'^mvmmmm* - .*••: s i k-ms mm-. ■ wmm QJornrll Cam i>rljnoI SGibrary KF1165.p C 37 ne " Un,Ver,,,yUbrary «,?. 9 eneral Principals of the law of ins 3 1924 018 742 324 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924018742324 The General Principles OF THE LAW M INSURANCE BY STANTON CANFIELD PEELLE AND J. HOMER DEIS, Of the Law Department Of the Columbian University. WASHINGTON. D. C. MILTON TIBBETTS 1901 COPYRIGHT, 1901, BY STANTON G PEELLE AND J. HOMER DEIS. PREFACE. It has been our desire, in the preparation of these pages, to present, in the briefest way, the general principles of the law of fire, marine, and life insur- ance, and so to afford a convenient and expeditious means of reviewing the subject. If matters of im- portance have been omitted or explanations in some cases are too compressed, we ask you to remember that the very purpose of the work would be defeated by lengthening it. We have tried to give abstracts of the most important cases on the law of insurance and to connect these with paragraphs that will give unity and coherence to the whole, so that the abstract and concrete sides of the law may both receive atten- tion. But while the work is planned primarily for those who have studied by the "case system," (and especially for those who have used Professor Wam- baugh's admirable collection of cases), still it is hoped that it may also prove a convenient and concise means of review for any student of the law of insurance. The works which have been made use of are: May on Insurance, Bliss on life Insurance, Kent's Com- mentaries, Arnould on Insurance, Angell on Fire and life Insurance, Wambaugh's Cases on Insurance, Parts I, II, III and IV, Smith's Leading Cases, The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, Par- sons on Contracts, Smith on Personal Property, Walker's American Law, and Blackstone's Commen- taries. But since these pages are for review rather than for reference, we have thought it not best to encumber them with citations of authorities. If, after a careful investigation of these pages, the student of insurance feels that he has been saved hours of labor and research, the purpose for which this book was written will have been consummated. S. C. P. April, 1901. J. H. D. ERRATA. Page 27, line 4. "$2,150 " should read "$3,150. " Page 29, line 7. "£150 " should read "£750. " taries. But since these pages are for review rather than for reference, we have thought it not best to encumber them with citations of authorities. If, after a careful investigation of these pages, the student of insurance feels that he has been saved hours of labor and research, the purpose for which this book was written will have been consummated. S. C. P. April, 1901. J. H. D. Cbe law of Insurance* CHAPTER I. Introductory. Definition. General Classi- fication. There is a high degree of probability that the Lombards were the earliest people of the European States to make use of insurance, one evidence of this is the derivation of the word policy from the Italian, polizza. The whole law of insurance is scarcely a century and a half old, and more than half of its most important principles and distinctions have been created within the last hundred years. Indeed, it has been computed that, up to the year 1756, when Lord Mansfield became Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, all the cases found in England relative to policies of insurance did not exceed sixty. — Angell on Marine and Fire Insurance Definition of Insurance. — "Insurance is a con- tract whereby one, for a consideration, undertakes to compensate another if he shall suffer loss." — May on Insurance. The promisor is called the underwriter, or insurer; the promisee, the insured or assured; the written instrument embodying the contract is known as the policy; and the consideration of the contract is the premium paid by the insured to the insurer. The general principles of the law of contracts apply to the contract of insurance, as they do to other contracts, as regards offer and acceptance, ratification, agency, fraud, etc. 8 The three principal forms of insurance are: (1) against loss by the perils of the sea (marine in- surance), (2) against loss by fire (fire insurance), (3) against loss of life (life insurance). While there are some important differences between marine, fire and life insurance, yet the general principles of the three have much in common. The requisites of a valid contract of insurance are: («) Proper parties. Those legally capable of con- tracting generally may enter into a contract of insur- ance, either as insurer or insured. (b) An insurable interest. At the commencement of the risk, this is always requisite; it is also requsite at the time of the loss, except in life insurance. (c) Proper subject-matter. (d) The insurer must be subjected to liability. (e) Those elements and terms which are essential to the existence of the contract must be fixed and certain. (f) A consideration. — Am. andEng. EncycL of Law. An open policy is one in which the amount of interest is not specified, but left to be proved in case of loss. A valued policy is one in which the parties have determined upon a valuation of the subject-matter, which shall be binding in case of loss. There is a double insurance when, "by different policies, the same interest of the same parties in the same subject-matter is insured against the same risk." If the entire amount insured by all the policies is in excess of the value of the insured property, there is over insurance. Re-insurance is a contract by which an insurer pro- tects himself in whole or in part against risks he has assumed in insuring a third party. The re-insurer may make use of any defense available to the insurer, to a suit on the policy. Between the re-insured and 9 the original insured there is no privity. It is a rule in fire, marine, and life insurance that if no risk attaches, no premium is to be paid, or if already paid, that, in the absence of fraud, it may be recovered. And in general, if no other time is speci- fied, the risk commences from the signing of the policy. In the absence of fraud, the policy may be made by its date, with or without the phrase "lost or not lost," to operate retrospectively, if both parties so intend. In marine and fire insurance, the contract is per- sonal and does not run with the title to the property. It is not the property, but the insured's interest in the property, that is insured against loss, total or partial. The transfer of the property, therefore, if it be such as totally to defeat this interest of the in- sured, discharges the insurers, unless they consent to such a transfer of the policy as will cover the newly acquired interest of the assignee, and when this is done it really amounts to making a new contract. But where there is no transfer of the property or of the interest insured, the policy itself may be assigned if there be no provision against it, and such assign- ment vests an equitable interest in the assignee. A policy of insurance may always be assigned after loss. In a marine policy the risks usually insured against are "perils of the sea, fire, barratry, theft, robbery, piracy, capture, arrests, and detentions." Where there is negligence on the part of master or crew, and a loss results from one of the perils insured against, it is a difficult question, depending to a great extent upon the facts of the particular case, whether or not the insurers are liable. But the tendency is to con- sider the negligence as the remote cause of the loss, and so to hold the insurers. Since there is always an implied warranty that the vessel insured is sea- 10 worthy and so able to encounter safely all ordinary maritime risks, it is a general rule that the insurers are bound only by those losses which result from uncommon or extraordinary risks. In a fire policy, the insurance is against fire and nothing but fire, that is, there must be ignition or combustion. But in the case of an extraordinary fire, if loss results directly from the heat or if the goods are damaged by water in bona fide efforts to extinguish the fire, even though there be no ignition as regards the goods so damaged by heat or water, still the insurers are liable for such loss. As negli- gence is one of the most frequent causes of loss by fire, the insured, in the absence of fraud, may recover in spite of his own negligence or that of his servants, unless he is chargable with real recklessness or mis-' conduct. And even though the fire be caused by the willful act of a third party, the insured may recover in the absence of an express stipulation excepting loss by incendiarism. It is to be noted that marine and fire insurance differ in the degree of negligence requisite to dis- charge the insurers, a much smaller degree being requisite in marine than in fire insurance. The reason of this is that losses by perils of the sea usually occur in spite of the diligent efforts of master and crew to save the property insured, while the most common cause of loss by fire, as stated supra, is the negligence of the insured or his servants. In a life policy, the insurance is against loss of life, and the amount insured is payable upon the death of the person upon whose life the insurance is made. It is customary to except in the policy death by duel- ling, suicide, or at the hands of justice, and to pro- hibit the person whose life is insured from engaging in certain trades or going to certain places. CHAPTER II. The Court of the Commissioners. In 1601, the Statute of 43 Elizabeth c. 12, was en- acted for the purpose of creating a court to try in- surance causes. "But the jurisdiction being some- what defective, as extending only to London, and to no other assurances but those on merchandise, and to suits brought by the assured only, and not by the insurers, no such commission has of late years issued : but insurance causes are now generally determined by the verdict of a jury of merchants, and the opinion of the judges in case of any legal doubts ; * *. ' ' — 3 Bl. Com. 74-5. The Act as to Marine Policies. In 1746, the Statute of 19 Geo. II. c. 37, was passed. It enacted, in substance, that since "interest or no interest" policies encouraged fraud and were of no advantage to commerce, "all insurances, interest or no interest, or without further proof of interest than the policy itself, or by way of gaming or wagering, or without benefit of salvage to the insurers, shall be totally null and void, except upon privateers, or upon ships or merchandise from the Spanish and Portu- guese dominions." — 2 Bl. Com. 460. The Gambling Act. In 1774, the Statute of 14 Geo. III. c. 48, was passed. The substance of its enactment is that, since insurance without interest has led to gaming, "no insurance shall be made on lives, or on any other event, wherein the party insured hath no interest ; 12 that in all policies the name of such interested party shall be inserted; and nothing more shall be recov- ered thereon than the amount of the interest of the insured."