaps the nearest approach to a people's war with 
 France after the Eestoration was in 1678, when the 
 armies of Louis had overrun Flanders, defeated the 
 Prince of Orange at Cassel, and menaced the Protestants 
 of Europe with final ruiii. Then there was unmistakably 
 a popular cry for war ; and this time it was the king 
 
THE BASES OF POLICY. 21 
 
 who put his veto on the warlike design of the people. 
 A strange phenomenon : explained, however, by the fact 
 that his impecunious Majesty had coolly sold both allies 
 and subjects to the French. 
 
 There is no more critical epoch in the history of 
 English policy than the year just mentioned, when the 
 three traditions met and conflicted together, and when 
 one at least of them entered upon its most active and 
 effective stage. It was an antigallic if not a purely 
 national policy to keep the French out of Flanders. It 
 had been a Protestant and therefore perhaps a national 
 policy from the days of Elizabeth. The desire of the 
 English people to fight for the independence of the 
 Flemish seaboard marks the vitality of the tradition. 
 The scandalous conduct of Charles and the exultation 
 of the English Catholics over the Treaty of Nimeguen 
 and the triumph of Louis bear witness to the simultane- 
 ous vigour of the despotic and papal policy, which 
 always counted on the French alliance. And the basis 
 of the Whig tradition was completed and consolidated 
 by the amazing act of Charles and Danby (of all men) in 
 selecting William of Orange as a husband for Mary of 
 York. 
 
 The national tradition, in spite of fitful revivals of this 
 kind, was obscured by the Eestoration, and overwhelmed 
 by the antigallic policy erected into a system by William 
 the Third. And the chief reason why, being national, it 
 could not assert itself in after years above the alternating 
 Whig and Tory traditions was because the Parliament 
 which should have proclaimed and enforced it was not 
 truly representative of the feeling of the country. It 
 had been so, in great measure, from its institution to 
 the time of the Barons' Wars. Its authority was usurped 
 by the Tudors ; but at the same time the Tudor 
 
'22 THE BASES OF POLICY. 
 
 monarchs were often in harmony with the masses of 
 their subjects, thanks to the conciliatory effects of the 
 Reformation. But when the aristocracy had fought and 
 won their l^attles with the Crown, and when an oligarchy 
 had secured the supreme power of State by limitation of 
 the royal prerogative, Parliament itself grew feeble w^ith 
 the increasing feebleness of the king. The House of 
 Commons was for war or peace, for spending or saving 
 money, as the case might be, but it did not express the 
 wishes of the people at large. Its majority did not even 
 express the wishes of the great towns, of the cultivators 
 of land, of tradesmen, professional men and private 
 gentlemen, except in so far as these might concur in 
 opinion with the few aristocratic families and wealthy 
 individuals who swayed the pocket and rotten boroughs. 
 The nation might or might not think with the pro- 
 prietary Houses. If not, so much the worse for the 
 nation. 
 
 At any rate the national view of foreign policy, when 
 it differed from the Whig and Tory traditions, was for 
 a long time overborne by the fact — entirely subversive 
 of the plan of our constitution — that the Lords, being 
 in themselves an Estate of the realm, had by money 
 and influence also made themselves spokesmen of the 
 Estate of the Commons. 
 
II. 
 
 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 The death of Mazarin, in March 1661, threw the Grand 
 Monarque on his own resources. Richelieu and the late 
 Cardinal had served France well : the one had humbled 
 Spain in the field, the other had given his sovereign the 
 Spanish Infanta for a wife, and with her a dowry includ- 
 ing certain coveted districts of Flanders and Luxembourg. 
 Now Louis determined to rule in his own name, and 
 both his people and the governments of Europe soon 
 learned that he was equal to the task. It was he who 
 was to sway the destinies of France and to disturb the 
 councils of her neighbours for more than half a century 
 to come. It was by him that a new direction was to be 
 given to tlie foreign policy of England, whereby the 
 whole after history of this country has been coloured 
 and distorted. 
 
 The Spanish marriage gave Louis something more 
 than the stipulated dowry, or if it did not give him he 
 assumed a claim on his wife's behalf to the Catholic 
 provinces of Spain in the Low Countries. He grasped in 
 1665 the pretext of the war between England and 
 Holland, and at the invitation of the latter country he 
 took the field, and seized Charleroi, Douai, and other 
 places from their Spanish garrisons. With varying 
 fortunes through successive years, holding cheap the 
 contemptible alternations of English policy, the French 
 monarch pursued his designs. When he could not out- 
 
24 WHIG TRADITIONS, 
 
 wit our diplomatists lie bribed our king ; and in spite of 
 the Triple Alliance, in spite of Prince William's marriage 
 with Mary of York, in spite of the anxiety of the English 
 people to curb his ambitions, he humbled Spain and 
 Austria, and carried off many valuable prizes of war. 
 England also was humbled, by French gold if not by 
 French arms. Holland alone maintained her honour 
 and her territory. At the conclusion of the Peace of 
 Nimeguen Holland alone had nothing to renounce ; and 
 William of Orange, the recognised head of the Coalition, 
 could personally treat with the king of France as an 
 equal. 
 
 It was clear that the Prince of Orange looked on the 
 Treaty of Nimeguen as a simple truce, and a truce full 
 of danger for himself and his allies. During the eleven 
 years which passed before he ascended the English 
 throne he laboured to prepare the ground for a renewal of 
 the struggle. Louis vastly aided his foes by the revocation 
 of the Edict of Nantes, which drove many thousands of 
 Frenchmen out of their native country, and stimulated 
 the Protestants throughout Europe to an ardent desire 
 for vengeance. The Coalition henceforth became more 
 than ever a religious league. Sweden, Savoy, the Ger- 
 man States made common cause with Holland. Spain 
 was glad to have a chance of recovering her lost pro- 
 vinces. Even the Pope was enlisted against Louis, 
 whose head had been turned by his military triumphs 
 until he assumed the airs of a king of kings. William, 
 patiently awaiting the development of English politics 
 under the infatuated misrule of James the Second, held 
 the Coalition in readiness to spring. 
 
 The English Eevolution of 1688 was doubtless in 
 some measure determined by the persecution of the Pro- 
 testants in France — neither the first nor the last instance 
 
JFHIG TliADITIONS. 25 
 
 of reaction between the public opinions of the two 
 countries. At the end of 1688 James took refuge at 
 the court of Louis, who received him with open arms, 
 and promised him both an asykim and a vindication 
 against his subjects. In January 1689 the king of 
 France, with the energetic rapidity which his enemies 
 knew so well, struck the first blow by declaring war 
 against Holland. Immediately afterwards WiUiam re- 
 sponded from his new vantage ground with a declaration 
 of war on the part of England, which could not tolerate 
 — as the king and his council maintained — the recogni- 
 tion by Louis of the royal authority of his guest. 
 
 From this moment we behold England fully committed 
 to the struggle against France ; so fully committed that 
 the inherited quarrel endured long after the reign of 
 William, and the traditional enmity outlived the reigns 
 of his four successors. 
 
 Could this committal have been avoided — could the 
 Whig tradition of foreign policy have been nipped in the 
 bud if William had never come to England, or if his 
 English councils and parliaments had steadily refused to 
 take active part in the Coalition ? Was there ample 
 ground for the English declaration of war in the hospitality 
 of Louis to James (of course before armies and fleets had 
 been placed at James's disposal) 1 And — a question 
 perhaps not much considered at the time — was there 
 sufficient justification in the known sentiments of the 
 English people for the wars of England against France ? 
 
 In the first place the participation of England in the 
 European Coalition was assured from the day when 
 Danby, Shrewsbury, Devonshire, and Bishop Compton 
 wrote to invite the Prince of Orange to accept the crown. 
 No one would imagine that the Prince could withdraw 
 from the leadership of this Coalition, and they who were 
 
26 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 his sponsors with the English people must have been 
 prepared to weight the scales with the sword of England. 
 William would not have mounted the throne on any 
 other understanding ; and in fact he firmly refused the 
 crown until the reality of the royal prerogative was 
 guaranteed to him. Once arrived at this point, the 
 champion of Europe could not have been expected to 
 hesitate. At first abetted in his plans by the peers of 
 both parties, and soon afterwards menaced by their 
 dallying with James, he persevered steadily in either 
 case with his obstinate antagonism to the French king. 
 The Commons he found hard to manage, and, as he 
 thought, niggardly in their allowances for the war ; but 
 on the whole he succeeded in bringing the power of 
 England to bear upon his enemy. As for the common 
 people who were not the Commons, and who had no 
 voice to declare their mind, the king might be excused 
 for thinking (if he thought of it at all) that a Protestant 
 nation, with their hereditary jealousy of France, and 
 inflamed by a recent cause of exasperation, were more 
 heartily with him than the aristocracy and the Commcms. 
 There was so much truth in this supposition that the 
 majority of English Whigs and Protestants were mani- 
 festly pleased by the war against the French tyrant and 
 the protector of the exiled James. There were of course 
 many on the opposite side. The Jacobites were already 
 strong, and whenever William's fortunes were or seemed 
 to be at the ebb they grew stronger and more aggressive. 
 The treasons of men like Admiral Herbert, threatening 
 as they did his throne, his life-long hopes, and the honour 
 and safety of England, must have been especially galling 
 to the king. The loss of the naval battle at Beachy 
 Head threw his plans into confusion ; another defeat at 
 La Hogue would have been followed by an insurrection 
 
WHIG TRADITIONS. 27 
 
 of the friends of James and tlie discouragement of the 
 Grand Alliance. In England and Ireland alike William 
 must have seen that his subjects were by no means 
 unanimous in their liking for the war ; but he had on 
 the other hand a staunch support from the Whig party 
 as a whole. 
 
 The Grand Alliance virtually succeeded in checking 
 the aggressions of the French, and to William the Third 
 is due the credit of the achievement. Judo:in2: from liis 
 point of view, and from the point of view of the leaders 
 of the Eevolution, the work was worth doing. From our 
 own point of ^dew the wisdom of our ancestors is ques- 
 tionable. A war to prevent the restoration of James was 
 doubtless a sacred necessity ; but a war of such magni- 
 tude, and an expenditure so unlimited, for the sake of 
 Dutch independence or the European balance of power, 
 or even the assertion of Protestant liberties on the 
 Continent, was less necessary and sacred. The con- 
 tinuation of the war after France had come to the end of 
 her aggressive energy was decidedly impolitic for the 
 English nation. Now at all events if not before the 
 foisting of the Dutch policy upon England was con- 
 summated ; and it was consummated by the Whigs. 
 
 From the year 1694 the Whig and Tory traditions of 
 foreign policy may be clearly distinguished, and the 
 responsibilities are more and more plainly marked. Up 
 to that year William had done his best to govern with 
 Ministers of the united parties ; and his difficulties had 
 been so great that he lent a willing ear to the scheme of 
 the Earl of Sunderland when that supple politician 
 advised him to choose his Chancellors and Secretaries of 
 State exclusively from the party which had a majority 
 
28 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 in the Commons. He did so with greater readiness 
 because though in 1694 the Tories predominated he had 
 reason to believe that an appeal to the country would 
 furnish a majority of Whigs, and the Whigs had shown 
 themselves most amenable to his guidance. These pre- 
 visions were put to the test in the following year, and 
 were justified by the result. A general election in 1695 
 placed the Whigs in power ; William composed his 
 Ministry of Eussell, Wharton, Somers, Montague, and 
 Shrewsbury ; and for the first time in English history 
 the House of Commons was under the control of a 
 responsible party Cabinet. 
 
 The intrigues of 1694-5 are worthy of particular 
 attention for the purposes of our present inquiry. The 
 Tories were and were not the heirs of the shameful 
 Stuart traditions. Some of them, by no means all, 
 desired the return of James, and subsequently favoured 
 the Old and Young Pretenders. Some of them, perhaps 
 very few, had built the edifice of their political faith on 
 he sorry foundation laid by Danby and King Charles. 
 One wing of the party would undoubtedly have sworn 
 by the Treaty of Dover, which aimed at restoring the 
 Catholic religion in England and making the English 
 king a French pensioner, though hardly one of them in 
 William's reign Avould have accepted a moral responsi- 
 bility for the acts of Charles and James. But nearly all 
 were opposed to the continuance of the war with France ; 
 and even such of them as loyally paid allegiance to 
 William protested against further hostilities. They had 
 never been enthusiastic in favour of the Grand Alliance, 
 and they now began very seriously to count its cost. 
 They pointed to the sacrifices of the country, to the 
 desperate condition of English commerce, to the mon- 
 strous and ever increasing burden of debt. The drain 
 
JVHIG TRADITIONS. 29 
 
 of our resources during the past six years had indeed 
 been outrageous, and no prudent man (so they contended) 
 could look upon it without alarm.. When the king 
 ascended the throne he found a " King's Debt" of less 
 than seven hundred thousand pounds ; now it was 
 reckoned by millions, and the interest had to be provided 
 for by novel and enormous taxation. They refused to 
 value the achievements of the war at such a price, and 
 urged the king to conclude an honourable peace. 
 
 But King William chafed under this reasoning. To 
 checkmate and humiliate Louis was the grand idea, 
 almost the one idea in, his mind ; and he set himself to 
 find counsellors who would advise him in the way that 
 he wished to go. Now it must be admitted that the 
 policy of the Tories at this juncture was a natural and a 
 creditable one. Whatever unpatriotic elements there 
 may have been in the party, it was not lack of patriotism 
 which accounted for the peace policy of the majority. 
 As it turned out, the advocates of peace could not com- 
 mand the suffrages of the constituencies, and it may be 
 argued from this that the war was still popular with the 
 country — that the war policy was still a national rather 
 than a Whig policy in 1695. It does not necessarily 
 follow, for the simple reason that vast numbers of the 
 taxpayers had no votes. Their opinion was never asked, 
 and there was no way open to them under the constitu- 
 tion of bringing their grievances effectively before the 
 Legislature. They may or may not have been in favour 
 of the war. The probability is that having so long borne 
 and being still called upon to bear an oppressive taxation 
 for small or inappreciable results they were heartily 
 opposed to it. This would not imply that the non- voters 
 thought differently in the matter from the voters im- 
 mediately above them in the social scale — a thing which 
 
30 WHIG TRADITIONS, 
 
 rarely though occasionally haj)pens. The voters them- 
 selves may have had no voice in the decision. The 
 electoral system had not reached the pitch of corruption 
 which it was to attain in the course of the following 
 century ; but it was already possible for a minority of 
 votes, of intelligence, of responsible worth, to overwhelm 
 the majority. On the whole it would hardly be unfair 
 to say that there is no sufficient evidence of popularity 
 to justify any one in believing that the policy of William 
 in his struggle against France had been adopted as a 
 national policy in England, or that it was ever more 
 than part of the general compact between the Prince 
 of Orange and the Whigs. 
 
 In any case the conduct of the Whig leaders in 1694 
 committed them more absolutely than ever to the Dutch 
 foreign policy. When the king was in the midst of his 
 difficulties with the Tory Ministers, and the necessary 
 votes were hard to obtain, the Junto who at that time 
 led the Opposition gave him to understand that such 
 difficulties as these need not obstruct his path if he would 
 put the administration of aifairs entirely in their hands. 
 Tliey bid for power by virtually offering to carry on the 
 war with vigour ; and William would have been some- 
 thing more than impartial and magnanimous if he had 
 refused to listen to a temptation of this kind, dangled 
 before him by a group of capable statesmen, with the 
 victor of La Hogue at their head. Not that Admiral 
 Eussell and his colleagues stooped to hypocrisy or a 
 surrender of conscience for the mere possession of office. 
 They doubtless believed in the necessity and ultimate 
 profit of the war — as most of our statesmen in every 
 age, and of each party, have believed in these things, 
 whatever disastrous game of war they may have been 
 playing. The fact remains that the Whigs undertook to 
 
WHIG TRADITIONS. 31 
 
 carry on the struggle with France after it was clear that 
 Louis had been checked, and that the Grand Alliance 
 had made Europe safe, in spite of the growing distress of 
 their countrymen, and in face of the peaceful inclinations 
 of the Tory Ministers. 
 
 The tradition had been finally and deliberately 
 adopted. It was no longer a question of contracting for 
 a constitutional king, for they had already secured one. 
 It was not a question of defending the country against 
 the machinations of James. Eussell and Shrewsbiu^y had 
 themselves intrigued with the late king, whilst it was 
 perfectly well known that many of the Tory leaders had 
 washed their hands of the Stuarts, and would never con- 
 sent to their return. It was not even a personal ques- 
 tion of forcing from Louis a recognition of William s 
 title to the throne. That would have come as a matter 
 of course with the arrangement of a f)eace, and every one 
 knew that Louis was ready for peace in 1694, if not 
 earlier. It was part of William's policy that peace could 
 be made with the French king only by wresting it from 
 him by a victory in the field ; and it was by accepting 
 this policy that the Whigs committed themselves to a 
 course of Dutch pertinacity and obstinacy, when they 
 might have gained a notable victory for the cause of 
 peace and retrenchment. 
 
 After all it was not by military prowess that peace 
 was made with France, and the Stuarts were thrown 
 over by Louis the Fourteenth. The Treaty of Ryswick 
 was concluded in 1697, after a secret correspondence 
 between William and Louis, in which the English king 
 made terms with his inveterate enemy for the express 
 purpose of defeating Austria's pretensions to the crown 
 of Spain. This also was Dutch policy, and the unfortu- 
 nate Whigs who still composed William's Ministry found 
 
32 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 themselves on the point of being committed to another 
 perilous intrigue, whereby England was once more to 
 step in as the special providence of the Continent. 
 
 It was natural enough that William, with his remark- 
 able zeal for maintaining the balance of power in Europe, 
 should see a vast danger in the rivalry of the French 
 and Austrian monarchs for the Spanish throne. The 
 addition to either Austria or France of the vast posses- 
 sions of Charles the Second — including Spain itself, the 
 Netherlands, the north Italian provinces, and the Indies 
 — could not seem a matter of indifference to ordinary 
 Englishmen, trained as they had been even from the 
 time of Elizabeth to think themselves the natural pro- 
 tectors of the Protestant countries. There has been 
 no time in our history when we could have contem- 
 plated without anxiety the existence of so great an 
 empire on the Continent. If, however, Louis had been 
 allowed to accept for his grandson the legacy conferred 
 on him by the doting Spanish king, it did not by any 
 means follow that Spain and France would ever be 
 united. Men of sense (without the strong preconceptions 
 of William the Third) did not fear this issue at the time, 
 and the English nation took a more sober view of the 
 Spanish question than the king. He, for his part, would 
 have put his veto on the will, and he did his best to pre- 
 vent Louis and his grandson from profiting by it. But 
 Englishmen had had an impressive lesson. The people 
 were resolutely bent on peace. The general election of 
 1701 returned a Tory majority, and Godolphin, rightly 
 interpreting the popular will, refused to see cause of war 
 in the Duke of Anjou's entry into Madrid, or even in the 
 seizure of the Netherlands by Louis. The Tory policy 
 might have prevailed on this occasion if it had not been 
 for an extraordinary act of infatuation on the part of 
 
IVHIG TRADITIONS. 33 
 
 the French king, who, in distinct violation of the treaty 
 signed by him four years previously, acknowledged the 
 son of James as king of England. 
 
 A complete change came over the nation and Parha- 
 ment when they heard of this calculated insult and 
 defiance. It was clearly a cause of war, according to all 
 the rules of international law, and it would have argued 
 greater moral courage than that generation was capable of 
 exercising if the gauntlet of Louis had not been instantly 
 picked up. In these days we might afford, in similar 
 circumstances, to laugh at the refusal of a foreign 
 sanction for a dynastic change, and we might possibly 
 preserve our calmness in face of the aggression of one of 
 the Great Powers on the opposite coast of the channel ; 
 but in 1701 this self-command was not possible. The 
 traditions were merged in an outbreak of passion, and a 
 Tory Ministry proposed a vote for 40,000 men. 
 
 The death of William, in 1702, had a curious effect on 
 English parties, and on their dispositions in regard to 
 foreign affaii's. The Whigs were not slow in recovering 
 their lost vantage ground, but for the moment they were 
 "dished" by the irony of events — long before their 
 political opponents had reduced that operation to a fine 
 art. Marlborough was a Tory ; the Lord Treasurer 
 Godolphin was a Tory ; and yet it was the old Whig 
 policy wliich they both so eagerly pursued. Queen Anne 
 formally declared (for the satisfaction of the reconstituted 
 Grand Alliance) her intention to continue the policy of 
 King William ; and thus the new European war was 
 opened on the same lines as the war of 1689-97, the 
 cliief difference being that the Earl of Marlborough had 
 taken the place of his royal predecessor. It was still a 
 personal influence which swayed the Coalition, and played 
 England as a pawn on the chessboard of Europe. The 
 
 G 
 
34 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 transfer of authority from king to subject and from 
 Whig to Tory brought no improvement in the system 
 under which this count ly had been made to play its 
 new role, and no alleviation of the popular distress. 
 Eather the contrary. Marlborough and his friends 
 proved themselves to be adepts at the game which their 
 rivals had taught them. William had raised the National 
 Debt from little more than half a million to twelve 
 milhons and a half. Under Anne, in a period shorter 
 by two years, it was increased to thirty-six millions 
 sterling. 
 
 But it is not to be supposed that the Whigs allowed 
 themselves to be definitely excluded from office whilst n 
 Whig war and a Whig policy were being successfully 
 carried on. Some of the best of the Tories, as we shall 
 see, were faithful to their tradition, and Marlborough, 
 who had battles to fight at home as well as abroad, was 
 compelled to supply several nota.ble defections by draw- 
 ing on the ranks of the Opposition. The elections of 
 1705 returned a majority favourable to the continuance 
 of the struggle, but the most ardent and influential of 
 the war party were Whigs. The Ministry was now 
 formed by a coalition from men of both parties ; and a year 
 or two later the members of the Junto had ousted the 
 remaining Tories from the Government. Sunderland, 
 Wharton, Somers, Co\\q3er, recovered place and power, 
 but only to find that the fruit of their victory was an 
 apple of Sodom. 
 
 The disgrace of Marlborough, his condemnation by a 
 Tory majority for dishonesty, and his virtual exile from 
 England, do not destroy the significant parallel between 
 him and King William. Both led Coalitions of Europe 
 against France, first with the sanction and then against 
 the wishes of the English people. Both clung to war 
 
WHIG TRADITIONS. 35 
 
 after its necessity or excuse was gone, and both threw 
 themselves into the arms of the Whigs in order to gain 
 an extension of support from the House of Commons. 
 In the case of both the staff on which they leaned was 
 broken under their hands. Both practically secured the 
 objects of the war and checked the ambition of Louis 
 the Fourteenth ; both outgrew the favour of theii* own 
 country and had to submit to peace against their will. 
 
 So long as there were in France pretenders to the 
 English crown whom the kings of France more or less 
 directly favoured, it was inevitable and just that the 
 Whigs should be constantly on their guard against 
 intrigues from St Germains and Versailles. Their 
 incentive to a watchful if not an active policy was 
 infinitely more creditable after the Treaty of Utrecht 
 than when it had sprung mainly from a compact with 
 the Prince of Orange and a determination to cling to 
 oflice. When the death of Anne was seen to be approach- 
 ing, and the Jacobites were menacing civil war, their 
 attitude was firm and intelligible. They came forward 
 as representatives and champions of the Revolution of 
 1688, as defenders of the Protestant succession, as the 
 friends of liberty and peace. There was no longer any 
 need for a Dutch policy, though its traditions were 
 ineradicable. War was not in their programme, and 
 indeed they had more than enough to do in foiling the 
 plots of traitors at home. The course pursued by the 
 j)arty for the next half century is altogether more satis- 
 factory (at any rate from the point of view of our present 
 subject) than it had been during the past five and twenty 
 years. As for domestic policy, Walpole and Pitt were 
 pledged to the strengthening of the constitution, to the 
 encouragement of English industries, to financial measures, 
 and peaceful national development. 
 
36 JFIIIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 One must not press too closely a comparison between 
 the conduct of the two political parties in regard to the 
 Stuart pretenders. There were Tories who displayed 
 unshaken fidelity towards the new dynasty, as there 
 were Whigs who corresponded with St Germains. Tlie 
 House of Hanover was not calculated to inspire English- 
 men with enthusiastic loyalty, and a Tory, especially if 
 lie happened to be a Catholic, had some excuse for look- 
 ing wistfully across the water, and privately drinking 
 the health of James or Charles the Third. The Whigs, 
 on the other hand, had no temptation to be disloyal. 
 Their principles were established as the principles of the 
 monarchy and the government; they had all the power of 
 the State at their r-ommand, and all the sources of patron- 
 age under their control. The first two Georges were 
 little better than nonentities, and gave the least possible 
 trouble to their advisers. Seldom has an English 
 Minister been more fortunate than Walpole or the elder 
 Pitt in the circumstances of his Administration ; and 
 never has a party with equal claim to respect been so 
 happy in the convergence of favourable events. Every- 
 thing contriljuted to strengthen the Whigs in their 
 supremacy. The defeat of the Jacobites in 1715, the 
 disgrace of Oxford, the flight of Bolingbroke and Ormond, 
 the implication of so many Tory leaders in an unsuccess- 
 iul revolt, knit the country more closely than ever to the 
 party of the Revolution, and left their opponents for 
 many years under the stigma of disloyalty and treason. 
 
 The death of Louis the Fourteenth, A\^hich happened 
 almost simultaneously with the fiasco of the Old Pre- 
 tender, relieved England of what had so long been a 
 nightmare to her. France was no longer held by 
 
WHIG TRADITIONS. 37 
 
 statesmen or private citizens as a hot-bed of intrigue from 
 which it behoved them to expect every kind of evil 
 growth; and indeed the change from the Grand 
 Monarque to his successor was decidedly advantageous 
 for Europe. Louis the Fifteenth, even when he grew to 
 man's estate, was not an arch-plotter like his great- 
 grandfather, whose spirit had descended in greater 
 vigour upon his gTandson Philip of Anjou, now Philip 
 the Fifth of Spain. The PiCgent Orleans courted the 
 alliance of England as a set-off ao^ainst the aj^ffressive 
 designs of Philip, who, ably served by Alberoni, was 
 striving to undo the Treaty of Utrecht, and was even 
 prepared to violate his renunciation of the French 
 succession. The English Ministry entered warily into 
 the French alliance. They secured a confirmation of 
 the Treaty — including the clause which barred the 
 Stuarts from residing in France — and shared the 
 responsibility of the engagement with Austria and 
 Holland ; but they took care not to be drawn into new 
 campaigns on the Continent. 
 
 One great mistake was committed by Stanhope 
 (during the absence of Walpole from the Ministry be- 
 tween 1716 and 1721), which, but for the accident of 
 a storm in the Bay of Biscay, might have led to a pro- 
 longed war with Spain. An English fleet was sent in 
 quest of the Spanish ships which had reduced Sardinia 
 and were attempting to reduce Sicily, and, finding them 
 in the Straits of Messina, sunk, captured, or dispersed 
 them. The fleet with which the Spaniards hoped to 
 take vengeance for this attack met the fate of another 
 Spanish Armada bound on a like mission ; but fortune 
 might have dealt differently with the antagonists, and it 
 was not Stanhope's msdom which prevented a long war 
 and a vast expenditure. It would have been little to 
 
38 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 his credit if he had involved the country in a conflict 
 with Spain, having France for his ally, half a dozen 
 years after the conclusion of a peace with France, when 
 our ally was Spain. The Whig tradition would scarcely 
 have been improved by such a development at such a 
 moment ; and perhaps it was well for England that the 
 ambitions of Philip were curbed in time, and that 
 Stanhope himself presently ceased to preside over her 
 destinies. The Quadruple Alliance of 1718 may have 
 been a wise act. Doubtless it seemed a necessary one 
 at the crisis. But from our later point of view it appears 
 probable that the attempt of Philip to disturb the settle- 
 ment of 1713 might have been guarded against so far as 
 English interests were concerned without any act of 
 war. 
 
 For more than two decades Walpole was First Lord 
 of the Treasury. The epoch was not one of unbroken 
 peace for England. We fought with Austria and Spain 
 in a cause which cannot be said to have imperatively 
 demanded our interference ; but on the whole the time 
 of Walpole's second Administration was a time of settled 
 and deliberate peace. '' He was," as Mr Green justly 
 writes, '' the first and greatest of our Peace Ministers. 
 ' The most pernicious circumstances,' he said, ' in which 
 this country can be are those of war, as we must be 
 losers while it lasts and cannot be great gainers when it 
 ends.' In spite of the complications of foreign afiairs, 
 and the pressure from the Court and Opposition, he 
 resolutely kept England at peace. It was not that the 
 honour or influence of England suffered in Walpole's 
 hands, for he won victories by the firmness of his policy 
 and the skill of his negotiations as eff'ectual as those 
 which are won by arms." 
 
 There are, in fact, two tests of ability which may be 
 
WHIG TRADITIONS. 39 
 
 applied to any statesmac charged with the foreign affairs 
 of a commercial and peace-loving country. His talent 
 AviU be shown especially in two directions, and we may 
 ask of him first, whether he has really been tried and 
 tempted by the existence of grave complications, and by 
 pressure at home and abroad which he has been firm 
 enough to resist ; and, secondly, whether he has been 
 able to obtain for his country most or all of the advan- 
 tages by peace which he might have secured by war, in 
 addition to the supreme advantage of peace itself. 
 Walpole stands the test in both respects, and it is 
 because he does so, and because he was in other senses 
 a typical Whig statesman, that he must always be 
 regarded as in the best sense of the term a regenerator, 
 if not a founder, of the Whig tradition of foreign policy. 
 There may be a foreign policy for England, as some 
 maintain, which would not include (or which would 
 strictly exclude) alliances with other nations for mutual 
 defence, or for dynastic compacts, or for any other than 
 commercial objects and the promotion of international 
 goodwill. This is a novel theory in our own days ; it 
 had barely been formulated in the days of Walpole. He 
 at any rate did not hold it. The basis of his system was 
 the formation of defensive alliances calculated to check 
 aggressive Powers on the threshold of war, with personal 
 negotiation in the interests of peace. In the Treaty of 
 Hanover — overborne, perhaps, by the advice of Towns- 
 liend — he stepped across this line. In this case he 
 not only bribed Sweden to neutrality but sent a fleet 
 to the Baltic to inspire the Empress Catherine with awe. 
 His excuse was that the Treaty and the despatch of the 
 fleet were purely defensive : Denmark, threatened by 
 Eussia, was in the nature of a bulwark of England. 
 The same spirit has led other and less prudent statesmen 
 
40 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 to see bulwarks of EnglaDcl in every quarter of the globe, 
 and has turned many a provision of pure defence into 
 an origin of war. The problem is, how to defend 
 England without putting it into the power of any other 
 nation to say that there shall be war instead of peace. 
 To hang out one's shield and throw down one's glove is 
 not the best way to keep out of a quarrel. 
 
 They who think that Walpole ran unnecessary risk in 
 1726 may believe, on the other hand, that he was some- 
 what too pacific in 1738. Philip of Spain was still the 
 disturbing cause. He had always hated England, and it 
 must be confessed that this was a natural hatred. We 
 held Gibraltar under the Treaty of Utrecht ; we had 
 foiled a desperate effort of the Spaniards to retake it in 
 1727. We were under engagements to restrict our trade 
 with South America within certain very narrow limits, 
 and our merchant seamen constantly violated these en- 
 gagements. Philip could not rest quietly in the shadow 
 of our naval supremacy, and he had now begun to plot 
 with France for our overthrow. In England itself the 
 old hatred of Spain revived with all the force which it 
 had inspired in the minds of Elizabeth's sea-captains, 
 and there was a clamour for war even before the nation 
 knew how far Spain and France were committed to 
 each other. Walpole was obliged to give way, and war 
 was declared against Spain in 1739 ; but to the end of 
 his tenure of office in 1742 he never entered into the 
 struggle with vigour and energy. 
 
 It is impossible not to admire the tenacity with which 
 Walpole clung to his principles and purpose, against 
 the stream of public feeling, in spite of the defections of 
 his followers, and even at the cost of his power and in- 
 fluence. Peace at almost any price was the maxim of 
 his policy, more than a century before another school of 
 
IVHIG TRADITIONS. 41 
 
 Liberalism accepted that phrase as accurately defining 
 their own position in regard to foreign affairs. Few 
 statesmen have been more wedded to office and more 
 loth to abandon it than Walpole ; and yet he resigned it 
 in 1742 because he could not be persuaded to adopt a 
 policy of war. T\\v most skilful briber of his day, he 
 fixed a stigma on his contemporaries either by saying or 
 by acting as though he thought that every politician 
 "had his price;" but he disproved the cynicism in his 
 own person when he showed that England's leading 
 statesman could not be bribed to wao-e a war of doubtful 
 
 o 
 
 expediency, even by a continuance of the highest honours 
 in the gift of the State. 
 
 Walpole's system of diplomacy, so far as he can be 
 said to have formed one, was based on a continual 
 alliance with France and Holland. The chief dangers of 
 relying upon this compact as a provision for the main- 
 tenance of peace were first, that — assuming reciprocity 
 in the connection — either of our allies might become 
 involved in quarrels likely to drag us into war on their 
 behalf, and, secondly, that either of them might be 
 drawn into compacts with other Powers, injuriously 
 affecting our interests. This latter supj)osition is what 
 actually occurred. France secretly conspired against us 
 with the king of Spain, whilst yet ostensibly loyal to 
 her prior engagement, and it was in this manner that 
 Walpole's system broke down. But if there was in that 
 age any better plan by which he might have preserved 
 the peace of England, it is at least questionable whether 
 it would have availed to prevent the war of 1738. 
 
 It will be observed that Walpole's system differed 
 from that of William the Third and his Whig Ministers 
 in having France for "natural friend," and Spain (with 
 or without Austria) for "natural enemy " ; whereas the 
 
42 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 earlier Dutch policy had found a natural enemy in 
 France. The continuity of the Whig tradition is not de- 
 stroyed by this difference, important as it was in itself. 
 The interests of England — always ostensibly and often 
 genuinely the sole consideration of English (or Anglo - 
 Dutch) diplomatists — seemed to be affected in one age 
 chiefly by French aggression, and in the next age chiefly 
 by Spanish intrigue. But in both cases the cardinal 
 error may be detected in the notion that it specially con- 
 cerned England to maintain the balance of power in 
 Europe. This was the great feature of William's scheme, 
 the principal contribution made by him to Englisli 
 politics, and the abiding substance of the Whig tradition. 
 It was comparatively new to our foreign policy in 
 1689. Take from the later Tudors and from Cromwell 
 their designs for the protection of the Continental Pro- 
 testants, and you leave them with scarcely any foreign 
 policy whatever. Take from William, from Marlborough, 
 and even from Walpole, the idea of European combina- 
 tions for the settlement of European affairs, and very 
 little will remain to them in the way of external policy 
 beyond the dynastic motives which were a legacy of the 
 Stuart tyranny. 
 
 The theory of the '' balance of power " has been built 
 up on an indefinite and fallacious idea, and it has at 
 various times been productive of the greatest possible 
 mischief in the community of European States. The 
 most legitimate sense of this much-abused term seems to 
 be that no one State in the community should be allowed 
 to grow so strong, whether by aggression or otherwise, 
 that it would be out of the power of an international 
 concert to restrain it. This is intelligible, and it may 
 be essentially true. But what are we to understand by 
 the dictum that a State '' should not be allowed " to 
 
WHIG TRADITIONS. 43 
 
 grow powerful '? And what is to be the point and the 
 rule of interference with a State which developes its 
 strength in a natural and peaceful manner, without 
 being actively aggressive ? 
 
 The Dutch policy, adopted by the Whigs, was to form 
 combinations of two or more States, pledged beforehand 
 to resist an aggressive power, though that power might 
 not attack every State in the combination, or even any 
 one State. Europe was a "system," governed by a 
 ''balance," and a ''combination" was to be formed for 
 the express purpose of controlling the balance, and 
 punishing any one who ventured to disturb it. France 
 coveted Hainault, or Luxembourg, or an Italian or a 
 Spanish province : let the Combination step in and make 
 the war general which might have been confined to a 
 trifling area. Of course there was the instinct of self- 
 preservation in this plan. William the Third at any 
 rate may have been actuated by such an instinct when 
 he was yet Prince of Orange. But what motive of that 
 kind aflected him when he had ceased to be Dutch, and 
 became an English king ? What was Hainault to Eng- 
 land, or England to Hainault ? 
 
 Walpole, however, had a more legitimate object in 
 forming his combinations than any Minister of the 
 epochs which preceded his own. If he thought of the 
 balance of power in Europe it was with a primary not 
 to say exclusive consideration for the material welfare 
 of England. He was not merely a peace Minister, but 
 a Minister who recognised the vital importance of com- 
 merce to Englishmen ; and abroad as at home he made 
 everything bend to the necessity of giving all possible 
 development to English trade. If Spain appeared to 
 him in the guise of a natural enemy, it was because 
 Spain attempted to exclude this country from the lucra- 
 
44 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 tive maritime trade with America, and because it was the 
 avowed aim of the Spaniards to destroy our supremacy 
 on the seas. It was for him no simple question of 
 maintaining a system and controlling a balance of power 
 on the Continent. He sought to foster English com- 
 merce by restraining the State which menaced it ; and 
 he succeeded for a long series of years in effecting his 
 object by the peaceful method of setting up a combina- 
 tion by which Spain was overawed. 
 
 The fact remains that Walpole's alliance with France 
 was an interruption and exception to the particular 
 Whig tradition inherited from William the Third, and 
 having its origin in the aggrandisement of France by 
 Kichelieu, Mazarin, and Louis the Fourteenth. The basis 
 of this tradition is formulated by Hume in one of his 
 *' Essays, Moral and Political," written in the last year of 
 Walpole's Administration. "For above a century," he 
 says, " Europe has remained on the defensive against 
 the greatest force that ever perhaps was formed by the 
 civil or political combination of mankind." If it was a 
 hallucination it was nevertheless a rooted idea in the 
 minds of Englishmen, and in no minds more firmly and 
 deeply than in those of the Whigs. 
 
 France had made her secret compact with Spain in 
 1733, at the same time when the two nations embarked 
 together in a vain attempt to wrest the sovereignty of 
 Poland from the control of the Eastern Powers. This 
 struggle ended in 1738, by which time the repeated 
 feuds between English and Spanish merchants in America 
 had so exasperated public opinion in England that Wal- 
 pole's hand was forced, and he was compelled to declare 
 war. The complications ensuing upon the death of the 
 Emperor Charles the Sixth, and the gallant efforts of 
 Maria Theresa to establish her title to her patrimony in 
 
WHIG TRADITIONS. 45 
 
 Austria, overshadowed the minor conflict. Walpole, 
 powerful though out of office, would have made the 
 policy of England turn upon and limit itself to the 
 assistance (mainly pecuniary) which he thought fit to 
 render to the Austrian Queen ; but Lord Carteret's in- 
 fluence was now supreme with George the Second. 
 The last of our crowned generals embarked on a cam- 
 paign which was to have carried the war into France. 
 Dettingen was followed by Fontenoy ; and, whilst the 
 military repute of England was being frittered away hy 
 a weak king abroad and a weak government at home, 
 the Young Pretender was marching down to Derby. 
 
 The justification of Walpole's policy was complete. 
 Not only was he shown to have been wisest in 
 council during the past few years, but the failure of 
 Charles Edward to rally Englishmen to his standard 
 proved that between the first and second Jacobite 
 revolts the heart of the country had been won by the 
 peaceful and prosperous rule of the Whigs. Walpole 
 had been succeeded after a short interval by Henry 
 Pelham, brother of the Duke of Newcastle, who trod 
 faithfully in the steps of his old leader. Pelham was 
 obliged by the influence of the Court to carry on the 
 war of the Austrian succession — though it was patent to 
 every rational man that England had no business what- 
 ever in this Continental squabble for the inheritance of 
 Charles the Sixth. But in domestic matters the pupil 
 carefully followed the lead of his master, and he managed 
 the afiairs of the country with so much tact that on his 
 death in 1754 the king is said to have exclaimed, ''Now 
 I shall have no more peace." 
 
 The Duke of Newcastle, who succeeded Henry Pel- 
 ham in the leadership of the Whigs, signalised him- 
 self chiefly by his incapacity. The beginning of the 
 
4G WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 Seven Years' War was marked by disaster for England 
 in the Mediterranean and on the Elbe, as well as in 
 America and India, and the Duke saved himself from 
 political extinction only by sharing the dignity and 
 power of office with Pitt. Newcastle had most of the 
 vices of the Whigs with few of their characteristic 
 virtues, and it would be idle to seek in his career for 
 the springs and motives of a consistent or intelligent 
 foreign jDolicy. But the circumstances in which England 
 was placed during the later years of the reign of George 
 the Second are sufficiently important to be passed under 
 review. 
 
 The Seven Years' War, so far as the English participa- 
 tion in it is concerned, was little else than a continuation 
 of the war of Austrian succession ; and that, as we have 
 seen, was coincident with our commercial war against 
 Spain and France. The Bourbon Compact was opposed 
 to us throughout, from 1733 during nearly thirty years. 
 Dating from our declaration of war in 1738 we were 
 almost incessantly in conflict with France, and we should 
 have carried on the struggle without intermission if Pitt 
 had had liis way, and if George the Third and his 
 " Bootjack " — as the Earl of Bute was contemptuously 
 called — had not somewhat ignominiously backed out 
 of it. 
 
 Now Pitt, a member of the Whig party (but a '' pa- 
 triot " Whig, who for some time had been a thorn in 
 Walpole's side), was by taste and talent a War Minister, 
 and his counsel had been for war from the beo^inninp'. 
 He had earned his legacy of ten thousand pounds from 
 the Duchess of MarllDorough by the spirit with which he 
 opposed the peaceful government of Walpole. He had 
 
WHIG traditions: 47 
 
 taken the helm from Newcastle (after the Duke's failure 
 in i 756) by virtue of his known disposition and abilities. 
 He fell from power in 1761 because he insisted, against 
 the new king and his friends, on fresh campaigns. His 
 policy was essentially one of war. But he had not re- 
 ceived this policy as a trust from his predecessors. Wal- 
 pole had not believed in war as an instrument of national 
 advancement. Pelham had inclined to Walpole's views, 
 although he was compelled to fight both France and 
 Spain. Newcastle had simply taken matters as he found 
 them, and had had little option when the Seven Years' 
 War broke out. It was from neither of these three Min- 
 isters that Pitt received the Whig tradition — to combat 
 France, to maintain by armed intervention the balance 
 of power on the Continent, to lavish money on combina- 
 tions, and to see a natural friend and a natural enemy on 
 the occasion of every European war. The continuity 
 Avas suspended for something like thirty years, so far as 
 regards the professed sentiments of the Whig leaders ; 
 and yet Pitt Avas simply taking up a thread which had 
 never been actually broken when he devoted himself 
 early in life to a policy based and built on war. 
 
 The fact is that the tradition which had been virtually 
 that of a party, and which Walpole had only repudiated , 
 so far as it recognised war as its necessary mode of opera- 
 tion, was continued by the people themselves when their 
 Ministers appeared to neglect it. The reaction from the 
 long peace of 1721-1738 exhibited itself in the latter year 
 as a popular sentiment of hatred against Spain ; and 
 from this time forward for many years the spirit of Marl- 
 borouorh, if not of William the Third, was harboured in 
 the breasts of Englishmen. It was public opinion which 
 carried on the series of wars under the Pelhams and the 
 elder Pitt ; and we shall do no wrong to the memory of 
 
48 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 tlie latter statesman if we conclude that lie was a War 
 Minister cliiefly because he read the minds of his fellow- 
 countrymen, and interpreted their wishes when Walpole 
 was unable or unwilling to understand them. 
 
 It is no doubt in a limited sense tliat the people ot 
 England can be said to have adopted the policy of armed 
 intervention in European affairs. There was still a People 
 behind the people which was inarticulate and uncon- 
 sulted ; but, so far as Englishmen were actually resolved 
 on war, we must suppose that they had been inoculated 
 with the idea by the politicians of the revolutionary 
 party, and naturally reacted from the inordinately long 
 period of Walpole's <|uiet rule to the military triumphs 
 and grandeur of the age of Marlborough. 
 
 The contrast between Walpole and Pitt is all the more 
 significant when we regard them as illustrating a recog- 
 nised maxim of eighteenth-century diplomatists, that 
 when a nation is not swayed by its own interests, it is 
 swayed by the personal character of the man who is at 
 its head.* Walpole, admiralily moral in his attachment 
 to the principles of peace and industrial development, 
 governed men by the most immoral system of bribery 
 ever attempted in England. Pitt, who probably chose 
 the method of war only because he saw that the nation 
 demanded it, would not stoop to systematic corruption. 
 Both were personally disinterested ; both were in a man- 
 ner isolated by a, statesmanlike breadth which found 
 few parallels amidst the political meanness of their age. 
 They stood at the poles of the Whig party, and yet eacli 
 
 * " Nations, said the political writers of the last century, are 
 governed partly by theii- own interests, partly by the private interests, 
 the prejudices and passions, of those who have the chief hand in 
 managing their affairs." — Professor Montagu Bernard, "Four Lectures 
 on Subjects connected with Diplomacy ;" Lect. 2. 
 
WHIG TRADITIONS, 49 
 
 in turn had the bulk of the party with him. Walpole 
 for peace, Pitt for war — both were supreme in power 
 and authority, and both, strange to say, were the idols 
 of the commercial classes. If Walpole was one of our 
 first Ministers who raised the interests of trade to the 
 level of high statesmanship, Pitt was one of the first who 
 acknowledged and employed the political force of the 
 nation at large. He taught the king, as George the 
 Second once reminded him, to look for the voice of the 
 people elsewhere than in the House of Commons ; and it 
 was on the people as a whole that he preferred to rest for 
 his support. He was a popular War Minister because he 
 undertook to give the nation what it had clamoured for. 
 Walpole was a popular Peace Minister because the nation 
 in his time had desired peace, and prospered by securing it. 
 It cannot be denied that the English people were them- 
 selves in great measure responsible for their wars in the 
 middle of the eighteenth century. The mass of the com- 
 mercial and industrial population scarcety had the power 
 of preventing the wars with France under William the 
 Third and Anne, even if they had wished to do so. They 
 had power to stop the wars under George the Second. 
 If they had displayed more self-command, if they had 
 not given way to passion, and had not been moved by 
 undue commercial greed in America, they would have 
 supported Walpole in his strenuous efi'orts to maintain 
 peace — and perhaps they would not have suffered by it. 
 At any rate they had themselves to thank for the war in 
 the first instance : and at the same time they had to pay 
 for the retention of Gibraltar, which was one of the prin- 
 cipal incitements of Spanish hatred, and the appropria- 
 tion of which by England at the Peace of Utrecht was 
 an act eminently calculated to involve us in future com- 
 plications. 
 
50 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 But if the people desired war, and if Pitt attained 
 power by giving them that which they desired, it is 
 certain that he professed a warlike policy with hearty 
 good- will, inspired by a conviction of its value to the 
 country. He is not entirely relieved of his responsibility 
 by the mood of the nation, for when the nation began to 
 be tired of fighting he urged it to maintain the struggle. 
 In short, he was not merely an instrument of the popular 
 will, but also a mouthpiece of the Whig tradition, which 
 he completely restored after its temporary obscuration by 
 Walpole. 
 
 Three critical events in the history of British dominion 
 beyond the seas distinguished the life of the elder Pitt. 
 In the first two — the conquest of Canada and the founda- 
 tion of Indian empire — he played an important part ; 
 for it was his spirit and constancy which encouraged 
 our generals and enabled them to achieve their splendid 
 triumphs. The other event occurred whilst Pitt was 
 virtually excluded from power by George the Third, and 
 under a succession of Ministers equally incompetent for 
 war and peace. It may be that if Pitt had remained at 
 the head of afiairs the English colonists in North 
 America would never have secured their independence — 
 would never have been exasperated into hostility, or 
 would have been subdued by the master-mind at home. 
 As it was, Chatham condemned the weakness and folly 
 which characterized our dealings with the colonists, and 
 from first to last avowed his sympathy with a nation 
 struggling for liberty. There is no reason whatever to 
 believe that he would have felt difierently if he had been 
 in office. It was only his illness in 1766 and his death 
 in 1778 which prevented him from resuming the helm 
 and restoring the credit of England. In the last year of 
 his life he proposed a policy which, carried out under 
 
WHIG TRADITIONS. 51 
 
 his own direction, might have conciliated the States to 
 the mother country by granting them self-government in 
 local affairs ; and in the firm belief that this plan would 
 succeed, he protested against the simple abandonment 
 of all authority over America on the very morrow of 
 Burgoyne's surrender. If he had lived, if he had 
 returned to office and worked out his design, the history 
 of the world might have been very different. It is not 
 necessary to doubt the wisdom of his advice in order to 
 believe that things are better as they stand. 
 
 In 1766 Chatham had proposed to transfer the pos- 
 sessions of the East India Company to the Crown — ^just 
 ninety years before the change was actually effected. 
 This fact like the other illustrates the imperial breadth 
 of a mind which, struggling against two mighty nations 
 in almost every quarter of the globe, and making 
 England (as he said in the last sentence which he 
 uttered) the terror of the world, could ftice with equal 
 calmness the acceptance of a new empire in the east and 
 the federation of revolted colonies in the west. This 
 also is an aspect of the later Whig tradition ; for the 
 organization and government of our Greater Britain are 
 questions bearing in a very direct manner upon the 
 relations of England with foreign Powers. The ideas of 
 the elder Pitt were such as bore fruit in after years if 
 not at once, and his Whig idea of empire was destined 
 to find development many decades later. 
 
 Lord Chatham had not been long in his grave when 
 his second son began to make his mark in the House of 
 Commons. William Pitt the younger began as a 
 reformer and a financier. A Whig by training and 
 introductions, he so far departed from his father's policy 
 
52 WHIG TRADITIONS. 
 
 as to ridicule the idea that any country could be per- 
 manently the enemy of another. But he clung to the 
 orthodox creed of international combinations, and he 
 would, if it had not been for a check in the House of 
 Commons, have plunged us soon after his accession to 
 office into a war with Eussia. 
 
 Pitt's foreign policy nevertheless belongs to the Tory 
 tradition, and may be dealt with elsewhere. After the 
 death of his father no statesman of the highest rank 
 sprang from the disorganised and divided Whig party 
 for many years ; or at any rate no opportunity occurred 
 during nearly half a century for the exercise of political 
 generalship by a Whig. Under the obstinate personal 
 rule of George the Third party distinctions had signified 
 little : bribes and Court influence settled nearly every- 
 thing. There were Rockingham Whigs, Bedford Whigs, 
 and the few who remained constant to the great 
 Commoner, even after he had done himself the injustice 
 of entering the House of Lords. As the members of the 
 body fell asunder, so the mind which had dominated the 
 body was weakened and distracted. The Whig tradition 
 was losing its homogeneity ; it M^as split up, complicated, 
 confused. The younger Pitt, liberally as he regarded 
 the French Revolution in its earlier phase, inclined 
 gradually and conscientiously to the Tories, who had 
 been growing in number and weight with the growing 
 disorganization of their rivals. Fox, after dragging a 
 section of the Whigs into a discreditable coalition with 
 North, apparently for the sole purpose of securing the 
 fruits of office, returned to the best precedents of the 
 party of Walpole and Chatham. Burke, unduly magni- 
 fying the injustice of the French revolutionary Assembly 
 towards the privileged orders, found himself warped from 
 theoretical Liberalism into practical reaction. 
 
WHIG TRADITIONS, 53 
 
 Of these three, and of the rank and file of the great 
 Whig party, Fox and his friends alone clung to the 
 French Eevolutionists after the death of Louis. The 
 most powerful of the aristocratic families passed over to 
 the side of Pitt in his 2;reat struo-ale with the Convention 
 and the Directory. Whiggism was as inane in 1795 as 
 Toryism had been inane in 1745. And yet it seems 
 probable that the final judgment of history — for historians 
 of the Revolutionary epoch are swaying to and fro to 
 the present day — will decide that the instincts of Fox 
 were just and rational, that Burke's denunciations worked 
 incalculable mischief to his own country and to the world, 
 and that Pitt's surrender of his opinions at the critical 
 moment was a weakness for which England had to suffer 
 an almost unendurable penalty. 
 
TIL 
 
 TORY TRADITIONS. 
 
 Every candid student of English history, especially if he 
 be by education and conviction a Liberal in politics, is 
 moved to sympathy by the attitude of the patriotic 
 Tories early in the eighteenth century. Their position 
 was extremely difficult. Favoured by Anne, sharing 
 the credit of Marlborough's victories, they held office 
 with a good prospect of continuance in power and influ- 
 ence ; but, on the other hand, they were placed between 
 the horns of a fatal dilemma. The memories of the Stuart 
 tyranny, of the crimes of James against the Constitution, 
 and of the plots of the earlier Jacobites, were not to be 
 shaken off : whilst the price of their possession of place 
 was the active promotion of what they stigmatized as a 
 Whig war. We cannot wonder that high-minded men 
 like Lord Nottingham, more or less loyal to the Revolu- 
 tionary settlement, though they might have welcomed 
 the old dynasty back again, refused to occupy so equivo- 
 cal a platform, and held aloof from office. The peculi- 
 arities of the situation if not their genuine convictions 
 attached them warmly to a policy of peace, and in fact 
 they were the steady advocates of peace throughout the 
 reign of Queen Ajme. 
 
 The Hanover Tories, as they were called after the 
 accession of George the First, supported Walpole in his 
 peaceful policy, being all the more disposed for peace 
 with France in particular because they could not have 
 
TOBY TRADITIONS, 55 
 
 desired war without playing into the hands of the Stuart 
 Tories. Many of the best men of this section were com- 
 pletely withdrawn from public life, for reasons such as 
 the one just mentioned, and they did not again take a 
 prominent part in politics until the Protestant succession 
 was fully assured — until the last Jacobite rising had 
 been suppressed with merciless rigour, which helped to 
 make the Staart cause almost fashionable again now 
 that it had ceased to be menacing. 
 
 The accession of Georoe the Third was in some sense a 
 signal for the general return of the old Tories to public 
 life. George was pleased to call himself a Whig; and the 
 elder Pitt was unquestionably a Whig ; and yet George 
 hated and diso^raced the Minister who had made Enoiand 
 respected all the world over. It was on the basis of this 
 petty hatred that the long-excluded party came once 
 more to the front. They were the king's friends now, 
 as their grandfathers had been the king's friends in the 
 time of Charles and James. New Toryism took its 
 stand between the platforms of the ablest and the feeblest 
 Whigs. 
 
 It is a somewhat disgraceful scramble for place and 
 patronage which presents itself to the sight of one who 
 surveys the political arena in the first decade of George's 
 reign. As soon as the king set up his standard on what 
 was left of the royal prerogatives, and showed a disposi- 
 tion to be monarch in act as well as in name, crowds of 
 supporters, sycophants, and parasites gathered round him. 
 Amongst these were unscrupulous Whigs, resolved on 
 clinging to power at any sacrifice of self-respect ; and on 
 the other hand there were the Tories, weak at first in 
 number, but always gaining strength, and ready on occa- 
 sion to strike an opportune bargain with the Whig place- 
 hunters. Kelying on his '* friends,'' from whatever 
 
56 TORY TRADITIONS. 
 
 quarter they might come, the king counterplotted Pitt, 
 drove him from office, and shortly afterwards appointed 
 the Marquis of Bute as his Minister, making it plainly 
 understood that the chief exercise of power and dispensa- 
 tion of patronage were to remain in his own hands. 
 Bute was pledged to peace — not because the people at 
 large had emphatically demanded it, or because the strain 
 of the military and naval expenditure had become in- 
 tolerable, but apparently because war was Pitt's policy, 
 and an old policy, and George had resolved to have a 
 new policy of his own. The peace of Paris, in 1 763, was 
 made virtually at England's instance, and it involved 
 the renunciation of some of the most valuable conquests 
 of the past few years. 
 
 This was to all intents and purposes the close of the 
 brilliant epoch whereof Pitt was the central figure, and 
 wherein his '' great Revolution families " had played an 
 ornamental and a prosperous part. The people still wor- 
 shipped Lord Chatham. Bute was hurled from power 
 on the morrow of the peace by the storm of unpopularity 
 which broke over him, and in spite of the royal favour. 
 If the Whig party had been united, George would have 
 been compelled to accept Chatham's terms, without which 
 the latter wisely declined to take office. But the Whig 
 party was hopelessly distracted. The families, indeed, 
 were less particular than their former leader, and Gren- 
 ville's sinister Administration was the result. The want 
 of firmness and disinterestedness at this moment of the 
 worst section of the oligarchical Whig families not 
 merely ruined the party, but lost America, and plunged 
 England into disaster and discredit. 
 
 The Administrations of Grenville, Grafton, and North 
 existed on condition of being subservient to George the 
 Third's caprices ; and thus the real power of the State, 
 
TORY TRADITIONS. 57 
 
 under the king, was in the hands of the courtiers and 
 the Tories. These, then, are in great measure respon 
 sible for the external troubles of Eno^land durinp* one of 
 
 o o 
 
 the darkest periods of her history since the Revolution ; 
 and the truth of this is not disproved by the fact that 
 the policy of the Government between 1768 and 1782 
 was in many respects opposed to what had hitherto been 
 the tradition of the Tories, as it was opposed to the policy 
 with which the king had originally set out. 
 
 The Tory tradition, such as it was, had been adroitly 
 built up by Bolingbroke out of the materials of the ruined 
 edifice of the Stuart dominion. Himself a thorough 
 Jacobite, who sufiered for his hopeless loyalty, St John 
 saw that the principles of the party, if they were to be 
 formulated in express terms, must be such as might be 
 subscribed by men who, unlike himself, had abandoned 
 the Stuarts and accepted the Revolution. They must 
 have the appearance of conformity to the new order of 
 things whilst really elastic enough to suit the creed and 
 the aspirations of the most ardent Jacobite. His '' Idea 
 of a Patriot King " may be thus read between the lines 
 from the first page to the last, and it was certainly not 
 to the Hanoverian doges (as Lord Beaconsfield described 
 the second George) that he wished his readers to look for 
 his typical monarch. The Bolingbroke system (in the 
 words of the same writer) included " a real royalty, in 
 lieu of the chief magistracy ; a permanent alliance with 
 France, instead of the Whig scheme of viewing in that 
 power the natural enemy of England ; and, above all, a 
 plan of commercial freedom, the germ of which may be 
 found in the long-maligned negotiations of Utrecht." 
 
 To this system in fact the Tories of the eighteenth 
 century more or less consciously adhered ; though it may 
 be questioned whether their struggle against Dutch 
 
58 TORY TRADITIONS, 
 
 finance was at any time as genuine or as vigorous as 
 their opposition to Venetian politics and French wars. 
 The most notable of Bolingbroke's disciples in successive 
 generations were men who began life as Whigs, and 
 who either actually or virtually abandoned their party 
 as their ideas matured. Lord Carteret, Secretary of 
 State in 1742, was one of these; and it was his fate, 
 as it was the fate of more than one statesman in 
 after ages, to accept office for the purpose of carrying 
 out a policy distinctly adverse to his opinions — Venetian, 
 Dutch, and misogallic. His son-in-law Shelburne (after- 
 wards Marquis of Lansdowne) was a supporter of Bute ; 
 and subsequently, in 1782, he had the satisfaction of 
 displacing North in order to close the lamentable era of 
 American war, and to conciliate a peace with France. 
 The younger Pitt was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
 Lord Shelburne' s Administration; and the distinguishing 
 features of his early policy as First Lord were his earnest 
 desire to maintain peace with France and his enlightened 
 efforts at financial reform. 
 
 The story of the French Revolution and of its effects 
 upon English policy has been told so often, and told 
 recently with so great pains to correct the mistakes of 
 former judgments upon it, that something like an apology 
 is due from any one who ventures on the well-beaten 
 track. But the revolutionary epoch is a bridge of 
 history without which all connection between the politics 
 of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would be lost, 
 and it is impossible to dispense with an examination, 
 however brief, of the acts and motives of Pitt and his 
 contemporaries. 
 
 So far as France is concerned, the English party 
 
 /f- 
 
TORY TRADITIONS, 59 
 
 traditions of foreign politics were practically determined 
 at the close of the last century — first because party 
 distinctions were almost confounded by the rapid suc- 
 cession of startling events, and next because there were 
 henceforth two Frances which appealed to our sympathies 
 and demanded our attention. Pitt, as we have seen, set 
 out with a policy which was in one sense traditionally 
 that of the Tories — a policy which he may have imbibed 
 from Shelburne and inherited from Bolin^broke, but 
 which at the same time was based on a national and a 
 natural sentiment. Sympathy with a nation long op- 
 pressed, eaten up by incessant war and taxation, which 
 now cast ofi" its fetters and struck a heroic blow for 
 liberty, stirred the heart of Pitt as it stirred the heart of 
 the country. In 1789 there were few Englishmen who 
 did not sympathise with the gathering of the States 
 General, with the early action of that body, with the 
 unification of the Assembly, and with the destruction 
 of the Bastille. 
 
 As the Eevolution proceeded, or rather as one revolu- 
 tion succeeded another in France, the opinions of poli- 
 ticians and private persons in this country naturally 
 varied, and the most opposite views found expression 
 and support, both in Parliament and amongst the 
 general public. But it is very dangerous to attempt to 
 fix, as some writers in our own day have attempted, the 
 time when legitimate revolution ended and mere anarchy 
 began. It is impossible to decide whether any particular 
 leader or fomenter of an agitation in Paris or the 
 provinces had or had not — or to what extent he had or 
 had not — the sanction of his fellow-countrymen for the 
 course which he pursued. It is still more idle to try 
 and settle for other men the limits of their sympathies 
 with the popular revolt, and to tell them at what point 
 
60 TORY TRADITIONS. 
 
 they ought to draw a distinction between just rebellion 
 and unscrupulous self-seeking. No doubt there is one 
 great change and contrast in the conduct of the French 
 people during the revolutionary epoch which does not 
 leave much room for difference of opinion, and that is 
 the change from the period of popular sovereignty, as 
 practically established in 1789, to the period of imperial 
 a,uthority as conferred upon or usurped by Bonaparte. 
 The advantages of the revolution were overbalanced by 
 disadvantages when France had begun to wage wars of 
 aggression, conquest, or mere military ambition ; but it 
 is difficult to say at what moment this evil development 
 should be held to have taken place. 
 
 Pitt saw the problem in its true light — as a question 
 not of moral justification or turpitude (with which English 
 statesmen had no concern), but of national internal 
 development, to which a wise English statesman could 
 not but wish well. As a Whig by extraction who had 
 taken rather the Tory than the Whig view of England's 
 foreign policy, he occupied a more neutral ground than 
 his father, or than any of his prominent contemporaries 
 might have been able to occupy. Regarding France (of 
 course under the dominion of its kings) as a nation with 
 whom it was possible and desirable for us to keep on 
 good terms, he had a motive for wishing to see the return 
 of Louis the Sixteenth to power, whatever guarantees 
 the people might first exact for their new constitution. 
 He would not feel this motive so strongly as the divine- 
 right Tories. He may indeed have believed that a friendly 
 France was just as possible and just as much to be 
 desired with the people for sovereign as with one man. 
 And it is certain that he felt a good will to the popular 
 cause which was not felt (or was felt less sincerely) by 
 many who agreed with his general policy. 
 
TOBY TRADITIONS. 61 
 
 It was of course the just and proper mode of con- 
 ducting our relations with France at this critical period 
 to leave her, as Pitt recommended, to arrange her 
 internal affairs as she best could. We had no right to 
 
 o 
 
 do anything else — not even to pelt our neighbours with 
 rlietoric, as Burke pelted them in so disastrously effective 
 a style. The revolution was no affair of ours ; inter- 
 ference and preaching were alike out of place. As time 
 went on, what with the clamour of the divine-right 
 Tories and the hysterical outbreak of the rhetoricians, 
 the work of Pitt became more and more difficult. 
 Nothing could be nobler than the calmness and resolu- 
 tion with which for upwards of three years he restrained 
 the passion of politicians, and strove to modify the action 
 of the European Governments. A cruel fate eventually 
 dragged him into the continental vortex, and made him 
 an indifferent war Minister when his ambition had been to 
 excel as a Minister of | peace ; but as long as he could 
 stem the tide of international bad feeling he continued 
 to do so. England moreover (in spite of Burke and his 
 friends) was probably one at heart with Pitt, at any 
 rate up to 1792, and before the hasty madness of the 
 Jacobins had played into the hands of their enemies. It 
 was not for England to quarrel with a revolution in 
 France, barely a hundred years after a revolution of her 
 own, from which she had reaped inestimable blessings. 
 It was not for us to quarrel with a popular Government 
 for imprisoning and beheading the king, who less than a 
 century and a half before had summarily beheaded a king 
 of our own. It was not our business to reprove or quarrel 
 with the French for turning against foreign interference, 
 even when they answered aggression with aggression. 
 We had done much the same thing under the Common- 
 wealth. But for the happy chance of England being an 
 
62 TORY TRADITIONS. 
 
 island our own Cromwell might have been a Dumouriez, 
 not to say a Bonaparte. It was not our duty or our 
 interest to fight Republicans because their excited rulers 
 urged other nations to seek liberty in their fashion. All 
 these things happened in France, and yet Pitt would not 
 move. He struggled bravely on, even with peace budgets 
 and reduction of armaments and remission of taxes, 
 hoping against hope that the sense of his fellow-country- 
 men would be with him ; and when Avar did come it 
 was on a declaration from France to England, and im- 
 mediately after Pitt's urgent entreaty to the Convention 
 to respect the independence of neighbouring States. 
 
 On the whole it seems that the inception of this war 
 w^as not directly due to either of the two foreign policies 
 which had so long found expression in England. But 
 indirectly it may doubtless be attributed to the Tory 
 policy of friendship for France under her kings, and to 
 Tory sympathy with the exiled aristocracy and the sup- 
 pressed Church. This is none the less true because 
 Burke, so largely responsible for the early passion which 
 tended to make peace impossible, and so reckless in his 
 encouragement of the emigrant princes and nobles, was 
 a Whig. The attachment to the Bourbons, the desire to 
 avenge Louis and his Court, the dislike of revolutionary 
 methods on the ground of principle — these were distinctly 
 Tory ideas, such as had been dear to the hearts of the 
 Jacobites and sacred in the philosophy of Bolingbroke 
 and his school. It may be admitted on the other hand 
 that the inveterate policy of the Whigs in regarding 
 France as a natural enemy had prepared the soil in 
 which this seed sprang up. 
 
 But, much as Pitt had tried to avoid war, and much 
 as he was disposed at first to be what Lord Beaconsfield 
 has called him, a democratic Minister, it is by no means 
 
TOBY TRADITIONS, 63 
 
 clear that he had acquitted himself of all responsibility 
 for the desperate struggle of the next quarter of a 
 century — assuredly the greatest calamity which has 
 befallen England for more than two hundred years. 
 After the Convention had declared war against us there 
 may have been no looking back. But the bold and 
 straightforward course would have been to acknowledge 
 in a spirit of candour the right of the French nation 
 to govern itself according to its own ideas. This was in 
 accordance with England's best principles. Fox would 
 have done it. Almost all the Whigs would have 
 applauded the act, any time between 1789 and 17.92. 
 Pitt's fatlier, Chatham, whom the Americans regarded 
 as one of the makers of their liberties, would scarcelv 
 have refused to extend to his neighbours the sympathy 
 which he had displayed in another hemisphere. In all 
 the circumstances of the case an unreserved recognition 
 of the government of the Convention would have cost 
 Pitt a great effort, and might have further cost him the 
 leadership of the Tory party. But it would have been 
 right. It would have been a national and a popular 
 policy. In all probability it would have saved the 
 Eepublic ; whilst it could not have opened the flood- 
 gates of war as they were opened by the hostile com- 
 bination of Europe against the French. 
 
 After war had broken out the majority of the Whigs 
 fell in with the Tories. They had hitherto suffered Fox 
 to be their spokesman, and stood by Pitt in his irul/ 
 liberal policy ; but now the banks and dykes were broke.i 
 through, and the flood of exalted passion overwhelmed 
 the whole field of English political life. Fox and his 
 handful of adherents stood out, bold but isolated figures, 
 in a weary waste of declamation and aggressive senti- 
 ment. With this exception Parliament almost forgot 
 
64 TORY TRADITIONS. 
 
 that it included two opposing parties. With the excep- 
 tion of the Constitutional Clubs, the Corresponding 
 Society, the half-dozen organs of English Jacobinism, 
 the country might have been supposed to be entirely 
 given over to one prevailing demand for war. And then 
 followed, naturally enough, the enormous increase of the 
 National Debt which cripples England to the present 
 day, and the portentous loss of personal freedom which 
 all but produced a revolt of our own proletariat in the 
 beginning of the nineteenth century. 
 
 The great personal ability of Pitt was displayed in the 
 energy with which he threw himself into the struggle 
 against France, rather than in the successes which he 
 achieved ; for in spite of our great naval victories, and 
 in spite of the vast sums of money which we had lavished 
 on the Continent, we had very little to boast of at the 
 peace of Amiens. The objects for which Europe had 
 striven were not attained. France was not punished ; 
 the Bourbons were not restored ; the Eepublican spirit 
 was even more perilous for Governments and crowned 
 heads than it had been in 1792. No doubt Pitt and 
 his colleagues had done all that lay in their power ; and 
 the people had paid fourfold taxes and subscribed im- 
 mense loans with as much cheerfulness as could have 
 been expected from them in the circumstances. But 
 there had been no definite success, and the policy adopted 
 in 1793 had not yet received its justification. On the 
 contrary, England had recognised the Eepublic. We 
 had been the active party in negotiating for a peace in 
 1796, as we were in arranging the peace of 1802. In 
 1 796 Lord Malmesbury was sent to Paris with instructions 
 to proffer the recognition of the Eepublic and the sur- 
 render of the French colonies, and to demand the with- 
 drawal of the Republican armies from Italy and Holland. 
 
TORY TRADITIONS, 65 
 
 And yet, shortly before this, Pitt had declared in the 
 House of Commons his belief that if France were pressed 
 hard on every side she would be compelled to sign such 
 a peace as would secure Europe from Gallic aggression, 
 and England from Eepublican innovation. 
 
 So near together come the boasts and the concessions 
 of this most melancholy chapter of English history ! 
 
 The result of the first three years of war had been to 
 add a hundred millions to the Debt and four millions a 
 year to the taxes. Much of this money had been spent 
 in forming and nursing combinations ; yet Prussia re- 
 mained doggedly at peace, Spain turned round upon us 
 at a critical moment, and Ireland, already in revolt, was 
 threatened by a large French army. Such was the state 
 of affairs in 1796, when Fox could not master sixty votes 
 against the continuance of the war. 
 
 Pitt had thrown himself into the current, and had 
 been borne along by the impetuous tide of passion. He 
 had not merely been converted into an energetic war 
 Minister ; he was also transformed into a restrictive, 
 anti-popular, almost despotic instrument of the monarch 
 who had hated and degraded his father. Ten years ago 
 he had proposed Parliamentary reform, retrenchment, 
 and an enlightened commercial legislation. The war 
 bad driven these good intentions out of his head, and 
 we find him now, in 1796, bringing in bills to provide 
 for the greater personal security of the king, and for the 
 summary arrest of seditious speakers at public meetings. 
 The '' Pitt and Grenville Acts," as they were called at 
 the time, which were vehemently but unsuccessfully 
 resisted by Fox, passed the two Houses by larger majori- 
 ties than those which had declared for the continuance 
 of war, and the minority could think of no better protest 
 aofainst them than withdrawal from the House of Com- 
 
 E 
 
66 TORY TRADITIONS, 
 
 mons. This course, however injudicious, cannot fairly 
 be said to have been dictated (in the words of some critics) 
 by spite or disappointment. It was a mark of extreme 
 reprobation of acts which unquestionably deserved to be 
 condemned; and it indicated the fervour of the small 
 Parliamentary minority at this turning-point of the 
 struggle. 
 
 Fox and his friends were morally stronger than their 
 numbers in the House would imply. Inarticulate Eng- 
 land was behind : the England which was obstinately 
 excluded from the franchise, which was deemed seditious 
 because it was unrepresented, which bore the burden of 
 a war whilst it ardently desired peace. For whatever 
 may have been the state of public opinion in 1793, and 
 however sincerely a majority of Englishmen may have 
 detested the proceedings of the French Jacobins, there 
 was abundant reason in 1796 to believe that the masses 
 were heartily sick of the war, and that they would wil- 
 lingly have withdrawn all pretensions to intermeddle in 
 the affairs of France. 
 
 The first Administration of Pitt was brought to a close 
 in March, 1801, after a duration of seventeen years ; and 
 though the ostensible reason of his retirement was his 
 inability to emancipate the Irish Catholics, the real 
 reason is much more likely to have been the accumula- 
 tion of difEculties in the struggle against France, the 
 break-up of the European coalition, and the pressure of 
 the popular demand for peace. He resumed office in 
 1804, again as a war Minister, and with an exclusively 
 Tory Cabinet. The Toryism of Pitt and the special 
 responsibility of the Tory party for the renewed war are 
 alike signalised by the formation of this Cabinet ; just as 
 
TORY TRADITIONS. 67 
 
 the joint responsibility of the Whigs is signalised by the 
 Coalition Ministry formed after the death of Pitt in I8O9, 
 which included Fox and Erskine, Grenville, Spencer, 
 and Windham, and, of the Tories, Sidmouth and one or 
 two of his former colleasfues. 
 
 Another fact is indicated by this Ministry of '' all the 
 Talents," and it is the entire confusion — at any rate for 
 the time — of the old Whig and Tory traditions of foreign 
 policy. These traditions, as already said, had been 
 merged in the new national interests created by the 
 European war. With the collapse of the French king- 
 dom the train of ideas based on the circumstances of the 
 seventeenth century had come to an end. It was no 
 longer a question as to whether France was or was not 
 our natural enemy. No doubt the bricks of the old 
 edifice had been used in constructing the edifice which 
 was to take its place, but in addition to these there were 
 new bricks. Other and yet busier hands were engaged 
 in moulding and firing the clay ; the Peoples had begun 
 to build for themselves. If Governments, Ministers, 
 politicians of the old school, failed to see the change or 
 refused to recognise it, so much the worse for them, as 
 was shortly to appear ; but the change had taken place. 
 To discerning eyes there could be no more convincing 
 demonstration of the fact than the uncertain conduct of 
 English statesmen on both sides between 1790 and 1822, 
 when the policy of this country in regard to Europe at 
 large was one of constant impulse rather than principle, 
 when diplomacy had become second-rate intrigue, and 
 when success at foreign courts had come to mean little 
 more than the purchase of alliances by the money of the 
 English taxpayer. The events of this period are seen in 
 the refracting light which precedes a new dawn — the 
 images are broken, the outlines blurred, the colours con- 
 
68 TORY TRADITIONS. 
 
 founded. Thus we have seen at least three sections of 
 the Whigs professing three different political creeds. 
 We have seen Tories given up to Dutch finance and 
 French wars — though they were at the same time 
 sufficiently orthodox to avoid the Venetian heresy. And 
 indeed George the Third was not a mere doge like his 
 grandfather and great-grandfather. He had done his 
 best to obey his mother's precept and ''be a king ; " 
 and, thanks to him and to the long anti-republican war, 
 the nineteenth century opened with a fair prospect for 
 England of once more re-conquering the divine-right 
 seventeenth-century long-Parliament and patriot-king 
 principle. An energetic monarch with lucid intervals, 
 and a new tradition of foreign policy admirably calcu- 
 lated to convert republics into military despotisms — 
 these two things combined had brought us to such a 
 pitch that progressive legislation was almost entirely 
 suspended— that even Fox regarded an extension of the 
 franchise as inopportune — that a Whig Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer in 1806 thought it impossible for England 
 long to continue paying the interest on its enormous 
 debt. 
 
 Over this state of affairs the Tory party presided with 
 little intermission. Fox and his colleagues were un- 
 ceremoniously dismissed in 1807, and from that time 
 for something like twenty years the Duke of Portland and 
 his Tory successors had undisputed control of the Ad- 
 ministration. It is true that in 1812, after the assassina- 
 tion of Perceval, the House of Commons voted an 
 address to the Prince Regent praying him to select a 
 Cabinet from the ablest men of all parties. The Prince 
 acceded to this request, and a coalition Ministry would 
 have been formed but for an insuperable difficulty which 
 arose in connection with the officers of the royal house- 
 
TOEY TRADITIONS, 69 
 
 hold. It was a difficulty of a most curious kind. The 
 Whigs insisted, on principle no doubt, that the appoint- 
 ments of the chief officers should be vacated as a necessary 
 consequence of the change of Ministry. The Tories 
 maintained that this was a matter touching: the comfort 
 and dignity of the monarch (in this instance of the 
 Eegent) ; and they refused to concede the point. The 
 chief officers themselves afterwards declared that they 
 had intended to resign as soon as a new Cabinet had 
 been formed. But the upshot of the matter was that 
 the negotiations fell through, and Lord Liverpool was 
 charged with the task of constructing a Tory Adminis- 
 tration. On such a question as this the fate of an 
 empire might have turned. 
 
 Would the accession to power at this moment of Lords 
 Grey and Grenville, with other prominent Whigs, have 
 much affected the course of events ? It is unlikely, and 
 least likely of all so far as the war is concerned. In the 
 summer of 1812 things were moving on the Continent 
 very much by their own weight, and no First Lord, no 
 Foreign Minister in Lord Castlereagh's place, would have 
 ventured to withdraw from the conffict. The address to 
 the Eegent had passed by four votes, and that no doubt 
 was a triumph for the Whigs. But there was no majority 
 which would have supported them in the event of a 
 rupture with the Tories ; and if they had by any means 
 got the upper hand in the Ministry their fate would 
 certainly before long have been the fate of Fox in 1807. 
 It had become plain enough that the Tory leaders had 
 little to fear so long as George the King and George the 
 Gentleman were alive. 
 
 It has indeed been argued that, but for this rehearsal of 
 the Bedchamber Plot, a vital change in the government 
 and policy of the country would have taken place. 
 
70 TOEY TRADITIONS. 
 
 *' The expulsion of the French from the Peninsnha," says 
 Alison, " the catastrophe of Moscow, the resurrection of 
 Europe, were on the eve of commencing when the con- 
 tinued fidelity of England to the cause of freedom hung 
 on the doubtful balance of household appointments. If 
 a change of Ministry had taken place at that time, the 
 destinies of the world would probably have been changed. 
 The Whigs, fettered by their continued protestations 
 against the war, could not with any regard to consistency 
 have prosecuted it with vigour." If this were so, and if 
 Lords Grey and Grenville sacrificed what they regarded 
 as sacred interests for a point of etiquette or a matter of 
 patronage, an indelible stain would rest on their honour 
 and on the credit of their party. But it is to be observed 
 that the issue was not between a Tory and a Whig 
 Administration. All that was offered to the Whigs was 
 a few places in a Cabinet which would undoubtedly have 
 remained Tory in influence — which at any rate would 
 have been pledged to continue the war. If the leaders 
 who had pleaded most earnestly for peace had had the 
 remotest chance in 1812 of securing the acceptance of 
 their policy, they would have grasped it at any cost. 
 If it had been possible by assuming or sharing responsi- 
 bility at that crisis to give satisfaction to the very strong 
 peace party in the country, and if it could have been 
 known beforehand that such a course would have pre- 
 vented the Russian campaign and the terrible slaughter 
 of the Hundred Days (though it would not have pre- 
 vented the fall of Bonaparte), Lord Grey and his friends 
 would not have shirked their duty. 
 
 Peace had by this time become the recognised policy 
 of the Whig party, as war had long been the recognised 
 jDolicy of their rivals ; and if the external conditions had 
 remained constant for some time longer it seems proba- 
 
TORY TRADITIONS. 71 
 
 ble that the policy of peace would have prevailed. Not 
 that Bonaparte would necessarily have won his desperate 
 game, or that England would have been content to see 
 him wielding a despotic sway over a large portion of 
 Europe. But peace might have effected in another 
 fashion what was actually achieved by war. Napoleon 
 Bonaparte was reaching the limits of his power in 1812, 
 and the Russian expedition itself was undertaken in 
 great measure to counteract the Emperor's growing un- 
 popularity at home. France had been almost surfeited 
 with glory, and it was as much as the Emperor could 
 do to obtain fresh levies for his armies. There had 
 never been a more opportune moment for coming to 
 peaceful and honourable terms with the French nation ; 
 but Liverpool and Castlereagh were not the men to set 
 the policy of conciliation on foot. 
 
 It would be unjust to estimate the policy of the Whigs 
 at this season from the point of view created by our 
 military triumphs in 1815. We must transfer ourselves 
 to the platform of 1812, and put ourselves in the place 
 of the advocates of peace at that particular crisis. We 
 shall then have no difficulty in acknowledging the sin- 
 cerity of their patriotism, or in discerning the lines on 
 which their later traditions of foreign policy have been 
 framed. We shall see that the same spirit guided them 
 for the most part in dealing with foreign affairs which 
 has always since the Eevolution guided them in dealing 
 with domestic affairs. And if it be necessary by way of 
 comparison to regard the aristocratic Tories and Whigs 
 as competing with each other for popular favour and 
 support in England, it must be conceded to the Whigs 
 that they have founded their claims during the present 
 century on their traditional approximation to that section 
 of the people which has most acutely suffered by our 
 
72 TORY TRADITIONS. 
 
 ruinous war expenditure, and which has most earnestly 
 demanded a policy of peace. 
 
