QforncU Itttueraita Slibrarg charles william wason collection' CHINA AND THE CHINESE THE GIFT OF CHARLES WILLIAM WASON CLASS OF 1876 1918 Cornell University Library DS 517.B61 Lectures on the strateav of the Russo-Ja 3 1924 023 037 199 The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924023037199 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR BY BREVET-MAJOR W. D. BIRD, d.s.o. (Late Professor Indian Staff College) LONDON HUGH REES, Ltd. 119, PALL MALL, S.W. 1909 ALL BIGHTS RESERVED CONTENTS rAOE I. Geographical and Political Factors ... 1 II. Events leading up to the War — Organisation of THE Armies — Strategical Considerations . 10 III. Narrative of the Land Operations up to the Battle op Liao-Yang 24 IV. Narrative op the Events Preceding the Battles OP THE Sha-Ho and Mukden .... 50 V. Lessons of the "War 64 APPENDICES Details op Organisation op Troops .... 70 Approximate Distribution and Strength of Troops at Various Periods 73 MAPS 1. General Map op Southern Manchuria . . In pocket 2. Plan op Positions at end op April, 1904 28 3. , 27th May .... 33 4. , 15th June .... 37 5. , 30th June .... 38 6. , 31sT July .... 45 7. , 25th August 48 8. , END OP Battle of Llao-Yang 49 9. , EARLY IN October 57 10. , END OP Sha-Ho Battle 58 11. New Year, 1905 59 12. , 20th February . 61 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR EVEEY campaign possesses special features distinguishing it from others, and perhaps even rendering comparison with them difficult. These differences are conditioned by topography, fertility, and climate, by national characteristics, by relative strength and efficiency, by resources, and by the character of the rival leaders. Some acquaintance with these factors is therefore required before a just appreciation can be made of the significance of the strategical operations during the recent struggle in Manchuria. The first item dealt with will be the geography of the seat of the war. The soldier regards geography from a somewhat different standpoint to that adopted by the civilian. To the latter the term geography means information as to the physical features of a country, as to its resources, climate, railways, rivers, harbours, cities, inhabitants, ex- ports, imports, policy, etc., which will be valuable in a commercial, political, or even social sense. But the soldier looks on all countries as possible theatres of war, and though he may, and does, seek for information similar to that required by the civilian, he enquires how the various physical, meteorological, commercial, human, and political factors will affect the progress of a campaign carried out in the country the geography of which he is studying. One of the first, if not the very first consideration, when 2 LECTUKES ON THE STEATEGY OF regarding geography from a military point of view, is therefore the communications of a potential theatre of war. Speaking generally, the direction taken by roads is deter- mined by the trend of the mountain ranges, which, to a certain extent, condition the flow of the water rained on to their sides, the river mouths, as a rule, also affording the best havens. Eoads usually follow the line of the least resistance — that is, the water channels — but lateral communications between river valleys cross the intervening ranges of moun- tains or hills at their lowest points. 1 Hence, to discover the general direction of roads, it is first of all necessary to obtain a clear idea of the coast-line, mountains, and rivers of an area. Coast. The coast-line of Manchuria and Korea from Shan-hai- kuan, eastwards, extends for 2300 miles, of which 1700 belong to Korea. [See Map 1.] Though in this long stretch there are many indentations, there are but few good har- bours, except in the south of Korea. Elsewhere tEe coast is of a shelving character, with flat mud shore_ sloping gradually for miles out to sea, and hardly covered with water even at high tide. On the shores of the Pe-chi-li gulf, the difference between high and low tide is sometimes as much as^twenty-five feet, but along the southern and eastern coast of Korea it does not amount to more than eight feet, and at Port Arthur and Dalny is ten or twelve feet. Commencing from the west, the first port of interest is Ying-kow, on the Liao river. Vessels drawing about seventeen feet can cross the bar at the mouth of the Liao, and can lie in the stream, which is five hundred yards or more wide, though the fair-way is much less. Ying-kow possesses wharves, lighters, etc., capable of dealing with a fair trade, but is ice-bound during five months in each year. Following the coast-line of the Liao-tung peninsula, lying between Ying-kow and the Yalu, the next important arm of the sea is found in Fu-chou bay, where shelter may be THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 3 obtained by vessels of moderate size, but at some distance from the shore. A more favourable anchorage is Hu-lu-shun bay, seven- teen miles southwards, but this place is without facilities for landing. To the south of Hu-lu-shun lies Society bay, with the Port Adams inlet, the latter being eighteen miles long and open to vessels of the average tramp steamer size. The shore of the inlet is, however, shelving, and there are few, if any, landing facilities. Chin-chou bay gives little or no shelter. Louisa and Pigeon bays afford protection to small steamers, from all but westerly winds. Port^AjjJuir is ice-free, land-locked, and of considerable extent, '15ut rias little deep water. The entrance is about five hundred to six hundred yards wide, but the fair-way available for large vessels is not much more than one hundred yards. The deep water lies in con- tinuation of the harbour mouth. There are docks, with accommodation for cruisers and smaller craft, and fairly good workshops. The harbour bottom is of stiff clay, with rock outcrop, which makes dredging difficult. The town and harbour were protected by a complete system of works. Thirty miles north of Port Arthur is Ta-lien-wan bay, six miles long and six miles wide. To the south of this bay lies Dalny, an ice-free port, with docks, and harbour available fOTsEips drawing thirty feet of water. Next come Yen- ta-kou, Kow-shi, and Pe-tsi-wo, also ice-free, but giving shelter only from ^est and south-west, and with shoal fore- shore for several miles. Ta-ku-shan resembles Pe-tsi-wo, but is ice-bound for several months in the year. The mouth of the Yalu is navigable by small steam vessels, but further south the Che-chen river affords a good anchorage, though Chin- am-pho, twenty miles up the estuary of the Tai-tpng river, IS ITBeibter port. The river at Chin-am-pho is a mile wide, and is said to be deep, but the foreshore shelves for half a mile, and the harbour is, in winter, ice-bound. Chem-ul-po, on the Han river, is the port of Seoul. It 4 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF is accessible to all ships throughout the year, though the anchorage is a mile from shore. In January and February the harbour is partially frozen, making discharge of cargo difficult. Fu-san, to the south of Korea, is a fair harbour protected by an island. Gen-san, on the east of Korea, is a good port, usually ice-free in winter, but shut off from the rest of the country by steep mountains. Vladivostock, in the Amur river province, possesses docks, and a harbour with two entrances. It is fortified, but is ice- bound for five months in each year. Mountains. The mountains of Manchuria are, in character, a series of wooded hills, whose lower slopes, when not covered with plantations of scrub oak or hazel, are cultivated in rough terraces, whilst the higher portions often consist of bare masses of rock, affording positions accessible in only one or two places. The hillsides, where not cleared for cultivation, are of soft soil, freely sprinkled and in some places almost covered with slabs of rock, and between the stones grow a profusion of creepers and wild flowers. The mountain area lies east and south of a line drawn roughly from Hsiung-yao-cheng to Fu-shun. ' The hills, which are volcanic in origiuj trend in a general ' north-easterly and south-westerly direction, and consist of a number of ranges roughly parallel to one another. These are separated by fairly level valleys, from one or two miles to four hundred yards wide, each boasting a stream, which rambles over a stony and shallow, though relatively wide bed. The principal range of hUls is the Feng-shui-ling^ with their southern continuation the Shui-nie-shan. The former rear themselves to a total of about 5000 feet above sea level, or 2000-3000 Jeet^ above their valleys ; the latter are not more than 2000-3000 feet above the sea. In these hills rise the Tai-tzu-Ho^ and its tributaries, which ' "Ho" ia the Chinese word for river, and "Ling" for pass. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 5 flow westwards, the Ai Ho and its tributaries flowing south to join the Yalu ; also the Tai-an Ho running southwards to Ta-ku-shan, and the Fu-chou river in the Liao-tung peninsula. West of the mountain area lies a great plain, extending for one hundred and fifty miles, or more, westwards to the Mongolian liilis. This plain, consisting of rich alluvial soil brought down by the great rivers Liao, Hun, and Tai-tzu, is thickly peopled, and highly cultivated, though liable to be- come swampy in wet weather. The division between plain and mountain is, in most localities, distinctly marked, still, in the area between Kai- chou and Liao-Yang, at distances of about twenty or thirty miles, long, somewhat serrated ridges run westwards on to the level ground, but usually end rather abruptly near the line followed by the railway. In the district between Liao-Yang and Mukden, the dividing line between plain and hill is still less clear, a series of isolated hills, or groups of little hills, extending for ten or fifteen miles west of the upland area, but as in the more southerly district, ceasing at or near the line of railway. The principal rivers watering the mountain and plain are Rivers. the Liao, the Hun and Tai-tzu. The Liao, rising in the Mongolian hills, flows at first in a north-easterly direction for three hundred miles. Then, bending south-east, it con- tinues in this course, until, after passing the Manchurian boundary, it is turned southwards by a spur of the central Manchurian hills, and travels for three hundred miles, across the plain to which it gives its name, into the gulf of Pe-chi-li near Ying-kow. On its left bank the Liao, twenty or thirty miles above Ying-kow, receives the Hun and Tai-tzu rivers, which meet a few miles above this point. The ^ general characteristic of all these rivers is that they run on, rather than below the plain, in broad, relatively shallow ' beds, and between banks raised by the silt they bring down. In the rainy season they are therefore liable to overflow, 6 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF and some ten years ago, eight days' continuous rain flooded the whole Liao plain for nearly three weeks. Steamers drawing seventeen feet of water can, as has been noted, navigate the Liao to Ting-kow, thirteen miles from its mouth. Large junks can sail up the river for some fifty miles, small junks ascend to Hsin-ming-ting. The Hun and Tai-tzu are navigable well above Mukden and Liao-Yang, and considerable timber trade, by means of rafts of logs cut in the higher reaches, is done on both rivers. The Hun, south of Mukden, is three hundred to four hundred yards wide, and the Liao is of similar width at Liao-Yang. In flood both rivers apparently rise five or six feet, and are not easy to navigate owing to the rapidity of the current. They are covered with ice, from November to March, sufficiently thick to support guns. The Yalu rises about midway across the northern boun- dary of Korea, and after flowing south-west for three hundred miles, empties its waters into the sea. In the upper reaches a wild region of mountain and forest is traversed, but some sixty miles from the mouth the southern bank is cultivated, though on the northern it is still enclosed by rocky hills and bluffs. The river is navigable, by junks, for about fifty miles, and small steamers can cross the bar at its mouth. At An-tung, it is over three-quarters of a mile wide. The remaining mountain streams possess characteristics similar to the Fu-chou river. This winds along in a sandy valley, from half a mile to two or three miles wide, and flows in a stony bed, not more than two feet below the valley level, its depth, in spring, rarely exceeding two feet. In the plain some of the tributaries of the Hun and Tai-tzu are six or eight feet below the level of the fields, but their banks are more often grass, or willow grown, than precipitous, and the depth of water is not, in spring, more than one or two feet. THE EUSS'O-JAPANESE WAE 7 The Chinese cart, drawn by three or four mules, is the Eoadsand tr anspo rt of Manchuria, hence almost every valley boasts a ™* *' cart track, and the passes traversable by wheel transport, possess, if not good, at least practicable, though steep, roads. No road in Manchuria is metalled, and the great Imperial and Mandarin roads differ from the others, only in that they are two or three times as wide, and, if possible, more rutty. In many places the roads and tracks have sunk below the level of the surrounding country. This is partly due to wear, but mainly to the fact that the Chinese farmer is accustomed, annually, to remove, and use as field manure, the road surface. So heavy do the roads become after rain, that carts habitu- ally sink up to their axles in mud, and on these occasions the carter often seeks firmer soil by a small detour into the neighbouring ploughed fields. To prevent this, the farmer digs, at right angles to and close to the edge of the road, a series of little trenches, about eighteen inches deep and wide, and six or eight feet long. In Manchuria, rain usually falls in July, August, and September, coming, as do the Monsoon rains in India, in bursts of from three to eight days, separated by bright intervals. During, and immediately after rain, cart traffic practically ceases, but as the soil is friable and dries quickly, the roads can be used again after two or three days' sun- shine. In October the roads freeze, and remain hard, but rough and full of ruts, until March, when the scanty snow that has covered them during winter, thaws by day. In April, the thaw regularly sets in, but the relatively hot sun soon dries the roads, and keeps them so, until the break of the Monsoon rains. The climate is temperate to hot in summer, but is, at times, very cold in winter. The snowfall is light, but when, as happens two or three times a week, a northerly wind blows, the thermometer, by day, falls to and below zero, whilst the nights are always bitter. 8 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF The principal, that is, the most used roads, are the Im- perial rbad from Pekin to the Yalu, and thence to Seoul. This road, which is some thirty to forty feet wide, runs, in Manchuria,' from Hsin-ming-ting to Mukden, a distance of 140 miles, thence to Liao-Yang, forty miles. From this place it plunges south-eastwards into the mountains, and after crossing the Mo-tien-ling pass, about 3500 feet above the sea, and the Feng-shui-ling mountains at Len-shan-kuan, runs, by Feng-huang-cheng, to An-tung, 180 miles from Liao-Yang. In Korea, it passes by Ping- Yang to Seoul, 140 miles from An-tung. The coast road from the Yalu to Port Arthur, via Ta-ku- shan, 230 miles. The road from Port Arthur to Kirin, via Kai-chou, Hai-cheng 230 miles, and Mukden 310 miles from Port Arthur. Eailways. The most important railways were, an extension of the Trans-Siberian line, known as the Chinese Eastern railway, running from near Chita to Vladivostock, for 200 miles in Eussian, and for 950 miles in Chinese territory. At Sungari, not far from Harbin, and 600 miles from the Siberian border, the Port Arthur branch leaves the main line, reaching Dalny in 600 miles, and Port Arthur in 615 miles. The line was single, and of five-foot gauge, the rails being single-headed, with flat base, and weigh- ing 62 lb. the yard; the ballast and sleepers were of but moderate quality. The sidings and crossing places were about ten miles apart, and the fuel burnt was wood, except in Southern Manchuria, where coal was used. Of bridges there were, on the main line, about a dozen over 200 yards length, of which the longest was that at Sungari, which measured about 800 yards. On the Port Arthur branch were thirty of about 80 yards length, whilst those at Liao-Yang and Mukden were more than 600 yards long, and that at Kai-chou was of some 300 . yards span. Apparently the maximum carrying capacity k developed was about twelve pairs of trains per day. The Imperial Chinese railway from Pekin to Ying-kow, THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 9 with a branch to Hsin-ming-ting, might possibly have been used by the Japanese to move troops against the Eussian right. This was a single line, of British standard gauge. There were telegraph lines along the railways, and cables! Telegraphs connected Fu-san with Japan, and Port Arthur with Chifu. joables. The Liao valley is a great grain-producing area, beans and Eesources. mi llet being princip ally raised . The millet, which grows to a height of ten feet, provides the Chiaaman with most of the necessaries of life. The grain is used as food for man and beast, and for distillation of spirits, whilst the stalks are chopped up as fodder, or are employed to thatch houses, fence gardens, or even as firewood. Few domestic animals are bred, except pigs, but Mongolia produces "quantities of sheep, cattle, and small horses, which are readily obtained from Hsin-ming-ting. The hilly country produces timber, and coarse silk from silk worms, which feed on the underwood. Coal of fair quality exists near many of the big towns, the principal centres being Fu-shun, Yen-tai, Pen-si-hu. The Chinese towns are all of one pattern, square built, Towns and and surrounded by a crenulated wall twenty to thirty feet ' *^°^' high, and at top eight to ten feet wide. These walls are pierced by numerous pagoda -roofed gates. Within are unmetalled streets, of one story, tile-roofed, shanties and shops, and in the case of the larger towns, suburbs of mud houses have grown up outside the city walls. In the plain, the villages consist of groups of thatched houses, with walls of mud, or of sun-dried bricks plastered with mud, each standing in a garden surrounded by a more or less thick and well-built wall, or by a fence of plaited millet stalks. In the hills, houses and walls are of roughly shaped stones, sometimes cemented, and the roofs are of thatch, slate, or tile. II Events rPHE war between Eussia and Japan is traceable, as are tlTe wir^^ ° most modern wars, at any rate, to intense conflict of interest between the two powers. For centuries, and at intervals of about a hundred years, the Japanese had made incursions into Korea and Manchuria, and had, after suc- cesses more or less important, and occupation more or less prolonged, been driven back to their islands by the Chinese. Korea and Manchuria were therefore the historical lines of Japanese expansion. Some fifty years ago, the Eussians first appeared in the Far East, when they wrested the Amur province and Vladi- vostock from China. At this time Japan was governed under a feudal system, when the land, though nomin- ally ruled by the emperor, was really under the power of the nobles, or Daimios, and their armed Samurai re- tainers. But, in 1868, the nation, after a severe struggle, overthrew the Dafmios. At about the same time the Eussians occupied Saghalien, an event which, combined with the seizure of the Amur province, caused Japan to fear for her safety. The Japanese, noting that the European strength lay in armament and organisation, now decided to avoid the fate of the Amur province and Saghalien, by organising the country, Grovernment, army and navy, on European principles. Japanese were therefore sent to Europe to assimilate Western ideas, and European teachers were freely imported into Japan. 