TC ^ 
 
 BOUGHT WITH THE INCO 
 FROM THE 
 
 SAGE ENDOWMENT 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 Me^nv^ W. Sage 
 
 ' 1891 
 
 ME 
 
 FUND 
 
 /J..'/.i' y , 
 
 
 
TC 784 K24"*" ""'""'"'' '-"""^ 
 ^'''iiinfiffiffiiSffi! ..?,"'' "■* "'onroe doctr 
 
 3 1924 022 883 544 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis bool< is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924022883544 
 
Q/-v^Belize 
 
 "^ -/-^^ ' A. 
 
 ^Oif§^ .^ ^TURNEFFE I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 S. Juan <J6l Sup 
 
 ■ ^, ■ 
 
 ,2>- 
 
 Bluefields 
 
 XS 
 
 ^lO^ ^'^_r^S-^/?/o Colorado 
 
 
 .pjarf/na 
 
 r. Blanco 
 
 ^., 
 
 y ^ ^E, — fc^J^V* '''^iV^ 
 
 C.BIanco^ ^ S. '■^""s-'Si^f'*^^ ^^'-^ .v\^^ ^O** 
 
 '°4>, 
 
 :?^/« 
 
 
 
 
 rf 
 
 
 
 6^-' 
 
 .•^ ..,.0' 
 
 X 
 
 
 
 -^0' 
 
 .Vi? 
 
 JREY 
 
 I Gulf of Pan fa 
 
 f,^S^' 
 
 
 o c^ 
 
 ,t^.' 
 
 ■^ . pta G3' 
 
 >»' 
 
 5 /'A Afa/a 
 
 ROUTES OF TRANSIT 
 
 ACROSS THE 
 
 CENTRAL-AMERICAN 
 ISTHMUS 
 
 o 
 
 
 Kellys Inlet p^^ 
 Humboldt 0ajy%*c^ 
 
 Cupica Baj 
 
 Chiri-Chiri ea^/ '^M?-°-^:f^ 
 
 N 
 
 CapeCorrientes 
 
 
 
 l^vila . 
 
 SCALE OF MILES 
 
 5 15 rf 50 75 
 
 Chirambipa/-'sf4a«'^ 
 
 
 Longitude West 84 from Greenwich 
 
THE NICARAGUA CANAL AND 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 A POLITICAL HISTORY OF ISTHMUS TRANSIT, WITH 
 
 SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE NICARAGUA CANAL 
 
 PROJECT AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE 
 
 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THERETO 
 
 BY 
 LINDLEY MILLER KEASBEY, PH.D., R.P.D. 
 
 Associate Professor of Political Science, Bryn Mawr College 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 
 NEW YORK LONDON 
 
 27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET 24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND 
 
 a;^t Itittchcibocliei "j^ttsi 
 
 1896 
 
A.^<5777 
 
 Copyright, 1896 
 
 BY 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 Entered at Stationers' Hall, London 
 
 Zbc Ifinfcherbocfier presSt mevp tRocbelle, m.v?. 
 
PEEFACE. 
 
 SINCE the discovery of America, much has beea 
 said and a great deal has beea written con- 
 cerning the question of isthmus transit ; but 
 during all these four centuries, comparatively little 
 has apparently been accomplished toward actually 
 joining the seas. The problem of interoceanic com- 
 munication has, however, in our day at last entered 
 upon its practical stage, and without being over-san- 
 guine, we may now look forward to its not far distant 
 solution. While the final technical plans for the ship- 
 canal are being perfected, it has, therefore, seemed to 
 me opportune to undertake the history of this project 
 which has been so long before the eyes of the civil- 
 ized world as an immediate possibility, and which 
 ere long, let us hope, will be a realized fact. 
 
 Owing to the geographical position of the United 
 States and their resultant political ambition, the 
 subject is one of peculiar importance to us Ameri- 
 cans, and it is under this settled conviction that the 
 present work has been conceived and carried out. 
 If the narrative exhibits a national prejudice, there- 
 fore, it may rightly be attributed to the fact that the 
 book is written avowedly from the Monroe doctrine 
 standpoint. 
 
iv Preface. 
 
 As no complete Mstory of the isthmus-canal pro- 
 ject has thus far been written, the necessary material 
 for the subject was found scattered through a num- 
 ber of old archives, government documents, general 
 histories, and books of travel, and among a host of 
 monographs and pamphlets. Having collected and 
 classified these various data, I have attempted to 
 weave the thread of the historical narrative through 
 the following pages in as even a manner as possible ; 
 and in order that the necessary coordination of the 
 raw material might not be entirely lost, I have fur- 
 thermore taken pains to group the exact bibliograph- 
 ical references under each section, hoping that this 
 arrangement of the notes may prove a useful guide 
 to those who desire more detailed information than 
 this book is able to afford concerning any of the 
 events here outlined. And in conclusion I have 
 taken the liberty of drawing some economic and 
 political deductions from the facts as they have im- 
 pressed themselves upon my judgment. These, how- 
 ever, are only matters of personal conviction, set 
 purposely apart from the historical narrative, to be 
 taken for what they are worth. 
 
 My thanks are due to Mr. J. W. Miller, Secretary 
 of the Nicaragua Canal Construction Company, for 
 his kindness in providing me with recent canal com- 
 pany data, and I am also under obligations to the 
 Maritime Canal Company for permission to repro- 
 duce the panorama map of the proposed canal route, 
 in connection with my account of the present techni- 
 cal situation of the project. I owe an especial debt 
 
Preface. v 
 
 of gratitude, besides, to my brother, Mr. Frederick 
 W. Keasbey, who has rendered me invaluable assist- 
 ance in the preparation of this book for the press, 
 by going over the entire manuscript, in correcting 
 the proof, and in making up the index. 
 
 Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, 
 September, i8g6. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 IN TROD UCTION. 
 
 § I. The Central American Isthmus 
 
 § 2. The Tehuantepec Route 
 
 § 3. The Honduras Route . 
 
 § 4. The Nicaragua Routes . 
 
 § 5. The Chiriqui Route 
 
 § 6. The Panama Route 
 
 § 7. The San Bias Route 
 
 § 8. The Caledonian Route . 
 
 § g The Atrato Routes 
 
 § 10. A Comparison of the Several Routes 
 
 The Honduras and Chiriqui Routes, 
 
 The Tehuantepec, San Bias, Caledonian, and Atrato Routes, 
 
 The Nicaragua and Panama Routes. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I 
 4 
 4 
 5 
 8 
 8 
 9 
 9 
 10 
 II 
 
 PART ONE. 
 
 THE MERCANTILE PERIOD AND THE ABSOLUTE MONARCHY — THE CANAL 
 PROJECT A ROYAL MONOPOLY. 1492-1815. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA. 
 
 § II. The Movement of the World's Commerce 
 
 § 12. The Forces Back of this Movement 
 
 § 13. An Historical Retrospect of the Movement . 
 
 § 14. The Mercantile System 
 
 § 15. Fifteenth-Century Voyages of Discovery 
 
 § 16. The Discoveries of Columbus and his Contemporaries 
 
 § 17. The Pope's Bull and the Treaty of Tordesillas 
 
 §18. The New World Thought to be an Island 
 
 § 19. Spanish Colonial Expeditions to the Northwest 
 
 19 
 21 
 21 
 
 25 
 29 
 30 
 33 
 34 
 36 
 
viii Contents. 
 
 PAGE 
 42 
 
 45 
 45 
 46 
 
 54 
 
 § 20. The Discovery of the Southwest Passage 
 
 § 21. The Tracing of North America's Atlantic Coast Line 
 
 § 22. The New World Known to be a Continent . 
 
 § 23. The Discovery of the "West Coast of South America 
 
 § 24. The Discovery of the West Coast of Central America . 
 
 § 25. The Discovery of the West Coast of North America 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE COLONIZATION OF THE ISTHMUS. 
 
 § 26. Spain's American Monopoly 5^ 
 
 § 27. The Opening of the Panama Route 57 
 
 § 28. The Conquest and Colonization of Nicaragua ... 59 
 
 § 29. The Kingdom of Guatemala 64 
 
 § 30. The Nicaraguan Transit Route 65 
 
 § 31. The Abandonment of the Tehuantepec Route ... 66 
 
 § 32. Early Canal Projects 68 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE ENGLISH FREEBOOTERS. 
 
 § 33. The Freebooter Republic ^i 
 
 § 34. Buccaneering Raids along the Isthmus 72 
 
 § 35. The English Occupation of Jamaica and Attack upon the San 
 
 Juan 75 
 
 § 36. The Treaty of 1670 between Spain and England ... 77 
 
 § 37. English Settlements along the East Coast of Central America 79 
 § 38. The Origin of the Mosquito Indians, and the First Steps 
 
 toward the English Protectorate over their Shore . . 81 
 
 § 39. The British Colony at Caledonian Bay 85 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SPAIN. 
 
 § 40. English Encroachments on the Isthmus during the Maritime 
 
 War 88 
 
 § 41. The Effect of the Seven Years' War upon the English Settle- 
 ments in Central America ....... 96 
 
 § 42. Nelson's Attack on the San Juan 100 
 
 § 43. The Treaty of Versailles, 1783 103 
 
Contents. 
 
 IX 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ( 44. Supplementary Treaty of 1786 105 
 
 I 45. Events in Central America during the Period of the Great 
 
 Continental Struggle in Europe 108 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CANAL PROJECTS. 
 
 46. Scientific Interest in the Transit Problem 
 
 47. Spanish Governmental Surveys across Tehuantepec 
 
 48. Renewed Interest in the Nicaraguan Route . 
 
 49. The Spanish Military Road across the Caledonian Route 
 
 50. Von Humboldt's Investigations along the Isthmus . 
 
 51. The Decree of the Spanish Cortes 
 
 "3 
 114 
 116 
 
 "7 
 iig 
 120 
 
 PART TWO. 
 
 THE PERIOD OF LIBERALISM AND INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE — THE CANAL 
 
 PROJECT A PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKING UNDER 
 
 GOVERNMENTAL GUARANTIES. I815-I865. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 § 52. The Growth of Individualism in Europe .... 123 
 
 § 53. The United States as a New Factor in the Canal Problem . 127 
 
 § 54. Spanish-American Independence . .... 129 
 
 § 55. The Monroe Doctrine . 132 
 
 § 56. The Panama Mission ........ 136 
 
 § 57. The United States Become Interested in the Canal Project . 141 
 
 § 58. The Bursting of the Pan-American Bubble .... 145 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 SOME INEFFECTUAL CANAL PROJECTS. 
 
 § 59. The King of Holland's Canal Project 149 
 
 § 60. President Jackson's Policy towards the Transit Question . 151 
 
 § 61. The Petition to Congress and the Stephens Reconnaissance . 154 
 § 62. The Breaking up of the Central American and Colombian 
 
 Republics 156 
 
Contents. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 § 63. Independent Action of the Several States in Regard to the 
 
 Canal . 158 
 
 § 64. Louis Philippe's Canal Project . . . 159 
 
 § 65. Louis Napoleon's Interest in the Transit Question . 161 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE BRITISH SEIZURE OF THE SAN JUAN. 
 
 § 66, Great Britain's Position on the Isthmus after Spanish-Ameri- 
 can Independence .164 
 
 § 67. The English Settlers and the Mosquito Indians . . 167 
 
 § 68. The English Claim to the Costa Rican Shore . 170 
 
 i^ 69. British Honduras, the Bay Islands, and Mosquitia . . . 170 
 
 § 70. Objections on the Part of the Spanish-American States . 173 
 
 § 71. The Seizure of the San Juan . . . . 175 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE CONFLICT ON THE ISTHMUS. 
 
 § 72. The Acquisition of California and its Effect on our Transit 
 
 Problem ........ 185 
 
 § 73. American Operations in Tehuantepec ... . 188 
 
 § 74. The Treaty with New Granada and the Panama Railway . 190 
 § 75. The "Compania de Transito de Nicaragua," and the Hise 
 
 Treaty 193 
 
 § 76. The American Atlantic and Pacific Ship-Canal Company and 
 
 the Squier Treaty with Nicaragua . . . 196 
 
 § 77. The Seizure of Tigre Island . . T99 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY. 
 
 § 78. Mr. Clayton's Course 202 
 
 § 79. Sir. Henry Bulwer's Diplomacy 207 
 
 § 80. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 210 
 
 § 81. The English Reservations 211 
 
 § 82. The Diplomatic Situation in 1850 215 
 
Contents. xi 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE CENTRAL AMERICAN IMBROGLIO. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 § 83. Colonel Childs's Surveys ... . . 217 
 
 § 84. The Accessory Transit Company 219 
 
 § 85. The British Maintain their Mosquito Protectorate and Re- 
 occupy Greytown 220 
 
 § 86. Costa Rican Claims ........ 223 
 
 § 87. The Basis of Settlement 226 
 
 § 88. The British Seizure of the Bay Islands 229 
 
 § 8g. Resolutions in Congress 231 
 
 § go. Lord Clarendon's Ultimatum . .... 233 
 
 § 91. The Bombardment of Greytown 235 
 
 § 92. Walker's Filibustering Expedition 238 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 ENGLISH VERSUS AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. 
 
 § 93. British Treaties with Honduras 248 
 
 § 94. The Dallas-Clarendon Negotiations 250 
 
 § 95. The United States Threaten to Abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer 
 
 Treaty .... 252 
 
 § 96. Alternatives Offered by Great Britain .... 253 
 
 § 97. Sir William Ouseley's Mission . . . . 257 
 
 § 98. The United States Express their Satisfaction .... 262 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 OPERATIONS ON THE LOWER ISTHMUS. 
 
 § 99. Dr. Cullen's Caledonian Project 264 
 
 § 100. Lieutenant Strain's Exposure of the P'allacy . . . 266 
 
 § loi. Mr. Frederick Kelly's Investigations along the Atrato and 
 
 San Bias Routes 269 
 
 § 102. The French Continue in their Delusions concerning the 
 
 Caledonian Route 274 
 
 § 103. The Chiriqui Colonization Scheme 278 
 
 § 104. The Panama Railway, and the Government's Guaranty of the 
 
 Route ... .... 282 
 
xii Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 THE FRENCH IN NICARAGUA. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 § 105. The French Renew their Designs upon America . . . 286 
 
 § 106. M. Belly's Canal Project 287 
 
 § 107. Efforts on the Part of the United States Government and the 
 
 American Canal Company to Offset Belly's Claims . . 289 
 
 § 108. Napoleon III, and his Plans in Mexico and Nicaragua 293 
 
 PART THREE. 
 
 THE PERIOD OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY — THE CANAL PROJECT A 
 NATIONAL UNDERTAKING. 1865-1896. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 THE REORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN CANAL PROJECT. 
 
 § 109. The Monroe Doctrine Before and After the War . . . 297 
 
 § no. Our Rapprochement with the States of the Isthmus . 301 
 
 § III. The United States Negotiate a Treaty with Honduras . . 303 
 
 § 112. The Dickinson-Ayon Treaty with Nicaragua . . . 305 
 
 § 113. The Gushing Convention with Colombia . . . 308 
 
 § 114. Admiral Davis's Report on the Canal Question . . . 312 
 
 § 115. President Grant's Canal Policy 314 
 
 § 116. The Hurlbut Treaty with Colombia 315 
 
 § 117. Grant's Provision for Surveys along the Isthmus and a Com- 
 mittee of Enquiry 318 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SURVEYS. 
 
 § 118. The Darien Expeditions ... ... 320 
 
 The Caledonian Route, 
 
 The San Bias Route, 
 
 The Atrato Routes. 
 
 § 119. The Tehuantepec Expedition 324 
 
 g 120. The Nicaraguan Expeditions 325 
 
 § 121. Supplementary Expeditions ... ... 328 
 
 § 122. The Final Report of the Commission 330 
 
Contents. 
 
 Xlll 
 
 PAGB 
 
 § 123. Its Effect upon the Immediate Diplomatic Situation . . 331 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS. 
 
 § 124. Ferdinand de Lesseps's Interest in the Canal Project . . 338 
 
 § 125. Resolution of the Paris Geographical Society . . , 339 
 
 § 126. La Societe Civile, and its Original Concession . . . 340 
 
 § 127. De Lesseps's Plans 342 
 
 § 128. The Wyse-Reclus Surveys on the Lower Isthmus and the 
 
 Company's New Concession ...... 344 
 
 ^129. De Lesseps Decides in Favor of the Societe Civile . .351 
 
 § 130. The Four Canal Projects . 352 
 
 § 131. The Make-up and Organization of the International Scientific 
 
 Congress 354 
 
 § 132. The Resolution of the Fourth Committee .... 355 
 
 § 133. The Final Decision of the Congress in Favor of Panama . 360 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 § 134. The United States Oppose an International Guaranty of the 
 
 Panama Route 362 
 
 § 135. The Provisional Interoceanic Canal Society .... 364 
 
 § 136. Failure of de Lesseps's First Efforts 366 
 
 g 137. The International Technical Commission and the Inaugura- 
 tion of the Work at Panama ...... 368 
 
 § 138. United States Coaling Stations at Chiriqui and Golfito . . 370 
 § 139. President Hayes's Message to Congress Advocating American 
 
 Control 373 
 
 § 140. De Lesseps's Activity in the United States and the Organiza- 
 tion of the Comite Americain 376 
 
 § 141. The Eads Ship-Railway Scheme 379 
 
 § 142. Tehauntepec, Nicaragua, and Panama 383 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 ANOTHER DIPLOMATIC BOUT WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 § 143. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty Again 389 
 
 § 144. Blaine's Circular Letter to the Powers of Europe . . . 392 
 § 145. Blaine's Pan-American Policy ...... 394 
 
xiv Contents. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 § 146. The Mosquito Protectorate Revived .... 39^ 
 
 § 147. Blaine Opens the Diplomatic Campaign with Great Britain . 39^ 
 
 § 148. Lord Granville's Reply to Blaine's Circular Letter . . 402 
 
 § 149. Blaine's Historical Objections .... 403 
 § 150. The British Reply to Blaine's Theoretical Argument and 
 
 Historical Objections . . ... 404 
 ^ 151. Mr. Frelinghuysen Takes up the American Case and Answers 
 
 Lord Granville's Despatches 408 
 
 § 152. Lord Granville's Traversal of Mr. Frelinghuysen's Case 412 
 
 § 153. Conclusion of the Correspondence .... 414 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 PANAMA VERSUS NICARAGUA. 
 
 § 154. La Compagnie Universelle du Canal Inter-Oceanique de 
 
 Panama 417 
 
 § 155. The Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua . . 422 
 
 § 156. President Arthur's Canal Project . . , 423 
 
 § 157. The Collapse of the Panama Canal Project . . . 427 
 g 158. The Abandonment of the United States Governmental Canal 
 
 Project 433 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 THE MARITIME CANAL COMPANY OF NICARAGUA. 
 
 {5 159. The Nicaragua Canal Association and its Concession . 437 
 
 § 160. President Cleveland's Award in the Boundary Dispute . 439 
 
 P 161. British and Americans in Mosquitia ..... 444 
 
 § 162. The Incorporation of the Maritime Canal Company by the 
 
 United States Government ...... 448 
 
 § 163. The Inauguration of the Work in Nicaragua . 450 
 
 § 164. Expeditions of Inspection . .... 451 
 
 § 165. The Blackman Claim and the Guaranty Bill of 1 8gi . 454 
 
 § 166. How Popular Interest in the Canal Project was Aroused 456 
 
 § 167. The Guaranty Bill of 1892 460 
 
 § 168. Efforts to Raise Funds by Private Subscription . . . 461 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 THE PRESENT SITUATION. 
 
 § 169. The Political Situation 463 
 
 Panama, 
 Nicaragua. 
 
Contents. xv 
 
 PAGE 
 
 § 170. The Technical Situation 473 
 
 Panama, 
 
 Nicaragua. 
 § 171. The Diplomatic Situation 498 
 
 Panama, 
 
 Nicaragua. 
 
 PART FOUR. 
 
 PROBABILITIES AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE FUTURE — THE NICARAGUA 
 CANAL A NATIONAL AMERICAN UNDERTAKING. 
 
 CHAPTER XXin. 
 
 THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CANAL PROJECT. 
 
 § 172 
 
 § 173. 
 
 § 174 
 
 § 175 
 
 S 176. 
 
 § 177 
 
 § 178 
 
 § 179. 
 
 § 180, 
 
 g 181 
 
 § 182 
 
 § 183, 
 
 § 184 
 
 § 185 
 
 The General Economic Outlook ... 511 
 
 A Method of Inquiry 516 
 
 Zone A. — Nicaragua versus Suez and the Cape . .521 
 
 Zone B. — Nicaragua versus the Horn ..... 529 
 
 Zone C. — Nicaragua's Monopoly of Sea-borne Commerce 533 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal and the Carrying Trade . . . 549 
 What the Nicaragua Canal will Do for the Commerce of the 
 
 United States ... . ... 551 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 THE NICARAGUA CANAL AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 The Contest over the Continents 556 
 
 Great Britain's Control of the Easterly Trade Routes . 562 
 
 Great Britain's Present Position in the West . 566 
 
 The Controversy over the Canal Route . . . 568 
 
 Neutralization, or American Control of the Transit-way? 575 
 
 Arbitration and the Transit Question . . . 585 
 
 Conclusion . .... . 589 
 
 APPENDICES. 
 
 Appendix A. — Treaty between the United States and New Granada, 
 
 1848 ; — extracts . . . 5Q9 
 
 Appendix B. — Clayton- Bulwer Treaty, 1850 ; — full text . . 600 
 
 Appendix C. — Dickinson-Ayon Treaty, 1868 ; — extracts . . . 604 
 
LIST OF MAPS. 
 
 1. The American Isthmus, Showing Several Canal 
 
 Routes Frontispiece. 
 
 FACING PAGE 
 
 2. Panoramic Map Showing Proposed Nicaragua 
 
 Canal Route . . .... 4§p 
 
 3. Diagram and Chart op Canal Trade . . 516 
 
 4. British Claims and Possessions in Central 
 
 America End of volume. 
 
THE NICARAGUA CANAL. 
 
 INTEODUCTION. 
 
 THE people of the United States have long 
 been convinced that, of all the varied 
 schemes of isthmus transit, the Nicaragua 
 ■canal project is the only one worthy of 
 their permanent consideration. It is now Central 
 ■over twenty years since their government American 
 officially confirmed them in this conclu- 
 sion ; the transient glory of Panama was unable to 
 .shake them in their faith, and to-day the best tech- 
 nical authorities of the world are only grounding 
 them the more firmly in their convictions. The 
 Nicaragua canal has thus come, as it were, to be 
 identified in the people's mind with the manifest 
 ■economic destiny of their country. 
 ,.The settled foreign policy of the United States 
 tas also worn for itself a deep groove in the popular 
 consciousness, and, in the light of their manifest 
 political destiny, the American people are equally 
 -determined to hold this continent for the Americans, 
 and leave Europe to fight ifc out for herself. 
 
 Thus from both the economic and the political 
 
2 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 points of view, The Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe 
 Doctrine may well be taken to typify our present 
 attitude toward the more general question of inter- 
 oceanic communication. 
 
 As soon as we regard the problem from an his- 
 torical standpoint, however, our horizon is at once- 
 extended to include the whole length and breadth 
 of the American isthmus. Every deflection in the 
 crest of its mountains and all the sinuosities of it» 
 shores have been carefully examined in the long 
 search for the most favorable route, and the 
 governments of both Europe and the United States 
 have also had their diplomatic dealings with all the 
 states of this isthmus in their rival efforts to secure 
 political control over the transit-way. The Ameri- 
 can isthmus as a whole, must, therefore, be taken as 
 the geographical and political basis of the present 
 enquiry ; for it is only through a process of historical 
 elimination and contraction that the more immediate- 
 problem of the Nicaragua canal and the Monroe 
 doctrine has at last been set forth in its true 
 light. 
 
 The political divisions of these isthmian lands are 
 familiar enough to every one as they appear on all 
 our ordinary maps. But nature's transit-ways across, 
 the isthmus are not so readily discernible. Thus, by 
 way of introduction, — though not indeed without 
 some trepidation, as geographical descriptions, how- 
 ever essential to a proper understanding of the 
 subject in hand, are unavoidably tiresome, — a brief 
 description of these several routes of interoceanic 
 
Introduction. 3 
 
 communication may be permitted at the outset, in 
 order that the historical narrative to follow may not 
 be broken into unnecessarily by further topograph- 
 ical explanations. 
 
 Our ends are not technical, however, and, there- 
 fore a simple method of reconnaisance must here 
 suffice to locate the lines in question. For this pur- 
 pose we have first to follow along the crest of the 
 great Cordillera range, from its emergence in the 
 table-lands of Mexico to its ultimate union with the 
 Andes of South America. This ridge has well been 
 named " the backbone of the American isthmus " ; 
 for in all its snake-like windings it continues to pre- 
 sent a persistent barrier between the two seas. As 
 no genuine break occurs in all the length of this 
 baffling mountain wall, we must mark, instead, the 
 several depressions which here and there indent its 
 crest. 
 
 With a sketch of the orographic profile thus be- 
 fore us, our next office will be to consider the 
 hydrographic features of the lands on either side. 
 Suitable harbors, lying in a favorable position on 
 the opposite shores of the isthmus, should be noted 
 in this connection, and the rivers emptying into each 
 must then be traced to their head-waters in the ridge. 
 Should one of our depressions perchance be found 
 to lie in the immediate vicinity of the sources of 
 these streams, then, through this pass in the moun- 
 tains, and down each valley to the harbors on either 
 shore, a route of transit may, at least provisionally, 
 be drawn. 
 
4 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 According to this method of enquiry, we had best 
 begin our examination of the isthmus in the north. 
 5. 2 The Among the southern plateaux of Mexico, 
 Tehuante- the Cordillera gradually assume the form 
 pec Route. ^^ ^ dividing ridge, and extend southeast 
 through the isthmus of Tehuantepec, keeping close 
 to the Pacific shore. In the crest of this range, mid- 
 way along the isthmus and exactly at its narrowest 
 point, lie two mountain passes, Tarifa and Chivela, 
 in close proximity to each other. Just north of 
 these depressions are the head-waters of the Rio 
 Coatzacoalcos, and from this point the winding river 
 may be traced, down the gradual but continuous 
 descent of the mountains, until it empties finally 
 into the Bay of Campechy on the Atlantic side. 
 The Pacific slope of the range is far more precipi- 
 tous at this point, but it, too, is furrowed by numer- 
 ous mountain streams, which disgorge themselves 
 abruptly into the lagoons of the southern shore. 
 Under such orographic and hydrographic conditions, 
 therefore, a provisional transit-way may be laid out 
 directly across the isthmus of Tehuantepec at this 
 point. After the isthmus, this route has been named 
 the Tehuantepec Route. 
 
 The main ridge of the Cordillera, after traversing 
 the isthmus of Tehuantepec, still continues to run 
 § 3. The parallel to the Pacific coast, forming an 
 Honduras unbroken mountain wall faclna: the sea, 
 °" ^' down as far as the Gulf of Fonseca. 
 Transverse ranges radiate from the Atlantic slope of 
 this main ridge, intersecting Guatemala in almost 
 
Introduction. 5 
 
 every direction, and stretching out northward and 
 eastward through Honduras to the Caribbean Sea. 
 At the Gulf of Fonseca the mountainous sea-wall 
 terminates rather abruptly in a group of detached 
 peaks around whose base the Rio Groascoran finds 
 its way to the southern ocean. This little stream 
 has its sources in the lofty plain of Comayagua, high 
 up between the transverse ranges of central Hon- 
 duras, whence it has carved out its valley line to the 
 Pacific. In the northern extremity of this plateau 
 rises the Rio Humuya. Winding down between the 
 mountains this river merges at their foot in the 
 broader Rio Ulua, which in turn empties finally into 
 the Caribbean Sea at the Bay of Honduras. Be- 
 tween these two points, therefore, — from the Bay of 
 Fonseca on the Pacific to the Bay of Honduras on 
 the Atlantic side, — a line might be drawn along the 
 two river valleys, which would at least fulfil the 
 general conditions necessary for the location of an 
 interoceanic railway. This is generally spoken of as 
 the Honduras Moute. 
 
 The plateau formation of central Honduras is con- 
 tinued along the left bank of the Goascoran and 
 around the southerly shores of the Gulf of g ^^^ 
 Fonseca, in the lower plains of Conejo and Nicaragua 
 Leon. It is from amid these latter table- outes. 
 lands that the main range of the Cordillera now 
 bifurcates ; one branch continuing along the Pacific 
 coast to unite in the south with the higher volcanic 
 peaks of Costa Rica, the other cutting jSTicaragua in 
 a southeasterly direction and terminating finally on 
 
6 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the Caribbean coast just north of the outlet of the 
 Rio San Juan. From this latter branch again great 
 wooded spurs stretch out toward the eastern sea- 
 coast, leaving between them but narrow defiles, 
 through which countless streams flow down to 
 mingle in the lagoons of the Mosquito shore. 
 Esconced, as it were, between these two great 
 branches of the Cordillera, lies a truly remarkable 
 depression, about seventy miles wide, which slopes 
 off gradually from the plains of Conejo and Leon in 
 the extreme northwest to the level of the sea along 
 the lower valley of the San Juan. Through this 
 depression runs a series of isolated volcanic peaks, 
 while in its centre, and for the most part filling it 
 up, lie the two great inland seas of the district, — 
 Lake Managua and Lake Nicaragua, — which are 
 united by a narrow channel. Thus a natural water- 
 course extends through Nicaragua in a northwesterly 
 direction, from the Atlantic on the one side to within 
 a few miles of the Pacific on the other ; but here 
 again the Cordillera interpose their persistent barrier 
 between the seas. Lake Managua is cut off from the 
 Grulf of Fonseca by the plains of Leon and Conejo ; 
 while along the narrow strip of land separating Lake 
 Nicaragua from the Pacific there extends the western 
 branch of the Cordillera, commonly designated as the 
 Coast range. 
 
 Inasmuch as the elevation of the northwestern 
 plateaux is comparatively slight, and as the ridge of 
 the low coast range is indented here and there with 
 easy passes, numerous opportunities are here afforded 
 
Introduction. 7 
 
 for extending this natural water-way of Nicaragua to 
 the Pacific by the excavation of a canal through the 
 remaining strip of land. From the northwestern 
 shores of Lake Managua, for example, a canal might 
 be cut through the plain of Conejo and thence down- 
 ward along the valley of the Estero Real to the Gulf of 
 Fonseca. Or, to take a shorter course, an excavation 
 could be made from Lake Managua directly across 
 the plain of Leon, to emerge upon the Pacific shore, 
 •either along the valley of the tiny rivulet Tamarindo, 
 ■or else farther north in the harbor of Corinto. Or 
 again, having located the depressions in the Coast 
 range, and having selected those from among them 
 whose concomitant hydrographic features seem favor- 
 able, other canal lines could be drawn through these 
 points from the western shores of Lake Nicaragua 
 to the Pacific. Of the several routes that might be 
 laid out according to this last method, the three 
 following are those most worthy of consideration: 
 (1) Up the Rio Lajas, across the very lowest divide of 
 all the great Cordillera range from the Arctic Ocean 
 to. the Straits of Magellan, and thence down the Rio 
 Orande to Brito on the Pacific ; (2) leaving the lake 
 level at Virgin Bay, across the next lowest depres- 
 sion to the south, to reach the Pacific by the very 
 shortest line of all at San Juan del Sur ; (3) up the 
 valley of the Rio Sapoa and across the more elevated 
 divide at this point, to descend again to the Pacific 
 at the Bay of Salinas. Such are the varied possi- 
 bilities of what in general may be called the Nica- 
 ragua Moutes. 
 
8 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 South of Lake Nicaragua the Cordillera again as- 
 sume the form of a single dividing range which cuts 
 s 5 The northern Costa Rica completely in twain by 
 Chiriqui its continuous ridge and its lofty volcanic 
 ^°"*^' peaks. About in the centre of the country 
 this ridge-like contour of the mountains is once more 
 varied by the appearance of another elevated table- 
 land ; but almost immediately the range reunites, 
 and then branches out again east and southeast^ 
 completely filling up the southern section of the 
 land between Chiriqui and Veragua. Though sin- 
 gularly rich in harbors, this section of the main 
 isthmus possesses no rivers of importance, as the 
 mountains are too near the shore. On this ac- 
 count, and owing to the continuous elevation of 
 the range, it must be deemed impracticable to lo- 
 cate a canal route anywhere within the region just 
 described. The relative position of the two superb- 
 harbors, Golfo Dulce and the Chiriqui Lagoon, on 
 either side, would naturally lead one, nevertheless, 
 to choose some pass in the dividing ridges, however 
 elevated, through which to lay out the route of an- 
 other interoceanic railway at this point. Such is the 
 Chiriqui Route. 
 
 After rounding out; the peninsula of Veragua, the 
 isthmus becomes but the barest strip of land, hardly 
 § 6. The ^road enough, indeed, to contain the moun- 
 Panama tain range itself, which now becomes even 
 more attenuated in its ridge-like form in 
 order to adapt itself to its closer quarters. But the 
 summit of the dividing ridge is correspondingly lower 
 
Introduction. 9 
 
 in these parts, and it is intercepted, moreover, by 
 frequent depressions. The first of these, Culebra, 
 is the lowest and the most favorably situated, from a 
 hydrographic point of view, for the location of an- 
 other canal route. From its northern slope the in- 
 termittent Rio Chagres in some seasons trickles, and 
 in others rushes, into the Caribbean Sea at Colou. 
 On the southern side of the divide a more steady 
 stream, the Eio Grande, flows down into the Bay of 
 Panama on the Pacific. Across this narrow isthmus, 
 between the cities of Colon and Panama, still another 
 line of possible transit may therefore be drawn and 
 called again after the isthmus, the Panama Route. 
 
 The Central American isthmus is narrowest just 
 at the point where it makes its final bend to the 
 south to join the South American continent. § 7. The San 
 Here on the Atlantic side is the excellent ^'^^ Route, 
 harbor of San Bias, while on the Pacific the waters 
 of the Rio Chepo flow down into the sea. No very 
 favorable depression indents the crest of the moun- 
 tains just here, it is true ; still, allowing hydrographic 
 conditions to turn the scales, a route, called the San 
 Bias Route, may be run across the isthmus at this 
 point from the Gulf of San Bias on the Atlantic to 
 the mouth of the Chepo on the Pacific. 
 
 The last section of the isthmus, that contained 
 between the Gulf of San Bias and the Atrato River, 
 is known geographically as the isthmus of g s. The 
 Darien. It is a region well provided with Caledonian 
 both rivers and harbors, and, on this ac- °"'^" 
 
 count at least, seemingly well adapted to the location 
 
10 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 of further canal routes. But here again orographic 
 conditions intervene. All along the length of this 
 last isthmus no real depression in the mountain ridge 
 is to be found. Hydrographically the region is so 
 admirably endowed, however, that, by ignoring 
 mountain obstacles once more, a canal line might be 
 run from Caledonian Bay, the most favorable harbor 
 on the Atlantic side, across a lofty divide, to the 
 (lulf of San Miguel on the Pacific. This could 
 be done either directly, by descending along the 
 valley of the Savannah, or, again, by describing a 
 bend to the south and following along the more 
 favorable valley of the Chucunagua to the Tuyra, 
 and thence to the sea. This more or less doubtful 
 route for a canal is called the Caledonian Route. 
 
 In Dai'ien the Cordillera describe an abrupt turn 
 to the south, following the general trend of the land, 
 o ^jjg and sweep across the narrow isthmus to 
 Atrato form henceforth one continuous range with 
 Routes. ^]jg Andes of South America. The wes- 
 tern slopes of these mountains still continue to drain 
 directly into the Pacific. But the countless streams 
 which rush down the narrower eastern defiles do not 
 empty as before into the Caribbean, but flow one 
 and all into the Eio Atrato. From its sources in 
 the Andes to its outlet in the broad Atlantic at the 
 Oulf of Darien, this great river flows due north 
 directly under the eastern base of the range. To 
 locate the several canal routes of this region the 
 Atrato river must therefore be taken as the base of 
 operations. From its confluence in the Atrato each 
 eastern mountain stream should be followed up to 
 
Introduction. 11 
 
 its head-waters in the dividing ridge. If in the close 
 vicinity of its sources a favorable mountain pass 
 exists, and if from the other side of such divide 
 another river bed may be traced down the western 
 mountain slopes to the Pacific, there an Atrato canal 
 route may be located. In some few cases such con- 
 ditions are fulfilled, and by using the Atrato river 
 as a common outlet to the Atlantic, the possible 
 canal routes of this section may be laid out as fol- 
 lows : (1) From the Atrato up the Cacarica to the 
 ■divide and thence down the Tuyra to the Gulf of 
 San Miguel ; (2) up the Truando from its confluence 
 with the Atrato, over the range which skirts directly 
 along the coast at this point, and down a more pre- 
 cipitous descent to Kelly's Inlet on the Pacific ; (3) 
 up the Napipi or the Doguado and over the moun- 
 tains, to emerge on the western sea-board either at 
 Oupica or Chiri-Chiri Bay ; (4) up the Atrato itself 
 to its head-waters in the Raspadura ridge, and thence 
 down the Rio San Juan to the sea at Chirambira, 
 considerably farther south. In detail these several 
 Atrato routes are spoken of as the Atrato-Tiiyra, 
 the Atrato-Trtbando, the Atrato-Napipi-Doguado, 
 and the Atrato-San-Jnan Routes. 
 
 Having thus located the routes geographically 
 from north to south through the isthmus, we have 
 now to judge of their comparative feasi- 
 bility from a technical point of view. To Comparison 
 this end we had best group the transit- oftheSev- 
 
 1 rm n i j. ^''^' Routes. 
 
 ways now into three classes : ine first to 
 
 include those lines which have only been regarded 
 
 with a view toward railroad construction ; the second 
 
12 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 to comprehend sucli as modern scientific investigation 
 has removed beyond the range of comparative feasi- 
 bility for a canal ; and the last to be made up of the 
 canal routes still open to technical discussion. 
 
 In the first class are to be placed the Honduras 
 and Chiriqui routes. Magnificent harbors indent 
 the shores at either terminus of both these 
 durasand routes, aud from a hydrographic stand- 
 Routes"' point there is little room for a choice be- 
 tween them. The distance between the 
 seas is longer across Honduras, but the ascent is 
 gradual over the divide. True, the plain of Coma- 
 yagua rises to the height of from two to three 
 thousand feet, but well-defined river beds mark the 
 way along almost the entire length of the route, and 
 a railway in this region would have few serious 
 grades to encounter. Between the Chiriqui Lagoon 
 and the Golfo Dulce the distance is only eighty 
 miles, but the range rises here to the height of five 
 thousand feet. By proper curves and tunnelling an 
 ordinary railroad line could be constructed without 
 very serious difficulty, however, to connect the two 
 shores of the isthmus at this point. 
 
 Our second class contains a whole history of 
 blighted hopes, but with our present knowledge of 
 TheTehuan- the Isthmus, we may dispose of these 
 
 tepee, San pOUteS with EL WOrd. 
 
 Bias, Caledon- 
 ian, and There is first the Tehuantepec route, so 
 
 Atrato Routes. , , .• . . • i • 
 
 attractive to American promoters, Ijnng as 
 it does directly in the path of the Gulf Stream, and 
 within easy access to the great Mississippi basin of 
 
Introduction. 13 
 
 our country. The climatic conditions of the region 
 are also favorable, but neither geography nor clima- 
 tography can weigh in the balance against the un- 
 favorable orographic and hydrographic features of 
 this section. In the list of disadvantages there is 
 first the distance across this isthmus to be consid- 
 ered, vphich would involve about one hundred and 
 fifty miles of actual excavation in digging the trench 
 of the canal. Then, again, a great number of locks 
 would in any event be necessary in order to cross 
 the divide, and at such an elevation — over seven 
 hundred feet at Tarifa, the lowest point, — no ade- 
 quate supply of water could be procured to flood 
 them from above. Lastly, there is no suitable har- 
 bor to be found at the northern terminus of the pro- 
 posed canal, while toward the south the numerous 
 little streams are continually disgorging the detritus 
 of the mountains into the lagoons of the Pacific 
 shore. In the face of such obstacles to canal con- 
 struction, the isthmus of Tehuantepec has at last 
 been relegated to the class of railroad routes, though 
 its advocates have long maintained that the line 
 should be used as a ship-railway at the very least. 
 
 At San Bias and Caledonia, where the isthmus is 
 so narrow and the harbors are so good, it was confi- 
 dently expected that straight sea-level canals could 
 easily be built to join the two seas. But here again 
 the mountains intervened to dash the high hopes of 
 enthusiasts. A lock system would in both cases 
 prove impossible, both on account of the breadth of 
 the isthmus and the lack of sufficient water supply. 
 
14 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Tunnelling might indeed be resorted to, but, com- 
 paratively speaking at least, this would prove too 
 costly an expedient. 
 
 From a hydrographic point of view, again, the 
 Atrato routes appear even more attractive than 
 those we have just been considering. It would 
 seem so easy a matter to enter this stream from the 
 mao-niflcent Gulf of Darien on the Atlantic, and then 
 only the merest strip of land would still cut us ofP 
 from the Pacific. But this belt of land contains the 
 Cordillera, and though, indeed, numerous river val- 
 leys furrow both the mountain slopes, still nowhere 
 along the range is the persistency of the dividing 
 ridge more marked than just here. At no one point, 
 in fact, does there occur just that coincidence of oro- 
 graphic and hydrographic conditions so essential to 
 the location of a canal route. Moreover, the climatic 
 conditions of this really tropical country, with its 
 constant rainfall through so many months of the 
 year, would necessarily militate against the construc- 
 tion and maintenance of a canal in this region, even 
 though topographic obstacles were overcome. Thus" 
 the Atrato section also has proved to be a region of 
 disappointments, as we shall see, and its promises 
 likewise have vanished. 
 
 Thus the lesson of engineering science is the les- 
 son of history as well, and for our third class we are 
 left with only the Nicaragua and Panama 
 
 The Nicaragua _^ t 
 
 and Panama routes. i hcse are the two great competi- 
 tors of our day for the fulfilment of inter- 
 oceanic transit, and between the two the issue has 
 
Introduction. 15 
 
 already been sharply drawn regarding a lock or a 
 sea-level canal. 
 
 Admitting the necessity of locks and all their 
 commercial disadvantages, it is through the Nicara- 
 guan depression that nature seems to have made most 
 of her concessions for the construction of an inter- 
 oceanic canal. The distance requiring actual exca- 
 vation through this region is comparatively short ; 
 the divides to be crossed are the lowest of all the 
 isthmus; the supply of water in the lakes is both 
 steady and abundant ; the character of the rock and 
 soil to be cut away is in the main favorable ; and 
 along the greater part of the route, at least, the cli- 
 matic conditions are equable. Besides the drawback 
 involved in the locks, the onlv other serious disad- 
 vantages of this route would seem to lie in the vol- 
 canic nature of the region traversed, and in the 
 absence of suitable harbors at either terminus of the 
 proposed canal. Already engineering science is 
 remedying the latter difficulty by artificial means, 
 and as to the former objection, nature herself is 
 assuring us, by her long continued acquiescence in 
 our plans. 
 
 Still the advantages to commerce of a direct sea- 
 level canal are so signal, that we would hesitate to 
 pronounce in favor of the Nicaragua route, so long 
 as Panama can offer us any hope of its ultimate 
 achievement. It would certainly be infinitely prefer- 
 able thus to mingle the waters of the Atlantic di- 
 rectly with those of the Pacific without having to 
 resort to locks ; and across the isthmus of Panama, 
 
16 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 if anywhere, is the opportunity afforded. The dis- 
 tance requiring excavation in order to accomplish 
 this purpose is here the shortest of all. The moun- 
 tain barrier to be cut through is also comparatively 
 narrow, and at its highest point along the line it 
 only rises 284 feet above the mean level of the sea. 
 At the termini of the proposed canal nature has, 
 moreover, provided suitable harbors, affording easy 
 ingress and egress from either sea. But here the 
 list of Panama's advantages must close. On the 
 other hand, the climate of this region is extremely 
 unhealthful, so much so, indeed, as to interfere very 
 seriously with the construction of the canal, to say 
 nothing of its maintenance and operation. Then, 
 above all, there remains the still unsolved problem 
 of the Rio Chagres. The flow of this little stream 
 is most uncertain, in the dry seasons making it 
 appear little more than a rivulet, and during the wet 
 seasons actually flooding the entire valley. As the 
 river itself persistently crosses and recrosses the only 
 possible canal route, and as both their levels must be 
 the same if the oceans are to be joined directly, it 
 becomes thus imperative that the waters of the 
 Chagres be diverted in some way and kept clear of 
 the bed of the canal. True, the difficulty could 
 easily be avoided if the canal were raised above the 
 river by locks; but the moment that locks enter 
 into the comparison, the advantages turn again in 
 favor of the Nicaragua route. 
 
 As between the lock canal through Nicaragua and 
 the sea-level canal across Panama, it is still an open 
 
Introduction. 17 
 
 question, with the balance of scientific opinion now 
 in favor of the former. But this is a technical ques- 
 tion, and the aita of this book is political. In this 
 introduction we have only attempted to tabulate in a 
 general way, the conclusions that science has thus 
 far reached in the problem of isthmus transit. We 
 must bear in mind, however, that these very conclu- 
 sions are the results of a long historical process, 
 which in its turn has had its influence upon the 
 political and economic evolution of the nations most 
 intimately concerned. And it is primarily with this 
 phase of the story that these pages have to do. 
 
Part One. 
 
 THE MEECANTILE PERIOD AND THE ABSOLITTE MON- 
 
 AKCHT THE CAJSTAL PEOJECT A EOTAL 
 
 MONOPOLY. 1492-1815. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA. 
 
 BISHOP BERKELEY'S oft-quoted lines— 
 " "Westward the course of Empires takes its 
 way " — would seem to tell but half the 
 story. From Asia successive waves of Aryan migra- 
 tion have, indeed, broken over the shores of 
 both Europe and America, but just as each Movement 
 ocean breaker is followed immediately by of the 
 an undertow movement sweepinsr back „ World's 
 
 1 Commerce. 
 
 toward the centre ot disturbance; so too 
 have these waves of Western civilization been suc- 
 ceeded in each case by a return current of trade and 
 commerce setting in toward the lands of the East. 
 Thus, on the one hand, our advance has been steadily 
 westward, through the European peninsulas to the 
 Atlantic, over the seas to the New World, and 
 across the American continent toward the countries 
 
 19 
 
20 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 of the Orient ; while, on the other hand, our easterly 
 trade lines with Asia have all the while been multi- 
 plying in number and gaining in stability. 
 
 In our day the circle of the globe is all but com- 
 pleted. On the western shores of America, Can- 
 ada and the United States now stand covetously 
 regarding the neighboring islands of the Pacific. 
 In the opposite direction the Suez canal has already 
 brought the Europeans in close touch with their 
 Asiatic colonies and dependencies, Africa has at last 
 become circum-colonized, and Russia is even now 
 busily engaged in establishing commercial connec- 
 tions with the Pacific through Siberia. The Oriental 
 nations themselves, surrounded thus on every side, 
 have begun to feel the impetus of this twofold 
 movement of Western civilization, and are waking wp 
 at last to the demands of its economic life. 
 
 The construction of an interoceanic canal joining 
 the waters of the Atlantic directly with those of the 
 Pacific must, therefore, owing to the sphericity of 
 the earth, merge these two great channels of trade 
 into one. The course of the world's commerce will 
 thus in the end assume a rotary motion, and com- 
 mercial advance can then no longer be likened to the 
 breakers of a rising tide with their back-rushing 
 undertow currents, but rather to the waves of the 
 deep-flowing sea itself, where no shore obstructs its 
 course. 
 
 Speaking generally it may be true enough to say 
 that production is carried on in order to satisfy the 
 ever-increasing wants of man. Since the institution 
 
The Discovery of America. 21 
 
 of reproductive capital, however, the immediate 
 
 cause of vrestern economic advance is rather to be 
 
 found in that insatiable desire of gain that 
 
 1 • ,,-1,1 . ■■ » § I2> The 
 
 nas ever since actuated those in control of Forces 
 the means of production. Such is the force Back of this 
 w^hich has gradually extended the zone of °'^'°^° • 
 our commercial activity ever farther westward, and at 
 the same time, bound the trade of Europe more and 
 more closely to the lands of the East. This self- 
 same sociological factor has also long been operating 
 upon the solution of the isthmian transit problem, 
 whose history we have here to record and whose 
 ultimate fulfilment we may confidently look for- 
 ward to. 
 
 The owning classes of Greece and Rome secured 
 their profits from the land by directing the labors of 
 slaves. As the slave system is technically 
 far from productive, however, it could not Historical 
 be relied upon to afford an indefinitely Retrospect 
 increasins: return, unless applied to an ever „ o t e 
 
 . » ' rr\ Movement. 
 
 expanding area of land. Thus after the 
 southei'n peninsulas of Europe had been more or less 
 superficially exploited in this way, the rich countries 
 of the East had perforce to be conquered and made 
 to give up their wealth. With Rome as its centre, 
 this twofold movement of trade and commerce 
 came thus to include the British Isles on its west- 
 ward advance, and the furthermost confines of Persia 
 within its eastern connections. Competition among 
 the several owners of Rome for the largest share in 
 these profits of conquest, resulted at the same time 
 
22 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 in the downfall of the smaller proprietors and the 
 concentration of all the wealth thus acquired in 
 the hands of the few. Individual initiative had no 
 further outlet in consequence, and, after all available 
 land had been taken up, the labor of rebellious 
 slaves and the tribute of conquered peoples no 
 longer sufficed to satisfy the growing demands of 
 the Roman monopolists and support their idle 
 clients. Diminishing returns set in, and not being 
 able to support itself financially, the Empire was 
 bound in the end to fall. 
 
 The barbarians of Northern Europe thereupon 
 assumed control of the economic advance of the 
 West. Still more strenuous conditions confronted 
 them, however, and, in order to acquire any profits 
 at all from such an environment, some more efficient 
 system of production than slavery had necessarily to 
 be evolved. Now the Roman proprietor owned not 
 only the land but also the laborer himself, and was 
 thus in a position to absorb the entire surplus value 
 of industry. What was gained thus in profits was 
 ultimately lost, however, in the energy of the actual 
 producers. The feudal owners of the Middle Ages 
 were obliged, therefore, to content themselves with 
 control of the land alone, binding their serfs to the 
 soil, it is true, but leaving them for the time, masters 
 of their own personality. Additional productive 
 energy was thus acquired, and from the land ele- 
 ment at least, profits were still assured to the pro- 
 prietary classes. 
 
 The continent now became the centre of economic 
 
The Discovery of America. 23 
 
 activity, and on the basis of serfdom the agricultural 
 lands of Western Europe began to be redeemed. Co- 
 incident with this western advance, a back-draft also 
 set in again toward the Orient. In order to gratify 
 a growing demand for luxuries among the feudal 
 lords, efforts came to be made at this time through 
 the arms of the crusaders and their mercantile allies 
 to reestablish trade connections with India; while 
 travellers and Christian missionaries also penetrated 
 into the very heart of the lands of the far East, 
 where the liberal and magnificent Mongols now held 
 sway. These first attempts were not altogether 
 successful ; for, by the time the proprietors of the 
 West had really begun to feel the need of Oriental 
 products, the ports of Asia Minor began one by one 
 to be closed upon them by the Ottoman Turks, while 
 the Tartar hordes of China, less hospitable than the 
 Mongols whom they had overthrown, now shut them 
 off by land. The merchants of Venice and Genoa, 
 nevertheless, still managed to maintain an indirect 
 and precarious trade with the East ; — just enough, 
 in fact, to keep the European appetite whetted for 
 Oriental treasure. 
 
 As a result of this partial failure, articles of luxury 
 had now for the most part to be produced at home. 
 This was now possible, as the growth of her mediae- 
 val towns had already raised handicraft in Europe 
 to the dignity of an independent calling. Serfdom 
 soon proved itself utterly inadequate for work of 
 this kind, as a high degree of individual initiative 
 was here essential to immediate success. Feudal 
 
24 . The Isficaragua Canal. 
 
 control, in consequence, became merely nominal over 
 the towns, where a system of industrial partnership 
 between gildmasters, journeymen, and apprentices 
 gradually came to take the place of serf labor. 
 After a routine had once been established, however,, 
 and handicraft too become systematized, individual 
 incentive on the part of the industrial laborers was 
 no longer of such paramount importance. Seeing 
 therein an opportunity for gain, the gildmasters 
 then graduall}" put a stop to these co-operative 
 methods of production, and in the end succeeded in 
 becoming owners and controllers themselves, direct- 
 ing the labor of their former partners, the journey- 
 men and apprentices, and producing more directly 
 for the market. 
 
 Cut off from all further activity in the East, the 
 feudal lords spent their energies, in the meantime, 
 competing and fighting with each other for the 
 largest share of Europe's agricultural profits. The 
 result of the contest was here the same as in Rome. 
 The weaker were dispossessed and their fiefs added 
 to the domain of the stronger, until finally the lands 
 of the West came for the most part under the con- 
 ,trol of a number of territorial lords, — the absolute 
 monarchs of Europe. The burgher aristocrats of the 
 towns were naturally loth to be absorbed in this 
 landed monopoly, but as they had begun to produce 
 for the market, and as the market was now controlled 
 by the monarch, they were forced in the end to 
 siibmit. The Church with her immense territorial 
 possessions lent her aid to the ambitions of these 
 
The Discovery of America. 25 
 
 monai-chs of the West in order to have them all 
 under her spiritual 'dictation from Eome, and the 
 evolution of the national states on the Atlantic was 
 thus rendered possible, where the Empire of the 
 Germans had failed.^ 
 
 At the outset the earlier monarchs had relied upon 
 the support of the discontented peasants and the am- 
 bitious burghers of the towns to aid them 
 in their designs against their rival feudal The Mer- 
 lords. Once in control, however, it was cantiie 
 necessary to provide for a centralized eco- ^^ ^'"" 
 nomic system. Agricultural and industrial labor 
 had still to be performed by a disenfranchised class, 
 but the profits must now be controlled by the 
 monarch himself. To this end the quondam feudal 
 lords, though deprived of the economic and political 
 independence they had before enjoyed, were left 
 upon their estates and still allowed to acquire an 
 income from their serfs, provided they supported the 
 Crown. The burgher aristocrats, likewise, were left 
 in nominal control, and . industrial labor continued 
 to be performed by journeymen and apprentices, 
 now working for a wage. The formerly indepen- 
 dent gilds thus became governmental affairs in like 
 manner, and their masters too had now to sup- 
 port the monarch both economically and politically. 
 
 ' Achille Loria, " Les Bases Economiques de la Constitution Sociale." 
 Paris, i88g. 
 
 Henry Dyer, " The Evolution of Industry." New York, 1895. 
 
 H. deB. Gibbins, "TheHistory of Commerce in Europe." London, 1891. 
 
 John Kells Ingram, " A History of Slavery and Serfdom." London, 
 1895. 
 
26 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Under this centralized system profits were acquired 
 from the land by the labor of agriculturists and 
 mechanics and controlled by the sovereign ; to be 
 distributed again in part among courtiers, city mag- 
 nates, and privileged companies, in return for their 
 support. The real incentive to production, the indi- 
 vidual initiative of the actual producer, was thus, 
 it is true, eliminated, but improved methods of pro- 
 duction under a centralized control allowed increas- 
 ing profits for a time from a widely extendable 
 market, before diminishing returns set in. 
 
 The continual circulation of coined money was, 
 however, absolutely essential for the smoothwork- 
 ing of this new industrial system. Coins of the pre- 
 cious metals had thus been used in the classic world, 
 and as their value and usefulness for this purpose had 
 long been known among the Teutons through the 
 merchants of Rome and the Saracens, this form of 
 money was naturally adopted by the nations of 
 the North to serve as their standard of value and 
 medium of exchange. Diyision of labor had now 
 become territorial as well as personal. The agricul- 
 tural fiefs provided food-stuffs and raw materials 
 for the whole nation, and also produced for the 
 market. These products had largely to be trans- 
 ported to the towns, the food-stuffs to support the 
 industrial population there, and the raw materials to 
 be worked up into articles of luxury and sold abroad 
 for a profit. Money was necessary for such ex- 
 changes, and as the market expanded, the demand 
 for the precious metals to be turned into coin grew 
 
The Discovery of America. 27 
 
 in like measure. An immense military and civil 
 service was likewise necessary to manage and defend 
 the realm, and as these could no longer be paid for 
 in kind, as before, the monarch also needed ready 
 money to carry on the government and keep up his 
 expensive court. 
 
 The maintenance and continued growth of the 
 rival monarchies came thus to depend largely on 
 the supply of money each sovereign was able to 
 amass within his borders. Europe was not plenti- 
 fully endowed with natural supplies of the precious 
 metals, and thus competition between the monarchs 
 became severe. Their peasants had still their feudal 
 rents to pay to their reinstated lords, and could not 
 be heavily taxed in addition by the central govern- 
 ment, without weakening their productive force and 
 thus diminishing the supply of raw materials so 
 essential for industrial advance. It was to indus- 
 try, therefore, that the monarchs had to look for their 
 supply of the precious metals and extra profits. By 
 having the raw materials of the land worked up into 
 articles of luxury in the towns, these could be shipped 
 abroad in ships of the producing nation, and sold 
 there at a profit for ready money. When pursued 
 consistently by each of the several rival monarchs 
 the efficiency of this policy was neutralized. Nor, 
 on the other hand, could the discontented, heavily 
 burdened peasant-labor be indefinitely relied upon 
 to supply the necessary food-stuffs and I'aw materials 
 for such an industrial regime. The expenses of court 
 and government kept all the while increasing, money 
 
28 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 and raw materials were becoming scarce, and profits 
 could no longer keep pace with the demands of the 
 proprietary classes, as disenfranchised labor failed 
 adequately to respond. The tide of prosperity was 
 turning and an era of diminishing returns seemed on 
 the point of setting in. 
 
 It was then, as the wave was about to break, that 
 a fresh undei'-current set in toward the lands of the 
 East. The indirect trade with the Indies from the 
 Mediterranean ports of Europe was still possible, and 
 during the fifteenth century this had increased enor- 
 mously in response to the growing demand of the 
 monarchs and their courts. Transportation along 
 these lines was difficult, dangerous, and expensive, 
 however, by reason of Mohammedan interference, and, 
 as European products could not well be transported so 
 far on account of their bulk, the precious metals had 
 necessarily to be shipped to pay for these importa- 
 tions. Instead of adding to her scanty store of gold 
 and silver this indirect trade with the Orient thus 
 only tended to diminish Europe's supply, until, by 
 the middle of the fifteenth century, the purchasing 
 power of money had doubled, and her products cor- 
 respondingly depreciated. It became thus evident 
 to the monarchs of the "West that some more direct 
 connections must be made with the Orient if her 
 treasures were to be absorbed. The marvellous 
 accounts of these riches, given by the travellers and 
 missionaries on their return from the lands of the 
 Grand Khan, had long since been made public, and 
 now, as the necessity was more urgent, the writings 
 
The Discovery of America. 29 
 
 of Marco Polo, Conti, and Mandeville, scarcely 
 credited before, received the closest attention, and 
 their glowing descriptions only added fresh fuel to 
 the flame of western commercial desire.^ 
 
 Great inducements came thus to be held out by 
 the powerful reigning families of the West to 
 explorers and adventurers who would 
 brave the dangers of the unknown seas Century 
 and discover a direct water-route to the Voyages of 
 Indies. The mercantile policy had already '^'=°'*'7- 
 paved the way for this enterprise by building up a 
 merchant marine, and training skilled navigators 
 during the days of the maritime revolution. Each 
 of the absolute monarchies on the Atlantic had 
 fleets of its own to keep the balance of trade in its 
 favor, while their demands for Eastern products had 
 had the further effect of improving the navigation 
 of the Mediterranean. Vessels and navigators there 
 were, and now that the mariner's compass was in- 
 vented, all was ready for the great voyages of dis- 
 covery of the fifteenth century. 
 
 All but the northern coast line of Africa was 
 wrapt in mystery to the Europeans of that day. 
 Geographers were now agreed, however, that this 
 
 ' J. K. Ingrain, " History of Political Economy." London, 1888. 
 
 Julius Kautz, ' ' Die Geschichtliche Entwickelung der NationalBkonomik 
 und ihrer Litteratur.'' Third edition, Berlin, 1879. 
 
 Luigi Cossa, "Introduction to the Study of Political Economy, " Trans- 
 lated by Louis Dyer, pp. 193-210, London, 1893. 
 
 R. H. Inglis Palgrave, "Dictionary of Political Economy," Vol. I, pp. 
 85-88. London, 1894. 
 
 J. Conrad et al, " Handw6rterbuch der Staatswissenschaften," Vol. IV., 
 pp. 1168-1173. Jena, 1890. 
 
30 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 great continent must have an end, and could one 
 but round its southernmost cape, lie must of necessity 
 come upon the southern shores of India, and thus 
 execute a flank movement on the Mohammedan and 
 Tartar alike. Thus the Infant Henry of Portugal 
 — the Navigator — argued, and ultimately his point 
 was, proved, though it took some fifty years of 
 cautious sailing along the mighty stretch of western 
 sea-board to the south, before Bartholomeu Dias 
 finally, in 1487, peered around the southern cape. 
 In the meantime other explorers in the employ of 
 Spain and England, with the same end in view of 
 establishing direct connections by sea with the 
 Indies, were unwittingly being borne on the crest 
 of the last wave of western advance to the shores 
 the New World.^ 
 
 The conception of the sphericity of the earth, hit 
 
 upon by some nameless Greek and discussed by 
 
 Aristotle and Strabo in the days of the 
 
 § i6. The classic world, had already been revived 
 
 Discoveries , , ■' 
 
 of Columbus during the middle ages by Albertus Mag- 
 and his j^us and Roger Bacon, and was now gain- 
 poraries ^^S ground through its, popularization in 
 the " Imago Mundi " of Alliacus. Colum- 
 bus at last determined to demonstrate the theory in 
 practice, and, while Portugal was continuing her 
 search for an easterly route to the Indies, he was 
 finally able to persuade the Spanish monarchs to 
 
 1 C. R. Markham, " The Sea Fathers," Chapters I. and II. London 
 and New York, 1884. 
 
 C. Raymond Beazley, " Henry the Navigator and the Age of Discovery 
 in Europe.'' New York, 1895. 
 
The Discovery of America. 31 
 
 allow him to seek a more direct route to these self- 
 same Eastern lands by sailing due west. 
 
 The trade-winds carried his vessels to the Baha- 
 mas, and as, according to the ideas of those days, 
 " whatever land was not Africa nor Europe was 
 Asia," Columbus naturally thought he had reached 
 the lands of his desires. In all his voyages of dis- 
 covery, therefore, Columbus busied himself identify- 
 ing these new shores with the countries of the far 
 East. Cuba he considered to be part of the main- 
 land of Asia, and Hayti, he was sure, must be the 
 island of Cipango (Japan), described by Marco Polo. 
 The other islands of the group belonged thus, in his 
 fancy, to the Indian Archipelago. So when Colum- 
 bus sighted the mainland of South America, off the 
 delta of the Orinoco, on his third voyage of discovery 
 in 1498, he was doubly sure he had again come upon 
 the eastern shores of Asia. He accordingly spoke of 
 this land as the "Tierra Firma," and, skirting the 
 coast to the westward, he believed he had found the 
 Terrestrial Paradise so glowingly depicted by 
 Mandeville. 
 
 Columbus's success encouraged his monarchs and 
 spurred on other ambitious explorers. In the follow- 
 ing year Hojedo and Vespucci came also to the shores 
 of South America and continued the discovery of its 
 northern coast line westward to the Gulf of Vene- 
 zuela. Vincent Pinzon followed, being the first to 
 cross the equator in these parts. He landed at about 
 the eighth degree south latitude, and then cruised 
 northwest along the shore, crossing the mouth of the 
 
32 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Amazon, to the island of Trinidad and the lands that 
 Columbus had discovered before. In the year 1500 
 Bastidas further developed the line of this northern 
 shore from Cape Vela, where Hojedo and Vespucci 
 had left off, to the Gulf of Darien and the isthmus 
 of Panama. 
 
 Thus a considerable stretch of unbroken coast line 
 had already been developed when Columbus set out 
 again in 1502, on his fourth and last voyage of dis- 
 covery, with the avowed purpose of connecting the 
 supposed mainland of Cuba with that of Paria 
 (South America), or of finding the strait between 
 them leading to the Indian Ocean. He mistook his 
 bearings, however, and landed this time on the 
 northern shores of Honduras, August 17th, where the 
 little town of Truxillo afterwards grew up. Return- 
 ing eastward he entered what has since been named 
 the Black river, and took possession in the name 
 of the Crown of Castile, calling the stream in witness 
 thereof, the Eio Possession. He then rounded the 
 point, calling it Cape Gracias k Dios, in gratitude for 
 the deliverance it afforded him from the fury of the 
 storm, and again took possession for his sovereigns. 
 Skirting along the coast from this point toward the 
 south, Columbus landed again at Bluefields Lagoon 
 and at the mouth of the San Juan, holding inter- 
 course with the natives at both points and trying to 
 learn from them the nature of the country. Seeing 
 that these savages possessed ornaments of gold, 
 Columbus was now convinced he had reached at last 
 the Golden Chei-sonesus, and eagerly continued his 
 
The Discovery of America. 33 
 
 searcli to the south, that he might pass through the 
 Straits of Malacca and, coming upon the mouths of 
 the Ganges, so fulfil his dream. He was soon forced 
 to put back, however, and, disappointed in his am- 
 bition, he returned to Spain to die.^ 
 
 The Pope, as we know, favored the ambitions of 
 the absolute monarchs of the West so long as they 
 ■continiied to regard him as their feudal 
 over-lord. In the voyages of discovery pop^Jg gyn 
 and conquest, now well under way, there and the 
 was as yet no source of conflict between „ "^f^^'j °^ 
 
 "^ , , . T TordesiUas. 
 
 the temporal and spiritual joowers. The 
 sovereigns wanted the wealth of the Indies, while 
 the Church desired to bring their teeming popula- 
 tions within her fold. Thus conqueror and priest 
 went hand in hand and mutually aided each other. 
 Already the Portuguese had received Papal grants 
 ■of the lands they had discovered, including the 
 islands of the Atlantic off the west coast of Africa ; 
 and now the Spanish sovereigns also became suitors 
 for like favors. To avoid future disjputes between 
 his two vassals, the Pope then drew a line of de- 
 markation between their respective fields of enter- 
 prise, running along an imaginary meridian a hundred 
 leagues to the west of the Azores and the Cape 
 Verde islands. King Emanuel of Portugal was not 
 satisfied with the rights thus saved, however, and 
 after some dispute, an agreement was reached by 
 
 ' Edward John Payne, "History of the New World Called America," 
 Vol. I., pp. 117-196. Oxford and New York, i8g2. 
 
 John Fiske, " The Discovery of America," Vol. I., Chapters V. and VI. 
 Boston, 1894. 
 
34 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the two" monarchs in the treaty of Tordesillas, — rati- 
 fied June 7, 1494, — wherein the line of demarkation 
 was removed to a point three hundred and seventy 
 leagues west of the Cape Verde islands. The main- 
 land of South America thus far opened up by the 
 Spaniards, thus became legally part of Portugal's- 
 domain, while the east coast of Central America and 
 the West Indian islands remained under the crown, 
 of Spain.' 
 
 In the meantime Portugal made good her legal 
 claim to the eastern peninsula of South America by 
 § i8. The actual discovery and conquest, though her 
 New World explorers came upon the shores of the 
 to be an New World as unwittingly as Columbus 
 Island. himself. In the year 1500 a Portuguese 
 sea-captain, Peter Cabral, following the course of 
 the famous da Gama, who two years before had 
 completed the work of Dias and reached the -Indies 
 by circumnavigating Africa, was driven oif the 
 coast by adverse winds and, getting caught in the 
 great equatorial current, came finally to the shores 
 of Brazil at modern Santa Cruz, near the spot where 
 Pinzon had landed shortly before. Finding this 
 newly discovered land to lie within the sphere of 
 his dominion, King Emanuel lost no time in press- 
 
 ' M. Creighton, " History of the Papacy during the Reformation," Bk. V., 
 Chap. VI., London, 1892-94. 
 
 E. G. Bourne, "The Demarkation Line of Pope Alexander VI.," Yale 
 Review, May, 1892. 
 
 L. L. Dominguez, " The Conquest of the River Plate," Hakluyt Soc. 
 Pubs., No. 81. 
 
 John Fiske, loc. cit.. Vol. I., pp. 454-460. 
 
The Discovery of America. 35 
 
 ing his claim, and as a result of the expeditions he 
 at once sent out, the coast line of South America 
 was still further developed toward the south to the 
 thirty-second degree. 
 
 Thus during the years that had elapsed between 
 the first land-fall of Columbus in 1492 to his death 
 in 1506, a continuous coast line of what he had sup- 
 posed to be Asia, was opened up for 7000 miles, 
 extending from the northern shores of Honduras 
 eastward and southward to the southern extremity 
 of Brazil as we know the land to-day. This was a 
 staggering blow to the earlier Columbian Hypo- 
 thesis, and ideas had now to be fitted in with the 
 facts as thus revealed. Peter Martyr as early as 
 1494 had spoken of the islands of the West Indies 
 discovered by Columbus, as the " 2s ew World," and 
 now Vespucci, in the account of his voyages pub- 
 lished in 1503, again concluded from the extent 
 of coast line then developed on the mainland, 
 that "we are Justified in calling this a 'New 
 "^'orld.'" In the eyes of the Europeans of that 
 day, this " New World," called " America," after 
 him who had thus dignified it as an indepen- 
 dent land-mass, was not a great continent as we 
 know it now; but rather was it a huge island 
 lying diagonally across the equator, with an un- 
 known extent to the north and south, and divided 
 longitudinally between the crowns of Spain and 
 Portugal.^ 
 
 1 E. J. Payne, loc. cit.. Vol. I., pp. 198-212. 
 John Fiske, loc. cit.. Vol. II., Chap. VII. 
 
36 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Two incentives now led discoverers and explorers 
 on : one the desire to round the island of the New 
 World either to the north or to the south 
 ishCoioniai ^^^ ^^^^ reach the Indies beyond ; and 
 Expeditions the other the hopes of finding gold in the 
 i° ^^^ New World itself. It was the latter im- 
 
 Northwest. , , . 
 
 pulse which led to most of the expeditions 
 to the north now undertaken by the Spanish colonists 
 in the West Indies. Their early settlements in these 
 islands, and on the shores of the mainland opposite, 
 had proven somewhat disappointing and were soon 
 exploited of their meagre supply of gold and slaves. 
 Rumors of rich lands farther west continually reached 
 their ears and induced them to undertake further 
 discoveries in this direction. Cuba was first proved 
 to be an island' in 1508 and almost immediately 
 colonized by the Spaniards. Ponce de Leon in the 
 same year opened up the island of Porto Rico to 
 Spanish colonization, and subsequently fitted out an 
 expedition there for further discovery to the north- 
 west in the Florida Sea. On Easter day of 1512 he 
 sighted the peninsula of Florida, and, having landed 
 at modern St. Augustine, he then made a survey of 
 the entire coast to the south. Rounding the cape 
 and seeing the broad waters of the gulf beyond, 
 de Leon thought his newly discovered land of 
 Florida to be but another island of the group, 
 and now the belief gained credence that, from the 
 main island across the equator, groups of smaller 
 islands dotted the seas to the northwest, including 
 
 ' By Sebastian de Campo. 
 
The Discovery of America. 37 
 
 those discovered by the Englisli and Portuguese 
 farther north, and ending with Iceland and the 
 British Isles. 
 
 King Ferdinand in the meantime had provided 
 for the further conquest and colonization of that 
 part of the main island lying within the sphere of 
 his dominion, and discovered by Columbus, Bastidas, 
 Hojedo, Vespucci, and Pinzon. The district lying 
 to the north of the Gulf of Darien he assigned, in 
 1508, to Diego de Nicuesa, one of his courtiers and 
 colonial agents, as the Province of Castilla del Oro. 
 All south of the gulf, and within the line of de- 
 markation, he granted at the same time to Alonzo 
 de Hojedo, the discoverer, as Nueva Andalucia. 
 Through shipwreck and starvation Nicuesa's colony 
 was I'educed to a mere handful of forlorn wretches 
 settled at Nombre de Dios ; and, indeed, Hojedo's 
 colony, on the southern shores of the Gulf of Darien, 
 fared not much better for the time. Unable to cope 
 with the natives, Hojeda sailed away for aid, leaving 
 his little colony to shift for themselves. It was then 
 that Vasco ISTuSez Balboa, the adventurer and com- 
 panion of Bastidas on his early voyage to these 
 parts, assumed control. Being familiar with this re- 
 gion, Balboa easily persuaded the colonists to emi- 
 grate across the gulf to the northern shore on account 
 of its greater fertility and salubrity. He then calmly 
 informed the new governor, Encisco, that they were 
 in Nicuesa's province now and no longer under 
 Hojedo's or his control. Nicuesa's authority was 
 next disposed of by a rebellion on the part of his 
 
38 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 new subjects, and Balboa was unanimously elected 
 Alcade of Santa Maria de la Antigua, the new city 
 now founded there. From the King's Treasurer at 
 Santo Domingo Balboa then received a commission 
 to act as governor of Castilla del Oro, and at once 
 set about his plans of further discovery. Hearing 
 from the natives of a great sea to the south of him, 
 and, still farther to the south, of a country rich in 
 gold, Balboa determined to learn the truth for him- 
 self. Having organized an expedition for the purpose, 
 he accordingly set sail from Antigua on September 
 1, 1513, and soon after landed at Caledonian Bay. 
 Thence, with a party of one hundred and ninety men 
 and a number of fierce dogs, Balboa pushed over the 
 dividing range, beset by swamps, Jungles, and hostile 
 natives. On the 25th his labors were rewarded by 
 the first glimpse of the Pacific, and on the 29th he 
 reached the coast at Grulf San Miguel.^ Balboa 
 took possession at once in the name of the Crown 
 of Castile, but the real significance of his dis- 
 covery could not be duly appreciated at that time, 
 as America was still thought to be an island. 
 The shores of Honduras were then regarded as 
 the northern limits of this great island, and this 
 other sea, discovered by Balboa, would therefore 
 seem to be but part of that same body of water 
 which washed it, and the other smaller islands to 
 the northwest. 
 
 This fallacy was soon to be exposed, however, and 
 the magnitude of Balboa's discovery revealed. A 
 
 ' Cf. Map, frontispiece. 
 
The Discovery of America. 39 
 
 few years after this, another expedition, under Fran- 
 cisco Hernandez de Cordova, set sail from Cuba in 
 search of other auriferous isles to the west. What 
 was supposed to be the island of Yucatan had 
 already been sighted ten years before by Pinzon 
 and de Solis from the northern shores of Honduras, 
 but of this Cordova was ignorant. Coming upon 
 the northerly shores of this peninsula, Cordova and 
 his men coasted along toward the northwest, landing 
 from time to time and gaining gold from the more 
 •civilized natives of this region, until they had passed 
 the Gulf of Campechy and come to the river Cham- 
 poton, when they put back, delighted with their 
 unexpected treasure, but still under the delusion 
 that they had come upon but another of the sup- 
 posed chain of islands. In the following year, 1518, 
 Juan de Grijalva continued these explorations along 
 the shores of the Gulf of Mexico toward the north 
 as far as the river Tampico, and in his wake came 
 Hernando Cortez, the conqueror, who revealed the 
 great wealth of the interior to the astonished colon- 
 ists and Europe. The land was still supposed to be 
 an island, however, so in the year of Cortez's con- 
 quest, Francisco de Garay, the Spanish governor of 
 Jamaica, despatched an expedition, under Alvarez 
 de Pineda, with the avowed purpose of finding the 
 strait which was supposed to flow between Mexico 
 and America toward the east. Instead of discover- 
 ing a water-way the land was found to be continuous 
 from Honduras in the south, to Florida in the north, 
 and the presence of the South Sea, discovered by 
 
40 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Balboa only a few miles from tlie Atlantic shore, 
 now became tlie mystery of the day.' 
 
 While the colonists were thus opening up rich 
 lands of gold in the New World, and at the same 
 § 20. The time gradually extending the coast line of 
 Discovery America to the north, the Spanish mon- 
 Southwest ^^^^' Ferdinand, had his eyes still fixed on. 
 Passage, the Indies. As yet Spain's new colonies, 
 had not proved to be particularly rich in the pre- 
 cious metals, nor could the American natives be 
 profitably sold as slaves. Portugal, on the other 
 hand, had not only reached the East by sailing 
 around the Cape of Good Hope and gained the rich 
 Moluccas or Spice islands at last ; but had long 
 supplied her markets with the best of slaves from 
 her African possessions on the way. It was no- 
 wonder then, that the Spanish sovereign was now 
 spurred on to renew his efforts to discover the strait 
 leading to the Indian Ocean, and still reach the East 
 by sailing west. In 1515 he accordingly despatched 
 his admiral, Juan Diaz de Solis, for this purpose., 
 De Solis crept along the coast of America farther 
 south than any had gone before, and came at last to 
 the mouth of the Plate river. Thinking this to be 
 the long looked for strait, he explored its banks, but 
 there lost his life, in the same year that his sovereign 
 passed away. 
 
 ' E. J. Payne, loc. cit., Vol. I., pp. 214-229. 
 
 H. H. Bancroft, " History of the Pacific States," Vol. I., Chap. VIII.- 
 XII, San Francisco, 1882-90. 
 
 Sir A. Helps, " Spanish Conquest in America," Vol. I., Bk. VI. New 
 York, 1867. 
 
The Discovery of America. 41 
 
 As Charles now ascended the throne, a little inci- 
 dent occurred in the Portuguese navy which aided 
 Spain in solving at last the secret of the strait. 
 Magalhaens, a Portuguese navigator, disgruntled 
 with his master on account of a matter of pay, 
 sought his revenge by going to the Spanish court 
 and oifering to reach the Moluccas by sailing west, 
 and also prove them to lie within Charles's moiety 
 of the globe. Cortez, it is true, was at this time 
 revealing the wealth of Mexico in the New World, 
 but Charles, like his father, still had his heart set on 
 the more distant Indies, and Magalhaens was thus 
 allowed to fulfil his bold promise. Familiar with 
 the results of the explorations of the Spanish colon- 
 ists in the Florida Sea and along the shores of the 
 Gulf of Mexico, Magalhaens deemed it bootless to 
 seek for a northwest passage ; so, leaving this dis- 
 trict to Spain's new rival, the French monarch, he 
 set out in August, 1519, for the shores of South 
 America, touching at Rio de Janeiro and then push- 
 ing on to the Plate. Finding this great estuary to 
 be after all but a river, Magalhaens continued his 
 search along the long stretch of coast to the south, 
 wintering along the shore, and in the spring he was 
 at last rewarded by the discovery of the strait which 
 still bears his name. Terra del Fuego to the south 
 of him, Magalhaens thought to be still another con- 
 tinent, — the Terra Australis of the Greek imagina- 
 tion. Crossing the sea stretching out beyond, which 
 he called the Pacific, Magalhaens did indeed reach 
 the East Indies at last, but there fell a victim to 
 
42 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 native jealousy. His reduced little band continued 
 on its way, nevertheless, and, by rounding the Afri- 
 can continent, finally reached Spain. After a voyage 
 covering some 14,000 leagues and lasting all but 
 three years, the old Columbian Hypothesis was thus 
 vindicated in the end. The East had been reached 
 by sailing west, and therewith an unbroken coast 
 line of America was finally opened up, from Florida 
 in the north to the straits of Magellan in the south.* 
 In the meantime an entirely different process of 
 discovery was being worked out along the eastern 
 § 21. The shores of North America, which only now 
 Tracing of began to be connected with the ambition of 
 America's ^^® absolute monarchs to reach the wealth 
 Atlantic of the Indies. Long before the dawn of 
 Coast Line. ^^^ Mercantile Era, the Arctic Ocean cur- 
 rent had carried Norse sailors to Iceland, and thence 
 to Greenland and the northern coasts of America. 
 These earliest European settlements in the New 
 World had long since been abandoned, but their 
 memory lived on in the Sagas, and English traders 
 and fishermen, being in the habit of visiting Iceland 
 during the fifteenth centurj^, heard the legends of 
 these Western isles. Although the Tudor monarchs 
 of England refused to consider themselves bound by 
 any papal bulls parcelling out the non-Christian 
 lands of the globe among the pontiff's beneficiaries, 
 still Henry VII. had reason to be well disposed 
 toward Spain at this time, and did not care to inter- 
 
 ' E. J. Payne, /oc. cit.. Vol. I., pp. 247-256. 
 John Fiske, loc. cit.. Vol. II., pp. 184-210. 
 
The Discovery of America. 43 
 
 fere directly with his plans. He was jealous of the 
 success of Columbus, however, and resolved to send 
 out a like expedition from his own ports to discover 
 other islands in the northwest, and perchance reach 
 the East in this way. So in 1496, John Cabot, the 
 captain chosen for the purpose, set sail from Bristol. 
 He wintered in Iceland and in the following year 
 continued his way, making land in America some- 
 where in modern Labrador or Newfoundland. Ac- 
 cording to his own account, Cabot cruised thence 
 three hundred leagues to the south, but nothing 
 more is known of this voyage, nor of the second one 
 which he is supposed to have undertaken. His dis- 
 covery spurred on Portugal, ever eager to fasten 
 on the islands of the Atlantic, and in 1500, one of 
 her navigators, Caspar de Cortereal, came to these 
 same shores, leaving the name of Labrador' to sur- 
 vive to this day. Neither gold nor marketable 
 slaves were to be found in this northern region, and 
 so the lands were abandoned for the time by the 
 rapacious monarchs of Europe and their greedy band 
 of adventurers. The discoverers had shown the way 
 to the fishermen, however, and after this Norman 
 and Breton fishers continued to visit the Newfound- 
 land Banks for cod. 
 
 As these men were French subjects, their early 
 fishing voyages to the shores of the New World 
 served as a basis for the claims soon to be made by 
 the King of France. Portugal had already reached 
 the Orient by sailing southeast, and Spain had just 
 
 ' Terra de Lavradores — the land of laborers or slaves. 
 
44 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 discovered the southwest passage to the Indies. 
 Charles, moreover; had now been elected Emperor, 
 over the head of his rival Francis, and had also 
 enormously added to his European possessions. It 
 was high time accordingly, for the King of France 
 to bestir himself if his prestige was to be maintained. 
 Spain by this time had practically abandoned the 
 coasts of Florida for the richer gold fields farther 
 south, and so, in default of a better, this district now 
 became the centre of Francis's colonial activity. 
 Giovanni da Verrazzano and Jacques Cartier were 
 accordingly despatched in turn by the French mon- 
 arch under orders, "to compete with other powers 
 for a share in the New World and find for France a 
 shorter route to Cathay." Verrazzano set out in the 
 autumn of 1523 and came first to the shores of North 
 Carolina. After landing and taking possession in his 
 sovereign's name, he sailed on toward the north 
 along the shore, stopping here and there and ascend- 
 ing the rivers of the eastern seaboard, until he 
 reached the coast of Maine. Cartier, following some 
 years later, further developed the coast-line to the 
 north, and continued the fruitless search for the 
 northwest passage far up the St. Lawrence river. 
 The immediate result of these voyages was thus to 
 prove what had long been suspected ; namely, the 
 continuity of the eastern seaboard of America from 
 Florida far into the north, and to dispel the illusion 
 of a navigable northwest passage.^ 
 
 The New World was thus at last proved to be a 
 
 ' E. J. Payne, loc. cit.. Vol. I., pp. 74-85, 230-237, 257-266. 
 
 John Fiske, loc. cit., Vol. I., pp. 151-213 ; Vol. II., pp. 2-24, 493-95. 
 
The Discovery of America. 45 
 
 continent of enormous extent, stretching in an appar- 
 ently unbroken line from the frigid zone § 22. The 
 in the north, across the equator and far New World 
 into the Antarctic regions. Balboa's ^^ ^ q^j,. 
 South Sea and the Pacific of Magalhaens tinent. 
 must therefore be the same, and the coasts of Asia, 
 it was now known, lay far beyond. And what of 
 the breadth of this new continent, now that, its 
 length was known ? Only a narrow strip of land 
 separated the Atlantic from the Pacific at Panama, 
 but this could not be the case all along. The 
 mystery of the continent thus invited further dis- 
 covery along its western shores. Nor was this all. 
 These Central American lands had already proved 
 themselves rich in gold, and there were promises of 
 much more to the north and to the south of them. 
 The isthmus thus became the centre of attraction as 
 the natural point of departure for further explora- 
 tion, and here Spain was already in undisputed control. 
 Voyages to the south must bring one again to the 
 .strait cutting off America from the Terra Australis, 
 and by sailing northward perhaps this seemingly 
 great continent of America might be found to be 
 after all but a huge peninsula of Asia. 
 
 It was the desire for gold which led Balboa to 
 cross the isthmus, as we know, and though his rivals 
 prevented him from continuing his voyages g ^^^ y^^^ 
 of South Sea discovery, others were eager Discovery 
 to take his place and prove the truth of "^^^c^^^^j 
 the current rumors of rich lands farther south 
 south. Pascual de Andagova made the America, 
 first attempt in 1522 and, after a seven days' jour- 
 
46 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 ney, succeeded in reaching the province of Birii, on 
 the west coast of South America. Francisco Pizarro 
 was meantime maturing his plans for the conquest 
 of Peru, and by 1535 he had opened up both the 
 interior and the coast to the European world. His 
 ally, and at the same time bitter rival, Diego Amal- 
 gro, pushed on the conquest into Chile, while from 
 the. south through the straits of Magellan came 
 Alonzo de Camargo in 1540 to share in the wealth 
 of the Incas. Thus by the middle of the century 
 the outline of the South American continent from 
 Panama to the straits of Magellan' was known, and 
 Spain was thus placed both legally and actually in 
 control of its richer half.^ 
 
 As Humboldt remarked, the men of that day 
 " could not accustom themselves to the idea that the 
 s 24 The continent extended uninterruptedly from 
 Discovery such a high northern to such a higb 
 ""•"t^"* southern latitude," and, now that the isth- 
 
 Coast of (.11 
 
 Central mus was fouud to be so very narrow at 
 America. Panama, what more natural than that the, 
 Atlantic outlet of the strait, which must connect the 
 two oceans in these parts, had been overlooked in 
 
 ' The fiction of the Terra Australis was not exploded until 1616, when 
 Lemaire and Schouten rounded the Horn, though Drake guessed the true 
 nature of the situation in his voyage of 1578. Cf. Nancy Globe of about 
 1550. 
 
 2 W. H. Prescott, " History of the Conquest of Peru," Bk. II., Ch. 
 II.-IV. Philadelphia. 
 
 R. G. Watson, " Spanish and Portuguese South America," Vol. I., Ch. 
 XII.-XIV. London, 1884. 
 
 Walter B. Scaife, "America: Its Geographical History," Ch. II. 
 Baltimore, 1892. 
 
The Discovery of America. 4T 
 
 the more or less cursory examination of the eastern 
 coast. The idea was inspiring, and as the configura- 
 tion of the continent south of Darien offered no hope 
 of a passage, the attention of explorers was soon 
 turned to the north, along the Pacific shores of the 
 isthmus. 
 
 When the magnitude of Balboa's discovery be- 
 came apparent, Encisco, whom he had so cleverly 
 ousted from command, secured his desired revenge. 
 He did not regain control himself, it is true, but 
 succeeded in persuading Ferdinand that Balboa the 
 adventurer was no fit person to act as the governor 
 of a province of such importance as Castilla del Oro 
 had now turned out to be. So Balboa's colonial 
 commission was never ratified by the Crown, but 
 instead, the two provinces, Nueva Andalucia and 
 Castilla del Oro, were merged into one, called Tierra 
 Firma, and Pedro Arias de Avila, generally spoken 
 of as Pedrarias, was installed as I'oyal governor in 
 1514. In Mr. Bancroft's words, Pedrarias was "by 
 far the worst man who came officially to the New 
 World during its early government."^ On his ar- 
 rival he at once cut short Balboa's further plans of 
 exploration, and soon had him arrested, brought in 
 chains before him, and beheaded. In spite of his 
 evil reputation, Pedrarias brought many colonists 
 with him, and, in order to further the work of South 
 Sea discovery, he now changed the seat of hia ad- 
 ministration to the Pacific coast and there founded 
 
 " H. H. Bancroft, " History of the Pacific States," Vol. I., p. 458, 
 footnote. 
 
48 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the town of Panama. His lieutenants, Fernando 
 Ponce and Bartolome Furtado, then made their way 
 along the coast as far as the Gulf of Nicoya in the 
 north, but failed to find any outlet toward the 
 Atlantic. 
 
 Charles, who had by this time succeeded to the 
 throne of Spain, grew impatient at the delay, and de- 
 spatched Gil Gonzales Davila, Contador of Espa- 
 fiola, to hasten on the work of South Sea discovery, 
 and open up the strait. Jealous of this intrusion, 
 Pedrarias refused to furnish the newcomer with 
 Balboa's vessels for the voyage, as he had been com- 
 manded by his sovereign to do. Nothing daunted, 
 Davila then took his own two little caravels apart 
 on the Atlantic, transported them in pieces across 
 the narrow isthmus, and put them together again in 
 Panama. Launching his reconstructed vessels on 
 the Pacific, Davila then set sail, in 1522, for the 
 north. Coming to the Gulf of Nicoya his party was 
 obliged to separate, owing to the unseaworthy con- 
 dition of one of the ships, which had naturally 
 suffered somewhat in the process of transportation 
 over the range. Thus obliged to abandon his own 
 vessel, Davila and his crew pushed on into Nicara- 
 gua by land. The Aztec caziques he met along the 
 way were at first quite well disposed toward the 
 bearded strangers, and Davila was allowed to pro- 
 ceed unmolested till the great inland sea of Nica- 
 ragua lay stretched out before him. The Spaniards 
 at once took possession of this wonderful lake for 
 their sovereign, Charles, but before they could ex- 
 
The Discovery of America. 49 
 
 plore its stores, and discover the water-way to the 
 Atlantic, — wliich here if anywhere on the isthmus 
 they naturally hoped to find, — the once friendly 
 Nicaraguans arose in anger and drove the intruders 
 from the land. On the Pacific coast Davila was 
 fortunate enough to rejoin his sea-force, which mean- 
 while had skirted the western shores of Nicaragua, 
 and searched along the banks of the Bay of Ponseca 
 in the vain hopes of discovering some outlet to the 
 Atlantic. Together they then returned to Panama, 
 "whence the news of their discovery of the existence 
 •of a great sea but a few miles from the Pacific, was 
 «oon heralded abroad. 
 
 As soon as Davila had departed to Espanola to 
 reorganize his force, Pedrarias determined to seize 
 this opportunity to outdo his rival and cheat him of 
 his new-found possessions. He accordingly sent his 
 lieutenant, Francisco Hernandez de Cordova, in 1524, 
 with a land force to the north, under secret orders 
 to seize the whole country about the inland sea in 
 the name of the governor, Pedrarias, and discover if 
 possible the strait to the Atlantic. After a trying 
 march through the wilds of Costa E,ica, Cordova 
 came upon the lake, or " Freshwater Sea," as he 
 called it, and with the greatest care explored its 
 shores. Coming at length upon the San Juan he 
 proceeded some way down the stream but, being 
 obstructed by rocks and rapids, it is said he was 
 unable to reach the i\tlantic coast. 
 
 Meanwhile Cortez had also been instructed by his 
 master, Charles, to push through Mexico to the South 
 
50 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Sea coast and searcli diligently north and soutlt 
 " for the passage which would connect the eastern 
 and western shores of the !N"ew World and shorten 
 by two thirds the route from Cadiz to Cathay." 
 Montezuma- had already informed Cortez of the 
 close proximity of the South Sea, and also of the 
 existence of a narrow isthmus just to the south of 
 him ; so he, too, ever as anxious as the King himself 
 to discover the fabled strait, at once despatched his 
 lieutenants Diego de Ordaz and Gonzalo de Sandoval 
 to explore this unknown region. They soon found 
 that no strait existed across the isthmus of Tehuan- 
 tepee, but at once recognized the value of the route 
 for the transportation of ship-building materials 
 from Vera Cruz to the Pacific. The forests about the 
 pass of Tarifa, they also discovered to be rich in the 
 timber necessary, and so reported. Cortez, delighted 
 at the success of the expedition, at once ordered 
 vessels to be constructed at Tehuantepec on the 
 Pacific, and determined to undertake his voyages of 
 South Sea discovery from this point. Fearing lest 
 the French discoverers in the north might succeed in 
 forestalling him there, Cortez also decided to send 
 out vessels from Vera Cruz on the Atlantic in search 
 of the northwest passage as well. With his plans thus 
 matured he wrote to his imperial master as follows : 
 
 " As I am ever desirous, so am I continually intent upon 
 using every means to put into execution and carry out my 
 wishes for the advancement of the service of Your Majesty, — 
 and seeing that nothing more remained for this object than to 
 discover the secrets of the coast still unexplored between the 
 
The Discovery of America. 51 
 
 river Panuco and Florida toward the north as far as Baccalaos 
 (Newfoundland), — because it is asserted that on that coast 
 there is a strait which passes into the South Sea, — I have 
 resolved to send three caravels and two brigantines for this 
 purpose. In this same manner I am about to send the ships 
 which I have constructed in the South Sea to explore the lower 
 coast in search of said strait ; because if there be one, it can not 
 escape the observation of either those in the South Sea, or those 
 going north. It would render the King of Spain master of so 
 many kingdoms that he might call himself lord of the world." 
 
 The old saying that while Columbus was success- 
 ful on the sea and unsuccessful on land, so Cortez 
 was ever successful by land, but ever unsuccessful 
 on the sea, proved true enough in this case. The 
 caravels sent out on the Atlantic in search of the 
 northwest passage, returned with nothing new to 
 report. Through the voyages of South Sea discov- 
 ery, the still unexplored coast-line of Central Ameir- 
 ica from Tehuantepec to the Gulf of Fonseca, was 
 indeed opened up, but instead of inlets and estuaries 
 of the sea to tempt the explorers, an unbroken 
 mountain wall presented itself to the disappointed 
 mariners all along the way. 
 
 Meanwhile news of Davila's discovery of the 
 Freshwater Sea in Nicaragua came to Cortez's ears. 
 Determined as ever to let no man get ahead of him 
 in solving the baffling secret of the strait, Cortez 
 forthwith sent still another expedition south, under 
 his lieutenant, Christoval de Olid, to oust Davila, in- 
 tercept Cordova on his march, and annex the entire 
 isthmus as far south as Panama, to his fast-growing 
 Mexican possessions. 
 
52 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Davila witli his re-enforcements had in the mean- 
 time sailed from Espanola intending to come upon 
 his Freshwater Sea this time from the Atlantic side 
 direct, and so avoid further trouble with Pedrarias. 
 He lost his bearings, however, and like Columbus 
 before, landed on the north coast of Honduras. Cor. 
 dova sent his lieutenant, Hernando de Soto, to pre- 
 vent Davila's party from pushing south, and, with 
 the arrival of Olid, confusion reigned supreme. No 
 one knew which was lawful master, so each began 
 scheming to shake off all control and gain the land 
 for himself. Cortez, moreover, had had cause to be- 
 come suspicious of his emissary Olid, and accordingly 
 sent out another of his lieutenants, Francisco de Las 
 Casas, to make sure of his rights, and upon the 
 arrival of the latter the situation became still more 
 complicated. 
 
 Cortez then, fearing treachery on all sides, decided 
 to go to the scene of action himself ; so, gathering a 
 large land force about him, in October, 1524, he 
 marched down through the forest of the eastern 
 coast, intent on becoming master of the Freshwater 
 Sea and its promising transit route. Overcoming 
 with his indomitable energy obstacles which would 
 have seemed insurmountable to any but the con- 
 queror of Mexico, Cortez arrived at last with a very 
 reduced force on the coast of Honduras. Finding 
 Davila and Las Casas had already disposed of the 
 traitor Olid, Cortez then won over Cordova from his 
 master, Pedrarias, and was about to make his descent 
 on the lake, when news of a serious uprising in. 
 
The Discovery of America. 53 
 
 Mexico reached him and he was obliged to hurry 
 back in April, 1525, leaving his followers, under 
 his lieutenant, Saavedra, to establish a colony in his 
 name at Truxillo. 
 
 Pedrarias in the south, having heard of Cortez's 
 triumphant march and of Cordova's defection, 
 hastily gathered together a land force in Panama, 
 and proceeded by forced marches to guard the lake 
 from Cortez's threatened attack. Finding on his 
 arrival no Mexican force to oppose him, Pedrarias 
 soon settled matters to his own satisfaction. Cordova 
 was executed for his treachery, and Davila, now forced 
 to abandon his claim, retired disgruntled to Mexico. 
 
 Pedrarias knew of the outlet to the Atlantic 
 along the San Juan, but now, for the first time, was 
 it positively proved that the two lakes were defi- 
 nitely cut ofE from the western ocean.^ All hopes 
 of discovering a direct westerly route to the Indies 
 had therewith to be abandoned, for the Spanish 
 
 ' There were legends current among the primitive Americans that this had 
 not always been the case, but that formerly there had existed a natural water- 
 way from Lake Managua to the Bay of Fonseca. The natives attributed 
 the closing of the passage to supernatural agencies. Volcanic action may 
 have accomplished the result in prehistoric times. 
 
 H. H. Bancroft, "History of Central America," Vols. I. and II.; 
 San Francisco, 1882-go. 
 
 E. G. Squier, " History of the Central American States," and " History 
 Nicaragua." New York, 1854. 
 
 Justin Winsor, " Narrative and Critical History of America," Vol. I. 
 
 W. Grimm, " Die Staaten Central- Amerikas." Berlin, 1871. 
 
 Brasseur de Bourbourg, ' ' Histoire des Nations Civilizees du Mexique et 
 de I'Amerique Centrale." Paris, 1857-59. 
 
 John T. Sullivan, " Report on Historical and Technical Information Re- 
 lating to the Problem of Interoceanic Communication by Way of the Amer- 
 ican Isthmus," pp. 10 ff. Govt. Print, 1883. 
 
54 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 explorers had pinned their last faith, in the existence 
 of such a water-way on the country about the Fresh- 
 water Seas. 
 
 Voyages of discovery henceforth to be under- 
 taken by the Spaniards must consequently have for 
 S2S The tlisii' sole purpose, the opening up of 
 Discovery fresh gold fields in America. The west 
 of the West ^^g^g^ of Mexico was known to bear off 
 
 Coast of 
 
 North to the northwest, but little was known 
 America. Qf ^}j^q country bcyond. In 1532 Hurtado 
 de Mendoza had reached Sinaloa along these shores 
 just opposite the southern point of the peninsula of 
 California, and in the following year Gonzalo 
 Ximenes came to the peninsula itself and thought it 
 to be an island. Rumors of great quantities of gold 
 in this direction as well, then led Cortez, baffled in 
 his search for the strait and balked in his designs 
 on the Freshwater Sea, to send out an expedition in 
 1539 under his captain, Francisco de UUoa, to ex- 
 plore these northern shores. Ulloa reached the 
 head-waters of the Gulf of California and examined 
 the coasts of the peninsula on both sides, but 
 brought back no gold. Being greatly hampered by 
 his enemies in Mexico, in his attempts to explore 
 this northwest coast, Cortez then returned to Spain 
 to seek redress, before continuing the work. While 
 Cortez was vainly pleading with his monarch for 
 justice, his enemies pursued the task of discovery in 
 America. In 1542 an expedition under Juan Ca- 
 brillo pushed its way along the rock-bound coasti;o 
 the north in search of California's hidden treasures. 
 
The Discovery of America. 55 
 
 Pogs, storms, and adverse winds delayed his course, 
 and soon after landing at Conception, in latitude 
 34° 26', Cabrillo died. Ferrelo, his successor in com- 
 mand, continued the search along the shore for a 
 suitable harbor, to about the 43d parallel and then 
 put back disheartened to Mexico. Cortez died soon 
 after in Spain, and without his indomitable energy 
 the explorations were abandoned, and California's 
 secrets lay buried for three centuries to come. 
 
 At the time of the death of Cortez, however, 
 enough was known of the shores of North America, 
 to convince the monarchs of Spain that they must 
 henceforth rest content with the southwest passage 
 to the Indies, or such mode of transit as they might 
 be able to provide across the narrow isthmus con- 
 necting the two land masses of the New World. 
 The discovery of the northwest passage, such as it 
 is, was therefore left to other hands.^ 
 
 ' Walter B. Scaife, loc. cit. pp. 27-30. 
 
 H. H. Bancroft, " History of the Pacific States,'' Vol. XIII. ("Cali- 
 fornia," Vol. I.). San Francisco, 1882-go. 
 
 Josiah Royce, " California," Ch. I., sect. 2. Boston, 1886. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE COLONIZATION OF THE ISTHMUS. 
 
 THOUGH Spain had ultimately proved the' 
 truth of the Columbian Hypothesis, for 
 which she had stood sponsor, she gained 
 but a slight hold thereby upon the countries of the 
 far East. The lands of the New World which had 
 fallen to her lot, as it were in passing, proved them- 
 S26 Spain's selves an adequate compensation for her 
 American loss, however ; and now that their hopes 
 Monopoly. ^^ ^ natural westerly route to the Indies 
 were also dispelled, the Spanish monarchs, still true 
 to their Mercantile policy, henceforth devoted their 
 energies to exploiting their American possessions,, 
 and holdino; them fast in their control. The dis- 
 coverers had had their day ; and thus it became the 
 era of the conqueror and colonist now. In their 
 train came royal governors and viceroys, and hence- 
 forth the precious metals and rich colonial products 
 of Spanish America were relied upon to increase the 
 treasure and maintain the European prestige of the 
 Home government. 
 
 The ancient Empire of Peru, so rich in gold and 
 silver, and conquered, as we know, by Pizarro and 
 Amalgro, was now, to this end, brought directly 
 
 56 
 
The Colonization of the Isthmus. 57 
 
 under the control of the Home government and 
 
 placed in the hands of an obedient Spanish viceroy. 
 
 This systematic exploitation of the lands of 
 
 the Incas had the further effect of stimu- opening- 
 
 lating anew the settlements along the isth- of the 
 
 mus of Panama, vrhich up to this had P^"*™^ 
 
 . Route, 
 
 languished, for across this narrow strip of 
 
 land the products of South America's western coast 
 
 could best be shipped home to Spain. 
 
 As soon as Spain assumed exclusive control of these 
 Peruvian lands, she accordingly made arrangements 
 to open up communications with this new source of 
 supply across the lower isthmus. The Panama colony 
 in consequence at once began to revive. A port of 
 entry and departure was now established at Panama 
 on the Pacific for the galleons sailing from Peru. A 
 wagon road was next laid out across the mountains 
 to Porto Bello on the Atlantic, and in this way a 
 more or less direct route of commerce was opened 
 up between Spain and the west coast of South 
 America. 
 
 At stated times during the year, vessels ladened 
 with Spanish manufactured articles for the colonists 
 were wont, in these early days, to congregate at 
 Carthagena, on the northern coast of South America, 
 as the climate was better there, and await the arrival 
 at Porto Bello of the caravans from Panama. Then 
 gorgeous fairs were held at this point under the 
 auspices of the Governor of Panama and the General 
 of the Galleons, which were attended by all the 
 merchants of the Spanish Main. Home wares were 
 
58 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 there exchanged for colonial products, and as the 
 Spanish vessels sailed away eastward, ladened down 
 with the precious metals of Peru, the ox-carts wended 
 their way back across the range to Panama, there 
 to reship such manufactured products as were not 
 needed on the isthmus to the Spanish colonists 
 farther south. 
 
 To make her monopoly in this early transit from 
 sea to sea doubly secure, Spain then brought the 
 provinces of the lower isthmus also under her own 
 governmental control. To this end the Kingdom or 
 Presidency of New Granada was established in 1542, 
 comprising the country to the north and south of the 
 Rio Atrato, and made subject to the Viceroy of Peru. 
 Then, fearing lest a competing route of transit might 
 be opened up the still unexplored Atrato, special 
 laws were enacted for the new Presidency, imposing 
 the penalty of death upon anyone who should at- 
 tempt to navigate this stream beyond the shores of 
 the Gulf of Darien.' All this was in harmony with 
 Spain's mercantile policy, and, for the time at least, 
 afforded her increasing returns for her pains.^ 
 
 Meantime the colonization of the province of 
 Nicaragua to the north was going on with rapid 
 strides. This section of the Central American isth- 
 mus, it will be remembered,^ is bisected diagonally 
 
 • By Royal Cidula of Philip II. 
 ^ Sullivan, loc cit., p. 12. 
 
 R. G. Watson, " Spanish and Portuguese South America," Vol. II., Ch. 
 IX. London, 1S84. 
 
 Engineering Magazine, Feb. 24, 1893. .London. 
 " Encyclopedia Britannica," " Colombia." 
 " Cf. Introduction, § 4. 
 
The Colonization of the Isthmus. 59 
 
 from northwest to soutlieast by the eastern branch 
 of the Cordillera. To the west of these mountains 
 lies, as we know, the remarkable Nica- 
 raguan depression, containing the two in- conquest 
 land seas. The eastern slopes of the range, and Coioni- 
 on the other hand, are covered with dense nation of 
 forests ; while the Caribbean sea-coast is 
 both low and marshy, and indented all along 
 by cays or lagoons formed by the countless little 
 streams flowing down the mountain sides and met 
 by the coral reefs along the shore. Coincident with 
 this line of orographic demarkation, there runs a 
 distinct line of division, also, in the climatic con- 
 ditions of the country. The northeast trade-winds, 
 redolent with the moisture of the Atlantic, blow 
 continually over this Caribbean coast of Nicaragua 
 and upon the eastern slopes of the Cordillera. The 
 moisture is thus caught by the dense forests of the 
 mountains and precipitated upon the land. Conse- 
 quently, this whole eastern section of Nicaragua, is 
 damp and very unwholesome, agriculture is practically 
 out of the question, the mountain slopes are destitute 
 of minerals on this side, and so the only occupations 
 open to the still half-savage inhabitants of this 
 country are hunting, fishing, and the growing of 
 tropical fruits. 
 
 By the time the trade-winds reach the crest of the 
 Cordillera, however, they have left the greater part 
 of their moisture behind them in the forests of the 
 eastern slopes. As a result climatic conditions 
 throughout the Nicaraguan depression are essen- 
 
60 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 tially different from those prevailing in the eastern 
 sea-coast section. The two lakes receive all the 
 surplus drainage of the mountains vphich encircle 
 them, and even during the wet season, lasting from 
 May to November, the rainfall is not excessive. All 
 through this district, moreover, the temperature is 
 moderate,' and the climate comparatively healthful. 
 The western slopes of the mountains are rich in gold 
 and silver and other valuable minerals; along the 
 uplands of Chontales, Segovia, and Matagalpa, stretch 
 out the richest kind of pasture lands, while the 
 plains below around the lakes are fertile and well 
 adapted to the cultivation of sugar, cotton, tobacco, 
 cacao, coffee, rice, and maize. 
 
 Under such conditions it was but natural that the 
 early Aztec colonists — supposed to have migrated 
 from Anahuac in Mexico — should have chosen these 
 fertile lands around the lakes for their new abode, 
 and left the wilder natives — Chontales,^ or Barbari- 
 ans as they called them — ^to wander still in savagery 
 as they would, through the forests of the eastern 
 mountains and along the Caribbean sea-coast. Pro' 
 tected thus on the east by the mountains and their 
 savage inhabitants, these primitive people were first 
 disturbed by Gonzales Davila and his band, who, as 
 we know, came upon them from the west. Thus 
 Pedrarias found them soon after, an agricultural 
 
 ' Ranging from 70° to go° Fahr. throughout the year. 
 
 ' This word ' ' Chontales " the Spaniards translated into ' ' Bravos," mean- 
 ing also barbarians, and used henceforth to designate the wilder hunting 
 tribes of the mountainous regions of the isthmus in contradistinction to the 
 more tractable fisher-folk who dwelt along the eastern sea-cpast. 
 
The Colonization of the Isthmus. 61 
 
 people, for the most part, tilling the rich soil around 
 their villages ; while some of their number were 
 •engaged in handicraft, fashioning implements of gold 
 and silver, weaving cotton cloth, and shaping and 
 ■decorating vessels of pottery. 
 
 By dint of his cruel war of extermination, Pe- 
 drarias and his followers soon destroyed all vestiges 
 of this early Aztec civilization, killing or enslaving 
 most of these primitive Americans and driving those 
 who escaped, far back into the mountains to join 
 their more savage neighbors there. As a reward for 
 such laudable energy, Pedrarias was in 1527 duly 
 ■commissioned by the Crown of Spain, to rule as 
 Governor over this new province, which was hence- 
 forth to be separated from Tierra Firma and called 
 IS^icaragua.^ With the fertile lands of the district 
 thus placed legally under his control, Pedrarias then 
 introduced cattle, horses, asses, pigs, goats, and fowls 
 from Spain and turned his colonists to cultivating 
 the soil. The rich mines of the eastern Cordillera^ 
 which Pedrarias now began to work by the labor of 
 the slaves he had captured, also added great quan- 
 tities of gold to the large supply already collected 
 from the demolished Aztec cities. 
 
 The great problem Avhich then confronted Pe- 
 drarias was, to open up an eastern outlet for his 
 products, that his thriving colony might be placed 
 in direct connection with Spain, and that he might 
 
 ' This was originally the name given to the lake, called by the Aztecs 
 ■" Cici-bola," but christened by the Spaniards " Nicaragua," i. e., Nicarao- 
 -agua, the "Waters of Nicarao," Nicarao being the name of the cazique in 
 these parts. 
 
62 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 not have to sue for the favors of transit across 
 Panama from his successor and rival, the Governor 
 of Tierra Firma. This was only possible by control- 
 ling the outlet of the San Juan, which still remained 
 in the hands of the savages of the eastern seaboard. 
 Pedrarias accordingly swept this Caribbean slope 
 with a slave hunting band, from the banks of the 
 San Juan even to Cape Gracias, enslaving the 
 wretched savages as he went with fetters and the 
 branding iron. But their ranks closed up behind 
 him, and the mouth of the river still remained in 
 the possession of the Indians during his lifetime. 
 
 Pedrarias died in 1531, and his successor, Con- 
 treras, recognizing the futility of his predecessor's 
 forcible methods, began at once on a policy of con- 
 ciliation, and, as a result, in a few months he was 
 able to open up navigation along the San Juan to 
 the Atlantic. Having obtained this favor, however, 
 Contreras forboi'e from antagonizing the Indians 
 further, and allowed them to roam unmolested along 
 the coast from the Bluefield's lagoon to the north, 
 till they were met again in Honduras by the cruel- 
 ties of Alverado, now Governor of that province. 
 Ecclesiastics then appeared upon the scene, to 
 see Avhat they could accomplish in rendering the 
 savages more tractable, by converting them to the 
 Christian faith. A Dominican convent had already 
 been established at Leon, in Nicaragua, and Bar- 
 tolom6 de Las Casas, the grand old " Apostle of the 
 Indies," after his arduous labors in Mexico, now 
 arrived to take up the cause of what remained of 
 
The Colonization of the Isthmus. 63 
 
 the Nicaraguan aborigines. The monks fell out 
 with the civil authorities, however, and seeing the 
 designs of the Governor, they soon quitted the 
 country in a body. 
 
 It was Contreras's ambition, indeed, to throw off 
 the Spanish yoke entirely and rule his province to 
 his own advantage. This was exactly what Spain 
 had feared of her ambitious conquerors and colonizers 
 in the New World, and had already taken means, 
 as we know, to defeat their ends by absorbing the 
 heretofore semi-independent provinces under her 
 own governmental regime. Contreras was accord- 
 ingly deposed from his governorship with the rest, 
 and his province became merged in the Presidency 
 of Guatemala now established.^ 
 
 This new kingdom, — or Chancellorate of Guate- 
 mala, as it was called, — was set up with the other 
 vice-royalties and presidencies in the general reor- 
 ganization of 1542. Its capital was established in 
 
 ' J. F. Bransford, " Climatic and Sanitary Notes on the Nicaragua Canal 
 Route,'' see " Nicaragua Canal : Discussion before the American Associa- 
 tion for the Advancement of Science," Thirty-sixth meeting, New York, 
 1887. 
 
 KlSden, " Handbuch der Landes-und Staatenkunde," 3te. Auflage, 
 1877, IV., p. 1122. 
 
 Herrera, Dec. III., Lib. II., Cap. III. Dec. VI., Lib. VIL, Cap. IV. 
 
 Brasseur de Bourbourg, loc. cit., I., 37, 150. 
 
 H. H. Bancroft, "Native Races of the Pacific," Vol. II., pp. 117, 543- 
 553, 684-747 ; Vol. III., p. 450 ; Vol. V., pp. 24, 164, 231. 
 
 Hid., " History of Central America," Vols. I. and II. San Francisco, 
 1882-90. 
 
 E. G. Squier, " Central American States," pp. 223-227. New York, 1B54. 
 
 Justin Winsor, loc. cit.. Vol. I., pp. 134-207. Boston, 1889. 
 
 Max MilUer, " Chips from a German Workshop." " Popul Vul." 
 
 Las Casas, " Destruction of the Indies." 
 
64 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the bishopric of Guatemala, but its out-lying fron- 
 tiers were very indefinite. As laid down in the Span- 
 § 29. The ^^^ statutes, the kingdom extended from 
 Kingdom of sea to sea, and from the northerly confines 
 Guatemala. ^^ -^^^ Granada in the south, to include 
 the province of Chiapas ^ in the north. As a matter 
 of fact, however, the Spanish colonists only held 
 possession of Guatemala, Honduras, San Salvador, 
 and the lake basin of Nicaragua; while the east- 
 ern coast of that province, as well as all the land 
 to the south, or modern Costa Rica, still remained 
 unconquered and uncolonized. Spain's claims to 
 this eastern seaboard rested, first upon Pope Alex- 
 ander's Bulls of 1493-'94 as ratified by the subse- 
 quent treaty of Tordesillas with Portugal, and then 
 uj)on Columbus's formal acts of possession on the 
 «oast in 1502. As for Costa Rica, botb her coast 
 lines had been explored by Spanish, voyagers, and 
 Cordova and Pedrarias had each marched through 
 the interior. But in the face of the growing oppo- 
 sition of her rivals, Spain felt it now incumbent 
 upon her to substantiate these claims by some more 
 tangible acts of conquest and colonization. While 
 framing laws for the new kingdoms, the Spanish 
 government, therefore, sent out one Diego Guiterez 
 to subdue the savages of the east coast of Nicaragua 
 and conquer the country to the south. He and his 
 followers were attacked by the Indians, however, 
 soon after their arrival in Costa Rica, and only six 
 returned to tell the tale. In 1560, after tke king- 
 doms on either side were well established, another 
 
 ' In modem Mexico. 
 
The Colonization of the Isthmus. 65 
 
 attempt was made to colonize this country soutli 
 of the San Juan. This time a governor was ap- 
 pointed, and after a few colonies had been planted, 
 the province was formally added to the Chancellor- 
 ate of Guatemala as the Intendancy of Costa Rica, 
 in 1574. At the same time the district lying along 
 the east coast, from the San Juan north to Cape 
 Oracias, was conveyed to Diego Lopez and Senor 
 Palacios, to be conquered and governed by them 
 also under the Chancellorate. But their failure 
 was likewise complete, and after this the eastern 
 shore was practically given over to the savages until 
 the coming of the Franciscan monks in the next 
 century. Still the Spanish authorities continued to 
 olaim dominion to the Atlantic, and as yet, indeed, 
 their title had not been questioned.* 
 
 Under the Chancellorate, the prosperity of the In- 
 tendancy of Nicaragua continued to increase. The 
 ■colonial cities of Leon and Granada founded „ ^^ 
 
 8 S"- The 
 
 by Cordova, grew in importance, and not Nicaraguan 
 only were the products of this fertile de- Transit 
 pression now shipped across the lakes and 
 thence down the San Juan to the sea, but in time 
 
 ' Royal Decrees of 1526, 1533, 1536. Royal Charters of November 29, 
 1540, and February 18, 1574. Royal CMula dated October 30, 1547, 
 August 31, 1560, July 2, 1594. 
 
 " Recopilacion deslndias,"!!., pp. 192, 194, 201, 277, 288. 
 
 Soc. Mex. Geog., Boletin V., pp. 326-331. 
 
 New Laws for the Kingdom of the Indies (1542-44). Bk. II., Tit. XV. 
 
 Laws 6 and 8. Madrid, 1 744. 
 
 British Accounts and Papers, Vol. LXV. Doc. 966, No. 5, Enclosure 
 
 31. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 25. 34th Cong., ist Sess. Docs. 10 and 12. 
 " Calvo Traites," VI., pp. 196-203. 
 5 
 
66 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the products of Peru as well came to be landed at 
 Porto Realjo or Corinto on the Pacific coast, and 
 carried thence across the low coast range to Lake 
 Nicaragua. Here thej' were reshipped and trans- 
 ported in small vessels to the Atlantic, and, at the 
 San Juan's mouth, they were loaded, together with 
 Nicaragua's own products, on the galleons bound for 
 Spain. This change in the route of transit was due 
 to the fact that transportation across Nicaragua was 
 found to be easier than that via Panama, and the 
 climatic conditions of the region far more favorable. 
 Thus the transient glory of Panama began to die 
 away, and in the end the whole district relapsed 
 once more into barbarism, and was practically given 
 over to its original savage inhabitants.^ 
 
 As long as Cortez ruled in Mexico, the route of 
 transit from sea to sea, which he had established 
 § 31. The across the isthmus of Tehuantepec, was still 
 Abandon- kept open. During these years of South 
 Tehuante- ^^^ explorations, this route was continu- 
 pec Route, ally in use for the transportation of ship- 
 building materials from coast to coast, and for keeping 
 the fleets of the Atlantic in close touch with those 
 he had built on the Pacific. It was then Cortez's fur- 
 ther ambition to open up a regular ti'ade route across 
 Tehuantepec, and thus connect the Spanish ports 
 more directly with the Moluccas. When Spain de- 
 
 ' Engineering Magazine, Feb. 24, 1893. 
 
 Squier, loc. cit., "Nicaragua." 
 
 Bancroft, loc. cit., " Central American States,'' Appendix. 
 
 Juarros, "History of Guatemala," pp. 346-359. 
 
 "Constable's Miscellany," Vol. XVII. 
 
The Colonization of the Isthmus. 67 
 
 cided to bring all her American colonies under her 
 centralized system, however, even the mighty Cortez 
 had to submit to the new laws, and abandon all his 
 later schemes. 
 
 Soon after his death, Mexico, too, was made a vice- 
 royalty, and developed from now oa in accordance 
 with Spain's governmental monopoly. As the trade 
 with Peru was already provided for, and inasmuch 
 as the Spice islands had by this time been abandoned 
 to Portugal, the Spanish authorities recognized no 
 immediate necessity of keeping open another route 
 of interoceanic transit. Mexico came, therefore, to 
 be exploited for itself alone, and was no longer used 
 as a point of departure for further trade to the west, 
 as Cortez had planned. The new Viceroy accord- 
 ingly took up his abode in the City of Mexico, and 
 began to ship the rich products of the country direct 
 to Spain from Vera Cruz. It was henceforth to be 
 Spain's invariable policy, moreover, to allow but one 
 port of entry on either sea for each of her isthmian 
 colonies. Acapulco had already been chosen as 
 Mexico's Pacific port, and with Vera Cruz now on 
 the Atlantic, the isthmus of Tehuantepec was of no 
 further use and was accordingly abandoned for good 
 and all. Nicaraguan transit was deemed sufficient 
 for all purposes, so Tehuantepec, like Panama, was 
 now turned over again to its native inhabitants to 
 rule as they would.^ 
 
 ' Engineering Magazine, he. cit , Feb. 24, 1893. 
 Sullivan, loe. cit., pp. ^off. 
 
