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 atljaca, Netu flark 
 
 LIBRARY OF 
 
 THE SAGE SCHOOL 
 
 OF 
 
 PHILOSOPHY 
 
Cornell University Library 
 arV154 ' 
 
 A brief history of Greel< philosophy. 
 
 3 1924 031 185 782 
 olin,anx 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031185782 
 
A 
 
 BRIEF HISTORY 
 
 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 BY 
 
 B. C. BURT, M.A., 
 
 Formerly Fellow, and Fellow by Courtesy, in the 
 Johns Hopkins University. 
 
 oi®io 
 
 BOSTON : 
 
 GINN & COMPANY, PUBLISHERS. 
 1889. 
 
±sz 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1888, by 
 
 B. C. BURT, 
 in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. 
 
 Typography by J. S. Cushing & Co., Boston. 
 Presswork by GiNN & Co., Boston. 
 
TO 
 
 H. G. B. 
 
 AND 
 
 E. S. McK. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The following work had its beginning in a series of 
 essays written for one of the ethico-religious periodi- 
 cals of the country. To these — at the suggestion of 
 friends whose counsel seemed to be as valuable as that of 
 any could possibly be and could not well be disregarded 
 — others were added to make a brief account of Greek 
 speculation from its beginning to its end. This account 
 has been prepared in the belief that the problems of 
 philosophy are in a large measure always the same, 
 and that the Greek solutions of the cardinal problems, 
 by reason of their simplicity and freshness (for they are 
 solutions that were found when the world's thought was 
 comparatively in its youth, and are, in larger measure 
 than those unacquainted with the history of thought 
 begin to suspect, the only original solutions of those 
 problems), and by reason of their remoteness from the 
 prejudices of the present, have a certain value not pos- 
 sessed by any others, particularly for the beginner in 
 philosophical thinking. Most of the works treating of 
 the subject of which this volume treats are learned and 
 extensive, overwhelming the general reader, and even 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 the student, almost, with a sense of the superabundant 
 wealth of the ancient thought in particular and the 
 world's thought in general. It is hoped that the pres- 
 ent work will render accessible in convenient form and 
 quantities some of the noblest portions of the intellect- 
 ual wealth of Greece. An attempt is here made not 
 merely to expound and elucidate, but also to present in 
 their historical connection, and give a just estimate of 
 the validity of, the leading standpoints and categories 
 of Greek thinking. Much reading and not a little 
 original study have been given to the task. 
 
 The writer takes the liberty to express here his sense 
 of obligation to G. S. Morris, Professor of Philosophy 
 in the University of Michigan, and formerly Lecturer 
 on Philosopy in the Johns Hopkins University, and to 
 G. S. Hall, late Professor of Psychology in the Johns 
 Hopkins University, and now President of Clark Uni- 
 versity, for suggestions and encouragement received 
 from them. A word of thanks is due also to John 
 Dewey, now Assistant Professor of Philosophy in 
 Michigan University, and Professor Elect of Philos- 
 ophy in the University of Minnesota ; and to a college- 
 classmate who has become a life-companion. 
 
 Ann Arbor, June, 1888. 
 
GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Introductory Paragraph, p. i. 
 
 I. NATURALISM, pp. 1-34. 
 
 §1- 
 The Hylicists, Hylozoists, or Early Ionic Natural Philosophers : 
 Thales, p. i; Anaximandir, p. 2; Anaximenes, p. 3; Result, p. 3. 
 
 §2- 
 
 The Pythagoreans, p. 4 : Pythagoras and the Pythagorean Society, pp. 
 4-6; Pythagorean Philosophy, p. 6; Number-Theory and Doctrine 
 of Contraries, pp. 6-7; Theories not purely Pythagorean, pp. 7-9; 
 Miscellaneous Theories, p. 9; Result, p. 9. 
 
 §3. 
 
 The Eleatics, p. 10 : Life of Xenophanes, p. 10; Philosophy of Xenopha- 
 
 nes, p. II; Result, p. 11; Life of Parmenides, p. 12; Philosophy of 
 
 Parmenides, pp. 13-14; Result, p. 15; Life of Zeno, p. t6; Philosophy 
 
 ofZeno,p.i6; Result, pp. 17-18; Melissus,^. 18; General Result, p. 19. 
 
 §4- 
 Heraclitus : Life of Heraclitus, p. 20; First Principle, pp. 20-21 ; Physi- 
 cal Doctrine, p. 22; The Soul and Reason, p. 22; Result, p. 23. 
 
 §5- 
 Later Natural Philosophers, p. 23 : Life of Jimpedocles,^. 24; Theory 
 of Nature, pp. 24-25 ; Theory of Knowledge, p. 26; Result, p. 26; 
 Life of Anaxagoras, p. 27; Theory of Nature, pp. 27-28; Theory of 
 Nous, or Mind, and Knowledge, p. 29; Result, p. 29; The Atomists, 
 Leucippus3.nADemocritus,p.y3; Theory of Nature, pp. 30-31; Theory 
 of the Soul, etc, pp. 31-32; Result, pp. 32-33. 
 
viii GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 §6. 
 General Character of the First Period in the History of Greek 
 Philosophy, pp. 33-34- 
 
 II. RATIONALISM, pp. 34-263. 
 
 §7- 
 
 The Sophists, p. 34 : Life of Protagoras, p. 35 ; Theory of Protagoras, pp. 
 35-36; Life of Gorgias, p. 36; Theory of Gorgias, pp. 36-37; Result, 
 p. 37. Hippias and Prodicus, p. 38; The Sophists as a Class (Result), 
 pp. 38-40. 
 
 §8. 
 
 Socrates : The Sophists and Socrates, p. 41 ; Special Sources of Informa- 
 tion regarding Socrates, p. 42; Life of Socrates, pp. 42-45; Personal- 
 ity of Socrates and its Relation to the Subsequent History of Greek 
 Philosophy, pp. 45-47; Philosophy of Socrates, p. 47; Spirit of the 
 Socratic Philosophizing, pp. 48-50; The Socratic Method, pp. 50-54; 
 The Doctrines of Socrates (their general character), p. 54; Physical Phi- 
 losophy of Socrates, p. 55; (Ethical Philosophy of Socrates) Relations 
 between Knowledge and Virtue, p. 56; General Consequences of the 
 Unity of Knowledge and Virtue, p. 57; Classification of the Virtues, 
 p. 58; Temperance, p. 58; Friendship, p. 59; Right Citizenship and 
 Justice, p. 60; Piety, p. 61; Wisdom, p. 62; Beauty, p. 63; General 
 Result, pp. 63-64. 
 
 §9- 
 The Followers of Socrates, p. 65. 
 
 § 10. 
 
 The Lesser Socratics, p. 65: The Megarians {Euclid, Eubulides, 
 Diodorus, Stilpo, and their doctrines), pp. 66-67; "^^^ Cynics (Aniis- 
 thenes, Diogenes, — their doctrines), pp. 67-69; The Cyrenaics (Arts- ■ 
 tippus, Theodorus, Hegesias, Anniceris, — their doctrines), pp. 69-71; 
 Result, p. 71. 
 
 §11. 
 Plato : Life of Plato, pp. 72-75; Plato's Works, pp. 75-78; Plato's Gen- 
 eral Conception of Philosophy, pp. 78-81; The Divisions of Philoso- 
 phy, p. 81; Dialectic as a Twofold Science, p. 82; Dialectic as a 
 Theory of Knowledge and Method, pp. 82-84; (Dialectic as a System) 
 
GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. IX 
 
 Thought and Being, pp. 84-85; The World of Ideas, pp. 85-87; 
 Relation of the Ideal, to the Phenomenal, World, pp. 88-90; (Physics, 
 or the Theory of Nature) The Method of Physical Speculation, p. 90; 
 The Cosmos, pp. 91-93; Body and Soul, pp. 93-97 ; (Plato's Ethics) 
 General Basis, p. 98; The Method of Ethics, p. 98; Nature and End 
 of the State, p. 99; The Parts of the State and the Virtue of Each, pp. 
 99-101 ; Virtue in the Individual, p. loi ; State Administration, p. 102; 
 False Forms of the State and their Genesis, pp. 104-107; The Eternal 
 Life, p. 107; Beauty and Art, p. 108; Later Form of Plato's Philosophy, 
 pp. 109-113; Result, pp. II i-i 13. 
 
 § 12. 
 The Disciples of Plato, p. 113. 
 
 The Old Academy, p. 114: SpeuHppus, p. 114; Xenocrates, p. 115; 
 Other Members of the Old Academy, p. 116. 
 
 §14- 
 
 Aristotle: Life of Aristotle, p. 116; General Character of Aristotle's 
 System, and His Chief Philosophical Works, pp. 1 18-122; Theory of 
 Knowledge, p. 122; Kinds of Knowledge, p. 122; Scientific, or Phil- 
 osophical, Knowledge, p. 122; Demonstration, p. 123; The Syllogism 
 (Deductive), pp. 123-125; Definition and Predicables, p. 125; The 
 Categories, p. 126; Syllogism (Inductive), pp. 127-128; Probable 
 Proof and Dialectical and Rhetorical Method, p. 129; First Philosophy, 
 or Metaphysics, p. 130; Being and Plato's Ideas, p. 131 ; Matter and 
 Form, Potentiality and Actuality, p. 132; Causes, or First Principles 
 (ApX^Oi PP- '33""'34> Kinds of Real Substance, Immovable Substance, 
 God, p. 135; Physics, or the Philosophy of Nature, p. 136; Essential 
 Character of Nature, pp. 136-137; Method of the Philosophy of Nature, 
 p. 137; Motion, Space, and Time, p. 138; The Visible Universe, p. 
 139; Graduated Scale of Being in Nature, p. 140; Psychology as a 
 Science, p. 140; Body and Soul, p. 141; Parts, or Faculties, of the 
 Soul, p. 142-147; (General Analysis, p. 142; Sense-Faculties, p. 143; 
 Phantasy and Memory, p. 144; Reason, pp. 144-146; Desire and Loco- 
 motion, p. 146) ; Practical Philosophy, p. 147; Method of Practical 
 Philosophy, p. 147 ; End of Practical Philosophy, or " Political Science," 
 pp. 148-149; Psychological Basis of Ethics, p. 149; Sources and Con- 
 ditions of Virtue, pp. 150-152; Definition of Virtue, p. 152; Deliberate 
 
X GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Choice, p. 153; The Ethical Virtues, pp. iS4-i57; R'S^t Reason, Pru- 
 dence and the Intellectual Virtues, Generally, pp. 157-158; Self- 
 Control and its Opposite, p. 158; Friendship, p. 159; Pleasure and 
 Happiness, p. 160; "Practical" Ethics, p. 160; Origin of the State, 
 p. 161; The Family, p. 162; Criticism of Certain Theories and Forms 
 of State (Plato and Others), pp. 162-165; The End of the State, p. 
 165; The Nature of the Citizen, p. 165; A Polity and its Kinds, p. 
 166; Who Should be Rulers, p. 167; The Best Polity, pp. 168-170; 
 Characteristics of Different Polities, pp. 170-174; Methods of Estab- 
 lishing and Maintaining the Various Forms of State, pp. 174-177; 
 Causes of Political Revolutions, pp. 177-180; The Most Permanent 
 Polities, p. 181; Plato's Theory of Revolutions, p. 181; Rhetoric, pp. 
 181-182; Poietical Philosophy, p. 183; Sources and Genesis of Aris- 
 totle's Philosophy, pp. 185-190; Substantial Unity of Plato and 
 Aristotle, p. 191; Result, pp. 191-194. 
 
 §15- 
 The Peripatetic School, p. 194: Theophrastus, p. 195; Strata of Lamp- 
 sacus, p. 196; Dicaarch of Messene, p. 196. 
 
 § 16. 
 Three Leading Post-Aristotelian Schools, p. 196. 
 
 § 17- 
 The Stoics and Stoicism : Zeno, Cleantkes, Chrysippus, and Others — 
 Lives, pp. 197-199; Stoic Conception of the Nature and Parts of Phi- 
 losophy, p. 199; Stoic Logic, p. 200; Origin of Ideas, pp. 200-201 ; 
 The Criterion of Truth in Ideas, p. 202; System and Logical Method, 
 p. 202 ; The Categories, p. 203 ; Physics, or the Theory of Nature, pp. 
 204-206; Ethics and its Parts, p. 206; The Chief Good, — Life accord- 
 ing to Nature, p. 207; Nature of Virtue, p. 207; Classes of Virtue, p. 
 208; Classes of Goods, — the Summum Bonum, pp. 209-211; The 
 Wise Man, pp. 21 1-212; The Stoics, and the Popular Religion, p. 213; 
 Historical Sources of Stoicism, p. 213; Result, pp. 214-215. 
 
 The Epicureans and Epicureanism: Epicurus and his School, pp. 
 216-218; The Parts of Philosophy, p. 218; (Canonics) Criterion of 
 Truth in Ideas, pp. 219-220; Method of the Study of Nature, p. 220; 
 Physics — Aim and General Character, p. 221 ; First Principle, p. 221 ; 
 Atoms, pp. 222-224; Properties of bodies, p. 224; The Visible Uni- 
 
GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI 
 
 verse, pp. 224-226; The Gods, p. 227; The Human Soul, pp. 227-229; 
 Ethics — First Principle (Pleasure), p. 227; Kinds of Pleasure, p. 230; 
 The Wise Man, pp. 230-232; Friendship, p. 232; The State, p. 233; 
 Religion, p. 233; Historical Sources of the Epicurean Doctrines, p. 
 234J Result, pp. 234-235. 
 
 § 19- 
 
 The Sceptics, p. 235 : Pyrrhonisis — Pyrrho, Timon of Phlius, JEneside- 
 mus, Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus, p. 236; Theories of the Earlier 
 Pyrrhonists, p. 236; The Later Pyrrhonists — The "Tropes," p. 237; 
 The Impossibility of Demonstration, Sign, and Cause, p. 239; Pure 
 Negativism of the Pyrrhonists, p. 240; Middle and New Academies, 
 p. 240; Arcesilaus, p. 241 ; Carneades, pp. 241-243; Result, pp. 
 243-245- 
 
 §20. 
 
 The Common Ground of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, pp. 
 245-247- 
 
 §21. 
 Philosophy in Rome : Eclecticism, p. 247. 
 
 §22. 
 
 The Later Peripatetics, pp. 248-250; Andronicus of Rhodes, Boethus 
 of Sidon, an unknown author, Alexander of jEga, Aspasius and 
 Adrastus of Aphrodisias, Aristocles, Alexander of Aphrodisias. 
 
 §23. 
 TheLater Academics, pp. 250-251 ; PhiloofLarissa,^.2y>; Antiochus 
 of Ascalon, p. 250. 
 
 §24. 
 
 The Later Stoics, pp. 251-261; Boethus, p. 251; Paneetius of Rhodes, 
 p. 2^2; Posidonius, -p. 2^2; Varro, p. 2^^; Cicero — Life, pp. 253-254; 
 General Conception of Philosophy, p. 255; Theory of Knowledge, p. 
 255; Physics, p. 256; Ethics, pp. 256-258; Seneca — Life, p. 258; 
 Philosophy, pp. 258-260; Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Marcus 
 Aurelius, p. 260; Cynicism, p. 261. 
 
 §25. 
 General Character of the Second Period, pp. 261-262. 
 
xil GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 III. SUPRA-RATIONALISM (AND SUPRA-NATURALISM), pp. 
 
 263-296. 
 
 §26. 
 Standpoint and Schools of the Third and Latest Period of Greek. 
 
 Philosophy, p. 263. 
 
 §27- 
 
 Jewish-Alexandrian School, p. 264: Aristobulus, p. 264; Philo- 
 Judmus, General Attitude, p. 264; Theory of Knowledge, p. 265; 
 God, p. 266; The Logos, p. 266; The Sensible World and Matter, p. 
 267; Man, p. 267; Result, p. 268. 
 
 §28. 
 Neo-Pythagoreanism, p. 269. 
 
 §29. 
 
 The Eclectic Platonists, p. 269. 
 
 §3°- 
 Neo-Platonism : Ammonites Saccas, p. 270; Ploiinus — Life, p. 270; 
 Dialectic, pp. 271-274; Reason, Intellect or Nous (Realm of Ideas), pp. 
 274-276; The One, The First, The Good, pp. 276-278; Intellect, Rea- 
 son, or Nous, as an Emanation, pp. 278-280; Soul, pp. 280-281 ; 
 Soul and Body, pp. 281-284; Individual Soul and Soul of the World, 
 p. 284; The Sensible World and Matter, pp. 284-286; Virtue, -.p. 287; 
 Historical Sources of the System of Plotinus, p. 288; Result, pp. 
 289-291. /'or/z^yry and Others, p. 291 ; yamhlichus, t^. 2<j\ •, Proclus 
 — Life, p. 292; Philosophy of Proclus, pp. 293-295 ; Result, p. 296. 
 
BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 For the convenience of the student a list is here given of 
 the principal easily-accessible works referred to in the following 
 pages or consulted in the preparation of them. The names 
 of other works are to be found in foot-notes throughout the 
 volume. 
 
 Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates (Fielding's trans.). 
 
 Plato's Works (Jowett's trans., with Analyses and Introductions). 
 
 Aristotle's Works : — 
 
 Organon (trans, by Owen in Bohn's Class. Lib.). 
 
 Metaphysics (trans, by McMahan in Bohn's Class. Lib.). 
 
 Psychology (trans, by E. Wallace, with Introd., and Notes and 
 Text). 
 
 Nicomachean Ethics (trans, by Browne in Bohn's Class. Lib., and 
 by Peters). 
 
 Politics (trans, by Welldon). 
 
 Rhetoric and Poetic (trans, by Buckley in Bohn's Class. Lib.). 
 Lives of the Philosophers, by Diogenes Laertius (trans, by Yonge 
 
 in Bohn's Class. Lib.). 
 Cicero's De OiBciis (trans, by Edmonds in Harper's Class. Lib.). 
 Seneca's Works (Lodge's trans.). 
 Select Works of Plotinus (trans, by T. Taylor). 
 Five Books of Plotinus (trans, by Taylor) . 
 Zeller's Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy (trans, by 
 
 Alleyne and Abbott). 
 Zeller's Pre-Socratic Philosophy, 2 vols, (a translation by S. F. 
 
 Alleyne from Zeller's Die Geschichte der Philosophie der Griechen. 
 Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools (trans, by Reichel). 
 
XIV BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Zeller's Plato and the Older Academy (trans, by Alleyne and Good- 
 win). 
 
 Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (trans, by Reichel). 
 
 Zeller's The Eclectics (trans, by Alleyne). 
 
 Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy. 
 
 Ueberweg's History of Philosophy (Morris's trans.). 
 
 Schwegler's Handbook of the History of Philosophy (Stirling's 
 trans.). 
 
 Ritter's History of Ancient Philosophy (trans, by Morrison). 
 
 A. W. Benn's The Greek Philosophers, 2 vols. 
 
 Grote's Plato. 
 
 Grote's Aristotle. ' 
 
 E. Wallace's Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle. 
 
 Grant's Aristotle. 
 
 Grant's Ethics of Aristotle, 2 vols. 
 
 I 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Greek Philosophy had its beginning in the seventh 
 century b.c. As distinguished from the theogony and 
 cosmogony of the poets, its natural precursors, it was, in 
 its beginning, an attempt to explain the sensible world 
 — its origin and constitution — upon the basis of defi- 
 nite, natural fact, or what was regarded as such, instead 
 of supernatural existences, such as gods and goddesses. 
 In this attempt observation and reflection played the 
 part played by imagination or fancy in the earlier ; 
 science and speculation, crude and false, though, no 
 doubt, they in large measure were, took the place 
 of mythology. 
 
 I. NATURALISM. 
 
 §1- 
 
 The Hylicists, Hylozoists, or Early Ionic Natural 
 Philosophers. 
 
 Thales. — The earliest of the Greek philosophers was 
 Thales, born at Miletus, a city on the western coast of 
 Asia Minor, about the year 640 b.c. Thales was distin- 
 guished for political and ethical wisdom, for his knowl- 
 edge of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, and for his 
 Egyptian and Eastern lore. Several propositions in 
 elementary geometry have been attributed to him, and 
 
2 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 he was reputed to have predicted an eclipse of the sun. 
 He declared the source of all things to be water ; hav- 
 ing, perhaps, been led to this hypothesis by the observa- 
 tion of the fact that water plays a great part in the econ- 
 omy of nature, or, as Aristotle says, by the idea that the 
 seeds and nutriment of all things have a watery charac- 
 ter. Thales held that nature is not merely material and 
 mechanical, but animate ; that water, the primal matter, 
 is filled with life or soul. He may have believed in the 
 existence of a world-soul, but probably not in the exist- 
 ence of an independent, world-ordering mind : dualism 
 originated later in the history of philosophy. 
 
 Anaximander. — Next, chronologically, to Thales was 
 Anaximander, also of Miletus, born 6i i b.c, whose work, 
 On Nature {irepi ^va-emi), was the earliest of many works 
 of the same class written by the early Greek philoso- 
 phers. Like Thales, he was a "scientist," being a 
 geographer and astronomer. He afiSrmed that all 
 things arise out of, and return into, an infinite entity, 
 indeterminate in character, which he termed to dveipov, 
 the Infinite (indefinite), and apxni "first principle." He 
 was, it appears, the first philosopher who employed the 
 term apxn in this sense. Out of the Infinite, which he 
 called " the Divine " and conceived as an eternal and 
 living, though not immaterial, being, he supposed actual 
 existences to have sprung by the generation, first, of the 
 "contraries," "the warm" and "the cold," "the moist" 
 and "the dry," then, by an eternal motion, of the uni- 
 verse of worlds, in the centre of which is the earth, fixed 
 in position and cylindrical in form. From the original 
 
 ' Ueberweg's History of Philosophy (Morris's translation), Vol. I. 
 pp. 34 and 35. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY 3 
 
 moisture all things were generated by heat. Animals 
 and men were evolved from fishes. The soul he de- 
 clared to be aeriform. Anaximander may be called the 
 earliest "evolutionist." 
 
 Anaximenes. — Nearly contemporary with Anaximan- 
 der was another Milesian, named Anaximenes (58.8- 
 524 B.C.). He assumed air to be the hpyr] of things, 
 conceiving it as infinite in extent and as animate, having 
 within itself, to employ a modern phrase, " the promise 
 and potency of life." From air, he held, fire, winds, 
 clouds, water, and earth were generated by the processes 
 of "thinning" (fire) and "thickening" — rarefaction and 
 condensation. 
 
 Result. — Aristotle, in the first chapter of his account 
 of early Greek philosophy, — the third chapter of the 
 first book of his Metaphysics, — affirms that scientific 
 knowledge is the knowledge of causes, which he divides 
 into four classes : the formal cause, or that which con- 
 stitutes the essence of a thing ; the material cause; the 
 efficient cause, or " first principle of motion " ; the final 
 cause, or the end. He affirms, and rightly, that the ear- 
 liest philosophers were occupied with the consideration 
 of the material cause of things, i.e., the material source 
 and constitution of the universe. Because of this they 
 have been called Hylicists (uX??, hyle, = matter) ; and be- 
 cause they held matter to be, not dead, but living, they 
 have received the name of Hylozoists {^(otj, = /i/e). It 
 should be noted, however, that in the Infinite of Anaxi- 
 mander there is the germ of a principle not merely physi- 
 cal but metaphysical ; for the Infinite, as such, cannot 
 be grasped by the imagination or sensuous thought, but 
 must be apprehended by abstract and pure thought. 
 
4 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 though it is only virtual and negative, not actual and 
 positive, conception. It should be noted, also, that there 
 are in the speculations of Anaximander and Anaximenes 
 the suggestion of processes by vi^hich the original world- 
 stuff becomes actual concrete things ; though this part 
 of their theories must be regarded as having been of 
 secondary importance in their thoughts. Crude as their 
 speculations must now appear to every one, Thales, 
 Anaximander, and Anaximenes must be looked upon as 
 philosophers, because they sought to determine the uni- 
 versal permanent element in what was for them the 
 universe. They are commonly spoken of as the Early 
 Ionic Natural Philosophers. 
 
 §2. 
 
 The Pythagoreans. — The next step in Greek specu- 
 lation was taken by Pythagoras and his followers, re- 
 garding whom and the theories of whom it is difficult to 
 arrive at clear, consistent, unquestionable views.-' 
 
 Pythagoras attd the Pythagorean Order. — Pythagoras 
 was born on the island of Samos, near the coast of 
 Asia Minor, about the year 580 B.C., dying at Metapon- 
 tum in Lower Italy about the year 510 B.C. Possibly 
 he was a pupil of Anaximander, and familiar with his 
 scientific and philosophical views. Possibly, also, he 
 travelled in Egypt, making additions to the store of his 
 scientific knowledge, and receiving a new religious and 
 ethical impulse through contact with the learned priest- 
 hood there. He was regarded by Heraclitus, a philoso- 
 
 1 See Zeller's Pre-Socratic Philosophy (a translation by S. F. AUeyne 
 of a portion of Zeller's Geschichle der Philosophic der Griechen), Vol. I. 
 PP- 306-308. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 5 
 
 pher of the next century, as very learned, but not very 
 profound. He either founded or contemplated founding 
 an ethico-religious order in his native place. Such an 
 order he did found in Crotona, Lower Italy, whither 
 some of his countrymen had migrated and he himself 
 went in 529 B.C. This order was, it may be conjectured, 
 such an embodiment as was possible to be made by a 
 Grecian on Grecian soil, of the idea of monasticism which 
 Pythagoras, if he visited Egypt, had brought from that 
 country. The discipline of the society was, particularly 
 in the later period of its existence, of the rigid, aristo- 
 cratic sort, out of harmony, as Hegel remarks, with the 
 democratic spirit of Greece. Habitual silence, implicit 
 obedience to the authority of the master, fidelity to 
 friends, abstinence, self-scrutiny, non-proselytism, were 
 required of all its members. Physical, as well as in- 
 tellectual, moral, and religious, culture was aimed at. 
 Pythagoras professed to be, not 0-0^09, wise, but ^CKoao- 
 ^09, lover of wisdom ; and we may regard the society 
 he founded as an organization intended to furnish the 
 conditions for a philosophic life. He was, it appears, 
 a man capable of leading such a life and of inspiring 
 others to do so. He was looked upon as a very Apollo 
 in his appearance, character, and gift of inspiration ; and 
 fabulous stories gathered about his name. By his per- 
 sonal dignity and worth, and by his teachings, he was 
 able to show — and was perhaps the first among the 
 Greek philosophers who did show — that wisdom is an 
 affair of character and life as well as of knowledge. The 
 maxims of the so-called "Wise Men" savor of a moral 
 utilitarianism not to be found in the doctrine and prac- 
 tice of Pythagoras and his followers. But the ideal of 
 
6 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pythagoras was not that of pure asceticism ; nor was the 
 society, at least in the earlier part of its existence, nar- 
 rowly monastic: the earlier Pythagoreans were, says 
 Grote, men of "practical efficiency of body and mind." 
 The society became large, and strong, not merely by its 
 influence upon the lives of its members, but also by its 
 influence in the political affairs of Lower Italy. It was 
 the prototype of many societies in other cities in Lower 
 Italy. It existed for more than a century ; having been 
 finally broken up by the opposition it aroused in the 
 democratic element of the population because of its too 
 decided espousal of the principles of the aristocratic 
 party. 
 
 The Pythagorean Philosophy. — We come now to the 
 Pythagorean philosophy, the speculations, that is to say, 
 of Pythagoras and his followers. It has been found 
 impossible to distinguish those of Pythagoras from 
 those of his followers. 
 
 The Number -Theory and the Doctrine of " Contraries." 
 — According to Aristotle,^ the Pythagoreans, having 
 especially cultivated the mathematical sciences, fancied 
 that they discovered the patterns, or archetypes, of 
 things, not in any sensible thing, as fire, earth, or 
 water, but in number, and asserted that the principles 
 of number were the principles of being, and that the 
 "whole heaven was a harmony and number." They 
 did not distinguish between the affirmation that the 
 principles or laws of number are the principles or laws 
 of things, and the aifirmation that numbers themselves 
 are things or the substances of things ; between number 
 as a "formal cause," and number as a "material cause," 
 
 1 Metaphysics, Bk. I., ch. 5. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 7 
 
 of all things. Now number is odd or even, one being 
 both odd and even. The odd is finite; the even infi- 
 nite. The number ten was held to be perfect. Some 
 of the Pythagoreans, Aristotle states, asserted that the 
 first principles were ten in number — ten pairs of "con- 
 traries " : the finite and infinite, the odd and the even, 
 unity and plurality, right and left, male and female, rest 
 and motion, straight and crooked, light and darkness, 
 good and bad, square and oblong. There seems at first 
 to be no direct connection between this crude table of 
 " categories " and the number-theory. The uniting 
 link between them may, however, be the thought that 
 the truth is the union of a contrariety of elements, i.e., 
 a harmony. Such seem to be the main features of the 
 Pythagorean theory in its earlier form. 
 
 Theories not purely ^thagorean. — Other theories 
 have been, though to some extent wrongly,^ attributed 
 to the Pythagoreans. In one of these the number one 
 represents the Deity, and, again, the principle of unity 
 or continuity in things, two represents the principle of 
 variety or difference, three the union of the two, four (as 
 the square of two) the "perfection" of mere differ- 
 ence, and ten, "the perfect number" (the sum of one, 
 two, three, a.nd four), the complete organic unity and har- 
 mony of the world. Again : " The author of a work as- 
 cribed to Philolaus [a Pythagorean of the fifth century 
 B.C.] sees in the principles of number the principles of 
 things. These principles are 'the limiting' and 'illimi- 
 tation.' They converge, to harmony, which is unity in 
 multiplicity and agreement in heterogeneity. Thus 
 they generate in succession, first, unity, then the series 
 
 1 Zeller's Pre-Socratic Phil., Vol. I. pp. 386 and fol. 
 
8 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of arithmetical or monadic numbers, then 'geomet- 
 rical' numbers or 'magnitudes,' i.e., the forms of 
 space: point, line, surface, solid; next material ob- 
 jects, then life, sensuous consciousness, and the higher 
 psychical forces, as love, friendship, mind, and intelli- 
 gence. Like is known by like, but it is by number 
 that things are brought into harmonious relations to the 
 soul. The understanding, developed by mathematical 
 study, is the organ of knowledge. Musical harmony 
 depends on a certain numerical proportion in the 
 lengths of musical strings. The octave, in particular, 
 or harmony in the narrow sense, depends on the ratio 
 1 : 2, which includes the two ratios of the fourth (3 : 4) 
 and the fifth (2:3 or 4 : 6). [This fact was discovered 
 by Pythagoras himself.] The five regular solids — the 
 cube, the tetrahedron, the octehedron, icosahedron, the 
 dodecahedron — are respectively the fundamental forms 
 of earth, fire, air, water, and the fifth element, which 
 encompasses all the rest. The soul is united by number 
 and harmony with the body, which is its organ, and at 
 the same time its prison. From the Hestia, i.e., from 
 the central fire around which the earth and counter- 
 earth^ daily revolve, the soul of the world spreads through 
 the spheres of the counter-earth, the earth, the moon, 
 the sun, the planets Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, 
 Saturn, and the fixed stars to 'Olympus,' the last sphere, 
 which includes all the others. The world is eternal and 
 
 1 Supposed to be under the earth and moving around the central fire 
 with it. Ten being the perfect number, there must, it was thought, be ten 
 bodies "borne through the heaven." There being, says Aristotle, only 
 nine apparent, the Pythagoreans assumed a tenth, calling it Counter-Earth 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 9 
 
 ruled by the One, who is akin to it, and has supreme 
 might and excellence. The director and ruler of all 
 things is God ; he is one and eternal, enduring and im- 
 movable, ever like himself and different from all things 
 beside him. He compasses and guards the universe." ^ 
 
 Miscellaneous Theories. — Certain other discoveries 
 and theories of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans may 
 be here mentioned for interest's sake ; some of them 
 bear relation to the number-theory, others do not. 
 Pythagoras is said to have discovered two important 
 truths in geometry : one relating to the triangle inscribed 
 within a semicircle, and another to the square of the 
 hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle. The discovery 
 of the latter is said to have elated him so much that he 
 sacrificed a hundred oxen and made a great feast. Some 
 of the Pythagoreans, if no^ Pythagoras himself, fancied 
 that the supposed celestial spheres were arranged at 
 intervals corresponding mathematically to the intervals of 
 the octave. Some of the Pythagoreans believed that the 
 earth rotated upon an axis. Pythagoras held the doc- 
 trine of the transmigration of souls, — believed that his 
 own soul had inhabited the body of Euphorbus, a Tro- 
 jan hero. The noblest education for a youth he thought 
 to be that which would fit him to be the citizen of a 
 well-regulated state. 
 
 Result. — From the foregoing it appears that though 
 the Pythagorean order was primarily religious and ethi- 
 cal, the Pythagorean philosophy was cosmical, a philos- 
 ophy not of conduct and of God but of the sensible 
 universe ; it appears, also, that, as Aristotle pointed out, 
 the first principle, the apxh^ of *he Pythagorean theory 
 
 1 Ueberweg's Hisi. of Phil, (trans.) Vol. I. p. 49. 
 
10 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is not "material" but "formal" or primarily so. The 
 subject of the Pythagorean speculation was, that is to 
 say, not the original world^tuff or material source of 
 things but the order stamped upon phenomena. These 
 speculations must be regarded as a step in advance of 
 those of the Hylicists. The Pythagorean theories, we 
 shall hereafter see, largely influenced subsequent specu- 
 lation, particularly that of Plato and the Platonists. 
 
 § 3- 
 
 The Eleatics. — Nearly contemporaneous with the 
 Pythagoreans was a school of thinkers known in the 
 history of philosophy as the Eleatics, being so named 
 from the city of Elea in Lower Italy, where they taught. 
 The leaders of this school were Xenophanes, Parmeni- 
 des, Zeno, and Melissus. 
 
 Life of Xenophanes. — Xenophanes, who was born 
 about the year 570 B.C., was a native of Colophon, a 
 town near the coast of Asia Minor, and not far from 
 Miletus and Samos, the birth-places of Thales and his 
 followers, and of Pythagoras. He was an elegiac and 
 gnomic poet, a wandering rhapsodist, in whom the mys- 
 tery of nature awakened a profound religious and spec- 
 ulative impulse. He was, it seems, very decidedly at 
 variance with popular religious and ethical views, and, 
 like many another intellectual radical, was obliged to 
 suffer on account of his convictions, becoming a fugi- 
 tive or an exile (it is uncertain which of the two) 
 because of them. He settled at Elea, there founding 
 the Eleatic school, distinguished and influential, as we 
 shall have abundant occasion to note, in the history of 
 Greek thought. He wrote a didactic poem. On Nature. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. II 
 
 Philosophy of Xenophanes. — Xenophanes took his 
 start apparently from the Infinite of Anaximander. In- 
 stead, however, of attempting to supplement and per- 
 fect this conception by uniting it with its opposite, the 
 Finite, as did the Pythagoreans, he lifted it above all oppo- 
 sition and held (more or less unconsciously perhaps) the 
 real infinite to be not existent in or for anything other 
 than itself, either as source of being or as ground of 
 harmony, but existent simply in and for itself. He af- 
 firmed, says Aristotle, that the universe is one, and 
 "looking wistfully at the whole heaven he declared 
 that the One is God." In other words, he held that 
 "the Many," multiplicity, is, as such, non-existent, and 
 that all things are parts or forms or aspects of the One. 
 The One, he held, is beyond human comprehension, 
 and yet he called it God, saying, " God is all ear, all 
 eye, all intellect ; without effort he sways all things by 
 the force of his thought." He combated the popular 
 anthropomorphic dogmas concerning the gods by such 
 arguments as the following : If oxen and lions had the 
 requisite skill, they would picture their gods as animals, 
 like themselves. He condemned Homer and Hesiod 
 for representing the gods as doing those things which 
 men would be treated as criminals for doing — as lying, 
 stealing, committing adultery. Although Xenophanes 
 did not, so far as we know, explicitly affirm the One to 
 be either material or spiritual — the explicit and clear 
 distinction, familiar to us, between the material and 
 spiritual was probably of later origin in the history 
 of thought — he held it to be essentially what we 
 call spiritual. Without mentally separating mind and 
 matter he declared reality to be one (the Many being 
 
12 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 phenomenal). The One as one is not a subject of gen- 
 eration or decay, of multiplicity or change : it is eternal, 
 infinite, imperishable. Regarding the Many, i.e., the 
 gods and the multitude of visible phenomena, Xeno- 
 phanes seems to affirm that man's knowledge is mere 
 opinion. Speaking hypothetically, he said that all 
 things have as their elements earth and water; the 
 earth extends indefinitely in space below us, the air 
 indefinitely above ; the stars are fiery clouds. 
 
 Result. — Compared with the speculations of earlier 
 philosophers those of Xenophanes present two new 
 features : first, they are not materialistic nor mathe- 
 matico-idealistic but theistic, — Xenophanes, though a 
 nature-philosopher, was a theological and rationalistic 
 nature-philosopher; secondly, they contain an element 
 of scepticism, — the mental attitude of Xenophanes 
 towards phenomena, or the universe as immediately 
 known to us, is negative. 
 
 Life of Parmenides. — Of the life of Parmenides, the 
 greatest of the Eleatics, who was born in the latter part 
 of the sixth century B.C., very little is known. He was 
 a man of striking appearance and impressive personality. 
 Plato ^ represents Socrates as having in his youth met 
 Parmenides and as remembering him in later life as 
 quite an old man, " with grey hair and a handsome and 
 noble countenance." The Pythagorean views of culture 
 were familiar to him and were in part adopted and prac- 
 tised by him, through the influence, it would appear, of 
 intimate friends of his who were Pythagoreans. Like 
 the Pythagoreans, he engaged actively in public affairs ; 
 and is said to have drafted for his native city, Elea, a 
 
 1 Parmenides, p. 127. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I 3 
 
 code of laws to which the citizens, annually, for a con- 
 siderable period of years, swore fidelity. He was, in all 
 probability, a pupil of Xenophanes ; it is certain that he 
 adopted the latter's views and developed them, in writ- 
 ing and in public lectures and discussions. He wrote a 
 philosophical poem, entitled On Nature, and having three 
 parts : the first, which is merely introductory to the sec- 
 ond and third, being an allegory representing the poet 
 as being transported to the realm of the " goddess who 
 knoweth all things " ; the second, a logical exposition of 
 the conception of Being, entitled On Truth; the third, 
 a mythological representation of the generation of the 
 world of sense, entitled On Opinion} 
 ■ Philosophy of Parmenides. — Parmenides begins the 
 exposition of his theory by opposing to Opinion, as the 
 mental correlate of Phenomena, Conviction, as the men- 
 tal correlate of Being, • — Conviction, upon whose " foot- 
 steps Truth closely follows." The One, which he 
 denominates Being, is known by thought or reason. 
 Thinking and Being are thus one (the One) and in 
 such a way that it matters not with which you begin 
 in thought, — you must always arrive at the same result, 
 since all things are one. But Being is only of what is : 
 there is no not-Being. Not-Being cannot even be con- 
 ceived, for the very conception of it converts it into 
 Being. The idea of not-Being (nothing) is a spurious con- 
 ception, a mere fancy. Being, and Being only, is : it is 
 
 Whole and only begotten, and moveless and ever-enduring : 
 Never it was or shaU be ; but the All simultaneously now is 
 One continuous one." ^ 
 
 1 See the jfournal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. IV. No. I. (1870); 
 also W. L. Courtney's Studies in Philosophy. 
 
 2 Jour. Spec. Phil., Vol. IV., etc. ; Courtney's Studies, etc. 
 
14 GREEK PHILOSOPHV. 
 
 It cannot have been generated, for, if so, it must have 
 sprung from not-Being ; but there could have been in 
 not-Being (pure nothing) no power or necessity to cause 
 its production. Being must be wholly or wholly must 
 not be.^ Nor does anything absolutely other than itself 
 spring from Being ; for that so-called other must itself 
 be, and so be identical with Being. 
 
 " Nor is there ought of distinct ; for the all is self-similar alway ; 
 Wherefore the all is unbroken, and Being approacheth to Being." 
 
 Such being the case, we return to our starting-point — 
 
 " One and the same are thought, and that whereby there is think- 
 ing. 
 Never apart from existence wherein it receiveth expression 
 Shalt thou discover the action of thinking, for naught is or shall be 
 Other besides or beyond the existent." 
 
 Being is, therefore, self-determined. It is, moreover, 
 not infinite, or indefinite, as Anaximander and Xeno- 
 phanes had held : an inner necessity renders it self-con- 
 tained and definitely thinkable. It is the knowing and 
 the known One ; self -caused and self -thought. It may be 
 compared to a sphere, — it is perfect in its homogeneity 
 and continuity and in the regularity and definiteness of 
 its limit. Of the phenomenal universe, our knowledge 
 of which is mere "opinion," the account given by Par- 
 menides is that it was created by the "goddess that 
 governeth all things," by the mixture of two entirely 
 contrary elements, one of which is like light and fire, 
 and the other is dark, dense, and cold. The first-created 
 of the gods was Love. The mind of the individual man 
 
 1 This seems to be the first enunciation in the history of Greek Philoso- 
 phy of the so-called Law of Excluded Middle. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I 5 
 
 is such an organic entity as the body, with its members, 
 is ; and the character of the human individual's thought 
 depends upon which of the two elements predominates 
 in his bodily constitution — mind that is to say, is a 
 function of body. 
 
 Result. — Comparing the philosophy of Parmenides 
 with that of Xenophanes, we observe, first, that the 
 thought theologically and poetically enunciated by the 
 latter was, by the former, abstractly and logically pro- 
 pounded and developed. Instead of the term God, 
 employed by Xenophanes, Parmenides employs the 
 term Being ; he does not dogmatically assert but rea- 
 sons ; he affirms the existence of, and employs, a method 
 of knowledge. We observe, secondly, that although 
 Parmenides acknowledges no absolute not-Being, he 
 draws sharply a distinction not so drawn by Xeno- 
 phanes, between reality and phenomena. Being and rel- 
 ative not-Being ; between whjf is given by " reason," 
 the organ of truth and conviction, and what is given 
 in "opinion." By virtue of the fact that he was the 
 first among the Greek thinkers to state and logically 
 deduce the notion of absolute being, he is the first 
 purely philosophical thinker among the Greeks ; by vir- 
 tue of the fact that he was the first to point out and 
 demonstrate the unity of Thought and Being, he is the 
 father of idealism. His statement of idealism is, how- 
 ever, we must note, incomplete, because Thought, though 
 recognized by him as an essential moment of Being, is 
 not distinctly recognized as the (for us, and, in fact, abso- 
 lute) prius of Being. 
 
 Life of Zeno. — In some respects the most remarka- 
 ble of the Eleatics is Zeno. His birth may be placed at 
 
1 6 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 about the year 500 b.c. Plato represents him ^ as a fine- 
 appearing man of forty when Socrates saw him with 
 Parmenides, who was about twenty-five years his senior. 
 He was a favorite pupil and, perhaps, the adopted son of 
 Parmenides. Though a devotee of speculative science, 
 he held not aloof from public affairs ; was, indeed, a 
 most enthusiastic patriot and a bitter hater of tyranny. 
 There is a story that, when tried for conspiring with 
 others against the tyrant of his native city, Elea, he 
 showed his hatred and disdain of the tyrant by biting 
 off his tongue and spitting it in his face. The brilliancy 
 of his intellect, the genuineness of his moral fibre plainly, 
 even now, mark him as one of the select spirits of Gre- 
 cian antiquity.^ 
 
 Philosophy of Zeno. — Zeno's main thesis is, in sub- 
 stance, Not-Being is not ; hence only Being is. Now 
 as Being is one and unchanging, not-Being must be 
 conceived as the many jpd changing. But the notion 
 of the many is self-contradictory, and, therefore, false. 
 The One, only, is, the Many are not, i.e., multiplicity 
 and change are unreal, phenomenal. Against the no- 
 tions multiplicity and change he advanced eight argu- 
 ments, — four against the former, four against the latter.* 
 The substance of one of the arguments against multipli- 
 city is as follows : If Being were absolute multiplicity, 
 then it must be both infinitely great and infinitely small ; 
 for, first, it must have an infinite number of parts, and, 
 
 1 Parmenides, p. 127. 
 
 '^ See the life of him by Diogenes Laertius (trans, in Bohn's Class. Lib.). 
 
 ' See MuUach's Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum, Vol. I. pp. 269 
 and 270; Zellet's Outlines of the Hist, of Greek Philos. (trans.), pp. 63 and 
 64; Pre-Socratic Philosophers, Vol. I. pp. 608-627. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1/ 
 
 secondly, each part must be infinitely small, i.e., without 
 magnitude. Another of the arguments is, in substance, 
 that, if a bushel of grain when shaken out produces a 
 sound when it strikes the floor, each grain and part of 
 a grain must produce a sound, which is not the fact. 
 Against change (of place) one argument is the follow- 
 ing : " Motion cannot begin because a body in motion 
 cannot arrive at a new place without passing through an 
 infinite number of intermediate places " — which is im- 
 possible. Another argument against motion is, "The 
 flying arrow is at rest ; for it is at every moment only 
 in one place." It is always in one place, Zeno argues, 
 because time is perfectly continuous — is not to be con- 
 ceived as a series of distinct "nows"; but if we sup- 
 pose movement through distinct spaces or places, we 
 must suppose distinct times. There is, therefore, no 
 motion ; the flying arrow is at rest. 
 
 Result. — If mere multiplicity is the first principle of 
 the universe, then there is nothing but an infinity of, so 
 to say, particles or points of nothingness ; for the prin- 
 ciple of multiplicity, taken as absolute, is not satisfied 
 if there be anything that is one and indivisible. But of 
 such points of nothingness, infinite in number though 
 they be, nothing can be constituted ; continuity and 
 identity, which are objects of reason, cannot spring from 
 infinite discontinuity and multiplicity. Multiplicity is, 
 therefore, purely phenomenal : not-Being is not. As 
 such, i.e., as a "fact," it is not denied by Zeno. Nor are 
 the arguments against motion tantamount to the denial 
 of motion as a fact presented to us by sense : it would 
 have been no "answer" to Zeno to point to a moving 
 object, for he simply denied motion as absolute. If 
 
1 8 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 motion were absolute, then (absolute) change in Being 
 would be possible, which is absurd, because, as Par- 
 menides declared, Being is 
 
 " Whole and only-begotten, and moveless and ever enduring." 
 
 Translated into the language of modern theology 
 or of modern science Zeno's argument would mean 
 "God, only, is; He is the same yesterday, to-day, and 
 forever," or " The laws of nature are unalterable." To 
 treat the arguments of Zeno merely as word-puzzles or 
 even as "fallacies," "material" or "formal," is to miss 
 their point. The peculiar method employed by Zeno in 
 the above-cited arguments — that of maintaining a posi- 
 tion by the demonstration of the inherent absurdity of 
 its opposite — was termed the dialectic method ; and be- 
 cause of his peculiar mastery in it, he was called the 
 inventor of dialectics, though the same method had 
 been employed by Xenophanes (to some extent) and 
 Parmenides. Zeno gave no account of this method.^ 
 Zeno's position, compared with that of Parmenides, is 
 indicated with sufficient accuracy by the statement that 
 he holds the reverse side of the position of which Par- 
 menides holds the ^^verse, the two being in substance 
 the same, and that he had a fuller consciousness than 
 Parmenides of the significance of method in and for 
 itself. Zeno did not, so far as is now known, put forth 
 a theory, mythological or other, of the visible universe. 
 
 Melissus. — Of Melissus, who flourished a little later 
 than Zeno and wrote a treatise in prose entitled On 
 
 1 This mode of arguing should be carefully discriminated from that of 
 overthrowing a position merely by adducing some fact that does not lie 
 immediately in the given position but which tells against it nevertheless. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I9 
 
 Nature, it is sufficient to say that his position was that 
 of Parmenides, qualified by the affirmation that Being 
 is unlimited in space. This seems to be a relapse 
 towards the ^^Majz-materialism of the Hylicists ; but 
 Melissus, while holding this, affirmed the entire oneness 
 of Being. Diogenes Laertius states that Melissus was 
 "greatly occupied in political affairs," was "held in 
 great esteem among his fellow-citizens," and, in conse- 
 quence, elected admiral by them, and "was admired still 
 more on account of his private virtues." 
 
 General Result. — The Eleatic philosophy is twofold 
 in character : it is a theory (though an elementary one) 
 of knowledge as well as of Being. (It is the earliest 
 theory of knowledge.) It is primarily, however, a theory 
 of Being, Thought being treated as, primarily, depend- 
 ent upon Being, not Being upon Thought, though the 
 two are inseparable. It is, therefore, to be classed 
 among the nature-philosophies, though the term nature 
 is given in this philosophy what is, practically, a new 
 interpretation, the Eleatic notion of nature verging on 
 that of mind. The Eleatic doctrine of Being is, as has 
 been said, that it is one ; of knowledge, that it is a prod- 
 uct or function of reason, Thought and Being being 
 organically one. The Eleatic theory is, therefore, osten- 
 sibly monistic. Practically, however, it is not quite so. 
 No intelligible account is given by it of phenomena, the 
 relatively non-existent ; a fact which, we may here prop- 
 erly surmise, we shall find to have been discovered and 
 pointed out by contemporaneous or succeeding thinkers. 
 And there is, of course, the same dualism in their theory 
 of knowledge as in their account of Being, for they 
 
20 GREfiK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 held reason to be trustworthy and sense to be illusory ; ^ 
 a view which, also, must have had its consequences 
 among contemporaneous or later thinkers. 
 
 §4. 
 
 Heraclitus. 
 
 Life of Heraclitus. — Nearly contemporary with Par- 
 menides was Heraclitus of Ephesus, who flourished 
 not earlier than 500 B.C., nor later than 450 b.c. He 
 belonged to the nobility of the place. He was in tem- 
 perament aristocratic, melancholy, and meditative ; and 
 gave up public office for contemplative retirement, hold- 
 ing the world in contempt. Mostly self-taught and in- 
 dependent in his views, he studied and freely criticised 
 those of others, and was probably the profoundest of 
 the early Greek thinkers. A work of his entitled On 
 Nature won for him, by the crudity of its style and, 
 also, we may suspect, by the depth and paradoxical 
 character of its contents, the sobriquet of The Obscure. 
 Diogenes Laertius relates that Socrates, when asked 
 what he thought of a certain work of Heraclitus, replied, 
 " What I have understood is good ; and so, I think, 
 what I have not understood is ; only the book requires 
 a Delian diver to get at the meaning of it." ^ 
 
 Heraclitus s First Principle. — Heraclitus is some- 
 times treated as a Hylicist and Hylozoist. He did, 
 it is true, assume a physical principle (fire) and affirmed 
 the universal presence of life in matter. The central 
 
 1 It is important here to discriminate between a scepticism that denies, 
 or gives up the belief in, the possibility of a knowledge of the real, and a 
 scepticism that consists merely in distrusting the "reports of the senses." 
 
 2 Lives of the Philosophers (Bohn's Class. Lib.), p. 65. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 21 
 
 point in his speculations, however, was not the universal 
 material source of things, but the universal process of 
 things. Emphasizing the aspect of change in Natiire, 
 he held that existence was an absolute process, a contin- 
 ual flux : iravra %«bj364, " all things flow," is his real first 
 principle. Instead of affirming, as did the Eleatics, 
 Only Being is, he aifirms or seems to affirm, Only not- 
 Being is ; Becoming or not-Being is the object of his 
 thought. But what is Becoming .■• Is it mere change .-' 
 Another of his dicta runs. All is and also is not : Becom- 
 ing, that is to say, is the union of Being and not-Being. 
 Being and not-Being are involved one in the other. Our 
 human bodies, for example, undergo a process of growth 
 and decay : we live and die continually, — live because 
 we die, die because we live. Moreover, what we call the 
 actual death of the body is but the birth of a new life : 
 " Both life and death are in our life and our death " ; 
 " While we live our souls are buried in us, but when we 
 die our souls are restored to life." Time- — to take 
 another example — cannot be conceived as now exist- 
 ent or now not. In time as in all reality, continuity 
 and discontinuity, Being and not- Being are inseparable. 
 Opposite qualities co-exist in the real, not merely in the 
 phenomenal, as the Eleatics declared. " Strife is the 
 father of all things." "Unite the whole and the not- 
 whole, the consentient and the dissentient, the conso- 
 nant and the dissonant and there arises one from all, 
 all from one." There is a continual conversion of the 
 Many into the One, and vice versa. The harmony of 
 the One and the Many, which the Pythagoreans asserted 
 but did not explain, is brought about through the notion 
 of Becoming, — activity, life. 
 
22 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Physical Doctrine of Heraclitus. — Now the omnipres- 
 ent element or medium in which this process is 
 realized and which is hardly to be distinguished from 
 the process itself is, according to Heraclitus, fire, which 
 in its purest form is spirit. By a process subtler than 
 the "condensation" of Anaximenes, fire is transmuted 
 into air, air into water, water into earth ; air, water, and 
 earth being, though "opposites," but stages in the in- 
 volution of fire. This is called the "downward way." 
 The two " ways " are inseparable or organic members of 
 one process. This process must be conceived, not as a 
 mechanical process, but as a vital organic process, in 
 which opposite forces are held as one. In the vast 
 process by which the visible universe is maintained 
 there is alternately a kindling and an extinguishing of 
 the elemental fire. 
 
 The Soul and Reason. — The human soul is but a 
 mode of the universal fire. The dry soul is best ; 
 moisture in the soul obscures reason. By respiration 
 and the action of the organs of sense, the soul is nour- 
 ished with the universal fire. "Souls enter the body 
 from a higher state of existence, and after death, when 
 they have proved themselves worthy of their privilege, 
 they return as daemons into a purer life."^ Eyes and 
 ears are bad witnesses to those who have " barbarous 
 souls." The senses deceive by giving the appearance 
 of fixedness to things not fixed. The reason is the real 
 source of knowledge. By reason man ceases to be a 
 dreaming individual and becomes a waking universal. 
 It is by participation in the universal reason, the K.oivo<i 
 
 1 Zeller's Pre-SocraHc Philos., Vol. II. p. 87. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 23 
 
 Xo'709, that we know and do that which is true and 
 right. 
 
 Result. — It is obvious that Heraclitus attained to a 
 riper and richer conception of nature than any of his 
 predecessors had attained to. The Eleatic notion of 
 the One and the Pythagorean notion of the harmony of 
 the One and the Many are realized more perfectly in 
 the Heraclitean doctrine, in which they are subordinate, 
 than in those theories in which they are principal. 
 Heraclitus recognizes no phenomenal world, however 
 shadowy, as separate from, and irreconcilable to, the 
 realm of Being, and the One and the Many are not, in 
 his notion, merely in harmony, they are the same thing, 
 by virtue of the power of motion, or life, and reason.^ 
 And if the material source of things is to be found 
 among the "elements" fire, air, earth, and water, cer- 
 tainly it must be that which is subtlest and capable of 
 the most manifold transformations. There is, even in 
 this latest age of the world, beauty in the Pythagorean 
 conception, a certain loftiness and splendor in the Elea- 
 tic ; but there is infinite vigor and pregnancy in the 
 Heraclitic. There does not appear immediately in the- 
 after-course of Greek speculation an intellectual mid- 
 wife — to borrow a Socratic metaphor — skilful enough 
 to bring to the birth its entire significance. 
 
 §s. 
 
 The Later Natural Philosophers. — The speculations 
 of Heraclitus, the Eleatics, and earlier philosophers, 
 
 1 The philosophy of Heraclitus has been called " the philosophy of the 
 logical law of the identity of contradictories." 
 
24 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 established, practically, certain fundamental points for 
 the philosophers whose views we have next to consider 
 and who may be called the Later Natural Philosophers 
 or Nature-Philosophers. One point was, that there is no 
 absolute change, no real "generation" or "decay" : ex 
 nihilo nihil fit. Another point was, that there is a 
 becoming, nature is a process. A third point, which 
 may be regarded as the (imperfect) synthesis of the two, 
 was that the process of nature is a mechanical process. 
 In place of the monism of the earlier theorists, we shall, 
 accordingly, find a more or less distinct dualism, of 
 matter and force, of the material world and reason. 
 Speculation now practically turns upon the inquiries, 
 What causes and maintains the process of nature .■' 
 What is the character and end of that process .' Of 
 these Later Nature-Philosophers, the chief are Empedo- 
 cles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democrittis. 
 
 Life of Empedocles. — Empedocles was a native of 
 Agrigentum in Sicily, and lived circa 495-535 b.c. He 
 took the active interest usually taken by the early Greek 
 philosophers in political affairs, and was a leader of the 
 democratic party in his native city. He was not only a 
 statesman and a philosopher, but an orator, a poet, a 
 physician, a prophet, and a thaumaturgist. His charac- 
 ter and personal influence are said to have been similar 
 to those of Pythagoras. 
 
 Theory of Nature. — Holding fast to the Eleatic idea 
 that generation and decay are impossible, he yet holds, 
 in a certain way, to the notion of Becoming; and at- 
 tempts to account for changing nature by the hypothe- 
 sis of a continued process of combination and separation 
 of certain (supposed) original, imperishable, unchange- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 25 
 
 able, purely material elements or "roots," — fire, air, 
 water, earth. Fire, air, and water, it has been seen, had 
 been separately posited as " principles " by earlier phi- 
 losophers. Empedocles was the first who assumed these 
 four as the primal elements. Now the question arises 
 — and this is the first appearance of such a question in 
 the history of Greek philosophy — What is the cause of 
 the combination and separation of the elements .■• The 
 elements we have just seen are purely material; the 
 combining and separating forces are Love and Hate, — 
 the ancient mythological analogues of the modern scien- 
 tific "attraction" and "repulsion." By Love the ele- 
 ments are bound indistinguishably together in one all- 
 embracing sphere ; Hate penetrating from the outside 
 to the centre drives the elements asunder, thus giving 
 rise to the world of individual existences. In the eternal 
 process of nature, Love and Hate alternately rule. 
 Variety in the world of individual existences arises, of 
 course, from variety in the combination of elements : 
 flesh and blood, for example, are composed of the four 
 elements united in equal proportions, whereas bones are 
 one-half fire, one-fourth earth, and one-fourth water. 
 Animals are formed by the combination by Love of 
 parts that existed separately, having sprung out of the 
 ■ earth. The monstrosities that were the result of the 
 earliest combinations, such as bodies of men united to 
 horses' heads, bodies of oxen with human heads, etc.. 
 gradually gave way to higher forms, until eventually 
 the present mode of generation was established. Empe- 
 docles, it thus appears, was, like Anaximander, an 
 "evolutionist." 
 
 Theory of Knowledge. — Even knowledge is explained 
 
26 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 by Empedocles as the result of mixture. Sense-percep- 
 tion is the effect of an efflux of particles from external 
 bodies entering pores corresponding in size to them, 
 in the body of the percipient. In the case of sight 
 there is a double efflux, — an efflux from the eye 
 as well as from the body perceived, sight being a conse- 
 quence of the intermingling of effluences.^ The efflux 
 from the eye is an efflux of particles of water and fire. 
 The elements in things are known through like ele- 
 ments in us, — earth through earth, water through 
 water, etc. Thought also depends, for its character, 
 on the character of the mixture of elements. Quick- 
 ness and acuteness of perception and thought result 
 from mixtures different from those from which their 
 opposites result. The psychological organ of truth is . 
 not perception but reflection. 
 
 Restdt. — The sources and essential character of the 
 theory of Empedocles are apparent. Conceptions bor- 
 rowed from, or suggested by, the Eleatics, Heraclitus, 
 and earlier speculators, are combined to produce what 
 is almost a purely mechanical explanation of natural 
 phenomena. The system is mechanical because of the 
 want of organic conception or affinity between the 
 posited original elements and powers of nature. But 
 for the anthropomorphic elements. Love and Hate, the 
 system would be entirely mechanical. We may reason- 
 ably expect to encounter in the history of early Greek 
 speculation a system from which such anthropomorphic 
 elements are entirely absent.^ 
 
 ^ In modern " psychological " phraseology this would mean that sight is 
 both " objective " and " subjective." 
 ^ See p. 32 infra. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 27 
 
 Life of Anaxagoras. — Anaxagoras was a native of 
 Clazomenas in Asia Minor. Though born somewhat 
 earlier than Empedocles he flourished a little later. 
 Giving up wealth and social position for philosophy, he 
 went in early manhood to Athens, and remained there, 
 as thinker and teacher, till near the close of his life, a 
 period of about fifty years. His sojourn at Athens was 
 the beginning of that magnificent course, hereafter to be 
 delineated, which philosophy ran there in the most ca- 
 pacious intellects of antiquity. Parmenides and Zeno 
 may have visited Athens, but Anaxagoras was the first 
 philosopher who made that city of culture and individu- 
 ality his home and the chief outward abode of philos- 
 ophy. His presence in Athens during the period of her 
 greatest glory under the statesmanship of his personal 
 friend (and disciple), Pericles, was, no doubt, opportune 
 for philosophy, and particularly for a system that placed 
 in the forefront of the universe z'oi)?, or intelligence. 
 Among the pupils of Anaxagoras there were — besides 
 Pericles — Euripides and Socrates. Because of the un- 
 popularity of his doctrine — he was accused of atheism 
 — and his connection with Pericles, he was obliged, 
 when the latter fell temporarily into disfavor with the 
 Athenian populace, to pay a fine and leave Athens. 
 He died at Lampsacus on the Hellespont, 428 e.g., at 
 the age of seventy-two. He wrote a work entitled On 
 Nature. 
 
