ill 
 
BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME 
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 The boss. 
 
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 3 1924 030 535 755 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
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 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030535755 
 
THE BOSS 
 
 AN ESSAY UPON THE ART OF GOVERNING 
 AMERICAN CITIES 
 
 BY 
 
 HENRY CHAMPERNOWNE 
 
 NEW-YORK 
 
 GEO. H. RICHMOND & CO. 
 
 1894 
 
A. 7iffG2- 
 
 Copyright, 1894, 
 By Geo. H. Richhiond & Co. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Dedication i 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of the Modern Municipality in the United 
 States of America 5 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of the True Ruler of the American Munici- 
 pality '. 8 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of the Difference between a Prince and an 
 Elected Ruler 13 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ^' Of the Difference between an Hereditary 
 
 Prince and a Boss 17 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Of the Likeness between the New Prince 
 
 AND THE Boss 21 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Of the Teaching of Aristotle Concerning Ty- 
 rants 27 
 
 CHAPTER VII. ^ 
 
 Of the Chief Aim of the Boss 30 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Of the Nobles in Ancient and Modern Cities. 35 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Of the People in the Ancient and in the 
 Modern City 42 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Of the .Division of the People into Factions 
 
 or Parties 47 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Of those through whom a Boss Attains Sover- 
 eignty 56 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Of some Peculiarities in the Situation of the 
 City of New York and in its Population-. 6i 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Of the Different Races in the City of New 
 York 68 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 Or the Religion of a Boss 75 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 Of the Foundation upon which the Power of 
 A Boss must be Fixed, if it is to be Durable 82 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 Of the Organization of a Political Force or 
 Machine 90 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 Of the Motive and Animating Principle of a 
 Political Organization or Machine 102 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 Of the Revenue Derived from the Citizens 
 and how far it may be Appropriated by 
 A Boss 109 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Of the Revenue from Political Contribu- 
 tions 122 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 , Of some things that Hinder and some that 
 
 Aid a Boss in Securing Revenue 130 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 Of the Different Kinds of Favors to be Ob- 
 tained FROM THE Government, and the 
 Principles to be Observed in Securing 
 Revenue from those who Obtain them ... 141 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 Of the Principles upon which Revenue is to 
 / be Obtained BY means OF Negative Favors. 148 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 /Of the Revenue to be Derived from Corpo- 
 rations 160 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 Of the Use to be Made of the Public Jour- 
 nals 167 L 
 
CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Of the Relations of the Boss of New York to 
 THE Organization of the Republicans .... 174 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 Of THE Policy to be Pursued by a Boss Re- 
 garding THE State Government 180 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 Of the Course to be Followed by a Boss in 
 National Politics 191 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 Of some Mistakes Lately Committed in the 
 Conduct of External Affairs 202 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 Of some Further Consequences of these Mis- 
 takes 213 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 Of what Deserves Praise or Blame in the 
 Conduct of Bosses 218 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is 
 
 better to be Loved than Feared 224 
 
 vii 
 
CHAPTER XXXir. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Of the means whereby Rulers firmly Estab- 
 lish THEIR Power 229 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 Exhortation to the Boss of New York to 
 Deliver the City from Misgovernment. . . 234 
 
TO THE BOSS OF THE CITY 
 OF NEW YORK 
 
 DEDICATION 
 
 Those who court the favor of bosses gen- 
 erally present them with whatever they pos- 
 sess that is most rare, curious, or valuable, 
 as fast horses, fighting cocks or dogs, choice 
 liquors and cigars, certificates of stock, or 
 even money, according to the dignity and 
 taste of the personage whom they seek to 
 profit. 
 
 For my part, my anxiety to present my- 
 self to the notice of your honor with the 
 best proof of my devotion has not enabled 
 me to discover, among all that I possess, any- 
 thing that I account so valuable as a know- 
 ledge of the proper conduct for a boss who 
 would maintain himself successfully ; a know- 
 ledge acquired by a long experience of mod- 
 ern affairs and a diligent study of the past. 
 The observations which I have made with 
 
all the reflection and accuracy of which I am 
 capable are contained in the small treatise 
 now addressed to you. And although I 
 have not the vanity to deem it worthy of 
 your acceptance, yet I am persuaded that 
 your goodness will not refuse the off'ering. 
 For it is certainly advantageous to have 
 placed before you, in such a shape that you 
 can understand it in a few hours, all the 
 experience of political affairs which I have 
 acquired during many years of continual 
 meditation and suffering in the school of ad- 
 versity. 
 
 You will find in this fragment neither a 
 salacious and highly flavored style, nor any 
 of those forcible expletives with which those 
 who surround you are accustomed to em- 
 bellish their conversation. Its interest must 
 depend upon the importance of the subject, 
 the solidity of the reflections, and the truth 
 of the facts recorded. 
 
 It will perhaps appear presumptuous in 
 me, a man without political influence, to pro- 
 pose rules of conduct to those who govern; 
 but — to use the illustration of a great writer 
 — as the painter, when about to sketch a 
 mountainous country, places himself in the 
 
plain, and in order to draw the scenery of a 
 vale ascends a height, even so, I conceive, a 
 person must be a boss to discover the nature 
 and character of a people, and one of the 
 people to judge properly of a boss. 
 
 Still more presumptuous would it be were 
 I to offer these reflections in place of that 
 celebrated treatise of the great Niccolb Ma- 
 chiavelli, to the study of which you undoubt- 
 edly give your days and nights. Nothing 
 that I can contribute could ever supersede 
 his wisdom ; but where he has confined him- 
 self to sketching the outlines, it is possible 
 for another to complete his work by filling 
 them in. Moreover, as I shall make clear 
 hereafter, the aims of a boss ought not to be 
 altogether the same as those of a prince, nor 
 are the methods to be used in guiding a de- 
 mocracy like those suitable for a principality. 
 Hence, while I nowhere contradict Machia- 
 velli, nor even venture to differ with him, I 
 have felt it necessary to extend and adapt 
 his plan in order to make it applicable to the 
 present times. But I have tried to make 
 these extensions in conformity with the orig- 
 inal design, so that, although the workman- 
 ship may be inferior, the whole may appear 
 3 
 
harmonious. This has seemed to me better 
 than to attempt to build entirely anew, for 
 the nature of men has not changed since 
 Machiavelli wrote ; and he who comes into 
 possession of an ancient dwelling which was 
 in the first place well planned and excellently 
 built can seldom gain by razing it, but will 
 rather endeavor to develop and complete it. 
 Some things must be taken away, more 
 added ; but no lapse of time can render any- 
 thing originally contrived with a wise regard 
 for human nature altogether obsolete. 
 
 I am therefore bold enough to hope that 
 you will accept this modest tribute out of re- 
 gard to the purpose with which it is offered ; 
 and if you condescend to read it with atten- 
 tion you will have evidence of my ardent 
 desire to see utilized to the best advantage 
 those lucrative opportunities to which fortune, 
 the favor of your fellow-citizens, and your 
 own splendid talents have called you. 
 
 If, from your elevated position, you should 
 condescend to look down upon a person in 
 my humble state, you will see how long and 
 how unworthily I have been persecuted by 
 the extreme and unrelenting malevolence of 
 fortune. H. C. 
 
 4 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 OF THE MODERN MUNICIPALITY IN THE 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
 All municipalities in this country differ in 
 their constitution from all those that do now 
 subsist, or that have heretofore subsisted, in 
 any of the other countries of the earth. All 
 these other cities, whether ancient or mod- 
 ern, are or have been ruled either by princes, 
 or by nobles, or by such of the inhabitants as 
 are either rich or at least do not count upon 
 wages for their support. But the govern- 
 ment of every city in this country is carried 
 on through the institution of manhood or uni- 
 versal suffrage, as it is called. Under this 
 institution the vote of every one in making 
 laws and in choosing rulers is of the same 
 weight, whatever his birth or wealth, or how- 
 ever he obtains his support ; and whoever 
 receives the votes of the greater number of 
 the people is lawfully their ruler. But in 
 5 
 
every city the number of those who count 
 chiefly upon their wages for support is either 
 greater than that of all the other citizens or 
 not very much less ; so that the common peo- 
 ple are able, when they are united, to choose 
 such rulers and to make such laws as please 
 them. 
 
 Yet this is not altogether true ; for the 
 municipality in this country is not entirely 
 independent, like the principalities, or most 
 of them, whereof Machiavelli wrote. It is 
 partly governed by the legislature of the 
 state or commonwealth in which the munici- 
 pality is situated ; nor is it entirely, although 
 nearly, free from the supervision and inter- 
 ference of the general government of the 
 United States. Because of this regulation 
 by outside rulers many things, as I shall 
 presently show, must be ordered differently 
 from what they would otherwise be, and the 
 conduct of the boss must be altered. But, 
 except for this interference, the common peo- 
 ple of the great cities of this country are by 
 law entitled to control their government. 
 There are perhaps in some other countries 
 municipalities that have apparently a like 
 government ; but this is so only in name, for 
 6 
 
they are more subject to interference from 
 outside powers. Thus the city of Paris, in 
 France, may seem to be governed by rulers 
 chosen by the inhabitants, but in reality it is 
 governed by the rulers of the nation. But 
 the city of New York is governed chiefly by 
 rulers chosen by its own inhabitants, and the 
 same is true of nearly all the cities of this 
 country. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF THE TRUE RULER OF THE AMERICAN 
 MUNICIPALITY. 
 
 Every city where all the inhabitants have 
 an equal voice in the elections, when it be- 
 comes great, is ruled by a boss ; for the in- 
 habitants, being generally engaged in neces- 
 sary work, have little time to consult as to 
 the manner after which, or the men by whom, 
 they desire to be governed ; moreover their 
 numbers are so great that they cannot know 
 one another, and it is impossible for them all, 
 or for any great part of them, to meet to- 
 gether in one place for deliberation. There- 
 fore they cannot agree upon any particular 
 man for their ruler, for no man is known to 
 all of them ; nor can they determine upon any 
 plan whereby they will be governed. On this 
 account many of them take no part in the 
 elections, every man thinking that he can do 
 nothing by himself, and that he will fare the 
 S 
 
same no matter who the rulers are. But the 
 common people for the most part do not fail 
 to vote, for the poorest of them considers that 
 upon the day of election his voice is equal to 
 that of the wealthiest citizen, in establishing 
 the laws and in determining how he will be 
 ruled ; and they care less for the nature of the 
 laws or the character of their rulers than they 
 do to boast that they have made and chosen 
 them of their own free will. From which 
 we see that the nature of men is the same 
 in a modern city as in an ancient principality 
 or monarchy ; for the Hebrews would have a 
 king to rule over them, although they were 
 warned that his rule would be more oppres- 
 sive than that of the priests, for no other 
 reason than to prove that their priests could 
 not control them ; and so the people of 
 Spain welcomed back Ferdinand joyously, in 
 spite of his being altogether depraved as a 
 man and oppressive as a king, because they 
 would not allow Napoleon to put over them 
 a king whom they had not chosen, although 
 his rule would have been better. 
 
 But some sharp-sighted men, considering 
 how these things are, combine secretly with 
 one another, and put forth before the time 
 9 
 
of the election the names of such men as 
 they desire for rulers. By combining in this 
 way they generally make sure of success, for 
 the rest of the inhabitants, having no organ- 
 ization, must, if they vote at all, vote for such 
 rulers as are thus offered them, or else vote 
 uselessly for such as each one prefers. From 
 which it is apparent that the rulers of the 
 city, although they are elected by the people, 
 are really determined beforehand by certain 
 men who give their attention to matters of 
 this kind ; and the people, however free they 
 may think themselves, do but carry out the 
 will of these men. 
 
 But in a great city the number of these 
 shrewd men is large, and, if they are to con- 
 tinue to be able to direct the whole people, 
 they must in their turn agree beforehand 
 among themselves; which can only be by 
 their submitting to one man who is the best 
 able to bring this agreement to pass. For it 
 is as true in political as it is in military affairs, 
 that no body of men can accomplish anything 
 without a leader, to whose orders they sub- 
 mit without delay or question. Nor is the 
 reason of this hard to see, since a great num- 
 ber either of sheep or of men cannot act to- 
 
gether except by imitation. For to explain 
 to them the end that it is desirable to attain, 
 and to discuss with them the means for at- 
 taining it, and to postpone action until all 
 have come to an agreement in their opinion, 
 would be an interminable task. Quick action 
 is commonly necessary, and it does not admit 
 of deliberation, or the statement of reasons, 
 or waiting to hear opinions. The proper 
 course to take must be decided upon without 
 hesitation, and therefore the final decision 
 must rest with one man ; for if there were 
 several of equal power they might not agree, 
 and the battle or the opportunity would be 
 lost. 
 
 Accordingly those who write of the art of 
 war say that one bad general who has the 
 supreme command will succeed better than 
 several good ones of coordinate powers ; for 
 he may act unwisely, but they will not act 
 at all. Hence it is a universal rule that in 
 any body of men that is to act promptly and 
 with effect there must be some ruler and 
 true monarch ; and such a body will always 
 in the end overcome a body opposed to it 
 that does not submit to such leadership. 
 Now in the American city this leader of the 
 
men who make it their business to determine 
 who the rulers shall be is called a boss. The 
 apparent rulers are indeed chosen by the peo- 
 ple, but the boss is the true ruler, by virtue 
 of his courage and ability, and he governs 
 through the apparent rulers. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PRINCE 
 AND AN ELECTED RULER. 
 
 An hereditary prince differs altogether in 
 outward appearance and conduct from the 
 chosen ruler of a municipality ; for a prince 
 is looked upon by some of his subjects as 
 ruling by the grace of God, and as being by 
 nature higher than other men, and by most 
 of the rest as I'uling by a prescriptive title 
 which it is more mischievous to dispute than 
 to accept. Therefore it is true, as Blackstone 
 says, that the law ascribes to the prince not 
 only large powers and emoluments, but like- 
 wise certain attributes of a great and trans- 
 cendent nature, by which the people are led 
 to consider him in the light of a superior be- 
 ing, and to pay him that awful respect which 
 may enable him with greater ease to carry 
 on the business of government. 
 13 
 
Hence a prince may do many things, both 
 evil and good, that other men may not. Thus 
 it is expected of him that he shall be mag- 
 nificent in his display of wealth, and he may 
 therefore exact more from his subjects if he 
 is lavish than if he is penurious; for they 
 think his splendor is in some way their own, 
 and take pride in it. And if no extraordi- 
 nary vices render him odious, as Machiavelli 
 says, he may indulge his desires as he will, 
 and yet engross the inclination and regard of 
 his subjects. Thus in France Louis XIV 
 caused the greatest misery to his people by 
 his extravagance and aggressive wars, yet he 
 was not only tolerated but admired by them 
 for the glory he brought to the nation ; and 
 Henry IV. who seldom denied himself any 
 pleasure, or refrained from the common vices 
 of men, is the best beloved of all the rulers 
 of that state. So we read, in one of the tales 
 of Sir Walter Scott, of certain virtuous maiden 
 ladies who not only harbored the Pretender, 
 Charles Stuart, at the peril of their lives, be- 
 cause they thought him their lawful prince, 
 but also gave shelter to his harlot, although 
 ordinarily they had as lief sinned themselves 
 as come near her. 
 
 1.4 
 
But in the constitution of the modern city- 
 no man is regarded as superior by nature or 
 by birth or by position to the rest, but all 
 are equal. The rulers that are chosen are 
 looked upon by the people less as their supe- 
 riors than as their servants, and they are fond 
 of deposing such rulers frequently, in order 
 that they may show their power. These 
 rulers have in the view of the law no attri- 
 butes of a great and transcendent nature, they 
 do not dare to exhibit great wealth or mag- 
 nificence for fear of the jealousy of their 
 fellow-citizens, and the latter will not per- 
 mit their rulers to indulge even in those 
 vices which they practise themselves without 
 making complaints of their offended virtue. 
 Hence it is not desirable for any man of am- 
 bition to be a chosen ruler, at least for a long 
 time. For if he endeavor to rule in reality 
 as well as in appearance he is at once hated 
 and put in peril of the law, and another is 
 presently chosen in his place ; and if he does 
 not try to rule in reality, he can do nothing 
 but carry out laws made by others for the 
 very purpose of hindering him and restrain- 
 ing his action. In such a career no man of 
 ambition can take delight. But ambitious 
 is 
 
men, when not born to the rule of principali- 
 ties, have always desired to make themselves 
 princes, seeing that the hereditary prince who 
 rules in reahty may do whatever he desires, 
 and be at the same time beloved, or not de- 
 tested — such men not considering how great 
 is the importance of age to a dynasty. On 
 the other hand, princes that have not been 
 ambitious have often been overthrown and 
 supplanted. 
 
 i6 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN HERED- 
 ITARY PRINCE AND A BOSS. 
 
 From what has been said it is evident that 
 there is little likeness between an hereditary 
 prince and a boss ; for it is the peculiarity 
 of the rule of a boss that it is neither recog- 
 nized by the laws, nor openly admitted to 
 exist even by the boss himself. So that it 
 is absurd to speak of a boss as being a ruler 
 by nature higher than other men, seeing that 
 he does not proclaim himself to be a ruler at 
 all. Upon this account he can make no dis- 
 play of a retinue or any of the magnificence 
 of a prince, having no subjects, and being 
 the apparent head of no principality. The 
 law ascribes to him neither large powers and 
 emoluments nor any attributes of a great and 
 transcendent nature. Therefore he cannot 
 take the first place at banquets or balls or 
 17 
 
entertainments given to distinguished persons 
 that visit his city ; for why should he ? He 
 is not the elected ruler of the city, and he- 
 does not let it be declared that he is the real 
 ruler. He has no title and represents no 
 trade or profession. Therefore he must be 
 content to let others take the places of honor 
 at all public feasts, and this he can do because 
 he knows that the power is his ; for he is 
 really the first who determines who shall be 
 apparently the first. 
 
 As he can make no display as a ruler, he 
 must beware of ostentation as a private man. 
 The reason of this is that the peculiar dan- 
 ger of a boss is envy ; and if he build himself 
 a palace, and have many servants wearing 
 livery, and display a coat of arms, and seem 
 to spend great sums of money in ostentation, 
 he immediately arouses the envy of those 
 who think they have raised him to power by 
 their efforts. They consider that he is in 
 nothing superior to them except in good 
 fortune, and that they are equally entitled 
 with him to share in the revenues which he 
 collects ; and they are therefore always ready 
 to plot against him if they think they can 
 succeed. Therefore, while the magnificence 
 
of a prince delights the subjects, the luxury of 
 a boss makes them discontented and angry ; 
 and this is especially true of those who are 
 his followers. They do not, like the retainers 
 of an hereditary prince, think that his mag- 
 nificence reflects glory upon them ; rather 
 do they look upon it as plunder which the 
 whole army has earned but which the gen- 
 eral has kept for himself. But from the time 
 of Achilles and Agamemnon to this day there 
 has always been danger to generals from the 
 division of the spoils. A wise boss will, then, 
 make little display of wealth, more especially 
 because it is in his power to accumulate and 
 possess it secretly ; and he will attend to 
 Aristotle's warning, that the haughtiness of 
 women has been the ruin of many tyrannies. 
 He will therefore not permit the women of 
 his family to treat others haughtily or to in- 
 sist upon precedence at feasts and tourna- 
 ments, or balls as they are called, given to 
 princes and other distinguished guests of the 
 city. It is better for him to deal with rebel- 
 lion in his own house rather than to allow the 
 arrogance of his women to stir it up outside ; 
 and he who cannot hold the women of his'' 
 family in subjection is not fit to be the ruler 
 19 
 
over a city. Let the boss therefore grasp the 
 substance and disregard the shadow : since 
 he is not the apparent ruler, but the real 
 ruler, let him also be content to be really 
 supreme in power without appearing so. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 OF THE LIKENESS BETWEEN THE NEW 
 PRINCE AND THE BOSS. 
 
 Machiavelli writes of many things that 
 do not greatly concern a boss. Thus he 
 speaks of mixed principalities, or such as 
 are annexed as appendages to another sove- 
 reignty, but it seldom happens in this coun- 
 try that one great city is annexed to another ; 
 although were the city of Brooklyn to be 
 annexed to the city of New York that boss 
 would be guilty of a capital error who failed 
 to observe what Machiavelli lays down upon 
 this point. But, for the present at least, I 
 will not consider it. Machiavelli further dis- 
 courses of those who from a private station 
 have ascended to the dignity of princes by 
 the favor of fortune alone ; but were it pos- 
 sible for any man to attain the position of a 
 boss in this way he would be at once over- 
 thrown, for the difficulty of this form of gov- 
 
ernment is so great that no good fortune 
 could sustain a boss who had no talent. As 
 Machiavelli says, even if such men meet with 
 few difficulties in their progress, they encoun- 
 ter many in maintaining their sovereignty. 
 
 Such were the Roman emperors who from 
 a private station attained to the empire by 
 corrupting the soldiery, for they were sup- 
 ported only by the pleasure and fortune of 
 those who advanced them — two foundations 
 equally uncertain and insecure. They had 
 neither the experience nor the power neces- 
 sary to maintain their position. Unless men 
 possess superior genius or courage, how can 
 those who have themselves always been ac- 
 customed to a private station know in what 
 manner to govern others ? Deficient in know- 
 ledge, they will be equally destitute of power, 
 for want of supporters on whose attachment 
 and fidelity they can depend. Such domin- 
 ion, like other things in nature of premature 
 and rapid growth, does not take sufficient 
 root in the minds of men, but must fall with 
 the first stroke of adversity ; unless, indeed, 
 the ruler so unexpectedly exalted possess such 
 superior talents that he can discover at once 
 the means of preserving his good fortune, and 
 
afterward maintain it by having recourse to 
 the same measures which others had adopted 
 before him. But it is better to leave fortune 
 out of account, for a boss must not think that 
 fortune will favor him, else he will neglect 
 necessary precautions ; neither should he be- 
 lieve that fortune is against him, for no great 
 success in ruling is likely to be attained by 
 him who expects to fail. 
 
 Neither need we at this time consider what 
 Machiavelli says of him who by foreign arms 
 acquires sovereignty ; for the force employed 
 by a boss is not an armed force, and since his 
 rule is secret it is not easy to call in forces 
 from outside, because they must act openly. 
 Nevertheless it is not prudent for a boss to 
 neglect anything that Machiavelli has writ- 
 ten, as appeared lately from the example of 
 Boss Billy Sheehan of Buffalo, who, instead of 
 ruling by means of his own followers there, 
 thought to strengthen himself by calling in 
 the aid of the legislature and the governor 
 of the state, by which means he involved 
 himself in complete ruin. 
 
 But when Machiavelli comes to speak of 
 private persons who have attained sove- 
 reignty without any special aid from fortune, 
 23 
 
whom he calls new princes, he lays down 
 rules which are as important for the boss of 
 this day as for the prince of the time when 
 he wrote ; for he observes, in his chapter en- 
 titled " Of Those who have Obtained Sove- 
 reignty by their Crimes," that they are in- 
 debted neither to fortune nor to virtue. Thus 
 Agathocles of Syracuse was of the lowest 
 class, the son of a potter, of dissolute and 
 wicked conduct in every relation of life ; but 
 he had such infinite ability and so much 
 courage, as well as strength of mind and 
 body, that after he had risen to be praetor he 
 was able to hold by violence what had been 
 granted to him by the public voice. This was 
 not owing to favor, but to his own genius ; 
 still, as Machiavelli says, it must not be called 
 virtue to murder one's fellow-citizens, and to 
 sacrifice one's friends, and to be insensible to 
 the voice of faith, pity, or religion. But Oli- 
 verotto da Fermo deserves not to be put on 
 an equality with Agathocles by Machiavelli, 
 for he suffered himself to be deceived by 
 Borgia, and was strangled before his rule 
 had lasted two years ; but Agathocles never 
 trusted any one and thus was never betrayed. 
 But after a boss has attained sovereignty he 
 24 
 
cannot continue to commit crimes of vio- 
 lence ; and it is doubtful if it is not wiser to 
 avoid them, so far as possible, when he is 
 struggling to attain it, so much milder are 
 our manners than those of our ancestors. 
 However, many of our bosses have risen to 
 power In this way. 
 
 Machiavelli further observes, In his chapter 
 upon " Civil Principalities," that a private in- 
 dividual may attain power by the favor of his 
 fellow-citizens, and without either violence 
 or treason. Such a sovereignty, he says, is 
 not to be acquired either by merit or fortune 
 alone, but by a lucky sort of craft. And he 
 elsewhere says that it very rarely happens, or 
 perhaps never occurs, that a person exalts 
 himself from a humble station to great power 
 without employing either force or fraud, un- 
 less he attains it by gift or hereditary succes- 
 sion. Again, he says that there is no instance 
 on record of a man who from an obscure sta- 
 tion arrived at great power by the single 
 means of open and avowed force, although 
 he has seen others succeed by cunning alone. 
 
 Moreover he shows that Xenophon, in his 
 Life of Cyrus, deduced the inference that a 
 prince who would make himself great must 
 25 
 
learn the art of deceiving. So it was with 
 the Romans, for they had recourse from the 
 very beginning to treachery and bad faith ; 
 and Machiavelli says this is always necessary 
 for those who desire to establish their domin- 
 ion over others. From all this it appears 
 plain to me that the rules for the conduct of 
 a boss are very nearly the same as those for 
 the conduct of him whom Machiavelli calls 
 the new prince ; and, indeed, whoever reads 
 his discourse will see that if he had addressed 
 a boss he would for the most part not have 
 written otherwise. 
 
 26 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 OF THE TEACHING OF ARISTOTLE CON- 
 CERNING TYRANTS. 
 
 It is evident to me that Machiavelli had 
 no knowledge of the book that Aristotle 
 wrote upon poHtics ; for if he had read it 
 he would have said certain things he has not 
 said, and as to certain other things he would 
 have referred to Aristotle as their author. 
 But, since they agree very nearly in what 
 they say, it seems that they probably say 
 what is true ; for if Machiavelli was a wise 
 man, Aristotle was even wiser. Accordingly, 
 when we find that Aristotle calls a certain 
 ruler a tyrant, and Machiavelli speaks of a 
 ruler of the same kind as a prince who has 
 made himself sovereign from a private sta- 
 tion, we may say that such a prince is the 
 same as a tyrant, and that what Aristotle 
 says of tyrants will be true of new princes ; 
 27 
 
and the same things will for the most part be 
 true of bosses. 
 
 This does not admit of doubt to one who 
 compares what these writers say ; for Aris- 
 totle defines a tyranny as existing where one 
 rules over his equals and superiors without 
 being accountable for his conduct, his object 
 being his own advantage and not the advan- 
 tage of those whom he governs. He also 
 says that the tyrant aims at wealth and plea- 
 sure rather than honor and virtue, but that he. 
 ought to order his life so that his manners 
 may not appear contrary to virtue, or at least 
 not wholly bad, but only in part. Now all 
 these things are to be found also in Machia- 
 velli's works, as when he praises Caesar Bor- 
 gia, who put to death all who he thought 
 injured him, and kept faith with no one, but 
 relied upon artifice and dissimulation ; for Ma- 
 chiavelli offers him as a model for every one 
 who would secure himself in a new principal- 
 ity. He further declares that the manner in 
 which men live is so different from that in 
 which they ought to live that he who endea- 
 vors to act as duty dictates necessarily insures 
 his own destruction ; and he reasons that the 
 prince who wishes to maintain his power 
 28* 
 
ought to learn that he should not be always 
 good. 
 
 Many other things of like import he says, 
 which I shall take up more at length here- 
 after, all of which prove beyond any question 
 that he regarded the prince as ruling for his 
 own advantage and not for that of others. 
 Accordingly, when Aristotle describes the 
 tyrant, and Machiavelli the new prince, they 
 are both speaking of the same kind of ruler ; 
 and we know that the boss is also the same, 
 for how can he be described otherwise than 
 as one who rules for his own advantage? 
 Accordingly the tyrant and the new prince 
 and the boss are the same, and nearly all the 
 rules of conduct appropriate for one of them 
 are appropriate also for the others. 
 
 29 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 OF THE CHIEF AIM OF THE BOSS. 
 
 What Aristotle and Machiavelli have said 
 leaves no doubt of the correctness of main- 
 taining that the purpose of the boss is to se- 
 cure his own advantage. But if we inquire 
 in what this consists we find that it is not in 
 all respects the same as that of the prince or 
 the tyrant ; for they are open rulers, but the 
 boss is a secret one. Hence we saw that it 
 was not wise for a boss to appear in great 
 magnificence before the public, or to make 
 great display of wealth in his manner of liv- 
 ing. It is also true that the boss cannot 
 hope to make his rule hereditary, which can 
 sometimes be done by the new prince and 
 the tyrant ; for, as they rule openly, men may 
 after a time grow used to their dominion, and 
 cease to remember any other. Both Aris- 
 totle and Machiavelli give examples to show 
 that this may take place, and the people 
 30 
 
come to accept the rule of the heir as natu- 
 ral. But this can never be the case with the 
 rule of a boss, for, because it is not an open 
 rule, it cannot engage the affections of men, 
 nor can their imaginations be impressed with 
 what is always kept out of sight. Even of 
 the tyrant Aristotle says that although he 
 may preserve the supreme power after he 
 has raised himself to it, yet he cannot easily 
 transmit it ; for those to whom it is trans- 
 mitted are apt to fall into an effeminate way 
 of life, and, by growing despicable, to offer 
 many opportunities to conspirators. 
 