 Simon Stevens, " The New Route of Commerce by the Isthmus of Te- 
 huantepec," London, 1S71. 
 
68 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Having thus thoroughly reorganized her American 
 colonies, and so arranged everything in harmony 
 g Early '^ith her Mercantile policy, that she was 
 Canal now receiving all the itnports of gold and 
 
 Projects. silver and other colonial products of her 
 possessions in the New "World, Spain began to look 
 covetously once more toward the lands of the Orient 
 beyond. Her engineers came to the front, at this 
 juncture, and pointed out to the sovereigns that by 
 cutting a water-way through the narrow isthmus, not 
 only would they be able to import the products of 
 Peru more easily, but furthermore, they might then 
 successfully compete with their rivals, for the trade 
 of the far East as well. The narrow belt of land 
 separating the two oceans seemed to the enthusiasts 
 of this age of great ideas but an insignificant bar- 
 rier, which might readily be pierced by a canal. 
 
 Even during the reign of Charles, plans were 
 formulated and explorations actually undertaken 
 along the Chagres river, with the idea of substi- 
 tuting a water-way for the wagon road which was 
 still in operation across the isthmus of Panama, 
 but Avhich was already proving unsatisfactory. 
 
 Later on, when Nicaraguan transit had superseded 
 the earlier Panama route, Philip II. had one of his 
 engineers, Batista Antonelli, conduct a survey along 
 the narrow strip of land that cut off the lakes from 
 the Pacific, in the hopes of being able to connect the 
 two bodies of water by a canal, and thus avoid the 
 inconvenient transportation by wagon across the 
 Coast range. 
 
The Colonization of the Isthmus. 69 
 
 These practical attempts of course came to noth- 
 ing, but still the subject of interoceanic transit by 
 means of an artificial water-way continued for many 
 years to be discussed iu print, from a purely theo- 
 retical point of view. In the year 1550 a significant 
 monograph on the question appeared, written by the 
 Portuguese sea captain and navigator, Antonio Gal- 
 veo, which attracted considerable attention at the 
 time. From his knowledge of the country, Galveo 
 maintained that four routes were possible ; but 
 among these he seemed to be most favorably im- 
 pressed with the one which would pass through 
 Nicaragua. In the following year the Spanish his- 
 torian, Lopez Gomara, thoroughly convinced of the 
 immediate importance of the project, addressed a 
 special plea to his master, Philip, urging him to 
 undertake the work for the further glory of Spain. 
 Three routes he declared to be feasible for this pur- 
 pose — Tehuantepec, Nicaragua, and Panama. " It is 
 true," he wrote, " that mountains bar the passes, — 
 but if there are mountains, there are also arms, — 
 take but the . resolve, and the means to do it will 
 not be lacking ; the Indies toward which the pas- 
 sage will be opened will furnish them. To a King 
 of Spain, with the riches of the Indies at his door- 
 way, when the end to be obtained is the commerce 
 in its products, the barely possible becomes easy." 
 
 But Philip, by this time, had become too deeply 
 involved with affairs in Europe to undertake a pro- 
 ject of such magnitude in distant America. Then, 
 too, he was beginning to realize at last the growing 
 
70 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 power of his livals. He deemed it wiser, therefore, 
 to cling fast to what he already had in America, 
 rather than run the risk of losing all, by cutting a 
 direct path to the East through his isthmus, only to 
 tempt the naval forces of England or Holland to 
 seize upon it for themselves. By the end of the cen- 
 tury, if we may Judge from the tone taken by the 
 later Spanish historian, Jose de Aosta, these con- 
 servative views seem to have gained the upper hand, 
 for he condemned the project as foolish, and even 
 went so far as to oppose it on religious grounds, say- 
 ing that it would be contrary to the Divine will to 
 pierce the isthmus, as God had evidently placed the 
 mountains there to check any such attempt. 
 
 The real truth of the matter was, that Spain had 
 already pursued her policy of colonial aggrandize- 
 ment as far as she dared in the face of her powerful 
 competitors. She had been obliged, in short, to 
 adopt an. attitude of defence over against her rivals, 
 and still it was with difficulty that she continued to 
 hold her own. All dreams of Eastern dominion liad 
 now perforce to be abandoned for good and all, and 
 her every endeavor was henceforth to be centred on 
 retaining intact that rich monopoly in America she 
 had so successfully secured.* 
 
 ^ Sullivan, Uc. cii., pp. 60-74. 
 
 Lopez Gomara, " History of the Indies," Pt. II., " Mexico." 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE ENGLISH FREEBOOTERS. 
 
 BY her high-handed policy and her domineering 
 ways, Spain had by this time made an enemy 
 of nearly every nation of Europe. As yet no 
 monarch dared oppose her openly ; but this did not 
 prevent private citizens of the different countries 
 from leaguing together against their com- g ^^^ 
 mon enemy the Spaniards, and endeavoring Freebooter 
 to wrest from them at least a share of their ^^P"''''*:. 
 wealth. The might of Spanish arms was still too 
 powerful to be opposed iu Europe, and so these 
 allies, — buccaneers or freebooters they were called, 
 — chose the West Indies and the Spanish Main as 
 their base of operations. Adventurers of England, 
 France, and Holland, under the connivance of their 
 respective governments, accordingly fitted themselves 
 out in swift, well-armed vessels, and lay in wait 
 among the West Indian islands to pounce upon the 
 Spanish merchantmen, homeward bound with the 
 rich products of Mexico, Central America, and Peru. 
 The Spanish monopoly of the mainland was still 
 complete at this time, but her European rivals had 
 already succeeded in laying claim to some few of the 
 smaller islands of the West Indies, that the Span- 
 
 71 
 
72 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 iards had passed over in their eager search for gold. 
 The freebooters now took it upon themselves to 
 increase the number of these accessions. About the 
 year 1630 the little island of Tortugas, off the north- 
 west of Espanola, was pounced upon by the band 
 and this became, for the time, the assembling place 
 of the marauders and their point of departure for 
 further attack.' 
 
 Emboldened by their success thus far, the buc- 
 caneers soon began to inaugurate raids on the main- 
 § 34. Buc- land colonies themselves, the sources of 
 caneering Spain's richest supplies. Sir Francis Drake,, 
 along the ^^^ ^^® daring adventurers of the Eliza- 
 isthmus, bethan age, had confined their attacks to 
 the undefended coasts of Peru and Central America;, 
 but the Englishmen of this later freebooting frater- 
 nity directed their operations primarily to the eastern 
 shores of the isthmus. 
 
 Both nature and history aided the English in their 
 designs upon this Caribbean seaboard. Spain had 
 never made good her theoretical claim of dominion 
 over this shore, except along the coasts of Honduras, 
 and at the mouth of the San Juan. True, the Fran- 
 ciscan monks had already begun their work of con- 
 version in the mountains of Nicaragua, but as yet- 
 their influence had not been felt along the coast. 
 Among the lagoons of this shore, the buccaneers 
 came thus upon a harmless, good-for-nothing band of 
 
 ' Bancroft, /oc. cit., " History of Central America," Vol. II., pp. 595 ff. 
 Squier, loc. cit., "Central American States," pp. 630 ff. 
 C. P. Lucas, "A Historical Geography of the British Colonies," Vol. II.,. 
 p. 56. Oxford, 1890. 
 
The English Freebooters. 73 
 
 Indians, called the Moscoes, who supported life, pre- 
 cariously enough, by fishing in the cays. Cut off 
 entirely from the interior by mountain barriers and 
 their more warlike brothers, the Chontales or Bravos, 
 this primitive fisher-folk had come but little in con- 
 tact with .the Spaniards, and knew them only from 
 the marauding expeditions of their slave hunters. 
 
 Finding the coast thus uninhabited by colonists, 
 and caring naught for Spain's theoretical rights, the 
 freebooters, upon their arrival, took pains to culti- 
 vate the friendship of these Moscoe Indians. They 
 made their permanent headquarters in the home of 
 the Moscoe chief at the mouth of the Segovia or 
 Wanks river, and established freebooter rendezvous 
 also in the Bluefields and Pearl lagoons. They gave 
 the natives rum in abundance, then taught them the 
 rudiments of the English language, and easily in- 
 duced them to join in the attacks on their common 
 enemies the Spaniards. 
 
 It was during these early years of freebooter 
 aggression that the Earl of Warwick, sailing under 
 letters of reprisal granted him by his sovereign, 
 Charles I., against the subjects of Spain, seized upon 
 the little island of St. Catalina, or Old Providence 
 island, as the English called it, lying just off the 
 coast of Nicaragua. The noble Earl soon grasped 
 the situation on the shore, and entered heartily into 
 the freebooters' schemes for planting the seeds of 
 British dominion in these parts. To further the 
 cause the Earl's company then established a trading 
 station at Cape Gracias, and eventually induced the 
 
T4 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 chief of the Moscoes to send his son the crown 
 prince to England on a three years' visit, that he 
 might receive a liberal education there. 
 
 Having thus secured the good will of the natives, 
 the English freebooters could now use their new 
 position to great advantage. Within the lagoons of 
 this eastern coast, sheltered from the elements by 
 the outlying coral reefs, and secure from attack by 
 the heavier Spanish war vessels, the lighter draught 
 buccaneering craft could safely lie in wait, ready on 
 a moment's notice to swoop down on the richly 
 ladened colonial galleons homeward bound from the 
 San Juan. To these same sheltered harbors, they 
 could then return and find a welcome after every 
 successful raid, and there divide their plunder in 
 peace, and plan their further expeditions. 
 
 Nor were these the only buccaneering settlements 
 of the British along the coast. The shores of Hon- 
 duras were indeed still held by the Spaniards, but 
 farther noi'th in Yucatan the seaboard was practi- 
 cally uninhabited. Here the hardy old Scotch buc- 
 caneer, Peter Wallace, established his band in 1638, 
 and thus laid the foundations of the future English 
 settlement of Belize.' The Bay islands Just off the 
 coast of Honduras had up to this time also been 
 governed from the Spanish colony of Truxillo. 
 Owing to the attacks of the freebooters, the Spanish 
 authorities were obliged to depopulate these islands, 
 however, and leave them to the mercy of the iu- 
 
 ' Some say after Wallace, or Willis, as he was also called ; others derive 
 the name from the French, balise, " a beacon." 
 
The English Freebooters. 75 
 
 vaders, having all they could do to defend the shore. 
 The sea-rovers lost no time in seizing upon the group, 
 and in this forcible allotment, the largest two 
 islands, Roatan and Gruanaja, fell into English 
 hands/ 
 
 All this time the Spanish ambassador at the 
 Court of St. James kept vainly protesting against 
 these unwarranted acts of the English o „ .pjj^ 
 freebooters. But the British government English 
 simply refused to consider the pirates as occupation 
 
 ■■• •' ^ . of Jamaica 
 
 subjects of the Crown, and thus avoided and Attack 
 all responsibility, one w^ay or the other, by "P°" ^^^ 
 disavowing their acts. England did not 
 offer to interfere, however, and at this juncture 
 Oliver Cromwell came into power. In accordance 
 with his vigorous foreign policy, the Protector then 
 decided to make use of the buccaneers to break 
 down Spain's monopoly in the West Indies before 
 lifting a finger against them. 
 
 To this end an expedition was secretly despatched 
 in December, 1654, to attack the island of Cuba and 
 wrest it from Spain. Cromwell's band of adven- 
 turers detailed for this purpose — " a sad miscellany 
 of distempered unruly persons," as Carlyle dubbed 
 them — failed in their original mission, it is true, but 
 
 ' British Accounts and Papers, Vol. LXV. , Doc. 966, Appendix B. 
 
 Sir Hans Sloane, " History of Jamaica," 1st ed., 1707 ; Vol. I., p. 76. 
 
 " Churchill's Voyages," 3d ed., 1746, Vol. VI., pp. 297-302. 
 
 Courtney De Kalb, "Nicaragua: Studies on the Mosquito Shore," 
 Bull. Amer. Geog. Soc, Vol. XXV., No. 2. 
 
 Bancroft, /oc. cit., "History of Central America," Vol. II., pp. 598 and 
 648 
 
 Squier, loc. cit., " Central American States," pp. 604-615 and 632. 
 
'J'G The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 they succeeded nevertheless iu gaining a foothold on 
 the island of Jamaica in May, 1655. Another five 
 years of struggle was, however, necessary before 
 English authority was fully recognized in the land. 
 
 This encouraged the English freebooters along the 
 shores of the mainland, for they now saw that their 
 government was openly supporting them, and they 
 felt more secure in consequence, with Jamaica behind 
 them to fall back upon in case of defeat. The 
 Spanish authorities, finding diplomatic methods of 
 no avail, had already tried to meet force with force, 
 but their expedition, fitted out in San Domingo in 
 1650, succeeded only in dislodging the English for 
 the time from the Bay islands. To avenge this 
 assault, the buccaneers along the shore then deter- 
 mined to push up the San Juan itself and attack the 
 inland colonies. 
 
 The English missionary. Gage, in his book^ on the 
 West Indies, published Just at this time, described 
 this Nicaraguan depression as " so pleasing to the 
 eye, and abounding in all things necessary, that the 
 Spaniards call it Mahomet's j)aradise." This glowing 
 account stimulated the freebooters' enthusiasm, and 
 their frequent sallies up the stream were repulsed by 
 the Spanish colonists with more and more difficulty. 
 Finally, in 1655, one band of these Englishmen, 
 under Edward Davis, actually succeeded in sacking 
 and looting the city of Granada itself. 
 
 After this, seeing their monopoly of interoceanic 
 
 ■C/". Thomas Gage, " English American New Survey of the West Indies." 
 London, 1648. 
 
The English Freebooters. 77 
 
 transit so seriously threatened, the Spanish fortified 
 the San Juan more strongly, establishing a garrison 
 in San Carlos at its junction with the lake, and erect- 
 ing a powerful fort, Castilla Viejo, farther down the 
 stream. The freebooters still guarded the mouth of 
 the river, however, and it is said the Spaniards even 
 went so far as to divert the course of the stream itself 
 by artificial dams, that it might debouch hereafter 
 farther south, through the Colorado mouth.' Thus, 
 for the time at least, they hoped to elude the vigi- 
 lance of their tormentors, and allow their galleons to 
 pursue their way unmolested to Spain.' 
 
 Once firmly established in the West Indies, the 
 English government could no longer shirk the re- 
 sponsibility of the doings of the freebooters g g .j-j^^ 
 a,long the Spanish Main. In fact, these Treaty 
 piratical raids had now become obnoxious , "^ '^^o 
 to England as well, in her new position. The spain and 
 British authorities, therefore, resolved to England, 
 break up the freebooter republic entirely, but if 
 
 ' It is impossible to determine the truth of this report. On the one hand, 
 ■we have it on good authority that the Crown commissioned an engineer, Fer- 
 ■ nando de Escobedo, in 1670, to undertake the work, and that, after the stream 
 was thus diverted, the San Juan was no longer navigable. Before this we 
 "have constant mention of vessels sailing up the San Juan to Granada, but, on 
 the other hand, in Herrera's account of Cordova's conquest, the author speaks 
 ■of "great rocks and falls " in the stream cutting off access to the Atlantic. 
 
 ' Courtney De Kalb, loc. cit. 
 
 Engineering Magazine, loc, cit., March 3, 1893. 
 
 Thomas Gage, " English American New Survey of the West Indies." 
 London, 1648. 
 
 Orlando W. Roberts, " Narrative of Voyages and Excursions on the East 
 Coast and in the Interior of Central America." Edinburgh, 1827. 
 
 Bancroft, loc. cit., " History of Central America," Vol. II., p. 623. 
 
 Squier, loc. cit., " Central American States," p. 576. 
 
^8 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 possible to retain all rights thus far secured by Eng- 
 lishmen on the shore. 
 
 It was a delicate task, but matters had gone so far 
 with Spain that the English found her quite ready 
 to come to terms on a basis satisfactory to them- 
 selves. It was Spain's idea, now, to secure her 
 monopoly on the mainland by acknowledging British 
 rights thus far secured in the West Indies, and so 
 free herself from further encroachments on the part 
 of the freebooters. England apparently agreed to 
 these terms, and a convention was accordingly con- 
 cluded between the two powers in 1670, — called 
 indifferently the American treaty, or the treaty of 
 Madrid, — in which their respective rights in the New 
 World were defined. 
 
 By the seventh article of this famous instrument 
 it was agreed : 
 
 " that the most serene King of Great Britain, his heirs and 
 successors shall have, hold, keep, and enjoy forever, with 
 plenary right of sovereignty, dominion, possession and pro- 
 priety, all those lands, regions, islands, colonies and places 
 whatsoever, being or situated in the West Indies, or any part 
 of America, which the said King of Great Britain, or his sub- 
 jects, do at present hold and possess." 
 
 The last clause was a clever piece of diplomacy 
 on the part of Sir William Godolphin, the English 
 ambassador to Spain, who negotiated the treaty, and 
 was intended to secure English rights on the main- 
 land, if possible, under the terms of the agreement. 
 It all depended upon whether English freebooters, 
 whose acts had up to this been persistently dis- 
 
The English Freebooters. 79 
 
 avowed by their own government, could now be 
 regarded as British subjects; and if so, whether 
 they could be said to " hold or possess " their points 
 of advantage on the eastern shore.^ 
 
 The English freebooters had by this time come to 
 recognize that their government was in earnest, and 
 had lost no time, accordingly, in doffing 
 their piratical garb. They never thought ush Settie- 
 of abandoning their positions along the «ients along 
 shores of Central America, however, but, coast of 
 now that their more exciting occupation Central 
 had to be abandoned, they transformed ™erica. 
 themselves into peaceful lumbermen, and soon built 
 up a fine trade in the mahoganies and rich dye 
 woods which grow in such profusion on this coast. 
 
 Concerning this log-cutting trade Sir T. Modyford, 
 Governor of Jamaica, reported in 1670, that : 
 
 " about a dozen vessels ply only this trade and make great 
 profit, selling the wood at ^^25 to ^^30 a ton ; they were priva- 
 teers, but will not leave the trade again ; they go to places 
 either inhabited by Indians or void, and trespass not at all 
 upon the Spaniards, and if encouraged the whole log-wood 
 trade will be English and very considerable to His Majesty, 
 paying _^5 per ton customs. The places they now trade at 
 are Cape Gracias k Dios, Darien, Mosquito, and many deserted 
 places in Campeche, Cuba and Hispaniola." 
 
 This report practically decided the Home govern- 
 ment in its course, and Lord Arlington, then Secre- 
 tary of State under Charles II., accordingly wrote 
 
 ' Treaty of Madrid, 1670, Article VII. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 194, p. 72 ; 47th Cong., ist Sess. 
 
80 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 to Godolphin about tlie matter in order to learn 
 how Spain would regard a fresh claim to the shore. 
 Sir William, anxious as he was to secure the rights 
 of his countrymen under the treaty he himself had 
 negotiated in their behalf, was still not very encour- 
 aging as to their immediate success, as his reply to 
 Lord Arlinojton shows. He admitted therein : 
 
 " the Crown of Spain to have as well too much right as 
 advantage in these woods, not to assert the propriety of them, 
 for though, perhaps, they are not all inhabited (which is not 
 to be admired) or distinguished into particular tenements, but 
 remain in common, yet they are in general possessed by these 
 people, who may as justly pretend to make use of out rivers, 
 mountains, and other commons, for not being inhabited or 
 owned by individual proprietors, as we can to enjoy any bene- 
 fit of those woods. And this is the sense of all the Spaniards, 
 who esteem themselves in full possession of every part of 
 that Province (Yucatan), notwithstanding that it containeth 
 much territory unpeopled, since, as I have said, to inhabit 
 and possess are distinct, neither is the former essential to the 
 latter." ' 
 
 Goldolphin's opinion was soon justified; for in 
 1G72 the Spanish government issued a cedula to the 
 effect that "such as should make invasion or trade 
 without license in the ports of the Indies should be 
 proceeded against as pirates." Acting upon this de- 
 cree the naval forces of Spain then made a vigorous 
 assault upon the woodcutters, and succeeded so far 
 as to confine them in their future operations, to the 
 district of Belize and the eastern shores of Nicara- 
 gua. The English government, on the other hand, 
 
 ' Sir William Godolphinto Lord Arlington, May ^, 1672. 
 
The, English Freebooters. 81 
 
 still persisted in maintaining the rights of the wood- 
 cutters under the treaty of 1670, and openly lent 
 them its support. The Spanish ambassador there- 
 upon laid a formal complaint before the Court of 
 St. James, and the matter was finally turned over 
 by the Crown to His Majesty's Commissioners for 
 Trade and Plantations, for further examination.' 
 
 In the meantime, other strangers had come to the 
 eastern seaboard of Nicaragua and found a welcome 
 among the Moscoes. About the year 1650 
 a Dutch slave ship, homeward bound Origin'ofthe 
 from Senegambia and freighted down Mosquito 
 with negroes, had, it appears, been driven " the Fkst 
 from her course and finally wrecked on steps 
 
 the Costa. Eican coast. Many of the poor to'^^rdthe 
 
 II. 1 • English 
 
 blacks, thtis liberated by chance from their Protector- 
 bonds, escaped to the shore on the break- ^te over 
 
 rt , 1 T IP, 1 • their Shore. 
 
 lug up ot the vessel, and, alter wandering 
 north in search of food, they came finally to the 
 abode of the Moscoes. Here they were taken in by 
 the good-natured aborigines, and given a tract of 
 land for their own, along the Sandy river. 
 
 The Moscoe tribe had already received a vein of 
 Caucasion blood, through its intercourse with the Eng- 
 lish freebooters. The Indians now began to amalga- 
 mate very freely with the negroes who had thus come 
 to their shores, and, from this strange mixture of races, 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc. 194, loc. cit., p. 72. 
 
 British Accounts and Papers, loc. cit.. Appendix B. 
 
 Sir Hans Sloane, loc. cit., p. 76. 
 
 Lucas, loc. cit., pp. 304-305. 
 
 De Kalb, loc. cit. 
 
82 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 there sprang a mongrel people who have ever since 
 been known as the Mosquito Indians. With the 
 more permanent settlement of the English in the 
 character of peaceful settlers, fresh Indo-European 
 strains were added to the hybrid race, and from this 
 time on, the negro element was also continually aug- 
 mented by blacks coming from Jamaica, until in the 
 end the negroid became the prevailing type. As a 
 result of these accessions and interminglings, the 
 Mosquito Indians increased very rapidly in numbers,, 
 and e'er long came to spread over the whole shore 
 from Cape Honduras in the north, to the Bluefields 
 lagoon in the south, where the Cordillera slope off to^ 
 the sea, — a strip of coast which henceforth came to 
 be rather indefinitely known as the Mosquito shore, 
 or Mosquito land. 
 
 From the outset the whites had been determined 
 to assert and maintain their supremacy over the 
 natives, and upon settling definitely in the land, the 
 English took further steps to establish their prestige. 
 
 Upon the death of the Moscoe chief, Oldman, his 
 heir had, it appears, been brought back from Eng- 
 land and invested by the settlers with royal dignities- 
 shortly after the British conquest of Jamaica. This 
 done, the new monarch was easily persuaded to ab- 
 dicate his sovereignty over the country in favor of 
 Charles II., and become an ally of England. In 
 return the English settlers then conferred upon King 
 Oldman a crown and a royal commission, which was 
 supposed to have come direct from King Charles. 
 True, the crown was but an old cocked hat, and the 
 
The English Freebooters. 83 
 
 commission only a bit of paper drawn up by the 
 settlers themselves, setting forth that the Mosquito 
 chief would treat well all Englishmen coming that 
 way. Oldman and his people were thoroughly satis- 
 fied with the arrangement, however, and seemed to 
 prize very highly these marks of royal condescension 
 from the brother monarch across the seas. 
 
 Their diplomacy had thus far succeeded in secur- 
 ing for the English the real power over the Mosquito 
 shore and nation, but it had not as yet brought 
 them officially under the protection of their own 
 government, nor secured for them its formal ap- 
 proval of their acts. This was the next card to be 
 played, and the settlers were prepared. Oldman 
 having died, his son Jeremy succeeded to the crown, 
 and this young monarch the settlers now bundled off 
 to Jamaica, in 1687, to beg from the Earl of Albe- 
 marle, the English Grovernor there, that he, like his 
 father Oldman, be taken under the protection of His 
 Majesty's government. In the suite of the Mosquito 
 monarch came a committee of the English settlers, 
 and in the memorial they had drawn up for him to 
 present to His Lordship, the Governor, it was set 
 forth how the Earl of Warwick had come to these 
 shores during the reign of King Charles I. of ever 
 blessed memory, and how on Oldman's return from 
 England he had abdicated in favor of King Charles 
 II., and received a crown and commission from His 
 Majesty's own hand. But Jeremy failed to play 
 his royal part with proper dignity, for, becoming 
 frightened in the midst of the scene, he stripped off 
 
84 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the British major's uniform in which he had been 
 dressed by his mentors, and scrambled up a tree out 
 of harm's way. 
 
 Sir Hans Sloane, the historian of Jamaica, who 
 was at this time in the Earl of Albemarle's house- 
 hold as his family physician, was present on this 
 occasion, and declared the Governor " did nothing in 
 this matter, being afraid it might be a ti'ick of some 
 people to set up a government for Bucaniers or 
 Pirats." ^ Later English authorities ^ maintain, on 
 the contrary, that the request of the Mosquito chief 
 was granted by the Earl of Albemarle, and the Eng- 
 lish Mosquito protectorate then and there estab- 
 lished. Strange to say these subsequent historians 
 refer to Sir Hans Sloane as their authority. 
 
 Whatever may have been the fate of Jeremy's first 
 mission to Jamaica, it is certain that the settlers 
 were in no way disheartened, for by 1701 they had 
 established a regular English factory on the Mosquito 
 shore, in order to advance their trade relations with 
 the merchants of the Spanish Main. Not long after 
 this, Governor Lawes succeeded the Earl of Albe- 
 marle in Jamaica, and hojaing to find him more 
 favorably disjjosed to their cause, the English 
 guardians of Mosquitoland once more sent Jeremy 
 across the main to sue for recognition and protection. 
 This time the Mosquito chief was more successful, 
 for the new Governor did unbend so far as to enter 
 into a private compact with Jeremy, wherein it Avas 
 
 'Sir Hans Sloane, loc. Hi. , p. 76. 
 ; ^ Bryan Edwards, '' History of the West Indies, including Some Accounts 
 of tlie British Settlements on the Mosquito Shore.'' London, 1819. Also, 
 Bridges, " Annals of Jamaica." 
 
The English Freebooters. 85 
 
 agreed that in return for money and arms, the Mos- 
 quito chief was to provide Governor Lawes with 
 fifty men to hunt down runaway slaves on his island. 
 
 This so-called treaty was indeed formally ratified 
 by the Assembly of Jamaica, June 25, 1720, and 
 Jeremy was sent back on a British sloop-of-war, 
 provided, by order of the Governor, with plenty of 
 rum for the voyage. The captain of the sloop re- 
 turned to Jamaica soon after with Jeremy's fifty 
 warriors according to the contract, and with this 
 agreement fulfilled, the third step in the formal 
 adoption of the Mosquito protectorate was supposed 
 to have been taken.' 
 
 A significant, though transitory, dominion on the 
 isthmus, was acquired during these early years by 
 other British subjects operating farther § 39. The 
 south. The isthmus of Panama had, as we British 
 know, been to all intents and purposes Caledonian 
 abandoned by the Spanish after the final Bay. 
 
 adoption of the Nicaraguan route for the products of 
 Peru. In 1671, the Welsh buccaneer, Morgan, then 
 
 ' Brasseur, loc. Hi., Tom. II., pp. 79, iio-iii. 
 
 Bancroft, loc. cit., " Native Races of the Pacific, "Vol. I., pp. 7i3and794. 
 
 Sir Hans Sloane, loc. cit.. Introduction, Vol, I., p. 76. 
 
 " Churchill's Voyages," Vol. VI., pp. 297-302, 3d ed. London, 1746. 
 
 Bryan Edwards, loc, cit., "Accounts of Mosquito Shore Drawn up for 
 British Government, \TTi." 
 
 Bridges, " Annals of Jamaica," loc. cit. 
 
 Long, " History of Jamaica." London, 1774. First ed. 
 
 British Accounts and Papers, Vol. Ixv., Docs. 13 and 966, with Appendix. 
 
 Journals of House of Assembly of Jamaica, June, 1720, Vol. II., p. 330. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 27, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
 De Kalb, loc. cit., " The Mosquito Race." 
 
 " The Mosquito Indian and his Golden Rule," By M. W., 1699, printed 
 for Henry Lintot and John Osborne at the Golden Ball, Paternoster Row, 
 London. 
 
86 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 pushed across this isthmus with his band and sacked 
 the little town of Panama. Thinking to find gold 
 in this region, an English freebooter, Captain Sharpe, 
 aided by the Darien Indians, next led a party of his 
 countrymen over the range from Caledonian Bay, in 
 1680, and attacked the struggling Spanish settlement 
 of Villa Maria on the Tuyra river. 
 
 This last expedition brought back no wealth to 
 speak of, but the description of the route as given 
 by Captain Sharpe's companion, Lionel Wafer, pro- 
 duced unlooked-for and long-drawn-out efEects. Ac- 
 cording to Mr. Wafer's account, the mountains of 
 this region were not in the shape of a ridge nor of a 
 solid dividing range, but consisted in a row of iso- 
 lated hills with broad valleys running transversely 
 between. 
 
 William Paterson, a noted Scotchman and one of 
 the founders of the Bank of England, read this ac- 
 count with the greatest interest, and thereupon 
 evolved his grand plan of establishing a distributing 
 centre at this point, for the commerce of the world, 
 and thus join the trade of the two Indies. The pos- 
 session of this isthmus, Paterson maintained, would 
 give to England " the keys of the world," and in his 
 enthusiasm he added, " this door of the seas, this 
 key of the universe, with anything of a reasonable 
 management will enable its proprietors to give laws 
 to both oceans, and become arbitrators of the com- 
 mercial world." 
 
 Bent on establishing the truth of his predictions, 
 Paterson at once gathered together a band of over a 
 
The English Freebooters. 87 
 
 thousand Scotch colonists, and established his settle- 
 ment at Caledonian Bay, in 1698. The failure of 
 this bold enterprise can never be laid to the door of 
 Paterson or his hardy Scotch followers. Had the 
 little band received the slightest aid or encourage- 
 ment from their government, they might easily have 
 driven ofE the insignificant force of Spanish marines 
 sent out to dislodge them, and with a few supplies 
 would have succeeded in gaining a solid foothold in 
 the land. 
 
 The English government, on the plea of having 
 just concluded a treaty of peace with Spain, did 
 everything to discourage these colonists, however, 
 and practically left them to their fate. The real 
 cause of this strange inaction on the part of those 
 heretofore so eager for every advantage, must be 
 attributed to the powerful English East India Com- 
 pany, which feared its monopoly would be broken 
 if Paterson's plans were successful. The magnates 
 of this great company gained the ears of the King, 
 and Paterson was forced to abandon his dream after 
 the most heroic effort to prove his point against all 
 odds. England thus lost one of her finest oppor- 
 tunities of controlling the isthmus from sea to sea, 
 and never since has she interested herself seriously 
 in these lower routes.* 
 
 ' Sullivan, loc. cit., pp. 13-16. 
 
 Engineering Magazine, loc. cit., March 3, 1893. 
 
CHAPTEK IV. 
 
 THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND 
 SPAIN. 
 
 FEELING secure under the American treaty in 
 her legal dominion over the isthmian colo- 
 nies from sea to sea, Spain did nothing fur- 
 ther to enforce her shadowy rights in practice. The 
 English, on the other hand, looked upon this treaty 
 of 1670 simply as a legal recognition on the 
 lish''En"^' P^^*" ^^ Spain, of the rights they had thus 
 croach- far acquired in the New World, and did 
 mentson ^^^ consider themselves in the least de- 
 
 the Isthmus t i t i- • • t • 
 
 during the terred thereby from continuing their policy 
 Maritime of encroachment, as soon as the opportunity 
 should present itself. The English wood- 
 cutters in Central America, in the meantime, contin- 
 ued to extend their holdings along the coast with; 
 the tacit approval of the Home authorities, who 
 were only waiting for a suitable time to arrive when 
 they might openly lend their aid in transforming 
 these doubtful holdings into regular colonial pos- 
 sessions. 
 
 As soon as war with Spain became imminent, in 
 1739, Governor Trelawney of Jamaica evolved a plan 
 whereby the English settlers on the mainland should 
 
 8S 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 89 
 
 unite into one colony, and, having stirred up the In- 
 dians to a general revolt, either cut the Spanish 
 colonists off entirely, from the eastern coast, or per- 
 haps drive them from the isthmus altogether. Ad- 
 miral Vernon, then in command of the "West Indian 
 station, entered most heartily into the scheme, and 
 wrote to his chief. Sir William Pultney, Lord of the 
 English Admiralty, most urgently in its favor, call- 
 ing his attention to the fact that " great advantage 
 niiight be made of the friendly disposition of this 
 people (the Mosquitos) in case of vs^ar with Spain." 
 "And it is not to be doubted," he continued, "but 
 in case of a rupture the government will improve so 
 fair an opportunity of advancing the interests of the 
 British Nation and its Colonies." 
 
 All this, moreover, was directly in accord with 
 the general plan of campaign as decided upon by 
 the Home government. England recognized the 
 futility of attacking the Spanish peninsula itself, for, 
 even if successful, she could gain no material advan- 
 tage in the terms of the peace, from such a course ; 
 while, on the other hand, should the West Indies 
 be made the centre of conflict, the island of Cuba 
 might be wrested from Spain, and English dominion 
 also extended to the mainland itself. With this 
 latter end in view, as soon as hostilities had been 
 declared, Admiral Lord Anson blockaded the com- 
 merce of the Spanish colonies on the west coast of 
 South America, and Commodore Handyside laid 
 siege to Corinto and Porto Realejo on the Pacific ; 
 while English agents were also sent to the eastern 
 
90 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 shores ia order to unite the settlers there and stir up 
 the Indians to revolt, as Trelawney had suggested. 
 Captain Lee, the agent detailed to prepare the 
 way in Belize, was given command of a Biitish sloop 
 of war, and soon had the Indians of Guatemala and 
 the English woodcutters there organized for attack, 
 and ready to join with the Mosquitos in their revolt 
 against Spanish rule. Another adventurer, one 
 liobert Hodgson by name, was sent to the Mosquito 
 shore. The English settlers gathered around him, 
 and by the use of bribes and favors he was soon 
 enabled to acquire the further good will of the na- 
 tives, and enlist them in his cause. Hodgson on his 
 arrival authoritatively reaffirmed the British protec- 
 torate over the coast and promised His Majesty's aid 
 in their proposed revolt against the Spaniards. The 
 standard of Great Britain was then for the first time 
 formally raised over the land, and the long-sought- 
 for alliance with Jamaica ratified by both parties.' 
 
 ' Hodgson's letter to his chief, retailing the events of these proceedings in 
 Mosquitoland, is so graphic and significant that it may be quoted here in 
 full as follows : 
 
 Sandy Bay, April 8, 1740. 
 May it please Your Excellency . . . 
 
 King Edward, being informed of my arrival, sent me word that he would 
 see me the next day, which he did, attended by several of his captains. I 
 read to him Your Excellency's letter and my own commission, and when I 
 had explained them by an interpreter, told ray errand, and recommended to 
 them to seek all opportunities of cultivating friendship and union with the 
 neighboring Indian nations, and especially such as were under subjection to 
 the Spaniards, and of helping them to recover their freedom. They ap- 
 proved everything I said, and appointed the i6th to meet the governor, 
 John Briton, and his captains, at the same place, to hear what I had further 
 to say. On the 1 6th they all came, except Admiral Dilly and Colonel Mor- 
 gan, who were sick. General Hobby and his captains were at too great a 
 distance to be sent for, but their presence not being material, I proceeded 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 91 
 
 English forts were thereupon erected in the land, 
 troops were sent over from Jamaica, and further im- 
 
 to acquaint them that, as they had long acknowledged themselves subjects 
 ■of Great Britain, the Governor of Jamaica had sent me to take possession of 
 their country in His Majesty's name ; then asked if they had anything to 
 object. They answered they had nothing to say against it, but were very 
 glad I was come for that purpose ; so I immediately set up the standard, 
 and reducing the sum of what I had said into articles, I asked them jointly 
 and separately, if they approved and would abide by them. They unani- 
 mously declared they would ; so I had them read over again, in a solemn 
 manner, under the colors, at the end of every article fired a gun, and con- 
 cluded with cutting up a turf, and promising to defend their country and to 
 procure them all the assistance and instruction from England in my power. 
 
 The formality all this was done with seemed to have a good influence upon 
 them, for they often repeated their desire of learning to read, and said they 
 must now mind their kings more than they had done, and do all they could 
 to help themselves and hurt the Spaniards, to whom I recommended all the 
 mercy that was consistent with their own safety ; but they seemed not to 
 understand me rightly, saying if they fight they must kill. The articles I 
 enclose, and hope Your Excellency will excuse so much ceremony, for, as I 
 had no certain information whether the country was ever taken possession 
 •of before or ever claimed otherwise than by sending them down commissions, 
 I thought the more voluntary and clear the cession of it was the better. The 
 governor came, attended with a numerous guard, who behaved to him with 
 much respect and silence. He is a sensible old man and carries a good com- 
 mand. The king being very young, I believe, not twenty, is not much ob- 
 served, but was he to be awhile in Jamaica or England, 't is thought he would 
 make a hopeful monarch enough. . . . 
 
 The same day Admiral Dilly and Colonel Morgan sent me word they 
 were coming to wait on me. I immediately crossed the lagune to meet 
 them, hearing they were sensible, clever fellows, and such I found them. 
 They had despatched a messenger to the governor to meet them the next 
 •day, to hold a general and decisive council. 
 
 They all met on Sunday, the 23d, at Senock Dawkra (Mr. Whitehead's 
 "house). The governor, being sick, tried our patience by making us wait till 
 the afternoon, but when he came made ample amends by the justness of his 
 sentiments. 
 
 He told the king and his captains, it was plain they had got a name and 
 the good opinion of the governor of Jamaica (whose success against the 
 rebellious negroes they had all heard of), and if they did not keep it up what 
 would the world say of them ? 
 
 There was an officer now sent down by Your Excellency to observe their 
 
92 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 migration encouraged. The Mosquito chief, it is 
 true, was still left in nominal control with all the 
 
 manner of fighting, and if they did not do their best they should lose the 
 favor of the English. It is true they were but a small number of people, 
 compared to us, who had men to spare for sickness and the sword, but if 
 they showed themselves worthy, no doubt the king of Britain would send a 
 force sufficient to get them all they wanted, besides teachers to instruct them 
 in what is right and good. He said General Hobby had often talked about 
 taking towns in time of peace, and called the English cowards. Now it was. 
 war, they must show they were not such themselves ; then the English were 
 the best judges when war or peace was proper ; and none of them had any 
 business to act otherwise than they were directed by the governor of 
 Jamaica. . . 
 
 I find my counsel about sobriety had some weight with the old men, but 
 the young ones are got together there since with the women into drinking 
 bouts. They intoxicate themselves with a liquor made of honey, pine apples, 
 and cassada, and if they avoid quarrels, which often happen, they are sure 
 to have fine promiscuous doings among the girls. The old women, I am told, 
 have the liberty of chewing the cassada before it is put in, that they may 
 have a chance in the general rape as the young ones. 
 
 I fell into one of them by accident last Monday, when I found Admiral 
 Dilly and Colonel Morgan retailing my advice among them, to little effect, 
 for most of them were too drunk to mind it, and so hideously painted that 
 I quickly left them to avoid being daubed all over, which is the compliment 
 they usually pay their visitors on those occasions. 
 
 Those two captains complain much of their drinking, but say it has been 
 taught them by the English ; others say not, for how should the English in- 
 vent the pine and cassada drink ? Their resentment of adultery has lost its 
 edge, too, more than among other Indians ; that, I make no doubt, they are 
 obliged to us for. Their breach of promises in their bargains I take to be 
 a good deal owing to a sense of being defrauded by traders, but through 
 their ignorance of numbers and value, not being able to tell how, they are 
 apt to make improper reprisals. As for their laziness, the grand promoter 
 of the rest, I really think it must have been owing to their discontent at the 
 usage they have received from privateers and others, because I don't find it 
 has been epidemical amongst them till lately. . . . 
 
 I have disposed of several presents, but their returns being chiefly in 
 visits to get more, or to drink punch, I have stopped my hand. The Lu- 
 beck duck, osnaburgs, powder, ball, flints, and shot I shall divide among 
 them at setting out, with a promise that they shall pay me according to their 
 behavior or their plunder. . . , Robert Hodgson. 
 
 Cf. Vernon Wager MSS. 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 93 
 
 outward emblems of sovereignty, but Hodgson, with 
 bis title of Superintendent, conferred upon him by 
 the authorities in Jamaica, practically ruled over the 
 shore. 
 
 Truxillo, the Spanish colony on the coast of 
 Honduras, had been attacked and razed to the 
 ground by Dutch buccaneers some time before, and 
 the Spaniards had never had the courage to rebuild 
 the town, open, as it had proved to be, to every 
 attack from the sea. Wishing to connect the settle- 
 ment in Belize more closely with the Mosquito 
 colony, the English, therefore, established a post on 
 the undefended coast at the Black river, between 
 Cape Gracias and Cape Honduras, and also seized 
 upon Roatan in the Bay islands, once more, and for- 
 tified it strongly against any attack. 
 
 All was then in readiness for the flndl raid upon 
 the Spanish colonies in the interior. From Gage's 
 work on the West Indies, and from the subsequent 
 accounts of the freebooters, the English government 
 was fully aware of the great value of the fertile 
 Nicaraguan depression, not only as a route of transit 
 between the two oceans, but also as a source of 
 natural wealth. The word was therefore given, and 
 Hodgson and Lee, supported by troops from Jamaica, 
 and accompanied by the Indians and English settlers, 
 made ready to push up the San Juan, and seize the 
 land about the lakes, even to the Pacific, In accord- 
 ance with this plan of campaign, the forts along the 
 river were successfully invested by the English and 
 their Indian allies in 1748 ; but Hodgson's offensive 
 
94 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 operations were at this point cut short by England's 
 coming to final terms with Spain in the treaty of 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, which brought the more general 
 war of the Austrian Succession to a close, as well as 
 this more special maritime struggle between Spain 
 and England. 
 
 This treaty was signed on the basis of a mutual 
 restitution of conquests, but it in no way undertook 
 to define the respective rights of the two parties in 
 Central America, and so, though Hodgson was at 
 once given notice to desist from further warlike 
 movements along the San Juan, he was still allowed 
 by the English authorities to remain in Mosquitoland, 
 as Superintendent of the shore, under orders from the 
 Governor of Jamaica. Spain, it is true, entered pro- 
 test after protest to the English government against 
 Hodgson's continued presence among the Indians,, 
 but, instead of sending a force to dislodge him, she 
 contented herself, as before, by requesting a Fran- 
 ciscan missionary to go down to the shore and try 
 by religious means to neutralize English influence 
 among the Mosquitos. In reply to their protests, 
 the English government assured the Spanish author- 
 ities that Hodgson was only kept there now to 
 restrain the Indians from attacking the Spanish 
 colonists and interfering with their trade with the 
 mother country. Acting under orders from Gover- 
 nor Trelawney, Hodgson then arrested the poor 
 Franciscan as an impostor, and bundled him off to 
 Jamaica. This aroused the Spanish colonists at last, 
 and they prepared for an attack. The English in 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 95 
 
 Mosquitoland called upon Jamaica for re-enforce- 
 ments, and war again seemed imminent. 
 
 At this Juncture (1752), Governor Knowles suc- 
 ceeded the more enthusiastic Trelawney in Jamaica, 
 and the English policy toward the settlers on the 
 shore was, for the time at least, radically changed. 
 Governor Knowles, in short, looked upon the whole 
 Mosquito settlement as a "job," and not worth a 
 quarrel with Spain. So the missionary was sent 
 back, and the eager Hodgson kept in close check 
 during the new Governor's brief incumbency in 
 office. 
 
 The Spanish now thought the opportunity favora- 
 ble to rid the isthmian colonies entirely of English 
 interference. To this end an attack was begun, in 
 1754, upon the woodcutters of Belize, the idea being 
 to push south and drive the settlers also from the 
 Bay islands and the Mosquito shore. This attempt 
 was a dismal failure, however, and Spain having 
 thus taken the initiative and attacked them in times 
 of peace, the English settlers after this felt no longer 
 any scruples in extending their settlements as they 
 would. Governor Knowles was then recalled from 
 Jamaica, and under his successor's rule the old 
 vigorous policy of encroachment was again sup- 
 ported from headquarters. 
 
 The Spanish authorities then seemed to resign 
 themselves, for the time, to the inevitable, and so 
 from the Rio Hondo in the north to the Bluefields 
 lasoon in the south, the entire eastern coast of Cen- 
 tral America, including its littoral islands, continued 
 
96 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 under English supremacy. In tlie opinion of His 
 Majesty's Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 
 whose report had since been handed in, these claims 
 were not, however, to be regarded in the light of 
 regular English settlements, but simply as including 
 limited usufructuary rights to cut timber along the 
 shore.' 
 
 Such was the rather doubtful condition of affairs 
 in 1756, at the outbreak of the Seven Years' war in 
 §41. The Europe. Seeing that England would of 
 Effect of necessity be led into the general conti- 
 Ygg^j.g,^^j.nental struggle, William Pitt, the elder, 
 upon the then Secretary of State in the Newcastle- 
 English government, which he had Just brought 
 mentsin iuto power, endeavored by diplomatic 
 Central means to league Spain on his side against 
 France, who was already assuming the 
 offensive again in America. To sooth Spain's anger 
 and win her over to the English cause, Pitt mag- 
 nanimously offered to evacuate all the settlements 
 along the mainland of Central America, and leave 
 
 ' British Accounts and Papers, loc. cit.. Vol. LXV., "Mosquito Corre- 
 spondence," App. A. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex, Doc, No. 194, loc. cit., pp. 73 jf". 
 
 Reports of Lords of Trade on the Mosquito Shore, Dec. 2, 1763. Plant. 
 Gen. M., p. 311. 
 
 De Kalb, loc. cit. 
 
 Engineering Magazine, loc. cit., March 3, 1893. 
 
 Vernon Wager MSS., as follows: 
 
 Sir Charles Wager to Admiral Vernon, May 23 and August 18, 1741 ; 
 Sir William Pultney to Admiral Vernon, August 17, 1740 ; Governor 
 Knowles to Secy, of State of English Govt., March 26, 1753. 
 
 Bancroft, loc. cit., " History of Central America," Vol. II., pp. 602, 
 628-29, and 648- 
 
 Squier, loc. cit., pp. 576-615, 636-638, and App. D. 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 97 
 
 the Spanisli colonists free once more to extend their 
 control to the eastern coast as they desired. Spain 
 would not listen to these proposals, but ranged her- 
 self instead on the side of France, in the vain hopes 
 of dislodging England entirely from her possessions 
 in the New World. 
 
 Great Britain's naval forces, and the indomitable 
 energy of her North American colonists, proved too 
 strong for this Franco-Spanish alliance, however, 
 and, in the end, Spain was even forced to give up 
 Florida to England for the part she had chosen to 
 play in the struggle. 
 
 As North America had been the scene of the 
 American phase of this continental struggle, the re- 
 spective claims of England and Spain on the isthmus 
 were in consequence but little affected thereby. 
 Still, by the treaty of Pai'is, — which in 1763 put an 
 ■end to the French and Indian wars, — it was pro- 
 vided that, in return for Florida, Havana should 
 be restored to the Spanish, and it was further agreed 
 that: 
 
 " His Britannic Majesty shall cause to be demolished all 
 fortifications which his subjects shall have erected in the Bay 
 •of Honduras and other places in the territory of Spain in that 
 part of the world." ' 
 
 With this nominal concession, England then took 
 pains to re-establish her former rights by the addi- 
 tion of another clause in the treaty, allowing her 
 subjects to cut wood henceforth unmolested any- 
 where along the eastern shore. 
 
 ' Treaty of Paris, Art. XVII.,— signed February lo, 1763. 
 7 
 
98 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Now that a peace had been secured, in general so- 
 advantageous to British claims, the English govern- 
 ment was ready to adopt a more regular and peaceful 
 regime in Central America. Not so Hodgson and 
 his followers, however; — for, seeing Spain thus 
 humbled, they thought the opportunity ripe to seize 
 iipon the San Juan. An expedition was accord- 
 ingly organized in an irregular sort of a way and the 
 attack was made in 1769. The Spanish Governor, 
 Herrera, learned of Hodgson's plans, however, and 
 his secret attack met with a resistance which he was 
 utterly unable to overcome. This war-like spirit 
 was uo longer in keeping with British plans, so, 
 having played his part and outlived his usefulness, 
 Hodgson was immediately recalled after this last 
 escapade, and the English authorities, with scrupulous 
 exactness, straightway caused the temporary fortifi- 
 cations along the shore to be demolished, and the 
 garrisons to be withdrawn. 
 
 Mosquitoland had by this time grown to be a 
 settlement of considerable size. The English, of 
 pure and mixed origin, now numbered some four 
 hundred or more souls, and under them worked 
 about nine hundred slaves in the cotton, indigo, and 
 cocoa fields which they had lately planted along the 
 shore. It was high time, therefore, since military 
 operations were suspended, that some more regu- 
 lar administration should be introduced in their 
 midst. Accordingly, in 1775, Lord Dartmouth, of 
 the Colonial Ofl&ce, drew up a system of government ■ 
 for the settlement, and attached it to Jamaica as a. 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 99 
 
 dependency. Colonel Lawrie was then despatched 
 to supersede Hodgson as Superintendent of the 
 shore, and with him was sent a Council of Govern- 
 ment, a Court of Common Pleas, and a Bench of 
 Justices of the Peace. A garrison was also asked 
 for by the settlers, but this last request was refused 
 on diplomatic grounds. 
 
 In Belize, the log-cutters had already organized a 
 government of their own, with its headquarters in 
 the islet of St. George's Bay, just oif the shore, and 
 had successfully resisted all attempts on the part of 
 the Spanish to dislodge them. There were British 
 subjects, white and black, to the number of some 
 three hundred living here, with about eight hundred 
 slaves ; and a few years before this, Admiral Burnaby, 
 and the famous Captain Cook had visited the settle- 
 ment officially to confirm the settlers in their rights 
 and constitution. 
 
 Sir Basil Keith, then Governor of Jamaica, was, 
 therefore, instructed by the colonial authorities to 
 watch over these young settlements on the shore ; 
 and the conservative Lords of Trade even went so 
 far as to describe them now as " districts ruled over 
 by the Home government wherein Englishmen pos- 
 sessed certain usufructuary rights." ^ 
 
 The Spanish Home government apparently acqui- 
 
 ' British Accounts and Papers, loc. cit.. Vol. I.XV., App. A. 
 George Chalmers, Notes for the Board of Trade. 
 Squier, loc. cit., " Central American States,'' App. D. 
 Bancroft, loc. cit., " History of Central America," Vol. II., p. 630. 
 De Kalb, loc. cit. 
 
 Bedford C. T. Pim, " Dottings in Panama, Nicaragua, and Mosquito." 
 London, i86g. 
 
100 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 esced in these later moves, and looked on with 
 
 ,, , evident unconcern, while the Ensrlish colo- 
 § 42. Nel- . ... 
 
 son's At- nial authorities quietly took these final 
 
 tack on the gteps necessaiy to transform the precarious 
 holdings of the British woodcutters into 
 legally authorized settlements. The Spanish colo- 
 nists in Central America were not so submissive. 
 Seeing that their government evidently did not 
 intend to take any further action against the con- 
 tinued encroachments of the English settlers, they 
 finally took matters into their own hands, and had 
 actually come to blows with the woodcutters and 
 their Indian allies, when the war of the American 
 Revolution broke out, and treaty rights were once 
 more rendered nugatory. 
 
 According to the terms of the Bourbon Alliance,^ 
 framed during the years of the Seven Years' war, 
 Spain at once took sides again with France and the 
 colonies, in this renewed struggle with England over 
 America. War was finally declared again between 
 the two powers in 1779, and, aroused at last from 
 her former lethargy, Spain at once sent troops into 
 Yucatan to dislodge the woodcutters from Belize. 
 Anticipating this attack British war-ships had al- 
 ready been despatched from Jamaica, and the 
 Spanish soldiery found itself obliged to retreat 
 before the settlers thus supported by the marines. 
 
 Having gained this primary advantage the English 
 now determined to renew their attack upon the Sau 
 Juan, hoping this time to realize the plan formulated 
 
 ' Cf. The Family Compact of 1761. 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 101 
 
 so many years before. The campaign as planned by 
 Governor Bailing of Jamaica for the reduction of 
 the Spanish Main, was almost identical with that 
 evolved by Governor Trelawney before. The forts 
 along the San Juan were to be invested, the lakes 
 seized, and Leon and Granada reduced to British 
 control. Then the forces were to push over the 
 Coast range and capture the port of Realejo on the 
 Pacific. Thus the Spanish mainland colonies were 
 to be severed, and the natural route of interoceanic 
 transit at last placed in England's hands. 
 
 Governor Calling presented his plan in detail be- 
 fore the ministry of Lord North, and, as soon as the 
 Cabinet had approved, he fitted out a powerful ex- 
 pedition, in Jamaica to undertake the work. Captain 
 John Poison of the army was given command of the 
 troops ; while Lord Nelson, then a young post-cap- 
 tain on board the British frigate HicJiinbrolce, was 
 put in charge of the convoy fleet, and entrusted 
 with the entire naval operations of the campaign. 
 The expedition set out from Jamaica and on March 
 24, 1780, reached the Mosquito shore, where the 
 troops were joined by the English settlers and a 
 band of their faithful Mosquito allies. Nelson 
 having volunteered to accompany Poison on his 
 inland attack, the entire party then pushed south, 
 followed by the convoys, and having reached the 
 mouth of the San Juan, commenced the ascent of the 
 stream in small boats. They met with no resistance 
 from the Spaniards until they reached the Castillo 
 Viejo. This the English invested oh the eleventh 
 
102 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 of April, and, after a stubborn siege, forced tlie 
 garrison to surrender on the twenty-ninth. Nelson 
 ■was here taken down with the fever, and was forced 
 to return to his ship to be carried back to Jamaica. 
 But Governor Bailing had sent out a large body of 
 re-enforcements, in the meanwhile, under General 
 Kemble, and upon his arrival the campaign was re- 
 sumed from this point. 
 
 The fever contracted on the eastern shore, now 
 spread with such alarming rapidity among the un- 
 acclimated English troops, however, that it was 
 reluctantly determined to abandon, for the time, the 
 attack on the inland colonies ; and, indeed, it was 
 high time, for, as it was, only three hundred men 
 reached the coast, out of the force of eighteen hun- 
 dred that had pushed up the stream. 
 
 England's designs upon the Nicaraguan canal 
 route were thus once more defeated, and little was 
 now left of Governor Calling's plans for the reduc- 
 tion of the Spanish Main. The larger contest in the 
 north had also begun to turn against the British by 
 this time, and matters were going hard with them in 
 the West Indies as well. Taking heart from these 
 misfortunes of the enemy, the Spanish Governor of 
 Guatemala thereupon organized a considerable 
 colonial force and made one last detei'mined effort 
 to dislodge the English settlers from the shore. 
 Left to their fate for the time, the woodcutters were 
 obliged to retreat, and take up a new position behind 
 the Spanish fort at Omoa on the Honduras coast, 
 and. across the bay in the island of Roatan, with the 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 103 
 
 rest of tlie settlers and a remnant of the British force. 
 The colonists finally dislodged them from these 
 vantage grounds as well, and compelled them all to 
 retreat still farther south below Cape Gracias. 
 
 In their memorable sea-fight off Dominica, the 
 British, under the gallant Admiral Rodney, Just 
 ihen succeeded in dispersing the French fleet, and 
 thus at a blow regained their West Indian prestige. 
 Dalling was again in a position to send re-enforcements 
 to the beleaguered settlers on the mainland, and the 
 whole force, now numbering over a thousand men, 
 then marched north to take revencre on the colonists 
 who had since entrenched themselves along the Black 
 xiver. Here the English gained an easy victory and 
 forced the Spanish commander to capitulate on 
 August 28, 1782.' 
 
 The varied struggles of the Revolutionary war 
 were now drawing to a close. Her sturdy colonists 
 — the very factor that had made England 
 so successful in her former contest with ^j^^ 
 
 Erance — had this time fought against her. Treaty of 
 ^ided by the Bourbon allies. With young Versailles, 
 America behind them, France and Spain 
 were at last in a position to dictate terms to their 
 •colonial rival, and England was thus forced to recede 
 from many long cherished rights in the New World. 
 
 ' Admiral Nelson, " Autobiography." 
 
 Kemble Papers, Vol. II., N. Y. Hist. Soc. Collections, 1884. 
 Bancroft, loc. cit., " History of Central America," Vol. II., pp. 604-612, 
 ■632. 
 
 Squier, loc. cit., "Central American States," pp. 577-581, 616-618, 638- 
 
 "640. 
 
104 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 In the famous treaty of Versailles, whicli was 
 supposed to settle all these matters, the long dis- 
 puted rights of the English settlers and woodcutters, 
 in Central America were also adjudicated, in a waj 
 that was thought to be final. By Article YI. of the 
 treaty between England and Spain, Great Britain 
 was forced to abandon the claim she had fought so 
 long and so hard to uphold, and admit Spain's para- 
 mount right of sovereignty over the entire isthmus 
 from sea to sea. In return, the Spanish authorities 
 were compelled, on their side, to grant " His Britan- 
 nic Majesty's subjects the right of cutting, loading,, 
 and carrying away log-wood in the district lying 
 between the rivers Wallis, or Belize, and Rio' 
 Hondo," and extending inland as far as the Eia 
 Nueva.' His Catholic Majesty assured to the Eng- 
 lish the enjoyment of these rights, however, only on 
 the condition "that these stipulations shall not be 
 considered as derogating in any wise from his rights 
 of sovereignty." 
 
 By this convention Great Britain was indeed con- 
 firmed in her possession of the Bahamas, but in 
 return for this the settlements in the Bay islands 
 and her protectorate over the Mosquito shore were 
 unconditionally abandoned. In order to provide for 
 the English settlers in these parts who had been thus 
 abandoned by the government, it was also agreed 
 between the two powers that : 
 
 " All the English who may be dispersed in any other parts, 
 whether on the Spanish continent, or in any of the islands 
 ' Cf. Map at end of volume. 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 105 
 
 •whatsoever dependent on the aforesaid Spanish continent, and 
 for whatever reason it might be without exception, shall retire 
 within the district which has been above described, in the 
 space of 1 8 months, to be computed from the exchange of the 
 ratifications." ' 
 
 In spite of these express stipulations, the English 
 settlers in Mosquitoland and Eoatan made no pre- 
 tence of retiring to Belize, and, in truth, 
 the British government took no special sulpte- 
 pains to require them to do so. The mentary 
 Spanish colonial authorities, not being able ^^^^\°J 
 at this time to force the settlers to comply 
 with the terms of the convention, simply waited for 
 the necessary eighteen months to elapse, and then 
 entered a formal protest before the English govern- 
 ment. Thus Great Britain really gained by her pro- 
 crastination, for she was now in a far better position 
 to treat with Spain than she had been in 1783. 
 
 After some further delay England agreed to enter 
 into a supplementary treaty with Spain to meet all 
 contingencies, provided the boundaries of Belize 
 should be considerably extended thereby, and the 
 rights of her settlers enlarged. Spain was obliged 
 to accept these conditions, — though indeed the fault 
 had not been hers, — and it was thereupon once more 
 agreed that : 
 
 " His Britannic Majesty's subjects, and other colonists who 
 have hitherto enjoyed the protection of England, shall evacuate 
 the country of the Mosquitos as well as the continent in gene- 
 ral and the islands adjacent, without exception, situated beyond 
 
 ' " Definitive Treaty of Peace between England and Spain " ; signed at 
 Versailles Sept. 3, 1783, Art. VI. 
 
106 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the line hereinafter described, as what ought to be the frontier 
 of the extent of territory granted by His Catholic Majesty to 
 the English." 
 
 To allow of no doubt concerning the sincerity of his 
 intentions on this occasion, His Britannic Majesty 
 further engaged : 
 
 " To give the most positive orders for the evacuation of the 
 countries above mentioned, by all his subjects, of whatever 
 denomination ; but if contrary to such Declaration, there 
 should still remain any persons so daring as to presume, by 
 retiring to the interior country, to endeavor to obstruct the 
 entire evacuation already agreed upon, His Britannic Majesty, 
 so far from affording them the least succour, or even protec- 
 tion, will disavow them in the most solemn manner, as he will 
 equally do those who may hereafter attempt to settle upon the 
 territory belonging to the Spanish Dominion." 
 
 Accordins; to this new acrreement the boundaries 
 of Belize were extended in the south to the river 
 Siboon or Jabon, and inland from the sources of that 
 stream in a straight line to a point where the west- 
 ern boundary of the Belize of 1783 intersected the 
 Eio Wallis.' The rights that England had obtained 
 in the treaty of Versailles were thus extended over 
 a considerably larger territory, and besides this, 
 Spain now granted the English settlers not only the 
 right to all kinds of woods growing within the limits 
 laid down, but also permission to gather all other 
 natural products of the earth there, provided this 
 grant should not be used as a pretext " for establish- 
 ing in that country any plantation of sugar, cof- 
 fee, cocoa, or other like articles; or any fabric or 
 
 ' Cf. Map at end of volume. 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 107 
 
 manufacture by means of mills or other machines 
 whatsoever, since all the lands in question being 
 indisputably acknowledged to belong of right to 
 the Crown of Spain, no settlement of that kind, 
 or the population which would follow, could be 
 a,llowed." 
 
 When this treaty of 1786 came up for final ratifi- 
 oation it met with great antagonism in the English 
 House of Lords. William Pitt the younger was 
 then at the head of the government and his ministry 
 was at the zenith of its power. On this point the 
 opposition held together, however, and declared that 
 by ratifying the convention, England was giving up 
 a settlement of great value and importance, to which 
 she had as good a claim as to the island of Jamaica, 
 and was taking in exchange a mere slip of land in 
 Yucatan, and in thus deserting her Mosquito allies, 
 she was hanging up her degradation in every court 
 of Europe. Pitt, with his liberal ideas and his friend- 
 ship for France and Spain, considered his government 
 bound by the treaty of Versailles, and so to this tirade 
 of the opposition the ministry replied, that " Great 
 Britain was abandoning nothing, as there never had 
 been a regular government in Mosquito, and that 
 whatever rights Englishmen had acquired there had 
 already been abandoned by former conventions with 
 Spain." As for Belize, the government declared that 
 this was merely a settlement " for certain purposes 
 under the protection of His Majesty, but not wathin 
 the territory and dominion of His Majesty." 
 
 Liberal ideas and individualistic conceptions of 
 
108 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 society were gaining ground rapidly in England at 
 this time, and the will of ambitious monarchs no 
 longer sufficed for national aggrandizement. The 
 Whig ministry was supported by a bare party ma- 
 jority, and the treaty was finally ratified on July 14, 
 1786. Thus, in its declining years, the once power- 
 ful Spanish monarchy was able to assert a sovereignty 
 over the isthmus that was ever denied it during the 
 days of its real greatness.' 
 
 Recognizing, at last, that their government would 
 no longer support them in their old policy of en- 
 croachment, some of the English settlers 
 §45. Events q| Roatan and the Mosquito shore aban- 
 
 in Central . ^ 
 
 America doned the scenes of their former conquests 
 during the ^nd retired within the confines of Belize, 
 the Great — being adequately indemnified for their 
 Continental lost holdings, however, out of the British 
 Europe^'" governmental exchequer, — while others 
 preferred to stay on, in the hopes of a 
 new turn of afEairs. The Spanish colonial authori- 
 ties then made a last effort to substantiate in fact 
 the legal dominion they had just acquired over the 
 Caribbean sea-coast. To this end the mouth of the 
 San Juan was again constituted a regular port of 
 entry, and a Spanish custom house was established 
 there in 1791. 
 
 ' Convention between Great Britain and Spain Relative to America, con- 
 cluded at London, July 14, 1786, Articles I., II., III., VII., XI., and XIV. 
 
 Parliamentary Register, 1887, Vol. XXII. 
 
 57 George III., p. 183. 
 
 British Accounts and Papers, loc. cit., Vol. LXV., Doc. 18, Enclosure 
 No. 6. 
 
Struggle between England and Spain. 109 
 
 Acting under tlie advice of the settlers who had 
 remained, and of the British traders coming to their 
 shores from Jamaica and Belize, the Mosquito Indians 
 remained loyal to the friends who had deserted them, 
 and still refused to recognize Spanish authority over 
 their shore. The Spaniards then used force, but the 
 Indians, entrenching themselves within the ruins of 
 the old English forts, frustrated every endeavor to 
 reduce them to control. 
 
 By the year 1796 England and Spain were again 
 in open conflict over European affairs on the conti- 
 nent, and for the time the conventions of 1783 and 
 1786 were held in abeyance. In the following year 
 the naval forces of Great Britain shattered the fleet 
 of the Spaniards off Cape St. "Vincent, and thus 
 opened the way to further encroachments in the 
 West Indies, and along the Spanish Main. Re- 
 solved to make the most of this advantage, the 
 settlers of Belize, who had already begun to feel 
 cramped in their more confined quarters, began 
 again to encroach upon the surrounding country, 
 and finally succeeded in extending their boundaries 
 to the west and south across the rivers Nueva, 
 Wallis, and Siboon.' The English government also 
 showed, by its fresh acts of aggression, that it no 
 longer considered the treaty of 1786 binding; for, 
 finding the Carib Indians of the island of St. Vin- 
 cent in the West Indies growing too closely attached 
 to French interests, the British authorities had them 
 deported in a body, and landed, — to the number of 
 
 ' Cf. Map at end of volume. 
 
110 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 about four thousand, — on the still uninhabited Bay 
 islands. 
 
 The Spanish government was now in an almost 
 helpless condition, but fearing English contentions 
 in the West Indies and Central America, it resolved 
 to take some means to protect the colonies there 
 from further attack. The Mosquito shore still lay 
 open to encroachment, and having learned from long 
 and bitter experience that the Guatemalan authori- 
 ties were utterly unable to cope with this problem, 
 the Committee on Fortifications of the Indies, to 
 whom the matter was entrusted, now advised that 
 the entire shore from the Cha2;res i-iver in Panama 
 to Cape Grracias, be turned over to the Vice-Royalty 
 of New Granada ' to conquer and defend, A royal 
 order to this effect was accordingly issued on No- 
 vember 20, 1803, but the actual transfer seems never 
 to have been undertaken. The threatened attack on 
 the coast did not take place, as England made peace 
 with Spain soon after, and in the confusion of the 
 Peninsula war which followed even the royal order 
 was forgotten. 
 
 Left to themselves again, the colonists of Gaute- 
 mala, led by their Governor, Colonel O'Neil, with a 
 naval force of some two thousand men, attempted to 
 drive the English from Belize ; but the Jamaican 
 authorities, ever watchful of these settlements on 
 the mainland, at once sent a warship to the scene, 
 and again the Spanish were driven back. As the 
 
 ' The Presidency of New Granada had since been raised to the rank of a 
 Vice-Royalty. 
 
Struggle between England and Spain, ill 
 
 colonists had taken the initiative in the matter, and 
 broken the treaty of 1786 themselves by their un- 
 authorized attack on the now legal settlement of 
 Belize, the vpoodcutters also considered themselves 
 no longer bound by the terms of the convention, 
 and continued to pursue their encroachment far into 
 the interior and down to the Rio Sarstoon in the 
 south. Having appropriated all this land, they 
 maintained, moreover, that it was theirs henceforth,, 
 by right of conquest ; for, by force of arms and in 
 time of war, they had driven back the Spaniards 
 who had unlawfully attacked them. 
 
 Unfortunately, the Napoleonic regime had, in the 
 the meantime, so involved governmental affairs in 
 Spain, that at the close ,of the Peninsula war, this 
 point of sovereignty, brought up by the English 
 woodcutters, was never formally passed upon. In 
 1814 the treaty of Madrid was concluded between 
 England and Spain, who were really allies in the 
 last campaign. By this treaty, and as if by an after- 
 thought, the conventions of 1783 and 1786 between 
 the same two powers were without further question 
 reaffirmed in toto. Thus, in theory, the events which 
 had transpired on the isthmus after 1786, were dis- 
 regarded entirely and the status quo maintained. As 
 a matter of fact, however, a horde of Carib Indians 
 now occupied the Bay islands, the Mosquitos still 
 controlled their shore, while the settlers in Belize, 
 under a Superintendent duly authorized by the 
 colonial authorities, continued in possession of the 
 tract of land they had seized upon, and ruled over 
 it henceforth as they would. 
 
112 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Thus the close of this long and varied struggle 
 left the Nicaraguan canal route still in the hands of 
 Spain, But the once formidable Spanish naonopoly 
 in the West Indies and the Spanish Main, was broken 
 forever, and the line of Great Britain's insular pos- 
 sessions now extended in a semicircle, starting from 
 Belize in the north and running through Jamaica, 
 the Bahamas, the Leeward and Windward islands, 
 the Barbadoes, and Trinidad, to join the mainland 
 once more at British Guiana in the south, and thus 
 enclose the' Caribbean Sea.' 
 
 'British Accounts and Papers, loc. cit., Vol. LXV. Doc. 966, No. 5, 
 Enclosures 1-7. No. 18, Enclosure 6. 
 
 U. S. Foreign Affairs, 3gth Cong., ist Sess. Pt. I., pp. 65, 66 ; Pt. III., 
 pp. 360, 361. 
 
 U. S. Foreign Relations, 43d Cong., ist Sess. Pt. I., pp. 356-361. 
 Treaty of Madrid, signed August 28, 1814. Additional Article. 
 
 Hertslet's State Papers, Vol. XL., p. 953 ; Vol. XLI., p. 757; Vol. XLII., 
 p. 153 ; Vol. XLIV., p. 244 ; Vol. XLVII., p. 66i : Vol. XLVIII., p. 630 ; 
 Vol. L., p. 126. 
 
 Ancona, " History of Yucatan," IV., p. 223. 
 
 George Henderson, " British Hondurus," p. 75. London. 
 
 R. M. Martin, " History of the West Indies." London, 1836. 
 
 Bancroft, loc. cit., "Native Races," pp. 713 and 793. " History of 
 Central America," Vol. II., p. 607. 
 
 Squier, loc. cit., " Central American States,'' pp. 241-247, 582-584. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CANAL PROJECTS. 
 
 DURING the years of this protracted straggle 
 between England and Spain for the political 
 mastery of the isthmus, the more 
 practical question of connecting the two ^jg^ jjjjg^g"^ 
 seas by an artificial water-way almost sank in the 
 
 out of siffht. J^'LT" 
 
 CT . T„ . . , . Problem, 
 
 Scientific interest in the transit problem 
 was, however, revived at the very outset of the con 
 flict, by La Condamine, the famous French astrono^ 
 mer. He and his confreres, Bouguer and Grodin 
 were sent out by their government in 1735, to take 
 part in an international scientific expedition to meaS' 
 ure an arc of the meridian on the plain of Quito, 
 During the years of his sojourn in Central and South 
 America, La Condamine thus had ample opportu 
 nity to make instrumental surveys along the isthmus, 
 and, as a result of his investigations, he came to the 
 conclusion that a canal might be opened up through 
 Nicaragua to join the two oceans. In 1740 La 
 ■Condamine presented an admirable paper on the 
 subject, embodying these conclusions, before the 
 Academy of Sciences at Paris, and called for some 
 .action on the matter of interoceanic transit. 
 
 8 113 
 
114 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Antonio de IT Uoa, the renowned Spanisli scientist^ 
 and his companion Jorge Juan, a young naval officer 
 well versed even then in mathematics and physics,, 
 were also members of this same scientific expedition. 
 They too made reconnaissances along the isthmus,, 
 and added a goodly quota to the scanty knowledge 
 of the day concerning the real topography of the 
 country. 
 
 The nations of Europe were then engaged in war,, 
 as we know, and the isthmian colonies being attacked 
 on both sides by the English, nothing of a practical 
 nature could possibly come from these reports- 
 Science was benefited thereby, however, for ia this 
 way were the first stones placed for the foundation 
 of the exact knowledge of the isthmus which has 
 since been reared. ' 
 
 During the short lull in hostilities, which ensued 
 between the close of the Seven Years' war and the 
 outbreak of the Revolutionary struggle,, 
 ish Govern- Spanish interest in the transit problem re- 
 mental Sur- vived. By the terms of the treaty of Paris, 
 Tehuan- Spain considered herself secure in the pos- 
 tepec. session of her mainland colonies, at least. 
 Thus, in order to make this control more effective, 
 and also to reap larger material advantages from 
 
 ' Charles Marie de la Condamine, " Relation Abregee d'un Voyage fait 
 dans rinterieur de I'Amerique Meridionale," Paris, 1745 ; "Journal d'un. 
 Voyage fait par Ordre du Roi," Paris, 1751. 
 
 Antonio de Ulloa, " Relacion Historica del Viage a la America Meri- 
 dional," 2 Vols., 1748 ; " Noticias Americanas," 1772. 
 
 Moritz Wagner, " Ueber die Naturverhaltnisse der verschiedenen Linien 
 welche fUr einen Durchstich des centralamerikanischen Isthmus in Vorschlag; 
 sind," Miinchen, i86g. 
 
Eighteenth Century Canal Projects. 115 
 
 these isthmian lands, that thoroughly enlightened 
 monarch, Charles III., deemed it wise now, to pro- 
 vide for some more adequate means of communica- 
 tion between the Atlantic and Pacific ports. 
 
 To this end, Antonio Bucarelli, Viceroy of Mexico, 
 was instructed by the Home government, in 1771, 
 to lay out a route for a canal across the isthmus of 
 Tehuantepec. Ever since the abandonment of this 
 transit route on Cortez's death, the topography of this 
 isthmus had remained wrapped in mystery. Legends 
 and traditions of the active transit carried on in 
 these parts by the original Spanish settlers more- 
 over had in the meantime given rise to the most 
 exaggerated accounts of a continuous river basin 
 extending from sea to sea, through a wonderful pass 
 in the mountains. It was these rumors which now 
 induced the Spanish government to act. Two com- 
 petent engineers, Antonio Cramer and Miguel del 
 Corral, were accordingly sent out by Bucarelli from 
 Mexico, according to royal orders, to explore the 
 region and make a survey of this route. 
 
 They had not gone far before they discovered that 
 a mountain barrier interposed itself between the 
 sources of the Coatzacoalcos and, the Pacific ; but, 
 having no means of determining the elevation of the 
 passes, they stopped here and confidently reported 
 to the Viceroy that a canal of small dimensions 
 could readily be built across the isthmus, requiring 
 neither locks nor inclined planes. 
 
 This naive plan was somewhat further developed 
 after Bucarelli's death, which occurred soon after the 
 
116 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 report had been handed in, by his successor in office ; 
 
 but upon the decease of the latter the plan was lost 
 
 sight of, and the Spanish authorities, disappointed 
 
 at the results, turned their attention farther south.' 
 
 Having learned enough of the real topography of 
 
 Tehuantepec, Charles III. of Spain henceforth con- 
 
 „ „ fined his interest to the more familiar Hic- 
 
 § 48. 
 
 Renewed araguan route of transit, hoping at least to 
 Interest ]jg ^ble to connect the lakes with the 
 Nicaraguan -P^^ifi*^ by an artificial water-way. Surveys 
 Route. were accordingly instituted under his or- 
 ders in 1779 by the Spanish engineers, Cramer, 
 Ysasi, and Muestro, and other explorations were also 
 undertaken in the following year by Don Manuel 
 Galisteo. In 1781 Galisteo made his final report, and 
 the results were indeed discouraging. Mountains 
 everywhere barred the way, and the lakes themselves 
 were found to be 133 feet above the level of the sea. 
 The mechanism of locks was then but little under- 
 stood, and with this difference of altitude between 
 the two bodies of water, the royal engineer saw no 
 practicable way of cutting a canal to connect them. 
 Hodgson and Lee, the English agents at Mosquito- 
 land and Belize, being by this time relieved of their 
 governmental duties through the institution of Lord 
 Dartmouth's more regular colonial regime in the 
 country, took pains to accompany in a private capa- 
 city the first of these Spanish surveying parties. 
 They had long been eager to lay hold of this fertile 
 
 ^ Sullivan, loc. cit., p. 74. 
 
 Engineering Magazine, loc. cit., March 3, 1893. 
 
 Simon Stevens," loc. cit. 
 
Eighteenth Century Canal Projects. 117 
 
 depression of Nicaragua for the Crown, and, on their 
 return to England after this, they gave a most glow- 
 ing account of the region and its magnificent facili- 
 ties for interoceanic transit. Their reports interested 
 the English authorities immensely and led at least 
 indirectly to the attack upon the San Juan, under- 
 taken by Nelson in the following year. 
 
 In spite of the discouraging reports of the royal 
 engineers, Spanish interest in the proposed canal 
 was still active at the close of the war. The details 
 of these surveys were then published and a company 
 was formed by Martin de la Bastide, under the 
 patronage of the Crown, to connect Lake Nicaragua 
 with the Pacific at the Gulf of Nicoya along the 
 Sapoa river. The Spanish fleet in the Pacific was 
 also instructed by Charles to make further surveys 
 of this route, but, though the war of the American 
 Revolution had terminated so favorably for the 
 Spanish, the political volcano in France had already 
 begun its ominous rumblings, and in the confusion 
 which followed, this canal project was forgotten.^ 
 
 The Spanish under Charles IV. were engaged after 
 
 this in defensive operations on the lower isthmus 
 
 as well. Paterson's unsuccessful colony at „ ^^ 
 
 ■' § 49. The 
 
 Caledonian Bay had taught them a lesson. Spanish 
 If this district were really " the key of the Military 
 universe," why had they been so foolish as across the 
 to allow it to revert again into the hands Caledonian 
 of the natives after they had once con- ^oute. 
 quered the land? Even now it might not be too 
 
 ' Sullivan, /oc. cit., pp. ^i, ff. 
 
 Engineering Magazine, loc. cit., March 3, 1893. 
 
118 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 late, and so in the year 1788, having secured all 
 their rights farther north, the Spanish authorities 
 began to make up for their errors of omission in the 
 south. Military posts and missions were accord- 
 ingly established at Ada in Caledonian Bay, on the 
 Atlantic, and at San Miguel, on the Pacific. The 
 plan then was to connect these two by a military 
 road over the range. Manuel Milla, the officer en- 
 trusted with the work, proceeded with his corps of 
 engineers from Caledonian Bay, crossed the divide, 
 and came finally to Puerto Principi, an old Spanish 
 fort on the Savannah river, from which point a trail, 
 called the Ariza's Road,^ led down to the sea. Milla 
 must have possessed a hardy constitution, and an 
 imaginative mind, for in his report he said that, in 
 crossing the " Montana Grande," he found no diffi- 
 cult pass " with the exception of a ravine at the 
 commencement, which four men could level off with 
 spades in less than an hour." Here was more proof 
 of the advantages of the Caledonian route and 
 Lionel Wafer's former description of the country 
 was thus more than corroborated.' 
 
 The delusion was allowed to live on, however, for 
 though the mountains seemed no obstacle to Milla, 
 their inhabitants, the Bravos, were more than a match 
 for both him and the military of Spain. The Bravos, 
 in short, objected to the road being cut through their 
 country, and compelled Charles to sign a treaty with 
 them, agreeing to abandon their country for ever. 
 Thus another failure was added to the long list of 
 
 ' After a governor of Darien. Cf. Map frontispiece. 
 2C/.,^«fe, §39. 
 
Eighteenth Century Canal Projects. 119 
 
 futile endeavors which characterized the reign of 
 this unfortunate monarch.' 
 
 After this all Europe was convulsed with the 
 Napoleonic wars, and schemes of political prepon- 
 derance on the isthmus were, for the time § 50. von 
 at least, abandoned. It was during these Humboldt's 
 very years, hoM^ever, that the real founda- ti^ralMg 
 tion of our knowledge of the topography the 
 
 of these lands was laid. This was due to isthmus, 
 the work of Alexander von Humboldt, the celebrated 
 ■German scientist, who spent these years travelling as 
 best he could through the length and breadth of 
 Spanish America, collecting scientific data of the 
 land for future publication. 
 
 Von Humboldt made as careful an examination of 
 the topography of these isthmian countries as the 
 circumstances would permit, and came to the con- 
 clusion that a canal to connect the two oceans was 
 practicable somewhere along the isthmus. The 
 difficulties in the way of scientific investigation in 
 these parts was then enormous, and in no section 
 more so than along the forbidden Atrato river. 
 Von Humboldt recognized the evident advantages 
 of these Darien routes, but being unable to examine 
 them in detail, was obliged to base his conclusions 
 on surmises and his general knowledge of the topog- 
 raphy of the district. With the Nicaraguan route 
 it was diiferent, and here von Humboldt was able to 
 •examine each of the proposed routes in detail. 
 
 As a result of his studies, and the knowledge he 
 
 ' Sullivan, loc. cit., p. ig. 
 
 Engineering Magazine, loc. cit., March 3, 1893. 
 
120 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 was able to glean from the natives, von Humboldt 
 finally gave his opinion on the transit problem as 
 follows : 
 
 " The Isthmus of Nicaragua and that of Cupica ' have 
 always appeared to me the most favorable for the formation 
 of canals of large dimensions." ' 
 
 Von Humboldt's conclusions in regard to the 
 practicability of an interoceanic water-way across 
 the American isthmus, were published in 
 Decree of Paris, Just as the Peninsula campaign 
 the Spanish Y7SiS drawing to a close. Soon after, with 
 the aid of the British allies, Ferdinand 
 VII. was reinstated, and recommenced his reign 
 under a constitution in opposition to the threatened 
 despotism of Bonaparte. The ambitious young 
 Cortes, assembled at Cadiz, was imbued with liberal 
 ideas, and bent on making the rejuvenated Spain 
 outshine even the ancient monarchy in the glory of 
 its works. With confidence in the truth of von 
 Humboldt's assertions, one of the first — and there- 
 with also one of the last — acts of this enthusiastic 
 legislature was, therefore, to pass a formal decree 
 providing for the construction of a canal for the 
 largest vessels through the Central American colo- 
 nies, and calling for the formation of a company to 
 undertake the work. 
 
 Despotism soon cast its pall again over this first 
 
 ' Atrato-Napipi Route. Cf. Intro., § g. 
 
 '' Cf. Alexander von Humboldt, "Personal Narrative of Travels," Vol. . 
 VI., pp. 239-300. 
 
 Also his " Essai Politique sur la Nouvelle Espagne." Paris, 1811. 
 
Eighteenth Century Canal Projects. 121 
 
 brief outburst of Spanish liberalism, however, and 
 no further attention was paid to this decree of the 
 erstwhile Cortes. The monarchy was, indeed, re- 
 established, but only the shell of Spain's pristine 
 glory now remained. The country was vacillating 
 between the dawnina: constitutional ajje and the 
 absolutism of the past, and, naturally, from the 
 events that had occurred, was in no position either 
 politically or financially to undertake a work of such 
 magnitude. 
 
 The day had passed when the absolute monarchs 
 of Europe could with a word order the execution of 
 this or that great enterprise, nor had the time yet 
 come when republican governments should take 
 upon themselves the responsibility of public under- 
 takings. The era of private capitalistic enterprise 
 was now being ushered in, and, as Spain had not 
 bred capitalists of sufficient courage and energy to 
 enter on a work of this kind, the canal project then 
 and there passed away from the Spanish, to be taken 
 up by other hands.* 
 
 ' Sullivan, loc. cit., p. 76. 
 
Part Two. 
 
 THE PEEIOB OP LIBERALISM AND INDIVIDTJAL INITIATIVE 
 
 THE CANAL PROJECT A PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
 
 UNDERTAKING UNDER GOVERNMENTAL GUARAN- 
 TIES. 1815-1865. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 D 
 
 URING all these years of competitive struggle 
 
 between the absolute monarchs of the West, 
 
 for the largest share in the wealth of the 
 
 Indies and America, social forces were continuously 
 
 active in Europe, working toward still an- 
 
 • ^ I-,- 11 • §52. The 
 
 other change m her political and economic Growth of 
 
 relations. The monopolistic system that individual- 
 had been evolved by the sovereigns, in ^^^^^ 
 spite of its admirable oi'ganization, was, 
 nevertheless increasingly expensive. The frequent 
 wars that were necessary to maintain the monarch's 
 government proved in the end a constant drain on 
 both his land and his labor resources. Home indus- 
 tries, however exploited, were unable to stand the 
 strain, and thus, in order to exist, each sovereign had 
 
 123 
 
124 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 perforce to keep adding to his domain fresh sources 
 of colonial supply. Geographic limitations and the 
 strength of competitors rendered this ever more diffi- 
 cult, and'the time was, therefore, bound to come 
 when the absolute monarchy, like the empire of 
 Rome before, could no longer support itself. 
 
 Peasants and artisans, who from the first had been 
 obliged to labor for the profit of the King and his 
 court, became more and more dissatisfied. They had 
 stood alone, however, so long as the safety-valve of 
 colonial enterprise continued to draw off the energy 
 of that large body of middle-class citizens, who were 
 willing to support the existing regime so long as it 
 paid them to do so. But in the end the monarchs of 
 Europe began to absorb the colonies also under their 
 monopolistic system, and to exploit them and their 
 settlers for the profit of the court. As govern- 
 mental expenses increased, therefore, so the circle of 
 those excluded from what they deemed a fair share 
 in the profits of industry expanded, and therewith 
 also the area of discontent. 
 
 The land at the disposal of the people of each 
 nation was both extensive and rich enough for all 
 their needs ; their natural labor force still remained 
 unimpaired ; and yet the profits continued to be 
 absorbed by an all-greedy few. Free access to the 
 land, and freedom to labor as they would for them- 
 selves being still denied them, the discontent of the 
 masses was therefore but natural. Could this in- 
 iquitous governmental system be but broken down, 
 — so the people argued, — and the surplus value 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 125 
 
 created by their own industry diverted from the use 
 of an idle and spendthrift class into the pockets of 
 the actual producers, all would again be well. The 
 ablest thinkers and writers of the time, moreover, 
 began to analyze the situation in much the same 
 way, until finally the disenfranchised came generally 
 to the conclusion that the royal governments of the 
 ■day, with their forced labor and monopolistic ten- 
 dencies, were really at fault. 
 
 In short, production on the basis of serfdom had 
 run its full course, and, like slavery before, had 
 resulted in the concentration of wealth, once more, 
 in the hands of a few. Profits having begun to fall 
 ■off, the owners were no longer able to pay for the 
 support that their numerical minority demanded. 
 Diminishing returns finally set in, and there being 
 BO more land immediately available, some more pro- 
 ductive system of labor had necessarily to be evolved 
 before anything like general economic satisfaction 
 could again be attained. 
 
 Now the wage system had long since been insti- 
 tuted in the handicrafts, and might, indeed, have 
 proved satisfactory, had it not been that the govern- 
 mental taxes and restraints laid on industry absorbed 
 too large a share of the surplus value. In agricul- 
 ture, on the other hand, the relics of the old serf 
 system still lingered on, and here again royal taxes 
 •only increased the burden of feudal dues. With the 
 wholesale removal of these oppressive governmental 
 ^nd feudal restrictions, the wage system might there- 
 fore be allowed to establish itself more freely, and 
 
126 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 prove its own efficiency. Sach then was the ultimate 
 demand of the age, that individuals should be left free 
 to hire their own laborers, or work for a wage them- 
 selves, as their economic circumstances might allow. 
 
 It was in England that this doctrine of individual 
 freedom in all branches of industrial activity was 
 earliest applied in practice. Her people were the 
 first to break down those galling restrictions encom- 
 passing both agriculture and trade, to make room 
 for a more liberal system of individual labor and 
 capital. Under the new regime, therefore, the centre 
 of economic activity took another step westward, 
 from the European continent to the British Isles. 
 But the Netherlands were working contemporane- 
 ously toward the same end, and France also broke 
 the chains of the past soon after by the more sudden 
 upheaval of her bourgeoisie in 1789. Thus before 
 the first quarter of our century had passed away the 
 phenomenon of individual freedom and individual 
 ownership was quite common among the nations o£ 
 Western Europe. Constitutional monarchies and 
 republics came gradually to take the place of the 
 absolutism of the past, governmental functions were 
 now reduced to a minimum, and individuals were 
 left free to exploit the land as they saw fit and make 
 what they could of their economic opportunities. 
 
 Freed almost entirely from governmental fetters, 
 and no longer hampered by either feudal or gild 
 restrictions, both agriculture and industry began to 
 expand very rapidly. This again resulted in an 
 accumulation of capital in the hands of private 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 127 
 
 individuals, whose sole aim it was to reinvest the 
 same with profit. An age of individual projects 
 and undertakings was thus ushered in, and the 
 westward and eastward movements of the world's 
 commerce received fresh impetus accordingly. 
 
 It came about in this way that, among the coimt- 
 less schemes for material advancement which charac- 
 terized the beginnings of this new century, there 
 cropped out also a rejuvenated interest in the inter- 
 oceanic canal project. But the complexion of the 
 transit problem was now completely changed. 
 Whereas in the earlier days it had been the dream 
 of the national monarchs of Europe to pierce the 
 newly discovered continent in their search for 
 Asiatic treasure, we have henceforth to deal with 
 individual capitalists, who hoped to increase their 
 private incomes by developing new lands and pro- 
 vidins: a shorter route for their Western American 
 and flourishing East Indian trade. 
 
 A new factor was, moreover, now added to the 
 canal controversy; for the people of the United 
 States had by this time entered into g^^^ ^^^ 
 the arena of political and economic com- United 
 petition with the older states of Europe, ^^tw^Fac- 
 and from their geographic position alone, tor in the 
 interoceanic transit must of necessity prove Canal 
 
 « 1 , , • I i xi Problem. 
 
 a matter of the utmost importance to them. 
 While still colonies of Great Britain, both our land 
 and our labor had long been systematically exploited 
 for the benefit of the English monarchy. Feeling 
 ourselves thus oppressed, we too had joined in the 
 
128 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 general revolutionary movement of tlie last century, 
 — not to change matters in Europe, however, but 
 rather to free ourselves entirely from the restrictions 
 of the Home government, and allow our people to 
 develop their own land with their own labor to 
 their own individual advantage. 
 
 The doctrine of individual liberty and private 
 ownership became, accordingly, the corner-stone of 
 our Constitution, and being thus — theoretically, at 
 least — on the same plane of industrial evolution, we 
 stood ready also to rival the Europeans henceforth 
 in the more practical struggle for individual wealth. 
 We then possessed one great advantage over the 
 capitalists of Europe which, for the time at least, 
 stood us in admirable stead. Being a new people, 
 on a new land, there was ample individual oppor- 
 tunity for all. As long as this was the case, it was 
 impossible for class spirit to develop, and, while 
 each could freely pursue his own individual ends, 
 ■\ve could still stand together as a compact whole, — 
 a nation of freemen, — with the exception of course 
 of our negro population. 
 
 As colonists, we had paid but little attention to 
 the struggle above described between England and 
 Spain for possession of the canal route in Central 
 America; on the one hand because we were still 
 loyal to the mother land, and again because we were 
 too much absorbed in our own settlements, warfares, 
 and economic issues. The case was altogether differ- 
 ent, however, after we had broken definitely with 
 Great Britain, and become the first independent state 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 129 
 
 in the New World. America we came then to re- 
 gard as the destined home of the free, and, having 
 taken the initiative ourselves, it seemed now incum- 
 bent upon us to defend this new continent from any 
 f ui'ther encroachments on the part of the rapacious 
 monarchs of Europe. 
 
 In Spanish America the colonial adventurers of 
 early days had, as we know, fought hard to preserve 
 their rights of conquest from the encroach- 
 ment of the governmental Viceroys. Fail- ish-Ameri- 
 ing in this, • and therefore rebellious at «=^" i"<^e- 
 heart, these men and their descendants 
 came gradually to mingle their blood with the down- 
 trodden natives themselves, and finally went so far 
 as to take up their cause against the exactions of the 
 royal Spanish taskmasters. A dissatisfied Spanish- 
 American population as well became in consequence 
 widespread, from the southern boundaries of our 
 land, through the isthmus, and southwestwards along 
 the Pacific coast of South America. As the power 
 of the Spanish monarchy began to decline, these 
 provinces of Spain in the New World were ready 
 and anxious, therefore, to seize a favorable oppor- 
 tunity to revolt. This came while their government 
 was futilely engaged at home in resisting the en- 
 croachments of Napoleon. Then, under the leader- 
 ership of a handful of patriots of their own blood, 
 aided by English, French, and even North American 
 volunteers, one by one the colonies began to break 
 away from Spanish control, and after many vicis- 
 situdes established a precarious independence. 
 
130 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 The New Granadans were the first to raise the 
 standard of revolt. Under the leadership of 
 Miranda and Simon Bolivar, the people of this 
 viceroyalty began their successful struggle with the 
 Spanish colonial authorities in 1811, and after a 
 varied conflict of some years' duration they were 
 finally able, in 1821, to establish the independent 
 republic of Colombia, consisting of the former Span* 
 ish provinces of New Granada, Venezuela, and Ecua- 
 dor. The cohesion of this young confederacy was, 
 indeed, very slight, as events soon proved. During 
 its brief existence, it accomplished one good act, 
 however, in abolishing the institution of slavery, 
 thus advancing one step farther toward the theo- 
 retical freedom of man, than even its northern 
 brother the United States. 
 
 The Central American Chancellorate was not long 
 in following New Granada's rebellious example.. 
 After one or more tentative efforts which miscarried,, 
 the city of Guatemala finally declared its inde- 
 pendence on September 15th, 1821, and invited the 
 other provinces to Join her in the revolutionary 
 cause. The others were willing enough to enter in,, 
 but on January 5, 1822, before the steps necessary 
 for an independent union could be effected, the 
 Mexicans interfered. Now this northern viceroyalty 
 after an earlier unsuccessful effort under Hidalgo,, 
 had also, by this time, achieved its complete inde- 
 pendence under Iturbide. But this patriot was 
 striving to establish an empire in the New World, 
 and was bent upon adding the Central American 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 131 
 
 states to his domain. In this he was, indeed, success- 
 ful for a time, and on November 4th, the Mexican 
 power was fully established in Guatemala. The 
 Emperor Iturbide's plans, besides meeting with dis- 
 favor in Spain, also called forth great opposition 
 from the Spanish Americans in Mexico, and bn April 
 23, 1823 he was forced to resign his control before 
 Santa Anna and his insurgents. The Central Amer- 
 icans thereupon seized the opportunity and expelled 
 Iturbide's forces from their land. Under pressure 
 of this double danojer from without the former 
 intendancies of Guatemala, Honduras, San Salvador, 
 Nicaragua, and Costa Rica then Joined together in 
 the independent Federal Republic of the United 
 Provinces of Central America, under their leader 
 General Filisola, thus leaving the province of Chi- 
 apas to adhere still to the then uncertain destinies 
 of Mexico. 
 
 Among the Spanish American provinces— ^and 
 herein they differed from English America — slavery 
 had always been part and parcel of the royal rigime, 
 and, as an institution, it was in consequence ever 
 identified with the evils of the whole colonial system 
 of the monarchy. In the new Central American con- 
 stitution, therefore, slavery was formally abolished, 
 as it had already been forbidden by the republic of 
 Colombia two years before. 
 
 Spanish America came thus, in theory at least, to 
 stand for the complete freedom of man ; though sub- 
 sequent events can hardly be said to have justified 
 this claim. In North America, this theoretical free- 
 
132 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 dom, was marred from the outset by the Constita- 
 tion's tacit approval of negro slavery ; but here on 
 the contrary, later events wiped out this stain. In 
 this original difference lay a pregnant cause of mis- 
 understanding, which was soon to separate for many 
 years th*e republic of the North from those, of the 
 Centre and the South. This divergence in views 
 was at first hardly manifest, however, and patriots 
 of both English and Spanish America chose for the 
 time to ignore its presence entirely.^ 
 
 Acting in our chosen capacity of guardian of the 
 liberties of America, we straightway acknowledged 
 _. the complete independence of these Span- 
 Monroe ish-American republics. Then, to demon- 
 Doctrine, strate even more explicitly our sympathy 
 with their cause, it was proposed in Congress that a 
 mission be appointed to visit the countries and con- 
 sult with their leaders in regard to future action. 
 
 The friendship we thus offered was soon put to a 
 more serious test. In Eastern Europe the principles 
 of the absolute monarchy still survived, and the 
 sovereigns of these inland states, together with the 
 temporarily restored dynasties of France an4^pain, 
 now began to show a disposition to crush out liberal 
 ideas wherever_posaible, by means of what was 
 termed their " Holy^Alliance." ThgjCzar of Russia 
 was already encroaching upon our own northwest 
 
 ' E. J. Payne, loc. ai., " History of European Colonies," Ch. XVI. 
 " Encyclopedia Britannica" ; " Colombia." 
 
 Bancroft, loc.cit., " History of Central America," Vol. in.,Ch. II., III., 
 IV., V. 
 
 'LoTxi.oTi Daily News, October, 1849. 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 133 
 
 boundaries, and now it was even rumored ttat the 
 Alliance intended to stamp out the revolutionary 
 spirit in South and Central America and to restore 
 tFes e colon ies to the lately re-established Spanish 
 monarchy^ 
 
 The mere rumor. was enough. Our principles were 
 now at stake, and with enthusiasm we took up the 
 gauntlet which Europe was apparently casting at our 
 feet. With us this was the " era of good feeling," 
 and the question of slavery had not as yet come up 
 to divide our people in twain. We were a united 
 nation, with a fixed purpose, and thus in the presi- 
 dential election of 1820, which put Mr. Monroe once 
 more in office, there was no division in the popular 
 vote, nortb or south, east or west. In answer to 
 Russia's pretensions and the intrigues of the Holy 
 Alliance it was quite possible, therefore, for John 
 Quincy Adams, then President Monroe's Secretary 
 of State, to boldly declare, that " with the exception 
 of the Britisb establishments north of the United 
 States, the remainder of both the American conti- 
 nents must henceforth be left to the management of 
 American hands." 
 
 Bolivar the patriot had in the meantime made 
 himself a military dictator in South America and 
 was aiming at the founding of an empire there, such, 
 as Iturbide had all but established in Mexico. The 
 restored Bourbons of France were, moreover, already 
 evolving a plan whereby, by making use of the work 
 of these dictators, they might place princes of their 
 own blood over the Spanish-American empires so 
 
134 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 formed. This was sure to arouse Great Britain's 
 suspicions, however, and induce her to side with us 
 in the coming dispute. Lord Castlereagh had, indeed, 
 up to this, rather favored the policy of the Alliance 
 abroad, — at least in its hatred of the Bonapartes, — 
 but upon his sudden death at this juncture, Mr. 
 Canning again took charge of the Foreign Office, 
 and at once began to make overtures to Mr. Rush, 
 our minister in London, suggesting that the two 
 governments henceforth co-operate in opposing the 
 designs of France and Spain in South America. 
 Mr. Canning frankly told Mr. Rush that England 
 now " conceived the recovery of the colonies by 
 Spain to be hopeless," and that time and circum- 
 stances alone would determine her recognition of 
 their independence. He then added significantly, 
 that though Great Britain " aimed at no possession 
 of them herself," and though she would " throw no 
 impediment in the way of an arrangement between 
 them and the mother country by amicable negotia- 
 tion," she " could not see any portion of them trans- 
 ferred to any other power with indifference." 
 
 Mr. Adams was astute enough to recognize that 
 England was actuated in her offer of co-operation 
 rather by fear of France than by any real sympathy 
 with our own national policy, and he could not see 
 why Great Britain should alone be made the exception 
 to our protest against further European interference 
 in America. The President, however, was not so 
 decided in his convictions. He was anxious to avoid 
 an " entangling alliance " with England, and yet, to 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 135 
 
 proceed alone in the matter would be contrary to his 
 oft reiterated policy of non-interference in the affairs 
 of the revolted colonies. In his dilemma President 
 Monroe appealed by letter to Mr. Jefferson, who was 
 then living in retirement at Monticello, and received 
 the following reply : 
 
 " The question presented by the letters you have sent me is 
 the most momentous which has ever been offered to my con- 
 templation since that of Independence. That made us a 
 nation ; this sets our compass and points the course which we 
 are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And 
 never could we embark upon it under circumstances more 
 auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, 
 never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe ; our 
 second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic 
 affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests 
 distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She 
 should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and 
 apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to be- 
 come the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be 
 to make our hemisphere that of freedom." 
 
 This letter from so high an authority went far to 
 convince the President of the wisdom of Mr. Adams's 
 plan, and practically decided his course. In his 
 annual message of 1823 he accordingly placed our 
 young government on record before the world as 
 follows : 
 
 The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a 
 principle in which the rights and interests of the United States 
 are involved, that the American continents by the free and 
 independent condition which they have assumed and maintain 
 are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future 
 
136 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 colonization by any European power. . . . We owe it 
 therefore to candor, and to the amicable relations existing 
 between the United States and those powers, to declare that 
 we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their 
 system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our 
 peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies 
 of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not 
 interfere. But with the governments who have declared their 
 independence and maintained it and whose independence we 
 have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowl- 
 edged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of 
 oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their 
 destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as a 
 manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United 
 States." ' 
 
 Our ultimatum to Europe was thus proclaimed^ 
 and, in the light of a general principle, the people 
 § s6. The ^^ ^^® United States enthusiastically sup- 
 Panama ported the Monroe doctrine. Divergence 
 
 ission. ^^^^ soon to arise, however, over the more 
 practical question as to the time, manner, and means 
 of its enforcement. 
 
 The period of the presidential election soon came 
 around again, and out of the midst of the single politi- 
 cal party of the day, a number of candidates appeared 
 for the place. In " the scrub race for the presidency " 
 
 ' President Monroe's Seventh Annual Message, December 3, 1823. 
 
 Edwin Williams, "President's Messages,'' 1789-1846, New York, 1846. 
 Vol. I., pp. 541-562. 
 
 President Monroe's Special Message, February 22, 1822, and Seventh. 
 Annual Message, December 3, 1823. 
 
 Francis Wharton, " Digest of International Law," § 137a. 
 
 U. S. Ex. Doc. No. 75, 31st Cong., ist Sess., p.- 94. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc. Nb. 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., p. 36. 
 
 Thomas H. Benton, " Thirty Years in the United States Senate," Vol. I.» 
 pp. 65-70, New York, 1856. 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 137 
 
 ■which followed, a good deal of political feeliog was 
 consequently engendered, and the " era of good feel- 
 ing" which had characterized the last election be- 
 came part of our past history. No one of the 
 candidates received the necessary number of votes 
 for election, and so the duty of choosing Mr. Mon- 
 roe's successor devolved ultimately upon the House 
 of Representatives. Mr. Adams was finally chosen, 
 and, as he was now known to have been the real 
 instigator of the Monroe doctrine, he naturally 
 enough regai'ded his selection, as a vindication of 
 his national policy, at least by the House. And yet, 
 when Mr. Clay brought the matter up before Con- 
 gress in the same year, and endeavored to bring the 
 House to pass a resolution embodying the Monroe 
 doctrine in due form, he was met with a flat refusal. 
 The Senate was also divided on the question along 
 both partisan and personal lines, and, indeed, for the 
 most part antagonistic to the new administration 
 then about to take ofl3.ce. All this naturally had 
 an effect on Mr. Adams, and somewhat modified his 
 views as chief executive. 
 
 England, having failed to secure our co-operation 
 in the matter of the Spanish-American republics, 
 had already solved her present diplomatic problem 
 along radically different lines. Finding his govern- 
 ment also included in our threat against Europe, 
 Mr. Canning at once came to an understanding with 
 the French Cabinet directly, and then recognized the 
 independence of the southern republics for Great 
 Britain. All Europe was thus ranged tacitly against 
 
138 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 our pretensions, and, to emphasize tlie matter, Mr. 
 Canning then politely informed our minister, Mr. 
 Rush, that " Great Britain considered the whole of 
 the unoccupied parts of America as being open to 
 her future settlements in like manner as heretofore." 
 
 Under these changed conditions an opportunity 
 was soon afforded for a thorough discussion of the 
 whole question of our relations toward the revolted 
 provinces of Spanish-America. Mexico, Central 
 America, Colombia, Buenos Ayres, Peru, and Chile 
 were the states which had up to this established 
 their independence, but their political situation was 
 still far from secure. They had one and all mod- 
 elled their republican institutions after the pattern 
 of the United States, and, as we had so magnani- 
 mously put ourselves on record in their behalf, they 
 now, naturally enough, looked to us for continued 
 support. A plan was accordingly evolved by Boli- 
 var, and eagerly taken up by the several states, for a 
 '■ Congress of American Nations " to meet in Panama 
 in June, 1826, — or as Mr. Benton then described it, 
 an " assembly of the American States of Spanish 
 origin, counselling for their safety and independ- 
 ence, and presenting the natural wish for the United 
 States to place herself at their head, as the eldest 
 sister of the new republics, and the one whose ex- 
 ample and institutions the others have followed." 
 
 President Adams at once accepted the iavitation 
 on behalf of the United States, and nominated en- 
 voys to the congress, as the whole scheme fitted in 
 exactly with his original policy. In his message to 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 139 
 
 the Senate, announcing his nominations, Mr. Adams 
 took great care to say, however, that there was no 
 attempt in the plan to form alliances or to engage in 
 any project of hostility to any nation, but that the 
 intention rather was to establish liJberal principles of 
 commercial intercourse and maritime neutrality, and 
 also possibly to come to an agreement for the adop- 
 tion of the Monroe doctrine. In even more guarded 
 terms the President then proceeded : " An agree- 
 ment between all the parties represented at the 
 meeting, that each will guard, by its own means, 
 against the establishment of any future European 
 •colony within its borders, may be found advisable. 
 This was, more than two years since, announced by 
 my predecessor to the world, as a principle resulting 
 from the emancipation of both the American conti- 
 nents. It may be so developed to the new southern 
 nations that they may feel it as an essential appen- 
 dage to their independence." 
 
 This was the Monroe doctrine reduced to a mere 
 phrase, and exhibited a woeful lack of foresight re- 
 garding the future exigencies of Spanish- American 
 politics. The idea of the assembly itself, however, 
 was inspiring to our young democracy, and the pa- 
 pers were full of the scheme, likening this congress 
 of the American states on their isthmus to the old 
 Amphictyonic Council, that was wont in classic days 
 to come together on the isthmus of Corinth to coun- 
 sel for the safety of the Grecian states. It was a 
 popular administration plan, in short, and the House, 
 which had made the President, naturally enough 
 
140 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 supported it; but this meant little, considering 
 the altogether indefinite nature of the diplomatic 
 proposals. 
 
 But a majority in the Senate was opposed to the 
 idea; not indeed. because the congress was in any 
 way to emphasize the Monroe doctrine over against 
 the powers of Europe, but rather because the pro- 
 posed convention at Panama was evidently intent 
 upon taking up the question of slavery, upon which, 
 the States of the North and South were already 
 divided. The institution of slavery, had, as we 
 know, already been abolished by Spanish America, 
 and now it was proposed that the Panama congress 
 should deliberate in regard to taking Joint action in 
 giving status to the young negro republic of Hayti. 
 This could never be. As one of our senators hotly 
 remai'ked, " No, this is a question which has been 
 determined herb for three and thirty years ; one 
 which has never been open for discussion, at home 
 or abroad. . . . It is one which cannot be dis- 
 cussed in this chamber, on this day ; and shall we go 
 to Panama to discuss it ? " 
 
 The upshot of it all was that the Senate Commit- 
 tee reported adversely on the President's recommen- 
 dation, and the following resolution was thereupon 
 spread upon the journal of the House : 
 
 " It is therefore the opinion of this House that the govern- 
 ment of the United States ought not to be represented at the 
 Congress of Panama except in a diplomatic character, nor 
 ought they to form any alliance, offensive or defensive, or 
 negotiate respecting such an alliance with all or any of the 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 141 
 
 South American republics ; nor ought they to become parties 
 with them, or either of them, to any joint declaration for the 
 purpose of preventing the interference of any of the European 
 powers with their independence or form of government, or to 
 any compact for the purpose of preventing colonization upon 
 the continents of America, but that the people of the United 
 States should be left free to act, in any crisis, in such a man- 
 ner as their feelings of friendship toward these republics and 
 as their honour and policy may at the time dictate." 
 
 By these words the last traces of any Monroe 
 doctrine sting were extracted from the President's 
 plan, and, though the invitation of our southern 
 neighbors was indeed, formally accepted, the pri- 
 mary objects of the mission were at the same time 
 totally defeated by the conditions and restrictions 
 that were loaded upon our envoys on their depar- 
 ture.' 
 
 The question of interoceanic transit had, in the 
 meanwhile, been brought up in this connection be- 
 fore the Federal Congress of the young 
 Central American confederacy, and, at the United 
 very time that our Senate was discussing states Be- 
 the objects of the Panama mission with interested 
 such warmth, the minister of this new in the Canal 
 republic, Don Antonio Jose Canaz, arrived '^°^^'^ ' 
 
 in Washington, and at once addressed a note to the 
 
 1 Thomas Benton, loc. cit.. Vol. I., Oh. XXV. 
 
 Ibid., " Abridgment of the Debates of Congress," Vol. VII., pp. 470, ff. 
 
 Thomas V. Cooper, " American Politics,'' Bk. I., p. 27. 7th ed., 
 Chicago, 1884. 
 
 Joseph West Moore, "The American Congress," pp. 232-233. New 
 York, 1895. 
 
142 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 State Department calling the attention of the United 
 State's government to the importance of the subject 
 of the proposed canal. " The republic of the Centre," 
 he wrote, " was in the first moments of its existence, 
 and nothing would be more grateful to it than a 
 co-operation by this generous nation, whose noble 
 conduct has been a model and a protection to all 
 the Americas ; and that it would be highly satis- 
 factory to have it a participator not only of the 
 merit of the enterprise, but of the great advantages 
 which that canal of communication must produce, 
 by means of a treaty which may perpetually secure 
 the possession of it to the two nations." 
 
 Henry Clay, who had lately been appointed Secre- 
 tary of State by President Adams, was himself a 
 warm advocate of a vigorous American policy. He 
 was also personally interested in the canal project 
 itself, and foreseeing the temper of the people in the 
 matter, he now resolved to strengthen the popular 
 support of the administration's course, by making 
 this transit scheme part and parcel of the Panama 
 mission. Clay was unable, of course, to commit his 
 government at once to Central America's proposi- 
 tion, but, after consulting with the President, he 
 informed Seflor Canaz, " of the deep interest which 
 is taken by the government of the United States in 
 the execution of an undertaking which is so highly 
 calculated to diffuse an extensive influence on the 
 affairs of mankind," and further expressed to him 
 " the acknowledgments which were justly due to the 
 friendly overture " he had made for his governmeM. 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 143 
 
 Leaving the matter of the treaty of co-operation thus 
 open, Mr. Clay then gave detailed instructions to 
 Mr. "Williams, our charge d'affaires to Central Amer- 
 ica, who was Just about to start for his post, order- 
 ing him to collect all the data possible as to the 
 feasibility of the proposed canal through Nicaragua, 
 and as to its probable cost. 
 
 Having worked out his plan thus far, Mr. Clay 
 then turned to the Panama envoys, who were now 
 waiting on the action of the Senate before depart- 
 ing, and informed them officially that "a canal for 
 navigation between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans 
 will prove a proper subject for consideration at the 
 congress," adding further that " that vast object, if it 
 ever should be accomplished, will be interesting in a 
 greater or less degree to all parts of the world, but 
 especially to this continent will accrue its greatest 
 benefits." 
 
 Mr. Clay had not miscalculated the popular 
 interest in the canal project. It soon became part 
 of the Monroe doctrine, and readily allied itself to 
 the more particular question of the Panama mission 
 still being discussed. The papers took it up and 
 the people were enthusiastic. Business men saw in 
 the project an opportunity of economic gain, and 
 looked with confidence to President Adams's admin- 
 istration for national aid in the undertaking. The 
 prospect of international rivalry only aroused 
 popular enthusiasm the more. Already a party of 
 English capitalists, guaranteed by Barclay, Richard- 
 son, and Company, the London bankers, had 
 
144 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 formulated a plan for the construction of a canal 
 througb. the western seaboard strip of Nicaragua to 
 connect witli the Jakes and the San Juan. A com- 
 petent ciyil engineer, Mr. John Bailey, had also been 
 sent out the year before with a reconnoitring party in 
 an armed brig to Central America, and was even then 
 in Nicai'agua making surveys and arranging for the 
 proper concessions. News of this expedition spurred 
 on our capitalists to more practical activity, a pre- 
 liminary company was thereupon formed in New 
 York, and an agent soon after sent off to the isth- 
 mus, under instructions to make surveys for the 
 company and to secure a concession if possible in 
 advance of the English. 
 
 All this activity naturally heightened the con- 
 fidence of the Central American republic in the 
 immediate execution of the work, and the Federal 
 Congress straightway passed an act formally provid- 
 ing for the construction of a canal for the largest 
 vessels through the territory of Nicaragua, and 
 granting very liberal concessions to any company 
 that should undertake the work. 
 
 Both the English and the American projectors 
 put in their bids, and, under authority of the act of 
 the Federal Congress, permission was accorded to 
 the latter capitalists to construct a canal " for vessels 
 of the largest burden possible," and on June 14, 
 1826, a contract to that effect was formally ratified 
 by both parties. A canal company was then defi- 
 nitely formed in the United States called "The 
 Central American and United States Atlantic and 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. Hi 
 
 Pacific Canal Company," ' but not being able to go 
 much further by themselves, the projectors then ap- 
 pealed to Congress for aid.^ 
 
 In Spanish America also, all was enthusiasm, the 
 power of the Viceroys had everywhere been broken 
 down, and now a congress of the independ- 
 
 S "iS The 
 
 ent states was about to meet in Panama, Bursting 
 to take counsel for Pan-American needs, of the Pan- 
 Believing now that the canal question ''^g^^^ff" 
 was likely to be one of the main centres 
 of discussion at the convention, and seeing that both 
 England and the United States were interesting 
 "themselves in the project, the other states of the 
 isthmus resolved not to be outdone in the matter 
 by the republic~of the Centre) Don Guadaloupe de 
 Yittoria, President of the lately established Mexican 
 confederation, accordingly ordered one of his army 
 ■engineers, General Orbegozo, to make a reconnaissance 
 across the isthmus of Tehuantepec ; and the state 
 of Vera Cruz, feeling itself more directly concerned 
 in this project than any of the other states of the 
 confederation, instituted further surveys in these 
 parts Tinder the direction of Don Orteo Ortiz. 
 
 General Bolivar, now President of Colombia, and 
 
 ' This company was organized by the following well known gentlemen of 
 the day : A. H. Palmer of New York ; De Witt Clinton, Governor of the 
 State, and builder of the Erie Canal ; Stephen Van Rensselaer of New York, 
 Monroe Robinson, President of the Bank of the United States, and others. 
 Their agent in Nicaragua was a Mr. Beneski. 
 
 * John A. Rockwell, Chairman; — "Report of Select Committee on 
 Canals or Railroads between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans." House 
 Report No. 145, 30th Cong., 2dsess., pp. 244-246, 374. 
 
 Sullivan, loc. cii., pp. 16-19. 
 
146 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 practically dictator of Pera and Bolivia, had still 
 larger plans in view. Having freed the country 
 from the rule of the Viceroys, it vpas evidently his 
 idea to use the congress of Panama for his own ends 
 and secure, if possible, a military dictatorship over 
 all Spanish America. In pursuance of this general 
 plan, Bolivar felt it essential to provide for an ade- 
 quate route of transit across the isthmus, which, 
 from the outset, should be under his exclusive con- 
 trol. He confined his attention, therefoi'e, to Pana- 
 ma, and arranged for surveys to be undertaken 
 along this route by a British engineer, Mr. Lloyd,, 
 and Mr. Falcmar, a Swedish captain in his service. 
 
 On June 22, 1826, according to appointment, the 
 congress came together in Panama. Neither of our 
 envoys appeared,^ however, and indeed, lacking the 
 hearty co-operation of the United States, the whole 
 convention was bound to be a flat failure. The 
 Spanish-American delegates soon realized this, and 
 after some general discussion they all decided to ad- 
 journ to Mexico, in search of better climatic condi- 
 tions. In this change of venue, however, the 
 congress became disintegrated, and seems never to 
 have reassembled as a body. Bolivar was, there- 
 fore, unable to carry out his scheme ; and, fearing 
 him no longer, both Peru and Bolivia freed them- 
 selves from his dictatorship. Without the aid of 
 the northern republic, upon whom they had all 
 
 ' On account of the long debate in the Senate, one of the envoys, Mr. 
 John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, did not receive his instructions in time to 
 reach Panama from the United States ; the other, Mr. Anderson, then 
 United States Minister to Colombia, died at Carthagena on his way. 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 147 
 
 relied, the independent states were left to their own 
 devices again, and the high hopes of the Pan- Ameri- 
 cans now, one after the other, fell to the ground. 
 
 The results of the Tehuantepec surveys amounted 
 to nothing, General Orbegozo reporting that "the 
 canalization of the isthmus was problematic and 
 gigantic," and the opportunity now being gone, they 
 were never further elaborated. In 1828, Messrs. 
 Lloyd and Falcmar also completed their recon- 
 naissance along the Rio Chagres, and reported a 
 break in the mountains here between Panama and 
 Porto Bello. Bolivar was no longer in a position to 
 carry out his ideas of iuteroceanic transit, however, 
 and so the report of these surveys was taken to 
 England instead, and there presented before the 
 Royal Geographical Society in London. 
 
 The results of these surveys, as well as of those 
 undertaken by the American company across Nica- 
 ragua, while immensely under-estimating the diffi- 
 culties to be met with in each case, could hardly 
 be said to have been encouraging to the enthusiasts 
 of the day. No money could be raised from private 
 sources to prosecute the canal project in Nicaragua, 
 and the company's appeal to Congress for aid stuck 
 fast in an early committee stage. The Senate had 
 had its way in regard to the Panama mission, and 
 the failure of the congress could only be regarded 
 as a defeat for the administration. Monroe, in his 
 famous message had indeed set forth with keen 
 perspicacity the attitude our government would in 
 the end be forced to assume toward our uncertain 
 
148 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 southern neighbors ; but events could not be fore- 
 stalled. The question of slavery had first to be 
 settled at home, and that was still a long way off. 
 Even then, necessity alone could drive us on to take 
 the stand advocated by the Monroe administration, 
 and such necessity was to be slow in maturing.' 
 
 ' Moritz Wagner, loc. cit., pp. ig-20. 
 Sullivan, loc. cit., p. 19. 
 North American Review, January, 1830. 
 
 E. G. Squier, loc. cit., "Nicaragua," Revised Edition, i860; Appendix, 
 Chapter III. , 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 SOME INEFFECTUAL CANAL PROJECTS. 
 
 THE abortive Panama congress Avas the cause 
 of one rather unexpected event. The King 
 of Holland, v^^ith a lively concern in Span- 
 ish-American affairs on account of his colonial pos- 
 sessions in Guiana, sent a representative, General 
 Werweer, to be present during the sittings § 59. The 
 of the convention, and keep an eye on the „^'"^.°^ 
 
 ^ . I.1TIT1T 1 TTTi M HoUand's 
 
 best interests 01 the JNetherlands. \vhile Canai 
 on the isthmus the General became deeply Project, 
 interested in the canal project. Upon his return, he 
 enlisted the favor of his sovereign in his plans, and 
 finally induced him to embark upon the undertak- 
 ing, at least in his private capacity. A Holland 
 company was then formed, with the King at its 
 head, for the construction of a canal through Nica- 
 ragua, and General Werweer was at once sent back 
 to Central America to secure a suitable contract 
 from the Federal government. The people of the 
 United States having failed them, and the Eng- 
 lish appearing to have lost all interest in their 
 project, the Central American authorities eagerly 
 grasped at this new opportunity, A very liberal 
 concession was accordingly drawn up and ratified by 
 
 149 
 
150 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 both parties on December 18, 1830, granting to the 
 Dutch not only an exclusive right of way across the 
 territory of Central America, but also a monopoly of 
 the coasting trade. 
 