 Theory of Nature. — To account for the order and 
 beauty of the world Anaxagoras assumes two principles, 
 one material, the other spiritual or ^2<a«'-spiritual. The 
 material principle is an infinite medley, a chaos, of an 
 infinite number of qualitatively different elements, which 
 
28 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 he terras aTrepixara, or the " seeds " of things. The ele- 
 ments, however, must, though different, be conceived as 
 organically the same ; i.e., each element mttst have in 
 it, potentially, all others, for we cannot conceive the 
 union of things absolutely different. The spiritual, or 
 quasi-s^ixit\xd\, principle is just the opposite in nature to 
 the material — perfectly "unmixed" and "pure," the 
 " finest and purest of all things," an independent, intel- 
 ligent power, since we cannot conceive order and beauty 
 as the offspring of mere necessity or chance. Out of 
 the original mixture, or chaos, the world was formed by 
 a rotatory motion produced by the action of the original 
 mind, a movement which, beginning at a single point 
 and gradually extending, caused a universal separation 
 of unlike, and union of like, seeds, the dense and moist 
 moving to the centre, the rare and warm to the circum- 
 ference of the world. This process of differentiation 
 goes on forever, becoming ever more refined. Differ- 
 ences in bodies result from differences in the character 
 of the seeds that predominate in their constitution. 
 From the hypothesis that certain substances, e.g., gold, 
 blood, bones, were formed only of seeds like themselves, 
 the name homceomerice {oiMoioixipeiai = like parts) was 
 applied by later writers (not by Anaxagoras) to the 
 original elements, or " seeds " of things. The earth he 
 conceived to be a cylinder resting on the air, in the 
 centre of the universe. The sun is not a blessed god, 
 as the multitude believe, but an immense glowing mass 
 of stone — as large as the Peloponnesus, — one of the 
 doctrines, probably, that gave ground for the charge of 
 atheism that was brought against him. The moon is 
 like the earth and is inhabited. Plants and animals 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 29 
 
 spring from germs communicated to moist or slimy 
 earth by tlie air and the asther ; they have souls, and feel 
 pleasure and pain. 
 
 Theory of Mind or Nous {vov<;) and of Knowledge. — 
 The world-mind has been described as a nature that 
 is perfectly "pure" and "unmixed," "the finest and 
 purest of all things," and independent of the material 
 universe. All derivative minds are essentially the same 
 with it, and with one another, differing from it and from 
 one another only in degree. Sense-perception, which is 
 dependent upon the structure of the bodily organs, is 
 not of "like by like," as Empedocles asserted, but of 
 " like by unlike," as of heat by cold : that which is 
 equally warm with ourselves makes no impression upon 
 us. The senses do not afford real knowledge ; that 
 comes through reason. Man's highest satisfaction lies 
 in the pursuit of wisdom. 
 
 Result. — The mechanicalness that is so conspicuous 
 in the theory of Empedocles is less conspicuous here ; 
 for there is, in the very essence of the "principles" of 
 the system — the "seeds," which, though different, are 
 potentially the same and virtually synthesizable, and the 
 world-ordering mind, — the beginning of an organic 
 conception of the universe. For if chaos be a mass of 
 potentially organizable, though not actually organized 
 or articulated elements, it just verges upon mind, which 
 is the actually determining, organizing element in the 
 universe. The system of Anaxagoras is mechanical, 
 therefore, in part because it offers no statement of this 
 connection between matter and mind. For another 
 reason, also, it fails of being organic and completely 
 rational, viz., Anaxagoras's conception of mind was, 
 
30 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 though fundamentally correct, but rudimentary. A de- 
 veloped conception of mind belongs, in fact, to a later 
 period in the history of thought. Plato and Aristotle, 
 the latter of whom, comparing him with other nature- 
 philosophers, likened him to a sober man coming in 
 among the drunken, properly enough found fault with 
 the theory of Anaxagoras, because in it mind was treated 
 as a mere mover of matter. Anaxagoras, as Plato points 
 out in his dialogue Phcedo (pp. 97-99), just missed 
 grasping fairly the idea of the final cause, or of end- 
 determined causation, in nature. 
 
 TtjCeucippus and Democritus, the Atomists ; their Lives. 
 — Of Leucippus's life nothing is known. He was the 
 originator of the essentials of the theory expounded 
 in the writings of Democritus, who was a pupil -of his. 
 Democritus was born in Abdera in Thrace about the 
 year 460 B.C. Possessed of great wealth, he was able 
 to gratify to the fullest extent his passion for knowledge, 
 which impelled him to travel very extensively in Egypt 
 and the East, and, upon his return home, to devote 
 himself to philosophical research. He was the most 
 learned of the early Greek philosophers, an encyclopae- 
 dist, worthy of the admiration freely bestowed upon 
 him by the still greater master of knowledges, Aristotle. 
 His numerous works, of which only fragments have 
 been preserved, were written in prose instead of didac- 
 tic verse, such as most of his predecessors had employed. 
 They were greatly admired among the ancients for their 
 style as well as their doctrine. Democritus lived about 
 a century. 
 
 Theory of Nature. — M^ fiaWov to Bev rj rt iii) Bev 
 ehai : " No more is Thing [Being] than no-Thing [not- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 3 I 
 
 Being]," says Democritus, recognizing the respective 
 claims of the Eleatics and Heraclitus. This implies 
 that Democritus accepted, and attempted to explain, 
 change as a fact. To do the latter, he conceived Being 
 to consist of innumerable eternal, infinitesimal, movable, 
 material elements, which he termed drofia (indivisibles), 
 i.e., atoms. With Being thus constituted (termed the 
 " full," " plenum " ) is coeval not-Being, empty space 
 (the " void " ). Thing and no-Thing, the " full" and the 
 "void" constitute absolute reality: all else is phenome- 
 nal. Unlike the four elements of Empedocles and the 
 "seeds" of Anaxagoras, they are not qualitatively, but 
 only quantitatively, different, — different as regards fig- 
 ure, size, weight, order, and position. The world of 
 individual existences is produced by the eternal falling (!) 
 and collision of the atoms, due to an inherent necessity. 
 By a rotatory motion thus generated the heavenly bodies 
 were produced. The qualitative as well as quantitative 
 properties of things depend merely upon the figure, size, 
 weight, arrangement, position, and number of the atoms 
 constituting them. Though atoms are imperishable, the 
 bodies composed of them are not. 
 
 Theory of the Soul, of Knowledge, and of the Good. 
 — Soul, or spirit, in the external world and in man, is 
 composed of fine, round, smooth, fiery atoms. The ex- 
 halation and inhalation of these is the source of life in 
 the human body. In the brain the motion of such 
 atoms produces thought, in the heart anger, in the liver 
 desire. Sense-perceptions are the effects of impressions 
 made upon the organs of sense by particles of air set in 
 motion by effluences from objects. The sensation of 
 sight, however, is a resultant of the meeting of emana- 
 
32 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tions from the eye with incoming impulses. Dreams 
 are effects of enfeebled and distorted images (etBooXa) 
 that have found their way from objects and persons to 
 our minds. The character and degree of trustworthi- 
 ness of sense-perceptions depend upon the character of 
 external impressions. Sense gives conflicting reports 
 .and is deceptive. Thought, which is a result of a sym- 
 metrical motion of atoms, is alone the source of knowl- 
 edge. The true method in knowledge is to proceed 
 from the known to the unknown. Ethically considered, 
 man's real being lies in nobility of soul : his real good 
 is happiness, which is not sensuous enjoyment but peace 
 and contentment springing from measure and modera- 
 tion in living. The highest happiness is the pleasure of 
 knowledge. The seat of morality is not in the act per- 
 formed but in the will. Democracy is the best form of 
 government. The wise and good are citizens of the 
 whole world. The popular gods are beings in the air 
 similar to man but far higher in degree. The truly 
 divine element in the world is the fiery atom or totality 
 of fiery atoms.-'^ 
 
 Result. — The theory of the Atomists is doubtless 
 the most perfect of the merely mechanical, non-anthro- 
 pomorphic,^ theories of nature of the early Greek phi- 
 losophers : it has a simplicity and an inner consistency 
 not possessed by any other. The conceptions of quan- 
 tity and natural necessity, which are the ruling concep- 
 tions of the theory, are harmonious and easily grasped, 
 and seem all-sufficient, until problems of soul and life 
 are confronted, when it becomes necessary to recognize 
 
 1 See Zeller's Prc-Socratic Philosophy, Vol. II. pp. 207-321. 
 ■^ See supra, p. 26. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 33 
 
 mind as an absolute. The Atomists are unable to 
 derive, theoretically, knowledge and feeling from the 
 nature and motion of atoms, and the conception of 
 natural necessity is poor in content compared with 
 that of mind. This being the case, while in one direc- 
 tion the Atomistic philosophy is the most highly devel- 
 oped of all the early nature-philosophies, the philoso- 
 phy of Anaxagoras is, on the whole, nearer the truth : 
 the philosophy of nature is naturally and necessarily 
 linked with that of mind. It should be noted before 
 leaving Democritus that he entered more largely than 
 did any of his predecessors into anthropological and 
 ethical questions, topics belonging to the philosophy 
 of man as distinct from merely physical nature. In 
 this respect he has greater affinity with the philoso- 
 phers of the next period than any of the very early 
 Greek philosophers. 
 
 General Character of the First Period in the History 
 of Greek Philosophy. — We have now, as will presently 
 appear, finished the first great epoch in the history 
 of Greek philosophy. Before going further we must 
 briefly sum up its characteristics. As to subject-matter, 
 thought has in this epoch been occupied chiefly with 
 external nature, — man and the supernatural receiving 
 but little consideration. As to its method, it has been 
 speculative, hypothetical, and deductive rather than 
 observational, inductive, "scientific," — rather than be- 
 cause, in any case, something must be "given" or 
 assumed at the start, and where this is true, there is 
 room for rough induction at least. The greatest achieve- 
 
34 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ment in method is, doubtless the "dialectic" of the 
 Eleatics and the Heraclitic " unity of opposites," which 
 are " possessions for all time." Of these we shall hear 
 again, farther on. Finally, as to the general attitude of 
 thought in this epoch, there has been a change from 
 simple unsophisticated confidence in the power of the 
 mind to know nature to a kind of scepticism, — scepti- 
 cism, indeed, not with reference to the scope of reflec- 
 tion but with reference to sense-perception. This scep- 
 ticism reached its highest degree in the Atomists, with 
 whom even the power of thought reached the minimum, 
 i.e., the power to know just the "void," "atoms," and 
 the motion of atoms. This seems to be the natural 
 consequence of regarding reality as external to mind, 
 and, viewed as such, may be considered one of the best 
 lessons to be gathered from the study of very early 
 Greek speculation. A higher thought, the obverse of 
 this, is virtually contained in the theory of Anaxagoras, 
 the reality and unity of all things in mind. 
 
 > II. RATIONALISM. 
 
 §7- 
 
 The Sophists. — There arose in Greece in the fifth 
 century b.c. a class of persons to whom, on account of 
 their peculiar pretensions to wisdom, was especially ap- 
 plied (and generally with opprobrium) the term " Soph- 
 ist," this term having been previously applied to any 
 who were preeminent among men in the knowledge of 
 human affairs. For certain reasons, somewhat pecu- 
 liar (as we shall see), these men must be included 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 35 
 
 among philosophers. The leading Sophists were Pro- 
 tagoras of Abdera, Gorgias of Leontini, Hippias of Elis, 
 and Prodicus of Ceos. Others among the most eminent 
 Sophists are those named Polus, Thrasymachus, and 
 Eutkydemus. 
 
 Life of Protagoras. — Protagoras of Abdera in Thrace 
 (circa 490-415 B.C.) was first in Athens about the 
 middle of the fifth century B.C. He was the first of 
 the Sophists to take a fee for instruction given by him, 
 — a practice that was condemned by Socrates and 
 Plato. Protagoras, however, as it would appear, charged 
 only a moderate fee and deserved not the contempt 
 with which the money-getting Sophists after him were 
 richly rewarded. He was a man of learning, character, 
 and intelligence — whom even Plato did not always 
 sneer at — and was much sought after. He had the 
 "courage of his convictions" and held and taught doc- 
 trines, religious and political, which caused him to be 
 condemned as an atheist, and his works (one of which 
 was on Truth) to be publicly burned. He is said to 
 have prepared laws for one of the Athenian colonies. 
 He was an embryo etymologist and a rhetorician ; he 
 affirmed, however, that rhetorical art consists in 
 "making the worse appear the better reason." 
 
 Theory of Protagoras. — "The measure of all things," 
 says Protagoras, "is man": "of things that are, that 
 they are ; of things that are not, that they are not." 
 To this dictum, which is in itself equivocal and may 
 mean that the human mind is adequate to the at- 
 tainment of absolute objective truth or that what is 
 true to one individual is true for him only, Protagoras 
 gave the latter meaning, and thus human knowledge 
 
36 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 was reduced by him to a "knowledge" of subjective 
 appearances. This doctrine, it will be perceived, is 
 simply the Heraclitean doctrine (superficially inter- 
 preted) of the eternal flux of things in general trans- 
 ferred from nature to man. Strictly applied, it would 
 signify not only that no two persons think or perceive 
 the same thing, but that no person thinks or feels twice 
 alike ; it would mean also that there is and can be no 
 real fixed object of knowledge. Contradictory opinions 
 are equally true ; right and wrong are merely matters 
 of subjective opinion ; the state is a compact based on 
 force. The existence of the gods is uncertain, — the 
 subject being too difficult and life being too short 
 to admit of our learning anything certain about the 
 matter.^ 
 
 Life of Gorgias. — Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily 
 {circa 480-395 B.C.) began teaching in Athens about 
 the year 427 B.C., and acquired as a teacher of rhetoric 
 "greater celebrity than any man of his time." His rep- 
 utation as a rhetorician — • he was an orator as well as a 
 teacher of rhetoric — seems to have overshadowed his 
 character as an acute thinker. 
 
 Theory of Gorgias. — In a work entitled On Nature 
 or the Non-Existefit Gorgias denied objective reality. 
 He argued : — Nothing is ; if anything were, it would be 
 unknowable ; and if knowable, not explicable in words. 
 One branch of his argument to prove that nothing is 
 is substantially as follows : — If anything were, it must 
 be derivative or eternal. It cannot be derivative, for, as 
 
 1 The doctrine of the " relativity of knowledge," it is thus to be seen, 
 is quite ancient. Plato's criticism of it, which will be cited later on, is 
 as good now as it was when first made. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 37 
 
 the Eleatics maintained, there is no becoming. It can- 
 not be eternal, for it would then be infinite ; but the 
 infinite is nowhere, for it can neither be in itself nor in 
 any other, and what is nowhere is not. To prove that 
 if anything were it would be unknowable, Gorgias 
 argues that thought and being are incommensurable, 
 since if they be not, whatever is thought must be, as, 
 for example, a contest with chariots, on the sea. Fi- 
 nally, knowledge, even if possible, could not be commu- 
 nicated because the sign of an idea and the idea itself 
 have no natural necessary connection.^ 
 
 Result. — The method of Gorgias is the dialectic of 
 Zeno, and his sceptical conclusions seem to flow from 
 the fact that he treats conceptions that are valid only in 
 relation to certain others that are correlative with them, 
 as if they were themselves absolute, and excluded those 
 others, e.g., the conceptions of being and not-being, one 
 and many, thought and being, infinite and finite, word 
 and idea. One has no meaning absolutely out of rela- 
 tion to many ; we cannot assume that only the one is. 
 The same holds true of being and not-being, infinite and 
 finite, word and idea. The argumentation of Gorgias 
 points, by the absurdity of its result, to the conclusion 
 that what is is a union of opposites, and we are, just on 
 this account, indebted to him ; holding to the principle 
 of identity (not of opposites but of each thing in and 
 by itself) he forces us to acknowledge the dualistic 
 character of consciousness. Gorgias, however, seems 
 to have had no higher than a purely sceptical aim in so 
 doing. The real lesson of his argumentation is that the 
 
 1 See Zeller'sPre-Socratic Philosophy, Vol. II. pp. 452-455. 
 
38 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 truth is not simple and abstract but complex and con- 
 crete. 
 
 Hippias and Prodiciis. — Hippias of Elis and Prodi- 
 cus of Ceos were younger contemporaries of Protagoras 
 and Gorgias. Because of the extent and variety of 
 his learning, Hippias was styled " the polymathist." 
 He declared that law is a tyrant compelling men to 
 do many things contrary to nature, a saying that reflects 
 a tendency then existing in Athens towards social 
 and political disintegration. Prodicus was a moralist, 
 and seems to have been considered by Socrates 
 as a sage adviser of youth, but no dialectician, or 
 scientific thinker. In the Second Book of Xeno- 
 phon's Memorabilia there is to be found an allegory 
 that Socrates is represented as borrowing from the 
 "Wise Prodicus." In this the hero Hercules is pic- 
 tured as exposed to the respective charms of two 
 female personages of opposite character, — Pleasure 
 and Virtue. The allegory was greatly admired among 
 the ancients. Prodicus is said to have investigated the 
 subject of synonyms. 
 
 The Sophists as a Class ; Result. — Strictly speak- 
 ing, the Sophists should, perhaps, be regarded as phi- 
 losophers only in a negative way : for they were interested 
 primarily not in universal science but in individualistic 
 culture ; they were moulders of men rather than inves- 
 tigators and expounders of ideas. They were shrewd 
 enough to see, however, that the pretension to the 
 possession of wisdom which the professional educator 
 necessarily puts forward ' must be supported by at least 
 a modicum of philosophy as such. Very much of the 
 real thing would doubtless have hindered, instead of 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 39 
 
 promoting, the realization of their main purpose, which 
 seems to have been to fashion what Plato calls the 
 " narrow, keen, little legal mind." ^ Their principal busi- 
 ness was the fitting of ambitious youths for political ca- 
 reers in a democracy. The young Athenian who must 
 distinguish himself before a body of dicasts, or judges, 
 was supposed to need all possible skill in rhetoric and 
 dialectic, and the appearance of being wise on all sub- 
 jects, particularly those relating directly to social and po- 
 litical matters ; the young Athenian required, and the 
 Sophist prepared himself to teach, not the philosophy of 
 the schools, which he considered merely as a juvenile dis- 
 cipline, but a " practical " philosophy. But the Sophist, 
 though not a genuine philosopher, did something to pre- 
 pare the way for philosophy. He was, as Grote says, 
 the "professor " or public teacher ; by him "higher edu- 
 cation " was offered to Grecian youth ; to him the young 
 man who in the schools had been trained in gymnastics, 
 had gotten the cream of the poets and moralists, had 
 learned to recite fittingly from their works and to take 
 part in dramatic choruses, went for instruction in " philos- 
 ophy," including mathematics, astronomy, dialectics, ora- 
 tory, and criticism. And the Sophist not only gave in- 
 struction ; he stimulated his pupils, if not to profound 
 inquiry, at least to the practice of analysis and criticism 
 before which merely superficial traditional views and 
 customs were not always strong enough to stand, — in 
 other words to something like free and independent, if 
 not sober, thinking. In saying this, we do not forget that 
 
 the practices of the later Sophists were not above mere 
 
 * 
 
 1 Theatetus,^. 175 (Jowett's trans.). 
 
40 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 verbal trifling and charlatanry.^ The philosophical find- 
 ings of the Sophists, though slender from a positive 
 point of view, were yet, in certain respects, marked and 
 important. They were certainly peculiar. If we com- 
 pare them as regards subject of speculation, method, or 
 point of view with those we have already considered, we 
 shall discover what proves to be the beginning of a 
 new epoch in the history of Greek speculation. Not 
 Nature but Man is the principal theme of the Sophists ; 
 they profess and practise everywhere a certain method 
 (the dialectical or g^iasi-dialectical) ; and their mental 
 attitude, instead of being that of confidence or scientific 
 circumspectness, is, wholly and on principle, sceptical, as 
 is well illustrated even in the very title of Gorgias's 
 work, On Nature, or the Non-Existent. And it will 
 appear as we proceed that their successors are very 
 largely occupied in developing and transcending their 
 point of view, correcting and further perfecting their 
 method, and investigating their theme. In its psycho- 
 logical aspect the philosophy of the Sophists was pure 
 sensationalism ; in its ethical, pure individualism, the 
 philosophy of mere "private judgment," "private right." 
 As Hegel puts it, — the Sophists introduced the princi- 
 ple of subjectivity into philosophy. 
 
 ^ For the most extended and authoritative accounts of the Sophists see 
 Grote's Hist, of Greece, Chap. LXVII.; The yournal of Sacred and Clas- 
 sical Philology, Vols. I., II., and III., arts, by E. M. Cope; Zeller's Pre- 
 Socratic Philosophy, Vol. II. pp. 462-469. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 4I 
 
 § 8. 
 
 Socrates} 
 
 The Sophists and Socrates. — The philosophical suc- 
 cessor of the Sophists, though a contemporary of the 
 earliest and chief ones, is Socrates. Like them, he 
 maintained a sceptical attitude towards the physical 
 speculations of the early nature-philosophers, and was 
 driven, in part at least, by the unsatisfactoriness of those 
 speculations, to the almost exclusive contemplation of 
 human nature. But to him "man" in the Protagorean 
 dictum meant man not merely in his individual, but also 
 and primarily in his universal, nature, man the thinker 
 and the natural participator in the life of his fellow-men. 
 For the showy rhetoric and false dialectic of the Soph- 
 ists he sought to substitute scientific method, adequate 
 to fact and universal truth ; and for their doctrine of 
 external pleasure and utility, the idea of inherent justice 
 and happiness. Like the Sophists, he questioned exist- 
 ing beliefs and institutions — theological, ethical, politi- 
 cal — but he sought to discover and preserve their 
 universal element, or truth. As to his external methods, 
 neither love of publicity or popular favor, nor ostenta- 
 tion of learning or skill in words, nor any desire to reap 
 pecuniary reward, had any part in them. In a word, he 
 sought the " simple truth " : in the spirit of the truth he 
 sought the truth iirst of all, in its own proper form, uni- 
 versality and accessibility to all intelligence. What 
 Hegel calls the principle of subjectivity was, as intro- 
 duced and employed by the Sophists, largely an empty 
 
 ^ See especially Zeller^s Socrates and the Socratic Schools (trans, from 
 Zeller's Die Geschichte der Philos. der Griecheri), 
 
42 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 form ; Socrates gave to it a definite, full, and enduring 
 content. 
 
 Special Sources of Information regarding Socrates. 
 — Socrates wrote no philosophical treatise. What is 
 known of him and his teachings has been learned 
 chiefly from the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Aris- 
 totle. Owing to the discrepancies between the presen- 
 tations of Xenophon and of Plato, there arises a question 
 as to which of the two affords the better view of Socra- 
 tes and his philosophizing. Xenophon's superiority, so 
 far as he possesses any, is due to his evident historical 
 intent. It has been urged, however, that he wrote 
 largely as an apologist, that he lacked the speculative 
 insight necessary for the appreciation at its full value 
 of the Socratic philosophizing, and that he has pictured 
 Socrates regarded as a pattern of manhood, rather 
 than Socrates the speculative inquirer. Plato's pre- 
 sentation, on the other hand, though undoubtedly an 
 idealization, is, in the earlier dialogues, sufficiently faith- 
 ful to external fact, and probably represents, more truly 
 than the Xenophontic, the spirit, method, and tendency, 
 if not the outward doctrines and circumstances, of the 
 Socratic philosophizing : the student who is especially 
 interested in the continuity and development of Greek 
 philosophy will, no doubt, derive, as regards Socrates, 
 more satisfaction from Plato than from Xenophon, for 
 the simple reason that Plato's mature views were shaped 
 with reference to the whole course of Greek thought 
 preceding him, being or containing, therefore, the devel- 
 opment of Socratic as well as other earlier doctrines. 
 
 Life of Socrates. — Socrates was bom near Athens, 
 about the year 469 B.C., his parents being Sophroniscus, 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 43 
 
 a sculptor, and Phsenarete, a midwife. Of his early- 
 years nothing is known, save that he must have received 
 the usual education in gymnastics, poetry, and music. 
 He was self-instructed in geometry and astronomy ; and 
 doubtless heard the lectures of some of the Sophists, 
 with whom, in all probability, he frequently measured 
 dialectical swords. It is conjectured that with some 
 regular instruction or other assistance from others, he 
 made a special study of the theories of the Pythago- 
 reans, the Eleatics, Heraclitus, and Anaxagoras. If he 
 really did so, he undoubtedly formed original opinions 
 of them, and regarded much in them as problematical 
 and futile. It is sometimes said that he followed for a 
 while his father's occupation, and that a work of his, 
 "representing the Graces attired, was standing at the 
 entrance to the Acropolis" as late as 150 a.d. Not 
 long after he was thirty years of age he entered upon 
 what he regarded as a divine calling, that of a seeker of 
 wisdom and searcher of men. He professed to know 
 only his own ignorance ; to be, not a teacher, but an intel- 
 lectual " midwife." In this vocation he spent most of the 
 remaining forty years of his life ; but instead of travel- 
 ling extensively, as did most of his predecessors in phi- 
 losophy, and of affecting a learned cosmopolitanism, as 
 did some of the Sophists, he remained continuously at 
 Athens, with the exception of three or four intervals 
 when he was absent on a holiday trip or with the army. 
 His astonishing indifference to hardship while in mili- 
 tary service, his bravery, his self-forgetfulness, his sagac- 
 ity, and, withal, his periods of rapt meditation, are for- 
 ever memorable. Public office he cared less for than 
 did any philosopher who had lived before him, and 
 
44 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 accepted it only once, and then not till near the close 
 of his life and only from a sense of duty. Once when 
 in office, and again when merely a private citizen, he 
 defied tyranny by refusing to violate at its bidding the 
 law of the state. Standing aloof from participation in 
 political affairs, he held firmly and, as he declared, patri- 
 otically, to his calling; and in the pursuit of this he 
 might be found in the gymnasium, the market-place, the 
 workshop, conversing with boys, men, and women, of all 
 sorts and conditions, putting to them keen questions, 
 and quickening the pulse of moral and intellectual life. 
 He was concerned almost as little about his own family 
 affairs as about affairs of state; and if Xanthippe was 
 really the scolding wife that tradition represents her to 
 have been, she certainly had occasion for so being. 
 Socrates was, in fact, so absorbed in his calling that he 
 neglected to exercise common prudence not only for his 
 family, but for himself. It was food and raiment to him 
 to probe the conceit and foolish ignorance of men, to 
 search their consciences and expand their shrivelled 
 individualities ; in short, to awaken them to the life of 
 true self-consciousness. In doing this he made them, 
 now his friends and helpers, now his bitter enemies, but 
 always, — frequently in spite of themselves, — his en- 
 lightened pupils. It was no part of his business or pur- 
 pose to fill the ears of men with a specious wisdom, and 
 to send them away self-complacent and ready to appear 
 wise for a price ; it was not primarily his business or 
 purpose to inform those with whom he conversed, but to 
 render them thoughtful, critical, and, if need were, even 
 sceptical. He became an object of ridicule and hatred 
 to the lovers of the old ways and times, and was, by the 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 45 
 
 poet Aristophanes, in his comedy of The Clouds, satirized 
 as a Sophist and a charlatan of the worst description. 
 At last, certain of the " conservatives," exasperated at 
 seeing themselves and their favorite institutions ex- 
 posed to the light of truth by Socrates and by others 
 whom he had stimulated to think, formally charged him 
 with discarding the national gods, introducing new gods, 
 and corrupting the youths of Athens. His defense was 
 bold and sharply critical, and he was (though by only a 
 small majority) condemned to be, according to law, im- 
 prisoned, heavily fined, or banished ; and when he refused, 
 somewhat haughtily indeed, to acknowledge any guilt, 
 and claimed, on the contrary, that he ought to be pub- 
 licly entertained in the Prytaneum, or City Home, as a 
 benefactor to the state, he was by a majority of eighty 
 votes adjudged worthy of death. He went to prison, 
 and, after a delay of thirty days, during which, partly, 
 as it would seem, from pride, but mostly from the spirit 
 and habit of obedience to regularly constituted authority, 
 he scornfully refused a proffered opportunity of escape, 
 he suffered the penalty by drinking hemlock (399 e.g.). 
 The moral sublimity of his last hours appears from 
 Plato's dialogue Phcedo. 
 
 The Personality of Socrates and its Relation to the 
 Subsequent History of Philosophy. — Of the personality 
 of Socrates, which seems to have satisfied Greek notions 
 of completeness and symmetry of character in every item 
 but one, namely, as regards harmony between exterior 
 appearances and interior reality (for Socrates was not 
 handsome in aspect), it is necessary to say only so much 
 here as will direct attention to three aspects of it that 
 appear to bear special relation to his doctrines, to have 
 
46 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 particularly influenced his contemporaries, presenting to 
 his followers (according to their various capacities) ideals 
 of mental and moral excellence, and exemplifications of 
 various portions of his doctrines, and thus to have deter- 
 mined in large measure the subsequent course of philos- 
 phy in its history. It is, probably, to the character 
 quite as much as to the teaching of Socrates that we 
 must look for the source of the explanation of the effects 
 of the Socratic philosophizing, and hence of the influ- 
 ence of Socrates in the history of philosophy. In the 
 first place, then, may be noticed his critical insight and 
 analytic faculty, which enabled him to understand at a 
 glance and expose plainly to view, if need were, the in- 
 ward condition of those about him. It was the pure 
 genius of inquiry and discovery directed, not to external 
 things, but to the things of the mind and conscience. 
 This appears in almost all the reported conversations of 
 Socrates with his contemporaries ; and there is evidence 
 of it in the fact that Socrates made possible, or it may 
 almost be said, discovered two such intellects as Plato 
 and Aristotle, not to mention, individually, at this 
 point, certain acute minds among the so-called Lesser 
 Socratics, of whom we shall have to speak hereafter. In 
 the second place, we notice his moral vigor and equi- 
 poise, the balance of strong emotions and animal faculties 
 under the rule of a superb will. Socrates, generally and 
 on principle, practised self-restraint, was even abste- 
 mious ; and, on the other hand, he at times far outdid 
 his fellows in convivial indulgence, but without losing 
 self-control. Socrates, the abstemious, was the ideal of 
 one class of philosophers ; Socrates, the easy master 
 of self, the ideal of another. In the third place, and 
 
Greek philosophy. 47 
 
 finally, there was his "daemon," or warning voice, and 
 the ever-present consciousness of the supernatural. Of 
 the real nature of this it is difficult to form a satisfactory 
 opinion. Socrates himself did not identify it with reason 
 or with conscience, he did not attribute to it a scien- 
 tific character or importance. Nor, on the other hand, 
 does he seem to have viewed it as a familiar spirit, an 
 attendant personality. It was to him, rather, an inner 
 oracle, which, instead of giving him a standard of truth 
 or rule of life, warned and restrained him on particular 
 occasions.^ To the general mission of his life it seems 
 to have been related only in so far as it gave increased 
 vitality to the idea or feeling of subjectivity or close re- 
 lation to an inner reality. Especially did it hold him 
 aloof from public affairs, thus contravening the whole 
 spirit of Greek life ; and it helped to add internal signifi- 
 cance to what had hitherto been too much a matter of 
 external observance, namely, piety and the religious life. 
 In the eyes of those about him he was by it rendered 
 more sacred and more authoritative as a teacher ; they 
 felt that in their converse with him they held commun- 
 ion with a seer and a man of God.^ 
 
 Philosophy of Socrates. — Coming now to the Socratic 
 philosophy, or, more correctly speaking, since Socrates 
 framed no system, — the Socratic philosophizing, — we 
 have to notice its spirit, its method, its content, or doc- 
 trines, and its general character and result. 
 
 1 Xenophon's Memorabilia, Bk. I. ch. I.; Bk. IV. ch. 8. 
 
 2 On Socrates's personality, see particularly, Xenophon's Memorabilia 
 (especially at the end) and Plato's Symposium. Schwegler's account is 
 brief, comprehensive, and very forcible. See his Handbook of the History 
 of Philosophy (Stirling's trans.), pp. 39, 41. 
 
48 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Spirit of the Socratic Philosophizing. — Regarding the 
 spirit of the Socratic philosophizing, it is to be remarked, 
 in the first place, that it was, as has been already stated, 
 in an important sense and a marked degree, sceptical. 
 He freely criticised prevailing beliefs, customs, and in- 
 stitutions. He discredited the early physical specula- 
 tion on the ground that it was unprofitable, and even 
 impious.^ He encouraged the study of geometry and 
 astronomy, for example, only in so far as they served 
 the most utilitarian ends. He discredited the "wisdom" 
 of the Sophists without always putting forward palpable 
 and positive doctrines in its stead. He discredited, if 
 we may say so, himself, asserting that he knew only 
 that he knew nothing. He made no pretension to be- 
 ing a teacher at all, not to say a teacher of philosophy.^ 
 It was, indeed, not without apparent reason that he was 
 considered by some of his contemporaries as a Sophist, 
 or even worse than a Sophist. Superficially regarded, 
 at least, Socrates was one of the most pronounced nega- 
 tivists of his age. And if we look below the surface for 
 what was positive in him, we shall find it, not in the 
 positing of an apyr] of all existence, but in his affirmation 
 of the necessity and all-sufficingness of self-knowledge 
 for the practical purposes of human life, in his love of 
 true manhood, and in his assumption that the essence, 
 or, rather, essences of things, can be expressed in a 
 definition valid for all human intelligences. The 
 position of Socrates was equivocal ; he knew that he 
 did not know,3 and yet he felt that he had a deeper 
 
 1 Xenophon's Memorabilia, Bk. I. ch. I, and Bk. IV. ch. 7. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. I. ch. 2. 
 
 ' Plato's Apology, p. 21. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 49 
 
 sense of reality than any other man of his age. And 
 this brings us to a second element in the spirit of the 
 Socratic philosophizing, namely, the profound irony that 
 pervades much of it. This is not that playful and sar- 
 castic irony that appears immediately on the surface 
 and belongs rather to the external manner and method 
 of Socrates ; that habit of pretending to be ignorant 
 in order the better to draw out or put to confusion a 
 pupil or disputant. It was, the rather, a certain equivo- 
 cality of speech begotten of the consciousness of the 
 possession of superior insight and of the existence of a 
 gulf between himself and his hearers. It was the irony 
 of his situation, and did not proceed from humor or whim. 
 When he professed ignorance, — though, from one point 
 of view he spoke the literal truth, for he had a deeper 
 insight than he could give adequate and scientific utter- 
 ance to, — he seemed to be giving the lie in words to 
 the well-known effects of his manner and teaching, his 
 well-known power over men's minds. This was some- 
 times perplexing and exasperating to his associates, and 
 more than anything else, perhaps, was the cause of his 
 death. Thirdly : This irony was softened in a measure 
 by a large geniality (proceeding from bodily and spirit- 
 ual health) — by what, in its superficial aspect, has been 
 termed by Hegel and others after him "Attic urbanity,"^ 
 but seems to be nothing more nor less than love of true 
 selfhood, regard for essential hitman nature. If, indeed, 
 the leading idea of the teaching of Socrates is, as we 
 shall see, the prime importance of self-knowledge, a 
 large element in its spirit is self-love or the love of the 
 true self, very like what in recent years has been termed 
 
 1 Hegel's Geschichte der Philosophies Vol. II. p. 50. 
 
50 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the "enthusiasm of humanity." The Greeks, gener- 
 ally, were lovers and admirers not of humanity in gen- 
 eral, but of Greek humanity ; Socrates was broader in 
 his insights and sympathies than his fellows were. But, 
 finally, the principal element in the spirit of the Socratic 
 philosophizing was a love of the truth, — a love rooted 
 in a profound sense of reality and a pretty clear insight 
 into the fundamental form of truth. This was, no doubt, 
 qualified by his attitude toward the existing philosophy 
 of nature and his predilection for man; and Socrates 
 was, consequently, not a philosopher in the fullest sense 
 of the term ; he was an ethical inquirer. But within 
 the sphere of human interests he never for long nor in 
 any essential regard turned aside from the search for 
 truth for its own sake. 
 
 The Socratic Method. — As to the method of the 
 Socratic philosophizing, we must observe that it was 
 not grounded upon the conception of any fully conceived 
 principle of all existence, and that, on the other hand, 
 it was not mere subjective groping after the "truth." 
 It was not merely a logical mode of procedure but was 
 also pedagogical. It was a method of bringing into 
 consciousness, by any and every true psychological ex- 
 pedient, clearly and effectively, true conceptions. Such 
 being the case, it is chiefly a necessity of exposition 
 merely that warrants the separation here of the spirit 
 and the method of this philosophizing. Logically re- 
 garded, the Socratic method was a compound of sim- 
 ple induction and definition — " two improvements in 
 
 science which one might justly ascribe to Socrates " ^ 
 
 and reasoning upon the principle of analogy. Socrates, 
 
 1 Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bk. XIII. ch. 4. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHV. SI 
 
 Xenophon tells us,i was always stimulating his compan- 
 ions to inquire into the essence or nature of things, and 
 to class them properly. He did not, however, frame a 
 systematic theory of logical (or pedagogical) processes 
 or method. But, again, the Socratic "method" was a 
 process, the outcome of which depended upon insight, 
 sympathy, tact, quite as much as upon logic. It was 
 an ethical conference, the presiding spirit of which was 
 the love of the truth, intellectual and moral. Informal 
 conversation was the natural outward aspect of it, both 
 on account of the state of the Greek mind and Greek 
 society and on account of the character of the truth 
 (chiefly ethical) that was the subject of the Socratic 
 inquiries. Crude individualism had begun to prevail ; 
 interchange of opinion was necessary and natural ; the 
 Greeks were a social, talkative people ; the raw material 
 for ethical science or edification had to be gathered and 
 wrought up by dialogue (whence "dialectic"). And, we 
 may observe in passing, the truth that was in Grecian 
 life must have been brought to life and made effective 
 in the Socratic conferences, for at them were present 
 some of the very flower of that life : Euripides, Xenophon, 
 Pericles the Younger, Critias, Alcibiades, Phaedo, Chsere- 
 phon, Plato, Euclid, and others, most of whom came to 
 Socrates "not," to quote Xenophon, "that they might 
 become public speakers in the assembly or the courts,^ 
 but that they might become noble and good, capable of 
 discharging properly their duties to their families, their 
 servants, their relatives, their friends, the state, and 
 
 1 Memorabilia, Bk. IV. ch. 5. 
 
 2 See above, § 7, p. 39. 
 
52 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 their fellow-countrymen." ^ Some of them, as Plato 
 and Euclid, came, no doubt, for intellectual training 
 also — to understand and catch, if possible, that won- 
 derful mastery of conceptions which made Socrates the 
 king of dialectic. Now, in these conferences with fresh, 
 earnest, active minds — and some not fresh, active, and 
 earnest — Socrates delighted to practise what he was 
 pleased to call his maieutic or obstetric art, — his art of 
 bringing ideas or conceptions to the birth, for he saw 
 that the minds of the Grecian youths were in labor. In 
 the practice of this art he assumed that truth is native 
 to the mind, — not to be poured into it, but, the rather, 
 to be drawn out of it.^ Now, sometimes, he feigned, 
 the ideas that he by his art brought to the birth were 
 not "worth keeping and rearing," and must be "exposed" 
 in real Spartan fashion, the only important consequence 
 of the "birth" being increased self-knowledge on the 
 part of those who had been relieved of the ideas with 
 which their minds had been pregnant. Sometimes, 
 however, the ideas were sound and vigorous, and, if well 
 cared for, might be reared into something worth the 
 trouble of rearing them. The Socratic dialectic — for, 
 as has been intimated, the dialogue became dialectic 
 — was, accordingly, twofold, destructive and construc- 
 tive. On the whole it was, perhaps, more frequently 
 the former than the latter, with a net result, however, 
 of what was positive and enduring ; as the one fact, 
 Plato, man and philosopher, is sufiicient to prove.^ And 
 
 ^ Memorabilia, Bk. I. ch. 2. 
 2 See Plato's Meno, pp. 81-83. 
 
 * If Critias and Alcibiades turned out badly we are obliged to assume 
 that it was hardly in them to do otherwise, whoever had been their master. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 53 
 
 if we look more closely into the nature and effect of the 
 Socratic dialectic, we find that the majority of those who 
 were, willingly or unwillingly to themselves, subjected to 
 it were, in the beginning, unripe for the perception of the 
 naked truth : they could not appreciate logical distinc- 
 tions, pure and simple, nor could they understand fact. 
 They were filled with false sentiments and opinions ; 
 some of them were stuffed with the learning of the 
 Sophists and were full of conceit. Before they could be 
 brought to the perception and appreciation of positive 
 and constructive truth they must be relieved of their 
 ignorance, false sentiment, and conceit. They must be 
 encouraged in their right opinions and their keen appe- 
 tite for knowledge. These services Socrates could per- 
 form for them thoroughly and well. The young man 
 who was confident that he was just, and understood what 
 justice was, lost confidence in himself and his ideas of 
 justice, after being compelled to contradict himself sev- 
 eral times within a few breaths ; and he simply desired 
 to know himself and how to make himself capable of 
 understanding what he had in vain long labored to un- 
 derstand. Such is a case, reported by Xenophon,^ of 
 the use of destructive dialectic and its effect. In dialec- 
 tic of this sort a false general statement was overthrown 
 by being shown to be inconsistent with an admitted 
 general truth or well-known particular facts. In the 
 opposite process, the constructive dialectic, some truth 
 or right opinion held by the learner was confirmed, or 
 some new truth was brought to light ; induction, defini- 
 
 1 Memorabilia, Bk. IV. ch. 2. Perhaps the happiest example of the 
 Socratic dialectic, destructive and constructive, is given in the Meno of 
 Plato. 
 
54 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tion, and reasoning by analogy constituting the logical 
 elements of the process. On the whole, the most valua- 
 ble result of the Socratic dialectic was the begetting, in 
 those who took part in the conferences, of the spirit of 
 Socrates himself, — modesty, the habit of circumspec- 
 tion, a sense of the differences in things, an intelligent 
 love of the truth and of wholeness or integrity of mind 
 and character ; what, in short, may be termed the phil- 
 osophic spirit. 
 
 The Doctrines of Socrates ; their General Cfiaracter. — 
 The doctrines of Socrates, it has already been intimated, 
 were chiefly ethical in content. Whatever there may 
 have been — and doubtless there was much — in what 
 we have termed the Socratic conferences, to suggest to 
 a mind like that of Plato, or of Euclid, who was after- 
 wards a leader of one of the Socratic schools, a science 
 of the soul (psychology), or of ultimate being (ontology), 
 the fact is that the old and popular maxim which Socrates 
 adopted as the expression of the leading thought of his 
 teaching, r^vaOi aeavrov, "Know thyself," was given by 
 him an application principally practical, or ethical (and 
 in a rather narrow sense) : Man should know himself — 
 in order to be good and do the good. Though he assumed 
 that truth was native to the mind and that human knowl- 
 edge is at bottom self-knowledge, he did not make the 
 nature of the mind or soul as such a subject of scientific 
 investigation, nor did he wholly or in part identify self- 
 knowledge with the knowledge of absolute intelligence 
 or reality. To judge from the Charinides, one of the 
 earliest and doubtless one of the most purely Socratic 
 of Plato's dialogues, Socrates was sceptical in regard to 
 the possibility of constructing a science of absolute 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 55 
 
 knowledge or being, it being impossible for him to sepa- 
 rate in thought the form of knowledge from the content. 
 Physical Philosophy of Socrates. — But Socrates did 
 not abstain entirely from speculation concerning things 
 not human. For though he hesitated on the threshold 
 of the science of ultimate intelligence and reality, and 
 cast aside as futile and impious the early nature-philoso- 
 phy, he was not without a theory of nature. In his 
 youth he was, according to a representation in one of the 
 dialogues of Plato, -^ always agitating himself with ques- 
 tions relating to the mechanical causes and constituents 
 of things. Anaxagoras, though not completely satisfac- 
 tory to him, had helped him to get beyond mechanical 
 to final causes, in which alone he found complete satis- 
 faction. Whether Plato's representation be perfectly 
 authentic or not, we find, as we turn the pages of 
 Xenophon, that a favorite theme with Socrates is the 
 beautiful and wise adaptation and order in nature, show- 
 ing the care of the gods or providence (for polytheistic 
 and monotheistic points of view are blended in the 
 accounts) for the human family. The Socratic inter- 
 pretation of nature is, however, not a philosophical 
 deduction. It does, indeed, subordinate nature to the 
 idea of the Good, but the mechanistic conception exists 
 side by side with, and practically prevails over, the tele- 
 ological and organic: nature, though held to be ani- 
 mated by a soul, is conceived as a wise contrivance, for 
 man's benefit chiefly, rather than as a living self-realizing 
 organism,^ in which man holds a superior place because 
 of his superior power of assimilating and synthetizing 
 
 1 See the Phado, pp. 97, 98, 99. 
 
 * See especially Memorabilia, Bk. I. ch. 4, and Bk. IV. ch. 3. 
 
$6 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the "elements" of reality. This latter conception of 
 nature we shall have occasion to examine when we 
 reach Aristotle. The Socratic theory, which is theo- 
 logical (in not the largest sense) rather than philosoph-. 
 ical, is the beginning, historically speaking, of what is 
 commonly termed Natural Theology. 
 
 Ethical Philosophy of Socrates. 
 
 Relations between Knowledge and Virtue. — Coming 
 now to the doctrines that are most characteristically So- 
 cratic,^ we find the first and most important to be this : 
 All virtue is knowledge. Knowledge here means, accord- 
 ing to the express testimony of Aristotle,^ as well as the 
 whole tenor of the Socratic discussions everywhere, (not 
 mere "prudence" or practical insight, but) science, cor- 
 rect definition. The man of virtue is not he who per- 
 forms his duties to self and the state, half-reflect ively, 
 but he who possesses, and consciously realizes in act, 
 the exact conception of each of his relations to self and 
 the state. Socrates meant that scientific knowledge is 
 not only a condition to virtue, but the sole condition; 
 and, conversely, that vice is simply ignorance: to do 
 wrong wittingly is better than to do right ignorantly.^ 
 Character and deliberate choice, consequently, were not 
 regarded by Socrates as elements of virtue. He did not 
 admit that there was any merit or virtue in the over- 
 coming of evil inclinations by force of character or will. 
 Given knowledge, thought he, and there follows, neces- 
 sarily and immediately, virtue. " Now the rest of the 
 world are of the opinion that knowledge is a principle 
 
 ' Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bk. I. ch.^. 
 
 2 See Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. III. ch. 8; Bk. VI. ch. ii. 
 
 * Xenophon's Memorabilia, Bk. III. ch. 9 ; Bk. IV. ch. 6. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 57 
 
 not of strength or of rule, or of command ; their notion 
 is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the 
 knowledge which is in him may be mastered by anger, 
 or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps favor, — just as 
 if knowledge were a slave and might be dragged about 
 anyhow. Now, is that your view .■" Or do you think that 
 knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which can- 
 not be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only 
 knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything 
 contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have 
 strength to help him.''"i 
 
 General Consequejtces of the Unity of Knowledge and 
 Virtue. — From the unity of virtue and knowledge it 
 follows that the virtues are not many, merely, but one 
 also. They are related to each other, not as the "parts 
 of the face" but "as the parts of gold," which are like 
 one another, and like the whole of which they are parts. 
 One implies the rest ; there is a necessary relation be- 
 tween them through knowledge.^ Possessing a common 
 essence, they possess a power of giving rise one tp 
 another : the man who, in one relation is temperate, 
 will in another be just, or holy, or courageous, as the 
 case may require. From the unity of virtue and knowl- 
 edge, it follows, also, that the virtues can be taught. 
 They are not, as the Sophists thought, so many particu- 
 lar knacks, or little arts, that can be caught and practised 
 by instinct : they are the offspring of conception, scien- 
 tific apprehension. Hence the importance, constantly 
 emphasized by Socrates, of comprehending in every in- 
 stance the exact nature of what is required to be done, 
 
 1 Plato's Protagoras, p. 352 (Jowett's translation). 
 ^ Protagoras, pp. 349, 360. 
 
S8 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and of a right training of the mind to the forming of 
 conceptions, i.e., scientific education. 
 
 Classification of the Virtues. — But, now, what virtues 
 are there ">. and of what are they the knowledge ? To 
 these questions Socrates gives no scientific answer. 
 Virtue is for him the knowledge of the Good, and the 
 Good is not the realization of a universal and absolute 
 end, but of the true conceptions or ends of individual 
 objects or acts. The Good, in other words, is the use- 
 ful. Upon being asked by one of his disciples if he 
 knew anything good, Socrates replied, "Do you ask, 
 Aristippus, if I know anything good for a fever.'"-' The 
 Socratic ethics is unscientific, and, in consequence, utili- 
 tarian and eudasmonistic. Notwithstanding the abstract 
 and radical character of its first principle — All virtue is 
 knowledge — it remains, for lack of development of that 
 principle, nearly on the level of mere custom and util- 
 ity. The principal virtues are assumed to be temperance, 
 friendship, courage, right citizenship, (which, in its high- 
 est form, is) justice, piety ; the root and sum of them all 
 being wisdom. 
 
 Temperance. — Temperance, the fundamental (though 
 not the crowning) virtue, is the keeping of the bodily 
 impulses in subjection to the desires of the mind. "I 
 consider it," says Socrates, "as a mark of perfection 
 in the gods that they want nothing; he, therefore, 
 approaches nearest the divine nature who wants the 
 fewest things." This must be construed, however, not 
 as an argument for asceticism, but for self-control merely. 
 "To continue master of himself in the midst of the allure- 
 ments of the senses by the unruffled dignity of his own 
 
 1 Memorabilia, Bk. III. ch. 8. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. . $9 
 
 inner life — that was the aim," says Zeller, "which his 
 moderation proposed to itself." Without temperance, 
 thought Socrates, men can be nothing in themselves or 
 to their fellows ; the good general, the good guardian, 
 the good neighbor, the good herdsman, the good slave, 
 is temperate.^ 
 
 Friendship. — Of friendship and love, Socrates, as we 
 learn from both Xenophon and Plato, made much. 
 Although, he said, the majority of mankind are more 
 diligent in acquiring houses, lands, slaves, flocks, and 
 household goods than in gaining friends, the firm and 
 virtuous friend is the most valuable of all possessions. 
 But the Socratic theory of friendship is not rose-colored : 
 friends are good because they are useful. True friend- 
 ship, however, can exist only between the intelligent, 
 virtuous, and disinterested. Socrates adopted the com- 
 mon Greek notion that the end of conjugal love was the 
 begetting of a numerous and healthy progeny. The force 
 of the Socratic doctrines of friendship must have been 
 enhanced for his associates by his spirit and manner in 
 conversation; he would "frequently assume the char- 
 acter and language of a lover " ^ for the purpose of win- 
 ning the confidence of others and getting them enamored 
 of the truth. It is the doctrine of Socrates set forth in 
 the light of his spirit that Plato has presented in his 
 Symposium, where Socrates is discoursing in an inspired 
 manner on spiritual love. In the Socratic conception of 
 friendship and love, there was, it seems, an element not 
 usually present in the Greek conception, namely, that of 
 the duty of love to enemies as well as to friends.^ 
 
 '■' Memorabilia, Bk. I. ch. 5. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. IV. ch. i ; Bk. II. chs. 6, 28. 
 
 8 Plato's Crito, p. 49. 
 
60 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Right Citizenship and Justice. — Socrates never allowed 
 to escape him any opportunity, on the one hand, to en- 
 courage those whom he thought competent, to engage 
 in the active service of the state, and, on the other, 
 to discourage those who were incompetent and over- 
 ambitious. Charmides, who was competent, he urged 
 to acquaint himself with his own powers and to lose 
 no occasion for exerting them in his country's ser- 
 vice ; ^ but Euthydemus he checked, in the following 
 satiric manner : " I never learned anything, O men of 
 Athens," he feigns Euthydemus as saying, "from any 
 one. On hearing that certain persons were skilled in 
 speaking and in the conduct of practical affairs, I never 
 sought to associate myself with them ; nor did I ever 
 seek an instructor among those competent to give in- 
 struction. On the contrary, I have persistently avoided 
 not only seeking instruction but even seeming to do so. 
 Nevertheless, I propose to offer such advice as may 
 happen to occur to me." ^ Socrates then likens him to 
 a man who should complacently announce that he never 
 thought of making a study of medicine and had never 
 received any instruction in it, and yet should solicit 
 others to offer themselves as subjects for him to experi- 
 ment upon. Socrates was, doubtless, one of the most 
 ardent, one of the wisest, of all the apostles of political 
 education and intelligent citizenship the world has ever 
 seen. The highest privilege, the most commanding 
 duty, the noblest function of the individual man are, 
 he declared, those connected with citizenship in an 
 intelligent, well-ordered state, — a state in which " not 
 
 1 Memorabilia, Bk. III. ch. 7. 2 Ibid., Bk. IV. ch. 2. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 6 1 
 
 the possession of power nor the fortune of the lot, nor 
 popular election, but knowledge alone, . . . confers a 
 claim to rule." ^ If he did not seek a conspicuous part 
 in the affairs of state,^ that was because he saw the 
 imperative need of checking ignorant ambition and 
 demagoguism by steadfastly doing what he could to 
 make knowledge and virtue prevail. As a subject, 
 though he saw fit to criticise existing institutions and 
 rulers, and to encourage independence of judgment 
 everywhere, he rendered strict obedience ; ^ as one of 
 the governors, he was perfect in firmness and fidelity. 
 Socrates was, in short, both in theory and practice, one 
 of the comparatively few completely sane and whole- 
 minded among men, — men who are able to preserve 
 the balance between what is and what "ought"' to be; 
 he was a just man in the larger, Greek sense of the 
 term. And, in the Greek view, justice, in which right 
 citizenship culminates, is the crowning virtue, the virtue 
 that harmonizes individual independence with friendship, 
 the relation of the individual to himself with his relation 
 to others. 
 
 Piety. — • The days of Socrates, if ever those of any man 
 were, were " bound each to each " ; if not by a " natural 
 piety" in exactly the Wordsworthian sense,* yet by a 
 piety as pure, deep, and simple, — as natural, — as that, 
 and more distinctively human. Though he discarded 
 
 1 Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools, ch. 7. 
 
 2 Memorabilia, Bk. IV. ch. I. 
 
 3 Ibid., Bk. IV. ch. 4. 
 
 * See, for example, Wordsworth's stanza beginning — 
 
 " My heart leaps up when I behold 
 A rainbow in the sky." 
 
(52 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 physical speculation as barren and impious, he believed 
 that the order of the world was cognizable by the power 
 of moral insight. He held that human wisdom, the 
 knowledge that conduces most to human welfare, was 
 but an image of the divine wisdom that ruled the world. 
 He enjoined piety for the double reason that it was due 
 to the gods (God) because of their (His) care for men, 
 and because of the wisdom apparent in the order of the 
 world, and that to the pious alone are communicated 
 some of the divine secrets that may not be penetrated 
 into by the unaided mind of man. He enjoined the 
 customary sacrifices merely as symbols of a pure heart, 
 and his prayer was simply that the gods would give him 
 those things that were good. In his belief and teaching 
 the Supreme Being was invisible, all-wise, all-powerful, 
 all-good, exercising dominion over the world as the 
 mind does over the body.^ 
 
 Wisdom. — Wisdom, which was sometimes enumerated 
 among the particular virtues by Greek teachers of ethics, 
 was, as we have seen, regarded by Socrates as the root 
 and the substance of all the virtues. " Socrates would 
 often say that justice and every other virtue is wisdom. "^ 
 This is, indeed, just what he meant by the dictum, All 
 virtue is knowledge. And by knowledge he undoubtedly 
 meant self-knowledge especially, — a clear, correct con- 
 ception, on the part of the individual, of his own powers 
 and limitations as well as of his divine nature. As we 
 have already seen, Socrates constantly strove to cause 
 those with whom he conversed to "examine into the 
 nature of things and class them properly," i.e., to form 
 
 1 Memorabilia, Bk. I. chs. 4 and 8. 2 /i,ij_^ gk. III. ch. 9. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 63 
 
 the habit of framing correct conceptions, and he held it 
 to be of the highest moment that they should apply the 
 art of framing conceptions to the getting of a knowledge 
 of themselves. Wisdom, then, was to Socrates the sci- 
 ence of human nature ; and since the end of this science 
 is virtue, wisdom is simply ethical or moral science. 
 Socrates did not construct such a science, but pointed 
 the way to it. Further, Socrates, as we know, held that 
 the scientific knowledge of self was sufficient to con- 
 stitute virtue : he who knows how he ought to serve the 
 gods is pious ; he who knows the laws that men ought 
 to observe is justi^ "justice and every other virtue is 
 wisdom " : true conceptions rightly apprehended have an 
 inherent and necessary power to make men good. 
 
 Beauty. — To the Socratic doctrine of the Good may 
 be appended, as in some sort a corollary, his doctrine of 
 Beauty. The term beauty is scarcely more with Socra- 
 tes than another name for what is also called goodness. 
 Beautiful is whatever is adapted to the purpose for 
 which it was intended, i.e., whatever realizes its con- 
 ception ; a dung-cart is beautiful if so made that it 
 answers its purpose.^ The work of the true painter or 
 sculptor — the artist — is not a medley of individually 
 beautiful elements having no connection with each other 
 for thought ; it is the embodiment of a conception.^ 
 
 General Result. — The general character of the So- 
 cratic philosophizing may be stated as follows: Socra- 
 tes was by natural temperament, by deliberate choice, 
 and by circumstances given the task of introducing the 
 
 1 Memorabilia, Bk. IV. ch. 6. 2 /^^v., Bk. III. ch. 8. 
 
 3 Ibid., Bk. III. ch. 10. 
 
64 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 problem of self-knowledge and of instituting a tendency 
 which should result in the substitution for the (to a 
 large extent) unscientific and unfruitful speculations of 
 the early Greek philosophers about nature, and for the 
 superficial subjectivism and humanism of the Sophists, 
 scientific — or at least definite — and fruitful concep- 
 tions about man, and, later, about universal reason 
 and nature. "All beyond him lies in the region of 
 unsophisticated use and wont, or prescriptive ethics, 
 like that of the Chinese or other Oriental civilizations ; 
 on the hither side, the chief interest is the ever-widen- 
 ing influence of the individual consciousness of moral 
 necessity, the long and gradual discipline of mankind 
 into independent responsible wills, endowed with ' rights 
 of conscience.' In the ante-Socratic principle the in- 
 dividual takes the impulse from without — from auspices 
 or auguries — nothing being undertaken without them. 
 Individual conscience and personal decision date from 
 the epoch of Socrates, and their growth from that time 
 is the progress of the world's history." ^ Socrates in- 
 stituted the science of man ; he did so by instituting in 
 the world's consciousness true manhood. And it is 
 very largely as 2^ personal force that he holds his place, 
 a very high one, in the history of the world's abstract 
 thought. Hence, we may repeat in conclusion, the ne- 
 cessity of presenting, in any account of the philosophy 
 of Socrates, so much, relatively, that is personal and 
 concrete in connection with what, in agreement with 
 the nature of the subject, must be impersonal and 
 abstract. 
 
 ♦ 
 ^ " Socrates " (art. by W. T. Harris in Johnson's Cyclopaedia). 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 6$ 
 
 §9- 
 
 The Followers of Socrates. — It would be too much to 
 expect that more than a very few of those who came 
 under the influence of Socrates could understand ex- 
 perientially his personality or interpret the thought 
 that lay underneath it ; and, in fact, the immediate 
 disciples and successors of Socrates may be divided 
 into three classes : first, those who (like Xenophon) 
 reproduced with little or no modification the Socratic 
 doctrines but only incompletely the Socratic spirit 
 and method ; second, those who, according to their 
 several personal temperaments and predilections, at- 
 tributed special importance to some one feature of 
 Socrates's teaching or personality ; and third, those, or, 
 rather, that one who, combining the principles and 
 doctrines of Socrates with principles and doctrines of 
 other thinkers, and interpreting freely the personality 
 of Socrates, was the first to give to philosophy, on a 
 Socratic basis, something like completeness of content 
 and form — namely Plato. Of the second class were 
 the so-called Lesser Socratics, whom we have next to 
 consider. 
 
 § lo. 
 
 The Lesser Socratics} — Of the Lesser Socratics there 
 were three schools, representing three very distinct 
 ''tendencies in the Socratic philosophizing : the Mega- 
 rians or Megarics, the Cynics, and the Cyrenaics. 
 
