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Digital file copy- right by Cornell University Library 1991. :i^:/ i^5P"-"' "H F f.' i M THE WAR IN EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN AN EPISODE IN THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE; BEING A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE SCENES AND EVENTS OF THAT GREAT DRAMA, AND SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN IT. BY THOMAS ARCHER, F.R.H.S., AUTHOR OF "fifty YEARS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROGRESS," "PICTURES AND ROYAL PORTRAITS," ETC. VOLUME III. LONDON; BLACKIE & SON, 49 and 50 OLD BAILEY, E.G. GLASGOW, EDINBURGH, AND DUBLIN. 1886. GLASGOW; W. G. BLACKIE AND CO., PKISTiiKS, VILLAFIELD. CONTENTS OF VOL. III. Thk Mahdi — Mahomet Achmet, .frontispiece. Khartum, the chief Town of the Soudan — looking North, to face 8 The First Cataract of the Nile, ,, 80 General Gordon releasing Prisoners at Khartum, Feb. 18S4, , too A Dervish preaching the Holy War, ,, 124 Surgeon-General J. O'Nial, c.b., ,, 202 Major-General Sir Herbert Stewart, k.c.b ,, 218 Scene on the Nile at Wady Halfa, „ 234 Hauling Boats fast a Cataract of the Nile ,, 250 Major-General H. Brackenbury. c.b „ 264 CHAPTER VI. p Difficulties of the Egyptian Government — The ex-Khedive's Opinion — Determina- tion of the British Government regarding Egypt — Cherif Pasha resigns, and Nubar Pasha succeeds him, .... Colonel Coetlogon at Khartum — Condition of the Place — Dr. BohndorPs Report, Colonel D. Stewart's Report on the Soudan — Policy of the English Government, General Gordon interviewfed — His Ideas of the Situation — Recommends the Appoint- ment of Nubar Pasha as Governor-general at Khartum — Cost of the Soudan — Causes of the Insurrection — Character of the Soudanese — Gordon warns the Govern- ment against announcing an intention to evacuate Kharttoi, .... Mr. Chamberlain's Declaration respecting the Duty of the English Government, Gordon, preparing to go to the Congo, is suddenly despatched to the Soudan — Difficulties of his Position — His Farevirell at the Railway Station — A characteristic Telegram 19 Gordon's Opinion of Ismail and Tewfik I Pashas, and of Service with an Oriental Government — The Egyptian People, . 22 Gordon appointed Private Secretary to Lord I Ripon, Viceroy of India, but suddenly ! resigns — His Explanation — He receives a i Message from China — Goes to Hong- Kong — His Advice to the Chinese Au- thorities — He proceeds to the Mauritius — His Work there, 25 Affairs at the Cape of Good Hope — A high and mighty Government — Gordon per- suaded to go to Basutoland — Unsatis- factory Conduct of the Aui.horities at the Cape, -32 Gordon's Sojourn in Palestine, . . -37 A New Prospect — Arrangements for the Congo Expedition with Mr. Stanley — Gordon's Letter to Sir Samuel Baker, . 38 Khartum at the beginning of 1884 — Mr. Power appointed Consular Agent — Story of the Destruction of Hicks's Army — Opinion of the Military Authorities on the Situation — Colonel Coetlogon's Tele- gram to Sir E. Wood, . . . -39 VI CONTENTS. Responsibility of the Egyptian Government for the Hicks Disaster— A " Black Nun's " Story, 43 Dangerous Position of Khartum — Proposal to send Zebehr Pasha to the Soudan — Telegrams from Khartiim to Sir E. Baring and the Khedive — Earl Granville's Questions, ..... 44 Earl Granville's Despatch to Mr. Baring- General Gordon's Memorandum on the Position of Affairs — "Observations" by Colonel Stewart — General Gordon's Orders — Difficulties of his Mission, .' 48 Gordon at Cairo — Views of the Egyptian Government — Sir E. Baring's Instructions to Gordon — He meets Sir Evelyn Wood at Port Said — Is appointed Governor- general of the Soudan — The Khedive's Letter, and his Conversation with Baron de Malortie — Abd-el-Kader declines to go to Khartum, .... 55 Gordon sets out for Khartum — His desire to be confronted with Zebehr Pasha — Zebehr's Resentment against Gordon — The Scene at the British Agency — A SwedishTraveller'sImpressions of Gordon — Zebehr's Grievances — The disputed Letter, 61 Gordon's change of Opinion respecting Zebehr — Opinions of Lieut. - colonel Watson and Colonel Stewart — Idea of sending Zebehr to the Soudan — The Hadendowas, . . . .69 (Gordon's Heroism — Conditionof the Soudan — A Sultan of Darfur appointed — Gordon arrives at Assouan — His Demand de- spatched to the Mahdi — Aspect of Assouan and Philae — The first and second Cata- racts — Wady Haifa and Korosko, . . 73 March across the Desert — The Village of Abu Hamed — Fate of an Egyptian Regiment — Gordon's Message to Sir E. Baring — His proposed Plan of Govern- ment — His strange Memorandum to Mr. Clifford Lloyd — His intention to visit the Mahdi — An oCBcial Flutter — Gordon's Proposal to the King of the Belgians, . 80 Gordon reaches Berber — His hopeful View of Affairs — Zebehr's fitness to "smash the Mahdi " — Gordon's Proclamations, . 91 Arrival of Gordon and Stewart at Khartum — The JIahdi proclaimed Sultan of Kordofan — Hussein Pasha dismissed — — The Levee at the Mudirieh — Arrears of Taxation cancelled — Some needed Reforms adopted, 97 Kassala besieged and in danger, . 100 Gordon's Difficulties at Khartum — His Plan for the Appointment of Zebehr — Sir E. Baring's apparent Approval of the Plan — Zebehr's Defence and Denials — Objec- tions of the British Government — Gordon and Stewart try to overcome these — Offi- cial Snubbing — Gordon's Reply — Inter- ference of the Anti-S'.avery Society, . loi Position of Affairs in Khartiim in March'— Reports regarding the Mahdi— Opposi- tion to the Government Policy — Mr. I lake on Zebehr Pasha — Gordon's in- creasing Difficulties — Position of the Gar- risons — Gordon's Suggestions rejected by the Government — Reconnaissances by Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power, . 120 The Relief of Halfiyeh determined on — A successful Sortie from Khartflm — An Attack on the Rebels — Worthlessness of the Egyptian Soldiers — Mr. Power's De- scription of the disgraceful Flight — The two traitorous Pashas — A startling Nar- rative — Gordon's Account of the Affair, . 132 Gordon's Correspondence with the Mahdi — Left to his own resources, he prepares to defend Khartflm — A Mutiny among the Bashi-Bazouks — Fall of Berber — Tele- graphic Station in the hands of the Rebels — Gordon's Messages from Khartflm — Communication stopped, . . . 144 Position of the British Government — Their Instructions to Gordon — Unwillingness to send Egyptian or English Troops, . 153 Affairs in Khartftm — Testimony of a native Witness — Messages from Gordon — His Telegrams to the Khedive — He proposes CONTENTS. vil to send Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power to Berber, 162 Votes of Censure in ^Parliament by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Michael Hicks Beach — Mr. Gladstone and the Marquis of Hartington defend the Action of Government — An Expedition to relieve Gordon foreshadowed, . . . .170 Financial Position of Egypt in 1883-84 — Useful Reforms instituted — The Indem- nity Commission for settling Losses caused by the Burning of Alexandria closed — A Financial Statement drawn up, and a Conference held — Lords Northbrook and Wolseley sent to Egypt, . . . 183 CHAPTER VII. A Relief Expedition decided on — Sir Samuel Baker's Letter to the Times on Egyptian Affairs — The Mudir of Dongola — The Army of Occupation in Egypt — Prepara- tions at Woolwich — Mutiny of a Turkish Battalion at Cairo, . . . .186 The four alternative Routes to Khartum — The Suakim-Berber Railway — Heavy Consignments of Plant and Materials for the Railway— The Project abandoned — Despatch of British Troops and their Arrival in Egypt, . . . . .192 The Nile Route to Khartflm determined on — Engagement of Canadian Voyageurs — Whale-boats for the Nile Passage — Stores and Provisions — The "Sinews of War" sent to Lord Wolseley — The Scene at Assiout, 202 Geography of Upper Egypt and Nubia — Assiout the ancient "City of the Wolves" — Up the Nile to Assouan and Korosko — From Korosko to Wady Haifa— The Cataracts up to Abu Hamed — Upper and Lower Nubia, and the Belad es Sudan or "Country of the Blacks," . .209 The Route of the Expedition — The Cataracts —The Nile Valley above Wady Haifa- New Dongola — Korti, the chief Town of the Shaikeyeh District, . . . 213 Difficulties of the Expedition — The British Force in Egypt — Possible Advantages of the proposed Soudan Railway Scheme — Conditions of the Nile Ascent — Stages of the Route — Stations established — A Nile "Nuggar," . . ... 218 Official Objections to the presence of News- paper Correspondents — Enterprise of the modem " War Correspondent " — A Cor- respondent's Journey across the Desert — His Notes on Camel-riding — The Diffi- culties of the Journey — Ignorance and Fanaticism of the People of the Soudan — Scarcity of Food Supplies, . . . 225 Hauling the big Steamers up the Cataracts — Passage of the Nassif-el-Kheir — The Railway Buildings and Plant at Wady Haifa — The Scene on the River Banks — The Times Correspondent describes the Passage of the Steamer, .... 234 The Journey from Wady Haifa to Dongola — Qualities of the British Soldier in the trying Labour — "Tommy Atkins" when off duty, 241 Dangers of the Nile Voyage — Accident to the Boat in command of Lieut. Crawford — Sir H. Stewart joins Major Gough, . 244 Lord Wolseley's Telegrams to Sir Evelyn Baring — The Story of the Murder of Colonel Stewart, Mr. Power, and M. Herbin the French Consul — The Stoker Hussein's Account of the Massacre — Fur- ther Details obtained by Major Kitchener, 245 The Engagement of Canadian Voyageurs for the Passage of the Nile — Cheerfulness of the Men — Ascent of the Ambigol Cataract — The Dongolese Boatmen and Nubians 249 The enormous Labour of the Expedition — The Canadian Voyageurs' Opinion of the Work — Passage of the first or Pioneer Boats described by an Eye-witness — Names of the five Canadians in charge of these Boats, . . . . . 252 A Messenger from Major Kitchener arrives from Dongola— Lord Wolseley receives VIU CONTENTS. News from Khartum — The Mahdi's Sum- mons, and Gordon's Reply — The Mahdi driven back ^ Wolseley's Anxiety to advance — His General Order to the Expedition 256 Sir H. Stewart at Dongola — His Interview with the Mudir— The Camp at Dongola— Social Amusements of the Men — Their Dealings with Camels, .... 258 The Camp at Korti — Preparations for cele- brating Christmas-day — A grand Enter- tainment, . . . . . .261 Tidings of Gordon and the Mahdi — The future Plan of the Campaign — Sir U. Stewart to march from Korti to Metammeh, and General Earle to advance up the Nile to Berber 263 Jottings received from Gordon — He urges Despatch, ...... 266 Sir Herbert Stewart's Column advances to Gakdul — Telegram from General Wolseley announcing the Battle of Abu- Klea— Our heavy Losses, . . 