 After the failure of our first efforts, we in this 
 country had abandoned all thought of the canal 
 project for ourselves ; but the libei'ality of this con- 
 cession to the Dutch aroused our government from 
 its apathy, and led us again to at least a negative as- 
 sertion of the Monroe doctrine. Mr. Adams had 
 failed to secure his second term, and the Democrats 
 were now in full control under President Jackson. 
 The foreign policy of the new administration was 
 still uncertain, and the vigorous tone of the de- 
 spatches now addressed to the Dutch government by 
 Mr.' Livingston, Jackson's Secretary of State, was 
 rather a surprise to the defeated Republicans, who 
 hardly expected such warmth from their Democratic 
 opponents. Our minister to the IN^etherlands, Mr. 
 Jeffrey, was first instructed to infoi'm the proper 
 authorities there, that we were the most interested 
 party in the transit question, and must therefore 
 enjoy all the advantages conceded to other nations. 
 Mr. Jeffrey was further told to secure for either the 
 people or the government of the United States the 
 majority of the stock of the Holland Conipany, and 
 a share in its monopoly. 
 
 There was no occasion for pushing the matter so 
 far, however, for in the confusion of the Belgian 
 revolution, which broke out just then, the King 
 and his company were compelled to forego their 
 
Some Ineffectual Canal Projects. 151 
 
 canal project and abandon their rights in Central 
 America.' 
 
 The vigorous policy of the new administration, 
 revived the hopes of the Central American states. 
 They recognized now that no further action » ^^ presi- 
 could be expected from the Dutch pro- dentjack- 
 moters, but, at the same time, saw with son's Policy 
 1 T 1 1 ■ • 1 TT • n oi towardsthe 
 
 dehght that interest m the United States Transit 
 
 was still alive. "All concur here," our Question, 
 consul to Central America, Mr. Henry Savage, then 
 wrote, " and every one seems tacitly to look forward 
 to the United States for the completion of this grand 
 project. They say that the United States, identified 
 in her institutions with this government, is the only 
 power that ought to have the preference." 
 
 In answer to this popular demajid, the Federal 
 Congress of the confederacy, again took action in the 
 matter, and by an act of the legislature, formally 
 offered the United States the prior right, before all 
 other nations, in the construction of a canal, laying 
 special emphasis once more upon the good-will and 
 political sympathy which had so long existed be- 
 tween the two republics. 
 
 Having gone so far in our opposition to the 
 Dutch, our government now thought the opportu- 
 nity good to reassert our own position in regard to 
 the transit question. We still desired no exclusive 
 ■control, but, whatever might be our positive action 
 
 ' Rockwell, loc. cit., pp. 259-269. 
 
 Sullivan, loc. cit., p. 20. 
 
 .Squier, loc, cit., " Nicaragua," Appendix. 
 
152 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 in the matter, we wanted all foreign governments to- 
 understand that we would brook no interference on 
 their part with the rights we claimed on the isthmus. 
 In reply to this generous proposition of the Central 
 American republic, the Senate, therefore, passed a 
 resolution on March 3, 1835, couched, it is true, in 
 very general terms, but still going so far as to re- 
 quest the President to open negotiations with the 
 governments of Central America and New Granada,^ 
 to protect by treaty stipulations any company which 
 should undertake the construction of the canal, and 
 secure the free and equal right of navigation of such 
 canal to all nations. 
 
 Though opposed to all plans for national improve- 
 ments at home, Jackson was still bent upon main- 
 taining the American policy on the isthmus. Upon 
 his re-election, therefore, he at once despatched a 
 special agent, Mr. Charles Biddle, to consult with 
 the authorities there, to make inquiries as to the 
 plans proposed, and to collect data of surveys and 
 estimates on the canal project, both in Nicaragua 
 and Panama. Contrary to instractions, Mr. Biddle 
 went first to Panama and there acted in a way 
 hardly calculated to advance the President's plans. 
 
 Some time before this, a shrewd adventurer call- 
 ing himself Baron Thierry, while an usher in Cam- 
 bridge had been elected sovereign of the islands of 
 New Zealand by a party of Maoris visiting England. 
 
 ' The Republic of Colombia was broken up in 1831 by the withdrawal of 
 Venezuela and Ecuador, and New Granada thus became an independent re- 
 public. Cf. §§ 52, 62. 
 
Some Ineffectual Canal Projects. 153 
 
 In this capacity, while on his way to the islands, he 
 had been able to secure from the government of 
 New Granada in Bogota, an exclusive right to con- 
 struct a canal across Panama to connect the rivers 
 Chagres and Grande. The English government, in 
 the meantime, had taken measures to frustrate the 
 plans of this would-be monarch, however, and upon 
 his arrival, he was not only refused permission 
 to land on his own (?) domain, but furthermore 
 declared a public enemy by the assembled New 
 Zealand chiefs. Without further friends or re- 
 sources for the moment, and deprived of his rank, 
 Thierry was consequently obliged to fqrego his ac- 
 quired interests in Panama as well, and his canal 
 concession was about to lapse. 
 
 Biddle reached Panama at this time, and, think- 
 ing to make a good thing of it, he took up the 
 Thierry concession for himself and his friends, and 
 henceforth abandoned the public interests of the 
 United States, for his own private gain. Having 
 collected all the information he could on the Panama 
 route, Biddle then hurried home on his own busi- 
 ness, never even stopping off at Nicaragua. He died 
 however, before he could mature his plans, and our 
 government hastened to disavow his acts. 
 
 Jackson's canal policy had thus nothing more sub- 
 stantial to show for itself than a vague resolution by 
 the Senate, and a partial report on the Panama route 
 submitted by Biddle just before his death.' 
 
 ' Rockwell, loc. cit., pp. 249^., 268-341. 
 
 Sullivan, loc. cit., pp. 20-22. 
 
 Squier, loc. cit., " Central American States," Vol., II., p. 259. 
 
154 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Left to themselves once more and not knowing 
 
 whicli way to turn, now that neither the United 
 
 „ , ^^ States nor Europe seemed able to furnish 
 §6i. The . '^ . 
 
 Petition to any serious aid in solving their transit 
 Congress problem, the Central American states 
 Stephens' boldly resolved to undertake the work 
 Reconnais- themselves. Mr. John Bailey, the engineer 
 ^*°'^^' sent over from England by the Barclay, 
 Richardson Company some years before,' had re- 
 mained on in Nicaragua interesting himself in the 
 canal project. To him the government of the re- 
 public then turned during the last days of its exist- 
 ence, but still sanguine of the success of its plans. 
 In 1837 Mr. Bailey began his surveys for the con- 
 federacy on the Pacific side of the lake, and decided 
 upon a route to run from Lajas to San Juan del 
 Sur on the Pacific.^ The results of this survey were 
 then sent to England and the United States and re- 
 ceived considerable attention in both countries. 
 
 Mr. Horatio Allen, the engineer of the Croton 
 Aqueduct, then being built, brought the matter up 
 in New York, and this report, taken together with 
 the action of the Central American republic, at once 
 stiiTed up the canal enthusiasts of our country to 
 fresh exertions in behalf of their pet project. The 
 Mayor of New York, Aaron Clark, and a number of 
 prominent citizens of that city and Philadelphia,^ 
 accordingly came together and evolved an elaborate 
 
 'C/.,anie,% 57. 
 ' Cf, Map, frontispiece. 
 
 ^ Aaron Clark, W. A. Duer, H. Radcliff, and Herman LeRoy of New- 
 York, and Matthew Casey and others of Philadelphia. 
 
Some Ineffectual Canal Projects. 155 
 
 scheme for a canal throiigli Nicaragua, and for 
 American colonization of the isthmus on a large 
 scale. These promoters then drew up a petition 
 which they presented to Congress in January, 1838, 
 asking that all the great powers of the world, and 
 also the Central American states be invited bj^ 
 the United States to join in " opening a navi- 
 gable communication between the Atlantic and 
 Pacific oceans by means of a ship-canal across the 
 isthmus which connects North and South America " ; 
 and that the United States now undertake surveys 
 as a preliminary step. 
 
 Congress referred the memorial to its Committee 
 on Roads and Canals, and the result was a volu- 
 minous report on the entire subject of isthmian transit, 
 presented soon after by Mr. Mercer the chairman of 
 this Committee. The gist of this governmental 
 document was expressed in these words : " The 
 United States, whose territory extends from the 
 Atlantic to the Pacific, cannot but regard with solici- 
 tude, any enterprise which, if practicable, will so 
 greatly approximate their eastern and western 
 frontiers." In accepting this report. Congress then 
 took occasion to pass another resolution on March 
 2, 1839, couched in about the same indefinite terms 
 as the Senate resolution of four years before. 
 
 The status quo of the Jackson administration was 
 thus re-established in regard to the transit question. 
 President Van Buren, of the same political faith as 
 his predecessor, followed also in the footsteps of his 
 canal policy. Another agent, Mr. John L. Stephens, 
 
156 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 was accordingly sent off to Central America to col- 
 lect the data on tlie project, which Biddle had neg- 
 lected, report on the general feasibility of the plan, 
 and give his opinion as to the best route. Unlike 
 his predecessor, Mr. Stephens was thoroughly con- 
 scientious and in earnest, and entered on the work 
 with great zest. After as careful an examination of 
 the countiy as the circumstances would permit, Mr. 
 Stephens recommended the Nicaraguan route in 
 strong terms, and advised the continuation of Mr. 
 Bailey's surveys in this region. As to the project 
 then in hand, Mr. Stephens was not so enthusiastic. 
 True, he estimated the cost of a canal across Nica- 
 ragua at only twenty-five millions of dollars ; but he 
 added significantly, " capitalists will not sink their 
 money in an unsettled and revolutionary country." ' 
 It was all true enough, — the American isthmus 
 certainly had degenerated into an " unsettled and 
 § 62. The revolutionary country " by this time. In all 
 Breaking ^-^^ states of Central America there was the 
 
 up of the 
 
 Central JVcicionaUsta, or Liberal party, which had 
 American brought about the original union in 1823, 
 Colombian ^^^ ^^^ fought hard to maintain the con- 
 Republics, federacy ever since. This party was always 
 enthusiastic over the Monroe doctrine, and advocated 
 the Pan-American idea under the guidance of the 
 United States. Opposed to the Liberals stood the 
 Conservative, or Clerical, party. These Conserva- 
 
 ' Rockwell, loc. cit., p. 236. 
 
 John L. Stephens, "Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas 
 and Yucatan," Vol. II., Ch. XIX., New York, 1841. 
 
Some Ineffectual Canal Projects. 157 
 
 tives, on the contrary, had never been in favor of a 
 union of the states, and had done all they could to 
 break up the confederacy on every occasion. 
 
 In 1826 the Clericals had, indeed, succeeded in 
 effecting the dissolution they desired, but three 
 years later the Liberal leader, Morazan, was able to 
 set the wheels of federal administration once more in 
 motion. Thereupon the Conservatives, disgruntled, 
 vs'ithdrew from the government entirely, and actually 
 went so far as to raise the Spanish flag again. This 
 was only playing into their adversaries' hands, how- 
 ever, and, backed by the mass of the people, Morazan 
 changed the seat of federal power from Guatemala 
 to San Salvador, and kept the southern states at any 
 rate for a short time true to his cause. In 1838 
 Carrera the Conservative raised a revolt against the 
 federal government, and from this time on it was 
 open war between Guatemala on the one hand, and 
 a Liberal confederacy, consisting of Honduras, San 
 Salvador, and Nicaragua, on the other — Costa Rica 
 in the south, devoted more especially to commerce, 
 and cut off from the other states by mountains, 
 taking little part in this political struggle. The 
 Clerical cause gradually gained ground after this; 
 Morazan was obliged to escape from the country, 
 and of the original confederacy nothing was now left 
 but a group of detached and warring little republics. 
 
 A similar political evolution was going on, also, 
 farther south, in the republic of Colombia. On 
 Bolivar's death in 1830 this unstable confederacy 
 had also broken apart. Venezuela and Equador 
 
158 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 withdrew, and New Granada became a separate re- 
 public under Bolivar's rival, the Liberal leader, San- 
 tander. But like Morazan, Santander was unable to 
 maintain his party in power, and in 1836 he was 
 defeated and driven from the country. The Clericals 
 then gained control, and what is known as the 
 " Twelve Years " ensued. This was a period of 
 ceaseless conflict between the Clerical party, on the 
 one hand, made up of Oligarchs, Absolutists, and 
 Jesuits and the disenfranchised Liberals on the 
 other.^ 
 
 These independent states of the isthmus were thus 
 left in sole authority over their respective canal 
 og inde- routes, and, like Spain and the Central 
 pendent American confederacy before, each was 
 Action of g^^Yi bent on exploiting; its special natural 
 
 the Several .^ ° '^ 
 
 States in monopoly to its own advantage. The 
 Regard to Conservatives were now pretty generally 
 in control throughout the isthmus, and, as 
 they had never been accustomed to look for support 
 either from the government or the people of the 
 United States, each state began now to sends its 
 agents to the Catholic countries abroad, in the hopes 
 of interesting European companies in its special 
 enterprise. 
 
 Guatemala accordingly despatched one of her 
 bishops to B,ome on this errand, while New Granada 
 offered liberal concessions to a bubble French 
 
 ' Bancroft, loc. cit., "History of Central America," Vol. III., pp. 187, 
 210. 
 
 Squier, loc. cit., " Central American States," Vol. II., p. 135. 
 
 Payne, loc. cit., " History of European Colonies," Ch. XVI. and XXI. 
 
Some Ineffectual Canal Projects. 159 
 
 scheme launclied by Messrs. Salomon and Company, 
 for the construction of either macadamized roads, 
 railways, or canals across the isthmus of Panama. 
 Under this all-inclusive grant surveys were instituted 
 by a French engineer, M. Morel, with the most 
 startling results. After making some sort of a re- 
 connaissance, this visionary reported the discovery 
 of a depression of only ten and a half metres be- 
 tween Porto Bello and Panama, and on this fictitious 
 basis worked out an eloborate canal plan for his 
 company, giving mathematically exact, and yet 
 entirely imaginary, figures and profiles. 
 
 Nicaragua and Hondui'as then bestirred them- 
 selves as well, and together authorized another pro- 
 moter, a M. Eouchoud, to conclude some agreement 
 with other French capitalists for the construction of 
 a transit-way within their territory.' 
 
 Louis Philippe was at this time at the zenith of 
 his power, and, being himself personally interested 
 in the canal project, he was regarded by . 
 
 all promoters as an ideal patron for the phiUppe 
 great undertaking. The Salomon Company Canal 
 first enlisted the monarch's attention, with 
 its dazzling promises of a sea-level canal across the 
 isthmus of Panama, at a ridiculously low cost. On 
 the advice of his famous minister, Guizot, Louis 
 Philippe at once sent one of his engineers, Napoleon 
 Garella, to Panama, to prove or disprove the correct- 
 ness of Morel's remarkable report. Garella, unlike 
 
 ' Moritz Wagner, loc. cii., p. 21. 
 
 Squier, loc. cii., " Nicaragua," Chap. III., Appendix. 
 
 s 
 
160 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 most of the French engineers who have examined 
 the isthmus, was thoroughly conscientious in his 
 work, and the results of his surveys effectually 
 quenched his monarch's former enthusiasm for the 
 canal project. Morel's wonderful depression, Garella 
 found to be 128 metres, 72 centimetres, above the 
 level of the sea, instead of the paltry ten and a half 
 metres reported ; and the lowest pass he could find 
 in this region measured 115 metres, 20 centimetres. 
 Garella. admitted, indeed, the possibility of a canal 
 across Panama, but insisted that its construction 
 would necessitate twenty-five locks and a tunnel of 
 5350 metres in length, involving in all, according to 
 his lowest estimate, a cost of 200,000,000 francs, 
 and this, for a small canal to accommodate vessels 
 of not over 600 tons' burden. No wonder Louis 
 was disheartened and lost interest in the project ! 
 
 Thinking the opportunity now fit to interest the 
 French monarch in the more favorable Nicaraguan 
 route, Don Francisco de Castellon, Nicaragua's min- 
 ister to France, not only offered Louis Philippe an 
 exclusive right to construct a canal through the 
 country, but furthermore proposed a French pro- 
 tectorate over the route. But Louis would have 
 none of it, though Guizot, ever watchful over French 
 interests, strongly admonished him against refusing 
 the ofEer, lest Great Britain should step in and fore- 
 stall him in the control of both Central America and 
 the canal.' 
 
 ' Moritz Wagner, he, cit., pp. 21, 22. 
 
 Squier, loc. cit. 
 
 J. C. Rodrigues, " The Panama Canal," p. 8, New York, 1885. 
 
Some Ineffectual Canal Projects. 161 
 
 Don Castellon then turned to Belgian promoters, 
 and by liberal concessions succeeded at last in form- 
 ing a company there, and enlisting the 
 patronage of their King. No money was Ntpoi^on's 
 forthcoming, however, and so the Nicara- interest in 
 guan conservatives, through another of the Transit 
 their agents, M. Marcoleta, Nicaragua's 
 charge d''affaires in Belgium, began to lay plans for 
 enlisting the attention of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, 
 the rising star of European politics, Avho was then a 
 political prisoner in the fortress of Ham. This 
 enthusiast became at once mightily interested in the 
 canal project, and it was soon arranged that he should 
 be allowed to organize a canal company in Europe 
 to be called La Ca/naU Napoleone de Nicaragua. 
 Upon his escape from Ham on May 25, 1846, Napo- 
 leon proceeded at once to London, and there wrote 
 his famous pamphlet on the canal question, in which 
 he advocated the Nicarasjuan route. The canal, as 
 he laid it out, was to go up the bed of the San Juan, 
 across both lakes, over the plains in the north, and 
 down the valley of the Estero Beal to the Gulf of 
 Fonseca.^ Napoleon had grand ideas on the transit 
 question, and a keen perception of the part it was 
 destined to play in European and American politics. 
 It may not be out of place, therefore, to quote his 
 own words here. 
 
 "The geographical position of Constantinople is such as 
 rendered her the queen of the ancient world. Occupying, as 
 she does, the central point between Europe, Asia, and Africa, 
 
 ' Cf. Map, frontispiece. 
 
162 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 she could beconie the entrepdt of the commerce of all these 
 countries, and obtain over them an immense preponderance ; 
 for in politics, as in strategy, a central position always com- 
 mands the circumference. This is what the proud city of 
 Constantine could be, and this is what she is not, because, as 
 Montesquieu says, ' God permitted that Turks should exist on 
 earth, a people most fit to possess uselessly a great empire.' 
 There exists in the New World a state as admirably situated 
 as Constantinople, and we must say up to this time as uselessly 
 occupied. We allude to the state of Nicaragua, As Constan- 
 tinople is the centre of the ancient world, so is the town of 
 Leon the centre of the new, and if the tongue of land which 
 separates its two lakes from the Pacific Ocean were cut 
 through, she would command by virtue of her central position 
 the entire coast of North and South America. 
 
 " The State of Nicaragua can become, better than Constan- 
 tinople, the necessary route of the great commerce of the 
 world, and is destined to attain an extraordinary degree of pros- 
 perity and grandeur. 
 
 " France, England, and Holland have a great commercial 
 interest in the establishment of a communication between the 
 two oceans, but England has, more than the other powers, a 
 political interest in the execution of this project. England 
 will see with pleasure Central America becoming a powerful 
 and flourishing state, which will establish a balance of power 
 by creating in Spanish America a new centre of active enter- 
 prise, powerful enough to give rise to a great feeling of nation- 
 ality, and to prevent, by backing Mexico, any further encroach- 
 ments from the north." 
 
 This monograph of Napoleon's attracted wide- 
 spread attention in Europe, and nowhere more par- 
 ticularly than in England. The Royal Geographical 
 Society there had kept itself informed all along in 
 regard to the surveys thus far made on the isthmus,, 
 but in every case had been disappointed in the re- 
 
Some Ineffectual Canal Projects. 163 
 
 ports. As a result of these surveys the Englisli 
 were at least convinced in. their own minds, — and, in 
 fact, Lord Palmerston had already so declared be- 
 fore Parliament, — that a canal across the isthmus 
 of Panama was impossible. But when Napoleon's 
 plans were now presented to Admiral Fitzroy, Her 
 Majesty's hydrographer, for detailed examination, 
 he was more favorably impressed with this route, 
 and reported favorably to the government. 
 
 From this time on, the British capitalists and 
 their government persistently kept their attention 
 fixed upon the Nicaraguan route, and were never 
 afterwards to be seriously influenced by either 
 French or American schemes in Tehuantepec, Paur 
 ama, or Darien. 
 
 English interest in Nicaraguan affairs had, in the 
 meantime, become aroused in quite a different but 
 in a much more practical way, as we have now to 
 see. All canal projects up to this had been but 
 dreams of enthusiasts, or schemes of irresponsible 
 speculators. Politics now began to enter into the 
 question again, and its evolution became at once the 
 more interesting.* 
 
 ' N. L. B. (Napoleon Louis Bonaparte), " Canal of Nicaragua, or a. 
 Project to Connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by Means of a Canal." 
 London, 1846. 
 
 H. C. Taylor, "The Nicaragua Canal," Pub. Araer. Geog. Soc, 1886, 
 pp. 26-30. 
 
 Sullivan, loc, cit,, p. 75. 
 
 Engineering Magazine, loc. cit., March 3, 1893. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE BRITISH SEIZURE OF THE SAN JUAN. 
 
 SLOWLY but surely were the two great Anglo- 
 Saxon powers, Great Britain and the United 
 States, being driven to the verge of another 
 controversy over territorial affairs in America ; and 
 events now began to point toward the isthmus as 
 the centre of the next conflict. 
 
 Having demonstrated her naval strength in Eu- 
 rope during her struggle with Napoleon, England 
 after this was left practically unmolested 
 Brit'ain's^^ in her eastern advance toward the Pacific. 
 Position on Nor, indeed, had her career in the west by 
 the Isthmus g^j means been cut short by the revolt of 
 
 after Span- . "' . . - . * » i 
 
 ish-Ameri- her American colonies. After her attempt 
 caninde- {-^ 1812, Great Britain, it is true, ceased to 
 pen n e. jjj^gj,fgj.g (Jij-ectly with the affairs of the 
 United States, but she was determined, none the 
 less, to parallel our westward advance toward the 
 Pacific, both on the north and to the south, and 
 thus shut us in on either side. Canada was, there- 
 fore, thoroughly propitiated, and American citizens 
 soon found they could raise no revolt among its in- 
 habitants. In the far Northwest English fur-traders 
 occupied the still undefined " Oregon country," and 
 
 164 
 
British Seizure of the San Juan. 165 
 
 there held their own against the pretensions of their 
 American rivals. 
 
 In Mexico the English could gain nq foothold, 
 but still farther south, among the West Indies, and 
 on the Spanish-American mainland, their position 
 was still secure. There were weak points in Great 
 Britain's claims in this region, however, and it was 
 these links which she now set about to strengthen. 
 
 According to the terms of the treaty of Madrid, 
 which reaffirmed the convention of 1786, it will be 
 remembered that Englishmen simply possessed cer- 
 tain well-defined usufructuary rights to the natural 
 products of the soil within the territory of Belize, 
 marked off by metes and bounds. But, as a matter 
 of fact, we know that the settlers had worsted the 
 Spanish colonists in battle, and were already in con- 
 trol of a much larger strip of land than that laid 
 down in the treaties, and were ruling it as they 
 chose. 
 
 In the meantime the Spanish-American colonies 
 had broken away from the motherland to establish 
 an independence of their own, and this coup must 
 necessarily have changed the legal aspect of affairs 
 as well. England no longer considered the treaties 
 she had made Avith Spain as binding between her 
 and the now independent Spanish- American states. 
 There was nothing now to invalidate the claim of 
 the English settlers to all the land they had oc- 
 cupied, therefore, unless Great Britain herself should 
 do so, by agreeing with the independent states to 
 re-enact with them the treaties she had made with 
 Spain, 
 
166 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 This England did with Mexico, when she acknowl- 
 edged the independence of that state, and in the 
 treaty of recognition, signed December 26, 1826, — 
 the provisions of the convention of 1786 between 
 Great Britain and Spain in regard to Belize, were 
 re-enacted word for word. Only a portion of Belize 
 now lay within Mexican territory, however, and the 
 encroachments of the British settlers had all been 
 toward the south into the territory of Guate- 
 mala.* But Guatemala had become part of the 
 short-lived Central American confederacy, and, in 
 acknowledging the independence of this republic 
 England took great care to make no mention of the 
 older treaties with Spain, and so left the question 
 of her settlers' rights in Belize still open. 
 
 Still another doubtful point introduced upon the 
 occasion of Spanish-American independence, was the 
 question concerning the future status of the Mos- 
 quito Indians. The Central American authorities 
 maintained that these natives and their shore 
 belonged to Nicaragua, and that they had come into 
 the confederacy as part of that state. Neither 
 Spain, Nicai-agua, nor the Central American republic 
 had ever exercised any permanent control over this 
 eastern coast, howevei', and, as the Spanish- Ameri- 
 can provinces had freed themselves, not jointly, 
 but severally from the mother country, why could 
 not the Mosquito Indians, who had all along re- 
 mained unconquered, novs^ set themselves up, in law 
 as well as in fact, as an independent nation, and 
 
 ' Cf. Map at end of volume. 
 
British Seizure of the San Juan. 167 
 
 Taeyond the jurisdiction of both Nicaragua and the 
 •Central American confederacy ? ^ 
 
 This claim, which the Mosquito Indians them- 
 selves had neither the sense nor the inclination to 
 set up, the English settlers now made in §. 67. The 
 their behalf according to their old accus- English 
 tomed ways. _ _ ^^ 
 
 Early in the century these Britishers be- Mosquito 
 gan to resume their old-standing friendship Indians, 
 with the Indians along the shore, whose numbers 
 ■were now considerably augmented by the accession 
 of numbers of Caribs coming from the Bay islands. 
 The Crown Prince of the tribe, George Frederick, 
 and his half-brother Robert,^ were first carried o£E 
 to Belize by the settlers in 1816, and then sent over 
 to Jamaica to complete their English education. 
 Upon the death of the Mosquito chief his father, 
 George Frederick was brought back to Belize and 
 there crowned with imposing honors and mock 
 tsolemnity, " King of the Mosquito Shore and Nation." 
 After the ceremony. His Majesty was transported in 
 a British war-ship to the land of his fathers, with 
 all the honors due to a savage half-breed monarch. 
 
 But the young King's inherited taste for alco- 
 
 ' Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between Great Britain and 
 Mexico. Dec. 26, 1826. Art. XIV. 
 
 U.S. Diplt. Corr., 1865-66., Pt. I., p. 65 ; Pt. III., p. 360. 
 
 U.S. For. Rels., I., pp. 656-61 ; 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 
 
 U.S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 27 ; Docs. 2 and 3, pp. 3-10, 32d Cong., 
 2d Sess. 
 
 Brit. Accts. and Papers, /oc. cit.. Vol. Ixv. App. C. Docs. 5 and 14. 
 
 ^ Since tiie first days of their intercourse with the British, these Indians 
 Jiad come to adopt these high-sounding English names. 
 
168 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 holic stimulants seemed only to have become in- 
 tensified by his liberal English education, and he was 
 killed not long after in some drunken brawl among 
 his subjects, George Frederick was succeeded by his 
 half-brother Robert, but this monarch became rather 
 too well disposed toward the Spanish- Americans of 
 the interior, to suit his English mentors. Robert 
 was therefore deposed by the settlers, and a pure 
 Sambo negro, christened also George Frederick, was 
 raised to the throne in his stead. 
 
 What became of this first sovereign of the Sambo 
 line does not appear from the chronicles of the 
 Mosquito kingdom. His reign was brief, at all 
 events, for he was succeeded in a few months by a 
 second Sambo king, called Robert Charles Frederick. 
 That he might be the more impressed with the 
 dignity of his position than were his immediate 
 predecessors, this monarch was also taken to Belize, 
 and there crowned in royal pomp on April 23, 1825, — 
 dressed it is said in the uniform of a British major^ 
 and surrounded by his court of noble lords. 
 
 Upon his return to Mosquitoland, His Highness 
 Avas found, indeed, to be rather too much impressed 
 with his royal dignity, for he soon considered himself 
 justified in granting away great stretches of his 
 domain to foreign traders who came to his shores, in 
 return for gay pieces of cotton stuffs, in which he 
 loved to dress his person in true kingly style. This 
 generosity was fatal to the English plans, so poor 
 Robert Charles Frederick was forthwith deported 
 from the land of temptation, and kept a close 
 prisoner in Belize for the remainder of his life. 
 
British Seizure of the San Juan. 169 
 
 In his last will and testament, — wticli bears the 
 date of February 25, 1826, — this exiled monarch, 
 generous to the last, appointed Colonel Macdonald, 
 the English Superintendent at Belize, regent over 
 Mosquitoland during the minority of his children, in 
 recognition of all the favors heaped upon him and 
 his people by the English ; and, as a last request, he 
 begged that the Church of England and Ireland 
 might be established in his country. 
 
 Macdonald delegated his private secretary, Patrick 
 "Walker, to act in his place as regent of Mosquito- 
 land, as his larger duties made it imperative that he 
 himself should remain in Belize. Under orders from 
 his chief, Walker thereupon set about reorganizing 
 the administration at Bluefields. The name of the 
 land was now changed to " Mosquitia," though all 
 the emblems of half-breed royalty were carefully 
 maintained, and the so-called hereditary monarchy 
 preserved. Walker then .gathered around him a 
 Council of State, which was English to the core, and 
 from behind this screen he was henceforth enabled 
 to control the destinies of the land.' 
 
 In the meantime other Englishmen were operat- 
 
 ' Brit. Accts. and Papers, loc. «V., Vol. LXV., "Mosquito Correspon- 
 dence." 
 
 De Kalb, loc, cit. 
 
 Robt. F. Stout, " Nicaragua," pp. 16S-171. 
 
 Dumis, " Central America,'' pp. 26-27. 
 
 Squier, loc. cit., " Central American States,'' pp. 582-584, 618-623, 641- 
 645. 
 
 Bancroft, loc. cit., " History of Central America," Vol. III., p. 315. 
 
 E. Bedford Pim, loc. cit., " Dottings in Panama, Nicaragua, and Mos- 
 quito." London, 1868. 
 
 Thomas Strangeway, " Sketch of the Jlosquito Shore,'' pp. 4-6. Edin- 
 burgh, 1822. 
 
ITO The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 ing in mucli the same way, in order to gain a 
 foothold farther south along the eastern seaboard 
 § 68. The of Costa Rica. The Mosquito chief, it 
 English seems, claimed jurisdiction over this coast 
 Co^'ta Ri- ^ ^^ well, through alliances with the Poya 
 can Shore, natives there. On his return from a 
 voyage to Carthageua, Sir John MacGregor had, it 
 appears, stopped off long enough at Mosquitia to 
 obtain from King George Frederick a large grant of 
 laud south of the San Juan, including the little 
 island of Boca del Toro. This grant he sold to a 
 company of English merchants, who then arranged 
 for a colonization scheme on a large scale. 
 
 Costa Rica was, indeed, rather favorably disposed 
 toward the plan, seeing in it an opportunity to 
 develop her land and commerce, and under such 
 favorable auspices the colony was formally inaugu- 
 rated.^ 
 
 With their power again established along the 
 Mosquito shore, and an English colony now planted 
 §69. British south of the San Juan, the next con- 
 Honduras, cern of Macdonald and his settlers was for 
 isiandf and dominion over the Bay islands, as these 
 Mosquitia. Were Strategically necessary in order to 
 connect Belize with the outlying regency of Mosqui- 
 
 ' John MacGregor, " My Note-Book." London, 1835. "Commercial 
 Statistics of all Nations. " London, 1844-50. 
 
 Brit. Accts. and Papers, he. cit.. Vol. LXV., Doc. 966, Enclosures 5-10. 
 
 De ICalb, loc. cit. 
 
 Constable's " Miscellany," Vol. XVIL 
 
 Orlando W. Roberts, " Narrative of Voyages and Excursions on the East 
 Coast and in the Interior of Central America." Edinburgh, 1827. 
 
 The Daily News. London, 1849. 
 
British Seizure of the San Juan. 171 
 
 tia and the British settlement beyond. Eoatan was 
 accordingly seized upon and resettled by the English, 
 with no resistance on the part of the Caribs, and prac- 
 tically without the knowledge of Honduras, as this 
 state was then in the throes of her civil strife between 
 the Liberals and Conservatives. 
 
 The Central Araeiican republic, moreover, was 
 now rapidly going to pieces, and Macdonald was 
 thus the more resolved to have a thoroughly organ- 
 ized English state, appear among the rest in inde- 
 pendent form upon its final dissolution. The Belize 
 Superintendency consisted, in these later days, of a 
 town — or rather a commercial agency — now estab- 
 lished at the mouth of the Belize river, where a 
 small detachment of English artillery, and a few com- 
 j)anies of negro infantry, recruited for the most part 
 in Jamaica, were stationed. The entire population 
 of the settlement numbered about 5,000, but of 
 these only 300 were whites, the remainder being 
 made up of half-breed Indians, and negro slaves from 
 Jamaica, who had lately been set free. Wood-cutting 
 was still the main industry of the land, agriculture 
 not having as yet become profitable. Out of such 
 material Macdonald then determined to constitute 
 a regular British colony. To this end he called to- 
 gether a legislative assembly of the white settlers 
 on the 14th of March, 1835, in order to take the 
 necessary steps toward formal independence from 
 Spanish- America. 
 
 As a result of these deliberations, the name of 
 Belize was changed to British Honduras, and the 
 
172 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 now independent state of Guatemala was duly in- 
 formed that the English claimed as theirs all the 
 land they had held since the days of Spanish- 
 American independence, to wit : from the Rio 
 Hondo in the north to the Eio Sarstoon in the south, 
 and westward to a line running parallel with the 
 coast through the Garbutt Falls in the Belize river.' 
 Macdonald, then, in November, 1840, proclaimed the 
 laws of England to rule henceforth in British Hon- 
 duras, Roatan, and Mosquitia ; and agents were sent 
 out to the Home government to petition Her 
 Majesty to recognize British Honduras and its de- 
 pendencies as regular colonies of the Crown. 
 
 No formal action was taken in the matter by 
 the English government before special agents could 
 be despatched to Central America to enquire into 
 the true nature of the situation. In the mean- 
 time war-ships of the West Indian station were 
 ordered to look after British interests in these parts, 
 and support the settlers in their claims if need 
 should arise. With the aid of this naval force, Mac- 
 donald formally occupied the island of Roatan in 
 the spring of 1841, and proceeded thence in the 
 British frigate Tweed to force Nicaragua to recog- 
 nize the independence of Mosquitia. From Blue- 
 fields the English vessel, accompanied now by a 
 sloop of war carrying the Mosquito flag sailed south, 
 and on the 19th of August appeared in the har- 
 bor of the San Juan. A demand was there made 
 of the Nicaraguan officer of the port, — a Lieutenant 
 
 ' Cf. Map at end of volume. 
 
British Seizure of the San Juan. 173 
 
 Quijano, — that he formally recognize the Mosquito 
 King as an independent ally of Great Britain. This, 
 Quijano indignantly refused to do, and, not having 
 as yet the proper sanction of their government to 
 enforce compliance with their request, the English 
 .contented themselves with seizing upon the person 
 of the stubborn custom-house officer, and, having 
 carried him away to a lonely point of the coast, they 
 put him ashore, and left him to make his own way 
 back to. the port as best he could.' 
 
 To these various acts of encroachment on their 
 domain by the English, the states of the isthmus, 
 naturally enough, objected. Colonel Gu-g„Q_ Qj^jg^. 
 lindo, the Central American minister ac- tions on the 
 credited to the United States, first brought %'* "^3^! 
 the matter up before our government American 
 during the Jackson administration. The states. 
 President was but ill-informed as to the situation in 
 Central America, however, on account of Mr. Bid- 
 die's never having gone there, and he therefore in- 
 formed Colonel Gulindo that his government did 
 not then deem it expedient to interfere. Later on, 
 under the Harrison administration, after Macdonald 
 had set up the new government in British Hon- 
 duras and made his demands upon the Central 
 American states, a special agent, Mr. William S. 
 
 ' Brit. Accts. and Papers, loc. cit.. Vol. LXV., Doc. 966, Enclosures 5 
 and 14. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 27, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
 George Henderson, " British Honduras." London, 1811. 
 
 United Service Magazine, August, 1850, " Statistical Account and De- 
 scription of the Island of Roatan." 
 
 De Kalb, loc. cit. 
 
174 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Murphy, was indeed sent down to the isthmus to 
 enquire into the afifair. Pie was somewhat vaguely 
 instructed by Daniel Webster, Harrison's Secretary 
 of State at this time, to insist that the United States 
 considered independent Central America to have 
 succeeded to all the rights of Spain on the isthmus;, 
 but bej^ond this Murphy i-eceived no orders enti- 
 tling him to act against the British, and so nothing 
 was really done to enforce the Monroe doctrine while 
 there was yet time. 
 
 After the breaking up of the confederacy. Colonel 
 Gulindo, now representing Guatemala as an inde- 
 pendent state, proceeded to London to lay the mat- 
 ter directly before the British government, in the 
 hopes of obtaining redress. But Gulindo being an 
 Irishman by birth, and thus a British subject still, 
 the Foreign Office on this ground refused to receive 
 him as an accredited minister from another state, 
 and thus the British government was enabled still to 
 avoid all official responsibility for the acts of her 
 enthusiastic settlers. 
 
 Costa Rica, it is true, had made no objection to 
 the English colony on her shores ; but the republic 
 of New Granada was not so complaisant. Referring 
 to the royal order of 1803 transferring this entire 
 strip of coast, lying between Cape Gracias and the 
 Rio Chagres, from the Chancellorate of Guatemala 
 to the Vice-royalty of New Granada,^ the govern- 
 ment of the republic, having succeeded to the right 
 of Spain, now claimed jurisdiction over this whole 
 
 1 Cf. ante, § 45. 
 
British Seizure of the San Juan. 175 
 
 shore, including even Mosquitia itself. Already the 
 President of New Granada had issued a decree for- 
 bidding the landing of the English colonists ; and 
 now the authorities of the republic began to press 
 their claims most vigorously, both against Costa 
 Rica for countenancing the scheme, and against 
 Great Britain, on the other hand, for encroaching on 
 their domain. 
 
 It was an easy matter for England to ignore these 
 several protests from disunited Spanish-America 
 so long as the United States remained passive in the 
 matter; and we were too much engaged- in our own 
 advance toward the west to trouble ourselves about 
 the affairs of our southern neighbors. The British 
 agents were thus given free rein on the isthmus, and, 
 with definite instructions from the Home govern- 
 ment, their energies were, indeed, well directed and 
 wonderfully fruitful in results.' 
 
 Meanwhile the English Foreign Office was watch- 
 ing with jealous attention the territorial expansion 
 of the United States that was still going 
 on apace. In 1842 the northeast boundary Seizure 
 dispute had been settled by the Ashbur- °^ ^^^ 
 ton treaty, and, from this fresh starting- 
 point, the rivals in the New World were now 
 making their final race to the Pacific. Along the 
 northwest frontier the English were still able to 
 hold the Americans in check, and pursue their own 
 
 ' M. Alvarez to Mr. Webster, December 30, 1834. 
 
 Col. Gulindo to Mr. Webster, June ist and 3d, 1835. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 27, 32d Cong., 2d Sess., Docs. i-g. 
 
 Brit. Accts. and Papers, he. cit.. Vol. LXV., Doc. 966, No. 5. 
 
176 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 westward course unmolested ; but toward tlie south- 
 west there was nothiug but Mexico to block the 
 way of our frontiersmen. Florida was already ours 
 by right, and American squatters in Texas had long 
 been pursuing a policy of encroachment against 
 Spanish-American claims, similar to that already 
 carried out to such good effect by the English set- 
 tlers farther south. 
 
 At this juncture the United States government 
 again took a hand, and in 1845 boldly annexed the 
 independent state of Texas to her fast-growing do- 
 main. This advance in the south called for some 
 concession to our competitor in the north, if war 
 was still to be averted. To avoid an immediate 
 struggle, we therefore allowed our northwest boun- 
 dary line to be run out to the Pacific along the 
 forty-ninth parallel, though there were many Demo- 
 crats of the day who would have preferred to force 
 the issue at once on the "fifty-four forty or fight." 
 
 As it was, each of the rivals had now gained a 
 foothold on the Pacific, but this was but the turning- 
 point in the race, and the course now lay toward the 
 southwest. There was but one path open to the 
 United States, and this stretched out directly before 
 them through California to the coast. But England 
 had already run her course in the north, and, in 
 order to emerge once more on the western seaboard, 
 she had now to make a wide detour to the south. 
 There was the longer way, by sea, around the Horn, 
 and, in order to provide for all contingencies. Great 
 Britain now took care to make good her rather shad- 
 
British Seizure of the San Juan. ITT 
 
 owy claim to the Falkland islands, and thus secure 
 the key to this route. The short cut across the 
 isthmus also lay open before her. British settlers 
 and agents had already blazed the way, and the 
 troops had only to follow. 
 
 The time was now ripe, and the English Home 
 government accordingly took matters entirely into 
 its own hands, and Was prepared to act with deci- 
 sion. Macdonald, the irresponsible filibuster, — 
 who, like Hodgson of old, had played his part in 
 the comedy, and was now of no farther use, — was 
 thereupon recalled, and in his place a regular Gov- 
 ernor was sent out to Belize, accompanied by a Chief 
 Justice, a Queen's Advocate, and all the parapher- 
 nalia of a legitimate British colony. Guatemala was 
 then informed oflScially by the English Secretary of 
 State for the Colonies, that Belize was henceforth to 
 be known as the colony of British Honduras, and 
 that Her Majesty considered its boundaries to ex- 
 tend to the Rio Sarstoon. Honduras was next told 
 in the same way, that Macdonald's act in seizing 
 upon the island of Roatan had been recognized by 
 the Crown, and that the island must now be con- 
 sidered as ofiicially under British control. 
 
 Everything was thus placed in readiness for the 
 contemplated move on the Nicaraguan canal route. 
 It was at this Juncture that Lord Palmerston, who 
 had rendered such yeoman's service to Great Brit- 
 ain's eastern advance toward the Pacific in the 
 ministry of Lord Grey and under the Melbourne 
 administration, was now once more called upon to 
 
178 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 take tlie reins of England's foreign policy in the 
 Lord John Russell cabinet. Palmerston was thor- 
 oughly conversant with the course of events on the 
 isthmus, and no longer had any doubts as to the 
 successful outcome of the war that we were still 
 waging with Mexico. He felt, therefore, that his 
 own government must lose no more time if Great 
 Britain were to gain equal rights with the United 
 States on the Pacific, and he resolved to act accord- 
 ingly. 
 
 In January, 1847, Palmerston instructed the Brit- 
 ish agents on the isthmus to hand in their reports, 
 and inform the Home government, first, in regard 
 to the exact boundaries of Mosquitia, and, secondly, 
 concerning the rights of English settlers there. Mr. 
 Chatfield answered from Guatemala that the Mos- 
 quito territory properly extended from the Roman 
 river in Honduras to the mid-course of the San 
 Juan, and westwards to the highest crest of the 
 Eastern Cordillera. Mr. Walker, writing from Blue- 
 fields, concurred in these boundaries, but suggested, 
 further, that a claim might well be made as far 
 south as the Chiriqui lagoon, considering the former 
 grants to MacGregor's colony along this shore. Mr. 
 O'Leary, in Bogota, finally called the attention of 
 his government to New Granada's claim to all this 
 eastern shore, and proposed that, by supporting 
 Costa Rica in her rights. Great Britain might well 
 gain a foothold south of the San Juan in much the 
 same way as she had already acquired her dominion, 
 farther north. 
 
British Seizure of the San Juan. 179 
 
 But the Costa Rican colony had since proved a 
 disastrous failure, and Palmerston deemed it impru- 
 dent to found any governmental claims on the rights 
 thus originally acquired. So he decided to disre- 
 gard New Granada's protests, and substantiate Brit- 
 ish rights indirectly by supporting the Mosquitos in 
 their demands. He therefore instructed the agents 
 to inform the Central American states that "the 
 right of the King of the Mosquitos should be main- 
 tained as extending from Cape Honduras down to 
 the mouth of the San Juan," and that this Mosquito 
 kingdom be henceforth recognized as an independent 
 power under the protection of Great Britain, who 
 would not look with indifference upon any encroach- 
 ments on the rights as thus defined. Chatfield, in 
 carrying out these instructions, took pains to add, on 
 his own account, that the boundaries so laid out 
 were announced "without prejudice to any rights of 
 the Mosquito King south of the San Juan," and thus 
 all the preliminaries were completed for the final 
 descent upon the Atlantic outlet of the proposed 
 canal. 
 
 As might have been expected, the states of Cen- 
 tral America raised a great hue and cry against this 
 sweeping British claim, and, naturally enough, Nica- 
 ragua was loudest in her protests. This was pre- 
 cisely what Lord Palmerston had looked for, and 
 indeed what he most desired. An informal cam- 
 paign was thereupon decided on to enforce Great 
 Britain's rights ; Governor Sir Charles Grey of Ja- 
 maica was duly instructed by the Home government 
 
180 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 to execute the plans, and war-sliips were detailed 
 by the Admiralty to act in conjunction with the 
 Jamaican authorities. According to orders the ves- 
 sels arrived off the Mosquito shore on October 23, 
 1847, and, in accordance with the decision of a 
 formal council of the Mosquito nation held at Blue- 
 fields under English auspices, Nicaragua was then 
 informed that on January 1, 1848, the Mosquito 
 King intended, with Great Britain's assistance, to 
 re-assume his lawful control over the San Juan. 
 
 At the same time Walker took his charge, the 
 Mosquito monarch, with him on the British war- 
 ship, Alarm, to the port itself, and again informed 
 the Nicaraguan commandant that His Royal High- 
 ness, the Mosquito King, was on board, and that the 
 Mosquito emblem must therefore be run up instead 
 of Nicaragua's flag, and that His Majesty must be 
 saluted. Once more the Nicaracjuan oflicer refused 
 to comply with this request, so the English landed 
 a small force and performed the proper offices 
 themselves. 
 
 After this preliminary feint, another council of 
 the Mosquito nation was held, on the 8th of 
 December, and resolutions were adopted ordering 
 Nicaragua to evacuate the port at once. Chatfield 
 carried these orders to the proper authorities in the 
 interior, and refused from the outset to listen to any 
 offers of arbitration proposed by Nicaragua and 
 Guatemala. Driven thus to extremities, Nicaragua 
 hastily mobilized her little military force and pre- 
 pared to defend the port. But the British were 
 
British Seizure of the San Juan. 181 
 
 there before them, and when the troops saw three 
 formidable war-ships in the harbor, — the Alarm, 
 the Yhien, and the Mosquito sloop, — they retreated 
 up the stream again to Serapiqui. True to their 
 word, on the first day of January, 1848, English 
 marines were landed, and the port invested. The 
 Mosquito flag was first raised and duly saluted. 
 The Nicaraguan officials of the port were then driven 
 out, and an Anglo-Mosquito administration installed 
 in their places. At a banquet held in the evening 
 by the victors, to which the vanquished were cor- 
 dially invited, the name of the port was formally 
 re-christened " Greytown," in honor of His Excellency 
 the Governor, whose plans had now been so auspi- 
 ciously carried out. 
 
 The victory was as yet but an empty one, how- 
 ever, and the English were not perfectly satisfied. 
 Force was necessary to clinch their claim. Leaving 
 but a meagre guard behind, the war-ships, therefore, 
 sailed away. The Nicaraguan forces could not re- 
 sist the temptation thus prepared for them, and as 
 soon as the vessels were out of gunshot range, they 
 came down the stream and drove the Anglo-Mos- 
 quito officials and their guard from the town. On 
 January 10th, the Nicaraguans then re-assumed con- 
 trol of the port and ran up their flag once more. 
 
 This flagrant violation of Great Britain's rights 
 was of course reported at once to the Home govern- 
 ment, and Lord Palmerston, now acting in the de- 
 fence of English subjects, was able to be much more 
 peremptory in his demands. The war-ships were 
 
182 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 ordered to invest the port again, and Chatfield was 
 now instructed to inform the Central American 
 states "that Her Majesty's government considers 
 that the claim of the Mosquito nation extends as far 
 as the southern branch of the St. John, which bears 
 the name of the Colorado, but which is just as 
 much a portion of the St. John as either of the other 
 two outlets of that river." The Vtxen and the 
 Alarm reappeared in the harbor of Greytown on 
 February 8th, and the English again took possession 
 of the port. Captain Loch of the Alarm, with a 
 force of two hundred and sixty marines, then fol- 
 lowed the fleeing Nicaraguan troops up the stream 
 in the ship's boats, and captured their stronghold at 
 Serapiqui. ^ 
 
 The English then followed the Nicaraguans to 
 Granada and besieged the town. Unable to oSer 
 further resistance the Nicaraguan government was 
 there forced at the point of the bayonet to agree to 
 the terms of peace submitted by Captain Loch. 
 Hostilities thereupon ceased, and on March 7th a 
 treaty M^as concluded whereby Nicaragua relin- 
 quished to the Mosquito King forever, all the rights 
 she had heretofore claimed over Greytown and the 
 custom house there. An English commandant was 
 thereupon installed in the port, and the war-ships 
 sailed away. 
 
 On receipt of the news in London of the favor- 
 
 ' Walker was unfortunately drowned at this point in the campaign, and, 
 after this. Captain Loch was obliged to assume diplomatic, as well as 
 military, duties. 
 
British Seizure of the San Juan. 183 
 
 able outcome of the campaign, Captain Loch was 
 Hghly complimented by the Eight Hon. E. J. 
 Stanley, Secretary of the Admiralty, on the import- 
 ant part he had played in the conclusion of the 
 affair, and Lord Palmerston then made haste to 
 assure Nicaragua of Great Britain's future good 
 will, offering now, under the changed conditions, to 
 receive her accredited minister. In this way the 
 English Secretary having demonstrated his force, 
 now hoped to secure the desired right of Avay 
 through Nicaragua's territory by peaceful nego- 
 tiation.' 
 
 New Granada's feeble claim to the eastern sea- 
 board was then summarily dismissed, and plans 
 were laid at once by the English Foreign Office to 
 secure control of the Pacific outlet of the proposed 
 ■canal as well. This last scheme involved dealings 
 with Nicaragua's northern neighbor, Honduras, as, 
 according to Napoleon's plans, on which the Eng- 
 lish were then relying, the canal was to debouch 
 into the Bay of Fouseca which was practically en- 
 
 ' British Accts. and Papers, loc. cit. , Vol. LX V. , ' ' Mosquito Correspond- 
 ence," Docs. 1-14 with enclosures. 
 
 U. S. Ex. Doc, No. 75, 31st Cong., ist Sess., Vol. X., pp. i-iiS. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 27, 32d Cong., 2d Sess., Docs. 1-9. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., p. iii. 
 
 Young, "Narrative of a Residence on the Mosquito Shore," p. 147. 
 New York. 
 
 E. Bedford Pirn, "Dottings in Panama, Nicaragua and Mosquito." 
 London, 1S68. 
 
 Squier, loc. cit., "Nicaragua," Ch. III., p. 679. "Central American 
 States," pp. 621, 641-647. 
 
 Bancroft, loc. cit., " History of Central America," Vol. III., pp. 314- 
 316. 
 
184 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 closed by that land. Means were, indeed, not want- 
 ing to obtain this end, but at this juncture the 
 United States began to interfere with England's 
 plans, and henceforth the struggle over the canal 
 route was to be between these two great rivals for 
 western prestige. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE CONFLICT ON THE ISTHMUS. 
 
 IT was the strong stand taken by the Democrats 
 in their convention of 1844 which really 
 brought about the annexation of Texas, 
 though Tyler, the Whig President, signed the 
 necessary resolution. Having thus practically 
 courted a war with Mexico, its prosecu- „ _. 
 tion was left entirely in the hands of Acquisition 
 the incoming Democratic administration, of California 
 President Polk, moreover, proved thor- Effect on 
 oiighly capable of the immediate task our Transit 
 thus set before him, and received due '^° ^'°* 
 credit for the victory gained over our American 
 antagonist. 
 
 Indeed, where Spanish-America alone was con- 
 cerned, the President appeared more than eager to 
 establish our national prestige. A dispute arose at 
 this time between the Indians and whites in Yuca- 
 tan, and, though there was no immediate question 
 of European interference on the peninsula, still 
 Polk took occasion to call the attention of Congress 
 to the matter, and indulged in a vigorous expression 
 of the Monroe doctrine to further emphasize his 
 policy towards the Americas. 
 
 i8s 
 
186 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Withal the British kept us down to the forty- 
 ninth parallel in the Northwest, in spite of previous 
 Democratic protests to the contrary; and, as for 
 England's endeavors to checkmate us on the isth- 
 mus as well, — to these Polk paid not the slightest 
 attention. Later on, when it was too late, he 
 pleaded ignorance of the British plans; but this 
 excuse showed " culpable negligence " at the veiy 
 least. Our State Department had all along been 
 fully cognizant of the doings of Macdonald and his 
 band, and as early as November 12, 1847, Mr. 
 Buchanan, Polk's Secretary of State, had received 
 notice from the Nicaraguan government, of Lord 
 Palmerston's threat against the San Juan. Beceiv- 
 ing no reply to this first diplomatic note, the 
 Supreme Director of Nicaragua, Don Jos6 • Querra, 
 then appealed directly to the President for aid. 
 Still no action was taken in the matter despite the 
 earnest solicitations of our consul in Nicaragua, Mi-. 
 J. W. Livingston, who was enabled to furnish his 
 chief at Washington with a detailed exposition of 
 the British plans fully a month before their final 
 execution. 
 
 Thus Polk lost his signal opportunity of asserting 
 the Monroe doctrine in the face of actual British 
 aggression on the isthmus; and only after matters 
 had gone too far, did the American people begin to 
 appreciate the true significance of such pusillanim- 
 ity. California was now ours, to be sure, with all 
 its magnificent extent of western seaboard ; but 
 was it not after all but an out-post, and extremely 
 
The Conflict on the Isthmus. 187 
 
 difficult to defend ? The " great American desert " 
 running through, our new lands, and flanked all 
 along by the rugged Rocky Mountain range, was 
 then deemed impossible for ordinary travel ; and 
 this difficulty was rendered the more aggravating 
 by the untoward political and economic conditions 
 of the time. 
 
 Serious trouble was already brewing between the 
 Northern and Southern States of the Union, and it 
 was thus doubly important for the Democratic 
 government at Washington to ally this newly ac- 
 quired western territory more closely to its strong- 
 holds in the South and its late conquests in the 
 Southwest. 
 
 The discovery of gold in California, furthermore, 
 induced an immense tide of immiCTation from the 
 East, to these rich fields of new wealth, and the 
 stream continued to increase alarmingly. Incon- 
 venience and danger attended both the toilsome 
 journey across the plains, and the perilous voyage 
 around the Horn ; and thus the people, too, began to 
 clamor for some better means of transit to the West. 
 
 Some visionaries in Congress suggested camels, 
 but, to the practical men of the day, isthmian transit 
 of some kind seemed the only adequate solution of 
 the problem. Thus all eyes were once more turned 
 toward the American isthmus. Capitalists of the 
 North, imbued with the quick commercial instinct, 
 saw in the new conditions an opportunity of reaping 
 rich profits by establishing immediate lines of transit 
 across this narrow strip of land between the seas. 
 
188 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Our Democratic statesmen also made haste to renew 
 the country's old-standing friendship for the Spanish- 
 American states of the isthmus, in the hopes of 
 securing political control along the routes that were 
 to be adopted. 
 
 Deeming it best not to test matters on the Central 
 American isthmus, at least until other routes of 
 transit had proved inadequate, both our 
 icanOpera-' government and our capitalists turned their 
 tions in first attention toward the Tehuantepec 
 Tehuan- route. We had nothing to fear there, at 
 
 tepee, . ° ; 
 
 any rate, as we had just defeated Mexico,, 
 and, consequently, might well expect to acquire 
 valuable transit rights across her territory under the 
 terms of the treaty of peace we were just about to 
 conclude. 
 
 The topography of this isthmus had come to be 
 much better known of late through the surveys 
 undertaken by an Italian engineer, Don Gaetano 
 Moro, who had been sent out some time before by a 
 Mexican promoter, Don Jos6 de Garay. Garay had 
 received valuable concessions for the construction of 
 an interoceanic railway across Tehuantepec from 
 Santa Anna's government, and in 1842 had pro- 
 ceeded to take advantage of his rights by instituting 
 these surveys. Instruments of precision were used 
 by Moro and his party, and, as a result, a seemingly 
 favorable route was laid out over Tarifa pass, for 
 either a railway as proposed, or for a canal of small 
 dimensions with many locks.' 
 
 ' The proposed canal was to be 50 miles long and to have l5l locks. 
 Estimated cost $17,000,000. 
 
The Conflict on the Isthmus. 189 
 
 In the meaDtime President Polk had instructed our 
 agent in Mexico, Mr. Trist, who was arranging mat- 
 ters there on the conclusion of the war, to offer to 
 double the indemnity of $15,000,000 we were about 
 to pay for the land we had already acquired, in return 
 for an exclusive right of way across Tehuantepec. 
 But the Mexican authorities, smarting under their 
 late defeat, and looking toward Garay himself for 
 the completion of the transit-way, refused this first 
 offer of ours. Some New York capitalists, under 
 the leadership of P. A. Hargous, nevertheless went 
 ahead, formed the Tehuantepec Railway Company, 
 and succeeded finally in buying out all the rights 
 and concessions of Garay and his associates. Mean- 
 while our government, by pushing matters against 
 Mexico, had gained still further territorial grants 
 toward the southwest. In the Gadsen treaty, there- 
 fore, Mexico, seeing Garay's rights already in Ameri- 
 ■can hands, resolved to make the best of it, and 
 reluctantly granted the United States the right to 
 construct a railroad, at least, across her isthmus. 
 
 At the request of the Tehuantepec company the 
 government also sent out a surveying party in De- 
 cember, 1850, under Brevet-Major J. B. Bai-nard, of 
 the Engineer Corps, and elaborated detailed plans 
 for the immediate construction of an interoceanic 
 railway to provide for the western trade. The 
 Mexicans continued to vent their ill-will, however, 
 by throwing every obstacle in the way of the 
 American surveying party, and thus delayed the 
 work. Other Americans, in the meantime, had 
 been more successful in Panama, and in the face of 
 
190 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 opposition and competition the Teliuantepec com- 
 pany abandoned its project for the time.^ 
 
 After Mexico's first refusal to grant a right of way 
 
 across Tehuantepec, Polk's administration turned at 
 
 once to New Granada, as other American 
 
 Treaty capitalists already had in mind the con- 
 
 with New struction of a railroad across the narrower 
 
 Granada ■ , i p t^ 
 
 and the isthmus 01 Jranama. 
 
 Panama The English government, we know, had 
 
 Railway, jigyej. deemed this district worthy of its- 
 serious consideration ; and, after learning the results, 
 of Garella's surveys, the French, too, seemed to have 
 abandoned this route for the time. The Democrats 
 were therefore given free rein on the lower isthmus 
 to carry out their chosen policy in the transit ques- 
 tion, and they certainly made good use of their 
 opportunity. 
 
 The twelve years of political strife had by this- 
 time I'educed the republic of New Granada to the 
 last extremities, and both Clericals and Liberals 
 were glad enough to seize this opportunity of United 
 States support in order to save their country from 
 ruin. Our government, having no immediate foreign 
 intervention to fear in this case, was also very liberal 
 in its offers of protection, and an agreement was. 
 
 ' U. S. Ex. Doc, No. 69, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 
 
 Rodrigues, loc. cit., p. 9. 
 
 Sullivan, loc. cit., p. 23. 
 
 " Encyclopedia Eritannica," '_' Teliuantepec." 
 
 ' ' An Account of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, with Proposals for Estab- 
 lishing a Communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans Based 
 upon Surveys and Reports of a Scientific Commission Appointed by Don 
 Jose da Garay." London, 1846. 
 
The Conflict on the Isthmus. 191 
 
 tlius soon readied between tlie two parties. In the 
 treaty then concluded we secured what we desired, 
 — an exclusive right of transit across that part of 
 the isthmus which lay within New Granada's do- 
 main, — and thus, at one stroke, acquired political 
 control over the Panama, San Bias, Caledonian, and 
 Atrato routes. In return for these favors the United 
 States government then formally recognized New 
 Granada's rights of sovereignty over this entire terri- 
 tory from sea to sea, and furthermore undertook to 
 guarantee "positively and efficaciously," to New 
 Granada, that it would defend such sovereignty from 
 all attacks, and also the absolute neutrality of every 
 route of transit within the territory so specified.' 
 
 This was indeed a positive assertion of the Monroe 
 doctrine ! In return for an exclusive right of tran- 
 sit, Polk had now actually guaranteed the indivisi- 
 bility of a foreign country, and that, too, a Spanish- 
 American republic. Such a policy, if vigorously 
 pursued elsewhere along the isthmus, and backed, if 
 need should arise, by force, would soon have placed 
 us in control of the entire situation. We must bear 
 in mind, however, that no one had seriously opposed 
 us as yet. The policy of our government toward 
 New Granada cannot, therefore, well be taken as a 
 criterion, as we were not put to a test on the lower 
 isthmus. 
 
 This comprehensive treaty with New Granada oe- 
 came a law on June 10, 1848, and under its terms 
 the Panama Railway Company at once completed its 
 
 ' For full text of these articles vid. Appendix A. 
 
192 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 arrangements for the construction of an immediate 
 system of transit. A contract was signed witli New 
 Granada, and a surveying party sent out under the 
 direction of Colonel Greorge W. Hughes of the 
 United States Topographical Corps, to locate the 
 most favorable line. Colonel Hughes discovered a 
 depression in the range of only 287 feet, lying be- 
 tween Navy Bay on the Atlantic, and Panama on 
 the Pacific, and along this route the road-bed was 
 accordingly laid out, to extend 47|- miles from sea to 
 sea, and to have a maximum elevation of 263 feet.^ 
 
 There was plenty of capital ready to embark on 
 the venture, — the Northern States providing the 
 majority, and Englishmen subscribing for the rest, — 
 and actual operations on the construction of the road 
 Avere soon after commenced under the supervision of 
 Colonel Totten and Mr. Trautwine. In this alto- 
 gether exceptional scheme of interoceanic transit, 
 promoters had nothing more serious to contend 
 against, than a very insalubrious climate. The mor- 
 tality during the work was indeed enormous, but as 
 there were always plenty of laborers to take the 
 place of those who succumbed, the undertaking was 
 never seriously retarded.^ 
 
 Whatever the prudence of the government's politi- 
 cal policy toward Central America, the economic 
 advantages of the Nicaraguan route proved too great 
 in the end to be any longer resisted by enterprising 
 
 ' Cf. Map, frontispiece. 
 
 " U. S. Senate Ex. Doc, No. 194, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 40. 
 
 Sullivan, loc. cit., pp. 23-24. 
 
 Rodrigues, loc. cit,, pp. 10 and 2g. 
 
The Conflict on the Isthmus. 193 
 
 American capitalists of the North. The results of 
 Lieutenant Bailey's surveys were by this time well 
 known through Mr. Allen's report/ and „ ^^^^ 
 Mr. Stephen's account of the region had, " Compania 
 moreover, lately been published in book ^^ '^"■°®'''' 
 form.^ Thinking to make use of this natu- gua," and 
 ral water-way across the isthmus, and thus ^^^ Hise 
 compete with the other promoters in pro- ^^^ ^' 
 viding a quick route of transit to the West, a com- 
 pany was then organized in Nicaragua by some 
 Northern capitalists, under the leadership of Messrs. 
 Brown and Company of New York, to be called the 
 Compania de Transito de Nicaragua, and on March 
 17, 1849, a contract was signed with the Nicaraguan 
 authorities for the prosecution of the work. 
 
 Nicaragua had already refused to meet Lord Pal- 
 merston's friendly overtures and was now induced 
 to take this bold step in derogation of treaty obliga- 
 tions with Great Britain, hoping, with the support 
 of our government, to regain her control over the 
 San Juan. In following up their contract rights 
 the American promoters soon became aware of the 
 immense practical advantages already acquired by 
 the English alongthe route. They immediately spread 
 the news at home of the British seizure of the San 
 Juan, and a storm of indignation arose throughout 
 the United States against such unwarranted British 
 aggressions. The Monroe doctrine again became the 
 talk of the day, and Polk's administration at 
 
 ' C/., ante, § 6l. 
 
 ' Cf. J. L. Stephen's, loc. cit., " Incidents of Travel in Central America, 
 Chiapas, and Yucatan." London and New York, 1842. 
 
194 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Washington could no longer avoid the inevitable 
 issue. 
 
 A special agent, Mr. Elijah Hise, was, therefore^ 
 hurriedly appointed by the President to visit the 
 scene, and in his letter of instructions to our envoy, 
 Mr. Buchanan at this late date took the ground that : 
 " The object of Great Britain in this seizure is evi- 
 dent from the policy which she has uniformly pur- 
 sued throughout her history, of seizing upon every 
 available commercial point in the world whenever 
 circumstances have placed it in her power ; and now 
 it seemed her evident purpose, by assuming the titl4 
 of protector over a miserable, degraded, and insig- 
 nificant tribe of Indians, to acquire an absolute 
 dominion over the vast extent of sea-coast in Nicara- 
 gua, and to obtain control of the route for a railroad 
 and canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans." 
 Withal Mr. Hise was given no definite instructions 
 to proceed against the British. He was even told 
 not to negotiate a treaty with Nicaragua, as, accord- 
 ing to Mr. Buchanan, " The government of the 
 United States has not as yet determined what course 
 it will pursue in regard to the encroachments of the 
 British government." So once more our agent was 
 sent off to the isthmus with the trite and indefinite 
 phrase that " The United States would not look with 
 indifference on encroachments of European powers 
 in the domestic affairs of the American republics." 
 
 Upon his arrival, Mr. Hise at once grasped the 
 true nature of the sitiaation, and was thoroughly 
 carried away by his enthusiasm, for the American 
 cause. Believing he was but carrying out the true 
 
The Conflict on the Isthmus. 195 
 
 policy of his government as originally expressed in 
 the Monroe doctrine, and lately substantiated in con- 
 nection with the transit question by the treaty just 
 concluded with New Granada, Hise went straight- 
 way to the capital of Nicaragua and requested the 
 authorities there to authorize a commissioner to treat 
 with him on the question. Don Beneventura Selva 
 was immediately appointed by the eager Nicaraguan 
 government in answer to this request, and with him 
 Hise drew up an all-comprehensive treaty on June 21, 
 1849 — entirely upon his own responsibility, it is true, 
 but thoroughly convinced that his government would 
 support him when the facts were made known. 
 
 By the terms of this instrument the United States 
 or " a company of the citizens thereof," were granted 
 the exclusive right of constructing and exploiting a 
 transit-way across Nicaragua, and permission was 
 further accorded them to take without compensation 
 all the land necessary for the work or its depen- 
 dencies. The government of the United States was 
 moreover to be allowed to erect its fortifications all 
 along the route and at the free ports to be estab- 
 lished at either end. In return for such monopoly 
 privileges, however, our government was not only 
 to guarantee the neutrality of the transit-way, but 
 also to formally recognize Nicaragua's right of sov- 
 ereignty over the territory she claimed from sea to sea ; 
 and Mr. Hise further promised that we would forever 
 " protect and defend " Nicaragua in these " sovereign 
 rights and dominion over the coasts, ports, lakes, 
 rivers, and territory justly within her jurisdiction." 
 
 Nearly every word of this treaty traversed the 
 
196 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 British, claim. By recognizing Nicaragua's sov- 
 ereignty from sea to sea, we ignored the Mosquito 
 protectorate, and in constituting Greytown a free 
 port to be guarded by American guns, we denied 
 the legality of the British occupation of the town. 
 In this form the treaty was sent on to the United 
 States, and though it was never formally submitted 
 to the Senate for ratification, its contents became 
 broadly known through the press, to be everywhere 
 heartily applauded by the people for its truly 
 American tone. But just at this time President 
 Polk went out of office, and his administration, in 
 consequence, was never brought to account for its 
 negligence in Nicaragua, nor had it to shoulder the 
 responsibility for the unauthorized acts of the special 
 envoy, Mr. Hise.^ 
 
 This placed the Whigs once more in conti'ol, and 
 their ideas on the transit question differed greatly 
 from those of their Southern opponents. 
 American Northern capitalists looked upon the canal 
 Atlantic and project purely as a money-making scheme, 
 Ship-Canal ^^'^ they only desired their government to 
 Company protect them in their rights. To President 
 Sauie/ Taylor and his colleagues it seemed there- 
 Treaty with fore important that a canal across Nicara- 
 Nicaragua. ^^^ should be constructed at once, and, as 
 English capital was then necessary for such a work, 
 they saw no reason why the United States should not 
 join with Great Britain in the prosecution of the 
 undertaking. The national interests necessarily in- 
 
 ' U. S.Ex. Doc, No. 75, 31st Cong., ist Sess., Doc. 6, pp. gi-117. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., pp. ^1 ff. 
 
The Conflict on the Isthmus. 197 
 
 volved, were thus scarcely given a thought, and the 
 private commercial interests of the North alone re- 
 garded. 
 
 Mr. Hise was, therefore, at once recalled, and the 
 acts of his rather doubtful diplomacy disavowed in 
 toto. In his place Mr. E. G. Squier was sent out to 
 the isthmus, with insti'uctions from Mr. Clayton, 
 President 'Taylor's Secretary of State, to negotiate 
 with Nicaragua for an " equal i-ight of transit for all 
 nations through a canal which should be hampered by 
 no restrictions, either from the local government, or 
 the company which should undertake the work"; but 
 above all things " not to involve this country in any 
 entangling alliances, or any unnecessary controversy." 
 
 In the meantime the Compania de Transito de 
 Nicaragua had become absorbed in the larger 
 American Atlantic and Pacific Ship-Canal Com- 
 pany, organized in New York under the auspices 
 of Messrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt, Joseph L. White, 
 Nathaniel H. Wolfe, and others ; and their agent 
 was already in Nicaragua working for a favorable 
 concession. 
 
 But upon his arrival Mr. Squier too became in- 
 bued with the spirit of the Monroe doctrine, and 
 began at once to oppose the British claims with fully 
 as much zest, but with considerably more judgment, 
 than his predecessor, Mr. Hise. Through his efforts 
 the Canal Company's agent was enabled, on Septem- 
 ber 23, 1849, to secure a very favorable concession 
 from Nicaragua for the construction of the canal. 
 Under the terms of this contract the American com- 
 pany secured the right to construct a canal from 
 
198 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Greytown, or any other feasible point on the Atlantic, 
 to Estero Keal, or any other point in Nicaraguan 
 territory on the Pacific. Land was also granted them 
 for the purposes of American colonization, as well 
 as for the canal itself, and the promoters were also 
 to have the monopoly of steam navigation on Nicara- 
 gua's lakes and rivers. Nicaragua thereupon granted 
 the American company a charter, formally incorpo- 
 rating it a juristic personality under her laws. 
 
 Simultaneously with the negotiation of this instru- 
 ment Mr. Squier also signed a treaty in his diplo- 
 matic capacity with the Nicaraguan authorities, 
 assuring the company in its right of way from sea 
 to sea. In return for this favor he engaged his 
 government to guarantee the neutrality of the canal 
 route, and promised that the United States would 
 recognize and defend Nicaragua's rights of sov- 
 ereignty between the two oceans, at least along the 
 line of the proposed canal and at either port. In 
 order to do away with the exclusive nature of this 
 guaranty, a clause was then inserted in the treatj^, 
 offering like rights to such other nations as might 
 care to negotiate with Nicaragua on the same terms 
 as the United States. Thus Mr. Squier rather san- 
 guinely hoped he had secured American rights on 
 the isthmus without binding his government to any 
 .exclusive control.^ 
 
 ^ British and Foreign State Papers, London Government Print, 1850-51, 
 Vol. XL., Doc. 62, p. 953. 
 
 U. S. Ex. Doc, No. 75, 31st Cong., ist Sess., pp. 118-185. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 194, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 49. . 
 Squier, loc. cit., " Nicaragua," Appendix. 
 
The Conflict on the Isthmus. 199 
 
 Having gained actual possession of the Atlantic 
 outlet of tlie canal, the British had already begun to 
 apply themselves to securins; control over „ ^^ 
 
 . . . § 77- The 
 
 the Pacific port as well, foreseeing, with Seizure of 
 
 their characteristic keenness, that the power Tigre 
 
 which dominated both termini of the pro- 
 posed route would always have the final word to say 
 in the transit question. Napoleon's route formed the 
 basis of the then calculations, and this, it will be re- 
 membered, had its western outlet in the Gulf of 
 Fonseca. Thus, though the actual terminus of the 
 <;anal was to be in Nicaraguan territory, Honduras 
 would still control the port and therefore the canal's 
 real outlet on the Pacific. The islands in the Gulf 
 of Fonseca, became, in consequence, of the utmost 
 strategic importance in the jDresent struggle for the 
 control of the route, as they occupied a position on 
 the Pacific shore similar to that held by Greytown 
 on the Atlantic. 
 
 The British proceeded against these islands in an 
 indirect way at first, by pressing an old claim for 
 debt against Honduras for damages said to be due 
 to Her Majesty's subjects. Thus, while Squier was 
 treating with Nicaragua, British war-ships took their 
 position off Truxillo and threatened the town with 
 their guns, while Chatfield kept pressing the Hon- 
 duras government for immediate satisfaction of the 
 English claim. 
 
 Hearing news of this coercion, and foreseeing its 
 probable outcome, Mr. Squier hurried north after 
 •concluding his negotiations with Nicaragua, and, 
 
200 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 entirely on his own authority, began to treat with 
 the Honduras government himself, hoping to secure 
 American rights there as well, and thus, if possible, 
 head off the English on this occasion. The Hon- 
 duras authorities were only too glad to accept this 
 solution of their diiEcult position, and on September 
 28, 1849, a treaty was concluded, granting to the 
 United States valuable stretches of land for naval 
 stations on Tigre island in the Gulf of Fonseca, and 
 for fortifications along the shores of the bay. By a 
 protocol the island of Tigre itself was furthermore 
 ceded to the United States for eighteen months 
 pending the ratification of the original treaty. 
 Thus the two rivals were for the moment placed on 
 equal terms. Great Britain held the Atlantic 
 outlet of the canal, while the United States were 
 secure in their control over the Pacific port. The 
 advantage was, indeed, slightly in our favor, for 
 we also held an exclusive right of way through the 
 interior. 
 
 When Chatfield heai'd of this treaty and its all-im- 
 portant protocol, he left the capital and proceeded 
 at once to the Pacific. The fleet then sailed away 
 from Truxillo, after firing a parting shot on the 
 town, and orders were hastily sent to the Pacific 
 squadron to meet Chatfield at the Gulf of Fonseca. 
 Acting in conjunction with this naval force, Chat- 
 field at once seized upon Tigre island for debt, in 
 the name of the Crown, and hoisted the British flag 
 there on October 16th. Squier forthwith notified 
 Mr. Chatfield that he had unlawfully taken posses- 
 
The Conflict on the Isthmus. 201 
 
 sion of land belonging to the United States, and 
 then ordered the British to evacuate the island. 
 This Chatfield flatly refused to do, whereupon 
 Squier gave him six days more of grace, and said 
 that any further occupation of the island after that 
 date would be regarded by his government as an 
 act of aggression to be dealt with accordingly. 
 
 Matters were in this interesting state, when Mr. 
 Clayton's diplomacy interfered, and the whole 
 transit question was taken out of the hands of the 
 belligerent agents in Central America, and amicably 
 adjusted in Washington.' 
 
 ' Brit, and For. State Papers, loc. cii., Vol. XL., p. 953, Docs. 14-17. 
 
 House Journal, U. S., 31st. Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1739-1801. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Doc, No. 43, 31st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1-26. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 27, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., p. 156. 
 
CHAPTEE X. 
 
 THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY. 
 
 THE doings of British and American agents 
 on the isthmus naturally stimulated di- 
 plomatic activity between the two govern- 
 ments. While advancing each in its own way 
 toward the Pacific, Great Britain and the United 
 S78 Mr States had, at the same time, been laying 
 Clayton's the train for a fresh quarrel, and the un- 
 Course. official publication of the Hise treaty finally 
 touched off the fuse. 
 
 According to this convention, the United States 
 undertook to guarantee Nicaragua's paramount right 
 of sovereignty from sea to sea ; but by the terms 
 of the Loch treaty with Nicaragua, the entire east- 
 ern coast, including the outlet of the San Juan, was, 
 to all intents and purposes, a British possession. 
 By Hise's act, therefore, the whole question was 
 brought to an issue ; involving England's rights of 
 encroachment in America, which we had up to this 
 persistently denied, on the one hand, and our own. 
 Monroe doctrine, which we had promised to uphold, 
 on the other. 
 
 Instead of preparing for the inevitable explo- 
 sion, Taylor directed all the energies of his feeble 
 
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 203 
 
 administration to extinguishing the train that Hise 
 had so recklessly fired. This enthusiast was re- 
 called, as we know, and Squier sent out in his place, 
 with strict and more guarded instructions. The 
 fact was, the Whigs had no majority in the Senate 
 and Taylor thus found himself on the horns of an 
 awkward dilemma. If he backed down now, the 
 anti-administration press was sure to accuse him of 
 pusillanimity in the face of British aggression ; and 
 yet he dared not risk an open conflict with England 
 with only a minority support in Congress. 
 
 Clayton thought he saw an outlet from the diffi- 
 culty by coming to an immediate agreement with 
 Great Britain on the basis of mutual aid and co- 
 operation in the transit problem. Fearing popular 
 enthusiasm, on the one side, and senatorial obstruc- 
 tion, on the other, Clayton resolved, however, to keep 
 his plan a secret until everything had been satisfac- 
 torily arranged. He therefore frankly explained to 
 the British minister, Mr. Crampton, the dilemma 
 the administration found itself in, and asked him to 
 lend his assistance iu helping them out of the 
 difficulty, on a basis agreeable to both parties. In 
 proof of his good intentions, Clayton offered to 
 abandon the Hise treaty unequivocally, and to 
 co-operate with Her Majesty's minister in securing 
 treaties from Nicaragua that should accord exclusive 
 rights to neither power; provided that Great Britain, 
 on her part, would " consent to make'arrangements 
 with regard to the Mosquito claim as would prevent 
 its being an obstacle to the design in question." 
 
204 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 He then ended by saying that " the United States 
 sought no exclusive advantage in the matter, and 
 rather wished the canal to be a bond of peace 
 between the two countries than a subject for 
 Jealousy." 
 
 Our new minister to England, Mr. Abbott Law- 
 rence, had not as yet started for his post, so, wishing 
 to avoid any unnecessary delay, Mr. Clayton in- 
 structed Mr. Rives, the lately appointed minister ta 
 France, to stop o£E in London long enough to lay 
 the proposition directly before Lord Palmerston 
 and learn his views on the matter. As Mr. Clayton 
 virtually conceded British rights to the Mosquito 
 shore. Lord Palmerston responded very cordially ta 
 these liberal offers of co-operation from our govern- 
 ment, and insinuated that Her Majesty's government 
 would look with favor on any plan to make the canal 
 the common highway of the world. 
 
 Upon his arrival in London, shortly after, Mr. 
 Lawrence also entered very heartily into this plan of 
 co-operation as outlined by his government. He 
 pointed out to Lord Palmerston that English and 
 American capitalists were already working harmoni- 
 ously in the construction of the Panama railway, and 
 suggested that Great Britain also join in the guaranty 
 which the United States government had lately 
 accorded to New Granada. In regard to the Mos- 
 quito protectorate, however, Mr. Lawrence did not 
 share the more generous views of his chief. On the 
 contrary, it was Lawrence's idea that, in return for the 
 right of co-operation in the construction and control 
 
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 205 
 
 ■of the canal, Great Britain should definitely abandon 
 all exclusive claims to the eastern seaboard and over 
 the outlet of the San Juan. Finding that Lord 
 Palmerstou entertained no thought of any such con- 
 •cessions, Mr. Lawrence accordingly prepared to fight 
 this question out first, along diplomatic lines ; for he 
 recognized very clearly that it was after all the 
 Mosquito protectorate and the seizure of the San 
 Juan which constituted the real issue between the 
 powers, and not the matter of the immediate con- 
 struction of the canal. As Palmerston was obdurate 
 . on this point and already had his case well in hand, 
 Lawrence set himself to the task of examining into 
 the history of the British claim, and preparing an 
 American rebuttal. He went through an immense 
 mass of original material on the subject,* and, having 
 sifted the historical evidence, he wrote to Mr. Clay- 
 ton that, "after a careful examination of the Mos- 
 quito claim with the protectorate of England, I can 
 see no ground for it to rest upon either in history, 
 public law, or justice." 
 
 Any discussion of the Mosquito protectorate was 
 fatal to Mr. Clayton's plan, as it would necessarily 
 involve delay ; so, growing impatient and dreading 
 the results of this fresh controversy, he wrote at 
 once to Mr. Lawrence, instructing him to ask Lord 
 Palmerston point blank : Whether her Majesty's 
 government now "intended to occupy or colonize 
 Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any 
 
 ' The results of Mr. Lawrence's investigations are to be found in Sen. 
 Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 67-81. 
 
206 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 part of Central America," and " wlietlier Great 
 Britain would unite with the United States in 
 guaranteeing the neutrality of a ship-canal, railway, 
 or other communication to be open to the world and 
 common to all nations." Mr. Lawrence reluctantly 
 did as he was bid, and then washed his hands of all 
 further responsibility in thjs unfortunate betrayal of 
 our claims. 
 
 As Mr. Clayton tacitly admitted the British 
 rights thus far acquired on the isthmus. Lord Pal- 
 merston lost no time in replying that Her Majesty's 
 government had no intention of further colonization 
 in Central America, and would gladly co-operate 
 with the United States in the construction and main- 
 tenance of a canal that should be open to all nations 
 on equal terms. To make sure of his original posi- 
 tion, this astute diplomat then added, however, that, 
 "though there existed a close political connection 
 between the Crown of Great Britain and the state 
 and territory of Mosquito,^ the British government 
 claimed no dominion there, and that, moreover, " Her 
 Majesty's government would freely undertake to 
 obtain the consent of Mosquito ' to such arrangements 
 as would render that port entirely applicable, and 
 on the principles above mentioned, to the purpose 
 of such a sea-to-sea communication." 
 
 Mr. Clayton saw no incongruity in the United 
 States obtaining the consent of a half-breed Indian 
 chief indirectly through the British government, to 
 construct a transit-way through the American conti- 
 nent, and so, in expressing himself fully satisfied 
 
 ^ The italics are my own. 
 
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 20T 
 
 with Lord Palmerston's assurances, he swallowed 
 the Mosquito protectorate whole, and never appeared 
 to be aware of the fact. 
 
 Having scored all his points, thus far, on Mr. 
 Clayton, and wishing to avoid any further risky dis- 
 cussion of British rights in Central America with 
 his more doughty antagonist, Mr. Lawrence, Lord 
 Palmerston then sent a special envoy. Sir Henrj'- 
 Bulwer, to Washington, in the temporary capacity 
 of Her Majesty's accredited minister to the United 
 States, that he might there treat with the Secretary 
 of State directly, and settle matters definitely along 
 the lines laid down. 
 
 Seeing that his arguments were no longer of any 
 avail with his government, Mr. Lawrence sorrow- 
 fully sent on his bulky historical refutation to Mr. 
 Clayton, only to be buried among the archives of 
 the State Department, adding pathetically in his 
 note of transmittal, that " whenever the history of 
 the conduct of Great Britain shall be published to 
 the world, it will not stand one hour before the bar 
 of public opinion without universal condemnation," ^ 
 
 Upon his arrival in Washington Sir Henry Bul- 
 wer took in the whole situation at a glance, and 
 soon after reported to Lord Palmerston, 
 that he felt sure from his observations, Henry Bul- 
 that the interest manifested by the United '^^'''s Di- 
 States in the Nicaragua-Mosquito dispute 
 merely arose from the fact of Nicaragua's having 
 
 ' British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XL., p. 953, Docs. 1-13. 
 U. S. Ex. Doc, No. 75, 31st Cong., ist Sess., pp. 118-130. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 27, 32d Cong., 2d Sess., Doc. 3, pp. 18-23. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 56^. 
 
208 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 granted the charter for the canal to an American 
 company; and, inasmuch as the two countries could 
 never agree on the matter, he deemed it -best to keep 
 this Mosquito question entirely aloof from the pres- 
 ent discussion, and to arrange instead for a conven- 
 tion with the United States which should " confer 
 upon American commerce all it can desire to obtain, 
 in a manner corresponding with the dignity and 
 honor of Great Britain, and the disinterestedness of 
 her protectorate over the Mosquito territory." 
 
 News reached the Senate, at this juncture, of 
 Chatfield's unwarranted seizure of Tigre island, and, 
 in spite of the earnest protestation' of the adminis- 
 tration forces, the Democratic majority thereupon 
 insisted upon an" immediate consideration of the 
 Squier treaty with Mcaragua. The convention was 
 accordingly brought up and referred without de- 
 bate to the Committee on Foreign Relations for 
 immediate consideration. The Committee then called 
 upon the State Department for all papers bearing 
 upon the question, and Mr. Clayton recognized at 
 once that he must either come to an immediate 
 agreement with Great Britain, or else accept his 
 defeat and turn the whole matter over to popular 
 discussion, after all, for final decision. 
 
 On the plea that the question was then being ad- 
 justed with the British minister, Mr. Clayton refused 
 to deliver over the correspondence called for, and, in 
 evident agitation of mind, hurried off to Sir Henry 
 Bulwer, and laid his predicament unreservedly before 
 him, with the earnest request that he waive further 
 
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 209 
 
 ■formalities and come at once to agreement along the 
 lines previously laid down. Not enough time had as 
 yet elapsed for Bulwer to have received definite in- 
 structions from London in answer to his last despatch; 
 but, seeing the trepidation of his antagonist, and 
 recognizing the advantage to his government, he de- 
 ■cided to take the responsibility of an unofficial act 
 upon his own shoulders, by proceeding at once to a 
 favorable conclusion while there was yet time. 
 
 But there were still important preliminaries to be 
 •disposed of before the British claim could be clinched. 
 The Squier treaty, derogating English rights, was up 
 before the Senate, and the American ultimatum to 
 Chatfield had not as yet been disclaimed. Bulwer 
 was quite ready to disavow Chatfield's act in seizing 
 the island of Tigre, could he be convinced that, in 
 return therefor his government would be left undis- 
 turbed in its rights along the San Juan, and at the 
 same time secure a half interest in the construction 
 and control of the canal. He had only to suggest 
 this alternative to the eager Clayton to be at once 
 assured that the United States would modify the 
 Squier treaty so as to make it no longer objectionable 
 to Great Britain, if Her Majesty's government, on its 
 side, would promise to keep the Mosquito protec- 
 torate from interfering with the construction and 
 maintenance of the transit-way. Bulwer could easily 
 give such assurances, as they were in line with his 
 previous instructions. Both governments then for- 
 mally disavowed the acts of their respective agents in 
 Honduras, and the two plenipotentiaries thereupon 
 
210 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 proceeded to draft a formal treaty settling all diffi- 
 culties that had arisen and providing for all future 
 contingencies. 
 
 Sir Henry Bulwer, nevertheless, insisted that this 
 rough draft must first be laid before Lord Palmerston 
 for approval, before he could proceed to the exchange 
 of final ratifications. In the interim that then oc- 
 curred, even Clayton's colleagues, — vs^ho vs^ere half- 
 way in the secret, — besought him to have the 
 objectionable Mosquito protectorate first disposed 
 of before coming to any definite agreement with 
 Great Britain in regard to the canal. Clayton re- 
 plied that he had arranged this matter satisfactorily 
 in the convention he had just concluded, and was 
 only waiting on Sir Henry Bulwer now to lay the 
 treaty before the Senate for approval.' 
 
 Lord Palmerston's approval of Sir Henry Bulwer's 
 clever diplomacy came duly to hand, and upon the 
 Th ^^ceipt of this note, the vagaries of our un- 
 ciayton- fortunate foreign policy under the Taylor 
 Bulwer administration, became crystallized in the 
 now famous Clayton-Bulwer treaty, signed 
 April 19, 1850.^ The real substance of this conven- 
 tion is contained in Articles I. and VIII. ; but the 
 wording of both is so hopelessly ambiguous, that 
 their construction is well-nigh impossible. Without 
 
 'Brit, and For. State Papers, Vol. XL., Docs. 5, 7, pp. 14-32. 
 
 U. S. Ex. Doc, No. 75, 3ist Cong., ist Sess., pp. 202-339. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 27, 32d Cong., 2d Sess, Docs. 19, 23, 26, and 34. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 194, 47th Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 55-88. 
 
 Cong. Globe, Vol. XXVI., p. 250. 
 
 ^ For full text of the treaty vide Appendix B. 
 
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 211 
 
 going into the finer points of distinction, just at 
 present, the important provisions of the treaty may 
 be summarized as follows : 
 
 (i) Neither Great Britain nor the United States shall ever 
 obtain or maintain any exclusive control over the canal ; nor 
 shall they build any fortifications along the route of the same. 
 
 (2) Neither Great Britain nor the United States shall ever 
 take possession of any part of Central America, nor fortify any 
 part of the same, nor establish any colonies there, nor exert 
 any dominion, nor make any use of any alliance or protecto- 
 rate either may have there to this end. 
 
 (3) Great Britain and the United States promise to mutually 
 guard the safety and neutrality of the canal, and to invite all 
 other nations to do the same. 
 
 (4) Great Britain and the United States also promise to 
 extend their joint support and protection to any satisfactory 
 canal company which may undertake the work. 
 
 (5) Great Britain and the United States, having not only 
 desired, in entering into this convention, to accomplish a par- 
 ticular object, but also to establish a general principle, hereby 
 agree to extend their protection, by treaty stipulations, to any 
 other practicable communications, whether by canal or rail- 
 way, across the isthmus, and especially to the interoceanic 
 communications which are now proposed to be established by 
 the way of Tehuantepec and Panama. 
 
 The treaty thus secretly concluded was then 
 rushed through the Senate, and there met with but 
 little debate, as it was generally under- 
 stood that under the terms of the conven- English 
 tion Great Britain had abandoned her Reserva- 
 policy of encroachment forever, and agreed '°"^' 
 
 to co-operate with our government henceforth, in 
 
212 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 tlie peaceful solution of the transit problem. It 
 was an inspiring idea, this fraternal joining of hands 
 by the two great Anglo-Saxon powers in the inter- 
 ests of international commerce, and Clayton's im- 
 agined success was deservedly popular for the time. 
 
 Mr. Clayton had, indeed, laid down his hand at 
 the very outset of this diplomatic game, but Sir 
 Henry had preferred to retain his cards and play 
 them in due order, nevertheless. He still held one 
 card, the winning trump, and this he now played 
 with precision. It was simply a note addressed to 
 Mr. Clayton to the effect that Great Britain did not 
 "understand the engagements of the convention to 
 apply to Her Majesty's settlement at Honduras or 
 its dependencies." Now the only possible dependen- 
 cies of British Honduras that one could then con- 
 ceive of, consisted in the Bay islands and Mosquitia, 
 and the boundaries of both these were still so un- 
 regulated that they might readily be used as the 
 bases of indefinite British encroachment into the 
 territory of Central America. With the addition of 
 this all-important reservation the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty, therefore, simply meant that Great Britain 
 was to remain secure in all her claims, while the 
 United States government was forever to keep its 
 hands off the American isthmus. 
 
 Bulwer's comprehensive declaration made little or 
 no impression on the still imperturbable Clayton. 
 He was quite sure in his own mind that the treaty 
 was in no way intended to interfere with Her 
 Majesty's rights in British Honduras ; but, in order. 
 
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 213 
 
 as he said "to leave no room for a charge of dupli- 
 city against our government," Clayton wrote a per- 
 sonal note to Mr. King, chairman of the Senate 
 Committee on Foreign Relations, asking him to sub- 
 stantiate this conclusion. No mention was made in 
 this note of the -phrase " and its dependencies,'^ and 
 Mr. King, never having seen the text of the original 
 declaration, was utterly unaware of this far-reaching 
 proviso. He therefore replied to Mr. Clayton, that 
 " the Senate perfectly understood that the treaty 
 did not include British Honduras " ; but, he added 
 of his own volition, "you should be careful not to 
 use any expression which would seem to recognize 
 the right of England to any portion of Honduras," 
 Mr. Clayton had already written his note in reply 
 to Sir Henry's declaration, and was only waiting to 
 hear from Mr. King before delivering it. Accord- 
 ing to his own memorandum of this note Clayton 
 acknowledged therein that " British Honduras was 
 not embraced in the treaty," but he carefully de- 
 clined either " to affirm or deny the British title to 
 their settlement or its alleged dependencies." This 
 wording was scarcely in accordance with Mr. King's 
 recqmmendation, but it embodied the Secretary's 
 views, so he signed the note and delivered it on the 
 same evening to Sir Henry Bulwer. The two pleni- 
 potentiaries thereupon proceeded " without further 
 or other action to exchange the ratifications of said 
 treaty." 
 
 The Clayton-Bulwer treaty as thus amended never 
 came up again before the Senate for approval, but 
 
214 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 was turned over at once to the executive. During the 
 short interval that elapsed between the final ratifica- 
 tion and promulgation of the treaty, Mr. Clayton 
 filed the British reservations, which he alone had 
 read, among the archives of the State Department, 
 with a brief memorandum ' of their receipt and the 
 action he had taken thereon. 
 
 The President, who had all along respected, but 
 never interfered with, the secrecy of the negotia- 
 tions carried on by his Secretary of State, evidently 
 knew no more than the Senators of the nature of 
 these subsequent modifications. Naively regarding 
 it in the light of a triumph for his administration, 
 he accordingly proclaimed the treaty in its original 
 form, and thus placed the first estoppel on our case 
 against Great Britain under the Monroe doctrine for 
 the control of the American isthmus.'' 
 
 ' Mr. Clayton's memorandum reads as follows : 
 
 " The within declaration of Sir H. L. Bulwer was received by me on the 
 2gth day of June, 1850. In reply I wrote him my note of the 4th of July, 
 acknowledging that I understood British Honduras was not embraced in 
 the treaty of the 19th day of April last, but at the same time carefully de- 
 clining to affirm or deny the British title in their settlement or its alleged 
 dependencies. After signing my note last night I delivered it to Sir 
 Henry, and we immediately proceeded, without any further or other action, 
 to exchange the ratifications of said treaty. [The blank in the declara- 
 tion was never filled up.*] The consent of the Senate to the declaration 
 was not required and the treaty was ratified as it stood when it was made, 
 
 "John M. Clayton. 
 
 " N. B. — The rights of no Central American state have been compromised 
 by the treaty or by any part of the negotiations." 
 
 * The words in brackets appear in the original in ink, but are marked out by lead-pencil 
 marks across their face. When they were so marked is not known. The blanks in the 
 original declaration are filled up with " 2qth " and " June," written with a different kind 
 of ink from the original. 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 82-87. 
 Cong. Globe, Vol. XXVI., pp. 2i\& ff. 
 
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 215 
 
 President Taylor died three weeks after his pro- 
 mulgation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and Vice- 
 President Millard Fillmore took his place 
 in the executive chair, calling upon Daniel Diplomatic 
 Webster to once more assume the duties situation 
 of the State Department. In this sudden 
 change of administration, Sir Henry Bulwer began 
 to fear for the repose of the Squier treaty in its tem- 
 porary resting-place. He therefore approached the 
 new Secretary on the matter, and told him of his 
 predecessor's promise, — made conditional on the sign- 
 ing of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, — that certain pro- 
 visions of the Squier convention should be rendered 
 nugatory. Webster's hands were bound by the 
 policy of the Taylor administration. With the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty now in force, the Squier treaty 
 with Nicaragua was no longer of any use, as its 
 ■essential points could not be pressed. So Webster 
 assured Sir Henry that he would ask the Senate to 
 take no further action in the matter. Congress ad- 
 journed soon after, and the diplomatic efforts of 
 both Hise and Squier were then buried past all 
 resurrection. 
 
 As a result of our disastrous foreign policy, the 
 American Canal Company was now placed under the 
 joint political protection of the two great powers 
 whose aims on this continent were necessarily antag- 
 onistic. From an economic point of view, the com- 
 pany's policy could henceforth be dictated by 
 citizens of each country according to the amount of 
 stock they were able to control ; but legally it still 
 
216 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 remained under the Jurisdiction of a vacillating and 
 insecure little state, whose interests had not been in. 
 the least consulted by the parties to this latest 
 diplomatic contract. 
 
 As for adjusting the disputed points of interna- 
 tional politics involved in the transit question, our 
 government had accomplished less than nothing.^ 
 The Clayton-Bulwer treaty rested on the unsubstan- 
 tial bases of compromise and ill-concealed difference 
 of opinion ; and, furthermore, the real issue that had 
 arisen between British rights of encroachment and 
 the American Monroe doctrine were no nearer solu- 
 tion than before. 
 
 To what confusion this ideal plan for co-operation 
 in the protection of the canal now led ; to what ex- 
 tent English capital came to the aid of the Ameri- 
 can company; in what manner Nicaragua looked 
 after the legal interests of her corporation ; and how 
 the long-standing disagreements between Gi'eat 
 Britain and the United States were settled by the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty, — all this can best be seen by 
 following the course of subsequent events.^ 
 
 ' " Correspondence with the United States Respecting Central America," 
 pp. 70-71. Printed by order of Parliament, London, 1856. 
 Brit, and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XL., Docs. 59-62. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 25, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. i, p. 4. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE CENTRAL AMERICAN IMBROGLIO- 
 
 WITH diplomatic matters still in sucli an 
 unsatisfactory state, the American pro- 
 moters were, nevertheless, gg q^^^_ 
 obliged to proceed with their more practi- nel Chiids's 
 cal work of providing an immediate means Surveys, 
 of transit through Nicaragua. To this end Colonel 
 O, W. Childs of Philadelphia, who had been the chief 
 engineer of the New York State canals, was sent off 
 to the isthmus to institute further surveys of the 
 route. 
 
 There were two routes through Nicaragua then 
 being discussed ; Napoleon's, which we know was 
 to pass through both lakes and emerge on the west 
 in the Gulf of Fonseca ; and another route surveyed 
 by a Danish engineer. Dr. Andreas Oersted, in 1848, 
 which was to leave Lake Nicaragua at the mouth of 
 the Rio Sapoa and proceed thence across the divide 
 to the Bay of Salinas on the Pacific.^ With Bailey's 
 previous surveys and these later data to go on, 
 Childs began his reconnaissance at the Pacific end of 
 the canal in August, 1850. After a careful exami- 
 nation of this section of the country, the American 
 
 ' Cf. Map, frontispiece. 
 217 
 
218 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 engineer decided to discard all previous plans, and 
 run a line of Lis own across the Coast range from 
 Lajas, on the western shores of Lake Nicaragua, to 
 Brito, on the Pacific, as he found the divide to have 
 an elevation of only forty-six feet above the level 
 of the lake at this point. Having laid out the west- 
 ern section of his route, Childs then proceeded across 
 the lake and continued his surveys along the course 
 of the San Juan, planning there for a series of locks 
 and dams to render navigation possible along this 
 stream to the sea. On the completion of his work 
 Colonel Childs reported to his company a plan for a 
 canal of 194 miles in length, to run from Grey town 
 to Brito, with twenty-eight locks, and to include both 
 river and lake navigation. 
 
 The company's officers then forwarded these plans 
 to the War Department for approval, and the Sec- 
 retary, Mr, Conrad, in turn passed them on, for 
 expert examination, to two officers of the Topograph- 
 ical Survey, Colonel Abert, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Turnbull. Their report, handed in ou March 20, 
 1852, confirmed Colonel Childs's conclusions in every 
 particular ; but, mindful of our promises of co-opera- 
 tion as set forth in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the 
 United States government thought it best, before 
 allowing the company to proceed, to submit this 
 verified report to English authorities for examina- 
 tion. Her Majesty's government accordingly ap- 
 pointed two experts. Colonel Aldrich, of the Eoyal 
 Engineers, and Mr. James Walker, an English civil 
 engineer of repute, to undertake the investigation ; 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 219 
 
 and they, too, approvred the original plan almost 
 "witliout reservation. 
 
 Indeed, Colonel Childs's were the first surveys 
 ^long the isthmus which could really lay claim to 
 any scientific accuracy. It was he who located the 
 ■very lowest depression in all the great continental 
 range ; and this canal route, as laid out under his 
 ■direction, has remained until to-day, with but slight 
 modifications and improvements, at least the best of 
 the Nicaraguan routes, if not the most advantageous 
 of any along the isthmus.^ 
 
 Admirable as Colonel Childs's plans were thus 
 proved to be from a technical point of view, they 
 ■could hardly promise an immediate solu- 
 tion of the transit problem, and this, after Accessory 
 all, was the pressing question of the hour Transit 
 for the Northern capitalists. Thus, in 
 order to reap some present advantage from the tide 
 of Western immigration, the American promoters 
 ■determined to open up temporaiy transit facilities 
 at once across Nicaragua ; without, however, losing 
 sight of the larger canal project, which they expected 
 vs^ould mature more slowly. 
 
 A subsidiary contract was accordingly concluded 
 with Nicaragua on August 14, 1851, whereby a 
 smaller concern, the Accessory Transit Company, 
 was carved out of the more inclusive American 
 Canal Company, and given the monopoly of steam 
 navigation on all the waters of that state. Having 
 
 ' English Engineering Magazine, loc. cit., March 3, 1893. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194., 47th Cong., 1st.. Sess., pp. 21 and 97. 
 
220 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 secured the formal approval of their plan from the 
 governments of Great Britain and the United States, 
 this exclusively American company then went ahead 
 very rapidly, and soon had a temporary route of 
 transit opened, up the San Juan and across the lake 
 in small steamers, and thence by stage coach over 
 the divide to the Pacific, along a fairly good mac- " 
 adamized road. 
 
 The project was an immediate success, and, being 
 the first in operation, it continued to make large 
 profits, until political complications and economic 
 competition came to bear too heavily on the scheme.' 
 
 It was the evil influence of international politics 
 
 which first cast its shadow over this promising route 
 
 of transit. Great Britain lost no time, in 
 
 §85. The £g^g+ -^ demonstrating to the United States 
 
 British 1 IT 1 • T 
 
 Maintain and all other interested parties, that she 
 
 their Mos- gti]} regarded Mosquitia as a dependency 
 
 tectoratr ^^ British Honduras ; for hardly had the 
 
 and Re- ink on the Clayton-Bulwer treaty had time 
 
 occupy ^^ ^ before a British war-ship appeared 
 
 Greytown. •' ' 111 
 
 off Greytown and landed a force of 
 marines. 
 
 Her Majesty's government knew full well that 
 this act would involve Great Britain in at least two 
 disputes ; so, choosing the weaker antagonist first, 
 Mr. Chatfield was instructed to settle matters with 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 25, 34th Cong., ist Sess., Doc. ig, p. 56. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex, Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 88-97. 
 American Whig Hiview, November, 1850, " The Great Ship Canal 
 Question." 
 
 Uniied Service Magazine, August, 1850. 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 221 
 
 Nicaragua at once, before that state could again place 
 herself under the protection of her northern neigh- 
 bor. Chatfield accordingly volunteered the informa- 
 tion to the Nicaraguan authorities, that by the terms 
 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty the United States had 
 recognized the sovereignty of the Mosquito King, and, 
 denied Nicaragua's claim to the shore in toto. When 
 questioned then in regard to the British occupation 
 of Greytown, he answered, that this question could 
 not possibly concern Nicaragua, as she had promised 
 in the Loch treaty never to interfere in the affairs of 
 this port. Having explained matters thus satisfac- 
 torily Chatfield finally informed Nicaragua that his 
 government still considered the boundaries of the 
 Mosquito kingdom to extend " from the southern 
 boundary of Honduras to the borders of Machuca 
 in the river San Juan." 
 
 After delivering his government's ultimatum in 
 this somewhat peremptory fashion, Mr. Chatfield 
 then adopted a more conciliatory tone toward the 
 humiliated and astonished Nicaraguans, and offered 
 them some advice on his own account. He told 
 them, in fact, that their insistence on their claims to 
 the Mosquito shore would " not be much longer of 
 any avail," and that their reliance upon " the pro- 
 testations and assurances on the part of pretended 
 friends" (the United States), was, in his opinion, an 
 incautious proceeding. "Nicaragua would do well," 
 he continued more persuasively, "to come to an 
 understanding without delay with Great Britain, 
 upon whose relations depend not only the commerce 
 
222 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 and welfare of the state, but the probability of any 
 positive measures being adopted for establishing an 
 interoceanic communication across her territory, since 
 London is the only place where sufficient capital and 
 spirit of enterprise can be found for carrying out a 
 project of such magnitude." Nicaragua was too be- 
 wildered to grasp all this at once, and so Chatfield 
 let the matter rest for the time, and prepared for the 
 larger quarrel which was now brewing. 
 
 There is an enormous distinction between uphold- 
 ing a general political principle and fighting for one's 
 own immediate economic rights. Up to this time 
 our people had been practically busy in the north, 
 but at the same time trying to maintain a theoretical 
 proposition in the south. But the theory and the 
 practice of the Monroe doctrine were now merged ; 
 for Americans, too, had since acquired rights on the 
 isthmus, and a change in our attitude toward Great 
 Britain was at once obvious. The Accessory Transit 
 Company now had its terminus and offices at the 
 Punta Arenas, just south of Grreytown, and this 
 station was also being used by the canal company as 
 their basis of technical operations along the route. 
 In the wake of the company's officers and its con- 
 tractors and laborers, there had followed a motley 
 line of American emigrants and adventurers, who 
 were expecting great things of Nicaragua now. 
 Thus a typical American town, under a municipal 
 organization and an elected mayor of its own, soon 
 grew up by the side of the Anglo-Mosquito settle- 
 ment of Greytown, which, since the institution of 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 223 
 
 transit througli this port, had also come to harbor a 
 miscellaneous mob of negroes and foreigners from 
 Europe. As questions of dispute came up between 
 the two great powers under the Monroe doctrine 
 they were therefore very apt to be disposed of, pro- 
 visionally at least, on the spot, by these two outpost 
 groups. 
 
 Matters first reached a crisis when the Anglo- 
 Mosquito custom-house officials of Greytown at- 
 tempted to exact some port dues from an American 
 vessel, the Prometheus. This of course raised a hue 
 and cry among the Americans. The dues were re- 
 fused, an English man-of-war fired on the American 
 vessel, and the agent of the canal company at once 
 appealed to our government to redress this insult to 
 the flag. Mr. Webster thereupon laid the matter 
 before the British government for an explanation, 
 and an issue was thus drawn asrain between the two 
 parties to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and that too 
 before a year had elapsed since its promulgation.' 
 
 Another element was yet to be added, however, 
 before the dispute could assume its ultimate form. 
 Seeing that his efforts in Nicaragua had „ gg_ c^gta 
 produced but little effect on the American Rican 
 
 proclivities of this republic, Chatfield con- Claims, 
 fined his attention after this to Costa Rica, and 
 found that the seeds he planted there fell on richer 
 
 ' British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XL., Docs. 61-63, 85-87. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 25, 34th Cong., ist Sess., Docs. 2-g, pp. 5-21, Doc. 
 40, p. 84. 
 
 "Central American Affairs and the Enlistment Question," pp. 90-in. 
 Printed as a House Document, Washington, 1856. 
 
224 The Nicarae^ua Canal. 
 
 ^1,1^ 
 
 soil. Costa Rica was always bitterly jealous of her 
 rival across the San Juan, and, furthermore, some- 
 what anti- American in her policy. By cultivating 
 her friendship, Chatfield saw that Great Britain 
 must gain a useful ally in both her present disputes. 
 
 A treaty of amity and commerce was accordingly 
 concluded between the two governments, at this 
 interesting juncture — harmless enough in its pub- 
 lished version, but still sufficient in itself to arouse 
 our suspicions. As an immediate result of this inno- 
 cent convention, Costa Rica suddenly began to assert 
 her claims to a share in the privileges of the transit 
 route. The right bank of the San Juan she now 
 declared to be hers. She therefore demanded in- 
 demnity from Nicaragua for the grants of land made 
 to the canal company on this side of the stream, and 
 insisted that the United States should accord her 
 equal partnership with Nicaragua in the transit 
 project. 
 
 A boundary dispute was thus opened between 
 these two jealous little republics, which, in spite of a 
 series of " definitive settlements," has never yet ad- 
 mitted of final adjustment. Both countries appealed 
 to old Spanish charters in verification of their re- 
 spective claims ; but, as these royal grants in the 
 New World so frequently overlapped, and as the 
 early colonists in their eager search for gold confined 
 themselves entirely to the richer lands, and never 
 took any pains to verify the true boundaries of their 
 provinces, these conflicting claims of the rivals could 
 cast little light on the question. 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 225 
 
 It therefore resolved itself into a pure matter of 
 expediency, and the several parties to the dispute 
 took sides in accordance vpith their respective self- 
 interests. San Salvador and Honduras joined hands 
 with Nicaragua, and together the three states arro- 
 gated to themselves the title of " The National Rep- 
 resentation of Central America." This union of the 
 independent commonwealths received the hearty 
 approval of the United States government, as it was 
 in the line of American civilization. Guatemala 
 held aloof from the quarrel, and Costa Rica openly 
 opposed the combination, with the tacit support of 
 ■Great Britain.^ 
 
 ' Costa Rica based her claims on the old charters granted by Spain to her 
 ■original settlers. The first of these was granted to Diego Guiterez in 1540 
 ■(<■/"., ante, § 2g), and authorized him to extend the Spanish conquest from 
 Veragua in the south as far as Cape Cameron and the Black river in the 
 north, provided he did not " approach vifithin 15 leagues of Lake Nicaragua, 
 inasmuch as these 15 leagues, together with the said Lake, have to remain 
 and do remain under the government of Nicaragua ; but the navigation and 
 fishery of that portion of said river (probably the San Juan) which remains 
 to you and of the said 15 leagues and lake which remain to Nicaragua are to 
 be enjoyed in common." On the failure of this expedition the Chancellorate 
 of Guatemala took the matter up and established the intendancy of Costa 
 Rica in 1574 {c/., ante, ibid.), defining its boundaries as extending "from the 
 north to the south seas in latitude and longitude from the confines of 
 Nicaragua on the side of Nicoya fronting the valleys of Chiriqui as far as the 
 province of Veragua to the south, and to the north from the mouths of the 
 ■channel, which is in those parts belonging to Nicaragua (the San Juan), all 
 the tract of land as far as the province of Veragua.'' On the basis of these 
 early grants Costa Rica now claimed, " as frontier the whole course of the 
 river San Juan and the shore of the lake Nicaragua from the place where 
 that river issues from the lake to a point opposite the mouth of the river La 
 Flor, on the Pacific, including of course in this demarkation the district of 
 Cuanacaste, otherwise called Nicoya," and further, " an equal right with 
 Nicaragua to the navigation of the aforesaid river San Juan, and of the lake, 
 and to the dominion of port San Juan." In her own constitution, January 
 21, 1825, Costa Rica, however, only claimed " as far north as the Colorado 
 
 IS 
 
226 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 With matters in such hopeless confusion again, 
 the diplomats in Washington then went rather 
 5 87 The perfunctorily to work at an attempt to 
 Basis of straighten out the tangle along the lines laid 
 Settlement. ^^^^ -^ ^-^^ Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Mr, 
 
 Webster refused, however, to take any steps toward 
 the adjustment of the questions pertaining to Cen- 
 tral America before he obtained from the British 
 government a distinct disavowal both of the unwar- 
 ranted act of the Grey town officials in detaining an 
 American vessel and of the open hostility of the 
 English naval commander. Lord Granville, who 
 had now succeeded Lord Palmerston as Foreifjrn 
 Secretary, did not choose to rest his government's 
 case on this minor point, involving as it did a direct 
 
 river, on the Atlantic, to the mountains which in those parts drain northward 
 into the San Juan and Lake Nicaragua, and to the Rio Salto (also called 
 Alverado) on the Pacific." Article VII. of the constitution of the short- 
 lived Central American Confederation provided for the definite demarkation 
 of disputed boundaries between the states, but the arrangement was never 
 completed. 
 
 Nicaragua, on the other hand, based her rights to the lower courses of the- 
 San Juan, upon Contreras's original seizure of the stream in 1531 {cf.,ante, § 
 28), and upon her subsequent occupation of the same down to the time of 
 the adverse occupation by the British. She, therefore, now claimed as her 
 own " as far south as a line drawn from a point on the Atlantic, midway 
 between the port of San Juan and port Mathina, to the Rio Salto on the 
 Pacific.'' 
 
 Royal Charters dated Nov. 29, 1540, and Feb. 18, 1574, copies to be found 
 in U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 25, 34th Cong., ist Sess., Doc. 10, pp. 28, 32-35, and 
 33-40. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 27, 32d Cong., 2d Sess., Doc. 39, p. 102, and 
 Doc. 40, p. 105. 
 
 Costa Rica Constitution, June 21, 1825, Ch. II., Art. 15. 
 
 Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1888, p. 461. 
 
 Squier, he. cit. " Central American States," p. 446. 
 
 Bancroft, loc. cit. " History of Central America," Vol. III., p. 253. 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 
 
 227 
 
 conflict witli citizens of* the United States ; so he 
 informed the American minister that the British 
 officer in question had acted without orders, and 
 that the government would not support the demands 
 of the Greytowu officials. 
 
 Upon the receipt of this assurance, Mr. Webster 
 at once opened up negotiations with the British 
 minister, Mr. Crampton, — who had resumed his old 
 duties at Washington on the departure of Sir Henry 
 Bulwer at the conclusion of his special mission, — ^for 
 a final settlement of the new disputes that had 
 arisen. Both diplomats listened with patience to 
 the conflicting and wearisome claims, set forth at 
 great length by the envoys from Nicaragua and 
 Costa Rica, and then drew up a so-called Basis of 
 Settlement, which, if accepted by the Central 
 American states in question, was to have adjusted 
 all existing difficulties. 
 
 According to the terms of this tentative arrange- 
 ment, a reserve was to be set apart for the Mosquito 
 Indians along the eastern shore, and, though Nica- 
 ragua was to have no word in the local government 
 of this section, she was still to pay the Indians a 
 tribute for three years. Municipal authority over 
 Greytown was to be given back to Nicaragua, it is 
 true, but as a port of entry the town was to be 
 turned over to the canal company and thus come 
 under the joint protection of Great Britain and the 
 United States. Costa Rica, on the other hand, was 
 now to secure about all she had ever claimed. Her 
 northern boundary line was to begin on the Atlantic 
 
228 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 at the Colorado mouth of the San Juan, and run up 
 this branch to its confluence with the main stream, 
 thence along the same to the lake, around its south- 
 ern shores, and across to the Pacific at the Rio la 
 Flor. Equal rights of navigation with Nicaragua 
 were also to be given her in both the river and the 
 lake, provided she too would respect the monopoly 
 of steam navigation in these waters already accorded 
 to the Transit Company. 
 
 Of course Costa Rica readily accepted the terms 
 thus secured for her by her powerful British advo- 
 cate ; but when the American agent, Mr. J. B. Kerr, 
 sent out for the special purpose, approached Nica- 
 ragua on the question, he was met with a storm of 
 abuse. The Nicaraguan officials at last began to 
 realize that there was after all some truth in what 
 Chatfield had said. They had clung to the Ameri- 
 can alliance, and spurned all advances from Great 
 Britain, in the positive conviction that the United 
 States government would free their territory from 
 British encroachment, and guarantee them in their 
 paramount rights of sovereignty from sea to sea. 
 All this was plainly set forth in the Monroe doc- 
 trine, and substantiated by a long line of diplomatic 
 notes. Senate resolutions, and the like. But instead 
 of this expected support from her self-constituted 
 protector, Nicaragua now found to her chagrin, that 
 the United States had actually entered into an alli- 
 ance with her arch-enemy, the British, to deprive 
 her of her long-recognized rights, and was even 
 preparing now to foist her bitter rival, Costa Rica, 
 in her place. 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 229 
 
 To reject the basis of settlement seemed no ade- 
 quate expression of her feelings on this occasion, so 
 Nicaragua then went further and issued a formal 
 decree protesting against all foreign interference in 
 her domestic affairs.' 
 
 The British authorities must have foreseen the 
 downfall of this altogether unsubstantial basis of 
 settlement, if we may judge, that is, from 
 the preparations they had already made to British 
 forestall us upon its final collapse. Seizure of 
 
 With British rights still secure along Jgf^J^^ 
 the Nicaraguan coast, the controversy be- 
 tween England and the United States now broke 
 out again farther north among the Bay islands. 
 English capitalists had secured no share in the prof- 
 its of the Accessory Transit Company, and they, 
 too, saw little prospect of an immediate income from 
 the larger canal project to which their government 
 had succeeded in admitting them. Also wishins; to 
 take advantage of the present influx of trade toward 
 the west, these English promoters then conceived the 
 idea of opening up temporary transit facilities by lay- 
 ing an interoceauic railway along the Honduras route, 
 and thus compete with Panama and Nicaragua. 
 
 This scheme necessitated some further govern- 
 mental control over the Bay islands, as Honduras 
 was in no way friendly to British enterprise, and, 
 like Nicaragua, always had to be coerced. Her 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 25, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., Docs. 13, 20-26, 27-31, 
 39-44, 47-48, 51-53, 62-63. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 27, 32d Cong., 2d Sess., Docs. 39-40. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., p. 91. 
 
230 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Britannic Majesty rarely refuses her subjects gov- 
 ernmental support in enterprises of this kind, and 
 this case proved no exception to that admirable 
 rule. 
 
 Since Macdonald's last seizure of the Bay islands 
 in 1841, British authority there had not been main- 
 tained as it should have been, however, and, indeed, 
 the English settlers in E.oatan scarcely knew 
 whether the island still constituted a dependency of 
 Bi'itish Honduras or not. In the meantime Ameri- 
 cans had come to these parts as well, and, turning 
 the tables on the English this time, they had already 
 secured the good-will of the Carib-Negro population, 
 and instigated them against their former masters. 
 One typical American adventurer, William Fitzgib- 
 bon by name, had, in fact, already had himself 
 elected chief by the natives, over the heads of the 
 English inhabitants of the island. This coup called 
 forth an earnest appeal to Her Majesty's government 
 on the part of the British settlers, and a war-ship was 
 immediately sent out from Jamaica to set matters 
 aright. But poor Fitzgibbon had nothing but his 
 bravado to support him, and American cheek against 
 a British war-ship made a rather unequal contest. 
 So the American chief was deposed after a brief 
 and troubled reign, and the authority of the English 
 settlers over the natives was re-established. But as 
 the Bay islands were now of such importance to the 
 British designs, and as the tentative agreement with 
 the United States had just fallen to the ground. 
 Great Britain considered the opportunity ripe to re- 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 231 
 
 assume undisputed governmental sway over this 
 island group. A formal declaration was therefore 
 issued from the Colonial Office to this efEect, and on 
 July 17, 1852, "The Colony of the Bay Islands" 
 was proclaimed in due form, with a Governor and 
 an Assembly of its own.' 
 