1890. The combined result of this policy, and of these events, was such an increase in the material prosperity and popula- 10 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 11 tion, that Japan_felt, about 18^90, the need foi expansion. At the same time it was feared that Korea, Japan's his- torical outlet on the mainland, inhabited by a physically fine, but in spirit decadent race, and ruled under the nerve- less suzerainty of China, might fall into the hands of Russia. Japan therefore decided either to occupy Korea, or to render herself paramount in the peninsula. With this object a quarrel was picked with China in 1894, 1894. the Chinese fleet was defeated off tfie Yalu, the passage of the river was forced, Port Arthur and Wai-hai-wai were taken. China thereupon concluded a peace on April 30th, 1895, 1895. under which Korea was declared intiependent, the Kuan- tung peninsula, that is, the area between Chin-chou and Port Arthur, was leased to Japan, and a large indemnity promised. Eussia, Germany, and Austria, now brought diplomatic pr^ufeT to beaj^on"^Japaif,'causing' her, much to the disgust of the nation, to relinquish her conquests. About 1891, Eussia had begun the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway, with the object of at once linking up her East Asian possessions more closely with her European territory, and, if circumstances were favourable, of wresting a further piece of country from China's feeble grasp. By 1895 the railway had nearly reached Lake Baikal. The Eussian press, and Foreign Office, at that time fostered in the national mind, the idea that Eussia must possess an ice-free port on the open sea, and this conception seems to have beeiT used "By a group of leading men in Eussia to induce the Government to take up the project of obtaining such a harbour in Southern Manchuria. J^an, meanwhile, seeing in Eussia's various manoeuvres, a direct threat to Japanese independence, began, in 1895, deliber- ately to prepare herself, both morally, physically, and politically, for a life and death struggle with her powerful competitor. She therefore set about"e3ucatmg the nation" \ to the idea of war with Eussia, and at the same time further 12 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF improved her armed forces, and looked round for allies. 1896. In 1896, Russia made another move in the game, when she obtained permission, from China, to run the Chinese Eastern railway direct from Chita to Vladivostock, instead of along the left bank of the Amur. In 1898, she went further, leasing Port Arthur from China, together with the southern portion of the Liao-tung peninsula. At the same time she began to construct, from near Harbin, a branch railway which, by 1900, had reached Port Arthur, though the line was but roughly laid, and was unballasted. 1900. In 1900, the late Dowager Empress of China, much impressed by the South African disasters of England, the power at that time most feared in Pekin, determined to try and rid China of foreigners, and with this object fomented the so-called Boxer rising. Russia at once seized the opportunity to occupy Man- churia to protect her railway, but later, in response to diplomatic representations, promised the powers to evacuate the Mukden province in October 1902, Kirin in the spriag of 1903, and Tsi-tsi-har, north-west of Kirin, in the autumn of the same year. Whilst these events were taking place, and the Japanese were organising their forces, the statesmen of Japan had, in 1902. 1902, concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Great Britain, under which it was agreed that if either nation were attacked by two powers, the other should come to the aid of her ally. Japan also entered into friendly relations with the United States, thus practically securing herself against the inter- vention of other nations in the forthcoming struggle with Russia. In October 1902, Russia evacuated part of south-west Manchuria, but failed to carry out her promise in respect to the remainder of the province. 1903. At the beginning of 1903, general Kuropatkin, the Russian War Minister, made a tour of inspection in the Far East, and as a result, a viceroyalty was created, which would THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 13 bring the various provinces, commands, and garrisons, under the central authority of admifal Alexiev, who was nomin- ated viceroy. Japan, angry at Eussia's breach of faith regarding the evacuation of Manchuria, and alarmed by the creation of a viceroyalty, which, it was feared, was but the prelude to an'mcfeasetn Eussian activity in the Far East ; began, in July 1903, to negotiate for the redemption of the pledge to quit Manchuria. These negotiations ended in war, in February 1904. Though Japan was not, perhaps, quite ready for war in 1903, her preparations^ere so far advanced as to render possible the inception of the campaign, whenever diplomacy decided that the favourable moment had arrived. Eussia, on the other hand, was by no means so well prepared. The Trans-Siberian, and Chinese Eastern railways, except the section round Lake Baikal, had indeed been roughly completed, the fortifications of Port Arthur had been strengthened, and the port of Dalny created. But the railways were not yet capable of heavy traffic, and the forces in the Far East were numerically weak. The bulk of the latter had not even been organised into corps, there was but little cavalry or technical troops, guns were not plentiful, nor for the most part of the newest models, and lastly, the troops were scattered throughout the terri- tory in small garrisons. Whether, from a military point of view, Japan should ' have declared war earlier, before, for instance, the railway to Port Arthur was completed, is for consideration. If the moment was unpropitious in 1900, she might, in 1902, after the conclusion of the alliance with England, have argued that Eussia's preparations were likely to be propor- tionally less complete than her own, and pressure could have been put on Eussia, in October 1902, to carry out the promised evacuation of Mukden. Possibly, however, the political atmosphere was less favourable in 1902 than was the case a year later. 14 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF Again, it would seem that Japan would have been better advised to have declared war after the Manchurian and Korean ports were ice-free, than at the time she selected. True, such policy would have added to the Port Arthur squadron four large cruisers from Vladivostock ; but Russia would not have been allowed two months in which to collect troops before the first blow was struck on land, and Japan might, in these circumstances, have overrun Southern Man- churia, and captured Port Arthur, before Russian regiments had begun to arrive in any numbers. It was, however, probably Russia's threat to increase her Par Eastern squadron, which caused Japan to precipitate matters, and make war in winter. Possessed of almost boundless resources in men, and with a navy twice as large as that of Japan, it would, at first sight, appear that Russia must have inevitably crushed her opponent. But complete accord between policy, and organisation for war, is as necessary to success as are great resources, other- wise defeat may be experienced before the resources can be developed, and Russia was unprepared for the conflict even in 1903-4. Encouraged by the success of a policy of bluff against other nations, Russia had apparently come to regard such procedure as infallible, but its inherent weakness became soon apparent when attempted against a rival ready to fight for her rights. Russia was, in a military sense, weak in the Par East. Her navy was, on paper, equal to that of the Japanese, but paper equality is not sufficient to command success in war, and the ships which might have turned the balance were many months' sail distant in Europe, whence it was, perhaps, impolitic to move them. Similarly, the Russian land forces in Manchuria were separated from the main army by a gap of some six thou- sand miles, bridged only by a single line of railway, ill laid, and, moreover, incomplete in the stretch round Lake Baikal. THE EUSSO-JAPAJ;rESE WAE 15 In 1904, Eussia possessed, according to the British official 'jOrganisation. account of the war, in round numbers^ a total of some 4,500,000 trained soldiers, of whom 3,500,000 belonged to i the active army and reserve, 345,000 were Cossacks, and i 685,000 National Guard. The period of military service was from the 21st-43rd year, of which eighteen years were spent in the active army and reserve, and the remainder in the National Guard. The colour service was for four or five years, and three years were passed in the reserve, during which period two trainings of six months were carried out. The Cossacks, Finns, and the Christians of the Caucasus, served under special regulations, whilst Mahomedans were pbliged to pay a sum of money in lieu of military service, but might volunteer to serve if they so desired. The field troops comprised the units of the active army brought up to war strength by reserves, and certain so- caUed reserve units, the cadres of which were maintained in peace, and filled up with reservists on mobilisation. In war time, depot units were also formed, of reservists and soldiers not fit or not required on mobilisation. For garrison duty there were special fortress and local troops. The National Guard was primarily designated for home defence, but was liable to furnish drafts for the field troops. At the commencement of the war, there were, in Europe and the Caucasus, twenty-five active army and reserve corps, in Eussian Turkestan two corps, in Eastern Siberia two corps, and in the remainder of the empire a number of unallotted units. (For composition of the army corps, see Appendix I.) The Eussian army was not really well trained and fit to take the field. Even officers who had passed the staff college rarely studied their profession after the completion of their course, and the regimental officers were ignorant of the theory of war. The practical training also left much to be desired. The 16 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF men were little practised in shooting, but were taught to rely on mass attacks, and the bayonet, to gain victory. Out- post and reconnaissance duties were neglected, and indi- vidual initiative discouraged. All ranks were, moreover, steeped in the plausible fallacy of the advantages inherent in the occupation of defensive positions, and attached undue importance to the value of ground, and to a defensive attitude ; yet, in actual practice, folds and features of ground were rarely utilised to the best advantage. Generals immersed themselves in details, and interfered unduly in the instruction of troops and companies, to the detriment of the training, and to the limitation of their own power to handle large forces, grasp important situations, or deal with great issues. But serious as were the above faults, they might have been partially overcome during the campaign, had all ranks been inspired with the sentiment of patriotism and unselfish devotion to duty. This was far from being the case. Even the officers openly, expressed their indifference to the war, and the rank and" file, though they fought well, and endured hardship with praiseworthy patience, went to the front unwillingly. Very different was the attitude of the Japanese army. Here every man was convinced that his utmost efforts were demanded to save the country from destruction, and the wonderful constancy of the Japanese soldiers was a more important factor in the national success, than was even the bold generalship of the liigher leaders. In Japan, every male between the ages of seventeen and forty was, in 1904, liable to serve in either army or navy, but military service did not, as a rule, according to the British official account, begin until the twentieth year. The army was organised as follows (see also Ap- pendix II) : — Active army, service three years — 180,000 men. On working furlough for four years and four months — 200,000 men. THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAK 17 Eeserve army (or Kobi), in which men served for five years, witE an organisation separate from that of the active army— 200,000. Conscript reserve, of men who had escaped service with the colours ; obligation for seven years and four months, or for one year and four months — 300,000. National reserve, of all men who had passed the classes mentioned above, and were less than forty years old — 400,000, of whom about half had received training. Of Japan's naval resources it is sufficient to note that her merchant navy had a tonnage of 650,000 and possessed be- tween 200 and 300 steamers. The Japanese army was trained in the German fashion, and though to several armies in Europe, Japanese officers were, and still are attached for instruction, it was to the German army that the majority were sent. The German model was therefore generally copied in both strategy and j tactics, though it is perhaps doubtful whether the Japanese peace training was as thorough as is sometimes claimed. The Japanese adopted the enveloping form of offensive ■ war, but attacked, with vigour, at all points. | Their infantry, at the beginning of the campaign, ad- ' vanced to the attack in relatively dense lines of skirmishers, whose movements were covered by both rifle and artillery i fire. The infantry pressed on, in the usual manner, as close as possible to the enemy's line, and then delivered a series of assaults, prepared by rapid but somewhat wild rifle fire, and covered by storms of shrapnel, delivered from rather long range. It does not seem that the subordinate generals and regi- mental leaders directed their men with any particular intelligence, or that the latter fought much with their heads. The commanders were, as a rule, rather prodigal of their meii's lives, and the soldiers, responding gallantly to their officers' orders, often, by their doggedness, repaired mistakes of tactics and leadership. The cavalry was not well organised. Eegiments were, for 18 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF the most part, with divisions, instead of being brigaded, and their employment was on a par with their organisation. Striking a balance between the forces actually or poten- tially available on both sides, and having due regard to their military value, it may be concluded that the Japanese possessed over the Eussians certain advantages of patriotism and training. Command Though Eussia had sufficient naval and military re- sources to ehsiire the defeat of her rival, the distribution of her fleet and army, necessitated by her European responsi- bilities, and the absence of well-developed land communica- tions between her European territories and the theatre of war, rendered it improbable that she would be able to transport to, and maintain in the Far East, an army large enough to overcome the Japanese, unless command of the sea could be obtained; for to have duplicated the railway would have been the work of years. Besides, Japan, even if overwhelmed on land, could, so long as she retained com- mand of the sea, have securely retired to some Torres Vedras, and there awaited a favourable opportunity to again take the offensive. And even if Eussia succeeded in driv- ing the Japanese from the mainland, her conquest would have been of little value until she obtained the power to utilise the ports won in land battles. Command of the sea, then, was vital to Eussia. Japan is an island empire, and though fairly self-con- tained, was, in some degree, dependent on retention of the command of the sea, the loss^of which would, at any rate, have put an end to her dreams of expansion. Moreover, loss of command of the sea would have exposed her to the danger of invasion. Without naval supremacy, Japan's armies could not have reached the continent of Asia, and once there, even supposing they drove the Eussians to Lake Baikal, before attaining naval superiority, their eventual ruin would have been all the greater, if the link binding the land forces with their island home was severed; for no large army could have been THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 19 maintained in Manchurja with command of the sea irre- vocably lost. Apparently, then, naval supremacy, that is, the destruction of ^EeTEostile fleet, was, for both sides, the decisive factor, and each should have strained every nerve to attain this end, relegating other necessary operations to strictly subordinate positions. Had Eussia been able to concentrate her whole fleet in Far Eastern waters, Japan's position would have been well- nigh hopeless, but Eussia had, as has been stated, been obliged to divide her navy iuto two portions, and at the decisive point possessed no numerical superiority over her opponent. Hence Japan might hope to apply the principle of ■ interior lines, to defeat the Eussians in detail, to ruin the Eastern detachment before it could be joined by its Wes- tern consorts. If the Eussian Eastern detachment chose to meet the Japanese fleet in fair fight, so much the better for Japan. But if the Eussians should elect to await, in their harbours, the arrival of their European navy, then it would be Japan's duty to capture those harbours, either sinking the ships at their berths, or obliging them to bolt out and give battle. Of the two military harbours, in the Far East, held by Eussia, Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the former was most valuable, being ice-free throughout the year. But whatever the relative merits of the two places, Port Arthur was of ! ; greatest importance to the Japanese, being the base of the '• larger portion of the Eussian fleet (four large cruisers i : only were in VladivostocTE) and after the naval surprise of , ' February 8th its asylum. It would