268 THE WAR IN EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. CHAPTER VI. The Question of the Soudan and England. Opinion of the Ex-khedive. State of Affairs at Khartflm. Embarrassment of the British Government. Gordon Interviewed. The Vox Populi. Gordon agrees to return to the Soudan. Starts for Egypt His Mission, and its Object. Zebehr Pasha again. The Journey and Arrival at Khartum. Active Measures. Halfiyeh. Position of Berber. Discussions in England. Egyptian Financial Changes. It is not to be wondered at that the Egyptian ministry was greatly perturbed. In the beginning of the year 1884 they had had to face the probability of an attempted invasion of Egypt itself by the savage and rebellious forces of the Mahdi. The condition of the Soudan provinces was almost hopeless so far as the maintenance of the authority of the government was concerned. It had become too evident that Egyptian troops could not stand before the wild and reckless onslaughts of the Baggara, the Hadendowa, and other fierce tribes of the desert, who had entered on the war stimulated by violent fanaticism, and seemed to be determined to pursue it to the death. The victories of the false prophet and his lieutenants had so raised his reputation that a host of new adherents followed his standard, and made up for the vast numbers who had been slain when they were confronted by sections of tribes as resolute and warlike as themselves, and who, though inferior in numbers, had been led by men with some knowledge of warfare and military tactics, and were provided with firearms in addition to the ordinary weapons, so that they were able to sustain the feeble courage or to threaten the cowardice of the untrained Egyptian recruits. Vol. in. 37 2 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. Nearly the whole of the Soudan was in a state of rebellion before the defeat of the followers of Osman Digma at El Teb and Tamai. The English government had maintained the declaration of the principle first laid down, and refused to recognize that they should be called upon practically to concern themselves either with the defence of the Soudan or its restitution to Egyptian rule. This, they contended, was the business of the Egyptian govern- ment if it was to be effected at all, and if it could not be accom- plished with the means at the command of the viceroy and his ministry it had better be abandoned, when a small force of British troops would remain to assist in preventing any invasion of Egypt itself by the rebels. The advice that had been seriously offered to the Egyptian government was that they should relieve the invested garrisons and relinquish the western provinces of the Soudan as quickly as possible. This advice was, as we have seen, in accordance with the expressed opinion of Lord Dufferin, and agreed in some measure with that held by General Gordon at the time that he had retired from the governor-generalship of the Soudan provinces. It must be remembered, however, that Lord Dufferin had been very doubtful whether the Eastern Soudan could be safely relinquished, and the khedive himself was entirely opposed to the abandonment of a territory which had already cost so much, and might under better conditions be made to yield a large amount of national wealth. , Of course it is easy for anybody to be wise after the event; but at the time just before the interposition of General Graham's force and our protection of Suakim, a good many people agreed with the ex-khedive Ismail when he was consulted by a visitor on the subject of the disaster in the Soudan. This shrewd personage attributed the rebellion in that region to the weakness of the government at Cairo. His highness said that in every part of the Soudan much power is in the hands of a number of religious chiefs, who can easily be managed, but are dangerous if neglected. He contrived to keep them quiet in his time by a small monthly stipend, which the Control, unwisely, as he thought, discontinued. He was of opinion that recent misfortunes OPINIONS OF THE EX-KHEDIVE. 3 might have been avoided if the railway from Suakim on the Red Sea, to Berber on the Nile, had been completed to the Soudan; and it was false economy that led to the abandonment of the scheme by the Control. The manner of sending the troops to the war had also, his highness contended, materially helped to the disaster. " Arabi's disbanded soldiers were sent up to reinforce Hicks Pasha like so many malefactors, deprived of their arms, dishonoured, and often led by officers who were forced to accept the task as a punishment, or even a form of exile. How could they fight with the material he had? I am not surprised at the calamity which has overtaken Egypt." To the question, " But does your highness think the Soudan should be at once aban- doned?" "Certainly not," answered Ismail; "for the moment I think every exertion must be put forth to secure the part of the country still in the possession of Egypt, and the question of reconquest should be postponed till the enterprise can be undertaken in a regular and organized manner, and not piece- meal as a solitary and adventurous enterprise. Unless a stand is made it is impossible to foresee the possible consequences for Egypt. I think, in view of the present crisis of affairs, one of the princes — e.g. my son Prince Hassan — should be named Governor- general of the Soudan, with plenary and uncontrolled powers. He could do a great deal, although the weakness of the execu- tive at Cairo might certainly impair his chances of success." " Might I ask," continued the interlocutor, "if your highness thinks English troops could be sent to the Soudan at the present juncture?" "No," answered Ismail; "such a step might involve still greater evils. Egyptian troops, if well officered, are best suited for the work of pacification." Ismail feared that a spirit of disaffection was rife among the Bedouin tribes of Egypt. " What, then, about the next move of the Mahdi? Will he descend upon Lower Egypt, or will he remain where he is?" "The Mahdi," said Ismail, "will probably advance from Obeid upon Dongola, and from Dongola to Berber, where he will entirely sever com- munications between the Soudan and Egypt." "But, Khartum? Will that be taken en routeV " Not at all. It is quite possible 4 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. to reach Dongola without passing through Khartum. He is at Obeid. He will probably advance northward, leaving Khartum on his right, and seize Dongola. From Dongola it is quite easy to strike Berber, and at Berber he will be able to sever all com- munications between the base at Suakim on the Red Sea and Khartum. It is impossible for Egypt to abandon her hold on her possessions in the south. It may be difficult to reconquer them. It is impossible to abandon them. The road must be kept open from Suakim to Berber, from Berber to Khartum, and from Khartum to Sennar. And that is what leads me to attach great importance to the defeat of Captain Moncrieff at Tokar. That reverse at the hands of Bedouins shows that even close to the littoral of the Red Sea communications are not safe. The rising of these Bedouins should be suppressed at once." It was rather an artful touch to suggest making either of the princes sole ruler of the provinces, especially as one of them had already been suspected of having on his own account, or as an agent of Ismail, increased the dissatisfaction that resulted in the rebellion of Arabi; but still there is much in the opinion which the ex-khedive expressed that showed which way the intention of the Egyptian ministry would be likely to turn, on their con- sidering the subject of abandoning the Soudan. The determination of the British government to restrict their operations to Egypt proper and the advice that they had given with regard to the abandonment of the Soudan was repeatedly considered in the Egyptian councils during the early part of January, 1884, and it was resolved to offer a partial compliance with the representations which had been so seriously urged. It was proposed to resign Darfur, Kordofan, and the other provinces, which were already in the hands of the rebellious natives and the followers of the Mahdi, and to offer the Eastern Soudan to the sultan, but the Egyptian government strongly objected to retire from Khartum. This decision may have been influenced by the opinion that the insurrection would eventually die out either because of dissensions among the tribes or from their probable disaffection when the Mahdi attempted to subject them to the A PEREMPTORY MESSAGE. 5 only kind of authority which would keep them under control. In such an event the possession of Khart The Pall Mall Gazette. DIFFICULTIES OF GORDON S POSITION. 2 t general's portmanteau, Lord Granville took his ticket for him, and the Duke of Cambridge held open the carriage door. He left London, at all events, with the sense that he was sped on his way by the good wishes of friends and comrades, and that the hearts of his countrymen beat in sympathy with him in the work that it was now known he had undertaken. That he entirely shared the views of the government is improbable. He must have known that the pressure of rapidly changing conditions in the rebellious province to which he was going, and the difficulties that might arise because of official complications at Cairo, would make it necessary for him to have a free hand, and that he could not be bound by anything like an unalterable programme. This freedom was accorded and understood; but inevitably when a change of circumstances came which seemed to necessitate a course that the government thought would cancel their declarations of the motives and the policy which led to their having sent a representative to the Soudan, compli- cation arose, and the strongly-expressed advice of the envoy was contrary to the opinion and to the principles on which the govern- ment had interposed for the purpose of evacuating the garrisons of the Soudan provinces. Gordon's own views changed on successive occasions — or, at all events, the practical conclusions at which he seemed to have arrived at a later date differed very considerably from those which he had been commissioned to carry out. These vicissitudes of expediency were among the difficulties which beset the government and appeared likely to become insuperable, especially as the conditions of affairs at Berber and Khartum could only be known by messages which for a long time gave no ground for supposing that it was necessary, even if it had been practicable, to afford any assistance of a kind that would have been outside the scope or the purpose of Gordon's endeavour. At a later period of the year the difficulties were increased by the means of regular communication being interrupted, and by several messages which were sent to and from