 This last act of Britisli aggression was too much 
 for the people of the United States, Congress took 
 the matter up as soon as it reconvened in g 8„_ Reso- 
 Decembei", and general excitement pre- lutionsin 
 vailed. Bit by bit the account of England's '^°"e"==- 
 policy of encroachment on the isthmus came out in 
 the course of the debate, and the indignation of the 
 people grew accordingly. 
 
 Finally, and almost by chance, Clayton's accept- 
 tance of Sir Henry Bulwer's all-inclusive reservations 
 was brought before the Senate, and those who. had 
 up to this been arguing for American rights stood 
 bewildered and aghast at the revelation. Senator 
 after Senator rose to his feet, and solemnly declared 
 that this was his very first knowledge of this outra- 
 geous betrayal of our claims. Some tried to clear Clay- 
 ton from a charge of perfidy, and this threw the blame 
 on Mr. King. His friends then attempted to justify 
 
 ' " Central American Affairs and the Enlistment Question,'' loc. cit., pp. 
 18-27, 43-46. Govt. Print, Washington, 1856. 
 
 Cong. Globe, 'Vol. XXVI., pp. 158, Igg, 204, 226, 235, 237,246,259, 
 265, 330. 338, 392,- 403. 420, 502, 529, 609, 849, and Appendix under 
 " Colonization in North America,'' and " Clayton-Bulwer." 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., p. 97. 
 
 Lucas, " Historical Geography of British Colonies," loc. cit.. Vol. II., p. 
 ^01, note. 
 
232 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 his course, and the debate took a personal turn. 
 This led to no good, and Senators who had voted for 
 the Clayton-Bulwer treaty then began to exonerate 
 themselves from blame, by declaring openly that 
 they never would have voted for ratification, had 
 they had an inkling of the true nature of the 
 provision. 
 
 But all these excuses and recriminations in no way 
 affected the present diplomatic situation, as the treaty, 
 with its damaging reservation, still held good. There 
 was but one way out of the difficulty, and that was 
 by proving that neither Mosquitia nor the Bay 
 islands could properly be classified as dependencies 
 of British Honduras. After an exhaustive examina- 
 tion of the historical evidence, the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations succeeded in making out some 
 kind of a case to justify this interpretation of the 
 matter, and drafted a resolution to the effect that 
 the establishment of a British colony on the Bay 
 islands, as well as the claims the English still per- 
 sisted in making to the Mosquito shore, were both 
 in direct violation to the terms of the Clayton-Bul- 
 wer treaty. The Senate passed the resolution as 
 reported, and thus placed the United States once 
 again on the basis of the Monroe doctrine. But our 
 old policy was now loaded with certain historical 
 clogs, which seriously encumbered its free movement- 
 in the desired direction.^ 
 
 Resolutions, even when passed by the Senate of 
 
 ' Congressional Globe, as quoted above. 
 
 " Central American Affairs, and Enlistment Question," loc, cit., pp. 18-27.- 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 233 
 
 the United States, are not all-powerful, and this 
 latest reiteration of the Monroe doctrine « Lord 
 only had the immediate effect of transferring Clarendon's 
 the burden of the dispute once more to the Ultimatum, 
 shoulders of our diplomatic representatives. 
 
 The Democrats had won the day in the last elec- 
 tion, and President Pierce's administration was just 
 then being installed. Mr. Marcy, the new Secretary 
 of State, was therefore obliged to take the matter in 
 hand without delay. Another agent, Mr. Solon 
 Borland, was thereupon sent off to the isthmus to 
 watch over American interests there during this acute 
 stage of the controvei'sy ; and, in the hopes of winning 
 back Nicaragua to our side again, Marcy instructed 
 Borland on his departure, to insist upon the stipula- 
 tions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and to explain 
 to the authorities there, that he regarded the instru- 
 ment "as meaning what the American negotiator 
 intended when he entered into it, and what the 
 Senate must have understood it to mean when it was 
 ratified, viz. : that by it Great Britain came under en- 
 gagements to the United States to recede from her 
 asserted protectorate of the Mosquito Indians and 
 cease to exercise dominion or control in any part of 
 Central America." 
 
 The London end of this fresh diplomatic campaign 
 was entrusted to Mr. Buchanan, and he, too, set out 
 for his post soon after with instructions from his 
 chief very similar to those given to Mr. Borland. 
 Lord Clarendon was then Foreign Secretary in Her 
 Majesty's government, and before him Mr. Buchanan 
 
234 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 laid our case, saying in substance, that thougt the 
 United States would not dispute the rights which 
 Great Britain had acquired for certain purposes in 
 Belize or British Honduras, they would insist that, 
 according to the express terms of the Clayton-Bul- 
 wer treaty, she should withdraw her protectorate 
 from the people and territory of the Mosquitos and 
 deliver up the Bay islands to Honduras, to whom 
 they rightly belonged, as they were not excepted in 
 the treaty as dependencies of Belize. 
 
 Lord Clarendon made a long statement in reply, 
 going very minutely into the history of the English 
 claim, and taking the ground that the Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty made no, provision against the Mos- 
 quito protectorate, but merely inhibited further 
 colonization by either power in Central America. 
 Coming to the more particular point at issue, the 
 English Secretary maintained that Belize had never 
 formed part of Central America, but had long 
 been a separate colony owing allegiance to Great 
 Britain ; and this fact, he continued, the United 
 States government had fully recognized in 1847 by 
 sending its consul there, and allowing him to carry 
 out his duties under a British exequatur.^ As for 
 the Bay islands, Lord Clarendon declaimed they had 
 for some years been a legitimate dependency of 
 Belize and, as such, had been expressly excepted 
 from the operations of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
 
 Having thus disposed of each disputed point in 
 
 ' Referring to Mr. Humpstead, the United States Consul to British 
 Honduras, who received his exequatur, March 3, 1847. 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 235 
 
 turn, His Lordship then laid down the British ulti- 
 matum to our government, saying that Her Majesty's 
 government declined to accept the Monroe doctrine 
 as an axiom of international law, and refused to be 
 questioned further by the United States as to her 
 original rights in Central America. 
 
 We should then have called for an immediate 
 abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, on the 
 ground of mutual misunderstanding between the 
 parties to the contract. According to the Senate's 
 interpretation of the instrument, Great Britain agreed 
 therein to abandon all territorial claims to the isth- 
 mus beyond the recognized borders of British Hon- 
 duras; but, following Lord Clarendon's official 
 statement. Her Majesty's government was secured 
 by the treaty in all the rights it claimed, and the 
 United States was precluded from entering any 
 further protest. No modification of the convention 
 could possibly harmonize such divergent and con- 
 flicting views. Abrogation, with a mutual return 
 to the status quo of 1850 was therefore the only 
 honorable alternative.' 
 
 We failed to take advantage of our opportunity, 
 however, though we might the more easily have 
 gained our point at this time, as England's 
 best energies were then being diverted Bombard- 
 toward the East, in checking the preten- >"ent of 
 sions of Russia, her Asiatic rival on the ^ ^ 
 Pacific. We contented ourselves, instead, with the 
 
 ' "Central American Affairs and the Enlistment Question," loc. cit., 
 
 PP- 43-46- 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., pp. gg-ioi. 
 
236 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 more innocent but less dignified amusement of twist- 
 ing the tail of the British lion in Congress. There 
 was enough jealousy and anger among our Senators 
 and Representatives arising from what had gone 
 before to make the debates sufficiently acrimonious 
 as it was ; but the feeling against England was ren- 
 dered still more bitter now, through the policy 
 adopted by the British government of enlisting 
 soldiers and sailors in our land to serve against 
 Russia in the East. A diplomatic rupture seemed 
 imminent, and, as a precautionary measure, Great 
 Britain increased her naval forces in the West Indian 
 station, and we followed her example. 
 
 As might have been expected, matters came to a 
 climax first in Greytown. The Anglo-Mosquito 
 authorities there had demanded certain concessions 
 from the Transit Company, which the latter had 
 peremptorily refused to grant ; and, upon his arrival, 
 Mr. Borland found feeling running high between 
 the two settlements. In the midst of the excite- 
 ment, Captain Smith, of one of the Transit Com- 
 pany's steamers, killed a Mosquito negro, and the 
 authorities attempted to arrest him for murder. 
 Smith took refuge in the house of the American 
 consul, Mr. Fabens, where Borland was also lodged. 
 An Anglo-Mosquito mob then attacked the house, 
 and the Americans attempted to defend themselves. 
 An American merchant vessel, Tlie Northern Light, 
 was lying in the harbor, and a volunteer corps, made 
 up from the passengers and the crew, then attempted 
 to come to the relief of the besieged. They were 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 237 
 
 fired upon by the town authorities, however, and 
 dared not land. Under cover of darkness, Borland 
 and Smith succeeded in making their escape to The 
 Northern Light, and, after a brief consultation, it 
 was decided to enlist a volunteer guard at the 
 expense of the United States, and leave it in charge 
 •of the Transit Company's station until relief could 
 be obtained from Washington. 
 
 The Northern Light then sailed north with Bor- 
 land and Smith on board, and as soon as the matter 
 was reported to the State Department, Captain 
 HoUins, of the United States sloop of war Cyane 
 was ordered to take his vessel to the scene of dis- 
 turbance and protect the Transit Company's interests. 
 ■Great Britain, still undesirous of forcing the issue 
 in Greytown, had but one war-ship in the harbor at 
 this time, and that but an indifferent schooner. 
 Obtaining no satisfaction from the town authorities, 
 Hollins then turned to the commander of this 
 vessel and informed him that unless the damages 
 his government demanded were paid he intended 
 to bombard the town. Tbe British officer simply 
 protested and would say no more. Having no 
 other alternative, Hollins then notified the inhabi- 
 tants that he intended on the following day to bom- 
 bard the town, and offered them all safe transport 
 to the American settlement at Punta Arenas. Ti'ue 
 to his promise, on July 9, 1854, the Cyane shelled 
 the little village, and Hollins afterward landed a 
 force of marines to complete his work of destruction 
 by burning what remained of the town. Such was 
 
238 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the fi'eedom of the port of Greytown that the 
 diplomats had been providing for ! ' 
 ^ Had the United States only been in a position to 
 continue the practical advantage she had thus some- 
 ,,r ., what forcibly gained, all might have 
 
 § 92. Walk- 1? ■ » • 11 
 
 er's Fill- turned out vs^ell. As it was the bom- 
 bustering bardtneut of Greytovpn was but the 
 
 Expedition, i ■ • » ,i j j 
 
 beginning or the mess we now proceeaed. 
 to make of our once promising transit rights in 
 Nicaragua. The Americans on the spot took a step 
 in the right direction by organizing a provisional 
 municipal government over the port. This Avas 
 allowed by the Nicaraguan government, and, lacking 
 the immediate support of their old ally, even the 
 Mosquitos were unable to interfere. 
 
 In the United States, however, the question of 
 slavery had already disrupted the nation, and pre- 
 vented the government from pursuing any one 
 policy consistently which required the support of 
 the whole people. Our very race to the Pacific had 
 been run by fits and starts, first the Northerners 
 pushing ahead and then the Southerners taking their 
 turn, and quarrels between the contestants were not 
 infrequent. 
 
 ^ After the race had been won over England, the 
 free states of our Union, showed a tendency to in- 
 crease more rapidly than the slave-holding areas, 
 owing mainly to the action of the California gold- 
 
 ^ U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, g, ssth Cong., 1st Sess. 
 Prest. Pierce, Second Annual Message. 1854. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 8, 33d Cong., ist Sess. 
 U. S. Ex. Doc, 85, 33d Cong., ist Sess. 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 239 
 
 diggers to whom freedom was an economic necessity. 
 The Gadsen treaty now precluded the acquisition of 
 any further slave territories south of Texas, but 
 fertile Cuba lay temptingly off our coast to the south- 
 east, and the disrupted condition of the Central 
 American states on the isthmus oifered exceptional 
 advantages also, for the filibustering expeditions of 
 the Southerners. President Taylor had discounte- 
 nanced these schemes of national aggrandizement, 
 toward the south, but Fillmore's administration had 
 already made an exception at least in favor of Cuba ; 
 and President Pierce now came into office with the 
 material assistance of the " Order of the Lone Star," 
 a secret cabal of Southern adventurers organized 
 with this one end in view. The " Ostend Mani- 
 festo " was thereupon issued, wherein we announced 
 to the world, that we were willing to purchase 
 Cuba; but if the island could not be thus acquired, 
 there was a strong probability of our using force to 
 accomplish the end. But Spain would not part 
 with the "Queen of the Antilles," and the force 
 which secretly left our shores to wrest it from her 
 was in no way equal to the task. 
 
 Assurance of success on the isthmus was more 
 promising, for sectional designs in this direction 
 must receive additional encouragement from the 
 national distrust of Great Britain's intentions in 
 these parts. Besides, we had already acquired a 
 foothold on these shores, and were even then in 
 possession of valuable rights of transit through 
 Nicaragua, with considerable grants of land in our 
 
240 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 name. The internal politics of this now distracted 
 little republic also favored the Southern cause. 
 Matters had reached a crisis between the Liberal 
 and Conservative factions by this time, and the 
 latter party seemed to be gaining ground every day. 
 The Liberals, as we know, wei'e enthusiasts in the 
 American cause, and, finding themselves now in such 
 straits, they decided to appeal to citizens of the 
 United States for aid. The leaders of the party 
 accordingly selected William Walker, a Southerner, 
 who had already gained a name as a filibuster by 
 his recent invasion of Lower California, to under- 
 take their cause. 
 
 Walker eagerly accepted this invitation and in 
 June, 1855, entered Nicaragua with a reckless little 
 band of fifty-eight American adventurers. With 
 the aid of the Liberals, the filibusters were almost 
 immediately successful, and by September they had 
 secured control of Granada the capital and strong- 
 hold of the Conservatives. A liberal government 
 was then inaugurated in the land, under a native 
 president, Patricio Rivas, but with Walker still in 
 control of the forces. 
 
 In the meantime another filibuster, named Kinney, 
 who was supposed to be covertly working in the 
 interests of Great Britain, had landed in Mosquitia 
 with another band of adventurers, and, with the aid 
 of the Indians and blacks, was attempting to dislodge 
 the Americans from the shore. Walker, on news of 
 this inroad, at once proceeded againt his rival, and 
 succeeded in driving him from the land. This act 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 241 
 
 at once secured for "Walker the enthusiastic support 
 of the Americans in Nicaragua, regardless of their 
 party affiliations. So, taking the policy of his 
 government toward Texas as his precedent, the 
 United States diplomatic agent, Colonel John H. 
 Wheeler, who had since succeeded Borland in 
 Greytown, straightway recognized the new liberal 
 government of Nicaragua officially. Walker there- 
 upon had one of his followers, another American 
 colonel named Pai'ker H. French, appointed 
 Nicaraguan minister to the United States, and Pierce's 
 govei'nment was thus forced to show its hand. 
 
 The Democratic administration was thus placed 
 in an awkward position. Under the political tension 
 of the day the Pi'esident could not well countenance 
 any scheme for the farther extension of the slave- 
 holding power ; and yet, in the face of the strong 
 cui-rent of popular indignation against the British, 
 he did not want to derogate the American cause oh 
 the isthmus by any' hostile act of his. In this 
 predicament, Marcy hoped to gain time by politely 
 declining to receive Colonel French as Nicaragua's 
 accredited representative, until he could learn 
 whether the people of that state supported the new 
 government. 
 
 But Walker was furious at this rebuff, and, think- 
 ing he recognized the machinations of the Northern 
 canal promoters behind this refusal of the President's, 
 he resolved to wreak his revenge on their property 
 in Nicaragua. So he induced his puppet president, 
 Hivas, to issue a decree, on February 18, 1856, 
 
242 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 annulling the charter of the American Canal 
 Company, under which the Transit Company 
 operated, and then seized upon the company's 
 steamers and property for debt. The oflScers and 
 stockholders thereupon called on the United States 
 to fulfil its promises, and protect them in their rights ;. 
 but the administration was now powerless, having 
 refused all diplomatic connection with the de factO' 
 government of Nicaragua, and not knowing just how 
 to proceed in a question between its own citizens in 
 a foreign country. 
 
 Matters now took an entirely different turn, and 
 there was strong evidence that Great Britain was 
 again secretly taking a hand in the dispute. That 
 is, the Costa Rican president suddenly appeared in 
 Nicaragua at the head of a strong force, and after a. 
 severe engagement drove Walker and his followers 
 back into Granada, and then seized upon the transit 
 route and all the company's effects. This made 
 filibustering a national question again, and sec- 
 tional differences were buried for the time in the 
 face of real or fancied British aggression. Wheeler,, 
 the American agent, always a strong partisan of 
 Walker's, had remained at his post despite the 
 severance of diplomatic relations between the two- 
 governments, and he now sent on to Washington a 
 detailed report of the Costa Rican invasion, with 
 copies of letters that had fallen into Walker's hands, 
 going to prove that Great Britain was simply using 
 Costa Rica as a cat's-paw to secure forcible posses- 
 sion of the canal route. 
 
The Central American Imbroglia. 243 
 
 Congress once more rang with Monroe doctrine 
 resolutions, the immediate abrogation of the Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty was again called for, and even the 
 Northern canal company now demanded that 
 Nicaragua's minister be received. With the nation 
 thus united it was easier for the President tO' 
 proceed as he would; and though in the interim 
 Walker's government cannot be said to have gained 
 any more in favor among the Nicaraguans, still 
 the United States so willed it, and the new envoy, 
 Father Augustin Vigil, was accordingly received at 
 Washington with enthusiasm. 
 
 Having thus by a happy chance received the 
 support of his own people. Walker was now ready 
 for his final coup d^tat — not in behalf of the 
 United States as a whole, however, but only in the 
 interests of her slave-holding states. For his 
 present designs Walker had no further use of his 
 former Liberal allies, so he deposed their president, 
 Rivas, and had himself elected in his stead by the 
 departments still controlled by the army. As chief 
 executive. Walker's first act was then to annul the 
 federal law that had forever abolished slavery in the 
 land, and thus at last demonstrated the ultimate 
 intention of his expedition. 
 
 Walker evidently expected the Southerners of his 
 own country to support him in this bold move, but 
 matters had already gone too far in the United States 
 to allow of any further extension of slavery, and this 
 decree of the American dictator only acted as a 
 boomerang to his cause. The Nicaraguans in a body 
 
244 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 deserted him, and called upon their Central Ameri- 
 can neighbors to join with them in driving the fili- 
 buster from the land. 
 
 As slavery had split the United States, so, per 
 contra, was this self-same question able on this one 
 occasion to unite the warring republics of the isthmus. 
 An allied army of Central Americans was soon raised, 
 Costa Rica alone holding aloof from the combination, 
 and Walker and his determined little band soon found 
 themselves penned up in the town of Rivas on the 
 Pacific shore. Meantime, Pierce's cabinet at Wash- 
 ington had decided that its only way out of the 
 present difficulty lay in deporting Walker and his 
 followers from the scene of their escapades, and then 
 endeavoring to patch matters up in some way with 
 the infuriated Central Americans. Acting under 
 these instructions the United States corvette St. 
 Mary's was already lying in the harbor of San Juan 
 del Sur, and lather than fall into the hands of his 
 enemies, Walker capitulated with the American 
 commander. Captain Charles H. Davis, and gave 
 himself up. With the consent of the Central 
 American allies, on May 1, 1857, Captain Davis 
 took Walker and his band on board and transported 
 them to Panama, to be taken thence in custody to 
 the United States for trial. 
 
 This left Costa Rica in full possession of the transit 
 route and all the company's steamers. Nicaragua 
 protested, Costa Rica claimed the shores of the lake 
 as her rightful boundary line, and a renewal of hos- 
 tilities was the inevitable result. Walker, it is true, 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 245 
 
 had by this time given bonds in New Orleans to the 
 amount of two thousand dollars to desist from further 
 unlawful enterprises ; but the vigilance of the authori- 
 ties of this port was not excessive, and he had little 
 difficulty in organizing another band of Southern 
 adventurers, — numbering this time nearly two hun- 
 dred men, — and, on November 25th, landed them 
 safely with his military equipment at Punta Arenas. 
 But before he could proceed up the San Juan to 
 take part in the struggle over the canal route, Com- 
 modore Paulding, of our navy, compelled him to sur- 
 render and brought the entire party back to New 
 Yoi'k. 
 
 Pierce's attitude toward the filibusters was en- 
 tirely too conservative to suit the hot-heads of the 
 South, so the Democratic convention at Cincinnati, 
 after nominating Buchanan as his successor, unani- 
 mously adopted a series of vigorous resolutions to 
 guide the new President in his policy toward the 
 isthmus. In substance these resolutions declared 
 that our foreign policy was then of more importance 
 than our domestic questions ; that the Monroe doc- 
 trine must be upheld ; that the transit route must 
 remain under our control, and our ascendancy in the 
 Gulf of Mexico insured ; and " that in view of so 
 commanding an interest, the people of the United 
 States cannot but sympathize with the efforts which 
 are now being made by the people of Central America 
 (meaning Walker and his band) to regenerate that 
 portion of the continent which covers the passage 
 across the interoceanic isthmus." Buchanan endorsed 
 
246 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 these sentiments very heartily, but before he could 
 take any action in this direction as President, Pauld- 
 ing's arrest of Walker put a quietus on the whole 
 affair. 
 
 Not to be balked in his designs the President re- 
 fused to hold the filibusters prisoners, and even 
 went so far as to send a special message to Congress 
 openly condemning the Commodore for thus " vio- 
 lating the sovereignty of a foreign country." Walker, 
 thus encouraged, then made a tour through the South 
 and succeeded in organizing still another expedition 
 of so-called " fanatical slavery propagandists," and in 
 June, 1860, set out once more for Central America. 
 This time he landed on the island of Roatan, Eng- 
 lish territory now, and here I'an amuck of a British 
 war-ship. The President of Honduras also took up 
 arms against the filibusters, and although Walker 
 made a brave fight, he was captured at last in trying 
 to escape into Nicaraguan territory. He was then 
 tried by court-martial, condemned, and shot. 
 
 A miserable ending this, for a once promising de- 
 mand for Cuba and the isthmus, — and the slavery 
 question was at the bottom of it all ! The Northern 
 Whigs were opposed to any national aggrandizement 
 solely in the interests of the South, and Taylor had 
 acted in their behalf. Pierce's vacillating policy 
 toward the isthmus was worse than no policy at all, 
 and Buchanan came too late to accomplish his de- 
 signs. So Cuba remained with Spain, and Great 
 Britain held her own in Central America ; while the 
 United States, as a power, only compromised herself 
 
The Central American Imbroglio. 247 
 
 unnecessarily by her arbitrary actions. With na- 
 tional and sectional interests involved in the self -same 
 issue, however, no better result could have been ex- 
 pected, and we were perhaps after all fortunate — 
 considering the circumstances of our internal politics 
 — in comincf off with as few scars on our Monroe 
 doctrine as we did.* 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 97-155. 
 
 U. S. House Ex. Docs., 24 and 26, 35th Cong., Ist Sess. 
 
 U. S. House Journal, pp. 165, 1302, 1368, 35th Cong., ist Sess. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Docs., 9, 13, and 63, 35th Cong., Ist Sess. 
 
 Congressiotlal Globe, 1857, 1858, 1859, under " Central America," 
 ■" Paulding," " Walker," Neutrality Laws," "Clayton-Bulwer." 
 
 President Pierce's Message to Senate, May 15, 1856. 
 
 W. V. Wells, " Walker's Expedition." New York, 1864. 
 
 Harper's Magazine, Vol. XXI., p. 693. New York. 
 
 Horace Greeley, "The American Conflict," Vol. I., Ch. XIX. Hart- 
 ford, 1864. 
 
 J J. Roche, " The Story of the Filibusters," Chaps. V.-XVIII. Lon- 
 don and New York, 1891. 
 
 E. J. Payne, "History of European Colonies," loc. cil., Ch. XXI., 
 •Sec. 8. 
 
 Bancroft, loc. cit., " History of Central America," Vol. III., Ch. XVI., 
 XVII. 
 
 Stout, loc, cit., " Nicaragua," p. 2H. 
 
 Nicaragua Official Bulletin, August 21 and September 10, 1856. 
 
CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 ENGLISH VERSUS AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. 
 
 HAVING successfully waged her first bitter 
 struggle with Russia for Eastern suprem- 
 acy, on the conclusion of the Crimean war 
 Great Britain was once more free to turn her atten- 
 tion to her American rival, and make good her do- 
 minion in the West. Thanks to our own 
 Treaties blundering policy, — and incidentally, also,. 
 '^■'^^ to the skill of the agents she had left 
 
 in charge, — England had really lost no 
 ground to speak of on the isthmus during these 
 years that she had been elsewhere engaged. Her 
 diplomatic position, indeed, had considerably im- 
 proved. It was- the United States who had lately 
 been playing the part of the aggressor in Central 
 America, and thus Great Britain was enabled to 
 appear in her rival's old role of peacemaker and 
 defender. 
 
 Even Honduras seemed to be no longer implacable 
 over the British occupation of the Bay islands, and 
 now ' showed her willingness to settle the matter 
 with England amicably, on a basis agreeable to both 
 parties. Still another interoceanic transit project 
 was the immediate cause of this rapprochement. 
 
 248 
 
English vs. American Diplomacy. 249 
 
 Taking advantage of the discomfiture of their Amer- 
 ican competitors in Nicaragua, the English promo- 
 ters had already advanced their own scheme for an 
 immediate transit system across Honduras, and or- 
 ganized the Honduras Interoceanic Railway Com- 
 pany. On April 28, 1854, Honduras had granted 
 them the requisite concessions, and they were now 
 anxious to proceed with the work as soon as their 
 government could accord them the proper political 
 security. 
 
 Negotiations were accordingly opened between 
 the two governments, and in August, 1856, the 
 drafts of two treaties were signed. According to 
 the first of these instruments, the Bay islands were 
 henceforth to constitute a free territory, under a 
 government of their own, distinct from Honduras 
 and yet in some way under her nominal sovereignty. 
 It would be difficult to understand how such sov- 
 ereignty was to be exerted, however, as Honduras 
 could neither tax the inhabitants nor establish any 
 military posts in the land ; while the Bay islanders, 
 though exempted from the Honduras levy, were still 
 allowed to raise a force of their own in their " own 
 exclusive defence." As against the designs of 
 American filibusters, slavery was to be forever pro- 
 hibited ; and thus, with a show of generosity. Great 
 Britain in reality was about to establish her colonists 
 still more securely in their land, and allow them to 
 hold the islands henceforth under treaty rights 
 and no longer in adverse possession. In return for 
 these favors granted, the neutrality of the Honduras 
 
250 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 transit route was indeed to be protected by Her Ma- 
 jesty's government ; though here again Great Britain 
 was wise enough not to claim any exclusive control. 
 Under the terms of the second treaty Great Britain 
 agreed to abandon her protectorate over the Mos- 
 quito Indians in Honduras, provided they were 
 granted a reservation along the shore. Honduras's 
 nominal sovereignty over the reserve was, it is true, 
 to be preserved ; but here, again, its practical exer- 
 cise would have proved difficult, to say the least, as 
 the Indians were accorded complete rights of local 
 self-government within their borders.^ 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs when Buchanan 
 
 entered upon his presidential term, with the firm 
 
 intention of caiTying out in practice the 
 
 Dallas- ^ bellicose resolutions of the party that had 
 
 Clarendon Just placed him in power. Thinking all 
 
 egotia- ^g^g ^^ 2^g^ going well with the American 
 
 tions. . . . 
 
 'filibusters in Nicaragua, and ignorant, as 
 yet, of the nature of the British treaties' with Hon- 
 duras, the President then appointed Mr. George 
 Mifflin Dallas our minister to the Court of St. 
 James, and instructed him to bring Great Britain to 
 terms along the lines of the American policy. 
 
 Still secure in all she had ever possessed on the 
 isthmus, and on the fair way of acquiring new rights 
 from Plonduras, Her Majesty's government was per- 
 fectly willing to meet Mr. Dallas half-way, and put 
 an end to the long-drawn-out controversy between 
 the two countries. The draft of a treaty was ac- 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., p. 105. 
 J. C. Rodrigues, "The Panama Canal," pp. 33, 206, 207. New York, 1885. 
 
English vs. American Diplomacy. 251 
 
 cordingly drawn up in London, and sent on to the 
 United States Senate for ratification. On the face 
 of it this convention loolced lilie a victory for the 
 American claim. Therein Great Britain consented 
 to withdraw from her protectorate over the Mos- 
 q^uito Indians, whether in Honduras or Nicaragua, 
 and to make some arrangement in their behalf 
 which should be agreeable to the United States. 
 The treaty also set the limits of the Belize settle- 
 ment, wherein British subjects might lawfully exer- 
 cise their possessory rights, and finally, provided for 
 Her Majesty's cession of the Bay islands to Hondu- 
 ras. All this was made conditional, however, on 
 Honduras's ratification of the two treaties just 
 signed with Great Britain. England, in short, was 
 endeavoring now to arrange mattei's satisfactorily 
 ■with the United States in behalf of the Honduras 
 railway, as, for the present, she had abandoned all 
 hope of the once promising Nicaraguan scheme of 
 transit. 
 
 The Senate was shrewd enough to see the mean- 
 ing of Great Britain's unexpected complaisance, how- 
 ever, and undertook to amend the treaty by dropping 
 the conditional clause entirely. The British govern- 
 ment naturally refused to ratify the convention as thus 
 amended, and offered a new basis of settlement to the 
 United States, instead ; providing for the recognition 
 of the Bay islands as part of Honduras, "whenever 
 and as soon as the republic of Honduras shall have 
 concluded and ratified a treaty with Great Britain, 
 by which Great Britain shall have ceded, and the 
 republic of Honduras shall have accepted, the said 
 
252 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 islands, subject to the provisions and conditions con- 
 tained in tHe said treaty." The Senate, of course, 
 rejected this alternative proposition ; for as Bu- 
 chanan rather tersely put it in his message: "After 
 the Senate had refused to recognize the British con- 
 vention with Honduras of the 27th August, 1856, 
 with full knowledge of its contents, it was impossible 
 for me, necessarily ignorant of the 'provisions and 
 conditions ' which might be contained in a future 
 convention between the same parties, to sanction 
 them in advance." 
 
 This failure on the part of the United States 
 government to come to terms with Great Britain, 
 also influenced Honduras in her decision, and, after 
 some further dickering, she too refused to ratify the 
 treaties of 1856. Thus another attempted basis of 
 settlement came to naught and the diplomatic situa- 
 tion remained unchanged.^ 
 
 Finding diplomacy of no avail, and at this late 
 date, after our own hands had become soiled with 
 unwarranted encroachment on the isthmus,. 
 United President Buchanan decided to call upon 
 States Congress for the immediate abrogation of 
 t^'^Abrogate*^® Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Indeed, he 
 the Clayton- made no secret of his intention, for, even 
 Buiwer before a definite course had been decided 
 upon. Lord Napier, the British minister in 
 Washington, was able to write to his government 
 
 ' Dallas-Clarendon Treaty, signed October 17, 1856, not ratified. 
 Cf. Wharton's "Digest of International Law," Vol. II., pp. 197-200. 
 President Buchanan's Message to Congress, December 8, 1857. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., p. 120. 
 
English vs. American Diplomacy. 253 
 
 that " an attempt will be made in the next session 
 of Congress to set aside the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
 My impression to this effect is constantly deepened 
 by reflection and by the information which reaches 
 me from several quarters. There can be no doubt 
 of the views of the President and Cabinet in this 
 matter." 
 
 The President chose, however, to lay the matter 
 before Congress in a tentative way at first, conclud- 
 ing a recital of the unfortunate facts with this 
 significant remark : " The fact is when two nations 
 like Great Britain and the United States, mutually 
 desirous as they are, and I trust ever may be, of 
 maintaining the most friendly relations with each 
 other, have unfortunately concluded a treaty which 
 they understood in senses directly opposite, the 
 wisest course is to abrogate such treaty by mutual 
 consent and to commence anew." ' 
 
 Above all things Great Britain desired to avoid 
 the abrogation of this treaty with the United States, 
 Avhich so amply secured her past claims, 
 justified her in her present position in natives 
 Central America, and assured her of her Offered by 
 control over all future schemes of ti'ansit Britain, 
 across the isthmus. Clever diplomacy was 
 needed, however, as Buchanan was fixed in his de- 
 termination; but Lord Napier was equal to the 
 occasion, and his government supported him nobly. 
 
 ' President Buchanan's Message to Congress, December 8, 1857. 
 
 U. S. House Reports, 1121, 46th Cong., 1st Sess. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 112 and 126. 
 
-54 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 With Walker's death filibustering came to an end 
 on the isthmus; and, with the exception of the 
 border warfare between Nicaragua and Costa E,ica, 
 quiet reigned in Central America. Taking advan- 
 tage of this cession of hostilities, Great Britain's first 
 step was to play the part of general peacemaker. A 
 special representative of the Crown, Sir William 
 Gore Ouseley, was accordingly despatched to the 
 isthmus, in order to settle with the Central American 
 states directly all matters of lingering dispute, and 
 thus prevent any further interference with British 
 designs on the part of the United States. 
 
 It was Napier's task in Washington to get the 
 President to accept this method of settlement, and 
 thus stave off the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty. He was not so stupid, of course, as to lay 
 bare the scheme thus, in all its nakedness; but cov- 
 ered it instead with a mantle of alternatives, and 
 adorned it all with an engaging- spirit of frankness 
 and conciliation. Napier informed Buchanan, and 
 his Secretary of State, General Lewis Cass, as it 
 were in passing, of the recent appointment of Sir 
 William Ouseley, and of the general nature of his 
 mission ; but, he added, if the President preferred, 
 Her Majesty's government would be quite willing 
 either to submit the disputed points of the Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty to arbitration, or, indeed, to abrogate 
 it entirely. To both the latter alternatives. Lord 
 Napier attached little barbs, however, which were 
 evidently intended to make our government hesitate 
 before admitting them, for fear of being caught fast. 
 
English vs. American Diplomacy. 255 
 
 Arbitration, in short, was only to be consented to in 
 case the United States should allow the matter to go 
 before some European power for decision ; but the 
 case in hand involved the validity of the Monroe 
 doctrine, and, as we had openly directed this doc- 
 trine against all the states of Europe, how could we 
 expect any favorable decision from one of them now 
 in a matter which affected their own national pres- 
 tige, as well as ours ? Abrogation was more in 
 accordance with Buchanan's ideas ; but Lord Napier 
 said his .government would only consent to this 
 alternative, in the event of the United States' formal 
 recognition of the status quo of 1852 ; or, in other 
 words, in case we officially ratified Great Britain's 
 claims to British Honduras, the Bay islands, and the 
 Mosquito shore. 
 
 "When put in this way, these alternatives influ- 
 enced Buchanan's opinions considerably, and some- 
 what modified his decision in regard to immediate 
 abrogation. Lord Napier evidently saw that his 
 last shots had hit home ; for he immediately adopted 
 a conciliatory tone again and told the President that 
 Great Britain was now as anxious as the United 
 States to settle all the difficulties that had so unfor- 
 tunately arisen between the two powers, along the 
 lines agreed upon in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty ; and 
 he only asked as a favor that the President refrain 
 from saying anything further in his next message to 
 Congress that might lead to a resolution demanding 
 the immediate abrogation of that convention ; for, 
 Lord Napier continued, with still another veiled 
 
256 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 threat, " such a step would not only frustrate the 
 purposes of Sir William Ouseley's mission, but 
 would have a calamitous influence on the future 
 relations of England and America." 
 
 Already effectually frightened off from the only 
 other outlets from the controversy, Buchanan then 
 walked squarely into the unsuspicious-looking diplo- 
 matic trap that Lord Napier had so cleverly set 
 for him. He naively informed Lord Napier that he 
 had indeed fully intended to make an exposition of 
 the whole affair before Congress, and feared his 
 statement would have shown up Great Britain in a 
 rather unfavorable light; but, he added hastily, if 
 Her Majesty's government really intended to carry 
 out the Clayton-Bulwer treaty as the United States 
 interpreted it, and, if His Lordship could definitely 
 assure him of the fact before Congress opened, he 
 would refrain from saying anything further about 
 abrogation. " To him it was indifferent," Buchanan 
 continued, " whether the concession contemplated by 
 Her Majesty's government were consigned to a di- 
 rect engagement between England and the United 
 States, or to treaties between the former and the 
 Central American republics ; the latter method 
 might in some respects be even more agreeable." 
 Should matters be brought to a satisfactory termina- 
 tion through Sir William Ouseley's present mission, 
 " nothing would give him greater pleasure," the 
 President concluded, "than to add the expression of 
 his sincere and ardent wish for the maintenance of 
 friendly relations between the two countries." 
 
English vs. American Diplomacy. 257 
 
 Thus His Lordsliip came out the victor in this 
 first diplomatic skirmish ; and, true to his promise, 
 Buchanan contented himself in his message to Con- 
 gress, with setting forth the causes of the failure of 
 the Dallas-Clarendon convention, and concluded with 
 the hope that the present overtures would prove 
 more successful.^ 
 
 Sir William Ouseley had stopped over in Wash- 
 ington on his way, in order to lay his general instruc- 
 tions before our government for approval, 
 and learn the result of Lord Napier's wiiiiam 
 diplomacy before setting out finally on his Ouseiey's 
 mission to Central America. Buchanan 
 having handed our case over into British hands, 
 there was nothing now to hinder Her Majesty's 
 envoy from departing to his post, and arranging 
 matters on the isthmus as he would, in the interests 
 of the Crown. 
 
 Ouseley found the Central American states in an 
 apathetic condition after the late exciting events. 
 Even Nicaragua and Costa Rica had been induced 
 to patch up their differences, in the so-called Canas- 
 Jerez treaty, signed April 15, 1858, which settled 
 their boundary dispute at least for the time. Strange 
 to say, a bond of sympathy had also begun to draw 
 the jealous little republics closer together ; and this 
 sprang from their mutual indignation against the 
 people of the United States for having attempted 
 to foist their institution of slavery upon the land. 
 This was, of course, to Great Britain's advantage, 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 112-117, 125-132. 
 
258 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 and Sir William found the people, therefore, much 
 more favorably disposed to his cause than he had 
 been led to expect. He still did not hurry matters, 
 however, prefei'ring to wait until the last vestiges of 
 excitement over Central American affairs had died 
 out in the United States, and until the Central 
 Americans, too, had become more thoroughly nor- 
 mal. With the preliminaries finally arranged to his 
 satisfaction, Ouseley then returned to England, leav- 
 ing Her Majestys charffS d'' affaires in Guatemala, 
 Sir Charles Lennox Wyke, to draw up the treaties 
 in form. 
 
 As a result of these negotiations Great Britain 
 was enabled to clinch her rights in Central America 
 by three important treaties : one with Gautemala, 
 another with Honduras, and a third with Nicaragua. 
 In each of these conventions England went on the 
 shrewd principle of abandoning certain claims of 
 the present, in order to make sure of her future 
 prestige ; and events have since amply demonstrated 
 the wisdom of her course. 
 
 The first treaty w^as concluded with Guatemala 
 on April 30, 1859, and here the British gained 
 pretty nearly all they had ever demanded. Therein 
 it was agreed : 
 
 " that tlie boundary between the republic and the British set- 
 tlement and possessions in the Bay of Honduras, as they 
 existed previous to and on the first day of January, 1850, and 
 have continued to exist up to the present time, was and is as 
 follows : Beginning at the mouth of the liver Sarstoon in the 
 Bay of Honduras and proceeding up the mid-channel thereof 
 to Gracias k Dios Falls, then turning to the right and continu- 
 
English vs. American Diplomacy. 259 
 
 ing by a line drawn direct from Gracias k Dios Falls due north 
 until it strikes the Mexican frontier." ' 
 
 This gave to Great Britain practically all tlie land 
 her settlers had encroached upon in derogation of 
 old treaty rights with Spain, and made the British. 
 Honduras of 1860 some three times the size of the 
 Belize of 1786. It must be noted, too, that this 
 latest convention speaks of " the British settlement 
 and possessions in the Bay of Honduras " ; whereas, 
 in his reservations to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the 
 English minister had only mentioned " Her Majesty's 
 settlement at Honduras." There was foresight in 
 this addition of a word, as it subsequently proved 
 to the detriment of our own diplomatic case. 
 
 The next of the three treaties was concluded with 
 Honduras on November 28, 1859, and here Great 
 Britain was most generous with her favors. The 
 fact was, the Honduras railway scheme had also col- 
 lapsed by this time, probably because the Panama 
 railway was now open to traffic and was showing 
 itself capable of fulfilling all the present require- 
 ments of isthmus transit. Thus Great Britain had 
 no immediate need of dominion in these parts, and, 
 as this had proved such a touchy point with the 
 United States, she deemed it wisest not to lose all 
 by precipitating another discussion. Still, Honduras 
 did not gain everything by the treaty. True, she 
 recovered her nominal control over the Bay islands ; 
 but only vnth the proviso that she should never 
 part with them to any other power. Honduras, in 
 
 ' Cf. Map at end of volume. 
 
260 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 other words, by thus accepting what she had always 
 claimed to be her own territory from British hands, 
 at once acknowledged Her Majesty's former right 
 of sovereignty over the lands in question ; and by 
 promising then never to part with the islands thus 
 acquired to any other power, she still further limited 
 her own sovereignty in favor of Great Britain. Her 
 Britannic Majesty promised, moreover, to abandon 
 her protectorate over such of the Mosquito Indians 
 as dwelt within the borders of Honduras, only stipu- 
 lating that such grants of lands as the natives had 
 already made to Englishmen along the shore should 
 be respected ; and making Honduras further agree 
 to pay these Indians an annual indemnity of five 
 thousand dollars for ten years. 
 
 Great Britain reserved to herself more rights as 
 she advanced to the south ; and the last of the 
 three conventions, called the treaty of Managua and 
 signed with Nicaragua on January 28, 1860, formed 
 the climax of Ouseley's diplomacy. With a show 
 of magnanimity England consented in this conven- 
 tion to withdraw from her protectorate over the 
 Mosquito Indians, and hand over the shore to Nica- 
 ragua ; but, in agreeing thereto, Nicaragua also made 
 the fatal mistake of formally acknowledging a claim 
 she had up to this persistently denied. It was in 
 this case, moreover, only Nicaragua's nominal right 
 of sovereignty which was recognized from sea to sea ; 
 for Great Britain took particular care to stipulate in 
 this treaty, that a reservation should be set apart for 
 the Indians along the eastern shore, extending from 
 the Bio Hueso in the north to the Rio Rama in the 
 
English vs. American Diplomacy. 261 
 
 south, and westward to 84° 15' west longitude.* 
 Within the area so set apart for their use, the In- 
 dians were to have the right of local self-government, 
 and by formally agreeing with Great Britain never 
 to interfere with administrative matters in Mos- 
 quitia, Nicaragua simply traversed the very sovereign 
 rights over the coast which she was supposed to 
 have acquired under the treaty ; and thus left Eng- 
 land with still the final word to say in matters per- 
 taining to the eastern seaboard. Relying on the 
 continuance of British influence among the Indians, 
 Great Britain did indeed allow that nothing in the 
 treaty should be "construed to prevent the Mos- 
 quito Indians at any future time from agreeing to 
 absolute incorporation into the republic of Nica- 
 ragua on the same footing as other citizens of the 
 republic, and from subjecting themselves to be gov- 
 erned by the general laws and regulations of the 
 republic instead of by their customs and regulations." 
 Such a contingency seemed very remote at that time, 
 but, in making this admission, British foresight was 
 at fault, as recent events have proved. 
 
 Under the terms of the treaty Greytown was 
 henceforth to be constituted a free port with privi- 
 leges of municipal government, not derogatory to 
 Nicaragua's shadowy rights of sovereignty. The 
 local ofl3.cers were furthermore authorized to levy 
 custom dues on all imported articles destined for 
 consumption in the interior. The money thus raised 
 was to go toward meeting the annual subvention of 
 five thousand dollars, which Nicaragua promised to 
 
 ' Cf. Map at end of volume. 
 
262 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 pay the Indians for the next ten years ; but in de- 
 fault of such payment, Great Britain was again to 
 have the right to interfere in behalf of her former 
 charges. Finally, all grants of land, either in Grey- 
 town or along the shore, which the Indians had 
 made to Englishmen since January 1, 1848, were to 
 be allowed. Property rights in the vicinity of the 
 canal route acquired by Captain Loch's invasion 
 were thus left undisturbed. 
 
 Great Britain's withdrawal from the coast was 
 thus after all but nominal. Nicaragua was indeed 
 assured in her rights of sovereignty to the sea, but 
 any attempt on her part to emphasize such sover- 
 eignty, either in Grey town or along the Mosquito 
 shore, would give Great Britain a legal right to in- 
 terfere. The old British Mosquito protectorate was 
 thus rendered negative and passive for the time, but 
 ready to become active and positive again as soon as 
 the proper moment should arrive.* 
 
 With a punctiliousness worthy of commendation, 
 the British Foreign Office communicated copies of 
 o 3 -j-jjg these three treaties to the United States 
 United government for approval, expressing the 
 states Ex- j^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ "finally set at rest 
 
 press their -"^ . •' . , ■' 
 
 Satisfac- the questions respecting the interpretation 
 tion, of i\^Q Clayton -Bui we r treaty which have 
 
 been the subject of so much controversy between 
 this country and the United States." 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 100-105. 
 Wheaton's " Digest of International Law," 2d ed., 1887, pp. 197-200. 
 Hertslet's State Papers, Vol. XL., p. 953; XLI., p. 757 ; XLIL, p. 
 153 ; XLVI., p. 244; XLVIL, p. 661 ; XLVIII., p. 630 ; L., p. 176. 
 " f'oreign Relations of the United States," 1888, pp. 460-464. 
 
English vs. American Diplomacy. 263 
 
 ,r 
 
 From a superficial examination of the instruments 
 it would seem as if the Monroe doctrine were finally 
 vindicated ; for had not Great Britain therein aban- 
 doned all claims both to the Bay islands and the 
 Mosquito shore ? — and these indeed were the only 
 points at issue. So it appeared to Buchanan at 
 least, for in his annual message to Congress he an- 
 nounced officially that " the discordant constructions 
 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty between the two gov- 
 ernments, which at different periods of the discussion 
 bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a final 
 settlement entirely satisfactory to this government." 
 Thus Whigs and Democrats both had their diplo- 
 matic terms, and, as a result, two formidable estop- 
 pels were now fastened on our Monroe doctrine. 
 Clayton's treaty was bad enough, in all conscience, 
 but Buchanan's satisfaction was worse. 
 
 As far as England and the United States were 
 concerned, transit across Central America was a 
 thing of the past and future, and no longer a present 
 necessity. But we lost all rights of the past and 
 made no provision for the future ; while Great 
 Britain retained about all she had acquired, and 
 wrung from us besides a good half interest in all 
 transit schemes that were to come. Were it not for 
 the opponents with whom she had to deal, one 
 would be tempted to say, what a triumph of British 
 diplomacy ! As it is we can only wonder at our. 
 own naive stupidity.' 
 
 • Prest. Buchanan's Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, i860. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., 1st Bess., p. 202. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 OPERATIONS ON THE LOWER ISTHMUS. 
 
 BELOW the Panama route, the topography of 
 the American isthmus was practically un- 
 known when the discovery of gold in Cali- 
 fornia made the transit problem a pressing question 
 
 ^ of the day. Fine harbors were known to 
 § 99. Dr. . -^ 
 
 Cuiien's indent the shores of this lower isthmus on 
 Caledonian either side, however, and rumor now had 
 it that at least six feasible canal routes 
 were to be found in these parts. True the Panama 
 railway was all but ready for traffic ; but this was 
 not enough for the enthusiasts of the day. Com- 
 merce demanded a canal, and a short sea-level canal 
 at that, and no circuitous lock-bound affair, such as 
 Nicaragua promised to provide. So, leaving the 
 United States and Great Britain to fight out the 
 question of political control farther north, English, 
 French, and American enthusiasts began their vain 
 search for a favorable canal route across this lower 
 isthmus. 
 
 The Caledonian route was the first to attract 
 attention, and this came about through the reports 
 of a certain Dublin physician, Dr. Edward Cullen, 
 who was then residing at Bogota. Cullen had, it 
 
 264 
 
Operations on the Lower Isthmus. 265 
 
 seems, come across Lionel Wafer's and Manual Mil- 
 la's untrustworthy accounts * of their respective 
 journeys across the isthmus in the days of Spanish 
 supremacy, from Caledonian Bay to the Pacific, and 
 he determined to verify the truth of these assertions. 
 Apparently satisfied in his own mind that neither 
 Wafer nor Milla had been mistaken in their descrip- 
 tion of the country. Dr. Cullen then prepared a 
 lengthy and very highly-colored paper on the Cale- 
 donian route, which he had presented, in July, 1850, 
 before the Royal Geographical Society in London. 
 The report created considerable excitement, and 
 Lord Palmerston's attention was also called to the 
 plan, in the hopes of interesting the government as 
 well. But Palmerston had never put any faith in 
 these schemes of transit across the lower isthmus, 
 and having just won his victory over the United 
 States in the Claytou-Bulwer treaty, he preferred to 
 confine his political plans entirely to Central America. 
 The London promoters, Messrs. Fox, Henderson, 
 and Brassey, were then waiting to receive the reports 
 of Colonel Child's surveys in Nicaragua ; but, wash- 
 ing to be prepared for all contingencies, they at once 
 sent out a civil engineer, Mr. Lionel Gisborne, to 
 make a reconnaissance of the route and report. Gis- 
 borne's reconnoitring methods were novel, but 
 hardly calculated to inspire much confidence in his 
 results. He first explored the shores of Caledonian 
 Bay, and then made his way for a short distance into 
 the interior until he was- driven back by the hostility 
 
 ' Cf. , ante, §§ 39 and 49. 
 
266 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 of the native Bravos. This decided him to cross the 
 isthmus along the more beaten track at Panama. 
 He then ascended the Rio Savannah' from San 
 Miguel on the Pacific, until fear of the Indians again 
 induced him to return to the coast. The great 
 divide still remained unexplored, so, following the 
 scientific methods of his precursor. Dr. Cullen, Gis- 
 borne guessed this to be one hundred and fifty feet 
 in height. He then returned to London and re- 
 ported to his employers most favorably on the route. 
 Thinking to arouse popular interest as well in the 
 plan, Gisborne then published his remarkable 
 2:)amphlet on " The Isthmus of Darien," wherein he 
 described the hydrographic features of the country 
 in the most glowing terms, and again made light of 
 the enormous dividing ridge that intervened.^ 
 
 Gisborne's report attracted immediate attention, 
 not only in England, but in France and our country 
 § 100. Lieu- as well. Dr. Culleu, in the meantime, had 
 tenant secured a very favorable concession from 
 Exposure of ^^® New Granadan authorities for the con- 
 the Fallacy, struction of a caual along the route he had 
 discovered, and European capitalists now became 
 eager to share in his rights. A French company 
 organized for the purpose, called the Societe d'J^tudes, 
 approached the doctor on the subject, begging to be 
 taken in ; but the shrewd Irishman o£Eered instead 
 
 ' Cf. Map, frontispiece. 
 
 ° Rodrigues, loc. cit. ,- pp. 11-26. 
 
 Moritz Wagner, " Ueber die Naturverhaltnisse der verschiedenen Linien 
 Tvelche fUr einen Durchstich des centralamerikanischen Isthmus in Vorschlag 
 sind." Miinchen, l86g. 
 
operations on the Lower Isthmus. 267 
 
 to sell them the secret of his route for 60,000 francs. 
 The company refused the offer, however, and deter- 
 mined, instead, to send out an expedition of its own, 
 to learn the truth of the matter before risking any 
 money in the undertaking. 
 
 The English contractors were equally enthusiastic 
 and at once placed Mr. Gisborne at the head of a 
 well-equipped surveying party to lay out his route 
 in detail. They were also enabled to interest their 
 government so far in the new scheme of transit, as 
 to induce the Admiralty to convey Gisborne and his 
 party to the scene in a British Avar-ship, and even to 
 send a small naval expedition of its own to recon- 
 noitre the Pacific coast in the vicinity. 
 
 Buchanan was at this time our minister in London, 
 and catching the general enthusiam for the Cale- 
 donian scheme, he communicated it to his administra- 
 tion at home. Lieutenant Isaac C. Strain of the 
 Navy had little difficulty, therefore, in inducing 
 President Pierce and Secretary of the Navy'Dobbin, 
 to grant him the requisite authority to organize a 
 volunteer expedition of Americans to explore the 
 route. Captain Hollins of the Cyane was accord- 
 ingly detailed to convey the party to the grounds, 
 and on January 17, 1854, Strain and his little band 
 of volunteers were landed at Caledonian Bay. 
 
 The British naval officers were already making 
 their way over the divide from the Pacific side, so 
 Strain started at once for the interior, hoping to meet 
 them on the ridge ; but to his surprise he soon found 
 himself confronted by an apparently impassable 
 
268 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 mountain barrier, rising everywhere before him, 
 from 1000 to 3500 feet in height. The majority 
 of his party then returned to the coast, leaving 
 Strain and a few of the more adventurous to make 
 their way over the divide as best they could. 
 
 On reaching the shore again the Americans who 
 had put back found quite an international naval 
 demonstration at anchor in the bay ; for Gisborne 
 and his party had since arrived, and the French 
 surveyors, sent out by the Societe d''JStudes, were 
 also there. The news the Americans brought of the 
 real character of the mountain range, was received 
 with consternation, and neither the English nor the 
 French would believe it. Gisborne's professional 
 reputation was at stake, so he determined to cross 
 the divide at any risk. Fearful of the fate of Strain 
 and his followers. Captain HoUins also sent a relief 
 expedition into the mountains ; but the French pre- 
 ferred to stay behind and examine the hydrographie 
 features' of the bay. 
 
 Strain, and his little band, after terrible hardship 
 and some loss of life, succeeded at last in reaching 
 the Pacific at Yvisa. Thence they proceeded to 
 Panama and crossed the isthmus to Colon, where 
 they were finally picked up hj the Cyane after the 
 relief party had been recalled. Gisborne also suc- 
 ceeded in crossing the divide ; but he reached the 
 coast at last less of an enthusiast than before. The 
 English naval expedition on the west returned to 
 their vessel with nothing better to report, and all 
 parties had now to confess that they had found no 
 depression in the range lower than 1000 feet. 
 
Operations on the Lower Isthmus. 269 
 
 On his return to this country Strain said : " We 
 claim to have clearly dispersed a magnificent and 
 dangerous fallacy, which has already cost many lives 
 and swallowed up a large amount of capital." After 
 this neither the English nor the Americans could be 
 induced to interest themselves further in Dr. Cullen's 
 visionary canal project ; but the French Societe was 
 not to be put off, and, not having examined the 
 route, they still persisted in believing in its 
 feasibility.^ 
 
 With the exposure of the Caledonian fallacy, 
 Tumor began to busy herself with the Atrato routes ^ 
 still farther south, and here again legend 
 supplied the deficiency in facts. It was p'°j' ^^^ 
 now related how a Spanish monk in 1788 Kelly's 
 had built a canal along the Raspadura investiga- 
 ravine, connecting the Rio Atrato with the t^e Atrato 
 Pacific, along the San Juan, and how, in and San 
 1799, a Biscayan pilot had called the atten- j^ ^^^ 
 tion of the French government to the ex- 
 istence of this artificial channel. It was also noted 
 that the careful Humboldt had been convinced, from 
 what he had been able to gather of the nature of 
 this then inaccessible country, that there were "no 
 chains of mountains, nor even a ridge of partition, 
 nor any sensible line of demarkation between the 
 Bay of Cupica on the coast of the South Sea and the 
 Rio Naipa (Napipi) which empties into the Atrato 
 
 ' Rodrigues, loc. Hi. ; Moritz Wagner, loc. cil. 
 
 Lieutenant John T. Sullivan, " Report on Historical and Technical Infor- 
 mation Relating to the Problem of Interoceanic Communication by way of 
 the American Isthmus," U. S. Govt. Print, 1883, pp. 25-28. 
 
 ' Cf. Map, frontispiece. 
 
270 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 fifteen leagues above its mouth." It was further 
 affirmed that, in 1803, a merchant of Carthagena, 
 Don Ignacio Pombo, had written to von Humboldt 
 fully corroborating his presumption that the whole 
 country along the Napipi was a plain. In support 
 of this theory of a break in the Cordillera at Cupica 
 it was also averred that a Spanish merchant in the 
 olden days had opened up a road for the transporta- 
 tion of merchandise from the head of the Napipi to 
 the Pacific. Finally it was stated, on good authority, 
 that, as late as 1820 a ship's boat from the Chilean 
 cruiser Aiides had been hauled from the Pacific to a 
 navigable point on the Atrato side of this divide in 
 ten hours. 
 
 The trutli was King Philip of Spain had forbid- 
 den the exploration of the Atrato under penalty of 
 death, and the Indians and the climate of the re- 
 gion had ever since maintained the sanction of his 
 edict, so nothing was really known of the topogra- 
 phy of the district. A wealthy American, Mr. 
 Frederick Kelly, having collected all the evidence 
 that rumor had to afford, now took it upon himself 
 to prove or disprove the truth of these reports in 
 the interest of science and for the benefit of the 
 still increasing "Western trade of his country. He 
 first sent out, at his own expense, Mr. J. C. Traut- 
 wine, who, it will be remembered, was one of the 
 constructing engineers of the Panama Railway, with, 
 a party of surveyors, in 1851, to learn the nature of 
 the fabled Raspadura ravine, and determine if a sea- 
 level canal could be located along its bed. On reach- 
 
Operations on the Lower Isthmus. 271 
 
 ing the head-waters of the Atrato after considerable 
 difficulty, Trautwine found the ravine of legend to 
 be a hill in reality, — or more properly a dividing- 
 ridge cutting ofE the Atrato entirely from the San 
 Juan. But before abandoning all hope of the 
 Atrato-San Juan route, Mr. Kelly sent out two fur- 
 ther expeditions in 1853, again at his own cost, to 
 discover the lowest elevation at which the divide 
 might be pierced by a canal. The reports were again 
 so unsatisfactory, however, that he reluctantly gave 
 up his original plan, and turned his next attention to 
 the Atrato-Ti'uando route. His Atrato party was 
 still to operate on that side, and another expedition 
 was sent out in 1854 under Captain Kennish to work 
 up toward the Truando from the Pacific. Only the 
 latter surveys were caixied out, to be sure, but from 
 such meagre data Kennish reported that a canal was 
 quite feasible in this region. 
 
 Mr. Kelly was elated over this imagined success, 
 and, eager to lay the results of his discovery before 
 the scientific and commercial worlds, which were both 
 so wrought up over the canal project at this time, 
 he at once set out for London and there reported his 
 results to the Royal Geographical Society and the 
 British Institute of Civil Engineers. British states- 
 men, geographers, and scientists, — Lord Clarendon, 
 Sir Richard Murchison, Robert Stephenson, and 
 Admiral Fitzroy, — all listened to Mr. Kelly's plans 
 with marked attention, and once more, widespread 
 interest was aroused. From England Mr. Kelly 
 proceeded to France and laid the matter before the 
 
272 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Emperor and his scientists ; but Napoleon had. a 
 plan of his own, and the French geographers still 
 had faith in the Caledonian route, so the American 
 enthusiast could arouse but little interest there. 
 Finally Mr. Kelly went on to Berlin and reported to 
 the aged von Humboldt the true nature of the coun- 
 try he had described from hearsay so many years 
 before. 
 
 Finding European interest again alive over the 
 canal project of the lower isthmus, and this time 
 through the efforts of an American citizen, Mr. 
 Buchanan in London thought it high time that 
 his government should take some action officially in 
 the matter, and continue the investigations so auspi- 
 ciously begun. He communicated his ideas to the 
 Pierce administration at Washington ; but soon after 
 this he returned home to be elected President him- 
 self. On taking office Buchanan succeeded in induc- 
 ing Congress to pass a law authorizing the Secretaries 
 of War and the Navy to co-operate in verifying Ken- 
 nish's surveys, and to determine whether it Avere 
 possible to divert the waters of the Atrato into the 
 Pacific. 
 
 Lieutenants Nathaniel Michler of the Army, and 
 T. A. Craven of the Navy, were accordingly ap- 
 pointed by their respective chiefs to undertake the 
 task, — the former to go into the interior, while the 
 latter made the necessary hydrographic surveys. 
 Lieutenant Michler, in his report, favored the route, 
 with some modifications ; though he estimated the 
 probable cost at $134,000,000, — which was over 
 
Operations on the Lower Isthmus. 273 
 
 twice the sum that Mr. Kelly had been figuring on. 
 Lieutenant Craven, on the other hand, condemned 
 the plan entirely in his report, as he reckoned the 
 ■cost and labor necessary for its accomplishment to 
 be incalculable. This disgusted Mr. Kelly with the 
 Truando route as well, and, leaving the Atrato dis- 
 trict to others, he devoted what remained of his re- 
 markable enthusiasm for the canal project to the 
 Panama and San Bias routes. 
 
 With this idea in mind Mr. Kelly next appealed 
 to Colonel Totten, who had been the chief construct- 
 ing engineer and was now the general superinten- 
 dent of the Panama Railway Company, asking his 
 opinion as to the feasibility of constructing a sea- 
 level canal along this route. Totten replied that a 
 canal would be impossible across the isthmus of 
 Panama without ten or tw^elve locks, and that, even 
 then it was extremely doubtful whether the Chagres 
 river could be diverted from its bed and kept clear 
 of the line. Mr. Kelly's own engineers corroborated 
 this discouraging report ; and so the enthusiast 
 turned finally to the San Bias route, still hoping 
 for success in the end. 
 
 Little was known of this San Bias region. In 
 1837 a Mr. Wheelwright had attempted a survey 
 along the route, and a few years after still another 
 reconnaissance had been begun by Mr. Edward 
 Hopkins ; but in both cases the Indians interfered, 
 and little of any value had thus been added to 
 the scanty knowledge of the district. So, in 1863, 
 Mr, Kelly sent out another engineer, Mr. Rude, to 
 
 l8 
 
274 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 make a preliminary barometrical examination of the 
 elevations to be crossed. , This proving satisfactory, 
 a regular surveying party was despatched during 
 the following year by Mr. Kelly and his associates. 
 As a result, a partial survey was executed by 
 Messrs. Mc Dougall, Sweet, Forman, and Eude, and 
 a canal line was run from a point opposite Chepillo 
 island off the Pacific coast, across the divide to with- 
 in two miles of the Atlantic at San Bias. Here the 
 party came in conflict with the natives and were 
 obliged to put back. The surveyors then guessed 
 at the remaining distance and reported a plan for a 
 •canal of 27^ miles with a tunnel to make up seven 
 miles of the length. But this offered no satisfactory 
 solution of the transit problem; so, after all the 
 money and labor spent, Mr. Kelly, disheartened, aban- 
 doned the lower isthmus and all its delusory canal 
 routes that had once appeared to him so promising. ^ 
 Even after Strain's exposure of its fallacy, the 
 Caledonian route seemed to claim a fatal fascination 
 for the French mind. They had evidence 
 French ^ '^^ ^^^ unfeasibility besides from one of 
 Continue in their own countrymen ; for a French 
 t eir Deiu- jj -gj^jj Dr. Lebreton, while practisinsr 
 
 sions con- •'■.•' ' , . ' ■■■ ° 
 
 cerning the his profession in New Granada made 
 Caledonian geveral reconnaissances along the Darien 
 divide in search of gold and a transit-way,, 
 but reported no depression in the range. 
 
 ■ Rodrigues, loc. cit. , pp. 1 1-26. 
 Sullivan, loc. cit., pp. 27-28, i>T ff. 
 
 Rear-Admiral Chas. H. Davis, " Report on Interoceanic Canals and 
 Railroads," Govt. Print, 18613, p. 1% ff. 
 
Operations on the Lower Isthmus. 275 
 
 The Societe d''£jtudes in Paris was not to be con- 
 vinced, however, and so, with a determination 
 worthy of a better cause, this company sent out 
 another surveying party in 1861, in charge of a 
 M. Bourdiol, to work its way into the interior, this 
 time from San Miguel on the Pacific. These 
 surveyors, like their predecessors, appear never to 
 have succeeded in crossing the range ; but on his 
 return, M. Bourdiol, with that airy enthusiasm and 
 lack of scientific precision so characteristic of all 
 the French surveys on the isthmus, was able to 
 elaborate a canal route out of his own mind. Ac- 
 cording to his plan a canal was quite feasible along 
 this route, to extend in a straight line from San 
 Miguel to Caledonian Bay, a distance of but 31 
 miles, with a maximum elevation of only 144 feet, 
 and at total cost of bai-ely $34,000,000. 
 
 This project naturally revived French hopes and 
 induced M. Airiau, another Frenchman then resident 
 in New Granada, to continue M. Bourdiol's surveys, 
 on his own account. Starting in also at San Miguel, 
 Airiau worked his way some distance up the range, 
 but he too seems never to have emerged on the 
 Atlantic side. With such meagre information at his 
 disposal, the eager Frenchman then returned and 
 elaborated the data he had collected in a remarkable 
 monograph on the " Canal Interoceanique par 
 I'Isthme du Darien." This work gave minute de- 
 tails of the route, and contained a collection of very 
 full but hopelessly inexact maps of the proposed 
 line. According to this sanguine authority, there 
 
276 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 was no dividing range to be encountered in this 
 region, — which was true as far as he had gone, — 
 but only groups of detached peaks. Thus by 
 following along the route he laid out, M. Ail'iau de- 
 clared, the canal would only have an elevation of 
 fifty metres to overcome. Thus Lionel Wafer and 
 Manuel Milla were exonerated from Strain's outra- 
 geous calumny, and French enthusiasm over the 
 route was justified. 
 
 M. Airiau had a rival, however, in the person of a 
 M. de Puydt, and the rival, moreover, possessed the 
 greater influence at the capitalistic court in Paris. De 
 Puydt claimed to have discovered a still lower depres- 
 sion lying between San Miguel on the Pacific and the 
 Gulf of Darien on the Atantic, and his plan was to 
 lay out a canal route diagonally across the isthmus 
 between these points, along the valley of the E.io 
 Tuyra. On the basis of this preliminary report a 
 company was formed in Paris by a group of French 
 capitalists, and de Puydt was sent back to the 
 isthmus with a corps of engineers to lay out his 
 proposed route in detail. He there gave evidence 
 of the striking originality of his mind. Wishing to 
 learn the altitude of the range, and not caring to 
 brave the dangers of the interior, de Puydt reached 
 his conclusions by measuring the velocity of the 
 stream at the mountain's base. According to this 
 calculation the divide before him rose some 101 feet 
 above the sea ; but, to be on the safe side, de Puydt 
 made it 150 feet, and returned to Paris with this 
 report. 
 
Operations on the Lower Isthmus. 277 
 
 Just at this critical juncture a Spaniard, named 
 Grogorza, came to de Puydt's assistance. In rum- 
 maging among some ancient archives in Madrid, 
 Gogorza came upon some old documents and a map, 
 which went to prove the existence of a very low 
 pass in the vicinity of de Puydt's explorations and 
 and directly in the line of his canal route. The 
 French promoters were elated over their success, and 
 even prevailed upon the more conservative Gom- 
 pagnie General Transatlantique to co-operate with 
 them in the final surveys. The French nation, it 
 must be borne in mind, was highlj^ wrought up over 
 American affairs at this time. The United States 
 was surely going to pieces ere long, and the Em- 
 peror was soon to re-establish French prestige in the 
 New World, Interoceanic canal projects were, 
 therefore, in the full swing of the tide, and the 
 de Puydt company Avas being carried along with 
 the rest. 
 
 Two surveying parties were accordingly despatched 
 to the lower isthmus ; one by the canal company, in 
 charge of another of its willing engineers, a M. 
 Lacharme ; and another under the direction of M. 
 Flachat, sent out by the Compagnie Transatlantique. 
 Flachat soon discovered that the fabled pass was all 
 a myth, and, without wasting further time on any 
 such fool's errand, he reported almost immediately 
 to his employers, that immense obstacles stood in 
 the way of any canal construction in this region. 
 Lacharme, indeed, was no more fortunate than his 
 colleague in locating the wonderful depression that 
 
278 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 de Puydt and the old Spanish map had described ; 
 but he had been sent out by a speculative company, 
 and it would never do to return without some inge- 
 nious and feasible plan. So he, too, elaborated a 
 scheme for a canal to connect the Gulf of San Miguel 
 with the Atrato by a somewhat longer route of fifty 
 odd miles, giving the maximum level as 190 feet. 
 
 But it was the Emperor's turn now, and he, as we 
 know, had a route of his own across Nicaragua. All 
 minor schemes of French enthusiasts were accord- 
 ingly brushed aside, as we shall presently see, to 
 make way for imperial ambitions.' 
 
 Neither the Spaniards in their search for gold, nor 
 the Americans in their quest for a transit route, had 
 as yet taken any notice of the Chiriqui 
 Chiriqui ^ isthmus. Savages still dwelt unmolested 
 Coioniza- here, and, though both New Granada and 
 i'°" Costa Eica claimed the land as theirs, still 
 
 Scheme. . . . ' 
 
 neither could, by any possibility, have de- 
 lineated its own frontier in these regions. Captain 
 Barnet, of the English navy, first explored the Chi- 
 riqui lagoon in 1839, for his own government, — 
 always on the lookout for coaling stations and the 
 like, — and reported very favorably to the Admiralty. 
 Some years later Golfo Dulce, on the Pacific side, 
 was examined very carefully by Admiral Pelion of 
 the French navy, and he was even more enthusiastic 
 in his report to the Home authorities. 
 
 ' Rodrigues, loc, cit., p. 17. 
 Moritz Wagner, loc. cit., pp. 13-17. 
 Sullivan, loc. cit., pp. 28-30. 
 
operations on the Lower Isthmus. 279 
 
 Citizens of the United States first came to this 
 isthmus after the migratory stream of gold-hunters 
 had found its way across Panama. Prospects of 
 opening up an immediate route of transit along the 
 Chiriqui route, were indeed not promising ; but, be- 
 sides the excellence of the harbors on either side, 
 American promoters now discovered the land to be 
 singulai'ly rich in timber, coal, and mineral wealth. 
 The climate was also found to be salubrious, and the 
 soil very fertile. This district of such surprising 
 hydrographic, orographic, and geognostic advantages, 
 paralleled the Panama railroad, and if improved, 
 could easily be made an entrepot and source of sup- 
 ply for the California trade. With this idea in 
 miud, a so-called Chiriqui Improvement Company 
 was organized by Ambrose W. Thompson and his 
 associates, of the United States, and, in May, 1859, 
 the company secured valuable concessions along the 
 route from the New Granadan govei'nment. 
 
 Being aware of the superb nature of the harbors 
 on either side, and learning now of the rich resources 
 of the interior. President Buchanan conceived the 
 idea of securing control of this route as well, for the 
 government and establishing naval stations there. 
 Surveys were thereupon instituted by the Navy, and 
 still another favorable report was the result. Con- 
 gress then took the matter up, and on June 22, 1860, 
 a commission was appointed to determine the quan- 
 tity and quality of the coal to be found in the 
 region, and report upon the character of the harbors 
 on either shore, and the practicability of construct- 
 
280 The Nicaragua Canal, 
 
 ing a railroad line to connect them. A careful ex- 
 ploration was then undertaken under government 
 auspices, and on January 6, 1861, the commission 
 reported that the harbors were excellent and easily 
 fortified ; that a railroad across the divide was 
 quite feasible ; and that the coal deposits were not 
 only fine in quality, but apparently inexhaustible 
 in quantity. 
 
 All seemed to promise well from these reports,, 
 both from the economic welfare of the Chiriqui 
 Improvement Company, and for governmental pres- 
 tige on this isthmus ; but our internecine disagree- 
 ment here again put a check on our national designs,, 
 and, with the outbreak of the war, the original 
 scheme fell through. Lincoln revived it, indeed, 
 soon after, but with quite a different purpose in 
 view. What to do with the host of slaves he was 
 about to emancipate, was the question which most 
 puzzled the President at this time, and knowing 
 from the report of the commission the nature of 
 these Chiriqui lands, it occurred to him that he 
 might establish a colony of negroes there. He ac- 
 cordingly instructed Mr. Chase to enquire into the 
 nature of the Improvement Company's title, and also 
 to report on the character of the region for such a 
 colonization scheme. Mr. Chase turned the matter 
 over to Mr. Jordan, then Solicitor of the Treasury, 
 and he reported most enthusiastically. The land 
 lying between the two harbors, Chiriqui lagoon and 
 Golfo Dulce, Jordan said, was most favorably situ- 
 ated for the colony, and the possession of it, he 
 
Operations on the Lower Isthmus. 281 
 
 thought, would be of immense importance to the 
 United States, fixing, as it must, their control over 
 the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, and the 
 Central American states, and assuring to them 
 their proper share in the commerce of South Amer- 
 ica and the Pacific. 
 
 This fixed Lincoln in his determination, and he 
 accordingly instructed the Secretary of the Interior 
 to arrange with the Chiriqui Improvement Company 
 for the purchase by the government of their rights 
 to some 2,000,000 acres of the land of the isthmus. 
 While these negotiations were in progress Lincoln 
 called a delegation of representative colored men 
 before him on August 14, 1862, and laid his plan 
 before them in detail, closing his recital with this 
 simple and characteristic appeal: 
 
 " Could I get a number of tolerably intelligent men, with 
 their wives and children, I think I could make a satisfactory 
 commencement. I want you to let me know whether this can 
 be done or not. These subjects are of very great importance, 
 worthy of a month's study of a speech delivered in an hour. 
 I ask you, then, to consider seriously, for yourselves, for your 
 race, for the good of mankind, things that are not confined to 
 the present generation but as, 
 
 " From age to age descends the lay 
 To millions yet to be, 
 Till far its echoes roll away 
 Into eternity." 
 
 On the 12th of September the formal contract 
 with the Improvement Company for the lands in 
 question was approved by the President, and on the 
 22d of the same month he issued his famous procla- 
 
282 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 mation of emancipation. Before the slaves were set 
 free on the first of the following January, however, 
 the exigencies of the war decided Lincoln to employ 
 the freedmen in the armies, and nothing more came 
 of his Chii'iqui colonization scheme.' 
 
 The Panama Railway was opened to traffic in 1855, 
 and during the same year the New Granadan prov- 
 ince of Panama, across whose territory 
 
 Panama ^ ^^® ^^^^ ^'^^ ■^^^'^' declared itself an inde- 
 Railway, pendent state. English and American 
 and the capital had co-operated in the construction 
 
 Govern- '■ ^ 
 
 ment's of the road, but the United States alone 
 Guaranty of };,ad assumed full responsibility for the 
 political neutrality of the route. Revolu- 
 tion was now rife in the land, and the very existence 
 of the company was threatened, before any income 
 had been secured. Here was a condition of affairs 
 which again over-taxed the diplomatic resources of 
 our country, already so weakened by troubles of its 
 own. 
 
 President Pierce and Secretary of State Marcy did 
 not consider the local government of Panama com- 
 petent to protect the transit route ; and yet the cen- 
 tral government at Bogota showed no disposition to 
 interfere in the affairs of this rebellious province. 
 On April 15, 1856, a riot occurred in Panama, causing 
 considerable loss of life and property, and still the 
 
 ^ U. S. H. Report, 568, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 49 #. 
 U. S. H. Ex. Doc, 41, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 45^. 
 Thomas F. Meagher, "A New Route Through Chiriqui," Harper's 
 Monthly Magazine, Jan., 1861. 
 Panama Star, Jan. g, 1853. 
 
Operations on the Lower Isthmus. 283 
 
 New Granadan government took no action. Our 
 government had undertaken to guarantee the neu- 
 trality of this isthmus, and had also promised to 
 protect the rights, property, and privileges of the 
 railroad company ; but, under the general terms of 
 the treaty, there did not seem to be any legal way 
 of asserting our control. To strengthen the position 
 of his government, Pierce accordingly despatched a 
 mission at once to Bogota to arrange for a new treaty. 
 The terms of this proposed convention were drawn 
 up by Secretary Marcy beforehand, and provided 
 that the United States government should buy, for 
 cash, all New Granada's reserved rights in the rail- 
 road, and also secure control of strategic islands in 
 the harbors at either terminus, for naval stations. 
 Then, in order to pi'ovide for the neutralization of 
 the route, in fact as well as in theory, Mr. Marcy 
 also proposed that a belt of land twenty miles broad, 
 lying on both sides of the railway line, and extend- 
 ing from sea to sea, be carved out of the territory of 
 New Granada and handed over to the jurisdiction 
 of two free municipalities to be established in As- 
 pinwall (Colon) and Panama, Finally, if the New 
 Granadan authorities would agree to pay all damages 
 arising from the injuries done in the riot, Mr. Marcy 
 agreed that his government would continue, under 
 this new treaty, to guarantee the neutrality of the 
 isthmus and New Granada's rights of sovereignty, 
 over the same, as before. 
 
 But the Jesuits and Conservatives were again in 
 power, and this faction was never favorable to the 
 
284 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 American cause on the isthmus. President Ospina 
 thought Pierce was supporting the Liberals in 
 Panama, and refused to accept his terms. Mos- 
 quera, the Liberal leadei', then precipitated the 
 revolution, and the war of the " hundred fights " 
 raged along the lower isthmus until July, 1861. 
 The Liberals were left in control, but Mosquera, a 
 true disciple of Bolivar, was not content with this, 
 and would have himself proclaimed military dictator 
 of the land. The provisional government then 
 called upon the United States in 1862, to protect 
 their lately established Confederation of Granadina 
 from the designs of the revolutionist, and asked for 
 the interposition of our naval and land forces. 
 
 Our only route of transit to the Pacific was indeed 
 in imminent danger of destruction, but Lincoln 
 could not very well spare any land forces to serve 
 on the isthmus, when the very integrity of the Union 
 was threatened at home. Our naval commander in 
 these waters was, it is true, instructed to " guarantee 
 at all hazards and at whatever cost " the safety of 
 the railway transit ; but this only introduced f I'esh 
 complications. Both the English and the Pl'ench 
 were covertly hostile to the Union cause, and the 
 two powers had agreed in their convention of 1861 
 to co-operate in their designs upon Spanish- America. 
 Seward, therefore, felt he could go no further with- 
 out a more adequate force at his disposal to sub- 
 stantiate our claim ; so he departed from our long- 
 established policy, and went so far as to suggest to 
 the English and French governments a joint occupa- 
 
Operations on the Lower Isthmus. 285 
 
 tiou of the isthmus of Panama, Luckily for us, the 
 two powers saw no necessity of such further inter- 
 ference, and preferred to confine their attention to 
 Mexico ; so the matter was dropped and the New 
 Oranadans left to work out their own salvation or 
 destruction. 
 
 Mosquera soon discovered that the time was not 
 yet ripe for his coup d''etat, and in 1863 he made 
 peace with his Liberal friends and proclaimed a new 
 constitution for the country. New Granada then 
 reassumed the name of the older and larger con- 
 federation of the revolutionary era, and became 
 known as the United States of Colombia. The 
 forty-four provinces of the republic were now fitted 
 into eight practically independent states, each under 
 a president of its own. Panama formed one of 
 these, and thus this truly democratic little state came 
 to rule over the destinies of the transit route for 
 many years to come. 
 
 The Panama railway managed to hold its own 
 splendidly through all the confusion, and, in theory 
 a.t least, our Monroe doctrine policy, as embodied in 
 the treaty of 1848 with New Granada, suffered no 
 diminution. Revolution among the Spanish-Ameri- 
 cans, and civil strife within our own borders, left us 
 with but shadowy rights on this lower isthmus, in 
 fact, however ; and a deal of patching and mending 
 was necessary before we could really make good our 
 claim to these parts.' 
 
 ' Rodrigues, loc. at., pp. 32, 184-185. 
 
 Payne, loc. cit., " History of European Colonies," Ch. XVI. 
 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Sup- 
 plement, Jan., 1893. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 THE FRENCH IN NICARAGUA. 
 
 \ S one of the Holy Allies, France was only toa 
 / \ eager to place one of her lately restored 
 -^ ^ Bourbon princes over the then doubtful 
 destinies of Spanish- America ; but the declaration 
 of our Monroe doctrine, together with England's 
 § 105. The more diplomatic but equally emphatic dis- 
 French approval, effectually crushed out whatever 
 their De- ^^^^ there still remained in the scheme, 
 signs upon During the republican period which fol- 
 America. Jowed, the French were asrain too much 
 engrossed with their own affairs to busy themselves 
 much about America ; and so, despite Guizot's warn- 
 ing, Louis Philippe's interest in the transit question 
 had, after all, been but passing. 
 
 But the political out-cast, Louis Napoleon, had for 
 some time been concerning himself minutely with 
 this technical problem of joining the two seas ; and 
 even before he came into power at last, dominion in 
 the New World with control of the interoceanic 
 canal route formed part of his imperial ambitions. 
 Events at home then began to foretell the rise of the 
 third Napoleon, and in America, too, the cast of the 
 political heavens also came to favor his ascendancy. 
 
 286 
 
The French in Nicaragua. 287 
 
 With tbe insalubrious lower isthmus Napoleon 
 would have nothing to do, though the field was 
 open and his countrymen were already leading the 
 way. His imperial mind was still fixed on the route 
 through Nicaragua, which he himself had evolved in 
 the days of his misfortune. The United States had 
 staked her Monroe doctrine on this isthmus with 
 Great Britain, and lost the game. The contestants, 
 moreover, had just retired from the scene ; the victor 
 in a position to bide her time before claiming the 
 fruits of her triumphs ; and the vanquished, now 
 torn by civil strife, was evidently unable to make 
 good the national ground she had lost. Thus the 
 Central American isthmus as well, lay temptingly 
 before the Emperor, and almost courted his advance. 
 
 Ground was broken for Napoleon's designs in 
 Nicaragua by another Frenchman, M. F61ix Belly, 
 Knight of San Maurice and Lazarus. This „ , ,, 
 enthusiast was working for a company of Belly's 
 his own, however, and only indirectly, and Canal 
 after he himself had been forced to step 
 aside, did he really make way for the imperial train 
 which followed. 
 
 Belly was interested in Dr. Oersted's route,^ and 
 thus advanced his first claims to recognition through 
 Costa Rica, within whose territory the Pacific termi- 
 nus of this canal route lay. It was he, indeed, who 
 induced Costa Eica and Nicaragua to come to terms 
 over their troublesome boundary dispute in the 
 above-mentioned Canas- Jerez treaty of 1858. Costa 
 
 ' Cy., ante, % 83. 
 
288 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Eica was, of course, only too willing to listen to any 
 proposals from Europe wliich would assure her a 
 share in the transit monopoly; and Nicaragua also, 
 in her righteous indignation against the United 
 States, proved open to persuasion. 
 
 Belly made the best of this favorable opportunity 
 to advance the cause of the French in Central 
 America ; and, in a public manifesto to the people, 
 he declared that " hitherto all the official agents of 
 the United States in Nicaragua have been accom- 
 plices and auxiliaries of filibusters." To preclude 
 further machinations on the part of Americans, 
 the silver-tongued Frenchman then proposed that 
 the canal route henceforth be "placed under the 
 guaranty of the three powers which had guaranteed 
 the Ottoman Empire, — England, France, and Sar- 
 dinia." It was just at this critical juncture that the 
 irrepressible Walker landed his second force on the 
 eastern shores, and was even then making prepara- 
 tions to ascend the San Juan. Belly had, accord- 
 ingly, only to point to this last filibustering expedi- 
 tion already in their midst to prove to the Central 
 Americans the truth of the charges he was making 
 against the United States. 
 
 Fortunately for Belly and his designs. Walker 
 was deported from the coast before he could inter- 
 fere, and all was plain sailing for the French after 
 this. Even Nicaragua was persuaded, and, in the 
 end, an all-comprehensive canal contract was drawn 
 up between the three parties concerned, and ratified 
 in May, 1858. This contract was to run for 99 
 
The French in Nicaragua. 289 
 
 years. Under its provisions M. Belly and his 
 associates were to have the right of constucting and 
 operating a canal along the Oersted route, and, for 
 this purpose, they -were at once to step into ^11 the 
 privileges heretofore granted to the American At- 
 lantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company, The French 
 government, moreover, was to be allowed to station 
 two war-ships at the ports of the proposed canal, or 
 in Lake Nicaragua itself " for the entire duration of 
 the works." ' 
 
 This contract with the French at once forced the 
 United States government and the American Canal 
 Company into another controversy over o ^^^ g£_ 
 the transit route ; and that, too, before forts on the 
 either one of them had had time to recover ^"^'f^^^' 
 
 . United 
 
 from their late struggles with Great Brit- states Gov- 
 ain and Central America on the same emmentand 
 general issue. Both, in fact, were busy ,,^„ caaai 
 patching up their wounded rights in Nic- Company to 
 .aragua, at the very time that M. Belly i^pQa^s" 
 appeared upon the scene, to open up the 
 scars afresh. 
 
 In the interim that elapsed between Walker's 
 capitulation on the west coast of Nicaragua and his 
 reappearance on the eastern shore. President Bu- 
 chanan thought to regain for his government those 
 rights of transit through Nicaragua which were by 
 
 ' Felix Belly, " Le Nicaragua, — Carte d'Etude pour le Trace, et le Profile 
 du Canal du Nicaragua." Paris, 1S58. 
 
 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1872, p. 742.' 
 Engineering Magazine, loc. cit. London, March, 1893, 
 Moritz Wagner, loc. cit., pp. 16-17. 
 
290 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 this time All but lost. Since the downfall of Walk- 
 er's administration, Nicaragua had no accredited 
 minister in Washington ; so, to accomplish the Presi- 
 dent's purpose, Secretary of State Cass was obliged 
 to call upon the good offices of the Guatemalan 
 minister, Mr. Yrisarri, in patching up the truce. 
 On November 16, 1857, these two had agreed upon 
 a treaty, which was to be presented to Nicaragua for 
 approval. The wording of this convention was very 
 similar to that of the earlier Squier treaty, which 
 had been side-tracked by Clayton at Bulwer's re- 
 quest ; and, though it accorded the United States no 
 exclusive control over the canal route, it would, if 
 ratified by Nicaragua, have amply secured all transit 
 rights we had thus far acquired. Hoping for the 
 success of this governmental arrangement in their 
 behalf, the American Canal Company had -also re- 
 organized its forces, and come out in a new form as 
 the Central-American Transit Company, under the 
 direction of Mr. William H. Webb and his associates. 
 All was thus made ready for the recovery of our 
 lost rights in Nicaragua, when Belly appeared to spoil 
 our best-laid schemes. The Nicaraguan dictator in- 
 dignantly repudiated the treaty which Yrisarri had 
 made in his behalf with the United States, and then, 
 as we know,' as if to emphasize his decision he trans- 
 ferred the former rights of the American Canal 
 Company to the persuasive Frenchman. Our case 
 indeed seemed hopeless, and especially so, since even 
 Walker was no longer there to use force in the mat- 
 ter if need be, to re-establish our lost prestige. 
 
The French in Nicaragua. 291 
 
 Neitlier tte government nor the Transit Company 
 altogether despaired however, and, by a happy 
 chance, they both held their own for a time. In 
 regard to the contract she had seen fit to conclude 
 with M. Belly, General Cass used very strong words 
 of disapproval to Nicaragua, and informed her dic- 
 tator that, though the United States sought no ex- 
 clusive interest in the canal, and though they could 
 not, perhaps, object to Belly and his associates form- 
 ing contracts for the work, still they did not intend 
 to allow such contracts to interfere with the rights 
 already acquired by American citizens, and that 
 furthermore they must insist that, whoever built the 
 canal, it must remain a free and safe transit for all 
 nations, and controlled by no one. Concerning the 
 proposed stationing of French war-ships at, or in 
 the canal, this, General Cass concluded, the United 
 States government could on no condition tolerate. 
 
 Having thus laid down the law to Nicaragua, we 
 naturally expected that state to appeal to Belly, and 
 never doubted for a moment that he in turn would 
 lay the matter before his government at home. It 
 certainly looked as if we were to have another Mon- 
 roe doctrine struggle on our hands over the canal 
 route, and this time with the French as our oppo- 
 nents ; but it was not to come in this way, nor was 
 the time yet ripe. The fact was, neither Belly nor 
 his associates had any governmental support at all ; 
 for the Emperor, as we know, had a canal project of 
 his own in his head, to which Belly's schemes were 
 but a let and a hindrance. So Belly's company was 
 
292 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 sacrificed, and for once the United States had her 
 own way on the isthmus without having to resort to 
 anything more serious than a diplomatic ultimatum. 
 
 Seeing the French promises were but words, 
 Nicaragua then returned to her old allegiance, and 
 consented to come to terms with the new American 
 Transit Company. On March 20, 1861, Webb and 
 his associates secured the former monopoly of steam 
 navigation in Nicaragua's waters, and a year or so 
 later Nicaragua also agreed to revive in their favor 
 all the former rights and privileges of the defunct 
 American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company 
 which Walker had so ruthlessly destroyed. 
 
 Lincoln's administration was in the meantime in- 
 stalled in Washington, and, to cement this renewal of 
 friendly relations, the President despatched a regu- 
 larly accredited minister to Nicaragua, who was cord- 
 ially received. In his message of December 4, 1864, 
 Lincoln then concluded the matter with these words : 
 
 " At the request of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, a competent 
 engineer has been authorized to make a survey of the river San 
 Juan and the port of San Juan. It is a source of much satis- 
 faction that the difficulties, which for a moment excited some 
 political apprehensions and caused a closing of the 'inter- 
 oceanic transit route, have been amicably adjusted, and that 
 there is a good prospect that the route will soon be reopened 
 with an increase of capacity and adaptation. We could not 
 exaggerate either the commercial or the political importance 
 of that great improvement." ' 
 
 ' U. S. Ex. Doc, 56, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 21. 
 
 U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. III., p. 18. 
 
 " The American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company. A Refuta- 
 tion of its Claim to the Nicaragua Route," New York Evening Post Job- 
 Print, Jan. 31, 1888. 
 
The French in Nicaragua. 293 
 
 But Lincoln's expression of satisfaction was pre- 
 mature, for the French were not to be so easily dis- 
 lodged from the American isthmus as he g j^g jj^_ 
 had supposed. Belly and his associates poieon ni. 
 formed but the advance sfuard of their *°'*^'^ 
 
 1 • 11 11 11 Plans in 
 
 claims, and the van was only betrayed that Mexico and 
 the Emperor might have a clear road for Nicaragua. 
 his own advance from Mexico in the north. 
 
 As Mr. McCarthy has well said : " The Emperor 
 Napoleon cared nothing just then about the Monroe 
 doctrine, complacently satisfied that the United 
 States were going to pieces, and that the Southern 
 Confederacy would be his friend and ally." We 
 had made no exception in favor of any European 
 power when we launched this doctrine in our youth- 
 ful strength ; and now that we had become weak- 
 ened and disrupted, two of the Holy Allies, France 
 and Spain, joined this time by our ever-ready rival, 
 Great Britain, were retaliating against us on the 
 Gulf. Napoleon meant more than his partners, 
 however, and he was soon left to carry out his 
 designs alone. These consisted primarily in the 
 establishment of a monarchy in Mexico, but this 
 meant French dominion of the Gulf, and this in turn 
 involved the control of the Nicaraguan canal route, 
 as the southern boundary of the kingdom thus con- 
 stituted. 
 
 All this could, of course, by no means be accom- 
 plished at a stroke, but the Emperor had his plans 
 well laid ; so, while his generals were still engaged 
 in settling the affairs oi his newly formed empire in 
 Mexico, he sent out one of his most able lieutenants. 
 
294 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Michel Chevalier, who was already familiar with, 
 the transit problems of America, to make sure of his 
 rights in Nicaragua. It was an easy matter for this 
 fickle little state to choose between a powerful con- 
 quering monarch, who promised much and was 
 bound to have his way at any cost, and a people 
 who had treated her rather badly in the past, and 
 who were now themselves torn by civil strife. With- 
 out thinking it at all necessary to annul the charters 
 she had granted but a few years before to the 
 American Transit Company, Nicaragua accordingly 
 accepted Chevalier's proposals with eagerness, and 
 the Emperor's plans, for one brief moment, seemed 
 on the fair road to fulfilment. 
 
 But Napoleon's star had reached its zenith, and 
 now began to set. Up to this the Emperor had 
 paid but indifferent attention to the protests of the 
 "Washington government against his operations in 
 Mexico ; but now that Richmond had fallen and 
 Lee had surrendered, these protests meant something 
 more serious. It was one thing for us to announce 
 our Monroe doctrine on paper, — and we have never 
 accomplished much in this way, — but it was quite 
 another matter to lay down the same law when 
 backed by the force that was then at our dis- 
 posal. So the Union government gave a last inti- 
 mation to the French that it would be convenient 
 for them to leave, and at the same time deployed a 
 body of veterans to the southwest, and the result 
 was indeed surprising. Napoleon withdrew, leaving 
 the ill-fated Maximilian to bear the brunt of his de- 
 
The French in Nicaragua. 295 
 
 sertion, and in a montli or more the Mexican Empire 
 ■was a thing of the past. 
 
 The Emperor clung fast, however, to the rights he 
 had acquired in Nicaragua, and still hoped to fulfil 
 his ambitions in America, by using this state hence- 
 forth as his vantage ground. But the United States 
 did not have to interfere any further in the matter, 
 for, as we had just emerged from our great struggle, 
 so Napoleon was now advancing steadily toward his 
 own ruin at Sedan, and with his downfall French 
 designs upon the Nicaraguan canal route came to an 
 end.' 
 
 'J. McCarthy, " History of Our Own Times," Ch. XLIV. 
 
 Bancroft, he. cit., " History of the Pacific States," Vol. IX., Ch. I-XIV. 
 
 Gaceta Oficial, Managua, Nicaragua, Feb. 27, 1887. 
 
Part Three. 
 
 THE PERIOD OF GOVEEWMENTAL ACTIVITY THE CA]!TAIi 
 
 PROJECT A NATIONAL UNDERTAKING. 1865-1896. 
 
 CHAPTEE XV. 
 
 THE REORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN 
 CANAL PROJECT. 
 
 THE era of good feeling which prevailed 
 throughout the land during President 
 Monroe's incumbency, was the outcome of 
 our national spirit and . enthusiasm, and for one brief 
 moment the " general will " of the people found ex- 
 pression in the action of the executive. ^ ^^^ 
 Havinfj neither sectional nor class inter- Monroe 
 ests immediately before our eyes, our „ ^ '^*"'*! 
 national vision was clear and we faith- After the 
 f-ully described the future as it appeared 'W'ar. 
 
 to us. No pressing necessity constrained us to 
 adopt the Monroe doctrine as a policy, however, for 
 plenty of waste land lay directly before us to the 
 west, and at that time we could not well conceive 
 of future exigencies urging us to demand the whole 
 American continent for our own uses. It was a doc- 
 
 297 
 
298 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 trine, nothing more, and its formulation was simply 
 an expression of our national faith. 
 
 Individuals of the same sect, holding fast to one 
 creed, are very apt to quarrel among themselves as 
 to the proper interpretation of their dogma and as 
 to its application to particulars ; — and so it vras with 
 us as a nation. The diversity of our natural en- 
 vironment was sure to divide us into at least two 
 factions imbued with diametrically opposite instincts. 
 Commerce, manufacture, and the small farm were the 
 evolutionary .products of the North ; plantations, 
 exportation, and negro slavery were the economic 
 necessities of the South ; — and yet, as a nation, ^ve 
 were bound to advance toward the west. 
 
 The more immediate question of slavery soon 
 came to form the nominal issue between the two 
 contending parties, and it was after all the sectional 
 antagonism between our free States and our slave 
 States, rather than our national rivalry with Great 
 Britain, that goaded us on to the Pacific. Even 
 after we had reached the coast our interests were 
 still divided, as we turned our attention to the 
 isthmus farther south. The Northerners were now 
 capitalists, and the transit project appealed to them 
 primarily as a source of revenue. To the Southern"- 
 ers, on- the other hand, interoceanic communication 
 was a means to quite a different end. It was 
 primarily the ambition of the South to extend the 
 area of slavery; and this required the addition of 
 immense stretches of territory toward the southwest. 
 Interoceanic transit facilities were indeed essential 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 299 
 
 in order to bind these newly acquired possessions 
 with the centres of slavery about the Gulf ; but the 
 land of the isthmus was also important of itself, as 
 a new centre of the Southern system. 
 
 During all these years we continued to uphold 
 the Monroe doctrine, ostensibly at least, as a nation ; 
 but in reality each faction was interpreting it to 
 Buit its own immediate needs, and supporting it in 
 its own behalf. But Great Britain, on the contrarj', 
 had long since passed through the adolescent stage 
 when internal politics were allowed to interfere with 
 the consistency of her foreign policy. Thus the 
 contest over the canal i-oute was hardly fair, be- 
 tween nations of such unequal age and experience ; 
 but we had, of our own volition, somewhat brusque- 
 ly asserted our majority, and were supposed to 
 know how to take care of ourselves. Besides, there 
 is as yet no tribunal in international law which 
 looks after the interests of diplomatic minors, in 
 order to prevent any injury accruing to them from 
 damaging contracts entered into during their youth. 
 Thus, whatever may have been our excuse, the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty, with all its damaging reser- 
 vations and estoppels, still held good. 
 
 The Civil war then followed, marking a period in 
 our national career, and giving still a different turn 
 to the Monroe doctrine. The nation was supposed 
 to be united after this, and as a result, our foreign 
 policy had to be readjusted to the status quo of 1823. 
 But force had been used to bring about the new 
 unity, and such methods were hardly calculated to re- 
 
300 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 establisli an " era of good feeling." The Northern Re- 
 publicans were left in complete control, at all events, 
 and they were now determined to bring all sections 
 of the country under their modern industrial regime. 
 As individuals they were to undertake the develop- 
 ment of the young West, and the reconstruction of 
 the old South. In their governmental capacity they 
 represented the nation as a whole, and they were 
 bound accordingly to make its influence felt in the 
 diplomatic world. 
 
 California was now a duly constituted State of the 
 reorganized Union ; but its inhabitants were still 
 cut off from the industrial life of the East by ranges, 
 of mountains and miles of uninhabited prairie. The 
 Union itself was none too firmly established as yet, 
 and it was, therefore, an imperative political 
 necessity for the Republicans that some permanent 
 system of transit be established between our eastern 
 and western seaboards. 
 
 A more thorough knowledge of the topography- 
 of the Rocky Mountain range had, however, by this- 
 time demonstrated the possibility of transcontinental 
 railway lines, and it was, therefore, with this more 
 immediate solution of the transit problem that Con- 
 gress concerned itself directly after the war. But 
 the North had become a commercial power as well, 
 and the shipping and coasting trade of the country 
 demanded a water-way to the West. The problem 
 was, indeed, not so pressing as before, but still the 
 demands of the near future were not to be lost sight 
 of, and it was, therefore, incumbent on the Republi- 
 cans to formulate a new canal policy. 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 301 
 
 Private capitalists of Europe and America had 
 tlius far succeeded in establishing some temporary 
 transit facilities and a railway across the isthmus ; 
 but then, in all their varied endeavors, they had 
 only secured, the political and diplomatic aid of their 
 respective governments. Something more substan- 
 tial than this was now necessary, but it was still a 
 question how far governmental agencies should com- 
 mit themselves in the matter. The conception of the 
 discus, and the idea of acquiring social profit from 
 rational public expenditure had not yet become 
 developed in the people's mind, and thus the period 
 we are about to describe must be designated as one 
 of transition, from the pui'e individualism of the 
 past toward the socialistic ideas that are now begin- 
 ning to prevail in the transit question. The United 
 States government has accordingly contented itself 
 up to the present with instituting surveys on its 
 own account and in planning to lend its credit to 
 some few, instead of to all its citizens. We have 
 thus to deal with a period of governmental aid for 
 private profit — a precursor, perhaps, of a coming era 
 of governmental control for national profit. 
 
 Before any further steps could be taken in the 
 matter of isthmus transit, the Republican govern- 
 ment at Washington had first to re-estab- „ ^^^ q^^ 
 lish those ancient bonds of friendship Rapproche- 
 between the United States and Span- "jentwith 
 ish- America which the Democrats, with of the 
 their semi-ofiicial filibustering expeditions isthmus. 
 had so effectually destroyed. A rapprochement 
 was no longer difficult, as the abolition of slavery in 
 
302 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the United States had practically removed the only 
 source of permaoent discord between the two Amer- 
 icas. Great Britain, too, was still holding aloof 
 from isthmian politics, and the French were ab- 
 sorbed, just at this time, with the exigencies of their 
 Empire at home. Mexico had been freed from for- 
 eign domination by the threatening attitude of the 
 United States, and all Spanish-America to the south 
 was again open to conviction on the Pan-American 
 idea. The Conservatives also had lost their hold 
 on the isthmus and the Liberals were everywhere 
 coming into power, with high hopes now of estab- 
 lishing a permanent union of the Central American 
 states as well. 
 
 Thus everything favored the American cause on 
 the isthmus, and Secretary of State Seward resolved 
 to make the most of the opportunities thus afforded 
 of reasserting our ancient prestige. "Everybody 
 wishes the Spanish-American states well," he wrote 
 to Mr. Dickinson, our minister in Central America, 
 "and yet everyone loses patience with them for 
 not being wiser, more constant, and more stable." 
 But, he continued, the United States still desire to 
 deal with them "g'ustly and fairly and in the most 
 friendly spirit," looking only to their " welfare and 
 prosperity." To these friendly overtures the Liberal 
 governments responded most heartily, and thus 
 assured, Mr. Seward proceeded to elaborate his plans 
 more in detail. 
 
 In the meantime the project of constructing an 
 interoceanic railroad line across Honduras had been 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 303 
 
 revived. Further surveys were then being insti- 
 tuted along the route, and Honduras had already 
 granted a concession for the work to the § m. The 
 British Honduras Tnteroceanic Railway United 
 Company.^ English capital was evidently gotiate a 
 behind the scheme, but no international Treaty with 
 question seemed likely to arise, as the Honduras, 
 matter was no longer of such serious political im- 
 portance. 
 
 Still Seward deemed the project well worthy of 
 his government's attention, and he proceeded at once 
 to enquire into the afEair. Squier's treaty with Hon- 
 duras had long since been disavowed, as we know, 
 and thus the United States possessed no rights of 
 transit through the country, so Seward was obliged 
 to act at once in order to make good this omission of 
 the past. The Liberals, just then coming into power 
 again, responded very cordially to these fresh over- 
 tures from their old-time ally of the North ; and on 
 July 4, 1864, a treaty was concluded between the 
 two powers, granting to the United States their de- 
 sired right of way through Honduras territory. In 
 return for this favor our government then undertook 
 to guarantee "positively and efficaciously "the neu- 
 trality of the route, and also Honduras's right of 
 sovereignty over the railway line as laid out, promis- 
 
 ' This plan seems to have originated with Captain Bedford Pim, of the 
 British Navy, who had been sent out by his government in i860 to protect 
 British interests on the isthmus from the attacks of American filibusters. 
 Pirn's forces co-operated with Honduras in apprehending Wallcer on his 
 last raid, and this paved the way to a friendly entente on the railway 
 question. « 
 
304 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 ing further " to protect the same from interruption^ 
 seizure, or unjust confiscation." 
 
 But Seward could not rest content with such gen- 
 eral treaty stipulations, securing for his government 
 only negative rights and assuring it no political 
 control. He desired, if possible, to revive all the 
 rights that Squier had been able to obtain, and again 
 secure the island of Tigre in the Gulf of Fonseca, 
 for a United States naval station. This might in- 
 volve some difficulties with Great Britain, however, 
 so Seward first wrote to Mr. Adams, our minister in 
 London, instructing him to " sound Lord Clarendon 
 as to the disposition of his government to favor us 
 in acquiring coaling stations in Central America, not- 
 withstanding the stipulation contained in the Clay- 
 ton-Bulwer treaty." 
 
 Adams's soundings soon convinced him that by 
 pursuing Seward's course we would shortly be upon 
 the rocks of another diplomatic controversy with 
 Great Britain, so he warned Mr. Seward that there 
 Avas " the possibility that the terms of the Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty might interpose difficulties in the way 
 of securing the most convenient point that we might 
 desire." Mr. Seward took the hint and deemed it 
 wiser to change his course.^ 
 
 In .Nicaragua also there were a number of ante- 
 bellum tangles to be straightened out before the 
 
 ' Sullivan, loc. cit., p. 79. 
 
 RodrigTies, he. cit., p. 33. 
 
 " Foreign Relations of the United States," 1868. Govt. Print. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47tli Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 155-157. 
 
 Captain Bedford Pim, " The Gate of the Pacific." London, 1863. 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 305 
 
 Kepublicans could lay the warp of their new canal 
 policy. The Emperor Napoleon had been forced 
 to abandon his projects in America, it is § nz. The 
 true, but during their short sojourn in Nic- Dickinson- 
 aragua his agents had at least succeeded Treaty v^th 
 in playing ducks and drakes with the Nicaragua, 
 rights of the American Canal Company. 
 
 Between Belly's rather ignominious exit and the 
 appearance of M. Chevalier, the Emperor's lieuten- 
 ant, the Central American Transit Company, it will 
 be remembered, became the lawful successor to the 
 rights and privileges of the unfortunate Accessory 
 Transit Company, Having gained this preliminary 
 advantage, the American promoters then opened ne- 
 gotiations with the Nicaraguan authorities, as we 
 have seen, for the renewal, in their name, of the 
 original concession to the defunct American Atlantic 
 and Pacific Ship Canal Company. A contract to 
 this effect was apparently signed, and at least in- 
 formally ratified by both parties in 1863 ; but some 
 trouble arose soon after, and Nicaragua again accused 
 the Americans of bad faith. 
 
 In the meantime, however, the Transit Company 
 had induced their government at Washington to 
 appoint a hydrographic expert. Captain P. C. F. 
 West, of the United States Coast Survey, to institute 
 a survey of the river and port of the San Juan, with 
 a view to rendering the stream navigable for light- 
 draught vessels, and the roadstead accessible for ocean 
 steamers. But by the time the work was completed 
 and the report handed in, the French had again inter- 
 
306 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 vened, this time in the person of the Emperor's 
 lieutenant, M. Chevalier, and secured monopoly- 
 rights in Nicaragua. This put an end to the practi- 
 cal operations of the Transit Company, but, being of 
 so passing a nature, the French occupation did not 
 seriously affect the more general question. After 
 the French had withdrawn the National Academy 
 of Sciences took the matter up, and appointed a 
 committee' to inquire into the causes that had led 
 to the deterioration of the harbor of the San Juan, 
 and to suggest plans for its improvement ; and this 
 induced Se\vard to institute fresh efforts toward re- 
 establishing cordial relations with Nicaragua in order 
 that American rights of transit might not suffer in 
 the future from foreign interference. 
 
 No further action had to be taken against the 
 French in Nicarasrua, but Mr. Andrew B. Dickin- 
 son, whom Lincoln had despatched to Central 
 America some time before, as we will remember, in 
 the conviction that everything had already been 
 satisfactorily provided for, soon saw that fresh 
 trouble was brewing along the Mosquito shore. 
 Upon the conclusion of the treaty of Managua, the 
 autonomous Mosquito reserve came naturally enough 
 under the control of a band of Jamaica negroes 
 and half-breed Mosquito Indians, calling themselves 
 British subjects, who at once established English, 
 laws in the land. The English settlers on the shore 
 
 ' This committee was composed of the following gentlemen : General A. 
 A. Humphreys, U. S. A. ; Rear Admiral C. H. Davis, U. S. N. ; and J. 
 E. Hilgard, Acting Superintendent of the U. S. Coast Survey. 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 307 
 
 supported the new regime and really directed its 
 policy. The Americans, on the contrary, ranged 
 themselves in opposition to the local government 
 of the reserve, and openly supported the Nicaraguan 
 authorities in their protests. Thus encouraged, the 
 Nicaraguan government refused to pay its subven- 
 tion to the Mosquito Indians, and also began to 
 interfere arbitrarily in the internal affairs of the 
 reserve. The British agents thereupon protested, 
 and reported the affair to the Home government. 
 
 Before acting officially in the matter, Dickinson 
 sought advice from Secretary Seward, and, after re- 
 ceiving documentary proof of his policy, he informed 
 the Nicaraguan authorities that the United States 
 government was cordially disposed toward their 
 claim of sovereignty over the Mosquitos, and would 
 support them in their present protest to Great 
 Britain. The reinstated Liberals of Nicaragua re- 
 ceived these assurances with delight, and promised 
 Mr. Dickinson that they would gladly revive the 
 old transit rights in favor of American citizens. 
 
 Mr. Dickinson had been sent out originally to 
 negotiate a new treaty with Nicaragua, and now the 
 opportunity was at last afforded of securing the 
 terms that Lincoln had hoped for. Nicaragua's 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs," Sefior Ayon, signified 
 his willingness to negotiate, and in June, 1868, a 
 treaty was finally concluded and ratified by both 
 parties.* This convention was very similar in its 
 provisions to the Squier and Cass-Yrisarri treaties, 
 
 ' For full text of important provisions of this treaty vid. Appendix C. 
 
308 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 both of wbicli had remained unratified. Mindful of 
 the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, however, 
 the United States took care in this convention not 
 to assume any exclusive control over the canal, but 
 still undertook, as before, to guarantee the neutrality 
 of the route. In return, Nicaragua once more 
 granted us a right of way across her territory ; but 
 this aojain was no exclusive right, for from all such 
 monopoly privileges we were now debarred by our 
 liberal promises to Great Britain. Thus the Dickin- 
 son- Ayon treaty was but a general arrangement after 
 all, and was intended to serve as a bond of friendly 
 union with Nicaragua, rather than a guaranty of 
 American dominion along the canal route. It has 
 never been deemed adequate to our needs, but for 
 one reason and another, as we shall see, it has never 
 been superseded by any more exclusive engagement, 
 and so it remains to this day.' 
 
 Our diplomatic and political relations with the 
 states of the lower isthmus were in equally bad 
 
 shape. In soliciting the co-operation of 
 Cushing Grreat Britain and France for a Joint guar- 
 Convention anty of the Panama route, Seward had 
 Colombia dade the best of an unfortunate situation, 
 
 but he felt he had certainly established an 
 awkward precedent. With the success of the Union 
 cause, the whole diplomatic situation had changed in 
 favor of the United States, and Seward now recog- 
 
 ' Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. S., 1868, Pt. II., p. 643. 
 Engineering Magazine, loc. cit., March 3, 1893. 
 De Kalb, loc, cit. 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 309 
 
 nized the necessity of reasserting our original policy 
 of exclusive control over this section of the isthmus. 
 
 The Liberal government was no sooner established 
 in the new confederacy of Colombia than it became 
 involved in a dispute with Spain. Spain was then 
 at war with Chile and Peru, and Colombia of course 
 sided with her Spanish-American neighbors. The 
 Spanish military authorities then attempted to force 
 materials of war across Panama in transitu to the 
 South Pacific, and Colombia again called upon the 
 United States to maintain the neutrality of the isth- 
 mus. This was a test case in international law and 
 involved the strict interpretation of our treaty of 
 1848. Appreciating the nicety of the legal points 
 involved, Secretary Seward referred the matter to 
 the Attorney-General for decision, and he decided 
 that the United States had the right under the treaty 
 to intervene, if the State Department should at any 
 time consider intervention necessary to maintain the 
 neutrality of the isthmus. The actual necessity did 
 not materialize at this time, but the judicial decision 
 alone Avent far to strengthen our case under the Mon- 
 roe doctrine, and bound the Liberals of Colombia still 
 more closely to the American cause. 
 
 But the treaty of 1848 was far too general in its 
 terms, and Seward was now the more determined to 
 emphasize American rights of transit and control 
 more in detail, and thus avoid all future question on 
 the subject. So important did he deem the matter 
 to be, that he prevailed upon Caleb Gushing, the 
 proved diplomatist of that day, to proceed to 
 
310 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Bogota in 1868 and open negotiations for a new 
 treaty. 
 
 Mr. Cusliing's Chinese experience must liave pre- 
 pared him for the condition of affairs he found upon 
 his arrival, for he really conducted matters admirably 
 in the midst of such political confusion as only 
 Spanish-America seems capable of enduring. Dur- 
 the previous year, 1867, Mosquera, the Liberal leader, 
 had again attempted to establish himself as Dictator, 
 but even his own party refused to support this last 
 coup d'etat. This precipitated a Conservative revolu- 
 tion which was in progress when Cushing arrived. 
 He did not press his point at once, therefore, but 
 took time to impress both parties with the views of 
 his government. For a moment the Conservatives 
 gained the upper hand, and, having banished Mos- 
 quera, they elected a new President of their own. 
 But the Liberals were still in the majority, and 
 Cushing saw that they were soon to regain control. 
 This occurred before the year had elapsed, and with 
 the Liberal government once more installed, without 
 the firebrand Mosquera at its head, it was at last 
 possible for Cushing to carry out his plans. 
 
 Thus, on January 14, 1869, a treaty was concluded 
 which, if ratified, would amply have secured our 
 rights on the lower isthmus. According to its terms 
 the United States were to have the sole right of con- 
 structing a canal within the territory of Colombia, 
 and for this purpose the Colombian government was 
 to reserve a strip of land across the isthmus for the 
 canal route itself, and ten miles on either side. The 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 311 
 
 land thus appropriated was to be divided into an 
 equal number of lots, half of which were to remain 
 with Colombia, and the other half to be conveyed 
 to the United States. The canal being constructed 
 by the United States, its government and control 
 \vere also to remain in their hands, and for this 
 purpose they were to be allowed to employ their 
 military forces if the occasion should arise. Co- 
 lombia, it is true, was still to retain the "political 
 sovereignty and jurisdiction over the canal and ter- 
 ritory appertaining thereto," but only with the pro- 
 viso that she should " not only allow but guarantee to 
 the United States of America the peaceable enjoy- 
 ment, control, direction, and management of the 
 same " ; and in conclusion it was declared that " the 
 political obligations herein assumed by the United 
 :States of America and the United States of Colombia 
 are permanent and indefeasible." 
 
 This convention in itself was a complete vindica- 
 tion of Seward's previous policy toward the states 
 of the lower isthmus, and must have acted as an 
 effectual bar toward the running of that dangerous 
 international precedent he had established during 
 the war. But internal dissension in our own coun- 
 try again put a quietus on our claims. It was this 
 time the Republicans who were quarrelling among 
 themselves; their Congress had already tried and 
 practically convicted their own President for high 
 crimes and misdemeanors, and an agreement between 
 the executive and the legislature was now out of the 
 •question. More as a matter of form than anything 
 
312 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 else, Johnson turned the Gushing treaty over to the 
 Senate for ratification on February 15, 1869, but 
 that body found it "inadequate," and thus Seward's 
 best efforts were sacrifled to party exigencies.' 
 
 While Seward was thus engaged in establishing 
 
 better diplomatic relations with the several states of 
 
 the isthmus, practical interest in the canal 
 
 ^"i" '. , proiect was again being aroused in the 
 
 miral Davis s ^ . ° ° . . 
 
 Report on United States through the activity of one 
 the Canal ^f q^j. young uaval officers. As early as 
 1857, Admiral Daniel Ammen, then a 
 young lieutenant, had interested himself in the re- 
 port of Strain's survey along the Caledonian route,, 
 and begged Secretary of the Navy Toucey for the 
 necessary funds and authority to continue the still 
 imperfect surveys of the lower isthmus. It was 
 Ammen's wise axiom, that " the bed of a stream or 
 river furnishes the line of lowest levels in the basin 
 drained," and as Strain was said to have distinctly 
 heard the evening gun of the Cyane lying off the 
 Atlantic shore, after he had crossed the divide and 
 was well down on the Pacific side, Ammen felt con- 
 vinced that there must be some low level in this 
 region which had thus far been overlooked. 
 
 Instead of being commissioned to continue the 
 explorations, Ammen was ordered off to the Pacific. 
 On returning from this cruise his vessel, the Merri- 
 rriac, was stationed for a time in the Bay of Panama,, 
 
 ' Rodrigues, loc. cit., pp. 34-36, 184-186. 
 
 E. J. Payne, loc. cit., " History o£ European Colonies," Ch. XVI. 
 " Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography," Vol, II., p. 38. 
 U. S. Ex. Doc, 112, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 313 
 
 and Ammen then asked leave of his commander to 
 conduct a volunteer expedition into the interior on 
 his own account. But permission was again refused 
 him, so Ammen returned, practically no wiser than 
 before, but with his theory as to the proper method 
 of conducting further investigations very well 
 worked out in his mind. He then read a paper on 
 the subject before the New York Geographical So- 
 ciety, which immediately awakened interest in his 
 plans. 
 
 During the period of the war which followed 
 Ammen's attention was greatly absorbed in his 
 duties as a naval commander, but not entirely to 
 the exclusion of his canal projects. It was at this 
 time that he aroused General Grant's interest in the 
 matter, and it was Gi-ant in turn who finally con- 
 vinced Secretary Seward of the paramount impor- 
 tance of securing a new treaty with Colombia, in 
 order to be sure of our advantage if Ammen's the- 
 ory of a low level across the lower isthmus should 
 after all prove correct. 
 
 Nor did Grant's activity stop there, for it was at 
 his request that Senator Conness of California in- 
 troduced a bill into Congress at this time calling 
 upon the Secretary of the Navy to furnish a report 
 of all the surveys thus far conducted on the isthmus, 
 and to give his opinion as to the relative practica- 
 bility of the several routes. The resolutions were 
 passed, and, under instructions from the Navy De- 
 partment, Rear Admiral C. H. Davis undertook to 
 look the matter up. His report was, indeed, far 
 
314 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 from encouraging. In regard to the lower isthmus, 
 Davis declared that this region had not, as yet, been 
 satisfactorily explored, and as for the more general 
 question of interoceanic communication, he asserted 
 "that there did not exist in the libraries of the 
 world the means of determining, even approxi- 
 mately, the most practicable route for a ship-canal 
 across the isthmus." ' 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs when Grant was 
 made President in 1869 ; and a vigorous American 
 . canal policy now became the political 
 dent Grant's order of the day. Grant had no doubts 
 Canal as to the technical feasibility of the project 
 
 ° "^^" and was only fearful lest the United 
 States should be forestalled in the matter by Europe. 
 "If it is not accomplished by America," he said, 
 "it will undoubte(ily be accomplished by some of 
 our rivals in power and influence," and " I regard it 
 as of vast political importance to this country that 
 no European government should hold such a work." 
 Thus impressed with the immediate necessity of 
 the case, Grant then decided upon a definite course 
 of action regarding the transit question, and subse- 
 quently laid his policy before the people with the 
 following recommendation : 
 
 " In accordance with the early and later policy of the gov- 
 ernment, in obedience to the often-expressed will of the 
 
 ' " Report on Interoceanic Canals and Railroads," Rear-Admiral Charles 
 H. Davis, Supt. of Naval Observatory. Govt. Print, 1869. 
 Sullivan, loc. cit.^ p. 30. 
 Rodrigues, loc. cit.,^^. 11-36. 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 315 
 
 American people, with a due regard to our national dignity 
 and power, with a watchful care for the safety and prosperity 
 of our interests and industries on this continent, and with a 
 determination to guard against even the first approach of rival 
 powers, whether friendly or hostile, on these shores, I com- 
 mend an American canal, on American soil, to the American 
 people." 
 
 But mucli still remained to be done before any 
 such American canal policy could be carried out in 
 detail, and Grant was also fully alive to the more 
 practical exigencies of the occasion. Our diplomatic 
 relations with the uncertain isthmian republics were 
 still in an unsatisfactory condition, and then, in view 
 of the final location of a canal route, the isthmus 
 itself had still to be regarded as an undiscovered 
 country. There were political and technical pre- 
 liminaries to be arranged, therefore, before anything 
 definite could be decided upon, and the President 
 accordingly at once took steps to provide for their 
 execution.' 
 
 Admiral Davis's report together with Admiral 
 Ammen's theory in the matter left the impression 
 that further surveys along the partially § ne. The 
 explored lower isthmus would result in Huribut 
 the location of a favorable canal route in "^^^^ 
 
 this region, despite the statements of Strain, Colombia. 
 Craven, and Flachat to the contrary. It thus seemed 
 to Grant doubly important to secure political control 
 of the country in question. Seward had responded 
 
 1 General Grant to Admiral Davis, July 7, 1S66. 
 
 Sullivan, loc. cit., p. 29. 
 
