ii! iIMLawi. }■; POLITICAL HISTORY )F JAPAN CORNELL university Library FROM Cornell University Library DS 835.B18 1921 The influence of the sea on the politica 3 1924 023 232 782 The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924023232782 THE INFLUENCE OF THE SEA ON THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF JAPAN The Influence of the Sea on The Political History of Japan BY VICE-ADMIRAL G. A. BALLARD, C.B. FORMERLY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTEtTl-IGENCE AND DIRECTOR OF THE OPERATIONS DIVISION OF THE ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF. GOLD MEDALLIST OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION NEW YORK E. P. DUTTON & CO. 1921 PREFACE This book is the outcome of suggestions made to me by friends, naval and otherwise, that I should employ the enforced leisure of half-pay in turning my attention to authorship ; but in offering it for the perusal of those who are attracted by historical subjects I would ask them to be indulgent enough to remember that forty-five years of service in the Navy is not the best of training for literary effort. All I have endeavoured to Accomplish, therefore, is to present a seaman's view of a subject of maritime interest which nobody has hitherto studied as a whole, and as I do not possess the advantage of being able to read the old Japanese records in the original, I have been dependent for my information in regard to the events in history upon the labours of those who do. Many histories of Japan have appeared in English, but very different versions of ancient historical occurrences are to be found in the various accounts hitherto published, and, as far as I have been able to ascertain in an exhaustive search through the British Museum Library, no attempt has been made to sift the discrepancies and produce a standard record based on an acceptance of the points on which the majority of weU-qualified writers are in agree- ment. Moreover, some writers, by specializing in the treatment of selected periods and passing lightly over others, have produced books which are lacking in propor- tion as a guide to the study of the whole matter, however valuable as works of reference for a part. vi PREFACE In approaching the subject, therefore, I began by com- paring all the different histories of Japan that have been published in this country, and, after eliminating all ver- sions of important events which are not accepted by the majority of recognized authorities, I arrived at a frame- work of history standing on the best foundation at present procurable or perhaps ever likely to be. The various writings dealing with special periods then afforded a fair amount of material for filling this framework in. Thus I am chiefly indebted for my information regarding Japanese events before the seventeenth century to Murdoch, whose detailed and instructive history is com- piled, I believe, from a first-hand acquaintance with authentic and original records, and is specially useful for a professional survey of such important chapters in the annals of Japan as the destruction of Kublai Khan's great armada of 4,500 ships, and the tremendous struggle with Korea and China in the sixteenth century, in which the Japanese naval and military operations were con- ducted on a scale reducing aU British wars before our own immediate time to insignificance. Perhaps few of our countrymen realize that long before the Napoleonic wars in Europe the seamen and soldiers of Japan had fought battles on both elements where the numbers engaged and the slaughter involved were greatly in excess of those at Trafalgar and Waterloo. For the period of seclusion which lasted from the middle of the seventeenth till the middle of the nineteenth century I am indebted for my information, in part again to Mur- doch, and in part to Brinkly, Aston, and others. In dealing with the era immediately following the emer- gence of Japan from her state of self-imposed isolation, historians are necessarily on firmer ground than before and discrepancies become rarer; but I have taken Adams's PREFACE vu history as the most reliable guide, nevertheless, being the work of one who was an actual spectator of the main incidents of that period as a member of the stafE of the British Legation. For a still later period I have been able to rely on official records. None of the above authors, however, can write as pro- fessional seamen, and none have made the influence of the sea on the political story of Japan a separate branch of investigation. It has been my endeavour, therefore, to extract aU matters of political importance on which the maritime situation has produced an effect, and add the comments suggesting themselves to a naval officer. But as these comments, although based on long experience, are merely expressions of personal opinion, I should welcome criticism or discussion by those who are qualified by professional training or special study to offer it. G. A. B. London, March, 1921 CONTENTS INTEODUCTOEY Position of Japan as affected by defeat of Germany and break-up of Eussia — Now third Power in the world — Mari- time strength — Financial position — Necessity for other countries to study Japan more than they do — Reasons for small part played by Japan in international aflairs informer days easily discernible in her history — ^Always potentially a Great Power — Martial temperament and warlike skill in Middle Ages — Insular position prevented conquering policy on large scale in days of primitive navigation — But saved Japan from conquest by Kublai Khan — Incessant oivU wars maintain military caste and lead to system of dictatorship under Shogun — Influence of sea on her early history bene- ficial on the whole- — Change in that condition owing to universal progress in art of shipbuildings — Military expedi- tions across water on large scale become practicable — War on the sea itself follows this development — Japan at first faUs to realize the change — Consequently defeated at first attempt to wage oversea war — Eemarkable value of the lessons of that war— Followed by 200 years' voluntary and rigid seclusion on part of Japan from whole world — Decadent effect of isolation — Sea surroundings detrimental to interests at this period — ^Arrival of Perry at Yokohama fljst forcible awakening — Further lesson inflicted by bom- bardment of two Japanese ports — Japanese realize their helpless position — Decide to build navy of their own — Development of new fleet — Outbreak of war with China in 1894 — ^Lessons of Korean War of sixteenth century carefully taken to heart — Japanese realized that sea command first condition of success and assumed the offen- sive — Complete success brought her period of preparation to take her place as a World Power to an end and opened new era — Final test of war with first-class military State — Supreme importance of sea command in a war with Eussia — Successful survival of the ordeal — Securely established CONTENTS as one of the Great Powers — General summary of influence of sea on Japanese history — First a source of safety — Then a source of danger — Then again of safety — First period of isolation natural — Second artificial — Combined duration 1,500 years — ^Followed by period of probation lasting for fifty — ^Followed again by present period of power 1-12 CHAPTEK I THE PEKIOD OF NATTJEAL SECLUSION TO THE END OP THE MONGOL INVASION General description of natural features of Japanese Empire, and racial characteristics of Japanese people — Conditions of their life foster fighting qualities — Land supports popu- lation, but only with difficulty- — Importance of ships for coastwise traffic — ^Very little foreign trade in early days — Proximity of Korea and strategic importance to Japan — Japanese expedition to Korea in second century — ^Pirst foreign attack on Japan occurred in eleventh — ^Attackers were tribe of Manchurian pirates — Description of ships — Styles of fighting — Kaiders defeated — Important effect of failure of raiders on other mainland States — Japanese left unmolested for 200 years thereafter — Birth of Mongol Empire — Serious menace to Japan — Ambitions of Kublai Khan to conquer Japan — Difficidty of getting there — ^Dip- lomatic advances rejected by Japanese — Kublai Khan pre- pares for war — Building fleet of 1,000 ships — Five years' preparation — ^First invasion in 1273 with 40,000 men — Invaders driven back to their ships — ^Fleet scattered by gale, with great losses — Kublai prepares second expedition on much larger scale — Fleet of 4,000 ships with 150,000 men^ — ^Six years' preparations — Defensive measures in Japan — Final diplomatic advance by Kublai — Kejected by Japanese — Invading army embarks — Great concentration of 4,500 vessels — Alarm in Japan — ^Landing of invaders — Desperate fighting — Complete destruction of Mongol fleet by violent typhoon — Terrible scene of destruction — ^Loss of 130,000 lives — ^Last attempt to invade Japan — Interval of 680 years before Japan again attacked- — Remarkable cir- cumstance that next attack came from Europe, 14,000 mUes distant — Great development of naval architecture in that interval renders this possible - - - 13-41 CONTENTS xi CHAPTEE II THE KOBEADT WAB OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTUET PAQES Three centuries of external peace for Japan — Notable for arrival of first Europeans and cliange in China — Dictator- ship of Shoguns established — ^Ambitions of Hideyoshi to conquer China^ — Preparation of fleet and army — ^Failure to obtain help of Portuguese ships — Prolonged diplomatic controversy with Korea — Request for Korean help re- jected — Hideyoshi decides to invade Korea first — ^Army of 200,000 men sails for Korea — ^Arrives safely and carries out briUiantly successful advance — Korean fleet under re- markable admiral, Yi-sun — Styles of sea-fighting in the East in sixteenth century^ — Korean flagship specially designed to meet them — Dreadnought of her day — Yi-sun attacks Japanese fleet and wins three great battles — Suicide of Japanese admiral — Japanese communications cut — Cap- ture of large convoy of ships with supplies for Japanese army — Yi-sun moves westward — Defeats another Japanese fleet convoying 100,000 reserve troops to Korea- — Convoy destroyed — Japanese plans for invading China ruined by defeat on the sea — Victorious Japanese army in Korea re- duced to starvation and forced to retreat to ports where it had landed — Temporary cessation of hostilities by Koreans and Chinese — Hideyoshi orders army to hold its positions on Korean coast while he gains time by prolonged diplomatic negotiations and builds new fleet^ — Koreans play into his hands by superseding Yi-sun through Court intrigue — But Korean and Chinese armies largely increased and reorganized^ — Hideyoshi fails to realize this — When ready he resumes hostilities with new army and fleet — Japanese victorious over new Korean admiral — Second invasion begins— Not successful in advancing far — Stubborn opposition of Korean and Chinese armies — Koreans reappoint Yi-sun to command fleet — ^Apprehension of Japanese in consequence^ — Death of Hideyoshi and consequent abandonment of campaign — Yi-sun attacks Japanese fleet convoying retiring army — Sixth and last great fleet action — Yi-sun kiUed in the fight — His character as Nelson of the East — One of the greatest leaders of men in history, with genius for strategy — Remarkable lessons of this war stUl applicable to oversea enterprises — No material gains to Japanese, but valuable experience, bearing fruit long after — Influence of the sea detrimental to Japan at this period of her history - - - 42-72 xii CONTENTS CHAPTEE III THE PERIOD OP VOLUNTAET SECLUSION TO THE OPENING OF THE TEBATT POETS AND THE ANTI-FOEEIGN DIS- TDEBANCES PAGES End of Korean War initiates long period of peace — Activity of Jesuit missionaries in Japan — ^Large numbers of Japanese Christian converts — Power of the priests — Their ambition to obtain political influence in Japan — Quarrels with Japa- nese—Alarm of Shogun at attitude of Christian converts — Edict of extermination of Christians and expulsion of aU foreigners from Japan — ^Difficulty in carrying it out — Ex- ception made in favour of Dutch under special restrictions — Beginning of period of 200 years of seclusion from the rest of the world — Japanese prohibited by own laws from leaving country — Other countries making rapid progress during this period in arts of peace and war — Great advance in science of shipbuilding and navigation — Precarious posi- tion of Japanese as weak island State — Trouble with United States over shipwrecked crews — ^Mission sent to Japan under Commodore Perry — Insistence on opening trade — Japanese afraid to refuse — First Treaty ports opened — Treaty with United States, followed by similar treaties with Great Britain, France, and Holland — ^Feeling against foreigners remains — Mikado averse to aU treaties, but Sho- gun ignores him — Clans of Satsuma and Chosiu support Mikado — Outrages on foreigners — Prince of Chosiu fires on United States, Dutch, and French vessels in Straits of Shimonoseki — Inefiective minor reprisals by ships of war of those Powers- — British Government orders fleet to Kagosima to demand punishment of murderers of British subjects and payment of indemnity by Satsuma clan — Confused condition of authority in Japan - 73-94 CHAPTEE IV THE BATTLES OF KAGOSIMA AND SHIMONOSEKI Arrival of British fleet under Kuper at Bay of Kagosima — Difficulty of pilotage — Eumoured nature of defences — Parleys with Satsuma officials — ^Delivery of British ulti- matum — Delay in reply and ultimate failure of attempts made to negotiate — ^Active measures begun by seizure of three Satsuma ships — Batteries on shore fire on British ships — Battle of Kagosima — Complete defeat of Satsuma — Kuper returns to Yokohama — Marked efEect of engagement CONTENTS xiii PAGES on all Japan — Payment of indemnity to British authori- ties — Subsequent friendly attitude of Satsuma leaders — But Chosiu leaders remain hostile — Conference of foreign Ministers to decide measures against Chosiu — Ultimatum to Mikado — Chaotic internal condition of Japan — British, French, and Dutch squadrons sail in company to enforce disarmament of Chosiu batteries — Their demands rejected — Battle of Shimonoseki and destruction of defences — Submission of Chosiu prince — Conference to settle indem- nity — Great effect on Japan — Complete reversal of attitude on the part of powerful clans — Confused political condition of country begins to improve — Foreign diplomats demand direct dealings with Mikado instead of Shogun — Mikado refuses further concessions — His death relieves situation — Young successor more enlightened — End of Shogunate de- creed — Rebellion on part of last Shogun — His troops march on capital, but suffer defeat — His fleet sails for northern island of Yezo and proclaims .independent republic — Tem- porarily successful, owing to weakness of Imperial forces on the sea — Ships purchased by Imperial Grovernment— Ex- pedition to retake Yezo — Engagements on land and sea and final defeat of rebels — Definite establishment of Mikado's power as actual ruler of Japan after lapse of 600 years — Great progress under new conditions — ^Pounding of Imperial Navy - - 96-124 CHAPTEE V THE FEBST PHASE OP THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAE Importance to Japan of keeping Korea free from domination by any other Power increased by developments in science of naval architecture — Strategic position of Korea affects China as well as Japan — ^A constant source of friction be- tween China and Japan for centuries — China claimed Korea as a tributary State over which she had special rights — Japan always refused to admit this— China averse to intro- duction of Western civilization into Korea — Japan in favour of it — Interests of both in KoreaeventuaUysettled by Con- vention of Tientsin in 1885 — Oppressive government of Korean Court party causes rebellion in 1894 — Chinese send troops to assist in quelling it — Japanese send troops also and suggest co-operation in reforming Korea — Chinese decline — EebeUion dies out — Japanese propose mutual withdrawal of troops — Chinese refuse this and prepare to send reinforcements by sea — Japanese send squadron to 2 xiv CONTENTS PAGES Korean coast to prevent their arrival — Orders sent to Japa- nese troops in Korea to prepare to attack Chinese force already there — ^War imminent — General features of stra- tegic situation — ^Advantages possessed by China — Compari- son of rival fleets — First outbreak of hostilities — Japanese squadron attack and defeat Chinese cruisers convoying transports and sink British steamer with Chinese troops on board — ^Diplomatic aspects of the incident — First oc- casion in history of a troop transport being sunk by torpedo — ^War formally declared — ^Laok of enterprise of Chinese fleet — ^Despatch of Chinese troops to Korea by land — Great invading expedition prepared in Japan — Japanese land victory at Peng-yang — Chinese fleet escorts store transports to Yalu Eiver — ^Discovered there by Japanese fleet — Battle of Yalu and defeat of Chinese — Escape of remnant to Port Arthur — Comments on the tactics of both fleets and general results of the battle — ^Attention of other countries aroused by Japanese victories — Eemarkable effect on public estimation of the Navy in Japan - - - 125-153 CHAPTER VI THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAS. AND THE FIBST ALLIANCE VS^ITH GREAT BRITAIN General remarks on strategic positions after Battles of Yalu and Peng-yang — Necessity for Japan to capture Chinese naval base to render Japanese maritime predominance per- manent — Strategic importance of Port Arthur — Plans for its seizure — Expedition starts, escorted by Japanese fleet — Lands without opposition on Liao-Tung Peninsula in rear of Port Arthur — Japanese fail to watch fortress from sea- ward — Chinese fleet escapes to Wei-hai-wei — Covering Japanese armies invade Manchuria from Korea — ^Advance on Port Arthur — Capture of fortress by land assault — Dis- appointment of Japanese at escape of hostile fleet — Neces- sity of capturing Wei-hai-Wei to destroy fleet — Further expedition required in consequence — Description of Wei- hai-wei from defensive standpoint — Estimate of its general strategic value — Plans for its capture — Expedition lands in Yung-ohing Bay — Severity of weather — General scheme of attack — ^Advance on first group of forts from rear Capture of aU land defences — Destruction of many Chinese ships by torpedoes in succession of night attacks by Japa- nese flotUlas — Desperate situation of remnant — Final surrender — Suicide of Chinese admiral — Estimate of his CONTENTS XV PAGES character — Japanese maritime supremacy over China thoroughly secured — ^All Japanese objects in entering war obtained — Peace arranged — ^Terms of Treaty of Shimo- noseki between Japan and China — Marked moral effect in Europe — Intervention of Russia, Prance, and Germany to prevent Japan retaining Port Arthur — ^Anger in Japan — Great diplomatic blunder of Germany— Events and con- siderations leading up to treaty of aUiance with Great Britain — Great instrument for securing peace in Par East — Supreme influence of the sea on situation thus created — Treaty based on maritime power — ^Pirst convention of its kind between a European and an Asiatic State — ^Also first between two island empires - - - 154-184 CHAPTER VII THE FIEST PHASE OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE MARITIME WAS General remarks on origin of Russian Empire in Asia — Want of an ice-free port anywhere in Russian territory a permanent source of political unrest in the East — Russian acquisition of Port Arthur in 1898 — Strategic situation thereby created — Boxer outbreak in China affords Russia a pretext for the occupation of Manchuria — Protests by other Powers — Japanese interests in Korea and neighbourhood especially affected — Japan proposes settlement by a compromise — Russia refuses— Strategic features of the Russo-Japanese controversy — Grave difficulties of Japan — ^Advantages of Russian position — Only one advantage possessed by Japan — Special peculiarities of general situation — Comparison of fleets — Faulty disposition of Russians — War becomes in- evitable — Japanese break off diplomatic relations and attack Russian ships outside Port Arthur — Russians retire into harbour — Mobilization of armies — ^Difficult situation arises for Japan^ — ^Doubts as to next move — Bold decision to send large army to Manchuria, although Russian fleet not definitely defeated — Policy of blocking them adopted — Repeated but unsuccessful attempts to effect it — Sea bombardments ineffective — Growing seriousness of the situ- ation for Japan — News received of preparations for the despatch of large fleet from the Baltic — Mining operations begun — Blowing up of Russian flagship with Commander- in-Chief — Serious damage to another Russian battleship- — Heavy loss to Russia — Failure of third and last Japanese attempt to block up Port Arthur — General appreciation of strategic position at end of first three months of war — Japanese prospects rather improved temporarily 185-21 5 xvi CONTENTS CHAPTER VIII THE SECOND PHASE OP THE EUSSO-JAPANESE MAEITIME WAR PAGES Eemarks on special features of three different kinds of oversea wars — Particular interest of Russo-Japanese War on account of close interdependence of operations on land and water — Japanese general plan for invasion of Manchuria — Great modifications necessitated by maritime situation — Imperative necessity of capturing Port Arthur and fleet inside — Element of time very important in view of Russian naval preparations in Europe- — ^Large diversion of force from Manchuria necessitated — ^Apprehension in Japan — Despatch and disembarkation of Port Arthur attacking army on Liao-Tung Peninsula — Difficulty of finding good landing - point — Danger to transports from Russian destroyers — ^Alarm at St. Petersburg on receipt of news — Urgent orders to Russian forces — Strenuous efforts to press on preparations in Baltic — Redoubled efforts of Japanese — Blowing up of two Japanese battleships — Gravest misfor- tune of war to Japan — Serious condition of affairs from Japanese standpoint — Battle of Nanshan and retreat of Russians — Japanese capture Talien-Wan Bay — General movements in Manchuria — ^Defeat of Russian relieving army — ^All hopes of saving Port Arthur thereby ended — Russian fleet ordered out to attack Japanese — ^Leaves har- bour accordingly — Japanese fleet proceeds to meet them — Russian admiral evades action and returns to Port Arthur — — Russian council of war advises against further attempts to break out — Japanese closing in on fortress — Final invest- ment — Peremptory orders to Russian fleet from Tsar to break out and make for Vladivostok — Japanese fleet ready — Great sortie of Russian fleet on August 10 — Battile of YeUow Sea — Remarkable incident turns the day in Japa- nese favour — Night retreat of Russian fleet in disorder Decisive importance of battle — Improvement in Japanese prospects— Raids of Vladivostok cruisers — Difficulty of locating — Sinking of Japanese transports — Public irritation in Japan— Cruiser battle of Ulsan— Another Russian defeat —Opinion changing in Europe as to certainty of Japanese defeat in the war - - - . . 216-250 CONTENTS xvii CHAPTER IX THE PINAL PHASE OF THE EUSS0-JAPANE3E MARITIME WAR PAGES Effect of Battle of Yellow Sea on plans of both belligerents— Russian fleet from Baltic starts — Anxiety in Japan — Japanese general assaults on Port Arthur fail with heavy losses — Urgent need of refit of Japanese ships — Japanese change their tactics and devote efforts to obtaining some point giving view of interior of harbour — Capture of 203 Metre HiU gives excellent observing position^ — Fate of Russian ships in harbour sealed in consequence — Sunk by bombardment of heavy siege batteries — One Russian battleship leaves harbour — ^Long series of torpedo attacks on her, lasting seven nights — ^Terrible weather conditions for attacking destroyers — Heroic defence — Sunk by her own crew under superior orders — Russian lines of defence broken through by land mines — ^Weakening power of defence — Final sujrender — Heavy losses on both sides in siege — Outward voyage of Baltic fleet — Remarkable feat of organization — Violation of neutral coaling ports — Final stage of voyage — Interest in Europe — ^Acute tension in Japan- — Strategic problem of interception- — Dispositions of Togo — Comparison of lines of battle in two fleets — Tactical conditions of coming fight — Russian fleet sighted at dawn by Japanese scouts — Dramatic situation — Battle fleets encounter— Opening phase of general action ofl Tsushima — Description of engagement — ^Appalling Russian losses — Devotion of Russian crews — Fighting continued aU night — ^More Russians sunk — ^Last remnant intercepted in flight to Vladivostok — ^Forced to surrender — Complete annihilation of Russian fleet — Capture of wounded Russian admiral — Unique historical features of this great battle — - Depression in Russia — Hopeless deadlock in land operations — ^Termination of war by Peace Conference in United States — Peculiar interest of special features in this remarkable maritime struggle — Different from all others in history in many important points — ^First use of mine and torpedo on large scale ..... 251-287 CONCLUSION Results of war establish Japanese position as first-class Power — Unexpected by foreign diplomats — General modification of foreign policy towards Japan in consequence, except in Great Britain — ^Anglo-Japanese alliance revised and brought up to date — Benefits secured thereby to both con- xviii CONTENTS PAGES traoting parties — ^The greatest instrument for maintaining peace in the Far East — Scramble for China stopped — Conditions in Korea compelled Japan to intervene after fifteen years' abstention — Position of Japan towards Korea similar to that of Great Britain towards Egypt in 1882 or United States towards Cuba in 1898— Annexation only alternative to permanent anarchy — Immediate improve- ment — ^Action criticized in irresponsible quarters, but recog- nized by other Governments as unavoidable — ^Alliance with Great Britain revised for the second time in 1911 — End of comments on influence of sea on political history of Japan from standpoint of the past — Eemarks on outlook for the future — Strong defensive position of Japan at the present time— DifSculty of attacking her without first-class naval base in Eastern waters — No Power owns such a base — Japan's policy too shrewd to be aggressive towards States of Europe or America — But wUl defend her interests in Far East tenaciously — War with any Power unlikely for three reasons — School of alarmists anticipate war with United States — Such a view based on ignorance and re- pudiated by Eoosevelt — No cause of trouble exists that cannot be settled by mutual forbearance- — Japanese griev- ance against emigration to United States not justified — Founded on lack of historical knowledge — Bacial differences cannot be abolished by League of Nations — Fundamental diSerences between peoples of European and Asiatic stock — Cannot inhabit same country on terms of equality in peace- — Same applies to Japanese emigration to Australia — But if Japanese are shut out from aU other continents their interests in their own quarter of the world must be recog- nized in common justice — Japanese are a civilized and pro- gressive race and entitled to recognition as euch — WiU defend their local interests with determination if threatened by commercial greed of other countries — Strong advantages for defensive war against attempts at aggression in eastern area of Asia — ^These considerations render war improbable, but moderation and restraint must be exercised by world's leading Powers in dealing with Far Eastern situation — Japanese battleship policy — Probably better served by submarines — ^Tribute to Japanese seamen by Eussian admiral — Pacific Ocean may earn its name in a double sense if reason prevails in politics — But if not it will witness one of the worst racial conflicts in the history of the world .... 288-296 LIST OF PLANS AND DIAGRAMS no. PAGE 1. Hakozaki Bat (Modebn Fukuoka) - - - 26 2. Steaits of Shimonoseki and Appeoaches - - 87 3. Gulp of Kagosima - - - - - 96 4. diageam showing opening movements at battle of Talu - ... 148 5. PoBT Aethue Peninsula and Neighboueing Coast- line - - 165 6. Wei-hai-wei Haeboue and Neighboueing Coast to Yung Ching Bat - - - 163 7. DiAGEAM Showing Fiest and Last Positions of Aemoueed Divisions at Battle of Yellow Sea 242 8. DiAGEAM Showing Oeganization of Japanese and EussiAN Aemoueed Squadeons - - 271 9. DiAGEAM Showing Appeoaoh Tactics op Japanese Aemoueed Divisions at Battle of Tsushima 274 Geneeal Map - - - • At end xix THE INFLUENCE OF THE SEA ON THE POLITICAL HISTOEY OF JAPAN INTRODUCTORY On the 28th of June, 1914, a political murder committed in the streets of a small European town, from which Japan lies many thousand miles distant, set alight a train of consequences profoundly affecting all the prin- cipal Powers of the world, and not least the Empire of the Rising Sun, far though it stands from the scene of the crime. Before this event, and the all but universal war to which it gave rise, Japan, with her fifty-five million inhabitants, ranked fifth in population among the States ruled under highly progressive social conditions, coming after Russia, the United States, Germany, and the British Empire, exclusive in each case of coloured subjects. But the war broke up the unity of Russia and, by the terms of peace, imposed stringent limitations upon the scale of armed forces that Germany was allowed to main- tain. As a result the Japanese people now stand third in point of numbers, instead of fifth, among the nations at liberty to maintain armed forces on any scale they please. Moreover, at the end of the war Japan was not only the third in population and the potential strength which that implies, but third strongest at sea. The fieet of Germany had disappeared, while that of Russia had ceased to be an effective force, and that of France had dropped out of competition as a result of financial stress. Only three naval Powers of any serious consequence really remained — that is to say. Great Britain, the United 2 INTRODUCTORY States, and Japan. And yet, again, the war left Japan in a condition of relative freedom from debt as compared with the other belligerents, which was almost tantamount to a doubling of the national capacity to spend. If not actually a wealthy State by the standards of the West, she remained at least free to devote such money as she could raise almost entirely to purposes of defence, whereas all the others are now compelled to set aside a large portion of their national revenues towards the meeting of obligations which do nothing to strengthen their positions. In regard to all the material requirements for waging war, therefore, the course of events from 1914 to 1918 elevated the Japanese to the third place among the peoples of the world for the time at least; and whether the twentieth century is hereafter to bring war or peace, a nation in that very prominent position cannot but exercise a strong influence on the development of human affairs. A still further factor in the prospective impor- tance of Japan is the constantly increasing trade of the Pacific Ocean, wherein she must inevitably play a large part. All present indications, indeed, seem to suggest that we have arrived at a period in which the character- istics of the Japanese people, as indicated in their national records, are deserving of more study among other countries than they have as yet received. In no European centre of learning does Japanese history form any part of the regular system of higher education, but the statesmen of the future must assuredly expect to reckon with Japan in all questions of wide international bearing, for although only fifty years have elapsed since the Japanese held no place in the politics of the greater Powers, and might be attacked with impunity by any European State, their representative stands to-day as an important figure at all international conferences, and no nation whatever would embark on a conflict with the forces under their flag except as a very serious measure. This rise to a front-rank place from a position of obscurity within two generations is generally recognized, JAPANESE FIGHTING SKILL 3 no doubt, as being without precedent in history, and to some superficial observers seems to suggest that a whole people have been unaccountably endowed with new attributes in that extraordinarily brief period. But the characteristics of an entire nation cannot undergo a complete transformation within a term of years no longer than the lifetime of a single individual — especially a nation of unmixed blood for twenty centuries; and the real truth is that Japan has been potentially a Great Power from a date antecedent to the political creation of most of the States comprising modern Europe. Her strength remained in abeyance, but it was there nevertheless, and the reasons for her long-continued obscurity stand plainly revealed in her history. From very early times the Japanese population has equalled or surpassed in numbers that of the great majority of the contemporary European Powers, and their aptitude for war has always proved second to none on every occasion of encountering a foreign enemy, even when at great disadvantages in equipment. Impartial evidence from various sources makes it clear that the Japanese warrior of the Middle Ages had no superior as an all-round man-at-arms with the weapons of the period, comparing weU as an archer with the English bowmen of Crecy, and as a swordsman proving himself more than a match for any opponent ever met, not even excepting the elsewhere invincible troopers of the Mongol conquerors. Xavier, the Jesuit missionary, warned his countrymen adventuring to the Far East that the Japanese blade should be regarded with respect, and the Chinese and Koreans who felt its strokes had a saying that its lightning play was so rapid that it hid the wielder from view behind a whirling circle of steel. On the only occasion in history in which a British vessel with a picked fighting crew ever engaged a Japanese ship similarly armed — both being free-lances of the sea — the action ended in a draw, after a most bloody and prolonged struggle, in which the English captain was killed and his men compelled to resort to the desperate expedient of raking their own decks with their own guns before the 4 INTRODUCTORY Japanese boarding-party were exterminated. Neither side gave any quarter; but although both vessels were ready enough to attack aU and sundry on the high seas except the ships of their own country, each refrained thereafter from interfering with the ships of the other. From old records it is also evident that the devotion of the Samurai was equal to his skill. The idea of surrender was foreign to all his notions of war ; and if for any reason defeat was inevitable, he usually died by his own hand rather than survive the death of his feudal leader, although not until he had left his mark on the enemy. Japanese annals have their parallels to the story of Thermopylae — as, for instance, the frequent defence of Tsushima to the last man ; but these heroic contests were regarded by the Samurai of the day as nothing more remarkable than proper displays of the spirit in which the profession of arms should be followed. Yet in spite of a pre-eminently martial temperament, and a numerical strength from which large armies could have been raised, the Japanese remained a negligible factor in the political rivalries of the nations until our own times, mainly as the result of occupying an insular posi- tion, of which the effect on Japanese history is traceable in one direction or another throughout its course. In the early Middle Ages, when the science of shipbuilding was still at a very primitive stage amongst Asiatics, the diffi- culties attendant on the sea transport of armies rendered Japan secure against invasion on a nationally dangerous scale, and even Kublai Khan failed in the attempt, with aU the maritime resources of the East at his disposal. But, conversely, it prevented the Japanese from threatening their neighbours, and for the first ten centuries of their authentic history kept them in the position of a Power of no importance beyond their own islands. It may seem strange that they should have acquired and maintained so great a skill in the weapons of war in those early days, if they so seldom met a foreign adversary, but the reason is not far to seek. They did it by incessant fighting among themselves. In some nations security CIVIL WARFARE 5 against foreign invasion has led to a complete decay of martial spirit, but in others it has engendered civil war as the only outlet to an irrepressible military temperament, and there never existed a people of whom this was more true than the Japanese. For more than a thousand years their domestic records were one tedious tale of internal quarrelling and bloodshed. Every great noble kept his own force of armed retainers, using them to serve his own interests ; and the Emperors, although venerated for their sacred descent, and nominally the sole sources of aU authority, were reduced to the position of ciphers by usurping leaders of powerful clans, who attained, in turn, to a position of dictatorship by success in civU war. These self -constituted autocrats ruled the land for just as long as their following was strong enough to keep other rivals out of power. Sometimes they maintained their ascendancy by a purely personal hold, and were succeeded by an opponent at their death ; and sometimes a clan was sufficiently formidable to retain its leaders at the head of national government for several successive generations. But the position of dictator, or Shogun, was always won by the sword and held by the sword, at a total cost of many thousands of lives, for the six hundred years during which the system lasted. And living thus in a state of constant war within their own territories, the Japanese developed a military caste who lived for nothing else, and reached a high state of efficiency in the use of their weapons; which served the nation well, on the compara- tively few occasions in their history on which they met a foreign enemy. There was, of course, another side to this. External dangers tend to keep a people united, and if Japan had been a mainland country, open to the invasion of alien armies, it is most improbable that aU this fratricidal fight- ing would ever have taken place. Japanese swords would then have found a proper use in mutual support for national defence, and under such conditions their wielders might perhaps, at certain periods of Asiatic history, have fought their way to a very prominent place in Asia, for. 6 INTRODUCTORY had they been willing to face such losses in marching against external foes as they suffered in massacring each other, their forces would have gone far before their career was stayed. On the other hand, however, it is practically certain that during the era of the Mongol conquerors they must have gone down before the enormous armies which subjugated all continental Asia and were only kept by the sea from overrunning Japan. The effect of the sea on their early history, therefore, although not without its drawbacks, was, in the main, beneficial. It imposed a certain degree of isolation, but at that period isolation was not attended by the grave drawbacks which it involved at a later age, and it con- ferred a degree of safety greater than that obtainable in any other way. Gradually, however, these conditions underwent a change, and before the end of the sixteenth century the art of the shipbuilders had progressed, even in the remote East, to a stage whereby the natural difficulties of sea transport had so far been reduced that military expeditions across the water were practicable on a large scale up to moderate distances. From this development armed conflict on the sea itself arose, a branch of warfare known for ages in the West, but new as a science in the Far East, and not properly understood for a long time in Japan. Consequently, on the first occasion on which the Japanese found themselves engaged in a war abroad they ended in failure, because they did not appreciate that war may be waged on the water with decisive effect, whereas their enemies did. Incidentally, it may perhaps here be observed that the six years' struggle with Korea in the sixteenth century, backed by China, which taught the Japanese that lesson, furnishes some of the most instructive pages in all history on the main principles which should govern combined naval and military operations. The Korean war of the sixteenth century, although ending unsuccessfully for Japan, had demonstrated to her rulers that if they chose to embark on a poMcy of foreign conquest the sea was no longer a barrier, provided POLICY OF SECLUSION 7 that they began such enterprises by defeating the enemy on the sea itseK before proceeding to other measures, or at least by taking precautions to ensure that the enemy could do them no harm on the water. But not very long after that war had ended the Japanese dictator in power came to the erroneous decision — for reasons set forth hereafter — ^that the best interests of his country were served, not only by keeping out of foreign wars altogether, but by avoiding intercourse of any kind with the external world, although up till then foreign traders had been welcomed and foreign missionaries of religion tolerated. And so, early in the seventeenth century, he expelled every foreigner from the land except a handful of Dutch, put a stop to the building of sea-going ships, and prohib- ited his own subjects from leaving their native shores on pain of death. By shutting out all communication with the rest of the world in this uncompromising fashion, the Japanese arrested their own progress completely, at a period when Europe was making great strides in the arts of war and peace, and when they themselves had but recently acquired extensive experience in the proper conduct of overseas expeditions. Hence arose a state of almost complete stagnation, in which the real power of Japan remained dormant and unsuspected for two whole cen- turies, while that of less ancient States was taking shape. During this period the Japanese remained profoundly ignorant of what was passing in other countries, and living, as they did, in a land which supplied all the neces- saries of existence, were content to remain isolated, in the belief that they had nothing to gain by foreign inter- course. Satisfied that their social and material progress left nothing to be desired, and failing to realize that, in the absence of the stimulating effect of foreign example and competition, they were standing still, they accepted without question the hermit-hke policy established by their dictators. But no such policy could have been either initiated or maintained except in an island whose inhabitants were debarred by law from taking to the water, or perhaps in a country such as Tibet, whose natural 8 INTRODUCTORY frontiers are very difficult to cross. Herein, therefore the influence of their sea surroundings was very detrimental to their true interests and helped towards a condition of arrested development attended with danger. Mean- while the science of naval architecture was advancing steadily in the West, and with the introduction of steam propulsion it reached a point in which the sea was trans- formed from a natural barrier to military movements into an area across which force could be exercised on the largest scale with less difficulty in overcoming natural obstacles than in most areas on land. Such a revolution could not leave any island indefinitely untouched, and, although its earlier effects were not immediately felt in Japan, the beginning of an enforced participation in the general affairs of the world eventually came in 1853, with the historic arrival of a United States squadron in Yoko- hama Bay, bearing instructions to insist upon opening communications with the Japanese Government, which were backed by armaments 200 years in advance of any- thing that Japan could oppose to them. A still more impressive demonstration of the impossibility of remain- ing permanently aloof frOm other peoples came a few years later, when two Japanese ports were bombarded with devastating effect as a warning not to murder and insult Europeans with whom they came into contact. Their condition now could not be more aptly illustrated than by quoting a metaphor ascribed to one of their own public men, who likened the position of Japan to that of an oyster which has closed its shell for safety, but for that very reason fails to realize that all the time it is lying on a fishmonger's stall for sale. In the days of primitive navigation salt water had been their great source of safety, but now it ceased in itself to afford its former protection, and, on the contrary, rather facilitated attack on Japan than otherwise. " We are surrounded by the sea, and therefore vulnerable at every point," were the words used in a petition from the Shogun to the Mikado in connection with foreign affairs. AJad, for a time, the Japanese failed to appreciate that this fact NEW NAVY 9 had another aspect in which the sea could, with proper measures, be artificially converted into a very effective line of defence. For this lack of insight regarding a cardinal principle in the strategic policy of an island State they should not be too hastily blamed, when it is borne in mind that even in Great Britain, with the plainest lessons in the past before them, there have been men in high authority who persistently would not, or could not, appreciate it. In due course the Japanese came to realize that as the weapons whose moral or material effect broke down their long seclusion arrived in ships, and could arrive in no other way, an efficient sea- going armament was their own first requirement if they were to escape further humiliation or even disaster. When they found that an isolated existence was no longer possible, therefore, they made the creation of a standing national navy one of the earliest objects of their attention. From very small beginnings this new fleet was carefully and judiciously developed, under the guidance of British officers, during a period of some twenty-five years, by which time its organizers felt that it was capable of asserting Japanese rights when threatened by a Power of minor maritime importance, such as China. Differences with the Government at Pekin in regard to events in Korea led to an outbreak of hostilities in 1894, and, for the first time in 300 years, Japan undertook important operations of war on the high seas. In this conflict a maritime superiority was not of immediate urgency for her home defence, because the enemy was unprovided with land forces capable of carrying war into the Japanese home territories, even if safely transported there. But the Japanese authorities had the unmistakable lesson of their former Korean war as a guide, and fully understood that they could never properly safeguard their interests across the water as long as the enemy could offer serious opposition on that element. They avoided the error, therefore, which had wrecked their schemes of conquest 300 years before, and lost no time in despatching their fleet in search of their opponents, 3 10 INTRODUCTORY with orders to bring the latter to action wherever encoun- tered. The successful issue of this policy relieved them of all anxiety regarding possible interference with the transport of their armies to points of strategic importance for the prosecution of a land campaign, and the final triumph of the Japanese arms on both elements marked, in effect, the conclusion of Japan's period of preparation to fill the role of a factor in the politics of the world, and the opening of her period of power. But the supreme ordeal of war with a first-class adversary remained before the position thus won could be regarded as stable. This final test was not long in coming, and afforded to the watching nations of other lands unmistakable proof of the Japanese national aptitude for war, not only by the conduct of the actual operations, but by the steadiness with which they faced the varying fortunes of the most critical phase of their history. In a struggle with Russia a maritime superiority meant a great deal more to Japan than it had in her dispute with China, because it involved encounter with an opponent of immense military resources, fully capable of waging war against the Mikado's army, even in his own territories, if once landed there. Under these conditions the sea was a line of defence which the Japanese were compelled to hold at aU costs, if their empire of two thousand years was to remain standing in any form but that of a crushed and possibly tributary State. Moreover, they were almost equally concerned to protect their interests in Korea, which were once again the immediate subject of dispute, and for that purpose armies dependent on a safe sea passage and uninterrupted communications had to be despatched to operate on continental soil. The test was of the most searching nature, and imposed an almost crushing strain on the Japanese Navy, but it survived in the end, after a series of operations which in point of successful achievement against superior numbers will bear comparison with any in maritime history ; and as the exploits of the seamen were emulated by their comrades on the land, the jretura of peace found SEA INFLUENCE 11 Japan securely established in a recognized place among the nations whose flags are symbols of real power. This position subsequent events have tended to consolidate more and more. If we place all these phases of the story of the Japanese people in review, therefore, it becomes apparent that their national existence has been constantly affected by their sea surroundings in one way or another from the remotest periods, sometimes to their advantage and sometimes to their detriment. In past ages they made no organized effort to use the water as a line of strategic defence, but it did act, nevertheless, as a natural obstacle to foreign aggression. On the other hand, it operated as a natural deterrent to Japanese expansion and intercourse with the outer world, and facilitated a very shortsighted policy of seclusionduring the vitally important seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while the colonial empires of Western Powers were taking definite shape in many quarters of the globe, including the Far East, and aU Europe was making great strides in the sciences of war and peace. With the abandonment of that policy under the stress of external pressure in the nineteenth century came a tiirning-point of critical importance, in which the Japanese began to recognize the importance of the sea as; a means of defence more clearly, and eventually arrived' at the understanding that it is on their fleet in the present, conditions of science applied to war that their chief: reliance must rest for the maintenance of their indepen- dence as a sovereign State. In fact, the preamble to the British Naval Discipline Act, which sets forth that " it is on the Navy, under the providence of God, that the wealth, safety, and well-being of the Empire chiefly depend," might be applied with equal truth to that other island people. A general survey of this influence of the sea on Japanese political history in the past and present falls pKoperly, therefore, into four main divisions. The first «2£ Ahese was the period in which a great measure of compulsory isolation was imposed by natural causes and the» seai|!as 12 INTRODUCTORY a safeguard. The second was the period in which the isolation was artificial and voluntary, although more com- plete, and the sea had become a source of danger. Taken together these two stages lasted for about 1,500 years. Then followed what might be called a period of probation, which did not last for more than forty, but in which they began to use the sea for defensive purposes, by establish- ing a fleet. Lastly came the era of power into which Japan has now entered. No man can foretell or even guess at its probable duration, but — unless the command of the air