the distant and beleaguered town being intercepted. General Gordon had little doubt of the success of his mission, so far as the evacuation of Khartum went, when he started on his 2 2 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. journey, though Sir Samuel Baker had said that the effort would be too late. It is probable, also, that though he was not less certain of the establishment of a settled government in the Soudan, he did not entirely agree with the conclusions of the ministry, though he apparently accepted without demur the terms of his instruc- tions. He is reported to have said just before his departure from London : " I go to cut the dog's tail off. I've got my orders, and I'll do it coute que coute." It was with his usual calm and singularly undemonstrative confidence that he said good-bye to the friends who saw him off by the train, which was delayed for a quarter of an hour that there might be a last word or two on the subject of his mission, before he and Colonel Stewart, who had been appointed his military secretary, started on that long last journey to the Soudan. Nine days afterwards a characteristic telegram was received from Cairo by the garrison at Khartiim signed " Gordon," and saying : " You are men, not women. Be not afraid. I am coming." When Gordon resigned his governor-generalship of the Soudan in 1879, and, after concluding the mission to Abyssinia which he had undertaken at the request of the new khedive, left Massowa for England, he had formed, and with some reason, an unfavourable opinion of Tewfik Pasha. He somewhat resented the deposition of Ismail, who had always treated him personally with considera- tion, and had placed the utmost confidence in him. "You say I do not trust Englishmen," the ex-khedive had said on one occasion. " Do I not trust Gordon Pasha.'' I trust him thoroughly, for he is an honest man, and not a diplomatist, but an adminis- trator." Gordon was one of those whom Ismail had deceived by failing to support him, and by allowing the influence of officials at Cairo to thwart the plans of the governor-general, but there was no ill feeling. The subject of Ismail's rule was one of those about which Gordon changed his mind. "It is a blessing for Egypt that he is gone," he said in 1879.^ Yet some of his later expressions intimate that he was afterwards strongly in favour of a restoration of Ismail to the viceroyalty. ' Vol. i. p. 211. EFFECTS OF GORDONS RESIGNATION. 23 We know that if he had found it difficult to continue in office under Ismail and his ministry, he found it impossible under Tewfik, with the renewed opposition of Riaz, Cherif, and Nubar, who endeavoured to interfere with his government of the Soudan. He had determined to resign before he consented to go to Abyssinia as an envoy of the new khedive. The manner in which the ministers received his communications of the result of his mission had confirmed his resolution to leave the country which had nearly cost him his life, but where he left many good friends and grateful memories among the people over whom he had been placed in authority. " Mene, Mene, Tekel, Upharsin," he telegraphed to one of the corrupt and retrogressive pashas who had been appointed in the provinces which he had so lately left, after having cut off the slave-dealers in their strongholds and secured the grateful affection of the formerly oppressed people. In April, 1879, he had said: " If the liberation of slaves takes place in 1884, and if the present system of government goes on, there cannot fail to be a revolt of the whole country." In April, 1880, just a year later, he wrote, " I have learned with equal pain and indignation that the khedive and his subordinate officers have permitted the resuscitation of the slave-trade in Darfur and the other provinces of Central and Equatorial Africa, and that fresh parties of slave-hunters are forming at Obeid in Kordofan, and that every order which I gave concerning the suppression of this abomination has been cancelled." He had then left Gessi to finish the work that remained to be done in the Bahr Gazelle, and it was completed, but the appointment of Raouf Pasha as governor- general seemed to be bringing back the old order of things. Gessi, as we have seen, left the Bahr Gazelle in the autumn of 1880. He with great difficulty made his way to Khartum. In April, 1881, he died in Suez.^ From that time the western provinces of the Soudan may be said to have been lost to Egypt. The work that Gordon had effected was undone. In the following month (May, 188 1) the "Mahdi" had began to make his pretensions; the slave-dealers and slave-owners saw that here was an opportunity ' Vol i. p. 214. 24 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. for an insurrection that would restore their power and influence. We have seen how Gordon longfed for rest, how in his half- humorous way he had a dream of coming to England to find a period of leisure without making engagements, or going out to dinner, but with full liberty to lie late in bed, to read and stroll about, and to eat oysters for lunch. He had at anyrate come to very definite conclusions as to the position of any European entering on important service for an oriental state, and he formu- lated his experience briefly as follows : — 1. Any foreigner entering the service of an oriental state may be sure that no native official will ever be punished, except in name, for anything he may do; he may be certain also that, unless he can hold his own by his own right hand, he will fall; and that it is not in the power, even if it is in the inclination (?) of the ruler of that state to help him. 2. A foreigner cannot go one-tenth as far in the use of — or rather abuse of — his authority as a native; the people will put up with the one, but not with the other, if he exceeds a certain limit. 3. A foreigner, seeing axiom No. i, is obliged, if he is to hold his place, to depart from European rules, and use, to some extent, arbitrary {i.e. oriental) means for defence and offence. 4. A foreigner, if conjointly charged with natives to carry out any work, may rest assured that his great enemies are those with whom he takes counsel, and that they are ready to be crushed if they can bring him down with them, and he may generally be sure that the ruler is not likely to do more than regret (?) his fall. 5. A foreigner, to succeed, must so regulate his affairs that no gain, but sheer loss, to the many would be incurred by his fall. (I mean tangible gain — patriotic sentiments, or advantage to the country, or glory, are sentiments which never weigh in the scale. Actual coin is Allah, and "there is none but" it.) When men reason thus, then fomenters of trouble find no hearers; but neglect this, and every one is ears. This is very natural and not indigenous to the East. When a foreigner has so regulated affairs that his fall will be a loss to the many, then he may afford to look THE AFGHAN QUESTION. 25 his enemies in the face, and not need the smile of the sultan or ameer. These are my views formed from experience; and they are true for Turkey, Egypt, and China, and, I expect, for all the East. PS. — Joseph was the first foreigner in the service of Egypt; he took good care to have the masses indebted to him through his having the means to help them. A minister of finance should never fall — for he holds the purse. The Egyptian people are a servile race, as foretold they should be; and not only do they not deserve a better government than they have, but they would not be content under a better govern- ment. The government is the outcoming of the people, it fitly represents them; it is a fallacy to suppose a good government would alter their nature — it can never do so. If the people were raised the bad government would disappear. It is a fault to attempt a remedy in the branches, seek it in the roots." Gordon had only a few weeks to call his own after his return to England at the end of December, 1879, and he had very great difficulty in evading the assiduous attentions of people who desired to lionize him and interview him, while the newspapers were loud in their praise of the late Governor-general of the Soudan, for whom somebody had invented the title of "the uncrowned king." In the spring of 1880 the government of Lord Beaconsfield had been succeeded by that of Mr. Gladstone, and the Marquis of Ripon had been appointed Viceroy of India in place of Lord Lytton. Everybody who heard of it was surprised that the noble lord had requested General Gordon to accept the appointment of private secretary, and were far more surprised that the man who had so recently claimed and exercised almost uncontrolled power over a vast province should have accepted such an office. It was believed that some extraordinary changes were to be effected in the administration of the affairs of the government of India; that the condition of Central Asia would receive prompt and decisive attention; that the Afghan question would be committed to the new secretary for consideration, and that with him would rest its 26 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. practical settlement. Various speculations were afloat to account for the appointment of so famous and energetic a man to fill what had been regarded, if not as an inferior, at all events as a com- paratively irresponsible and subordinate post, and "society" in Cal- cutta was in a flutter at the probability of this clear-eyed, simple- minded, plain-living satirist of shows and frivolities coming into its midst with a personal influence which would not be snubbed down or ignored, and a position and reputation so high that it would be impossible to affect indifference, especially if it should turn out to be true that he had accepted the secretaryship that he might have an opportunity of settling the Anglo- Russian frontier But the public wonder and the half dismay of Indian fashionable circles were soon dissipated. The one was turned into curiosity, the other was relieved, by the sudden announcement that Gordon had relinquished the secretaryship almost before he could have fulfilled any of its duties. He had left London with the viceroy in the latter part of May, and the public who had followed the telegraphic reports of the journey had scarcely learned that it had terminated at Bombay when the intelligence also arrived that Gordon had resigned. Anybody who knew him must have known that, though he had accepted the appointment in good faith and because he never thought about his own personal demands in relation to any work that he believed it might be his duty to do, he would never be able to submit to the merely subordinate work of a secretary. It was not reasonable to suppose that a man who had been a kind of sultan over a large territory requir- ing absolute authority on the part of its governor, would be able to carry out the orders of a superior in a direction which he might be convinced was altogether a wrong one, and yet refrain from . either interference or remonstrance, except perhaps in the way of a suggestion made with bated breath. It was certainly a good thing that he discovered the mistake he had made before it had become deplorable by a collision between him and his superiors who represented the government. Evidently he had found out, not only that it would be disastrous for him to abide by his hasty decision, but that it was actually impossible. He explained his A MESSAGE FROM CHINA. 