 North American Review^ February, 1881. 
 
316 The Nicaragua Canal, 
 
 very readily to Grant's previous suggestions in re- 
 gard to securing a more favorable treaty with 
 Colombia, and, as we know, tte Gushing convention 
 was the immediate result. But while the negotia- 
 tions were still pending, the personal relations be- 
 tween the two became strained, owing to the action 
 taken by President Johnson in military matters ; and, 
 to quote the words of Lieutenant Sullivan, " the 
 subsequent indifference shown by Mr. Seward, the 
 Secretary of State, caused General Grant to refrain 
 from having anything more to say to him in relation 
 to further examinations of the isthmus." 
 
 But Grant's course had since been vindicated by 
 his party, and one of his first acts as President was 
 to call upon his old military companion and trusted 
 friend, General Stephen A. Hurlbut, to continue the 
 diplomatic relations with Colombia which Gushing 
 had been obliged to abandon. General Hurlbut 
 accepted the post of resident minister in Bogota, and 
 began at once to arrange with the Liberal govern- 
 ment for the prosecution of further surveys on the 
 lower isthmus, and for the re-enactment of the un- 
 ratified Gushing convention. 
 
 All went well at first, and on January 26, 1870, 
 General Hurlbut signed a treaty with the Colombian 
 authorities, which revived in favor of the United 
 States nearly all the rights which Gushing had pre- 
 viously secured. That is, the United States again 
 secured the exclusive right of constructing and 
 operating a canal within the confines of Colombia; 
 but in regard to the right of military intervention 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 317 
 
 on their part, and in the matter of an exclusive 
 guaranty of the route, the Colombian plenipoten- 
 tiaries were not so generously disposed as before. 
 Conservative influences had a^ain become a factor 
 in the problem, and these all tended toward an 
 international system of control. 
 
 Neither Grant nor his Secretary of State, Mr. 
 Hamilton Fish, were thoroughly satisfied with the 
 political provisions of the Hurlbut treaty, but sub- 
 mitted it to the Senate, nevertheless, for amendment 
 or ratification. But the Conservatives in the Colom- 
 bian legislature, on the contrary, thought the treaty 
 granted too much to the United States, and insisted 
 on amending it in such a way as to make it provide, 
 in so many words, for a joint protectorate of the 
 powers. Mr. Fish took strong ground on this mat- 
 ter, and informed the Colombian government that 
 " in the present state of international law, such a 
 joint protectorate would be the source of future 
 trouble, and might probably prove an obstacle to 
 the ratification by the United States Senate of a 
 treaty on the subject." 
 
 But this threat had no effect upon the Colombian 
 government. The Clerical minority had confidence 
 in the enthusiasm of the French, and thus refused to 
 ■commit themselves in advance to the still uncertain 
 American cause. Mr. Fish was right ; the United 
 States Senate refused to ratify the treaty as amended, 
 and, as the Colombians could not be coerced into 
 our way of thinking, the Hurlbut convention also 
 remained unratified, and the diplomatic relations be- 
 
318 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 tween the two countries still continued to be regu- 
 ulated by the unsatisfactory, and altogether too 
 general, basis of 1848.' 
 
 In the meantime Grant was busily engaged in 
 providing for the technical preliminaries of the 
 8 jj_ work. In this matter of locating the canal 
 
 Grant's route the President had complete confl- 
 
 Provision (jgjjgg [-^ Admiral Ammen, and was par- 
 lor Surveys , , i i i 
 Along the ticularly anxious that he should now be 
 
 Isthmus and afforded ample opportunity for carrying 
 tee of *^^* ^^^ plans of investigation. To this 
 
 Enquiry, end Ammen was recalled from the Asiatic 
 station by the ]S^a^'y Department, and appointed 
 Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, that he might in 
 this capacity organize and direct the surveying 
 expeditions that Grant had in view. 
 
 But Congress had first to provide the necessary 
 authority and appropriations, before the work could 
 be begun. At Grant's instigation Senator Conness 
 again took the matter in hand, and in the spring of 
 1869, succeeded in having a resolution passed by 
 Congress providing for the necessary explorations 
 on the isthmus by officers of the United States 
 Navy. Admiral Ammen was then put in charge of 
 the operations and directed by the Secretary of the 
 Navy "to give special attention to the selection of 
 the most efficient officers for this work ; to look 
 closely to the proper supply of articles of sub- 
 sistence, and for the best instruments found by 
 
 ' Rodrigues, loc. cit., pp. 36 and 186. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 157-162. 
 
Reorganization of American Project. 319 
 
 experience to be suitable ; to formulate orders for 
 his examination and approval; to examine closely 
 tlie results of surveys ; and to supply whatever defi- 
 ciencies might be found to exist for the full investi- 
 gation and determination of this question." 
 
 Under a further resolution of Congress, the Presi- 
 dent, on March 13, 1872, also appointed an In- 
 teroceanic Canal Commission, consisting of the 
 Chief Engineer of the Army, General A. A. Hum- 
 phreys, the Superintendent of the Coast Survey, 
 C. P. Patterson, and Admiral Ammen, as Chief of 
 the Bureau of Navigation. This board was in- 
 structed to study the results of the several exploring 
 parties, and also to gain all available knowledge 
 regarding the question of interoceanic communication 
 from other reliable sources. 
 
 The diplomatic efforts of our State Department 
 had thus far met with but indifferent success, owing 
 to the lack of proper methods in dealing with the 
 Spanish American republics ; but the Navy Depart- 
 ment had only natural obstacles to contend with, 
 and its duties, as we shall see, were both thoroughly 
 and admirably performed.' 
 
 ' Sullivan, loc. cit., pp. 29^. 
 
 Rodrigues, loc. cit., pp. 11-36. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 15, 46th Cong., ist Sess. ^ 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SURVEYS. 
 
 THE surveying parties organized by the 
 Bureau of Navigation and now sent do^^^l 
 to the isthmus under the auspices of the 
 United States government, were detailed solely 
 for the purpose of acquiring exact and scientific in- 
 o Jig -pjie formation concerning the several canal 
 Darien Ex- routcs. There was no scheme or conces- 
 peditions. ^^^^ behind the movement with which the 
 final reports of the surs^eyors had to be made to co- 
 incide in order to assure the success of any precon- 
 ceived project. In short, the private profit of 
 promoters was for the time at least shut out, and for 
 once the public interest of the American people 
 alone considered. 
 
 Admiral Ammen's plan of following up the river 
 valleys in order to come upon the lowest level on 
 the di^Tide, was adopted now as the fundamental 
 principle of all the expeditions. An admirable com- 
 missary department was then organized in advance, 
 to mitigate as far as possible the danger and discom- 
 forts necessarily attendant upon the sur^^eys along 
 the lower isthmus. Each exploring party was pro- 
 
 320 
 
United States Government Surveys. 321 
 
 A^ded vdth instruments of precision, and naval disci- 
 pline was ordered all along tlie line. 
 
 Tlie Darien expedition was the first to start in 
 1870, in charge of Commander T. O. Selfridge, with 
 orders to examine the San Blas-Chej)o regions and 
 all contiguous territory lying south and east. 
 
 Operations were begun on the Atlantic side at 
 Caledonian Bay, to determine at the outset if Ad- 
 miral Ammen's theory of a low level in The caiedon- 
 this divide was after all correct. Selfridge '^" ^°""'- 
 found no depression in the range lower than one 
 thousand feet, — precisely as Strain had previously 
 reported. Lockage was furthermore discovered to 
 be out of the question on account of the lack of an 
 adequate water supply ; so Selfridge was forced to 
 conclude that a canal along the Caledonian route 
 was impracticable unless a tunnel of from eight to 
 eleven miles in length be driven through the moun- 
 tains. The exigencies of isthmus transit could 
 scarcely call for the execution of such a stupendous 
 undertaking, and so Selfridge felt justified in report- 
 ing to his chief that he had finally " pricked the 
 bubble of Dr. CuUen's Darien route." 
 
 The expedition then retraced its steps along the 
 isthmus to the Gulf of San Bias. In 1864, it will 
 be remembered, Mr. Kelly's engineers had Thesan 
 proceeded from Chepo on the Pacific, across ^'^^ Route, 
 the di^dde to within a few miles of this point, when 
 they were turned back by the hostile natives. Ac- 
 cording to their report, a canal could be constructed 
 a,long the San Bias route, provided a tunnel seven 
 
322 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 miles long be cut througli the range. It was no-w^ 
 Selfridge's plan to fill in tlie gap in tliese surveys 
 from the Atlantic side. But the results were again 
 disappointing, for the reconnaissance of the eastern 
 divide only added another three miles to the tunnel, 
 and even then Selfridge deemed the route scarcely 
 practicable, except perhaps as a last resort, in case 
 no more favorable location could be found. 
 
 In the following year Selfridge divided his forces 
 and arranged for a systematic survey of the Atrato 
 TheAtrato Toutes, leavlug Captain E. P. Lull in 
 Routes. charge of the Atlantic division, while he 
 himself crossed over to the Pacific side. 
 
 The Atrato-Tuyra route had been guessed at in a 
 variety of ways by the French, as we have learned, 
 but nothing was really knoAvn of the interior. Lull 
 was therefore ordered to work his way up the Ca- 
 carica from the Rio Atrato to the divide, while 
 Selfridge proceeded from the Gulf San Miguel along- 
 the Tuyra to meet him on the summit. Each party 
 made a favorable report upon the harbors they left, 
 behind them on the shore, but when they reached 
 the range they found the topographical reality quite 
 at variance with the previous surmises. Lull dis- 
 covered that the main divide had nowhere an 
 elevation of less than eight hundred feet in the 
 neighborhood of the sources of the stream ; and Self- 
 ridge on his side was met by a perfect network of 
 hills along the Pacific, rising everywhere from two 
 hundred to four hundred feet, before he even came 
 to the main range. A canal along this route would 
 
United States Government Surveys. 323 
 
 require actual excavation for a distance of fifty-iive 
 miles, and Selfridge estimated its lowest cost at 
 1250,000,000. Thus Lacliarme's fanciful project 
 went by the board, and there only remained de 
 Puydt's figures to be verified. But the wonderful 
 pass he had described was found to be 688 instead 
 of 150 feet in height, and consequently the whole 
 region of the Tuyra had also to be abandoned as 
 impracticable. 
 
 While engaged in these surveys on the west, Sel- 
 fridge had further divided his forces and despatched 
 a third party to examine the valley of the Xapipi 
 farther south. The conditions were found to be 
 more favorable here, and on the basis of the report 
 handed in, Selfridge laid out a provisional canal 
 route to extend for twenty-eight miles from Chiri- 
 Chiri Bay on the Pacific, along the valley of the 
 Napipi to the Atrato ; and roughly estimated the 
 cost of construction at $61,000,000. 
 
 Having thus filled in all the gaps that Mr. Kelly 
 had left in the knowledge of the Darien canal routes, 
 Selfridge abandoned his labors in this disappointing 
 region and handed in his report. Through Ameri- 
 can enterprise the legends of the district that had 
 once held out such high hopes, were noAV replaced 
 by disagreeable facts, and only a bare possibility of 
 canal construction in this region remained. 
 
 The second governmental expedition was sent out 
 in the fall of 1870 in command of Captain E. ^Y. 
 Shufeldt, to determine whether a canal were pos- 
 sible across the isthmus of Tehuantepec. All sur- 
 
324 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 veys tlius far instituted in this region had been 
 
 mainly with a view toward railroad construction, 
 
 ^, but Shufeldt was con^dnced that a canal 
 
 8 '^9- The 
 
 Tehuante- could be built anywhere along the isth- 
 pec Expe- j^us if money enough were forthcoming, 
 and pro^dded that water could be foimd 
 on the summit. 
 
 Moro, we will remember, had laid out a canal 
 route across Tehuantepec in 1843, which was to run 
 through Tarifa pass, and be fed by two or more 
 small streams having their sources near the summit. 
 But Shufeldt found this plan to be impossible, as 
 the junction of the streams in question lay 180 
 feet below the level of the pass. He then began a 
 search for a more favorable depression in this 
 ^dcinit}', but soon found Tarifa and Chivela to be 
 the lowest of them all. As none of the streams of 
 this region was either high enough or large enough 
 to flood the canal, Shufeldt was obliged to devise a 
 system whereby the Rio Corte should be made to 
 act as a feeder to the canal by means of pumps and 
 a supplementary aqueduct. 
 
 Under these disadvantageous conditions a canal 
 route was then laid out, to begin at the head of 
 navigable waters of the Rio Coatzacoalcos and pro- 
 ceed along the valley of this stream to the summit 
 at Tarifa, and from this point down the western 
 slope, to the lagoons on the Pacific shore. The total 
 length of this canal was to be 144 miles. One 
 hundred and forty locks were found to be necessary 
 in order to cross the divide, and to make the waters 
 
United States Government Surveys. 325 
 
 of the Corte available, a feeder of 27 miles had to 
 l)e built. Shufeldt may thus have solved the diffi- 
 culty of an adequate water supply, but the matter 
 of expense practically eliminated the Tehuantepec 
 route henceforth from the range of comparative 
 feasibility for canal construction. 
 
 By this process of elimination, the Nicaraguan 
 routes came thus again to command attention. The 
 conditions were far better known here, 
 and Child's surveys had already demon- Nicaraguan 
 strated the feasibility of at least an advan- Expedi- 
 tageous lock canal across this section of 
 the isthmus. The first Nicaraguan expedition set 
 out in 1872 under the command of Commander 
 Crossman, but met Avith a sad misfortune at the 
 start. On landing, the ship's boat was capsized in 
 the surf and Crossman was drowned. 
 
 The command thus devolved upon the junior 
 officer of the expedition. Captain Chester Hatfield. 
 After the necessary reorganization had been effected, 
 Hatfield took his men across Nicaragua to the west- 
 em shores of the lake and there set about a system- 
 atic examination of the numerous passes in the 
 Coast range. Dr. Oersted's route along the Rio 
 Sapoa was first studied and found impracticable. 
 The line that Child's had mn from Lajas to Brito 
 was next examined, and again his conclusions were 
 verified. In order to shorten this route somewhat 
 and avoid the unsatisfactory valley of the Rio 
 Grande, Hatfield then tried a line from the Rio 
 Medio to the Pacific at Brito, but this was found to 
 
326 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 involve a longer cut tlirough tlie divide. Tlie recon- 
 naissance was then continued at two points farther 
 north along the range, but in neither case was a 
 more favorable depression to be found. The rainy 
 season set in at this juncture, and, on June 12, 1872, 
 Hatfield returned to his ship, leaving a party of 
 midshipmen behind to complete the hydrographic 
 survey of the lake. 
 
 Late in the autumn the surveys were resumed by 
 another expedition in command of Captain Lull, — 
 who, as we know, had by this time completed his 
 explorations on the lower isthmus, — ^dth Lieutenant 
 A. G. Menocal as his civil engineer. Taking up the 
 work ^vhere Hatfield had left ofE, Lull continued to 
 examine all the passes to the north of Brito between 
 Lake Nicaragua and the Pacific, but could find none 
 suitable for a canal route. The party then passed 
 on to Lake Managua to examine the route advocated 
 by Napoleon. The harbor facilities at Realejo they 
 found to be excellent, but the route as a whole they 
 could not recommend so strongly. Continued dredg- 
 ing Avould be required, in their opinion, to keep the 
 narrow channel open between the two lakes, and as 
 Lake Managua was now discovered to be 22|- feet 
 higher than Lake Nicaragua, locks would also have 
 to be provided. Lull thought the level of Lake 
 Managua to be still uncertain on account of volcanic 
 disturbances, and in the face of such a series of dis- 
 advantageous conditions, he therefore decided to 
 abandon the route as impracticable. 
 
 The line from La Virgen Bay to San Juan del 
 
United States Government Surveys. 327 
 
 Sur was next tried, but here the summit was found 
 to rise 605 feet above the Pacific, and so this route 
 "vvas likewise abandoned. 
 
 The Lajas and Medio routes, both terminating at 
 Brito on the Pacific, were thus the only ones left, 
 and Child's opinion, given so many years before, was 
 thus again substantiated. The Lajas summit ^sA'as 
 discovered to be 90 feet lower than that to be 
 crossed along the Medio route, but still in the 
 former case the waters of the Rio Grande had to 
 be diverted, and this went far to equalize the advan- 
 tages of the two. The Medio route was also discov- 
 ered to be 1^ miles shorter than the Lajas, and this 
 turned the scale in its favor for Lull and his party. 
 
 Having thus succeeded in locating what in their 
 opinion appeared to be the most favorable route 
 across the Coast range, the surveyors then turned 
 their attention to the middle and eastern sections of 
 the canal line. The lake had already been exam- 
 ined by the party of midshipmen detailed for the 
 purpose by Captain Hatfield, and it was now 
 demonstrated that the body of water stood at an 
 equal height, viz., 107.63 feet, above the mean tide 
 level of either sea. This Avas an important detail 
 and greatly simplified the question of lockage. It 
 was then found that, with a proper system of dams, 
 the Rio San Juan could easily be rendered naviga- 
 l»le from the lake down as far as the Castilla rapids, 
 or, indeed, the greater part of the way. Thus the 
 actual excavation required in the eastern section was 
 reduced to a minimum. 
 
328 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 The work was all thorouglily done on this Nicara- 
 guan expedition and nothing was taken for granted; 
 for the poor reports from Tehuantepec and the 
 lower isthmus had already convinced the authorities 
 at Washington of the relative importance of these 
 Nicaraguan routes, and they were determined to be 
 sure of their data. A feasible canal line had now 
 been run through the territory, and only the details 
 remained to be elaborated. 
 
 The reports of the surveys thus far undertaken on 
 the isthmus were then turned over to Grant's lately- 
 appointed Interoceanic Ganal Commission 
 piementary for examination. The results were not 
 Expedi- deemed as j-et sufficient, however, to jus- 
 tify a final decision, so a special committee 
 was then appointed at the request of the Commission,, 
 consisting of Major Walter McFarland and Captain 
 William H. Heuer of the United States Engineers, 
 and Professor Henry Mitchell of the United States 
 Coast SuiTi^ey, to make a further study of the Darien 
 and Nicaraguan routes and report thereon. Some 
 dissatisfaction had also been expressed at the dis- 
 paraging account Selfridge gave of Mr. Kelly's San 
 Bias project ; and, as the Panama route had not as 
 yet been thoroughly surveyed with the possibility 
 of canal construction in mind, it was thought best 
 to send out another expedition in order to clear up 
 these still doubtful points. Selfridge's provisional 
 canal line along the valley of the Napipi also seemed 
 to hold out some promise, so still a further party 
 
United States Government Surveys. 329 
 
 was organized to make a more thorougli survey in 
 this region. 
 
 Lull and Menocal were detailed for the San Bias 
 and Panama surveys, and after going over the entire 
 length of the San Bias route they fully confirmed 
 Selfridge in his opinion as to its impracticability. 
 After a detailed examination of the Panama route, 
 Lull and Menocal came to the conclusion that a 
 tide-level canal was here out of the question on 
 account of the uncertain flow of the Rio Chagres, 
 the rainfall at times causing the river to rise sud- 
 denly from 20 to 50 feet above its normal level. 
 They found a lock canal, however, to be quite 
 possible in this region. In their report, therefore, 
 they elaborated a plan for such a canal, estimating 
 its cost at about $95,000,000. 
 
 The Atrato-Napipi route tHimed out disappoint- 
 ing. Lieutenant Frederick Collins Avas put in 
 charge of this survey, and after a careful reconnais- 
 sance he was obliged to conclude that the canal 
 would have to extend for some 30 miles, involving 
 a tunnel of 3^ miles, and would cost 98 instead of 61 
 million dollars as Selfridge had previously estimated. 
 
 Thus as a result of all the surveys, only the 
 Nicaragua and Panama routes really remained to be 
 considered, and according to the best American 
 opinion there was to be no distinction between the 
 two in the matter of locks.' 
 
 ' A detailed account of these United States governmental surveys is to be 
 found in Lieutenant Sullivan's Report, loc. cit. 
 
330 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Toward the end of 1875, all the reports of the 
 various surveys, examinations, and enquiries were 
 
 completed and handed in, and it only re- 
 FinaTRe-^ maiued for the Commission to weigh all 
 port of the the evidence and decide upon the most 
 Commis- favorable route. The Commission then 
 
 ^yent carefully over the entire question of 
 interoceanic transit from the earliest consideration 
 of the problem down to these latest governmental 
 surveys, and on February 7, 1876, finally reported to 
 the President as follows : 
 
 " The commission appointed by you to consider the subject 
 of communication by canal between the waters of the Atlantic 
 and Pacific Oceans across, over, or near the isthmus connect- 
 ing North and South America, have the honor, after a long, 
 careful and minute study of the several surveys of the various 
 routes across the continent, unanimously to report : 
 
 " That the route, known as the ' Nicaragua Route,' begin- 
 ning on the Atlantic side at or near Greytown ; running by 
 canal to the San Juan River ; thence following its left bank 
 to the mouth of the San Carlos River, at which point naviga- 
 tion of the San Juan River begins, and by the aid of three 
 short canals of the aggregate length of 3.5 miles reaches Lake 
 Nicaragua ; from thence across the lake and through the val- 
 leys of the Rio Del Medio and the Rio Grande to what is 
 known as the Port of Brito, on the Pacific coast, possesses, 
 both for the construction and maintenance of a canal, greater 
 advantages, and offers fewer difficulties from engineering, com- 
 mercial, and economic points of view, than any of the other 
 routes shown to be practicable by surveys sufficiently in detail 
 to enable a judgment to be formed of their relative merits." 
 
 This Commission was made up of men of tried 
 intelligence and probity, and it represented, more- 
 
United States Government Surveys. 331 
 
 over, the best expert opinion the country could 
 afford. It had acted from entirely disinterested 
 motives, and based its opinion upon only the most 
 carefully verified data. It is not strange, therefore, 
 that this decision has carried weight in the Ameri- 
 can mind, nor is it to be wondered at that the nation 
 has never since been seriously diverted from its alle- 
 giance to the Nicaragua canal route by other more 
 or less visionary schemes. ' 
 
 The decision of the Commission had the immedi- 
 ate result of casting still another diplomatic burden 
 upon the shoulders of the State Depart- 8123 its 
 ment. Technical experts of the Army and Effect upon 
 Navy might well decide that the Mcara- ^''^ '™"?^f '" 
 
 . . ate Diplo- 
 
 gua route was the best from " engmeenng, matic 
 
 commercial, and economic points of view " ; Situation, 
 but this was far from saying that the location of a 
 canal across the territory of Nicaragua carried A^ith 
 it any present political advantage to the government. 
 On the contrary, the Nicaragua route had always 
 offered distinct diplomatic disadvantages, to the 
 construction and operation of a canal, and the situa- 
 tion was as yet but little improved. 
 
 If the United States were determined to construct 
 a canal across this section of the isthmus, it was ab- 
 solutely necessary as a political precaution, that the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty first be modified to suit the 
 altered circumstances, and then that some more 
 definite rights of transit be gained from Nicaragua 
 for the purpose. Mr. Fish fully appreciated the 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 15, 46th Cong., ist Sess. 
 
332 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 importance of these diplomatic conditions, and im- 
 mediately set himself to the task of at least starting 
 them on the road to fulfilment. 
 
 Fish was as ardent an advocate of the Monroe 
 doctrine as the President himself, and, finding the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty in their way, these two first 
 hunted about- to find some cause for its abrogation. 
 Both Nicaragua and Guatemala had already com- 
 plained to the IJnited States that British settlers in 
 Belize and Mosquitia had overstepped their boun- 
 daries and acted in a manner derogatory to the 
 treaties of 1859 and '60. Indeed, the Guatemalan 
 minister went so far as to say, that his government 
 no longer considered itself bound by the treaty of 
 1859, as the English had continued to encroach be- 
 yond the Sarstoon river, with the tacit approval of 
 the boundary commission sent out by the British 
 authorities to adjust matters. Nicaragua, on the 
 other hand, still refused to recognize the local gov- 
 ernment in Mosquitia, and positively declined to pay 
 the idemnity which the treaty of Managua had 
 called for. Taken together these two complaints 
 might constitute a sufficient cause. Fish thought, to- 
 bring the Clayton-Bulwer treaty again up for dis- 
 cussion between the two signatory powers ; though 
 he was none too sure of his ground. He there- 
 fore instructed General Schenck, the United States- 
 minister in London, to look the Guatemalan matter 
 up first, and if he found the facts to be as reported, 
 to remonstrate with Lord Granville "against any 
 trespass by British subjects with the connivance of 
 
United States Government Surveys. 333 
 
 their government, npon the territory of Guatemala, 
 as an infringement of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty 
 whicli will be very unacceptable in this country." 
 
 Having thus inserted the wedge of a fresh discus- 
 sion with England, Fish next turned his attention 
 to Central America, in order to regulate our diplo- 
 matic relations with these states in accordance with 
 the new conditions. Matters, he found, had again 
 come to a hopeless pass between Nicaragua and 
 Costa Rica, in spite of the Canas-Jerez treaty which 
 was supposed to have settled their boundary dis- 
 pute for all time. But since then the Rio San Juan 
 had changed its course and was now debouching its 
 v^^aters through the Colorado mouth farther south. 
 Thus both the channel and the port, Costa Rica now 
 declared to be hers, and would have levied dues upon 
 !Nicaraguan imports. 
 
 The Nicaraguans had it on good authority that 
 Costa Rica was this time being supported in her 
 claims by a French canal syndicate, represented on 
 the isthmus by a M. Lefevre, and this only added 
 jealousy to their anger. But instead of basing 
 their protests on a principle of international law, 
 lately established by the treaty of Washington, giv- 
 ing riparian owners a natural right to the naviga- 
 tion of the stream which separates them, the 
 Nicaraguan authorities straightway declared the 
 Canas-Jerez treaty to be void on some flimsy tech- 
 nical grounds, and, in retaliation, they then seized 
 upon Costa Rican territory on the west coast. 
 War broke out again between the two states, 
 
334 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 and the rest of tlie Central American republics 
 lent their military support to Nicaragua in the 
 struggle. 
 
 Throughout Central America the Liberals were 
 still in control, and there was now a plan on foot to 
 change this armed alliance against Costa Rica into 
 a constitutional union of the states. Mr. Fish was 
 greatly in favcir of this scheme, thinking it would 
 strengthen the American cause against French and 
 English rivals. He therefore urged the matter 
 strongly upon Nicaragua, pointing out to her that 
 the Mosquito question had only come up for discus- 
 sion after the dissolution of the last Central Ameri- 
 can confederacy. Mr. C. A. Williamson, the United 
 States Minister in Central America, was also in- 
 structed to offer the good offices of his government 
 to put an end to the present conflict, and thus ren- 
 der the proposed union possible. As might have 
 been expected, however, the movement came to 
 nothing. General Barrios, President of Guatemala, 
 attempted to use force in the matter, and this only 
 excited the jealousy of the other states, and caused 
 them to hold aloof. The Conservatives everywhere 
 were opposed to the union, and the internal revolu- 
 tions they fomented in several of the states effectu- 
 ally put an end to the whole scheme. 
 
 The decision of the Commission had already given 
 Nicaragua, moreover, an undue impression of her 
 own importance, and this feeling was now increased 
 by further flattering advances being made to her by 
 
United States Government Surveys. 335 
 
 another French, canal projector, M. Blanchet, who 
 had been for some time looking over the ground, 
 and was now anxious to secure a concession. The 
 Conservatives were desirous of coming to terms at 
 once with the French, while the Liberals still re- 
 mained loyal to their American alliance ; but both 
 parties regarded the technical decision in favor of 
 their canal route as a vindication of Nicaragua's 
 political rights as well, and they all looked with 
 confidence to some sort of foreign intervention that 
 should crush out their rival, Costa Rica, and make 
 their country the leading state on the isthmus. 
 
 To be the more sure of their technical premises, 
 the Nicaraguan authorities, therefore, called upon 
 Mr. Menocal to continue his surveys along the lower 
 San Juan. While the Work was in progress, the 
 Liberal government also despatched a special com- 
 missioner, SeBor Cardenas, to Washington to learn 
 what terms the United States were willing to make 
 for the immediate construction of the canal under 
 American auspices. 
 
 Mr. Fish entered heartily into the plan and soon 
 had the draft of a new treaty drawn up, providing 
 for such necessary changes in the Dickinson- Ayon 
 convention as would render it possible for a com- 
 pany of American capitalists to undertake the work. 
 The wording of this instrument was very diplomatic, 
 and its tone was conciliatory, for Fish was anxious 
 that no objection should be raised by Great Britain 
 and the other maritime powers of Europe to his 
 
336 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 American canal project. But in this case the objec- 
 tions came from Nicaragua herself. Senor Cardenas, 
 in short, refused to consider the question at all 
 unless Mr. Fish would consent to pay Nicaragua an 
 indemnity for the bombardment of Greytown. This 
 was, of course, too absurd, for at the time of the 
 bombardment, Greytown itself was both legally and 
 actually beyond the jurisdiction of the Nicaraguan 
 government, and besides, the United States still con- 
 sidered themselves justified in the course they had 
 pursued. 
 
 Mr. Fish could not possibly consent to commit his 
 government to any such stultifying conditions, and, 
 as Cardenas would listen to no other terms, the 
 negotiations were very soon broken off, to the inmie- 
 diate and ultimate disadvantage of both parties. 
 Indeed, it seemed impossible for our State Depart- 
 ment to make any progress at all in adjusting the 
 diplomatic difficulties of the transit question, and 
 Fish thus met with no more success in the matter 
 than Seward had done before. 
 
 Grant certainly did his utmost during his two 
 presidential terms to place the American canal pro- 
 ject on a safe and sound basis. From the purely 
 technical point of view the work of his administra- 
 tions was cro-sATied with success, but politically the 
 question was now in even a worse condition than 
 before. Grant appreciated this full well, for before 
 setting out on his tour around the world, he made a 
 personal appeal to President Hayes, who was now 
 installed as his successor, urging him to leave no 
 
United States Government Surveys. 337 
 
 stone unturned in providing for more adequate 
 arrangements in behalf of the American canal.* 
 
 ' U. S. Foreign Relations, 1871, p. 683. 
 
 U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, Oct. 7, 1S71, and June, 1874. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. i5T ff. 
 U. S. H. Ex. Docs., 732-43, 43d Cong., ist Sess. ; 157 and 168, 44th 
 Cong., 1st Sess. ; 59-61, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 
 
CHAPTEE XVII. 
 
 THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS. 
 
 ONE of the greatest monuments to the Bona- 
 parte Emperors of France is the Suez 
 canal, projected by Napoleon I., and suc- 
 cessfully carried out to completion under the auspices 
 of his nephew, Napoleon III. To Ferdinand de 
 Lesseps was given the credit for the technical part 
 g J24 Per- *^^ *^® work, and his fame as an engineer 
 dinand de suffered no diminution in the minds of the 
 Lesseps's j^j-ench ^vith the downfall of his political 
 
 Interest in •*- 
 
 the Canal master. De Lesseps thus stood as the 
 Project. connecting link in France beween the 
 achievements of the Empire and the possibilities of 
 the Republic. Having joined the two seas in the 
 East for the former, it became naturally enough his 
 ruling ambition to unite the two oceans in the West 
 for the latter. A noble work, indeed, but more 
 than one man could accomplish, to cut through the 
 last dykes which still held back the eastern and 
 western advance of the Aryans, and thus allow a 
 smooth flow for the pent up commerce of the West. 
 In view of the diplomatic complications attending 
 both the construction and the maintenance of the 
 Suez canal, and in the light of the past and present 
 
 338 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 3;39 
 
 C(mtroTersies over the political control of the Ameri- 
 can isthmus, de Lesseps confidently looked for an 
 intervention of the powers in regard to the inter- 
 oceanic canal, as Europe, he thought, could never 
 consent to see it pass entirely into American hands. 
 If the states of Europe were thus destined to act in 
 political concert against the Monroe doctrine pre- 
 tensions of the United States in regard to the canal, 
 it would be well, de Lesseps thought, for the French 
 to take the lead again in providing for the technical 
 details ; but Avith better hopes this time of main- 
 taining their own prestige in the face of European 
 rivals. 
 
 But before taking any definite action, the French 
 had first to inform themselves, as the Americans 
 were already doing, in regard to the rela- 
 tive advantages of the several canal routes; Resolution 
 and with this end in view de Lesseps in- of the Paris 
 duced the Paris Geographical Society, oi^J°^^^^'- 
 which he was then the president, to take 
 the question up in the interests of science and the 
 world's commerce. The matter was accordingly 
 referred to the Society's Committee on Commercial 
 Geography, and in 1875 this body reported that 
 "in spite of the great number of explorers, there 
 was no topographical knowledge complete enough 
 on many points of the Darien and on many of the 
 southern valleys of the Cordillera ; and that whUe 
 such gaps existed in that knowledge, it would be 
 premature to pronounce conclusively on the choice 
 of a route." 
 
340 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 This was indeed true, as- far as tlie Frencli were 
 aware, for the reports of the American surveying 
 expeditions had not yet been published; but the 
 committee did not attempt to sa}' in what manner 
 these " gaps " in science were to be filled in for the 
 Society. It was de Lesseps's idea to have the 
 Society make arrangements for an international 
 congress of experts and laymen ii;terested in the 
 canal project, which should meet in Paris and decide 
 upon the best route ; but Avith the present meagre 
 information concerning the topography of the isth- 
 mus this plan seemed to him impossible. To 
 advance matters somewhat the Geographical Society 
 then appointed a special Comite frangais to study 
 the question, but as no funds were available for 
 further survejs this committee was unable to pro- 
 ceed, and de Lesseps's canal project hung fire for the 
 time. 
 
 At this critical juncture some gentlemen of the 
 older imperial regime stepped forward and offered 
 § 126. La their assistance to the Republic. The events 
 Soci^t^ of 1870 had played havoc with the careers 
 its Original ^^ these men, and they were eager for a 
 Conces- chauce of retrieving their broken fortunes, 
 sion. rpj^g canal project then seemed to offer the 
 
 fairest opportunity. Their Emperor had always 
 been a firm advocate of the scheme, and now de 
 Lesseps, his ablest lieutenant, was interesting him- 
 self in the matter in Isehalf of the Republic. De 
 Lesseps, moreover, was a relative of the ex-Empress 
 Eugenie, and through the favor of their imperial 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 341 
 
 mistress, these men might well hope to secure the 
 promoter's co-operation in the plans they had in 
 view. 
 
 With this idea in mind, a provisional company 
 was organized by these former adherents of the 
 Empire, called La Societe Civile Internationale du 
 Canal Interoceanique, and placed under the direc- 
 tion of a French naval officer, Lieutenant Lucien 
 Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse, and his brother-in-law, 
 General Etienne Tiirr, a Hungarian by birth. Being 
 purely speculative in character, the first efforts of 
 this company were directed toward securing a 
 marketable concession from one of the states of the 
 isthmus, and toward acquiring such property rights 
 along the canal route as could be disposed of later 
 on at a profit to some duly organized construction 
 company. The Nicaragua route the imperialists 
 found had already been pre-empted by their com- 
 patriots, Lefevre and Blanchet ; the isthmus of 
 Tehuantepec they deemed impM.cticable for canal 
 construction; and an American railroad company 
 was still in control of Panama. So nothing remained 
 for the speculators but to turn their attention to the 
 delusive lower isthmus. 
 
 The American experts had by this time pro- 
 nounced their unfavorable judgment upon these 
 canal routes, so Colombia was very ready to lend 
 her ear to further persuasions from the French. 
 Wyse had no difficulty, therefore, in securing a very 
 favorable concession from the Colombian govern- 
 ment for his company, and on May 28, 1876, a 
 
342 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 grant was made according the French a right of way 
 anywhere across the isthmus " south and east of the 
 line joining Capes Tiburon and Garachine." To the 
 north and west of this line the lands were supposed 
 to be under the control of the Panama Railway 
 Company, and as a, right of way across this region 
 would have to be bought with something more sub- 
 stantial than the brilliant promises that had satis- 
 fied Colombia, Wyse was too prudent to demand any 
 more for his company just then. 
 
 De Lesseps, in the meanwhile, was interesting 
 himself in the various canal projects, and endeavor- 
 § 127. De ^^S **^ determine in his own mind upon 
 Lesseps's the most favorable route. Already he had 
 P'^"s- written to M. Blanchet that he regarded 
 "the project of a canal through Nicaragua as the 
 one which offered the greatest facility in execution 
 and the greatest security in exploitation." De 
 Puydt's route also seemed to afford many advan- 
 tages, and when presented to him for his approval, 
 de Lesseps spoke of the plans as "realizing his 
 disiderata." 
 
 Bvit technical opportunities were not the only 
 factors in the problem, and de Lesseps desired to 
 examine the concessions first, before coming to any 
 final decision. De Puydt had had no dealings 
 with Colombia, but Blanchet already had a bill 
 before the Nicaraguan legislature providing for a 
 concession in his behalf. This might have turned 
 the scale at once in favor of the Nicaragua route, 
 but the political advantages of the lower isthmus. 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 343 
 
 "were at this juncture enhanced by Wyse's return to 
 Paris with his concession from Colombia, which 
 included de Puydt's route. Thus Blanchet had a 
 canal route but was not sure of his concession ; 
 "while Wyse had a concession, but as yet had made 
 no attempt to discover a canal route. So de Lesseps 
 wisely determined to reserve his decision in favor of 
 either party, until one or the other should have 
 completed his claim. 
 
 With the interests of the Geographical Society 
 :and his proposed International Congress in mind, 
 de Lesseps, therefore strongly advised the Wyse- 
 Tiirr company to continue the French explorations 
 on the lower isthmus, and thus fill in the " gaps " in 
 science, while locating for themselves a favorable 
 canal route at the same time under the concession. 
 "Wyse and his associates at once took the hint, for 
 with de Lesseps'd interest aroused in their plans the 
 chain of their speculative canal project was all but 
 completed. It was this company of imperialists, 
 therefore, which finally came to the aid of the 
 Geographical Society and offered to complete, at 
 its own expense, the topographical knowledge of 
 the lower isthmus, and make it possible at last to 
 decide upon the best route, — though just how the 
 most favorable canal line was to be determined 
 upon by surveys instituted within a restricted area, 
 bounded by the terms of a private concession, does 
 not appear.' 
 
 ' Revue des Deux Mondes, August i, 1 879. Paris. 
 Journal des D^bats, August 7, 1879. Paris. 
 
344 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 An exploring expedition was accordingly fitted 
 out by the Societe Civile, on October 6, 1876, and 
 § 128. The Wyse having volunteered his services, he 
 Wyse R€- was put in command of the party. 
 
 ur- rp-j^g Atrato-Tuyra route beinff the first 
 
 veys on the _ _ •' o _ 
 
 Lower isth- within the limits of the concession, was 
 mus and the therefore the first to be examined. Opera- 
 New Con- tions were begun on the Pacific side at 
 cession. gan Miguel. From this point M. Celler, 
 one of Wyse's most efficient engineers, ran a canal 
 line some way up the Tuyra and planned to continue 
 the route across the range, to descend to the Atrato 
 along the valley of the Cacarica. The total distance 
 Celler calculated to be something over 140 miles, 
 and a canal to connect the navigable waters on 
 either side, he thought, would require a number of 
 locks and a tunnel of over two hundred feet in 
 length. 
 
 But Wyse knew that such a plan would never 
 enlist attention, and so he decided to run a line of 
 his own from the head-waters of the Tuyra, by a 
 shorter and more direct route, to Acanti Bay in the 
 Gulf of Darien. There were mountains intervening, 
 but Wyse knew nothing of these, and thus he had 
 no serious difficulty in elaborating his plans for a 
 tide-level canal along this route. No one of the 
 party had as yet succeeded in reaching the Atlantic 
 side of the divide, but early in April, when the 
 rainy season set in, Wyse considered the knowledge 
 he had gained amply sufficient for all his purposes, 
 and he therefore returned with his experts to Paris» 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 345 
 
 Tliey found de Lesseps was not to be so easily 
 satisfied, however, so fearing to lose Ms favor, the 
 Societe Civile again despatched Wyse and a survey- 
 ing party to the isthmus in the autumn of 1877, 
 with orders to locate a more favorable route. This 
 was impossible, ho-wever, within the restricted area 
 of the original concession, so Wyse was now given 
 authority to negotiate with Colombia for a more ex- 
 tensive grant, and if there seemed no help for it, 
 also to come to some arrangement "with the Panama 
 Railway Company for the location of a canal Kne 
 within the region it claimed. 
 
 On this second expedition Wyse was accompanied 
 by another French naval officer, Lieutenant Armand 
 Rt'clus, and a number of civil engineers. Before 
 appl}'ing to the Colombian authorities for a more 
 comprehensive concession, Wyse wished to find how 
 far to the west the limits of his grant would have to 
 extend in order to include a favorable route, and 
 above all things he desired to avoid coming into 
 serious conflict with the American company at 
 Panama. So his first efforts "were directed upon the 
 San Bias route, and in December operations were 
 begun again on the west coast. The party spent 
 just two weeks on this exploration, but being un- 
 provided with canoes, and not being able to make 
 mxich progress by wading up the streams, the results 
 of the expedition cannot be said to have been 
 remarkable. 
 
 Wyse was evidently nettled at the reception his 
 Acanti canal plans had met with in Paris, and he 
 
346 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 now decided to make a more thorough survey of the 
 region and demonstrate the advantages of the route. 
 He therefore took his party once more to San 
 Miguel, and on January 2, 1878, set them to work 
 again on the line. It vs^as Wyse's intention this 
 time to push on over the divide himself, but the 
 mountains disheartened him and he decided instead 
 to reach the Atlantic by a more roundabout, but 
 withal by an easier way.. Leaving Reclus in charge 
 of the main expedition, -^^dth orders to continue the 
 surveys across the range, Wyse accordingly took one 
 of his civil engineers, M. Verbrugghe, with him, 
 and proceeded by steamer to Panama. There he and 
 his companion took the train across the isthmus, and 
 on February 4th they were taken on board a French 
 war-ship and conveyed to the Gulf of Darien. 
 Wyse and his companion were there put ashore, 
 and the two then pushed up the Rio Acanti for 
 some distance, just far enough, indeed, to convince 
 Wyse that he had enormously underestimated the 
 length of the Atlantic slope in his guess from the 
 Pacific side. Wyse was now forced to recognize the 
 hopelessness of his original plan, and, without wait- 
 ing for R^clus to join him on the shore, he embarked 
 again on the war-ship and returned to Panama. 
 
 On his way back Wyse had ample time to think 
 the matter over and plan a new scheme. In the 
 light of the past, he was well aware that no capital 
 could be raised on the Caledonian route, the Atrato 
 and San Bias routes had now both been tried and 
 found wanting, so only the Panama route remained. 
 
The International Scientific Coiigress. 347 
 
 But the choice of this route would involve not only 
 a considerable extension of the Society's concession, 
 but also some financial arrangement with the 
 Panama Railway Company. Wyse was obliged to 
 Tecognize this, but seeing no other alternative, he 
 resolved to abandon further surveys and devote 
 iimseK to canying out the necessary diplomatic ne- 
 gotiations. He could not act, however, until he had 
 communicated his plans to the main party, and so he 
 was obliged to wait in Panama till the others 
 returned. 
 
 Meanwhile, Peclus really did succeed in crossing 
 the range at Acanti, but not falling in with Wyse 
 as he had expected on the Atlantic shore, he soon 
 rejoined his force and started the whole party back 
 to Panama, having spent just twenty-three days in 
 the so-called survey of the Atrato-Tuyra route. 
 P.eclus reached Panama on February 25, 1878, and 
 there found Wyse awaiting his arrival. Wyse then 
 announced his intention of going at once to Bogota 
 to secure a new concession, and ordered R^clus, in 
 his absence, to make a survey of the Panama route. 
 
 No time was to be lost, so Wyse embarked on the 
 same day for the south. The steamer landed him 
 at Buenaventura, and there he took to horseback and 
 .scrambled up over the mountains mth what haste 
 he could, reaching the capital on March 12th, after 
 a ride of fifteen days. The trip was made in so short 
 a time, he said, " that the inhabitants of the capital, 
 accustomed to long ridings, were astounded. It is 
 true," he continued, " that I rode sometimes twent}-- 
 
348 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 two hours in a day, but at any rate I arrived in time 
 to treat -witli the administration of President Parra, 
 ■who, well aware of our efforts, had shown himself 
 favorably disposed to discuss the modifications which 
 I was commissioned to ask in the concession of May 
 28, 1876." The administration in question had 
 indeed but nineteen days to live, but in less than a 
 week Wyse was able to draw up a new concession 
 to suit himself and secure the signature of the 
 executive. 
 
 According to the terms of this grant the Society 
 Civile secured an exclusive right of way anywhere 
 within the territory of Colombia, provided due 
 regard should be had to the rights of the Panama 
 Railway Company. The land grants to the com- 
 pany were also more than doubled in this second 
 concession, choice sections of Colombia's public do- 
 main being promised, beside all the land necessary 
 for the canal itself and its works. In return for 
 such generous favors, AVyse took it upon himself to 
 provide for the organization of a regular construc- 
 tion company mthin two years' time, which in turn 
 ■would complete the canal before twelve more years 
 had elapsed. The Colombian government was to 
 be paid in cash and stock for its grant, and was also 
 to receive a share in the profits of the canal for the 
 next himdred years, and such percentage, Wyse 
 promised, should never be less than $250,000 a 
 year. 
 
 Meanwhile Reclus was having a hard time of it 
 ■with his surveys along the chosen route. Illness 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 349 
 
 overtook him first and lie was not able t(j begin 
 operations until March 11, 1878. A week Avas then 
 spent in fruitless reconnaissances,, and March 28th 
 found him once more back again in Panama. It 
 was not until April 2d, therefore, that Reclus reall}' 
 commenced his sun^ej^s along the present Panama 
 route. A Colombian engineer, Senor Sosa, accom- 
 panied Reclus part of the way, but after the first 
 week he, too, was taken Ul and returned. On April 
 20th Reclus himself contracted an earache, and in 
 "the face of this last .misfortune he finally abandoned 
 the attempt and went back to Panama. Reclus 
 ivas frank enough to admit, it is true, that the sur- 
 vey " was not an exploration in the true sense of the 
 word." Mr. Rodrigues, the commissioner who Avas 
 sent down to the isthmus later on by the New York 
 World, descril )es it more tersely as " a walk, if not a 
 ride over the Panama Railway line." Such as it was, 
 however, this was the surs-ey on which de Lesseps 
 based his Panama canal project, and on this account 
 alone has it been deemed Avorthy of any description. 
 
 Ten days after his return to Panama Reclus set 
 out for Europe, and laid the results of his explora- 
 tions before the Paris Geographical Society and the 
 company Avhich had sent him out, to be elabor- 
 ated for the benefit of science and speculation 
 respectively. 
 
 It took some time for "Wyse to engineer his con- 
 cession through the imcertain Colombian legislature, 
 but he AA'as successful at last, and on May 18, 1878, 
 after the last amendment had been disposed of, the 
 
350 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 new President added his final approval to tlie grant. 
 Within twenty-four hours Wyse was again on his. 
 way, and stopping off at Panama just long enough 
 to learn that Keclus had completed his surveys and 
 returned to Paris, he hurried on to Nicaragua to 
 see what progress his rival Blanchet had made in. 
 the interim toward securing his concession. 
 
 Upon his arrival Wyse learned that the French 
 canal bill had indeed passed the Mcaraguan Cham- 
 ber of Deputies, but failed by one vote in the 
 Senate. A motion to reconsider had been entered,, 
 however, and so the question "was still in doubt.. 
 The situation was thus not at all to Wyse's liking,, 
 but an interview Avith the President, Fernando 
 Guzman, soon convinced him that Blanchet's fate 
 was sealed, unless, indeed, he could muster a two- 
 thirds majority in the legislature to pass his bill 
 over an executive veto.' 
 
 Having learned of the President's intention to 
 veto Blanchet's bill, "Wyse saw that as far as con- 
 cessions played any part in the struggle, his com- 
 pany was already far in advance of its French 
 competitors. In the matter of the choice of a canal 
 
 ' Guzman, in fact, was strongly in favor of an American canal, and made 
 no secret of his proclivities. When informed of the result of the vote and 
 of the motion to reconsider, he sent for the Senator who had moved for a, 
 reconsideration and frankly told him of his intention to veto the bill. The. 
 Senator was surprised and asked Guzman for his reasons. The President 
 replied by jogging the Senator's memory and enquiring " if he remembered 
 the French military occupation of Mexico and their attempt to destroy the 
 Republic there?" He was convinced, he continued, that if the French 
 built the canal, they would control the country and treat Nicaragua as they 
 had already treated Mexico ; while the Americans, on the other hand, 
 "want the canal and will not destroy our government." 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 351 
 
 route, however, he was by no means so sure, so he 
 thought it well worth his while to go over the 
 Nicaragua route, in order to collect evidence against 
 it, and be better prepared to refute its claims when 
 the case came up in Paris. This did not take him 
 a great while, for on July 1st Wyse took the 
 steamer for San Francisco, and in due time arrived 
 in New York. There he came to terms with the 
 Directors of the Panama Railway Company, and 
 soon after took passage for Europe and arrived in 
 Paris on August 11, 1878.' 
 
 Up to the present de Lesseps had, as we know, 
 been standing between two groups of speculators in 
 Paris, one backing Blanchet in his efforts g ^^ 
 to gain a concession from Nicaragua, and Lesseps 
 the other supporting Wyse in his schemes J^^*^"^^^'" 
 on the lower isthmus. But he had thus Societe 
 far refrained from rendering his decision Civile, 
 in favor of either syndicate, preferring to wait 
 until the former secured a concession, or the latter 
 discovered a canal route to turn the scale. It was 
 now a comparatively easy matter for de Lesseps 
 to decide, however, between a company with a 
 good route but no concession to cover it, and a com- 
 pany with an extensive concession, and at least the 
 possibility of a number of routes within its range. 
 As a result of the Wyse-Eeclus surveys the gaps in 
 
 ' " Rapport sur les Etudes de la Commission Internationale, etc.," Paris, 
 l87g. Lahure, Imprimerie Generale. 
 
 Rodrigues, loc. Hi., Ch. III. ; Sullivan, loc. cil., Ch. X. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess... pp. 166-174, for Colom- 
 bian concession in full. 
 
352 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the topographical knowledge of tlie lower istlimus 
 were, moreover, filled in for science, and all was tlius 
 made ready for the convocation of the proposed 
 canal congress. In the name of the Paris Geo- 
 graphical Society, the governments of Europe and 
 America were accordingly asked to send delegates 
 to an International Scientific Congress, to meet in 
 Paris in May, 1879. Invitations were also sent to 
 foreign geographical societies and other organiza- 
 tions, and de Lesseps took care to have a number of 
 his personal friends in foreign countries included in 
 the list. 
 
 In the interim de Lesseps busied himself arrang- 
 ing matters in the interests of the Societe Civile and 
 its Panama canal route. In the first place France 
 herself must be well represented at the Congress and 
 by men congenial to de Lesseps's plans. Thus, sup- 
 porters of the Empire, Suez canal men, and Panama 
 enthusiasts, were exclusively chosen as delegates. 
 Then, too, the committees had to be made up before- 
 hand in order that no hitch should occur in having 
 the propei' resolutions presented before the Congress. 
 All this de Lesseps attended to with great care, and 
 ultimately had everything arranged to the satisfac- 
 tion of himself and his friends. 
 
 Much also remained to be done by the Societe 
 Civile before the Congress met, in elaborating their 
 § 130. The surveys and drawing up a choice of plans 
 Four Canal for the Canal. On the basis of the data 
 rojec s. ^-j^^^ Wyse and Reclus had collected, four 
 practicable canal routes were accordingly worked 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 353 
 
 out in Paris with, great care and in considerable 
 detail. 
 
 The first plan was for a canal with twenty-two 
 locks, along the Atrato-Tuj-ra route, stretching some 
 79 miles in length and overcoming a summit level of 
 but 164 feet. The cost of this undertaking was 
 estimated at $140,000,000. 
 
 The second project provided for a tide-level canal 
 from San Miguel to Acanti in the Grulf of Darien. 
 Only 46 miles of actual excavation were here re- 
 quired, though the plans called for a tunnel of 10-^ 
 miles. The cost in this case was figured at $120,- 
 000,000. Such were the brilliant results of Wyse's 
 first surA^eys, as continued by R^clus, but surely in 
 striking contrast to the topographical facts which 
 had so disconcerted them while on the ground ! 
 
 In the third project, the abandoned San Bias 
 route was resuscitated. A tide-level canal was now 
 declared feasible here, to extend only 25-|- miles be- 
 tween the seas, and involving a tunnel of but 9-^ 
 miles, and all at the trifling cost of $95,000,000. 
 Thus was Selfridge's opinion controverted, and Mr. 
 Kelly's origiifal plan revived ; but then wading up 
 a, stream to see hoAV far it goes, is hardly considered 
 a safe method of reconnaissance, hoAvever productive 
 of attractive canal projects. 
 
 But these first three plans were after all only in- 
 tended as foils, to set off the advantages of the 
 Panama route, and this was, therefore, reserved till 
 the last. Still another tide-level canal was noAv de- 
 clared to be quite possible along the valleys of the 
 
354 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Chagres and the Rio Grande, with, a length of but 
 46 miles and only requiring 4^ miles of tunnelling. 
 This came at a somewhat lower price, $85,400,000. 
 Thus Reclus's outing along the Panama Railway had 
 served some purpose after all, even though the ear- 
 ache had interfered. 
 
 Everything was thus in readiness for the final coup- 
 
 \vhen the International Scientific Congress finally 
 
 ^^ assembled in Paris on May 15, 1879. The 
 
 § 131. The . 
 
 Make-up make-up of the convention gave prescience 
 andOrgani-of {^g fl^^l decision. There were 136 dele- 
 the Inter- g^t^s in all, and of these, 74, a comfortable 
 national majority, were Frenchmen, devoted for the 
 
 Scienti c mQg^ pg^j.j; ^Q (Jg LeSSeps's cause ; while- 
 Congress. •■ . . . •• , 
 
 the remaining 62 consisted of foreigners 
 from England, the United States, Holland, Switzer- 
 land, and Germany, and a goodly number from 
 Spanish America as well. Only 42 of the delegates 
 were engineers, the rest were laymen made up of 
 de Lesseps's personal friends, Suez Canal Company 
 employees, bankers, politicians, speculators, members- 
 of geographical societies, army and navy officers, and 
 so on. 
 
 There were eleven delegates from the United 
 States. The government commissioned two of these,, 
 Admiral Ammen and Mr. Menocal, but carefully 
 instructed them not to allow the United States to 
 become officially committed to any decision the Con- 
 gress might choose to make. The rest of the Ameri- 
 can delegation was composed of Mr. N. Appleton, of 
 Boston, a personal friend of de Lesseps, Mr. Kelly,. 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 355 
 
 Commander Selfridge, Cyrus W. Field, two gentle- 
 men from California, and three others. 
 
 As had been previously arranged, M. de Lesseps 
 took the chair and opened the Congress with a highly 
 ornate speech in which he spoke, of the " marriage 
 of the oceans " and the " divorcement of the conti- 
 nents," and concluded by saying that the proceedings 
 were to be conducted " a V Americain^'' and that 
 he hoped a decision would be reached within eight 
 days. De Lesseps then proceeded at once to divide 
 the Congress up into five grand committees, four of 
 eighteen members each, and one, the famous Fourth 
 Committee- composed of fifty-four delegates whose 
 duty it was to decide upon the route. This was, of 
 course, the only committee of importance, and de 
 Lesseps had accordingly packed it beforehand with 
 supporters of his scheme. 
 
 Mr. Menocal and Commander Selfridge figured as 
 the American members of this technical committee, 
 and Admiral Ammen was also called in to 
 give the results of the surveys he had Resolution 
 lately had instituted for his government. of the 
 
 Selfridge explained the nature of the_ '^°^-^^ 
 
 o _ \ Committee. 
 
 Atrato-Napipi route, and also gave valu- 
 able information concerning the San Bias project. 
 Menocal presented a detailed account of the Nica- 
 ragua route, and endeavored to impress upon the 
 committee the difliculties attending the proper con- 
 trol of the Rio Chagres along the Panama route. 
 
 The English delegates. Sir John Hawkshaw and 
 Sir John Stokes, both supported Menocal in his 
 
356 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 oj)inions, and did all in their power to bring some 
 order into the proceedings of the committee. 
 
 The French delegation was divided. Blanchet 
 spoke in favor of the Nicaragua route of course, and 
 tried to form a combination with the Americans in 
 favor of his company, but failed. De Puydt tried 
 to gain a hearing, but finding de Lesseps had de- 
 serted him, he retired disgruntled and refused to 
 present his plans. Wyse presented the four plans 
 elaborated by the Soci6t6 Civile, and concluded in 
 favor of the tide-level Panama project. Pointed 
 questions in regard to the control of the Chagres 
 were at once put by Menocal and Hawkshaw, and 
 a heated discussion followed which resulted disas- 
 trously for Wyse's original plans. 
 
 To put an end to these general discussions that 
 were leading to no results, two sub-committees were 
 then appointed, the one to consider the question of 
 locks, and the other to report on the possibility of a 
 tide-level canal. Both these sub-committees were 
 composed exclusively of Frenchmen, but they both 
 agreed that with the information at their disposal it 
 was impossible to consider a tide-level canal, and 
 they reported unanimously, therefore, in favor of 
 the Nicaragua project, saying that this had been 
 " studied with much care and skill " and that in their 
 opinion "it could be executed without material 
 difliculties." 
 
 Things were looking dark for de Lesseps in spite 
 of his careful previsions, and when matters came to 
 this pass he determined to interfere. He therefore 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 357 
 
 appeared in person before the committee on the fol- 
 lowing day, May 27th, and told its members that 
 the Congress was waiting impatiently for their report 
 and wanted to be informed as to the relative cost of 
 the several canals. The Congress would also re- 
 quire, he added, a direct yes or no answer from its 
 committee, first as to whether a tide-level canal were 
 possible, and second, if so, whether it could be con- 
 structed along the Panama route. There was much 
 objection in the committee to such a categorical pro- 
 cedure, but de Lesseps insisted and, with the help 
 of his henchmen, he carried his points. 
 
 Estimates were accordingly drawn up by the sub- 
 committees for all the routes proposed, but only the 
 Nicaragua and Panama figures carried any weight 
 with the main committee. The total cost of the 
 Nicaragua canal was fixed at $143,000,000, and its 
 time of construction at six years. The Panama 
 canal, on the other hand, was estimated at $208,- 
 000,000, and to this the sub-committee added another 
 $40,000,000 as a fair compensation to the Panama 
 Railway Company. Twelve years were then given as 
 the ininimum j)eriod of construction. An animated 
 discussion followed the presentation of these reports. 
 The Fourth Committee then shut out all those who 
 had presented projects and proceeded off-hand to 
 raise the estimate of the Nicaragua plan to $180- 
 000,000, and the Panama to $240,000,000. The 
 time of construction of the Nicaragua canal was 
 then increased in the same way to eight years 
 instead of six. 
 
358 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Finding everytliing still turning against them de 
 Lesseps and the Society Civile then adopted radical 
 measures, the results of which alone are known. At 
 this Juncture Wyse appeared before the committee 
 , with a new plan to control the Chagres by means 
 of a huge dam and thus render a tide-level canal 
 possible. The project was at once taken up by de 
 Lesseps's supporters and referred to a sub-committee 
 with instructions to work up the estimates and report 
 on the following day. 
 
 On May 28th, that is in less than twenty-four 
 hours, the sub-committee succeeded in paring down 
 the previous estimate on the Panama project to 
 $140,000,000 and reported favorably on the new 
 plans. Mr. Menocal then asked "whether or not 
 the design of such a canal was based on any actual 
 survey or examination of the ground to determine 
 its practicability, and if no surveys had been made 
 for that purpose, on what data the sub-committee 
 had based the estimates," but he could obtain no 
 satisfaction. Seeing that the Nicaragua project was 
 being forcibly put aside to make room for the 
 Panama scheme, the American delegates then offered 
 to supply further information concerning the latter 
 route from the results of their recent surveys. M. 
 Simonin, one of de Lesseps's most ardent supporters, 
 thereupon jumped up and said hotly : " We are not 
 here to register these schemes. Do they propose 
 that we shall set about and examine everything that 
 the Americans have been doing for the last ten 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 359 
 
 years ? We should lose our time." The Americans 
 made no reply, but ceased after this to take any 
 further part in the discussions of either the Congress 
 or its committees, it being their opinion, as expressed 
 by Admiral Ammen before the Congress that "only 
 able engineers can form an opinion, after careful 
 study, of what is actually possible and what is rela- 
 tively economical in the construction of a ship canal." 
 The committee had evidently ceased to care for any 
 such expert opinion, and the self-respecting engineers 
 of England, France, and the United States, in conse- 
 quence, withdrew. 
 
 Left to themselves the de Lesseps clique accepted 
 the report of the sub-committee in favor of Wj'se's 
 project, and at once put a resolution through the 
 committee adopting the Panama route. The vote on 
 this preliminary question showed 20 in the affirma- 
 tive, with 9 abstentions, and 26 absentees. It was 
 next decided by 16 votes that the canal should be a 
 tide-level one. Finally an inclusive resolution was 
 introduced to the effect that : " the committee, stand- 
 ing on a technical point of view, is of the opinion 
 that a canal such as would satisfy the requirements 
 ■of commerce is possible across the isthmus of 
 Panama, and recommend especially a canal at the 
 level of the sea." Amid great confusion and excite- 
 ment among the rival French enthusiasts, this final 
 resolution was ultimately carried by the de Lesseps 
 party, the vote standing 16 to 3 with 11 abstentious 
 and 7 absentees. Thus the deliberations of the 
 
360 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Fourth Committee were brought to a stormy close, 
 and by a seemingly large majority, the persistent 
 de Lesseps carried his point for the Soci6t6 Civile. 
 On May 29th a full session of the Congress was 
 convened to listen to and pass upon the report of 
 ^, the Fourth Committee. Few beyond de 
 
 § 133. The ... "^ 
 
 Final Lesseps's immediate friends and supporters 
 Decision appeared, however, as the result was 
 Congress already foreseen. The report of the com- 
 in Favor of mittee was read and a vote taken without 
 Panama, further discussion. Out of the 136 dele- 
 gates only 98 cast their votes. Of these 75 voted in 
 the affirmative and only 8 in the negative. Sixteen 
 abstained, and 37 were reported absent. The analy- 
 sis of the vote showed that only 19 out of 75 affirm- 
 ative votes were given by engineers, and 8 of these 
 were to be attributed to the employees of the Suez 
 Canal Company. Of the 19 experts again, only 5 
 were practical engineers, and only one, a young grad- 
 uate and resident of Panama had ever been on the 
 isthmus. There were originally 5 delegates of the 
 French Society of Engineers, but of these 2 voted 
 No, and the remaining 3 absented themselves from 
 the session. 
 
 The galleries were crowded with spectators, how- 
 ever, and great enthusiasm prevailed when the result 
 of the vote was announced. De Lesseps was once 
 rnore shown to be right, and he became, in con- 
 sequence, more the favorite than ever. It only re- 
 mained now for the International Scientific Congress 
 to announce its decision to the world, and this it did 
 
The International Scientific Congress. 361 
 
 at once by the unanimous adoption of the following 
 resolution : 
 
 " Le Congrfes estime que le percement d'un canal inter- 
 oc^anique k niveau constant, si desirable dans I'interet du 
 commerce et de la navigation, est possible, et que le canal 
 maritime pour repondre aux facilitds indispensables d'acces et 
 d'utilisation qui doit offrir avant tout un passage de ce genre 
 devra etre dirige du Golfe de Limon k la bale de Panama." ' 
 
 'Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, " Le Panama Canal," Aconomiste Fran^ais, 
 August 8 and 15, 1885. 
 
 " Compte Rendu des Seances du Congres International, etc." Paris, 
 1879. 
 
 " Interoceanic Canal Congress," Instructions to the United States Dele- 
 gates and Reports of the Proceedings. Washington Govt. Print, 1879. 
 
 North American Review, August, 1879. 
 
 Rodrigues, loc, cit., Ch. IV. 
 
 Sullivan, loc. cit., Ch. XI. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE MONROE 
 DOCTRINE. 
 
 AS soon as it became known in the United 
 States that de Lesseps had lent his name 
 and influence to the Panama project, appre- 
 hension seized hold of the minds of the American 
 people. The idea of a foreign corporation building 
 and controllina; a transit-way across the 
 
 § 134. The . . " , , "^ 
 
 United American isthmus was in itself not at all 
 States Op- agreeable to us, and rumor now had it 
 ternationai ^^^^ ^^ Lesseps was negotiating for a 
 Guaranty of coalition of the European powers to 
 the Panama guarantee and defend the neutrality of 
 the route. Governmental action was, 
 therefore, thought to be necessary in order to nip 
 this diplomatic project in the bud. 
 f General Burnside, then Senator from Ehode Island, 
 and always an ardent American, accordingly intro- 
 duced a preliminary resolution in the Senate to the 
 efEect that the United States viewed " with serious 
 disquietude any attempt by the powers of Europe 
 to establish under their protection and domination 
 a ship canal across the isthmus of Darien." A typi- 
 cal Monroe doctrine discussion followed, and the 
 
 362 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 363 
 
 Senate came finally to the conclusion that no canal 
 across the isthmus should be opened up to the com- 
 merce of the world, which was not placed virtually 
 under the protection of the United States./ To be 
 sure of its ground the Senate then called on the 
 President for copies of all the diplomatic corre- 
 spondence that had passed between the United 
 States and foreign governments since 1869 respect- 
 ing the canal, together with all treaties proposed or 
 submitted. The Republican canal policy already 
 had a history, as we know, and the idea now was 
 to establish precedents therefrom and formulate it 
 anew. 
 
 Nor was the House to be outdone in the matter 
 of the Monroe doctrine. Mr. Frye introduced the 
 first resolution before this body, stating that any 
 form of protectorate by a European nation on the 
 American isthmus was against the settled policy of 
 the United States, and that it was the interest and 
 the right of this government to have exclusive con- 
 trol of any canal to be constnicted across said 
 isthmus. This resolution was at once referred to a 
 select committee, which reported unanimously in its 
 favor. Another resolution was then passed appoint- 
 ing a committee to call together an international 
 convention of representatives from this government 
 and the republics of Central and South America to 
 consider the policy and expediency of a canal and 
 report upon the Monroe doctrine. But the House, 
 too, lacked definite information on the subject, and 
 in order to take no false step in furthering the in- 
 
364 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 terests of the American canal, it finally appointed 
 a select committee from among its members " to ex- 
 amine all petitions, memorials, resolutions, bills, and 
 reports on the canal, or other mode of facilitating- 
 communication between the Atlantic and Pacific 
 oceans." * 
 
 Besides this political opposition in the halls of 
 Congress, de Lesseps's Panama canal project met with 
 economic competition as well among 
 Provisional American capitalists. Even before the 
 interoce- meeting of the International Scientific 
 anic Canal Qongress there were plans on foot in the 
 
 Society. .° i 
 
 United States for the formation of a pre- 
 liminary Nicaragua canal society, and Admiral Am- 
 men had in fact gone to Paris as a delegate in the 
 hopes of convincing the European authorities of the 
 superior advantages of the route that the Americana 
 had decided upon. 
 
 On their return to the United States both Am- 
 men and Menocal reported the character of the pro- 
 ceedings of the Congress to their government, and 
 took care also to let the American people understand 
 the onesidedness of the international decision in 
 favor of Panama. A spirit of economic rivalry was- 
 thus aroused against the French, and the American, 
 canal project for the time seemed to receive fresh 
 impetus from de Lesseps's competing scheme. 
 
 Taking advantage of this trend of public opinion 
 in behalf of the Nicaraguan project, a number of 
 
 ' U. S. House Reports, 1121, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 
 U. S. Misc. Doc, 16, 46th' Cong., 3d Sess. 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 365 
 
 prominent capitalists * then organized a Provisional 
 Interoceanic Canal Society, with Captain S. L. 
 Phelps as president, for the purpose of arranging all 
 the necessary preliminaries of the work. The route 
 in this case was already determined upon, so the 
 next thing necessary was a concession. Mr. Meno- 
 cal was accordingly sent off to Nicaragua to obtain 
 the necessary grant, as he was by this time thor- 
 oughly familiar with the political as well as the 
 topographical conditions of the country, and might 
 well be relied upon to secure good terms. 
 
 A name as prominent among Americans as de 
 Lesseps's in France, was also required to lead the list 
 of the Nicaragua canal promoters, and the Society's 
 choice fell very naturally upon the ex-President. 
 ■Grant was, indeed, an ideal patron of the project. 
 From the works of his two administrations his deep 
 interest in an American canal was known all over 
 the country. It was Grant's commission, moreover, 
 which had decided in favor of the Nicaragua route, 
 and fixed the American people in their belief of its 
 superior advantages. Furthermore, Grant had no 
 confidence in the Panama project which the French 
 were now favoring, and had distinctly declared that 
 ^'considering the engineering difiiculties attending 
 the diversion of the Chagres river and the necessary 
 construction of an artificial lake to hold its floods, 
 together with the tunnelling or open cuts, the cost 
 
 ' Captain S. L. Phelps, Admiral Daniel Ammen, General George B. Mc- 
 Clellan, General Edward F. Beale, Captain E. S. Crowninshield, Captain 
 George W. Davis, Hon. Levi P. Morton, Messrs. George W. Riggs, Howard 
 Potter, Hugh J. Jewett, A. G. Menocal, and others. 
 
366 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 of the canal cannot be less tlian $400,000,000 and 
 would probably be much more." Thus in every 
 way Grant's association with the present Nicaragua 
 project must inspire confidence in its success. He 
 was still absent on his tour, but being reached by 
 telegraph, he cabled back his approval, and accepted 
 the trust thus imposed upon him by his old associ- 
 ates. Thus in the United States as well, an inter- 
 oceanic canal project was launched before the public 
 with a considerable degree of national enthusiasm.' 
 American opposition to his project, coupled with 
 the jealousy of his rivals at home, had a disasti'ous 
 effect on de Lesseps's original plans, and he 
 ure of de^' ^"^'T ^oou discovered that the decision of 
 Lesseps's the Scientific Congress in his favor had not 
 First made it all plain sailing after all for the 
 
 Efforts. •'^ ° 
 
 Panama scheme. De Puydt, Blanchet, and 
 the other French speculators, who had been check- 
 mated in the Congress by Wyse and his company, 
 now took their revenge by making much of the 
 American objections, and by pointing out to the 
 French people that even de Lesseps's own friends, 
 Lavalley, Cotard, and other eminent engineers, who 
 were certainly competent to judge, had declared 
 themselves opposed to the Panama route. 
 
 De Lesseps at first paid no attention to this oppo- 
 sition at home and abroad, but stoically went ahead 
 with his original plans. He first bought out all the 
 rights of the Society Civile from the Tiirr-Wyse 
 
 ' " The Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua,'' published by the Nicaragua 
 Canal Construction Company, p, ii. New York, 1891. 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 367 
 
 syndicate, for $2,000,000 in the name of a company 
 to be formed in due course of time, promising 
 $1,000,000 in cash, and the balance in stock of the 
 new company. Thus the imperialists retrieved their 
 fortunes and that was after all the main interest they 
 had in the scheme. The Colombian government 
 vi^as then promised $150,000 in part payment for the 
 concession, and this settled all outstanding claims 
 for the time. 
 
 Having arranged for the preliminary expenses 
 through some of his banker friends, de Lesseps then 
 appealed to the French people to make good these 
 advances and provide funds for the prosecution of 
 the work. On July 23, 1879, he issued his first 
 prospectus and called for subscriptions, promising 
 five per cent, interest during the period of construc- 
 tion, and insisting that the stock would pay at least 
 eleven per cent, on the opening of the canal to 
 traffic. 
 
 But de Lesseps had miscalculated the influence of 
 his enemies. Public opinion in fickle France was 
 already aroused against the scheme, and the first 
 prospectus fell flat. Some few shares only were 
 taken up, and these were sacrificed soon after at a 
 large discount. Instead of discouraging de Lesseps, 
 this failure only aroused his Gallic fighting blood 
 and made him resolve to win success at any cost. 
 To regain public confidence he then recalled the 
 shares he had sold, and paid the first stockholders 
 in full. On August 19th de Lesseps announced 
 to the public that he was about to depart in person 
 
368 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 for Panama with his International Technical Com- 
 mission to verify the Wyse-Reclus surveys and leave 
 no further doubt as to the practicability of the plan. 
 On his return, he said, he would stop over in the 
 United States and explain to the American people 
 that the Panama canal was to be a work of civiliza- 
 tion undertaken by private parties in the interests 
 of the peaceful commerce of the world, and in no 
 way intended to interfere with the Moni'oe doctrine. 
 Unluckily for de Lesseps's schemes the ubiquitous 
 American correspondent ' was in Panama to welcome 
 ^ 137. The lii'^) 3,nd soon the columns of our news- 
 interna- papers and magazines were filled with 
 
 tional Tech- , • j. i! j.i • i i i 
 
 nicai Com- sarcastic accounts 01 this remarkable ex- 
 mission and pedition. De Lesseps arrived with his 
 the inaugu- -^jfg ^^(j three of his numerous family, in 
 
 ration of the , ^ . n -n 
 
 Work at order to prove that the climate of Panama 
 Panama. ^^s healthful, as One of the correspond- 
 ents averred. Another wrote that the expedition 
 had more the air of a "picnic party" than of a 
 scientific survey, and that fishing in the Bay of 
 Panama seemed more attractive to the young en- 
 gineers than the swamps and rocks of the interior. 
 
 Work was to be begun on the first day of the 
 year, de Lesseps had told his compatriots before 
 leaving, so a fete was arranged for the inauguration. 
 A special steamboat was chartered for the occasion, 
 speeches were assigned, and plenty of champagne 
 
 ' Mr. J. C. Rodrigues, the author of " The Panama Canal," was the most 
 active of these, writing articles for the New York World, the Nation, and 
 the London Financial News. 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 369 
 
 provided. The boat stuck fast in the mud, however, 
 two miles from the mouth of the Rio Grande, and 
 so the gold-tipped pick-axe and shovel, brought all 
 the way from Paris to begin the excavation of the 
 great canal, could not be brought into requisition. 
 But the first stroke was after all but a " shnulacro,^'' 
 de Lesseps declared, and so the ceremonies were 
 conducted on the stranded steamer instead. The 
 champagne was uncorked, the speeches delivered, 
 the work was blessed by the Bishop of Colombia, 
 and the account of the grand inauguration was at 
 the same time cabled on to Paris from Panama. 
 
 In the presence of the American newspaper corre- 
 spondents, something more serious than this had now 
 to be done, so, as soon as its members could recover 
 from the effects of iihefete, the International Techni- 
 cal Commission began its oiBcial surveys. There 
 were two competent engineers from Europe on this 
 international board, but the remainder of the party 
 consisted of biassed and incompetent men, chosen 
 for de Lesseps's own purposes. In six weeks the 
 survey was completed, and on February 14, 1880, 
 the report was handed in, stating that a tide-level 
 canal was quite feasible along the route laid out by 
 E^clus. The Commission estimated nearly 100,000,- 
 000 cubic yards to be excavated, however, instead of 
 the 60,000,000 cubic yards that Wyse had calculated 
 on ; but by reducing the contingencies from twenty- 
 five per cent, to ten per cent., it figured out the actual 
 cost of the canal at $168,000,000, excluding prelimi- 
 nary, banking, and administrative expenses, and in- 
 
3T0 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 teresfc during the period of construction. But this 
 increase in the financial estimates did not at all 
 please de Lesseps, so he took it upon himself to 
 reduce the figures of the Technical Commission to 
 $132,000,000, and thus proved his confidence in hi& 
 own appointees. 
 
 Having thus demonstrated the practicability of 
 the Panama route from a technical point of view, de 
 Lesseps set out at once for the United States to 
 silence the political opposition of the Americans, 
 and offset their economic aspirations in regard to 
 the Nicaraguan project. 
 
 The inauguration of the French canal project at 
 Panama, with the possibility of a European guaranty 
 in the background, induced the Hayes ad- 
 United ministration at Washington to take positive 
 states action in the matter at once and thus be 
 stations at prepared for a show of force in case diplo- 
 Chiriqui matic protests should not prove sufiicient. 
 andGoifito. rp^^ opening of the Panama railway 
 under American auspices some years before, and 
 the diflBculties that arose over the proper guaranty 
 of the route, had, as we know, already shown the 
 government the necessity of establishing naval coal- 
 ing stations on the isthmus in the immediate vicinity 
 of the termini of the route. Our efforts to secure 
 governmental conti'ol of the Panama route itself 
 with naval depots in the harbors at either end had 
 not met with success, but, through Lincoln's contract 
 with the Chiriqui Improvement Company, the gov- 
 ernment still had the right to establish naval stations 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 371 
 
 on both the Atlantic and Pacific shores at Chiriqui 
 and Golfito. It rested entirely with the Executive 
 when this right should be exercised ; so as a precau- 
 tionary measure President Hayes now ordered that 
 the proper steps be taken to establish United States 
 control in this region. The matter was turned over 
 to the Secretary of the Navy, Richard W. Thompson, 
 and under orders from the Department, during the 
 month of February, 1880, Commander Picking of 
 the Kearsage landed coal at Boca del Toro, in the 
 Chiriqui Lagoon, and Commander Howell of the 
 Adams took formal possession in the same way at 
 Golfito. 
 
 Commander Picking reported that " if our govern- 
 ment intends to exercise a protectorate over the 
 Central American republics, we should certainly 
 have a coaling station on the coast for our vessels. 
 And no place offers the facilities of this." But 
 funds were at once necessary for the purpose, so 
 the matter was brought to the attention of Congress 
 and referred to the House Committee on Naval 
 Affairs. In May, 1880, the Committee reported in 
 favor of the scheme, and called for an adequate ap- 
 propriation. " It would be difficult to suggest," the 
 Committee said, " any object of interest more im- 
 portant to the people of the United States than the 
 maintenance of free communication by land and sea, 
 between the Atlantic and Pacific States and Terri- 
 tories of the Union " ; and as " experience has shown 
 that the public authorities of the states through the 
 territory of which this communication in the event 
 
372 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 of the construction of any ocean water-way or ship 
 canal, must be maintained, are unable to afEord ade- 
 quate protection of the interests of the citizens of 
 other countries " ; and as " it seems to be the settled 
 policy of this government ... to exercise a pro- 
 tectorate and supervision over any such water-way 
 or ship canal, in the equal interests of mankind," it 
 was therefore the Committee's opinion " that as a 
 precautionary measure for the protection of the per- 
 sons and property of the citizens of the United 
 States, connected with or using the said water-way, 
 and in order to render such, protectorate efficient and 
 complete, the Secretary of the Navy should be 
 authorized and instructed to secure adequate coaling 
 stations and harbors for the use of the naval forces 
 of the United States, at proper points on the Atlantic 
 and Pacific coasts of Central America and of the 
 American isthmus." 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy asked for $200,000 to 
 start with, and the President, being " convinced of 
 the wisdom and propriety of the suggestions pre- 
 sented " by the Committee urged upon Congress the 
 necessity of an immediate appropriation.' Congress 
 then voted the sum required and left it to the dis- 
 cretion of the Navy Department to act without de- 
 lay at the moment the necessity should arise.^ 
 
 When de Lesseps arrived in Washington early 
 in March, therefore, he found things had gone 
 
 ^ U. S. Ex. Doc, 46, 49th Cong., ist Sess. 
 
 U. S. Statutes at Large, XXI., 448. Appropriations under the Navy 
 Department. 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 373 
 
 much farther than he supposed. Congress had 
 ah'eady declared itself politically opposed to his 
 plans, and its committees of enquiry were 
 now bringing to light many disagreeable president 
 facts, which de Lesseps would rather have Hayes's 
 left buried, concernina; the proceeding's of '^^f^*^^ *** 
 
 . 1 n • • Congress 
 
 the International Scientific Congress. Some Advocating 
 of the foremost men in the United States American 
 were backing the rival Nicaragua canal pro- 
 ject, and they seemed sure of gaining a concession 
 where the French had failed. To enforce their op- 
 position to the Panama canal, the naval forces of 
 the United States were also active and ready to 
 maintain their government's political prestige at 
 either terminus of the route. Such untoward activity 
 in the United States, taken together with his failure 
 to arouse enthusiasm at home, was enough to dis- 
 courage a man of less persistence than de Lesseps ; 
 but he had resolved not to be outdone, so he now 
 set about making the best of a bad situation. 
 
 De Lesseps's first efforts at conciliation were 
 directed upon the President himself, but he gained 
 but little satisfaction from the interview. Hayes 
 received his distinguished visitor politely, but did 
 not hesitate to inform him that, no matter who might 
 build the canal, the United States were bound to 
 maintain an exclusive political control over the 
 route. In fact the President even then had before 
 him all the diplomatic correspondence that the Sen- 
 ate had called for, and having gone over it very 
 carefully with Mr. Evarts, his Secretary of State, he 
 
374 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 had fully made up his mind on the subject, and was 
 at that very time engaged in preparing his message 
 of transmittal. On March 8th, a day or so after 
 this interview, the documents were accordingly laid 
 before the Senate, with a message from the President 
 giving his views on the canal question and the Mon- 
 roe doctrine, couched in the following unequivocal 
 language : 
 
 " In further compliance with the resolution of the Senate, I 
 deem it proper to state briefly my opinion as to the policy of 
 the United States with respect to the construction of an 
 interoceanic canal by any route across the American 
 Isthmus. 
 
 " The policy of this country is a canal under American 
 control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender 
 of this control to any European powers. If existing treaties 
 between the United States and other nations, or if the rights 
 of sovereignty or property of other nations stand in the way 
 of this policy — a contingency which is not apprehended — 
 suitable steps'should be taken by just and liberal negotiations 
 to promote and establish the American policy on this subject, 
 consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected by it. 
 
 " The capital invested by corporations or citizens of other 
 countries in such an enterprise, must, in a -great degree, look 
 for protection to one or more of the great powers of the world. 
 No European power can intervene for such protection, with- 
 out adopting measures on this continent which the United 
 States would deem wholly inadmissible. If the protection of 
 the United States is relied upon, the United States must ex- 
 ercise such control as will enable this country to protect its 
 national interests and maintain the rights of those whose pri- 
 vate capital is embarked in the work. 
 
 " An interoceanic canal across the American Isthmus will 
 essentially change the geographical relations between the 
 Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, and between 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 375 
 
 the United States and the rest of the world. It will be the 
 great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our Pacific 
 shores, and virtually a part of the coast-line of the United 
 States. Our mere commercial interest in it is greater than 
 that of all other countries, while its relation to our power and 
 our prosperity as a nation, to our means of defence, our unity, 
 peace, and safety, are matters of paramount concern to the 
 people of the United States. No other great power would, 
 under similar circumstances, fail to assert a rightful control 
 over a work so closely and vitally affecting its interest and 
 -welfare. 
 
 " Without urging further the grounds of my opinion, I repeat, 
 in conclusion, that it is the right and the duty of the United 
 States to assert and maintain such supervision and authority 
 over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus that connects 
 North and South America as will protect ournational interests. 
 This, I am quite sure, will be found not only compatible with, 
 but promotive of, the widest and most permanent advantage 
 to commerce and civilization." 
 
 Accompanying this message of the President's 
 there were also some pertinent remarks by Mr. 
 Evarts concerning the more immediate question of 
 Colombia's concession to the French. This contract 
 which Wyse had lately secured, Evarts thought in 
 itself presented " an occasion for a deliberate indica- 
 tion by the government of the United States of its 
 Telations to enterprises of this nature, both in its 
 position as an American power, and under its speci- 
 fic treaty rights and obligations toward the United 
 States of Colombia." To the economic features of 
 the undertaking that de Lesseps had in mind, Evarts 
 did not see that we had any right to object, but he 
 added, "this view of the subject is quite too narrow 
 
376 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 and too superficial. It overlooks tbe direct relations 
 of the other American nations to the contemplated 
 change in the route of water-borne commerce, and 
 the indirect but equally weighty considerations by 
 which the relations of the American nations to the 
 great powers of Europe will be modified by this 
 change. It does not penetrate the formal character 
 of the contract as between private capital and local 
 administration, and appreciate its real and far-reach- 
 ing operation upon the commercial and political 
 interests of the American continent." The United 
 States " as the great commercial and political power 
 of America " must therefore, Mr. Evarts concluded,, 
 be " a principal party " to any project of interoceanic 
 transit, and " the question involved presents itself 
 distinctly to this government as a territorial one, in 
 the administration of which, as such, it must exer- 
 cise a potential control." * 
 
 After this vigorous expression of American politi- 
 cal opinion, de Lesseps wisely decided to abandon 
 § 140. De his original plan of a European guaranty. 
 Lesseps's The Panama canal had no official conuec- 
 the United ^'^'^ with the French government at this 
 States and time ; de Lesseps was working for his own 
 t e '■gam- pgj,gQj^g^-]^ reputation as an engineer rather 
 the Comity than for the political prestige of his country ; 
 Americain. and the bankers and speculators supporting 
 him were only anxious to make money out of the 
 scheme. It was a prudent move on de Lesseps's 
 
 ■ U. S. Ex. Doc, No. 112, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 194, 47th Cong., ist Sess., p. 165. 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 377 
 
 part, therefore, to make no point on the political 
 aspects of the canal, in opposition to the Monroe 
 doctrine, and to devote all his energies instead to 
 undermining the economic foundations of the Nic- 
 araguan project. 
 
 Knowing that much would be made by his 
 enemies in Paris of this political opposition of the 
 Americans, de Lesseps at once cabled to his son 
 that "the message of the President assures the 
 political security of the canal." This dispatch was 
 printed in both the French and American papers, 
 and was interpreted by the public of each country 
 to suit their preconceived ideas of international or 
 national control. 
 
 Thus avoiding the dangerous political issue, de 
 Lesseps then prepared to carry on a seci'et warfare 
 aojainst his economic antagonist, the Provisional 
 Canal Society. He had many personal friends in 
 this country whom he interested in his Panama pro- 
 ject, and most active among them was his old ally, 
 Mr. Appleton. More potent still was the pressure 
 brought to bear in de Lesseps's behalf by the 
 Panama Railway Company, whose influence as we 
 know had already been enlisted in favor of the 
 French scheme by Wyse some time before. The 
 railroad stockholders now had the immediate pros- 
 pect of disposing of their rights and their plant for 
 $20,000,000, considerably more than the amount it 
 had cost them, — and their support could thus be 
 relied upon. 
 
 Out of such material de Lesseps then constituted 
 
378 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 his famous Comite Americain to serve in his absence 
 as a militant force against the Nicaraguan project, 
 and in the interests of the Panama canal. Accord- 
 ing to the terms of the agreement the duties of this 
 American committee were thus specifically defined : 
 
 " The Committee shall represent in the United States of 
 America the interests of the company in everything that con- 
 cerns the observance of the neutrality of the canal as defined 
 in Article V. of the law of the United States of Colombia, 
 granting the concession for the said canal ; and, moreover, 
 the Committee shall represent the company in any other 
 matter for which the company, through the Board of Adminis- 
 tration, may request its co-operation, not only during the 
 construction, but also during the working of the canal." 
 
 Being offered a salary of $25,000 a year, Hayes's 
 Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Thompson, to whom had 
 been entrusted the task of strengthening the position 
 of the United States on the lower isthmus, was now 
 induced by de Lesseps to act as chairman of the 
 committee, and bestir himself henceforth in the in- 
 terest of the French at Panama. De Lesseps also 
 appointed three great banking firms in New York, 
 J. and W. Seligman, Drexel Morgan and Co., and 
 Winslow Lanier and Co., to act as the financial 
 agents of the Panama Canal Company in the United 
 States, and promised each house very liberal com- 
 missions for its services.' This was all good business, 
 but the transactions were, to say the least, incongru- 
 
 ' From a subsequent Congressional investigation it appears that these 
 three banks together received $r, 200,000, — practically for the use of their 
 names and nothing more.— C/". Report of Cong. Com. of Investigation, 
 March 2, 1893. 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 379 
 
 ous and somewhat disparaging withal to the Ameri- 
 can patriotism that was then being vaunted in the 
 halls of Congress and expressed in the President's 
 message. But it must be borne in mind that de 
 Lesseps then possessed an untarnished reputation as 
 an engineer, and seemed to have unlimited funds at 
 his disposal ; while the prospects of revenue from 
 the American canal project were certainly not bril- 
 liant. Furthermore, the diplomatic French pro- 
 moter had apparently accepted the President's 
 condition of American control over his canal, and 
 thus placed the project on a purely commercial 
 basis, open to the capital of the world. 
 
 Having thus arranged matters to the smallest 
 detail in America, de Lesseps sailed for Liverpool 
 on April l2, 1880, well pleased with his mission, 
 and determined now to arouse the enthusiasm of 
 Europe in his bold plans.' 
 
 No sooner had de Lesseps departed for Europe 
 than the Nicaragua canal promoters found themselves 
 opposed by still another scheme of inter- 
 oceanic transit. The antagonism this time Eads Ship- 
 arose in the United States, and was repre- Railway 
 sented by a company organized by Captain 
 Eads, who had a plan in mind for a ship-railway 
 across the isthmus of Tehuantepec. 
 
 This idea of transporting loaded vessels across the 
 
 ' De Lesseps's Prospectus, November 15, 1880, and Report of January 
 31, 1881. 
 
 The Panama Canal, Report of the U. S. Congressional Committee of 
 Investigation, March 2 and 11, 1893. Washington Govt. Print. 
 
 Rodrigues, loc. cit., p. 113. 
 
380 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 isthmus by rail was no novelty. It had been sug- 
 gested by Dr. William F. Channing of Providence, 
 E. I., some years before while the Panama railway 
 project was still being discussed io this country. In 
 1865 a patent was taken out, and, the railroad hav- 
 ing been constructed by this time in Panama, the 
 plan then was to utilize the Honduras route for the 
 purpose. The British-Honduras Interoceanic Rail- 
 way Company had thus far been unable to accom- 
 plish anything definite under its concession of 1864, 
 and the patentees of the ship-railway therefore hoped 
 to engage English and American capital in their 
 scheme, and combine with the railway company for 
 the construction of the work. No funds could be 
 raised, however, and the pi'oject was abandoned. 
 
 Shortly after this Captain James B. Eads gained 
 his reputation as an engineer of great originality and 
 resource by the construction of his big bridge across 
 the Mississippi at St. Louis. On the completion of 
 this structure Eads further added to his fame by 
 proving to an incredulous public the practicability 
 of his scheme for deepening the channel of the lower 
 Mississippi by means of jetties. Congress appropri- 
 ated funds for the continuation of the jetty system, 
 and Eads was looked upon as the leading civil engi- 
 neer of the day. 
 
 Surveying his successful work from the last of the 
 finished jetties Eads turned to one of his assistants 
 and said : " We must next discharge the commercial 
 volume of the Mississippi into the Pacific ocean." 
 With this idea in mind he examined into the ques- 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 381 
 
 tion of interoceanic communication, and of all the 
 schemes of transit thus far put forward, he was most 
 impressed with Dr. Channing's project of a ship-rail- 
 way. The details of the plan did not seem sat- 
 isfactory to Eads, however, so he modified them 
 -considerably according to his own ideas. As finally 
 set forth the plans provided for a cradle car in which 
 a, loaded vessel might be taken bodily from the water 
 a,nd carried across the isthmus on a four-fold steel 
 track, the car to be drawn by four powerful locomo- 
 tives abreast. But to Eads the Honduras I'oute did 
 not seem at all advantageous for his purposes, either 
 from a technical or from a commercial point of view, 
 and he therefore, endeavored to persuade de Lesseps 
 to adopt his plans at Panama. But the French pro- 
 moter would have nothing but a sea-level canal, so 
 Eads then determined to apply his scheme for a ship- 
 railway on the Tehuantepec route instead. 
 
 The right of way across this isthmus still belonged 
 to an American company. Mr. Hai'gous and his as- 
 sociates failed, as we know, in their original endeav- 
 ors to forestall the Panama company and construct 
 the first railroad across the American isthmus ; but 
 in 1857 the Tehuantepec railway project had been 
 revived, and a fresh survey of the route had been 
 conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Sidell, U. 
 S. A. A definite line was then adopted, but the war 
 intervening soon after, nothing further was attempted 
 until 1870, when a new company was formed under 
 the direction of Mr. Simon Stevens. By a decree of 
 the Mexican government of December 20, 1870, 
 
382 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 this company gained the additional right to construct 
 a canal as well as a railway across the isthmus, and 
 succeeded in having a committee appointed, to ex- 
 amine the principal artificial water-ways of Europe, 
 with reference to the construction of the Tehuante- 
 pec railway and ship-canal. 
 
 The project again hung fire at this point, however, 
 and Eads found the Tehuantepec concessionaries very 
 willing to merge their interests with his and arrange 
 for a ship-railway instead of a canal aci'oss the isth- 
 mus. A company was thereupon organized for the 
 purpose, and on May 6, 1881, the Mexican govern- 
 ment granted the promoters a very favorable con- 
 cession for the work. 
 
 Eads estimated the cost of construction at $18,- 
 750,000, and in order to provide for the necessary 
 expenses he and his associates then appealed to Con- 
 gress to grant them a financial guaranty of $2,500,- 
 000 a year for fifteen years from the opening of the 
 railway, provided that they proved the possibility 
 of transporting a vessel of 3000 tons burden unin- 
 jured across the isthmus.' The bill was referred to 
 the House Committee which was then engaged in 
 studying the question of interoceanic communication. 
 Eads himself appeared a number of times before the 
 commilitee, and explained his project in detail. Con- 
 gressmen had a high respect for Eads's ability as an 
 engineer on account of his successful solution of the 
 
 ' In the concession of 1881 the Mexican government had already granted 
 a similar guaranty of $1,250,000, on condition that a further guaranty of 
 $2,500,000 be obtained from foreign nations. 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 383 
 
 puzzling problem of the Mississippi, and so con- 
 vincing were his present arguments, that the com- 
 mittee registered its preliminaiy approval of the 
 project in its report, as follows : 
 
 " It is but proper to say that in the opinion of the most able 
 and well-known engineers, naval architects, and ship-builders 
 of the world, the construction of a ship-railway at Tehuantepec, 
 in accordance with the plans which have been submitted to 
 them by Mr. Eads, is entirely practicable. Indeed, many of 
 these experts go much further than this, and declare that a 
 railway is preferable to a canal ; — first, in the economy with 
 which it can be constructed ; second, in the facility with which 
 it may be enlarged when commerce demands enlargement ; 
 third, in the economy with which it can be operated ; and 
 fourth, in its ability to transport vessels with greater rapidity 
 and less delay.' 
 
 In the meantime Mr. Menocal was busily engaged 
 in Nicaragua prevailing upon that government to 
 grant his company a concession. But 
 Blanch et had also been exerting his influ- .§ '^^' ^^' 
 
 T>T- T • 1 nuantepec, 
 
 ence again upon the JNicaraguan legisla- Nicaragua, 
 ture, and had left an impression that the *«d 
 
 French company, with unlimited funds at 
 its back, would be willing to shift it allegiance to 
 Nicaragua if proper arrangements could be made with 
 
 ' Elmer L. Corthell, " Scientific Solution of the Interoceanic Problem," 
 New York, 1886. 
 
 TAe Scientific American, January, 1886. 
 
 Daniel Ammen, "The Certainties of the Nicaragua Canal Contrasted 
 with the Uncertainties of the Eads Ship-Railway." Washington, 1886. 
 
 Sullivan, he. cit. 
 
 Simon Stevens, ' ' The New Route of Commerce by the Isthmus of Te- 
 huantepec." London, 1871. 
 
384 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the government. Menocal had to bestir himself to 
 combat this impression, but managed to convince 
 the Nicaraguan authorities in the end that the 
 American promoters vpere really in earnest this time 
 and that their government was supporting them in 
 their project. It vs^as therefore finally agreed that 
 Nicaragua should grant the Provisional Society a 
 concession ; but only on the condition that a regular 
 canal company should be organized, and actual work 
 begun on the canal within the space of two years 
 from May 22, 1880. 
 
 This was a very short space of time in which to 
 arrange all the necessary preliminaries for the work, 
 and Grant himself was rather doubtful as to the 
 wisdom of making the attempt, but his associates, 
 on the other hand, were still eager to enter the list 
 with their rivals and bid for government aid. 
 Strong influence had already been brought to bear 
 on the House Committee by de Lesseps's agents in 
 the interests of Panama, and now Eads had come to 
 the front with his original scheme for a ship-railway, 
 and was scoring his points, as we know. 
 
 On January 26, 1881, the House Committee added 
 fresh complexity to the problem by handing in its 
 report. Instead of digesting the material and com- 
 ing to a definite conclusion, as Grant's commission 
 of inquiry had done, this committee clung close to 
 its instructions, and simply gave out in an abridged 
 form, the testimony it had received and the informa- 
 tion it had collected on the technical aspects of the 
 several routes. The advantages of the Nicaraguaa 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 385 
 
 project were indeed reiterated, but Eads's scheme 
 now came in for a fair share of approval, as we have 
 seen, and the Panama tide-level plan also received a 
 more favorable mention than before. 
 
 Thus the first result of the report was to bring 
 the three modern projects of interoceanic communi- 
 cation, — the Tehuantepec ship-railway, the Nica- 
 ragua lock-canal, and the tide-level canal across 
 Panama, — squarely before the American public as 
 competitors. But Congress had been called upon to 
 provide for an American canal, and it was there- 
 fore necessary to decide on a definite route. The 
 trouble seemed to lie in the lack of sufficient evidence 
 on the subject, so the Senate then turned to the 
 Navy Department, on March 17th, requesting " such 
 information as had been collected by the Bureau of 
 Navigation relating to the problem of interoceanic 
 communication by the American Isthmus." * 
 
 Such evidence must go to prove their contentions, 
 the Nicaragua enthusiasts thought, as Grant's com- 
 mission had rendered its favorable decision on their 
 project upon data collected by the Bureau of Naviga- 
 tion. But the time at their disposal was growing 
 short, and an extension of their concession was neces- 
 sary if Congress was not yet ready to decide. Cap- 
 tain Phelps and Captain Lull therefore set out for 
 Nicaragua to use their powers of persuasion upon 
 
 ' The duty of tabulating the data on the canal question and collecting the 
 reports of the several surveys, in the illness of Admiral Nourse, to whom 
 the task was assigned, devolved upon Lieutenant John T. Sullivan, U. S. N., 
 who, on April 28, 1883, submitted the voluminous report so often referred 
 
 to in these pages. 
 
 25 
 
386 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the authorities there to grant their company a further 
 respite. But Blanchet had already anticipated their 
 failure, and was again negotiating for a concession to 
 the French when they arrived. It was a nip-and- 
 tuck struggle this time, but with the timely diplo- 
 matic aid of their State Department, the Americans 
 were again successful, and secured a further exten- 
 sion of their concession to September 30, 1884. 
 
 It was also necessary to bring their project for- 
 mally before Congress, and thus meet Eads on his 
 own ground. Early in the next session, therefore, 
 on December 15, 1881, Senator Miller of California 
 presented their bill, calling for political protection 
 and a government guaranty of the Nicaragua canal 
 project. But here a fresh difficulty was encountered. 
 Whatever might be the technical advantages of the 
 Nicaragua route, the Senators knew very well that 
 the construction of an American canal in this region 
 would surely involve the government in another 
 diplomatic controversy with Great Britain. The 
 domestic aspects of the question had thus to be 
 overlooked, and the bill was turned over by the 
 Senate to its Committee on Foreign Relations for 
 consideration. After careful deliberation of some 
 months the bill was reported back with amendments, 
 and then passed on to the House Committee on 
 Foreign Affairs for further consideration. There the 
 question was again gone over in detail, and it was 
 not until July 21st that the bill was reported to the 
 House. Still further amendments were added in 
 this report, but the committee considered the matter 
 
Panama Canal and Monroe Doctrine. 387 
 
 to be of great importance to the country and hoped 
 the considerations it set forth " would induce Con- 
 gress to give its prompt attention to the report." 
 
 In a three-cornered fight it is very apt to be the 
 case that the two weaker combine against the strong- 
 est, and this was the predicament the Nicaragua 
 promoters now found themselves in. De Lesseps 
 did not fear the rivalry of the Tehuantepec ship- 
 railway scheme, but he could not brook a competing 
 canal project. Eads, on the other hand, was looking 
 to government support, and it was the Nicaragua 
 promoters, and not de Lesseps, who were balking 
 him in this. So Eads and de Lesseps, naturally 
 enough, joined forces in the lobby to keep Congress 
 from committing itself in favor of the Nicaragua 
 canal. Thus no action was taken on the House 
 Committee's report, and the Nicaragua canal pro- 
 moters had, therefore, to begin their fight anew when 
 Congress reassembled. Their bill was this time pre- 
 sented before the House by Mr. Kosecrans of Cali- 
 fornia, and referred again to the Committee on 
 Foreign Affairs. It was reported back as before, 
 but through the persistent influence of the opposi- 
 tion lobby, action on the report was delayed until 
 late in the session. It then came up as unfinished 
 business, and. a majority was indeed enlisted in its 
 favor, the final vote standing 127 Ayes and 76 Nays. 
 But a two-thirds vote was needed for the considera- 
 tion of the report under such circumstances ; and 
 thus, in spite of their best efforts, the Nicaragua 
 enthusiasts had to accept their defeat. 
 
388 The Nicaragua Canal, 
 
 But Eads was no more successful with his bill, so 
 it was de Lesseps who really came out victorious in 
 this struggle before Congress. He had demanded 
 nothing of the government but the confusion of his 
 enemies, and being fortunate enough to have two 
 American rivals, he had only to set the one upon 
 the other in order to gain his own ends.' 
 
 * U. S. House Report, 211, 46th Cong., 3d Sess. 
 U. S. House Report, 1698, Senate Report 368, 47tli Cong., 1st Sess. 
 U. S. Senate Report, 952, 47th Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
 North American Review, Oct. and Nov., 1885, under " Recollections of 
 General U. S. Grant." 
 
 The Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua, loc. cit., p. II. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 ANOTHER DIPLOMATIC BOUT WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 1~^HE contest between the rival routes left 
 Panama master of the immediate situa- 
 tion, it is true, but the straggle also had 
 other and more far-reaching effects. From the very- 
 moment that the canal question came up for discus- 
 sion in Congress, in the sittings of the „ 
 
 •t-i. ^u 1, r it- § '43. The 
 
 various committees, throughout the re- ciayton- 
 
 ports submitted, and in all the resolutions Buiwer 
 adopted, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty stood AgaiiT 
 threateningly in the background, ready to 
 cast its pall over every expression of Americanism. 
 The Tehuantepec and Nicaraguan projects had thus 
 to suffer for lack of governmental support, while de 
 Lesseps and his agents, who had so skilfully avoided 
 the political issue, were given free rein in their 
 plans. 
 
 In examining into the matter the various commit- 
 tees of Congress were very soon forced to recognize 
 that the President's American canal policy could not 
 be carried out under the terms of the Clayton-Bul- 
 wer treaty without coming into direct conflict with 
 Great Britain over the political control of the canal. 
 John Quincy Adams had been shrewd enough to see 
 
 389 
 
390 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 through Canning's clever move, and consequently re- 
 fused to allow England to figure as the one European 
 exception to the Monroe doctrine ; but as far as the 
 transit question was concerned, his foresight went 
 for naught, for Palmerston soon after forced Clayton 
 to admit Great Britain as a silent partner in the canal 
 project, and Buchanan then sealed the bargain with 
 his approval. Thus whatever the President might 
 now say as to the policy of American conti'ol, the 
 hands of Congress were bound. 
 
 Not having themselves to blame in the matter, the 
 committee-men in Congress fell to abusing the Tay- 
 lor and Buchanan administrations for their blunders. 
 " The attitude assumed on this occasion," one com- 
 mittee said, " by the American Secretary of State 
 (Clayton) was so strangely inconsistent alike with 
 the interests and with the dignity of the United 
 States that it is impossible for the committee to ad- 
 vert to it without pain." Another fretfully remarked 
 that " the shortsightedness and weakness of Mr. 
 Clayton on this occasion were the less excusable 
 since he seems to have been fully conscious not 
 only of the greatness and splendor of the advan- 
 tages he was throwing- away for his country, but 
 also of the entire legitimacy of our claim to those 
 advantages." 
 
 The conamittee delegated by the House to call for 
 a convention of the Spanish-American States and 
 report upon the Monroe doctrine, also came to the 
 dead-wall of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty before it 
 had even concluded its preliminary deliberations. 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 391 
 
 Finding it could proceed no further along the lines 
 laid down, this committee then reported that " so 
 long as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty has a formal 
 shadow of existence, it cannot but tend to cloud 
 and obscure the perfectly simple, Just, and equitable 
 policy of the United States in regard to the inter- 
 oceanic transit question, and to any plans or enter- 
 prises wherever originated and organized for opening 
 a sea-way through the isthmus of Panama or the 
 Central American States." 
 
 Immediate transit projects might well enough be 
 left to suffer for the errors of the past, but the gen- 
 erally unsatisfactory diplomatic situation could not 
 be allowed to remain ; so the upshot of the whole 
 matter was that the Senate and the House, having 
 suffered the Tehuantepec and Nicaragua proposals 
 to go by the board, finally got together, on April 16, 
 1880, and complemented the President's American 
 canal policy in a Joint resolution to the following 
 effect : 
 
 " Resolved that the President of the United States be, and 
 he is hereby, respectfully requested, if the same in his opinion 
 shall not be incompatible with the public interest, to take im- 
 mediate steps for the formal and final abrogation of the Conven- 
 tion of April 19, 1850, between the United States of America 
 and Her British Majesty, commonly called the ' Ship-Canal 
 Treaty ' or the ' Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.' " ' 
 
 Garfield's administration was installed at this June- 
 
 ' U. S. House Report, ii2r, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 
 U. S. House Report, 1698, 47th Cong., ist Sess. 
 U. S. Senate Report, 952, 47th Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
392 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 ture and it thus fell to the lot of his Secretary of State 
 James G. Blaine, to open this fresh diplomatic 
 §. 144. controversy with Great Britain for the 
 Blaine's abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
 Letter^to Following the earlier resolutions of Con- 
 the Powers gress and President Hayes's message on the 
 of Europe, gubject, Blaine thought it best, first, to 
 inform all the powers of Europe of his government's 
 general intention to maintain its political control over 
 the canal route, and then answer England's special ex- 
 ceptions to the decision as they were recorded. To 
 this end he composed a very carefully worded circular 
 letter on the subject, which he despatched on Juue 24, 
 1881, to the American ministers abroad, with instruc- 
 tions to communicate its contents to the several gov- 
 ernments to which they were respectively accredited. 
 The reported European guaranty of the Panama 
 canal route was made the main subject of this 
 despatch, and of course Blaine took strong ground 
 against any such intervention of the powers in Amer- 
 ican affairs. The United States government, he main- 
 tained, had already "positively and efficaciously" 
 guaranteed the neutrality of this route, and there- 
 with also the sovereignty of Colombia over the terri- 
 tory in question. This guaranty, therefore, Blaine 
 continued, " does not requii-e reinforcement or acces- 
 sion or assent from any other power," and, moreover, 
 " supplementing the guaranty. . . . would necessa- 
 rily be regarded by this government as an uncalled- 
 for intrusion into a field where the local and general 
 interests of the United States- of America must be 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 393 
 
 considered before those of any other power save 
 those of the United States of Colombia alone." The 
 Secretary then declared again, in the language of his 
 predecessor Mr. Evarts, that his government had no 
 desire to interfere with the purely commercial man- 
 agement of the canal, but was determined, neverthe- 
 less, to maintain its political control over the route, 
 and, he went on, " the United States of America will 
 insist upon her right to take all needful precautions 
 against the possibility of the isthmus-transit being, 
 in any event, used offensively against her interest 
 upon the land or upon the sea." " If the proposed 
 canal were a channel of communication near to the 
 countries of the Old World, ... it might very prop- 
 erly be urged that the influence of the European 
 powers should be commensurate with their interests," 
 Blaine argued, and, if assured of equal participation 
 in its enjoyment, the United States could find no 
 fault with the exercise of such influence. "The 
 case, however, is here reversed," he went on, " and 
 an agreement between the European states to jointly 
 guarantee the neutrality, and, in effect, control the 
 political character of a highway of commerce, remote 
 from them and near to us, forming substantially a 
 part of our coast line, and promising to become the 
 chief means of transportation between our Atlantic 
 and Pacific states, would be viewed by this govern- 
 ment with the gravest concern." Thus Blaine con- 
 cluded in still more definite language, " Any attempt 
 to supersede that guaranty by an agreement between 
 European powers which maintain vast armies and 
 
394 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 patrol the sea with immense fleets and whose inter- 
 est in the canal and its operations can never be so 
 vital and supreme as ours, would partake of the 
 nature of an alliance against the United states." ' 
 
 Blaine hardly expected the continental powers 
 to take any present exception to his remarks, as de 
 §. 145. Lesseps had already abandoned his idea of 
 Blaine's a Joint European protectorate of the Pana- 
 American ™^ canal route. But with Great Britain it 
 Policy, was quite different. Neither her govern- 
 ment nor her citizens had anything whatever to do 
 with de Lesseps's plans, and yet Blaine had classed 
 the British along with the rest of the Europeans, and 
 distinctly told them that they must have nothing 
 further to say in regard to the political control of any 
 canal across the American isthmus. Now, by the 
 tei'ms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty still in force, 
 Grreat Britain was allowed a half interest in the con- 
 trol of all three transit-ways, and consequently must 
 object to any such interpretation of the Monroe doc- 
 trine as Blaine was attempting to apply in the canal 
 controversy. 
 
 Blaine confidently expected this, and knowing full 
 well that the narrower issue between England and 
 the United States would be drawn in Nicaragua 
 rather than Panama, he hastened to prepare our dip- 
 lomatic relations with that country to meet it. 
 
 Congress evidently had in mind a closer union of 
 the United States and Spanish America with refer- 
 
 'For full text of this despatch see Sen. Ex. Doc, 194, 47th Cong., ist 
 Sess. 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 395 
 
 ence to the Monroe doctrine, and Blaine's first efforts 
 were therefore directed toward uniting the Central 
 American staites in our interests. He accordingly 
 instructed Mr. Logan, the new United States minister 
 to these countries, who was then about to start for his 
 post, to visit all the states of Central America and en- 
 deavor to persuade them to give over their ceaseless 
 quarrelling and unite once more into a confederacy, 
 promising them the constant aid and encouragement 
 of the United States in cementing the Union. 
 
 Logan did as he was told but soon became pessi- 
 mistic concerning the possibility of a united Central 
 American republic. " Nothing but the strong arm 
 of an absolute monarchy," Logan wrote to Blaine, 
 " supported by ample resources of money, ships and 
 men could tie them into a single government." But 
 Blaine was not discouraged, for he never expected 
 his Pan-American plans to mature in a day. He 
 then suggested to the several Presidents of the isth- 
 mian republics, that they meet together in Panama 
 and talk the situation over ; but as the United States 
 were not to be represented at this peace congress, the 
 Spanish- American executives failed to respond. See- 
 ing then that initiative was not to be expected from 
 the parties concerned, Blaine issued a formal invita- 
 tion to the Central American states to send delegates 
 to a peace congress to be held in Washington in 
 November, 1882. 
 
 As might have been expected Costa E,ica was again 
 the only state which held aloof. The authorities of 
 this republic always looked to European rather than 
 
396 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 American support, and just now the French were in 
 high favor there, represented by Blanchet and his 
 associates. Guatemala, on the contrary, went to the 
 other extreme and became enthusiastic over Blaine's 
 Pan-American schemes. The Liberals had long been 
 working toward a union of the Central American 
 states, Guatemala's President maintained, but as yet 
 they had never proved strong enough to effect their 
 desires unassisted, and, since the days of Walker's 
 expedition, the United States had only shown them- 
 selves inclined to render Spanish- America their moral 
 support. What the Liberal party now demanded 
 was the material assistance of some strong foreign 
 power to accomplish its design, and, the Guatemalan 
 executive declared the United States was the only 
 government which could render such aid. This was 
 more or less in accordance with Blaine's own ideas, 
 but the time for such action had not yet come, and, 
 indeed, it took several years more of manoeuvring 
 before the Spanish- Americans actually came to Wash- 
 ington on their first Pan-American mission.' 
 
 In the meantime Great Britain had been making 
 her influence felt in Central America in quite a 
 g ^ , ^jjg different way. The British foreign policy 
 Mosquito moves forward more steadily and smoothly. 
 Protector- — g^j^^ indeed with much less outward 
 'fuss, — than ours; and had Blaine only 
 taken the trouble to examine into the affair more 
 closely, he must have recognized that his diplomacy 
 was distanced from the start. The fact was, Blaine's 
 
 ' Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. S., 1880-81. 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 397 
 
 Pan-American promises were given too late in the 
 day to affect tlie immediate question of interoceanic 
 transit ; for wliile the attention of our Congress was 
 absorbed in passing its bellicose resolutions, England 
 had quietly stepped in and raised yet another bar to 
 our claims over the Nicaragua canal route. 
 
 Ever since Secretary Seward's promises of support, 
 the Nicaraguan authorities had continued to with- 
 hold their promised indemnity to the Mosquito In- 
 dians, and persistently refused to abide by the terms 
 of the treaty of Managua. The British Foreign Office, 
 nevertheless, quietly acquiesced in such infringe- 
 ment until it had fully established its case. Then, 
 in 1880, before Blaine had an inkling of its plans, 
 a peremptory demand was made upon Nicaragua 
 to submit all matters in dispute to the Emperor of 
 Austria for arbitration. True, the United States 
 were in no wise consulted in the matter ; but then 
 they could not justly complain of the slight, as they 
 had already declared themselves satisfied with the 
 terms of the treaty of 1860, and the questions at 
 issue only involved its proper interpretation. Lack- 
 ing American support when she most needed it, 
 Nicaragua had been obliged to agree, and thus, in 
 July, 1881, the imperial arbitrator handed down his 
 decision as follows : 
 
 (i) Nicaragua's sovereignty over the reservation is limited 
 and Mosquitia constitutes merely an inseparable " political 
 appurtenance of the main country." 
 
 (2) Nicaragua has no right to regulate trade, nor levy im- 
 port or export duties within Mosquitia, nor grant any conces- 
 sions within its territory. 
 
398 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 (3) Greytown is a free port, and Nicaragua can collect 
 neither import nor export duties there. 
 
 (4) Nicaragua's only source of revenue from Mosquitia is 
 from postage stamps and coinage. 
 
 (5) Mosquitia is entitled to its own flag with some emblem 
 of Nicaragua sovereignty attached. 
 
 (6) The subvention stipulated in the treaty must be paid in 
 full by Nicaragua. 
 
 (7) Nicaragua only holds her rights in Mosquitia so long as 
 she obeys the treaty, and the moment she departs from its 
 terms Great Britain may rightly interfere, for " England has an 
 interest of its own in the fulfilment of these conditions stipu- 
 lated in favor of those who were formerly under its protection, 
 and therefore also a right of its own to insist upon, the fulfil- 
 ment of those promises as well as of all other clauses of the 
 treaty." 
 
 This decision was little short, of a complete reaffir- 
 mation of the Mosquito protectorate which Great 
 Britain was supposed to have abandoned ; but, as 
 usual, the United States only brought up their Mon- 
 roe doctrine in rebuttal after the whole matter had 
 been concluded.^ 
 
 Blaine, moreover, appears to have been totally un- 
 aware of this practical revival of the British claims 
 g to the mouth of the proposed canal, and 
 
 Blaine thus, with scarcely an inch of diplomatic 
 Opens the ground to Stand upon, he plunged at once 
 Campaign ^^^^ ^ diplomatic controversy with England 
 with Great for the abrogation of, the Clayton-Bulwer 
 ri ain. treaty according to the joint resolution of 
 Congress. 
 
 ' Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. S., 1880-81. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 20, 53d Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 76-142. 
 
 De Kalb, loc. cit. 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 399 
 
 His circular letter had, he thought, sufficiently in- 
 timated his general intentions, and so, on November 
 19, 1881, Blaine addressed a long despatch to Mr. 
 Lowell, our minister in London, outlining his case 
 under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This treaty, he 
 began, was agreed upon some thirty years before 
 under exceptional circumstances which were tempo- 
 rary in character and which now no longer exist. 
 Each government then claimed certain rights'in Cen- 
 tral America, and both were anxious to see a transit- 
 way constructed at once. The United States did 
 not possess sufficient capital at that time to under- 
 take the work alone, and therefore the desire for 
 British funds greatly influenced the convention. 
 But all this has changed, Blaine continued, and the 
 United States, having since developed their interests 
 along the Pacific coast so enormously, now have new 
 duties to perform with which the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty interferes. The idea of this treaty was to place 
 the two signatory powers on a plane of equality, but 
 its present operation, Blaine maintained, would practi- 
 cally concede " to Great Britain the control of what- 
 ever canal may be constructed " ; for " the treaty 
 binds the United States not to use its military force 
 in any precautionary measure, while it leaves the naval 
 power of Great Britain perfectly free and unre- 
 strained." In order to equalize matters on this basis 
 it would therefore be necessary to prohibit war ves- 
 sels of Great Britain from passing through the canal ; 
 for, our Secretary argued, " if no American soldier is 
 to be quartered on the isthmus to protect the rights of 
 
400 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 his country in the interoceanic canal, surely by the 
 fair logic of neutrality, no war vessel of Great Britain 
 should be permitted to appear in the waters that 
 control either entrance to the canal." Inasmuch as 
 England has fortified and now holds all " the stra- 
 tegic points that control the route to India," it is 
 therefore no more unreasonable, Blaine maintained, 
 " for the United States to demand a share in these 
 fortifications, or to demand their absolute neutraliza- 
 tion, than for England to make the same demand in 
 perpetuity from the United States with respect to 
 the transit across the American continent." As Eng- 
 land thus guards the route to her colonies, so the 
 United States only desire to guard their route to 
 a section of their own territory comprising, Blaine 
 said, " nearly 800,000 square miles, — ^larger in extent 
 than the German Empire and the four Latin 
 countries of Europe combined, — " and inhabited 
 not by people of alien races, as was the case 
 with India, but by citizens " of our own blood and 
 kindred, — bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh." 
 In the event of a hostile movement against the 
 Pacific states, the United States cannot therefore, 
 permit themselves to be bound by a treaty which 
 gives " the same right through the canal to a war- 
 ship bent on an errand of destruction, that is re- 
 served to its navy sailing for the defence of the 
 coast and protection of the citizens." " A mere 
 agreement of neutrality on paper between the great 
 powers of Europe," Blaine feared, " might prove in- 
 effectual to preserve the canal in time of hostilities." 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 401 
 
 " The first sound of a cannon in a general European 
 war would," lie said, " in all probability, annul tlie 
 treaty of neutrality, and the strategic position of the 
 canal commanding both oceans might be held by the 
 first naval power that could seize it," and this would 
 be a fatal blow to the domestic commerce of the 
 United States. Other nations were already gaining 
 supremacy in Central America, he added, and unless 
 the treaty of 1850 were modified in some way, both 
 Great Britain and the United States must stand by 
 helpless, while some other power stepped in and 
 directed the canal. Already, Blaine pointed out, 
 France is standing sponsor for the Panama canal, 
 and under the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
 the United States were not able to assert their plain 
 rights acquired from Colombia in 1848. 
 
 From these and other considerations of a like na- 
 ture, Blaine was finally able to conclude that the 
 American isthmus should be placed "under the con- 
 trol of that government least likely to be engaged in 
 war, and able, in any and every event, to enforce 
 the guardianship which she shall assume. For pro- 
 tection to her own interests, therefore, the United 
 States, in the first instance, asserts her right to con- 
 trol the isthmus transit ; and secondly, she offers, by 
 such control, that absolute neutralization of the canal 
 as respects European powers, which can in no other 
 way be certainly attained and lastingly assured." 
 