 Lords Liverpool and Castlereagh, who are chiefly 
 associated with the Tory Administration of 1812-22, 
 were happy in the circumstances which placed them at 
 the head of affairs at the moment when the star of Bona- 
 parte had begun to set. The causes which in 1 8 1 4 made 
 the entry of the Allies into Paris comparatively easy 
 were already potentially in existence when Liverpool 
 was charged with the formation of his Ministry, and 
 when Castlereagh took his place at the Foreign Office. 
 So far as the war was concerned, and the re-establish- 
 ment of affairs on the Continent, Lord Castlereagh was 
 the directing spirit of English policy. It was he who 
 refused the French terms of peace in 1812, who alien- 
 ated Denmark in 1813 by engaging to transfer Norway 
 to the Swedish crown, who most firmly insisted on the 
 restoration of all the old dynasties, who made his personal 
 influence prevail in the councils of the Sovereigns at 
 Bar-sur-Aube and Chatillon, who took exception to the 
 feeble Treaty of 1814, and ably represented the English 
 Government at Vienna. 
 
 The gist of the Tory policy at the conclusion of this 
 long and calamitous struggle may be found in the in- 
 structions given to Castlereagh when he was appointed 
 plenipotentiary at Chatillon ; but of course as a leading 
 member of the Cabinet he had himself assisted in draw- 
 ing up the programme of his action. These instructions 
 professed to be based on the unchanged demands of 
 England since the beginning of the war with France — ■ 
 the retirement of the French armies within their old 
 boundaries, the restoration of the ancient rights of the 
 various countries of Europe, and the provision of " security 
 for the future." They did not put forward the restora- 
 
TORY TRADITIONS, 37 
 
 tion of the former French dynasty as a necessary con- 
 •dition of agreement ; and it is noteworthy that this 
 condition had never been openly made by the English 
 Cabinet, from 1792 to 1814. But in almost every 
 document drawn up and published by our Government a 
 desire was expressed for this restoration, in terms well 
 calculated to set the French people against the notion of 
 a settlement. Thus in 1800 Lord Grenville wrote to 
 Talleyrand — ''His majesty makes no claim to prescribe 
 to France what should be the form of her government, 
 or in whose hands she shall vest the authority necessary 
 for conducting the aflPairs of a great and powerful nation;" 
 but in the same document he wrote — ''The best and 
 most natural pledge of the abandonment by France of 
 those gigantic schemes of ambition by which the very 
 existence of society in the adjoining States has so long 
 been menaced would be the restoration of that line of 
 princes which for so many centuries maintained the 
 French nation in prosperity at home and consideration 
 and respect abroad. Such an event would alone have 
 removed, and will at any time remove; all obstacles in 
 the way of negotiation or peace. . . .It would give to 
 all the other nations of Europe, in tranquillity and 
 peace, that security which they are now compelled to 
 seek by other means.'' 
 
 Talleyrand must have smiled at the idea of " pro- 
 sperity at home and consideration and respect abroad," 
 under Louis the Fourteenth, for instance ; and he must 
 have laughed to hear this eulogy on the Bourbon kings 
 from an English Minister. 
 
 There can be little doubt that this constant harping 
 on the advantages of a restoration would at all times 
 create a difficulty in the way of peace. Negotiations on 
 the basis of an acknowledgment of the Eepublic would 
 
74 TOBY TRADITIONS, 
 
 probably have succeeded with the Directory, if not with 
 the First Consul. But the Tory policy of England, 
 admitted or implied, was to destroy the Republic. The 
 war was originally waged against the republican pro- 
 paganda, which had grievously alarmed the English king 
 and his Ministers. The great distinction between Tories 
 and Whigs — at any rate the great distinction between 
 the prosecutors of the war and those who opposed it — 
 was that the former were smitten with panic and fired 
 with animosity, and resolved to kill the French Republic 
 at any conceivable cost, whilst the latter were at all 
 times willing to act on the first and truest policy of Pitt 
 — to leave France to settle her internal affairs as she 
 best could. 
 
 The continuation of the Tory management of foreign 
 affairs after the Congress of Vienna bears witness to the 
 survival of the party traditions in two senses. There 
 were the traditions of the old divine-right party, 
 champions of royalty, defenders of ancient privilege, 
 opponents on principle and with rare exceptions of 
 popular emancipation ; and there were further the tradi- 
 tions of method and of alliance, growing out of the six 
 great coalitions against Bonaparte. The Congress had, 
 on the whole, done a just and necessary work, but its 
 decisions were not all founded on the strictest principles 
 of justice. It had in profession and theory replaced the 
 former landmarks, but there had been departures from 
 the rule. The new map of Europe was in some respects 
 arbitrary ; the Great Powers had made and taken "com- 
 pensations," which had no sanction but their own will, 
 and no justification but by the right of possession and 
 force. In order to give each other a guarantee of their 
 
TORY TBADITIONS. 75 
 
 gains, and at the same time to provide against any 
 possible recrudescence of the revolutionary spirit in 
 Europe — crushed out for the present by the oppressive 
 weight of war — they entered into an agreement pledging 
 them to meet from time to time by common consent, to 
 discuss important matters of European concern, and par- 
 ticularly to concert measures for the suppression of 
 n^volutionary movements. That this was their special 
 and primary design is manifest not so much from the 
 wording of the various treaties signed by the monarchs 
 and plenipotentiaries at Paris as from the spirit of the 
 whole negotiation, and the character of the Congresses 
 which afterwards met. The first of these was appointed 
 for the year 1818, but the most memorable are the 
 two w^hich were subsequently held at Laybach and 
 Verona. 
 
 The sublimation of the intermeddling system of 
 foreign policy — from which gigantic evils, and here and 
 there an advantage, have accrued to the States subjected 
 to its influence — was attained in the Holy Alliance, 
 signed in 1815 between the monarchs of Russia, Austria, 
 and Prussia, and assented to by the other Continental 
 Powers. This mystical (and it may not be unfair to call 
 it a mystifying) treaty was regarded with jealousy and 
 dislike by all that was liberal in England ; and for- 
 tunately the constitution had prevented the Regent 
 from setting his hand to the document. Castlereagh 
 nevertheless expressed his qualified approval of it ; and 
 perhaps his common sense is more strongly impeached 
 l3y this approval than the quality of his statesmanship. 
 The treaty — which seems to have been the suggestion of 
 a female Russian fanatic, adopted and carried out by the 
 Czar — was on the face of it a piece of politico-religious 
 philadelphism, stufled with devotional fervour which 
 
76 TORY TRADITIONS. 
 
 suspicious men did not hesitate to call hypocrisy, but 
 which may after all have been only self-deception. The 
 secular gist of the Holy Alliance — for it had a secular 
 phrase wrapped up in its Christian verbiage — was simply 
 this : — '' The sole principle in vigour, either between the 
 said Governments or among their subjects, shall be the 
 determinatioD to render each other reciprocal aid, and to 
 testify by continued good deeds the unalterable mutual 
 affection by which they are animated. '^ 
 
 The Holy Alliance proved to be infinitely more injurious 
 in its application than in its inception ; though it is clearly 
 against the interests of mankind that the governments of 
 great military Powers should engage in the name of reli- 
 gion to render each other mutual aid. The natural result 
 of such a compact was that a nation struggling for its 
 liberty, and working out its development within its own 
 borders, might instantly be coerced into submission to a 
 hated tyranny by the forces of alien States. And this, 
 in fact, was what actually happened in the case of Naples 
 and Spain in 1820 and 1822. The Czar, to whom the 
 Holy Alliance owed its existence, called for a Congress of 
 the Powers, which accordingly met at Troppau at the 
 end of 1820, and adjourned to Laybach in the following 
 January. The decision formed at Troppau and carried 
 out at Laybach concisely expresses the practical realisa- 
 tion of Madame Krudener's mysticism. It was agreed 
 by the Powers — Russia, Austria, and Prussia, with 
 France and England at any rate sanctioning the pro- 
 ceeding by the presence of their representatives — that 
 though the spirit of the age demanded liberal institu- 
 tions, these institutions must come as a gift from the 
 sovereign, of his own free will ; that the Neapolitans and 
 Spaniards had presumed to acquire them for themselves ; 
 and that consequently the revolutionists must be put 
 
TORY TRADITIONS, 77 
 
 down by force. Accordingly an Austrian army was sent 
 into Naples, as in the following year a French army was 
 allowed to go into Spain, and the liberties of these two 
 countries, which might otherwise have been secured, were 
 crushed out at the moment of attainment by the simple 
 fiat of three despotic sovereigns. 
 
 Had the English Government any right to be repre- 
 sented at Troppau and Lay bach ? According to our 
 notions of to-day, decidedly not. The only excuse which 
 can be made for Sir Charles Stewart's presence at Trop- 
 pau is that the Grand Alliance was not yet practically 
 dead — that the English Cabinet did not wish abruptly 
 to withdraw from the concert established seven or eight 
 years before, and that our ambassador, though he attended 
 the Congress, formally demurred to its decision. Not- 
 withstanding this, it would have been a bolder and more 
 honest course to hold aloof altogether. England had 
 been unable, on account of the fundamental principles of 
 her constitution (as Lord Castlereagh admitted), to join 
 herself to the Holy Alliance. These Congresses were 
 summoned on the basis of that Alliance, and there was 
 therefore a good and sufficient reason for abstention. 
 There was also another reason amply strong — the 
 pronounced dislike of the English people for the Holy 
 Alliance and its unholy work. 
 
 The death of Lord Londonderry in 1822 marks a term 
 in the foreign policy of England. Canning, his successor 
 at the Foreign Office, was a man of very different senti- 
 ment and spirit. Though he had undertaken to carry 
 on the traditions by which his predecessor had been 
 governed, and which had been reduced to writing as a 
 guide for the future, he soon displayed the force of his 
 own character and genius. Perhaps the most liberal act 
 of the whole of Castlereagh's life was his statement of 
 
78 TOBY TRADITIONS. 
 
 England's position in regard to the Congress of Laybach. 
 Apart from his attitude on this occasion, his policy was 
 consistently restrictive and anti-revolutionary, whilst he 
 had come to be one of the most heartily abused states- 
 men in England. Canning was from first to last assured 
 of popular sympathy, and much of his official action was 
 essentially Liberal in its character. He stands out pro- 
 minently at a very important crisis in our national his- 
 tory ; but his foreign policy looked to the future rather 
 than to the past — was experimental rather than tradi- 
 tional — and had its root in popular desires and convic- 
 tions rather than in the schemes of statesmen and the 
 documents of the Foreign Office. 
 
IV. 
 
 POPULAR TRADITIONS. 
 
 Lord Castlereagh, in a Circular Note addressed to our 
 representatives at the foreign courts in January 1821, 
 explaining his inability to concur in the decisions of the 
 Congress of Laybach, pointed out that the scheme of 
 intervention in Italy for the purpose of suppressing the 
 Neapolitan revolt was *' diametrically opposed to the 
 fundamental laws of Great Britain." And at a previous 
 date, the principles of the Holy Alliance having been 
 impugned by Brougham in Parliament, he admitted that 
 the Prince Regent had been precluded by the Constitu- 
 tion from becoming a party to this agreement. 
 
 What, then, were the unwritten laws of this country 
 which made such an alliance with the Eastern despotisms 
 impossible for us ? What was the traditional spirit of 
 our Constitution which happily preserved us from parti- 
 cipatino- in so great an outrage on the liberties of other 
 nations 1 What prevented the enthusiastic Foreign Min- 
 ister of a Tory Government from acting in concert with 
 England's allies '? 
 
 The saving fact was nothing more nor less than this — 
 that our national edifice is based and built up on revolu- 
 tion ; that its foundation and corner stones are resistance 
 to oppression and the forcible exaction of free institutions 
 from reluctant monarchs and governments. It was im- 
 possible for King George or Lord Castlereagh to put his 
 hand to a document declaring that the admission of the 
 
80 POPULAR TRADITIONS. 
 
 people to power must be a spoDtaneous grace of tlie 
 sovereign, because every chapter of English history shows 
 that the acknowledgement of our riohts has been forced 
 upon our monarchs by their subjects. The nobles began 
 it for us when they broke their own feudal bonds with- 
 out specially consulting either their lord paramount or 
 their inferiors. The Estate of the Commons were no 
 sooner gathered in council than they carried on the work 
 of emancipation, and made of their taxes an instrument 
 against which the king was never able to contend for 
 ^ many years at a time. And the people at large soon 
 followed suit, wresting their liberty piecemeal from king 
 and lords and Commons as occasion served, or as dire 
 necessity urged them. The movement was always from 
 below upwards — by violent upheaval and not by conde- 
 scending grace. The royal goodwill was a royal accom- 
 modation to circumstances. Honest and consecrated 
 revolution was the actual lever by which the people of 
 this country made themselves free. 
 
 However it may have been up to the end of the 
 Stuart tyranny — however much Bolingbroke and his 
 school may have tried to persuade themselves that the 
 restoration of Charles the Second had wiped out the 
 stigma of the Puritan ascendency — there is no sober 
 doubt as to the thoroughly revolutionary character of 
 the Constitution after the compact of 1688. The arrange- 
 ment between William of Orange and the lords who 
 fetched him over, and between William and Mary and 
 the Parliament of 1689, was simply a business-like con- 
 tract, by which divine right was finally negatived, and 
 hereditary right was overruled. A throne-market was 
 set up : the people sold and William bought a crown. 
 Henceforth we were to date our liberties from a pronuncia- 
 miento of the aristocracy and a revolt of the army, from a 
 
POPULAR TRADITIONS, 8l 
 
 Dutch invasion and a declaration of rights. There was 
 no escape from this logical conclusion except for those 
 who contended that the people at large, mainly inarticu- 
 late at that moment, had no part in the contract, and 
 that they had the right to overturn it. This in fact has 
 been the argument and the theory of many inflexible 
 Tories ; but it was not the argument of the Government 
 in 1815. And it is not the argument of any statesman, 
 whatever his party, who comprehends the genius of his 
 country and the conditions of its developmeat. 
 
 The conduct of the English Ministry in holding aloof 
 from the Holy Alliance and declining to take part in the 
 interventions which sprang out of it was much criticised 
 at the time by Eussian and German writers, as well as 
 by a small section of the majority at home. It was 
 urged that the action of Pitt and his colleagues in 1793 
 and the action of Lord Liverpool and his colleagues in 
 1821 were inconsistent, whilst the Continental Powers 
 had every right to expect that the policy of the former 
 crisis would have been maintained by the more distinctly 
 Tory Government which had assisted in shaping the 
 treaties of 1815. But it is manifest that the grounds of 
 intervention were very different in the two cases. 
 Whatever may be thought of the justification for any or 
 all of the coalitions against France, they were formed to 
 ward off a real danger to Europe, 'whereas there was no 
 real danger in 1821 for any interests, monarchical or 
 other, outside the borders of Italy and Spain. No pro- 
 paganda was menaced from either of these countries, and 
 it is difficult to believe that the Eastern Powers (great 
 as their reason was for timidity) could have seriously 
 anticipated one. But the French propaganda had been 
 active and formidable, especially from the year 1792, 
 and the Eepublican armies had shown themselves quite 
 
 F 
 
82 POPULAR TRADITIONS. 
 
 capable of making good the threats of the Convention. 
 So far as England was concerned she had been extremely 
 unwilling to fight the Republic, and the war broke out 
 on the declaration of France. It was an absurdity to 
 suppose that either Spain or Naples or Piedmont would 
 wage war upon England, or that these countries would 
 have the power, even if they had the will, to disturb the 
 peace of united Europe. 
 
 Now it is scarcely necessary to point out that the 
 influence which saved us from war in 1821 was not the 
 influence of any traditional foreign policy, and least of 
 all the influence of the Tory tradition. The systematic 
 policies of the past century and a quarter had been built 
 up more or less upon coalitions with European States 
 for the maintenance of the balance of power. Nearly all 
 our wars had been undertaken for this purpose, or as the 
 result of an enmity created or nursed by this unreasonable 
 view of our international position. Such systems and 
 such traditions would clearly not have sufficed to guard 
 us against a coalition at Laybach or Verona. That 
 which did save us and guard us at this period was the 
 revolutionary character which our forefathers had im- 
 pressed upon the State, and the tradition of sympathy 
 with oppressed peoples which we had inherited even 
 from the davs of Elizabeth and of Cromwell. We had 
 aided foreign Protestants in securing freedom ; we had 
 conceded liberty to the American colonists as a right 
 conquered by violence ; and it was felt to be absolutely 
 impossible after such precedents that an English Minister, 
 be he ever so anxious to retain the friendship of the 
 king's allies, should consent to take part in suppressing 
 a revolution in another State. 
 
POPULAR TRADITIONS. S3 
 
 Here then we have a national tradition of forei<m 
 policy — a tradition which had not grown up in courts 
 and cabinets, which had not derived itself from a 
 dynasty, or an alliance, or a '' natural enemy " or friend, 
 but which was part and parcel of the national character, 
 as necessary to Englishmen as the spirit and resolution 
 which had won them their domestic liberties. It may 
 not be an absolute necessity that men determined to be 
 free should also determine that the people of other States 
 should gain their freedom ; though if there be such an 
 absolute rule it will account amongst other things for 
 the tendency to propaganda observed in many free 
 nations. It is enough to note as a fact that there has 
 long been amongst us this ardent sympathy with 
 struggling peoples — that it has on many occasions been a 
 potent influence for ourselves and for others — that it is 
 by this time a clearly recognised tradition of our foreign 
 policy — and that it is a tradition identified with the 
 national character, and not with either of the systems 
 elaborated by the great political parties. 
 
 If the mass of the English people had been in posses- 
 sion of power, or if they had had their due share of 
 power during several generations, the policy which is 
 essentially national and popular would have been 
 systematized, and it also like the other two would have 
 achieved its roll of splendid triumphs. As it is, the 
 triumphs of popular sentiment are sufiiciently great and 
 glorious, but they are not triumphs of a system. They 
 have been isolated, they have not hitherto availed to 
 build up a strong, compact, definite foreign policy ; or, 
 if the policy has at length been established, it is only in 
 our own generation, and it has scarcely conquered for 
 itself a place in history. Single traditions no doubt 
 have a history of their own ; but the edifice of traditions 
 
84 POPULAR TRADITIONS. 
 
 such as may constitute a system is at most a con- 
 struction of to-day. The tradition of ardent and some- 
 what aggressive sympathy with nationalities struggling 
 to be free — which forbids our statesmen to take the side 
 of the oppressor and occasionally compels him to take 
 the side of the oppressed — is amply and gloriously illus- 
 trated in the annals of Great Britain. "We owe the 
 credit of more than one chivalrous intervention between 
 tyrants and their victims to the spirit of militant Pro- 
 testantism ; for a nation did not cast off the yoke of 
 Eome without taking a sword in its hands, and the com- 
 mon effort against the common persecution made it 
 possible, if not indispensable, for the strong to come to 
 the aid of the weak. The patronage of Protestants in 
 the Low Countries by Elizabeth and the exaction of 
 toleration for the Waldenses by Cromwell are notable 
 instances of practical English sympathy for the oppressed 
 on the score of religion. Nearer to our own times, the 
 frequent interventions of our Government — at the instance 
 of public opinion — in behalf of Greeks, of Syrians, of 
 Poles, and of Slavs, afford ample evidence of the exist- 
 ence of this very effectual sentiment of universal freedom 
 in the Enolish mind. 
 
 Closely allied with this traditional motive is another, 
 equally powerful, more practical, and exercising a wider 
 influence over the nation as a whole. This also is ardent 
 and aggressive ; this also is essentially characteristic of 
 the people, and has more than once or twice imposed 
 action on Ministers of either party, engaged the efforts 
 of diplomacy, and incited national wars. It is the motive 
 of an industrious and commercial country, anxious to 
 establish in all parts of the world new markets for its 
 trade, new commercial centres, new alliances or mono- 
 polies as outlets to its superabundant energy. It is not 
 
POPULAR TRADITIONS. 85 
 
 altogether or of necessity a selfish instinct which has led 
 the English people to cover the surface of the globe with 
 a network of dependencies and colonies, of open ports 
 and guaranteed harbours ; but no doubt the constructive 
 selfishness of industry and enterprise is the spur whicli 
 has driven us to plant our standards of trade in every 
 productive clime, and which has placed our whole power 
 of attack and defence at the disposal of our merchants. 
 
 The line of contact between the two motives above 
 mentioned is to be found in the desire to surround our- 
 selves with independent nations which, being free as we 
 are free, may serve as bulwarks and buttresses of our 
 own power, and, being industrious as we are industrious, 
 may add to our commercial stability. This motive, the 
 resultant force of the other two, has been rather instinc- 
 tive than clearly defined in the past, but it is probably 
 destined to be the most precise tradition in the system of 
 national foreign policy which is gradually displacing the 
 systems of other days. It is a motive in every sense 
 worthy of a free and generous people, being equally 
 devoid of the quixotism which would make us an indis- 
 criminate champion of the oppressed and of the selfish- 
 ness which would lead us to profit ourselves at the 
 expense of the rest of mankind. In the strengthening 
 and confirmation of this tendency we are able to perceive 
 the harmonization of two traditions apparently irrecon- 
 cilable — and not only apparently irreconcilable but 
 actually antagonistic in spirit and operation. The 
 tradition which cast its influence upon us when in 
 the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries we (often un- 
 scrupulously) endeavoured to oust the Spaniards from 
 their monopolies in South America and the West Indies 
 is' assuredly hard to reconcile with the tradition which 
 caused us, at about the same times, to sacrifice life and 
 
86 POPULAR TRADITIONS, 
 
 treasure in defending the Protestants on the Continent. 
 The tradition exemplified in the arbitrary establishment 
 of our factories on the Indian Coast, and in plundering 
 and outraging the native races, is scarcely one in kind 
 with the tradition which constrained us to emancipate 
 our own slaves, and to exert pressure on other nations in 
 order to induce them to take a like course. The history 
 of the present generation will be full of similar contrasts ; 
 for the national desire to aid struggling nationalities and 
 to promote the cause of universal freedom operates side 
 by side with the keen determination to find a field for 
 British commerce in every inhabited country. 
 
 As it is certain that neither the one tradition nor the 
 other is in the meantime failing in vie^our — as in fact 
 both motives grow stronger amongst us year by year — 
 it is in the highest degree satisfactory that they should 
 exhibit this tendency to a mutual modification of form, 
 and that, whilst the sentiment of popular emancipation 
 becomes more and more practical, the instinct of com- 
 mercial aggression is chastened by a stronger respect for 
 justice. The tendency in question was aptly illustrated 
 at one and the same moment in the spring of 1881, by 
 the common sense and moral coura2:e which liberated 
 Thessaly without a blow and reverted to a policy of 
 just dealing in the Transvaal. 
 
 There is a warning as well as a consolation in the 
 check which the more generous policy is putting upon 
 the more unscrupulous one ; for manifestly they are not 
 always the same body of Englishmen who are obedient 
 to these two traditions, and particular cases must arise 
 in which the advocates of an aggressive policy will find 
 themselves practically opposed by men of the other way 
 of thinking, from whence grave evils may befall the 
 State. Within the memory of living men there have 
 
POPULAR TRADITIONS, 87 
 
 been several critical instances of this antao^onism of ideas 
 and interests — an antagonism severe and bitter whilst it 
 endures, and bringing at least the semblance of humilia- 
 tion upon us as a military Power, but nevertheless a 
 prelude to harmony in the not far-distant future when 
 pubhc opinion on these points shall be definitely formed. 
 Twice has an English aggression on Afghanistan, under- 
 taken by Anglo-Indians with a view to strengthening 
 the north-western frontier, and so (in their judgment) 
 consolidating an empire based on commercial develop- 
 ment, been repudiated and reversed at home. On both 
 occasions we had suffered disaster in the first place, 
 whereby the repudiation was made infinitely more diffi- 
 cult for statesmen and soldiers ; but on both occasions 
 we had first restored the military position and vindicated 
 ourselves by force of arms, so that we might undoubtedly 
 have held the country if we had wished. But the 
 Englishmen who considered that the primary duty of all 
 was to be upiight and moral, and that an immoral act 
 such as the invasion of Afghanistan ought to be undone 
 at any cost of pride and credit, were shown (especially 
 in 1880) to be in the majority, and their will prevailed 
 in spite of the most spirited protests of the other party. 
 It was the same with the repudiation of the Transvaal 
 aggression, which, unfortunately delayed until after the 
 shedding of blood, was still in a very real sense the work 
 of Englishmen who would not consent to ratify a transac- 
 tion based on injustice and greed. 
 
 It is needless to say that these renunciations of con- 
 quest and revindications of national morality are not to 
 be desired on their own account, or for any profit or 
 advantage which they bring to the empire. If it is well 
 not to keep a territory which has been gained by more 
 or less unscrupulous public servants, it would be de- 
 
88 POPULAR TRADITIONS. 
 
 cidedly better not to have taken such territory at all, 
 and not to have left a system in operation by which 
 individual men may at any time arrogate to themselves 
 the power to act unjustly in the name of their country. 
 And if national morality needs to be strongly asserted, 
 this might surely be done most reasonably by limiting 
 the irresponsibility of our proconsuls, and by avoiding 
 the entrance to transactions which the public conscience 
 is likely to disavow. It is not by such acts as the with- 
 drawal from Afghanistan and the retrocession of the 
 Transvaal that Englishmen should rejoice to prove their 
 moral strength, but rather by cultivating a public opinion 
 and a system of policy in which there should be no place 
 for aggression, whether authorised or unauthorised by 
 the Government. 
 
 A distinction may fairly be draw^n between the 
 aggressive policy of individuals or particular Ministries 
 and the as^orressive commercial tradition of the nation at 
 large ; for the one does not necessarily arise out of the 
 other, and there is no reason why the follies and crimes 
 of every public servant should be attributed to an in- 
 herent vice of the national character. The aggression 
 concocted by a Government, or by a Viceroy and his 
 council, or by a military clique, is usually undertaken 
 for certain political ends, for the achievement of brilliant 
 triumphs bringing promotions or prolongation of office 
 in their train ; and these ends are distinctly and clearly 
 vulgar. Against aggression of this kind the nation has 
 undoubtedly declared itself, and it is improbable that 
 we shall ever again be launched into wars of military 
 aggression. The people have already condemned and 
 renounced them ; and we may be sure that as the de- 
 
POPULAR TRADITIONS. 89 
 
 mocracy advances in dignity and self-respect it will be 
 less than ever disposed to sanction a war for the removal 
 of onr neighbours' landmarks. But the aggressive tradi- 
 tion which in other days led our merchants to extend 
 the sphere of their enterprise without much scruple was 
 in a way more respectable, because it partook of the 
 nature of ordinary competition in industrial pursuits, 
 and w^as rarely in the first instance anything more than 
 an arbitrary demand for freedom of commerce. This 
 tradition also is tending to become obsolete amongst us, 
 partly perhaps because we have already covered the 
 inhabited area of the world with our network of trade, 
 but chiefly because w^e are developing a courageous belief 
 in the greater efficacy of legitimate, honest, peaceful 
 extension. 
 
 There are those who contend that the policy of aggres- 
 sion has never in any case brought us even a material 
 and sordid benefit. Not only, they say, is the policy 
 immoral, whether its objects be political or commercial, 
 but it is not and cannot be successful. It may give em- 
 ployment to the army and navy — but the men had better 
 be adding to the wealth of their country by peaceful 
 labours. It may, as in the case of India, open up a 
 lucrative career for a vast number of. Englishmen — but 
 there is room at home for as many able-bodied men as 
 England can produce, and the conquest of great depend- 
 encies like India simply creates lucrative employment for 
 members of the well-to-do classes at the expense of the 
 British taxpayer. 
 
 Mr Bright developed this argument in a striking passage 
 of the first speech delivered by him to his constituents 
 at Birmingham ; and it would perhaps be impossible to 
 find anywhere else a more forcible exposition, in a few 
 words, of the contention that aggressive wars cannot de- 
 
90 POPULAR TRADITIONS. 
 
 velop the commercial interests of the nation. '* I am 
 inclined to think," he said, '' that with the exception of 
 Australia there is not a single dependency of the Crown 
 which, if we come to reckon what it has cost in war and 
 protection, would not be found to be a positive loss to 
 the people of this country. Take the United States, 
 with which we have such an enormous and constantly 
 increasinof trade. The wise statesmen of the last srenera- 
 tion, men whom your school histories tell you were states- 
 men, serving under a monarch who, they tell you, was a 
 patriotic monarch, spent £130,000,000 of the fruits of 
 the industry of the people in a vain — happily a vain — 
 endeavour to retain the colonies of the United States 
 in subjection to the monarchy of England. Add up the 
 interest of that £130,000,000 for all this time, and how 
 long do you think it will be before there will be a profit 
 on the trade with the United States which will repay 
 the enormous sum we invested in a war to retain those 
 States as colonies of this empire ? It never will be paid 
 off. Wherever you turn you will find that the opening 
 of markets, developing of new countries, introducing 
 cotton cloth with cannon balls, are vain, foolish, and 
 wretched excuses for wars, and ought not to be listened 
 to for a moment by any man who understands the multi- 
 plication table, or who can do the simplest sum in arith- 
 metic. Since the ' Glorious Revolution,' since the en- 
 thronisation of the great Norman territorial families, 
 they have spent in wars, and we have worked for, about 
 £2,000,000,000. The interest on that is £100,000,000 
 per annum, which alone, to say nothing of the principal 
 sum, is three or four times as much as the whole amount 
 of your annual export trade from that time to this. 
 Therefore, if war has provided you with a trade, it 
 has been at an enormous cost ; but I think it is 
 
POPULAR TRADITIONS, 91 
 
 by no means doubtful that your trade would have 
 been no less in amount and no less profitable had 
 peace and justice been inscribed on your flag in- 
 stead of conquest and love of military renown.'' Mean- 
 while, whether we were at peace or whether we were at 
 war, our public debt continually increased. Whatever 
 the increase of our population, of our machinery, of our 
 industry or our wealth, still the National Debt went on 
 increasing. " Although we have not a foot more terri- 
 tory to conserve, or an enemy in the world who dreams 
 of attacking us, we find that our annual military ex- 
 penses during the last twenty years " — this was spoken in 
 1858— ''have risen from £12,000,000 to £22,000,000.'' 
 The great progress of public opinion in this du-ection 
 since Mr Bris^ht uttered these words is an evidence not 
 so much of the personal influence of the speaker — though 
 that influence could not easily be exaggerated — as of a 
 reaction and return to the accepted doctrines of the days 
 of Walpole. Walpole, as we have seen, clung to peace 
 at almost any price. He laboured to show the country, 
 and he did show it very successfully, how our national 
 w^ealth and industries might be developed by peace 
 instead of by war, and he would never consent, until 
 the intrigues of his rivals and the madness of the people 
 forced his hands, to adopt the barbarous method against 
 which his judgment protested. The national and popu- 
 lar tradition of peaceful commercial development had 
 scarcely come into existence in the eighteenth century. 
 Walpole was one of its originators, and as such he stands 
 out of the line of the Whig and Tory exponents of 
 foreign policy. In the meantime the national and 
 popular tradition of commercial development by aggres- 
 sion was in full force, and it was a gust of passion 
 generated by this tradition which drove Walpole into. 
 
92 POPULAR TRADITIONS, 
 
 the Spanish war of 1739. A century and a quarter 
 after the fall of Walpole, aided by the lessons of the 
 forty years' peace, and the deep misgivings excited by 
 the Crimean war, Englishmen had begun to recognise 
 a newer and better way, and to discern the outlines of 
 the nobler system which their forefathers had been 
 building up for them. 
 
 On the whole it seems reasonable to conclude that 
 the temper of the English people in regard to questions 
 of foreign policy has been developed from its best and 
 most generous traditions. At any rate the process is in 
 operation, and the chronicle of events from year to year 
 attests the fact. Of the aspects of what has been shown 
 to be in the present age the national policy of dealing 
 with international affairs something further must be said 
 hereafter in a different connection ; but in the meantime 
 it is interesting to observe how steadily and logically the 
 development just mentioned has been carried on during 
 the past hundred years. 
 
 The popular sympathy with struggling nationalities 
 (which combines with the cultivation of an industrious 
 peace to constitute what is likely to be England's foreign 
 policy in the future) received a notable stimulation 
 towards the close of the last century. The revolution- 
 ary epoch from which the present political liberties of 
 so many European peoples trace their origin gave to 
 England less in the shape of political liberty than it 
 gave to some other nations, whose need of liberty was 
 greater ; but still the boons which it conferred upon us 
 were neither few nor slight. Amongst them was a 
 firmer conviction and a clearer demonstration of the 
 rights of communities to self-government, and especially 
 the right of a nation to take its affairs into its own hands. 
 The success of the French outbreak had given a sanction 
 
POPULAR TRADITIONS. 93 
 
 to revolution, and the fairly judicious behaviour of the 
 leaders during the first three years gained for the move- 
 ment a certain kind of acceptance even amongst Tory 
 politicians. In England it was of course rather a 
 question of fellow-feeling for revolutionists by revolu- 
 tionists than one of astonished admiration for a new 
 departure in history. We too had had our rebellions, 
 had dethroned our kings, and established Parliamentary 
 supremacy. We too, both at home and in America, had 
 crowned successful revolt. We were before and not 
 behind the French in adapting old methods to new 
 needs and circumstances — before and not behind them 
 in making revolution respectable ; but perhaps for this 
 very reason we looked on at the convulsions of our 
 neighbours with the deepest interest. 
 
 It is impossible that we in our generation should be 
 able to realise the intense sympathy felt by our grand- 
 fathers with the French people — with Assembly, Conven- 
 tion, and Directory — in their efi*orts to establish a solid 
 Eepublic, in the thoroughness of their creed, and in the 
 heroic struggle of the saiis-ciilottes against the armies 
 of monarchical Europe. There can be no doubt what- 
 ever that this great spectacle, which was in itself a 
 political education, drew out and confirmed our tradi- 
 tional preference for the revolutionary mode of national 
 progress, and added strength to the sentiment which 
 made our ancestors ever ready to espouse the cause of 
 the peoples. For a few years the elation and en- 
 thusiasm excited by these events were shared by a 
 majority of Englishmen. Pitt, as we have seen, was 
 influenced by them long after the bulk of his party had 
 taken sides with the eastern despotisms. It is true that 
 the excesses of the Jacobins alienated a large section of 
 the Whigs, and left only the more robust friends of 
 
94 POPULAR TRADITIONS. 
 
 liberty in sympathy with the French Republic. But 
 Fox and his followers, with all who felt like them 
 amongst the general English pu1)lic, were able to look 
 beyond the troubles and crimes of the day, and to per- 
 ceive the immeasurable advantages which the upheaval 
 of France must ultimately confer upon the world. If 
 passion and prejudice, as well as just reprobation, blinded 
 men for a long time to the real achievements of the French 
 revolution, and to the actual gains of the revolutionary 
 epoch throughout Europe, there were some at any rate 
 who could not be thus blinded ; and there came a time 
 when the majority of Englishmen saw cause to acknow- 
 ledge a balance of good. 
 
 The death of Napoleon at St Helena, and the similar 
 course of England and France in regard to the Holy 
 Alliance and the Congress of Lay bach (though the French 
 Government were not unwilling to receive a mandate 
 from the Alliance at Verona), tended to diminish 
 the gulf which a quarter of a century of wars had 
 created between the two countries. Their subsequent 
 joint action in Greece — where they made it their business 
 to promote the success of an insurrection — helped to draw 
 them yet more nearly together. The revolutions of 1830 
 and 1848, regarded by many Frenchmen as vindicat- 
 ing the work of 1789 — ^just as in England 1688 had 
 been taken to vindicate 1649 — ^certainly did much to 
 reconquer the positions won and lost during the first 
 Republic. 
 
 Between 1789 and 1870 there have been frequent 
 action and reaction in the revolutionary development of 
 France, which have necessarily produced cognate move- 
 ments in Europe at large. The pendulum has swung 
 backwards and forwards, but the hands on the dial have 
 steadily advanced ; and the timepiece marks the progress 
 
POPULAR TRADITIONS. 95 
 
 of England at least as accurately as that of France. Our 
 revolutions in the meanwhile have cost us less, and have 
 been less dramatic, than those of our neighbour, but 
 undoubtedly we have been well justified by their results 
 for the sympathy which we had displayed towards the 
 ideas of 1789. Our policy of peace, retrenchment, and 
 reform — shaped out before Louis had so much as con- 
 sented to summon the States General — was first impeded, 
 then notably strengthened, by the portentous conflict in 
 Europe ; and in no respect has this policy been more 
 distinctly advanced, nowhere has it been more successful, 
 than in its application to foreign affairs. 
 
 Electoral reform in England has exerted a greater 
 influence on our relations with other countries than 
 might be imagined by unreflecting persons. The only 
 sure mode of giving effect in every generation to the will 
 of the people in matters of external policy is by making 
 the people themselves the masters of their own destinies ; 
 and this is not possible until the representative system of 
 government is brought to perfection. In 1793 the last 
 word was with the aristocrats and the nabobs. After 
 1832 it was to a somewhat fuller jury that a Minister 
 was able to appeal for sanction ; but even in 1853 Lord 
 Aberdeen could not share his responsibility (as he would 
 perhaps have gladly done) with the nation as a whole. 
 He w^ent unwillingly to a worthless war — a war which 
 almost every one now condemns, and which might have 
 been forbidden then, as war of a like kind was forbidden 
 in 1876 and 1878 — if the chief sufferers by war could 
 have been consulted. From 1868 onwards we have had 
 a fairly wide franchise and a tolerably complete represen- 
 tation of the responsible classes ; and from 1868 it has 
 
96 POPULAR TRADITIONS, 
 
 seemed less and less probable that England will ever 
 again undertake a wanton or an avoidable war. 
 
 It is argued that if we were to guide ourselves by the 
 j^opular foreign policy which might happen to be upper- 
 most from year to year we should fall into a hundred 
 dangers and disasters — that the people would be bad 
 Foreign Ministers and diplomatists — that popular opinion 
 is often distorted by passion, or misled by ignorance and 
 demagogy — and that we could not possibly dispense in 
 the management of our international concerns with the 
 experience and subtlety of men trained to the craft. 
 There is doubtless a certain danger of this kind, which 
 may be estimated at what it is worth ; but when we see 
 what ruling classes have done for us in the past we can 
 hardly feel much alarm in regard to the national self- 
 government of the future. Nor is it by any means 
 certain that popular opinion, or passion, or ignorance 
 would often lead the country astray on questions of war 
 and peace, of commercial interchange and reciprocation. 
 So far indeed as we have had the means of judging since 
 the direction of affairs has come practically into the 
 hands of the people, the interests of England have been 
 perfectly safe with them, and the instincts of the masses 
 have been sound and patriotic. 
 
 Leaving this question, however, for further considera- 
 tion in another place, we may be content with the fact 
 that the extension of the franchise and a better electoral 
 system have transferred a large share of political power 
 to the democracy, and that as a consequence the popular 
 traditions of sympathy with oppressed races, peaceful 
 commercial development, straightforward dealing with 
 powerful or weaker nations, and abhorrence of war, have 
 been raised to something like the influence formerly 
 possessed by the Tory and Whig traditions. The long 
 
POPULAR TRADITIONS. 97 
 
 stretch of peace which followed the Napoleonic wars may 
 have been due in the first place to exhaustion and revul- 
 sion; but the great revolution of 1832 undoubtedly made 
 us more loth, as a nation, to engage in European conflicts. 
 The Afghan war was undertaken against the will or 
 without the knowledge of Englishmen in general. The 
 Crimean war was '' drifted" into by the coalition Minis- 
 try of Lord Aberdeen, vastly to the discredit of the 
 older officialism. The exjDcditionary wars which have 
 since taken place have been for the most part avoidable, 
 and may (let us hope) be regarded as the last outcome 
 of a system fallen into decay. 
 
 In yet another sense the revolutionary epoch eff*ected 
 a large modification of England's attitude towards the 
 outer world. The vast distm-bances and complications 
 which arose out of the French upheaval stimulated the 
 2^opular craving for peace. There had of course always 
 been a peace party in England, or at any rate there had 
 been a numerous body of men who protested against the 
 frequency of wars, and who were able in one way or 
 another to make their voices heard in favour of peace. 
 The demand for a peaceful policy had been formulated 
 before Walpole s time ; his Administration sanctioned it 
 iind made it a permanent factor in politics. It was pre- 
 eminently a popular demand; but the most formal writers 
 on international law — as Grotius in the seventeenth cen- 
 tury, and Vattel in the eighteenth — treat it as a legi- 
 timate and serious problem for the consideration of 
 publicists. Grotius recommended a Congress of nations 
 for the purpose of settling international disputes without 
 recourse to war ; and towards the close of the eighteenth 
 century the idea of arbitration had assumed a definite 
 shape — not indeed so definite in Europe as in the minds 
 of the genuine statesmen who presided over the birth of 
 
98 FOFULAll TBADITIONS. 
 
 the American Eepiiblie. Fi-ankliu, Jefierson, Adams, 
 took the j^hilosophical view of the question whicli was 
 naturally generated in a country so far removed from 
 the influence of the older monarchies, and which was 
 so well calculated to form the tahida rasa of their new 
 political system. Franklin declared with his character- 
 istic boldness that there had never been a good war or 
 II bad peace. Jefferson stigmatised war as '^ an instru- 
 ment entirely ineflicient towards redressing wrongs," 
 whicli increased instead of indemnifying losses. These 
 were the men who had come out of our heavily-taxed 
 and ever pugnacious England, and they were anxious to 
 return good for evil by exposing the mischief of chronic 
 wars, '' by Avhich," as Samuel Adams said, " the world 
 has too lono' been deluoed, to the destruction of human 
 happiness and the disgrace of human reason and govern- 
 ment." 
 
 But the old country had yet her terrible lessons to 
 learn. It might have been infinitely better for the world 
 if English statesmen a hundred years ago had been 
 willing to accept this lesson also from the exiles Avho 
 had already taught them that a nation struggling for its 
 liberties can never be finally crushed. If Pitt had been 
 a Peace Minister in fact, as well as in desire, and the 
 French scourge had never passed over us, the aspirations 
 of the popular advocates of peace might have been ful- 
 filled, even in the eighteenth century. 
 
 The pioneers of the revolutionary epoch in Europe 
 were perhaps more sentimental and less practical than 
 the Americans ; they looked to the immediate creation 
 of Utopias rather than to gradual and logical develop- 
 ment, and yearned for universal peace when they should 
 have been devising plans for arbitration or disarmament. 
 But at all events they set peace before the world as an 
 
POPULAR TRADITIONS. 99 
 
 aim aud object, and so familiarised the minds of men 
 Avdth its beauty and virtue that the speedy abolition of 
 war became one of the primary interests of the great 
 political revival. Saint-Pierre, Leibnitz, Fichte, Ben- 
 tham, amongst a score of propagandists, led the way in 
 the new cult of peace ; and to the fervid imagination of 
 philosophers and philanthropists this cult was never 
 nearer to its consummation than in the first intoxicating 
 triumphs of 1789 and 1790. 
 
 The quarter of a century of war which was substituted 
 by the irony of fate for the expected apotheosis of peace 
 devastated and exhausted the whole of Europe, but it 
 did not (as it could not) destroy the revolutionary ideas 
 iigainst which despotism had set its face like a flint. 
 Paradoxical as it appears, the revolution had meant and 
 made for peace, and the suppression of the revolutionary 
 Governments contributed in no small degree to the ulti- 
 mate repudiation of war. No sooner was the work of 
 the last Grand Alliance completed than the peoples in 
 almost every European country began to stir and murmur 
 in their hives. Revolution rose from the ashes of re- 
 volution ; France herself, and Spain, and the Italian 
 States, and the English democracy which had so patiently 
 awaited its turn, took up the tale of 1789 as though it 
 had never been interrupted, and carried on the process 
 of development as though the chain had been unbroken 
 throughout those five weary lustrums. 
 
 The speeches, the books and pamphlets, the general 
 history of the second and third decades of the century 
 reveal a notable growth of democratic sentiment and 
 activity amongst Englishmen of nearly all classes. There 
 had been democratic activity on the outbreak of the 
 French revolution ; we had our Friends of the People, 
 our Corresponding Society, our "seditious meetings" 
 
100 POPULAR TRADITIONS. 
 
 (distinguislied mainly by abnormal demands for a better 
 representative system, and alarming tlireats of with- 
 holding taxes until these demands were accorded). But 
 a petty white terror had suppressed the red radicalism of 
 our puny revolution ; and, indeed, the common-sense 
 English people, which had no sympathy with Jacobinism, 
 sharply repudiated French modes and models of progress 
 when tliey saw to A\'liat a miserable kind of caesarism 
 they had brought the men of '89. The democracy suited 
 to English minds was the democracy which had seen 
 disaster in English victories over the American colonists, 
 and glory in the final triumph of the States — the demo- 
 cracy of Fox, the virtual democracy of Pitt in his youth, 
 of Lord Grey when he declared that resistance to laws 
 thought bad was justifiable if it were likely to be success- 
 ful. In the worst days of the NajDoleonic tyranny 
 sensible men put the light of their democratic tendencies 
 under a bushel, and stood aside until the whirlwind had 
 passed. Fox admitted that the cry for reform Avas ill- 
 timed in 1796, and ten years later he took office without 
 stipulating any of the points which he would have 
 thought indispensable a dozen years before. 
 
 But when the war was over and Napoleon was in 
 exile, the truce in Eng-land drew to an end. There was 
 no longer the French bugbear to be thought of — more 
 injurious to the cause of English democrats than menac- 
 ing to the crown or the aristocracy. Jacobinism and 
 imperialism had alike been effaced in blood, and there 
 remained for us chiefly the great lessons which had 
 borne their fruit in the first and genuinely popular 
 uprising of France. From the signing of the Treaty of 
 Paris the English people began to insist on taking the 
 ]nanagement of their affairs at home and abroad into 
 tlieir own hands. The peace which they had regained 
 
POPULAB TRADITIONS. 101 
 
 they resolved to make permanent. The war which had 
 wrecked and ruined them they determined to make their 
 last. The gallant struggle which succeeded has been 
 told with eloquence and unction by many historians, and 
 it may be told hereafter with even more of philosophic 
 breadth and courage. It is a story in which we see the 
 democracy of England asserting its strength and claim- 
 ing its inheritance ; and it is a story in which no feature 
 is more conspicuously prominent than the effort to 
 establish peace on a secure and stable basis. 
 
 There are aspects of our still somewhat inchoate 
 popular foreign policy which deserve to be considered in 
 detail ; but it may be interesting in the meantime to 
 review in historic order some of the more important 
 personal policies of the nineteenth century. 
 
V. 
 
 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLIGY. 
 
 (Teorge Canning, .... 
 
 Born, Apr. 1770 
 
 M.P. for Newport, .... 
 
 1793 
 
 Foreign Secretar}' {Portland Admin.), . 
 
 Mar. 1807 
 
 Duel with Castlereagh ; resigned, 
 
 Sept. 1809 
 
 Ambassador at Lisbon, 
 
 1814 
 
 President, Board of Control {Liverpool Ad/niii.)., 
 
 June 1816 
 
 Resigned, ..... 
 
 Dec. 1820 
 
 Appointed Governor-General of India, 
 
 Mar. 1822 
 
 Foreign Secretary (Liverpool Admin.), . 
 
 Sept. 1822 
 
 First Lord, ..... 
 
 Apr. 1827 
 
 Died, ... ... 
 
 Aug. 1827; 
 
 Few Engiislimen of liis time coiifeiTed greater Ijenefits 
 on their coimtiy than Canning. His policy was popular, 
 liberal, generous, and straightforward ; he was at a most 
 <]:ritical period the champion of liberty against a more 
 insidious foe than Bonaparte had ever been ; and he 
 had the extreme felicity of l:)eing able to establish free 
 nations on Ijoth sides of the Atlantic, and to strike a 
 blow at oppression such as made the despots reel. Short 
 as his life was, he died not too soon for his fame. If he 
 had lived another twenty years there might have been 
 little more for him to do ; though it is quite possible 
 that he would have ended his political career as a WJiig, 
 or at least have stood by Peel's side in the honourable 
 attitude of *'a great Parliamentary middleman." He 
 would not indeed have taken part with Grey, and his 
 old antagonist Brougham, in extending the franchise — a 
 course to which he was always obstinately and even 
 bitterly opposed. He could not have entered with the 
 
CANXLYG'S FOREIGN POLICY. 103 
 
 Duke of Richmond into a coalition Cabinet. The con- 
 tinuance of his Administration, supported by his great 
 { )opularity in the country, would doubtless have deferred 
 J teform ; and if he had eventually stood aside to let a 
 Reform Act pass he would probal^ly have returned to 
 office either a converted Whig or the leader of an irresis- 
 tible combination. Tory as he was in many respects, he 
 had sufficiently attested his liberal sympathies by his 
 youthful generosity, by his support of Catholic eman- 
 <"ipation and the abolition of the slave trade, and above 
 all by the resolution and energy with which he rescued 
 his country from its damaging connection with the 
 despots who, as he said, '' with the gospel on their lips 
 were ready to crush free institutions with the sword." 
 
 Canning was one of the boys whom Pitt had the art 
 of gathering about him, and inspiring with his own 
 indomitable activity. Fresh from Eton and Christ 
 Church, half inclining to cast in his lot with Fox, 
 Sheridan, Burke, and the brilliant school of Whigs whose 
 brilliance was fated to be almost its sole reward, he was 
 sent for by the great Minister, and tempted with the 
 offer of a seat in Parliament and a contingency of office. 
 Poor and ambitious, he might have had difficulty in 
 refusino' such a chance if he had been conscientiously 
 opposed to the politics of his patron. But he was not 
 conscientiously opposed to these politics. He had not 
 committed himself to the leaders to whom his uncle had 
 introduced him, and his opinions on such questions as 
 that of Parliamentary reform —with which even Pitt had 
 coquetted — are a proof that he did little violence to him- 
 self by accepting the invitation of the Premier. He was 
 Imrely twenty-five when he was made Under-Secretary 
 for Foreign Afiairs, and though that position was not 
 one of special responsibility so long as the Foreign 
 
104 CJKA7NG'S FOIIEIGN POLICY. 
 
 Secretary was in the House of Commons, or with Pitt 
 himself in the Commons, yet the circumstances of the 
 time made the post important. As Pitt's pupil and 
 favourite lieutenant Cannino^ of course became a war 
 Minister like his leader ; and he was always more 
 or less a war Minister, to the end of his life. He 
 shnred the official belief of the day, that France, and in 
 particular Napoleon Bonaparte, must be subdued at all 
 costs ; just as, later in life, he made up his mind that 
 the Holy Alliance must be put down, whatever that also 
 mio'ht cost. 
 
 Pitt saw that he had not made a mistake in his esti- 
 mate ; and as long as he lived Canning was honourably 
 associated with him. But the young politician was not 
 a man to conciliate friendships. His tongue and his pen 
 were too bitter, his sallies of wit or humour were too 
 vehement and straight to the mark, for close amity with 
 any but his intimate connections. The Anti-Jacohin 
 made him almost as many foes as it gained him admirers. 
 When he rose to speak in the House men Avould get up 
 and walk out — not because he was a bore to whom it 
 would be tedious to listen, but because he was clever 
 enough to be worth snubbing. His quarrel and duel 
 with Castlereagh were the climax of a rivalry, or at any 
 rate the outcome of an antipathy, which caused his with- 
 dra\\'al from Parliamentary life at a most critical period, 
 and heightened a contrast of conduct and policy alto- 
 gether favourable to the younger man.* 
 
 * Canning is perhaps not much, read in our time ; and it may be his 
 own fault. He certainly has the virtue of pungency in denunciation 
 and spirit in the eulogy of his friends. His invectives on the French 
 revolutionists were bitter enough, and still more bitter his scorn of the 
 English sympathisers Avith or palliators of the French. Here, for in- 
 stance, is the hymn which was to welcome in St Paul's thu high-priest 
 of the Theo-philanthropists. 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 105 
 
 So far as our present purpose is concerned, Canning is 
 to be regarded simply as one who carried on and modified 
 the traditions of our foreign policy during an epoch on 
 which the subsequent history of England, as of the 
 world, has so largely turned. And in thus regarding 
 him we must draw a certain distinction between his 
 conduct as Foreign Minister in 1807-9 and his conduct 
 as Foreign Minister and Premier after 1822. Not that 
 Canning turned his coat in the interval, or, in the 
 Avords of a Tory historian, "sacrificed principle to 
 ambition, and climbed to power by adopting the principles 
 
 Couriers and Stars, sedition's evening host, 
 Thou Morning Chronicle and Morning Post ! 
 Whether ye make the rights of man your theme, 
 Your country libel, and your God blaspheme, 
 Or dirt on private worth and virtue throw, 
 Still blasphemous or blackgiiard, praise Lepaux. 
 
 And ye five other wandering bards that move 
 In sweet accord of harmony and love, 
 
 C dge and S . . th . y, L . . . d, and L , . b, and Co., 
 
 Tune all your mystic harps to praise Lepaux ! 
 
 Pr . . , tl . y and W . . . f . , Id, humble, ho\y men, 
 Give praises to his name with tongue and pen I 
 
 Th . Iw . 1, and ye that lecture as ye go, 
 
 And for your pains get pelted, praise Lepaux I 
 
 Praise him each jacobin, or fool, or knave. 
 
 And your cropped heads in sign of worship wave ! 
 
 All creeping creatures, venomous and low, 
 
 Paine, W . 11 . . ms, G . dw . n, H . Icr . ft— praise Lepaux ! 
 
 And so on. In a more generous vein is a song -written in 1802 in 
 honour of Pitt, for the inaugural ceremony of the Pitt Club. 
 
 If hush'd the loud whirlwind that ruffled the deep, 
 
 The sky if no longer dark tempests deform ; 
 "When our perils are past shall our gratitude sleep ? 
 
 JSo I — Here's to the pilot that weather'd the storm ! 
 
 . , . And shall not his memory to Britain be dear, 
 Whose example with envy all nations behold ; 
 
 A statesman unbiass'd by interest or fear. 
 By power uncorrupted, untainted by gold ? 
 
 Who when Terror and Doubt through the universe reign'd, 
 While Rapine and Treason their standards unfurl'd, 
 
 The heart and the hoj)es of his country maintain'd. 
 
 And one kingdom preserved 'midst the wreck of the world. 
 
106 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY, 
 
 wliicli lie had spent the best part of his life iu com- 
 bating." There is not mucli evidence even of a change 
 of <3pinion which wouki justify such a charge as this ; 
 and change of opinion is not sacrifice of principle. He 
 changed by natural development of mind, and was able 
 to point at every step to the reasonable and logical 
 motives which constrained him. It may be that as a 
 young man fresh from Oxford — where the first Marquis 
 of Lansdowne had already pointed him out as future 
 Premier of England — he hesitated for some days or 
 weeks before casting in his lot with either party. So 
 
 . . . So, Pitt ! when the course of thy greatness is o'er, 
 
 Thy talents, thy virtues, we fondly recall ! 
 Xow justly we j)rize thee, when lost we deplore, 
 
 Admired in thy zenith, but loved in thy fall ! 
 
 . . . And O ! if again the rude whirlwind should rise, 
 The dawning of peace should fresh darkness deform, 
 
 The regrets of the good, and the fears of the wise, 
 Shall turn to the pilot that weather'd the storm ! 
 
 His "Ode to the Doctor" is a fair sample of the kind of wit which 
 made Canning feared in the House. It is a good hit at the rival 
 of his own leader and patron, struck after Addington had ventured on 
 a particularly bold piece of nepotism. 
 
 When the faltering periods lag, 
 
 Or the Rouse receives them drily, 
 (.'heer, oh cheer him. Brother Bragge, 
 
 Cheer, oh cheer him, Brother Hiley. 
 
 Each a gentleman at large. 
 Lodged and fed at public charge, 
 Paying, with a grace to charm ye, 
 This the fleet and that the army. 
 
 Brother Bragge and Brother Hiley, 
 Cheer him when he speaks so vilely ; 
 Cheer him when his audience flag. 
 Brother Hiley, Brother Bragge. 
 
 Equally familiar to the reader Avill be Canning's comparison of his 
 friend with the statesman w^ho succeeded him in office — " Pitt is to 
 Addington what London is to Paddington." Canning, however, could 
 take as well as give — and perhaps he had to take more than he gave. 
 *' Give me," he said, in his " New Morality " — 
 
 (Jive me the avowed, the erect, the manly foe, 
 Bold I can meet — j^^^l^^ps may turn his blow ; 
 Kut of all plagues, good Heaven, thy wrath can send, 
 Save, save, oh ! save me from the candid friend ! 
 
CANXING'S FOREIGN POLICY, 107 
 
 iiiucli at least may Le allowed as part of the defect of 
 youth. The page was clean and blank ; the pencil was 
 put into his hand, and when he sketched the plan of his 
 ambition he had nothing to erase. At the outbreak of 
 the French Kevolution he was a student at Christ 
 Church — a generous boy of nineteen, full of the storm 
 and impetus of enthusiasm, and ready to believe all good 
 things of his fellow men. He l^elieved well of the 
 Revolution, as Pitt, his elder by eleven years, and most of 
 the able men on both sides believed. If soon afterwards 
 he displayed Ijitter enmity against the Republic in its 
 military phase, he did so in common with the majority 
 of the Whigs, as well as wdtli Pitt and the Tories. 
 Nothing so much attests the constancy of the more gener- 
 ous views which are mainly associated with his memory 
 by the present age than the lack of sympathy always 
 apparent between him and Castlereagh. It is Castle- 
 reagh, not Canning, Avho typifies for us the anti-popular 
 aspects of the diplomacy of that age. One of the most 
 memorable acts of Cannino-'s first term in the Foreim 
 
 o o 
 
 Office was his unsuccessful attempt in 1809 to secure the 
 removal of Castlereagh from the Government. His utter 
 inability to fall in with Castlereagh's views and methods 
 led to his j)ractical exclusion from office during most of 
 the long term between his resignation in the year just 
 named and his second appointment as Foreign Secretary. 
 The change which came over the spirit of English 
 policy in 1822 was soon made manifest, and the 
 sovereigns and statesmen of eastern Europe found to 
 their cost that they had a very different kind of man to 
 deal with now that Canning had taken the place of Lord 
 Londonderry. It was the time when the Czar and his 
 associates believed that they might advantageously put 
 the Holy Alliance into active operation — when, in fiict, 
 
108 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 they did give effect to that sacred compact by sup- 
 j)ressing the revolutions in Italy and Spain. London- 
 deny himself had Ijeen obliged to confess that England 
 could take no part in an intervention between the 
 monarch of any country and his subjects — unless indeed 
 it were in behalf of the subjects ; but he had done this 
 with much tenderness for the feelings of his Russian, 
 Prussian, and Austrian friends, and had been at pains to 
 soften down (if not apologise for) the peculiar constitu- 
 tion of his country. Canning lost no time in showing the 
 crowned heads and ministers of those countries (and all 
 else whom it might concern) that their divine right, Hoi}' 
 Alliance and unholy act principles found no response in 
 the minds of Englishmen save one of abhorrence and 
 repudiation. . The foreign statesmen with whom Canning 
 had to deal — the Metternichs and Nesselrodes of the 
 imperial courts — were sufficiently well read to know the 
 genius of the English constitution, and their chief art in 
 intriguing with our representatives in the past had been 
 to cozen and flatter us into overstepping the lines of that 
 constitution. With Castlereagh they had in some 
 measure succeeded ; and it must have been very 
 galling to them to be confronted by an English Tory 
 statesman who addressed them almost in the strain of 
 a Fox. 
 
 Canning indeed Avas not Ijy any means a mere Tory. 
 He was a Free Trader, he was for Catholic emancipation, 
 he was for the entire abolition of slavery. And above 
 all he Avas a believer in the great advantages, com- 
 mercial and other, which would be reaped hj England 
 as a commercial country from the establishment of free 
 nations all over the world. He had not been member 
 for Liverpool Avithout learning much commercial wisdom 
 from Mr Gladstone and his other friends and suj^porters 
 
CJNNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 109 
 
 in that thriving port. He had not been President of 
 the Board of Trade Avithout comtatino- and assimilatino; 
 the doctrines of political economy. His receptive and 
 candid mind had readily admitted the force of the argu- 
 ments employed by those who assured him that the 
 future prosperity of England demanded a continual 
 enlargement of the field of her traffic beyond the seas. 
 And he would not have been a statesman if he had 
 not constructed upon this basis a system of practical 
 policy. 
 
 The generous characteristics of Canning's foreign 
 j)olicy have already been affirmed. Apart from these, 
 have we not here, in what may be called the Liverpool 
 School of commercial development, a main source and 
 motive power of the system associated with his name ? 
 And was it not, in effect, the revival of the Whig system 
 of Walpole, qualified and enlarged by the imperial lean- 
 ings of a quasi-Tory Minister ? 
 
 Canning's secretary and part biographer, Stapleton, 
 professes to give us a succinct account of his patron's 
 system of foreign policy ; and both from the Avriter's 
 knowledge of his subject and from our independent 
 means of testing his accuracy we may conclude that 
 what he tells us of this system is at least true in 
 itself, if it does not cover the whole ground of debate. 
 
 '' The Holy Alliance (writes Mr Stapleton) was to be 
 annihilated, and instead of the interests of that union of 
 European sovereigns being made the main consideration 
 in British policy, the interests of Great Britain herself 
 were what, as a British statesman, Mr Canning deter- 
 mined more particularly to consult. It was not, how- 
 ever, that he thought that the aggrandizement of Great 
 Britain ought to be sought at the expense of other 
 Powers. On the contrary, he said that her prosperity 
 
110 CANi\Ii\G\S FOBEIGK POLICY. 
 
 must contribute to the prosperity of surrounding nations, 
 and her stability to the safety of the world. But it was 
 in contradistinction to the doctrines of universal philan- 
 thropy, and equally so to their opposite extreme, the 
 doctrines of legitimacy and divine riglit, which had 
 given birth to the Holy Alliance scheme of amalgamating 
 the dijflferent interests of separate States, and of binding 
 their monarchs, as monarchs, to each other, instead of 
 uniting them as protectors to their own dominions, that 
 he asserted that the interests of his own native land are 
 those to which above all others a statesman should 
 attend. Still it was not by any violent transition from 
 a practice of sujDport to a system of active opposition t( > 
 that Alliance that he could have safely brought any 
 satisfactory results. A sudden change from^one side to 
 the other Avould infallibly, by raising the hopes of the 
 democratical party, have excited them to outrage, and 
 thus produced tlie very evil which it was intended to 
 j)revent. But no : the dissolution of the Alliance was 
 to be effected gradually, by the withdrawal from it of 
 the countenance of England ; and the balance was to be 
 held not only between contending nations, but between 
 conflicting principles, giving the preponderance to 
 neither, but aiding rather the liberal side, because the 
 anti-liberals were then stronofest/' And elsewhere : — 
 
 a ( 
 
 The true policy of England/ Canning said, ' was to 
 move steadily on in her own orbit, without looking too 
 nicely to the conduct of the Powers in alliance with her ; 
 to be content with her own glory, and by its example to 
 excite other nations to arrive at the same advantages 
 which her peculiar system had bestowed upon her ; but 
 not by a wild crusade to endeavour to force those advan- 
 tages upon other countries, converting blessings into 
 curses as respected them, and courting danger and 
 
CANNING'S FOBEIGN POLICY. 1 1 1 
 
 difficulty as regarded herself/ Thus it was that ]\Ir 
 Canning endeavoured ' to stay the plague both Avays ; ' 
 and thus he ' held the balance between conflicting prin- 
 ciples and contending nations.' " 
 
 Such was the attitude which Cannino- had resolved to 
 maintain towards other Powers so far as the mutual 
 relations of England and her allies were concerned ; but 
 he had also a very definite system of policy in regard to 
 the active promotion of British interests abroad — a con- 
 sideration which no English Minister can deem of 
 secondary importance. Not only must our prosperity 
 contribute to the prosperity of surrounding nations, but 
 the prosperity of surrounding natious must contribute to 
 our own, and their stability to the stability of England. 
 More or less clearly expressed in Canning's utterances — 
 more or less vividly present in his mind — this theory 
 was an essential part of his policy, and lias become one 
 of the principal components of our national tradition. 
 
 It has been urged that the course adopted by Canning 
 in favouring the Spanish insurgents, in supporting 
 Portugal against the Spanish court, and in aiding the 
 formation of the South American republics, was inspired 
 in great measure by what we have termed the LiverjDool 
 School, and that one of its special motives was to save 
 the capital and interest of the gigantic loans made by 
 England to the revolutionary Cortes. It may well have 
 been so. The motive is intelligible ; but it would not 
 in itself sufiice to account for the liberal policy of the 
 reconstructed Ministry of 1822. The student of history 
 must take a wider view, and must give his fellow men 
 credit for greater diversity of disposition, if he Avould 
 avoid the blind man's ditch. 
 
 A more lofty and doubtless a truer estimate was 
 formed of Canning's conduct by the House of Commons 
 
1 1 2 CANmNG'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 and the country from the moment when it was known 
 how firm a tone had been assumed by the new Foreign 
 Secretary in regard to the Congress of Verona (1822). 
 As Hobhouse deckired in the debate on the Address, if 
 the same language had been used at Troppau and 
 Lay bach which had been used at Verona we might 
 not have been faced by the difficulties which we then 
 had to meet. In other words, if Castlereagh had more 
 loyally and energetically interpreted at Troppau the 
 al3iding convictions of the English people in respect of 
 the independence of foreign States, and the injustice of 
 interference in their concerns, it is quite conceivable that 
 the Congress of Verona might never have been heard of. 
 And in that case it is more than conceivable that a 
 strong and Liberal Spain might have taken her place in 
 the new economy of European nations. 
 
 Some writers who have preferred the statesmanship of 
 C-astlereagh to the statesmanship of Canning have 
 pointed out that the former did at any rate put on 
 record at Laybach the inability of England as a revolu- 
 tionary country to suppress the revolutions in Italy and 
 Spain ; and they refer to the State paper mentioned by 
 Canning in this debate as containing the principles of 
 his future action, inferring that it must have been 
 wholly or partly the composition of Castlereagh. The 
 fact is that this paper was drawn up in May 1820, 
 Ijefore Cannino- had ceased to attend the meetino^s of the 
 Cabinet in consequence of the death of his son. 
 Internal evidence, and something approaching to an 
 assertion of authorship on Canning's part * indicate that 
 
 * It was not, he said on a subsequent occasion, referring to his 
 admission of the existence of this paper, "with the intention of 
 separating himself from those who preceded him in office, nor with 
 the desire of claiming to liimself any merit which belonged to them, 
 
CJNNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 113 
 
 he was at least responsible for the sentiments of this 
 most important document, which has all the significance 
 of a new charter of English policy. Moreover, Castle - 
 reagh's manifest reluctance in declining the invitation to 
 joint action with the Holy Alliance must be held to 
 preclude him from the credit (which he himself would 
 scarcely have claimed) of having originated this blazon 
 of revolutionary principles. 
 
 The comparison between Canning and Castlereagh as 
 Foreign Ministers must be instituted on two grounds — 
 the ground of action and the ground of principle. Now 
 the principles of Canning's policy, as we have seen, were 
 laid down in some sense as early as 1807-9, when he, 
 not Castlereagh, was Minister. Unfortunately for him- 
 self, and for England also, he fell a victim to factious 
 opposition before he had had time to act upon the lines 
 which he had drawn. The mistakes of England's action 
 were made at and between the Congresses of Vienna and 
 Laybach, when Castlereagh, not Canning, was Minister. 
 In 1815 Canning was not a member of the Cabinet, 
 being then in honourable exile at the Lisbon lesjation. 
 
 that he felt himself called upon to repeat what he had stated on a 
 former day, and what had been much misunderstood, — narrowed by 
 some and extended by others — that, applicable to the considerations on 
 which the Congress was to be employed, he had found in the records 
 of his office (and it was also in the records of the country) a State 
 paper, laying down the principle of non-interference, with all the 
 qualifications properly belonging to it. When, therefore, with what- 
 ever degree of courtesy, it had been ascribed to him that he had 
 applied new principles to a new case, he had thought it but just to 
 remind the House of a fact of which indeed it was already in posses- 
 sion. The principle of non-interference with the independence of 
 foreign States was laid down in the document to which he alluded as 
 broadly, clearly, and definitively as it was possible for any statesman 
 to wish to lay it down." 
 
 H 
 
lU CANNING'S FOEFAGN POLICY. 
 
 He did not like the Treaty of Vienna. He did not 
 admit the wisdom of binding this country in alliance 
 ^yith the Eastern Powers to maintain the existing dis- 
 tribution of territories in Europe — unjust as part of that 
 distribution undoubtedly was. In 1821 Canning was 
 again practically severed from Lord Liverj)oors Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 In a word, Canning had laid down principles which 
 he was unable to translate into action : Castlereagh pro- 
 fessed principles which were virtually contradicted by 
 his action. The principles were the same ; it was the 
 personality of the Ministers which carried them to 
 different issues. 
 
 Canning, it has been said, ought not to have gone to 
 Verona. In our own time, it is just possible, a Minister 
 might accept the seals of office in the morning and write 
 a despatch in the afternoon stating tliat the intentions 
 of his predecessor could not be carried out. That is a 
 blunt style of diplomacy which might give more or less 
 satisfaction to a democratic public opinion ; but in 1822 
 it was impossible. The Minister of that day had not 
 <mly a State paper for his guidance ; he had the etiquette 
 of the age, which bound him to take up the threads of 
 the Foreign Office as his predecessor had left them, and 
 to follow them at any rate until he could plausibly let 
 them drop. This was what Canning intended to do. 
 Yet he might not have taken part in the actual delibera- 
 tions of Verona if the Duke of Wellington's indisposition 
 had not made him too late to deliver himself of his 
 charge at the preliminary meeting at Vienna. 
 
 Canning's best excuse for having anything to do with 
 this Congress was that a blank refusal would have greatly 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN FOLICl \ 1 1 r> 
 
 disconcerted the Powers, interrupted the amicable rela- 
 tions between them and England, and probably destroyed 
 his influence on the Continent. But having determined 
 to send the Duke as our representative he instructed him 
 that, if the Allies should resolve in any way to intervene 
 by force in the affairs of Spain, then " come what might, 
 he should refuse the King's consent to become a party 
 to it," even though the dissolution of the Alliance should 
 be the consequence. This was the bold, and on that 
 account decidedly the judicious course ; and as the con- 
 ditions of the Duke's attendance were plainly made 
 known to the assembled monarchs the effect of Canning s 
 attitude upon them was precisely what he had intended. 
 It showed them that England could no longer be left out 
 of account in the arrangement of their plans — that her 
 Minister could not be relied upon for the complaisant 
 neutrality, often coupled with moral encouragement, 
 which had been received from Castlerea^h, but that he 
 must be considered as at all events a possible opponent 
 in European complications. The general relief in Eng- 
 land was as great as the consternation of Russia and 
 Austria. For thirty years this country had occupied a 
 false position. A revolutionary State, owing almost 
 everything to the pressure which its people had been 
 able to bring to bear upon its monarchs, it had been 
 arrayed on the side of desj)ots against a revolutionary 
 people. The majority of Englishmen had sanctioned the 
 policy of Pitt, at any rate after the declaration of war 
 by the French Convention; but the relief was very great 
 when it was understood that Canning had finally put 
 an end to the subserviency of English diplomacy at the 
 courts of the Eastern Powers. 
 
 It had been bitter enouMi that Enoiand (even if she 
 had no alternative) should have been the chief instru- 
 
1 1 6 CANNING' S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 ment in crushing the French Eepublic, and making the 
 German and Russian tyi'annies supreme on the Con- 
 tinent ; still more bitter that without really defeating 
 the ideas of 1789 in any country where they had taken 
 root we had virtually defeated in our own country the 
 ideas of 1688. It had been bitter to know that the out- - 
 come of the war had been a material gain to the despots, 
 injustice to most of the smaller States,*'' and a ruinous 
 burden of debt for ourselves ; still more bitter that the 
 English people, after making pecuniary sacrifices which 
 in the spring and summer of 1815 rose to the frightful 
 sum of £1,400,000 a day, should have found themselves 
 after the Peace shorn of liberty as well as prosperity by 
 Ministers who aped the maxims and methods of absolute 
 power. It is infinitely to Canning's credit that he read 
 
 * " The Treaty of Paris had replaced the elder Bourbons on the 
 throne of France, and the Congress of Vienna had divided the terri- 
 tories of Europe among the Sovereigns whose arms had defeated 
 Napoleon. It was to be desired at that time that the wishes of the 
 people of Europe should be consulted both in the choice of the Sovereign 
 whom they were in future to obey and the form of the institutions by 
 which they were thenceforth to be ruled. Both these conditions were 
 set at naught by the armed monarch s at Vienna. The Belgians wished 
 to be Belgian ; they were made Dutch. The Lombards wished to be 
 Italian ; they were made Germans. The old Republics of Holland, 
 Genoa, and Venice were not restored ; the Prussians, who had in- 
 dulged the hope of having a Constitution granted to them, were not 
 gratified ; the charter granted to the French people by Louis XVIII. 
 contained ambiguous phrases by which Charles X. was enabled, fifteen 
 years afterwards, to assume the power of dispensing with its most impor- 
 tant provisions." (Earl Pussell, in the Introduction to his " Speeches 
 and Despatches.'') The gains of Kussia, Austria, and Germany are not 
 fully enumerated in this passage ; they included the divided spoils of 
 Poland — for the partition treaties of 1772 and 1793 were sanctionefl 
 by the Congress of Vienna, the partial exceptions in favour of Cracow, 
 <fec., being a mockery clearly destined for reversal at the earliest 
 opportunity. 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 117 
 
 the real mind of the country in 1822, and that in a 
 sufficiently calm and unostentatious way he put his veto 
 for ever on what may be styled the subservient tradition 
 of England's policy. 
 
 He had not been many weeks at the Foreign Office 
 when the representatives of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and 
 France paid him a collective visit to point out the in- 
 convenience (to them) arising out of the despatch of an 
 English Minister to the revolutionary Government at 
 Madrid. Canning limited himself to replying that, " as 
 Sir William a Court must by that time have entered 
 upon his functions at Madrid, it was useless in any way 
 to discuss the propriety of sending him to that capital." 
 The Duke of Wellington, at Verona, faithfully echoed 
 the tone and reflected the colour of his chief's new policy. 
 The Czar made some sort of complaint against the atti- 
 tude of Lord Stratford at Constantinople, when the Duke 
 firmly defended his compatriot ; and though Alexander 
 hereupon rejoined with a compliment to our Ambassador 
 in Turkey, the English representative was not satisfied 
 until he had in set terms repeated his vindication in a 
 letter to Nessebode. 
 
 The results of the Congress of Verona so far as Spain 
 was concerned were certainly a partial triumph for 
 Canning's policy. Though it was impossible for him, as 
 it turned out, to save the revolutionary Government, 
 and to prevent the return of the dynasty by which the 
 country had been brought to ruin, he did give the dc 
 facto Government a chance for its life. The Czar had 
 contemplated a joint attack on the Spaniards, and had 
 intended at all events that a Russian force should enter 
 the Peninsula. His design, however, was overruled, the 
 Congress was technically abortive, and it was left for 
 France alone, at her own instance, though with the con- 
 
1 18 CJXM^G'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 iiivaiKje of tlic Ea.stern Powers, to l^lay the part of 
 executioner. The Due d'Angouleme proved to be com- 
 [)etent for his task, and thus the fate of Spain was 
 sealed. The Bourbons were rehabilitated ; but the re- 
 volted colonies for the most part established their in- 
 dependence. 
 
 The conduct of Cannino* in reoard to the South Ame- 
 rican Republics, as well as in regard to the Franco - 
 Spanish quarrel, was exceedingly creditable to him and 
 to Enoiand : nnd it remains to this day one of the 
 bviohtest incidents in the national tradition of this 
 country. The assistance rendered by us, as a revolu- 
 tionary State, to revolutionary peoples asserting their 
 claim to self-government was accorded in this instance 
 l)y a nominal Tory. The same thing is true of the assist- 
 ance given to the Greeks a few years later. No doubt 
 the Whigs under a capable leader would have done the 
 like if they had been in power, and would thus have jus- 
 tified the best of their earlier traditions. But they were 
 not in power. The Tories were in power; and a weak 
 Tory premier, guided by a strong independent colleague, 
 allowed England to show herself in her true colours as 
 the protagonist of revolution. 
 
 Therefore it is impossible to consider this mark and 
 type of England's foreign policy in the nineteenth cen- 
 tuiy as a mark and tyjDC of the tradition of either party. 
 The impossibility is confirmed in both cases by the subse- 
 quent bearing of Whigs and Tories alike towards various 
 popular causes in various parts of the world — notably by 
 their bearing towards the subject races of Turkey, to- 
 wards the Greeks, and the Afghans, and the slaves of the 
 Southern States of America, and to numerous minor 
 races in Europe, Asia, and Africa. No doubt there are 
 Iionourable exceptions. Individual peoples have profited 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY, 119 
 
 by English jDartisan policy ; individual English statesmen 
 Iiave directed the policy of their party in a truly gene- 
 rous sense. But in most of the instances where we have 
 given effectual help to struggling nationalities it has been 
 the voice of popular, national, instinctive sympathy for 
 the oppressed which has dominated the councils of the 
 State, and virtually dictated a policy to the Government. 
 It has been the people, not a party, which has prevailed. 
 It has been the third or popular tradition which has 
 made us true to our better selves, whether Whig or Tory 
 has been at the helm. 
 
 Canning strove honestly and in the most disinterested 
 manner to arrange the difficulty which had arisen be- 
 tween France and Spain. He offered his mediation to 
 the French Government; and his despatches to our repre- 
 sentatives abroad, both on this and on other occasions, 
 are models of the diplomacy which (when mediation is 
 possible and politic) befits the national policy of a power- 
 ful Liberal State.'"* 
 
 Nevertheless the opponents of the Government found 
 room for argument, and even for censure, in the conduct 
 of the Foreign Office, and in the negotiations which had 
 proceeded between England and France. Both Whigs 
 and High Tories called Canning to account. Lord 
 EUenborough and Lord Grey were particularly inclined 
 to condemn the tameness of the course pursued by our 
 
 * Appendix, A. — To the generality of readers the despatches of 
 Canning are not so familiar as they were to our fathers and grand- 
 fathers. Yet in an age when the popular tradition gathers strength 
 from year to year it might be well worth while to reprint some of them, 
 with a selection from his speeches, in the hope that they would be read 
 at any rate by politicians and students. A few of these illustrating 
 the text are given in an Appendix to this volume. 
 
120 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 Foreign Minister. How, they contended, could Can- 
 ning, who in 1808 was personally responsible for the 
 Peninsular war, and for the despatch of the Duke of 
 Wellington to Spain in order to drive out the French, 
 now abandon the same country to the same enemy? 
 France, said Lord Grey, was dictating to an independent 
 nation a change in its constitution ; the principle was 
 " most odious and most unjust ;" and if England should 
 think fit to take up arms in defence of Spain she had an 
 undeniable right to do so. No doubt we must think of 
 the interests of our own country, as well as of our right 
 or title to go to war. But our interests were really at 
 stake ; the danger was at our doors. " We ought not 
 to stand by and see the Peninsula overrun :" the balance 
 of power would be destroyed by the presence of France 
 in Spain. '' AVhen once France had the custody of 
 Spain she would be backed by the FToly Alliance in her 
 efforts to destroy the liberties of mankind. The mon- 
 archical princijDle once established, and liberty driven 
 from the Continent, it was not to be supposed either 
 that she would remain unassailed in this her last asylum, 
 or that the despots of Europe would tolerate the bitter 
 reproaches of the free press of England or the unshackled 
 discussions of her independent ParUament." 
 
 This was a somewhat extraordinary medley of ideas 
 to come from the mouth of a. Whig. Sympathy with the 
 de facto Government in Spain, dread of a, restoration of 
 the old tyrannic and incompetent dynasty, indignation 
 against the truculent intervention of France — these were 
 perfectly natural feelings in the mind of Lord Grey ; 
 but the conclusions which he di'ew from the facts of the 
 case do not seem to have been justified. Of course it 
 could not be urged by a statesman in the present day 
 that England has an "undeniable right" to take part in 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY, V2\ 
 
 a quarrel between two Continental Powers merely 
 because she holds the conduct of one of them to be 
 odious and unjust. Nor should we expect a Whig 
 statesman to maintain that British interests were at 
 stake because one country was attacking another ; nor 
 yet that the balance of power in Europe was likely to be 
 fatally disturbed by the presence of a French army in 
 Spain, or a German army in Austria, or a Russian army 
 in Turkey. The force of treaties and of public law, 
 apart from special facts and military chances, would be 
 held to be quite sufficient as a guarantee for Europe. 
 There were treaties existing when Lord Grey spoke — 
 such as the Anglo- Spanish treaty of 1812, by which 
 Spain undertook not to enter into another combination 
 with France in the nature of the Family Compact ; a 
 treaty to which France had formally adhered in 1815 — 
 which might have set his mind at rest. As for the fear 
 of the Holy Alliance assailing liberty in her last asylum, 
 in this country, it was too manifestly exaggerated to 
 quicken the pulses of ordinary Engiislmien. 
 