27 resignation of the post in a few words, in which he simply acknow- ledged that he had made a mistake. "Men at times, owing to the mysteries of Providence, form judgments which they afterwards repent of. This is my case in accepting the appointment Lord Ripon honoured me in offering me. I repented of my act as soon as I had accepted the appointment, and I deeply regret that I had not the moral courage to say so at that time. Nothing could have exceeded the kindness and consideration with which Lord Ripon has treated me. I have never met anyone with whom I could have felt greater sjmipathy in the arduous task he has undertaken." It had been evident to everybody — so everybody said — that a man like Gordon could not become a comparative cipher and occupy the private secretary's office in Government House; but it had not seemed impossible to himself until he began to reflect on the limitations to which he would be subject in the discharge of his duties. That he should have formed a judgment that he afterwards (and even very soon afterwards) repented of was, it may be said, not altogether outside his experience any more than it was outside that of others. In the Soudan he had to deal with such a network of treachery, greed, and unscrupulous false- hood that it was exceedingly difficult to form immediately, judg- ments which were not afterwards either cancelled or greatly modified by circumstances, or the crooked conduct of the men by whom he was surrounded. These changes of judgment were among the causes of the uncertainty which attended the subsequent relations between him and the government after he had gone out to Khartum. Gordon had intended to leave Bombay for Zanzibar, where he proposed to help the sultan, Syed Burghash, against the slave- dealers, when a telegram reached him from Mr. Campbell, the agent in London of Mr. Hart, the Chinese commissioner of customs, to whom the message had been sent from Gordon's former colleague, Li Hung Chang. This telegram ran, " I am directed to invite you to China. Please come and see for yourself This opportunity for doing really useful work on a large scale 20 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. ought not to be lost. Work, position, conditions can all be arranged with yourself here to your satisfaction. Do take six months' leave and come." The answer returned to London was, "Inform Hart Gordon will leave for Shanghai first opportunity. As for conditions, Gordon indifferent." It must be remembered that General Gordon was still an officer in the British service, and, of .course, had to apply to the war-office for leave to go to China, where his friend " Li," who had been the imperialist governor-general of the Kiang provinces co-operating with the commander of the " ever- victorious army " to quell the Tai-ping rebellion, was anxiously awaiting that com- mander who had been known all over Europe as "Chinese Gordon." The war-office authorities naturally hesitated to grant leave of absence to an officer of the British service unless he could state his purpose in going to China and the position he was to hold there, for it was with Russia that the Chinese were contemplating hostilities in connection with the operations at Kashgar. In answer to these inquiries he could only reply, " I am ignorant;" but that there might be no obstacle in the way, he sent in the resig- nation of his commission, and sailed for Hong-Kong. He certainly had no reason to complain of any undue restraint being placed upon him by the military authorities, especially as the news of his intention was likely to, and afterwards did, cause great anger and excitement in Russia. His resignation was not accepted, and he received permission to go on condition that he should not enter on any military service. Even to this he would not pledge himself. All he would say was, " My fixed desire is to persuade the Chinese not to go to war with Russia, both in their own interests and those of the world, and especially those of England. To me it appears that the questions in dispute cannot be of such vital importance that an arrangement could not be come to by concessions on both sides. Whether I succeed in being heard or not is not in my hands. I protest, however, against being regarded as one who wishes for war in any country, far less in China. In the event of war breaking out I could not answer how I should 'act for the present; but I shall ardently desire a speedy peace. Inclined GENERAL GORDON IN CHINA. 29 as I am, with only a small degree of admiration for military exploits, I esteem it a far greater honour to promote peace than to gain any petty honours in a wretched war." Li Hung Chang, of whom Gordon had said that he was the ablest man in China, had risen to the highest position in the empire, and was now little less than prime minister, but with the suspicion in the Celestial court that he was possessed of an overweening ambition, and of a damaging inclination to adopt the methods and progressive policy of foreign teachers, even to the extent of seeking the permanent aid of foreign arms, and yet fortunately he and Prince Kung, of whom he was guardian, were in favour of peace, while his rival minister Tso and Prince Chun were advocating war General Gordon arrived at Hong-Kong on the 2d of July, and after a short stay with Sir John and Lady Hennesey at Government House, went to visit the viceroy at Canton, where he distinctly told his numerous friends in answer 10 their inquiries that his visit was unofficial, that he was there on a holiday to see his old friend Li, and that his views would be opposed to a proposal to form an Anglo-Chinese military force in case of war, as he should strongly advise the Chinese to use their own army. He spoke in the same way at Tientsin and at Pekin, where Li Hung Chang received him with effusive welcome, falling on his neck and kissing him, with the conviction that he had now a powerful supporter in the man who, seventeen years before, had earned a right to speak in Chinese councils. Gordon lost no time before conferring with the nobles and mandarins, he himself being one of them by the imperial rank bestowed on him after the suppression of the Tai-ping rebellion He was resolute and outspoken in advising peace. His voice prevailed, and perhaps mainly because he gave formal expression to his advice in a memorandum which strongly opposed the employment of a foreign force, as he contended that China possessed a long-used military organization, a regular military discipline which should be left intact, as it was suited to her people, who in numbers had the advantage over other powers, were inured to hardships, and could be made formidable by being armed with breech-loaders, to the 30 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. use of which they should be taught to become accustomed. His memorandum went much further than this, for it entered with con- siderable minuteness into the system on which the Chinese army should be trained, the arms and artillery which should be furnished to it, the manner in which such arms and munitions might be provided, and the methods by which the army should operate in the field and under the conditions of actual warfare, some of the tactics which he recommended having been apparently taken from his observations of the natives in the Soudan. One passage of the document is very peculiar : — " China should have a few small-bored, very long range wall-pieces, rifled and breech-loaders. They are light to carry, and if placed a long way off will be safe from attack. If the enemy comes out to take them the Chinese can run away; and if the enemy takes one or two, it is no loss. Firing them in the enemy's camp a long way off would prevent the enemy sleeping; and if he does not sleep, then he gets ill and goes into hospital, and then needs other enemies to take care of him, and thus the enemy's numbers are reduced." One could well fancy that there is a little of Gordon's frequently irrepressible satirical humour here; but in effect the advice is a part of his recommendation of a system of harassing warfare with large bodies of infantry able to march unencumbered by much baggage or by any heavy artillery, and well armed with breech-loaders carrying about looo yards.'^ The concluding words of the memorandum were : " China wants no big officer from foreign powers. I say big officer because I am a big officer in China. If I stayed in China it would be bad for China, because it would vex the American, French, and German governments, who would want to send their officers. Besides, I am not wanted. China can do what I recommend herself If she cannot I could do no good." The authorities at the war-office were indulgent to him, and, it must be confessed, they strained their rules to the utmost; but as he did not give any guarantee that he would not take up arms in ' This document appears in extenso in The Story of Chinese Gordon by A. Egmont Hake, and on the advice which it contains the Chinese army was afterwards formed. GORDON IN THE MAURITIUS. 