 Having thus in a somewhat peremptory fashion 
 laid down the deliberate opinion of his government, 
 Mr. Blaine rounded off his despatch with the hope 
 
 26 
 
402 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 that Great Britain would at least consent to a 
 friendly modification of the disagreeable treaty in 
 harmony with the American demands. 
 
 This could hardly be expected, however, for 
 Blaine seemed to forget that during all these years 
 Great Britain had been advancing toward the west 
 as well as toward the east, and that it was equally 
 imperative upon her to fortify and guard her western 
 as well as her eastern trade route. Everything that 
 Blaine had to say was true enough as an expression 
 of our national policy, but if we felt so strongly in 
 the matter, why had we not acted more in accord- 
 ance with our convictions ? As a matter of fact, 
 Buchanan had long ago closed our case, and Blaine's 
 argument being entirely theoretical and ex parte 
 showed no good grounds on which it could be 
 reopened. 
 
 Blaine was quite right in his original supposition 
 that Great Britain Avould take exception to his cir- 
 cular letter on the Monroe doctrine as ap- 
 § 148. Lord j-g^ to the canal. Lord Granville was 
 
 Granville s ^ 
 
 Reply to then Foreign Secretary, and his reply, 
 Blaine's (jated November 10, 1881, crossed Blaine's 
 Letter. Special despatch on the way. His Lord- 
 ship expressed some surprise at the nature 
 of the circular letter of the State Department of the 
 United States, and more especially in its application 
 to the British government. He was glad, he said, to 
 learn that Mr. Blaine had no intention of initiating 
 a discussion on the question of the joint guaranty 
 of the isthmus, and he only wished to call attention 
 to the fact that " the position of Great Britain and 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 403 
 
 the United States witli reference to tte canal, irre- 
 spective of the magnitude of the commercial rela- 
 tions of the former power with countries to and 
 from which, if completed, it will form the highway, 
 is determined by the engagements entered into by 
 them, respectively, in the convention . . . com- 
 monly known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty " ; and, 
 Lord Granville curtly concluded, "Her Majesty's 
 government rely with confidence upon the obser- 
 vance of all the engagements of that treaty." 
 
 But the British Foreign Office was mistaken, for 
 not only the Secretary of State, but also both 
 Houses of Congress were eager to reopen § ^^^ 
 the old contest with England over the Blaine's 
 control of the American isthmus. On the ^. .*^*°r"^* 
 
 Objections. 
 
 receipt of Lord Granville's note at the 
 hands of the British minister, Blaine was forced to 
 recognize that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty must hence- 
 forth act as an estoppel to any further theoretical 
 discussion of American rights. Still unappalled by 
 the inherent weakness of his case, he thereupon set 
 bravely to work to break down the bar by the force 
 of certain "historical objections," which hedespatched 
 in a second note to Mr. Lowell on November 29th. 
 
 With great care Mr. Blaine went over all the 
 diplomatic correspondence that passed between the 
 two governments during the years that had elapsed 
 between 1850 and 1859, quoting very largely and 
 commenting sharply by the way. From the diplo- 
 matic history thus recorded, Blaine was finally able 
 to conclude that "the engagements of the treaty 
 were misunderstandingly entei'ed into, imperfectly 
 
404 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 comprehended, contradictorily interpreted, and mu- 
 tually vexatious," and that, therefore, the convention 
 must now be either abrogated, or revised. 
 
 This was again all true enough as far as it went, 
 but then Blaine seemed to forget that his govern- 
 ment had come to these self-same conclusions in 
 regard to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty as early as 1854. 
 But instead of insisting upon its abrogation at this 
 time, Buchanan had allowed himself to be hood- 
 winked in the matter, while Great Britain pursued 
 her own plans. The treaties she arranged with the 
 isthmian states seemed plausible, and Buchanan, as 
 we know, had deliberately closed our case by 
 declaring himself " entirely satisfied " with the 
 result. This, we will remembei", was in 1860, and 
 Blaine only brought his historical objections down 
 to 1859. In logic as well as in legal procedure, one 
 is not allowed to deal with estoppels chronologically. 
 On the contrary, the last in time is the first to be 
 attacked, and by reversing this order, Blaine's " histo- 
 rical objections " fell considerably short of the mark. 
 
 Lord Granville deemed Mr. Blaine's theoretical 
 argument worthy of but slight consideration, the 
 § j^g The principles upon which it was grounded 
 British being as far as he was aware, " novel in 
 to^Biaine's i^iternational law." There were some ques- 
 Theoreticai tions of fact in the despatch, however, to 
 Argument ^Jjidi ije saw fit to take exception. In the 
 Historical ^^^^ place His Lordship denied that Her 
 Objections. Majesty's government exercised any pro- 
 tectorate over the route to the East or along the 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 405 
 
 Suez canal. Then again he pointed out that, inas- 
 much as English subjects had aided in that develop- 
 ment of the Pacific coast to which Mr. Blaine had 
 alluded, Great Britain was therefore as much an 
 interested party in the construction and control of 
 the canal as the United States. In regard to the 
 unexampled character of the development of this 
 western sea-board, Lord Granville admitted it as a 
 fact and congratulated the United States for their 
 share in the achievement; but, he continued, he 
 could not well understand how Mr. Blaine could 
 speak of it as unexpected. On the contrary, Gran- 
 ville argued, as early as 1823 President Monroe him- 
 self distinctly provided for the future of the Pacific, 
 and surely the conditions could not have so changed 
 since 1850 as to warrant the United States in vitia- 
 ting the careful agreement then entered into between 
 the two powers to cover this very question. It is 
 perfectly true, the British Secretary admitted, that 
 the foreign policy of the United States has never 
 given rise to any feelings of suspicion or alarm in 
 Europe, but should they now change their plans and 
 begin to fortify the international water-way and 
 consider it as a part of their coast-line, they must 
 expect to meet the logical counterpart of this doc- 
 trine in the other powers across the sea. 
 
 Looking at the question from this point of view, 
 Lord Granville declared that Her Majesty's govern- 
 ment still regarded the principles embodied in the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty as " intrinsically sound " and 
 "applicable to the present state of affairs." Both 
 
406 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the United States and Great Britain, he maintained, 
 had made pi'ogress in the right direction through 
 the treaties they had lately entered into with the 
 Central American states, and now. His Lordship 
 concluded, Great Britain would gladly co-operate 
 with the United States in any invitation to the 
 powers to Join in the international guaranty contem- 
 plated in the treaty. 
 
 This first despatch of the English Secretary bore 
 the date of January 7, 1882, and having thus dis- 
 posed of the theoretical side of the case, he next 
 took up Mr. Blaine's " historical objections " in an- 
 other note to Mr. West, the British Minister in 
 Washington, dated January 14, 1882. This answer 
 required much more detail, so Lord Granville too 
 went back over the diplomatic correspondence be- 
 tween the two governments from 1850 on, and 
 answered each point raised by Mr. Blaine, from the 
 English point of view. The British diplomatist, 
 however, did not end the matter with 1859, but 
 went on and showed from President Buchanan's 
 own message that at that time the United States 
 had shown themselves to be entirely S3,tisfied with 
 the result. His Lordship then rather pertinently 
 remarked that " in cases where the details of an 
 international agreement have given rise to difficulties 
 and discussions to such an extent as to cause the 
 contracting parties, at one time, to contemplate its 
 abrogation or modification as one of several possible 
 alternatives, and where it has yet been found prefer- 
 able to arrive at a solution as to those details rather 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 407 
 
 than to sacrifice the general basis of the engage- 
 ment, it must surely be allov\ ed that such a fact, far 
 from being an argument against that engagement, 
 is an argument distinctly in its favor." " It is 
 equally plain," Lord Granville continued in the 
 same vein, " that either of the contracting parties 
 which had abandoned its oven contention for the 
 purpose of preserving the agreement in its entirety 
 would have reason to complain if the differences 
 which had been settled by its concession were after- 
 wards urged as a reason for essentially modifying 
 those other provisions which it had made this sacri- 
 fice to maintain." 
 
 From his perusal of the correspondence in ques- 
 tion, — which Lord Granville complained Mr. Blaine 
 had only quoted in part, — the English Secretary, 
 thei'efore, drew the following conclusions : first, that 
 the present differences between the two governments 
 had their origin, not in the general principles of the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty, but solely in the stipulation 
 concerning colonization in Central America by Great 
 Britain and the United States, which stipulation 
 Mr. Blaine now desired only to retain in part in 
 order that the United States might be free to estab- 
 lish naval and military stations along the canal 
 route ; second, that the declarations of the United 
 States during the controversy were distinctly at 
 variance with any such proposal ; third, that at one 
 time Great Britain was willing to abrogate the treaty 
 on condition of reverting to the status quo of 1850, 
 but that the United States had declined, saying that 
 
408 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 such an arrangement would be fraught with great 
 danger to the good relations between the two par- 
 ties, and that now events had rendered such a course 
 impossible ; fourth, that a better conclusion had 
 since been reached by Great Britain voluntarily con- 
 ceding the points in issue, and that this new basis 
 was then entirely satisfactory to the United States 
 and had remained undisputed for twenty years. 
 
 It amounted to just this : Great Britain very natur- 
 ally refused to accept our theory of the Monroe doc- 
 trine, and having managed her foreign affairs with far 
 more acumen and consistency than we, she was easily 
 able to scatter the forces of our doubtful " histoiical 
 objections." 
 
 In the meantime the Garfield administration had 
 come to a tragic end before its time, and in the 
 § 151. Mr. new order of things the burden of the 
 Freiing- diplomatic dispute fell upon Mr. Frederick 
 Takes up T. Frelinghuysen, President Arthur's See- 
 the Ameri- retary of State. It is doubtful, indeed, 
 andAn-^ whether Mr. Frelinghuysen would have 
 swers Lord pursued the question any further at this 
 Granville's ^jjj^e had not President Arthur's canal 
 policy, of which we will shortly learn, 
 necessitated some immediate modification of the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
 
 As it was now perfectly evident that the two 
 governments could never agree on the theory of tlie 
 question, there was no course open to Mr. Freling- 
 huysen other than continuing the " historical objec- 
 tions " ; and, it must be admitted, he made more of 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 409 
 
 his government's bad case than his predecessor. In 
 reply to Lord Grranville's despatches of January Vth 
 and 14th, Mr. Frelinghuysen addressed an admir- 
 able state paper to Mr. Lowell, in which he at least 
 succeeded in narrowing down the issue to a few 
 salient points of fact. 
 
 Beginning his despatch with a fresh statement 
 of the general question, Frelinghuysen repeated 
 Blaine's previous declarations that it appeared to 
 the United States both " unnecessary and unwise, 
 through an invitation to the nations of the earth, 
 to guarantee the neutrality of the transit of the 
 isthmus, or to give their navies a pretext for assem- 
 bling in waters contiguous to our shores, or to pos- 
 sibly involve this republic in conflicts from which its 
 natural position entitles it to be relieved." He then 
 declared that in times of peace treaties were either 
 harmless or useless, but that when wars came it was 
 impossible to enforce them. Any such agreements 
 among the powers of Europe in regard to the canal, 
 must moreover lead to their political intervention in 
 American aifairs, "which the traditional policy of 
 the United States makes it impossible that the 
 President should either consent to or look upon 
 with indifference," for " the formation of a protec- 
 torate by European nations over the isthmus transit 
 would be in conflict with a doctrine which has been 
 for many years asserted by the United States," and 
 which " opposes any intervention by European na- 
 tions in the political affairs of American republics." 
 
 This was but a reassertion of the Monroe doc- 
 
410 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 trine, to be taken for what it was worth, and Mr. 
 Frelinghuysen knew full well from Blaine's experi- 
 ence just what effect it would have upon the 
 British Foreign Secretary. So passing quickly from 
 this introductory statement to his own historical 
 objections to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, Freling- 
 huysen first endeavored to show that the treaty fell 
 naturally into two parts, Articles I to VII., contain- 
 ing "particular objects," and Article VIII., which 
 concluded the treaty, containing a "general prin- 
 ciple." The more important of the two particular 
 objects was the immediate construction of a canal 
 through Nicaragua, and with the events that trans- 
 spired after the signing of the treaty, this immediate 
 purpose of the convention, he maintained, -had 
 lapsed. The only other particular object of the 
 treaty emanated entirely from the United States 
 and consisted in a desire on their part to "dis- 
 possess Great Britain of settlements ; in Central 
 America, whether under cover of Indian sovereignty 
 or otherwise." Contrary to this second object Fre- 
 linghuysen declared. Great Britain exercised "do- 
 minion over Belize or British Honduras, the area of 
 which is equal to that of Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
 and Rhode Island " ; whereas according to the terms 
 of the Spanish grants, these English privileges " were 
 confined to a right to cut wood and establish saw- 
 mills " within a much smaller territory. Now even 
 admitting the validity of the so-caUed "declara- 
 tions" made by Sir Henry Bulwer, and acknowl- 
 edged by Mr. Clayton, in regard to " Her Majesty's 
 settlement at Honduras," still, Frelinghuysen main- 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 411 
 
 tained, the British government had no right under the 
 treaty of transf ornaing this settlement into a colony. 
 But he added, his government refused to be bound by 
 these informal " declarations," as they were made sub- 
 sequently to the conclusion of the treaty, and were 
 never accepted either by the Senate or the President. 
 They could not, therefore, be considered as part of 
 the treaty. Nor could the United States be es- 
 topped in their objections to this Honduras colony 
 by President Buchanan's avowal in 1860, for his satis- 
 faction was only expressed at the British disposses- 
 sion of the mouth of the canal and did not refer to 
 British Honduras at all. 
 
 Coming finally to the general object of the treaty 
 as contained in Article VIH., which provided for 
 the co-operation of the two governments in the con- 
 trol of any other canal that might be built, Freling- 
 huysen answered that this only applied to the 
 railway and canal lines proposed at the time of the 
 signing of the t/reaty, in Tehuantepec, Nicaragua, 
 and Panama, and could have no reference to the 
 projects at present being discussed. These old pro- 
 visions could not, therefore, now be brought up by 
 Great Britain, to provide for an international guar- 
 anty of the Panama route, for even before the sign- 
 ing of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the United States 
 had assumed an exclusive guaranty of this route by 
 a treaty with the then republic of New Granada, 
 which was still in force, and this last named treaty 
 could not justly be superseded, for a protectorate of 
 this kind was, "like government, necessarily exclu- 
 sive in character." For thirty years the United 
 
412 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 States had continued to extend their protection to 
 the Panama Railway during the most troublous 
 times, and should Great Britain at this late date 
 demand a share in such guaranty according to the 
 provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, they 
 " would submit that experience has shown that no 
 such joint protectorate is requisite," and " that the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty is subject to the provisions 
 of the treaty of 1848 with New Granada, while it 
 exists, which treaty obliges the United States to 
 afford, and secures to them, the sole protectorate of 
 any transit by the Panama route." 
 
 Thus from the history as well as from the theory 
 of the matter, Mr. Frelinghuysen finally concluded 
 that the United States esteemed themselves compe- 
 tent to refuse to afford their protection jointly with 
 Great Britain, and that they would furthermore 
 " look with disfavor iipon an attempt at a concert 
 of political action by other powers in that direction." 
 He therefore trusted that Lord Granville would be 
 led to change his mind and agree to the modifica- 
 tions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty suggested by hi« 
 predecessor, Mr. Blaine. 
 
 Such a change of mind would have involved a 
 complete reversal of the British policy toward the 
 8 jg2. Lord isthmus, and could scarcely have been 
 Granville's seriously expected. Instead, Lord Gran- 
 ^'^Mr^'^Fre- ^^^^^ despatched another note to Mr. West 
 linghuysen's on December 30, 1882, traj^ersing every 
 Case. Qjjg (jf ]y[j._ Frelinghuysen's points in turn. 
 
 In the first place the English Secretary denied 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 413 
 
 that Article VIII. of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty- 
 only referred to the particular transit schemes then 
 iu question, and pointed out that in the article re- 
 ferred to, the protection of the two governments 
 was first afforded to the Nicaraguan company of 
 1850, then "to any other practicable communica- 
 tion," and only in the last place "specially" to 
 those " which are now proposed to be established 
 by way of Tehuantepec or Panama." Lord Gran- 
 ville further called attention to the fact that in the 
 treaties which the United States and Great Britain 
 had negotiated with the Central American states 
 since 1850, the principle of joint protection had in 
 each case been acknowledged, and inasmuch as the 
 United States had seen fit to negotiate such treaties, 
 they could not now fall back on the older conven- 
 tion of 1848. But even in this treaty with Colom- 
 bia, Granville could see no exclusive right of 
 protection conferred upon the United States, and 
 did not therefore consider his government shut out 
 thereby from any joint guaranty of the isthmus. 
 
 In regard to the British colony at Belize, Lord 
 Granville was easily able to demonstrate that this 
 had been acquired by conquest long before the sign- 
 ing of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and that English 
 rights in this region had, moreover, been expressly 
 excepted before Great Britain had consented to 
 ratify the convention. Furthermore, the English 
 diplomatist was able to convict our State Depart- 
 ment of an inconsistency by pointing out that since 
 that time the United States government had form- 
 
414 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 ally recognized the legal existence of the colony of 
 British Honduras in the Postal Convention of 1869, 
 to which he called Mr. Frelinghuysen's attention. 
 
 In consideration of these facts Lord Granville 
 maintained, on his side, that Great Britain had really 
 done nothing in violation of the Clayton-Bulvv'er 
 treaty, and that, as there seemed to be no doubt 
 about the intent of Article VIII. of that conven- 
 tion, he could see no need of renewing any of the 
 provisions of the treaty nor of modifying it in any 
 way. 
 
 The diplomatic discussion had now about run its 
 course, and the only result was that the two govern- 
 ments were wider apart in their opinions 
 elusion of than before. Still Mr. Frelinghuysen re- 
 the Corre- turned to the attack, and the controversy 
 dragged on. The interpretation of .Article 
 VIII. did not seem to be settled, so Frelinghuysen 
 again tried to prove that it only applied to the 
 transit projects of 1850. At most, he maintained, 
 this article was simply an agreement between the 
 two governments to enter into future negotiations to 
 guarantee some canal, and as thirty years had now 
 elapsed without such negotiations being undertaken, 
 the United States considered the treaty to have 
 lapsed, both in its particular and in its general 
 features. 
 
 To this Lord Granville replied that no time had 
 been set in Article VIII. within which the canal 
 must be built, and that therefore, there could be no 
 presumption now that the treaty had lapsed. 
 
Diplomatic Bout with England. 415 
 
 As this was after all but a question of opinion, on 
 which there seemed no hope of agreement, Mr. Fre- 
 linghuysen did not push the matter any further, but 
 returned instead to the question of British Honduras. 
 Great Britain certainly had raised her settlement at 
 Belize to the rank of a colony, but whether in dero- 
 gation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was still a ques- 
 tion. Frelinghuysen took no notice of the United 
 States' recognition of the colony in the Postal Con- 
 vention of 1869, but attempted rather to press the issue 
 raised by Mr. Fish concerning British encroachments 
 subsequent to the treaty of 1859, and in regard to 
 Guatemala's assertion that her government no longer 
 considered this treaty as binding. 
 
 But Lord Granville had no intention of allowing 
 the United States to interfere in a matter which 
 only concerned the British government and Guate- 
 mala, so he curtly informed Mr. Frelinghuysen that 
 both Secretary of State Clayton and President 
 Buchanan had recognized English rights in this dis- 
 trict and declared themselves satisfied, and that the 
 question was therefore closed to any further discus- 
 sion. Having thus expressed himself finally on the 
 subject, the British diplomatist wound up the con- 
 troversy by declaring that her Majesty's government 
 was not able to see how the United States could 
 bring up their Monroe doctrine at this late date, 
 when the same doctrine had not precluded them 
 from entering into the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in 
 1850. 
 
 This was all quite true and to the point. After 
 
416 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Clayton's and Buchanan's unfortunate estoppels we 
 had no case, and it was foolish to try to construct 
 one, only to have it broken down, and thus add an- 
 other victory to our adversary's long list. Far bet- 
 ter would it have been for us to have cried pecGO/oi 
 as to the past, and still insisted upon our national 
 rights under the Monroe docti'ine, simply as a matter 
 of self-preservation. Our instincts had been right all 
 along, but we had possessed neither the force nor 
 the determination to follow where they led. In try- 
 ing to avoid an inevitable issue with Great Britain, 
 our statesmen had committed one diplomatic blunder 
 after another, until it was impossible for us now to 
 disentangle ourselves. In trying to do so Blaine and 
 Frelinghuysen only drew the cords the tighter. 
 There was but one thing to be done, — to break 
 through the diplomatic web which enveloped us and 
 stand forth before the world naked, and ashamed no 
 doubt, but still young and vigorous and ready for a 
 wiser future.^ 
 
 ' For correspondence in full see U. S. Sen. Ex. Docs., 78 and 194, 47tli 
 Cong., 1st Sess, ; Sen. Ex. Doc, 26, 48th Cong., ist Sess. 
 
CHAPTER XX. 
 
 PANAMA VERSUS NICARAGUA. 
 
 Blaine and Frelinghuysen claimed American con- 
 trol over the entire isthmus and all its possible tran- 
 sit routes. But the practical contest had 
 now narrowed itself down to the rivalry of § iS4- La 
 two canal projects, Panama and Nicaragua, un^gj^'iie 
 and each of these involved political and du Canal 
 diplomatic relations of its own. In the ^ inter- 
 
 . . Oceanique 
 
 matter of the Monroe doctrine as applied de Panama, 
 to the transit question, Great Britain had 
 certainly got the better of us in the argument ; but 
 now we had to deal with the French, and their canal 
 project required very different treatment. 
 
 On his return to Europe after arranging matters 
 satisfactorily in America, de Lesseps undertook an 
 extensive lecturing tour through England, Holland, 
 Belgium, and France in order to arouse enthusiasm 
 over the Panama canal. The route, he said, had 
 now been examined by competent engineers and 
 found to be " much easier and less expensive " than 
 was thought. The Suez canal was a gigantic work, 
 de Lesseps declared, in comparison vnth the " baga- 
 telle of the Chagres difficulties." American opposi- 
 tion, he had discovered, only arose from envy of " la 
 27 417 
 
418 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 gloi/re FrangaisP He had won over prominent states- 
 men of the United States, and now an " entente cor- 
 diaW'' had been arranged. Thus de Lesseps still 
 chose very wisely to avoid the underlying political 
 issue, and to appeal to the European pocket-book 
 instead. 
 
 In France, too, his agents hg-d done noble work 
 during the absence of their chief in routing antagon- 
 ism to the project. Through influences that Only 
 later came to light, the French press, which up to 
 this had been either openly opposed to the Panama 
 scheme or, at best, but luke-warm in its favor, now 
 began to poar forth columns of fulsome flattery on de 
 Lesseps, the promoter, and the grand project he had 
 in mind. The Messager de Paris, formerly of the 
 opposition, now declared it had been " converted 
 by the serious studies made by M. de Lesseps in 
 Panama." The Journal des Actionaires announced 
 that the " canal project had been welcomed with en- 
 thusiasm in the United States." The Figaro drew 
 a beautiful picture of " the marriage of the oceans," 
 with de Lesseps ofiiciating in the robes of the high- 
 priest of civilization ; but then added more laconi- 
 cally that funds were necessary to perform the cere- 
 mony. The Republique Frangais calculated that 
 the canal could be completed in six years for $120,- 
 000,000, and would net each shareholder fifteen per 
 cent, on his stock. The Journal des Debats went fur- 
 ther still and announced that there were contractors 
 ready to take up the work for $102-,000,000, and 
 after adding to this the necessary sums for interest, 
 
Panama versus Nicaragua. 419 
 
 banking and administration expenses, extras, and the 
 like, tkis paper concluded that the stock would pay 
 a clear profit of fourteen per cent. La Liberte then 
 began to scold the doubters, and urged them to have 
 more faith in de Lesseps, " who comes before you 
 with the authority of science." "Invest in these 
 shares," the enthusiastic editor continued, " and by 
 and by you will be proud of your part in opening 
 this work of civilization. . . . The result will 
 be a surprise to those who have but faith in our 
 great fellow-countryman." 
 
 At the proper moment, when enthusiasm was. 
 sufficiently aroused, de Lesseps issued his second 
 prospectus, on November 15, 1880, announcing that 
 the Technical Commission had reduced the number 
 of cubic yards to be excavated and thus considerably 
 lowered the cost, and that the contractors MM. 
 Couvreux and Hersent were now " ready " to under- 
 take the construction of the canal for $102,000,000,^ 
 Then to dissipate the absurd rumor started by his 
 enemies, that the people of the United States in any 
 
 ' As a matter of fact no such contract was ever concluded. M. Cou- 
 vreux had been de Lesseps' partner in Suez, and had already advanced him 
 considerable money on Panama. He did indeed declare that the canal 
 would not cost over $102,000,000, but then he wanted to get his money 
 back and have the new company purchase his Suez dredges besides, and 
 hence his lower estimate. Thus far the cost of the canal had been 
 variously estimated as follows : 
 
 Mr. Wyse's estimate, 1879 $85,000,000 
 
 Canal Congress at Paris, 1879, first estimate 208,000,000 
 
 " " " " second estimate 140,000,000 
 
 De Lesseps's Technical Commission, Feb. 14,1880 168,000,000 
 
 De Lesseps's rectified estimate, Feb. 27, 1880 132,000,000 
 
 Contractor's bid, Nov. 15, 1881 102,000,000 
 
420 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 way objected to the project, de Lesseps pointed 
 with pride to " the full co-operation of the great and 
 powerful American banking houses," which, he said, 
 " shows the results of my trip to the United States." 
 
 The effect of such diplomacy was really astound- 
 ing. When the subscription books were opened, so 
 well had the preliminary moneys been expended in 
 influencing public opinion, that instead of the six 
 hundred thousand shares offered for sale, over a 
 million were immediately subscribed for at a par 
 value of 500 francs each. There were indeed more 
 than 100,000 eager applicants, for the most part 
 consisting of small proprietors and women, and thus 
 each bidder had to be contented with but from one 
 fourth to one third the number of shares he or she 
 had subscribed for.^ 
 
 Such unprecedented enthusiasm of course added 
 enormously to the eclat of the newly formed Com- 
 pagnie Universelle, but the first stockholders' meet- 
 ing which was called together by de Lesseps on the 
 last day of January, 1881, somewhat clouded over 
 the rosy aspect of affairs. De Lesseps himself was 
 all sunshine, it is true, and in his report he declared 
 with confidence that " all problems have been solved 
 
 • Of the 1,206,609 shares demanded 994,508 were asked for by French, 
 men and 212,101 by foreigners. Most of the foreign subscribers were 
 Alsatians and Spaniards. No shares were taken in the United States 
 besides those allotted to bankers, etc. The allotment was finally made to 
 102,230 applicants, and of this number 99,982 held less than 20 shares 
 apiece, i. e., 80,837 held from i to 5 shares, 19,143 held from 6 to 20 shares, 
 3208 held from 21 to 50 shares, and so on down, till we find only 8 holding 
 from 900-1000 shares, and only 14 holding any over 1000. Out of the 
 102,230 original subscribers 16,000 were women. 
 
Panama versus Nicaragua. 421 
 
 and all difficulties smoothed over." But ttere was 
 a little matter of preliminary expenses that had to 
 be attended to, and this was the cloud upon the 
 horizon. A committee was then appointed to report 
 on these expenses, which had now to be made good 
 from the paid-up stock. 
 
 Within a month the committee was ready to re- 
 port, and on March 3d de Lesseps called a second 
 meeting of the stockholders, to provide for the defini- 
 tive organization of the company according to the 
 French law. It would never have done to present 
 the committee's report at the start, so de Lesseps 
 began to stimulate confidence anew among his asso- 
 ciates and prepare them for the shock. " The prob- 
 lem of the American isthmus is comparatively easy," 
 so he began his second report. " It is an operation 
 the exact mathematics of which are perfectly well 
 known, and the grandeur of the effort to be made 
 does not at all trouble the enterprising contractors 
 to whom you will supply the means of carrying it 
 out." The Technical Commission, de Lesseps de- 
 clared, was composed of " the most competent engi- 
 neers." It had concluded to dam the Chagres, and 
 this de Lesseps maintained to be "a very simple 
 solution of the only doubtful question about the 
 execution of the work of opening the canal." Work 
 was to be begun at once, he announced. The 
 " installations," — ^meaning thereby, clearing the liue, 
 studying the hydrographic features of the harbors, 
 constructing houses for employees, hospitals, work- 
 yards, offices, etc. — ^were all to be completed by 
 
422 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 October, 1881. The Culebra cut was then to be 
 attacked, and during November and December the 
 dredges were to be set to work. In January, 1882, 
 work was to be begun all along the line, and by 
 1888 the canal was to be opened to commerce. 
 
 After this introduction of brilliant promises, the 
 committee's report was read, and to the conster- 
 nation of the stockholders they now found that 
 they had first to make good some $9,000,000 already 
 sunk in the preliminary expenses. Thus from the 
 very outset, the poor people of France began to feed 
 the vultures with their savings, and this first brood, 
 though perhaps the hungriest, was by no means the 
 last of the flock.' 
 
 At the same time another canal company was be- 
 ing organized in the United States, with far less 
 ostentation, and, on this account, perhaps. 
 Maritime ^ ^i^h nothing like the same quota of suc- 
 Canai cess. The gentlemen of the Provisional 
 Company of Qg^^^^ Society had, as we know, been 
 
 Nicaragua. •' . . 
 
 granted under their last concession until 
 
 September, 1884, to complete all the preliminaries 
 
 of their work. While Congress was considering the 
 
 provisions of their bill, therefore, they took occasion 
 
 to have their informal preliminary company merged 
 
 into a more regular corporation, to be known in the 
 
 future as the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 
 
 But their guaranty bill had failed to become a 
 
 ^ Sulletin du Canal Interocianique, Nos. 15-28, Paris. 
 
 Economists Franfais, August 8 and 15, 1885. 
 
 Rodrigues, loc. cit., Ch. VI. 
 
 Bunau-Varilla, " The Past, Present, and Future of Panama," Paris, 1893. 
 
Panama versus Nicaragua. 423 
 
 law, and so some other and more immediate means 
 liad now to be resorted to in order to raise the 
 necessary funds. General Grant and General Mc- 
 Clellan then lent their influence to the project, and 
 it was mainly due to their co-operation that a syndi- 
 cate of capitalists was formed, under the direction 
 of the banking-house of Grant and Ward, which 
 agreed to undertake the construction of the canal. 
 Here in America, however, it was the banking-house 
 which failed, and after Grant and Ward had be- 
 come so hopelessly involved, there was no further 
 hope of the canal project for which they and the old 
 General stood sponsor. 
 
 Grant's name had served as the talisman thus far 
 for the Nicaraguan project, and now this name was 
 shrouded for the time in a financial cloud. No 
 further influence could in consequence be exerted 
 either in the United States or Nicaragua, and on 
 September 30, 1884, the company's concession lapsed.* 
 
 President Arthur all along had very little con- 
 fidence in the ability of American capitalists to 
 construct the Nicaragua canal, and more § 156. 
 especially since Congress had hesitated to President 
 lend its aid to the undertaking. And yet canai Pro- 
 he -was deeply impressed with the par- ject. 
 amount importance of a transit route under 
 American control. The Panama canal project was 
 now well under way, but citizens of the United 
 States owned no stock in the enterprise, and the 
 diplomatic correspondence on the question had at 
 
 ' " The Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua,'' he. cit., p. ii. 
 
424 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 least gone far enougk to show tliat Europe had no 
 idea of allowing the United States to guarantee the 
 neutrality of the route single-handed. Great Britain 
 was definitely opposed to such an exclusive 
 American protectorate, and she would easily be able 
 to enlist the other European powers in an inter- 
 national syndicate for the purpose. Now it mattered 
 not whether the canal were cut through Panama or 
 Nicaragua; in either event it must, in Arthur's 
 mind, form practically a part of our southern coast 
 line, and hence should be kept under our control. 
 Thus there seemed to the President but one solution 
 of this difficult and perplexing problem, and this 
 was to give over the Panama canal to French en- 
 terprise and European control, and at the same time 
 to maintain the political prestige of the United 
 States by the construction of a canal of our own. 
 across Nicaragua farther north. The American 
 transit route must in this case be bought outright 
 and paid for by the United States government, and 
 the canal be built under its exclusive auspices. 
 This northerly waterway would then mark our 
 national frontier on the south, and what we owned, 
 Arthur argued, we could certainly control and de- 
 fend, according to the ordinary laws of property. 
 This was simply cutting the knots of our diplomatic 
 tangle, it is true, but Arthur justified his policy by 
 insisting that the control of the canal was a political 
 necessity involving our national union and pros- 
 perity, and that if it were not secured, we must 
 surely disintegrate as a nation. 
 
Panama versus Nicaragua. 425 
 
 Before any practical steps could be taken in this 
 governmental canal project, some diplomatic 
 arrangement had first to be made with Nicaragua, 
 more comprehensive in its terms than the still exist- 
 ing Dickinson- Ayon treaty. This duty fell of course 
 upon Mr. Frelinghuysen, and as a result of his prede- 
 cessor's diplomacy towards the Central American 
 states, the task was not as difficult as it might have 
 been. 
 
 Nicaragua, indeed, was only too glad to grasp 
 again the helping hand of the United States in the 
 midst of her fresh difficulties. According to the 
 decision of the Emperor of Austria Great Britain 
 was once more supreme on her eastern sea-board. 
 Costa Bica was still claiming the canal route as her 
 proper boundary, and instead of a peaceful con- 
 federacy. President Barrios of Guatemala was now 
 trying his hand at a forcible union of the states, 
 in spite of the earnest protests of Nicaragua, 
 Honduras, and San Salvador, and their appeals to 
 the United States for aid. 
 
 Surrounded thus by foreign and domestic difficul- 
 ties, Nicaragua then sent a special commissioner, 
 Sefior Joachim Zavala, at the request of Secretary 
 Frelinghuysen, to treat with the United States 
 government directly in regard to the canal. Freling- 
 huysen had already outlined his plans and the 
 Nicaraguan envoy this time readily agreed to the 
 proposals. A convention, known as the Freling- 
 huysen-Zavala treaty, was accordingly drawn up 
 without delay and submitted to the Senates of both 
 
426 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 countries for approval, early in December, 1884. 
 Therein it was definitely provided that the United 
 States government should itself undertake to con- 
 struct, operate, and maintain its exclusive control 
 over the canal through Nicaragua. To this end 
 Nicaragua was to accord our government an exclu- 
 sive right of way across her territory from sea to sea, 
 and also grant to the United States a fee-simple 
 title to a strip of land two and one half miles broad 
 all along the route. In return the United States 
 undertook to guarantee and protect in its integrity 
 Nicaragua's lawful tenitory, and furthermore to 
 loan to her government the sum of $4,000,000 to be 
 expended in public improvements. Upon its com- 
 pletion the canal was to belong to Nicaragua and 
 the United States jointly, the former to receive one 
 third and the latter two thirds of the net revenues 
 therefrom. This was of course nothing short of a 
 protectorate over all Nicaragua, but then such a pro- 
 tectorate ^vas thought to be necessary, inasmuch as 
 the United States were to own the canal route 
 themselves, and had therefore to be in a position to 
 defend their own property. 
 
 Having thus cleared the political ground, it was 
 now necessary to provide for the economic and tech- 
 nical details of the canal project. Upon the failure 
 of Grant and Ward, and after the canal company's 
 concession had expired in September, there were no 
 longer any domestic obstacles in the way of the 
 President's plans. Following instructions from the 
 Executive, Secretary of the Navy, William E. Chan- 
 dler, on December 15, 1884, therefore, ordered Mr. 
 
Panama versus Nicaragua. 427 
 
 Menocal to proceed at once to Nicaragua and locate 
 the route, detailing Lieutenant R. E. Peary and 
 Ensign W. I. Chambers to assist him in the work. 
 
 While negotiating for the Provisional Canal Soci- 
 ety's concession in 1880, Menocal had completed a 
 re-survey of the western section of the route, and 
 decided to run the canal line from Lake Nicaragua 
 to Brito on the Pacific, along the Lajas route, instead 
 of along the Rio Medio, as Lull had previously 
 recommended.' There was no immediate necessity, 
 therefore, of going over this section of the route 
 again, so Menocal and his party confined their pres- 
 ent surveys for the government to an examination of 
 the canal line along the Rio San Juan, and to a 
 hydrographic study of the still unsatisfactory harbor 
 at Grreytown. The work was completed on April 
 25, 1885, and in the following November a very com- 
 prehensive report w^as handed in to the Secretary of 
 the Navy, to await the action of the Senate on the 
 Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty.^ 
 
 By this time the activity of the Panama Canal 
 Company, both in Paris and on the isthmus, had 
 reached an unprecedented pitch. It was an § 157. The 
 activity devoted, however, not so much to Collapse of 
 
 1 • ffji ij.j.1 the Panama 
 
 the actual prosecution or the woi'k as to tne Canai 
 
 feeding and nest-feathering of new broods Project, 
 of vultures. 
 
 ' Cf., ante, § 120, p. 327. The only difficulty Lull had found in the Medio 
 route consisted in the proper diversion of the waters of the Rio Grande. 
 Menocal seemed to think this was quite possible, and therefore chose the 
 Lajas route, as its summit was lower. 
 
 ^ U. S. Ex. Doc, 99, 49th Cong., ist Session. 
 
 Neu' York Tribune, December 18, 1884. 
 
 " Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua," he. eit , p. 12, and Appendix No. 5. 
 
428 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 With what funds there were left out of the first 
 instalments of the stock after paying for the prelimi- 
 nary expenses, a force of some three hundred Euro- 
 peans was sentout from Paris in October,1881,to clear 
 the line and arrange for the necessary plant. It was 
 soon found that instead of the 100,000,000 cubic yards 
 of excavation that de Lesseps had been figuring on, 
 the canal as planned would require an excavation of 
 at least 176,000,000 cubic yards. Little was thought 
 of this change, however, and in 1882 actual operations 
 were commenced on the canal itself at different points 
 along the line. The work was not undertaken by 
 the original contractors, MM. Couvreux and Her- 
 sent, however, — for they had followed the prudent 
 example of the Tiirr-Wyse syndicate and retired 
 from the enterprise with a large indemnity, — but by 
 a score of companies whose bids were higher but 
 whose promises, at least, were equally brilliant. 
 
 But the work of excavation did not progress with 
 the despatch that was expected. The climate was 
 found to be deadly, and at the very outset a large 
 number of the unacclimated European laborers and 
 two or three of the company's most competent en- 
 gineers succumbed. This raised wages considerably 
 and introduced a spirit of recklessness and lack of 
 responsibility in the continuation of the work.' Con- 
 
 ' White mechanics had now to be paid $5 a day, skilled black laborers 
 $2.50 a day, and unskilled black laborers $1.75 a day. The company was 
 pledged to furnish the contractors with requisite labor. High commissions 
 were paid to agents to keep up the supply, but still more labor was required, 
 and the contractors, not having enough hands, could shift the responsibility 
 for unfulfilled contracts on the shoulders of the company. 
 
Panama versus Nicaragua. 429 
 
 siderable excavation was accomplished, it is true, ia 
 the low lands on either shore by the work of power- 
 ful dredges, but this was a comparatively easy task. 
 Upon the Culebra cut in the interior, however, the 
 contractors fell far behind their promises, and very 
 little impression was made.' 
 
 The company was more successful in providing 
 what were deemed to be the necessary auxiliaries of 
 the work. A majority interest in the Panama Rail- 
 way Company was acquired, that the road might be 
 used as an accessory to the canal.' Magnificent hos- 
 pitals were erected both in Panama and Colon, but 
 at enormous expense. Countiy villas were built for 
 the officials, general offices for the company, dwell- 
 ings for the laborers, work-yards, warehouses, wharfs, 
 and a score of other structures, on all of which the 
 contractors reaped a big harvest of unnecessary com- 
 missions. 
 
 During the six years that elapsed between 1881 
 and 1887, seven different Directors Greneral were sent 
 out to supervise the work, two years being the long- 
 est stay that any of them cared to make. No one 
 employed knew any thing about the progress of the 
 work, so they all very soon ceased to care. Lacking 
 all control, the officials of the company on the 
 isthmus gave themselves up to all the dissipations 
 
 ' A Dutch company had the contract for this work, and agreed to remove 
 793,000 cubic yards a month for the first eighteen months, and 429,000 
 cubic yards a month after that. There were 26,000,000 cubic yards to be 
 cut from this section alone, and yet the Dutch company never succeeded in 
 excavating more than 130,000 cubic yards a month. 
 
 ° The actual amount paid on the shares was $18,000,000. 
 
430 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 that professional gamblers and the like from Paris 
 took pains to provide for them in Panama and 
 Colon. Kevelry thus increased by night Avhile the 
 work on the canal fell off by day. The pace grew 
 quicker as the years went by, until 1887, when the 
 funds ran short, and only about two fifths of the 
 canal had been dug. 
 
 To meet this fearful drain on the funds, de Lesseps 
 had first to call for fresh payments on the stock, and 
 issue new bonds. But these sources of revenue soon 
 came to an end. The stock then began to be sold 
 out at a large discount, and fresh loans on the bonds 
 could no longer be floated. De Lesseps continued 
 to make fresh promises at every stockholders' meet- 
 ing, but, with so little to show for the money already 
 spent, the fears of the holders were not to be so easily 
 averted. To stave off the inevitable crisis, the press 
 had also to be bribed more liberally than ever, and 
 to keep the condition of affairs from being brought 
 up in the Chambers, Deputies and even dignified 
 Senators had to be hushed. 
 
 In his extremity de Lesseps in 1886 appealed to 
 the government for permission to raise money by a 
 lottery loan,' but this first request was refused. At 
 an enormous cost an ordinary loan of $120,000,000 
 was . then floated, but after commissions to bankers 
 and bribes for the press had been deducted ^ only a 
 portion of this sum was available for the canal. 
 Charles de Lesseps, the old promoter's son, declared 
 
 1 The Minister of Public Works, M. Baihaut, who supported the lottery- 
 plan, demanded $200,000 and received f 75,000 for his ineffectual services. 
 * The ordinary loan cost $2,200,000 to raise. 
 
Panama versus Nicaragua. -±31 
 
 that this loan would be sufficient to complete the 
 canal within three years, but he knew full well that 
 something like twice the sum and twice the time 
 would be required. In 1887 another loan of like 
 amount was found necessary to continue the work 
 and pay the fast-accumulating interest. Baron Rein- 
 ach was given $1,200,000 to float the bonds, but in 
 spite of brilliant prospectuses, inspired articles, stump 
 speeches, and the like, only half the loan was taken up. 
 The company's affairs were now in a desperate 
 condition, and at this juncture it was decided to 
 abandon the tide-level project and resort to the lock 
 system, thus reducing the amount of the excavation 
 by 85,000,000 cubic yards. But this was a fatal 
 modification, for only by promising a straight tide- 
 level canal had de Lesseps won adherents to his 
 Panama project at all, and even with this reduction 
 in the amount of excavation, the cost of the canal 
 was now raised to something over $300,000,000, 
 according to the new estimates. A contract was 
 nevertheless made with M. Eiffel, the famous en- 
 gineer, to undertake the new works, and elaborate 
 plans were presented. On this fresh basis the com- 
 pany then again applied to the government for its 
 approval of a lottery loan, but was again refused. 
 An eloquent petition was then gotten up with 
 158,000 names attached, and this time the govern- 
 ment gave way and sanctioned the plan. The effort 
 cost the company large sums,' however, and it was all 
 
 ' M. OberndOrffer, who planned the lottery loan, received $400,000 for 
 his suggestions, $400,000 more went for " pubhcity," $580,000 for banking 
 expenses, and $280,000 to politicians, journalists, etc. 
 
432 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 to no purpose after all, for on December 14, 1888, the 
 final crash came and payments had to be suspended. 
 ' A parliamentary enquiry was at once instituted 
 in the hopes of saving the enterprise, but its revela- 
 tions only brought about still more calamitous re- 
 sults, as we shall presently see. Work on the canal 
 was soon after discontinued, and with all the funds 
 that had passed through its hands the company had 
 only succeeded in excavating between fifteen and 
 twenty miles of the least difficult portions of the 
 canal, leaving still the most difficult portion to be 
 dug through the interior. 
 
 The official liquidator then found that the canal 
 had already cost over $262,000,000, whereas de Les- 
 seps had declared that $120,000,000 would complete 
 the work. Of this sum only $100,000,000 had gone 
 into the works, however, the rest having been either 
 paid out in Paris or squandered in Panama. Salaries, 
 profits, commissions, and the like swallowed up 
 $88,000,000, while something approaching $32,000,- 
 000 had been paid for floating the various loans. 
 The total expenses in Paris for the eight years 
 amounted, in themselves, to over $75,000,000. Or 
 as one of the committee on new proposals put it, 
 one third of the funds was spent legitimately, one 
 third was squandered, and one third was stolen.^ 
 
 ■ Cyclopedic Review of Current History , Vol. III., No. I, 1893. 
 Quarterly Review of Current History, March, 1893. 
 " Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia," Vol. XVIII., p. 319. 
 " Encyclopaedia Britannica," " Panama Canal." 
 Bulletin du Canal Interoceanique. 
 
 Armand Reclus, " Explorations," Tour du Monde, Paris, 1880. 
 John Bigelow, " The Panama Canal," Report to New York Chamber of 
 Commerce, February, 1886. Rodrigues, loc. cit.. Chaps. IX. and X. 
 
Panama versus Nicaragua. 433 
 
 News of the doings of the Panama Canal Company 
 
 in Panama reached the United States in a variety of 
 
 ways. No hint of the real stat6 of affairs „ „ ^^ 
 
 . § 158. The 
 
 leaked out through the Paris press, but Abandon- 
 correspondents of American papers * visited ^^°^ °^}^^ 
 the isthmus during the course of the work, states Gov- 
 and predicted the inevitable crash a year ernmentai 
 or two before it actually came. Then in Canal 
 1886 de Lesseps requested the New York 
 Chamber of Commerce to appoint a delegate to ac- 
 company him on a tour of inspection over the line, 
 saying that representatives of the Chambers of Com- 
 merce of France, England, and Germany would be 
 of the party. The Hon. John Bigelow was accord- 
 ingly appointed, and though he was royally enter- 
 tained by the officials of the canal company, he was 
 in no vnse blinded to the hopeless condition of the 
 project, and did not hesitate to express his opinion 
 publicly on his return. 
 
 Officers of the United States government also had 
 an opportunity of passing their judgment on the 
 work, for in the midst of the high carnival at 
 Panama, a riot occurred among the Colombian na- 
 tives, Avhich required the intervention of our navy 
 under the terms of the original guaranty. Since 
 the adoption of the Liberal Constitution of 1863, it 
 appears that the Clericals in Colombia had gradually 
 been gaining ground. Recognizing their strength, 
 a radical leader, Dr. Nunez, swung around the 
 
 1 Special correspondents sent out by the JVe7u York Herald and the 
 American Engineer of Chicago. Cf. files referred to at close of this 
 
 section. 
 
 28 
 
434 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 political circle and took up their cause in 1885. 
 During the course of the revolution which followed, 
 Colon was burned and the transit route threatened. 
 The French officials were powerless to interfere, so 
 when the railway line appeared to be in imminent 
 danger American marines were landed and order 
 preserved. . The Clericals were ultimately successful, 
 and Nunez reaped his reward by becoming practical 
 Dictator of the country. The local autonomy of the 
 several states was then done away with, and Co- 
 lombia came under the rule of a strong military 
 government. 
 
 The American naval officers who took part in the 
 intervention, and those who were stationed off 
 Panama and Colon during the progress of the work,^ 
 were instructed by the authorities at Washington to 
 make reports on the progress of de Lesseps's enter- 
 prise. The information thus furnished was for the 
 most part unfavorable to the project, and this, taken 
 together with the newspaper reports which now be- 
 gan to appear, went far to encourage the Arthur 
 administration in its plans for the Nicaragua canal. 
 
 But the ratification of the Frelinghuysen-Zavala 
 treaty was of course the condition precedent to the 
 continuation of the government's project. As far as 
 Nicaragua was concerned, all doubt in this regard 
 was soon removed by the Legislature of that state 
 approving the Convention as it stood. But in the 
 Senate of the United States other considerations had 
 
 ' Lieutenants R. M. G. Brown, R. P. Rodgers, Francis Winslow, and R. 
 H. McLean. 
 
Panama versus Nicaragua. 435 
 
 to be taken into account beyond the mere desire for 
 the immediate construction of the canal. Under the 
 circumstances, ratification of the treaty meant sure 
 trouble with Great Britain, but in spite of this fact 
 there were many Senators who would have been 
 willing to make the matter a test case under the 
 Monroe doctrine. In this way we might, indeed, 
 have asserted our natural rights at the expense of 
 our treaty obligations, and simply taken our chances. 
 A strong minority was, however, opposed to any 
 such radical course, and insisted upon delaying the 
 question, at least until some better understanding 
 could be arrived at with England. 
 
 The matter remained in doubt, therefore, for some- 
 thing over a month, as the Senate could come to no 
 conclusion. Finally, toward the end of January, 
 1885, the treaty was acted upon in executive session, 
 but failed of ratification under the two-thirds rule, 
 — the vote standing 32 Ayes to 23 Nays. A motion 
 to reconsider was at once entered, and the treaty 
 still remained for a short time before the Senate. 
 
 But the Republicans had met with defeat in the 
 last election, and the Democrats now came into con- 
 trol. President Cleveland's ideas on the canal ques- 
 tion differed radically from those of his Republican 
 predecessor, however, and in his annual message of 
 1885 he took pains to outline quite a different policy 
 in the matter, as follows : 
 
 " Maintaining as I do the tenets of a line of precedents from 
 Washington's day, which proscribe entangling alliances with 
 foreign states, I do not favor a policy of acquisition of new 
 
436 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 and distant territory, or the incorporation of remote interests 
 with our own. Therefore, I am unable to recommend propo- 
 sitions involving paramount privileges of ownership or right 
 outside of our own territory, when coupled with absolute and 
 unlimited engagements to defend the territorial integrity of the 
 states where such interests lie. While the general project to 
 connect the two oceans by means of a canal is to be encour- 
 aged, I am of the opinion that any scheme to that end, to be 
 considered with favor, should be free from the features al- 
 luded to." 
 
 Shortly after the treaty failed of ratification, 
 therefore, the President had it withdrawn from the 
 Senate for further executive consideration, and it 
 was not again presented to Congress. 
 
 Many years had now elapsed since the Panama 
 Congress, but the United States government still 
 felt indisposed to assert its position of protector 
 among the Spanish- American states. Arthur's plan, 
 like Adams's of long ago, was still premature, and 
 matters in consequence were left to drift along 
 pretty much as before. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty 
 was thus allowed to stand, and our diplomatic rela- 
 tions Tvith Nicaragua continued to be regulated by 
 the unsatisfactory Dickinson- Ayon convention.' 
 
 ^ New York Herald, Nov. 2, 1884 ; Febraary 8, 1885. 
 
 American Engineer , Oct., 1884. 
 
 New York Tribune, Feb. 3, 1886. 
 
 New York Times, May I, 1885. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 123 ; Ex. Doc, gg, 49th Cong., ist Sess. 
 
 " The Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua," loc. cit., p. 13. 
 
CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 THE MARITIME CANAL COMPANY OF NICARAGUA. 
 
 THUS within the space of a few years the 
 pendulum of the American canal problem 
 swung backward and forward between the 
 lipiits of individual initiative and the further ex- 
 treme of governmental control. There was nothing 
 to hold it at either end of the arc, so, as a § 159. The 
 matter of course, without further momen- Nicaragua 
 tum, it now began to oscillate around its ciation and 
 own centre. its Conces- 
 
 Private capitalists had indeed demon- ®*°"" 
 
 strated their economic inability to undertake the 
 construction of the canal, but since then the govern- 
 ment likewise had been obliged to withdraw from 
 the enterprise for political reasons. An opportunity 
 was thus afforded for a partnership between the 
 two, leaving neither party to assume the entire 
 political and economic responsibility of the work. 
 Such was evidently Cleveland's idea, and the imme- 
 diate effect of his message was, therefore, to encour- 
 age private promoters to again take the initiative in 
 the undertaking, in the hopes that the government 
 would lend them its support. 
 
 In order to arouse public opinion in the matter 
 
 437 
 
438 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 and bring the subject up once more for general dis- 
 cussion, Commander H. C. Taylor was tlien invited 
 to deliver an address on the canal question before 
 the American Greographical Society. His paper was 
 indeed deserving of the attention it received. Inter- 
 est in the enterprise was thus reawakened, and 
 shortly after, on October 20, 1886, a number of 
 prominent gentlemen came together by appointment, 
 to devise ways and means of again setting the 
 project on its feet. As a result, on the 3d of De- 
 cember, another Provisional Canal Association' 
 was informally organized, and in the following 
 March Mr. Menocal was once more sent off to Nica- 
 ragua to negotiate for a concession. Being author- 
 ized by the promoters to make an advance payment 
 to Nicaragua of $100,000, in order to convince that 
 government of the company's serious intentions, 
 Menocal had no difficulty on this occasion, and, on 
 April 21, 1887, a very favorable concession was 
 agreed to and ratified by the proper authorities. 
 
 A so-called Nicaragua Canal Construction Com- 
 pany was then incorporated by the Provisional 
 Association, to institute the final surveys and pro- 
 vide for the necessary technical preliminaries of the 
 
 ' The following gentlemen were associated in this organization : Hon. 
 Charles P. Daly, Commander H. C. Taylor, Horace L. Hotchkiss, A. S. 
 Crowninshield, Francis A. Stout, Frederick Billings, Hiram Hitchcock, 
 A. B. Darling, J. W. Miller, James Roosevelt, R. A. Lancaster, Henry R. 
 Hoyt, F, F. Thompson, G. H. Robinson, A. C. Cheney, H. Fairbanks, 
 C. H. Stebbins, C. Ridgley Goodwin, A. B. Cornell, J. F. O'Shaughnessy, 
 A. G. Menocal, Admiral D. Ammen, Robert Garrett, T. Harrison Garrett, 
 G. E. Kissell, Henry A. Parr, Charles D. Fisher, John L. Williams, Jules 
 Aldige, and many others. 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 439 
 
 work. Mr. Menocal was made chief -engineer of the 
 enterprise, and in November a surveying party was 
 sent down to Nicaragua to co-operate with him in 
 the final location of the line. Menocal had already 
 become thoroughly familiar with the nature of the 
 canal route, as we know, and since his recent sur- 
 veys of 1880 and 1884, two English engineers, 
 Messrs. Passmore and Climie, had also made a 
 hydrographic examination of the river and harbor 
 of the San Juan for the Nicaraguan government.' 
 So data in abundance were available for the present 
 expedition, and the canal plans were now worked 
 out in detail.^ 
 
 Renewed interest in the canal meant, however, as 
 usual, fresh diplomatic negotiations by the govern- 
 ment with the Central American states, g ^^^ Presi- 
 Realizing this fact, and anxious to know dent cieve- 
 whether the present administration was . land's 
 
 . . . Award in 
 
 willing to lend them its support in their the Bound- 
 private undertaking, the Nicaragua canal ^T ^is- 
 promoters wrote to Secretary of State ^" ^' 
 
 Bayard asking him. to assure them on this point. 
 He replied at once that the administration was 
 highly in favor of the enterprise being conducted 
 in this way " under the control and guidance of 
 American ownership and capital " ; and to empha- 
 size his assurances he enclosed a copy of Cleveland's 
 
 ' Their report was subsequently embodied in a British government White 
 Book. 
 
 ^ Engineering Magazine, March lO, 1893, loc. cit. 
 
 " The Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua," loc. cit., p. 13, and Appendix 
 No. 2. 
 
440 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 message, adding that he was sure that the President 
 had " undergone no change in the views nor abate- 
 ment in the interest set forth in that paper." 
 
 Thus called upon to turn his attention to the isth- 
 mus, Bayard found matters in greater confusion than 
 ever. There seems, indeed, to be a more or less 
 regular cycle in what we might call the involution, 
 rather than the evolution of the Central American 
 states. First civil war breaks out between the two 
 political parties in some one republic, generally re- 
 sulting in the overthrow of the existing administra- 
 tion. Thereupon the Liberals and Conservatives in 
 all five republics take sides, the former advocating 
 and the latter opposing a union of the states, and 
 the so-called " war " becomes general. When this 
 has gone on long enough the would-be Central- 
 American dictator appears upon the scene, and 
 then forgetting all their previous animosities, the 
 other states hastily come together and take up 
 arms against the oppressor of their free republi- 
 can institutions. No dictator has as yet proved 
 strong enough, it is true, to accomplish the union by 
 force, but upon every such attempt the separate 
 states, so absurdly jealous of their nominal inde- 
 pendence, have in each case become panic-stricken 
 and sworn undying friendship for each other in 
 the future. Thus the cycle is apt to be concluded 
 by the negotiation of a series of treaties in which 
 war is forever abandoned and arbitration substituted 
 as a method of settling their innumerable disputes, — 
 and, it is useless to add, such conventions are regu- 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 441 
 
 larly broken at the outbreak of the next civil war, 
 when the cycle begins again on its periodical invo- 
 lution. 
 
 At the time of which we are at present speaking, 
 the political revolution was entering on its last stages, 
 and Bayard found himself too late to check its com-se, 
 even if he had so desired. President Barrios of 
 Guatemala had again proclaimed the union of the 
 states, on February 28, 1885, and declared himself 
 at the same time their supreme military chief. Hon- 
 duras espoused his cause, San Salvador vacillated, 
 and for once at least in their long career of mutual 
 jealousy and antagonism, Nicaragua and Costa Rica 
 stood together in their opposition to the despot. 
 War was declared and the United States took 
 sides against Gautemala. His government was 
 anxious to promote the union of the states. Bay- 
 ard explained, but could not countenance the use 
 of force for the purpose. American citizens, in- 
 clined toward filibustering adventure, were not so 
 squeamish in the matter, however, and quite a num- 
 ber arrived from the United States in Honduras 
 and San Salvador bent upon making their influence 
 felt in the final adjustment of affairs. United States 
 war-ships followed to protect American interests, 
 and the crisis then rapidly matured. On April 
 2, 1885, the decisive battle of the war occurred, 
 and Barrios, the cause of all the trouble, was killed. 
 Thereupon the rest of the states began to tumble 
 over each other in their promises of peace and good- 
 will, and soon the nonnal order of things was re- 
 
442 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 establislied without any serious harm having been 
 done. A treaty of perpetual peace was then con- 
 cluded on February 16, 1887, between the five re- 
 publics, binding them jointly and severally in the 
 future to a policy of non-interference, and holding 
 them again to the principle of international arbi- 
 tration. 
 
 With no general war to divert them Nicaragua 
 and Costa Rica are very apt to be at logger-heads 
 over their interminable boundary dispute, and the con- 
 troversy became especially acrimonious on this occa- 
 sion as the canal question was again in the air, and 
 the American company had already sent its agent 
 to Nicaragua, as we know, with ready money at his 
 disposal, to obtain the proper concessions. This 
 excited Costa Kica's cupidity once more, and again 
 caused her to put forward her claims to the canal 
 route. Lest this dispute should lead to a renewal 
 of hostilities, the other states finally induced the 
 two which could never agree of themselves, to refer 
 the whole question to President Cleveland to arbi- 
 trate. The task was, indeed, a delicate one, and yet 
 at the same time one which the United States gov- 
 ernment was very glad to assume, as the precedent 
 thus established gave hope of a better state of affairs 
 in the future. 
 
 With the aid of the Assistant Secretary of State, 
 Mr. Rives, the President then went carefully over all 
 the accumulated evidence and decided the question 
 on March 22, 1888, at least to the immediate satis- 
 faction of all parties. According to the award, the 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 443 
 
 Canas- Jerez treaty of 1858, which Nicaragua had 
 repudiated without due cause, was now declared to 
 be valid, and the boundary line was fixed as before, 
 parallel to, and three miles south of, the San Juan. 
 Nicaragua was to be allowed to execute any works 
 of improvement in her own territory, provided she 
 did not occupy or damage the territory of Costa 
 Rica, and provided also she in no wise impaired the 
 free navigation of that part of the Rio San Juan in 
 which Costa Rica was entitled to share. Nicaragua 
 could therefore make no grants for canal purposes 
 on the right bank of the river without first asking 
 Costa Rica's " opinion," as, according to the tenns of 
 the Canas-Jerez treaty, Costa Rica possessed certain 
 natural rights in the navigation of the San Juan 
 below Castilla Vie jo. On the other hand, the Presi- 
 dent decided that Costa Rica had no right under the 
 treaty to be a party to the grants which Nicaragua 
 might see fit to make for the purposes of an inter- 
 oceanic canal, though in case the construction of 
 such a canal should involve any injury to Costa 
 Rica's rights, her " opinion " in the matter, Cleve- 
 land said, should be more than " consultive " and 
 " advisory," and that in such an event her " positive 
 consent " would be necessary, and compensation 
 should be allowed. StUl Costa Rica was to have 
 no claim to the profits set apart to Nicaragua from 
 the canal project in return for the favors and privi- 
 leges the latter state might concede. 
 
 Both parties accepted the decision and ratified the 
 award, but Costa Rica showed her determination 
 
444 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 from the outset to make what advantage she could 
 from such rights as had been accorded her. So to 
 avoid further trouble, if possible, the canal company 
 at once made liberal terms with Costa Kica as well, 
 and, on August 9, 1888, a further compensation con- 
 tract was signed by Menocal granting Costa Rica all 
 she could well desire, and giving the company in 
 retiu-n full rights to construct the canal as it had 
 planned.' 
 
 Quiet now reigned among the Central American 
 states. Nicaragua and Costa Rica were for the time 
 
 „ , „ . at least content, and the Ameiican canal 
 § i6i. Brit- ' . . 
 
 ish and Am- company was secure m its proper conces- 
 ericans in gions for the work ; but diplomatic diffi- 
 squi la. ^^^^^gg g^Q]^ remained. We might settle 
 matters to our satisfaction on the isthmus, but, hav- 
 ing arranged the preliminaries, we always found 
 ourselves face to face with the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty and its uncomfortable conditions. The gov- 
 ernment, it is true, was no longer directly respon- 
 sible for the canal project, but still the question of 
 American control was about as important as before, 
 and like his predecessors, Bayard also had strong con- 
 victions on this point. When the matter came up be- 
 
 ^ U. S. House Ex. Docs., 732, 735, 739, 743, Part II., 43d Cong., ist 
 Sess. 
 
 U. S. House Ex. Docs., 157, 168, Part I., 44th Cong., 1st Sess. 
 U. S. House Ex. Docs., 5g-6r, Part I., 48th Cong., ist Sess. 
 U. S. Senate Report, 1944, Appendix I., 51st Cong., ist Sess. 
 U. S. Foreign Relations, 1888, " Cleveland's Award." 
 U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1880-1887. 
 Gaceta Oficial, Managua, Nicaragua, Feb. 27, 1887. 
 New York Tribune, Jan. 11, 1891. 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 445 
 
 fore Congress in 1880, Bayard had declared in the 
 Senate that the canal " must be under the control of 
 the government of the United States." " Our power 
 may be questioned," he said at that time, " but it wiU 
 be maintained," and, he concluded, " every counsel 
 of wisdom, therefore, exhorts us to seize the day and 
 in time of peace prepare for war, for it is the surest 
 mode to avert it." The responsibility of maintain- 
 ing such control had now devolved upon Bayard's 
 shoulders in his official capacity, and he accordingly 
 lost no time in reopening the old question of the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty with the British Foreign 
 Office. 
 
 Mr. Frelinghuysen, it will be remembered, in his 
 efforts to overturn the existing status of the Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty, had directed his attack upon the 
 colony of British Honduras; but even while this 
 correspondence was being exchanged events were 
 taking place in the Mosquito reserve which were 
 now destined to revive the case in its original bear- 
 ings. Whatever may have been the political effects 
 of the Emperor of Austria's decision, it certainly 
 resulted in giving economic dignity and importance 
 to the Mosquito shore. The British control of the 
 government of the reserve which the English settlers 
 had practically usurped, though never allowed by 
 Nicaragua, was now justified by the Emperor's 
 award. Still, Anglo-Saxon direction to whatever 
 purpose applied, is far better than Spanish-American 
 rule, and the immediate result of the new order of 
 things, was to give fresh life to the business interests 
 
446 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 of the settlement. British and American capital 
 now sought larger investment along the shore and 
 the trade in woods and fruits came to increase very 
 rapidly, dividing itself pretty equally between Eng- 
 land and the United States. Blueflelds, the capital, 
 became, accordingly, a business settlement of for- 
 eigners, and the English directors were wise enough 
 to govern the reserve solely in the interest of these 
 commercial classes. Nicaragua, and indeed the In- 
 dians themselves, suffered in consequence, but Ameri- 
 can business interests were greatly benefited thereby. 
 Politically, however, the United States were bound 
 to stand by Nicaragua in the dispute, and thus the 
 American settlers were placed in an anomalous posi- 
 tion, their patriotism urging them to stand by their 
 government in the matter, their personal interests 
 demanding that they support the existing regmie. 
 
 The government of the reserve before long fell 
 into the hands of an irresponsible clique of foreign- 
 ers who ignored Nicaragua's rights entirely. But the 
 settlement was now growing rich, and Nicaragua 
 desired to have a share in its revenues. So a policy 
 of renewed interference was decided upon in the 
 face of the Emperor's decision. A Nicaraguan post- 
 office was accordingly opened at Blueflelds as a pre- 
 liminary step, troops and police began to congregate 
 in the town, and there was even talk of erecting forts 
 along the shore. When matters reached this pass, 
 Mr. Gastrell, the British minister to the Central 
 American states, reported the condition of affairs to 
 his government and asked for instructions. Nicara- 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 447 
 
 gua at the same time appealed to the United States, 
 and, having also learned the nature of the issue 
 through his own subordinates on the ground, Mr. 
 Bayard concluded that some immediate action must 
 be taken in behalf of American interests and the 
 canal company. 
 
 On November 23, 1888, a letter was accordingly 
 addressed to Mr. Phelps, United States minister in 
 London, in which Mr. Bayard took the ground that 
 his government, not having been made a party to the 
 arbitration of 1880, did not consider itself bound in 
 any way by the Emperor of Austria's decision. He 
 further declared that the United States had never 
 supposed that the treaty of Managua gave Great 
 Britain any further right to influence, direct, or con- 
 trol the destinies of the Mosquito territory, and that 
 they must, therefore, now insist upon Nicaragua's 
 paramount right of sovereignty being recognized in 
 fact as well as in theory. Great Britain's present 
 action in attempting to interfere in a dispute between 
 Nicaragua and the Indians living within her borders, 
 was nothing more nor less than a revival of the 
 Mosquito protectorate, in a new form, Mr. Bayard 
 maintained, and the United States could not look 
 with indifference upon any such protectorate. 
 
 All this was again well enough if regarded as a 
 reassertion of American claims, but in reality Mr. 
 Bayard had no diplomatic grounds for his complaints. 
 Having had an opportunity to examine the treaty of 
 Managua, and having declared ourselves satisfied 
 therewith, we could not now plead any misunder- 
 
•i-iti The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 standing of its terms. Nor could we refuse to be 
 bound by the Emperor of Austria's decision, for, by 
 recording our satisfaction with the treaty, we were 
 no longer a party to any dispute over its proper in- 
 terpretation. Great Britain could therefore perfectly 
 well refuse to discuss the question any further with 
 us directly, and the matter was thus allowed to work 
 out its own solution in a manner somewhat surpris- 
 ing to both parties, as we shall presently see.* 
 
 In the meantime, with their concessions and con- 
 contracts secured, and the canal route definitely 
 located, the gentlemen of the Provisional 
 § 162. The Association were anxious to inaugurate the 
 
 Incorpora- , . . ° 
 
 tion of the work in Nicaragua. They did not feel 
 Maritime Justified in proceeding, however, until they 
 pany by the ^^^ ^^ least succeeded in securing the 
 
 United moral support of the government. Public 
 
 states Gi 
 ernment. 
 
 a es ov- QpJQiQjj ^g^s accordingly aroused all over 
 
 the country in their behalf, the press be- 
 gan to call upon the government to come out in 
 favor of the present American canal project, and 
 Congress was deluged with resolutions from various 
 State legislatures, chambers of commerce, boards of 
 trade, and other organizations, urging it to incor- 
 porate the canal company under the laws of the 
 United States. 
 
 When popular enthusiasm had been sufficiently 
 
 ' Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1888, p. 759. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 20, pp. 14, 70, and 87, 53d Cong., 3d Sess. 
 
 U. S. Senate Calendar, 378, Report of Senator Morgan, April 14, 1894. 
 
 New York Nation, No. 762, Feb. 5, 1880. 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 449 
 
 aroused in this way, on January 10, 1888, two bills 
 were introduced simultaneously in the Senate and 
 the House by Senator Edmunds and Representative 
 Norwood, providing for the incorporation of the 
 Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. Inasmuch as 
 these bills only asked for the government's political 
 protection, and as this had already been virtually 
 promised by the President, there was little opposi- 
 tion in Congress to the request. Both bills being 
 identical, the Senate bill was, therefore, allowed to 
 take the place of that before the House, and the 
 measure ultimately secured the sanction of both 
 branches of Congress. On February 20, 1889, the 
 President added his approval, and the Maritime 
 Canal Company thus secured the rights of a Juristic 
 personality under the laws of the Federal govern- 
 ment. 
 
 On the fourth of the following May the company 
 was duly organized, with a capital of $150,000,000 
 in five-per-cent. bonds and $100,000,000 in ordinary 
 stock. Mr. Hiram Hitchcock was elected president,^ 
 and the concessions were duly transferred from the 
 old company to the new. A contract was then 
 entered into with the Construction Company for the 
 prosecution of the work, and henceforth the Maritime 
 Canal Company of Nicaragua came to represent the 
 American canal project as a private undertaking.^ 
 
 Mr. Menocal retained the post of engineer-in-chief 
 
 ' The position he still fills. 
 
 ' U. S. Statutes, Vol. XXV., pp. 673-675. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Report, 1944, Appendix K, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 
 
 " The Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua," loc. at., pp. 14, 15. 
 
 29 
 
450 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 of the undertaking, and on Hay 26th the first con- 
 structipn party, consisting of forty-seven 
 inaugura-^ engineers and their assistants, was sent ofE 
 tionofthe to Nicaragua to inaugurate the work under 
 Work m j^-g direction. Supplies and materials were 
 
 Nicaragua. i i • i i in 
 
 despatched with the party and orders were 
 given to stop at Jamaica and pick up a sufficient 
 number of acclimatized laborers. The party arrived 
 at Greytown on June 8th and at once commenced 
 work, with nothing like the display that had char- 
 acterized the inauguration of the Panama canal, it is 
 true, but with far greater determination to succeed. 
 What de Lesseps had called the " installations " 
 were little more than begun, however, when Nicara- 
 gua and Costa Rica again fell to quarrelling over 
 their respective rights along the canal line. Each 
 had made its own contract with the canal company, 
 to be sure, but neither would consent to countersign 
 the grants accorded by the other, and thus fresh 
 controversies were bound to arise. The company 
 appealed to the government of the United States to 
 adjust matters, and, as Mr. Blaine had now reassumed 
 control of the State Department, he was again called 
 upon to exercise his good offices in behalf of the canal. 
 Mr. Mizner was then our minister to Central America, 
 and by acting decisively and at once he was able to 
 bring the refractory little republics to order, and 
 finally induced them to sign a convention, called the 
 "Treaty of Limits," which emphasized President 
 Cleveland's award, and once more "settled" the 
 boundary dispute for the time. 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 451 
 
 This diplomatic diflSculty occasioned some delay 
 in the technical prosecution of the work, but after 
 the adjustment had been affected operations were 
 resumed. The canal line was now laid out accord- 
 ing to the plans, storehouses, machine-shops, and 
 wharfs were constructed, dwellings for officers and 
 employees were erected, a hospital service was organ- 
 ized, and railroad and telephone lines were run along 
 the eastern section of the canal route.^ 
 
 These works were merely preliminary, however, 
 and were only intended to substantiate the company's 
 rights under its concession with Nicaragua, g jg ^^_ 
 The real test lay in the ability of the Mari- pediUons of 
 time Canal Company to raise the necessary '"spection. 
 funds for the actual construction of the canal. 
 
 The promoters were, indeed, genuinely anxious 
 ihat the work should be completed with Ameri- 
 can capital, but sufficient funds could not be raised 
 in the United States, they thought, unless the gov- 
 ernment should come to their aid with a financial 
 guaranty and give the enterprise at least the stamp 
 of a national undertaking. Otherwise, they openly 
 declared they would have to float their securities on 
 the markets of the world and invite foreign capital 
 to subscribe. This latter plan, again, if vigorously 
 pursued, must necessarily react in favor of the for- 
 mer, by stirring up American patriotism in the un- 
 dertaking when confronted with the possibility of 
 
 • Report of the Maritime Canal Company to the Secretary of the Interior, 
 l8go. U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 5, 51st Cong., 2d Sess. 
 U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1890. 
 
452 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 foreign control. Thus in following its own business 
 interests, the canal company really cast the responsi- 
 bility of the decision upon the American people 
 themselves. 
 
 On March 5, 1890, Hon. Warner Miller was elected 
 president of the Construction Company, and a few 
 days later he set out on an expedition of inspection, 
 taking with him a number of gentlemen, both ex- 
 perts and laymen, that they might see for themselves 
 and report to their friends the progress and possi- 
 bilities of the work. The party was selected with 
 rare disci'imination, and all interested elements were 
 well represented. Two English engineers, Messrs. 
 H. F. Donaldson and H. F. Gooch were invited, in the 
 hopes that their I'eport might enlist British capital in 
 the enterprise. An American technical expert from 
 private life, Mr. D. McN. StaufEer, was also present 
 to encourage American investors. The United States 
 government likewise detailed experts from the Army 
 and Navy to accompany the expedition in an official 
 capacity and report the results of their inspection. 
 The officers appointed for the purpose were Major 
 C. E. Button, and Lieutenant Guy Howard of the 
 Army, and Commander Willard H. Brownson, and 
 Lieutenant W. L Chambers of the Navy. A number 
 of Journalists also accompanied the party, that the 
 people might be informed of the undertaking through 
 the press. A mishap befell the party on the voyage, 
 as their vessel, the steamship Aguan, was wrecked 
 upon a coral reef in the Caribbean Sea, but fortunately 
 no lives were lost, and, after being obliged to spend 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 453 
 
 six days on an island, they were taken off by a coast- 
 ing steamer, and finally landed at Greytown on April 
 2d. The visitors were then shown over the route, 
 and given an opportunity to see the equipment in 
 working order and inspect the work thus far accom- 
 plished. General satisfaction was expressed at the 
 result. The English engineers on their return to 
 Great Britain spoke with approval of the work, and 
 the American officers also reported favorably on the 
 enterprise to their government. The press was like- 
 wise loud in its praises of the undertaking, and alto- 
 gether, as a result of the expedition, the Nicaragua 
 canal project was placed on a much firmer and surer 
 basis before the world. 
 
 Shortly after this, the Nicaragua government ap- 
 pointed two commissioners, Senors Don J. A. Roman 
 and Don Maximilian Sonnenstern, to inspect the 
 work of the company, and determine whether, during 
 the first year, $2,000,000 had been legitimately ex- 
 pended upon the work, as provided for under the 
 concession. Their report, handed in on November 
 6, 1890, was also entirely favorable, and the com- 
 pany was duly informed by Nicaragua's President, 
 that Article XL VII. of the concession had been 
 "fully and completely complied with." Thus un- 
 der the terms of their contract with Nicaragua the 
 canal promoters now had ten years before them to 
 complete the work, and they felt Justified, therefore, 
 in continuing their preparations accordingly.* 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 4, 52d Cong., ist Sess., p. 3. 
 
 " Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua," loc. cit., pp. 17, 18, and Appendix 10. 
 
454 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Opposition to the company's plans then arose from 
 quite an unexpected source, and in order to under- 
 o jg, -pjjg stand the situation we must recollect in 
 Biackman what hopeless confusion the French inter- 
 Ciaim and ygntion in Nicaragua left the rights of the 
 
 the Guar- . . ° ° 
 
 anty Bill original American canal company. 
 of 1891. Between M. Belly's ignominious exit and 
 
 the appearance of the Emperor's agent, the Nicara- 
 guan government authorized the organization of tlie 
 Central American Transit Company, as we have 
 learned, and offered, at least, to revive in favor of 
 Mr. Webb and his associates, all the rights and 
 privileges of the American Atlantic and Pacific 
 Ship Canal Company, whose original charter Walker, 
 the filibuster, had previously annulled. But the 
 Nicaraguan authorities and the American promoters 
 fell out, as we know, and shortly after this, M. 
 Chevalier appeared upon the scene to dazzle the 
 republic with the Emperor's magnificent plans. 
 
 The Americans were then straightway forgotten, 
 and Nicaragua, we will remember, granted exclusive 
 rights of transit to the French. But Napoleon could, 
 make nothing of his concession, and, on March 16, 
 1877, Nicaragua again transferred the monopoly of 
 steam navigation in her waters, this time conferring 
 the right upon Senor F. A. Bellas, an Italian resi- 
 dent of Greytown. 
 
 Thus there could be little doubt from her acts 
 that Nicaragua had long since come to regard as 
 null and void the rights of navigation and transit 
 previously granted to citizens of the United States. 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 455 
 
 But the American company appears to have lived on 
 in name at least, and a resident of Kansas, Mr. A. 
 L. Blackmau, now came forward and claimed to be 
 the possessor of its residual rights. 
 
 At his instigation, therefore, Mr. Richardson, the 
 Representative from Kansas, presented a bill before 
 the House to repeal the charter of the Maritime 
 Canal Company. The bill was referred to the Com- 
 mittee on Commerce, but after a careful examination 
 of the subject, the committee could discover no 
 adequate ground for the adverse claim. A report 
 was accordingly handed in to this effect on August 
 30, 1890, and the rights of the Maritime Canal Com- 
 pany under its United States charter were officially 
 reaffirmed. 
 
 But the situation was still not entirely satisfactory 
 to the government, with rival claims to the route 
 among American citizens, and the possibility of 
 foreign capital seeking investment in the canal, so the 
 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations then took the 
 matter into its own hands, and reported a bill, on 
 January 10, 1891, authorizing the government to 
 guarantee the principal and interest at four per cent, 
 of an issue of $100,000,000 of the canal company's 
 bonds. The funds thus raised were to be exclusively 
 applied to the construction of the canal, and the gov- 
 ernment was to hold $70,000,000 of the company's 
 ordinary stock as a pledge and secuiity for the 
 amounts advanced under its guaranty. The Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury, in whose custody the stock was 
 to be left, was furthermore to have the power of 
 
456 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 voting upon it at his discretion, and the President 
 might name the majority of the company's board of 
 directors. 
 
 This was sailing somewhat closer to the wind of 
 governmental control, and showed that the tide was 
 again beginning to turn against private initiative in 
 the canal project. The bill was introduced by 
 Senator Sherman, chairman of the committee, and 
 was ably discussed during the remainder of the 
 session. Senator Morgan and the other members of 
 the committee were strongly in favor of its passage, 
 but still it was not thought wise to press the matter 
 at this time to a final vote.' 
 
 The speeches in the Senate at least had the effect 
 
 of setting the people thinking over the canal project 
 
 and the matter of American control. The 
 
 §166. How j^gjg^^g^j question of a closer union of the 
 
 Popular .... 
 
 Interest in Americas in the interests of trade and 
 the Canal commerce was also being discussed at this 
 Aroused, time, as a result of Blaine's Pan-American 
 congress which had lately met in Washing- 
 ton. Thus the attention of the country was being 
 turned to the south, and the people were again forced 
 to consider the question of their future politico- 
 economic relations with the states of Spanish- America. 
 
 ' " The American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company. A Refuta- 
 tion to its Claim to the Nicaragua Canal Route." New \(A Evening Post 
 Job Print, Jan. i, 1888. 
 
 Gaceta Oficial, Managua Nicaragua, Feb. 27, 1887. 
 
 " Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua," loc. cit. , pp. 15, 16. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Bill, 4827, January 10, 1891, and speech of Hon. John T. 
 Morgan on the same, February 6, 1891. — Sen. Report, 1944, 31st Cong., 
 1st Sess. 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 457 
 
 There were now two projects on foot, one for a 
 railroad through Central America to connect Mexico 
 and the United States with the countries of South 
 America, and the other for a canal across the isthmus. 
 The two schemes complemented each other, however, 
 and both demanded definite action on the part of the 
 United States. The time was therefore ripe for a 
 thorough agitation of the question of interoceanic 
 communication, and the friends of the Nicaragua 
 canal determined to make good the opportunit3^ 
 
 On December 15, 1891, a special meeting of the 
 New York Chamber of Commerce was called to listen 
 to an address on the canal project by the Hon. Warner 
 Miller, president of the Construction Company. In in- 
 troducing the speaker, Mr. Charles S. Smith, president 
 of the Chamber, took occasion to express himself 
 very strongly in favor of governmental ownership, 
 construction, and control of the canal, and resolutions 
 were adopted at the close of the meeting to the effect 
 that the enterprise was entitled to the encouragement 
 and loyal support of the American people. 
 
 California, always deeply interested in the problem 
 of interoceanic transit, was the next to take the 
 matter up ; and, early in the following year, a State 
 convention of leading citizens was called together in 
 San Francisco to discuss the question. As a result 
 of this meeting a memorial was presented to Congress 
 on behalf of the people of California, urging imme- 
 diate governmental action on the canal question, and 
 the Governor of the State was also requested to call 
 together a National Nicaragua Canal Convention to 
 meet in St. Louis in the spring. 
 
458 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Invitations were accordingly issued by California's 
 Executive to the Governors of the other States and 
 Territories, asking them to appoint delegates. The 
 convention met in June, 1892, with three hundred 
 representatives from thirty States and Territories, 
 and the enthusiasm appeared to be indicative of the 
 temper of the American people. Resolutions were 
 adopted calling upon Congress to aid in the con- 
 struction of the canal, and an executive committee 
 was also appointed to examine into the question 
 further, and arrange for another canal convention 
 later on. 
 
 This was the summer of the presidential campaign, 
 and the commercial policy of the country was there- 
 fore the principal theme of political discussion. But 
 both free-trade and reciprocity favored interoceanic 
 communication, and thus the Nicaragua canal project 
 was fortunate enough not to become entangled in 
 the political dispute. Republicans and Democrats 
 had differed on the question of governmental control 
 of the transit-waj', it is true, but this issue had 
 already been neutralized by the Senate committee's 
 proposal of a guaranty, and both parties accordingly 
 came out strongly in favor of the new plans. In 
 their respective letters of acceptance both Cleveland 
 and Harrison also took pains to express their ap- 
 proval of the undertaking, and thus for once at least 
 in its varied career, the Nicaragua canal project 
 received a genuinely national endorsement. 
 
 The friends of the project were naturally elated, 
 and confident now of success. After the election. 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 459 
 
 therefore, the executive committee on the transit 
 question, appointed at the St. Louis meeting, issued 
 its invitations at once for another canal convention 
 to meet in New Orleans on the 30th of November. 
 Every State and Territory was this time represented 
 and 600 delegates were present on the occasion. In 
 the course of the preliminary discussion. Governor 
 Foster of Louisiana spoke for the Gulf section. 
 Judge Jones of Arkansas set forth the farmers' 
 interest in the project, and Governor Estee of Cali- 
 fornia dilated upon the advantages that would accrue 
 to the Pacific slope from the construction of the 
 Nicaragua canal. Senator Morgan then made a long 
 statement of the case from the governmental stand- 
 point. After considering the project very carefully 
 in its diplomatic, political, strategic, and commercial 
 aspects, the Senator came definitely to the conclusion 
 that the government was both justified and warranted 
 in giving its support to the undertaking. Resolu- 
 tions were, thereupon, unanimously adopted calling 
 once more upon Congress to lend its aid in the con- 
 struction of the canal, and to take such steps as 
 would best accomplish the desired result at a mini- 
 mum cost of time and money.' 
 
 These various petitions, memorials, and resolutions 
 
 ' "What the Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Trade and Exchanges 
 of New York, Boston, etc., and Prominent Newspapers and Individuals 
 have to say about the Nicaragua Canal." Pamphlet, New York, 1888. 
 
 Proceedings of Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, Dec. 
 15, 1891. 
 
 Proceedings of the Nicaragua Canal Conventions at St. Louis and New 
 Orleans, June 2, and 3, 1892, November 30, 1892. 
 
 D. H. Montgomery, " Leading Facts of American History," § 390. 
 
460 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 in favor of governmental participation in the canal 
 project had their desired effect upon Congress. The 
 g 167 The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
 Guaranty again vpent over the whole question very 
 ^'"°'^'®9^" carefully with the intention of pointing out 
 some way by which American capital could construct 
 the canal, and leave it under the exclusive control of 
 the United States government, without coming into 
 conflict with Great Britain. It was indeed a difficult 
 course to navigate, but the committee had by no 
 means lost confidence in its earlier chart and prom- 
 ised to steer clear of the difficulties. 
 
 On December 23, 1892, Senator Sherman accord- 
 ingly presented an amended guaranty bill before the 
 Senate in behalf of his committee and strongly 
 recommended its passage. Like the former measure 
 this bill provided for a governmental guaranty of the 
 canal company's bonds to the extent of $100,000,000 ; 
 and again gave the President power to name a 
 majority on the company's board of directors. 
 Instead of holding the shares in pledge as before, 
 however, the government was now to receive in 
 return for the security granted, and without further 
 compensation, $80,500,000 of the capital stock of the 
 company in full ownership. A similar bill was in- 
 troduced into the House at the same time, and Con- 
 gress thus had another opportunity of coming to 
 some decision. 
 
 The course thus laid down in the chart was a 
 point or two closer to the wind than before, for the 
 government was now not only to guarantee the 
 
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 461 
 
 bonds, but also to own a majority of the stock. It 
 was a question, therefore, whether better progress 
 could not be made by going about on the other tack, 
 and making straight for governmental ownership 
 and control. But Congress was assured by the com- 
 mittee that such a course would inevitably land the 
 country on the shoals of another diplomatic contro- 
 versy with England. Why not ease off then toward 
 the open of free competition in the canal project ? 
 Because, the committee answered, there were foreign 
 capitalists there, ready to embark on the undertaking 
 and steer it entirely away from our control. It was 
 the old question of Scylla and Charybdis, with the 
 British government on the one hand and the British 
 investor on the other, and again Congi'ess did not 
 dare make the run. 
 
 There were able speeches in both branches of 
 Congress on this occasion as well, but, as before, the 
 canal bills failed to reach a final vote.' 
 
 The Maritime Canal Company was thus thrown 
 back again on the markets of the world, with its 
 financial prospects injured rather than g j^g ^j. 
 aided by the government's interference. forts to 
 The Construction Company had been pro-^^j^^^^'^^J 
 visionally capitalized at $12,000,000, and Subscrip- 
 one hundred and twenty thousand shares t'°"- 
 
 of $100 each had already been disposed of at fifty 
 cents on the dollar. But the $6,000,000 thus ac- 
 quired were now all but spent in providing for the 
 
 ' U. S. Sen. Report, 1142, 51st Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
462 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 surveys and the plant, and in the inauguration of 
 the canal. 
 
 Funds were therefore necessary to continue the 
 work, and some arrangements had now to be made 
 for an issue of bonds. Bids were accordingly 
 opened by the Construction Company for $5,000,000 
 gold bonds with interest at six per cent., guaranteed 
 by the Maritime Canal Company's long-time bonds. 
 The issue was not entirely successful, however, and 
 a substitute plan was then evolved for selling bonds 
 of a low denomination to the people direct. 
 
 But before this last scheme could be put into 
 execution the panic of 1893 came on, and the Con- 
 struction Company, without further funds at its dis- 
 posal, and with notes coming due, was obliged to 
 suspend payments. Work on the canal came to a 
 standstill in consequence, and, on August 30, 1893, 
 the Construction Company went into the hands of a 
 receiver. 
 
 The Maritime Canal Company, with neither gov- 
 ernment guaranty nor private subscriptions to rely 
 on, had thus to keep the Nicaragua project afloat 
 during the storm. It weathered the gale success- 
 fully, nevertheless, and both public and private 
 relief parties appear to be now on their way to its 
 lelief, — but this belongs more properly to the pres- 
 ent situation, to be outlined in the following 
 chapter.' 
 
 ' Bond Circular, Nicaragua Canal Construction Co., April 26, 1892. 
 Bond Prospectus of same, June 25, 1893. 
 U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 5, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
A 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 THE PRESENT SITUATION. 
 
 S we come to examine the present situation 
 of the interoceanic transit question, we 
 lose our historical perspective. Viewed 
 from so close a range, each special phase of the 
 problem appears to make up the whole. We must 
 take several different standpoints, there- § ^ ^u 
 fore, and rest content with describing the Political 
 particular aspects of the subject in turn as Situation, 
 they appear to us from the several vantage-grounds 
 chosen. 
 
 The political features of the canal question will 
 probably" be the first to attract our attention, as 
 recent events have lately brought them out in strik- 
 ing relief. More particularly is this the case with 
 the de Lesseps project. It is the Panama canal 
 scandal, accordingly, which should first be des- 
 cribed. 
 
 The immediate results of the official liquidation of 
 the Panama Canal Company's affairs have already 
 been set down in the course of the 
 
 Panama. 
 
 narrative, and the effect of these figures 
 upon the volatile French mind may well be 
 imagined. As the parliamentary enquiry pro- 
 
 463 
 
464 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 gressed the indignation of the people grew, 
 until finally, on November 21, 1892, the storm 
 burst in a mad fury. The matter was then brought 
 up in the Chamber, on an interpellation by M. Dela- 
 haye, and though no definite accusations were 
 brought, it was stated that $600,000, at least, had 
 been improperly used by the canal company in brib- 
 ing Senators and Deputies. The government could 
 not face the storm directly, and it was therefore 
 agreed that a special Committee of thirty-three 
 members be appointed to examine into the truth 
 of the charges. On the same day judicial sum- 
 monses were issued against the directors of the com- 
 pany charging them with the "use of fraudulent 
 devices for creating belief in the existence of a chi- 
 merical event, the spending of sums accruing fi-ora 
 issues handed to them for a fixed purpose, and the 
 swindling of all or part of the fortune of others." 
 The case was called up before the Court of Appeals, 
 on November 25, but as neither of the de Lessepses 
 appeared, and as the evidence was not yet in shape, 
 the trial was adjourned until January 10, 1893. 
 
 Baron Keinach, the company's financial agent, died 
 very suddenly, before the special Committee of the 
 Chambers could include him in the prosecution. 
 The circumstances surrounding his death were sus- 
 picious, and rumors of suicide and murder quickly 
 spread. M. Brisson, chairman of the Committee, 
 called the government's attention to these rumors, 
 and requested that the body be exhumed, and the 
 theory of suicide tested. M. Loubet, Minister of 
 
The Present Situation. -±65 
 
 Justice, replied, that as no formal charges had been 
 made, the government had no power to proceed. 
 Brisson then moved a resolution of regret that the 
 Baron's papers had not been sealed upon his death. 
 Loubet called for the order of the day instead, but 
 the Chamber refused to sustain him. This was 
 practically a vote of lack of confidence in the gov- 
 ernment, and on November 28th, the Cabinet accord- 
 ingly resigned, amid the wildest excitement. 
 
 Brisson and Casimir-P6rier were called upon in 
 turn by the President to construct a new Cabinet, 
 but both failed. M. Ribot, the Foreign Minister, 
 was finally successful, and on December 5th the 
 new government assumed control. This Cabinet 
 change amounted to a victory for the canal com- 
 pany's opponents, and the investigation was now 
 allowed to proceed without further hindrance on 
 the part of the government. The Committee then 
 came forward with startling evidences of corruption. 
 The wholesale bribery of the Paris press was re- 
 vealed in all its details. M. Thierree declared be- 
 fore the Committee, that the late Baron Reinach had 
 deposited $670,000 in his bank in Panama funds, 
 and drawn it out again in 26 checks to bearer. 
 Senators, Deputies, government officers, and jour- 
 nalists were now named as the recipients. M. An- 
 drieux, ex-Prefect of Police, asserted that $260,000 
 had been distributed by the company's agents 
 among his colleagues alone, and, as a further result 
 of his evidence, 100 members of the Legislature 
 were implicated in the scandal. M. Rouvier, Min- 
 
466 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 ister of Finance, then caused another sensation by 
 resigning his portfolio and confessing that he had 
 supplemented the secret service fund by soliciting 
 contributions (from friends of the government) in 
 order to put down the Boulangists. 
 
 The names of almost all the leaders of the Repub- 
 lic were thus besmirched, and it was time for the 
 new government to act. The directors of the canal 
 company were accordingly arrested now on the 
 more serious charge of corrupting public function- 
 aries. Warrants were also issued ao^ainst five Sena- 
 tors and five Deputies,^ — and five of the ten were 
 found to be ex-Ministers of the government. 
 
 The trials were then begun. On January 10, 
 1893, the adjourned case came up before the Court 
 of Appeals, and on February 14th sentence was 
 pronounced upon the directors. Ferdinand and 
 Charles de Lesseps were each condemned to five 
 years' imprisonment and a fine of $600, MM. Fon- 
 tane and Cottu to two years in prison and a fine of 
 $400, and M. Eiffel to two years' imprisonment and 
 a fine of $4000, as his own net profits of the general 
 rascality had amounted to a far larger share than 
 the rest. On March 8th the trial for coi-ruption 
 was taken up before the Assize Court, against the 
 younger de Lesseps, MM. Fontane, Baihaut, Blon- 
 din, and ex-Minister Proust, Senator Beral, and 
 others. De Lesseps received one j^ear more of im- 
 prisonment, Blondin was sentenced to two more 
 years in prison, and M. Baihaut was punished with 
 five years' imprisonment, a fine of $15,000, and loss 
 of civil rights. 
 
The Present Situation. 467 
 
 But the sentence against the older de Lesseps 
 was not carried into effect, as he was supposed to 
 have been sufficiently punished by his disgrace. 
 On appeal to the Court of Cassation the earlier 
 Judgment against Charles de Lesseps was also set 
 aside, and he was finally released on September 12, 
 1893. The convictions were all, indeed, merely 
 nominal ; but the investigation and trials at least 
 had the effect of temporarily clearing the political 
 air from corruption. They also freed the Panama 
 canal project from the vultures that had fastened 
 themselves so persistently upon it, and left it, as we 
 shall see, still in a condition to be resuscitated.' 
 
 The Panama Canal scandal also found its echo in 
 the United States. The company, as we know, had 
 its committee and financial agents in this 
 
 , , Nicaragua. 
 
 country, and there were grave suspicions 
 that Representatives of our own Congress, as well 
 as Deputies of the French Chamber, had received a 
 share in the spoils. It was also asserted that the 
 Panama Railway Company, now practically owned 
 by the French, had entered into a contract with the 
 Pacific Mail Steamship Company to maintain trans- 
 continental rates, in restraint of trade. A special 
 Congressional Committee was accoi'dingly appointed 
 to examine into the several charges. Legislative 
 corruption could not be proved on the evidence pre- 
 sented, but the Committee cautiously admitted that 
 further investigation might not be altogether fruit- 
 less in this connection. Mr. Thompson's activities 
 
 1 Quarterly Record of Current History, March, 1893. 
 Cyclopedic Review of Current History, 1893, Vol. III., No. I. 
 
468 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 as chairman of the Oomite Americai/n were now 
 brought to light, and mention was also made of the 
 sums paid to the three New York banking houses 
 for apparently no consideration on their part. 
 
 In regard to the alleged combination of railroad 
 and steamship companies to prevent free competi- 
 tion between the isthmus and transcontinental 
 routes, the Committee was more explicit. From 
 the report it appeared that the transcontinental 
 lines, the Pacific Mail Company and the Panama 
 Railway Company, were all in league, and that this 
 combination had for the past " fifteen years been 
 diminishing commerce between New York and San 
 Francisco across the isthmus." This monopolj'^, the 
 Committee thought, could not be beneficial either 
 to the domestic or to the foreign commerce of the 
 country, and therefore recommended that it be 
 broken up at once by the government. 
 
 Coming to the more general question of American 
 control, the Committee was unable to see anything 
 in our treaty relations with the states of the isth- 
 mus, which should prevent foreigners from owning 
 and dominating the transit route. It was regarded 
 as a matter of regret, nevertheless, that the Panama 
 railway, an American corporation, should be practi- 
 cally owned by foreign capitalists, and the Commit- 
 tee, in conclusion, could not " refrain from calling 
 attention to what seems to be an obvious deduction 
 from the facts shown — that it is the interest of the 
 United States that the American people should ab- 
 solutely control some outlet across the isthmus at 
 
The Present Situation. 469 
 
 some point which shall be used for the benefit of 
 American trade in general as an open and continu- 
 ous competitor, affording no opportunity for entan- 
 gling subsidies from great competing lines, or chance 
 of falling into the grasp of any monopoly through 
 stock manipulation." 
 
 The Committee's conclusions, and the subsequent 
 resolutions adopted by Congress in favor of Ameri- 
 can control, were indeed encouraging to the canal 
 promoters, but it was now recognized, more fully 
 than before, that the Maritime Company had a pow- 
 erful domestic enemy in the transcontinental railway 
 combination. These very Pacific roads were, how- 
 ever, themselves the first fruits of the country's post- 
 bellum policy of encouraging private enterprise with 
 promises of governmental support, and now it was 
 proposed to carry out somewhat the same idea with 
 regard to the Nicaragua canal. But the people of 
 the United States, — and more particularly those of 
 the western and southwestern sections of the coun- 
 try, — had already had their object lesson in this 
 regard, and they were not at all inclined to embark 
 on a like project again, however smooth sailing it 
 might now promise to be. 
 
 The Senate Committee, on the other hand, still 
 felt obliged to hold to the old course, and steer the 
 project between the open of foreign competition and 
 the dangers of European control. It was but a nar- 
 row channel at best, and there was a rock in the 
 centre, — protruding in the shape of Nicaragua's and 
 Costa Rica's "inalienable rights of sovereignty," — 
 
470 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 which had also to be avoided. The enterprise had 
 thus to be brought still closer to the wind of gov- 
 ernment ownership and control, in order to make 
 any headway at all ; and fresh instructions were 
 given accordingly. On January 22, 1894, the guar- 
 anty bill of 1892 was again introduced into the 
 Senate and referred once more to the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations. There it was somewhat modified 
 to suit the altered exigencies of the occasion. As 
 amended, the bill provided for a governmental guar- 
 anty of but $70,000,000 of the canal company's first 
 mortgage bonds with interest at 3 per cent., though 
 a further issue of $30,000,000 was allowed, but 
 without guaranty. The amount of stock to be 
 issued was also strictly limited to $100,000,000, and 
 $70,000,000 of the total amount was to pass, as be- 
 fore, to the United States, in full ownership and 
 without further consideration. The balance of the 
 stock was to go toward indemnifying Nicaragua and 
 Costa Rica, toward extinquishing all former issues, 
 and toward the further construction of the canal.' 
 For work done and for materials and plant fur- 
 nished, the canal company was to be paid in the 
 endorsed bonds, but all other obligations of the 
 company were to be liquidated in stock as above 
 provided for. Ten out of the fifteen directors of 
 tlie company were to be appointed by the President 
 and confirmed by the Senate, and the entire super- 
 
 ' In the following proportions : To Nicaragua, $6,000,000 ; to Costa 
 Rica, $1,500,000; and to extinguishing former issues and construction of 
 canal, $22,500,000. 
 
The Present Situation. 471 
 
 vision of the canal construction was to be placed in 
 the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury, who 
 should have at his side an expert board appointed 
 by the President to examine and report every quar- 
 ter year upon the work as it progressed. 
 
 In defence of the course adopted by his Commit- 
 tee, Senator Morgan said that it was the nearest 
 approach that the government could make to the 
 policy of definite control, and that the course as laid 
 out was the "only channel of approach through 
 which it can get to the question without a violation 
 of the sovereignty of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and 
 without an infraction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty 
 or a departure from it," and he concluded, "the 
 ownership of stock in this corporation is the sole 
 method in sight, or in contemplation, by which the 
 United States can exert an influence over the opera- 
 tions of this canal for the protection and benefit of 
 the government and people of the United States, 
 otherwise than by forcible or hostile intervention 
 with the nations or the powers that will control it." 
 The compensation accorded to the canal company 
 by the amended bill seemed to be reasonable, and, 
 as the Senate had confidence in the final judgment 
 of its Committee, the report was adopted on January 
 25th, and the bill was accordingly sent on to the 
 House for concurrence. 
 
 In the House the bill was this time referred to 
 the Committee on Inter-State and Foreign Com- 
 merce ; but at its hands the canal promoters were 
 obliged to suffer a still further diminution of their 
 
472 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 reserved rights. The Committee, ia short, only ap- 
 proved of the guaranty features of the bill as 
 amended by the Senate, and considered that the 
 canal company was receiving too much in the way 
 of compensation for the work it had done. A sub- 
 stitute measure was accordingly reported back to 
 the House, providing for an equal guaranty of the 
 same amount of bonds, but awarding considerably 
 less to the company. 
 
 But this final change of course, as might have been 
 expected, — and as was probably intended, — brought 
 the project into stays, head on to the wind, and ready 
 to go about, at last, on the tack of governmental own- 
 ership and control. Congress was prepared for this 
 result, and at once set about making everything ship- 
 shape before heading in the new direction. A new^ 
 chart was the first thing required, and, in order to 
 be sure of the reckonings, an appropriation was at 
 once made to provide for a governmental commission 
 of inspection, whose duty it should be to ascertain 
 "the feasibility, permanence, and cost of construction 
 and completion of the Nicaragua canal." 
 
 The conclusions of the experts are purely technical 
 in character, as we shall presently see; but the 
 nature of their criticisms nevertheless argue strongly 
 in favor of adopting the new course of govern- 
 mental construction and control. This is, indeed, 
 as it should be, but even though the technical 
 calculations have been made up, the chart is still 
 far from complete. There are the economic ad- 
 vantages and disadvantages of the new course yet 
 
The Present Situation. 473 
 
 to be considered, and there are also political rocks 
 and diplomatic shoals to be marked out beforehand 
 in order to be subsequently avoided. The govern- 
 ment has at all events taken upon itself the task of 
 steering the project through, and it should not, 
 therefore, proceed by dead reckoning, nor should 
 it rely too explicitly upon the calculations thus far 
 made by a private company whose aims must 
 necessarily have been primarily speculative in their 
 nature. But Congress has begun to take its bearings 
 before deciding definitely on its future course, and 
 we may therefore break off this long and varied 
 history of the political aspects of the canal question 
 with some degree of confidence in the future.' 
 
 In the introduction to this work an attempt was 
 made to give a description and present a comparison 
 of the several routes of transit across the g ^^^ -^^^ 
 American isthmus. As a result of this Technical 
 study we found the Panama and Nicaragua Situation, 
 routes to be best adapted to canal construction, and 
 we therefore gave over the isthmus of Tehuantepec 
 to the doubtful possibilities of a ship railway.^ Such 
 
 ' Report of the House Panama Investigating Committee, March 3, 1893. 
 
 U. S. Sen. Report, No. 331, House Reports, Nos. 1201 and 7639, 53d 
 Cong., 2d Sess. 
 
 ^ It should be noted in this connection that the Mexican government has 
 lately completed its interoceanic railway across the isthmus of Tehuantepec, 
 and the road is now in operation. Since Captain Eads's death, in 1887, no 
 further steps have been taken in the matter of the ship-railway project, but 
 there are still some who believe that it would prove the cheapest and best 
 solution of the problem of interoceanic communication, vide, "The Te- 
 huantepec Ship Railway,'' by Elmer L. Corthell, National Geographic 
 Magazine, February, 1896. 
 
474 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 must be the conclusions of our narrative as well ; 
 but history has somewhat modified the original issue 
 between the two canal routes, and the present situa- 
 tion, therefore, calls for a re-rating of the technical 
 advantages of the Panama and Nicaragua projects. 
 
 Panama's original claims were for a tide-level canal, 
 but this, we know, is no longer the case. If judged on 
 their respective technical merits with a lock- 
 canal in view, the advantage would, indeed, 
 turn slightly in favor of Nicaragua, had not history 
 since intervened to equalize matters. One third of 
 the funds raised by de Lesseps's unfortunate com- 
 pany were, as we have learned, legitimately spent 
 upon the actual construction of the Panama canal, 
 and the work thus accomplished has already reduced 
 Nicaragua's technical handicap to nothing, and prac- 
 tically placed the two projects on a par. 
 
 The collapse of the Panama company threw the 
 entire management of afEairs into the hands of the 
 French courts, and the official liquidation, more- 
 over, left assets amounting to some $20,000,000 to 
 keep up the plant, continue the surveys, and allow 
 time for the I'eorganization of a new company. In 
 1890 Lieutenant Wyse's services were again called 
 into requisition by the liquidators, to obtain an 
 extension of the concession. As might have been 
 expected, Wyse's welcome at Bogota was not as 
 cordial as before, but, after much labor, he was 
 finally able to induce the Colombian authorities to 
 extend the grant for ten years, provided a new 
 company was organized by February, 1893. This 
 
The Present Situation. 475 
 
 the liquidators found to be impossible, but they 
 succeeded, nevertheless, in having the concession 
 extended from month to month until they could 
 settle upon some plan for the continuation of the 
 work. Finally a contract was signed by the Colom- 
 bian Minister of the Interior and Dr. F. Paul, 
 attorney for the liquidators, providing further time 
 for the organization of the new company, and 
 allowing still another ten years for the completion 
 of the work. Arrangements were also made for the 
 liquidation of the company's debt to Colombia in 
 annual cash instalments, and from present report it 
 appears that all obstacles in the way of the con- 
 struction of the canal arising from inadequate con- 
 cessionary rights have at last been removed. 
 
 Since the courts took the matter into their hands 
 three separate engineering expeditions have been 
 sent out to resurvey the route and adopt new plans. 
 The recommendations of the first two commissions 
 are for an improved lock-system. The report of the 
 third expedition has not yet been made public. 
 
 The possibility of constructing a tide-level canal, 
 as de Lesseps originally planned, is not denied, but 
 the cost of such a water-way, beyond what has been 
 already spent on the works, is estimated at $200,- 
 000,000. The final plans for a lock-system have not 
 as yet been definitely announced. According to one 
 recommendation a dam is to be built to collect the 
 waters of the Chagres, and form a large lake at the 
 summit of the canal, affording free navigation for 
 from twelve to twenty-one miles, according to the 
 
476 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 situation chosen for the dam. The canal is to be 
 flooded from this lake, and, as the originator of the 
 plan has put it, " then what has been our greatest 
 enemy will be our greatest friend." Six locks are 
 required to reach the level of the lake, 125 feet 
 above tide- water; and the cost of construction is 
 estimated at $150,000,000, including all collateral 
 expenses. Another plan calls for the construction 
 of two dams, one across the upper, and one across 
 the lower Chagres. Two lakes will thus be formed 
 supplying water to the upper and lower sections of 
 the canal respectively. Ten locks are to be built 
 according to this system, raising the summit level of 
 the canal to 170 feet, and thus reducing the excava- 
 tion through Culebra to a minimum. By utilizing 
 the work already done, it is estimated that $100,- 
 000,000 will complete the canal if this latter plan 
 be adopted. 
 
 The Panama route has at last been carefully and 
 minutely surveyed. The geological nature of the 
 earth and rock to be excavated has been examined 
 and found favorable. The line has been cleared, 
 and, as we know, some twenty miles of the canal 
 have already been excavated. The entire plant of 
 the original company, including buildings, wharves, 
 di-edges,' barges, steam vessels, pontoons, railway 
 locomotives and cars, and a considerable amount of 
 the necessary machinery, is there on the ground, and 
 still in good condition for the work. There are at 
 present about 2000 men employed on the canal, and 
 
 ' Some of the dredges were sold to the Nicaragua company, cf. post. 
 
The Present Situation. 477 
 
 it is rumored that the force is to be largely increased 
 in a short time. Funds ax'e being raised in Paris to 
 prosecute the work, and those now in charge of the 
 undertaking declare, that the canal will be completed 
 within six years.' 
 
 As our aim has thus far been primarily historical, 
 the technical aspects of the Nicaragua canal problem 
 have received but scanty consideration, 
 
 _ ^ _ Nicaragua. 
 
 and even now we can do no more than 
 summarize the results of the best expert opinion on 
 the subject, and draw our conclusions accordingly. 
 
 During the course of the narrative mention has 
 been made of all the more important surveys that 
 have been instituted along the route, and we know, 
 at least, that the present plans for a canal across 
 Nicaragua are the result of long and careful study, 
 and the product of many minds. For our present 
 purpose, however, we need go no further back than 
 the surveys made in 1850-52 by Colonel Childs, for 
 the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Com- 
 pany, as he was the first to definitely locate the line 
 from sea to sea. Grant's canal commission then 
 took the matter up, as we know, and, in 1873, Com- 
 mander Lull, having elaborated the plans somewhat 
 
 ' Robert T. Hill, "The Panama Canal Route," National Geographic 
 Magazine, February, 1896. 
 
 Bunan-Varilla, "The Past, Present and Future of the Panama Canal." 
 Miinchener Neuste Nachrichten, November 17, 1892. 
 
 Amedee Sebillot, " Ach^vement ifeconomique du Canal de Panama," 
 Paris, 5th ed., 1892. 
 
 European edition Herald, January 20, 1S91. 
 
 W. E. Christian, " The Panama Canal Scandal," Special letter to /)««- 
 ver Republican, January 29, 1893 ; United Press Despatches, July 31, 1895. 
 
478 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 further, recommended the Childs route, with certain 
 modifications, to the government. Mr. Menocal, we 
 will remember, was one of the civil engineers of the 
 Lull expedition, and, since that time, he has devoted 
 many years of careful investigation to a further 
 study of the problem. In 1880 he re-located the 
 line between the lake and the Pacific for the Pro- 
 visional Canal Society, and in 1885 he adopted a 
 new route from the San Juan to the Atlantic for 
 the government. As chief engineer of the Construc- 
 tion Company he has since filled out the details and 
 specifications of the project, and it is upon these 
 later data that the present working plans for the 
 canal are based. 
 
 Still Congress was not entirely satisfied with the 
 fulness of the results, and therefore took occasion, as 
 we have seen, to provide for an expert commission, 
 to be composed of an engineer from the Army, one 
 from the Navy, and one from civil life, for the pur- 
 pose of ascertaining the " feasibility, permanence, and 
 cost of construction " of the proposed canal. In re- 
 sponse to this request, President Cleveland, on April 
 25, 1895, appointed Lieutenant-Colonel William 
 Ludlow, U. S. A., Civil Engineer M. T. Endicott, 
 U. S. K, and Mr. Alfred Noble, of Chicago, to serve 
 on this board. The United States cruiser Mont- 
 gomery was placed at the disposal of the party, and 
 the experts spent the months of May and June 
 going over the route and inspecting the plant and 
 machinery. On their return, the members of the 
 board made a careful study of all the accumulated 
 
The Present Situation. i79 
 
 data pertaining to the engineering problem of the 
 Nicaragua water-way, and concluded their labors 
 with a minute investigation of the canal company's 
 final plans. 
 
 With these various data before us we are now in 
 a position to set forth the present status, and sum- 
 marize the future possibilities of the Nicaragua canal 
 project from the engineering point of view. The 
 outline must be purely descriptive, however, and 
 lacking in technical details, for criticism of a scien- 
 tific problem, cannot well come from the pen of a 
 layman. 
 
 From our general knowledge of the topography 
 of the country, we can readily understand that the 
 magnificent body of water in the centre must be 
 taken as the key to the technical problem. The 
 lake, in other words, is to form the summit-level of 
 the water-way, and, as navigation is possible for some 
 distance down its outlet, the San Juan, there are in 
 reality two canals to be constructed, one to join the 
 lake with the Pacific, and the other to extend the 
 navigable watei's of the San Juan to the Atlantic. 
 Between the two canals, free navigation will be 
 possible along the upper courses of the river and 
 across the lake. 
 
 From sea to sea the total distance to be traversed 
 will be something over 174 miles. For convenience 
 we may, however, divide the route into three main 
 sections, — the western division, from Lake Nicaragua 
 to the Pacific ; the division of lake and river naviga- 
 tion ; and the eastern division, from the San Juan to 
 
480 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the Atlantic, — and we will describe the situation 
 accordingly. 
 
 THE WESTERN DIVISION. 
 
 Lajas to Brito, 17.7 Miles. 
 
 Childs adopted Brito as the Pacific terminus of 
 the canal, and subsequent authorities, without ex- 
 ception, commend the wisdom of his choice. There 
 has been some difference of opinion, however, as to 
 the exact location of the line from the lake to this 
 point. Between the head-waters of the LaJas and 
 Grande rivers Childs discovered the very lowest de- 
 pression of all the great continental divide, and 
 accordingly determined to lay his canal line along 
 these valley floors. But Lull feared the uncertain 
 flow of the Rio Grande through its mountain gorge 
 on the west, and so decided to proceed from the lake 
 along the valley of the Rio Medio, somewhat farther 
 north, and over a considerably more elevated divide 
 to Join the Lajas route again at Bi'ito. After further 
 investigation Menocal could find no particular dififi- 
 culty in the proper regulation of the Rio Grande, and 
 therefore re-located the line along the Lajas route as 
 planned by Childs before. The present canal board 
 has added its approval to this location, and we may 
 therefore accept the Lajas route as final. 
 
 From a point on the lake situated 900 feet above 
 the mouth of the river, the canal will then be cut for 
 a distance of 5 miles through an open rolling country, 
 up the valley of the Lajas, and across a gradually 
 ascending plain, to the summit of the western divide. 
 
PANORAMIC VIEW OF THE NICARAGUA CANAL. 
 
 Pacific Ocean 
 
 BRITO TOLA BASIN LAJAS 
 WESTERN 
 DIVIDE 
 
 Inactive Volcanoes 
 OMETEPB and MADERA 
 
 Lake Nicaragua 
 
 SOUENTINAME IS. FORT SAN CARLO.'l RIO FRIO RIO SAN JUAN RIO SAN CARLOS 
 
 FORT CASTILLO 
 
 OCHOA DAM 
 
 EASTERN LOCKS SAN JUAN DEL NORTE Afl^ntir Hra^n 
 
 DIVIDE OR QREVTOWN -fviianiic ucean 
 
 SAN FRANCISCO BASIN DESBADO BASINS 
 
The Present Situation. 481 
 
 The elevation at this point is 154 feet above the 
 mean tide of the sea, but only 44 feet above the 
 summit level of the lake and the canal. Allowing 
 the water-way a depth of 30 feet, the maximum 
 depth of the cut will thus be 74 feet. From the 
 summit of the divide, 2^ more miles of excavation 
 will bring the canal to the head-waters of the Rio 
 Orande, situated in a narrow gorge on the western 
 slope of the range ; and from this point the line is 
 to follow the general course of the stream for the 
 remaining distance to its outlet at Brito on the 
 Pacific. 
 
 According to Menocal's original plan the canal, 
 after emerging from the gorge, was to follow the 
 I'ight bank of the Grande, and be lowered to the 
 level of the Pacific by means of four locks con- 
 veniently situated at points along the line. It was 
 subsequently decided, however, to extend the sum- 
 mit level of the canal 4^ miles farther westward by 
 damming the Rio Grande at a point called La Flor, 
 3^ miles from the Pacific, and thus form a large 
 basin by arresting the waters of the Grande and its 
 main tributary, the Tola. This alternative route is 
 called the Tola basin line. 
 
 There would be considerable advantage in thus 
 extending the summit level of the canal toward the 
 west, as the area of free navigation would thereby 
 be somewhat increased ; but, on account of the lack 
 of a proper site and by reason, of the diflSculties in- 
 volved in the construction of a dam of such magni- 
 tude, the canal board has condemned Menocal's 
 
482 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 scheme as impracticable. The present recomnienda- 
 tions are, therefore, for the low-level route, and it is 
 suggested that the left bank of the Rio Grande will 
 probably be found to be better adapted than the 
 right to the final location of the line ; for by follow- 
 ing this course all danger of interference from the 
 Tola river will be avoided. 
 
 In the matter of locks the canal board makes 
 some general recommendations, and also introduces 
 certain particular modifications in the plans as 
 adopted by the company. All locks should have a 
 minimum width of 80 feet, in order to provide 
 for the passage of modern ships of war and the 
 broad-beam freight carriers that are now being 
 built, whereas the company's present estimates only 
 call for locks of 70 feet in breadth. Slight modi- 
 fications have also been introduced by the govern- 
 ment engineers in the position and relative lift of 
 the four locks on the Pacific side, and their plans 
 now provide for a tide lock with a lift of 24-|- feet, 
 and three others with lifts of 30 feet each. 
 
 Brito was adopted as the Pacific terminus of the 
 canal not at all on account of its hydrographic advan- 
 tages, but simply by virtue of necessity, as it lay at 
 the end of the Lajas-Grande line. It is, in fact, no 
 harbor at all, but merely an indentation of the coast, 
 exposed to the full force of the Pacific seas. Various 
 systems of breakwaters have been suggested in order 
 to shield the outlet of the canal and provide for an 
 artificial harbor, but none of the plans thus far 
 evolved appear adequate to the canal board. The 
 
The Present Situation, 483 
 
 company's project is therefore condemned, and as a 
 tentative plan, — pending a more complete hydro- 
 graphic survey, — it is suggested that the entrance 
 be moved slightly toward the southeast, and that 
 the breakwaters and jetties be considerably ex- 
 tended, in order to provide for both an outer and an 
 inner harbor. 
 
 From its study of this section of the route, the 
 canal board concludes that, with the modifications 
 suggested, the western division " presents no serious 
 obstacles to canal construction." 
 
 LAKE AJSTD KIVEE DlVISIOir. 
 
 Lajas to Fort San Carlos, 56.50 miles. Fort San 
 Ga/rlos to OcJioa, 69 miles. Total Idks and ri/ver 
 navigation, 125.50 miles. 
 
 Lake Nicaragua, as we know, drains southeast 
 through the San Juan into the Atlantic, but as the 
 river is obstructed in several places by rapids, and 
 as its delta mouths are now unnavigable, the ques- 
 tion is, at what point along the banks of the stream 
 the waters of the lake shall be turned into an arti- 
 ficial channel, and navigation thus continued to the 
 sea. And here again there is the choice between a 
 hw-l&vel and a high-level route. 
 
 Colonel Childs proposed to extend the summit 
 level of the lake as far as the Castillo rapids, 37-^ 
 miles distant from the San Juan outlet, and continue 
 the navigation of the stream below this obstruction 
 by means of seven dams and corresponding locks to 
 
484 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the moutli of the Serapiqui river, 91 miles from the 
 lake. The eastern canal was then to be constructed 
 from this point along the left bank of the San Juan 
 to Greytown, which was at that time an excellent 
 harbor. Lull also extended the summit level of the 
 lake to Castillo, and by means of four dams and 
 locks continued the liver navigation as far down as 
 the mouth of the San Carlos. Hei'e the canal was 
 to leave the San Juan, according to his plan, and 
 follow its left bank to the outlet of the San Juanillo, 
 whence it was to proceed in a straight line to Grey- 
 town, as before. 
 