 What was true among the Greeks, when 
 he wrote, is still more true among the Amer- 
 icans of the present time ; for, if a father has 
 talents, he is so much concerned in getting 
 wealth that he leaves the education of his 
 sons to others ; and his sons, thinking they 
 will receive the wealth gathered by their 
 father, take no thought of maintaining them- 
 selves, but are indolent and dissolute. This 
 is especially true of bosses, for their position 
 is so difficult to maintain that they must give 
 their whole time to it, and not be cumbered 
 with the education of children. It is not 
 likely, therefore, that their children will be 
 31 
 
fit to rule, for the children of those who have 
 talents are not often distinguished, at least in 
 the same way as their parents, and the rule 
 of the boss cannot be handed from one to 
 another, as in an hereditary kingdom, but 
 can be acquired only by the same talents by 
 which it is maintained. So that it is folly for 
 a boss to aim to make his rule hereditary. 
 
 Nor will he aim to establish permanently 
 a certain method or system of ruling. It is 
 true that the clergy of the Roman Church, 
 and more particularly those of the religious 
 orders, such as the Society of Jesus, who 
 have no offspring and therefore cannot ex- 
 pect to continue their rule in their own fam- 
 ilies, yet strive most earnestly to make the 
 power of their orders enduring after they are 
 dead. To this end they labor strenuously, 
 and suffer all manner of privations and tor- 
 ments, and even sacrifice their lives. But 
 they do this believing that it is for the greater 
 glory of God, as they say, and that they will 
 thus secure their own eternal felicity ; but it 
 is absurd for a boss to think of such things, 
 or to believe that God will reward him when 
 he is dead for pursuing his own advantage 
 when he was living, and for striving to make 
 32 
 
it possible for others to do the same. Neither 
 Aristotle nor Machiavelli anywhere say that 
 the prince or the tyrant need have regard to 
 the gods, or think that he should concern 
 himself about what may happen to him after 
 he is dead; and if any man is troubled with 
 cares of this kind, let him not think to be a 
 boss, for he is not fit. 
 
 Aristotle says, indeed, that the tyrant 
 should seem to pay particular attention to 
 the worship of the gods, and that this must 
 be done so as to give no suspicion of hypoc- 
 risy. But he makes it plain that the only 
 object of this is to make the citizens believe 
 that the tyrant has the gods on his side, and 
 that they have less to fear while he who 
 governs them is religious and reverences the 
 gods ; and the same is true of the boss, as I 
 shall show hereafter. Machiavelli, also, says 
 that the prince should endeavor to gain the 
 reputation of piety, although self-preserva- 
 tion will often compel him to violate the laws 
 of religion ; from this it plainly appears that 
 his opinion was the same as that of Aristotle. 
 
 What, then, should the boss aim at, if he 
 is not to strive to establish his family, or to 
 have a palace and live magnificently, or to 
 33 
 
perpetuate the order or society through which 
 he gained the government, or to obtain the 
 affection of his subjects? If he can have 
 none of these things, will he not be wiser to 
 forego ruling and seek a mode of life having 
 more pleasure ? Not if he is a man of ambi- 
 tion ; to such a man, ruling is itself a sufficient 
 pleasure. His aim, therefore, is not different 
 from that of the new prince, although there 
 are many pleasures denied to him that the 
 prince may have without peril so long as he 
 makes it his chief end to rule. But the exer- 
 cise of power over the persons and fortunes 
 of many will always be in itself a sufficient 
 end and a sufficient occupation for the ambi- 
 tious man ; and if he cannot content himself 
 with this, but must yield to the temptations 
 of smaller pleasures, he will not long be trou- 
 bled with the cares of sovereignty. This is 
 what is meant by Aristotle when he tells the 
 tyrant to take good care of only one thing,, 
 namely, the power, that not only the willing, 
 but the unwilling also, shall submit to it ; for 
 if he once lose this his tyranny is at an end. 
 The aim of a boss is, therefore, not to live 
 luxuriously and ostentatiously, but to attain 
 power and to possess it so long as he lives. 
 34 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 OF THE NOBLES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN 
 CITIES. 
 
 As to the manner in which a boss is to 
 raise himself to sovereign power, it is not 
 altogether easy to determine this from what 
 is said by the older writers. Machiavelli de- 
 clares that the sovereignty is obtained by the 
 favor either of the people or of the nobility ; 
 for the different parties in a state are reduced 
 to these two elements, one springing from 
 the aversion of the people to the oppressive 
 government of the nobles, the other from the 
 desire of these latter to govern and oppress 
 the people. Hence he lays it down that a 
 principality emanates either from the nobles 
 or from the people, according as it operates to 
 their advantage respectively ; for when the 
 former are too weak to cope with the people 
 they have often no other means of subduing 
 them than by advancing from their own class 
 35 
 
one whom they nominate prince, that under 
 the mark of an acknowledged authority they 
 may indulge their desire for domination. The 
 people, likewise, when they can no longer re- 
 sist the oppression of the nobles, throw all 
 their power into the hands of one person 
 alone, and appoint him prince to defend and 
 protect them. 
 
 Aristotle, also, says that a tyrant is chosen 
 out of the meanest populace as an enemy to 
 the nobles, that the common people may not 
 be oppressed by them ; and that the gene- 
 rality of tyrants were mere demagogues who 
 gained credit with the people by inveighing 
 against the nobles. But he also says that 
 some princes have become tyrants, and that 
 some oligarchies have been changed into tyr- 
 annies, and that such was the rise of almost 
 all the ancient tyrannies of Sicily ; so that he 
 seems to say nearly the same thing as Machi- 
 avelli. But since both these writers speak 
 of a class of citizens called nobles, and say 
 nothing of the boss, some may think they 
 say nothing to the point; for such persons 
 say there are no nobles in our cities. But 
 those who say this are deceived ; for it does 
 not follow because a certain name is no 
 36 
 
longer used that the thing which formerly 
 bore that name has ceased to exist. But 
 wise men will inquire into things rather than 
 names, and if they find that a thing known 
 to them by a certain name is in all, or nearly 
 all, respects the same as something known to 
 former writers by a different name, they will 
 conclude that it is the same thing. Thus 
 Machiavelli, as we have seen, does not use 
 the name tyrant, but the account that he 
 gives of the new prince shows that he was 
 the same ruler that Aristotle called a tyrant. 
 And many persons in our own country 
 seem to think that if a few men overthrow the 
 government of a monarch and make them- 
 selves rulers, calling the new government a 
 republic, therefore it is a government like 
 our own, although it may be in reality an 
 oligarchy or a despotism. So also many 
 persons have mourned with Cicero, when 
 they have read his laments concerning the 
 downfall of the Roman republic, and the loss 
 of their liberties by the Roman people, think- 
 ing that he had in mind a government in 
 which all the people had a voice ; whereas 
 the Roman republic was then a corrupt oli- 
 garchy, and what we mean by the people 
 37 
 
were not thought of by Cicero under that 
 name at all. Accordingly we must inquire 
 whether there is any class in our cities that 
 takes the same part and has the same char- 
 acter as the class called the nobility by the 
 older writers ; for if we find such a class, then 
 probably many of the things will be true of it 
 which were said of the nobility by Aristotle 
 and Machiavelli. 
 
 Now the real distinction and essence of 
 those called nobles at all times has been this, 
 that they have thought that they should rule 
 over the people and that the people should 
 maintain them, desiring above all things that 
 others should labor so that they might live 
 without labor. Many other things may also 
 be truly said of nobles, but they are all true 
 because of their connection with this princi- 
 ple. Thus the nobles say that they are of 
 higher birth than the common people, but 
 they mean by this only that their fathers 
 before them did no labor, but compelled the 
 people to labor for them ; and the titles that 
 they assume are explained in the same way, 
 for they generally arise from the affection of 
 their followers, or from the lands which the 
 nobles have owned but which the people 
 38 
 
have tilled for them. Accordingly, so soon 
 as a noble is no longer sustained by others, 
 but is compelled to work for others in order 
 to live, he ceases to be regarded as a noble, 
 and if he clings to his title he becomes ridic- 
 ulous. Such are those counts and barons 
 that come hither from other countries where 
 they have become impoverished ; for while 
 they are admired by a few foolish persons, 
 especially women, the generality laugh at 
 them. Hence it is always the mark of the 
 noble that he seeks to rule so that he may 
 be supported by others. 
 
 Now no one will say that there is no class 
 of persons in our cities desiring to rule in 
 order that they may live at the charge of the 
 people ; for there is such a class, and those 
 who belong to it are called politicians. There- 
 fore, since those whom we call politicians are 
 nearly the same as those called nobles by 
 Aristotle and Machiavelli, what they say of 
 nobles is likely to be true, or nearly so, of 
 politicians. It is a proof of this, if more 
 proof be needed, that these politicians also 
 have titles as the nobles do. Some of these 
 are titles of affection. Such was the case with 
 a politician in the city of New York who was 
 39 
 
called Prince Hal, like the prince of whom 
 Shakespeare wrote ; and there was one called 
 the Plumed Knight, like Henry of Navarre, 
 and another called Blue-eyed Billy. There 
 was also one called Fatty, like Charles the 
 Fat of France, and one called the Bald Eagle 
 of Westchester, like Charles the Bald. An- 
 other was called the Silver-Tongued Orator, 
 like Nestor the Pylian ; and many more could 
 be mentioned. Some of them, also, have 
 titles from the regions or countries where 
 they are powerful and whence they draw 
 their support — such as the Boss of Coney 
 Island, the Boss of Rensselaerswyck, the Boss 
 of Syracuse, and many others. 
 
 Yet there is this difference between the 
 noble and the politician, that as the noble 
 generally receives wealth from his ancestors, 
 while the politician is poor, the noble is often 
 less rapacious than the politician ; for it is 
 not necessary for the noble to live at the ex- 
 pense of the people, although it is desirable, 
 but for the politician it is both desirable and 
 necessary. Moreover the noble is sometimes 
 restrained by haughtiness, and sometimes 
 urged on, thinking himself a superior being 
 to the commonalty, because neither he nor 
 40 
 
his ancestors have sold their labor ; but the 
 politician is neither restrained nor animated 
 by pride or honor, but is moved only by 
 hunger and greed. There are other differ- 
 ences which I could add, but, as they are 
 not material, let these suffice ; for in their 
 relation to the government the noble and 
 the poHtician are essentially alike. 
 
 41 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 OF THE PEOPLE IN THE ANCIENT AND IN 
 THE MODERN CITY. 
 
 In speaking of nobles I pointed out that 
 we should not be deceived by a difference of 
 names, and think that because a certain name 
 is no longer used therefore the thing has dis- 
 appeared. But it is equally necessary to ob- 
 serve that we may be deceived by finding' the 
 same name used when the thing has become 
 changed. Thus, as we have seen, both Aris- 
 totle and Machiavelli speak of the people of 
 a city as the only other class besides the no- 
 bility ; and so a thoughtless person would 
 consider that when we speak of the people 
 of a city at the present time we mean the 
 same thing as these writers. But it is a mis- 
 take to think this ; for in the cities whereof 
 Aristotle wrote the slaves and some others 
 were not reckoned among the people, and 
 had no voice in making the laws and choos- 
 42 
 
ing the rulers, so that perhaps not one tenth 
 of the men dwelling in such a city had the 
 suffrage ; whereas in the modern city in this 
 country all men have it. And the same 
 thing is partly true of the cities of Italy which 
 Machiavelli had in mind ; for although there 
 were no slaves, at least by that name, yet 
 very many of the inhabitants were not freemen 
 or citizens, and had no part in the government. 
 Now when we speak of the people we 
 mean all the inhabitants, or all the male 
 adults, except the politicians. But that a 
 government by such a people as this could 
 exist in a city would probably not have 
 seemed credible to either Aristotle or Machi- 
 avelli. For they thought that a people such 
 as they knew could hardly be restrained from 
 plundering the rich if it became possessed of 
 the government; and they would have said 
 that if the power was obtained by the very 
 poorest, such as slaves and outlaws, the city 
 would be at once destroyed by their ex- 
 cesses. And perhaps this might be so were 
 our cities independent, like those known to 
 these writers ; for they knew little of cities 
 that were subject not only to one state but 
 to two, which is the case with our cities. By 
 43 
 
this means not only are the people greatly- 
 restrained, but the politicians also. Accord- 
 ingly in our cities both the rich and the poor 
 are commonly meant when we speak of the 
 people, and the classes are not two, as reck- 
 oned by Aristotle and Machiavelli, namely, 
 the nobles and the people, but three — the 
 politicians, the rich, and the poor. 
 
 In another respect the people of a modern 
 city differs much from the people of an an- 
 cient city, or from one of the middle ages — 
 namely, in being very much greater in num- 
 bers. For some of the Greek cities had but 
 a few hundred citizens, and the Italian cities 
 were not very much larger; nor was there 
 any city of those times that had one tenth 
 as many citizens as the city of New York 
 now has. But the results of this, as I said 
 at the outset, are very important ; for where 
 there is so great a congregation of men they 
 cannot act as one body, either in choosing 
 rulers, or in making laws, or in deliberating 
 about what is best to be done; for at the 
 most not more than two or three thousand 
 men can be gathered in one hall so as to 
 hear one orator, nor are there many orators 
 that can be heard by a greater number in 
 44 
 
the open air. Moreover no man can be ac- 
 quainted with more than a few hundred oth- 
 ers, and most of these he cannot know well. 
 Hence in a great city it may be said that no 
 one knows the wishes or desires of many of 
 the citizens, and it often falls out that the 
 greater number of them desire the same 
 thing, but cannot bring it about because they 
 are ignorant of their own agreement. 
 
 Accordingly it is necessary that the citi- 
 zens should be divided into small groups ac- 
 cording to districts, in order that the govern- 
 ment may not become unmanageable, and 
 that they should make laws not directly, but 
 by means of delegates. From this it has 
 come to pass that most of the citizens who 
 reflect at all upon these matters believe it 
 impossible for those who desire to improve 
 the government to be united and to combine 
 for that purpose. Herein lies the strength 
 and opportunity of the politicians ; for they 
 can unite, being few and acquainted with one 
 another, and having nothing else to engage 
 their attention ; but the multitude cannot. 
 Neither can the multitude have any leaders, 
 at least for any long time, except the politi- 
 cians. But the politicians can be their leaders, 
 45 
 
since they reward themselves with the offices ; 
 and whoever becomes a leader of the people, 
 expecting to be repaid for his labor with of- 
 fice, is a politician, as I have already shown. 
 It will not seem surprising that the multi- 
 tude should be led in this way, if we consider 
 that poor men cannot leave their work and 
 give their time to public affairs and to delib- 
 erations and the like, because of their pov- 
 erty ; and the rich will not. For the rich 
 have their own pleasures, and take little de- 
 light in mingling with ,the people and hum- 
 bhng themselves and pretending to think the 
 poor equal in wisdom and virtue to them- 
 selves, not thinking truly any such thing. But 
 unless they do this the people will not listen 
 to them or follow them. Some of the rich, it 
 is true, may now and then do these things, but 
 they do them expecting to be chosen rulers 
 by so doing, and they are therefore politi- 
 cians, although not of the needy sort. Accord- 
 ingly it plainly appears both that the people 
 must have leaders and that these leaders must 
 be politicians ; and this is likely to remain 
 true so long as every inhabitant of a city has 
 an equal voice with every other in choosing 
 the rulers and in fixing the public charges. 
 46 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 OF THE DIVISION OF THE PEOPLE INTO 
 FACTIONS OR PARTIES. 
 
 There are certain divisions of the people 
 in a modern city that are different in some 
 respects from those which generally prevailed 
 in earlier times ; at least we find little men- 
 tion of anything like them in the older writers. 
 Such are the divisions which are called in our 
 country the Democratic and Republican par- 
 ties. It is true that some writers tell us that 
 the populace of Constantinople was divided 
 into factions called by the names of different 
 colors, and we know^ that in some Italian 
 cities there were factions called the Blacks 
 and the Whites. From this it might seem 
 that the same divisions continued to our day ; 
 for the difference between our parties seems 
 to have been on account of color, the Repub- 
 licans formerly showing affection for black 
 men, and the Democrats despising them. But 
 47 
 
more recently the Republicans declared that 
 the people of Hawaii, because of their black 
 complexion, either had no rights that white 
 men were bound to respect, or could not 
 govern themselves, but must be ruled by 
 white men ; and the Democrats appeared to 
 be grieved that these people should be treated 
 as inferiors. 
 
 From this it seems probable that these di- 
 visions are for most people matters of name 
 only, and that one man is a Democrat or a 
 Republican because his father called himself 
 by that name ; as one man is called Smith 
 because his father was called Smith, and yet 
 he thinks that that name is natural to him 
 and a part of himself, and that if he were 
 called by another name he would be a differ- 
 ent person. For these reasons, therefore, the 
 greater number adhere to these parties, and, 
 as is generally true of factions, most of those 
 adhering to one party hate bitterly those of 
 the other, and believe no good of them. As 
 Thucydides said, the tie of party is stronger 
 than that of blood, because a partizan acts 
 without asking why. Party associations are 
 not based upon any established law, nor do 
 they seek the public good; they arise from 
 48 
 
the love of power, originating in avarice and 
 ambition, and the leaders make the public 
 interest, to which in name they are devoted, 
 in reality their prize. 
 
 It was probably because these divisions 
 seemed to Aristotle and Machiavelli trifling 
 and irrational that they make no mention of 
 them; but in our cities they are not trifling. 
 As I have pointed out, the cities of which 
 these writers discoursed were independent, 
 or nearly so, and did not receive their laws 
 from states of which they were members. 
 But the American city is a part not only of 
 the state in which it is situated, but also of 
 the Union of states, or the nation; and the 
 two parties of which I spoke are called na- 
 tional parties, because they prevail through- 
 out the whole nation. The greater part of 
 the people are so devoted to them that when 
 a ruler, such as a governor or a judge, or 
 even a mayor or an alderman, is to be chosen, 
 and when candidates have been proposed, 
 every one immediately desires to know the 
 candidate of his own party, and votes for 
 him without regard to his character or fitness 
 for the place. 
 
 This is so partly because it is easier to find 
 49 
 
out what a man is called than what he really is, 
 but principally because men become wonted 
 and attached to any organization with which 
 they act, like soldiers to a regiment, and grow 
 reluctant either to break old ties or to form 
 new ones. Loyalty is with most men stronger 
 than reason. They find it impossible to act 
 with certain others in one contest, and against 
 them in another ; for they cannot strive with- 
 out becoming incensed at their antagonists, 
 and they cannot forget their anger and ha- 
 tred. Moreover every one fears that if he 
 should vote for a mayor who was not of his 
 party because he would rule better, and he 
 should be chosen, those of the other party 
 would boast and declare that he was chosen 
 because the people desired that his party 
 should triumph. Again, the generality of 
 mankind have no leisure to inquire into pub- 
 lic affairs or the merits of their rulers. They 
 cannot consider difficult questions of policy 
 at every election, but must decide once for 
 all which party they will adhere to, and hav- 
 ing taken it, as a man his wife, for better, for 
 worse, they must cleave to it so long as they 
 live. Hence many men will vote for the can- 
 didate of their own party even when they 
 5° 
 
know him to be a bad man, thinking it to be 
 upon the whole the less of two evils. 
 
 Nothing, it is obvious, can afford a more 
 favorable opportunity to a boss than this de- 
 votion of men to their party organizations. 
 He has only to gain control of the organiza- 
 tion of the stronger party, and then he can 
 bring forward such men to be rulers as he 
 desires, confident that most of those who call 
 themselves by that party name will give them 
 their support. As to the manner in which a 
 boss may gain control of a party organiza- 
 tion, it will be necessary to speak more at 
 length hereafter; but it is evident that the 
 name of the party organization in no way 
 concerns the boss, except that he must take 
 care to belong to the party which numbers 
 most in his own city, for otherwise he can- 
 not maintain himself. Accordingly we see 
 that a boss in Pennsylvania is generally of 
 one party, but a boss in New York of an- 
 other. And if one party greatly outnumbers 
 the other, then it is easy for a boss to rule a 
 long time ; while if the parties are nearly equal 
 in numbers, it will be very difficult, yet not 
 altogether impossible. Let no one suppose, 
 therefore, because the parties have no differ- 
 51 
 
ence except in name, or are concerned wholly 
 with measures to be adopted by the nation, 
 and not with the. government of the cities, 
 that it follows that they have nothing to do 
 with choosing rulers for the cities ; for it is 
 not true that men are not moved by names, 
 since they are for the most part altogether 
 ruled by them. This also was true when Ma- 
 chiavelli wrote, because he might have spoken 
 much of the parties called the Guelphs and 
 the Ghibellines in the Italian cities, which set 
 the people by the ears in municipal affairs, 
 although they had properly nothing to do 
 with the city government. 
 
 Since it has been necessary to refer to 
 parties, it is desirable to speak of the manner 
 in which they are constituted or organized. 
 Upon this matter neither Aristotle nor Ma- 
 chiavelli has, apparently, anything to say ; but 
 really when they speak of a military force 
 they are saying what is in point; for when 
 Machiavelli mentions an armed force as neces- 
 sary for the prince, he means such a force as 
 will enable him to maintain himself, and at 
 the time when he wrote it was necessary that 
 such a force should be armed. But at the 
 present time no boss has need of such a force, 
 52 
 
or could use it if he liad it; for in the first 
 place, as I have before said, he is a secret 
 ruler and cannot make himself prominent; 
 and, what is more important, because the 
 city is outwardly ruled by the majority of 
 voters, as we say, in a peaceful manner, and 
 not by armed men. Indeed, if any city 
 were openly ruled by armed men, the gov- 
 ernment of the state would interpose and 
 meet arms with arms. What is important, 
 therefore, either to a prince or to a boss, is 
 that he should have a force upon which he 
 can depend sufficient to enable him to pre- 
 vail. Provided the end is attained, it is im- 
 material whether the means employed by 
 this force is arms or voices or anything else. 
 Now the great need of any number of men, 
 if they are to accomplish anything by acting 
 in common, is to be organized and disciplined. 
 If they are soldiers, they must learn to obey 
 their leaders without any deliberation or in- 
 quiry or hesitation ; for this is the end of all 
 discipline, that a great number may act in ac- 
 cordance with the plan and will of one mind. 
 A few such soldiers, if properly led, will put 
 to flight a great multitude not accustomed 
 to listen to orders or to obey them promptly. 
 53 
 
For the greater the number the weaker the 
 army, unless they all act as one man toward 
 a common end; since otherwise they hinder 
 and delay one another. It is true that a great 
 number of men may agree to act in a certain 
 way after deliberation, and because they find 
 that they all desire the same thing ; and when 
 this happens it may be difficult for either a 
 prince or a boss to maintain himself. But 
 even in such a case it is necessary for this 
 multitude to submit to leaders and to obey 
 them without question ; for otherwise their 
 whole time would be passed in discussion and 
 they would accomplish nothing. 
 
 From all this it plainly appears that parties 
 must have organization and discipline; and, 
 since there are everywhere two parties, there 
 must be in every city two organizations, as 
 they are called, each organization having its 
 own leaders. These leaders, moreover, since 
 they give their time and labor to the disci- 
 pline of their forces and to the contests for 
 power, and are at the same time poor, must 
 obtain their living in some way through this 
 occupation ; for no one would pay them 
 wages for such other work as they could do 
 when thus engaged. Accordingly they gen- 
 54 
 
erally hope to be made public officers, and 
 hence they are poHticians, as we have said. 
 If they do not obtain offices, they must be 
 supported by those who do obtain them, or 
 in some secret way by their party, having no 
 other resource. As this support is precari- 
 ous, they are often corruptible, and it is there- 
 fore necessary for a boss not only to control 
 strictly the organization of his own party, but 
 also to pay careful attention to the character 
 of the politicians belonging to the organiza- 
 tion of the party opposed to him. 
 
 55 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 OF THOSE THROUGH WHOM A BOSS AT- 
 TAINS SOVEREIGNTY. 
 
 Let us now return to what Machiavelli 
 says of the manner in which a private person 
 may attain sovereignty through the favor of 
 his fellow-citizens. He declares that the 
 sovereign power is obtained by favor of the 
 people or of the nobility ; and we have to 
 inquire whether in our cities a boss may rise 
 by the favor either of the people or of the 
 politicians. But after what has been explained 
 concerning the people, it will be evident that 
 a boss can seldom rise through their favor, and 
 that he cannot maintain himself if he should 
 so rise ; for the people are necessarily led by 
 politicians. Hence much that Machiavelli says 
 of the advantage of attaining sovereignty by 
 the popular favor is not true concerning a 
 boss ; for if he would rise by favor of the peo- 
 56 
 
pie he must do nothing except enforce the 
 laws, and this would often be not only un- 
 profitable to him, but presently also unsafe. 
 Therefore it may be conceded, as Machiavelli 
 says, that if a boss could attain power by the 
 will of the people, he would find no one to 
 resist him, and would not need to do injus- 
 tice, and could maintain himself so long as he 
 preserved the affection of his subjects ; but it 
 is idle to repeat this, for a boss does not attain 
 power in any such manner. 
 
 A boss, then, must attain power through 
 the politicians. But what Machiavelli says 
 of the nobles is true of the politicians, that, 
 although a boss is raised by their favor, he 
 will find much difficulty in supporting him- 
 self, because he will be surrounded by men 
 who, as they think themselves still his equals, 
 submit reluctantly to his authority. It is also 
 true that the people could be contented with- 
 out the exercise of injustice by a boss, but not 
 the politicians ; the latter seeking to practise 
 tyranny, the former merely to avoid it. So 
 it is true that when the people cease to favor 
 any man they simply desert him, while the 
 politicians may not only desert, but also con- 
 spire against him ; for as they generally have 
 57 
 
more penetration than the common people, 
 they are likely to secure themselves in time 
 by going over to the more fortunate compet- 
 itors. Yet in spite of this I do not hesitate 
 to say that a boss must not only gain power 
 through the favor of the politicians, but must 
 also retain it through them ; although he must 
 beware of driving the people to revolt by op- 
 pression. 
 
 To explain the subject more fully, as Ma- 
 chiavelli has done, let us examine the two 
 points of view in which a boss ought to con- 
 sider his politicians ; and first, whether they 
 are entirely attached to his fortune or not. 
 Those who give him proofs of their zeal and 
 devotion deserve his honor and esteem, pro- 
 vided they are not rapacious. But those who 
 do not, perhaps have no other motive for their 
 coolness than a natural timidity and want of 
 spirit. In this case he may employ them, and 
 that with great advantage, particularly if they 
 are able in counsel, for then they will honor 
 him in prosperity, and in adversity they will 
 do him no injury. But when they keep aloof, 
 from ambition or some other latent cause, it 
 is a proof that they more regard their own 
 welfare than that of the boss. He therefore 
 58 
 
ought to consider them as declared enemies, 
 who, not content with abandoning his inter- 
 ests, would not hesitate, in adversity, to take 
 hostile measures against him. 
 
 Yet it is partly true that a boss, although 
 he be advanced by the poHticians and against 
 the will of the people, should strive to gain 
 their attachment ; nor is this very difficult, if 
 he will protect them against those who seek 
 to oppress them. For the people desire little 
 more of their rulers than security from op- 
 pression, and as it is natural, when we receive 
 favors from those from whom we expected 
 only evil, to feel more obliged to such bene- 
 factors, so the attachment of the people to a 
 boss who treats them well will be more cer- 
 tain than if he had attained his rank by their 
 aid. As Machiavelli says, let no one quote 
 the old proverb against me, that he who relies 
 upon the people builds his house upon the 
 sand. This may be true in the case of a sin- 
 gle citizen opposed to powerful enemies or 
 oppressed by the magistrates, as happened to 
 the Gracchi at Rome ; but a boss who is not 
 deficient in courage and who is able to com- 
 mand — who, not dejected by ill fortune nor 
 deficient in necessary preparations, knows how 
 59 
 
to preserve order in his city by his own wis- 
 dom and ability — need never repent having 
 laid the foundation of his security on his peo- 
 ple's affections. If he succeeds in doing so, 
 the knowledge will tend more than any other 
 influence that he can bring to bear to make 
 the politicians submissive to his authority. 
 
 60 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 OF SOME PECULIARITIES IN THE SITUATION 
 
 OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND 
 
 IN ITS POPULATION. 
 
 We must now proceed for a time in our 
 inquiry without the aid of Machiavelli, for the 
 city of New Yori<, with which we are princi- 
 pally concerned, not only differs from the cit- 
 ies known to him, as do other modern cities, 
 but it also differs from all other modern cities 
 in several most important particulars. There- 
 fore it is not strange that the government of 
 this city should be in certain respects differ- 
 ent from that of any other. Of the wealth 
 of this city I need not speak at any length. 
 By its situation it is clearly destined to be the 
 greatest city of the world, and it will levy toll 
 upon the merchandise of all the natjons of the 
 earth. The boss that can make this city trib- 
 utary to him, therefore, will have all mankind 
 6i 
 
for his subjects ; and to i-ule over such a realm 
 in this way is a sufficient end for the most 
 ambitious man. 
 
 It is true that certain ignorant writers rea- 
 son as if the opulence of this city were due to 
 its inhabitants, and not to its situation, and 
 they say that the rents received by the own- 
 ers of the land belong not to them but to all 
 the inhabitants. But the folly of this appears 
 if we consider that the greater part both of 
 all the goods and of all the people that come 
 to this country from others pass through this 
 city because of its situation ; and the same is 
 true of what goes forth from this country. 
 To this place all railroads desire to extend 
 their lines ; to this place men that have gained 
 riches come to dwell ; to this place all travel- 
 ers direct their course ; to this place all that 
 make or buy or sell goods must come to 
 obtain materials or to procure or dispose of 
 their wares ; and the more this is so the more 
 it will be so. 
 