— 2 Bl. Com. 460. But this act does not affect bona fide insurances and it does not extend to marine insurances, which were provided for by a prior Act, St. 19 Geo. II. c. 37, mentioned above. These two acts will be treated under Chapter III upon Insurable Interest. CHAPTER III. Insurable Interest. Section I. In General. Definition: "Such an interest in a subject of in- surance as will entitle the person possessing it to obtain insurance. ' ' — Bouvier . "A mere toager policy is that in which the party assured has no interest in the thing assured, and could sustain no possible loss by the event insured against if he had not made such a wager." — Parker J. in Amory v. Gillman, 2 Mass. 1. "It is not requisite that the insured party should have an absolute property in the insured subject, or that the subject or interest should be one that can be exclusively possessed or be transferable by de- livery or assignment. Insurable interest involves neither legal nor equitable title. The subject or in- terest must, however, be such that it may be de- stroyed, lost, damaged, diminished, or intercepted by the risks insured against. The interests usually insured are those of the owner in any species of prop- erty, of mortgagor, mortgagee, holder of bottomry or respondentia bond, of an agent, consignee, lessee, factor, carrier, bailee, or party having a lien or en- titled to a rent or income, or being liable to a loss depending upon certain conditions or contingencies, or having the certainty or probability of a profit or pecuniary benefit depending on the insured subject." — Bouvier. Goddart v. Garrett, 2 Vern, 269. The defendant insured a ship in which he had no 14 interest other than money loaned on a bottomry bond. The time covered by the policy extended beyond the timeof the loan. When the time of the bottomry risk was past, the plaintiff prayed the Court of. Chancery to cancel the policy, and the court did so on the ground that the defendant's lack of interest made it void, even though expressed in the policy "interest or no interest. 17 This suit was brought in Chancery because a court of law cannot declare a policy void until after loss and suit brought upon it. Here the insurer wished to have the policy cancelled before loss. Depaba v. Ludlow. 1 Cbmyns, 360. The plaintiff's ship, insured by the defendant "in- terest or no interest,'''' was Captured by a pirate, but recovered nine days later. The plaintiff sued the defendant on the policy. It was held that, as the policy read "interest or no interest" the plaintiff needed not to prove his. interest and the defendant could not controvert it; further, that the plaintiff was entitled to insurance for the damages sustained, even though he recovered the ship. The case of Goddart v. Garrett, decided in 1692, clearly held an insurance without interest to be void at common law. But as proof of interest could often be had at the trial only with great inconvenience and difficulty, there had grown up a practice of inserting in the policy the words "interest or no interest" so as to dispense with proof of interest at the trial. This was the question presented in the case of Depaba v. Ludlow, decided in 1720. This case has been taken by some to hold a policy without interest valid at common law if the words "interest or no interest' 1 '' are inserted; but what was really decided was that the parties might agree to waive proof of interest, and not that a policy without interest was valid. The 15 question of validity of a wager policy was not directly presented, for the inspired had an interest and suffered a partial loss, as the report shows. The statutes of 19 Geo. IL c 37, and 14 Geo. III. c. 48, (see Ghapter II), which prohibited insurance without interest, have frequently been taken to im- ply that before their enactment a wager policy was valid at common law. But the better view seems to » be that these statutes were merely declaratory of the common law, and that an insurance without interest would have been void independently of them. Section II. Marine Insurance. The interests most frequently insured in a marine policy are those based upon a legal or equitable title to the ship and its appurtenances, to the cargo, to the freight which the ship m.aj- earn, or to the profits of the voyage. Case I. Barclay v. Cousins. 2 East, 544. (1802). The plaintiff, acting as agent for his principal, ob- tained a policy from the defendant on expected profits. There was a total loss of the ship and cargo, and a verdict for the plaintiff subject to a special case. Upon this case the court decided that an interest in profits is insurable, just as freight, bottomry, and respondentia interests, which have no physical exis- tence. Case II. Worthington v. Bearse and Others. 12 Allen, 382. (1866). The defendants issued a policy of insurance to one owning seven-eighths of a vessel, said policy payable to the plaintiff, to whom the said owner had mortgaged his entire interest. Later this owner entered into a contract for the sale of his interest, but the contract was not executed, and at the time the ves- sel was lost he owned the se\-en-eighths insured, sub- 16 ject only to the plaintiff's mortgage. On appeal it was held that, as the contract of sale was not executed, it did not defeat the plaintiff's right to recover on the policy; and further, that even if the sale had been completed, it would only have suspended the defend- ant's liability, which would have been revived upon the re-transfer of the property to the plaintiff. Case III. Merchants Marine Ins. Co., Applelants v. Rumsey and Johnson, Respondents. 9 Can. S. C. 577. (1884). The plaintiffs agreed with the charterers of a vessel to furnish the greater part of the cargo for a trading voyage. The plaintiffs were to have complete control of the goods during the voyage, and were to pay themselves for the goods ad- vanced by a sale of the return cargo, paying over any balance to the charterers. They took out a policy of insurance with the defendant company for the said voyage,limited to four months, on merchandise under deck. All of the original cargo but a small part had been traded for other goods which were placed under deck, when the vessel and cargo were lost within the four months insured for. To action on the policy, the defendants pleaded that, by its terms, it covered only the original cargo, and that the plaintiffs had no insurable interest. But the court held that, by any reasonable interpretation, the policy covered all goods under deck during the voyage insured for, and the plaintiffs clearly had an insurable interest. An insurable interest then, may be based, not only upon ownership, legal or equitable, of ship or cargo, but also upon expected profits or commissions, liens upon cargo, advances made on a ship for its equip- ment, loans upon mortgage or respondentia, the ad- vances of a consignee, agent, or factor, etc. As to the time during which the insurable interest 17 must exist, the Supreme Court of the United States has held, in the ease of Hooper v. Robinson, 98 U. S. 528, that an insurable interest need not exist at the time of effecting the policy, but that it is sufficient if it subsist during the risk and at the time of the loss. It was also held in this case that one in whose interest an insurance is made may make it his by adopting it, either before or after loss, though the loss may have happened before the insurance was made, and that "where the insurance is lost or not lost, the thing in- sured may be irrecoverably lost when the contract is entered into, and yet the contract be valid. It is a stipulation for indemnity against past as well as future losses, and the law upholds it." Section III. Fire Insurance. Clearly one who holds the legal or equitable title to real or personal property has an insurable interest in such property. But even one who has no such title and no present possession or right of possession, may still have an insurable interest, if he will derive benefit from the continued existence of the property, or will suffer loss from its destruction. — (107 Mass. 377; 62 N. Y. 47). Case I. Marks v. Hamilton, 7 Exch. 323. (1852). The plaintiff, after a discharge under the Insolvent Debtors Act, acquired property which he insured with the defendant against loss by fire. Later the discharge was annulled because of fraud in the pro- ceedings, so that the property insured was never legally or equitably the plaintiff's. But the court held that, since the plaintiff was in possession as the apparent owner, responsible to those who were the real owners, he had an insurable interest. 18 Case II. The National Filtering Oil Co., Respon- dent, v. The Citizens' Ins. Co., Appellant. 106 N. Y. 535. (1887). The plaintiffs, owners of a patent, leased the ex- clusive use of it to a certain firm, and then insured the firm property with the defendant for the protec- tion of their royalties against diminution through loss of the firm property by fire. To an action on the policy after loss, the defendant pleaded that there was no insurable interest. But the court held that, since the plaintiffs suffered a loss by the diminution of their royalties when the firm property was burned, their interest in the said property was insurable. From these cases it will be seen that a liability for the care or preservation of another's property, or the certainty that one will suffer loss from the destruction of another's property, gives the one likely to suffer loss an insurable interest in that other's property. Other interests that have been held insurable are those of mortgagor, mortgagee, agent, consignee, lessee, factor, common carrier, trustee, executor, bailee, stockholder in the corporate property, part- ner in the firm property even before account settled, one holding under an executory contract, etc. Ex- pected profits or advantages are insurable provided the insured has a present interest in the property or enterprise out of which the profits are to come. It was stated as the general rule in marine insur- ance that one needs to have an insurable interest only from the time the risk begins. But in fire in- surance, because of the difference in the subject- matter, it has been laid down as a general rule that one must have an insurable interest even at the time of effecting the policy. — (11 Can. S. C. 92). Since a contract of insurance is single and indivisi- ble, an insurance upon the whole of a piece of 19 property when one has an insurable interest in only a part may be void. Thus it has been held in the District of Columbia that "in a suit on a policy void as to a part of the property insured for want of insurable interest, plaintiff cannot re- cover pro tanto in respect to such of the property as actually belonged to her, the policy being a single, entire, and indivisible contract, which is invalidated by the forfeiture." — Dumas v. Insurance Co., 12 App. D. C. 245. Section IV. Life Insurance. Every man has an insurable interest in his own life without limit as to amount. To have an insur- able interest in the life of another, one must in gen- eral be a creditor or surety, or be so related by blood or by marriage as to have a reasonable expectation of benefit from the continuance of the lif e. Case I. Lord v. Dall. 12 Mass. 115. (1815). The defendant was one of the underwriters on a policy of insurance upon the life of one for the bene- fit of his sister, the plaintiff. It was shown that she was entirely dependent upon her brother for her support. To an action on the policy the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had no insurable interest. But the court held otherwise and supported the policy. The laws of the various States differ considerably as to the relationship requisite to support a life policy. A husband has an insurable interest in the life of his wife, and vice versa. (57 Vt. 496). And generally a child may insure the life of a parent. Beyond this there is much confusion. The question is largely dependent upon the statutes of the partic- ular State. In some of the States there are statutes requiring the son to support the father, the grand- 20 son to support the grandfather, and vice versa. This gives the one under legal obligation to furnish sup- port, or the one entitled to support, an insurable in- terest in the other's life. And it has been held that one who voluntarily undertakes the support of a child has an interest in the child's life; '92, 1 Q. B. 864. A contract of marriage has been held to give the intended wife an insurable interest in the life of the intended husband; 52 Mo. 213. On the other hand it has been decided that the mere relation of brother will not support a policy. In England the courts have held that under the Statute 14 Geo. III. c. 48, a pecuniary interest in a life is necessary to support a contract of insurance; 10 B. and C. 724, '92. 