should ever supersede the command of the water — that must depend, in the first place, on the ability of the Japanese to hold their own afloat, as the necessary foundation of all safety to a nation of islanders, and the influence of the sea on their future must in consequence be at least as profound as on their past. CHAPTER I THE PERIOD OP NATITRAL SECLUSION TO THE END OF THE MONGOL INVASION The Archipelago, or chain of islands, which forms the home of the fifty-five million souls comprising the Japanese race is approximately 1,150 English miles in length, and lies roughly in a north-easterly and south-westerly direc- tion, with its southern extremity nearest to the Asiatic continent, from which it is separated by the Straits of Tsushima, exactly 100 nautical miles in width, the penin- sula of Korea forming the opposite shore. The three principal islands, in succession from the north, are known on British Admiralty charts as Yezo, Nipon or Honshu, and Kiushiu; and although these are not the native names, nor, indeed, the names always used by European writers, they have obtained so general an acceptance by this time that they will be used in the pages which follow. Yezo, which has always been the least developed of the three, was not fully occupied nor governed by the Japanese till a much later period than the other two, and is still partly populated by a distinct aboriginal people. Nipon is the largest, and has always been the seat of government during the period of authentic history, whether the actual administration was in the hands of the Mikado himself or of the Shoguns who usurped his power. Kiushiu alonfe of the three has known the tread of an invading army, but the duration of that infliction was brief. All three are possessed of many fine natural harbours, and offer the facilities for maritime enterprise which breed a seafaring coast population, and all are in parts rugged and mountainous inland. A large proportion of the Japanese race, therefore, are either mountaineers 13 14 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION or sea fishermen, the representatives of many generations brought up under natural surroundings of a description which, judging from the history of the ancient Greeks, or the Norwegian Vikings, or later of the Japanese them- selves, tend to develop a fighting stock. All these islands were also able, till very recent times, to support the whole of their inhabitants from the products of their own soil and fisheries, without recourse to supplies from other lands, but this self-maintenance has reached its extreme limits from a constant increase in population. To preserve the unity of a State whose component parts are separated by sea channels good water communications are obviously necessary, and ships form an important branch of national requirements. In Japan this demand was formerly emphasized by the rough nature of much of the country in the islands themselves, which made land routes difficult in many areas; and, as the geographical contour of the empire is long and narrow, coastwise traffic has always been able to form a useful alternative to inferior roads. So much was this recognized, even at an early period, that in an edict beginning with the words " Ships are necessary to Japan," an Emperor who ruled more than a thousand years ago ordered that every province was to be chargeable with the building and main- tenance of a specified number in proportion to its resources. But although the aggregate volume of shipping which moved in Japanese waters even in early days was large, and the ports were well filled, the vessels themselves were mostly small and seldom engaged in foreign voyages, even when that was not prohibited by their navigation laws — unless, indeed, as pirates. In part this was due to the self-contained nature of Japan, whose population was independent of foreign trade or supplies ; but in part also it was probably due, in the days of primitive navigation, to climatic conditions, for the seas which surround the coasts are often subject to severe weather. All through the winter northerly winds prevail in the Straits of Tsu- shima with some force, and although in the summer months fine and calm spells are very common, they may be broken KOREA AND JAPAN 15 at any moment by a violent typhoon between June and October. These dangers to navigation were without a doubt a factor of considerable importance in reducing the risks of invasion in former ages, but they also acted as a deterrent to the expansion of a seagoing mercantile marine. The nearest land on the Asiatic continent to Japan is Korea, now a part of the Japanese Empire, but which in the very early days of Japanese history consisted of three separate kingdoms j although at a later period these became united under one Sovereign. The Korean penin- sula is in the main a fertile, open country, bordered by a coast with good harbours on the south and west ; and the ancient population were almost exclusively agriculturists and fishermen, like the Japanese themselves, though in advance of the latter in a knowledge of the arts and sciences of the day, and better shipbuilders. But they were always inferior in natural aptitude for war. Erom the remotest period its geographical proximity has always invested Korea with special importance in Japanese eyes, and Japanese foreign policy has always made it a cardinal point of endeavour to prevent any powerful alien State from obtaining a foothold in that land, though not in- variably with success. Eor such an attitude their own past experiences afford a good reason. Korea was the advanced base of the only great enterprise ever under- taken by an alien conqueror for the subjugation of Japan; and up to the end of the nineteenth century it was the only foreign country in which a Japanese army had ever conducted operations on a large scale. Japanese history is legendary and largely mythical in its earlier chapters; but it remains a sufficiently established fact that in, the second century of our era the Empress Jengo ordered a large expedition to invade Korea, which was entirely successful in its object. The ancient accounts of this enterprise, however, are as full of miraculous occurrences and divine interpositions as those of the siege of Troy, and the campaign, as recorded, is not of much help in consequence to the study of a subject of 16 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION intense practical application. Therefore, beyond briefly observing that operations of war on an important scale of some kind did take place with results satisfactory to the invaders, which still retain a great hold on Japanese imagination, no further reference to that event will be made in these pages, which only endeavour to deal with the incidents of authentic history. For the first twelve centuries of the Christian era the Japanese were left, as far as any records exist, unmolested and unthreatened by any external danger — although incessantly fighting among themselves — and during that period only one descent took place upon their shores which was of sufficient importance to be noticed at all, although even that in no way endangered their national independence. The accounts of this affair read precisely like those of the Viking or Danish raids on the shores of Northumberland or Norfolk. A tribe of Manchurian pirates, known as " Tois," inhabited the mainland coast between Korea and Saghalien, and about the year 1019 extended their depredations so far beyond their natural scope as to despatch a fleet of twenty vessels to seize what spoil came within their reach in the way of plunder or prisoners on the ighores of Japan. No estimate of their total numbers is known to exist, but the contem- porary descriptions of their ships and their methods of fighting are fairly detailed, from which we learn that the former were about 50 feet long and carried forty oars each. These figures, if accurate, are interesting, because they indicate that the vessels must have carried a double tier of oars, like the biremes of Greece or Carthage. It would be impracticable to place twenty oars a side in a single tier along the gunwale of a craft only 50 feet long, unless used as paddles after the fashion of a savage's canoe, and paddles can only be used in that way in a boat of very low freeboard, unfit for sea work over more than very short distances. With a double tier, on the other hand, a high freeboard design would be necessary, giving good sea-going qualities if the beam was adequate, as we may suppose it to have been, and a vessel of that size TOI RAID 17 would easily carry a hundred men under moderately favourable conditions of weather. From this, if the total force is estimated at about 5,000 men, it may very probably be somewhere near the mark. The Toi raiders began by attacking the little island of Tsushima, lying in their path, half-way between the southern point of Korea and the main Japanese coasts, which nearly 900 years later was destined to give its name to the greatest naval victory in Japanese annals. The smaU garrison fought to the last man, and were exterminated without any material gain to the attackers, who then sailed on to Kiushiu. For some reason the Japanese failed to interfere with their disembarkation, possibly because nothing was known of their approach until too late to collect a fleet of armed junks, or a land force to oppose them on the beach. Having disembarked, they marched inland on a general foray, and an interest- ing account is given in the old records of their fighting tactics. Their battle formation was in three lines, with spears in the front rank, swords in the second, and bows in the third. But this formation, although, perhaps, well suited to the open hillsides of Manchuria, must have been very difficult to maintain on a broad front, in a country of mountain, forest, and marsh, such as Japan, where every level lies under rice cultivation, knee-deep in mud and water, and abundant natural cover exists for the skirmish- ing archers who were the forerunners of the riflemen sharpshooters of a later age. The Japanese Samurai of the earlier periods was not an adept at massed tactics, and to him a battle was more in the nature of an aggre- gation of personal encounters than an occasion for co- ordinated effort in which individual action has no play; but as an individual combatant he was unsurpassed, and in his own land the natural features gave every advantage to a loose system of fighting. As a consequence the raiders were soon in difficulties with a defending force, hastily assembled by the Japanese Grovernor of the province; and in time encountered such determined and sanguinary opposition that their advance came to a halt, after suffer- 18 I'lRST PEfUOD OF SECLUSION ing severely from the defending archers and from am- bushed bodies of swordsmen, who broke into their ranks at close quarters, regardless of their own lives. Finding that further progress was impossible, their leaders at length gave the order to retire again to their boats; but, as the withdrawal seems to have been carried out in good order, we may infer that the Japanese success was not over- whelming, and this view receives confirmation from the fact that the Tois by no means abandoned their efforts as a result of an initial failure. It was evidently their in- tention, after the usual practice of coastal raiders encoun- tering unexpected resistance at one point, to try their fortune at some other, in the hope that by moving quickly they could carry out an effective foray before succour arrived. But foul winds prevented their immediate departure from the harbour in which they had first arrived, and gave the Japanese time to collect a fleet of thirty- eight vessels for a counter-attack, which was delivered with such effect that the enemy were driven to sea. Unfortunately, no detailed account of this naval engage- ment exists — the first in authentic Japanese history; but, as the old records make no mention of captures on either side, it would appear unlikely that boarding tactics were any feature of the fight, which more probably took the form of an archery action, wherein the enemy's heavy-armed spearmen could take no part, while the Japanese vessels, although inferior in numbers, were yet so crowded with bowmen that they could establish a superiority of fire. But the invaders even then did not abandon their project, and as the Japanese lost touch with them at nightfall, either through lack of energetic leading or in the belief that they had withdrawn alto- gether, they only withdrew far enough to reorganize, and then descended to another part of the coast farther south, from which they carried off 1,200 prisoners, and sailed away before a rescue could be effected. Viewed in the light of immediate results, this raid does not assume the proportions of an incident of real impor- tance in Japanese history. A few wretched captives were EFFECTS OF FAILURE Id carried off by a comparative handful of men, who did not represent a portion of the armed strength of a powerful army with plenty more to follow, but merely the supreme effort of a relatively small tribe. But the incident did, nevertheless, serve as a sort of unintentional reconnais- sance in force for the whole of Eastern Asia, and its effects were in reality considerable. A certain amount of inter- course had been in progress between Japan and China, chiefly through the movements of the Buddhist priests and others, learned in the civil arts and knowledge of the period, who had been encouraged by the Mikado to visit Japan as teachers ; and a small volume of trade also passed both ways. But very little was known on the mainland of the defensive capabilities of the Japanese, as these had never been put to the test, and many rumours were current as to the supposed wealth which the islands contained. Had the Toi raiders encountered a feeble opposition, and returned with a substantial booty, even in the shape of captives alone, their first enterprise would certainly have been repeated, and the knowledge of their success, circulating in time through China and Korea, would in all probability have induced other and more important imitators to follow their example in that predatory age. But their decidedly rough reception indicated unmistakably that no aggressive action directed against Japan could hope for much profit, unless organized on so large a scale that the necessary number of ships to carry it could not possibly be found. And so, for 200 years more, Japan remained unmolested, thanks to an insular position and a valiant people. In point of fact, the Japanese seafarers turned the tables by taking to piracy on an extensive scale themselves, and became the scourge of the mainland coasts. In the early years of the thirteenth centm?y, however, a menace to Japanese liberty began to take shape, which presented a parallel to the danger to England arising at the periods of the dominations of Philip II. of Spain and Napoleon on the Continent of Europe. In the year 1162 a lad, afterwards known to history as Jenghiz Khan, 20 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION was born in a herdsman's tent on the desolate plateau of Mongolia, who, in virtue of a superlative genius for lead- ing men and an insatiable lust for power, had, before his death, brought not only aU Mongolia, but all the central zone of Asia, from the Persian Gulf to the Pacific, under his domination, and left one of the most widely execrated names ever borne by a human being. In due course his vast domains descended to his grandson, Kublai Khan, who also inherited much of his ambition and ability, and spent his life in extending these domains still farther, with such success that when his reign in its tiu-n ended he was ruling — according to Howorth — over a larger area of the earth's surface than any monarch in history before or since. It was his eventual aim to compel all Asia and its adjacent islands to acknowledge his sovereignty, either as part of the dominions under his direct administration, or as tributary States, and he intended that Japan should be included in this colossal scheme. Kublai began with China, in the northern part of which he was already engaged in a campaign on behalf of his brother, whom he succeeded as the reigning Khan when the latter died. China was at that time under the Sung dynasty, with its capital at Nankin, and covered an area of about two-thirds of its present extent, in which stood numerous large walled cities; but its many millions of inhabitants were engaged chiefly in agriculture, as their descendants are still. The Mongols broke in from the north, where Kublai founded the city of Pekin, in 1264, as his future capital, and, in the process of time, surrounded it by walls twenty- seven miles in circuit, 50 feet high and 40 feet thick, of which the greater part still stand. He then commenced a series of conquering campaigns, in which his armies, under the immediate command of some very able leaders, advanced irresistibly southward for fifteen years, annexing province after province, and city after city, until by the year 1279 they had traversed the whole of the Chinese Empire, and entered the gates of Canton, where the last stand of the Sung dynasty was made. His troops are MONGOLIAN MENACE 21 sometimes referred to as the Mongolian " hordes," but in the ordinary acceptance of that expression, as distin- guishing a rabble from an army, it does not apply, for, although including almost every nationality in Asia, they were highly trained and disciplined, and equipped with aU the most up-to date appliances of war, includ- ing baUistas and other engines for siege work. Their organization into units was very complete, and their movements were conducted with a scientific precision and strategic grasp comparable to the operations of Hannibal or Buonaparte. Nor were they opposed by a feeble enemy in their conquest of China. The Chinese military mandarins of our own time may rightly hold a poor place in the estimation of soldiers, but their forerunners of the thirteenth century frequently dis- played the greatest skill and courage, and not a few of the cities were only reduced by starvation after long investment and desperate resistance, in which the de- fending leaders fell themselves. When at its zenith, therefore, the military power of the Mongols was a very serious danger indeed to aU the independent nations of Asia. It was while his main campaigns in China were still in their early stage that Kublai first turned his eyes towards Japan. That fateful gaze had boded ill for the freedom of every land upon which it had previously fallen, but an obstacle, of a kind of which he had no previous experience, now lay in his line of vision. Korea was already part of the Mongolian Empire when he succeeded to the throne — although her King was allowed a nominal power as a tributary ruler — and Japan was only 100 miles farther off, a distance which his troops would have covered in a few days on the land. But, unfortunately for his plans, it was 100 miles of salt water with no way round, an element which very few of the Mongols — a nation of inland stockriders — had ever seen, and upon which they never, to the end, proved formidable. Ultimately, it was to frustrate his utmost efforts against Japan, just as effect- ually as it frustrated those of Napoleon against Great 22 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION Britain, although its effect did not take shape through precisely the same chain of causes. The problem was of a kind new to Kublai, but no form of obstacle ever diverted him in the pursuit of his vast ambitions, and, as the situation presented military diffi- culties of a special form, he opened his advances towards Japan by a recourse to diplomacy, to which he was always ready to turn as an alternative to military measures, if the occasion appeared to require it, and it seemed to have a possibility of success. Unfortunately the old accounts of the fateful series of events which followed are extremely vague, and sometimes discrepant, especially as to dates ; but certain points are well established, and from these we learn that about the year 1268 he despatched two envoys with a letter to be delivered to the Mikado, of which the principal sentences are given thus by Howorth : " The most powerful rampart between small countries and their strong neighbours is peace between their Sov- ereigns. This political axiom, supported by long ex- perience, becomes most certain when it refers to the weak neighbours of an empire such as I have received from my ancestors, which is especially favoured by Heaven. I am now master of China. A crowd of kingdoms filled with fear and respect have submitted to my laws notwithstand- ing their distance. . . . The Korean King, whom we number among our subjects, touched by our generosity, came to the foot of our throne to do homage. I, in return, covered him with favours, determined to treat him rather as a father than as an Emperor and master. You and your people have surely heard of this. Korea is close to Japan. Since the foundation of your kingdom you have constantly trafficked with China. How is it that you have never sent anyone to my Court since I came to the throne ? Have you not heard of my accession ? I have sent you two officers to remind you of this and secure a mutual friendship which will be the bond of a lasting peace. The wise men who are about me tell me that all men are brothers ; the universe consists of but one family, and how can useful rules and good laws be upheld in a family where there is discord ? Woe to those who love confusion and wish for war. King, think of this, you and your people." FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY 23 Some of the assertions in this letter were not quite accurate. His treatment of Korea had been anything but generous, as the Japanese knew well enough, and he was not really master of China till nearly ten years later, for he had not at the time reached farther south than the Yang-tse-kiang. But Northern China was certainly under his heel; and in any case a precise adherence to facts has never been regarded, even in Europe, as an essential in diplomatic correspoiidence. The tone of the letter, as it stood, would obviously have permitted of only one answer from a land State accessible to the march of Kublai's troops, unless its people preferred extermina- tion to subjection. With an island State inhabited by a virile race, the case was altogether different; and Kublai was so shrewd a man that he probably realized this, and was merely feeling his way. The first two envoys never got beyond Korea, where the local authorities impressed them with such alarming accounts of the dangers of their mission, that they pre- ferred to face even the wrath of their master than to pro- ceed. What fate awaited their hesitation there is nothing to indicate, but two others who took their places evidently found it expedient to obey orders, whatever the risks on the other side might be, for they arrived in due course in a Japanese port, from which they were forwarded, under guard, to the capital, where they presented Kublai's letter. Here they were forcibly detained for six months, and then sent back with no answer, but this treatment was mild as compared to the fate which awaited envoys who followed later. It seems quite possible that Kublai anticipated the likelihood of some such result, for he was ready to begin his preparations for more forcible measures, although these presented considerable difficulties from the outset. As in the case of Philip II. with the Armada, and Napoleon with his flat-bottomed craft for crossing the English Channel, it was necessary for him to commence operations by building his floating means of transport; in which respect, as in many others, the whole story of the project 24 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION offers parallels to various schemes for the invasion of Great Britain. But it was quite impossible, with the resources at his disposal, to build ships in anything like adequate numbers, which, knowing nothing of jiautical affairs, and refusing, like Napoleon, to take the advice of those who did, he failed at first to appreciate or believe. The largest type of junk which the shipwrights upon whom he had to rely were competent to put in the water was only capable of transporting, perhaps, 100 soldiers in addition to her crew, provided she was not further bur- dened with campaigning supplies and horses, but a pro- portionately lesser number of soldiers if a load of these had to be carried. Apparently the organizers of the pro- posed expedition considered it necessary that a large stock of supplies and horses should go with it, for their calcu- lations only left room for forty soldiers per vessel on an average, and the utmost efforts of the shipbuilders on the seacoasts which acknowledged Kublai's rule at that time — of whom the majority were Koreans — were unequal to putting more than 1,000 such vessels in hand. The King of Korea protested, in fact, that even that number was in excess of any possible production. Kublai was forced to realize, therefore, at the start that the fighting strength of the invading force must be limited to 40,000 men, and it seems scarcely credible that he could have believed that so comparatively small an expedition would suffice to conquer all Japan. Nevertheless he issued imperative orders for 1,000 ships to be built, and at the same time imposed upon the Koreans the further task of placing a large tract in the northern part of their country under special cultivation, as a source of future food-supplies for the prospective army of invasion. Presumably he either hoped to intimidate the Japanese by a demonstration, or by the mere knowledge of his preparations, or else intended to seize one of their outlying islands and hold it as a hostage, or as an advanced base for a larger force to follow. Having issued these instruc- tions, he allowed five years for the preparations to mature — for with an inflexible determination of purpose he WAR COMMENCED 25 combined great powers of patience — and meanwhile proceeded with the execution of his campaigns of conquest in other and more immediately promising directions. At the same time, he never relaxed his diplomatic efforts towards Japan, and, although precise information on this point is lacking, it seems evident, from sundry references in old chronicles, that several more envoys were despatched during this period without any better results than the first. One of his ships also, by his orders, seized and carried off two Japanese men of high rank from Tsushima ; and these they sent to Pekin, where they were treated well by Kublai, who, with a view to impressing them with his power, showed them his palace and his army, and then sent them back to Japan to spread the tale. By the end of 1273 — all these dates being approximate only — his preparations were complete, or at least suffi- ciently so to proceed with the enterprise. Only 900 ships had been launched, but 40,000 troops, with all their campaigning supplies, were concentrated and ready, and it was not considered that the shortage of sea transport was great enough to justify further delay, as the Japanese had shown no signs whatever of submitting to his demands. In the month of November, therefore, when the typhoon season is well over, the troops were embarked and the fleet of transports sailed. Operations were commenced by attacks upon the small islands of Tsushima and Iki, which lay on the way, and where once again the garrisons fought to the last man, although an escaping vessel hastened to Japan with the news. This gave the Japanese a brief interval for preparations, although they could not possibly tell on what part of their coast the blow would fall — the inevitable strategic disadvantage under which the defenders in such a case must labour, if they are not strong enough at sea to deal with the enemy in his passage. Kublai's fleet, on continuing their voyage, shaped course for Hakozaki Bay — a very fine natural harbour on the north shere of Kiushiu, which island, as observed on a previous page, is the southernmost of the Japanese chain, and therefore the nearest to Korea, though not the metro- 4 26 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION politan centre of govermnent. The selection of Kiushiu as a first destination may have been due to a desire to get the sea passage over, or it may have been deliberately planned, on the grounds that the expedition was not on a sufficient scale to strike at the heart of the Japanese Empire, though possibly strong enough to seize an extremity before a proper defending force could be hurried to the spot, and there establish itself tUl reinforced from Korea. This policy would be greatly facilitated by Kublai's undisputed command of the sea, by which he Eionr? Witlbsr 1.1 d. ai FIG. 1. — ^HAKOZAKI BAY (MODERN FUKUOKA). Forta indicated thus could hope to prevent succour reaching Kiushiu from Nipon or the other islands. At any rate, the selection was well justified on strategic grounds, in so far as the whole adventure was justifiable on any sound principles of war at all. The actual disembarkation in Hakozaki Bay seems to have been effected without opposition on the beach itself, but as soon as the Mongols advanced inland their troubles began. The provincial Governor had rapidly assembled a numerous force of local levies, all skilled fighters in their own kind of ground; and although these FIRST MONGOL RETREAT 27 were inferior tacticians to the Mongols and had to fall back at first, their numbers were so constantly increased that at last they were able to make a stand behind a ditch or entrenchment, extending for several miles across the invaders' line of march. Towards evening the Mongols found their position very difficult, and returned again to the beach, although without being followed up. But they seem to have feared the consequences of a possible counter-attack at night at close quarters, in which the Japanese swordsmen would have been terrible adversaries and their own superiority in field tactics would have availed them little; for eventually they re-embarked altogether, under cover of darkness and pouring rain. The re-embarkation suffered no interference, because the Japanese were not near enough to realize in the dark what was happening; but towards early morning the weather came decisively to their assistance, for the rain proved to be the precursor to wind, as is so often the case, and a violent gale set in from the northward, the only quarter from which the bay is exposed. The Korean crews, fearing to be driven on shore, slipped or cut their cables, and the whole fleet struggled out for open water, but many were wrecked in the attempt, and all the rest scattered, the remnants of the expedition returning by degrees in straggled confusion to various points on their own coasts, with a loss of about 300 ships and 20,000 men killed in action or drowned. This was Kublai's first experience of warfare associated with the sea — although by no means his last; and his immediate failure after five years of laborious preparation, though trivial as compared with the terrible and over- whelming disaster which was in fate for his second attempt a few years later, was nevertheless of sufficient magnitude to have discouraged a man of less resolute character. But, as already observed, the great Mongol conqueror never allowed himself to be diverted from his purpose, and his few rebuffs only served to stimulate his efforts the more. Without delay he issued orders for the building of another 1,000 ships, and his attitude towards the 28 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION Japanese was so much the reverse of chastened, that he sent an envoy to the Mikado to summon him to Pekin at once to answer for his actions. The Japanese, in no respect alarmed by this outburst, and too deeply com- mitted for temporizing measures, beheaded the envoy and all his suite on the execution ground for common criminals, on their arrival at the Japanese capital. After that Kublai kept his diplomats at home for a time, but nursed his wrath and proceeded with his schemes. He was not so weak a character, however, as to allow his haste for revenge to spoil his chances, and spent another five years in patiently waiting for his plans to mature once again. AU through this period his armies engaged in China were moving victoriously southwards, and as one seaport after another on the Chinese coast fell into his hands, so his resources in shipping increased enormously from year to year, and his prospects of success against Japan improved in proportion, for his resources in men were always overwhelming. Meanwhile the Japanese, on their part, were fully alive to the extreme gravity of their situation and strenuously employed in preparing for its developments. The tremendous menace which had rolled irresistibly across three-fourths of the Asiatic Continent, crushing every- thing before it, had now turned most definitely in their direction, and although, indeed, an immovable obstacle was in its path, which must break much of its force, it was impossible to estimate whether it would be broken sufficiently to save Japan. They entertained no illusions whatever as to the nature of the fate which would await them if Kublai once gained a firm footing on their territory; and an appeal for unity in the presence of an appalling common danger, issued by order of the Mikado, is said to have produced a condition of freedom from internal dissension unknown in Japan for generations. The fighting element in the population was thoroughly reorganized, reinforced with picked levies, and improved in equipment and training. Defences were erected at all the principal harbours on the Korean side, strategic MONGOLIAN ARMADA 29 roads improved, and a fighting flotilla established, towards the manning of which every maritime province had to contribute. As Japan had no large vessels, however, there were only light craft and fireships. Six years passed in this way, with both sides preparing for a final struggle, which Kublai knew would tax his utmost efforts to bring to successful issue, and the Japanese knew must prove a matter of life or death to their independence as a nation. By the year 1280 Kublai's preparations were complete. Before that date his conquest of China to its extreme southern limits had placed at his disposal a mercantile fleet of about 3,500 junks of different sizes, in addition to his new fleet in Korea. A few of these vessels were undoubtedly very large for that period, if Marco Polo's accounts are to be believed, requiring crews of 300 men each. But the majority were no heavier than the junks used in the first expedition, and the carrying capacity of the whole fleet in Chinese waters, for the comparatively long voyage to Japan, was only estimated at 100,000 men with supplies, water, and horses. An army of that size was accordingly assembled in readiness for embarkation in the ports of China, with a very large allowance of stores to provide for a long absence. Simultaneously, another army of 50,000 men with supplies was being assembled in Korea, with 1,000 vessels as transport. The two forces were entirely separate commands, and for convenience may be designated as the northern or Korean army, and the southern or Chinese. It is said that the former, although the smaller in numbers, was composed of Kublai's best Mongolian legions, and formed the spear-point of the expedition. The southern armament was more mixed, and consisted in part of Chinese levies of less formidable fighting quality. We see, therefore, that Kublai was now about to launch his enterprise with a total army of 150,000 men — that is to say, a force of nearly four times the strength of his first expedition, and which in fact represented the very maximum, in point of numbers, that could be embarked 30 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION by using the whole sea-going tonnage on the coasts oi his vast empire in the East, inclusive of a large number of vessels specially built under pressure. As far as troops were concerned, he could have trebled these numbers without much difficulty, if ships had been available to carry them, and here lay the decisive factor of the whole situation. An army of 150,000 men was not really suffi- cient to conquer Japan, but the sea prevented any larger force from getting there, because, in the state of human progress at that time, not even the utmost exertions of the monarch of the most extensive empire of the period could overcome the practical difficulties of maritime conveyance. Murdoch has estimated that Japan, by an extreme effort, might just possibly have raised a defending army of 400,000 men. No statement of the force which actually was raised is known to exist, but even if Murdoch's estimate is halved — and it certainly seems rather high — and if allowance is made, further, for the advantages which the attack possesses of selecting its point of descent, it is evident that Kublai's schemes ran but an indifferent chance of success, unless he could transport at least a quarter of a million men to the Japanese coasts — that is to say, nearly double the number for which he could possibly find tonnage. Kublai, however, had conquered a country of twenty times the population of Japan, and had perhaps some justification for the belief that nothing could stand before his troops, for up till then they had indeed proved invincible, even against greatly superior numbers. He embarked on the project with confidence accordingly and, as already observed, was ready to move by the year 1280. Before actually setting his forces in motion, nevertheless, he made one final effort to settle matters diplomatically, and despatched one more unfortunate envoy and suite to demand surrender. But by now the Japanese were so deeply stirred in their national pride, that they treated this mission even more summarily than its predecessors of six years before. The members of the latter were permitted at least to reach the Japanese capital before PROBLEM OF ASSEMBLY 31 being executed, but these new arrivals were beheaded on the beach as they landed. Nothing therefore remained but for Kublai to go ahead, and in doing so he opened one of the most fateful chapters in Eastern history. When the armies had been embarked, the first move to be made was the concentration of the fleet of some 4,500 vessels of varying sizes, from ports hundreds of miles apart — a piu-ely maritime problem of vast magnitude and complexity for the admirals in command, involving many considerations of which modern seamen have no experience or even idea. The governing factor of the whole situation was the north-east monsoon, which blows down the coast of China all through the winter with sufficient force to make it impossible for sailing craft of the smaller sizes, such as formed the bulk of the transport fleet, to work a passage to the northward during the period from November till March. The concentration, therefore, had to be planned for some date between April and October, and, as the spring months are a time of calms and variable winds, in which only slow progress under sail is possible, the final assembly could not be expected to be complete before May. But by that time the typhoon season is near, and although fair weather usually prevails in the Eastern summer, one of these tremendous hurricanes may take place on any day from June till October, and especially in August. A tjrphoon is the chief anxiety of the seamen of the Ear East to this day, and in Kublai's time no vessel existed which had much chance of surviving one if caught at sea. Nor was it practicable to assemble the fleet in Korean ports in the spring and wait till the typhoon season was over, because the supplies and provisions there available were only sufficient for the northern army. The southern army had to bring everything of that nature in the transports with it, and began using up its rations from the day it embarked. Time was therefore a serious consideration, and a delay all through the summer was out of the question. The whole enterprise was, in fact, unavoidably planned for execution with a fatal possibility hanging over it from the outset, and perhaps 32 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION only a seaman can properly imagine the constant anxiety of mind under which the admirals must have laboured. Kublai was compelled to gamble with the weather, and he lost the final throw; but of that more hereafter. Judging by the course of subsequent events, it would seem that the admirals decided to concentrate at a sea rendezvous near the island of Iki in the straits, for which each fleet was to make separately, so as to arrive in May. But in putting the two armies under separate commanders Kublai had acted with less than his usual soundness of judgment, and this mistake gave rise to a certain degree of early misfortune, for the northern commander, being all ready to begin long before his colleague from the south could arrive, decided to undertake initial operations on his own account by attacking the islands of Tsushima and Iki unsupported, where he evidently expected an easy success. He sailed, accordingly, for that purpose in March. The former fate of the garrison had not been forgotten by the Japanese, however, and the islands were now held in such strength, that the Mongols on landing were met and driven back to their boats, after suffering so heavily that further attempts were abandoned, and the ships returned to Korea amid much dissension and recrimination for the failure. There they remained till the arrival of the southern fleet at the rendezvous was nearly due, and then sailed to join it. Actual accounts of the great concentration do not exist, but, from the course of subsequent events, it was evidently successfully carried out during the month of May in accor- dance with arrangements. Many days were doubtless required to complete the assembly, for to control the movements of 4,500 vessels of various sizes and rates of sailing, so as to ensure precise arrival on a given date, would be impossible in practice, and the task was so gigantic that its actual achievement without endless delay indicates a high efficiency in the naval administration. If we consider all the labour and organization required at the present day to embark and to transport an expedi- tion of 50,000 men and supplies, with every facility in GRAND CONCENTRATION 33 the way of large steamers, capable of carrying unbroken military units up to battalions or even brigades, and able to move in company whatever the direction of the mind, with almost exact adherence to a programme, we may form some idea of the problem of carrying an army of three times that number, split up into mere platoons, in thousands of junks no bigger than coasting ketches whose movements were necessarily slow and uncertain. To keep together the embarked fractions of one military command corresponding even to a battalion, the speed of its transports had to be controlled by that of the slowest sailer; and even when they were moving in good order, a sudden shift of wind might throw them all into confusion. And when, in addition to that, the movements of the various transport divisions had again to be more or less regulated in relation to each other, so as to keep the larger units intact, and the subordinate leaders of various ranks had to receive their orders from day to day, or at least from time to time, the extraordinary magnitude and difficulty of the naval staff work becomes apparent. Taken as a whole, the testimony of events seems to indicate that the operation was in fact one of the very greatest achievements in nautical history. It was successfully completed by early in June, and then the whole enormous armada of 4,500 vessels moved on with the least possible delay, but detached a division to seize Iki, off which the rendezvous had been arranged. Whether their next main movements were as ordered by Kublai himself, or as decided by the naval and military leaders, we do not know, but from their nature it would seem as if they were more influenced by nautical than by strategic considerations; because the armada headed for Kiushiu once more instead of for Nipon, which, under the circumstances of their second enterprise, was a bad policy from a purely strategic point of view. If the Mongols really believed that they had a good prospect of subjugating Japan, they should have availed themselves of their complete freedom from opposition at sea to aim their thrust at the heart of their adversary, instead of 34 FIRST PERIOD OP SECLUSION an extremity, and landed in Nipon as the centre of administration and residence of authority, which contains several harbours within comparatively easy marching distance of what was then the capital and seat of govern- ment. The fact that they did not do so requires some explanation, but nothing is on record on that point, and we can only surmise that some very compelling consideration influenced their plans at which we are left to guess. The choice of Kiushiu, as the fearest island within reach, suggests that for some reason of great importance they wished to get the sea passage over as quickly as possible, and, in fact, we may judge that their haste was extreme, because the western extremity of Nipon was only a short day's sailing farther on. More- over, it seems most significant that the Japanese on their part evidently expected that Kiushiu would be the point of attack, for it was there that they made their main arrangements for defence. Some very urgent considera- tion, therefore, recognized by both sides, must have impelled the invaders to shorten the sea trip at all costs ; and nothing is apparent that would account for this, unless it was that the ever-present dread of a typhoon, while the vast fleet was still at sea, so completely possessed the leaders' minds as to dominate all their actions, even to the extent of ignoring the strategical exigencies of the situation. For such an attitude, indeed, their subsequent experiences afforded ample justification, whether it really was the cause which governed their decision or not; and for Kiushiu they certainly steered without any sign of hesitation that can be traced. Meanwhile the Japanese were fully aware that Kublai's forces were on the move, and the unsuccessful attacks on Tsushima and Iki in March warned them that his blow was about to fall. It would be wrong to say that they were terrified, but they were certainly in a very anxious frame of mind. Every man fit to bear arms was now in the ranks or afloat in the light flotillas, and every other preparation that could be made was complete. The non- combatants in the population, headed by the old men and SECOND INVASION 35 the principal dignitaries of the State, flocked in crowds to all the temples, where the bells rang without ceasing day and night, and the priests of every sect in the Empire supplicated as unceasingly for Divine assistance. The provincial and district commanders had received their final instructions and completed their dispositions, the scouting ships were out at sea, the troops were under arms, and the whole attitude of the defenders cannot perhaps be better indicated than by quoting a Japanese expression intended to denote the appearance of men in a state of strained apprehension: " They gazed to their front and swallowed their spittle." It was on or about June 23 — according to Murdoch — that the sails of Kublai's enormous fleet were first sighted from the headlands of Kiushiu, covering the whole northern horizon ; and although the choice of that island for the general disembarkation was strategically inde- fensible — even if well-advised for other reasons — the plan of operations to be carried out on arrival on its coasts was probably the best that could be devised as a first stage in the campaign in the circumstances. The fleet with the northern army steered for Hakozaki Bay, the point of attack of the former expedition; but in the intervening years it had been strongly fortified, and the direct threat to its front required to be supplemented by a threat on flank or rear. The fleet with the southern army there- fore made for the Gulf of Imari — a good harbour about thirty miles to the westward, where the defences were weak and an easy advance inland was doubtless antici- pated. This move must have possessed the further advantages of leaving the Japanese uncertain as to which was the main attack, and of avoiding an overcrowding in either harbour. As the defenders were not strong at sea, neither invading fleet seems to have encountered any opposition in entering their respective anchorages, and the northern fleet moored in Hakozaki Bay, head and stern in a line; with the vessels close alongside each other, and as near as possible to the shore, in order to breach the defences 36 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION on the sea-front by a bombardment of heavy stones thrown from siege catapults and other appliances of that nature with which they had been specially armed. From the contemporary accounts it would further appear that they were lashed together by chains for mutual support, and that planks were laid from ship to ship, in order to facilitate a rapid rally to any vessel in case of a boarding attack by Japanese boats coming in from the light flotillas hovering about outside. Several such attacks were made with great determination, but although they were sanguinary affairs the line remained unbroken. The troops were landed at an unfortified part of the bay and began a series of assaults on the Japanese defences, in which they encountered a most obstinate resistance and suffered heavy losses. The southern fleet arrived in detachments in the Gulf of Imari a little later, and the whole southern army of 100,000 men landed without interference, and began an advance towards Hakozaki over an intervening tract of high and broken country. But a strong Japanese field-army was soon encountered, and a series of desperate battles in the hills ensued, lasting for many days almost continuously, at the end of which the invaders were held up everywhere. The Japanese light flotillas also succeeded in cutting out, or setting on fire, many vessels lying in the more exposed outer berths. July passed in this way without any real gains to Kublai's cause, and by the beginning of August the Mongol generals must have begun to realize that ultimate success was becoming very doubtful. Events were proving that the armies at their disposal were inadequate for the task in hand, and they had no hope whatever of reinforce- ments. The southern troops had been brought to a standstill far from their objective, and the northern were engaged in fruitless efforts to reduce the Hakozaki fortress, which held out obstinately against stone bom- bardment, fire attacks, and every other form of assault, from land or sea, known to the military science of the time. Heavy losses had been suffered by the invaders, and their GREAT TYPHOON 37 supplies must have been getting depleted without any prospect of replenishment. Under these circumstances a situation was soon reached in which the position of the southern army was becoming untenable, and its commander ordered a withdrawal. It may be that he intended to transfer his operations to another part of the coast, but it is said that some of his troops were getting demoralized under the Japanese counter-attacks, and, in any case, he never had the chance. Accordingly he retired from his advanced positions, and even re-embarked the greater part of his command. His colleague of the northern army still held on to his position before Hakozaki, however, where he was not as yet in actual danger of being driven into the sea, and his fleet in the Bay were in immediate touch. But his force was much reduced by losses in battle and sickness. Matters were in this condition when, on or about August 15, the very danger took shape which had always been apprehended by the invaders, although much less so since, their safe arrival in harbour. A typhoon of quite exceptional violence burst on the northern coasts of Kiushiu, and once again the elements came to the assistance of Japan in the most dramatic and decisive of fashions. In the matter of weather the fortune of the Mongols had so far been good, but now it took a much worse turn than either side had reason