 1 The following account is in matters of detail based largely upon Zel- 
 ler's account in the Socrates and the Socratic Schools. Assistance has been 
 derived from Hegel's interpretation (which is the best) in his Geschichte 
 der Philosophic, Vol. II. 
 
66 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The Megarians, or Megarics. — The Megarians took 
 their name from the place Megara (not very far from 
 Athens), in which the school flourished. These thinkers 
 — children of the intellectual subtlety of Socrates (see 
 p. 46) — occupied themselves with dialectics and con- 
 ceived reality, which they termed the Good, not as 
 ethical Being but as a purely abstract ontological entity, 
 Being in the Eleatic sense. The Good, they declared, 
 and only the Good is. Their method was similar to 
 that of Zeno, and so tenaciously did Euclid, the founder 
 of the school, cling, theoretically at least, to the prin- 
 ciple of identity, the logical counterpart of pure Being, 
 that he rejected the Socratic reasoning by analogy, af- 
 firming that to explain things by means of others unlike 
 them is impossible and to explain them by means of 
 things like them is superfluous. The principal Mega- 
 rians besides Euclid were Eubulides, Diodorus, and, 
 unless he belongs rather with the Cynics, Stilpo, said 
 to have been the most brilliant of them all. The method 
 of the Megarics, it appears, degenerated into logical 
 hair-splitting and fell into disrepute under the name 
 " eristic." From one point of view, indeed, it seems 
 idle to affirm, as did Stilpo, that only "identical prop- 
 positions " {e.g. A man is a man) are valid ; but Stilpo 
 was consistent : simple, abstract identity is, as we shall 
 find Plato demonstrating, no principle of synthesis. 
 This, however, was not the most disagreeable phase of 
 the "eristic"; it became, to use words-' applied by 
 Plato to the corrupt Sophist in general, "disputatious, 
 
 controversial, pugnacious, combative," and if it served 
 f 
 
 ^ Sophist, p. 226. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 6j 
 
 any good purpose whatever, served only to stimulate 
 minds more profound than the Megarian to a discovery 
 of a serious, straightforward, logical method : the Me- 
 garians, bad as well as good, must share the credit of 
 having incited both Plato and Aristotle to logical and 
 metaphysical investigation deeper than their predeces- 
 sors had undertaken. One of the most celebrated 
 pieces of dialectic employed by the Megarians is that 
 of Diodorus on possibility and actuality, which " is still 
 admired after centuries as a masterpiece of subtle 
 criticism" : — "From anything possible nothing impos- 
 sible can result. But it is impossible that the past can 
 be different from what it is ; for had it been possible at 
 a past moment, something impossible would have resulted 
 from something possible. It was therefore never pos- 
 sible, and generally speaking it is impossible that any- 
 thing should happen differently from what has hap- 
 pened." ^ 
 
 The Cynics. — Nearest in method and spirit to the 
 Megarians were the Cynics, who also declared that 
 only "identical propositions" are valid, and who con- 
 ceived the Good, if not as the abstract, universal, sole 
 metaphysical entity, the One, yet as the equally abstract 
 particular, individual One. The Cynics took their name 
 either from a place near Athens, — a gymnasium called 
 the Cynosarges, — where Antisthenes (born 444 e.g.), their 
 leader, taught, or else from their unsociableness, chur- 
 lish {doggish = KvviKo<i = cynical) manners and mode of 
 life. Antisthenes — a pupil of Gorgias — was an intimate 
 associate of Socrates and considered himself the genuine 
 
 1 Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools, p. 232. 
 
68 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Socratic. Superficially speaking, such he was. He 
 affected a preference to ethics over logic and physics 
 (philosophy of nature), holding logic to be entirely 
 subsidiary to ethics, and physics to be valueless ; and 
 adopted the narrowest view of ethics, the view, namely, 
 that treats the individual as merely such, as merely a 
 particular, isolated, empty self. He inverted, or techni- 
 cally speaking, converted, Socrates's dictum. All virtue 
 is knowledge (making it All knowledge is virtue) and 
 then took as the ideal of virtue a strained conception 
 of the Socratic self-control and superiority to appetite. 
 The Cynic doctrine of virtue is practically, therefore, in 
 a word this : The Good is the realization, to the fullest 
 possible extent, of the conception of the abstract indi- 
 vidual self. In conduct, — for the Cynics were consci- 
 entious and attempted to live up to their ideal, — this 
 doctrine had for its result shabbiness of dress, indecency 
 of manner and life, mendicancy, vagrant "citizenship 
 of the world," almost complete abandonment of all 
 concrete relation to family, state, and religion. This, 
 obviously, was pure asceticism, unlovely, unhuman ; but 
 it was the asceticism not of " supernaturalism " but of 
 naked "naturalism," abstract "positivism." Antisthe- 
 nes was himself a true exemplar of the Cynic virtue : 
 " He wore no garment except a cloak ; allowed his 
 beard to grow; carried a wallet and staff; renounced 
 all diet but the simplest ; . . . [was] stern, reproachful, 
 and bitter in his language ; careless and indecent in his 
 gestures." ^ The most cynical and famous of the Cyn- 
 
 1 Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy, p. 178; also Diogenes 
 Laertius, Life of Antisthenes. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 69 
 
 ics, however, was Diogenes of Sinope, who was con- 
 ceited, scurrilous, witty, more than half wise, a carica- 
 ture of Socrates, — sleeping in porticos, coarsely and 
 scantily clad, living on the rudest fare, drinking water 
 from the palm of his hand, violating all rules of decency, 
 railing at whatever and whomever he whimsically con- 
 ceived a dislike to, an admired, privileged "Dog" in- 
 deed ! ^ At their best, however, the Cynics undertook 
 to be moral benefactors : to teach and enforce by moral 
 suasion the doctrines of simplicity in living, sincerity 
 and candor in speech, the paramount value of the inner 
 life. But they were extremists, and their doctrines 
 passed into and gave rise to those diametrically opposed 
 to them. 
 
 The Cyrenaics. — From particular, individual will it is 
 but a step to particular, individual pleasure, and the next 
 form to be considered of that peculiar mode of abstrac- 
 tion which characterizes the Lesser Socratics is found 
 in the Cyrenaic doctrine of the good as happiness, or 
 pleasure. The founder of the Cyrenaic school was Aris- 
 tippus of Cyrene (born 435 B.C.), who,^ notwithstanding 
 his appetite for luxury in living, and the abundance of 
 his means for gratifying it (for he was wealthy), was 
 strongly attracted by Socrates and his teachings, and 
 became an enthusiastic disciple of his. The point of 
 greatest attractiveness to Aristippus was, doubtless, 
 Socrates's practice and theory of self-control, not in the 
 form of self-denial but of easy mastership of self in the 
 midst of free indulgence. The doctrine of the Cyrenaics 
 appears to have been in its origin and development sub- 
 stantially as follows : happiness and virtue, or the good, 
 
 ' Dior;. Laert. 
 
70 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 coincide. Whatever does not conduce to that, the sole 
 end of human existence, is worthless (logic and physics 
 are completely subsidiary to ethics). The only objects 
 of knowledge are feelings, which are the sole end of action. 
 Each individual knows only his own feelings, which, 
 therefore, constitute the sole end of his actions. The 
 only feelings of absolute worth are pleasurable feelings. 
 Hence virtue, the good, is the pleasure, — and primarily 
 the bodily pleasure, — of the individual. This view 
 underwent a development which is substantially as fol- 
 lows : — The discovery was made that there is a difference 
 among pleasures in degree and kind, and that the idea 
 of pleasure as such is untenable. Pleasures must some- 
 times be purchased by pain, and a balancing of pleasures 
 with pains is necessary to a determination of the value 
 of pleasures. Again, it was discovered that pleasures, 
 to be most fully desirable, must at least be accompaiiied 
 by thought or wisdom, and hence that mere bodily 
 pleasures are inferior in kind. The Cyrenaics thus 
 arrived at a theory of happiness which, as we shall see, 
 differed from those of Plato and Aristotle, which had 
 from the beginning a thought-basis, only as regards basis, 
 and consequently as regards value for a life that is radi- 
 cally determined by thought. There is here the same 
 weakness that appears in the theories of the other Lesser 
 Socratics, and in the philosophizing even of Socrates 
 himself : namely, the want of a thought-basis, and hence 
 of essential synthesis and wholeness. The lives of the 
 Cyrenaics, it appears, conformed fairly well with their 
 doctrines. Aristippus was a brilliant pleasure-seeker, 
 but he was more than that; he understood something 
 of true nobility of mind — that he had felt in Socrates, 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 7 1 
 
 and he appears to have possessed it so far as to know 
 " how to preserve calmness and composure in the midst 
 of the perpetual change of human affairs, how to govern 
 his passions and inclinations, and how to make the best 
 of all the events of life."^ Nearly a century later the 
 Cyrenaic doctrine underwent still further development. 
 This began with Theodorus (near the close of the fourth 
 century B.C.), who affirmed the self-sufficiency of private 
 intellectual satisfaction, for the attainment of which he 
 renounced, theoretically at least, family, country, the 
 popular religion, and all else. Hegesias, advancing a 
 step, affirmed happiness to consist in resignation, a strug- 
 gle to avoid or endure pain rather than an effort to find 
 positive pleasure, which he regarded as beyond human 
 attainment. According to him, indifference, not posi- 
 tive desire, was the philosophic attitude of mind. He 
 is said to have committed suicide. Anniceris, finally, re- 
 treated towards the earlier Cyrenaic doctrine, advocating 
 the active pursuit of pleasure and a due attention to all 
 possible sources of enjoyment. He even recognized 
 self-sacrifice as a means to true happiness. To intelli- 
 gence or mental culture he seems to have assigned only 
 a secondary position in the scale of desirable things. 
 
 Result. — The general character of the doctrines of 
 the Lesser Socratics need not be dwelt upon here. It 
 has already been pretty fully indicated, and will receive 
 further elucidation in the accounts that are to follow of 
 the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, and the post-Aristote- 
 lian schools of philosophy, with which last they will 
 be seen to have very close connection. We there- 
 
 ^ See above, p. 58, for a similar statement concerning Socrates. 
 
72 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fore pass at once to Plato, who was the truest continu- 
 ator of the philosophy of Socrates. 
 
 Life of Plato. — Plato was born either at Athens, or 
 at ^gina, on the island of the same name, probably in 
 the year 427 b.c. He was of a wealthy and aristocratic 
 family, and doubtless received the highest educational 
 advantages the brilliant age in which he lived afforded. 
 He asshnilated the best parts and elements of the good 
 poets, himself possessed unquestionable poetical talent, 
 having written some dithyrambics, lyrics, and tragedies, 
 and had a clear eye for universal truth ; he was, in short, 
 one of those youths of fine gifts, spirit, and education 
 who were the delight of the great teachers in Greece. 
 " By Heracles ! " exclaims Socrates, speaking of the 
 beautiful youth Charmides, in Plato's dialogue of that 
 name, "there never was such a paragon, if only he has 
 one other slight addition." " What is that } " asks 
 Critias. " If he has a noble soul," says Socrates. From 
 all accounts, one of which represents him as a son of 
 Apollo, it would appear that Plato was, in the eyes of 
 his master, Socrates, just such a paragon. Before he came 
 under the influence of Socrates he may have been pos- 
 sessed by the then ordinary ambition of Athenian youths, 
 to shine among politicians. It is difficult to conceive, 
 however, that a youth of poetical and meditative tem- 
 perament, and of very decidedly aristocratic predilections, 
 could find anything congenial in the corrupt politics of 
 a degenerated and degenerating democracy such as ruled 
 Athens in Plato's early manhood. At all events, his 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 73 
 
 mind was, by his intercourse with Socrates, permanently 
 fixed upon philosophy — he had already studied Hera- 
 clitus, if not others of the earlier philosophers — and he 
 chose for himself a life of comparative seclusion and 
 contemplation rather than one of active intercourse with 
 the world at large. Coming to Socrates at the age of 
 nineteen or twenty, he remained a modest and devoted 
 disciple until the death of the master, a period of eight 
 or nine years. His intercourse with Socrates must have 
 had as consequences an intensification of already exist- 
 ing intellectual appetites, and awakening of new ones, 
 and the implanting of an ideal of manhood — in brief, a 
 drawing out and strengthening of all his faculties. After 
 the jieath of Socrates, Plato, to escape the hostility of 
 the persecutors of Socrates, went to Megara, and there 
 became a pupil, or at least a companion, of Euclid. 
 How long he remained there is not known. It is certain 
 that before many years he travelled to Cyrene, in Africa, 
 to Italy, and to Sicily. Probably he visited Egypt also. 
 At Syracuse, Sicily, the tyrant Dionysius, who thought 
 his doctrines impracticable, "senile," and was anxious 
 to get rid of him, treated him as a prisoner of war, and 
 delivered him to a Spartan ambassador, " who exposed 
 him for sale in the slave market of .lEgina. Ransomed 
 by Anniceris, a Cyrenian, he thence returned to his na- 
 tive city." Through his travels his views of life and 
 society were expanded, and he acquired a fuller knowl- 
 edge of mathematics and of the Pythagorean philosophy 
 and ethical regime — facts that must be taken into 
 account in any view of the development of his philo- 
 sophical theories. By the year 387 or 384 b.c, if not 
 earlier, he was teaching and writing at Athens, where 
 
74 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 he had founded a school in a gymnasium called the 
 Academy. His devotion to his school — avowedly a 
 place of scientific, in contradiction to sophistic, instruc- 
 tion and culture — seems to have been complete. The 
 instruction given, which was free, was mostly oral in 
 form, because of his fear that written discourse would 
 be misinterpreted, and of the value he set upon personal 
 contact and the living word. In his preference for this 
 method he was a true Socratic; he was also not un- 
 Socratic in combining with instruction, social intercourse 
 and the enjoyment with his pupils of an occasional feast. 
 But the purely scholastic life did not afford him the op- 
 portunity he desired for the practical application of his 
 theories, and about the year 367 B.C. we find him in 
 Syracuse, Sicily, instructing the younger Dionysius, 
 who, by the death of his father, had become ruler of 
 that city, in ethical and political philosophy. But what- 
 ever hopes Plato may have had in common with other 
 ancient philosophers of seeing philosophy successfully 
 applied to government, failed. Even had the Platonic 
 theories been truly "practicable," Dionysius, it seems, 
 was far from being the man to appreciate and apply 
 them. Plato returned to Athens, and, with the exception 
 of an interval (about 361 B.C.) during which he went on 
 a third journey to Sicily to reconcile Dionysius with his 
 brother-in-law, Dion, an earnest disciple of Plato, devoted 
 the remainder of his life exclusively to teaching philoso- 
 phy in the Academy. He died in 347 b.c. at the age of 
 eighty, with powers undiminished, and reverenced both 
 by fellow-countrymen and by foreigners for the exceed- 
 ing brilliancy of his intellect and the loftiness and beauty 
 of his character. No philosopher, either of ancient or 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 75 
 
 of modern times, save, perhaps, his master Socrates, and 
 his pupil Aristotle, has so won and retained the esteem 
 of thoughtful men. "Plato," says Hegel, "is one of the 
 world-historical individuals ; his philosophy is one of the 
 world-historical facts which, from their beginning to all 
 subsequent times, have exercised the most important 
 influence upon the formation and development of mind."^ 
 Plato's Works. — Regarding the Platonic writings — 
 their authenticity, the order (or approximate order) of 
 their production, the growth of ideas and theories in 
 them, and their style — there are a few points which it 
 seems indispensable that even the general student of the 
 history of Greek philosophy should be aware of. For a 
 full account of these, however, the reader must, of 
 course, be referred to the accessible learned authorities, 
 particularly Zeller, Ueberweg, and Grote. As to the 
 authenticity of the Platonic dialogues the student has 
 simply to accept, as Plato's own, all (or nearly all, the 
 exceptions being unimportant) the dialogues that appear 
 in the collection known as Professor Jowett's translation. 
 The doubts of Ueberweg and certain others as to the 
 authenticity of the important dialogues Meno, Parmeni- 
 des. Statesman, and Sophist are not concurred in by 
 authorities generally.^ As to the order of the writings 
 and the growth of Plato's ideas and theories there are 
 two (three) leading hypotheses ; one (Schleiermacher's) 
 is, that the dialogues were produced according to a more 
 or less fully preconceived philosophical scheme ; the 
 other (Hermann's) is that they appeared in a succession 
 
 1 " Geschichte der Philosophic," Bd. II. p. 147. 
 
 2 See Zeller' s Plato and the Older Academy (a translation from Zeller's 
 Geschichte der Philosophic der Griechen), p. 82. 
 
"jS GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 determined by the "natural growth of Plato's mind." 
 The most recent authorities see fit to adopt a mean 
 between these two hypotheses, inclining, it would seem, 
 rather toward the latter. According to the theory of Her- 
 mann, the dialogues may be divided into three classes. 
 Those of one class are " Socratic, or elementary, of 
 another dialectic or mediatizing, of the third, expository 
 or constructive." The first, " written, in part, before 
 the death of Socrates, in part, immediately after, have a 
 fragmentary, more exclusively elenchtic and protreptic 
 character, confine themselves almost entirely to the 
 Socratic manner, and as yet go no deeper into the fun- 
 damental questions of philosophy. The second class is 
 distinguished by greater dryness, less liveliness, less 
 cheerfulness of form, and by that searching criticism 
 (sometimes approving, sometimes polemical) of the Meg- 
 aro-Eleatic philosophy which occupied the time of Plato's 
 sojourn in Megara. In the third period, there is, on the 
 one hand, as to style, a return to the freshness and ful- 
 ness of the first ; while on the other, Plato's horizon has 
 been enlarged by the inquiries of the Megarian period, 
 by residence in foreign countries, and especially by the 
 knowledge he acquired of the Pythagorean philosophy, 
 and from the fusion of all the elements we get the most 
 perfect exposition of his system, in which the Socratic 
 form receives the deepest content and thus attains its 
 highest ideal." ^ Combining the two theories with cer- 
 tain minor considerations and certain indications noted in 
 
 ^ Plato and the Older Academy,-^^. 103, l04;alsopp. 117-119. Schweg- 
 ler agrees with Hermann; see his Handbook of the History of Philosophy, 
 pp. 62-67 (Stirling's translation). Practically the difference between 
 Zeller and Schwegler here is of little consequence to any but the specialist 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 7/ 
 
 the study of the dialogues themselves, Zeller arrives at 
 substantially the following groups: \. Lesser Hippias, 
 Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Euthyphro, Apol- 
 0Sy> Crito; 2. Pkcedrus, Gorgias, Meno, Thecetetus, Sophist, 
 Statesman, Parmenides, Symposium, Phcedo, Philebus 
 (transitional) ; 3. Republic, Timceus, Critias, Laws. The 
 places of Eiithydemus and Cratylus are uncertain. First 
 Alcibiades, Menexenus are by Zeller considered spurious.^ 
 In the first group, then, — ■ to expand a little what is 
 contained in the foregoing, — we must look for the 
 purely Socratic doctrines wrought out in the Socratic 
 manner, and for the historical Socrates, the substance 
 of these dialogues being ethical ; in the second group is 
 to be found principally the Platonic theory of Ideas, — of 
 conceptions and the corresponding archetypal entities ; 
 in the third group are contained, besides the theory of 
 a dialectic as a science, the theories of virtue, of the 
 state and of nature. The general student will find all 
 that he requires in the Apology (for a picture of Socrates), 
 Protagoras (for Socratic dialectic applied to ethics), 
 ThecBtetus (for the theory of knowledge), Phcedrus and 
 Phcedo (for the theory of the soul and of Ideas), Republic 
 (for the theory of Ideas, of virtue, and of the state), Phi- 
 lebus (for the theory of the finite and infinite, of Ideas 
 and the good), Timceus (for the theory of nature and the 
 soul). The student will be disappointed if he expect to^ 
 
 1 It should be noted that certain English authorities at the present mo- 
 ment, chief among them Henry Jacl<son and R. D. Archer-Hind, regard 
 the Parmenides and the Philebus as among the very latest of Plato's works 
 and as containing, therefore, the latest form of Plato's leading thought, the 
 Theory of Ideas. See below, p. 1 1 2. (See Journal of Philology, Cam- 
 bridge, 1882.) 
 
78 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 find dogmatic conclusions at every step in Plato. Plato 
 believed thoroughly in keeping the mind open and trying 
 questions in every possible way. One may read several 
 dialogues — go through, so to say, several movements of 
 the Platonic symphony — without finding a real pause. 
 As to the external style of the dialogues, the wise reader 
 will guard against treating the myths and metaphors in 
 which the dialogues abound in a temper too prosaic. 
 Plato's philosophy is, in many places, steeped in poetry, 
 but, if rightly read, is not ?/«philosophical on account of 
 that. The force of these remarks will receive pointed 
 illustration when we reach Aristotle and his criticisms 
 upon Plato. 
 
 Plato's General Conception of Philosophy. — Philoso- 
 phy, says Plato, speaking half-allegorically, springs from 
 a certain " divine madness " caused by the recollection, 
 at the sight of the "beauty of earth," of that "true 
 beauty " of which the soul had a vision in a pre-existent 
 state.^ And this " madness " is no superficial thing : 
 it springs from the very essence of the soul as an im- 
 mortal being : it is a prophecy of the soul's return to 
 the knowledge and enjoyment of eternal reaUty. This 
 return is brought about by philosophy. By philosophy 
 alone can the Idea of the Good be represented among 
 men and they become like God, "in whom is no un- 
 righteousness at all." 2 Not, indeed, that any philoso- 
 pher has perfect wisdom, for God alone is wise, and the 
 Idea of the Good is with difficulty discerned.^ Men 
 are, as it were, confined in a dark den, where they can 
 scarcely tell shadows from realities. The ascent to the 
 
 1 Pktcdrtis, p. 249. ^ Thecetetiis, p. 176; Phado, p. 82. ^ P/usdrtts, p. 278. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 79 
 
 upper world is slow and difficult, and the Idea of the 
 Good is seen last. In this ascent there are four stages, 
 in the last of which, only, is the real truth apprehended.^ 
 The first is mere opinion ; the second, right opinion, or 
 true belief, which, however, is " without reason," i.e., 
 is unscientific ; the third is understanding, or what is 
 commonly termed science, though it is in reality only 
 quasi-scie.x)X\?ic, because it rests on certain unproved 
 presuppositions ; the fourth is science, or completely 
 reasoned knowledge, knowledge in which there are no 
 unexamined or unfounded presuppositions or hypoth- 
 eses.^ Now the last stage is reached only through a 
 course of discipline which may be described as follows. 
 The "divine madness" being presupposed to exist, in 
 germ, at least, in all minds, but especially in certain 
 ones who are, therefore, embryo philosophers, there 
 must, in the first place, be " right opinion " " engrafted " 
 on it. This must be done by training in gymnastics 
 and music, — gymnastics for the body and music for the 
 soul. (Music is to be understood here as including 
 poetry.) " He who has received this true education of 
 the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions 
 or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while 
 he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul 
 the good, becomes noble and good, he will justly blame 
 and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth even 
 before he is able to know the reason of the thing : when 
 reason comes, he will recognize and salute her as a 
 friend with whom his education has made him long 
 familiar." The gymnastic education^ supplements the 
 
 1 Reptiilic, p. 517. ^ Ibid., pp. 511 and 533. ^ JUd., p. 402. 
 
80 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 musical with strength and firmness, courage and spirit, 
 both animal and mental. But, in the second place, 
 there must be mathematical training to enable the soul 
 to " rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true 
 being." Such training gives measure, harmony, unity 
 to thought, and tends in its results towards the " vision 
 of the Idea of the Good" ; it furnishes the mind with 
 a method and enables it to give something like scientific 
 form and validity to its "right opinion." Such training, 
 however, is but the "prelude" to the "actual strain of 
 philosophy." ^ Philosophically speaking, the defect of 
 mathematics {i.e., arithmetic and geometry) is that it is 
 but a half step from sense. It reasons correctly, but it 
 reasons about that which is, as compared with being, 
 semi-sensuous, and its first principles are mere hypoth- 
 eses : " as to the mathematical arts, which, as we 
 were saying, have some apprehension of true being — 
 geometry and the like — they only dream about being, 
 but never can they behold the waking reality so long 
 as they leave the hypotheses which they use, undis- 
 turbed, and are unable to give any account of them." ^ 
 It is "dialectic and dialectic alone which does away 
 with hypotheses in order to establish them ; the eye of 
 the soul, which is literally buried in some outlandish 
 slough, is by her taught to look upward ; and she uses 
 as hand-maids in the work of conversion the sciences we 
 have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, 
 but they ought to have some other name, implying 
 greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than 
 science ; and this in our previous sketch was called 
 
 1 Republic, p. 525. 2 Ibid., p. 533. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 8 1 
 
 understanding." ^ Dialectic, then, is the highest science, 
 the " coping-stone " of the sciences. The preparation 
 required for it is of the severest kind, and demands the 
 strongest and steadiest minds. Only the " unwearied, 
 solid man," who loves labor, has a good memory, is 
 morally whole and sound, should undertake it ; dialectic, 
 in fact, cannot be undertaken without risk of intellectual 
 and moral disintegration (such as the Sophistic culture 
 fosters) until the age of thirty, and even then only by 
 the best minds in the best bodies. Five years must be 
 given to the theoretical mastery of it before any attempt 
 to make practical application of it to the affairs of 
 state (for the state is to be ruled by philosophy) ; the 
 remaining years of a man's life after fifty are to be 
 given to the pursuit of it.-^ Such is Plato's general 
 notion of philosophy. 
 
 The Divisions of Philosophy and their General Rela- 
 tions. — Plato nowhere formally makes a division of 
 philosophy into distinct parts. Circumstances had 
 made his task one of synthesis rather than of analysis. 
 He had gathered together what he saw to be the strands 
 of philosophy which earlier thinkers had held in separa- 
 tion, and in his hands philosophy became for the first 
 time something like a complete whole. But such a 
 division or analysis was virtually contained in his syn- 
 thesis, and was made actual by a pupil of his, Xenocrates. 
 The parts recognizable in Plato's philosophy, are, then. 
 Dialectic, the theory of thought and being, as such, 
 Physics, the theory of nature, and Ethics, the theory of 
 the Good. Now of these parts dialectic is highest, the 
 
 1 Republic, p. 533. 2 Hid., pp. 535-540. 
 
82 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 " coping-stone " ; as regards both method and con- 
 tent it furnishes to the other parts the ideal of truth. 
 In its purest form it is the science of absolute knowl- 
 edge and being, whereas all other sciences are sciences 
 of being that is derivative and has cognoscibility and 
 reality only in so far as it "participates" in that true 
 supreme being. 
 
 Dialectic as a Twofold Science. — The dialectic of 
 Plato may be described as the natural result of the 
 Socratic conception developed under the influence, in 
 Plato's mind, of the negative, or repelling, force of the 
 Heraclitic doctrine of the eternal flux of things of sense, 
 and the positive, or attracting, force of the Eleatic doc- 
 trine of being as one and unchangeable. Plato, in other 
 words, held with Socrates that knowledge exists only 
 in the form of the conception, a definite, unchanging 
 notion, and, with the Eleatics, that that of which there 
 is knowledge is not the world of sense as Heraclitus had 
 characterized it, but being, one and universal. Knowl- 
 edge and being are thus correlative, and dialectic is 
 hence a twofold science, the science of knowledge and 
 of being. It is also the application of the science of 
 knowledge in the getting of knowledge, and hence is a 
 method ; and, we may say also, of the science of being 
 in action, though Plato does not use the term frequently, 
 if at all, in this sense. 
 
 Dialectic as a Theory of Knowledge and as Method. — 
 As a science of knowledge it is a true account of the 
 way in which true conceptions are formed and of con- 
 ceptions in their relations. But this way is dialectic as 
 method. In its lowest form dialectic is simply the art 
 of speech, the art of developing and expressing clearly 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 83 
 
 and effectively our ideas concerning tlie " essence of 
 each thing." ^ This, it will be seen, is but a description 
 of the Socratic practice in its outward aspect, which 
 Plato seems always to have regarded as of vital impor- 
 tance. To him philosophy was an energizing of the 
 whole soul, a matter of life as well as of thought, pre- 
 eminently a personal thing. Hence that preference of 
 his, already mentioned, for the spoken over the written 
 word. Inwardly the dialectic method was with Plato 
 the Socratic induction supplemented by division and 
 classification and the comparing of the consequences of 
 opposite hypotheses.^ This is the method of thought 
 (not of sense) and is based on the hypothesis that real 
 knowledge is contained in conceptions, not in sensations. 
 The sensational theory of knowledge, the theory first 
 propounded by Protagoras, Plato condemned with argu- 
 ments among the principal of which are the following. 
 If the sensational theory be true, "I wonder that he 
 [Protagoras] did not begin his great work on Truth with 
 the declaration that a pig or a baboon or some other 
 stranger monster which has sensation is the measure of 
 all things ; " again, that theory fails to account for the 
 permanent character of knowledge, since on the suppo- 
 sition that both "object" and "percipient" are in con- 
 stant flux there can be no permanence anywhere ; and, 
 finally, the theory is self-contradictory, since by its own 
 terms it may be just as well false as true. No, the 
 
 1 Republic, p. 534 ; Phcedrus, pp. 277, 278. 
 
 2 Phiedrm, pp. 265, 266; Parmenides, pp. 128 and 136; Republic, 
 pp. 427, 428. In the passage last mentioned, Plato refers to, by name, 
 the method termed by Mill the " Method of Residues." " Modern Induc- 
 tive Philosophy " was largely " anticipated " by Plato and Aristotle. 
 
84 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 truth is that knowledge is given in conceptions and con- 
 ceptions only. The method of knowledge is the method 
 of thought ; the seeing of " unity and plurality in na- 
 ture." " If I find any man" who can do that, "him I 
 follow and walk in his footsteps as if he were a God." 
 Now induction, the " upward way " of knowledge, is to 
 Plato but tentative, suggestive, not final and conclusive ; 
 a begetter of insight but not of science ; and must be 
 supplemented by division, the "downward way" of 
 knowledge. Induction suggests a hypothesis or possi- 
 ble definition of some whole ; division verifies or over- 
 throws the hypothesis by exhibiting distinctly and in 
 their relations the parts of the whole defined. With 
 regard to division Plato says, " you should not clip off 
 too small a piece . . . the safe way is to cut through the 
 middle, and this is the more likely way of finding classes. 
 Attention to this principle makes all the difference in 
 a process of inquiry." ^ This method of division is 
 known as dichotomy. The method of investigation 
 which consists in following out opposite hypotheses and 
 comparing their consequences is, of course, Eleatic in 
 origin. That hypothesis whose consequences are the 
 most probable is the truer hypothesis. The dialectic 
 method as just described is, as we shall see, the pre- 
 cursor of the Aristotelian logic. 
 
 Dialectic as a System. 
 
 Thought and Being. — In the conceptions arrived at 
 by the dialectic method, then, we have knowledge, i.e., 
 we have the real thought of being, and the only real or 
 permanent conviction possible for us. That this is true 
 appeared to Plato, not only as a consequence of the 
 
 ^ Statesman, 262 ; Sophist, throughout. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 85 
 
 synthesis of the Eleatic and Socratic doctrines of being 
 and knowledge but from such considerations as the fol- 
 lowing : The "divine madness" that seizes upon "in- 
 genuous natures " and impels them to philosophy, can be 
 but the working of the soul's innate knowledge of a 
 higher state than the present, a state in which thought 
 and being are more immediately one. Again, the source 
 of knowledge even in the present existence is not the 
 organs of sense, but the soul working through them, 
 and our cognitions, which must be cognitions of some- 
 thing, are cognitions, not of the world of sense as such, 
 but of being. Finally, we cannot suppose that there is 
 anything absolutely out of relation to us, for in such a 
 case, God who, if anything, would be out of relation to us, 
 since he is absolute, could not know us and our world : 
 we should constitute an absolute being by ourselves, — 
 all of which is absurd, "monstrous."^.' But if this be 
 true, being is intelligent, since thought as the thought 
 of being is (by virtue of the unity of thought and being) 
 being so far as it (being) is capable of being thought. 
 Being, therefore, thinks or is intelligent. 
 
 The World of Ideas. — To determine, then, the nature 
 of being as an object of thought (and it is only as such 
 that we can know it) we must determine what are the 
 absolute conceptions. These, in number and nature, 
 correspond with the types or classes of phenomenal exis- 
 tence. Now as thought andbeing_axe_one, and as the 
 absolute conceptioiisTiave~^ch a separate character and 
 place in thought, it follows that being is not merely one 
 in nature but many also. Being as one in many is 
 
 ^ Pkadrm,-p. 245; Theatetus, pp. 184, 185, 203-209; Phado, pp. 74, 
 75; Parmenides, 132-135. 
 
/ 
 
 86 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 termed by Plato the Idea or World of Ideas (etSr)). So 
 far as we can speak of beings, there are, then, corre- 
 sponding to the types or classes of phenomenal exis- 
 tences, certain entities, which are noumenal : Ideas. As 
 objects of definiteJbiowledge, the Ideas are distinct, 
 fixed, independent :^n this they are in sharp contrast 
 with sense-natures, which as Heraclitus held, are fleet- 
 ing and pass into their opposites, "admit generation 
 into or out of one another." But the Ideas "partici- 
 pate " in, or " commune " with, each other. Not, how- 
 ever, promiscuously, but in certain cognizable ways. 
 The ideas of rest and motion, for example, do not par- 
 ticipate in each other except indirectly, through partici- 
 pation in being.^ The communion of being and not- 
 being is explained as follows. Being is all-inclusive, 
 embracing even not-being, unless, indeed, being is 
 "pure and fixed emptiness." But being is not such :, 
 we cannot conceive it " to be devoid of life and 
 mind, and to remain in awful unmeaningness and fix- 
 ture." ^ In speaking, therefore, of not-being, i.e., gene- 
 ration, motion, variety, etc., we speak not of something 
 opposed to being but different merely. In general, then, 
 not-being is the element of otherness or difference in- 
 herent in being.* The Ideas together constitute an 
 organism which is governed by the Idea of the Good 
 (the end of all things). The Idea of the Good embraces 
 
 1 Phado, pp. 78-103. 
 
 2 The communion of Ideas is treated especially in the dialogues, Soph- 
 ist, Parmenides, and Philebus. 
 
 * Sophist, pp. 247-250, 257, 259. 
 
 * Translated into modern phraseology, this means that all motion, all 
 change, is but the self-affirmation, the self-identification of the Eternal. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 87 
 
 within itself a "mixture " ^ of " mind " (which is definite 
 and knowable) and "pleasure" (which is relatively in- 
 definite and unknowable) together with the cause of the 
 " mixture," or soul. The Good is thus not abstract but 
 concrete ; and as the only causal principle in the uni- 
 verse is soul, the Idea of the Good is a concrete, intelli- 
 gent (and intelligible) power. The Good is further 
 described by Plato as including measure, beauty, sym- 
 metry, as well as "mind," "pleasure," and "causality."^ 
 Of the Good as the supreme Idea he says : " Whether I 
 am right or not God only knows ; but, whether true or 
 false, my opinion is that in all the world of knowledge 
 the Idea of the Good appears last of all and is seen only 
 with effort, and when seen, is inferred to be the univer- 
 sal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of 
 light and lord of light in this world, and the source of 
 truth and reason in the other : this is the first great 
 cause which he who would act rationally either in public 
 or in private life must behold."^ Again, "the Good is 
 not only the author of knowledge in all things known 
 [as the sun is of "visibility in all things visible"] but of 
 their being and essence, yet the Good is not essence 
 [mere being .'] but exceeds essence in dignity and 
 power." * As the supreme Idea is an intelligent and 
 intelligible power, those below it must, as partaking in 
 it, also be intelligent and intelligible powers. (Being, 
 indeed, is simply power. ^) The realm of Ideas is, then, 
 a spiritual kingdom : an independent, self-existent, eter- 
 nal community of intelligent beings.^ 
 
 '^ P/iilebus,^. 2-j. ^ /did., -pp. 61,63, 6^, 6j. ^ Republic, p. c,!";. 
 
 * Republic, pp. 508, 509. See p. 506. ^ Sophist, pp. 247, 248. 
 
 ^ There seems to be no real warrant for affirming (as some do) that to 
 Plato the Ideas are merely thoughts in the "mind " of God. 
 
88 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Relation of the Ideal, to the Phenomenal, World. — In 
 the foregoing is virtually contained Plato's answer to a 
 question that now naturally arises, What is the relation 
 of the world of Ideas to the phenomenal world? to 
 knowledge and objects of knowledge in the world given 
 to us ? The answer is, in general terms, as follows : 
 " That which imparts truth to the object and knowledge 
 to the subject is what I would have you term the Idea 
 of the Good, and that you will regard as the cause of 
 science and truth as known by us." But to speak par- 
 ticularly, 7?;"^^, of Ideas as related to human knowledge. 
 It is by virtue of the presence of the Idea in us that 
 we are self-moving, self-identifying, and so, capable of 
 knowledge, whether it be scientific comprehension or 
 common understanding. The idea as the source and 
 synthesis of cognition and being, makes possible for us 
 by its working in us ^ the true thought of reality. For 
 Plato, consequently, knowledge possessed certain ele- 
 ments not recognized by earlier philosophers. The 
 Eleatics failed to find in our cognition of phenomena 
 anything but "opinion"; Plato declaring things them- 
 selves, and our cognition of them to be of the Idea, 
 posited philosophically (and was the first who did so) 
 the knowledge, of the real in_the phenomenal. Again, 
 the Lesser Socratics affirmed that only " identical propo- 
 sitions " are valid. Plato discovered a principle of syn- 
 thesis, and thus showed the possibility and the necessity 
 of real judgments. Thirdly, Socrates did not entirely 
 rise above the notion of merely correct conceptions to 
 that of ontologically true conceptions, was sceptical as 
 to the possibility of absolute science, hence did not 
 attain to a pure metaphysics. Plato did this in positing 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 89 
 
 the Idea as the fountain of knowledge and being. In 
 so doing, he gave a new content and a new method to 
 philosophy. The content of philosophy is not the ab- 
 stract entity termed by the Eleatics Being, nor the 
 purely phenomenal world, which the Sophists declared 
 knowable only in individual sensation, and Socrates only 
 in individual conception, but the concretion of these, 
 the world of Ideas, in itself and as having effect and' 
 manifestation in the phenomenal world, and the phe- 
 nomenal world as having its source and cognoscibility in 
 the Ideal world. Again, from the fact that the Idea is the 
 source of knowledge and being, it follows that the true 
 method or " way " of knowledge is the " downward way," 
 induction being but an eye-opener, merely a condition 
 of nascent or incipient insight. Dialectic, then, is in 
 the last analysis, not merely the method of our thinking 
 and our theory of the Idea, but is also the method of 
 the Idea and the Ideal theory of the Idea. And as the 
 " downward way," it is not mere division, but, since the 
 Idea is universal and not to be absolutely divided — also 
 synthesis; it makes place for the "unity of opposites." 
 But, secondly, as to the relation of the Ideas to the world 
 of objective, sensible phenomena, the Ideas are conceived 
 by Plato, not only as causes,C*but as archetypes of 
 things, the eternal patterns to which the artificer of the 
 world looks in framing the world.^ The world of Ideas 
 is self-existent and independent ; phenomenal objects | 
 " participate " in Ideas or are " imitations " of them. { 
 
 ^Phcedo, p. 75; Phcedrus, p. 95; Zellers Plato and the Older Academy, 
 pp. 262, 268. Schwegler's Handbook of the Hist, of Philos. (Stirling's 
 trans.), p. 79. 
 
 ^ Parmenides, p. 132 ; Timaus, p. 28. 
 
90 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The exact nature of this participation, or imitation, seems / 
 not to have been explained by Plato quite satisfactorily to j 
 himself (or to those coming after him). In fact, Plato rec- | 
 ognized at this point certain unsolved difficulties in his 
 theory of Ideas, and was impelled towards a modification 
 of the theory.^ For example, if the Ideas are entirely u 
 independent of the phenomenal world. Jww can they be 
 the source of existence to other things or of knowledge 
 in us ? These difficulties were afterwards pointed out . 
 and used against the theory by Aristotle.^ Though 
 participating in Ideas, phenomenal objects are but im- 
 perfect representations of Ideas. Why this is so, is 
 explained in the theory of nature, or of that which, 
 instead of being uncreated, fixed, and scientifically cog- 
 noscible, is created, changing, and an object of " opinion " 
 and "sense." 
 
 Physics, or the Theory of Nature. 
 
 The Method of Physical Speculation. — In the philo- 
 sophical study of nature it is necessary, first of all, Plato 
 reminds us, to remember that, owing to the contingency 
 pertaining to things created and changing, we cannot, in 
 speculating upon such things, proceed with dialectic 
 exactness and certainty of method, but must ''observe 
 the rule of probability."^ Plato shared, to some extent, 
 Socrates' s distrust of physical speculation, (as well as 
 Heraclitus's view of the mutability of all phenomenal 
 things), regarding it, however, as a kind of pardonable 
 and perhaps praiseworthy indulgence, though far from 
 
 1 See below, p. 112. 
 
 ^ Parmenides, pp. 1 32-135; Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bk. XIII. chs. 4 
 and 5. 
 
 * Timcetts, pp. 28, 29, 48. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 9I 
 
 possessing the dignity and value of dialectic, or true 
 science. "A man may sometimes set aside arguments 
 about eternal things, and for recreation turn to consider 
 the truths of generation which are only probable ; thus 
 he attains pleasure not to be repented of, and makes for 
 himself during his life a wise and moderate pastime." ^ 
 
 The Cosmos. — The created world is as perfect an imi- 
 tation and manifestation of the Idea as was practicable : 
 it is a living, intelligible being, a "blessed god." God 
 formed the world because he is good and " desired that 
 all things be as like himself as possible." The world is 
 not an absolutely perfect manifestation of the Idea 
 because there was, when the world was created, a certain 
 element of necessity which reason had to "persuade" or 
 "get the better of," though it could not completely over- 
 come \t? This element of necessity and obstacle to the 
 complete manifestation of the Idea is "matter." God 
 (Idea as power working towards an end) formed, first, the 
 world-soul, by uniting as perfectly as possible, according 
 to certain numerical relations, an unchangeable, indivis- 
 ible essence (Idea as fixed, intelligent and intelligible 
 nature) and a divisible, corporeal, movable nature, thus 
 creating an intermediate essence partaking of the nature 
 of the " same and other " and possessing the power to 
 declare the "sameness and diversity of things." This 
 mediating, mathematical intelligence (the world-soul) — 
 mathematics, we have seen, is, with Plato, intermediate 
 between science and opinion — God diffused throughout, 
 and united perfectly with, a perfect body made of the 
 four elements, fire, air, water, earth — " in the harmony 
 
 ' Timam, p. 59. ^ Ibid., pp. 30, 33, 48. 
 
92 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of proportions " — and smooth, even, perfectly spherical. 
 The soul he formed prior in time and excellence to the 
 body to be the "ruler and mistress of it." ^ The world 
 is, accordingly, a "blessed god," not eternal, indeed, but 
 an image of eternity and a perfect whole, indissoluble 
 except by the hand of the Creator. Time and the world, 
 created together, are without end. The world is divided 
 according to the "sameness and diversity" of "motion" 
 into two spheres, that of the fixed stars and that of the 
 planets, all these having souls and being gods. The 
 latter revolve about the earth (which is fixed and spheri- 
 cal and is pierced by the spindle or axis of the universe) 
 in spiral courses from west to east. The four elements 
 are not eternal but were created out of an eternal inde- 
 structible somewhat, the " receptacle and in a manner 
 the nurse of all generation," an "invisible, formless being 
 which receives all things and attains in an extraordinary 
 way a portion of the intelligible, and is most incompre- 
 hensible." Plato seems to identify it with space, a 
 " third nature " — the indivisible essence and the corpo- 
 real, divisible essence being the first and second — which 
 is " eternal and perceived without the help of sense and 
 by a spurious reason." ^ It is not a corporeal substance 
 for it is not that out of which but that in which phenom- 
 ena have become, and it is in its very essence negation 
 or not-being (passive, however, rather than active), and 
 the occasion of the relative not-being, or the mutability, 
 of phenomena. It may be likened to a mother, phe- 
 nomena to a child, and the source of phenomena to a 
 father.^ It is the mean, or middle term, between phe- 
 
 1 Timsus, pp. 32, 34, 35, 38. ^Ibid., pp. 51, 52. 3 m^^ p j^ 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 93 
 
 nomena and the Idea.^ It is that element of " necessity " 
 — "matter" — which hinders, while it makes possible, 
 the manifestation of the Idea. Fire, air, water, and earth 
 are, consequently, not corporeal but merely geometrical 
 bodies, fire being four-faced, air eight-faced, water 
 twenty-faced, earth six-faced (cubical). All this (and 
 much more of similar character), it must be remem- 
 bered, is, to Plato, only "probable" or conjectural — 
 not science. 
 
 Body and Soul. — ■ Thus much for that portion of the 
 work of creation which God himself performed. The 
 rest was given into the hands of the created gods. 
 These, "imitating the power" of God, formed man 
 and animals, the latter being but a lower type of the 
 former.^ The " seed " of the immortal part of the 
 soul of man was provided by God himself. It is, of 
 course, by this part, which is simple, self-identical, self- 
 moving, and indestructible, that the soul participates 
 in the Idea and is rational. The mortal part has two. 
 portions, the "spirited" (courage) and the appetitive 
 (desire). The former is naturally inclined to obey the 
 immortal, or rational, part of the soul, but is too often 
 dragged down by the appetitive part, which is animal, 
 and even vegetable, in its tendencies. The rational 
 part of the soul is located in the head, courage in the 
 heart, and desire in the lower portion of the trunk, 
 particularly the liver, which is the seat also of inspira- 
 tion and prophecy, these being but a very low order of 
 knowledge. To Plato the so-called parts of the soul are 
 not parts but faculties. Of their inter-connection he 
 
 1 See Jowett's Introduction to the Timaus, section 3. 
 
 2 Plato not an " evolutionist." 
 
94 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 offers no explanation. Perception is of like by like (as 
 with Empedocles). In sight, for example, the fire from 
 the eye meets the external fire, and vision is the result. 
 Sight and hearing are the noblest of the senses. "Thus 
 much let us say : that God invented and gave sight to 
 this end, — that we might behold the courses of intelli- 
 gence which are akin to them, the unperturbed to the 
 perturbed ; and that we, learning them and being par- 
 takers of the true computat-ions of nature, might imitate 
 the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our 
 own vagaries. The same \mutatis mutandis\ may be 
 afifirmed of speech and hearing." ^ The soul was "im- 
 planted in the body by necessity " : entered into it in 
 consequence of a fall from a nobler, preexistent state. 
 There is not between the two that perfect harmony 
 which exists between the world-soul and its body (" the 
 perfect animal "). On the contrary, there is a certain 
 antagonism^ between body and soul, the influence of 
 the former upon the latter being evil and degrading, the 
 cause of ignorance and spiritual disease. The body, 
 indeed, is the soul's prison. The relation between the 
 two is represented as follows in the well-known allegory 
 of the Charioteer and Winged Horses, in which are 
 symbolized, on the one hand, reason, on the other, 
 " courage," or passion, and appetite.^ "Now the winged 
 horses and the charioteer of the gods are all of them 
 noble, and of noble breed, while ours are mixed; and 
 
 1 Timceus, pp. 45, 47. 
 
 2 There is a certain discrepancy between the accounts of the Phadrus 
 and the Timaus on this point. The Phadrus has been followed in what 
 is now given. 
 
 ^ Phcedrus, pp. 246-255. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 95 
 
 we have a charioteer who drives them in a pair ; and 
 one of them is noble and of noble origin, and, as might 
 be expected, there is a great deal of trouble in managing 
 them. . . . Now the chariots of the gods, self-balanced, 
 upward glide in obedience to the rein ; but the others 
 have a difficulty, for the steed who has evil in him, if 
 he has not been properly trained by the charioteer, 
 gravitates and inclines and sinks towards the earth, and 
 this is the hour of extremest agony and conflict of the 
 soul. For the immortal souls, when they are at the 
 end of their course, go out and stand upon the back of 
 heaven [the sphere of the fixed stars], and the revolu- 
 tion of the spheres carries them around and they be- 
 hold the world beyond." When, through the unruliness 
 of the steeds, the soul becomes unable to rise sufficiently 
 high to " behold the vision of truth, and through some 
 mishap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness 
 and vice, her feathers fall from her and she drops to the 
 earth, then the law ordains that this soul shall in the 
 first generation pass not into that of any other animal 
 but only of man, and the soul which has seen the most 
 of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher, or 
 artist, or musician, or lover ; that which has seen the 
 truth in the second degree shall be a righteous king, or 
 warrior, or lord ; the soul, which is of the third class, 
 shall be a politician, or economist, or trader ; the fourth 
 shall be a lover of gymnastic toils or a physician ; the 
 fifth, a prophet or hierophant ; to the sixth, a poet or 
 imitator will be appropriate ; to the seventh, the life of 
 an artisan or husbandman ; to the eighth, that of a 
 sophist or a demagogue ; to the ninth, that of a tyrant : 
 all these are states of probation, in which he who lives 
 
96 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 righteously improves, and he who lives unrighteously 
 deteriorates his lot." The soul's chief inspiration to 
 righteousness is the recollection of the eternal beauty 
 of which it had heard or caught a glimpse. This 
 "wingless probation" continues for the soul of the 
 philosopher or the lover who is faithful to his insight, 
 three thousand years, the soul then returning to the 
 place whence it came. Others are judged "when they 
 have completed their first life," and, at the end of the 
 first thousand years, they have a new choice of life, the 
 good and the bad souls alike taking what they prefer, 
 i.e., what their natures prompt them to take. "And 
 the soul of the man may pass into the life of a beast, or 
 from the beast again to the man ; " but the souls of those 
 who have not seen the truth will not pass into human 
 forms, but into those of animals. After death souls are 
 classified as holy, moderately good, curably wicked, and 
 incurably wicked. The last are punished eternally. — From 
 the foregoing may be gathered several essential points in 
 the Platonic psychology : the mixed nature of the soul, 
 its participation in the Idea, and the necessity that the 
 Idea be in a manner realized in it, the preexistent state, 
 and the recollection of that state, the immortality of 
 the soul, future retribution, and the transmigration of 
 souls. The logical connection between these may be 
 briefly, though imperfectly, indicated as follows : the 
 soul as participating in the Idea must be prior to the 
 body ; it must, even though immersed in the slough of 
 sense, retain some recollection of that preexistent state, 
 for the Idea is and cannot be obliterated by sense ; but 
 the Idea as the Good cannot be completely attained to 
 in the world of sense ; hence there must be a future 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 97 
 
 state and future retribution ; and finally, the character 
 of the retribution must vary with the bodies or immedi- 
 ate environment of the souls of men. The doctrines 
 of preexistence and of recollection, or reminiscence, 
 demand special notice. They seemed to Plato to fol- 
 low not only from the theory of the soul as an off- 
 shoot of the Idea, but also from the nature of knowl- 
 edge as such. A certain boy, Meno, knows noth- 
 ing of geometry, and yet Socrates succeeds in getting 
 him to understand a geometrical demonstration and in 
 drawing from him certain principles of demonstration ; 
 which would be impossible, thinks Plato, if the prin- 
 ciples of demonstration had not lain already in the boy's 
 mind.^ Again, though we say that pieces of wood or 
 stone are equal, we yet perceive that they are not abso- 
 lutely equal, and the conclusion must be that the soul 
 possesses, by a sort of recollection implying preexis- 
 tence, the conception of absolute equality.^ The argu- 
 ment for the immortality of the soul may be summa- 
 rized as follows:^ The soul is "ever in motion" and 
 self -moving ; it cannot be destroyed by immorality, the 
 only thing that could destroy it, if anything could ; the 
 soul is immortal because God is good, and cannot allow 
 so beautiful a creation to perish ; the thirst for absolute 
 knowledge and for a, future life, implies immortality ; 
 opposites pass into each other, sleeping into waking, 
 death into life, etc. ; preexistence implies immortality ; 
 the soul is an invisible essence, and so possesses the 
 
 1 Meno, pp. 81-83. 
 ^ Phado, pp. 74 and fol. 
 
 ^ See Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 127; also Phcedrus, 
 p. 245; Republic,^. (X)^; Timaus,-^. i,\; /'/^iza'd, pp. 62-107. 
 
g8 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 imperishable, indestructible character of the Idea ; the 
 soul is not a "harmony" of bodily activities, but is 
 itself, the rather a principle of harmony ; it participates 
 in the Idea of life, is immortal by virtue of the fact that 
 it Uves. In the Phcedo (p. 79) Plato conceives immor- 
 tality as synonymous in essence, not with everlasting- 
 ness, but with wisdom, i.e., perfect self-knowledge and 
 self-determination. 
 
 Plato's Ethics. 
 
 General Basis. — The conception of the soul as par- 
 ticipating in the Idea and as immortal, is the basis of 
 Plato's ethical doctrines. The life of the soul is one 
 life ; it is, by reason of the very nature of the soul as an 
 original indissoluble harmony and principle of harmony, 
 the union of the individual with himself and others, not 
 only in the present existence, but in a future state also ; 
 it is the life of justice with its necessary concomitant 
 happiness. The state, therefore, in which alone the indi- 
 vidual soul is furnished with the conditions necessary 
 for the realization by the soul of harmony in itself and 
 with others in this present existence, is but an instru- 
 ment of the Ideal, eternal life, the life of the Idea of 
 the Good.^ 
 
 The Method of Ethics. — From the immediately pre- 
 ceding statements it appears that Ethics and Politics, 
 the sciences of individual and of statal good and virtue, 
 are to Plato one. And it is an essential characteristic 
 of the method of Plato in the Republic that he begins 
 - with a consideration of the state as being the " individ- 
 ual written larger and on a larger scale," ^ and having 
 given a merely tentative theory of that, passes to the 
 
 1 Reptiblic, pp. 6n, 612. ^ Ibid., p. 368. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 99 
 
 individual, then back to the state, and so on. This 
 characteristic as well as the content of his theory has 
 its source in Plato's ever-present anxiety about the true 
 ideal totality of things, his never-ceasing quest after a 
 true and comprehensive principle of synthesis among 
 things. By the use of this method he diminishes, if he 
 does not obviate altogether, the appearance of arbitrarily 
 applying to one sphere principles discovered in another. 
 To him there is no abstract individual : the individual 
 is the state in miniature. 
 
 Nature and End of the State. — Historically consid- 
 ered, the state, Plato agrees with the Sophists in hold- 
 ing, arises out of natural, human necessity : physical 
 need, self-interest, lead to division of labor and to asso- 
 ciation for common and mutual benefit. But the state 
 is not merely an association for the better supplying of 
 natural or animal wants, the realization of the nature 
 of the individual as such ; government is not merely a 
 police force having its only use in the prevention of the 
 clashing of individual wills and interests. The state is 
 an organism, a vital totality, whose essence lies in its 
 being an instrument and manifestation of the Idea ; the 
 individuals constituting it consciously cooperate in the 
 realization of the absolute conception of the whole. 
 The state exists for the special benefit of no particular 
 individual or class of individuals. 
 
 The "Parts" of the State and the Virtue pertaining 
 to Each. — The members of the state are divided into 
 three classes : the husbandmen, who supply the natural 
 needs of the state ; the fighters or military class, who 
 defend the state against encroachment from without, or 
 make conquests for the enlargement of the territory of 
 
lOO GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the State ; and the rulers, or counsellors, who determine 
 the plans by which the state subsists as an instrument 
 of the Idea, the embodiment of the conception of jus- 
 tice. The two last-named classes Plato designates as 
 the guardians of the state. Each of these classes has 
 its peculiar virtue : the virtue of the husbandmen being 
 temperance, that of the fighters courage, that of the 
 rulers wisdom. A careful and long-continued training 
 is necessary to the making of the guardians : they are 
 to be tried " more thoroughly than gold is tried in the 
 fire." They are not only to be given that education in 
 music, gymnastics, and the sciences which is requisite 
 as a preparation for the study of philosophy, but they 
 are to be tried with tests of memory, with " toils and 
 pains and conflicts," and " with enchantments and ter- 
 rors." If they retain under all circumstances, "a rhyth- 
 mical, harmonious nature, such as will be most service- 
 able to the man himself and to the state," they are 
 worthy to become guardians of the state.^ They are 
 to have no property beyond what is absolutely neces- 
 sary, to have no private houses, to be allowed only a 
 " living " salary, to have common meals, and to reside 
 together. — But what are the virtues in themselves, and 
 where is justice.'' To answer this latter question, we 
 must, says Plato, by the "method of residues" care- 
 fully eliminate the known virtues, one after another, 
 until we arrive at justice. First, then, is wisdom, the 
 virtue of the counsellors, which is knowledge that ad- 
 vises " not about any particular thing in the state [e.g-., 
 carpentering, brazen implements, agriculture] but about 
 the whole state, and considers what may be regarded 
 
 1 Republic, Bks. II. and III. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. Id 
 
 as the best policy both internal and external."^ Next 
 may be eliminated courage, the virtue of the fighters, or 
 auxiliaries of the counsellors, which is the " preservation 
 in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains 
 about the true nature of dangers." Temperance, the 
 virtue of the husbandmen, may be best described as the 
 " natural harmony of master and slaves, both in states 
 and individuals, in which the subjects are as willing to 
 obey as the governors are to rule."^ Now justice, also, 
 would appear to be a harmony, and is not with perfect 
 ease to be distinguished from temperance. It is, how- 
 ever, that harmony wherein each individual minds his 
 own business and is not a " busy-body," and each class 
 in the state preserves its own sphere. Justice is the 
 all-pervading spirit of harmony, the union of the many 
 in one, of whole and part in the state. 
 