1 Q. B. 864, (1891). In this country the courts have been divided upon this ques- tion; but the better rule seems to be that the interest need not be capable of pecuniary estimation if one person is really dependent upon the other and has a reasonable expectation of benefit from the continu- ance of the latter's life. It was not until 1795 that the question was first presented in England whether or not a creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor. The court, without hesitation, held such an interest in- surable; and the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that where one partner advances money with which another is to conduct the partnership business, he has an insurable interest in the life of the latter; 108 U. S. 498. But the amount of the policy must be proportionate to the debt. Thus it was held that adebt of $70 is not sufficient to support a policy for $3,000 taken out by the creditor upon the life of the debtor; 15 Wall. 643. As to the time when the insurable interest must begin and during which it must continue, there is a 21 very important difference between marine and fire insurances and those upon lives. It has been stated as the general rule that in marine insurance the in- terest must begin as soon as the risk and continue till loss, and that in fire insurance it must exist from the effecting of the policy and until loss. But in life insurance it is sufficient if one has an insurable in- terest at the time of effecting the policy. The reason of this difference is that marine and fire insurances are contracts of indemnity, while life insurance is not. This distinction, however, was not recognized by the courts till 1S54. Previous to that time the lead- ing case on the subject was that of Godsall v. Boldero, 9 East, 72. There the plaintiffs, who were creditors of Mr. Pitt, insured his life to secure the amount of his indebtedness to them. The debt was paid by Mr. Pitt's executors, and it was held that the as- sured could not recover upon the policy, Lord Ellen- borough saying, "It is a contradiction in terms to bring an action for indemnity where, upon the whole event, no damage has been sustained." In 1854 this case was reversed by the case of Dalby v. India and London Life Assurance Co., and the distinction stated above was established. Case II. Dalby v. India and London Life Assurance Co. 15 C. B. 365. (1854). The plaintiff, a life insurance company, insured the life of the Duke of Cambridge, and then took out a policy of re-insurance for part of the amount with the defendant. The plaintiff later arranged to have the original policies cancelled, but kept alive the policy of re-insurance. It was held that as life in- surance is not a contract of indemnity, the plaintiff may recover even if he has no interest at the time of 22 the death of the life-insured provided he had an in- terest at the time of effecting the policy. The basis of this difference between marine and fire insurances and those on lives is that, while there may be no loss under a marine or fire policy, there is sure to be a loss under a life policy, for every life must end. The contract of life insurance is much like that of an annuity reversed; for the premium is computed to be a precise equivalent for the risk taken. Mr. May seems to be the only authority of weight who maintains that life insurance is a contract of indemnity; and even he, while maintaining that the contract is such as between debtor and creditor, ad- mits that the contrary is true as between the parties to the policy. CHAPTER IV. Representation. Section I. In General. Definition: "A verbal or written statement made by the assured to the underwriter, before the sub- scription to the policy, as to the existence of some facts or state of facts, tending to induce the under- writer more readily to assume the risk, by diminish- ing the estimate he would otherwise have formed of it." — May on Insurance. Kinds: There is a great difference of opinion as to whether or not representations like warranties may be classified as affirmative and promissory, but May in his treatise on Insurance after impliedly admitting this classification, distinguishes as to their effect in these words : ' 'while material falsity in an affirmative representation will be a complete defense to an action on a policy of insurance, the material falsity of an oral promissory representation without fraud is no defense whatever." In the case of Alston v. Mechanic'' s Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Hill, 329, Chancellor Walworth, in his opinion, dis- cusses the attitude of the authorities on the subject of promissory representations, and says that he is unable to find any case in which a court has adopted a distinction between affirmative and promissory representations. Breach: "Ordinarily, a false representation, unlike a warranty, to have the effect of avoiding a policy, must be material to the risk." — Amer. andEng. Enc. of Law. 24 Materiality: The materiality of the information conveyed to the insurer, and whether the knowledge of the assured was material to the insurer to know, are questions of fact for a jury. This point "was fully considered, and with a review of the English and American authorities, in the case of the New York Fire Insurance Company v. Walden, and that doctrine has since received the unqualified sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States." — Kent's Commentaries, Vol. III. Representations and Warranties: Generally, a representation is collateral to a contract and not a part of it, while a warranty is a part of the contract. Marine, Fire and Life Insurance: Both upon prin- ciple and judicial opinion it is believed to be the cor- rect doctrine, that the rules which govern represen- tation in fire insurance substantially apply to life in- surance. But the courts are more strict in their construction of representations in marine than in fire and life insurance. Burden of proof: "There is no doubt that, as to mere misrepresentations, the burden of proof is upon the defendent to show them untrue." — Bliss on Life Insurance. District of Columbia Cases. 1. An application for insurance such as to give the impression to the insurer that the title is com- plete and absolute, when in fact it depends upon con- tingencies for its continuance, is misleading and vit- iates the insurance. A misrepresentation material to the risk avoids the policy. Columbian Insurance Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Pet., 25. 2. This was a case in which a representation by the insured as to the state of his health made on the first day of October, in order to obtain a renewal of his policy, "was held not to be a continuing repre- sentation to the 14th day of October, the date of the renewal receipt. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Higgin- botham, 93 U. S. 38a Lord Eldon thought it settled law that, if a person meaning to effect an insurance, exhibited a policy underwritten by .a person of skill and judgment, know- ing that this would weigh with the other party and disarm the ordinary prudence exercised in the com- mon transactions of life, and it turnedout that this per- son had not in fact underwritten the policy, or had done so under such terms that he came under no obligation to pay, this would vitiate the policy. The position of a statement in the policy will often determine its character as being either a warranty or merely descriptive matter. Whether a state* ment shall be taken as a warranty is a mere question of interpretation, to be ascertained in policies of in- surance just as in other contracts. "It is said that words of warranty are always in- serted in the policy, which means in the body or by reference, and representations never. But neither of these propositions is universally true, for many warranties are implied, and the description of the subject-matter insured is very commonly attended by mere representations concerning the conditions of things; and these representations are often, by reference, made part of the policy, though actually written only in the application:" 2 Hall, 632. Section II. Marine Insurance. Case 1. Bize v. Fletcher. 1 Park Ins. 8th ed. 493 (1779). The insurance was upon the ship Carnatic. "Wafered" to the policy was a slip of paper on which was written the. following representation: "Is to go to Madeira, the isles of France, Pondicherry, China, 26 the isles of France, and L'Orient." The ship did not follow the route designated in the representation, but went to Bengal on Aug. 23, 1778 instead of to China, and was captured in October of that year. The defense contended that the representation accom- panying the policy restrained the voyage to the limits specified. Lord Mansfield to the jury: Where a represen- tation accompanies an instrument it is understood that the party making it may vary from it. "The great question in this ease is, whether the represen- tation was false, and that in a matei'ial instance?" "If the variance between the intended voyage, as described in the slip of paper, and the actual voyage as performed, did not tend to increase the risk to the underwriters, this slip of paper being only a repre- sentation, you must find for the plaintiff." Verdict accordingly. Case II. Whitney v. Haven. 13 Mass. R. 172. It was proved by brokers that the plaintiff declared at the time of effecting the policy, that the vessel was to sail within five days, and that the defendant said that his name should be taken off the policy, or that he would not be bound, if she did not then sail. She did not, however, sail within five days, and the delay was relied upon as a sufficient defense. But the court decided that the defendant could not avail him- self of it, not because the delay was justified by the apprehended danger of capture, but because the stipulation formed no part of the written contract, and that parol evidence was not sufficient to give it effect. Case HI. Lewis and Another v. The Eagle Insurance Co. 10 Gray, 508. (1858). An action of contract upon a policy of insurance on 27 the schooner "Emeline," valued therein at $6,000. The defendants alleged that the plaintiffs had repre- sented that the vessel cost $5,000 and had had $1,000 laid out on her, whereas the real cost was $2,150. Evidence was offered to prove the allegations. The presiding judge instructed the jury that in order to avoid the policy the misrepresentation of value had to be fraudulent, because in their answer the de- fendants had taken upon themselves the burden of proving a fraud. Merrick, J. The ruling of this court is that the judge's instructions were erroneous. If a repre- sentation of the value of a ship is false, it is enough to vitiate the policy. New trial granted. Lord Mansfield: "A collateral representation, if false in a point of materiality, makes the policy void ; but if not material, it can hardly ever be fraudulent." — Pawson v. Watson. 2 Cowper 785. Lord Mansfield: "A representation must be fair and true. It should be true as to all that the insured knows; and, if he represents facts to the underwriter without knowing the truth, he takes the risk upon himself. But the difference between the fact as it turns out, and as represented, must be material." — MacdowaU v. Fraser. 