to expect, for this particular storm was not only of unusual severity, but the path it followed was the very worst it could have taken from the invaders' standpoint, as it blew onshore. Typhoons in the open are nearly always a serious matter for sailing vessels of any kind, and cases have occurred in which they have caused the loss of even full-powered mail- steamers; but in harbour they are as a rule less to be feared, because the tremendous seas which are the chief danger do not find scope to develop their full violence. If Kublai's immense armament had been caught on the passage, disaster would have been a foregone conclusion, but the Mongols were justified in supposing that, with the passage safely over, the worst of their dangers were behind 38 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION them. On comparatively rare occasions, nevertheless, the force of the blast alone is sufficient to blow every vessel from her moorings, even in a well-sheltered port — as, for example, in the case of the great typhoon which devastated Hong-Kong in 1906 — and it happened to be a storm of this order which fell on Kublai's fleets. The old records state that the wind was from the north and west, from which, by applying the law of revolving storms, it seems probable that the vortex was travelling north- eastward through the Straits of Tsushima, parallel to the coast of Kiushiu at no great distance. The effect of the hurricane upon the thousands of transport junks crowding the waters of Hakozaki and Imari Bays was simply appalling, and the scene presented as it rushed across those anchorages, sweeping everything before it in one common doom, must have been one of the most awful in the whole history of war. Even when witnessed apart from any destructive results a typhoon offers a most impressive spectacle. The blackened skies, the moun- tainous seas, and the roaring fury of the wind, all combine to produce an effect which has few equals in nature. But when to these is added the crash of colliding ships and falling masts, the parting of cables, and the overwhelming of entire fleets, no effort of the imagination can really give any idea of the sight. Moreover, to complete the awful picture of destruction in the water, a merciless slaughter was taking place on the land. The Japanese were not slow to avail themselves of the intervention of Nature on their behalf, and, abandoning their defensive attitude, fell upon the enemy's forces still on shore, which in the absence of any help or support from their comrades afloat, were soon overborne and exterminated. Even the unfortunate wretches who tried to swim to the shore from the sinking vessels were cut to pieces as they struggled exhausted from the surf, till the beaches were red, and for this the Japanese had at least the extenuation that their victims were the aggressors and never gave quarter to Japanese if at their mercy. The only swimmers who survived were a party who managed to reach one WRECK OF THE FLEETS 39 of the small islands in the Gulf of Imari, where there was no garrison; but as these were subsequently captured and carried ofE to slavery, their fate was probably little better than that of those who perished. Apparently their lives were spared because they were southern Chinese serving under compulsion, and not Mongols from the north. The ancient versions give a mass of unconnected detail as to the actual form of shipwreck suffered by the fleets, which it is not always easy to follow as a general account ; but it would seem that the fate which overtook the ships in Imari Gulf was practically identical in nearly all cases. Finding the harbour a trap with the wind in the north, they made desperate efforts to get outside when their cables parted, but a strong tide added to their difficulties, and in the end the whole 3,000, or thereabouts, were driven on to the rocks and cliffs along the eastern shores of the gulf and dashed to pieces. So great was the mass of wreckage, that it is said that at one point it formed a " jamb " between an island in the gulf and the shore, across which a man could walk the whole way out after the storm on shattered hulls, planks, and spars. That this is quite conceivable will be admitted by those who saw the wall of wreckage on the eastern side of Hong- Kong Harbour, to the north of the Ly-ee-moon Pass, after the typhoon of 1906. The fleet at the Hakozaki anchorage suffered nearly, but not quite, so complete a disaster. A large number were blown on to the shoals at the eastern end of the bay and demolished in the breakers, and the remainder, to escape a like fate, struggled out to sea, where hundreds more foundered in the open. A mere remnant succeeded in weathering the storm in the end and regaining Korea, in an utterly demoralized condition. But whatever fate may have overtaken individual vessels, it is at least certain that when in a few hours the typhoon had passed, some 4,000 of Kublai's ships had been lost in one way or another, and of the men they had carried about 130,000 had perished by the sea or by the sword. If the Japanese themselves had been gifted for the time with the control 40 FIRST PERIOD OF SECLUSION of the elements, they could scarcely have overwhelmed their adversaries more completely, and it is but natural that many devout Japanese should believe to this day that the priests were right in claiming that celestial aid came to the assistance of their country in response to their appeals. The losses of the Spanish Armada were not nearly so overwhelming, and if Philip II. ever heard of the experiences of Kublai Khan, he must have known that there was at least one monarch in history whose fortune was even worse than his own when he essayed the conquest of an island State. In this fashion ended the only serious attempt ever made by an alien ruler to subjugate Japan. Some author- ities have written as if the typhoon had been her salvation, but that is not strictly correct. Thanks to the stubborn re- sistance of the defending armies, the invasion was already on the road to failure when the typhoon occurred; and the forces of Nature merely hastened the discomfiture of the invaders which the Japanese had begun, and brought it to a more tragic ending than it might otherwise have suffered. But the successful resistance of the Japanese was only possible because the physical barrier of the sea imposed such limitations upon Kublai's efforts, that the force of his blow could be withstood by a valiant race. Had Japan been a continental State, not all the bravery of her sons would have availed to maintain their freedom, for Kublai could have poured ten times their numbers across their frontiers, and their fate must have been similar to that suffered at his hands by aU the mainland nations of the Far East. It is said that even the dismal failure of the second expedition did not discourage the spirit of this indomit- able man, and that he immediately gave orders for the preparation of a third. But the experiences of the first two had left such an impression among his men, that the troops intended for the third deserted as fast as they were assembled, and his death put an end to the project in its early stages, which his successors never revived. We read in history of Napoleon's grenadiers on the beach SECURITY OF JAPAN 41 of Boulogne, staring at the distant cli£Es of Kent and Sussex, on which they were never destined to form up. The Mongol conquerors on the seaboard of China were not subjected to the tantalizing experience of having the object of their ambitions actually before their eyes in this way, but they knew, nevertheless, that a fertile and desirable land lay across the restless waters of the Straits of Tsushima, and had to learn that it must remain for ever beyond their reach. Nearly six centuries were to pass before any Japanese again fell on their own soil by the act of a foreign enemy. And if its true significance is grasped, it will be recognized as a very noteworthy circum- stance that, although these first attacks on Japan were launched from Far Eastern Asia, the next were carried out by forces from Far Western Europe — a circumstance which was only rendered possible by the extraordinary advance of naval architecture in the interval ; for whereas the Mongols could only cross a narrow strait with sonle difficulty and much risk, the European frigates whose guns came into action against the defences of Kagosima and Shimonoseki 580 years afterwards had traversed 14,000 nxiles of the ocean with confidence and ease. CHAPTER II THE KOREAN WAR OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTtTRY For more than three centuries after the disastrous ending of the Mongol invasion Japan was externally at peace, and when next her forces were engaged with a foreign enemy, hostilities were of her own making, and the theatres of operations were on foreign soil and the high seas. But this interval was nevertheless a period of some consequence in the history of Japanese relationships with the rest of the world, even though not marked by any incidents of naval or military importance, except as regards the frequent civil wars, which do not form any proper part of the subject of these pages. Among other events, it brought the Japanese into touch for the first time with Europeans, for it was somewhere about the year 1540 that certain Portuguese traders found their way to the dominions of the Mikado, under circumstances which are sometimes attributed to an accident. The arrival of these adventurers was followed by that of Roman Catholic missionaries, and although the subject of religious propaganda does not come within the scope of this work, unless it has a bearing on maritime affairs, the introduction of Christianity into Japan had such important conse- quences at a later period, that it did affect maritime affairs in common with everything else, and cannot pass without mention here. When the Japanese authorities discovered the advantages of commercial intercourse with the Portuguese, the latter received every encouragement to extend their business, and, as it was evident that the Roman Catholic priests exercised a considerable influence over the traders, these priests were at first allowed to preach their religion without hindrance, and made converts in large numbers. 42 POWER OF SHOGUNS 43 Great changes had passed over the continent of Asia in this same period. The empire of Jenghiz and Kublai had fallen to pieces, and the Mongols, after their period of brief but very extensive domination, had reverted to their original status of desert tribesmen, regretted by none. China was again a separate monarchy, but under the Ming dynasty, which maintained no diplomatic relations with Japan. Korea, now free from Mongol tyranny, was virtually an independent kingdom once more, and kept up a friendly official intercourse with the Japanese. But the Koreans were nominally vassals of China, paying as such a small annual tribute, and the Chinese Government were jealous and mistrustful of Korean relationships with Japan. The Japanese form of government had become very complicated, and its curious structure must be understood in its main points for a proper appreciation of subsequent events. It has been observed in the introductory chapter to this book that the Emperor, or Mikado, possessed no actual power, and that the de facto rulers of Japan were dictators, who rose to supremacy in civil war. But this subversion of authority did not take place in the very early stages of Japanese history, for during that period the Emperors had been the actual as well as the legitimate rulers. Among the high offices of State at their disposal, however, was that of " Shogun," or Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Forces, and in the course of time the Shoguns usurped the whole functions of government, civil and military, internal and external, until the sole prestige attaching to the person of the Mikado was his direct descent from a traditional celestial ancestry always officially acknowledged. He was still nominally the only source of legitimate authority, but so entirely had the substance become a shadow, that instead of the Mikado selecting the Shogun, it was often the Shogun who selected the Mikado, subject only to the condition that his choice was made from among the numerous male progeny of the Imperial house. In dealing with matters of foreign policy, the Shogun's power was so absolute and un- 44 FIRST KOREAN WAR questioned, that foreign potentates sent their embassies or missions to his Court instead of the Mikado's, and referred to the Japanese people as his subjects. His crest was emblazoned on the war-flag of the Empire; he raised armies and fleets as he pleased by taxing the whole land at his unfettered discretion ; he lived in a capital city of his own ; and, although nominally responsible to the Mikado for all his actions, was in point of fact accountable to nobody, provided he did nothing violently contrary to the interests of his own supporters and clan. So completely did the position of the Shogun become an accepted principle in the unwritten Constitution of Japan, that during certain periods of history the Shogunate remained hereditary in the same family for several generations. And a further complication arose from the strictly observed law that the holder of the title must be of noble ancestry. Hence, when, as occasionally happened, a man of humble origin rose to supreme power by virtue of special distinction as a leader in the clan wars, he could not adopt the title of Shogun, although he exercised all his functions. In such cases he usually appointed a puppet Shogun, from whom he nominally received orders, who was in turn supposed to derive aU authority from a puppet Mikado, although neither had any power whatever. It was a man of this kind, Hideyoshi by name, who became one of the foremost statesmen in Japanese history, and the moving spirit in the events which led to the great foreign war of Japan in the sixteenth century. As a country lad accustomed to horses he first found employ- ment in the Shogim's stables, and subsequently accom- panying his master in the civil wars, displayed such remarkable military talents, that he rose to be one of the Shogun's principal generals, and on the death of the latter succeeded to his position, although his birth prevented him from adopting the title. Hideyoshi had great ambition as well as political genius, and, from a succession of sayings with whidh he has been credited, it would seem that he cherished an aspiration to conquer aU China from an early stage in his career; although, as he was PLANS OF HIDEYOSHI 45 fflit?„ jyiieducated, it is doubtful whether he had more than a vague notion of the vast extent of that country. While stjll serving under his predecessor in power, he^ first disclosed this purpose by asking the latter to grant him the revenues of Kiushiu for one year to enable him to build ships for a conquest of Korea. With the assist- ance of the Koreans he would then, he said, proceed to conquer China " as easily as a man rolls up a mat." But his master was not disposed to countenance such a project, and Hideyoshi could take no steps in the matter till he came to power himself in the year 1582. Even then the unsettled state of affairs in his own country occupied all his attention for about four more years, and it was not till 1586 that he began his preparations in earnestby ordering the building of 2,000 ships. It was at this early stage in his plans that an incident occurred which suggests that he had some intuition of the import- ance of ensuring that no serious threat could be made against his sea line of communications before embarking on an enterprise which involved crossing the water. He sent for two Portuguese Jesuit priests, whom he knew to be men of influence with their own people, and with whom he was on very friendly terms, and to them he explained his scheme at length, intimating his intention to leave hia brother in charge of Japan, and immortalize his own name by subjugating China and Korea, even if he met with his death in the enterprise. He professed a resolve to extend liberal treatment to the vanquished peoples, and promised the priests that they might build churches all over China if^he succeeded. Then the object underlying this hand- some appeal to their religious enthusiasm was made apparent by a request that they woidd exert all their influence with the Portuguese authorities to obtain on his behalf the temporary loan of two Portuguese heavily armed ship9,_^it]j,lheir officers and crews, for which he offered to pay liberally. . Very unfortunately for Hideyoshi, this proposal led to no results, for his own ships were unprovided with guns, and were about to take part in a whole series of naval 46 FIRST KOREAN WAR engagements of decisive importance, and to encounter opposition in a totally unexpected form, against which nothing but artillery armaments would have been of any use. His failure in these negotiations with the Portuguese was d estined to cause, in the end, the failure of his w hole grandiose project, and the influence of the sea on Japanese history was about to be manifested in a new and unfavour- able light. But nothing existed in the pas£annals_of his country to^ warn him of the risk of conducting oversea warfare without first establishing a naval superiority over the enemy^. Japan had never embarked on a foreign enterprise of importance within the period of her authentic history, and the only attack ever directed against her own shores had been Kublai Khan's invasion, in which the Mongols' naval power had been so over- whelming, that they were never opposed on the sea at all, and no fighting took place on that element to furnish an object-lesson. Hideyoshi was evidently uneasy on this point, as we have seen, but his apprehensions were solely the outcome of his strategic instinct, and, as there was nothing in the way of historical experience to confirm them, he seems to have cast his doubts aside, refusing to let the failure to get the Portuguese vessels put a stop to the prosecution of his schemes. Having started his preparations in the way of raising troops and building ships, he had to find some pretext for fastening a quarrel on Korea, unless he could obtain any kind of guarantee of Korean neutrality or assistance in his prospective invasion of China, of which he was evidently doubtful. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries complimentary missions had passed frequently between the Korean and Japanese Governments, and under the friendly relationships thus prevailing, permission had been granted for a party of Japanese farmers to settle in Korea. But these immigrants ultimately caused so much trouble, that they were sent back, and early in the sixteenth century the custom of exchanging diplomatic envoys fell into abeyance. This cessation of courtesies had lasted for a long period in Hideyoshi's time, but it EXCHANGE OF ENVOYS 47 answered his purposes as a pretext for an attitude of injured dignity, and he despatched a somewhat peremptory note to the King of Korea accordingly, demanding that the former reciprocal exchange of envoys should be resumed. The King was disinclined to renew this expensive custom, which had never been approved of in Pekin, and Hideyoshi, not satisfied that his own envoy had been sufficiently zealous in pressing the point, be- headed him on his return to Japan with a negative answer; thus affording yet another example of the risks of a diplomatic career among Oriental nations in the Middle Ages, for if an ambassador was too aggressive he was apt to be executed by the potentate to whom he was accredited, but if he was not aggressive enough he ran a chance of a similar fate at the hands of his own master. Next year Hideyoshi sent another mission of two envoys to reiterate his demand, and these were instructed not to return until they had obtained the King's agreement to the proposal, in which they were eventually successful, but not until after two whole years of importunity and argument. A Korean diplomatic mission was accordingly sent to Japan, but Hideyoshi's vanity had been so much ruffled by the delay, that, having gained his point, he now kept the Korean envoys waiting in his turn for a year more, and after treating them most unceremoniously, sent them back with a letter to their King, informing him of his plans. It was not till 1591, therefore, or nearly four years after the King received his first request from Hideyoshi to resume the custom of exchanging missions, that he received a plain intimation of the latter's intention to attack China, and with it a request for Korean assistance, upon which Hideyoshi said his future friendship with Korea would depend. Meanwhile Hideyoshi's preparations for the despatch qI a first, army of 200,000 men were nearing completion. The returning Koreans were accompanied by the two Japanese envoys, and these latter were instructed to make it public that Hideyoshi's reason for attacking China was because the latter had refused to receive a 48 FIRST KOREAN WAR Japanese embassy — which was at best a mere excuse — and that if the Koreans remained neutral, and did not obstruct the Japanese troops who would be sent through their country to invade China, they would be unmolested. Hideyoshi's attitude towards Korea was, in fact, very similar to the German attitude towards Belgium in 1914; and, like the King of the Belgians, the King of Korea flatly refused to agree to any such proposal, pointing out the friendly relations existing between his own country and China, and the hopelessness of the whole project, which he likened to a bee stinging a tortoise. He kept the Chinese Government fully informed of Hideyoshi's intentions at the same time. It is difficult to estimate whether this rebuff was a disappointment to Hideyoshi or played into his hand. The refusal of the Koreans to take any part in a war against China made it clear that he could only get through Korea by force, if he persisted in sending his troops by that route — which in itself was quite unnecessary— and it was c^ertainly not, to his advantage topxovokeKorean hostility,- at a time when he was about to engage another and a formidable adversary, for the Chinese of that period had a well-trained and excellently equipped army. But the view has been taken by some writers that he felt confident of being able to conquer Korea, even if he failed, in Cbina, and hoped thereby to gain some celebrity at least. Others have suggested that his principal object throughout had been to keep the peace among his restive subjects at home by providing a foreign outlet for "their energies without much caring in what direction, and Korea lay neargg.t3t hand. It is true that he had talked of conquering China for years, but could reach the Chinese coast without going through Korea at aU. The only advantages to be gained by forcing the Koreans into the war might be an addition to his forces of a certain number of compulsorily raised and doubtfully useful levies, or the possibility of making Korea an advanced source of food-rsupplies f or the army invading China, as Kublai had done in his preparations for invading Japan. But Hideyoshi never PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 49 seems to have openly announced that as a reason for his subsequent actions. When all is considered, it may perhaps be near the truth to suspect that his early ambi- tion of conquering China had weakened with the passage of time and the increased knowledge it brings ; but that he still hoped to inflict a blow of some sort as a reprisal for the consistently unfriendly attitude of the Chinese, and knew that, even if his armies never succeeded in reaching their territory, he would greatly irritate the -Chinese Government by an armed occupation of their vassal State. If the Koreans raised no difficulties, so much tlie better; but if they did, he felt able to enforce his purpose on them. ^ WhUe these four years of diplomatic controversy had been dragging their length, a Japanese army of 300,000 men had been raised, trained, and equipped. Of these, two-thirds were detailed as an expeditionary force for Korea, and the remaining third as a reserve. The plan of^mpaign was to land in Southern Korea and fight a way through to the Chinese frontier on the north. The reserves were to be sent up the west coast of Korea by sea to reinforce the army first landed when that stage had been reached. A portion of the whole were then to remain fo^uard the land line of communications, while the rest crossed the frontier and marched on into Chinese Manchuria. As a general scheme of operations this plan would have been sound enough, provided the position at sea was secure. But in the absence of any established maritime aiftpfiaqrity it was jt. risky proceeding to despatch arra;rmy across even the comparatively narrow Straits of Tsushima, and it was simply inviting di^astier_to, propose sending large reinforcements all the way by water up the Western Kibrean coast. At the last moment ^idg^shi's health kept him from taking personal command, andThe enterprise started with- out" him. "TKe leading divisions were embarked towards the end of May, 1592, and crossing without interference, landed, at Fusan, a port near the southern extremity of Korea, on the 24th of that month, being followed in rapid 50 FIRST KOREAN WAR succession by the remainder. The initial aperatiofls were brilliantly successful, and the Japanese swept through the enemy's country like a tldarwave, carrying everything before them. Neither fortified towns nor mountain passes nor deep rivers checked their impetuous advance for a single day; and scattering the hostile armies in every direction, their leading troops covered the 200 miles_jbo Seoul — the Korean capital — in less than three wggjjgirsuj thedute of ^disembarking at Fusan. Their van_SEasJed^ by the biaY?_^4-9S£.^lS-lConishi, who, although only a subordinate general, became the most distinguished of the Japanese officers as the war proceeded, ' and deserves special mention as'sharing with Blalce, Rupert, and a very few others, the rare merit of having commanded both fleets and armies with equal success. Like the others, he began as a soldier, and then took to the sea. Before the Japanese had arrived at Seoul the King had already fled northwards; in which direction, after a few days' halt to rest the troops, Konishi continued his advance, ^y July 15 he had reached the important town of_Peng;-jang on the Taidong River, near the~3t6sj_^coastj_^ seventy miles short of the. Chinese frontier ji^^ where the reserves from Japan were intended.to j'pin up^wlffi him, after making the sea passage-to the river entrance. But while the invaders werewinning victory after victory on the'Tan3.j, ibGyw^0-:snS.&rmg^^.^ at sea. "Oil that element the Koreans were at home, and Fate had ordained that this obscure and generally undistinguished race were to produce at this crisis a man, Admiral Yi:sun, whose achievements entitle him to a place in the very front rank, of great naval commanders, although his name is scarcely known to the historians of the West. With a wide grasp of a strategic situation and remarkaBle'skill as a naval tactician, Yi-sun combmg,d a spirit of leadership always animated by the principle of the uncompromising offensive, the only true spirit of war. "His mere presence in any engagement seemed always sufficient to ensure victory, but _his_ h,eadlon£ attacks were never mere blind adventures, for he resembled KOREAN "DREADNOUGHT" 51 Nelson_Jn--Gmitting no precautions to secure success, although he never hesitated to strike hard when the occa^on. arose. Moreover, in addition to his other gifts, he possessed an unusual talent for mechanical invention, whpE^plac.e,d.him far ahead of all his Eastern contem- poraries as a naval architect, and contributed materially to his successes in war. In this, as in many other points of his character, he much resembled the celebrated Cochrane, although it was his fortune to work on a vastly wider scale. And, like the latter, he does not seem to have understood the art of remaining in favour in high places. In the sixteenth century, although firearms and even aKiEeryjyere known onland in the East as well as the "West, no Asiatic nation had as yet equipped a ship with giiiis, and neither the Japanese nor the Koreans were exceptions to this general rule., Their fighting sjiips only differed from their traders — when they differed at all — in having more oars and a better design for speed and haridiiiess in mangeuyring, The principal method of attack was by boarding, and if for any reason that was not possible, an archery or matchlock action took place, in which the targets were the hostile crew and not the ship. A third, and often successful, form of engaging was fefieeted by setting- the eiiem;^'s ship alight by the nse of flre-arfdws. During the four years of diplomatic tn^ahgling which preceded the war, Yi-sun's inventive faculties had been at work to produce a vessel which should be able to resist all three methods of attack, while losing "Tiothirig in her own powers of olfence, and he succeeded beyOndmeasur^. Beginning with a hull design, adapted for very high speed and handiness in manoeuvring, he covered this by an iron-plated turtleback deck impervious to fire, arrows, or bullets; along the top of which were fixed a number of sharp upright spikes, thus making the ship equally proof against boarders. For offensive purposes he strengthened her stem as a ram, and.con- stCTcted. arciiery ports ahead, abeam, and astern. The vessel was in fact the Dreadnought of her day in the East, 62 FIRST KOREAN WAR and her memory still forms a subject of Korean national song. It is possible that Hideyoshi-iad-xeceivfid some intelligence abdiit' this remarkable craft which was the cause of Ms effort to bbtm3)r::*he -iwx). Portuguese ships ; but, if so, he must have kept it secret from his own men, for her ^rstappearancearoong theJaEa,neaa-Has-aYidei)Jtlj quite as much a surprise as.the appearance of the Merrimac was to the Congress~a,nd Cumberland in the American Civil War. On the outbreak of war Yi-sun was statio^d,.jKith_a squadron on the* west^joast- of Korea, '^j| the defence of the southern harbours, for whicli the Japanese made, was entrusted to another admiral. Butthe latter: Jya^s a poltroon, who offered no effective opposition ,. tp . the enemy, and contented himself witb, appealing tojyi-sun for help. Yi-sun required no second invitation, and, with or without the sanction of higher authority, left his special area of limited responsibility to hasten in search J^,. the J^apanese fleet. The exact whereabouts and disposition of the latter is riot on record, but the events of tlie next few days give some general indication of it. Froia these it would seem that the main body was cruising somewhere near the northern end of the main line of sea communica- tions, not far from the Korean coast, with two look-out- squadrons to the westward; of which the outermost and strongest was stationed at the island of Okpo about thirty miles distant, and the second arid smaller at the island of Noryang, about half as far, either as a connecting-link or a reinforcement in either direction, , -A certain nmaaber of other vessels were employed on convoy escort. Very disastrous was the fate of all these forces. Before the war was ten days old, and while the Japanese were in the very midst of their victorious advance on the land, Y^i-sun had come round the south-west point of Korea, and was approaching the Japanese fleets in aTmarinCTjehich reminds the reader of Nelson's approach to. tiie" French before the Battle of the Nile, as described in the^pages of Mahan. And, like the French, the Japanese had at the time no suspicion of the character of the man whogs« FLEET ACTIONS 53 terrific blows they were .abflut.to feeL That ignorance ttidr-iK5t"7ast long, and his first victims were the outlying ^^^JR^-A^^i^^ecl off 0£po. These he sighted early on a June morning, about a fortmght after the first Japanese troops had landed, and, with a strong fair wind, he sailed ^*§l!ljijtO-ihem, No records exist, unfortunately, as to his battle formation, but it seems evident, from the old Korean accounts, that "he took the lead himself in his invulnerable Dreadnought, which charged through the enemy's fleet unharmed herself, but dealing out destruc- tion on every side. His example so inspired his other ships that they _attacked with equal determination and skill, and although the Japanese displayed all their usual courage, they fought in vain. The Koreans manoeuvred to prevent boarding, and, relying on their fire-arrows, soon had twenty-six Japanese vessels in a blaze. The remainder, to save themselves, cut their cables, made sail, and "BTcattfered, but were hotly pursued with further losses. Yi-sun had too much important work still before him, however, to be in a position as yet to disperse his fleet in a general chase, in consequence of which several of the ships of this squadron effected their escape.^ It was otherwise with the units that received bis subsequent attention. Pressmg eastwards before a, fair wind, he fell in with the smaller outlying squadron oftNoryang the same afternoon, which he attacked in the same fashion, and annihilated to,. the. very last vessel before dark. Haying, completed this, he continued to steer eastward aU night, with the restllt that by the morning he had reached the Japanese main line of communications, and there he encountered what seems to have been the Japanese Grand Fleet, or at least the main portion of their navy. Detailed accounts of the great battle that followed do not exist; but the results are authentically recorded. Quite undeterred by the' strength of the enemy, Yi-sun went at them as if with a sledge-hammer, and again proved invincible. The action raged aU day, but although the Japanese fought with desperate courage, fortune never wavered from the Korean side, and the whole Japanese fleet was sunk 54 FIRST KOREAN WAR burnt, or captured; while their gaUantjadiniral,, having done his best for the honour of his country, preserved the honour of his own name in his^countryinen's eyes by com- mitting suicide in the approved fashion for a> Samurai:: who has suffered defeat. Yi-sun now dominated the maritime situation without fear of a rival, which, under the strategic circumstances of the case, was practica.lly tantamount to saying that he dominated the situatioff on the landT as well. He had destroyed the eneiny's fleet and placed himself effectively astride of the main tine of communications' of. the eiiemy's army, occupying a position analogous to that of Nelson after the Nile, which is one of the highest points of success to which an admiral can attain. He now proceeded to reap the fruits. Rightly anticipating that he would not have long to wait, he remained on the scene of his latest victory for the time, and a very few days later -bad the satisfaction of sighting a large convoy approaching from the southward, laden with importatlt' supplies for the forces in Korea, quite unaware of the danger ahead, and only escorted by twenty -five fighting craft. —Chase was giyen at once; the escort was easily overpowered, and although the transports-scattered, they all- fell a prey to the faster Koirean ships, not one escaping. This was the first direct misfortune to the army in the field resulting from the defeat of their comrades afloat, but far worse were to follow. Many commanders, of not altogether inferior judgment, might have decided to remain where they were, if in Yi- sun's position, satisfied with the brilliant successes to their credit and hoping for the luck of further captures on a larger scale. But not so Yi-sun, who was never satisfied that he had done enough, if we may judge by his actions, and whose outlook was certainly never confined to one point of the compass. It swept the whole horizon, and he seems to have anticipated that more convoys were not' likely to travel by the main route for the.,time .at least. Like Nelson off Toulon, he had to keep a watch in tjrO- directions at once to naakesure of countering the .enemy's YI-SUN'S STRATEGY 55 movements, for there was always the possibility that, in iiis~al5sence from his own original station on the west coast, Japanese supplies to the land theatre of war might pass that way without his knowledge . This passage was in point of fact-^as explained on a previous page — the route selected in the original plan of campaign for the main body of reserves intended to join the army in Korea before the march into China began. It may be doubted whether Yi-sun knew anything of that, but he decided, nevertheless, to linger no more on the eastern main route ajE^^is great haiil, and slipped away unobserved to the westward,'" to a^ watching station o£E the south-western islands of Korea, from which he could move quickly in either direction, and Which islands he felt sure would be sigWed for navigational reasons by any vessels taking tfie-western route. Events ftiUy demonstrated the sound- nessof his judgment, and no strategic move of importance was ever better timed. The northern advance of the Japanese armies had been so rapid, that the reserves intended to join by the western route had been embarked, in part at least, by the end of June. There is nothing to indicate whether by that time Hideyoshi was aware jof. the Korean successes at sea or not;' but he made the fatal blunder^ of , adhering to. his .jMiginai scheme; and a fleet of many hundred transports, es&orted by the majority of the fighting ships still remain- ing te Japan," sailed early in July by the western passage. As 'Yi-sun had. expected, they shaped course so as to sight the isfands off the south-west coast of Korea, and tHus^teered Tight into- the trap- he had laid for them. At dawn on July 9 the convoy came in sight of the Korean fleet, but at a great distance off, and "the Korean admiral, apparently afraid that the enemy might escape, abandoned his- -.usual plan of direct attack, and resorted to the stratagem of feinting a retreat himself under oars. The ruse succeeded perfectly, and .the Japanese admiral, in haste to capture a supposed flying enemy, gave general chase with all his fighting ships. Yi-sun, taking care not to" retreat tocTfast, led them on tillthey were well 56 FIRST KOREAN WAR strung out, and the faster vessels, with which he might otherwise have experienced some difficulty in closing, were drawing near. Then, being under sweeps, at the critical moment his ships suddenly altered course sixteen points together and fell on the leading chasers, a manoeuvre which may seem simple enough on paper to the unpro- fessional mind, but which only a naval officer can properly appreciate as a test of a well- trained fleet. The Koreans began their attack this time by ramming, and once again Yi-sun led in his battle-proof "flagship, with which he smashed his way irresistibly through the Japanese fleet. His other vessels did the. same, and the leading ships of the enemy were overpowered and sunk before their consorts could come up to their support. It is probable that many were caught in the act of turning, with their broadsides exposed to the stems of the advancing Koreans. Those that escaped immediate disaster were driven back on to the main body of the convoy, and the whole retreated eastward in a disorganized crowd,, into which Yi-sun's ships dischargedfire-arrows with murderous effect. During the running fight seventy Japanese fighting ships had been sunk or otherwise destroyed, when a large reinforcement was sighted coming down from ahead. As the two bodies were steering towards each other, they closed very quickly, and the Japanese admirals made a determined attempt to stem the retreat with the new arrivals. But in the effort they lost some fiity more vessels by ramming or fire, and then, for thg,fir,§|^,d only time when engaged with, a foreign eiiemy,"e5'fea-.tEe Japanese lost courage, and refusing in despair to-figljt against an apparently unconquerable foe, gave way in all directions and becamea prey to utter demoralization. The retreat degenerated into a rout, in whlchr-transports and escorts, sinking ships and burning ships,- were all mixed together; and so complete did^the panic become, that in the end the great majority pf those that escaped destruction in other ways made for the coast, rather than suffer the fates of their consorts, where they were driven ashore in scores and wrecked with great loss of life. As INVADER'S RETREAT 57 regards its materiel, at least, the convoy was practically annihilated, and all prospects of a Japanese invasion of China was brought abruptly to an end. This was the great Korean admiral's crowning exploit. In the short space of six weeks he had achieved a series of successes unsurpassed in the whole annals of maritime war, destroying the enemy's battle-fleets, cutting his lines of communication, sweeping up his convoys, imperilling the situation of his victorious armies in the field, and bring - ing his most ambitious schemes to utter ruin. Not even Nelson, Blake, or Jean Bart could have done more than this scarcely known representative of a small and often cruelly oppressed nation ; and it is to be regretted that his memory lingers nowhere outside his native land, for no impartial judge could deny him the right to be accounted among the born leaders of men. WhUe this latest and most crushing defeat had befallen the Japanese arms at sea, Konishi with his army was waiting at Peng-yang for the expected reinforcements to commence the invasion of China. He was not strong enough to move without them, and when in due course he learnt that they would never arrive, he knew that all the Japanese plans had miscarried and the farthest point of advance had been reached. But the Japanese forces had been weU spread over Korea, and for the time their hold was strong enough for them to retain their position in all parts and await orders. All through the autumn they waited thus, but day by day their situation became more precarious, for not only were supplies running low in the absence of any communication with Japan, but the ChiaesfiLKere^rofitinglJyTihe respite to concentrate a very strong and well-equipped army on the frontier. In the depthuof winter this army assumed the counter-offensive, and bjvixtjxe of superior numbers drove Konishi out Of Peni-jang, with thejresult that all the Japanese forces ha3 to fall back southward on Seoul. This was the be- ginning of a land retreat consequent upoii defeat at sea. The Chinese followed up the retirement, and the Koreans, heartened by Yi-sun's great exploits, waged a persistent 6 58 FIRST KOREAN WAR guerrilla warfare which taxed all the efforts of the starving Japanese troops to resist. They noade a -staBid art SeQul and repulsed a vigorous effort on the part of the, Chinese to drive them out, but matters went-frombad to worse owing to the stoppage of food-supplies, and by the end of the winter their position had become so desperate that ihey were compelled to ask-for-termfi-of-peace. Upon the receipinSFiMs Yeque'st the Chinese and Koreans agreed to desist from further attacks if the Japanese would with- draw from Korea altogether. The Commander-in-Chief of the invading army had no option but to accept these terms, although he knew that it would be difficult to persuade Hideyoshi that this was so ; and exactly a year from the date of their first landing in Korea the Japanese marched out of Seoul southwards for their ports of em- barkation, undefeated in arms and unbroken in spirit, but physically weakened by hunger and incapable of under- taking further operations of war. Their impotence had been brought about by the operation of an agency on which they had never even set their eyes. This should properly have ended hostilities altogether, and the Chinese Commander-in-Chief evidently believed that it had, for he on his part at once marched north- wards to return to his own country, leaving the Koreans to take care of themselves, although the enemy's troops were not yet embarked for Japan. But in the meantime Hideyoshi had no intention of abiding by terms of peace which were equivalent to an acknowledgment that he had failed not only to conquer China, but even to effect a permanent conquest of Korea. Orders were therefore sent by him that the Japanese army, instead of embarking, were to seize and hold a number of strong natural positions on the coast, each on a cape or promontory easily defended on the land side, and there to form entrenched camps. Among the Japanese generals Konishi was much against this half-and-half policy — which was neither making proper war on Korea nor evacuating it — and strongly urged a complete withdrawal. But although the ablest of the Japanese soldiers, he was not the Commander-in- YI-SUN SUPERSEDED 59 1. Chief, and his views did not suit the ambitious vanity of Hideyoshi. Konishi's sound and disinterested advice nearly cost him his head, and, under definite instructions from Japan, strong garrisons were left at selected points along the south coast of Korea, although the majority of the war-worn troops were embarked for home. Such an attitude on the part of the Japanese would, of course, have been impossible if the Koreans had chosen to make use of their overwhelming superiority at sea to cut off the supplies of these garrisons, which Yi-sun would have done without doubt if free to act. But the Koreans were at this stage guilty of a piece of supreme folly which played straight into Hideyoshi's hands, and doubtless strengthened his purpose. Yi-sun^ . great successes had . aroused the jealousy of a faction with strong influence^ at Court, and these people, by means of a particularly dis- graceful intrigue, obtained his supersession .from.- the King in favour of one of thems&lves,,an utterly- worthless and incfOihpetent officer, who lived a corrupt and intem- perate life, and was hated by the mSi. This admiral was content to enjoy the emoluments of his command without undertaking the responsibilities, and, as he never went to sea, the flpet under Ms orders fell into a condition of utter inefficiency and disrepair. He was perfectly rea^y^~^ accept the nominal cessation of hostilities, following on the Japanese evacuation of Seoul, as an excuse for inaction, and the enemy's garrisons remaining on the coast in defiance of the terms of peace had nothing to fear with such a man in command afloat, ffideyoshi's great object now was to gain time enough to~ rebuild the Japanese havy'ahd raise a fresh army before the protests certainrta arise in China and Korea against the maintenance of these armed posts developed into measures for forcible ejection. Diplomatic proceedings, if sufficiently pro- longed, might answer this purpose, and in regard to these he was a past master at inventing plttusible causes for delay. In consequence, when certain Chinese envoys arrived at his capital to arrange terms for a permanent peace, including the withdrawal of these garrisons, he / 60 FIRST KOREAN WAR kept them waiting for many months on various pretexts and then sent them back with an entirely fresh set of proposals which he knew would be unacceptable. This led to an endless exchange of diplomatic correspondence, exactly as he had intended, in which missions came and went in true Oriental fashion, with constant protests from one side and constant evasions and excuses from the other. In this way he successfully dragged out the negotiations for three whole years, while the Japanese shipwrights were building a new fleet as fast as they could hammer the planks together, a new field-army was being raised and equipped, and large depots of food were being quietly accumulated at the entrenched camps, ^.