 This was the line which Canning took in replying to 
 his critics. He did not believe that the presence of the 
 French in Spain would be an actual menace to England, 
 or even remotely dangerous for English liberties. He 
 did go so far as to admit that the bellicose action of 
 France tended to disturb the balance of power, and that 
 ultimate complications with Portugal might hereafter 
 compel us to intervene ; but the disturbance and the 
 complications had not yet arisen, and that which had 
 already taken place was not deemed sufficient to justify 
 us in declaring war. Moreos^er, ''the strength of Great 
 Britain had very lately been strained to the utmost ; her 
 means were at that precise stage of recovery which made 
 it most desirable that the progress of that recovery should 
 
122 CJXmXG'S FOREIGN POLICY, 
 
 not be interrupted ; and her resources, then in a course 
 of rapid reproduction, would by any sudden check be 
 thrown into disorder more deep and difficult of cure." 
 Thus it was in the interests of a policy of peace and re- 
 trenchment that the Tory statesman opposed a Whig 
 statesman in his recommendation of war ! 
 
 It is difficult to say what had become of the older 
 party traditions when this conflict of principles and ideas 
 was possible. No doul^t we perceive in the attitude of 
 Lord Grey a vigorous assertion of the central dogma of 
 tlic^ Whigs — the right of popular constitutional changes ; 
 and if he could at that date have thrown off the incubus 
 of the '' balance of power/' and confined his argument 
 to the advisability of protecting the Spanish constitution, 
 nothing more need have been said than that he had not 
 made out a sufficiently strong case for armed interven- 
 tion. The fact is that this aro-ument alone was no 
 longer the exclusive privilege of Whig statesmen. It 
 had l)ecome, as we have seen, or at least it was in process 
 of Ijecoming, the mark of a national rather than of a 
 party tradition. The Whigs had to a great extent for- 
 feited their title to it by coalescing with Pitt in 1793 
 and 1806 — if not wilfully and wrongfully, yet certainly 
 to their damage and discredit. 
 
 It was a home-thrust whicli Canning delivered to his 
 arraigners in the House when he declared that though 
 England, in the event of a war with France, might not 
 think herself justified in employing against her enemy 
 *' the arms of internal revolution," yet Spain would be 
 both justified in using and willing to use such weapons 
 " in a struggle begun avowedly from an enmity to her 
 internal institutions." Was it then for England, who 
 had waged such a long war against Jacobins and an- 
 archists in France, to be instrumental in placing in the 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 123 
 
 haucls of Spain the means of inflicting so dreadful a 
 retaliation ? — " to be a party to a war in which, if Spain 
 should be victorious, the consequences to France, and 
 through France to Europe, might be such as would 
 make the effects of victory more l^aneful than defeat ?" 
 
 The Opposition of 1823 could make no rejoinder to 
 an argument of this kind. 
 
 The Franco-Spanish question was complicated for 
 England by a Portuguese question, arising out of a treaty 
 between this country and Portugal whereby we had 
 guaranteed her against attack. In Portugal as in Spain 
 there had been a revolution ; a constitutional Govern- 
 ment had been established, and though the royal family 
 had returned to their capital the popular movement was 
 still triumphant. When appealed to for a guarantee of 
 the existing order of things Canning replied that to give 
 this would be to interfere in the internal afiairs of the 
 State, and thus to violate the principle of non-interfer- 
 ence which England actually professed, and which 
 Portugal herself should desire to maintain. '' If England 
 
 examined the new institutions of Portugal for the sake 
 of deriving^ from them new motives for fulfillino- old 
 engagements, with what propriety could she prohibit 
 other Powers from examining them for the purpose of 
 draAving any other conclusion?" It was enough to say 
 that the recent modifications of tlie Portuguese Govern- 
 ment had in no way affected England's engagements 
 to Portugal, and that she felt herself still as much bound 
 to defend that country under its altered constitution as 
 under the monarchy with which the alliance had been 
 formed. 
 
 This, it is manifest, was a test case for the policy of 
 
124 CANNING'S FOBEIGN POLICY. 
 
 non-intervention, such as Cannino- hild conceived and 
 professed it; and the manner in which he met the appeal 
 of Portugal in 1822 was more satisfactory — certainly 
 more in accord with the principles of national foreign 
 policy which have struck their roots in the heart of 
 modern England — than his reception of a similar appeal 
 in 1826, when he sent troops to Lisbon. Yet even for 
 this course there were reasons which must have gone far 
 to satisfy the minds of the most tenacious champions of 
 non-intervention. 
 
 In 1825 England had arranged a treaty between 
 Portugal and Brazil whereby the independence of the 
 latter country was recognised ; and the Spanish Govern- 
 ment, which from the suppression of the revolution in 
 1823 had been at war with the American colonies, 
 greatly resented the EngHsh mediation, and felt a not 
 unnatural alarm at the consequences to themselves of so 
 notable an instance of successful revolution. The situa- 
 tion was complicated at the same time by the death of 
 the Portuguese king and the uncertainty of the succession. 
 The heir to the crown, Don Pedro, had been selected as 
 Emperor of Brazil, and he took the opportunity as soon 
 as he heard of the king's death of assuming the royal 
 title in order to grant a constitution to Portugal, after 
 which he appointed his daughter as his successor. 
 Canning saw fit to accept this arrangement, though he 
 was not without misoivius: as to the result of summon- 
 ing the Cortes at Lisbon, which was provided for in Don 
 Pedro's charter. 
 
 It was now that the Spaniards, urged both by their 
 own jealousies and by the private instigations of Metter- 
 nich, who was playing a card of his own in the shape of 
 Dom Miguel, the brother of Don Pedro, then resident at 
 Vienna — determined to pick a quarrel with Portugal; 
 
CAiYiVING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 1 25 
 
 and in the course of 1826 (a French garrison being all 
 the time established at Cadiz) they violated Portuguese 
 territory. Canning here saw his casus foederis : England 
 was bound by treaty to protect Portugal against foreign 
 attack, and a foreign attack had been constituted by the 
 action of the Spanish Government. He received the 
 news from Portugal on. the 8th of December, drew up on 
 the 9th and delivered to Parliament on the ilth a royal 
 message announcing the despatch of troops to Lisbon,* 
 and actually despatched the troops on the following day. 
 For all that could be seen to the contrary this might 
 have been the first step (so far as our action was con- 
 cerned) of a long, disastrous, and general European war. 
 Spain undoubtedly had reason to hate us, and its mon- 
 archical government had special inducements to combat 
 the revolutionary spirit in Portugal, even though it 
 might be assisted by English arms. France — the 
 presence of whose army in the Peninsula was in great 
 measure responsible for the outbreak of hostilities — had 
 hardened her heart against our frequent warnings. The 
 Austrian Government hated Liberal institutions in any 
 shape, and Metternich would have been particularly 
 glad to defeat and humiliate England. It might easily 
 have happened that these three countries would be found 
 ranged together against us, and in that case we should 
 scarcely have escaped the calamities of one or two 
 adverse campaigns. If all this was not probable it was 
 at least possible, and the English Government and 
 people were not without a deep sense of the gravity of 
 the step which had been taken. 
 
 For Canning, indeed, and for the Cabinet, there had 
 been little option in the matter. Our treaties bound us 
 to Portugal, and the main question at the time was 
 
 "* Appendix, B. 
 
1 2G CANNING'S FOREIGN FOLIC } ". 
 
 whether we had, by our action in the few preceding 
 years, needlessly aggravated the situation of affiiirs. 
 The High Tories were disposed to think that Canning 
 had done so by his tenderness to the popular constitu- 
 tions of other countries, and especially by his recognition 
 of the South American States. They blamed his policy 
 in this respect ; and even in the Cabinet there were 
 individual members who believed that war might have 
 been avoided. The only means, however, by which 
 they could have prevented the occurrence of the cause 
 of war would have been by the continuance of Castle- 
 reagh's policy of subservience to the despots — amongst 
 them the despots of France and Spain ; and the cause 
 of war having arisen, the only mode in which they 
 could have escaped the necessity of fighting would have 
 been by repudiating the treaties with Portugal. It is 
 possible that they might have withdrawn on princif)^ 
 from the engagements entered into with the Portuguese 
 crown so soon as the revolution of 1820 had overturned 
 the throne. This would have been the sole method even 
 approximating to a just and creditable policy ; but that 
 course had not been adopted, and there can be no doubt 
 that the English people had warmly approved of Can- 
 niuo-'s action from the first. 
 
 The C[uestion suggests itself whether Canning and 
 the country, having in 1822 so freely declared themselves 
 in favour of peace and retrenchment, would not have 
 done better for the national interests by divesting them- 
 selves of their responsibilities under the Portuguese 
 treaties, and ridding tliemselves of the embarrassments 
 connected with the guarantee. From our present point 
 of view this question would probably be answered in the 
 atiirmative with very little hesitation. It may be 
 doubted whether there is at this moment any corner of 
 
CANNING' S FOREIGN POLICY. 1l>7 
 
 the European Continent, or any region in tlie whole 
 world, not being English territory, in respect of which a 
 true majority of the English people would willingly 
 consent to give an absolute guarantee — binding them- 
 selves to go to war in order to preserve it from attack. 
 However this may be with ourselves in our own days, 
 the case was clearly different in 1826. Then Canning 
 was certainly prepared to fight for Portugal — as he had 
 announced himself to be fi*om the year 1822. And the 
 reasons of this disposition are plain enough. Canning, 
 as a Minister, clung to the treaties. As a Minister 
 sincerely anxious to promote the interests of England 
 beyond the seas he had determined to aid the formation 
 of the American free States, and to pursue in Europe a 
 course in harmony with this design. As a Minister who 
 had been called to power by the popular voice, and to 
 whom popular ftivour was the breath of his nostrils, he 
 was bent on carrying out a policy which he knew to be 
 popular. As for the disposition of the people at large, 
 there were two motives which more than any other 
 induced England to oppose the dynastic Governments in 
 the Peninsula, and to defend the Portuguese in 1826. 
 One was the motive of sympathy with the Spanish and 
 Portuguese revolutions, which enlisted the national mind 
 in the cause of the struggling races. The other was the 
 desire to secure new outlets for British commerce in 
 America by establishing free and rapidly-developing 
 States in place of the fettered and unsettled colonies of 
 weak or hostile European Powers. 
 
 These are the principles on which England and the 
 English Minister for Foreign Affairs proceeded in the 
 third decade of the century, not only with respect to 
 Portugal but also with respect to the recognition of the 
 independence of the Spanish colonies — Colombia, 
 
128 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 Ecuador, Venezuela, the Argentine States, Chili, and 
 Peru. * In the debate which took place after the com- 
 njunication of the royal message on Deceml3er 12th, 
 1826, Canning vindicated his policy in a splendid effort 
 of oratory, perhaps the best example of his style which 
 has been handed down to us.+ This speech was wel- 
 comed by the House and the country as an absolute 
 justification of the policy of the Government. In 
 Parliament, beyond a few timid criticisms and the 
 implacable wrath of Joseph Hume and his fellow- 
 economists, there was no opposition to Canning's policy ; 
 and if events had not permitted us to withdraw our 
 troops before any serious need for their services had 
 arisen, there can be no question that the country would 
 have heartily supported the Government in the course 
 on which it had entered. The knowledge of this fact 
 doubtless influenced France in its adoption of conciliatory 
 measures : and the sight of the British troops sufficed to 
 clear Portugal of its invaders. 
 
 Another question of special importance and interest 
 with which Canning was called upon to deal, and which 
 occupied him more or less closely throughout the last 
 six years of his life, was the Greek question. This also, 
 like the questions raised in south-western Europe, was 
 the outcome of a revolution — of a revolution coincident 
 with and not to be entirely dissociated from the revolu- 
 tions in Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The risings of 
 1820-1 may be looked upon as an afternjiath of the 
 harvest of 1789, produced from the same seed though 
 under varied conditions. In each case a weak and 
 oppressive Government impelled the populace to revolt ; 
 
 * Appendix, C. t Appendix, D. 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 1 2 9 
 
 in each case there had been an initial triumph of the 
 people sufficient to warrant Europe — more than sufficient 
 to warrant England — in treating with the revolutionary 
 leaders as at least able to represent and answer for the 
 nation. But in Greece there was this peculiarity, that 
 the Government which had been overturned was alien 
 in race to the revolted people ; it was not on the same 
 terms of amity with the great European Powers, and the 
 signataries of the recent international treaties were not 
 pledged to it in the same manner as to the sovereigns 
 of Italy and Spain. Such treaties as there were at thafc 
 time between Turkey and the Powers were almost 
 entirely outside the bounds of the European economy. 
 They were for the most part exacted after wars which 
 the Porte had brought on itself by the misgovernment of 
 its subject races, and their object was (at all events 
 nominally) the relief of these subject races from oppres- 
 sion. The same original causes led up to the Greek 
 revolt, and as Eussia in particular had secured a right of 
 intervention on behalf of the Porte's Greek subjects it 
 was not to be expected that the members of the Holy 
 Alliance would be so much shocked by this insurrection 
 as they were by the outbreaks in the western peninsulas. 
 Nevertheless the sincere hatred of rebellion in any 
 form which was entertained by Alexander and his allies 
 prevented them from acknowledging the independence 
 of the Greeks, or from taking any steps which might 
 have promoted their cause. The delegates sent to 
 Verona were refused a hearing, and, though Eussia made 
 some show of an intention to go to war with Turkey, 
 Greece did not at that time derive the slightest assist- 
 ance from the Powers. She was compelled at tre- 
 mendous odds to keep the question alive for another 
 
 I 
 
130 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 five years, until, mainly by the contrivance of Canning, 
 Europe had made up its mind to interfere. 
 
 No fair conclusion as to the disposition of Canning 
 towards the Greek cause can be drawn from the atti- 
 tude of England in 1822. Castlereagh died, as we 
 have seen, when the Congress of Verona was about to 
 assemble ; and the first care of his successor was to con- 
 fine within the narrowest possible limits the action of the 
 representative whom it had been resolved to send to 
 the meeting. Thus when Nesselrode introduced the 
 subject of the Greek revolt, and of Russia's relations 
 with the Porte, Canning contented himself with an 
 almost colourless declaration, whereby he left the 
 matter open for future treatment. The Czar, Nessel- 
 rode had stated, was ready to renew his diplomatic 
 relations with the Porte if the latter would either dis- 
 cuss the guarantees suitable to be given to the Greeks 
 as an inducement to them to conclude an armistice, or 
 prove '' by a series of facts " that it was disposed '' to 
 respect the Christian religion, placed under the protec- 
 tion of Russia," and establish peace in the Greek penin- 
 sula. The Austrian, Prussian, and French representa- 
 tives accepted this position as reasonable ; but Wel- 
 lington hesitated. It was necessary for him to consult 
 his Government before taking formal note of Nessel- 
 rode's declaration ; and at the end of a fortnight he 
 received his instructions from Canning. He then, after 
 acknowleda;in2: the " mamanimous moderation " of the 
 Czar, affirmed that in the opinion of his Government 
 the Porte had already displayed, by its partial conces- 
 sions, a " series of facts " which would warrant Russia 
 in re-opening diplomatic relations. At the same time 
 he undertook that the influence of Enorland should be 
 brought to bear on the Porte in order to confirm it in 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY, 131 
 
 its good dispositions. On the following day a docu- 
 ment was communicated to the Congress, in which the 
 Czar declared that ''the friendship of his allies in- 
 spired him with such a sense of security that he en- 
 tirely confided to their wisdom the direction of all 
 future negotiations." ^^ 
 
 The situation was undoubtedly a diflGicult one for 
 Russia, and consequently for all the Powers. The 
 Czar was honestly opposed to the revolutionary prin- 
 ciple, even when its application was injurious to the 
 hereditary enemy of his country. He was probably 
 relieved to find that he could creditably escape from 
 the active championship of insurgents against their 
 sovereign ; and it need not be supposed that Canning 
 had no sympathy with the Greeks because at this mo- 
 ment he virtually dissuaded Russia from going to war 
 with Turkey. 
 
 The fact is that Canning had already conceived his 
 design of outwitting and overthrowing the Holy Alli- 
 ance ; and it is a question whether he did more to 
 effect his purpose by defending Portugal against their 
 machinations or by preventing them from having their 
 own way in Turkey. There can be no doubt that he 
 saw from the very beginning that neither Greek liberties 
 nor English interests would be advanced by the un- 
 fettered action of Russia in the . Balkan peninsula, and 
 he set himself to work to strengthen the influence of 
 his country in Greece. He became aware of a 
 plan, distinctly favoured by the Russian court, to set 
 up an autonomous State with Capo d'Istria as its 
 prince ; and at the same time he knew that an in- 
 creasingly powerful sentiment in Russia was urging 
 the Government to go to war with Turkey. He rc- 
 
 * See the author's " New Greece," p. 304. 
 
132 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 solved that the question of Greek independence — the 
 possible importance whereof in the future develop- 
 ment of European politics he plainly foresaw — should on 
 no account be settled by the exclusive action of the 
 Czar. 
 
 So widely had Canning diverged in 1824 from the 
 *' continental policy '' of his predecessor at the Foreign 
 Office. So far had he progressed in the establishment 
 of an English policy, and in the confirmation of a 
 national Eno;lish tradition. 
 
 In 1823 the Emperor Alexander had attempted once 
 more to find work for the Holy Alliance. He pro- 
 posed a conference of the Powers at St Petersburg, in 
 order to arrange terms between the Turks and the 
 Greeks, and to this proposal Austria at once acceded. 
 But Canning, firmly resolved both to thwart the 
 Alliance and to keep the initiative in Greek affairs 
 out of Russia's hands, was at no loss for an excuse 
 to refuse the invitation. The Greek leaders as well as 
 the Porte had declined all ofi*ers of mediation, and on 
 this ground alone he gave it as his opinion that it 
 would be useless to attempt an arrangement. The 
 coolness which he displayed on this occasion seems to 
 have given great umbrage to the continental Ministers, 
 and Metternich in particular resented the independent 
 action of the English Government. In a private letter 
 to Nesselrode he threw out a hint that '' the true Alli- 
 ance" would do well to consider how it might best 
 assert its dignity against " the friend and protector of 
 rebels." 
 
 If however Canning had been in any sense the pro- 
 tector of the Greeks up to this time, he had certainly 
 acted with strict impartiality. He recognised the K^lli- 
 gerent rights of the insurgents — for, as he put it to the 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY, 133 
 
 Turks, the only alternative was to regard them as pirates, 
 and it would be monstrous to give that character to a 
 population of " millions of souls." But in doing this, 
 and whilst expressing his inability to hinder private 
 individuals in England from giving assistance to the 
 Greeks, he insisted on the strict observance by the latter 
 of international law. And his efforts were directed quite 
 as much to the preservation of peace between Eussia and 
 Turkey as they were towards securing fair play between 
 the combatants. 
 
 Another ground on which Canning declined the Con- 
 ference in 1823 was that Russia had broken off diplom- 
 atic intercourse with the Porte, and he considered that 
 her mission ought to be re-established before the united 
 Powers attempted to mediate. This was manifestly a 
 powerful and logical argument, and it was an argument 
 reflecting credit and dignity on the Minister who made 
 it. The Russian Government, which doubtless found it 
 very difficult to resist the desire of the nation to go to 
 war, obstinately declined to appoint an Ambassador. A 
 demand had been made upon Turkey for the evacuation 
 of the Danubian Principalities, and Lord Strangford had 
 used every possible effort to induce the Porte to comply 
 with this condition. The Porte yielded in May, 1824, 
 and the Czar at once nominated a representative for the 
 Constantinople mission. On this Canning, who had 
 again been urged to take part in a Conference at St 
 Petersburg — not in the interests of the Holy Alliance, 
 but for the special consideration of a plan which had 
 been put forward by Nesselrode — was disposed to enter 
 into the concert ; but the premature disclosure of the 
 Russian scheme, and the vehement repudiation of the 
 scheme by Turks and Greeks alike, added to the fact 
 that Russia had not yet fulfilled her promise as to the 
 
134 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 appointment of an Ambassador to the Porte, led him to 
 withdraw his conditional assent. 
 
 It is important to note the reasons for Canning's action 
 at this juncture of aSairs. It was far from being a 
 capricious isolation of England from the Eastern Powers 
 on which he had decided to base his conduct ; his 
 motives are plain, they do him credit, and they were in 
 entire harmony with the disposition of the English 
 nation. He declined, to go to a Conference for nominal 
 objects which could not be attained, and at the risk of 
 bringing about the very results which he dreaded. He 
 saw — as he expressed himself in Parliament — that "in 
 lending ourselves to an undertaking which we ourselves 
 believed to be utterly useless, we must either assign to 
 the Parliament and people of this country reasons for 
 our conduct by which in fact it was not actuated, and 
 must express hopes which in fact we did not feel — a 
 proceeding which was totally out of the question ; or 
 else, by declaring frankly our reasons for engaging in so 
 unpromising a negotiation, we should betray the secret, 
 and thereby destroy the illusion, by which the Emperor 
 of Eussia was to be fortified against the warlike impul- 
 sion of his people." 
 
 Englishmen have decided that this was an occasion on 
 which their Minister was completely justified in refusing 
 to participate in the European concert. It was not a 
 straightforward concert ; it was not a possible concert ; 
 it was not a concert from which any good result could 
 ensue. There are times when the joint action of the 
 Powers is necessary to the welfare of the community, 
 but there are also times when it would be clearly in- 
 jurious. Canning had not set himself against the Holy 
 Alliance to fall thus easily into another snare of a similar 
 kind. He knew with whom he had to deal, and he 
 
CANNINCrS FOREIGN POLICY. 135 
 
 preferred to incur the displeasure of Nesselrode and 
 Metternich rather than fall back into the "continental 
 system" by making himself a party to intrigues and 
 deceptions almost certain to end in unjust war. When 
 his second refusal was communicated to Nesselrode the 
 latter seems to have lost his temper. He at once declared 
 that all deliberations between his Government and that 
 of England, both with reference to the relations of 
 Russia and Turkey and with reference to the affairs of 
 Greece, were thenceforth absolutely at an end. To this 
 message Canning replied phlegmatically enough. He 
 observed that ''the Emperor was master, to do as he 
 pleased," that the declaration of Count Nesselrode was 
 ''an ebullition which would probably pass away," and 
 that " ere long the two countries would probably find 
 themselves again in the same path." 
 
 This blunt method of procedure which was character- 
 istic of Canning's diplomacy soon told upon Nesselrode. 
 Mr Stratford Canning was sent in 1825 as our Ambas- 
 sador to St Petersburg, and after he had informed the 
 Eussian Government that " if Count Nesselrode was 
 not prepared to listen to what he had been instructed to 
 communicate on the part of his Government upon the 
 Greek question, he could not delay making application 
 to the Emperor for his audience of leave," the resolution 
 of the Czar and his Minister was relaxed, and negotia- 
 tions were resumed. The English Ambassador then 
 calmly repeated the original offer of his Government — 
 that England would entertain the question of a joint 
 mediation if the Russian mission were re-established, 
 and if either belligerent should apply to the Allies for 
 their good offices. 
 
 Against a policy so straightforward and so consistently 
 just there is really no chance for the more tortuous 
 
136 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 modes of diplomatic action. As the cool and persistent 
 man succeeds in everyday life where the passionate and 
 the subtle miss their way, so Canning, who had elected to 
 be thoroughly English in dealing with English interests 
 abroad, gained on this occasion one of the most notable 
 triumphs of his life. After the Continental Powers had 
 vainly attempted to arrive at an agreement amongst 
 themselves, and had only managed to emphasize their 
 differences of opinion, they ''one and all began to look 
 to Enoiand for assistance." Before the end of October 
 1825 — ''the same year in which the Alliance had been 
 offended by the recognition of Spanish America, and 
 Eussia had refused to discuss in anywise the subject of 
 Greece with the British Government," the Russian, 
 Austrian, and French Governments had separately 
 expressed their wish to Canning that he would take the 
 question into his own hands, since England was " the 
 only Power which could bring the state of affairs in 
 Greece to a satisfactory settlement."* 
 
 The appeal was as gratifying to England as to Canning 
 individually, but he did not hastily jump at the chance. 
 " Things are not ripe," he wrote to a friend, " for our 
 interference. We must not (like our good Allies) 
 interfere in vain. If we act we must finish what is to 
 be done." 
 
 Meanwhile the English Government had been carefully 
 assembling the materials for future use. The attitude 
 of impartiality between Turkey and Greece had been 
 most scrupulously maintained, and Canning's dealings 
 with the Porte had been so judicious that, in spite of 
 his recognition of Greece as a belligerent, and in spite 
 of the interval between the mission of Lord Strang^ford 
 and the mission of Mr Stratford Canning, when we 
 
 * Stapleton, ch. 12. 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY, - 137 
 
 were represented at Constantinople by a simple Charge 
 cl'AfFaires, our influence and credit with the Divan 
 were scarcely impaired. At the same time the overtures 
 of the Greeks were received with much circumspection, 
 not to say with a little show of rudeness. The delegates 
 in London had oS*ered to accept an English protectorate, 
 and when that was declined they asked Canning to 
 nominate a king. The Provisional Government in 
 Greece formally put the country under our protection. 
 But Canning not merely refused to have what was thus 
 urgently pressed upon him — he desired the Greeks to 
 abstain from anything calculated to wound the suscepti- 
 bilities of the Powers, and went out of his way to check 
 the voluntary aid which was being rendered to the 
 insurgents from this country. In the meantime he did 
 not cease to urge the re-establishment of the Eussian 
 mission at Constantinople, and to recommend peaceful 
 counsels to the Turks and Greeks. 
 
 The death of the Czar in 1826 suddenly brought the 
 whole matter to a head. In Alexander there had been 
 removed one of the surest pledges of peace in the East ; 
 for it was undoubtedly his personal influence alone 
 which had restrained the nation from a Turkish war. 
 His successor Nicholas set out with a declaration in 
 which he announced himself as being determined to 
 proceed in the path marked out by the Czar Alexander ; 
 and care was taken at the same time to ascribe to the 
 late Czar a resolution in favour of immediate war. 
 Canning now saw that his time for action had come, 
 and as soon as he saw this he put his plans in execution. 
 
 His idea had always been to save the Greeks from 
 destruction by bringing pressure to bear on the Porte 
 without a Eussian invasion. So long as he had been 
 able to prevent this invasion, or so long as the Czar 
 
138 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 abstained from war, he could aObrd to wait for the 
 golden opportunity. If his efforts on behalf of Greece 
 were deliberate, and if the long delay had imposed 
 terrible sacrifices on the insurgents, the result proved 
 that his method had been effectual. But now it appeared 
 impossible that the policy which he had hitherto pur- 
 sued should continue to avail him. Eussia would 
 certainly fight unless he could persuade her that she 
 might attain her object without recourse to arms, and 
 it happened by a fortunate coincidence that at the same 
 moment the Greek Government had appealed to Mr 
 Stratford Cannins: for En owlish mediation. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington therefore, who was pro- 
 ceeding to St Petersburg on a special congratulatory 
 mission to the new Czar, was instructed to inform the 
 Eussian Government that England was prepared to 
 mediate both between the Turks and Greeks, and be- 
 tween Eussia and the Porte ; and in the event of 
 Eussia's declining this proposal he was to assent to a 
 joint mediation by England and Eussia between Tur- 
 key and Greece. The result of the Duke's mission was 
 the signature of the Protocol of April, 1826, by which 
 the two contracting Powers agreed to propose to the 
 Porte the establishment of a tributary Greek State, 
 and to propose to Austria, France, and Prussia the 
 joint guarantee of this State by the five Great 
 Powers. 
 
 The policy of Canning in turning aside from the 
 idea of a general conference, and in seeking to arrange 
 the Greek question by a limited combination, must of 
 course be judged by the light of contemporary Euro- 
 pean politics. The principle, at least, was unsound ; 
 it smacked of the Whig or Dutch policy of the seven- 
 teenth and eighteenth centuries, and needs to be ex- 
 
' CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY, 139 
 
 plained before it can be approved. Canning has him- 
 self detailed for us the reasons which guided his action 
 in 1826-7; and his statement is interesting even for 
 the present generation. ''' But however necessary this 
 course may have appeared to him, and however great 
 the success of his policy as a whole, the partial com- 
 binations into which he now entered are in themselves 
 the least admirable features of the tradition which he 
 left behind him. 
 
 The difficulty of his position in regard to the pecu- 
 liar attitude of the Powers to each other, and especially 
 in view of the Holy Alliance which had forced upon 
 England her policy of isolation, cannot be left out of 
 sight. The last clause of the Protocol of 1826, pro- 
 viding for the co-operation of the Allies, was adopted 
 on Canning's own suggestion ; and this recognition of 
 a sound international doctrine was at once construed 
 by the Prussian Government (with a malicious expres- 
 sion of satisfaction) as giving countenance to ''the 
 principle of an unasked authoritative interference of 
 the (Holy) Alliance." f In spite of this misconception 
 and difficulty, it is to be observed that most of the 
 subsequent acts and instruments for which the English 
 Government was responsible during the progress of the 
 Greek question were carried out only after the co- 
 operation of France, Austria, and Prussia, had been 
 scrupulously invited. It was not Canning's fault that 
 France alone entered heartily into the combination 
 with England and Eussia. 
 
 The events of our own generation have had the 
 result of making us thoroughly familiar with the treat- 
 ment of the Greek question by the Ministry of Can- 
 ning. The embodiment of the St Petersburg Protocol 
 * Appendix, E. t Stapleton, ch. 1 6. 
 
140 CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 in the Treaty of July, 1827, with the interpreting 
 instructions to our representative at Constantinople 
 and to the commander of the English fleet in the 
 Mediterranean, virtually complete the record so far as 
 he is concerned. That which came afterwards was the 
 natural result of his acts, though it is possible that he 
 foresaw neither Navarino nor the creation of an abso- 
 lutely independent Greece. Firmly as the Allies had 
 resolved to bring the Greek war to an end, and to stop 
 the Turkish and Egyptian massacres, and easily as the 
 Treaty might be construed as warranting the use of 
 force by the allied fleets, the joint instructions to the 
 English, Eussian, and French commanders were that 
 they should take the utmost care to prevent their acts 
 from deo'eneratino; into hostilities. Cannincr's aim had 
 always been to maintain peace, more particularly be- 
 tween Eussia and Turkey. He had advanced to the 
 point of admitting that if any hostile action should be 
 necessary, or should follow inevitably from the media- 
 tion which had been entered upon, it would be better 
 that this action should be taken by the three Powers 
 conjointly than by Eussia alone. This contingency 
 seems to have been at least contemplated from the 
 time of the accession of the Emperor Nicholas ; and 
 the possibilities of the future were clearly in sight 
 when the Secret Article of the Treaty of London — 
 proposed by the French and accepted by the other 
 negotiators — was agreed to on the day after the prin- 
 cipal articles had been signed. 
 
 * 
 
 * It was agreed in this Secret Article tliat ''if within the term of one 
 month the Porte does not accept the armistice proposed in the 6th 
 Article of the patent Treaty, or if the Greeks refuse to carry it into 
 execution, the High Contracting Powers shall declare to either of the 
 contending parties which may be disposed to continue hostilities, or 
 
CANNING'S FOREIGN POLICY. 141 
 
 As a matter of fact, Canning died on the 8 th of 
 August — one month after the signature of the Treaty — 
 and the battle of Navarino was fought on the 20th of 
 October. It may be that if the English Minister had 
 lived the Allied fleets would not have fired a shot, and 
 Russia would not have invaded Turkey in 1828. This 
 must be matter of conjecture only ; and so also must be 
 the development which would have been given to the 
 Greek question under the continued guidance of Can- 
 ning. It is sufficient for his fame that he added the 
 virtual liberation of Greece to the recognition of the 
 South American Republics ; that he not only destroyed 
 the Holy Alliance but exacted the respect and admira- 
 tion of Europe ; and that by adopting a national system 
 of foreign policy he extended and transmitted to suc- 
 ceeding generations some of our best and noblest tradi- 
 tions. 
 
 to both of them if necessary, that the said High Powers intend to 
 exert all the means which circumstances may suggest to their prudence 
 for the purpose of obtaining the immediate effects of the armistice of 
 which they desire the execution, by preventing as far as possible all 
 collision between the contending parties ; and, in consequence, im- 
 mediately after the above-mentioned declaration the High Powers will 
 jointly exert all their efforts to accomplish the object of such armis- 
 tice, without, however, taking any part in the hostilities between the 
 two contending parties. Immediately after the signature of the pre- 
 sent Additional Article, the High Contracting Powers will, consequent- 
 ly, transmit to the admirals commanding their respective squadrons 
 in the Levant conditional instructions in conformity loith the arrange- 
 ments above declared^'' These conditional instructions were of a 
 pacific, or at any rate of a negative character, and it was maintained 
 by the Governments of the three Powers that they could not be held 
 to justify the destruction of the Turko-Egyptian fleet. It was the 
 Turks who opened fire in the Bay of JSTavarino; but it was the Allied 
 Admirals who, in their zeal to keep a particularly close watch on the 
 slave-dealers (in accordance with their instructions), sailed well within 
 the Turkish line of fire. 
 
VI. 
 
 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 [Henry Temple, Lord Palmerston, . . Born Oct. 1784 
 
 M.P. for Newport ; Junior Lord, . . . 1807 
 
 Secretary at "War {Perceval <h Liverpool Admin.\ 1809 — 1828 
 Foreign Secretary {Grey Admin.\ . Nov. 1830 — Nov. 1834 
 Foreign Secretary {Melbourne Admin.\ Apr. 1835 — Aug. 1841 
 Foreign Secretary (7?w5seZ^ ^ c???un.), . July 1846 — Dec. 1851 
 Home Secretary {Aberdeen Admin.\ . Dec. 1852 — Jan. 1855 
 Vriuie'MAni^tQr {Defeated on Chinese War\ Feb. 1855 — Mar. 1857 
 Prime Minister {Defeated on Conspiracy Bill), 
 
 Apr. 1857— Feb. 1858 
 Prime Minister until Death, . . June 1859 — Oct. 1865] 
 
 Henry Temple, the collateral descendant of William 
 the Third's namesake and friend, could hardly have 
 failed to be influenced by the popular foreign policy 
 of Canning, and ultimately to develope into a Whig. 
 It is true that he opened his long political career as a 
 Tory, the nominee of Perceval, the pupil of Lord Malmes- 
 bury, the steady adherent of Lord Liverpool, the effective 
 administrator whose best speeches were in favour of vast 
 and increasing armaments. But the period of the 
 Napoleonic wars had been proved in many cases to be a 
 powerful solvent of Whig principles, especially in young 
 men. Motives similar to those which had made Can- 
 ning a client of Pitt drew the young Irish viscount in 
 the train of Pitt's successors, and curiously enough the 
 two politicians liberated themselves together from the 
 unbending Toryism w^hich recognised Eldon for its most 
 ardent leader. 
 
 There wxre nevertheless great and characteristic differ- 
 
PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 143 
 
 ences, as well as notable similarities, between Canning 
 and the statesman who, after a brief interval, succeeded 
 Canning in the direction of our foreign policy. Palmer- 
 ston never enjoyed the popularity and favour which 
 were lavished on the elder man. During the first stages 
 of his career he had few friends in society, fewer in 
 political circles, and scarcely any beyond the seas. His 
 colleagues did not greatly care for him, and Lord Liver- 
 pool more than once attempted to send him into honour- 
 able obscurity. Like Canning he received oflFers of 
 positions which would have brought him mere werlth 
 and esteem in place of the ripest fruits of ambition ; but 
 whilst Canning was rescued from suppression by his own 
 brilliance and the intervention of his fellow-countrymen, 
 Palmerston reserved himself for his future triumphs by 
 quiet confidence and tenacity. Like Canning again, 
 Palmerston ofiended the uncompromising Tories by de- 
 claring for Catholic Emancipation ; and thus and other- 
 wise he leaned towards the Whigs. On some questions 
 indeed, as (in middle life) on the question of Reform, 
 he was more liberal-minded than Canning ; but on 
 the crucial questions of foreign politics he was less 
 courageously attached to the cause of struggling nation- 
 alities, and less generously consistent. If the com- 
 parison were pushed into the domains of scholarship, 
 oratory, and mental refinement, a wide gap would be 
 found to exist between the polished and trenchant Anti- 
 Jacobin and the homely, downright, ungrammatical 
 talker and letter-writer who divided his time between 
 statecraft, the turf, and the nursing of his moderate 
 patrimony. As for the distinctions of their foreign 
 policies, these became more manifest and significant with 
 every act of Palmerston's later career. 
 
 The death of Lord Liverpool threw upon many of the 
 
144 FALMEIiSTOJSrS FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 most active politicians of that day the Bccessity of 
 making, or at least contemplating, a definite election 
 between rapidly diverging courses. There was as much 
 (or more) difi'erence between Canning and Eldon as 
 between Canning and Grey ; and when the former 
 became First Lord of the Treasury the lack of harmony 
 amongst the Liverpool Tories was converted into an 
 open breach. They who chose to follow Canning, and 
 to retain or accept office under the popular Commoner, 
 virtually by that act severed their political connection 
 with the party which contained Eldon, Welling- 
 ton, Bathurst, Herries, and the other seceders. The 
 Coalition which now came into power was in fact the 
 nucleus of that broad Liberal party which, without 
 homogeneity for some twenty years to come, was to 
 wdeld power in England during the greater part of four 
 decades. In this party were included from time to time 
 old Whigs who could pose as Tories and old Tories who 
 could join hands Avith the Whigs ; Whigs who could 
 consistently make common cause with rivals in process 
 of conversion, and Tories who, in spite of Canning's 
 appeal to popular opinion or of Peel's logical evolutions, 
 "came round by instinct" (as Palmerston jDut it) "to 
 the oat- sieve." 
 
 On the formation of the Goderich Ministry Palmer- 
 ston 's advancing Whiggism was emphasized by the king's 
 frustration of his appointment as Chancellor of the Ex- 
 chequer. His four months' tenure of office under the 
 Duke of Wellington, in combination with Huskisson and 
 the other Canningites, though it was the result of an 
 honourable and liberal invitation from the Duke, proved 
 to Palmerston the impracticability of further alliance 
 with even the moderate Tories. On the morrow of his 
 acceptance of a place in the Cabinet he wrote to his 
 
PALMEBSTOJSrS FOREIGN POLICY, 145 
 
 brother that he liked the Whigs much better than the 
 Tories, and agreed with them much more. No doubt, 
 however, he had seen strong reason for taking ojfice, and 
 he saw strong reason for remaining at his post after he 
 had undertaken it. When Grant threatened to resign 
 on a domestic matter Palmerston urged him to recon- 
 sider his resolution, in as much as the Cannins^ites must 
 act together, and if they all went out of office the con- 
 sequence would be a purely Tory Government that 
 would speedily throw over all those measures on which 
 Canning had founded his fame. '' We should break im- 
 mediately with Russia, probably also with France, back 
 out of the Greek treaty, and unite ourselves again with 
 Metternich, and adopt the apostolical party in Spain 
 and Portugal." ^'' 
 
 The dispositions of Palmerston in regard to foreign 
 aSairs, and the shrewdness of perception which at all 
 times characterized him, are conspicuous in his letters 
 and journal during the few years succeeding the death 
 of Canninof. He divined at once that Metternich would 
 berin to court the Eno^lish connection. He considered 
 that ''the smash at Navarino" was *'a display of power 
 and an indication of determination" which the Turks 
 would appreciate, and believed that it would smooth 
 rather than increase our difficulties. He was strongly in 
 favour of a bold policy in Greece, proposing that England 
 and France should carry out a joint occupation of the 
 Morea, and urmnor that the Government should demand 
 the return of the Greek captives shipped to Alexandria 
 at the end of 1827, in spite of Admiral Codrington's 
 fleet. When the Duke of Wellington recommended to 
 the Cabinet a programme anything but generous to the 
 Greek insurgents, he '' expressed a strong objection to 
 
 * Lord Palmerston's Journal, March 28, 1828. 
 
 K 
 
146 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 the limit of the Morea, as at variance with the spirit and 
 principles both of protocol and treaty, because permanent 
 j^acification could not be looked for when large districts, 
 long in revolt, were excluded from the settlement/' He 
 maintained that even the occupation of the provinces by 
 a joint expedition ** could not produce a settlement of 
 the Greek question except through the prostration of 
 Turkey. The blockade of the Dardanelles must be in- 
 effectual unless we became actually at war with Turkey ; 
 since, till we obtained belligerent rights, we should not 
 be able to stop the only material supplies, namely, corn 
 and other provisions, which would be brought by neutrals. 
 But to land a sufficient army, and sweep the Turks from 
 Greece, would execute the treaty practically ; and then 
 the formal acquiescence of Turkey became less important." 
 It is evident that the tradition of Canning was already 
 being developed in the hands of his disciples. Though 
 Palmerston affirmed that England ought not in any case 
 to go to war with Turkey, he had advised more than one 
 act which would probably have led to war ; and he 
 approved the co-operation of the English and Eussian 
 fleets in the Mediterranean after the Eussian armies had 
 invaded Turkey, which his former leader would never 
 have done. But it was neither love of Eussia nor 
 political animosity against Turkey which made Palmer- 
 ston incline to this programme of action. His motive 
 no doubt was the desire that English policy (that is, for 
 the present, the policy of Canning) should prevail, and 
 that it should be carried out with spirit and thorough- 
 ness. In 1829 he wrote that "one's notion that Eussia 
 could eat up Turkey at a mouthful has been utterly 
 dissipated;" but he added, *'for my part I heartily 
 wish her success, as the only chance of making a good 
 settlement of the Greek State." He went on to lament 
 
PALMEESTOJSrS FOREIGN POLICY. 147 
 
 that the Government was not more liberal in this respect 
 — not merely in sympathy with Eussia as a probable 
 deliverer of Greece, but also in the will and desire to 
 strike a blow on its own account for the heroic and loner- 
 enduring race. 
 
 Up to the time when Palmerston accepted the Foreign 
 Secretaryship in Lord Grey's Ministry he had had at 
 most a consultative voice in regard to the external affairs 
 of the country. He had been as a rule the most liberal 
 member of the Cabinets in which he was included, and 
 he had rendered all the assistance in his power to Lord 
 Dudley, in the eflforts of the latter to give eflFect to the 
 popular policy of Canning. It was partly if not mainly 
 on account of the known liberahty of his views, and 
 because he was the ablest of the Canningites who re- 
 mained generally faithful to the traditions of his master, 
 that Lord Grey placed him at the Foreign Office. 
 
 Critical as the time was with us at home, domestic 
 concerns did not render the country indiflerent to com- 
 plications abroad. The general election of 1830 followed 
 close upon the French and Belgian revolutions, and now 
 as in 1789 the influence of our continental neighbours 
 was distinctly manifested in England. The long agony 
 of Greece had powerfully afi'ected the minds of a large 
 number of Englishmen, and the partial success of the 
 French outbreak, resulting as it did in the establishment 
 of a revolutionary and constitutional monarchy, enlisted 
 the popular sympathies. The disorganization of our 
 foreign policy ever since the death of Canning had dis- 
 gusted all those who had admired Canning's work, and 
 the nation was glad of an opportunity to call stronger 
 and more generous men to the helm. The heart of 
 England wished Greece to be free — WT.shed Belgium to 
 be free — wished to ensure the stability of the new French 
 
148 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 government, or at any rate to give it sympathy and fair 
 play. In short, the Tory supremacy which had virtually 
 existed in this country for forty years had come to an 
 end, and it was on foreign questions almost as much as 
 on home questions that the revulsion had taken place. 
 The continental policy of Castlereagh and the national 
 policy of Canning — it is hard to say which of the two in 
 chief — had trained the country to a genuine liberality of 
 opinion in foreign affairs. The nightmare of the Na- 
 poleonic wars, and of all the ills which they brought in 
 their train, was passing away, and in its stead the nation 
 had been taught to recognise its ancient, characteristic, 
 magnanimous traditions, which made it the abettor 
 rather than the destroyer of revolutionary governments 
 — the champion of liberty against all odds and opposi- 
 tions rather than the ally of despots for the restoration 
 of dynasties. 
 
 If this sentiment was less clearly expressed, and less 
 frequently interpreted in words and in print, during the 
 electoral contest of 1830 and the bitter struggle for 
 reform, it was instinctively present in the mind of every 
 Liberal ; and from that time to this it has been growing 
 stronger and more intense. We know that Lord Grey 
 had felt it when he was a young man — that the Whigs 
 had given Canning their support on the strength of it, 
 even though Canning was obstinately opposed to domestic 
 reform — that the possession and profession of this senti- 
 ment had converted many of the Canningite Tories into 
 Liberals, as they would probably have converted Canning 
 himself if he had lived three years longer. And thus it 
 was in every sense natural and fitting that Palmerston 
 should be offered and should accept the seals of the 
 Foreign Office in 1830. 
 
PALMEESTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 149 
 
 The responsibilities which Lord Palmerston now took 
 ■Lipon himself add greater significance to his utterances of 
 opinion than they had borne np to this date. It had 
 been easier for him to criticise the crude ideas of the 
 Duke of Wellington, in letters to his brother and his 
 brother-in-law, than it was to pick his steps in the 
 thorny path on which he had entered. But opportunities 
 soon occurred to him of exhibiting the peculiar qualities 
 which made him (in general) more successful as a Foreign 
 Minister than he had ever been as a War Minister- — 
 faculties for business, readiness of device, tact, clear- 
 sightedness, indomitable energy and enterprise. No 
 sooner had he taken ofiice — feeling, as he put it, ''like a 
 man who has plumped into a mill-race, scarcely able by 
 all his kicking and plunging to keep his head above 
 water" — than he found questions of the utmost import- 
 ance demanding instant solution. He was however far 
 from being daunted. Acting boldly on his instincts — of 
 course with the deliberative assistance of his colleagues 
 — he soon shaped out a definite course of policy. 
 
 In November 1830, Lord Aberdeen was still at the 
 Foreign Office. On December 20, the independence 
 of Belgium was affirmed by the representatives of the 
 Powers in London. The Belgian question was but the 
 avenue to one of far greater dimensions, for French 
 statesmen and diplomatists (who had long been com- 
 plaining that English jealousies stood in the way of 
 their development on the eastern frontier) saw in the 
 dissolution of the Netherlands a pretext and occasion of 
 advance. The Belgian Assembly had off*ered the crown 
 to a son of Louis Philippe. Palmerston at once gave 
 Talleyrand to understand that the acceptance of this 
 offer was an impossibility, and that the ambitions of the 
 French Ministers were, to say the least of it, iU-timed. 
 
150 PALMERSTOWS FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 It was not that he undervalued the friendship of France, 
 or that he could afford to dispense with her co-operation, 
 but he knew that these same considerations weighed 
 still more effectively with France herself. 
 
 In the re-settlement of Belgium and Holland, and in 
 the shaping of his conduct towards France, Palmerston 
 had to decide quickly and act energetically. He decided 
 and acted not so much by reference to traditions as 
 by drawing on his own resources, and by selecting the 
 policy which commended itself to him at the moment. 
 
 There was, or there may appear to have been, some 
 peril thus early in the abnormally decisive manner of 
 treatment which Palmerston accorded to the questions 
 which arose with foreign Powers. His maxim was 
 clearly to produce a moral effect — not the effect of mere 
 display, but the calculated effect which must be caused 
 by a belief in England's complete readiness to strike if 
 it should come to striking. He wrote to Lord Granville 
 at Paris (January 27, 1831), instructing him to question 
 the French Government concerning three or four ships 
 which were fitting out at Toulon, and concluded his 
 letter by saying : — '' It is no harm that the French 
 should think that we are a little upon the alert with 
 respect to our navy, because I believe it is the fear of a 
 naval war which has greatly tended to induce the 
 French Government to make the efforts necessary for 
 the preservation of peace." This is one of the first of 
 many proofs which Palmerston gave of his belief in 
 the efficacy of brag, especially when qualified by the 
 assumption of a reasonable suspicion on our own part. 
 A more notable instance occurred in 1859, when his 
 open and repeated imputations of French hostility very 
 nearly pushed us into war with a nation really anxious 
 to be on good terms with us. 
 
PALMEBSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY, 151 
 
 War, indeed, was actually threatened by Palmerston 
 in 1831, in order to prevent the acceptance of the Bel- 
 gian crown for the Due de Nemours ; and here, then, 
 we find him committed in his first year of office as 
 Foreign Minister to a mood of di]3lomacy which, though 
 it might have the same objects in view as Canning 
 had, or would have had under the circumstances, was 
 certainly in contrast with Cannings ordinary mood. 
 Canning never threatened war. He sent the Duke of 
 AVellington to St Petersburg, and Mr Stratford Canning 
 to Constantinople, and even went himself to Paris — each 
 occasion being one of delicacy and danger— for the very 
 purpose of avoiding the necessity of menace, open or 
 implied. His cause of quarrel with Spain, and through 
 Spain with France and Austria, was real enough ; no 
 one could doubt his spirit ; and yet he did not menace 
 the Spanish Court. He was thoroughly resolved to 
 defend the integrity and independence of Portugal, but 
 he did not set up his post and throw down his glove. 
 He sat calmly and quietly awaiting his castes foederis ; 
 and the result of this deliberate attitude was the with- 
 drawal of the French, the rapid right-about of the 
 Spaniards, and the involuntary respect of Metternich. 
 
 Palmerston might have brought matters to a climax a 
 little sooner, but he could not have arranged them more 
 successfully, or with so slight expenditure of force. His 
 quicker methods were employed at imminent risk of 
 making enemies or storing up grudges. It appears 
 almost marvellous, when we read his despatches and 
 instructions, that we escaped in his time another war 
 with France. He seems to have set out with the idea 
 that Louis Philippe and his Ministers were playing a 
 designedly anti-English game, and that they took a 
 delight in saying offensive things to English Ministers. 
 
152 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 *' Pray take care," he writes to Lord Granville, ''in all 
 your conversation with Sebastiani, to make him under- 
 stand that our desire for peace will never lead us to 
 submit to affront either in lanouao-e or in act." * And 
 again : " Sebastiani really should be made to understand 
 that he must have the goodness to learn to keep his 
 temper ; or, when it fails him, let him go to vent his ill- 
 humour upon some other quarter, and not bestow it 
 upon England." In another letter he writes : '/ Pdrier 
 is honest, but it is not in human nature that he should 
 not every now and then be swayed by the dishonesty of 
 Sebastiani, and, I fear I must add, the Avant of fixed 
 principle of the King." ^nd in another: ''We are 
 deeply convinced that it is greatly for the interest of 
 England and of France that their friendship should be 
 intimate and unbroken. But true friendship cannot 
 exist without perfect confidence on both sides. . . . 
 Suspicion and distrust are fatal to confidence and 
 friendship." 
 
 It is plain that Palmerston's distrust of France — which 
 Avas either exaggerated or dwelt upon with excessive 
 emphasis — was a peril to the friendship of the two coun- 
 tries, and gxeater than was natural under the circum- 
 stances. The tone of his letters beino; so downrio-ht and 
 forcible, everything was made to hinge upon the discre- 
 tion of our representatives abroad. We could not have 
 had a safer medium at Paris in 1831 than Lord Gran- 
 ville ; but there Avere instances in other places and at 
 other times Avhen men of less tact and suavity, possibly 
 rendered aggressive by the stimulation of despatches 
 from the Foreign Office, committed the double fciult of 
 
 * See the selections from Lord Palmerston's correspondence in 
 Lord Dalling and Lulwer's Life. 
 
PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 1 5 3 
 
 oflfending friendly Powers and failing to secure the 
 objects of their diplomacy. 
 
 No doubt there was much diflBculty in the Belgian 
 question, and especially in the matter of the fortresses, 
 and in the incident of the French occupation. But the 
 doubt suggests itself whether Lord Palmerston may not 
 have increased his difficulty by too much insistance. It 
 is at least questionable wisdom to take the bull by the 
 horns when it is disposed to turn its tail upon you. On 
 the whole, however, the English Minister conducted the 
 negotiations with an ability, a vigour and success, which 
 were fully recognised by all the Governments concerned 
 in them. 
 
 His share in the settlement of the Greek question was 
 slight in comparison with the part which he took in 
 establishing the Kingdom of Belgium. He had in reality 
 little to do with the final arrangements in this case, and 
 one is inclined to wish that he had done a great deal 
 more. The French occupation, the Eussian War, the 
 London Conference of 1830 — when Greek independence 
 was at length resolved upon — had paved the way for a 
 settlement before Palmerston came into ofiice. But he is 
 saddled with a portion of the responsibility for the 
 Mediation of 1832, which was marked by unfortunate 
 timidity and weakness. We might have expected better 
 thin<xs from the statesman who in the Wellinsfton 
 Cabinet had been more favourably incHned to the Greeks 
 than any of his colleagues."''' But perhaps it was im- 
 possible for Palmerston to go beyond the terms of the 
 instrument which was agi-eed upon in May between 
 England, France, and Eussia, and which was accepted 
 and ratified by the Porte in the following July. ' The 
 
 * Unless we except Peel, who was even then anxious to confer 
 independence on the new State. 
 
154 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 time was sccarcely propitious for Greece. There was a 
 great desire on the part of the three Powers to close a 
 question which had for so many years engaged and 
 strained the diplomacy of Europe. France and England 
 were still perplexed by the affairs of the Netherlands, 
 and were actually, on however small a scale, at war with 
 Holland. Russia had had her war with Turkey, and 
 was at the moment involved in controversy with the 
 Western Powers in reo^ard to Poland.''' And there were 
 other pending matters of great and general importance 
 which must have increased the desire of the Powers to 
 close the Greek question. Nevertheless the arrangement 
 which they concluded was anything but a piece of credit- 
 able statesmanship. They made a Greece altogether too 
 cram2:)ed for healthy existence and development, saddled 
 her with a great debt and an extravagant expenditure, 
 fixed on her an incompetent boy -king with a foreign 
 court and army, and expected her forthwith to produce 
 the fruits of a mature national organisation. There is no 
 question that Palmerston could have done better ; but 
 
 * The virtual revision of the Treaty of Vienna in respect of 
 Holland and Belgium seems to have encouraged Russia to trample on 
 the clauses of the same Treaty relating to Poland, The Poles had 
 received a constitution, or a sanction for their constitution, at Vienna, 
 and Nicholas now punished their revolt hy confiscating their liberties. 
 Palmerston protested against this course in a despatch to Lord 
 Heytesbury, apparently communicated to Count Nesselrode. In this 
 despatch he was thoroughly in accord with the English Tradition. 
 He pointed out that, even if the entire Polish nation had taken part 
 in the revolt, this fact would prove the existence of a deep-seated dis- 
 content which was not likely to be removed by a sweeping abrogation 
 of the constitution. And he added that, because a war between two 
 States is held to dissolve existing treaties, it did not follow that civil 
 war annulled constitutions. Lord Bailing and Bulwer quotes from 
 Lord Palmerston's papers the notes for his despatches to Lord Heytes- 
 bury. — Life, vol. ii., p. 127. 
 
PJLMEESTOJSrS FOREIGN POLICY. 155 
 
 Wellington and Aberdeen had spoiled the business which 
 Canning had begun, and the Vfhig Foreign Minister was 
 apparently too much occupied with Belgium to pay much 
 attention to the interests of Greece. 
 
 The first stage of Palmerston's career as Foreign 
 Minister closes in 1834, with the dismissal of the Mel- 
 bourne Ministry ; and we are already in a position to 
 judge of his character and capacity in office. In the 
 first place, it is clear that Lord Palmerston had no 
 system, strictly so called — no system based professedly 
 upon tradition and precedent, or upon the maxims and 
 acts of a predecessor. His system was to be without a 
 system. His policy was to decide for himself, as the 
 emergency seemed to require, and by reference to his 
 individual conception of the nature and necessities of the 
 case. He sought to have his own way, and generally 
 had it, by dint of insistance, and even menace. He ad- 
 mired Canning, and began by calling himself Canning's 
 disciple in foreign policy ; but his individuality was too 
 strong to be subjected to the example of any master, 
 however wise. His was no policy of the pigeon-hole ; 
 he had perhaps too little respect for tradition ; he made 
 the welfare of his country and the success of his n( goiia- 
 tions depend on the vigour and firmness of his own conduct. 
 When he happened to take precisely the right view of a 
 particular problem, and when he was well served by our 
 representatives at foreign courts, he certainly reaped 
 triumphs of a more or less complete and brilliant kii d ; 
 but the risk was manifestly too great for any statesman 
 to run. If either he or his instruments failed — and both 
 failed at times — the country was inevitably the chief 
 sufi*erer. 
 
156 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY, 
 
 Thus Palmerston, on more than one or two occasions, 
 obstructed rather than advanced the national tradition. 
 There was too much of his own personality imported 
 into the transaction of public affairs. He did too little 
 to construct upon the basis of those who had gone before 
 him. 
 
 With this, and partly as a consequence of this, Pal- 
 merston was at times extremely unpopular in Europe. 
 A faithful chronicler, if not always a very close observer 
 of contemporary English politics, records one or two 
 judgments passed upon the Foreign Secretary in his 
 earlier days which are not without significance. '' Ma- 
 dame de Lieven told me," writes Greville, on Feb. 13, 
 1884, '' that it was impossible to describe the contempt 
 as well as dislike which the whole corps diplomatique 
 had for Palmerston, and, pointing to Talleyrand, who 
 was sitting close by, 'surtout lui.' They have the meanest 
 opinion of his capacity, and his manners are the reverse 
 of conciliatory/^ On the 23d of September in the same 
 year he writes : '' He (Melbourne) asked me if I thought 
 ifc was true that Talleyrand had taken such ofience at 
 Palmerston that he would not return here on that 
 account, and if I knew what it was that had affronted 
 ]iim ; whether any deficiency in diplomatic punctilio, or 
 general offensiveness of manner. I told him I had no 
 doubt it was true, and that the complaints against Pal- 
 merston were so general that there must be some cause 
 for them ; and though Madame de Lieven might be 
 prejudiced against him, all the foreign ambassadors 
 could not be so." A little later we find Greville testi- 
 fying to Lord Palmerston's qualities as a man of business, 
 but he still talks of him as most unpopular, both at the 
 Foreign Oflice and at the Embassies (Feb. 17, 1835). 
 Eighteen months afterwards he records an opinion of 
 
PJLMEBSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 157 
 
 TaUeyrand's, that '' there was but one statesman" in the 
 Ministry, '' and that was Palmerston ; " and he expresses 
 surprise to hear the Foreign Secretary spoken of in high 
 terms by those who knew him officially. ''Lady Granville, 
 a woman expert in judging, thinks his capacity first-rate ; 
 that it approaches to greatness from his enlarged views, 
 disdain of trivialities, resolution, decision, confidence, 
 and above all, his contempt of clamour and abuse." 
 
 Decision and confidence were doubtless the most 
 notable of Palmerston s characteristics ; and not seldom 
 they reached the point of obstinacy and self-will. It is 
 not to be inferred from the observations which have pre- 
 ceded that he ever consciously threw oS" the influence of 
 Canning, or repudiated his early sympathies with op- 
 pressed nationalities. In 1836 he writes privately to 
 his brother complaining of the '' scurvy " conduct of 
 Louis Philippe in backing out of the Quadruple Alliance 
 between England, France, Spain, and Portugal, the ob- 
 ject of which was to exclude the Absolutist claimants to 
 the thrones of the two last-named countries. The French 
 king, he says, was as ambitious as Louis XIV., and was 
 intriguing for crowns to put on his children's heads. 
 '' I hope," he writes, "there may be a counter revolution 
 in Portugal ; but so do not hope the Holy Alliance. 
 They think the Constitution of 1820 may bring back 
 Miguel and despotism again, as it did once before. They 
 hate Pedro's charter, because it is too reasonable a system 
 of government ; an impracticable constitution is a thing 
 to their heart." 
 
 At no time of his career was Palmerston more genu- 
 inely national, and more apparently inclined to take a radi- 
 cal view of the political situation, than when he occupied 
 a place in Lord Melbourne's Cabinet. It is not a little 
 strange, when we remember his undoubted want of 
 
158 PA LMEES TON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 popularity in certain quarters, and especially abroad, to 
 find that he was accused of a tendency to identify the 
 interests of England with those of other nations. He 
 took occasion to claim for himself and his colleagues, in 
 1839, that there never was an Administration which 
 paid more attention to the commercial interests of the 
 country ; and he declared in answer to his critics that 
 the interest of England was the guiding principle of the 
 Government. The charge certainly appears to have 
 been unmerited ; and not long afterwards an opportunity 
 occurred, in connection with a sulphur monopoly given 
 to France by the King of Naples, of defending himself in 
 the House of Commons. 
 
 This incident is one of special interest, because it 
 illustrates not merely the action of Lord Palmerston as 
 Foreign Secretary but also the commercial policy of 
 England in an age when monopolies were still the basis 
 of much of our foreign trade. In 1816 we had con- 
 cluded a treaty with the kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
 which placed the contracting States on a footing towards 
 each other of the most favoured nation ; and amongst 
 the stiDulations was one to the effect that the Govern- 
 ment of Naples should not grant to another State any 
 mercantile privileges which might be injurious to British 
 interests. In 1838 the sulphur monopoly in Sicily was 
 granted to France for a consideration. The English 
 Government protested, and when the Neapolitan king 
 had more than once promised to abolish the monopoly, 
 and to indemnify the English merchants who had been 
 injured by the violation of the treaty, without keeping 
 his promise, the fleet was sent to the Mediterranean, and 
 captured a number of Neapolitan vessels. This act of 
 war brought the Government of Naples to their senses, 
 and the English demands were complied with. 
 
PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 159 
 
 There was of course something more for our Foreign 
 Minister to proceed upon in this case than the exclusive 
 consideration of British interests. The claim against 
 Naples was based upon a treaty engagement, and Lord 
 Palmerston was technically right in his insistance — '' im- 
 patient" as he admitted this insistance to have been. 
 But the whole incident was the reverse of creditable to 
 us, and it belongs to a system and fashion of policy 
 which have happily all but passed away. The Treaty 
 itself was a quarter of a century old ; it was from the 
 first somewhat unequal in its provisions, and it was con- 
 cluded under circumstances which left the Neapolitans 
 very little to say in the matter. Moreover, the exaction 
 of a monopoly of trade, general or particular, in the 
 dominions of a weaker State, whether it rested upon the 
 Treaty (as Palmerston declared) or only upon his inter- 
 pretation of the Treaty (as the King of Naples main- 
 tained), was against all sound principles of international 
 commerce. Shrewd as Palmerston was, and anxiously 
 as he aimed at giving satisfaction to popular sentiment, 
 wherever the national interests were concerned, he did 
 not perceive that the promotion of our trade by such 
 means as he saw fit to adopt — the employment of 
 menace, the despatch of a fleet, the seizure of merchant 
 vessels, the bombardment of towns — was in reality 
 opposed to the sentiment and wishes of the nation. 
 Perhaps it may not have been so before the inauguration 
 of our Free Trade policy, and the passing of the Naviga- 
 tion Acts. But it was so from 1850 onwards; and 
 Palmerston did not even then comprehend the fact. 
 
 This is all the more strange because he was professedly a 
 disciple of Huskisson's, as he was one of the earliest oflicial 
 converts of Cobden's. He had gone with his colleagues 
 to the country in 1841 on a platform distinctly condem- 
 
160 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 natory of the principles of monopoly, abroad and at 
 home. His familiar vindication of Free Trade at the 
 outset of the session of 1842 bore witness to the develop- 
 ment of his political ideas, and stamped him as an advo- 
 cate of unfettered international commerce. But the acts 
 with which he, and no other, discredited these liberal 
 principles soon after their adoption by the country were 
 in direct contradiction to his theories. The best known 
 passage in his speech of February 9, 1842, is that in 
 which he describes the object of natural laws and the 
 dispensation of Providence as being, '' that commerce 
 may freely go forth, leading civilisation with one 
 hand, peace with the other, to render mankind happier, 
 wiser, better/' But it was not as the mild nurse of 
 peace and civilisation that English commerce had been 
 made to figure just eighteen months before these words 
 were spoken. It was not exactly in the interests of 
 peace and civilisation that we seized the Greek merchant 
 vessels in 1850, and waged the Chinese war seven years 
 later. Even if Palmerston had persuaded himself that 
 it was so, and had seen no inconsistency between his 
 professions and his actions, the verdict of posterity will 
 agree with the verdicts of the House of Commons and of 
 the constituencies in regard to the last-mentioned per- 
 versions of our national foreign policy. 
 
 Incidents such as the seizure of the Neapolitan ships in 
 1840 must have been present in the mind of Peel when 
 he declared, early in the course of his premiership, that 
 he respected the rights and dignity of other States, 
 " small as well as great, weak as well as strong," and 
 that he looked on the use of " menace or force solely as 
 a last extremity, legitimate only when it was absolutely 
 necessary. " 
 
 The details of the interventions in Greece and in 
 
PALMEESTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 161 
 
 China, and the morals which are to be drawn from these 
 chapters of our political history, are too trite to call for 
 repetition. Lord Palmerston's repute as a Foreign 
 Minister can never be dissociated from his conduct on 
 these occasions, and his most discriminative admirers 
 will be content to say, with his colleague, Lord Russell, 
 that ''the year 1840 saw the climax of his ability and 
 success as a statesman." The mistakes of 1850 and 
 1857-9 deprived him of the title to be considered as 
 occupying the highest rank amongst the Ministers who 
 have shaped our policy abroad. That he was skilful 
 and audacious in asserting the dignity of England, and in 
 securing for her respect and deference in other lands, 
 need hardly be said. ''We are all proud of him,'' Peel 
 admitted in 1850 ; but it was in opposing a vote of 
 confidence in Palmerston's foreign policy that he rendered 
 this tribute to his public services. Englishmen have for 
 the most part agreed in the appreciation and reservations 
 of Peel. 
 
 In one respect Lord Palmerston made a contribution 
 to the traditions of English policy abroad which has 
 exercised an important in|luence on every statesman who 
 has succeeded him at the Foreign Office, and which for 
 good or evil has been potent in its effects upon the 
 course of European history. The reference of course is 
 to the quadruple treaty of alliance signed in 1840 
 between England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia for the 
 protection of the Turkish Empire. We have here a 
 point of contact between the policy of Palmerston and 
 the policy of Russell ; for Lord Russell seems to have 
 been specially consulted on the subject by his colleague 
 before the proposal for the treaty was submitted to the 
 
 L 
 
162 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 full Caljinet, and he gave his adhesion to the plan in the 
 belief that it afforded the only alternative to an '' aban- 
 donment of the Turkish Empire as a spoil to be scrambled 
 for between Russia and France."* 
 
 The Porte had begun to reap poetical justice for the 
 encouragement which it had given to its too powerful 
 tributary in Egypt. Mehemet Ali and his general 
 Ibrahim had been carrying all before them in Syria ; the 
 Sultan was unable to resist ; France was secretly laying 
 her snares in the hope of securing predominance in the 
 Levant and on the Nile ; and English statesmen could 
 scarcely be expected to entertain a doubt that Russia 
 also w^ould soon find a pretext for interference. The 
 case of Turkey was desperate, and her ruin imminent. 
 Potentially Egypt had an inexhaustible reserve of 
 strength, not only in Africa but in Asia ; and with the 
 connivance of France and Russia the armies of the 
 ambitious pashas would unquestionably have stripped the 
 Sultan of a large portion of his dominions. It was for 
 the English Government to decide whether they would 
 risk the destruction of the Turkish power in Europe, 
 which manifestly implied not the substitution of an 
 Egyptian tyranny, but the aggrandisement of two 
 European States, and the serious disturbance of inter- 
 national politics. 
 
 There are many Englishmen at the present moment 
 who would not hesitate to say that this was a question 
 with which it was not necessary to concern ourselves, 
 and that it would have been better for us in the lono^ 
 run if we had let thiners take their course — even thouorh 
 France might have become paramount in Egypt and 
 Syria, and Russia on the Bosphorus. Such a decision, 
 
 * Lord Hussell s ^' Eecollections and Suggestions," Ch. 2. 
 
PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 1G3 
 
 probably impossible for this country to-day, was certainly 
 impossible in 1840. No Foreign Minister could at that 
 juncture have contemplated the abandonment of Turkey; 
 and least of all was Palmerston inclined to do so. He 
 had, in fact, a problem to solve which was in many 
 particulars identical with Canning's problem, fourteen 
 years before. In order to eliminate the danger from 
 Eussian intrigue he invited the Government of the Czar 
 to enter into the engagement above-mentioned. The 
 same proposal was virtually made to France ; and when 
 Louis Philippe and his Ministers declined his invitation 
 Palmerston obtained the consent of the Cabinet to the 
 quadruple treaty — though not until he had overcome the 
 opposition of his colleagues by a threat of resignation. 
 
 No sooner was the treaty signed than he displayed 
 his characteristic energy and promptitude. He had just 
 settled what was known as the Sulphur question, and he 
 expressed to his brother great satisfaction that the ships 
 were " set free in that quarter," for there was '' work 
 for them to do '' in the Levant. Perhaps no English 
 Minister ever made more use of the fleet than Palmerston. 
 He was always manipulating it, or advising its employ- 
 ment for one purpose or another ; and rarely without 
 manifestly advancing his designs and attaining his object. 
 On this occasion his policy unquestionably succeeded, in 
 so far that it checked the Egyptians, saved the Turks, 
 baulked France, and kept a great temptation out of the 
 way of Russia. 
 
 The opponents of Lord Palmerston's policy at this 
 crisis — Holland and Clarendon, with many of the 
 stauncher Whigs, and in some measure Lord Melbom^ne 
 himself — seem to have been loth to take a course so 
 offensive to France as that which the Foreign Minister 
 suggested ; and doubtless they were influenced at the 
 
104 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 same time by a question as to our justification in taking 
 up arms against the Egyptians. In and out of Parlia- 
 ment, moreover, there were the professed advocates of 
 peace, economy, and international morality, who strenu- 
 ously objected to the intervention of England in a 
 matter of this kind. There were others, again, who 
 stigmatised the action of the Government as a recru- 
 descence of the old policy of maintaining the balance of 
 power, and who denied that the alleged intrigues of 
 France in Egypt could affect this balance in such a way 
 as to render it imperative on England to oppose her 
 and to risk a quarrel vvdth a neighbour with whom we 
 ought to ally ourselves as closely as possible. 
 
 Comparatively little was said during the consideration 
 of this question about the English route to India, mainly, 
 of course, because the sea-route through the Egyptian 
 isthmus had not yet been seriously contemplated. But 
 it is none the less true that British interests in the East 
 were present in Lord Palmerston s mind, as they had 
 been present in Canning's, over and above the considera- 
 tion of the balance of power in Europe. And it is 
 advisable to remember this in tracing the progress of 
 the tradition which chiefly distinguishes our foreign 
 policy since the Congress of Vienna. The grounds on 
 which nearly every English Minister has acted in 
 observing this tradition are, first, that England is bound 
 by her vital interests to prevent any powerful nation 
 from controlling her route to India, and secondly, that 
 she is bound by the same interests to prevent (as Lord 
 Russell puts it) the abandonment of Turkey " as a sjDoil 
 to be scrambled for." 
 
 The last of these arguments is one of very doubtful 
 force, except in as much as it is associated with the 
 first. The fiction that Constantinople is on the route to 
 
PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 1 65 
 
 India seems to be fast losing its hold on the imagina- 
 tions of Englishmen ; and as soon as the constituencies 
 are fully persuaded that the holder of Turkey in Europe 
 cannot forbid our passage from Malta to Egypt they 
 Avill probably care very little into whose hands the pos- 
 sessions of the Sultans may fall. But so long as India 
 is ours, and so long as its present relations with the 
 Home Government are maintained, the supreme neces- 
 sity of guarding these relations from interruption must 
 create for us an Eastern Question on the continent of 
 Europe. 
 
 But have not all our statesmen, from the death of 
 Canning to the year 1880, exaggerated the dangers 
 menacing our communications with India, and enor- 
 mously exaggerated the importance of keeping the con- 
 tinental Powers out of European Turkey ? 
 
 In the Aberdeen Administration of 1852, which 
 waged the Crimean War on the latter ground especially, 
 Lord Palmerston was at the Home Office — Lord John 
 Eussell, and subsequently Lord Clarendon, being Foreign 
 Secretary. But as a member of the Cabinet, with a 
 personal influence as strong as that of any of his col- 
 leagues, he was largely responsible for the inception and 
 prosecution of this war. The responsibility was increased 
 by his acceptance of the premiership in 1855, with 
 practically the same Cabinet which Mr Eoebuck's 
 motion had compelled to resign — a course fully com- 
 mittino- him to the defence of the late Government. 
 His difficulty in this defence did not, however, consist 
 in having to prove that the war itself was justifiable. 
 No one asked him to do this. Almost the only persons 
 in a prominent position who condemned the policy of 
 the conflict with Eussia were Cobden, Mr Bright, 
 and the members of the Peace Party ; and they fell at 
 
166 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 this period into extreme unpopularity. The nation at 
 large was the real wager of the Crimean War ; and in 
 this we must conclude that it was untrue to its better 
 and nobler traditions. Few persons in our day are at 
 the pains of justifying the alliance with France or the 
 conflict with Eussia on such utterly insufiicient grounds. 
 That this conflict was in some sense the outcome of the 
 tradition handed down from Canning to his successors 
 it would be difficult to deny;'"' but how unlike the action 
 of Canning in 1826 was the policy which made us the 
 allies, if not the dupes, of "Napoleon the Little." 
 
 Immediately after the assumption of the premiership 
 by Lord Palmerston, Mr Layard vigorously attacked the 
 conduct of public aff'airs, and declared that what the 
 country wanted was "not septuagenarian experience, 
 but more of youthful activity and energy." No doubt 
 administrative energy was one of the chief needs of the 
 Aberdeen and Palmerston Cabinets. Palmerston him- 
 self had apparently exhausted his energy, or at any rate 
 the spirit which had so often made his energy service- 
 able to the State, in the noteworthy diplomatic fiasco of 
 1851, when an unwarrantable expression of opinion in 
 favour of Louis Napoleon's violation of the French con- 
 stitution drew down upon him the reproof of the Queen, 
 and caused his dismissal from Lord John Russell's 
 Cabinet. His conduct on this occasion was the more 
 
 * The Emperor Nicholas complained that he had been misled by 
 English statesmen into thinking that English and Russian policy on 
 the Eastern Question nearly coincided. That he had some reason in 
 this complaint can scarcely be doubted in view of the friendly pour- 
 parlers which took place between the Czar on the one part and Sir 
 Eobert Peel and Lord Aberdeen on the other, during a visit of the 
 former to London in 1844. A memorandum apparently embodying 
 the results of these pourparlers, and retained in our Foreign Oflice, is 
 quoted in the Appendix (F). 
 
PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1 6 7 
 
 remarkable because his policy and feeling had usually 
 been anti-French, and his sympathies constitutional. 
 He wrote to Lord Normanby, at Paris, after the im- 
 prisonment of the deputies and the carnage in the 
 streets: — ''Such a state of antagonism had arisen 
 between the President and the Assembly that it was 
 becoming every day more clear that their co-existence 
 could not be of long duration; and it seemed to me 
 better for the interests of France, and through them 
 better for the interests of the rest of Europe, that the 
 power of the President should prevail." Lord Palmer- 
 ston had often complained of the previous French 
 Governments that their policy and intrigues aped those 
 of Bonaparte ; and yet we find him at this crisis going 
 out of his way to assist a new Bonaparte in defeating 
 the liberties of a friendly nation.'" His departure from 
 diplomatic rule and etiquette was sufficiently expiated 
 by loss of office. But it is impossible to exaggerate 
 the mischievous character of Lord Palmerston's offence 
 against the spirit of the English constitution, and against 
 the traditions of national policy which he had received 
 direct fi'om the hands of Canning. The natural effect 
 of his act was to make England an abettor of the worst 
 possible kind of outrage on the rights of a neighbouring 
 independent State. 
 
 The instinct which dictated his assurances to ]\L 
 Walewski and his despatch to Lord Normanby was one 
 entirely opposed to the best instincts of English states- 
 manship : it was an instinct of which Pitt would have 
 been ashamed, which Castlereagh would have acknow- 
 
 * The memory of this spontaneous compliment to Napoleon was 
 present in the minds of Englishmen when in 1858 Lord Palmerstou 
 introduced the Conspiracy to Murder Bill, and, under pressure of 
 public opinion, was defeated on Mr Milner Gibson's amendment. 
 
168 PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 ledged to be against " the fundamental laws of the 
 country," and which could never have existed in the 
 heart of Canning. To have not only felt but acted 
 upon such an instinct suffices to deprive Lord Palmer- 
 ston of the title to be regarded as a national Foreign 
 Minister, and spoils the record of his spirited policy on 
 other occasions. He had often made the continental 
 Governments respect us, even when he was defeating 
 their cherished plans. His conduct in 1851 tended to 
 make them despise us, even when we were playing into 
 their hands. 
 
VII. 
 LATER WHIG POLICY. 
 
 (1859-1866). 
 
 [Lord John Russell, 
 
 Bom, 1792 
 
 1813 
 1830—1832 
 1831—1832 
 1835—1839 
 1839—1841 
 
 M.P. for Tavistock, 
 
 Pavmaster of the Forces, 
 
 Supported the Reform Bill in the Commons 
 
 Home Secretary {Melbourne Admin.), 
 
 Colonial Secretary „ 
 
 First Lord, .... July 1846— Feb. 1852 
 
 Foreign Secretary {Aberdeen Admin.), Dec. 1852 — Feb. 1853 
 
 In Cabinet without office, „ . . until June 1854 
 
 Lord President, „ . . until Jan. 1855 
 
 Colonial Secretary {Palmerston Admin.), . . 1855 
 
 Foreign Secretary {2d Palmerston Admin.), June 1859 — Nov. 1865 
 
 Made an Earl, . .... July 30, 1861 
 
 First Lord, .... Nov. 1865— June 1866] 
 
 The Eevolution of 1848, like the Eevolution of 1789, 
 was French in its inception, but European in its scope, 
 causes, and results. Both these movements manifested 
 themselves in almost every continental State, the mani- 
 festation varying in form according to the character and 
 condition of the several peoples, though it seems to 
 have been due in each case to the same motive power. 
 England was no exception to the rule. She did not 
 escape the revolution, but the shock was borne with less 
 disturbance, because the original equilibrium was greater. 
 And it was perhaps for this very reason, because they 
 already possessed much of what other nations were 
 striving for, that the people of this country became in- 
 
170 LATER WHIG POLICY. 
 
 volvecl in contests for the freedom of other countries 
 rather than for their own. We made no great progress 
 in domestic constitutional liberty on either occasion. 
 We had fought our great fights in 1642 and 1688 : it 
 was now demanded of us that we should pay what 
 hitherto remained unpaid of the price of our successful 
 revolutions in the seventeenth century. 
 
 As a consequence or sequel of the revolutions of 1789 
 and 1821 Endand secured the liberties of South America, 
 Portugal, and Greece. As a sequel of the revolution of 
 1848 England confirmed the liberties of the Greeks, and 
 played an important part in emancipating the Italians. 
 
 It was (naturally enough) the Whigs who took upon 
 themselves the accomplishment of objects so consonant 
 with their party traditions and so harmonious with the 
 aims of the national genius of Englishmen. The best 
 traditions of the Whigs, so far as their foreign policy is 
 concerned, may be summed up in the phrase which has 
 usually served them for a watchword. The theory of 
 the Whig policy is based on '' civil and religious liberty 
 throughout the world;" and whenever the party has 
 been true to its principles — whenever its statesmen, as 
 distinguished from its mere place-hunters, have had the 
 courage of their convictions, and have acted up to their 
 political creed — this watchword has been justified. The 
 career of Earl Eussell afi'ords apt illustration of the truth 
 of what has been said. 
 
 Lord Eussell occupies a position in English history 
 which will probably appear more important to the next 
 generation than it did to his own. He was defeated 
 more frequently, he resigned more frequently, he 
 was less generally influential and popular, than any 
 of his principal colleagues ; but he held office as a 
 Liberal Cabinet Minister of first rank over a term 
 
LATER WHIG POLICY. 171 
 
 whose limits include the third part of a century. 
 Throughout his life he was a consistent Whig, and 
 his political professions varied remarkably little from 
 the beginning to the end. He had not the initiation of 
 Lord Palmerston, nor the genius of Mr Gladstone, nor 
 the suavity of Lord Granville, nor the plodding ability 
 of Lord Clarendon ; but he had the straightforwardness, 
 the bluntness, the backbone which Englishmen delight 
 to see in their Ministers, and he held hig-h the standard 
 of England's honour and generosity. His conduct 
 during the Italian struggle for independence, and his 
 attitude towards Europe in defence of the action of 
 Sardinia in 1859-60, earned for him a title to the lasting 
 gratitude of his countrymen. Of all Whig diplomatists 
 up to the time of the re-unification of Italy he did most 
 to give effect to the national and popular tradition which 
 overlaps, though it does not coincide with, the tradition 
 of his party. 
 