 It is absurd to suppose that these all come 
 hither for love of the inhabitants of the city, 
 and not because they find convenience and 
 profit and pleasure in its situation; for very 
 many of these inhabitants are thieves and 
 62 
 
beggars and dissolute persons, and such in- 
 habitants are not a source of wealth to any 
 city, but of poverty, requiring great outlay 
 both to prevent their wickedness and to pun- 
 ish it. Accordingly I say that the great rents 
 obtained for the lands .in this city arise from 
 its being, as it were, the center of the world, 
 and are paid by every one that comes here 
 even for a short period, as well as by those 
 that dwell here all the time ; and not only so, 
 but they are paid by all those both in this 
 country and in others that either produce or 
 buy or sell merchandise which is brought 
 hither. 
 
 It is evident, therefore, that it is not easy 
 to assign a limit to the revenue that may be 
 derived from levying taxes upon the lands in 
 this city ; for if there were no taxes the own- 
 ers of the lands would receive so much the 
 higher rents, and those that pay the rents 
 care little whether the ■ owners of the lands 
 keep them for their own use and pleasure or 
 have to divide them with their rulers. Many 
 even say that the rulers should have them 
 all. Accordingly it is only the owners of the 
 lands that will complain if very great sums 
 are exacted from them, and they are but a 
 63 
 
small part of the inhabitants. Moreover the 
 rents increase with the increase of the popu- 
 lation and traffic of the world, and if the taxes 
 are not increased quite so much the owners 
 will not attempt to rebel ; for they do not re- 
 volt whose condition is improving, but they 
 whose condition is growing worse. This, 
 therefore, is the only limit to be observed by 
 a boss in determining the amount of revenue 
 that he will exact ; but let him beware of ex- 
 ceeding this limit. 
 
 If the city of New York has been favored 
 by nature in its situation, so it seems to have 
 been intended by its shape to be governed 
 by a boss; for it is principally a long and 
 narrow island, and the traffic in it is so great 
 that continually more space is given up to 
 shops and warehouses and offices, and less 
 and less to dwellings. Very great numbers 
 come hither daily from other places, going 
 back to their homes at night ; and the laws 
 are such that none of these people, although 
 they are greatly concerned in the government 
 of the city, by reason of their whole support 
 being obtained here, has any voice whatever 
 in choosing the rulers or making the laws. 
 And this shows, as I said, that the city is in- 
 64 
 
tended by nature to be ruled by a boss, for 
 this class of whom I have just spoken is the 
 most dangerous of all to him. Nor is the 
 reason of this hard to see, since these men 
 are for the most part married, and choose to 
 live away from the city in order that their 
 children may have better homes and live 
 healthier lives; for, by reason of the high 
 rents, only the rich can afford to have sepa- 
 rate homes of their own in the city, and all 
 others must live in what are called apartment 
 or tenement houses, where a number of fam- 
 ilies are sheltered under one roof. 
 
 This is not disagreeable to the brutish class, 
 that beget children without forethought, like 
 cattle, or to those that marry intending to have 
 no children. But neither of these classes is 
 dangerous to a boss, the former because it is 
 too ignorant to know aught of government, 
 the latter because they care little about any- 
 thing except their present comfort, and are 
 indifferent to what takes place after they are 
 dead. But those who beget children with 
 forethought, and are anxious about their edu- 
 cation, and desire to accumulate wealth that 
 their children may be provided for — these 
 are they who are constantly disposed to pry 
 6s 
 
into matters of government, and to stir up 
 discontent over the manner in which the pub- 
 lic revenues are expended, and to complain 
 of the increasing of public debts; for, on 
 account of their children, they are even more 
 concerned about the future than the present, 
 wishing their children to live better lives than 
 themselves. Wherefore it is fortunate for the 
 boss that not many of this class can live in 
 the city of New York. Let him look to it, 
 when schemes are broached for enlarging its 
 limits, that he add not to their numbers. 
 
 It is true that among the dwellers in the 
 city there is a class of men called reformers, 
 most pestilent and dangerous to a boss. They 
 are truly described by Aristotle as conspir- 
 ators through ambition and not as seeing 
 before them great gains, and they engage in 
 attempts to overturn governments which they 
 think unjust, as in any other noble actions, 
 in order that they may be illustrious and dis- 
 tinguished among others. Their aim in de- 
 stroying a tyrant is not to gain a tyranny, but 
 renown. Fortunately for the boss, the num- 
 ber of those, as Aristotle says, who act upon 
 this principle is very small ; for we must sup- 
 pose they regard their own welfare as nothing 
 66 
 
in case they should not succeed. Moreover, 
 so soon as there appears to be a chance that 
 they will succeed, they are joined by many 
 who say that they are reformers, but who 
 really desire their own gains, and hope to get 
 some share in the public revenues and the 
 offices. Such men are not really reformers, 
 but politicians, and they are not greatly to 
 be feared even when they array themselves 
 with the reformers, for they are generally cor- 
 ruptible ; and moreover, many who know their 
 real character think the true reformers are no 
 better, because they act together. Hence a 
 wise boss can generally defy the reformers; 
 for if we leave out of our reckoning all the 
 strangers and travelers that come to the city 
 for a short season, all those that reside here 
 for the most part but are not citizens, and all 
 those that work here during the day but sleep 
 elsewhere — and this we may do, because none 
 of these has any voice in the government — 
 those that are left are chiefly of a character 
 to submit willingly to the rule of a boss. 
 
 67 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 OF THE DIFFERENT RACES IN THE CITY 
 OF NEW YORK. 
 
 The population of the city of New York 
 differs from that of nearly every other great 
 city, in that very many of the citizens are 
 natives neither of the city nor of this coun- 
 try, and it is probably true of a majority that 
 either they or their parents have come hither 
 from foreign lands. The number of different 
 races is very great, but the chief of these have 
 hitherto been the Irish and the German races. 
 But of late there have come many Scandina- 
 vians and Bohemians and Hungarians and 
 Poles and Russians, and especiaUy Italians. 
 Not a few of these still speak foreign tongues, 
 and as they can understand neither our speech 
 nor our laws nor our government, they care 
 little who rules over them. With such as 
 these it is at present easy for a boss to deal ; 
 and although in the future he may suffer much 
 68 
 
trouble and anxiety from the rebellious dis- 
 position and discontent of these foreigners, 
 yet, by reason of their differences of race and 
 of language, they will be for a long time 
 weak ; for they cannot combine, but through 
 race-hatreds they may be set one against 
 the other. With the Italians, because they 
 are especially dear to the pope, more diffi- 
 culty may be encountered, as I shall here- 
 after explain. For the present, however, it 
 is necessary to consider the Irish and the 
 Germans, for their number is so great that 
 through them a boss must rule, if at all. 
 
 The Germans are for many reasons easier 
 to govern than the Irish. They are slower 
 in thought and quieter in disposition, and 
 they love to divert themselves in the com- 
 pany of their wives and children with music 
 and plays, and they drink chiefly beer and 
 light wines and coffee, which things tend to 
 make them peaceable and averse to all kinds 
 of broils and contests. Moreover they have 
 long been accustomed through military ser- 
 vice to obedience to rulers, and they are used 
 to paying heavy taxes, and to be punished if 
 they complain, so that they are submissive to 
 whatever government is established, and do 
 69 
 
not venture to think of overthrowing it. Fur- 
 thermore, when they come to this country 
 they find their burdens much diminished, for 
 their taxes are lighter and they are freed 
 from military service. Hence they naturally 
 feel no discontent with a government which 
 is easier to bear than that from which they 
 have escaped, and they do not care to trou- 
 ble themselves about it. 
 
 With the Irish it is altogether different; 
 for they are of the Celtic race, which is the 
 same in its character as when Julius Caesar 
 wrote of it. Now, as then, factions every- 
 where prevail among them, and they are de- 
 voted to the chiefs or leaders of these factions, 
 expecting to be protected and supported by 
 them. They are still, as in Caesar's time, eager 
 to participate in governing, fickle and change- 
 able in their counsels. And in their diver- 
 sions they desire not the company of their 
 wives and children, since they chiefly enjoy 
 fighting and contention of all kinds, and if 
 they cannot take part themselves in what, in 
 their speech, they call rows and shindies and 
 ructions, they love to look at them, and to 
 attend such sports as prize-fights and cock- 
 fights and dog-fights, or even horse-races and 
 70 
 
games of ball, if they can do no better. But 
 they despise such diversions as the Germans 
 love — listening to players upon musical in- 
 struments and the like — and they drink from 
 preference distilled liquors. This they do 
 partly because their native country produces 
 no fruits from which wine may be made, and 
 partly because they love the strength of such 
 liquors ; for the climate of Ireland is wet and 
 cold, producing desire for drink that heats the 
 blood. There is another reason also ; for they 
 have always hated the English and all their 
 laws, and, because the English have forbidden 
 them to make their own liquors, they have 
 all the more made them in secret. Therefore 
 their drink is generally whisky ; for it is pos- 
 sible to conceal a whisky-still, but not a brew- 
 ery, by reason of the small strength and great 
 bulk of beer. Hence they are always turbu- 
 lent ; for they are easily excited even when 
 sober, and when, as often happens, they are 
 overcome with drink, they are apt to be violent 
 and ferocious. 
 
 For this people adversity seems to be bet- 
 ter than prosperity. In their own country 
 they are not very intemperate ; for, although 
 they love liquor, by reason of their poverty 
 71 
 
they are generally unable to get it. But 
 when they come hither and find themselves 
 suddenly rich, according to their standard, 
 many of them become drunken, never having 
 known how to get any pleasure from money 
 except in spending it for drink. And at home 
 they are merry and full of wit and frequently 
 pleasant and courteous in their speech; this 
 is partly because they have learned servility 
 through long oppression, although only their 
 manners and not their hearts have been sub- 
 dued ; but partly also because they are grate- 
 ful to those who treat them kindly and gen- 
 erously, and when they give their affection 
 they give it without reserve. But here they 
 soon cease to be distinguished for their wit, 
 and many of them become brutish in their 
 manners and insolent to all whom they do 
 not fear. 
 
 For they are told that in this country all 
 men are equal, which, being ignorant of polit- 
 ical matters, they interpret to mean equal in all 
 respects. Wherefore, when they find them- 
 selves treated as befits their barbarous con- 
 dition, they are aggrieved, and believe that 
 they are deprived of what is their due. More- 
 over, since in their own land they have had no 
 72 
 
places for diversion or entertainment except 
 taverns and dram-shops, they continue to re- 
 sort to such places here. But it is the fashion 
 among our people to speak evil of these re- 
 sorts and of those who keep them and of 
 those who frequent them, and the Irish, not 
 understanding this, think themselves disliked 
 without reason, or because they are of a differ- 
 ent race and religion. From all these causes 
 it comes to pass that the Irish are generally 
 detested by the other inhabitants of this coun- 
 try, whether rightly or wrongly ; and they 
 are therefore suspicious and resentful, and act 
 together in a clannish way, as those do who 
 think that every man's hand is against them. 
 Furthermore, because they have ever looked 
 upon their English rulers as enemies, they 
 have a tendency to hate all government, as 
 signifying oppression. Therefore they are 
 not submissive as the Germans are ; who, in- 
 deed, have been oppressed by rulers of their 
 own race, but the Irish by foreigners. But 
 whatever the cause may be, whether the natu- 
 ral sturdiness of the race or something else, 
 they have submitted to the English only upon 
 compulsion, and have always rebelled when- 
 ever there was opportunity. 
 -73 
 
It might seem that such a race would be 
 equally difficult for a boss either to rule over 
 or to rule with, and it would probably be so 
 for a boss not of their own race. But these 
 people have a strong feeling of devotion 
 and loyalty to one another, which has been 
 strengthened by persecution. Although they 
 fight among themselves, yet that is because 
 they love fighting and have none else to fight 
 with ; but if any one from outside interfere 
 they will cease belaboring one another and 
 all attack him. Hence any one whom they 
 look upon as properly their ruler, whether of 
 the laity or the clergy, they will support with 
 the greatest loyalty ; and so long as he takes 
 their part against those who would oppress 
 them, he may oppress them himself as much 
 as he pleases. For all these reasons a boss 
 who will favor them and their religion, espe- 
 cially if he is of their race, may count upon 
 their loyalty if he will lead them properly. 
 Hence, in spite of the name they have of 
 being rebellious, they are better supporters of 
 a boss than the Germans, even if the latter 
 are more numerous ; for they will submit to 
 be ruled by the Irish, but the Irish will not 
 submit to be ruled by them. 
 74 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 OF THE RELIGION OF A BOSS. 
 
 Many persons who are conversant with 
 political affairs say that a boss has nothing to 
 do with religion ; but in saying this they are 
 clearly mistaken. For among the ancients 
 many rulers who were distinguished for their 
 crimes were also distinguished for their rev- 
 erence for the gods, and in this way they 
 prevented the people from becoming dis- 
 affected. And in modern times not a few 
 men have gained great riches by all manner 
 of frauds and iniquities, and yet they have 
 been at the same time careful in their reli- 
 gious observances, and have won great praise 
 by liberality in their public benefactions. Ac- 
 cordingly, if a boss requires to rule by dis- 
 honest and corrupt means, it is all the more 
 important for him to win the favor of the 
 religious, and to prevent them from arraying 
 themselves against him. 
 75 
 
It may be urged against me that it is not 
 so important now as when Aristotle wrote 
 that a ruler should, as he advises, appear to 
 reverence the gods ; for when he wrote there 
 were thought to be many gods, but all the 
 people of a city were of the same religion; 
 whereas in a modern city there is thought to 
 be but one God, but the religions are many. 
 But this should not lead us to think that a 
 boss ought to have no religion, but rather 
 that he should choose that religion which 
 will be most advantageous to him, and at the 
 same time show some favor to the others. 
 Since the religion of the Irish is the Roman 
 or Papist religion, and since a boss must rule 
 by means of this race, that should be the faith 
 professed by him, at least in the city of New 
 York. Indeed, if he professed a different 
 religion from the Irish it is probable that he 
 could not secure their allegiance ; for they 
 have been taught by their long servitude to 
 hate all that do not hold with them. More- 
 over their priests have joined heartily with 
 them in withstanding the oppression of the 
 English, and have endured the greatest pov- 
 erty and suffered the crudest persecutions 
 rather than desert them, so that there is no 
 76 
 
people more devoted to their clergy or more 
 willing to obey them. 
 
 A further reason why a boss should make 
 this choice is because those who hold to the 
 other religions do not believe that the Papists 
 are eternally accursed, while the Papists teach 
 that all others are accursed. Moreover many 
 of the Germans and of the other races are 
 Papists ; but if any of the Irish are not Papists 
 they are more hated than the English them- 
 selves. Nor will it be hard for a boss to avoid 
 conflicts with those holding to the other re- 
 ligions, since they are generally not ruled by 
 their clergy, thinking them ignorant of polit- 
 ical affairs and unfitted to take part therein. 
 But the greater part of the Papists are them- 
 selves unlettered and ignorant, and at the 
 same time think their priests divinely in- 
 spired, so that they are easily led by them. 
 But if the clergy of the other religions are 
 discontented, a boss can generally quiet them 
 by exempting their institutions from taxes, 
 or making some of them charges upon the 
 public revenues, or granting them similar fa- 
 vors. If he does this, they will not dare to 
 conspire against him, for fear of losing their 
 subsidies ; and they cannot complain that the 
 77 
 
revenues are corruptly obtained if they share 
 in them : nor is it usual for men of any reli- 
 gion, and especially the clergy, to reject 
 money given to their churches because it 
 was obtained in an evil way by the givers. 
 
 For a long time it has been possible for the 
 Boss of New York to count upon the support 
 of the Romish clergy, by granting them all 
 manner of favors and seeing to it that as many 
 of the offices as possible should be given to 
 adherents of their church; for as the people 
 are led by the politicians, and the politicians 
 by a boss, so the laity are led by their priests, 
 and the priests by their bishop. This alliance 
 has occasioned some expense to the boss, by 
 diverting a part of his revenue to the pur- 
 poses of the Roman church, and by causing 
 him to yield occasionally in the matter of 
 appointments desired by his own followers. 
 But the cost has been none too great, for the 
 alliance has been more necessary for him than 
 for the clergy. They could maintain their 
 power without him, although shorn of much 
 revenue ; but he could not maintain himself 
 for any long time were the clergy to turn 
 their people against him. It has therefore 
 been the part of wisdom for the boss to treat 
 78 
 
the Archbishop of New York with the great- 
 est deference and not to refuse any of his 
 requests, even though he seemed by so doing 
 to admit another to a share in his power. 
 Moreover the boss can in his turn demand 
 preferment for such of the clergy as he fa- 
 vors, and can contrive that those who are 
 well disposed toward him shall be advanced 
 to the highest places in the church. 
 
 But from some cause which is not yet re- 
 vealed this alliance has been recently threat- 
 ened by the intervention of the Pope of 
 Rome. Some maintain that his interference 
 has been brought about because of the great 
 number of Italians now dwelling in this coun- 
 try, who are necessarily ruled by the Irish 
 clergy ; for the popes, being always ItaUans, 
 have naturally given the chief positions at 
 their disposal to ecclesiastics of that race, 
 and it has perhaps seemed to them that the 
 time has come for the Italian clergy in this 
 country to be placed at the head. Others say 
 that the pope is jealous of the Archbishop of 
 New York, as exercising too much power and 
 enjoying too great emoluments through his 
 alliance with the boss. Whatever the ex- 
 planation may be, the fact is patent that the 
 79 
 
pope now maintains an Italian as his legate 
 in this country, and that this legate overrides 
 the Irish bishops, to their extreme humilia- 
 tion and discomfiture. 
 
 History furnishes many examples of con- 
 flicts between princes and popes ; but we shall 
 look in vain for an instance where a struggle 
 has taken place between a pope and a boss ; 
 for they are both, in a sense, secret rulers, 
 their authority not being established by law, 
 and the only sanction for their commands be- 
 ing of a spiritual nature. Experience, there- 
 fore, does not enable us to predict what the 
 outcome of such a struggle would be. Yet 
 the pertinacity with which the popes always 
 maintain their claims, and the enduring char- 
 acter of their power, contrasted with the con- 
 stant dangers which threaten the rule of a 
 boss, and the need which he is under of con- 
 tinually shifting his policy, make it clear that 
 no boss should array himself against the pope 
 unless his power depends upon it. It would 
 be beyond question a great calamity to a boss 
 were the chief clergy in this country to be 
 Italians rather than Irish ; yet if the pope de- 
 mands this, it is better for the boss to yield. 
 He may to some extent lose his hold upon 
 80 
 
the Irish people, but he ought easily to con- 
 vince the pope that the great favors and rev- 
 enues now enjoyed by the Roman clergy at 
 the public expense would be imperiled by the 
 overthrow of the dominion of bosses. The 
 alliance with the Roman church should there- 
 fore be maintained by a boss, even if he must 
 show favors to the Italian clergy rather than 
 the Irish; but he should support the Irish 
 clergy in their resistance to the new policy of 
 the pope as long as possible, for he will never 
 again have allies so faithful as these have 
 been. 
 
 8i 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 OF THE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH THE 
 
 POWER OF A BOSS MUST BE FIXED, 
 
 IF IT IS TO BE DURABLE. 
 
 The importance of looking at things rather 
 than names, in such an inquiry as this, has 
 been already explained. Hence I shall make 
 no excuse for repeating much that Machia- 
 velli says of military establishments, and of the 
 different kinds of troops, and of the duties of 
 a prince relative to his military force. For 
 the aim of Machiavelli was to show by what 
 means it was necessary for a prince to main- 
 tain himself, and when he wrote there was no 
 way in which this could be done except by 
 arms ; but it would be absurd to say that be- 
 cause a boss cannot make use of armed men 
 he requires nothing that will effect the same 
 result. This is so far from being true that he 
 is all the more in need of disciplined forces 
 because he is deprived of the use of arms, 
 82 
 
and much that Machiavelli lays down con- 
 cerning troops will be true of such forces. 
 Thus, I repeat, it is well understood that a 
 small body of well-disciplined troops will de- 
 feat a much larger force of troops that are ill- 
 disciplined, even if they have the same arms ; 
 but it is not so well understood that a similar 
 thing is true of political contests ; yet such is 
 the truth. Although it is the law that the 
 greater number shall rule, yet nearly always 
 a smaller number, voting under orders as one 
 man, will prevail over the greater number; 
 because the latter are divided in their coun- 
 sels, and many of their votes merely offset 
 one another by being cast for different men. 
 Indeed, if this were not so, it would be nearly 
 hopeless for a boss to attempt to rule, since 
 there are probably always more citizens op- 
 posed to him than favoring him. His safety 
 lies in their disunion and in the union of his 
 own followers. Accordingly let us proceed 
 to apply what Machiavelli says of military es- 
 tablishments to the forces of the boss. 
 
 He observes, in the first place, that troops 
 
 which serve for the defense of a state are 
 
 either national, foreign, or mixed. Those of 
 
 the second class, whether they serve as auxil- 
 
 83 
 
iaries or as mercenaries, he declares to be use- 
 less and dangerous ; and the prince who relies 
 upon such soldiers will never, in his opinion, 
 be secure ; because they are always ambi- 
 tious, disunited, unfaithful, and undisciplined. 
 Brave amongst friends, but cowardly in the 
 face of an enemy, they neither fear God nor 
 keep faith with man ; so that the prince who 
 employs them can only retard his fall by 
 delaying to put their valor to the proof. In 
 short, they plunder the state in time of peace 
 as much as the enemy does in time of war. 
 To place this matter in a clearer light, he 
 says, it is to be observed that the command- 
 ers of these troops are either men of conduct 
 or ability, or they are not. If they are, they 
 cannot be trusted ; because their own ele- 
 vation can only be obtained by oppressing 
 either the prince who employs them or others 
 against his will. If they are not, they must 
 hasten the ruin of the state they serve so ill. 
 He adds that if he is told that every other 
 commander will act in the same manner, his 
 answer is that every war is carried on either 
 by a prince or a repubhc, and that a prince 
 ought to put himself at the head of his 
 armies. 
 
 84 
 
We need not concern ourselves with what 
 Machiavelli has to say of the conduct of wars 
 by repubHcs, but his last observation is a 
 maxim for the boss even more than for the 
 prince. And, if we look at it narrowly, it ex- 
 plains all that he has said before ; for all his 
 objections to the employment of mercena- 
 ries arise from their having their own com- 
 manders. It is on this account that they are 
 worthless and treacherous to the prince. If 
 they were accustomed to obey him, and he 
 were in the habit of punishing them for in- 
 subordination and mutiny, it would matter 
 little where they were born ; and so the Eng- 
 lish find it now in the East Indies, where 
 they hold great bodies of excellent troops in 
 the best of discipline by putting over them 
 only English officers; whereby a few thou- 
 sands rule quietly over many millions. 
 
 Moreover, if we examine Machiavelli's ob- 
 jections to the use of auxiliaries, they all re- 
 duce to the same thing. He says that this 
 kind of military force may perhaps be useful 
 to the state by which it is provided, but is 
 always injurious to the prince by whom it 
 is employed. For when defeated, the prince 
 suffers the usual consequences; and when 
 85 
 
victorious, he lies at the mercy of such an 
 army. He assigns as the cause of this, among 
 other things, that the auxiliary force is not 
 under the command of the prince ; but he 
 needed not to mention the other causes, for 
 this cause is sufficient of itself. If we study 
 all the examples that he adduces, we see 
 that they all teach the same lesson : that the 
 prince who would successfully employ an 
 armed force must command it, and make it 
 entirely dependent upon himself. If he allows 
 it to have commanders of its own, it will obey 
 these commanders as willingly when they 
 turn against the prince as when they fight for 
 him. The best troops are those which obey 
 whatever orders they receive without hesi- 
 tation or inquiry, and provided orders come 
 to them from the accustomed sources they do 
 not pause to ask for what end they are given. 
 But if Machiavelli wrote concerning mer- 
 cenaries with less wisdom than usual, it was 
 because he was greatly distressed by the con- 
 dition of Italy at that time. Through the 
 use of mercenary troops by the ecclesiastical 
 princes, who were strangers to the art of war, 
 Italy came to be invaded by Charles VIII, 
 ravaged and plundered by Louis XII, op- 
 86 
 
pressed by Ferdinand, and insulted by the 
 Swiss. Yet, since the invaders employed 
 mercenaries, it would seem that the deplor- 
 able state of Italy was due chiefly to the 
 fierce hatreds of the different states, which 
 led them to prefer subjection to foreign rule 
 rather than to that of their own countrymen. 
 The application of all this to the case of a 
 boss is very plain. A boss must himself com- 
 mand the force by which his power is main- 
 tained, and make every member of that force 
 understand that he is entirely dependent upon 
 one single leader. It is true that a boss must 
 commit the immediate discipline of his force 
 to subordinate officers; but he must never 
 allow these officers to think themselves the 
 real commanders, or permit their troops to 
 look upon them as such. If he allows this, all 
 the evils of mercenary and auxiliary troops 
 described by Machiavelli will at once arise, 
 and a boss who is incapable of exercising this 
 authority will soon be displaced by some of 
 the leaders whom he has allowed to grow too 
 powerful. He may flourish for a time, but if 
 he does not apprehend evils till it is too late to 
 prevent them, he cannot be truly called a wise 
 man ; yet such foresight is bestowed upon few. 
 87 
 
From his reasonings and examples, Ma- 
 chiavelli draws the conclusion that a prince 
 ought to make the art of war his occupation, 
 for it is peculiarly the science of those who 
 govern. War, he says, and the several sorts 
 of discipline and institutions relating to it, 
 should be the prince's only study, the only 
 profession he should follow, and the object 
 he ought always to have in view. By this 
 means princes can maintain possession of their 
 dominions, and private individuals are some- 
 times raised thereby to supreme authority ; 
 while, on the other hand, we frequently see 
 princes shamefully reduced to nothing by 
 suffering themselves to be enfeebled by sloth- 
 ful inactivity. By a neglect of this art, he 
 repeats, states are lost, and by cultivating it 
 they are acquired. 
 
 But if this is true of a prince, whose rule is 
 comparatively easy, how much more is it true 
 of a boss, who is at every moment of his ca- 
 reer exposed to the malignant attacks of envi- 
 ous and disappointed men, and who can have 
 no adherents except among those who believe 
 that he is capable of maintaining himself! 
 If he does not display this capacity, his down- 
 fall will infallibly be sudden and complete ; 
 88 
 
and he can only attain this capacity by mak- 
 ing the art of handling his forces — which is 
 in modern times, for a boss, the same thing 
 as the art of war for a prince when Machi- 
 avelli wrote — his sole study and occupation. 
 This art is now commonly called the art of 
 practical politics, and by neglecting it bosses 
 lose their power, and by cultivating it they 
 maintain it. This is what is meant by Aris- 
 totle when he so earnestly exhorts the tyrant 
 to take good care of only one thing, namely, 
 the power, that not only the willing but the 
 unwilling also shall submit to it ; for if he once 
 lose this, his tyranny is at an end. And he 
 expressly says that if a tyrant will not study 
 to acquire any other \'irtue, yet he ought to 
 aim at political ability. Accordingly, to sum 
 up the whole matter, I maintain that a boss 
 should labor night and day to perfect himself 
 in the art of practical politics, in order that he 
 may maintain his forces in the highest state 
 of efficiency and discipline ; or, in the speech 
 of modern times, that he should develop and 
 perfect a political organization, which is com- 
 monly called also simply an organization or 
 machine. 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 OF THE ORGANIZATION OF A POLITICAL 
 FORCE OR MACHINE. 
 
 Having shown that a boss must maintain 
 himself by means of a disciplined force, I have 
 now to explain the methods to be observed 
 in organizing such a body. Before doing so, 
 however, it will be advantageous to restate 
 the general principles already established for 
 the conduct of a boss of the city of New 
 York. In the first place, it appeared that, 
 since the public are divided into two parties, 
 he is to rule by one of them, which is at pres- 
 ent the Democratic party, because it is the 
 most numerous. And within this party it is 
 necessary to rule by means of the politicians, 
 for they alone can be held in subjection. It 
 is desirable, also, to secure the alliance of the 
 Roman church, or at least not to arouse its 
 hostility. And the chief reliance must be 
 90 
 
upon the Irish race, as being not only most 
 loyal to leaders of its own religion and blood, 
 and therefore amenable to discipline, but also 
 as being naturally fond of strife, and hence 
 not slothful or indifferent. The other races 
 are, indeed, not to be neglected or maltreated ; 
 but as the same reliance cannot be placed 
 upon them, they cannot be made use of to 
 the same extent. Such are the general prin- 
 ciples to be observed. 
 
 To take up the particular rules, I maintain 
 that a boss should see that his force is con- 
 stituted of a large number of small companies, 
 each company being drawn from a certain re- 
 gion and led by a captain of its own. Herein 
 the organization of a machine differs essen- 
 tially from that of an army ; for an army is 
 made up, it is true, of companies, but these 
 companies are united into regiments, and 
 these into brigades, and so on. This is re- 
 quired by the nature of military affairs where 
 many bodies of men are to be moved in dif- 
 ferent places in order to be concentrated at 
 a particular moment in one spot. Besides, 
 when an action is brought on, it often be- 
 comes necessary to change all prearranged 
 plans at a moment's notice, which can be 
 91 
 
accomplished only when the commander has 
 able generals under him. But in a political 
 contest there is no concentration of forces, 
 nor is there any general action, but a great 
 number of petty ones, each in its own local- 
 ity ; the aim being to cast the greatest num- 
 ber of votes in as many of those places as 
 possible. But since these votes are to be cast 
 for candidates determined in advance, when 
 the decisive day of election has come it is im- 
 possible to change the orders. The policy 
 adopted may prove to be mistaken, but it is 
 then too late to alter it. Concerning this a 
 boss is at liberty to consult his captains as 
 much as he thinks desirable, and he is fortu- 
 nate if he has wise counselors ; but he will se- 
 cure them at too great a sacrifice if he allows 
 them to become so powerful as to control his 
 decisions. 
 