seem, then, that Japan's primary objective being Japanese the Eussian fleet based on Port Arthiif, plans should have ° ^^"^ ^^^' been made to secure the early capture of the fortress, since it was possible that the squadron would not quit the shelter of the harbour. But it was important to occupy Korea, whence the siege of 20 LECTURES ON THE STEATEGY OF Port Arthur could, in some degree, be covered, for no Eus- sian force moving into the Liao-tung peninsula could afford to neglect a Japanese army placed on or near the Yalu. The possession of Korea would also be a strong diplomatic card, and until Dalny was taken, no satisfactory harbours for landing troops, existed, except in Korea. If beaten in Manchuria, or at Port Arthur, Japan, with command of the sea, could perhaps maintain herself suffi- ciently long in the mountains of Korea to render Eussia weary of the struggle. Even without command of the sea, if the naval actions were indecisive, Japan, by using the islands in the Tsushima strait, might maintain a force in Korea, and might even, though this would be unlikely, prosecute the siege of Port Arthur from this base. It is therefore^thought, that, as was done, Korea should, in the first instance, have been occupied by the Japanese. The capture of a fortress can be attained either by main force, or by starvation, the method employed being contin- gent on the necessity for the early reduction of the place. No fortress can survive, for long, the defeat of the field forces of the nation, hence, if the field armies are destroyed, the capitulation of the national fortresses is only a matter of time. Thus there were open to Japan two methods for the re- duction of the Far Eastern naval bases of the Eussian fleet. They could either be besieged, assaulted, and so captured, every effort being directed to the achievement of this result, and only sufficient troops diverted against the Eussian armies, to prevent their interfering with the besiegers; or one" or both fortresses could be blockaded, whilst every man not required for this purpose marched against the Eussian army. Of these alternatives it is believed that the former would have been the correct course, more especially in view of the possibility of the despatch of Eussian naval reinforce- ments from Europe. But whichever policy Japan elected to pursue, her utmost THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 21 e ndeavours should h av e beendiD eatfid to the achievement of the main purpose, whether it was the early destruction of the Eussian ISavai bases, or the rapid ruin of the Eussian field armies, before either armies, or fleet, could be reinforced from Europe. There should have been no halting between two opinions, such policy tends to failure, and at the decisive point it is impossible to be too strong. Japan, however, chose to pursue a double objective, under- taking both the siege of Port Arthur, and the destruction of the Eussian armies. Possibly she undervalued the re- sisting power of Port Arthur, and the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway, hoping to achieve the early capture of the fortress, and then victory over such forces as Eussia might have deployed. Or, perhaps, her army was, in the circumstances, deemed sufficiently strong to attain both objects. Or, again, the Japanese may have thought that, in spite of the necessity for taking Port Arthur, the Eussian army must be attacked and beaten, before it became for- midable in organisation and numbers. Whatever motives may have . prompted her military policy, Japan, in the event, possessed decisive preponderance of force neithe r in front of "Jort Arthur, nor in the field. But for the determination of her infantry, and the resolu- tion of her higher"commanders, this fact might well have led to disaster. Neither at Liao-Yang, nor at the Sha-Ho, did the Japanese possess sufficient force to gain decisive victories, and the cause ol..,itiajr^ weakness was the large number of troops that had been absorbed in the siege of Port A.rthur. The resistance offered by this fortress made Liao-Yang an indecisive battle, and gave Eussia time in which to collect so many troops, that, even after the fall of the place, the Japanese failed to gain, at Mukden, a decisive victory. On the other hand it is believed that had two or three extra divisions been detailed to besiege Port Arthur, this 22 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF ' place would have fallen by assault, after a few weeks' siege ; and long before the Eussians could have made really serious efforts for its relief, or could have assembled a sufficiently large army in Manchuria, to give them the advantage in the subsequent campaign. Japanese plan. The plan actually adopted by Japan was an enveloping advance of three armies, from widely different directions i — the Yalu, Ta-ku-shan, and Dalny — on Liao-Yang, whilst a ' fourth army besieged Port Arthur. Converging operations, though they menace the enemy's communications, involve risk of defeat in detail. They were, however, doubtless forced on Japan, by the political necessity for initial occupation of Korea, and the immobility of the Eussians was probably known, and counted on. More- over, in so mountainous a country as Southern Manchuria, some dispersion of force would have been necessary for pur- poses of supplj, unless Japan made adequate arrangements for rapidly utilising the Port Arthur railway as it fell into her hands. But then her advance would have been frontal. Having adopted a plan of convergent operations from separate bases, Japan's object should have been to exercise such simultaneous and vigorous pressure, from all directions, as to prevent concentration of hostile force against any one of her separated armies. At the same time these should have made every effort to attain, as soon as possible, tactical con- tact with one another, by rapid, but well-regulated advance on a common objective. Russian Eussia's objects were naturally, to a great extent, the con- objects. ^gj,gg Qf ^.jjQgg Qf jjjg Japanese. Japan wished for rapid and early success, Eussia desired time to collect her scattered forces. Such development of resources might be accomplished if Eussia's Far Eastern fortresses correctly carried out, with the assistance of her Siberian field troops, their delaying functions. Whilst fortifying and provisioning. Port Arthur, and Vladivostock, for lengthy sieges, Eussia should, therefore, THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 23 have prepared to manoeuvre with the troops not required to ' garrison these places, so as to draw on themselves, and away from the fortresses, the Japanese armies. At the same time, pending the collection of an army adequate to undertake the offensive, the Japanese, as opportunity offered, might have been harassed and exhausted by minor engagements, and attacked in detail, if chances, as actually happened, occurred. Whether the Eussian Eastern squadron should have fought a decisive action with the Japanese, or awaited the arrival of the reinforcements, is a difficult question to answer. The solution of the problem depended on the probable date when naval reinforcements from Europe might be ex- pected. If likely to be long delayed, the natural inclination would be to risk all in a decisive naval action. Such resolution might have been taken, having regard to the fact that long waiting in port might be harmful to the machinery of the vessels, and deleterious to the efficiency of the crews, and might even, as was the case, result in the destruction of the fleet from land. As to the Eussian plan it is not easy to speak, for, Russian plan. in effect, the operations, up to the battle of Liao-Yang, were a series of half-measures. This tencTs'to confirm the report that the Eussian councils were divided, one party advocating that tihe defence of Port XrthuFshould be intrusted solely to the garrison ; the other that every effort should be made for its assistance. in Japanese calculations. February 1904. WHEN initiating, in the autumn of 1903, the diplomatic pressure which finally resulted in war, Japan, prac- tically secure, through the JBriti8h_aUiance, from the in- terference of third parties, seems to have calculated that her navy was capable of beating^ in detailj the divided portions of the Eussian fleet, aiM that her army could cqp-^ successfully, with any force that Eussia could maintain in the Far East. " ' ,~^^^~-^ The confidence of the Japanese in their navy was fully justified. But the unwise dispositions of the Japanese armies, the resistance offered by Port Artl^ur, the slowness of the Japanese military deployment, the quantities of supplies obtained by Eussia from Manchuria and Mongolia, and the imexpectedly efficient working of the. Trans-Siberian rail- way, enabling Eussia to place in the fiehi a larger force than Japan had contemplated, upset the Japanese calculations. Japan was therefore obliged, not only to augment her active army, but to so modify her recruiting laws as to enable larger masses of men to be placed in ffie field. Trusting, however, in her power to beat Eussia, Japan con- tinued to press for Eussia's evacuation of Manchuria, until, on February 6th, 1904, negotiations were broken off, and diplomatic relations with Eussia severed. (See Appendix III.) On the same day the Japanese navy sailed to attack the Eussian squadron at Port Arthur, a few ships being detached to destroy a couple of small Eussian cruisers lying at Chem- ul-po, and to convoy a force of 2500 men, destined to occupy Seoul, the capital of Korea. At 3 a.m. on 9th, the Japanese troops landed in face 24 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAK 25 of the Eussian cruisers, and railed at once to Seoul. The next day the Eussian ships were sunk when issuing from the harbour. Meanwhile, admiral Togo had surprised the Eussian squadron lying outside Port Arthur, and had torpedoed three of the largest ships. Whilst these events were taking place, mobilisation orders had been issued in Japan, at 2 p.m., on February 6th, to the Guard, 2nd and 12th divisions, and to the fortresses of Tsushima and Hakodadi. The Japanese had originally intended to secure possession of Southern Korea, at"any rate, by landing the 12th division at Fu-san and moving it, by march route, eighteen stages to Seoul; and had already made arrangements for supply along the road. After the fi rst naval success it was, however, determined to use Chem-ul-p6~as the"porFoI disembarkation. In February the mouth of the Yalu, Ta-ku-"shan, and Ying-kow are all ice-bound, and do not become clear of ice until the middle of Maircff, so that the Japanese could not, at that time, have taken advantage of their temporary command of the sea by landing troops at those places. Thegain, by adoption of such a course, would have been shortened lines of communication had command of the sea been maintained; but tEeTorce at Ying-kow, at any rate, would have been somewhat exposed, owing tolts proximity \ to Liao-Yang, where the Eussians were assembling, and transports sailing to Ying-kow must have passed relatively ^.r^ close to Port Arthur. On February 14th, the 12th division railed to Nagasaki, where it embarked in six groups of transports, of which the first sailed at noon, on 15th. By 21st, t he whole division had landed at Chem-ul-po, and a defachment had occupied Ping- Yang. ""■" ''''" Simultaneously two regiments of the 4th division were March, despatched to Chem-ul-po, and garrisons placed in Fu-san, Ma-sam-po, and Gen-san. Mobilisation had, meanwhile. 26 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF proceeded in Japan, and by March 4th, the Guard and 2nd divisions had concentrated at Hiroshima, ready to embark under the command of general Kuroki. Chin-am-ph^ the port of Ping- Yang, was reported clear of ice on Mar ch 10t h, and as the 12th division had now assembled in sufficient force at the latter place, to secure the landing, it was decided to disembark, here, the Guard and 2nd divisions. By 29th the troops were all on shore, and the 12th division well to the north of Ping- Yang. Information now reached general Kuroki, that, with the exception of 1500 to 2000 Eussian. cavalry, no hostile troops were south of the Yalu. The Japanese, therefore, pushed forward parties towards the river Yalu, to at once bridge the rivers Che-chen and Tai-ing, to form supply depots, and to reconnoitre roads. The result of this reconnaissance was that all roads were found to be bad, and the coast road alone was reported fit for the movement of a large force. The "whole country was, moreover, stated to be destitute of supplies. In these circumstances, it is for "consideration, whether Kuroki would not hav e been better advised to have marched 6nIy~tEel2th division towards the Talu, seiiding the Guard and 2nd divisions northwards, by ship, at any rate to Bo-to and Ei-ka-ho, thus following the precedent of the Vimeiro campaign. '■ This course would have been less fatiguing, and not more risky, than marching by detachments along one bad road, ^ '. and would have saved valuable time. ' Probably, however, shipping was not available for the purpose. April. On April 1st, sufficient supplies having been collected at An-ju, Kuroki pushed on a force londer general Asada, who, by 7th, had reached Ei-ka-ho, where a supply depot was formed. On the latter date the main body of the Japanese marched northwards, throwing out towards Yong-pyong a weak flank THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 27 guard, which was to halt there until the main body had passed An-ju, and Jhen march to Chang-Syong. The advanced guard reached Wi-iTTon'April 8th , and on 21st, the army was concentrated near that place, whilst the i^lSk detachment stood at Chan g-Syong . Lines of supply had also been established to Ei-ka-ho, Bo-to, and Qui-em-pho. During these operations, the 1st and 3rd di vision s had, on April 1st, conc entrated at . Hir oshima, whilst the 4th division had mobilised and was standing at Osaka, and an ar tillery brigade , of 108 guns, was also ready to take the field. In April, these divisions had been quietly embarked in a fleet of about a hundred transports, which sailed to Chin-am-pho, as they were ready, unescorted, though pro- tected by the operations of the Japanese fleet against Port Arthur. By May 1st, the three divisions had concentrated at May. Chin-am-pifib 'under general __Oku, ready either to assist I Kufoki in forcing the passage of the Yalu, by landing between that river and Ta-ku-shan, or, if not required by ' the Ist army, to invade the Liao-Tung peninsula. As it is hardly conceivable that the Japanese can have been ignorant of the weakness of the Eussian Yalu detach- ment (see Appendix IV), it seems to have been excess of caution that held Oku's detachment in hand so long, for the greateT delay in attacK^Port Arthur, the more formidable woulHnje'itsTorEiEcatiqSr' Meanwhile, war had been formally declared on February 10th, and, on the same date, the Czar had issued a ukase, ordering the mobilisation of the troops in the Siberian military district, and in the districts of Perm, Viatka, and Kazan. Between February 9th and 12th, most of the powers, including China, published declarations of neutrality. Japan and Korea entered into an a^eement on February 23f3, under "wBTcBrtrapan, in exchange for "the right to use certain places in Korea for military purposes, guaranteed the integrity of the country. 28 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF On February 29th, general Kuropatkin was appointed commander-in-chief in Manchuria, and general Linevitch in the Ussuri district, but both were under the orders of admiral Alexiev, the viceroy. Admiral Makarov was given command of the Eussian Far Eastern squadron on February 16th, and on the same day the viceroy transferred his headquarters from Port Arthur to Mukden. '"" "' ' """*'" Meanwhile, the Japanese had made several abortive at- tempts to enclose the Eussian fleet, which had taken rwuge in Port Arthur, within the confines of the harbour, by sink-^ ing vessels across the mouth. By April i2th, the Eussian fleet had been so far repaired as to be able to leave Port Arthur, but on this day, the battleship Petr o^mlov jk, with Makarov on board, was sunk by a floating mine, and another battleship was injured by the same means. By the end of April, the opposing forces had reached roughly the strength, and had attained the distribution given in Appendix IV, the bulk of the Eussian field troops being, apparently, in the neighbourhood of Liao-Yang and Ying- kow, and on the Yalu. [See also Map 2.] Probably the acquisition, by the Japanese, of command of the sea, disinclined the Eussians to risk more troops in the Liao-tung peninsula than were required for the defence of Port Arthur. At any rate no, arrangement seems to have been made to hold points where the disembarkation of Japanese troops was possible; or to place a mobile force in some central position such as Pu-la/n-tien, whence troops could march, with relative rapidity, to oppose a landing at Port Adams, or Pe-tsi-wo. The coast-line was watched by cavalry, but this was the only measure taken. But this same factor of sea-power induced considerable dispersion of force, for, in addition to the garrison of Vladi- vostock, there were strong detachments on the Yalu, and at Ying-kow, the former separated by 180 miles of rough APPROKIMATE POSITIONS AND STRENGTH, AT END OF APRIL, 1904. 2 Scale of Miles P . 20 *p 60 , 80 too Russians O Japanese cb "Fibres represent TVumbert irv thousands. /Port A-rlhxtr Hfi/IcdenA fJLiao yanff Ta.-7ru-shano_9^ ArLtujig^, @^ vwrftfi. APPROKlMJiTE POSITTOIsrS J^n STRENGTH, 27 MAY, 1904. 3 Scale of Miles. O go ^ 60 So 100 Russians vJ Japanese r'~l Figures Tepr-eserCt maribera ZTi thodLsands. „ Q Ut'Erfi (i3)< yPoT-i Arlh-vcr Mulcdenl" Liao Yo-nq ® ^ f-lt.i^'- Ta-lat-shan GlI 'o 6? ^ APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AND STRENGTH 30^'' JUNE . 1904. 