 The long revolutionary conflict in Italy, paralysed for 
 a time by the Holy Alliance, but never absohitely crushed 
 out, was renewed in 1848, paralysed again by the French 
 troops in Eome, and once more revived under the 
 championship of Sardinia. To serve his own ambitions 
 Louis Napoleon made common cause with Victor Em- 
 manuel, rescuing Lombardy from the Austrians in the 
 campaign of 1859. The audacity of Garibaldi in 186^ , 
 and the ambitions of Prussia in 1866, practically com- 
 pleted the unification of the Peninsula. The part which 
 England took in this memorable regeneration was purely 
 passive, but it was a most important contribution to the 
 success of the movement. When the Governments of the 
 Powers in 1858 attempted a mediation between Austria 
 on the one hand, and Sardinia and France on the other, 
 England took the lead in the negotiations, and made 
 
172 LATER IFHIG POLICY, 
 
 proposals which, if the court of Vienna had been less 
 impracticable, might Iiave rendered war unnecessary. 
 liOrd Malmesbury and Lord John Russell successively 
 did their best to minimise the calamity when it had 
 become inevitable ; but Austria, underrating the diffi- 
 culties with which she had to contend, interrupted the 
 negotiations by a sudden resort to arms, — at the same 
 time throwing upon England and her two Eastern neigh- 
 bours the responsibility of encouraging revolution and 
 rebellion. The fact was that Russia looked on the 
 matter as a quarrel between Austria and France, and 
 Gortchakoff was as anxious for the friendship of the 
 former country as he was ill-disposed or indifferent 
 towards the latter ; whilst Prussia was already aiming 
 at the extrusion of Austria from the Confederation, and 
 was therefore quite prepared to see her weakened and 
 humbled. 
 
 These two Governments, like the Government of 
 France, had their special designs and ambitions in 1859, 
 so that Austria was practically left without a friend in 
 Europe. But the time for discrimination came in 1860, 
 when Garibaldi drove King Ferdinand from Naples, and 
 Victor Emmanuel marched through the Papal States. 
 France had been satisfied, and had received her prize ; 
 Prussia had seen the humiliation of her rival, and there 
 was nothing to be gained for any save the Italians in 
 the complete liberation of the Peninsula. Therefore the 
 heinousness of insurrection appeared to the continental 
 courts in a strong light, and they began to protest against 
 the perfidy of Sardinia. This would have been natural 
 enough from them if they had not taken the opposite view 
 so long as it suited their purpose. It may even be ad- 
 mitted that there was a noteworthy difference between 
 the circumstances of the two years, and that the invasion 
 
LATER WHIG POLICY. 173 
 
 of Sicily and Naples was forced upon the King of Sardinia 
 by Garibaldi, against his express command, if not against 
 his will. There was so far a justification for the change 
 of tone ; but it was made clearly manifest that these 
 Governments had no genuine sympathy with the Italian 
 people in their rejection of tyrannous rulers and foreign 
 domination.^ On the other hand, the conduct of the 
 English Government (with Lord John Russell at the 
 Foreign Office and Lord Palmerston as premier) 
 was equally sympathetic on both occasions, affordincr 
 the happiest contrast with the action of France and tJie 
 Eastern Powers. As in 1858 Lord John Russell had 
 warned the Court of Vienna that this country was 
 wont to admit the right of a people to decide under 
 what kind of government it would live, so in 1860 he 
 gave evidence of undiminished goodwill towards the 
 Italian patriots on the part of the English Ministry 
 and people. His despatch to our representative at Turin, 
 giving reasons why the Queen s Government could not 
 imitate the attitude of France, Prussia, Russia, and 
 Austria in condemning the invasion of the Papal States 
 by Italy, is full of spirit. Its argument is based not 
 merely upon the fundamental laws of England but also 
 upon the irrefragable Vattel — who had declared, gene- 
 rations before, "that when a people, for good reasons, 
 takes up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of 
 justice and generosity to assist brave men in the de- 
 fence of their liberties." "^^ 
 
 This despatch, followed by the refusal of a French 
 proposition that the combined fleets should prevent the 
 landing of the Garibaldians on the mainland, virtually 
 secured the independence of Italy. If we had made 
 common cause with the other Powers in 1860 there can 
 
 * Appendix G. 
 
174 LATER JFHIG POLICY. 
 
 be little doubt that the unification of the Peninsula 
 would have been prevented ; Victor Emmanuel might 
 never have been King of Italy ; the Neapolitan kingdom 
 and the Temporal Power might have endured to the 
 present day. 
 
 There had been no more important recognition and 
 sanction of revolution in Europe — certainly none of 
 equal significance and consequence. And yet the change 
 was effected with remarkable ease. The Italians were 
 fortunate in the opportunity of their revolt, for the 
 selfish interests of three Great Powers were as potent in 
 their favour as the declarations of the Enorlish Govern- 
 ment. It is very evident that these declarations were 
 in the highest degree serviceable to the Italians, and 
 they mark an epoch in the development of popular and 
 international freedom. * 
 
 The characteristic of Lord John Russell's action — 
 and it was a personal characteristic of this Minister — 
 
 ^ Lord Palnierston's Administration, formed in June 1859, included 
 the following members : — 
 
 First Lord, Viscount Palmerston. 
 
 Lord Chancellor, Lord Campbell. 
 
 Lord President, Earl Granville. 
 
 Lord Privy Seal, Duke of Argyll. 
 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer, . . W. E. Gladstone. 
 
 Home Secretary, Sir G. C. Lewis. 
 
 Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell. 
 
 Colonial Secretary, Duke of Newcastle. 
 
 War Secretary, S. Herbert. 
 
 India Secretary, Sir C. Wood. 
 
 Chancellor of the Duchy, ... Sir G. Grey. 
 
 First Lord of the Admiralty, . . Duke of Somerset. 
 
 President of the Board of Trade, . T. Milner Gibson. 
 More than one of these, in addition to the Foreign Secretary, had 
 given public and special indication of a spirit in sympathy with the 
 Italian revolutionists, and adverse to the usurpation of power by Louis 
 Napoleon. 
 
LATER TFHIG POLICY, 175 
 
 Avas moral courage : courage to perform what the mind 
 had approved, even if he were isolated in its performance, 
 and if he were compelled to shock diplomacy and fly in 
 the face of precedent. Does it not appear that that 
 which we in our own day recognise as the popular and 
 national policy, and furthermore as the official policy of 
 England not lightly to be departed from by Ministers of 
 any denomination, is the product of old principles and 
 new moral courage ? There was nothing new in the 
 principles on which Lord John Russell had acted. They 
 were at least as old as the seventeenth century — as old 
 as the Revolution and as Vattel. Tories and Whigs had 
 from time to time acted in the spirit of them : the Whigs 
 in particular had professed and maintained them. But 
 the men who had most candidly accepted this policy, 
 and who would most courageously have acted upon it, 
 had been excluded from power. The people, as a people, 
 were not able to put into practice principles which had 
 been inculcated in them by the whole course and signifi- 
 cance of the nation's history. They were not yet in 
 power so far as the Parliamentary franchise was con- 
 cerned ; but, on the other hand, they were power- 
 ful through public opinion, and especially through 
 the press. And no doubt it was in reliance upon public 
 opinion, and in the exercise of a moral courage inspired 
 and supported by the press, that Lord John Russell was 
 able to throw off the trammels of oflicialism and diplo- 
 matic restraint, and to pen the noble despatch ^to Sir 
 James Hudson. 
 
 The reinvigorated policy of the English Government 
 was continued under the influence of its Foreign 
 Secretary, of course with the sanction of the Premier ; 
 
176 LATER WHIG POLICY. 
 
 and a new occasion soon arose for applying the principles 
 of the despatch just mentioned. England was responsible 
 in a double sense for the development of the Greek 
 kingdom — first by her participation in the engagements 
 of 1826-32, and secondly by the fact of her j)rotectorate 
 over the Ionian Islands, which had existed since 1815. 
 The treaty which placed these islands under the protec- 
 tion of Great Britain referred to them as " the United 
 States of the Ionian Islands," and they had generally 
 been regarded by English statesmen as a virtual republic, 
 confided to our care in order to ensure its peace and 
 good government. Their natural destiny, at any rate 
 since 1832, was that they should be united with the 
 Greek kingdom (of course in fulfilment of the wishes 
 of the population) as soon as the Government of Athens 
 might seem competent to undertake the charge. In the 
 meantime we were represented at Corfu not by a Governor 
 but by a High Commissioner, and the spirit of our 
 arrangements with the Ionian Greeks was provisional 
 and tentative. 
 
 Now the conditions of the problem as it came before 
 the Palmerston Administration of 1859 were these : — 
 The demand for union with Greece had long existed, and 
 it was growing more and more urgent every year. Mr 
 Gladstone's mission to Corfu served only to define this 
 sentiment with greater emphasis, and to draw from the 
 inhabitants a more unequivocal demand than ever. 
 But this was not a parallel case with that of the Italians, 
 who had demanded absolute self-government, and proved 
 themselves to be capable of exercising it. The lonians 
 required to be transferred from our Government (which 
 was practically self-government) to the sway of a king ; 
 and though they had urged many complaints against 
 English rule it was certainly impossible to suppose that 
 
LATER WHIG POLICY, 177 
 
 government from Athens, under King Otho, would be 
 more constitutional, or more advantageous to them in 
 itself, than government from London. The identity of 
 race and national interests between the Greeks of the 
 mainland and the Greeks of the islands made the demand 
 of the latter a reasonable one, against which it was im- 
 possible logically to contend ; but the question was com- 
 plicated by the fact that the Bavarian king of Greece 
 had notoriously proved himself to be a failure, and it 
 could scarcely be justifiable on our part to turn over the 
 seven islands to his tyrannous rule even at the request 
 of a popular majority. To have done so before 1862 
 would have been to defeat the very objects of legitimate 
 revolution — the chief of which is to secure a better 
 system of government. 
 
 It was on these grounds that Mr Gladstone, and after 
 him Sir Henry Storks, reported strongly against con- 
 ceding the demands of the lonians. It was on these 
 grounds that Lord John Eussell refused to listen to their 
 request, and that the Queen was advised to reject their 
 petition. But the revolution of 1862, which drove King 
 Otho from the throne of Greece, and left the three 
 guaranteeing Powers at liberty to provide a new monarch 
 in his place, entirely altered the situation. From this 
 moment the English Ministers showed themselves willing 
 and even anxious to come to an understanding by which 
 they might disburden themselves of an unwelcome charge. 
 The fact is very instructive in connection with the 
 recognised tendency of English Governments to yield 
 timely assent to demands which have become urgent and 
 troublesome, whenever it is apparent that they will be 
 pressed with unwearying persistence, and that they are 
 based on a foundation of reason. The principles on 
 which this policy of concession rests are those which 
 
178 LATER JFHIG FOLIC Y. 
 
 have been observed as directinor the Whig; tradition for 
 more than a cenfcury and a half, but they have come to 
 be applied more systematically to the solution of minor 
 questions, both in foreign and in domestic concerns. 
 They who ask often, and forcibly, and for things to 
 Avhich they are theoretically entitled, are likely to secure 
 their object from an English Whig Ministry. The consti- 
 tution allows it and our Ministers award it. All that is 
 necessary is that the demand shall be in itself equitable 
 and logical. The rest follows from our national tradi- 
 tions, from our constitutional premisses and our funda- 
 mental lavvs. And Englishmen may be content to believe 
 that this system of government is wise and progressive, 
 and that the truest moral courage is displayed by states- 
 men who are most ready to give effect to the system. 
 That which was recognised and sanctioned by the Ad- 
 ministration of 1859 was the fact that the lonians had 
 rendered their demands irresistible by constant iteration 
 and agitation. It was impossible for a nation like 
 England, with a policy based and built up on justified 
 revolution, to resist the pleading of a people which 
 claimed to be governed by men of its own race rather 
 than by aliens. 
 
 The only limits to this claim which Lord John Eussell 
 and his colleagues had been careful to impose were that 
 the new rulers should be both entitled and able to rule. 
 A king at Athens was certainly entitled to extend his 
 dominion to Corfu ; and the revolution of 1862 was 
 looked upon in London as a virtual guarantee that Otho's 
 successor would be a stronger and more constitutional 
 ruler than Otho. It was therefore in direct recognition 
 of the legitimacy of the revolution that the English 
 Cabinet determined to unite the Ionian Islands with the 
 Greek State. 
 
LATER JFHIG POLICY. 179 
 
 A constitutional king Wcis found for Greece in the 
 person of Prince William of Denmark ; and as soon as 
 lie had been elected, and had accepted the throne, the 
 English Government invited the Great Powers to sign a 
 treaty modifying the instrument of 1815, and releasing 
 England from the charge confided to her. The seven 
 islands were transferred to the kinoxlom of Greece under 
 certain easy conditions ; and thus a new chapter was 
 added to the record of England's nobler and more 
 generous traditions. 
 
 Meanwhile a new question was arising in Europe, 
 ominous of trouble to more than one of the Great Powers. 
 In 1862 Prussia revived an old German claim on the 
 southern provinces of Denmark, her Government having 
 resolved — as it presently appeared — to pursue a policy 
 of aggrandisement based on the principle of national 
 re-unification. In this case also there was a question of 
 popular demand and revolutionary agitation, a section of 
 the inhabitants of Schleswig and Holstein having claimed 
 to enter the German Confederation as early as 1846. 
 The Danish king had with some difficulty made good his 
 title, and in 1850 a treaty between Denmark and Prussia, 
 followed by another treaty between Prussia, England, 
 France, and Sweden, had guaranteed the integrity of 
 Denmark as then constituted. In spite of this inter- 
 national agreement the Duchies themselves continued 
 their agitation, in which they were encouraged by the 
 Prussian Government. On the very day when Prince 
 William was proclaimed as King George of Greece, the 
 Kino- of Denmark issued a proclamation formally annex- 
 ino- Schleswig, and including it under the new constitu- 
 tion which he had conferred upon his dominions, but 
 
180 LATER WHIG POLICY, 
 
 allowing a greater measure of independence to Holstein 
 and Lauenburg, these provinces being admittedly asso- 
 ciated with the German Confederation. Prussia and 
 Austria took exception to the attitude of the king ; and 
 Holstein, relying upon German aid, refused to acknow- 
 ledge the authority of the Danes. A vote of the Prussian 
 Chambers was obtained, declaring '' that the honour and 
 interest of Germany demand that all the German States 
 should preserve the rights of the duchies of Schleswig 
 and Holstein ; " and a few weeks later the frontier was 
 crossed by a vanguard of Saxon and Hanoverian troops. 
 
 In these circumstances Denmark accepted the media- 
 tion of England, and on the last day of 1863 Lord 
 Eussell despatched a note to the German Federal Diet, 
 in which in the interests of peace he required that a 
 Conference of the Powers which had signed the recent 
 treaty, together with a representative of the Confedera- 
 tion, should meet in Paris or London to settle the differ- 
 ences between Germany and Denmark, and that in the 
 meantime the status quo should be maintained. The 
 mediation was declined by the German States, and three 
 weeks later an army of Prussians and Austrians entered 
 Holstein. 
 
 It must be allowed that Earl Russell was justified in 
 tendering the mediation of England. The treaty of 1850 
 directly authorized, if it did not compel him to take 
 such a step. The question mainly debated at the time 
 was whether we were not bound to go much farther, and 
 intervene with material aid to the nation whose integrity 
 we had guaranteed. But the situation was very com- 
 plicated and difficult. We had had little inducement to 
 take part in the guarantee of 1850, and it might have 
 been wiser to abstain from that act ; but we had then 
 simply set our hand to an instriTment to which the 
 
LATER WHIG POLICY, 181 
 
 German Powers were the principal parties. We had 
 signed after Prussia and Austria ; now Prussia and 
 Austria were attacking Denmark. We had signed with 
 Eepublican France and Sweden ; now France was Im- 
 perial, and Sweden, apart from the other Powers, was of 
 no practical account. 
 
 There were thus three sides to the question. The 
 Ministerialists urged that, being in fact signataries of 
 the treaty of 1850, we were at least called upon to offer 
 our mediation, but that when this mediation was declined, 
 taking all the circumstances into account, we could not 
 be considered as bound to go to war for Denmark against 
 our fellow-guarantors. The Tory Opposition, if they 
 did not precisely maintain that we were so bound, 
 twitted the Government with having first lectured and 
 then retreated. The advocates of a domestic, non-inter- 
 fering, precautionary, and peaceful policy contended that 
 we had been rash in giving the original guarantee, and 
 that we should be infinitely more rash in taking any 
 steps which might commit us to a war for such inade- 
 quate cause. The policy of the Government was a mean 
 between two extremes ; and, even if one of these extremes 
 was the best course to pursue, it is hard to see how Earl 
 Russell and his colleagues could either have withheld the 
 offer of mediation or have gone beyond it when it was 
 rejected. 
 
 Lord Derby, criticising the conduct of our foreign 
 affairs at this time, afiirmed that Lord Russell's policy 
 might be summed up in two words — meddle and muddle. 
 ''During the whole course of his diplomatic correspond- 
 ence, wherever he has interfered — and he has interfered 
 everywhere — he has been lecturing, scolding, blustering, 
 
 and retreating Thanks to the noble earl and the 
 
 present Government, we have at this moment not one 
 
182 LATER JFIIIG POLICY. 
 
 single friend in Europe ; and more than that, this 
 country, the chief fault of which was that it went too 
 direct and straightforward at what it aimed, which never 
 gave a promise without the intention of performing, 
 which never threatened without a full determination of 
 striking, which never made a demand without being 
 prepared to enforce it — this country is now in such a 
 position that its menaces are disregarded, its magnilo- 
 quent language is ridiculed, and its remonstrances are 
 treated with contemptuous indifference.'^ 
 
 This was anything but a just view to take of Lord 
 Russell's conduct in the Italian, Greek, and Danish 
 questions ; for in the first case, in so far as he may have 
 lectured he certainly stood to his words, and made good 
 his promises to the Italian people, whilst in the other 
 two cases he appears to have acted in the wisest manner 
 that circumstances would allow. No doubt there was 
 indignation and irritation in England on the subject of 
 the German attack on Denmark ; but Englishmen would 
 assuredly not have thanked Lord Eussell for plunging 
 them into war on that account. Nevertheless the 
 Government had gone so far as to remonstrate with 
 Prussia and Austria for their breach of the guarantee 
 of 1850. 
 
 There was another and a more important question 
 which came to the front about the same time, in reo-ard 
 to which Lord Eussell's action was more open to criticism; 
 though on the whole he deserved well of his countrymen 
 in this case also. The civil war in America was exceed- 
 ingly embarrassing for England. The Southern States 
 had many friends on this side of the Atlantic ; they were 
 numerous and powerful ; for a long period it seemed 
 
LATER WHIG POLICY, 183 
 
 probate that they would prevail in arms against the 
 North ; and (perhaps the most potent consideration of 
 all) they furnished the bulk of the raw material for one 
 of our staple industries. The recognition of their bellig- 
 erent rights was demanded by popular opinion, and by a 
 majority in Parliament ; and Lord Palmerston's Cabinet 
 could not well avoid the proclamation of absolute 
 neutrality between the two contending parties. They 
 might have obtained the sanction of a majority for yet 
 more friendly recognition of the Confederate States ; and 
 it is certainly to their credit that they resisted the pres- 
 sure put upon them. Lord Russell has taken upon 
 himself the blame of permitting the escape of the 
 Alabama from Birkenhead, as also the responsibility for 
 detaining the Alexandra and other vessels. He would 
 have shown wisdom and prudence if he had from the 
 beginning perceived the true significance of the American 
 war — had seen on which side the best interests of Eng- 
 land were involved, and had done what his position 
 enabled him to lead the sympathies of Englishmen into 
 accord with their better traditions. 
 
 The prescience of Mr Bright on this occasion is as 
 notable as it had been in the case of the Crimean War, 
 and the moral courage with which he formed and ex- 
 pressed his conclusions was all the more remarkable 
 because a short-sighted manufacturer in his place would 
 have seen nothing but the impending ruin of his trade. 
 A passage in one of his speeches presents him in a curious 
 light as justifying a resort to arms ; and the argument is 
 worth citiner because it shows how far a leader of what 
 is known as the Peace Party may go, in an extreme 
 case, towards an admission of satisfaction at the existence 
 of a state of war. '' Looking,'' Mr Bright said at Roch- 
 dale, in the winter of 1861, ''at the principles avowed 
 
184 LATER WHIG POLICY, 
 
 in England, and at its policy, there is no man, who is 
 not absolutely a non-resistent in every sense, who can 
 fairly challenge the conduct of the American Government 
 in this war. It would be a curious thing to find that the 
 party in this country which on every public question 
 affecting England is in favour of war at any cost, when 
 they come to speak of the duty of the Government of 
 the United States is in favour of * peace at any price/ 
 I want to know whether it has ever been admitted by 
 politicians, or statesmen, or people, that a great nation 
 can be broken up at any time by any particular section 
 of any part of that nation." Whether the South suc- 
 ceeded in its attempt or not, Mr Bright declared his 
 belief that, in a few years, '* the twenty millions of free 
 men in the North will be thirty millions, or even fifty 
 millions — a population equal to or exceeding that of this 
 kingdom. When that time comes, I pray that it may 
 not be said amongst them that, in the darkest hour of 
 their country's trials, England, the land of their fathers, 
 looked on with icy coldness, and saw unmoved the perils 
 and calamities of their children. As for me, I have but 
 this to say : I am but one in this audience, and but one 
 in the citizenship of this country ; but if all other 
 tongues are silent, mine shall speak for that policy which 
 gives hope to the bondsmen of the South, and which 
 tends to generous thoughts, and generous words, and 
 generous deeds, between the two great nations who 
 speak the English language, and from their origin are 
 alike entitled to the English name." 
 
 Eemarkably as Mr Bright's predictions have been 
 fulfilled by the after history of the United States, and by 
 the relations which have been established between the 
 two countries, they were for the most part scouted at the 
 time when they were uttered ; and Lord Eussell was at 
 
LATER WHIG POLICY. 185 
 
 one with his colleagues, and with nearly all the prominent 
 politicians on both sides, in believing that the secession 
 of the Southern States would be carried into ejffect. 
 There can be little question in our own day as to the 
 merits of the case, whether from a practical or from a 
 moral point of view ; but a Ministry is obliged to shape its 
 course more or less according to the popular opinion of 
 the time, and popular opinion in this instance began by 
 favouring the South rather than the North. The struggle 
 was regarded by many as one quite distinct from the 
 issues of slavery and abolition, though to be sure it could 
 not be kept distinct from these issues. It was considered 
 in the light of a struggle for independence on the part 
 of some millions of industrious people, claiming the 
 right of self-government, which England has always 
 maintained to be due to those who are prepared to fight 
 for it. 
 
 With these conflicting opinions to take into account, 
 perhaps no other statesman in Lord Russeirs place could 
 have contrived any better to satisfy the wishes of the 
 nation in regard to the treatment of the belligerents. A 
 critic of the quality of Mr Grote described the '' perfect 
 neutrality " of England as " almost a phenomenon in 
 political history," and declared that no such forbearance 
 had been shown for two centuries past. *'It is the 
 single case in which the English Government and public, 
 generally so over-meddlesome, have displayed some 
 prudent and commendable forbearance." And Mr Grote 
 censured very warmly the manner in which the Northern 
 States had requited this forbearance. No doubt it was a 
 happy thing that England should have kept herself clear 
 of the complications which more than once threatened 
 to drag her into the American Civil War. But the 
 Federals, whatever their conduct towards England may 
 
186 LATER WHIG POLICY. 
 
 have been, can scarcely be accused of ingratitude. 
 There was no demand upon their gratitude in the fact 
 that we did not help the planters to cast off their allegi- 
 ance. It was no credit to us that we abstained from 
 what would have been a lunatic war. On the other hand, 
 the bitter tone of English society against the cause 
 of the North, and the strange unwillingness of Eng- 
 lish politicians and newspapers to recognise the true 
 aspects of the case, fully explained the animosity of 
 the Northerners, and went far to account for the demand 
 made upon us in respect of the escaped privateers. At 
 any rate the Washington Government was justified 
 by events in the position which it took up, and in its 
 interpretation of international law. 
 
 Though our aljstinence from war on this occasion was 
 not so phenomenal as Grote conceived it to be, yet no 
 doubt the bearing of our Ministers between 1862 
 and 1866 was in the main judicious and satisfactory. 
 The nation saw with relief that its Ministers were no 
 longer disposed to seize hastily upon a pretext for war, 
 even when they might count on a parliamentary ma- 
 jority. It would have been easy for Lord Palmerston 
 and Lord Eussell, by acts which would certainly have 
 been condoned, to take the part of the Southern States 
 in 1862, or 1863, and thus to plunge the country into 
 a desperate and costly struggle. That they did not do 
 so was apparently due to the coolness and judgment of 
 Lord Eussell in particular. His great mistake in con- 
 nection with the American Civil War w^as in permitting 
 the departure of the Alabama from Birkenhead. He 
 had received the opinion of Sir E. Collier to the effect 
 that the equipment of the vessel in an English port was 
 a breach of international law ; but he delayed action for 
 four days, awaiting the opinions of the law officers of the 
 
LATER WHIG POLICY, 187 
 
 Crown, and in the interval the Alabama set sail. Save 
 in this dereliction he did nothing which committed 
 England to a quarrel with the Northern States ; and it 
 is only fair to his memory that we should suppose him to 
 have been actuated by a conviction that a larger portion 
 of the community than the classes then enfranchised 
 ought to be consulted before the nation engaged in a 
 new war. 
 
 Lord Russell had never concealed his belief that the 
 Eeform Act of 1832 was inadequate to the necessities of 
 the case. He was one of the first, in the leading rank 
 of politicians, to advise a supplementary extension of the 
 franchise ; and it was only the strong objection of Lord 
 Palmerston in his later years which prevented his col- 
 leagues from taking a new departure. When Lord 
 Russell once more assumed the premiership in 1865 he 
 lost no time in proposing to his Cabinet that the superior 
 classes of working-men should be forthwith admitted to 
 the franchise ; and the delay which occurred between 
 1865 and 1867 was due simply to the practical and per- 
 sonal difficulties of legislation. The new initiation of 
 the movement was practically the work of Lord Russell, 
 who thus placed on record his conviction that the work- 
 ing-classes were now entitled to the same consideration 
 which had been given to the claims of the middle classes 
 just a third of a century before. 
 
 The country owes him a debt of recognition on this 
 account ; and the fact should be the more scrupulously 
 admitted and remembered because he was the leader of 
 the Whig party, and not in any sense a democrat. The 
 new order of things in England must depend mainly 
 on the strength and judgment of democratic leaders. 
 Lord Russell was an aristocratic Whig, with all the tra- 
 ditions and most of the prejudices of his order and party ; 
 
188 LATER WHIG POLICY. 
 
 and yet lie perceived beforehand the justice of the prin- 
 ciples on which the case of the English democracy rests. 
 Not merely by his introduction of a Reform Bill in 
 1866, but also by the general tone of his foreign policy, 
 he acknowledged the right of the whole community 
 to rule itself, and to guide its destinies at home and 
 abroad. 
 
 No doubt the new departure was really taken in 1867, 
 in an Act which, though passed by a Tory Government, 
 went far beyond what Lord Russell had contemplated a 
 year previously. But in spite of this, and in spite of the 
 fiict that Lord Russell somewhat sharply criticised the 
 policy of Mr Gladstone's first Administration, it must be 
 allowed to the credit of the Whigs that their leader had 
 responded to popular aspirations, and had entered upon 
 the right j)ath before the actual transfer of the casting 
 vote from the middle to the working classes. 
 
VIII. 
 DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 (1868-74.) 
 
 Looking back from the standpoint of to-day on the 
 whole course of our policy towards other States, not 
 merely in the present century but from the Revolution 
 of 1688, we cannot fail to be struck by a fact as remark- 
 able in itself as it is satisfactory for the people of this 
 country. Whenever the national policy of England has 
 been in question, and an issue has been raised in which 
 the popular weal and wish have been largely concerned, 
 the action of the two great political parties has been 
 distinctly and, as a rule, instantly affected by public 
 opinion. There has forthwith, on the part of the leaders 
 on both sides, been a virtual bidding for the favour and 
 support of the nation — not of necessity an unscrupulous 
 or unseemly bidding, but conspicuous and confessed. 
 
 It was natural, after the Revolution, that our states- 
 men should recognise more clearly than before that the 
 ultimate source of power and authority was in the voice 
 of the masses, and not merely in the voice of the electo- 
 rate but in the numerical force which practically makes 
 the strength of revolutions. It was chiefly the Whigs 
 who saw and acted on this truth for more than half a 
 century after the Bill of Rights had sealed the contract 
 between the CroAvn and the people. The Tories looked 
 back, and hankered after the old order of things, until 
 
190 DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 the last Pretender had proved the futility of further resist- 
 ance. But in the latter part of the eighteenth century 
 there was a notable development of opinion amongst the 
 Tories. Having once accepted what they could not fail 
 to admit was a revolutionary constitution for England, 
 they also accepted the logical conclusion already arrived 
 at by their political rivals. They saw the necessity of 
 bowing sooner or later to public opinion ; they felt the 
 increasing power of this opinion, and of the masses 
 amongst whom it was generated ; and tliey perceived that 
 the truest wisdom of a statesman — best for the masses, 
 for the country through the masses, and for themselves 
 through both — was to meet popular demands as they 
 arose, perhaps to postpone them if they could, certainly 
 to manipulate them as well as they could, but at any 
 rate to grant them in the end. 
 
 When the younger Pitt took office (not to go more 
 deeply into the subject) he was inoculated with this idea; 
 and at the same time he found the expression of public 
 opinion, in books, pamphlets, and the newspapers of the 
 day, more vigorous than it had ever been before. The 
 periodical press rapidly gained strength in the decade 
 preceding the French Eevolution, and it was only the 
 cataclysm of 1792 which prevented its steady progress. 
 On this basis of opinion and popular disposition Pitt 
 began life as a reformer, and for some time struggled 
 manfully against the cry for war with France, as though 
 he foresaw that his career Avas about to be shaped for 
 him after a model which he would never have selected 
 on his own account. Canning caught the lamp from the 
 dying hands of Pitt, and he too was a Tory imbued with 
 the spirit of popular progress, though his individual 
 tendencies led him in a different direction from that 
 which the great war Minister had originally taken. 
 
developme:sts. 1 9 1 
 
 Canning's friends and disciples continued this particular 
 line of Tory tradition — Huskisson towards Free Trade, 
 Palmerston towards a foreign policy which w^as as char- 
 acteristically English and spirited as that of his master, 
 though somewhat less generous and more exclusively 
 insular. Peel, whatever his want of personal sympathy 
 with Canning, was like-minded with him in several im- 
 portant respects ; and so it was with one or two of the 
 more distinguished Tory members of his Cabinet. 
 
 The policy of these statesmen was not rightly described 
 as a policy of ''Tory men and Whig measures." 
 Their measures were not Whig. They were national 
 and popular. They were measures in harmony w4th the 
 English constitution, and were therefore in some sense 
 revolutionary. From the point of view of an old Tory, 
 who happened to have been brought up with a high 
 degree of respect for the divine right of kings and the 
 feudal privileges of the aristocracy, they were revolu- 
 tionary without any reservation, and full of peril to at 
 least two estates of the realm. Thus it was that the 
 Tories abovenamed, from Pitt to Peel, found their most 
 bitter enemies amongst their ow^n denomination ; and in 
 some noteworthy instances they divided their party as 
 thoroughly as the Whigs have divided their followers by 
 marking out the limits of popular concession. But it is 
 nevertheless true that no great Tory leader for sixty 
 years past — and with one brief interval of exception no 
 great Tory leader since the days of Bolingbroke — has 
 found government practicable in England without stoop- 
 ing or rising to the revolutionary method. 
 
 The last conspicuous example was afforded by Lord 
 Beaconsfield, who made the concession of political prin- 
 ciples a fine art in 1867, and a few years later throned 
 the paradox of democratic imperialism. 
 
192 DE VELOPMENTS. 
 
 The lesson which remains to be drawn from these 
 facts is that popular progress in England, and the advance 
 of the nation towards the definitive establishment of its 
 popular and logical policy, are due almost as much to 
 Tories as to Whigs. Not to the Tory party ; because 
 the statesmen who reversed the continental policy of 
 Castlereagh, who sealed the liberties of America, Portu- 
 gal, Greece, who emancipated the Eoman Catholics, who 
 gave us Free Trade, and who enfranchised the w^orking 
 classes, relied in every case upon Liberal assistance, and 
 virtually withstood and affronted their party in obeying 
 their convictions. Most of them, moreover, ceased to be 
 Tory when they became revolutionary. It is in the 
 record of only one amongst them all — perhaps the 
 greatest genius, certainly the most ingenious politician — 
 that he contrived to lead an active and united Tory 
 party after he had carried a Radical measure by the aid 
 of a Whig alliance. 
 
 The Reform Act of 1867 gave the casting vote in 
 English politics to the working classes, and thus poten- 
 tially placed in the people's hands the influence, authority, 
 and self-control, for which it had been constantly and 
 persistently striving. Our children will be in a position 
 to realise the great results which must flow from the 
 virtual creation of the democracy in 1867. We ourselves 
 may live long enough to see what the people of this 
 country will be able to effect by means of the lever which 
 has been given to them. It is related of Mr Bright that 
 when Cobden suggested to him, on the morrow of their 
 Free Trade victory, a new agitation in the interest of 
 national retrenchment, he preferred to work in the first 
 place for an extension of the franchise, believing that the 
 
DEVELOPMENTS. 193 
 
 people would know how to retrench, as well as to secure 
 their other cherished aims, when once they had been 
 made arbiters of their own fate. It may already be said 
 that Mr Bright's prescience has been justified. The 
 people indeed are not yet emancipated in the sense of 
 being fully represented in Parliament. There are cate- 
 gories still to be included in the franchise, and there are 
 amendments of the representative system which men of 
 all parties agree to be necessary. And again it is true 
 that the classes emancipated in 1867 do not seem to 
 have used their power consistently, as though they were 
 conscious of its value, or were resolved to assert their 
 strength. But the general course of events since the 
 passing of the Reform Act tends to show that the demo- 
 cratic factors of the State are henceforth those which 
 must count the most in any estimate of the various 
 forces of the community, and that organization alone is 
 needed to make the people as a people — not ''king, 
 lords, and commons," nor privileged classes acting on 
 behalf of the whole nation, but the commonwealth of 
 Engiand^what it has never yet been, from year to year 
 master in its own house. 
 
 It must be concluded that the general election of 
 1868, the first in which the newly enfranchised house- 
 holders were called upon to exercise their rights, was 
 decided, or at any rate made emphatic, by the vote of 
 the democracy. Mr Gladstone apparently understood it 
 in this sense when he offered Mr Bright one of the most 
 important seats in his Cabinet, and when he drew up a 
 programme of reforms which he could not have proposed 
 to a purely Whig Ministry. The people at large under- 
 stood it in this sense when they acclaimed a policy 
 including the aims of nonconformists and liberationists, 
 of radical land-law reformers and the advocates of compul- 
 
 N 
 
194 DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 sory secular education. And the correctness of this view 
 was confirmed a few years later, when the Government 
 began to lose its hold upon the country because it lost 
 the support of leading Radicals and Nonconformists. 
 The Liberal union was breached in more than one or two 
 places ; and though an attempt was made to heal the 
 breaches by bringiug Mr Bright again into the Cabinet, 
 it was manifestly owing to the discouragement of the 
 democratic sections that Mr Gladstone's Government fell 
 in 1874. 
 
 Several notable questions of foreign policy occurred 
 during this Administration, and on three or four of 
 these it is worth while to touch. The dispute with the 
 United States in reference to our breach of neutrality 
 came to a head whilst Lord Granville was at the Foreign 
 Office, and it was settled by the conclusion of the Treaty 
 of Washington and the Geneva Arbitration. The national 
 view taken of this dispute seems to have been that it 
 had existed too long, that its protraction, with the con- 
 sequent animosity between the two countries, was a 
 discredit to our statesmanship, and that, since the quarrel 
 had been allowed to attain exaggerated proportions, it 
 would be better to make concessions beyond what we 
 might think just, in order to bring the difficulty to a 
 solution. In this spirit the nation acquiesced in the 
 Treaty, and in the award of the arbitrators ; but a great 
 soreness remained in the minds of many Englishmen, 
 even after they perceived the happy result of the arbitra- 
 tion in wiping out the old animosities. 
 
 Perhaps no one now regrets that we went to Geneva, 
 and loyally paid the heavy fine in which we were 
 amerced. The Tories must share with the Whigs the 
 responsibility for keeping the quarrel open so long after 
 the offence was committed. That there had been an 
 
DEVELOPMENTS. 195 
 
 offence on our part was not denied. No one acknow- 
 ledged it more freely than Lord Russell, who was Foreign 
 Minister when the predatory vessels were allowed to 
 escape from England. The question is whether we could 
 not have emerged from our difficulty with less delay 
 and at a less cost — whether, in fact, we should not have 
 made amends in a frank and honourable spirit as soon as 
 the Washington Government brought its complaint to 
 our notice. 
 
 Lord Russell, in one of the last of his published writ- 
 ings, contends that Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville 
 went too far in their compliance with American demands, 
 presenting their case to the court of Geneva in terms 
 which made an unfavourable verdict certain beforehand, 
 and needlessly giving to their concession the appearance 
 of an act of submission and deference. He suggests 
 arguments which Lord Granville might have used to 
 show that the dereliction of duty on the part of England 
 was not so great as the Americans made out ; but in 
 point of fact the gist of the difficulty as it came before 
 Mr Gladstone's Government was that argument had 
 already been exhausted, and that the quarrel, then six 
 years old, had passed from the phase of candour to the 
 phase of bitterness and exasperation. Lord Russell had 
 done his part towards this deterioration of the diplomatic 
 incident. He had shown fight over the question, con- 
 scientiously enough, no doubt; but the Washington Govern- 
 ment had been as obstinate in demanding too much as he 
 had been obstinate in offering too little. As early as 1865 
 the United States proposed an arbitration on the several 
 matters in dispute between the two countries, which 
 Lord Russell refused. It stands to Lord Beaconsfield's 
 credit that he accepted the same offer (under somewhat 
 more satisfactory conditions) when made by Mr Reverdy 
 
196 DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 Johnson in 1868 ; and this time it was the American 
 Government which prevented an accommodation. When 
 Mr Gladstone took office he found the whole question 
 involved in confusion and difficulty, and the steps 
 which he took must be judged in the light of the fact 
 that he had to arrange the quarrels of other people, and 
 not his own. 
 
 That which he actually did was to consent to the sit- 
 ting of a High Joint Commission, to the signature of the 
 Treaty of Washington, and to the decision of the Court 
 of Arbitration. In all these cases the English Govern- 
 ment was represented just as fully as the American 
 Government, by her best statesmen and lawyers ; and 
 this is all that an arbitration can ever guarantee before- 
 hand. If there is any value whatever in the method of 
 arbitration, Mr Gladstone's Government took the proper 
 measures to secure it. It was clearly not in their power 
 to command success ; and there is no sufficient reason 
 for stio-matisino; their conduct as either submissive or 
 deferential to the United States. A frank reference of 
 disputed points to the judgment of a third party must 
 always be open to a reproach of weakness from the mouth 
 of those whose favourite method is pugnacity. But pug- 
 nacity was not the favourite method of Lord Eussell, 
 and the reproach came amiss from his lips. In this 
 question of the Alabama and kindred claims he showed 
 less of that moral courage which had heretofore been 
 manifested in his character, whilst the high moral courage 
 of Mr Gladstone and his colleagues was one of their dis- 
 tinguishing features. 
 
 Though there was not wanting amongst Englishmen a 
 sense of mortification at the award of the Geneva court, 
 and though the idea prevailed that we had, in the interest 
 of peace, strained a point or two against ourselves in the 
 
DE VELOPMENTS, 197 
 
 Treaty of Washington, the settlement was received with 
 pleasure by the nation as a whole, and the three millions 
 and a quarter which we had to pay sat lightly on the con- 
 science of the majority. The sum was so trifling in 
 comparison with the cost of a war, and the effect of the 
 judgment was so beneficial in bringing England and the 
 United States together again, that all unprejudiced minds 
 accepted the solution without demur ; whilst the advo- 
 cates of arbitration as a formal method for the settlement 
 of international quarrels were notably encouraged. A 
 remarkable illustration of the influence which this inci- 
 dent had exercised amongst English politicians was 
 afforded in the session of 1873, when Mr Henry Eichard 
 actually succeeded in carrying a resolution in favour of 
 establishing *' a general and permanent system of interna- 
 tional arbitration." 
 
 But the time was not yet ripe. The principle was 
 accepted ; the practice was initiated ; but it is necessary 
 that the nation should speak more imperatively than it 
 has ever yet done before an English Government can 
 stand officially committed to a policy of formal arbitra- 
 tion. 
 
 A case of considerable delicacy arose in connection 
 with the independence of Belgium, which appeared to 
 be menaced on the outbreak of hostilities between the 
 French and Germans in the summer of 1870. Belgium 
 was guaranteed by the Powers in 1832, when Prince 
 Leopold was set upon the throne, and successive English 
 Governments had always attached great importance to 
 this guarantee. It was alleged that a war could not pro- 
 ceed between two such Powers as France and Germany 
 without jeopardy to the position of Belgium, which lay 
 
108 DEVELOPMENTS, 
 
 between the combatants, and which naturally oifered a 
 great temptation to each of them. Public opinion in 
 England was mnch moved by the war, and by the possi- 
 bility that a violation of Belgian territory might render 
 it necessary to intervene. That there was some ground 
 for this alarm was proved by the fact that the absorption 
 of Belgium by France, as part of a compact between her 
 and her rival, had actually been proposed by the Empe- 
 ror's Government a few years before. 
 
 In these circumstances the English Cabinet had no 
 choice but to take steps for the assurance of the safety 
 of Belo-ium. Lord Granville demanded at Paris and 
 
 o 
 
 Berlin a pledge that the combatants would respect the 
 neutrality of the country ; and after the war had broken 
 out he exacted their participation in a treaty by which 
 England bound herself, in case of an infraction of the 
 guarantee by either side, to co-operate with the other in 
 defending the neutral territory. This course, absolutely 
 imposed upon Mr Gladstone's Government, would doubt- 
 less have sufficed for all practical purposes; but the popular 
 feeling and the excitement of the two Houses of Parliament 
 compelled them to do still more. Something like a panic 
 had taken possession of the country ; and on the eve of 
 the prorogation Mr Cardwell asked for a supplementary 
 vote of two millions sterling, in order to maintain an 
 additional force of twenty thousand men during the con- 
 tinuance of the war. 
 
 In the Upper House Lord Russell gave evidence of the 
 broad distinction which he drew between the case of 
 Belgium in 1870 and the case of Denmark in 1863 by 
 bringing forward a bill for the calling out of the militia ; 
 but he did not persist in this attempt to supplement the 
 efforts of the Government. On the other hand there 
 were some who condemned the supplementary vote as 
 
DEVELOPMENTS. 199 
 
 useless, and lamented that a Liberal Cabinet, presided 
 over by Mr Gladstone and including Mr Bright, should 
 have succumbed to a panic, and hastened to prepare for 
 war. Eeplying in the Commons to such arguments as 
 these, the Prime Minister claimed that the attitude of 
 his Government was wise as well as spirited — that, whilst 
 they had no option but to defend the integrity of Bel- 
 gium, the neutrality of England was distinctly peaceful 
 in its character. 
 
 As it turned out, the two millions might well have 
 been saved ; and it does not appear that any sufficient 
 cause existed (beyond the demand of public opinion as 
 then interpreted) for the raising of the additional troops. 
 It was contended that the preparation of these troops was 
 a natural sequel to the conclusion of the treaty with 
 France and Prussia, and that having undertaken on 
 emergency to co-operate with one of these Powers against 
 the other we were bound to hold ourselves in readiness 
 for such an emergency. The pretext is a doubtful one. 
 The Treaty was surely ample in itself That instrument 
 once signed, a deliberate violation of Belgian neutrality 
 was in the last degree improbable ; but even if it had 
 occurred our peace establishment (which had been raised 
 in two years from 106,500 to 130,000, reserves included) 
 was quite strong enough for the demonstration which 
 would have been necessary, or for the first step in a more 
 formidable intervention. This at any rate is the view 
 which was taken by men who had kept themselves free 
 from panic, and who felt confidence in the discretion of 
 the combatants and the strength of England's position. 
 But it was not the prevailing view at the moment ; and 
 it seems to have been practically impossible for the 
 Government to take a difi*erent course from that which 
 w^as dictated to them. 
 
200 DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 The '' secure " neutrality of England, as Mr Gladstone 
 called it, was studiously and carefully maintained ; and 
 we can look back with entire satisfaction on the general 
 attitude of the Government to both parties in this 
 memorable contest. When the German ambassador in 
 London, with somewhat overweening assumption, invited 
 this country to prohibit the export of war materials to 
 France — and when even some Englishmen were disposed 
 to think that the exporters of arms were bringing us into 
 another difficulty of the Alabama kind — Lord Granville 
 replied to Count Bernstorff in dignified and almost re- 
 proving terms. When it had been impossible to foresee 
 how the fortune of war would turn, he reminded the 
 Count, we were scrupulous in following the dictates of 
 practice and precedent. Since then France, notwith- 
 standing her courage and gallantry, had suffered unbroken 
 reverses, whilst Germany had given extraordinary proofs 
 of her skill and strength. '' Your Excellency," Lord 
 Granville concluded, " as the representative of a great 
 and chivalrous nation, must agree with me that it would 
 not be possible that we should now change the policy 
 which we declared to our Parliament to be usual, just, 
 and expedient, because it was stated by the victorious 
 belligerent to be in some degree favourable to the defeated 
 enemy." 
 
 This is in the very best style of English diplomatic 
 language, and displays a spirit which Englishmen will 
 never, under any modification of their foreign policy, 
 regret to witness in the conduct of their Ministers. 
 
 At the moment when the indemnity was being paid to 
 America in accordance with the award of Geneva, and 
 when for various reasons the popularity of Mr Glad- 
 
DEVELOPMENTS. 201 
 
 tone's Government was rapidly on the wane, in the sum- 
 mer of 1873, a petty war was undertaken by us against 
 the Ashantee tribes of Western Africa. In its cause, its 
 inception, its prosecution, in the disproportion of its cost 
 to the value of the objects attained, it had many points 
 of resemblance with the Abyssinian war in 1867 ; and 
 however much these two expeditions may seem to have 
 been justified at the time, there is probably in our own 
 day a pretty general opinion that the country paid too 
 dearly on both occasions for what it gained. In a sense, 
 no doubt, the wars were necessary and inevitable. At 
 any rate the question as to their necessity was for the 
 men of 1867 and 1873 rather than for ourselves. Short 
 as the time is — reckoning by years — since Sir Robert 
 Napier and Sir Garnet Wolseley were employed in re- 
 ducing King Theodore and King Coffee to submission, it 
 would be unfair to judge the Governments of Lord Derby 
 and Mr Gladstone by the public opinion which exists in 
 the ninth decade of the century. All that we can justly 
 do is to examine the reasons alleged by the advocates of 
 those costly expeditions, and to indicate the arguments 
 which might induce us, in similar circumstances, to follow 
 a different course. 
 
 The Abyssinian war was undertaken solely in order to 
 release a few English prisoners, truculently held in 
 durance (though not otherwise ill-treated) by an over- 
 weening savage. The difficulty thus created for us was 
 by no means easy to deal with. The Government of the 
 day were urged to stretch out the long arm of England 
 on behalf of these captives, first by the captives them- 
 selves and their friends, next by public writers and 
 speakers who never counted the cost of the operation in 
 money and lives, and again by those who had some idea 
 of the cost, but who held that the dignity and reputa- 
 
202 DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 tion of England demanded the effort, apart from any 
 consideration of the prisoners. The reason which was 
 hjoked upon as most cogent in 1867 was the last of the 
 three. It was the vindication of English honour, rather 
 than the liberation of these particular men, which led to 
 the despatch of the expedition ; but it may be ques- 
 tioned whether the other reasons are not really more 
 potent in their character. The inducement of humanity, 
 magnified and exaggerated by a popular enthusiasm, 
 might have sufficient force even in our own time to 
 involve the country in war, because it would overbear 
 the calmer dictates of reason, and defeat the counsels of 
 prudence and patient strategy. But a question as to 
 the dignity and honour of the nation may be more coolly 
 discussed and analysed. Here also the heads of the 
 counsellors may prove to be weaker than the hearts, or 
 the imaginations, of the people ; but there is more scope 
 for rational procedure. Many a man who would give 
 his vote for war at the thought of a single English 
 captive languishing in the power of a barbarian would 
 take ample time to consider the limitations of national 
 dignity, and would listen with deliberate attention to all 
 that could be said on the matter. 
 
 Eno-lishmen are beeinninof to think, or are thinkinof 
 with more of conviction year after year, that the honour 
 and repute of the country throughout the world depend 
 less on its acknowledged pugnacity than has generally 
 been supposed. Of course so long as war is the chief, 
 not to say the only arbitrament amongst nations, it must 
 command the respect of civilised Powers and ignorant 
 races to know that we are ready to fight over the least 
 discredit done to an English citizen. No statesman ever 
 laid greater stress on this notion than Lord Palmerston, 
 who boasted that the whole offensive strength of the 
 
DEVELOPMENTS, 203 
 
 country was at the back of every man who set his foot 
 in a foreiorn land. His combative assertion of Enoland's 
 dignity, which made him so popular at home and so 
 greatly disliked abroad, has scarcely yet ceased to be 
 regarded with admiration by large classes of his country- 
 men ; and it was certainly a powerful memory and 
 example in 1867, even to men of the opposite school of 
 politics. But the present generation appears to doubt 
 both the dignity and the efficacy of such a policy. It is 
 very dubious indeed whether we shall ever again consent 
 to embark on a war like the one in Abyssinia for the pur- 
 pose of convincing savage nations of our ability to crush 
 them, whatever we may do for the release of captive 
 travellers and missionaries. 
 
 The Ashantee expedition was perhaps less justifiable 
 than the march upon Magdala. A quarrel had arisen 
 between the subjects of King Coffee and the tribe of the 
 Fantees, who were (or were considered to be) friendly 
 to the English. The inhabitants of Elmina having given 
 asylum to a number of Ashantee troops, this town was 
 reduced to ashes by marines and seamen from several 
 of our ships lying off the coast. With more or less of 
 reason the English merchants then conceived themselves 
 to be in danger; Cape Coast Castle was said to be 
 threatened by an army of thirty thousand Ashantees 
 something like a panic ensued, in Africa and at home 
 Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent out with a large force 
 and the whole coast was blockaded from Cape Coast to 
 the river Assinee. 
 
 Now it was manifest, as the commander of the expedi- 
 tion declared to the native chiefs as soon as he reached 
 the Gold Coast, that this was '' not an English war but 
 a Fantee war." The English forts were so strong that 
 we ourselves had nothing to fear from the Ashantees ; 
 
204 DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 but as it had become evident that a merely defensive 
 war would result in the destruction of the Fantees we 
 had decided to help them. These are Sir Garnet 
 Wolseley's own words ; and they were not mere words 
 of policy. They expressed the truth, and that truth 
 undoubtedly condemns the expedition as either useless 
 or disproportionate to the end in view. It Avas not 
 clear that we had any reason to dread an attack by 
 the Ashantees on Enoiishmen. It was not clear that 
 our sailors had any right to burn Elmina. But to 
 us it seems abundantly clear that the despatch of another 
 man-of-war in place of Sir Garnet Wolseley and his 
 expedition would have done all that was necessary in 
 the way of repelling the assaults of King Coffee, or 
 teaching him a lesson which he would not be likely to 
 forget. 
 
 The policy of the Government in 1873 was sharply 
 criticised, by their natural friends as well as by their 
 natural enemies. Earl Grey wrote one of his studied 
 letters to the Times, in which he pointed out how the 
 costly expedition might in his opinion have been avoided. 
 Lord Salisbury, carping at the heroic measures of the 
 Cabinet so far as the Home Office was concerned, sug- 
 gested that Ministers did not allow their heroism to cross 
 the threshold of the Foreign Office. '' They offer us," 
 he said, '' a remarkable instance of Christian meekness 
 and humility ; but I am afraid it is that kind of Chris- 
 tain meekness which turns the left cheek to Russia and 
 America, and demands the uttermost farthing of 
 Ashantee." 
 
 Banter of this kind, and phrases like the '' plundering 
 and blundering" of Lord Beacon sfield's electioneering 
 
DEVELOPMENTS, 205 
 
 letter to Lord Grey de Wilton, were freely pelted at 
 the Government. The reproaches passed current at the 
 time — -chiefly, perhaps, because the Ministerialists them- 
 selves were discouraged and disorganized by their 
 domestic troubles, by the grave discontent of Noncon- 
 formists, friends of the Established Churches, publicans, 
 and '' harassed interests " of various kinds. There was 
 no evidence at the general election of 1874 that the 
 country had been moved to indignation by Mr Glad- 
 stone's and Lord Granville's foreign policy. Of course 
 Opposition speakers and writers had inveighed against 
 the Geneva settlement, and against the tameness of the 
 Cabinet in permitting Russia to repudiate the Treaty 
 of Paris, and to occupy Khiva in spite of a formal 
 promise on the part of the Czar. But it does not 
 appear that the condemnation of Mr Gladstone's first 
 Ministry by the constituencies was attributable to his 
 policy on these and other questions of international 
 concern. There is, on the contrary, fair reason to con- 
 clude that the voters with whom the balance of power 
 actually rested, and many of whom abstained in 1874 
 from exercising their right, would willingly have re- 
 tained Mr Gladstone's services if the issue had been 
 confined to foreign affairs. 
 
 The turning of the left cheek to Russia, which Lord 
 Salisbury's scriptural rhetoric contrasted with our exact- 
 ing conduct in Ashantee, was undoubtedly a sore annoy- 
 ance for the large number of Englishmen who had by 
 this time definitively accepted the Czar as their " natural 
 enemy." When in the year 1870 the Government of 
 St Petersburg, taking advantage of the Franco-German 
 war, formally declared to the Powers that it no longer 
 regarded itself as bound by the clauses of the Treaty of 
 Paris relating to the Black Sea, the English Cabinet 
 
206 DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 was placed in a condition of the utmost difficulty and 
 delicacy. It was called upon at a few days' notice to 
 decide a question which manifestly involved some of the 
 main traditions and problems of English policy. It was 
 clear enoup'h that Russia's action, if the veto of her co- 
 signataries were not placed upon it, would practically 
 set her free from the general limitations of the Treaty ; 
 and there was ample cause to suspect that her self- 
 assertion at this moment was a sign of renewed activity 
 w]]ich might forebode no little perplexity for England in 
 the immediate future. If the Czar were in reality our 
 natural enemy, and if it behoved us on that account to 
 take measures of defence and precaution, then no doubt 
 it was incumbent upon Mr Gladstone's Cabinet to strain 
 every nerve in order to hold Russia to her plighted 
 word. 
 
 This question was duly considered by the Cabinet ; 
 but it was apparent to all men from the beginning that 
 the issue was one of might rather than of right. Unless 
 we were prepared to go to war with Russia single- 
 handed, there was no course open to us except to assent 
 with as good a grace as possible. An Anglo-Russian 
 war, entered upon at the crisis of the Franco-German 
 war, would have implied nothing short of a continent in 
 arms, for it would not have been in the nature of things 
 that Austria and Italy should in these circumstances 
 have remained at peace. Clearly the English Govern- 
 ment could not lightly undertake the responsibility of 
 plunging Europe into such a vortex of war. The most 
 weighty and inexpugnable reasons would be necessary to 
 justify them in a resolution of this kind ; and the reasons 
 which were urged upon them by irresponsible advisers 
 did not commend themselves to Mr Gladstone and his 
 €olleaofues as sufficiently strong. 
 
 .^^^ ^^^^^^^^j Q. 
 
DEVELOPMENTS. 207 
 
 The contention was that England alone should insist 
 at all hazards on the withdrawal of Eussia's pretensions. 
 But England had been one of seven co-signataries of the 
 Treaty of Paris ; her responsibility was shared with the 
 other six ; her duty was limited in the same manner ; 
 and her interest in the particular question raised bv 
 Russia was certainly not so paramount as to make her 
 set these limitations entirely out of account. The posi- 
 tion which Mr Gladstone's Cabinet took up was the 
 cautious, the straightforward, and the wise one. They 
 protested against the violation by Russia of a solemn 
 Treaty. An active interchange of notes took place 
 between Lord Granville and Prince Gortchakofi'.* For 
 some weeks the controversy was full of peril, though not 
 of bitterness ; but in the end our Cabinet accepted the 
 suggestion of Count Bismarck to refer the Russian Cir- 
 cular to the representatives of the Powers in London. 
 
 It is impossible to maintain that Mr Gladstone or 
 Lord Granville could have done more in the circum- 
 stances, even if to have done more would have been 
 desirable. Russia had alleged that the recent changes in 
 Europe had disturbed the balance of power to her detri- 
 ment, and that the Treaty must on this account be con- 
 strued in an altered sense. Germany so far agreed with 
 Russia as to employ a mediating influence. France 
 could not move. Austria and Italy were decidedly un- 
 willing to move. There was plainly no alternative for 
 England but to fall in with the judgment (or the pre- 
 dicament) of her allies. 
 
 Thus it happened that the tradition of English policy 
 in Eastern Europe, which Lord Palmerston had done so 
 much to strengthen, and which had appeared to be con- 
 secrated and perpetuated by the Crimean War, was 
 
 * Appendix H. 
 
208 DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 modified in 1870 almost against our will. It is certain 
 that Mr Gladstone's Cabinet — then at the height of its 
 authority and power — did not readily depart from the 
 tradition in question. When the secret history of the 
 time comes to be written it will perhaps be shown that 
 no Minister in 1870 was more staunch, or more disposed 
 to insist on every letter of the Treaty of Paris, than the 
 one who six years later deliberately came to the conclu- 
 sion that a tradition involving the '' natural friendship " 
 of Turkey must at any rate be modified so far as that 
 element was concerned. 
 
 The critics of the Government were quite right in one 
 sense. A new departure in the Eastern Question was 
 taken in 1870 ; and virtually also a new departure in 
 England's policy. It was very manifest that we were no 
 longer to be led blindly by our " natural " hostilities. 
 Eeason, and above all moral courage, were henceforth to 
 be called more and more into play. Few Englishmen 
 would have believed, at the moment when Prince Gort- 
 chakoff's circular was made public, that this country 
 could possibly emerge without fighting from a series of 
 international incidents such as those which distinguished 
 the succeeding decade. 
 
 Little more than two years after this repudiation of 
 the Treaty of Paris another incident occurred which 
 raised bad blood between England and Eussia, and 
 which was made an occasion of reproach against Mr 
 Gladstone's Cabinet. In the first month of 1873 a 
 report reached this country that the Government of the 
 Czar had decided upon an expedition to Khiva ; and the 
 news created no little sensation amongst those who saw 
 a danger for England in the advance of the Russians in 
 
DEVELOPMENTS. 200 
 
 Asia. The line of this advance was in the direction of 
 India, and the Enssophobes had been persistently urging 
 that our great dependency in the East was the real ob- 
 jective of the encroaching Muscovites. The Liberal Go- 
 vernment itself was startled and alarmed by this new 
 move, and a lively interchange of notes between London 
 and St Petersburg at once ensued. In the course of this 
 correspondence the Czar sent a special message to the 
 English Cabinet, by the hand of Count Schouvaloflf, to 
 the effect that the expedition, which was not to consist 
 of more than four and a half battalions, had received 
 distinct orders not to take possession of Khiva — that its 
 object was simply to release fifty Russian prisoners, and 
 to teach the Khan a lesson. The pledge was accepted 
 by our Government as satisfactory ; the relations of the 
 two countries were established on excellent terms ; and 
 the old animosity was to some extent cleared away by 
 the arrangement of a marriage between the Duke of 
 Edinbursfh and the Grand Duchess Marie. 
 
 In June of the same year General Kauffmann entered 
 Khiva, and three months later he signed a treaty with 
 the ruler of Bokhara, whereby the occupied territory on 
 the right bank of the Amou Darya was formally annexed 
 by Eussia. The town of Khiva itself was left out of 
 this arrangement, but the Eussian troops continued to 
 hold the town. As Mr Gladstone's Administration came 
 to an end in the beginning of 1874 it can scarcely be 
 blamed for not having exacted the observance by Eussia 
 of the promise of the Czar. The promise in question 
 had not excluded the possibility of a temporary occupa- 
 tion ; and, though its spirit was clearly violated by the 
 annexation of the territory mentioned in General Kauff- 
 mann's treaty, it was impossible for England imperatively 
 to demand the evacuation of Khiva within six months 
 
 
 
210 DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 of its capture.'" They wlio made it a test of states- 
 manship that a high tone should be adopted with the 
 Government of St Petersburg were bound in candour to 
 admit that Lord Granville had used successful diplomacy 
 in eliciting: the assurances of the Czar. If it was incum- 
 bent on us to hold Russia to this pledge, the task fell 
 naturally to the Government which assumed office in 
 1874. 
 
 The policy of England between 1869 and 1873 was 
 on the whole national, honourable, and successful. We 
 had not bullied and we had not cringed. Our system 
 was certainly not continental, though there is a sense in 
 which it may be said to have been cosmopolitan. We 
 yielded to the United States in 1872 — but it had been 
 right to yield. We yielded to Russia in 1870 — but 
 every other Power had yielded, we had no real option 
 in the matter, and, even if we had been in a position 
 to choose, there were very many who thought that in 
 this case also it was right to yield. Concession is no 
 crime in the eyes of candid men ; whilst in every ques- 
 tion of right and wrong, where a course that is honour- 
 able stands opposed to a course that is merely overbear- 
 ing and selfish, concession is most indisputably a virtue. 
 And not a virtue only ; but when the disadvantage of 
 yielding amounts to nothing more serious than a fallaci- 
 ous appearance of being weak where we are not weak, 
 and pusillanimous where we are not pusillanimous, to 
 concede a point of dispute with a friendly nation is a 
 sign of true strength and confidence. 
 
 *The terms of the Czar's promise, and those of the treaty which 
 seem to violate its spirit, will be found quoted in the Appendix (I). 
 
IX. 
 
 DIVAGATIONS. 
 
 (1874-80.) 
 
 The events of the last few years are too fresh in the 
 memories of Englishmen to need recalling in detail ; but 
 they are at the same time too important to be slurred 
 over. In point of fact, the history of the country from 
 1876 to 1880, so far as foreign affairs are concerned, is 
 a history of popular emancipation from old traditions, 
 the more significant because it seems to have brought us 
 past the crisis of our national development. 
 
 The diplomatic incidents of the previous period were 
 casual, isolated, and practically confined to the domain 
 of the Cabinet and the Departments. The incidents 
 which distinguish Lord Beaconsfield's long Administra- 
 tion were critical, imperial, protracted, and they occupied 
 the mind of the whole country for years in succession. 
 
 The enfranchisement of the working classes in 1867 
 had only partially affected the tone of public opinion — 
 and this mainly in regard to domestic matters — during 
 Mr Gladstone's first term of office as Prime Minister. 
 Perhaps the general election of 1874 did as much as 
 any other single cause to awaken the sense of power and 
 the resolution which might have been expected to 
 follow upon the acquisition of the Parliamentary vote. 
 The men who had been so constantly flattered by the 
 dread openly expressed of them in many quarters found 
 
212 DIVAGATIONS, 
 
 themselves defeated and discredited. They felt that 
 they had not put forth their strength. Some of them no 
 doubt had abstained from voting without any idea that 
 Mr Gladstone would be expelled from office. The defeat 
 was worth more to them than a victory, since it shewed 
 them the necessity of union and discipline, without 
 which the franchise would be an empty boon. To those 
 who had the opportunity of judging how the current of 
 democratic feeling had ebbed and jdowed, it was mani- 
 fest that on the very morrow of the elections of 1874 
 the bulk of the Liberal party was virtually united in 
 efforts to shake off the domination of their rivals. If this 
 be true, we may judge how great a strain was put upon 
 the patience of the constituencies for the next six years. 
 This strain was caused, or raised to its highest degree 
 of tension, by the fact that a Ministry endowed with 
 power in a moment of reaction by the domestic dif- 
 ferences of the Liberals, by sectional discontents and 
 the vengeance of harassed interests — chosen in 1874 
 for no purpose more distinctly than to give rest to a 
 country weary of heroism at the Home Office — had the 
 opportunity three or four years later, and even six years 
 later, of dealing with some of the most important ques- 
 tions of foreign policy which had ever been submitted to 
 the judgment of an English Ministry. This was per- 
 fectly legitimate and constitutional, but it was so incon- 
 gruous as to be thoroughly absurd. Septennial Parlia- 
 ments have occasionally been regarded as one of the 
 bulwarks of our national safety, but in this case the 
 institution had produced a result which was to say the 
 least of it remarkable. 
 
 It might be unsafe to affirm that at no time after 
 the year 1876 would an appeal to the constituencies 
 have given popular sanction to the acts of Lord Beacons- 
 
DIVAGATIONS. 213 
 
 field's Government. But this is not the question. 
 Whatever might have been the outcome of a general 
 election when the animosity against Eussia, or the ad- 
 miration for Lord Beaconsfield, was at its highest, the fact 
 IS that this appeal was not made, and this sanction was 
 not given. It was a flaw in the basis of the imperialist 
 foreign policy that a Government acceding to power in 
 the reaction of 1874 should have been found, without 
 any further consultation of the popular judgment, 
 turning queens into empresses and esquires into knights 
 of the garter, brandishing sepoys at Malta and 
 ghoorkas in Afghanistan, acquiring places of arms in 
 the Levant and treaties at Berlin, receiving ovations at 
 Charing Cross and royal visits at Hughenden — all on 
 the strength of a policy which was generally repugnant 
 to the sentiment of the nation. 
 
 The evidence of this repugnance, though it may not 
 be strong enough to carry conviction to every mind 
 amidst the controversial heat of the present generation, 
 will yet in all probability be strong enough to satisfy the 
 candid reader of history. The facts may be briefly 
 recapitulated. Lord Beaconsfield owed his elevation in 
 1874 to the abstinence of Liberal voters, and not to an 
 absolute majority of his supporters over the supporters 
 of Mr Gladstone. His mandate was clearly of a negative 
 character, as admitted by himself and his colleagues. 
 The first two sessions of his Administration were 
 characterized by permissive and inoperative Acts of a 
 domestic order ; and it was not until Lord Northbrook 
 was virtually recalled from India, until the Queen was 
 proclaimed Empress and her Minister had addressed his 
 first significant hints to Kussia, that ordinary English- 
 men began to understand that their Government had 
 an active foreign policy. 
 
;in DIVAGATIONS. 
 
 If then Lord Beaconsfield at the outset of his 
 Administration had no mandate from the country in 
 regard to foreign affairs, and if at the end of his Ad- 
 ministration his policy was emphatically condemned by 
 the constituencies, the only remaining doubt is whether 
 in the meantime, between 1876 and 1879, the imperialist 
 policy received the assent and approval of the nation. 
 Unquestionably it had pleased a considerable number of 
 professed Liberals, and it enabled the Government to 
 command more than their normal majority in the two 
 Houses of Parliament. In the metropolis, and especially 
 in the higher grades of the social scale, there was an 
 apparent preponderance of opinion in favour of the action 
 of the Cabinet ; and during the continuance of the 
 Eusso-Turkish war, and for some time after the conclu- 
 sion of the Treaty of Berlin, Ministers could count upon 
 resolutions of confidence from mass-meetino-s in various 
 parts of the country. 
 
 But on the other hand there were at all times evident 
 marks of dissatisfaction with the policy of Lord Beacons- 
 field and his colleagues. The feeling aroused in 1876 
 by the Turkish massacres in Bulgaria was deep, national, 
 overwhelming. In the autumn of this year it was 
 impossible for the avowed friends of Turkey to hold a 
 public meeting. It was not the eloquence of Mr Glad- 
 stone which roused the popular fervour, for there were 
 many indignation meetings in London and the provinces 
 before Mr Gladstone quitted his retreat at Hawarden 
 and entered the arena. A resolution was passed almost 
 universally at these meetings to the effect that England 
 ought never, under any circumstances, to fight again as 
 an ally of the Porte ; and there is no room for doubt 
 that this resolution was the deliberate judgment of the 
 people of England. The enthusiastic Conference on the 
 
DIVAGATIONS, 215 
 
 Eastern Question at St James's Hall in December, 1876, 
 marked the culmination of this sentiment against the 
 corrupt rule of the Turks. The rejection by the Porte 
 of the demands made upon it by the Conference of 
 Constantinople in the beginning of the following year 
 strengthened the hands of those who maintained that 
 England ought to combine with the other Great Powers 
 in exerting pressure upon the Sultan's Government, and 
 to discontinue anything like moral aid or encouragement 
 at Constantinople. In the spring of 1877 the English 
 Cabinet made an effort, in common with the continental 
 Powers, to bring Turkey to reason. The protocol, signed 
 on the 31st of March, if it had been loyally accepted by 
 the Porte, might have saved Turkey from the disasters 
 whicli followed. At any rate the action of our Govern- 
 ment at this period was fairly in harmony with the sense 
 of the nation ; and, coupled with the suspicions enter- 
 tained of the insincerity of Eussia in her invasion of the 
 Sultan's dominions, it conciliated the minds of many 
 Englishmen who had hitherto strongly condemned the 
 isolated action of the Cabinet. 
 
 Thus it may perhaps be said that from the opening 
 of the campaign to the date of the Berlin Congress — or 
 during the greater part of 1877 and 1878 — the policy of 
 Lord Beaconsfield was more approximately a popular 
 policy than at any previous or subsequent time. But 
 the withdrawal of Lord Derby from the Foreign Office 
 and from the Government, in March 1878, was coinci- 
 dent with the defection of many other supporters of the 
 Ministry, who had found their confidence too severely 
 tested by the ostentatious preparations for war. The 
 triumphs reaped after this by Lord Beaconsfield and 
 Lord Salisbury, though notable in themselves, do not 
 seem to have roused the general enthusiasm of the 
 
216 DIVAGATIONS. 
 
 country. The ovations at Charing Cross and the Duke 
 of Wellington s Eiding School, the personal favour dis- 
 played towards Lord Beaconsfield by the Queen, the 
 gold casket from California and the gold wreath from 
 Leamington, were natural responses to a dramatic exhibi- 
 tion of success. But they did not imply the calm and 
 sober approval of the nation, and we should not be 
 warranted in affirming that this approval had ever been 
 given to the policy of the Government as a whole. 
 
 The object of our present inquiry is to examine 
 whether Lord Beaconsfield's policy was at any time such 
 as to deserve the name of a national and popular policy 
 — even in the limited sense of being momentarily en- 
 dorsed by the nation. It does not appear to have been 
 so. When his personal successes were most brilliant and 
 conspicuous there was always a strong and increasing 
 volume of opinion in the country, felt by those who 
 were competent to discern it, and expressed by a large 
 majority of its organs in the Press, which mistrusted 
 and condemned him. 
 
 Of what kind, then, was the policy of Lord Beacons- 
 fickrs Cabinet, if it was not national and popular ? It 
 has been styled an imperialist policy, and the term is 
 not inappropriate. It was also a personal policy, for it 
 possessed many of the individual characteristics of the 
 Premier. It was always in evidence. Each develop- 
 ment was theatrical, startling, not to say transpontine. 
 The man was in his measures ; and if we wished to 
 believe that the nation was rendered stronger, more 
 commanding, and more glorious, it was exacted of us 
 at the same time that we should acknowledge a higher 
 and yet a higher flight of the genius of Benjamin Disraeli. 
 
DIVAGATIONS. 217 
 
 Though Lord Beaconsfield was constantly carrying his 
 readers and hearers back to the pohtics of the eighteenth 
 century, and eulogising the temper of Bolingbroke, Shel- 
 burne, and Pitt, it was not on the traditions of these 
 statesmen that his own policy was wholly or generally 
 framed. Whilst Palmerston was in office he had been 
 compelled by party exigencies to take a line opposed to 
 Palmerston 's ideas ; and yet in 1874 and 1875, when he 
 set himself to consider what he should do with his 
 splendid opportunity, it was to Palmerston's armoury 
 that he had recourse for his weapons. So far as his 
 policy may be regarded as coming within the limits of 
 English traditional statesmanship, it was a policy based 
 and built on that of the Whigs. Under Palmerston he 
 had protested against too much activity in external 
 affairs ; but when he had made up his mind to adopt a 
 foreign policy of his own he decided upon an order of 
 ideas which pre-supposed interference and initiation all 
 over the world. Of course there is no parallel between 
 the two men except in the matter of their unwearying 
 activity, and their resolution to make England predomi- 
 nant. Palmerston took his opportunities as they came ; 
 Beaconsfield made them. It has been charged against 
 the older statesman that he presumed too much upon 
 the ill-will of Englishmen towards Eussia, thereby di- 
 minishing the chances of an understanding in 1853 ; and 
 further, that he encouraged the animosity against France 
 a few years later, at the imminent risk of war. A ten- 
 dency of this kind was unquestionably displayed by 
 Lord Beaconsfield, who kept open the Eastern Question 
 when it might have been closed, threw constant obstacles 
 in the way of an agreement between England and Russia, 
 and on several other occasions avoided a settlement when 
 it suited his plans to have an open question on his hands. 
 
218 DIVAGATIONS. 
 
 No one knew the meaning and force of a political tra- 
 dition better than Lord Beaconsfield ; and amongst his 
 colleagues there were men who looked upon the traditions 
 of their party with the utmost reverence. Yet no Eng- 
 lish statesman has more frequently or irreverently thrown 
 traditions overboard, wherever there was a chance of 
 initiating a policy which might triumph and go down to 
 history as his own. Even if he professed to follow a 
 tradition he gave it some new development, which 
 caused it to advance (or seem to advance) more in one 
 year than in the previous two hundred. 
 
 From one act we may learn the character of all. We 
 teach our schoolboys that English liberties are founded 
 upon the revolutionary proceedings of their ancestors, 
 and especially upon the fifty years of revolt against the 
 tyranny of the Stuart kings, ending with the Revolution 
 of 1688. We impress upon them the fact that our 
 charters and Bills of Rights were exacted from the Crown 
 by constant determination and firmness, and that the 
 chief guarantees of our existing institutions rest upon 
 the basis of a contract entered into between the English 
 Parliament and a Dutch Prince. The lessons of this 
 particular period of English history are so important 
 that no child in a national school ought to earn his 
 p'rant from the State until he has been made familiar 
 with it ; but Lord Beaconsfield began his final epoch of 
 oflBce — his only epoch of power — by throwing the Re- 
 volution overboard. He thought it was his vocation to 
 re-model the history of England, and calmly asked the 
 nation to proclaim their queen an empress. If the true 
 instinct of the people had not now declared itself in 
 spite of his Parliamentary majority, the imperial titles 
 would have come into use in England as well as in India, 
 and the sulkiness of a few Liberals in 1874 would have 
 
DIVAGATIONS. 219 
 
 been visited with a punishment more abnormal even 
 than the abnormal punishment which it received. 
 
 Many of Lord Beaconsfield's acts were distinguished 
 by a similar spirit of mutiny against the constitution ; 
 and in some cases they trampled upon precedent and 
 tradition with at least temporary impunity. The intro- 
 duction of Indian troops into Europe was absolutely sub- 
 versive of the law of England, and was an exercise of indi- 
 vidual authority which richly deserved impeachment. But 
 this was a case in which the sentiment of the people at 
 large — the democratic sentiment of the masses — was less 
 informed by knowledge, and it consequently escaped the 
 immediate and effective condemnation which had been 
 accorded to the Royal Titles Act. Yet the offence 
 was in reality greater, for it was committed not only 
 in reliance upon the popular ignorance or indifference, 
 but without so much as a reference to Parliament. 
 The House of Commons separated for an Easter recess 
 with an assurance that no cause existed for anxiety ; and 
 immediately afterwards the nation was informed that 
 native Indian troops were on their way to Malta. 
 
 These were matters affecting the constitution rather 
 than the foreign policy of the country ; at any rate 
 in the first instance. But the whole action of Lord 
 Beaconsfield's Government in dealing with the Eastern 
 Question tended to disturb our relations with friendly 
 Powers, and it was on this account a double transgres- 
 sion against the people of England. It is at any time 
 and in any State a grave crime in a Minister to risk or 
 force on a war which might be avoided ; and it was a 
 special offence in Lord Beaconsfield to pursue such a 
 policy, because he had seen the path on which the 
 nation had begun to tread. He had observed (no man 
 was more able or more likely to understand it) that the 
 
220 DIVAGATIONS. 
 
 new generations of Englishmen were bent on preserv- 
 ing peace as much as possible with all countries — that 
 they were prepared to do this, when they honourably 
 could, at some sacrifice of feeling and immediate profit 
 — that they were henceforth minded to arbitrate rather 
 than to quarrel, and to act in concert for an indubitably 
 good cause rather than to isolate themselves with a view 
 to independent and perilous action. He knew that the 
 classes enfranchised in 1867, by his own act, were 
 overwhelmingly democratic in their feelings and aspira- 
 tions, that they made for peace, retrenchment, social 
 and political reform. If he had resolved on a straight- 
 forward course he might have given the country large 
 and beneficent measures, within the lines of the Con- 
 servative party, and still acceptable to all parties. He 
 might have recalled to the minds of Englishmen that 
 social progress was equally necessary with political pro- 
 gress. He might have dwelt impressively on hygienic 
 laws, glancing in his manifestoes and speeches at the 
 importance of the sewage question, and even venturing 
 on such an epigram as ''sanitas sanitatum, omnia 
 sanitas." He might have persuaded his followers to 
 pass an Agricultural Holdings Act, a Friendly Societies 
 Act, an Artizans' Dwellings Act — Acts that would 
 work, that would not require the subsequent assent of 
 every wealthy individual afi'ected by them, and that 
 would not injuriously press upon the very people whom 
 they were intended to benefit. 
 
 No doubt this would have been difficult to accom- 
 plish ; but there would have been all the more credit in 
 the achievement. Instead of attempting it, and persist- 
 ing until he had overcome every obstacle, he preferred 
 only to make a show of domestic legislation for the first 
 two sessions, and then he began to unfold his pro- 
 
DIVAGATIONS. 221 
 
 gramme of imperial development. Though he had 
 something to say of the democracy which was compli- 
 mentary and flattering, and though he maintained that 
 the monarch and the Tory peers were the natural allies 
 of the masses, his foreign policy was manifestly opposed 
 to the interests of the working-men, above all other 
 classes in the country. For the most part the working- 
 men recognised this fact, and stood opposed to him from 
 first to last. 
 
 If Lord Beaconsfield's policy had been acquiesced in 
 by the nation, and if it had thus retained a logical con- 
 nection with the policy which preceded and followed it, 
 there would have been a special inducement to consider 
 it in detail ; for there are few periods in which the 
 student of history will encounter so many striking 
 illustrations of English political principles. But the 
 necessity does not arise. The imperialist ideas were 
 never accepted or acquiesced in. They were strenuously 
 protested against as un-English and unsound, and more 
 than one or two of Lord Beaconsfield's acts were re- 
 versed after the general election of 1880. But so long 
 as Lord Derby remained at the Foreign Office the attitude 
 of the Cabinet was in great measure diplomatically correct. 
 It was only when open threats of war were followed by 
 equivocations and secret conventions that our policy 
 was seriously deflected from the straightforward path. 
 
 Lord Derby left the Cabinet v/hen his colleagues had 
 decided to call out the reserves. He had been uneasy 
 before, but he had loyally supported the Prime Minister, 
 and he must be held largely responsible for all that took 
 place in 1875-7. The most important diplomatic act of 
 this period was the refusal to co-operate in the Berlin 
 
222 DIVAGATIONS. 
 
 Memorandum, which was agreed to in May 1876 by 
 the courts of Berlin, St Petersburg, and Vienna, and 
 which might have been made a collective instrument of 
 Europe if the English Government had not declined to 
 acquiesce in it. This refusal on our part prevented the 
 concert of the Powers, and took away every hope of 
 securing peace by combined pressure upon the Porte. 
 The effect of England's isolation was so thoroughly 
 calculated to aggravate the question which had arisen in 
 the East that [jord Derby could only find an excuse in 
 the belief that he was acting upon the general traditions 
 of England's policy in the past. It is worth while to 
 look at the reasons alleged by him in his despatches for 
 a course which certainly appears to have been most 
 unfortunate and disastrous. 
 
 The proposal of the Powers was directed in the first 
 place to the pacification of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 
 Servia had made terms with the Porte, but the Servian 
 and Montenegrin peoples were both giving aid to the 
 Bosnians. A Bulgarian rising was at the same moment 
 being suppressed with merciless rigour, though the 
 massacres which soon afterwards aroused the indigna- 
 tion of the world had not yet been made public. On 
 the 19 th of May Lord Derby wrote to Lord'Odo Eussell 
 at Berlin, expressing the regret of himself and his col- 
 leagues in finding themselves unable to co-operate in the 
 policy of the three Eastern Powers. " Her Majesty's 
 Government," he said, '' appreciate the advantages of 
 concerted action by the Powers in all that relates to the 
 questions arising out of the insurrection, but they can- 
 not consent to join in proposals which they do not 
 conscientiously believe likely to eff'ect the pacification 
 which all the Powers desire to see attained." 
 
 This was in a sense unanswerable ; for if the Beacons- 
 
DIVAGATIONS. 223 
 
 field Cabinet did not believe that the proposed mediation 
 would result in peace they could feel no strong induce- 
 ment to take part in it. But the object of a mediation 
 is to try to bring about a certain end, and not merely to 
 register a foregone conclusion. 
 