^jd all this timeiihe.Korean war-junks were lying rotting at their anchors, or in use as traders, with their fighting crews discharged, and Yi-sun fretting out his soul in oblivion and retirement. In 1596, after three years of diplomatic controversy and armed peace, Hideyoshi was ready to begin aU over again, and had, in fact, already passed a force of about 100,000 men surreptitiously across the water. He also received Konishi back to favour, and being a shrewd judge of men, appointed him to the chief command of the new Japanese fleet, all the former admirals having been killed. Then he suddenly assumed an aggressive attitude by affecting great indignation at the latest Chinese diplo- matic communication, on the grounds that it assumed the submission of Japan, and stated in his reply that he intended to punish the Koreans for impeding good relations between his own country and China — a claim without any justification whatever. But he made a second capital mistake in his calculations. His first had been the assumption that even if he encoun- tered some trouble on the sea — which he evidently did expect — he need not fear a fatal interference with his schemes. The consequences of that error had been too palpable for even the most obtuse of strategists to miss, and he took every precaution against its repetition. Now, however, he completely underestimated the strength of HOSTILITIES RENEWED 61 the probable opposition on the land by failing to appreciate that the comparative ease with which the original invading army had overrun Korea was partly due to the inefficient military organization of the enemy and the dilatoriness of the Chinese in coming to their help. He looked forward, therefore, with confidence to a second easy occu- pation of that country, secure against undoing by sea. But the Chinese Government had learnt their lesson also. They realized that they had made an initial mistake in not hastening to Korea's assistance at the very beginning of the war, and a second mistake in allowing the Chinese army to withdraw without seeing the Japanese fairly out of the country. Being suspicious of Hideyoshi's intentions all through the long period of suspended hostilities, they took the opportunity to pour troops into Korea until the whole country was filled, and every city, pass, and ford strongly held and scientifically fortified. Hideyoshi resumed hostilities in the summer of 1596 by despatching the new Japanese army, escorted by the new Japanese fleet under Konishi, whom the incompetent Korean admiral received peremptory orders to attack. He was obliged to obey, but by his previous negligence the Korean fleet had fallen into such a state of inefficiency that it was no longer formidable, and in the battle which ensued — the fifth sea-fight of the war — Konishi com- pletely turned the tables by scoring the first great naval victory against a foreign enemy in Japanese history. The Koreans were overwhelmingly defeated and nearly all their ships destroyed. Their unworthy admiral saved his life in the fight, and by influence at Court saved his head afterwards, but was severely flogged by his own people. The Japanese had now no serious anxiety about their sea communications, and, although Konishi had not been opposed by a very formidable adversary in the battle, he is at least entitled to the credit of having done every- thing that was immediately required. But when the land operations began a different tale was developed. The new army encountered stubborn 62 FIRST KOREAN WAR opposition in superior numbers in every step in its advance, and the Japanese forward movement was so slow, that after six months of constant fighting they had progressed no farther than a point which they had reached in a fortnight in the first invasion. They were still far from Seoul when brought to a final stand in a pitched battle with the main Chinese army, and the Japanese leaders were forced to recognize that this second attempt to subdue Korea was doomed to end like the first. For a time they were undecided whether to maintain their position, or to accept the inevitable and begin a retirement, for their losses had been heavy, and although their communications were secure and their supplies ample, even Japanese troops get worn out with incessant fighting sooner or later. But Hideyoshi was still paramount in Japan, and the army commanders knew that it would be hopeless to obtain his approval to abandon the war so long as the enemy refrained from the offensive. How long this state of deadlock would have lasted it is impossible to say had not a new and unex- pected factor of great portent suddenly arisen. Yi-sun was once again at sea. The Korean King, after -treating the national hero with the basest ingratitude, had turned to him for help, and the great admiral, always ready to come .forward in his country's cause, had accepted the command afloat for a second time, although scarcely any ships Trefe left to take under his orders since Konishi's defeat of the Korean fleet under Yi-sun's predecessor. Moreover, for some reason of which we know nothing his own former armoured flagship seems to have dis- appeared; although there are indications which suggest that this was due to shipwreck, and not to destruction in action, for the place where her bones were reported to lie was pointed out by Korean traditions as late at least as the nineteenth century. Yi-sun collected what remained of the Korean fleet, .however, reinforced -by a -squadron of Chinese, and it is remarkable testimony to the Tespect in which his name was held that- this squadron was OfdgfeH to follow his instructions, for on all other occasion& of eo= YI-SUN AT SEA AGAIN 63 operation with the Koreans the Chinese insisted, on taking the supreme cbriimand. After asseinbling this mixed foree-tm "the west coast- -he sailed southward, towards the cruising area of the main. Japanese fleet, and was very soon again engaged. K(mshji_ had detached a squadron to the westward fro assist the army on that side, unaware >-©t::yi"sun's movements, which fell in with the latter- coming from the opposite direction— ofi the south-western -islands, near the scene of his great victory of four years before. For the fifth time the presence of the great Korean was a guarantee of success to, his country's arms, and the Japanese again suffered comprete and disastrous defeat. News of this fresh reverse at sea had an immediate eSect'bn the councils of the Japanese army commanders, for although it was only a detached squadron which had suffered, and the main Japanese fleet under Konishi himself was still intact, past experiences of the results of defeat at sea had made them very cautious about taking any further risks. Hesitation came to an end at once by an order to aU the Japanese land forces, extended in various directions, to abandon the offensive and fall back on the line of entrenched positions along the southern coast. It was then late in the year 1596. Here they remained all the winter, closely and constantly harassed and threatened on the land side, but free from investment by sea, because, although Yi-sun had defeated a detached squadron,, his, own was to©- weak-ia .gjambers to attempt decisive conclusions with the main Japanese fleet, even under sufih a.leader as himself.. By avoiding the forlorn hope of an attack, nevertheless, he remained a permanent menace on the Japanese sea flalrk, which kept '"Kjohishl" perpetually apprehensive. It would no doubt have been the jproper policy for the latter to have moved westward and forced Yi-sun to engage. But, perhaps because his training as a soldier gave his mind a bias towards land operations, he devoted his whole attention instead towards supporting and assisting the harassed troops on shore, in regard to which he displayed the greatest activity. His failure to understand the proper 64 FIRST KOREAN WAR use of the offensive at sea was a very common one at the time, and not unnatural in a man who only took to sea service late in life, although it was not shared by the more distinguished of the European sea-soldiers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centiu-ies. But it was the only fault in his brilliant record. Matters remained in this indecisive condition until well into the summer of 1597, and the Japanese maintained themselves in a situation from which they had nothing to gain — and which threw a severe strain on the morale of their troops — simply because Hideyoshi refused to admit that he was beaten. But his immense industry coupled with a licentious private life had worn out his vitality, and his days were drawing to a close, although he was not an old man. By the autumn the position in Korea was so bad that the Japanese commander in the field was on the point of asking the enemy for an armistice, when news was received at his headquarters of Hideyoshi 's death, and his successor in the office of Shiogun debided on a genera-l abandonment- of the campaign. Orders for a complete re-embarkation were issued accordingly, which began in the early winter, but had to be carried out with extreme caution, to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the unfavourable tactical position in which an embarking army is always placed with hostile forces in great strength close at hand. It was some time, therefore, before the last troops were on board, but as the Chinese and Korean armies showed no enterprise in grasping the opportunity, the whole process was safely completed in due course, and the transports sailed for home escorted by the main Japanese fleet under Konishi, who had been the first to arrive in Korea nearly six years before and was now the last to leave. But the Japanese misfortunes were not quite yet at an end. Yi-sun had no sympathy with the supineness of his land colleagues in allowing their enemy to embark without striking them a farewell blow, and resolved that on his own element at least they should feel one. Watching his chance, he hurried up from the westward, CHARACTER OF KONISHI 65 just as the immense convoy were fully started. The great battle that followed was the Korean Trafalgar, for even if the defeat of the Japanese was not nearly so complete as that of France and Spain, it ended the battle-fleet actions of Japan for 300 years, but at the cost of the life of the greatest seaman against whom they ever fought. In certain other respects it had a dramatic piquancy of its own, for although the very final act of a six years' struggle, it was the only occasion on which the two chief participants ever met as direct adversaries in action. For many reasons the moment of the mutual sighting of their respective fleets must have been pregnant with profound emotions for both. On the one side was Konishi, the valiant and capable commander by land and sea, always inspired by a disinterested sense of duty; shrewd in council ; formidable in war. Konishi had been the outstanding figure on the Japanese side throughout, although never the Commander-in-Chief of the forces on land. His army division had been the first to disembark on Korean soil and head the original invasion ; it was the first to enter the enemy's capital and advanced nearest to the Chinese frontier of any. Then when the tide of success turned it covered the Japanese retirement with equal distinction. Konishi had been averse to Hideyoshi's obstinate policy of recommencing operations, under- standing the problem far better than the latter, but was selected, nevertheless, for the highly responsible position of commander at sea ; which , on the whole he filled with conspicuous success, if not genius, and it was to him as such that was entrusted the last duty of ensuring the safety of the final withdrawal.- He survived the day, but was now associated with definite failure through no fault of his own, and had to endure the mortification of seeing all his efforts and sacrifices brought to nothing. On the other side was Yi-sun. When for the last time the Korean admiral sighted an enemy's fleet ahead he had only a very few more hours to live, but for that fleeting space he enjoyed at least the supreme satisfaction of seeing the last of the invaders leave his native land and 66 FIRST KOREAN WAR the knowledge that no man had been more instrumental than himseK in bringing that end to pass. The great convoy moved slowly, as such formations usually do, and Yi-sun had no difficulty in catching it up. Once more he attacked with all his old dash, but Konishi, with his numerically superior fleet, made a splendid defence, and the engagement was long and desperately contested. Details of its phases do not exist, and the old accounts of the results are not in complete agreenaent, for whereas those from Korean sources say that the majority of the Japanese ships were sunk, the Japanese versions say that it was the majority that escaped. Both si^s- admit 'he€bvyUijsSfiS*JaQ?E&v-eE,^-a»dr it "Sfeems certain that the convoy was broken up, althoug:h j. portion-event- uaHy reached Japan in safety^ Tnthe height of the action Yi-sun waskiEedr'a fittiiig end to sucli"^'c£ffeer^.'°'Tns always~"dSfficult for Englishmen to admit that Nelson ever had an equal in his profession, but if any man is entitled to be so regarded, it should surely be this great naval commander of Asiatic race who never knew defeat and died in the presence of the enemy ; of whose move- ments a track-chart might be compiled from the wrecks of hundreds of Japanese ships lying with their valiant crews at the bottom of the sea, ofE the coasts of the Korean peninsula. No commander, on the sea at least, ever more thoroughly justified Napoleon's saying that " war is an affair not of men but of a man," for Yi-sun had to work with inferior material. Individually the Koreans may, perhaps, have been better seamen in some ways than the Japanese, but they were never their equals as natural born fighters; and it was only because their admiral infused his own unconquerable spirit through his whole fleet that, under his leadership, his men were ready at any time to meet a physically braver adversary with enthu- siasm for the encounter and confidence in the result. It does not lessen his credit that his successes were partly due to the use of a vessel that he had himself designed, with such superior fighting qualities that nothing afloat could face her. The object of war is to defeat the enemy. CHARACTER OP Yl-SUN 67 and the man or the nation that attains that end by the intelligent production of more eflfective weapons than the adversary is fully entitled to the success thereby achieved. Moreover, Yi-sun not only produced the better ship, but he made the very best use of her qualities; and it seems, in truth, no exaggeration to assert that from first to last he never made a mistake, for his work was so complete under each variety of circumstances as to defy criticism. Although his whole record of service is well known, there is not a single point of importance in which his judgment can ever be held to have been at fault. At the very outset he realized that the sea could not be made impassable to the Japanese by splitting up the Korean fleet into squadrons stationed at fixed points round the coast. The unsoundness of such a policy is well enough understood, in these days, but in his time there were no recognized ^ principles of naval strategy in existence, and he had to work entirely on his own initiative. He saw a situation so clearly, however, that his inborn confidence in a proper course of action made him fearless of responsibility, and his native courage did the rest. Leaving his first station, he went in search of the enemy, but did not commit the error of cruising about to seize transports while the Japanese fighting fleets remained in existence and accessible to attack. He recognized from the first that the best method of reaching the fruit was to take a sharp axe and cut down the tree. And so he deliberately began by attacking the fighting fleets, on which all else depended, and having utterly demolished these first, spread his activities not only over one line of the enemy's communications but over all. His whole career might be summarized by saying that, although he had no lessons from past history to serve as a guide, he waged war on the sea as it should be waged if it is to produce definite results, and ended by making the supreme sacrifice of a defender of his country. In all the volumes of history there is perhaps no record of any war which in its own course furnished such a complete series of lessons on all the fundamental laws pertaining to the conduct of oversea campaigns as this 68 FIRST KOREAN WAR conflict between Japan and her mainland neighbours. Some principles of importance were emphasized by the consequences attendant on failure to recognize them, others by the results of their proper observance, and others, again, by both. But aU received illustration in one way '/] or another. The first phase of hostilities. demonstrated . ./' forcibly and immediately the iolly of crossing the seas to attack an enemy without first having ensured beyftnd^ reasonable doubt-that they are, safe. to. xjxqss... .Thistiiay seem a simple enough axiom nowadays, and yet that very mistake was made by Napoleon himself when he went to Egypt two centuries later.- The second phase ' > of hostilities proved that, although maritime superiority i is the indispensable preliminary to all success in attacking an oversea-enemy, it is not enough in itself to subdue an opponent whose national existence" is independent of sea comBiunication^, and must,, 111 such cases be accom- panied or followed by the application of force on an ade- quate" scale oil shore. A fleet may achieve unaided the conquest of an island by threatening it with the grip of blockade, and this has sometimes happened; the most recent case being the surrender of the strongly garrisoned Spanish colony of Cuba, which capitulated after the destruction of Spanish sea power, although scarcely any invading troops were on its soil. And it is common knowledge that if the maritime supremacy of Great Britain passed into an enemy's hands. Great Britain's fate would be sealed without any necessity for emplojdng an army to bring her to terms. But if the enemy to be attacked across the water is a continental State, or a self-supporting; island — such as Japan was, for example, untU very recent times — sea command is only the first step towards over- throw. This was doubly exemplified in the Korean War,. In the first phase the complete domination of Yi-sun was of inestimable defensive value to Korea, but it was no serious threat to the hearths and homes of the Japanese, even though Japan was almost denuded of troops,because there was no Korean army fit to follow up the work of the fleet and no Chinese army ready. And when four years LESSONS OF THE WAR 69 later the command of the sea passed to Japan as a result of Konishi's victory afloat, the insufficiency of the Japanese army caused the failure of Hideyoshi's resumed efforts at conquering Korea. (-Thirdly, the war illustrated in the most unmistakable manlier the importance of the. offensive in maritime operations, by the consequences both of its adoption on "the one hand and its rejection on the other. If Yi-sun had remained in a purely defensive attitude at the outset, the whole course of events would have been different, for although the actual conquest of China might not in any case have proved a feasible military operation with the resources in men at Japan's disposal, the Japanese conquest of Korea had given them so strong a hold on all its strategical points, that they would have been very difficult to dislodge by land attack if the army of occupation could have received regular and adequate supplies from Japan. Conversely, when the Koreans lost the command of the sea the policy adopted by Konishi of waiting for Yi-sun to attack instead of attacking Yi-sun kept the invading forces in a state of constant apprehension for the safety of their sea communications, weakened their resolve, and allowed the comparatively minor Korean fleet to strike a last blow after the enemy was embarked and helpless, which Yi-sun of all men was the least likely to miss. Fourthly, the conflict supplied a very striking demon- stration of the value of mechanical inventions as applied to belligerent purposes. Mechanical inventions will not win a war of themselves — as some highly placed specialist officers seemed to believe when anti-submarine appliances were receiving attention in 1916 — but, when added to a proper understanding of strategic principles and used with a proper spirit, they go far to ensure victory against a less progressive opponent, however brave he may be. As a rule, if we may judge by well-known cases, the tendency of soldiers and sailors is to view new war appliances with distrust. The committee of British naval officers apointed to report on the advisability or otherwise 70 FIRST KOREAN WAR of introducing steam-engines into the navy, condemned them in immeasured terms as dangerous inventions. Only the experiences of Sebastopol overcame the reluctance of the British Admiralty to adopt armour-plating. There are officers of high rank still alive who were predicting that submarines would never prove a reaUy serious danger to fleets, not half a dozen years before the time when they came near to bringing the Allies' cause to ruin. And so also on the land, to take one notable case only, it is well known that many very highly placed soldiers disbelieved that tanks would have any effect on tactics in the field. But a minority in both professions are gifted with a more clear-sighted imagination than their less independent colleagues, and, refusing to be trammelled by the con- ventions of their day, strike out into new lines. Such a man was Lord Fisher in the twentieth century, and such a man was Admiral Yi-sun in the sixteenth. Both produced vessels of such novel and powerful design that nothing previously built could face them, and it was the fortune of Yi-sun that he himself had the opportunity of demonstrating how to make the very best use of the invincible ship that was the product of his own brain. While under his command she always seems to have been in the right place at the right time. The war had cost the Japanese thousands of lives, //hundreds of ships, and a great expenditure of their economic resources — all without any material gain what- ^ ever. On the other hand, it had been very rich in experiences as a guide of the greatest value to naval and military administration and policy. Whether these would have borne any fruit in improving warlike efficiency in the immediately succeeding period it is impossible to say, for Japan was on the eve of an era of 250 years of complete and deliberately adopted seclusion from the rest of the world when the war ended, and, with the exception of a very small expedition to Formosa, did not again undertake hostilities abroad till the year 1894. But the Japanese have tenacious memories, and when, almost exactly 300 years after the Kgrean enterprise EFFECTS ON JAPAN 71 of the sixteenth century, they were again involved in the solution of a precisely similar strategic problem, in the very same arena, it is difficult to believe that the experi- ences of their ancestors had no effect on their plans; for whereas on the first occasion they blundered on many points of cardinal importance and ended in failure, on the second they made only one mistake of any consequence and ended in complete success. Perhaps, above all, they remembered the effect on their former plans of the offensive maritime strategy of Yi-sun, for they have never omitted ia their later wars to act on the offensive at sea themselves. And to a like extent they have now thoroughly grasped the importance of being abreast of other countries in regard to the most up-to- date and efficient ships and appliances of war. With these facts in mind, it is interesting and perhaps not altogether unprofitable to speculate as to the possible course of history in the East, supposing that the Japanese of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, instead of shutting themselves up as they did, had come forward and displayed a spirit of progress such as their descendants do now. If the latter are perfectly competent to build and handle the complicated modem battleship, it seems reasonable to believe that the former could have learnt to build and handle the much simpler wooden liner of an earlier period. And if with this to work upon, a warlike and ambitious Shogun had been again in power, it requires no exaggerated flight of the imagination to picture a fleet of Japanese 74 's dominating the whole Western Pacific, and with the co-operation of well-equipped troops extending the dominions of the Mikado right through the Malay Archipelago, perhaps even to Australia. Under such conditions the hold of the Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese on their Eastern Asiatic colonies must have been precarious, unless they kept on very friendly terms with the ruling Shoguns; for in the state of European politics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, none of them would have received material assistance from the Western Powers against an attack by Japan on the far 72 FIRST KOREAN WAR side of the world. Even the position of Great Britain in India might not have been secure without the despatch of a much larger naval force to the Indian Ocean than could properly have been spared during the frequent wars in European and Atlantic waters. These hypothetical conditions, however, never arose, and the Korean War had no immediately obvious effects on the status of Japan as a world Power, either in regard to material force or naval and military efficiency. In tracing the influence of the sea on that chapter of her national existence, the conclusion to which the history of events seems to point is that, whereas it had assisted Japan in the days of Kublai Khan, it assisted her enemies in the days of Hideyoshi, because her enemies had learnt how to make use of it in war, which the Japanese had not. But in both of these wars it was by that element more than anything else that the plans of the invaders had been brought to nothing. CHAPTER III THE PERIOD OP VOLtraTARY SECLUSION TO THE OPENING OF THE TREATY PORTS AND THE ANTI-POREIGN DIS- TURBANCES. The death of Hideyoshi and the end of the Korean War marked the close of one sharply defined period in the national affairs of the Japanese people and the opening of another, in which, for the space of two centuries and a half, they had no external history whatever. It is true that for the first twenty years of the new epoch they did still associate with men from other lands, but only in their own ports for purely commercial purposes, and not only did they not embark on foreign wars, but they maintained no official intercourse with the rulers or Governments of other States. In treating of the special subject of these pages, therefore, a long gap occurs at this point, corresponding chronologically to the interval between the reign of James I. of England and Queen Victoria, and our sources of information regarding Japanese affairs before that interval are of a widely different nature from those referring to the incidents which followed it. Any narrative which deals with events up to the close of the Korean War must necessarily be founded on old, vague, and often incomplete records ; but when next the influence of the sea on Japanese history had become so unmis- takably manifested as to deserve special attention, a period had been reached of so recent a date, that it lies within the memory of men still living, and every detail of important events is accurately known from the first- hand evidence of participants. At the same time, some reference to the period immediately following the Korean War is not altogether out of place here, for although it was not a period in which the influence of the sea was 73 7 74 SECOND PERIOD OF SECLUSION directly traceable in Japanese affairs, it was a time of political events and developments within the Empire which profoundly affected Japan's relationship towards other countries ; and all questions concerning the attitude of an island State in regard to other lands must have their maritime aspects. On the death of Hideyoshi, in 1598, he was succeeded as Shogun by lyeyasu, of the Tokugawa clan — a man with a remarkable talent for domestic administration but no inclination for foreign enterprise, whose whole period of authority was devoted to consolidating the power of his office throughout the Empire, and with it the power of his own clan. The Korean War had become unpopular long before its close, and caused much dis- content among the rival clans by reason of the taxation it entailed, but lyeyasu suppressed all signs of active trouble with a firm hand, and the civil wars which had so long and so often stained the previous history of Japan were things of the past under his strong rule. Like his predecessor, he encouraged foreign trade, and the Portu- guese, Spanish, and Dutch merchants who arrived in Japan received his support and assistance. His policy, therefore, although largely dictated by personal interests, was on the whole beneficial to Japan, tending as it did to promote peace, progress, and wealth. One feature in the general domestic situation caused him considerable trouble, however. Reference was made in the last chapter to the activities of the Jesuit mission- aries who accompanied the first Portuguese traders. These had increased in numbers, and representatives of other Roman Catholic fraternities had arrived in Japan and entered into the work of Christian propaganda with great energy. Impressed by the fervour and courage of these missionaries, many of whom were ready and even anxious for martyrdom, thousands of Japanese had embraced Christianity, including several men in high position — as, for example, Konishi himself — and the power and influence of the Roman Catholic clerics were constantly on the increase, particularly in Kiushiu. JAPANESE CHRISTIANS 75 So long as these missionaries confined their attention to spreading the doctrines of their faith, they aroused no serious antagonism except amongst the Buddhist and Shinto priests. As a nation the Japanese have never been fanatical adherents of any one special religion, although the majority profess — or did profess — Buddhism. The ShogunS, therefore, had no reason, of either a personal or political nature, to oppose Christianity, and Hideyoshi displayed considerable interest in the tenets of Roman Catholicism, although he never became a convert. But by degrees the success of the missionaries in obtaining proselytes led them to aim at establishing an influence in other directions, and from small beginnings their lust for power went farther and farther. Whole villages of converts looked to their priests for guidance in every- thing they did, and displayed a decreasing deference to other authority and an increasing antagonism to their own countrymen of other faiths. Riots and disturbances became frequent in the Christian districts of Kiushiu, and if the Christians were not always the aggressors, they were at least seldom slow to make reprisals, and sometimes offered forcible resistance to the Government officials engaged in repressing disorder. Eventually the doctrine began to spread that a Roman Catholic owes his first allegiance to the Pope, and the Japanese Christians sent a mission of their own to Europe, by a homeward-bound Spanish ship, to do homage at Rome. Such a theory has rarely found acquiescence even among Roman Catholic princes, and its enunciation in a non- Christian country like Japan was certain to lead to serious trouble sooner or later. By the time of lyeyasu's accession to power the status of the Christian community had become the most difficult political question in Japan ; but although he occasionally treated the Christians with severity, he did not attempt to deal with the matter on a wholesale plan, and it was still an unsolved problem when he retired from the Shogunate in favour of another successor of the same clan. This Shogun also passed it on in his turn to yet another named lyemitsu. 76 SECOND PERIOD OF SECLUSION A different stamp of ruler altogether now came into authority, with neither the administrative talents of lyeyasu nor the liberal statesmanship of Hideyoshi; but although narrow-minded, obstinate, and easily alarmed for his own position, lyemitsu was not lacking in energy or force of purpose, and he resolved to deal with the Christians once for all in drastic fashion. To that end he initiated a policy for the extermination of the native Christians — subject only to the alternative of recantation — and for the expulsion of all aliens, as the root cause of the whole evil. Nor did his intentions stop there. In his eyes foreigners were barbarians of an inferior race, association with whom must necessarily prove demoralizing to the Japanese, and, to prevent the possibility of any such contamination, he made it a capital offence for his own countrymen to leave their native shores. To facilitate the enforcement of this decree, he issued a prohibition against the building of any vessel of more than 75 feet in length — a dimension sufficient for the coasters and fishing craft which are always most necessary to Japan as an Empire of islands, but not for sea-going ships — and at the same time gave orders to the local officials at all the ports in the realm, that any foreign vessel entering a Japanese harbour was to be destroyed and the whole of her crew put to death. The expulsion of the foreigners presented no great difficulty, on account of their small numbers, especially as the bond of a common religion was not strong enough to prevent violent political and commercial animosities among themselves, for the Spanish Roman Catholics quarrelled ceaselessly with Portuguese Roman Catholics, and the Protestant Dutch were hated by both. It was effected without serious trouble, therefore, in spite of angry and vigorous protests, although the Dutch obtained a respite, on the grounds that they had kept strictly to trade and made no attempts to proselytize or obtain political power. But the extermination of the native converts was quite another matter. These numbered about a quarter of a million, including many men of noble CHRISTIANS SLAUGHTERED 77 rank, and, as it is a fine point in the Japanese temperament always to be ready to face death for an ideal, the whole, with very few exceptions, were quite ready for martyrdom, but determined to sell their lives dearly. Only a small fraction accepted the alternative of abjuring their faith, and lyemitsu found that he had a task of great magnitude before him, requiring all the forces at his disposal. The process was nevertheless taken in hand and carried through ruthlessly for a period of about five years, during the whole of which time the converts defended themselves with a fortitude and constancy that evoked the admiration of even their persecutors, until the last remnants to the number of about 40,000 retired to a position on the coast, of such great natural strength that all efforts to break into it from the land side failed. It was equally inacces- sible from the sea, and as lyemitsu had no artillery his operations were brought to a deadlock. In this dilemma he took the strange step of appealing for help to the Dutch, of whose ships a few were still in Japanese waters by his permission. The Dutch agreed to help, but at a price. They made it a condition of lending an armed vessel that the edict for their expulsion should be rescinded and that for the future they, and they alone, should enjoy the privilege of trade with Japan. To this lyemitsu expressed his assent, and a Dutch ship thereupon bom- barded the converts' position and forced them to evacuate it, whereupon the Shogun's forces fell upon them and slaughtered them all. Harsh things have been said about the Netherlanders for their action in this matter, which was in the main undoubtedly inspired by the oppor- tunity of acquiring the monopoly of a very lucrative trade; but it should be borne in mind as an extenuating consideration that the Roman Catholics on their part regarded the Dutch as heretics, beyond the pale of clemency, and would undoubtedly have acted without hesitation in the same way had the conditions been reversed, whether any inducements from a commercial point of view were involved or not. Having obtained hia object, lyemitsu respected his pledge so far as to allow 78 SECOND PERIOD OF SECLUSION Holland the sole monopoly of trade in Japan, but under such humiliating conditions, that it seems incredible that any representatives of a race of proved national courage and self-respect should have submitted to them, in doing which they lowered all Europeans in Japanese eyes. Except, however, for a handful of Dutchmen, virtually imprisoned within a high wall on a small island in Nagasaki Harbour, Japan was now clear of foreigners and Clwistians alike. The laws prohibiting Japanese to travel abroad or build large vessels were also enforced to the letter, and, as far as it lay in their power, the various Court officials carried out the order to destroy foreign vessels entering Japanese ports, for a Spanish ship that did so at a somewhat later period was attacked by a swarm of boats and set on fire, eventually blowing up with all her crew after a desperate resistance. Preparations were hastily made at a later date still for treating the British frigate Phaeton in the same way when she entered Nagasaki Harbour in 1808 in search of Dutch prizes, but she sailed out again before they were complete, leaving the commander of the local defences to commit suicide for his supposed disgrace, although she could easily have taken care of herself if his dispositions had had time to mature. And so, before the middle of the seventeenth century, the land which was destined at a later era to become a Great Power had voluntarily and deliberately settled down to a period of 200 years of complete abstinence from intercourse with the outer world. Surrounded on every side by the sea which they were debarred from crossing, and refusing to receive visitors from its farther shores, the Japanese entered upon a phase of existence during which they might as well have been residents in another planet for all they knew of events passing in foreign lands. It was not a period of actual unhappiness, for they were at peace within their own borders, and of serious want there was none. But national development was arrested, and history inakes it clear that the nation which stands DANGERS OF ISOLATldN 79 still stands in danger. Asiatics have never displayed much inventive originality in the application of science to war, and as this rule applied ftilly to the Japanese, their weapons and defensive arrangements remained on stationary models in the absence of example or instruction from elsewhere, and became entirely obsolete as time passed on. All through this period the world was shrinking, in a sense, and its different parts drawing closer together, by reason of the great progress in the knowledge of naviga- tion, and war in other lands was a business in which science more and more played a part. The ships of Eng- land, France, Holland, Spain, and Portugal were carry- ing their pioneers to conquer and colonize fresh lands across the oceans, some at no great distance from Japan itself, and all the coasts of the globe, except in the polar regions, were becoming by degrees accessible to their visits. With the expanding dimensions of new naval designs, heavier armaments were possible, maritime war was evolving fresh tactical methods, and the principles which should govern the battle dispositions of fleets of large vessels were being demonstrated by distinguished British, French, and Dutch admirals. Salt water ceased in itself to be a formidable obstacle to military enterprise, and whereas ha the days of the Mongol ELhans Japan had been in a safer position than the States of Central Asia, these conditions underwent by degrees a complete reversal. Long before the Japanese were awakened to the danger of living in a state of isolated stagnation, their shores and coastal traffic were at the mercy of attacks to which they could have opposed only the feeblest resistance; and it was perhaps fortunate for them that in the seven- teenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries the Powers of the West were so frequently at war with each other, that none had either opportunity or inducement to molest a weak country on the other side of the world. With nautical science making such advances, however, it was impossible that Japan should remain immersed in a self-constituted prison for ever, and her emergence 80 SECOND PERIOD OF SECLUSION was eventually occasioned by a factor which did not exist when her voluntary seclusion first began. The secession of the British North American Colonies from the Mother Country brought for the first time an iadependent Power into politics which lay to the east of Japan instead of the west, and in due course the Pacific Ocean was sailed by keels under its flag. Most of these were engaged in the whaling trade, in pursuit of which a few crossed to the Asiatic side, where some were wrecked on the Japanese coasts and their crews ill-treated. These incidents in- volved Japan in a matter of recognized mutual obligation among civilized nations. Reciprocal trade might be a matter for the individual decision of separate States, but reciprocal assistance against the accidents attendant on oceanic navigation was accepted as a common duty by all, and it was not to be expected that a highly progressive country, such as the United States, would refrain from taking the necessary steps to protect the interests of its citizens, on a question over which no civilized Government would raise any difficulty whatever. But Japan, although living under an established social organization with laws of its own, was not administered by a civilized Government, in the elsewhere accepted sense of the term, and was notoriously averse to official intercourse with other countries on any subject whatever. It was no easy matter, therefore, to compel the Japanese to attend to representations from outside sources, unless by the display of force on a sufficient scale to ensure at least a respectful hearing. But even then it required very skilful diplomacy to attain the end in view without bloodshed, to which the United States President was very loath to resort, and it was necessary for him to exercise great care in selecting the man to handle such highly explosive material. Lord Palmerston once remarked that whenever he had particularly difficult negotiations to undertake with foreigners he preferred' to employ a naval officer, and although that view has seldom found favour with his successors at the British Foreign Office, something of the kind was evidently uppermost in the ARRIVAL OF PERRY 8l mind of President Fillmore, for his choice fell upon Commodore Perry, of the United States Navy, not only as commander of the squadron which he intended to send as a means of compelling respect to a United States diplomatic mission, but as his actual representative in the transactions which he hoped to effect with the Japan- ese authorities. This selection was amply justified by the results. Perry sailed at the end of 1852 with the frigates Susque- hanna and Mississippi, and the sloops Plymouth and Saratoga. No line-of-battle ships in any country had at that time been supplied with steam-engines, and, as it was considered advisable by the United States Navy Department that only steamers should be employed in this mission, the squadron was limited to the four steamships mentioned, which, although not of the most formidable fighting quality, presented in the aggregate a sufficient force to impress the Japanese. The Commodore was instructed to present a letter from President Fillmore to the "Ruler of Japan," and to endeavour to obtain the sanction of the latter to a treaty for securing proper protection for shipwrecked crews, and for the allocation of a port in which American whalers could obtain ordinary supplies; also for permission to establish a coal depot on some small, uninhabited island ; and lastly, if possible, for the opening of one or more ports for the sale of Ameri- can goods. No reasonable objection could be raised on any grounds to an insistence on all these demands, except the last, and even if it is not within the legitimate rights of one nation to force its trade upon another, the Japanese themselves are now the first to admit that Perry's strong line in this matter led in the end to great benefits to themselves. The squadron sailed from an Atlantic port, via the Cape of Good Hope and Hong-Kong, and arrived in Yokohama Bay in July, 1853, where their appearance caused the greatest consternation among Japanese officials and people alike. It was an unknown occurrence for even a single foreign vessel to enter their harbours, and here were no 82 SECOND PERIOD OF SECLUSION less than four in company. Obviously it was impossible to attempt the enforcement of the law by which these ships should be destroyed for visiting a Japanese port, but so long a period had elapsed since any occasion had arisen for acting upon its provisions, that this was a minor matter in itself, if only they could be got rid of. It was of far more consequence that Japanese interests in other directions appeared to be in imminent danger. Firstly, they feared for the safety of their coasting vessels and fishing craft, for, although no sea-going ship had been built in Japan within the memory of many generations, their coastwise traffic and fishing industries were just as important to their economic welfare as they had always been. Secondly, their coastal population was appre- hensive of attack on their towns and villages. Such a proceeding was no doubt far from the intentions of Perry, who would only have resorted to it in the face of extreme provocation, but the Japanese were in the completest ignorance of the customs of war among civilized peoples, and overawed by the impressive size, to them, of the American ships. A general and immediate exodus for the interior consequently took place among the inhabi- tants around Yokohama Bay, and Tokio was in such a state of panic, that the civic authorities, although thoroughly alarmed themselves, had to issue calming proclamations to allay the confusion. Perry informed the local Governor, who was the first official with whom he could get into contact, that ]je wished to see the Emperor's chief Minister to explain the object of his visit. This message having been forwarded to the Shogun, a Chinese interpreter in the employ •f the latter was sent on board the Susquehanna, who returned to the Shogun with the President's letter, upon the receipt of which a general council of the Government officials and nobles near at hand was assembled, and sat in debate all night without arriving at any decision, except to temporize if possible A large section, in supreme ignorance of the true weakness of Japan, were all in favour of rejecting the American proposals off-hand, but the more clear-headed FIRST FOREIGN TREATIES 83 members realized that these proposals were backed by a force which it was beyond their power to resist, and that their rejection would merely postpone the inevitable, while probably entailing serious consequences in the process of settlement. Eventually a reply was sent to say that the matter was of such importance that it would require long consideration, and requesting that in the meanwhile the squadron should withdraw. Perry agreed to this, as he realized that the Japanese authorities had been placed in a difficult position, in which ruthless measures might only throw everything into chaos; but at the same time he warned them that he would return for an answer early in the following year. He then sailed for the coast of China, where he remained for the winter months. Returning in the following spring, he demanded a reply to the President's letter and his own draft of a treaty. No actual progress had been made by the Japanese in the interval towards either, but his reappearance made it clear that he was not to be put off by further indefinite excuses; and another council meeting was called, at which, after a long and heated controversy, the war party were eventually outvoted and it was agreed that a treaty embodying the four points raised by Perry should be drawn up, in which Nagasaki andHakodate were to be nominated as ports to be open to American traders. When com- pleted it was signed on behalf of Japan by three officials detailed by the Shogun, and not by the Mikado, who had been ignojed by the Japanese administrators throughout, and was strongly opposed to the whole transaction, being profoundly ignorant of the weakness of his own country when confrcilited by such a Power as the United States. In this attitude he was supported by a large party of influential but equally ignorant territorial nobles. The success of Perry's mission very naturally induced other Governments to ask for equal concessions, and before the year had closed a precisely similar treaty was concluded between the Shogun and Great Britain, to which, however, the Mikado was equally averse. These two diplomatic instruments ojily aimed at the establishment of amenities 84 SECOND PERIOD OP SECLUSION in very minor matters, and were not followed for a long time by any permanent official intercourse, but they were the first steps towards breaking down the barrier with which Japan had shut out the world for so long. Por four years they answered their purpose and no effort was made to enlarge their scope, but by 1858 the resulting trade had assumed such proportions that new and more extensive provisions for commercial intercourse had be- come necessary; and after another long period of discus- sion and delay, revised treaties were drawn up, in which Great Britain, the United States, Prance, and Holland were all granted equal commercial privileges. In 1859 the Shogun agreed that these four Powers and Prussia should send regular diplomatic representatives to Japan, although these were not accredited to the Court of the Mikado at Kioto, who still remained obstinately opposed to any Idnd of dealings with foreigners. Yokohama was nominated as a third treaty port, which place, although only at that time a fishing village, had a good anchorage and was conveniently near to Tokio, where the Shogun had his capital and seat of government, and where the foreign diplomats took up their official residence. But, although a prosperous and increasing trade was fairly established, anti-foreign prejudice continued to exist among a large section of the nobles and their armed retainers, and during the two years which succeeded the arrival of the foreign official representatives a whole series of murderous attacks were made, usually after dark, on foreigners of different nationalities, including members of the various diplomatic staffs. The British Legation was twice broken into at night by bands of ^sassins, who killed several of the attendants and two marine sentries; and on the second occasion Colonel Neale, the British Minister, had a narrow escape himself, while two of his secretaries were severely wounded. American, Prench, and Dutch subjects were murdered in the streets of Yokohama, and the anti-foreign party even went to the length of assassinating certain of the Shogun's principal officials for holding intercourse with the foreign Ministers, ANTI-FOREIGN CLANS 85 which so intimidated the others, that the diplomatists found it impossible to obtain the punishment of the perpetrators of any of these acts of violence. This immunity naturally encouraged others to follow their example. Among the most powerful clans in Japan, next to that to which the Shogun belonged, were those of Satsuma and Chosiu, and both were very jealous of the supreme position of the Tokugawa family, which had retained the office of Shogun from generation to generation ever since the days of lyeyasu, 250 years before. Both belonged to the western parts of the Empire, the Satsuma estates lying not in the main island at all, but in Kiushiu. Both also had raised their large forces of armed retainer into comparatively efficient military organizations. By obtaining models and drawings of smooth-bore ordnance at various periods from the Dutch agents at Nagasaki, they had succeeded in casting a number of guns, which they mounted as sea defences, and which, although not a match for the rifled armaments of the European vessels in Japanese waters, were destined to prove capable of inflicting considerable damage to ships at close range, and were believed to be equal to any artillery in the world by their possessors. The policy of these clans was to support the Mikado in his anti-foreign attitude, partly to add to the difficulties and embarrassments of the Sho- gun's pro-foreign administration — which was enjoying most of the benefits of trade through Customs dues — and partly because they were as ignorant as the Mikado himself of the hopelessness of offering resistance to the foreigners by force. Of this support the Mikado availed himself by asking the Prince of Satsuma to pro- ceed to Tokio with 600 of his armed retainers as an escort to an official from the Imperial Court, who was to convey an order to the Shogun to break off all foreign intercourse forthwith. The Shogun received the order — which he knew he could not obey, but promised the Imperial messenger, nevertheless, that he would — and the latter, with the Satsuma chief and escort, started to return to the Mikado at Kioto. As the procession was passing 86 SECOND PEKIOD OF SECLUSION along the main road, close to the foreign settlements in Yokohama, they met a riding-party of three English merchants and a lady, whom several of the Satsuma soldiers slashed at with their swords, killing one named Richardson and wounding the others, who only saved their lives by galloping off as fast as they could. On hearing of this incident the British Minister imrpediately pro- ceeded to the Shogun to lodge a strong protest and a request for the seizure and punishment of the criminals, but the Shogun frankly admitted that it was beyond his power to effect their arrest, and could only promise to forward the Minister's request to the Satsuma chief, who in the meantime was being received with marked honour by the Mikado on his return to Kioto. Shortly after this occurrence the new British Legation, which had just been built but was not yet occupied, was burnt to the ground during the night by a party of incendiaries. Much more serious developments were soon to follow. All these attacks had been the work of sword or dagger, in the hands either of individual fanatics or of small bands of anti-foreign desperadoes of humble position, most of whom avoided publicity. It was reserved for the Prince of Chosiu, one of the most powerful nobles of Japan, to embark on acts of open war with shot and shell against the shipping under foreign flags in Japanese waters. His territories lay at the extreme western end of Nipon, the main island of the Empire, and formed the north shore of the narrow and tortuous Straits of Shimo- noseki, which give access to the Inland Sea at the western extremity, and through it afford the shortest route between Nagasaki or the ports of China on the one hand, and Yokohama and the ports of Central and Western Japan on the other. As previously observed, the Chosiu clan were, according to Japanese standards, well organized and equipped for war; and had erected a series of batteries commanding these Straits on plans taken from Dutch military treatises, which were armed with 8-inch shell guns and 32-pounders. They had also purchased and armed with similar weapons a steamer and two sailing ATTACKS ON SHIPS 87 vessels, and, in pursuance of an understanding with the Mikado, their Prince proceeded to take forcible measures to close the Straits, which he fully believed he was strong enough to effect, even in the face of foreign opposition. The first intimation received of his intentions took the form of an attack without any warning, on June 25, 1863, on the United States steamer Pembrok^ while on passage from Yokohama to Shanghai by the usual route through the Straits. As she entered the narrows and approached K I U S I U ■yWi.lkijrHrl.su, FIG. 2.