 Virtue in the Individual. — According, now, to the 
 method proposed at the beginning, we are to apply what 
 has been found to be true of the state to the individual. 
 The individual, then, has in him the three principles of 
 wisdom, courage, and temperance ; wisdom being the 
 virtue of reason, courage of spirit or passion, and tem- 
 perance of appetite. The individual, therefore, "whose 
 several principles do their own work will be just, and 
 will do his own work." "Assuming the threefold divi- 
 sion of the soul, must not injustice be a kind of quarrel 
 between these three — a meddlesomeness and interfer- 
 ence, and rising up of a part of the soul against the 
 whole soul, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is 
 made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of 
 whom he' is the natural vassal — that is the sort of 
 
 1 Republic, p. 428. ^ Ibid., pp. 428-434. 
 
102 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 thing : the confusion and error of these parts is injus- 
 tice, and intemperance, and ignorance, and in general 
 all vice." ^ Further, the qualities that make a state, 
 make a man : the good citizen is the good man. — As a 
 corollary to this theory of virtue, it follows that the 
 Sophistic notion of virtue as the whim or pleasure of 
 the individual, and of justice as the will or pleasure of 
 the strongest,^ is false. And (it may not improperly be 
 added at this point) to Plato the Socratic idea that virtue 
 is knowledge is not quite the correct one. Virtue, as 
 we learn from the dialogue Philebus, is a union of 
 " mind," or knowledge, and pleasure, and there is a kind 
 of natural virtue consisting in a disposition, uncon- 
 sciously acquired, to do right deeds. The great benefit 
 of education to the young is the creation in them by it 
 of this tendency (unconscious though it may be) to 
 take pleasure in good things, to have good instincts, to 
 entertain right feelings generally.^ 
 
 State Administration.'^ — But how shall the state be 
 managed, and, in particular, what is to be done with the 
 women and children ? Is not the state to be conducted 
 on the principle that "friends will have all things in com- 
 mon " .' It is, in the first place, hardly possible to refuse 
 to the women the same education that is given to men, 
 ridiculous as such a plan may appear at first sight. The 
 mere difference as regards the begetting and bearing of 
 children is unessential. The education that makes a 
 man a good guardian will make a woman, also, a good 
 guardian. In the second place, there must be no't only 
 sameness of education and pursuits but also community, 
 
 1 Repttblic, p. 444. ° Jbid., p. 402. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. I. * Jbid., Bk. V. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. IO3 
 
 or the holding in common, of women and children — ■ "no 
 one is to know his own child, nor any child his parent.'' 
 The union of the sexes must be made as " holy " as 
 possible, and, to this end, must be under the strict and 
 scientific siipervision of the wise men of the state. The 
 best of either sex must be " united with the best as often 
 as possible, and the inferior with the inferior, and they 
 are to rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not 
 of the other." The union is to be managed secretly and 
 by proper officers, who will also take charge of the off- 
 spring. There must, of course, be no irregular or ille- 
 gitimate unions. But, in the third place, there must be 
 community of property. The public spirit of the guar- 
 dians must not be allowed to suffer a check from any such 
 distinction as meum and hiuin. As to the practicabil- 
 ity of a state in which there is community of women, 
 children, and property, there is, indeed, some doubt. In 
 times of war there would be no difficulty; the women 
 and children would accompany the men. The children 
 should become accustomed to the sight of such dangers 
 as they themselves may have to face when they become 
 adults. Acts of bravery must be. recompensed by in- 
 creased liberty to beget children ; acts of cowardice by 
 degradation to the rank of husbandmen or artisans. 
 Love for the state must be kept pure and strong. It 
 remains true, however, that only " when philosophers 
 rule, or the kings and princes of this world have the 
 spirit and power of philosophy, will this ideal state, as 
 has been said, have a possibility of life and behold the 
 light of day." But the theory is, nevertheless, none the 
 worse as a theory " because we are unable to prove the 
 
104 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 possibility of a city being ordered in the manner de- 
 scribed." ^ 
 
 The False Forms of State and their Genesis. — Having 
 constructed the pattern state, which he designates as the 
 Aristocracy, Plato gives, with a view to showing still 
 more pointedly the nature of justice and injustice and 
 the relation between them and happiness and misery, an 
 analysis of the false forms of the state, together with 
 the kinds of individuals corresponding to them, and of 
 the genesis of these forms and the classes of individuals 
 corresponding to them. The false forms of the state 
 are four in number; the timocracy, or government of 
 honor ; the oligarchy, or government of the few and the 
 rich ; the democracy, or government of the (uneducated) 
 multitude; and tyranny. There are, of course, four 
 sorts of individuals to correspond with these. The false 
 forms of the state, taken in the order in which they 
 have just been named, are regarded by Plato as succes- 
 sive degenerations of the true form, or aristocracy, i.e., 
 the government of the wisest and best. " All political 
 changes originate in divisions of the actual governing 
 power," that is, in strife. Now the strife by which aris- 
 tocracy degenerates into timocracy arises in the following 
 way. The guardians losing, through ignorance and mis- 
 management, the control of marriages and births, there 
 springs up a weaker race, which undervalues knowledge 
 and culture, and, lacking thus the principle of harmony, 
 falls into inequality, irregularity, and, finally, strife. The 
 courageous, or " spirited," element gets the advantage of 
 the knowledge-loving and, although the guardian class 
 remains the honored class and does not fall back into 
 
 I Republic, Bks. VIII. and IX. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. IO5 
 
 the place of the husbandmen or artisans, philosophers 
 are excluded from power, the military class predominates, 
 and the state is better fitted for war than for peace : 
 one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen, — 
 the spirit of contention and ambition. Such is the 
 timocratical state and its genesis. The timocratical indi- 
 vidual and his genesis are like unto them. The son 
 of a "brave" but "easy-going" father, he comes to lack 
 " single-mindedness towards virtue," and to be a lover of 
 power and honor ; he is no longer wise and morally sound 
 and whole, but ambitious and contentious. Oligarchy 
 arises when the desire of power and honor, which char- 
 acterizes the timocracy, grows into a thirst for gold and 
 exclusive possession. For the realization of this desire, 
 force and intimidation are resorted to. The evils of 
 such a form of government are manifestly these : riches 
 hold the place of knowledge; the state is divided against 
 itself, the rich on the one side, the poor on the other ; 
 war cannot be carried on because the rich rulers are 
 more afraid of the poor subjects than of the external 
 enemy of the state ; there is no longer a systematic 
 division of pursuits ; there is in the state a large floating 
 element that has no vital interest in it : in short, oli- 
 garchy is a government of the wildest extremes. The 
 oligarchical individual is of the same pattern ; avaricious, 
 selfish, arbitrarily coercing his better impulses and bend- 
 ing all his energies to the hoarding of wealth. Instead 
 of rationalizing and ennobling his passions, he keeps 
 them in slavish subjection to his one desire, and they are 
 ready to turn against him at the earliest opportunity. 
 Democracy and the " democratical man " originate as 
 follows : the rich come to rule arbitrarily and exasperate 
 
I06 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the poor ; war comes, from within or without, and then 
 the rich must fight against or by the side of the poor, and 
 there is a general redistribution of power and privileges. 
 Then follow false freedom, irreconcilable differences of 
 opinion, a throwing off of responsibility to the State, 
 entire abandonment of principle, an altogether " charm- 
 ing form of government, full of variety and diversity, 
 and dispensing equality to equals and unequals alike." 
 As for the democratical individual, he grows out of the 
 oligarchical in the most natural manner possible. He 
 just gets a taste of the honey of dissipation and the un- 
 restrained gratification of desire, and away fly the old, 
 miserly habits, the passions grow fierce and numberless, 
 and "insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence," 
 under the lead of vain conceit, come trooping into his 
 soul in "bright array" called by the sweet names of 
 "breeding," "liberty," "magnificence," "courage"! If 
 he attemps to reform, he assumes one virtue, then 
 another and another, and finally " shakes his head and 
 says they are all alike, and that one is as honorable as 
 another." He is a rare being, full of "liberty, equality, 
 and fraternity," an epitome of all mankind, is emulated 
 by all — men and women alike — but he knows nothing 
 about order and law. " And now comes the most beau- 
 tiful of all, man and state alike, tyranny and the tyrant." 
 Tyranny springs from democracy by excess of liberty. 
 In the anarchy that follows " when all things are ready 
 to burst with liberty," the people " always have some 
 champion whom they nurse into greatness " and make 
 "protector," and he, with the mob at his back, accuses, 
 condemns, and banishes or kills whomsoever he pleases. 
 If he is driven out he gets back again, for he is the " peo- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. IO7 
 
 pie's friend " ; then he is more of a "wolf " than ever. 
 Happy man ! he flatters and is flattered, hates and is 
 hated, suspects and is suspected, plots and is plotted 
 against, and the state over which he tyrannizes is in a 
 most "blessed" condition. The tyrannical individual is 
 like unto him. Giving his appetites full liberty he is 
 obliged to deceive, to coerce, and to perform deeds of 
 violence in order to maintain himself and his rabble. 
 He has in him the essence of the highwayman, the rob- 
 ber of temples, the man-stealer; is just the sort of crea- 
 ture the rabble choose for their leader when anarchy 
 comes. No man is meaner and more unhappy than he ; 
 none more of a slave, more of a coward — except the 
 tyrant in public station. Unquestionably the tyrannical 
 man and the tyrannical state are the worst — the most 
 unjust and the most miserable — of all. — The upshot of 
 Plato's masterly analysis of the false forms of state and 
 the individuals like unto them is this: justice and hap- 
 piness, whether in the individual or the state, are insepa- 
 rable. " Must we hire a herald or shall I proclaim the 
 result — that the best and justest man is also the happi- 
 est, and that this is he who is the most royal master of 
 himself ; and that the worst and most unjust man is also 
 the most miserable and that this is he who is the great- 
 est tyrant of himself and of his state." ^ 
 
 The Eternal Life. — Plato's account of justice does 
 not end with his analysis of the state. With him jus- 
 tice is a matter of the soul as an immortal being, and of 
 the Idea ; and ethics, in the broad sense of the term, is 
 more than politics. The paramount thought with Plato 
 is that of the Eternal Life, the life of the Idea, or God. 
 
 1 Republic, p. So. 
 
I08 GREEK. PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Justice, instead of being merely the proper performance 
 of duties incident to membership in a social order, is 
 the perception, enjoyment, and application of absolute 
 truth and beauty ; the being like God, and the living as 
 a member of an eternal order. The just man is the 
 child of the gods as well as the state. In all this is to 
 be found further proof of the union of justice with hap- 
 piness : for the enjoyment of that which, as the pleasure 
 of the just man must be, is essential and permanent, is 
 itself essential and permanent, and the " gods have a 
 care of any one whose desire is to become just and to 
 be like God, as far as man can attain his likeness by the 
 pursuit of virtue." The true life is therefore a blessed 
 life ; the crown of victory in the immortal race belongs 
 to the just alone.i 
 
 Beauty and Art. — To the foregoing account of the 
 Good we may append a word on Beauty, which is insep- 
 arable from goodness. Beauty is the symmetry per- 
 vading that mixture of "mind" and "pleasure" which 
 constitutes the Good ; and the business of art is to 
 reproduce, or imitate, ideal reality, or the symmetry of the 
 ideal truth and goodness that are reflected in phenom- 
 ena. Plato cares nothing for " art for art's sake " : 
 he cares only for the Idea, — a faithful " imitation," or 
 representation, of that is respectable, but an "imitation" 
 of an "imitation" of it is abominable. The good man 
 "imitates" the Idea, and is beautiful; but the tragic 
 poet who " imitates " bad men, even perfectly, is a mon- 
 ster, "thrice removed from the king and from truth." ^ 
 "We must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to 
 the gods, and praises of famous men are the only poetry 
 
 1 Reftiblic, pp. 612, 613. 2 Ibid., p. 597. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. IO9 
 
 which ought to be admitted into our state." ^ Homer 
 and his followers must therefore be expurgated or else 
 must be driven out. As for rhetoricians and orators, 
 let them learn the nature of the soul and speak accord- 
 ingly. The Idea, whether in men's minds or the out- 
 ward universe, is sufficient unto itself. Rhetoric as 
 practised by the Sophists and professional- rhetoricians 
 is on a level with the art of cooking ; it is a mere 
 "knack," gotten by a kind of accident and having noth- 
 ing in common with a science of the soul or with dialec- 
 tic, which is the true and only science and art of think- 
 ing and speaking. 
 
 The Later Form of Plato's Philosophy. — The fore- 
 going is a sketch of the philosophy of Plato in that form 
 which is most conspicuous in his writings, and has been 
 historically the more celebrated and, perhaps, more influ- 
 ential. There are certain other doctrines of Plato, later, 
 apparently, in origin than those already considered. From 
 Aristotle^ we learn that Plato, who, as we have seen, 
 was not completely satisfied with the doctrine of Ideas 
 in its earlier form, came, under the influence of Pytha- 
 goreanism, to hold that Ideas, instead of being original, 
 were derivative, having for their elements, on the one 
 hand, the One, and on the other, the Great and the 
 Small ; the One being the principle of definiteness in 
 the Ideas, and the Great and Small, which are elements 
 of "duas" or duality, being the principle of diversity 
 and indefiniteness, i.e., the material principle. "Plato," 
 says Aristotle, "conceived that, since the Ideas are 
 causes of all things else, the elements of them are the 
 
 ^ Republic, p. 607. See also Bks. II. and III. 
 2 Metaphysics, Bk. I. ch. 6, and other passages. 
 
no GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 elements of all existences. The Great and the Small, 
 therefore, are causes as matter {i.e., material causes) and 
 the One and Numbers as substance {i.e., formal causes). 
 From the Great and the Small Ideas arise by participa- 
 tion in the One." Plato held with the Pythagoreans 
 that the One is an entity, not a predicate of something 
 else ; also that numbers are the causes of existence to 
 all other things (than Ideas). But though the Pythago- 
 reans identified numbers and phenomenal existences, 
 Plato regarded them as separate, having been deter- 
 mined so to do by his method. In the later theory of 
 Plato, then. Ideas and numbers constitute, as distin- 
 guished from phenomenal existences, a class by them- 
 selves. Aristotle expressly says, however, that Plato 
 held the Ideal numbers to be intermediate between 
 Ideas proper and sensible things. Ideal numbers differ 
 from ordinary numbers in being qualitatively different 
 from one another. This theory of Ideas and Ideal 
 numbers has affinity, it will be observed, with the 
 doctrine of the Timceus, already stated, that the world- 
 soul is mathematical in nature. — In the Laws Plato 
 gives a theory of the "second best" (not an Ideal) 
 state ; " the first and highest form of the state, and 
 of the government, and of the law," being "that in 
 which there prevails most widely the ancient saying 
 that friends have all things in common " ^ (the form 
 described in the Republic). In the Laws, as in the Re- 
 public, it is declared that the state has as end the good 
 of all, not of any person or party merely.^ But the good 
 is conceived not so much as the Ideal good (the rule of 
 the Idea in the lives of men) as the good of man as 
 
 1 Laws, p. 739. ^ Ibid., p. 715. (See Republic, p. 420.) 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. Ill 
 
 such. The rulers of the " second best '' state need not 
 be dialecticians, but only morally and religiously wise 
 and prudent men. Instead of philosophy, they have, as 
 their guide, religion and the science of number.-' The 
 supreme power in the government is a council of twenty 
 persons, ten old and ten young, — priests, " guardians 
 of the law," and " the general superintendent of educa- 
 tion." ^ Community of property, and of women and 
 children, does not obtain in the "second best" state. 
 There are, however, certain regulations as to the maxi- 
 mum and minimum amounts of property that may be 
 held by any person, and as to the disposition of property 
 by purchase, sale, marriage, inheritance, etc. ; regula- 
 tions, also, regarding marriage, the number of families 
 (5040), the disposal of children not heirs. ^ Education 
 is strictly a state affair, and men and women are to be 
 educated alike. The citizens, of whom there are four 
 classes (the class distinction being based on a property 
 distinction), devote themselves to the state and their 
 mental and bodily development ; agriculture, commerce, 
 and the industrial arts generally, being carried on by 
 slaves or resident foreigners. The " second best " 
 state is (as, indeed, the title of the work expounding 
 it should suggest) a state based upon the idea of gov- 
 ernment by law instead of by the decisions of wise men, 
 or philosophers, merely. It has no immediate relation 
 to the Idea, the theory of Ideas playing no part in the 
 Laws. 
 
 Result. — The philosophy of Plato is in its genesis a 
 synthesis of elements drawn from earlier thinkers, a 
 
 1 Laws, pp. 738, 747, 884, 885, 909. 
 ^ JUd., pp. 951, 96J. ^ Ibid., pp. 740-745. 
 
112 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 conservation of most, if not all, of the truth, with much 
 of the error (as from a modern point of view it must be 
 deemed) contained in the earlier systems. In its idea 
 and end it is an attempt to discover a complete and true 
 universal of thought and being : no thinker could have 
 been more anxious to do full justice to all the elements 
 of experience in the effort to comprehend the universe 
 in a single mental grasp. But, as has already been sug- 
 gested, and as Plato himself saw, there is a certain 
 lacuna, or gap, in the system : its first principle, the 
 Idea, does not stand in a perfectly concrete relation 
 with the terms that require to be united. As the 
 Idea is merely Plato's name for perfect intelligence, and 
 will, and power, and is the only possible philosophical 
 first principle, the system of Plato is not at fault in its 
 first principle ; it is at fault, rather, in the want of com- 
 plete development of that. Plato has not fully shown 
 why and how the Idea is the source of being, of knowl- 
 edge, and of goodness. The " ascent to the Idea," 
 which Plato describes as so difficult, is made by Plato 
 with sufficient truth and reality : it is the " downward 
 way" that is imperfectly pointed out and traversed. 
 Plato's thought in this part of his system seems, how- 
 ever, to have undergone a steady development. At first 
 he held that there must be Ideas for all groups of "indi- 
 viduals having a common name," ^ artificial as well as 
 natural ; then, that there are ideas for actual natural 
 classes only (not, as he had formerly held, of relations 
 and negations) ; and, again, that Ideas may perhaps be 
 merely "patterns [or types] fixed in nature." ^ This last 
 thought, it was left for Aristotle to develop. Finally, in 
 
 ^ Republic, p. 596. "^ Parinenides, p. 132. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. II3 
 
 the Laws the theory of Ideas found no place.^ Again, f 
 as to the nearness of Ideas to phenomena, the Ideal num- 
 bers of the later theory above-described were evidently 
 adopted by Plato as a means of rendering the abstract 
 concrete, or of making the " rational real," and the " real 
 rational." The mathematical nature of the world-soul 
 was assumed for the same purpose. Finally, the notion 
 of "participation" was explained as equivalent to "as- 
 similation," or the bearing a likeness, to the Idea. Fur- 
 ther critical comment on Plato at this point is rendered 
 superfluous by the fact that we shall have to consider, 
 later, criticisms passed upon him by Aristotle, his truest 
 interpreter and the noblest continuator of his phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 § 12. 
 
 The Disciples of Plato. — The disciples of Plato were 
 numerous.^ But the difficulties that have just been 
 pointed out in Plato's doctrines, made it impossible that 
 any of them, even Aristotle, should be complete followers 
 of Plato. In fact, it has to be said that just what was 
 most characteristic in Plato's technical doctrines — the 
 theory of Ideas and of the state founded thereon — was 
 not adopted without modification and developed, by any 
 of his disciples. But there was a marked difference in 
 the ways in which the ideas of Plato were taken up 
 
 1 Not given up completely by Plato himself, however; only held in 
 abeyance. 
 
 ^ See the list given by Zeller in Plato and the Older Academy, pp. 
 SS3-5SS. no'e. 
 
114 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and developed by his followers, and on the basis of this 
 we may divide them into two classes, into which fall, on 
 the one hand, Aristotle, who had mastered all of Plato's 
 teaching, and had adopted and developed in natural 
 sequence a larger portion of it than any other of Plato's 
 disciples, and, on the other, certain persons who became 
 leaders in the school of Plato, the Academy, after his 
 death, and who gave adherence only to comparatively 
 limited portions of the Platonic theory, particularly, what 
 has above been given as the Later Theory of Plato. 
 We take up first these incomplete disciples, the mem- 
 bers of the Academy. 
 
 § 13. 
 
 The Old Academy. — To the Academy in various 
 periods of its existence various names have been ap- 
 plied. As it was in the period immediately after Plato's 
 death, it is known as the Old Academy. The names 
 Middle Academy and New Academy apply to it in later 
 periods of its existence. At the present moment we 
 are concerned only with the the Old Academy, and 
 have to speak particularly of Speusippus, Xenocrates, 
 HercLclides of Pontus, Polemo, Crates, Philip of Opus, 
 and Grantor. ' 
 
 Speusippus. — Speusippus, Plato's nephew and succes- 
 sor at the head of the Academy (347-339 b.c), dis- 
 carded the Theory of Ideas, and posited many principles 
 instead of one, reducing the Idea of Plato to three dis- 
 tinct "causes," or "principles," viz., the One, Reason, 
 and the Good. He adopted the Pythagorean theory of 
 numbers, separating, however, numbers from things. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. II5 
 
 He slighted physics ; and in ethics advanced the theory 
 that the highest good, or happiness, is virtue plus certain 
 external goods needed to make life agreeable, in other 
 words, is "life according to nature." 
 
 Xenocrates. — Xenocrates of Chalcedon, the successor 
 of Speusippus at the head of the Academy, and the 
 most distinguished member of the Old Academy, modi- 
 fied the Theory of Ideas, identifying Ideas with mathe- 
 matical entities. Following Plato, he held all things to 
 be derived from Unity and Duality. He distinguished 
 three media of knowledge and three corresponding 
 classes of existence : thought (which affords pure knowl- 
 edge), perception (which gives knowledge, though not 
 pure), and opinion (in which truth and knowledge are 
 mixed in equal proportions) ; intelligible objects (beyond 
 the heavens), sensible objects (within the heavens), and 
 objects intermediate between these (the heavens them- 
 selves). The soul, which like all things else springs 
 from the two primary causes. Unity and Duality, is a 
 self-moved number ; souls differ by virtue of the differ- 
 ence in the manner in which Unity and Duality unite 
 in forming them. The soul is a spiritual essence, may 
 exist apart from the body, and is, in its irrational as well 
 as its rational part, immortal. The world is a system of 
 graduated existences, is permeated by soul, is ruled by 
 gods and daemons, and is eternal. The five elements, 
 ether, fire, air, water, earth, originated from atoms. 
 Goods are goods of the soul, of the body, and of the 
 outer life. Virtue is the highest good. Happiness is 
 virtue, or the proper development of natural faculties, 
 plus the external goods conducing to it. Wisdom and 
 science are related to prudence as the theoretical to the 
 practical. 
 
Il6 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Other Members of the Old Academy. — Heraclides of 
 Pontus, who is said to have been " entrusted with the 
 direction of the Academy during Plato's last journey to 
 Sicily," Polemo, who succeeded Xenocrates as head of 
 the Academy, Crates, successor to Polemo, Philip of 
 Opus, editor of Plato's Lazvs and supposed author of 
 Epinomis, a supplement to the Laws, and Grantor, " the 
 earliest expounder of Platonic writings," deserve men- 
 tion. Heraclides followed Plato in ethics, and the 
 Pythagoreans in cosmology, in general, but assumed as 
 material principles atomic bodies having the power to 
 affect each other not mechanically but by a kind of 
 affinity, and affirmed the soul to be an ethereal essence. 
 Polemo is said to have devoted himself exclusively to 
 ethics, particularly discountenancing dialectical specu- 
 lation. 
 
 §14- 
 
 Aristotle. 
 
 Life of Aristotle. — Aristotle was bom at Stagira, in 
 Thrace, in the year 384 b.c. He was the son of 
 Nicomachus, friend and physician to Amyntas, king 
 of Macedonia. Early left an orphan, he came under 
 the charge of a guardian, named Proxenus, a native 
 of Atarneus, in Asia Minor. In his eighteenth year 
 (367 B.C.), he went to Athens, and for about twenty 
 years was associated with Plato, a considerable portion 
 of the time, no doubt, as pupil, directly and indirectly. 
 Diogenes Laertius says^ that Aristotle "seceded" 
 from Plato, and that there was a tradition that Plato 
 once declared, "Aristotle has kicked us off as chick- 
 
 1 Lives of the Philosophers (Bohn's Class. Lib.), p. iSi 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. tl/ 
 
 ens do their mother after they have been hatched"; 
 but modern critics ^ are unwilling to believe that there 
 was any serious breach between master and pupil. 
 Every reader of Aristotle knows, however, that Plato 
 receives a full share of the criticism that it. was Aris- 
 totle's habit to mete out to all his predecessors in phi- 
 losophy. Aristotle's ability, intellectual independence, 
 and disposition to criticise, were doubtless early felt by 
 his teacher. Not long after the death of Plato, and 
 perhaps because of that, Aristotle left Athens. He 
 resided at Atarneus, the native place of his guardian, 
 Proxenus, and of Hermeias, a fellow-pupil and governor 
 of Atarneus and Assos. Here he married Pythias, a 
 near relative or friend of Hermeias, and remained until, 
 three years afterwards, Hermeias was betrayed to the 
 Persian king to be put to death ; thence he went to 
 Mytelene, and from that place, two or three years later 
 (342 or 341 B.C.), to the court of Philip of Macedon to 
 become the tutor of his son Alexander, afterwards sur- 
 named "The Great." What the effect of this relation- 
 ship between Aristotle and his pupil was upon the 
 mind and future career of Alexander we cannot exactly 
 say. By it Aristotle gained a royal friend and patron, 
 who rendered him large pecuniary aid towards the prose- 
 cution of scientific and philosophical research. At this 
 time he obtained King Philip's consent to the. rebuild- 
 ing of his native city, Stagira, which had a few years 
 previously been destroyed in war, and he himself di- 
 rected the rebuilding. In 335 B.C., he returned to 
 Athens and there established a philosophical school 
 (a rival to the Academy) in a gymnasium " attached to 
 
 1 See Ueberweg, Zeller, and Grant. 
 
Il8 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the temple of Apollo Lyceius," whence the school was 
 called the Lyceum. To this school, which became 
 flourishing, and to the composition of scientific and 
 speculative treatises, the next twelve years of Aristo- 
 tle's life were exclusively devoted. From the fact that 
 instruction was given while the teacher, or teacher and 
 pupils, were walking, or was given in a place called " The 
 Walk " (d •n-epl-Traro^), the school received the name 
 of the Peripatetic School. As between Plato and his 
 pupils, so between Aristotle and his, the friendliest per- 
 sonal relations were cultivated. In 323 B.C., because of 
 his friendship with Alexander and other members of the 
 Macedonian Court, and his supposed sympathy with the 
 Macedonian power, and because of popular, democratic 
 animosity towards philosophers, and of religious bigotry 
 among the Athenians (for he was formally accused of 
 impiety by the chief priest), Aristotle felt compelled to 
 leave Athens. He died the next year, on the island of 
 Euboea, at the age of sixty-three. From the events of 
 his life, from his will, a copy of which may be found in 
 the " Life " of him by Diogenes Laertius, and from his 
 ethical and political writings, it may be inferred that he 
 was a man of probity and good feeling, and deserved 
 and won the respect and kindly regard of his fellows. 
 
 Getieral Character of Aristotle's System, and his Chief 
 Philosophical Works. — To understand the general char- 
 acter of Aristotle's philosophy, not only, but even the 
 outward character of his chief philosophical works, it is 
 necessary to bear in mind the status of philosophical 
 thinking when he began to frame his system. The per- 
 sonal element which Socrates by his character and 
 method had made prominent in philosophy, had been. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. II9 
 
 in large measure, preserved by Plato. Definite and 
 penetrating as was Plato's conception of philosopliy, 
 there is, manifestly, in his writings a large mixture, as 
 regards both matter and method, of purely philosophi- 
 cal elements with elemejits not purely philosophical but 
 personal ; though in a larger sense of the term than is 
 applicable to the Socratic philosophizing, for the per- 
 sonal element of the Platonic Dialogues is not merely 
 individual and realistic (as is that in Xenophon's Memo- 
 rabilia, for example), but largely dramatic and poetic. 
 From one point of view, though perhaps not the high- 
 est and truest, there is an essential duality in the Pla- 
 tonic philosophy, in that it is a compound of philosophi- 
 cal and in a sort non-philosophical elements. Now it 
 happened that (as must be perfectly evident to any one 
 upon even a superficial acquaintance with any of Aris- 
 totle's extant writings) Aristotle was, by mental tem- 
 perament, just of a nature to observe and feel this 
 duality, and to take up and prosecute the inquiry, What 
 is and what is not pure philosophy, as regards both mat- 
 ter and method ? His earliest works, written probaMy 
 when he was under the immediate influence of Plato, 
 were, it is known, dialogues, and were praised by Cicero 
 in such terms that we may properly infer that they were 
 in part imitations — and not unworthy ones — of Plato 
 himself. But his late works, those from which we have 
 to draw our knowledge of his philosophy, are evidently 
 based on a full consciousness of what is, technically 
 speaking, philosophy and what is not, and of the grand- 
 divisions of philosophy itself. There had been prac- 
 tised from the time of the Sophists a certain art, or 
 method, of handling ideas as such. This art, which he 
 
I20 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 found in considerable degree of perfection, Aristotle 
 investigated thoroughly, — and was the first who did so, 
 — discovering that there was one branch of it that, if 
 developed, was adequate to real, or scientificj truth, and 
 another that was adequate to probable truth only. This 
 art, or method, and particularly the first-named branch 
 of it, he thought to be an essential feature in philosophi- 
 cal thought (though not a branch of philosophy proper) 
 as distinguished from that which is not philosophical. 
 He expounded it in certain works, which, taken col- 
 lectively, are now known as his Organon, the name 
 originating not with Aristotle himself but with certain 
 of his followers. The name was adopted because of a 
 remark dropped by Aristotle that the thing treated of 
 in the works was a means to, or instrument {pp'^avov) of, 
 philosophy rather than a part of philosophy itself. The 
 works are, therefore, in large measure merely introduc- 
 tory to the strictly philosophical works, though an ac- 
 count of his philosophy has to borrow much from them. 
 One of the six works constituting the Organon is on 
 categories of thought, its title, The Categories ; one on 
 terms and propositions, viz.. On Interpretation; two 
 on scientific proof, or demonstration, The Prior Analyt- 
 ics snd The Posterior Analytics; and two on probable 
 proof. The Topics and The Sophistical Refutations. But 
 now, philosophy, as a system, has certain parts or 
 branches, distinguished by the having of different ends, 
 or objects. According to Aristotle, one branch has for 
 its end pure truth as such, another truth in conduct, 
 and a third truth in art.^ The first of these is termed 
 Theoretical, or Speculative, Philosophy, the second, Prac- 
 
 1 Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bk. V. ch. I ; Bk. I. ch. i, De Caelo ; Bk. III. 
 ch. 7. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 121 
 
 tical Philosophy, the third, Poetical, or if, for distinction's 
 sake, we transfer the Greek term {-rroLrfTLKri) without 
 alteration, Poietical Philosophy. Speculative Philosophy 
 has three branches : First Philosophy (tt/swtt; ^Ckoao^ioi) 
 or Theology, Mathematics, and Physics. The parts of 
 Practical Philosophy are Ethics, CEconomics (there is no 
 complete genuine Aristotelian treatise extant on this 
 subject ^ ), and Politics? First philosophy, or theology, is 
 treated particularly in the so-called Metaphysics (= yitera 
 TO (^uo-t/ea = " after or beyond the physics," a name 
 given by editors of Aristotle's writings to certain books, 
 either because they followed The Physics in the manu- 
 script or were regarded as treating subjects logically 
 subsequent to "physical subjects"). Physical subjects 
 (j.e., subjects relating to nature) are treated in several 
 works, the chief of which are The Physics, On the 
 Heavens, On the History of Animals, De Attima, or Psy- 
 chology. No extant work of Aristotle is devoted to 
 mathematical topics. The chief works in Practical Phi- 
 losophy are The Nicomachean Ethics^ and The Politics. 
 The Poetic is the only work exclusively devoted to 
 Poietical Philosophy; certain chapters (Bk. V. [VIII.]) 
 in the Politics, however, treat important topics in this 
 branch of philosophy. Aristotle's Rhetoric stands alone 
 as a kind of appendix to the logical and ethical works. — 
 As to the time and order of the production of the works 
 above-mentioned, it has been conjectured that they were 
 written during Aristotle's last residence in Athens, 
 
 1 See Ueberweg, V. 1. I. p. 148. 
 
 2 Metaphysics, Bk. V. ch. I; Bk. X. ch. 7; Nic. Ethics, Bk. VI. ch. 8. 
 ' The Eudemian Ethics and The Great Ethics (Magna Moralia) are 
 
 " Aristotelian," but not Aristotle's own. Certain books (V.-VII.) of the 
 Nicomachean Ethics, however, are probably Eudemian in authorship. 
 
122 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 while he was at the head of the Lyceum, and probably 
 in nearly the following order :^ ist, The Organon ; 2d, 
 The Nicomachean Ethics and The Politics ; 3d, The 
 Poetic and The Rhetoric; 4th, The Physics, On the 
 Heavens, On the History of Animals, The De Anima, 
 or Psychology ; 5th, The Metaphysics. It seems certain 
 that they were all produced after the general idea 
 of his system had matured in Aristotle's mind. In this 
 regard, as in others, Aristotle's method, we may note 
 in passing, was quite different from Plato's. In fact, 
 growth is not particularly characteristic of the philoso- 
 phy of Aristotle as exhibited in his works. 
 
 Aristotle s Theory of Knowledge. — We begin the 
 exposition of Aristotle's philosophy with an account 
 of what Aristotle himself regarded as introductory to 
 philosophy proper, viz., his theory of knowledge, of its 
 sources and method. 
 
 Kinds of Knowledge. — There are in knowledge three 
 fundamental differences that Aristotle takes cognizance 
 of in his theory of knowledge : differences as regards 
 the object, method, and source of knowledge. Knowl- 
 edge may have for its object causes (or first principles) 
 or phenomena. Its method may be apodictic (demon- 
 strative) or dialectic ("probable"). Its source maybe 
 sense or reason. 
 
 Scientific, or Philosophical Knowledge. — Scientific, or 
 philosophical, knowledge {iiria-TijinT)) is knowledge, the 
 subject of which is causes (ap'^at), the method, demon- 
 stration (aTToSet^t?), and the source, reason (vovs;). In 
 the knowledge of causes is involved the knowledge of 
 whatever else can be shown demonstratively to flow 
 
 ' Compare the statements of Ueberweg, Zeller, Grant, and Wallace. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 123 
 
 from them ; and a theory of scientific knowledge is an 
 account of the source from, or faculty by, which we get 
 the knowledge of causes, and of the method of demon- 
 stration. Now it was natural, both from the previous 
 history of speculation and the character of the problem 
 itself, that Aristotle should consider the latter part of 
 the problem of scientific knowledge first, which he does, 
 particularly in the Prior Analytics. 
 
 Demonstration. — Considered as regards method, 
 knowledge is scientific, or demonstrative, when it is 
 derived from certain, or necessary, premises by a certain, 
 or necessary, process of reasoning. 
 
 The Syllogism (Deductive). — Now the process in 
 which, certain things being assumed as true, a certain 
 other thing obtains, necessarily and because of the 
 things assumed, is called by Aristotle the Syllogism} 
 The syllogism is, therefore, the central point in the 
 method of demonstration expounded by Aristotle ; it 
 was regarded, and rightly so, as his own discovery.^ 
 The syllogism (avXXoyia/xo^) consists of three proposi- 
 tions : two premises {irpoTcia-eK) and a conclusion 
 (a-vfiirepaafia) ; and has three terms (opoi), the major 
 or larger term (jjuel^ov uKpov), the minor or smaller term 
 (eXuTTov CLKpov), and the middle (jxeaov), which may be 
 larger in compass than either of the others or between 
 them. The middle term is so called because it is the 
 mean, or uniting term, in the syllogism.^ — The members 
 
 1 Prior Analytics, I. i. The reader cannot do better here than to fol- 
 low the account of Aristotle's logic given in Wallace's Outlines of the Philos- 
 ophy of Aristotle. ^ Soph. Elench,ch. ■^^. 
 
 ' Prior Analytics, Bk. I. chs. 25, I, 4, 5, 32, 26, 6 (see Wallace's Out- 
 lines, pp. 37-39)- 
 
124 GREEK. PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the syllogism are propositions. Propositions may be 
 either affirmative or negative, universal, particular, or 
 indefinite. There are four sorts of propositions that 
 may enter into the syllogism : the universal affirmative, 
 the universal negative, the particular affirmative, the 
 particular negative. As regards the relations of these, 
 — the universal affirmative and particular negative are 
 opposed as contradictories {avrKfjanicci^ avriKeia-dai) ; 
 so are the universal negative and particular affirmative. 
 The universal affirmative and the universal negative are 
 contrarily opposed {ivavriwi avriKelcrOai). Of contra- 
 dictory opposites, if one be true, the other is false : con- 
 traries may both be false. -^ — Now the ru/es of the syllo- 
 gism given by Aristotle are, that in every syllogism 
 there must be one affirmative premise, there must be 
 one universal premise, and terms must not be treated 
 as universal in the conclusion which are not so in the 
 premises.^ — Syllogisms differ in kind and scientific 
 value according to the relative compass and the posi- 
 tion of the middle term. A syllogism in which the 
 minor term is " in the whole middle " (i.e., is the sub- 
 ject of a proposition of which the middle is predicate) 
 and the middle term is "in the whole major" {j..e., is the 
 subject of a proposition in which the major is predicates- 
 is termed a syllogism of the "first figure" (ttp&tov 
 a-^Vfio)- In 3- syllogism of this figure the middle term 
 lies "between" the extremes. A syllogism in which 
 both major and minor terms are " in [less than] the 
 whole middle" (i.e., are subjects of propositions in each 
 of which the middle term is a predicate), is a syllogism of 
 
 1 Onlnterp.6; Cat. lo; /V. ^«a^/. I. ch. 2, etc. (Wallace, pp. 29-31) . 
 
 2 Prior Analytics, Bk. I. ch. 24 (Wallace, p. 40). 
 
 3 Pr. Analyt. Bkr. I. ch. 24 (Wallace, p. 40). , 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 12$ 
 
 the second figure (Bevrepov a-xfifia). A syllogism in 
 which the major and minor terms are each greater than 
 the middle {i.e., are predicates of propositions in each 
 of which the middle term is subject) is a syllogism of 
 the third figure (rpiTov a)(fifia).^ (The "fourth figure" 
 of modern text-books was not recognized by Aristotle ; 
 it did not spring out of his conception of the syllogism.) 
 Now the first figure is the only one that gives universal 
 conclusions ; the second figure giving only negative 
 conclusions, and the third only "particular" conclu- 
 sions. It is also the only figure that yields naturally 
 and directly in the conclusion all that is contained in 
 the premises and no more. We can sometimes derive 
 a universal conclusion from the premises of a syllogism 
 of the second and third figures, but this can be done 
 only indirectly; hence these figures are "imperfect," 
 the first alone being " perfect. "^ — The hypothetical 
 syllogism (^crvWoyiafio'; i^ vwoOeaeaxi) is a syllogism in 
 which, there being a certain condition, a certain propo- 
 sition obtains. The latter, however, may obtain when 
 the former does not ; but if the latter does not obtain, 
 the former does not.^ 
 
 Definition and the Fredicables. — Now the conclusion 
 of a syllogism the premises of which are true, states, if 
 the conclusion be a universal affirmative and is correctly 
 drawn, a scientific truth, and is virtually the expression 
 of the essence {ova-La), or nature, of some real existence ; 
 hence is a definition. The knowledge of the essence 
 of a thing embraces a knowledge of the common and 
 
 1 Prior Analytics, Bk. I. chs. 5, 24, 26, 32, 56 (Wallace, pp. 37-39). 
 
 2 Md., Bk. I. chs. I, 5, 7, 23, 24, etc. (Wallace, pp. 39-41). 
 
 3 Ibid., Bk. II. 4 (Wallace, pp. 41-42). 
 
126 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 characteristic attributes of the class, or genus, to which 
 it belongs and of the specific attribute that renders the 
 thing an individual representative of the class. In other 
 words, the definition {opo<;) contains the expression of 
 the union of the genus (ye'vo?) and the differentia 
 {Btd<f)opa) of the thing defined. Other attributes (not 
 necessary to definition, however) are the property 
 (tStoi/), which, though essential, is not a mark of dis- 
 tinction, and the accident (<rvfi/3e/3ijK6<;), which may or 
 may not belong to the subject defined. 
 
 Tke Categories} — Essence, or substance (pvaLd), is 
 one of the ten aspects, according to Aristotle, under 
 which things in general must be viewed. Substance is 
 whatever is the subject of attributes, e.g., man, Socrates ; 
 and it is either an individual, a species, or a genus. 
 Substance in the primary sense is the individual, spe- 
 cies and genus being only secondary substance.^ The 
 remaining nine aspects are quantity {^o(To<i = how 
 many .'), quality (ttoio? = of what kind .'), relation (Trpo? 
 tl), place (ttov), time {iroTe), position (/ceiaOai), condition 
 (exetv), action {-Troielv), passivity (Trda-xetv). Of these 
 ten — termed categories — substance is principal ; all 
 others imply it. These are everywhere employed by 
 Aristotle. (The idea of a table of categories may have 
 been suggested to him by the Pythagorean table (see 
 p. 7).) These categories were not "deduced" in any 
 manner from a higher conception by Aristotle, but were 
 
 1 Categories, 4, 7, 8; Topics, Bk. I. 9; Metaphysics, Bk. VI. I, 7 
 (Wallace, pp. 25-27). 
 
 ^ Aristotle's doctrine of substance, as we shall see in what follows, 
 appears inconsistent or at least undeveloped (see Metaphysics, Bk. VII. 
 ch. 7). The above view is the earliest, and the one that seems to har- 
 monize best with the theory of categories, in which it occurs. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 127 
 
 taken empirically, as suggested, perhaps, by the funda- 
 mental forms, or "parts," of speech in the Greek lan- 
 guage. ^ 
 
 Syllogism (Inductive). — Now causes (in the knowl- 
 edge of which or of what can be syllogistically shown 
 to flow from them scientific knowledge consists), though 
 visible to the eye of reason, are not known to us im- 
 mediately. Knowable things are of two kinds : those 
 which are prior for us (7r/)09 vfia'i irpoTepov) and those 
 which are prior by nature {<j)va-ei nrpoTepov). Of the 
 latter-named kind are causes, or first principles.^ Our 
 knowledge of causes, or what is prior by nature, has its 
 beginning in our knowledge of things as they are for us. 
 The (syllogistic) process by which we reach those firm 
 universal propositions which state the essence, or are 
 the definitions, of causes is induction {iira^as'yrj), which 
 is the "passing from particulars to universals," and is 
 the inverse of deduction, which is the passing from 
 universals to particulars.^ Induction, like deduction, is 
 syllogistic : for in induction we unite by inference the 
 middle term to one of the extremes (major and minor 
 terms) by means of the other. Thus, if B is a "middle" 
 to A and C, we can prove by means of C that A may 
 be predicated of B. For example, let the deductive 
 syllogism be, "B is A, C is B, therefore C is A" ; then 
 the inductive syllogism is, " C is A, C is B, therefore B 
 is A." The conclusion of the inductive syllogism cor- 
 responds to the major premise of the deductive. .The 
 inductive syllogism is a syllogism of the third figure, 
 and strictly speaking, its conclusion is not universal 
 
 1 Posterior Analytics, Bk. I. ch. 2. 
 
 2 Topics, Bk. I. 12, l8; Prior Analytics, Bk. II. 23 (Wallace, pp. 
 42-44). 
 
128 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 but particular. We may, however, assume it to be uni- 
 versal if we know that C and B are inter-convertible 
 and that "B is C " holds. (The syllogism is then prac- 
 tically a syllogism of the first figure.) A real induc- 
 tion presupposes a knowledge of all the individuals of a 
 class. "No particular kinds of Induction are formu- 
 lated by Aristotle, but he has noticed incidentally the 
 principle of most of the 'Experimental Methods,' and 
 in particular that of the method of concomitant varia- 
 tions." ^ The premises of the inductive syllogism are 
 not truths of reason, corresponding to first principles, 
 but perceptions of sense. But sense as such gives 
 knowledge only of the particular, and we can by induc- 
 tion reach universals only on the hypothesis that there 
 is a common and permanent nature in the many. The 
 idea of a common permanent nature originates in a 
 higher faculty than sense. Animals have the faculty 
 of sense-perception, but not all animals have the power 
 of "retaining one certain thing in the soul" and of 
 forming universal notions. Permanency and univer- 
 sality presuppose reason. Aristotle, however, allows 
 himself to say that sense-perception introduces, or " in- 
 forms " (e/iTTOiet), the universal. 2 (He compares the 
 manner in which the universal unconsciously grows 
 out of the particular of sense to the way in which sol- 
 diers in battle are caused to fly by the perception of one, 
 and then another, and so on, fleeing.) In so far, however, 
 as there results from the inductive syllogism something 
 that is not given in sense-perception as such (and it is 
 by induction only that we reach the first universals that 
 
 1 Wallace, p. 43 ; see Prior Analytics, Bk. II. ch. 23. 
 ^ See below, pp. 144-146. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 29 
 
 are the foundation of science), induction does not prove 
 {aTToSeiKvua- ip) anything (it is noi a7r6Sei^i<;) though it 
 does sAow {S7)Xoc) something. 
 
 Probable Proof ; Dialectical and Rhetorical Method. — 
 The foregoing is, in outline, Aristotle's account of sci- 
 entific method as employed particularly in speculative, 
 or theoretical, philosophy. He recognizes and gives a 
 full analysis of another sort of method, which is only 
 ^fz^aj/- scientific and finds place especially in Practical 
 Philosophy, — ethics, politics, etc. Here "dialectical," 
 or probable, reasoning is employed. In practical affairs 
 it generally suffices if we have premises that possess 
 only a high degree of probability, and if our conclusions 
 have, not absolute validity, but a fair warrant in the 
 premises. In such matters it is not always easy or 
 even possible to arrive at absolutely correct definitions, 
 and it is not always necessary that all steps in our pro- 
 cesses of reasoning should be stated, that" everything 
 should be proved, even plausibly ; indeed, it is better 
 that many things be taken for granted, that many things 
 be left to the natural bent of mankind towards truth 
 and justice. This is the case particularly in rhetorical 
 argumentation ; in dialectical reasoning logical method 
 prevails though the premises may be only plausible.^ 
 In rhetorical reasonings the enthymeme, a quasi-s^Vi^o- 
 gism, having but one premise, and example, by which 
 we argue from a particular to a particular (through an 
 
 1 It is a part of Aristotle's catholicity of temper that he shows some 
 fondness for this ^«a«'-scientific method. Absolute truth, he repeatedly 
 says, is not in all cases within the reach of human powers, and it is often- 
 times necessary and best to be content with less than that. If we deny 
 that this is in any sense a philosophical view, we must throw away his 
 works on Ethics and Rhetoric. See below, pp. 148 and 181. 
 
130 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 assumed universal), may be employed instead of the 
 complete syllogism and induction. 
 
 "First Philosophy," or Metaphysics. — We come now 
 to Aristotle's theory of Being (to ov) which at the very 
 outset we shall find to be in close agreement with his 
 theory of knowledge. Being is fixed or changeable. 
 That there is fixed being appears from a consideration 
 of the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras. If all 
 things are in a continual flux, we have to say that a 
 thing is and is not the same at the same moment and in 
 the same regard. If we say that contradictory proposi- 
 tions are equally true, we practically affirm that all 
 propositions and terms mean the same thing, and may 
 affirm, for example, that a man is a wall. And if being 
 is not in any regard fixed and definite, what becomes of 
 affirmation, and demonstration, and rational action P^ 
 Being is, then, in one aspect fixed, and in this aspect it 
 is being per se {jo ov 17 ov), being in the highest sense ; 
 it is being that answers to scientific knowledge, and is 
 known by us last in order of time, though (and because) 
 first in the order of nature. Now the science of being 
 per se, being as being i^ro ov ■§ ov) Aristotle deems to be 
 the highest part of philosophy and terms it " First Phi- 
 losophy " {irpdiTi) ^iXocro^la). It is what we, following 
 the example of the early editors of Aristotle's works, 
 term metaphysics. "First Philosophy," then, does not 
 treat, as does mathematics, for example, of some phase 
 or department of being, but of being taken universally, 
 or as such. And just as. the "science of health" treats 
 of the preservation, the production, the symptoms or 
 signs of it, and the capacity for it, so the science of 
 
 > Metaphysics, Bks. Ill and IV. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I3I 
 
 being treats of whatever has reference to it, whatever is 
 primarily or derivatively being. 
 
 Being; Plato's "Ideas." — But what is being, i.e., 
 under which of the categories must we conceive it .' 
 Evidently under that which is highest and first, which 
 denotes not anything that can be predicated, but is itself 
 the subject of all predicates. Being, in other words, is 
 substance, oixjia ; and in the highest sense it is indi- 
 vidual in nature, since primary substance is the individ- 
 ual.^ Being, or substance, therefore, is not identical 
 with those " universals " which Plato held to be being. 
 Plato's theory of Ideas is untenable ; because, if the 
 Ideas are transcendent and perfectly independent of the 
 world of individual phenomenal existences, they are not 
 in any explicable manner causes of the existence, or of 
 the character of things, or of our knowledge of them. 
 If substance is primarily individual, the substances of 
 things must be in and with things themselves, and it is 
 only on the hypothesis that they are, that we can con- 
 ceive them as having anything to do with the existence 
 or changes in things or can attain a knowledge of them 
 by the process of induction. Universal notions are 
 indeed necessary for demonstration's sake, but demon- 
 stration does not necessarily presuppose the existence 
 of the Platonic universals, because it is necessary, and 
 suiKicient, for scientific knowledge, if there be a One 
 in or among the many instead of being separate from 
 and in addition to the many. The supposed participa- 
 tion of things in Ideas is therefore a mere fancy, to be 
 allowed only in metaphorical speech ; and the Ideas, if 
 
 ' For a different view, see Metaphysics, Bk. VII. ch. 7. 
 
132 G|IEEK PHILOSOPHV. 
 
 there were such things, would be only idle copies of the 
 things of the sensible world or mere barren entities, of 
 which nothing could be known or said.^ 
 
 Matter and Form ; Potentiality and Actuality. — 
 Every finite substance is the result of the becoming 
 actual of that which already was in possibility. As it 
 actually is for us, it is a definite cognizable being ; as 
 only possible, it was, relatively at least, indefinite, in- 
 cognizable. That by virtue of which it is definite and 
 cognizable — relatively or absolutely — is termed its 
 form. As it existed in possibility, it was but matter. 
 As its actual being is but the realization of its being 
 in possibility, every substance contains, or is the union, 
 in some manner, of matter and form. The stone out 
 of which the statue is made is in possibility a statue 
 — is "matter" for a statue. When form {j-.e., a particu- 
 lar character) is given to it there results the actuality, 
 i.e., the statue, which is the union of a certain matter 
 and a certain form, and is an individual substance. 
 Matter (uX?;) and form {}iop^r\), it must be observed, are, 
 like possibility, or potentiality (Suva/it?), and actuality 
 {ivefyyeid), generally speaking, correlative terms, because 
 it is the same thing which in one aspect is form and 
 in another matter. Not every possibility becomes actu- 
 ality, and there is one form which is pure form (God). 
 In the union of matter and form there are, in different 
 substances, different degrees of preponderance of form 
 over matter. Those substances that have stability, 
 universality, or, at least, generality, as a characteristic, 
 owe this to the largeness of the element of form in 
 
 1 Metaphysics, Bk. I. ch. 9; Bk. VI. chs. 14, 15, 16. Posterior Analyt- 
 ics, Bk. I. chs. II, 8, etc. (See Wallace's Outlines, and Ueberweg.) 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 33 
 
 them, contingency in things being due to the influence 
 of matter.^ A thing is in a state of imperfection as 
 long as it is in the process of becoming ; it attains per- 
 fection, or is an entelechy {ivTeki)(eia), only as actuality.^ 
 In this respect, then, actuality is " prior " to potential- 
 ity. But it is also "prior" in another respect: we 
 know the potentiality only (as we reason by the prin- 
 ciple of analogy) from the actuality. The actual is 
 partly prior in time to the potential, partly not. The 
 child is prior to the man, and yet the existence of the 
 child presupposes the existence of a man prior to that 
 of the child. The actual is prior to the potential be- 
 cause the actual is that which is what it is, whereas the 
 potential may or may not be, is therefore not self-iden- 
 tical, but self-contradictory.^ 
 
 Causes, or First Principles (cLp-xaC). — If, now, we in- 
 quire why matter assumes form, why the possible be- 
 comes actual, the 'answer is, that " there must be an 
 efficient cause imparting motion from potentiality into 
 actuality." Every substance, therefore, involves in its 
 existence and nature, matter, form, and efficient power.* 
 These three are consequently principles, or causes. To 
 them must be added a fourth, the end (reXo?), or final 
 cause ; for every thing that becomes, not only is " pro- 
 duced from something, by something, and is some- 
 thing," but has an end. These four causes — to take 
 an illustrative example — would be, in the case of a 
 house, as follows : The end, reXo?, or final cause, oh 
 eveKa, is comfort and protection ; the matter, vktj, or 
 material cause, is earth and stones ; the form, or formal 
 
 1 Metaphysics, Bk. V. ch. 2. ' Metaphysics, Bk. VIII. ch. 8. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. VIII. ch. 6. * Ibid:, Bk. VI. ch. 7; Bk. I. ch. 3. 
 
134 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cause, TO tl tjv elvai, is the mental pattern or idea in 
 the builder's mind according to which it is made ; the 
 efficient cause, odev r] apxh t^? fiera^oXi]^, is the builder 
 and his art.^ But the four causes are not always so 
 widely distinct as here. The child is the end of a cer- 
 tain process of which the material, formal, and efficient 
 causes are in the parent.^ Again, the end and the pro- 
 cess may be the same ; the end of sight is the act of 
 seeing, of speculation, speculation.^ In these two cases 
 there is also a certain degree of identity between the 
 formal and the final cause, on the one hand, and the 
 efficient cause, on the other ; i.e., seeing and speculation 
 are " inherent " in him who sees and him who specu- 
 lates. Speaking generally, since the final cause of a 
 thing is only its form, or ideal nature, p/us existence, the 
 formal cause and the final cause may, without logical 
 inconsistency, often or, perhaps, generally, be regarded 
 as one, viz., the formal cause, to ti rjv elvai. Again, in 
 beings that have souls the efficient cause is in a man- 
 ner identical with the formal and final cause. Thus 
 the name /brmal cause often implies more than its defi- 
 nition really contains. Further, form being necessary 
 to the actuality of a thing, it is natural to think and 
 speak of things as "forms," although they involve mat- 
 ter. It is owing to this importance of form that Aris- 
 totle comes to speak of form or essence, instead of the 
 individual, as substance.* The forms of absolute, or 
 infinite, substances necessarily imply the existence of 
 the actuality of those substances. 
 
 1 Metaphysics, Bk. II. ch. 2. ' Metaphysics, Bk. VIII. ch. 6. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. VII. ch. 4. * IHd., Bk. VII. ch. 7. See above, p. 126. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 35 
 
 Kinds of Real Substance : Immovable Substance, 
 God. — Logically regarded, substance is, we have seen, 
 of two (three) kinds : substance as individual, as spe- 
 cies, and as genus, the first-named being primary, the 
 others secondary, substance. Ontologically speaking, 
 substance is of two (three) kinds : sensible substances, 
 of which one part is mere body and subject to decay, 
 and the other is soul and eternal ; and super-sensible, 
 " immovable substance." ^ Of the existence of sensible 
 substance we need no proof ; the existence of the im- 
 movable substance is proved partly, as we have seen,^ 
 from the very idea of demonstration, and partly, from 
 the known nature of sensible substances. These sub- 
 stances change and pass out of being ceaselessly and 
 forever. The causes of sensible beings as sensible, are 
 other sensible beings, and the causes of these are also 
 other sensible beings and so on in infinitum. No such 
 being, or substance, has in itself the principle of change, 
 or motion : they move or change, produce motion, or 
 change, only as moved or changed by some other being. 
 We must, then, look for an original source, or cause, of 
 motion, or change, which must lie in that which pro- 
 duces change, or motion, without itself being subject to 
 these. This, then, must be the immovable substance. 
 It exists purely as energy and as actuality, and hence is 
 separate from the world of change, or motion.^ If it is 
 asked how the immovable substance causes change, or 
 motion, the reply must be that it does so as a thing that 
 is known and desired, i.e., as a thing that is loved, does. 
 It is the source of order in the world, as the general is 
 
 1 Metaphysics, Bk. XI. ch. i. ^ See p. 130. 
 
 8 Metaphysics, Bk. XI. chs. 6, 8. 
 
136 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of order in the army. From it is " suspended the whole 
 Heavens." The Ufe of the Prime Mover is excellent 
 and blessed. That perception and that enjoyment are 
 the most excellent which are of that which is most 
 excellent. It is characteristic of the human mind to 
 find its highest satisfaction in the contemplation of it- 
 self, the most excellent of the things it has power im- 
 mediately to know : much more so is it of the Divine 
 Mind, and the life of the Divine Being is therefore, a 
 life of blessed self-contemplation. God is just the "en- 
 ergy," i.e., the activity and complete realization, of the 
 ideal essence of mind, — he is the Thought of Thought. 
 His life is eternally what our life is only for short 
 periods of time. God is the highest substance, the 
 individual that is (in form and efficiency at least) also 
 universal : the absolute and eternal, alone of all things 
 sufficient unto himself. 'He is the absolute Good, the 
 supreme ideal end of all things else. 
 
 Physics, or the Philosophy of Nature. — We have just 
 seen that substance is immovable and movable, and that 
 the science of immovable substance, or of substance as 
 immovable, is First Philosophy or Metaphysics. The 
 science of ^aimovable substance, or of substance as mov- 
 able, is Physics, or the Philosophy of Nature. Movable 
 substance is of two kinds : that which has, in a manner, 
 the principle of motion in itself, and that which has not. 
 But the principle of motion in this is the soul ; hence 
 Physics discusses, and is primarily the philosophy of, 
 the soul.i 
 
 Essential Character of Nature. — Nature, as having the 
 principle of motion within itself, is possessed of a soul, 
 
 1 Metaphysics, Bk. V. ch. i ; Bk. X. ch. 3, etc. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I37 
 
 is a living being, and its works are in all respects like 
 those of an artist, except that the latter have their effi- 
 cient cause outside themselves, whereas the efficient 
 cause of the works of nature is immanent. Nature is 
 governed by the principle of the end and does nothing 
 in vain.i The end is an immanent end : the end of the 
 plant or the animal is to be just the plant or the animal. 
 Nature is both matter and form, but the form prevails 
 to such an extent that nature works generally, if not 
 always, in the same way and towards cognizable ends. 
 There is, indeed, a certain mechanical necessity in 
 nature : but it is secondary, not primary, a condition 
 merely, not a cause, — just as "heavy" and "light" are 
 conditions but not causes with reference to the house 
 made by the builder.^ There is, also, a certain element 
 of contingency in nature : there are in the animal king- 
 dom monstrosities, which are examples of nature's 
 failure to attain to form, or reason. Such failures are 
 inherent in matter, which is the contingent cause of 
 what is accidental.^ But in spite of necessity and 
 chance, or contingency, nature is governed by form, or 
 inherent end. 
 
 Method of the Philosophy of Nature. — As governed 
 by the end, or reason, nature is an object of science ; 
 and yet owing to the contingency inherent in matter, the 
 science of nature, or Physics, is not so purely a demon- 
 strative science as is that of being. Careful and com- 
 prehensive observation and induction are requisite as a 
 basis from which to rise to principles ; truth is not to be 
 attained by those who, preoccupied with theories, neglect 
 
 1 De Anima, Bk. III. ch. 12. ^ Physics, Ek. II. 9. 
 
 ^ Metaphysics, Bk. V. ch. 7. 
 
138 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 facts.^ But observations and deductions from facts are 
 to be governed by the idea of the end : the highest of 
 the " causes " of knowledge as of being is in Physics, as 
 in Metaphysics, the final cause. 
 
 Motion, Space, and Time. — Motion {Klvri<n<;) is the 
 entelechy or natural state of the potential as potential. 
 In other words the world of matter is inherently a world 
 of movement — matter has reality (form) for us only as 
 in motion. Motion is distinguished by Aristotle from 
 change (/iera/SoXTj), which embraces origin and decay, in- 
 crease and diminution, alteration (in kind or quality), and 
 change in place. Motion is merely a kind of change, 
 and includes only the six last-mentioned kinds of 
 change, all (six) of which are or involve change in place. 
 The six kinds of motion referred to may be grouped into 
 three : changes in quality (alteration), in quantity (in- 
 crease and diminution), and in "place." "Place" {roirosi) 
 is not (as we understand it) position, nor the space oc- 
 cupied by a body, but the limit presented to a body by a 
 surrounding body or by surrounding bodies ; it may be 
 compared to a vessel in which water or any other mate- 
 rial substance is held. No " place " is- empty (there is 
 no empty space) ; the world is a plenum. The move- 
 ment of bodies is therefore merely an exchanging of 
 "places." Space is not infinite but ends with the sphere 
 of the fixed stars. The world as a whole is not in any 
 "place." The perfect motion is circular ; for only such a 
 motion, a motion the path of which is without begin- 
 ning or end, answers to the eternal nature of the Prime 
 Mover. Such is the motion of the sphere of the fixed 
 
 1 Posterior Analytics, Bk. I. ch. 33/ De Gencratione et Corruptione, 
 Bk. I. ch. 2. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 39 
 
 stars, upon which God acts, though without touching it. 
 Motion is eternal, since every motion of a real thing 
 implies, on the one hand, an antecedent motion which, 
 again, implies another and so on in infinitum and, on the 
 other hand, a subsequent one, which, in turn, implies 
 another and so on in infinitum. The eternity of motion 
 implies an eternal cause of motion,^ — a corollary to the 
 theorem of the eternity of motion is that of the eternity 
 of time. Time is the " number of motion with reference 
 to earlier and later." We should have no conception of 
 time merely from the idea of a "now." Consciousness 
 of succession (arising from the perception of motion) is 
 also necessary. Practically, however, every "now" is 
 a union of "before" and "after," and so time is in 
 itself potentially infinite. Time as a numbering pre- 
 supposes a "numberer," infinite time an infinite mind.^ 
 The universe has always been, and always will be the 
 same. 
 
 The Visible Universe. — The visible universe was 
 conceived by Aristotle as a living sphere. Exterior 
 to the sphere is the abode of the Prime Mover. That 
 part of the sphere nearest the abode of the Prime 
 Mover — the region of the fixed stars — partakes of the 
 perfection of the Prime Mover, or Deity, dwelling in 
 felicity and realizing the highest end of existence ; the 
 centre of the sphere, the region of our earth, is the 
 place of imperfection. The region of the planets is 
 intermediate in character as in place between the other 
 two. The material elements are five in number, — 
 earth, water, air, fire, ether. Ether, the most perfect 
 of them, exists only in the upper heaven, is not subject 
 
 1 Physics, Bk. VIII. ch. i. = Ibid., Bk. VIII. ch. i ; Bk. VI. ch. 6, etc. 
 
140 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to changes either in quaUty or in quantity, but to change 
 in place only, and has only a circular (perfect) motion. 
 Of the other elements, earth is lowest, fire highest, in 
 place and nature. They easily pass into one another, 
 being active and passive in nature, and are, as compared 
 with ether, the fifth element, or quintessence, imperfect 
 and the cause of imperfection in the lower world. Their 
 motions are not circular : earth moves downwards, fire 
 upwards, air and water having intermediate motions. 
 Of fire, air, water, and earth all living beings are com- 
 posed, homogeneous parts, e.g., flesh or bones, being 
 formed of like parts, and heterogeneous of the homoge- 
 neous. 
 
 Graduated Scale of Being in Nature. — There is 
 throughout nature a gradation of being, and at certain 
 points it is with difficulty that beings of one kind can 
 be distinguished from those of another.^ Certain plants 
 {e.g., the sponge) very closely resemble animals, and 
 the attributes possessed by animals are possessed by 
 man in a higher degree of perfection. Life pervades 
 even the elements. 
 