 It was impossible for the English Cabinet to be 
 assured of Turkey's insuperable obstiuacy, however much 
 they might have seen reason to anticipate it ; and their 
 misgivings were not a sufficiently forcible argument to 
 justify them in refusing to make an eflFort, or in putting 
 an additional obstacle in the way of success. If concert 
 had already been tried and had failed, there would be 
 reason in declining to make another hopeless attempt ; 
 but it was not so. The concerted action of the Powers 
 had succeeded with Turkey in the case of the Greeks, and 
 there was no cause to doubt that it would be equally 
 successful now, if backed with equal firmness. The con- 
 sequence of England's abstention was precisely what 
 might have been expected ; it hardened Turkey's heart 
 and sti0*ened her neck. We refused to act with the 
 Powers because we doubted whether we could make 
 peace, and by this means we rendered the continuance 
 and spread of the war inevitable. 
 
 It was the fear of weakening Turkey — a bulwark of 
 England against the aggression of her natural enemy — 
 which made the Cabinet hesitate to urge peace upon 
 her ; and Ijord Derby confesses this in a very candid 
 manner. " It appears to Her Majesty's Government," 
 he wrote, " that they would not be justified in insisting 
 upon the Porte consenting to an armistice without 
 knowing whether the military situation admitted of its 
 being established without prejudice to the Turkish 
 Government. Her Majesty's Government would not 
 advise the Porte against acceding to an armistice should 
 
224 DIVAGATIONS. 
 
 the Turkish Government consider that the political and 
 military position admitted of it." The Powers had sent 
 ships to Salonica — where consuls had recently been 
 murdered by Turkish fanatics — and the English Govern- 
 ment thought fit to add an opinion " that care should 
 be taken that the naval forces of foreign Powers are not 
 employed in any manner contrary to the Treaty rights 
 of the Porte, or subversive of the Sultan's authority." 
 
 In a despatch to Sir Henry Elliot at Constantinople, 
 forwarded on the same day, Lord Derby encloses a copy of 
 his despatch to Lord Odo Russell ; and he writes to our 
 Ambassador at Constantinople in this strain : — "^ I have 
 to point out to your Excellency that Her Majesty's 
 Government have, since the outbreak of the insurrection 
 in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, deprecated the diplomatic 
 intervention of other Powers in the affairs of the Otto- 
 man Empire. . . . They cannot conceal from themselves 
 that the gravity of the situation has arisen, in a great 
 measure, from the weakness and apathy of the Porte in 
 dealing with the insurrection in its earlier stages." 
 
 This was written on May 19. Just five weeks later 
 the first news of the Bulgarian atrocities was received 
 in England. It is not -surprising that the English 
 people, who were startled out of all calmness and 
 patience by the revelations of the newspaper correspon- 
 dents and commissioners, should have seen a connection 
 of some sort between the policy of the English Govern- 
 ment and the action of the Porte, and that when the 
 language of Lord Derby's despatches came to be printed 
 in a Blue-book, the virtual encouragement of Turkish 
 energy in the suppression of revolt should be looked 
 upon as partly accounting for the terrible severities in 
 Bulgaria. Nothing, of course, could have been further 
 from Lord Derby's intention, or from the intention of 
 
DIVAGATIONS, 225 
 
 the Cabinet of which he was a member. That their 
 aim was to strengthen Turkey against the chance of 
 disintegration, and against the supposed designs of 
 Eussia in particular, was evident enough ; but any 
 amelioration of the condition of the subject races which 
 might be compatible with this policy would have been 
 heartily welcomed by them. The question for us to 
 consider is whether they had not already, by rejecting 
 the proposed concert of Europe, pushed their policy to 
 an extreme, and run unjustifiable risks in order to make 
 the English dominate over the continental mode of 
 settling the affairs of the Continent. 
 
 It may be easy for an Englishman to believe that 
 English modes of action are better than modes suggested 
 by three continental States ; but patriotic faith became 
 too absurd when it took the form of believing that 
 English isolation was better than international concert 
 and mediation, in the interests of oppressed nationalities, 
 and for the renewal of peace in a country where con- 
 tinued war was a common danger. Yet this was the 
 kind of faith which had to be exercised by the supporters 
 of the Government policy in 1876. It could only be 
 exercised by those who made jealousy of Russia para- 
 mount over every other consideration ; and the policy of 
 the Government could only be maintained by statesmen 
 w^ho believed that Russia was our natural enemy, that 
 English interests would be largely promoted by counter- 
 j)lotting Russia, and that in adopting such a course they 
 were developing and handing down a national tradition. 
 
 No doubt this was Lord Derby's belief ; and whatever 
 motives Lord Beaconsfield may have had in addition it 
 was also his professed belief. But what ground was 
 there for the contention 1 No doubt we had a traditional 
 distrust of Russia. It existed even at the end of the 
 
226 DIVAGATIONS. 
 
 eigliteentli century, nursed perhaps by the outrage on 
 Polish liberties. It was renewed under Canning, when 
 he set himself to destroy the Holy Alliance, of which 
 the first Alexander was the guiding spirit. It was 
 fostered and confirmed under Lord Palmerston, who led 
 the anti-Russian section in Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet, and 
 who was largely responsible for the hostile mood of this 
 country during the Crimean war. The sentiment en- 
 dured for many years — with decreasing strength and 
 bitterness, but still with sufficient life in the old stock 
 to revive under the influence of fresh complications in 
 the East. On the whole, however, it seemed as though 
 Russophobia were a thing of the past, or at least gradually" 
 dying out. The amity of the two nations increased ; the 
 arrangement of a marriage between an English prince 
 and a Russian princess appeared to many in the light of 
 a guarantee of better understanding in the future. 
 Then came the arbitrary repudiation by the Russian 
 Government of a restriction which England had placed 
 upon it in 1856 ; and though perhaps the majority of 
 people in this country cared not one jot about the 
 reversal of the Black Sea clauses, yet it is certain that 
 the incident of ]870 had roused much indignation 
 amongst Englishmen of the more aggressive school. 
 The indignation rankled ; and the embers of old ani- 
 mosity were fanned into a flame by the rapid progress 
 of General Kauffmann in Asia. With such a state of 
 feeling in England, and especially amongst the influential 
 sections of the party in power, it needed only a com- 
 pliant or a clever statesman to restore the traditions both 
 of popular opinion and of the Foreign Office. 
 
 Unfortunately for Lord Beaconsfield and his Cabinet — 
 unfortunately, it cannot be doubted, for their repute as 
 far-seeing and prudent statesmen — it was less easy to 
 
DIVAGATIONS. 227 
 
 excite a genuine (that is to say a wild and inconsiderate) 
 Eussophobism amongst the masses of EngHshmen than 
 it was to get the processes of diplomacy back into their 
 former grooves. Not that the Prime Minister and 
 Foreign Secretary adhered closely and candidly to the 
 official traditions of Eastern policy. They departed from 
 these on several occasions, introducing^ developments 
 which would have caused the despair of Canning and 
 excited the contempt of Palmerston. If their reference 
 to tradition had been precise and their action perfectly 
 regular — if they had quarrelled with Eussia and yet 
 avoided anything like a violation of the constitution — 
 there can be little doubt that they would have been 
 allowed even to drag the country into war : not indeed 
 without a strenuous protest, and the forfeiture of office at 
 the next general election, but without that cogent argu- 
 ment and that pressure of public opinion which rendered 
 war impossible for us in 1877-8. 
 
 As it was, the extravagant departures of Lord Beacons- 
 field from official and popular traditions, his offences 
 against the authority of Parliament and the sacredness of 
 the constitution, and the cynicism with which he manip- 
 ulated the credit of England and risked the peace of the 
 nation, arrayed against him- the judgment and the votes 
 of a large majority of Englishmen. The imperialist 
 policy, with its ramifications in Asia and Africa, stood 
 condemned in 1880 with an emphasis rarely exceeded at 
 any previous crisis in the history of our relations with 
 foreign States. And the condemnation had been pro- 
 nounced by that democracy which Lord Beaconsfield 
 had so notably reinforced by his Eeform Act of 1867. 
 
X. 
 THE NEW DEPARTURE. 
 
 The General Election of 1880 turned especially on 
 questions of foreign policy, and the verdict of the con- 
 stituencies was given against Lord Beaconsfield, and in 
 favour of Mr Gladstone, on issues which had been raised 
 by the action of the former and the criticism of the 
 latter. The country was appealed to mainly and prim- 
 arily to decide whether its foreign aflfairs should be 
 conducted on the system inaugurated in 1874 or after the 
 fashion of 1870 and 1872. The question was perfectly 
 simple. The contrast between the two statesmen repre- 
 senting these opposite methods of dealing with inter- 
 national affairs was so marked that no man could fail to 
 see what his vote implied. An " imperial " policy on one 
 side was balanced against a national policy, or what 
 claimed to be a national policy, on the other ; and the 
 people at large was called upon to make its choice. It is 
 not often that a nation has the opportunity of so definitely 
 expressing its will and attaining its object. No other 
 monarchy in Europe has ever been in a position to dictate 
 to its rulers the kind of foreign policy which it elects to 
 adopt. If England was able to do this in 1880, and 
 chose to be guided by national, democratic, and essentially 
 moral principles, it was because we had virtually in 1867, 
 and actually in the period between 1876 and 1880, taken 
 an entirely new departure. 
 
 We had (the fact will bear repetition) converted our- 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE. 229 
 
 selves or been converted into a democracy from the 
 moment when'every ratepaying householder was endowed 
 with the franchise. From this time forward it was in 
 the power of the masses to control the Ministry of the 
 day (subject, of course, to a Septennial Act) — to decree 
 a programme of domestic and foreign policy — to give 
 tone and colour to the whole government of the country. 
 The change was potentially complete. It remained for the 
 masses themselves to make use of their privileges, and 
 for genuine patriots and statesmen to train the emanci- 
 pated orders in the proper discharge of political duties. 
 The State which had now come into existence was capable 
 of almost any development ; but it was necessary in the 
 first instance that the actual wielders of power and in- 
 cumbents of office should give the initial motion to this 
 new generation. 
 
 Now Mr Gladstone's first Administration, which was 
 nicknamed "heroic" by his rivals and critics, really 
 deserved the epithet, for it gave precisely such an initial 
 motion to the democracy as it was fitted to receive. The 
 Administration of 1868 was honest and courageous; it 
 attempted and achieved great reforms ; it promoted peace 
 and retrenchment ; it governed with sincerity and moral 
 earnestness. Its power came to an end with the union 
 and cohesion of its supporters ; but its system of govern- 
 ment had not failed, and not one of its principles had 
 been discredited. 
 
 The Administration which succeeded Mr Gladstone's 
 in 1874 did not attempt to carry on the work begun by 
 its predecessor, but rather sought to counteract it. Lord 
 Beaconsfield and his colleagues could not, if they would, 
 have added velocity to the motion of the English democ- 
 racy, for the simple reason that they feared its power, 
 and thought it their duty to limit and check it. Instead 
 
230 THE NEW DEPARTURE. 
 
 of ennobling they vulgarised and debased the masses, by 
 enlisting them in quarrels with other nations, by teach- 
 ing them to look for glory in unjust warfare, and by 
 conducticg the foreign aflFairs of the country on crooked 
 and slippery paths. Their success would have been 
 greater and more injurious than it actually was if the 
 people themselves, encouraged and aided by patriotic 
 men, had not repudiated the lessons of their teachers. 
 
 In 1880 the people, as a whole, threw off the incubus 
 which liacl rested upon them, took new cH)urage and 
 strength from their relapse, and voted themselves back 
 into the old " heroic " courses. They understood what 
 the issues were upon which an appeal was being made 
 to theni. A Liberal or democrat may have reasoned 
 with himself at the last general election somewhat after 
 this fashion : — 
 
 " The question which is put before us at this crisis is 
 capable of being reduced within a comparatively narrow 
 compass. It is not a question of more or less patriotism 
 on one side than on the other. It is not a question of 
 the glory or prestige of the country, which are as safe in 
 the hands of one party as in those of another. It is no 
 question of greater loyalty or national spirit with Lord 
 Beaconsfield than with Lord Hartington or Mr Glad- 
 stone. The Government spokesmen may say this, but 
 they are wrong. The real question, the true issue, which 
 should now be present in the mind of each individual 
 voter, and which will decide every honest vote, every 
 single election, and the aggregate result of the national 
 conflict, may be expressed in a few words. Is England 
 to remain true to her character as a free, self-governing, 
 strong and fearless nation, valuing freedom more than 
 life, and justice more than gain, refusing to be dictated 
 to by any other Power in the world, and always proving 
 
THE NEIF DEPARTURE. 231 
 
 herself to be the friend of oppressed nationalities, no 
 matter how great their oppressors might be ? If Eng- 
 land is to continue in this glorious path, wherein she 
 has gained honour and liberties, then the nation has to 
 consider whether Lord Beaconsfield or Lord Hartington 
 is the more likely to sustain her — whether Sir Stafford 
 Northcote or Mr Gladstone is best fitted to control her 
 finances — whether Lord Salisbury or Lord Granville is 
 most to be trusted in dealing with the foreign relations 
 of this important empire. Englishmen want to be great, 
 "but they want above all to be morally great — in other 
 words, they want their word and their will to be as 
 powerful as their gunpowder and bayonets. More than 
 this, they want their strength, such as it is, to be exerted 
 in good causes, and especially in aiding young and strug- 
 eiinof nationalities to win freedom and vierour. Now, 
 whatever Lord Beaconsfield has done, whatever the 
 tendency of his Cabinet has been during the past few 
 years, one thing is certain, namely, that the power of 
 England has been used against the cause of freedom and 
 independence, against the interests of peace and justice, 
 in almost every quarter of the globe. 
 
 '' As for the claims of the Liberal leaders to confidence, 
 it is to be remembered that we owe to modern Liberal- 
 ism, in the first place, the Eeform Act, which abolished 
 rotten boroughs, created many new seats in the most 
 important country towns, and enfranchised a large pro- 
 portion of the population. Even the second Reform Act 
 of 1867 was due to Liberal pressure, though actually 
 passed by the Tories. To Liberalism we owe Free Trade, 
 which has made bread cheap in England, beyond all 
 chance of returning to famine prices. To the same great 
 principle we are indebted for cheap newspapers, freedom 
 of public speech and writing, the penny postage, national 
 
232 THE NEW DEPARTURE. 
 
 education, the abolition of slavery, the repeal of such 
 oppressive taxes as those on windows, on advertisements 
 and the like, and the removal of the disabilities of 
 Jews. This is a glorious roll of reforms, which have 
 conferred upon the whole country the most enormous 
 benefits ; and it would be an ingratitude of the deepest 
 dye if professing Liberals were to forget them at a crisis 
 like this, and desert their leaders for the party which has 
 opposed every one of these measures. In finance, the 
 Liberals are no less entitled to the support of the country 
 than in the matter of general reform. The last Liberal 
 Government remitted more than twelve millions sterling 
 of taxation. They reduced the National Debt by the 
 vast sum of twenty-six millions sterling, and did not 
 evade the liability for their own acts by the clumsy 
 device of making their successors pay for what they 
 themselves undertook to do. They lowered the income 
 tax to as little as threepence in the pound, and then, 
 being more than able to pay their way, were prepared to 
 abolish it altogether. They raised the trade of the 
 country to a state of high prosperity, established favour- 
 able international treaties of commerce, and maintained 
 harmonious relations with foreign countries. At the end 
 of six years they showed a surplus of six millions ster- 
 ling, which they left in the national exchequer at the 
 disposal of the Tories. The Tories, on the other hand, 
 began by spending these six millions in a questionable 
 manner, and, now that their turn has come to give up 
 the seals of office, they show a virtual deficit of eight 
 millions. They have increased our annual expenditure 
 from seventy millions to the enormous sum of eighty- 
 five millions, most of the increase being devoted to 
 military and naval purposes, although they have not 
 materially improved our defences, nor added a single 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE. 233 
 
 ironclad of their own devising to the British navy. 
 And whilst they have aggravated the distress of the 
 country, and paralysed commercial enterprise when they 
 ought to have found means to encourage it, their vaunted 
 foreign policy has only increased the complications which 
 they profess to have diminished. 
 
 " Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues, so far from 
 giving us an honourable peace and a high prestige, have 
 lowered our reputation all over the world, and have 
 threatened war when there was not the slightest cause 
 for it. They plunged us into a quarrel with Afghanistan, 
 thus making the Ameer our enemy when he might have 
 been our friend, and destroying the natural frontier 
 between India and Russia in Asia, which the wisest 
 Indian statesmen declared to be the strono;est we could 
 have. They simultaneously plunged us into a miserable 
 war with the Zulus, without any provocation on the part 
 of those savages, and thereby caused the sacrifice of 
 many lives, and the absolute waste of several millions 
 sterling. As for our prestige abroad, we used to be con- 
 sidered the champions of freedom and the natural friends 
 of oppressed nationalities. This reputation, which Eng- 
 lishmen were wont to value so highly, they have jeo- 
 pardised, if not destroyed. We have been the friends and 
 abettors of tyrants ; and the country is now insulted by 
 being told that Germany and Austria, the willing victims 
 of gigantic military despotisms, anxiously desire the 
 return of Lord Beaconsfield to power. The Slavonic 
 nations have obtained freedom in spite of the efforts of 
 our Government to curtail or prevent it ; and they have 
 obtained it at the hands of our alleged enemy, the des- 
 potic Government of Eussia. Surely shrewd and com- 
 mon-sense people will not be so deceived as to take the 
 imperialists at their own valuation ; nor will they listen 
 
2?A THE NEJF DEPARTURE. 
 
 to the calumny that a Liberal Government would do less 
 for England, for humanity, and for peace." 
 
 These were the arguments constantly employed in the 
 j)olitical campaign which ended in April 1880, and they 
 prevailed with thousands of wavering voters. The 
 Liberal majority included the mass of the working men, 
 the abstaining sections of 1874, the philosophical demo- 
 crats, and all who conceived that the traditions of their 
 country had been unwarrantably interrupted by Lord 
 Beaconsfield. There were indeed many — the most 
 jjrudent as well as the most timid of these — who feared 
 the effect of a too sudden reversal of the policy actually 
 pjursued by the outgoing Government, and who appre- 
 hended from the triumph of the democracy evils almost 
 as great as those which they wished to eradicate. No 
 doubt it was a very delicate question indeed whether an 
 incoming Government might safely undo the diplomatic 
 work of their predecessors, and how far they could with 
 decency and good faith back out of engagements entered 
 into by men who had lost the confidence of the nation. 
 That was a question which it was necessary to leave to 
 the tact of a new Ministry, guided and informed by 
 public opinion ; but Mr Gladstone took care to reassure 
 the country on this point. In one of his speeches in 
 Midlothian he referred to an insinuation of this kind 
 which had been publicly made by a Cabinet Minister, to 
 the effect that if the Liberals came into power they 
 would at once make an end of all the eno^affements into 
 which the Conservative Government had entered, and 
 *' relieve the country of the consequences at no other 
 expense than its honour and good faith." This Mr 
 Gladstone strenuously denied. '^ However they might 
 deplore," he said, *'the misdeeds and dangers of the 
 course pursued by the Government, the country must 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE. 235 
 
 abide by the consequences. Prudence, care, and dili- 
 gence might do much in course of time, but whatever 
 faith required must be accepted/' 
 
 When the elections were over, and Mr Gladstone was 
 installed in power, he and his colleagues were immedi- 
 ately required to consider the various questions of 
 foreign and imperial concern which had been left to 
 them as a legacy by Lord Beaconsfield's Government. 
 The difficulty soon made itself apparent. It was evi- 
 dently harder for the Liberals to set straight what had 
 become involved, and to draw the line between repudia- 
 tion and acceptance, than it had been for the Conserva- 
 tives to follow out their definite and preconceived policy. 
 There was not merely the problem itself, and the neces- 
 sity in each case of providing alternative courses of 
 action, but there was also the political complication at 
 home, which threw on the Government the task of con- 
 sulting and satisfying all classes in the kingdom — the 
 defeated imperialists no less than the Whigs and the 
 democrats. Amongst these it was impossible to avoid the 
 giving of oSence to all ; and thus, at the very moment 
 when high principles had triumphed, the vast inconven- 
 iences of our imperfect system of party Government were 
 illustrated with unusual emphasis. 
 
 Our national traditions of foreign policy took a new 
 departure ; but the first results were attended by not a 
 little which was unfortunate and even disastrous. It is 
 noteworthy, but not anomalous, when the reasons of the 
 phenomenon are considered, that the gravest consequences 
 of this sudden change of policy were experienced in our 
 own dependencies. In Europe things went fairly well. 
 The behests of the country were faithfully and skilfully 
 
236 THE NEW DEPARTURE, 
 
 executed by our Ministers ; and as they were just and 
 reasonable behests, tending to peace and consolidation, 
 little more than patient firmness was necessary to secure 
 the assent of the Powers to the proposals of the English 
 Cabinet. The whole Eastern Question was settled — as 
 far as it could be — without the loss of a single life, with 
 an insignificant expenditure of money, and in almost 
 undisturbed amity. But the case was different when we 
 had to deal with the outlying portions of our own 
 empire, and to cut ojff the living tentacles of British 
 aggression. 
 
 Public opinion had demanded that restitution should 
 be made in two quarters where the proconsular authority 
 of our representatives abroad — to use a term which has 
 of late become familiar — had been stretched to an auda- 
 cious extreme. On the north-western frontier of India 
 and on the borders of Natal an aggressive policy had 
 been adopted, in both cases apparently in reliance upon 
 the known dispositions of the Home Government, and 
 in both cases reversing a former policy approved and 
 sanctioned by the generality of Englishmen. The policy 
 of non-intervention in Afghanistan had been accepted so 
 deliberately, and been so long undisturbed, that none 
 but a few well-informed people in England, and only 
 a small proportion of Anglo-Indians, suspected that the 
 return of Lord Northbrook and the mission of Lord 
 Lytton could be a prelude to the re-opening of this 
 closed question. The Afghan war excited the alarm of 
 the experts and the strong dislike of the people at large 
 — a dislike converted into indignation by the disasters 
 which followed as its natural sequel. One of the most 
 imperative mandates entrusted to Mr Gladstone and 
 Lord Hartington in 1880 was the injunction to with- 
 draw the English troops from Cabul and Candahar, and 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE. 237 
 
 to leave the Afghans in possession of their own country. 
 The true '* scientific frontier " was declared by the English 
 constituencies (of course informed and guided by men 
 most competent to give an opinion) to lie where such 
 men as Lords Lawrence and Northbrook had drawn and 
 held it : and the declaration was one to which it was 
 necessary to give effect. 
 
 The accomplishment of the task was assigned to Lord 
 Hartington, and there is no reason to t[uestion the 
 ability with which he set about it. The withdrawal 
 could not be made out of hand, and the order could not 
 be issued at a day's notice. There were military con- 
 siderations, considerations of health, and even of the 
 interests of the Afghans themselves, which required the 
 exercise of much deliberation. The final decision of the 
 Government seems to have come as speedily as the con- 
 ditions of the problem would allow, and the disaster of 
 Maiwand, though possibly due to the scepticism of the 
 natives as to our intention of evacuating the city of 
 Candahar, could scarcely have been avoided by anything 
 which Lord Hartington might have done. As for the 
 evil results to ourselves, the injury to our prestige, and 
 the menace to our safety in India, which were confidently 
 predicted by advocates of the forward policy, there are 
 perhaps few serious politicians or competent authorities 
 of any kind who maintain either that Mr Gladstone's 
 Government could have pursued a different course or 
 that the course actually pursued has made our position 
 in India weaker than it would have been if we had held 
 our footing in Afghanistan. 
 
 The case of South Africa was different. In this in- 
 stance, it might be thought, there was less reason for 
 
238 THE NEW DEPARTURE. 
 
 delay in carrying out the behests of the country. The 
 people on whose liberties we had encroached were less 
 formidable (or at the time they seemed less formidable) 
 than the people of Afghanistan ; and there was no 
 powerful nation behind them, as the Russians were 
 behind the Afghans, to give us colourable cause of 
 alarm, or to be an element in the problem of retrocession. 
 Our authorities in 1880 probably felt something 
 approaching to contempt for the military strength of 
 the Boers ; and being thus without fear of evil hap 
 they might safely have been the more willing and 
 zealous in retiring. But instead of this the absence of 
 peril only seemed to make the Colonial Office and the 
 Cape Government more circumspect about their task ; 
 and that which actually happened to us in the Transvaal 
 was precisely what might have been foretold. The Boers 
 knew all about the general election in England ; they 
 knew that the English people desired that the annexa- 
 tion should be rescinded ; and yet, in place of orders to 
 withdraw, they felt the grasp of England apparently 
 tightening, and saw fresh troops marching up the 
 country. The reasons which have been given for this 
 protraction of the occupation are not satisfactory. They 
 amount, in one form or another, to pleas of English in- 
 terests within or without the Republic. But these were 
 the pleas which had been raised by Sir Bartle Frere and 
 Mr Sprigg, by Lord Carnarvon and Sir Michael Hicks- 
 Beach ; and they were pleas which had not commended 
 themselves to the minds of Englishmen at home. 
 
 The constituencies had been specially emphatic and 
 outspoken in regard to the forward policy in South 
 Africa, which was condemned as altogether out of har- 
 mony with modern English sentiment. Before the 
 dissolution of 1880 the Liberal Opposition had vigorously 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE. 239 
 
 impeached the conduct of Sir Bartle Frere, in a resolu- 
 tion marked by unusual severity of tone. It had been 
 confidently expected that the repudiation of this policy, 
 and in particular the recall of Sir Bartle Frere, would 
 have been amongst the very earliest acts of the new 
 Government. But Sir Bartle Frere was not recalled ; 
 the restitution of tlie Transvaal was delayed ; and 
 a fresh war of aggression was undertaken by the Cape 
 authorities under the virtual sanction — at any rate 
 without the instant and uncompromising veto — of the 
 Liberal Ministry. 
 
 The reasons given for the continuance at his post of a 
 High Commissioner on whom the responsibility of former 
 aggressions had been laid possessed some weight — both 
 in themselves and by the character of the statesmen who 
 urged them. The Cape Parliament had not given its 
 decision on the important question of Confederation. 
 It was desirable that Sir Bartle Frere should be allowed 
 to continue his efforts in this direction, since there was 
 room to think that the Confederation of South Africa 
 might be the best possible guarantee of peace in the 
 future. The motive of personal forbearance and gene- 
 rosity was not so strong where the interests of States 
 and the uprightness of political standards were con- 
 cerned. Be this as it may, there can be little doubt 
 that the leisurely movement of the authorities in this 
 matter was fraught with bad results, and was a flaw in 
 the policy of the Government. 
 
 The two incidents referred to above suggest certain 
 wider considerations as to the power of our representatives 
 in various quarters of our empire beyond the seas ; and 
 there are few more interesting topics in the whole range 
 
240 THE NEW DEPARTURE, 
 
 of questions with which the men who conduct the im- 
 perial affairs of England have to deal. The attitude and 
 behaviour of our High Commissioners, viceroys, governors, 
 and consuls towards the people of our dependencies on 
 the one part, and towards adjacent foreign countries on 
 the other part, affect us as a nation in a very peculiar 
 degree. Our honour and credit are in their hands, which 
 they can stake and jeopardise without any immediate 
 restraint, and which they may even forfeit before the 
 mass of the English people has an opportunity of check- 
 ing them. There is no country in the world for which 
 these considerations are so vital as they are for ourselves, 
 because the British Empire has frontiers in every clime 
 and neighbours of almost every nationality. No doubt 
 the danger has been diminished by the beneficent inter- 
 vention of science, which has brought us into close con- 
 tact with the colonies, and has enabled our Secretaries of 
 State to converse in their offices with the rulers of far- 
 distant territories. But recent occurrences have shown 
 ns how great the peril may yet be, and how necessary it 
 is for a self-governing people in England to limit and 
 define the authority of its proconsuls. The new de- 
 parture of our foreign policy will not be satisfactory or 
 well-directed until either the colonial and vice-reo-al 
 governments are more closely subordinated to the will of 
 the English constituencies, or the bonds between them 
 and the mother country are made to depend entirely 
 upon the free will of the colonists, as well as upon 
 the will of the nation at home. Until one or other 
 of these modifications has been eff'ected the honour and 
 interest of England must be more critically at stake than 
 the interests of the colonies themselves. * 
 
 * No more telling illustration could be cited of the danger referred 
 to in the text than the case of the destruction of Batanga, on the West 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE. 241 
 
 The general question as to the action of our repre- 
 sentatives abroad, in special connection with Afghanistan 
 and South Africa, was raised in Parliament in the 
 session of 1880; and the debate on this occasion was 
 
 Coast of Africa, which was thus related by Mr Henry Richard in the 
 House of Commons, April 30, 1881 : — "The ruler of the town of 
 Batanga had been nicknamed King Jack by people who frequented it. 
 The inhabitants captured a person entitled to British protection and 
 carried him into the bush. He was detained for seven weeks and then 
 escaped, having, according to his own acknowledgement, been treated 
 very kindly, or at least without any undue harshness. But a man who 
 desired to magnify his own office called a meeting of the European 
 inhabitants of the town, and they unanimously decided that the case 
 called for the application of force. Who were those European resi- 
 dents 1 They consisted of four men, two of whom might be English- 
 men, but two were Germans ; and the British Consul thought he had a 
 right to call on the commander of Her Majesty's ships to act as Pro- 
 tector-General of all the commercial adventurers who went to that coast, 
 to whatever nationality they belonged. The commander on the station 
 did not seem much enamoured of the task he was invited to perform, 
 and he demanded proof that the man who had been wronged was a 
 British subject — proof which was never forthcoming ; and he reminded 
 the Consul that the Government did not profess to afford protection to 
 British subjects who chose to establish themselves among savage tribes 
 remote from our stations. Commodore Richards^ scruples, however, 
 were allayed, and he went with British vessels to the spot and gave 
 instructions to Commander Romilly, of the Boadicea, to carry into effect 
 the vote of the four European residents. Commander Romilly pro- 
 ceeded accordingly to the town of King Jack with a party of 140 
 officers and men ; no opposition was offered to their landing. The 
 exploit was described in Commander Romilly's report to the Admiralty. 
 The town comprised 300 well-built huts, some with two storeys, and 
 forming a quadrangle. The town was burned down, many canoes were 
 destroyed, the banana trees cut down, and the crops also destroyed. 
 Not satisfied with working this amount of havoc, a detachment was 
 sent three-quarters of a mile along the coast to burn down another 
 village. The Admiralty telegraphed to ask the reason for the burning 
 down of that village, and it was alleged that the people there had been 
 concerned in the seizure of the man who had been taken prisoner.'' 
 
 Q 
 
242 THE NEW DEPARTURE. 
 
 one of the highest value. Mr Henry Richard, who was 
 sujiported by sixty-four votes out of a hundred and 
 thirty -six — a division scarcely less significant than the 
 one in which the same hon. member, some eight years 
 previously, had gained an actual majority for a motion 
 in favour of international arbitration — moved the House 
 of Commons to declare '' that the power claimed and 
 exercised by the representatives of this country in various, 
 parts of the world to contract engagements, annex terri- 
 tories, and make war in the name of the nation without 
 authority from the central Government is opposed to 
 the principles of the British Constitution, is at variance 
 with recognised rules of international law, and is fraught 
 with danger to the honour and true interests of the 
 country." 
 
 As Mr Richard said, in support of his motion, although 
 at the present time, according to the theory of the Con- 
 stitution, the power of peace or war is vested in the 
 sovereign — that is to say in the Cabinet, yet there are 
 many who believe that this is a dangerous departure 
 from former policy. There was a time when the con- 
 sent of the great council of the nation and afterwards of 
 Parliament had to be obtained, and was necessary, to a 
 war or a treaty. The question really was, to use Mr 
 Richard's own words, '' whether this great nation was to 
 be master of its own destinies, or whether every petty 
 officer, dressed in a little brief authority, should be at 
 liberty to pledge the blood and treasure of thirty-two 
 millions of people to any extent at the impulse of his 
 own pride, resentment, or caprice. If it was found un- 
 wise to allow the colonies to drag the country into war, 
 how much more necessary was it to curb individual 
 officers and prevent their forcing the nation into violence 
 and bloodshed." 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE. 243 
 
 Mr Gladstone officially opposed this motion, and 
 mainly on the ground that if it were passed it must 
 remain inoperative until followed up by other and 
 distinct acts, very difficult to accomplish, and implying 
 in their character a very notable development of national 
 policy. The practical advocates of the principles laid 
 down in Mr Richard's motion would not, of course, con- 
 test this statement : they would say, '' By all means let 
 us recognise what our motion involves ; and let us press 
 it all the more strenuously because its adoption will com- 
 mit us to further action." But Mr Gladstone knew too 
 well the impossibility of going before the natural de- 
 velopment of public opinion. However much he may 
 have sympathised with the motion in the abstract, he 
 could not as Prime Minister assent to it, because he would 
 in so doing have committed himself and his colleagues 
 to a change of system which could not have been brought 
 about. Nevertheless there are some passages in his 
 speech so full of signiJficance in respect of the develop- 
 ment which has actually been made in our national 
 system of policy that they may be looked upon as a 
 valuable aid to the comprehension of our subject.* 
 
 In them Mr Gladstone shows that the diminished 
 control of Parliament over our foreign officials, through 
 the Executive Government of the day, must be attributed 
 to the greater pubHcity of Parliamentary debates, and to 
 the speed with which the proceedings of the two Houses 
 are conveyed to all who care to know them, enemy and 
 friend alike. It is evident that disadvantage may on 
 some occasions arise from the discussion in an open 
 Parliament of matters relating to war or peace, or of 
 treaty engagements. It might be urged that the advan- 
 tages of such a regulation would outweigh the disadvan- 
 
 * See Appendix, J. 
 
244 THE NEW DEPARTURE. 
 
 tages ; and certainly if previous discussion by the 
 popular delegates were indispensable for the ratification 
 of every international agreement the people would at 
 any rate be able to guard itself from unsatisfactory and 
 discreditable undertakings, and would have itself alone 
 to thank for such as might actually be fixed upon it. 
 
 Manifestly the value of such a rule would increase 
 with the increasing democratic vigour of the people, with 
 its ability to keep itself clear of wars and entanglements, 
 with its moral force over itself aud its neighbours, and 
 with its repudiation of underhand dealings. The more 
 independently a nation holds itself, in act and pledge, 
 amongst the other nations of the world, and the more 
 clearly it is understood to confine itself to peaceful pur- 
 poses and ends, the less cause it will have to trouble 
 itself about the publicity of its deliberations in Parlia- 
 ment, and the better it will be able to transfer from the 
 Cabinet to the national assembly matters touching its 
 most important foreign relations. But there are few if 
 any democracies which have attained such a position as 
 this. The foreign affairs of the United States are en- 
 trusted to a Committee which deliberates more or less 
 privately — and in all cases more privately than the open 
 Senate. 
 
 England of course is very far from being in a condi- 
 tion to discuss all the concerns of her extended empire 
 publicly and without reserve. Even if all other difficul- 
 ties were removed she could not avoid setting the con- 
 tinental Powers against her, one and all, by submitting 
 their proposals to be canvassed in Parliament, and pulled 
 to pieces in the newspapers next morning. The conse- 
 quence would be that the foreign Courts would treat 
 with us as seldom and as superficially as possible ; and 
 England cannot afford, until very considerable changes 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE, 245 
 
 have taken place, to be thus held diplomatically at arm's 
 length by her allies. Our methods of diplomacy, in fact 
 — which are the methods of civilised States generally — 
 are amongst the last things with which the nation could 
 dispense in any new departure ; and this for the simple 
 reason that they are not entirely our own creation, and 
 do not depend exclusively upon pur approval. We must 
 in some degree be governed in secret council, and be at 
 the mercy of individual discretion, even after we have 
 throned a moral public opinion in matters relating to 
 war and peace, to treaties and conventions, to aggressions 
 and annexations. We must allow Cabinets and single 
 Ministers to guide our destinies, and commit us to par- 
 ticular courses long after we have made it virtually im- 
 possible for them to play fast and loose with despots, or 
 to obstruct the path of rising nationalities. 
 
 But it is a fair question whether Mr Gladstone, in the 
 speech already cited, has conceded as much authority to 
 the popular representatives as these might safely and 
 serviceably exercise. No annexation, he says, is valid 
 until it is ratified at home — " unless it was done in 
 pursuance of authority from home. ' ' But whose authority ? 
 If it was by the authority of a Minister or of the whole 
 Cabinet would this suffice to make the annexation valid 
 even as a matter of theory ? It would not suffice in 
 practice, for public opinion at home can always demand 
 the reversal of the act, as in the case of the Transvaal. 
 The objections which exist to giving the people a power 
 of reversal over treaty obligations in general do not exist 
 where the question is one of annexation. In respect of 
 the making of war it is no doubt impossible, as Mr 
 Gladstone says, to take adequate security. We must 
 rely to a great extent on the control of agents by the 
 Executive, on the control of the Executive by Parliament, 
 
246 THE NEW DEPARTURE. 
 
 on the just representation of tlie people in Parliament, 
 and on the clarification and elevation of popular opinion. 
 But at the same time, and even at the present day, is it 
 not just and reasonable to ask that at any rate Parliament 
 shall be the virtual declarer of war — the voice to say 
 whether a declaration shall or shall not be oiven ? It is 
 
 o 
 
 practically too late for Parliament to interfere after a 
 royal address has been brought down to announce that 
 the irrevocable step has been taken ; yet surely it is due 
 to the people, and they may justly demand, that they 
 shall be the last and the final tribunal to decide on war 
 before the matter has been carried beyond their control. 
 If the making of war and peace be a royal prerogative, 
 yet it is competent to Parliament to declare that it ought 
 to be so no longer ; and it is not probable that any incum- 
 bent of the royal office in England would spontaneously, 
 as a point of principle, and persistently decline to assent 
 to the change. 
 
 As for all other inconveniences, we may make com- 
 paratively light of them. With resolution and moral 
 courage it may be found that the disadvantages usually 
 predicted as being likely to ensue from the attribution of 
 the war-making power to the popular representatives 
 would disappear in practice, or would appear as positive 
 advantages. For instance, it would be no disadvantage 
 but an occurrence of the best possible character if, after 
 the ^'proconsuls," or the ambassadors, or the court, or 
 the Foreign and other Cabinet Ministers had been for 
 some time helplessly drifting, or blundering, or mischief- 
 making (and all these things are unfortunately possible) 
 until for them at least there seemed to be no conceivable 
 outlet and issue but war — after the spending Departments 
 had been set to work and the newspapers had been 
 reporting hostile utterances from both ends of the 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE, 247 
 
 entanglement — the calm voice of Parliament could 
 intervene with a blank refusal to fight. It is easy to 
 imagine all that might be said in such a case by the 
 organs of the party which happened to be in a minority ; 
 but the heaviest of all their charges would not tell a 
 featherweight against the grand moral triumph and the 
 vast practical benefit of an action of this kind. 
 
 And would it be at all different in principle from our 
 late repudiation of injustice in the Transvaal ? Would 
 it not be a mere extended demonstration of the national 
 resolve to make a new departure in our policy towards 
 other States — which is, in other terms, to ourselves ? To 
 repeat a familiar comparison, an Englishman is not now 
 considered a poltroon, as he once was, for refusing to 
 fight a duel ; and when public opinion is riper — or per- 
 haps this very day if public opinion were duly consulted 
 — the nation of Englishmen would not lose caste or credit 
 in the world by declining an unnecessary appeal to arms. 
 But it is first indispensable that we should have the final 
 issue in our own hands. An individual cannot place his 
 quarrel at the discretion of seconds and then refuse to 
 abide by their decision. But it is neither for the dignity 
 nor for the advantage of a nation to give its honour and 
 supreme interests into the keeping of one man or of one 
 Cabinet, however shrewd this Minister or Cabinet may be. 
 
 The principle of restitution, illustrated in the evacua- 
 tion of Afghanistan and the withdrawal from the Trans- 
 vaal, is a novel but not an absolutely new development 
 of English policy. Nothing more striking than the two 
 facts just mentioned had ever been known in our his- 
 tory. Though we had made over the Ionian Islands to 
 
248 THE NEW DEPARTURE. 
 
 the Greeks some twenty years before, this was not a re- 
 storation of ill-gotten possessions, and it was not done 
 in the teeth of any serious opposition at home. We 
 had indeed made other restitutions, after war, and more 
 or less on compulsion ; but in the case of Afghanistan 
 and the Transvaal the basis of the act was not a battle 
 or a popular rising. The true basis was a mandate from 
 the English people to its representatives in Parliament, 
 and to a Government selected from the ranks of the 
 majority. The people, speaking through an educated 
 public opinion, through politicians on the platform, 
 through the newspaper press, and finally through the 
 ballot-boxes, had declared its will that these two coun- 
 tries should, at any cost, and in spite of any misconcep- 
 tion of motive, be restored to their rightful owners. If 
 it might have been, it would have pleased Englishmen 
 to see the double restitution made on the morrow of 
 the general election ; but the time chosen for the com- 
 plete fulfilment of the national mandate was manifestly 
 determined on the responsibility of the Executive Go- 
 vernment. The nation had no ready means of hastening 
 this fulfilment, but such means as it had were employed. 
 It is necessary to recall this fact for the behoof of those 
 who tell us that the acts of restitution were disastrous, 
 and who argue from thence that all acts of a similar 
 character are likely to be disastrous. The victories of 
 Ayoob Khan and of the Boers might not have been won 
 over English soldiers if the evacuations could have taken 
 j)lace as the first bold and significant measures of the 
 Government in 1880. At any rate the discredit of the 
 Transvaal War might have been avoided in this way. 
 It is probable enough, as already admitted, that the 
 delays were not merely excusable but inevitable, and 
 that Mr Gladstone's Cabinet, or the departments presided 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE. 249 
 
 over by Lord Hartington and Lord Kimberley, did the 
 utmost which was practicable in the circumstances. 
 But it should be fully and fairly understood that the 
 English people, and the principle of the new departure 
 in our English policy, are not accountable for the un- 
 happy conditions which attended these magnanimous 
 retrocessions. 
 
 Less novel and startling in its nature was the perform- 
 ance of the popular behests in Europe. The principle 
 on which Englishmen desired to see the Eastern Ques- 
 tion laid to rest was a principle which had been con- 
 stantly and studiously impressed upon them for several 
 years past by Mr Gladstone ; but, though unfamiliar 
 from long disuse, it was in reality a principle which had 
 been often previously applied in Europe, and which had 
 almost always produced excellent results. 
 
 It was the policy of international concert — the unsel- 
 fish agreement of all the European Powers for a de- 
 fined and beneficent object — on which the people now 
 relied for the satisfaction of their responsibilities in 
 Turkey. And the effectual resumption of this policy in 
 1880, immediately after a period of isolation and dis- 
 cord, may reasonably be considered as an element of the 
 new departure which Englishmen have thought fit to 
 take. 
 
 As the popular mandate in Asia and Africa had been 
 restitution, so the mandate of the constituencies in 
 regard to Europe was that the Liberal Government 
 should endeavour to unite all the Great Powers in a 
 resolute and harmonious effort to exact the obedience of 
 Turkey, and to ensure the freedom of her subjects. The 
 popular sentiment in this case was the offspring of the 
 
250 THE NEW DEPARTURE. 
 
 popular traditions transmitted from generation to gene- 
 ration. The principle was old — the application only 
 was to be new. The argument of the friends of inter- 
 national concert in 1880, at the moment when Mr 
 Gladstone's Cabinet were attempting to put it in 
 operation, was of this kind. It was at last possible to 
 assure ourselves that the instincts which had guided us 
 during the past few years, and which had induced us 
 to confide our destinies to a Liberal Government, were 
 about to be justified by results. A policy without am- 
 biguity and without cunning deflections, a policy trans- 
 parent to all the world, was on the eve of being carried 
 into effect. There was no longer the possibility of great 
 and sudden surprises ; we were no longer to be kept on 
 the tenter-hooks of suspense lest at a moment's notice 
 we should be found to have new responsibilities, and to 
 have entered upon new zigzags and declivities of in- 
 trigue. Every student of history could write out the 
 principles on which our policy rests, and the reasons by 
 which it is to be supported. Every candid and intelli- 
 gent man could work it out from the axioms of morality 
 and politics, and could prove that, when scrupulously 
 applied, it cannot fail to be successful. The policy of 
 concert is simply the management of international rela- 
 tions according to fixed laws of human action, which are 
 as absolute and as sacred in the dealings of State with 
 State as they are in the dealings of individuals. The 
 chief necessity is to be honest and straightforward, to 
 desire the general good, and to work for it by justifiable 
 means. If the Great Powers would all have faith in the 
 efficacy of this rational method, and would use it frankly 
 and unanimously, half the trouble which arises amongst 
 the nations of the world would be abolished at a stroke, 
 and the happiness of the human race would be incalcul- 
 
THE NEJF DEPARTURE. 251 
 
 ably increased. But as we cannot yet hope for such a 
 consummation, and as the conflicting interests of the 
 Powers musfc always keep them more or less selfishly 
 apart, it follows that some nations must be more ready 
 than others to enter into concert ; and, as a rule, it will 
 be the most unselfish nations of all which will propose 
 special concerts for special purposes. As a further 
 natural consequence, it follows that the concert of 
 nations, when attained, must depend for its continuance 
 upon the energy, the good intentions, the moral influence 
 of the Power which has brought it into existence. The 
 concerts which have been established by England have 
 mostly possessed the same general characteristics ; and 
 it is possible to read the features of the concert of 1880 
 in the light of the best concerts of former epochs. The 
 prevailing sentiments of the English people with regard 
 to foreign nations is a desire to see rising nationalities in 
 various parts of the world acquire the means of freedom 
 and self-government — not solely for the benefit of the 
 struoroiing races themselves, but because the extension of 
 the limits of freedom is obviously the best guarantee of 
 liberty and prosperity for all. It is for these objects 
 that the wisest English statesmen in past times have 
 invited the concert of the Great Powers, and never for 
 the oppression or retardation of liberty. 
 
 If such boastings and aspirations as these were too 
 confident and crude, if Englishmen flattered themselves 
 too much on the achievements of the past and the possi- 
 bilities of the future, it must be admitted that they had 
 been encouraged to do so by their political guides and 
 teachers. And they were in some measure justified 
 by what the Liberal Government was actually able to 
 accomplish within its first year of ofiice. It was Mr 
 Gladstone, Earl Granville, the Marquis of Hartington, 
 
252 THE NEIF DEPARTURE. 
 
 and the section of Liberals which Mr Bright and Mr 
 Chamberlain represented in the Cabinet, who had in- 
 spired the English democracy with a belief in the efficacy 
 of a moral and humane diplomacy ; and it A\ras for them 
 to prove, when in office, that their methods would suffice 
 to insure success. Much depended on the manner in 
 which the new policy of England in the Eastern Ques- 
 tion was to be set before the Powers, and to be carried 
 out in practice. There was to be in this case no restitu- 
 tion, and no actual undoing of arrangements and engage- 
 ments entered into by the late Government, but the 
 invitation of the continental courts to a friendly com- 
 pact, in place of the reservations and distinctions which 
 had hitherto been maintained between England and her 
 nominal allies, was doubtless in some sense a withdrawal 
 from an occupied position, which required infinite deli- 
 cacy of procedure. It would have been easy to give the 
 Powers an impression that we were weak, irresolute, vacil- 
 lating, or at the mercy of an unskilled democracy, and that 
 the whole responsibility and blame of our fickleness 
 rested upon the Government of Mr Gladstone. We 
 should thus have lost prestige, and have been less con- 
 sidered in the councils of Europe — not merely less relied 
 upon, but less respected for strength and firmness. 
 
 England however was happy at this moment in being 
 served by a Foreign Secretary and an Under-Foreign 
 Secretary both well adapted for the task in hand. The 
 tact and suavity of the one combined with the skill and 
 minute attention of the other anticipated or removed 
 every obstacle to success, and it became possible before 
 the new Government had been six months in office to 
 arrange a course of proceeding, based upon international 
 concert; for the solution of the outstanding difficulties. 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE. 253 
 
 The problem was to obtain from the Porte the dis- 
 charge of its unfulfilled obligations under the Treaty of 
 Berlin. Nearly two years had passed since the ratifica- 
 tion of that instrument, and still the claims of Greece 
 and Montenegro were unsatisfied. The English Cabinet 
 rightly thought that it was not for the advantage or 
 dignity of Europe that the Sultan should continue to 
 evade his responsibilities, and that two countries which 
 had nominally profited by the Treaty should be in- 
 definitely baulked of their rights. It was on this basis, 
 in strict conformity with and fulfilment of the Treaty of 
 1878, that Lord Granville invited the Powers to renew 
 their efi'orts for the settlement of the question ; and there 
 can be no doubt that our Foreign OflBce was acting on 
 this occasion strictly as the representative and executor 
 of the national will of England. On both questions — in 
 the case of Greece perhaps more distinctly than in the 
 case of Montenegro — public opinion had been lucidly 
 expressed, and most of the Ministers who obtained power 
 in consequence of the general election of 1880 stood 
 deeply committed to the cause of the Greeks and 
 Montenegrins. 
 
 As the rights of Montenegro had been more formally 
 defined in the Treaty of Berlin than the rights of Greece, 
 and as there was moreover less jealousy and complication 
 in the former case than in the latter, the action of the 
 Powers was directed in the first instance to securing: the 
 rectification of the Montenegrin frontier. One of the 
 first steps taken by the six Governments after they had 
 consented to act in concert was to sign, according to 
 precedent in such matters, a self-denying protocol, bind- 
 ing them to a disinterested co-operation in the work 
 which they had undertaken. In the terms of this pro- 
 tocol the Governments, "in order to prove the entire 
 
'Z5i TEE NEW DEPARTURE, 
 
 disinterestedness with wliicli they pursue the execution 
 of all the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, undertake 
 not to seek, in any arrangements which may be come to 
 in consequence of their concerted action for the execution 
 of the said Treaty in regard to the Montenegrin question, 
 and eventually the Greek question, any augmentation of 
 territory, any exclusive influence, or any commercial 
 advantage for their subjects which those of every other 
 nation may not equally obtain." The engagement in 
 this formal instrument was of the essence of the under- 
 taking entered into by the Powers, and it served to 
 place the whole proceedings on an entirely different foot- 
 ing from the partial combinations for less unselfish 
 objects which had in former times existed between two 
 or more States of the European community. Whilst a 
 similar instrument might be employed by the members 
 of such a partial combination, no international concert of 
 the whole community could be formed without it. It is 
 the specific act which binds the contracting parties to- 
 gether, stamps the character of their agreement, and adds 
 to it a sanction which nothing else could so effectually 
 give. If it is not alone sufficient to ensure the disin- 
 terestedness of the Powers, and to prevent them from 
 seeking exclusive gains, it places the strongest moral 
 obstacles in the way of a self-seeking policy, whether 
 on the part of the concert or on the part of single 
 States. 
 
 The rights of Montenegro were not secured until 
 something more than the formal agreement of the Great 
 Powers had been manifested to the Porte. The Naval 
 Demonstration, and, beyond that, a threat to send the 
 combined fleet for a special purpose to Smyrna, at length 
 brought the obstinacy of the Turkish Government to an 
 end, and Dulcigno was ceded to the Montenegrins early 
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE. 255 
 
 in the month of December. The employment by the 
 Powers of their ships of war, and their menace of a 
 forcible intervention at Smyrna, were acts of virtual 
 hostility sufficiently justified by international law, by 
 precedent, by the necessities of the case, and by the 
 antecedent conduct of Turkey. At any rate, not to go 
 behind the general relations between the Porte and 
 Europe as illustrated and defined in the Treaty of 
 Berlin, they were as fully justified as the conclusion of 
 that Treaty itself, which had been ratified by the Sultan. 
 If it was within the right of Europe, technical or moral, 
 to conclude that Treaty, it was certainly within her 
 rio;ht to exact obedience to it. It has been said that 
 Turkey had had abundant and recent precedents for the 
 evasion of an obnoxious treaty ; and in fact it may be 
 admitted that she would have had as much right to 
 evade the Treaty of Berlin, if she had been able, as some 
 of the Great Powers had had to shake ojff inconvenient 
 restrictions. But this is an admission which proves its 
 converse — namely, that the Powers had the right of the 
 strong^est to exact obedience to a clear and definite 
 international en2:ao^ement. 
 
 The general subject of European concert is better 
 exemplified in the recent history of the Greek question, 
 which was more protracted, and gave more frequent 
 occasion for the interchange of diplomatic correspond- 
 ence, than any other matter arising out of the Eastern 
 problem. It will therefore be interesting to review this 
 question in greater detail. 
 
XL 
 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 (1880-1.) 
 
 The Greek question of 1880-1 had its origin in the 
 same causes which produced the Slavonic risings of 
 1875-76, and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. The 
 misgovernment of the Hellenic provinces of Turkey had 
 kept Epirus, Thessaly, and Crete in a state of chronic 
 insurrection for years before the Russian invasion ; and 
 when the subjects of King George impelled their Govern- 
 ment to prepare for action in 1877 and 1878 they were 
 only seizing upon an opportunity for which they had 
 been long and impatiently waiting. 
 
 In 1877, before the Russians had crossed the Danube, 
 there seemed to be a probability that Greece would 
 throw herself into the struggle. The Porte, at any rate, 
 saw reason to fear this, and called upon the English 
 Government to restrain its neighbour from hostile 
 measures. The appeal was successful. On the 9th of 
 June our representative at Athens wrote to the Earl of 
 Derby, then Foreign Minister, in these terms : — '' M. 
 Trikoupi undertakes to go beyond the international 
 duties which can strictly be required of Greece, and to 
 endeavour to prevent outbreaks in the neighbouring 
 provinces, upon condition of obtaining a promise from 
 Great Britain that when the time comes for entering 
 upon negotiations for peace, over which Her Majesty's 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONCERT, 257 
 
 Government may be expected to exercise considerable 
 control, it will be considered that there is an Hellenic 
 question before Europe, no less than if such an Hellenic 
 question had been raised by the actual insurrection of all 
 the Hellenic provinces."* 
 
 Lord Derby replied, on the 2nd of July, that Her 
 Majesty's Government were '* ready to assure the Greek 
 Government that, so far as might lie in their power, 
 they would, when the time came for the consideration of 
 the settlement of the questions arising out of the war, 
 be ready to use their best influence to secure for the 
 Greek population in the Turkish provinces any adminis- 
 trative reforms or advantages which may be conferred 
 upon the Christian population of any other race." 
 
 This was not quite as much as the Greeks asked for ; 
 but it was a virtual admission that the Greek question 
 existed, and an absolute promise that England would do 
 her best to solve it. Moreover, there is ground for 
 asserting that pledges of a more distinct and unreserved 
 character were at the same time verbally given at 
 Athens. 
 
 In August, the Greeks were vehemently agitated by 
 fresh outrages in Epirus and Thessaly, and by the ap- 
 parent collapse of the Turkish resistance to Russia ; and 
 the Government were unable to prevent a few volunteers 
 from crossing the frontier. The Porte once more applied 
 the lever of English influence, and once more Greece 
 restrained herself in deference to our mediation. The 
 same process was repeated towards the end of the 
 year. 
 
 In February 1878, when the Russian terms of peace 
 had been dictated to Turkey, and Greece saw herself 
 almost entirely neglected in the proposed arrangement, a 
 
 * Blue Book ; " Turkey, No. 19, 1878." 
 
 K 
 
258 THE EUROPEAN CONCEBT, 
 
 Greek force actually entered the Turkish dominions ; 
 l)ut it was at once recalled, on the urgent representations 
 of more than one of the Great Powers. M. Deligianni, 
 who had succeeded M. Trikoupi at the Foreign Office, 
 addressed a Circular Note to the Powers, affirming that 
 this fresh act of self-restraint was inspired by " perfect 
 confidence" in the "promise of the Great Powers" that 
 "the national aspirations and interests of the Greek 
 population in Turkey should become the object of the 
 deliberations of the approaching Congress ; " and at the 
 same time he put forward a request for " the special 
 representation of Greek aspirations." The Greeks were 
 allowed to nourish their hopes, their demand for repre- 
 sentation at the Congress was entertained, and Lord 
 Derby repeated the assurance which he had given on the 
 2d of July. 
 
 We have here a distinct moral compact between 
 England and Greece — a compact in which the Greeks 
 pledged their vital interests and tlieir dearest ambitions 
 on the faith of an English promise. Our word as a 
 nation was passed. As a nation, we had a right to ex- 
 pect that it should be kept, and not broken. 
 
 During the Spring of 1878, and whilst negotiations 
 were proceeding between the Great Powers with a view 
 to the holding of a Congress, first at Vienna and after- 
 wards at Berlin, the English Government consistently 
 maintained the claim of Greece to state her case be- 
 fore the plenipotentiaries. Lord Derby was loyal to 
 his undertaking, and when he quitted the Foreign Office 
 the difficulty was already virtually overcome. The de- 
 spatch with which his successor, Lord Salisbury, signa- 
 lised his assumption of his new post gave us no reason to 
 suppose that Greece had specially suffered by the change, 
 and the champions of the Hellenic cause looked forward 
 
TEE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 259 
 
 to the Congress with some hope, if not entirely without 
 niissfivino:. 
 
 The first transactions at Berlin were calculated to mve 
 satisfaction in a very high degree to the Greeks and their 
 friends. In England, at any rate, there was no little 
 astonishment at the fervid and enthusiastic manner in 
 which the Marquis of Salisbury maintained the pre- 
 tensions of Hellenism, and backed them against the 
 claims of the clients of Russia. The rio^hts of the Greek 
 populations in Epirus and Thessaly, in Macedonia^ 
 Thrace, and Crete, Avere brought prominently to the 
 front ; and the undue preponderance which Russia had 
 sought to give to the Slavs was opposed, not in the 
 interest of the Mahomedans, or on the plea of Turkish 
 " independence and integrity," but expressly on behalf 
 of the Hellenic race. " The Slavs," Lord Salisbury said 
 at the second sitting, " have as their defender in this 
 room a powerful military nation, related to them by 
 blood and by faith, strong in the prestige of its recent 
 victories. The Greeks, on the contrary, have as their repre- 
 sentative here no nation of the same race. Her Majesty's 
 Government is of opinion that the decisions taken under 
 such circumstances would not content the Greek race, 
 and, consequently, would not promote either the tran- 
 quillity of the Ottoman Empire or the peace of Europe." 
 
 The justice and the warmth of this advocacy were, to 
 a large extent, though not altogether, successful ; and 
 the Greek plenipotentiaries prepared themselves to argue 
 the case of their oppressed fellow-countrymen before 
 the Congress. How did it happen, after this, that an 
 '' Eastern Eoumelia " was fantastically carved out of 
 what Lord Salisbury called the '' Greek provinces " of 
 Turkey without so much as consulting the representa;- 
 tives of King George ? How did it come to pass that 
 
260 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 these representatives were subsequently told to confine 
 themselves to the case of Thessaly and Epirus, were 
 snubbed for trying to do what Lord Salisbury had de- 
 manded that they should be allowed to do, and were 
 taunted with "mistaking the intentions of Europe?" 
 Students of history yet unborn may perhaps ask these 
 questions with even a deeper sense of wonder than we 
 are able to feel in the present generation. The records 
 of diplomacy offer few more striking instances of incon- 
 gruity and tergiversation. 
 
 It was due in some measure to M. Waddington that 
 Greece was prevented from taking any part in deciding 
 the fate of Eastern Roumelia. The English plenipo- 
 tentiaries must bear alone the responsibility of 
 diminishing the modest minimum of France, and of 
 hindering the emancipation of millions of Greeks when 
 it was in their power to secure it. On the 29th of June, 
 at the ninth sitting, M. Deligianni and M. Ehangabe 
 had their first and last audience of the Congress. They 
 argued the matter from every point of view, in the 
 interests of the Greeks of the two provinces, in the 
 interests of Greece, in the interests of Europe, and in 
 the interests of Turkey itself. They proved to demon- 
 stration as much as Russia had proved for Bulgaria, 
 as much as all the plenipotentiaries had admitted in 
 the case of Eastern Roumelia, and as much as Lord 
 Salisbury had by implication admitted in the case of 
 the '' Greek provinces " generally. That which they 
 said was notoriously true, supported by notorious facts, 
 and they were justified in expecting that their champion- 
 ship would prevail. 
 
 Let us see how the affair stood at this moment. It 
 had been established that Epirus and Thessaly were 
 in the same miserable plight as Bulgaria, Bosnia, and 
 
%THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 261 
 
 Roumelia. The indictment had been drawn up, irre- 
 fragable testimony had been adduced, the plaintiflFs' 
 advocates had conducted their case with complete 
 efficiency. All that remained to be done was for the 
 bench to give its decision ; and it was prepared to 
 decide according to the merits. But before it could 
 do so one of the judges, solemnly pledged to deliver a 
 righteous judgment, and having already committed 
 himself in eloquent terms to the very principles on 
 which the plaintiffs' advocates had relied, suddenly 
 turned round, and gave his opinion entirely against 
 the weight of the evidence. He declared himself ad- 
 versely to the plaintiffs, and by his firm attitude and 
 obstinate persistence succeeded in wresting the judg- 
 ment of the court in favour of the wrongdoer. 
 
 This is what Greece, and the friends of Greece, were 
 driven to regard as the attitude of England at the 
 Berlin Congress, and especially at the sitting recorded 
 in the 13th Protocol, when the emancipation of the 
 Porte's Greek subjects was limited — and that only by 
 way of a vague recommendation — to the southern half 
 of Thessaly and Epirus. It had been hoped that the 
 whole of these two provinces, with Crete and possibly 
 Macedonia, would have been rescued from Turkish mis- 
 rule. This was clearly foreshadowed by Lord Derby, 
 and subsequently by Lord Salisbury, in the name of Her 
 Majesty's Government. It had been further hoped that 
 the frontier of the Hellenic kingdom would have been 
 extended so as to include the dense Greek populations 
 whereof Janina and Larissa are the centres. This was 
 the least that could be expected from the plenipo- 
 tentiaries after the opinions which they had expressed 
 in the earlier meetings of the Congress, and after the 
 liberal manner in which they had treated the Danubian 
 
202 TEE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 Principalities, and the provinces of Bulgaria o.ncl Eastern 
 Eoiimelia. 
 
 So far as tlie Congress is concerned, this is what the 
 Greek nation and race obtained from it. In Eoimielia, 
 a large Hellenic population was bound up with a larger 
 Slavonic population, to the detriment of both. A¥ith 
 i-egard to Crete, a Turkish promise was accepted as 
 covering the necessities of the case. With regard to 
 Thessaly and Epirus (in the words of the 13th Protocol), 
 *'the Conoxess invites the Sublime Porte to come to 
 an understandizrg with Greece for a rectification of 
 frontiers ; '' and ''is of opinion that this rectification 
 might 'follow the valleys'" of the Salamvrias and 
 Kalamas ; whilst " at the same time the Powers are 
 prepared to offer their direct mediation to the two 
 parties." And, lest Greece should presume too much 
 on the ''invitation" and ''opinion" of the plenipo- 
 tentiaries, Prince Bismarck subsec|uently assured the 
 Turkish plenipotentiaries that "the paragraph in ques- 
 tion expressed a desire of the Congress, and not a 
 resolution in which the Porte was asked to concur." 
 
 Greece had come to Berlin asking for the recognition 
 of a just claim. She was sent away with an opinion 
 and a desire. It was impossible that either she or her 
 friends should look upon this as fair and generous treat- 
 ment. The champions of the Hellenic cause at once 
 recognised that, as far as they were concerned, the issue 
 of the Congress was chimerical in the extreme. 
 
 Englishmen had more reason than other people to 
 regret this outcome of the Congress, and to criticise the 
 mode in which the disappointment was brought about. 
 It is matter of history, which no one has seriously 
 attempted to deny, that the two plenipotentiaries of this 
 country, and Lord Beaconsfield in particular, were per- 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 263 
 
 sonally responsible for the overthrow of the hopes of 
 Greece. Sir Charles Dilke stated the leading facts in 
 connection with England's change of attitude at Berlin 
 in the course of the Parliamentary debate on the Treaty, 
 shortly after the return of the Premier and Foreign 
 Secretary. ''What," he asked, ''had happened between 
 the ninth and thirteenth sittings of the Congress ? After 
 the ninth sitting M. Waddington had been charged by 
 his colleagues with the duty of studying the Greek pro- 
 posals, and formulating a resolution to be submitted to 
 tlie Congress. His first resolution had been for the 
 annexation of the whole of Thessaly and Epirus to 
 Greece. The proposal was supported privately by Italy, 
 and even by Austria herself. It was not opposed by 
 Germany and Russia, yet it had to be abandoned on 
 account of the resistance which it met with from some- 
 where. M. Waddington thus fell back on the territorial 
 limits which are mentioned in the Protocol, but pro- 
 posed a definite and settled annexation. This met with 
 decided opposition from the English delegates ; and on 
 the very morning of the sitting which was to decide the 
 case of Greece, M. Waddington had an anxious but 
 fruitless interview with Lord Beacon sfield, and pointed 
 out in how hard a 230sition he was placed by those who 
 had asked him to formulate a resolution on the subject 
 of the Greek demands, and who then opposed his mini- 
 mised proposal, which was in fact their own. The result 
 of the opposition of the English delegates was the pro- 
 posal of the resolution in such a form that it found no 
 place as a resolution in the Treaty." 
 
 Thus it appears that Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, 
 after they had gone to Berlin pledged to do their best 
 for Greece, after they had secured the representation of 
 the Hellenic kingdom in the Congress, and after Lord 
 
264 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 Salisbury had pointedly set up the Hellenic claims in 
 opposition to the claims of the Slavs, ended by reducing 
 these claims to *' an irreducible minimum," and declin- 
 ing to make even the slightest mention of them except 
 in such a form that Prince Bismarck contemptuously 
 spoke of them as a mere '' desire " of the Congress. 
 Before we pass on to consider what has been the effect 
 and the sequel of this desire, it is necessary to refer to 
 something of a still graver character, which cannot be 
 treated as an incontrovertible fact, like all the foregoing 
 statements, but which at least amounts to a serious and 
 pertinent suspicion. It is certainly difficult to avoid 
 the conclusion that the cause of Greece was sacrificed 
 at Berlin to the interests of another country — that the 
 broken j)ledges of English statesmen were the extra- 
 vagant price which we had to pay for the acquisition of 
 Cyprus. 
 
 Mr Shaw Lefevre, referring to this suspicion at a 
 meeting at Willis's Rooms, convened by the Greek Com- 
 mittee in May 1879, said : — '* It is my belief that when 
 the dates of these transactions are carefully compared, 
 this is the only possible solution of the matter. It was 
 on the 29th of June that the Greeks obtained a hearing 
 in the Congress ; the Anglo -Turkish Convention was 
 signed by the Grand Vizier on the 1st of July, and the 
 Treaty was finally ratified on the 4th of July ; on the 
 4th of July, at Berlin, a proposition was made to post- 
 pone to the next day the consideration of the Greek 
 question ; and it was on the 5th of July — the very day 
 after the ratification of the Anglo-Turkish Convention — 
 that the question of what should be done with Greece 
 came on for decision before the Congress of Berlin. 
 Putting these dates together, we cannot but come to 
 the conclusion that the interval was occupied by Sir H. 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 265 
 
 Layard in negotiating the Anglo-Turkish Convention, 
 under which Cyprus was handed over, and that as a 
 consideration for this the cause of Greece was to be 
 abandoned by England." 
 
 This evidence, if not exactly such as would carry con- 
 viction in a court of law, will probably be strong enough 
 to convince most people, now and in succeeding genera- 
 tions, that the statesmen who professedly regarded British 
 interests (real and supposed) as paramount over all other 
 considerations did abandon the cause of Greece at Berlin 
 for the sake of Cyprus. 
 
 The effect produced npon the Porte by the expression 
 of Europe's opinions and desires at Berlin was soon made 
 manifest. The thirteenth sitting of the Congress was 
 held on the 5th of July. On the 13th orders were given 
 at Constantinople to increase the army in Thessaly by 
 10,000 men, whilst a squadron under Manthorpe Bey 
 was despatched to Volos. On the 17th, the Greek 
 Government invited the Turkish Government to appoint 
 Commissioners for the regulation of the new frontier ; 
 but on the 20th^ after the subject had been discussed 
 on several occasions by the Ministers of the Sultan, it 
 was decided not to give up any territory to Greece, and 
 not to comply with the wishes of Europe. Safvet Pasha 
 declared to Sir H. Layard that this decision was final, 
 and authorised him to communicate the fact to the 
 English Government. No one can be surprised at this 
 resolution on the part of Turkey. If she could not 
 resist the Russians in Roumelia, and if she could not 
 hope to exclude the Austrians from Bosnia, she was at 
 least able to baulk the expectations of Greece ; and it 
 was natural that she should at once resolve to do so. 
 
266 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 Every statesman in Europe must have perceived that 
 the decision of the Porte was definitive, and, as far as 
 the Sultan and his Ministers were concerned, irrevocable. 
 Without pressure of some kind or another it was certain 
 that Turkey would not come to terms with Greece, and 
 the Greeks were, therefore, fully justified in urging that 
 Europe should forthwith proceed to the mediation which 
 it had declared itself ready to offer. But the Powers 
 showed then, as some of them showed on subsequent 
 occasions, that th-ey were by no means in a hurry to see 
 the Berlin Treaty fulfilled. 
 
 The conduct of the Greek Government after the Con- 
 gress was both legitimate and dignified. Greece en- 
 deavoured to hasten the accomplishment of her hopes, 
 and she was certainly not to blame for that. If any- 
 thing, she erred on the side of patience, of complaisance 
 to the Powers which had left her in the lurch, and of 
 meekness under the intolerable delays of the Porte. She 
 did not attempt to take by violence the territory which 
 Europe wished her to receive, nor did she in any other 
 way seek to deviate from the path of procedure marked 
 out for her at Berlin. 
 
 The invitation sent by Greece to Turkey on the 17th 
 of July remained without the slightest acknowledgment. 
 On the 8th of August Safvet Pasha sent round to the 
 Powers an elaborate Circular Note, showing cause why 
 their advice should not be followed by the Porte. In 
 September Greece renewed her request for mediation, 
 without efi'ect ; but at last, on the 21st of October, M. 
 Waddington addressed a despatch to the Governments 
 of the Great Powers, suggesting that the time had now 
 arrived for acting on the 24th Article of the Treaty. 
 His proposal was that the six Powers should ask the 
 Porte to give its explicit adhesion to the principle 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 267 
 
 of a rectification, and should consent to name Commis- 
 sioners. 
 
 Five of the Powers at once frankly accepted this pro- 
 posal ; but Lord Salisbury demurred to its form, regarded 
 it as a menace to Turkey, considered the time '' inoppor- 
 tune " for such a step, and regretted that the Powers 
 had not ''thought fit to delay" it. A month after the 
 date of M. Waddington's despatch Lord Salisbury for- 
 mally replied, in a long plea for Turkish interests,* 
 assenting to the mediation on condition that Greece 
 should be ''invited in return to srive the Porte securitv 
 in the future against the claims which have often 
 threatened the peaceable relations of the two Powers 
 in the past." The plenipotentiary who had startled 
 the Congress five months before by his bold assertion 
 of the Hellenic rights, even in Macedonia and Thrace, 
 now spoke of the transaction as a " mutual act of paci- 
 fication," and complained that Greece had *' made no 
 corresponding offer " on her own part. 
 
 On the 15th of December the Turkish Government 
 agreed to name Commissioners. Then followed the 
 farce which was described by Sir Charles Dilke at the 
 meeting in Willis's Rooms already referred to, by which 
 the Porte contrived to throw fresh delays in the way of 
 the Conference. "On the 31st of December the Turks 
 named as the place for the first meeting of the Com- 
 missioners a village which they described as Khoukhout, 
 near Narda, a village for which the Greeks sought in 
 vain upon their maps. On the 1st of January the 
 Greeks accepted the proposal, but they stated that they 
 were unable to discover Khoukhout. On the 19th of 
 January, after again a great deal of delay, the Turks 
 explained that Khoukhout meant Anino. On the 20th 
 
 * Elue Book; ''Greece, No. 1, 1879." 
 
268 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 the Greeks replied that there was no village there, but 
 they were so anxious to begin negotiations that they 
 would send up Commissioners at once, in what they be- 
 lieved to be the direction that was intended. The 
 Greek Commissioners sailed in the ship Olga, on the 
 20th of January, for the Gulf of Arta. At the entrance 
 of the Gulf a shot was fired, and they were stopped, and 
 the Porte protested in a note to Athens against their 
 ' inconvenient promptitude.' On the 25th of the same 
 month the place of meeting was changed to Prevesa, 
 and on the 26th the Greeks accepted it, and sent up 
 their Commissioners in the King's yacht Amphitrite. 
 The Amphitrite again was fired upon and stopped, and 
 the Turks again protested. The first meeting only took 
 place on the 5th of February." 
 
 The Conference at Prevesa came to nothing, because 
 the Turks refused to take the Congress line as a basis of 
 negotiations. On the 20th of March 1879, the Greek 
 Commissioners were recalled, and on the following day 
 M. Deligianni repeated the appeal for European media- 
 tioD. Again M. Waddington was the first to respond. 
 On the 21st of April he addressed a Note to the Powers, in 
 which he suggested that direct mediation should be em- 
 ployed by means of a Conference of the Ambassadors at 
 Constantinople. To this proposal the German Govern- 
 ment gave an immediate and specially cordial assent ; 
 but the Governments of Austria and Italy reflected the 
 views of England on the subject, which were to the 
 effect that the Ambassadors should act independently, 
 and not in concert. This, of course, practically disposed 
 of the idea that the Ambassadors^ as representing an 
 European concert, might have exercised a salutary in- 
 fluence over the new Commissioners whom Turkey and 
 Greece were invited to appoint. The Commissioners 
 
TEE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 269 
 
 were named ; but, as the European concert did not exist 
 in any eJBFective sense, the influence of the Ambassadors 
 was hardly more than nominal. 
 
 On the 12th of June Lord Salisbury wrote to Sir 
 Henry Layard a long despatch, setting forth in a fair 
 and candid style the reasons which should induce 
 Turkey to come to terms with Greece. In this despatch 
 the action of the Ambassadors was spoken of as though 
 it was to be the principal instrument in securing the 
 compliance of the Porte, and Sir H. Layard received 
 his instructions in that sense. But we know the result 
 of this second Conference. We know that Greece entered 
 upon it without hope, because the Porte refused before- 
 hand to accept the recommendations of the Congress as 
 binding. We know that the discussions were fruitless, 
 that there was no real ejffort to arrive at an understand- 
 ing, and that the delays of the Turks were as truculent, 
 if not quite so frivolous, as those adopted six months 
 before. We know that the consent of the Powers in 
 June remained fruitless until the following November, 
 and that the meetings of the Commissioners between the 
 17th of November and the 29th of December were only 
 a series of make-believes and equivocations on the part 
 of the' Sultan's Government. And we know that, 
 throuofhout this lono; and discreditable six months, 
 whilst the representatives of Greece were being tricked 
 and befooled at Constantinople, the Ambassadors of the 
 six Great Powers were either unwilling or unable to bring 
 the slightest eflectual pressure to bear upon the Porte. 
 
 Kememberinsr that this Conference was the result of a 
 nominal mediation of the Powers, in accordance with 
 the 24th Article of the Treaty of Berlin, and that the 
 Ambassadors really did receive instructions to act in 
 consultation with each other, we must regard this new 
 
270 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT, 
 
 failure as a defeat of the Powers in detail, a rejection of 
 the advice of Europe, a diplomatic fiasco of the worst 
 kind, traceable entirely to the fact that the intervention 
 between Greece and Turkey was practically valueless. 
 There was no concert of the Governments, no identical 
 .action on the part of the Ambassadors, and, therefore, no 
 pressure such as the Porte was likely to feel. And why ? 
 It is painful to be obliged once more to throw the chief 
 blame of this failure upon our own country. It was 
 England who first refused M. Waddington's very moderate 
 suo;crestion of united action. It was to the Enoiish 
 Government that this new disappointment of the 
 Thessalians and Epirotes was primarily due. 
 
 Such was the condition of the Greek question in the 
 Spring of 18 SO, when the general election replaced the 
 Conservative Government by a Government under the 
 guidance of Mr Gladstone. As soon as the initial 
 measures had been taken by our Foreign Office to 
 establish a special concert of the Great Powers Lord 
 Granville proposed that a Conference should meet at 
 Berlin, in pursuance of the 24th Article of the Treaty of 
 1878, for the purpose of mediating between Turkey and 
 Greece ; and on the 9th of June our representative at the 
 German capital received his instructions. Lord Gran- 
 ville sent on this date a despatch to Lord Odo Russell, in 
 the course of which he said : — 
 
 '' The protracted continuance of the present situation 
 was clearly most inexpedient in the interests of both 
 Greece and Turkey, and as it was evident that there was 
 no prospect of the two Governments being able to come 
 to terms if left to themselves, the French Government 
 were of opinion that the only means of bringing the 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 271 
 
 matter to a practical conclusion was that the Commis- 
 sioners to be appointed by the Powers should meet, at 
 all events, in the first instance, at some place outside 
 of Turkey. Her Majesty's Government considered that 
 the purpose in view could best be secured by a Confer- 
 ence being summoned to meet either in Paris or Berlin, 
 when it might be determined, by a decision of the 
 majority, what line of frontier should be recommended 
 for adoption, and that an International Commission 
 composed of officers possessing technical knowledge 
 should subsequently proceed to the locality, if it should 
 be deemed necessary, to decide upon the details. The 
 views of Her Majesty's Government are indicated in the 
 instructions addressed to Mr Goschen on his proceeding 
 to Constantinople. Her Majesty's Government wish it 
 to be distinctly understood that while urging the com- 
 pletion of this rectification of frontier upon the Porte in 
 the interests both of Turkey and Greece they desire to 
 adhere generally to the geographical indications given 
 in the 13 th Protocol of the Congress of Berlin. They 
 do not wish that there should be any forcible annexation 
 to the latter country of an unwilling Mussulman popu- 
 lation in such numbers as to be a source of danger and 
 insecurity. On the other hand, they consider that the 
 line should be so drawn as to relieve the Greek-speaking 
 inhabitants so far as they are collected in a sufficiently 
 defined district from a Government which does not 
 satisfy their traditional sympathies and national aspira- 
 tions.* 
 
 This, it is clear, was a generous, but not an uMuly 
 partial interpretation of the question at issue between 
 Turkey and Greece. It was in very striking contrast 
 with the attitude assumed l)y Lord Beaconsfield and 
 
 * Pari. Papers; ''Greece, No. 3, 1880." 
 
272 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT, 
 
 Lord Salisbury, though it was entirely in harmony with 
 the national sentiment of England, as this' sentiment 
 had been manifested during the previous eighteen 
 months. 
 
 The rectification of the Greek frontier agreed upon by 
 the Conference of June, 1880, was more favourable to 
 Greece than the Powers were able to carry into effect. 
 It may be that the goodwill of Europe towards a small 
 and energetic State, and towards the large Greek pojDU- 
 lation under Turkish rule which had so long and vainly 
 struggled for independence, carried the plenipotentiaries 
 beyond the mark where a cooler prudence would have 
 caused them to arrest their steps. But on the other 
 hand there can be no doubt that the resolutions of the 
 Conference might have been sustained, and the question 
 might have been settled on a more satisfactory basis, if 
 the European concert had not grown weaker and less 
 effective in the interval. The Porte, as was only 
 natural, refused compliance with the demands of the 
 Powers. It had demurred to the original meeting of 
 the Conference, and it now demurred to the conclusions 
 of the Conference. But this opposition might have been 
 overcome, as the opposition to the Montenegrin settle- 
 ment was overcome, by a judicious display of firmness 
 and a timely demonstration of force. England for her 
 part left nothing undone to obtain for the Greeks all 
 that the Berlin Conference held out to them, and for 
 some time the Powers continued to insist with the Porte 
 on the definitive character of their resolutions at Berlin. 
 
 An unfortunate turn was given to the negotiations by 
 a change of Government in France, which substituted 
 M. Barth^lemy St Hilaire for M. de Freycinet. The 
 new Foreign Minister of France lost no time in modifying 
 the position which his country had hitherto occupied 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONCERT, 273 
 
 in regard to the Greek question. In conversation with 
 Lord Lyons, on the 3d of October, he declared that 
 France could take no initiative in the matter. The de- 
 liberate resolution of the Government was to adhere 
 closely to the concert of the Six Powers, but not to take 
 any lead themselves. '' They were decidedly of opinion 
 that the Montenegrin, Greek, and Armenian questions 
 should now be treated as one whole ; and, in the interest 
 of peace and harmony, they were extremely anxious 
 that all three should be finally settled with the greatest 
 possible promptitude by the Six Powers in concert. 
 The French Government would carefully consider any 
 suggestions for settling them which might be proposed 
 to them, and would be very desirous of adopting any 
 plan which was agreed upon by the other Powers. They 
 must, however, state at once distinctly that they would 
 not incur any risk of being drawn into a war. On the 
 one hand, the French Government were, M. Barth^lemy 
 St Hilaire said, prohibited by the Constitution from 
 making war without the consent of the Chambers ; while, 
 on the other hand, public opinion throughout France 
 would vehemently disapprove any action on the part of 
 the Government which might appear to tend, however 
 remotely or indirectly, to involve the country in 
 hostilities." * 
 
 Recent events in Tunis aflford a curious commentary 
 on this text ! 
 