1 Doug. 260. Lord Mansfield: "If the assured states that as a fact which he does not know to be true, but only be- lieves it, it is the same as a warranty." — Milts V* Bruttan. 1 Park Ins. 8th ed. 414. Lord Ellenborough: "If a representation is once made, it is to be considered as binding, unless there is evidence of its being afterwards altered or with- drawn." — Edwards v. Footner. 1 Camp. 530. Lord Eldon: "When the misrepresentations were made under such circumstances and in such a way 28 that they took the confidence of the purchaser, and induced him to act -when otherwise he would not, this was a fraud which would affect the sale." — SibbalcZ v. Mill. 2 Dow, 263. Parker, C. J. r " We think that the statement of the day on which a vessel will sail, is substantially noth- ing more than stating an expectation that she will sail on that day." — Rice et Al v. New England Marine Ins. Co. 4 Pick. 439, Thomas, J.: "A representation of what a vessel cost, or what was paid for it, is a representation as to a material fact." — Lewis and Another v. Eagle Ins. Co. 10 Gray, 508. Section III. Fire Insurance. Case I. Alston v. The Mechanic's Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Hill, 329. (1842). The defendants were requested to insure the per- sonal property and the building of the plaintiff, a cal> inet maker, but they refused to assume the risk un- less the plaintiff would agree to cease using the fire- place in his shop. The proof showed that the plain- tiff said " he would abandon his fireplace in the base- ment altogether; he would not use it himself or suffer any other person to use it for any purpose whatever, but woUld use a stove which he had. ' ' The statement was not inserted in the policy. Referees admitted the above as testimony and reported in favor of the defendants. After judgement, the plaintiff sued out a writ of error. Court of Errors: The defendant's counsel contends that the plaintiff made a promissory representation that was material and was not ful- filled; but the court holds this an agreement and not a representation. Therefore, the referees erred in admitting parol evidence of an agreement to defeat the policy. — Judgement reversed. 29 Case II. Dickson v. The Equitable Fire Assurance Co., 18 U. C. Q. B. 246. (1859). "Action on a policy of insurance, for $1,100, against fire, upon a wooden building, comprising a tavern and two tenements under the same roof, occupied as dwelling-houses." The defendants alleged that the plaintiff represented in his application the value of the building to be £150, whereas it was of much less value as was established by evidence of carpenters. The judge instructed the jury that if the defendants were induced by this representation to take a risk they would not have taken if they had known the facts, they should not be held liable. Verdict for plaintiff. Rule for new trial obtained on the ground that the verdict was against law and evidence, and the judge's charge. Robinson, C. J. delivered the opinion of the court: The evidence in this case poinds so strongly to the conclusion of fraudulent overvaluing that there ought to be a new trial. Rule absolute. Note 1. On the second trial there was a verdict for the plaintiff, but the court refused to disturb it, even though the evidence did not differ materially from that given on the first trial. Note 2. After reading the case of Lewis v. Eagle Ins. Co., chapter III, section II, it would seem, from the evidence, that the the jury should have given its verdict for the plaintiff. But, as stated ante, the law of representation in relation to marine insurance dif- fers when applied to fire insurance. The defendants in the case just cited were under no obligation to rely upon the veracity of the plaintiff's assertions; for the premises were at hand, and if they had deemed the representation as to value sufficiently important to determine their action in assuming or refusing the risk, they should have examined the said premises 30 for themselves. Their not doing so may have been regarded by the jury as an indication that the de- fendants considered this representation immaterial. If there is a material misrepresentation T it makes no difference whether it be by way of design or mis- take. If, as a person of ordinary capacity, a man ought to have known a fact, he must be presumed to have known it. What may be expected to be obtained for goods at their retail price may reasonably be represented as their value. Walker, J. "Where the agent knows or can judge of the value of the property, and accepts an applica- tion without objection, even if the valuation is higher than it should be, we cannot say that it is so far material as to vitiate the policy." — Ins. Co. of N. A. v. McDowell, 50 I1L 120. It is not every answer to every question in an ap- plication for insurance that is to be deemed and taken as an assertion or representation of a fact, for the question may be so put as to ask for a mere state- ment of opinion. — 7 Ex. 744. Rapallo, J.: "A material misrepresentation by the agent for effecting the insurance will defeat it, though not known to the assured, and though made without any fraudulent intent on the part of the agent, to the same extent as though made by the assured himself." — Armour v. Transatlantic Fvre Ins. Co., 90 N. Y. 450. Miller, J. : "Statements made by the insured in his application for insurance are not deemed war- ranties unless they are incorporated in the policy, or, in some appropriate methed, referred to in that in- strument ""—Presbyterian, etc. , Fund v. Allen, 106 In Reinsurance: In respect to the duty of disclosing all material facjbs, the case of reinsurance does not differ from that of an original insurance, unless by being in some instances even stronger; 107 U. S. 485. Agency: The general principles of agency are here applicable. If a party, knowing that his agent is about to procure insurance, withhold information from the agent for the purpose of misleading the underwriters, it is a fraud and vitiates the insur- ance; 1 Pet. 170. 38 Sectton II. Marine Insurance. It is a frequent practice in marine insurance to in- sure retroactively ships which are at sea, so that the whole voyage is covered by the policy. Such an in- surance must, of course, be made in good faith; if the insured has information that his ship is in danger,, or hears rumors to this effect, and conceals this in effecting the insurance, the contract is void; and the insured cannot recover even though the loss occur in some other way than in the one anticipated, for the contract laekb mutuality and so is void ab initio. The rule in marine insurance in regard to conceal- ments is very strict, and it is the tendency of the courts to hold that the concealment of any material fact, or of anything that would tend to increase the risk, whether the concealment be intentional or by mere oversight, avoids the policy. Thus the United States Supreme Court has held that, if a vessel takes on board papers which increase the risk of capture, and if this be not the regular usage of the trade in- sured, the non-disclosure of the fact that such papers ' are on board, will avoid the policy: 6 Crandh, 274. In Bates v. Hewitt, L E. 2 Q. B. 595, Cockburn, C. N J. said: "It is also well-established law, that it is immaterial whether the ommission to communicate a material fact arises from intention, or indifference, or a mistake, or from it not being present to the mind of the assured that the fact was one which it was material to make known." It has been said that the concealment of a fact known to the insurer does not avoid the policy. When the insurer had known the fact formerly, the ques- tion is, whether or not it was present to his mind at the time of effecting the policy; if it was not the policy is void. "It is laid down as a general propo- sition, that the party proposing the insurance, if he 39 has omitted a material fact, can only enforce the in- surance which, from the omission to communicate the fact, would otherwise be avoided, in the event of the jury finding by their verdict that by means of what he did communicate coupled with any other fact that then might be present to the mind of the insurer, the latter knew at the time he granted the insurance the fact which it was the duty of the assured to com- municate." "L. R. 2 Q. B. 595. "But it is not necessary to disclose minutely every material fact; assuming that there is a material fact which he [the insured] is bound to disclose, the rule is satisfied if he discloses sufficient to call the atten- tion of the underwriters in such a manner that they can see that if they require further information they ought to ask for it." '96, 1 Q. B. 123. Case I. Locke v. The North American Ins. Co., 13 Mass. 61. (1816). The plaintiff, who was the equitable, but not the legal owner of certain goods, insured them for a cer- tain voyage with the defendant; he was not asked and did not state his interest in the property. There was a total loss by capture; to action on the policy, the defendant, among other pleas, set up the con- cealment of interest by plaintiff. The court felt that upon general principles such a concealment should avoid the policy; but in view of the previous decisions said: "We are satisfied, as the law stands, that a bona fide equitable interest in property, of which the legal title is in another, may be insured under the general name of property, or by a description of the thing in- sured; unless there should be a false affirmation or aepresentation, or a concealment, after inquiry, of the true state of the property." Judgment for the plaintiff. 40 Case II. Ruggles v. General Interest Ins. Co., 4 Mason, 74. (1825). The vessel of the plaintiff, insured by the defend- ant, was wholly lost. The master of the vessel kept the information of her loss from the owner to enable him to effect an insurance upon her. This the owner did in entire good faith; later he made an abando- ment and claimed a total loss. The defendant pleaded that the knowledge of the master bound the , the owner, and that the policy was therefore void for concealment. Judge Story, in deciding for the plain- tiff, said: "My opinion is, that in the present case, where there has been an abandoment in due time for a loss really total, if the owner, at the time of procur- ing the insurance, had no knowledge of the loss, but acted with entire good faith in procuring the insur- ance, he is not precluded from a recovery, nor is the policy void by the omission of the master to commu- nicate intelligence of the loss, although such omission was wilful and with the fraudulent design to enable the owner to make insurance after the total loss, the owner not being conusant of any such act or design at the time of such insurance. My opinion also is, that it was the duty of the master to give information of the loss to his owner as soon as he reasonably could, and that his omission was a plain departure from his duty." This case was carried up to the Supreme Court of the United States by the defendant (12 Wheat. 408); there the same conclusion was reached, but upon a different ground. The reasoning of the court was that the relation of principal and agent between the owner and master of the vessel ceased from the moment when the vessel was totally lost; and that thereafter, if the master was the agent of any- one, it was of the underwriter. The judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed Upon this ground. 