 But Menocal was not satisfied with either of these 
 low-level lines, and so, in 1885, he determined upon 
 his own bold and original plan for a high-level route 
 to the Atlantic. Taking 110 feet as the maximum 
 level of the lake, and assuming a natural fall in the 
 stream of 4 feet to the San Carlos river, his proposal 
 is to construct a huge dam, with an elevation of 106 
 feet, square across the San Juan at a place called 
 Ochoa, situated 3^ miles below the mouth of the 
 San Carlos, and 69 miles from the lake. Embank- 
 ments are also to be built along the ridge' which 
 skirts the San Carlos valley on the south, in order 
 to raise the waters of that stream as well, and allow 
 them still to flow into the San Juan above the dam. 
 In this way a large basin will be formed by flooding 
 both valleys, and the San Juan, as far down as 
 Ochoa, will practically be converted into an arm of 
 the lake. It will then be possible to extend the 
 summit level of the canal from this point eastward 
 
The Present Situation. 485 
 
 to within sight of the Caribbean, as we shall pres- 
 ently see. 
 
 The Ochoa dam and the San Carlos embankment 
 are also to act as weirs, and discharge the surplus 
 waters over their crests when the level exceeds 106 
 feet. Thus, allowing for the natural fall of the San 
 Juan,, the lake is to be kept at a constant elevation 
 of 110 feet,, through the automatic action of the 
 dams and weirs. 
 
 The government engineers are struck with the 
 boldness and ingenuity of Menocal's plan, but, in 
 spite of its manifest advantages over the low-level 
 line, they are unable to give it their unqualified en- 
 dorsement, at least, on the basis of the meagre and 
 insufficient data that the canal company has thus 
 far collected on the subject. A dam of such magni- 
 tude as the one proposed, and calculated to with- 
 stand a flood of unknown volume, is, as far as they 
 have been able to learn, unprecedented. Still the 
 project is not considered impossible, and final decision 
 as to its practicability is accordingly reserved until 
 the problems involved have been more thoroughly 
 studied. 
 
 In the first place, the regimen of the river and 
 the lake have not as yet been sufficiently determined 
 to allow of any exact calculations, and the presump- 
 tion of a natural fall of four feet to Ochoa seems 
 simply to be based on guess-work. The proposed 
 use of the dam as a weir is, moreover, inadmissible, 
 according to the opinion of the board ; and, in order 
 to maintain the level of the lake at an elevation of 
 
486 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 110 feet, it will, therefore, be necessary, the experts 
 declare, to stop all leakage and overflow at Ochoa 
 by building an impervious dam with a crest at least 
 120 feet high. There will then be two contingencies 
 to be met. On the one hand, a lowering of the level 
 of the lake through evaporation during the dry 
 season would interfere with the navigation oi the 
 canal ; and if, on the other hand, floods should raise 
 the summit-level unduly, property along the shores 
 of the lake would be injured. To guard against 
 this double danger, the board suggests either a sys- 
 tem of sluices, or a series of weirs with movable 
 dams, along the San Carlos ridge. If the effects of 
 a drought should be feared, then the outlets could 
 be closed toward the end of the wet season, and the 
 waters stored up above the Ochoa dam as in a reser- 
 voir. If, on the other hand, too much water is be- 
 ing emptied into the lake from the mountain streams, 
 the surplus could then be discharged at will through 
 the sluices or over the weirs. These suggestions 
 are merely temporary, however, for nothing can 
 really be definitely decided until the necessary 
 hydrographic surveys are completed. 
 
 The canal board also has several criticisms to 
 make concerning the site of the proposed dam, and 
 the materials of which it is to be constructed. Ac- 
 cording to the company's present plans, the dam is 
 to be a rock-fill structure on a sand foundation; 
 but, considering the weight of the waters to be held 
 back, the government engineers consider this method 
 of construction extremely hazardous. A masonry 
 
The Present Situation. 487 
 
 dam on a rock foundation is, in the board's opinion, 
 to be preferred, provided a proper site can be found 
 and tlie cost of sucb a structure be not prohibitory. 
 Under proper conditions and with proper pre- 
 cautions a rock-flU dam is not deemed impossible, 
 however; but, at all events, the problems of construc- 
 tion must be studied much more carefully, and before 
 the iinal location is decided upon a thorough search 
 should be made both above and below Ochoa for a 
 better site than that now adopted. 
 
 The canal board, in short, likens the Ochoa dam 
 to the pier of a cantilever bridge, upholding " the 
 burden of the great constructions that stretch in 
 both directions to constitute the water-way." The 
 problem is "to build a dam in opposition to the 
 tremendous and unknown forces of the river floods, 
 while the imperative requirements of the completed 
 structure are, that it shall be permanent beyond per- 
 adventure and practically impermeable." The com- 
 pany's present plan is therefore condemned and the 
 recommendations call for a thorough investigation 
 of the hydrographic and geologic factors involved. 
 If the conditions prove favorable, then the higl;i- 
 level route may finally be adopted, but if not, then 
 a return must be made to the low-level line ; and, in 
 order to be prepared for the alternative, further 
 surveys along the lower San Juan are also advised. 
 
 If the high-level route be the one adopted, then 
 free navigation will be possible from Lajas, on the 
 western shores of the lake, to Ochoa in the San 
 Juan, a distance of about 125 miles. Some dredg- 
 
488 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 ing and rock-blasting will be necessary, however, at 
 several points along tlie way to deepen and broaden 
 the channel and reduce curvatures. The company's 
 specifications and estimates for this work, the board 
 finds again very inadequate, and furthermore recom- 
 mends a considerable enlargement of the present 
 plans. 
 
 THE EASTERN DIVISION. 
 
 Oehoa to Greytown, 31.36 Miles. 
 
 According to the present plans for a high-level 
 line the artificial channel will leave the river bed 
 Just above the Ochoa dam and proceed in a more 
 easterly direction, by short stretches of excavated 
 canal and through six basins, for a distance of 12^ 
 miles to the foot of the eastern divide. This section 
 of the water-way in reality passes through four ad- 
 jacent river valleys, — the Chanchos, Nicholson, and 
 San Francisco valleys, and the Florida lagoon, — 
 which are to be joined by the canal and flooded by 
 damming up the breaks in the range of hills which 
 skirts them on the south. 
 
 The line is ingeniously located and shows careful 
 study of the topography of the country. Here 
 again, however, the board regards both the hydraulic 
 and geologic data as incomplete, and advises that 
 all the streams be carefully gauged, and that numer- 
 ous borings be made to determine the character of 
 the foundations for the embankments. 
 
 There are to be 67 of these embankments in all. 
 
The Present Situation. 489 
 
 varying in height above the ground from a few feet 
 to 70 feet and upward, and extending in crest 
 length over a distance of nearly 6 miles. The com- 
 pany's plans provide for an elevation of 114 feet for 
 the crest of these dams, thus allowing 8 feet of free- 
 board above the assumed summit level of the canal 
 at Ochoa. But the board has raised this level from 
 106 to 110 feet, as we know, and this will call for a 
 corresponding increase in the height and dimensions 
 of the embankments. They are to be built of clay 
 on a mud foundation, and great care will, therefore, 
 have to be taken in their construction. Their main- 
 tenance will also require special vigilance, and the 
 board furthermore takes pains to point out the 
 facility with which a breach might be effected in 
 this wall in time of war, thus effectually destroying 
 isthmian transit through the canal at a critical junc- 
 ture. 
 
 At the further extremity of the San Francisco 
 basin the canal approaches the eastern divide along 
 the valley of the Rio Limpio. In order to reach the 
 head-waters of the Deseado on the eastern . slope a 
 continuous cut, with an extreme depth of 324 feet 
 and an average depth of 140 feet, will here have to 
 be made through the hills, for a distance of 3 miles. 
 This is without doubt one of the most costly sections 
 of the entire route, but again the canal board is re- 
 luctantly obliged to report that " the data at hand 
 are so scanty and defective that no satisfactory treat- 
 ment of the subject is possible." 
 
 The company has estimated the total amount of 
 
490 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 excavation at 11,700,000 cubic yards, of which about 
 70 % is rock ; but the engineers maintain that the 
 slopes cannot be made so nearly vertical without con- 
 siderably increasing the cost of maintenance, and, in 
 their provisional estimate, they accordingly allow 
 for a larger cube. There is no particular engineer- 
 ing difficulty involved in the cut, but further borings 
 are required in order to determine the character of 
 the rock to be excavated and thus calculate the 
 necessary angle of the slopes. 
 
 The summit level of the canal is continued beyond 
 the eastern end of the cut along a quarter of a mile 
 of excavated canal, and through a basin, about 
 2000 feet long, formed by damming the Deseado, 
 to the first of the locks on the Atlantic side. Be- 
 tween the fii'st lock on the west and the first lock on 
 the east, the summit level of the canal will thus ex- 
 tend for a distance of 149 miles, and this of course 
 is one of the great advantages of the high-level 
 route, grouping thfe locks, as it does, close together 
 on either shore, and allowing a long stretch of free 
 navigation through the centre of the country. 
 
 Presuming a summit level of 106 feet, the canal 
 company's plans provide for but three locks on the 
 Atlantic side, with lifts of 40, 35, and 31 feet respec- 
 tively, in order to lower the canal to the sea. But if 
 the level be kept at 110 feet, as the board proposes, 
 this would involve the first lock having a lift of 44 
 feet, as the difference could not well be distributed 
 if but three locks are to be used. Such a lift, though 
 unprecedented, is by no means impossible ; still the 
 
The Present Situation. 491 
 
 canal board is of the opinion that, in order to avoid 
 all risks, four locks had best be substituted, the one 
 nearest the sea having a lift of 26 feet, and the re- 
 maining three, lifts of 28 feet each. These locks, too, 
 must have a minimum width of 80 feet, and their 
 location and construction are tentatively provided 
 for in the nevr plans. 
 
 The locks on this side are connected by basins, 
 formed by damming the Deseado at several points, 
 and by short stretches of excavated canal. The 
 passage from summit level to sea level on the east 
 side covers a distance of about 6 miles. 
 
 It is the company's present plan to proceed from 
 the last lock by a curve through the Bernard lagoon 
 for a distance of something over 9 miles to Greytovrn 
 harbor; but the board advises a straight line, in- 
 stead, with sidings for the convenient passage of 
 vessels. 
 
 The company adopted a plan for the improve- 
 ment of Greytown harbor and incurred considerable 
 expense in building out a breakwater nearly 1000 
 feet into the sea. But the result has not been all 
 that was expected, and the canal board maintains 
 that the problem has not as yet been sufficiently 
 studied. But, thanks to the labors of Professor 
 Mitchell of the Coast Survey, the causes of the re- 
 cent deterioration of Greytown harbor are now pretty 
 generally understood, and with a proper knowledge 
 of the forces at work, there should be no serious 
 difficulty in redeeming the roadstead. Not enough 
 detailed information has as yet been collected, it is 
 
492 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 true, for the adoption of a final plan ; but the canal 
 board is nevertheless of the opinion that the entrance 
 from the sea should be moved about 1^ miles tow- 
 ard the east and that the present lagoon should be 
 used as an inner harbor to be connected with the 
 outer entrance by a short canal. 
 
 The government commission considers the climatic 
 conditions of Nicaragua to be, on the v^^hole, well 
 adapted to the prosecution of the work, and advises 
 the employment of Jamaican negroes for the un- 
 skilled labor required. No danger is to be expected 
 from either floods or seismic disturbances, and in the 
 opinion of the engineers there are no insurmountable 
 difficulties to be encountered along the route. In 
 short, the Nicaragua canal has once more been de- 
 clared by competent experts to be a feasible project, 
 and the only cause for present discouragement lies 
 in the lack of proper information regarding the 
 hydraulic and geologic details of the undertaking. 
 
 Eeference to the historical naiTative will indeed 
 render the present situation entirely comprehensible. 
 Childs laid out a possible route across the country, 
 and Lull merely elaborated the general plans. It 
 was Menocal, therefore, who first devoted himself to 
 a detailed consideration of tbe practical problem of 
 canal construction. Topographical data were the 
 first to be collected, in order to provide for the 
 more exact location of the line, and this work has 
 been admirably done by Menocal and bis several 
 surveying parties. Careful hydrographic and 
 geologic surveys had yet to be instituted, but, under 
 
The Present Situation. 493 
 
 the terms of its concession, the company was obliged 
 to adopt final plans at once, and commence the 
 work of actual construction almost immediately. 
 Operations were therefore begun prematurely and 
 the public was given to understand that all the 
 surveys were completed. Congress wisely refused to 
 rely explicitly on the testimony presented, however, 
 and now the canal board has revealed the truth of 
 the matter. 
 
 Judging from the general situation and from the 
 data already collected, American and foreign engi- 
 neers, however, agree that the project is practicable. 
 What is immediately demanded is a further 
 study of the hydrographic and geologic factors 
 entering into the problem, and the • canal board 
 therefore concludes by recommending a detailed 
 investigation, covering eighteen months time, or two 
 diy seasons ; and urges that Congress appropriate 
 $350,000 for the purpose. The question is thus at 
 last brought squarely before the American people 
 in a tangible form, and one cannot help feeling that 
 it would be money wisely expended thus to clear the 
 matter of all doubt and make an intelligent decision 
 possible on the true merits of the case. 
 
 When we come to consider the probable cost of 
 the undertaking we are met with a gradually ascend- 
 ing scale, as the magnitude of the project has been 
 increased in accordance vnth our modem knowledge 
 of the subject and in harmony with our present 
 needs. Childs had in mind a canal of small dimen- 
 sions, and estimated the cost at $31,538,319. Lull 
 
494 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 enlarged tlie plans considerably and increased the 
 probable cost to $65,722,147. Menocal went much 
 more into details and in 1890 presented an itemized 
 account, amounting to a total of $65,084,176. 
 These figures were then presented to an expert 
 board ' for revision, which considerably increased the 
 amount and handed in its estimate at $87,799,570. 
 But the canal company still holds to the earlier 
 figures, and now estimates the cost, according to the 
 plans adopted, at $66,466,880. 
 
 The present canal board, on the other hand, con- 
 siders all these estimates too low, even if the present 
 plans be adhered to ; and further adds to the cost by 
 enlarging the scope of the work. As a provisional 
 estimate $133,472,893 is accordingly given, though 
 the board frankly admits that " the existing data are 
 inadequate as a basis for estimating the cost of many 
 of the structures, some portions of the work may 
 cost more, some less." " But in the judgment of the 
 board, the entire project can be executed for about 
 the total amount of the estimate." 
 
 The canal company has already incurred con- 
 siderable expense in securing its concessions, in 
 instituting the surveys, in providing its plant, and 
 in the inauguration of the work. In round numbers 
 about four and a half million dollars have been 
 spent in this way, but the existing assets fall far 
 
 ' This rivisionary board was composed of the following members : John 
 Bogart, Chief Engineer of the Erie Canal System; E. T. D. Myers, 
 expert, railway engineer ; A. M. Wellington, expert, aqueduct engineer ; 
 K. A. Hitchcock, Professor of Engineering in Dartmouth College ; Chas. 
 T. Harwey, civil engineer, builder of the the Sault Ste. Marie Canal. 
 
The Present Situation. 495 
 
 below this sum. The concession is indeed valuable, 
 and the surveys, as far as they go, represent a legiti- 
 mate and necessary expense. A clearing has been 
 made along the line for about 10 miles on either side, 
 and a railroad has been constructed from Greytown to 
 the locks on the eastern side, a distance of something 
 over 11 miles. There are five groups of permanent 
 buildings near Greytown, covering an area of 1|^ 
 acres, and including storehouses, shops, quarters for 
 the officers, barracks for the men, hospitals, offices, 
 etc. ; but they are all sadly in need of repairs. 
 The Pellas franchise, purchased by the company and 
 giving it the monopoly of steam navigation on 
 Nicaragua's lakes and rivers, must also be reckoned 
 among the assets ; but beyond the items enumerated, 
 all else must be accounted dead loss. 
 
 There is the Greytown breakwater already in an 
 advanced stage of decay, and practically useless, at 
 any rate, on account of its position. The canal has 
 also been partially excavated for a third of a mile 
 inland from the present harbor ; but, if the canal 
 board's recommendations are to be adopted, this, too, 
 must be abandoned. The railroad ties are rotted 
 out, and the equipment is probably unserviceable. 
 The five dredges formerly used at Panama and 
 bought by the company from the contractor, lie " on 
 the bottom uncared for, with rusted machinery, and 
 woodwork dropping." The steel boats, launches, 
 hulls, and machinery are all rusted through, and the 
 auxiliary service is practically beyond repair. 
 
 Should Congress now decide to take the matter 
 
496 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 up, no claim could well be made for this loss, as the 
 company assumed the entire responsibility, and be- 
 gan the work of construction prematurely, in the 
 hopes of being relieved through private subscription 
 or by government aid. Under the terms of their 
 contract with Nicaragua the promoters had to begin 
 the work at once, and spend at least $2,000,000 dur- 
 ing the first year. The surveys were as yet incom- 
 plete, and the plans were in no way adequate, but 
 in order to save their enterprise, the promoters went 
 ahead, and, without financial assistance from the 
 government, soon came to grief. They can claim no 
 damages, therefore, as they took the risk voluntarily 
 in the hopes of extra profits, and in the course of 
 their enterprise experienced loss instead. But the 
 company still owns valuable assets, as we have just 
 seen, and, in case of resumption of work under gov- 
 ernment auspices, these, of course, should be fairly 
 and adequately allowed for. 
 
 We thus find the technical situation in Nicaragua 
 to be very similar to that we have just been describ- 
 ing in Panama. In both cases private companies 
 undertook the work with insufficient knowledge of 
 the difficulties to be encountered, and, as might have 
 been expected, each has lately come to grief. To be 
 sure, much more money has been sunk in the Pana- 
 ma undertaking, but then again considerably more 
 has been accomplished. An. ugly scandal was also 
 unearthed with the downfall of the one project, 
 while only financial embarrassment has accompanied 
 the failure of the other; but this is a question of 
 
The Present Situation. 497 
 
 degree rather than of kind, and the net result is, 
 after all, about the same. 
 
 The immediate responsibility for both canal pro- 
 jects has at any rate devolved upon the two gov- 
 ernments most intimately concerned. Thus the 
 French courts are at present engaged in straightening 
 out the Panama tangle, while the American Congi'ess 
 has lately undertaken to clear up the situation in 
 Nicaragua, and, with governmental assistance, both 
 projects are now beginning to emerge from their late 
 periods of discouragement. 
 
 A lock canal is, moreover, declared to be feasible 
 along either route, and in the matter of probable 
 cost of completion the two proposed water-ways, 
 — in spite of Panama's handicap in the amount of 
 money spent and work done, — now stand practically 
 on a par. For- economic and political reasons, as I 
 hope to show, the United States must still adhere 
 to its choice of the Nicaragua route, but it is well 
 to note, at this Juncture, that the present technical 
 comparison is by no means unfavorable to our 
 cause. We may, therefore, leave off our consid- 
 eration of the technical aspects of the Nicaragua 
 canal problem also, with fair hope of its not 
 far distant solution.^ 
 
 ' Sullivan, loc. cit., " Report on Historical and Technical Information, 
 etc.," 1883. 
 
 A. G. Menocal, "The Nicaragua Canal : Its Design, Final Location, 
 and Work Accomplished," i8go. 
 
 Ibid., Paper prepared for the Chicago Water Congress, 1893. 
 
 Report of Canal Board, cf. U. S. House Document No. 279, 54th Con- 
 gress, 1st Sess. 
 
498 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 It is in examining the diplomatic aspects of the 
 canal question at short range that our vision is likely 
 g ^^^ to be most distorted. Having only the 
 bipiomatic bare facts before us, we can do no more than 
 Situation, poijj^ quJ; their probable diplomatic rela- 
 tions; for what has actually been made of these 
 recent facts by the diplomatists of the several coun- 
 tries concerned, must still remain state secrets until 
 some definite conclusion is reached. 
 
 With the collapse of the Panama canal company, 
 the attention of the diplomatic world was diverted 
 from the lower isthmus, and Colombia and 
 anam . ^-^^ United States were thus left alone to con- 
 trol the railway route as they had oi'iginally arranged. 
 But since the riot and revolution of 1885, our govern- 
 ment has had no further occasion to interfere. Every- 
 thing, indeed, went well in Colombia so long as Dr. 
 Nunez's dictorial hand held the reins of power. This 
 typical Spanish-American statesman, died, however, 
 on September 18, 1894, and since then matters have 
 been in a continual turmoil. Upon the Dictator's death 
 the old factional fight between the Conservatives and 
 Liberals again broke out. Nunez's lieutenant, Hol- 
 guin, succeeded him, but died before he could reor- 
 ganize the government. Caro, the Vice-President, 
 then took office, and made a hard fight to retain the 
 Conservatives in power. But the Liberals took up 
 arms against him, and a state of anarchy has existed 
 in the country ever since. President Caro has now 
 resigned, — March 14, 1896, — and, just at present, 
 there seems to be no government at all in Colombia. 
 
The Present Situation. 499 
 
 We have only to conclude from the situation in 
 Panama, therefore, that Spanish- American politics on 
 the lower isthmus are as hopeless as ever, and that 
 the problem of the guaranty is still to be solved. 
 The French may be able to build the Panama canal, 
 but the question still remains, who is to control the 
 route? Colombia, at least, cannot be relied upon, 
 and as the United States still stand sponsor for this 
 republic before the world, the responsibility of the 
 final decision must ultimately fall upon their shoul- 
 ders. The historical conditions are really without 
 precedent, and the present situation, therefore, calls 
 for a new order of diplomacy from our government. 
 This, however, is but one of the many political prob- 
 lems involved in the American transit question, and 
 may more properly be discussed in a later chapter.' 
 
 Recent events in Mosquitia also seem destined to 
 have far-reaching effects on the canal question, and 
 on this occasion the United States would 
 
 1 1 - rni ■ n . • Nicaragua. 
 
 appear to be the gainer, i he sins ot omission 
 committed so long ago by Ouseley and Wykein negoti- 
 ating the treaty of Managua, have, finally, descended 
 upon the present generation of English agents in Cen- 
 tral America; and, if we accept the present situation 
 as final, the time-honored Mosquito protectorate must 
 now be considered a thing of the past. 
 
 It came about in this way. The flourishing con- 
 dition of the Mosquito shore under the rule of the 
 foreigners, as we know, excited the cupidity of 
 
 ' United Press Despatches, March 14, 1896. 
 Panama Star and Herald, March 13, 1896. 
 
500 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Nicaragua. Definite measures were decided upon in 
 1893, and a special commissioner, General Lacayo, 
 was directed by the President of the Republic, to 
 proceed to the reservation and endeavor to per- 
 suade the Indians to become citizens of Nicaragua. 
 Lacayo's first efforts were unavailing, however, for 
 though the Mosquitos had by this time been entirely 
 excluded from the government of the reserve, they 
 were still loyal to their English mentors. 
 
 At the same time another revolutionary cycle was 
 well on its way among the Central American states. 
 A magnificent project of union had already been 
 elaborated on paper, but, as usual, the details of the 
 proposed " Republic of Central America " bred dis- 
 pute, and Nicaragua and Honduras were now at 
 open war. In January, 1894, Honduras forces 
 crossed the border and took up their position at 
 Cape Gracias, in Nicaraguan territory. On the pre- 
 text of preparing for an expected invasion of the 
 reserve, Nicaragua thereupon marched her troops to 
 Bluefields and, on February 11th, occupied the town. 
 The Mosquito flag was then hauled down by the 
 Nicaraguan military officials, and martial law was 
 proclaimed over all the reservation. 
 
 Clarence, chief of the Mosquitos, protested against 
 such military occupation of his country, and appealed 
 to the foreigners for aid. But the situation had by 
 this time become political, rather than purely com- 
 mercial as before, and the foreign element was, in 
 consequence, divided in its proclivities. The English 
 and the United States agents at once notified their 
 
The Present Situation. 501 
 
 respective governments of the crisis, and war-ships of 
 both countries were hurried to the shore. 
 
 The old Kearsage, despatched by our Navy De- 
 partment to the scene of disorder, was wrecked on a 
 reef in the Caribbean, however, and so when the 
 British forces arrived, late in February, they had 
 free hand to make what arrangements they pleased. 
 The marines were accordingly landed, and the Nica- 
 raguan troops again offered no resistance. Martial 
 law was then raised and the sovereignty of the Mos- 
 quitos was reasserted over the reserve. 
 
 The British consular and naval authorities then co- 
 operated and induced the Nicaraguan commissioner 
 to agree to the establishment of a provisional govern- 
 ment, until some definite conclusion could be reached 
 between the two signatory powers to the treaty of 
 Managua. The English also made urgent proposals 
 to the American residents to take part in the pro- 
 posed arrangements, even threatening to withdraw 
 British protection if they refused to comply. But 
 the Americans had by this time been forewarned, 
 and positively declined to have anything to do with 
 the provisional administration. 
 
 The United States government then took a hand 
 in the dispute, and, to all intents and purposes, in- 
 formed Great Britain that she must at once withdraw 
 her forces from the shore. The British Foreign 
 Office, not deeming it wise to force the issue, com- 
 plied at once with this request and gave over the 
 reserve, to be fought for again by the Nicaraguans, 
 the Indians, and the foreigners. 
 
502 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 This left Nicaragua, for tlie time at least, mistress 
 of the situation, and, as might have been expected, 
 the condition of affairs soon became intolerable. 
 Thinking to avoid the underlying political issue, the 
 foreign residents, regardless of nationality, then held 
 an indignation meeting and passed resolutions re- 
 questing chief Clarence to resume his authority over 
 the reserve. Despite the oflS.cial warning of their 
 government, the Americans allowed their business 
 interests, on this occasion, to get the better of their 
 political instincts, and took an active part in these 
 international proceedings against Nicaraguan sove- 
 reignty. But the confusion of national interests in- 
 volved in this incipient revolution made it impossible 
 for either Great Britain or the United States to 
 recognize the acts of their respective settlers. Thus 
 disavowed by their own governments, and unable to 
 proceed alone, the foreign residents were now com- 
 pletely at the mercy of revengeful Nicaragua. 
 
 But matters could not go on very long in this way, 
 and everyone recognized that the crisis was not far 
 oft'. The Nicaraguan officials, still supported by the 
 troops, continued to control the situation in Blue- 
 fields, and the Indians and foreigners became every 
 day more restive under the restraint. On July 5th 
 an altercation arose between some native policemen 
 and a government official, which soon developed into 
 a riot. The foreigners and their Indian allies be- 
 sieged the government house and demonstrated their 
 strength very effectually. Chief Clarence thereupon 
 resumed his authority by a coup (Tetat and called 
 
The Present Situation. 503 
 
 upon all the inhabitants of the I'eserve to support 
 his cause. By the aid of the foreigners a de facto 
 government was then established, with sovereignty- 
 vested in a Council of State, composed of two Amer- 
 icans and twelve British subjects, among the latter 
 being a number of mulattoes from Jamaica. The 
 native j)olice were also reorganized as a militia force, 
 and an American placed in command. The Nicara- 
 guan troops were at this time stationed at the Bluff, 
 some five miles back of the town, so a sally was made 
 on the evening of the sixth, and the engagement re- 
 sulted in the killing of two Nicaraguan soldiers and 
 the wounding of several others. 
 
 The revolutionary movement does not appear to 
 have received the entire support of the foreign popu- 
 lation, but as both British and American citizens 
 were involved, even the more peacefully inclined 
 residents could not escape suspicion, and their gov- 
 ernments too were held responsible for this unwar- 
 ranted attack. Thus the United States government 
 was placed in an extremely awkward position, for 
 American citizens were now involved in an attempt 
 to overthrow Nicaragua's sovereignty, which up to 
 this we had declared to be inviolable. To appease 
 Nicaragua's anger, and still not disparage American 
 rights along the shore, was, indeed, a difficult task, 
 and careful diplomacy was required. 
 
 An American naval force was on hand, however, 
 and Captain O'Neil, the officer in command, at once 
 offered his services to the Nicaraguan commissioner in 
 restoring order. The offer was accepted, and uppn 
 
504 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the landing of the American marines, the Nicara- 
 guan troops withdrew. This left the de facto Mos- 
 quito government in control, but the Nicaraguan 
 government had yet to be heard from. 
 
 In times of excitement Central America is easily 
 aroused, and on such occasions the forces of govern- 
 ment are very apt to proceed with far more force 
 than dignity. So nothing must do for Nicaragua 
 now, but to crush out the revolution and incorporate 
 the reserve by force. The military was accordingly 
 called upon and troops were once more sent to the 
 shore. Opposition on Great Britain's part would 
 certainly have involved her in fresh trouble with the 
 United States. Nor could the United States inter- 
 fere without denying Nicaragua's sovereignty over 
 the coast. Thus the Nicaraguans were again given 
 free hand to take the revenge they desired. Chief 
 Clarence and his mulatto allies fled to Jamaica, and 
 the British and American residents were thus left 
 helpless to bear the brunt of the attack. ' 
 
 Bluefields was again occupied, and then the pro- 
 scriptions were published. Notice was served by 
 the Nicaraguan commissioner to members of the late 
 Council of State, requesting them to appear before 
 him at his office at a certain hour. Instead of meet- 
 ing the commissioner, however, the foreigners were 
 confronted by a file of soldiers, and were one and all 
 made prisoners. No charges were preferred, no 
 respite was allowed and protests were of no avail. 
 The British and the Americans were accordingly 
 hurried ofE, just as they were, to Greytown, and 
 
The Present Situation. 505 
 
 thence sent on to Managua — a twelve-days' journey 
 in all, — for conviction. Objections were made by 
 both the British and American diplomatic repre- 
 sentatives against such summary procedure, but 
 Nicaragua was then too excited to listen to any 
 rules of international law. A trial was considered 
 unnecessary, and the whole party was summarily 
 banished from the country. 
 
 The governments of Great Britain and the United 
 States, had now perforce to interfere ; but verj- dif- 
 ferent methods were chosen by each, according as 
 their respective national interests dictated. 
 
 Fortunately Nicaragua is as quickly calmed as she 
 is easily excited, and as reason tallied in this case 
 with her own self-interest, she soon consented to 
 come to terms with the United States. In a month 
 or so, the decree of banishment was raised from the 
 American exiles, and the two governments and 
 their citizens now promised to co-operate in their 
 endeavors to persuade the Mosquitos to incorporate 
 themselves voluntarily into Nicaragua. Ouseley and 
 Wyke had, as we know, provided for such a contin- 
 gency, but they had not deemed the event probable, 
 considering British prestige on the shore. But the 
 American residents were now in the ascendant 
 throughout the reserve, and, in spite of the late 
 fiasco, their influence proved strong enough in the 
 end to induce Chief Clarence and his band to 
 become Nicaraguan citizens. A convention of the 
 tribes was accordingly called, and on November 20, 
 1894, by a formal decree, the Indians themselves 
 
506 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 declared for incorporation. In due course of time, 
 after the proper preliminaries had been arranged, 
 the reserve thus became the Nicaraguan department 
 of " Zelaya " ; and the ghost of the British Mosquito 
 protectorate, which the Emperor of Austria had 
 raised, was now laid to rest — let us hope, for good 
 and all. 
 
 The disputes that have arisen between Great 
 Britain and the United States in regard to American 
 territorial questions, have, indeed, usually been set- 
 tled in favor of that party which could bring the 
 greater amount of influence to bear on the spot. 
 Up to the present English prestige has been domi- 
 nant everywhere south of Mexico ; but from the 
 present instance we might be led to conclude that 
 the tide has now begun to turn in our favor. At 
 least we know from our experience in Panama and 
 Mosquitia, that where Americans have invested 
 their capital and gone themselves to live, there they 
 have made their influence supreme, and this at least 
 is encouraging, in view of the greater American 
 growth that is now before us. 
 
 But Great Britain is not in the habit of allowing 
 indignities to her subjects to go unpunished, and as 
 she had already lost her hold on the eastern sea- 
 board, reparation from Nicaragua had to be sought 
 for in other ways. One of the Englishmen arrested 
 and banished was a British consular officer, — Mr. 
 E. D. Hatch, proconsul at Bluefields, — and this con- 
 siderably aggravated Nicaragua's offence against 
 the law of nations. The British government accord- 
 
The Present Situation. 507 
 
 ingly demanded $75,000 damages for Hatch's un- 
 lawful arrest ; but Nicaragua made no pretence even 
 to take the matter under consideration. The point 
 was then pressed, and Nicaragua decided to send an 
 envoy to England to treat with Lord Kimberley, 
 the British Foreign Secretary, on the subject. But 
 the only result was a reiteration of the British ulti- 
 matum. As Nicaragua either could not or would 
 not comply, a British fleet under Admiral Stephen- 
 son thereupon seized upon the port of Corinto, on 
 April 27, 1895, and held it as security for the claim. 
 
 The people of the United States were greatly 
 excited over the seizure, but the government could 
 have nothing to say, as Great Britain was simply 
 seeking redress for the self-same injuries for which 
 the United States had also demanded and received 
 satisfaction. The only possible way out of the diffi- 
 culty was for Nicaragua to pay the smart money 
 demanded, and then insist upon the withdrawal of 
 the British forces. The United States government, 
 therefore, wisely refrained from any official inter- 
 ference ; but some arrangement was made whereby 
 San Salvador advanced the sum demanded, and, 
 without seeking further redress, the British then 
 evacuated the port. 
 
 Thus both the eastern and western shores of 
 Nicaragua have at last been freed from British 
 domination, and Americans have therewith fallen 
 heirs, not only to the political influence heretofore 
 exerted by the English in these parts, but also to a 
 number of economic advantages. The English had in 
 
508 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 mind the construction of a railway from Bluefields 
 to Rama, and from Rama on ttrougli the forest to 
 San Ubaldo, on the eastern shore of Lake Nica- 
 ragua. A railroad already connects Corinto with 
 the western shores of the lake, so the construction 
 of the new line on the east would complete a system 
 of railroad and lake transportation from sea to sea. 
 Surveys were indeed made of the route, but the 
 Baring Brothers' failure cut short the plans of the 
 English syndicate, and the concessions have since 
 lapsed. The project has accordingly fallen into 
 Nicaragua's hands, the work has been resumed, and 
 with the help of American capital, there is a fair 
 prospect of its being shortly completed. 
 
 Along the Mosquito shore as well, there are 
 projects of extensive improvements on foot, and 
 here again American capital is interested. Light- 
 houses are to be erected at suitable points along 
 the coast, and a line of steamers provided, to run 
 between Grey town and Cape 6rracias, calling at the 
 intermediate ports. In order to bring the Rama 
 banana plantations in closer communication with 
 the shore, the plan is to build a railroad from the 
 Rama river to Monkey point, and there provide 
 suitable harbor facilities for shipping the fruit on 
 ocean-going steamships to Europe and the United 
 States. 
 
 But the maintenance of our lately assumed politi- 
 cal prestige, and the safe-guarding of our future eco- 
 nomic interests in Nicaragua must of necessity cast a 
 weighty responsibility upon our government, and 
 
The Present Situation. 509 
 
 call for a new order of diplomacy. It was all very 
 well to maintain Mcaragua?s sovereign rights in 
 the face of British aggression, but when Nicaragua 
 shall begin again to assert that same excitable sover- 
 eignty of hers in opposition to Costa Rica's claims 
 along the canal route, the case will be quite different. 
 
 Then again, it is very doubtful whether the Mos- 
 quito Indians and their American allies will long 
 submit to Nicaraguan rule in Zelaya. The govern- 
 ment of Nicaragua is even now endeavoring to ex- 
 tend its monopoly of the liquor traffic over the 
 shore, and the foreign residents have already organ- 
 ized themselves in opposition to the republic on the 
 excise question. To complicate the question still 
 further, Nicaragua is at present in the midst of 
 another of her periodical revolutions, and, as the 
 reserve is now part of the republic, it cannot escape 
 ail political responsibility as before. President Ze- 
 laya has proclaimed himself dictator, the insurgents 
 are active in opposition, and altogether the present 
 political situation in Nicaragua is as bad as it well 
 could be. 
 
 Owing to the force of circumstances. Great Britain 
 may no longer be a factor in the immediate diplo- 
 matic problem of the canal route, but this only casts 
 a double responsibility on our own shoulders. We 
 have promised Nicaragua, on the one hand, that her 
 sovereignty shall be respected, and, on the other 
 hand, we are still under obligations to Great Britain 
 to see that the terms of the time-worn Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty be preserved. With American inter- 
 
510 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 ests in Nicaragua to guard, and a government canal 
 project in view, we may certainly expect, therefore, 
 to have our hands full in regulating the future 
 diplomatic relations of the transit-way. Thei'e is 
 plenty of experience, but no international precedent 
 to guide us in our course, and the only hope would 
 therefore seem to lie in our present determination 
 to come to some more satisfactory terms with the 
 Spanish-American states of the isthmus, in regard to 
 the interoceanic canal and the Monroe doctrine. 
 
 • U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc, 20, 53d Cong., 3d Sess. 
 
 U. S. Consular Reports, 1894-95, Consul O'Hara, San Juan del Norte. 
 
 Engineering Magazine, loc. cit., March 15, 1893. 
 
 Ira D. Travis, " British Rule in Central America," pp. 20-33. 
 
 Publications of Michigan Political Science Association, No. 5, July, 1895. 
 
 Statesman's Year Book, 1896. 
 
ART 
 
 Four. 
 
 PROBABILITIES AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE FUTTJEE 
 
 THE NICAEAGUA CANAL A NATIONAL AMERICAN 
 UNDERTAKING. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CANAL 
 PROJECT. 
 
 HAVING traced the history of the transit 
 question through all its vicissitudes, we 
 are still met with considerable diversity of 
 opinion regarding the economic advantages of the 
 scheme. There are those, on the one hand, „ ^. 
 
 g 172. 1 ne 
 
 who promise high dividends from the pro- General 
 ject, by calculating to the penny the pi'ob- Economic 
 able cost of construction, and estimating to 
 a nicety the amount of tonnage that will pass through 
 the canal upon its completion. But there are others 
 who maintain that the whole project is impracticable, 
 and that the millions spent upon the canal might 
 just as well be sunk in the sea. 
 
 Croakers and enthusiasts are ever the natural con- 
 comitants of large undertakings, however, and in this 
 
 5" 
 
51- The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 particular case the cause of the present divergence 
 is apparent. Those who take extreme ground against 
 the canal project will, in most cases, be found to be, 
 in one way or another, connected with the transcon- 
 tinental railway companies, whose immediate inter- 
 ests are antagonistic to the proposed American 
 water-way. On the other hand, those who dilate 
 upon the present economic advantages of the canal 
 and calculate its revenues so exactly, for the most 
 part have funds invested in the project, and conse- 
 quently regard it pi-imarily in the light of a money- 
 making scheme. 
 
 The present diversity of opinion may therefore be 
 looked upon as but a symptom of this ei'a of compe- 
 tition, and thte contradictions should by no means be 
 taken too seriously. That the project is technically 
 practicable there can at least be no manner of doubt, 
 and, for proof of this, we are not obliged to rely on 
 present canal company data. English and French 
 engineers of the highest repute have, as we know, 
 proclaimed the fact, and the results of the latest 
 surveys instituted by experts of our owij govern- 
 ment substantially corroborate the general conclu- 
 sions reached by their predecessors a quarter of a 
 century ago. Canal enthusiasts of our day may, 
 therefore, safely rest their technical case on the 
 testimony of engineering science, and the judgment 
 of the world can only be favorable. 
 
 In the matter of probable cost we must, however, 
 discriminate between the sum for which a canal 
 could be built, and the amount for which the ca/nal 
 
Economic Aspects. 513 
 
 should be built ; and the decision rests largely upon 
 the question, whether the undertaking is to be carried 
 out as a*prwate or as a public enterprise. In the 
 former case the dividends of stockholders are alone 
 to be considered, while, in the latter, the interests 
 of the American people, as a whole, are to be taken 
 into account. We have the estimates of a private 
 company already before us, and the government has 
 also presented us with a provisional bid. In all 
 probability the people will soon be called upon to 
 decide what kind of a canal they want, and who 
 shall build it for them. In the meantime, therefore, 
 let us not confuse the two issues, and condemn the 
 entire project offhand as chimerical, simply because 
 a national water-way is likely to cost more than a 
 purely private undertaking. 
 
 When we come, finally, to consider the question 
 of the probable tonnage of the canal, we are con 
 fronted by a still greater divergence of opinion 
 Various estimates have been made, varying all the 
 way from 300,000 tons to 9,000,000 tons annually 
 but neither the manner of approaching the prob 
 lem nor the methods thus far employed in calculat 
 ing the tributary tonnage seem to me satisfactory, 
 
 ' Mr. Joseph Nimmo, in Forum, March, 1896, 300,000 tons. 
 
 Ibid., in Report to Secretary of Treasury, August 7, 1880, 1,625,000 
 tons. 
 
 Admiral Ammen, 1876, 4,833,000 tons. 
 
 M. Levasseur, 1878, 5,250,000 tons. 
 
 M. Levasseur and associates, 1879, estiraate for Panama Company of 
 probable traffic in 1888, 7,250,000 tons. 
 
 Maritime Canal Company, 1889, 8,121,093 tons. 
 
 Nicaragua Canal Construction Company, estimate for 1897, 9,933,302 
 
 tons. 
 
 33 
 
514 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 On the one hand, those who run the figures up, 
 draw unwarranted conclusions from Suez and Sault 
 Ste. Marie canal statistics ; while those, on the other 
 hand, who would belittle the advantages of the un- 
 dertaking, only take into account the commerce that 
 is at present accommodated in other ways, and im- 
 mensely underestimate the future trade that the 
 canal will call into existence. 
 
 The Sault Ste. Marie canal is an inland water-way 
 and not apposite. The Suez canal was not con- 
 structed until long after the markets of the East had 
 been developed, and a great body of commerce thus 
 stood ready to employ the shorter route. Such is 
 not at all the case with the Nicaragua canal ; but 
 then, on the other hand, we must not forget that the 
 trade of the Pacific is as yet in its infancy ; and, just 
 as Europe has developed the far East, so is America 
 now bent on developing the far West. Europe be- 
 gan the work before an adequate route of commerce 
 was provided, but America can aiford to wait be- 
 fore entering upon her task, until favorable trade- 
 lines are established. In short, the Suez canal took 
 advantage of the past and added to its tonnage 
 while the Nicaragua canal will only provide for the 
 future, — and prospective development can certainly 
 not be measured very accurately in tons. 
 
 Then again, in making up the estimates, the 
 natural movement of the world's commerce, — west- 
 ward and eastward from a centre which is itself 
 constantly moving toward the west,^ — has thus far 
 
 ' Cf. Chapter I., §ii. 
 
Economic Aspects. 515 
 
 been left out of account. As a result the American 
 isthmus has always been taken as the point of de- 
 parture, and, from this centre, calculations have been 
 made as to how far around the globe, on either side, 
 the influence of the canal would extend. Such a 
 method appears to me both misleading and inade- 
 quate, and we can scarcely expect satisfactory results 
 so long as we thus restrict our horizon. 
 
 It would be far beyond the purposes of this book, 
 — and indeed the ability of its author, — to attempt to 
 estimate the commercial effects of the canal. What 
 we need is another board of experts to study this 
 phase of the more general problem of interoceanic 
 transit. Congress has already provided for a technical 
 commission to examine into the engineering features 
 of the undertaking; may we not hope, therefore, 
 that a statistical board will also be appointed by 
 the government to take up the commercial side of 
 the case ? From the results of such an investiga- 
 tion, we could at all events reach a decision regard- 
 ing the economic importance of the canal, and the 
 report itself would, at the same time, be an im- 
 portant guide to the commercial possibilities of our 
 future. 
 
 Meantime, as the matter is of such immediate im- 
 portance to all sections of our country, and, as the sub- 
 ject seems in general to be so imperfectly understood, 
 I am tempted to at least offer a point of view, and 
 suggest a method of inquiry, which — I am presump- 
 tuous enough to believe — will be fruitful of good 
 results if properly elaborated by competent experts. 
 
516 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 With Western industrial civilization as its point 
 of departure, the sea-borne commerce of the world 
 has proceeded in opposite directions, west- 
 Method of ward and eastward, as nearly as possible 
 Inquiry. along the parallels of latitude. Natural 
 obstacles were encountered, however, on either side, 
 and in the one case the trade was diverted around 
 Africa, and in the other, around South America. 
 
 But the barrier on the east has since been broken 
 through, and the easterly undercurrent of commerce 
 has, in consequence, proceeded much farther around 
 the globe than has its primary westerly advance. 
 Given, therefore, a westerly water-way as well, and 
 the problem is to determine first, where would the 
 westerly and easterly trade lines ultimately merge 
 into one ? and second, what would be the effect of 
 such a water-way upon the future development of 
 the commerce of the West ? 
 
 Bearing in mind the historical movement of the 
 world's commerce, and mindful of the natural 
 obstacles it has encountered ; we may conveniently 
 divide the surface of the globe into two sections by run- 
 ning lines longitudinally through the two isthmuses 
 in question, — thus separating Europe from Asia, 
 and dividing the continents of Africa and America 
 each into two unequal parts. 
 
 The Atlantic section will thus include the indus- 
 trial states of Europe and America, whence has 
 come the impetus of the world's commerce. 
 
 The Padfic section^ on the other side, will then 
 contain the rich, and as yet only partially de- 
 
Lon^tude West eft from Greenwich 
 
 Cape Gracias 
 
 ^ a Dies 
 
 BRITISH CLAIMS 
 
 AND 
 
 POSSESSIONS. 
 
 scale: or miles 
 
 Lon^Hude West 
 
 from Washington 
 
Economic Aspects. 517 
 
 veloped lands which the commerce of the Atlantic 
 section, in its westward advance and its easterly 
 undercurrent, has constantly striven to reach. 
 
 Within the Atlantic section there are also par- 
 tially developed lands, — to wit, the western portion 
 of Africa, the eastern portion of South America and 
 the Mississippi valley, — which exchange their raw 
 materials with the manufactured products of the in- 
 dustrial states of this section. Conversely, there are 
 also manufacturing countries situated within the 
 Pacific section — namely India and Japan — which 
 trade with the partially developed lands bordering 
 upon the same sea. But with both these trade rela- 
 tions we shall have nothing whatever to do, as the 
 commerce thus carried on will never have to pass 
 through either one of the water-ways.* 
 
 It is, therefore, only the reciprocal commercial 
 relations between the Atlantic and Pacific sections 
 that we have at. present to consider. This portion 
 of the world's commerce we may accordingly speak 
 of as canal trade^ since it must come within the zone of 
 attraction of one or the other of the water-ways. 
 At present this canal trade consists largely in an 
 exchange of the manufactured products of the At- 
 lantic section for the raw materials of the Pacific 
 section ; but with the growth of home industries in 
 the Pacific countries, and the opening up of new 
 lands in the Atlantic, a balance will eventually be 
 struck, and the trade will become truly reciprocal. 
 
 ' It is not to be denied, however, that the domestic trade of the Atlantic 
 and Pacific sections is, and must continue to be, indirectly affected by the 
 competition from without set free by the construction of the canals. 
 
518 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 With, the opening of the proposed water-way 
 across the American isthmus, this canal trade will 
 ultimately have the choice of two main routes, an 
 easterly trade route and a westerly trade route, and 
 each of these main routes will again be divided into 
 a natural and an artificial highway. For example, 
 vessels starting from the industrial states of the 
 Atlantic section may reach the ports of the Pacific 
 section either by sailing east or by sailing west, and 
 in the former case again they may either proceed 
 through the Suez canal or around the Cape of Good 
 Hope ; while by taking the latter course they may 
 either pass through the Nicaragua canal ^ or round 
 the Horn.^ 
 
 For the purposes of further elimination we may, 
 therefore, subdivide the canal trade into three main 
 classes : 
 
 (1) Easterly canal trade, being such portion of 
 the total canal trade as — either by reason of dis- 
 tances saved or other signal advantages — will con- 
 tiaue to reach the Pacific section by passing through 
 the Suez canal or sailing around the Cape. 
 
 (2) Nevbt/ral canal trade, being such portion of 
 the whole as can be regarded neither as entirely 
 tributary to the easterly nor to the westerly route. 
 The comparative distances to be traversed being 
 taken in this case to be about the same, the choice 
 of the routes would here depend upon certain ad- 
 ventitious circumstances. 
 
 ' Or the Panama canal as the future may decide. 
 " The route for steam vessels is through the Straits of Magellan. 
 
Economic Aspects. 519 
 
 (3) Westerly canal trade, being such portion of 
 tlie total as must be entirely tributary to the west- 
 erly route, either on account of distances saved or 
 ■ by reason of other favorable conditions accompany- 
 ing the voyage through the Nicaragua canal or 
 around the Horn. 
 
 One part of the canal trade will thus fall under 
 the influence of the Suez canal, and to secure its 
 share of this commerce the easterly water-way will 
 only have to compete with the natural route around 
 the Cape. Another portion of the canal trade will 
 in like manner come under the influence of the 
 Nicaragua canal, and, to obtain its due quota of 
 this commerce, the westerly water-way will only 
 have to come into competition with the natural 
 route around the Horn, — or, what is the same thing, 
 through the Straits of Magellan. What is left of 
 the canal trade will thus be open to the competition 
 of the two canals. 
 
 The zone of the Suez canal might accordingly be 
 so extended as to include both the easterly and the 
 neutral canal trade ; and, in like manner, the Nica- 
 ragua canal zone might possibly be so expanded as 
 to comprise the westerly and the neutral canal 
 trade. But we have not at present to deal with the 
 ship-canal question as a whole. All we have in 
 mind is to demonstrate the commercial importance 
 of the westerly water-way. Without losing sight of 
 any of the possibilities of the American project, we 
 may, therefore, safely confine our attention hence- 
 forth exclusively to the Nicaragua canal zone. 
 
520 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Within this zone, the American water-way will, 
 on the one hand, have to compete with the easterly 
 trade route, — to wit, with the Suez canal and with 
 the voyage around the Cape ; — and, on the other ■ 
 hand, it will also have to enter into competition 
 with the natural westerly route, — namely, A^dth the 
 voyage around the Horn or through the Straits. 
 The zone in question therefore bounds the possible 
 rather than the probable influence of the Nicaragua 
 canal, and the kernel of the problem immediately 
 before us is, accordingly, to detei-mine, first, just 
 how much of the commerce of the world now in- 
 cluded Avithin this zone will become tributarj^ to the 
 water-way upon its completion ; and, secondly, what 
 effect the canal itself will have upon increasing the 
 amount of the trade in question. 
 
 With due regard to the competing routes with 
 which the American water-way must perforce con- 
 tend, and for the purposes of more detailed consid- 
 eration, we had, therefore, best split up the zone of 
 the Nicaragua canal into three subsidiary zones, as 
 follows : 
 
 Zone A — ^to include the portion of the main zone 
 wherein the Nicaragua canal will come into compe- 
 tition with the easterly route, ^.e.,. the Suez canal 
 and the voyage around the Cape. 
 
 Zone B — ^to include the portion of the main zone 
 wherein the Nicaragua canal will only come into 
 competition with the natural westerly route, i. e., the 
 voyage around the Horn or through the Straits of 
 Magellan. 
 
Economic Aspects. 521 
 
 Zone O- — to include the rest of the main zone, and 
 herein the Nicaragua canal will have a monopoly of 
 the water-borne commerce in question. 
 
 Judging from the comparative distances to be 
 traversed under purely natural conditions, the west- 
 erly route should compete with the east- ^ 
 erly for the trade between the industrial a — ^110^1"- 
 states of the Atlantic section and the gua versus 
 
 countries of the far East. Or, in other f "^^ *"** 
 
 the Cape. 
 
 words, the zone of what we have called 
 the neutral canal trade should lie naturally off the 
 east coast of Asia. Given artificial water-ways 
 through both isthmuses, and the case would be the 
 same. But history has thus far failed to present 
 the problem in this simple fashion. Before the 
 Suez canal was built, all this sea-borne commerce 
 with the far East proceeded by way of the Cape, as 
 the natural easterly route was in all cases shorter 
 for Europe than the natural westerly, and America 
 was then too young to engage in this trade. Thus 
 what was naturally neutral canal trade became en- 
 tirely tributary to the easterly route, simply because 
 it had its only origin in Europe, instead of being 
 divided naturally between the Atlantic ports of 
 Europe and America. 
 
 After the trade between Europe and the far East 
 had reached considerable proportions in its way, it 
 was given a further impetus by the construction of 
 the Suez canal. As a result, when the eastern sec- 
 tion of the United States grew strong enough to 
 compete for a share in this trade, it found itself 
 
522 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 handicapped from the start, for the Atlantic ports 
 of Europe were now placed over 2500 miles nearer 
 the countries of the far East than were the Atlantic 
 ports of the United States. Our country, conse- 
 quently, in spite of its natural position and the com- 
 modities it has to offer, has never been able to take 
 any considerable part in this commei-ce, and the 
 neutral canal trade accordingly still remains tribu- 
 tary to the easterly route, or more specifically, at 
 present, to its artificial highway. 
 
 In dealing with the first subsidiary zone of the 
 Nicaragua canal there are thus two distinct ques- 
 tions to be considered ; first : how much, if any, of 
 the trade now being carried on between Europe and 
 the far East will become tributary to the American 
 water-way ; and second : to what extent will the 
 Nicaragua canal make it possible for America to 
 take part in the future commerce of the far East, 
 and thus divide the properly neutral canal trade 
 more equally between the easterly and westerly 
 water-ways. 
 
 In answer to the former question we may say that 
 the American water-way will have practically no 
 effect in diverting any of Europe's present trade with 
 the countries and islands of the far East from the 
 easterly route, for the Suez canal will still afford 
 the shorter and more convenient highway of the 
 two. 
 
 Such portion of this trade as now reaches the far 
 East from Europe in sailing-vessels, still proceeds 
 by way of the Cape on account of the lack of wind 
 
Economic Aspects. 
 
 523 
 
 in the Red Sea ; and some have claimed that this 
 commerce, at least, will be diverted to the Nicara- 
 gua route/ But this would appear very doubtful ; 
 for it must be borne in mind that a region of " dol- 
 drums " also exists along the westerly coast of the 
 American isthmus ; and then again, the African con- 
 tinent presents convenient points of call on either 
 
 'TABLE SHOWING COMPARATIVE DISTANCES BETWEEN 
 EUROPE AND THE FAR ,EAST VIA THE EASTERLY 
 AND THE WESTERLY ROUTES. 
 
 
 Via 
 
 Cape of 
 
 Good 
 
 Hope 
 
 Via. 
 Cape 
 Horn 
 
 Differ- 
 ence in 
 favor of 
 Good 
 Hope 
 
 Via . 
 Suez 
 Canal 
 
 via 
 Nicara- 
 gua 
 Canal 
 
 Differ- 
 ence in 
 favor of 
 Suez 
 Canal 
 
 Savin? 
 effectedTjy 
 
 Liverpool to 
 
 Suez 
 
 vs. 
 
 Good 
 
 Hope 
 
 Nicara- 
 gua TO. 
 Cape 
 Horn 
 
 Singapore — miles 
 Hong Kong " 
 Shanghai " 
 Melbourne ' ' 
 Yokohama ' ' 
 
 13.505 
 15,051 
 
 15,921 
 13,140 
 16,040 
 
 18,570 
 18,030 
 17,610 
 13,352 
 17,529 
 
 5065 
 2979 
 1689 
 212 
 1489 
 
 7958 
 
 9810 
 
 10,680 
 
 11,350 
 
 11,765 
 
 14,326 
 13,786 
 13,370 
 12,748 
 12,111 
 
 6368 
 3976 
 2690 
 1398 
 346 
 
 5547 
 5241 
 5241 
 1790 
 4275 
 
 4244 
 
 4244 
 
 4240 
 
 604 
 
 5418 
 
 Marseilles to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Singapore — miles 
 Hong Kong " 
 Shanghai " 
 Melbourne " 
 Yokohama ' ' 
 
 13,265 
 14,811 
 15,681 
 12,900 
 15,800 
 
 18,350 
 17,810 
 17,390 
 13,132 
 17,309 
 
 5085 
 2999 
 1709 
 232 
 1509 
 
 6628 
 8180 
 9050 
 9720 
 10,135 
 
 14,136 
 13,596 
 13,180 
 12,558 
 11,920 
 
 7508 
 5416 
 4130 
 2838 
 1785 
 
 6637 
 6631 
 6631 
 3180 
 5665 
 
 4214 
 4214 
 4210 
 
 574 
 5389 
 
 The tables given in this chapter are compiled from two sources : first, from 
 data furnished by the United States Hydrographic Office, and second, from 
 a series of tables given in the London Engineering Magazine of April 14, 
 1893. The two authorities are practicallyin accord, and where any divergence 
 occurs the longer distances have been taken in making up the present 
 tables. In all cases the length of the sailing routes is only approximate. 
 
524 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 side for these sailing craft, while the voyage via 
 Nicaragua is across the open seas for the greater 
 part of the way. 
 
 On the other hand, there are a number of pro- 
 ducts of the far East, which are now brought back 
 to Europe by the easterly route, and thence re- 
 shipped in bulk across the Atlantic to America.^ 
 The opening of the Nicaragua canal would probably 
 give this trade the rotary motion natural to it, and 
 as homeward bound commerce at least, it would thus 
 become tributary to the American water-way. 
 
 Such then is the very slight influence Avhich the 
 Nicaragua canal will be able to exert upon Europe's 
 present trade with the countries of the far East. 
 
 Coming to the second question, in regard to the 
 future commerce between the industrial states of the 
 Atlantic section and the far East, we must bear in 
 mind that the United States are at present practically 
 shut out of this sea-borne traffic by reason of in- 
 adequate facilities of transportation.' But the Nica- 
 ragua canal will bring our eastern and Gulf ports 
 equally as near to the markets in question as the 
 
 ' Australian wools, for example, are now brought back to England and 
 thence shipped in bulk to the United States. Many of the products of New 
 Zealand and the Pacific islands take the same course under ' the present 
 conditions. 
 
 ^ The present trade of our Atlantic and Gulf ports with the far East only 
 amounts to 416,152 tons a year. On account of transcontinental railroad 
 freight rates, it is found cheaper to ship from New York and Philadelphia 
 via Liverpool. On the other hand, Great Britain's imports from India 
 amount to 7,250,000 tons annually ; from Australia, 16,000,000 tons ; from 
 Hong Kong, 7,000,000 tons ; and from the Straits Settlements, 7,000,000 
 tons. 
 
Economic Aspects. 
 
 525 
 
 Suez canal has already brought the Atlantic ports 
 of Europe.' That is to say, the Atlantic ports of 
 Europe will have the advantage over those of the 
 
 ' TABLE OF COMPARATIVE COMPETING niSTANCES FOR 
 EUROPEAN VERSUS AMERICAN CANAL TRADE BY 
 SHORTEST AVAILABLE ROUTES, NOW AND AFTER 
 THE OPENING OF THE NICARAGUA CANAL. 
 
 
 Present. 
 
 Future. 
 
 Liverpool vs. New 
 York. 
 
 No. 
 
 of 
 
 miles 
 
 In favor of 
 
 Due to 
 
 No. 
 
 of 
 
 miles 
 
 3591 
 1228 
 2402 
 
 1350 
 
 In favor of 
 
 Due to 
 
 With Singapore. . . 
 " Hong Kong. 
 " Yokohama. . 
 
 " Melbourne. . 
 
 3591 
 3591 
 3549 
 
 1840 
 
 Liverpool 
 Liverpool 
 Liverpool 
 
 Liverpool 
 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 
 Suez Canal 
 
 Liverpool 
 Liverpool 
 New York 
 
 New York 
 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 Nicaragua 
 
 Canal 
 Nicaragua 
 
 Canal 
 
 Marseilles vs. New 
 York. 
 
 4921 
 5221 
 
 5179 
 3570 
 
 Marseilles 
 Marseilles 
 Marseilles 
 
 Marseilles 
 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 
 4921 
 2858 
 1772 
 
 280 
 
 Marseilles 
 Marseilles 
 New York 
 
 Marseilles 
 
 
 With Singapore. . . 
 " Hong Kong. 
 " Yokohama.. 
 
 " Melbourne. . 
 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 Nicaragua 
 
 Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 
 Liverpool vs. New 
 Orleans. 
 
 4142 
 3840 
 2885 
 
 2150 
 
 Liverpool 
 Liverpool 
 Liverpool 
 
 Liverpool 
 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 
 Suez Canal 
 
 2907 
 
 515 
 
 3II5 
 
 2063 
 
 Liverpool 
 
 Liverpool 
 
 New 
 
 Orleans 
 
 New 
 Orleans 
 
 
 With Singapore. . . 
 " Hong Kong. 
 " Yokohama. . 
 
 " Melbourne. . 
 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 Nicaragua 
 
 Canal 
 Nicaragua 
 
 Canal 
 
 Marseilles vs. New 
 Orleans. 
 
 5472 
 5470 
 
 4515 
 3780 
 
 Marseilles 
 Marseilles 
 Marseilles 
 
 Marseilles 
 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 
 Suez Canal 
 
 4237 
 2145 
 
 1485 
 
 433 
 
 Marseilles 
 
 Marseilles 
 
 New 
 
 Orleans 
 
 New 
 Orleans 
 
 
 With Singapore. . . 
 " Hong Kong. 
 " Yokohama. . 
 
 " Melbourne. . 
 
 Suez Canal 
 Suez Canal 
 Nicaragua 
 
 Canal 
 Nicaragua 
 
 Canal 
 
526 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 United States with the markets of Malaysia and 
 southeastern China, but the Atlantic and Gulf ports 
 of the United States will be brought comparatively 
 nearer to the ports of Australia, Japan, northeastern 
 China, and Corea. 
 
 America's ability to compete for the future trade 
 of the far East must, therefore, depend upon her 
 capacity of supplying the markets in question with 
 the commodities demanded. Raw materials and 
 manufactured goods both go to make up the import 
 canal trade of these Eastern countries. Let us, 
 therefore, consider them in turn. 
 
 Europe cannot supply the raw materials that the 
 East now demands, and thus the United States will 
 have a free hand in this portion of the canal trade, 
 with only the Eastern countries themselves to com- 
 pete with. Petroleum and cotton are the main 
 articles of this trade, and both these are typical 
 American products. Russia is our competitor for 
 the former, but then the demand is very large and 
 constantly increasing, so, with adequate transporta- 
 tion facilities, the competition is not likely to become 
 severe. In the production of the quality of cotton 
 required for the Eastern trade, the United States 
 have a virtual monopoly. Even India requires our 
 long-fibre cotton to mix with her short-fibred pro- 
 duct in her manufactures, and Japan will have 
 little else.^ Raw cotton is no longer being grown 
 in Japan, and at the same time the number of her 
 
 ■ The first shipment of raw cotton from the United States to Japan was 
 in 1888, and amounted to 85,000 lbs. At present we are sending over 
 7,000,000 lbs. annually. 
 
Economic Aspects. 527 
 
 mills, looms, and spindles is increasing year by year 
 at a remarkable rate/ Our growers have already 
 begun to supply these markets, but the obstacles in 
 the way of transportation are enormous. 
 
 The Nicaragua canal will at once solve the diffi- 
 culties of this trade, and in these instances the 
 benefits will accrue to the Mississippi valley and the 
 southeastern sections of our country. A "direct 
 trade " from the Gulf to the markets in question 
 will then be possible, and such is the present 
 demand of our producers. 
 
 In supplying tte markets of the East witk manu- 
 factured goods, the United States will, of course, 
 have to compete with Europe ; but then there are 
 certain natural advantages on our side which must 
 have their effects as soon as an adequate trade route 
 is established. We already have the necessary skill 
 and machinery, and our supply of the raw materials 
 is unbounded. There are millions upon millions of 
 people in the far East who demand cotton goods for 
 clothing. Up to the present Great Britain has sup- 
 plied the great bulk of these finished commodities, 
 but India of late has begun to compete with Lan- 
 cashire ; and Japan, as we know, is increasing her 
 manufacturing facilities very rapidly. But the de- 
 mand, as we can well imagine, is enormous, and the 
 mills of New England, and those to be established 
 in the South, may weU compete for a goodly share 
 in this trade, and more especially as in some grades 
 
 ' During the years 1883-93, the number of cotton mills in Japan increased 
 from I to 46. In 1883 there were 5456 spindles put to work. By i8gi the 
 number had increased to 380,000, and at present over 1,000,000 are in 
 operation. 
 
528 The Nicarasrua Canal. 
 
 of cotton goods the United States have already a 
 practical monopoly. Then, too, we must remember 
 that China and Japan are now on the threshold of 
 a great material development, and the industrial 
 states of the Atlantic section are to provide at least 
 the immediate facilities. Railroad and shipping 
 supplies and machinery of all kinds will be required, 
 and, if a water-way be provided, there is no reason 
 why the United States should not supply the de- 
 mand as well as Europe. We have huge plants in 
 working order all along our northeast coast and 
 throughout the Mississippi valley. What we need 
 is a knowledge of the market and an adequate trade 
 route thither. 
 
 Thus far it would seem that the main benefits of 
 this future trade with the East would accrue to the 
 Atlantic rather than to the Pacific sections of our 
 country ; whereas, under the present circumstances, 
 it is rather our western ports which profit by the 
 commerce in question. But we have only been 
 speaking of the possible export trade. We now 
 import far more from the far East than we send 
 out, and with the extension of our export trade 
 these imports will tend also to increase rather than 
 to diminish. Now the shortest and most advan- 
 tageous route from the western outlet of the Nica- 
 ragua canal across the Pacific passes very close to 
 San Francisco.^ On their return voyage, at any 
 
 ' Cf. chart of Pacific laid down on the gnomonic projection as illustrated 
 by Captain Henry C. Taylor in a recent address before the Society of Naval 
 Architects and Marine Engineers. 
 
Economic Aspects. 529 
 
 rate, the vessels engaged in this Eastern trade will 
 accordingly make this port a point of call, landing 
 a part of their cargoes there for distribution through- 
 out the West, and then reloading with the products 
 of the Pacific slope for our own eastern markets. It 
 cannot be rightly said, therefore, that the Nicaragua 
 canal would exert a deleterious effect on our West- 
 ern ports, by diverting their Eastern trade. On the 
 contrary, it must rather tend to enhance their com- 
 mercial importance. 
 
 In summary we may, therefore, conclude our con- 
 sideration of this zone by admitting that the Ameri- 
 can water-way wiU have no appreciable eifect in 
 diverting Europe's present commerce with the far 
 East from the Suez canal ; and by prophesying, on 
 the other hand, that the Nicaragua canal will give 
 a great impetus to our own trade with these coun- 
 tries. Or, in other words, when once the westerly 
 route is placed on a par with the easterly, then at 
 last the United States will obtain their due share of 
 the neutral canal trade. 
 
 The Nicaragua canal will have to compete with 
 the natural westerly route, — around the Horn or 
 through the Straits of Magellan, — for two „ „, _ 
 
 & , ° § 175. Zone 
 
 sets of commercial relations, the one an b.— Nicara- 
 activitv of the present, the other a possi- &"» versus 
 
 ^ .-.. n ■, » 1 1. T^ 1 the Horn. 
 
 bility of the future, namely : for Europe's 
 trade with the west coast of South America, and 
 for the trade of the Atlantic ports of South Amer- 
 ica, with the countries and islands of the Pacific. 
 Steam vessels plying between European ports and 
 
530 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the countries of western South America now pass 
 through the Straits of Magellan, but sailing craft 
 are obliged to take the longer and more dangerous 
 course around the Horn. In either case the Nica- 
 ragua canal must necessarily divert the larger por- 
 tion of this trade from its present routes, and here 
 again the relative distances saved will prove the 
 determining factor. 
 
 The canal, for example, will bring Valparaiso 
 over a thousand miles closer to the ports of Europe, 
 and the saving will, of course, be still greater when 
 measured from the more northerly ports of Callao 
 and Guayaquil.' As a general pi'oposition we may 
 therefore say that Europe's sea-borne commerce with 
 the west coast of South America as far down as, 
 and including, the port of Valparaiso, will in the 
 future become tributary to the Nicaragua canal. 
 But the proposition is open to some exceptions. 
 Sailing vessels from Europe to Valparaiso, and per- 
 haps even those bound to Callao, may continue to 
 use the Horn route in order to avoid the canal tolls, 
 
 "TABLE SHOWING DISTANCES SAVED BETWEEN LIVER- 
 POOL AND THE WEST PORTS OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 VIA THE NICARAGUA CANAL. 
 
 Liverpool to 
 
 Via 
 Cape 
 Horn 
 
 Via 
 Straits of 
 Magellan 
 
 Via 
 
 Nicaragua 
 
 Canfl 
 
 Saving effected by Canal over 
 
 Horn Route 
 
 Straits Route 
 
 Guayaquil — miles 
 Callao, 
 Valparaiso, " 
 
 11,204 
 
 10,539 
 
 9.380 
 
 10,620 
 9.960 
 8,760 
 
 5,947 
 6,464 
 7,734 
 
 5,293 
 4,075 
 1,646 
 
 4,673 
 3,496 
 1,026 
 
Economic Aspects. 531 
 
 and keep clear of the doldrums on the west side of 
 the isthmus. Then again the Panama railway will 
 bid for a portion of this trans-isthmian trade, but 
 we can scarcely imagine such a difference of transit 
 rates in favor of the land route as would perma- 
 nently compensate for the extra cost of reloading.' 
 Time alone can measure the weight of these and 
 other exceptions, but on the whole, I believe, our 
 general proposition will hold good.. 
 
 Again, by reason of comparative distances, Europe 
 now possesses a virtual monopoly of this South 
 American canal trade, — Great Britain being the 
 largest holder and Germany coming next.^ But the 
 absolute saving in distance effected for Europe by 
 the construction of the canal will be to her, at the 
 same time, a comparative loss ; for the Atlantic and 
 Gulf ports of the United States will thereby 
 gain a comparative advantage over those of Europe 
 of over two thousand miles. And as the trade 
 in question consists in an exchange of South 
 America's raw materials for manufactured goods 
 which the United States are able to make as well, 
 if not better than the industrial states of Europe, 
 we may expect to see the present European mo- 
 
 ' The transit trade via the Panama railway shows a slight falling off of 
 late. In 1893 it amounted to only 185,591 tons, being Z12 tons less than 
 that of the previous year. 
 
 * Full three fourths of the trade in question is now in European hands, 
 and for the most part controlled by Great Britain. Europe imports from 
 these countries guano, nitre, wool, cotton, grain, copper and silver ore, 
 cocoa, coffee, rubber, etc. ; and exports to the ports in question, cotton and 
 woollen goods, railroad supplies, machinery, and manufactured articles of 
 various sorts. 
 
532 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 nopoly broken at last upon the completion of the 
 American water-way. 
 
 Europe's present trade with the west coast of 
 South America will thus become largely tribiitary 
 to the Nicaragua canal upon its opening, but 
 whether the ultimate efEect of the water-way will be 
 to increase or diminish the amount of the commerce 
 in question, must depend upon the ability of the 
 United States to compete, and of this we shall have 
 more to say in the consideration of the next zone. 
 
 On account of the peculiar shape of the southern 
 continent, and by reason of the comparatively unde- 
 veloped condition of its northern shores, the local 
 sea-borne trade between the east and west coasts of 
 South America will doubtless continue to use the 
 route around the Horn or through the Straits. The 
 commerce between the eastern ports of South Amer- 
 ica and the western ports of North America, must, 
 on the other hand, become entirely tributary to the 
 canal, as we shall presently see. So far as American 
 trade is concerned, therefore, the artificial westerly 
 water-way will thus only come into competition with 
 its natural rival in the case of future commercial 
 relations being established between the Atlantic 
 ports of South America and the islands of the cen- 
 tral Pacific and the countries of the far East. In 
 such an event distance would again be the deter- 
 mining factor, and Pernambuco may, therefore, be 
 taken provisionally as the neutral port of this pos- 
 sible commerce of the future. 
 
 Having spoken of the commercial relations in 
 
Economic Aspects. 533 
 
 wHch the artificial westerly route will Lave to com- 
 pete with the easterly route, — via theoj^g 2one 
 Suez canal or by way of the Cape ofc— Nicara- 
 
 Good Hope, — and with the natural west- g"a's Mo- 
 
 1 . , T nopoly of 
 
 erly route, — either around the Horn or sea-borne 
 
 through the Straits, — we have now to Commerce, 
 consider the rest of the canal trade coming within 
 the zone of the Nicaragua canal, where the Ameri- 
 can water-way will have a natural monopoly of the 
 sea-borne commerce in question. Two classes of 
 commerce fall within this last subsidiary zone : first, 
 the trade of the Pacific ports of North America 
 with the Atlantic ports of Europe and the United 
 States; and second, the trade between the east and 
 west coasts of North America, and the west and 
 east coasts of South America. 
 
 Even though possessing a monopoly of the ocean- 
 borne commerce sailing from the ports of the Pacific 
 slope to Europe and the Atlantic sea-board of the 
 United States, the Nicaragua canal will still find 
 powerful competitors on land in the transcontinental 
 railroads. The future division of this trade has, in- 
 deed, already become a matter of considerable con- 
 troversy between the two opposing factions, and the 
 subject should, therefore, receive careful attention. 
 But the scope of this book does not permit of an 
 exhaustive inquiry, and we can, therefore, only 
 attempt to plot off the ground and add a few pre- 
 liminary suggestions. 
 
obt The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 The Pacific railroads were supposed, indeed, to 
 accommodate all the trade between our eastern and 
 our western ports, but their claims have not been 
 entirely justified, and, in the very nature of things, 
 their promises must remain to a large extent 
 unfulfilled. 
 
 We must note, in the first place, that the trans- 
 continental railroads have not as yet been able to 
 divert all the trade of the West from the natural 
 route. The wheat of the Pacific slope, and a con- 
 siderable portion of the timber of the Northwest, 
 are still transported by water around the Horn or 
 through the Straits to Europe and our own Atlantic 
 ports. This trade will be diverted to the canal, as 
 there will be a saving in distance of over 10,000 miles, 
 and a corresponding lowering of freight rates and 
 time.' But on account of the diffictdties and cost of 
 transportation, the exports of wheat and timber 
 from the West are at present very much smaller 
 than it is natural for them to be.'' If then the rail- 
 
 ' TABLE SHOWING DISTANCES SAVED BETWEEN SAN FRAN- 
 
 CISCO AND THE ATLANTIC PORTS OF THE UNITED 
 
 STATES AND EUROPE BY THE NICARAGUA CANAL. 
 
 San Francisco to 
 
 Cape 
 Horn 
 
 Straits of 
 Magellan 
 
 Nicara- 
 gua 
 Canal 
 
 Saving effected by Canal over 
 
 Horn Route Straits Route 
 
 New Orleans — miles 
 New York " 
 
 Liverpool " 
 
 16,000 
 15,660 
 15,620 
 
 13.539 
 13,174 
 13,494 
 
 4,147 
 4,907 
 7,627 
 
 11,853 
 
 10,753 
 
 7,993 
 
 9,392 
 8,267 
 5,867 
 
 ' The exports via the ocean route from these Pacific ports to Europe in 
 1895 amounted to but 628,735 tons. 
 
Economic Aspects. 535 
 
 roads have not made the growth of this trade possi- 
 ble, it is an important question whether the canal 
 itself will do so. 
 
 It does not pay at all to ship wheat by rail from 
 California, and to send it by sea around South 
 America involves chartering a vessel, paying high 
 rates for freight and insurance and running big risks 
 of a decline in the market while the product is on 
 its way.^ Under such adverse conditions, it is then 
 but natural that the wheat trade of the Pacific slope 
 should have fallen off of late. But with a regular 
 line of steamers plying between the Pacific ports of 
 North America and the markets of the Atlantic sec- 
 tion through the Nicaragua canal, the growers of 
 the western coast would be placed on a par with 
 those of Argentina, Russia, and India, at least as 
 far as transportation facilities were concerned. 
 
 We are still a great wheat-exporting country, and 
 when a water-way is constructed across the isthmus, 
 and a ship canal is built to connect Lake Erie with 
 the Hudson, this export trade will divide itself 
 naturally into three main divisions. The growers 
 of the lower Missouri valley will continue to ship 
 down the river to New Orleans and thence to the 
 markets of Europe. Those of the upper and east- 
 ern valley of the Missouri wiU still send their crops 
 via the Lakes to New York and thence in bulk 
 across the Atlantic. But the wheat of the Pacific 
 
 1 Railroad rates amount to from $20 to $30 a ton. Steamship rates via 
 Straits of Magellan amount to $12 a ton, and the freight by sailing vessels 
 around the Horn amounts to $io a ton. 
 
536 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 slope will go by the Nicaragua canal, and tlie 
 growers of the Saskatchewan also will, in all proba- 
 bility, send their crops by rail to the west coast and 
 thence to Europe via the isthmus water-way. In 
 all these cases the railroads will be employed as 
 tributary lines, and will probably find their earnings 
 increased, rather than diminished, by the improved 
 facilities in water-borne commerce. 
 
 In calculating the future extent of this trade we 
 must not lose sight of the fact, however, that our 
 wheat exports are now falling off and must continue 
 to do so, on the whole, in the face of foreign compe- 
 tition, as our own population increases and as we 
 become more of a manufacturing and commercial 
 nation and less of a purely agricultural country.' 
 Nevertheless, for the immediate future at least, our 
 wheat growers will gain considerably by the con- 
 struction of the Erie ship-canal and the isthmian 
 water-way and, in my belief, our railroads will be 
 no losers. 
 
 Along our eastern coast and in Europe there is a 
 growing demand for timber, as an increase in the 
 density of population always means a decrease in 
 the local forest area. America's northwest frontier, 
 on the contrary, is a land of almost inexhaustible 
 supply,^ and the timber there is vainly trying to 
 
 ' United States exports of manufactured goods are increasing relatively 
 to their exports of farm products. 
 
 ^ There are 25,000,000 acres of forest lands in the Northwest, containing 
 about 400,000,000 feet of uncut timber. In Washington alone there are 
 something like 175,000,000 feet of uncut yellow and red fir. Professor Sar- 
 gent says that a yield of 200,000 square feet to the acre is not at all un- 
 
Economic Aspects. 537 
 
 seek its natural outlet. Some little goes by rail 
 across the continent, and another small portion finds 
 its way to Europe and the East around the Horn, 
 but in both cases the rates are practically prohibi- 
 tory for such a bulky commodity.' By lowering the 
 rates at least one third, and by reducing the time 
 about three fourths over the Horn route the canal 
 will break down the barriers that are now confining 
 this trade and assure its future development. 
 
 The isthmian water-way will thus do for our tim- 
 ber exports just what it will do for our wheat. The 
 forest products of the Mississippi valley, as they are 
 being cut down with the advance of agricultural and 
 manufacturing civilization, will continue to be ex- 
 ported from New Orleans. As we advance from 
 the Lakes farther toward the Northwest through the 
 forest belt, the timber will still be shipped east as 
 before. But with the development of the Pacific 
 Northwest, where the forest growth is heaviest, Ave 
 miist ship the product via the Nicaragua canal. 
 Our growth in the former directions has been so 
 
 common there, and that, within an area of 20,000 square miles, a yield of 
 250,000 square feet can be relied upon. The timber lands of Oregon alone 
 cover an area of 25,000 square miles. 
 
 ' A sailing vessel loaded with lumber from the Northwest could not reach 
 the shipyards of Maine in less than 130 days by sailing around the Horn, 
 and the freight charges would be about $12 a thousand. Through the 
 Nicaragua canal the voyage would be reduced for sailing craft to 40 to 50 
 days and the rate would not amount to more than $8 a ton. The voyage by 
 steamer via the canal would be reduced to 20 days and the charges would 
 be about $9 a ton. In 1886 Washington and Oregon together shipped 
 6,000,000 cubic feet of lumber around the Horn ; in 1887, 48,000,000 cubic 
 feet ; and in 1888, 471,325,000 cubic feet. Since then the shipments have 
 fallen off somewhat, as the trade does not pay at the present freight rates. 
 
538 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 rapid, that the burden is already beginning to fall 
 on our Northwest timber lands ; and we may there- 
 fore look with confidence to a great future for this 
 trade, beginning with the opening of the American 
 water-way. 
 
 There are other raw products of the Northwest 
 now shut oif from Europe and the East for lack of 
 proper facilities of transportation. The rivers are 
 alive with salmon, and the fishing banks lately dis- 
 covered off the west coast are as rich, if not richer 
 than those along our Atlantic sea-board. They have? 
 besides, the extra advantage of being as nature has left 
 them and unhampered by the diplomatic vagaries of 
 man. Access to these grounds, and an adequate out- 
 let foi their products, can only be provided by cut- 
 ting through the isthmus to the south, and then, 
 indeed, their future will be assured. There are, 
 moreover, the wools, the hops, the peltries, and a 
 score of other raw products of this wonderful region 
 even now waiting for a means of access to their nat- 
 ural markets, and this the Nicaragua canal will 
 afford. 
 
 Concerning the future of this northwestern section, 
 Professor Shaler says : " The student of North 
 America who seeks to foretell the course of events 
 in the coming century finds great assurance as to the 
 prosperity of this part of the continent." Its growth 
 is indeed bound to be both swift and great, and, in 
 my opinion, its development and the Nicaragua 
 canal must mutually interact as reciprocal cause and 
 effect. 
 
Economic Aspects. 539 
 
 Thus far we have only spoken of such trade of 
 our distant West, which finds no outlet over land. 
 But many of California's products are now shipped 
 east by rail,' and it is a further question how much 
 of this trade will be diverted from its present lines 
 to the canal. 
 
 The wine and garden products of the Pacific slope 
 are here the most important articles to be considered, 
 and, to me at least, there would seem to be no ques- 
 tion but that these commodities will in the future 
 be carried to our Atlantic ports and Europe via the 
 canal. It is true that transcontinental freight rates 
 have steadily been decreased, '' but still the western 
 horticulturists are complaining, and it is hard to 
 conceive how railroads across such a continent as 
 ours can possibly compete with an open sea route 
 that would be but little longer. 
 
 Through-freight by rail means, furthermore, a 
 trans-shipment on the eastern sea-board, as far as the 
 European market is concerned. Then at all events, 
 much more can be shipped at once by sea, and at a 
 far lower cost than by land." The refrigerator sys. 
 tem is equally as applicable to steamships as to rail- 
 
 1 In 1 8go California shipped East $82,000,000 worth of products. 98^ 
 went by rail, and only 2 % via the Panama railway and around the Horn. 
 
 " On green fruits the rates have been reduced from $2.50 per 100 pounds 
 in 1873, to $1.25 in 1895. On dried fruits the reduction has been from $2.25 
 per 100 pounds in 1873 to 60 cents in 1895. The rates on wine have fallen 
 off during the same period from I2.00 to 40 cents. 
 
 ' It is estimated that the cost of steamship transportation is to the cost of 
 railroad transportation as one is to five. A 5,000 ton steamer can carry a 
 cargo equal in amount to that borne by 333 cars each carrying 30,000 
 pounds. 
 
540 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 road cars/ and the difference in time, slight as it 
 is, would then cnt but little figure in the decision. 
 Some freight may still have to be rushed through 
 regardless of cost, and this will continue to go by 
 rail, but as a general proposition, I should feel safe 
 in declaring that the canal is destined to divert most 
 of the through-freight from the far West now going 
 by rail. 
 
 But then again the markets for California's pro- 
 ducts are just beginning to be opened up,^ and Avith 
 proper facilities for exportation, there is certainly an 
 enormous future for her export trade. The railroads 
 are doing their best, perhaps, but in spite of the 
 demand for its products, land in some of the richest 
 valleys of the Pacific slope is going begging, and the 
 people of this section are chafing against the restraints 
 that bind their natural trade. 
 
 The distances to Europe and the East are at 
 present too great and the rates too high to make the 
 export trade in California's garden products at pres- 
 ent profitable. An isthmian water-way is, in short, 
 required, to make demand and supply meet ; and with 
 the natural growth of the trade, the railroads will 
 again in the long run not be the losers, inasmuch as the 
 falling off in through-freight will be more than made 
 good, by the increase in the local traffic necessary to 
 bring the products of the Pacific slope to the west- 
 ern sea-board. 
 
 ' A steady temperature of from 36° to 38° Fahr. will preserve fruit indefi- 
 nitely, if kept perfectly dry. 
 
 ^ In 1873 California shipped 2, 896,530 pounds of green fruits to the eastern 
 markets, and in 1893 the amount had grown to 149,040,480 pounds. Here 
 again, however, there has been a falling off of late on account of freight rates. 
 
Economic Aspects. 541 
 
 In regard to this trade of the Pacific slope 
 with Europe and the Atlantic ports of the United 
 States we may therefore conclude : first that the 
 commerce which now proceeds by sea around the 
 Horn, or across the continent by rail, will be di- 
 verted to the canal ; and secondly, that the water- 
 way itself, by breaking through the barriers which 
 now restrain this trade, will be the immediate cause 
 of a far greater development of the rich regions in 
 question than is now possible. 
 
 Thus the Pacific slope likewise has a strong inter- 
 est in the construction of the American water-way. 
 True the Pacific railroads are now bitterly opposed 
 to the project, but one cannot help feeling that this 
 policy of antagonism is extremely short-sighted, for 
 the ultimate results of the canal must redound to 
 their advantage, if historical analogies are in any 
 way to be relied upon. 
 
 n. 
 
 Besides rendering the coasting trade of North 
 America thus continuous, the canal will also make 
 possible a reciprocal coastwise traffic between the 
 east and west shores of the northern continent and 
 the west and east shores of the southern continent.' 
 It is indeed only the isthmus barrier which to-day 
 checks this natural development of the mutual trade 
 relations between the two Americas, and the proba- 
 
 ' The domestic trade of the United States along the Atlantic, Gulf, and 
 Pacific coasts amounts now to about 100,000,000 tonsayear, but only a very 
 small portion of it goes around the Horn. 
 
542 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 ble future of this commerce is therefore well -worthy 
 of our consideration. 
 
 E,eg9,rding the trade between the Pacific ports of 
 North America and the Atlantic ports of South 
 America, we have only to note that it must in the 
 main consist in an interchange of the special raw 
 products of either section, as neither region in ques- 
 tion has as yet reached the industrial stage of devel- 
 opment. The nucleus of such a trade already exists, 
 — being at present accommodated by the isthmus 
 and Horn routes, — and the canal will of course 
 render its further development possible. Nothing 
 definite can, however, be said of the probable future 
 of this commerce. There is undoubtedly a growing 
 demand in South America for the wheat and canned 
 goods of the Pacific slope ; and, on the other hand, 
 the people of California and the Northwest desire 
 the coffee and tropical products of Brazil. There is, 
 therefore, the possibility, at least, of reciprocal rela- 
 tions spiinging up between the two, and the com- 
 merce in question, such as it may be, must naturally 
 be tributary to the canal. 
 
 Very different conditions confront us, however, 
 when we reverse our position and come to consider 
 the possibilities of future commercial intercourse 
 between the Atlantic coast of North America and 
 the Pacific coast of South America. On the one 
 hand, we have a numerous population still upon the 
 extractive and agricultural stages of economic civili- 
 zation, who want the manufactured goods of the 
 industrial states of the Atlantic section, and whose 
 
Economic Aspects. 
 
 543 
 
 own raw produce is in universal demand. On the 
 other hand, we have to do with an industrial peo- 
 ple who have manufactured commodities to offer, 
 and who in turn demand the raw produce of their 
 southern neighbors. The isthmus barrier now cuts 
 these two groups off entirely from any commercial 
 dealings with each other, with the result before 
 mentioned, of making Europe the present distribut- 
 ing centre of the trade in question. 
 
 But the construction of the canal will have a two- 
 fold effect in changing all this. By enormously re- 
 ducing the absolute distance ' between the Atlantic 
 and Gulf ports of the United States and those of 
 South Aniierica's western sea-board, it will, in the first 
 place, greatly facilitate commerce between the two. 
 And then again, it will give these same eastern 
 
 ' TABLE SHOWING DISTANCES SAVED BETWEEN THE AT- 
 LANTIC PORTS OF NORTH AMERICA AND THE PACIFIC 
 PORTS OF SOUTH AMERICA BY THE NICARAGUA CANAL. 
 
 
 Via 
 Cape 
 Horn 
 
 Via. 
 Straits of 
 Magellan 
 
 Via 
 Nicara- 
 gua 
 Canal 
 
 Saving eSected by Canal over 
 
 
 Horn Route 
 
 Straits Route 
 
 Guayaquil— miles . . . 
 Callao " ... 
 Valparaiso " ... 
 
 11,471 
 
 10,689 
 
 9,750 
 
 10,300 
 9,640 
 8,440 
 
 3,227 
 3,744 
 5,014 
 
 8,244 
 
 6,945 
 4,736 
 
 7,073 
 5,896 
 3,426 
 
 New Orleans to 
 
 11,683 
 
 io,goi 
 
 9,962 
 
 10,787 
 
 10,005 
 
 8,805 
 
 2,340 
 2,984 
 4,254 
 
 9,343 
 7,917 
 5,708 
 
 
 Guayaquil — miles . . . 
 Callao " ... 
 Valparaiso " ... 
 
 8,447 
 7,021 
 
 4,551 
 
544 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 sea-poi'ts of our country a comparative advantage of 
 from tvv^o to three thousand miles over those of 
 Europe to the markets in question." Whether or 
 not trade relations v^^ill in the future be established 
 between the eastern ports of North America and 
 the western ports of South America ^vill therefore 
 depend : first, upon the capacity of our manufactur- 
 ing centres to supply these southern countries with 
 the articles they demand ; and secondly, upon their 
 
 ' TABLE OF COMPARATIVE COMPETING DISTANCES FOR 
 
 THE TRADE OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
 WITH THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 
 
 
 Present 
 
 Future 
 
 Liverpool vs. 
 New York* 
 
 No. of 
 miles 
 
 In Favor of 
 
 Due to 
 
 No. of 
 miles 
 
 In Favor of 
 
 Due to 
 
 With Guayaquil. 
 " Calloa.... 
 ' ' Valparaiso 
 
 150 
 150 
 150 
 
 Liverpool 
 Liverpool 
 Liverpool 
 
 Horn 
 
 Route 
 Horn 
 
 Route 
 Horn 
 
 Route 
 
 2,837 
 2,748 
 2,748 
 
 New- 
 York 
 
 New 
 
 York 
 New 
 
 York 
 
 Nicaragua 
 Canal 
 
 Nicaragua 
 Canal 
 
 Nicaragua 
 Canal 
 
 Liverpool vs. 
 New Orleans 
 
 362 
 362 
 362 
 
 Liverpool 
 Liverpool 
 laverpool 
 
 Horn 
 
 Route 
 Horn 
 
 Route 
 Horn 
 
 Route 
 
 3,550 
 3,461 
 3,449 
 
 New 
 
 Orleans 
 New 
 
 Orleans 
 New 
 
 Orleans 
 
 
 With Guayaquil. 
 
 " Callao 
 
 ' ' Valparaiso 
 
 Nicaragua 
 Canal 
 
 Nicaragua 
 Canal 
 
 Nicaragua 
 Canal 
 
 * The Horn route has been taken for the purpose of comparison in this 
 table. By employing the route through the Straits, the eastern ports of the 
 United States now have a very slight advantage over the Atlantic ports of 
 Europe. 
 
Economic Aspects. 545 
 
 ability to compete Avith the manufacturers of 
 Eiirope for this trade. 
 
 The chief articles of export of South America's 
 western coast to the industrial states of the Atlantic 
 section consist in nitrates, guano, cocoa, wool, cotton, 
 copper, silver, and other minerals. Most of these 
 raw products now go to Europe, as we know, and 
 in return therefor the western sea-board states re- 
 ceive from Europe manufactured goods, consisting 
 in clothing, furniture, textiles, machinery, railroad 
 supplies, etc. These countries, at present, only im- 
 port from the United States such commodities as 
 cannot be produced in Europe, and yet we demand 
 their products and must now reimport them from 
 abroad. 
 
 But the producers and manufacturers of our At- 
 lantic and Gulf sections can perfectly well supply 
 these tropical and southern markets with the food- 
 stuffs, coal, oils, clothing, furniture, hardware, and 
 other manufactured goods they demand,' and the only 
 possible check which now restrains this perfectly 
 natural development of trade is the isthmus barrier. 
 
 The eastern coast of North America and the west- 
 ern shores of South America lie practically on the 
 same meridian, and, if continued southeastward, the 
 line of the Mississippi river bed would join this 
 
 ■ The demand in question is to-day for the following articles : Flour, 
 meat, dairy products, provisions, furniture, wooden-ware, carriages, agri- 
 cultural implements, iron and steel (raw and manufactured), oils (petroleum 
 and cotton-seed), coal, soaps, chemicals, drugs, fancy articles, leather (raw 
 and manufactured), paper and stationery, malt liquors and spirits, cotton 
 and woollen goods, gunpowder, arms, and explosives, earthenware, glass- 
 ware, and china, flax, hemp, etc. 
 35 ■ 
 
546 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 meridian near the Atlantic entrance to the canal at 
 but a very slight angle. Given an isthmian water- 
 way, therefore, perfectly direct trade relations could 
 be opened up from both these sections to the markets 
 in question.' 
 
 We not only possess the raw materials demanded 
 in their crude form by these western Spanish-Ameri- 
 can states, but also those to be worked up into the 
 finished products they desire ; and herein we have 
 an advantage over our European competitors. Eu- 
 rope is to-day no better off than we are in the way 
 of the requisite machinery and skill for manufacture, 
 and by the construction of the canal the comparative 
 distance to the market will also be in our favor. To 
 deny that a large portion of this South American 
 trade will ultimately fall into our hands, seems to 
 me, therefore, tantamount to saying that American 
 producers and manufacturers are unable to look 
 after their own interests, and this we know has, 
 thus far at least, not been the case. 
 
 But South America's western ports will not be 
 the only markets opened up in this direction by the 
 construction of the canal. Every year adds to the 
 tonnage of the coasting trade of our Atlantic and 
 Gulf ports with the West Indian islands and the 
 countries bordering on the Caribbean^; and there 
 are, besides, the rich valleys of the Amazon and the 
 
 ' The construction of the proposed Chicago drainage canal would extend 
 these direct trade relations with South America to include the rapidly grow- 
 ing maniifacturing centres about the Lakes. Chicago would thus become a 
 distributing centre for the southern trade as well. 
 
 ' The United States Caribbean trade now amounts to 500,000 tons a year. 
 
Economic Aspects. 547 
 
 Orinoco yet to be developed. From our historical 
 narrative we also know that citizens of the United 
 States are extending their economic interests along 
 Central America's eastern sea-board. Such, then, 
 are the beginnings of our trade with the countries 
 of the Caribbean, and its future is bound to be 
 great. True, it cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded 
 as canal-trade, but nevertheless the water-way will 
 add very considerably to its development, for the 
 canal, as we know, is to pass directly through the 
 centre of the isthmus, and by means of supplemen- 
 tary railroads and canals it will thus be able to 
 attract to it all the export products of the countries 
 on either side. 
 
 Instead of traversing a desert, as does the Suez 
 canal, or passing through. a swamp, as must be the 
 case with Panama, the Nicaraguan water-way will 
 cross a country rich in tropical and subtropical 
 products. Dye-woods and mahoganies on the east, 
 precious metals in the mountains, and throughout 
 the depression in the centre, coffee, cocoa, sugar, 
 cochineal, indigo, rubber, and tropical fruits, — such 
 are some of the raw materials which the canal will 
 open up to our coasting trade. 
 
 The Spanish-Americans of the isthmus even now 
 demand our monopoly products and our manufac- 
 tured goods ; but this will by no means be all ; for 
 the canal itself will encourage colonization, and the 
 foreign settlements on the shore will doubtless be 
 extended along its route and around the lakes. 
 Shipping interests will surely mature, coaling 
 
548 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 depots, docks, and supply stations for the fleets will 
 be built on the shores of the lake, and commercial 
 distributing centres will no doubt be established 
 along the banks of the canal. 
 
 Our Mississippi valley may then supply the coal 
 required for the vessels engaged in the canal trade, 
 and our manufacturers will find a still further market 
 for their products among the increased population of 
 the isthmian lands. With an abundant and steady 
 water-supply stored up in the lakes and flowing over 
 the weirs, manufacturing establishments may also, in 
 the more distant future, find place along the route. 
 
 Captain H. C. Taylor likens these " natural fields 
 of foreign trade for the United States " lying toward 
 the South, to those thatlay before England in the East, 
 and indeed the parallel is apt. The British began to 
 open up these virgin lands beyond the Cape before 
 the Suez canal was built, and the Eastern water-way 
 added enormously to their trade. The people of the 
 United States are now extending their interests 
 toward the South, and the Nicaragua canal will also 
 assure the future development of their commerce in 
 this direction. It was the British manufacturers and 
 merchants who gained most from the East Indian 
 trade, and so too, in the present case, it will be the 
 merchants and manufacturers of the eastern section 
 of our country who will reap the immediate advan- 
 tages from this future commerce with the interior 
 and western coasts of Spanish- America, made possi- 
 ble by the Nicaragua canal. 
 
 In dealing with the question of the canal trade of 
 
Economic Aspects. 549 
 
 the future we have thus far confined our attention 
 entirely to the reciprocal demand and supply of the 
 countries concerned, and calculated com- 
 mercial intercourse accordingly. But the jjicaraRua 
 products in question must be carried across Canal and 
 
 the seas, and each nation must accordinsrly .*^^5"7" 
 1 1 ■ • 1 11 T •' ing Trade, 
 
 nave snips, in order to reach the markets 
 
 thus opened up by the canal. The competition that 
 is sure to arise among the industrial States of 
 the Atlantic section for a share in this canal com- 
 merce, must, therefore, be considerably modified by 
 the element of present preponderance in the carrying 
 trade. 
 
 The British merchant marine to-day far exceeds 
 that of every other nation,* and this should go far 
 toward turning the balance of the future canal trade 
 in England's favor. But as far as Europe itself is 
 concerned, the present disproportion in the carrying 
 trade should in no wise be affected by the cutting of 
 the American water-way, as England will gain abso- 
 lutely and suffer comparatively in like manner with 
 the other European states by the distances saved 
 thereby. It is only between the United States and 
 England, therefore, that the present unfavorable 
 comparison will tell, and in this matter our mer- 
 
 • Fifty-six per cent, of the present carrying trade is now shipped in British 
 bottoms, while American ships are to-day only carrying eleven per cent, of 
 the foreign trade of the world. Great Britain owns more than one-half of 
 all the steamships that ply the oceans ; Germany comes next, but she only 
 owns one-seventh as many as England, France is third, and the United 
 States fourth with but one-twelfth as many steam vessels as their British 
 rival. In the matter of sailing craft our country is second in the list, next to 
 England, but here again we fall nearly two-thirds behind. 
 
550 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 chants, producers, and manufacturers will certainly 
 be at a decided disadvantage. 
 
 It is an old but trustworthy axiom that " trade 
 follows the flag," and if our country is to take ad- 
 vantage of the markets opened up by the canal, 
 then, indeed, we must bestir ourselves in the matter 
 of our merchant marine ; else, in spite of natural 
 advantages and distances in our favor, England will 
 continue to hold the markets. Perhaps it is well, 
 then, that the construction of the canal has been so 
 ' long delayed ; for, as it is, we shall now have time to 
 build our ships and train our men, and thus be pre- 
 pared to take our proper share in the canal trade of 
 the future. 
 
 As Captain Taylor has also pointed out, the Carib- 
 bean is the natural training-ground for this com- 
 merce which is later to stretch out through the 
 canal toward the south and west. We should, 
 therefore, follow England's admirable example and 
 first send out agents to open up the markets in 
 advance, and then build ships and follow them 
 with our products. We have at least a decade 
 ahead of us before the canal can be built, and the 
 time would indeed be well spent in extending our 
 commercial interests along the shores of the Carib- 
 bean and among the West Indian islands. With our 
 ships built and our merchants and manufacturers 
 prepared, we would then be equipped to push on 
 through the canal and take part in the larger compe- 
 tition that is to be developed beyond the isthmus iu 
 the Pacific. 
 
Economic Aspects. 551 
 
 What has thus far only come out in passing may 
 now be stated as a fact, namely : that the United 
 States, above all other nations, will be bene- § lys. 
 
 fitted by the construction of the isthmian What the 
 
 1 ' Nicaragua 
 
 ^^^^^- _ Canal will 
 
 Geographically the position of our coun- do for the 
 try is, indeed, unique, situated as it is, ^°™^f^t^e 
 midway between the continents and front- united 
 ing on either sea ; but historically we have states, 
 thus far failed to make good our natural advantages. 
 The difficulty lies, however, not at all in a lack of 
 ability to develop our own resources, but simply and 
 solely in the obstacles which to-day confront our 
 sea-borne commerce. 
 
 Since our manufacturing centres are situated in 
 the eastern districts of our country, the only present 
 markets for our finished products lie in the Atlantic 
 section of the globe, and we are thus thrown directly 
 into competition with the industrial states of the Old 
 World. Europe, moreover, presents little demand 
 for these manufactured products of ours, as she her- 
 self produces the self-same commodities. Eastern 
 South America offers, it is true, a more promising 
 field for this trade, but the northern sea- board is still 
 undeveloped, and from Cape St. Roque to the south 
 Europe has the advantage over us in distance. Thus 
 only the countries bordering on the Caribbean re- 
 main, and it is in this direction accordingly that the 
 commerce of our Atlantic and Gulf sections and the 
 Mississippi valley is now beginning to turn. 
 
 Conversely, the districts of our country which are 
 
552 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 richest in raw materials front upon the Pacific, and 
 in this section of the globe there is little or no de- 
 mand for these products. The markets for the 
 produce of the Pacific slope all lie in the Atlantic 
 section, and from these it is practically precluded 
 by the inadequacy of the present facilities of trans- 
 portation. 
 
 In short, what we manufacture within our At- 
 lantic section is required on the Pacific ; and what 
 we grow on our Pacific section is demanded on the 
 Atlantic. Or what amounts to the same thing, in 
 the Pacific section there is no market for the pro- 
 ducts of the far West ; and in the Atlantic section 
 there is but a limited opportunity to dispose of the 
 finished commodities of our eastern sea-board. 
 
 Under normal conditions, however, our trade re- 
 lations should extend in both directions and across 
 both seas, our manufactured products proceeding 
 from the east toward the south and west, and our 
 raw materials going from the west toward the east. 
 But this of course will only be possible after the 
 isthmus barrier has been broken through. 
 
 The Pacific slope even now sends many of its pro- 
 ducts to the Atlantic, and the advantages that the 
 Nicaragua canal will accord to the further develop- 
 ment of this trade are, in consequence, pretty gener- 
 ally recognized. But the benefits that will also 
 accrue to the eastern sections of our country by the 
 construction of the isthmus water-way seem still to 
 be but imperfectly understood. And the reason for 
 this is that we have thus far been, as it were, back- 
 
Economic Aspects. o53 
 
 ing our way toward the Pacific with our eyes still 
 turned toward the Atlantic. Historical tradition 
 has, indeed, fixed our gaze in this direction, and it 
 appears to be difficult for us to appreciate that, in 
 the natural order of things, our primary advance must 
 still be toward the West, and that our future trade 
 relations with Europe must rather constitute the 
 under-tow movement of our commerce toward the 
 East. 
 
 In the early colonial days, America was looked 
 upon simply as a source of supply for Europe, and 
 the inherited instincts of this Mercantile tradition 
 still cling to us to-day. Most of our products pro- 
 ceed from oui- Atlantic ports to Europe, and our 
 South and West still act as feeders to our East. 
 But such will not long continue to be the case. In 
 backing out farther and farther toward the West, 
 Europe and the Atlantic have necessarily grown 
 smaller in our eyes as the distance has increased. 
 And now we are on the point of facing about at 
 last to take a look at the Pacific stretching out at 
 our feet. In the immediate foreground we will see 
 an immense undeveloped field stretching out before 
 us toward the north and south ; and, on beyond 
 across the sea, we will not6 the advance of the 
 under current of European commerce sweeping out 
 toward the East. The ocean invites our ships and 
 the horizon is alluring in every direction. Our 
 merchants and manufacturers are already equipped, 
 moreover, to embark on this trade ; but they are 
 still hemmed in by the isthmus. For the Mississippi 
 
554 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 valley our Gulf and Atlantic sections, the Nicaragua 
 canal will thus open up the markets of South Amer- 
 ica's western sea-board, the Pacific islands and the 
 countries of the far East. Such then will be the 
 immense service that the water-way will perform for 
 America's westerly advance. 
 
 But, on the other hand, the easterly under-current 
 of our commerce setting in toward the Atlantic sec- 
 tion will likewise pass through the canal. Thus the 
 far West and the Pacific slope will also be provided 
 with an adequate outlet for their produce, and the 
 water-way will accordingly redound to their advan- 
 tage as well. All sections of our country will thus 
 be benefited by the construction of the Nicaragua 
 canal, and all should therefore join hands at last in 
 providing for its speedy completion. 
 
 And, indeed, this final function of Western eco- 
 nomic civilization, in according to the commerce of 
 the world that rotary motion it has so long been 
 striving for, has naturally enough fallen to oiir lot. 
 The Europeans have already provided a channel for 
 the under-current of their commerce towards the 
 East, and its waters now wash the shores of India, 
 Malaysia, Australia, and Southeast Asia ; but further 
 than this the back-draft of Europe's trade cannot 
 possibly extend. Further impulse must now come 
 from the West. The last great wave of Aryan 
 migration landed Europeans upon the shores of 
 America, but the tide of westward advance has been 
 flowing in ever since, and now another breaker is 
 rising to its crest. This time it is the Americans 
 
Economic Aspects. 555 
 
 themselves who are being borne on, and the dykes 
 that nature has raised in the West will no more be 
 able to hold back the tide, than were those she built 
 in the East strong enough to check its under-current. 
 
 The earth is a sphere, and the commerce of the 
 world is bound to move along its parallels. As the 
 Atlantic was the sea of the fifteenth century, so is the 
 Pacific destined to be the ocean of "the twentieth. 
 What the Suez canal has already dofie for the eco- 
 nomic development of the Eastern Hemisphere by 
 breaking down the barrier between the seas ; such 
 is the function that the Nicaragua canal has to 
 render to the future growth of the western half of 
 the world by joining the two oceans. 
 
 Toward the West and in the East Europe has 
 performed her part and played it well. It is Amer- 
 ica's turn now, and the nation is coming at last to 
 realize its destiny. Europe, Asia, and America — 
 these are the three mighty forces which are soon to 
 meet in the Pacific, there to begin anew the great 
 struggle for commercial supremacy. 
 
CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 raOua 
 
 3- 
 
 THE NICARAOUA CANAL AND THE MONROE 
 DOCTRINE. 
 
 IF it be true that the complete development of 
 America depends jj^s so largely upon the con- 
 struction of an interoceanic canal, and if, as 
 the Monroe doctrine, maintains, the continent is 
 really tb be reserved for the exclusive enjoyment of 
 its present inhabitants, it would seem then 
 Contest to follow quite naturally that the political 
 , pver the conl^'ol of the transit- route should be left 
 'in the hands of the United States, since 
 th^y have assumed ^ae, responsibility of guiding 
 America's growth and establishing her power. . But 
 the logic of this conclusion will probably not be 
 accepted beyond the shores of this continent, as the 
 still unffecognized Moni'oe docti'ine forms the minor 
 premise of the syllogism. We may, therefore, still 
 expect the inhabitants of the Old World to take 
 exception to this final proposition and to deny that 
 it follows necessarily from what has preceded. Be- 
 fore drawing our final conclusions, let us, therefore, 
 argue our Monroe doctrine case more fully and test 
 our conclusions with the analogies of experience. 
 It will probably be admitted as a fundamental 
 
 556 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 557 
 
 proposition that struggle in one form or another is 
 the ultimate principle of life, and that it is only 
 through ceaseless competition that the materially 
 fittest are able to survive on earth. But contest in 
 turn generally results in combination among sur- 
 viving units of equal strength, in order that further 
 struggle with stronger competitors may be possible 
 vpithin an extended environment. Thus competition 
 and co-operation both enter into the general scheme 
 of life and follow each other in the relation of 
 reciprocal cause and efEect as larger and larger units 
 are evolved. 
 
 Our far-distant ancestors, — or ape-like progenitors, 
 if you will, — may, indeed, have lived peaceably 
 enough among themselves in detached polygamic 
 hordes so long as they continued to subsist on the 
 natural fruits of the earth, and while there was still 
 enough to go ai'ound. But difficulties arose among 
 them when their numbers began to increase, and re- 
 productive capital, in the way of slaves, cattle, and 
 land, came to be regarded in the light of wealth. 
 Hordes then showed a tendency to unite into mili- 
 tary bands for the defense of their hunting grounds, 
 and struggle ensued for the possession of set portions 
 of the earth. With capital in cattle, the patriarchal 
 family was evolved, and the descendants then clung 
 close together in clans for the protection of their 
 flocks. When agriculture was taken up, these 
 nomad cla,ns settled down on the land and united 
 into tribes for the cultivation and defense of their 
 territory. But as numbers continued to increase. 
 
558 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 migration and further contest were essential, in 
 order tliat succeeding generations of the fittest 
 might survive. 
 
 The first peninsula of Europe vpas occupied in 
 this way, and from the early Homeric tribes there 
 grew the Grecian city-states. But with all its 
 vaunted civilization, the history of Greece is one 
 long record of internal dissension and external con- 
 test ; and, in this case, combination only came after 
 the units had worn themselves out in their ceaseless 
 struggle for individual supremacy. But the monop- 
 oly of the peninsula was finally effected from the 
 North, and, thereupon, a fresh contest was inaugu- 
 rated with the larger units of the East for still more 
 land. 
 
 Roman civilization, too, began in precisely the 
 same way, and pursued an almost identical course. 
 Rome's success was greater, however, for by contest 
 and combination she came in the end to control 
 pretty much all the then known world. 
 
 Upon the collapse of the Empire, western civiliza- 
 tion became disintegrated again, and the Feudal 
 period was thus marked by a struggle among smaller 
 units for the possession of land. But the forces of 
 monopoly ultimately prevailed once more, and a 
 union of fiefs was the result. Owing to the peculiar 
 topography of Europe and the effect of the same 
 upon the ethnic growth of her inhabitants, the conti- 
 nent was, however, never made politically one ; but, 
 instead, each peninsula came in the end to contain a 
 compact nation, ruled over by an independent, abso- 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 559 
 
 lute monarch. As miglit have been expected, com- 
 petition then broke loose among the nations them- 
 selves ; but, by reason of- near equality of strength 
 and on account of the possibility of alliances, little 
 territorial change was effected by these purely inter- 
 national struggles. The boundaries of the European 
 states thus remain about the same to-day, though the 
 element of conflict is still rife in their midst, with 
 armed neutrality as the only guaranty of peace. 
 
 But Europe's geographic unities are small, and the 
 nations inhabiting them, not being able to expand 
 beyond their own respective borders, soon began to 
 feel themselves cramped for room. Continued growth 
 being essential to their life, an advance was accord- 
 ingly begun against the weaker continents of the 
 world. 
 
 With Europe as its centre of disturbance, this 
 latest aggressive movement proceeded in both direc- 
 tions toward the east and toward the west. Russia, 
 being fortunate enough to have an open road 
 through Siberia, was consequently enabled to reach 
 the Pacific by land. But the maritime nations of 
 Europe were obliged to advance by sea, and a course 
 in either direction lay before them. As a result, 
 southeast Asia and its littoral islands were seized 
 upon by these maritime powers of the West, the 
 shores of Africa were occupied, and America too was 
 parcelled out among the rivals. 
 
 But this very advance toward the east and the 
 west was bound in turn to engender still another 
 struggle among the European states for the posses- 
 
560 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 sion of the continents they had thus occupied, and 
 for the control of the trade routes thither. The 
 native populations of Asia, Africa, and America 
 were first reduced to subjection by their Western 
 masters, and then, as the colonies of each nation were 
 extended, competition broke out among the exploit- 
 ers themselves for the largest share in the spoils. 
 Elimination of the weaker powers and combination 
 among the stronger have again been the inevitable re- 
 sult, until, in our day, this final contest over the 
 continents and their approaches promises to be a 
 battle royal among the giants. 
 
 At the terminus of the easterly trade routes 
 Russia and England are at present battling for 
 supremacy in Asia, and France is supporting the 
 Muscovite in the struggle. But in between the 
 European rivals, little Japan is now bravely forcing 
 her way to the front ; and thus, despite these long 
 centuries of Western exploitation of the East, an 
 Asiatic power may, after all, have to be reckoned 
 with in the final adjustment of affairs. 
 
 In Africa there are two distinct contests being 
 waged, and all the states of Europe are jealously 
 watching the final partition of the coming continent. 
 Below the desert of Sahara, and along the course of 
 the natural easterly route. Teutons and Anglo-Sax- 
 ons are at odds over Central and South African 
 affairs ; while in the north, along the line of the 
 artificial easterly route, the English once more come 
 into confi^ict with the Franco-Russian alliance con- 
 cerning the Egyptian question. 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 561 
 
 On the west the American continent constituted 
 still another battle-ground for the competing powers 
 of Europe, and for many years the main issue here 
 turned upon the discovery and monopoly of the 
 westerly route to the Indies. In the early days, 
 England, France, Spain, Portugal, and Holland, all 
 took an active part in this struggle for supremacy in 
 the New World ; but the severity of the competition 
 thus engendered finally resulted in the practical 
 elimination from the controversy of all the European 
 states, save England. Having finally humbled her 
 Old World adversaries Great Britain was still not 
 given free hand in the management of the affairs of 
 the continent however ; for in the very midst of the 
 contest an American nation was born in the north, 
 which from its earliest infancy signified its intention 
 to enter into the fray, and very soon demonstrated 
 its inherited ability to do so. 
 
 At the very first blow this youthful but self- 
 assertive young nation established" its own independ- 
 ence from the motherland, and England thereby lost 
 one-half of her North American possessions. The 
 spirit of successful autonomy then spi-ead south 
 through Spanish- America as well, and Great Britain 
 soon found her farther advance towards the west 
 blocked by a line of independent Americas, mar- 
 shalled and led by the United States. 
 
 A new issue was thereupon drawn. Great Britain, 
 on the one hand, " considered the whole of the un- 
 occupied parts of America as being open to her 
 future settlements in like manner as heretofore"; 
 36 
 
562 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 but the United States, on the other hand, declared, 
 that "the American continents, by the free and 
 independent condition which they have assumed and 
 maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as sub- 
 jects for future colonization by any European power." 
 Thus the American continent was destined to become 
 the scene of still another contest, and the battle for 
 supremacy on this side of the globe was henceforth 
 to be waged between the acknowledged leader of the 
 Old World and the would-be champion of the New. 
 
 And as the new rivals continued their advance 
 toward the west, the interoceanic trade routes soon 
 became involved in this later dispute as well. Thus 
 the modern contest over the American continent has 
 likewise, in its turn engendered a controversy over 
 the control of the western gateways to the Pacific. 
 A number of skirmishes have already occurred be- 
 tween the rivals, several compromises have been 
 effected, but as yet no final decision has been 
 reached. 
 
 If then we have rightly accounted for the facts as 
 they appear, it would seem as if a vital struggle 
 g were brewing for supremacy in each of the 
 
 Great three partially developed continents of the 
 Britain's world, Asia, Africa, and America ; and in- 
 the East- asmuch as Asia and Africa lie to the east 
 eriy Trade of Europe and America on the west, the 
 several contests over the continents in ques- 
 tion group themselves accordingly along the courses 
 of the easterly and westerly trade-routes. And fol- 
 lowing the line of this geographical division there 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 563 
 
 runs an essential political distinction aa well. Great 
 Britain, as we have seen, is a party to each and every 
 dispute, but her opponents are differentiated accord- 
 ing to the direction of her advance. To the east, 
 that is, England's chief competitors are the European 
 states; while on the west she has only American 
 nations to contend with. 
 
 And what is still more pertinent to the subject in 
 hand, these contests over the continents on either 
 side of the globe have, in each event, generated a 
 further struggle among the self -same competitors for 
 the control of the highways thither. Thus far in 
 the controversy, moreover, the control of the trade- 
 routes has in each case gone hand in hand with 
 supremacy on the continents; and to-day serious 
 rivalry only exists among such of the nations as 
 have been wise enough thus to connect their distant 
 colonies with their political bases. 
 
 Grreat Britain's imperial ascendency on either side 
 of the globe may, indeed, be said to be directly due 
 to such foresight. And in order the more fully to 
 comprehend the significance of her present position 
 in the West, it may be well, therefore, to summarize 
 the results of the self-same policy as more fully 
 elaborated along the line of the easterly routes. As 
 an analogy, at least, the digression is apposite, and it 
 may serve also as a useful criterion wherewith to 
 estimate the strength of Great Britain's position on 
 the other side of the globe. 
 
 To put it briefly : England's advance towards the 
 east has been marked by an extension of her com- 
 
564 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 merce, on the one hand, and by an expansion of her 
 dominion on the other. G-reat commercial com- 
 panies, armed but only indirectly responsible to the 
 governn;ent, led the way ; and after matters had 
 been brought to a crisis in this manner, the Home 
 authorities in every case stepped in and planted a 
 regular British colony. The advance post thus 
 gained was in each event armed against internal 
 revolution, and fortified against external attack ; 
 and in this way Great Britain's present control of 
 both the easterly sea-routes has been secured. 
 
 Along the course of the natural easterly route, 
 which skirts the shores of Africa, her political 
 power is practically paramount. The southern ex- 
 tremity of the continent constitutes an English 
 colony, British dependencies and protectorates dot 
 the coasts, stretching out to the north on either side, 
 and littoral islands belonging to the Crown mark 
 the course of vessels sailing from Europe by this 
 longer route around the Cape. Thus, in spite of the 
 fact that the Teutonic nations of Europe are now 
 taking the part of their South- African kinsmen in 
 an attempt to break down this British monopoly, 
 England, with her present control of the sea-route 
 thither and by means of her magnificent navy, is still 
 in a position to maintain her supremacy. 
 
 The artificial easterly route leads along the north- 
 ern shores of Africa and the southern shores of 
 Asia, to the far East ; and Grreat Britain is here 
 opposed, every inch of the way, by the Franco-Rus- 
 sian alliance. But her foresight and energy have 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 565 
 
 been equal to this occasion as well, and the entire 
 route is now practically under her control. Gibraltar 
 guards the entrance to the Mediterranean, and from 
 this point Malta and Cyprus mark the way to the 
 terminus of the Suez Canal. The water-way itself 
 practically belongs to England and the nominally 
 neutral country through which it passes is still 
 occupied by British troops. By a recent diplomatic 
 agreement the canal itself has been neutralized, to 
 be sure ; but not so its continuation, the Red Sea ; 
 and the only outlet from the latter is again blocked 
 by British protectorates and their dependent strate- 
 gic islands. France objects to these arrangements, 
 and with the support of Russia she has of late be- 
 gun to emphasize her demands more emphatically ; 
 but here again Great Britain's actual possession of 
 the situation renders diplomatic protests on the part 
 of her rivals of but little avail. 
 
 The islands of the Indian ocean, on beyond where 
 the natural and artificial routes unite, are for the 
 most part English possessions ; the Indian peninsula 
 with Ceylon and Burmah form part of the British 
 Empire ; and the Straits Settlements, still farther 
 on, guard the outlet to the Pacific through the 
 straits of Malacca. The possession of Hong Kong 
 and her administrative control of the Chinese cus- 
 toms have advanced Great Britain's power to the 
 north, along the shores of Asia ; North Borneo gives 
 her a word to say in the affairs of Central Oceanica, 
 and her title to Australia and New Zealand insures 
 her dominion in the southeast. 
 
566 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Thus the other maritime states of Europe which 
 had also to proceed by sea have long since been dis- 
 tanced in the race, and in spite of modern hostile 
 alliances, England is still able to hold her own 
 against them. But Russia, being uninterrupted by 
 European rivals in her advance toward the east, 
 was able to add all Siberia to her domain, and her 
 own military road to the Pacific is now nearirig 
 completion. Thus with a land route under her ex- 
 clusive control and an unbroken line of connections 
 along the way, Russia has become England's real 
 rival in the far East. The weaker European states 
 are consequently hastening now to take Russia's side 
 in the imminent Asiatic controversy, and England, in 
 the meantime, is seeking to strengthen her line of 
 sea connections, in order . to be prepared for the 
 inevitable antagonism. 
 