 The cooling of French sympathies for Greece, or 
 rather the modification of the part which France had 
 played in the European concert, paralysed the action of 
 the Great Powers, and destroyed all hope of settling the 
 frontier dispute on terms specially favourable to the 
 
 *Lord Lyons to Earl Granville, Oct. 3, 1880. Pari. Papers; 
 "Greece, No. 1, 1881. '* 
 
 S 
 
274 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 Greeks — which would have been as the English Govern- 
 ment had thought specially favourable to the best 
 interests of Europe. The Porte took advantage of the 
 altered condition of affairs to decline more emphatically 
 than ever the advice which had been given to it by the 
 six Governments. The Ministers of the Sultan even 
 went so far as to assume an initiative of their own by 
 offering to enter into fresh negotiations for a rectifica- 
 tion of the Greek frontier, on the understanding that 
 the decisions of the Berlin Conference should be allowed 
 to fall to the ground, or at least that they should be 
 over-ridden by the new proposal. 
 
 Towards the end of the year 1880 the French Govern- 
 ment — which had already been instrumental in causing 
 the separation of the combined fleet immediately after 
 the cession of Dulcio-no — suwested that the mediation 
 between Turkey and Greece should be converted into an 
 arbitration. This scheme, though assented to by all 
 the Great Powers, failed by the refusal of the Greek 
 Government (and subsequently of the Porte) to invite or 
 accept an arbitration.* Meanwhile Greece had not 
 ceased to prepare herself for war. She claimed for her- 
 self the right to carry out by force of arms the resolu- 
 tions of the Conference ; and only the earnest represen- 
 tations of the Powers withheld her from this course. 
 
 The ultimate result of the withdrawal of France was 
 made manifest in the Spring of 1881, when a com- 
 promise was effected between the recommendations of 
 the Powers at Berlin and the paltry rectification offered 
 by the Porte in October 1880. The Governments, 
 
 * 
 
 The proposal of arbitration by France, and the language held on 
 the subject by the English Government, constitute an instructive 
 chapter of diplomatic history. Three of the principal despatches will 
 be found quoted in the Appendix (K). 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONCERT, 275 
 
 anxious above all things to have the question settled, 
 and despairing of their original scheme since their active 
 concert had been terminated by the French Cabinet, 
 followed up the plan of arbitration by one which was 
 still better calculated to play into the hands of the 
 Turks, and to defeat the hopes of the Greeks. They 
 gave instructions to their Ambassadors at Constantinople 
 to enter into negotiations with the Sultan's Ministers. 
 There was, it must be confessed, nothing to be proud of 
 in this phase of the question. Europe went to Constan- 
 tinople virtually for the purpose of compromising her 
 decisions at the Conference, and this after solemnly 
 adjuring Turkey, with something like menace, to carry 
 those decisions into effect. Her representatives 
 were treated with rudeness, and were compelled in the 
 end to accept on behalf of the Greeks a mere fragment 
 of their claims in Epirus, with a moderate rectification 
 in Thessaly. Greece was constrained, by very heavy 
 pressure brought to bear upon her, to submit to this large 
 discounting of what she had been led to expect ; and so, 
 lamely enough, the question was brought to an end. 
 
 If Europe had thus come to a weak, not to say an 
 impotent conclusion, and had suffered the Porte to gain 
 (at least from its own point of view) a great diplomatic 
 triumph, it cannot fairly be argued that the policy of 
 concert had been tried in vain. In the Montenegrin 
 question it had been thoroughly active and operative : 
 but even in the Greek question it must be credited with 
 having brought about a settlement of a long-standing 
 and delicate quarrel. If the Government of the Eepublic 
 had been steady — if France, after stipulating in the first 
 place that the combined squadron should be used on 
 
276 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT, 
 
 behalf of the Greeks as soon as it had served the cause 
 of the Montenegrins, had resolutely adhered to that line 
 of conduct — the Powers might have been able to release 
 Epirus, as well as Thessaly, from the rule of the Turks. 
 We cannot be quite certain that they would have done 
 this without landing their troops, but there was at least 
 a reasonable hope that they might have found it possible. 
 The retreat of the French from the position which they 
 had originally taken up had destroyed this hope ; but, 
 even as it was, Greece obtained what she could never 
 have obtained without the assistance of the united 
 Powers. The concert had endured in some form, and 
 the consequence was that a large portion of the ancient 
 land of Thessaly was definitively added to the Greek 
 State. 
 
 In order to estimate fairly the service rendered to the 
 Greeks by Europe it should be remembered that the 
 Congress of Berlin did not absolutely bind the Powers to 
 intervene in their favour. The six Governments did not 
 positively and imperatively require the Porte to liberate 
 any of its Greek subjects in the border provinces. The 
 Treaty did not pledge those who signed it to effect a 
 transfer of Thessaly and Epirus. All that had been done 
 up to 1878 was to recognise and set forward the Greek 
 claims, to express the desire and advice of Europe, and 
 to hold out to the Greeks a prospect and a promise of 
 assistance. But for the individual Government of Eng- 
 land the case was a more special and urgent one than it 
 could be for Europe as a community. No doubt it is 
 true that the community was bound and entitled to watch 
 over the liberties and good order of each of its component 
 States ; and it was only on this ground that the Congress 
 of Berlin had been justified in dealing with the subjects 
 of Turkey, and that England in 1880 was warranted in 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 277 
 
 inviting the Powers to employ concerted action. But this 
 country had assumed to itself a peculiar concern and in- 
 terest in Greece ; the English Government, as we have 
 seen, had taken the initiative in bringing the Hellenic 
 cause before the Congress ; and in the year 1880, after 
 the constituencies had given their mandate to a new 
 Ministry, English encouragement in a still more emphatic 
 sense had been held out to King George and to the in- 
 surgent provinces. 
 
 The responsibility thus passed on by the Government 
 of Lord Beaconsfield to the Government of his successor, 
 and accepted with something more than formal acquies- 
 cence by Mr Gladstone and his colleagues, was as real 
 and as grave as any responsibility of a similar character 
 could be ; and the history of the negotiations set on foot 
 by the Foreign Office, from the first invitation addressed 
 by Lord Granville to the Continental Powers up to the 
 last discussions of the Commissioners for the transfer of 
 the ceded territory, proves that the Liberal Government 
 was determined to honour its engagements. The pre- 
 ceding Government, which had taken so notable a part 
 in shaping the Treaty of Berlin, had not seen its way 
 during a period of eighteen months to make good its word 
 of promise. It had been unable to do so for the simple 
 reason that the policy which it had pursued did not 
 admit of an amicable agreement amongst the Powers, 
 without which the Porte could not be induced to come to 
 terms with Greece. But Mr Gladstone's foreign policy 
 was based on international concert for the discharge of 
 international obligations. As soon as he came into 
 office he set this concert on foot ; and his initiative at 
 once communicated to the Powers, and eventually to 
 Turkey, the moral impetus necessary for the solution of 
 the difficulty. 
 
278 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 When the concert of 1880 was first spoken of and 
 entered upon, the policy of the Liberal Government 
 was criticised in various quarters — mainly of course by 
 the general political opponents of Mr Gladstone and his 
 colleagues, but occasionally, and in a modified sense, by 
 a section of his followers. So far as the former kind 
 of criticism calls for remark in this place, it may be 
 said to have been based upon the alleged impossibility 
 of e9*ecting any great or permanent good by a pretended 
 asfreement of Powers whose aims and wishes are known 
 to be irreconcilable. It was urged by many who had 
 supported the so-called imperialist policy of Lord 
 Beaconsfield and the Marquis of Salisbury that a sincere 
 co-operation of the six Great Powers on any question 
 affecting the problems of south-eastern Europe was in 
 the nature of things unattainable. A pretended concert 
 might be entered into, but it must infallibly prove to be 
 a sham, and there could be no true mark of statesman- 
 ship in efforts put forth for the purpose of establish- 
 ing it. England herself had separate interests in the 
 East, and these would be jeopardised, if not actually 
 sacrificed, by going into council with our rivals. 
 Compromises would be necessary in some shape or other, 
 and our representatives would thus be called upon to 
 abandon the objects of English policy in exchange for 
 whatever advantages they might gain for their client. 
 In any case we should be using for purposes not essen- 
 tial to our own aims the influence and authority which 
 ought to be reserved for occasions of real necessity. 
 The desire to help the Greeks, or the Montenegrins, or 
 to compel obedience from the Porte, was in great mea- 
 sure sentimental, and a truly patriotic Minister would 
 not permit himself to be swayed by sentiment. Mr 
 Gladstone might attempt his benevolent task, but the 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 279 
 
 attempt would recoil upon himself. He would receive 
 a snub from one Power, or be out-manoeuvred by 
 another; and sooner or later he would be taught by 
 experience that his predecessors had pursued the course 
 most calculated to serve the interests of the country. 
 
 The critics who employed such arguments as these 
 were encouraged in their opinion by each] successive 
 obstacle encountered by the new policy; and they 
 hailed the fulfilment of their predictions when the ships 
 of the Great Powers separated after the surrender of 
 Dulcigno. But it is possible that their want of con- 
 fidence in the method and their satisfaction at its 
 supposed collapse were due to the formation of too high 
 an estimate in the first instance of what an international 
 concert actually is, and what it may be expected to 
 accomplish. A concert is a mere agreement for a special 
 purpose. So long as it lasts it may naturally produce 
 more amicable relations amonsrst the concertinsc Powers 
 in ordinary matters, but the special purpose will be the 
 formal limit of the special agreement. And when this 
 special purpose is accomplished it may be that (as in 
 1880-1) a better general understanding will subsist 
 amongst the Powers ; but the absence of this need not 
 destroy the effect of the previous concert, as its attain- 
 ment was not one of its defined objects. All that is 
 necessary is that the parties to the agreement shall have 
 fully decided beforehand on the particular end to be 
 accomplished, and that they shall solemnly bind them- 
 selves by the usual self-denying protocol. 
 
 There is manifestly a broad distinction to be drawn 
 between a concert of this kind and the combinations and 
 alliances so frequently formed by our statesmen in the 
 eighteenth century. It differed from most of them, of 
 course, in being an association of all the Great Powers 
 
280 TEE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 (which practically means the whole of Europe) against a 
 State which is scarcely to be included in the European 
 economy. But it differed also from the vast majority 
 of them in being an association formed in order to carry 
 out the terms of a treaty, by a Minister beyond all 
 cavil attached to the cause of peace and free government. 
 Its success was menaced by the supposed — it was indeed 
 almost rendered futile by the partial — disaccord of a 
 single Power ; but the entire honesty of its purpose 
 was attested by the fact that even after the dispersion of 
 the ships in the Adriatic, and after the temporary arrest 
 of all action by M. St Hilaire's unlooked for intervention, 
 the Powers did persist in their unselfish efforts until they 
 had wrung from Turkey so much as was possible with- 
 out a war. 
 
 This veritable triumph of international policy must be 
 counted to the credit of Mr Gladstone's Administration. 
 But behind the Government of the day, inspiring their 
 will and encouraging their efforts, we may discern the 
 authority of the popular mandate, to which the conduct 
 of an English Ministry must always actually or pro- 
 fessedly conform itself, and which in 1880 had un- 
 questionably laid down the principles whereby the 
 course of the nation was to be guided. The new de- 
 parture had been definitely taken ; the old systems had 
 been sifted and discriminated ; and the foreign policy of 
 England was for the first time dictated by the voice of 
 the democracy instead of being merely based upon tradi- 
 tions and precedents. 
 
 The informing and directing mind in the new develop- 
 ment of English policy, which has been lightly traced in 
 the foregoing pages, was the mind of the statesman 
 whose greatest triumphs have been won at home, in 
 legislation, and in the discussion of social and economical 
 
TEE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 281 
 
 questions. It has sometimes been said that a democracy 
 can have little real concern in matters of foreign policy, 
 and that it will consequently be disposed to neglect 
 them, to shirk the responsibilities inseparable from 
 empire, and to insulate itself in its commercial and 
 domestic interests. There is, perhaps, very little rea- 
 son for such a charge. At any rate it is usually pre- 
 ferred by men who admit themselves to be opposed to 
 democratic institutions, and we may hesitate to accept 
 their conclusions until we have examined the grounds 
 on which they rest. Meanwhile, it is not superfluous to 
 point out how strongly the incidents just reviewed, and 
 the action of Mr Gladstone throughout our recent com- 
 plications, tend to rebut the assertion. The majority 
 which saw fit to arrest and reverse Lord Beaconsfield's 
 foreign policy, and to establish the relations of England 
 with other countries upon an entirely diflerent footing, 
 was unquestionably drawn from the classes which are, 
 or which constitute the main element of, the English 
 democracy. And the statesman who interpreted and 
 carried out their wishes, to whom the problems of foreign 
 policy were all in all for something like five years, was 
 one who had almost constantly occupied himself up to 
 1876 with a distinct order of subjects. 
 
 It is interesting to observe, as no one who considers the 
 two men side by side can fail to observe, how many points 
 of resemblance are presented by the characters and careers 
 of Canning and Gladstone. The fact is none the less 
 noticeable when we bear in mind the warm admiration 
 which Mr Gladstone has frequently expressed for his 
 predecessor, whose influence was admittedly strong 
 upon his youthful mind, and whose example may more 
 
282 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 than once have given shape and direction to his 
 policy. 
 
 These two men, whose lot it was at an interval of 
 more than half a century to rescue and confirm the 
 better traditions of England's foreign policy, and to give 
 satisfaction to the national conscience after a period of 
 audacious innovation, sprang from the middle class of 
 English society. Both received, at Eton and Christ 
 Church, the highest education and the utmost social 
 and intellectual refinement which it is in the power of 
 English parents to give to their sons. Both developed 
 early and brilliant talents, attracting notice and securing 
 a favourable entrance into political life by their triumphs 
 at the University. Both were elegant writers and 
 vigorous speakers, generous in sympathies and ardent 
 in ambition. Both began as Tories, rather by the acci- 
 dent of friendship and circumstance than by such force 
 of disposition and conviction as is wont to create strict 
 partisans. 
 
 Canning was recognised by his contemporaries as the 
 most powerful Parliamentary orator since Pitt and Fox had 
 held the mastery of the popular House. Mr Gladstone's 
 contemporaries have praised his oratory with equal enthu- 
 siasm : but whilst he resembles Canning in the brilliance 
 of a fervid genius, in the marvellous exuberance of his 
 diction, and in his wealth of classical adornment, he has 
 made up by moral elevation and analytic subtlety what- 
 ever he may lack of the other's poetic sentiment and 
 playful conceits. In one remarkable feature the two 
 men exhibited the strength of their versatile character, 
 intellectual as well as simply rhetorical. They both 
 dealt with figures, with statistical facts, with monetary 
 laws and economical problems, in such a manner that 
 their hearers were wont to consider their speeches on 
 
TEE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 283 
 
 these subjects as by no means the least interesting of 
 their discourses. But the greatest charms in the elo- 
 quence of each were perhaps felt by their least cultivated 
 hearers, who were fascinated and lifted out of themselves 
 by the energy, the vehemence, the loftiness and grandeur 
 with which they handled the abstract principles under- 
 lying political policy and action. 
 
 The early opposition of Canning to Catholic emancipa- 
 tion — which brought down upon him the lash of Peter 
 Plymley in his letters to his brother Abraham — and the 
 warmth with which he subsequently advocated this 
 measure of justice remind one forcibly of Mr Gladstone's 
 gradual convictions on the subject of the Irish Church. 
 And yet, though both were slowly pliable, in the sense 
 that both steadily advanced in Liberalism as they 
 recognised the needs and requirements of the nation, 
 both attested their real consistency of mind by obstinate 
 adherence to many of their earliest, if not always their 
 most generous convictions. Both distinctly promoted 
 the cause of English democracy by the same candour 
 and logical directness which enabled them to accept 
 inevitable conclusions. Neither of them had it in him 
 to be an unbending partisan. The force of individuality 
 was too strong in both, whilst their moral courage and 
 high spirit forbad them to persist in any course which 
 their judgment had condemned. 
 
 It is, however, in the domain of foreign politics that 
 the career of Canning receives its most notable parallels 
 in the career of Mr Gladstone. The later statesman 
 inherited most of the traditions and even methods by 
 which Canning's policy was distinguished ; and by a 
 strange coincidence he encountered very similar con- 
 ditions for their exercise. Both found the affairs of 
 south-eastern Europe disturbed by Turkish misrule, by 
 
284 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. 
 
 Eussian intrigue, and by the aspirations for liberty of 
 the Porte's Christian subjects. Both took the helm of 
 the State from the hands of men who had made them- 
 selves intensely unpopular by neglecting the best 
 national traditions of Englishmen ; and in each case 
 it was necessary to reverse this antecedent policy, and 
 to give satisfaction to the public mind by revindicating 
 the right of the people to speak the last word in foreign 
 as in home politics. Canning's system of diplomacy 
 and international engagements was sharply contrasted 
 with that of Lord Castlereagh ; the incompatibility of 
 their temper and modes of thought had made their 
 presence in the same Cabinet almost an impossibility; and 
 nothing could have been more welcome to the country 
 than the substitution of the commoner for the peer in the 
 direction of its foreign policy. In circumstances not 
 dissimilar, Mr Gladstone succeeded Lord Beaconsfield 
 in 1880. 
 
 The great services rendered by these two statesmen to 
 the Greeks, and to other oppressed nationalities in various 
 parts of the world, their coolness in dealing with ground- 
 less panics, their vehemence in denouncing artificial 
 panics, and their success in establishing England's 
 foreign relations on a basis of justice and dignity, com- 
 plete a somewhat remarkable parallel, which it may be 
 worth the historian's while to elaborate. 
 
XII. 
 
 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 
 
 It is sometimes contended (as already said a few pages 
 back) that the democracy, as such, can have no distinct 
 foreign policy, in as much as it is bent on popular 
 progress, material and social, and its natural aims are 
 limited to domestic concerns and ameliorations. 
 
 When Mr Gladstone was raised to power in 1880, 
 some of his most ardent followers looked with consider- 
 able jealousy on the efforts which he put forth in the 
 interests of the Greeks and Montenegrins. They urged 
 that it was the special business of a popular Minister to 
 devote himself to the internal affairs of the country, to 
 political reform, to retrenchment, to peaceful constitu- 
 tional development, to legislation in the interests of the 
 community. They were especially anxious as to the 
 results which might follow from the establishment of the 
 European concert, on the ground that it might lead us 
 into new complications, aggravate old quarrels, commit 
 us to fresh responsibilities, and even plunge us into war. 
 It behoved us, they said, to mind our own business, to 
 set our own house in order, and leave to others the solu- 
 tion of international disputes when our standing as a 
 free commercial nation was not clearly involved. 
 
 Very few, it may be, of the politicians who took this 
 line of argument were wholly out of sympathy with the 
 desire of their leaders to reverse the foreign policy of 
 Lord Beaconsheld's Government, even if the reversal 
 
286 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 
 
 should go so far as to necessitate the bringing of diplo- 
 matic pressure to bear upon the Porte. Their desire 
 was to withdraw from the enterprises and questionable 
 engagements of the English imperialists, for the very 
 reason that these imperialists had transgressed the 
 bounds of a safe and sober policy, and had interrupted 
 the course of sound national development. They wished 
 the Continental Powers to be assured at once that the 
 country had repudiated the method of disturbance and 
 intrigue, and that it had returned to the methods of 
 steady industrial progress ; and they had been suffi- 
 ciently convinced by facts to believe that the constraint 
 of the Porte was necessary before Europe could re-enter 
 upon its peaceful path. But they could not contemplate 
 any course which even remotely threatened to entangle 
 us in a network of intrigue, and to divert our attention 
 from the home concerns which had latterly been so 
 much neglected. 
 
 These sentiments were natural, and thoroughly worthy 
 of respect. The nation had been led away from its 
 domestic pursuits, and sickened by a succession of pro- 
 jects, adventures, speculations, and disasters, until at 
 length there was no aspiration more entirely predomin- 
 ant in the minds of the majority of Englishmen than 
 the aspiration to return to a commonplace and unambi- 
 tious programme of action. Many reforms, more or less 
 urgent, stood over from the sessions which had passed ; 
 and if the Conservatives had remained in power they 
 would probably have stood over for years to come. 
 These the nation wished to see accomplished; and above 
 all there was a growing intensity of desire to legislate in 
 a drastic manner for the remedy of Irish grievances. 
 It was comprehended on all hands that Mr Gladstone 
 was the statesman most likely to achieve these objects, 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 287 
 
 and there was thus a forcible reason for replacing him 
 in office, over and above the reason derived from his 
 bold condemnation of Lord Beaconsfield's foreign policy. 
 Now there can be no question that the democratic 
 opinion here indicated was both general amongst all 
 classes of democrats and in accordance with the natural 
 instincts of the people. But in some quarters it seems 
 to have been carried to an extreme. Undue stress was 
 laid upon the urgency of particular domestic reforms, and 
 less than due weight was given to the importance of the 
 problems of foreign policy which had been left unsolved 
 by the former Government. And the misapprehension 
 is one by no means uncommon amongst democratic 
 writers and thinkers of a certain school of thought. They 
 are apt to forget that there can be no regular domestic 
 progress so long as the country has unfulfilled pledges or 
 engagements abroad, and assuredly none so long as the 
 public mind is disturbed by a feeling that the honour of 
 the nation has been brought into question by its Minis- 
 ters. Both these conditions existed in 1880, and it was 
 inevitable that a very strong current of opinion in regard 
 to external aSairs should pass over all ranks of society, 
 and should for a time overwhelm, or threaten to over- 
 whelm, matters of purely domestic concern. It was 
 evident to the great majority that the best and speediest 
 way of making progress with the general interests of the 
 country was to arrange as peacefully as possible the diffi- 
 culties of the moment. This was at any rate the neces- 
 sary initial step, however unwelcome its necessity may 
 have been. Without it there could be no restoration of 
 industry and security, and the problems which had been 
 shirked and avoided would have forced themselves upon 
 the Ministry with fatal pertinacity. The policy of the 
 Government in 1880 was in short a policy not merely of 
 
288 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 
 
 peace but also of popular advancement and reform ; and 
 as such it was indisputably a foreign policy which the 
 leader of a democratic people might fairly and serviceably 
 adopt. 
 
 It cannot however be seriously contended that the 
 English people, as its democratic character expands and 
 strengthens, will ever be able to dispense with an active 
 system of policy in regard to foreign affairs. The nation 
 may grow more industrial in its habits and aspirations ; 
 it may attach greater importance to internal develop- 
 ment, to legislative reform and social emancipations, but 
 it can never be relieved from the respoDsibility of guard- 
 ing its interests beyond the seas, and of dealing with the 
 complications thrust upon it by other countries or by its 
 public servants. Nor does it seem likely that any but a 
 small minority would either expect or wish that it could 
 isolate itself within its own borders. The utmost that 
 can be looked for is that the causes and inducements of 
 trouble beyond the seas may be contracted within a nar- 
 row compass, that the need for intrigue and the risk of 
 war may be diminished in every possible way, and that 
 the system adopted by our statesmen may be of such a 
 character as to reduce the dangers of the State to a 
 minimum. 
 
 The party traditions of foreign policy, and to some 
 extent the general tradition of the country which has 
 been kept distinct from party, have served their turn 
 more or less successfully in the past. Their achievement 
 has been to convert the small island of England into a 
 mighty empire, to make her authority respected through- 
 out the world, to win for her renown as an enterprising, 
 energetic and victorious nation, as a nation of hardy adven- 
 turers, of persevering colonists, of indomitable fighters, to 
 build up her imperial dominions on a foundation of in- 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 289 
 
 flexible strength and impartial law — to extend, to increase, 
 to overbear, to predominate over all other peoples, if not 
 in war yet in industry and commerce and wealth. It is 
 to the wielders of the old traditions that we owe very 
 mnch of what we have and are at this moment. They 
 were themselves the outcome and product of the national 
 growth, and they conducted our aflfairs in successive ages 
 as the genius of their race and nation inspired them. 
 They may have lacked origination and moral courage, 
 but still they have earned the gratitude of all generations 
 by the vast and incomparable results of their efforts. 
 There have been mistakes, there have been wrong methods 
 and inexcusable acts in the construction of ouj edifice of 
 empire. It may be that some of these mistakes will yet be 
 remedied, and that for some of these inexcusable acts 
 England may yet find means to make a noble restitution. 
 But the dominion which has come down to us from our 
 ancestors is an inheritance and a charge which ought not 
 to be lightly esteemed by any man of English descent 
 or nationality, and which must not be allowed to 
 deteriorate in the hands of a democratic people or 
 Government. 
 
 It is no doubt a very serious question — whether the 
 democracy is capable of sustaining the weight of empire 
 which must presently fall (if it has not already fallen) 
 upon its shoulders. Serious at any rate this question 
 must be for such as have no faith in the wisdom or 
 competence of the English people at large — for such as 
 believe that competent Ministers and patriotic resolution 
 are to be looked for only amongst the traditional ruling 
 classes, or amongst the middle classes whose political 
 emancipation dates fifty years back instead of ten or 
 
 T 
 
290 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY, 
 
 twelve. For those who have more confidence in the 
 general good sense and capability of their countrymen, 
 and who believe that the simple possession of a vote 
 gives to every enfracchised Englishman the knowledge 
 and the inspiration necessary for its intelligent use, the 
 prospect is by no means so dark. And if, instead of 
 taking alarm at the very name of democracy, and 
 concludinof that it must be in its nature inimical to ideas 
 of imperial sway and statesmanlike government, the 
 timid forecasters of the future of England would con- 
 sider all that is reassuring and hopeful, as well as that 
 which gives them cause for anxiety, it is possible that 
 they might with no long delay gain confidence from the 
 consideration. 
 
 The word '' democracy " has been used in various 
 senses, and indeed its true meaning differs from age to 
 age or from year to year in accordance with the condi- 
 tion of the people themselves. The English democracy, 
 it is needless to say, is not to be identified simply with 
 the lower categories of Parliamentary voters, correspond- 
 ing for instance with the householders and lodgers 
 admitted to the franchise in 1867. No doubt these 
 categories are, broadly speaking, the bulk of what we 
 generally understand to be implied in the term ; but the 
 democratic elements of society are in no way limited to 
 them. 
 
 In the first place, we shall encounter in every rank, 
 from the aristocracy downwards, men who on political 
 grounds elect to be classed with the democracy — who 
 will conscientiously use the words of the French noble, 
 and say, " s'il faut choisir, je suis du peuple." Mid- 
 way in the social classification there are of course many 
 thousands of pure democrats — men and women whose 
 easy circumstances, or education, or refinement of mind 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 291 
 
 and life, cannot deprive them of the instincts and aspira- 
 tions which more than poverty or humble station give 
 them a claim to the title which they aifect. Lower than 
 the lowest of the men who are yet enfranchised come the 
 hundreds of thousands to whom the vote has been 
 virtually promised — the agricultural labourers, and other 
 smaller categories in borough and county constituencies 
 who are likely to profit by the next Reform Act. Beyond 
 these again are the many thousands, more or less intelli- 
 gent, who are waiting for their qualification, or who fail 
 to acquire it because they constantly move from place to 
 place, or who lose it by the occasional acceptance of 
 poor-relief, or who are so low down in the scale as to be 
 untouched by the Act of 1867. All these can think, 
 and endure, and aspire, and complain : their voices are 
 heard in the streets and their hands are lifted round the 
 platforms of public speakers : they count at the polls 
 of popular assemblies and they sit on the self- constituted 
 juries of popular opinion. Their will is often as power- 
 ful, their impulses as generous, their understanding as 
 direct and shrewd as those of their emancipated 
 fellow-citizens. One and all, from lord to pauper, they 
 swell the ranks of the democracy, and make it beyond 
 all question and cavil the preponderating and over- 
 whelming *' mass " of the community. 
 
 Not a party, nor a section, but rather (by way of 
 distinction) the People itself. For this democracy, 
 including as it does, numerically, perhaps seven-eighths 
 or nine-tenths of the population of Great Britain, and 
 represented as it is, intellectually, by so many speakers 
 and writers of the highest rank, and by so large a 
 proportion of what we call the organs of public opinion, 
 comprises within itself, in addition to its share of the 
 capital and commerce and territorial influence of the 
 
292 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY, 
 
 country, the great interest of labour as a whole, the 
 excess of political energy which is due to the need and 
 demand for reform, the power of discipline and organisa- 
 tion which always resides with a well-directed multitude, 
 the impetus and prestige of success, which are sure to 
 belong to the rising classes in a country where so much 
 remains to be won for the lower orders. Set on one side 
 the sections of the aristocracy, the plutocracy, and one 
 or two others easy to be numbered however numerous, 
 and eliminate all of every class who from motives more 
 or less respectable prefer to cast their votes with these, 
 the remainder are not simply the vast majority of the 
 people, but in a very real sense they are the actual people. 
 The power of the English democracy, its political 
 significance, its ability under existing conditions to 
 make its will prevail in the councils of the nation, have 
 received in our own days many notable proofs. It was 
 popular opinion, the opinion of men who could not vote 
 as well as the opinion of those who could, which practi- 
 cally won the battle of Free Trade, and many minor 
 strugo;les of domestic policy — the Reform Act of 1867 
 included — between that time and the present. It was 
 popular opinion which saved us from war on more than 
 one occasion, during the last two Administrations of 
 Palmerston, and the last of Lord Beaconsfield. It was 
 popular opinion which sanctioned and made possible 
 the disestablishment of the Irish Church, and the Land 
 Acts of 1870 and 1881. Yet more apposite to our 
 present inquiry, it was the force of popular opinion 
 which arrested the great imperialist revival of 1876-80,. 
 which repudiated a foreign policy whose displays of 
 glory had no attractions for the hard-working, tax-pay- 
 ing multitudes, however much they may have flattered 
 some of the less responsible sections of the democracy. 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 295 
 
 That there is danger also in the authority thus unmis- 
 takably wielded by the masses must not be overlooked. 
 A mob misled may exert a pernicious influence upon the 
 Government of a free country ; and such an influence 
 has been exerted in England at least once or twice in 
 our generation. But experience such as that which was 
 gained in the crisis of 1880 serves to show us that the 
 best safeguard against the ignorance or passion, the 
 feebleness or the fickleness of the residuum is secured by 
 conferring the Parliamentary vote as rapidly and widely 
 as possible. The dignity of the franchise, and the poli- 
 tical education which is its necessary complement, 
 increase our guarantee of wise and prudent action in 
 the mass of the people. The danger, moreover, is 
 diminished in proportion as the humblest classes of the 
 community, voters and non-voters, acquire the skill and 
 the habit of reading ; for they are in this way brought 
 to a great extent under the guidance of journalists, 
 pamphleteers, and the whole school of writers for the 
 public press, whose influence, directed and moderated 
 by the conditions under which they themselves labour in 
 their high vocation, is in general more beneficent and 
 efl'ectual than the influence of platform orators and party 
 agents. 
 
 Against the peril of democratic or pseudo -democratic 
 passion, and the further peril of ignorant and unsound 
 judgments on questions of foreign policy, must be set 
 the often-attested danger of committing our public 
 affairs to the discretion of monarchs, hereditary rulers, 
 and the representatives of privileged classes. If the 
 country cannot hope to be placed beyond the reach of 
 danger in one shape or the other, and if something must be 
 entrusted to the fallibility of human guidance, it seems 
 better — the spirit of the age declares it to be better — to 
 
294 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 
 
 give the interests of the State into the hands of the 
 aggregate of individuals composing the State. Under 
 our old systems we have had wars undertaken for the 
 desperate and selfish purpose of establishing a dynasty, 
 or of avoiding a revolution. We have had wars for the 
 equally desperate and cynical purpose of gratifying the 
 pride, the resentment, the obstinate will, or the over- 
 weening: intriOTes of statesmen. We have had wars 
 undertaken most unjustifiably for the arrest of national 
 developments, for the support of oppressive monarchs 
 against their subjects, for the promotion of the objects 
 of a party, from motives of aggression, whether national 
 or commercial or imperial. Some such wars, it may be, 
 would be waged by a pure democracy, and certainly 
 there would be a peril of such wars under an imperfect 
 democracy. But it is fair to conclude, from historic 
 experience and theoretic deduction, that a democratic 
 form of government, based upon popular representative 
 institutions of the most liberal kind — with, for a time, 
 the inevitable derogation of traditional systems and 
 official precedents — would render us more free from war 
 and not less assured against disaster than we have been 
 at any period of our national development. 
 
 What is to be the system of foreign policy which will 
 be found most suitable and serviceable to the English 
 democracy? What is there that we must abandon, and 
 what is there that we must adopt, in order to accommodate 
 our national traditions to the need of the future ? 
 
 These are questions which may be usefully put, and to 
 which every suggested reply may bring its contribution 
 of enlightenment, but which could not be fully answered 
 without assumption and dogmatism. It may be worth 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 295 
 
 while to review some of the principal solutions of the 
 problem which have been proposed bj statesmen and 
 public writers. 
 
 In the first place it will perhaps be admitted as beyond 
 dispute that, with the increase of democratic origination 
 in the councils of the State, the tendency of diplomacy 
 will be more and more towards openness, transparency, 
 and publicity. Of course the old craft of diplomacy — 
 the subtle, overreaching, lying craft which they brought 
 to perfection in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
 — is already virtually dead. The diplomacy of our own 
 times is more simple and honest. There are indeed still 
 varieties and degrees of the craft ; but there is nothing in 
 the current tradition of English diplomacy which requires 
 a representative of our court abroad to adopt an untruth- 
 ful or underhand method. On the contrary, the best 
 models are marked by straightforwardness, and the most 
 honoured precepts are those which commend a frank and 
 open bearing. The late Lord Clarendon, examined shortly 
 before his death by a Select Committee on the Diplo- 
 matic Service, gave it as his opinion that if any special 
 art were required in diplomacy it was *' to be perfectly 
 honest, truthful, and straightforward." 
 
 It is impossible to doubt, after a review of such facts 
 as have been dealt with in the foregoing pages, that few 
 influences have been more powerful in bringing back the 
 formal intercourse of European Governments from the 
 underhand to the above-board style of diplomacy than 
 the character of English statesmanship, and of the English 
 Ministers who have conducted the affairs of their country 
 at the continental courts. The national temperament 
 was less suited to the subtle and more or less dishonest 
 modes evolved by Spanish and Italian diplomatists, or 
 by schools of diplomacy such as that of Strasburg, 
 
296 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY, 
 
 wherein Metternich imbibed his earliest lessons, than it 
 was to blunt and downright modes of its own ; and as 
 English policy, backed by English ships and resources, 
 was often found to prevail over the more elaborate diplo- 
 macy and the vaster armaments of other Powers, it was 
 only natural that the quality of our statesmanship should 
 secure respect, not to say imitation from our allies. 
 
 There is no need to claim sjDecial credit for our influ- 
 ence over the diplomacy of Europe ; and indeed it may 
 be admitted that the chief agent in purifying and simpli- 
 fying the diplomatic art has been the greater publicity of 
 the conditions under which it has been practised. The 
 distance between capital and capital has been diminished 
 by railway and telegraph ; despatch follows despatch 
 with greater rapidity; the results of negotiation are more 
 quickly reached ; the various steps in the process are 
 either allowed to become public before the process is at 
 an end or are made common property after a much 
 shorter interval than was formerly the case. Something 
 may be lost by this publicity. It limits the confidences 
 exchanged between ambassadors ; it cuts them off from 
 sources of information which might otherwise be open to 
 them ; and it occasionally leads to offence or annoyance 
 on the part of a Government or a court. But on the 
 whole its advantage considerably outweighs its draw- 
 backs. It is a powerful incentive to honesty of purpose 
 and method, rendering falsehood difficult and duplicity 
 hazardous.- The mighty force of public opinion is almost 
 as effectual in the councils of Europe as in the councils 
 of individual States, and within recent times it has been 
 known to untie or cut a knot over which mere diplomacy 
 might have laboured in vain. 
 
 We are not to conclude that the art is decaying, or its 
 necessity passing away, because it is accommodating 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 297 
 
 itself to a new order of things. Diplomacy in the sense 
 of a discussion by statesmen of international questions 
 must always be indispensable ; and some diplomatists 
 will be more skilful than 'others ; and the rivalry of 
 individual Ministers is not likely to be less keen as the 
 resort to war becomes more and more rare. But to 
 everything that is not perfectly just and straightforward 
 the democracy of our age is instinctively opposed ; and 
 thus only the reality, and nothing of the ceremonial of 
 diplomacy can be expected to survive or to be restored. 
 At any rate for England in the future — an England of 
 democratic government, a commercial empire bent on 
 consolidation as opposed to aggression, and on indus- 
 trial rather than imperial development — the sphere of 
 diplomacy is likely to be contracted within the narrowest 
 possible circumference. As we cannot dispense with 
 resident ministers at foreign capitals, we may be 
 content to limit their action to what is absolutely 
 unavoidable. As time goes on, and as the will of the 
 democracy more and more predominates, it will doubt- 
 less feel itself entitled to demand that an English 
 minister shall be regarded first and foremost as our 
 chief business agent in the country to which he is 
 accredited. It will probably require that diplomacy 
 shall be made less of a profession, that the area of 
 selection for ambassadors and embassy officials shall be 
 much wider, that changes in their appointment shall be 
 more frequent, and that officious action on the part of 
 our representatives shall be discouraged, forbidden, and 
 guarded against. 
 
 It is manifest that the diplomatic system, of a demo- 
 cracy must approximate more nearly to the model of the 
 United States than to that of any of the European 
 Powers ; and there is no modification which ought to be 
 
298 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY, 
 
 attempted with greater zeal by a people anxious to 
 minimise the dangers to which all peoples must be 
 subjected. In the diplomacy of our own time and 
 country, as Professor Bernard writes,* there is a special 
 risk " that native habits of thought and feeling may be 
 quite worn away in one whose whole life from youth to 
 age is spent in foreign courts, and further that foolish 
 rivalries and jealousies may be kept alive (as at certain 
 European capitals they have been) by the mere force of 
 tradition and habit between nations whose agents have 
 been used to regard themselves as employed to watch 
 and counteract each other." 
 
 How much have we not been called upon to pay for 
 the maintenance of the mere traditions of the Constan- 
 tinople embassy — apart from the absolute needs and 
 value of that embassy ! 
 
 The right conclusion seems to be that up to a certain 
 point diplomacy will always be a necessity ; that its 
 domain ought to be and must be made distinctly narrow ; 
 and that every license of our diplomatists beyond their 
 assigned narrow limits can tend only to danger and 
 mischief. 
 
 What then are to be the limits ? Can they be 
 defined ? If we must have a system which can be 
 described and taught, within what lines is it to be con- 
 structed ? In other terms, what are the interests which 
 our Foreign Ministers are imperatively required to 
 guard, and in defence of which it is absolutely necessary 
 for us to maintain our representatives across the seas ? 
 
 There is a sense in which England is more bound than 
 any other country in the world to keep watch and ward 
 
 * Four Ledurfis on Subjects connected with Diplomacy. Lect. 3. 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 299 
 
 over its interests. We have frontiers in every latitude 
 and longitude. Our fleets crowd every sea, and carry 
 English merchants to every shore. We are not the 
 mere island which we used to be, hardly more than a 
 century ago. We have an empire on our hands such as 
 no nation ever had before, and no nation is likely to 
 have again. We must administer this empire whether 
 we would or no ; and in order to do so we must send 
 our deputies to every square of the cadastral chart. It 
 is not for us to consider whether we will have a system 
 of foreign policy or not, whether we will have a 
 diplomacy or not, whether we will be imperial in our 
 modes of government or simply insular and exclusive. 
 All that we can do is to assign limits to our methods of 
 rule, to multiply precautions against the perils that 
 environ us, and (if we see fit) to resolve that our burden 
 of empire is already sufficiently heavy without adding 
 to it by a featherweight of responsibility. 
 
 For our colonies we have colonial governments ; and 
 the wisdom of our legislators in the l^st generation has 
 made the links that bind them to us so light and supple 
 that the Colonial Office rarely needs the aid of the War 
 Office or the Admiralty to strengthen its authority in 
 the most distant climes. The colonies of England are 
 so strong, and their relations with the mother country 
 are as a rule so firm and amicable, that we are almost 
 relieved of anxiety in respect of them. Justice is a 
 sceptre which suffices to maintain our sway over the 
 vast dominions of Canada, of Australia and New Zealand, 
 of South Africa, of the West Indies and the scattered 
 island settlements which Englishmen have made their 
 homes. If they chose to leave us we could scarcely 
 prevent them. If they were attacked by our enemies 
 no English fleet or army could be more eflectual in theii- 
 
300 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 
 
 defence than their own internal resources. It is more 
 necessary that we should secure the moral than the 
 physical bonds which unite them to the empire ; and it 
 is not in regard to them that a just English Government 
 need keep its vigils and nurse its anxieties. 
 
 But we have dependencies which we hold on other 
 terms, and which own our authority in another spirit. 
 The fruits of concjuest and treaty belong to us by a title 
 altogether different from the title of colonisation. It may 
 not be so trivial or so mischievous as some men think it 
 to inquire into the legitimacy of our title-deeds to these 
 dependencies, or into the justice or advantage of their 
 retention ; but such inquiries need not be raised in the 
 present place. We have duties and obligations dating 
 from actual possession, and what we have to consider 
 — what the English democracy will more and more 
 anxiously consider — is the basis of government and 
 defence on which our foreign dependencies are to be 
 held in the future. 
 
 One thing only need be said in respect of our title to 
 possession, and it is this. No question of credit or pres- 
 tige seems to be necessarily involved in the maintenance 
 of a subject territory or island. There may be conside- 
 rations of policy, of sentiment, of commercial advantage, 
 of acquired duties towards the subjected inhabitants, of 
 danger from other countries in the event of a particular 
 de]3endency passing from our hands to theirs, which 
 would forbid us to dream of surrendering any of the ter- 
 ritories now dependent upon us. But if these considera- 
 tions had no weight, we should forfeit neither credit nor 
 prestige by abandoning them. If it seemed good to us 
 to divest ourselves of the responsibility — if it would not 
 hurt us, but on the contrary benefit and relieve us — to 
 cut adrift a rabbit-warren in the North Sea, or a rock in 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 301 
 
 the Mediterranean, or a continent in Asia, we mio^lit do 
 this without misgiving as to our honour and repute. 
 England is not so weak as to fall to the ground even for 
 the loss of India — especially since it is extravagant to 
 suppose that India could ever in that case be brought into 
 subjection to any other European Power. And England 
 is not so low in the esteem of the world that an act of 
 national emancipation, however great and unprecedented, 
 could do her dishonour. 
 
 But the question has not arisen, and may never arise. 
 No party at the present moment — probably not a dozen 
 members of Parliament as now constituted — would listen 
 to any proposal for the gradual retrocession of India to 
 the native princes, with the contemplated result of our 
 ultimate withdrawal from the country. And it is by no 
 means to be concluded that if the democracy had control 
 of the Government — if the Cabinet were purely demo- 
 cratic, and were supported by a large majority in the 
 House of Commons — it would be disposed to abandon 
 either India or any other of our possessions abroad. The 
 utmost that appears likely to be attempted is to place 
 India on the footing of a federal colony, with more or 
 less of self-government, and with such guarantees as it 
 may be possible to take against the chance of a repudia- 
 tion of our suzerainty. Even this is chimerical : the 
 proposal may never be seriously made or entertained, at 
 any rate in the present century, or under the existing 
 conditions of our political ideas. But it is not unfair to 
 conclude that this would be the limit of danger in 
 regard to India. An English democracy would cer- 
 tainly not be in haste to give up anything which was of 
 manifest value to the country, nor would it — ^judging 
 by indications which are already plain for all of us to 
 understand — throw a vast country into anarchy and 
 
302 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 
 
 relative barbarism to which we have contracted so many 
 obUgations of duty. It might desire to federate, to eman- 
 cipate by gradual steps, to bind the country to us by 
 moral and commercial bonds stronger even than a mili- 
 tary occupation. But it will never desire to cut off from 
 our dominion this great dependency in Asia, which has 
 quite as much to gain from our good government as we 
 have to gain from its revenues.* 
 
 * Perhaps the view most widely entertained by English democrats 
 on the subject of India is one which Mr Bright propounded in the 
 House of Commons a quarter of a century ago (1858), shortly after the 
 great rebellion. *' How long," Mr Bright asked, " does England pro- 
 pose to govern India ] Nobody answers that question, and nobody 
 can answer it. Be it 50, or 100, or 500 years, does any man with the 
 smallest glimmering of common sense believe that so great a country, 
 with its twenty different nations and its twenty languages, can ever be 
 bound up and consolidated into one compact and enduring empire 1 I 
 believe such a thing to be utterly impossible. We must fail in the 
 attempt if ever we make it, and we are bound to look into the future 
 with reference to that point. The Presidency of Madras, for instance, 
 having its own Government, would in fifty years become one compact 
 State, and every part of the Presidency would look to the city of 
 Madras as its capital, and to the Government of Madras as its ruling 
 power. If that were to go on for a century or more, there would be 
 live or six Presidencies of India built up into somany compact States; 
 and if at any future period the sovereignty of England should be 
 withdrawn, we should leave so many Presidencies built up and iirmly 
 compacted together, each able to support its own independence and its 
 own Government, and we should be able to say we had not left the 
 country a prey to that anarchy and discord which I believe to be in- 
 evitable if we insist on holding those vast territories with the idea of 
 building them up into one great empire. But I am obliged to admit 
 that mere machinery is not sufficient in this case. . . . We want 
 something else than mere clerks, stationery, despatches, and so forth. 
 We want what I shall designate as a new feeling in England, and 
 an entirely new policy in India. We must in future have India 
 governed, not for a handful of Englishmen, not for that Civil Service 
 whose praises are so constantly sounded in this House. You may 
 govern India, if you like, for the good of England, but the good of 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 303 
 
 If in the opinion of statesmen and in the conviction 
 of English public opinion it is ever practicable to federate 
 India as Mr Bright suggests in the passage just cited — 
 if ever, thanks to the steady and law-abiding rule of the 
 country by Englishmen in past times, it is possible to 
 give a large measure of self-government to the Indian 
 races, leaving them in a condition of secure self-reliance, 
 and yet retaining a close commercial and imperial con- 
 nection with them — an enormous burden will be taken 
 off our shoulders, and an incalculable relief will be 
 ejffected in our general system of administration. This, 
 in fact, will be a great temptation of the democracy so 
 soon as it enters on the unfettered exercise of political 
 power — as it is even now a more or less distinct aspira- 
 tion of perhaps a majority of English voters. 
 
 On the whole it would seem that the load of respon- 
 sibility cast upon our diplomatists in regard to the main- 
 tenance of our possessions abroad cannot be lightly 
 thrown off, or even much diminished ; whilst on the 
 other hand the tendency of the day, and the especial 
 tendency of the masses of the population, is to seize 
 every opportunity of lightening the load, and circum- 
 scribing the action of our officials beyond the seas. The 
 sense in which the English democracy is likely in the 
 future to appreciate the value of a skilful diplomacy, and 
 to cherish the service as indispensable to its welfare, is the 
 sense that was expressed in an answer of Lord Odo 
 
 England must come through the channels of the good of India. There 
 are but two modes of gaining anything by our connection with India. 
 The one is by plundering the people of India, and the other by trad- 
 ing with them. I prefer to do it by trading with them. But in order 
 that England may become rich by trading with India, India itself must 
 become rich, and India can only become rich through the honest admi- 
 nistration of justice, and through entire security of life .and property." 
 
304 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. 
 
 Russell before the Select Committee on the Diplomatic 
 Service referred to a few pages back, when he declared 
 his opinion that diplomacy would become one of our 
 most powerful instruments for the promotion of peace 
 and good relations between different States. "At the 
 present moment," said Lord Odo Russell, '^we look to 
 armies to establish peace and goodwill among Christians, 
 but I am sure diplomacy will be a better engine when 
 properly developed and organized. The more feelers you 
 have all over the civilized world, the better informed you 
 are, and the more influence you can exercise ; and I 
 think that through an organization of that kind you are 
 more likely to establish peace and goodwill among Chris- 
 tians than you are through armies." 
 
 The democracy, once fairly in power, will not be so 
 foolish (for the democracy in power means a widely 
 educated and experienced public opinion) as to reject 
 any serviceable instrument of good government. It will 
 simply claim the right to decide for itself what shall be 
 the development and organization of our diplomatic 
 methods. 
 
 Within the limits above indicated — after all possible 
 provisions have been made for controlling the action of 
 officials, diminishing the needless responsibilities and 
 costs of empire, and rendering war as near as may be 
 obsolete as a mode of settling international disputes — it 
 will clearly be the interest of a free and industrial 
 country like England to throw its full strength into the 
 system of arrangements by which its trade with other 
 nations, and the immunity of its citizens in foreign lands 
 and seas, are guaranteed and protected. These arrange- 
 ments must include, of course, diplomatic representa- 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY, 305 
 
 tives at foreign capitals, commercial representatives at 
 the great centres of industry throughout the world, 
 governors and officials in our possessions abroad — prac- 
 tically, in short, the very organization which we have 
 already set on foot. Only, in retaining this organiza- 
 tion, and in throwing our whole strength into it, it will 
 behove us to see first that on the frontiers of the empire 
 no superfluous officials, or officious persons, are busy in 
 carrying out their special ideas as to the further develop- 
 ment of our dominions, and secondly, that this vast 
 machinery of government is not employed for any pur- 
 pose except in the protection of our commerce and the 
 guarantee of personal immunity to Englishmen abroad. 
 
 It will be said that this is the actual theory of our 
 imperial organisation at the present time — that the State 
 as a State knows nothing of aggressions, or of the con- 
 struction of scientific frontiers — that English troops in 
 our colonies and dependencies, and English vessels in 
 various seas and harbours, are solely for the defence of 
 English persons and property — and that accumulated 
 experience has brought us gradually and deliberately to 
 the existing arrangements. In other words it may be 
 contended, and is often contended, that as we are in 
 many respects already a democratic country, governed 
 by democratic methods — writing, thinking, and speaking 
 the language of democracy — so in regard to our foreign 
 policy we have at this moment a system and an organiza- 
 tion precisely suitable (at any rate in theory) for our 
 popular character and needs. " The democracy widens,'' 
 it might be urged, '' and advances, and grows stronger 
 year by year. The statesmen of the day understand it, 
 and are content to guide it, without seeking to subject it 
 again. All that is wanted is that a progressive nation 
 shall continue to expand and develop its system of policy 
 
 u 
 
306 DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY, 
 
 as it develops itself, and as the necessity of the moment 
 may require/' 
 
 There is so much force in these remarks as to render 
 them in one sense truisms. But it is a pertinent ques- 
 tion to ask whether we have no alternative except to wait 
 on the slow process of natural development — and, if we 
 have, whether it would not be well for us to adopt the 
 alternative. It is true enough that the national English 
 policy — the policy of the past fifty or sixty years, let us 
 say — has been on the whole progressive, and has been 
 carried forward with tolerable regularity by our Prime 
 Ministers and Foreign Secretaries, whichever party may 
 have been in office. It is true that the deflections from 
 this policy have been due to men of both parties, and not 
 exclusively to the party which is responsible for the great 
 relapse of 1876. This also cannot be denied; but since 
 deflections and relapses are so frequent, and even since 
 they are possible, may we not conclude that a really potent 
 democracy — a people arrived at full age, in possession of 
 its patrimony, and thoroughly responsible to itself for 
 its acts and resolutions — would be competent to hasten 
 its political evolution instead of too patiently waiting for 
 it, and to perfect at once its system of policy instead of 
 merely adapting old methods to new circumstances as 
 occasion seems to demand 1 
 
 It is possible that the theory of " natural develop- 
 ment " as applied to political institutions may be scarcely 
 less fallacious than the theory of the "natural enemy." 
 At all events it is indisputably true that, so soon as the 
 people in general are convinced that this or that amend- 
 ment of our system would be advantageous to the coun- 
 try, the natural course and the wise development will 
 consist in immediately adopting this amendment, instead 
 of waiting until a new emergency has made its adoption 
 
DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY. ' 307 
 
 either more easy or more difficult. No doubt our greatest 
 dangers spring from the fact that we cannot in the present 
 condition of parties receive a guarantee that our national 
 policy at its best shall always be respected and carried 
 out by the Government of the day. But there are other 
 and independent dangers arising out of our actual system 
 of policy and diplomacy. Against the first class of 
 dangers the democracy cannot hope to be secure until it 
 wields the sceptre of real power (that is, as above said, 
 until the general public opinion is thoroughly educated 
 and experienced). Against the second class of dangers it 
 is possible that the imperfect and unorganised democracy 
 of the present day should take measures to guard itself 
 
 To perfect our system and to ensure its faithful obser- 
 vance are, therefore, the great and yet the practicable 
 requirements without which we cannot hope to establish 
 our foreign policy on a basis at once firm and endurable. 
 We may expect to find that this policy is constantly and 
 undeviatingly observed by our Ministers whensoever those 
 Ministers are the direct representatives of an experienced 
 and educated nation — when the English democracy is 
 wisely and completely organised, and when its authority 
 over its public servants is immediate and undisputed. 
 In the meantime the problems which (confront us in re- 
 spect of our national foreign policy are neither remote 
 nor impossible for us to solve. They are amongst the 
 most interesting and critical problems of the day, and . 
 they may be taken in hand even by the existing consti- 
 tuencies with a reasonable hope of solution. 
 
XIII. 
 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 Of the two great facts on which the English system of 
 foreign policy now rests, and on which it must yet more 
 broadly and firmly rest in the future, the one may be 
 deduced from our national history, whilst the other can 
 be inferred from our national character and condition. 
 
 (1.) As a free people we have staunchly maintained the 
 principles of freedom throughout the world, admitting 
 (in theory) the right of all other nations to be as free as 
 we are ourselves. And as a people who have gained 
 freedom by methods more or less revolutionary, we have 
 frequently asserted the right of other peoples to decide 
 under what form of government they will live. 
 
 (2.) As a commercial nation, having become wealthy 
 and powerful by industry, which has given us vast re- 
 sources of strength, and enabled us to overcome enemies 
 superior to us in a military sense, we still retain our in- 
 dustrial habits and our commercial instincts, and make 
 the interests of commerce and industry a chief object and 
 consideration of our policy. 
 
 These are the two great planks of our national plat- 
 form. If any other principles, apparently distinct, may 
 be enumerated amongst the leading principles of our 
 system, they will probably be found to fall under one or 
 other of the two above cited.'"" Freedom and sympathy 
 
 * In a speech at West Calcler, in November 1879, Mr Gladstone 
 tated the principles on which our policy should be based in the fol- 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 309 
 
 with freedom — wealth and the promotion of commercial 
 interests : it is on this foundation that our ancestors 
 have built, and that we may be satisfied to consolidate 
 their edifice. 
 
 Now in order to guard and perpetuate these acquired 
 possessions of freedom and prosperity it is necessary 
 that the State should surround itself with guarantees 
 of their enjoyment. And of these guarantees the most 
 effectual is the continued maintenance of peace. The 
 nation that most steadily and constantly adheres to a 
 peaceful policy, whose wars are least frequent and whose 
 expenditure on military and naval armaments is propor- 
 tionately the lowest, will clearly prosper most in the pur- 
 lowing terms. (The second column imderneath will indicate how Mr 
 Gladstone's six principles may be included in the broader classifica- 
 tion.) 
 
 ** 1. That we should foster the 
 the Empire by just legislation 
 
 strength 
 of the Empire by just legislation and by 
 economy at home, thereby producing two great 
 elements of national power, viz. , wealth which is 
 the physical element, and union and contentment 
 which are moral elements, and that we should re- 
 serve the strength of the Empire for great and 
 worthy occasions. 
 
 2. That we should do our utmost to preserve 
 the peace of the world. 
 
 3. That we should use every endeavour to main- 
 tain the concert of Europe, remembering that 
 common action for a common object is the only 
 way in which we can unite the Great Powers in 
 obtaining objects connected with the common 
 good of all. 
 
 4. That we should avoid needless and entangling 
 engagements. 
 
 5. That we should acknowledge the equal rights 
 of all nations. 
 
 6. That we should have a sympathy with free- 
 dom, and a desire to give it a scope founded not 
 upon visionary ideas, but upon the long experi- 
 ence of many generations within the shores of this 
 happy isle." 
 
 [This passage is quoted from a paper by Mr Grant 
 Duff on '* Foreign Policy " (MacmiUans, 1880).] 
 
 1. This is the second of 
 the two principles laid 
 down in the text. 
 
 2-5. Peace, concert, 
 qualified non-interven- 
 tion, and the freedom of 
 commercial and other in- 
 ternational relations, are 
 principles subservient and 
 ancillary to (1) and (6). 
 Their observance is neces- 
 sary to the accumulation 
 of national wealth and the 
 enjoyment of popular 
 freedom. 
 
 6. This is the first of 
 the two principles in the 
 text. 
 
310 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY, 
 
 suit and accumulation of wealth, and will be in the best 
 condition to reap the full advantages of freedom — as by 
 the enactment of beneficial laws, the cultivation of the 
 arts and amenities of social life, and so forth. In time 
 of war it often happens — and during a war of special 
 magnitude it must of necessity happen — that commerce 
 is arrested in almost all its channels, that industry is 
 paralysed, and that the possession of free institutions by 
 the people becomes little better than a mockery. 
 
 There is a fine passage in one of Mr Bright's speeches in 
 the House of Commons against the Crimean War, wherein 
 the eloquent advocate of peace draws in few words a 
 graphic picture of the sacrifices incurred by war and the 
 gains which accrue to a nation from its avoidance. '' The 
 past events of our history," said Mr Bright, '' have taught 
 me that the intervention of this country in European wars 
 is not only unnecessary, but calamitous ; that we have 
 rarely come out of such intervention having succeeded in 
 the objects we fought for ; that a debt of £800,000,000 
 sterling has been incurred by the policy which the noble 
 Lord (John Russell) approves, apparently for no other 
 reason than that it dates from the time of William III. ; 
 and that, not debt alone has been incurred, but we have 
 left Europe at least as much in chains as before a single 
 effort was made by us to rescue her from tyranny. I 
 believe if this country, seventy years ago, had adopted 
 the principle, of non-intervention in every case where her 
 interests were not directly and obviously assailed, that 
 she would have been saved from much of the pauperism 
 and brutal crimes by which our Government and people 
 have alike been disgraced. This country might have 
 been a garden, every dwelling might have been of marble, 
 and every person who treads its soil might have been 
 sufliciently educated. We should indeed have had less 
 
DEMOCRA TIC FOREIGN POLICY. 3 1 1 
 
 of military glory. We might have had neither Trafalgar 
 nor AVaterloo ; but we should have set the high example 
 of a Christian nation, free in its institutions, courteous 
 and just in its conduct towards all foreign States, and 
 resting its policy on the unchangeable foundation of 
 Christian morality." 
 
 Englishmen are perhaps much more inclined to agree 
 with Mr Bright to-day than they were a quarter of a 
 century ago, and many thousands would now be found 
 to echo nearly every word of this passage. At any rate 
 it seems to express the characteristic ideas of the demo- 
 cracy on the subject of peace and war. The cultivated 
 public opinion of the country which is hereafter to lead 
 the democracy in England will doubtless understand 
 sufficiently well that the disuse of war does not and can- 
 not depend on one nation alone — that no nation can 
 enjoy perpetual peace unless it has the co-operation of 
 its neighbours and allies — and that the frailty of human 
 nature, or the tenuity of human wisdom, is fairly certain 
 at some time or other to bring disaster on the State. 
 No reasonable man expects finality or perfection in a 
 system or an executive Government, and thus there must 
 be for years to come occasional wars which might with a 
 little more prudence be prevented. But at the same 
 time the democracy may be counted on to repudiate 
 the traditional combinations and complications of Europe 
 in which our forefathers delighted to meddle, and to re- 
 duce in every conceivable way the occasions of interven- 
 tion in quarrels which do not ''directly and obviously" 
 touch our interests. 
 
 In order as much as possible to systematise the policy 
 of peace, and to make this policy regular and serviceable, 
 it is indispensable that the nation should first have 
 educated itself up to a point at which the undertaking 
 
312 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 of a needless war would be morally impossible, and 
 wanton intervention in the affairs of other nations abso- 
 lutely impossible. It is a ripe public opinion rather 
 than a formal system, or public opinion informing and 
 constituting a system, to which we must look for a pledge 
 against future wars ; and we are now fortunately arrived 
 at such a stage in our development that we can point to 
 the successful use of methods appropriate to a free and 
 industrial democracy. We have avoided wars by the 
 moral force of opinion (as in 1859, in 1863, in 1871, and 
 in 1878), we have boldly accepted the alternative method 
 of settling disputes, which consists in submitting them to 
 arbitration (as in 1872), and we have even had the 
 courage to arrest a war already begun (as in 1880-1), 
 and thus in the very strongest manner to assert our 
 deliberate election of peace. 
 
 The condemnation of war on principle, as generally 
 unjust and nearly always unprofitable, and the moral 
 courage which enables us to pass over minor causes of 
 war such as in former generations would infallibly have 
 led us to fight, are based on mental cultivation and on 
 the lessons of experience ; but the resort to arbitration is 
 an active exercise of the national authority which might 
 be formally perpetuated, and sanctioned by international 
 agreements. Arbitration once approved and accepted by 
 some of the leading Powers in the world, it is manifest 
 that the first step would have been taken towards a 
 general disarmament. The chief excuse for the mon- 
 strous armaments now raised by all the European States 
 is the uncertainty of the situation, and the doubt from 
 day to day which country is likely to be next attacked. 
 If this fear could be extinguished by some system or 
 guarantee of arbitration in the event of serious dispute, 
 the whole aspect of the case would be altered, and the 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 313 
 
 great military nations would be able to disarm in com- 
 parative safety. 
 
 Of course disarmament alone would be of little use in 
 the preservation of peace. No nation with a good 
 quarrel, no nation unjustly attacked would be deterred 
 from fighting by the mere fact that its services were on 
 a peace establishment, though this would undoubtedly 
 be a very powerful inducement. If the disarmament 
 had been fair and equal, the motive would be felt 
 in common by both disputing Powers, and it might 
 generally suffice to restrain them. Bat with a system of 
 arbitration, based as it might easily be upon an inter- 
 national treaty, drawni up and discussed and agreed to 
 at a formal Congress in a time of unbroken peace — not 
 when blood was hot, at the beginning or end of a great 
 war — why should we think that a solemn treaty of this 
 kind, agreed to by all in the interests of all, would fail 
 to secure its purpose ? 
 
 Moral agreements fail when the moral sense is not 
 sufficient to hold the contracting parties to the observance 
 of their pledges. But the moral sense which would 
 suffice to make the Great Powers assemble at a Peace 
 Congress and agree to an international compact would 
 probably suffice to make each of them keep faith with 
 the community. The chief need is to bring the nations 
 of Europe to such a mind that the Congress might be 
 summoned by common consent. As soon as our Govern- 
 ments have begun to regard this as a practical matter, 
 and as soon as our diplomatists have succeeded in 
 arranging it, we shall know that a public opinion has 
 been formed strong enough to add authority to the 
 popular will, and to hold monarchs and Ministers to the 
 fulfilment of their pledges. 
 
 We need entertain little doubt that the nations would 
 
3 1 4 DEMOCRA TIC FOREIGN POLICY, 
 
 cling to and elaborate a system of international arbitra- 
 tion when it had once been put into practice. The ad- 
 vantages of the method are so great as compared with the 
 method of war — the saving is so great even for the party 
 ag^ainst whom the award is Piven — that no elaborate 
 argument is needed to establish its superiority. The 
 Government of the United States, which as a democratic 
 Government has always been economical of its force and 
 its resources, has practised arbitration in repeated in- 
 stances, and with various nations ; and it may be said 
 to have definitely accepted it as a mode of settling all 
 ordinary disputes. We ourselves have made trial of it ; 
 and if the findino- of the Geneva court was not calculated 
 to persuade the people of this country that arbitration 
 must always be a satisfactory thing in itself, yet there 
 can be no doubt that in the long run the settlement of the 
 Alabama difficulty has commended itself to Englishmen 
 as a wise and rational act. The conclusion has been 
 very much what Mr Bright concluded from the moment 
 when the American claim was first preferred against us. 
 '' If any man thinks he has a right to go to law with 
 another, and that other has an answer to his claim, the 
 case must be heard. And so between two great nations 
 and two free Governments. If one has claims against 
 the other, and the other has counter claims, clearly 
 nothing can be more fair than that those claims should 
 be courteously and honestly considered." 
 
 The preservation of peace, by a system of arbitration 
 or by any other means, will depend, as already said, 
 upon the elevation of public opinion in the several States 
 of a community, and upon the international agreement 
 of these States through the medium of their Governments. 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 315 
 
 Tlie concert which has so often been found useful in 
 asserting the authority of the community, with or with- 
 out menace of war, must be employed in the direct 
 interest of peace before the pursuit of peace can be 
 systematized. International concert, therefore, will be an 
 indispensable element in the democratic system of foreign 
 policy — not merely as a principle to be occasionally 
 resorted to, but as a constant aim of our Ministers and 
 a constant object of our diplomacy. No means of 
 securing all that we desire to obtain from other nations 
 can be so effectual as the cultivation of good feeling 
 between peoples and Governments, which ought to be the 
 first duty of our representatives at foreign courts. 
 
 It would be difficult to exaggerate the practical value 
 of such a diplomacy as this, or the practical effect of 
 reciprocal amity between State and State. With common 
 sense on the part of the peoples, and ordinary prudence 
 on the part of the Governments, war is virtually abolished 
 by the interchange of sympathy which has recently been 
 established between England and the United States, and 
 between England and Franca It is to the sympathy of 
 public opiuion that we must look for the origination 
 of such a concert as may hereafter guarantee to us the 
 enjoyment of settled peace, of the privileges of free 
 institutions, and of unfettered commerce. 
 
 In so far as we have a right, or as we can hope, to 
 take a part with other peoples in the consolidation of 
 their liberties, it is mainly by expressions of public 
 opinion, operating through the concert of nations, that 
 this honourable instinct may be made operative. The 
 expression alone is frequently effectual ; and English- 
 men have on innumerable occasions displayed their 
 loyalty to freedom in every part of the world, even in 
 despite of the Governments of their own and other 
 
3 1 6 DEMOCRA TIC FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 countries. But that which the public opinion of one 
 people has been able to effect in a casual and desultory 
 manner, the Government of that people, acting in con- 
 cert with other Governments (including or excluding the 
 Government of the people whose liberties are in ques- 
 tion) may accomplish in a more pacific and thorough 
 fashion. In any case, the extension of popular liberties 
 throughout the world must inevitably result from the 
 creation of a concert based on sympathetic public 
 opinion. 
 
 Concerts not based on such a foundation, though they 
 have called themselves Holy, and have been professedly 
 directed towards the advancement of sacred objects, have 
 usually proved to be tyrannic in their operation. There 
 are indeed cases of concert for particular purposes in 
 which the contracting Powers have bound themselves by 
 a self-denying protocol, and have faithfully observed 
 their pledges, to which liberty has owed great develop- 
 ments. It w^ill perhaps be generally (if not always) 
 found that these genuinely benevolent concerts of the 
 Governments have been dictated by public opinion in 
 the several States, and have not been the spontaneous 
 acts of the Governments themselves. 
 
 Although in one sense the principle of international 
 concert covers the whole ground of a democratic system 
 of foreign policy, and though it might consequently be 
 regarded as one of the fundamental rules of action, it is 
 practically a means more than an end of policy, and is 
 adopted in order to insure the peace necessary for the 
 extension of freedom and the accumulation of resources. 
 If we were to look upon concert as an end rather than 
 a means, it would be requisite that we should give credit 
 to the peoples of the world (whether as democracies or 
 not) for an essential and universal motive of pure bene- 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 317 
 
 volence — not to say of moral or even religious propa- 
 gandism. There are some who would unhesitatingly 
 affirm the necessary presence of this motive in any worthy 
 system of foreign policy. Mr Bright, for instance — and 
 it is impossible to discuss the character and prospects of 
 the English democracy without frequent reference to the 
 opinions of Mr Bright, in almost every stage of the dis- 
 cussion — dwells emphatically on the presence of a motive 
 based on revealed religion and an inspired Scripture. In 
 a speech delivered at Edinburgh in the year 1853, on 
 the eve of the Crimean War, he addressed his audience 
 in these terms : — 
 
 '' You profess to be a Christian nation. You make it 
 your boast even — though boasting is somewhat out of 
 place in such questions — you make it your boast that 
 you are a Protestant people, and that you draw your rule 
 of doctrine and practice, as from a well pure and unde- 
 filed, from the living oracles of God, and from the direct 
 revelation of the Omnipotent. You have even conceived 
 the magnificent project of illuminating the whole earth, 
 even to its remotest and darkest recesses, by the dissem- 
 ination of the volume of the New Testament, in whose 
 every page are written for ever the words of peace. 
 Within the limits of this island alone, on every Sabbath, 
 20,000, yes, far more than 20,000 temples are thrown 
 open, in which devout men and women assemble that 
 they may worship Him who is the ' Prince of Peace.' 
 Is this a reality ? or is your Christianity a romance ? 
 is your profession a dream ? No, I am sure that your 
 Christianity is not a romance, and I am equally sure that 
 your profession is not a dream. It is because I believe 
 this that I appeal to you with confidence, and that 
 I have hope and faith in the future. I believe that we 
 shall see, and at no very distant time, sound economic 
 
318 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY, 
 
 principles spreading much more widely amongst 
 the people ; a sense of justice growing up in a soil 
 which hitherto has been deemed unfruitful ; and, which 
 will be better than all, the churches of the United 
 Kingdom — the churches of Britain awaking, as it were, 
 from their slumbers, and girding up their loins to more 
 glorious work, when they shall not only accept and 
 believe in the prophecy, but labour earnestly for its 
 fulfilment, that there shall come a time — a blessed time 
 — a time which shall last for ever — when ' nation shall 
 not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they 
 learn war any more. 
 
 Perhaps there will always be in every democracy, 
 and there will certainly be in the English democracy, 
 a strong infusion of the religious spirit. We may take 
 it for granted that the masses of Englishmen as a rule, and 
 English Governments from time to time, will desire to base 
 their policy upon moral or religious considerations, and 
 that they will in particular aim at establishing peace 
 and international concert on such grounds as those in- 
 dicated in the passage above quoted. But it can hardly 
 be maintained that these motives will be (or even that 
 they ought to be) of the essence of our foreign policy. 
 For in the first place they could never be universal in 
 any people, and it is clear that a popular policy should 
 be the natural policy of each individual in the State. 
 And in the second place, it would be fatal to the cha- 
 racter of a democratic foreign policy- -at any rate for 
 Englishmen — that it should involve a moral or a reli- 
 gious propagandism, of which intervention in some shape 
 or mode would be the logical development. 
 
 The promotion of concert as a means to an end is 
 therefore a natural adjunct of our foreign policy, and 
 an adjunct without which any system of democratic 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 319 
 
 policy must be hopeless. But to concede to it the 
 dignity of a fundamental principle, or to urge that 
 either peace or concert should be an universal and ab- 
 solute aim in a popular system appears to lead us on 
 the path in which Madame Krudener discovered the 
 mystery of the Holy Alliance. There may seem to be 
 every possible distinction between a propaganda of 
 peace and a compact for mutual armed assistance ; but 
 in the long run it would probably be found that the 
 issue in practice was the same. Crusades to enforce the 
 doctrines of peace have not been rare in the past, and a 
 democratic war in the interests of peace might be the 
 outcome of a propaganda such as many estimable men 
 have sought to estabKsh. 
 
 It may be said that if the foreign policy of a demo- 
 cratic nation like England be more and more strictly 
 reduced to the two principles of freedom for individuals 
 and freedom in commerce, whilst intervention of every 
 kind is reduced to a minimum, there will be an inevitable 
 tendency to selfishness in our relation with other Powers, 
 which will cause us to confine ourselves to insular aims 
 and methods, and to neglect the great interests of the 
 empire outside our narrow home boundaries. We shall 
 think less of the welfare of the world in general, do less 
 from motives of benevolence, care less by counsel or 
 mediation to preserve peace amongst our allies, be less 
 willing to take upon ourselves such engagements and 
 guarantees as are necessary for the protection of weaker 
 States, and even pay less heed to the extension of freedom 
 in other lands. Our whole energies will be likely to be 
 concentrated in the accumulation of wealth, or perhaps 
 of the simple means of luxury and refinement ; and thus 
 
320 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY, 
 
 all the symptoms of decay which have been observed in 
 the great empires of past ages will be developed in this 
 country. 
 
 It would undoubtedly be a vast misfortune if one-half 
 or one tithe of these sinister predictions were well founded, 
 and if we were really in peril of degenerating so far from 
 our higher standards. But, happily, the English demo- 
 cracy has sufficient confidence in itself to laugh at such 
 omens as these. There are indeed few signs of decay 
 in the character of Englishmen in the present generation. 
 They have given no evidence to justify the evil prophets 
 — unless it be in their inclination to believe that the 
 empire is sufficiently wide, without carrying its limits 
 farther, and in their determination that at any rate these 
 limits shall not be carried farther by unjust aggression. 
 The democratic classes have doubtless decided that 
 ''needless and entangling engagements " ought to be 
 avoided, and that we ought as much as possible to con- 
 fine ourselves to the management of our own affairs. 
 But they have not interpreted this decision as meaning 
 that we ought to exclude all consideration of the afiairs 
 of the outer world, or that we ought in any way to con- 
 tract our sympathies and deny our good offices to weak, 
 struggling, or friendly States. The attitude of these 
 classes in 1880 plainly attested their sympathy with 
 other nations, their attachment to the cause of peace, and 
 their willingness to lead or follow a concert of the Powers 
 in the pursuit of worthy ends. There is no reason to be- 
 lieve that England will ever lose her concern in external 
 affiiirs, however prudent she may be in undertaking fresh 
 responsibilities, and however much she may be disposed 
 to limit her interventions. 
 
 It is conceivable — or rather we may regard it as certain 
 — that the character of English intervention in behalf of 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. Zll 
 
 an oppressed race, or a weak ally struggling for independ- 
 ence, would be more elFective in proportion as it was rare, 
 deliberate, and the outcome of an irresistible popular 
 opinion. 
 
 But indeed there should be no necessity for an argu- 
 ment to persuade any man that the future of England 
 is a bright and not a dark one ; and, in particular, there 
 should be no doubt as to the sufficiency for all high pur- 
 poses of a system of policy based upon j)eaceful enter- 
 prise and the instincts of freedom. The history of this 
 country is full of instances which prove that these 
 motives are ample for honour as well as for profit, and 
 for noble deeds as well as for material success. 
 
 Earlier in the present volume,* these main lines of 
 our popular traditions in the past were considered and 
 compared ; and reason was there seen for the conclusion 
 that the two motives referred to were often found to be 
 mersred in our desire as Eno^lishmen ''to surround our- 
 selves mth independent nations which, being free as we 
 are free, may serve as bulwarks and buttresses of our 
 own power, and, being industrious as we are industrious, 
 may add to our commercial stability. This motive, the 
 resultant force of the other two, has been rather instinc- 
 tive than clearly defined in the past, but it is probably 
 destined to be the most precise tradition in the system 
 of national foreign policy which is gradually displacing 
 the systems of other days. ... In the strengthening 
 and confirmation of this tendency we are able to perceive 
 the harmonization of two traditions apparently irrecon- 
 cilable." 
 
 Here, then, we seem to have a satisfactory basis for 
 
 *Pp. 84-5. 
 
322 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 our foreign policy, and it is on this foundation that we 
 may expect the democracy which is now inheriting power 
 to build up its system. In other words, we may expect 
 that the people of England, as represented first by public 
 opinion and next by the constituencies, will year by 
 year practice a more constrained, a more precise and 
 better defined foreign policy, less variable under successive 
 Ministers, less disturbed by the memory of old tradi- 
 tions, not incompatible with but not relying upon the 
 benevolence of propagandists, and taking for its main, 
 its sufficient, possibly its only imperative principle the 
 development of peaceful material progress throughout 
 the world, by the encouragement of English enterprise, 
 by the j)rovision of markets for English commodities 
 abroad and foreign commodities in England, by the 
 assistance of free States whenever the opportunity pre- 
 sents itself, and by cultivating good relations with every 
 country. 
 
 Whilst it is manifest that the old national sympathy 
 with freedom takes its place in this system, yet the 
 special desire to assist other nations in their development 
 might also be accounted for in a different manner. The 
 prosperity of England depends upon the prosperity of 
 the world. Commerce, which is the life-blood of our 
 wide empire, can thrive only by the continuous thrift 
 of the nations with whom we trade. Our wealth 
 accumulates in proportion as we can supply our custo- 
 mers with goods, and constantly employ the hands of 
 our industrial population. Disaster falls upon us when 
 our markets are closed, or when other nations buy less 
 from us, or when we have during some months or years 
 produced more commodities than our customers require. 
 In this case it is necessary that we should discover new 
 customers, that we should find new outlets for our pro- 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 323 
 
 ductions, and new demands to occupy our industry. To 
 this end we must busy ourselves both in developing our 
 trade with every existing State and in helping to build 
 up new States which are likely to traffic with us. 
 And since a free nation will trade incalculably better 
 than an oppressed population — since a civilised people 
 will be more industrious than a despotic country 
 — we have every incentive in our own interests and 
 necessities to promote the cause of freedom wherever 
 we find it. 
 
 It would be a mistake to look upon this policy as sel- 
 fish or unworthy. The happiness of every individual in 
 the State depends upon the general prosperity of the 
 State, and further upon the general prosperity of the 
 world. And by happiness here is implied not merely 
 that a man should have the means of supplying his 
 material wants, but also that he should be in a position 
 to add comforts, refinements, and luxuries to his neces- 
 saries ; that he should be able to educate his children 
 according to his mind, and that he should have leisure to 
 enter upon the higher levels of thought and imagination 
 which constitute for him (as for his fellow -citizens) the 
 life most worth living. 
 
 The English democracy is not likely to take the means 
 for the end, and to suppose that the fruits of industry 
 are won so soon as the market is closed and the ship sails 
 back into port. For it is the very essence of the demo- 
 cratic spirit to construct the domestic edifice on a basis of 
 independence and security ; and it was in search of these 
 solid foundations of personal freedom that our ancestors 
 in every generation went forth beyond the seas, to barter 
 on every coast and to ransack every clime. Industry 
 and enterprise led them to wealth, and wealth to inde- 
 pendence, and independence to the attainment of those 
 
324 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 inestimable liberties which they have handed down to 
 their descendants. 
 
 It is in this respect that our commercial policy acquires 
 its true dignity for every reasonable and right-judging 
 man. Englishmen are well able, both by experience and 
 by natural disposition, to discriminate between a policy 
 built on honourable industry and a policy which dissi- 
 pates instead of accumulating resources, and which seeks 
 an unprofitable glory by more or less unscrupulous enter- 
 prise. They are able to see how little of real value is 
 gained when we have created international complica- 
 tions in order to manipulate them, and when we have 
 disturbed the councils of Europe in order to win a shallow 
 distinction in them. ''True glory," it has been finely 
 said, *' depends not upon military success, which is at 
 best splendid misfortune, but upon brilliant achievements 
 in the arts of peace, upon wealth wisely and nobly used 
 for 23ublic and private purposes ; upon long lists of great 
 statesmen, great poets, great historians, great artists, 
 great orators, great men of science ; upon thinking first 
 the thoughts which other nations adopt, and building up 
 first the institutions which other nations imitate ; upon 
 deserving to obtain from the future the praise of having 
 been wise and just. That and that alone entitles any 
 people to claim for itself the first place amongst the 
 nations." '"'' 
 
 It is to such noble rivalry, to such aims and resol i- 
 tions to excel, that Englishmen have long stood com- 
 mitted ; and we need have no fear that their aspirations 
 will ever be lower or meaner than these. Least of all 
 does it seem likely that the democracy will lower the 
 national standard in this respect when we remember that 
 its ranks are largely recruited from the " long lists of 
 
 * Mr Grant Duff; '^ Foreign Policy " ; (Macmillans). 
 
BEMOCEATIC FOPMGN POLICY, 325 
 
 great statesmen, great poets, great historians, great artists, 
 great orators, great men of science." A party (if it must 
 be a party) whose leaders are drawn from the aristocracy 
 of talent and culture will hardly fall back upon the 
 '' occidental flats " of mere wealth and false glory. 
 
 The question remains, how we are to carry our policy 
 of freedom and commerce into effect. What modifica- 
 tion of our system as it stands will be necessary when 
 the democracy is established in power ? How shall we 
 contrive that our responsibilities may be as nearly as 
 possible limited to the defence and guarantee of our com- 
 mercial interests — which implies that our whole naval 
 and military force shall be at the back of our merchants 
 and travellers, and that our whole moral force shall be 
 exerted in behalf of free nations, or nations struggling to 
 be free ? 
 
 Perhaps the first answer which a candid man will 
 feel himself constrained to give to these questions is 
 that the national foreign policy of England does already 
 in theory (and especially, as we have seen, from the 
 year 1879) approximate to the policy which is de- 
 manded by our character and circumstances as an ex- 
 panding democracy. The potential change of 1867 
 became an actual change and development in 1880, 
 and at this moment we are able to say that the Go- 
 vernment of the country in its foreign relations is very 
 much what a perfect democracy would desire to see it. 
 