- -STRAITS OF SHIMONOSEKI AND APPROACHES. Forts indicated thus the north shore, under which the Chosiu men-of-war were at anchor, she suddenly found herself under a hail of round-shot, and only escaped sinking by steering hard over to the farther side of the Straits and proceeding at full speed. Utterly at a loss to account for this treatment, her master made a full report to the United States Consul at Nagasaki next morning, where he called to drop his Japanese Inland Sea pilot, and where the incident caused great excitement and conjecture among foreign shipping and commercial circles. Before it was known in Yoko- 88 SECOND PERIOD OP SECLUSION hama the French naval despatch-vessel Kienchang had started from that port to make the same voyage, completely in ignorance of the danger awaiting her and meeting with worse fortune than her predecessor. She happened to arrive at the eastern approach to the Straits too late to complete the passage through before dark, and, as they were unlighted and unsurveyed at that time, no traffic passed except by daylight. In accordance with custom, therefore, she anchored to wait, but chanced to berth within range of the eastern batteries, and her anchor had scarcely touched bottom when they opened a rapid fire. Before having time even to slip her cable she was hulled in seven places and much damaged in her upper gear, only escaping destruction by steaming as fast as possible through the Bungo Channel, an alter- native exit from the Inland Sea to the southward. As in the case of the Pembroke, this outrage was known next day at Nagasaki by the arrival of the vessel herself, and conjecture became rife as to whether other ships would undergo similar treatment. This matter was not left for long in doubt, and the next to experience it was a man- of-war. The first two vessels were helpless to defend themselves and might be attacked without fear of im- mediate return fire; but the Chosiu leaders cannot be accused of want of courage, for the third was the Dutch 16-gun corvette Medusa, which could and did retaliate at once. The Medusa was at Nagasaki when the other vessels arrived, on the point of starting for Yokohama with the Netherlands Minister on board. Her captain heard all about their escapes, but did not believe that the batteries would dare to fire on a well-armed ship, and determined to follow the usual route instead of the longer open sea passage. He was soon undeceived. Entering the Straits at the western end, the corvette in due course approached the Chosiu war- vessels, which were lying with their heads to the flood-tide behind a shoal ridge with only two fathoms of water on it. Above and behind them on the cliffs were the westernmost of the shore batteries. As the Medusa drew abreast of the vessels she was received AMERICAN REPRISAL 89 by several warning rounds of blank, but her commanding officer was not a man to be deterred by threats, and steamed on; whereupon the whole of the Japanese guns ashore and afloat opened fire with shot and shell. Her men were abeady at their quarters and immediately replied with all her port broadside. Her first effort was to sink the Ohosiu ships, but owing to the intervening shoal she could not get within 600 yards of them, and meanwhile was receiving a cross-fire from four to five batteries, under which she began to suffer severely. Con- tenting herself, therefore, with several broadsides at the hostile vessels, which silenced their fire, she made a dash to get through, running the gauntlet of the whole line of defences, whose fire she returned in succession as fast as her men could load and lay. In passing, she was hit seventeen times in the hull by 8-inch shell and 32-pound shot, and fourteen times in her spars and funnel, several of her crew being killed or wounded, and some of her guns temporarily disabled. The Netherlands Minister had a narrow escape himself. But she was undamaged in machinery or steering-gear and reached Yokohama two days later. Before her arrival information had been received of the attack on the Pembroke, a«d the Medusa brought the news of the attacks on the Kienchang and herself. The United States Navy was at that period only represented in Japanese waters by the 6-gun sloop Wyoming, as the American Civil War was at its height and the other vessels were required nearer home. Where the much more heavily armed Dutch ship had experienced such a severe handling, it did not seem possible that a sloop could undertake adequate reprisals for firing on the United States flag; but her commanding officer determined, nevertheless, to do whatever might prove to be possible, and started at once for Shimonoseki on receipt of the intelligence. His tactics were not only bold but skilful, for instead of steering directly towards the entrance of the Straits from the Inland Sea, he kept close over to the Kiushiu shore, which at this part forms an acute angle, 8 90 SECOND PERIOD OF SECLUSION with one side as the south coast of the Straits and the apex as the promontory which marks their eastern termination. By hugging the land behind this cape, the Wyoming was screened from the batteries on the Chosiu side till within a comparatively close range, and having arrived at its point, she went full speed round it, and was well on her way across the open water towards where the Chosiu vessels lay — which her captain determined to make the main object of his attack — before either they or the guns on shore had discovered his presence and come into action. The enemy's vessels were moored in starboard quarter- line in their usual berths, with their heads pointing to the westward, and the steamer at the far end of the line, in that direction. The Wyoming therefore approached from their port quarter, and aided by her light draught passed either over or round the shoal behind which they lay. Steamiag at her utmost speed under the concentrated fire of all the batteries, she made for the interval between the two westernmost ships, and passing them within 50 yards gave them each a full broadside at that range with staggering efEect. The ships to starboard returned it, however, and she was badly shaken herself, but the one to port— which was the steamer — had all her own guns trained to port, in the expectation that the Wyoming would keep to the main channel, and had not time to bring them round on the old-fashioned traversing carriages before the American was passing within pistol- shot on the other side. The shots from the latter struck all along her water-line, and finding she was sinking, the Japanese ship slipped her cable and steamed towards the beach; but the Wyoming meanwhile had passed round her bows, and turning back placed an 11 -inch spherical shell in her boiler, which finished her. By this time the sloop was suffering severely, neverthe- less, from the fire of the guns on shore, having been hit a dozen times or more in the hull and at least as often in the rigging and masts; and as she was hopelessly out- matched in weight of metal by the batteries, she steamed out of range, after firing a few finishing rounds at the FRENCH REPRISAL 91 two remaining Japanese vessels, one of which she left in a sinking condition. This ended a very gallant action, in which the Wyoming succeeded in sinking one enemy's ship and disabliag another right under the guns of shore defences whose total armament was many times in excess of her own. The Chosiu men claimed that she was driven off, which was true, but not until she had inflicted losses on a superior force which were much heavier than she suffered herself; and, although the affair did not end in the defeat of the defenders, it did at least prove that they could not fire on the United States flag unless they were prepared for reprisals, even when the bulk of the United States Navy was engaged in dealing with trouble at home. This action was fought on July 16, five days after that with the Medusa. On the same day Rear-Admiral Jaures, commanding the French naval forces in the East, left Yokohama in the 35-gun frigate Semiramis, with the gun-vessel Tancrede in company, to conduct reprisals for the firing on the French despatch-boat Kienchang. The frigate carried two companies of Colonial troops in addition to her own crew, with the intention of making a land attack, if possible, after a bombardment. The two ships approached the eastern end of the Straits by the Bungo Channel, as the Wyoming had done, but on rounding the point they followed a different plan of action; for whereas the short-range smooth-bore armament of the American had compelled her to attack at close range if she was to engage at all, the Semiramis carried rifled guns which could outrange anything on the Japanese side. They anchored, therefore, out of reach of the Chosiu guns, and the frigate began a bombardment of the easternmost battery, which was sustained for the whole forenoon with- out receiving any reply. The gun- vessel was then ordered to close and reconnoitre, and ascertained that, although the work under attack had evidently been abandoned, the batteries farther west were still held, for she drew their fire and was three times hit before retiring. The French admiral thereupon decided to make a reconnaissance on 92 SECOND PERIOD OF SECLUSION land, and a force of 250 men was disembarked, under cover of the gun- vessel, near the outer flank of the battery which had been bombarded. 1 his party encountered no signs of the enemy, and found the battery completely demolished, but, while they were engaged in destroying the magazines and barracks, the lookout on board the Tancrede observed a large body of Japanese troops ap- proaching in the distance by the road which led from the town of Shimonoseki. Getting their exact range, the gun- vessel was able to keep them under fire with sufficient effect to prevent them from attacking the French party on shore until the demolitions were complete and the party back in the boats; but the possibility of being attacked in some force made it undesirable to conduct further operations on shore, and, although the remaining batteries might have been bombarded like the first, the French admiral decided that enough had been done in the way of reprisals to vindicate the honour of the French flag. He weighed the same evening accordingly and returned to Yokohama. There were no serious casualties on the French side. The Chosiu clansmen had now been three times engaged with foreign war-vessels in the space of nine days, and had suffered the loss of one ship, the disablement of another, the complete demolition of a battery, and con- siderable damage to their remaining shore defences. Their casualties had also been heavy. But in spite of all this they were by no means subdued. Their fortifications were soon repaired, they had plenty of men left, and they could see that the Dutch and American ships had on their part suffered considerably also. The forbearance of the French in destroying only one battery they could not understand, and although the landing of an armed party on their territory impressed them a good deal, they regarded its eventual re-embarkation as a sign that the foreigners were only prepared to undertake minor attacks and not regular operations on an extensive scale. The Straits therefore remained unsafe to pass, and at the same time very distorted versions of these affairs were being BRITISH ULTIMATUM 93 circulated through Japan and exciting the more restless anti-foreign elements. It had become obvious that nothing short of concerted action on strong lines, by- all the foreign Powers with interests to guard in Japan, could restore a situation to the normal which was growing more threatening every day. A period of ten months had now elapsed since the attack on the small riding-party of British subjects on the Yokohama road by the Satsuma retainers, which had caused the death of an Englishman, and the con- sequences of that act were nearing their fulfilment, although the procedure had been slow. On finding that he could secure no promise of the arrest of the murderers from any authority in Japan, the British Minister had reported the whole affair to the British Foreign Office, and awaited instructions, but this involved long delay because the nearest point from which telegrams could be sent to London was India, and in those days India was nearly a month by sea from Japan. It was not till the following year, therefore, that a reply was received. In this the British Minister was instructed to inform the Shogun that the British Government had heard with great regret of recent occurrences, and demanded at once a public apology from the Japanese authorities for the murder and insults of which their subjects had been guilty, and the payment of an indemnity of £100,000. If this was refused, the Shogun was to be given to understand that a sum amounting to millions might have to be exacted as an indemnity for the cost of operations which Great Britain might find it necessary to undertake to obtain justice. Furthermore he was to be notified that, as he himself had stated that he could not lay hands upon malefactors within the domains of the Satsuma clan to which the murderers belonged, a British naval expedition would proceed to a Satsuma port, and demand from the head of the clan the immediate trial and execution of the assassins, and the payment by the Satsuma treasury of the sum of £25,000 as an indemnity to the British subjects who had suffered by their actions. 94 SECOND PERIOD OF SECLUSION When the British Minister received these instructions a still further delay was occasioned by the absence of the Shogun from Tokio, whence he had gone to visit the Mikado, and it was not till two months later that the public apology demanded by the British Government was tendered and the indemnity of £100,000 paid over. The anomalous and confused condition of the administra- tion in Japan at this period was illustrated by the fact that the Mikado had issued peremptory orders that neither apology nor indemnity should be forthcoming, and yet the Shogun disregarded his master's instructions. But the Shogun and his officials were within range of British ships lying in Yokohama Bay, and well acquainted with the power that lay behind the British Minister, whereas the Court of the Mikado was not. StilJ more remarkable evidence of the complications attendant on the system of dual sovereignty was shortly forthcoming, for scarcely had the indemnity been paid and the apology made public — both contrary to the Imperial orders — than the Shogun notified all the foreign representatives that he proposed to act on an Imperial decree to remove every foreigner from Japan and close all the treaty ports. To this announcement the foreign diplomats sent a joint reply, in which they intimated to the Shogun that if any action of that kind was taken in violation of treaties, it would be equivalent to a declaration of war by Japan. The Shogun forwarded their communication to the Mikado and his notables at the Imperial Court, and while they were pondering its contents they received the news of certain proceedings taken by the British squadron in Japanese waters, which opened their eyes to their true position, and gave the Japanese authorities and terri- torial chiefs their first lesson for 260 years as to the power which a maritime State can exercise for the pro- tection of its interests, and the vulnerability of an insular empire which fails to maintain a strong fleet. CHAPTER IV THE BATTLES OP KAGOSIMA AND SHIMONOSEKI It has already been observed that the British Foreign Office had notified the Shogun that a naval expedition ■would take direct action against the Satsuma clan to obtain the surrender of the murderers of a British subject and the payment by the clan of an indemnity of £25,000. The diplomatic incidents related at the close of the last chapter had caused the British Minister to postpone the immediate execution of this part of his instructions, but by the beginning of August he decided that it should no longer be delayed. On the sixth of that month, accordingly, the British ships-of-war at Yokohama sailed for the coast of the Satsuma province under Rear-Admiral Kuper. The squadron consisted of the frigate Euryalus, of 35 guns, flying his flag; the corvette Pearl ; the sloop Perseus ; the paddle-sloop Argus ; and the gim-vessels Racehorse, Coquette, and Havoc. The British Minister himself was on board the flagship, and the immediate destination of the force was Kagosima Bay — a very large natural harbour on the southern coast of Kiushiu, where lay the town of that name, which was the capital of the Satsuma domains. The Bay, although deep in most parts, was at that time uncharted, which necessitated great caution in navigation and added materially to the responsibilities of the Admiral. Of the defences no details were known, but it was reported that the Satsuma batteries contained smooth-bore ordnance of fairly heavy calibre, and that they were manned by a well-trained force. The heaviest guns in the squadron were some 100-pounder Armstrongs in the flagship, and the majority of the vessels carried 8-inch or 64-pounders. Kuper arrived ofE the mouth of Kagosima Bay late on 95 96 PERIOD OP REFORM August 11, and after careful sounding and examination found a suitable depth and bottom for anchoring for the night, just inside the entrance. Early next morning a boat with Japanese officials came out to demand the reasons for his arrival, asking also what further movements he intended, and what number of guns the squadron carried. To these questions such replies were made as were considered expedient, and the squadron then weighed and steamed carefully up the Bay, until th^y were off the town, when they again anchored. Owing to the great depth of water farther out, it was necessary to berth somewhat close to the shore and within range of a Kagoslma =\a>^ Town FIG. 3. — GULF OF KAGOSIMA. Forts indicated thns l^iuoif W alk«« I.ti number of batteries, in which the men could easily be seen round the guns from the ships. Here another official boat came alongside to ask whether the squadron had any communication to make to the Prince of Satsuma, in whose harbour they lay ; and her occupants were given a letter addressed to their chief, setting forth the demands of the British Government for the arrest and execution of the malefactors, and the payment of the indemnity specially imposed on their clan. It stated that if these demands did not receive compliance coercive measures would be adopted to obtain satisfaction. The officials on receiving this letter replied that the Prince was at a DEMANDS PRESENTED 97 place fifty miles distant, and insisted that the British Minister and the Admiral must go on shore to present their demands and discuss the whole matter with the council of the clan. They were informed that the British officers had nothing to add to what was contained in the letter and nothing to discuss; and in further parleyings and explanations the day passed, but the letter was eventually accepted for deliverance. Next morning the Satsuma Commander-in-Chief came alongside in a state barge, and requested not only to see the British Minister, but to bring his whole personal escort of forty armed men on board the Euryalus with him. This request was granted, but to prevent any possibility of trouble the marines of the flagship were first drawn up across the quarter-deck, and when the Japanese escort stepped over the gangway they found themselves faced by a line of fixed bayonets, beyond which only their commander and another officer were allowed to pass. It transpired afterwards that the escort was chiefly composed of young men of good family and adventurous disposition who hoped to distinguish themselves in their countrymen's eyes by killing the Minister and Admiral if they saw the chance. The Commander-in-Chief brought a reply to the British ultimatum of an evasive and indefinite nature, pleading great difficulty in tracing the murderers, and alleging that at the time of the assault it was believed by the assailants that the English party were outside the area permitted by treaty for foreigners, as the Shogun had not made its limits properly clear. He suggested that the whole matter should be discussed with the Shogun, and that the squadron should withdraw. After a long debate he was informed that no excuses or sugges- tions could be entertained, and went on shore again. As the squadron had now been nearly forty-eight hours in the Bay, and there were no signs of any acceptance of the demands of the British Government, the Minister requested the Admiral in the evening to take charge of the situation and commence forcible measures. Kuper's plan of action was to begin by seizing three steamers 98 PEEIOD OP REFORM belonging to the Prince of Satsuma, which the latter had purchased not long before, and which were now lying at an anchorage to the northward of the town, where they were not covered by the batteries. But it was too late to take steps in the matter before dark, especially as a complication of a somewhat serious nature threatened to intervene, for it looked as if the elements were coming to the assistance of the Japanese just as they did in the days of Kublai Khan. Being the middle of August, it was the height of the typhoon season, and before night- fall the barometer had begun to fall very rapidly. Under ordinary circumstances the ships of the British squadron had less reason to fear a typhoon than the armada of the Mongols, and, given sufficient sea-room, even the smallest could hope to weather any but the very worst by lying-to, or by riding it out at anchor, if in a sufficiently sheltered harbour with good holding ground. But Kuper's ships would have had no sea-room if the wind blew onshore instead of offshore, and as the coast was unsurveyed he did not know where good holding ground existed. For- tunately for him, the large island of Sakarajima lies in the middle of the Bay, and under the lee of this he could always hope for some shelter from wind in whatever quarter. Like other admirals before him, he found the exigencies of war complicated by the requirements of seamanship, but the political situation called for urgent attention, and he knew that if for any reason whatever he withdrew from Kagosima with the British demands unsatisfied, the moral effect would be very bad. He accepted the weather as he found it, therefore, but with all the seamanlike precautions necessary to the occasion. At daybreak the signs had become very threatening, but he ordered three ships to get under way to seize the steamers and tow them to the squadron's anchorage. This step inflicted a pecuniary loss on the Satsuma chief of nearly three times the indemnity demanded, for the vessels had cost him between sixty and seventy thousand pounds to purchase. The operation was carried out in full view of the town and batteries, but it took some hours BRITISH ENGAGE 99 to complete, as the prizes had no steam up themselves, and, by the time they were in tow alongside their captors, the first blasts of the coming typhoon had begun to sweep across the Bay and render towage difficult. The remainder of the squadron were getting under way to seek better shelter, when the Japanese precipitated matters by suddenly opening fire from every gun that they could bring to bear. They admitted afterwards that they thought that the violence of the gale would seriously affect the fighting capacity of the squadron, and that the moment was opportune to take the initiative as a retalia- tion for the seizure of their steamers. Kuper, finding that he now had to fight, but could not engage properly with the captured vessels in tow, made a signal to set them on fire and cast them off, which was accordingly done, and all three were destroyed. Having completed this operation, he cleared for action and struck topgallant masts, as it was now blowing furiously; then formed line with the flagship leading, and steaming to the northward of the defences, turned in succession and passed the whole of the batteries, engaging each in turn at ranges of from 400 to 800 yards down the entire front. It was a short but sharp affair. The Japanese returned the fire with great spirit, and, although outmatched in weight of metal, had the advantage of steady gun platforms, whereas, in spite of the close range, accurate firing was difficult from the rolling ships, whose decks were being washed down fore and aft by the heavy seas. Unfortun- ately the thickly populated commercial quarter of the town lay behind some of the defences, and received all the " overs," from which it was soon in flames. Of the general effect of the firing the admiral reported thus in his despatch : " It was impossible to ascertain precisely the extent of the injury inflicted upon the batteries ; but considering the heavy flre which was kept up from the ships, at point- blank range, the effect must have been considerable. Many guns were observed to be dismounted, the batteries were several times cleared, and the explosion of magazines 100 PERIOD OF REFORM gave evidence of the destructive effects of our shell; one half of the town was in flames and entirely destroyed, as well as a very extensive arsenal or factory and gun foundry, and five large Loo-Choo junks, the property of the Prince, in addition to the three steamers already described. A heavy typhoon blew during the night, and the conflagration, increasing in proportion to the height of the storm, illuminated the entire Bay." The injury was by no means all on one side, however, for the Japanese stuck to their guns courageously, in spite of the overwhelming fire to which they were sub- jected, and, as the fighting was at very close quarters, the inferior ranging power of their guns was not the dis- advantage it might otherwise have been. Many of their shots took effect, and although no ship was actually disabled several were a good deal knocked about, and the squadron suffered sixty-three casualties. Captain Josling and Commander Wilmot, of the flagship, both being killed by the same shot passing over the bridge, from which Kuper himself had a narrow escape. By the time that the southernmost battery had been passed and engaged, the full force of the typhoon had developed, and as night was coming on the Admiral had no alternative but to break off the action and seek shelter under Sakarajima, opposite the north side of which he anchored just before dusk, in a position which not only gave a lee from the storm, but was out of range of any Japanese guns which could bear on it. Defences existed on the island itself, but only on the western side, covering the channel between the island and the town, and none of these faced the area where Kuper berthed his ships. The Japanese have sometimes claimed that the engagement was a draw, because, although its discontinuance was necessitated by the violence of the gale, several of the batteries were still unsilenced when the squadron ceased firing and retired. But it was never the Admiral's intention to annihilate. His object was to make it clear to the Satsuma leaders that rejection of the British demands would involve them in more serious consequences OPERATIONS COMPLETED 101 than acceptance ; and in this he was quite successful. The indemnity for which he had asked was a very moderate sum, easily within the power of the Satsuma Treasury to pay; but the damage inflicted by the British shells amounted to hundreds of thousands if not millions sterling, and in the end the indemnity had to be paid to save yet further loss. Similarly the price forfeited in Satsuma lives to save three or four assassins from justice was a very heavy one, although its full tale was never divulged. Moreover, Kuper had not quite finished. All through the night the typhoon raged from various quarters and fanned the flames of the burning city, till the flare was visible throughout the extensive territories of the clan, and in some directions far beyond, but the shifts of wind did not come from points of the compass which threatened the British ships, and by daybreak its force had begun to abate. At noon the wind had died down sufficiently for the squadron to weigh and resume operations. As the town and its vicinity were covered by a dense pall of smoke from the smouldering ruins, and the batteries before it appeared to be deserted, Kuper turned his atten- tion to the defences on Sakarajima, and steamed down the channel between the island and the west side of the Bay, which they overlooked. These batteries were inferior in armament to those attacked the day before, and, as they ma.de no effective reply, they were soon demolished. With this the British' Minister considered that adequate reprisals had been completed, and the " Cease fire " signal was made. Kuper then anchored off the south end of the island to repair the damages sustained in action, which occupied his ships for about a week; after which, being again ready for sea and with their mission completed, they sailed for Yokohama, where they arrived on August 24. Although the forces engaged were inconsiderable, and the matters at issue of comparatively minor consequence from a material standpoint, and although the fire of the British guns was only directed against the adherents of a single clan, there is no doubt whatever that the Battle 102 PERIOD OF REFORM of Kagosima was a very important event in the history of Japan. The Satsuma occupied a prominent place in the general estimation of the Japanese people, and the consequences of the British attack made a proportionate impression. The engagements that had taken place a few weeks previously between foreign vessels and the Chosiu batteries had been only small-scale affairs at most, which had left the general position much as it was before. But at Kagosima a whole squadron had attacked, with a result which was a revelation to all Japan, and most of all td the Satsuma leaders themselves. This cannot be better indi- cated than by quottag from Adams's " History of Japan," which in reference to the incident remarks as follows : " One thing is certain and is acknowledged by every Satsuma man — namely, whatever was the true account of the action, the bombardment of Kagosima was the turning-point as far as that powerful clan was concerned. It was then that the men belonging to the military class in Satsuma first became convinced that Japan was not the strongest country in the world, and that there were other nations more powerful and more civilized. It was from that time that they began to cease to look down upon foreigners with contempt, and henceforward their principality began, as they expressed it, to be ' opened.' They subsequently took the lead in introducing European machiuery and inventions and in employing skilled Europeans to teach them, and they became fired with a desire to rival foreign nations in the arts of civilization and peace as well as the art of war." Furthermore, it was significant that this proof of Japanese weakness, when confronted with the armed forces of a European Power, was the outcome of a dispute with the nation which in due course was to be the first with which Japan ever entered into a formal defensive alliance. It was the maritime and commercial supremacy of Great Britain which led to both. In 1863 British trade in the treaty ports so much predominated over that under other flags, that the British subjects in Japan were more numerous than those of all the other foreign nationalities put together; and it was due to their preponderating EFFECT ON JAPANESE 103 numbers that the first foreigners whom the Satsuma retainers encountered on the Yokohama road, and attacked with murderous intent, were Englishmen. Just forty years later, it was the sea power of Great Britain that offered Japan the inducement to enter into definite relationship for mutual defence with the British Govern- ment, which has continued to exist, with certain modi- fications, ever since. It was in many respects a fortunate thing that the conflict did not arise in connection with matters of commercial or purely material importance, but from British insistence on the vindication of a principle affecting national rights. In their traditional attitude towards war and its proper causes, the Japanese are very much influenced by ideals, and can fully appreciate action undertaken to uphold a point of national honour, even when it entails sacrifices far in excess of those which would be involved in surrender. The Satsuma leaders were themselves inspired by such motives when they preferred to accept battle rather than give up three or four of their retainers, or pay an indemnity which lay easily within their means ; and the Japanese had been previously inclined to take the view, perhaps not altogether without reason, that the Western nations were never moved by any considerations but those of a purely commercial or material character. It was a wholesome corrective to this idea to demonstrate that a European Power attached so much importance to the life of even one of its subjects as to be prepared to risk the lives of a good many more to avenge it when improperly taken; and, although it is to the United States that the credit is due for first bringing Japan to realize that no nation in modern times can remain permanently dissociated from all the rest of the world — least of all a nation of islanders — it was the destiny of Great Britain to prove to the Mikado and his people that Western States are sometimes actuated by other motives than that of mere material gain, and may on occasion face risks and losses for the sake of performing what they consider their duty towards civilized principles and national self-respect. 104 PERIOD OF REFORM And it was because Great Britain employed the far- reaching arm of sea power to demonstrate this fact to Japan that the Japanese themselves for the first time began to appreciate what sea power could effect. As a conse- quence, one of the very first acts of the Satsuma clan after the engagement was to endeavour to lay the foundations of a fleet of their own through the good offices of the very Government they had been fighting against. They realized that even if the shore defences at Kagosima had been strong enough to drive off Kuper's ships, the latter could have attacked at some undefended part of their long coast- line, or seized all their coasting trade with ease, and that nothing but the highly mobile defence represented by a squadron of their own could protect them against such a danger. And, as the British ships were obviously ex- tremely efficient, they decided to seek efficiency from the same source, under circumstances which shed an instruc- tive and creditable light on the Japanese national character, exhibiting as they do a frank acceptance of defeat, coupled with an absence of any trace of animosity towards their vanquishers. Two months after the British squadron had disappeared round the eastern headlands of the Bay of Kagosima, the British Minister wrote to the Shogun, requesting him once again to draw the attention of the Prince of Satsuma to the fact that the indemnity was still unpaid and the murderers still at large. This came as an unpleasant surprise to the Prince and his leaders, who thought that the departure of Kuper and his ships had ended the matter; but they had no desire for another visit, and in due course two Satsuma officials presented them- selves at the British Legation, with the money in bullion and a written pledge to take all possible steps to trace the culprits. They asked at the same time that, as a token of the re-establishment of peaceful and friendly relations, the British Minister would represent to his Government the desire of their chief to purchase a war-vessel in England, which the Minister promised to do, and in his despatch referred to the " good-humour " which had marked the proceedings. DIPLOMATIC CONCERT , 105 But although August 14, 1863, was a notable date in Japanese annals for the reasons given above, it only marked a first step, and others were necessary to extend the impressions then created. The decisive elBEect pro- duced on the attitude of the Satsuma clan by British guns did not immediately produce a similar result on the Prince of Chosiu, whose main defences were still intact, in spite of three engagements with foreigners, and whose object of closing the Straits of Shimonoseki had been attained in spite of the attacks to which he had been sub- jected as protests. Traffic had ceased to use the Straits altogether, and suffered the inconvenience, delay, and expense entailed in following the longer sea route, rather than face the risks attendant upon the shorter. Accord- ingly, after the reprisals conducted by the French Admiral the foreign Ministers agreed that the conditions prevailing had become such that it was necessary to take concerted action for the protection of the common interests, and resolved to work by mutual arrangement in all measures for opening the Straits, whether by force or negotiation. They decided in the first place to present a joint demand that the Japanese Government should immediately dismantle the Chosiu batteries and punish the Chosiu Prince, and in the letter addressed to the Shogun in which this demand was conveyed the following passages occurred: " The outrages and insults which the Prince of Chosiu has ventured to undertake by firing into the ships-of-war of France, the United States, and the Netherlands is looked upon as an attempt to carry out the edicts of the Mikado, communicated through the Shogun, for the ex- pulsion of foreigners. " This will be resisted by a force the extent of which cannot at present be contemplated. " No reasonable man in Japan can doubt as to what must be, even in one year, the fate of this country if the outrageous and lawless attempt to cancel solemn treaties by treacherous and violent acts is not immediately abandoned. But if there are nobles in Japan who do not understand that the solemn obligations imposed by 9 106 PERIOD OF REFORM treaties cannot and never have been set aside by violence in any part of the world, the whole people of the country will suffer by the ignorance of these -nobles. "The Shogun's officials have informed the French Minister that they are able to punish leaders who commit acts of war or other outrageous deeds. If so, let the Government with aU speed destroy the batteries of the Prince of Chosiu and remove his guns." This protest, together with the moral effect of the attack on Kagosima, produced a confused and compli- cated political situation in Japan. In the first place, the complete defeat of the Satsuma forces made it abun- dantly clear at last to the anti-foreign Mikado and his supporters that the expulsion of the foreigners was not likely to be so easily accomplished as they had expected. The Shogun and his party had been aware of that all the time, but in view of the steadily growing power of the Mikado had feared to lose influence by not appearing to agree with his policy. But the latter had no intention of abandoning the idea, even after Kuper's squadron had shown up matters for the first time in their true light. His notion now was to meet force by force, waiting until Japan was strong enough for the purpose, which in his ignorance he believed would only require a delay of a very few years at most. He instructed the Shogun accordingly to purchase war-vessels in Europe as expeditiously as possible, and erect fortifications at all important points on the coast; and as the Prince of Chosiu 's obstinacy in keeping the Straits closed was likely to precipitate trouble before Japan was ready, he openly repudiated the pro- ceedings of that chief, and banished his clan from repre- sentation or attendance at the Imperial Court. But as no steps were taken to disarm his batteries the Prince remained truculent, not only to foreigners but to the Mikado himself. In point of fact he had some reasonable cause of complaint against his treatment by the latter, for there is no doubt that in firing on foreign vessels he was acting directly in accordance with the Mikado's first policy of expelling foreigners forthwith, as communi- POLITICAL CHAOS 107 cated to him by an Imperial order. By degrees all the anti-foreign malcontents in the Empire came to regard him as their proper leader, and flocked to his domains; and as his followers increased in this way so did his attitude become more and more insubordinate. His chief animosity was directed against the Shogun, whom he regarded as a tool of the foreign diplomatists; but his resentment against the Mikado, to whom he had previously been very loyal, was now almost equally strong, and before long led him to rash proceedings. As an evidence of his intention to act independently of both, he fired on one of the Shogun's steamers while she was passing through the Straits, and sank her with considerable loss of life. This chaotic and uncertain condition of affairs lasted all through the winter, and the foreign representatives could get no attention paid to their demands for the demolition of the Shimonoseki batteries. The Mikado would not go so far as to absolutely weaken the defences anywhere in Japan, and the Shogun — with whom alone the foreigners had direct intercourse — was conscious of his waning authority and not in a position to take a strong line against any powerful recalcitrant. He even went so far in the other direction as to propose to the foreign Ministers the closing of Yokohama as a treaty port, ostensibly on the grounds that their official presence was fomenting a constantly increasing unrest among the local population, but in reality as a pretence to the Mikado that he was in sympathy with the Imperial policy. The diplomatists saw through his schemes and peremptorily rejected the proposal; but their position was becoming more difficult every day, partly on account of the confused condition of all administrative authority in Japan, and partly because the Shogun was going behind their backs and had despatched a mission to Europe, hoping to obtain the agreement of the Powers to the closing of Yokohama in that "way. They realized that, although the Shogun was outwardly making an appearance of goodwill, he was in reality finding that his only chance of remaining iq. power was to act secretly in accordance with the wishes 108 PERIOD OF REFORM of the ever-growing Imperial party in developing Japanese armaments with a view to their ultimate use against foreigners. In accordance with this temporizing policy, he deprecated strongly any direct action on the part of the foreign fleets against Chosiu, and assured the foreign representatives that the clan would be called to account, in due course, for their outrages to foreign flags, and also for disregard of Imperial orders. But nothing happened to indicate that this was other than an empty promise. Winter passed amid a fruitless exchange of diplomatic protests and arguments, which it would be tedious to recapitulate here, and meanwhile batteries were being erected at various points covering the anchorage of the foreign fleets in Yokohama Bay, A state of affairs had been reached in which, to quote Adams, " the Treaty Powers seemed to be reduced to one of three alternatives: to accept the actual position, to withdraw altogether from Japan, or to maintain treaty rights in integrity by force of arms." A new British Minister, Sir Rutherford Alcock, had arrived, and when a period of ten months had elapsed since the joint protest of the foreign legations had been handed in to the Shogun, his patience came to an end, and he proposed to his colleagues of France, Holland, and the United States that the measures which had proved so eminently successful at Kagosima should be repeated at Shimonoseki. This proposal received their full concurrence, and notes in identical and forcible terms were despatched simulta- neously to the Shogun from each legation on May 30, pointing out that, in spite of promises on his part to deal with the Chosiu Prince, nothing had been done, and repeating the warnings against further procrastination; which, however, had been so frequently addressed to him for months previously by the individual Ministers, that he had come to regard them as having no real meaning. For several weeks these fresh notes remained unanswered, and then a reply was received at each legation, in which the Shogim expressed his surprise at the strong language used by the diplomatists and protested that in the easting ORDERS TO FLEETS 109 condition of feeling in Japan in regard to foreigners, " hasty " or forcible measures might lead to very disturb- ing and disastrous results. On receipt of this answer, the Ministers replied that unless within a period of twenty days satisfactory redress was forthcoming, they would themselves take such action as they considered necessary ; but before proceeding to extremes they made a last effort to preserve the peace by a direct approach to the Prince of Chosiu himself. Two young Samurai of good family belongiQg to that clan — Ito and Inouye by name — had been sent to England three years before to be educated, and had been so much impressed by the evidences of British power which met their eyes, that on hearing of the un- compromising attitude taken up by their chief towards foreigners, they had hastened back to Japan to warn him of the impossibility of maintaining it. They offered their services to the British Minister, and at his request were given a passage from Yokohama to Shimonoseki in a British corvette, which was ordered to land them outside range of the batteries. The Chosiu Prince received them, but as he was now committed to a definite policy of forcible opposition, not only to the foreigners but to the Japanese Government, their mission was productive of no results. He sent, nevertheless, a verbal message back by them to the British Minister to say that he was acting under written orders from the Mikado in closing the Straits, and offering to obtain the Imperial sanction to open them if they would wait for three months. When the twenty days of grace had expired, the British, French, Dutch, and United States Ministers simultane- ously requested the officers commanding the naval forces under their respective flags in Japanese waters " to proceed with all convenient speed to open the Straits of Shimonoseki, destroying and disarming the batteries of the Prince of Chosiu, and otherwise crippling him in all his means of attack." The officers were further informed that " the political situation rendered it desirable that there should be no considerable delay in the commence- ment of the operations " — a perfectly superfluous intima- HO PERIOD OF REFORM tion to admirals who had been ready and anxious to act for a whole year, during which period all the delay in taking steps to deal with an impossible situation had been due to the disinclination of the diplomats to grasp it with a firm hand. If the example of the prompt measures taken by the Wyoming and Semiramis to conduct reprisals for insults to the American and French flags afloat — a point in which the naval officers could act without the diplomatists — had been followed by an equal promptness on the part of the legations to insist upon the observation of the treaty whereby the Straits were free to navigation, an entire year of delay and loss to trade would have been avoided, and the satisfactory results obtained by the ultimate resort to a strong line of action would have been procured proportionately earlier. But dilatory though the diplomatic body had been, the British Minister had at least the excuse that he was ahead of the British Foreign Office, for, after the events which followed, he was actually recalled to England to account for his precijntate action, although his explanation was in the end deemed to be adequate. As soon as they received the diplomats' request to take the matter in hand, the British and French admirals, and the Dutch and American captains, who were the seniors in their own services present, held a council to decide upon a combined plan of attack, and on August 17 the various squadrons, comprising altogether seventeen vessels, sailed from Yokohama in execution of their mission. The British force consisted of the frigate Euryalus, flying the flag of Rear- Admiral Kuper; the line- of-battle ship Conqueror with a battalion of marines on board, sent out from home as a guard for the British community; the corvettes Tartar, Leopard, and Barrosa ; the sloops Perseus and Argus; and the gunboats Coquette and Bouncer. The French vessels were the frigate Semiramis, the corvette Dupleix, and the gun- boat Tancrede ; the Dutch, the corvettes Medusa, Metalen Kruis, and D'JamM, and the paddle-sloop Amsterdam ; and the American, the chartered steamer Takiang, ACTION BEGINS 111 mounting only one gun. Leaving Yokohama independ- ently, they first made for a general rendezvous at the Island of Himeshima in the Inland Sea, where all had arrived by September 3. That same day the squadrons weighed and steered in company towards the eastern entrance of the Straits of Shimonoseki, in the approaches to which they anchored the same afternoon, beyond range of the batteries ; and the following morning was spent in a final reconnaissance, after which orders were issued for the plan of attack. The batteries were ten in all, but the two farthest to the westward, numbered 9 and 10 in the plan, lay at some distance from the remainder, and were not to be included in the first day's objective. The main defences were numbered 3 to 8, while numbers 1 and 2 were minor works on the eastern flank. A whole day was to be devoted, if necessary, to bombardment, and if the defences had then been silenced, the next was to be occupied in a general landing, to complete the work of demolition and remove the guns if possible. The six corvettes Tartar, Leonard, Barrosa, Metalen Kruis, D^Jamhi, and Dupleix were to deliver a close frontal attack on the six batteries of the central group. The Euryalus and Semiramis were to engage the same at long range with their heavy rifled guns, being unable to move close in on account of their draught of water; while the Perseus and Medusa, with the gunboats Coquette, Bouncer, and Tancrede, were to engage batteries 1 and 2 and maintain a raking fire on the central group. The paddle- sloops Amsterdam and Argus and the American steamer Takiang were to remain under way, in readiness to tow or support any vessel in difficulties, but to open fire on any targets on which they could range; but the line-of- battle ship Conqueror was compelled to keep out of action, except at extreme range with her lOO-pounder Armstrongs, on account of her size and heavy draught. It was decided that the attack was to take place on an east-running tidal stream, so that any vessel disabled or forced to withdraw should not be carried up the Straits into difficult pilotage. The tide served at 2 p.m., before which time the whole 112 PERIOD OP REFORM fleet was under way, and at that hour the Euryalus made the signal to engage. The vessels thereupon steamed in at full speed to their allotted positions for attack, opening fire as they took them up, which the forts returned at once, and very soon every gun afloat and ashore that could bear or range on an enemy was in action. All through the afternoon the roar of the bombardment sounded through the Straits and far across the Chosiu territories, and by its volume of sound caused great excitement among the population even many miles inland. The Chosiu clansmen made a courageous and determined defence, but their weapons were no match for European armaments, and one after another their batteries were knocked out, till by 5.30 p.m. the last Japanese gun was silenced and the ships ceased fire. After conferring together the admirals considered that the defences had been sufficiently damaged to render further bombardment unnecessary, and decided that the general landing should take place next day, in accordance with programme. All ships therefore anchored for the night, but, as a precaution, kept ready for emergency. It was well for them that they did, for at dawn the defenders proved their determined spirit by opening fire again from the one battery still in a condition to fight, and did considerable damage to the Tartar and Duphix, Ijdng close in front of it, before the concentrated return fire of the inshore vessels reduced the battery to dust. When this had been accomplished the Euryalus made the landing signal, and 1,500 British, 350 French, and 200 Dutch seamen and marines were soon in the boats of the squadron making for prearranged points on shore, in tow of the sloops and gunboats, under cover of the guns of the larger ships. Arrived at their proper positions, they landed, formed up, and, under the personal direction of Kuper himself, advanced on the batteries, which were found deserted and partly in ruins. A strong covering force was then posted, and demolition parties set to work to dismount the guns, bum the carriages, and blow up the magazines. But this process suffered some interference ACTION ENDS 113 from the fire of a large body of Chosiu troops in a stockade and a wooded valley in rear of