3 1 China, they were compelled to send a message that his leave had been cancelled. He was on his way home when the intimation reached him at Shanghai, and the leave was then extended to give him time to get back to England by the end of February, 1881. For some time he had been cherishing the intention of taking the longed-for holiday rest in Syria and Palestine, but he had no sooner reached home than he was caught by some of the moving questions of the hour — the condition of Ireland and the Irish, — the evacuation of Candahar. To Ireland he went on a visit, and came to his own conclusions on the subject of the troubles, but he had already been devoting his attention to a proposal on the part of the King of the Belgians to organize an international expedition to the Congo, of which his majesty desired that he should take the command. The scheme was not then matured, and Gordon, after a brief holiday at Lausanne, accepted an offer to proceed to Mauritius as commanding royal engineer. A good many of his friends were highly pleased that he had undertaken this post, because they regarded it as a method of reserving him, as it were, in case some important duty should demand a man of unusual qualifications, energy, and resource. Just before taking this appointment Gordon had received intelligence of the death of Gessi in the French hospital at Suez; and the news was a blow to him, for he knew that his work in the Soudan would now be undone. On his way out Gordon stayed at Suez to visit the grave of his brave lieutenant and faithful follower. At Mauritius the work was somewhat irksome because of official routine, but the ten months passed there brought in reality something like the needed rest, and as much leisure as Gordon would have been likely to take. It was a quiet, peaceable, and by no means an unhappy time, during which he was greatly interested in those marvellous islands the Seychelles, made some curious speculative researches as to the geographical position of the Garden of Eden, and as a more professional occupation planned and put forward some very excellent schemes for the defence of the Indian Ocean. While thus occupied, in March, 1882, he was raised to the rank of major-general, and at about the same time, or 32 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. earlier, a request had reached him from the Cape government to assist in terminating the war in Basutoland. Gordon had offered his services a year before — that is to say, while he was taking his brief holiday at Lausanne in the spring of 1 88 1 he had received an intimation from the government of the Cape of Good Hope offering him the command of the Colonial forces at a salary of ;^i500 a year. But he was not inclined to undertake military service merely, as he believed that the condition of affairs in Basutoland would offer a field for his talent in media- tion and the removal of the causes of hostilities; he had, therefore, telegraphed to the premier of the Cape government, " Chinese Gordon offers his services for two years at £700 a year to assist in terminating war and administering Basutoland." This overture was not accepted, but a year later, affairs in Basutoland having become serious and another Colonial government having come into authority, it was thought to be of the utmost importance to secure the services of some one of proved ability, firmness, and energy; and on the 23d of February, 1882, Sir Hercules Robinson telegraphed to the Earl of Kimberley to inquire whether Colonel Gordon, R.E., C.B., would be permitted to go out to the Cape for the purpose of consulting with ministers as to the best measures to be adopted with reference to Basutoland, and should he be prepared to renew the offer made to their predecessors. Leave was immediately granted by the war-office, and the premier of the Cape then telegraphed to Gordon asking him if he was disposed to renew the offer which he made to the former ministry in April of the previous year. They did not expect him to be bound by the salary then stated, and urged him, should he agree, to go out at once in order to learn the facts, the knowledge of which would be requisite for him to render them advice and assistance. By so doing, they said, he would confer a signal favour on the colony, leaving his future action unimpeded. This seemed to be plain enough. Gordon had refused the mere command of the forces, but had offered to assist in terminating the war and administering the country. That was the offer which the Colonial government had now accepted if he could be induced to repeat it, and, in A HIGH AND MIGHTY GOVERNMENT. 33 compliance with the urgent request contained in their telegram, he started immediately, and reached the Cape in May. This is not the place in which to enter into an account of Gordon's experiences under a government which appears to have acted in the spirit of the lower type of parochialism, and to have treated him much as a pompous board of guardians might treat a minor parish official if they had first asked his advice and then found that it was opposed to some local personal interest which they had not the courage to disturb. He had no sooner arrived there than he found that ministers were apparently under the fear of Mr. Orpen, who was the Administrator of Basutoland, for, though they did not approve of that gentleman's policy, they thought that it was too popular to be immediately traversed. If Gordon would for a time take the position of commandant- general, which he had previously refused, they would be able to avail themselves by and by of his invaluable counsel and well- known ability and integrity. He was never careful of his own personal claims, and as he was already sufficiently acquainted with the condition of affairs in Basutoland to have arrived at the conclusion that prompt and decisive measures were necessary, and to believe that the policy which was being pursued was not likely to put an end to the hostility of the natives, he consented to remain, in the expectation that he would shortly be permitted to take some part in the work for which he had been summoned. In a very short time he had made investigations which convinced him that the primary mistake had been that of transferring Basutoland from the Imperial to the Colonial government without consulting the Basutos themselves, and he proposed that they should be assembled and permitted to discuss the terms of an agreement with the Colonial governor. No reply was made to his memorandum, nor to subsequent representations on the very matters which he had been sent for to examine and advise upon. He had been requested to examine and report on the Colonial force, and in his reply he showed that by a system of economy — which began by cutting down his own salary one-third — the force of 1600 men might be increased to 8000, and yet /^7000 be saved Vol. III. 39 34 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. to the colony. Nothing followed. He was asked to go up country and report on some matters there, and was afterwards told to draw up suggestions of remedies for the evils which he pointed out. He did so; no notice was taken. Possibly he was too earnest and too rapid for the Colonial ministry, or they may have differed entirely from his conclusions; but as they had professed to disagree with the condition of things which he had been sent for that he might improve them, something should have been done. The ministry did nothing except to treat the man, whom they had solicited to hurry to their aid, with an indifference that was unbearable whether it arose from sloth, trepidation, or arrogance. On the 1 8th of July the ministry requested him to go to Basutoland. In reply he sent a memorandum containing propo- sitions for a convention. He felt that if he went it was due to himself that he should go prepared with some definite proposal in which he would be sustained by the authority of the govern- ment. No answer. He had, however, sent a private note to the premier, saying that it was useless for him to go, unless the government were prepared to acknowledge his presence and take account of his proposals. He heard no more of it, though he afterwards offered to resign his office as commandant-general and to go as resident to the territory of the hostile chief Masupha for two years at a salary of ;^300 a year, as he believed that in time he should be able to gain the old chief's confidence and restore order to the country. No doubt this proposition seemed too wild and unconventional to require any answer, and by that time it began to be recognized that Gordon was not a likely man to be induced to appear to endorse a policy to which he was entirely opposed. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that he had made the relative position of the government and himself extremely awkward by letting it be known that having proposed a convention, and exposed the provocation and oppression to which the natives were subjected by unjust laws put in force by incompetent and brutal magistrates, he should refuse to lead a force against the Basutos unless improvements were made both in the laws and in the choice of those who administered them. A BASE DEED. 35 Little as he cared about personal consequences, he would perhaps scarcely have said this unless he had felt that it would either produce a crisis or preface his resignation. In August, however, the secretary for native affairs, Mr. Sauer, went up to W'illiams- tOAvn and asked Gordon to go with him into Basutoland, where he was to meet Mr. Orpen the ministerial representative. Gordon contended that as he was opposd to Mr. Orpen's policy, and as the government had taken no notice of the convention which he had suggested, he could be of no possible use there. Still Sauer persisted, and Gordon reluctantly consented to accompany him. They reached Basutoland in September, and had an interview with Letsea the chief, who assumed to be an ally of the government and hostile to Masupha. Gordon was more than ever convinced that the policy of encouraging hostility between the tribes was utterly mistaken, and he handed to Mr. Sauer a memorandum to that effect. Mr. Sauer, after having considered the memorandum, asked Gordon if he would go as a private individual to Masupha and see what he could do. It must be remembered that Mr. Sauer was an important official, that he knew what were Gordon's views, and that the government, also knowing them, wished him to accompany the secretary. Gordon was not a man to shrink from such an attempt as Sauer now persuaded him to undertake, even though he had no credentials nor instructions, and his mission was non-official and merely tentative. He went, as usual, unarmed, and as usual impressed the savage chief with his honesty of purpose and the truth of his representations. Had this not been the case Gordon might never have returned alive, for while he was negotiating with Masupha, the emissaries of those who had the management of the policy that was being pursued, had incited Letsea to send his son Lethrodi with a number of men to attack the old chief. It is not desirable to speculate on the possible motives of the immediate instigators of such an act. That Gordon had gone to see Basuto on a mission of peace was known, but that was the moment chosen treacherously to renew hostilities. Doubt- less Gordon's expressions of indignation and astonishment were equal to those of the old chief himself, who with a fine instinct 36 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. seemed instantly to acquit his visitor of either knowledge of or participation in the base act, and suffered him to depart un- molested. Masupha apparently knew better than the Cape ministry what was due to a gentleman and a brave, upright, and distinguished man. Gordon departed for the nearest station from which he could telegraph his resignation to the under- colonial-secretary at Cape Town. This was on the 26th of September, 1882, and his resignation being accepted he left