 Psychology : Its General Character and Place among 
 the Sciences. — Aristotle's work on the soul is the earli- 
 est of the distinct systematic treatises on the subject, 
 and is based on a careful review of all previous theories 
 as well as a profound special knowledge of the subject. 
 He takes the general position that psychology is a part 
 of the science of physical nature, because the "feelings 
 of the soul are inseparable from the physical substratum of 
 animal life "; and yet, also, that it is of a transcendental 
 character, since there are clear cases of " states " that 
 
 1 On l/ie Paris of Animals, Bk. IV. ch. 5. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I4I 
 
 "are peculiar to the soul alone," e.g., thought. Both 
 the purely materialistic and the purely transcendental 
 theories of the soul are therefore treated by him as one- 
 sided ; and his investigations are both empirical and 
 speculative in character. Regarding the place of psy- 
 chology among the sciences he says : " The acquisition 
 of knowledge is, we conceive, always something high 
 and honorable : but one form of knowledge is superior 
 to another either in virtue of the self-contained sim- 
 plicity of its truths or by the greater dignity and won- 
 drousness of its contents ; and on both these grounds 
 the investigation of the' soul might with justice claim a 
 foremost place, and, besides, the knowledge of it is 
 thought to have important bearings on truth generally 
 and especially on nature : for soul is, as it were, a prime 
 factor in animal existence."^ 
 
 Body and Soul. — Life is a process of nutrition, 
 growth, and decay.^ Where this process goes on, there 
 is organic being ; and where there is organic being, there 
 is soul. Soul (the principle of motion) may be defined 
 as the entelechy, or perfection, of organic bodily exist- 
 ence. It is not itself, however, bodily, or material ; it 
 has not magnitude nor parts ; nor is it subject to 
 motion. If it possessed magnitude, there would be no 
 thought, for thought is a unit and may be exercised 
 once for all, whereas the parts of a thing are repetitions 
 of one another.^ Since the soul is not a magnitude, is 
 not spatial except only "incidentally," i.e., as related to 
 body, it does not move itself (topically, or in place), and 
 
 1 De Anima, Bk.- 1, ch. 1. (See Aristotle's Psychology in Greek and 
 English, with Introd. and Notes by Edwin Wallace, etc.) 
 
 2 /Md.,Bk. II. ch. I. 
 
142 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is not capable of being moved by anything outside 
 itself.^ It is even better not to say that the soul 
 sympathizes or thinks or learns, but that man does 
 so by means of the soul. ^ But the soul, though not 
 "movable," is the cause of motion, and operates in 
 and through the body as a whole and in its parts, de- 
 veloping it and using it as an instrument. Just by 
 virtue of the unity of the soul, and of its power over 
 the body, is the body an organism, the soul being the 
 entelechy of the body, the form that gives intelligible 
 existence to the body, which is "matter." Body and 
 soul are, then, one, as form and matter are one. The 
 soul is, indeed, dependent upon the body, but only in so 
 far as the body is a condition to its activity, and a con- 
 dition, too, to which the soul, as being form, is prior.* 
 The soul, in short, is the efficient, formal, and final 
 cause of the body.* But the soul is more than the mere 
 entelechy of the body. One part of it, we shall see, is 
 separable from the body, and has no single and separate 
 correlative in the body. 
 
 Parts, or Faculties, of the Soul. — The faculties (Su- 
 vdfjiei<s) of the soul are those of nutrition {dpeTrriKov), 
 which includes generation, or reproduction,^ of sense- 
 perception (ala-dTfTiKov), of desire, or volition (operiKov), 
 of locorfiotion (kivtjtikov), and of intellect (SiavorjTiKov), 
 
 1 De Anima, Bk. I. chs. 2 and 3. (See also ch. 5.) 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. I. ch. 4. 
 
 ' The existence of the soul in the body is, in other words, a stage in its 
 process of self-realization. We can as well say that the body is in the soul. 
 
 ' £>e Anima, Bk. II. ch. 4. 
 
 5 Ibid., Bk. II. ch. 3. That the nutrition is a function of the soul fol- 
 lows firom the principle that whatever exhibits an idea or an end belongs 
 not to matter but to form. De Anima, Bk. II. ch. 4. 
 
143 
 
 which embraces understanding and reason. The last- 
 named faculty is separable from the body, and is pecu- 
 liar to the soul of man. (Animals have all the other 
 faculties except, in some cases, that of locomotion. 
 Plants have only the nutritive soul.) These faculties 
 are related one to another as successive stages in a 
 developing life, the higher involving the lower (man 
 contains within himself the life of the plant and the 
 animal^). By means of the nutritive (reproductive) 
 function the (universal) soul gives itself outward per- 
 manence, i.e., though the individual dies, the species 
 survives. Thus the form has actuality. In sense-per- 
 ception, the form (not the matter) of objects is preserved, 
 to be transmuted by the higher faculties of the soul.^ 
 Desire and locomotion give external reality to concep- 
 tions. Reason is the faculty of form purified of all 
 sensuous or ^«fl«-sensuous matter. The primary seat 
 and organ of seiisation is the heart, the brain acting 
 merely as a regulator of the heart's action. But per- 
 ceptions of sense are gained through five special organs 
 (the organs of the five well-known senses), a general fac- 
 ulty of sense through which such impressions {e.g., num- 
 ber, figure, size) as are not given through any one par- 
 ticular organ alone but by all in common, are received, 
 and the power of inference.* The sense of touch under- 
 lies the other four, contact through a medium being 
 necessary to render the possible object of sensation 
 really such.* Of the five senses hearing has the most 
 of reason in it. In perception by inference, or "inci- 
 
 '■ See what was said above on the Socratic Natural Theology, p. 55. 
 2 De Anima, Bk. II. ch. 12. » /^jV/., Bk. II. ch. 6. 
 
 1 nid., Bk. II. ch. 7. 
 
144 , GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 dental perception," we learn of sensuous attributes by 
 reasoning from concomitant, or accompanying, attri- 
 butes. In sense-perception is apprehended not the 
 mere individual but what is universal,^ since sense re- 
 ceives the form of objects without the matter of them. 
 Springing immediately out of the sense-faculty are phan- 
 tasy {(jjavTacTLa), or imagination, and simple memory 
 (jj,vi]fj,7j). Phantasy is perception sublated and given a 
 ^«aj?-permanence and independence but weakened. 
 Memory, also, is a permanent, or relatively permanent 
 state of the soul, resulting from the lodging of impres- 
 sions produced in sense and the imagination : it is conse- 
 quently an image of previous states of the soul.^ Neces- 
 sary to memory is the idea or reflection (involving the 
 presence of the purely active faculty of the mind, reason) 
 that the idea before the mind has previously been before 
 it. Repetition of an impression may be spontaneous or 
 volitional : in the former case it is an act of pure mem 
 ory ; in the latter, of recollection so-called (avdtJ.vr]Ti<;). 
 In this act the mind moves from one idea to another 
 connected with it through the implicit idea of similarity, 
 contrast, or contiguity, so recalling the idea soight.^ 
 Such an act has in it a larger degree of spontaneity 
 than simple memory, imagination, or sense-perceptio i, 
 though even sense is not mere receptivity. Tha activity 
 of soul as primarily spontaneous is reason. That there 
 is such a faculty appears from the fact that there must 
 be a distinct power that perceives the essential nature 
 
 1 Posterior Analytics, Bk. II. ch. 19. Hence the possibility of induction. 
 See above, p. 128. See below, p. 146. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. II. ch. 19, and De Memoria, I. 
 ' De Memoria, 2. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 45 
 
 of things, a power different from that which perceives 
 things themselves, a power, e.g., that perceives the essen- 
 tial nature of flesh different from that which perceives 
 flesh itself : in short, a power that perceives and judges 
 of form apart from matter. Now this faculty is no doubt 
 " unmixed " (as Anaxagoras asserted) with the body or 
 with things ; it must, however, if it be anything more 
 than a bare potentiality, be capable of having an object, 
 and must, therefore, have in it, or be related to, an ele- 
 ment of passivity like sense, though different in degree 
 and somewhat in kind. There must, in other words, be 
 a kind of passive reason, related to the active as matter 
 is related to creative mind in the external world. The 
 ideas of reason are potentially in the passive reason and 
 are brought into actuality by the power of active reason, 
 just as potential color is made into actual color by the 
 power of light. Now that the ideas thus made actual 
 by active reason are ideas of objects is manifest from 
 the fact of the unity of reason in man with the reason 
 in the external world, and from the fact, also, that in 
 sense-perception there must be a unity of subject and 
 object as a condition of there being any communication 
 between subject and object, — receptivity presupposing 
 community of nature.^ In regard, further, to the nature 
 of the relations of the active and passive reason, Aris- 
 totle says that the passive reason (which it would seem 
 can be nothing more nor less than the ensemble of all 
 the powers of the mind beneath pure eternal reason) is 
 perishable and can " think nothing without the support 
 of the creative intellect," whereas the active is immortal 
 and eternal, and eternally thinks.^ Now the ideas of 
 
 I De Anima, Bk. III. chs. 4 and 5. » Ibid., Bk. III. ch. 5. 
 
146 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 active reason viewed merely as possible objects of rea- 
 son, or possible forms of its functioning, constitute 
 science (eVto-TT^/iij). The actual employment of these, or 
 functioning with them, is speculation (dempeiv).^ As the 
 perfection, or entelechy, of the soul's activities, reason 
 presupposes the activities of sense, imagination, simple 
 memory, and recollection, and is immanent and implicit 
 in these. (Passive memory is thus the middle term be- 
 tween reason and the phenomenal real world.) This 
 explains why it is that the special senses, and the com- 
 mon, or general, sense, still more, apprehend not mere 
 individuals but qualities in individuals, and that imagi- 
 nation, simple memory, and recollection have a perma- ' 
 nent element in them : that, in short, no operation of 
 the mind is purely passive and relative (irrational), 
 but all partake more or less of the spontaneity and 
 absoluteness of pure reason. The mind has knowledge 
 even in sense-perception. The reason that is in the 
 world is perceived by the reason in the soul. The 
 essences of things it knows absolutely, for they are 
 the objects, as they are the creations only of reason. 
 Active reason, however, is, according to Aristotle, . 
 entirely separable from the body, and eternal. Im- 
 mortality for the finite individual, consequently, is 
 not a necessary postulate of the Aristotelian psy- 
 chology. The appetitive and locomotive faculties of the 
 soul are related to the others through the feelings 
 of pleasure and pain. Every perception, conception, or 
 thought awakens a feeling of pleasure or of pain which 
 involves the "judgment" that the object of the percep- 
 tion, thought, or conception is good or evil, and to be 
 
 I De Anima, Bk. II. ch. I. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 47 
 
 desired or avoided accordingly. (This "judgment" is 
 entirely analogous to the judgment in the purely intel- 
 lectual sphere, that a thing is true or false.) The desire 
 or aversion thus aroused produces in the heart, which is 
 the seat of sensation, feeling, and motion, a certain 
 degree of warmth, which, if sufficient, is followed by 
 bodily motion, external action. In animals the stimu- 
 lating cause of desire or aversion may be only a dull 
 perception ; in man it is also, and most characteristically, 
 an idea of reason.^ 
 
 Practical Philosophy. — Man as a being that is subject 
 to desire limited by reason and leading to choice and 
 action, is termed practical. The philosophy of man as 
 such a being is Practical Philosophy, to which we now 
 naturally come. 
 
 Method of Practical Philosophy. — In accordance 
 with his idea that the highest activity of the soul is 
 that of reason, or the theoretic faculty, Aristotle affirms 
 that the highest and best life for man is a life of contem- 
 plation, the life of the speculative philosopher. But this 
 proposition, instead of being assumed at the beginning 
 as a starting-point for a deductive and scientific treat- 
 ment of the subject of man's practical activity, appears 
 as the conclusion, or, rather, as a conclusion, of an inves- 
 tigation that is only quasi-^c\^nX\SiQ.. Aristotle, in other 
 words, after stating in very general terms ^ what the end 
 (for every art and every methodical procedure must be 
 governed by 'the conception of the final cause) of the 
 science dealing with man as a practical being is, pre- 
 mises that different subjects require to be differently 
 
 1 De Anima, Bk. III. chs. lo, ii, etc. 
 
 2 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I. ch. 2. 
 
148 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 treated, some, e.g., mathematics, with strictness of 
 method, others with greater freedom of method. Po, 
 litical science (for such is the name given by Aristotle 
 to the science in question) is of the latter class ; human 
 affairs are especially uncertain, and here especially we 
 must proceed from things better known to us to things 
 better known (or knowable) in themselves, i.e., from 
 facts to principles. Hence, also, the student in politi- 
 cal science should have been " well and morally edu- 
 cated": the inexperienced, ill-educated, or morally 
 deiicient (whether old or young) are unprepared for 
 the study of this science because they have not the 
 completeness and excellence of character and informa- 
 tion that afford to the student the materials that must 
 form the content of the science.^ 
 
 End of Practical Philosophy, or "Political Science." — 
 Now the end of Political Science is the (conception of 
 the) good of man, and the good of man may be consid- 
 ered as the good of the individual and that of the state, 
 though these are in essence the same. Political Science 
 has, then, two natural branches : Ethics, treating of the 
 good of the individual man, and Politics, treating of the 
 good of the state.^ But what is the " good of man " .' 
 Following a practice common with him, Aristotle dis- 
 
 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I. chs. 2 and 3. We hear much of Empiri- 
 cal Psychology at the present day. But this must be of little value if the 
 souls empirically studied are poor in quality and attainment. 
 
 2 Perhaps Economics should be included among the Political Sciences. 
 " Eudemus (^MiVi, I. 8, 12, 18, b. 13) distinguishes between iroXiTiK^- 
 oiKovofuKTi, and (f>p6vri<rLs as the three parts of a philosophy of action ; but 
 Aristotle himself nowhere puts the matter so definitely. Cf. however, 
 Nic. Eih.,\i. 8. 1141, b. 30, where a similar distinction is implied" 
 (Wallace, p. 23). 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 49 
 
 cusses current opinions on the subject of the good, and 
 pays particular attention to Plato's doctrine of the Good 
 as Idea. This doctrine he rejects as being false, chiefly 
 on the grounds that it presupposes a real unity among 
 things that are one in name only, and that it is too 
 abstract for application to the matters in hand (since 
 human good is found only in what is practicable for 
 man) ; ^ and limits the idea of the Good to that of the 
 "good for man." Now the good generally, is that which 
 is an end, and the good of man is simply the realized 
 end of man as man. The end of man, his peculiar 
 function, or work (epjov), is the energizing of the soul 
 according to reason ; or, since in reason lies man's 
 characteristic quality, we may say an " energy of the soul 
 according to virtue" (apeTif) ; or, if there be more than 
 one virtue, the " best and most perfect virtue " ; and, 
 further, "in the most fortunate life since, as neither 
 one swallow nor one day makes a spring, so neither 
 does one day nor a short time make blessed and 
 happy." 2 This realization of the soul's peculiar excel- 
 lence we may call happiness. Complete happiness, 
 however, does not exist without the presence of certain 
 external conditions, such as the possession of friends 
 and of wealth ; nor without the element of pleasure, 
 since no one can be called truly just who takes no 
 pleasure in acting justly, or truly liberal, who takes no 
 pleasure in being liberal.^ 
 
 Psychological Basis of Ethics (and Politics). — The 
 student of poUtical science must, it is obvious, study the 
 soul (though not necessarily with scientific exactness 
 
 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. T. ch. 6. ^ Ibid., Bk. I. chs. 7 and 9. 
 
IJO GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and completeness) ; he must know what its functions, 
 which are the virtues, are. Now the vegetative soul is 
 not capable of any virtue or the want of any virtue that 
 we need consider here. The appetitive soul, though 
 rebellious, yet participates in and submits to reason, 
 and has, therefore, a certain capacity for real virtue. 
 For present purposes, then, the soul is two-fold, one 
 part being reason itself, the other, obedient to reason ; 
 and virtues are accordingly of two kinds : ethical 
 (rjOiKaC) and intellectual or dianoetic (SiavoijTiKai).^ 
 
 Sources and Conditions of Virtue. — Virtue has two 
 sources, the intellectual virtues, resulting chiefly from 
 instruction, the ethical, from habitual action, or habit. 
 Virtue is, then, not innate and necessary, not a natural 
 phenomenon (like, for example, the falling of a stone), 
 which is no result of habit but of natural necessity ; nor 
 is it, as Socrates thought, identical with knowledge ; but 
 the result of habit and teaching as affecting a natural 
 capacity.^ This natural capacity, however, is not such a 
 capacity as is, e.g., sight, which requires only to be ex- 
 erted to be an "energy." This natural capacity for 
 virtue is also a capacity for its opposite. Right instruc- 
 tion and right habit are required to render it a real 
 capacity for virtue, i.e., a capacity for virtue only. 
 Men become just and temperate and brave by per- 
 forming actions that are just and temperate and 
 brave. In this case, Aristotle remarks, the "energy" 
 precedes the "capacity" instead of following it. Virtue, 
 being a result of habit, is by Aristotle termed a 
 
 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I. ch. 13. 
 
 ^ This is Aristotle's answer to the question, argued by the Sophists and 
 by Socrates, whether virtue could be taught. See above, p. 57. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. IS I 
 
 habit.i That it is a habit and not a mere feeling nor 
 a mere natural capacity is evident from the circum- 
 stance that men are not called good and bad merely 
 because of their feelings or their capacities as such. 
 Inherently, i.e., without relation to deliberate intent 
 or choice (which, as we are about to see, is a con- 
 dition of virtuous action), the feelings are morally 
 indifferent. Moreover, by our feelings we are said to 
 be "moved," by our habits to be of a certain disposition. 
 Again, our capacities are ours by nature, but men are 
 not good and bad by nature.^ Now the actions that 
 give rise to habits constituting virtues are of a certain 
 definite nature. Acts leading to (established) virtue 
 must, in the first place, be distinguished from those 
 resulting in works of art. The latter class have for 
 their end the production of what is excellent in itself, 
 without reference to the character or mental condition 
 of the doer ; but actions are just and temperate, not if 
 they have a certain result, but if the doer does them in 
 a certain condition of mind ; viz., if, first, he does them 
 wittingly ; if, secondly, with deliberate choice, and choice 
 of the things done for their own sakes ; and if, thirdly, 
 he does them from firm and settled purpose or principle. 
 Just acts and temperate acts are such as a just or tem- 
 perate man does or would do. The artist is an artist by 
 virtue of the possession of a certain kind of knowledge 
 and skill ; the conditions just mentioned as conditions 
 necessary to the rendering an act virtuous are not con- 
 
 1 Habit (c^if is from ix^i-v, to have, and etymologically = habit) fairly 
 means in Aristotle's usage, a fixed and definite power and tendency in 
 the soul (i.e., a faculty, almost), not merely a customary mode of action. 
 
 * Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II. ch. 5. 
 
152 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ditions of his action. On the other hand, knowledge 
 or skill is only of secondary importance among the 
 conditions of virtuous action.^ But it is necessary 
 to show by what sort of habit virtue is constituted. 
 Habits, regarded as quantities, may, as dependent upon 
 the passions or emotions, be in the mean or may be 
 in either extreme, and, this, either as regards other 
 habits or ourselves. Virtue must be the habit that is in 
 the mean, because virtue, like nature, is more "accu- 
 rate " and excellent than any art, and every art as well 
 as every science realizes its end by aiming at the mean. 
 The ethical mean, however, is, of course, not identical 
 with arithmetical, but is determined by an investigation 
 involving the application of certain categories, — " the 
 time when, the cases in which, the persons towards 
 whom, the motive for which, the manner in which " 
 actions are performed.^ Certain convenient rules for 
 hitting the mean as regards ourselves are the following : 
 one must avoid the worse of two extremes ; one must 
 avoid especially that extreme to which he is more in- 
 clined ; one must be on his guard in matters pertaining 
 to pleasure and the pleasant.® 
 
 Definition of Virtue. — The foregoing discussion of 
 virtue leads to the following definition of virtue : " Vir- 
 tue is habit characterized by deliberate choice, in the 
 mean relative to ourselves, which is fixed or determined 
 by reason, and as the prudent man would determine it." 
 There are involved in this definition two points that 
 require elucidation, and are, accordingly, (by Aristotle 
 
 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II. ch. 4. ^ Ibid., Bk. II. ch. 6. 
 
 8 IKd., Bk. II. ch. 9; also Bk. VI. ch. I. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I 53 
 
 or some faithful disciple of his^) further developed in 
 later chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics:'^ viz., What, 
 precisely, is deliberate choice ">. and What is reason as 
 exercised by the prudent man {j>p6vifios:) ? 
 
 Deliberate Choice. — Deliberate choice must be dis- 
 tinguished from voluntary choice. That is voluntary 
 choice or action which is made or done wittingly and 
 willingly, the origin or cause of which, whether the 
 consequence be or not, is in the person making the 
 choice or doing the deed. (That is involuntary choice 
 or action which is made or done through constraint, or 
 through ignorance, not of general and commonly known 
 facts or laws, but of certain particular circumstances.^) 
 Deliberate choice is calculating choice exercised in re- 
 gard to things contingent and within our power to do.* 
 About that which is eternal, or necessary, or in the 
 ordinary course of external nature, or irrational, or 
 impossible, or purely accidental, there is no deliberate 
 choice : it is beyond our sphere. We deliberate about 
 means oftener than about ends, for they are more uncer- 
 tain. Deliberate choice, as appears from the definition, 
 is narrower in range than voluntary choice, which is 
 not necessarily calculating, nor exercised with regard to 
 things within our power. Children, fools, and madmen 
 often exercise voluntary, but not deliberate choice. All 
 deliberate choice is voluntary, but not all voluntary 
 choice is deliberate. Now, by the definition, a virtu- 
 
 ^ It is a common opinion among critics that Bits. V.-VII. of the Nico- 
 machean Ethics were not written by A. but by a close follower named 
 Eudemus. 
 
 ' Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. III. chs. 1-5; Bk. VI. chs. 1-13. 
 
 s Ibid., Bk. III. ch. I. See, also, Rhet., Bk. I. ch. 4. 
 
 1 1bid., Bk. III. chs. 2, 3. 
 
154 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ous act or habit is an act or a habit dependent upon 
 deliberate choice, but Aristotle maintains, of course, 
 that so far as acts are voluntary, they are of an 
 ethical character and are classifiable as virtuous or the 
 opposite. 
 
 The Ethical Virtues. — The determination of the 
 nature of " right reason " as exercised by the prudent 
 man requires an examination of the intellectual or 
 dianoetic virtues. It is necessary, however, before 
 undertaking that, to give an account of the ethical 
 virtues. These, together with the corresponding ex- 
 tremes in "excess" and "defect," are assumed (not 
 demonstrated) by Aristotle to be the following : Cour- 
 age (the mean), rashness (the excess), cowardice (the 
 defect) ; temperance, intemperance, want of suscepti- 
 bility to feelings of bodily pleasure and pain ; liberality, 
 or moderateness in the ordinary giving and receiving of 
 riches, prodigality, illiberality ; munificence, or right 
 measure in large expenditures of money, vulgar ostenta- 
 tion in expenditure of money, " smallness " in this re- 
 gard ; magnanimity or high-mindedness, vanity, exces- 
 sive humbleness ; moderate ambition, or love of honor, 
 inordinate ambition, spiritlessness, or want of ambition ; 
 mildness of temper, irascibility, insusceptibility to 
 anger; civility, obsequiousness, incivility; candor, arro- 
 gance, assumed self -depreciation ; cleverness of wit, 
 buffoonishness, clownishness ; susceptibility to the feel- 
 ing of shame, shamelessness, bashfulness ; just indig- 
 nation, envy, malice [!]j justice, equity, and injustice.^ 
 
 1 Nicomackean Ethics, Bk. II. ch. 6; Bk. III. ch. 6; Bk. V. Shame 
 and indignation are not, A. says, strictly virtues and vices, but are men- 
 tioned as illustrations of the doctrine of the mean. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 155 
 
 Special attention may, for illustration's sake, be paid 
 here to courage (avBpeia), high-mindedness (jieyaXoifrv- 
 P(;ta), and justice (^iKaioavvTJ). Courage is the virtue 
 possessed by any one who feels confidence with regard 
 to what he ought to feel confidence with regard to, 
 from the right motive, in the right manner, and at the 
 right time ; and fears in like manner. He whose seem- 
 ing courage is a result of anxiety to appear worthy 
 of distinction, of experience in matters demanding 
 courage, of anger, of hope, or of ignorance, is not 
 truly courageous. True courage springs only from the 
 love of the honorable, and the suggestions of reason.^ 
 "Magnanimity" (high-mindedness) is the ornament of 
 the virtues, making them greater and existing only 
 where they exist. The "magnanimous" person is a 
 person of conscious dignity and worth. He esteems 
 honor, or the regard of good men, above all things else 
 (though he does not " go in search of it ") ; he does not 
 overrate worldly success, is courageous, liberal, inde- 
 pendent, not resentful, above flattery, dignified in bear- 
 ing.^ Justice may be divided into universal justice and 
 particular justice. Universal justice is the habit of 
 obedience to law and of dealing with men fairly, i.e., 
 according to the principle of the mean. And since 
 there are laws relating to all matters, universal justice 
 in a manner comprehends all other virtues, and is there- 
 fore perfect virtue, — more admirable than " the evening 
 or the morning star." It is greater in perfection than 
 the other virtues also, because the exercise of it con- 
 stitutes a reference of the individual to others as well 
 as himself. It is not a kind, or division, of virtue ; it is 
 
 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. III. chs. 7, 8. ^ 11,1^^^ £],.. JV. ch. 3. 
 
156 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the whole of virtue. ^ Particular justice, which is one 
 of the virtues and not the whole of virtue, is the mean 
 relative to the distribution of wealth, honor, or what- 
 ever else can be distributed among the members of a 
 political community, and to the correction of errors in 
 transactions between men. The first-mentioned kind 
 of particular justice is termed distributive, the second- 
 mentioned, corrective, justice. Distributive justice 
 takes account merely of the character and merits of 
 individuals ; corrective justice, of the equalities and in- 
 equalities of transactions. Distributive justice is based 
 upon the geometrical mean, — as is a man's deserts so 
 is that which he receives in the distribution : corrective 
 justice is based upon the arithmetical mean, — the losses 
 of one must be compensated for by the gains of an- 
 other. Mere reciprocity is not justice.^ Justice may 
 be also divided into natural and legal. Natural justice 
 is that which is " everywhere equally valid and depends 
 not upon being or not being received." Legal justice 
 is that which rests on enactments.^ Supplementing 
 and perfecting legal justice is equity, which is defined 
 as the "correction of law wherever it is defective owing 
 to its universality." Through inadvertence or through 
 lack of knowledge, on the part of the legislator, the 
 law may fail of being sufficiently specific. Its defect is 
 supplied by the equitable man, who, feeling bound by 
 the law of sympathy, and preferring arbitration to strict 
 judicial procedure, takes due account of human failings, 
 of the intention of the law-maker rather than the letter 
 of the law, of the character and general conduct of 
 
 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. V. ch. I. " Ibid., Bk. V. chs. 2, 3, 4, 5. 
 
 3 Ibid., Bk. V. ch. 6. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 157 
 
 the person accused, of the differences in faults and 
 crimes.^ 
 
 "Right Reason,^' Prudence, and the Intellectual Vir- 
 tues Generally. — What, now, is the exact character of 
 reason as exercised by the "prudent man" in determin- 
 ing the practical mean ? The answer to this question 
 will be brought out in the discussion of the intellectual 
 virtues, which have now to be treated. The under- 
 standing has as object either that which is necessary 
 and absolutely knowable or that which is contingent 
 and only relatively knowable. Things of the first- 
 mentioned kind are either principles or consequents of 
 these ; things of the second-mentioned class are particu- 
 lar objects of experience. Principles are known by 
 intuition {vov<;), their consequents by demonstration 
 {eTnarriiir}). Intuition and demonstrative thought, con- 
 sidered as habits, are virtues, and together constitute 
 wisdom {aocj)ia), the highest of the intellectual virtues, 
 — the highest because having reference to the noblest 
 things.^ The intellectual powers or habits the objects 
 of which are contingent are art (Texvr)), and prudence, 
 or practical wisdom {(j)p6vrjai<;), which differ in that the 
 principle of the one class (as related to persons) lies in 
 the objects themselves, of the other in the doer.^ Art 
 is a certain "habit" of "making" governed by true 
 reason; the absence of art, the "habit" of "making" 
 governed by false reason. The nature of prudence, or 
 practical wisdom, may be further explained by a consid- 
 eration of the prudent, or practically wise, man. The 
 mark of such a man is the ability to deliberate success- 
 
 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. V. ch. lO; Rhetoric, Bk. I. ch. 13. 
 •^ Ibid., Bk. VI. chs. 3, 6, 7. ^ 7^,^., Bk. VI. ch. 4. 
 
158 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fully respecting the good and expedient in relation to 
 living well. Now, as we have_ seen, no one deliberates 
 about things that cannot be otherwise than they are, 
 nor about things that are beyond their power to do. 
 Prudence, or practical wisdom, then, is not that wisdom 
 in which intuition and demonstration are embraced, 
 but a certain rational habit having practical reference 
 to human good. Wisdom has to do with ends, pru- 
 dence with means. But prudence is more than mere 
 sagacity or shrewdness or fair-mindedness or intelli- 
 gence, though these may be contained in it; it is the 
 moral insight and the tendency to right action that are 
 begotten of experience in acting justly, temperately, 
 etc.^ Until prudence is attained, virtue or, rather, what 
 appears to be such, is but "natural" virtue, the virtue 
 of those "who do what they ought and what a good 
 man ought to do " only half-consciously and half-volun- 
 tarily. Virtue proper, as distinguished from natural 
 virtue, is habit not merely in accordance with, but in 
 union with, "right reason," or the perception of the 
 true mean. Again, such are the unity and force of 
 prudence that, whereas the natural virtues may exist 
 separately, the true virtues exist in conjunction. 
 
 Self-Control and its Opposite. — With regard to the 
 question, discussed and answered in the negative by 
 Socrates,^ whether knowledge is " dragged about," or 
 overcome, by passion, Aristotle holds that when scientific 
 knowledge is present to the mind, passion cannot arise, 
 though it may do so " when that opinion which is the 
 result of sensation " is present ; and that one who vir- 
 tually possesses knowledge may, nevertheless, do wrong 
 
 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI. chs. 10, II, 13. 2 ggg above, p. 57. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I 59 
 
 if he fails to use the knowledge he possesses. ^ The 
 habit of yielding wrongly to feelings of pleasure and 
 pain through the influence of passion is " incontinence," 
 or want of self-control. It differs from intemperance in 
 not being characterized by deliberate choice or prefer- 
 ence. The "mean" habit corresponding to "inconti- 
 nence" is self-control. The incontinent man is less 
 blameworthy (not more blameworthy, as Socrates had 
 held) than the intemperate man. 
 
 Friendship. — Closely related to virtue, if indeed it be 
 not a kind of virtue, is friendship. It is certainly a con- 
 dition to virtue and is, besides, most necessary, honora- 
 ble, and pleasant. It unites individuals and states, and 
 is a prime condition of the existence of society : it is 
 eminently a subject for the consideration of the political 
 philosopher.^ Friendship exists when there is among 
 men a common desire to do good one to another for that 
 other's sake. It is "good-will mutually felt." No true 
 friendship is based on a love of the merely expedient or 
 agreeable ; true friendship is consonant only with a love 
 of the good, and exists among those who are themselves 
 good. True friendship, however, is both expedient and 
 pleasant. Perfect friendship is not merely a habit but an 
 energy, and implies intercourse ; it is active rather than 
 passive, and consists more in conferring than in receiv- 
 ing benefits. Friendship as implying community (of 
 interest) is closely related to justice as a bond of union 
 among men.^ By the good man friendship is greatly 
 valued, because through it he acquires a second self (in 
 others) ; he can contemplate virtue and the good in 
 
 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VII. chs. 3 and 4. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. VIII. ch. i. » /^^v., Bk. VIII. chs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 
 
l60 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 others better than in himself alone, — and existence is 
 desirable for the sake of the perception of the good.^ 
 Friendship, that is to say, is practically a species of self- 
 contemplation. 
 
 Pleasure and Happiness. — Human good has been 
 defined as happiness, which includes, besides virtue, a 
 second ingredient, — pleasure ; for pleasure is the agree- 
 able consciousness that regularly attends the " energy," 
 or perfect activity, of any power, an activity that is noth- 
 ing more nor less than perfect virtue. Pleasure differs as 
 "energies" differ, the highest pleasures attending the 
 noblest energies. True pleasure is what appears such 
 to the good man. Pleasure is not a good in itself ; it is 
 good only as a concomitant of virtue and a condition to 
 absolute perfection.^ Happiness, we have seen, is the 
 energy of the soul according to the law of virtue, the 
 highest happiness corresponding to the highest virtue. 
 But the highest virtue is wisdom, the virtue of the 
 speculative, or theoretic, faculty. The energy of this 
 faculty is the noblest, most constant, most pleasant, the 
 most self-sufficient, the most divine of all. It seems to 
 be, in each man, his true self, the " ruling and the better 
 part." In comparison with this, ethical energies are of 
 secondary importance. Absurd, indeed, it would be 
 were each man not to strive his utmost to live in ac- 
 cordance with the conception of this, — to be his true 
 self! 
 
 Practical Ethics. — Theoretical ethics is not the whole 
 of ethics ; men must be virtuous, not merely theorize 
 about virtue. Something more than theory is required, 
 
 ^ Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. IX. ch. 9. 
 2 Ibid., Bk. X. chs. i, 4, 5. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. l6l 
 
 for the making of men virtuous, for the majority of 
 mankind are guided not by knowledge but by pas- 
 sion ; they must be educated to virtue. And it is the 
 business of the state so to legislate that its citizens may 
 be provided with all necessary practical conditions to 
 virtue. Even should the state neglect the education of 
 its citizens, it is the duty of every individual to " con- 
 tribute to the virtue of his children and friends." This 
 he will best be able to do if he make himself fit to be a 
 legislator.^ This brings us to Politics proper, the sec- 
 ond part of the general science of human good. 
 
 Origin of the State?' — The state is a growth the germ 
 of which is the sexual relation, based on that desire of 
 "leaving an offspring like oneself" which is "natural 
 to man as to the whole animal and vegetable world," 
 and those organic and inborn differences among human 
 beings whereby some are naturally rulers, others sub- 
 jects. Historically prior to the state are the individual, 
 the family, or household, and the village, or community, 
 the state being an association "composed of several 
 villages," "the village" the simplest association of sev- 
 eral households, etc. But the state is in idea prior to 
 all these^ for man is by nature a " political animal " ; 
 were he not, he would have to be a god or a brute. He 
 is by nature fitted for the realization of the idea of law 
 and justice, of which the state is but the embodiment 
 and organ.* 
 
 1 Nicomachmn Ethics, Bk. X. ch. 9. 
 
 2 The following outline follows the translation of the Politics made by 
 J. E. C. Welldon, M.A. (1883). 
 
 8 Politics, Bk. I. chs. i and 2. 
 
1 62 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The Family. — The elementary relations existing in 
 the family, or household, are,' according to Aristotle, 
 those between husband and wife, parent and child, mas- 
 ter and slave ; and the science of the household has, 
 therefore, three branches. Slavery is a natural and 
 beneficent institution, owing to the natural differences 
 in the intellectual and moral natures of men. The 
 function of the slave is mere physical service ; he is a 
 tool, or instrument, of his master, the power of the latter 
 over him being despotic. The slave is a kind of prop- 
 erty. The head of the family rules wife and children 
 not as a despot but as a constitutional ruler. Wife and 
 children possess the same virtues as the head of the 
 family, but possess some of those virtues in a lower 
 degree than he. One part of the soul is natural ruler, 
 the other natural subject ; a corresponding difference 
 exists among persons in society. In every part of the 
 household and of the state there is a reference to the 
 whole. In the household the whole is contained (ideally) 
 in the head of the family ; and the virtue of the child,, 
 the wife, the slave, has reference to that of the head of 
 the family.^ One branch of the science of the house- 
 hold is the art of acquisition, which has its foundation 
 in the wealth realized from the products of the earth. 
 This is natural finance ; unnatural finance is the art 
 of money-getting and trading in money. It is greatly 
 subject to abuse.^ 
 
 Criticism of Certain Theories and Forms of the Stat/; 
 Plato and Others. — The theory propounded by " Socra- 
 tes " in Plato's Republic has, Aristotle thinks, three car- 
 
 l Politics, Bk. I. chs. 12 and 13. ^ jiij_^ 35^ j_ (-hs. 8-11. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 63 
 
 dinal defects ; ^ it aims at too great unity ; the means 
 proposed for the accoriiplishment of the end proposed 
 are inadequate ; the theory is vague, does not lay 
 down proper limitations. (i) A state, as an organic 
 whole, consists of a number of different kinds of indi- 
 viduals ; the idea proposed in the Republic as the end to 
 be realized is the idea of a household or an mdividual 
 rather than of a state. The Platonic theory in its prin- 
 ciple of rotation in office seems to assume that the actual 
 personalities of the individuals who alternately rule and 
 submit to authority are alternately changed, since dif- 
 ferent personalities naturally belong to those who are 
 fitted to rule and those who should be ruled. The 
 theory is thus false and self-contradictory. Again, the 
 theory is false in the doctrine of unity, because inde- 
 pendence is the object to be obtained by society, and a 
 real state is more independent than a household or an 
 individual.^ (2) The proposition that all individuals in 
 such a state can with equal right " call the same thing 
 mine and thine " is a mere quibble. All collectively, 
 not distributively "call the same thing mine." Again, 
 people owning things in common care less for their 
 possessions than those who individually have property. 
 Community of wives and children would fail to conceal 
 the parentage of children, and it would, besides, lead to 
 endless mistakes, to crime and family pollution. Such 
 community would be more appropriate among the hus- 
 bandmen than among the guardians, because it dimin- 
 ishes, not increases, mutual affection, and so weakens 
 the class in which it is practised. The greatest bless- 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. II. chs. 2-6. ^ Ibid., Bk. II. ch. I. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. II. ch. 2. 
 
164 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ing in the state is mutual affection : this is the only real 
 source of the unity so eulogized by " Socrates." The 
 transference of children from one class to another would 
 be impossible, and, even if possible, would be an addi- 
 tional source of outrage, sensual love, and homicide. 
 Community of property is also impossible, — at least in 
 the Platonic sense, — as is evident from so simple a fact 
 as that of the invariable quarrelling of persons keeping 
 a common purse while travelling together. Community 
 in the use of property is perhaps desirable, but not com- 
 munity in the tenure of it. The legislation proposed in 
 the Republic has a " specious and philanthropic appear- 
 ance," but is plainly impracticable. The only " commu- 
 nity" practicable is that produceable by moral disci- 
 pline, intellectual culture, and education.^ (3) About 
 the main body of the state — all, indeed, but the guar- 
 dians — little or nothing is determined by the Republic. 
 If there be community of wives and children and prop- 
 erty among them, how will they differ from the guar- 
 dians ; and what will induce them to be ruled by the 
 guardians .' There will be two mutually hostile states 
 in one. If the husbandmen are given ownership of 
 land on condition of their paying a fixed rent to the 
 guardians, they will soon become arrogant and intract- 
 able. There are also certain minor defects in the 
 Republic? To the Laws of Plato nearly the same 
 objections are applicable, since, with the exception of the 
 community of wives, children, and property, the regula- 
 tions are the same in the Laws as in the Republic? Pol- 
 ities advocated by Phaleas, Hippodamus, Solon, and 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. II. chs. 3-5. " Ibid., Bk. II. chs. 5 and 6. 
 
 3 Ibid., Bk. II. ch. 6. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. l6$ 
 
 others, and the institutions of the Spartans, Cretans, 
 and Carthaginians are also reviewed by Aristotle. 
 
 T/ie End of the State. — Man, it has been affirmed, is a 
 " political animal," and men would naturally unite in a 
 social organization without the motive of a supposed or 
 perceived common advantage to be realized in so doing. 
 The true view of the state undoubtedly is that it is an 
 association the real end of which is not the prevention 
 of mutual injury or promotion of commercial exchange, 
 though these are secondary objects of its being, but 
 a " complete and independent existence, a life of fe- 
 licity and nobleness " — not a life in common merely, 
 but a noble life ; the true state is devoted chiefly to 
 virtue. 1 
 
 The Nature of the Citizen. — As the state is a com- 
 posite entity the elements of which are citizens, we 
 have to determine the conception of the citizen. Not 
 residence, nor the mere right to appear as plaintiff or 
 defendant in a judicial action, nor the possession of free- 
 dom, nor the being indispensable to the existence of the 
 state, as, for example, artisans and children are, nor all 
 of these together, but a "participation in judicial power 
 and public office " is the absolute mark of citizenship 
 (in a democracy).^ Now there is a question as to what 
 is the virtue of a good citizen. Is it or is it not identi- 
 cal with that of the good man 1 The answer must be, 
 in general terms, that the virtue of the citizen differs 
 with different forms of government (for we may assume 
 that there are several kinds of polity,, or government), 
 whereas the virtue of the good man is everywhere the 
 same. And even in the same form of government, there 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. III. chs. 6 and 8. ^ yj^v., Bk. III. chs. i and 5. 
 
1 66 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are different functions to be performed, and hence dif- 
 ferent virtues in tlie citizens as such. The good ruler 
 possesses the virtue of prudence {i.e., the virtue of the 
 good man), which is not indispensable in the sub- 
 ject. Under a polity, however, in which the subject 
 may become ruler, and ruler subject, there is doubtless 
 an identity between the virtue of a good citizen and that 
 of a good man ; and " the virtue of a good citizen may 
 be defined as a practical acquaintance both as ruler 
 and subject with the rule characteristic of a free 
 community." Virtue approximating that of the good 
 man is, then, necessary to the citizen ; and it is just 
 because of this fact that artisans and children are not 
 citizens.^ 
 
 A Polity and its Kinds. — "A polity is an order of 
 the state in respect of its offices generally, and espe- 
 cially of the supreme office." Polities are of two kinds, 
 according as they have for their end public or private 
 interest. " When the rule of the individual or the Few 
 or the Many is exercised for the benefit of the commu- 
 nity at large, the polities are normal, whereas polities 
 which subserve the selfish " interest either of the indi- 
 vidual or the Few or the Masses are perversions." ^ 
 Polities may also be divided in accordance with differ- 
 ences as regards the governing power, which may be an 
 individual or a few persons or many. A normal polity 
 of the first sort is termed a Kingship, of the second, an 
 Aristocracy (a government by the best, o\ dpia-Toi, or 
 else for the best interests of the community, to dpiarov), 
 of the third, a Polity Proper. The corresponding cor- 
 rupt polities are the Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democ- 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. III. chs. 4 and 5. 2 Rid., Bk. IIL ch. 7. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 6/ 
 
 racy. The real difference between an oligarchy and a 
 democracy is a diif erence as regards wealth, — wealth 
 characterizing the former, poverty the latter.^ 
 
 Who should be Rulers. — If it should be asked, 
 Who ought to rule ; one, few, or the many .' the answer 
 in general terms is, Whatever class embraces in itself the 
 largest number of conditions to the good man, i.e., vir- 
 tues and external goods such as wealth, birth, etc. Col- 
 lectively viewed, the masses or the many would, on this 
 ground, generally have the supremacy ; but if there are 
 a few men, or if there is even one man sufficiently pre- 
 eminent in virtue above the masses, to them or to him 
 "all should render willing obedience."^ From this it 
 follows that the democratic form of polity (not, however, 
 pure democracy but constitutional democracy) must gen- 
 erally be best, though there is a sufficient reason for the 
 different kinds of polity in the fact that different kinds 
 of populace demand different classes of rulers. "The 
 populace which is suited to kingship is such as is natu- 
 rally qualified to submit to a family whose superiority in 
 virtue entitles them to political command ; an aristo- 
 cratical populace is one that is capable of yielding the 
 obedience of free men to those whose virtue fits them 
 for command as political rulers ; and a constitutional 
 populace, one that is capable of rule and subjection in 
 conformity to a law which distributes the offices of state 
 to the rich according to a principle of desert."^ The 
 kingship is unstable ; for the king cannot, unsupported, 
 rule the masses, and, if he have assistants, they may 
 become his peers, and he is no longer king. In fact, 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. III. chs 6-9. ^ /^jv., Bk. III. chs. 11-13. 
 
 3 /i5?V., Bk. III. ch. 17. 
 
l68 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the tendency of a polity not already constitutional is 
 towards a constitutional polity, i.e., a polity resting not 
 on the will of one or a few, but on law. In the state as 
 in the individual, the universal element rules the partic- 
 ular, the intellect (law is the creation of intellect) the 
 passions.! 
 
 The Best Polity. — What, now, is the best polity t 
 In general, it is that which furnishes the highest con- 
 ditions to an independent and intelligent, i.e., a virtuous, 
 life for individuals and state alike. The state should 
 comprise the largest number of persons consistent with 
 a comprehensive knowledge, on the part of the citizens, 
 of one another and the affairs of the state. The coun- 
 try should also be of such size and character in other 
 respects that it can be "readily comprehended in a 
 single view," i.e., "allow of military succour being 
 brought to any point at a short notice." The city 
 should be so located with reference to land and sea that 
 it will possess independence and security, and yet suffi- 
 cient facilities for intercourse with other cities. It must 
 have a suitable naval force. The citizens should be 
 "spirited" and "independent." There must be food, 
 mechanical arts, supply of money, religious ritual, means 
 of administering justice. There must be a proper line 
 of division between citizens and those who are not citi- 
 zens, — the citizens comprising the soldiery and the de- 
 liberative class, those not citizens comprising the hus- 
 bandmen, artisans, and hired laborers. The lands must 
 be partly public, partly private, — public lands defraying 
 the expenses of religious worship, and common meals, 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. III. ch. 14-17. The state must have a true psychological 
 basis. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 69 
 
 and private lands being so divided that owners (who must 
 be citizens) possess portions on the frontier as well as in 
 the city. The cultivators of the soil should be slaves. 
 The city must be favorably situated with regard to con- 
 ditions for health and political and military action. The 
 city should be walled and arranged, internally, with ref- 
 erence to the convenience of the citizens, buildings ap- 
 propriated to religious services (with certain exceptions), 
 common meals, "supreme magisterial boards" being in 
 the same locality, etc. Education^ must be the same 
 for all citizens, and must be provided by the state, since 
 training in the public business should be public, and 
 every individual is but a subject member of the state. 
 The education provided should be suited to leisure and 
 peace rather than business and war, for the virtues rela- 
 tive to the former are higher than those relative to the 
 latter. It should begin with the physical and ethical 
 natures of the child and advance to the purely rational, 
 since the natural order of development is from the 
 "habits" to reason. Marriage and the begetting of 
 children must be regulated by the state. Infancy and 
 early youth must be carefully surrounded with the purest 
 influences as regards speech and manners and scenes. 
 Reading and writing should be taught, because of their 
 general utility ; the art of design or painting, for its use- 
 fulness as a means to forming right judgment of works of 
 art ; gymnastics, because it promotes health and vigor ; 
 music, because it is a source of rational enjoyment. 
 Since the education of the body precedes that of the 
 intellect, the first training of children must be in gym- 
 
 1 Politics, Bks. IV. and V. 
 
170 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nasties. Before the age of puberty this should not be 
 severe ; for, as the experience of the Lacedemonians 
 proves, severe gymnastics renders youths brutal in their 
 feelings, and, besides, unfits them for intellectual occu- 
 pations. Three years following puberty may be given 
 to other studies, then severe gymnastics may be taken 
 up. Music comes later, because its chief use is the 
 purification of the passions or emotions and the afford- 
 ing enjoyment to the rational nature. The Dorian and 
 Lydian airs, which are intellectual and emotional, may be 
 employed, but not so frequently the Phrygian, which is 
 largely physical in its effects. Flute-playing and "pro- 
 fessional" musicians are hardly to be encouraged. The 
 education provided by the state should, in a word, be 
 not that which is indispensable or practically useful 
 merely, but that which is, also, liberal and noble. 
 
 Characteristics of Different Polities. — The true states- 
 man must possess a knowledge of all possible forms of 
 polity and the laws appropriate to each. Differences in 
 polities arise from differences in the combination of the 
 elements or parts of a polity ; the husbandmen or agri- 
 cultural class, the mechanical class, the commercial 
 class, the hired laborers, the military class, the rich, or 
 the leisured, class, and the public officials, or the delib- 
 erative and judicial classes. Two or more of these may 
 practically unite in one. Now there are two principal 
 forms of polity, viz.. Democracy and Oligarchy. "A 
 democracy exists when the authority is in the hands of 
 the free poor, who are in a majority ; and an oligarchy 
 when it is in the hands of the propertied, or noble, class 
 who are in a minority." In a democracy either the laws 
 or popular decrees may be supreme. If the laws are 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I7I 
 
 supreme, the democracy is constitutional. In a democ- 
 racy in which popular decrees are supreme there is large 
 scope for demagogues. When eligibility to office de^ 
 pends upon a property qualification or birth, or on the 
 actual possession of citizenship, the democracy becomes 
 practically constitutional, i.e., is governed by fixed legis- 
 lation, because, for want of means and of leisure for 
 self-indulgence, the citizens are content , with holding 
 merely such meetings of the assembly as are indispen- 
 sable. Constitutional democracy may then be of three 
 kinds. Of oligarchy there are four species : one in 
 which a moderate qualification for eligibility to office 
 obtains, the poor being in the majority, and every one 
 who has sufficient property enjoying full political privi- 
 leges ; another in which there is a high property qualifi- 
 cation and " officers elect to the vacancies " ; another 
 in which office-holding is hereditary ; a fourth, similar 
 to the last-mentioned but placing the supreme authority 
 in the executive and not in the law. In the first-men- 
 tioned form of oligarchy, naturally, the law is supreme ; 
 in the second, owing to the power of the rich, the law 
 is "accommodated" to the "general principle of the 
 polity " ; the third form is ostensibly constitutional, but 
 naturally verges towards the fourth, which is monarchi- 
 cal.^ Other forms of polity are Aristocracy, Tyranny, 
 and Polity Proper. Strictly speaking, an aristocracy is 
 a polity in which the good man and the good citizen are 
 identical. But any polity in which regard is had to 
 wealth, virtue, and numbers, or to any two of these, is 
 termed aristocratical. In a strict tyranny there is an 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. VII. chs. 1-6. 
 
172 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 " irresponsible rule over subjects, all of whom are equals 
 or superiors of the rulers, for the personal advantage of 
 the ruler and not of the subjects." A polity proper 
 is, in general terms, a kind of mean between oligarchy 
 and democracy — inclining, however, towards the latter. 
 A "criterion of a good fusion is the possibility of 
 calling the same polity a democracy or an oligarchy," 
 and, further, the known existence in the state of no ele- 
 ment anxious for a change of polity.^ The best polity 
 must be that which appears best when judged by the 
 standard of a virtue not beyond the attainment of ordi- 
 nary human beings, since the happy life is the mean 
 life ; and the best state will, accordingly, be that in 
 which the middle classes (as regards wealth) are in the 
 majority, or at least hold. the balance of power, and laws 
 are enacted that aim at the satisfaction of the middle 
 classes. The reason why so many existing polities are 
 either oligarchical or democratical is that the middle 
 class is generally small in them.^ Every good polity 
 has three departments : the deliberative, the political, 
 the executive. In democratical polities the function of 
 deliberation is performed wholly or chiefly by the peo- 
 ple, either collectively or by alternation ; in oligarchical, 
 by a few or comparatively few persons ; in a polity 
 proper, in some cases, by persons appointed partly by 
 suffrage, and in others by persons appointed by lot, or 
 in all cases by persons appointed partly by lot, partly by 
 suffrage. " The deliberative body is supreme upon all 
 questions of war and peace, the formation and dissolu- 
 tion of alliances, the enactment of laws, sentences of 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. VI. chs. 7-10. 2 Ibid., Bk. VI. chi 11-13. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 73 
 
 death, exile, and confiscation ; to it belongs the election 
 of oflficers of state, and to it they are responsible at the 
 expiration of their term of office." As regards the 
 executive department, some offices are common to the 
 various forms of polity, others are peculiar : a council 
 is a democratic institution, a preliminary council is oli- 
 garchical. The modes of appointment are different in 
 different forms of polity. In a democratical polity "all" 
 appoint " from all by suffrage, or by lot, or by a combi- 
 nation of the two " ; in an oligarchical polity, appoint- 
 ment is made of some "from some by suffrage, or some 
 from some by lot, or some from some by a combination 
 of the two, though the appointment by suffrage is more 
 strictly oligarchical than that by lot or by a combination 
 of the two " ; in a polity proper the "appointment is not 
 vested in all the citizens collectively, but all are eli- 
 gible, and the appointment is made either by lot, or by 
 suffrage, or both, or in which the persons eligible are in 
 some cases all the citizens, in others some of them, and 
 the appointment is made either by lot or suffrage or 
 both " ; in a polity of the aristocratic sort the " appoint- 
 ment is made by some partly from all and partly from 
 some, either by lot or suffrage, or partly by suffrage and 
 partly by lot." The courts of law — constituting the 
 judiciary — are eight in number: a court of scrutiny, 
 a court to try offences committed against the state, a 
 court to try constitutional questions, a court to try 
 cases between officers and individuals respecting fines, 
 a court to try important cases of private contract, a 
 court of homicide, a court of aliens, a court for the 
 trial of petty contracts. The forms of constitution of 
 
174 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the courts in which universal eligibility and universal 
 jurisdiction are combined are democratical ; those in 
 which limited eligibility and universal jurisdiction are 
 combined are oligarchical ; those in which there is a 
 combination of universal and limited eligibility are 
 "characteristic of aristocracy and a polity."^ 
 
 Methods of Establishing and Maintaining the Various 
 Forms of Government. — We have seen that differences 
 in democracies arise from differences in the character 
 of the population. Differences may also spring from 
 differences in the combination of features that are 
 peculiarly democratic. But there are two primary prin- 
 ciples of all democracies : equality and the rule of the 
 majority, and the liberty to live according to one's 
 pleasure. Characteristic of popular government are 
 the following-named features : " the eligibility of all 
 citizens to the offices of state and their appointment by 
 all ; the rule of all over each individual and of each 
 individual in his turn over all ; the use of the lot in the 
 appointment either to all the offices of state or to all 
 that do not require experience or special skill ; the ab- 
 sence of property qualification or the requirement of 
 the lowest possible qualification for office ; the regula- 
 tion that the same person shall never hold any office 
 twice, or shall not hold it much oftener than once, or 
 shall do so only in a few cases, with the exception of 
 military offices ; a system of short tenure of offices 
 either in all cases, or in all cases where it is possible ; 
 the power of all or of a body chosen from all to sit as 
 judges in all or almost all, or at least the greatest and 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. VI. chs. 14-16. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 75 
 
 most important cases, such as cases arising out of the 
 audit of the officer's accounts, constitutional cases, and 
 cases of private contract ; the supreme authority of the 
 public assembly in all questions, or at least the most 
 important, and of no individual office over any question, 
 or only the smallest number possible." "The most 
 characteristic feature is the council, except where all 
 the citizens receive a large fee for attendance in the 
 Assembly." Another characteristic feature is the pay- 
 ment of the members of the departments, as far as pos- 
 sible. Others are low birth, poverty, intellectual degra- 
 dation, the not holding office for life, the decision of 
 the majority of both rich and poor, if they agree, and if 
 they disagree, of the absolute majority, or in other 
 words of those whose collective property assessment is 
 higher. There are four forms of democracy : the agri- 
 cultural, the pastoral, the mechanical or commercial, 
 and the extreme, in which "the popular leaders usually 
 enrbll the largest possible number of persons in the 
 rank of the citizens, conferring political rights not only 
 upon all the legitimate children of citizens, but upon 
 their bastards, and upon children who are descended 
 from citizens upon the side of one parent only, whether 
 the fathers or the mothers." Of these, the first is the 
 best, the last the worst.-' It is the business of the legis- 
 lator not only to establish democracies, but to provide 
 for their security. Such laws should be enacted as will 
 cause the poor to be satisfied with their condition. 
 They should be subsidized, should be directed to indus- 
 trial pursuits, given a share in the enjoyment of the 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. VII. chs. 1-14. 
 
176 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 property of the rich.^ The best form of oligarchy, we 
 have seen, approaches the poUty, so-called. In it there 
 are two degrees of property qualification, a higher and 
 a lower : all persons admitted to citizenship are from 
 the better elements of the commons. In an oligarchy 
 the military class rules. This has four divisions : cav- 
 alry, heavy-armed troops, light-armed troops, marines. 
 Only the rich can support cavalry and heavy-armed 
 troops, and hence these are peculiarly oligarchical, the 
 others being democratical. In a country suited to cav- 
 alry, that division of the military class may be supreme ; 
 in a country suited to heavy-armed troops that division 
 may rule. Oligarchies are preserved by putting upon 
 the rich the burden of heavy expenses for sacrifices, 
 public buildings, etc., and relieving the poor of all such.^ 
 The offices of government must be properly constituted. 
 Executive offices are : the superintendence of the mar- 
 ket, the superintendence of all public and private prop- 
 erty in the city, the superintendence of such property 
 in the country and the suburbs of the city, the receiving 
 and holding and distributing public revenues, the re- 
 cording of public accounts, the levying and collecting 
 of fines, the superintendence of military affairs, and 
 marine affairs, the auditing of public accounts, the 
 giving of preliminary consideration to bills to be pre- 
 sented to the public assembly, this last being the 
 supreme office. Religious offices are the superintend- 
 encies of divine worship, and of the public sacrifices 
 that are not assigned by the law to the priesthood, but 
 are solemnly celebrated upon the hearth of the state. 
 
 1 PoUHcs, Bk. VII. ch. 5. » Ibid., Bk. VII. chs. 6, 7. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 77 
 
 Other offices are the censorship of boys and women, 
 presidencies of gymnastic exercises, and Dionysiac 
 Contests. The Guardianship of the Laws is an aristo- 
 cratical institution, the Preliminary Council oligarchical, 
 and the Council democratical. 
 
 Causes of Political Revolutions, etc. — It remains to 
 consider the " nature, number, and character of the cir- 
 cumstances which produce political revolutions, the 
 agencies destructive of the several polities, the general 
 sequence of polities in a revolutionary age, and, lastly, 
 the preservatives of polities both generally and individ- 
 ually."^ Generally speaking, the cause of seditio7i is 
 "inequality." The common people are seditious when 
 they think they have a smaller share of political advan- 
 tages than others have, and the oligarchs when they 
 think they have not a greater share than others have. 
 In the one case it is from a position of inferiority that 
 the people are encouraged to sedition by the hope of 
 equality ; and in the other, from the position of equality 
 by a hope of predominance. The predisposing causes 
 of sedition and revolution are : desire of gain and honor ; 
 envy and indignation at the gain and honors of others ; 
 the possession of too great power ; fear of punishment or 
 of becoming victims of crime ; contempt of the oligarchs 
 for the masses, or vice versa ; the disproportionate 
 increase of one class in the state ; party-spirit ; gradual 
 change in government ; diversity of race ; the localities of 
 states (" when the country is not naturally adapted to the 
 existence of a single state ") ; the accession of persons of 
 high repute or influence to some peculiar office or class 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. VII. ch. 8. 
 