41 Case III. Proudfoot v. Montefiore. L. R 2 Q. B. 511. (1867), The defendant had entered into a contract with the plaintiff to deliver to him a policy of insurance on his ship. The plaintiff brought this action for non-de- livery of the policy, and the defendant pleaded a con- cealment on the part of the plaintiffs agent. The plaintiff himself had acted in good faith; but his agent, instead of notifying him by telegraph of the loss of the ship, as was then the commercial custom, had done so by mail, in order that the plaintiff might have time to insure. It was held that the agent should have communicated with his principal by telegraph, since it was customary, and that the owner was responsible for the fraudulent act of his agent, on the principle that " where a loss must fall on one of two innocent parties through the fraud or negligence of a third, it ought to be borne by the party by whom the person guilty of the fraud or negligenee has been trusted or employed." Judg- ment for the defendant. It will be noticed that this case is indirect conflict with Case II, just preceding it. Cockburn, C. J., in this latter case, in speaking of the opinions of Judge Story and of the Supreme Court, says that he considers the ruling of the former erroneous and the ground of the latter very unsatisfactory and unten- able- The courts of the United States have been in- clined to take the view laid down in Proudfoot v. Montefiore; and it is probable that if the Supreme Court of the United States were again called upon to decide this question, it would reverse its former decision. Section III. Fire Insurance: It has been stated that in a marine insurance the concealment of a material fact, even though result- 42 ing from mere oversight or mistake and not fromany fraudulent intent, avoids the policy. The reason of this is that the underwriter, from the nature of the subject-matter, is usually unable to make an exami- nation for himself and so is entirely dependent upon the information given him by the insured. In a Are insurance, however, the underwriter has an oppor- tunity to inspect the property to be insured, either in person or by an agent. Because of this difference, the courts, especially in this country, have gradu- ally come to take into account the intention of the insured and to hold that a concealment must be both fraudulent and material to avoid the policy. If, how- ever, questions are asked him, the insured is bound to make a true and full representation concerning all matters so brought to his notice, and a concealment in answering these questions will have the same effect as in a marine insurance; that is, if it be material, the policy is avoided regardless of the intention of the insured ; 5 Hill, 188. But though the insurer, if he ask no questions, is ordinarily presumed to insure at his own risk, yet if there be any unusual danger or risk the insured must make it known, even though there be no inquiry to call forth this information; 8 How. 235. Case 1. Buf e v. Turner and Others. 2 Marsh 46. (1815). The plaintiff, a merchant living in Heligoland, brought this action on a policy of insurance, issued by the defendants, on his warehouse. The defendants pleaded that, when the plaintiff wrote for the insur- ance, the warehouse was in imminent danger from a fire not yet extinguished in a building nearby, that the plaintiff knew this, but concealed it, and that because of this fraudulent concealment the policy was void. Issue was joined on this plea; the jury acquitted the 43 plaintiff of any fraudulent intention, but thought the concealment material, and so gave a verdict for the defendants. The court thought the jury justified in giving this verdict and refused a motion to set it aside. This English case illustrates the rigor of the earlier law as applied to concealments in fire insur- ance. Case II. Lyon and Another v. The CommercM Ins. Co. 2 Rob. 266. (1842). The plaintiffs, lessees of a building, sub-leased the second story of it to one who kept a gambling estab- lishment. Later the defendant issued a policy to the plaintiffs upon goods kept in the first story of the said building. The secretary of the defendant com- pany had expressed his objections to taking risks near gambling establishments, but he asked no ques- sions as to whether or not there were any sub-tenants, nor did the plaintiffs give any information in regard to this. The defendant pleaded that the occupation of the sub-tenant materially increased the risk and that its concealment avoided the policy. The jury in the lower court decided that this was not a mater- ial concealment, and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs. On appeal, it was held ttiat the question of materiality was properly left to the jury, and that, since they had found the concealment immaterial, the policy was valid. The court said: "No case, it is be- lieved, can be referred to, in which it has been held that the owner of a house, or a tenant on a lease for years, is bound to disclose or communicate to his underwriters the names and pursuits of the tenants, or sub-tenants, living on the premises, [provided no questions are asked in regard to this matter]. If the insurers wish to guard themselves against the risk or dangers supposed to result from certain pursuits 44 or occupations of the tenants, or sub-tenants, of houses on which they make insurance, whether it be on the property itself, or on goods in it, they have it in their power to insert in the policy a warranty to> that effect." Case III. Pelzer M'f'g. Co. v. St. PaulF. & M. Ins. Co, Pelzer M'f'g. Co. v. Savannah F. & M. Ins. Co. 41 Fed. R. 271. (1890). The plaintiff stored some bales of cotton with cer- tain warehousemen,, who insured the said cotton with the defendants, in their own name, after the usual form of warehouse policies. After loss the policies were assigned to the plaintiff, who brought this ac- tion upon them. The plaintiffs contended: (1) that, the warehousemen had no insurable interest, and (2) that they did not disclose the fact that the cotton in- sured in their own name was the plaintiff's property. But it was held that they had a right, as warehouse" men, to insure in their own name, to sue in their own name, and to assign the policies. The court stated that the action was to be treated as if brought by the warehousemen. The defendants contended: (3) that the warehousemen concealed the fact that, because of a release by them to the railroad, the insurance company was deprived of the right of subrogation and so of suit against the railroad for the burning of the warehouse, occasioned by sparks from the rail- road's engines; and that this concealment avoided the policy. The court instructed the jury that, to avoid the policy, this fact must have been material and also either intentionally concealed or at least left un- stated by the warehousemen without good reason, that is, when they should have known it to be material, if it were so. The jury found the fact to be immater- ial and the court dismissed the motion for a new trial made on exceptions to the charge to the jury. 45 In the case of a reinsurance, it has been held that the reinsurer is discharged by the failure of the rein- sured to make known the bad character of the origi- nal insured, even though the insured was not bound to make this known to the reinsured; 17 Wend. 359. In a case where no questions were asked as to the ownership of the property, and the insured failed to state that he owned the building but not the ground upon which it stood, it was decided that the conceal- ment was immaterial, and that if the insurer wished such information, he should have asked for it; 18 Pick. 419. Ranney, J. (2 Ohio St. 452): "It is not now true, whatever may be thought of the older authorities, that there is no difference in this respect [conceal- ment] between marine and fire insurance; nor that a failure to disclose every fact material to the risk, upon which information is not asked for, or suppressed with a fraudulent intent, will avoid a policy of the latter description. * * In marine insurance, the underwriter, from the very necessities of his under- taking, is obliged to rely upon the assured, and has therefore the right to exact a full disclosure of all the facts known to him, which may in any way affect the risk to be assumed. But in fire insurance, no such necessity for reliance exists, and if the under- writer assumes the risk without taking the trouble to either examine or inquire, he cannot very well, in the absence of all fraud, complain that it turns out to be greater than he anticipated." Section IV. Life Insurance. The rigor of the law in regard to concealments in a marine insurance has been discussed. In England the tendency of the courts has been to hold the same rules applicable to fire and life insurance. But, as was said in regard to fire insurance, the courts of 46 this country have been inclined to take a more liberal view. As the subject of the fire insurance is usually in a po- sition to be inspected by the insurer or his agents, so also the subject of life insurance is almost always present for examination. And further, it is custo- mary in fire and life insurances to put to the insured a number of questions deemed material in estimating' the risk. When he has answered these fully and truly, he may assume that he has stated all required of him, provided nothing is kept back with fraudulent intent. The first of the following cases is given as illustra- tive of the rigor of the English law and of the early law in this country. Case I. Huguenin v. Rayley. 6 Taunt. 186. (1815). The person whose life was insured by the defend- ant was in a debtors' prison at the time the policy was effected. An agent of the insured procured the policy for her: and he was not asked and did not give any information as to her being in prison. To an ac- tion on the policy, the defendants pleaded that this was a fraudulent concealment, which avoided the policy. It was argued for the plaintiff that the de- fendant asked no question calling for a statement of the imprisonment, and that the insured was not bound to disclose facts which were not inquired about. It was argued for the defendant that "from whatever cause the concealment originated, if there was a con- cealment of that which it was important should be known, it avoids the policy." The court said that, though there had not been "an omission of the state- ment of any matter which the office called for; never- theless, if the imprisonment were a material fact, the keeping it back would be fatal;" and a new trial was 47 ordered that the materiality of the imprisonment might be decided by a jury. Case II. Rawls v. American Mut, Life Ins. Co. 27 N. Y. 282. (1863). The plaintiff obtained from the' defendant a policy of insurance upon the life of John L. Fish, a person of very intemperate habits; but no information re- garding these habits was asked or given. To an ac- tion on the policy, the defendant pleaded that it was void because of this concealment. On the first trial the judge said: "The presumption is that the insurers questioned the party upon all subjects which they deemed material, and all which were in the contem- plation of the parties at the time, and beyond that, clearly a party is not bound to disclose;"' he then charged the jury: "that if Fish answered frankly and truly all the questions put to him, then there was no concealment. The mere omission to state matter not called for by any specific or general question would not be a concealment, and would not affect the valid- ity of the policy. ' ' Upon this charge the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff ; the case was twice appealed, and each time the judgement was affirmed. Case III. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank and Trust Co. 37 U. S. App. 692. (1896). The plaintiff in error was the defendant in the lower court. The teller of a bank had been embezzling its funds for over a year before his death. A few months be- fore he died, he obtained a policy of insurance from the plaintiff in error, but was not asked and did not give any information as to his embezzlement. Before his death, which resulted from the mental strain arising from a disclosure of his crime, he assigned the said policy to the bank, the defendant in error. 48 The lower court charged the jury that, to avoid the policy, the concealment of information not asked for must have been intentional. To this charge the plaintiff in error took exceptions, maintaining that "the motive or cause of the non-disclosure is unim- portant, if the fact be found material to the risk, and was known to the insured when he obtained the in- surance." The Court of Appeals held the charge to the jury to have been correct. The court discussed at length and with a copious citation of authorities the tendency of English cases of fire and life insurance to follow the law applicable to marine insurance; and then traced the gradual de- parture of American fire and life insurance cases from this 'rigorous rule. Judge Taft, who delivered the opinion, then said in conclusion: "But, whatever the effect of this case, we think the modern tendency, even of Massachusetts decisions, is to require that a non-disclosure of a fact not inquired about shall be fraudulent, before vitiating the policy; and, as already stated, this view is founded on the better reason. The subject is by no means as clear upon the author- ities as could be wished, and the text writers find much difficulty in reconciling the cases." "The mere non-communication of his habits of life by the party whose life was insured, would not in itself vitiate the insurance, even though those habits were in the opinion of the jury such as tended to shorten life." 2 Moo. & R. 328. When the insured is asked whether or not he has previously applied for insurance, and if so, with what results, the non-disclosure that other companies have refused to insure him is a material concealment and avoids the policy; 11 Ch. D. 363. As mentioned before, the question of materiality is 49 to be determined by the jury. The question is, not whether either party believed a particular circum- stance material, but whether it was in fact material; 8 B. & C. 586. "As regards the general principle, I am not pre- pared to lay down the law as making any difference in substance between one contract of assurance and another. Whether it is life, or fire, or marine assur- ance, I take it good faith is required in all cases, and though there may be certain circumstances from the peculiar nature of marine insurance which require to be disclosed, and which do not apply to other con- tracts of insurance, that is rather, in my opinion, an illustration of the application of the principle than a distinction in principle." Jessel, M. R., M. Ch. D. 363. (1879). CHAPTER VI. Warranty. Section I. In General. Definition: "A warranty is a part of the contract evidenced by the policy, and consists of an assertion of a fact or an undertaking to do a particular act, upon the accuracy or performance of which the validity of ■ the contract depends." Kinds ; An affirmative warranty may be express or implied, but it usually consists of a positive repre- sentation in the policy of the existence of some fact or state of things at or previous to the time of mak- ing the policy. A promissory warranty may be express or implied, but it usually has reference to the happening of some future event or the performance of some act in the future. Performance: In the case of Hide v. Bruce, 3 Douglas, 213, it was held that, inasmuch as the in- surer has the right to demand a strict performance of the warranty by the insured, and cannot be com- pelled to accept a substantial compliance, or to show that the breach was any way material to the risk, so, on the other hand, the insured is held only to a bare compliance with his engagement, which is not to be extended by construction to include what is not necessarily implied in the terms of the warranty. Nature: In the absence of statutory enactments to the contrary, the only concern of the courts is to determine whether or not the warranty has been complied with and not to inquire into its materialty. 51 In the case of a warranty, the person warranting un- dertakes that the matter is such as he represents it; and unless it be so, whether it arise from fraud, mistake, negligence of an agent, or otherwise, then the contract is not entered into; there is in reality no contract; 3 Dow. 255. Construction: If there is repugnancy between the printed and written portions of a policy of insurance, the written part controls the printed without regard to the order of the conflicting parts. Whenever a statement in a policy is ambiguous, admitting of two interpretations, the courts are in- clined to construe it as a representation; 95 IT. S. 673. Mutual Insurance Companies: If a man insure in a mutual company, he becomes a member of the com- pany, and is consequently under obligation to observe its by-laws; and if the rules and regulations are re- ferred to in the policy they are to be taken as a part of the contract and so as a warranty. Marine, Fire and Life A ssurances : It is the ten- dency of the courts to construe statements in a policy of marine insurance as warranties. In fire and life assurances, however, the courts are not so strict in the interpretation of the contract, much of the mat- ter contained in policies of this character being considered as descriptive, i. e., statements having the force of representations. Thus in a policy of fire insurance, when the prop- erty was described as situated in a certain yard be- tween Mead and JrcA Streets, whereas it was between Mead and Ash Streets, the objection of variance was overruled, Arch Street as written in the policy being neither a necessary nor material part of the de- scription. Burden of proof: It is sometimes a vital question whether the onus rests upon the plaintiff to show a 52 compliance with the warranties or whether such com- pliance is presumed, so that the burden is upon the defendants to show a non-compliance. If the accepted definitions of a warranty are to be construed literally, it would seem that the onus should be upon the plaintiff; that is, if a warranty is a condition precedent, compliance with it should be established before the plaintiff can recover. In Campbell v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. r 98 Mass. 381, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts says: "From the very nature of the case, the party seeking his indemnity or payment under the contract must bring his case within the provisions of the in- strument he is undertaking to enforce. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to present a case in all respects conformable to the terms under which the risk is assumed." What constitutes a warranty: There are numer- ous cases in which it has been held that what is writ- ten upon the face, margin, or back of a policy is equally a part of the contract. But it seems that a paper does not become a part of the contract, so as to be construed as a warranty, by being folded in or waf ered to the policy. The applications, proposals, conditions annexed, and by-laws, may be made part of the contract by the use of words in the policy declaring that they shall be the basis of the contract. Parol evidence; Evidence of usage to explain, or rather to give effect to the meaning of the policy, is commonly resorted to. 1 Phillips on Ins. Breach: It is too firmly settled to be questioned that the breach of an express warranty, whether material to the risk or not, whether a loss happens through the breach or not, absolutely determines the policy and the assured forfeits his rights under it. 53 Mutual Companies. "A mutual company is one in which the members are both the insurers and the insured. The prem- ium paid by them constitutes the fund which is liable for the losses and expenses, and they share in the profits in proportion to their interest, and control and regulate the affairs of the company." Amr. and Eng. Enc. of Law. "Where the laws of a mutual endowment association make suspension for mon-payment of dues a forfeiture of membership benefits, or provide a formal method for suspension in such case, nonpayment of dues will not, ipso facto, work forfeiture, though the assured was secretary of the society, and formal proceedings for suspension have not been had because he failed, as required, to report his own delinquency. Oster- man. v. District Grand Lodge No. 4, 1. O. B. B. (Cal.). 42 p. 412. Where a mutual benefit certificate, and the appli- cation for it, provide that if the monthly dues, assessments, etc., required to be paid, are not paid to the company on the day due, the certificate shall be void, the payment of such dues and assessments is a condition precedent to any subsequent liability of the company, and it need not take any action de- claring a forfeiture in order to relieve it of liability. Pitts v. Hartford Life and Annuity Ins. Co., 34 A. 95, 66 Conn. 376. Where a member of a mutual benefit society fails to pay assessments as provided by the by-laws and his certificate of membership, such certificate is void. Scheele v. State Home Lodge of Farmers' Mutual Protection, 1 Mo. App. Rep'r, 751. 63 Mo. App. 277. 54 Section II. Marine Insurance. In marine insurance the usual subjects of express warranty are: ownership of vessel and cargo, neu- trality, lawfulness of the goods or adventure, pre- sence of convoy, and the time of sailing. There is another class of warranties known as warranties implied by law. They are: an honest statement by the assured of material circumstances, attending the risk, that the ship shall pursue the course of her voyage in the usual manner, the sea- worthiness of the vessel, "and perhaps that the risk is to commence and the policy is to attach within a reasonable time." By far the most important of these is the warranty of sea-worthiness. This war- ranty is strictly a condition precedent, and a failure in its requirements as to ship, officers, or pilot, will invalidate the contract. The standard of sea- worth- iness of a ship varies according to her location, the season of the year, the length and character of the voyage, and the age of improvement. As stated in Section 1 of this chapter, the courts are inclined to be more strict in their construction of policies of marine insurance than of those against fire and loss of life. Thus, in a United States Su- preme Court case, it was held that a warranty that "orders will be given that the ship shall not cruise" is satisified only by positive orders not to cruise, not by mere absence of authority not to cruise; 1 Dall., 162. Case I. Eden and Another v. Parkinson. 2 Dousf. 732. (1781). The plaintiffs insured the ship and cargo at and f rom L'Orient to Rotterdam; "warranted a neutral ship and neutral property." The ship sailed from L'Orient on the 11th of December, 1780, at that time being neutral property and continuing to be so until the 20th of December, on which day hostilities com- 55 menced between the English and Dutch, The ship ceased to be neutral property and was taken on December 25, 1780. Verdict for plaintiff subject to opinion of the court. Held, that the warranty, that the property was neutral did not continue throughout the voyage. "The warranty is that things stand so at the time, not that they shall continue." Case II. De Hahn v. Hartley. 