South Africa only a little more than five months after he had been induced to take office there by the persuasion that he could place at the disposal of the colonial government qualifications which all the world, except that government, had been able to appreciate. It may, of course, be contended that by his experiences and the positions which he had held Gordon had learned to take an attitude which in an officer holding any other than the highest position in a regular government would appear to be somewhat masterful, and his own character and disposition were not favour- able to habits of submission or circumlocution. That he was accustomed to advance his own views with much plainness when he thought that occasion called for a personal expression of them is well known, but after allowing for all this the conduct of the Cape government cannot be defended. Had he not been allowed to remain under a misconception of the position he was to occupy he would probably have resigned as promptly as he did when he discovered that he had himself made a mistake in accepting the post of private secretary to Lord Ripon, and his explanation would then have involved nobody but himself, as when people complained on that occasion that he had suppressed his motives for resigning, he said at once that, in such a position with a turbulent spirit like his, he would be likely to do more harm than good, and would only too probably hamper the viceroy, and involve him in difficulties. It must have been with a sense of relief, not unmingled with a certain feeling of disdain, that Gordon left the Cape. His experi- ences there had apparently tended to increase his reserve, but had not embittered his temper. He had learned not to fear and not A NEW PROSPECT. 37 to care much what man could do to him, and he had very Httle regard for the opinions of the Cape high officials, who had received his resignation with a certain pompous alacrity, which vainly attempted to imply a snub, as it was defeated by the calm imper- turbable brevity of Gordon's last note. Now he wanted to be alone, or, at all events, to seize, while he could, the opportunity for a time of seclusion; and soon after his return to England he went to Palestine and settled outside Jerusalem. There he lived chiefly on bread and fruits, reserving tobacco, in the form of cigarettes, for special occasions, and devoted the greater part of his pay to the relief of the poor and distressed. Most of his time was devoted to research in subjects which interested him deeply. It was with an eagerness that was almost a passion that he pursued the survey of the Holy Sepulchre, the Tabernacle, and the walls of Jerusalem. He had taken the holy sites in hand, to prove them not the holy sites at all, greatly to the horror and scandal of clerical tourists. But he was no mere iconoclast; he worked as one seeing sermons in stones and good in everything — with the faith of a Christian, but the eye and brain of an engineer. The Bible was his guide, and he did not care for sites if he had a map. " In reality," he said, " no man, in writing on these sites, ought to draw on his imagination; he ought to keep to the simple facts, and not prophesy or fill up gaps." Among the subjects in which he took the deepest interest was the proposed Jordan Canal, and he went thoroughly into the details of that great scheme.^ He was resting, and at peace, but his was not a nature to remain long satisfied with occupations which may be said to have been chosen for his own gratification. His activity would soon seek a wider scope. He had continued to keep up his acquaintance with public affairs, and was noting events with an interest as keen as ever. It was scarcely likely that he would remain long without some application being made to him to undertake important work, and the scheme for a mission with Stanley on the Congo was in the future — in the immediate future, as it turned out; for, while he was planning how he would return and resume, at the east end of London, the ' A. Egmont Hake : Story of Chinese Gordon. o 8 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. work among the poor which he had formerly carried on at Gravesend, he had letters from the King of the Belgians reminding him of the scheme for administering certain territory on the Congo and establishing an anti-slavery mission in memory of the dead son of the sovereign, who had obtained his promise to take the control if the assent of his government and of the other powers were secured. It took a very short time for Gordon to prepare for leaving Palestine. He sailed from Jaffa by the first ship, a battered merchantman that was nearly wrecked on the voyage, and was very soon at Brussels, where the final arrangements for the Congo enterprise were rapidly completed, the plans discussed, and full instructions and authority placed in his hands. It has been significantly said, that but for the excitement of popular feeling by the publication of the opinions expressed by General Gordon to the representative of a newspaper, and the strong opinion in favour of his being sent out to the Soudan by the government, he would probably have been discussing the programme of the Belgian mission with Mr. Stanley on the banks of the Congo, instead of finding himself beleaguered in Khartum ; but neither the news- paper editors nor the public, whose enthusiasm was aroused, were aware that the government had made overtures to secure his services some time before, when he might have achieved prompt and complete success in the undertaking for which he was required, but that Gordon himself was reluctant to accept the appointment, and the Egyptian ministry were absolutely opposed to the results which it was mainly intended to accomplish. Gordon had desired to induce Sir Samuel Baker to undertake the duty, and as late as the 12th of January had written to him a letter in which he had given a general view of tne situation, from which it was evident that he regarded the intervention of Turkish troops as desirable if not inevitable. He said: — " If the sultan allows the Mahdi to be head of the govern- ment, he virtually abdicates all authority over the Hedjaz, Syria, Palestine; therefore if we prevent his action, or refuse propositions such as I have made, we virtually upset the sultan in the countries MR. POWER AT KHARTUM. * 39 I have named. I take it for granted that you will go; and I would recommend, (i) permission to be got from the sultan to engage 4000 of his reserve troops, both officers and men, which will be under your brother's command, and be volunteers with a promise of remuneration at end of their services; (2) that some 2000 Beloochees under the native officers should be enlisted in India, who have been soldiers of her Majesty, old sturdy warriors; for your cavalry, you can horse them in Hedjaz, Palestine, and Syria; (3) that her Majesty's government will allow you to purchase from her Majesty animals, paying a percentage on all purchases; (4) that her Majesty's government should allow mili- tary store officers to aid you, but not to go into the field." We have already seen what was the course of events at Suakim and in the Eastern Soudan up to a date beyond that at which Gordon arrived in Khartum, and we may now glance at the situation of the latter place at the beginning of 1884 previous to his arrival in the southern provinces. The only Englishman at Khartiim, except Colonel Coetlogon, who was of course in the Egyptian service, was Mr. Power, the special correspondent of the Times, and in December, 1883, Sir E. Baring telegraphed to Earl Granville asking permission to employ this gentleman as temporary consular agent, that there might be somebody to send information of what was going on from time to time. This proposal was approved by the foreign minister, and from that time until the arrival of Gordon, and afterwards, Mr. Power occupied an official position, apparently without discontinuing to represent the Times. There had ceased to be any hope that even a remnant of the army of Hicks Pasha had escaped, and later reports (at the end of January, 1884' seemed to give even a more sinister aspect to the supposed causes of his immediate defeat. A Greek merchant who escaped from Obeid and arrived at Khartiim declared that he was present at the battle, and affirmed that from the time General Hicks left Duem large bodies of Arabs camped each night on the place or "seriba" occupied by General Hicks the night before. He frequently wished to turn and disperse these men, but Alladeen Pasha assured him that they 40 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN, were friends following to back up the Egyptian army. On the sixth or seventh day General Hicks sent back a small body; they were fired upon by the Arabs; and then General Hicks again insisted that these men should be dispersed. Alladeen refused, and General Hicks then drew his sword and threw it on the ground, saying that he resigned, and would no longer be respon- sible if the governor-general did not permit his orders to be obeyed. General Hicks said that from the time he left Duem Alladeen caused his orders to be disobeyed. After some time he was persuaded to resume the command; but things went on as before, the body of Arabs in rear always growing larger. After some small engagements Kashgil was reached. Here an ambus- cade had been formed for days, and the guide told to lead the army thither. When the Arabs opened fire from behind rocks and trees they were wholly concealed, and the guns in position could fire with impunity. The shells and bullets of the Egyptians were harmless, so thick were the rocks and trees. General Hicks wheeled his army to gain the open, but found the defile blocked by Alladeen's so-called friends the Arabs, who had been following him for days. These had got into cover and opened fire on the army. The Arabs from behind their cover kept up a fire for three days, and in the whole affair lost no more than from 270 to 300 men. The Egyptian soldiers were then lying on the ground dying or in convulsions from thirst, and the Arabs found them in groups of twenty or so unable to rise. They were all speared on the ground. General Hicks's staff and escort had water, and were in a group on horseback. When the Arabs came out of cover General Hicks charged, leading his staff and shooting down all the rebels in his way. They galloped past towards a sheikh supposed by the Egyptians to be the Mahdi. General Hicks rushed on him with his sword and cut his face and arm; the man had on a Darfur steel mail-shirt. Just then a club thrown struck General Hicks on the head, and unhorsed him; the horses of the staff were speared, but the officers fought on foot till all were killed. General Hicks was the last to die. The Mahdi was not in the battle, but came to see General Hicks's