5 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 37 Japanese headquarters ordered Kawamura not to advance beyond Hsui-yen. He therefore halted and intrenched. This fact, as has been stated, considerably influenced Kuropatkin's plans, for, seeing that the Japanese had not advanced beyond Hsui-yen, he allowed Stackelberg to con- tinue his concentration on Teh-li-tzu. On 12th, Oku being ready to move from Pu-lan-tien, Kawamura was directed to proceed towards Hai-cheng as soon as he could, leaving Asada to watch Hsi-mu-cheng. Kuroki, too, was ordered tb advance, and so distract Russian attention from Oku. But supply difficulties prevented the movement of the 1st army, so that Kuroki was only able to pUsh forward some detachments, in addition to sending Asada to the 10th division. Keller was, however, deceived by these movements, and thmEmg that Kuroki meant to attack his right, began to mass troops on this flank. Meanwhile, Oku had commenced his march from Pu-lan- tien, and by 13th, the 3rd and 5th divisions were, with the artillery brigade, at Wa-fang-tien, the 4th division near Fu-chou, and the cavalry brigade on the right flank; the 6th division, which had now landed, was following some marches in rear. Why Oku advanced before the arrival of the 6th division is not quite clear. Possibly policy dictated the move, or perhaps the Japanese were anxious as to the 1st and 4th armies, though to risk the defeat of Oku, to help them, imless they were believed to be in serious straits, was hardly sound strategy ; or it may be that they wished to retain the initiative, n^ot allowing this advantage to pass to the enemy. On June 15th the Japanese defeated the Eussians at Teh-U-tzu, driAring in their right, but did not follow up the success with any vigour; in fact there was practically no pursuit. The only other incidents, worth mention, which took 38 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF place at this juncture, were some readjustraents of troops on the Eusaian side, when Eennenkamf was strengthened at { the expense of Keller, whilst Mischenko was reinforced. In looking at the table showing the number of troops in Manchuria on June 15th (Appendix VI, and Map 4), the large, garrison of Vladiyostock is noteworthy, as demonstrating the containing effect of sea^power. TChe^f esence of "half this force in Manchuria might, at this period, have turned the scale in favour of the Eussians. After the battle of Teh-li-tzu, the 1st and 9th East Siberian divisions, now known as the 1st Siberian corps, retired to Kai-chou, covered by Samsojiov's cavalry, and remained in this neighbourhood until the end of the month. During June, Mischenko's detachment was again re- inforced, and a general southward movement made towards Ta-shih-chiao, where a position was fortified. (See Appendix VII and Map 5.) The dispositions of the Eussian troops appeared, in fact, to indicate an offensive in force against Oku, and perhaps it would have been well for the Eussians had they now defi- nitely decided either to advance or to retire, instead of con- tinuing a wasteful policy of half -measures. Apparently Kuropatkin would have liked to have with- drawn his southernmost forces north of Hai-cheng, for the operations of Kuroki and Kawamura had rendered the Eussians anxious as to the safety of the corps of Stackel- berg and Zarubaiev. But the viceroy, Alexiev, who was con- tinually urging Kuropatkin to adopt the offensive, on the ground that the strength of the Japanese had been exagger- ated, forbade such retirement, which would have been detri- mental to Port Arthur, as showing that the Eussians had, for the moment at any rate, abandoned all idea of its relief. On the Japanese side, the 2nd army, probably owing to transport and supply difficulties, hardly made any advance northwards, and on June 30th, was only thirteen miles north of Teh-li-tzu. The 10th division, which in accordance with the orders of THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 39 marshal Oyama, the Japanese commander-in-chief, had moved slowly on Hai-cheng, was, soon after the victory of Teh-li-tzu, ordered to halt and await the advance of the 2nd army. On receipt of these instructions, Kawamura determined to attack, about June 26th, the Chi-pan-ling and Ta-ling passes, by which date he calculated that Oku should have reached Kai-ping. On 24th, just as all arrangements were completed, Kawa- mura, in common with the other generals, was notified that as the Eussian fleet could still leave Port Arthur, and render \ sea transport of supplies precarious, the combined advance on Liao-Yang must be delayed until after the rainy season, that is, until Setitembjer, At the same time news came from Oku, that, owiiig to transport difficulties, the 2nd army could not, for the moment, advance. Thus the Japanese, already beginning to feel the drag on their operations, of the fortress of Port Arthur, which was sheltering the enemy's fleet, proposed to abandon the initiative, a step likely to bring ^fio'us consequences in view of the dispersion of their forces, Kawamura, nevertheless, decided that it would be wise to secure his position, by clearing the passes, and, by 27th, had { taken both Chi-pan-Hng and Ta-ling, driving off Misehenko's , detachment. Meanwhile, Keller had, as a result of Teh-li-tzu, been ordered to send one brigade to An-shan-tien, and to make, with the remainder of his force, a demonstration towards Peng-huang-cheng ; an operation which, if it had any effect, i would be more likely to increase than to relieve pressure on Stackelberg. Keller, therefore, mustered eight battalions, and advancing in two columns, reached a point ten miles from Peng-huang- cheng, unopposed. He then retired, and on arriving at Len- shan-quan, on June 18 th, received orders to remain on the defensive. N"o sooner had Keller withdrawn, than Eennenkamf 40 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF attacked the 12th division at Ai-yang-pien-meng, but soon drew off. The two Eussian generals seem to have acted indepen- dently, thereby reducing the chances of success. On June 24th, the 1st army commander also moved forward to occupy the passes over the main Feng-shui-ling range, for by doing so, though drawing nearer to the enemy's masses, he would limit the Eussian power of manoeuvre. The army marched north-westwards ia three columns, owing to the mountainous nature of the district, the Guards on Erh-chia-pu-tsz, the 2nd division on Len-shan- kuan, and 12th division by Sai-ma-chi. Before this advance Keller and Eennenkamf feU back, so that, by 27th, the Guard and 2nd divisions were holding the Mo-tien-ling and neigh- bouring passes, and the 12th division a pass twelve miles west of Sai-ma-chi — sometimes called North Feng-shui-ling. Eain now fell heavily, quite disorganising the communica- tions of the 1st army. It has been suggested that, under the original Japanese plan of campaign, the 1st army was intended to move on Hai-cheng, and not towards Liao-Yang, and that the primary object of the Japanese leaders was to concentrate their own forces rather than to envelop the Eussians. The direction actually taken by Kuroki's army is ascribed to the influence of topography, and to the fact that the only practicable roads from the Yalu to the Liao converged on Liao-Yang. In 1894, the army which crossed the Yalu did march on Hai-cheng. It appears, then, that if the Japanese had desired Kuroki's army to move on Hai-cheng, sufficient roads would have been available for the purpose. It is probable, therefore, that the Japanese deliberately moved the 1st army by the more northerly routes, with the object of at once preventing Eussian operations towards Port Arthur by the menace thus offered to the Eussian line of commimication, and of keeping the 1st army in a position from which it could envelop the Eussian left in any locality THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 41 south of Mukden. No doubt it was calculated that the Eussians could not quickly overwhelm Kuroki in the hilly country lying south-east of Liao-Yang, and that the attrac- 1 tion of Port Arthur, and the presence of the other two armies, would tend to lessen the probability of such a counter-stroke. Possibly the Japanese hoped, after the rapid capture of Port Arthur, to apply to the Eussians the enveloping tactics actually attempted at Mukden, with the 3rd army as left wing, and Kuroki's army in a more favourable position than was their right on that occasion. Whilst these events had been taking place inland, the Bussian fleet had, on June 23rd, put to sea, but was driven back intoTKe harbour by the Japanese. On June 26th the 3rd army captured a ridge known as Ken-san, about ten miles from Port Arthur, subsequently repulsing several attempts to retake the position. At about this time the 3rd army was reinforced by the 9th division and 4th Kobi brigade. (For positions of troops see Appendix VII, and Map 5.) During the early part of July, the Eussians showed a July, good deal of activjtj^in the eastern theatre of war, a couple of battalions attacking Mo-tien-ling, whilst Eennenkamf continually, but without success, harassed Kuroki's line of communication, with the object of trying to find out his dispositions. The operations were all apparently under- taken to obtain information, for, owing to Kuroki's inert- ness after his _ advance, whilst the other armies were relatively active, and to the westward movement of Asada, the Eussians thought that Kuroki's army was stealing a march on them. Kuroki, in fact, was at one time reported to be marching towards Ta-k^-shan and Port Arthur, or, as another rumour had it, to be concentrating on his right, preparatory to crossing the Tai-tzu river, and advancing on Mukden — a movement of which the Eussians were a good deal afraid. Not satisfied with the result of the earlier operations, and since the cavalry was not able to pierce the Japanese 42 LECTURES ON THE STEATEGY OF outpost Knes, Keller, on July 17tli, attacked the Japanese positions at an'di near Mo-tien-ling, with one brigade of the rtrEircorps7and twelve battalions of the 3rd and 6th East Siberian divisions. With these troops he succeeded, though at somewhat heavy cost of life, in discovering that the Japanese 1st army had not materially altered its dispositions. Kuropatkin thereupon determined, on the arrival, in Southern Manchuria, of the 1st and 17th European cor£s, expected about the middle of Augusl,'"to attack and drive back Kuroki, whose position was thought to be menacing to Liao-Yang; though it does not appear that the Eussians had valid grounds for assuming that the Japanese would remain quiet for so long a period. Kuroki now d.elivered a eountej-attack, when, on July 19th, the i2th division drove a Eussian force, of some 7000 men, with twenty-four guns, from Chao-tao, whence they not only prevented direct communication between the 2nd and 12th divisions, but could have attacked, in flank, the Mo-tien-ling position. From Chao-tao a road led to Mukden, via Pen-si-hu, so that the Japanese exploit again made Kuropatkin doubt whether the 1st army was not contemplating a movement against his communications. The Eussian commander-in-chief, who, on the news of Teh-li-tzu, had at once hurried southwards, now hastened to An-ping, directing portions of the 10th corps, newly arrived from Eussia, to march to Yu-shu-lin-tzu, and drive the Japanese back towards Sai-ma-ehi. At this period, the Japanese armies in Manchuria were still without a commander-in-chief in the theatre of war, marshal Oyama not having yet arrived from Japan. Such procedure, closely copying the action of Moltke in 1866, is open to criticism, for the rival armies were now in such close contact that decisive events, which could not well be controlled from Tokyo, might take place at any moment. Oya ma should, therefore, more especially since the activity of the Eussians had no doubt shown the danger of post- THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 43 poning the advance until September, and as the Eussian fleet was no longer formidable, have ere now placed himself where he could closely supervise the operations of his forces. But Kuropatkin's action was much more reprehensible, for j his continued movements" musThave dislocated the arrange-l ments of his staff, and his presence, in localities where detachments of his army had suffered reverses, was likely not to improve, but to prejudice his grasp of the general situation, by leading him to attach undue importance tc local incidents. Ku ropatkin's j flttiasys are said to have been prompted by the fact that he mistrusted the capacity of his subordinate generals. But such meddlesomeness would tend to aggravate rather than to mend matters, and all the Eussian leader's energies were requiref^for tEe organisation, and even train-ij ing of his army. . Many regiments possessed newly raised/ battalions; the East Siberian brigades had recently beei^: expanded into divisions, and were full of drafts of men who | had never seen a magazine rifle ; and the transporFtrain was not e^JeTen'Er Uofebve^'tlie Eussian armies were parcelled ; into a series of independent detachments, without cohesioq,, or knowledge of one anothe/s movemeiTts. Not even thai force opposing Kuroki was under one commander. It is a matter of experience that no one leader can efficiently control more than five or six units. It would seem, then, that Kuropatkin should have done as he after- wards did, divided his troops into two or three armies, each under a responsible commander. Probably, however, the I men were lacking. No sooner had Kuropatkin reached An-ping, than news came of the advance of Oku's army, on July 23rd, doubtless ujader taken to jceli^ve pressure on Kuroki. This general's isolated position was, most likely, causing' anxiety to the Japanese, who had probably heard of the movement of troops eastwards from Liao-Yang. Kuropatkin at once posted southwards, only to arrive 44 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF after the action of Ta-shih-chiao, when Oku drove back the 1st and 4th Siberian corps, both under general Zarubaiev, of the 4th corps, which was most severely engaged. The position of Ta-shih-chiao, on one of the spurs flung westwards into the Liao plain from the Eeng-shui-ling group of mountains, had been fortified, so it is curious that the Russians, having accepted battle, offered so moderate a resistance, for they fought merely a rear-guard action. Apparently Kuropatkin, in view of Kuroki's position at Mo-tien-ling and Chao-tao, did not desire to involve his southern detachment too deeply, but at the same time did not wish to give up Ying-kow without a struggle. Zaru- baiev had therefore been ordered not to commit himself, and as a result, the Japanese gained the prestige of a victory, and the Russians sacrificed lives to no purpose. On 25th and 26th, the 2nd army halted at Ta-shih-chiao, occupying Ying-kow on the latter date. On 28th, communication was oj)ened between the 2nd . and 4th armies, and the 5th division was detached to re- inforce general Nodzu^s command. This army had, after the capture of Chi-pan-ling and Ta-Ung, skirmished, in the area south of Hsi-mu-cheng, with Mischenko's detachment. Towards the end of July marshal Oyama assumed direct command of the Japanese armies. Coupling this fact with the advance of Oku's force to Ta-shih-chiao, it may there- fore be assumed that the Japanese policy of delay until September, had now been definitely abandoned. 7 After Ta-chih-chiao the Russians fell back to Hai-cheng^ and as a result of this contraction of frontage, were now in a more favourable position than at any previous period of the campaign. They were occupying, with 140,000 sabres and bayonets, a semicircle of about sixty miles raffius, where- as the Japanese, with not more thaS 1T)6,000, were spread over quite eighty-five miles ; moreover, owing to the draw- ing of 1;Ee"4th army towards the 2nd, probably with the object of placing as strong a force as possible near the Port Arthur road, a gap of quite thirty miles of mountainous APPROKIMATE POSITIONS AND STREmiTIf ON 31 f^ JULIT, 190^. Scale of Mflas ZQ 'to 60 So Muh£/ei Q> RzLSsians O tlapanese L_J Fitjtcres represent rucmierj in T^iLsands Co IS-n^-Jcc um:e. ' RTI PortArlhur THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 45 country existed between the right of the 4th and the left of the 1st army. (See Appendix VIII, and Map 6.) Kuropatkin could now, without much countermarching, have attacked the 2nd and 4th armies, who combined mustered about 61,000 sabres and bayonets and 300 guns, with 75,000 bayonets, 8500 sabres, and 350 guns, whilst he attacked and contained, with some 40,000 bayonets, j 3500 sabres, and 172 guns, Kuroki's army of 37,000 rifles and sabres and 152 guns. Or, conversely, he could have moved against Kuroki with about 55,000 bayonets, 5000 sabres, and 200 guns, whilst i holding the 2nd and 4th armies with 60,000 bayonets, 7000 sabres, and 282 guns. Kuropatkin's reserve was, however, so meagre, that in neither case was it probable that the numerical preponder- ance he could bring to bear would be decisive, whilst which- ever fraction of the Japanese was attacked, must be met more or less directly in front, unless, indeed, the troops at Liao-Yang could tufnrKTuroki's right by Pen-si-hu. As already remarked, before taking the offensive, Kuro- patkin should have considered where success was most likely to produce decisive results. Kuroki's army certainly most nearly menaced the Eus- sian line of communication, and for this reason its defeat would have been advantageous to the Eussians. But Kuro- patkin's forces were so disposed that he could not easily envelop Kuroki's left, separate this army completely from the 4th army, and drive the former towards Feng-huang- cheng; moreover, success against Kuroki's left would not necessarily involve the retirement of Oku and Nodzu; StiU less would the victory be decisive, if Kuropatkin, moving his Liao-Yang troops to Pen-si-hu, rolled up the 12th division; for though, perhaps, this division could be more easily defeated than any other portion of the Japanese forces, a success against the Japanese right would tend only to bring the armies into one straight line, not to cause their ruin. 46 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF Similarly, the defeat of the 4th army, though it would doubtless iaeonvenience the Japanese, and would probably cause Kuroki to fall back, would not oblige them to raise the siege of Port Arthur ; and since Nodzu lay in a hilly country, rapid success, so necessary to prevent envelopment by the Japanese wings, would not be easy. J)ku, on the other hand, directly covered the most im- portant of the Japanese lines of supply, to Ying-kow and Dalny, and also the siege of Port Arthur. If he could be driven back and routed, the Japanese armies would be in a sorry plight. Hence, it seems that the Eussian stroke should have been delivered against Oku's army, which, by using the railway, could also be most quickly attacked. Besides, the ground where the battle would take place was more favourable to the Eussian organisation and armament than the mountains, and the physical difficulties of the hills would help to delay Kuroki and Nodzu, when they attempted to exert pressure to assist Oku. However, Kuropatkin seems to have intended nothing more than a direct attack on the 12th division, with the fractions of the 10th corps already designated for the purpose. But before even this operation could take place, marshal Oyama, hearing from Kuroki that the Eussians appeared to be massing against the right of the 1st army, wisely decided to anticipate the enemy's offensive, and to spoil their plan by a forward moveinent by the whole 1st army, on July 30th and 31st. This operation was to be comtmed, apparently, with a simultaneous advance by the other two armies, and with active raids against the Eussian line of communication, by the Chinese Hun-huse brigands. On 31st, the 1st army was successful in defeating Keller's detachment, and portions of