1 T. R. 343. (1786). An action brought by the plaintiff (an underwriter) to recover back the amount of a loss that he had paid upon a policy of insurance. In the margin of the policy were the words, sailed from Liverpool "with 50 hands or upwards." The plaintiff, after paying the amount of indemnity, heard that the "Juno," the ship insured, had sailed with only 46 hands. The court held that the marginal note was a warranty and that the condition not being complied with the policy was void. Note 1. This judgment of the King's Bench was " unanimously affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber." In Lily v. Ewer, 1 Doug. 72 (1779), the court held that, when a convoy for the whole voyage is clearly intended, an unforseen separation is an accident to which the underwriter is liable; "for the meaning of a warranty to sail with convoy is not that the ships must continue and arrive together." A marine policy is a commercial contract, and it is construed according to the import of the words as they are understood among merchants. Section III. Fire Insurance. The warranties in fire policies usually relate to the material of the subject matter, its locality, the prox- imity and characteV of the adjacent buildings, the pursuits of tenants, the value of the property, future 56 occupation, the presence of a watchman on the prem- ises, and the means at hand for extinguishing fire. Since the case of Fowler and Others v. JStna Fvre Insurance Co., (1827), in which it was held that prem- ises described as a frame house filled in with brick, amounted to a warranty that it was a house answering that description, it has been conceded that there is no principle of construction applicable to written agreements, which will permit a court to hold a stip- ulation not to be a warranty in a fire policy, which it should hold to be a warranty in a marine policy. The description of the property insured in the pol- icy is not as a rule literally binding upon the assured ; but when the rate of premium is affected by the des- cription, it operates as a warranty that the property is of the character and class described; 13 Conn. 533. Case I. Crocker v. People's Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 8 Cush. 79 (1851). An action on a policy of insurance, whereby the defendants insured the plaintiff "two thousand dol- lars on his machine shop, a watchman kept on the premises, * * ." At the trial it appeared that a watchman had been hired to watch what was called half the night, that is, going in at half -past five, and leaving at half -past ten o'clock. He was employed for this time from November 28th to December 8th, when the fire occured, about one o'clock in the morn- ing. The defendants contended that employing a watchman for such a time was not such a compliance with the terms of the policy as would entitle the plaintiff to recover. "Witnesses testified that there was a difference in the hours of keeping a watch in different establishments. The judge instructed the jury that the clause in the policy did not speak of a constant watchman, but a watchman, some watchman; and that therefore, if the assured in good faith had 57 kept a watchman on the premises, the policy would he complied with. The jury were also instructed to Tefer to the evidence in determining whether or not the assured acted in good faith. A verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendants alleged exceptions. Shaw, C. J. : The terms of the policy did not re- quire a strict and constant watch. The directions to the jury were right. Judgment on the verdict. In the above ease, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts applies to warranties in fire policies the same doctrine that was laid down by the court of King's Bench, 1783, in the marine cause, Ride v. Bruce. That doctrine is, as stated ante, that the in- sured is held only to a bare compliance with his en- gagement, which is not to be extended by construc- tion to what is not necessarily implied in the terms of the warranty. Mr. C. J. Breese said that the presence of a watch- man on the premises insured has been the occasion of much litigation; and the decisions of the courts on this subject are not in unison. There are two New York cases bearing on this ques- tion that are generally accepted as good law. In the first of these, First National Bank of Ballston Spa v. The President and Directors of the Insurance Company of North America, it was held that the possession of the insured property by the sheriff, under an execution against the assured, and the exclusion of him and his servants does not absolve the latter from a warranty that he will keep a watchman on the premises at night. The other case is Ripley v. Aetna Insurance Co., 30 N. Y. 136. In this case the policy was based on a written survey in the form of question and answer; to a question whether there was a watchman in the building during the night, the assured answered, "There is a watchman nights;" a fire occured on 58 Sunday morning before daylight, when no watchman was present ; and it appeared that it was not customary to keep a watchman in the building between twelve o'clock on Saturday night and the same hour on Sun- day night; held, the assured could not recover; 30 N. Y. 136. Case II. Garrett, Executor of Taylor, v. Provincial Ins. Co. 20 U. C. Q. B. 200. (1860). This was an action on a policy of insurance, effected by testator with the defendants upon a steam saw- mill. In the body of the policy were written the words: "The assured hereby agrees to keep twelve pails full of water on each flat of said mill during the continuance of this policy." It was shown that the number of buckets required was not in the mill when it was burned, but their presence there would have been useless, as the fire was not discovered until it was so far advanced that it was impossible to enter the building. It was held that the above stipulation was a promissory warranty, the performance of which was necessary to the right to sue upon the policy. Judgment for defendants. Case III. National Bank v. Insurance Co. 95 U. S. 673. (1877). The Supreme Court held: (1) When a policy of in- surance contains contradictory provisions, or has been framed so as to leave room for construction, the court should lean against that construction which imposes upon the assured the obligations of a war- ranty. (2) "Where the application for insurance states that assured has, in the instrument, made a just, full and true statement of all material facts in regard to the condition, situation, value, and risk of the property, so far as known to him, it is only a covenant of good faith, and is not broken unless the estimates by the assured are intentionally excessive. ' ' 59 Where a building is insured as a dwelling-house it is not a warranty that it is a tenanted house, nor that it shall be occupied while the risk endures, nor that it shall be guarded by a keeper. In a recent case, decided in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, it was held that the acceptance of a policy describing a building as "oc- cupied as a dwelling house, " is a warranty that the building is so occupied; 4 App. D. C. 66. But it is not a warranty that it shall continue to be so occupied ; 4 Conn. R. 129. 3 N. Y. 122. It is only when the change in the occupancy of premises, containing property insured, increases the hazard, that the assured is under an obligation to in- form the company thereof: 986 U. S. 85. Oakley, J. "The insurers, having a description of the property in their possession, are presumed to insert in the policy itself as much of that description as they deem material; and by omitting any part of it, they show that they are content to take such part as a representation merely, and to look to it only for estimating the risk." 2 Hall, N. Y. Super. Ct. 589. Grover, J. Where a fire policy refers to a survey and declares that it shall constitute a part of the policy, the statements therein contained in regard to the situation, care, and use of the property are to be regarded and construed as warranties ; 50 N. Y. 45. In Goddcurd v. Monitor Ins. Co., 108 Mass. 56, it was held that a policy insuring a building as a ma- chine shop, as represented by one applying for the insurance, when in fact the building was occupied as an organ factory, on which the risk was greater, was void, because the minds of the parties never met. Section IV. Life Insurance. The warranties usually contained in a policy of life insurance relate to the age, health, residence, last 60 medical attendant, habits;, other insurances effected on the life, and the occupation of the insured usually at the time of making the application. The warranty in good health is of tern construed too strictly by the courts. But in the cases of Boss v. Bvadshaw, 2 Park Ins. (8th ed.) 933, and Willis v, Poole, 2 Park Ins. (Sth ed.) 934, Lord Mansfield says, that such a warranty does not mean that a man is. physically perfect and that he is not without the seeds, of disorder. There are usually conditions in the policy to the effect that if the assured die from certain causes the insurance company shall be exempted from lia- bility. The most prominent of these are: death by suicide, death at the hands of justice, and death in known violation of law. As to the effect upon the liability of the under- writer, the courts discriminate between voluntary suicide, accidental death, and suicide by an insane person. Thus all the authorities agree that the in- surance company is exempted when, a sane man in the possession of .his faculties,, destroys his life; but it must be clearly established that the assured died by his own volwntary act; for, on the ground of public policy, the presumption is against suicide; 10 App. D. C. 277. However, if death is the result of some accident, as by taking poison by mistake, the courts hold the insurers liable. Whether or not suicide by an insane person invalidates the contract is not clearly settled, and the limited scope of this book does not admit of the investigation that the importance of the subject warrants. The insurance company, however, may make an exception in the policy in regard to suicide, "whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or ' and thus be relieved from liability ; 11 App. 61 D. C. 447. But the condition of exemption must be certain and tangible, or the court will not undertake to enforce it: 150 XT. S. 527; 120 U. S. 527 ;1 Mac A. 632. The other exceptions to liability are death at the hands of. justice and death in known violation of law. The former is defined as death by virtue of a judicial sentence, while the interpretation of the latter is in dispute. The District of Columbia Code provides that every policy of insurance procured, directly or indirectly, by a person; convicted of murder or manslaughter of the assured, for his own benefit or payable to him upon the life of the person so killed, shall be void, p. 173, s. 961. Case I. Wilkinson v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. 30 Iowa, 119 (1870). One of the questions and answers in the applica- tion, which was incorporated into the policy by ref- erence, was, "14. Has the party ever met with any accidental or serious injury; if so, what was it? — No." Four years before this insurance was effected, the insured had fallen out of a tree, but the injury sus- tained was only temporary and did not affect her longevity. The defendants pleaded that the answer to the question in the application was false and avoided the policy. The court held; (1) that this question being a warranty must have been truly answered: (2) that the question must be reasonably construed, so as not to include every little accident not affecting the health, as burns, falls, cuts; (3) that the question was truly and reasonably answered. Cose II. American Popular Life Insurance Co., Plaintiffs in Error, v. Day, Executor, Defend- ant in Error. 