 Upon this account I do not hesitate to say 
 that a boss should as far as possible avoid the 
 employment of generals, and should allow 
 those whom he is obliged to employ very 
 limited powers. The necessity of this arises 
 from his extreme liability to be overthrown 
 by treachery and mutiny. The commander 
 of an army is less exposed to this danger, 
 92 
 
because he has the power to put to death at 
 once or to imprison any one, whether gen- 
 eral officer or private soldier, that does not 
 render him prompt obedience. Yet even the 
 most absolute commander frequently does not 
 dare to punish a general whom he knows to be 
 unfaithful, fearing the revenge of the soldiers 
 who have been accustomed to obey him ; and 
 if he is determined to punish such a one, he 
 first removes him from his command. Not 
 many commanders have been more absolute 
 than Napoleon ; but he was put to the great- 
 est anxiety by the jealousies of his marshals, 
 and some writers claim that he was finally 
 ruined because these men had come to think 
 themselves so great that they would not 
 faithfully carry out the orders of their chief 
 unless they thought fit. 
 
 But a boss can neither put to death nor im- 
 prison his subordinates, and he is not always 
 able to deprive a rebellious officer of his posi- 
 tion, or at least not at once. Hence I main- 
 tain that a boss should take care that none of 
 his officers becomes very powerful, and, there- 
 fore, if he must have generals, he should be 
 constantly on the watch to learn whether 
 those under their command are disposed to 
 93 
 
obey them or him, and to see if any of these 
 generals is trying to win over the others to 
 support him. It is evident enough that the 
 captain of a few hundred voters can never be 
 dangerous to a boss, so long as he is directly 
 under his command and has no dependency 
 upon any other officer. It is equally evident 
 that a general who has under him a number 
 of captains who have nothing to do with the 
 supreme commander may become a danger- 
 ous rival to the latter. Hence, if it is possible 
 for a boss to make all the captains directly 
 responsible to him and to no one else, it is 
 certainly advantageous. I know that a differ- 
 ent custom prevails in the city of New York, 
 and, as is always the case, many will be found 
 to say that existing customs are best, or at 
 least that they cannot be altered. If they 
 say what is true, it behooves every boss of 
 New York to watch the conduct of his gen- 
 erals with the utmost jealousy, for he is sure 
 to be sooner or later undone by them. 
 
 But I do not admit that what they say is 
 true; for if we refer to what Aristotle and 
 Machiavelli have advised, we find them both 
 laying it down that tyrants and princes must 
 take care that no citizen attains any high de- 
 94 
 
gree of power. Thus Aristotle quotes from 
 Herodotus with approbation the story of the 
 conduct of Periander when Thrasybulus sent 
 a messenger to him asking for advice as to 
 how he should rule. For Periander said noth- 
 ing to the messenger, but walked with him 
 in his garden, and, as he walked, struck off 
 the heads of the tallest flowers ; signifying 
 that a tyrant must, from time to time, make 
 way with the most eminent citizens. And 
 Aristotle declares again that a tyranny must 
 be preserved by keeping down those that rise 
 too high, and removing those that are of an 
 aspiring disposition. 
 
 Machiavelli also frequently commends this 
 policy in princes, and in commenting upon 
 the conquest of Asia by Alexander he ob- 
 serves that all monarchies of which there are 
 any records left in history have been governed 
 either by an absolute prince, to whom all the 
 rest are slaves, and whose ministers, by his 
 favor and consent, assist in governing the 
 kingdom ; or else they have been ruled by a 
 prince and nobles who claim a share in the 
 government not so much through the prince's 
 favor as from the antiquity and nobility of 
 their blood. Such nobles also possess states 
 95 
 
and subjects of their own, who acknowledge 
 them as their lords and entertain a particular 
 affection toward them. In a country gov- 
 erned by a prince and ministers of his own 
 appointment, the sovereign enjoys infinitely 
 the greatest authority, because throughout 
 the whole kingdom no authority is acknow- 
 ledged but his ; and if any obeys another it is 
 only as a minister or official for whom no 
 particular affection is felt. 
 
 Thus, Machiavelli said, the Turkish mon- 
 archy is governed by an absolute ruler, who 
 divides his kingdom into different provinces 
 ruled by different governors whom he changes 
 and recalls at pleasure. Such a state is difficult 
 to attack, because the invader cannot be called 
 in by the nobles of the kingdom, nor can 
 he reckon on the assistance and rebellion of 
 those who surround the prince. The officers 
 of such a state being his slaves and depen- 
 dents, it becomes more difficult to corrupt 
 them; and, supposing it were possible, little 
 assistance is to be had from them, since they 
 are unable to draw the people along with 
 them, for the reasons before adduced. Al- 
 though Machiavelli wrote long ago, time has 
 only made his wisdom more manifest ; for the 
 96 
 
Turkish monarchy still endures, and whatever 
 losses it has suffered have been due princi- 
 pally to a disregard of the principle which 
 Machiavelli explained, as in the case of Me- 
 hemet AH of Egypt, and the Hospodars of 
 the Danubian provinces. 
 
 From all this it seems to be beyond ques- 
 tion that the despotic ruler, whether he be 
 called tyrant, or prince, or boss, must cause 
 it to be understood that all preferment comes 
 only from him, and continues only at his 
 pleasure. To prevent those to whom he 
 commits the charge of affairs from forming a 
 different opinion, he must see to it that they 
 have no ground for believing that they obtain 
 ofifice through the personal support of their 
 followers. I admit that it may be impractica- 
 ble to select generals or leaders from among 
 those that have no followers; but what I 
 maintain is that if the generals think they 
 owe their places to their followers and not to 
 the boss, they will be arrogant and insubor- 
 dinate, and constantly ready to mutiny. On 
 the other hand, if they are satisfied that their 
 following is not sufficient to put them in office 
 and to maintain them there, they will be sub- 
 missive and devoted to the ruler who has 
 97 
 
given them what they had not power to take 
 by themselves. 
 
 Hence, I repeat, a boss should, so far as 
 practicable, rule directly through the captains 
 of the small districts and not through interme- 
 diate officers; for these will almost of neces- 
 sity be puffed up by their directing numbers 
 of inferiors, and will gradually come to feel 
 that these subordinates obey them and not 
 the boss ; and the subalterns, knowing only 
 these superior officers, will have the same 
 feeling. Hence there will be produced an 
 army with such gradations that it may be 
 commanded by one person as well as an- 
 other, and in such a case the power of the 
 boss can be but temporary. Whereas if he 
 will take such generals as he must have from 
 among the captains of the districts, they will 
 understand that they owe their preferment 
 directly to his favor and to their devotion to 
 his interests, and not to the demands of their 
 own followers. 
 
 This is the lesson taught by the history of 
 the later Roman emperors. After Sejanus 
 had united the praetorian guards into one 
 compact body, the praetorian prefect became 
 the most powerful man in the Roman state, 
 98 
 
making whomsoever he pleased emperor, and 
 presently dethroning him. It is true that 
 power received upon these terms may be 
 preserved for a while by submission on the 
 part of the ruler to those who are in name 
 his subjects — if indeed this may be called 
 power; but, as Machiavelli shows, it is hard 
 to please such masters without discontenting 
 the people. For when an army is controlled 
 by officers of this kind, the soldiers will be 
 rapacious and insolent, and they will con- 
 stantly endeavor to satiate their avarice and 
 cruelty at the expense of the subjects. 
 
 In this they cannot be restrained : their 
 own generals will not do so, for fear of losing 
 their popularity ; and the commander cannot, 
 for the soldiers do not receive their orders 
 from him, and he dares not issue such orders 
 to the generals, for fear of their refusing to 
 execute them. If he attempts this, as Ma- 
 chiavelli shows to have happened in the case 
 of many of the emperors, he will probably 
 fall a victim to their hatred ; for, as he says, 
 hatred is as easily incurred by good actions 
 as by evil, and hence a prince is often com- 
 pelled to be wicked in order to maintain his 
 power. For when the strongest party is cor- 
 99 
 
rupt (whether it be the people-, the nobles, 
 or the troops), he must comply with their dis- 
 position, and content them, and from that 
 moment he must renounce doing good, or it 
 will prove his ruin. 
 
 This Machiavelli says as showing the ne- 
 cessity laid upon those emperors who were 
 raised by the praetorian guards to yield to 
 them ; for if one has to choose between excit- 
 ing the hatred of the stronger or the weaker 
 party, it is better to take part with the stronger. 
 But if the guards had not been united under 
 their own generals, the emperors could have 
 held them down and restrained their excesses. 
 There should be no occasion to resort to such 
 perilous remedies as those used by Hiero of 
 Syracuse, who had all his mercenaries slaugh- 
 tered, and by Mahmoud, the Turkish emperor, 
 who massacred the greater part of his Jani- 
 zaries. Since a boss can now employ no such 
 effective measures as these, let him take care 
 to avoid situations where they would be de- 
 sirable, by preventing the rise of powerful 
 subordinates. In every one of his chief offi- 
 cers let him constantly see an envious and 
 malignant rival, who can be made harmless 
 only by being kept powerless, and in all of 
 
them together a band of conspirators who 
 are restrained from overthrowing him only 
 by their distrust and jealousy of one another. 
 In selecting his subordinates, therefore, a 
 boss will do wisely to follow the counsel of 
 Machiavelli, who declares that there is one 
 infallible rule whereby a prince may know 
 his ministers, viz., to observe whether they at- 
 tend more to their own interest than to that 
 of the state. A minister should be entirely 
 devoted to the public service, and should 
 never address the prince on his private af- 
 fairs. It is the part of a boss, therefore, to 
 attend to the interest of a faithful minister, 
 and to heap honors, riches, fortune, and other 
 favors upon him, that/ so he may be satisfied 
 in his station, and have no reason to desire 
 a change ; in fine, that he may dread, and 
 endeavor with all his power to prevent, any 
 fatal reverse which may threaten his master. 
 Whether these rules have been observed or 
 not in the government of the city of New 
 York, I do not now consider ; especially since 
 the matter is open to the observation of all. 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 OF THE MOTIVE AND ANIMATING PRINCI- 
 PLE OF A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
 OR MACHINE. 
 
 If we examine the history of the great 
 armies that have won success in the past, 
 with a view to ascertaining the motives that 
 have led so many human beings to devote 
 themselves to probable death, and to undergo 
 certainly the greatest hardships, we shall find 
 that in most cases, where the success of an 
 army has been permanent, the soldiers have 
 been animated with love for their commander. 
 It is true that glorious feats were performed 
 by the armies of the Lacedsemonians and the 
 early Romans and those of some other peo- 
 ples, merely from their sense of duty ; but 
 these were armies of citizens serving in the 
 defense of their own families and homes and 
 possessions. But the armies of Alexander 
 and of Hannibal and of Julius Csesar and of 
 
Napoleon were not citizen armies defending 
 their own country, but were generally en- 
 gaged in conquest. Hence the motive of 
 the soldiers could not have been patriotism, 
 but must have been something else ; and in 
 all these cases the soldiers were devoted to 
 their commanders. But this devotion was 
 not so much the cause of their success as 
 their success was the cause of their devotion ; 
 for they would not have loved these generals 
 had they been unsuccessful. But the success 
 obtained by soldiers is desired by them partly 
 because it is a dehght for men to triumph in 
 contests of every kind with their fellows, and 
 odious to be beaten, and partly because suc- 
 cess enables them to satisfy their desires with 
 the goods of the defeated, and- frees them 
 from the fear of losing their own. No one 
 can doubt that the former of these motives is 
 to many men more powerful than the latter; 
 for they frequently perform actions that are 
 dangerous for the sake of glory, although 
 such actions bring them no profit. But the 
 greater number would probably prefer profit- 
 able actions that were inglorious, or at least 
 would not be content with winning victories 
 that were barren of profit. 
 103 
 
I have already shown that we must not 
 believe that there is no likeness between the 
 force of a boss and the army of a prince be- 
 cause arms are no longer employed. Hence 
 it is reasonable to suppose that in the main 
 the boss must appeal to the same motives in 
 his followers as are appealed to by the prince 
 in the case of his soldiers. In other words, 
 if a boss is to maintain himself, he must win 
 success for his forces, that they may be both 
 lifted up by the consciousness that they can 
 defeat their adversaries, and comforted with 
 substantial spoils. Now so far as glory is 
 concerned, the boss need not greatly trouble 
 himself ; for, being immaterial, it can be easily 
 divided. There is no limitation as to its quan- 
 tity, and all may share in it. But in the case 
 of the spoils, as I have said before, there is 
 sure to be much heart-burning, and, being 
 material and therefore limited in quantity, 
 there is never such an abundance as to satisfy 
 all. This difficulty, however, does not appear 
 to be much greater in the case of a boss than 
 in the case of the general of an army ; and if 
 it has been overcome by generals who have 
 yet retained the loyalty of their troops, it may 
 also be overcome by a boss. 
 104 
 
Moreover in the case of his forces the nega- 
 tive motive, fear of loss, is of great influence ; 
 for soldiers immediately dissipate their spoils 
 in riotous living, but the spoils distributed by 
 a boss are in the shape of offices to which 
 salaries are attached, and thus have perma- 
 nence. Accordingly, whenever any man ob- 
 tains an office, he is not alone concerned lest 
 he lose it, but his parents also, and frequently 
 his brothers and sisters and cousins, and also 
 the parents and kin of his wife, especially 
 among the Irish, because of their clannishness. 
 For all these consider that if the profits of 
 that office are lost by their relative, he will 
 no longer be able to do them favors by his 
 influence with other officers, and moreover 
 will probably have to be supported by them, 
 and his family likewise ; for most of those 
 that have held poHtical offices are not thought 
 desirable servants by private employers. 
 
 Thus it frequently happens that if one 
 man receives an office there are ten voters 
 who are interested in having him keep it; 
 and therefore if the offices in the city of 
 New York are wisely distributed, it is possi- 
 ble to secure the fidelity of a very great 
 number, if not a majority, of the citizens. In 
 105 
 
the case of the army, every soldier must be 
 paid and have his share of the spoils ; but in 
 the case of the organization controlled by 
 the boss, if a certain number are paid with 
 offices most of the remainder may be held in 
 submission. For they are not writhout hope 
 that after a time some of the spoils may be 
 awarded to them, and, as appears from the 
 conduct of those who buy chances in lotte- 
 ries, as well as in the case of soldiers, men are 
 always hopeful beyond reason. 
 
 Hence, although it might seem at first 
 incredible that the greater number of the 
 citizens should be governed in their voting 
 by the expectation of being maintained at the 
 expense of the remainder, this is no more un- 
 reasonable than that men should spend their 
 money in gambling, concerning which it is 
 even true that the more they lose the more 
 confident they become of winning. So that 
 it is by no means necessary that the organ- 
 ization should comprehend a majority of the 
 citizens ; for, in the first place, probably one 
 fourth of the citizens never vote at all, and 
 many of them will vote always with whatever 
 organization bears the name of the national 
 party to which they are attached ; and great 
 io6 
 
numbers will vote with the organization which 
 will make the best provision for their rela- 
 tives, as we have just seen. Moreover the 
 opposition are seldom united, and whenever 
 there is any prospect of their combining 
 against the government of a boss, the leaders 
 of the other party will try to make it a com- 
 bination in their own favor. 
 
 Furthermore it is generally possible to make 
 a secret treaty with these leaders, whereby 
 they shall, while seeming to be hostile to a 
 boss, be really causing their followers to cast 
 their votes as he wishes. Such treaties can 
 almost always be effected by the promise of 
 a certain share in the spoils. There are also 
 many profitable contracts to be awarded as 
 a boss wills. So that it sufficiently appears 
 that the motive and animating principle of 
 the machine or organization of a boss is the 
 expectation of office or of profit to be some- 
 how made at the expense of the pubHc, either 
 for one's self or for one's friends and relatives ; 
 or, what is much the same, the fear of losing 
 some office or profit already obtained. If a 
 boss can contrive to maintain these hopes 
 and expectations without excessive disap- 
 pointment, he may continue with even more 
 107 
 
prosperity than the great generals whom I 
 have named, for he is less exposed to exter- 
 nal attack ; but like them he must instantly 
 suppress all signs of mutiny with the greatest 
 severity. 
 
 1 08 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 OF THE REVENUE DERIVED FROM THE 
 
 CITIZENS AND HOW FAR IT MAY BE 
 
 APPROPRIATED BY A BOSS. 
 
 The revenue collected from the citizens 
 of New York, which is at the disposal of a 
 boss, is of two kinds. There is first the rev- 
 enue that is raised openly and by authority 
 of law, nearly all of which is derived from 
 taxes, from assessments, from rents, and from 
 fees and licenses. The peculiarity of this 
 revenue is that it is required by law to be 
 accounted for to the public, and must appear 
 of record, so that those who collect it must 
 pay it over only upon proper vouchers and 
 warrants. 
 
 The second kind of revenue has secret 
 
 sources, and it is impossible and would be 
 
 dangerous to keep any account or record of 
 
 it, for fear of its being disclosed. This rev- 
 
 109 
 
enue consists, first, of what is paid to secure 
 the assessment of property at a low rate, or its 
 omission from the rolls, and which is there- 
 for© a payment for exemption from taxation. 
 Secondly, it consists of the contributions of 
 those who may be put to expense by hostile 
 legislation, and who pay to prevent it, and of 
 those who pay to secure favorable legislation 
 or advantages in rents or contracts; either 
 money being contributed, or shares of stock, 
 or sometimes knowledge concerning coming 
 changes in the prices of stocks, or concerning 
 new enterprises and improvements whereby 
 the values of particular properties may be 
 affected. Thirdly, payments may be exacted 
 from those who desire to secure immunity 
 for their violation of laws, or to secure pro- 
 tection against many sorts of molestation, and 
 also to cause the persecution of enemies or 
 rivals in business. There are certain other 
 sources of revenue, but these are the princi- 
 pal ones. 
 
 The expenditure of the revenues that are 
 raised openly is for the most part regulated 
 by law, and consists almost wholly in pay- 
 ments for services and for materials. The 
 quantity of materials purchased for the city 
 
of New York, in order to supply the schools 
 and hospitals and prisons and the various 
 offices, and for many other purposes, is very 
 great ; consisting of food and clothing, horses 
 and machinery, and numberless other things. 
 These purchases are made by the city officers, 
 partly of such persons and upon such terms 
 as they choose, and partly, after advertise- 
 ment of what is required, of those who offer 
 to furnish the materials at the lowest prices. 
 But the difference is not very material, since 
 it is generally possible, when it is determined 
 that a certain person shall receive a contract, 
 so to contrive the forms and specifications 
 that he alone can bid successfully. And if 
 this cannot always be done, yet so much trou- 
 ble may be caused to contractors who insist 
 upon obtaining these contracts, by rejecting 
 their work as not conforming to the terms 
 specified, or by withholding their pay, that 
 they are soon discouraged and withdraw 
 from competition. As to the payments for 
 services, they consist almost entirely of sal- 
 aries and wages, which are fixed by law or 
 by the city ordinances. The total amount 
 of these is very large, and the rates vary ex- 
 tremely, some officers receiving a hundred 
 
times as much as others ; and frequently those 
 receiving the highest pay perform the least 
 service. 
 
 In general it may be said, concerning the 
 collection as well as the spending of the 
 taxes, that a boss should pay attention to the 
 advice of Aristotle, and seem to keep an 
 exact account both of what is received and 
 of what is paid, taking particular care that 
 he appear to collect and keep them, not as 
 his own property, but as that of the people ; 
 nor need he ever fear that he shall lack 
 money while he have the supreme power in 
 his hands. In the case of salaries it is gen- 
 erally necessary that they be fully paid, not 
 merely because they are paid by draft, but 
 chiefly because they are paid so frequently 
 and to such great numbers that if any less 
 should be paid than is due there could be no 
 concealment of it. But in paying contractors 
 and in the purchase of materials, the amounts 
 vary, and the times of payment are irregular, 
 and the number of persons concerned is few, 
 so that there is more opportunity for securing 
 commissions and deductions. 
 
 Nor is it very material, according to the 
 opinion of some, that all such expenditures 
 
are made matter of public record, for few per- 
 sons examine these records, or could under- 
 stand them if they did. This seemed to be 
 proved clearly by Boss Tweed; for when 
 great complaints were made that the city 
 was being defrauded in its contracts, he in- 
 vited a number of citizens, distinguished for 
 their integrity and thought to be wise in 
 matters of business, to examine the accounts. 
 This they accordingly did, but he was able 
 to deceive them so completely that they re- 
 ported the debt of the city as being twenty 
 millions of dollars less than it was in truth, 
 and they further certified that the financial 
 affairs of the city were administered in a cor- 
 rect and faithful manner. Nevertheless it was 
 by means of the records that Boss Tweed was 
 undone ; for some unfaithful clerk discovered 
 their falsity, and procured evidence of it 
 which was published abroad. Peradventure 
 this boss might even then have maintained 
 himself had he claimed to be ignorant of the 
 frauds, and thrown the blame upon his offi- 
 cers ; but instead of doing so he openly con- 
 fessed that he had used the taxes as his own 
 property, and defied the people, which no 
 boss can safely do in modern days. Accord- 
 "3 
 
ingly it seems most judicious to have the re- 
 ceipts and expenditures truly recorded, since 
 otherwise it is possible that there may be de- 
 tection and exposure, which will stir up the 
 citizens to rebel. A wise boss will guard 
 not only against what will probably occur, 
 but also against what seems unlikely, if it may 
 cause his ruin ; having in mind the proverb, 
 " It is the unexpected that happens." 
 
 Such being the principal sources of revenue 
 that exist in the city of New York, and the 
 general purposes for which it is expended, so 
 far as the expenditure is prescribed by law, 
 it remains to inquire more particularly con- 
 cerning the manner in which a boss shall 
 appropriate so much of this revenue as he 
 requires. Since, as we have seen, he cannot 
 without great peril take money directly from 
 what I have called the open or legal sources, 
 his income must be derived either indirectly 
 from these sources, or else come wholly from 
 the secret revenues. As to these latter, it is 
 beyond question that they are very great, and 
 some of them may safely be appropriated by 
 a boss. Thus it frequently happens that rich 
 men desire to carry on some great work that 
 is not only for their own profit but also for 
 114 
 
the common good, but are deterred by the 
 clamor of the writers for the press, who find 
 favor with the populace, or think they do, 
 by affecting to be concerned for their welfare, 
 and by denouncing the rich as caring noth- 
 ing for justice and as governed wholly by 
 avarice and greed. But if the work be de- 
 sirable, it is wise and safe for a boss to pay no 
 regard to the venal yelping of these wretches, 
 for the opinions of the weightier and more 
 intelligent of the citizens are no more influ- 
 enced by it than the course of the moon by 
 the baying of hounds. 
 
 A boss may therefore with propriety en- 
 courage men of wealth and power to carry 
 out improvements, by signifying to his fol- 
 lowers that he desires no opposition. In this 
 way he becomes entitled to share in the prof- 
 its of the work, and justly, for without him 
 the folly of the people would have prevented 
 it altogether, as happened in the time of Com- 
 modore Vanderbilt. For he was disposed, and 
 he had both the power and the opportunity, 
 to provide such means of quick travel as were 
 needed by the people of the city ; but he was 
 so reviled by the writers for the press, or jour- 
 nalists as they are called, whom the people 
 115 
 
only applauded, that he became wroth, and 
 cursed both the people and the writers, and 
 declared that they might travel after such 
 manner as they could, for he would do noth- 
 ing for so vile a crew. No greater triumph 
 was ever won by scurrility posing as virtue ; 
 for the people of the city are to this day 
 suffering from the evils brought upon them 
 through their tolerating the licentiousness of 
 their journalists in this instance, nor is it yet 
 certain that they will ever get the means of 
 quick travel which they might have been en- 
 joying for many years. 
 
 By rendering such assistance to rich and 
 powerful men, a boss acquires a claim to their 
 gratitude, and may reasonably ask to be in- 
 formed of great enterprises at their very in- 
 ception, and to be allowed to participate in 
 them, whereby he may be enabled to take 
 advantage of changes in values, either of land 
 or of other forms of property. In like man- 
 ner he may be compensated for checking 
 legislation intended to damage men of wealth 
 and the enterprises in which they are en- 
 gaged, and also for communicating informa- 
 tion as to what will be his course in all these 
 matters. He may also share in the payments 
 ii6 
 
made by those who desire to violate laws 
 without being punished ; and there are cer- 
 tain other ways of secretly obtaining revenue. 
 I am far from saying that there is no dan- 
 ger attending the receipt of revenues of this 
 kind by a boss ; but the sums to be obtained 
 are very great, and moreover a boss has no 
 other resources whereby he can maintain him- 
 self. The dangers must therefore be faced ; 
 but it is important to understand their nature 
 in order to be prepared to guard against them. 
 The chief danger comes from the followers 
 of the boss, for it is apparent that in many 
 things he is obliged to act through them. 
 Accordingly, when he directs them either to 
 enact some law favorable to an enterprise, or 
 to arrest legislation unfavorable to particular 
 interests, they will at once understand that 
 he will be paid for what they do, and, unless 
 they are very well disciplined, or in some way 
 made content, they will complain and will be 
 disposed to revolt against him. On the other 
 hand, if he allows them to receive pay for re- 
 ducing assessments, or for procuring charters, 
 or for withdrawing proposed laws, or for hav- 
 ing the city make purchases of their favorites, 
 or for arranging to let them obtain contracts, 
 117 
 
the greatest possible evils will follow. The 
 very least of these will be that the boss will 
 receive but a small part of this revenue, while 
 his followers will keep the most of it. This 
 they can do, since the amount of it cannot be 
 known, and they will represent it to be less 
 than it really is, in order that they may sur- 
 render as Httle as possible. 
 
 A greater evil is that, as there is no system 
 in such tolls and exactions and commissions 
 when levied by a great number of persons, 
 they are after a time raised to such an extent 
 as to be intolerable, and the people first groan 
 under them and then rebel. For many per- 
 sons come to them and obtain money for 
 such purposes as I have described, when they 
 really have no power to do anything in return 
 for what is paid. This is called levying black- 
 mail, and those who pay it feel that they have 
 been robbed, and yet they dare not complain 
 for fear of exposing their own corruption. 
 The evil thus spreads throughout the whole 
 government of the city, and affects so many 
 that their discontent presently breaks all 
 bounds, and the boss is overwhelmed in the 
 ruin of the followers whose insolence he was 
 too weak or too indolent to restrain. 
 ii8 
 
As to the folly on the part of a boss of al- 
 lowing his followers to become arrogant and 
 to feel that they are able to maintain them- 
 selves without his aid, I have already said 
 enough, and there is nothing to be added to 
 the maxims of Aristotle. Therefore I do not 
 hesitate to declare that he will not very long 
 remain a boss who allows his followers to 
 plunder the citizens at their will, and to keep 
 the spoil for themselves ; for the citizens will 
 believe that the spoil goes to the boss, and 
 will be inflamed against him for his rapacity. 
 In this way he will suffer the consequences 
 of the misdeeds of others without receiving 
 any profit from them, and will lose both fame 
 and fortune. 
 
 It may perhaps be objected that it will be 
 impossible for a boss to rule unless he allows 
 his followers to levy blackmail ; for otherwise 
 he will be unable to remunerate them with 
 sufficient liberality to make them faithful. I 
 do not deny that the matter is one of great 
 difficulty, but it can never be admitted that 
 a boss is necessarily obliged to rule in such a 
 manner as to insure his own destruction. If 
 this were so, not only would this treatise be 
 futile, but most of what Aristotle and Ma- 
 119 
 
chiavelli wrote concerning tyrants and princes 
 must be rejected. Since we know that many 
 tyrants and princes have prospered, and as it is 
 apparent that they could not have prospered 
 had they held their followers in no restraint, 
 we may conclude that there is no impossibil- 
 ity, whatever may be the difficulty, in estab- 
 lishing upon a firm basis the rule of a boss in 
 the city of New York. 
 
 The impossibility imagined to exist has 
 arisen from the disregard of the principles 
 already laid down concerning the discipline 
 of the organization or machine. Owing to 
 this disregard, certain leaders have grown so 
 powerful as to be able to insist upon indem- 
 nity for the acts of their dependents in levy- 
 ing blackmail, and have undoubtedly appro- 
 priated to themselves a great amount of 
 plunder, and secretly, if not openly, defy the 
 boss to control their action. Unless these 
 leaders are reduced they will certainly over- 
 throw the boss, and they are only prevented 
 from attempting this by the fear of over- 
 throwing themselves. 
 
 I contend, therefore, that the proper system 
 for raising revenue requires that the petty 
 exactions of the followers of the boss should 
 
be suppressed, and that, so far as is possible, 
 all payments of secret or illegal revenue of 
 the kinds that I have described should be 
 directly controlled and regulated by him 
 alone. To a great extent he should receive 
 them himself, with the greatest secrecy, with- 
 out written evidence, and never in the pres- 
 ence of more than one person besides himself, 
 whether that person be his own confidential 
 agent or the representative of those who bar- 
 gain with him ; and it is also desirable that the 
 transaction should be spoken of, even when 
 consummated, as something different from 
 what it really is. 
 
 This principle, however, can be applied 
 only when a few persons and a few great in- 
 terests are involved. Where a great number 
 desire to violate the laws, as happens in the 
 case of the sellers of drink, it is not only im- 
 practicable, but also undignified, and even 
 dangerous, for a boss to conduct the negotia- 
 tions in person, and resort must be had to 
 methods that require the most careful con- 
 sideration, to which I shall now proceed. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 OF THE REVENUE FROM POLITICAL CON- 
 TRIBUTIONS. 
 