 Great Britain's advance in the opposite direction 
 towards the Pacific has also been characterized in the 
 
 same way by a skilful combination of 
 Britain's militarism and industrialism, and here, 
 Present Po- too, she has been wise enough to leave 
 the"west ^^ undefended point behind her along the 
 
 course of the westerly routes. To this 
 end, the Bermudas in the central Atlantic were early 
 occupied and are still held. And after a severe 
 contest, having established her prestige in the North 
 American continent, England's next efforts were 
 directed toward securing her position in the West 
 Indies-, with the further intention, as we know, of 
 forcing her way across the isthmus to the Pacific. 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 567 
 
 This last attempt mischanced, however, and at this 
 juncture the United States took upon themselves 
 the burden of the contest which the powers of Eu- 
 rope had, up to this, been waging so desperately but 
 with ever-lessening success. 
 
 England's supremacy in the New World was, in- 
 deed, curtailed, for the time, but by no means cut 
 short, by the loss of her North American colonies. 
 In order to redeem her prestige, a careful plan was 
 soon after matured for the fortification of the eastern 
 and western coasts of Canada, and a military road 
 has since been constructed to connect the two. Then, 
 with a view toward completing at least one circle of 
 connections around the globe, subsidized transport 
 lines were also established across both the Atlantic 
 and the Pacific oceans, uniting Great Britain's North 
 American possessions with the Home country on the 
 one hand, and with her Eastern colonies on the 
 other. 
 
 A second attempt to establish another chain of 
 connections farther south across the isthmus again 
 proved unsuccessful, it is true ; but even in this di- 
 rection England's present strategical position is by 
 no means to be despised. From British Honduras 
 in the north to British Guiana in the south, insular 
 possessions of the Crown still enclose the Caribbean ; 
 and, though the transit-way to the Pacific has not 
 yet been secured. Great Britain has at least been able 
 to keep it clear, thus far, from the grasp of her 
 competitors. And, finally, it must also be borne in 
 mind, that the Falkland islands in the far south, still 
 
568 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 guard the entrance to the straits of Magellan, and 
 thus reserve to England her desired control of the 
 natural westerly route. 
 
 Thus with a persistence worthy of really enthusi- 
 astic admiration, England has extended her imperial 
 system toward the west even to the Pacific ; and 
 now it is her evident intention to firmly join these 
 outposts of her westerly advance with her already 
 well-established colonial bases in the East. Great 
 Britain's imperial ambition is thus ultimately to en- 
 circle the globe with her political and commercial 
 connections along the courses of the easterly and 
 westerly trade-routes. But on the east her designs 
 are opposed by Russia, while on the west the 
 United States dispute her further advance. Con- 
 flict is consequently imminent in either direction, 
 and the outcome of this twofold controversy cannot 
 yet be foretold. 
 
 Aristotle and Rousseau were no doubt right ; it is 
 the small self-supporting states which are the hap- 
 g 183 The P^^^*- -^"* *^i^) after all, amounts to lit- 
 Controversy tie more than the common saying that 
 over the Ca- children are freer from care than grown- 
 up folks. Whether for happiness or for 
 misfortune, individuals are nevertheless bound to 
 mature, and just so must nations with vitality neces- 
 sarily expand. And the imperial instinct is, more- 
 over, very apt to seize hold of every state when it 
 reaches maturity, even as the desire to do battle with 
 the world usually fastens itself upon the youth upon 
 attaining his majority. Little Holland was as am- 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 569 
 
 bitious as the other powers of Europe for colonial 
 aggrandizement, and, of late, still younger Belgium 
 has been reaching out toward Africa, Switzer- 
 land is, indeed, an example of a country that has 
 avoided the imperial fever ; but then, as we all know, 
 mountains are grand preventives of disease. Thus 
 in our day there are nations which have been forced 
 out of the struggle by their competitors, and some 
 few again which have never made the attempt ; but 
 all these, as a recent writer has put it, "are negligi- 
 ble quantities. They are domesticated species, liv- 
 ing by the grace of their neighbors under artificial 
 conditions." 
 
 And the United States, too, might have become 
 thus domesticated, and so continued to fulfil the 
 Aristotelian ideal of a happy state, had they only 
 been content to remain the original thirteen colonies, 
 clustered along the eastern sea-board of the North 
 American continent. But the mountains behind 
 them were low, and tempting passes led to a land of 
 further promise beyond. The Mississippi valley 
 proved as attractive as it had appeared, and ere long 
 the American nation was spread out along the left 
 banks of the stream. But with further territory the 
 land-hunger of the Americans only increased, and 
 they soon came to grow greedy for Louisiana, stretch- 
 ing out still farther beyond. Jefferson accordingly 
 made the bargain, and Napoleon, the party of .the 
 second part, is said to have remarked, prophetically : 
 " I have now given England a maritime rival that 
 will sooner or later humble her pride." 
 
570 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 It was thus the purchase of Louisiana which really 
 cast the die of our destiny in the New World. 
 With the Valley and the Gulf in our possession, iso- 
 lation was henceforth to be out of the question. 
 The Pacific was now our only natural frontier on the 
 west, and we were bound to become an interoceanic 
 power. 
 
 The direction of our territorial advance was thus 
 far along the line of least resistance, that is to say, 
 directly toward the west, overland ; but having 
 in this way become a power on the Gulf, through 
 the purchase of Louisiana, we then found our 
 eastern coast-line disjointed by the interposition of 
 the peninsula of Florida. A brief struggle with 
 Spain was all that was necessary to remedy this first 
 defect, it is true ; but by continuing to extend our 
 dominion in the same direction, the acquisition of 
 California, which followed soon after, again placed 
 us in an awkward strategical predicament ; for our 
 entire western sea-board was now isolated. If con- 
 tinued but a short distance toward the south, ho\i\r. 
 ever, the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Pacific coast 
 lines of the United States would all three intersect 
 on the nari'ow isthmus. Thus the political control 
 of the transit-way would easily have obviated this 
 second difficulty as well ; but in endeavoring to 
 round out our southern frontier in this direction, 
 we -found ourselves opposed by the machinations of 
 our British rival, and our own attempt to secure the 
 canal route likewise mischanced. 
 
 Thus the United States had also to content them- 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 571 
 
 selves for the time with the institution of transcon- 
 tinental railway connections ; but, having possessions 
 on the Pacific, they were bound to defend them, and 
 for this purpose their naval forces had henceforth to 
 be divided and their coast defences developed dis- 
 connectedly. So long as the intervening country 
 remained unsettled, there was, however, little thought 
 of the necessity of further contest in the matter ; but 
 with' the development of the West and the conse- 
 quent disappearance of the frontier, the ideas of the 
 American people are rapidly reverting to militarism 
 again. The truth is, their democratic institutions 
 cannot tolerate crowded conditions. More room is 
 already being demanded, and fresh territory cannot 
 well be secured without another struggle. Canada 
 blocks the way on the north, and to the south the 
 people are held in check by treaty obligations with 
 a friendly state. America's littoral islands have 
 thus come to be regarded with envy, and the annex- 
 ation of Cuba and Hawaii is already a matter of 
 serious consideration in the United States. 
 
 But in both cases the Americans will again find 
 themselves confronted by British imperial designs, 
 and whether their expansion be thus toward the east 
 or toward the west, or in both directions, it is per- 
 fectly evident that the control of the sea-route 
 thither and thence across the isthmus will in any 
 event once more become a matter of serious dispute 
 between the rivals. 
 
 Were Cuba to be annexed to the United States, 
 Great Britain's ascendency in the West Indies would 
 
572 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 be endangered, and, in order to preserve the balance 
 of Caribbean power, she would naturally put forth 
 every effort to keep the transit-route free from the 
 domination of her competitor. Should the United 
 States, on the other hand, consent to come to terms 
 with the present Hawaian republic, the isolation of 
 their western possessions would be still more pro- 
 nounced, unless the isthmus canal were constructed 
 and placed under their control. But England, as 
 we have already learned, is striving to make the 
 central Pacific the meeting ground of her own east- 
 ern and western advance, and she will accordingly 
 brook no political rivalry there if it can possibly be 
 avoided. 
 
 Thus even as Great Britain's earlier struggle with 
 the European states for supremacy in the New World 
 led her into a controversy with Spain for the posses- 
 sion of the isthmus, so the more modern contest over 
 the American continent between England and the 
 United States has already involved the question of 
 isthmus transit within the toils of its political and 
 economic complexities, and the present situation 
 affords but little hope of an immediate solution of 
 the difficulty. But in spite of the serious condition 
 of affairs, there are many who are sanguine enough 
 to believe that further struggle between the Anglo- 
 American rivals is to be avoided ; and because for- 
 sooth " blood is thicker than water " ! When judged 
 from the evolutionary standpoint, however, this 
 analogy is ill-chosen. For if we should go still far- 
 ther back to the life of plants and animals, we would 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 573 
 
 find the struggle for existence to be, in fact, most 
 severe among just sucli similar species when each is 
 expanding rapidly. Or as a Biologist, writing for 
 the Saturday Review, has recently put it : " Crea- 
 tures of the forest have no quarrel with those that 
 haunt the sea-shore, until they have tried issue with 
 all other forest creatures. Insect-eaters will not 
 struggle for fruits until they have beaten ofp all 
 other insect-eaters. . . . Casual encounters may 
 occur wherever creatures with offensive weapons 
 come together ; vital struggles only where the 
 growth of one species forces it against another." 
 And if we have read aright the history of the con- 
 flict of men upon earth, the conclusions of biology 
 must be taken to be those of sociology as well. Can 
 it be possible then that the laws of social evolution 
 are to be so modified in this American environment 
 as to eliminate this cardinal element of conflict ? It 
 certainly would not seem so, if we may judge from 
 our own short history ; and a heavy burden of 
 proof thus rests with those who would draw any 
 such conclusions from an old proverb of doubtful 
 origin. 
 
 On the contrary, England and the United States, 
 similar social species, — blood relations, if you will, — 
 are both expanding rapidly in America, and inas- 
 much as the productive area necessary for the future 
 support of each is strictly limited, it would seem in- 
 deed as if a vital struggle for supremacy in the West 
 were inevitable, unless one of the two contestants 
 were voluntarily to retire from the contest. Blood 
 
574 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 may indeed be thicker than water, Jbut blood is not 
 thicker than land ; and it has thus far been a ques- 
 tion of territory rather than a matter of personal 
 animosity which has separated the Americans from 
 their kindred across the sea. Those then who would 
 belittle the inevitable antagonism by smoothing over 
 the real issue with fine phrases wofully misin- 
 terpret the persistence of British imperial ambition 
 and sadly underestimate the vitality of American 
 civilization. Great Britain, in short, appears to be 
 bent upon fulfilling her imperial mission in the 
 world, and the United States are bound to grow; 
 and each of the two powers has a national policy in 
 accordance with its aims. As far as this continent is 
 concerned, England's purposes are, therefore, very 
 similar to those of the United States ; and further 
 expansion in this direction on the part of either will 
 in all probability lead to further conflict between 
 the two. 
 
 Just now, indeed, there are several points of fric- 
 tion between the competitors, at any one of which a 
 quarrel is only too apt to be generated. Bat if our 
 history of the past and our analysis of the present 
 are to be trusted, it would seem as if the future rela- 
 tions between the rivals really hinged upon the isth- 
 mus gateway to the Pacific. To-day the question 
 here turns upon the bearings on an antiquated com- 
 promise, but year by year the tension is becoming 
 more severe, and before the interoceanic canal is 
 constructed some more stable adjustment will have 
 to be effected, if, as the diplomatists now tell us, the 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 575 
 
 present amicable relations between the two powers 
 are to be preserved. 
 
 But it is difficult to conceive how this controversy 
 over the control of the transit-route can be perma- 
 nently settled before the broader contest g^g 
 over the American continent is decided ; Neutraiiza- 
 for the smaller issue is in reality but an in- '^'°°' •"■ 
 
 J 1 (■ 1 1 1 IT American 
 
 tegral part or the larger, and upon the de- control of 
 cision of either one would seem to hang the the Tran- 
 solution of the other. The narrower is ^' "^^^ 
 quite naturally the more definite question of the 
 two, however ; and here, as we know, the issue has 
 already been drawn. Pending the promised adjust- 
 ment, we may, therefore, be allowed to analyze the 
 transit problem more closely in the hopes of deter- 
 mining its real bearings upon the broader issue 
 involved. 
 
 Great Britain, on the one hand, thinks the canal 
 route should be neutralized among the powers of 
 Europe and America; and rather speciously refers 
 to Suez for her precedent. On the face of it, this 
 claim would seem somewhat too inclusive ; but, be- 
 fore questioning the appositeness of the analogy, let 
 us first test the accuracy of the reference. 
 
 By reason of its geographical position, the Suez 
 canal, should, indeed, favor ail the maritime states of 
 Europe about equally, and accord special advantages 
 to none. But, despite the theoretical neutralization 
 of the water-way, this is quite out of the question so 
 long as the British continue to own the canal, occupy 
 Egypt, and dominate the easterly route. It would 
 
576 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 accordingly appear as thougli this agreement of neu- 
 tralization were, after all, but a plausible diplomatic 
 form, under cover of which Great Britain is still able 
 to maintain her superiority over her maritime rivals. 
 The adjustment, such as it is, has, moreover, only 
 lately been effected, and the paper agreement has 
 not yet stood the test of a European war. Besides 
 being one-sided in its nature, the present arrange- 
 ment is, consequently, of too recent a date to be 
 cited as an adequate historical precedent. But from 
 the point of view of accuracy, by all means the most 
 important objection to the reference is the fact that 
 Russia, England's most powerful opponent along the 
 course of ths easterly route, is no party to this con- 
 tract of neutralization. Considering the present 
 status of the Eastern question the omission is cer- 
 tainly most significant ; for Germany has no present 
 interest in the control of the canal, France would 
 undoubtedly follow Russia if a dispute were to arise, 
 and all the rest of the signatory powers to the con- 
 vention, save England, are negligible factors in the 
 problem. Thus, under the circumstances it would 
 hardly be safe, even on a point of accuracy, to draw 
 any deductions from Suez in favor of a like neutrali- 
 zation of the westerly water-way, however plausible 
 the reference may at first sight appear. 
 
 But in reality the two cases are quite distinct, 
 both geographically and politically ; and, if analogies 
 are insisted upon, the international terms employed 
 should at least be reduced to a common denomi- 
 nator. 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 577 
 
 The Suez canal is distinctly the European gateway 
 to the Pacific section, and in matters pertaining to 
 this easterly water-way we Americans can conse- 
 quently have no possible concern, as our political 
 and economic interests do not properly lie in this 
 direction. It is accordingly a matter of comparative 
 indifference to us whether the Suez canaf'be neu- 
 tralized among the powers of Europe or exclusively 
 controlled by any one. In much the same way will 
 the isthmus canal, when constructed, constitute the 
 American gateway to the Pacific, and in so far at 
 least as their economic future is concerned, the 
 European states, conversely, can have but a second- 
 ary interest in the affairs of this westerly water-way. 
 Their present trade with Asia and Africa will, in 
 short, remain totally unaffected thereby, and practi- 
 cally their only employment of the canal will there- 
 fore be in reaching the western shores of America 
 and the neighboring Pacific islands. But if our 
 analysis of the economic situation has been correct, 
 the very existence of an isthmus water-way will, in 
 itself, tend to divert the bulk of this commerce into 
 American hands, by reason of comparative distances 
 saved ; and the natural geographic distinction be- 
 tween the easterly and westerly routes will thus 
 eventually become the more marked. 
 
 It would seem then, logically, as though the powers 
 of Europe might also allow the New World repub- 
 lics to make such arrangements as they chose for the 
 control of the isthmus water-way, even as the states 
 of America decline to interfere in any way with the 
 
578 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 present inter-European neutralization of the Suez 
 canal. But the logic of geography is not yet that of 
 history, and the moment we take political considera- 
 tions into account we are confronted with a con- 
 fusion of terms. 
 
 Just as the states of Europe are still competing 
 among themselves for supremacy in Asia and Africa, 
 so was the original contest over the American conti- 
 nent likewise purely inter-European in character; 
 and though the facts of the case have since been 
 considerably altered, the traditions of this earlier 
 conflict are still kept alive in the diplomatic world. 
 Regarded from the standpoint of past history, there- 
 fore, America, like Asia and Africa, still constitutes 
 a field of possible colonial activity on the part of the 
 inhabitants of the Old World. The independent 
 Americans think differently, it is true ; but then 
 their claim to the exclusive control of the continent 
 has not yet been recognized abroad, and until they 
 establish their diplomatic demands, they cannot 
 therefore well expect to be left to their own devices 
 in the management of the affairs of the New World. 
 Thus in spite of the logic of geography, and perhaps 
 also that of economics as well, traditional influences 
 naturally induce the European states to regard them- 
 selves as necessary parties to any contract for the 
 international neutralization of the westerly canal 
 route. 
 
 This argument, drawn from history in favor of 
 continued European interference in the affairs of the 
 New World, is furthermore supported by present 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 579 
 
 political considerations of a weighty nature, which 
 go to strengthen the tradition. American indepen- 
 dence was effected, as we are aware, toward the 
 close of the inter-European controversy over the 
 Western continent, and before the elimination of the 
 Continental states from the struggle had become 
 a recognized fact. Still regarding them, one and all, 
 as possible competitors, the United States accord- 
 ingly took it upon themselves to warn all the powers 
 of Europe from further interference in the affairs of 
 the American continent ; and in their Monroe 
 doctrine they therefore made no exception in favor 
 of such of the Continental states as had already been 
 placed Jiors de combat by their British antagonist. 
 Thus while traditional influences still impelled the 
 Europeans to regard the New World as coming 
 within the sphere of their political prestige, the hos- 
 tile attitude now assumed by its independent inhabi- 
 tants forthwith urged them to unite in expressing 
 their historical convictions. The result was that the 
 very European powers which up to this had been 
 competing among themselves for supremacy in 
 America, suddenly found themselves forced into a 
 tacit alliance against the Monroe doctrine preten- 
 sions of the United States. 
 
 Had America only succeeded in freeing herseK 
 completely from the Old World before launching 
 her threat, this hostile European alliance need not, 
 perhaps, have disturbed her future plans. But 
 despite the revolt of her colonies. Great Britain still 
 remained a power in the New World, and, owing to 
 
580 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the indiscriminate nature of the claims thus made 
 by the United States, she could, moreover, hence- 
 forth rely upon the support of her erstwhile Euro- 
 pean competitors in furthering her future designs in 
 America. The Monroe doctrine thus organized the 
 Old World against the New, and, by fixing the 
 European tradition, it gave Great Britain allies, 
 while it isolated the United States. 
 
 From the standpoint of tradition and history, 
 therefore, England's present demand for the inter- 
 national neutralization of the isthmus canal is accord- 
 ingly not nearly so disinterested as it would appear ; 
 for by claiming no exclusive control for herself over 
 the westerly route she would thus be able to range 
 all the maritime states of Europe on her side in 
 opposition to the more presumptuous claims of her 
 rival ; and having in this way assured herself of non- 
 American control, her present ascendency in the 
 Caribbean would amply secure her against the 
 possibility of further aggression on the part of her 
 European allies. Thus, while the logic of geography 
 pleads for the cause of the United States, the tra- 
 ditions of history still support the British claim ; 
 and it is through this inherent contradiction of 
 premises that the transit question has already be- 
 come involved in the larger issue over the still un- 
 recognized Monroe doctrine. 
 
 But, as a matter of fact, America is now passing 
 through a transitional stage in her growth, and while 
 the outcome is still undetermined it is equally as 
 impossible to trace analogies from the traditions 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 581 
 
 of the past as it is to draw conclusions from the 
 logic of the future. Let us therefore confine our 
 attention to the present, and apply the Suez precedent 
 accordingly. 
 
 And what though we must still deny the fact of 
 complete American independence, we may still recog- 
 nize that the contest over this continent has passed 
 through its inter-European into what we may call 
 the Anglo-American phase of its course. As the 
 neutralization of the Suez canal has already been 
 effected by the several parties to the controvei'sy 
 along the easterly route — namely, England and the 
 maritime powers of Europe — so. Judging from the 
 present condition of affairs on this side of the globe, 
 it would seem as though the future neutralization of 
 the isthmus canal ought likewise to be provided for 
 by the respective parties to the controversy along 
 the course of the westerly route — to wit, Great 
 Britain and the republics of America. But as no 
 such equality of strength exists among the political 
 entities of the New World as we found to be the 
 case in the Old, and as combination has here taken 
 the form of a grouping of the weaker states around 
 the strongest, the parties of the second part are in 
 reality one, for the United States voluntarily took 
 the lead in this American partnership, and the 
 southern republics have always been quite content 
 to have their diplomatic interests thus represented 
 by their northern neighbor. Thus, if in tracing our 
 analogy we were to allow ourselves to be guided 
 neither by the logic of geography nor by the tradi- 
 
582 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 tions of history, but simply by the facts as they 
 appear, the Suez precedent would naturally argue 
 in favor of a joint protectorate of the isthmus canal 
 at the hands of Great Britain and the United 
 States. 
 
 Now this is precisely the adjustment that has 
 already been effected by the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty ; and in default of a more inclusive form of 
 guaranty, Great Britain, indeed, is well enough 
 satisfied with the arrangement. And well she may 
 be ; for according to the terms of the present con- 
 tract, the United States are precluded from defend- 
 ing and controlling the continuation of their southern 
 sea-board, while England, by means of her ascendency 
 in the Caribbean and with the aid of her magnificent 
 navy, is easily able to hold her own on this side of 
 the globe, in precisely the same way,. indeed, as she 
 still retains her supremacy along the course of the 
 easterly route in the face of her European com- 
 petitors. 
 
 But just as the United States have always per- 
 sistently denied the analogies of tradition, so they 
 now refuse to allow the logic of geography to be any 
 longer confused even by the interpolation of his- 
 torical fact. Their Monroe doctrine was directed 
 against Europe as a whole, and, in spite of her re- 
 served rights in the New World, no exception was 
 made in favor of the Home country. At that time 
 their vision was somewhat confused, it is true ; but 
 since becoming an . interoceauic power their eyes 
 have been opened, and they now recognize in Great 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 583 
 
 Britain their only serious competitor for American 
 prestige. By mutual agreement a definite line of 
 division has been drawn between the respective 
 North American bases of the rivals, but to the 
 south there is still a confusion of claims. Some forty 
 years ago, when conflict was imminent in this direc- 
 tion, a truce was signed in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty ; 
 and as the contestants have since been engaged in 
 strengthening their respective positions in the North, 
 the convention has thus far served its ptirposein pre- 
 serving the peace. But in the course of their natural 
 growth, and in pursuance of their larger Pan-Ameri- 
 can ideal, the United States now have in mind the 
 cutting of an isthmus canal to Join the shores of the 
 continents ; and, recognizing at last the inevitable 
 antagonism to their aims on the part of their British 
 competitor, they now demand, in place of any form 
 of international neutralization, the exclusive political 
 control of the route. 
 
 And, from the standpoint of national preservation, 
 the claim is, indeed, well justified. For, when re- 
 garded geographically as the future uniter of 
 America's coast-lines, it is ridiculous to compare the 
 isthmus canal with its counterpart in the East ; and 
 from this point of view the United States can hardly 
 be blamed for disregarding the logic of a doubtful 
 international analogy. In our day every nation 
 deems it of the utmost strategic importance to round 
 out its natural boundaries and to defend its frontier 
 thus secured. The United States are also keenly 
 alive to the necessity of this national safeguard ; but 
 
584 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 the isolation of their western sea-board renders the 
 completion of the task under present circumstances 
 wellnigh impossible. As it is, their naval forces are 
 constantly being increased only to be divided, and 
 their coast defenses have still to be developed dis- 
 connectedly. But by piercing the isthmus these 
 dangerous and expensive expedients would imme- 
 diately be avoided. And if the United States now 
 feel it incumbent upon themselves thus to fortify 
 and defend their separated coast-lines, how can they 
 be expected to forego the political control of the 
 isthmus canal, when this water-way will of itself 
 ultimately join their shores and render their southern 
 sea-board continuous ? 
 
 When regarded from the broader point of view of 
 the Monroe doctrine this American demand for ex- 
 clusive control of the transit route is likewise, at 
 least, intelligible. For even as Pan-American reci- 
 procity is impossible, economically, without the 
 presence of an interoceanic canal, so is the political 
 alliance of the American republics quite out of the 
 question so long as Europe persists in sharing in the 
 control of the route. And inasmuch as the United 
 States have already taken upon themselves the re- 
 sponsibility of guiding America's growth and estab- 
 lishing her power, it is but natural that they should 
 now insist upon acquiring and controlling the'proper 
 means to the end. In short, Pan-Americanism and 
 the Monroe doctrine are both involved in this 
 present controversy over the canal route, and, as 
 these are vital questions to the United States, they 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 585 
 
 will of course continue to deny the logic of European 
 tradition in the matter and insist upon American 
 control. 
 
 But in so doing they will once more come into 
 direct conflict with the British imperial system. 
 Thus the future struggle over the canal route must 
 continue to remain an integral part of the larger con- 
 test over the American continent, and until the 
 broader issue is settled, no permanent decision can 
 be looked for in the narrower question thus in- 
 volved. International neutralization may carry on 
 the face of it a somewhat more disinterested air than 
 the claim of exclusive American control ; but, as a 
 matter of fact, the demands of both parties are 
 purely selfish in character, and, in consequence, 
 diametrically opposed. 
 
 If, then, in this controversy over the canal route, 
 no permanent agreement may be looked for between 
 the two governments concerned, on account „ „ ... 
 
 . ... § 184. Arbi- 
 
 of the inherent contradiction of their re- tration and 
 spective national policies ; the question im- the Transit 
 mediately arises whether the dispute may 
 not be referred to some third party for decision. 
 Arbitration is, in fact, now being suggested as the 
 future alternative for war between England and the 
 United States, and it may be that the transit ques- 
 tion will likewise admit of this manner of adjust- 
 ment. The argument is, indeed, plausible, and 
 humanity strongly supports the main premise ; but 
 what should be, is still not always possible, and both 
 the principle of international arbitration and its ap- 
 
586 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 plicability to the present case should first be tested 
 before hasty conclusions are drawn. 
 
 Arbitration, in the first place, presupposes two dis- 
 puting units of about equal strength, and then an 
 impartial umpire to decide the question. But the 
 American Monroe doctrine is by no means so well 
 established in the world as is the British imperial 
 system, and the United States could, consequently, 
 scarcely expect Great Britain to meet them on equal 
 terms in the matter ; for, under an impartial decision, 
 they would be gaining too much and she too little, 
 in such an event. If, however, the present disparity 
 of the claims were to be taken into account, we, in 
 our turn, would naturally hesitate to risk our ill- 
 established rights in an open court under such un- 
 equal conditions. But even conceding the eligibility 
 of the parties, there still remains the selection of an 
 impartial umpire to decide the question, and in a 
 matter of this kind, involving British imperial unity 
 on the one hand, and the American Monroe doctrine 
 on the other, the choice would, indeed, prove a diffi- 
 cult one. We might select honest and capable men 
 from our country, and England might choose honest 
 and capable men from hers ; but, as honest men and 
 patriots they must, one and all, necessarily have in- 
 herited a national bias. And, at all events, the de- 
 ciding vote would still have to rest with a foreigner. 
 From what country then could he be chosen ? Eng- 
 land, on her side, would probably insist upon a 
 European ; but then we levelled our Monroe doc- 
 trine square in the face of all Europe and failed to 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 587 
 
 give notice to non-combatants that they might avoid 
 the issue if they would. We could, therefore, hardly 
 expect any European arbiter to appreciate the jus- 
 tice of our present claims ; and we would, accord- 
 ingly, in all probability, refuse to submit any Monroe 
 doctrine question to his decision. And so, con- 
 versely, if given free choice in the matter, we would 
 naturally decide upon an American arbiter; but 
 England, in turn, would doubtless object to this 
 selection on the ground of the inherited bias of such 
 an umpire in favor of the Pan-American ideal. In 
 default of a European or an American, the two con- 
 testants might then have to resort to an Asiatic 
 arbiter. Such a choice would, indeed, prove accept- 
 able enough to us, as our vital interests do not lie in 
 this direction ; but Great Britain has an Eastern 
 question also on her hands, and, considering its pres- 
 ent unsettled state, she could scarcely consent to 
 allow the two issues to become confused in this way, 
 as she would thus be risking her rights on both 
 sides of the globe at the same time. 
 
 But without pressing the point any further, and 
 supposing for the sake of argument, all the minor 
 conditions of international arbitration to be fulfilled 
 between the Anglo-American rivals, there still re- 
 mains the crucial question, as to whether a contro- 
 versy of this character, involving British imperial 
 unity on the one hand, and the American Monroe 
 doctrine on the other, after all admits of such man- 
 ner of adjustment. The issues at stake are certainly 
 vital, and it is still open to serious doubt whether 
 
588 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 modern governments will ever consent to submit 
 questions of national integrity to a third party for 
 decision, any more than individuals nowadays refer 
 matters of self-defense to the courts. Such at least 
 has never been the case in the past, and it is difficult 
 to detect any such tendencies in the present interna- 
 tional relations between England and the United 
 States. 
 
 In the matter of the Geneva award we did, it is 
 true, refer our case to an international tribunal ; but 
 at that pai'ticular time, it must be remembered, we 
 were more than England's match, with our military 
 and naval forces still on a war footing. Besides, 
 this was, at most, but a question of damages, and, 
 even then, we only consented to submit to arbitra- 
 tion under conditions, thus reserving our natural 
 right of self-defense. The Behring sea tribunal is a 
 later instance of Anglo-American arbitration, but 
 here again the questions submitted were vital to 
 neither party, and the conclusions thus far reached 
 are, moreover, of too doubtful a character to carry 
 much weight as a precedent. 
 
 From the evidence at hand we would, therefore, 
 be inclined to conclude that arbitration is only 
 applicable to the Anglo-American controversy under 
 serious limitations and with important reservations ; 
 or, to put it differently, as a method for adjusting 
 disputes of secondary importance, involving neither 
 the integrity of the British Empire, nor the princi- 
 ples of our own Monroe doctrine. But unfortu- 
 nately the question of the political control of the 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 589 
 
 canal route, being part and parcel of the larger con- 
 test over the American continent, is vital to each of 
 the two great powers of the West and of secondary 
 importance to neither. We must, therefore, prefer 
 to maintain a skeptical attitude toward the efficacy 
 of arbitration in the transit question, at least so long 
 as the international claims of the United States con- 
 tinue to remain unrecognized. 
 
 Having cast our Monroe doctrine gauntlet at 
 Europe's feet, to be taken up quite naturally by 
 England, nothing apparently remains for 
 us, therefore, but to accept the issue and „ f" '^^" 
 
 ' . ' , •- ... Conclusion. 
 
 continue to compete with our British rival 
 for supremacy along the course of the westerly 
 route, and for future prestige in the New World 
 bordering on the Pacific. We should, therefore, 
 carefully define our present diplomatic position, and 
 at the same time take practical steps to emphasize 
 our demands. 
 
 And first of all, our Monroe doctrine, itself, needs 
 re-rating, in accordance with the changes that have 
 since been wrought in the international relations of 
 the world. Thinking to mitigate in some degree the 
 inclusive nature of our claims in America, we prom- 
 ised in return never to interfere in the international 
 affairs of Europe. But the affairs of Europe are 
 nowadays, as we know, the affairs of Asia and 
 Africa as well, and the periphery of our promises 
 must, therefore, be considerably extended if the pro- 
 viso is still to hold good. And such an expansion 
 of our assurances would, indeed, involve no appreci- 
 
590 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 able limitation of our policy ; for the American con- 
 tinent with its littoral islands offers in itself sufficient 
 opportunity for our future growth, and we will prob- 
 ably never become so cramped for room that we will 
 feel any desire to extend our political power to the 
 Eastern Hemisphere. We should accordingly allow 
 the European states to partition Africa as they 
 will, and carry on their struggle for supremacy in 
 the far East without let or hindrance on our part. 
 In these wars of conquest and in matters relating to 
 these colonies and dependencies, " we have never 
 taken part, nor does it comport with our policy 
 to do so " ; for we belong by right to the West, and 
 of all the continents, America alone has fallen to 
 our lot. 
 
 Great Britain, however, remains to-day as much 
 an American, as she is an African and an Asiatic 
 power, and her political proclivities, moreover, are 
 essentially European. So long as she chooses to 
 continue her advance toward the west, we need, 
 therefore, scarcely expect this re-statement of our 
 Monroe doctrine case to have any appreciable effect 
 in mitigating her present antagonism to our aims on 
 this continent. By way of a possible contingency, 
 it is worthy of note in this connection, however, that 
 England is at present confronted by powerful op- 
 ponents in every quarter of the globe, and a mighty 
 struggle assuredly awaits her if her present empire 
 is to be kept intact. To make matters worse, her 
 position is one of almost complete isolation, and to 
 cope with her numerous competitors single-handed 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 591 
 
 will, indeed, prove a herculean task. Being a party 
 to all the modern contests over the continents, and 
 having different opponents in every one, it would, 
 however, be very difficult for Great Britain to form 
 a present alliance which would not conflict with her 
 own colonial interests in one direction or another. 
 Should she join forces with France and Russia, her 
 influence in Egypt and the far East must suffer dis- 
 paragement ; if, on the other hand, she should take 
 sides with the triple alliance, her aims in South 
 Africa must be curtailed ; and, finally, in seeking an 
 American alliance she would be obliged to recognize 
 the Monroe doctrine and abandon her policy of fur- 
 ther political prestige in the West. But when hard 
 pressed by her enemies, necessity may eventually 
 drive Great Britain to a choice of these various 
 evils, and her problem would then resolve itself 
 into a question of expediency, as to what part of her 
 imperial system she should abandon in order to save 
 the rest. Now Asia and Africa both lie toward the 
 east, and England's colonial interests are accord- 
 ingly twofold in this direction. Her possessions 
 on this side of the globe are, besides, both larger 
 and more lucrative than are those which lie in 
 America toward the west. The New World is, 
 moreover, inhabited by creatures of her own kith 
 and kin with whom an alliance would be quite pos- 
 sible were she to make the necessary sacrifice, and 
 from experience England is likewise well aware of 
 the force of the national aims of her former colo- 
 nists. Taking all things into consideration it may 
 
592 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 in the end prove more expedient, therefore, for 
 Grreat Britain to abandon the American continent to 
 the Americans, in return for their undivided support 
 in the international affairs of the world ; for by so 
 doing she could henceforth concentrate all her forces 
 in the East and so save Asia and Africa. It is thus 
 not without the range of international possibility, 
 perhaps, that Great Britain may herself one day 
 voluntarily consent to recognize the modem Monroe 
 doctrine and give over the destinies of the New 
 World to the exclusive direction of the United 
 States ; — not indeed as an act of charity, but simply 
 as 9, matter of imperial necessity. We Americans 
 could ask no more, and the bargain would probably 
 be sealed, for such would certainly be the ideal con- 
 summation of Anglo-Saxon civilization. 
 
 We cannot anticipate the arrangement, however, 
 for initiative in the matter must at all events pro- 
 ceed from our rival, and for the present, at least, we 
 may rely on Great Britain's continuing to work out 
 her present imperial plans without seeking aid or 
 advice from others. And so long as our immediate 
 antagonist refuses to recognize our claim, we must 
 perforce look for sympathy in a different direction, 
 or to put it more bluntly, among her other competi- 
 tors. It would seem, indeed, as though the Conti- 
 nental states of Europe might now consent to ratify 
 this more modern Monroe doctrine bargain, as their 
 future interests lie toward the east rather than in 
 the west, and since they, like ourselves, are one and 
 all opposed in their advance by Great Britain. But 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 593 
 
 the influence of tradition is still powerful in the 
 Old World, and the antagonism created among the 
 Europeans by the expression of our original Monroe 
 doctrine has yet to be overcome. Thus so long as 
 England chooses to continue her advance toward 
 the west, she will in all probability still be able to 
 rely on the moral support of at least the maritime 
 powers of Europe, in spite of their mutual antago- 
 nism to her aims in the East. But with Russia the 
 case is somewhat different, as she is at most only 
 half-way European in her proclivities and in no wise 
 a competitor for American prestige. Under the 
 present circumstances, therefore, Russia is the only 
 Old World power to whom we can look for any sym- 
 pathy in our present Monroe doctrine demands, and 
 this is the case not at all because our international 
 interests are identical, but rather, on the contrary, 
 because they are the reverse. Russia, in short, has 
 a struggle on her hands for supremacy in the East, 
 and in this controversy the United States are in no 
 wise concerned. The United States, on the other 
 hand, have their Monroe doctrine to advance in the 
 West, and Russia, in turn, is no longer a party to this 
 dispute. Both powers are, however, for the present, 
 at least, confronted by the self-same competitor, and 
 thus, by working in harmony, each may attain its 
 own ends without in any way interfering with the 
 national designs of the other. It is under just such 
 conditions that international partnerships are nowa- 
 days made in the diplomatic world, and even though 
 tradition has placed all forms of entangling foreign 
 38 
 
594 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 alliances beyond the pale of our own diplomacy, it 
 is still well to recognize in advance from whom we 
 may be likely to expect sympathy in our coming 
 Monroe doctrine struggle. 
 
 But if we prefer to continue the contest single- 
 handed, we must not expect the mere expression of 
 our intentions, unsupported by adequate force, to 
 accomplish our ends. Thus having defined our 
 diplomatic position in the world, we must at once 
 make more practical provision to strengthen our 
 present Monroe doctrine claims. And to this end 
 it is of primary importance that we round out our 
 southern frontier by constructing and controlling an 
 interoceanic canal. Thus, in determining upon the 
 route of isthmus transit, political considerations must 
 also be given due weight, in order that no strategical 
 mistake be made in the final location of the line. 
 
 Considered in this light, the isthmus of Tehuante- 
 pec constitutes the ideal situation for the canal, since 
 the control of the Gulf is already ours, and as there 
 would then be but a short stretch of foreign sea- 
 board intervening between the Pacific terminus of 
 the water-way and California's southern boundary. 
 Unfortunately, however, the cost of a canal across 
 Tehuantepec would be practically prohibitive, and, 
 from a strategic point of view, a ship-railway would 
 scarcely prove an adequate substitute. 
 
 Our more or less satisfactory treaty with Colombia, 
 taken together with the existence of the Panama rail- 
 way and the preparations already made for construct- 
 ing a canal across this isthmus, might lead us, on the 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 595 
 
 other hand, to decide upon the Panama route. But 
 such a choice would necessitate our bringing the 
 entire American isthmus under our political control, 
 unless, indeed, we chose to run the risk of our rival 
 cutting her own way to the Pacific through Nicaragua 
 in our rear. In this event, however, our frontier 
 would again be isolated and our coast-lines even 
 more disjointed than before. Thus, in adopting the 
 Panama route we would simply be burning our 
 strategical bridges behind us, and this would be 
 little short of foolhardy, considering the nature of 
 the contest now before us. 
 
 Under the circumstances, therefore, the Nicaragua 
 route would seem to be our only choice from a politi- 
 cal point of view, and it is indeed fortunate that the 
 technical factors involved do not seriously militate 
 against our necessity. There are some strategical 
 disadvantages accompanying the choice of this route, 
 it is true, and among them must be reckoned ; in the 
 first place, the inadequacy of the ports at either 
 terminus of the canal ; and, secondly, the danger of 
 damage being inflicted by the enemy to the embank- 
 ments on the eastern side, in case the high-level line 
 is to be followed. But, on the other hand, the 
 Nicaragua route offers some exceptional advantages 
 when judged thus from the purply strategical stand- 
 point ; and foremost among them is the presence of 
 the magnificent fresh-water sea in the centre, capable 
 of accommodating an entire fleet if necessary, and 
 rendering possible the reparation of injuries inflicted 
 upon our vessels on the high seas. It is true, our 
 
596 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 national territory will not, properly speaking, extend 
 as far south as the Nicaragua canal, but in this case 
 there will at least be no danger of our rival inter- 
 cepting us on the rear, and our strategical position 
 on the isthmus will thus be rendered reasonably 
 secure. Then, too, it naust be remembered that the 
 intervening states, besides being well disposed to our 
 Monroe doctrine claims, are also under our promised 
 protection ; and when the contemplated railway lines 
 are constructed through these neighboring republics 
 to join the banks of the water-way with our own 
 political centres, the Nicaragua canal will then, to 
 all intents and purposes, unite our coast-lines and 
 constitute our southern frontier. 
 
 But even after our final choice has been made in 
 favor of the Nicaragua canal, there still remains the 
 more pressing problem of establishing our political 
 control along the route. There can be little doubt 
 that Grreat Britain will continue for the present to 
 oppose our claim, and her objections will, moreover, 
 be perfectly well justified by the terms of the Clay- 
 ton-Bulwer treaty still extant. Through carelessness 
 we were led into this arrangement unwittingly, and 
 now we have only our own selfish reasons for setting 
 aside the contract. Our diplomatic demands will, 
 therefore, scarcely be allowed by our rival, and per- 
 emptory notice on our part of immediate abrogation 
 of the convention might precipitate a conflict in 
 other directions for which we are by no means 
 prepared. 
 
 It would seem best for us, therefore, to allow the 
 
The Monroe Doctrine. 597 
 
 treaty to stand for the present, and in the meantime 
 make practical provision for maintaining our future 
 prestige along the route. To this end we must first 
 establish ourselves on an equal footing with our 
 competitor, both economically and politically, in the 
 Caribbean, and take measures also to secure our 
 position along the western shores of the continent. 
 Then, either as a nation or as a government, we must 
 construct the Nicaragua canal, exclusively with 
 American capital ; for what we own, — according to 
 well recognized laws of property, — we can assuredly 
 control and defend, despite intei'national provisions 
 to the contrary. If objections are then raised by 
 our adversary, we will have fact instead of mere 
 theory wherewith to combat them, and a clear-cut 
 issue will at last be drawn. 
 
 And in pursuing the course here outlined, we 
 will simply be imitating the admirable policy our 
 rival has thus far successfully pursued in establish- 
 ing her ascendancy on the opposite side of the globe. 
 For in spite of the present neutralization of the Suez 
 canal, England by owning the water-way, and by 
 means of her influence along the course of the 
 easterly route still maintains her desired supremacy 
 in this direction ; and so the United States, by con- 
 structing the Nicaragua canal, and by establishing 
 their prestige along the course of the westerly route, 
 may, despite the present integrity of the Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty, well hope to force the ultimate recog- 
 nition of their Monroe doctrine and control the 
 western gateway to the Pacific. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NEW 
 GRANADA. RATIFIED JUNE 10, 1848— EXTRACT. 
 
 Article XXXV. 
 
 The United States of America and the Republic of New Granada, 
 desiring to make as durable as possible the relations which are to be 
 estabUshed between the two parties by virtue of this treaty, have 
 declared solemnly and do agree to the following points : 
 
 1st. For the better understanding of the preceeding articles, it is 
 and has been stipulated between the high contracting parties that 
 the citizens, vessels, and merchandise of the United States shall 
 enjoy in the ports of New Granada, including those of the part of 
 the Granadian territory generally denominated Isthmus of Panama, 
 from its southernmost extremity until the boundary of Costa Rica, 
 all the exemptions, privileges, and immunities concerning commerce 
 and navigation which are now or may hereafter be enjoyed by 
 Granadian citizens, their vessels and merchandise ; and that this 
 equality of favors shall be made to extend to the passengers, corre- 
 spondence, and merchandise of the United States in their transit 
 across the said territory from one sea to the other. The government 
 of New Granada guarantees to the government of the United States 
 that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama, upon 
 any modes of communication that now exist or that may be hereafter 
 constructed, shall be open and free to the government and citizens of 
 the United States, and for the transportation of any articles of pro- 
 duce, manufactures, or merchandise, of lawful commerce, belonging 
 to the citizens of the United States ; that no other tolls or charges 
 shall be levied or collected upon the citizens of the United States, or 
 their said merchandise thus passing over any road or canal that may 
 be made by the government of New Granada, or by the authority of 
 the same, than is, under like circumstances, levied upon and collected 
 from the Granadian citizens ; that any lawful produce, manufactures, 
 
 599 
 
600 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 or merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States thus pass- 
 ing from one sea to the other, in either direction, for the purpose of 
 exportation to any other foreign country, shall not be Uable to any 
 import duties whatever ; or, having paid such duties, they shaU be 
 entitled to drawback upon their exportation ; nor shall the citizens of 
 the United States be liable to any duties, tolls, or charges of any kind 
 to which native citizens are not subjected for thus passing the said 
 isthmus. And, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and con- 
 stant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an especial compensa- 
 tion for the said advantages, and for the favors they have acquired 
 by the 4th, 5th, and 6th articles of this treaty, the United States 
 guarantee positively and eflficaciously to New^ Granada, by the present 
 stipulation, the perfect neutraUty of the before-mentioned isthmus, 
 with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may 
 not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this 
 treaty exists ; and, in consequence, the United States also guarantee, 
 in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which 
 New Granada has and possesses over the said territory. 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY. RATIFIED JULY 5, 1850. 
 
 The United States of America and Her Britannic Majesty, being 
 desu-ous of consolidating the relations of amity which so happUy sub- 
 sist between them, by setting forth and fixing in a convention their 
 views and intentions with reference to any means of communication 
 by ship-canal which may be constructed between the Atlantic and 
 Pacific Oceans by the way of the river San Juan de Nicaragua and 
 either or both of the Lakes of Nicaragua or Managua, to any port or 
 place on the Pacific Ocean, the President of the United States has 
 conferred fuU powers on John M. Clayton, Secretary of State of the 
 United States, and Her Britannic Majesty on the Right Honorable 
 Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, a member of Her Majesty's most honor- 
 able privy council, knight commander of the most honorable Order 
 of the Bath, and envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary 
 of Her Britannic Majesty to the United States, for the aforesaid 
 purpose ; and the said plenipotentiaries having exchanged their full 
 powers, which were found to be in proper form, have agreed to the 
 following articles : 
 
Appendix. 601 
 
 Article I. 
 
 The governments of the United States and Great Britain hereby 
 declare that neither the one nor the other "will ever obtain or main- 
 tain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal ; agree- 
 ing that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications 
 commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or 
 fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nica- 
 ragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central 
 America ; nor will either make use of any protection which either 
 affords or may afford, or any alliance which either has or may 
 have to or with any state or people, for the purpose of erecting 
 or maintaining any such fortifications, or of occupying, fortifying, 
 or colonizing Nicaragua, Costa Eica, the Mosquito coast, or any 
 part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising dominion 
 over the same ; nor wiU the United States or Great Britain take 
 advantage of any intimacy , or use any alliance, connection, or influ- 
 ence that either may possess with any state or government through 
 whose territory the said canal may pass, for the purpose of acquiring 
 or holding, directly or indirectly, for the citizens or subjects of the " 
 one, any rights or advantages in regard to commerce or navigation 
 through the said canal which shall not be offered on the same terms 
 to the citizens or subjects of the other. 
 
 Article II. 
 
 Vessels of the United States or Great Britain traversing the said 
 canal shall, in case of war between the contracting parties, be 
 exempted from blockade, detention, or capture by either of the bel- 
 ligerents ; and this provision shall extend to such a distance from the 
 two ends of the said canal as may hereafter be found expedient to 
 establish. 
 
 Article III. 
 
 In order to secure the construction of the said canal, the contract- 
 ing parties engage that if any such canal shall be undertaken upon 
 fair and equitable terms by any parties having the authority of the 
 local government or governments through whose territory the same 
 may pass, then the persons employed in making the said canal, and 
 their property used, or to be used for that object, shall be protected, 
 from the commencement of the said canal to its completion, by the 
 governments of the United States and Great Britain, from unjust 
 detention, confiscation, seizure, or any violence whatsoever. 
 
602 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Aeticle IV. 
 
 The contracting parties will use whatever influence they respec- 
 tively exercise with any state, states, or governments, possessing or 
 claiming to possess any jurisdiction or right over the territory which 
 the said canal shall traverse, or which shall be near the waters applic- 
 able thereto, in order to induce such states or governments to facili- 
 tate the construction of the said canal by every means in their power. 
 And furthermore, the United States and Great Britain agree to use 
 their good offices, wherever or however it may be most expedient, in 
 order to procure the establishment of two free ports, one at each end 
 of the said canal. 
 
 Article V. 
 
 The contracting parties further engage, that when the said canal 
 shall have been completed, they will protect it from interruption, 
 seizure, or unjust confiscation, and that they wiU guarantee the 
 neutrality thereof, so that the said canal may forever be open and 
 free, and the capital invested therein secure. Nevertheless, the 
 ' governments of the United States and Great Britain, in according 
 their protection to the construction of the said canal, and guarantee- 
 ing its neutrality and security when completed, always understand 
 that this protection and guaranty are granted conditionaUy, and 
 may be withdrawn by both governments, or either government, if 
 both governments, or either government, should deem that the per- 
 sons or company undertaking or managing the same adopt or estab- 
 lish such regulations concerning the traffic thereupon as are contrary 
 to the spirit and intention of this convention, either by making unfair 
 discriminations in favor of the commerce of one of the contracting 
 parties over the commerce of the other, or by imposing oppressive 
 exactions or unreasonable tolls upon passengers, vessels, goods, wares, 
 merchandise, or other articles. Neither party, however, shall with- 
 draw the aforesaid protection and guaranty without first giving six 
 months' notice to the other. 
 
 Article VI. 
 
 The contracting parties in this convention engage to invite every 
 state with which both or either have friendly intercourse to enter 
 into stipulations with them similar to those which they have entered 
 into with each other, to the end that all other states may share in 
 the honor and advantage of having contributed to a work of such 
 general interest and importance as the canal herein contemplated. 
 And the contracting parties likewise agree that each shall enter into 
 
Appendix. 603 
 
 treaty stipulations with such of the Central American states as they 
 may deem advisable, for the purpose of more effectually carrying 
 out the great design of this convention, namely, that of constructing 
 and maintaining the said canal as a ship communication between the 
 two oceans for the benefit of mankind, on equal terms to all, and of 
 protecting the same ; and they also agree, that the good offices of 
 either shall be employed, when requested by the other, in aiding and 
 assisting the negotiation of such treaty stipulations ; and should any 
 difiEerences arise as to right or property over the territory through 
 which the said canal shall pass between the states or governments of 
 Central America, and such difiEerences should in any way impede or 
 obstruct the execution of the said canal, the governments of the 
 United States and Great Britain wiU use their good offices to settle 
 such differences in the manner best suited to promote the interests 
 of the said canal, and to strengthen the bonds of friendship and 
 alliance which exist between the contracting parties. 
 
 Article VII. 
 
 It being desirable that no time should be unnecessarily lost in com- 
 mencing and constructing the said canal, the governments of the 
 United States and Great Britain determine to give their support and 
 encouragement to such persons or company as may first offer to 
 commence the same, with the necessary capital, the consent of the 
 local authorities, and on such principles as accord with the spirit and 
 intention of this convention ; and if any persons or company should 
 already have, with any state through which the proposed ship canal 
 may pass, a contract for the construction of such a canal as that 
 specified in this convention, to the stipulations of which contract 
 neither of the contracting parties in this convention have any just 
 cause to object, and the said persons or company shall moreover have 
 made preparations, and expended time, money, and trouble, on the 
 faith of such conitract, it is hereby agreed that such persons or 
 company shall have a priority of claim over every other person, 
 persons, or company to the protection of the governments of the 
 United States and Great Britain, and be allowed a year from the 
 date of the exchange of the ratifications of this convention for con- 
 cluding their arrangements, and presenting evidence of sufficient 
 capital subscribed to accomplish the contemplated undertaking ; it 
 being understood that if, at the expiration of the aforesaid period, 
 such persons or company be not able to commence and carry out the 
 proposed enterprise, then the governments of the United States and 
 Great Britain shall be free to afford their protection to any other 
 persons or company that shall be prepared to commence and proceed 
 with the construction of the canal in question. 
 
604 The Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Article VIII. 
 
 The governments of the United States and Great Britain having 
 not only desired, in entering into this convention, to accomplish a 
 particular object, but also to estabUsh a general principle, they hereby 
 agree to extend their protection, by treaty stipulations, to any other 
 practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the 
 isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially 
 to the interoceanic communications, should the same prove to be 
 practicable, whether by canal or railway, which are now proposed to 
 be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama. In granting, 
 however, their joint protection to any such canals or railways as are 
 by this article specified, it is always understood by the United States 
 and Great Britain that the parties constructing or owning the same 
 shall impose no other charges or conditions of ti-affio thereupon than 
 the aforesaid governments shall approve of as just and equitable ; 
 and that the same canals or railways, being open to the citizens and 
 subjects of the United States and Great Britain on equal terms, shall 
 also, be open on like terms to the citizens and subjects of every other 
 state which is willing to grant thereto such protection as the 
 United States and Great Britain engage to afford. 
 
 Article IX. 
 
 The ratifications of this convention shall be exchanged at Washing- 
 ton within six months from this day, or sooner if' possible. 
 
 In faith whereof, we, the respective plenipotentiaries, have signed 
 this convention, and have hereunto afiixed our seals. 
 
 Done at Washington, the nineteenth day of April, anno Domini 
 one thousand eight hundred and fifty. 
 
 John M. Clayton. [l.s.] 
 
 Henry Lytton Bulwhr. [l.s.] 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 THE DIOKINSON-AYON TREATY. RATIFIED JUKE 20, 1868— 
 EXTRACTS. 
 
 Article Xrv, 
 
 The RepubUc of Nicaragua hereby grants to the United States and 
 to their citizens the right of transit between the Atlantic and Pacific 
 oceans through the territory of that Republic on any route of com- 
 
Appendix. 605 
 
 munication natural or artificial, whether by land or by water, which 
 may now or hereafter exist or be constructed under the authority of 
 Nicaragua, to be used and enjoyed in the same manner and upon 
 equal terms by both Republics and their respective citizens ; the 
 Republic of Nicaragua, however, reserving its rights of sovereignty 
 over the same. 
 
 ARTICLE XV. 
 
 The United States hereby agree to extend their protection to all 
 such routes of communication as aforesaid and to guarantee the 
 neutrality and innocent use of the same. They also agree to employ 
 their influence with other nations to induce them to guarantee such 
 neutrality and protection. 
 
 And the Repubhc of Nicaragua on its part undertakes to establish 
 one free port at each extremity of one of the aforesaid routes of 
 communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. . . . 
 The United States shall also be at liberty on giving notice to the 
 government or authorities of Nicaragua to carry troops and muni- 
 tions of war in their own vessels, or otherwise, to either of said free 
 ports and shall be entitled to their conveyance between them with- 
 out obstruction by said Government and without any charges or tolls 
 whatever for their transportation on said routes, provided said troops 
 and munitions of war are not intended to be employed against 
 Central American nations friendly to Nicaragua. 
 
 Article XVI. 
 
 The Republic of Nicaragua agrees that should it become necessary 
 at any time to employ military forces for the security and protection 
 of persons and property passing over any of the routes aforesaid, it 
 will employ the requisite force for that purpose ; but upon failure to 
 do this from any cause whatever, the government of the United 
 States may, with the consent or at the request of the government of 
 Nicaragua, or of the minister thereof at Washington or of the com- 
 petent legally appointed local authorities civic or military, employ 
 such force for this and no other purpose, and when in the opinion of 
 the government of Nicaragua tlie necessity ceases, such force shaU. 
 be immediately withdrawn. In the exceptional case, however, of 
 unforeseen or imminent danger to the lives or property of citizens 
 of the United States, the forces of said Republic are authorized to act 
 for their protection without such consent having been previously 
 obtained. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abert, Colonel, his report on Childs's 
 surveys, 218 
 
 Acanti Bay, 344 
 
 Accessory Transit Company organ- 
 ized, 219 
 
 Adams, John Quincy, Secretary of 
 State, 133 ; President, 137. See 
 also Monroe Doctrine 
 
 Airiau continues Bourdiol's surveys 
 of Caledonian route, 275 
 
 Albemarl, Earl of. Governor of 
 Jamaica, 83 
 
 Aldrich, Colonel, his report on 
 Childs's surveys, 21S 
 
 Allen, Horatio, his report on Nica- 
 ragua Canal project, 154, 193 
 
 Amalgro, Diego, his conquest of 
 Chile, 46 
 
 American Atlantic and Pacific Ship 
 Canal Company, organized, 197 ; 
 reorganized, 290. See also Central 
 American Transit Company 
 
 Ammen, Admiral Daniel, his early 
 interest in the canal project, 312 ; 
 given charge of United States 
 government surveys, 318 ; member 
 of Interoceanic Canal Commis- 
 sion, 319 ; delegate to Interna- 
 tional Scientific Congress, 354 
 
 Andagova, Pascual de, his explora- 
 tions, 45 
 
 Andes mountains, 10 
 
 Andrieux, ex-Prefect of Police, his 
 evidence on Panama Canal scan- 
 dal, 465 
 
 Anson, Lord, British Admiral, 89 
 
 Antonelli, Batista, surveys Nica- 
 ragua route, 68 
 
 Aosta, Jose de, his condemnation 
 of the canal project, 70 ' 
 
 Appleton, N,, de Lesseps's friend in 
 America, 354, 377 
 
 Arbitration and the Transit Ques- 
 tion, 585 
 
 Arlington, Lord, English, Secretary 
 of State under Charles II., 79 
 
 Arthur, President, 408 ; his canal 
 project, 423 et seq. ; failure of, 
 435 
 
 Aryan migration, Ig 
 
 Aspinwall, see Colon 
 
 Atlantic coast of North America, its 
 trade with Pacific coast of South 
 America, 542, 546 ; its trade with 
 the West Indies and Caribbean 
 coast, 546, 548 
 
 Atrato, Rio, 9, 10 ; navigation of, 
 prohibited by royal order, 58 
 
 Atrato, routes, description of, 10 ; 
 disadvantages of, 12 ; surveyed by 
 Kelly's engineers, 1851, 1854, 
 269 et seq. ; surveyed by Selfridge 
 and Lull, 1871, 322 ; surveyed by 
 Collins, 1874, 329; Wyse-Reclus 
 surveys of , 1876, 1878, 344, 346; 
 canal project, Soci/U Civile, 353 
 
 Ayon, Seiior, Nicaragua Commis- 
 sioner, 307. See also Treaties, 
 Dickinson-Ayon 
 
 Aztec, colonists in Nicaragua, 60 
 
 B. 
 
 Bailey, John, surveys Nicaragua 
 route for Barclay Richardson and 
 Company, 144 ; for the Central 
 American States, 154 
 
 Balboa, Vasco Nuiiez, discovers 
 Pacific, 38 ; deposed and killed, 
 47 
 
 Barclay, Richardson and Company, 
 London bankers, their canal pro- 
 ject, 143 
 
 607 
 
608 
 
 Index. 
 
 Barnard, Major J. B., surveys 
 Tehuantepec route, 1850, 189 
 
 Barnet, Captain, R. N., explores 
 Chiriqui lagoon, 1839, 278 
 
 Barrios, General, President of Gua- 
 temala, 334, 425, 441 
 
 Basis of settlement, 226 
 
 Bastidas, his discoveries, 32 
 
 Bastide, Martin de la, his plans for 
 Nicaragua Canal, 117 
 
 Bay Islands, occupied by English 
 freebooters, 74 ; settled by Caribs, 
 109 ; seized by English settlers, 
 171 ; proclaimed British Colony, 
 230 ; free territory under treaty of 
 1856, 249. See also Roatan 
 
 Bayard, Secretary of State, his policy 
 in Central America, 444 
 
 Belize, founding of settlement in, 74, 
 see also "Wallace ; organization of 
 government in, gg ; British rights 
 in, acknowledged by treaties of 
 1783, 1786, 104, 106 ; further 
 British encroachments in, log ; 
 extent of 1796, 109; extent of 
 1805, Tii ; British rights in, by 
 treaty of 1814, iii ; British claims 
 to after Spanish American inde- 
 pendence, 165 ; name changed to 
 British Honduras, 171 ; extent of 
 1840, 172 ; declared colony of, 
 British Honduras, 177. See also 
 British Honduras 
 
 Belly, Felix, his Nicaragua Canal 
 project, 287 
 
 Benton, Thomas, United States 
 Senator, 138 
 
 Bernard, lagoon, 491 
 
 Biddle, Charles, his report on canal 
 project, 152 et seq. 
 
 Bigelovif, Hon. John, his report on 
 Panama project, 433 
 
 Black River, English post at, 93 
 
 Blackman, A. L., his claim, 455 
 
 Blaine, James G., Secretary of State, 
 his circular letter to the powers 
 of Europe in regard to Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty, 392 et seq. ; his 
 Pan-American policy, 394, 456 ; 
 opens diplomatic campaign with 
 Great Britian, 398 ; his historical 
 objections, 403 ; induces Nica- 
 ragua and Costa Rica to sign 
 Treaty of Limits, 450 
 
 Blanchet, French promoter, 335,342, 
 356, 366, 383. 386, 396 
 
 Bluefields, lagoon, discovery of by 
 Columbus, 32; freebooters rendez- 
 vous, 73 
 
 Bluefields, town of, capital of Mos- 
 quitia, 446 ; riot in, 502 
 
 Bolivar, General, his plans as mili- 
 tary dictator, 133 ; institutes sur- 
 veys across Panama, 146 ; his 
 death in 1830, 157. See also 
 Panama Congress 
 
 Borland, Solon, United States agent 
 in Nicaragua, 233, 236 
 
 Boundary dispute between Nica- 
 ragua and Costa Rica, 224 
 
 Bourdiol, surveys Caledonian route 
 for Socieli d'£tudes, 275 
 
 Brisson, Chairman, Panama Com- 
 mittee, 464 
 
 British Honduras, extent of Eng- 
 land's claim in, 172, 177. See also 
 Belize ; Interoceanic Railway 
 Company, 303, 380 
 
 Brito, harbor of, 7, 480, 482 
 
 Brown and Company, promoters, 
 193. See also Canal Companies, 
 Compania de Transito 
 
 Brownson, Willard H., Commander 
 U. S. N,, 452. See also Expedi- 
 tions of Inspection 
 
 Bucarelli, Antonio, Viceroy of Mexi- 
 co, 115 
 
 Buchanan, Secretary of State, 186 ; 
 Minister to England, 233 ; Presi- 
 dent, his message in regard to 
 filibusters, 246 ; threatens to 
 abrogate Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
 253 ; expresses his satisfaction 
 with results of British diplomacy 
 in Central America, 263 ; plans 
 to secure control of Chiriqui route, 
 279 
 
 Bulwer, Sir Henry, his diplomacy, 
 207 et seq. See also Treaties, 
 Clayton-Bulwer 
 
 Bumside, General, his speech be- 
 fore Senate, 362 
 
 Cabot, John, his voyages to Amer- 
 ica, 43 
 Cabral,. Peter, his voyages, 34 
 
Index. 
 
 609 
 
 Cabrillo, Juan, expedition of, 54 
 
 Cacarica, Rio, II 
 
 Caledonian Bay, 10, 321 ; colony at, 
 85. See also Paterson 
 
 Caledonian route, description of, 9; 
 disadvantages of, 13 ; survey for 
 military road across, 118 ; Dr. 
 CuUen's report upon, 265 ; proved 
 infeasible, 269 ; canal project 
 Societd d' j&iudes, 275 ; surveyed 
 by Bourdiol, 275 ; examined by 
 Selfridge, 321 
 
 California, acquisition of by United 
 States and its effect on transit prob- 
 lem, li^etseg.; State Conven- 
 tion of, 457 ; products of, wheat, 
 wine, garden, 539 ; discovery of 
 gold in, see Gold. 
 
 Camargo, Alonzo de, voyage of, 46 
 
 Campechy, Bay of, 4 
 
 Canal Board, appropriation for, 472 ; 
 appointment and operations of, 
 478 
 
 Canal Companies, Central American 
 and United States Atlantic and 
 Pacific Canal Company, 144 ; 
 Dutch Canal Company, 149 ; La 
 Canale Napoleone de Nicaragua, 
 161 ; Compania de Transito de 
 Nicaragua, 193 ; American At- 
 lantic and Pacific Ship Canal 
 Company, 197, see also Central 
 American Transit Company ; La 
 Sociiti Civile Internationale du 
 Canal Inter oceanique, 341 ; La 
 Compagnie Universelle du Canal 
 Interoceanique de Panama, 417, 
 420 ; Maritime Canal Company, 
 of Nicaragua, 422 
 
 Canal Conventions, California State, 
 457 ; St. Louis, National, 458 ; 
 New Orleans, National, 459 
 
 Canal Projects, early, 68 ; scientific 
 interest aroused in, 113; object 
 of interest to individual capital- 
 ists, 127 ; interest of United States 
 aroused by Panama Congress, 141 ; 
 Central American enterprises, 154, 
 158 ; Louis Philippe's, 159 ; Louis 
 Napoleon's, 161 ; renewed inter- 
 est in United States after acqui- 
 sition of California, 187 ; reorgan- 
 ization of American, 298 ; four 
 projects of SociM Civile, 352 ; 
 
 Panama, inauguration of, 368 ; 
 work on, 427 ; Tehuantepec, 
 Panama, and Nicaragua as com- 
 petitors for United States' support, 
 385 ; Panama vs. Nicaragua, 417 
 et seq. ; President Arthur's, 423 ; 
 Nicaragua, inauguration of, 450. 
 5e^fl/j(7 Philippe, Napoleon, Belly, 
 Ammen, Davis, Grant, de Lesseps 
 
 Canal Routes, description of, 4 et 
 seq. • present controversy over, 
 568-575 ; neutralization or Ameri- 
 can control of, 575-585 ; compari- 
 son of, from a strategical point of 
 view, 594 
 
 Canas-jerez, see Treaties 
 
 Canaz, Antonio Jose, Central Amer- 
 ican Minister to the United States, 
 141 
 
 Canning, English Foreign Secretary, 
 134, 137 
 
 Cardenas, Nicaraguan C o m m i s- 
 sioner, 335. See also Fish 
 
 Carib Indians, landed in Bay Isl- 
 ands, 109 
 
 Caro, Vice-President and President 
 of Colombia, 498 
 
 Carrying trade, relations of Nica- 
 ragua Canal to, 549, 550 
 
 Cartier, Jacques, his voyages, 44 
 
 Cass, General Lewis, Secretary of 
 State, 254, 291. See also Treaties, 
 Cass-Yrisarri 
 
 Castellon, Francisco de, Nicaraguan 
 Minister to France, 160. See also 
 Philippe 
 
 Castilla del Oro, province of, 37. 
 See also Nicuesa 
 
 Castillo rapids, 483 
 
 Castillo Viejo, invested by English, 
 
 lOI 
 
 Central America, United Provinces 
 of, see Federal Republic 
 
 Central American Transit Company, 
 290, 305 
 
 Chagres, Rio, 9 ; uncertain flow of, 
 16, 329 ; Wyse's plan to regulate, 
 358 I present plan to regulate, 
 475 
 
 Chambers, Lieutenant W. I., sur- 
 veys Nicaragua route, 427 ; in- 
 spects work done, 452. See also 
 expeditions of inspection 
 
 Chancos valley, 488 
 
610 
 
 Index. 
 
 Channing, W. F., his ship railway 
 scheme, 380 
 
 Charles, King of Spain, 48 
 
 Chatfield, English agent in Central 
 America 178,180, 199, 220. See 
 also Tigre Island 
 
 Chepo, Rio, 9 
 
 Chevalier, Michel, Napoleon's agent, 
 294 
 
 Childs, Colonel O. W., his surveys 
 in Nicaragua, 217, 477 
 
 Chirambira, port of, 11 
 
 Chiri-Chiri Bay, n 
 
 Chiriqui, lagoon, 8, 12 ; province 
 of, 8; colonization scheme, 278; 
 Improvement Company, 279, see 
 also Thompson, Ambrose W. ; 
 coaling stations, 370. See also 
 Golfito 
 
 Chiriqui route, description of, 8 ; 
 favorable for railway, 12 
 
 Chivela pass, 4 
 
 Chontales uplands, 60 
 
 Chucunagua valley, 10 
 
 Clarence, Mosquito Chief, 5CX)-502 
 
 Clarendon, Lord, English Foreign 
 Secretary, 233 ; his ultimatum, 
 235. See also Dallas-Clarendon 
 
 Clark, Aaron, his canal project, 154 
 
 Clay, Henry, his resolution em- 
 bodying Monroe Doctrine, 137; 
 his interest in the canal project, 
 142 
 
 Clayton, Secretary of State, his 
 canal policy, 197, •2,0'2,,et seq. See 
 also Treaties, Clayton-Bulwer 
 
 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, signing of, 
 210; debate in Congress on, 231, 
 et seq. ; threatened abrogation of, 
 252, see also Buchanan ; resolu- 
 tion in favor of abrogation of, 
 391 ; subsequent diplomacy in re- 
 gard to, 392, et seq.; analysis of 
 by Frelinghuysen, 410 ; adjust- 
 ment effected by, 582 ; for full 
 text of, see Appendix B 
 
 Cleveland, President, his canal 
 policy, 435 ; arbitrates boundary 
 dispute between Nicaragua and 
 Costa Rica, 1888, 442 ; appoints 
 Canal Board, 478 
 
 Coaling stations, see Chiriqui, Gol- 
 fito 
 
 Coast range, 6 
 
 Coatzacoalcos Rio, 4, 115 
 
 Collins, Lieutenant Frederick, U 
 S. N., surveys Atrato-Napipi 
 route, 329 
 
 Colombia, independence of, 130 
 abolishes slavery, 130 ; disinter- 
 gration of, 1 57 ; United States of 
 285 ; present government in, 49r 
 See also New Granada, Treaties 
 
 Colon, town of, 9 
 
 Colorado, Rio, made outlet of San 
 Juan, 77 ; Costa Rica's claim to, 
 see Boundary Dispute 
 
 Columbian Hypothesis, 35, 56 
 
 Columbus, his theories, projects, and 
 discoveries, 30, et seq. ; lands in 
 Central America, 32 ; death of 33 
 
 Comayagua, plain of, 5, 12 
 
 Comiti A mericain ,378 
 
 Commerce, movement of world's, 19; 
 how affected by canal, 20, 521, 
 et seq. ; development of, 21 ; 
 United States, how affected by 
 canal, 551-555 
 
 Comfagnie Ghiirale Transatlan- 
 tique, 277 
 
 Concessions, Colombia, to Socidti, 
 Civile, 1876, 1877, 341, 348 ; 
 Mexico to Eads's company, 1881, 
 382 ; Nicaragua to Provisional 
 Interoceanic Society, 1880, 1882, 
 384, 386 ; Nicaragua to Pro- 
 visional Interoceanic Canal 
 Association, 1887, 438 
 
 Conejo, plain of, 5, 6 
 
 Conness, Senator, introduces resolu- 
 tion for government surveys, 
 318 
 
 Conservative party in Central 
 America, 156, 240, 302, 334, 440 
 
 Construction Company, Nicaragua 
 Canal, incorporation of, 438 ; in 
 hands of receiver, 462 
 
 Conti, his description of the East, 
 29 
 
 Continents, the contest over, 556- 
 562 
 
 Contreras, succeeds Pedrarias as 
 governor of Nicaragua, 62 ; opens 
 San Juan, 62 
 
 Cordillera range, 3,4, 5, 6, 10 
 
 Cordova, Francisco Hernandez de, 
 his discoveries in Mexico, 39 ; 
 explores Lake Nicaragua, 49 
 
Index. 
 
 611 
 
 Corinto, harbor of, 7 ; British oc- 
 cupation of, 507 
 
 Corral, Miguel de, surveys Tehuan- 
 tepec route, 1771, 115. See also 
 Cramer 
 
 Cortereal, Caspar de, his discoveries, 
 43 
 
 Cortes, Spanish, its decree, 120 
 
 Cortez, Hernando, conquest of 
 Mexico, 39 ; his efforts to find the 
 strait, 50 ; his march to the 
 Fresh-water Sea, 52, et seq.; his 
 death, 55 
 
 Cost of Construction, Nicaragua 
 Canal, various estimates, 494 ; 
 Panama Canal estimates, 419 
 note, 473, et seq. 
 
 Costa Rica, topography of, 8 ; in- 
 tendancy of, 65 ; joins Federal 
 Republic, 1823, 131 ; English 
 claim to shore of, 170 ; her claim 
 to canal route, 224, 333 ; Basis of 
 settlement concerning, 227; union 
 of the five states, 1885, 441 ; com- 
 pensation contract with, 444. See 
 also Boundary Dispute 
 
 Cotton, United States export of, 
 526 
 
 Couvreux and Hersent, contractors, 
 419, 428 
 
 Cramer, Antonio, surveys Tehuan- 
 tepec route, 1771, 115. See also 
 Corral 
 
 Crampton, English minister to 
 United States, 203, 227 
 
 Craven, Lieutenant T. A.,U. S. N., 
 surveys, Atrato routes, 272. See 
 also Kelly 
 
 Cuba, proved to be an island, 36 ; 
 agitation toward annexation to 
 United States, 239 
 
 Culebra, cut, 429, 476 ; pass, 9 
 
 Cullen, Dr. Edward, report on Cal- 
 edonian route, 264 
 
 Cupica, port of, 11 
 
 Gushing, Caleb, negotiates treaty 
 with Colombia, i86g, 310. See 
 also Treaties 
 
 D. 
 
 Dallas, George MifiSin, United States 
 
 Minister to England, 250 
 Dallas-Clarendon, negotiations, 250 
 
 Dalling, Governor of Jamaica, loi 
 Darien, isthmus of, 9, 10 ; gulf of, 
 
 10; expeditions, 1870, 321, el 
 
 seq. See also Selfridge 
 Dartmouth, Lord, draws up scheme 
 
 of government for Mosquitoland, 
 
 1775. 98 
 
 Davila, Gil Gonzales, his explora- 
 tions in Nicaragua, 48 ; his 
 struggle with Cortez and Pedrarias, 
 50, et seq. 
 
 Davis, Admiral, U. S. N.,his report 
 on canal question, 314 
 
 Davis, Captain Charles H., U.S.N., 
 forces Walker to capitulate, 244 
 
 Davis, Edward, loots city of 
 Granada, 76 
 
 De Leon, Ponce, his discoveries, 36 
 
 De Lesseps, Charles, his report on 
 progress of Panama canal, 430 ; 
 his trial and conviction, 466 ; 
 
 De Lesseps, Ferdinand, his inter- 
 est in the canal project, 338 ; his 
 plans, 342; decides in favor of So- 
 cim Civile, 351 ; International Sci- 
 entific Congress, 354 ; failure of 
 first efforts, 366 ; inaugurates work 
 at Panama, 368 ; attempts to gain 
 support in the United States, 376; 
 arouses enthusiasm for Panama 
 project, 417; organizes Panama 
 Canal Company, 420 ; his trial and 
 conviction, 466. See also Panama 
 
 Demarkation, Papal line of, in 
 America, 33 
 
 De Puydt, surveys Atrato-Tuyra 
 route, 276 ; his canal project, 342, 
 356, 366 
 
 Deseado, valley, basins, 490, 492 
 
 De Solis, Juan Diaz, his voyages, 
 40 
 
 De Soto, Hernando, Cordova's lieu- 
 tenant, 52 
 
 Dias, Bartholemeu, his voyages, 30 
 
 Dickinson, Andrew B., United States 
 minister to Central America, 306 
 
 Dickinson-Ayon treaty, 1868, 307 ; 
 for extracts from, see Appendix 
 C. See also Treaties 
 
 Divide, eastern, 489 
 
 Doguado, Rio, 11 
 
 Donaldson, H. F., English engineer, 
 452. See also Expeditions of in- 
 spection 
 
612 
 
 Index. 
 
 Dutton, Major C. E., U.S.A., 452. 
 See also Expeditions of inspection 
 
 Eads.Captain James B. ,his ship-rail- 
 way scheme, 379, etseq.; fails to 
 
 secure governmental support, 388. 
 
 See also Tehuantepec 
 East, the far, Europe's trade with, 
 
 $22, et seq.; United States' trade 
 
 with, 524-529 
 Easterly trade routes, Great 
 
 Britain's control of, 563-566 
 Ecuador, province of Colombia, 
 
 1821, 130 ; withdraws 1830, 157 
 Edmunds, Senator, introduces bill 
 
 to incorporate Maritime Canal 
 
 Company, 449 
 Eiffel, M., his plans for a lock canal 
 
 across Panama, 431 ; his trial 
 
 and conviction, 466 
 Encisco, Governor of Nueva An- 
 
 dalucia, 37, 47 
 Endicott, M. T., civil engineer, 
 
 member of Canal Board, 478 
 Erie ship-canal, 536 
 Estee, Governor of California, 
 
 speech on canal project, 459 
 Estero Real, 7 
 Evarts, Secretary of State, his 
 
 letter advocating exclusive control, 
 
 375 
 Expeditions of inspection, Nica- 
 ragua canal, 451, etseq. 
 
 Falcmar, Captain, Swedish engineer, 
 surveys Panama route for General 
 Bolivar, 146. See also Bolivar, 
 Lloyd 
 
 Federal Republic of United Prov- 
 inces of Central America, es- 
 tablished in 1823, 131 ; disinte- 
 gration of, 1838, 156 
 
 Ferdinand, King of Spain, colonial 
 plans of, 37 ; his desire to dis- 
 cover the southwest passage, 40 
 
 Ferrelo, succeeds Cabrillo, 54 
 
 Filisola, General, forms Federal 
 Republic of Central America, 
 1823, 131 
 
 Fillmore, President, 215 
 
 Fish, Secretary of State, 317 ; his 
 diplomacy in Nicaragua, 332. 
 See also Cardenas 
 
 Fitzgibbon, William, American ad- 
 venturer, 230. See also Bay 
 Islands 
 
 Fitzroy, Admiral R. N., his report 
 on Nicaragua route, 163. See also 
 Napoleon 
 
 Flachat, French engineer, con- 
 demns Atrato route, 277 
 
 Florida lagoon, 488 
 
 Fonseca, Gulf of, 5, 7 
 
 Foster, Governor of Louisiana, 
 speech on canal project, 459 
 
 Fox, Henderson and Brassey, 
 London canal promoters, 265 
 
 Freebooter raids, 72 et seg. 
 
 Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, 
 takes up diplomatic dispute with 
 England, 408. See also Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty 
 
 Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty, see 
 Treaties 
 
 French, Parker H., Nicaraguan 
 minister to United States, 241 
 
 Frye, introduces resolution in Con- 
 gress, 363 
 
 Furtado, Bartolome, his discoveries, 
 48 
 
 G. 
 
 Gage, English missionary, his book 
 on Central America, 76 
 
 Galisteo, Manuel, his report on 
 Nicaragua route, 1781,116 
 
 Galveo, Antonio, his monograph on 
 the transit question, 69 
 
 Garay, Jose de, Mexican promoter, 
 l88. See also Tehuantepec route, 
 Moro 
 
 Garay, Francisco de, Spanish Gov- 
 ernor of Jamaica, 39 
 
 Garella, Napoleon, surveys Panama 
 route, 159. See also Philippe, 
 Louis 
 
 Garfield, President, 391 
 
 George Frederick, Mosquito chief, 
 167, 168 
 
 Gisborne, Lionel, explores Cale- 
 donian route, 265 
 
 Goascoran, Rio, 5 
 
 Godolphin, Sir William, negotiates 
 treaty of 1670, 78 
 
Index. 
 
 613 
 
 Gogorza, discovers maps and docu- 
 ments bearing on canal project, 
 
 277 
 
 Gold, Mercantile demand for, 27; 
 effect of its discovery in California 
 on transit problem, 187 
 
 Golfito, coaling station, 371. Seealso 
 Chiriqui 
 
 Golfo Duke, 8, 12 
 
 Gomara, Lopez, his plea to King 
 Philip, 69 
 
 Gooch, H. F., English engineer, 
 452. See also Expeditions of in- 
 spection 
 
 Gracias 4 Dios, Cape, rounded by 
 Columbus, 32 
 
 Grande Rio, Nicaragua, 7 ; regula- 
 tion of, 327, 480, see also Childs, 
 'Lull, Menocal ; Panama, 9 
 
 Grant, General, his interest aroused 
 in canal project, 313 ; his canal 
 policy, 314, et seq.\ his provision 
 for government surveys, 318; 
 associated with Provisional Inter- 
 oceanic Canal Society, 365, 366 ; 
 with Maritime Canal Company, 
 423 ; Grant and Ward, bankers, 
 
 423 
 
 Granville, Lord, succeeds Palmer- 
 ton, 226 ; replies to, Blaine's 
 circular letter, 402 ; replies to 
 Blaine's theoretical argument and 
 historical objections, 404; traverses 
 Mr. Frelinghuysen'scase, 412 
 
 Great Britain, her position on 
 isthmus after Spanish-American 
 independence, 164 ; her control 
 of the easterly trade routes, 563- 
 566 ; her present position in the 
 West, 566-568 
 
 Grey, Sir Charles, Governor of 
 Jamaica, 179 
 
 Greytown, naming of, 181 ; bom- 
 bardment of, 237 ; indemnity 
 demanded for, 336 ; constituted 
 a free port by treaty of i860, 261; 
 harbor of, 305, 491. See also 
 West, Mitchell 
 
 Grijalva, Juan de, his discoveries in 
 Mexico, 39 
 
 Guanaja, see Bay Islands 
 
 Guaranty Bill, of 1891, 455 ; of 
 of 1892, 460 ; of 1894, 470. See 
 also Morgan, Sherman 
 
 Guatemala, Chancellorate of, 63 ; 
 boundaries of, 64 ; revolt of, 130 ; 
 independence of , 1821, 130; under 
 Mexican dominion, 131 ; joins 
 Federal Republic, 1823, 131 ; 
 withdraws, 1838, 157 ; indepen- 
 dence acknowledged by England, 
 166 ; union of the five states, 
 1885,440. &i? a/jo Treaties 
 
 Guiterez, Diego, his attempted con- 
 quest, 64 
 
 Guizot, Minister to Louis Philippe, 
 
 159 
 Gulindo, Colonel, Central American 
 Minister to tlie United States, 
 173; Guatemalan envoy to Eng- 
 land, 174 
 
 H. 
 
 Hargous, P. A. , American promoter, 
 189, 381. See also Tehuantepec 
 
 Hatch, E. D., British pro-consul at 
 Bluefields, 506 
 
 Hatfield, Captain Chester, com- 
 mands first Nicaraguan expedi- 
 tion, 1872, 325 
 
 Hawkshaw, Sir John, English dele- 
 gate to International Scientific 
 Congress, 355. See also Stokes 
 
 Hayes, President, establishes coal- 
 ing station at Chiriqui, 371 ; his 
 message advocating exclusive con- 
 trol, 374 
 
 Herrera, Spanish Governor of Nic- 
 aragu, 98 
 
 •Heuer, Captain William- H., his 
 report on Darien and Nicaragua 
 routes, 328. See also Mitchell, 
 McFarland 
 
 Hidalgo, Mexican leader, 130 
 
 Hise, Elijah, treaty with Nicaragua, 
 1849, 195. See also Treaties 
 
 Hitchcock, Hiram President Mari- 
 time Canal Company, 449 
 
 Hodgson, Robert, establishes British 
 protectorate over the Mosquito 
 Indians, 90 ; Superintendent of 
 Mosquito Shore, 94 ; his last 
 expedition to seize the San Juan, 
 98 ; report on Nicaragua route, 
 116. See also Lee 
 
 Hojedo, Alonzo de, his voyages, 
 31 ; granted Nueva Andalucia, 37 
 
614 
 
 Index. 
 
 Hollins, Captain, U. S. N., bom- 
 bards Grey town, 237 ; convoys 
 Strain's expedition to Caledonian 
 Bay, 267 
 
 Honduras, Interoceanic Railway 
 Company, 249 
 
 Honduras, Joins Federal Republic 
 1823, 131 ; Liberal Confederacy, 
 1838, 157 ; union of the five, 
 states, 1885,441. See also Treaties 
 
 Honduras route, description of, 5 ; 
 favorable for a railway, 1 2 
 
 Howard, Lieutenant Guy, U. S. A., 
 452. See also Expeditions of in- 
 spection 
 
 Hughes, Colonel George W. , surveys 
 Panama route, 192 
 
 Humboldt, Alexander von, his in- 
 vestigations along the isthmus 
 119 
 
 Humphreys, General A. A. , member 
 of Interoceanic Canal Commis- 
 sion, 319 
 
 Humuya, Rio, 5 
 
 Hurlbut, General Stephen A., 
 negotiates treaty with Colombia, 
 1870, 316. See also Treaties 
 
 I. 
 
 Individualism, growth of, 123 
 
 International guaranty of Panama 
 route, 362 ; Blaine's attitude, 
 toward, 392. See also Monroe 
 Doctrine. 
 
 International Scientific Congress, 
 1879, plan for, 352 ; make up and 
 organization of, 354 ; decides in 
 favor of Panama route, 360. See 
 also de Lesseps 
 
 International Technical Commis- 
 sion, 368 
 
 Interoceanic Canal Commission, 319; 
 final report of in favor of Nic- 
 aragua route, 330. See also 
 Ammen, Humphreys, Patterson 
 
 Investigating Committee, Panama 
 Canal, its report, 467 
 
 Isthmus, the American, its natural 
 features, 2, et seq. 
 
 Iturbide, Mexican leader, 130 
 
 J- 
 Jackson, President, his canal policy, 
 152 
 
 Jamaica, occupied by British, 1655, 
 75 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, his letter on the 
 Monroe Doctrine, 135 
 
 Jeffrey, United States Minister to 
 the Netherlands, 150 
 
 Jeremy, Mosquito Chief, 83 
 
 Jones, Judge, speech on canal pro- 
 ject, 459 
 
 Jordan, Solicitor of Treasury, report 
 on Chiriqui route, 280 
 
 Juan, Jorge, physicist, examines 
 isthmus, 114 
 
 K. 
 
 Keith, Sir Basil, Governor of Ja- 
 maica, 99 
 
 Kelly, Frederick, investigates Atrato 
 routes, 270 ; investigates San Bias 
 route, 273 ; delegate to Inter- 
 national Scientific Congress, 354 
 
 Kelly's Inlet, n 
 
 Kennish, Captain, surveys Atrato- 
 Truando route, 271. See also 
 Kelly 
 
 Kerr, J. B., United States agent in 
 Nicaragua, 228 
 
 King, Chairman United States Sen- 
 ate Committee, 213 
 
 Kinney, Filibuster driven from Nica- 
 ragua by Walker, 240 
 
 Knowles, Governor of Jamaica, 95 
 
 L. 
 
 Lacayo, General, Nicaraguan Com- 
 missioner, 500 
 
 Lacharme, French engineer, surveys 
 Atrato route, 277 
 
 La Condamine, French scientist, 
 examines isthmus, 113 
 
 La Flor dam, 481 
 
 Lajas, Rio, 7 ; route, 218, 327, 427 
 note, 480 
 
 Las Casas, P'rancisco de, Cortez's 
 lieutenant, 52 
 
 Lawes, Governor of Jamaica, 84 
 
 Lawrence, Abbott, United States 
 Minister to England, 204 
 
 Lawrie, Colonel, succeeds Hodgson 
 as Superintendent of Mosquito 
 shore, 99 
 
 Lebreton, Dr., examines Darien di- 
 vide, 274 
 
Index. 
 
 615 
 
 Lee, Captain, his expedition to Be- 
 lize, go ; report on Nicaragua 
 route, Ii6 
 
 Lefevre, French promoter, 333 
 
 Leon, plain of, 5, 6, 7 
 
 Liberalism, growth of, 107 ; period 
 of, 124 
 
 Liberal party of Central America, 
 156, 240, 302, 334, 440 
 
 Limpio, Rio, 489 
 
 Lincoln, President, his Chiriqui col- 
 onization scheme, 280 ; his policy 
 on lower isthmus, 284 ; his policy 
 in Nicaragua, 292 
 
 Livingston, J. W., United States 
 Consul in Nicaragua, 186 
 
 Livingston, Secretary of State, 150 
 
 Lloyd, English engineer, surveys 
 Panama route for General Bolivar, 
 146. See also Falcmar 
 
 Loch, Captain, R. N., leads attack 
 upon Nicaragua, 182. See also 
 Treaties 
 
 Locks, western division, 482 ; east- 
 em division, 490 
 
 Logan, United States Minister to 
 Central America, 395 
 
 Lopez, Diego, his attempted con- 
 quest, 65 
 
 Lowell, United States Minister to 
 England, 399, 403, 409 
 
 Ludlow, Lieutenant Colonel Will- 
 iam, member of Canal Board, 478 
 
 Lull, Captain E. P., surveys Atrato 
 routes, 1871, 322 ; surveys Nica- 
 ragua route, 1872, 326, 480. See 
 also Lajas and Medio routes 
 
 M. 
 
 Macdonald, Colonel, Superintendent 
 at Belize, constituted regent of 
 Mosquitia, 169 ; establishes colony 
 of British Honduras, 171 ; occu- 
 pies Roatan, 172 ; attacks Grey- 
 town, 173 ; recalled, 177 
 
 MacGregor, Sir John, his colony in 
 Costa Rica, 170 
 
 Magalhaens, his voyage around the 
 world, 41 
 
 Managua, Lake, 6, 7 ; treaty of 
 i860, see Treaties 
 
 Mandeville, his description of the 
 East, 29 
 
 Marcoleta, Nicaraguan chargi d'af- 
 faires to Belgium, 161. See also 
 Napoleon 
 
 Marcy, Secretary of State, 233, 241, 
 283 
 
 Maritime Canal Company, organiza- 
 tion of, 422 ; incorporation of, 
 449 ; thrown on markets of world, 
 461 
 
 Martyr, Peter, speaks of the " New 
 World," 35 
 
 Mat^alpa, uplands of, 60 
 
 McFarland, Major Walter, reports 
 on Darien and Nicaragua routes, 
 328. See also Heuer, Mitchell 
 
 Medio route, 327, 427 note ; 480 
 
 Mendoza, Hurtado de, his discover- 
 ies, 54 
 
 Menocal, Lieutenant A. G., surveys 
 Nicaragua route, 326, 335, 427, 
 439, 480, et seq. ; surveys San Bias 
 and Panama routes, 329 ; delegate 
 to International Scientific Con- 
 gress, 354 ; negotiates concession 
 for Provisional Canal Society, 365, 
 384 ; for Provisional Canal Asso- 
 ciation, 438. See also Nicaragua 
 Canal, present plans 
 
 Mercantile system, 25 
 
 Mercer, Chairman Committee on 
 Roads and Canals, his report on 
 canal project, 151; 
 
 Mexico, independence acknowl- 
 edged by England, 1826, 166 
 
 Michler, Lieutenant Nathaniel, sur- 
 veys Atrato routes, 272. See also 
 Kelly 
 
 Milla, Manuel, surveys Caledonian 
 route, 118 
 
 Miller, Senator, introduces bill for 
 Nicaragua Canal Company, 386 
 
 Miller, Warner, President Construc- 
 tion Company, 452 ; address be- 
 fore New York Chamber of Com- 
 merce, 457 
 
 Miranda, Spanish-American leader, 
 130 
 
 Mississippi Valley, its relation to 
 canal, 527 
 
 Missouri Valley, its relation to canal, 
 535 
 
 Mitchell, Professor, his studies of 
 Greytown harbor, 328, 491. See 
 also Heuer, McFarland 
 
616 
 
 Innex. 
 
 Mizner, United States Minister to 
 Central America, 450 
 
 Modyford, Sir T., Governor of Ja- 
 maica, 79 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, its relation to Nic- 
 aragua Canal, 2, 556-597 ; proc- 
 lamation of, 132 et seq,, 579; as 
 asserted by President Adams, 139 ; 
 neglected by President Polli, 186 ; 
 its effect upon French attempt to 
 gain a foothold on isthmus, 286 ; 
 its effect on international guaranty 
 of Panama Canal, 362 et seq. ; its 
 relation to the Transit Question, 
 580, 584; rerating of, 589 
 
 Morazan, Liberal leader, 157 
 
 Morel, French engineer, surveys 
 Panama route, 159. See also Salo- 
 mon 
 
 Morgan, Senator, speech before Nevf 
 Orleans convention, 459 ; speech 
 before Senate, 471 ; Welsh buc- 
 caneer, 85 
 
 Moro, Gaetano, Italian engineer, 
 surveys Tehuantepec route, 188. 
 See also Gaiay 
 
 Moscoe Indians, 73 
 
 Mosquera, Liberal leader, 284,310 
 
 Mosquito, Indians, origin of, 81 ; 
 English regency over, 1825, 169 ; 
 status of according tp treaty' of 
 Managua, 260 ; Kingdom, estab- 
 lished by England, 1816, 167 ; ex- 
 tent of, according to British claim, 
 179 ; land, establishment of British 
 dependency of, 98 ; protectorate, 
 established, 90 ; maintained after 
 Clayton-Bulvifer treaty, 220 ; re- 
 affirmed by Emperor of Austria, 
 397 ; abandoned, 499-507 ; shore, 
 description of, 6 ; trouble in after 
 treaty of Managua, 306 ; present 
 plans for improvement, 508 
 
 Murphy, 'William S., United States 
 agent in Central America, 173 
 
 N. 
 
 Napier, Lord, British Minister to 
 United States, negotiates with 
 President Buchanan as to Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty, 252 et seq. 
 
 Napipi, Rio, 11 
 
 Napoleon, Louis, his canal project, 
 ibietseq., 2%6 et seq., ztj'ietseq. 
 
 National Academy of Sciences, en- 
 quires into causes of deterior^ition 
 of Greytovi^n harbor, 306 
 
 National Representation of Central 
 America, 225 
 
 Nelson, Lord, his attack upon the 
 San Juan, 100 et seq. 
 
 Neutralization of canal route, 575 
 
 New Granada, kingdom of, 1542, 
 58 ; province of Colombia, 1821, 
 
 130 ; separate republic, 1830, 157 ; 
 opposes British jurisdiction over 
 Mosquito shore, 174 ; claim set 
 aside by England, 183; treaty 
 with United States, 1848, 190 ; 
 See also Treaties ; for extracts see 
 Appendix A. Becomes known as 
 United States of Colombis^, 285. 
 see also Colombia 
 
 Nicaragua, conquest of, 48, 49 ; 
 colonization of, 58 ; climate of, 
 59 ; products of, 60 ; early in- 
 habitants of, 60 ; under English 
 supremacy, 95 ; attempted seizure 
 of, by British, loi ; Spain's do- 
 minion confirmed by treaties of 
 1783 and 1786, 103 et seq. ; 
 joins Federal Republic, 1823, 
 
 131 ; Liberal Confederacy, 1838, 
 157 ; compelled by England to 
 relinquish Greytown, 182 ; joins 
 National Representation of Cen- 
 tral America, 225 ; liberal govern- 
 ment formed, by "Walker, 240 ; 
 union of five states, 1885, 441. 
 See also Treaties, Boundary Dis- 
 pute 
 
 Nicaragua, Lake of, 6, 7, 479 
 Nicaragua Canal, its relation to 
 Monroe Doctrine, 2 ; work com- 
 menced on, 450 ; expeditions of 
 inspection, 1890, 452 ; present 
 plans 477-493. See also Canal 
 Projects, Maritime Company, 
 Construction Company 
 Nicaragua Canal Route, regarded as 
 most favorable by the United 
 States, I ; description of, 5 ; com- 
 pared to Panama route, 14, 15 ; 
 transitway across established, 65 ; 
 still in hands of Spain, 1814, 112 ; 
 examined by Condamine, 1735, 
 113; surveys instituted by Charles 
 III., 1779-1781, 116 ; examined 
 
Index. 
 
 617 
 
 by von Humboldt, 119 ; further 
 surveys and formation of Ameri- 
 can company, 144 ; surveys by 
 Central American states, 1 54 ; ad- 
 vocated by Napoleon, 161 ; Eng- 
 land's interest in, 163 ; seizure of 
 eastern terminus by English, 175 
 et seq. ; British control of, igg ; 
 Colonel Child's surveys of, 217 ; 
 United States government surveys, 
 325; final report of commission in 
 favor of, 330 ; report of Canal 
 Board on, 477 et seq. ; regarded 
 from strategical standpoint, 595 et 
 seq. See also Belly, Childs, Lull, 
 Menocal, Canal Projects 
 
 Nicaraguan Expeditions, 1872-1873, 
 325 et seq. 
 
 Nicholson, valley, 488 
 
 Nicoya, Gulf of, 48 
 
 Nicuesa, Diego, granted Castilla del 
 Oro, 37 
 
 Noble, Alfred, member of Canal 
 Board, 478 
 
 North America, trade of Pacific ports 
 of, vifith Europe, 533-541 ; trade 
 between east and vilest coasts of, 
 533-541 ; trade of east and west 
 coasts of, with west and east 
 coasts of South America, 541-548 
 
 Northwest Territory, its products 
 and future, 537-538 
 
 Norwood, Representative, intro- 
 duces bill to incorporate Maritime 
 Canal Company, 449 
 
 Nueva Andalucia, province of, 37. 
 See also Hojedo 
 
 Nunez, Dr., dictator of Colombia, 
 433, 498 
 
 O. 
 
 Ochoa, dam, 484-488 
 
 Oersted, Dr. Andreas, his route, 
 217, 287 
 
 Oldman, Mosquito Chief, 82 
 
 Old Providence Island, 73 
 
 O'Leary, English agent in Bogota, 
 178 
 
 Olid, Christoval de, Cort,ez's lieuten- 
 ant, 51 
 
 Omoa, Spanish fort of, 102 
 
 O'Neil, Captain, U. S. N., restores 
 order in Mosquitia, 503 
 
 O'Neil, Governor of Guatemala, no 
 Orbegozo, General, surveys Tehuan- 
 
 tepec route, 145. See also Vitto- 
 
 ria 
 Ordaz, Diego de, explores isthmus 
 
 of "Tehuantepec, 50 
 Ortiz, Orteo, surveys Tehuantepec 
 
 route, 145. See also Vera Cruz 
 Ouseley, Sir William, English envoy 
 
 to Central America, 254, 256, 260 
 
 P. 
 
 Pacific ports of North America, their 
 trade with Europe and the Atlan- 
 tic ports of the United States, 
 533-541 ; their trade with the At- 
 lantic ports of South America, 
 542 ; railways, their relation to 
 the canal, 533 et seq. ; slope, its 
 relation to canal, 529 
 
 Palmerston, Lord, English Foreign 
 Secretary, carries out plan for 
 British control of Nicaragua route, 
 177 et seq. ; his diplomacy in re- 
 gard to Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
 204 et seq. ; succeeded by Lord 
 Granville, 226 
 
 Panama, founding of town of, 47 ; 
 decline of, 66 ; sacking of by Eng- 
 lish buccaneers, 86, see also 
 Morgan ; riots in, 282, 434 ; canal 
 project, how affected by Monroe 
 Doctrine, 362 et seq. ; inaugura- 
 tion of, 368 ; beginning of work 
 on, and its enormous expense, 427 
 et seq. ; liquidation of, 432 ; 
 present plans, 474 et seq. ; canal 
 scandal, 464 et seq., see also de 
 Lesseps, Ferdinand ; congress, 
 planned by Bolivar, 138; attitude 
 of United States toward, 140 ; 
 resolutions of Congress concern- 
 ing, 140 ; its relation to .canal 
 projects, 141 ; failure of, 146 ; 
 railway company organized, 191 ; 
 opened, 1855, 282 ; difficulty in 
 maintaining neutrality of, 282 ; 
 its right of way, 342 ; comes to 
 terms with SocUte' Civile, 351 ; re- 
 port of Investigating Committee, 
 467 ; competition with canal, 531 
 
 Panama Route, description of, 8 ; 
 compared to Nicaragua route, 14, 
 
618 
 
 Index. 
 
 15 ; advantages of for sea-level 
 canal, 16 ; opening of transit 
 across, 57 ; surveys by Bolivar, 
 1826, 146, see also Falcmar, 
 Lloyd ; surveys by Salomon Com- 
 pany, 1836, 159, see also Morel; 
 declared unfeasible by English, 
 163 ; report on, see Totten ; sur- 
 veys by Lull and Menocal. 1873, 
 329 ; surveys by Reclus, 1878, 349 ; 
 canal plans, SociM Civile, 354 ; 
 International Scientific Congress 
 decides in favor of, 360 ; regarded 
 from strategical standpoint, 594. 
 See also de Lesseps, Ferdinand 
 
 Panic, 1893, its effect on canal com- 
 panies, 462 
 
 Paterson, William, his colony in 
 Caledonian Bay, 86 
 
 Patterson, C. P., member of Inter- 
 oceanic Canal Commission, 3 rg 
 
 Paulding, Commodore U. S. N., 
 forces Walker to surrender, 245 
 
 Peary, Lieutenant R. E., U. S. N., 
 surveys Nicaragua route, 427 
 
 Pedrarias, Governor of Tierra Fir- 
 ma, 47 ; explores Nicaragua, 53 ; 
 conquest of Nicaragua, 59 ; Gov- 
 ernor of Nicaragua, 61 
 
 Pelion, French Admiral, explores 
 Golfo Duke, 278 
 
 Pellas, franchise, 454, 495 
 
 Peru, Spanish trade vi'itli, 56 
 
 Petroleum, United States export of, 
 526 
 
 Phelps, Captain S. L. , President 
 Provisional Canal Society, 365 
 
 Phelps, United States Minister to 
 England, 447 
 
 Philippe, Louis, his canal project, 
 159 et seq. See also Salomon 
 
 Picking, Commander U. S. N., re- 
 port on Chiriqui, 371 
 
 Pierce, President, his canal policy, 
 233, 282 
 
 Pineda, Alvarez, his discoveries in 
 Mexico, 39 
 
 Pinzon, Vincent, his voyages, 31 
 
 Pitt, William, the elder, his offer to 
 evacuate Central America, 96 
 
 Pitt, the younger, his advocacy of 
 treaty of 1786, 107 
 
 Pizarro, Francisco, his conquest of 
 Peru, 46 
 
 Polk, President, his failure to assert 
 Monroe Doctrine, 185 etseq. 
 
 Polo, Marco, his description of the 
 East, 29 
 
 Poison, Captain John, his expedition 
 up the San Juan, loi. See also 
 Nelson 
 
 Ponce, Fernando, his discoveries, 
 48 
 
 Provisional Interoceanic Canal Asso- 
 ciation, 438 ; Society, 365, 387 
 
 Pultney, Sir William, Lord of Eng- 
 lish Admiralty, 89 
 
 Quijano, Nicaraguan Customs Of- 
 ficer, 173. See also San Juan 
 
 R. 
 
 Raspadura ridge, 11 ; ravine, 271 ; 
 see also Kelly, Trautwine 
 
 Reclus, Lieutenant Armand, his sur- 
 vey of San Bias route, 344 ; of 
 Atrato route, 345 ; of Panama 
 route, 349. See also Wyse 
 
 Reinach, Baron, his connection with 
 Panama Canal scandal, 431, 464 
 
 Reservation, Mosquitos provided 
 for by treaty of Managua, i860, 
 260 
 
 Reservations to Clayton - Bulvper 
 treaty, 211 et seq. 
 
 Resolutions, United States Senate, 
 in regard to canal project, 1825, 
 152 ; 1839, 155 ; of Congress in 
 regard to British seizure of the 
 Bay Islands, 1852, 232 ; of Dem- 
 ocratic Convention, Cincinnati, 
 245 ; of Congress providing for 
 government surveys, 318 ; of Con- 
 gress providing for Interoceanic 
 Canal Commission, 319 ; of Paris 
 Geographical Society, 339 ; of In- 
 ternational Scientific Congress in 
 favor of Panama, 361 ; of Con- 
 gress in favor of exclusive control, 
 363 ; of Congress in favor of coal- 
 ing stations, 372 ; of Congress, 
 joint, in favor of abrogation of 
 Clayton-Bulvifer treaty, 391 ; of 
 St. Louis Canal Convention, 
 458 ; of New Orleans Canal Con- 
 vention, 459 
 
Index. 
 
 619 
 
 Rivas, Patricio, President of Nica- 
 ragua, 240. See also Walker, 
 W illiam 
 
 Rives, Assistant Secretary of State, 
 442 
 
 Roatan, seized by English free- 
 booters, 75 ; by British settlers, 
 g3, 171, 172. 5«^ o/jo Bay Islands 
 
 Robert, Charles Frederick, Mos- 
 quito chief, 168 
 
 Rodrigues, J. C, correspondent, 
 34g, 368 note i 
 
 Roman, J. A., Nicaraguan commis- 
 sioner, 453, See also expeditions 
 of inspection 
 
 Rouchoud, French promoter, 159 
 
 Rude, surveys San Bias route, 274. 
 See also Kelly 
 
 Rush, Richard, United States Min- 
 ister to England, 134 
 
 S. 
 
 Saavedra, Cortez's lieutenant, 53 
 
 Salinas, Bay of, 7 
 
 Salomon and Company, their Pana- 
 ma canal project, 159. See also 
 Philippe, Louis 
 
 San Bias, harbor of, 9 ; route, de- 
 scription of, g ; disadvantages of, 
 13 ; surveyed for Mr. Kelly by 
 Mr. Rude, 1863, 273 ; by Self- 
 ridge, 1870, 321 ; by Lull and 
 Menocal, 1874, 329 ; by Wyse 
 and Reclus, 1877, 345 ; canal 
 plan, SociHi Civile, 353 
 
 San Carlos, fort, river, ridge, valley, 
 
 483-484 
 Sandoval, Gonzalo de, explores 
 
 isthmus of Tehuantepec, 50 
 San Francisco, basins, 488-489 
 San Juan, Rio, 6 ; ascended by free- 
 booters, 76, see also Davis ; for- 
 tified by Spanish, 77 ; reconsti- 
 tuted Spanish port of entry, 1791, 
 108; English demand upon, 173, 
 see also Quijano ; seizure of, by 
 British, 175 et seq. 
 San Juan del Sur, 7 
 San Juanillo, Rio, 484 
 San "Miguel, Gulf of . 10, 11 
 San Salvador, joins Federal Repub- 
 lic, 1823, 131 ; Liberal Confed- 
 eracy, 1838, 157 ; union of five 
 
 states, 1885, 441 ; advances in- 
 demnity money to Nicaragua, 
 507 
 
 Santander, Liberal leader, 158 
 
 Sapoa, Rio, 7 
 
 Saskatchewan valley, wheat of, 536 
 
 Savage, Henry, United States Con- 
 sul to Central America, 151 
 
 Savannah, valley of, 10 
 
 Schenck, General, United States 
 Minister to England, 332 
 
 Segovia, uplands of, 60 
 
 Selfridge, Commander, T. O., U. S. 
 N., commands Darien expedi- 
 tions, 1870, 321 ; delegate to In- 
 ternational Scientific Congress, 
 
 355 
 
 Selva, Beneventura, Nicaraguan 
 commissioner, 195. See also 
 Hise 
 
 Serapiqui, Rio, 182, 484 
 
 Seven Years' War, its effect on Eng- 
 lish settlements in Central Ameri- 
 ca, g6 
 
 Seward, Secretary of State, his plan 
 for joint intervention, 284 ; ne- 
 gotiates treaty with Honduras, 
 303 et seq. ; with Nicaragua, 306 ; 
 with Colombia, 309. See also 
 Treaties 
 
 Shaler, Prof. N. S,, his prophecy 
 concerning the Northwest, 538 
 
 Sharpe, Captain, English buccaneer. 
 86. See also Caledonian Bay 
 
 Sherman, Senator, introduces guar- 
 anty bill, l8gi, 456 ; presents 
 amended guaranty bill, 460 
 
 Shufeldt, Captain R. W., U. S. N., 
 commands Tehuantepec expedi- 
 tion, 1870, 323 
 
 Siboon (Sibun), Rio, 106 
 
 Sidell, Lieutenant Colonel W. H., 
 surveys Tehuantepec route, 381 
 
 Slavery, abolished by Colombia, 
 130 ; by Central American Con- 
 stitution, 131 ; its effect upon 
 American canal project, 2g8 
 
 Sloane, Sir Hans, historian of Ja- 
 maica. 84 
 
 Smith, Charles S., President New 
 York Chamber of Commerce, his 
 address, 457 
 
 Soci/t^ Civile, organized, 341 ; ex- 
 peditions of 1876, 1877, 344 ; its 
 
620 
 
 Index. 
 
 canal project, 352 ; bought up by 
 de Lesseps, 367. See also Canal 
 Companies, de Lesseps, Wyse, 
 Reel us 
 
 SociM d' Etudes, 266, 275 
 
 Sonnenstern, Maximilian, Nicara- 
 guan commissioner, 453. Seealso 
 expeditions of inspection 
 
 Sosa, Senor, Colombian engineer, 
 
 349 
 
 South America, Europe's trade with 
 west coast of, 529-532 ; trade be- 
 tween east and west coasts of, 532 ; 
 trade of west and east coasts of, 
 with east and west coasts of North 
 America, 541-549 
 
 Spain, her American monopoly, 56 ; 
 her position in America toward 
 close of i6th century, 70 ; attacks 
 upon her American monopoly, 71 
 
 Spanish-America, independence of, 
 129 et seq. 
 
 Squier, E. G., negotiates treaty with 
 Nicaragua, 1849, 197 ; with Hon- 
 duras, 1849, 200. See also 
 Treaties . 
 
 Stanley, Rt.-Hon. E. J., Secretary 
 English Admiralty, 183 
 
 Stauffer, D. McN., American en- 
 gineer, 452i Seealso expeditions 
 of inspection 
 
 Stephens, John L. , his reconnais- 
 sance of isthmus, 156 
 
 Stephenson, Admiral R. N., oc- 
 cupies Corinto, 507 
 
 Stevens, Simon, his Tehuantepec 
 project, 381 
 
 Stokes, Sir John, English delegate 
 to International Scientific Con- 
 gress, 355. Seealso Hawkshaw 
 
 Strain, Lieutenant Isaac C, U. S. 
 N,, explores Caledonian route, 
 267 ; proves its infeasibility, 269 
 
 Suez canal, neutralization of, quoted 
 as precedent, 575 
 
 T. 
 
 Tamarindo, Rio, 7 
 
 Tarifa, pass of, 4, 13, 188 
 
 Taylor, Captain Henry C, U. S. N., 
 his address before American Geo- 
 graphical Society, 438 ; illustrates 
 gnomonic projection, 528 note; 
 
 his description of the Caribbean, 
 548, 550 
 
 Taylor, President, his canal policy, 
 1 96 
 
 Tehuantepec, expedition, 1870, 325, 
 see also Shufeldt ; Railway Com- 
 pany, i8g, see also Hargous ; ' 
 route, description of, 4 ; disad- 
 vantages of, 12 ; favorable for 
 ship railway, 13 ; abandoned as 
 route of transit, 67 ; surveyed, 
 1771, 115 ; 1826, see also Orbe- 
 gozo, 145 ; 1842, see also Garay, 
 Moro, 188 ; 1857, see also Sidell, 
 381 ; 1870, see also Shufeldt, 324 
 et seq. ; regarded from strategical 
 standpoint, 594 ; ship-railway, 
 473 note 2. See also Eads 
 
 Thompson, Ambrose W., organizes 
 Chiriqui Improvement Company, 
 
 1859. 279 
 
 Thompson, Richard W. , Secretary 
 of Navy, Chairman of Comite 
 Americain, 378, 468. See also 
 Hayes, coaling stations 
 
 Tierra Firma, province of, 47 
 
 Tigre Island, seizure of, 199 et seq. 
 See also Squier. 
 
 Timber trade of United States, 536 
 
 Tola basin, 481 
 
 Tonnage, estimates of prospective, 
 513 note I 
 
 Tortugas Island, 72 
 
 Totten, Colonel, supervises con- 
 struction of Panama Railway, 
 192 ; report on Panama canal 
 project, 2J3 
 
 Trade routes, classification of, 518- 
 520 ; contest over, 560 et seq. 
 
 Trautwine, J. C, .supervises con- 
 struction of Panama Railway, 
 192 ; surveys Atrato route, 270. 
 See also Kelly 
 
 Treaties, Tordesillas, 1494, 34 I 
 American, 1670, 77, 88 ; Aix-la- 
 Chapelle, 1748, 94 ; Paris, 1763, 
 97 ; Versailles, 1783, IC3 : Sup- 
 plementary, 1786, 105 ; Madrid, 
 18 14, III ; Loch, with Nicaragua, 
 1848, 182 ; Gadsen, 1853, 189 ; 
 New Granada, 1848, 191 ; Hise, 
 with Nicaragua, 1849,195 ; Squier, 
 with Nicaragua, 1849, 197 ; with 
 Honduras, 1849, 200 ; Clayton- 
 
Index, 
 
 621 
 
 Bulwer, 1850, 210 ; for full text 
 see Appendix B ; England and 
 Honduras, 1856, 249 ; Canas- 
 Jerez, 1858, 257, 287, 443 ; Eng- 
 land, with Guatemala, 1859, 258 ; 
 with Honduras, 1859, 259; with 
 Nicaragua, Managua, i860, 260 ; 
 Cass-Yrisarri, 1857, 290; United 
 States, with Honduras, 1864, 303 ; 
 with Nicaragua, Dickinson-Ayon, 
 l868, 307 ; for extracts from, see 
 Appendix C ; United States, with 
 Colombia, Gushing, i86g, 310 ; 
 Hurlbut, 1870, 316 ; with Nica- 
 ragua, Frelinghuysen - Zavala, 
 1884, 425, 436 ; of Perpetual 
 Peace between Central American 
 states, 1887, 442 ; of Limits be- 
 tween Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 
 i88q, 450 
 
 Trelawney, Governor of Jamaica, 
 88 
 
 Trist, United States agent in Mex- 
 ico, 189 
 
 Truando, Rio, n 
 
 Truxillo, colony of, 53 
 
 Turnbull, Lieutenant-Colonel, his 
 report on Childs's surveys, 218 
 
 TUrr, General Etienne, his connec- 
 tion with the Soci^U Civile, 341. 
 See also Wyse 
 
 Tuyra, Rio, 10, 11 
 
 Twelve Years, the, 158 
 
 Tyler, President, 185 
 
 U. 
 
 Ulloa, Antonio de, surveys along 
 isthmus, 114 
 
 Ulloa, Francisco de, Cortez's lieu- 
 tenant, 54 
 
 UUua, Rio, 5 
 
 V. 
 
 Van Buren, President, his canal 
 policy, 155 
 
 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, his canal pro- 
 ject, 197 
 
 Venezuela, province of Colombia, 
 1821, 130 ; withdraws, 1830, 157 
 
 Vera Cruz, institutes surveys across 
 Tehuantepec, I45. See also 
 Ortiz 
 
 Veragua, province of, 8 
 Vernon, Admiral R. N., 89 
 Verrazzano, Giovanni da, his voy- 
 ages, 44 
 Vespucci, Amerigo, his voyages, 31 ; 
 calls America the " New World," 
 
 35 
 Vigil, Father Augustin, Nicaraguan 
 
 minister to United States, 243 
 Virgin Bay, 7 
 Vittoria, Guadaloupe de, President 
 
 Mexican Confederation. 145 
 
 W. 
 
 Wafer, Lionel, his report on Cale- 
 donian route, 86 
 
 Walker, James, his report on 
 Childs's surveys, 218 
 
 Walker, Patrick, acts as regent of 
 Mosquitia, 169 ; his claim to San 
 Juan, 178 
 
 Walker, William, his filibustering 
 expedition to Nicaragua, 240 ; his 
 coup d'etat, 243 ; deported by the 
 United States, 244 ; condemned 
 and shot, 246 
 
 Wallace, Peter, his settlement in 
 Yucatan, 74. See also Belize 
 
 Wallis, Rio, 106 
 
 Wanks River, 73 
 
 Warwick, Earl of, his colony in Old 
 Providence Island, 73 
 
 Webb, William H., American pro- 
 moter, 2go. See also Central 
 American Transit Company 
 
 Webster, Daniel, Secretary of State, 
 174,215,223,226. Seealso'&ssa 
 of settlement 
 
 Werweer, General, Dutch agent in 
 Central Amepca, 149 
 
 West, Captain P. C. F., surveys 
 river and port of San Juan, 305 
 
 West, Sackville, British minister to 
 United States, 406, 412 
 
 West Indies, Spanish settlements in, 
 36 
 
 Wheat trade of the United States, 
 
 535 
 
 Wheeler, John H., United States 
 agent in Nicaragua, 241 
 
 White, Joseph L,, American pro- 
 moter, 197 
 
622 
 
 Index. 
 
 Williams, United States charge d'af- 
 faires in Central America, 143 
 
 Williamson, C. A., United States 
 Minister to Central America, 334 
 
 Wolfe, Nathaniel H., American 
 promoter, 197 
 
 Woodcutters, English, their rights 
 in Central America, 7g et seq. See 
 treaties of 1783, 1786, 1814 
 
 Wyke, Sir Charles Lennox, Eng- 
 lish charge d'affaires in Guate- 
 mala, 258 
 
 Wyse, Lieutenant L. N. B., his 
 connection with SocieU Civile, 
 341 ; his Panama canal plan, 358 ; 
 sent to secure new concession, 
 
 474. See TUrr, Reclus, De Les- 
 seps 
 Wyse-Reclus surveys, 1876, 1877, 
 344 et seq. 
 
 X. 
 
 Ximenes, Gonzalo, his discoveries, 
 54 
 
 Z. 
 
 Zavala, Seiior Joachim, Nicaraguan 
 commissioner, 425. See also 
 Frelinghuysen, Treaties 
 
 Zelaya, department of, 506 ; Presi- 
 dent and Dictator of Nicaragua, 
 509 
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. 
 
 AMERICA AND EUROPE. A Study of International Relations. 
 I. — The United States and Great Britain : Their True 
 Governmental and Commercial Relations. By David 
 A. Wells. 
 II. — The Monroe Doctrine. By Edward J. Phelps, late 
 
 Minister to Great Britain. 
 III. — Arbitration in International Disputes. By Carl 
 
 SCHURZ. 
 
 (No. 87 in the " Questions of the Day " Series.) 
 Together, i vol. 8vo, 75 cents. 
 ** This is an extremely interesting book, a book which should make for peace." 
 
 COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. An Analysis of 
 the Administrative System, National and Local, of the United States, 
 England, France, and Germany. By Frank J. GooDNOW, Professor of 
 Administrative Lavif in the University Faculty of Political Science, 
 Columbia College in the City of New York. Two volumes, 8vo 
 (each complete in itself, vi'ith index), price per volume, $2.50. 
 Volume I. — Organization. Volume II. — Legal Relations. 
 
 ** A work of great learning and profound research . . . remarkable alike for an- 
 alytical power and lucidity of method . . . unique and of permanent excellence. — 
 Neuu York Tribune, 
 
 OUTLINES OP ROMAN LAW. Comprising its Historical Growth 
 and General Principles. By William C. Morey, Ph.D. i2mo, $1.75 
 
 " The work possesses more than ordinary interest, for it marks an epoch in American 
 legal literature.'* — Albany Law Journal, 
 
 *' The whole work is executed with care and accuracy, and shows a wide knowledge of 
 modern scholarship." — Boston Advertiser, 
 
 THE FOREIGN POLICY OP GREAT BRITAIN. By 
 
 Montague Burrows, Professor of Modem History, University of 
 Oxford. 8vo, $3.00. 
 
 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN 
 EUROPE. From the Congress of Vienna to the Present Time. By 
 Charles M. Andrews, Associate Professor of History in Bryn Mawr 
 College. To be completed in two volumes. Sold separately. With 
 maps. Bvo, gilt tops, per volume, $2.50. 
 Part I. — From 1815-1850. 
 Part II. — From 1850 to the Present Time. (In preparation.) 
 
 THE NICARAGUA CANAL AND THE MONROE DOC- 
 TRINE. A Political History of the Various Projects of Interoceanic 
 Transit across the American Isthmus, with Special Reference to the 
 Nicaragua Canal, and the Attitude of the United States Government 
 Thereto. By LiNDLEY M. Keasbey, Associate Professor of Political 
 Science, Bryn Mawr College. With maps. 8vo. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW. A simple statement of its Principles. 
 By Herbert Wolcott Bowen, United States Consul-General at 
 Barcelona, Spain, i2mo. 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York and London.