the 10th corps, and drove them back to the ridges enclosing, on the east, the valley of the i'Tan river. On news of this reverse, Kuropatkin, fearing for Liao-Yang and his Une of communication, directed those troops which THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 47 had been in the neighbourhood of Hai-oheng to fall back to a strong and carefully intrenched position along the ridge of hills near An-shan-tien. This retrograde movement was also due to the lacli that U^u had succeeded in interposing, after but slight resistance, some troops between the 2nd and 4th Siberian corps; whilst the 4th army had, on July 31st, taken Hsi- mu-chen g^dri ving back Mischen ko. The 4th army thus closed to within five miles jof the 2ncrarmy. The Japanese occupied Hai-cheng" on ^August 3rd, and the August, result of the operations undertaken towards the end of July, was therefore to reduce tlie combined frontage to about sixty or seventy miles. BiiF^uroki's army was not more than twenty-five or thirty miles from Liap-Yang, whilst the 2nd and 4th were still quite forty-five miles from that city. At the same time the country to be traversed by Kuroki was the more difficult, so that in_pointof_time, the three armies were perhaps ec[ually_distant from the town._ Kuroki's advanced position had, however, practically com- mitted the Japanese to a converging attack on Liao-Yang, for his army, which should have formed the mobile wing of the Japanese forces, could now only manoeuvre with difficulty and risk. Had Oyama's hand not been forced by the threat against the 12th division, and had the 1st army force been held back on the line Chao-tao to Geb-ato, for instance, and the 2nd and 4th armies pushed on to An- shan-tien, the Eussians would have been in a more difficult position, whilst the Japanese would have run no greater risk. The 2nd and 4th armies could then have attacked the enemy's front, and the 1st been used to envelop his left flank, wherever the battle for Liao-Yang was fought. Heavy rain fell at the beginning of August, which, com- bined with the fact that the Japanese were also probably waiting for the result of the first and abortive assault^ on Port Arthur, delivered between August 20th and 24th, put an end to active operations, on a large scale, for nearly a month. During this interval, the Eussians were still lying south THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 49 and no idea of offensive seems to have been entertained by the Eussian general. The initiative was therefore left to th e Japan ese, and fearful lest, on the news of the failure of the assault on Port Arthur, the Eussians should seize this advantage, they recommenced their converging advance on Liao-Yang. As before, the 1st army was first committed to action, with the object, it is said, of causing the Eussians to evacuate the An-shaB-tien position. The Japanese, as a result, lost all power jol manoeuvre, except with such troops as could, at considerable risk, "Be withdrawn from the battle frontage. But, it would, ap- parently, have been to the Japanese advantage had the Eussians stood at An-shan-tien, for their envelopment by Kuroki could then have been undertaken without the necessity of placing his army astride the Tai-tzu riyer. Kuropatkinj plan appears to have been to hold the posi- tions at An-shan-tien, and east of An-ping, sufficiently long to oblige the enemy to show his hand and force. Having accom- plished this, the army was to retire on the intrenchments that had been made round Liao-Yang, then, pivoting on this bridge-head, it was to manoeuvre on both banks of the Tai- tzu ; and if the enemy divided his force and placed it astride the river, it was to faU, in superior numbers, on one or other fraction. Except that the troops holding the advanced positions were liable to defeat in detail, and if not beaten, must, at any rate, have been subjected to the demoralising influence of another retirement, the plan, though cautious, was reason- able. But in the event Kuropatkin failed 'to~carry out his conception, and was defeated. (See Map 8.) IV September. fTHHE strategical operations, proper, of the Eusso-Japanese JL war, may be said to have ended with the commence- ment of the battle of Liao-Yang, but the subsequent operations were on so extended a scale, that it is proposed to deal, in outline, with events leading up to the battle of Mukden. After their defeat at Liao-Yang, the Eussians retired northwards with stolid deliberation, unpursued by the Japanese, the main body reaching the neighbourhood of Mukden on September 6th. Kuropatkin's first impulse seems to have been to evacuate Mukden, and retreat to Tieh-ling, a town about forty miles north of the Manchu capital, where an offshoot from the Manchurian mountains is again projected into the Liao plain, offering a position suitable for defensive tactics. But circumstances soon caused the Eussian commander to change his mind. In the first place the Japanese pursuit ceased. Then political pressure appears to have been brought to bear on him from Eussia, through the viceroy Alexiev, to discontinue the retirement. Then, again, the Eussians were much dependent for meat supply on Hsin- ming-ting, and were naturally unwilling to abandon to the enemy, Mukden, a town lying in a rich grain-growing district, and of considerable political importance. It was therefore decided to halt at Mukden, and the army was quartered in this neighbourhood, as follows : — Of the cavalry, G-rekov's Orenburg Cossack division kept touch with the Japanese along the Sha and Shi-li rivers ; Mischenko, with the Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade, stood 5° THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 51 eastwards, as far as the Fu-shun to Pen-si-hu road ; and the cavalry division, under Samsonov, watched the country east of Fu-shun. Besides these, there were the customary de- tachments wide to both flanks. The 10th and 17th corps remained, with the 2nd and 4th Siberian corps, south of the Hun river, and were employed in constructing bridge-heads to the railway and Imperial road bridges, in the shape of a semicircle of forts, round a radius from Hun-ho-pu to Yan-su-chian-tzu. The 1st Siberian corps proceeded to Fu-ling, six miles east of Mukden, the 3rd to Fu-shun, twenty miles further east. The two then began to intrench the line of the Hun from Mukden to Fu-shun, constructing works on both banks of the river. The 5th Siberian corps was placed between Mukden and Hsin-ming-ting ; and the 1st corps, now arriving from Europe, had its headquarters at Pu-ho, fifteen miles north of Mukden. The 5th East Siberian corps, which had been broken into detachments during the battle of Liao- Yang, seems still to have been disseminated. But, later, apparently, portions of this and of the 5 th Siberian corps were amalgamated, and known as the 5th corps. Soon after Liao-Yang, the Czar, believing that the defeat of the Russians had perhaps, in part, been due to the fact that Kuropatkin's army was too large for one man to manage, decided to form two armies in Manchuria, under admiral Alexiev as commander-in-chief, one to be com- manded by Kuropatkin, the other by general Grippenberg, at that time commanding the Vilna army corps. This appointment, perhaps, turned Kuropatkin's thoughts to projects for retrieving his reputation. The fact that the numbers and strength of the Russian army had been much increased also made an offensive appear to be promising ; for there had arrived from Europe, the 1st corps, drafts to replace casualties, Q.F. guns in sub- stitution for those of older pattern, up to that time in use by the Siberian corps, and the 6th Siberian corps was on its way to the seat of war. 52 LECTUKES ON THE STRATEGY OF Before attempting to attack the Japanese, Kuropatkin, taught hy his experience at Liao-Yang, proceeded to delegate his authority, and to decentralise command, by organising his forces into three groups or armies. Of these, the Eastern detachment, lying east of Mukden, was composed of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberian corps, with the Siberian Cossack division, under general Stackelberg. The western detach- ment of the 10th, 17th corps, and portions of the 5th European and 5th Siberian corps, now known as the 5th corps, with the Orenburg Cossack division, was under general Bilderling. A central force consisting of the 1st corps, the 4th Siberian corps, and the 6th Siberian corps, when it came up, with Mischenko's Trans-Baikal Cossack division, was under the commander-in-chief. In addition, the usual- strong mixed forces watched both flanks. Attention was also given to mapping, or to revising maps of the area round Mukden, but apparently little was really done, for Stackelberg's detachment is said to have possessed but few maps at the time of the Sha-Ho battle. Whilst the Russians were thus engaged, the Japanese, exhausted by their efforts at Liao-Yang, had halted, the 1st army on the line Hei-yin-tai to Lo-ta-tai, the 2nd and 4th armies south of the Tai-tzu, and west and east of Liao- Yang. About September 14th, marshal Oyama seems to have decided to undertake further offensive operations in a month's time, by which date, no doubt, drafts to make good the losses of Liao-Yang would have arrived, as well as the 8th division. Accordingly, instructions were issued to this effect, each army was allotted a district in which to advance, and the troops were warned, that, in future, frontal attacks, when unaccompanied by enveloping movements, were to be avoided as far as possible. This last provision exactly coincided with tactical instructions promu^ated by the Russians about the same time. To the 1st army was assigned the Ta-lien-kou to Pu-tsao- THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 53 yai road, and the district eastwards as far as Pen-si-hu. The 4th army was to use the roads on either side of the railway, and the 2nd army the roads westward as far as the right bank of the Hun. The reserve, of Kobi brigades, was to march west of the railway, and behind the right of the 2nd army. It was not until September 10th that the bridges over the Tai-tzu, at Liao-Yang, were repaired, and the 2nd army began to cross the river and to intrench itself on the line Shan-tai-tzu to Ta-pa-tai-tzu. The 4th army, which commenced, about the same time, to move to the north of Tai-tzu, took up the line Nan-tai to La-ni-pu. The 1st army lay mainly between La-ni-pu and the Yen- . tai coal mines, but Umezawa's detachment was about fifteen miles to the east, at Ping-tai-tzu ; apparently partly for the purpose of reconnoitring the district allotted to the 1st army, partly because Ping-tai-tzu is an important valley centre, whence roads lead to Pen-si-hu, and thence to Chao- tao and the Yalu. As has been stated, both commanders were contemplating offensive operations, and for this purpose each wanted in- formation of the enemy's dispositions. Though the masses of Eussian cavalry made it difficult for ^the Japanese patrols to penetrate the enemy's outpost line, the Japanese service of spies seems to have afforded them fairly accurate information of the Eussian dispositions ; and, after all, cavalry, more often than not, can only confirm, or show to be false, news obtained from other sources. At any rate, Oyama knew that the whole Eussian front and flanks were covered by cavalry; that the 5th Siberian corps was reported west of Mukden, the 10th and 17th corps round, or close to the city, the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps east of Mukden ; but the 3rd Siberian corps was not located. He was also aware that works were being constructed north of the Sha-Ho, and east of Mukden, and that reinforcements, in the shape of the 1st European and 6th Siberian corps, were coming up. 54 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF It has been said " that rivers and mountains, like other complications in the art of war, afford additional oppor- tunities to skill and talent, and additional embarrassments to incapacity " ; and, indeed, the presence, in the theatre of operations, of the great Hun river, and of the mountains north of Pen-si-hu, fully exemplify the truth of this remark. The Hun river certainly complicated the problem pre- sented to Oyama, for he could not, without placing his army astride so serious an obstacle, carry out a converging move- ment against the Eussians, nor could he, without consider- able risk, attempt to turn, after the manner of Lee, or envelop their right flank. On the other hand, the Hun would protect the Japanese left, and render, difficult, attack by the Eussians from this direction. Perhaps the Japanese commander-in-chief might have tried to surprise the enemy by crossing the whole, or at any rate the greater, part of his army, over the Hun and Tai-tzu, near Hsiao-pei-ho. Then marching between the Hun and Liao rivers, he could have attacked the Eussian right, thus turning the Hun and the fortifications south and east of Mukden and, at the same time, using the Hun as a line of supply. Such plan would have demanded the temporary uncover- ing of the main line of supply from Ying-kow and Dalny. But a fortified Liao-Yang should have sufficiently protected the line of communication, until Japanese pressure on the Eussian communications had obliged the latter to abandon any enterprises that might have been undertaken south of Mukden. Moreover, if advancing southwards in force, the Eussians would probably have sent a detachment west of the Hun, and would have, therefore, placed themselves astride the river. If unable to adopt so bold a course, Oyama, relying on the Hun to protect his left, could repeat the tactics of Liao- Yang, by advancing directly on Mukden with the 2nd army, and moving the 1st and 4th armies, in echelon behind the 2nd, through the hills, towards Fu-shun. Here they could THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 55 probably, with ease, force the passage of the Hun, but supply in the hill area might be difficult. Or he could imitate Lee's action in 1862, and detach Kuroki to move round the Eussian left whilst the rest attacked, or remained fronting, the Eussians. In any case, either the passage across the Hun, or the march through the hiUs, would be a slow proceeding, which would increase the risk that the enemy might probe the plan, and counter-attack before its development. Or, again, he could adopt a less ambitious, though probably not less risky plan, and act as he apparently intended, making a direct advance on Mukden and Pu-shun, and trusting to Kuroki to overlap and envelop the enemy's left. At any rate the situation of the two armies, now front- ing each other, and astride their lines of communication, rendered necessary either a bold turning movement^ or an equally dangerous, though to outward appearance less risky frontal advance against the Eussian works; and the last course would be the least likely to lead to decisive results. The alternatives presented to the Eussian commander-in- chief much resembled those placed before Oyama. About the middle of September, the information available to Kuropatkin inclined him to believe that two Japanese divisions were between Nan-tai and Shan-tai-tzu, that four divisions were immediately north of Liao-Yang, two divi- sions near the Ten-tai coal mines, and two divisions be- tween Ping-tai-tzu and Pen-si-hu. He knew, moreover, that Liao-Yang was fortified, for he had made the works, and he believed that all the Japanese troops were in- trenched. There were several courses open to the Eussian leader. He could utilise the Hun as a line from which to manoeuvre, constructing bridges, and building bridge-heads at, say, Chan-tan, at Hun-ho-pu south of Mukden, and at Fu-shun, and keeping his army, with the exception of his cavalry, north of the river. But this plan would be unenterprising, and therefore a confession of weakness and inferiority. 56 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF Or he could, whilst fortifying Hun-ho-pu to secure his com- munications, and covering his front with cavalry, who would be especially active in the hill area, march the bulk of his army down the right bank of the Hun, and cross the river south of Chan-tan and Hei-kou-tai. This plan would in- volve the passage of the Hun, a broad river, in somewhat close proximity to the Japanese left, but the blow would fall near the Japanese main line of communication. Or, again, the Eussian general could move his army south- wards, astride the Hun, attacking the Japanese in front with one portion, and when their attention was fully en- gaged, throwing the remainder across the river on to their left flank. In this case there would be risk of defeat in detail, for the enemy might envelop the troops east of the Hun Ho, or might even make a counter-attack towards Fu-shun. But if they advanced on Fu-shun, their move- ments in the hills, especially if opposed, would be slow, and their blow would not so nearly menace the Eussian line, as would his own operations the Japanese communications. Or, the Eussians, advancing from Mukden and Fu-shun, might try to envelop the Japanese right at Pen-si-hu, whilst closely engaging their front. In order that the enveloping movement might come as a surprise to the enemy, it should take place after his front had been attacked. Objections to this project would be that the Eussian armament was not well suited to hill warfare, for they had only three or four mountain batteries; that supply would be difficult; that movements in mountainous country are always slow, but are particularly so when opposed ; that the Japanese main line of communication was many miles distant, and that therefore to sever it would be difficult ; also that there would be risk of defeat in detail, for the enemy, whilst holding the Eussian left in the hills, might attack their centre, and envelop their right. Again, the Eussians might advance in three converging masses with the object of enveloping the enemy, though, having regard to the fighting power of the Japanese, they THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 57 had hardly sufiBcient numerical preponderance to justify hopes that envelopment would be successful. Or, they might move in double echelon from their centre, holding back both wings, so as to meet and counter the enveloping tactics practised by the Japanese. Such procedure would lead to a desperate frontal battle, without prospect of de- cisive victory. The plan actually adopted by Kuropatkin was an attack on the Japanese right, for which the detachment of Staokel- berg was designated, the purpose of the movement being to draw the Japanese reserves in an easterly direction. This accomplished, the Eussian right and centre, which would have been withheld from close action, could, it was hoped, attack with success. To this plan it may be objected that the main operation, though to be directed against the troops covering the principal Japanese line of supply, was to be a mere frontal attack, and therefore more likely to be