 It may be thought that a boss who re- 
 garded the principles laid down in the last 
 chapter would find his income and power 
 diminished rather than increased ; for he must 
 rule by the aid of the politicians, and I have 
 shown that they must be deprived of the 
 opportunity to levy contributions for them- 
 selves. To this I reply that it is not only 
 unwise to allow any of them to receive large 
 sums in this way, but also unnecessary. It is 
 unwise for the reason already given, because 
 if they are able to enrich themselves by plun- 
 dering the people after this fashion, they are 
 sure to become insolent and mutinous. It is 
 unnecessary, because it is entirely possible for 
 a boss to make such provision in other ways 
 for his followers as will keep them devoted to 
 his interest. They may be at first discon- 
 
tented, but when they find that they must 
 choose between receiving such pay as the 
 boss allows them, and having nothing at all, 
 they will presently yield. 
 
 In this the overwhelming advantages to a 
 boss of having a well- disciplined organization 
 become apparent ; for it is possible to collect 
 a very great revenue in the form of contribu- 
 tions to his organization, and a boss may re- 
 tain out of this an ample sum for his own use, 
 and still leave sufficient for the maintenance 
 of his forces. Moreover there is nothing ille- 
 gal in such contributions, since it is impossi- 
 ble to forbid citizens to give money for the 
 expenses attendant upon elections, and it is 
 no less impossible to inquire effectively into 
 the motives of their contributions, or into the 
 disposition that is made of them. Hence a 
 boss may require a faithful account to be 
 kept for him of all that is received by the 
 organization, while he is accountable to no 
 one for its expenditure. Indeed should any of 
 his followers presume to demand an account 
 of a boss, no punishment can be too quick or 
 too severe for him. Such a demand can 
 have but one purpose, and, as nothing is more 
 alarming than that any one should venture to 
 123 
 
make it, a boss should instantly drop every 
 other affair and devote his whole energy to 
 crushing all those that have given the slight- 
 est countenance to the movement, and should 
 even discipline those that have not actively 
 opposed it ; letting it be know^n that he deems 
 it high treason for any of his followers to as- 
 sume to inquire into the amount of his rev- 
 enue, or the manner in which it is procured. 
 These contributions to the machine have 
 two main sources. They are paid either by 
 those already possessing or expecting to ob- 
 tain offices, or by those who desire or receive 
 favors through the special action or inaction 
 of the government. As to the first class, the 
 fundamental principle is perfectly simple. The 
 salaries of the offices of government should 
 almost invariably be fixed at a higher rate 
 than what would be paid for equal service by 
 private employers. It is impossible to over- 
 estimate the importance of this principle, and 
 so long as a boss can maintain it he may 
 laugh at all the machinations of those who 
 call themselves reformers of the civil service. 
 For nothing is more certain than that when 
 a higher price is to be paid for anything or 
 any service than what it is currently worth, 
 124 
 
there will be such a desire to obtain this addi- 
 tional profit as to multiply the competitors ; 
 and it is also evident that whoever desires to 
 obtain a profit of this kind, which he has done 
 nothing to deserve above others, is not of a 
 character to stick at making some payment 
 for it. 
 
 Some difficulty, it is true, may from time 
 to time be occasioned by laws prohibiting 
 such payments ; but there are many ways in 
 which such laws are evaded. It is therefore 
 only necessary for a boss to leave in the pos- 
 session of the holders of office such a part of 
 their salaries as shall be somewhat more than 
 their services are worth in the market, and 
 all the rest he may require to be paid to the 
 organization ; for, although the office-holders 
 will bewail their assessments, they will think 
 it better to pay them, since even then they 
 will receive more for their services than they 
 could elsewhere obtain. 
 
 In order to comply with the laws, such 
 payments must always be spoken of as vol- 
 untary ; but if any one should choose not to 
 pay what is customary, he must, upon some 
 pretext or other, be deprived of his office as 
 quickly as possible ; nor, in spite of laws in- 
 125 
 
tended to prevent this, will it be generally 
 very difficult to bring it about, provided the 
 fundamental principle above stated be ob- 
 served. Those best fitted to judge estimate 
 that the sums paid for service of all kinds by 
 the government of the city of New York are 
 not less than twofold what private employ- 
 ers would pay for the same or better service. 
 Hence a revenue of several millions of dollars 
 ought to be produced by a wise and equitable 
 system of assessments, all of which should be 
 strictly accounted for to the boss, and dis- 
 bursed by him without rendering any account 
 to any person. But he should be constantly 
 upon his guard against attempts by his sub- 
 ordinates to increase these assessments se- 
 cretly for their own use ; for if this practice 
 comes to prevail, the exactions will shortly be 
 so great as to leave less to the office-holders 
 than their services are really worth, and, like 
 all overtaxed people, they will be ready to 
 rebel. It will, moreover, strengthen a boss 
 with the mass of his followers if they know 
 that they can appeal successfully to him 
 against the oppression of their immediate 
 superiors. 
 
 A second principle is of almost equal im- 
 126 
 
portance, viz., that the number of offices 
 should be as great as possible. The policy 
 of this is too evident to need explanation ; for 
 in this way both the forces and the revenue 
 of a boss are increased, and, since the office- 
 holders are taken from the citizens, the num- 
 ber of those who may be interested to over- 
 throw him is diminished. The countries of 
 France and Italy both show the operation of 
 this policy. The taxes are so great in France 
 that those who have property find it difficult 
 to support the burden, and in Italy it has ap- 
 parently become impossible ; yet in neither 
 case can the load be reduced, because this 
 can be done only by reducing the number of 
 office-holders. But their number is now so 
 great "that with the aid of their friends and 
 dependents they can menace the government 
 and defeat all attempts at saving in this way. 
 Whatever change takes place in the parties, 
 therefore, no reduction of expenditure fol- 
 lows. But of the application of this policy 
 in the city of New York I shall speak more 
 fully hereafter. 
 
 I have already given reasons why a boss 
 should rule his force rather through a large 
 number of officers, each commanding a small 
 127 
 
number of men, than through a small number 
 of generals, each commanding an army of his 
 own. This poHcy should be consistently ap- 
 plied in the case of salaries. It will be far more 
 advantageous to a boss to give places to fifty 
 men at salaries of two thousand dollars each, 
 than to give one man a place where he may 
 receive a hundred thousand dollars, even 
 though he may contribute a greater sum by 
 way of assessment than the fifty. For there 
 can be no question that an office of which the 
 emoluments are so great has generally its own 
 system of levying contributions, and has a 
 great patronage, neither of which things is it 
 for the interest of a boss to tolerate. 
 
 Let him therefore look to it that the emol- 
 uments of such offices are diminished, and 
 that the appointments are not made by one 
 man from his own followers, but are distrib- 
 uted throughout the city according to the 
 number of faithful voters. It is a capital mis- 
 take for a boss to allow a man having a 
 large personal following to hold such an 
 office as that of the clerk, or the sheriff, or 
 the register, or the commissioner of public 
 works, or even to be a police or fire commis- 
 sioner. For every such man is apt to think 
 128 
 
that he may rise to be a boss, and will sur- 
 round himself with those who are devoted to 
 him. If such men are allowed to hold these 
 ofifices at all, it must be upon their promise 
 to appoint only such subordinates as are ap- 
 proved by the boss. In this way they will 
 be weakened, for their followers will quickly 
 lose faith in them. But it is better to keep 
 such men out of those ofifices where there 
 are many appointments to be made, or much 
 patronage to distribute, and, if necessary, to 
 give them places where the salaries are high 
 but the appointments few ; or even to placate 
 them with gifts of money from the revenue of 
 the organization, or with desirable contracts. 
 Such are the general rules to be followed 
 concerning ofifices and salaries ; but of some 
 exceptional cases, and of payments for favors 
 received from government, it remains still to 
 speak. 
 
 I2g 
 
CHAPTER XX. 
 
 OF SOME THINGS THAT HINDER AND SOME 
 
 THAT AID A BOSS IN SECURING 
 
 REVENUE. 
 
 To resume what I have just been saying, 
 the aim of every boss should be to make all 
 the holders of office feel their immediate de- 
 pendence upon him, not only for their posi- 
 tions, but also for the amount of their sala- 
 ries. The greatest obstacle encountered in 
 bringing this about is the law, which fixes 
 the terms of all important offices, and also 
 the pay attached to them. The law may be 
 evaded, however, if the boss can prevent 
 those from getting office who will not prom- 
 ise beforehand to resign whenever he wishes 
 it and to pay proper assessments. Yet this is 
 only practicable with men who, after they 
 have obtained a benefit, will do what they 
 promised in order to obtain it, and such men 
 130 
 
are few. Hence it is of the greatest impor- 
 tance to a boss that the term of office fixed 
 by law should be as short as possible; for 
 then those who get office will keep their 
 promises, fearing that if they do not they 
 will be presently displaced and reduced to 
 poverty. In many cases, also, it is possible 
 to require the payment of assessments in ad- 
 vance, especially where the power of a boss 
 is so great that whosoever he permits to be 
 nominated by the organization is certain to 
 be elected. 
 
 So far as most of the offices in the city of 
 New York are concerned, the term is suf- 
 ficiently short ; but an important exception is 
 found in the case of the higher judges, whose 
 term was made fourteen years, after the 
 downfall of Boss Tweed, for the very purpose 
 of thwarting all future bosses. Undoubtedly 
 this has succeeded to a certain extent, for 
 the boss has not always been able to prevent 
 the election of judges who refused to obey 
 his orders, thinking a term of fourteen years 
 sufficient, and likely to be, indeed, longer than 
 the reign of a boss. This mischief, however, 
 has been fortunately reduced a good deal by 
 means of the very great salaries received by 
 131 
 
these judges. For if we consider the cer- 
 tainty of payment, and the short hours and 
 the long vacations of the courts, and the 
 honor and power of the position, these sala- 
 ries are far beyond what the lawyers — except 
 perhaps one in a hundred — can earn by the 
 practice of their profession. Indeed one of 
 the wisest of these judges declared that there 
 was not one man upon the bench in the city 
 of New York who could earn the amount of 
 his salary if he were off it. Hence there is 
 never any difficulty in finding men of suf- 
 ficient ability for the places who are ready, 
 for the sake of winning such rich prizes, to 
 make the promises required by the boss. 
 
 Thus the event is happy ; for if the salaries 
 of the judges were one half what they now 
 are, a boss could not find men of sufficient 
 ability to discharge the duties of the office, 
 who would pay assessments or make any 
 promises, and he would thus altogether lose 
 control of the judiciary, which might be fatal 
 to his power. But it is evident that men 
 who will pay assessments for the sake of ob- 
 taining these positions are not of a character 
 to be dreaded by a boss ; for if they yield to 
 one temptation they will to another. Yet, 
 132 
 
after having paid their assessments in advance, 
 and being firmly established in office, they 
 may assume too great independence, and it 
 is accordingly desirable that the most servile 
 characters be selected, and that the promises 
 they make to secure their places shall be writ- 
 ten or witnessed, so that they can be publicly 
 proved against them. If this is done the fear 
 of exposure will render them tractable. Even 
 with this precaution trouble will arise from 
 time to time, and it is a fortunate thing for the 
 boss that there are few offices whereof the 
 term is so long. As to the lower judges, 
 there has never been any difficulty encoun- 
 tered by him in keeping them in perfect sub- 
 jection, since he can name them himself. 
 
 Regarding the other principal offices, there 
 is little to be added to the advice of Aristotle, 
 who remarks that it is wise not to make one 
 person too great, but if any, then more than 
 one ; for they will act as guards upon one an- 
 other. But if it is necessary to intrust large 
 powers to one person, then a boss should take 
 care that he be not one of an ardent disposi- 
 tion ; for such a temperament is upon every 
 opportunity readiest to rebel. And if it 
 should seem necessary to deprive any one 
 133 
 
of his power, it is well to do it by degrees, 
 and not to reduce him all at once. 
 
 Concerning those who clamor for what they 
 call the reform of the civil service, while their 
 designs are full of danger for bosses, and 
 would result in their overthrow were they to 
 be carried out, it does not appear that there 
 is at present much reason for apprehension. 
 For, in the first place, they demand that none 
 shall hold certain offices who have not under- 
 gone examination as to their fitness ; thinking 
 that in this way they may prevent the boss 
 from selecting those whom he favors. But 
 unless they can deprive him of the power to 
 say who the examiners shall be, they can do 
 little more than put him to some inconveni- 
 ence, while at the same time they give him 
 the additional offices of the examiners to fill. 
 Hence unless they can control the govern- 
 ment altogether, they cannot take this power 
 from a boss, and it will be politic for him to 
 multiply the number of these examiners as 
 much as possible, and especially to have large 
 salaries attached to the places, but to be 
 careful to fill them with men who are weak 
 but of good reputation. In the second place, 
 these reformers insist that no one shall be dis- 
 134 
 
placed from any office after he once secures 
 it, except for malfeasance. Now so long as 
 the pay of these offices is more than is given 
 by other employers, and the work less than 
 they require, the envy of mankind will never 
 permit those who are so fortunate as to obtain 
 these places to hold them in peace. Hence 
 the office-holders will be disposed to pay the 
 proper assessments to the boss, fearing that 
 otherwise he may find some way of displac- 
 ing them ; which, indeed, he can generally 
 contrive to do. 
 
 On the other hand, should a boss suffer a 
 temporary defeat, the reformers will have tied 
 their own hands, so that they cannot remove 
 his followers and replace them with their own 
 favorites. Should they attempt this, every 
 one would cry out against their inconsistency, 
 and since they have little in the way of re- 
 ward to promise their followers they are not 
 likely to have a great number. Accordingly, 
 as I say, it does not seem that the boss need 
 stand in present dread of these reformers; 
 but should they once turn their attention to 
 reducing the number of offices and the amount 
 of the salaries, and to making the heads of 
 departments responsible for the performance 
 135 
 
of a proper amount of work by their subor- 
 dinates, as they seem now to be doing in the 
 city of Brooklyn, then they would indeed be- 
 come formidable. This, however, is not very 
 likely to take place, for the reason which I 
 shall next state. 
 
 For whatever clouds may seem now to 
 overhang the pathway of a boss, a brilliant 
 and glorious light is cast upon his future ca- 
 reer by the increase of those who are called 
 socialists. These people differ greatly among 
 themselves concerning many of their doc- 
 trines, and the length to which they would 
 carry them ; but they all agree in this, that gov- 
 ernments should hereafter undertake many 
 more things than at present. Some hold that 
 the government of a city should furnish the 
 citizens with light, and with communication 
 by the telegi^aph and telephone, and should 
 manage all the means of transportation ; and 
 some add many other things. They enter- 
 tain these opinions, they say, because they 
 detest all monopoly as injustice, and as these 
 things are now monopolies, they should be 
 conducted so that the gain from them should 
 go to the public and not to a few private 
 citizens. 
 
 136 
 
Some of them, it is true, consider land to 
 be the only subject of monopoly, and reason 
 that if the rent of land is confiscated or highly 
 taxed, justice will be attained. But there is 
 an increasing number who behold what they 
 term natural monopolies everywhere, and 
 whatever business can be monopolized they 
 wish the government to monopolize. Such 
 are the views of many of those who profess 
 to teach the science called political economy, 
 who are known among themselves as econo- 
 mists. Moreover, by reason of their regard- 
 ing the present institutions as unjust to the 
 poor, they generally favor the payment by 
 government of higher wages to those whom 
 it employs than they can earn elsewhere, and 
 desire it to undertake all manner of public 
 works. 
 
 Certainly a boss must be of a dull and sor- 
 did nature that would not look with delight 
 upon the rapid increase of these people, and 
 encourage them by every means in his power. 
 For what does he himself desire but to in- 
 crease the number of offices, and to pay more 
 for services than they are currently worth, 
 and to have the government undertake all 
 manner of public works? Whatever these 
 137 
 
reformers of society may aim at, they are 
 evidently the best of allies for a boss; for 
 they labor to increase his power of their own 
 free will, and he need pay them nothing; 
 whereas his own followers require to be paid. 
 Nevertheless, since those who are greatly oc- 
 cupied in condemning the injustice of others 
 are often negligent concerning their own vir- 
 tue, a boss should endeavor to enlist secretly 
 in his service some of the leaders of these 
 people by gifts of office or other favors, as in 
 this way he may secure many votes at sma-ll 
 expense. 
 
 Some of the economists, also, may be won 
 over by being flattered with appointments to 
 positions of dignity, and other favors; pro- 
 vided the boss does not appear to court them 
 too openly. For these persons generally seek 
 to obtain a knowledge of political affairs by 
 studying at the universities of other countries, 
 and by reading books upon government that 
 teach nothing concerning bosses or machines, 
 but describe only the apparent rulers, such 
 as mayors and governors and other elected 
 officers — as if it were possible for these offi- 
 cers to be nominated without any political 
 organization or machinery. And studying 
 138 
 
books that treat of the administration of the 
 affairs of cities where the populace has httle 
 voice in matters of taxation and expenditure, 
 they consider that they know all that is to be 
 known, and are thus easily reached through 
 their vanity. Nor is it surprising that they 
 should gladly see the government undertak- 
 ing many new things, since they suppose that 
 they shall reconstitute it as they desire, and 
 that they and their disciples will then be in 
 control ; although they never consider in what 
 manner the control is to be obtained. 
 
 It is doubtless true that men of this kind 
 have not many followers among the wise, and 
 are especially ridiculed by those who have 
 experience of the manner in which human 
 affairs are carried on; but they have not a 
 little influence among the class from which 
 reformers are generally drawn, and through 
 their position they are enabled to impart their 
 views to the young men that study at the 
 universities. Hence if it were necessary to 
 hire them to teach that there should be more 
 offices and public works, to do so would be 
 for the interest of a boss ; but now they do 
 this of their own accord. Since we have 
 seen that the only reformers to be dreaded 
 139 
 
by a boss are those who would reduce the 
 expenses of government and the number of 
 the ofiSce-holders, it is a fortunate thing that 
 these reformers should be opposed by those 
 from whom they might reasonably expect 
 support; otherwise the security of bosses 
 might have been already disturbed. But so 
 long as the socialists have their present influ- 
 ence it will not be necessary for a boss to 
 take any open part in urging measures for 
 increasing his patronage. Like Julius Csesar, 
 he may affect modesty and coyness in depre- 
 cating the enlargement of his responsibilities, 
 while the ignorance and folly of the citizens 
 furnish him with ample opportunities for in- 
 creasing his power. 
 
 140 
 
CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF FAVORS TO 
 BE OBTAINED FROM THE GOVERNMENT, 
 AND THE PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED 
 IN SECURING REVENUE FROM THOSE 
 WHO OBTAIN THEM. 
 
 In addition to appointments to office, favors 
 that may be obtained from the government, 
 and are therefore controlled by a boss, are of 
 two kinds. Of the first class are positive 
 favors, or such as bring an actual gain or 
 profit to those who receive them. The sec- 
 ond class comprises what I call negative fa- 
 vors, which consist generally in relief from 
 losses or penalties inflicted by the govern- 
 ment or its officers. To consider the matter 
 in detail, we see that positive favors may be 
 dispensed in the awarding of contracts in 
 such a manner that certain men may obtain 
 them, although their bids are higher than 
 would be made by others if there were no 
 141 
 
favor in the competition. Similar favors are 
 possible in the purchase of supplies, and in 
 the letting or selling of property belonging 
 to the city. In like manner profit may often 
 be made by those who receive early know- 
 ledge of what is to be done in the way of pub- 
 he works and improvements and in various 
 legal proceedings. 
 
 Favors may also be shown by the officers 
 of the city in making weak defenses to actions 
 and suits, and in acquiescing in the assess- 
 ment of excessive damages in proceedings for 
 the condemnation of lands for public uses. 
 Also in what is called patronage, or the ap- 
 pointment to positions where the period of 
 service and the emoluments are not prescribed 
 by statute, there is much opportunity for the 
 judicious distribution of favors, and this, too, 
 among citizens of honorable reputation. Even 
 in cases where the compensation is limited to 
 a small sum by law, it has become the prac- 
 tice to exact more ; and by inducing such 
 citizens to accept these illegal fees, a boss 
 may bring them insensibly to look upon his 
 government with friendliness. By this means 
 he may comply with the advice of Aristotle, 
 when he says that a tyrant should show such 
 142 
 
respect to men of merit in any line that they 
 shall not think they could be more honored if 
 their fellow-citizens were members of a free 
 state ; and that he should let it be understood 
 by those who receive such honors that they 
 come from himself. 
 
 Concerning favors of this kind I have al- 
 ready spoken, and need add only the general 
 maxim that whenever any exceptional gain 
 or profit is derived from the government, the 
 amount received beyond what the service is 
 worth, or the excess of gain over what could 
 be obtained without favor, constitutes a fund 
 from which contributions are to be made for 
 the use of the boss or his followers. The 
 danger of these contributions I have suffi- 
 ciently explained ; let the boss, therefore, if 
 he cannot retain the control of them in his 
 own hands, at least see that he is informed 
 of their amount and that they are kept within 
 narrow bounds, so as not to become a public 
 scandal. 
 
 The revenue to be derived from what I 
 have called negative favors is not only much 
 greater than what is to be obtained from all 
 other sources, but it is also infinitely safer. 
 The cause for this I shall presently state; but 
 143 
 
I will first consider some of the lesser forms 
 of this revenue, to which many objections 
 exist. It is to be observed, in the first place, 
 that the officers of the government, and espe- 
 cially the police, may exact payments from 
 those who have violated no law whatever, 
 merely because their position enables them 
 both to inflict injury or annoyance and to 
 refuse protection. Thus shopkeepers will 
 pay something to the policeman that guards 
 their region, rather than feel that he is ill 
 disposed and may not exert himself to de- 
 fend their property against robbers and other 
 mischievous persons ; just as men not only 
 pay the keeper of an inn for their entertain- 
 ment, but also pay his servants in order to 
 obtain proper attendance. 
 
 But it is evident, on the one hand, that no 
 revenue of this kind is likely to reach the 
 boss, for it is too petty for him to be con- 
 cerned with ; and, on the other hand, if these 
 exactions are allowed, they may become so 
 outrageous and intolerable to the citizens as 
 to make them discontented and rebellious. 
 For some policemen in this way obtain from 
 the merchants of their precincts gifts of cloth- 
 ing sufficient for their families, besides food 
 144 
 
and drink and other provisions ; even the old 
 women that sell nuts and apples at the street 
 corners contributing of their stock. Such offi- 
 cers are, indeed, nearly supported by means 
 of these presents, and they have their pay in 
 addition. It is altogether for the interest of 
 a boss to check with severity such practices 
 as these, for in spite of all he can do they will 
 prevail to a certain extent, and the revenue 
 derived from them, either for himself or for 
 the organization, is insignificant. If needful, 
 let the salaries of the policemen be increased, 
 so that they may be able to pay their assess- 
 ments without inconvenience ; but let them 
 by all means be restrained from adding to 
 their salaries by these methods. It is a car- 
 dinal maxim, for a boss as well as for all 
 rulers, that revenue should be obtained with 
 the least possible vexation of those who fur- 
 nish it. 
 
 Of nearly the same character, and ex- 
 posed to many of the same objections, is the 
 revenue derived by the threat of loss or pen- 
 alty on account of pretended or merely tech- 
 nical and trivial violations of laws and ordi- 
 nances. For most citizens know little of the 
 provisions of the laws relating to the govern- 
 145 
 
ment of the city, and even less of the ordi- 
 nances. The number of these regulations is 
 countless, and the lawyers themselves can- 
 not tell what they are without much study. 
 Hence it happens every day that citizens 
 violate some rule of conduct or other, and if 
 those in authority are rapacious or ill disposed 
 toward such citizens, they are exposed to 
 frequent fines and arrests. Moreover there 
 are many laws giving great and arbitrary 
 powers to inspectors, whether of the con- 
 struction of buildings, or of food, and many 
 other things, and in all these cases the dis- 
 cretion of the inspector is made final by the 
 law, and whatever he orders to be done must 
 be done. It is easy for him, therefore, to re- 
 lieve those whom he favors from compliance 
 with the requirements of the law, or to insist 
 that expensive changes must be made in 
 buildings, or to let it be understood that if 
 he is not propitiated such changes will be 
 required. 
 
 Now so far as these laws are used to bring 
 citizens into the organization, by making 
 them understand that the payment of a mod- 
 erate assessment will exempt them from an- 
 noyance and expense at the hands of inspec- 
 146 
 
tors, they may be politic ; yet practices of this 
 sort cause so much indignation among men 
 of honor that even this is not certain. But 
 so far as the inspectors appropriate what 
 they exact to their own use, their conduct 
 is altogether prejudicial to the power of the 
 boss. 
 
 147 
 
CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH REVENUE 
 
 IS TO BE OBTAINED BY MEANS 
 
 OF NEGATIVE FAVORS. 
 
 The revenue derived from the condonation 
 of real violations of well-known laws is, upon 
 all accounts, the most important to a boss. 
 Speaking within bounds, this revenue is ab- 
 solutely necessary to the existence of his 
 power, and the art of cultivating it is for him 
 the most essential of all arts. Concerning 
 the nature of laws and justice this is not the 
 place to discourse at length, but it is apparent 
 that the laws enacted by our legislators are 
 frequently nothing more tharr the wishes of a 
 few men, or perhaps even of one man, craftily 
 arranged and formulated so as to secure the 
 force of the government as a sanction, and its 
 aid in imposing these wishes as laws upon the 
 citizens. In the language of most of those 
 who write upon these matters, the enactment 
 148 
 
of such laws by the legislators is called the 
 expression of the will of the people ; but in 
 truth the people are generally ignorant of the 
 laws that are passed, and, if they knew what 
 they were, would frequently reject them. It 
 is evident, therefore, that many laws now in 
 force are unjust laws ; by which I mean that 
 they are thought unjust by a great portion 
 of the people, who will disobey them without 
 feeling guilty of sin, or at least will look upon 
 those who disobey them with little disappro- 
 bation. Accordingly I divide all laws into 
 those that are just and those that are unjust; 
 calling those just which are approved by all, 
 or nearly all, and those unjust which are 
 thought so by large numbers. 
 
 Concerning just laws, it is only necessary to 
 say that it is always unwise and unsafe for a 
 boss to exempt from punishment those who 
 violate them, or at least to allow this to be 
 done openly, no matter how great offers of 
 money may be made to secure immunity. 
 For by such condonation the whole people 
 will be enraged, and if it often occurs, they 
 will infallibly rise and overthrow those who 
 permit such abuses. This appears clearly 
 enough from what happened to Boss Tweed. 
 149 
 
The people endured many oppressions pa- 
 tiently under his rule, until they saw that his 
 favorites were allowed to violate just laws 
 with impunity, when they could be controlled 
 no longer ; and they not only drove out the 
 boss, but nearly destroyed the organization 
 also. Let a boss, therefore, neither attempt 
 himself to secure revenue from this source, 
 nor allow others to do so; and if it seem 
 necessary at times to protect some favorite, 
 let this be accomplished secretly through the 
 delays and measures provided by the laws 
 and the courts for the nullification of their 
 own action, which will generally provide 
 sufficient means of escape. 
 
 It is quite otherwise with unjust laws. 
 There are some, it is true, that maintain that 
 it is just for a citizen to obey an unjust law; 
 but even these will admit that if the law is 
 outrageously unjust it may be a greater sin 
 to obey than to disobey it. But the greater 
 part of mankind consider less whether an act 
 is legal than whether it is right ; and if they 
 are not condemned by their own consciences 
 or by the judgment of their neighbors, they 
 care little for the condemnation of the law. 
 Such men will therefore not hesitate to pay 
 150 
 
money rather than suffer penalties for doing 
 what they do not think wrong; and most of 
 the citizens will think it so outrageous to in- 
 flict punishment in such cases that they will 
 be pleased if the officers charged with the 
 enforcement of the law wink at its violation. 
 Herein, therefore, lies the greatest of all op- 
 portunities for a boss. 
 
 This subject is well explained by the wise 
 philosopher, Adam Smith, in his treatise of 
 the " Wealth of Nations." After reciting the 
 laws devised for the protection of the makers 
 of woolen goods in England (which provided 
 that whoever carried a sheep out of the king- 
 dom should forfeit all his goods and have his 
 left hand cut off and suffer a year's imprison- 
 ment, and if he repeated the act should be 
 put to death), and some later statutes of like 
 spirit, he remarks that the morals of the peo- 
 ple were not so corrupt as those of the con- 
 trivers of such laws. And concerning exces- 
 sive taxes upon foreign goods brought into 
 the country, he says that few people have 
 any scruple about receiving smuggled goods ; 
 and indeed that to have any such scruples 
 (though to receive such goods is a manifest 
 encouragement to this violation of the rev- 
 151 
 
enue laws, and to the perjury which almost 
 always attends it) would in most countries be 
 regarded as one of those pedantic pieces of 
 hypocrisy which, instead of gaining credit with 
 anybody, serve only to expose the person 
 who affects to practise them to the suspicion 
 of being a greater knave than most of his 
 neighbors. Accordingly he says of the smug- 
 gler that by this indulgence of the public he 
 is often encouraged to continue a trade which 
 he is thus taught to consider as in some 
 measure innocent; and that although he is 
 no doubt highly blamable for violating the 
 laws of his country, he is frequently incapable 
 of violating those of natural justice, and would 
 have been in every respect an excellent citi- 
 zen had not the laws of his country made 
 that a crime which nature never meant to 
 be so. 
 