178 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in the state ; an even balance of antagonistic classes in 
 the state. Political disturbances may be brought about 
 either by force or by fraud.^ " The main cause of revo- 
 lution in Democracies is the intemperate conduct of the 
 demagogues, who force the propertied class to combine, 
 partly by instituting malicious prosecutions against in- 
 dividuals, and partly by exciting the masses against them 
 as a body." Democracies are transformed by revolution 
 into democracies of a different type and into tyrannies. 
 Revolutions in oligarchies are principally of two kinds : 
 the oppression of the masses by the oligarchs, and sedi- 
 tion among the oligarchs themselves. Sometimes sedi- 
 tion in oligarchies is due to demagogues paying court 
 to members of the oligarchical party or to the masses. 
 Revolutions occur when the oligarchs, having wasted 
 their means in riotous living, are eager for innovation 
 and strive to establish a tyranny ; and when some of the 
 oligarchs suffer a repulse at the hands of others. Over- 
 despotism in oligarchies, exciting indignation in mem- 
 bers of the governing class, is a cause of sedition. 
 Oligarchies are destroyed by the creation within them 
 of oligarchies. Revolutions may be the result of acci- 
 dental circumstances. In aristocracies one cause of 
 revolution is the limitation of the number of persons 
 admitted to honors of state. Another cause is the put- 
 ting of a stigma upon persons of consequence. Another 
 is the exclusion of an individual of strong character 
 from honors of state. Another, the existence of exces- 
 sive poverty on one side or excessive wealth on the 
 other in the state. Finally, the existence already of a 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. VIII. chs. 1-4. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 79 
 
 sedition headed by a powerful individual able to extend 
 his authority. The main cause of sedition in polities and 
 aristocracies is a " deviation from their proper principle 
 of justice in the constitution of the polity itself." Gen- 
 erally revolutions are from polities of a given kind into 
 others of a similar kind, not into their opposites. Poli- 
 ties are liable to dissolution both from external and 
 internal causes. Polities are preserved by watchfulness 
 against illegality and gradual changes, against the begin- 
 nings of revolution, and artifices to impose upon the 
 masses; by officials^ keeping on good terms with citi- 
 zens enjoying political privileges ; by the limitation of 
 the tenure of office to short periods ; by proximity to 
 destructive agencies which excite alarm and put the 
 people on their guard ; by legal regulations for restrain- 
 ing frauds and rivalries among the upper classes ; by 
 reduction of assessments at the proper time ; by not in- 
 vesting any individual with disproportionate authority ; 
 by the creation of officers to exercise supervision over 
 all whose life or conduct is detrimental in its influence 
 upon the polity ; by taking precautions with regard to 
 those enjoying remarkable prosperity; by abstaining 
 from confiscating the estates and profits of the rich, 
 and chiefly by so ordering affairs that officers of the 
 state find no opportunity for merely personal gain. 
 " There are three qualifications requisite in all who are 
 to hold the supreme office of state, viz. : firstly, loyalty 
 to the established polity ; secondly, the greatest capac- 
 ity for the duties of their office ; and, thirdly, the virtue 
 and justice appropriate to the polity, whatever it may 
 
 > Politics, Bk. VIII. chs. 5-7. 
 
l80 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be." All legislation beneficial to polities tends to pre- 
 serve them in a fixed condition, but most especially 
 that which is guided by the principle of the mean. The 
 strongest preservative of polities is education in the 
 spirit of those polities.^ The causes predisposing to in- 
 surrection in monarchies are injustice, fear, and contempt, 
 — the injustice consisting principally in insolence, some- 
 times in the spoliation of private property. " Insurrec- 
 tion may take the form of an attack either upon the 
 person or upon the authority of the rulers." Attacks 
 of the first form are occasioned by insolence, by per- 
 sonal affronts, by degrading corporal punishment. Am- 
 bition may cause insurrection. Tyrannies are destroyed 
 by influences from without or within.^ The preservatives 
 of monarchy are, in general terms, the following : mean- 
 ness of spirit in the subjects, distrust among them of 
 one another, incapacity for affairs, affecting of good 
 will on the part of the monarch towards his subjects, 
 not exciting the indignation of the masses by lavish 
 expenditures, the seeming to collect taxes and impose 
 public burdens only for economical purposes, the pre- 
 serving an address of dignity without sternness, the 
 avoiding of insults to his subjects, moderation in sen- 
 sual pleasure, enriching of the city by edifices and dec- 
 orations in the assumed spirit of the guardian of the 
 public interests, display of religious zeal, inflicting pun- 
 ishments through personal agents, the depriving officers 
 of their places not suddenly and harshly, but gradually 
 and mildly, avoiding oppression, — in short, " wearing 
 the appearance not of a tyrant, but of a householder or 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. VIII. chs. 8, 9. ^ /^;^._ Bk. VIII. chs. 8, 9. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 181 
 
 king; not of a self-seeker, but of a guardian of public 
 interests." ^ 
 
 The Most Permanent Polities. — The most permanent 
 polities are the kingship and the polity proper ; the least 
 permanent, oligarchy and tyranny. 
 
 Plato s Theory of Revolution. — The theory of revo- 
 lution advanced in the Republic is defective at many 
 points.^ 
 
 Rhetoric. — An offshoot of political science and of 
 dialectic is Rhetoric, or the art, or "faculty," not of per- 
 suasion, but of discovering the possible means of per- 
 suasion (as medicine is the art, not of curing disease, 
 but of finding and applying all possible remedies that 
 cure , or tejid to cure) ; for it is the science or quasi- 
 science of that kind of discourse, particularly, whose 
 propositions are drawn from "political science" and 
 whose method is borrowed from, or formed after, that 
 of dialectic. It is not a science, because/ neither in 
 theory nor in practice does it aim at exact truth but 
 only probable truth of matter, or employ perfect rigidity 
 of method. It adapts the truths of political science and 
 the principles of dialectic to the ordinary life and mind. 
 It differs, further, from dialectic in aiming at the pro- 
 duction of conviction and not merely at the artistic 
 and effective logical combination of propositions.^ Per- 
 suasion may be the result of two classes of "proofs," 
 or means of persuasion, designated as scientific and 
 unscientific. In the former are comprised arguments, 
 the character of the speaker, the disposition of the 
 audience ; in the latter, witnesses, tortures, properly 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. VIII. ch. 2. « Ibid., Bk. VIII. ch. I2. 
 
 3 Rhetoric , Bk. I. chs. i, 2. 
 
1 82 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 taking advantage of the state of the laws, deeds, and 
 oaths. Arguments truly adapted for persuasion must 
 possess at least a guasi-syllogistic character and must 
 be composed of propositions that are, or seem to be, 
 true or highly probable. The speaker must appear to 
 be a person having ability, principle, and good-will 
 towards his hearers. The only honorable and other- 
 wise properly rhetorical means of controlling the feel- 
 ings of an audience are to be found in the honesty and 
 good-will of the speaker himself and the knowledge of 
 the passions and dispositions of men. True rhetorical 
 method does not consist in warping the mind by firing 
 the passions.^ There are three branches of Rhetoric : 
 one treating of the " means of persuasion which address 
 themselves to the understanding," another of style, and 
 another of the arrangement of the parts of the discourse.^ 
 There are three kinds of oratory : that which finds place 
 in the deliberative assembly, has for its end the expedi- 
 ent, and is termed Deliberative Oratory ; that which finds 
 place in irregular as well as regular public assemblies 
 has for its object the honorable, is panegyrical or vitu- 
 perative, and is termed Demonstrative (eVtSet/crt/cj^ Or- 
 atory ; that which finds place in the courts of law, has 
 justice for its object, and is termed Judicial Oratory.^ 
 Rhetoric is a useful and legitimate art, because it is in 
 harmony with the general tendency in human nature 
 towards truth and justice, and is better adapted than 
 science to ordinary intelligence, trains the mind to 
 look at both sides of a question, and is such a means 
 
 1 Rhetoric, Bk. I. ch. 3; Bk. II. ch. I; Bk. I. ch. 2. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. II. ch. 26 and Bk. III. ch. 1. 
 » Ibid., Bk. I. ch. 3. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 83 
 
 of defence for the mind as gymnastic skill is for the 
 body.^ 
 
 Poetical, or Poietical, Philosophy (see above, p. 121). — 
 Poietical philosophy, or the philosophy of art, is the 
 theory of the "habit of making joined with right rea- 
 son." Art, together with conduct (or "doing"), has to 
 ^ do, we have seen, with the contingent, whereas wisdom, 
 including intuition and science, is concerned with being. 
 Art, as a form of knowledge, is superior to experi- 
 ence, and stands next in rank to wisdom. Under art 
 as a whole is included house-building and other purely 
 productive arts as well as the "imitative" arts, poetry, 
 music, sculpture, etc. In art there are three pro- 
 cesses : production, contrivance, and contemplation. 
 The immediate end of works of art as such is in 
 the works themselves ^ (not in the artist). Art either 
 "imitates," or represents, or it perfects that which 
 nature has left imperfect.^ As "imitative," art makes 
 prominent the universal element in things.* The 
 "imitative" arts— poetry, music, painting, sculpture — 
 may have for their effects amusement and relaxation, 
 rational enjoyment and the purification of the feelings, 
 and moral discipline. As a source of amusement and 
 relaxation, art "heals" the pain of labor.^ A rational 
 enjoyment arises from the perception of the fact of re- 
 semblance between things "imitated" and their "imita- 
 
 1 Rhetoric, Bk. I. ch. I. Attention may here be called to the remark- 
 able discussion of the passions and aspirations of men in the first seventeen 
 chapters of Bk. II. 
 
 2 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI. ch. 4, and Metaphysics, Bk. I. ch. 2. 
 s Physics, Bk. II. ch. 8. * Poetic, ch. 9. 
 
 * Politics, Bk. v. chs. 5 and 7. 
 
184 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tions," and the discovery that the imitations are repre- 
 sentations or symbols of the objects imitated, a discovery 
 that partakes of the character of an acquisition of new 
 knowledge. ("All men have by nature a desire and 
 impulse towards knowledge."^) Purification of the feel- 
 ings takes place when, after an ecstasy of soul produced 
 by works of art, we relapse into our normal state, expe- ^ 
 riencing "pleasurable feelings of relief."^ Art affords 
 moral discipline, and influences character by teaching 
 men to "enjoy right pleasures and entertain right feel- 
 ings of liking or dislike." This it does by "imitating," 
 or representing, such pleasures and feelings, and pro- 
 ducing effects similar to those produced by the original 
 causes of them. In music, as has been stated, an 
 ethical effect is produced by the Dorian melodies and 
 harmonies, an emotional by the Lydian, and a physi- 
 cal by the Phrygian. Poetry consists in the imitation 
 of actions, manners, and sentiments by means of rhythm, 
 melody, and measure, — i.e., by some or all of these, — ■ 
 in narrative or in action. The characters imitated may 
 be better or worse, or neither better nor worse, than 
 ordinary characters. In tragedy, better, in comedy, 
 worse, than ordinary characters are "imitated." Trag- 
 edy is the representation in pleasing language by means 
 of. persons acting and not merely by means of narration, 
 of an action having dignity, completeness, and magni- 
 tude; producing, by its effect upon the emotions of 
 fear (or terror) and pity, a purification of the mind of 
 such feelings.* The fear and pity (which must not be 
 confounded here with horror and compassion) awakened 
 
 1 Metaphysics, Bk. I. ch. i ; Poetic, ch. 4; Rhetoric, Bk. I. ch. 4. 
 
 2 Politics, Bk. V. ch. 7. » Poetic, ch. 6. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 85 
 
 by tragedy arise from the contemplation of a worthy 
 character undergoing misfortune through some short- 
 coming incident to human nature.^ Comedy is the imi- 
 tation of only such worse than ordinary characters as are 
 ridiculous merely. Epic poetry resembles tragedy in 
 having for its subject an important action having be- 
 ginning, middle, and end, but differs in requiring a 
 more extended action, in admitting a larger degree of 
 the wonderful, in being narrative and employing neither 
 music nor the spectacle, and in requiring a nobler dic- 
 tion and more stable metre. Tragedy excels epic poetry 
 for the following reason : it possesses every excellence 
 of the latter and, besides, greater perspicuity and a 
 greater degree of simplicity and unity.^ The chief 
 point to be attended to in both kinds of poetry is the 
 fable, or story, of the action. As compared with his- 
 tory, poetry is the more philosophical, because it gives 
 more truthfully the universal element of human life.^ 
 
 Sources and Genesis of Aristotle's Philosophy. — We 
 have now to consider (briefly) the sources and genesis 
 of the philosophy of Aristotle, and its points of contact 
 with earlier systems. And it is well to bear in mind 
 here that Aristotle prepared a historico-critical sketch 
 of Greek philosophy from its beginning down to Plato,* 
 that frequently in various works he refers to and com- 
 ments upon the doctrines of earlier thinkers, par- 
 ticularly, as we have seen, of his master, Plato, and that 
 he was in mental temperament a natural, though not 
 uncritical, conservative. It would, perhaps, be safe, 
 then, to say, even without comparison of his doctrines 
 
 1 Poetic, chs. 13 and 14. ^ IHd., ch. 9. 
 
 2 Ibid., ch. 26. * See Metaphysics, Bk. I. chs. 3-9. 
 
1 86 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 with those of earlier thinkers, that there was no impor- 
 tant doctrine of any earlier philosopher that had not 
 passed under his critical notice, and that no lead- 
 ing principle of his own was discovered and adopted 
 by him without reference, positive or negative, to the 
 theories of those earlier speculators. A consideration 
 of the sources and genesis of his philosophy and its 
 point of contact with earlier systems involves, therefore, 
 a glance at the principal features of the earlier Greek 
 thought. Aristotle's logical theories appear to be, for 
 the most part, new and original with him, and yet it is 
 evident that they sprang out of the intellectual condi- 
 tions of his age. The time was ripe for bringing 
 out of the relative chaos of dialectic, false and legit- 
 imate. Sophistic and Socratico-Platonic, the formal 
 order of logical system. In metaphysics Aristotle's 
 Being and God are in a direct line with the Being of 
 Parmenides, the Nous of Anaxagoras, and the highest 
 Idea of Plato, and his attempt to unite being and phe- 
 nomena through the doctrine of the four causes and the 
 conceptions of possibility and actuality is an organic 
 continuation of the effort of most of the thinkers be- 
 fore him, after Parmenides and Heraclitus, to reconcile 
 the grand ideas of these two heroes in early Greek 
 thought. The first suggestion of the doctrine of causes 
 must, it would seem, have come to him from his teacher 
 or his teacher's works, e.g., the Timmus, but, judging 
 from his point of view in his history of Greek philoso- 
 phy,i it seems not improbable that Aristotle himself 
 regarded his doctrine of causes as substantially his own, 
 
 1 See above, p. 3. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 8/ 
 
 and as the summing-up and flower of all previous Greek 
 thought ; and there seems to be no reason for denying 
 that he was right in so doing. The theory of possibility 
 and actuality is peculiarly Aristotelian. The first solid 
 " putting " of the idea of a perfectly efficient, concrete, 
 intelligent power, an actual immanent (as well as trans- 
 cendent) mind must be credited to Aristotle. Possibility 
 and actuality as organic unity is, virtually, Aristotle's 
 formula for the universe as living, thought-determined 
 being. In physics Aristotle deviated very widely, in one 
 respect, from almost the whole previous course of Greek 
 philosophy ; he declared the world to be uncreated and 
 always the same, whereas earlier thinkers, from Anaxi- 
 mander down, had held a doctrine either of physical 
 evolution or of creation. This deviation finds its ex- 
 planation, as we have seen, in the theory that motion, 
 the characteristic of the phenomenal world as such, pre- 
 supposes, in the last analysis, an eternal being which 
 is the eternal cause of motion, — motion consequently 
 having no temporal origin. The conception, also, of 
 nature as a j^^-realizing end, or system of such ends, is 
 peculiarly Aristotelian. In other respects Aristotle's 
 theory of nature is, on the whole, that of Plato, and in 
 minor points agrees with those of Parmenides, Heracli- 
 tus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras. To Plato and Aristotle 
 alike the universe is spatially finite ; it is a sphere, of 
 which the outer portion is divine in nature, the central 
 human and imperfect, the former through a descending 
 series giving the law to the latter. Aristotle's definition 
 of the elements has points in common with those of 
 Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Plato. His 
 theofy of the soul, the first system of psychology, was 
 
1 88 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 framed after a thorough review ^ of all previous Greek 
 theories on the subject ; and it embodies and unites 
 in a truly organic way the real aperqus, or true in- 
 sights, of those theories. Here as almost everywhere 
 else, he follows Plato more closely than he does any 
 other thinker. Adopting substantially Plato's subdi- 
 vision of the soul into parts and faculties, he yet by 
 means of his original insight of the entelechy, or per- 
 fect realization, has made a true advance in thought, 
 upon Plato, in the mode of viewing the soul as a sub- 
 stance, or real unitary being, though it must be con- 
 fessed that in his negative attitude towards immortality 
 he seems to fall far below the spirit of Plato's teach- 
 ing. As regards his ethical doctrines we have already 
 indicated sufficiently, perhaps, their relation to Socrates. 
 (There are no ethical teachings prior to those of Socrates 
 with which it is necessary here to compare Aristotle's.) 
 In showing Aristotle's affinity in this respect with 
 Plato, we cannot, perhaps, do better than borrow the 
 words of Sir Alexander Grant. Aristotle plainly enough 
 owes to Plato : " (i) The conception of moral science as a 
 whole, — that it is a sort of politics, which is the science 
 of human happiness. (2) The conception of the practi- 
 cal chief Good, — that it is rekeiov and avTapKe<; [' per- 
 fect ' and • self-sufficient '] and incapable of improve- 
 ment or addition. (3) The conception that man has 
 an epyov, or proper function, that man's aperri perfects 
 this, and that his well-being is inseparable from it. 
 
 (4) The conception of Psychology as a basis for morals. 
 
 (5) The doctrine of Meo-oVi?? [the Mean], which is only 
 
 1 Occupying nearly the whole of the first book of the De Anima. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a modification of the Mer/stoTT?? of Plato. (6) The doc- 
 trine of ^povrjcri^, which is an adaptation, with altera- 
 tions, of the Socratico-Platonic view. (7) The theory of 
 Pleasure, its various kinds, and the transcendency of 
 mental pleasures. (8) The theory of Friendship, which 
 is suggested by questions started but not answered, in 
 the Lj/sis of Plato. (9) The Agnoiology, a theory of 
 Ignorance, in Book XII., — to explain how men can act 
 against what they know to be best, — which appears to 
 have been considerably suggested by Platonic discus- 
 sions. (10) The practical conclusion of the Ethics, — 
 that philosophy is the highest good and the greatest 
 happiness, being an approach to the nature of the 
 Divine Being." ^ Aristotle's theory of the state has 
 much less, relatively, in common with Plato's. The 
 end of the state, as conceived by both philosophers, 
 was, no doubt, the same, viz., the happiness or good of 
 the whole,' not of any part of the state ; but Plato's pre- 
 ferred state was a state governed merely by wise men, 
 Aristotle's a state governed by law (made and under- 
 stood by the citizens). Each had in view a state that 
 should have a true psychological basis, a state in which 
 reason and not passion should rule ; but Aristotle's, it 
 would seem, is a theory which better accords with 
 actual human nature and better provides for the natural 
 rule of intellect over passion. Here, as elsewhere, Aris- 
 totle follows more closely than Plato the conception of 
 the universal immanent in the particular. Aristotle's 
 "best polity" has more kinship with Plato's "second 
 best" state, expounded in the Laws; but Plato is as 
 
 ^ See Essay in Vol. I. of Grant's Ethics of Aristotle. 
 
I go GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 much an extremist in one way in the Laws as he is in 
 another in the Republic} Finally, Aristotle (it is easy 
 to see) attained to his conception of the state largely 
 through a struggle with Plato's, and his divergence from 
 Plato here seems to be but a part of that general diver- 
 gence which is the result of a natural development in 
 metaphysical standpoint. Aristotle's rhetoric, or theory 
 of persuasion, is the first systematic philosophical theory 
 of the subject it treats, and is mostly original. He had 
 thoroughly sifted the Sophistic rhetoric and, instead of 
 adopting it or any part of it, condemned it as the false 
 art of warping the judgment. Fundamental hints for 
 his theory are to be found, however, in the Phcedrus and 
 Gorgias of Plato. The idea that men can be really per- 
 suaded only by instrumentalities capable of reaching 
 their moral and logical faculties and habitudes is quite 
 Platonic; but circumstances and Plato's hatred of the 
 Sophists having made it his business to destroy false 
 rhetoric rather than construct a theory of true rhetoric, 
 it falls to Aristotle to construct such a theory, which, of 
 course, as a thinker, if not as a stylist, he was qualified 
 to do. To the homeliness (if we may apply the term 
 here) of the Socratic conception of beauty and the aus- 
 terity of the Platonic, there is little in Aristotle's that 
 is akin. Aristotle would merely purify and elevate the 
 inborn //i2>'-instinct in human nature ; Plato would se- 
 
 ' Aristotle has without doubt come nearer to the mean that is within 
 reach of a race of beings that naturally tends towards truth and justice. 
 The truth would seem to be that Aristotle had an abiding sense of the sub- 
 stantial rightness of his conception of nature as instinct with intelligence 
 and hence right and truth, and could afford to rely on the natural positings 
 of the human soul. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I9I 
 
 verely restrict feeling and imagination, which, in their 
 union, constitute the art-instinct in human nature. 
 
 The Substantial Unity of Plato and Aristotle. — The 
 divergences that have been pointed out between Aris- 
 totle and Plato need not blind us to the fact that they 
 are, in spite of those divergences, in substantial har- 
 mony. This appears immediately if they be compared 
 with one who is fundamentally opposed to either, i.e., 
 whose first principle is a purely material principle, 
 whether water, air, fire, atom (ancient or modern), or 
 all these, or any number of them together, — thus viewed, 
 Plato and Aristotle are at one, for they are both com- 
 pletely committed to the view that spirit, and spirit 
 only, is absolute. They do not, it is true, entirely get 
 rid of "matter," but treat it as a kind of negative 
 function of spirit, or form ; to Aristotle matter is pas- 
 sive reason in the world ; to Plato it is a kind of " spu- 
 rious reason." The entire weight of Plato's teaching 
 was, as we have already seen, thrown into the scale in 
 support of the thesis that the real is rational and the 
 rational is real, and Aristotle, with many criticisms and 
 demurrings, it is true, in regard to secondary matters, 
 simply added to Plato's thought the immense weight of 
 his own. In fact, probably no other two of the world's 
 master-thinkers are in such substantial agreement as 
 these two. With such solidarity of thought through- 
 out the whole history of human speculative thought, 
 the philosophical mind of the world would be really one, 
 as indeed it ideally is. Philosophy in itself and philoso- 
 phy in its history would be all but identical. 
 
 Result. — We have now to attempt an estimate of the 
 worth of the leading features of Aristotle's philosophy. 
 
192 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In general, it may be said that Aristotle carried the 
 development of that conception of mind as absolute 
 which Anaxagoras was the first to suggest, to the high- 
 est point possible under the circumstances of his age, 
 and that he brought philosophy fully around to the 
 opposite of the nafve naturalism with which it began. 
 That he (together with Plato) established a consistent 
 universalistic idealism has often been doubted. God, 
 in the system of Aristotle, is, it has been held, a 
 deus ex machina, has but an idle, shadowy being, and 
 the system ends in dualism. The immovableness of 
 being, the transcendence of the Deity, or Thought of 
 Thought, the separableness of reason in the soul from 
 the other faculties seem, perhaps, to warrant such an 
 assertion. But, on the other hand, to make God merely 
 the bond of union (even though organic) among the 
 parts of nature is to ignore the fact of a separable rea- 
 son, and is to be satisfied with the purely naturalistic 
 view of the world, — with the naturalistic instead of the 
 spiritualistic conception of organic unity. Somehow 
 immanent in the world God must be, but he is, also, 
 transcendent. Aristotle's category was that of spirit, 
 not life merely, and his conception of God, or a tran- 
 scendent divine reason, seems to be an excellence, not 
 a defect in his system. A great feature in the system 
 of Aristotle is its conception of nature, defective as 
 that conception in some respect no doubt is. From 
 the standpoint of modern physical speculation, Aris- 
 totle's theory of nature falls below that of most of his 
 predecessors, — Anaximander and other " evolution- 
 ists," the Pythagoreans (the centre of whose universe 
 was not the earth but the so-called " central fire "), the 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 93 
 
 Atomists (who discovered by speculation something very 
 like the modern atom, the hypothesis of which is at 
 least accounted as an indispensable " working hypothe- 
 sis "). But in that it demonstratively put matter under 
 the sway of reason and kept the "object" within the 
 sphere of the "subject" and thus made it organic, 
 Aristotle's theory far surpassed in philosophic rightness 
 that of any of the early nature-philosophers, and has 
 hardly been surpassed by that of any of those who have 
 succeeded him. That his theory of the soul, the kernel 
 of his theory of nature, has stood the test of centuries 
 hardly need be said : his conception of reason and sense 
 as organically one is far in advance of widely prevailing 
 mechanistic psychological theories of this moment. In 
 Aristotle's ethical and political theories there is want- 
 ing, no doubt, the clearness and decision of Socrates's 
 " All virtue is knowledge," or Kant's " You ought, 
 therefore, you can " ; but there is a certain moral poise 
 and health in the conception of a just synthesis of 
 man's capacities in the right fulfilment of his function 
 i^p'^ov), and great strength and stability in the concep- 
 tion of virtue as a habit and fixed tendency, the founda- 
 tion and moving force of which is eternal reason itself. 
 There is, indeed, in the formula describing virtue a theo- 
 retical surd, or irrational "quantity," the idea of the 
 "prudent man." But we may question whether, after 
 all, moral activity is not such a surd, as involving some- 
 thing beside mere calculation, as being only semi-rational. 
 Again, contemplation, the virtue of "the philosopher" 
 in the Ethics has been felt to be ?^«moral in character ; 
 but here again we may question whether Aristotle is 
 not substantially correct. He practically admits that 
 
194 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 such a virtue is beyond the reach of most men ; is 
 there not, nevertheless, a certain theoretical justice in 
 holding it to be the most perfect virtue ? Is Aristotle 
 so very far from Socrates and Kant in this ? Were not 
 the ethical requirements laid down by them more "theo- 
 retical" than "practical"? The doctrine that man is 
 a "political animal " can, it might seem, never be entirely 
 supplanted. But it must not be forgotten that even 
 Aristotle, as did Plato, put man the philosopher above 
 man the citizen, and that, practically, at least, the notion 
 of man as a political animal must, so to say, recede and 
 give larger place to that of man as a perfectly self-con- 
 scious and self-determining being. Society is an or- 
 ganism, not for life merely, but for spirit, and spirit is 
 not to be shut up in outward institutions. 
 
 § IS- 
 
 The Peripatetic School. — That, after the death of 
 Aristotle, there should arise a thinker who should grasp 
 and develop on all sides his philosophy as he had grasped 
 and developed Plato's would appear strange indeed ; 
 and, as a matter of fact, there was no such thinker. 
 The immediate followers of Aristotle comprehended 
 and adopted only portions of his system, and those not 
 of the highest importance in speculative thought. Of - 
 the school of Aristotle, the so-called Peripatetic School, 
 there were very few thinkers even worthy of being re- 
 membered. We speak here of but three — Theophras- 
 tus of Lesbos, Strato of Lampsacus, and Diccearch of 
 Messene. Mention will be made later of Peripatetics 
 who were, it would appear, scarcely more than Aristote- 
 lian editors and commentators. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 1 95 
 
 Theophrastus of Lesbos. — Theophrastus (circa 372 
 -287 B.C.) a favorite disciple of Aristotle and chosen 
 by him to be his successor at the head of the Peripatetic 
 school, gave the theories of Aristotle a- marked naturalis- 
 tic interpretation ; being apparently moved by the desire 
 to bring reason and sense into closer union than, as it 
 seemed to him, Aristotle had brought them. He did 
 not, however, give up completely the transcendence of 
 reason, but treated motion, in which he included, as 
 Aristotle had not done, genesis and destruction as a lim- 
 itation of the soul, and treated "energy " not merely as 
 pure activity, or actuality, but as akin to physical activity. 
 He affirmed, practically, that there was no motion that 
 did not contain an " energy." This was equivalent to 
 giving an absolute character to motion, whereas with 
 Aristotle the absolute was unmoved. The alleged 
 motions of the soul (Aristotle had denied motion to the 
 soul) were of two kinds: corporeal — e.g., desire, pas- 
 sion, anger, — and incorporeal, e.g., judgment and the 
 act of cognition. He retained Aristotle's notion that 
 external goods are a necessary concomitant of virtue and 
 an essential to happiness, and " held that a slight devia- 
 tion from the riilfes of morals was permissible and re- 
 quired when such deviation would result in warding off 
 a great evil from a friend or in securing for him a great 
 good." "The principal merit of Theophrastus consists 
 in the enlargement which he gave to natural science, 
 especially to botany (phytology), in the fidelity to nature 
 with which he executed his delineation of Human Char- 
 acters, and next to these things, in his contributions to 
 the constitution and criticism of the history of these 
 sciences." ^ 
 
 1 Ueberweg's Hist, of Phil, Vol. I. p. 182. 
 
ig6 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Strata of Lampsacus. — A pupil of Theophrastus and 
 the next leader, after him, of the Peripatetic School 
 (281-279 B.C.) was Strato of Lampsacus. Strato dis- 
 carded the doctrine of the real transcendence of reason, 
 and held that there could be nothing in the human in- 
 tellect which had not already been in sense. "He 
 placed the seat of sensation not in the members of the 
 body, nor in the heart, but in the seat of the under- 
 standing; gave to sensation a share of the activity of 
 the understanding; made the understanding inter-con- 
 vertible with thought directed upon sensible phenomena, 
 and so came near resolving the thought of the under- 
 standing into sense." ^ This was done in the attempt 
 to derive from Aristotle's conception of nature as 
 a power working unconsciously towards ends a per- 
 fectly simple organic (even materialistically so) concep- 
 tion of the universe. Strato did not, it would seem, 
 busy himself with experimental fact, but erected his 
 theory upon a purely speculative basis. The theory of 
 Strato is obviously a forward step in the direction taken 
 by Theophrastus. 
 
 Diccearch of Messene. — Dicaearch went still further 
 and reduced all particular forces, including souls, to a 
 single omnipresent, natural "vital and sensitive force." 
 Here we have the naturalistic conception of organic 
 unity in perfect simplicity. Dicaearch is said to have 
 devoted himself more to empirical investigation than to 
 speculation. 
 
 §16. 
 
 Three Leading Post- Aristotelian Schools of Philoso- 
 phy. — We come now to three leading post- Aristotelian 
 
 I Ritter's Hist, of Phil. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I97 
 
 schools of philosophy which, though standing in pecu- 
 liar opposition one to another, yet are really to be re- 
 garded as belonging to the same organic movement of 
 thought, and to have a common logical and psychologi- 
 cal point of origin. They are known as the Stoics, the 
 Epicureans, and the Sceptics (among whom may be 
 included the Academicians). 
 
 § 17- 
 
 The Stoics: Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Others. 
 The Stoic school was founded near the beginning of the 
 third century B.C., by Zeno, a native of Cittium in 
 Cyprus. Having spent twenty years or more in the 
 study of philosophy with teachers of the Cynic and Me- 
 garian schools, and of the Old Academy, ^ — Crates, 
 Stilpo, Diodorus, Xenocrates, Polemo, — he opened a 
 school at Athens, in a place known as the Painted 
 Porch, troiKiKi] ^roa — whence the name of the school 
 — and gained numerous disciples. He became noted 
 for the simplicity of his habits of living, the temper- 
 ateness and terseness of his speech, and the austerity 
 of his manner, which, however, is said to have " relaxed 
 at a dinner party." He won great respect from the 
 Athenians, "who gave him the keys of their walls 
 . . . honored him with a golden crown and a brazen 
 statue."-' In obedience to what he believed a sign 
 or omen, signifying that he should end his life, he 
 strangled himself. His successor at the head of the 
 Stoic School was Cleanthes, a water-carrier, who is 
 
 ^ Diogenes Laertius, Life of Zeno, pp. 259 and following. 
 
198 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 described by Diogenes Laertius as industrious, atten- 
 tive to the teachings of his master, and wholly de- 
 voted to philosophy, but as not intellectually strong, 
 and very slow of mind. He did little or nothing more 
 as a philosopher than to sanction by his influence the 
 teachings of Zeno, being intellectually inc'apable of de- 
 veloping them to any great extent. He wrote numerous 
 books and a Hymn to Zeus, which has been called the 
 "most important document of the Stoic philosophy." 
 The next president of the Stoic school was Chrysippus 
 of the Soli, or Tarsus, in Cilicia (or Cicilia), who was 
 bom about 280 B.C. " He was a man of great natural 
 ability, and of great acuteness in every way, so that in 
 many points he dissented from Zeno, and also Cleanthes, 
 to whom he often used to say that he only wanted to be 
 instructed in the dogmas of the school, and that he 
 would discover the demonstration for himself." ^ He 
 acquired great fame as a dialectician,^ was vastly indus- 
 trious, writing five hundred lines a day, compiling 
 (largely from the poets) more than seven hundred books, 
 and, it is supposed, expanded portions of the teachings 
 of the earlier Stoics, without, however, departing very 
 essentially from the doctrines put forth by Zeno. " By 
 Chrysippus the Stoic teaching was brought to complete- 
 ness ; and when he died, in the year 206 e.g., the form 
 was in every respect fixed in which Stoicism would be 
 
 1 Diog. Laert., Life of Chrysippus (Trans, in Bohn's Class Lib.). 
 
 ' " This philosopher used to delight in proposing questions of this sort : 
 The person who reveals the mysteries to the uninitiated commits a sin : 
 the hierophant reveals them to the uninitiated : therefore the hierophant 
 commits sin. . . Again, if you say anything, what you say comes out of 
 your mouth ; but you say a wagon : therefore a wagon comes out of your 
 mouth." Diog. Laert. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. I99 
 
 handed down for the next following centuries."^ Othci 
 eminent Stoics were Aristo of Chios, who repudiated 
 all philosophy but ethical philosophy ; Herillus of Car- 
 thage, who declared knowledge to be the chief good, and 
 opposed Zeno in some points ; a certain Dionysius, who 
 inclined to the doctrines of the Cyrenaics, etc. 
 
 Stoic Conception of the Nature and Parts of Philosophy!^ 
 — It is characteristic of the Stoic philosophers that, 
 dividing philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics,^ they 
 laid the chief stress upon ethics, conceiving the real as 
 that which acts on, or can be acted on by, us. The 
 historical source of this we are to look for, most proba- 
 bly, in the conditions of the education of philosophers, 
 as well as the general conditions of the times. The 
 Stoics were, (in other words) intellectual descendants 
 and representatives of the earlier Cynic schools, with 
 a large infusion, no doubt, of the dialectico-sceptical 
 spirit of the Megarian school and the Academy. The 
 general relations between logic, physics, and ethics 
 they conceived as follows : The chief good is virtue ; 
 virtue is " life according to nature " (a saying of Speu- 
 sippus and Xenocrates) ; a true life according to nature, 
 must depend upon the having a right conception of 
 nature ; but a true conception of nature is reached 
 only in a certain way — by a certain method, and by 
 the application of a certain standard, or criterion. The 
 science of the good is ethics ; of nature, physics ; of 
 methods and the criterion of knowledge, logic. Hence, 
 
 ' Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. 
 2 Life of Zeno, pp. 274-276. 
 
 ^ " Cleanthes says there are six divisions of reason, according to philoso- 
 phy ; dialectics, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology." Diog. Laert. 
 
200 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 though ethics is highest, and in one sense, first, it is in 
 another sense last, presupposing physics, which, in turn, 
 presupposes logic. Zeno and Chrysippus compared 
 philosophy to an animal ; logic being bone and sinews, 
 physics the flesh, and ethics the soul. 
 
 Stoic Logic. — With the Stoics logic is the science 
 not only of thought but of expression — a corollary of 
 their leading thought (taken in its simplicity) that the 
 end of man is action, i.e., to be really and externally 
 what he is virtually and internally. The Stoic logic, 
 therefore, included much that now falls in the domain 
 of grammar ; but it also included what now belongs to 
 formal logic, and the theory of cognition, in the nar- 
 rower sense, or theory of the sources of ideas and the 
 criteria of knowledge. By some of the Stoics, however, 
 logic was declared to have for its parts, — rhetoric, " the 
 science conversant about speaking well concerning mat- 
 ters which admit of detailed narrative " and dialectic, 
 the science of arguing correctly in discussions, which 
 can be carried on by question and answer [Chrysippus] 
 ... a knowledge of what is true and false, and neither 
 one thing nor the other,^ etc. Dialectic has two parts : 
 one dealing with ideas, and the other with the expres- 
 sion of ideas. 
 
 Origin of Ideas.^ — All ideas, according to the Stoics, 
 originate from sensation, or the working of the mind 
 upon what is given in sensation. The soul, Zeno held, is 
 in sensation affected by external objects, as wax is by the 
 seal that is pressed upon it. Perceptions (tpavraa-iat) 
 
 ' Diog. Laert. 
 
 ^ Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, pp. 277 and following. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 201 
 
 are impressions upon or in the soul (ruTrcoo-et? ev ■^vxv)- 
 Chrysippus preferred to say that perceptions, both ex- 
 ternal and internal, are changes of the soul {erepaxreK; 
 ■<^v)(fi<;), to regard perception as active rather than pas- 
 sive ; i.e., as s. grasping {KaTak'r]->^i<i) of the object instead 
 of a being impressed by it. Perceptions remaining in 
 the soul after the act of perception become memories, 
 which taken in their unity, or as a whole, become expe- 
 rience, this in turn being the basis of judgment, or belief 
 transcending sensation. From perceptions there arise 
 spontaneously conceptions or general notions which the 
 Stoics termed " common ideas " (koivuI evvoiai, or irpo- 
 \7ji|r6{9). General notions may be produced, by a con- 
 sciously directed act of the mind. As to the special 
 processes (as distinguished from media or sources) by 
 which ideas are gotten, the Stoic theory is as follows : 
 "All our thoughts are formed either by direct percep- 
 tion or by similarity, or analogy, or transposition, or 
 combination, or opposition. By direct perception we 
 perceive those things which are objects of sense ; by 
 similarity those which start from some point present to 
 our senses ; as for instance, we form an idea of Socrates 
 from his likeness. We draw our conclusions by analogy 
 adopting either an increased idea of the thing as of 
 Tityus' or the Cyclopes ; or a diminished idea as of a 
 pigmy. So, too, the idea of the centre of the world 
 was one derived by analogy from what we perceived to 
 be the case of the smaller spheres. We use transposi- 
 tion when we fancy eyes in a man's breast ; combination 
 when we take in the idea of a centaur ; opposition when 
 we turn our thoughts to death. Some ideas arise from 
 
202 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 comparison, — for instance, from a comparison of words 
 *and places." ^ 
 
 The Criterion of Truth in Ideas? — -According to 
 Chrysippus and others the criterion of knowledge is 
 perception : we ktiow only what we perceive (by sense) ; 
 only those ideas contain certain knowledge for us which 
 are ideas of real objects. (General notions contain no 
 reference to reality, are merely subjective.) What ideas 
 these are, can be known with certainty only by the 
 wise man. But real perceptions, or the ideas of real 
 objects ((f>avTaa-lai, KaTaXTj-TrnKai), possess greater dis- 
 tinctness than others, a certain power to compel belief 
 or assent. That other ideas might also possess such 
 distinctness and power to compel assent, the Stoics did 
 not deny. 
 
 System and Logical Method. — The Stoic theory of 
 knowledge and of conceptions included the idea of a 
 science as a system of ideas. But to only one branch 
 of systematic method did they give but little attention ; 
 viz., deduction, in the theory of which they made some 
 improvements. They particularly emphasized the syl- 
 logism, the doctrine of which they held to be the most 
 important part of dialectic, on the ground that it shows 
 what is capable of demonstration, aids in forming the 
 judgment, and gives scientific character to our knowl- 
 edge. On the subject of propositions and argumenta- 
 tion, the Stoics laid down numerous distinctions, some 
 of which now seem trivial, useless, or irrelevant to 
 what is known as formal logic.^ They laid particular 
 
 ^ Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno. (Trans, p. 278.) 
 * Ibid., p. 276. 8 Ibid., pp. 282-289. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 2O3 
 
 stress upon hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms. 
 It is, however, not quite correct to say ^ that the Stoicsj 
 introduced both the hypothetical and the disjunctive 
 syllogism. The former, or a near approach to it, may 
 be found explained in Aristotle's Prior Analytics? 
 
 The Categories. — • The categories admitted by the 
 Stoics are (besides the supreme conception of Being, or, 
 rather, according to the Stoics, Something) four in num- 
 ber : subject-matter, or substance, to WoKeiixevov ; qual- 
 ity, TO iroLov ; condition, to tto)? e')(^ov ; relation, ro irpoi; 
 Ti TTftj? e^ov. Quality seems to correspond, in general, to 
 Aristotle's "form." Real quality is of two kinds : com- 
 mon, or general (xoti'w?), and peculiar, or special (t'StoJ?). 
 Examples of to ttco? c'^ov are size, motion, color, etc. 
 Right and left, sonship and fatherhood, are examples of to 
 TT/joV Tt TTw? e^ov. Tho four categories have a natural in- 
 terrelation. Substance cannot exist apart from quality, 
 i.e., real substance is definite. Condition presupposes 
 quality, and relation condition. Zeller has pointed out 
 three regards in which this theory of categories differs 
 from Aristotle's : ^ the number of the categories,* their 
 relation to each other, and their relation to a higher con- 
 ception. To these may be added a fourth : the catego- 
 ries of the Stoics are not so purely logical, or conceptual, 
 as the Aristotelian categories. The Stoic ." substance " 
 is, as we shall immediately see, matter either universal 
 or particular ; quality is purely material in origin, being 
 due to a tension caused by air currents. 
 
 ' As Zeller (and Benn after him) says. 
 ^ See above, p. 125. 
 
 ° See Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 95. 
 * Aristotle's " action " and " passion " are preserved in the Stoic " ac- 
 tive" and "passive" principles of the world, i.e., "matter" and "force." 
 
204 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Physics, or the Theory of Nature} — The physics of the 
 Stoics is also their metaphysics, for, though they could 
 not avoid palpable inconsistencies with fact in so doing, 
 they held material being to be the whole of being. 
 This idea is in harmony with their sensational theory 
 of knowledge, apparently a misconception of the Aris- 
 totelian, and, of course, with their ethical doctrine that 
 reality is that which acts on us or is acted on by us. 
 God, the Soul, the Good, virtue, vice, emotion, judg- 
 ments are to the Stoics material, though time, space, 
 place, expression are admitted to be immaterial. Sub- 
 stance, TO viroKeifi^vov, is either universal matter or the 
 matter of individual objects. Quality, ro ttoiov, is due 
 to air currents circulating through bodies. The world has 
 a double nature ; matter is capable of acting as well as 
 being acted on ; in other words, the world is a duality 
 of matter and force. Matter, the passive principle, is 
 without any distinctive quality. The active principle, 
 inherent in the passive, matter, is reason, or God, con- 
 ceived, however, as material. By whatever name called, 
 — mind, soul, reason, logos ^ (Xoyos), fate, law, nature, 
 providence, — God is the all-pervading fire, the soul and 
 seminal principle of the world, and is distinct from it 
 only in abstraction : the distinction between them is a 
 distinction without a difference. The world is, there- 
 fore, a living thing, pervaded by soul, — in different 
 degrees in different parts. It is one, finite, and spheri- 
 cal. Exterior to it is a boundless (incorporeal) vacuum, 
 there being no vacuum in the world. The world was 
 produced by God out of his own substance, and will be 
 
 1 Diog. Laert., Li/e of Zeno, pp. 307, 318. 
 
 2 An idea common in the latest period of Greek philosophy. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 205 
 
 absorbed again into that. Immediately afterwards a 
 new world will be created, and so on in infinitum. In 
 the creation of the world were generated, first, the four 
 elements, fire, air, water, and earth, which are, all, " es- 
 sence without any distinctive quality." " The fire is 
 highest, and that is called sether ; in which first of all 
 the sphere was generated in which the fixed stars are 
 set, then that in which the planets revolve ; after that 
 the air, then the water ; and the sediment, as it were, of 
 all is the earth, which is placed in the centre of the 
 rest." ^ The water has a spherical form and the same 
 centre as the earth ; so, too, has the air surrounding it. 
 Water and earth constitute the body of nature, fire and 
 air its soul. The successive worlds that are by the 
 Deity put forth from, and taken back into, his own 
 substance are in all respects similar. Throughout all 
 changes law abides. The world is, by virtue of the 
 unity of matter and force, an organic whole. There is 
 perfect adaptation of means to ends. Plants have their 
 end in animals, animals in man, the whole, as a whole, 
 in gods and men. Imperfection and evil are only appar- 
 ent, attach not to the whole (which is organically per- 
 fect), but to the details of the constitution of things. 
 The soul of man is material. "Whatever influences 
 the body and is influenced by it in turn, whatever is 
 united with the body and again separated from it, must 
 be corporeal. How can the soul be other than cor- 
 poreal } Whatever has extension in three dimensions 
 is corporeal, and this is the case with the soul, since 
 it extends in three dimensions over the whole body. 
 Moreover, thought and motion are due to animal life. 
 Animal life is matured and kept in health by the breath 
 
 ' Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 309. 
 
206 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of life. Experience also proves that mental qualities 
 are propagated by generation, and that they must be 
 consequently connected with a corporeal substratum."^ 
 The central seat of the soul is the breast. The parts 
 of the soul are the five senses, the generative power, the 
 power of speech, and the intellect. The last-named is 
 the principal part, and is the seat of personal identity. 
 The emotions, or " passions," — classified as grief, de- 
 sire, fear, and pleasure — were termed by the Stoics 
 "perturbations," and were declared to be merely judg- 
 ments. Error in thought is a consequence of these 
 perturbations. Being a part of the universal soul, the 
 individual human soul is not free in will, though it is 
 subject to moral responsibility. The soul, though cor- 
 poreal, lives after death, but will at the end of the world 
 (cycle) cease to be as an individual, being dissolved in 
 the universal soul whence it sprung. 
 
 Ethics: its Parts? — Ethical speculation was exten- 
 sively practised by the Stoics. According to Diogenes, 
 — Chrysippus and others, but not Zeno nor Cleanthes, 
 divided ethics into " the topic of inclination [or natural 
 tendency], the topic of good and bad, the topic of the 
 passions, the topic of virtue, the topic of the chief good, 
 and of primary estimation, and of actions : the topic of 
 what things are becoming, and of exhortation and dis- 
 suasion." We shall treat here of the Chief Good, the 
 Nature of Virtue, the Classes of Virtue, the Classes of 
 Goods, the Wise Man, and the Stoic attitude towards 
 the Popular Religion. 
 
 The Chief Good: Life according to Nature. — Nature 
 
 ^ Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. 
 ^ Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, pp. 290-307. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 20/ 
 
 working as an artist produces in each thing a certain 
 inclination, or tendency, to preserve a certain form of 
 existence. "The first and dearest object" of every 
 animal (man included) is the preservation of its own 
 existence and its consciousness of its own existence. 
 This is its life according to nature ; this is virtue and 
 the chief good, ^- for virtue and the chief good can be 
 only life according to nature. But what, precisely, is life 
 according to nature .■" On this point there was a differ- 
 ence of opinion among the Stoics. By "nature" must 
 we understand our human or our universal nature, or 
 both ? Zeno, it appears, had adopted, or, at least, em- 
 phasized, merely the first of these three conceptions of 
 nature ; but in the course of the development of Sto- 
 icism as a theory the second and then the last became 
 predominant, the last being held by Chrysippus. "Chry- 
 sippus," says Diogenes,^ "understands that the nature 
 in a manner corresponding to which we ought to live is 
 both the common nature, and also human nature in par- 
 ticular, but Cleanthes will not admit of any other than the 
 common one alone as that to which people ought to live 
 in a manner according ; and repudiates all mention of 
 a particular nature." In the " life according to nature " 
 is included also, we shall find, life in and according to 
 a social order, for nature is but a synonym for reason, 
 and society is but a natural off-spring of reason, the 
 common nature of mankind. 
 
 Nature of Virtue. — Now a life according to nature is 
 a life determined by that which takes cognizance of 
 reason in the world, viz., real knowledge. Virtue, in 
 
 ^ Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 291. This is a point in which Cleanthes 
 did get beyond Zeno, who apparently stood nearer to the Cynics. 
 
208 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 other words, is knowledge. With the Stoics the dis- 
 tinction made by Aristotle, and even by Plato, between 
 virtues based on knowledge, on the one hand, and on 
 the other, natural and acquired virtues, or virtues based 
 on habit "joined with reason," does not hold. Strictly 
 speaking, the emotions have nothing to do with virtue : 
 they are, if any thing, mere hindrances to it, "perturba- 
 tions," from which the wise or virtuous man is entirely 
 free. Virtue is, rather, a condition of apathy (dirddeia). 
 But though virtue is in its origin intellectual, it is in 
 actuality something more than that : it is action, — 
 action based on knowledge. The Stoic conception of vir- 
 tue differs considerably, it thus appears, from the Socratic 
 conception and the conception held by Plato and Aristotle. 
 The Stoics differ from Socrates, also, in holding that 
 wrong-doing must be classed among things voluntary. 
 They assert that vice is the result not of ignorance 
 merely but of emotional perturbation, and that man has 
 and must exercise control over the emotions, — gener- 
 ally by suppressing them. There are no degrees in 
 virtue 1 (but then, at the same time, a distinction is 
 made by the Stoics between an action that is merely 
 fitting, KaOfjKov, and one that results from a virtuous 
 disposition, KUTopOwfia) ; and there is no mean between 
 virtue and vice, a "stick must be either straight or 
 crooked." ^ According to Cleanthes (with whom, 
 however, Chrysippus disagrees at this point) virtue can- 
 not be lost, " on account of the firm perceptions which 
 it plants in men."^ 
 
 Classes of Virtue.^ — Regarding the classification of 
 
 1 Ueberweg's Hist, of Phil., Vol. I. p. 200. 
 
 '' Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 305. 
 
 ' Ibid. * Ibid., pp. 292, 293. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 209 
 
 the virtues, there was a difference of opinion among the 
 Stoics. One divided virtues into speculative and prac- 
 tical ; another into logical, natural, and ethical. Some 
 said there were four virtues ; others, and among them 
 Cleanthes and Chrysippus, more than four ; one, Allo- 
 phanes, asserted that there was but one virtue, viz., 
 prudence. Aristo thought that what was considered a 
 variety of virtues was more properly a variety of objects 
 with which virtue, in itself one, was concerned. Chry- 
 sippus held that there were distinct conditions of soul 
 constituting distinct virtues. Those, or at least some 
 of those, who held that there is a plurality of virtues, 
 held also that some of the virtues are "primitive" and 
 some " derived " ; that the " primitive " virtues are 
 "prudence, manly courage, justice, and temperance," 
 and that, "subordinate to these as a kind of species 
 contained in them are magnanimity, continence, endur- 
 ance, presence of mind, wisdom in council." ^ That the 
 "virtues reciprocally follow one another and that he 
 who has one has all"^ was admitted even by Chrysippus. 
 Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and other Stoics agreed in think- 
 ing that virtue could be taught.^ 
 
 Classes of Guods : the " Summum Bonum." — Virtue, 
 we have seen, was with the Stoics the chief good, or 
 summum bonum. The Stoics did not admit that, as 
 Aristotle had held, there was any thing to be added 
 to virtue to constitute happiness, or the highest good ; 
 nor, as they admitted no degrees in virtue, did they 
 admit degrees in goods : " All goods are equal . . . every 
 good is to be desired in the highest degree . . . and 
 
 I Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno. " Ibid., p. 304. 
 
 s Ibid., p. 292. 
 
2IO GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 admits of no relaxation and of no extension." ^ Some 
 things, however, are good in themselves ("final goods "), 
 and others are good because they lead to final goods 
 ("efficient goods"), others still are both efficient and 
 final. The Stoics acknowledged another distinction 
 which may, perhaps, be regarded as a softening (re- 
 quired by practical necessity) of their rigid rule con- 
 cerning goods. All things are good, bad, or indifferent. 
 Things positively bad are the vices, the diametrical 
 opposites of the virtues : folly, intemperance, cowardice, 
 injustice. Things indifferent are things that are 
 "neither beneficial nor injurious, such as life, health, 
 pleasure, beauty, strength, riches, good reputation, 
 nobility of birth, and their contraries, death, disease, 
 labor, disgrace, weakness, poverty, and bad reputation, 
 baseness of birth, and the like." ^ Of things indifferent 
 some, it is evident, are objects of preference (■Trporjy/j.eva), 
 because they " concur in producing a well-regulated 
 life," and others are things to be avoided or rejected 
 {dTroTrporjyfiiva), because they are of the opposite char- 
 acter. "Every good is expedient, and necessary, and 
 profitable, and useful, and serviceable, and beautiful, 
 and advantageous, and eligible, and just : expedient 
 inasmuch as it brings things which by their happening 
 do us good ; necessary inasmuch as it assists us in what 
 we have need to be assisted ; profitable inasmuch as it 
 repays all the care that is expended on it, and makes 
 a return with interest to our great advantage ; useful 
 inasmuch as it supplies us with what is of utility ; 
 serviceable because it does us service which is much 
 
 1 Diog. Laert., Zi/e of Zeno, p. 292. 2 Ibid., p. 296. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 211 
 
 praised ; beautiful because it is accurate in proportion 
 to the need we have of it and to the service it does ; 
 advantageous inasmuch as it is of such a character as 
 to confer advantage on us ; eligible because it is such 
 that we may rationally choose it; and just because it 
 is in accordance with law, and is an efficient cause of 
 union." ^ 
 
 The " Wise Man" — Now he who is the personal em- 
 bodiment of virtue — since all virtue is the same, we need 
 not say here perfect virtue — and who alone possesses 
 absolute goods, and is worthy to have the advantage of 
 all those " indifferent " things which are objects of " pref- 
 erence" is the wise man. The wise man is he who, 
 being perfect in his knowledge of the laws of the uni- 
 verse, above all passion, and completely governed by 
 reason, is perfectly self-contained and self-satisiied, — a 
 fit companion for the gods, yes, even for Zeus himself. 
 But the idea of the perfectly virtuous and self-sufficient 
 individual man was in part necessarily abandoned by 
 the Stoics. For, in the first place, they were obliged to 
 admit that in reality there had been, and was, no such 
 man ; even the most exemplary men, Socrates, Diogenes, 
 Antisthenes, had made great improvement in virtue ; 
 and, in the second place, though by their affinity, his- 
 torical and logical, with the Cynics they were inclined 
 to regard the individual as self-sufficient, they were 
 obliged to admit that by the very fact of his possessing 
 reason .the wise man is bound to his fellow-man, that he 
 must and will have friends, in whom he may see the 
 reflection of himself. They asserted, indeed, that the 
 
 1 Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 295. 
 
212 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 wise man was the only person worthy to have friends. 
 Again, the wise man will marry and beget children 
 (Zeno held that there should be " community " of wives 
 and children among wise men) ; he will also, according 
 to Chrysippus, take active part in affairs of state, for 
 he will desire to restrain vice and excite men to virtue.^ 
 And yet to realize as fully as possible the conception 
 of individual independence, the Stoics made the wise 
 man a citizen of the world, not binding him too closely 
 by ties of family, friendship, or nationality. This idea 
 hit the mean between the crudeness of Cynicism, pure 
 and simple, and the practice of ordinary social life in a 
 nation or a state. (The best political constitution is a 
 mixed one, "combined democracy and kingly power 
 and aristocracy.") Towards the universe, as a whole, 
 and the power therein, the attitude of the wise man is 
 that of resignation and obedience. In this attitude he 
 is but acting out his own true nature. "The virtuous 
 man . . . will honor God by resigning his will to the 
 divine will ; the divine will he will think better than his 
 own will ; he will remember that in all circumstances 
 we must follow destiny, but that it is the wise man's 
 prerogative to follow it of his own accord ; that there is 
 only one way to happiness and independence, — that of 
 willing nothing except what is in the nature of things 
 and will realize itself of our will." ^ But the Stoics af- 
 firmed, on the other hand, that " a wise man will ration- 
 ally take himself out of life, either for the sake of his 
 country or of his friends, or if he be in bitter pain, or 
 under the affliction of mutilation, or incurable disease."^ 
 
 1 Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 303. 
 
 2 Zelier's S'oics, Epicureans, aud Sceptics. 
 * Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 306. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 21 3 
 
 The Stoics and the Popular Religion. — The Stoics 
 did not approve of the ordinary forms and instrumental- 
 ities of religion. To them the world was full of the 
 Deity. Their philosophy was thus a religious, or at 
 least a theological, philosophy. They gave the names 
 of gods to "fruits, wine, and other gifts" of the gods, 
 did not forbid the worship of ancient heroes, and on the 
 hypothesis that God was everywhere accessible, prac- 
 tised the "art of divination" and prophecy, though 
 there was not perfect unanimity among them in regard 
 to this last point. They had a peculiar over-fondness 
 for rationalizing the ancient myths, or giving them plain 
 and consistent meanings.^ To them there was reason 
 in everything. 
 
 Historical Sources of Stoicism. — The chief historical 
 sources of Stoicism have already been in part indicated. 
 In logic and dialectics the Stoics were followers of Aris- 
 totle and the Cynics. Their neglect of induction is 
 quite in keeping with their subjective individualistic 
 tendencies generally. In physics they were followers 
 of Heraclitus, Socrates, and Aristotle ; their fire, or 
 logos, or world-spirit being Heraclitic, their teleology 
 being Socratic (not Aristotelian), their ' active ' and 
 ' passive ' principles, ' matter ' and ' force ' being quasi- 
 Aristotelian. In ethics they followed Socrates, the 
 Cynics, and the philosophers of the Old Academy, their 
 leading doctrine, ' Follow nature,' having been prac- 
 ticed by the Cynics and enunciated by certain philoso- 
 phers of the Academy (Xenocrates, Speusippus, and 
 Polemo). On the whole, the Stoics cannot be credited 
 
 ^ See Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. 
 
214 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 with a large degree of intellectual originality ; they 
 were, rather, apostles of moral force, a certain (limited) 
 ethical individuality. 
 
 Result. — It remains to examine (briefly) the connec- 
 tion, coherency, and validity of the leading Stoic con- 
 ceptions. A distinct breach in the Stoic system is 
 involved in the fact that whereas reason is held to be 
 universal and knowable, and sense is held to be the 
 source and criterion of knowledge, it is denied that 
 there is a rational universal element in sense. Another 
 incoherency, closely akin to this, is that while sense is 
 held to be the only source of knowledge, the processes 
 of thought are treated as something essential. An 
 obvious inconsistency in the Stoic physics is the position 
 that only material things are real and the admission that 
 certain immaterial things, e.g., time, space, expression, 
 are real. Of a similar character is the idea that the 
 soul is corporeal. Here the Stoics are about on a level 
 with the Hylozoists. The conception of organic unity 
 is given here too simple a form. The unity of body 
 and soul cannot be that of simple identity or of mate- 
 rialistic organicity (if we may be allowed such a word) ; 
 it is a unity in which difference is contained, an ideal, 
 or speculative, vinity. There is, too, an unexplained 
 paradox, to say the least, in the Stoic idea that, though 
 the individual is merely a part of universal reason and 
 is subject to necessity, he is morally responsible. In 
 the cardinal ethical doctrine of the Stoics, Live accord- 
 ing to nature, there is, as the development of thought 
 in the history of the school proves, a certain instability 
 and inconsistency. Is nature the individual human 
 nature, the universal nature, or a union of the two.' 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 215 
 
 The later Stoics, as we have seen, took the last-men- 
 tioned view of the case, thus solving the conception. 
 The mere individual in himself is practically nothing 
 and becomes nothing if he be absorbed in the bare uni- 
 versal. Again, virtue is declared to be the only good, 
 and yet there are admitted to be, besides things that 
 are positively bad, a class of things that are " indiffer- 
 ent," some of which are "objects of preference," and 
 useful and pleasant to the wise man ; and an act fit- 
 tingly done is to be distinguished from one done with 
 right intention. Further, the sphere of the wise man 
 is said to be pure reason, and yet he is subject to emo- 
 tion, at least to the extent of having to repress and sup- 
 press it. Moreover the wise man is self-sufficient, but 
 he needs friends and should take an active part in public 
 affairs, and is dependent upon and benefited by the 
 possession of external goods. Furthermore, all virtuous 
 men are absolutely virtuous, all bad men are absolutely 
 bad ; but Socrates, Antisthenes, and Diogenes, who are 
 not perfect, are not bad. Finally, the wise man is a fit 
 companion for Zeus, and yet his attitude towards the 
 universal order should be that of resignation and sub- 
 mission. In general, the Stoic system is full of paradox : 
 instead of harmonizing or reconciling the natural antith- 
 esis of sense and reason, the individual and universal, 
 it brought the members of the antithesis into sharper 
 opposition, and this, too, in spite of the obvious unity 
 aimed at by the conception of the world as an organic 
 whole and of the individual as being universally self- 
 suflflcient.i 
 
 ' See below, p. 246. 
 
2l6 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 § i8. 
 