costly than decisive. Moreover, the Japanese might consider that an advance against the Eussian left, would afford more effective relief to their own right, than the direct despatch of reinforce- ments to this flank. (For positions of troops, see Appendix X, and Map 9.) In criticising the Eussian dispositions it may be remarked that it might have been more advantageous had Kuropatkin, instead of putting his reserve behind his centre, in position to directly reinforce either wing, added, from the beginning, one corps to his left wing, and placed two corps along the Sha-Ho to the east, and three corps to the west of the railway. The three groups could then have come into action, successively, from left to right, whilst the corps west of the railway could have outflanked the enemy's left. At the same time, such of his 17,000 cavalry as were not required for local protection, might, since the Japanese cavalry was not numerically formidable, have been formed into two masses of, say, 7000 and 10,000, the larger to operate against the Japanese right, the smaller against their left wing. 58 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF The flank detachments should also, if not quite abolished, have been very much reduced in strength, so as to enable effort to be concentrated at the decisive point. The arrangement of the Japanese army may be criticised in the sense that it was perhaps better posted for a defensive battle covering Liao-Yang, than for the offensive movement which Oyama is said to have contemplated, for long marches to either flank would have to be made before the troops could be in position to initiate an enveloping movement, Oyama seems to have received early intimation of the enemy's projects. On September 28th, the actual date on which Kuropatkin issued his general plan of action, [with only a reservation that the time for its inception was to be notified later,] the Japanese commander-in-chief informed his army leaders that the Eussians might, at any moment, move in force against Ping-tai-tzu, and that arrangements must, therefore, be made against this contingency. October. Again, on October 2nd, a Eussian army order was pub- lished, and copied in the Press, announcing that the time had come for the Eussian army to take the offensive, and drive the enemy southwards. This may have been regarded by the Japanese as a blind, for in spite of this warning, they were in some degree sur- prised by the enemy's offensive. But, as happened throughout the war, the Eussian opera- tions were so slow and hesitating, that the Japanese, by a vigorous offensive, were able to deprive the enemy of his initial advantage. After severe fighting, the armies halted, exhausted and facing one another, on the banks of the Sha river, where they settled down, in close contact, to await— the Eussians the arrival of reinforcements, before again ilnder taking the offensive, the Japanese the release of their 3rd army by the capture of Port Arthur. (See Map 10.) The viceroy Alexiev was recalled soon after the Sha-Ho battle, leaving Kuropatkin free to direct operations, and to continue the work of organising the army. s § En I o i S s- =0 0{] x-^ -w THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 59 For some months the Eussians devoted themselves to November reorganisation, and to the absorption of reinforcements. *"•*> Both sides also busily intrenched, and whilst bickering was frequent, it rarely assumed serious proportions, notwithstand- ing that the armies, in places, were not fifty yards apart. The first event, worthy of note, to happen in the winter January, was the fall of Port Arthur on January 1st, 1905. (For ^^o^- positions of the armies, see Appendix XI, and Map 11.) This occurrence made it certain that the Japanese would soon receive an accession of three or four divisions. The Eussians having now completed the organisation of their army, and being in sufficient numbers to warrant hope of a successful attack on the enemy, Kuropatkin seems, therefore, to have thought the moment propitious for an offensive, more especially because the political situation in Eussia was such as to render the government anxious for a victory. Two great obstacles stood in the way of active measures — the shortness of the days, and the coldness of the time of year. In spite of the rigorous climate, Kuropatkin decided to attack the Japanese, hoping, perhaps, that the Eussians, inured to cold, would support the inevitable hardships better than the enemy. Before taking the offensive, the Eussian leader, either with the object of discovering if any troops from Port Arthur had reached the armies, or to alarm the enemy as to his communications, sent round the Japanese left, a force of about fifty squadrons, with half a dozen batteries, and a few infantry, all under Mischenko. The raid ended on January 11th, and was so far suc- cessful, that the Eussians learnt that no troops of the 3rd army had reached Liao-Yang. Kuropatkin now resolved to roll up the Japanese left, but proposed to use for this purpose, only about 30,000 men, drawn from the 8th and 10th corps, the Eifle corps, and the 1st and 6th Siberian corps. There seems no doubt that, having regard to the frontage 60 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF occupied by the two armies, the numerical superiority of the Eussians, some 100,000 men, and the strength of the Eussian front line, behind which manoeuvre should not have been difficult, Kuropatkin possessed the power to deal a serious blow on either flank. This the Japanese would find difficult to parry, unless troops were withdrawn from the first line, in which case there would be risk of the front being broken. The left flank of the Japanese was most inviting; here the country was not so difficult as were the eastward hills, the distance to be traversed by the Eussians would be less than would be required to turn the enemy's right, and the Japanese left was nearer their main line of communication. If, then, the left were broken, the enemy's line of supply would be in serious danger, and, in addition, it was believed that the Japanese did not anticipate an attack on this flank. On the other hand, the Japanese reserves were thought to be standing near Yentai station, and therefore well placed to reinforce the left. Forewarned is forearmed, and a primary condition of success in war, is, therefore, that the enemy shall be misled, and that the blow, when delivered, shall come as a sur- prise. The Eussians, however, neglected this rule, for, from January 13th onwards, the Eussian right began to show unusual activity, a balloon usually raised at Sha-ho-pu, moving westwards, whilst on 17th and 18th, cavalry occu- pied Ssu-fang-tai, west of Chan-tan. It may of course be said that these manoeuvres might have been a ruse to draw the enemy's attention westwards ; and this fact constitutes one of the great disadvantages of the defensive, in that the defender can rarely be certain whether the enemy's movements are a stratagem, or the prelude to an attack. But the Japanese possessed other information of the Eussian intentions, for, on the night of January 24th, six THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 61 EuBsian soldiers, who surrendered to the Japanese in differ- ent portions of the frontage held by the armies — and such desertions were unfortunately frequent, especially amongst the Jews in the Czar's service — all reported that an attack would be made, on 26th, agaiast the Japanese left. In spite of this, the Japanese were somewhat taken aback, when, on 26th, the Eussians attacked, in force, the village of Hei-kou-tai. They were, however, driven back after three days' hard fighting. As at the Sha-Ho, the Eussians lost their initial advantage through the undue deliberation of their movements, and no serious operations took place against the Japanese front, to prevent reinforcement of the threatened point. The Japanese contented themselves with beating off the attack, probably, because they were unwilling to become in- volved in a decisive battle, before the arrival of the 3rd army. In the interval between the battle of Hei-kou-tai and that February, of Mukden, no stirring events occurred ; but, as a result of this action, both sides increased their fortified frontage, the Japanese continuing to hold Hei-kou-tai, and the neighbour- ing villages, in force, whilst the Eussians threw up in- trenchments west of Chan-tan. In other respects the Eussians do not seem to have altered their dispositions, but the arrival of the 3rd army, and the completion of Kawamura's 5th army, caused some changes to be made in the arrangement of the Japanese troops. (See Appendix XII, and Map 12.) The annual thaw, which usually begins early in March, and would render the rivers unfordable, and the roads and fields heavy, was now imminent. It was therefore to be pre- sumed, that, in spite of the cold, one or both commanders would assume the offensive in the interval, more especially since the Japanese, now that the 3rd army had arrived, could not, for some time at any rate, expect further rein- forcement. Towards the middle of February, the Eussians did decide 62 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF again to attack the Japanese, and even before this date the latter had worked out a plan of attack. The experience of the Sha-Ho battle had taught the Eus- sians the local resisting power inherent in mountain positions, and whilst railways had been run to various portions of the Eussian frontage, thus facilitating supply, none had been laid far into the mountains south of Fu-shun. The feeding of a large force in this locality would therefore have de- manded quantities of transport, which could probably only be procured with difficulty. Moreover, to have turned the Japanese right, would have required a long detour, for Kawamura's army was some distance east of Pen-si-hu ; and success, if attained, would probably have been local rather than decisive, for the enemy's line of communication lay many miles from the 5th army. Attack on the right was also apparently expected by the enemy, for, according to Kuropatkin's information, the bulk of the 3rd army had been sent to Kawamura. Then, again, the armament of the Eussian army, possessing as it did but few mountain guns, was not well suited to hill warfare ; and lastly, if he moved a number of troops eastwards, Kuropatkin would, in some degree, uncover his own communications, and render himself liable to counter-attack west of Mukden. On the other hand, the position of the Eussian reserves, the alignment of the auxiliary railways, the armament of the Eussians, their preponderance in cavalry, and the level nature of the country, would facilitate operations against the Japanese left. By adopting this plan, Kuropatkin would be retaining the bulk of his army near Mukden, and his line of communication, and it might reasonably be hoped that Kawamura's advance would be sufficiently long retarded, to enable decisive success to be gained against the Japanese left; though here would be met the enemy's reserves. Kuropatkin, therefore, decided to attack the Japanese left, but without attempting envelopment, the intention being, apparently, to crush the enemy by weight of numbers, about THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 63 three corps being used for the offensive, whilst the remainder kept their positions. This plan may be characterised as a half-measure, and it would have been wiser to have withdrawn certainly one, probably better still two corps, from the strongly fortified frontage, and to have placed a mass of four or five corps west of the Hun, covered by 10,000 or 15,000 cavalry. The enemy's right and front might then have been attacked, and when these had been closely engaged, the stroke might have been launched against their left. The Japanese, however, had already adopted a formation calculated to at once meet envelopment by the enemy, or shouM he remain on the defensive, to facilitate the enclos- ing of his forces; the 3rd army being placed behind the left, the 5th behind the right flank. They had moreover decided to assume the offensive, on February 20th, their plan, apparently, stopping short at nothing less than the envelopment of the Eussians, the 5th army operating against the enemy's left, the 3rd army against his right. In order, however, to deceive the enemy as to their intentions, and to induce him to send his reserves eastwards, thus facilitating the deployment of the 3rd army, Kawamura was to move first. This stratagem succeeded, and to it the Japanese were a good deal beholden for their victory. That the Japanese plan was rather beyond the capacity of their forces, is shown by the event. In these circumstances, it would probably have been better to have reduced Kawamura's strength, and added these troops, as well as the general reserve, which was retained behind the centre far into the battle, to the 3rd army. This army would then have comprised about five divisions, and its operations would probably have been decisive. By withdrawing cavalry from the divisions of the 2nd and 4th armies, where it had not much scope, a larger mass might also have been placed on the left, with advantage to the Japanese operations. V THE strategical lessons of the Eusso-Japanese war are those which throughout history have clamoured for recognition, but have never, apparently, been thoroughly appreciated. Often governments have courted disaster by living in the present, by disregarding future possibilities, and by pur- suing, regardless of consequences, policies likely to end in disaster. So Eussia, hypnotised by the vastness of her empire, and encour^Mby the exaggerated fear of her actions displayed by certain European ministries, embarked thoughtlessly on an ni-considered policy of expansion. This brought her face to face with an apparently we^ak, buLdetermined_foe, whose ve^y existence was threatened by Eussian preten- sions. Eussia's policy, in this particular, outst ripped her stratfigx, that is, her forces were not in position to liHpose her wishes, should they lead to conflict with Japan. As a result, the great northern power paid the usual penalty for unpreparedness, bad organisation, and unsou nd distribution of force. She lost the initiative, was obliged to conform to the operations of^ the enemy, and to push into the front line, as they arrived in the theatre of war, a heterogeneous collection of units, who were without cohesion. As always happens in such circumstances, councils were divided, plajis hastily arranged, and as hastily abandoned, generals Tiad_ no confidence in one another, nor in their men, and the troops, sharing this feeling, mistrusted their leaders. 64 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 65 Even when projects promised success, they were marred by faulty execution. Fighting as they were in the midst of a semi-hostile population, and dep endent t o a great extent onjheir single line of_railway to Europe, the Eussians were also, from the first, forced to make l arge detachments to guard their com- munications, as to the security of which they were naturally sensitive. Eussia was therefore obliged J:q_accgptdef eat from a weaker nation, who, through careful preparation, and sound OTganisation, which go far to ensure succesrin war; and with the help of judicious alliances, was able to beat a more powerful rival. Neither wealth, resources, .numbers^of •f>&pulatiQn, nor PY§a arme d force , are therefore decisive factors in war. More important than these are foresight, preparation, and organisation. Eussia's pol icy of expansion was not_ national ; it was rather the policy of a few ambitious men. The support of the natioja,^ an. important. Atem_in_w^ was therefore lacking, and the soldiers went to the front unwillingly, or even under compulsion. Consequently, though the Eussians fought well, they fou ght wi thout enthusiasm, and their generals could not rely on this factor. But the Japanese people entered heart and soul into the ^ntest, inspiring their soldiers to noble deeds. The difficulty of remedying errors in initial deployment is clearly shown by the course of the campaignT^ The Eus- sians never overcame the original drawback of their local weaknessj the Japanese laboured, throughout^ under TEe disadvantage inherent in the false strategy of pursuing a double objective, unless possessed of great preponderance of force. The Japanese plan was faulty, in that effort was not con- centrated against the decisive point, whilst the projects were somewhat beyond the capacity of the national resources. 