 Can there be any doubt as to the policy of 
 a boss toward such laws? If he were to 
 contrive with all the ingenuity with which 
 he is endowed, and with the aid of all the 
 philosophers that have ever written, he could 
 never invent any system more exactly adapted 
 to his purposes and requirements than this 
 which others have constructed for him. For 
 152 
 
the desire of a boss is to raise a revenue with- 
 out authority of law, in order that he may 
 not have to render any account concerning 
 it, and to do this without causing the people 
 to complain. Hence if he use his power to 
 shield them from unjust laws, they will natu- 
 rally feel grateful to him, and will gladly pay 
 him any reasonable sum for such protection. 
 
 A boss ought therefore to encourage the 
 passage of such laws, if he can do so without 
 being known, although openly appearing to 
 oppose them ; and when they are enacted he 
 should let it be understood that they will not 
 be enforced against those citizens who con- 
 tribute to the organization. This, of course, 
 is not to be proclaimed openly, for a boss 
 ought always to pretend to be desirous of 
 carrying out the laws, but it can be made 
 generally known without difficulty. But those 
 who think that they may violate the law with- 
 out making such contributions must be taught 
 that this is not to be done with impunity. 
 Nor is there any danger that they will com- 
 plain loudly, no matter how much they may 
 be aggrieved ; for they will dread prosecution 
 by the officers of the law, and in any case 
 they make but a sorry figure when they call 
 153 
 
upon the public for sympathy, since they ad- 
 mit that they are law-breakers, complaining 
 only because they are punished more severely 
 than others who commit the same offenses. 
 
 Were a boss to have the power to frame 
 such an unjust law as would be most pro- 
 ductive of revenue, and at the same time one 
 of which the lax enforcement would be most 
 popular, he would naturally select for prohi- 
 bition such acts as are performed by a large 
 number of the citizens so habitually that they 
 seem necessary to them, and a part of their 
 ordinary life, and therefore altogether proper 
 and right. For it is evident that they will 
 not cease these acts because the legislators 
 have declared they shall, and they will there- 
 fore fly to the boss for protection. As it 
 would be odious to the last degree for him 
 to propose such a law, it must be regarded 
 as extremely fortunate for him that certain 
 of the citizens have voluntarily taken this 
 burden upon their own shoulders, in procur- 
 ing the enactment of statutes intended to pre- 
 vent the drinking of fermented and distilled 
 liquors. Some of these people are sincere, 
 and, thinking these Hquors to be poisonous, 
 refrain from drinking them themselves, as 
 154 
 
well as endeavor to restrain others. But 
 most of them are not sincere, but are guilty 
 of the hypocrisy described by Adam Smith ; 
 for they drink these liquors every day in their 
 own houses and at their own clubs, while 
 they try to forbid others from drinking them, 
 either altogether or at least upon the first day 
 of the week, called Sunday ; and frequently 
 they obtain laws intended to prevent poor 
 men from obtaining these drinks, but not the 
 rich. 
 
 Even when the laws that they procure do 
 not altogether prohibit the poor from obtain- 
 ing such drinks, they impose excessive taxes 
 upon those that supply them, as if they were 
 determined that the poor should obtain their 
 drink only at a very great price and of bad 
 quality ; for the taxes are made so high that 
 the dealers must needs buy what is cheap 
 and therefore generally bad. In this way, 
 by depriving the common people of sound 
 and wholesome liquors upon the pretense 
 that they are poisonous, they force them to 
 content themselves with what is really poison- 
 ous. So, to prohibit the people from such 
 recreation upon their weekly holiday as they 
 are accustomed to is an unjust law, to be 
 155 
 
welcomed by a boss, but not to so great an 
 extent ; for it is much more difficult to allow 
 such a law to be violated without arousing 
 public outcry ; neither can so great a revenue 
 be derived from permitting its violation. 
 
 There are other laws thought unjust by 
 small numbers of the citizens ; but the gen- 
 eral principle is that the best law for the 
 purposes of a boss is that which is thought 
 unjust by the greatest number, and which 
 prohibits acts which they desire to perform 
 most frequently. Upon every account, there- 
 fore, the laws that prohibit citizens from sell- 
 ing or giving liquors to one another, either at 
 all times or upon particular days, such as 
 Sundays and other holidays, are to be fa- 
 vored by a boss. If he cannot procure the 
 passage of such laws, then he should favor 
 such as make it difficult to engage in this 
 traffic, either by taxes or by refusal of license 
 to all except a few. The best law is that 
 which altogether prohibits the traffic, and the 
 next best is that which makes permission to 
 engage in it a matter of favor, or of payment 
 of heavy fees. For in this way a monopoly 
 is established in the hands of a few, and be- 
 cause they feel that they are unjustly treated 
 156 
 
and persecuted by the government, they will 
 combine to defend themselves, and will con- 
 tribute liberally in their own defense and to 
 prevent the competition of those who do not 
 pay equal contributions. 
 
 It may seem strange, since the greater part 
 of the inhabitants of New York are in the 
 habit of daily drinking fermented and distilled 
 liquors, and think it no sin, that such laws 
 should prevail. This is because these laws 
 have been enacted by the legislature of the 
 state and not by the people of the city ; and 
 indeed they have been passed in defiance of 
 their wishes. For the Irish in their wretched 
 estate in their native land, as I have already 
 pointed out, have had scarce any pleasure 
 but the drinking of whisky, of which, on ac- 
 count of their poverty and the severity of 
 the excise, they could get but little. But 
 when they come to this country they find 
 that whisky is more cheaply obtained, and, as 
 they expect greater freedom here, they are 
 enraged when the law threatens to deprive 
 them of liquor altogether. The Germans 
 also are equally exasperated, for they are 
 used in the evening and upon Sundays, in 
 their own country, all to go, both priest and 
 157 
 
people, men and women and children, to gar- 
 dens and halls where they drink beer and 
 listen to music and look at plays ; and they 
 think it is not wrong but right to do so. As 
 they do not believe what is right upon that 
 side of the ocean to become wrong when 
 they cross to this, and as their chief enjoy- 
 ments are drinking beer and hearing music, 
 they are outraged by our sumptuary laws, 
 and were it not for their habits of submission 
 they would openly rebel against them. 
 
 Accordingly both the Germans and the 
 Irish will loyally support a boss, unless his 
 government is very oppressive, provided he 
 will alleviate the severity of the excise, so 
 that those who do not wish to fast may not 
 be compelled to do so by those who are able 
 to escape the necessity. Both of these peo- 
 ples will therefore adhere to the organization 
 and contribute freely, so long as the boss pro- 
 cures them relief; especially those among 
 them who make the sale of liquors their busi- 
 ness. But the boss must look to it that they 
 are not called upon for other than the regular 
 contributions, for if the policemen and other 
 retainers are permitted to levy blackmail, 
 great discontent will arise. But if he is care- 
 158 
 
ful in this matter, he need not be anxious 
 about his rule so long as the legislature of 
 the state imposes laws of this kind upon the 
 inhabitants of the city of New York. 
 
 The best friends of the boss, therefore, are 
 those who denounce most furiously the buy- 
 ers and sellers of drink ; for these dealers are 
 naturally angry at the foul language with 
 which they are assailed, and they are appre- 
 hensive of the greatest injustice should their 
 assailants obtain the power. Hence they 
 combine for self-defense, and place their 
 whole force, which is very great, at the ser- 
 vice of the boss, looking to him as their only 
 refuge. But if they were justly treated, they 
 would cease to contribute to the organiza- 
 tion, and would be indifferent to what hap- 
 pened to the boss ; nor is it probable that he 
 could maintain his power without their assis- 
 tance. It is therefore every way to his in- 
 terest to have them continually assailed, in 
 order that they may remain steadfast in their 
 allegiance to him. 
 
 159 
 
CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 OF THE REVENUE TO BE DERIVED FROM 
 CORPORATIONS. 
 
 The plan of this treatise does not permit 
 me to enter into minute details, or to discuss 
 the application of general rules to particular 
 cases. There is one subject, however, of so 
 great consequence, by reason of the magni- 
 tude of the revenues affected, that it would 
 be unwise to pass it by. The law concerning 
 those who associate themselves in any enter- 
 prise provides that the whole of the property 
 of every associate shall, if necessary, be de- 
 voted to the payment of the debts incurred 
 in the enterprise. In order to escape this 
 onerous requirement, as well as some others, 
 but especially this, it is customary to form 
 what are called corporations ; as to which the 
 law is that only such property as is contrib- 
 uted to make the capital stock of the corpora- 
 tion can be called upon to satisfy the debts 
 i6o 
 
incurred in its business. Every one, there- 
 fore, knows the utmost that he can possibly 
 lose, and almost all great undertakings are 
 now carried on through incorporations. In- 
 deed in no other way could they be carried 
 on ; for few individuals have so great prop- 
 erty as to enable them to undertake such 
 works by themselves, and men are only will- 
 ing to incur the liability of partners when they 
 are associated with a very few others whom 
 they know intimately. The industry of mod- 
 ern times, therefore, has come to depend upon 
 the laws affecting corporations. 
 
 It was formerly true that the legislators, 
 seeing the gain to the people in providing 
 this means for the application of property to 
 industry, favored corporations, and granted 
 them powers, such as that of eminent domain, 
 properly belonging only to the community. 
 By this means, and by many improvements 
 in the art of transporting both things and 
 men, some of these corporations came to at- 
 tain great magnitude. When this has taken 
 place, for nearly the same reasons that make a 
 boss necessary in the government of cities, the 
 management of their affairs falls into the hands 
 of one man. or a very few men, of great wealth 
 i6i 
 
and capacity. Such men are by nature am- 
 bitious, and by the conditions of their place 
 unscrupulous ; for if they were not ambitious 
 they would never reach the position, and if 
 they were not unscrupulous they would not 
 retain it, any more than a boss. For the 
 struggle after traffic in which they must en- 
 gage when they have competitors does not 
 permit them to keep faith with one another, 
 their agreements concerning their charges 
 being numberless and very costly, but in 
 many cases broken as soon as made. But 
 when they have no competitors, then they are 
 tempted to exact excessive charges. 
 
 It results from this that many things un- 
 just and oppressive to the people are done by 
 the officers of corporations, so that a certain 
 odium has come to attach to the very name. 
 The common people being naturally envious 
 of the rich, and hearing of these oppressions, 
 forget the great gains that have come to them 
 through corporate enterprises, and clamor 
 against them. In this clamor the journals, 
 thinking to please the people, join, and at 
 the present time the legislators are openly 
 hostile to corporations and only favor them 
 in secret. For two reasons the corporations 
 162 
 
are at their mercy, and must pay for favors 
 if they would have them. In the first place, 
 their property is not so free as that of an in- 
 dividual, nor is it so well protected against 
 confiscation by our constitutions or bills of 
 rights ; and secondly, the property of a great 
 corporation generally tends to become fixed, 
 so that it cannot be withdrawn, both in things 
 immovable and in what is called the good- 
 will of its business. 
 
 Under such circumstances it is easy to see 
 what will happen. The legislators, rejoicing 
 in the opportunity of gratifying at the same 
 time the hatred of the common people and 
 their own cupidity, would, unless restrained, 
 commit the folly of the peasant who, accord- 
 ing to the fable, killed the goose that laid him 
 golden eggs, the quicker to gratify his avarice. 
 By means of new taxes, and additional re- 
 quirements, and provisions for regulation and 
 inspection, and commissions, and many other 
 devices, the legislators of New York would 
 probably in a few years confiscate the gains 
 made by most of the corporations of that 
 state ; while by means of special charters they 
 would endeavor to raise others in their place. 
 The managers of the corporations, therefore, 
 163 
 
must either see themselves robbed of their 
 property or defend it by inducing the legis- 
 lators to desist from their attacks. So rapa- 
 cious, however, have the legislators become 
 that the cost of this defense is now a heavy 
 charge upon the corporations, and their man- 
 agers are in constant terror so long as the 
 legislature sits. 
 
 Here, too, the economists take an important 
 part, for they declare that the corporations 
 are monopolies and keep gains for themselves 
 that belong to the whole people ; by which 
 the legislators are greatly encouraged to con- 
 tinue plundering in the name of justice. But 
 from the time when the children of Israel 
 seized the possessions of the Canaanites upon 
 the ground of their wickedness, and the kings 
 of Europe in the middle ages confiscated the 
 wealth of the Jews on account of their ex- 
 tortion, and those who came from the Old 
 World drove out the natives of this continent 
 because they were heathen, down to the pres- 
 ent day, when the children of the missionaries 
 of Hawaii have overthrown the government of 
 that country upon the ground of the deprav- 
 ity of the people converted by their parents, 
 this has always been the best of reasons why 
 164 
 
one man should possess himself of the prop- 
 erty of another. 
 
 The policy of a boss, under such condi- 
 tions, hardly needs to be explained. If he is 
 wise he will interfere to prevent the ruin of 
 the community through the rapacity of the 
 legislators. He will, it is true, be hated by 
 them as snatching the prey from their mouths, 
 but, on the other hand, he will be looked upon 
 as a protector by the corporations. It was in 
 this way that the king of France established 
 the royal power, many centuries ago, so that 
 it endured for ages. For the nobles took ad- 
 vantage of their powers and oppressed the 
 trading corporations of that time, whereupon 
 the king took their part and obtained not 
 only their loyalty, but a large and certain rev- 
 enue as well, while he was at the same time 
 enabled to curb the nobility. 
 
 A boss must, however, concede something 
 to the legislators, nor should this be any 
 mean sum ; for he will have trouble in con- 
 trolling those who are not from his own city. 
 Upon the other hand, the corporations will 
 gladly pay him a large and certain revenue 
 to be relieved from constant attacks and to 
 obtain such laws as they need. They will, 
 165 
 
moreover, appoint to places in their service 
 such persons as he desires ; and in this way 
 he can provide for many of his followers and 
 for some of the legislators. He can also 
 cause such servants, and even others, to join 
 the organization and contribute to its revenue, 
 for he can have them displaced if they re- 
 fuse, as is done in the case of those corpora- 
 tions that transport passengers in the streets 
 of New York. 
 
 A boss can also provide for his followers 
 by having laws passed creating commission- 
 ers to oversee various corporations, and he 
 may even make the pay of these followers a 
 charge upon the corporations. But if he does 
 this he should let the corporations select com- 
 missioners that are agreeable to them, and in 
 this, as always, he should carefully abstain 
 from arousing discontent by making his ex- 
 actions too high. He should never demand 
 so much as to make any business unprofitable 
 or even less profitable than others. His only 
 safety lies in causing those who have wealth 
 and power to think that it is better for them 
 to submit to his rule rather than to risk the 
 exactions of the legislature or to fly to the 
 unknown ills of revolution. 
 1 66 
 
CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 OF THE USE TO BE MADE OF THE PUBLIC 
 JOURNALS. 
 
 All the common people at the present 
 day obtain their knowledge of everything 
 except their own personal affairs through the 
 public journals. Few things, therefore, are 
 of more importance to a boss than the ac- 
 counts which these journals give of his rule. 
 He cannot now imprison or put to death 
 those writers that offend him, but it is in his 
 power to injure them or to benefit them at 
 his pleasure. The power to do this comes 
 through the law, in the same way that the 
 power to use the offices is obtained. For as 
 the law provides higher salaries for the hold- 
 ers of office than their services are worth, so 
 it also provides that many things shall be 
 printed in the journals and paid for at a much 
 higher rate than the cost. The owners of 
 167 
 
the journals generally contrive these laws, 
 representing that the public needs to be in- 
 formed in this way of many legal matters 
 that in no wise concern it, although it is ab- 
 surd to suppose that such advertisements are 
 read by every one, or that those interested 
 are not likely to be otherwise informed ; for 
 which, indeed, the law generally provides. 
 
 But as the owner of a journal is seldom 
 able to have the law prescribe that such ad- 
 vertisements shall be printed in his own par- 
 ticular publication, since thus his greed would 
 be too apparent, he is exposed to competi- 
 tion, and is therefore to a great extent at the 
 mercy of the politicians and, in the city of 
 New York, of the boss. For it is in their 
 power, or his, to deprive a certain journal 
 altogether of this lucrative patronage, or to 
 compel it to share its excessive profits. In 
 many other ways a boss can make it for the 
 interest of the owner of a journal to be his 
 friend, but of these I will refer to one alone. 
 It generally happens that the owner of a jour- 
 nal, if he be also one of its writers, comes to 
 look upon himself as greater than other men, 
 because he sees the multitude believing what 
 he lays before them ; and when he has be- 
 i68 
 
come puffed up in this way he immediately 
 desires to obtain some office of distinction. 
 To such a man it is plain the assistance of the 
 boss will be of the greatest value, and he will 
 therefore give the boss all the assistance in 
 his power if he can secure his favor. A 
 wise boss, therefore, need seldom meet with 
 much difficulty in making these people his 
 friends. 
 
 Nothing would be more mistaken, however, 
 than to suppose that any open profession of 
 friendship is either practicable or desirable. 
 For it is necessary that those who read a jour- 
 nal should be accustomed to assume that 
 those who write it are wise and disinterested 
 men. To publish a journal, as has been re- 
 cently done, in the avowed interest of a boss 
 is a piece of the greatest folly. No one out- 
 side of the organization will read such a jour- 
 nal, and for the followers of the boss to be 
 compelled to buy it is nearly sufficient to 
 cause a revolt within their ranks. On the 
 other hand, the people have become so used to 
 the foul and abusive language of the writers 
 of journals that they are not influenced by 
 their denunciation of parties and organiza- 
 tions, or even of particular bosses, so long as 
 169 
 
it is expressed in familiar and general terms, 
 and no definite charges, supported by evi- 
 dence, are brought forward. A prudent boss 
 will therefore encourage journals secretly 
 friendly to him to speak in this harmless way, 
 in order to disarm suspicion; arranging at 
 the same time that all really dangerous and 
 odious charges shall be avoided, and that 
 when any actual movement against him is 
 undertaken it shall be opposed upon plausible 
 grounds. Thus, if the Reformers undertake 
 to elect candidates of their own to office in 
 defiance of the boss, he should direct his 
 journals professing to be of the Republican 
 party to join indeed in denouncing him, but 
 to maintain at the same time that it is unwise 
 for citizens of the Republican party to vote 
 for any candidates except those nominated 
 by the Republican organization. So long as 
 this policy is adhered to, the Reformers can 
 always be defeated ; for if all the Republicans 
 be against them, as well as the boss, their 
 numbers are too few for them to prevail. 
 
 The boss should therefore explain to these 
 
 writers what things he really desires and what 
 
 he cares nothing about, so that they may 
 
 fiercely denounce the latter and be silent 
 
 170 
 
concerning the former. He should permit 
 them to speak evil of him when he is strong, 
 and warn them to be moderate in their lan- 
 guage when he is in real danger. He should 
 see that they make false charges against him 
 of such a kind as he can openly disprove, in 
 order that the people may think that he is 
 falsely accused in other respects also. By 
 carefully attending to this policy the boss will 
 after a time cause a great number of citizens 
 to believe either that he is a good ruler or 
 else that it is impossible to find out anything 
 concerning him that is trustworthy. Nor 
 should he forget that as he is a secret ruler it 
 is much better that he should be little talked 
 of or thought about ; but if he must be dis- 
 cussed, then let as little as possible be said of 
 him, or else let the journals publish a great 
 deal continually. By the former policy the 
 citizens will not be aroused to interest, and 
 by the latter their interest will be quickly 
 fatigued. For men have many other things to 
 think of besides their government, and they 
 soon weary of hearing that it is corrupt, if no 
 plan for reforming it at once is available. If 
 a boss observes these maxims he will gen- 
 erally receive from the journals more benefit 
 171 
 
than injury; but it is dangerous to attack 
 them and really arouse their hostility. 
 
 This may be illustrated by an example, 
 given by Aristotle, of the peril to tyrants of 
 arousing resentment by injury. He men- 
 tions that Decamnichus was the chief cause of 
 the conspiracy against Archelaus, the occa- 
 sion of his resentment being that Archelaus 
 had dehvered him to Euripides the poet to 
 be scourged; for Decamnichus had greatly 
 offended Euripides by speaking of the foul- 
 ness of his breath. Nearly the same thing 
 recently took place in this city ; for the edi- 
 tor of a journal, Godkin, grievously offended 
 Mitchell the police justice by showing that 
 he had formerly kept a tavern resorted to by 
 thieves, and saying certain other evil things 
 concerning him ; whereupon the boss per- 
 mitted this writer to be imprisoned by 
 Mitchell. The consequence was the same 
 as in the case of Decamnichus ; for the man 
 was already sufficiently ill disposed toward 
 the rule of the boss, and his imprisonment 
 only rendered him more implacable, so that 
 he became the most formidable of all the 
 conspirators against the organization. Now 
 it is evident that neither could the breath of 
 172 
 
Euripides be purified by the scourging of 
 Decamnichus, nor the reputation of Mitchell 
 by the imprisonment of Godkin ; and even if 
 this could have been done it would not have 
 been of suflScient importance either to the 
 tyrant or the boss to justify his imperiling 
 his dominion. 
 
 Let the boss, then, avoid needlessly enrag- 
 irjg a notoriously irritable class, who are above 
 all men wise in their own conceit, as he would 
 avoid stirring up a swarm of wasps. For a 
 man is more powerful and wiser than many 
 wasps ; nevertheless a few of them when 
 aroused will put the boldest man to flight. 
 Since it is possible for the boss to propitiate 
 most of these editors by money or office or 
 the promise of them, let him not neglect this 
 simple means of converting annoying and 
 mischievous adversaries into secret but useful 
 friends. 
 
 173 
 
CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 OF THE RELATIONS OF THE BOSS OF NEW 
 
 YORK TO THE ORGANIZATION OF 
 
 THE REPUBLICANS. 
 
 I HAVE hitherto principally confined my- 
 self to explaining the rules of conduct to be 
 observed by the boss in his relations with the 
 organization of his followers, which is now 
 commonly called the machine, but is in the 
 city of New York also called Tammany Hall, 
 from the place of meeting of the chiefs. I 
 have also given some reasons for thinking 
 that too much power is given to the chief- 
 tains of the thirty districts into which the 
 city is divided, although no danger is to be 
 apprehended by the boss from the district 
 committees, which appoint the eleven hun- 
 dred captains of the election precincts ; be- 
 cause the boss can take advantage of the 
 174 
 
rivalries and jealousies of the members, and 
 see that such men are made captains as he 
 desires. Accordingly the policy of doubling 
 the number of the district leaders, so that 
 there shall be two in each assembly district, 
 is to be commended; for they will infallibly 
 be jealous of each other, and the boss by giv- 
 ing ear secretly first to one and then to the 
 other will come soon to understand their real 
 dispositions and designs, and learn how far 
 every man is to be trusted and how far he is 
 to be feared. It would indeed be possible 
 to speak at greater length upon all these 
 things, and to give illustrations of what has 
 been done that is to be commended and of 
 what has been done that is blameworthy ; 
 but I shall have effected my purpose if I 
 have laid down some general rules with suffi- 
 cient clearness to enable a boss to apply them 
 to particular cases. 
 
 Concerning the organization of the Re- 
 publicans it might seem that a boss need not 
 concern himself, but such an opinion would 
 be altogether mistaken. For, by reason of 
 the frequent elections provided by our laws, 
 a boss is exposed to incessant attacks, and, 
 since most men call themselves either Repub- 
 175 
 
licans or Democrats, it is probable that those 
 who plot against the Boss of New York will 
 endeavor to make use of the RepubHcan ma- 
 chine — at least so long as the boss controls 
 the Democratic organization. On the other 
 hand, should another organization be formed 
 among the Democrats hostile to the boss, it 
 is evident that the Republicans might hold 
 the balance of power, and in that event the 
 boss would be compelled to make terms with 
 them in some way. This he can do, but the 
 Reformers cannot, because they dare not offer 
 either money or offices, and without these the 
 leaders of the Republicans cannot be won 
 over. 
 
 It is obvious, therefore, that the manner 
 in which the Republicans are organized can 
 never be a matter of indifference to a boss. 
 To say this would be like maintaining that a 
 general need not interest himself in the or- 
 ganization of the army of his enemy. The 
 organization of the Republicans, indeed, de- 
 serves not only his careful attention, but 
 also his active intervention and participation. 
 Hence it is altogether for his interest that 
 this organization should be controlled by a 
 boss, or by only a few chiefs; for it will be 
 176 
 
necessary to purchase their allegiance, which 
 would be impossible were they very numer- 
 ous, their rapacity being such that all the 
 offices and salaries in the city of New York 
 would not satisfy them. 
 
 Hence it is indispensable for a boss to have 
 a certain number of these chiefs constantly in 
 his pay, even when there are no dangerous 
 plots against him ; otherwise they may be 
 displaced and he be left without allies at a 
 time when he sorely needs them. This may 
 be easily accomplished by having the legis- 
 lature pass laws for what are called non-par- 
 tizan commissions, which will give the boss 
 a certain number of offices to be distributed 
 among such of the Republican politicians as 
 will be of most service to him. No difficulty 
 will be experienced in this, for politicians are, 
 by their very occupation, venal, and provided 
 they obtain money they care little whence it 
 comes. Thus when a dangerous uprising 
 takes place, headed by those who are indiffer- 
 ent to party names, but desire to have the 
 government of the city administered accord- 
 ing to their notions, the secret allies of the 
 boss who direct the organization of the Re- 
 publicans will proclaim that only those who 
 177 
 
are faithful to the RepubHcan party are fit to 
 hold office. They will accordingly propose 
 such men as the Reformers cannot accept; 
 for the latter will think them no better than 
 those already in power. 
 
 In this way the schemes of the Reformers 
 can generally be brought to nothing, for, as 
 I have said before, they are never numerous 
 enough to succeed if the Republican organi- 
 zation is against them. There can be no 
 doubt, therefore, that it is the part of wisdom 
 for a boss to pay the Republican leaders 
 with great liberality so long as they will pur- 
 sue this policy. But whether it is better to 
 use money and other favors, or to turn over 
 to them certain offices, it is not altogether 
 easy to decide. For if some offices are allowed 
 to the Republicans, many of that party will 
 be pleased, and think that greater success of 
 this kind may be obtained in the future ; 
 while if money and favors are secretly em- 
 ployed, the great mass of the Republicans, 
 being ignorant of this, will be inclined to think 
 that their party can hope for no success, and 
 will be disposed to listen to the arguments of 
 the Reformers. Hence the advantage of the 
 non-partizan commissions which I have de- 
 178 
 
scribed. But the greatest forethought and 
 caution must be exercised in entering into 
 treaties of this kind, and they should not be 
 resorted to if the same advantages can be 
 secured in any other way. 
 
 179 
 
CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 OF THE POLICY TO BE PURSUED BY A 
 
 BOSS REGARDING THE STATE 
 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Having examined in detail the measures 
 to be followed by a boss in maintaining a 
 trained force, and in raising a suitable reve- 
 nue, and in regulating the government of his 
 city, it remains now to show in what manner 
 he should arrange his external relations. As 
 I have already pointed out, these are of two 
 classes : the relations to the government of 
 his state and the relations to the general 
 government. Of these the former are by far 
 the more important. How important they 
 are appears at once when we consider that all 
 the laws under which the government of the 
 city of New York is carried on are enacted 
 by the legislature of the state; that all the 
 offices to be filled are created by the same 
 
body, and the salaries attached to them gen- 
 erally fixed ; that it is in the power of this 
 body to administer the government of the 
 city through commissioners appointed by it, 
 without consulting with the boss; that by 
 doing away with sumptuary laws it could 
 dry up the principal revenue of the boss at 
 its very source ; and that it could take from 
 his hands the control of the police, of the 
 finances, and, more than all, of the judges. 
 
 In view of all that may come to the boss 
 from this quarter, both evil and good, it is im- 
 possible to exaggerate the necessity of adopt- 
 ing and consistently following the proper 
 policy. For, as Machiavelli says in speaking 
 of the Romans, it is the duty of every wise 
 ruler, not only to provide a remedy for pres- 
 ent evils, but at the same time to anticipate 
 such as are hkely to occur. By foreseeing 
 them at a distance they are easily remedied ; 
 but if we wait till they have surrounded us 
 the time is past and the malady is become in- 
 curable. It happens then as it does to phy- 
 sicians in the cure of a consumption, which in 
 the commencement is easy to cure and diffi- 
 cult to understand, but when it has neither 
 been discovered in due time nor treated upon 
 i8i 
 
a proper principle, it becomes easy to under- 
 stand and difficult to cure. The same thing 
 takes place in state affairs. By foreseeing 
 them at a distance, which is only done by 
 men of talents, the evils which arise in a gov- 
 ernment are soon cured ; but when, from want 
 of foresight, they are suffered to increase to 
 such a height that they are perceptible to 
 every one, there is no longer any remedy. 
 