 ' Epicurus and his School. — Epicurus, the founder of 
 the Epicurean School, was born in Samos, in the year 
 342 or 341 B.C. Stimulated to inquiry (according to 
 one account) by the reading of Hesiod, and failing to 
 get satisfactory answers to his inquiries (concerning 
 chaos) from his instructors, he began, at the age of 
 fourteen, the study of philosophy. At the age of 
 eighteen he went to Athens, and remained there as a 
 student of philosophy until, at the age of thirty, he 
 began teaching it, first at Mytelene, then at Lampsacus, 
 and finally (about 306 b.c.) at Athens, where he taught for 
 thirty-six years. His knowledge of and regard for 
 other philosophers was slight. He had received some 
 instruction in the doctrines of Plato, and thought him 
 " golden," and in those of Democritus, whom he de- 
 risively called Leocritus (humbug i"), but whose physical 
 theories he borrowed freely ; had perhaps been a pupil 
 of Xenocrates and Nausiphanes, a Democritean, who 
 had been a pupil of Pyrrho, the Sceptic ; he ridiculed 
 Aristotle as a debauchee, glutton, and vendor of drugs ; 
 called Protagoras a "porter," Heraclitus a "disturber," 
 the Cynics the " enemies " of Greece ; declared that 
 the Dialecticians (the Stoics i") were "eaten up with 
 envy." He is said to have thought highly of Anax- 
 agoras, though it is hard to see why ; there are no traces 
 of any influence of Anaxagoras upon his thinking. 
 The same may be said with regard to his admiration of 
 Plato. His opinion of other philosophers is indicative 
 of his attitude towards things in general, which is nega- 
 tive. His criticism of other philosophers, it would 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 217 
 
 appear, and doubtless, also, the character of his doc- 
 trines, excited towards him hostile feeling and comment, 
 and there were those who spoke of him as an extreme 
 voluptuary ; but Diogenes Laertius declares him to 
 have been a man of excessive modesty (a modesty that 
 caused him to "avoid affairs of state"), of filial grati- 
 tude, of philanthropy and piety ; to have been warmly 
 regarded by very numerous friends, and honored by 
 his country with brazen statues. He died in 270 B.C., 
 made cheerful in spirits, in the midst of great physical 
 suffering, by the " recollection " of "his philosophical 
 contemplations." He bequeathed the garden in which 
 he had met his disciples in philosophical converse to 
 the surviving members of his school and to all coming 
 after them who should choose to " abide and dwell in 
 it " and maintain his doctrines. Between him and the 
 members of the school there was a very strong personal 
 tie, and his personality, as well as his dogmas, was 
 deeply impressed upon their minds. His dogmas em- 
 bodied in brief statements, and, regarded as common 
 intellectual possessions {icvpiai So^ai), were committed 
 to memory by his disciples and were handed down 
 traditionally. Diogenes Laertius ^ speaks of the " per- 
 petual succession of his school, which, when every 
 other school decayed, continued without any falling off, 
 and produced countless numbers of philosophers, suc- 
 ceeding one another without any interruption." In his 
 productivity as a writer he almost rivalled Chrysippus. 
 He boasted of the originality of his writings, of the 
 
 1 See Lives of the Philosophers (Bohn's Class. Lib.) ; Life of Epicurus, 
 pp. 424-479. 
 
2l8 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 perspicuity of their style and freedom from rhetorical 
 constraints and ornaments. But he was guilty of a 
 neglect of true rhetorical method which has justly 
 brought down upon his style the condemnation of 
 critics, ancient and r.nodern. Of eminent Epicureans 
 there should be mentioned the following : Hermarchus 
 of Mytelene, president of the school after the death of 
 Epicurus ; Metrodorus and PolycBnus of Lampsacus ; 
 Apollodorus ; Zeno of Sidon ; Lucretius, the Latin poet, 
 who has followed Epicurus closely in essential points 
 in his poem De Rerutn Natura. Among the immediate 
 personal disciples of Epicurus were several womeH,^ a 
 fact that gave occasion to rival schools for disagreeable 
 gossip about the Epicurean school. 
 
 The Parts of Philosophy. — Epicurus divides philoso- 
 phy into three parts : Canonics, Physics, and Ethics. 
 Canonics is the science of the criteria of truth. It con- 
 tains nothing of dialectic, for Epicurus declared that the 
 " correspondence of words with things was sufficient for 
 the philosopher." Epicurus regarded it as scarcely more 
 than a mere introduction to physics, which in turn was 
 held subsidiary to ethics, for Epicureanism, like Stoicism, 
 Cynicism, and indeed most of the other post-Socratic 
 systems in ancient philosophy, was primarily (and one- 
 sidedly) ethical in its aim. There seems, in fact, to have 
 been a strong tendency to make, or, rather, a habit of 
 making, two parts of philosophy. Physics {including 
 Canonics) and Ethics.^ It will be seen in detail, as we 
 proceed, how the physics, very largely, and the canon- 
 
 ^ The Leontion of Landor's Imaginary Conversation, Epicurra, Leon- 
 Hon, and Ternissa, bears the name of one of these. 
 ^ Diog. Laert., Life of Epicurus, p. 434. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHV. 2ig 
 
 ics less so, are determined by the leading ethical doctrines 
 of Epicurus, viz., that the end of human existence is 
 pleasure. It cannot be said, however, that there is a 
 deduction of the parts of his system from the notion of 
 pleasure, and to attempt such a deduction here would 
 convey a wrong idea of the tone and mode of his 
 thinking. 
 
 Canonics: Criteria of Truth in Ideas} — The criteria of 
 truth in ideas are, according to Epicurus, the " senses," 
 preconceptions, or anticipations (TrpoXijylreK), or "recol- 
 lection of an external object often perceived anteriorly," 
 and the "passions." "But," says Diogenes, "the Epicu- 
 reans, in general, add also the perceptive impressions of 
 the intellect." Of these criteria the senses are primary : 
 " Every notion proceeds from the senses, either directly 
 or in consequence of some analogy or proportion, or com- 
 bination." The senses are entirely pure of all influence 
 of memory, reason, or any other mental operation: 
 they merely receive impressions from external causes, 
 adding nothing, subtracting nothing. Each sense and 
 sensation, furthermore, is independent of every other. 
 One sensation cannot be a criterion for another resem- 
 bling it or differing from it. The senses are, therefore, 
 their own guarantee : reason cannot pronounce upon 
 them ; rather are the senses the foundation of reason. 
 An error in perception must, therefore, not be attributed 
 to the senses, but to judgment, or inference, (wrongly 
 added preconceptions or "perceptive impressions of the 
 intellect ") attending sensation.^ An example of a precon- 
 ception or anticipation is the idea that arises in the 
 mind immediately upon pronouncing the word "man" 
 1 Diog. Laert., Li/e of Epicurus, pp. 435, 436. 2 Ibid., p. 435. 
 
220 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in the sentence, " Man is such and such a nature." The 
 idea is one we " owe to the preceding operation of the 
 senses," and it is to be depended upon as a correct one. 
 Such an idea is a necessary condition to every percep- 
 tion or judgment. (That is, " representation " is a con- 
 dition of "presentation" and judgment.) "To be able 
 to affirm that what we see at a distance is a horse or an 
 ox, we must have some anticipation in our minds which 
 makes us acquainted with the form of a horse or an ox. 
 We could not give names to things if we had not a pre- 
 Hminary notion of what things were." The certainty of 
 our judgment depends upon our properly applying our 
 anticipations. "Error and false judgment always 
 depend upon the supposition that a preconceived 
 idea will be confirmed or at all events will not be 
 overturned by evidence." The passions are pleasure 
 and pain, the former being natural, and the other for- 
 eign, to human nature. They are the criteria of ethical 
 judgment; i.e., (according to Epicurus), judgment em- 
 ployed in determining what things should be chosen and 
 what avoided. "Opinion" (So^a) and "supposition" 
 (uTr6\r]-\]ri<;) are partly true and partly false : true when 
 supported, not contradicted, by evidence ; false if con- 
 tradicted by any evidence. It is often necessary to 
 suspend the judgment. There is a certain degree of 
 truth and objectivity in dreams. 
 
 Canonics: Method in the Study of Nature} — Now as 
 to method in the study of nature, we must proceed 
 "from the known to the unknown." First, there must 
 be an exact notion for each term, or there will result 
 mere "verbal demonstration in infinitum." Leading 
 
 1 Diog. Laert., Life of Epicurus, pp. 437, 438, 456, 459, etc. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 22 7 
 
 terms must represent indemonstrable notions ; i.e., no- 
 tions true according to some one or more of the criteria. 
 We must be able to bring into our investigation, when 
 necessary, the "impressions we receive in the presence 
 of objects." We may pass to the unknown by analogy 
 and by induction, but it is necessary to be on our 
 guard against false analogies and against accepting un- 
 verified induction as equal in value to immediate cer- 
 tainty. Proper analogies are those founded on appear- 
 ances, and are to be held superior to hypotheses. Now 
 appearances may be susceptible of different " explana- 
 tions," and it is a rule, made and insisted on by Epicu- 
 rus, that we must guard against supposing that there is 
 only one way of explaining phenomena. Phenomena 
 may have many different causes and require as many 
 different explanations. The Epicureans gave little atten- 
 tion to deductive logic as such. 
 
 Physics : Aim and General Character} — Besides the 
 principles of method laid down in the canonic, physical 
 speculation must be conditioned by the idea that man's 
 chief end is happiness, and that, therefore, he requires 
 to know only so much as will preclude all ground for 
 disquietude of soul, — the fear of death, of dasmons, of 
 mysterious and unforeseen events. 
 
 First Principle. — The fundamental conception (mate- 
 rial principle) of physics is, according to Epicurus, that 
 nothing can come of nothing : the All has always been, 
 and always will be, such as it now is, since there is noth- 
 ing into which it can change, nor is there anything 
 which, entering it, can cause it to change. The uni- 
 
 ^ Diog. Laert., Life of Epicurus, pp. 438-466. 
 
222 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 verse is a material universe. Our senses bear testimony 
 to the existence of bodies ; and reasoning upon the tes- 
 timony of the senses (for the' senses, we have seen, are 
 the foundation of reason) we infer the existence of 
 space, for if there were not " that which we call vacuum, 
 or space, or intangible nature, there would be nothing 
 in which the bodies could be contained or across which 
 they could move, as they really do move." We cannot, 
 in other words, perceive, or conceive by the aid of infer- 
 ence or analogy, any universal quality or thing that is 
 not body, or quality of body, or vacuum. 
 
 Atoms. — Bodies perceptible to the senses are compos- 
 ite and dissoluble. But there must be something " solid 
 and indestructible " that remains after their dissolution ; 
 because if we suppose bodies to be divisible in infinitum, 
 we are brought to the absurdity of " reducing everything 
 to nothing," and consequently of saying that something 
 can come of nothing. Composite bodies, then, have as 
 their element the atom. The atom, though not cogniz- 
 able by the senses, must have magnitude, it being solid 
 and destructible, and a part of that which has magni- 
 tude. But since the process of division of bodies may 
 conceivably be carried to an indefinite extent, we must 
 assign to the atom the smallest possible dimensions. 
 And in order to account for sensations and differences 
 of quality in bodies we must suppose that atoms differ 
 in magnitude. Again, it is impossible to account for 
 the vast variety of form in bodies without supposing a 
 great, an incalculable, variety in form among atoms. In 
 any particular finite body the number of atoms is finite : 
 in the entire universe the number is infinite, for the 
 universe, not being limited by anything, is infinite, and 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 223 
 
 body and vacuum are consequently infinite, because " if 
 the vacuum were infinite, the number of bodies being 
 finite, the bodies would not be able to rest in any place : 
 they would be transported about, scattered across the 
 infinite vacuum for want of any power to steady them- 
 selves, or to keep one another in their places by mutual 
 repulsion : if, on the other hand, the vacuum were finite, 
 the bodies being infinite, then the bodies clearly could 
 never be contained in the vacuum." Furthermore, atoms 
 have weight. Finally, the motion and the dissolution of 
 sensible bodies (which can be caused only by a knock- 
 ing together of the atoms) presuppose motion of the 
 atoms. The atoms, in fact, must have been continually 
 moving and with an equal rapidity from all eternity, 
 since the vacuum offers no more resistance to the light- 
 est than it does to the heaviest. Because of the differ- 
 ent weight of the atoms, some of them move downward, 
 some are pressed upward. Because of the " reciprocal 
 percussion of the atoms, some of them have a horizontal 
 movement to and fro." An atom has not any movement 
 perceptible to the senses. The motion of the atoms is 
 not due, as Democritus held, merely to natural neces- 
 sity, i.e., to their weight, but to a certain power of self- 
 movement, the ability, as it were, to "swerve a little" 
 from a straight, fixed, and otherwise necessary, line of 
 movement. Among the arguments employed by Lucre- 
 tius (who may be regarded as an authority for the Epi- 
 curean physical theories) is the following : "If all mo- 
 tion is. ever linked together, and a new motion ever 
 springs from another in a fixed order, and first begin- 
 nings do not, by swerving, make some commencement 
 of motion to break through the decrees of fate that 
 
224 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cause follow not cause from everlasting, — whence have 
 all living creatures here on earth, whence, I ask, has 
 been wrested from the fates the power by which we go 
 forward whither the will leads each, by which we like- 
 wise change the direction of our motions, neither at a 
 fixed time nor fixed place, but when and where the mind 
 itself has prompted? For, beyond a doubt, in these 
 things his own will makes for each a beginning, and 
 from this beginning notions are willed through the 
 limbs." ^ There is, however, no other cause of motion 
 in the atoms than that which is contained in themselves. 
 The distances of the atoms from one another vary, some 
 being great, others small. 
 
 Properties of Bodies. — The properties of bodies, such 
 as forms, colors, magnitude, weight, are not particular 
 substances (as the Stoics asserted), nor can it be said 
 that they have no reality at all. They cannot be con- 
 ceived as independent of the bodies, and must be con- 
 ceived when we form an idea of bodies. Of these there 
 are two classes : attributes, which constitute by their 
 union the " eternal substance and essence of the entire 
 body " ; and accidents, which are not entirely inherent 
 in bodies, but which, nevertheless, cannot be ranged 
 among the incorporeal and invisible things. "These 
 last, as they are not necessarily inherent in the idea of 
 a body," can be conceived only in the moment in which 
 they affect the senses. (Here we have, or appear to 
 have, the modern psychological distiriction between pri- 
 mary and secondary qualities of bodies. Democritus 
 had made the sam^ or a similar, distinction.) 
 
 1 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (Munro's Trans.), p. 34. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 225 
 
 The Visible Universe. — Of the worlds in distant space 
 we must reason very much as we do regarding bodies 
 that we " observe under our own eyes." Worlds and 
 all other objects that may be compared to those objects 
 " under our own eyes " have each been separated from 
 the infinite by a movement peculiar to itself,^ and they 
 will be destroyed, some more, others less, rapidly. Epi- 
 curus did not believe that any worlds were formed by 
 violent motions and crashings of other worlds, but by a 
 flowing together of atoms to form a nucleus, and a gath- 
 ering of "germs" about the nucleus thus formed. The 
 number of worlds is infinite ; but it is not reasonable to 
 suppose that the worlds are identical in form, or that 
 there are worlds of every possible form. There is no 
 increase or decrease of body in the universe as a whole. 
 The earth is suspended in the air. Lucretius explains 
 why the earth does not drop or sink from its place in 
 the centre of the world, as follows : " In order that the 
 earth may rest in the middle of the world, it is proper 
 that its weight should be lessened, and that it should 
 have another nature underneath it, conjoined from the 
 beginning of its existence and formed into one being 
 with the airy portions of the world in which it is em- 
 bodied and lives." The sun and the moon are in size 
 what they appear to the senses to be. They are not 
 reabsorbed into the whole. We must " beware " of sup- 
 posing that the heavenly phenomena — "the motions 
 and courses of the stars, the eclipse, their rising, set- 
 ting, etc." — are "produced by any particular being 
 which has regulated or whose business it is to regulate, 
 
 1 See Zeller. 
 
226 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 for the future, the order of the world, a being immortal 
 and perfectly happy : for the cares and anxieties, the 
 benevolence and the anger, far from being compatible 
 with felicity are, on the contrary, the consequence of 
 weakness, of fear, and the want which a thing has of 
 something else." The truth is that these phenomena 
 are governed by a " kind of necessity " ; they have an 
 order that was given them at the first organization of 
 the universe. And yet we must not try to explain these 
 phenomena in accordance with any idea of uniformity 
 of cause : of supposing that there is but " one single 
 mode of production " and of rejecting "all other expla- 
 nations which are founded on probability." The eclipses 
 of the sun and moon, for example, may be due to the 
 fact that these bodies extinguish themselves, or to the 
 fact that other bodies interpose between them and us ; 
 lightning may be the effect of a " shock and collision of 
 the clouds," of the lighting up of the clouds by the winds, 
 of the mutual pressure of the clouds, or of the pressure 
 of the winds against them, or of various conditions. 
 Susceptible of explanation upon the principle of a "plu- 
 rality of causes " (to employ a modern phrase for a very 
 old idea in the history of philosophy) are, likewise, the 
 difference in the length of days and nights, clouds, 
 thunder, hurricanes, earthquakes, winds, hail, snow, dew, 
 comets, falling stars, etc. Regularity in celestial phe- 
 nomena should not be made any more of than the little 
 coincidences daily occurring immediately about us, a 
 fact, the full appreciation of which would bring the per- 
 fect quietude and confidence of soul that characterize 
 the wise man. 
 
 The Gods. — Nature, we have just seen, is, to the 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 22/ 
 
 Epicureans, in no sense controlled by a divine power or 
 by divine powers. The Epicureans, nevertheless, be- 
 lieved in the existence of gods and treated of them in 
 that branch of their philosophy called physics. Of the 
 gods, philosophers — but not the oi ttoXXol, whose ideas 
 of the gods are mere " opinion '' and are impious — have 
 distinct knowledge through anticipations, trpoXr]-y^ei^. 
 The gods are infinite in number and dwell in the vacant 
 spaces between the worlds, in immortality and perfect 
 felicity, without concern for the universe about them. 
 Prayer and divination are, consequently, discarded by 
 the Epicureans as the offspring of ignorance and fear. 
 Epicurus says, however, that it is better to follow the 
 fables about the gods than to be a slave to the ' fate ' of 
 the natural philosophers [Stoics], better to believe that 
 the gods are to be moved by gifts and honors than to 
 believe in an inexorable necessity. 
 
 The Human Soul} — The human soul is a " bodily sub- 
 stance composed of slight particles diffused all over the 
 members of the body, presenting a great analogy to a 
 sort of spirit": it is composed of "atoms of the most 
 perfect lightness and roundness," "wholly different 
 from those of fire " (Democritus had said that the soul 
 was composed of fiery atoms). The soul cannot be in- 
 corporeal, for it would then be, like the vacuum, incap- 
 able of ' doing ' or ' suffering ' anything," and merely a 
 "condition and place of movement." In the soul is the 
 seat of sensation, though doubtless sensation depends 
 in part upon the body. There are " reciprocal bonds of 
 sympathy uniting soul and body by virtue of which, the 
 soul takes cognizance of the changes that take place in 
 
 1 Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, pp. 441-443, 447, 448, etc. 
 
228 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the body which is its envelopment, and then reflects 
 these into the body as sensible affections." "But there 
 are certain affections of the soul of which the body is not 
 capable." The irrational part of the soul, only, is dif- 
 fused over the whole body, the rational part, as the emo- 
 tions of joy and fear prove, having its seat in the chest. 
 On the death and dissolution of the body the soul leaves 
 it and dissolves and no longer has power of sensation or 
 motion. Sensation is explained by Epicurus as being 
 produced by the impact upon the organs of sense of 
 infinitely small," thin, film-like emanations from bodies, 
 which having the same arrangement and motion as the 
 atoms in the bodies glide with infinite rapidity through 
 vacant space, escaping all obstacles. These are termed 
 images. " One must admit that something passes from 
 external objects to us in order to produce sight and the 
 knowledge of forms ; for it is difficult to conceive that 
 external objects can affect us through the medium of 
 the air which is between us and them or by means of 
 rays, whatever emissions proceed from us to them, so as 
 to give us an impression of their form and color. This 
 phenomenon, on the contrary, is perfectly explained, if 
 we admit that certain images of the same color, of the 
 same shape, and of a proportionate magnitude pass 
 from the objects to us, and so arrive at being seen and 
 comprehended. These images are animated by an ex- 
 ceeding rapidity, and, as, on the other side, the solid 
 forming a compact mass, and comprising a vast quantity 
 of atoms, emits always the same quantity of particles, 
 the vision is continued, and produces in us one single 
 perception which always preserves the same relation to 
 the object. Every conception, every sensible perception 
 
OREEK PHILOSOPHY. 229 
 
 which has to do with the form or other attributes of 
 these images is only the same form of the solid body 
 perceived directly, either in virtue of a sort of actual and 
 continual condensation of the image, or in consequence 
 of the traces which it has left in us." Hearing is pro- 
 duced, not by the air, but by " some sort of current " 
 which, by virtue of the aiifinity of the small bodies com- 
 posing it with one another and their identity in nature 
 with the object from which they emanate "puts us very 
 frequently into communication of sentiments with this 
 object, or at least causes us to become aware of the ex- 
 istence of some external circumstances." Perception, in 
 this case, depends on a "sort of sympathy" between 
 subject and object. The case of smell is similar. — The 
 human will is free, and man is accordingly a proper sub- 
 ject of moral praise and blame. 
 
 Ethics: First Principle, Pleasure. — All good and evil, 
 says Epicurus, are in sensation : that which is the priva- 
 tion or absence of sensation, e.g., death, is nothing to 
 us. The first good is pleasure, it being that to which 
 all human "choice and avoidance" have reference, "for 
 the sake of which we do everything," "the beginning 
 and end of living happily " (j.e., well), that without 
 which we are unsatisfied and seek it, with which we 
 are satisfied and desire nothing. The desire of pleasure 
 is connate with us, and it is inherent in animals. No 
 pleasure is intrinsically bad ; but not every pleasure is 
 always worthy of being chosen, for the " efficient causes 
 of some pleasures bring with them a great many pertur- 
 bations of pleasure," and the choice of such pleasures 
 would contravene the law that pleasure is the chief 
 good. Even some pains are better than some pleasures, 
 
230 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 because of the greatness in degree of the pleasures con- 
 sequent upon the choice of them. The pleasure, there- 
 fore, that is the chief good, is of a certain sort. 
 
 Kinds of Pleasure. — Now pleasures are in kind 
 either bodily or mental, and they are either "motions" 
 [the Cyrenaic doctrine], e.g., cheerfulness and joy, or 
 " states," e.g., freedom from fear or bodily pain. The 
 pleasure that is the chief good is not the bodily pleasure 
 of the debauchee, but the "freedom of the body from 
 pain and the soul from confusion," " the sober contem- 
 plation which examines into the reasons for choice and 
 avoidance, and which puts to flight the vain opinions 
 from which the greater portion of the confusion arises 
 which troubles the soul." But though the pleasures of 
 the mind or soul are superior to those of the body, the 
 pains of the soul are worse than those of the body, since 
 the body is "sensible to present affliction while the 
 soul feels the past, present, and future." The noblest 
 pleasure is inseparable from prudence and the other 
 virtues ; but, nevertheless, not the virtues but pleasure 
 is the chief good. " We choose the virtues for the sake 
 of pleasure ; not on their own account." Justice and 
 injustice have no independent existence ; they have 
 significance only as means and hindrances to pleasure. 
 " Courage does not exist by nature, but is engendered 
 by a consideration of what is suitable." "Friendship 
 is caused by one's wants," and "arises from a commu- 
 nity of participation in pleasures." It appears, then, 
 that the highest pleasure is not, as the Cyrenaics de- 
 clared, a motion, but a state ; e.g., contentment, freedom 
 from ambition, from fear and apprehension. Specifi- 
 cally, the highest happiness of which human life is 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 23 1 
 
 capable is a freedom from all apprehension relative to 
 death and eternity, a state of the soul born of the 
 knowledge that death is "no concern either of the 
 living or of the dead, since to the one it has no exist- 
 ence and the other class has no existence itself." 
 
 The "Wise Man." — Epicurus "said that injuries 
 existed among men either in consequence of hatred or 
 of envy or of contempt, all of which the wise man 
 overcomes by reason ; also that a man who has been 
 once wise can never receive a contrary disposition, nor 
 can he of his own accord invent such a state of things 
 as that he should be subjected to the dominion of the 
 passions ; nor can he hinder himself in his progress 
 towards wisdom ; that the wise man, however, cannot 
 exist in every state of body nor in every nation ; 
 that if the wise man were to be put to the torture, he 
 would still be happy ; that the wise man will not only 
 feel gratitude to his friends, but to them equally 
 whether they are present or absent. . . . Nor will he 
 marry a wife whom the laws forbid. He will punish 
 his servants, but also pity them, and show indulgence 
 to any that are virtuous. The Epicureans do not think 
 that the wise man will ever be in love or that he will 
 be anxious about his burial, or that love is a passion 
 inspired by the gods. . . . They also assert that he will 
 be indifferent to the study of oratory. Marriage, say 
 they, is never a benefit to a man, and we must be quite 
 content if it does no harm ; and the wise man will never 
 marry and beget children . . . still, under certain circum- 
 stances of life, he will forsake these rules and marry. 
 Nor will he ever indulge in drunkenness, nor will he 
 entangle himself in affairs of state. Nor will he be- 
 
232 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 come a tyrant. Nor will he become a Cynic ... or a 
 beggar. And even though he should lose his eyes, he 
 will still cling to life. The wise man will be subject to 
 grief. He will also not object to go to law. He will 
 leave books and memorials of himself behind him ; but 
 he will not be fond of frequenting assemblies. He will 
 take care of his property, and provide for the future. 
 He will like being in the country; he will resist for- 
 tune, and will grieve none of his friends. He will show 
 a regard for a fair reputation to such an extent as to 
 avoid being despised; and he will find more pleasure 
 than other men in speculations. . . . The wise man 
 may raise statues if it suits his inclination ; if it does 
 not, it does not signify. The wise man is the only 
 person who can converse correctly about music and 
 poetry; and he can realize poems, but not become a 
 poet. . . . The wise man will also, if he is in need, earn 
 money, but only by his wisdom. He will propitiate an 
 absolute ruler when occasion requires, and will humor 
 him for the sake of correcting his habits. He will 
 have a school, but not on such a system as to draw a 
 crowd about him. He will also recite in a multitude, 
 but that will be against his inclination. He will pro- 
 nounce dogmas.-* He will be the same man asleep and 
 awake, and he will be willing even to die for a friend." 
 " It is possible for one man to be wiser than another." ^ 
 Friendship. — Independent as the " Wise Man " of the 
 Epicureans is, he yet needs friends ; and friendship is 
 
 1 Zeller supposes that the long-continued existence of the Epicurean 
 school was a consequence of the dogmatism (and conservatism) practised 
 and cultivated by Epicurus himself. 
 
 2 Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, pp. 466-468 (trans, somewhat altered). 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 233 
 
 to him, next to freedom from fear of death, the greatest 
 source of pleasure. If one cannot make friends, he 
 should avoid making enemies. " The happiest men are 
 they who have arrived at the point of having nothing 
 to fear from those who surround them ; such men live 
 with one another most agreeably, having the firmest 
 grounds of confidence in one another, enjoying the 
 advantages of friendship in all their fulness, and not 
 lamenting as a pitiable circumstance, the premature 
 death of their friends." Epicurus's theory here agrees 
 precisely with his practice. 
 
 The State. — Towards the state the Epicureans were 
 somewhat shy. Epicurus himself, we have seen, avoided 
 affairs of state ; and he declared that the wise man 
 would never busy himself greatly with these unless 
 there were special reasons for so doing. But, as may 
 be inferred from Diogenes' s account of the Epicurean 
 "Wise Man," they did not believe or advocate a 
 haughty independence of and disregard for governmen- 
 tal authority ; and they were not republican but monar- 
 chical in political sentiment. They adopted here as else- 
 where an independence for the individual which did not 
 overshadow or threaten the independence of any other 
 individual. 
 
 Religion. — Substantially the same is the Epicurean 
 attitude towards the universal order of things — an at- 
 titude of independence and easy freedom. Man, if he 
 be wise, is not overawed by the contemplation of 
 nature and the gods, but dwells in serenity and happi- 
 ness. Nature is not an object of fear or worship ; the 
 gods are not reached by divination and prayer ; rather, 
 are they to be merely contemplated in their perfect 
 
234 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 immortality and felicity. Such contemplation is to man 
 the source of the purest happiness. 
 
 Historical Sources of the Epicurean Theories. — In 
 physics Epicurus was obviously a follower of Democri- 
 tus ; in ethics, of the Cyrenaics ; though he departs 
 somewhat from the doctrines of both schools. Democ- 
 ritus seems to have arrived at his doctrine of the atom 
 by combining Eleatic and Heraclitean conceptions : 
 Epicurus attempts to deduce the atom from what is 
 given in sense as such. To the Cyrenaic doctrine, 
 of pleasure, Epicurus added an ingredient of subjective 
 intellectualism, giving the theory a certain appearance 
 of refinement but no higher ethical value. No such 
 definite historical sources for the Epicurean canonic 
 can be pointed out. 
 
 Result. — The logical key to the system of Epicurus, 
 if system it may be called, is doubtless the idea of the 
 easy and undisturbed independence and being-for-self of 
 the individual. This idea, obviously, has most interest 
 for Epicurus in its ethical bearings. His " Wise Man " 
 is one who possesses independence, not by positively 
 mastering all that might otherwise interfere with his 
 independence, or by actively cooperating with others to 
 secure for himself and all others the independence he 
 seeks, but by withdrawing from the world into a place 
 specially prepared for those whose aim is to realize the 
 conception of the independent individual in quiet con- 
 templation, and pleasant converse with those who are 
 not inclined to oppose but mildly to second their 
 thoughts and wills. With this view there is a certain 
 natural, but not necessary, agreement in the doctrine of 
 the atoms and empty space. The atom, like the human 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 23 S 
 
 individual, is an independent entity and, to a certain 
 extent, also, it, like the human individual, follows its 
 "own sweet will," — it is self-moving, moves rapidly 
 and without violent contact with other atoms, — the 
 atoms "flow." As the atoms are independent of one 
 another and human individuals likewise, so are man 
 and the universe, man and the gods, the gods and the 
 worlds surrounding them. There is, however, a certain 
 mild sympathy between subject and object in the Epi- 
 curean theory of knowledge. Considered as a whole, 
 then, the system of Epicurus, though possessing a cer- 
 tain kind of inner refined harmony, is not a really logical, 
 close, concrete system ; its parts, instead of having the 
 ultimate synthetic interrelation that springs from a 
 positive, definite, and all-penetrating conception, exist, 
 as it were, side by side (as the atoms do in unlimited 
 space), held together merely by the vague conception 
 of quiet, passive pleasure. 
 
 § 19- 
 
 The Sceptics. — Under the term Sceptics are here in- 
 cluded the so-called Pyrrhonists, Earlier and Later (to 
 whom alone, often, the term is applied) and the philoso- 
 phers of the so-called Middle and New Academies ; the 
 attitude of these thinkers being essentially the same. 
 The chief of the Pyrrhonists are Pyrrho, Timon of 
 Phlius, ^nesidemns, Agrippa, and Sextus Empiricus ; 
 the leading Academicians are Arcesilaus, Carneades, 
 and Clitomachus. 
 
 The Pyrrhonists: Lives} — Pyrrho, the first of the 
 Sceptics, was an Elean who had . imbibed Democritean 
 
 1 See Diog. Laert., pp. 402-423 ; Zeller; Ueberweg. 
 
236 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 doctrines from a certain philosopher, Anaxarchus, whom 
 he accompanied to India in the army of Alexander the 
 Great. From Diogenes Laertius we learn that he was 
 peculiar, even morbid, in temperament, being extremely 
 indifferent and having no sympathy with general human 
 nature. There is no reason to suppose that he espe- 
 cially admired any of the philosophers (Democritus 
 excepted). He is said to have been highly honored by 
 his country and much esteemed by certain philosophers, 
 among them Epicurus. He died in 270 B.C., at the age 
 of ninety. His eccentricity among the philosophers of 
 his times appears in the one fact (among others) that 
 he left behind him no written works. Diogenes says 
 that he had many disciples but very few of them are 
 now known. Of these may be mentioned Nausiphanes, 
 the instructor of Epicurus, and a certain Timon of 
 Phlius (320-230 B.C.), who had been a pupil of Stilpo, 
 the Megarian, and succeeded Pyrrho as leader of the 
 school. Timon had no successor. The Pyrrhonists 
 did not possess the social qualities of other thinkers of 
 their day. Considerably later than these men, i.e., in 
 the first and second centuries a.d., others, styling 
 themselves Pyrrhonists, took up and elaborated the 
 doctrines of Pyrrho and Timon. Of these we mention 
 .^Enesidemus of Cnossus (first century), a certain phi- 
 losopher by the name of Agrippa, and the celebrated 
 Sextus Empiricus (200 a.d.). 
 
 Theories of the Earlier Pyrrhonists. — The position 
 of Pyrrho and of Timon, adopted and extended by 
 later thinkers, is that there is no criterion of truth 
 either in sense or in intellect ; that, consequently, there 
 is no knowledge, contradictories are equally true (or 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 237 
 
 false), that the true, philosophic attitude of mind is 
 complete suspension of judgment (eTroxn)- These men, 
 in other words, finding in the realm of intellect the 
 same contradictions that they, like the Eleatics, Hera- 
 clitus, Democritus, the Sophists, Plato, and indeed 
 nearly all the earlier thinkers had pointed out in the 
 realm of sense, developed to its limit a principle that 
 had before them not received complete development, 
 even in the theories of the Sophists. But Pyrrho and 
 Timon did not entirely despair of arriving at truth of a 
 certain kind : truth in life, or conduct, they believed 
 accessible. They taught here that the truth is imper- 
 turbability of mind {arapa^ia), which follows suspension 
 of judgment "like a shadow," and unquestioning obe- 
 dience to custom and tradition. 
 
 The Later Pyrrhonists : The "Tropes!'^ — -By the 
 later Pyrrhonists there were advanced against the pos- 
 sibility of knowledge certain special modes of view 
 termed "tropes" (rpoTrot). Ten of these, which are 
 attributed to ^nesidemus, are (in substance) as follows : 
 The denying of knowledge on the ground (i) of the differ- 
 ences in the feelings of animals as regards pleasure and 
 pain, what is injurious or advantageous ; (2) the differ- 
 ences in the "nature and idiosyncrasies of men"; (3) 
 the "difference of the organs of sense"; (4) the "dis- 
 position of the subject [the human individual], and the 
 changes in general to which it is liable"; (5) "differ- 
 ence in laws and established customs, belief in mythical 
 traditions, conventions of art, and dogmatic opinions " ; 
 (6) the " promiscuousness and confusion of objects " ; 
 
 1 Diog. Laert., Life of Pyrrho, pp. 409-413. 
 
238 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (7) " difference as regards the distance, position, space, 
 and objects in space " ; (8) differences as regards the 
 " magnitudes or qualities of things — heat or coldness, 
 speed or slowness, paleness or variety of color," etc; (9) 
 "frequency or rarity or strangeness of the thing under 
 consideration " ; (10) " the fact that all things are known 
 by comparison with others." In all these cases it is, 
 practically, held that there is ground for suspension of 
 judgment in the fact that, owing to the differences and 
 contrariety of things, it is impossible to apply the law of 
 identity, or conception of uniformity ; i.e., it is impos- 
 sible to think (in the strictest, narrowest sense of the 
 term). For example, — to take the third "trope," — 
 since an apple is yellow to the sight, sweet to the taste, 
 fragrant to the sense of smell, i.e., since sight, taste, and 
 smell are different and incommensurable, it is impossi- 
 ble to believe that there is in reality anything such as we 
 ordinarily believe an apple (say) to be — " what is seen 
 is just as likely to be something else than reality." To 
 take another example : since " the Persians do not think 
 it unnatural for a man to marry his daughter, but among 
 the Greeks it is unlawful" "and since the Egyptians 
 embalm their dead, and then bury them, the Romans 
 burn them, the Paeonians throw them into the lake," no 
 positive conclusion regarding marriage or the disposal 
 of the dead is possible. The five tropes of Agrippa are 
 these : the disagreement in opinion among men ; the 
 logical necessity of proceeding in infinitum in the 
 attempt to arrive at a fixed, first principle ; the fact that 
 no object is perceived independently, but always in 
 its relation to something else ; the necessity of start- 
 ing always with hypotheses : the reciprocal nature of 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 239 
 
 proofs, e.g., proving porosity by evaporation and evapo- 
 ration by porosity. 
 
 The Impossibility of Demonstration, of a Sign, of a 
 Cause, etc. — The possibility of demonstration was de- 
 nied by the Sceptics on the ground that there are no 
 true indemonstrable premises, and without such all rea- 
 soning aiming at ultimate certainty must be a regressus 
 in infinitum. It was denied also that anything could 
 be regarded as a sign or indication of anything else : 
 the invisible obviously cannot be a sign, either of the 
 invisible or the visible ; nor can the visible be a sign of 
 the invisible, since the two bear no relation to one an- 
 other, and finally, there is no need of a sign for the 
 visible. Again, the notion of a cause is a spurious con- 
 ception. "Cause is something relative. It is relative 
 to that of which it is the cause. But that which is rela- 
 tive is only conceived and has no real existence. . . . 
 However, let us admit that there are such things as 
 causes. In that case, then, a body must be the cause 
 of a body or that which is incorporeal must be the 
 cause of that which is corporeal. Now, neither of these 
 cases is possible ; therefore there is no such thing as a 
 cause. In fact, one body cannot be the cause of an- 
 other body, since both bodies have the same nature ; 
 and if it be said that one is the cause, inasmuch as it 
 is a body, then the other must be a cause for the same 
 reason. And in that case one would have two recip- 
 rocal causes; two agents without any passive subject. 
 Again, one incorporeal thing cannot be the cause of 
 another incorporeal thing, for the same reason. Also, 
 one incorporeal thing cannot be the cause of a body, 
 because nothing that is incorporeal can produce a body. 
 
240 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Nor, on the other hand, can a body be the cause of any- 
 thing incorporeal, because in every production there 
 must be some passive subject-matter; but as what is 
 incorporeal is by its own nature protected from being a 
 passive subject, it cannot be the object of any produc- 
 tive power. There is therefore no such thing as any 
 cause at all. From all which it follows that the first 
 principles of all things have no reality ; for such a prin- 
 ciple, if it did exist, must be both the agent and the 
 efficient cause." Motion, the act or possibility of learn- 
 ing, the distinction between good and evil, were likewise 
 found impossible by the later Pyrrhonists. 
 
 Pure Negativism, of the Pyrrhonists. — Pyrrhonism 
 reached its culmination when, it being objected (it would 
 seem, by the Stoics) that the Pyrrhonists were incon- 
 sistent in declaring that they knew nothing and yet 
 admitting common fact of experience, or were, even in 
 terms self-contradictory in saying that they knew noth- 
 ing, because they must know that they did 7tot know, — 
 the Pyrrhonists answered that they admitted fact merely 
 as such, i.e., not as known and demonstrated fact, and 
 that in saying that they knew nothing they merely 
 stated a fact, but did not logically defitie or demonstrate 
 their position. " We confess," said they, " that we see, 
 and we are aware that we comprehend that such a thing 
 is the fact ; but we do not know how we see, or how we 
 comprehend"; or, "while we say that we define noth- 
 ing, we do not even say that as a definition." 
 
 The Middle and New Academies.^ — Arcesilaus. — 
 Arcesilaus (third century b.c.) had been a pupil of the 
 
 iSeeZeller; Ueberweg; Diog. Laert., pp. 163-170, 177-180. 
 
CREEK PHILOSOPHY. 24I 
 
 Peripatetic Theophrastus, and of Polemo, Grantor, and 
 Crates of the Old Academy. He was the founder of 
 the Middle Academy, so-called. His philosophical en- 
 ergies were given chiefly to combating the theories of 
 the Stoics. He denied validity to the Stoic idea of per- 
 ception, or the "cataleptic representation" {(pavraa-ia 
 KaToXrjTTTiK^), basing his denial on the very obvious 
 ground that a false representation might be of sufficient 
 strength to compel assent, as well as a true one ; and he 
 reached the position that it was not possible to know 
 anything with certainty — not even that we did not 
 know. In this he agrees with Pyrrho. He was, also, 
 in agreement with Pyrrho in holding probability to be 
 the "highest standard for practical life." From Dioge- 
 nes, who describes him as a "man of very expensive 
 habits," a "sort of second Aristippus," we ought per- 
 haps to infer that in ethics Arcesilaus sympathized with 
 the Cyrenaics ; we have, at all events, no reason to 
 think that he was practically or theoretically an advo- 
 cate of impassivity. 
 
 Carneades?- — Carneades, the founder of th« New 
 Academy (second century B.C.), industriously studied 
 and combated the Stoic doctrines, gave little attention 
 to physics, and was fond of disputing on ethical topics. 
 He was a forcible speaker, and drew many persons, even 
 from other schools, to hear him. He repeats with added 
 illustration the arguments of Arcesilaus and the Pyrrho- 
 nists on the worthlessness of the senses and the intel- 
 lect as criteria of knowledge. The Stoic theology was 
 especially attacked by him. Neither the alleged consen- 
 
 1 See Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. 
 
242 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sus gentium, nor the alleged design manifested in nature 
 is to him a demonstration of the existence of God; 
 mere agreement of opinion among the majority of the 
 human race proves nothing, and the existence of danger 
 and destruction, folly, misfortune, misery, and crime in 
 the world is sufficient refutation of the supposed fact of a 
 providence. But even admitting the appearance of order 
 in the world, what necessity is there for affirming the 
 existence of a world-soul ? The very idea of a God, an 
 infinite personal being, an infinite being possessing the 
 intellectual and moral attributes of man, is untenable. 
 How can God be subject to the changes of sensation, feel- 
 ings of pleasure and pain .' With what reason can he 
 be called brave, magnanimous, prudent .' We cannot 
 conceive God as limited or unlimited, corporeal or in- 
 corporeal. In short, we cannot think of God under the 
 forms of sense or of intellect without encountering con- 
 tradiction ; we have no right, therefore, to assert posi- 
 tively, as the Stoics do, the being of a God. And there 
 are no gods; nor is divination conceivable, since to 
 "know accidental events beforehand is impossible, and 
 it is useless to know those that are necessary and una- 
 voidable, nay, more, it would even be harmful." Any 
 supposed cases of fulfilment of prophecy are merely 
 cases of accidental coincidence. Further, the human 
 will is free, for there is no proof of the existence of 
 uniform causality in nature, and we know, as a matter 
 of fact, that our decisions are free. Justice is mere 
 expediency. We have no positive knowledge ; our only 
 guide is probability. Now, probability is of three 
 grades : mere probability, unimpeached probability, un- 
 impeached and confirmed probability. " The lowest de- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 243 
 
 gree of probability is when a notion produces by itself 
 an impression of truth without being taken in connec- 
 tion with other notions. The next higher is when that 
 impression is confirmed by the agreement of all notions 
 which are related to it. The third and highest is when 
 an investigation of all these notions results in producing 
 the same corroboration for all." "Assent will be given 
 to no notion in the sense of its being absolutely true, 
 but to many notions in the sense that we consider them 
 highly probable." On ethical questions Carneades was 
 so fully non-committal that not even his nearest disciple 
 got from him any positive view. In this he went be- 
 yond all Greek sceptical thinkers, for they, as we have 
 seen, admitted that a norm of conduct was to be found 
 in tradition and custom. Carneades is a representative, 
 therefore, of the most completely developed philosophi- 
 cal scepticism in Greece. 
 
 Result. — The position of the Sceptics may be de- 
 scribed, in a word, as similar to that expressed by the 
 modern phrase "the relativity of knowledge" and is, 
 more than any other in the history of ancient philos- 
 ophy, allied to the well-known modern philosophical 
 attitude denoted by the phrase. But it would, most 
 probably, be wrong to suppose that the ancient agnostics 
 held to the idea of a real thing-in-itself behind the (sup- 
 posed) relative and irreconcilable phenomena. They 
 gave up the idea of causation (as we have just seen) with 
 all others, the very idea which, when applied to explain 
 the origin of knowledge, gives rise to the thing-in-itself. 
 By way of general comment, interpretative and critical, 
 we have to notice, in the first place, that there is a 
 certain evasion on the part of the philosophers we 
 
244 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 have just been considering of the obligation to think 
 everywhere and always as best we can, and a dogmatic 
 assumption that thought has for its only presupposition 
 and principle the notion of identity. In other words, 
 if the Sceptic admits a thing as a fact, must he not 
 accept the consequences of inference from the fact, 
 must he not ask what the fact means.' "Facts" are, 
 indeed, not ultimate for philosophical thought but they 
 must be given a meaning, and there is properly speak- 
 ing, therefore, no such thing as a universal suspension 
 of the judgment. Thought can have no other object 
 than truth or reality ; and is there not a certain demand 
 upon thought in facts recognized zs, facts, i.e., something 
 immediately before the mind, whatever be their content, 
 whether sensible or supersensible .' Again, how is sus- 
 pension of judgment, pure negativity in thought possi- 
 ble.' This state of mind, if reflected upon, contains its 
 own negation. It is double-sided ; but the Sceptics saw 
 only that side which could present itself in the act of 
 withdrawing, or abstracting, from contradictory phe- 
 nomena. If the Sceptic's principle is Thought, he must 
 think and let phenomena fall into his scheme as best 
 they may. This the Sceptics did not do ; nor did they, 
 on the other hand, take "facts" for what they were 
 worth and by a fair induction, supplemented by reflec- 
 tion, draw a meaning out of them. The nearest approach 
 made to this is contained in Carneades's doctrine of 
 probability, which seems not to have been thought of 
 as a way to the truth for mind, but only as a way to a 
 comfortable mental attitude or a theory adapted to 
 " practical purposes " ; which, in other words, contained 
 no other necessity than that which implied the impo- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 245 
 
 tency of mind and not the irrational and non-existent 
 character of the thing regarded as the object of knowl- 
 edge. The Sceptical doctrine, though valid as against 
 uncritical dogmatism {e.g., Stoicism), is not valid as 
 against the position that in human experience, subject 
 and object, thought and phenomenon, are, by the very 
 nature of the conditions of experience, correlative : not 
 mere identity but identity in difference is the law of 
 real thought. We are not at liberty to ignore fact ; we 
 are at liberty, and, in fact, obliged, to follow concep- 
 tions, and, among them, the conception of pure thought, 
 to their consequences. Making allowance for a natural 
 difference between sense and thought as forms of 
 mental activity, the meanings of fact should tally with 
 the positings of thought. It might perhaps be said 
 of the theory of the ancient Sceptics, as it was said 
 by a modern Sceptic of his own theory, that it was 
 unanswerable but convinced nobody. But even this 
 need not be said. The Sceptic is not at liberty to 
 suspend the judgment : for on the one hand, he must 
 make the most of facts, and on the other, he must 
 deduce the consequences of a suspension of the judg- 
 ment, namely, he must accept and understand the fact 
 of mere subjectivity. And this is the service of 
 Scepticism — that it brings this fact to light. 
 
 § 20. 
 
 The Common Ground of the Stoics, Epicureans, and 
 Sceptics. — Widely distinct as the schools of which we 
 have just been speaking may seem to be, a comparison of 
 them with each other and with the schools preceding 
 them brings to light a very important point of agreement 
 
246 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 among them. As distinguished from the thinkers of 
 the first period of Greek philosophy, the period of the 
 nature-philosophers, these three schools, together with 
 Plato and Aristotle, have their principle in the subjec- 
 tive (mind) instead of the objective (nature). But with 
 Plato and Aristotle, the subjective embraces positively 
 the objective in its sway; -with the later schools the 
 subjective stands in a somewhat doubtful relation to the 
 objective, preserving a guasi-independence, either in the 
 midst of the objective, as with the Stoics, or in retire- 
 ment from, and a negative attitude towards, the objec- 
 tive, as with the Epicureans and Sceptics. A relatively 
 higher value is placed upon the particular individual 
 subject than had been placed upon it by Plato and 
 Aristotle, and the universal subject has a tendency to 
 become purely transcendent. The sources and avenues 
 of knowledge are supposed to lie in those things which 
 are characteristic of man as an individual, i.e., in the 
 senses chiefly, and the highest end of conduct is seen 
 in that which has primary, if not sole, reference to the 
 general individual as such. The philosophy of the 
 Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Sceptics is, in tendency, 
 if not in actuality, the philosophy of the individual as 
 such determining itself : it is Socraticism developed on 
 its narrower side and is the most advanced stage then 
 yet reached by philosophy in this direction. In Scepti- 
 cism the pure abstract individual is hardly distinguish- 
 able from the abstract universal, and Scepticism is 
 therefore at the very threshold of a philosophy of self- 
 determination. In Stoicism and Epicureanism the 
 practical renunciation of all outside the individual self is 
 incomplete. They are, therefore, slightly less advanced 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 247 
 
 stages of the thought that constitutes the essence of 
 Scepticism. In the stress laid by all these schools 
 upon the individual, lies their strength as well as their 
 weakness. But they only implicitly posited the indi- 
 vidual as the universal. 
 
 § 21. 
 
 Philosophy in Rome : Eclecticism^ — In the schools 
 we have just been considering, thought appears to have 
 reached a natural limit or, rather, turning-point : ceasing 
 (with Aristotle) to be thought for its own sake and in 
 its true universal character (the Thought of Thought), 
 it has become thought for action's sake ; it is no longer 
 the thought of the universal but is the thought of the 
 individual. Beyond this limit, or turning-pofnt, thought 
 gives place to action, or life. In this direction nothing, 
 it would seem, is to be expected of philosophy but a 
 repetition of itself or a passing into exhortation and 
 conduct. A complete return to a development of the 
 earlier standpoint, that of Plato and Aristotle, seems 
 practically impossible. The strained, paradoxical indi- 
 vidualism of the Stoic doctrine and spirit, the evident 
 one-sidedness of Epicureanism, and the destructive 
 negativism of Scepticism are all — and particularly the 
 last-mentioned — -of a character to produce distrust of 
 philosophy as a science, to disintegrate and scatter 
 thought rather than concentrate it and give it the active 
 consciousness of organic totality. Nor was there any- 
 thing in the outward fortunes of philosophy to beget — 
 directly — this consciousness. The Roman world — and 
 all the world at this time was becoming Roman — was 
 
 1 See Zeller's The Eclectics. 
 
248 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a world of action. Philosophers were Romans, or, if not, 
 must think for Romans : in Rome, even philosophy must, 
 literally, "do as the Romans do " and, as it happens, must 
 be practical, in the narrowest sense. It must give up, 
 to a large extent, its pretension to universality as re- 
 gards the object of knowledge or the knowing subject. 
 Philosophy, in other words, becomes " eclectic " : the 
 individual thinks whatever practical necessity or con- 
 venience for him requires or suggests, is governed by 
 theoretical necessity neither as regards the source, 
 origin, or consistency of his thought. He borrows ideas 
 and combines them loosely ; he borrows only such ideas 
 as have a practical bearing, and gives them only such 
 combination and setting as the practical demands or 
 suggests. Differences as regards the amount of bor- 
 rowing, the sources from which they borrow, and the 
 manner of combining and setting borrowed ideas make 
 the differences between the "Eclectics." The Eclectics 
 do not, of course, constitute a school in any strict sense 
 of the term. The greatest number of the so-called 
 Eclectics are of Stoic persuasion ; but we also find 
 among them ^wajz-representatives of the Peripatetic 
 School, the Academy, and the Cynic School. The 
 Epicureans did not become Eclectics but remained a 
 distinct sect. We begin with the later Peripatetics. 
 
 §22. 
 
 The Later Peripatetics. — The later Peripatetics were 
 not to any great extent originators of philosophical con- 
 ceptions or theories but were chiefly Aristotelian ed- 
 itors and commentators. Of these editors and com- 
 mentators we may mention Andronicus of Rhodes, by 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 249 
 
 whom, it is supposed, the works of Aristotle "were 
 first properly collected and edited " (70 B.C.) ; Boethus 
 of Sidon (first century b.c.) ; an unknown author of a 
 remarkable work entitled On the Cosmos ; Alexander of 
 ^gce (first century a.d.) ; Aspasius and Adrastus of 
 Aphrodisias (120 a.d.) ; Aristocles of Messene, and, 
 particularly, the pupil of Aristocles, Alexander of Aphro- 
 disias (200 A.D.), who was known as the Exegete Kare^o- 
 ')(fiv (commentator par excellence). Most of these men 
 in their interpretations and developments of Aristotle's 
 doctrine incline towards a materialistic view of the uni- 
 verse, similar to that held by the earlier Peripatetics 
 and by the Stoics. Their effort was directed towards 
 removing apparent dualistic features of Aristotle's phi- 
 losophy, such as the separateness of God and nature, of 
 reason and the lower faculties, of knowledge considered 
 as having for its object the universal, and the real as 
 the individual. None of these identified God and 
 nature ; but they represented God as actively working 
 in nature though preserving a distinct identity. They 
 attained what is undoubtedly a very exalted conception 
 of the Deity. By Alexander of Aphrodisias and others 
 the soul was considered a product of the bodily organ- 
 ism. Alexander explained the universal as merely a 
 form of knowledge ; holding, on the other hand, that 
 the individual is the only real. In doing this he did 
 not solve the difficulty but merely put it a little aside, 
 inasmuch as it does not appear that he asserted the 
 organic unity of the universal and the individual. — We 
 may, with sufficient propriety, class with these Peripa- 
 tetics the celebrated physician Galen (Claudius Gale- 
 nus), who lived in the second century a.d. He followed 
 
250 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Aristotle in logic, physics, and metaphysics, though in- 
 clined to keep physical speculation, as such, within 
 narrow bounds. He seems to be an example of the 
 " scientist " who is cautious in regard to making affirm- 
 ations concerning the supersensible, though holding 
 belief in the supersensible to be necessitated by reli- 
 gious and moral experience. 
 
 §23. 
 
 Later Academics. — Two Eclectic Academicians re- 
 quire to be noticed here : Philo of Larissa in Thessaly, 
 who succeeded Clitomachus and was at one time 
 teacher of Cicero, and Antiochus of Ascalon, a pupil 
 of Philo, and at one time head of the Academy. These 
 men flourished in the beginning of the first century 
 B.C. They repudiated the Middle and New Academics, 
 and regarded themselves as true Academicians. 
 
 Philo of Larissa. — Philo would accept neither the 
 Sceptical, nor its opposite, the Stoical, theory of cogni- 
 tion. He advocated a doctrine of probability, or, rather, 
 of a kind of conviction more firm than that resting on 
 probability and yet not reaching perfect certainty; 
 what might, perhaps, in current phrases of to-day be 
 termed "moral certainty," "practical conviction," "in- 
 tuition." His test of truth in ideas was, in other 
 words, the self-evidence that belongs, or is supposed to 
 belong, particularly to ideas of the moral consciousness. 
 
 Antiochus of Ascalon. — Antiochus, going a step fur- 
 ther, denied that the moral consciousness could be satis- 
 fied with mere probability ; and, accordingly, attempted 
 to refute the Sceptical theory of cognition. He thought 
 that the senses are, when in a healthy condition, trust- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 251 
 
 worthy, that, though suspension of judgment might be 
 necessary in certain individual cases, it is not always 
 required, and that the Sceptical theory was self-contra- 
 dictory in its conviction of the impossibility of convic- 
 tion, and in distinguishing between truth and error, and 
 at the same time practically denying the distinction. 
 In physics he agreed essentially with the Stoics. In 
 ethics he held to a modified Stoicism and was in close 
 sympathy with the Old Academy, placing the goods 
 and virtues of the body along with those of the soul, 
 among the perfect goods and virtues. He is, however, 
 chargeable with what, in view of this, is an inconsistency, 
 viz., the drawing a broad line of distinction between the 
 wise and unwise. He was at one time teacher of 
 Cicero, and of Varro, the great Roman scholar. 
 
 §24. 
 
 Later Stoics. — Leading Later Stoics are Boethus, 
 Pancetius, Posidonius, Varro, Cicero, Seneca, Musonius 
 Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. 
 
 Boethus. — Boethus deviated from the doctrine of the 
 original Stoics in that he gave as criteria of knowledge, 
 reason, desire, and science, as well as perception, denied 
 truth to the doctrine of the world-conflagration, denied 
 also that God was the soul of the world, and that proph- 
 ecy and divination were possible. Three of his reasons 
 for the denial of the doctrine of the world-conflagration 
 were the following : the world could not be destroyed by 
 any cause acting within it, nor by any cause without, 
 since there was only void without ; God must become 
 an idle being if the world were destroyed ; " after the 
 complete annihilation of the world [by fire] this fire 
 
252 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 must itself be extinguished for want of nourishment, 
 and then the new formation of the world would be im- 
 possible." 
 
 PancBtius. — Panaetius (circa 1 80-1 10 b.c), who was 
 "the chief founder of Roman Stoicism," a friend of 
 Scipio Africanus, the Younger, and afterwards head of 
 the Stoic school at Athens, departed more widely than 
 any of the later Stoics from the dogmatic spirit and the 
 tenets of the earlier. He denied divination and the con- 
 flagration-theory. He gave to the soul a dualistic charac- 
 ter, recognizing a vegetable element, to which he claimed 
 that the reproductive function in man belonged, and 
 accommodated the Stoic theology to the popular reli- 
 gion, and the Stoic ethical system to popular sentiment. 
 From him were largely borrowed by Cicero the first two 
 books of the celebrated treatise on Duties (De Officiis). 
 
 Posidonius. — Posidonius (first half of first century 
 B.C.), another Rhodian who taught the Romans philoso- 
 phy, substituted for the Stoic doctrine that the soul is 
 rational, the Platonic doctrine that the soul is both 
 rational and irrational in its parts. Posidonius held 
 that reason cannot, as the earlier Stoics declared, be 
 the cause of the passions, which, he thought, are by 
 nature, irrational, but that reason and the passions 
 exist side by side in the soul as distinct faculties. He 
 seems to have been led to this position by the common 
 facts of experience, going to show that except in 
 highly cultivated natures mere thought or will is not 
 sufficient to arouse and control passion. By this view 
 Posidonius relaxed the evident strain in the system of 
 the earlier Stoics upon the faith of ordinary conscious- 
 ness in its own immediate presentments. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 253 
 
 Varro. — Varro rejected the scepticism of the Acad- 
 emy and Stoic one-sidedness. According to him hap- 
 piness, or the end of life, is virtue plus the external 
 goods conditioning it, and requires for its foundation a 
 principle of positive knowledge. He is accordingly in 
 sympathy with Antiochus and the Old Academy. 
 
 Cicero: Life. — Cicero (106-44 B.C.) holds a place in 
 the history of philosophy not so much as an original 
 philosophic thinker as one who, by his enthusiasm for 
 noble ideas and his power of expression, and by the 
 fact that he preserved from oblivion and gave form, 
 order, and spirit to many doctrines of older thinkers, 
 contributed to the spread and extended influence of 
 philosophic conceptions and spirit among men. His 
 interest in and study of philosophy, which seems to have 
 had its origin in rhetorical or oratorical studies and 
 ambition, began early and continued, so far as his polit- 
 ical occupation permitted, throughout life, the last two 
 or three years of his life being entirely devoted to the 
 composition, or compilation, of philosophical works. 
 His first teacher in philosophy was the Epicurean Phas- 
 drus, who was lecturing in Rome about the year 88 B.C. 
 Though Cicero " seems to have been converted at once 
 to the tenets of his master," ^ he was soon after led 
 to abandon them. At about the same time he studied 
 dialectic (chiefly) with the Stoic Diodotus, without, how- 
 ever, accepting the Stoic doctrine as a whole. He was 
 more attracted by Philo of Larissa, who came to Rome 
 at this time. Philo, it seems, was a brilliant orator, 
 roused in Cicero the highest enthusiasm for his subject, 
 
 1 See Introduction to J. S. Reid's The Academica of Cicero. 
 
254 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and converted him from Epicureanism to the stand- 
 point of the Academy. The next seven years (after 
 88 B.C.) were given to the study of philosophy, law, and 
 literature. Two years at a later time were " spent in 
 the society of Greek philosophers and rhetoricians." At 
 this time he heard at Athens the Epicurean Zeno of 
 Sidon, and, also, Phaedrus, whom ten years before he 
 had heard at Rome. He was influenced chiefly by 
 Antiochus of Ascalon, whom he admired for his dialect- 
 ical skill and the pointedness of his style. At Rhodes 
 he met Posidonius, who seems to have been his model 
 among the Stoics as Antiochus was among the Academ- 
 ics. Until quite recently it has been customary to at- 
 tach comparatively little importance to Cicero as a phi- 
 losopher because his philosophical works are, avowedly, 
 chiefly translations and paraphrases of the writings of 
 Greek philosophers ; but there seems to be at the pres- 
 ent moment a growing disposition to give him high 
 praise for his enthusiasm for philosophical culture in an 
 age and country not especially favorable to philosophy, 
 and for preserving from oblivion, and infusing order 
 and spirit into, the dogmas of the later Greek schools 
 of thought. Of the early Greek thinkers, it should 
 be said here, he knew little or nothing; nor was he 
 master of the ideas of either Socrates, Plato, or Aris- 
 totle. He is, rather, a child of the individualistic and 
 subjective thinkers of the later periods of Greek 
 thought. The motive of Cicero's philosophical writ- 
 ing was, if not that of the original truth-seeker, that 
 of the truth-lover and patriot who was desirous that his 
 country should have the benefit, in its own tongue, of 
 the thought of a more cultivated and thoughtful people. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 25$ 
 
 Cicero's General Conception of Philosophy. — Entirely 
 in accordance with the spirit of the age, and particularly 
 with the spirit of the Roman people, Cicero looked upon 
 philosophy chiefly as a thing having to do with practi- - 
 cal life. Philosophy is the love of wisdom, and wisdom 
 is the knowledge of things divine and human, "which 
 comprehends the fellowship of gods and men, and their 
 society within themselves." Ethics is thus given the 
 first place in philosophy. Logic is recognized as having 
 value because it supplies the method and the criteria of 
 truth, and physics because it raises the mind above mean 
 interests to the contemplation of the divine, and affords 
 it high rational enjoyment. Cicero cannot in this re- 
 spect be charged with anything like Cynic narrowness ; 
 he has a most genuine enthusiasm for science and learn- 
 ing, is indeed far superior to his age in this regard. 
 But the wise and good man, if called upon by a danger 
 threatening his country to make a choice between scien- 
 tific studies and his country's good would, according to 
 Cicero, feel obliged to choose the latter. 
 