the main position, and it was necessary to drive them out, which operation caused some loss to the British landing party. It was not till nightfall, therefore, that the demolitions were sufficiently complete for the whole force to return to the ships. The two days' programme of attack had now been carried out in accordance with plan, and it was decided that the crews should rest on the third, partly to give the Chosiu chief an opportunity of submission should he desire it. But as he made no sign, and as the two remoter westernmost batteries were still unattacked, on the morning of the fourth the Tartar, Dupleix, Metalen Kruis, and D'Jambi were sent up the Straits to engage them. The batteries offered no return fire, however, and before long it transpired that a general surrender was imminent, for in the course of the morning an envoy under a flag of truce came on board the Euryalus, to ask for a termination of hostilities, and to declare that no opposition would thenceforward be offered to the free passage of the Straits. The envoy, in proof of the Prince's claim that he had been acting under Imperial orders, produced the Mikado's written instructions to expel the foreigners. His sub- missive attitude was now possibly caused, in part, by the remarkable circumstances that only three weeks previously he had despatched his whole troops to attack the capital and seize the Mikado, but had suffered decisive defeat by the forces of the Shogun. The chaotic political situation had, in fact, produced the extraordinary result that the strongly anti-foreign Mikado was being actively assisted to quell a vassal by the foreigners His Majesty wished to expel, because that vassal was carrying out orders that the Mikado had issued himself not long before. When the active operations were complete, large parties were landed from the ships to remove the armaments of the forts. This arduous task occupied three days, but the surrender of the Chosiu Prince ensured that it should proceed without opposition on his part, and sixty-two Japanese guns were eventually put into the boats of the 114 PERIOD OF REFORM fleet and taken on board, leaving the whole position in- capable of inflicting further injury on passing traffic. The object of the expedition being thus completely achieved, and the senior officer of each nationality provided with a full written assurance from the Chosiu chief that the Straits would remain free as far as he was concerned, the various squadrons separated and returned indepen- dently to Yokohama. The total casualties in the com- bined squadrons were only seventy-two in killed and wounded, and, thanks to their superior weight of arma- ment, the fire of the defence had been so effectively dominated that the only ships to suffer considerable damage were the Tartar and the Dupleix, which had occupied positions during the attack exposing them to a somewhat concentrated attention from the batteries. About a fortnight later a conference was held by the foreign diplomats to settle the extent of the indemnity which they had warned the Shogun would be demanded in the event of finding it necessary to open the Straits by force. Representatives of the Shogun attended the conference by invitation, and accepted the decisions at which it arrived. The Prince of Chosiu, having agreed in a previous document of surrender to pay all. the expenses of the expedition, in addition to a ransom for the town of Shimonoseki from attack, was fined three million dollars, which the Shogun undertook to pay from the Imperial Treasury, and recover under his own arrangements from the Prince. Thus ended a difficult situation in a manner which was ultimately to the advantage of all concerned, and not least to those who for the moment seemed to suffer by its terminating in such a way. For fifteen months the Chosiu clan had kept the Straits closed in defiance of all warnings, and, besides offering violence to vessels under several foreign flags, had inflicted direct loss on all foreign trade by forcing it to take a longer route, and indirect loss by keeping alive a condition of uncertainty as to the whole policy of the Japanese authorities, whose neglect to disarm the Shimonoseki batteries suggested sympathy with the IMPORTANT RESULTS 115 attitude of the Chosiu Prince. But all that was now at an end, and again to quote Adams : " As after the afEair of Kagosima, so it was after that of Shimonoseki. As the former opened the eyes of the Satsuma clan to the superior power of foreigners, and turned their hostility into overtures of friendship, so it was now with the Chosiu clan, and thus two of the most determined enemies of foreign intercourse were won over to our side. The loss of life was inconsiderable, and it is at least probable that the striking of this blow not only at once avoided more serious complications, but also a greater loss of life in the future. It was necessary, unless we were determined to be continually harassed and to suffer our trade to be exposed to serious interruptions, that the warlike but ignorant clans should be taught their inferiority in war. Nothing less than actual experience would have convinced them, and they were acute enough to perceive and profit by that experience." But although the moral effect was somewhat similar in degree in both cases, the material results were much more important at Shimonoseki than at Kagosima. As the latter was not a treaty port and did not command any trade route useful to foreign vessels, the destruction of its defences was no advantage to foreign commercial interests. But at Shimonoseki it was quite otherwise, and as soon as the Straits were reopened and the Inland Sea route made safe once more, trade revived and increased. The bombardment of Kagosima was an act of justice, undertaken by a solitary Power for the maintenance of respect for its subjects, and to inflict just retribution for murder. But the attack on Shimonoseki was the work of a coalition of civilized States whose object was the enforcement of treaties with purely material ends in view, and it was ultimately the Japanese who benefited more than any other people by their enforcement, although at the time they were too ignorant to foresee that result. Among its other consequences, it proved to be an indirect step in re-establishing the ancient power of the Mikadoliimself . One of the first acts of the foreign diplo- mats, after the Chosius' submission, was to insist upon the 116 PERIOD OF REFORM recognition of foreign treaties by the Mikado in person, instead of leaving them entirely in the hands of a sub- ordinate such as the Shogun, even though the whole administration of Japan was conducted by the latter. iTiis was a very great change from every point of view. According to Adams — " rt was becoming manifest that the existence of these two centres of authority was at the bottom of most of the complications which had arisen in respect of foreign relations, and it was high time that the Shogun should be made aware that the Representatives would have to insist upon a recognition of the treaties by the Emperor, in order that future difficulties might be avoided, and that the relations with foreigners might be placed upon a more satisfactory and durable basis." The foreign Ministers accordingly addressed a letter to the Shogun in which the following passages occurred : " The experience of the last few years has abundantly manifested that there exists a want of accord on the subject of foreign relations between the Mikado and the Shogun. . . . The Mikado, requiring the abrogation of treaties, had reduced the Shogun to the alternative of either dis- obeying his legitimate Sovereign or bringing on his country all the calamities of a war against four of the greatest Powers of the West. For to annul the treaties entered into with them without their consent is to declare war. " The Shogun, desiring to avoid both these fatal contingencies, has hitherto sought a solution of the difficulty by half-measures, equally distasteful to the Mikado and the foreign Powers. Hence the Treaty Powers have replied by the despatch of forces adequate to the destruction of the batteries and defences of the Prince of Chosiu. " The Mikado can no longer be under any illusion, therefore. If he continues to desire the abrogation of the treaties, he must also desire war. It is for the Shogun, who knows all the dangers of the situation, to anticipate and prevent the fatal consequences. The time for half-measures has passed irrevocably. The four great Powers having material interests in Japan can no longer sufEer their own dignity and the interests of their subjects ATTITUDE OF SHOGUN 117 to be continually called in question. A solution of the difficulty has become indispensable, and the only one that promises either peace or serenity is the ratification of the treaties of the Mikado." This communication at first only produced the usual evasive promises of ultimate attention, and the usual protest that no steps were immediately possible to lay the matter before the Imperial Court. But other influences were forcing the Shogun's hand. Since their experiences at Kagosima and Shimonoseki the Satsuma and Chosiu clans had definitely abandoned an anti- foreign policy, in the belief that it was impossible to carry out. In that respect they had arrived at the same opinion as the Shogun himself, although it was at variance with the views of the Mikado, who still adhered obstinately to the hope that in time the foreigners might be expelled. But these clans were always very jealous of the Shogun's power, and the latter began to fear that they would succeed in obtaining foreign support in their ambition to deprive him of his authority if he did not display some clear proof that he was acting as the foreigners desired. Not long after receiving the above-quoted joint letter from the diplomats, therefore, he acquainted them that he had informed the Mikado that in his opinion a time had arrived in which it had become necessary for the Imperial signature to be appended to all the already existing treaties for regulating the intercourse between Japan and other countries. This was early in 1865, and a strong international squadron had recently anchored at Kobe, the port which lay nearest to the Mikado's capital of Kioto. At first the Mikado utterly refused to agree to any such revolutionary proposal as would involve his sacred person in direct dealings with aliens from other lands. But the Shogun thereupon threatened to resign office, and presented a final appeal which is translated thus by Adams : " We Have adopted the practice of mutually enriching and strengthening both ourselves and others by the exchange of what we produce for what th6y produce. 118 PERIOD OF REFORM and this seems to me a natural and necessary law. For Japan to stand alone among the nations in refusing intercourse with all the others appears to indicate timidity and is detrimental to our power and dignity. A few years ago we concluded a treaty with the United States of which Your Majesty approved, and from that time we have been abandoning old-fashioned ideas and becoming powerful and wealthy. I have especially made it my endeavour to learn from the foreigners in matters in which they excelled, and to obtain siups and guns such as theirs from the profits of trade. The foreigners have now come to Kobe, close to Your Majesty's city of residence, with a strong fleet to request a further extension of these treaties, but Your Majesty wishes to break off all foreign relations and expel the foreigners. I have used every argument with their diplomatists, but they refuse to remain content, and if they cannot get what they want will force their way to your palace. " To provoke war in our unprepared state would be very dangerous, and even if we were victorious for a time a land such as ours, which is entirely surrounded by the sea, would be constantly exposed to attacks on every quarter, involving a continual state of war and great misery. ..." The concluding sentence of this appeal affords a signi- ficant indication that the better-informed Japanese had at length realized Japan's weakness as an insular State. Long accustomed to regard the sea as a protection, they now understood that it had become a source of danger, and that through the facilities for approach which it offered to potential enemies it exposed their country to the risk of attack in a far greater degree than a continental realm. This awakening to the truth had a most important effect on the subsequent policy of Japan, but its full meaning had not yet dawned on the Mikado himself. He did, indeed, reluctantly assent to signing the treaties under the Shogun's threat of resignation, for he was afraid of the power of the turbulent western clans, and had neither the experience nor the knowledge to undertake the defence and administration of his Empire himself; but he obstinately refused, nevertheless, to make any further concessions to foreign proposals. At the same DEATH OF MIKADO 119 time the foreign diplomats felt that a great step in advance had been taken when they saw the Imperial signature for the first time on documents which displayed their own, and believed with confidence that they could afEord to wait for further developments. It was an unheard-of thing in Japan for a Mikado to take a personal part in official dealings with the subjects of alien races, whom the majority of his people stUl regarded with contempt and aversion, and the foreign Ministers did not consider it expedient to press for immediate further con- cessions. They knew, moreover, that the most powerful anti-foreign influences at the Mikado's Court had been removed by the conversion of the Satsuma and Chosiu chiefs to a favourable attitude towards foreign inter- course, and also that the severe defeats suffered by these powerful clans had caused a profound sensation through- out the country. For the time, therefore, they were content to let matters rest. Nor had they long to wait, for in little more than a year the Mikado died. His successor, the Emperor Mutsuhito, was a lad of only fifteen, and, as such, little Ukely to exercise much influence on the proceedings of the Shogun, even if as imfavourably disposed towards the foreigners as his predecessor had been. At a later period, when in due course he attained to full power, he proved to be as progressive and enlightened as the old Mikado had been the reverse, thus becoming one of the most important figures in Japanese history: but for the time he was a negligible factor. The old Shogun had also died not long before, but his decease did not greatly affect the situation, because his successors continued his policy. Some difficulty had, indeed, been experienced by the clan to which he belonged in getting any member of the chief family to take the Shogunate, which was fast losing its great pre-eminence and involving the holder of the office in heavy labours without any com- pensations. Eventually, however, a relative of the old Shogun accepted the vacant position, but although an able man, his period of authority proved to be brief, 120 PERIOD OF REFORM and he was the last holder of the uncrowned dictatorship of Japan. For a period of about a year he acted as a chief of administration, and then, at the suggestion of the entire nobility of Japan, surrendered his authority to the Emperor. His ofl&ce was abolished and his execu- tive power vested in an elected council of clan chiefs and Samurai, with a Cabinet appointed by the Sovereign. An Imperial army was also established on a permanent footing, to which all the principal clans were ordered to supply a specified quota of troops. For a brief period, however, circumstances arose which seemed to suggest that this momentous change had only come into existence to be abolished again. The ex- Shogun was led to believe by some of his clansmen very shortly after his resignation that the power he had surrendered was really passing, not to the Emperor, but to his old rivals of Chosiu and Satsuma, thus exciting his alarm and inflaming clan jealousy once more. Assign- ing as a reason therefor his intention of protecting the Imperial interests against ambitious intrigues, he took the field at the head of his men and became in turn a rebel in arms. The civil war which followed is of special interest in connection with the subject of these pages, for it was not concluded until the opponents had measured swords on the sea as well as the land, and it taught the young Emperor and his new advisers that the ruler of an archipelagic State must be in a position to exercise effective force on salt water if he wishes not only to defend his realms against external attack, but to main- tain his authority among his own subjects. The rebel army commenced by marching forthwith on the Imperial seat of government at Kioto, but were met by the Imperial troops before reaching it and severely defeated. The ex-Shogun only escaped capture by flight to the coast, where he boarded a vessel of his own and returned to Tokio; but the Imperialists followed up their success by marching there also and demanding his surrender, with all the remnants of his fighting forces ashore and afloat. After some further resistance the NAVAL REBELLION 121 ex-Shogun and Ms remaining troops did surrender, but his ships refused to do so. These vessels formed a stronger squadron than anything the EmperOr could bring against them at the time, although comprising only eight corvettes, armed steamers, and yachts, under the Shogun's Admiral Enomoto. On hearing of the surrender of their comrades on shore, they left their anchorage in Yokohama Bay and sailed for the coast of Yezo, the northernmost of the three principal islands of the Empire, in October, 1868. In addition to their own crews they carried a large number of malcontents and rebels, all trained to arms, which Enomoto organized as a land force, and with these he captured Hakodate, the principal town in the island. There he established Ms headquarters, and, having proclaimed an indepen- dent Republic, extended Ms hold over a considerable area. For several months he remained supreme in Yezo, as the Imperial Government were powerless to embark on any active measures against Mm wMle he was the stronger at sea; but they were in a position to prevent supplies of any kind reaching Ms sMps from their former arsenal and dockyard, and, as Enomoto's financial resources were small, he was soon in difficulties to obtain fuel and ammumtion for Ms squadron. Eventually the Emperor was able to purchase several vessels suitable for his requirements, some being small war-vessels formerly belonging to other States, and others merchant-steamers convertible to fighting purposes. With these the Imperial Government felt strong enough to undertake operations, and in April, 1869, despatched a squadron of seven sMps to Awomori Bay, wMch lies at the northern end of the main island of Nipon, opposite to Hakodate. By tMs move on their part Enomoto was compelled to keep the rebel squadron concentrated for the protection of Ms base, which had no other defences, and thereby prevented from spreading to reconnoitre, or threaten the many alternative sea lines of communication between Nipon and Yezo. He'^recognized that under these circum- 10 122 PERIOD OF REFORM stances he had nothing to lose by taking the ofEensive^- which, in fact, was his only chance — and being a bold leader in war, if not a far-seeing politician in peace, he attacked the Imperialist squadron at their anchorage and nearly captured their flagship by actual boarding. This enterprise just fell short of success, however, and he was repulsed with considerable damage to his ships. For two months the squadrons remained facing each other, during which period the Imperial party assembled and embarked a force of troops in hired transports, which they despatched by a circuitous route far out to sea, and landed on the east coast of Yezo, at a point about seventy miles to the northward or rear of Hakodate. The rebel admiral might possibly have intercepted these had he been aware of the movement, but his enforced concentration kept him entirely ignorant of his enemy's activities except immediately in front of him, and the loss of two of his best ships by running ashore in the uncharted waters in which he was operating increased his difficulties. After their disembarkation the Imperial troops ad- vanced on Hakodate, driving the comparatively weak rebel land force before them, and at the end of a month's marching and fighting arrived near the outskirts of the town and proceeded to invest it on the land side. Enomoto's hold on Yezo was thereby terminated, and his only base threatened; but as there remained the possibility that he would break away with his ships and seek the sanctuary of some neutral port as a political refugee, the Imperial squadron now began active measures, and after some preliminary long-range skirmishes de- livered a close attack on the rebel squadron in Hakodate Bay. In the severe action which ensued one of the attacking vessels was blown up, but two of the rebels were sunk, and as Enomoto had then only four left and very little ammunition, he surrendered with the remnant of his command. By his submission the very last vestige of the once great power of the forces of the Shoguns of Japan passed for ever, and the realms over which they REBEL MILURE 123 had ruled became for the first time for 600 years united aa one Empire under their legitimate Sovereign. In his account of the incidents of this rebellion, Adame, speaks of the Imperial squadron as if, in the opening stages, it had not been commanded with a proper spirit of enterprise; but that criticism is not justified, for, whether by intention or otherwise, the manner of its use was extremely well suited to the special circumstances of the case. With the opposing forces so evenly matched as they were at sea, the results of an immediate attack on the rebels would have been at least a matter of chance, especially as Enomoto was a bold and capable com- mander. No doubt if the Imperialists had won the secessionist cause would have collapsed at once, but if the victory had gone to their enemies the suppression of the rebellion would have been indefinitely postponed. By taking up a threatening attitude directly opposite the rebel base and avoiding decisive contact for the time, they placed Enomoto at a serious disadvantage, and reduced the risks attendant on the sea transport of the Emperor's army to a minimum. When the rebel base was invested on the land side, then the Imperial admiral very properly forced a decision on the water. Apart from its purely Japanese aspects, this insurrection was instructive, for although the forces engaged on both sides were on a small scale, the progress of events furnished a clear indication of the difficulties attending any rebel- lious enterprise undertaken by a fleet. An insurrectionary army may overthrow an existing Government and set up another, because, if strong enough, it can usually find sources of supply and money for waging war. But a fleet is ultimately dependent on the land for all its requirements, and unable to maintain its fighting efficiency, or even to move, without supplies, which — especially as regards ammunition — can usually be denied to it by the authorities with whom it is in conflict, and which it cannot obtain outside its own country except with great difficulty. Enomoto's ultimate success was always doubtful for these reasons, even if, for a time, 124 PERIOD OF REFORM he was able to maintain his independence owing to the weakness of the Imperial power at sea. After these events the progress of Japan went steadily forward. The young Emperor proved to be enlightened and progressive in his views, and was supported by a singularly able and patriotic body of responsible advisers. Abandoning the old traditions of rigid seclusion, he received the representatives of the foreign Powers in person, and eventually transferred the Imperial residence and seat of government to Tokio, which has been the recognized capital of Japan ever since. A few fanatics refused to accept the new era, and outrages on foreigners still occasionally took place, but were firmly dealt with by the Japanese authorities, to the complete satisfaction of the foreign legations. An Imperial navy was founded, which in its early developments was organized and trained by British officers specially lent for the purpose, and was destined soon to make a notable mark in history. When Perry handed the American President's letter to the representative of the ruling authority in Japan the Japanese flag was absolutely unknown on the high seas. Fifty years later it was flying at the ensign staffs of one of the most formidable fleets of modem times, whose officers and men were richer in personal experiences of maritime war than their contemporaries in any other naval service in the world. CHAPTER V THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CHINO-JAPAirBSE WAR Reference has been made on several previous pages to the strategical and political importance to Japan of maintaining the Korean peninsula free from annexation or domination by a strong naval Power, and for the first 1,500 years of well-authenticated Japanese history Korea was the only alien territory in regard to which Japan can be said to have evinced any official interest, or formulated a foreign policy in any definite shape. As the transit of the seas became more and more practicable with the progress of science and the developments in naval architecture which science rendered possible, so did this importance of Korea to Japan become more and more accentuated. In the days of the Mongols any enemy who had planted his foot in Korea, although arriving thereby at the nearest possible position on terra firma to the Japanese shore, was yet still separated therefrom by an uncertain interval of time, which might be anything from three or four days to as many weeks. And even under the most favourable conditions a strict limit was imposed, as we have seen, on the force with which he could undertake an attempt at invasion. But in the nineteenth century, when Japan appeared on the stage as an ambitious and progressive State, the passage from Korea could be completed with some certainty in a few hours, unless under exceptional conditions of weather, and an enemy making the attempt would be subject to no limitations in the matter of sea transport. The invasion of an island, however, is only possible by the sea, and if the sea passage can be prevented by superior naval power, then it does not much matter whether it is a channel of only twenty odd miles which 125 126 WAR WITH CHINA the invaders must cross — such as the Strait of Dover — or the whole width of the ocean. Japan has never had to fear invasion by an enemy in Korea when that enemy's flag has carried less heavy metal afloat than her own, any more than Great Britain had to fear it from Napoleon or Wilhelm II., in spite of what St. Vincent called the " old women of both sexes " have so often asserted to the contrary. But invasion is not the only method of operating against an opponent across the water. There are others not so easily dealt with. As Jean Bart and Duguay-Trouin demonstrated plainly enough to the British naval officers of the eighteenth century, consider- able damage can be inflicted on the economic resources of an enemy, even in the face of a superior fleet, by determined and skilful men, if they have the advantage of secure bases within easy reach of important trade routes. With an aggressive Power in occupation of the fine and easily defended natural harbours of the Korean coast, a few such men with a naval force at their disposal, even much inferior to that of the Japanese, could yet cause perpetual apprehension and appreciable loss to Japanese commercial interests, and impose a burden on Japanese finances for the maintenance of a blockade analogous to the heavy strain thrown upon the British Treasury to enforce the blockade of the French ports in the Napoleonic wars. From a naval point of view, therefore, Japan was always concerned to keep the Korean harbours in their ancient status of undefended fishing ports, free from the grip of any ambitious Power which might convert them into sea fortresses available as shelters for maritime raiders. But it has always been the tragedy of Korea to be strategically important to China as well as to Japan. Like the Belgians between France and Germany, or other small peoples in history wedged in between heavy-footed neighbours, the Koreans have suffered from living in a land whose position gave natural advantages for war to others, and which rendered their soil either a direct object of covetousness, or at the least an allotment upon CHINA AND KOREA 127 which their neighbours trampled by turns, for the express purpose of preventing other people from trampling on it. Its strategic importance to China is obvious from a glance at the chart. The communications of the Chinese Imperial capital and seat of government at Pekin with the outside world — over which the large annual rice tribute from the southern provinces and other food supplies travel — ^lie chiefly by the Peiho River into the Gulf of Pechili, and so on into the Yellow Sea. The eastern bomidary of the Yellow Sea is formed by the west coast of Korea, wMch thus flanks the approaches of the principal entry and exit to and from Pekin; and, ever since that city has formed the Imperial capital and seat of administration, Chinese policy has aimed at keeping Korea peculiarly subject to Chinese domination, but free from the influence or coercion of other States and especi- ally from interference by Japan. Herein lay for centuries a perpetual source of irritation and jealousy between the statesmen of Pekin and Kioto. Neither could perhaps be accused of actively aggressive intentions towards Korea — with the notorious exception of Hideyoshi — but neither wished to see the other there. As a rule the claims of China were the more specifically asserted up till the year 1882, and were more definitely supported by the presence from time to time of armed forces. And Korea usually treated China as having the better rights in her territory, although these were always vague, and the attitude thus taken up was more due to fear than to predilection. From all this China frequently laid a claim to Korea as a tributary State, although with varying emphasis according to the political conditions prevailing from time to time, and the advantages or responsibilities which such a claim might entail. But the Japanese never recognized these pretensions or made any corresponding claim on their part. Their policy was to keep Korea free and independent from any external entanglements. When Japan emerged from retirement in the middle of the nineteenth century and began the introduction of 128 WAR WITH CHINA Western methods of administration, the problem of Korea became more acute and complex than ever. The Chinese authorities regarded the Japanese adoption of civilized and progressive government with profound distrust, and did their utmost to prevent the spread of any such ideas of reform into Korea, where they supported the ancient forces of conservatism and reaction, and, on several occasions, sent troops to assist the Korean Government in quelling insurrection. In this attitude they found great favour with the Korean Court party, where the Queen was dominant and placed^all her relations in the various offices of authority, with the result that the people were atrociously misgoverned and oppressed. The Japanese policy, on the other hand, was all in favour of progress, and although not interfering in the internal administration of the country, they used tljeir influence to spread reform indirectly, and gave asylum to Korean political refugees of advanced ideas ; with the result that they became so intensely unpopular with the Court party, that the Japanese diplomatic representative in Seoul had more than once to seek safety in flight. Affairs were in this permanently chaotic and conflicting condition when an arrangement for placing them on a definitely settled footing was made in 1885 whereby China, after much hesitation, agreed, by the Treaty of Tientsin, that neither the Chinese nor the Japanese authorities might send troops to Korea without acquainting the other party to the contract. Not long before it was ratified the Korean Government had taken the important step of concluding certain commercial treaties with several European Powers. This event afforded Japan a well-established foimda- tion for her constantly asserted claim that Korea was an independent State and not a tributary of China, for although the precise conditions which constitute the freedom of a people from external supervision are nowhere actually laid down, it is generally recognized among the nations that an unfettered control of its foreign affairs entitles any country to the status of independence; and the view held by the Japanese authorities would probably KOREAN INSURRECTION 129 have reeeived the endorsement of any body of inter- national jurists had it been referred to a Court of Arbitra- tion. But the Japanese knew that Pekin would obsti- nately refuse to accept any such ruling if the matter were brought up in this way, and as a protection to their own interests, they based their practical policy on the terms of the Tientsin Convention, whereby they were entitled, by an agreement under the Imperial seal of China, to equal privileges with the Pekin Government in regard to the despatch of armed forces to Korean territory. Matters remained on this footing for nine years more, during which period the misgovemment of Korea went from bad to worse, until even that incredibly long-suffering people had been goaded into an efEort to relieve their misery from a degree of tyranny that had become unen- durable. Early in 1894 a secret political society, animated by no more harmful aim than to ameliorate the intolerable situation of the population, broke into revolt and soon obtained a considerable measure of success in their con- flicts with the troops of their oppressors. These latter, instigated thereto by the Chinese diplomatic representa- tive in Seoul, applied to Pekin for armed assistance in quelling the insurrection, which was immediately forth- coming. But by the terms of the Tientsin Treaty the Chinese authorities were bound to notify Japan of the action they were about to take, and in the letter con- veying this information they once again referred to Korea as their " tributary State." To this the Japanese took exception in their reply, and, while not entering any actual protest against the despatch of Chinese troops, they intimated that they on their part would send a Japanese force to protect Japanese interests in the unsettled state of the country. Furthermore, they sug- gested that a joint commission should be appointed by CMna and Japan to investigate Korean affairs and submit recommendations for improving the administration and finances. Such a proposal was not, of course, properly consistent with the theory of Korean independence, and it was inspired in part no doubt by a desire to benefit 130 WAR WITH CHINA Japanese commercial interests, which stood to gain by any economic improvement in the condition of that country. But it demonstrated that Japan was not pressing for any advantages which she was not prepared to share with China, and the suggestion was at least one which offered the prospect of amelioration to the Koreans themselves. The Chinese authorities, however, took alarm at the notion of reforming the Korean Govern- ment, which was the last thing they desired. A prompt rejection of the Japanese proposals ensued, and although at first claiming Korea as a tributary State, they now, in their haste to put a stop to any such projects, went to the opposite extreme, and declared with all the emphasis at their command that the Koreans were an independent people who must be allowed to manage their own affairs. A halt in the diplomatic correspondence then followed, for the Japanese had said their last word, and the rival policies had reached an irreconcilable point, both parties being committed to the despatch of armed forces to Korean territory under a situation from which neither had any intention of withdrawing. The Chinese began by sending 2,000 men from Wei-hai-wei, and selected the port of Asan as the point of disembarkation — a harbour lying on the west coast of Korea well to the southward, about seventy miles from Seoul and within easy reach of the rebel head- quarters farther inland. There they formed an en- trenched camp. The Japanese on their part despatched an infantry brigade, about 4,000 strong, direct to the Korean capital, landing them first at Chemulpo. These two small armies were then only separated by a distance of a few hours' steaming by sea or a few days' march by land. It was, in theory at least, a risky move for Japan to send any troops at all in such a critical situation, dependent as they necessarily were upon sea communica- tions whose safety was still an open question. But their intelligence service had accurately gauged the true war value of the Chinese fleet, and the course of events justified their acceptance of the risk. CHITICAL SITUATION 131 Por a few weeks the situation, although strained, under- went no change, except that the rebels, fearing that no chance of ultimate success remained, dispersed without further efforts to struggle against fate. The original object in despatching troops from China and Japan thus ceased to exist, and a mutual withdrawal was suggested by the Japanese, but to this the Chinese refused to agree. Finding, therefore, that their troops must remain in Korea, for the time at any rate, the Japanese resolved that the work of reform should no longer be put off, and if the Chinese would not co-operate they decided to take the matter in hand by themselves. This they had begun to do when information came to hand that the Chinese were preparing for the despatch of additional troops in large numbers for no obvious purpose but to strengthen their hold on Korea. Warning Pekin that any such step would be regarded as an unfriendly act, the Japanese authorities directed the officer in command of their own brigade at Seoul to march to Asan, where the Chinese were entrenched, and be prepared to attack, and at the same time despatched a squadron of light cruisers to the west coast of Korea to prevent the arrival of any Chinese reinforcements by sea. A further cause of apprehension arose from the intelligence that a Chinese division 15,000 strong, with plenty of artillery, had crossed the Korean frontier and was advancing on Peng- yang, a fortress of evil memory in their own history. Matters were thus fast moving towards a situation in which it was necessary for the fighting services to be prepared for immediate emergencies, and although the moment had not quite arrived for the diplomats to quit the stage, war was something more than a possibility. The strategic conditions before the naval and military authorities on both sides were precisely similar in all their inain features to those which had confronted their ancestors in the Korean War of the sixteenth century, although materially modified in their details by the progress of scientific invention in the interval. Like the inhabitants of any other insular empire, the Japanese 132 WAR WITH CHINA could do nothing to assert their rights in Korea or any other part of the world without first getting on board their ships, and it was because the Koreans under Yi-sun had fixed their attention mainly on this point that they brought disaster upon the schemes of Hideyoshi. The first thing, therefore, that demanded the attention of their authorities was the war chart hanging on the wall of the Tokio Admiralty, for if the Chinese were in a position to profit by Yi-sun's example, all Japanese aspirations in Korea were bound to come to an end. This^the Chinese should certainly have been able to do, for in regard to its material specifications their fleet was undoubtedly the more powerful of the two. And they had the further advantage that for them defeat on the sea did not imply failure in everything else, as it did for Japan. A land route to Korea was at their disposal, and although for large-scale movements it was vastly less convenient and expeditious than the route by sea, this route did at least render it possible in theory for their soldiers to redeem any shortcomings on the part of their seamen where their position in Korea was concerned. Provided, therefore, that hostilities were limited to Korea, all the strategic advantages lay with China. If, on the other hand, the Chinese policy intended to regard Korea as a side-issue for the moment and strike at the heart of Japan — as Kublai Khan would certainly have done in the circum- stances — these strategic advantages would disappear, but success in the endeavour would secure not only all Chinese interests in Korea but much else besides. For the Pekin Government, therefore, lay the choice in theory of embarking either on an unlimited offensive, or of following a purely preventive or defensive policy, although the latter could, on paper at any rate, be carried out best by a naval strategy which was offensive in its methods of operation. When war did break out they confined themselves to the defensive from first to last, and it seems evident that they had neither any real grasp of the general situation nor any plans for dealing with it. The Japanese had both. The circumstances were PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 133 suoh that nothing but an offensive strategy could meet their requirements. Realizing this, they seized the initiative at the outset, and never allowing it to pass from their hands, forced the war to follow the course which best suited their purposes. In the first place they confined their attention to the limited objective of driving the Chinese out of Korea. But when that end had been accomplished they embarked on unlimited war, for reasons explained hereafter; and if the Chinese had continued to hold out long enough, there is very little reason to doubt that the Japanese plan of campaign would ultimately have aimed at dictating the terms of peace in Peldn itself. When a critical point had been reached in the diplomatic interchange of notes both sides prepared their sea forces. As already observed, the fleet under the yellow-dragon flag of the Emperor Kwang-su was the more formidable of the two on paper, but its constitution and system of administration were not conducive to a high state of efficiency for war. The Chinese Empire was divided up into large provinces, each equalling an average European State in area and population, and these provinces were ruled by Viceroys who raised their own revenues and maintained their own armies, distinct from the others; and in some cases a naval force as well. The various squadrons thus created were all at the absolute disposal of the Emperor and his council of war for the defence of his realms ; but although all aimed in different degrees at copying British naval methods, they varied very much in their state of readiness for service and scale of establish- ment, and were not co-ordinated or organized in any way under a proper central authority. The northern or metropolitan province of Chi-li, in which stood Pekin, was governed by the celebrated Viceroy Li-Hung-Chang, sometimes called the "Bismarck of China"; who, with the assistance of the Imperial Council, had founded a fleet more powerful than those of all the central and southern provinces put together, and this formed the main bulk ot the Chinese sea force. 134 WAR WITH CHINA To estimate its true value is not easy, as the types of vessels varied very much, and almost every pattern of ordnance in use at the time in other countries was repre- sented in the aggregate of their armaments. The better ships had been built in Germany or England, but the guns came from many different makers, and the extreme variety of ammunition rendered the question of war- supply very complex at best. A list of the vessels with their tonnage and armaments is given in Appendix I., together with a similar list of the fleet of their adversaries ; but, as Chinese and Japanese names are apt to be very confusing to European readers, it may perhaps be prefer- able in the account of the war here given to omit names — except in the case of a few of the more important ships — and confine all reference to classes, especially as this account does not profess to be detailed. Eliminating wooden vessels and certain others not suitable for duties in the open sea, and using modem terms to differentiate the others, the total Chinese sea-going fleet might be summed up as consisting of five armoured vessels, ten small light cruisers, nine sloops or despatch- vessels, and thirty small torpedo-boats. Of non-sea-going types it included twenty-six very small coast-defence gunboats, but nearly all these were stationed up the Chinese rivers, and only six took any part in the war, which was confined to salt water. The two principal armoured vessels were the German- built battleships Ting-yuen and Chen-yuen, of 7,430 tons displacement, each mounting four 12-inch Krupps and designed with good speed and protection according to the standards of their day. Properly handled and fought these two should have been more than a match for the six best ships of the Japanese Navy, and they did eventu- ally engage these six for four hours without decisive result on either side. The remaining three Chinese armoured vessels were much smaller, displacing only 2,850 tons or thereabouts, and carrying a pair of 8-inch and a pair of 6-inch guns. These three were built at Foochow Dockyard, but some of their weapons were CHINESE FLEET ^ 135 British and some German. Relatively to the other types composing the Chinese fleets, they occupied a position analogous to that of armoured cruisers, and although " armoured cruisers " proper were at the time an un- known class of vessel, the term will be used in this context for convenience in referring to these three ships. The ten light cruisers ranged from 2,200 to 2,600 tons in displacement. Each movmted two or three 8-inch guns, although of different patterns in different ships, and each carried in addition from two to eight lighter weapons of 4 8-inch to 6-inch calibre. The nine sloops displaced from 1,000 to 1,250 tons. Two of these, built at Elswick, carried a pair of 10-inch Armstrongs each — an altogether disproportionate arma- ment for their size, which handicapped them in other ways. The other seven mounted either one 6-inch and one 4-inch gun or a pair of 4'7-inch. The thirty torpedo-boats were mostly of the old small type known as "second-class," but fit for operations near a base, and had they been handled in the same spirit as the torpedo craft in the Japanese Navy would have proved a very serious menace to the enemy, who had no defended harbour or anchorage in the principal theatre of operations. A few years previously Li-Hung-Chang's fleet was in a serviceable condition. The Chinese Government had obtained the assistance of a very capable and energetic post-captain on the Active List of the British Navy as an organizer, who, with the co-operation of a staff of officers of the various branches of his own service and a few of other European and American nationalities, had worked it up into a useful fighting force. The discipline was excellent, the training conducted on sound lines both as regards theory and practice, and the adminis- tration was free from corruption. War stores were main- tained up to establishment both on board and at the reserve depots. Externally the ships were smart and clean, internally they were in good working order. Constant cruises at sea kept their officers well practised 136 WAR WITH CHINA in manoeuvring together, and every vessel was regularly docked for refit and overhaul. In all respects, therefore, the fleet represented a force to be reckoned with at its face value. And in the famous sea fortress of Port Arthur it had the additional advantage of a headquarter base of great natural strength in a commanding strategic position; well equipped with docks, basins, repairing plant, and store depots, and strongly fortified. During a certain epoch, therefore, not long antecedent to the war, China occupied a favourable maritime position, not only on paper but in fact. Unfortunately for the Chinese themselves, however, the jealousy of Europeans, which is so common among Oriental ofiicials, began to assert itself; and by degrees the position of the foreigners was made so difficult that the head of the mission threw up the appointment and was followed by all the commissioned officers of the British service, although a small and heterogeneous collection of aliens of subordinate rank remaiaed, some of whom were not naval officers at all. Deterioration soon followed. First the administration became dishonest and stores were peculated. Then favouritism and worse secured the appointment of in- competent officers to high places, with the result that discipline grew slack and training suffered. Docking and refitting were neglected to save money that went into the wrong pockets, and the ships themselves with their armaments and machinery were allowed to fall into bad repair. But whether by intention or otherwise, all this was concealed from higher authority by an adherence to the former standard of external appearances. Lying in Port Arthur or Wei-hai-wei, the ships presented smart and well-kept exteriors, which to some extent misled even European naval officers as to their real condition, and utterly deceived a landsman such as Li-Hung-Chang on his State visits of inspection to the fleet. None but the Japanese knew the real truth, thanks to their excellent secret intelligence service. When war with Japan was imminent the chief command was in the hands of Admiral Ting, an ignorant officer, whose sole qualification for his JAPANESE OFFICERS 137 responsible post was an unmistakable personal courage of which he gave frequent proof. By no means the least of the advantages enjoyed by the Japanese lay in the fact that the conduct of the hostile operations rested with a man who had little in common with the great leader whose genius had inspired their enemy's resistance on the sea 300 years before. In Japan at that time the Navy held but an indifferent place in the public esteem — chiefly from political causes — and except in oflficial circles its real efficiency was not understood. Domestic politics, when first introduced into Japan on European models, developed some of their worst forms of intrigue between parties, and although the governing classes had agreed to sink all the old rivalry between clans when the Shogunate was abolished, an undercurrent of the former jealousy still remained. The Satsuma clan had been the first to take up the idea of a national navy with energy and enthusiasm, and the young men of good Satsuma families had come forward to officer the new service in greater numbers than all the other classes put together, with the result that Satsuma influence was supreme in the fleet. This caused political rivals to declaim against its efficiency to such an extent that for some years before the war the Government had experienced considerable difficulty in getting the naval estimates passed. In point of fact, the nation was obtaining very good value for its money all the time, but the exploits of the fleet when put to the supreme test of war were so little expected that they caused as much surprise as elation. This fleet differed from that of their adversaries iu nearly all the essentials of a war service. In the first place, it was a single organization under the control of a central authority, and administered as such. Secondly, the administration was honest and important appoint- ments went by merit, with the result that the discipline was second to none in the world, and all ranks and ratings were animated by a high professional spirit. Training was thorough, great care and attention were devoted to 11 138 WAR WITH CHINA the upkeep of the vessels and their armaments, and all stocks and reserves of war munitions were maintained at proper levels. Like the fleet of Li-Hung-Chang, the fleet of the Japanese Emperor was originally modelled on British naval standards in almost every