 Let us, then, carefully consider the nature 
 of the government of the state of New York. 
 There is, in the first place, a Governor, who 
 is elected by the majority of the voters, and 
 who has, in addition to some minor powers, 
 the great power of forbidding the passage of 
 laws. This power is absolute, unless two 
 thirds in number of the legislators are in favor 
 of the law, and the office of Governor is there- 
 fore of great importance. There is also a Sen- 
 ate, composed of thirty-two members, and an 
 Assembly, of one hundred and twenty-eight 
 members, every one of whom is chosen by 
 the voters residing in a particular district. 
 Those are mistaken who imagine that these 
 numbers are of no consequence, and that it 
 would be the same thing if they were doubled. 
 The number of voters in the state being, 
 
perhaps, a million and a half, it is evident at 
 once that every legislator must represent a 
 great many thousand citizens ; and whenever 
 this is the case it is inevitable, from the causes 
 that I explained at the beginning of this trea- 
 tise, that the nomination of candidates should 
 fall into the hands of the politicians. If the 
 number of legislators were greatly increased, 
 this would not be true to the same extent ; 
 for where a community or a district has but 
 a few thousand people they all know one an- 
 other, and therefore they know the character 
 of the man for whom they are asked to vote. 
 Hence it is for the advantage of a boss that 
 the number of legislators should be as small 
 as possible ; for so long as the pohticians de- 
 termine who they shall be it is possible for 
 the boss to have an understanding with them ; 
 and, moreover, when it becomes necessary to 
 purchase legislation, there are not so many to 
 be paid. But in the case of the Governor, 
 although the politicians nominate him, yet 
 they are more Hmited in their selection ; for 
 it is necessary to nominate a man of some dis- 
 tinction and ability for the place, or there may 
 be danger that he will be defeated through 
 the disgust of the people. It may not be at 
 183 
 
first sight evident, but it is nevertheless true, 
 that the people of the whole state are likely 
 to know more concerning the character of 
 their Governor than the people of a district 
 to know of the man who represents them in 
 the Senate or Assembly. Men are interested 
 in a few great and prominent officers, but 
 they cannot carry in their minds the names 
 and histories of a multitude of petty ones. 
 
 The government of the state being thus 
 constituted, and the people of the state being 
 divided into two parties, Republican and 
 Democratic, the membership of the legisla- 
 ture will be, for the most part, determined by 
 the poHticians that control the party organi- 
 zations. As to the legislators chosen from 
 the city of New York, there can be little diffi- 
 culty, as a rule, in securing the return not 
 only of such Democrats, but also of such Re- 
 publicans, as are satisfactory to the boss. As 
 to the choice of Democratic representatives 
 outside of the city of New York, the matter 
 is not without difficulty. If a boss attempts 
 by direct action to secure the nomination of 
 men who will obey him, he is sure to arouse 
 such opposition and jealousy as will cause 
 him embarrassment, if not defeat. On the 
 184 
 
other hand, if he enters into negotiations with 
 the politicians of the region, he engages in 
 very complicated matters that may lead to 
 unexpected entanglements. I shall presently 
 give some examples of this, but for the pres- 
 ent it is sufficient to say that a boss must be 
 guided by circumstances, and that only one 
 general rule can be laid down, viz., that he 
 should not be induced to pay too high a price 
 for support of this kind. 
 
 It is a serious question whether it is not 
 better policy for a boss to spend money in 
 winning over his open enemies, rather than 
 in inducing those to support him who are to 
 a certain extent bound to do so by their party 
 allegiance. I have already explained the im- 
 portance of having an understanding with 
 the leadei's of the Republicans in the city of 
 New York, and nearly the same reasons exist 
 for a secret alliance with those who control 
 the party in the state ; if indeed they be not 
 the same persons. For the revenues avail- 
 able to politicians in the other parts of the 
 state are much smaller than in the city of 
 New York, and it is possible to obtain many 
 supporters at a moderate cost. Especially 
 when Republican legislators have shown that 
 185 
 
they are disposed to carry out the wishes of 
 a boss, he may be able to secure their fidelity 
 by assistance when they are struggling to ob- 
 tain renomination. Thus it will be generally 
 possible for a boss to have a sufficient num- 
 ber of legislators under his control, or favor- 
 ably disposed to him, to guard against very 
 injurious measures. 
 
 Hitherto we have looked at this matter 
 from one point of view, as if a boss were ex- 
 posed to attack and must secure allies in order 
 to defend himself We should, however, rec- 
 ollect that the Boss of New York is infinitely 
 more powerful, through the great force at his 
 disposal, and because of his large revenues, 
 than any of the politicians that aspire to be 
 bosses throughout the state. It is a timid 
 and pusillanimous policy that induces a pow- 
 erful boss to make such terms with his infe- 
 riors as imply that they are conferring a favor 
 on him by entering into the treaty. He 
 should rather take the position that they are 
 in his power and that he can ruin them if he 
 chooses, and induce them to render their sup- 
 port more as a means of their own preserva- 
 tion than as a favor. It is true that if all of 
 these politicians should enter into a conspir- 
 i86 
 
acy against him, their combined power might 
 be greater than his. Let us recall, however, 
 the observation of Machiavelli. History, he 
 says, is filled with conspiracies ; but how few 
 have been crowned with success! No one 
 can carry on such a design alone nor trust 
 any accomplices but malcontents. These fre- 
 quently denounce their confederates and frus- 
 trate their designs, in the hope of obtaining 
 a large remuneration from him against whom 
 they are leagued. Hence those with whom 
 you are necessarily associated in a conspiracy 
 are placed between the temptation of a con- 
 siderable reward and the dread of a great 
 danger; so that, to keep the secret, it must 
 either be intrusted to a very extraordinary 
 friend of your own or to an irreconcilable 
 enemy of the boss. Thus it is almost impos- 
 sible that a combination should be formed 
 against a boss by the politicians outside of 
 the city without his gaining early knowledge 
 of it ; and if he have this knowledge he should 
 at once, by threatening some and cajoling 
 others, divide their counsels and render them 
 futile. 
 
 No objection exists to the granting of fa- 
 vors to these petty bosses, so long as this can 
 187 
 
be done without impairing the power of a 
 boss in his own city ; but the emergency 
 must be indeed grave to justify his incurring 
 odium on their account, either among his fol- 
 lowers or among the people whom he rules. 
 It does not admit of doubt that several very 
 grave mistakes of this kind have been recently 
 made, of which the evil consequences have 
 already to some extent appeared, and will 
 still further appear. These mistakes have 
 been so serious, and the principle which they 
 illustrate is of such importance, that they re- 
 quire examination by themselves, and I shall 
 therefore dismiss the subject for the present. 
 But so far as secret alliances with the leaders 
 of the Republicans are concerned, although 
 these alliances tend to produce discontent 
 among the followers of a boss, who do not 
 understand why rewards should be given to 
 those apparently hostile to them, yet if he 
 has observed the rules which have been pre- 
 sented here concerning the discipline of his 
 forces he need not hesitate to suppress these 
 murmurs by proper punishment. He need 
 feel the less anxiety because the conferring 
 of these rewards has a tendency to pacify the 
 people, who conceive that an equitable dis- 
 i88 
 
tribution of offices is taking place in spite of 
 the boss, and wiio reason, therefore, that his 
 power over them is not so absolute as the 
 Reformers represent. 
 
 In short, the maxims that are to be ob- 
 served by a boss in ordering his relations with 
 the state government are few and simple : 
 First, to bear it always in mind that the pres- 
 ervation of his own power is the supreme 
 end, and therefore to do nothing for another, 
 nor tolerate anything from another, that may 
 interfere with this. Second, to limit his as- 
 sistance to other politicians to such an amount 
 as will not make any one so powerful as to 
 .be able to do him much injury, and to extend 
 it only to those who are ready to give the 
 strongest pledges of their fidelity and grati- 
 tude. Third, to require, as the first condition 
 of his aid, that all legislation relating to the 
 city of New York shall be approved by him. 
 Fourth, to forbid his own legislators to collect 
 revenue for themselves, through threats of 
 legislation against the rich, or through prom- 
 ises of legislation in their favor. All such 
 revenues belong properly to the boss, but he 
 will be compelled to divide them, not only 
 with his own legislators, but also with the 
 189 
 
leaders from other parts of the state; other- 
 wise his own legislators will be driven by- 
 hunger to listen to plots against him. For their 
 pay is not sufficient to meet the expenses of 
 their elections, and they must be reimbursed, 
 and that liberally. So with the other lead- 
 ers : they must be allowed a bountiful share 
 of this revenue, or they will turn against the 
 boss and pass laws that may do him great 
 harm. But if he will aid them in passing 
 such laws as bring them in much revenue, they 
 will generally allow him to do as he desires 
 in other things. This he can well afford to 
 do, provided he retain the control of the reve- 
 nues of the city of New York. 
 
 190 
 
CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 OF THE COURSE TO BE FOLLOWED BY A 
 BOSS IN NATIONAL POLITICS. 
 
 A BOSS who desires to maintain himself in 
 security in his own dominion will always con- 
 sider the effect upon his own fortunes of any 
 action which he is urged to take in national 
 politics. We have seen that in the politics 
 of the state of New York this is true, because 
 the state government directly controls that 
 of the city of New York, and therefore it 
 cannot be safely neglected by a boss. It is 
 otherwise with the government of the United 
 States ; for it has very little to do with that 
 of this city, and, so far as the laws enacted 
 by Congress are concerned, it is, as a rule, a 
 matter of very slight consequence to a boss 
 what they are, with an exception which I shall 
 presently notice. But, owing to the fact that 
 the Custom-house at New York gives employ- 
 191 
 
ment to great numbers of men, and the Post- 
 office also, to say nothing of the offices of the 
 United States Attorney and Marshal, and 
 some others, it is worth while to exercise as 
 much control as possible over these appoint- 
 ments, in spite of the inconvenience caused 
 by the civil-service laws, which greatly limit 
 their number. Hence it is necessary for a 
 boss to study well his relations to national 
 politics and to the administration. 
 
 In order to understand clearly the difficul- 
 ties that arise in determining these relations, 
 let us first consider the policy to be pursued 
 by a boss regarding the choice of the United 
 States Senators from the state of New York. 
 It is proper to begin with this matter, because 
 it is customary for the President of the United 
 States to appoint such men to office as are 
 proposed by the Senators from the states 
 where the offices which are to be filled exist, 
 at least when they are of his party ; and if a 
 boss desires to have such appointments made 
 to his satisfaction, it would seem that he must 
 first make sure of the Senators. To make 
 the subject entirely plain a number of pnssi-- 
 bilities must be considered ; fdr the President 
 may be of one party and the Senators may 
 192 
 
be either of that party or of another ; and the 
 policy of a boss must be different in every 
 contingency. 
 
 It might at first sight seem beyond ques- 
 tion that if the President is a Democrat the 
 boss should procure the election of Demo- 
 cratic Senators. It is true that this may fre- 
 quently be wise; but let the boss remember 
 that if he allows some politician to be elected 
 who has not been in the habit of obeying 
 him, he places a man at Washington who is 
 inevitably puffed up by his position, and who 
 will be disposed to insist that his own friends 
 and followers shall be appointed to the offices 
 in the city of New York, as well as through- 
 out the state. The reason of this is to be 
 found in the length of the term of the office 
 of Senator — which may exceed the duration 
 of the power of a boss — and the honor of 
 the position ; for as the Senators of old were 
 frequently statesmen and men of wisdom, 
 there is a tradition among the people regard- 
 ing the office which makes whoever holds it 
 think himself wise. Therefore, unless a boss 
 can make sure of the fidelity of the politician 
 whom he causes to be elected, either by writ- 
 ten pledges or in some other way, it may not 
 193 
 
be politic for him to bring about the election 
 of Democratic Senators. 
 
 This will be more apparent if we consider 
 the case of a Democratic President and Re- 
 publican Senators. Such Senators could have 
 little influence with the President in filling 
 the offices, and he would naturally turn to 
 the boss for advice, particularly if he were 
 satisfied that the boss had been or would be 
 friendly to him. If the President came from 
 the state of New York, he might, it is true, 
 insist upon appointing his own friends, and 
 upon this account it seems more desirable 
 that he should come from some other state ; 
 but even then the organization might be suffi- 
 ciently recognized. Upon the whole, there- 
 fore, this case is likely to be the most favor- 
 able to the power of a boss. 
 
 Let us next examine the situation when the 
 President is a Republican. It is evident that 
 then a Democratic Senator would be of no 
 use whatever to a boss, no matter how great 
 his fidelity ; for the President could seldom 
 have any motive for paying any attention to 
 him. But let us consider what would take 
 place if the boss entered into an arrangement 
 with the Republican leaders for the election 
 194 
 
of Republican Senators. The result would 
 be that these leaders could make sure that 
 the Senators chosen by them would make 
 such appointments as they desired. Hence 
 if a proper treaty has been previously made 
 with these leaders by a boss, there will gen- 
 erally be little danger that the men appointed 
 will be positively hostile to him ; and, by the 
 terms of the treaty, he may be left secure in 
 his own dominion. But it is almost always 
 the case, among the Republicans of this state 
 especially, that there are some men, eminent 
 as speakers or as editors of journals, who are 
 consumed with desire to be Senators and who 
 will gladly make treaties with a boss to bring 
 this about. 
 
 There can be no doubt that such treaties 
 are for the interest of a boss. If any one 
 questions it, I repeat — the President of the 
 United States is either a Democrat or a Re- 
 publican. If he is a Democrat, a Republican 
 Senator can do a boss at all events no harm, 
 and may render him services in his own state. 
 And if the President is a Republican, then 
 also a Republican Senator, especially if he 
 has been aided by the boss, will do no harm ; 
 for the President will appoint Republicans to 
 195 
 
office no matter who is Senator. In such a 
 case a Democratic Senator would be useless ; 
 and if the President is a Democrat, a Senator 
 of that party would be superfluous, if not 
 positively mischievous. Yet it must be ac- 
 knowledged that there may be special reasons 
 for acting in particular ways upon particular 
 occasions, and while treaties of the kind I 
 have described are for the advantage of a 
 boss, he should exercise the greatest care 
 that they do not become publicly known ; for 
 if they do, he may suffer more from the charge 
 of treachery than he will gain by the provi- 
 sions of the treaty. 
 
 I said that with one exception the laws of 
 the United States little concerned a boss of 
 New York. That exception is the case of a 
 law imposing an income tax. The collector 
 of this tax in the city of New York will be- 
 come altogether the most important officer 
 under any existing government. No Roman 
 proconsul or prefect, no Persian satrap or 
 Turkish pasha, ever had such opportunities 
 for enriching himself as this officer will have, 
 and he could easily make his revenue exceed 
 that of the boss himself. For, in addition to 
 the tax, many men will gladly pay great 
 196 
 
sums to the collector rather than disclose the 
 secrets of their trade or business; and this 
 collector will be armed with power to com- 
 pel even the boss to render an account of all 
 the revenue which he receives, and to dis- 
 close the particulars of his transactions with 
 the organization and with his followers. No 
 sacrifice can be too great for the boss to make 
 in order to secure control of this appoint- 
 ment ; not merely that he may participate in 
 its emoluments, but especially that he may 
 avert the ruin that would come upon him 
 were he compelled to reveal the sources of 
 his revenue. 
 
 As to that part of the external policy of a 
 boss which involves the nomination of a can- 
 didate for the office of President of the United 
 States, the temptation is very great to make 
 a display of power. No doubt it is a daz- 
 zling idea to a boss to be able to decide who 
 shall be the chief ruler of the greatest nation 
 of the earth, especially since the people are 
 reputed to select their own rulers. A boss, 
 however, who allows himself to be carried 
 away by visions of this character, without 
 considering what may be the effect upon his 
 own power, is more likely to diminish his in- 
 197 
 
fluence than to extend it, and may even bring 
 about his own ruin through his overreaching 
 ambition. 
 
 For a boss may either succeed or not suc- 
 ceed in procuring the nomination of such a 
 man as he desires. If he does not succeed 
 he is laughed at throughout the country, and 
 his followers lose confidence, not only in his 
 ability, but also in his good fortune. Since 
 the strength of rulers consists essentially in 
 the opinion that is commonly entertained of 
 their strength, nothing can be more disad- 
 vantageous to a boss than to be defeated in 
 what he has openly undertaken. He not 
 only makes a dangerous enemy in the candi- 
 date whom he opposed, but he encourages 
 the Reformers to believe that if he can be 
 beaten abroad he may be at home. If he 
 succeeds he may, it is true, preserve his own 
 prestige ; but as it is very difficult to per- 
 suade the people not to reject any candidate 
 openly favored by a boss, his victory is likely 
 to be a barren one. 
 
 To place this matter in the clearest light, we 
 must attentively examine the nature and ex- 
 tent of the interest of a boss of New York in 
 the success of the party to which he belongs in 
 198 
 
the national elections. Certainly the mere 
 display of his power, without positive results, 
 cannot be regarded as greatly for his interest. 
 The policy to be adopted in the legislation of 
 Congress is generally a matter of entire in- 
 difference to him. The only thing, therefore, 
 in which he is concerned, is the appointment 
 of national officers in the city of New York. 
 In determining his policy he must inquire 
 concerning every step how it will affect this 
 supreme object. If he is certain that some 
 man whom he favors can not only be nomi- 
 nated but also elected, and if he is also cer- 
 tain that after this man is elected he will 
 make satisfactory appointments, then indeed 
 a boss would be foolish not to embrace his 
 opportunity. But how often is this likely to 
 happen? In order to be certain as to the 
 appointments it is necessary to select a poli- 
 tician willing to pledge himself to do what is 
 required of him. But such a man can seldom 
 have much standing in the party, and is cer- 
 tain to be either unknown or odious to the 
 people. It will therefore be difficult to nomi- 
 nate him, and more difficult to elect him. 
 The consequences of defeat, as we have 
 seen, are so serious as to make it unwise to 
 199 
 
risk them for such precarious chances of 
 victory. 
 
 On the other hand, if a boss favor unosten- 
 tatiously some man from another state who 
 is already strong with the party and not hated 
 by the people, and such a man is nominated 
 and elected, he will be likely to make the 
 appointments which the boss desires ; for he 
 will naturally be grateful and will have no 
 reason to favor any other organization in the 
 state. Besides, whenever any man becomes 
 President, he immediately begins to cast about 
 for means whereby he may be reelected, and 
 therefore he is anxious not to offend those 
 who have aided him. A boss, therefore, can 
 generally arrive at a good understanding with 
 the candidate of his party for the Presidency, 
 even if he is not able to obtain positive pledges. 
 
 If, however, it becomes evident that the 
 candidate of the Democrats will not do what 
 is desired in making the appointments, and 
 if he can be defeated by a secret alliance of 
 the boss with the leaders of the Republicans, 
 this will generally be the part of wisdom. 
 For these leaders require to be rewarded in 
 some way, and if they can obtain the national 
 offices in this city and in the state, they will 
 
need nothing more from the boss. Moreover 
 they consider these of the greatest conse- 
 quence, and in order to make sure of them 
 they will consent to any terms required by 
 him ; so that he may not only arrange that 
 the national officers shall not be hostile to 
 him, but also provide for whatever legislation 
 he desires in the state. There are other 
 cases to be considered, but I have said enough 
 to make it evident that in these external re- 
 lations the policy of the boss is to be deter- 
 mined exclusively by regard to his own force 
 and his own interests in the city of New 
 York, and not by any vain dreams of extend- 
 ing his dominion throughout the country. 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 OF SOME MISTAKES LATELY COMMITTED 
 
 IN THE CONDUCT OF EXTERNAL 
 
 AFFAIRS. 
 
 This is the proper place to illustrate the 
 principles that I have laid down by examples 
 from recent political history. Many circum- 
 stances indicate that the power of the boss 
 in the city of New York is greatly shaken, 
 and that not only the citizens, but also many 
 of his own followers, are either already con- 
 spiring against him or are prepared to do so ; 
 although a few years ago his rule appeared 
 to be absolute. Moreover, Boss Billy Shee- 
 hanof Buffalo, and Boss McLaughlin of Brook- 
 lyn, and Boss McKane of Coney Island, have 
 all been cast down, and their ruin is so com- 
 plete that it is doubtful if they will ever rise 
 again. In the case of Boss Sheehan and Boss 
 
 202 
 
McKane there may be nothing that is not 
 easy to understand ; for both their wisdom 
 and their forces were small, and they seem to 
 have disregarded most of the counsels both 
 of Aristotle and of Machiavelli as completely 
 as if they had never written. But Boss 
 McLaughlin was thought to be a wise boss, 
 and his power was apparently as firmly estab- 
 lished as that of the Boss of New York. 
 There must therefore have been some com- 
 mon cause in operation in all these cases. 
 
 It is an observation of Aristotle's that revo- 
 lutions are generally brought about by some 
 trifling occasion, while the real cause lies be- 
 neath the surface. The occasion of all this 
 ruin to the bosses of New York was indeed 
 trifling, being merely the choice of a judge 
 for the Appellate Court of the state. But 
 the candidate of the Democrats for this place 
 was a man without distinction either as a 
 judge or as a lawyer, and one whose conduct 
 in carrying out the orders of politicians in 
 defiance of the law had made him odious to 
 the most eminent of his own profession and 
 to a very great number of the people. When 
 it became rumored that it was the intention 
 of the leaders of the Democrats to nominate 
 203 
 
this man, an outcry arose on every side, so 
 that it was apparent that there would be an 
 uprising among the people against him. It 
 is conceivable that there might be circum- 
 stances which would make it necessary to 
 nominate such a candidate ; but in this case 
 there were no such circumstances. The man 
 had no followers and was powerless for in- 
 jury ; so that, no matter what promises had 
 been made him, there would have been no 
 danger in refusing him this office. If it be 
 said that he deserved gratitude for his ser- 
 vices, we have to inquire whether any king 
 would put a general in command of his forces 
 out of gratitude, when he knew that the sol- 
 diers would not follow him, and that he would 
 be defeated and the kingdom probably lost. 
 If it be the part of wisdom to lead one's 
 troops into an action which can be avoided, 
 knowing that by doing so the army will be 
 utterly routed and the whole people dispir- 
 ited, then it was wise to make this nomina- 
 tion. But if it be an act of folly to destroy 
 one's own troops in a contest in which victory, 
 even if won, would be wholly unprofitable, 
 while defeat would be fatal, then this nomina- 
 tion is to be condemned. 
 204 
 
In view of the principle that the first rule 
 of the boss is the preservation of his own 
 power, nothing was to be gained by the elec- 
 tion of this judge. The revenue of the boss 
 would not have been increased by one penny, 
 nor his forces by a single follower, and al- 
 though it is desirable to have friendly judges 
 in this court, yet it would have been easy to 
 obtain some one of sufficient pliability and 
 popularity as well. There was therefore noth- 
 ing to gain and everything to lose by making 
 this nomination. The motive that influenced 
 the boss to consent to it was obviously not 
 his own interest, and it follows that he was 
 led to do so to further the interests of an- 
 other. The only possibility upon which such 
 conduct could be justified is that this other 
 was in position to deprive the boss of some 
 great good, or to do him some great injury. 
 
 When we examine the circumstances, how- 
 ever, we see that this contingency did not 
 exist, for it was the Senator, Hill, who was 
 formerly Governor of the state, that caused 
 this nomination to be made, and that must 
 have led the boss to consent to it. It is not 
 difficult to see that he was greatly interested 
 in this matter, for if he succeeded in having 
 205 
 
this judge elected he would then have ap- 
 peared the most powerful politician of the 
 country, and no one would have contested 
 with him the next nomination to the Presi- 
 dency by the Democrats. On the other 
 hand, if he was deterred from nominating 
 him, after all he had said about it, by the 
 clamor of his opponents, then every one would 
 have declared it was because of weakness; 
 and when he desired to be nominated by the 
 Democrats he would have been laughed at 
 by the politicians as one who, as they say, 
 could not carry his own state. However 
 desperate the outlook, therefore, Senator Hill 
 was in a position where it was more danger- 
 ous for him to retreat than to stand still, and 
 his only hope lay in attacking with the utmost 
 boldness. As every one knows, he was ut- 
 terly ruined; for if the candidate who repre- 
 sented him was so completely overwhelmed, 
 there is every reason to suppose that Senator 
 Hill would himself fare even worse. 
 
 The conduct of the boss, therefore, would 
 not have been altogether without justification 
 if he had had reason to suppose that this 
 judge could be elected, and that Senator Hill 
 would make such appointments as were satis- 
 206 
 
factory when he became President, and that 
 the possibility of this future benefit was suffi- 
 cient to outweigh the danger of present in- 
 jury to his own power. But it cannot be 
 maintained that any such reasons existed. 
 There was ample experience to show that, 
 even with a candidate that was unobjection- 
 able, the alternation of popular whim or preju- 
 dice, especially in view of the great distress 
 then prevailing among the poor, would bring 
 about a defeat for the Democrats ; and there 
 was most abundant evidence that the reputa- 
 tion of the candidate would turn great num- 
 bers against him that would otherwise have 
 voted with that party. It is true that much 
 aid from the Republican politicians was 
 counted on, and it does not seem that they 
 failed to try to carry out the bargain ; but 
 the error arose from disregarding the simplic- 
 ity of the issue. For when there are many 
 candidates to be voted for, or when there are 
 important questions to be decided in the 
 national politics, the politicians can generally 
 arrange many exchanges of votes ; but in this 
 election the choice of a judge of the highest 
 court of the state was in every one's mind, 
 and even the common people revolted at the 
 207 
 
thought of choosing a lawbreaker to fill such 
 a place. 
 
 Nor was it very probable that Senator Hill 
 could have been chosen President even if he 
 had succeeded in being nominated. For there 
 is nothing that he has done that has pleased 
 the people, but only the politicians ; and even 
 if he could have succeeded in obtaining the 
 vote of the state of New York, it is by no 
 means certain that he could have obtained a 
 sufficient number of votes from the other 
 states. The whole matter is wrapped in un- 
 certainty, which is enough in itself to cause 
 the boss to have nothing to do with it ; more- 
 over it is not certain that if Senator Hill 
 were chosen President he would be altogether 
 governed by the boss in making his appoint- 
 ments in the city of New York, for he would 
 naturally become very arrogant and would 
 not endure to be dictated to, being President 
 of the whole people, by the ruler of one city. 
 Even if this were not so, yet the whole pos- 
 sible gain was altogether insufficient to make 
 it prudent for the boss to stake his own do- 
 minion upon such uncertain chances. Doubt- 
 less it is desirable to control the national 
 offices in New York, but it is much more im- 
 208 
 
portant to hold securely the regular revenues 
 of the boss; and it is a capital mistake for 
 him to risk the loss of everything merely for 
 a chance of gain which is after all not indis- 
 pensable. 
 
 If we inquire how this mistake came to be 
 committed, we shall find that it was really 
 the consequence of a previous error. For how 
 came Senator Hill to occupy a position where 
 he could involve the boss in his fortunes, and 
 induce him to imperil his own dominion in 
 aid of the ambitious schemes of another? 
 This could only be through the error of the 
 boss in allowing the power of Hill to grow 
 too great. He should have long ago dis- 
 cerned the ambition of the man, and have 
 made use of him only for a time, and then 
 have destroyed him. He does not require 
 allies that have plans for making themselves 
 supreme ; for it is inevitable that such allies 
 should try to make use of his power to aid 
 them in their ambitious schemes, while what 
 he desires is assistance in his own legislation. 
 It is better, therefore, to make use of the 
 politicians of the state up to a certain point, 
 and so long as they are not too ambitious; 
 but when they begin to put their own ends 
 209 
 
above those of the boss it is time for him to 
 seek out aUies that will be equally useful and 
 less dangerous. 
 
 It is not easy to decide whether it was poli- 
 tic or not for the boss to make Hill Governor 
 and Harrison President by arrangement with 
 the Republican politicians. For in this way, it 
 is true, the boss secured favorable legislation ; 
 but he made Hill too powerful, and he cer- 
 tainly gave the national offices in the city of 
 New York to the Republicans. True, Presi- 
 dent Cleveland had not made such appoint- 
 ments as the boss desired, but they were not 
 altogether unsatisfactory, and if the boss had 
 supported him he might have been even more 
 complaisant. There was very little to be 
 gained by the boss, therefore, through engag- 
 ing in this commerce for the sake of Hill, and 
 the increased power of the latter was a loss 
 and not a gain ; so that it must be looked 
 upon as a mistake ever to have allowed him 
 to become Governor, or at least at that time. 
 
 Another mistake of a similar kind has been 
 made in taking too prominent a part in nomi- 
 nating candidates for the Presidency. I must 
 repeat the caution that a boss is a secret ruler, 
 and that it is unwise to draw public attention 
 
to himself. Hence he should not send a dele- 
 gation to the convention of his party to de- 
 mand that this man shall be nominated and 
 that one not, as has several times been done 
 of late. For in no instance did the late Boss 
 of New York succeed in having the candidate 
 he favored nominated, or the one he opposed 
 defeated; although, as we have just seen, he 
 prevented the election of one after he had 
 been nominated. He thus failed altogether 
 in securing the offices, which was the only 
 interest he had in the matter; he made the 
 President hostile to him by his conduct; and 
 the affair was so notorious that he acquired 
 a reputation for treachery to his party that 
 he could never be rid of. The result of all 
 these mistakes has been to weaken the organ- 
 ization greatly, by making it odious not only 
 in the city of New York, but also in the 
 whole country. For it must never be for- 
 gotten by a boss that his rule really depends 
 upon his keeping the people from thinking of 
 it. He and his organization are never be- 
 loved, and can endure only so long as the 
 people are not stirred up to active sedition. 
 If a boss acts upon the principle that he can 
 defy the people, and attempts to rule them 
 
openly and to display his power in a despotic 
 manner, they will quickly rise against him 
 and overthrow him, and even cast him into 
 gaol, as they did Boss Tweed. Hence, as the 
 organization of the boss necessarily compre- 
 hends many thieves and ruffians and miscre- 
 ants of every kind, he should never allow it 
 to parade or appear at all in public, lest the 
 people, being suddenly made aware of the 
 real character of those who rule over them, 
 be moved by shame and disgust to revolt. 
 
CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 OF SOME FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF 
 THESE MISTAKES. 
 