 We have no serious entanglements from which danger 
 is to be apprehended. We have no alliances or secret 
 understandings (so far as one of the outside public may 
 judge) which might at any time involve us in a foreign 
 complication, and still less a war, against our will. We 
 
826 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY, 
 
 have given no guarantee on our individual account ; and 
 we have given few joint guarantees, express or implied, 
 which would imperatively demand from us a costly 
 military intervention. Such pledges as we have given to 
 particular States (express or implied) could be eflfectually 
 discharged by a timely demonstration with our fleet — as 
 we have recently proved in several notable instances. 
 And whatever guarantees of this kind are now in exist- 
 ence cover the independence and immunity of States 
 which are the outposts of freedom in commerce and con- 
 stitution — States like Greece, with a great commercial 
 future and a critical geographical position, or like Egypt, 
 on a hierhroad of Eno-lish traffic, which it is vital to us 
 to control or neutralise, or like Belgium, the situation of 
 which on the Continent has been supposed to render it 
 specially important to the security of British interests. 
 
 These guarantees, however, are of unequal force and 
 value. It is by no means certain that Englishmen, pro- 
 perly consulted, would approve the guarantee of Belgian 
 independence such as it actually exists ; and it is very 
 doubtful whether they would give such a guarantee at the 
 present time, in the absence of a precedent. The reason 
 is that the independence of Belgium is not now regarded 
 as entering into any system of English defence or security ; 
 and its commercial importance is not so great as to 
 warrant us in going to war on this ground alone. It 
 is impossible to foresee what would be the decision of a 
 pure democracy in the event of a sudden invasion of 
 Belgium by France or Germany ; but we can scarcely 
 suppose that an absolute and sole guarantee of its in- 
 dependence would be given by Englishmen in a time of 
 peace. The same thing is probably true of most of the 
 States which have heretofore enjoyed our guarantee. 
 We may not be able in respect of any one of them to 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY, 327 
 
 wash our hands of all responsibility ; but the tendency 
 of public opinion is clearly to limit our positive pledges 
 as strictly as may be. 
 
 This presupposed, and assuming the nation to be bent 
 on preserving peace by every honourable means, we may 
 conclude that its diplomacy would be relied upon and 
 strengthened in proportion as its military and naval 
 expenditure was (within due bounds) retrenched. Eng- 
 land could never with safety resign her supremacy 
 on the seas ; but even in her navy there are probably 
 large retrenchments which might prudently be eflfected. 
 With a navy capable of defending her commerce, and 
 every coast of her extensive empire — with an army equal 
 to any emergency at all possible for us to foresee — we 
 might hold ourselves independent of the gigantic arma- 
 ments of other Powers to a neater extent than we 
 actually do. But in this case it would be specially 
 incumbent upon us to perfect in every conceivable 
 manner the system of our diplomatic and consular ser- 
 vices, in order to supply whatever defect of strength or 
 repute might follow (or be supposed to follow) our opei^ 
 repudiation of the methods of war. 
 
 " Not/' writes Mr Grant Duff, in a pamphlet already 
 quoted, '' until our public men take more seriously the 
 duty of being students of public affairs before they can 
 claim with any right to lead public opinion about them ; 
 not until, by making the Foreign Office, the Diplomatic 
 and Consular Services, as good as they can be made, we 
 have provided Government with proper eyes and ears 
 all over the world, are we authorised to say that our 
 crowned democracy cannot manage international affairs. 
 The truth is, it has never had a fair chance of doing so, 
 it has never possessed proper organs for their manage- 
 ment. It has been sometimes imagined that the gradual 
 
3-28 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 democratizing of Europe would be fatal to diplomacy, the 
 most exclusive and aristocratic of professions. No one 
 will continue to hold that opinion who looks below the 
 surface at the realities of things. A great deal of the 
 glitter and frippery that were once associated with 
 diplomacy, and made it the laughing-stock of serious 
 men, has already fallen off it, and something more has 
 still to fall, but the real importance of diplomacy is only 
 beginning. More and more the diplomatist will think 
 of himself not merely as the representative of his 
 Sovereign, out of whose personal income the English 
 diplomatist used till recent times to be paid, but as the 
 representative of the whole nation, from the Sovereign 
 downwards. More and more will he recognise himself 
 to be the expression of what ought to be, and, in spite 
 of occasional Jingo outbreaks, is with every decade becom- 
 ing more and more the prevailing feeling of the country, 
 in its relations at least with civilised States, ' Peace 
 on earth, good will towards men.' More and more will 
 he recognise that his is indeed the highest of all the ser- 
 vices, that the army and navy are merely the necessary 
 and honoured instruments which the nation keeps in 
 reserve with which to meet unreason, if he who is the 
 representative of reason shall unfortunately fail." 
 
 In order to render diplomacy fit to be the servant 
 of the democracy, the same writer contends that there 
 should be, in every place of political importance, a repre- 
 sentative of this country, charged to send to the Foreign 
 Office the most correct and early information on all im- 
 portant matters ; whilst at the Foreign Office this infor- 
 mation should be digested and arranged, and made 
 pubhc as soon as circumstances would admit. Further- 
 more, every British embassy and mission should be " a 
 centre of the best kind of British influence ; " our diplo- 
 
DEMOCBATIC FOREIGN POLICY, 329 
 
 matists should mix not merely in court society but 
 amongst general politicians and men of letters in the 
 places to which they are accredited, and should keep 
 themselves less socially distinct as a class or as indivi- 
 duals in their own country. 
 
 No doubt these are directions in which 2:reat advances, 
 may be made. The Foreign Office, indeed, already dis- 
 charges the functions here assigned to it, perhaps as ably 
 and fully as the present conditions of diplomacy allow. 
 In particular, the commercial and other reports of 
 British consuls, periodically issued, are of extreme value 
 both to the Government and to the public, whilst the 
 Parliamentary Papers in general supply us with more 
 purely diplomatic information — not perhaps with all 
 possible haste, but with greater promptitude than is the 
 case in any other European country. 
 
 With respect to the personal character and bearing of 
 our representatives a,broad, the need is not so much that 
 the men holding th-e positions of ministers, secretaries of 
 legation, consuls, and so fortih, should take ^ more popular 
 view of their calling as that a much wider field of selec- 
 tion should be travelled over in search of suitable candi- 
 dates for nearly every branch of the profession. There 
 is no apparent reason why diplomacy should not be a 
 perfectly open career. There is 3it any rate little reason 
 to doubt that it will be thrown open so soon as the 
 hardihood of the democracy has had occasion to deal 
 with it. That which would be necessary would be to 
 secure that merit of every suitable kind should find 
 entrance to the profession, and that the Government 
 should never be precluded from selecting special agents 
 and ministers for particular missions. 
 
 The foreign ministers of the United States are chosen 
 in such a manner as to confer honour upon, and to utilise 
 
330 VEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY, 
 
 in the public service, men distinguished in letters, or in 
 social life, who are pre-eminently fitted to be vehicles of 
 accurate information and international courtesy and 
 good will. The system is understood to work well. It 
 is far more liberal than our own ; and it might be worth 
 while for our Government, in the exercise of the discre- 
 tion which it actually possesses, to step more frequently 
 out of the beaten track, not only in respect of vice- 
 consuls and consuls, but also in the appointment of 
 special representatives. 
 
 It is certain that the popularisation of the diplomatic 
 and consular services in the directions indicated would 
 add immensely to the confidence of the people in its 
 government abroad. The popularisation of the home 
 service will come as a matter of course with the perfec- 
 tion of the parliamentary system, and the thorough 
 representation of the democracy. But, so far as our 
 foreign policy is concerned, a satisfaction and relief not 
 wholly attainable under existing conditions would be 
 gained by diluting the traditional characteristics of 
 these services with a greater admixture of fresh and 
 unsophisticated talent, and by the employment for 
 specific purposes of men whose thoughts and habits 
 have not become narrowed in a groove.* 
 
 * A good instance of the value of this deviation is afforded in the 
 mission of Mr Goschen to Constantinople in 1880. No doubt Mr 
 Goschen had been trained in oflfice, if not precisely as a diplomatist. 
 And no doubt his employment was quite in accordance with precedent, 
 especially with the precedents of the older English diplomacy — of 
 good Bishop Robinson for example. But the despatch to Constanti- 
 nople at such a crisis of a man whose life work had been finaiKie, not 
 diplomacy, was in some manner an innovation which produced very 
 happy results. I do not refer so much to the settlement of the Greek 
 question, which was (even if unreasonably) a disappointment to many 
 Englishmen, as to the general effect upon the Porte of Mr Goschen's 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 331 
 
 With a settled disposition towards peace and retrench- 
 ment, with a spirit of enterprise checked only by the de- 
 termination to be just, and with a network of represen- 
 tatives abroad whose function would be strictly limited 
 to being the eyes and ears and touch of the Home Go- 
 vernment, our English democracy may move forward in 
 the path which is marked out for it. And perhaps it 
 would be impossible more accurately and succinctly to 
 clothe in words the nature of England's national destiny 
 than by assigning to her as her great mission in the 
 future the practice, the development, and the champion- 
 ship of Free Trade. 
 
 It is a noteworthy fact that the blind powers of re- 
 action which (often with unwitting or unwary human 
 instruments) have in these past years been sapping at the 
 foundations of England's moral and commercial greatness 
 have attacked, one after the other, all the main principles 
 of her essentially national traditions. Our historical de- 
 velopment has made us a free democracy, with a strictly 
 limited royal prerogative and a virtual popular sove- 
 reignty. In 1876-8 the attempt was made to convert 
 the royal into an imperial style, and the prerogative was 
 on more than one occasion substituted for the authority 
 of Parliament. The inclination of the democracy towards 
 peace, and peaceful metliods of diplomacy, had been 
 
 character and attitude. But in the Greek question also our representa- 
 tive acquitted himself as well as, or better than, we could hve expected 
 any member of the regular diplomatic profession to have done. The 
 truth seems to be, that the ambassadors of four out of the six Powers 
 developed at Constantinople a portentous and Turk-like stolidity, 
 against which it is to the credit of Mr Goschen that he did so much 
 for Greece, for English policy, and for civilisation. To him, with Mr 
 Gladstone, Lord Granville, and Sir Charles Dilke, the Thessalians 
 are especially indebted for their liberty. 
 
332 DEMOCRA TIC FOREIGN POLICY, 
 
 emphatically declared both before and after the admission 
 of the working-classes to the franchise ; but Lord 
 Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury had threatened war and 
 lavished menace. Our sympathy with oppressed races 
 had never been stronger than it was shown to be in the 
 seventh and eighth decades of this century ; but the same 
 two statesmen deliberately preferred to this sympathy a 
 decaying party tradition. Eetrenchraent was manifestly 
 in the intention of the people at large, though no man- 
 date to retrench may have been given at the general 
 election of 1874 ; and money was spent by the million 
 on superfluous armaments and useless demonstrations. 
 For all this the nation revindicated itself in 1880 ; and 
 then, without long delay, the undermining process was 
 renewed in an organised assault upon the last of all our 
 traditions. The impeachment of Free Trade, distinctly 
 encouraged by the Conservative chiefs, must be regarded 
 as the closing phase of a five years' antagonism to the 
 characteristic national traditions. 
 
 The attempt which is being made at this moment to 
 reverse the commercial policy accepted by the country 
 in 1846 can appear formidable only to those who do not 
 realise the fact that this policy is the natural and neces- 
 sary outcome of the tendencies of the nation, and that 
 it is consequently an organic part of our popular consti- 
 tution. The policy contended for by Cobden and Bright, 
 adopted by Peel, sanctioned by statesmen of both parties 
 and by the people as a whole, was no mere experiment 
 tentatively put in operation, like an income tax or an 
 army reform. It was a logical conclusion from unques- 
 tioned facts — an irreversible decision foUowino: after lonof 
 deliberation. The Corn Importation Acts, the tariff re- 
 ductions, the repeal of the Navigation Acts — all these 
 steps from first to last were simple developments of the 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY, 333 
 
 national growth, and regular evolutions from predisposing 
 causes. In brief, Free Trade is the legitimate offspring 
 of freedom and of trade. In its lineaments are the 
 features of both parents ; and it will hardly perish until 
 Freedom, " grave mother of majestic works," drops the 
 crown from her brow and the trident from her hand, and 
 her isle-altars know her no more. 
 
 The definite adoption of the Free Trade policy not 
 merely confirmed our commercial supremacy amongst the 
 nations of the world — it consecrated the international 
 feeling which had long been fostered by theorists and 
 promoted by our most far-seeing statesmen. There was 
 much to be done — there is much to be done at this day 
 — before Englishmen can be brought candidly and prac- 
 tically to admit the equal rights of all States, and to 
 cement the friendship of every nation, great and small, 
 by removing every cause of irritation due to unw^arrant- 
 able aggressions in the past. The mere insinuation that 
 anything of this kind could be necessary on our part, 
 even if such words as reparation and restitution were 
 never employed, was once sufiicient to raise a storm of 
 adverse criticism ; but it is scarcely so any longer. The 
 new generation has developed greater moral courage, and 
 the English democracy both repudiates aggression and 
 laughs at the idea that retrocession is of necessity a sign 
 of weakness. It is now granted, at least in general terms, 
 that the sway of England has been made to extend over 
 sundry rocks and islands which are of no service to her, 
 and that she might gain rather than lose strength by 
 abandoning them.'" 
 
 * " If (Cobden used to say) the (zovernment would let me go to 
 Spain with an oifer to cede Gibraltar, on condition that its fortifica-. 
 tions were razed or dismantled, I could get from the Spanish Govern- 
 ment such a commercial treaty as would be of enormous advantage to 
 
334 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 The men who fought the battle of the tariffs were men 
 of statesmanlike breadth and foresight, and they were 
 only following their own principles to their logical con- 
 clusions when they maintained that the nation must gain 
 incalculably by every act of international conciliation and 
 goodwill. Cobden was in the first place a mere Anti-Corn 
 Law agitator ; but before he died he was " the interna- 
 tional man/' It was not merely that his principles were 
 
 the English manufacturers and labourers, and would be an infinite 
 boon to Spain. It would not be much to give away, for Gibraltar is 
 of no value whatever as a check to the entrance into the Mediter- 
 ranean." (Mr Thorold Rogers : " Cobden and Modern Political 
 Opinion.") In 1862 Cobden's most intimate friend, Mr Bright, touched 
 on this same question in a speech to his constituents ; and the pas- 
 sage, striking enough in itself, gains immeasurably in significance by 
 the lapse of nearly twenty years since the date of its utterance. 
 " Suppose," said Mr Bright, " the English Government heard that 
 Spain was equipping expeditions, by land and sea, for the purpose of 
 retaking that fortress and rock. Now, although it is not of the 
 slightest advantage to any Englishman living, excepting to those who 
 have pensions and occupations upon it; although every Government 
 knows it, and although more than one Government has been anxious 
 to give it up, and I hope this Government will send my friend, 
 Mr Cobden, to Madrid, with an offer that Gibraltar shall be ceded to 
 Spain, as being of no use to this country, and only embittering, as 
 statesmen have admitted, the relations between Spain and England — 
 and if he were to go to Madrid with an offer of the Rock of Gibraltar, 
 I believe he might obtain a commercial treaty with Spain that would 
 admit every English manufacture, and every article of English pro- 
 duce into that country at a duty of not more than ten per cent. ; — I 
 say, do you not think that, if you heard that Spain was about to 
 retake that useless rock, mustering her legions and her fleets, the 
 English Government would combine all the power of this country 
 to resist it 1 " Can we feel sure that this question would at all times 
 elicit an answer in the affirmative 1 And would it not be wise on 
 the part of our statesmen, if at any time the opportunity seems to 
 present itself, to perform a long-delayed act of reparation, the per- 
 formance of which would redound to the profit as well as to the credit 
 of England *? 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 335 
 
 for all nations and ages. He was deeply penetrated by 
 the belief that the welfare of all nations depended on the 
 freedom and reciprocation of their intercourse. It was 
 the fervonr of this faith which led him to recommend and 
 negotiate the Commercial Treaty with France, which was 
 not so much a legitimate issue of the principles of 1846 
 as it was an enthusiastic realisation of his international 
 creed. He looked forward with confidence to the imme- 
 diate results of free trade — to the vast increase of imports 
 and exports, to permanently cheap food, to the dimin- 
 ished frequency of famine, wholesale pauperisation, and 
 financial panics, and to the wider distribution of natural 
 wealth. But he looked for similar and even greater 
 benefits from constant international approximations. 
 
 That which Cobden could scarcely venture to maintain, 
 from tribune or platform, to the day of his death, with- 
 out stamping himself as one of the most chimerical of 
 men, is now an integral part of England's definitive 
 national tradition. 
 
 With this our survey of England's policy, and of its 
 traditions efiete and effective, comes to an end. It has 
 been no more than a rapid survey, and is not to be taken 
 as settling, or attempting to settle, any one of the ques- 
 tions which have been passed in review. Its object will 
 be attained if it may contribute to show on which of oiir 
 national traditions the greatness of this country has been 
 mainly built, and to which of them we ought chiefly to 
 look for our future development. The conclusions arrived 
 at may be briefly recapitulated. 
 
 The relations of England with foreign States have 
 been for two centuries past in the hands of responsible 
 Ministers, drawn alternately from the two pohtical 
 
336 DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY. 
 
 parties, and answerable (1) to the monarch, (2) to the 
 Estates of the Lords and Commons, and (3) to the 
 general mass of the people. 
 
 The policy of these Ministers has been, on the whole, 
 thoroughly patriotic in intention, and usually in accord- 
 ance with the party traditions, handed down from 
 generation to generation. But there have been Ministers 
 in successive ages who have diverged from the strict 
 traditions of their own party, either in the direction of a 
 wish expressed by the monarch, or in obedience to a 
 popular sentiment — declared sometimes within and 
 sometimes without the walls of Parliament. 
 
 The j)arty traditions have been based as a rule on cer- 
 tain notions as to the friendship or suspicion which 
 England ought '' naturally '' to entertain towards par- 
 ticular Continental States ; and they have resulted in 
 periodical wars, combinations, and engagements of a 
 more or less embarrassing kind, with the Great Powers of 
 Europe. 
 
 Side by side with these party traditions there has 
 always existed a body of tradition which has been 
 characteristically national and popular — sometimes 
 clearly defined, sometimes tacit or obscure — now in 
 harmony with a party tradition, and again directly 
 opposed to the policy of the Ministers in othce. 
 
 Until very recently Englishmen have not had the 
 opportunity of giving distinct expression to their general 
 sentiment when it did not happen to coincide with the 
 Ministerial policy or the party traditions. The enfran- 
 chisement of the middle classes in 1832, and of the 
 working classes in 1867 — combined with the increased 
 power of the press, and the developments introduced by 
 steam and electricity — has at length enabled the nation 
 to pronounce and give effect to its sentiments. 
 
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY, 337 
 
 The result of these changes has been to call the 
 English democracy into existence as virtually the sove- 
 reign power in the State ; and from this time forward 
 we may expect to find that the feeling of the country, 
 expressed through the medium of a cultivated and 
 balanced public opinion, will prevail with rare exceptions 
 over discarded party traditions, and (if necessary) over 
 the judgment or the wishes of the " estates of the 
 realm." 
 
 Finally, there is no reason for discouragement, but 
 rather every reason for confidence, in this altered con- 
 dition of things ; because the popular traditions of 
 Englishmen have been unmistakably shown to rest upon 
 the principles of national industry and sympathy with 
 freedom throughout the world. 
 
 The whole tendency of the English democracy is 
 towards freedom and progress — not freedom and pro- 
 gress in this country alone, but wherever the influence 
 of international goodwill can be brought to bear. 
 
 • • • • • • 
 
 ** So let the change which comes be free 
 To ingroove itself with that which flies, 
 And work, a joint of state, that plies 
 Its office, moved with sympathy. 
 
 " A saying hard to shape in act ; 
 For all the past of Time reveals 
 A bridal dawn of thunder-peals, 
 Wherever Thought hath wedded Fact." 
 
SUMMARY. 
 
 I. 
 
 The Bases of Policy. 
 
 Contrasted views of foreign policy, page 1 ; advantages 
 of fixed principles, 2 ; tbe English historical point 
 of view, 3 ; development of a national policy, as dis- 
 tinguished from traditional policies : policy of the 
 United States, 4-9 ; contraction of responsibilities is 
 the great need in the case of England : evidences of 
 the process, 9 ; the future is in the hands of the 
 democracy, 10. 
 
 Effects of insularity on the policy of England, 1 1 ; the 
 people until recently were without a voice in the 
 management of foreign ajBfairs, ih. ; the new starting- 
 point in 1660 : our examination of the modern tra- 
 ditions may begin with the reign of Charles the 
 Second, 13 ; the shameless policy of Charles and 
 certain of his Ministers : the age of French pensions, 
 14 ; birth of Tory and Whig traditions, 15 ; the 
 Contract of 1688-9 : the Dutch graft, 17-19. 
 
 Influence of France on England's policy, 1 9 ; the policy 
 of royal emergencies and aristocratic intrigues, 20 ; 
 three lines of policy converged in 1678, 21 ; the 
 Estate of the Commons long practically without a 
 voice, 22. 
 
340 SUMMARY. 
 
 11. 
 
 Whig Traditions. 
 
 Designs of Louis XIV., 23 ; the coalition against him : 
 proud position of the Prince of Orange at the peace 
 of Nimeguen : this peace a mere truce, 24 ; William 
 III. definitively committed England to the struggle 
 against France, 25-27. 
 
 The Whig and Tory traditions are more clearly distin- 
 guished from 1694 : responsible party Cabinets date 
 from 1695, 27-29 ; attitude of parties in 1694-5 : 
 the Whigs sanction the Dutch policy, 29-31 ; the 
 Treaty of Ryswick (1697) a Dutch intrigue: Wil- 
 liam's idea of the balance of power, 31-2 ; a Tory 
 majority in 1701: the traditions merged, 32-3; 
 parallel between William III. and Marlborough, 34 ; 
 mixed motives of the Whigs, 35 ; of the Tories, 36. 
 
 Altered relations with France and Spain, 36-8 ; the 
 policy of Walpole — a policy of peace, 38-9 ; eleva- 
 tion of the Whig tradition, 39-42 ; theory of ''the 
 balance of power," 42 ; Europe a " system," go- 
 verned by a ''balance," and preserved by "com- 
 binations " : bases and variations of this usage, 43 ; 
 the Family Compact of France and Spain, 44 ; jus- 
 tification of Walpole's policy, 45 ; Pelham and New- 
 castle, ib. 
 
 The elder Pitt by taste and talent a War Minister, 46 ; 
 he reverted to the older Whig, or Dutch policy, with 
 a modified popular sanction, 47 ; contrast between 
 Pitt and Walpole, 48 ; responsibility of the nation, 
 especially of the commercial classes, 49 ; English 
 dominion beyond the seas — Canada, India, the 
 
SUMMARY, 341 
 
 North American colonies, 50; Pitt's later career: 
 the Whig idea of empire, 51. 
 The younger Pitt began as a reformer and a financier, 
 51; but his foreign policy belongs to the Tory tra- 
 dition, 52 ; the Whig party disorganised and 
 divided : the Chatham, Rockmgham, and Bedford 
 Whigs : the attitude of Fox and Burke, 52-3. 
 
 III. 
 
 Tory Traditions. 
 
 Difficult position of the Tories in the early part of the 
 eighteenth century ; Jacobites and Hanover Tories, 
 54-5 ; new Toryism took its place between the 
 platforms of the ablest and the feeblest Whigs, 55 ; 
 George III. exalted the royal prerogative : the 
 King's Friends, 56-Q ; the "great Revolution 
 families " : the Grenville, Grafton, and North Admi- 
 nistrations, 56-7 ; Bolingbroke and the Tory tradi- 
 tion : " Dutch finance, Venetian politics, and French 
 wars," 57-8. 
 
 The French Eevolution, and its effects on English policy, 
 58 ; variety of opinion in England with respect to 
 the Eevolution, 59 ; Pitt reluctantly follows the 
 lead of the majority, 60-2; his alternative, 63; 
 the Whigs (except Fox and his friends) combined 
 with the Tories after the breaking out of war, ib. ; 
 Pitt's energy : the equivocal character of his success, 
 64 ; first results of the struggle : its eSect upon 
 popular liberties in England, 65 ; English opinion 
 in 1796, Q^, 
 
 Pitt's second Administration, ^Q ; ''Ministry of all the 
 
342 SUMMARY. 
 
 Tcalents," 67 ; utter collapse of the official Whig 
 party, 68-70 ; the restoration of its better traditions, 
 70-2 ; the Liverpool Administration : Castlereagh's 
 ability, 72 ; the English Government recommends 
 the restoration of the Bourbons, 72-4. 
 The Congress of Vienna, 74 ; general policy of the Great 
 Powers, ih. ; the Holy Alliance between Kussia, 
 Austria, and Prussia, 75 ; the Congress of Laybach: 
 England represented there, 76-7 ; position of affairs 
 on Lord Londonderry's death, 77-8. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Popular Traditions. 
 
 The " fundamental laws of Great Britain " prevented our 
 joining the Holy Alliance, or participating in the 
 measures taken against the Italian and Spanish re- 
 volutionists : the revolutionary principle in English 
 history, 79-81; continental criticism of the attitude 
 of England, 8L 
 
 English traditions of sympathy with oppressed peoples : 
 a national tradition of foreign policy, 82-4 ; illustra- 
 tions, 83-4 ; the aggressive traditions of commerce 
 and industry, 84 ; the combination of these motives, 
 85 ; modern illustrations, 86 ; national morality, 87. 
 
 Distinction between the aggressive policy of Ministers 
 and the aggressive commercial policy of the English 
 nation, 88 ; the value of gains by aggression has 
 been questioned on various grounds, 89 ; Mr Bright's 
 declarations on this subject, 89-91 ; the temper of 
 the democracy on questions of this order has been 
 developed from the best English traditions, especially 
 
SUMMARY, 343 
 
 from the traditions of peace and the traditions of 
 peaceful and successful revolutions in England, 
 91-5. 
 Effects of electoral reform on our relations with other 
 countries : decrease of the responsibility thrown 
 upon Ministers, and of the risk of war, 95 ; the 
 alleged danger of giving the control of foreign 
 affairs to the democracy, 96 ; gradual development 
 of the policy of peace : the United States have set 
 an example in this respect, 97-9 ; contrast between 
 French and English democracies, 99-101. 
 
 V. 
 
 Canning's Foreign Policy. 
 
 General character of Canning, 102 ; liis early life ; 
 attracted to Pitt, 103 ; characteristics as a speaker 
 and writer: illustrations, 104; his early develop- 
 ment : ideas on the French revolution, 106-7 : 
 Canning and Castlereagh, 107-8 ; distinguishing- 
 marks of Canning's foreign policy : Stapleton's 
 testimony on this point, 109-11 ; Cannings liberal 
 vein, 111-2; principles on which he took office as 
 Foreign Minister in 1822 : further contrast with 
 Castlereagh, 112-4. 
 
 The Congress of Verona : Canning's reasons for sending 
 a representative, 114-7; his attitude towards the 
 Powers, 117 ; partial triumph of his policy, ih. ; his 
 patronage of revolutionists in various countries, 
 117-9. 
 
 The Spanish question in 1822-3, 119; ability of Canning's 
 despatches, ib, ; his critics: Lord Grey, 119-22 ; 
 
34-t SUMMJnr. 
 
 the traditions confused, 122; the Parliamentary 
 Whigs in 1823, 122-3. 
 
 The Portuguese question in 1822-6, 123 ; Canning s policy 
 in reference to the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, ib. ; 
 his share in securing the independence of Brazil, 
 124 ; the Spanish attack on Portugal regarded as a 
 casus feeder is : troops sent to Lisbon, 124-5; the 
 danger and justification of this step, 125-6 ; recog- 
 nition of the South American Republics, 127-8. 
 
 The Greek question, 1822-7 : nature of the Greek move- 
 ment, 128-9 ; the attitude of Russia towards the 
 Greek revolution, 129 ; Canning uses a moderating 
 influence, 130 ; especially in order to keep the settle- 
 ment of the question out of the hands of the Holy 
 Alliance, or of Russia alone, 131-2 ; Canning's im- 
 partiality, 132 ; his reasons for declining a Confer- 
 ence when proposed by Russia, 133-4 ; his phleg- 
 matic bearing : the mission of Mr Stratford Canniug 
 to St Petersburg, 135 ; complete success of Canning's 
 i:)olicyin regard to the Powers, 136 ; Canning and the 
 Greeks, 136-7 ; mission of the Duke of Wellington 
 to St Petersburg, 138 ; Canning's combinations, 
 138-9 ; his last measures in reference to the Greek 
 question, 139-41. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Palmekston's Foreign Policy. 
 
 Palmerston's early career : originally a Tory, 142 ; com- 
 parison between Palmerston and Canning, 143 ; 
 Palmerston was a follower and disciple of Canning, 
 144 ; leans to the Whigs, ih. ; his appreciation of 
 
SUMMJin\ 345 
 
 foreign affairs : robustness of his views, 145-6 ; 
 Foreign Secretary under Lord Grey : characteristics 
 of his policy, 147-8. 
 
 The Belgian question in 1830, 149 ; Palmerston's promp- 
 titude and energy : his methods of diplomacy, 
 150-2 ; his share in the settlement of the Greek 
 question, 153 ; firmness of his attitude towards 
 Russia, 154. 
 
 Estimate of Lord Palmerston's qualities as a Foreign 
 Minister, 155 ; his unpopularity, 156 ; his confi- 
 dence and bluntness, 157 ; English interests a guid- 
 ing principle with him, 158 ; the Sulphur question 
 158-9; Palmerston's inconsistency: interventions 
 in Naples, Greece, China, 160-1. 
 
 Pidmerston and the Eastern Question : the quadruple 
 alliance of 1840, 161 ; the Turko-Egyptian question, 
 162 ; Palmerston's energy not always relished by 
 his colleagues, 163 ; England's interests in the East, 
 164; Palmerston and the Crimean War, 165; his 
 transgression of diplomatic usage in 1851 : censured 
 by the Queen and dismissed by Lord John Russell, 
 166-3. 
 
 YIL 
 
 Later Whig Policy. 
 
 (1859-66.) 
 
 The Revolution of 1848 : compared with that of 1789, 
 169 ; the watchword of the Whigs — '' civil and re- 
 ligious liberty throughout the world," 170; Lord 
 Russell's probable place in history; his characteristics 
 
346 SUMMARY. 
 
 as a Foreign Minister, 170-1 ; a champion of popu- 
 lar liberties, especially in Italy, 171-3 ; his spirited 
 despatch to Sir James Hudson, 173-5. 
 
 Cession of the Ionian Islands, 175 ; Mr Gladstone's mis- 
 sion to Corfu, 177; English tradition requires the 
 concession of demands (1) at home and (2) abroad, 
 when founded on justice and urged with persistence, 
 177. 
 
 The Prusso-Danish question of 1863-4, 179; Denmark 
 guaranteed, ih. ; attacked, 180 ; the position of 
 England in the matter, ih. ; criticisms of Lord Derby 
 and others on the Ministerial policy, 181-2 ; their 
 injustice, 182. 
 
 The Civil War in America, 182 ; the escape of the Ala- 
 hama, 183 ; Lord Russell's responsibility, ih, ; Mr 
 Bright on the war ; the attitude of England gene- 
 rally, 183-5 ; Grote's judgment on this question, 
 185-6 ; Lord Russell was apparently anxious to en- 
 large the area of national responsibility in foreign 
 afifairs : his first act on assuming the premiership 
 was to propose a measure of electoral reform, 187-8. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Developments. 
 
 (1868-74.) 
 
 Influence of public opinion on the conduct of both poli- 
 tical parties: illustrations, 189-91; the statesmen 
 of both parties have employed and sanctioned revo- 
 lutionary methods of progress, 191-2. 
 
 The new departure in 1867 : the casting vote given to 
 the democracy, 192; this fact illustrated in 1868, 
 
SUMMARY, 347 
 
 193; and not contradicted in 1874, 194; settle- 
 ment of the Alabama dispute, ih. ; the policy of Mr 
 Gladstone questioned by Lord Eussell, 195 ; happy 
 results of the Geneva Arbitration, 196-7. 
 
 The neutrality of Belgium menaced in 1870, 197 ; steps 
 taken by the Government, under the pressure of 
 public opinion, 198 ; the necessity of these steps 
 maybe contested, 199 ; Lord Granville's dignified 
 Note to Count BernstorjBF, 200. 
 
 The Abyssinian and Ashantee expeditions, 200 ; com- 
 pared, 201-3 ; grounds on which similar expeditions 
 may be justified, ih. ; Sir Garnet Wolseley on the 
 character of the Ashantee war, 203-4. 
 
 Criticisms on the foreign policy of Mr Gladstone's first 
 Administration, 204 ; attitude of this Administra- 
 tion towards Eussia, 205 ; Eussias repudiation of 
 the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, 205 ; 
 the English Government could not gainsay it, 
 206-7 ; a new departure in the Eastern question 
 was taken in 1870, but it was practically forced 
 upon England, 207-8. 
 
 The Eussian expedition to Khiva : the Czar's promise, 
 208 ; apparent contradiction in the capture of 
 Khiva and annexation of territory by General 
 Kaufimann : the attitude of Mr Gladstone's Govern- 
 ment on this occasion, 209-10. 
 
 IX. 
 Divagations. 
 
 (1874-80.) 
 
 The circumstances of Mr Disraeli's accession to office, 
 211 ; significance of the election of 1874, 212 ; 
 Lord Beaconsfield had no mandate from the country 
 
Q 
 
 48 SUMMARY. 
 
 in foreign affairs, and liis policy was never clearly 
 sanctioned by a majority, 213-5; the character of 
 Lord Beaconsfield's success, 216. 
 
 The policy of 1876-80 was imperialist and personal, 
 216 ; contrast between Lord Beaconsfield and Lord 
 Palmerston : the former borrowed a part of his 
 policy from the latter, 217; he ignored or at- 
 tempted to counteract the revolutionary tendencies 
 of the English people: illustrations, 218-9; and 
 stultified his own electoral reform of 1867, 219-21. 
 
 Lord Derby's share of responsibility for the transactions 
 of 1875-8, 221 ; rejection of the Berlin Memoran- 
 dum : difficulty of concert in 1876, 222 ; traditional 
 motives of Lord Derby, 223 ; the relations of the 
 English and Turkish Governments, 224-5 ; English 
 distrust of Ptussia, 225 ; fomented by Lord Beacons- 
 field's Government, 226-7. 
 
 X. 
 
 The New Departure. 
 
 Significance of the election of 1880 : the nation had now 
 resolved upon its new departure, 228 ; the gradual 
 development since 1867, 229 ; sentiments of demo- 
 cratic thinkers in the Spring of 1880 : contrasted 
 claims of the two parties, 230-4 ; the new Govern- 
 ment bound in great measure by the acts of its pre- 
 decessor, 234 ; difficulties of Mr Gladstone's Govern- 
 ment on its accession, 235. 
 
 Disasters consequent on the change of Ministry, 235 ; 
 revindication of the national traditions in connec- 
 tion with the Afghan war, 236 ; action of Lord 
 Hartington : drawbacks and results, 237. 
 
SUMMARY. 349 
 
 The withdrawal in South Africa : tardy satisfaction given 
 to the popular feeling in this matter, 237 ; reasons 
 given for the delay not entirely acceptable, 238 ; 
 Sir Bartle Frere's twofold functions, 239. 
 
 England's policy in reference to the government of our 
 dependencies and colonies, 239 ; the influence of 
 scientific innovations on our *' proconsular " system, 
 240 ; modifications in this system still necessary : 
 illustration in the case of Batanga, ih. ; control over 
 the action of our representatives abroad : the ques- 
 tion discussed in the House of Commons, April 30, 
 1880, 241 ; Mr Henry Richard's argument and Mr 
 Gladstone's official attitude on the subject, 242-3 ; 
 this attitude considered : annexations, treaty obliga- 
 tions, the war-making power, 244-7 ; a more direct 
 popular control in these respects appears to be desir- 
 able, 247. 
 
 Restitution of ill-gotten possessions as a principle of the 
 new departure, 247 ; modern illustrations, 248-9. 
 
 The popular mandate in regard to European complications : 
 its character: its performance by Mr Gladstone's 
 Government, 249 ; popular sentiment in favour of 
 international concert in 1880, 250 ; correspondence 
 of the action of Liberal statesmen to this sentiment, 
 252 ; nature of the problem in Europe : the Monte- 
 negrin and Greek questions, 253 ; moral justification 
 of the Powers, 254-5. 
 
 XL 
 
 The European Concert. 
 
 (1880-1.) 
 
 The origin of the Greek question of 1880-1 : general 
 retrospect, from 1875 to the Congress of Berlin, 
 
350 SUMMARY. 
 
 256-265 ; from the Congress of Berlin to 1880, 
 265-270. 
 
 Diplomatic action of Lord Granville in 1880 : proposal 
 of concert, 270 ; Lord Granville's interpretation of 
 the question (on the part of Mr Gladstone's Cabinet) 
 in strikiner contrast with that of the Beaconsfield 
 Cabinet, 271 ; the Conference of June, 1880 : its 
 sanguine conclusions, 272 ; the sudden change in 
 the policy of France, on the accession to office of M. 
 St Hilau^e, 272 ; the European concert paralysed 
 by this change, 273 ; France proposes the conver- 
 sion of the mediation into an arbitration : reluctant 
 assent of England, and reduction of the award to 
 Greece, 274-5. 
 
 The policy of concert had practically succeeded, even in 
 the arrangement of the Greek question, 275 ; Eng- 
 land's responsibility to the Greeks was virtually 
 discharged by Mr Gladstone's Government, which 
 had done all that was possible to honour the engage- 
 ments of the country, 276-7 ; objections to the 
 policy of concert by Opposition critics : partly due 
 to misconception of that policy, 278-9 ; difference 
 between this concert and the older combinations, 
 279-80 ; significance of the policy of international 
 concert as a method resorted to by the democracy 
 — and by a Minister who had heretofore confined 
 himself to domestic legislation, 280. 
 
 Parallel between Canning and Mr Gladstone : in birth, 
 in education, in endowments, in early predisposi- 
 tions, in oratorical gifts, in logical directness and 
 pliability, in the conditions of their career, especially 
 with respect to foreign policy. 
 
SUMMARY. 351 
 
 XII. 
 
 Democratic Diplomacy. 
 
 It is sometimes urged that a democracy cannot have a 
 distinct and effective foreign policy : the contentions 
 of a certain school of democrats on this point, 285 ; 
 the lessons of 1880-1 : domestic progress was im- 
 possible until an active and energetic foreign policy 
 had been carried into operation, 287; position of the 
 English democracy in relation to foreign States, 288. 
 
 The English democracy : considerations as to its com- 
 ponent elements and characteristics, 289-91 ; the 
 democracy is in fact the people, 291 ; its strength 
 and weakness, 292-4. 
 
 The art of diplomacy must in a special sense be culti- 
 vated and practised by a democratic State, 294 ; it 
 must derive its authority from an advanced popular 
 opinion, 296 ; diplomacy old and new, 296-8. 
 
 Limits of English diplomatic action, hard to assign, 298 ; 
 relations of the mother-country to the colonies, 299 ; 
 to India in particular, 301 ; the integrity of the 
 empire not menaced by popular supremacy, 303-4. 
 
 The diplomatic system most suited to a democracy, 304 ; 
 very much what we have at this moment, 305 ; but, 
 in so much as developments or modifications are 
 necessary, it may be questioned whether we might 
 not safely and wisely hasten the change, especially 
 by increasing the popular control over our represen- 
 tatives abroad, 306-7. 
 
 XIII. 
 
 Democratic Foreign Policy. 
 
 The national system of foreign policy rests upon two 
 principles, comprehending all others — (1) freedom 
 
352 SUMMARY. 
 
 and sympathy with freedom, (2) wealth and the 
 promotion of commercial interests, 308-9 ; Mr 
 Gladstone's enunciation of the necessary principles, 
 ih. ; Mr Bright on the failure of the war-system to 
 secure either of these objects, 310-11 ; the systema- 
 tization of the peace policy — education of public 
 opinion the chief requisite, 312 ; this education will 
 encourage and compel i\\Q Governments to make 
 and keep an international compact, for disarmament 
 and arbitration, 313-4. 
 
 For these ends the cultivation of international good feel- 
 ing should be the first care of a democratic diplo- 
 macy, 314-5 ; this mutual good feeling and 
 benevolence should be a motive rather than a 
 method or an end of our policy, 316-7 ; Mr Bright 
 on Christianity in politics, 317-8 ; the danger of a 
 propagandism of peace based on religious motives 
 and methods, 318-9. 
 
 The alleged selfishness of democratic policy : reasons for 
 questioning the allegation, 319-20 ; a democratic 
 policy based on peaceful enterprise and the in- 
 stincts of freedom is ample for honour as well as 
 for profit, 321. 
 
 The guiding principles of democratic foreign policy in 
 England are often mero;ed in the desire to surround 
 ourselves with free and industrious nations, 321-2 ; 
 and this is not a selfish desire, but one based on the 
 noblest instincts, 323 ; and the English democracy 
 is committed to it in its best interpretation, 324. 
 
 It may be contended that our foreign policy is already 
 shaped and actively directed on these lines : we are 
 not overburdened with guarantees, and we only 
 protect the outposts of freedom in commerce and 
 constitution, 325-6 ; our guarantees, however, are 
 
SUMMARY, 353 
 
 unequal in force : the case of Belgium considered, 
 326 ; the limitation of our guarantees will enable 
 us to retrench : and retrenchment will compel us to 
 rely more upon diplomacy, 327 ; modifications 
 which seem to be desirable in our diplomatic and 
 consular systems, and in the Home Service, 327-30. 
 
 Free Trade and the championship of Free Trade may be 
 looked upon as the actual vocation of England, 331 ; 
 the present assault on Free Trade is the culmination 
 of a five years' antagonism to the characteristic 
 national traditions, 331-2 ; the logical outcome of 
 our adoption of the system of freedom in commerce, 
 333 ; the case of Gibraltar, ih., note; international 
 treaties and approximations, 334-5. 
 
 Recapitulation : conclusion, 335-7. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 A. — Despatch of Canning laying before France 
 the case of the Provisional Government 
 of Spain (1822), 355 
 
 B, — Eoyal Message announcing the despatch of 
 
 troops to Portugal (1826), . . . 357 
 
 C— Canning's Eeasons for recognising the South 
 
 American Republics, . . . .358 
 
 D. — Extracts from Cannings Speech, Dec. 12, 
 
 1826, 360 
 
 E. — Canning's Instructions to the Duke of Wel- 
 lington, on his departure for St Peters- 
 burg, ....... 367 
 
 F. — Memorandum of the Emperor Nicholas (1844), 370 
 
 G. — Lord John Russell's Despatch to Sir J. Hud- 
 son (1860), 372 
 
 z 
 
354 SUMMARY, 
 
 H. — The Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of 
 
 Paris: official Correspondence (1870), . 375 
 
 I. — The Czar's Promise and the Occupation of 
 
 Khiva (1873), 380 
 
 J. — Extracts from Mr Gladstone's Speech on 
 the Action of our Representatives abroad 
 (April, 1881), 383 
 
 K. — Corresj)ondence throwing light on the French 
 change of front in the Greek Question 
 (1880), 387 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 A. 
 
 (Page 119.) 
 
 On the appeal of Spain for England's mediation in 1822, Canning 
 instructed our representative at Paris to acquaint the French Govern- 
 ment with this fact. He was to admit that the concessions offered by 
 Spain were not completely satisfactory ; hut, in making this admission, 
 he was to point out " the peculiar circumstances under which it was 
 written; for although the more enlightened part of the Government, 
 and of the Cortes of Spain, did not believe the Constitution to be in 
 all its parts usefully and permanently practicable," yet could it reason- 
 ably be expected that they would declare their readiness to yield to 
 foreign dictation ] " Let M. de Chateaubriand," said Canning to the 
 Ambassador, "ask of himself, as we in England have asked of ourselves, 
 whether, if there existed in the frame of the Government of France, 
 or of England, respectively, all those imperfections which either 
 theoretical criticism or factious clamour imputes to them, we should 
 consent, even if we were already resolved to probe and to reform those 
 imperfections, to do so on the demand of a foreign Power, made under 
 the menace of foreign war, as the penalty of refusal. . . . Let 
 M. de Chateaubriand further ask himself whether, even by the mode 
 of making that demand, that part of the Spanish Government or nation 
 which might be willing to undertake those ameliorations of the present 
 Constitution of Spain, without which it is alleged to be unsafe to her 
 neighbours, has not been placed in a situation of great difficulty. The 
 Cabinet of France, as well as that of England, must know enough of 
 the course of popular Governments and of the influence of popular 
 parties to be aware that a proposition, even upon indifferent matters, 
 thrown loose before the public at the same time that it is submitted to 
 the Government is one of which the Government is no longer master. 
 How much more so when that proposition is of a nature to appeal to 
 the . strongest passions of mankind, — to pride, to resentment, to 
 
356 APPENDIX. 
 
 patriotism, — and, consequently, to array and exasperate all those pas- 
 sions against a decision which could only be expected from the calmest 
 temper and most deliberate reflection 1 Is it not plain that the same 
 proposition completely changes its nature according to the manner in 
 which it is brought forward % And that a proposition which, if sub- 
 mitted through the regular channels of diplomacy, to a Sovereign or 
 to a Cabinet, might be matter of wholesome advice or amicable remon- 
 strance, when addressed to the mass of a nation aloud, and in the pre- 
 sence of all the world, becomes a taunt and a defiance 1 The publica- 
 tion of the despatch to M. la Garde, while it was yet on its road to 
 Madrid, was defended by the alleged necessity of tranquillising the 
 public mind at Paris ; but if there was a public mind at Paris requir- 
 ing to be tranquillised there was a public mind at Madrid liable to be 
 inflamed ; and if it was so desirable for the Cabinet of the Tuilleries 
 to carry with them the general sense and feeling of the French people, 
 how tremendous was the task imposed upon the Government of Spain, 
 when a concession was extracted from them such as the strongest 
 Government would find it difficult to make, and when they were at 
 the same moment deprived of the opportunity of preparing and recon- 
 ciling (if that had been their wish) the feelings of the people of Spain 
 to that concession? " These observations were not made with a view 
 to inculpate the French Government, but merely for the purpose of 
 reminding de Chateaubriand " of the situation in which the French 
 Ministers had placed themselves towards Spain, by the manner in 
 which their first alternative for war had been propounded ; and of im- 
 pressing upon them the necessity of not omitting any opportunity, 
 however little promising they might deem it, for again stating to Spain 
 the grounds of their dissatisfaction and the nature of their demands." 
 The remainder of the instruction was employed in endeavouring to 
 convince the French Government of the small likelihood of their secur- 
 ing by war the objects which they professed to seek by it. — (^6' 
 cjuoted h%j Staioleton : '' Political Life of Canning '') 
 
APPENDIX. 357 
 
 B. 
 
 (Page 125.) 
 
 The Royal Message drafted by Canning and delivered by him to 
 the House of Commons on Dec. 11th, 1826, was as follows : — 
 
 " George E. — His Majesty acquaints the House of Commons that 
 His Majesty has received an earnest application from the Princess 
 Eegent of Portugal, claiming, in virtue of the ancient obligations of 
 alliance and amity between His Majesty and the Crown of Portugal, 
 His Majesty's aid against an hostile aggression from Spain. His 
 Majesty has exerted himself for some time past, in conjunction with 
 His Majesty's Ally, the King of France, to prevent such an aggression, 
 and repeated assurances have been given by the Court of Madrid of 
 the determination of His Catholic Majesty, neither to commit, nor to 
 allow to be committed, from His Catholic Majesty's territory, any 
 aggression against Portugal ; but His Majesty has learned, with deep 
 concern, that notwithstanding these assurances, hostile inroads into 
 the territory of Portugal have been concerted in Spain, and have been 
 executed under the eyes of Spanish Authorities, by Portuguese 
 Eegiments, which had deserted into Spain, and which the Spanish 
 Government had repeatedly and solemnly engaged to disarm and to 
 disperse. His Majesty leaves no effort unexhausted to awaken the 
 Spanish Government to the dangerous consequences of this connivance. 
 His Majesty makes this communication to the House of Commons 
 with the^^full and entire confidence that his faithful Commons will 
 afford to His Majesty their cordial concurrence and support in main- 
 taining the faith of treaties, and in securing against foreign hostility 
 the safety and independence of the Kingdom of Portugal, the oldest 
 ally of Great Britain. (^« I^-' 
 
358 APPENDIX, 
 
 C. 
 
 (Page 128.) 
 
 Mr Stapleton, in his " Life of Canning," thus summarises the argu- 
 ments by which that statesman defended his recognition of the 
 revolted colonies of Spain : — 
 
 First, it was a measure essentially advantageous to British interests ; 
 being especially calculated to benefit our commerce. N'ext, it enabled 
 this country to remain at peace, since it compensated us for the con- 
 tinued occupation of Spain by a French force, — a disparagement to 
 which, otherwise, it would not have become us to submit. Lastly, it 
 maintained the balance between conflicting principles ; since it gave 
 just as much of a triumph to popular rights and privileges as was 
 sufficient to soothe the irritation felt by their advocates at the victory 
 which absolute principles had obtained by the overthrow of the con- 
 stitutions of Spain, Portugal, and Naples ; and it dealt a death-blow 
 to the Holy Alliance, by disabusing its members of the strange fancy 
 with which they were prepossessed, that " the differences between 
 them and the British Ministers (where they, did differ) were merely 
 feints on the part of the latter to avoid a conflict with public 
 opinion." 
 
 With regard to the first : the extensive commercial transactions 
 between Great Britain and the Spanish Colonies from 1808 to 1825 
 are a sufficient proof of the magnitude of the interests which were at 
 stake. It could not, however, be expected that a trade so consider- 
 able, with such countries, could be carried on without the merchants 
 concerned in it meeting occasionally with some grievances of which they 
 had cause to complain. The authority of Spain was extinguished in 
 almost all of the ports of the Spanish main. If British merchants 
 were aggrieved, there was no authority to which Great Britain could 
 apply for redress ; those possessing the legitimate power, being wholly 
 unable to grant it, and those possessing the de facto power not being 
 recognised as Governments, could not be called upon to remedy evils 
 for which, while unrecognised, they could not be held to be respon- 
 sible. The recognition, therefore, of those de facto Governments, 
 which had the means of protecting the trade carried on with their 
 subjects, gave a security to that trade which must necessarily have 
 been highly advantageous to the individuals who were engaged in it, 
 
APPENDIX, 359 
 
 since security is one of the first essentials of commerce. "With regard 
 to the second : the occupation of Spain by France being prolonged 
 indefinitely was undoubtedly a disparagement to this country, because 
 it disturbed the balance of power in a manner which, if Spain had 
 been the Spain of former days, would have been exactly similar to 
 that which Great Britain had twice before exerted her whole force to 
 prevent. If Mr Canning, therefore, abstained from either making a 
 " direct attack upon France," or " undertaking a war upon the soil of 
 Spain," it was because he saw, not only that the " possession " of that 
 country might " be rendered harmless in rival hands — harmless as 
 regarded us, and valueless to the possessors," — but that compensa- 
 tion might be obtained by conferring a recognised political existence 
 on the different countries of the Spanish Indies ; so that if France 
 occupied Spain, it should not be " Spain with the Indies." With regard 
 to the last : the demonstration of the fact that, because the Spanish 
 American Governments were the offspring of rebellion, and republican 
 in their form. Great Britain would not be prevented from entering 
 with these Governments into treaties of amity and commerce, provided 
 that other circumstances prescribed the fitness of such a course, was 
 an exact counterpoise to the Holy Alliance in refusing to continue 
 diplomatic relations with the constitutional Government of Spain, 
 because that form of government was not the free gift of the Spanish 
 monarch. Moreover, the Holy Alliance was virtually dissolved by the 
 measure ; for from that time forth the intimate union between its 
 members ceased to exist, and they no longer continued to act together 
 upon the same principles. 
 
360 APPENDIX, 
 
 D. 
 
 {Page 128.) 
 
 The following passages are taken from Canning's speech in the 
 House of Commons, on affording aid to Portugal, Dec. 12, 1826 : — 
 
 " Amongst the alliances by which, at different periods, this country 
 has been connected with the other nations of Europe, there is none so 
 old, so constant, so precise in obligations, or so intimately interwoven 
 with the most brilliant periods of the history of this country, as the 
 alliance between Great Britain and the crown of Portugal. It dates 
 back to distant centuries ; it has survived every great conflict. It is 
 much older than the epoch to which I am about to advert, but it 
 received its greatest vigour when the present royal family of Portugal 
 was seated on its throne. The house of Braganza was placed at the 
 head of an independent monarchy at the instance and by the friend- 
 ship of Great Britain. The connexion between the two kingdoms 
 has been continued, renewed, and maintained, under every difficulty ; 
 it has been adhered to in periods when the faith of other alliances 
 has been shaken ; it has been vindicated in those fields of blood and 
 glory which remain among the most brilliant pages of the history of 
 England. Sir, in that alliance we have always been scrupulously 
 faithful. It may sometimes have been burthensome to England, and 
 there may even now be those who wish to shake it off ; but a feeling 
 growing out of national faith, a feeling of common interest, a sym- 
 pathy between the two countries, must, upon consideration, convince 
 everybody of the comparative advantages and obligations of this alli- 
 ance. It is not wholly, however, at distant periods, it is not altogether 
 amongst ages long gone by, that traces of this union are to be found. 
 In the latest compact of modern Europe, that which now forms the 
 patent law of the nations of the world — I mean the Convention of 
 Vienna — this country, with its eyes open to all the inconveniences of 
 the connexion, but with its memory full of all its benefits, and with 
 all the feelings belonging to them, renewed solemnly the previously 
 existing obligations. This it did in terms so strong that there is no 
 possibility of violating them without the most disgraceful breach of 
 national honour. ... It was only this morning that I received intel- 
 ligence announcing that the whole of the constituted authorities in 
 Portugal were most anxious for the presence of the British troops, 
 
APPENDIX, 361 
 
 and that both the Chambers had been unanimous upon the subject. 
 Sir W. A'Court, from whom the information came, stated in his 
 despatch, dated the 29 th of ISTovember, that the day after the news 
 arrived of the entry of the rebels into Villa Seca, application was 
 made by the ministers for British aid, upon the faith of ancient 
 treaties ; the deputies, in a body, gave their assent ; and the peers, 
 rising from their seats, were to a man unanimous upon the subject ; 
 and the Duke of Carhaval described them as all ready to offer every 
 assistance, either personal or otherwise, in their power. Sir W. 
 A'Court's informant stated that the feeling displayed upon the occa- 
 sion was worthy of the good days of Portugal. The question of the 
 reception of our troops being arranged, it came next to be considered 
 whether the casus fcederis had arrived. ISTow, it is clear that bands 
 of armed Portuguese, armed and equipped by Spain, had crossed the 
 Portuguese frontiers, not in one place, but at several points. One 
 incursion had been made at Tras-os-Montes, and others at different 
 other points. It certainly is possible that some slight aggression 
 might have been committed by a few discontented persons or strag- 
 glers at a single point, without creating much alarm ; but when an 
 attack was made in this way upon a whole line of frontier, no doubt 
 could be entertained of the nature and object of the aggression. It is 
 true, it would be more undoubted if a single Spaniard had crossed 
 the frontier with a hostile feeling. But the question with the British 
 Government was this — is there less hostility in a Portuguese army 
 crossing the frontier, when avowedly in the pay and service of Spain ? 
 The incursion, then, by persons nurtured on the soil was at the insti- 
 gation and by the support of foreigners. It is therefore idle to say 
 that it is not in truth and in fact a foreign invasion. It is true that 
 Spain has not availed herself of her own or other mercenaries, but she 
 has made use of the mercenaries of Portugal itself. I have already 
 stated that it was not his Majesty's intention to interfere with the 
 internal regulations of Portugal j that is a question which they must 
 settle amongst themselves. But there is a wide distinction between 
 her internal regulations and foreign aggressions upon her. And 
 when bands of armed refugees, confessedly supported by a foreign 
 power, break in upon her peace and quiet, it would be a laxity in 
 politics and a solecism in morality for which we should be justly con- 
 demned by this House, if we denied to interfere. The question, as it 
 appears to me, is this — there is a treaty, not framed in a corner, but 
 openly avowed to the world — a treaty, known and acknowledged to 
 other courts ; and I am sure that neither can his Majesty refuse to 
 
362 APPENDIX. 
 
 act in accordance with it, nor can the House of Commons consistently 
 refuse to support his Majesty in maintaining the national honour and 
 character, and giving effect to these treaties. This is the case upon 
 which I stand ; and I put it without reference to any collateral points, 
 because I wish to he clearly understood by those to whom this state- 
 ment will find its way. But I have something to add, to which I 
 beg the attention of the House. When I call for the aid of this 
 House and the country in favour of Portugal, it is not to be under- 
 stood that I call upon it to go to war with Spain. I beg honourable 
 gentlemen to bear this in mind ; and farther to understand, that 
 though I think the conduct of Spain unneighbour-like, nay, even 
 contrary to the laws of God and man, still I do not mean to insinuate 
 that there is no compunction, no locus ^xx'nitentice, no possibility of 
 redress, no hope of retracing their steps on the part of that nation. 
 Sir, I say no such thing ; but I do say that it is our duty to fly to 
 the defence of Portugal, be the assailant who he may. I now come 
 to the question of who is the assailant. Sir, the present state of 
 Portugal is so unusual in the history of nations, its history is crowded 
 with events so extraordinary, that I hope I shall not be considered as 
 unnecessarily wasting the time of the House if I enter shortly, and as 
 succinctly as possible, into a detail of a few of its leading facts, and 
 their effects upon the present position of Europe. It is generally 
 known that the king of Portugal was anxious to raise Brazil from a 
 colony to metropolitan condition, and that upon his Majesty's return 
 to Portugal that colony became anxious to achieve her independence, 
 and it was apprehended that the two crowns would be separated. 
 The king of Portugal therefore determined to settle the sovereignty 
 of Brazil upon his eldest son. This was hardly done, the ink with 
 which the deed was made out was hardly dried, when the premature 
 death of the king of Portugal again united both crowns upon one 
 head. The advice of this country, and another nation connected with 
 Brazil, was tendered upon the occasion, and not before the king of 
 Portugal had determined to abdicate the crown of Portugal in favour 
 of his eldest daughter. This abdication was accompanied with the 
 offer of a free constitutional charter. It was stated that this had 
 been done by the advice of Great Britain. It was no such thing — 
 England gave no such advice ; not because ministers approved or dis- 
 approved of such a measure, but because they felt that it formed no 
 part of the duty of an English ministry to interfere with the internal 
 regulations of that or any other country. It is certainly true that 
 that charter was brought from Brazil by a gentleman who has filled, 
 
APPENDIX, 363 
 
 and continues to fill, an office of high trust from this country. Sir 
 Charles Stewart happened to be at Brazil at that time, and he was 
 requested by the king of Portugal to take that charter to Lisbon as 
 he was returning home. Sir Charles Stewart did brin^ it to Portugal ; 
 but no blame whatever attached to that gentleman in consequence of 
 having done so. But he was ordered to return to England, in order 
 to prevent the suspicion that that charter was advised by British 
 councils or supported by British agency. With respect to that 
 charter, I do not feel called upon to give an opinion — I certainly 
 entertain an opinion upon it ; but as an English minister, all I shall 
 say is. May God prosper that attempt at the extension of constitu- 
 tional liberty ; and may the nation to which it is extended prove as 
 fit to receive and cherish it as she is to discharge her other duties 
 amongst the other nations of Europe ! It is impossible that we can 
 desert our ancient allies— but at the same time it is impossible that 
 we could support the Portuguese if there existed a schism amongst 
 the constituted authorities. We do, however, go to Portugal in faith 
 of our treaty; when there, we shall do nothing forcibly; but we 
 shall, at the same time, take care that nothing is done by other 
 nations to prevent the freest action of the constitution there estab- 
 lished. So much I have felt it necessary to say relative to the case 
 of Portugal ; internally it is not our intention to interfere with that 
 country, but external violence shall not be used against her while 
 Great Britain has the power to wield an arm in her defence. ... I 
 set out with saying there were many reasons which induced me to 
 think that nothing short of a point of national faith or national 
 honour — I will not say, would justify, but would make desirable, any 
 approximation to the possibility of a dangerous war. Let me be 
 understood, however, distinctly as not meaning that I dread a war in 
 a good cause (and in no other may it be the lot of this country to 
 engage !) from a distrust of the strength of the country to commence 
 it, or of her resources to maintain it. I dread it indeed, but upon far 
 other grounds ; I dread it from a consciousness of the tremendous 
 power Great Britain possesses of pushing hostilities in which she may 
 be engaged to consequences which I shudder to contemplate. Some 
 years ago, in the discussion of the negotiations with Spain, I took the 
 liberty of adverting to a topic of this nature — that the position of this 
 country was one of neutrality, not only between contending nations, 
 but between contending principles ; and that it was in the position of 
 neutrality alone we could maintain that balance the preservation of 
 which I believed to be essential to the peace and safety of the world. 
 
36i APPENDIX. 
 
 Four years' experience (it is now more than three years and a half 
 from that date) has confirmed rather than altered my opinion. I fear 
 that the next war to he kindled in Europe, if it spread heyond the 
 narrow limits of Spain and Portugal, will he a war of a most tremen- 
 dous character — a war not merely of conflicting armies, hut of con- 
 flicting opinions. I know that if into that war this country enters 
 (and if she do engage, I trust it will he with a most sincere desire to 
 mitigate rather than exasperate, and to contend with arms rather than 
 with the more fatal artillery of popular excitation), she will see under 
 her banners, arrayed for the contest, all the discontented and restless 
 spirits of the age — all those who, whether justly or unjustly, are dis- 
 satisfied with the present state of their own countries. The conscious- 
 ness of such a situation excites all my fears ; for it shows that there 
 exists a power, to he wielded by Great Britain, more tremendous than 
 was, perhaps, ever yet brought into action in the history of mankind. 
 But though it may be ' excellent to have a giant's strength,' it may 
 he ' tyrannous to use it like a giant.' The knowledge that we possess 
 this strength is our security ; and our business is not to seek oppor- 
 tunities of displaying it, but by a partial and half-shown exhibition of 
 it to make it felt that it is the interest of exaggerators, on both sides, 
 to shrink from converting their umpire into their competitor. The 
 situation of this country may be compared to that of the ruler of the 
 winds, as described by the poet : — 
 
 Celsa sedet .^Eolus arce 
 
 Sceptra tenens ; mollitque animos et temperat iras : 
 Ni faciat, niaria ac terras coelumque profundum 
 Quippe ferant rapidi secum, verrantque per auras. 
 
 The consequence of letting loose the passions at present chained and 
 confined would be the production of a scene of desolation which no 
 man can contemplate without horror ; and I should not sleep easy on 
 my couch if I thought by a single moment I had precipitated it. 
 This, then, is the reason — a reason the reverse of fear — a reason the 
 contrary of disability — why I dread the recurrence of a war. That 
 this reason may be felt by those who are acting on opposite princi- 
 ples, before the time for using our power shall arrive, I would bear 
 much, and I would forbear long • I would almost put up with any- 
 thing that did not touch our national faith and national honour, 
 rather than let slip the furies of war, the leash of which is in our 
 hands, while we know not whom they may reach, and doubt where 
 the devastation may end. Such is the love of peace which the British 
 
APPENDIX. 3G5 
 
 Government acknowledges, and such tlie duty of peace which the cir- 
 cumstances of the world inculcate. In obedience to this conviction, 
 and with the hope of avoiding extremities, I will push no farther the 
 topics of this part of the address. Let us defend Portugal, whoever 
 may be the assailants, because it is a work of duty ; and let us end 
 where that duty ends. We go to Portugal, not to rule, not to govern, 
 not to dictate, not to prescribe — but to plant our standard, and to 
 secure her independence. Where the standard of England is planted, 
 there foreign dominion shall not come." 
 
 In reply to some observations from Hume and others. Can- 
 ning said : — " I candidly admit that I have understated the case 
 against Spain. I have done so purposely and designedly, and I 
 warned the House that I did so, wishing to attack no more of the 
 conduct of Spain than was sufficient to establish a casus foederis^ and 
 not to attack so much of it as would have rendered it absolutely im- 
 possible to avoid a war, which the full statement of the case would 
 have done. An amendment has been made, and it has been justified 
 by a reference to a declaration which I made some years ago, when I 
 stated that it would be exceedingly onerous for this country to engage 
 in war. The difference between the two cases, upon which I ground 
 the difference of conduct, is that in the one instance I maintained 
 that war was to be avoided when we were not obliged to engage in 
 it ; whereas in the present case I say that unless it can be averted 
 by seasonable demonstrations on the part of this country, war cannot 
 be avoided." He could not, without giving to hostilities that tremen- 
 dous character which ought to be avoided, agree to the repeal of the 
 Foreign Enlistment Act, although such a retaliation would be per- 
 fectly justifiable. With regard to the withdrawal of the French 
 troops from Spain, it did not at all affect the present question. " I 
 most sincerely believe that the exertions of France are directed to the 
 preservation of existing treaties ; and it is my conviction that if the 
 army was withdrawn, party rage would reassume its desperate charac- 
 ter, and that class, avowedly the least in numbers, would become its 
 victims." He denied that the position of England was affected by the 
 French occupation of Spain. He did not believe that this was that 
 Spain of which our ancestors were so justly jealous — that Spain upon 
 whose territories it was proudly boasted that the sun never set. The 
 balance of power had been greatly altered in the course of a century. 
 "If we have for the present been dispossessed of anything in our 
 situation as forming part of the balance of power, we have been fully 
 compensated. Was it necessary to blockade Cadiz to restore the situ- 
 
366 APPENDIX, 
 
 ation of England ? No. I looked at the possessions of Spain on the 
 other side of the Atlantic ; I looked at the Indies, and I called in the 
 New World to redress the balance of the Old. This, then, is my 
 answer — France has gained no advantage, obtained no power ; Spain 
 is become to her a source of unpalliated and unmitigated evil; I 
 believe she would be glad of anything which would help her out of 
 the difficulty in which she has placed herself ; I believe she would be 
 thankful to us for any interference which would tend to relieve her 
 of her unprofitable accession ; but it is our present policy to rivet her 
 in her bondage, and make it with her a point of honour. I feel 
 bound to express my sense of the support which has been so generally, 
 and with such gi'atifying language, bestowed upon his Majesty's 
 Government in this emergency. I repeat again that our object is not 
 war ; our object is, to be enabled to take the most effective measures 
 for the preservation of peace." 
 
APPENDIX, 367 
 
 E. 
 
 (Page 139.) 
 
 In the instructions given by Canning to the Duke of Wellington 
 on the departure of the latter for St Petersburg, the Foreign 
 Minister wrote : — ■ 
 
 *' It was to be hoped that the renewal of the Conferences would not 
 be proposed by any one. No Power except Prussia had recently 
 adverted to it as within the scope of reasonable expectation. But 
 Prussia having no contact with Turkey, and no intercourse with 
 Greece, had no more interest than anj'' of the remotest Powers of 
 Europe in the question at issue. The object of the British Govern- 
 ment was to avoid the fruitless and perplexing process of a Conference ; 
 and for this end there was perhaps no more convenient mode than by 
 multiplying the conditions which alone would induce the British 
 Ministry to allow a British Plenipotentiary to attend. The conditions 
 which Great Britain had already invariably required were : — I. The 
 complete re-establishment of the Eussian Mission at Constantinople. 
 2. An abjuration by all parties concerned of any employment of force 
 against either Greeks or Turks. To these were then to be added, 3. 
 An abjuration by all and each of the intervening parties of any views 
 of aggrandisement or peculiar advantage to be derived to themselves 
 either from the success or the failure of the intervention. But if 
 Great Britain further insisted, as it was but reasonable to do, that the 
 King of the Netherlands, the Maritime Power next in importance in 
 Europe to England and Prance, should likewise be invited to take 
 part in any Conference to be held on a question so nearly touching 
 maritime interests ; and further, if she required (as had been already 
 proposed by Prince Metternich), 4. That the seat of the Conference 
 should be London ; the result would probably be either that the pro- 
 posal would be got rid of altogether through the separate objections of 
 different Powers to the several conditions annexed to it, or that, if, 
 contrary to all expectation, all parties should waive their objections for 
 the sake of obtaining British co-operation, the British Government 
 would at least afford that co-operation on their own terms. England 
 would then go into a Conference wholly different in character from 
 those against whose decisions she had twice had to protest in the face 
 
368 APPENDIX. 
 
 of the world, and the British Ministers would have an account of the 
 principles and intentions of that Conference to render which might be 
 rendered without disguise not only to the parties whose interests were 
 discussed, but to the British Parliaroent and nation. It could not be 
 supposed — it was in truth utterly hopeless — that such a Conference 
 would be able to settle the disputes of Turkey and Greece. But it 
 would have a better chance of so doing than a Conference consisting 
 of five Powers, of whom one (Kussia) would be in a state bordering on 
 hostility to the Turks ; another (Austria) virtually and in conduct 
 their Ally ; the third (France) involved in complicated intrigues alike 
 with Greece and with Egypt • the fourth (Prussia) only either the 
 instigator or the abettor of violent counsels in JJussia ; and England 
 paralysed in her endeavours to do good by the conflicting interests 
 and passions of her Allies." Dismissing, therefore, the notion of a 
 Conference, Canning reverted to the consideration of a confidential 
 concert between Great Britain and Russia. '' In such concert there 
 was little or no difficulty to be apprehended from the Greeks. They 
 had already thrown themselves upon the aid of England so confidently 
 that she had only to name the terms of her interference. If, there- 
 fore, Mr Stratford Canning's attempt at separate intervention should 
 have failed, it was unlikely that in their then state they would reject 
 the only remaining hope of extrication from their dangers by refusing 
 to admit Eussia into the mediation. But if the ofier of the joint 
 intervention of England and Russia should be rejected by the Porte, 
 the next point to be considered was, what course England would 
 adopt herself, and what she would recommend to Russia to pursue 1 
 In solving this question, it was necessary to ask, however England 
 might deny the right of Russia to go to war, what probability there 
 was of preventing it 1 Prevention could only be effected — 1. Either 
 by a combination with Austria and Erance, or, 2. by the single admoni- 
 tion of Great Britain to Russia, that she would not see the Turkish 
 Power destroyed. As to the first mode, France had distinctly avowed 
 that she could not tolerate a division of Turkey like that of Poland, 
 by which Russia and Austria alone should be the sharers. Austria, 
 too, feared hostilities between Russia and Turkey. But both France 
 and Austria might be looking to become partakers in the spoils, and 
 their opposition might cease so soon as Russia was successful. Thus 
 the task of resistance to Russia would devolve on England alone ; and 
 if the Sultan's throne were laid prostrate England might be involved 
 in war, not only with Russia but with the other Continental Powers. 
 As to the latter mode, would it be sound policy for Great Britain 
 
APPENDIX. 369 
 
 singly to undertake the defence of the Porte 1 and would her Govern- 
 ment have been supported by Parliament in such a war, Eussia 
 espousing (as in that event she would) the cause of the unhappy 
 Greeks? In 1791 the Parliament refused to interpose to arrest the 
 progress of Russia towards Turkey, and that before the struggles of the 
 Greeks for their independence had excited the sympathies of the 
 English public. On the other hand, if Eussia were to mingle in the 
 fray, would it be possible for England long to preserve that even- 
 handed neutrality which would probably end in the partition of the 
 Turkish Empire, and in a general contest for the spoils *? It was 
 therefore well worth while to consider whether, in the hopelessness of 
 avoiding altogether an ultimate participation in those consequences, 
 the British Government might not, in perfect consistency with the 
 principles which it had thus far professed, take some active measure 
 which, by restraining the excesses of the existing war between Turkey 
 and the Greeks, might force upon the former that disposition to 
 accommodation which would afford the best, if not the only, chance 
 of producing a change in the warlike counsels of the Eussian 
 Emperor. " 
 
 2- A 
 
370 APPENDIX, 
 
 (Page 1G6.) 
 
 It was in June 1844 that the Czar Nicholas visited England, and 
 endeavoured to come to an understanding with the Government. 
 Mr Kinglake ("Invasion of the Crimea," vol, i.) refers to this visit 
 in the following terms. The Czar, he says, "evidently meeting with 
 no encouragement, covered his retreat by giving in his adhesion to 
 England's accustomed policy, and to do this with the better effect 
 he left in our Foreign Office a solemn declaration not only of his 
 own policy but likewise, strange to say, of the policy of Austria ; 
 and all this he blended in a somewhat curious manner with words 
 which might be read as importing that his views had obtained the 
 sanction of the English Government. But it must be certain that 
 the Duke of Wellington, Sir Kobert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen re- 
 frained, as it is the custom of our statesmen to do, from all hypo- 
 thetical engagements." — The substance of the paper here referred to 
 is as follows : — 
 
 " Eussia and England are mutually penetrated with the conviction 
 that it is for their common interest that the Ottoman Porte should 
 maintain itself in a state of independence and of territorial possession 
 which at present constitutes that empire, as that political combination 
 is the one which is most compatible with the general interest and the 
 maintenance of peace. Being agreed on this principle, Russia and 
 England have an equal interest in uniting their efforts in order to 
 keep up the existence of the Ottoman Empire, and to avert all the 
 dangers which can place in jeopardy its safety. With this object, 
 the essential point is to suffer the Porte to live in repose, without 
 needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings, and without inter- 
 fering, without absolute necessity, in its internal affairs. In order to 
 carry out skilfully this system of forbearance, with a view to the 
 well-understood interest of the Porte, two things must not be lost 
 sight of. They are these : — In the lirst place, the Porte has a con- 
 stant tendency to extricate itself from the engagements imposed upon 
 it by the treaties which it has concluded with other Powers. It 
 hopes to do so with impunity, because it reckons on the mutual 
 jealousy of the Cabinets. It thinks that if it fails in its engagements 
 towards one of them, the rest will espouse its quarrel, and will screen 
 
APPENDIX. 371 
 
 it from all responsibility. It is essential not to confirm the Porte in 
 this delusion. Every time that it fails in its obligations towards one 
 of the Great Powers, it is the interest of all the rest to make it sen- 
 sible of its error, and seriously exhort it to act rightly towards the 
 Cabinet which demands just reparation. The object for which 
 Russia and England will have to come to an understanding may be 
 expressed in the following manner: — 1. To seek to maintain the 
 existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present state, so long as that 
 political combination shall be possible. 2. If we foresee that it must 
 crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to everything 
 relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to re- 
 place that which now exists, and, in conjunction with each other, to 
 see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation 
 of that empire shall not injuriously affect either the security of their 
 own States, and the rights which the treaties assure them respectively, 
 or the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. For the purpose 
 thus stated, the policy of Russia and Austria ... is closely united 
 by the principle of perfect identity. If England as the principal 
 maritime Power acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that 
 France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course 
 agreed upon between St Petersburg, London, and Vienna. Conflict 
 between the Great Powers being thus obviated, it is to be hoped 
 that the peace of Europe will be maintained even in the midst of 
 such serious circumstances." 
 
272 APPENDIX, 
 
 G. 
 
 (Page 173.) 
 
 The following despatch was sent hy Lord John Russell to Sir James 
 Hudson, Envoy Extraordinary at the Court of the King of Sardinia, 
 on October 27, 1860 :— 
 
 " Sir, — It appears that the late proceedings of the King of Sardinia 
 have been strongly disapproved of by several of the principal Courts 
 of Europe. The Emperor of the French, on hearing of the invasion 
 of the Papal States by the army of General Cialdini, withdrew his 
 Minister from Turin, expressing at the same time the opinion of the 
 Imperial Government in condemnation of the invasion of the Roman 
 territory. The Emperor of Russia has, we are told, declared in strong 
 terms his indignation at the entrance of the army of the King of 
 Sardinia into the Neapolitan territory, and has withdrawn his entire 
 mission from Turin. The Prince Regent of Prussia has also thought 
 it necessary to convey to Sardinia a sense of his displeasure ; but he 
 has not thought it necessary to remove the Prussian Minister from 
 Turin. After these diplomatic acts, it would scarcely be just to Italy, 
 or respectful to the other Great Powers of Europe, were the Govern- 
 ment of Her Majesty any longer to withhold the expression of their 
 opinions. In so doing, however. Her Majesty's Government have no 
 intention to raise a dispute upon the reasons which have been given, 
 in the name of the King of Sardinia, for the invasion of the Roman 
 and Neapolitan States. Whether or no the Pope was justified in 
 defending his authority by means of foreign levies ; whether the King 
 of the Two Sicilies, while still maintaining his flag at Capua and 
 Gaeta, can be said to have abdicated — are not the arguments upon 
 which Her Majesty's Government propose to dilate. The large 
 questions which appear to them to be at issue are these : — Were the 
 people of Italy justified in asking the assistance of the King of 
 Sardinia to relieve them from Governments with which they are dis- 
 contented, and was the King of Sardinia justified in furnishing the 
 assistance of his arms to the people of the Roman and Neapolitan 
 States ? There appear to have been two motives which have induced 
 the people of the Roman and Neapolitan States to have joined 
 willingly in the subversion of their Governments. The first of these 
 was that the Governments of the Pope and the King of the Two 
 
AFFIJNDIX. 373 
 
 Sicilies provided so ill for the administration of justice, the protection 
 of personal liberty, and the general welfare of the people, that their 
 subjects looked forward to the overthrow of their rulers as a necessary 
 preliminary to all improvements in their condition. The second 
 motive was that a conviction had spread since the year 1849 that the 
 only manner in which Italians could secure their independence of 
 foreign control was by forming one strong Government for the whole 
 of Italy. The struggle of Charles Albert in 1848, and the sympathy 
 which the present King of Sardinia has shown for the Italian cause, 
 have naturally caused the association of the name of Victor Emmaimel 
 with the single authority under which the Italians aspire to live. 
 Looking at the question in this view, Her Majesty's Government 
 must admit that the Italians themselves are the best judges of their 
 own interests. That eminent jurist Yattel, when discussing the law- 
 fulness of the assistance given by the United Provinces to the Prince 
 of Orange when he invaded England and overturned the throne of 
 James II., says : 'The authority of the Prince of Orange had doubt- 
 less an influence on the deliberation of the States-General, but it did 
 not lead them to the commission of an act of injustice; for when a 
 people from good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but 
 an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of 
 their liberties.' Therefore according to Vattel, the question resolves 
 itself into this : — Did the people of Naples and of the Koman States 
 take up arms against their Governments for good reasons 1 Upon this 
 grave matter Her Majesty's Government hold that the people in ques- 
 tion are themselves the best judges of their own affairs. Her Majesty's 
 Government do not feel justified in declaring that the people of 
 Southern Italy had not good reasons for throwing off their allegiance 
 to their former Government; Her Majesty's Government cannot, 
 therefore, pretend to blame the King of Sardinia for assisting them. 
 There remains, however a question of fact. It is asserted by the 
 partisans of the fallen Governments that the people of the Roman 
 States were attached to the Pope, and the people of the kingdom of 
 Naples to the dynasty of Francis II., but that Sardinian agents and 
 foreign adventurers have by force and intrigue subverted the thrones 
 of those Sovereigns. It is difficult, however, to believe, after the 
 astonishing events that have been seen, that the Pope and the King 
 of the Two Sicilies possessed the love of their people. How was it, 
 one must ask, that the Pope found it impossible to levy a Roman 
 army, and that he was forced to rely almost entirely on foreign 
 mercenaries ? How did it happen, again, that Garibaldi conquered 
 
374 APPENDIX. 
 
 nearly all Sicily with 2000 men, and marched from Reggio to ^N'aples 
 with 5000 ? How but from the universal disaffection of the people 
 of the Two Sicilies 1 Neither can it be said that this testimony of the 
 popular will was capricious or causeless. Forty years ago the Neapoli- 
 tan people made an attempt regularly and temperately to reform their 
 Government under a reigning dynasty. The Powers of Europe 
 assembled at Laybach resolved, with the exception of England, to 
 put down this attempt by force. It was put down, and a large foreign 
 army of occupation was left in the Two Sicilies to maintain social 
 order. In 1848, the Neapolitan people again attempted to secure 
 liberty under the Bourbon dynast3% but their best patriots atoned by 
 an imprisonment of ten years for the offence of endeavouring to free 
 their country. What wonder, then, that in 1860 the Neapolitan 
 mistrust and resentment should throw off the Bourbons, as in 1688 
 England had thrown off the Stuarts ? It must be admitted, undoubtedly, 
 that the severance of the ties which bind together a Sovereign and 
 his subjects is in itself a misfortune. Notions of allegiance become 
 confused ; the succession to the Throne is disputed ; adverse parties 
 threaten the peace of society ; rights and pretensions are opposed to 
 each other and mar the harmony of the State. Yet it must be acknow- 
 ledged, on the other hand, that the Italian revolution has been con- 
 ducted with singular temper and forbearance. The subversion of 
 existing power has not been followed, as is too often the case, by an 
 outburst of popular vengeance. The extreme views of democrats have 
 nowhere prevailed. Public opinion has checked the excesses of public 
 triumph. The venerated forms of Constitutional Monarchy have been 
 associated with the name of a Prince who represents an ancient and 
 glorious dynasty. Such have been the causes and concomitant circum- 
 stances of the revolution of Italy. Her Majesty's Government can 
 see no sufficient ground for the severe censure with which Austria, 
 Prance, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of 
 Sardinia. Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to 
 the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their 
 liberties, and consolidating the work of their independence, amid the 
 sympathies and good wishes of Europe. — I am, &c., 
 
 (Signed) " J. Russell." 
 