point of importance, and like the Chinese the Japanese had parted with the British officers who had been their first in- structors; not, however, because the latter were dis- satisfied, but because their own officers felt that the time had arrived when they were competent to assume full responsibility themselves. But in dispensing with British guidance the Japanese service had not been allowed to fall into decay. All the lessons received were borne in mind and real efficiency for war was the sole object kept before officers and men alike. Externally, perhaps, their vessels left no better an impression on the casual spectator than those of their prospective opponents, but that W9.s because they were much more exposed to sea weather. In his writings on European wars Mahan has drawn a comparison between the trim appearance of Villeneuve's ships lying idly shut up in Cadiz and the storm-beaten British vessels watching and waiting for them outside. In a lesser degree some such comparison might have been made between the Chinese and Japanese fleets of 1894, and to this day the rival claims of paintwork and gunnery are familiar to every naval service. With the Japanese paintwork received such attention as was possible, but was relegated to its proper place. On the other hand, their armaments were well oUed, their engines ran smoothly, and, above all, their officers and men were thoroughly acquainted with the handling and use of their ships and the weapons they carried. A Japanese vessel was kept in her proper station in the squadron, and a Japanese gun was well laid before firing and quickly loaded again. When war appeared imminent Vice- Admiral Count Ito was appointed Commander-in-Chief — a capable and enterprising officer, to whose lot it fell to demonstrate to the hitherto unsuspecting world that in the new Japanese fleet a fresh factor JAPANESE SHIPS 139 requiring serious attention had appeared in international politics. In its actual composition its weakest point was the total lack of any armoured integers of even moderately recent type. The only armoured ships appearing in the Japanese Navy List were three small obsolete broadside vessels, built nearly twenty years previously and almost worn out. These three were mobilized, nevertheless, and used, although their presence with the fleet was more a source of anxiety to Ito than of strength. One small cruiser also carried a 5-inch belt, but with it so light an armament as to be in efiect a light cruiser only, in which category she is included in the lists and com- ments which follow. Of the remainder of the fleet the principal ships were three unarmoured cruisers of 4,300 tons displacement, two of which were built in France and the third in Japan from French plans. Each of these carried a 12-8 inch 66- ton Canet gun with a 4-7-inch secondary armament. Two carried the heavy weapon mounted forward, and the third mounted it aft, but their designs embodied the serious defect of an excessive development of fire from one end of the ship at the expense of an insufficient volume of fire at the other, and it was never repeated in later vessels. At the same time, their hitting power was formidable, and, in truth, it was their three Canet guns which formed the foundation upon which all Japanese plans afloat and ashore were built up, for to Japan everything depended from the outset upon obtaining the eommand of the sea, and in these monster pieces of ordnance lay almost their only hope of securing it. These vessels formed the main part of the Japanese line of battle in consequence, and one of them, the Matsushima, carried the flag of the Commander-in-Chief. Next to these three ships came five light cruisers dis- placing from 3,000 to 4,000 tons, of which two were armed with a pair of 10-inch weapons and the others carried mixed armaments of 6-inch and 4-7-inch calibre. Although only half as numerous as the light cruisers of 140 WAR WITH CHINA the Chinese Navy, they were individually larger and better vessels. Four of the five possessed a sufficiently equal speed to work well together as a squadron. The fifth, in spite of only mounting a 5-inch armament, was stationed in the main division of the fleet by virtue of carrying a 5-inch belt, which put her in the same line as the ships with 12-8-inch weapons. Her nondescript design made it difficult to place her usefully in company with any vessels in the whole fleet. The Japanese sloops were twelve in number, ranging from 600 to 1,700 tons in displacement. One carried an armament of two 10-inch Armstrongs and was a sister vessel in every detail to the pair of similarly gunned sloops in the Chinese Fleet. Another was very fast and modern. The remainder were rather old. Ship for ship they were a fairly even match for the same class under the dragon flag. Thirty - eight small torpedo - boats completed the Japanese naval forces, which did some excellent work in the second phase of the war. In the aggregate, therefore, the Japanese sea forces consisted of three quite obsolete battleships, three light cruisers carrying battleship guns, five light cruisers of normal design or nearly so, twelve sloops, and thirty- eight torpedo craft. This gave Japan a less powerful fleet than that of her opponents, which suffered under the further disadvantage of possessing no secure or defended base or war anchorage immediately facing the main theatre of operations, such as the Chinese possessed in Port Arthur, and also to some extent in Wei-hai-wei. As already observed, the Japanese Government, on hearing of the intended movement of Chinese reinforce- ments towards Korea, had despatched a light-cruiser squadron of three vessels, under Rear- Admiral Tsuboi, to intercept their passage by sea if possible, and ordered the Japanese brigade at Seoul to march towards Asan and be prepared to attack the Chinese camp. War had not so far been actually declared, but these measures were FIRST ENGAGEMENT 141 ♦ the first step in that direction and very soon caused active hostilities to begin. For its intended purpose this light-cruiser squadron would have been inadequate if the Chinese had used their main fleet as a protection to their transports, but Tsuboi's command was fast enough to avoid action if confronted by a superior force, and the Chinese failed to take proper precautions. As if in contempt of the Japanese warnings against sending more troops to Korea, they merely detailed an escort of one light cruiser and one sloop for the transports. These two vessels, however, with two munition ships, had arrived safely on July 24 in Asan Harbour before Tsuboi could reach the scene, and after completing this duty, sailed early next morning to return to a Chinese port. But a couple of hours later, while steaming westwards among the numerous islets off the coast and passing through the narrow channel which separates them from the mainland, they suddenly encountered the three Japanese cruisers making from the opposite direction towards Asan. The latter turned at once to a parallel course and attacked. A running fight ensued in which the Chinese had no chance from the first, for not only were they outnumbered, but the quick-firing Japanese armaments completely smothered the comparatively slow-firing Chinese guns. Both Chinese vessels were soon on fire, and while the sloop steered for the beach in a sinking condition, the light cruiser made for Wei-hai- wei, where she eventually arrived in a considerably damaged condition after being chased for part of the way by one of her enemies. As the action was terminating a third Chinese vessel was sighted ahead, which turned and retreated, but was soon overhauled and captured, proving to be a converted merchant steamer employed for despatch work. Some hours later, while Tsuboi was cruising on the same spot, on the watch, yet another vessel was observed approaching from the northward. This was the British steamer Kowshing, chartered by the Chinese Government for the conveyance of 1,200 picked troops and a field-battery to Asan, all under the orders 142 WAR WITH CHINA of a German military officer. Trusting to her British ensign for immunity from attack, she was provided ivith no escort at all; and as her master was quite unaware of the events occurring only a few hours before, he pursued his course in no anticipation of immediate danger, till a signal was received to anchor at once from one of the Japanese cruisers steaming towards him. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the latter was commanded by a Captain Togo, destined later to become historically famous. When she had anchored as directed, the Kowshing was boarded by a boat from the cruiser, conveying instructions to weigh again and follow the Japanese ship. The British master, and the German officer commanding the troops, realized that refusal was hopeless, but the troops mutinied and demanded that if not allowed to land in Korea they should be sent back to Taku, whence they had come. For three hours the Japanese carried on parley and discussion, but all in vain, and then, finding it impossible to get any orders obeyed and having other duties of a pressing nature to carry out, the cruiser fired a torpedo and sank the Kowshing with the great majority of the people on board. The Japanese picked up the British officers, treated them well, and gave them their liberty, but were accused of making insufficient efforts to rescue the Chinese soldiers; and the incident occasioned much protest and controversy at the time, on the grounds that they had no right to sink a vessel under British colours before war was declared. The British Government, however, after mature delibera- tion, decided that as a cruiser engagement had already taken place the same morning a state of war existed, under which the Japanese action was not unjustifiable; and moreover, if British owners chose to place their vessels at the disposal of foreign States they must accept the risks attendant thereon and look to their employers for protection. Prom an historical point of view the incident was very noteworthy as being the very first occasion on which a troop transport was ever sunk by a Whitehead torpedo, thus affording unmistakable proof WAR DECLARED 143 that a new danger threatened the movement of armies by sea, through the introduction of a deadly weapon capable of use in even the smallest-sized vessels. News of Tsuboi's engagement reached the Japanese brigade marching on Asan very soon, and relieved the general in command of any apprehensions of finding the Chinese force materially increased in strength on his arrival. It had been a race between Viim on the land and the Chinese reinforcements on the water as to who should get there first, which the latter had been on the point of winning when Tsuboi intervened with decisive effect. Continuing his advance, a few days after the opening exchange of shots at sea, he commenced the war on land, by storming the Chinese trenches at Asan and breaking up the whole defending force. This relieved the Japanese of any danger from that direction, but a more serious menace^ was threatening them from the Chinese frontier to the northward. Six days after Tsuboi's affair the Japanese Emperor delivered a formal declaration of war, which was followed by an interval of more than a month as regards further encounters on either element, while a general mobiliza- tion was being pressed forward. This period was occupied by the Japanese in strenuous preparation for the despatch of a large army and the collection of its sea transport, and by the Chinese in pouring troops into Korea by the land route to seize the northern Korean fortress of Peng-yang and other points of strategic importance. Properly it should have witnessed the settHng of the vital question of maritime superiority one way or the other, for both navies were fully mobilized long before the land forces, and the Japanese cruised continually about the Yellow Sea, often within sight of the enemy's ships lying in Port Arthur. But the latter refused to take up the challenge and never lifted an anchor. It was afterwards averred by an American in the Chinese service that Ting wished to go out and engage, but was ordered to^ refrain by his Government. But although the Pekin authorities did undoubtedly interfere incessantly with 144 WAE WITH CHINA their naval and military commanders, the fact remains that when the day arrived on which Ting did meet the enemy at sea his tactics evinced more of a desire to get home than to take the offensive. This was not due to any lack of personal courage, for whatever his faults may have been cowardice cannot be laid to his charge. It is more likely that he realized his own unfitness for a com- mand requiring a high degree of professional competence, and was alive to the ignorance of some of his officers. The Chinese authorities meanwhile had heard with alarm of Japanese preparations for the despatch of troops to Korea on a large scale. Totally failing to perceive that by the experiences of their own country in the sixteenth century it was far the best plan for them to intercept this army while helpless on the sea, or possibly doubtful of the efficiency of their fleet after the encounter of two of their ships with Tsuboi, they contented them- selves at first by continuing to send more troops to Korea by land all the way. This certainly ensured their safety against attacks by Japanese ships, but in the absence of any railway the route was very slow, and except at great loss of time, useless as a line of movement for their best troops in Shantung, right on the far side of the Yellow Sea from Korea, hundreds of miles distant by road. Eventually a partial use of the sea route became unavoidable, and having been duly impressed with the consequences of sending an insufficient escort with the Kowshing, they ordered Ting at last to get to sea and undertake convoy duty with all his available ships, thus for the first time placing him within reach of Japanese attack. The Chinese admiral sailed accordingly with his two battleships, his three armoured cruisers, three light cruisers, and four sloops, as escort for some trans- ports leaving Taku for the mouth of the Yalu River, which forms the boundary between Korean and Chinese territory. There he arrived without incident on September 16 and anchored his main fleet some miles outside, but sent an armoured cruiser with a sloop and two torpedo-boats into the river with the transports. FLEET MOVEMENTS 145 For nearly a month Japanese troops had been landing in Korea in ever-increasing numbers, some on the east coast and some on the west, but none molested or threatened while on the sea. By the beginning of September the Army Command decided that the force in the field had reached sufficient dimensions to under- take the offensive, and a northerly movement was started of which the first important result was the assault and capture of the fortress of Peng-yang with most of its garrison, after some stiff fighting, on September 16 — the very day on which Ting had arrived off the Yalu not far distant to the northward. It so happened that during the immediately preceding period the main Japanese fleet had been employed in precisely the same work as their enemy — that is to say, in escorting troop transports. On September 14 Ito and all his command, with thirty troopships carrying reinforcements under his protection, arrived off the mouth of the Taidong River, on which, as observed in a previous chapter, stands the town of Peng-yang at some distance from the sea, and at that moment on the eve of capture by the Japanese army. In this he had successfully accomplished the very operation which Hideyoshi had planned, but Yi-sun had frustrated, just 300 years before. Knowing that the plan of the land campaign was to push on to the frontier if Peng-yang was taken, and having no more convoy duty requiring his attention for the moment, he decided to co-operate with the land advance by scouring the Gulf of Korea, to prevent sea-borne reinforcements or supplies from reaching the remnants of the Chinese army retiring northwards from the Peng-yang neigh- bourhood towards Manchuria. Having left the trans- ports under his charge safely at their destination, he sailed on September 16 on a reconnoitring cruise to the northward and eastward with this object in view. Although neither knew it, both fleets were now at sea within a very short distance of each other, which every turn of Ito's propellers diminished. The decisive hour of the seamen's share in the war was therefore at hand. 146 WAR WITH CHINA The Japanese ships were organized in two divisions of unequal strength. The main division consisted of the three heavily armed vessels of the Matsushima class, the belted light cruiser Chiyoda, and two very old broadside battleships. This last pair were always at the rear of the line, where in spite of the utmost exertions of their stokers they constantly dropped astern, and one was so slow that only by cutting comers at every alteration of course could she keep station at all; in pursuit of which method of retaining his proper place in the line her captain broke right through the middle of the Chinese fleet in the heat of battle within a cable's distance of their most powerful ships on either hand, and risked being blown out of the water rather than suffer any accusation of avoidable lagging. The other Japanese division was composed of four fast light cruisers under Tsuboi, who seems to have been entrusted with a very wide discretion in regard to his tactical movements, judging from the wording of Ito's despatches. A gun- boat and an armed merchant cruiser were attached for auxiliary service, and ran great risks in carrying out their duties. The Japanese fleet first made for the island of Hai- yun-tau to the north-westward, o£E which they arrived at daybreak on September 17, but found no signs of the enemy. They then headed north-eastward towards the mouth of the Yalu River. Here Ting's fleet were still at anchor, and as the Japanese were burning very smoky coal his lookouts discerned the approach of some large force nearly an hour before they were sighted themselves, which gave the Chinese time to weigh and form for action. No option but to fight now remained, as the Japanese were between them and Port Arthur, evidently bent on forcing battle. It was in the direction of Port Arthur, therefore, that Ting steered, and as this brought the fleets steaming towards each other their mutual approach was rapid. Ting's standing orders for fleet action were of the crudest description, based on the principle that when once engaged each captain was to TING'S BATTLE FORMATION 147 act as he considered best under the circumstances — which a little later two of them interpreted as giving them permission to run away altogether — but as far as possible sister ships were to act in concert. For general guidance all were to watch the flagship. Orders of such a kind make it obvious that he exercised no effective control over his force for tactical purposes, and either understood very little of fleet manoeuvring himself or placed no reliance on his captains for working together. It is, however, but fair to admit that the science of manoeuvring steam fleets in action was only in its infancy everywhere at the time. One other order of his on record directed that no quarter was to be given to the enemy — an order which suggests the working of a mind embittered by anticipations of defeat, and only hoping for some chance opportunity of wreaking a savage revenge. In weighing, the Chinese admiral formed his fleet in single line abreast, but left the armoured cruiser, the sloop, and the two torpedo-boats which were up the river to follow on as a separate division. British officers had taught the Chinese that line abreast is a good forma- tion for the approach stage of a fleet action, and Ting accepted this teaching. But as every naval officer now knows, a line abreast must always be prepared to turn together in either direction to prevent the enemy from attacking a wing or crossing the "T." Moreover, the wings should be formed of powerful ships even at the expense of strength at the centre. Ting omitted to observe either of these important points. He placed his four armoured vessels in the centre, two sloops and one light cruiser as his starboard wing, and two light cruisers and one sloop as his port, giving a line of ten vessels all told. Then he blundered straight ahead. He knew the letter " A " of the naval tactician's alphabet — more or less — but that was all, which was worse than learning nothing at all, for it merely led him to dispose his ships in a formation giving very favourable opportunities to the enemy if he did not understand how to make proper use of it himself. And as line abreast is difficult to keep 148 WAR WITH CHINA for any length of time except with very well-handled ships, his formation was already getting ragged before the fight began. It was then about midday. Ito saw his chance and took it, but can scarcely have dared to hope for such initial good luck as followed. His own fleet were in single line ahead with the light- cruiser division in the van. Steaming at full speed diagonally across the enemy's bows, he made straight for the starboard or northern end of their line. The Chinese ships opened a heavy fire as he passed, but, the range being long and the targets in rapid movement, X Track of ff^ \ > 3 CO FIG. 8. — ^DIAGRAM SHOWING ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN ARMOURED SQUADRONS. 272 WAR WITH RUSSIA for Russia and immortal glory for Japan. Roshdest- vensky's crews had been at their quarters all night expecting torpedo craft, but nothing had been sighted. For thousands of them it was the last day of existence, and before another sunrise they were lying in the eternal darkness of water 400 feet deep. About a couple of hours past midnight the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru was scouting on the advanced patrol forty nules west of the Goto Islands, and became for ever famous in Japanese history by making out the dim form of a strange vessel in the darkness on a suspicious course, and by following her up, sighted the whole Russian fleet at daylight and flung off the anxiously awaited wireless message, to be taken up and repeated by the long line of lookout ships, the cruiser squadrons at Tsushima Island, and the main armoured divisions at Masampo. Togo's suspense was at an end. An hour later the light cruiser Idzumi at the southern extremity of the line of lookouts also sighted the enemy and shadowed them, keeping out of range of their guns but reporting their course, speed, and formation from hour to hour by wireless so that Togo knew exactly what they were doing. As the morning advanced more Japanese appeared, and by seven o'clock the situation was very dramatic. In the centre of the picture was the Russian fleet moving steadily onwards in a compact formation of two columns, with the Idzumi watching and following all their movements from the horizon. To the north- ward, still many hours ahead, Togo was steaming out from Masampo to cross their path with his armoured divisions, the hammer-head of Japanese sea power by day, although a less serious menace than his destroyers in the hours of darkness. From Tsushima Island the cruiser squadrons were hastily weighing and standing to the south-westward to get into touch with the enemy, while from all other directions the widely extended scouting cruisers on patrol were hurrying in on receiving the wireless general recall. In this way the forenoon passed, and before midday the Russians had arrived OPENING OF BATTLE 273 abreast of Tsushima. The first messages from the Idzumi had reported them in two columns with the battleships to starboard, and as it was Togo's intention to make the battleships his first object of attack, he stood right across to the east of their anticipated line of advance on leaving Masampo, so as to attack on that side. But the enemy altered both course and formation before coming into his sight, haulmg up more to the northward and forming single column, which made Togo turn back to the westward at half-past twelve, and in that direction he was steering when three-quarters of an hour later the Russians appeared about six miles to the south. Standing on right across their path, so as to attack from the port side instead of the starboard, he then turned to meet them. Roshdestvensky had altered formation twice during the forenoon, and his fleet was now in one line with his five best battleships in the van, his older and smaller armoured vessels in the centre, and his light cruisers and auxiliaries in the rear. Togo's plan was to engage the head of the Russian line with his own armoured ships while his light cruisers attacked the tail. Thus it came about that the centre received comparatively little attention till a later stage. When he turned to meet them, as just described, both fleets were in single line steaming fast, and therefore approaching so rapidly that in ten or twelve minutes the leading vessels would have passed each other on opposite courses. But that was never his intention, and with quick insight, just as they were coming into range, he swung his flagship to the north-eastward and led the Japanese line right round in succession to a parallel course with the Russians. It was an audacious manoeuvre to execute close under the bows of a fast advancing enemy, and had the Russians been a highly trained force he would have suffered, but he took the risk of appraising them at their true value. They did endeavour to make him pay the penalty by opening a concentrated fire on each Japanese ship as she turned, but their guns were badly laid, and for all the 274 WAR WITH RUSSIA effect they produced on their adversary's movements they might just as well have thrown stones. Togo's change of direction was completed without mishap; and served the double purpose of bringing the whole weight of his attack on the Russian van, and of keeping him between Roshdestvensky and Vladivostok. The terrible superiority of the Japanese gunnery now 4'' Hi Japanese o Russians • ie^7Wfllk«TLtd.,.e. FIG. 9. — DIAGRAM SHOWING APPEOACH TACTICS OF JAPANESE AKMOURED DIVISIONS AT BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA. (NOT TO SCALE.) came into full play. As each ship reached the turning- point and swung into action her starboard guns opened fire, and when the last had steadied her helm on the new course the Japanese broadsides were thundering out in rapid succession all along the line and making three or four hits to the enemy's one. Such a duel could not last long, and in less than fifteen minutes the Russian flagship Souvaroff and the battleship Oslydbya — fifth in ROSHDESTVENSKY WOUNDED 275 the line — were both on fire and suffering seriously. Finding that he could no longer stand on, Roshdestvensky took the only alternative and sheered off to the eastward, leading the Russian line gradually round. Togo thus scored his first point, for now the enemy was no longer heading for home, but the Japanese Admiral had no intention of relaxing his grip, and followed the Russians accordingly; which his superior speed enabled him to do although on an outer circle. This forced Roshdestvensky to keep on turning till he was heading southward in the opposite direction to Vladivostok altogether. A quarter of an hour later the Russian Commander-in-Chief was struck down unconscious with a fractured skull, and the command devolved upon Nebogatoff, far to the rear in the third division; Felkersham, the original second in command, having died at sea two days before the battle. Very soon afterwards the Souvarojf received a shell in the steering-gear and hauled out of the line unmanageable, and shortly after that again the Oslyahya, shattered by the crushing fire of the Japanese second division, was sunk fighting to the last and taking 500 of her crew with her. Togo had scored a second and very important point by forcing a change of command on his adversaries in the height of action during a critical bit of manoeuvring, and disabling the vessel whose officers alone knew the former Chief's intentions at the moment and could have given a lead. In his despatches he stated that the battle was practically won in the initial stage, which certainly seems to have been the case. It was now nearly three o'clock and the action had lasted for an hour. From that time onward it became one of the most confusing and complicated engagements ever fought on the sea at continuous full speed, in which the movements were so intricate that to attempt to follow them in detail in a general account is merely tedious. A full description of the events of the four hours intervening before nightfall can indeed never be given, for few of the Russians participating therein survived, and so many of their ships caught fire that the 276 WAR WITH RUSSIA surface of the water was covered with a pall of smoke to leeward, spreading for miles, which, in conjunction with the misty weather, occasionally made it impossible for their antagonists to discern their movements at all. It may suffice to say, therefore, that when the Russian flagship fell out, the lead was taken by her next astern, the battleship AUocander III.; and the Russian fleet, in a ragged line, turned and twisted to almost every point of the compass in desperate endeavours to shake off Togo's tenacious pursuit, while the Japanese followed every movement as they discerned it and sooner or later frustrated its intention. Twice the contending forces lost touch in smoke and haze for a full half-hour and firing ceased, only to burst out again with the utmost fury directly the misty outlines of the enemy's vessels reappeared. At other times disabled ships were sud- denly encountered, including the Souvaroff, and smothered in an inferno of Japanese shells; for the turnings and doublings of the Russians often took them backwards and forwards through the same area. For the greater part of this period the two Japanese armoured divisions moved independently, the first under Togo himself and the second under Kamimura, and hunted their opponents through all this welter of obscurity and destruction from one to the other, but kept their own order to perfection. Twice the Russians were driven south, twice east, and once west, but never ceased making strenuous efforts to turn north towards Vladivostok — only one day's steaming distant — and always their enemies headed them off. The Japanese, although engaging every vessel that might be visible, endeavoured as far as possible to concentrate their fire on the powerful Russian battleships in the van; and thus, after the Souvaroff and Oslyabya were disposed of, the Alexander III. and Borodino came in for special attention. Towards evening the Alexander was a mass of flames and leaking all along the water-line. Through enormous holes in her sides spectators in other ships could see an interior like a red-hot furnace. Yet a hand- ful of heroes fought on in the fore-turret with the only FATE OF RUSSIAN SHIPS 277 serviceable guns left, till she took a plunge at last and went to the bottom with 840 officers and men, of whom only 4 were saved. For a brief period the Borodino succeeded to the lead, and then a Japanese shell arrived in one of her magazines and blew her up with another 840 souls, of whom only 1 survived. The next Russian loss was the Souvaroff, which occurred at some distance from the main fighting at the time. After disablement this vessel drifted helplessly for hours while the tide ot battle sometimes drew near and sometimes receded; and as her colours remained flying, whenever a Japanese division dashed by every vessel gave her a passing broad- side, till she became a riddled wreck with all her thirty odd guns rendered unserviceable except one small 12-pounder. The unconscious Commander-in-Chief had been removed with great difficulty to an attendant Russian destroyer during a lull, but the other officers and men remained and must have suffered appallingly before the end, although details on that point can never be known. Sighting her helpless condition late in the day, some Japanese cruisers and destroyers moving about in a special lookout for disabled ships approached and summoned her to surrender, but were answered by fire from her one serviceable gun, and compelled in conse- quence to give her the coup de grace. Two torpedoes striking amidships sunk her in a few minutes with 900 ranks and ratings, and the last thing to disappear was the Russian ensign on the stump of a mast. Thus before nightfall four of the five most powerful ships in the Russian fleet were at the bottom of the Straits of Tsushima, and of this class only the Orel remained. Her comparative immunity was due to chance. Bad handling in forming single line from two columns just before the battle began had caused a slight overlap between the first and second divisions, and thus the Orel, instead of being ahead of the Oslyabya, had been abreast of her on the far side from the enemy when the Japanese first attacked. This sheltered her during the fierce fighting of the initial stage, in which the latter 278 WAR WITH RUSSIA vessel was sunk, and as the Orel never succeeded to the lead she escaped the concentrated weight of fire which fell on her sister ships later in the day. The second-rate vessels in the centre of the line had also escaped actual destruction so far, although more or less severely injured, for in the obscurity of the afternoon's conflict the Japanese had fired on any ships in sight at the time when the leaders were not visible. When darkness came down on the scene the Russian remnant were struggling on under Nebogatoff in the old battleship Nicholas II., and Togo, finding good practice no longer possible in the failing light, drew out of action, and disappeared from the enemy to the north-eastward in the direction of Vladivostok. Thus for the second time in this war the big ship with the gun retired from the stage in favour of the little ship with the torpedo till the sun should appear again. Togo's move had the double object of leaving a clear field for his torpedo craft during the night, and getting ahead of NebogatofE to renew the battle if necessary next day. It also gave the tired Japanese armoured divisions a chance to lick their wounds; in other words, to repair damage, attend to casualties, ease the machinery, and pass a quiet night. But for the Russians there was to be no such respite. When the blows of the Japanese armoured ships ceased to fall NebogatoS did indeed get a chance at last to shape course for Vladivostok, but only to suffer another form of persecution. Four of the eight remaining Russian armoured vessels were in no condition for fast steaming, and soon after dark the remnant of the Russian fleet began to break up. These four gradually dropped astern, and the surviving light cruisers and auxiUaries of the original Russian rear — which had become separated from the main force during the day under the attack of the Japanese light cruisers — lost touch at nightfall altogether, and steamed away under cover of darkness to seek refuge in neutral ports. The wind had gone down towards evening, leaving favourable weather con- ditions for even the smaller torpedo craft, of which they NIGHT FIGHTING 279 took full advantage. Before sunset fifty- eight Japanese destroyers and torpedo-boats were steaming parallel to the Russians, safely out of range, but only waiting for darkness to begin their attacks, and making it obvious to the weary and dispirited enemy that a desperate night's work still lay before them. Nebogatoff's own flagship, with the Orel, and the coast-defence vessels Apraxin and Senyavin, drew away from their more seriously damaged consorts, and although attacked during the course of the night by destroyers that had gone ahead to cut them off, suffered no loss, partly on account of their speed and partly because they were showing no lights. Their end, therefore, was postponed till next morning, when it took the form of surrender. The vessels that could not keep up, however, were doomed to meet their fate by the torpedo. As they lagged and separated the flotillas closed in and began by attacking the armoured cruiser Nakhimoff, which in spite of a fine defence was torpedoed and left in a com- pletely helpless and semi-submerged condition; but remained afloat till the morning, and was then sunk by her own men to avoid being taken a prize by some approaching Japanese cruisers, although they themselves were picked up. The Japanese threatened to leave them to their fate if they persisted in sinking their vessel — and with perfect justice — but humanity prevailed over an insistence on belligerent rights and their threat was not executed. Herein it must be admitted that the Japanese displayed more forbearance than many Euro- peans would have done. After dealing with the Nakhimoff the destroyers continued their sweep and found the Navarin, the most powerful of the older battle- ships, which they eventually sank after a gallant resist- ance at midnight with 650 officers and men. Two hours later they discovered the Sissoi Veliki, and she also was torpedoed, but did not sink till daylight, after two Japanese cruisers had tried to take her in tow as a prize. Most of her crew were, however, rescued. The fourth of the lagging cripples was the Ushakoff, which escaped 280 WAR WITH RUSSIA discovery in the darkness only to meet her fate later. Thus the tide of Japanese success flowed unchecked by night as by day, and did not cease when day appeared once more. But the night attacks cost them the loss of three torpedo-boats and the temporary disablement of seven more, with heavy casualties to their crews. When Togo ceased firing with his main force soon after sunset, he called off all the scattered cruiser divisions at the same time by wireless signal, so as to leave no vessel of the larger classes to interfere with the torpedo craft, and ordered a general rendezvous next morning at Matsushima Island, lying about 200 miles to the north- ward almost on the direct route to Vladivostok. Thence he intended to spread an intercepting line to catch any surviving Russian vessels still trying to push on, and the general movement towards the rendezvous from the neighbourhood of the daylight action filled the intervening area during the night with detached squadrons and ships from the light-cruiser divisions and destroyer flotillas making their way north over wide intervals. This north- ward stream went on all night and far into the next day, and Nebogatoff steered right into the trap prepared for him with the four ships remaining in his company. In shaping course straight for his port of refuge instead of making a wide detour under cover of darkness he committed a fatal strategic error, for he merely followed in Togo's wake in the most convenient way to facilitate the operations of the Japanese Admiral, as he might have foreseen. For the first hour of daylight on the following morning he remained undiscovered by the enemy, but at five o'clock one of the light-cruiser division making for the general rendezvous hove in sight to the westward and reported his position at once to the main fleet about fifty miles ahead. This sealed his fate, and within three hours the Japanese armoured divisions appeared on the horizon right ahead in overwhelming force standing straight towards him. Soon afterwards the rapidly approaching battleships opened fire, where- upon the Russians turned away, and striking their colours RUSSIAN DEBACLE 281 stopped engines and awaited their captors. Ceasing fire at once, the Japanese closed round, and spent several hours in the somewhat lengthy process of putting prize crews on board and taking charge, which was rendered difficult by the scarcity of undamaged boats left available after the fight of the day before. In this operation they were still employed in the afternoon when the last of the Russian armoured ships, the Ushakoff, appeared in the distance approaching from the southward. This vessel had suffered a good deal in the battle on the previous day, but escaped attack by night as already observed, and chanced to be so far in rear of the general Japanese movement to the northward that she neither saw nor was seen by any enemy vessel till she came in view of the main fleet, after her officers had congratulated themselves on their supposed safety. The Japanese summoned her to surrender by signal, but her captain refused and tried to escape. Two Japanese armoured cruisers then went after her like unleashed greyhounds, and a hot fight ended her career, in which her captain, finding escape or resistance impossible, gave orders to open the valves to let her sink, going down with her himself, although most of her crew were saved. Thus within a little more than thirty-six hours from the moment when a small group of officers on the bridge of the Shinano Maru had first discerned the outlines of the Russian fleet through the drizzle of a stormy dawn not a single armoured ship in that fleet remained to fight for her country, and eight of the twelve were no longer above the surface of the ocean. Nor were these the only events of importance during the aftermath of the great battle. Seven of the eight Russian destroyers which survived endeavoured to make for Vladivostok during the night, but all were sighted and chased by the Japanese torpedo craft next day, and only two escaped. Four were sunk in the attempt, and one, on being nearly caught up by her pursuers towards evening, stopped her engines and struck her colours without offering any resistance, much to their surprise. 20 282 WAR WITH RUSSIA On approaching to take possession they discovered the reason. Several officers of higher ranks than are usually seen in destroyers were observed on deck round a recum- bent figure, and on sending a boat on board, the Japanese made the sensational discovery that they had captured the Russian Commander-in-Chief, crippled in body and broken in mind. The destroyer that had originally removed him ft-om his disabled flagship had sustained such damage later that he was transferred to another, which was making her utmost efforts to get away, but when escape was no longer possible surrendered to save his life. As regards the fate of the eight Russian light cruisers engaged during the battle in protecting the auxiliaries in rear of the main fleet from the enemy's same class of vessel, these had become so much scattered before evening that only three remained in line under the Russian cruiser Admiral Enquist, who made many efforts after dark to press on towards Vladivostok, but was so repeatedly though unsuccessfully attacked by torpedo flotillas that he lost all hope of getting there, and turned southward towards the Philippines, where his three ships were interned by the United States authorities on their arrival at Manila a few days later. Another light cruiser was torpedoed and disabled, being sunk by her own crew next morning to avoid capture. The remaining four evaded night attack, but two were sighted and engaged by the Japanese ,cruisers next day, and finding escape impossible were also sunk by their own men after offering a stubborn defence for a long time. The other two escaped the Japanese attention altogether by virtue of very high speed, but one ran ashore in a dense fog next morning and was wrecked. Seven of the eight were therefore eliminated in one way or the other, and only a solitary survivor reached the destination for which all Roshdestvensky's fleet had originally been steering forty-eight hours before. This vessel conveyed the terrible news to the Russian Government. This great battle stands unique in the whole history of war on land or sea in one respect. Of the Russian COMPLETENESS OP DEFEAT 283 officers and men, 4,830 lost their lives, but of the Japanese only 110. Thus the proportion of killed on the two sides was 44 to 1, a figure which has never been approached in the slightest degree in any of the decisive encounters of the whole world where the fight opened with no over- whelming advantage in numbers, position, or weapons on either side. In regard to losses in ships no great naval victory has ever led to a more complete annihila- tion of the enemy in so short a time unless we go back to very ancient history. Only two French ships of the line escaped at the Battle of the Nile, which Mahan, in writing before the Russo-Japanese conflict, had described as the "most complete of naval victories"; but at Tsushima every vessel in the main Russian line without exception was either destroyed or captured, while of the lighter craft every cruiser but one was lost to her country either permanently or till the end of the war, and every destroyer except two. The auxiliaries suffered in the same degree. And an analysis of the methods whereby the three armoured divisions forming the main Russian force met their ends respectively is extremely illustrative of the systematic completeness of the Japanese work. Togo had planned to begin to fight by day in the Straits, and to follow this up all night by destroyer attacks while his capital ships went on ahead under cover of darkness towards Vladivostok for a resumption of the battle next day; and thanks to an excellent organization and a complete understanding with his divisional flag officers, all this was carried out just as he intended. It may be admitted that Roshdestvensky and Nebogatoff both played into his hands, the first by passing through the Straits by day owing to apprehension of torpedo craft; and the second by adhering to the direct Vladi- vostok route on the night of the 27th. But that should not lessen the admiration evoked by the remarkable success of the whole scheme and the precise adherence to programme in its execution. The Russian armoured ships were organized in three divisions, forming, however, only one line, as already observed, with the best ships 284 WAR WITH RUSSIA in the van, the second-rates in the centre, and the third in the rear. All ships in the van division were destroyed by gunfire on the first day except the Orel — for the Souvaroff was practically disposed of before being actually sunk by torpedo; all in the centre division were sunk by torpedo during the night except the Oslyahya — already sunk by gunfire ; and all in the rear division were captured or sunk on the second day in trying to reach Vladivostok. The Orel escaped destruction with her consorts of the van division on the first day for reasons already given, but fell a prize on the morrow. The immediate results of the victory were most far- reaching. In Russia the news caused the deepest depres- sion, and all hopes of ultimately winning the war vanished. On land the situation had arrived at something in the nature of a deadlock, promising no decisive outcome either way in spite of the Russian reverse at Mukden, for the Japanese had reached the limit of their capacity in men and money, and could not hope to drive the enemy back any farther. The Russians, on the other hand, although far from the end of their resources in troops, were unable to send any more to the war, because their one line of railway could only with the utmost difficulty feed those already at the front. Thus although strong enough to hold their ground they were unable to advance. As neither side could take the offensive on land, nothing but a decisive defeat of the Japanese on the sea could alter the situation, and this the Russians had signally failed to achieve. The conditions after Tsushima, there- fore, were singularly favourable for foreign mediation, and President Roosevelt took the opportunity to offer his services. At his invitation, after some preliminary discussions in June, a conference of representatives assembled in the United States which arrived at an agreement signed on September 5, 1905, bringing the war to an end. By the terms of peace Russia expressly recognized that Japanese interests were permanent in Korea from the military, political, and economic stand- points, which had been the special contention of the SPECIAL FEATURES 285 victors from the first. The lease of the Liao-tung peninsula with Port Arthur obtained by Russia from the Chinese was also transferred to Japan ; together with the southern half of the island of Saghalin which the Japanese had occupied in July. No indemnity was paid, but the Russian ships lying half submerged in Port Arthur were raised and added to the Japanese fleet. Some were returned to Russia in 1915 when Russians and Japanese were both fighting against Germany. Lastly, the Russian evacuation of Manchuria, forced by defeat in the field, was rendered permanent. Japan had therefore attained all the objects for which she entered the war. In its maritime aspects the great trial of strength thus brought to a conclusion presented several features invest- ing it with an interest peculiarly its own. In the first place, no war of importance in which the territories of the belligerents were entirely separated by the sea, and on which both were strong, was ever confined in all its branches of naval activity to so limited an area in the actual fighting. In the British struggles with France, Holland, and Spain from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, actions on a large or small scale were fought in most of the seas of the globe, although the central and decisive events occurred near the coasts of Europe. But the strife between the ships of Russia and Japan was intensely localized, and neither Navy established a world- wide command of the sea over the other; for it was just as dangerous for a Japanese steamer to appear in Euro- pean waters to the very end as it was for a Russian to be seen east of Singapore. Neither antagonist owned a sufficient volume of sea-borne trade to be worth special attention; and except for the raids of the Vladivostok cruisers, neither resorted to a giierre de course in con- sequence. Nor did the flag of either fly over distant and isolated possessions inviting attack and giving rise to excentric operations, such as those waged simul- taneously between Rodney and De Grasse in the West Indies, and Suffren and Hughes in the Bay of Bengal. From first to last the whole efforts of the contending 286 WAR WITH RUSSIA admirals were directed towards measures for destroying each other's fleets in order to dominate the small area of water Ijang between Japan and the Asiatic Continent. The second point which distinguished the war from all others waged between civilized States lay in the fact, of which mention has already been made, that the numerically inferior Navy had no option but to a/ct on the offensive throughout, even though it possessed no means of replacing lost vessels. That the Japanese should have faced the test involved in such conditions rather than submit to interference in regions where their national honour and interests were at stake, suffices in itself to stamp them as a remarkable people even if they had never done anything else. And their triumphant emergence from this severest of trials proves their posses- sion of a natural aptitude for scientific warfare of the highest order. Apart from the general strategy, which was simple, the tactical and technical features of the operations are specially interesting, because this was the first war of importance waged after the invention of the Whitehead torpedo, and the last before the invention of the submarine. For centuries before its outbreak the gun alone had counted as the only naval weapon of any real importance. Hence arose the "capital ship," using that term in its generally accepted sense as denoting the vessel in which the maximum tonnage enables the greatest number of guns of heavy calibre to be carried, whether she was the three-decker of the wooden era, or the steel successor of a later period with a 12-inch armament and a proportionate thickness of protective plating against the gunfire of an enemy. But in the latter half of the nineteenth century certain forms of under-water attack were invented, to meet which the gun had little power to act effectively, and opposed to these the capital ship was unable to take care of herself. In the Napoleonic wars the ship-of-the-line feared nothing afloat by day or night, and even as late as 1855 she lay close off a first- class hostile base such as Sevastopol with perfect im- punity. But fifty years later a time had come when she UNIQUE CONDITIONS 287 feared the attack of destroyers