body. As each A DEAD-LOCK. 4 1 sheikh passed he pierced it with his lance, an Arab custom, that he might say he assisted in his death. The report added that the Mahdi had a large standing army of 35,000 paid men, and could obtain 30,000 in three days when he called for them. At the end of November, 1883, it was not easy to say whether there was any security against the rebellion anywhere above Assouan, Siout, or Minieh. The remains of the Egyptian troops were to be concentrated at Khartum, where Colonel Coetlogon had arrived with the movable column employed in clearing the White Nile bank as far as Duem. He calculated that when he had collected his whole force within the place the total of the avail- able troops would be not more than 4000, in the only spot where Egyptian authority was likely to keep any footing, and where the success at El Obeid was already causing so much disaffection among the populace that the colonel was seriously thinking of attempting a retreat down the river to Berber, whence he thought that he might reach Suakim, although, as was afterwards known, the route from Berber to the sea would probably have been impassable to a body of disheartened troops, harassed at every step by a horde of enemies already exulting over the news of a victory over the army which had been annihilated at Kashgil on the 5th of November. The opinion of the military authorities at Cairo as represented by General Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, and General Baker, who met to discuss the subject officially, was that the Egyptian government would find it impossible to hold the Soudan with the force at their disposal, and that it would be eventually necessary, after withdrawing the garrisons, to fall back from Khar- tiim to Egypt proper; but that Khartiim should, if possible, be held long enough to allow the more advanced posts and detached garrisons in the Soudan to rejoin, while the Egyptian government should try to render as much support as possible from Suakim. We have seen, however, that aid from Suakim became impracticable, because of the extension of the insurrection to the Eastern Soudan, and the disasters which occurred there. Had it been practicable to keep open the route between Suakim and Berber, or had the 42 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. railway, which had been talked about so long before, been com- pleted between these two points, the conditions might have been very different; but as it turned out, everything tended towards the isolation of Khartum, which alone was not worth preserving even if its preservation had been possible, with the whole of the sur- rounding provinces in arms and their chiefs so far committed to the revolt that they were determined to stand the hazard. On the 25th of November Colonel Coetlogon telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Wood, " Khartum and Sennar cannot be held in two months' time. There will be no food. All supplies are cut off to save what remains of the army of the Soudan. A retreat on Ber- ber should be ma,de at once, and by a combined movement from Berber and Suakim that route should be opened. Reinforcements arriving could not reach Khartum except by land, and for that a very large force is necessary, and no supplies for them if they did arrive. The river route cannot be relied upon, as it can be stopped any day where mountains overhang the river, which at that point is narrow and shallow. We have only two steamers that could do towing work. Both are small, of no power, and old. To carry a force by river would be very difficult in a month's time even if unattacked. The troops that are left are the refuse of the army, mostly old and blind. Again I say the only way of saving what remains is to attempt a general retreat on Berber. This is the real state of affairs here, and I beg of you to impress it on his highness the khedive." At this very time, or at least the next day, two telegrams were sent to Earl Granville from Sir E. Baring, who had succeeded Sir E. Malet as governor-general at Cairo : one was to assure his lordship that the Egyptian government fully understood that the whole responsibility of any operations in the Soudan must rest on them, and that they must rely wholly on their own resources; and the other that intelligence from Suakim had arrived, that fears were entertained for the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat, as the troops refused to go to their relief There was small hope, therefore, of organizing a movement towards Berber with Egyptian troops, and the army of Sir Evelyn Wood had been, as we have "WHAT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DONE. 43 seen, enlisted under the distinct promise to the recruits that they should not be called upon to serve in the Soudan. It would appear that the whole disaster in the Soudan may be attributed to the determination of the Egyptian government to send Hicks Pasha to operate in Kordofan. Sir Samuel Baker had advocated the White Nile being made the boundary of Egypt's authority. As early as April, 1883, the Earl of Dufferin had told the Egyptian minister for the Soudan that the disturbances which had then taken place were mainly to be attributed to the misgovern- ment and cruel exactions of the local Egyptian authorities at Khartum, and that whatever might be the pretensions of the Mahdi to a divine mission, his chief strength was derived from the despair and misery of the population. Lord Dufferin added that if the Egyptian government were wise it would confine its efforts to the re-establishment of its authority in Sennar, and would not seek to extend its dominion beyond that province and the bordering river banks. This would have diminished and ultimately put an end to the drain on the Egyptian treasury, and if Dongola, Khartum, and Sennar had been endowed with a just and humane administration, the ultimate recovery of so much of the abandoned territories as it might have proved desirable to reannex, might have been easily effected at a later period. General Hicks had to contend with innumerable difficulties and annoyances, and was frequently thwarted by the jealousies, the apathy, and the incapacity of the local authorities with whom he had to act. His means of transport were also deficient; the steamers placed at his disposal were in an unsatisfactory con- dition; nor were his troops any of the best, though under his leading they do not seem to have fought badly. Over all these impediments, however, he successfully triumphed, and Lord Dufferin, on the day that he left Egypt, telegraphed to Earl Granville the news of the general's victory at IMarabiyeh, which took place on the 29th of April, 1883, and led to the complete re-establishment of the authority of the Egyptian government in Sennar. Lord Dufferin was distinctly of opinion that had General Hicks's offensive operations terminated here, all would have been 44 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. comparatively well. A deep river and a considerable tract of desert separated the liberated territory from the Mahdi's head- quarters, and breathing time had been gained for effecting the defensive operations suggested by Colonel Stewart, and for the establishment of a just and decent administration at Khartiim and Sennar, as well as for negotiations with some of the disaffected tribes. On the 29tn of December a " black nun," a lay sister of an Austrian convent at Obeid, arrived at Khartiim after twenty-one days' journey. She stated that there was no army or body of soldiers existing in Kordofan, and that the Mahdi was mustering his forces for an advance on Khartum. She also declared that not one Egyptian soldier escaped massacre, and that the only European prisoner brought in was a Pomeranian Uhlan servant of Major Seckendorf, and that he was well treated by the Mahdi, as also were all the missionaries at Obeid; but that though the Mahdi personally treated the whites well, the tribes generally were bent on their massacre. The position at Kharttim was evidently dangerous, and it had there been heard that Berber had already been attacked by a body of Bishareen Arabs, who, though they had been repulsed by the Bashi-Bazouks, had probably not retreated to any great distance. As early as December i8th Admiral Sir William Hewett had reported that the road from Suakim to Berber was closed, and that it was probable that an organized army other than Egyptian, to the number of 15,000 men, would be necessary to re-open the country. This was the intelligence conveyed to him by Suleiman Pasha, the governor-general and commander-in-chief of the army at Suakim, who also stated that all supplies would have to be imported for such an army as would be required to fight its way and keep the route open to Berber. It may be mentioned here that in the first days of December the Egyptian government had proposed to send, and afterwards did send, Zebehr Pasha to Suez. He had raised some black troops, who were sent to Suez, where they were- made somewhat reluctantly to embark for service at Suakim. They having shown ZEBEHR PASHA. 45 signs of mutiny because Zebehr himself was not to command them, he having been recalled to Cairo, they were only overawed and compelled by the Egyptian troops, under the command of Majors Kitchener and Chermside. The Egyptian troops were commanded by English officers, otherwise the black recruits would doubtless have proceeded to open hostilities. On the 9th of December Sir E. Baring wrote to Lord Granville that it had been proposed to send Zebehr, and said: " Under ordinary circumstances his employment by the Egyptian government would have been open to considerable objection, and I should have thought it my duty to remonstrate against it. Under present circumstances, however, I have not thought it either necessary or desirable to interfere with the discretion of the Egyptian government in this matter. Whatever may be Zebehr Pasha's faults, he is said to be a man of great energy and resolution. The Egyptian government considers that his services may be very useful in commanding the friendly Bedouins who are to be sent to Suakim, and in conducting nesfotiations with the tribes on the Berber-Suakim route and else- where. I may mention that Baker Pasha is anxious to avail him- self of Zebehr Pasha's services. Your lordship will, without doubt, bear in mind that up to the present time the whole responsibility for the conduct of the affairs in the Soudan has been left to the Egyptian government. It appeared to me that, under present circumstances, it would not have been just, whilst leaving all the responsibility to the Egyptian government, to have objected to that government using its own discretion on such a point as the employ- ment of Zebehr Pasha. I make these remarks as the employment of Zebehr Pasha may not improbably attract attention in England." There could be no question that public opinion in England would be excited by the proposal, and subsequently, when the proposition was made by the Egyptian government to send Zebehr to Khartum, the Anti-slavery Society appealed to Earl Granville against it, quoting the declarations of General Gordon with regard to the influence which Zebehr had exercised in maintaining the slave traffic. 