 Let no one suppose that a defeat suffered 
 by a boss in external affairs has no effect 
 upon his power at home. If any one enter- 
 tains such an opinion he has only to consider 
 the disastrous consequences which have re- 
 sulted from the folly of the Boss of New York 
 in allowing himself to be made the tool of 
 Senator Hill in the manner just set forth. 
 For one of these consequences was that the 
 boss lost control of the legislature, and be- 
 cause of this he was compelled to give up a 
 great share of the revenue derived from the 
 corporations to the Republican politicians, or 
 else forego it altogether. He was also obliged 
 to surrender the control of the police of New 
 Yqrk by sharing it with the boss of the 
 Republicans. Besides this he lost prestige 
 Z13 
 
among his followers, and encouraged those 
 whom he had allowed to grow too great to 
 defy him openly and to combine to take the 
 power away from him. 
 
 But what was worse than this, his defeat 
 wonderfully cheered the Reformers, and stirred 
 them up to make the most virulent attacks 
 upon the organization. The nature of these 
 attacks shows the truth of the maxims that I 
 have laid down in this treatise. Where these 
 maxims have been observed the organization 
 has repelled all assaults, if any have been 
 made ; but where they have been violated 
 the attack has succeeded. Thus the laws 
 concerning voting at elections are just laws, 
 in the sense that I have before explained; 
 but the boss allowed his followers to violate 
 them openly. Consequently when the or- 
 ganization was attacked because of this, it 
 was able to offer no defense. The boss, there- 
 fore, by violating the maxim as to just laws, 
 failed to accomplish that at which he aimed, 
 demoralized his own forces, and caused the 
 name of his organization to stink in the nos- 
 trils of the people. 
 
 Moreover his defeat enabled the Reformers 
 to bring about an investigation of his govern- 
 214 
 
ment. Ordinarily these investigations do a 
 boss no harm, for they are conducted by the 
 Republican politicians, who are his secret al- 
 lies, and if a boss has wisely distributed his 
 favors among them he is secure from injury. 
 And in the present case the Republican poli- 
 ticians were indeed very reluctant to have 
 an investigation ; but they were not able to 
 withstand the taunts of the Reformers. Even 
 then, had the maxims here laid down been 
 observed, the investigation would either not 
 have taken place or would have had no inju- 
 rious results. For if there had been a Re- 
 publican politician among the Commissioners 
 of Police he would have been held responsible 
 for the corruption of that body, and his party 
 with him ; whereas, by yielding to the greed 
 of his followers in demanding all these offices, 
 the boss had assumed the entire responsibil- 
 ity. In consequence of these errors a great 
 part of the system whereby the revenue of 
 the boss is collected has been made public, 
 to the incomputable injury of his power. 
 
 This investigation showed the wisdom of 
 
 these maxims in another way. For I pointed 
 
 out that it was unwise for a boss to allow his 
 
 followers to levy any assessments for them- 
 
 215 
 
selves, lest the burden to the citizens become 
 intolerable. But this is exactly what the 
 investigation disclosed ; for the keepers of 
 bawdy-houses had faithfully paid their regu- 
 lar assessments without any complaint, but 
 when they found that in spite of this they 
 were persecuted and that additional contri- 
 butions were exacted from them, they were 
 driven to despair. Had they been treated 
 with justice by the boss and been secured 
 the immunity for which they had paid, they 
 would never have been brought to testifj'' 
 against him ; for they would have feared that 
 he might ruin them. But being already 
 ruined by his oppression, and having nothing 
 to hope for, they determined to take such 
 revenge as was in their power by disclosing 
 the methods by which the boss and his fol- 
 lowers carried on the government of the city. 
 On the other hand, the observation of the 
 principles which I laid down concerning the 
 revenue to be derived from corporations was 
 proved to be extremely advantageous to the 
 boss in this investigation. For many of the 
 managers of these corporations are Republi- 
 cans and some of them are Republican poli- 
 ticians, and they were entirely unwilling that 
 216 
 
their dealings with the boss should be made 
 public. It is uncertain whether they stood 
 in dread of the law or whether they were 
 well satisfied with their treatment by the 
 boss ; nor is this point material, since it was 
 at all events arranged that he should with- 
 draw for a season to a foreign country. His 
 release by the investigators is thus a sufificient 
 proof that the collection of revenue from cor- 
 porations had been managed with skill. By 
 protecting them against the blackmailing 
 schemes of his followers he has rendered 
 them a service which it is worth their while 
 to pay for; and by allowing the Republican 
 leaders to receive some of this revenue he 
 has made sure that they will take pains to 
 keep it secret. Thus a wise liberality is pro- 
 ductive of more revenue in the end than a 
 selfish greed. " There is that scattereth, and 
 yet increaseth ; and there is that withholdeth 
 more than is meet, but it tendeth to poverty." 
 
 217 
 
CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 OF WHAT DESERVES PRAISE OR BLAME IN 
 THE CONDUCT OF BOSSES. 
 
 It now remains to show in what manner 
 a boss should behave to his subjects and fol- 
 lowers. Now I, like Machiavelli, write only 
 for those who possess sound judgment, and I 
 think it better to treat this subject as it really 
 is, rather than to amuse the imagination with 
 visionary models of republics and govern- 
 ments which have never existed. I am aware 
 that Machiavelli has been much blamed be- 
 cause he counsels princes to be wicked. But 
 he explicitly says that the manner in which 
 men live is so different from that in which 
 they ought to live, that he who deviates from 
 the common course, and endeavors to act as 
 duty dictates, necessarily insures his own 
 destruction. Thus, he says, a good man, if 
 he wishes to be virtuous in all respects, must 
 218 
 
be undone in a contest with so many who are 
 wicked. Accordingly, when he inquires if a 
 prince ought to be faithful to his engage- 
 ments, he shows that all great princes have 
 resorted to deceit, and that it is impossible 
 for any one to succeed otherwise. 
 
 To place this matter in the clearest light, 
 let those who contend that bosses or princes 
 ought to exercise all the virtues answer this 
 question : How should a general behave in 
 the face of the enemy? Is he bound to ex- 
 plain to his adversary the movements that he 
 is about to make, the number and position of 
 his troops, and the strength of his defenses ; 
 or shall he mislead him by all manner of de- 
 ceit? But whatever is true of a general is 
 still more true of a boss. He is surrounded 
 with deadly enemies, who are continually on 
 the watch to overthi^ow him ; and of those 
 who pretend to be his friends the most are 
 ever ready to turn traitors. It would doubt- 
 less be happy, as Machiavelli says, for a prince 
 to unite in himself every species of good 
 quality, and the same is true of a boss ; but 
 our nature and the circumstances in which 
 we are placed do not allow such perfection to 
 exist. Machiavelli did not write his treatise 
 219 
 
for the purpose of encouraging men to be 
 princes ; nor do I recommend any one to try 
 to make himself a boss. But there are certain 
 principles that must be followed by princes 
 and bosses if they are to maintain themselves, 
 and it is desirable that these should be clearly 
 understood; by bosses for their own safety, 
 and by reformers in order that they may 
 know how to direct their attacks. As a writer 
 upon the art of war is not condemned because 
 he advises how the most horrible carnage and 
 destruction may be produced, so ought neither 
 Aristotle nor Machiavelli, nor those who imi- 
 tate them, to be blamed for explaining the 
 methods followed by politicians. 
 
 Let a boss, then, avoid both the defects 
 and the virtues that may occasion his ruin, 
 but let him not shrink from encountering 
 some blame on account of vices which are 
 important to the support of his power. Yet, 
 as Machiavelli admits, it is very desirable to 
 appear to have good quahties, even if one 
 does not really possess them; and Aristotle 
 expresses the same opinion. A boss, like a 
 prince, cannot exercise all the virtues, because 
 self-preservation will often compel him to vio- 
 late the laws of charity, religion, and justice; 
 
but he should endeavor to gain a reputation 
 among the people for kindness, piety, justice, 
 and fidelity to his engagements, and never ut- 
 ter anything in public which does not breathe 
 of these qualities. He should persevere in 
 the path of rectitude so long as he feels no 
 inconvenience in so doing, and only deviate 
 from it when prudence dictates such a course. 
 He should keep his word when he can do it 
 without injury to himself, and be careful not 
 to break faith with those whom he will have 
 to call upon at another time. It is idle for a 
 boss to think of gaining the affection of the 
 citizens ; yet if he cannot gain their love, he 
 may at least avoid their hatred. But among 
 his own followers he should be esteemed 
 merciless ; for only by dread of severe pun- 
 ishment can they be kept in discipline. As 
 Machiavelli says, friends acquired by means 
 of money alone, and whose attachment does 
 not spring from a regard for personal merit, 
 are seldom proof against reverse of fortune, 
 but abandon their benefactor when he most 
 requires their services. Friendship of this 
 kind, being a mere moral tie, a species of 
 duty resulting from a benefit, cannot endure 
 against the calculations of interest; whereas 
 
fear carries with it the dread of punishment, 
 which never loses its influence. 
 
 Concerning the breaking of faith, it should 
 be added that such promises as a boss may 
 find it inconvenient to fulfil he should never 
 make either in writing or in the presence of 
 witnesses. This rule he can the more easily 
 observe because of the secrecy of his govern- 
 ment ; and, if he follow it, those who accuse 
 him of bad faith will be unable to establish 
 the truth of their complaints, and will be 
 thought to be aggrieved by some private 
 disappointment. A boss ought also to take 
 care that he breaks faith only with those who 
 are not strong enough to injure him, or who 
 cannot serve him in the future. Accordingly 
 he should ruin a man at the time when he 
 breaks faith with him, in order to prevent him 
 from being mischievous ; and if the circum- 
 stances do not permit of this, then it will gen- 
 erally be better to keep faith with him, unless 
 the cost be too great. This is especially true 
 in the case of the Republican leaders. A boss 
 needs their aid continually, and they are so 
 situated that he cannot ruin them ; therefore 
 he should make them trust him, or they will 
 not keep faith with him in their turn. 
 
 222 
 
But toward his own followers a boss need 
 not hesitate to practise deceit. If he follow 
 the maxims that I have advanced, none of 
 these henchmen should be sufficiently power- 
 ful to be dangerous to him, and he ought to 
 be able to ruin any of them whenever he 
 chooses. He may therefore make them such 
 promises as are necessary to obtain willing 
 service; but if he find it not expedient to 
 keep these promises, let him not commit the 
 mistake of retaining among his followers those 
 whom he has disappointed. This would be 
 like the error of Antoninus, which Machiavelli 
 mentions, in keeping in his body-guard a 
 centurion whose brother he had put to an 
 ignominious death, and whom he continually 
 threatened ; an imprudence which cost him 
 his life. Matters of severity should be fin- 
 ished at one blow, that when the impulse to 
 revenge is most powerful the difficulty may 
 be the greatest. 
 
 223 
 
CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 OF CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER 
 
 IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN 
 
 FEARED. 
 
 That a boss should be feared by his fol- 
 lowers I have already maintained ; but the 
 matter deserves further explanation. A boss 
 cannot make use of the cruelties practised 
 by tyrants and princes of old, who had it in 
 their power to kill those obnoxious to them 
 and to confiscate their property. Neverthe- 
 less he can frequently make it difficult for 
 one whom he is determined to injure to suc- 
 ceed in earning a living ; and this is peculiarly 
 true of politicians, since if they are deprived 
 of office they are generally unable to do any- 
 thing for their own support. It is evident, 
 therefore, that it is possible for a boss to be 
 severe, as well as a prince or a tyrant, although 
 in a somewhat different way. And it still re- 
 224 
 
mains true that by showing severity at the 
 proper time there is frequently a saving of 
 suffering. By making a few examples at the 
 beginning a boss really shows more humanity 
 in the end, than if by too great indulgence 
 he permits disorders to arise which terminate 
 in rebellion. Such disorders disturb the whole 
 organization, while punishments inflicted by 
 a boss affect only a few individuals. 
 
 The fact that Machiavelli especially recom- 
 mends this policy to a new prince is evidence 
 that it is the proper policy for a boss. He 
 quotes with approbation what Virgil wrote of 
 Dido, who excused her severity by the neces- 
 sity under which she lay of defending a throne 
 which she did not inherit from her ancestors : 
 
 Res dura et regni novitas me talia cogunt 
 Moliri. 
 
 Men are still, as they were formerly, un- 
 grateful, timid, fickle, dissembling, and self- 
 ish ; so long as you can serve them they are 
 entirely devoted to you, but in the day of 
 need they turn their back upon you. He 
 ■that rules such creatures will find a reputa- 
 tion for cruelty useful to him by keeping them 
 in obedience ; and so it was in the case of 
 225 
 
Hannibal, who led a large army composed 
 of all kinds of people into a foreign country, 
 and yet had never occasion, either in pros- 
 perity or adversity, to punish the least dis- 
 order or the slightest lack of discipline. 
 
 Since the authority of a boss rests upon no 
 foundation of law, or hereditary dignity, or 
 affection, but simply upon the desire of gain 
 among his followers, it is necessary to its per- 
 manency that they should be made to trem- 
 ble at the very thought of treachery to him. 
 This can only be brought about by his pun- 
 ishing, with all the severity in his power, 
 whomsoever he sees to be ambitious of sup- 
 planting him, or inclined to the company of 
 plotters. This matter will not be clearly 
 understood without carefully discriminating 
 between the ways laid down by Aristotle for 
 preserving a tyranny, which appear to be 
 altogether opposite to one another. But if 
 we look at them narrowly we see that one of 
 these ways is to be followed by the tyrant or 
 the boss in dealing with the citizens — and of 
 this I shall presently speak — but the other 
 is to be taken in holding the nobles or the 
 politicians in subjection. As to them it is 
 undoubtedly true that the tyrant or the boss 
 226 
 
ought to keep down those who rise too high, 
 to guard against everything which is wont to 
 give rise to high spirits or mutual confidence, 
 to endeavor to know what every one chooses 
 to do or say, and for this purpose to employ 
 spies, and, in short, to spread everywhere sus- 
 picion and distrust. Aristotle sums up the 
 whole matter in the statement that there 
 should be three objects kept constantly in 
 view. One is, that the subjects should be of 
 abject dispositions, for such men never con- 
 spire against any one. The second is, that 
 they shall have no confidence in one another, 
 for while this is so the ruler is safe from at- 
 tack. And the third object is, that the sub- 
 jects shall be without the means of doing any- 
 thing, for no one undertakes what it is plainly 
 impossible for him to perform. What Aris- 
 totle and Machiavelli unite in recommending 
 need not be enforced by me ; and he is^ a 
 vain and presumptuous boss that thinks he 
 can safely disregard their cautions. 
 
 I will not repeat what these authors have 
 to say of the dangers of being hated and 
 despised, and of yielding to the pleasures of 
 sense, and of listening to flatterers; not be- 
 cause they are not important, but because it 
 227 
 
is better that every boss should read these 
 warnings for himself, and behold the exam- 
 ples which history has to offer him. But in 
 leaving the subject of punishment it should 
 be said that a boss may with great advan- 
 tage, upon many occasions, allow the magis- 
 trates to apply the law in the case of such 
 followers as he intends to destroy. For they 
 will generally have done things for which the 
 law provides punishment, and by allowing it 
 to be put in execution a boss may not only 
 avoid personal encounters and resentments, 
 but may also flatter the people by leading 
 them to believe that he does not hinder the 
 administration of justice but sustains it; and 
 this, too, is recommended by Aristotle. But 
 at the same time a boss should liberally re- 
 ward those who prove themselves wholly 
 faithful, so that all may see that but one way 
 exists wherein they may fare securely and 
 prosperously. In this manner a boss may 
 avoid the hatred, and even win the servile 
 attachment, if not the affection, of most of 
 his followers. 
 
 228 
 
CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 OF THE MEANS WHEREBY RULERS FIRMLY 
 ESTABLISH THEIR POWER. 
 
 After considering the causes whicli de- 
 stroy a monarchy or kingdom, Aristotle points 
 out that as one of these causes lies in bring- 
 ing the government nearer to a tyranny, so 
 the safety of a tyranny consists in making the 
 government more nearly like that of a king. 
 He lays it down, therefore, that the tyrant, 
 after having made sure of the power, should 
 partly act and partly affect to seem like a 
 king. He should appear to pay attention to 
 what belongs to the public, and not indulge 
 in such lavish expenditure as will offend the 
 people, who will be apt to think that his lux- 
 ury is paid for out of their earnings. Aris- 
 totle also recommends, as I have before shown, 
 that a tyrant should keep an exact account 
 both of what is received and of what is dis- 
 bursed, and should endeavor to appear to col- 
 229 
 
lect taxes and to require public services only 
 for the purposes of the state and not for his 
 own uses. He ought also to improve and 
 adorn the city, and observe many other pre- 
 cepts tending to keep his subjects quiet and 
 contented. The whole matter is summed up 
 by Aristotle when he says that the rule of 
 conduct for a tyrant is to afifect the character 
 of a guardian and king; to appear not the 
 plunderer but the protector of his people ; to 
 avoid ostentatious superiority in his manner 
 of living ; and to so order his conduct that he 
 may appear virtuous, or at least half good, 
 and not wholly wicked, but only in part. 
 
 Machiavelli in his turn discourses of liber- 
 ality and parsimony, and says that it is for 
 the interest of a prince to be accounted lib- 
 eral, but dangerous for him so to exercise his 
 liberality as to be thereby neither feared nor 
 respected. He explains this by saying that 
 if a prince be only liberal for his own grati- 
 fication he will please but few and will be 
 called selfish. A prince who wishes to gain 
 the reputation of being liberal should be re- 
 gardless of expense ; but then, to support this 
 reputation, he will often be reduced to the 
 necessity of levying taxes upon his subjects, 
 230 
 
and of resorting to every species of fiscal ex- 
 pedient, which cannot fail to make him odious. 
 Besides exhausting the public treasury by his 
 prodigality he will destroy his credit, and will 
 run the risk of losing his power on the first 
 reverse of fortune ; his liberality, as always 
 happens, having insured him more enemies 
 than friends. And, which is worse, he cannot 
 retrace his steps and replenish his finances 
 without being charged with avarice. 
 
 A prince, therefore, who cannot be liberal 
 without endangering his power should not 
 trouble himself much about the imputation 
 of being covetous ; for he will be esteemed 
 liberal in time, when his people see that by 
 economy he has improved his revenue so as 
 to be able to undertake useful enterprises 
 without imposing new taxes. Then the many 
 from whom he takes nothing will deem him 
 sufficiently liberal, and the few only whose 
 greed he has failed to satisfy will accuse him 
 of avarice. Machiavelli illustrates this by the 
 example of Julius II, who attained the ponti- 
 fical chair by means of his bounty, but judged 
 rightly in supposing that in order to succeed 
 in his wars he must practise parsimony at 
 the sacrifice of all reputation for liberality. 
 231 
 
He also refers to Caesar, who, it is alleged, 
 could never have attained the empire but by 
 his liberality, and comments upon this claim 
 in these words : " You are either in possession 
 of dominion already, or you are not. In the 
 former case liberality would be prejudicial; 
 in the latter case the reputation of it is ser- 
 viceable and necessary." Csesar endeavored 
 to appear liberal while he aspired to the em- 
 pire of Rome. But if he had lived longer he 
 would have lost that reputation for liberality 
 which had paved him the way to empire, or 
 he would have lost himself in the attempt to 
 preserve it. There have been princes, like 
 Cyrus, Alexander, and Cassar himself, distin- 
 guished for their success and also for their 
 liberality ; their prodigaHty, however, was not 
 at the expense of the public purse, but was 
 supported out of the spoils of war. Machia- 
 velli, however, cordially approves great enter- 
 prises as tending to make a prince esteemed, 
 and recommends him to honor talents, to 
 protect the arts, to have provision made for 
 the entertainment of the people with festivals 
 and shows, and to do everything in his power 
 to attach his subjects to his rule by making 
 their lives as easy and pleasant for them as 
 232 
 
possible. In their advice to the tyrant and 
 to the prince it thus appears that Aristotle 
 and Machiavelli are altogether at one, and it 
 only remains for me to show the application of 
 their wisdom to the particular circumstances 
 of a boss of New York 
 
 233 
 
CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 EXHORTATION TO THE BOSS OF NEW YORK 
 
 TO DELIVER THE CITY FROM MISGOV- 
 
 ERNMENT. 
 
 As I began by pointing out that he who 
 would enjoy permanent power as a boss must 
 be contented to live without ostentation, so I 
 will conclude this treatise with the same re- 
 flection. For if it be true, as Aristotle says, 
 that a tyrant ought to pay attention to what 
 belongs to the city, and not indulge in lavish 
 expense, lest he offend the people, it is also 
 true of a boss. If he who has no open source 
 of revenue spends great sums in buying race- 
 horses and stock-farms, and maintains race- 
 courses himself, besides building a palace and 
 maintaining a gorgeous equipage, he cannot 
 fail to arouse envy and hatred. Moreover, 
 by participating in the gains made by en- 
 couraging gambling at the race-tracks, he 
 234 
 
will be tempted to enforce the law against 
 gambling elsewhere ; in which way he will 
 incur the enmity of the gamesters, as is said 
 to have happened in the case of those who 
 keep what are called pool- rooms. Their 
 phght may not excite the sympathy of the 
 people, but they are most trustworthy sup- 
 porters of the organization, and they are 
 likely to become disaffected when they see 
 their own gains reduced in order to swell 
 those of the boss. It is true, then, as Aristotle 
 says, that many will think that these luxuries 
 of the boss are paid for out of their hard 
 labor. 
 
 What Machiavelli says of liberality is also 
 true. If the boss allow the city to be plun- 
 dered by his followers, and blackmail to be 
 levied on every hand, he will find it impossi- 
 ble to obtain the necessary means for great 
 schemes of improvement. What vast reve- 
 nues might now be flowing not only into the 
 treasury of the organization but also into the 
 coffers of the boss, out of the construction of 
 a roadway underneath the city, had not the 
 organization become so odious through its 
 blackmail that every citizen cries out when- 
 ever it proposes any new undertaking ! It is 
 235 
 
not even possible to build a great palace for 
 the public offices, because the rapacity of 
 some of the followers of the boss has become 
 ungovernable. What is this but to be liberal 
 in such a way as to be neither feared nor 
 respected? Has it secured any friends to 
 the boss? Or rather has it not made him 
 more enemies and ingrates than friends? 
 
 It is true that in order to lay hold of the 
 power it may be necessary to be liberal, as 
 Caesar was ; although he was able to secure 
 the means for this by the sale of the captives 
 that he took in war. But when once power 
 has been attained, the boss should see to it 
 that his liberality never takes the form of 
 allowing his followers to plunder at their 
 will. As Aristotle says, he need never fear 
 the lack of money so long as he is ruler, but 
 let him obtain and expend it in the manner 
 that I have shown, and not with an ill-advised 
 liberality that only makes him odious to the 
 citizens and weak in the eyes of those whose 
 excesses he winks at. And as to his own 
 expenditure, let it be as secret as possible, in 
 order that he may not suffer the fate of the 
 tyrants described by Aristotle, who perished 
 because, from the vain wish to be envied, 
 236 
 
they invited many to witness their extrava- 
 gance and debauchery. 
 
 In order to win esteem for himself, or at 
 least, such a degree of favor as to make him 
 safe against revolt, the boss should therefore 
 follow Aristotle's advice and endeavor to 
 appear rather the guardian than the plun- 
 derer of the city, and to gratify the pride 
 and promote the comfort of the inhabitants. 
 For the people of this city care principally 
 for two things : to be comfortable themselves, 
 and to make a display before one another. 
 And of the two, perhaps they would for the 
 most part rather seem to others to be happy 
 and luxurious than really to be so ; for they 
 are willing to live in very confined abodes 
 provided they can dress so as to be thought 
 rich when they go abroad. Moreover men 
 are so constituted that every individual re- 
 gards himself as somehow of greater merit 
 and importance when he is a citizen of a great 
 community than when he is an inhabitant of a 
 village ; and this is true whether he deserves 
 any distinction or not. Even St. Paul took 
 pride in being of no mean city ; and he who 
 dwells in a city with two millions of other 
 pien, although he may be himself ignorant 
 237 
 
and vicious, yet feels a contempt for even 
 wise and virtuous men who dwell in smaller 
 communities. 
 
 This form of pride is especially stimulated 
 by whatever makes a city beautiful, conve- 
 nient, and magnificent. All pubHc works 
 that tend to do this are a support to a boss, 
 and the more magnificent they are the greater 
 the esteem in which he stands. Thus even 
 Boss Tweed is spoken of with favor by many 
 because of the great avenues laid out under 
 his rule ; and the same is true of Boss Shep- 
 herd of the city of Washington. Let not a 
 boss fear the expense of such works ; for if 
 they render the city more attractive the citi- 
 zens will make little complaint of the cost, 
 and, besides, rich men will be more drawn to 
 dwell here from all parts of the country, 
 thereby Hghtening the burden. Nothing has 
 been more productive of revenue to the poli- 
 ticians than the great bridge over the East 
 River; but so great is the pride of the people 
 in this structure that no one ever inquires 
 into the cost of maintaining it. Even if these 
 works cannot be made directly productive of 
 revenue to a boss, because of the interference 
 of the Reformers, yet as they tend to draw 
 238 
 
wealth to the city they are sure to increase 
 his revenue indirectly. 
 
 Upon this principle nothing is more foolish 
 than for a boss to permit laws to be passed, 
 or to be enforced, that expose the wealthy 
 to vexation and annoyance. All attempts to 
 pry into the sources of the income of citizens 
 or its amount, for the purposes of taxation, 
 are of this nature, and it is because of their 
 freedom from vexation of this kind hitherto 
 that so many wealthy persons have come to 
 this city to reside. But in recent years we 
 have seen such laws enacted as drive the 
 richest corporations to seek their charters 
 without the state. A boss that permits and 
 encourages such an imbecile poHcy as this is 
 not likely to hold his place very long. He 
 not only dries up the sources of his revenue, 
 but by the annoyance he occasions the man- 
 agers of the corporations he turns them into 
 most dangerous enemies. Now, also, there 
 are incessant attempts made to compel people 
 that own property that has already paid taxes 
 to pay again upon their evidences of prop- 
 erty, so that many of them spend their time 
 in foreign countries or in other places where 
 they are not harassed in this way. Such a 
 239 
 
policy as this will not be pursued by any en- 
 lightened boss, but he will endeavor rather 
 to secure for the wealthy, so long as they do 
 not oppose him, all manner of protection and 
 rehef from annoyance. 
 
 Indeed it is undoubtedly true that the 
 greatest support of the government of the 
 boss at present lies in the protection to life 
 and property that it furnishes. Men delight 
 to walk abroad without fear of violence, and 
 to sleep in their houses without dread of rob- 
 bery ; and they are not easily moved to rebel 
 against a government which secures them 
 these blessings. But if they find that they 
 are in danger of robbery under the guise of 
 taxation and other forms of law, and are plun- 
 dered rather than protected by the police, 
 they will quickly cease to be contented with 
 their rulers. Let the boss, therefore, study 
 by every means in his power to allay appre- 
 hensions of this kind ; thinking, like the hus- 
 bandman who sows seed, that what he seems 
 to lose now he will gather with increase here- 
 after. 
 
 In the matter of public works and improve- 
 ments, also, a boss should remember that his 
 subjects greatly consider their own comfort 
 240 
 
and are enraged and disaffected when they 
 cannot go forth without annoyance. The 
 policy of covering the streets with smooth 
 pavements is undoubtedly to be commended, 
 for it has not only brought in revenue, but 
 has also won much support to the boss ; but 
 this advantage is in danger of being lost if 
 the streets are not kept clean. I am aware 
 that a boss encounters here a great difficulty, 
 owing to his being obliged to rule through 
 the Irish race. For these people, being 
 uncivilized in their own country, and accus- 
 tomed to live in cabins which they share with 
 fowls and swine, become indifferent to ordure ; 
 it being a saying among them, to justify their 
 mode of life, that as the pig pays the rent he 
 deserves to share the cot. Accordingly when 
 they come to this city they consider it a waste 
 of time to clean the streets, and probably the 
 most of them do not know whether they are 
 clean or filthy. Hence it is not easy to get 
 them to attend to this matter, even if they 
 are paid to do so. But there is nothing in 
 the shape of misgovernment that so openly 
 appears as this. For it cannot be concealed, 
 and it is as it were forced upon the senses 
 of all, both residents and strangers. A wise 
 241 
 
boss will therefore permit none of his follow- 
 ers to trifle in this business, but will see to it 
 that the work is done; rightly considering 
 nothing beneath his attention that directly 
 affects the disposition of his subjects. I do 
 not hesitate to say that this single matter is 
 of vital importance to the rule of the boss, 
 for if he had taken care that the streets were 
 always free from filth and dust, and were 
 kept smoothly paved and clear of obstruc- 
 tions, the Reformers would now try to over- 
 throw him in vain, no matter how great sums 
 he had expended ; whereas by allowing the 
 streets to be filthy and unsafe he disgusted 
 the citizens and made them ready to listen 
 to his enemies. 
 
 Let the boss, then, as Aristotle recom- 
 mends, play the part of a real king, securing 
 to himself the power in the manner that I 
 have explained, but using it to make the city 
 not only safe, comfortable, and healthy, but 
 also convenient, stately, and splendid. Let 
 him not fear to be extravagant in spending 
 great sums upon docks and parks and public 
 buildings, provided they are beautiful and 
 magnificent. For such things, as plainly 
 appeared at the great Fair at the city of 
 242 
 
Chicago, delight the people, and there is no 
 limit to the amount which they are willing to 
 have spent in this way. Let him never for- 
 get that whatever draws men to the city of 
 New York, and especially those who have 
 riches, increases the number of his subjects 
 and the sources of his revenue. Let him 
 study continually to make the life of the citi- 
 zens more and ijiore agreeable to them. A 
 boss that will assiduously follow this policy 
 will establish his power upon a firm founda- 
 tion and will bring to naught the counsels of 
 the Reformers and of all his other enemies. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 243