66 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF Not only was the power of resistance of the Eussian troops quartered in Manchuria esteemed too lightly, but the transporting capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway was also undervalued. Nor was war declared at the most favourable moment, from a military and meteorological point of view. " Want of foresight, too, was displayed in not sufficiently discou nting the influence jof the climatic and topographical conditions in HancEuna, which undoubtedly delayed the Japanese operations, to the advantage of the Eussians. Still, vigorous execution^ enabled the nation to achieve a considerable success; the movements of the armies were successfully co-ordinated in such a manner as to afford one another support; and the menace of the 1st army to the Eussian line of communication produced the expected effect. The whole course of the operations, in fact, again proves that it is not so much ability to plan, as resolution to carry through^ that is required to make successful war ; though, naturally, a good plan, well executed, is the ideal to be attained. Comjnand of _the sea also proved a valuable asset to Japan, in forcing~Eussia to strongly guard the fortress of Vladivostock, and in causing her generals to be diffident of risking troops in the Liao-tung peninsula. The value and importance of the initiative is another lesson of the war. He who is obHgedJ;o|£no]^hejenmj^lead£eases to be a free agent, a fact which adversely affects his judgment, rendering him weak and vacillating. The initiative does not belong in perpetuity to the assailant, to him who first attacks, for the defender, by an early counter-stroke, may reverse the positions. Circumstances will not always permit a belligerent to attack first, but it is to be remembered that the longer the initiative is left to the opponent, the greater become his chances of success. THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 67 "^^^ strong and weak points of e nveloping st rategy stand out clearly. There is no magic, calculated to ensure success, in enveloping strategy, that is, in converging movements on several lines of operation. Far from it, this form of war is the most risky, and the general who adopts exterior lines, deliberately, or of necessity, separates his forces, affording the opponent the desired opportunity of beating them in detail. But converging .movements favour e nvelop ment, and en- velopment, if successful, is decisive, a fact which tempts commanders to run the risks its inception entails. War would be fairly easy were the game played, even blindfold, on a chessboa rd: with no factors of weather, or topography, to disturb calculations; with men of wood, not delicate human beings, with which to make moves ; and with full knowledge of the enemy's dispositions. It is the presence of these disturbingelements that makes war so difficult an art; Iot even in countries with settled cUmates, the influence of weather on the health of the men, or on the mobility of the army, may, at any moment, pre- judice the best-laid plans. But a more variable factor, even than weather, is human nature, and if a wide margin must be left to allow for the 'effect of climate, a wider is required to discount human eccent ricities. If ignorance of the enemj's jgosition and movements be added to the plot, it is clear that no plan of operations, npt ela stic, ha s great chance of success. Kuro patkin's wavering attitude may have, and probably did, influence, that of his subordinate generals, but it cannot be said that they executed his plans with the spirit he had the right to expect. Yet generous_eo;;Ogeration^is one of the foundations of success in war. It'is notj at present, easy to say how much or how little either commander was influenced by political pressure, and to what extent the course to be pursued, was dictated from localities far from the seat of war. 68 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF The general policy to be followed in war rests with the National Government^ but interference in the details of the conduct of a campaign cannot but lead to disaster, as his- tory has shown time and again. Training for war is an important part of peace prepara- tion, but is, owing to the innate conservatism of human nature, perhaps the most difficult portion of 'what maybe called peace strategy. Men's minds habitually seek refuge in rules, vainly hoping thereby to solve life's difficulties and dilemmas. As a result, though formalism spells ruin in war, the Russians certainly, the Japanese in some"degree, were found behind modern rec[uirements in their training, and both paid for their fault by useless sacrifice of life. The difficulty of keeping training up to date lies mainly in the fact that it is not possible, in peace, to pronounce definitely on the in- fluence that will be exercised by improvements in armament. Moreover, officers and men dislike the trouble of changing methods in which they have been trained, and which may, in the past, have stood the test of war. A lesson of this_war is thafif a sound plan vigorously execuEeT is the foundation, good information is the keystone of military success. An efficient service of intelligence cannot be improvised, it must be carried on by men whose minds have been trained in these matters. Of this the Japanese were aware, and though, in some respects, their topographical information was faulty, their intelligence service in Europe, combined with a local system of spies, who were assisted by the friendly Chinese population, usually afforded early and accurate news of the enemy's dispositions and intentions. The Russian intelligence department is said to have been ill organised ; and it is even stated that few, if any, officers at Russian headquarters were able to read the Japanese writing, and that documents which fell into their hands could not therefore be deciphered. In contrast, too, to the silence of the Japanese press, the THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 69 Eussian newspapers published details of the mobilisation of troops, and the despatch of reinforcements, which laid bare to the enemy the strength of the opposing army. Lastly, the great d ifficulty of war is demonstrated by the failure of the Eussian leader in this campaign. Kuropatkin was n o fool as judged by or dinary standards. To those who knew him he appeared a clever, cultured man, well read in military literature. He was reckoned resolute, he possessed much of that war experience which is rated so high, and had distinguished himself on service. He seemed, therefore, to possess the qualifications required in a general. Yet he failed. The weight of responsibility was too great for him, and, in reality, he lacked the character to carry through his plans, and to d ominate the will of his opponent. Character may be an inborn quality, like strength of arm, or swiftness of foot, but character can be formed and developed, and " to teac h taste is inevitably jo^formjcharac- ter." But if there has been acquired the ambition to labour to perfect knowledge and judgment ; the will to over- come difficulties not to be beaten by them ; the sentiment that "nothing has been done whilst anything remains un- done, and that to fail is better than not to attempt"; a great step will have been made towards the formation of a character fit to take command, should fortune so shape the career. APPENDIX I EUSSIAN OEGANISATION A Normal Army Corps consisted of — Two infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and corps engineers. An Infantry Division included — Two brigades, each of two, four-battalion regiments; one artillery brigade of six or eight batteries, each of eight guns; and an engineer company. 1 :J '''<'••■'■'•- "^ A cavalry division comprised two brigades, each of two, six- squadron regiments, with two horse batteries. Total: 3000-3500 sabres or lances, and 12 guns. Total strength of an army corps : about 28,000 rifles, 3500 sabres, 124 guns. ' Of the corps that took part in the war, the following, which belonged to the active European army, were approximately of the above strength: 1st, 4th, 10th, 16th, 17th. The 5th and 6th Siberian Corps were composed of European reserve units, and numbered 28,000 rifles and 96 guns. The 4th Siberian Corps was made up of Siberian reserve units, and possessed 28,000 rifles and 64 guns. The 2nd Siberian Corps included East Siberian troops, and reserve units, and possessed 27,000 rifles and 80 guns. The 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps were formed in Eastern Siberia before the war, and numbered 22,000 rifles and 80 guns. \\ None of the Siberian corps had special corps cavalry, but It Cossack divisions, and smaller units, were attached to them as > > required. Armambnt. — That of the artillery was of a heterogeneous nature. About one-third of the field batteries possessed a modem 3 in. Q.F. gun, with shield; firing a practically smokeless powder, and throwing a shrapnel up to 6000 yards with time fuse, and 7000 yards with percussion fuse. The remainder of the field guns were principally 70 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE "WAE 71 muzzle-loading weapons, of 3-42 calibre. Tljere were a ;few_ mountain guns, and a proportion* of Keavy artillery and howitzers. The cavah^r carried sword, a rifle similar to that of the infantry, sometimes a bayonet, and the front rank had, also, usually a lance. Of rifle ammunition, 45 rounds were on the man, and 24 rounds in the regimental transport. The infantry weapon was a '3 charger-loading rifle, each charger holding five cartridges. The rifle was sighted to 2100 yards, and weighed nine pounds. Each man carried 120 rounds in his pouches, bandolier, and kit bag. Equipmbnt and Eations. — Each infantry man had usually, on his person, biscuit and salt for t wo and a half days ; and eighty men per company were equipped with spades!~ llie total weight carried by the infantry soldier, including clothing, was sixty pounds. ' DT reserve rations, there were, in Vladivostock and district, at the begiiohiiig 6i Ihe war, three months' supplies; in the Port Arthur command, twelve months' food ; and eight months' in the Siberian military district. Enginkers. — Pontoon units had from 300-400 yards of bridg- ing material, and many engineer companies possessed a light field park. The European companies had forty miles of cable and wire, and there were four East Siberian telegraph companies, each with six- teen miles of wire. There were also, in the army, three telegraph companies with Marconi wireless equipment, for maintenance of communication between the Commander-ia-Chief and army com- manders. Machine Guns. — Several divisions had eight-gun machine-gun companies. Mounted Soouts. — Most divisions possessed companies of mounted scouts. 72 LECTUKES ON THE STEATEGY OF APPENDIX II JAPANESE OEGANISATION The army was organised on a territorial system. There were thirteen districts, each furnishing one division, and one Kobi brigade. Four new divisions, and Kobi brigades, were raised in 190jL_ A division included two brigades, each of two, three-battaUon regiments ; one cavalry regiment ; six, six-gun batteries ; and three companies of engineers. Total: 11,400 rifles, 430 sabres, 36 guns, 830 engineers. The 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th divisions had mountain guns only; the 7th division had half field and half mountain guns; the remainder possessed field guns. A Kobi brigade consisted of two, two-battalion regiments, and numbered 3500 rifles. A mixed Kobi brigade was composed of one infantry brigade of two, threfrK,ttalion regiments ; three batteries ; and one company of engineers. Total: 5000 rifles, ? sabres, 18 guns, 280 engineers. An artillery brigade^ consisted of three regiments, each of six, six-guiTlBattMwir ' \ C"''^'' '^'^'^^"^ A cavalry brigade comprised two regiments, of four squadrons each. Armament. — The field and mountain guns were of the same calibre — 2 '95 inches. Both fired a practically smokeless powder, and the field gun ranged to about 5000 yards. After the Sha-Ho battle, the field gims were provided with shields. There were batteries of 4'72 howitzers, and heavy guns of various kinds. The artillery carried both shrapnel, and high explosive shell. The cavalry were armed with a sword, and with a carbine sighted to 1500 yards. The infantry possessed a rifle of -256 calibre, sighted to 2280 yards, weighing about eight and a half pounds, and loaded by means of a charger carrying five cartridges. Of ammunition, 150 rounds were supposed to be on the man, and 60 rounds on the ammunition mules. THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 73 Eations, etc. — Each man had, on his person, two days' rations ; and two-thirds of the men carried an intrenching tool strapped to the knapsack. Enqinbbks. — The bridging sections possessed 153 yards of bridge, and a telegraph section had 36 miles of air line and cable. Machine Guns. — In 1904-5 each division was given fourteen Hotchkiss guns. These were organised into two six-gun batteries, and one two-gun section. APPENDIX III TABLES SHOWING THE APPEOXIMATE DISPOSITIONS AND NUMBERS OF THE AEMIES COMBATANT TROOPS, LESS ARTILLERYMEN Japanese BEGINNIKG OF FEBRUARY, 1904. 1st division, 1st Kobi brigade Guard, Guard Kobi brigade . 2nd division, '2nd Kobi brigade 3rd division, 3rd Kobi brigade 4th division, 4th Kobi brigade 5th division, 5th Kobi brigade 6th division, 6th Kobi brigade 7th division, 7th Kobi brigade 8th division, 8th Kobi brigade 9th division, 9th Kobi brigade 10th division, 10th Kobi brigade 11th division, 11th Kobi brigade 12th division, 12th Kobi brigade Depot troops in addition. Grand total: 245,000 rifles, 10,500 sabres, engineers. Tokyo. Tokyo. Sendai. Nagoya. Osaka. TJjina. Kumatoto. Hokkaido. Hirosaki. Kanazawa. , Hijemi. Marugame. Kokura. 828 guns, 14,000 74 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF Russians Vladivostock (Ussuri) district BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY, 1904. 1st, 2nd, 6tli, 8th East Siberian rifle brigades. 2nd brigade of the 31st division. 2nd brigade of the 35th division. Two regiments of cavalry. One engineer battalion. Fourteen batteries. Fortress troops. Railway troops. Field troops Fortress troops . Railway troo^DS . Total .... 40,500 1,500 112 Kuan-tung peninsula, and Southern Manchuria 3rd, 4th, and 7th East Siberian rifle brigades. Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade. One engineer battalion. Five batteries. Fortress troops. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 33,500 1,500 112 3,500 — — 3,500 — — Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Field troops 21,000 1,400 40 Fortress troops . 2,500 — — Total . 23,500 1,400 40 On the ' railway • south of Harbin 5th East Siberian rifle brigade, One cavalry brigade. Two batteries. Railway troops. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Field troops . 5,500 1,300 12 Railway troops . 7,500 — — Total . 13,000 1,300 12 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 75 Russians {continued) Grand total. Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns. Field troops . . . 60,000 4,200 164 Fortress troops Railway troops Frontier guards Total . 6,000 — — 11,000 — — 13,500 8,000 48 90.500 12,200 212 APPENDIX IV Japanese South of Wi-ju, and Ghang-syong END OF APRIL. 1st army, general Baron Kuroki. Guard division. 2nd division. 12tli division. Rifles. Sabres. Total . . 33,500 1,000 Guns. 126 Engineers. 800 Chm-am-pho Under general Oku, in transports. 1st division. 3rd division. 4tli division. Half an artillery brigade. Rifles. Sabres. Total . . 33,500 1,000 Guns. 162 Engineers. 800 Grand total . 67,000 2,000 288 1,600 Russians Towards Shan-hai-huan END OF APRIL. Rifles. Sabres. General Kossagovski. 1,400 250 76 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF Russians (continued) Neighbourhood of Ldao-Yang 5th East Siberian, rifle division. 1st Siberian infantry division. One brigade 10th corps. One brigade 17th corps. Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade. Twelve squadrons Cossacks. Six companies engineers. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total .... 27,500 4,300 140 Near Ying-how 1st and 9th East Siberian rifle divisions. Six squadrons dragoons. One battalion engineers. Teh-li-tzu, and Pu-lan-tien One brigade, five squadrons, and one horse battery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total .... 20,000 700 64 Near An-tung, and Ta-ku-shan Lieutenant-general Zasulitch. 3rd and 6th East Siberian divisions. Mischenko's Cossacks. Rifles. Sabres. Guna. Total .... 18,000 2,900 72 East of Kuan-tien-hsien Colonel Madridov. Two squadrons and two companies of mounted scouts. Port Arthur, and neighbourhood 4th East Siberian rifle division. 7th East Siberian rifle division. Two companies engineers. Three battalions fortress troops. One squadron. Rifles. Sabres. Field guns. Total .... 25,500 120 64 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 77 Russians {continued) Vladivostoek and district 2nd East Siberian rifle division. 8th East Siberian riile division. Ussuri cavalry brigade. Fortress troops. Rifles. Total . . . 21,500 Sabres, 1,000 Field guns. 56 Rifles. Field troops . . . 67,000 In fortresses . . . 47,000 Railway and frontier troops 24,500 Sabres. 8,300 1,120 8,000 Field Guns. 276 120 48 Grand total . . 138,500 17,420 444 APPENDIX V Japanese Feng-huang-cheng, and Ai-yang-pien-meng 27th may. 1st army, general Baron Kuioki. Guard division. 2nd division. 12 th. division. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 30,000 1,000 128 2,000 Nanshan, Pu-lan-tien, Torsha river, and Yen-ta-kou. 2nd army, general Baron Oku. 1st division. 3rd division. 4th division. 5th division. 11th division. 1st cavalry brigade. An artillery brigade (less one regiment). Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers Total . . 55,000 3,200 234 4,000 78 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF Japanese (continued) Ta-hiL-shan Nucleus of the ith army. 10th division. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . 11,000 400 36 300 Grand total . 96,000 4,600 398 6,300 Russians Towards Shan-hai-kuan 27th may. General Kossogovski. Rifles. Sabres. 1,400 250 Liao-Tang and neighbourhood 5th East Siberian rifle division. 2nd brigade 31st division, 10th corps. 2nd brigade 35th division, 17th corps. Portions of 2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions. Various Cossack and artillery units. Total Rifles. 37,000 4,000 Guns. 118 South of Wa-fang-tien. Major-general Samsonov. Sabres. 2,600 Guns. 6 Ying-kow, Kai-chou, Hai-cheng, and neighbourhood Lieutenant-general Stackelberg. 1st East Siberian rifle division. 9th East Siberian rifle division. Part of 2nd Siberian reserve division. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . . 27,500 200 80 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 79 EussiANS (continued) North of Feng-huang-cheng Lieutenant-general Count Keller. Srd East Siberian rifle division. 6th East Siberian rifle division. Part of 2nd Siberian reserve division. One Cossack regiment and horse battery. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. 14,000 600 54 Sairma-ehi. Major-general Eennenkamf. Eifles. Sabres. Guna. 2,100 2,100 14 East of Sai-ma-cM Colonel Madridov. Eifles and Sabres. 700 Hsui-yen Major-general Mischenko. Sabres. Guns. 2,000 6 Port Arthur, and Nan-shan Lieutenant-general Stoessel. Eifles. Sabres. Field Guns. 25,500 120 64 VladivostocJc Lieutenant-general Linevitch. Eifles. Sabres. Field Guns. 22,000 3,600 64 Eifles. Sabres. Field Guns. Field troops . . . 82,500 11,950 278 In fortresses . . . 47,500 3,720 128 Eailway and frontier guards . . . 34,300 8,000 48 Grand total . . 164,300 23,670 454 80 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF APPENDIX VI Japanese Advancing from Feng-huang-cheng, and Ai-yang-pien-meng 15th JUNE. 1st army, general Baron Kuroki. Guard division (less Asada brigade). 2nd division. 12tli division. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 25,000 1,000 128 2,500 North of Torku-shan, and at Hsui-yen 4th army, general Kawamura. lOth division. Asada brigade of Guards. Eiflea. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 16,500 400 36 800 Teh-li-tzu 2nd army, general Baron Oku. 3rd division. 4tli division. 5tli division. 1st cavalry brigade. Artillery brigade. 6th division (coming up). Rifles. Sabrea. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 45,000 2,800 252 3,000 Advancing on Port Arthur 3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 1st division. 1 1th division. Rifles. Sabres. Guna. Engineers. Total . . 23,000 430 72 1,600 Grand total . 109,500 4,6.i0 488 7,900 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 81 RtrsaiANs Liao-Yang, and Mukden 15th JUNE Portions of 1st brigade, 31st diYision, and of Isfc Siberian division. Cossack and artUlery units. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total .... 12,500 1,500 46 Torshih-cMao, Hai-cheng, and Ying-kow Bulk of 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions). 2nd brigade 31st division. Biflea. Sabres. Guns. Total .... 21,000 2,200 54 Towards Shan-Jiai-kuan General Kossogovski. Total Rifles. 1,500 Sabrea. Guns. 250 8 Feng-shui-ling range Lieutenant-general Count Keller. 3rd East Siberian rifle division. Part of 6th East Siberian rifle division. One Cossack regiment, and one horse battery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total .... 