46 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. Things were going from bad to worse around Khartum, and the impression gaining ground that there would be no interposition to save the Soudan to Egypt, it was rumoured that Menelek of Shoa, assisted by the Gallas, would probably seize Harrar, and that the Somalis might turn the Egyptians out of Berbera and Zeila. An engagement had taken place between the rebels and the garrison of Gazeerah on the Atbara, in which the latter succeeded in beating off their assailants, but destroyed the fortified encampment at Gazeerah and made their way to Berber. On the 30th of December, 1883, Mr. Power telegraphed to Sir E. Baring from Khartiim, saying: — " The European and loyal population are beginning to think that they have been either forgotten or abandoned by the govern- ment at Cairo. The state of affairs here is very desperate; we know that twenty-three days ago the Mahdi was assembling a great army to attack us, and to an Arab, Obeid is only an eleven days' march from here. Some do the distance in nine days. What numbers he will bring I cannot say, but we have here, including gunners and sentries, in all but 3000 to hold 4 miles of earthworks, on which are a few old bronze guns and one Krupp field-piece; this number of men would not properly man the walls, and it leaves us without any reserve or relief to move to a threatened place in case of attack. It also forbids us having any guard in the city, which, in case of attack, will be at the mercy of an undisguisedly rebel population. At present we are not strong enough to seize the well-known ringleaders or agents of the Mahdi. This is well known to the government, yet over forty days have elapsed since it heard the news of our situation here, and there are as yet no signs of a relieving column arriving. We have not yet even heard if they have arrived at Assiout, eight hours from Cairo. On the 27th of last month (November) the khedive telegraphed most distinctly that Zobeir Pasha and his Bedouins had left Cairo two days before. He said that Baker was leaving Suez, yet I find that the papers of the 4th instant state that neither one nor the other have left Cairo, and that Zobeir was, before leaving, to raise, arm, and, I suppose, train 1000 A TELEGRAM FROM KHARTUM. 47 negroes. In three days this town may be in the hands of the rebels, yet there has been an attempt made to prevent the Kawah and Duem garrisons from joining us. . . On Christmas Day Ibrahim Pasha told me that every house in Kharttim had arms in it, and we are not strong enough to have domiciliary visits carried out. Colonel Coetlogon is indefatigable in his efforts to provide that nothing should be left undone for the safety of the town. All the works have been carried out under his personal supervision, and he is continually inspecting the working gangs while at work; he has driven a deep ditch and parapet 1400 metres long across the level space or plain left dry by the subsidence of the river; but for him this broad avenue into the town would have been left open and unprotected, so now the fortification runs from river to river. There is here a small portion of the population, European or otherwise, whose loyalty is undoubted. These men would un- doubtedly be ready to defend their property and families here, and act as police to keep the mob in check, in case of attack, but there are no arms to serve out to them, there being but a few hundred rifles in the arsenal, not enough to provide for accidents amongst the soldiers." Now, on the ist of December Earl Granville had telegraphed to Sir E. Baring asking whether, if General Gordon were willing to go to Egypt, he would be of any use either to the consul-gen- eral or to the Egyptian government, and if so, in what capacity; and the reply received the next day had been: — "The Egyptian government is very much averse to employing General Gordon, mainly on the ground that the movement in the Soudan being religious, the appointment of a Christian in high command would probably alienate the tribes who remain faithful. I think it wise to leave the whole responsibility of Soudan affairs to them, and not to press them on the subject." On the 9th of January Colonel Coetlogon telegraphed to the khedive strongly urging an immediate withdrawal from Khartum. One-third of the garrison were unreliable, and if it had been twice as strong it could not have held Khartum against the whole country, which, without a doubt, was all opposed to 4^ EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. Egyptian government. Preliminary instructions had been given to prepare for a retreat. The Egyptian governor and com- mander of troops entirely agreed with him. On the following day Earl Granville asked whether General Gordon or Sir Charles Wilson would be of any assistance under the altered circumstances of a new ministry having been formed at Cairo; but the answer received in a few hours was that it was not thought that the services of either of them could be utilized at pre- sent. On the 14th of January Earl Granville telegraphed: "Can you give further information as to prospects of retreat for army and residents at Khartum, and measures taken?" and on the i6th the answer came: — "With reference to your lordship's telegram of the 14th instant, I hope soon to be able to telegraph fully, as the sub- ject of the withdrawal from Khartum is now being discussed. There can be no doubt, however, that very great difficulties will be encountered. It was intended to despatch Abd-el-Kader, the new minister of war, to Khartum; he at first accepted, but now declines to go. The Egyptian government would feel greatly obliged if her Majesty's government would select a well-qualified British officer to go to Khartum instead of the war minister. He would be given full powers, both civil and military, to conduct the retreat." This, of course, was the same thing as leaving the government here to appoint Gordon at once. We have already noted what were the instructions to General Gordon contained in a letter from Earl Granville setting forth the objects of his mission. It was first arranged that Gordon should not go to Cairo on his way to Khartum, as he had no desire to have an audience with the khedive Tewfik, and thought it better in some respects that he should go entirely untrammelled, so that he might not be subjected to any Egyptian official restrictions ; but Earl Granville had, on the 19th of January, sent to Sir E. Baring say- ing: — " I inclose copy of the instructions which I have addressed to Major-general Gordon, who proceeds to-night to Egypt, accom- panied by Lieutenant-colonel Stewart, to report to her Majesty's government on the state of affairs in the Soudan. General Gordon will be under your instructions, and will perform such GENERAL GORDON S MEMORANDUM. 49 Other duties beyond those specified in my despatch as may be intrusted to him by the Egyptian government through you. He will report to you his arrival in Egypt, but as he is anxious not to go to Cairo I have to request you, if possible, to make arrangements for meeting him at Ismailia, in order to concert with him whether he should proceed direct to Suakim, or go himself or despatch Colonel Stewart to Khartum via the Nile." It may be noted that Gordon was thus officially to take instruc- tions through the British consul-general at Cairo, who, however, replied that it would be useless for General Gordon and Colonel Stewart to go to Suakim, where General Baker was doing all that could be done with the means at his disposal; but that they should first go to Cairo with Sir Evelyn Wood and General Watson, who would meet them at Port Said, and after discussing matters should proceed to Khartum. Daily conferences were being held on the subject of the Soudan, and instructions had already been sent by the Egyptian government to Khartum to commence at once send- ing to Berber all the civil officials and non-combatants who were desirous of leaving, and for whom transport could be provided. Endeavours were also being made to secure the co-operation of the heads of tribes. Discretion had been left to the garrison of Sennar either to retire by the Kassala route, or cut its way through to Khartum. Very few Europeans remained at Khartum, and the real difficulty was in withdrawing the native civil popu- lation who wished to leave, and the garrison, with the wives and children of the soldiers. General Gordon on his way to Port Said, drew up a memor- andum in which he distinctly set down the position of affairs and his own opinions with regard to them as follows: — " Memorandum by General Gordon. "I.I understand that her Majesty's government have come to the irrevocable decision not to incur the very onerous duty of securing to the peoples of the Soudan a just future government. That, as a consequence, her Majesty's government have determined Vol. III. 40 50 EGYPT AND TPIE SOUDAN. to restore to these peoples their independence, and will no longer suffer the Egyptian government to interfere with their affairs. " 2. For this purpose, her Majesty's government have decided to send me to the Soudan to arrange for the evacuation of these countries, and the safe removal of the Egyptian employes and troops. "3. Keeping paragraph No. i in view, viz. that the evacuation of the Soudan is irrevocably decided on, it will depend upon circumstances in what way this is to be accomplished. " My idea is that the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet All's conquest, and whose families still exist; that the Mahdi should be left altogether out of the calculation as regards the handing over the country; and that it should be optional with the sultans to accept his supremacy or not. As these sultans would probably not be likely to gain by accepting the Mahdi as their sovereign, it is probable that they will hold to their independent positions. Thus we should have two factors to deal with — namely, the petty sultans asserting their several independence, and the Mahdi's party aiming at supremacy over them. To hand, there- fore, over to the Mahdi the arsenals, &c., would, I consider, be a mistake. They should be handed over to the sultans of the states in which they are placed. " The most difficult question is how and to whom to hand over the arsenals at Khartum, Dongola, and Kassala, which towns have, so to say, no old standing families, Khart