very much indeed after dark, and left the latter in virtual command of the sea near their base — at least, during the night. Togo never ventured in the vicinity of Port Arthur with his battle- squadron when the sun was below the horizon. And even in the daytime the capital ship was not always safe, for the only two lost by Japan in the whole war were sunk as a result of the secret operations of a small mine-layer costing not a tenth part of the value of either. Thus, when the Russo-Japanese War broke out the undisputed supremacy of the gun was seriously challenged for the first time by the torpedo and the mine, and with no small degree of success. Ten years later the introduction of the submarine made the sea as unsafe for the capital ship by day as the surface torpedo craft had already made it by night. Having ceased to be able to take care of herself in war, she never now leaves her base unless protected by a cloud of destroyers, and never approaches an enemy's harbour except at her peril. Thus the Russo-Japanese War afEorded a practical demonstration of the first step in the degradation of the type of vessel representing the extreme embodiment of the power of the gun, coming as it did at the intermediate stage between the long era when she reigned without a rival on the sea, and her situation at the present day, when her movements are always conditioned and influenced by dangers which her own powers can do little to avert, although these forms of menace are as yet in the infancy of their development. For these reasons this great conflict must always retain a special historical interest of its own as the only war of consequence fought under such conditions. CONCLUSION With the termination of hostilities all in their favour the Japanese had emerged from a form of ordeal usually recognized as entitling a people to a place among the Great Powers of the world — that is to say, a successful struggle to a finish with one of these Powers themselves. The events of the years 1904 and 1905 had falsified the predictions of the numerous prophets — naval, military, and political — who foretold that Russia would throw Japan in the dust, should the latter ever be rash enough to provoke a trial of arms with an adversary held by Europe in a respect amounting to awe. And as this result was quite unexpected by the Governments of other countries, the diplomats of the world had to adjust their policy somewhat extensively to meet the new conditions. Thus in Berlin, where Russia had been supported in her anti- Japanese policy as long as Japan was not strong enough to oppose it, a visiting Japanese prince was ostentatiously welcomed when the news of Tsushima was received. In Great Britain alone among the first-class Powers of Europe no reversal of attitude was required, and the foresight of the British Foreign Office four years previously in entering into alhance with Japan while yet but a minor Power received its due. Nor did the British Cabinet wait till the war was at an end to cement and emphasize this policy of friendship, for in 1905, while hostilities were still in progress, the original Alliance was revised and extended by mutual agreement. The main point of difference between the old and new treaties lay in the second article of the latter, which provided that if either of the contracting parties was involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests in Eastern Asia the'other would come 288 NEW FORM OF ALLIANCE 289 to its assistance, although this arrangement was not to take effect until the war then actually running its course had terminated. By the first Alliance neither party had been obliged to ofEer active assistance to the other unless the other was attacked by two or more enemies, and thus Japan had to fight Russia unsupported, although in the knowledge that Russia also could look for no allies. But by the second Alliance each was pledged to render help if the other was attacked at all. This ensured to Japan that any Power except Russia thereafter intending to threaten her position must first get past the British Fleet; and although Russia did not have to cross the sea to menace Japanese interests, she could only adopt an aggressive attitude in the future with the knowledge that Japan would fight a second time under no repetition of her former anxiety in regard to her lines of communication. To Great Britain the second Alliance ensured the continued eflfective protection of her commercial interests in the Far East, and obtained the support of the greatest military Power in the Eastern Hemisphere for her situa- tion in India. Thus when the new terms were made public in August, 1905, the whole world knew that no aggressive policy would be possible in Eastern Asia without encountering the active opposition of two maritime Powers, one of which possessed the largest fleet in existence, and the other the most experienced in all that related to modem warfare on the sea. On this substantial foundation the external peace of that portion of the globe has rested securely ever since. Ambitious schemes of spoliation at the expense of China came perforce to an end, and the long-existing scramble for territorial and commercial concessions ceased at the same time, never to be revived to this day in spite of the constant weakness of that country from internal discord. In 1910, fifteen years after the release of Korea from the hampering domination of Pekin by the results of the Chino-Japanese War, Japan proclaimed an annexa- tion of that incurably retrograde land. During the 290 CONCLUSION interval the Koreans had proved themselves to be quite incapable of setting up any stable form of government of their own. Chaos reigned on all sides, security for life and property was non-existent, and economic con- ditions had gone from bad to worse. No advice from outside sources received attention, and no prospects of any improvement in the situation appeared. All this was most inimical to the interests of Japan, which Great Britain and Russia had expressly recognized as politically, militarily, and economically " paramount " in Korea. Japan, in fact, found herself in circumstances similar to those of other progressive and civilized countries, whose position has suffered by the existence of some hopelessly inefficient rule in a minor State where their subjects have interests. In such eases the time usually arises sooner or later when intervention becomes unavoidable, and an end has to be made of an impossible situation by turning out the incompetents and substituting just and efficient administrators, as Great Britain did in Egypt in 1882, and the United States in Cuba in 1898. After fifteen years of abstention from interference in which the Koreans were given every chance to mend their ways, Japan did the same, and as no alternative form of govern- ment was possible in Korea except her own, that land was added to the dominions under the Japanese Crown. Action of this kind by a stronger Power towards a weaker invariably raises protests in some irresponsible quarter, as Great Britain found in regard to Egypt and the United States in the Spanish colonies, and Japan has not escaped the usual criticism levelled by unofficial sympathizers in all such cases. But no protest was raised by any civilized Government, all of which had long foreseen the step as inevitable, and recognized that had they been in the position of the Japanese authorities themselves the voices of their own subjects would sooner or later have forced them to take similar measures. The change in Korea was very soon apparent. Life and property became secure under a strong administration, commerce and finances regained a stable and prosperous condition, SITUATION OF JAPAN 291 agriculture revived, and a civilized rule replaced a barbarous and brutal anarchy. In 1911 the Japanese Alliance with Great Britain was revised for a second time to bring it up to date in regard to the then existing international situation, and to introduce a clause providing that if either of the con- tracting parties should conclude a general treaty of arbitration with some third Power, nothing in the terms of the Alliance should compel it to go to war with that third Power in support of its ally. This provision, how- ever, has never yet assumed proportions of much con- sequence, since no such general treaty of arbitration has been concluded by either contracting party to the Alliance as yet. But this second revision of the standing agree- ment ■jnth Great Britain was the latest step taken by Japan towards the consolidation of her international position, especially on the sea, and with its mention the purely historical treatment of our subject comes to an end. Before concluding, it may perhaps be permissible to make some reference to the outlook for the future. Japan stands now wellnigh impregnable to direct attack, as a result of great natural advantages of position combined with success in war and wisdom in diplomacy. Sur- rounded by the Pacific Ocean, which has once again become her great guarantee of safety because she has learnt how to use it as a line of defence; separated by 10,000 miles of water from Europe and nearly 5,000 from America; and having no great military neighbour near at hand since the break-up of the Russian Empire, her situation is such that no Power in the world can seriously threaten her in her own regions in the near future at least. For any attack on Japan as matters now stand the enemy must be in possession of a fleet about three times as powerful as that of the defence, because no other country has a fully-equipped modem naval base and arsenal in the Eastern Pacific capable of docking two or three of the largest battleships simul- taneously; or of removing guns 100 tons in weight; or 292 CONCLUSION of manufacturing wholesale supplies of heavy-calibre ammunition; or, lastly, of storing the millions of tons of oil-fuel required by a twentieth-century fleet in war. Without such a base in easy reach a large proportion of the attacking fleet — probably a third — must constantly be at some distance from the theatre of operations; while the force actually on the spot must always be twice as strong as the defence if any effective watch or blockade is to be possible. No Power exists at present in a position to undertake such a task. The one poten- tially vulnerable section in the Japanese strategic position is her Korean land frontier, which, like the British frontier in India, requires defence by an army dependent on sea communications and cannot be held by sea-power alone. But until that joint in her harness is threatened by a first-class military Power firmly established in Asia, and independent of the sea for keeping its army in the field — such as Russia was in 1904 — its security cannot be seriously disturbed. As matters stand at present, therefore, Japan is practi- cally safe against aggression while she maintains an efficient fleet. And although she will certainly offer a determined opposition to any policy injurious to her vital interests, her own policy is not based in aggressive intentions towards others; for even if the Japanese were inclined to indulge in dreams of conquest such as in- flamed the German mind prior to 1914, they are quite sane enough to realize the madness of attempting to attack any civilized State in Europe or America. For these reasons peace may be regarded as well established and likely to endure between Japan and all civihzed Powers, for no war can take place if neither side assumes the offensive. It is true that a certain class of alarmists, with little knowledge of naval affairs but a rich endow- ment of nervous imagination, persist in regarding a con- flict between Japan and the United States as one of the probabilities of the not very remote future. But surely such a view is not very complimentary to the intelligence and self-control of two great peoples. Theodore Roosevelt RACIAL DIFFICULTY 293 never agreed with it, and no man was ever in a better position to judge or more ambitious for the good of his own country. Causes of friction may undoubtedly exist, but none lying beyond hope of settlement if reasonable forbearance is exercised on both sides. A section of Japanese public opinion is aggrieved because their countrymen receive different treatment as regards resi- dence in the United States to Europeans, and claim an equality on the grounds that Japan is a member of the League of Nations. At first sight this resentment may seem natural, but they should study history, which will teach them that the roots of this matter lie far deeper than in the nicely balanced theories of international lawyers. Racial differences are inborn and constitute a factor in human affairs that cannot be abolished by speech-making round a conference table at Geneva. To ignore their existence is to depart from practical politics in settling international relations. It is not a question of the superiority or inferiority of this people or that, but simply a question of fundamental difference of mentality and social instincts. The Japanese need fear comparison with no race in the world as a nation of virile, courageous, and high-minded men, exercising a greater influence on human progress in their own quarter of the globe than anyone else. In their patience, industry, and indifference to enervating material comfort, their stan- dards are above those of most other lands. But four- fifths of the population of the United States are of pure European extraction, and history makes it abundantly clear that Europeans and Asiatics are so constituted that they can never inhabit the same country in peace unless one or other occupies the position of an inferior race. Even when Europeans of different racial origin, such as Teutons and Slavs, are living in the same area in large numbers, the political conditions are nearly always unstable. These plain lessons should make it clear to anyone that a wholesale Japanese emigration to the United States would be as bad for Japan as for America, involving the Governments of both countries in constant 294 CONCLUSION anxiety, unless the emigrants frankly accepted a subject position such as that of the Greeks and Armenians under Turkish rule, or the negroes of the Southern States of the Union — which Japanese self-respect would never allow. The same applies to Australia. The vast empti- ness of that portion of the British Empire is one of the most regrettable and disappointing features of our time, but British enterprise hoisted the Union Jack in southern latitudes at a period when the Japanese were declining to move a step beyond their own shores, and the small population which does inhabit Australia's southern fringe are Europeans, who could not exist in harmony in the same country with any people of non-European origin. But this racial exclusiveness must be recognized as holding good in both directions if the world is to remain at peace. Political practices of the Monroe doctrine type, although based entirely on self-interest, cannot without a violation of the most elementary principles of morality and justice refuse to other countries the advan- tages which they insist on for their own. If Europe, America, and Australia are all reserved for the interests of populations of European origin, then the interests of Japan must in common equity be allowed to prevail in Eastern Asia, which is their own quarter of the earth's surface. If the Japanese were a hopelessly retrograde and incapable people, obstructing the spread of civiliza- tion, it might be otherwise, but they are not. Japan will doubtless exercise in the course of time a beneficial influence on the coasts of the North-West Pacific, com- parable to that exercised by Great Britain in India and France in North Africa, and she has every reason to claim that her political, military, and economic interests, which have already been expressly recognized by Great Britain and Russia as paramount in Korea, should be recognized by all States as paramount throughout the Far East. Forbearance must be exercised in that direc- tion if peace is to be maintained; and should commercial temptations prompt any other country to thwart Japanese aspirations in areas where the Japanese are more vitally PACIFIC WARS IMPROBABLE 295 concerned than anyone else, the sympathy of every right-minded man should lie with Japan. Under such provocation the Japanese could not be expected to submit without forcible protest, nor would they be deserving of respect if they did. And the aggressor will be faced with a most formidable task if he persists in enforcing his policy. Apart from the great distances separating Japan from other continents — which exercise a potent influence in keeping the peace in themselves — the natural geography of the North-West Pacific confers important strategic advantages on Japanese defensive requirements. The chain of islands forming the Empire covers the sea approaches to Eastern Asia from Vladivostok to Shanghai in a manner somewhat corresponding to that in which Great Britain covers the sea approaches to North- Western Europe, and no military or naval expedition can get past this natural barrier if Japan offers resistance, unless with great risk and difficulty. It was this advantage of position that enabled Togo to make fairly certain of intercepting the Russian fleet before it reached its destination. These considerations would seem to point inevitably to the conclusion that the North Pacific is not likely to carry the rumble of heavy gunfire in our time if self- control and reasoned sense prevail among the leading Powers of the world. Moderation, restraint, and poli- tical sagacity enabled the elder statesmen of Japan to lead their country in the early steps of its progress from a position of no importance to a place in the front rank. It may sincerely be hoped that their successors in the years to come will remember that excellent example. And if the responsible directors of foreign policy in any other land are tempted to interfere unreasonably with Japanese predominance in Eastern Asia, they will do well to recall the fact that it was the uncompromising insistence of St. Petersburg on the pursuit of a course detrimental to Japanese interests in those regions that ended in sweeping the Russian flag from the Eastern seas and Manchuria, and pulling it down from the ramparts of 296 CONCLUSION Port Arthur, although not until Japan had exhausted every effort of diplomacy in trying to meet Russia half- way. If the day should come, nevertheless, when diplomacy fails again to settle some question in which Japan considers herself vitally concerned, then the influence of the sea on her history will once more play an all-important part. At present Japanese naval policy relies on the very largest form of battleship as the instrument of sea-power, but it is at least an open question as to whether the greater part of the money thus spent would not be better invested in the form of submarines, for Japanese waters are particularly well suited to the operations of that type of vessel on account of their great depth, which precludes the possibility of sub- marines being " mined in " as they were in the North Sea. With a couple of hundred of these craft as a defence no foreign battle-squadron would ever be likely to approach her coasts or attempt to enter the Yellow Sea. But whether the battleship or the submarine is the implement in use, it is on the men who handle it that everything depends in the end, and in the human element of security the Japanese are well provided. Nobody is likely to controvert the warning issued by the Russian Commander-in-Chief to his men before sailing to meet them in battle, that "the loyalty of the Japanese to their throne and country is unbounded. They do not suffer dishonour and they die like heroes." Japan lies in the Pacific Ocean, which earned its ng,me from its comparative freedom from the war of the ele- ments, and if reason prevails in politics may earn it in a double sense by its freedom from the wars of mankind. But if civilization fails once again to keep men from wholesale massacres of each other, then that great expanse of blue water may become the highway to one of the most sanguinary racial conflicts that ever convulsed the world, from which the victor is likely to emerge in little better condition than the vanquished to whichever side the fortune of war may ultimately incline. APPENDIX I In the lists given in the appendices only the vessels which were competent to undertake war duties on the high seas appear. No local defence flotillas or river gunboats are included, as none of these played any appreciable part in the main events of the wars of Japan. In compiling these lists the elaborate and diffuse classification of old lists has been reduced and simplified, in order to facilitate an understanding of the actual war values of the contending fleets by readers who are not conversant with the terms formerly applied to distinguish many older types of vessels. Designations which are no longer in use, such as first-, second-, or third-class cruiser, gun-vessel, torpedo gunboat, etc., have been omitted, and the ships are grouped in accordance with their nearest approach to the more precise differentiation of the period of the Great War. Thus all unarmoured vessels which are above 2,000 tons displacement have been classed as light cruisers, and all below that tonnage as sloops, unless the torpedo armament has been the most important part of their offensive equipment, in which case they have been included in the category of torpedo craft. Thus, for example, the so-called " torpedo gimboats " of the Russian Navy — which carried no armament worthy of mention — ^have been classed as destroyers, to which type of vessel they most nearly correspond in size, equipment, and war value. Similarly the small but very heavily armed Elswick vessels of the Chaoyang class, which were so different in design from all other ships of their date that they stood in a class by themselves, have been included here among the sloops, on account of their tonnage, their lack of protection, and their slow rate of fire, which, in spite of the great calibre of their two heavy guns, prevented them from being a match for the lighter quick- firing armaments of the enemy's cruisers. No vessels have been included in the " armoured " cate- gories except those which possessed not only a belt and a 297 21 298 APPEKDIX I certain degree at least of protection to their guns, but an armament of sufficient weight to qualify them to engage any ships of the enemy with at least a possibility of success. In the old lists the sole qualification for inclusion in the armoured groups was the possession of a belt, which produced many anomalies of a most misleading description in an assessment of war value. For example, the Ghiyoda was classed as an armoured vessel by virtue of a 5-inch belt, although her offensive equipment was merely a few unprotected gims of the lightest calibre, whereas her consorts of the Matsushima type were classed as unarmoured, because, although they carried the heaviest guns then afloat in well-armoured bar- bettes, they had no belts. Similarly the Vladimir and Dmitri are included among the armoured vessels in the old lists of the Russian Navy, although their armaments were so light that they were never used in armoured divisions in war. All such vessels, therefore, have been classified as light cruisers, which is the type most nearly representing their true belUgerent qualification. The smaller Chinese armoured vessels in 1894 were some- times classed in the old lists as battleships, sometimes as coast-defence ships, and sometimes as first-class cruisers. The term " armoured cruiser " had not at that time come into use at all, but as it more correctly describes their character relatively to the other units of a fleet than any other, it has been adopted here. No wooden vessel has been included in the "modem" groupings which was more than fifteen years old at the time. In the lists of obsolete but stiU serviceable ships nothing has been included with a speed of less than ten knots. In regard to speed in general, the figures given are based on an estimate of a reduction for age, and represent not necessarily the trial speeds, but the reasonably attainable speeds at the time. In the details of armaments all calibres have been given in inches for the sake of simplicity, to which the measurements of Russian and other guns in centimetres have been reduced, not to a precise decimal, but to the nearest corresponding calibres in the British service of recent years. This gives the most convenient standard of comparison for British readers, in which the very minor inaccuracy of one or two decimals of an inch is not of any consequence. DETAILS OF SHIPS 299 SEA-GOmG FLEET OF JAPAN AT OUTBREAK OF WAR IN 1894 Modern Light Cruisers (8) • Name. Armament. Tonnage. Knots. Akttsushima . 4 e-inch, 6 4-7-iiich 3,150 19 Chiyoda . . . 10 4-7-inch 2,450 19 Hashidatb . 1 12-5-iiich, 11 4-7-mch 4,270 17 Itsukttshima . 1 12-5-inch, 11 4-7-inch 4,270 17 Matsushima . 1 12-5-ineh, 11 4-7-inch 4,270 17 Naniwa .. . 2 10-inch, 6 6-inch 3,650 17 Takachito . 2 10-inch, 6 6-inch 3,650 17 YOSHINO .. . 4 6-inch, 8 4-7-inch Modern Sloops (12). 4,150 23 Name. Armament. Tonnage. Knots Akagi . 4 6-inch 615 12 Atago . 1 8-inch, 1 4-7-inch 615 12 Katstjraki . 2 7-inch, 6 4-7-inch 1,470 12 Maya . 4 6-inch 615 12 MUSHASI . . . 2 7-inch, 5 4-7-inch 1,470 12 OSHIMA . . . 4 4-7-inch 640 14 Takao .. . 4 6-inch 1,760 15 Tsukushi . 2 10-inch, 4 4-7-inch 1,500 15 Tatsuta . . . 2 4-7-inch 875 21 TSOKAI . . . 1 8-inch, 1 4-7-inch 615 12 Yaeyama . 3 4-7-inch 1,600 20 Yamato .. . 2 7-inch, 5 4-7-inch 1,470 12 Modern Torpedo Craft (21). Number and Class. Gun Armament. Tonnage. Knots. 1 torpedo-boat . . 4 machine-guns 20 torpedo-boats 2 machine-guns 190 (60 J to i90 19 20 to 23 Obsolete Vessels fit for Minor War Duties (4). Number and Class. Gun Armament. (3 7-inch, 6 6-inch 3 battleships .. \ to (4 10-inch, 2 7-inch 1 sloop . . . . 1 6-inch, 4 4-7-inch Tonnage. Knots. 2,200 1 to \ 10 3,720 J 900 10 300 APPENDIX I SEA-GOING FLEET OF CHINA AT OUTBREAK OF WAR IN 1894. Modern Battleships (2; . Name. Armament. Tonnage. Knots Chentiten . 4 12-inch, 2 6-inch 7,430 13 TlNGYUEN . 4 12-inch, 2 6-inch 7,430 13 Modern Aemoueed Cruisers i (3). Name. ArWMment. Tonnage. Knots. KiNGYUBN . 2 8-inch, 2 6-inch 2,850 15 PiNGYUEN . 1 10-inch, 2 6-inch 2,850 10 Laiytten . . . 2 8-inch, 2 6-inch 2,850 15 Modern Light Cruisers i 10). Name. Arraament. Tonnage. Knots. Chiyuen . . . 3 8-inch, 2 6-inch 2,300 16 Chtngyuen . 3 8-inch, 2 6-inch 2,300 16 FoocmNG . 3 8-inch, 7 4-7-inch 2,500 15 FOOSING . . . 2 8-inch, 8 4-7-inch 2,200 15 Kaichai . . . 2 8-inch, 6 6-inch 2,480 13 Nanshuen . 2 8-inch, 8 4-7-inch 2,200 13 Nantin . . . 2 8-inch, 8 4-7-inch 2,200 13 TSIYUEN . . . 2 8-inch, 1 6-inch 2,350 13 YUNGPAO . 3 8-inch, 7 4-7-inch 2,500 13 Yesing . . . 3 8-inch, 7 4-7-inch Modern Sloops (9). 2,500 13 Name. Armament. Tonnage. Knots. Chaoyang . 2 10-inch, 4 4-7-iQch 1,350 14 FOOCHOW. . . 2 6-inch 1,300 11 HUANTAI . . . 2 6-inch, 5 4-7-inch 1,300 13 KOJSTGBIN . 1 6-inch, 1 4-7-inch 1,100 18 KONGHAI . 1 6-inch, 1 4-7-inch 1,100 18 KWANCHI . . . 2 4-7-inch 1,200 12 KWANKING . 3 4-7-inch 1,000 16 KWANPING . 2 4-7-iQch 1,000 10 YUNGWEI.. . 2 10-inch, 4 4-7-inch Modern Torpedo Craet. 1,350 14 Number and Glas,. Gun Armament. Tonnage. Knots. I torpedo-boat . . 4 machine-guns 130 24 f20 -^to 23 27 torpedo-boats 2 machine-guns 65 DETAILS OP SHIPS 301 APPENDIX II SEA-GOING FLfeET OF JAPAN AT OUTBREAK OP WAR IN 1904 Modern Battleships (6). Name. Armament. Tonnage. -Knots. ASAHI . 4 12-mch, 14 6-inch 15,200 18 Fuji . 4 12-inch, 10 6-inch 12,320 19 Hatsuse . . . 4 12-inch, 14 6-uich 15,000 19 MiKASA . . . 4 12-inch, 14 6-inch 15,200 18 Shtktshima . 4 12-inch, 14 6-inch 14,850 18 Yashima . . . 4 12-inch, 10 6-inch 12,320 19 MoDEEN Armoured Cruisers (8). Name. Arm<^ment. Tonnage. Knots ASAMA . 4 8-inch, 14 6-inch 9,750 22 AZUMA . 4 8-inch, 12 6-inch 9,430 20 Idzumo . . . 4 8-inch, 14 6-inch 9,750 21 IWATE . 4 8-inch, 14 6-inch 9,750 22 Kasuga . . . 1 10-inch, 2 8-inch, 14 6-inch 7,700 20 NlSHTN . . . 4 8-inch, 14 6-inch 7,700 20 TOKIWA . . . 4 8-inch, 14 6-inch 9,750 23 Yakumo . . . 4 8-inch, 12 6-inch 9,850 20 Modern Light Cruisers (16). Nam,e. Armament. Tonnage. Knots Akashi . . . 2 6-inch, 6 4-7-iQch 2,657 20 Akitsushima . 4 6-inch, 6 4-7-inch 3,150 18 Chitose . . . 2 8-inch, 10 4-7-inch 4,760 22 Chiyoda . . . 10 4-7-inch 2,450 16 Hashidate . 1 12-5-inch, 11 4-7-inch 4,280 16 Itsukushima . 1 12-5-inch, 11 4-7-inch 4,280 16 Idzumi . . . 2 6-inch, 6 4-7-inch 2,800 17 Kasagi . . . 2 8-inch, 10 4-7-inch 5,400 22 Matsushima . 1 12-5-inch, 11 4-7-inch 4,280 17 Naniwa .. . 2 10-inch, 6 6-inch 3,650 15 Nutaka . . . 6 6-inch 3,420 20 SUMA . 2 6-inch, 6 4-7-inch 2,660 20 Takachito . 2 10-inch, 6 6-inch 3,700 15 Takasago . 2 8-inch, 10 4-7-inch 4,160 23 Tsushima . 6 6-inch 3,420 20 YOSHINO .. . 4 6-inch, 8 4-7-inch 4,180 23 302 APPENDIX II MoDEEiir Sloops (5). Name. Armament. Tonnage. Knots Chihaya . . . . 2 4-7-inch 1,250 21 MiYAKO . . . . 2 4-7-inch 1,800 20 Tatsttta . . . . 2 4-7-inch 880 21 TSUKUSHI . . 2 10-inch, 4 4-7-inch 1,350 13 Yayeyama . . 3 4-7-inch 1,600 20 Modern Torpedo Ceaft^'(33). Number and Glass. Gun Armament. Tonnage. 6 destroyers 1 1 destroyers 9 first-class tor- pedo-boats 7 first-class tor- pedo-boats . . fl 12-pounder, \^ Is 6 -pounders J fl 12-pounder, \ \5 6-pounders / h3 3-pounders [■3 3-pounders 285 310 150 120 Knots. 30 31 30 28 mlscbllaneotrs obsolete vessels fit foe subisdiaey Duties in Wae (12). Number and Glass. 1 battleship 1 armoured cruiser 1 light cruiser . . 5 sloops . . 4 sloops Gun Armament. 4 12-inch, 4 6-uich 1 10-inch, 2 6-inch 2 8-inch, 1 6-inch i2 6-inch, 5 4-7-inch to 4 6-inch 6-inch, 1 4-7-inch to 8-inch, 1 6-inch Tannage. Knots 7,400 2,000 2,260 1,470 to 1,770 "615 to 770 12 10 12 12 to 13 10 to 13 DETAILS OF SHIPS 303 SEA-GOING FLEET OF RUSSIA AT OUTBREAK OF WAR IN 1904= (INCLUSIVE OF VESSELS NEARING COMPLETION, BUT EXCLUSIVE OF BLACK SEA FLEET) MoDEEN Battleships (16^ . Name. Armament. Tonnage. Knots Albxandee II. . . 2 12-inch, 4 9-inch, 8 6-inch 9,930 13 Alexander III. 4 12-inch, 12 6-inch 13,500 18 BOBODINO 4 12-inch, 12 6-inch 13,600 18 Knliz Souvaeoff 4 12-inch, 12 6-mch 13,500 18 Navaein . . 4 12-inch, 8 6-inch 10,200 15 Nicholas I. 2 12-inch, 4 9-inch, 8 6-inch 9,670 13 Oebl 4 12-inch, 12 6-inch 13,600 18 OSLYABYA 4 10-inch, 11 6-inch 12,670 18 Peeesvyet 4 10-inch, 11 6-inch 12,670 18 Peteopavlosk . . 4 12-inch, 12 6-inch 11,350 16 Poltava . . 4 12-inch, 12 6-inch 10,960 16 POBIEDA . . 4 10-inch, 11 6-inch 12,670 18 Retvisan 4 12-inch, 12 6-inch 12,700 18 Sevastopol 4 12-mch, 12 6-inch 10,960 16 Sissoi Veliki . . 4 12-inch, 6 6-inch 10,400 15 Tsaeevitch 4 12-inch, 12 6-inch 12,900 19 MoDEEN Aemottbed Ceuisees (4). Name. Armnment. Tonnage. Knots Bayan . . 2 8-inch, 8 6-inch 7,720 22 Geomoboi 4 8-inch, 16 6-inch, 12,330 20 6 4-7-inch Rossia . . 4 8-inch, 16 6-inch 12,130 20 Rtjeik 4 8-inch, 16 6-inch, 10,920 19 6 4-7-inch MoDEEN Aemoueed Coast-Deeence Ships (3) . Name. Armament. Tonnage. Knots. Admieal Apeaxen 3 10-inch, 4 6-inch 4,200 15 Admieal Senyavin 4 9-inch, 4 6-inch 4,100 16 Admieal Ushakoef 4 9-inch, 4 6-iiich 4,100 16 304 APPENDIX II MoDEEN Light Ceuisees (13). Name. Armament. Tonnage. Knots. Almaz 6 4-7-inch 3,280 19 ASKOLD . 12 6-inch 5,900 23 AUROEA 8 6-inch 6,630 20 BOGATYE . 12 6-inch 6,640 24 BOYAErN 6 4-7-inch 3,200 25 Diana . 12 6-inch 6,630 30 IZUMEUD 6 4-7-inch 3,080 24 Jemchoug . 6 4-7-inch 3,080 24 NOVIK 6 4-7-inch 3,080 24 Olbg . 12 6-inch 6,670 22 Pallada 8 6-inch 6,630 20 SVETLANA . 6 6-inch 3,800 20 Vaeyag . 12 6-inch 6,500 23 Modern Toepedo Ceaft (61). Number and Class. Gun Armament. Tonnage. Knots. I 7 3-pounders "400 20 6 destroyers . . -[ to - to to (^11 3-pounders 735 22 r 1 12-pounder, 3 3-pouii- [240 27 44 destroyers . . ] ders, to 1 12-pound er, { to to [ 5 3-pounder8 [370 29 1 destroyer . . 6 3-pounders 280 35 [ 80 19 10 torpedo-boats 2 to 4 machine-guns to to 140 22 Obsolete Vessels fit foe Subsidiaey Wae Duties (14). Number and Glass. Gun Armament. Tonnage. Knots. f8 8-inch, 10 6-inch, 2 armoured cruisers-! to 3 light cruisers 9 sloops . . [2 8-inch, 13 6-inch (2 8-inch, 14 8-inch, { to [ 6 6-inch fl 9-inch, 1 6-inch, { to 2 8-inch. 1 6-inch INDEX A Adams, " History of Japan," ex- tractsfrom,102,108,115,ll ,117 Agulhas Bank, 264 Akagi, the, 299 Akashi, the, 301 AhiUushima, the, 299, 301 Aleook, Sir Rutherford, British Minister to Japan, 108; recalled, 110 Alexander II, the, 303 Alexander III, the, 276, 303; sunk, 277 Alexeiefi, Admiral, 220 ; in command of the fleet, 202; in Manchuria, 227 Almaz, the, 304 Amsterdam, the. 111 Amur River, 187 Angar Pequena, 264 Anglo- Japanese^ treaty, 181-184 Angola, 264 Apraxin, the, 279, 303 Archipelago Islands, 13 Argus, the, 95, 111 Asahi, the, 301 Aaama, the, 301 Asan, port of, 130, 140 Askdd, the, 304 ^ioffo, the, 299 Aurora, the, 304 Australia, population, 294 Awomori Bay, 121 Azuma, the, 301 B Baltic, the, 186, 194; fleet, 261, 270; fire on British trawlers, 262; coaling at sea, 263; voyage to Tsushima Island, 263-273; Battle of Tsushima, 272-284; fate of, 282; casualties, 283 Ba/rrosa, the. 111 Bayan, the, 303; strikes a mine, 234, 236; sunk, 256 Bezobrazo£E, Rear- Admiral, at Vladi- vostok, 245; raids, 245 Black Sea, 194 Bogatyr, the, 304 Borodino, the, 276, 303; blown up, 277 Bouncer, the. 111 Boxer Rebellion, 180, 188 Boyarin, the, 304 British Naval Discipline Act, 11 British North American Colonies, secession, 80 British trawlers fired on by the Baltic fleet, 262 Buddhism, 75 Bungo Channel, 88, 91 C Canton, 20 Chaoyang, the, 297, 300 Chefoo, 170 Chemulpo, 206, 209 Chenyuen, the, 134, 195, 300; damaged, 161, 169, 172 Chihaya, the, 302 Chi-li, 133 China, 154; war with Japan, 9, 131, 143; invaded by the Mongols, 20; under the Ming dynasty, 43; treaty of peace with Japan, 58, 173; diplomatic missions to Japan, 60; assistance to Korea, 61; strategical importance of Korea, 126; relations with, 127; policy, 132; provinces, 133; cession of territories, 173, 174; indemnity, 174; the Boxer Rebellion, 180, 188 China Sea, 263 Chinchow, 225, 226 Chinese army JEoroe the Japanese to retreat, 57, 62; camp at Wei-hai- wei, 130; fleet, 133-137, 160, 169, 171; outbreak of hostilities, 141; Battle of the Yalu, 146-151 ; an- nihilation, 172 Chingyuen, the, 300 Chitose, the, 301 Chiyoda, the, 146, 298, 299, 301 Chiyuen, the, 300 Chosiu, Prince of, attack on foreign 305 306 INDEX shipping, 86-93; demand for bis punishment, 105; banished from Court, 107; insubordination, 107; opposition policy, 109; surrender, 113; amount of his fine, 114 Chosiu, the, 85; policy, 85 Conqueror, the. 111 Coquette, the, 95, 111 Crimean War, 216 D Dakar, port of, 264 Dardanelles, the, 186, 194 Diana, the, 304 D'Jambi, the. 111, 113 Dmitri, the, 298 Dreadnought, the, 51, 53 Dugnay-i?rouin, 126 Dupleix, the. 111, 112, 113, 114 Dutch merchantB in Japan, 74, 78 ; bombard the converts, 77 E Elliot Islands, 220 English merchants, attacked by Japanese, 86, 93 Enomoto, Admiral, sails for Yezo, 121 ; attacked by Imperial troops, 121-123; surrender, 122 Enquist, Admiral, 282 Essen, Captain, 256-259 Euryalua, the, 95, 97, 111, 112, 113 P Felkersham, Rear- Admiral, 263; death, 275 Fillmore, President, 81 Fisher, Lord, 70 Fooching, the, 300 Foochow, the, 300 Foochow Dockyard, 134 Fooaing, the, 300 Formosa,70, 267 oededto Japan, 174 ; Prance, the fleet, 1; colonization of lands, 79; treaty with Japan, 84 ; demands demolition of Shimo- noseki batteries, 105-110; force, 110; attack, 111-114; interfer- ence with Japan, 176, 179 Fuji, the, 301 Fukuoka Bay, 26 Fusan, Japanese troops land at, 49 G Gaboon Biver, 264 Geneva Convention, 206 Germany, result of the war on the army and nayv, 1; policy to Japan, 176-179, 288 Good Hope, Cape of, 81 Goto Islands, 269, 272 Great Britain, naval Power, 1; colonization of lands, 79; treaties with Japan, 83, 84, 181-184, 288; demand payment of indemnity, 93, 104; trade with Japan, 102; duty to national rights, 103; demand demolition of Shimono- seki batteries, 105-110; force, 110; attack, 111-114; policy to Japan, 180; administration of Egypt, 290 Great Pish Bay, 264 Qromoboi, the, 249, 303; strikes a mine, 268 H Hai-yun-tan, Island of, 146 Hakodate, port opened to traders, 83; capture of, 121 Hakozaki Bay, 25, 35 Hashidate, the, 299, 301 Hatsuse, the, 301 ; sunk, 223 Havoc, the, 95 Hideyoshi, military talents, 44; wish to conquer China, 45, 49; preparations for war, 46-49; army, 47, 49; sends envoys to Korea, 47; policy against, 58-64; death, 64, 73 Himeshima, Island of, 111 Hiroshima Bay, 160 Holland, colonization of lands, 79; treaty with Japan, 84; demands demolition of Shimonoseki bat- teries, 105-110; force, 110; attack, 111-114 Hong-Kong, 81; devastated by a typhoon, 38, 39 Howorth, extract from, 22 Huantai, the, 300 Hujruan-kon, 157, 158 Idzumi, the, 301; sights the Baltic fleet, 272 lessen. Rear- Admiral, raids, 247; at Vladivostok, 248; Battle of Ulsan, 248 Iki, Island of, attack on, 25, 32 Imari, Gulf of, 35, 39 Indian Ocean, 263, 265 Inouye, 109 Ito, 109 Ito, Admiral Count, Commander- in-Chief of the Japanese Fleet, 138 ; ofE Taidong River, 145; Battle of the Yalu, 148-151 Itauhushima, the, 299, 301 Ivan III., Tsar of Russia, 181 INDEX 307 Iwate, the, 301 lyegasn, Shogun, administration, 74; retirement, 75 lyemitsu, Shogun, 75; policy against the Christians, 76; expulsion of foieignera, 76 Izumrud, the, 304 Japan, third naval Power, 1 ; finan- cial position, 2 ; rapid rise from a position of obscurity, 2; insular position, 4, 19, 291; civil wars, 5, 42 ; war with Korea, 6 ; period of seclusion, 7-9, 11, 78-80; creation of a navy, 9; war with China, 9, 46-49, 60, 131-143; war with Russia, 10; influence of the sea, 11; invasion of Korea, 15; in- vaded by " Tois," 16-19; rejection of diplomatic advances from Kublai Khan, 22, 28, 30; defeats the Mongolians, 32, 35-45; pre- parations for war, 28-30, 34; introduction of Christianity, 42, 74; trade with Portugal, 42, 74; the Emperor, or Mikado, 43; the Shogun, 43; relations with Korea, 46, 48; disasters at sea, 50; de- struction of the fleet, 52-57, 63, 65-67; retreat, 57; terms of peace, 58, 284; diplomatic missions, 60; lessons of the war, 67-72; cost, 70; expulsion of foreigners, 76, 106; mission from the United States, 8 1 -83 ; treaty ports opened, 83; treaties with the Powers, 84; attack on foreign shipping, 86-93 ; result of dual administration, 94, 107, 116; Battle of Kagosima, 95- 101; payment of iademnities, 104, 114; Battle of Shimonoseki, 111-114; office of Shogun abol- ished, 120; operations against Admiral Enomoto, 121-124; Im- perial Navy, 124, 195-198; strate- gical and political importance of keeping Korea free, 125- 129; proposals of reform, 129; policy against China, 133, 155; preparation of sea forces, , 133, 143; outbreak of hostilities, 141; Battle of the Yalu, 146-151; policy to capture Port Arthur harbour, 155-160; attack on Wei-hai-wei harbour, 161-170 treaty of peace with China, 173 territories ceded to, 173, 174 interference of Russia, France, and Germany, 176-178; policy in the European War, 178, 179; treaty with Great Britain, 181- 184, 288, 291; first phase of the war with Russia, 185-215; result of the Russian occupation of Manchuria, 189; negotiations, 190; disadvantages of hostilities, 191; bases for war-supplies, 192; despatch of troops to Korea, 207, 209; second phase of the war, 216-250; plan of invasion of Manchuria, 217; final phase, 251- 287; annexation of Korea, 289; policy, 292; member of the League of Nations, 293; relations with the United States, 293; predomin- ance in Eastern Asia, 294-296; naval policy, 296 Japanese, the, aptitude for war, 3, 10, 286; martial spirit, 4; converts to Roman Catholicism, 75; extermination, 76-78; char- acteristics, 293, 296 Japanese army land at Fusan, 49; advance on Seoul, 50; defeated, 62; at Chemulpo, 130; victory at Pengyang, 145, 151, 154; cap- tures Port Arthur, 156-160; at Yung-ohing Bay, 165; attack on Wei-hai-wei, 165-170; disembark at Liao-tung, 219-221, 227; Battle of Telissu, 227; victories in Man- churia, 253, 261 Japanese Fleet, 9, 124, 137-140, 146, 178, 193, 195-198, 224, 238, 207, 299, 301; destruction, 52-57, 63, 65-67; attempts to block Port Arthur, 208-211, 214; mining operations, 212; siege of Port Arthur, 219-223, 225-227, 233- 238, 253-259 ; Battle of the YeUow Sea, 238-247; Battle of UIsan,245, 249; work of repairing, 254, 260, 268; capture of " 203-Metre Hill," 255; attack on the Sevastopol, 256-259; casualties, 260, 283; dispositions, 268; battle ofE Tsu- shima, 272-284 Jaures, Rear-Admiral, reprisals, 9 Jemchoug, the, 304 Jenghiz Empire, fall of, 43 Jenghiz Khan, 19, 186 Jengo, Empress, invasion of Korea, 15 Jesuit missionaries in Japan, 74 Josling, Captain, killed, 100 K Kagosima, Battle of, 41, 95-102; Bay, 95; Gulf of, 96 308 INDEX Kaichai, the, 300 Kamimura, Bear-Admiral, 208, 238, 245-247; at the Battle of Ulsan, 248 Kamranh Bay, 265 Kamschatka, 185 Kasagi, the, 301 Kasiiga, the, 301 Katsuraki, the, 299 Kiao-chao, port of, 243, 244 Kienchang, attack on, 88 Kingyuen, the, 300 Kioto, 117, 120 Kiushiu Island, 13; raid of Tois, 17- 19; invaded by Mongols, 26, 34; riots, 75 Kniaz Souvaroff, the, 303 Kobe, 117 Kondratenko, General, killed, 259 Kongbin, the, 300 Konghai, the, 300 Koniflhi , General , advance on Korea, 50; at Peng-yang, 57; pohcy of withdrawal, 68, 65; in command of the new Japanese fleet, 60; naval victory, 61; defeated, 62, 65-67 Korea, 13; war with Japan, 6; in- vasion of, 15; xmder the rule of the Mongolian Empire, 21-23; independence, 43, 173; relations with Japan, 46, 48; armed posts in, 59, 63; troops from China, 61, 130; inefficiency of the fleet, 61; defeated, 61; lessons of the war, 67-72; strategical and politi- cal importance to Japan, 125; to China, 126; relations with China, 127; misgovemment, 128; insurrection, 129; proposals of reform, 129; troops from Japan, 130, 207, 209; annexed to, 289; condition, 290 KowsMng, the, 141 ; sunk, 142 Kruis, the. 111, 113 Kublai Khan, attempts to invade Japan, 4; founds the city of Fekin, 20; campaigns in China, 20-22; diplomatic advances to Japan, 22, 30; preparations for war, 23-25, 27-31, 40; faUure of his expeditions, 25-27, 35-37; size of his army, 29; concentra- tion of the fleet, 31-33; attack on Kiushiu, 34; destruction of his fleet by a typhoon, 37-40; death, 40 Kuper, Rear-Admiral, in command of a British squadron, 95, 110a at Kagosima Bay, 95; present demands, 96; seizes steamers, 98; Battle of Kagosima, 99-101 ; sails for Yokohama, 101 Kuropatkin, General, in command in Manchuria, 222, 227 Kwanchi, the, 300 Kwang-su, Emperor of China, 133 Kwanking, the, 300 Kwanping, the, 300 La P&ouse, Straits of, 267, 269 Laiyuen, the, 300 League of Nations, 293 Leopard, the. 111 Leu-kung-tau, Island of, 163, 164 Liao-tung Peninsula, 156, 157, 158, 217, 219; ceded to Japan, 173 Liao-yang, Battle of, 153 Libau, 254 Li-Hung-Chang, Viceroy, 133, 136; diplomatic mission to Japan, 173 Ly-ee-moon Pass, 39 M Madagascar, 264 MakaroS, Admiral, 202; in com- mand of the Russian fleet, 210, 212; characteristics, 210; killed, 213 Malacca, Straits of, 263, 268 Malay Archipelago, 261 Manchuria, 157; invasion of, 158, 217, 227, 253; railway to Port Arthur, 187; occupied by Russian troops, 188-190; evacuated, 285 Masampo, 269, 273 MaUusUma, the, 139, 149, 298, 299, 301 Matsushima Island, 280 Maya, the, 299 Medusa, the. 111 ; attack on, 88 Merrimao, the, 52 Metalen, the, HI, 113 "Metre Hill, 203-," capture of, 255 Mikado or Emperor of Japan, 43; opposition to foreigners, 83, 85, 94; treatment of Prince Chosiu, 106; refuses to deal with foreign Mmisters, 117, 118; death, 119 Mikasa, the, 199, 301 Minefields, 268, 287 Mississippi, the, 81 Miyako, the, 302 Mongolia, 20 Mongolians, the, invasion of China, 20; military power, 21; fleet destroyed by a typhoon, 38-40; revert to desert tribesmen, 43 INDEX 309 Mukden, 158; Battle of, 261, 263 Murdoch, 30, 33 Mushasi, the, 299 Mutsuhito, Emperor of Japan, 119; enlightened views, 124 N Nagasaki harbour, 78, 86; port opened to traders, 83 Nakhimoff, the, torpedoed, 279 Naniwa, the, 299, 301 Nankin, 20 Nan-shan, Battle of, 225 Nanshuen, the, 300 Nantin, the, 300 Naval designs, progress, 79 Navarin, the, 303; sunk, 279 Navy, Japanese, 24, 193, 195-198; founded, 124; character of the, 153 Neale, Colonel, attempt on his life, 84 NebogatofE, Bear- Admiral, 266; in command of the Baltic fleet, 275; surrenders, 281 Neva, the, 186 Nichdas II., the, 266, 278, 303 Niitaka, the, 301 Nipon or Honshu Island, 13, 86, 121, 267 Nishin, the, 301 Nogi, General, attack on Port Arthur, 233; Battle of the Yellow Sea, 238-245 North Sea, 178 Noryang, Island of, 52, 53 Novik, the, 244, 304 O Okhotsk, Sea of, 187 Okpo, Island of, 52 Oleg, the, 304 Orel, the, 277, 279, 284, 303 Oahima, the, 299 Oslydbya, the, 274, 303; sunk, 275, 278, 284 Oyama, Marshal, 159 Pacific Ocean, 80, 185, 291, 296; trade, 2 PaHada, the, 304; sunk, 256 Palmerston, Lord, 80 Pearl, the, 95 Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, 127, 156, 158, 161, 162 Peiho Kiver, 127, 173 Pekin, 20, 127; siege of the foreign legations, 180 Pembroke, the, attack on, 87 Peng-yang, 50, 57, 131; capture of, 145, 151, 154 Peresvyet, the, 241, 303; sunk, 256 Perry, Commodore, mission to Japan, 81-83; at Yokohama Bay, 81 Perseus, the, 95, 111 Pescadores Islands ceded to Japan, 174 Peter the Great, 186 Petropavlosk, the, 303; blown up, 213,215 Phaeton, the, 78 Philippine Islands, 267 Pingyuen, the, 300 Plymouth, the, 81 Pobieda, the, 303; strikes a mine, 213; sunk, 256 Polo, Marco, 29 Poltava, the, 303; sunk, 256 Port Arthur, 136, 143, 155; position, 156; advance of the Japanese, 156-160; leased to Russia, 181, 187; railway to Manchuria, 187; attempts to block, 208-211, 214; siege of, 219-223, 225-227, 233- 238, 251-259; surrenders, 259 Portugal , trade with Japan, 42, 74 ; colonization of lands, 79 Quelpart, Island of, 269 R Racehorse, the, 95 Ramming " tactics," 152 Eetvizan, the, 205, 211, 303; sunk, 256 Rietzenstein, 236 Roman Catholic missionaries in Japan, 42, 74 Roosevelt, Theodore, 284, 292 Roshdestvensky, Admiral, in com- mand of the Baltic fleet, 262 voyage to Tsushima Island, 263 273; characteristics, 263, 265 exhortation to his men, 266 Battle of Tsushima, 273-275, wounded, 275, 277; taken prisoner, 2S2 Bosaia, the, 303 Rurik, the, 303; damaged, 248 Russia, the Fleet, 1 ; war with Japan, 10, 204; policy to, 176, 179; Port Arthur leased to, 181, 187;founda- tion of the Empire, 185 ; first phase of the war with Japan, 185-216; extent of territory, 186; policy to reach an ice-free port, 186; 310 INDEX in Manchuria, 18S; advantages of a war, 191; baaes for war-sup- pliea, 192; maritime position, 194; second phase, 216-250; mine- fields, 223, 233; final phase, 251- 287; terms of peace, 284; evacua- tion of Manchuria, 285 Russian army defeated at the Battle of Telissu, 227 Russian fleet, 1, 188, 200-202, 211, 222, 236, 270, 303, 304; distri- bution 202-204; reinforcements, 212, 218 ; chased by the Japanese, 231; in the siege of Port Arthur, 232-238; Battle of the Yellow Sea, 238-245; fate of, 243-245, 282; Battle of Ulsan, 245-249; leave Libau, 254; Battle of Tsushima, 272-284; casualties, 283; " torpedo gunboats," 297 S Saghalien, 16 Saigon, port of, 244 St. Petersburg, 221 Sakarajima, 100 Samurai, the, skill in war, 4, 17 Saratoga, the, 81 Satsuma, the, 85; policy, 85 Sebastopol, 70 Semiramis, the, 91, 111 Senyavin, the, 279, 303 Seoul, 50, 67 Sevastopol, the, 256, 303; strikes a mine, 231; attack on, 256-258; sunk, 259 Sha-ho, Battle of, 253 Shanghai, 244 Shantung, 144, 163 Shihishima, the, 223, 301 Shimonoseki, Straits of, 86, 87, 246; closed for traffic, 105, 109; demand for the opening, 105-109; attack on, 111-114; reopened, 115; Treaty of, 173, 179 Shinano Mam, the, sights the Baltic fleet, 272, 281 Shipbuilding, progress of, 6 Ships, methods of attack, 51; use of the ram, 152 Shogun, or dictator, 5 ; Commander- in-Chief of the Imperial Forces, 43; power, 43; crest, 44; office abolished, 120 Shogun, a, demand of the foreign Ministers, 105-108; temporizing policy, 107; letter from the foreign Ministers, 116; appeal to the Mikado, 117; resignation, 120; rebellion, 120; flight, 120; sails for Yezo, 121 Sissoi Veliki, the, 303; torpedoed, 279 Souvaroff, the, 274, 275, 303; sunk, 277, 284 Spain, colonization of lands, 79 Spanish ship blown up, 78 Stark, Vice-Admiral, 202 Stoessel, General, 256, 258 Submarines, danger from, 70, 287 Suez Canal, 264 Suma, the, 301 Sung dynasty, 20 Susquehanna, the, 81, 82 SveUana, the, 304 Taidong River, 50, 145, 209 Takachito, the, 299, 301 Takao, the, 299 Tahasago, the, 301 TaJciang, the. 111 Taku, i42 Takushan, 226 Talien-wan Bay, 202, 220, 225; capture of, 159, 226 Tancrede, the, 91, 111 Tangier, 263 Tartar, the, 111, 112, 113, 114 Tatsuta, the, 299, 302 Telissu, Battle of, 227 Tengchow, 165 Tientsin, Treaty of, 128 Ting, Admiral, in command of the Chinese fleet, 136, 160, 169;tacticB, 144; ofE the Yalu, 144, 146; orders, 146; formation of his fleet, 147; Battle of the Yalu, 148- 151 ; escape to Wei-hai-wei, 158, 167; error of policy, 167; disables the guns, 168, 172; surrenders, 170; commits suicide, 170; chief advisers, 171 Ting-yuen, the, 134, 300 Togo, Admiral, 142; in command of the Japanese fleet, 198 ; character, 199; attacks on the Russian fleet, 204, 210; chases it, 231; disposi- tion of his fleet, 268; Battle of Tsushima, 272-284; tactics, 273, 283 Tois, or Manchurian pirates, in- vasion of Japan, 16; vessels, 16; raids on Tsushima, 17; on Kiu- shiu, 17-19; defeated, 17 Tokio, 82, 124 Tokiwa, the, 301 Torpedoes, use of, 286 Tsarevitch, the, 205, 211, 238, INDEX 311 240, 303; intemed at Kiao-cbao, 243 Tsiyuen, the, 300 Tsokai, the, 299 TBuboi, Eear- Admiral, 140 Tsugaru, Straits of, 267, 269 Tsukushi, the, 299, 302 Tsushima, Island of, 246; attack on, 17, 25; Straits of, 13, 14, 41, 49, 238, 245, 267, 269; defence of, 4; Battle of, 272-284 Tsv^hima, the, 301 Typhoon, 31, 37, 98-101 U Ukhtomski, Rear-Admiral, 236; Battle of the Yellow Sea, 241; policy, 252 Ulsan, Battle of, 245-249 United States, naval Power, 1; squadron in Yokohama Bay, 8; relations with Japan, 80, 293; mission to, 81; treaty with, 83, 84; Civil War, 89; demands de- molition of Shimonoseki batteries, 105-110; force, 110; attack, 111- 114; peace conference, 284; ad- ministration of Cuba, 290 Vshakoff, the, 279, 303; sunk, 281 Van Fong Bay, 266 Varyag, the, 304 Victoria, Queen, 73 Victoria, the, sunk, 225 Viren, Captain, in command of the Russian fleet, 252 Vitgeft, Admiral, in command of the Russian fleet, 215, 220; orders, 222, 230, 235; declines action, 230; councils of war, 232, 235; ordered to leave Port Arthur, 235; Battle fo the Yellow Sea, 238-240; killed, 240 Vladimir, the, 298 Vladivostok, 246; harbour of, 187, 202 W Wars between States, three cate- gories, 216 Wei-hai-wei, 130, 158, 161; har- bour, 162; attack on, 165-170 Whaling trade, 80 Whitehead torpedo, invention, 286 Wilhelm II., Emperor of Germany, character of his policy, 177 Wilmot, Commander, killed, 100 Wyoming, the, action against Japanese vessels, 89-91 Xavier, the Jesuit missionary, 3 Yakumo, the, 301 Yalu River, 144; Battle of, 146- 151 Yamato, the, 299 Yang-tse-kiang, 23 Yashima, the, 301; sunk, 223 Yayeyama, the, 299, 302 YeUow Sea, 127, 143, 155, 187, 194, 237; Battle of, 238 Yermak, the Cossack leader, 185 Yesing, the, 300 Yezo Island, 13, 121, 267 Yi-sun, Admiral, achievements, 50; inventive faculties, 51; ship, 51, 57, 70; destruction of the Japan- ese fleet, 52-57, 63, 65-67; strate- gic move, 55; superseded, 59; in command of the fleet, 62, 65; killed, 66; record, 67 Yokohama Bay, 8, 81 ; treaty port, 84; proposal to close, 107 Yoshino, the, 299, 301; sunk, 224 Yung Ching Bay, 163, 165 Yungpao, the, 300 Yungwei, the, 300 PRINTED IS GREAT BBITAIK B7 BILUNa AND BOHB, LTD., SUILSrOBD ABO UHIB Approximate Positions of Principal Maritime Events in Japanese History A. General Rendezvous of Kublai Khan's inuading Armada of 4500 uessels in 1280 A.D. B. Defeat of Japanese Grand Fleet by Koreans in 1592 C. Defeat of Japanese Conuoy with WO, 000 re-inforcements for Army of inuasion in Korea in 7592 D. Japanese victory of the Yalu in 1894 E. Japanese uictory of the Yelloui Sea In 1904 F. Japanese uictory of Ulsan in 1904 G. Japanese uictory of Tsushima in 1905 H. Surrender of last remnants of Russian Fleet Emery Walker Ltd. sc.