12,600 600 54 Sai-ma-chi Major-general Eennenkamf. Total . Rifles. 3,500 Sabres. Guns. 2,200 16 Hdng-ehing-ting Lieutenant-colonel Madridov. Total . Rifles. 700 Sabres. Guns. 1,000 4 82 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF EussiANS (continued) Ghi-pan-Ung, Ta-Ung Major-general Mischenko. Part of the 4th Siberian corps. Cossacks, and horse guns. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total .... 10,500 2,000 38 Teh-U-tzu Lieutenant-general Stackejberg. 1st East Siberian rifle division. 9th East Siberian rifle division. 2nd brigade 35th division. Cossack units. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 27,000 2,500 94 Port Arthur Lieutenant-general Stoessel. Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns. Total . . 25,500 120 64 Vladivostock Lieutenant-general Linevitch. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 22,000 3,600 64 Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns. Field troops . 89,300 12,250 314 In fortresses, etc. . . 47,500 3,720 128 Railway, etc., guards . . 34,300 8,000 48 Grapd total . . 171,100 23,970 490 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 83 APPENDIX VII Japanese Motien-ling, and North Feng-shui-ling 30th JUNE. 1st army, geneial Baron Kuroki. Guard division (less Asada brigade). 2nd division. 12th division. Umezawa's mixed Kobi brigade. Rifles. Sabres. Gud3. Engineers. Total . . 30,000 1,000 152 2,600 Chi-pan-ling, and Ta-ling 4tli army, general Count Nodzu. 10th division. Asada brigade of Guards. 10th Kobi brigade. Rifles. Sabres. Gnus. Engineers. Total . . 21,000 430 54 1,000 Near Kai-chou 2nd army, general Baron Oku. 3rd division. 4th division. 5th division. 6th division. 1st cavalry brigade. An artillery brigade. Rifles. Sabres, Guns. Engineers. Total . . 45,000 2,800 252 3,200 Kensan 3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 1st division. 11th division. One or two Kobi brigades. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 26,000 450 72 1,600 Grand total 122,000 4,680 530 8,400 84 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF EUSSIANS Ldao-Tang, and Mukden 30th JUNE. Various detachments. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 8,000 1,500 14 Harbin, and Kirin Garrisons. Rifles. Sabres. Gnns. 3,000 400 8 Towards Shan-Jmi-huan General Kossogovski. Rifles. Sabres. Gnns. 1,500 250 8 Chao-tao, and North Feng-ehui-lmg Major-general Eennenkamf. Rifles. Sabres. Gnns. 3,500 2,200 26 West of Mo-tien-ling Lieutenant-general Count Keller. Portions of the Srd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions. Cossacks. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 6,500 600 24 On route to join Keller Rifles. 6,500 Guns. 24 Hsing-ching-ting Lieutenant-colonel Madridov. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 700 1,000 4 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 85 EussiANS (continued) Tang-chi, GM-pan-Ung, and Ta-ling Major-general Mischenko. Part of 4tli Siberian corps. 2nd brigade 35th division. Cossacks and horse guns. Bayonets. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 16,000 1,800 72 South of Kai-ehou Major-general Samsonov. Sabres. Guns. 3,000 12 Kai-chou, and Ying-kow Lieutenant-general Stackelberg. 1st East Siberian rifle division. 9th East Siberian rifle division. Cossacks and horse guns. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 29,000 750 50 Hsi-mvrchmg Lieutenant-general Zasulitch. Portions of 5th and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions. Cossacks and horse guns. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 10,500 1,500 46 Hai-cheng, and Ta-sMh-ehiao Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev. Portions of 4th Siberian corps and of 31st division. Cossacks. Rifles. Sabres. Guns, Total . . 24,000 800 160 Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns. Field troops . 109,200 13,800 448 In Fortresses, etc. 47,500 4,120 128 Eail way and frontier guards . . 34,300 11,000 48 191,000 28,920 624 86 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF APPENDIX VIII Japanese Attacking the Russian positions at Tu-shu-lin-tzu, Pen-ling, and To-wan 31sT JULY. 1st army, general Baron Kuroki. Guard division. 2nd division. 12th division. TJmezawa brigade. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 36,000 1,000 152 2,000 South of Hsi-mu-cTieng 4tli army, general Count Nodzu. 5th division. 10th division. 10th Kobi brigade. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 25,000 850 90 1,000 Ta-shih-chiao, and south of Hai-cheng 2nd army, general Baron Oku. 3rd division. 4th division. 5th division. 1st cavalry brigade. Artillery brigade. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 33,000 2,400 216 2,400 Besieging Port Arthur 3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 1st division. 9th division. 11th division. Two or three Kobi brigades. Naval brigade. Siege train. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 45,000 450 378 1,600 Grand total . 139,000 4,700 836 7,000 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 87 ElTSSIANS Near Kovrpang-tzu 31sT JULY. General Kossogovski. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 1,500 250 8 Liao-Yang, MuMen, Kirin, Harbin Garrison and drafts. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 15,600 2,10 64 An-ping, Yu-shu-lin-tzu, and Pen-ling Lieutenant-general Sluchevski. 10th corps (9th and part of 31st divisions). Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 22,500 750 88 To-wan, in Lan valley Lieutenant-general Count Keller. 3rd East Siberian rifle division. 6th East Siberian rifle division. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 17,000 1,750 72 Pen-si-hu Major-general Lubavin. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 2,000 1,000 12 East of Pen-Bi-hu Lieutenant-colonel Madridov. Rifles. Sabrea. Guns. 1,500 1,000 8 Marching eastwards from Liao-Yang Part of 17th corps. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 11,500 750 72 88 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF Russians (continued) South of Hai-cheng Major-general Mischenko. Cossack brigades. Sabres. Guns. Total • 5,000 48 Hai-cheng and neighbourhood Lieutenant-general Stackelberg. 1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions.) Lieutenant-general Zasulitch. 2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division). Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev. 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions). Part of 31st division. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 60,000 1,700 234 Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns. Field troops 131,500 14,300 606 In fortresses, etc. 47,500 4,000 128 On railways, etc. 34,300 11,000 48 213,300 29,300 782 APPENDIX IX Japanese East of the ridge dividing the lower portions of the Lan and Tan rivers 25th august. 1st army, general Baron Kuroki. Guard division. 2nd division. 12th division. Umezawa brigade. A Kobi brigade. Total . Rifles. 45,000 Sabres. 1,200 Guns. 170 Engineers. 3,000 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR Japanese {contirvued) Shan-in-tzai, and towards Hai-eheng 4th army, general Count Nodzu. 5th. division. 10th division. 10th Kohi brigade. 20th Kobi brigade. Total . Rifles. 27,000 Sabres. 850 GUUB. 112 89 Engineers. 1,700 Between Hai-cheng and An-shan-tien 2nd army, general Baron Oku. 3rd division. dth division. 6th division. 2nd Kobi brigade. Artillery brigade. 1st cavalry brigade. Total . Rifles. 35,000 Sabres. 2,400 Guns. 240 Engineers. 2,800 Besieging Port Arthur 3rd army, general Baron Nogi Rifles. 40,000 Grand total Sabres, 450 Guns. 378 Engineers. 1,600 147,000 4,900 900 9,100 Russians Tai-t»u R., Kung-shan-ling, An-ping, etc. 25th august. General Bilderling. 10th European corps (general Sluchevski). I7th European corps. 3rd Siberian corps (general Ivanov). 2nd cavalry brigade (general Lubavin). Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total. . 53,000 4,200 330 90 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF Russians (continued) Mukden, Kirin, Harbin Garrisons and drafts. Eifles. Sabres. 20,000 350 GllTlfl. 24 Towards Ta-wan, on Liao B. General Kossogovski. Eifles. Sabres. 1,500 250 Guns. 8 Hast of Pen-si-hu Lieutenant-colonel Madridov. Eifles. Sabres. 3,000 650 Guns. 24 An-shan-tien, Sha-Ho village Lieutenant-general Stackelberg. 1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions). Lieutenant-general Zasulitch. 2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division and part of 71st division). Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev. 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions). Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade. Ural Cossack brigade. Siberian Cossack division. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Total. . 50,000 7,000 200 Liao- Yang and neighbourhood Lieutenant-general Dembovski. 5th Siberian corps (5th and part of 71st divisions). 35th division. General Samsonov's cavalry Eifles. Sabres. Gnns. Total. . 30,000 4,000 80 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 91 Russians (continued) Kifles. Sabres. Field Guns. Field troops . . 157,500 16,450 666 Fortresses, etc. . 47,500 4,000 128 Railway, etc. . 34,300 11,000 48 239,300 31,450 842 APPENDIX X Japanese South of Yemtai coal mines, Ping-tai-tzu, etc. BEGINNING OF OCTOBER. 1st army, general Baron Kuroki. Guards division. 2nd division. 12th division. Umezawa's brigade. 2nd cavalry brigade. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . 42,000 2,100 120 3,000 Lor^i-pu to Nan-tai, but bulk still south of the Tai-tzu 4th army, general Count Nodzu. 5th division. 10th division. 10th Kobi brigade. 20th Kobi brigade. Artillery. Rifles. Total . . 25,000 Sabres. Guns. 300 170 Engineers. 1,700 Nan-tai to Shan-tai-tzu, but some troops still south of the Tai-tzu 2nd army, general Baron Oku. 3rd division. 4th division. 6 th division. 1st cavalry brigade. Artillery brigade. Rifles. Total . . 35,000 Sabres. Guns. 2,600 138 Engineers. 2,400 92 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF Japanese (continued) Besieging Port Arthur 3rd army, general Baron Nogi. Eifles. Sabrea. Guns. Engineers. Total . 45,000 Liao- 450 Tang ' 396 1,600 General reserve. 2nd KoM brigade. 3rd Kobi brigade. nth Kobi brigade. Two artillery brigades. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total 26,000 430 144 Grand total 173,000 5,880 968 8,700 Russians Advancing on and between the Fu-shun to Wei-ning-ying, and the Fu-ling to Ping-tai-tzu roads BEGINNING OF OGTOBEE. Eastern force. Lieutenant-general Stackelberg. 1st Siberian corps (1st and 9tb East Siberian rifle divisions). 2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian rifle division, and part of 54th division). 3rd Siberian corps (3rd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions). Moving on Hsiao-chia-ho-tzu General Eennenkamf 's detachment. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 60,000 7,000 194 Guarding left flank as far as Sai-ma-chi and Hsing-ching-ting road Colonel Madridov, and others. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. 3,500 1,800 32 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 93 RtrssiANS (continued) Guarding right flank as far as Liao river Detachments of generals Dembowski and Kossogovski. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 11,000 3,000 48 Advancing southwards astride the railway Western force. General Bilderling. 10th army corps (9th and 31st divisions). 17th army corps (3rd and 35th divisions). Part of Orenburg Cossack division. West of the Hun Ho 5th army corps (portions of 71st and 54th divisions). Eifles. Sabres. Guns, Total . . 50,000 4,500 222 South of Mukden General reserve. 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions). 1st corps (22nd and 27th divisions). 6th Siberian corps (55th and 72nd divisions). In touch with enemy Mischenko's cavalry. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . 55,000 3,200 326 Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns. Field troops 179,500 19,500 822 Fortresses, etc. . 45,000 4,000 128 Railways, etc. 34,000 11,000 48 258.500 34,500 998 94 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF APPENDIX XI (See Map 11) Japanese From south of Hua-ling to Tung-kow 1st JANUARY, 1905. 1st army, general Baron Kuroki. Guard division. 2nd division. 12th division. Umezawa brigade. Two Kobi brigades. ArtUlery. Rifles. Sabres. Gune. Engineers. Total . . 44,000 1,200 180 3,000 Pvrtsao-yai to Putilov hill ith. army, general Count Nodzu. lOth division. Two or three Kobi brigades. Artillery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 20,000 600 96 450 Kvrchia-tzu, to Ta-tai Cavalry to Hei-koiirtai 2nd army, general Baron Oku. 3rd division. 4th division. 6th division. 1st cavaby brigade. Artillery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 33,000 2,400 204 2,400 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAK 95 Japanese (ecmiinued) East of Pen-si-hu Snd cavalry brigade. Sabres. Guns. 1,500 6 Near Ten-tai station, and at Lang-tung-kou General reserve. 5tli division. 8th division. Four or five Kobi brigades. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 40,000 800 108 850 Besieging Port Arthur 3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 1st division. 7tli division. 9tli division. 11th division. Two or three Kobi brigades. Naval brigade. Siege train. Rifles. Sabres, Guns. Engineers. Total . . 53,000 450 396 2,000 Grand total. 190,000 6,950 990 8,700 KUSSIANS South-east of Mukden 1st JANUARY, 1905. 1st army, general Linevitch. 1st corps (22nd and 37th divisions). 2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division, and 1st Siberian division). 3rd Siberian corps (3rd East Siberian division, and part of 78th division). 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions). 96 LECTUKES ON THE STRATEGY OF EusaiANS (continued) Thirty miles east of Pen-si-hu General Alexiev's detachment. Portions of 6tli East Siberian, and of 71st divisions. Part of Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 90,000 6,500 320 Hsing-ching-ting Colonel Madridov's force. Bifles. Sabres. Guns. 1,200 750 4 Connecting Aleociev, and Madridov General Maslov's Siberian reserve brigade. Bifles. Sabres. Guns. 4,000 200 8 West of Putilov hill, to Ghi-tai-tzu 3rd army, general Bilderling. 6th Siberian corps (55th division and Orenburg Cossacks). I7th corps (3rd and 35th divisions). 5th corps (54th and 61st divisions). Bifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 60,000 4,000 240 San-chia-tzu, to Ghanrtan 2nd army, general Kaulbaurs. 1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions). 8th corps (14th and 75th divisions). 10th Corps (9th and 31st divisions). Eifle corps (three rifle brigades). Mischenko's Cossacks. Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 90,000 3,000 320 Hun-ho-pu, and Tao-shan-tun General reserve. Portions of 16th corps, and of 6th Siberian corps. Heavy and other artUlery. Bifles. Sabres, Guns. Total . , 20,000 200 206 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR BussiANS {continited) Between Hun, and Liao rivers Bennenkamf's detachment. Rifles. 3,000 5,000 Guns. 48 97 Field troops Fortresses, etc. Railways, etc. Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns. 268,200 19,650 1,146 43,000 4,000 128 25,000 11,000 48 336,200 34,650 1,322 APPENDIX XII Japanese Between Wei-tzu^yu, and Pao-tzu^en. 20th FEBRUARY, 1905. 5th army, geiiera;l Kawamitra. 11th division. Three or four Kobi brigades. Total . Rifles. Sabres. Guns. . 25,000 600 72 Engineers. 2,000 From HuOrUng, to south of Feng-ehiorpu 1st army, general ! Guard division. Raron Kuroki. 2nd division. 12th division. Umezawa brigade. 5th Kobi brigade. Artillery, etc. Total . Rifles. Sabres. Guns. . 39,000 1,200 180 Engineers. 3,000 98 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF Japanese (continued) South of Feng-ehia-pu, to Ling-shen-pu 4th army, general Count Nodzu. 6th division. 10th division. Tvro or three Kobi brigades. Artillery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers Total . . 35,000 850 142 1,700 Ling-shen-pu, to Hei-kou-tai 2nd army, general Baron Oku. 4th division. 5th division. 8th division. Two Kobi brigades. Artillery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 42,000 1,000 204 3,000 Yang-chiorwan, Huang-ni-wa, and Hsiao-pbi-ho 3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 1st division. 7th division. 9 th division. Artillery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 30,000 1,200 270 1,400 San-chia-pao, to Shan-ko^u-shu 1st cavalry brigade. 2nd cavalry brigade. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 3,000 12 Shi-li-ho, and Yen-tai station General reserve. 3rd division. Three or four Kobi brigades. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. Total . . 25,000 350 42 400 Grand total . 196,000 8,200 922 11,500 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 99 Russians South-east of Mukden 20th FEBRUARY, 1905. 1st army, general Linevitch. 1st army corps (22iid and 37th divisions). 2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division and 1st Siberian division). 3rd Siberian corps (3rd East Siberian division and part of 71st division). 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian divisions). Siberian Cossack division. Thirty miles east of Pen-si-hu General Alexiev's detachment of part of 6th East Siberian and of 71st division, with a portion of Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade. Rifles, Sabres, Guns. Total . . 90,000 6,500 356 Msing-ehing-ting neighbourhood Colonel Madridov's force. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 1,200 750 4 Connecting Alexiev, and Madridov General Maslov's Siberian reserve brigade. Rifles, Sabres. Guns. 4,000 200 8 South of Mukden 3rd army, general Bilderling. 6th corps (54th and 61st divisions). 6th Siberian corps (55th division and Orenburg Cossacks). 17th corps (3rd and 35th divisions). Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 60,000 4,000 240 100 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR Russians {continvsd) South-west of Mukden 2nd army, general Kaulbaurs. 1st Siberian corps (1st, 9th, and part of 6th East Siberian divisions). 8th corps (14th and 75th divisions). 10th corps (9th and 31st divisions). Rifle corps (three rifle brigades). Between the Hun and Liao rivers Rennenkamf s detachment. Mischenko's Cossacks. Caucasus cavalry brigade. Part of 5th Siberian corps. Rifles. Sabrea. Guns. Total . . 90,000 8,000 356 South of Mukden General reserve. 16th corps (25th and part of 41st divisions). 72nd division of 6th Siberian corps. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Total . . 35,000 300 240 Field troops Fortresses, etc. Railways, etc. Rifles. Sabres. Field Gang, 280,200 19,750 1,204 15,000 3,000 80 25,000 11,000 48 320,200 33,750 1,332 WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, LTD. PRINTERS, PLYMOUTH