APPENDIX, 375 
 
 H. 
 
 (Page 207.) 
 
 Articles 11-14 and 19 of the Treaty of Paris, relating to the neutral- 
 isation of the Black Sea, run as follows : 
 
 "11. The Black Sea is neutralised; its waters and ports, open to 
 the mercantile marine of all nations, are formally and for ever closed 
 to the war ships of the Powers on the coasts, as well as of every other 
 Power, saving the exceptions mentioned in articles 14 and 19 of the 
 present treaty. 
 
 "12. Commerce in the ports and waters of the Black Sea, freed 
 from every kind of restraint, shall be subject only to regulations of 
 health, customs, and police, drawn up in a spirit favourable to the 
 development of commercial transactions. In order to give desirable 
 security to the commercial and maritime interests of all nations, 
 Kut«sia and the Sublime Porte shall admit consuls into their ports on 
 the shore of the Black Sea, in conformity with the principles of inter- 
 national right. 
 
 " 13. The Black Sea being neutralised, as stated in article 11, the 
 maintenance or establishment on its coasts of naval arsenals becomes 
 unnecessary and purposeless. Therefore His Majesty the Emperor of 
 All the Russias and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan undertake not 
 to construct or retain any naval arsenal on these coasts. 
 
 "14. Their Majesties the Emperor of All the Russias and the 
 Sultan having concluded an agreement with the view of determining 
 the force and number of the vessels of light burden necessary for 
 their coast-service, which they reserve to themselves the right of 
 maintaining in the Black Sea, this agreement is annexed to the 
 present treaty, and shall have the same force and value as if it 
 formed an integral part thereof. It cannot be either annulled or 
 modified without the consent of the signatary Powers of the present 
 
 treaty. 
 
 " 19. In order to insure the execution of the regulations which shall 
 have been laid down by common consent, in accordance with the 
 principles declared above [in articles 15-18 relating to the navigation 
 of the Danube] each of the contracting Powers shall have the right 
 of stationing at aU times two vessels of light burden at the mouths of 
 the Danube." 
 
 Prince Gortchakoffs Circular to the Powers, rejecting the Treaty of 
 
376 APPENDIX. 
 
 1856, was dated OctolDer 31, 1870. After referring to several facts 
 which seemed to the Russian Government to have greatly modified 
 the circumstances in which Russia assented to the Treaty, the 
 Circular proceeds as follows : — 
 
 " Our august Master cannot admit that treaties violated in their 
 essential and general clauses should continue to be binding in those 
 clauses which affect the direct interests of his empire. His Imperial 
 Majesty cannot admit, in fact, that the security of Russia should rest 
 upon a fiction which has not withstood the ordeal of time, and that 
 it should be endangered in consequence of his respect towards engage- 
 ments which have not been performed in all their integrity. Relying 
 on the sense of equity of the Powers signataries of the Treaty of 1856, 
 and the consciousnsss these have of their own dignity, the Emperor 
 bids you declare that his Imperial Majesty can no longer consider 
 himself bound to the terms of the Treaty of March 18, 1856, in so far 
 as these limit his rights of sovereignty in the Black Sea. That his 
 Imperial Majesty considers it his right and his duty to give notice to 
 his IMajesty the Sultan of his withdrawal from the special and addi- 
 tional convention annexed to that treaty, which fixes the numbed and 
 the size of the men-of-war which the two Powers bordering on the 
 Black Sea reserve to keep in the said sea. That he conveys loyal 
 information of this to the Powers and guarantors signataries of the 
 general treaty, of which the special treaty is an integral part. That 
 in this respect he replaces the Sultan in full possession of all his 
 rights in the same manner as he reclaims his own. In the discharge 
 of this duty, you will be careful to state that our august master has 
 no other object in all this besides the security and dignity of his 
 Empire. It is by no means the intention of his Imperial Majesty to 
 revive the Eastern question. On this, as on all other points, he harbours 
 no other wish than the maintenance and consolidation of peace. He 
 entirely adheres otherwise ^ to the general principles of the Treaty of 
 1856, which have established the position of Turkey in the European 
 concert. He is prepared to come to an understanding with the 
 Powers who signed the Treaty, either with a view to comfirm its 
 general stipulations, to renew them, or to substitute for them any 
 other arrangement which may seem equitable and calulated to ensure 
 the peace of the East and the European balance of power. His Ma- 
 jesty is convinced that this peace and this balance of power will 
 receive an additional guarantee by being laid on more just and solid 
 bases than those arising from a position which no great Power could 
 accept as a normal condition of existence." 
 
APPENDIX, 377 
 
 Lord Granville replied to this Circular on November 10, pointing 
 out that the independent action of Eussia was such as would 
 weaken the force of all treaties ; and none the less because Prince 
 Gortchakofif had affirmed that his Government were willing to ob- 
 serve certain articles of the instrument of 1856. *'The question 
 arises," Lord Granville continued, " not whether any desire expressed 
 by Eussia ought to be carefully examined in a friendly spirit by the co- 
 signatary Powers, but whether they are to accept from her the announce- 
 ment that by her own act, without any consent from them, she has 
 released herself from a solemn covenant. I need scarcely say that her 
 Majesty's Government have received this communication with deep 
 regret, because it opens a discussion which might unsettle the cordial 
 understanding it has been their earnest endeavour to maintain with 
 the Eussian Empire ; and for the above mentioned reasons it is im- 
 possible for her Majesty's Government to give any sanction on their 
 part to the course announced by Prince Gortchakoff. If, instead of 
 such a declaration, the Eussian Government had addressed her 
 Majesty's Government and the other Powers who are parties to the 
 Treaty of 1856, and had proposed for consideration with them whether 
 anything has occurred which could be held to amount to an infrac- 
 tion of the treaty, or whether there is anything in the terms which, 
 from altered circumstances, presses with undue severity upon Eussia, 
 or which, in the course of events, has become unnecessary for the 
 due protection of Turkey, her Majesty's Government would not have 
 refused to examine the question in concert with the co-signataries of 
 the treaty. Whatever might have been the result of such communi- 
 cations, a risk of future complication and a very dangerous precedent 
 as to the validity of international obligations would have been 
 avoided." 
 
 On the 20th of November Prince Gortchakoff replied to this Note 
 as follows : — 
 
 ** Our august Master had to discharge an imperious duty to his own 
 country, without wishing to injure in any way the Governments which 
 were signataries of the Treaty of 1856. On the contrary his Imperial 
 Majesty appeals to their sense of justice and their regard to their own 
 dignity. We regret to see that Lord Granville addresses himself prin- 
 cipally to the form of our communications. The form was not our 
 choice. We could have asked nothing better surely than to attain our 
 end by an agreement with the signataries of the Treaty of 1856. But 
 the principal Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty well knows 
 that the attempts made at different times to assemble the Powers in a 
 
378 APPENDIX, 
 
 general Conference with a view to remove the causes of difficulty which 
 disturbed the general peace have invariably failed. The prolongation 
 of the present crisis, and the absence of a regular government in 
 Trance postpone still further the possibility of such an agreement 
 Meanwhile the position in which the treaty left Russia has become 
 more and more intolerable. Lord Granville will agree that the Europe 
 of to-day is very far from being the Europe which signed the Treaty 
 of 1^56. It was impossible that Russia should agree to being the 
 only Power bound indefinitely by an arrangement which, onerous as 
 it was at the time when it was concluded, became daily weaker in its 
 guarantees. Our august Master has too deep a sense of what he owes 
 to his country to force it to submit any longer to an obligation against 
 which the national sentiment protests. We cannot admit that the 
 abrogation of a purely theoretical principle to which no immediate 
 efi'ect is given, and which simply restores to Russia a right of which 
 no Great Power could consent to be deprived, should be considered as 
 a menace to peace ; or that in annulling one point of the Treaty of 
 1856 there is any implication that all are annulled. The Imperial 
 Cabinet never had any such intention. On the contrary, our com- 
 munication of October 19th (31st) declares in the most explicit terms 
 that his Majesty the Emperor fully maintains his adhesion to the 
 general principles of the Treaty of 1856, and that he is ready to come 
 to an agreement with the signatary Powers of that treaty, either to 
 confirm its general stipulations or to renew them, or to substitute for 
 them any other equitable arrangement which may be thought suitable 
 to secure the repose of the East and the equilibrium of Europe. 
 ^Jliere seems then to be no reason why the Cabinet of London should 
 not, if it please, enter into an explanation with the signataries of the 
 Treaty of 1856. For our part we are ready to join in any deliberation 
 having for its object the settlement of guarantees for the consolidation 
 of peace in the East. We are persuaded that fresh guarantees would 
 be found in the removal of a permanent cause of irritation between 
 the two Powers the most directly interested. Their mutual relations 
 would be more firmly established on the basis of a good and solid 
 understanding." 
 
 A few days later Prince Bismarck issued his invitations to the Con- 
 ference, which the English Cabinet, after much deliberation, saw fit to 
 accept. On November 28, Lord Granville wrote to Prince Gortchakoff, 
 and, referring to his declaration that the Russian Government did not 
 intend to give immediate application to its formal resumption of 
 liberty in the Plack Sea, wrote : — - 
 
APPENDIX. 370 
 
 " If these words are to be construed into an announcement that 
 Eussia has formed and stated her own opinion of her rights, hut has 
 no intention of acting in conformity with it without due concert with 
 the other Powers, they go far to close the controversy in which the 
 two Governments have been engaged. Her Majesty's Government 
 have no objection to accept the invitation of Prussia to a Conference, 
 upon the understanding that it is assembled without any foregone con- 
 clusion as to its results. In such case her Majesty's Government will 
 he glad to consider with perfect fairness, and the respect due to a great 
 and friendly Power, any proposals which Russia may have to make." 
 
380 APPENDIX. 
 
 I. 
 
 (Page 210.) 
 
 The promise of tlie Czar, referred to in the text, will be found em- 
 bodied in the following despatch from Earl Granville to Lord A. 
 Loftus : — 
 
 Foreign Office, Jan. 8th, 1873. 
 
 ** My Lord, — Having received information from your Excellency and 
 from Count Erunnow that Count Schouvalow, a statesman enjoyin^^ 
 the full confidence of the Emperor of Russia, bad left St Petersburgh 
 for London at the desire of his Imperial Majesty, I had the pleasure 
 of receivinor his Excellency on the 8tli instant. He confirmed the fact 
 that it was by the Emperor's desire that he sought a personal inter- 
 view with me. It had caused great surprise to his Imperial Majesty 
 to learn from various sources that a certain amount of excitement and 
 susceptibility had been caused in this country on account of questions 
 connected with Central Asia. The Emperor knew of no questions in 
 Central Asia which could affect the good understanding between the 
 two countries. It was true that no agreement has been come to as to 
 some of the details of the arrangement concluded by Lord Clarendon 
 and Prince Gortchakow on the basis of Mr Forsyth's recommenda- 
 tions as to the boundaries of Afghanistan ; but the question ought 
 not to be a cause to ruffle the good relations between the two 
 countries. His Imperial Majesty had agreed to almost everything 
 we had asked. There remained only one point regarding the pro- 
 vinces of Badakshan and Wakhan. There might be arguments used 
 respectively by the departments of each Government, but the Emperor 
 was of opinion that such a question should not be a cause of differ- 
 ence between the two countries, and his Imperial Majesty w&s deter- 
 mined it should not be so. He was the more inclined to carry out 
 this determination in consequence of His Majesty's belief in the 
 conciliatory policy of Her Majesty's Government. Count Schouvalow 
 added on his own part that he had every reason to believe, if it were 
 desired by Her Majesty's Government, the agreement might be arrived 
 at at a very early period. With regard to the expedition to Khiva, 
 it was true that it was decided upon for next spring. To give an 
 
APPENDIX. 381 
 
 idea of its character it was sufficient to say that it would consist of 
 four and a half hattaHons. Its object was to punish acts of brigan- 
 dage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan that 
 such conduct on his part could not be continued with the impunity 
 in which the moderation of Eussia had led him to believe. Not only 
 was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of 
 Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and direc- 
 tions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not 
 in any way lead to a prolonged occupation of Khiva. Count Schou- 
 valow repeated the surprise which the Emperor, entertaining such 
 sentiments, felt at the uneasiness which it was said existed in England 
 on the subject, and he gave the most decided assurance that I might 
 give positive assurances to Parliament on this matter. With regard to 
 the uneasiness which might exist in England on the subject of Central 
 Asia, I could not deny the fact to Count Schouvalow ; the people of 
 this country were decidedly in favour of peace, but a great jealousy 
 existed as to anything which really affected our honour and interest ; 
 that they were particularly alive to anything affecting India ; that the 
 progress of Russia had been considerable, and sometimes, as it would 
 appear, like England in India, and France in Algeria, more so than 
 was desired by the Central Governments ; that the Clarendon and 
 Gortchakow arrangements, apparently agreeable to both Governments, 
 had met with great delay as to its final settlement; that it was with 
 the object of coming to a settlement satisfactory to both countries, 
 and in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, that I had addressed to your 
 Excellency the despatch of the 17th October. The only point of 
 difference which now remained, as Count Schouvalow had pointed 
 out, concerned Badakshan and Wakhan. In our opinion, historical 
 facts proved that these countries were under the domination of the 
 Sovereign of Cabul, and we have acknowledged as much in the public 
 documents; that, with regard to the expedition to Khiva, Count 
 Schouvalow was aware that Lord Northbrook had given the strongest 
 advice to the Khan to comply with the reasonable demands of the 
 Emperor, and if the expedition were undertaken and carried out with 
 the object and within the limits described by Count Schouvalow it 
 would meet with no remonstrance from Her Majesty's Government, 
 but it would undoubtedly excite public attention, and make the 
 settlement of the boundary of Afghanistan more important for the 
 object which both Governments had in view, viz., peace in Central 
 Asia and good relations between the two countries. As to coming to 
 a decision at an early date, it appeared to me desirable, inasmuch as 
 
382 APPENDIX. 
 
 it would bear a different aspect if arrived at in the spirit with which 
 both Governments were actuated, and not complicated by possible 
 discussions raised in the British Parliament. I concluded by telling 
 Count Schouvalow that I knew the confidence which was placed in 
 him by the Emperor, and that I felt sure that my colleagues w^ould 
 agree with me in appreciating his visit to England, as a gratifying 
 proof of the eminently conciliatory and friendly spirit with which the 
 Emperor desired to settle without delay the question at issue. 
 — I am, &c., Sid. 
 
 (Signed) '' Granville. 
 
 'J 
 
 These are the first two articles of the treaty concluded between 
 General Kaulfmann, Governor-general of Turkestan, and the Ameer of 
 Bokhara, signed Oct. 10, 1873 : — 
 
 " Art. I. The line of frontier between the dominions of His 
 Imperial Majesty the Emj)eror of all the Eussias and those of His 
 Eminence the Ameer of Bokhara remains unaltered. 
 
 "All the Khivan territory on the right bank of the Amou Darya 
 being now annexed to the Russian Dominions, the former frontier 
 separating the possessions of the Ameer of Bokhara from the Khanate 
 of Khiva, and stretching on the west from the locahty called Khalata 
 towards Gugertli *Togai' on the right bank of Amou is abohshed. 
 The territory situated between the former Bokhara-Khivan frontier, 
 the right bank of the Amou Darya from Gugertli to Meshekh 
 ' Togai' inclusive, and the line passing from Meshekli to the point of 
 junction of the former Bokhara-Khivan frontier with the frontier of 
 the Russian Empire, are annexed to the dominions of the Ameer of 
 Bokhara. 
 
 ''Art. 11. The right bank of the Amou Darya being detached 
 from the Khanate of Khiva, all the caravan routes leading from 
 Bokhara to the North into the Russian dominions traverse henceforth 
 exclusively lands belonging to Bokhara and Russia." 
 
APPENDIX, 383 
 
 J. 
 
 (Page 243.) 
 
 House of Commons, April 30, 1881. On Mr Richard's motion con- 
 cerning the action of our representatives abroad, Mr Gladstone said : — 
 "... We have had raised on former occasions very interesting de- 
 bates about the powers exercised by the executive Government witliout 
 the direct authority of Parliament, and my hon. friend has gone back 
 to the records of the 14th century or thereabouts, in which he Avas de- 
 lighted to find that he was not original in the notion of an appeal to 
 arbitration, but that our forefathers were beforehand with him at 
 so remote a period. I may go a little further than he did, and say 
 that in reading the records of those times I am struck in the main 
 with the extreme good sense and practical turn of mind displayed by 
 the chiefs of Government in those days — so struck that I often ask 
 myself whether upon the whole, notwithstanding the progress made 
 in many respects, and especially in the quality of good sense, and the 
 higher elements of justice and humanity — the advance made by our 
 race is so great as is supposed. The hon. member has referred to a 
 class of cases not involved in the scope of the motion, in which the 
 controversy is between the right of Parliament and the practice of 
 the Executive Government, and he has quoted with approbation pre- 
 cedents of the direct intervention of Parliament in regard to the 
 making of peace or war. The development of this empire and the 
 changes that have taken place in our Constitution, though on the 
 whole in favour of liberty, have by no means tended in every case to 
 the increase of the control of Parliament over the administration of 
 public affairs. Without doubt, in former times, and down to a 
 period as late as the last century, Parliament had much more to say 
 in matters of peace and war, and particularly in matters of treaty 
 engagements, than it now has. But we must recollect what the Parlia- 
 ment was in those days ; it was virtually an assembly meeting with 
 closed doors ; the people of this country were not cognizant in detail 
 from day to day, or even from week to week, or month to month, of 
 the proceedings of Parliament ; and Parliament could be used by the 
 Crown as a Council to a considerable extent without incurring the 
 tremendous inconvenience of disclosing to the whole world what you 
 
384 APPENDIX. 
 
 "Were about, and, therefore, of defeating in any way the power to use 
 our means and resources. But the augmentation of empire and the 
 increase in the number of territories for which we are responsible have 
 entirely altered our position in that respect, and above all the opening 
 of the doors of Parliament to the people of this country and the 
 communication of its proceedings, from moment to moment, to the 
 whole world have disabled Parliament from doing that which in 
 former times it might justly do, and which it was habitually to some 
 extent called upon to do. 
 
 *'. , . The late Parliament was a Parliament of a very different 
 composition and tendency from the j)resent ; but it derived its 
 authority from the same source ; and although I may say I abhorred 
 a great deal of what it did, that Parliament had just as good a right 
 in a constitutional sense to do all it did as we, the present House of 
 Commons, have to act in conformity with our own convictions. I 
 must go a little further. In justice to the late Government, I will 
 say that I do not recollect one single instance in which a majority of 
 that Parliament showed the slightest disposition to check the late 
 Government ; but I do recollect a great many instances in which they 
 urged the Government to do more. Though I should have said that 
 the control of the late Parliament was no control at all in reference 
 to the proceedings of the late Government, I must say I felt on 
 various occasions obliged to the late Government, because they did 
 not do all the late Parliament wished them to do. There are many 
 other cases. My hon. friend does not like annexations ; but, I am 
 sorry to say, annexations in many instances were forced on the 
 Government by Parliament. I don't recollect any instance in which 
 annexations made by the Government have been disapproved by 
 Parliament. When the North- Western frontier of India was enlarged, 
 the emphatic approval of the House of Commons was given to that 
 enlargement. When the Island of Cyprus was in a certain sense 
 acquired by proceedings as to which I have a decided opinion, which 
 it is not necessary to utter, it was thoroughly and cordially approved 
 by the Parliament that represented the people, and was elected under 
 the same charter as we have been. I might go further back. During 
 the time of the Government before the last there were some of the 
 most benevolent and philanthropic agencies in this country that from 
 time to time exhibited a very great disposition to press annexations on 
 the Government. There was the annexation of the Fiji Islands. I 
 was accustomed once a year to be besieged in this House by those 
 who insisted on it. Going further back, the annexation of New 
 
APPENDIX. 385 
 
 Zealand was not due to any proceedings of the local representatives of 
 this country— it was not due to statesmen of either party in either 
 House of Parliament, but to an action strictly popular, forcing it on 
 the attention of the Government. I will take another instance— one 
 which always seemed least justifiable of all the proceedings carried on 
 in the British name within the last half-century, and that was the 
 destruction of the fleet— it was called the piratical fleet— of the Rajah 
 of Sarawak by Sir James Brooke. But it was challenged in Parlia- 
 ment by Mr Hume, who received a sort of isolated support from Mr 
 Sidney Herbert and some others acting on a strongly conscientious 
 conviction; but he was met by a very large majority indeed. It was 
 one of the most unauthorized proceedings. My memory may have 
 failed to take up other instances that may have occurred ; but I must 
 say during the last forty years I can only recollect one proceeding of 
 the character my hon. friend reprobates as having been efi'ected in a 
 distant portion of the world by the representatives of this country, 
 which was seriously and generally disapproved at home, and that was 
 the annexation of Scinde. Scinde was annexed by Lord Ellenborough, 
 under Sir Charles Kapier, the commander-in-chief of the army on the 
 Indus. That country was rapidly conquered and annexed, but the 
 annexation was unanimously disapproved by the Conservative Cabinet 
 of that day. I know not whether I speak without prejudice on the 
 point, but the policy of annexation and aggression was at that time 
 more uniformly and strongly discountenanced by the Conservatives 
 than even by the Liberals. That, however, was an instance deemed 
 generally by the country to be unjust, and certainly it was so deemed 
 by the central authority. Besides, it could not be reversed without 
 producing a greater amount of mischief than was involved in the 
 recognition of the act. 
 
 "... You have now got undoubtedly, notwithstanding the 
 complexity of your empire, the control of the central authority 
 enormously increased. The responsibility of the central authority is, 
 of course, increased also. I will not say this is an unmixed good, 
 because unquestionably proceedings of a very complex nature, con- 
 ducted through the medium of the telegraph, are more liable, I think, 
 to miscarriages and mishaps than where the communications are of a 
 more deliberate and regular character ; still, upon the whole, the risk 
 to which my hon. friend refers is diminished in a very great degree — 
 I will not say it is infinitesimally small. The theatres of action that 
 are not within the immediate reach of the telegraph are comparatively 
 very limited ; so that, upon the whole, my hon. friend may rest satis- 
 
 2 B 
 
386 APPENDIX. 
 
 fied with the knowledge, at any rate, that the control of the central 
 Government is now immensely increased by the action of the tele- 
 graph ; almost from every principal centre of British territory abroad 
 intelligence is transmitted in a time that may be counted by hours, 
 instead of by weeks, and in some cases by months. I have in 1878 
 and on other former occasions stated, I think, very clearly what I con- 
 ceive ought to be the guiding principles of the Executive Government 
 in these matters. I think the Executive Government are bound in 
 general terms to contract no treaties except such as they can contract 
 compatibly with certain assurances on their own part — first, that they 
 deem the engagement to be for the advantage of the country ; and 
 secondly, that they deem it to be one sufficiently within the know- 
 ledge and expectation of Parliament. With regard to the annexation 
 of territory, I must say that no annexation of territory performed by 
 an agent abroad is valid — it is mere waste paper until ratified at home, 
 unless it was done in pursuance of authority from home, and if so 
 done it has the seal and the stamp of the central authority. With 
 regard to making war in the name of the nation, I may say it is im- 
 possible to take adequate security. What you really want is not 
 merely the improvement of the machinery b}^ which the central autho- 
 rity controls its extraneous agents, it is the improvement of the central 
 authority itself. It is the formation of just habits of thought ; it is 
 that we should be more modest and less arrogant ; it is that we 
 should uniformly regard every other State and every other people as 
 standing upon the same level of right as ourselves. It is that in the 
 prosecution of our interest we shall not be so carried away by zeal as 
 to allow it to make us for one moment forgetful of the equal claims 
 and the equal rights of others. That is a very grave question 
 indeed, and one upon which I am bound to say I believe the central 
 authority is quite as much in need of self-discipline and self-restraint 
 as its extraneous agents." 
 
APPENDIX. 387 
 
 K. 
 
 (Page 274.) 
 
 Parliamentary Pcqyers : Greece. iVo. 2 (1881). 
 
 Lord Lyons to Earl Granville. 
 
 "Paris, December 22, 1880. — My Lord, — I made known to M. 
 Barth^lemy St Hilaire this afternoon, in the terms of the telegram 
 which your Lordship did me the honour to address to me the day 
 before yesterday, the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government with 
 regard to his proposal that the Six Powers should convert their 
 mediation on the Greek Frontier question into an arbitration. . . . 
 I proceeded to ask him for explanations as to the principle and 
 details of his proposal, and as to the reception it had met with from 
 other Powers. M. Barthelemy St Hilaire began by telling me that 
 Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy had already signified to him 
 their acceptance of his proposal in principle. Austria and Germany 
 had accompanied their acceptance with a declaration that they were 
 not in any way to be led on towards the adoption of coercive measures ; 
 but Prance, M. Barthelemy St Hilaire said, was quite as determined 
 as they were on this point ; indeed, it was of the essence of the 
 arbitration that it was absolutely pacific. His Excellency proceeded 
 to give me explanations, of which the substance was as follows : — His 
 intention is not that the Powers shall offer their arbitration to the 
 contending parties, but that Turkey and Greece shall be brought to 
 ask for it. The condition sine qua nan is that each of the two coun- 
 tries shall bind itself, absolutely and unreservedly beforehand, to abide 
 by the decision of the Powers, whatever that decision may be. M. 
 Barthelemy St Hiliare has already written to the French Eepresenta- 
 tives at Constantinople and Athens to explain this plan to them, and 
 to authorise them, within certain limits, to use, if occasion serves, 
 language calculated to promote the acceptance of it. If he receives 
 the adhesion of England, as he has already received that of Austria, 
 Germany, Italy, and Russia, he will send more formal instructions to 
 the French Ambassador at Constantinople to take steps to induce the 
 Porte to refer the questions between itself and Greece to the arbitra- 
 tion of the Powers. He will also instruct the French Representatives 
 
388 APPENDIX. 
 
 in London, Berlin, Rome, St Petersburg, and Vienna to request that 
 directions may be sent to the Representatives of the other Powers at 
 the Porte to act in concert with the French Ambassador for the same 
 purpose. M. Bart]i(^,lemy St Hilaire thinks that the Porte may be 
 induced to refer the matter to arbitration by the conviction it must 
 feel that the arbitrators cannot but come to a decision more favour- 
 able to it than that of the Conference. . . . Supposing the two 
 parties to have agreed to the arbitration, the time will then come 
 to settle details as to the mode in which it shall be executed. 
 M. Barthelemy St Hilaire does not conceive that another formal 
 Conference will be either necessary or advisable. He supposes 
 that the Powers will be able to come to an agreement as to their 
 award by ordinary diplomatic communications with each other. 
 It has occurred to him that, as a proof of their sincerity, and 
 as a security against all chance of collision, Tui-key and Greece 
 might each withdraw its troops to a certain distance within its pre- 
 sent frontier. Afterwards, wlien the definitive frontier had been 
 settled by the award of the Six Powers, it might be marked out in the 
 space thus left free, by Commissioners deputed by them for the pur- 
 pose. Having given me these explanations, M. Barthelemy St Hilaire 
 said that he had sent instructions to the French Ambassador in Lon- 
 don, which would enable him to express the views of the French Go- 
 vernment in detail to your Lordship. He concluded by expressing an 
 earnest hope that the concert of Europe would soon be made complete 
 by the adhesion of Great Britain to the plan now adopted by France 
 and the other four Powers. I imagine that the acceptance of Austria, 
 Germany, Russia, and Italy has been made by all of them, more or less 
 explicitly dependent (1) upon the adhesion of the Six Great Powers 
 without any exception : and (2) upon the absolute engagement both of 
 Turkey and Greece to be bound by the award of the Arbitrators. I 
 understand that Russia has laid especial stress upon this last point, as 
 one necessary to the dignity of the Governments." 
 
 M. Bai'tMleviij St Hilaire to the Comte de Mouy. 
 
 "Paris, Ze 28 Ddcemhre 1880. — M. le Comte, — Depuis la guerre 
 glorieuse de I'lnd^pendance, voila soixante ans, jasqu'au Congr^s de 
 Berlin en 1878 et jusqu'k la Conference du mois de Juin dernier, la 
 France n'a pas cesse de prodiguer ^ la Gr^ce les t^moignages de I'interet 
 le plus sincere et de la sympathie la plus efficace. Ses conseils ne peuvent 
 etre suspects, raeme quand ils risquent de d^plaire; ils sont toiijours d'une 
 
APPENDIX, 389 
 
 indiscutable loyaute ; et notre devoir de donner des conseils amicaux,dus- 
 sent-ils n'etre pas suivis, est d'autant plus etroit qu'ils peuvent etre plus 
 utiles et que les circonstances o^ nous les ofFrons sent plus craves. 
 En ce moment le Gouvernement Plell^nique n'interpr^te pas bien le 
 principe sur lequel il pretend appuyer ses revendications k main arniee ; 
 et il confere, soit a TArticle XXIV du Traite de Berlin, soit aux 
 decisions de la Conference du mois de Juin 1880, une valeur et une 
 portee qu'ils n'ont pas. Dans ces deux assemblees, les Puissances 
 n'ont voulu etre et n'ont ete que mediatrices ; leur intention a ^t6 de 
 faciliter les negociations entre les parties interessees ; elles ne voulaient 
 point aller et ne sont point allees au dela. EUe^ n'ont pas prononc^ 
 une sentence ex^cutoire, comme le Gouvernement Grec le pense, et il 
 n'a pas le droit de prendre par la force ce qui ne lui a pas ^te concede 
 par le legitime proprietaire. L'Europe ne pouvait pas disposer de la 
 Cr^te, de I'Epire, et la Thessalie, quelle ne poss^de pas j mais elle a 
 simplement conseille k la Gr^ce et a la Turquie de s'entendre sur une 
 delimitation des frontieres nouvelles, qu'elle s'est bornee a indiqaer 
 comme la plus pratique, sans avoir a la transferer en toute pro- 
 priety k I'une des parties en I'arrachant h, I'autre. Comme, dans la 
 question actuelle, ce point est de la derniere importance, nous y insis- 
 terons en tachant de le mettre ici dans toute sa clart^. D'abord, il 
 faut bien savoir ce qu'est la mediation proprement dite et Ton cora- 
 prendra mieux alors I'oeuvre de la 'Conference de Berlin. La plus 
 haute autorite dans les questions de cet ordre dit expressement : — 
 ' La mediation, dans laquelle un ami commun interpose ses bons offices, 
 se trouve souvent efficace pour engager les parties contendantes k se 
 rapprocher, a s'entendre, ou a transiger de leurs droits, Le mediateur 
 doit garder une exacte impartiality. ... II est eonciliateur et non pas 
 Juge ; sa vocation est de procurer la paix. . . . Le mediateur n'est 
 pas garant du traite qu'il a m^nag^, s'il n'en a pas pris expressement 
 la garantie.' (Vattel, ^ Droit des Gens,' tome IL, p. 304, section 
 328, seconde Edition.) C'est la exactement ce qu'a fait la Conference 
 de Berlin, et elle ne pouvait pas faire davantage en sa quality de media- 
 trice. Elle a essaye de concilier les parties en consentant k leur indi- 
 quer de quelle fa^on elles pourraient s'entendre ; son mandat s'est 
 renferme dans ces limites ; d'aucune maniere, elle n'a garanti le Traite 
 qu'elle proposait. Nous reconnaissons que, d^s les premiers moments 
 oil la decision de la Conference a ete connue, le Gouvernement 
 Helienique a interprete les cboses tout autrement, et que, dt^puis lors, 
 il a persevere dans l' interpretation erronee qu'il leur donnait. Au 
 mois de Juillet dernier, quelques jours a peine apr^s la cloture de la 
 
390 APPENDIX, 
 
 Conference, il a appele les reserves de son armee, comme pour se mettre 
 inim^diatenient, ' manu militari,^ en possession de territoires qui lui 
 auraient ^te definitivement acquis. Les Puissances justement in- 
 quiries de cette resolution, se sont empressees de calmer, autant 
 qu'elles I'ont pu, ce mouvement que rien ne justifiait ; et le Gouverne- 
 nient Grec a consenti k ralentir ses pr^paratifs, sinon h. les arreter, 
 comme il I'aurait du. Mais depuis que I'affaive de Dulcigno a ete ter- 
 minee, la Gr^ce a repris ses armements avec un redoublement d'activite 
 et sur la plus vaste ^cbelle, puisqu'on parle de porter les troupes 
 jnsqu'au cLiffre ^norme de 80,000 hommes. Le but bautement pro- 
 clam6 de ces armements est une guerre k la Turquie si elle s' oppose, 
 ainsi que tout le fait pr^sager, h. Toccupation des territoires en litige. 
 La Grece doit done se Tavouer ; elle n'a pas le droit pour elle, et 
 Vagression qu'elle m6dite ne sera qu'une atteinte toute gratuite au 
 Droit des Gens. Elle n'est pas meme menac6e par la Turquie, car la 
 Porte Ottomane ne fait que se mettre en defense contre une attaque 
 qu'on annonce k bref delai. Elle pense si peu a recourir la premiere a 
 la force qu'elle propose d'ouvrir des n^gociations nouvelles et d'^viter 
 ainsi un confiit sanglant, qu'elle r6prouve sans le craindre, et qu'elle 
 denonce aux nations civilis6es dans sa note du 15 D^cembre. Les 
 consequences de I'attaque qui se prepare pourront etre redoubtables 
 autant que le principe sur lequel elle s'appuie est insuffisant et faux. 
 La Grece ne peut pas se flatter que la guerre qui ^clatera sur les fron- 
 ti^res de I'Epire et de la Tbessalie soit exclusivement confin^e k ces 
 contr6es. Dans I'^tat ou est aujourd'bui toute la presqu'ile des Bal- 
 kans, il n'est pas douteux que la guerre gagnera de proche en proche, 
 et que I'incendie, si difficilement ^teint en 1878, ne se rallume avec 
 une intensity presque irresistible. De quel ceil les Puissances de 
 I'Europe pourront-elles regarder ces d^sordres ? Pense-t-on qu'elles 
 demeureront impassibles en face de perturbations qui peuvent si 
 ais^ment les gagner elles-memes ? Que devient la paix g6n6rale et le 
 concert Europeen, qui, depuis plus de deux ann^es, a pu la maintenir? 
 La Gr^ce pense-t-elle que ce soit un moyen de t^moigner k I'Europe la 
 gratitude qu'elle lui doit que de d^chainer de pareils fl^aux sur 
 I'humanite % Que ferait done la Gr^ce, si, au lieu de m^diter I'attaque, 
 elle avait a la repousser, et a se d6fendre contre d'iniques agresseurs % 
 Meme fut-elle victorieuse, ce qui est peu vraisemblable, qui peut 
 r6pondre de ce qu'elle deviendrait avec tons les pays limitrophes, dans 
 une conflagration universelle, dont le r^sultat est absolument incalcul 
 aqle 1 Ce sont \k des considerations que doivent bien peser les 
 hommes d'Etat de la Grece ] elles sont de nature a les retenir sur la 
 
APPENDIX. 391 
 
 route funeste oil une premiere faute les entraine, et oil chaque jour les 
 pousse de plus en plus. Nous ne nous dissimulons pas qu'a cette 
 heure, apres les engagements de toute sorte qu'on a pris, il est bien 
 difficile de cesser ce qu'on a commenc6, avec plus de precipitation que 
 de dessein refl^chi. Mais plus on marche dans la voie fatale ou Ton 
 est entr^, plus on descend la pente qui m^ne infailliblement \ I'abime. 
 Aw cas d'un desastre, la Gr^ce peut-elle esp^rer que I'Europe, dont les 
 avertissements r6p6t6s auraient 6te m^connus, vole a son secours ? 
 L'Europe meme serait-elle alors unanime dans sa sympathie pour une 
 grande infortune comme elle Test aujourd'hui dans ses conseils et ses 
 appels r^it^r^s a la sagessedes Hellenes] Personne ne sauraitenr6pondre, 
 et le doute tout au moins est permis. La Gr^ce, non justifi^e dans ce 
 qu'elle appelle son droit, s'epuisant par des depenses hors de toute propor- 
 tion avec ses ressources, d^sapprouv^e par TEurope, qui ne veut pas la 
 guerre, la Gr^ce ne pent sortir des embarras qu'elle s'est suscites que par 
 la demarche qu'on lui conseille de faire aupr^s des Puissances ainsi qu'on 
 la conseille k la Porte Ottomane. C'est de demander leur arbitrage 
 pour terminer le differend, qui dure depuis deux ans et demi, et qui ne 
 peut plus etre tranche directement par de nouvelles n^gociations apres 
 celles qui ont ^chou^ a Prevesa et a Constantinople. Get arbitrage, si 
 on I'obtient, permettrait k la Gr^ce de suspendre les armements exces- 
 sifs qui la ruinent, puisque I'Europe aurait consenti k regler elle-meme 
 le destin des populations Helleniques, qui pourraient s'en fier a sa sol- 
 licitude. L'arbitrage est toute autre chose que la mediation, et voici 
 encore ce qu'en dit Vattel (Id. ihid.^ p. 305, section 329) : — ' Quand 
 les Souverains ne peuvent convenir sur leurs pretentions, et qu'ils 
 desirent cependant de maintenir, ou de retablir la paix, ils confient 
 quelquefois la decision de leurs diiferends a des arbitres, choisis d'un 
 commun accord. D6s que le compromis est li^, les parties doivent se 
 soumettre a la sentence des arbitres ; elles s'y sont engag^es et la foi 
 des Trait^s doit etre gardee.' C'est la precis^ment le cas de la Grece 
 et de la Turquie, et leur int^ret h. toutes les deux est si evident qu'on 
 a quelque peine k comprendre qu' elles hesitent a adopter pour vider 
 leur differend le moyen qu'ont pris naguke la Grande Bretagne et les 
 Etats-Unis pour regler I'affaire de '1' Alabama.' L' objection la plus 
 specieuse que la Gr^ce puisse opposer a cette sage resolution, recom- 
 mandee par un cxemple venant de si haut et si recent, c'est qu'elle ne 
 peut accepter rien qui soit moindre que ce qui lui a ^t^ promis par la 
 Conference de Berlin. Deja on a r^pondu k cette objection en faisant 
 voir qu'elle ne repose sur aucun fondement, et que jamais les Puis- 
 sances mediatrices n'ont accord^ k la Gr^ce le droit de se saisir k force 
 
392 APPENDIX, 
 
 ouverte desterritoires qui ne luiontpas M legitimementconc(^d^s. Cette 
 objection, si Ton continue k vouloir s'en servir, ne r^pond absolument 
 qu'k des exigences d'amour-propre, et les nations doivent se garder de 
 ces illusions egoistes tout autant que les individus. A bien regarder 
 les choses, que peut-on craindre sc^rieusement d'un arbitrage, qui serait 
 d'ailleurs si honorable et si utile pour la Gr^ce comme pour la Porte 
 Ottomane 1 On craint une seule chose, c'est que la delimitation 
 nouvelle ne comprit une moindre etendue que la pr6c6dente. Mais il 
 ne faut pas se borner a cette crainte vague et tout-a-fait indetermin^e ; 
 il faut examiner la difference probable des deux delimitations, avec toute 
 la precision possible en une telle mati^re ; il faut apprecier, avec une 
 approximation rigoureuse, ce que perdrait la Grece a une decision qui 
 lui serait, ^ ce que Ton presume, moins favorable que Fautre. Autant 
 qu'on pent en juger, la Gr^ce, d'apres Tavis de la Conference de Berlin, 
 recevrait un agrandissement de 20,000 kilom. carr^s. Peut-on croire 
 que la sentence arbitrale ^intervenir rt^duisit de plus de 2,000 ou 3,000 
 kilom. Carres cette part considerable ? Est-il \ supposer que la differ- 
 ence put etre plus grande 1 Et ce serait pour une reduction aussi 
 l^g^re que la Gr^ce irait livrer aux hasards d'une guerre ses des- 
 tinees d'abord, puis celles de I'Europe et le maintien de la paix 
 generale 1 Nous avouons que nous ne pouvons nous resigner a cette 
 douloureuse perspective. La Gr^ce doit se dire que dans la guerre qui 
 a hni au debut de 1877 elle n'avait joue aucun role, qu'elle n'etait pas 
 materiellement prete k en jouer un de quelqne importance, qu'elle 
 n'a pas eu k verser une goutte de sang, et qu'elle n'a pas ete forc^e 
 de dcpenser une drachme. II est vrai qu'elle s'est rendue au desir 
 des Puissances qui Font invitee a ne pas se meler a la lutte. Aussi 
 lus Pnissancps ont-elles reconnu cette condescendance en permettant 
 a la Gr^ce d'etre entendue au Congr^s de Berlin dans les questions 
 qui la touchaient directement ; aussi les Puissances ont-elles con- 
 senti tout expr^s pour la Gr^ce exclusivement a reunir cette annee 
 meme la Conference de Berlin et a offrir un avis conciliateur ; enfin, 
 aussi les Puissances sont-elles disposees, nous nous permettons de le 
 croire, k rendre I'arbitrage, s'il a lieu, aussi favorable a la Grece 
 qu'il sera possible. II nous semble done que, toute compension faite, 
 la part du royaume Hellenique sera toujours bien belle, puisqu'il 
 s'accrottra des deux cinqui^mes environ de ce qu'il est aujourd'hui. 
 C'est un r^sultat que nous regardons comme infaillible, et il nous semble 
 qu'il nitrite d'etre accepte, sans compter qu'il assurerait au raonde 
 I'inappreciable bienfait de la paix. Que si toutes ces raisons puissantes 
 qu s'adressent a la raagnanimite et a la sagesse du peuple Helleni(pie 
 
APPENDIX. 393 
 
 et de son Gouvernement ne les touchent pas, le monde civilise n'aura 
 plus qu'a leur kisser Tentiere et lourde responsabilite des ev^nements 
 formidables que nous pr^voyons et que nous aurions vainement 
 essaye de prevenir." 
 
 Lord Lyons to Earl Granville, 
 
 ''VAms, January 14, 1881. — My Lord,— This morning, in obedi- 
 ence to tlie instruction contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 
 day before yesterday, I spoke to M. Bartheleuiy St Hilaire of his 
 despatch of the 7th instant" [contesting the right of Greece to take 
 up arms on the sanction of the Berlin Congress and Conference]. '' I 
 said to his Excellency that your Lordship had desired me to point 
 out to him that, in that despatch, he appeared to have adopted the 
 Turkish arguments, in opposition to those which had all along been 
 used by the Representatives at Constantinople, including up to a 
 recent date the French Ambassador ; and I reminded him of the col- 
 lective note of the 25th August, in vj'hich the Representatives had 
 declared to the Porte that the Powers could not consent to reopen the 
 question of the line of frontier, but must abide by the decision of the 
 Conference at Berlin. I proceeded to observe that Her Majesty's 
 Government desired to make quite sure that their attitude in 
 regard to his Excellency's proposal of arbitration was exactly under- 
 stood by him, and that, if he would allow me, I would recite to 
 him the substance of communications on the subject which had 
 been made by your Lordship to the Erench Embassy in London. 
 On the 3 1st of last month your Lordship had, I said, told M. 
 d'Aunay, the Secretary of the Embassy, who had come to you on be- 
 half of M. Challemel-Lacour, that telegraphic instructions had been 
 sent to Her Majesty's Representatives at Constantinople and Athens 
 to support the French proposal, basing their arguments not only on 
 the general objections to a war, the necessity for which might be 
 peacefully avoided, but also on the particular risk and danger to Turkey 
 and Greece of war, and even preparations for war, in the present case. 
 I mentioned the three reservations which your Lordship had, at 
 the same time, stated to M. d'Aunay : that is to say (1) that, in sup- 
 porting the French proposal of arbitration. Her Majesty's Government 
 did not consider the position changed with regard to the decisions of 
 the Congress and Conference of Berlin; (2) that Her Majesty's 
 Government must retain their liberty of action as arbitrators in case 
 the arbitration was held, and that, at the present time, they had come 
 
Q 
 
 94 APPENDIX, 
 
 to no foregone conclusion ; (3) that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's 
 Government, Greece could not be considered to have lost the position 
 she previously held as to the frontier assigned to her in case he was 
 unwilling to accede to the new proposal. I added that your 
 Lordship had explained to M. d'Aunay that you had made these 
 reservations in order that they might be known to the French 
 Government, but that you should not communicate them to the 
 Greek Government for fear of their injuring the present negotiations. 
 I went on to say that, on the 10th instant, your Lordship had 
 authorised Her Majesty's Minister at Athens to take part in a collec- 
 tive and simultaneous representation, which had been proposed by his 
 French colleague, if the other Powers also took part in it. Your 
 Lordship had added a caution, not to be mentioned to the Greek 
 Government, that Her Majesty's Minister should not commit himself 
 to any arguments which would imply an abandonment of Greece if 
 she refused to accept the arbitration, I added that your Lordship 
 had told M. Challemel-Lacour that this caution had been given 
 in consequence of your having observed that the arguments used 
 by the French Minister at Athens with regard to the decisions 
 of the Congress and Conference of Berlin resembled those which 
 had hitherto been used by the Turks, and which had been com- 
 bated by the Kepresentatives of the Powers at Constantinople. 
 Having listened patiently and attentively, M. Barthelemy St 
 Hilaire said . . . with regard to the arguments in his desjjatch he 
 could not help thinking that they were sound and valid, whether 
 they had been previously used by the Turks or not. He went on 
 to say that he was pushing the arbitration proposal vigorously at 
 Constantinople. He was convinced that his original idea of 
 obtaining the consent of the Porte first of all was the correct one. 
 He found the Turks very reasonable, and did not despair of succeeding 
 with them in a short time. This being the case, he had determined 
 to suspend operations for the moment at Athens, in the hope that he 
 might resume them with an announcement that the consent of the 
 Turks had been already given. He had accordingly set aside, for the 
 present, the idea of a collective representation on the part of the 
 Eepresentatives at Athens, and had instructed M. de Moiiy to hold 
 his hand for the moment, to foster the good-will of his colleagues in 
 the matter, but to abstain from asking them to present a note or take 
 any other active steps immediately. M. Barthelemy St Hilaire told 
 me that he had communicated confidentially to the Representatives 
 at Paris of Turkey and of Greece, as well as to those of the Five Great 
 
APPENDIX. 395 
 
 Powers, his three recent papers on the Greek question— that is to say, 
 his despatches of the 24th and 28th ultimo, and of the 7th instant." 
 
 The despatch of December 24, referred to in the last sentence, was 
 a Circular Note to the French representatives abroad, in which the 
 Foreign Minister at great length, and Avith extreme vigour, not to 
 say emotion, pointed out the grave dangers to be apprehended from a 
 war between Turkey and Greece. 
 
INDEX TO PROPER NAMES. 
 
 A. 
 
 Aberdeen, Lord, 155. 
 
 Ministry and the Crimean War, 95, 97, 226 ; want of administra- 
 tive energy in, 166 142, 165, 169. 
 
 Abyssinian War, 201, 203. 
 
 A'Court, Sir William, his mission to Madrid, 117. 
 
 Adams, Samuel, on peace and war, 98. 
 
 Addington and Canning, 106. 
 
 Adriatic, 280. 
 
 Afghanistan, English policy in, 87, 88, 118, 241 ; Lord Beaconfield's policy 
 in, 213 ; war with, 233, 236, 238 ; Ameer of, 233 ; evacuation of, 
 247, 248. 
 
 Afghans, 237, 238. 
 
 Africa, Imperialist policy in South, 227, 237, 238 ; confederation of South, 
 239 ; the proconsular system in, 241 162, 201, 203, 249, 299. 
 
 Alabayna claims, 183, 186, 187, 196, 200. 
 
 Alberoni, 37. 
 
 Alexaridra claims, 183. 
 
 Alexandria, 145. 
 
 Alison, Sir A., quoted, 70. 
 
 All, Mehemet, Conquests of, 162. 
 
 America, North, English trade with, 44 ; disasters of England in, 46 ; 
 
 independence of the States, 50, 51, 56, 93 ; civil war in, 182 
 
 49, 192, 204. {See United States.) 
 
 America, South, EngHsh trade with, 40, 127 ; revolutions in, 124 ; recogni- 
 tion of republics in, 136 85, 111. 
 
 Americans, The peace policy of, 98 63, 82, 100. 
 
 Amiens, The peace of, 64. 
 
 Amou Darya River, 209. 
 
 Anino, 267, 
 
 Anne, Queen, foUows the policy of William III., 33 ; increase of the 
 National Debt under, 34 ; favours the Tories, 54 35. 
 
 Argentine States recognised by Canning, 128. 
 
 Argyle, Earl of, a prominent Whig, 17 \ present Duke of, 174. 
 
 Arlington, Lord; responsible for the Treaty of Dover, 15 1. 
 
 Arta, Gulf of, 268. 
 
 Ashantee War, 201, 205. 
 
398 INDEX. 
 
 Ashley, Lord Shaftesbury, and the Presbyterians, 14; his intrigues 
 against the Court, 16 1. 
 
 Asia, Imperialist poHcy in, 227 162, 209, 233. 
 
 Assinee River, 203. 
 
 Athens, 176, 177, 178, 256, 257, 258. 
 
 Australia, 90, 299. 
 
 Austria ; humbled by Prince of Orange, 24 ; " natural enemy " of Eng- 
 land, 41 ; .member of the Holy Alliance, 75, 76 ; at the Congress of 
 Vienna, 116; declares war against France, 172; Italian Independ- 
 ence, 173 ; attacks Denmark, 180, 181 ; party to the Treaty of Paris, 
 207 31, 32, 37, 38, 45, 115, 117, 121, 138, 139, 151, 171, 182, 206. 
 
 Ayoob Klian, 248. 
 
 B. 
 
 Baltic, the, a fleet sent to, by Walpole, 39. 
 
 Bar-sur-Aube, Conference at, 72. 
 
 Bastille, Destruction of, 59. 
 
 Batanga, Burning of, 240, 241. 
 
 Bathurst, Lord, 144. 
 
 Beaconsfield, Lord, 57; his foreign policy, 211-227, 233, 237, 278, 281, 
 285, 287. 
 
 Administration, the Election of, in 1880, 228 ; treatment of the 
 
 Alabama claims by, 195 62, 191, 211-227, 229-231, 262, 263, 
 
 274, 284. 
 
 Bedford Whigs, 52. 
 
 Belgians and the Congress of Vienna, 116, 154. 
 
 Belgium, Revolution in, 147 ; the re-settlement of , 150; the independence of, 
 149 ; Palmerston's policy towards, 153, 155 ; during the Franco- 
 Prussian Wai', 197-199, 326. 
 
 Bentham, Jeremy, a peace jDropagandist, 99. 
 
 Berlin, The Congress of, 215, 259, 261-265, 276 ; the Treaty of, 213, 214, 
 253, 258-266, 269, 277 ; Conference of, 270, 274 198, 222. 
 
 Bernard, Prof. Mountague, quoted, 48, 298. 
 
 Bernstortf, Count, 200. 
 
 Birkenhead, 183, 186. 
 
 Birmingham, 89. 
 
 Biscay, Bay of, a Spanish fleet wrecked in, 37. 
 
 Bismarck, Prince, and the Treaty of Paris, 207 ; and the Congress of Ber- 
 lin, 262, 2^. 
 
 Black Sea, 205, 226. 
 
 Blake, Admiral, 13. 
 
 Boadicea^ The, on the West Coast of Africa, 241. 
 
 Boers, War with the, 238 ; victories of the, 248. 
 
 Bokhara, 209. 
 
 Bolingbroke, Lord, the flight of, 36; "Idea of a Patriot King," 57; 
 policy of, 59 3, 58, 62, 80, 191, 217. 
 
INDEX. 399 
 
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, The fall of, 72 ; the coalition against, 74 ; death of, 
 94 60, 62, 70, 71, 102, 103, 116. 
 
 Bosnia, Pacification of, 222 260, 265. 
 
 Bosphorus, The, 162. 
 
 Bourbons, The, 62, 64, 73. 
 
 Brazil, 124. 
 
 Bright, Eight Hon. J., speech at Birmingham (1858), 89, 91 ; on the 
 Crimean War, 165 ; on the American War, 183-4 ; on the Franchise, 
 192 193-4, 199, 252, 302-3, 310, 311, 314-7, 334. 
 
 Brougham, Lord, and the Holy Alliance, 79. 
 
 Bulgaria, 214, 224, 260. 
 
 Burke, Edmund, 61-2. 
 
 C. 
 
 Cabul, Evacuation of, 236. 
 Cadiz, French garrison at, 125. 
 
 Carnarvon, Lord, 238. 
 
 California, 216. 
 
 Campbell, Lord, 174. 
 
 Canada, Conquest of, 50 299. 
 
 Candahar, Evacuation of, 236, 237. 
 
 Canning, George, succeeds Castlereagh, 77; liberal policy of, 78; chron- 
 ology, 102; early life, 103; the Anti- Jacobin, 104; opposes the 
 Holy Alliance, 108, 112, 115, 132, 226; and the Congress of 
 Verona, 114, 116; his Eastern policy, 130, 131, 133-140, 155; 
 Spanish policy, 119-122 ; Portuguese policy, 123-128 ; and the South 
 American States, 128 ; compared with Palmerston, 143 ; with Mr 
 Gladstone, 281-284 ; death and character of, 141 ; his followers, 191 
 1, 3, 105-107, 109-111, 117, 144-148, 151,156-7, 163-168, 190, 227. 
 
 Canning, Mr Stratford, his mission to St Petersburg, 135 ; his mission to 
 Constantinople, 151 136, 138. 
 
 Cape Coast Castle, 203. 
 
 Capo d'Istria, Count, 131. 
 
 CardweU, Lord, 198. 
 
 Carteret, Lord, 45. 
 
 Castlereagh, Lord, and the Holy Alliance, 75, 79, 108, 112, 115 ; Canning's 
 
 duel with, 104; death of, 77, 130 1, 3, 69, 71, 72, 107, 113, 
 
 114, 126, 148, 167, 192, 284. 
 
 Catherine of Russia, 39. 
 
 Chamberlain, Right Hon. J., and the international concert, 252. 
 
 Charing Cross, Ovation at (1878), 213, 216. 
 
 Charleroi, 23. 
 
 Charles II., corrupting influence of, 13, 16 ; foreign pohcy of, 14 ; his 
 intrigues, 15 17, 21, 28, 55, 80. 
 
 Charles II. of Spain ; the struggle for his succession, 32, 
 
 Charles YI. (of Austria), Death of, 44, 45. 
 
400 INDEX, 
 
 Charles X. of France, 116. 
 
 Charles Edward, the Young Pretender, 45. 
 
 Chatham, Lord, a war minister, 46, 47, 49 ; contrasted with Walpole, 48 ; 
 
 policy of, 50-52, 55, 56 ; sympathy with the Americans, 63 1. 
 
 Chatillon, Conference at, 72. 
 Chili, recognised by Canning, 128. 
 China, 161. 
 Christ Church, 103, 282. 
 
 Clarendon, Lord, and the Quadruple Treaty, 163 165, 171, 295. 
 
 Cobden, and the Crimean War, 165 159, 192, 333-5. 
 
 Codrington, Admiral, 145. 
 
 Coffee, King, 201-204. 
 
 Collier, Sir Eobert, and the Alabama^ 186. 
 
 Colombia, 127. 
 
 Compton, Bishop, invites the Prince of Orange to accept the throne, 25. 
 
 Constantinople, 117, 133, 137, 140, 151, 164, 215, 224, 265, 268, 269, 275. 
 
 Corfu, Mr Gladstone's mission to, 176 178. 
 
 Cowper, Lord, 34. 
 Cracow, 116. 
 
 Crete, Insurrections in, 256 259, 261-2. 
 
 Crimean War, 92, 166, 207. 
 
 Cromwell, Imperiousness of, 13 ; foreign policy of, 42 1, 62, 82, 84. 
 
 Cyprus, 264, 265. 
 
 Czar (Alexander I.) and the Holy Alliance, 75, 76, 107, 132, 226 ; his 
 
 Eastern policy, 131, 133 ; death of, 137 117, 129, 130, 135. 
 
 Czar (Nicholas), succession, 137 3 and the Quadruple Treaty, 163 
 
 138, 140, 154. 
 Czar (Alexander II.) and the Treaty of Paris, 205-6 ; and Khiva, 208-210. 
 
 D. 
 
 Danby, Lord, advises a declaration of war against France, 15 ; intrigues 
 
 with France, 16 ; invites the Prince of Orange (with others) to 
 
 accept the throne, 25 1, 21, 28. 
 
 Danube, River, 256. 
 
 Deligianni, M., 260, 268. 
 
 Denmark ; alienation of, 72 ; authority of, renounced by Schleswig-Hol- 
 
 stein, 180; attacked by Prussia, 181 39, 182, 198. 
 
 Derby (the late Earl), his criticism of Lord John Pussell, 181. 
 
 (the present Earl) ; his despatch to Lord Odo Russell, 222 ; policy 
 
 of, 222-7, 256 ; secession from the Government, 221, 258 261. 
 
 Derby, March of the Young Pretender on, 45. , 
 
 Dettingen, Battle of, 45. 
 
 Devonshire, Earl of, invites the Prince of Orange (with others) to accept 
 
 the thi^one, 25. 
 
INDEX, 401 
 
 Dilke, Sir Charles, and the Greek question, 252, 263, 267. 
 
 Disraeli, Benjamin, his personal policy, 216. {See Beaconsfield.) 
 
 Douai, 23. 
 
 Dover, Treaty of, 28. 
 
 Dudley, Lord, 147. 
 
 Dulcigno, Cession of, 254, 274. 
 
 Dumouriez, 62. 
 
 E. 
 
 Ecuador, its independence recognised by England, 128. 
 
 Edinburgh, Dulce of, married to the Grand Duchess Marie, 209. 
 
 Egypt and Turkey, 162-5. 
 
 Elbe, Eiver, 46. 
 
 Eldon, Lord, 142, 144. 
 
 Elizabeth, Queen, 13, 21, 32, 40, 82, 84. 
 
 Ellenborough, Lord, his attacks on Canning, 119. 
 
 Elliot, Sir Henry, ambassador at Constantinople, 224. 
 
 Elmina, Bm^ning of, 203-4. 
 
 Emmanuel, Victor, 174. 
 
 Epirus, insurrection in, 256 ; cession of, 262 259-261, 275, 276. 
 
 Eton College, 103, 282. 
 
 F. 
 
 Fantees, 203, 204. 
 
 Fichte as a peace propagandist, 99. 
 
 Flanders, 21, 23. 
 
 Fontenoy, Battle of, 45. 
 
 Fox, C. J., policy of, 52, 53, 63, 65-7 ; dismissal of, 69 94, 100, 103, 282. 
 
 France, Walpole's alliance with, 44 ; revolution in, 58-61, 100 ; declares 
 war against England, 62 ; and the Holy Alliance, 76, 94 ; Can- 
 ning's fear of, 103; and the Congress of Vienna, 116; and the 
 Congress of Verona, 117; Palmerston's jealousy of, 150; intrigues 
 in Egypt, 164 ; the crown usurped by Louis Napoleon, 167 ; aids 
 the Italians, 173 ; engages in the Crimean War, 207 ; and the 
 
 Eastern Question, 273-275 41, 43, 45-47, 49, 54, 64-67, 71, 82, 
 
 99, 119, 123, 125, 126, 128, 138, 139, 145, 151-154, 162, 163, 166, 
 171, 172, 179, 181, 190, 198, 200, 217, 260. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, as a peace propagandist, 98. 
 
 Frere, Sir Bartle, 238-9. 
 
 Freycinet, M. de, resignation of, 272. 
 
 G 
 
 Garibaldi, drives Ferdinand from Naples, 172 171. 
 
 Geneva Arbitration, The, 194-196, 200, 205 
 Genoa, and the Congress of Vienna, 116. 
 
 2 c 
 
402 INDEX. 
 
 George I., 54. 
 
 II., 45, 46, 49. 
 
 III., personal rule of, 52 46, 50, 52, 55, 56, 68, 69, 79. 
 
 IV., 69. {See Prince Eegent.) 
 
 of Greece, 179, 256, 259, 277. 
 
 Germains, St, 35, 36. 
 
 Germany and Belgium, 197 ; conquests of, 200 ; and the Treaty of Paris, 
 207 ; and the Beaconsfield Administration, 233 ; and the claims of 
 Greece, 263 16, 180. 
 
 Gibraltai', held under the Treaty of Utrecht, 40 49, 233, 234. 
 
 Gibson, Mr Milner, 167, 174. 
 
 Gladstone, Right Hon. W. E., offers Mr Bright a seat in the Cabinet, 193 ; 
 and the Alabama claims, 195, 196 ; and Belgium, 199, 200 ; and 
 the Ashantee War, 201 ; and the Bulgarian massacres, 214 ; and 
 the General Election of 1880, 228 ; speeches in Midlothian, 234 ; 
 returned to power, 235 ; on the proconsular system, 243, 245 ; and 
 the Transvaal, 248 j and the Eastern Question, 249 ; and the Inter- 
 national Concert, 250-252, 277, 278 ; compared with Canning, 281- 
 284 3, 17, 171, 174, 188, 198, 212, 213, 230, 231, 236, 285. 
 
 Gladstone Administration, The &st, and the Treaty of Paris, 206-208 
 194, 209, 211, 229. 
 
 ■ : The second, and the Transvaal, 248 ; and the Inter- 
 national Concert, 250-252, 280 237, 270. 
 
 Gladstone, The elder Mr, 108. 
 
 Goderich Ministry, The, Pahnerston and, 144. 
 
 Godolphin, Lord, 32, 33. 
 
 Gortchakoff, Prince, and the Treaty of Paris, 207, 208 172. 
 
 Goschen, Rt. Hon. G. J., 71, 330. 
 
 Grafton, The Duke of, 56. 
 
 Grant, Charles (Lord Glenelg), and Palmerston, 145. 
 
 Grant Duff, Mr M. E., quoted, 309, 324, 327-8. 
 
 Granville, First Earl, ambassador at Paris, 150, 152. 
 
 Second Earl, and the Alabama claims, 194, 195 ; and Belgium, 
 
 198 ; his despatch to Count Bernstorff, 200 ; and the Treaty of 
 Paris, 201 ; and the occupation of Khiva, 210 ; and the Interna- 
 tional Concert, 251-3 ; despatch to Lord Odo Russell, 270 
 
 171, 174, 205. 
 
 The late Lady, her opinion of Palmerston, 157. 
 
 Greece, insm-rection in, 129, 131 ; English policy towards, 136 ; Palmer- 
 ston's policy towards, 45, 154, 155 ; Palmerston's interventions in, 
 160; cession of the Ionian Isles to, 176; revolution in, 177 ; the 
 recent claims of, 253, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 263-270 ; and the 
 
 Berlin Conference, 272, 273, 274, 276, 277 94, 130, 135, 138, 140, 
 
 146, 147, 170, 179, 192, 262. 
 
 Greeks, The, our national policy towards, 118 132, 133, 137, 140, 275, 
 
 278, 285. 
 
INDEX, 403 
 
 Green, Mr J. R, quoted, 38. 
 
 Grenville, Lord, his despatch to TaUeyrand, 73 56, 65, 67, 69, 70. 
 
 Greville (C. C.) quoted, on Palmerston, 156. 
 
 Grey, Second Earl, his criticism of Canning's policy, 119-122 ; adminis- 
 tration of 142 69, 70, 100, 102, 144, 148. 
 
 Grey, Present Earl, his criticism of Mr Gladstone's policy, 204. 
 Grote, Mr, on the American War, 186. 
 Grotius, on arbitration, 97. 
 
 Hainault, 43. 
 
 Hall, St James's, Conference at, 215. 
 
 Hanover, The treaty of, 39. 
 
 Hanover Tories, as opposed to the Jacobites, 54. 
 
 Harley, 1, 36. 
 
 Hartington, Lord, and the evacuation of Candahar, 237, 249 230, 
 
 236, 251. 
 Hawarden, 214. 
 Helena, St, 94. 
 Herbert, Mr Sidney, 174. 
 Herries, Mr, 144. 
 
 Herzegovina, the, pacil&cation of, 222, 224. 
 Heytesbury, Lord, Palmerston's despatches to, 154. 
 Hicks-Beach, Sir Michael, 238. 
 Hobhouse, Sir J. C, 112, 
 Hogue, La, 26, 30. 
 HoUand, War with England,''23 ; successfully opposes France, 24 ; France 
 
 declares war against, 25 ; allied to England, 41 ; the resettlement 
 
 of, 150 37, 64, 154. 
 
 Holland, Lord, and the Quadruple Ti^eaty, 163. 
 
 Holstein, 179, 180. 
 
 Hudson, Sir James, Lord John Bussell's despatches to, 175. 
 
 Hughenden, Eoyal visit to, 213. 
 
 Hume, David, on the attitude of France, 44. 
 
 Hume, Joseph, his opposition to Canning's policy, 128. 
 
 Huskisson, Mr, 144, 159, 191. 
 
 I. 
 
 India, English aggression in, 86 ; the route to, 164, 165 ; Eussian advance 
 towards, 209 ; Lord Beaconsfield and, 213 ; aggressive policy in, 
 236 46, 237, 302, 303. 
 
 Indies, West, 85, 299. 
 
 Ionian Islands, 176-178. 
 
404 INDEX. 
 
 Ireland, Revolution in, 65. 
 Italians, 170. 
 
 Italy, Revolution in, 81, 108, 112, 128; unification of, 171-174; and the 
 claims of Greece, 263 64, 79, 129, 206, 207. 
 
 J. 
 
 Jack, King, 241. 
 
 James II., welcomed by Louis XIV., 25 ; and the English nobles, 26 ; his 
 
 son supported by Louis, 33 14, 27, 28, 31, 64, 55. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, on peace and war, 98. 
 
 Janina, 261. 
 
 Johnson, Mr Reverdy, 261. 
 
 K. 
 
 Kalamas, River, 262. 
 
 Kauffmann, General, enters Khiva, 209 ; his progress in Asia, 226. 
 
 Khiva, Occupation of, 205, 208, 209. 
 
 Khoukhout, a Turkish cuckoo cry, 267. 
 
 Kimberley, Earl of, and the surrender of the Transvaal, 249. 
 
 Krudener, Madame, and the Holy Alliance, 76, 319. 
 
 L. 
 
 Lansdowne, Thii^d Marquis of, and Canning, 106. 
 
 Larissa, 261. 
 
 Layard, Sir Austen Henry, criticism of Palmerston's policy, 166 ; and 
 
 the Anglo-Turkish Convention, 265 269. 
 
 Lawrence, Lord, 237. 
 
 Laybach, Congress of, 75-79, 82, 94, 112, 113. 
 
 Leamington wreath. The, 216. 
 
 Lefevre, Right Hon. G. Shaw, on the Anglo-Turkish Convention, 264. 
 
 Leibnitz on peace, 99. 
 
 Leopold, Prince, 197. 
 
 Lepaux (Larevelliere de, president of the Directory), 104, 105. 
 
 Levant, The, 141, 162, 163, 213. 
 
 Lewis, Sir G. C, 174. 
 
 Lieven, Madame de, 156. 
 
 Lisbon, 113, 124, 125. 
 
 Liverpool, Canning member for, 108 109, 111. 
 
 Liverpool, Lord, Palmerston an adherent of, 142 ; death of, 143. 
 
 ■ Administration, 69, 81, 143. 
 
 Lombardy, 171. 
 
 London, Greek mission to, 137 ; the Conference of, 153 140, 166, 177, 
 
 178, 180, 200, 207, 209, 214. 
 Louis XIV., his relations to Charles II., 13, 14 ; and the Treaty of Dover, 
 
 15 ; promises aid to James IL, 25 ; correspondence with WiUiam 
 
 III., 31 ; seizes the Netherlands, 32 ; checked by Marlborough, 35 ; 
 
 death of, 36 19-21, 23, 29, 33, 44, 73, 157. 
 
INDEX, 405 
 
 Louis XV. succeeds to the French throne, 37. 
 
 XVI., 53, 60, 62. 
 
 XVIII., The charter of, 116. 
 
 Luxembourg, 23, 43. 
 
 Lyons, Lord, 273. 
 
 Lytton, Earl, despatched to India, 236. 
 
 M. 
 
 Macedonia, 259, 261, 267 
 Madras, 302. 
 Madrid, 32, 117, 
 Maiwand, disaster at, 237. 
 
 Mabnesbury, Earl of, special ambassador at Paris, 64 ; guardian of Pal- 
 merston, 142. 
 
 Present Earl, Foreign Secretary, 1858, 172 . 
 
 Malta, 165, 213 j Indian troops at, 219. 
 
 Manthorpe Bey, 265. 
 
 Maria Theresa of Austria, 44. 
 
 Marie, Grand Duchess of Russia, m. Duke of Edinburgh, 209. 
 
 Marlborough, Duke of, 34, 42, 47, 48, 54. 
 
 Duchess of, her legacy to Pitt, 46. 
 
 Mary of York (Queen of William III.), 16, 19, 21, 24, 80. 
 Mazarin, Cardinal, 23, 44. 
 Mediterranean, 46, 140, 146, 301. 
 Melbourne, Viscount, 156, 163. 
 
 Administration, 142, 155, 157, 169. 
 
 Messina, Straits of, 37. 
 
 Metternich, 108, 124-5, 132, 135, 145, 151, 296. 
 
 Midlothian, Mr Gladstone in, 234. 
 
 Miguel, Dom, Portuguese Pretender, 124, 157. 
 
 Monmouth, Duke of, his pretensions favoured by Ashley, 1 6. 
 
 Montague, member of the Cabinet of 1695, 28. 
 
 Montenegro, recent claims of, 253-4, 273, 275-278, 285. 
 
 Morea, 145, 146. 
 
 Moscow, 70. 
 
 N. 
 
 Napier, Sir Robert, 201. 
 
 Naples, Revolution in, 76, 77, 82, 172, 173. 
 
 Napoleon III., 166, 167, 174. 
 
 Natal, 236. 
 
 Navarino, Battle of, 140, 141, 145. 
 
 Nemours, Due de, and the Spanish crown, 151. 
 
 Nesseh-ode, 108, 117, 130, 132, 133, 135, 154. 
 
 Netherlands, The, 32, 154. 
 
 Newcaatle-on-Tyne, Fourth Duke of. Prime Minister in 1754, 45-47. 
 
406 INDEX. 
 
 Newcastle-under-Lyne, Fifth Duke of, 174. 
 Nile, River, 162. 
 Nimeguen, Treaty of, 21. 
 North, Lord, 58. 
 
 Northbrook, Lord, Recall of, 213 236-7. 
 
 Northcote, Sir Stafford, 231. 
 
 Nottingham, Lord, his refusal to take office, 54. 
 
 0. 
 
 Olga, The, fired on by the Turks, 268. 
 
 Orange, Prince of, the compact with, 17, 35 ; his poHcy before accepting 
 
 the crown, 43. {See WiUiam III.) 
 Orford, Edwai'd Russell, Earl of, 1, 28, 30, 31. 
 Orleans, Duke of. Regent of France, 37. 
 Ormond, Duke of, flight of in 1715, 36. 
 Otho, King of Greece, 177, 178. 
 Ottoman Empire, 224. {See Porte, Turkey.) 
 Oxford (City), 106. 
 Oxford, Harley, Earl of, disgraced in 1714, 36. 
 
 P. 
 
 Paine, Thomas, 105. 
 
 Palmerston, Viscount, his policy, 145-188 ; chronology and early career, 
 142-4; compared with Canning, 143-4; his unpopularity, 156-7; 
 his despatches, 160, 154, 167; his dismissal by Lord John Russell, 
 166 1, 173, 202, 207, 217, 226, 267. 
 
 Paris, Peace of (1763), 56 ; Treaty of, 100, 116, 205-208 64, 72, 75, 
 
 150-152, 167, 180, 198, 271. 
 
 Pedro, Don, Emperor of Brazil, 124, 157. 
 
 Peel, Su' Robert, 102, 144, 160, 161, 166, 191. 
 
 Peru, 128. 
 
 Perier, French statesman (1831), 152. 
 
 Perceval, Spencer, Assassination of, 68, 142. 
 
 Pelham, Henry, his policy, 45, 47. 
 
 Peninsula, expulsion of the French from, 70 117, 120, 127. 
 
 Philip V. of Spain, his intrigues, 37, 38, 40. 
 
 Piedmont, Revolution in, 82. 
 
 PieiTe, St, peace propagandist, 99. 
 
 Pitt, WiUiam, Lord Chatham, his policy, 35, 46-51, 56 36, 46, 56. 
 
 {See Chatham.) 
 
 (second son of Lord Chatham), 51-53, 58-65, 74, 81, 93, 115 ; 
 
 had an alternative policy in 1789-92, 62, 63 ; his resignation and re- 
 sumption of office, 66 ; patron of Canning, 103-108 1, 68, 98, 
 
 100, 122, 142, 167, 190, 191, 217. 
 
 Pitt Administration, first (1783-1801), 68, 66 ; second (1801-6), 66, 67. 
 
 Plymley Letters (Sydney Smith's), 283. 
 
INDEX. 407 
 
 Poland, 44, 84, 116, 154. 
 
 Porte, 129-38, 140, 153, 162, 214-5, S23-4, 253-7, 261-280, 284-6, 330. {See 
 
 Turkey.) 
 Portland, Duke of. First Lord of the Treasury, 68. 
 Portugal, 111, 121, 123-8, 131, 145, 151, 157, 170, 192. 
 Prevesa, 268. 
 
 Prince Regent, 68, 79 ; and the Holy Alliance, 75, 79. 
 Prussia, 65, 75-6, 116, 117, 161, 171, 173, 179-182, 199. {See Germany.) 
 
 Q. 
 
 Queen, The, her displeasure with Lord Palmerston, 166 ; and the claims 
 of the Ionian Islands, 177 j proclaimed Empress of India, 213. 
 
 R. 
 
 Rhangabe, M., 260. 
 
 Richard, Mr Henry, and arbitration, 197 ; on the proconsular system, 241-3. 
 
 Richards, Commodore, 241. 
 
 Richelieu, Cardinal, 23, 44. 
 
 Richmond, Late Duke of, 103. 
 
 Robinson, Bishop, as a diplomatist, 330. 
 
 Rochdale, Speech of Mr Bright at, 183. 
 
 Rockingham Whigs, The, 52. 
 
 Rogers, Mr Thorold, quoted, 333. 
 
 Rome, The French troops in, 171. 
 
 RomiUy, Commander, 241. 
 
 Roumelia, Eastern, 259, 260, 262, 265. 
 
 Russia, 39, 52 ; and the Holy AUiance, 75, 76, 117 ; and the Congi^ess of 
 Vienna, 116 ; repudiates the Black Sea clauses, 205-8 ; occupies 
 
 Khiva, &c., 208-10 115, 129-36, 138, 140-1, 146-7, 153-4, 
 
 161-3, 165, 172-3, 213, 215, 217, 225, 227, 233, 238, 257, 259, 
 260, 263. 
 
 Russell, Lord Odo, ambassador at BerKn, 222, 224, 270 ; quoted, 304. 
 
 Lord John (afterwards Earl), his foreign policy, 169-188 ; chronology; 
 
 his policy contrasted with Palmerston's, 161 ; quoted, 116, 162, 164 
 165, 195-6, 198, 310. 
 
 Administration, 142 ; Palmerston's dismissal from, 166. 
 
 S 
 
 Safvet Pasha, 265. 
 
 Salamvrias, River, 262. 
 
 Salisbury, Lord, and the Ashantee "War, 204; succeeds to the Foreign 
 
 Office, 258 ; and the claims of Greece, 259-261, 263, 264, 267, 269, 
 
 272 205, 215, 231. 
 
 Salonica, Ships sent to, 224. 
 
408 INDEX. 
 
 Sardinia, 37, 171-173. 
 
 Savoy, allies itself to Holland, 24. 
 
 Schleswig, 179, 180. 
 
 Schouvaloff, Count, 209. 
 
 Sebastiani, M., 152. 
 
 Servia, Insurrection in, 222. 
 
 Shelbiu'ne, Earl of (first Marquis of Lansdowne), 58, 59, 217. 
 
 Sheridan, 103. 
 
 Shrewsbury, Lord, invites the Prince of Orange (with others) to accept 
 
 the crown, 25, 28, 31. 
 Sicily, 37, 158, 173. 
 
 Sidmouth, Lord, 67. (See Addington.) 
 Slavonic nations, 233, 258-9. 
 Smyrna and the combined fleet, 254-5. 
 Somers, Lord, 28, 34. 
 Somerset, Duke of, 174. 
 Spain, humbled by Holland, 24 ; English dislike of, 40, 47 ; declares war 
 
 upon England, 65 32, 38, 41, 43-4, 46, 76-7, 81-2, 112, 115, 
 
 117, 120-3, 125-6, 128-9, 145, 151, 157. 
 Spencer (Second Earl), 67. 
 Sprigg, Mr, 238. 
 Stanhope (First Earl), 37, 38. 
 
 Stapleton, Mr (private secretary of Canning), quoted, 109, 136, 139. 
 Stewart, Sir Charles (brother of Lord Castlereagh), 77. 
 St Hilaire, M. Barth^lemy, 272, 273, 280. 
 St John, 57. (See Bolingbroke.) 
 
 Storks, Sir Henry, his mission to the Ionian Islands, 177. 
 Strangford, Lord, and the Porte, 133, 136. 
 Stuarts, The, 57, 218. 
 Sunderland, Earl of, 27, 34. 
 Sweden, 24, 39, 72, 179, 181. 
 Syria, 162. 
 
 T. 
 
 Talleyrand, 73, 156-7. 
 
 Tavistock, 169. 
 
 Theodore, King, 201. 
 
 Thessaly, Liberation of, 86, 262-3, 275-6 ; insurrection in, 256-7, 259, 260, 
 
 265. 
 Thrace, 259. 
 Toulon, 150. 
 
 Townshend, Viscount, 39. 
 Trafalgar, Battle of, 311. 
 
 Transvaal, English policy in, 86, 88, 238, 245, 247-8. 
 Troppau, Congress of, 75-77, 112. 
 Trikoupi, M., 256, 258. 
 
INDEX. 409 
 
 Tiidors, The, 4-2. 
 
 Tunis, 273. 
 
 Turin, 173. 
 
 Turkey, 117, 121, 129, 131, 133, 135-140, 146, 154, 162-5, 208, 214-5, 223, 
 
 225, 249, 255, 258-260, 265-7, 269-270, 274-7, 280. (See Porte). 
 Turks, 132, 133, 137, 145, 276. 
 
 U. 
 
 United States of America, Diplomatic custom of, 297 4, 184, 194-7, 
 
 210, 244. {See America, North). 
 Utrecht, Treaty of, 37, 40, 57 ; peace of, 49. 
 
 V. 
 
 Vattel, 1 75, 
 
 Venice, and the Congress of Vieima, 116. 
 
 Venezuela recognised by Canning, 128. 
 
 Verona, Congress of, 75, 82, 94, 112, 114. 
 
 Vienna, Congi'ess of, 72, 74, 113, 116, 117, 129, 130, 164. 
 
 Treaty of, 114, 124, 154, 172-3, 222, 258. 
 
 Volos, 265. 
 
 W. 
 
 Waddington, M., and the claims of ({recce, 260, 263, 267, 268. 
 
 Walewski, M., Lord Palmerstons assurances to, 167. 
 
 Walpole, Policy of, 35 ; a peace Minister, 38, 91 ; a typical Whig Mini- 
 ster, 39 ; his system of diplomacy, 41 ; supported by the Hanover 
 Tories. 54 1, 36-7, 40, 42, 44-49, 52, 97, 109. 
 
 Walsingham, 1, 13. 
 
 Waterloo, Battle of, 311. 
 
 WelHngton, Duke of, and the (Ireek insurrection, 130 ; his mi.ssion to St 
 Petersburgh, 138, 151, 114, 120, 144-5, 149, 155. 
 
 Ministry, The, 1 53, 
 
 West Calder, 308. 
 
 Wharton, Manjuis of, 2K, 34, 
 
 Wa.shington, Treaty of, 194, 196-7. 
 
 William III,, his compact with tlie English nation, 17 ; his foreign 
 j)olicy, 18, 19, 2] ; declares war against France, 25 ; refuses to dis- 
 continue the war, 29 ; allies himself with Louis XIV., 31 ; death, 
 
 33 ; the Act of Settlement, 80 16, 24, 26-8, 30, 32, 34, 41-4, 47, 
 
 49, 142, 310. 
 
 William, Prince of Denmark, elected King of Greece, 179. 
 
 Wiltttn, [jord Cirey de, Lord Beaconsfield's letter to, 205. 
 
 2 D 
 
410 INDEX. 
 
 Windham, William, 67. 
 Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 201, 203-4. 
 Wood, Sir C. (Lord Halifax), 174. 
 
 Y. 
 
 York, James Duke of, 16. 
 
 Mary of (Queen), 16, 19, 21, 24 ; and the Act of Settlement, 80. 
 
 Z. 
 
 Zealand, New, 299. 
 Zulus, The, 233. 
 
 Tnrnlnill er' Spears, Printas^ Edinburgh,