39 N. J. L. 89. (1876). The testator, upon whose life the insurance was effected, answered certain questions of the insurer 62 in a paper intended as a proposal for Insurance, and agreed in writing in said proposal that the answers and accompanying statements should form part of the contract. The policy declared that the insurance was in "consideration of the representations made" 1 to the company, but did not refer, except as just stated, to the proposal or application. The counsel for the company insisted that, by virtue of the agree- ment in the application, the questions and statements in said application made part of the policy and were therefore warranties. The court held that if the policy itself does not directly or indirectly declare the answers and statements m the application a part of the contract, it will be assumed that all previous negotiations have been superseded, and that the policy alone expresses the contract of the parties. The fact that the policy refers to the representations, as the consideration of the contract does not change the representation into a warranty or give it a higher character. Case III. Knecht v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 90 Pa. 118. (1879). In this case the insured declared in his application that he was not afflicted with any diseases or pernici- ous habits, and that he would not practice any habits tending to shorten his life. The insured died as a result of the subsequent immoderate use of intoxi- cating drinks. The court held that his declaration was merely the expression of his intention and that he did not covenant in any part of the contract that he would not practice any pernicious habits. "Nor did he promise, agree, or warrant, not to do so." There is no evidence that the declaration of the insured's intention was false. The mere declaration in the application is not sufficient to avoid the policy. In the case of Knight v. Mut. Ins. Co. of N. Y. 9 63 Weekly Notes of Cases, 501, the distinction is made between the word declare employed in an application and the word guarantee similarly used. In the above case it was guaranteed that the insured would not practice any habit tending to shorten his life. The guaranty was held to be the same as a warranty; and in this respect the case is distinguishable from Case III in this section. In those applications that are made part of the contract by the terms of the policy, it is a rule that answers responsive*to direct questions asked by the insurance company are to be regarded as warranties ; but that where the answers are not so responsive, but volunteered without being called for, they should be construed to be mere representations; 2 Flippin, 9. CHAPTER VII. "Warranties Implied by Law. Section I. Seaworthiness. Definition: "The state or quality of being sea- worthy, or able to resist the ordinary violence of wind and weather. " — Kent. "A mere capacity of performing the voyage, and earning the premium, is not sufficient to constitute seaworthiness."— 3B. & S. 669. But the ship must "possess all the qualities of seaworthiness, and be navigated by a competent master and crew. " — 1 Pet. 179. This warranty ex- tends, not only to the ship and all its fittings, but also to the usual and proper papers and charts, a sufficient supply of provisions and fuel, proper bal- last and storage of the cargo, and suitable officers and crew ; and if the vessel be unseaworthy , the policy does not attach. Even one who innocently ships goods in a vessel in which he has no interest is bound; and if the vessel prove unseaworthy the insurer is discharged; 1 Park Ins. 8th ed. 470. It is generally sufficient if a ship be seaworthy at the time of sailing; but where two of the members of a crew, sufficient in number at the time of sailing, were only engaged for a part af the voyage and re- fused to complete it, the policy was declared void, 3 B. & C. 158. When the vessel becomes unseaworthy through the neglect or misconduct of the master or crew, after sailing from port in a seaworthy condition, the insurers are bound; 5 M. & W. 405. In England it has been held that there is an implied warranty of seaworthiness in a voyage, but not in a 65 time policy, 4 H. L. C. 353; but there seems to be a tendency in this country to imply such a warranty in both kinds of policies, 7 Allen, 211; the decisions, however, show considerable contrariety of opinion. Section II. Deviation. "A deviation is a voluntary departure, without necessity or reasonable cause, from the regular and usual course of the voyage insured. This discharges the underwriters from the time of the deviation. And any unnecessary delay during the course of the voyage, whether at s"ea or in port, is tantamount to a deviation, and followed by the same consequence. And the reason, on which these principles are found- ed, is that it is understood, as a part of the contract of insurance, that the voyage insured is to be prose- cuted in the usual and ordinary route, and the bus- iness of it attended to, at least, with ordinary dili- gence. * * The shortness of the time, or the distance of a deviation, makes no difference, as to its effect on the contract. * * If it be voluntary and without necessity, it puts an end to the contract." 9 Mass. 436. The policy is discharged from the time of the dev- iation only, 2 Salk. 444; and a mere intention to dev- iate does not discharge the insurer, 3 Cranch, 357; nor a deviation from an imperative necessity, such as the forceful opposition of the crew or of some other ship. And it was held that where a vessel, in accordance with a general custom in those parts, touched at a certain place for supplies, this was jus- tifiable and no deviation ; but "mere purposes of con^ venience will not excuse a deviation, nor will anything but actual necessity." 13 Mass. 68. A deviation never avoids the policy unless it be the voluntary act of those in charge of the ship; but to constitute a deviation, it is not material that the 66 risk should be increased, it is sufficient if the risk is different; 3 Doug. 39. An unreasonable delay in the time of sailing is a deviation and discharges the in- surer ; 8 Bing. 317. In an action on a time policy ex- cepting the navigation of certain rivers, it was held that a deviation cannot arise under a time policy, and so, that the navigation of the said rivers merely sus- pended, but did not discharge the risk; 37 Mo. 25. Section III. Illegality. Marine Insurance: In every contract of marine insurance there is an implied warranty that the voy- age is legal; and if the voyage is "a direct contraven- tion of the law of the land," or for trade with an enemy without the license of the home government, the policy is void; 1 Doug. 254, 8 J. R. 548. "An in- surance on a voyage undertaken in violation of a blockade, or of an embargo, or of the provisions of a treaty, is illegal, whether the policy be on the ship, freight, or goods embarked in the illegal traffic. An insurance on property intended to be imported or exported contrary to the law of the place where the policy is made, or sought to be enforced, is void. The illegality of the voyage in all eases avoids the policy, and the voyage is always illegal when the goods or trade are prohibited, or the mode of its prosecution violates the provisions of a statute." 3 Kent Com. (6th ed.) 262. Fire Insurance: In a contract of fire insurance, there is an implied warranty that the business car- ried on in the premises insured shall be legal; this is very similar to the implied warranty of the le- gality of the voyage in marine insurance. The gen- eral principle applicable to both of these warranties is "that where the consideration is illegal, immoral, and wrong, or where the direct purpose of the con- tract is to effect, advance, or encourage acts in viola- 67 ticra of law, it is void. But if the contract sought to be enforced is collateral and independent, though in some measure connected with acts done in violation of law, the contract is not void." — 11 Wheat. 271, 8 Cush. 583. Thus where whiskey was kept and sold in violation of law, the policy was held void, 97 Mass. 288; but where, contrary to law, a lottery was held in the building insured and the fire that destroyed the building resulted from this, the policy was declared valid, because while the insured was personally liable for the holding of the lottery, still the building was not subject to any forfeiture; 8 Cush. 583. INDEX. Application 52, 6? Assignment 9 Breach: in a representation 23 in a warranty 52 Burden of proof-. 24, 51, 52 Code 61 Concealment, 34-49- fire 41 life 45 marine 39 Conditions „ . . 10, 69 Court of Commissioners 11 Deviation , 54, 65 Evidence 52 Frauds 21, 32, 33, 40-43 Gambling Act 11 Habits 47,48,60 Health 60, 61 Illegality of business 66 ofvoyage 54,66 Incendiarism Iff Indemnity 21, 22 Insurable interest 9, 13,22 fire n interest or no interest 14,17 life 19 marine 15 Insurance: definition i double - g fire 9,10,17,28 41, 55, 66 lile 10, 11, 19, 31, 45, 61 marine 8,9,10, 11, 15, 25, 38, 54; 64 •69 Insurance — Continued mut ual 24, 25, 51, 53 origin 7 over-insurance 8 re-insurance 8 requisites 8 Insured 7 Insurer 7 Materiality: concealment 35, 39, 48, 49 representation 24, 27, 32, 33 warranty 50, 51 Negligence 9 Perils 9, 10 Policy 7 lost or not lost 9, 17 open 8 valued 8 wager 11, 13 Premium 7 Representation 23-33 affirmative 23 fire 28 life 31 marine 25 promissory 23 Risks 10 Seaworthiness 54, 64 Suicide 60 Title equitable 13,15,17,39 legal 13,15,17,39 Underwriter 7 Valuation 27 Variance ; 26 Warranty - - 50-67 affirmative , 50 construction 51 express 50 fire • 55 implied 50 in body of policy 25 life 60 marine 54 promissory '• 50, 58 by reference in policy 25 TABLE OF ABSTRACTED CASES. Alston v. Mechanic's Mut. Ins. Co. 23, 28 Amr. Popular Life Ins. Co. v. Day, Executor, 61 Barclay v. Cousins 15 Bize v. Fletcher 25 Bufe v. Turner and others 42 Carter v. Boehm . 35-37 Crocker v. People's Mut Fire Ins. Co. 56 Dalby v. India and London Life Ass. Co. 21 DeHahn v. Hartley 55 Depaba v. Ludlow 14 Dickson v. The Equitable Fire Ass. Co. 29 Eden and Another v. Parkinson 54 Garrett, Executor of Taylor, v. Provincial Ins. Co. 58 Goddard v. Garrett 13 • Hide v. Bruce 51 Huguenin v. Ray ley 46 Knecht v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. 62 Lewis and Another v. The Eagle Ins. Co. 26, 29 Locke v. The N. A. Ins. Go. 39 Lord v. Dall 19 Lyon and Another v. The Commercial Ins. Co. 43 Marks v. Hamilton 17 Merchant's Marine Ins. Co., A., v. Rumsey and Johnson, R. 16 National Bank v. Insurance Co. 58 Nat'l Filtering Oil Co., R., v. The Citizen's Ins. Co., A. 18 Pelzer M'f'g. Co. v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., Pelzer M'f'g. Co., v. Savannah F. & M. Ins. Co. 44 Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanic's S. B. & T. Co. 47 Proudfoot v. Montefiore 41 Rawls v. Amr. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 47* Ruggles v. General Int. Ins. Co. 40 Traill v. Baring 31 Wainright, Executor, v. Bland and Others 31 Whitney v. Haven 26 Wilkinson v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 61 Worthington v. Bearse and Others 15 Insure With^~ The Riggs iFire Insurance Company 708 14th Street. N. W., WASHINGTON, D. C. LAW. MISCELLANEOUS. W. H. Loudermilk & Co. New BOOKSELLERS Secondhand. 1424-26 F ST.. N. W. CORCORAN BUILDING. HEADQUARTERS FOR BOOKS BOUGHT, LAW TEXT BOOKS, SOLD, LAW QUIZ BOOKS. EXCHANGED. SCIENTIFIC. MEDICAL. •:• Columbian * University * WASHINGTON, D. C. Chartered by Congress, 1821, Gbe Columbian College, Cbe Corcoran Scientific School, Cbe School of Graduate Studies, 2be law School, She School of Jurisprudence and diplomacy, She iffiedical School, Che dental School v^ *>* v^ Session of 1900-1901. 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