 Theory of Knowledge. — In regard to knowledge as 
 such and the standard of truth, the most impressive fact 
 to Cicero's mind seems to have been that of the wide 
 variety of opinion among men and of doubts that 
 might be easily raised regarding our ability to know 
 our own bodies, our souls, God, nature, etc. Cicero 
 deems the proper attitude of mind to be that of the 
 Academy, viz., doubt, or suspension of judgment, leav- 
 ing room, however, for the acceptance of what seems 
 highly probable. But as Cicero's interest was not, like 
 that of Carneades, polemical, he looks upon doubt less 
 as an end in itself than as a necessary preliminary to 
 
256 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 free undogmatic belief in what seems most probable. 
 He agrees with the Sceptics in holding nothing as ab- 
 solutely certain, but with the dogmatists, also, in holding 
 as firmly as possible to the truth as far as it is, or can 
 be, known by us. In other words, there must be a 
 rational basis for action, and such basis must consist in 
 the probable which is made a ground of decided and 
 decisive belief. The highest probability belongs, ac- 
 cording to Cicero, to the presentments of the moral 
 consciousness, which are innate truth. Nature, he 
 says, bestowed upon man a "mind capable of grasping 
 all virtue, and, apart from any teaching, implanted in 
 him rudimentary ideas of the most important matters, 
 and began, so to speak, and included among his consti- 
 tutional endowments, the groundwork, as we may call 
 it, of the virtues." ^ The senses, also, and the consensus 
 gentium are to be trusted. 
 
 Physics. — In physics Cicero's chief interest lies in 
 questions relating to God, freedom, and immortality, 
 questions having to him the highest ethical bearing. 
 The ground for belief in God, the immortality of the 
 soul, and the freedom of the will is, that such belief is 
 innate and common to the race. God is the " creator, 
 or, at least, the ruler of all things." " He is free and 
 remote from all mortal mixture, perceiving and moving 
 all things, and endued with eternal motion in himself." 
 He is not declared by Cicero to be immaterial. The 
 human soul has close affinity with God, and has on that 
 account high worth, and high obligation resting upon it. 
 
 Ethics. — Cicero's position in ethics is indeed Eclectic ; 
 
 1 De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (trans, by J. S. Reid), V. 21, 59. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 257 
 
 even somewhat vacillating and inconsistent, but is on 
 the whole, perhaps. Stoical, with a certain leaning 
 towards the position of the Later Peripatetics. To him 
 virtue is the highest, the only unconditional good ; but 
 there is a very evident desire on his part to unite to 
 virtue as a necessary and universal concomitant the 
 "expedient." The perfect austerity of the old Stoic 
 ethics is not an element in Cicero's ethical ideal, argue 
 as eloquently as he may against the allowing of expe- 
 diency to take the place of virtue. The whole of the 
 Second Book of one of his chief ethical works, the De 
 Officiis, is taken up with showing how " the expedient " 
 is to be attained. Virtue, the honestum, is, according 
 to Cicero, one ; but it is of four varieties, — wisdom 
 (the highest virtue), justice, magnanimity (large-souled- 
 ness), and moderation : "sagacity and the perception of 
 truth," "the preservation of society by giving to every 
 man his due and by observing the faith of contracts " ; 
 " the greatness and firmness of an elevated and unsub- 
 dued mind" ; the observing of "order and regularity in 
 all our actions." Cicero's divergence from the old Stoic 
 conception of virtue is greatest in his idea of temper- 
 ance, or moderation. To him this is grace and sweet- 
 ness, polish of manner, as well as regularity and control 
 of appetites ; it is perfect fitness and adaptation of manner 
 and conduct ; it is culture, urbanity. He says that it 
 is more easy to conceive than to express the difference 
 between "what is virtuous " [in the broad sense], which 
 he styles the honestum, and "what is graceful," or 
 the decorum. In this there seems to be the manifes- 
 tation of a tendency to allow the latter to swallow up the 
 former. He finds that the Stoics are sometimes guilty 
 
258 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of "subverting delicacy," as were the Cynics, and says, 
 " Let us, for our parts, follow nature, and avoid what- 
 ever is offensive to the eyes or ears ; let us aim at the 
 graceful or becoming [^decorum'] whether we stand or 
 walk, whether we sit or lie down, in every motion of 
 our features, our eyes, our hands." The ethics of Cicero 
 is, in short, the Stoic ethics refined, or humanized : pain 
 and pleasure are to him not " indifferent," as to the old 
 Stoics. This refinement, or humanism, also appears 
 markedly in Cicero's conception of friendship, which 
 he places next to wisdom among the things most valu- 
 able to man, and defines as nothing else than a complete 
 union of feeling on all subjects, human and divine, 
 accompanied by kindly feeling and attachment. Cicero 
 did not attain, however, to the conception of a universal 
 love towards men. 
 
 Seneca:. Life. — The leading Eclectic Stoic of the next 
 century is Seneca (3-65 a.d.). Seneca was educated 
 in the school of the Sextians (a noted though short-lived 
 sect in Rome that united a kind of Cynicism with Pythag- 
 orean rules of life, preaching a moral life and putting 
 forth no speculative doctrines), and thence had in him 
 a strong touch of asceticism, which appears particularly 
 in his doctrine of the soul and its relation to the body. 
 He was teacher and political counsellor of the wicked 
 emperor Nero, and had weaknesses of character that 
 were inconsistent with true philosophy and certainly 
 quite discordant with the principles of Stoicism. 
 
 Seneca s Philosophy. — In Seneca, philosophy is prac- 
 tically reduced to ethics. He attached no importance 
 to logic, and held to physics (in which he followed 
 closely the Stoics of the Old School) chiefly for its ethi- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 259 
 
 cal bearing. In his doctrine of the nature of the soul, 
 Seneca gives up the simple monism of the Stoics for the 
 dualism of Plato, keenly realizing what the older Stoics 
 had not allowed themselves to recognize, the natural 
 conflict between "passion and reason." "The body, or, 
 as he contemptuously calls it, the flesh, is something so 
 worthless that we cannot think meanly enough of it : it 
 is a mere husk of the soul, a tenement into which it has 
 entered for a short time, and can never feel itself at 
 home, a burden by which it is impressed, a fetter or 
 prison for the loosing and opening of which it must nec- 
 essarily long ; with its flesh it must necessarily do bat- 
 tle ; through its body it is exposed to attack and suffer- 
 ing ; but in itself it is pure and invulnerable, exalted 
 above the body, even as God is exalted above matter. 
 The true life of the soul begins, therefore, with its de- 
 parture from the body."i We have here an echo of 
 Plato's Phcedrus. Seneca was forbidden, by his mate- 
 rialistic conception of the nature of the soul, to posit 
 unconditionally the immortality of the soul. Although 
 giving theoretical assent to the Stoic ideal of the Wise 
 Man, he seems to have felt obliged to doubt (as did most 
 of the later thinkers who were in sympathy with the 
 Stoics, but could not so completely abstract from envi- 
 ronment) that the ideal was one that could be realized. 
 He saw, rather, in the conditions of human life the 
 necessity for self-criticism and internal conflict. Instead 
 of the strong tendency manifest in the earlier Stoic doc- 
 trine to self-complacent individualism, there appears in 
 Seneca a consciousness of human imperfection, which 
 
 1 Zeller's Eclectics, p. 222. 
 
26o GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 bears fruit in a disinterested regard for men in general. 
 " The real crown of his moral doctrine lies in the uni- 
 versal love of man, the purely human interest which 
 bestows itself on all without distinction, even the mean- 
 est and most despised, which even in the slave does 
 not forget the man; in that gentleness of disposition 
 which is so especially antagonistic to anger and hatred, 
 tyranny, and cruelty, and which considers nothing 
 worthier of a man and more according to nature than 
 forgiving mercy, and benevolence that is unselfish 
 and disseminates happiness in secret, imitating the 
 divine goodness towards the evil and the good ; which, 
 mindful of human weakness, would rather spare than 
 punish, does not exclude even enemies from its good- 
 will, and will not return even injury with injury." ^ 
 It was by virtue of the influence of this mildness and 
 sympathy that the rather heartless theology of the 
 older Stoics became in Seneca a true religion. In 
 Seneca, Stoicism verges upon its opposite. 
 
 Musonius Rufiis, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius. — 
 Deserving of mention, though they seem to have con- 
 tributed nothing to philosophy as a science, are Musonius 
 Rufus (latter part of the first century a.d.), Epictetus 
 (about the same time), a Phrygian slave who taught phi- 
 losophy in Rome, and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the 
 Roman Emperor (i 21-180 a.d.). Epictetus was a pupil 
 of Musonius, and Marcus Aurelius a profound admirer 
 of Epictetus ; so that there is a close historical connec- 
 tion between the three. They are also in essential 
 agreement in their spirit and teachings. Completely 
 possessed by the ethical idea, the whole force of their 
 
 ^ Zeller's Eclectics, p. 240. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 26 1 
 
 philosophizing goes toward rendering the individual a, so 
 to say, moral sphere, perfect in itself and without rela- 
 tion of dependence, positive or negative, to others. They 
 teach the doctrine of an all-pervading, over-ruling Provi- 
 dence and of a kind but dispassionate regard for man. 
 They belong to the noble class of conservators and dis- 
 seminators of the ethical spirit. Epictetus and Marcus 
 Aurelius taught a reverence for " the God (haifimv) 
 within." Their philosophy is, of course, of the Stoic 
 type, with a tendency to simple Cynicism. 
 
 Cynics. — Later came philosophers of the pure Cynical 
 type, who may be looked upon as Stoics reverted to the 
 original prototype of Stoicism, i.e., the Cynicism of 
 Antisthenes and Diogenes, the most fundamental and 
 permanent element of Stoicism being its disguised 
 Cynicism. 
 
 §25. 
 
 General Character of the Second Period in the History 
 of Greek Philosophy. — A review of Greek thought from 
 the end of what was designated as the First Period dis- 
 covers a common fundamental characteristic in the (more 
 or less conscious) assumption that truth and reality are 
 contained in reason, (mind, thought, vovi) regarded 
 either as opposed or as indifferent to nature (the primary 
 object of thought in the First Period) or as wholly above 
 and beyond nature and phenomena generally or, finally, 
 as above or higher than nature but embracing or at least 
 constituting the essence of nature and phenomena gen- 
 erally. Hence the designation Rationalism (p. 34) for 
 this period. It is perhaps hazardous to attempt a dog- 
 matic and precise classification of thinkers and schools on 
 
262 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the basis thus afforded for classification, but some such 
 one as the following appears substantially correct. The 
 representatives of the assumption or view that reason 
 is opposed, or at least indifferent to, phenomena taken 
 in their universal character are the Sophists, Socrates {?), 
 the Cynics, Cyrenaics, the early Stoics (in ethics), the 
 Epicureans, the Sceptics, the Eclectic Stoics, Academics, 
 and Cynics ; of the assumption that reason is wholly 
 above and beyond phenomena, the Megarians ; of the 
 assumption that reason, though higher than nature, 
 embraces it or constitutes its essence, Plato, the leading 
 members of the Old Academy, Aristotle, the Peripatetics, 
 the Stoics (in physics), and the Eclectic Peripatetics, — 
 Plato and Aristotle tending toward a supra-rationalism, 
 and the others toward a kind of rationalistic naturalism, 
 i.e., the identification of reason with nature. The gen- 
 eral tendency of thought may be described as being 
 toward the point of view of the first-named assumption, 
 i.e., toward subjectivism, away from universalism. But 
 because of the contradictory character of the rationalistic 
 standpoint as thus developed by the actual course of 
 thought, a natural step for thought is to abandon this 
 standpoint for another, the supra-rationalistic. The 
 position of the Megarians is allied to the supra-rational- 
 istic in all, perhaps, but as regards name. The One of 
 the Megarians like the Being of the Eleatics was the 
 object of thought, or reason, not of a power above rea- 
 son. In Plato and Aristotle, in the idea of the good 
 which is above science and being, or essence, and the 
 thought of thought, which is above the heavens — we 
 have a distinct suggestion of a higher standpoint than 
 the ordinary use of the term reason in the period covers. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 263 
 
 III. SUPRA-RATIONALISM (AND SUPRA-NATURALISM). 
 
 §26. 
 
 Standpoint and Schools of the Third and Latest Period 
 in Greek Philosophy. — As a matter of fact it was just 
 this supra-rationalism (and hence supra-naturalism) that 
 became the standpoint of the thinkers and schools of 
 the latest period of Greek thought. Such a standpoint 
 was in part involved even in the common, non-philo- 
 sophical consciousness of the time, — one century b.c. 
 and several centuries afterwards, — which was filled with 
 (supposed) intimations of and with aspirations towards 
 the supra-natural : belief in magic, the existence of 
 "daemons," a prophetic character in dreams, and, of 
 course, in the immortality of the soul, was rife ; ^ and it 
 was but natural that an attempt should be made to find 
 a real warrant, a philosophical basis, for such intimations 
 and aspirations. It was natural also that such basis 
 and warrant should, first of all, be looked for in systems 
 of philosophy already in existence. As a matter of 
 fact, it was found particularly in the systems of the 
 Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics ; and cer- 
 tain systems arose that were little more than professed 
 rehabilitations of these systems, and having in common 
 with one another, not only the same general aim but 
 many doctrines, adopted from these systems. To the 
 schools thus arising have been applied the names, Alex- 
 andrian, or Jewish-Alexandrian (Platonic and Aristote- 
 lian), Neo-Pythagorean, Eclectic-Platonic, Neo-Platonic, 
 etc. 
 
 1 See an interesting discussion on this point in A. W. Benn's The Greek 
 Philosophers, Vol. II. ch. 4. 
 
264 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 §27. 
 
 Jewish-Alexandrian Schools. — Of the philosophers of 
 the Jewish-Alexandrian school we speak of Aristobulus 
 (160 B.C.), who appears to have been the first to com- 
 bine Jewish and Greek conceptions, and of Philo Ju- 
 daeus, a (Jewish) theologian of Alexandria, who flour- 
 ished in the first part of the first century a.d., and, hke 
 Aristobulus, combined Jewish and Greek conceptions. 
 Alexandria was at this time a meeting-place for the 
 whole Mediterranean world, and a natural point of syn- 
 cretism, also, for the ideas of that world. 
 
 Aristobulus. — Aristobulus held that the world is 
 ruled by a divine power (not God but a "potency" of 
 God), and that God is extra-mundane, visible only to 
 reason {yovi). "In interpreting the [Jewish] seven 
 days' work of creation, Aristobulus interprets, meta- 
 phorically, the light, which was created on the first day, 
 as symbolizing the wisdom by which all things are 
 illumined, which some of the Peripatetic philosophers 
 had compared to a torch ; but, he adds, one of his own 
 nation (Solomon, Prov. viii. 22 seq. .') had testified of it 
 more distinctly and finely, that it existed before the 
 heavens and the earth. Aristobulus then endeavors to 
 show how the whole order of the world rests on the 
 number seven." ^ 
 
 Philo Judceus : General Attitude^ — Philo built up a 
 philosophical system out of material borrowed from 
 the Greek philosophers and treated in the spirit of the 
 Hebrew, or, rather, Oriental conception of God as the 
 
 I Ueberweg's Hist, of Phil, Vol. I. p. 227. 
 ^ Ritter and Ueberweg. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 26$ 
 
 sole being and as remotely transcendent above the 
 world. Naturally, therefore, he treats the logic and 
 physics of the earlier philosophers (so far as these 
 divisions of philosophy are concerned with mundane 
 things and are within the general range of human intel- 
 ligence) as of comparatively slight consequence, and 
 converts philosophy into higher theology. 
 
 Theory of Knowledge. — Philo agrees with the Scep- 
 tics (Academicians) as to- the inability of the human 
 mind to attain to knowledge of the real, but instead 
 of adopting their theory of probability, makes knowl- 
 edge possible as a "gift" from God, a revelation. This 
 knowledge comes to man when in a certain state of 
 soul denominated "enthusiasm," a "reposeful divine 
 rapture," in which the soul, liberated from sense and 
 absorbed in itself, is fructified by God. In such a reve- 
 lation is contained for man the knowledge of the prob- 
 able ground of things : God is too high above human 
 thought to be clearly apprehended by it even in a state 
 of " enthusiasm." Man may by his own effort become 
 capable of such a revelation, worthy of such a gift, 
 through philosophic thought ; the revelation itself is a 
 gift. Philosophy is the highest form of human knowl- 
 edge strictly as such. Other sciences, i.e., grammar, 
 rhetoric, geometry, etc., are but limited in power : they 
 are merely propaedeutic to the higher wisdom. They 
 have value as media between sense and reason, but 
 true knowledge is given not in sense-perception nor 
 in demonstration, but in " immediate intuition," an 
 activity or condition of the soul in which there is 
 no co5peration of bodily activity. Knowledge of the 
 individual object is the lowest form of knowledge, the 
 
266 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 highest form being concerned with the highest genus, 
 being. Of being, however, we only know that it is, 
 which is practic2,lly all that we know of God as he is 
 in himself. 
 
 God. — According to this theory of knowledge, God 
 is the sole self-existent being, without properties, un- 
 mixed, higher than virtue and science, than beauty and 
 goodness; he has no name, is unknowable, simply is. 
 And yet he is, if we must ascribe to him attributes, 
 immutable, supremely happy, supremely good, universal 
 reason, supra-sensible light ; he is (like the Prime Mover 
 of Aristotle) above and out of the world ; present in it 
 by his power, not by his substance, or essence. 
 
 The Logos. — The middle term between God and the 
 world, i.e., his power, lies in his energies, or potencies 
 (which, though attributes, are distinct from him), which 
 are emanations from him, and the totality and unity of 
 which is the Logos {^6jo<i), or Word. The highest of 
 these is creative power, second is the "ruling potency," 
 third, the "fore-seeing," fourth, the "law-giving," etc. 
 These are to be conceived as personal activities and, 
 perhaps, beings (like the Ideas of Plato). Though God 
 is the creator, the Logos is ruler, his minister, and 
 " Second God." As related to both God and the world, 
 the Logos (Word) has a double nature, which may be 
 symbolized by an inward thought and an expressed 
 thought in their union, or interrelation. The Logos 
 (sometimes designated as Sophia) is thus an image of 
 God and the archetype of the world, or, adopting the 
 terminology of Plato, whom Philo here in a manner fol- 
 lows, the Logos is the Idea, the Idea of Ideas, the 
 "place " (to'tto?) of Ideas, the supra-sensible world. The 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 267 
 
 Ideas (or potencies), whose place and totality the Logos 
 is, are ministering powers, angels, differing in degree of 
 excellence and together constituting a hierarchy. When 
 not illumined by the light of God, man may be illumined 
 by that of the angels. The supra-sensible world, though 
 gradated down to the sensible, is quite distinct from it. 
 
 The Sensible World and Matter. — The sensible world 
 is a copy and reflection of the supra-sensible. It was 
 created, through the instrumentality of the Logos, out 
 of matter, which is purely corporeal, without form or 
 property, inert, motionless, passive, potential, the source 
 of imperfection in the sensible world, God being author 
 only of that which is good. Matter, it thus appears, is 
 in the system of Philo even more than in earlier sys- 
 tems a necessary, irreducible element. 
 
 Man. — Between the sensible and supra-sensible worlds 
 stands man. By the world of sense man is seduced 
 from God and put under the rule of material necessity 
 and imperfection, but as a child of the Logos, as a 
 rational being, capable of knowing (in part) and aspir- 
 ing after divine excellfence, he is subject to the law of 
 justice and must be regarded as free. Man's supreme 
 good is divine contemplation, or " mental peace and re- 
 pose, and joy in God." This is also his virtue, for in 
 virtue alone goodness lies. In virtue the pleasure of 
 sense has no place and human science has only a subor- 
 dinate one, virtue being a "gift" from God. The four 
 virtues assumed by Plato are by Philo treated as but 
 (lower) forms of one virtue, viz., "goodness after the 
 pattern of divine wisdom." This wisdom is higher than 
 prudence, which is earthly, merely. Three degrees of 
 virtue are — - to begin with the lowest — virtue resulting 
 
268 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 from (human) science, virtue resulting from an ascetic 
 life, and virtue that is a natural "gift." The two first 
 mentioned are human ; the last is divine. These three 
 are interdependent. A fourth kind of virtue is that hav- 
 ing as its condition philosophic science ; it is, however, a 
 gift, as is natural virtue, with which on this account it 
 is on a level. Other virtues or, rather, perhaps, condi- 
 tions to virtue, are hope, repentance, and justice. 
 
 Result. — The most conspicuous historical sources of 
 Philo's doctrines are the scepticism of the Later Aca- 
 demics, the Platonic theory of Ideas (of which Philo sup- 
 posed Moses to be the real originator), and the Stoic 
 ethics and physics. He owed much also to the Pythago- 
 reans ; was a debtor, indeed, to most of the leading 
 earlier systems in the history of Greek philosophy. His 
 theory of knowledge and virtue as gifts from God is 
 original and distinctive, — a new growth in the his- 
 tory of Greek thought. Similar to it, perhaps, may 
 seem Plato's idea that knowledge is the working of the 
 Idea in man, or that we rise to the Idea of the Good by 
 an act of soul higher than science, and Cicero's thought 
 that there is in man an innate perception of virtue, God, 
 and immortality. But the extremes of the system of 
 Philo, owing to the Oriental remoteness of God from 
 the world, are so distinctly separated that they are 
 brought together only by an act of speculative imagi- 
 nation, or faith, whereas neither Plato nor Cicero steps 
 outside the sphere of thought, or the conception of the 
 objective organic whole. The point and principle of 
 synthesis in the system of Philo is an unexplained sub- 
 jective emotion (}.e., aspiration towards God) ; in the 
 systems of Plato and Cicero it is an intellectual effort to 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 269 
 
 grasp (not passively apprehend) things mentally in their 
 unity. According to Philo, spiritual knowledge is given 
 to man ; according to Plato and Cicero, man acquires 
 such knowledge by means of a power possessed by him- 
 self, the function of which is just that of seizing upon 
 the thing knowable. (By Plato the existence of such 
 a power is deduced ; by Cicero it is, rather, assumed.) 
 Philo' s place is therefore among mystical philosophers ; 
 he is a theologian who has based himself upon religious 
 feeling without giving an iiitelligible account of it and 
 of the process (" intuition ") by which it reaches its goal, 
 the knowledge of God. It may not inappropriately be 
 added concerning him as a theologian that he practised 
 an unliteral, allegorical interpretation of the Jewish Scrip- 
 tures (analogous to the Stoic rationalizing of myths), 
 and that because of his belief in the " impurity of mat- 
 ter," he did not conceive of the Logos as incarnated 
 " nor identify the Logos with the expected Messias, to 
 which course, nevertheless, he was powerfully moved 
 by the practical and spiritual interest connected with 
 redemption through the Messias."^ 
 
 §28. 
 
 Neo-Pythagoreanism. — • Pythagoreanism was revived 
 in the first century B.C. by a certain P. Nigidins Figu- 
 lus. The school thus originated is known as the Neo' 
 Pythagorean School. 
 
 § 39. 
 
 The Eclectic Platonists. — We must mention here the 
 1 See Ueberweg. 
 
2/0 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 historian Plutarch {circa 50-125 a.d.), who is placed 
 among those Eclectics who kept most closely to the 
 doctrines of Plato himself. 
 
 § 30. 
 
 Neo-Platonism. — Platonism was revived by an Alex- 
 andrian named Antmonius Saccas, of whom little else 
 is known except that he was the teacher of Plotinus 
 (presently to be spoken of), and must have flourished 
 in the early part of the third century a.d. He is said 
 to have regarded the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle 
 as substantially one and the same, and to have taught 
 both in their purity. Other leading Neo-Platonists are 
 Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, and Proclus. 
 
 Life of Plotinus. — Plotinus {firca 205-270 a.d.), a 
 native of Lycopolis, in Egypt, studied philosophy eleven 
 years in the school of Ammonius Saccas, and went, at 
 about the age of forty, to Rome and opened there a school 
 of philosophy, which was attended by a large number of 
 persons of learning and eminence, both male and female. 
 Here he taught for twenty-six years. He was of ascetic 
 habits, was ashamed of his body, ate neither flesh nor 
 bread, despised medicine, was averse to giving informa- 
 tion of his personal history. He appears to have aimed 
 at a philosophical culture that should, as far as possible, 
 strip the outward individual as such of his attributes ; 
 and one of his practical projects was the founding of a 
 state with a constitution" such as that expounded in 
 Plato's Laws. In the ascetic and mystic character of 
 his ideals he resembled, it would seem, the Pythagore- 
 ans ; and yet there can be no doubt that he regarded 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 27 1 
 
 the theoretical as far above the level of the practical, — 
 philosophical contemplation as above narrow moral dis- 
 cipline. His works, fifty-four in all, were arranged and 
 edited by his pupil Porphyry, in a collection of six 
 groups, of nine works each, whence the name Enneads 
 (^evvea = nine)} Plotinus was a violent opponent of the 
 pugnacious Christianity of his age ; but both in his life 
 and in his writings there stands out in full relief the 
 desire and purpose to hold the mind above the things 
 of mere sense and in the light of its own pure nature. 
 Dialectic. — Plotinus, as did his master Plato, particu- 
 larly in the middle period of his philosophizing,^ held 
 philosophy or, rather, perhaps, the approach to it, to 
 consist in a mental flight from this world to a higher 
 region, in becoming "like God," an ascent to the Idea 
 of the Good ; and in his opuscule, On Dialectic, he ex- 
 plains, after the manner of Plato, the method or mode 
 of ascent to the Idea of the Good from the level of 
 the born musician, lover, and philosopher, who are 
 gifted, each in a particular way, with a finer perception 
 than most men, of the harmony that lies veiled in the 
 sensuous world. The perception which the musician 
 and lover have of the harmony and inner truth of things 
 is overpowered by "astonishment," the mere sensation 
 of the beautiful ; and these gifted natures have first to 
 be raised to a standpoint from which they can distin- 
 guish the principles of beauty {e.g., concord, rhythm, 
 figure) in objects of sense from the immediate environ- 
 ment of those principles. They may then contemplate 
 
 1 See Ueberweg's History of Philosophy for the subjects, grouping, and 
 chronological order of the works. 
 
 2 See Theatetus, p. 176; also, Phmdrus and Republic. 
 
272 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 those principles in a higher grade of development {e.g., 
 beautiful pursuits and laws) and then pass on through 
 the study of the sciences to dialectic, or the science of 
 thought and being, which is the " immediate instru- 
 ment " of the Good itself. The born-philosopher does 
 not require to be disengaged from meshes of sense and 
 feeling; he is naturally quick to perceive thought-dis- 
 tinctions, but is somewhat dubious and only in want of 
 some one to "indicate the way." He passes readily 
 from the particular to the universal, and, after having 
 received a training in the sciences, finds dialectic to be 
 his native element. What then is dialectic .' " It is a 
 habit enabling its possessor to reason about everything, 
 to know what each thing is, in what it differs from 
 other things, what the common something is in or of 
 which it participates, where each of these is, if a thing 
 is, what it is, what the number of beings is, and of 
 non-beings (which are not nothing but different from 
 beings). It also discusses the Good and the contrary 
 of it, the Eternal and its contrary. All these things 
 it discusses scientifically and not from opinion." " It 
 employs division, obtains knowledge of the first genera 
 of things, intellectually connecting that which results 
 from them till it has proceeded through the whole of 
 an intelligible nature, and again by an analytic process 
 it arrives at that to which it proceeded from the first." ^ 
 Dialectic is not merely the instrument of philosophy : 
 " it is concerned with being and what lies beyond being : 
 it knows the motions of the soul, what the soul admits 
 and what it rejects " ; it understands manner, virtues, 
 
 I Select Works of Plotinus (trans, by T. Taylor). 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 2/3 
 
 habits, passions, actions. It is the "most honorable 
 part " of philosophy, but it presupposes, and is presup- 
 posed by, the other parts. It is not possible to know 
 dialectic without knowing " inferior concerns " ; but 
 though these may be in a manner understood " without 
 dialectic," the knowledge of them is perfected by dialec- 
 tic. The first principles of dialectic have their origin 
 in intellect and not in any faculty or activity of the 
 soul relating particularly to " inferior concerns." Dia- 
 lectic in its highest form stands above, and "surveys," 
 logic, or the principles of the understanding, or dianoetic 
 faculty, which immediately govern the sciences relating 
 to inferior concerns. The foregoing, which, it is to be 
 observed, is quite Platonic in quality, elevates us to the 
 standpoint of Plotinus, the standpoint of speculation 
 (vision), or pure thought, or self-consciousness. Another 
 account of the steps leading to this standpoint (which 
 should be added to the foregoing, not only because it 
 is more scientific but also because the meaning of 
 Plotinus's philosophy is easily missed without care in 
 the attempt to approach his standpoint) is the follow- 
 ing : ^ The standpoint of sense is, naturally and neces- 
 sarily for most men, prior to that of thought. Some 
 never get beyond this; considering the things of sense, 
 " as the first and last of things and apprehending that 
 whatever is painful among these is evil and whatever is 
 pleasant is good." "Others are in a small degree ele- 
 vated from things subordinate, the more excellent parts 
 of the soul recalling them .from pleasure to a more 
 worthy pursuit." "Others through a more excellent 
 
 1 See On Intellect, Ideas, and Being (Taylor's trans.). 
 
2/4 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 power and with piercing eyes, acutely perceive supernal 
 light, to the vision of which they raise themselves 
 above the clouds and darkness, as it were, of the lower 
 world, and there abiding despise these regions of sense, 
 being no otherwise delighted with the place which is 
 truly and properly their own, than he who after many 
 wanderings is at length restored to his lawful country." 
 Concisely stated, the steps of progression in the love 
 and knowledge of the beautiful are : first, love of sensi- 
 ble beauty ; second, " love of the beauty of science 
 and virtue and of beauty of soul " ; third, love of the 
 " cause of beauty of soul " ; fourth, love of " that which 
 is first and which is beautiful from itself." In this 
 last alone is there complete saitisfaction ("Uberation 
 from parturiency ") for the soul that is in intellectual 
 travail. 
 
 Reason, Intellect, or Nous : the Realm of Ideas. — 
 Since the ascent to the realm of that which is " beautiful 
 from itself " has been by a process of abstracting from 
 the uniformities and types in things, and thinking more 
 and more of the types in themselves, that which is " first 
 and beautiful from itself" must be conceived as the realm 
 oipure types or forms, which is intellect, or reason. Soul 
 is not that which is " first and beautiful from itself," 
 because, if it were, one soul would not be beautiful and 
 wise, and another unwise and base (as now is the case) ; 
 soul is subject to passions, or passive changing states : it 
 is linked with the sensible world and, as thus involved 
 (incidentally) in motion, .is in " capacity " not in 
 "energy" (Aristotle's distinction of hvvafii,<; and ivep- 
 ryeia). Soul is beautiful merely as participating in intel- 
 lect, or reason ; reason alone is in energy and always in 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 2/5 
 
 itself, for itself, and from itself. In reason, things are 
 known as they really are, and the knower and the known 
 are one. Reason is the place of being, the totality of 
 pure forms, and of knowledge. If intellectual percep- 
 tion were not a perception of being, then intellect were 
 only a "capacity" or "possibility, " but we must have 
 that which is in energy, and intellect is seen to be such 
 only when the objects of intellectual perception are in 
 intellect itself. If they were elsewhere, or outside of 
 intellect, or had no being, then intellect would only be 
 in capacity not real intellect and the objects of its per- 
 ception not being. Intellect is, then, both that which is 
 and that which knows. And, further, in so far as sen- 
 sible things participate in types, they are objects of 
 intellect ; and not only so, but since intellect, or reason, 
 has only itself for its object, they are creations of intel- 
 lect. Further, still, it is the same thing to perceive 
 intellectually and to be. In intellect all things subsist 
 collectively, or at the same time, and yet as one, just as 
 in the seed are contained all the potentialities of the 
 future plant. But there is in intellect no (temporal) 
 process as in the growth (and reality) of the seed. Rea- 
 son is eternally "present with itself." "It does not 
 extend itself to the objects of its perception as if it did 
 not possess them, or as if it acquired them externally or 
 obtained them by a discursive process, as if they were 
 not already present with it ... : but it stands firmly 
 in itself." For this reason, intellect, as distinguished 
 from being, does not exist prior to being ; if it did, 
 we should have to say that intellect, by energizing 
 and intellectually perceiving, generated beings. Rather, 
 intellect is posterior to being, just as the energy of fire 
 
2/6 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is posterior to fire ; and yet, since intellect would lack in 
 itself being (and hence would not be intellect) if it became 
 its object or being, we say that being and intellect are 
 one. Considered with reference to its contents the 
 intelligible world is or contains in it " according quali- 
 ties and quantities, numbers and magnitudes, habitudes, 
 actions, and passions, which are according to nature, 
 motions, permanencies, both universal and particular," 
 " sameness, difference, the stable, essence, quality, art." 
 On the contrary, there is in the intelligible world no art 
 that has to do with sensible things. " Neither will the 
 agriculture be there which is conversant with a sensible 
 plant ; nor the medicine which saves the health of the 
 body, or which contributes to strength and a good cor- 
 poreal habit. For there is another power, another 
 health, there, through which all animals are sufficiently 
 corroborated." Rhetoric, military art, oeconomics, 
 politics, and all natural objects are there merely by par- 
 ticipation. " Geometry, however, by being conversant 
 with intelligibles must be arranged in the intelligible 
 world." The soul in its real essence is there and the 
 true sciences and justice and temperance. 
 
 The One, The First, The Good. — In intellect, or 
 reason, there is a certain duality of the knower and 
 the known, even though these be in a manner one, 
 and therefore, says Plotinus, reason is not the Absolute 
 (The First, The One, The Good). The Absolute is what 
 is One simply and without qualification. It is prior to 
 being and intellect. It is in itself neither intelligible 
 nor intellective. It is intelligible in the sense that, 
 being that which alone is absolutely perfect, its pres- 
 ence with or to intellect or reason is essential to the 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 2TJ 
 
 perfect being and activity of intellect. If this, which 
 is prior to intellect itself, had intellectual perception, it 
 would have to have present with it another thing, and 
 hence would not be sole and first, but "many" and 
 second. The One is not one among many, nor one in 
 or through many : it is absolutely sole. The thought 
 of it is wholly unlike the thought of anything else. 
 To attain to the perception of the One it is requisite 
 to abstract totally from the wqrld of sense, i.e., " to com- 
 mit one's soul to, and establish it in, intellect." One 
 then perceives that which is absolutely formless and 
 distinctionless, and it may be, becomes- weary of the 
 vision and wishes to descend again to the world of sense. 
 " When the soul directs its attention to that which is 
 formless, then being unable to comprehend that which 
 is not bounded, and, as it were, impressed with forms 
 by a former of a various nature, it falls from the appre- 
 hension of it and is afraid it will possess nothing from 
 the view. Hence it becomes weary in endeavors of 
 this kind, and gladly descends from the survey, fre- 
 quently falling from all things till it arrives at some- 
 thing sensible, and, as it were, rests on a solid substance ; 
 just as sight, also, when. wearied with the perception 
 of small objects, eagerly turns to such as are larger." 
 Nevertheless, the Absolute, or First, is to be approached 
 only in the manner described. All intellectual percep- 
 tions proper, however pure of sense, are but conditions 
 to the apprehension of the One. In speaking of the One 
 we necessarily apply names to it that designate not any- 
 thing that is really in the One itself, but, " something 
 which happens to us because we possess something 
 from it, the One meantime subsisting in itself. It is 
 
2/8 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 necessary, 'however, when speaking accurately of the 
 One, neither to call it that nor this. But we, running, as 
 it were, externally around it, are desirous of explaining 
 the manner in which we are affected about it. At one 
 time, indeed, we draw near to it, but at another time 
 fall from it by our doubts about it. . . . Doubt espe- 
 cially arises because the perception of the highest Good 
 is not effected by science [i.e., natural, or mathematical 
 science] nor by intelligS«ce [the knowledge of pure 
 types] like other intelligibles, but by the presence of 
 him. All concrete or synthetic doctrine extends only 
 so far as the way and progression to him." The act 
 of perceiving the One is a complete merging into it, a 
 perfect union of knowing subject with known object, a 
 union which is of the nature of the One and is hence 
 necessarily a perfect union of the knowing subject with 
 itself. It is only after separating from the One that 
 intellect has before it the distinction of subject and 
 object. The One is distinct from, though present with, 
 all else. 
 
 Intellect, Reason, or Nous as an Emanation. — The One 
 being thus prior for thought to all things else is the 
 absolute prius of all things -else. But in what way .' 
 How does the (our) thought of the One lead to that of in- 
 tellect, soul, and sensible things .' How do all things 
 else follow from the One .■' When we try to hold or, 
 we may just as well say, lose, ourselves in the concep- 
 tion of the One, or pure formlessness, we find sponta- 
 neously arising the thought of the opposite. This fact 
 is the foundation of Plotinus's theory of the "genera- 
 tion and order of all things after the first." "The One 
 being perfect in consequence of not seeking or possess- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 2/9 
 
 ing, or being in want of anything . . . becomes, as it 
 were, overflowing,^ and the super-plenitude of it pro- 
 duces something else. That, however, which is gen- 
 erated from it (being still under its influence) turns 
 towards it. (to become or to partake of, the One) and is 
 filled, and was generated looking to it. But this is 
 intellect and the permanency of it about the One pro- 
 duced being, but its vision intellect. When, therefore, 
 it is established about the One in order that it may see 
 it, then it becomes at once intellect and being." ^ In 
 this vision of the One intellect has the consciousness 
 of power and of itself. The One, that is to say, having 
 produced by its overflowing an energy which it causes 
 to turn back towards it and look at it sinks down (for 
 that intellective power) into the realm of being, and 
 being and intellect are thus organically distinguished 
 and joined — immanent the one in the other by the 
 presence of the One — ^as knower and known. Intel- 
 lect viewing being in a light reflected from the One — 
 seeing being by vision that it has immediately on leav- 
 ing the One — sees being as one (a form of One) rather 
 than many, and one with itself (intellect) : it therefore 
 sees itself. Viewing being as being, i.e., as established 
 and independent, it sees it as many (rather than one). 
 In the latter form it is discursive and scientific, not 
 pure intellect. " By logically analyzing the conception 
 of self-consciousness we obtain, first of all. Nous itself, 
 or Reason, as the subject, and Existence as the object 
 of thought. Subject and object, considered as the 
 
 ^ In all other natures desire or wanl is the cause of their putting forth 
 energy. 
 
 2 On the Generation and Order of Things after The First (Taylor's 
 trans.). 
 
28o GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 same with one another, give us Identity ; considered as 
 distinct they give us Difference. The passage from 
 one to the other gives Motion the limitation of 
 thought to itself gives Rest. The plurality of deter- 
 minations so obtained gives Number and Quantity, their 
 specific difference gives Quality, and from these princi- 
 ples everything else is derived." ^ Such is the deduc- 
 tion of the primary ideas from the One and from Nous 
 and Being. The intelligible world does not fall below 
 the notion of organic unity. The intelligible world 
 is an " image " of the One. It is an organism of eter- 
 nal types and forms. Now, since form must have real- 
 ization in matter, there is in the intelligible world a 
 universal substratum, " incorporeal matter." This is 
 the bond of union, among the Ideas, or distinct forms, 
 of the intelligible world. It is cognized by "indefinite" 
 reason. 
 
 Soul. — Out of the superabundance of the Intellect, or 
 Nous, comes soul,^ which is an " image " of Nous, as 
 this is of the One. It partakes of the permanent, 
 abiding nature of Nous but has in it also the negative 
 of permanence, the principle of motion. Nothing, how- 
 ever, intervenes between soul and Nous : though dis- 
 tinct, they are continuous one with the other. Soul, 
 imitating Nous, looks back to its origin (as the Demiur- 
 gus of Plato's Timceus looks to the Idea) and generates 
 an image of itself ; viz., .visible nature which also is a 
 kind of soul. From both of these are generated souls, 
 rational and irrational. The " procession," or going 
 
 1 Benn's The Greek Philosophers, Vol. II. p. 321. 
 
 2 See On the Essence of the Soul, a Discussion of Doubts relative to 
 the Soul. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 28 1 
 
 forth of souls, from Nous is neither a voluntary nor a 
 compulsory act, but "resembles a physical leaping or 
 the natural tendencies to wedlock, or the impulses to 
 certain beautiful actions to which we are not excited by 
 a reasoning process." Each individual soul has inhe- 
 rent in it the universal law that carries it naturally to its 
 particular end at the time appointed by the law itself ; 
 or, to state the same fact in a different way, each soul 
 is suspended from an intellect which rules its course 
 (as, according to Aristotle, the Heavens are "suspended" 
 from the Deity, or Prime Mover). " Souls fall from the 
 intelligible world, in the first place, indeed, into the 
 heavens, and there receiving a body they proceed 
 through it into terrene bodies so far as their progres- 
 sions are more extended in length. And some of them 
 proceed from the heavens into inferior bodies, but 
 others pass from certain bodies into others : these being 
 such as have not sufficient power to raise themselves 
 from hence on account of the great weight of oblivion 
 which they have attracted and which draws them down 
 by their oppressive influence." Souls differ either in- 
 herently or from the diversity of the circumstances 
 into which they are introduced or from fortune and 
 education. That natural and, as it were, free necessity 
 which conducts all beings to that condition of existence 
 to which they are adapted, " coordinating and weaving 
 together even the smallest things," is a kind of uni- 
 versal justice awarding their deserts to those who have 
 done good or evil, whether in this life or a preexistent 
 state. 
 
 Soul and Body. — As being an " intelligible nature 
 and divine allotment " the soul is not body nor the bar- 
 
282 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mony in incorporeal natures, nor the entelechy, or per- 
 fection, of the body. The soul is " present with " the 
 body ; and, as the One is with intellect and intellect 
 with the soul, it is not in the body ; rather the body is in 
 it, as the air is and shines in the light. As intermediate 
 in nature between the perfectly indivisible (the One and 
 intellect) and the divisible (the sense world), the soul is 
 present with the body as whole and as part. The whole 
 soul is in each part, but has a difference of function in 
 the different parts by virtue of its adaptability to differ- 
 ences in the organs of the body. If the soul were not 
 (as thus) an organism, all synthesis of the findings of 
 the separate senses would be an impossibility and so, 
 likewise, would all distinguishing and mental registering 
 of sensations, for there will be no locating of them. 
 The order and beauty of the cosmos, to take a quite 
 analogous case, show that there must be a single power 
 which wisely connects and governs all things in it. This 
 power is the soul of the world. The soul in the body, 
 by virtue of its (relative) divisibility, supplies all parts 
 of the body with life and "power of sensation"; by 
 virtue of its indivisibility it "conducts all things wisely." 
 In the case of the sense of touch the whole body is 
 present as instrument with the soul ; in that of the other 
 senses only limited parts of the body. The central seat 
 of sensation is the brain. Though the sensitive soul is 
 bodily in nature, it is, to some extent, "judicial," or 
 intellective. The phantasy, or imagination (in the widest 
 sense), is permeated by reason ; impulse and appetite are 
 not entirely beyond the influence of reason and phan- 
 tasy. Memory has its roots partly in the intellect, 
 partly in the phantasy. The soul is throughout, there- 
 
GREEK. PHILOSOPHY. 283 
 
 fore, dominated by reason, or intellect. But because 
 of the natural deterioration of intellect that takes place 
 in the passing of intellect into soul, the intellect in the 
 soul is not pure, or intuitive, but discursive, or rationalis- 
 tic, intellect. Only rarely does the soul while in the 
 body attain to the summit of intellect and merge into 
 the Divine Being. It always possesses, however, though 
 it does not always energize according to them, the in- 
 nate ideas which it brought with it from the intelligible 
 world. The soul, after its separation from the body, 
 retains its powers, and has, if it has been deeply at- 
 tracted by its bodily life, a recollection of everything 
 done or suffered in the body. Evidence of the truth of 
 the supposition that memory is not purely bodily in ori- 
 gin and will continue after death is to be found in the 
 fact that the soul remembers, while in the body, some 
 things that are not bodily in their origin. " In course 
 of time after death the recollection of other things from 
 former lives will arise, so that some of the bodily recol- 
 lections will be dismissed and be despised. For, the 
 soul becoming in a greater degree purified from the 
 body will recollect those things, the remembrance of 
 which she lost in the present life." The intellect, as 
 well as the memory, undergoes a process of purification 
 after death. Then the ratiocination and the use of dis- 
 course which are made necessary now by the irregular 
 diversity of beings, or existences, give place to a pure 
 intuition. " If, however, souls live in the intelligible 
 world without (discursive) reasoning, how can they be 
 any longer rational ? They are still rational because 
 they are able to employ a reasoning process whenever 
 circumstances render it necessary. It is necessary to 
 
284 ' GREEK PHILOSOPHY 
 
 assume a ratiocination of this kind ... we must not 
 think voice is employed by them there so long as they 
 entirely subsist in the intelligible world. But where 
 they have bodies in the heavens they do not use the 
 dialect which they employ here through indigence or 
 ambiguity ; but performing everything in an orderly 
 manner and according to nature they neither command 
 anything to be done nor consult about it. They also 
 mutually know the objects of their knowledge through 
 a conscious perception; since even here, likewise, we 
 know many things through the eyes, pertaining to those 
 that are silent. There, however, every body is pure and 
 each inhabitant is, as it were, an eye. Nothing, likewise, 
 is there concealed or fictitious, but before one can speak 
 to another the latter knows what the former intended 
 to say." The Plotinic spirit-realm is thus completely 
 determined, or organized, according to the conception of 
 pure self-consciousness. 
 
 The Individual Soul and the Soul of the World. — 
 The individual soul is en rapport with the soul of the 
 world and receives influences from it ; but is, by virtue 
 of its rational part, a different soul from that of the uni- 
 verse — just as the soul of the child in the womb is 
 different from that of the mother. The soul of the 
 world, which produces the beauty and order of the cos- 
 mos, is (in part, at least) transcendent. Man may rise 
 to a true sense of his own inherent worth and dignity 
 by the contemplation of the soul of the world as mani- 
 fested in the cosmos. 
 
 The Sensible World and Matter. — The sensible world 
 begotten and fashioned by the soul of the universe, is 
 an " imitation " of that soul immediately and of the in- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 285 
 
 telligible world indirectly, for the soul receives from the 
 intelligible world the principles of all things. These 
 principles, or forms, it is the function of the soul to 
 objectify. The result, the objectification of forms, is 
 just the world of sensible objects. Form, however, re- 
 quires for its objectification that in which it shall receive 
 real existence, and this is termed matter.^ Sensible 
 objects as such are constantly passing into and out of 
 existence. Since form is intelligible, and as such per- 
 manent, these changes must be due to the matter of such 
 objects. Corporeal matter takes on now one form, now 
 another, is potentially all things and " always some differ- 
 ent thing." All theories, therefore, that represent matter 
 as fixed, or determined, in any respect, as are the elements 
 of Empedocles and atoms of Democritus, or as hav- 
 ing form, as do virtually the " seeds " of Anaxagoras, are 
 false. Matter is absolutely without quality of any sort 
 — without even magnitude — all qualities, or determina- 
 tions, being given to it by form, which alone possesses 
 definiteness or distinguishableness. If matter possessed 
 magnitude, for example, the creator would be subservi- 
 ent to that, and "his production would not possess 
 the quantity [nor the quality.?] which he wished it 
 should, but that which matter is capable of receiving." 
 "Every form possesses magnitude and the quantity 
 which it contains is accompanied with reason (i.e., with 
 a productive principle) and subsists under this. Hence 
 in every genus of things quantity is defined together 
 with form. For there is one magnitude of a man and 
 another of a bird." Matter is indefinite and perceived 
 
 1 See Plotinus's On Matter. 
 
286 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 by the indefinite reason. "If, however, everything is 
 known by reason and intelligence, but here reason in- 
 deed says what it is requisite to say about it, and wish- 
 ing to become intelligence is not intelligence but, as it 
 were, a privation of intellect, — ■ if this be the case, the 
 conception of matter will rather be spurious, and not 
 genuine ; be composed of an imagination which is not 
 true and another kind of reason (compare Plato's ' spu- 
 rious reason ' in the Timmus ^). What, therefore, is the 
 indefiniteness of the soul 1 Is it not all-perfect igno- 
 rance, such as the absence of knowledge .' Or does the 
 indefinite consist in a certain negation in conjunction 
 with a certain affirmation, and is it like darkness to the 
 eye, obscurity being the matter of every invisible color 1 " 
 The notion of matter is not exactly that of nonentity, 
 if it be possible to think nonentity. The soul is pained, 
 shrinks, at the thought of indefiniteness, and instinc- 
 tively affirms seeming nonentity as a kind of entity. 
 But matter is, nevertheless, not magnitude nor quality 
 of any sort but merely the capacity for the objectivity 
 of the quality that is in form. Form, in other words, 
 just as, seemingly, about to pass into nothingness sud- 
 denly develops into magnitude and every other quality. 
 Matter is merely then the subject of the qualities and 
 has no reality if there be no form. But as far as matter 
 is concerned, there is between matter and form no rela- 
 tion prior to their union, matter being entirely "indif- 
 ferent to quality." Matter is mere externality, or other- 
 ness. When we term it the infinite, or indefinite, we 
 can mean only that it is not something possessing the 
 
 1 Timaus, p. 52. See above, p. 92. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 287 
 
 attribute of indefiniteness, but the indefinite itself. Cor- 
 poreal matter is "perfect poverty," "necessarily evil," 
 and the cause of evil. 
 
 Virtue.^ — The world of sense is, for man, evil ; for it 
 is the world of indefiniteness and change, whereas man is, 
 by his very essence, — intellect and soul, — pure and per- 
 manent. He must fly hence and become like God ; in 
 this lies his virtue. It is doubtful if all the so-called 
 virtues are virtues. Temperance and fortitude, for ex- 
 ample, imply that man is subject to fear; but pure rea- 
 son knows no dread. The so-called " political virtues " ^ 
 are founded on deliberation, but deliberation is not a 
 purely intellectual act or function. Temperance, forti- 
 tude, prudence, and justice possess, indeed, a certain 
 efficacy in assimilating man to the divine ; but God has 
 no need of any of these virtues as such. Assimilation 
 is of two sorts : one requiring an approach of two 
 things towards each other in quality ; the other, that one 
 of the two things approach in similitude the other, this 
 other ranking as "first" and remaining unchanged. 
 The assimilation upon which perfect virtue depends is 
 assimilation to that which is unchanged. Such assimi- 
 lation must result in a purification of the soul of all 
 passion, and in making necessary sensations of pleasure 
 remedies and means of liberation from pain, in causing 
 the irrational part of the soul to be obedient to the 
 rational part. In accordance with this idea, the "politi- 
 cal virtues " must be transformed so that wisdom "will 
 consist in a contemplation of what intellect contains" ; 
 
 1 See On the Virtues. 
 
 2 That is, the virtues described by Plato and Aristotle as necessary to 
 the good citizen, the member of the ideal state. 
 
288 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 true justice will be that "energy of one thing towards 
 itself in which there is not another and another " {i.e., 
 the unity of self-consciousness) ; temperance, inward 
 turning to intellect ; fortitude, apathy, according to a 
 similitude of that to which the soul looks {i.e., the One 
 shining in Reason), and which is naturally impassive " 
 {i.e., pure reason). The virtue and end of man is that 
 perfect felicity which is to be found only in intellectual 
 contemplation. The soul's growth in this virtue is its 
 return to God, the source from which it ultimately em- 
 anated, the One. The proper virtue of the individual 
 soul is of like nature with the "virtue" of all else that 
 emanates from the One. Nous, Soul, Nature have their 
 being and produce their works in acts of " contempla- 
 tion " ; that is to say, in their natural aspiration and re- 
 turn towards the One.^ 
 
 Historical Sources of the System of Plotinus. — If 
 we say that the system of Plotinus is, historically con- 
 sidered, an attempt to mediate between, or " reconcile," 
 the systems of Plato and Aristotle, rather, however, from 
 the standpoint of the former than of the latter, we shall 
 indicate at one and the same time the main historical 
 sources and the essential character of the system in it- 
 self. In the one we have the Idea of the Good which 
 Plato afifirmed (in the Republic^) to be above both 
 knowledge, or science, and essence, or being. In the 
 conception of reason and being as the unity of subject 
 and object we have the God of Aristotle, and in the in- 
 telligible world Plato's realm of Ideas given rather the 
 psychological character of Aristotle's God. Plotinus's 
 
 1 See On Nature, Contemplation, and the One. 
 ^ See above, p. 87. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 289 
 
 theory of the soul, with its doctrines of preexistence, 
 the imprisonment of the soul in the body, and its immor- 
 tality, is Platonic and not Aristotelian ; but Plotinus's 
 arguments relating to the unity of the soul, its relation 
 to the body, the unity of subject and object, etc., seem 
 to be traceable to Aristotle's De Aninta. In Plotinus's 
 account of the sensible world and of matter, we find a 
 combination of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic views 
 combined. Again, Plotinus's ethics, if such it may be 
 termed, is, in its subjectivity, asceticism, and impassiv- 
 ity, somewhat Stoic ; in its purely theoretic tendency, 
 Aristotelian ; in i s purism, enthusiasm, and aspiration 
 towards sup i-mundane perfection, Platonic. Finally, 
 in the deduction from the One of all things else, we 
 have an attempt similar to that of the Pytha^reans to 
 deduce all things else, from mere number up to self-con- 
 sciousness, from the primal One.^ Plotinus himself very 
 frequently speaks with veneration of the " ancient phi- 
 losophers," and freely acknowledges obligations to them. 
 Result. — Notwithstanding, however, the obvious in- 
 debtedness of Plotinus to earlier philosophers, it seems 
 clear, even from our brief sketch of his real system, that 
 he had a standpoint and a full, firm grasp upon the phil- 
 osophical conceptions that he had borrowed, that were 
 quite his own. By bringing together Plato's Idea and 
 Aristotle's Thought of Thought, he, in the first place, 
 openly converted the former from an idea, or thought- 
 object, to a conception, or thought-function, or, better, a 
 thinking-subject, and so made the Idea more distinctly 
 an intelligent, synthetic power, — the One, that is to 
 say, is Plato's Idea become inner, spiritual ; and, in the 
 
 1 See above, p. 7. 
 
290 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 second place, made the latter, Thought of Thought, 
 which is a more or less dual self-consciousness, more 
 distinctly absolute spirit. Viewed externally, or as 
 idea, the One of Plotinus seems, indeed, but a mere 
 abstraction, indistinguishable from mere matter; but, 
 comprehended from within, it is the opposite of that, 
 — it is pure intellectual power, absolute self-determi- 
 nation. If it seems to lack content, we have to re- 
 member that its content is merely held in abeyance, 
 is to be developed by the system : the One is in reality 
 fulness of power, which goes forth spontaneously — 
 overflows — into existence, or concrete actuality. Psy- 
 chologically considered, Plotinus possesses a certain 
 unique excellence that even places him, in a certain re- 
 spect, above both Plato and Aristotle — the one a mas- 
 ter of dialectic thinking and the other of discursive 
 reflection, — viz., a singularly sustained purity and lofti- 
 ness of insight and peculiar power of keeping the mind's 
 eye ever fixed in the direction of the .sole truth. This 
 appears particularly in his masterly attempt at a synthe- 
 sis of the Idea and the Thought of Thought, and the 
 completeness with which the conception of the One 
 dominates his mental attitude; and constitutes a new 
 force in the history of Greek thought. — As regards the 
 perfection of the system of Plotinus as a system, one 
 point seems to demand attention here. The system is 
 a system of emanation, and there is, logically, no return 
 of the first principle upon itself : the system is a straight 
 line instead of circle, a fact that seems at first sight 
 peculiarly inconsistent with the fact that its first prin- 
 ciple is the One. The solution of the antinomy seems to 
 lie in the consideration that, just because the One is abso- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 29 1 
 
 lute, it can be "mediated" by nothing else. A return 
 into self is not necessitated. It overflows naturally, 
 spontaneously, and is in no way dependent in its emana- 
 tions. There is, it may be said, a certain "return" 
 towards the One on the part of the soul and of nature in 
 the act of contemplation ; but the One is in no way 
 affected by this, though the return may be considered 
 as a natural, spontaneous consequence of the working of 
 the One in the soul and in nature. 
 
 Porphyry and Other Commentators. — Mention may 
 be made of Porphyry, the pupil and biographer of 
 Plotinus, whose right to a place in the history of phi- 
 losophy seems to rest chiefly upon his services in dif- 
 fusing the opinions of Plotinus, and in expounding in 
 an attractive manner writings of Plato and Aristotle, 
 particularly portions of the Organon of the latter. He 
 taught piety and asceticism, and inclined to theurgy. — 
 Three other important commentators on Aristotle are 
 Themistius (fourth century a.d.), Simplicius, and Phi- 
 loponus (sixth century a.d.). 
 
 Jamblichus. — Jamblichus (fl. 306-337), a pupil of 
 Porphyry, " attempted a speculative justification of su- 
 perstition. He imitated Pythagoras more than Plato, 
 his philosophy resting rather on mystical speculations 
 with numbers than on Platonic ideas. In his system not 
 only did all the gods of the Greeks and Orientals (ex- 
 cepting the Christian God) and the gods of Plotinus find 
 a place, but he also took a quite peculiar pleasure in 
 adding to the number of superior divinities from the 
 resources of his own fancy." ^ Above even the One of 
 Plotinus, Jamblichus supposes an unknowable essence. 
 
 1 Ueberweg. 
 
292 GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Below the One are the intelligible world, the world of 
 thinking beings, including Nous, Power, and Demiurge 
 (Creator). Next in rank is a triplicity of souls, and last 
 the sense-world. Jamblichus blended with theology Neo- 
 Pythagorean number-speculation. He defended image- 
 worship, theurgy, and prophecy. His ethical creed is 
 contained in the idea, held by Plotinus and Porphyry, 
 of purification. He is said to have been the intellectual 
 ideal of Proclus, the last great thinker of the school of 
 the Neo-Platonists and the last great mind in the history 
 of Greek speculation. 
 
 Proclus:'^ Life. — Proclus (412-485 a.d.) carefully 
 prepared himself for the profession of forensic oratory 
 and afterwards gave attention to the sciences — particu- 
 larly to geometry, preparing commentaries on the works 
 of Euclid, — gaining probably in this way much of that 
 fine intellectual power and that appreciation of scien- 
 tific method and form which place him among the 
 master-dialecticians and system-makers. He was espe- 
 cially noted for his moral and spiritual excellence; for 
 the possession not merely of the "political virtues," 
 but also of the "theological," or "religious," virtues. 
 " He seems to have held the view that the pupil of 
 theology ought to avail himself of every branch of en- 
 lightenment, but the philosophical specially, as a means 
 to a higher intelligence, in that he is to purify himself 
 by virtue, to make himself master of physics, and by 
 logical exercises prepare himself for a knowledge of the 
 divine. His object is to construct a complete system 
 of theology on a train of consequential reasoning." 
 
 1 See Ritter and Ueberweg. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 293 
 
 He mastered the whole course of Greek philosophy, 
 prepared commentaries on the Parmenidcs and Timceiis 
 of Plato, and Plato's theology generally, and taught 
 philosophy at Athens. 
 
 The Philosophy of Proclus. — The philosophy of Pro- 
 clus may be described in general terms as substantially 
 the same in content with that of Plotinus, differing 
 from it in scientific rigidity and symmetry, as regards 
 form, and by a more marked theological aim. Imme- 
 diately below the One there is in the system of 
 Proclus not, as in that of Plotinus, the intelligible 
 world, or reason and being, but a "plurality of unities " 
 which mediate between the One and what is below 
 them, the One being otherwise entirely out of relation 
 to that which emanates from it. These unities are 
 gods. They are "followed by the triad of the intel- 
 ligible, intelligible-intellectual, and intellectual essences. 
 The first of these falls under the concept of being, 
 the second under that of life, the third under that of 
 thought. Between these three essences, or classes of 
 essences, there exist also, notwithstanding their unity, 
 an order of rank ; the second participates in the first, 
 the third in the second. The intelligible in the nar- 
 rower sense of the term, or Being, includes three triads, 
 in each of which the first two terms are " limit " and 
 " illimitation," the third terms being in the first triad, 
 the union of the two first or " being " ; in the second, 
 "life"; in the third, ideas or that which has "life in 
 itself." In each of these triads, the first or limiting 
 term is also denominated by Proclus (who follows in 
 this particular the precedent of Jamblichus) " Father" ; 
 the second or limited term, Power; and the third 
 
294 GREEK- PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or mixed term, " Reason." The intelligible-intellectual 
 sphere falling under the concept of life contains, ac- 
 cording to Proclus, feminine divinities, and is sub- 
 divided into the following triads : One, Other, Being, 
 the triad of original numbers ; One and Many, Whole 
 and Part, Limitation and Illimitation, the triad of gods 
 who hold together ; and the triad of ' perfecting Gods.' 
 The intellectual essences, lastly, falling under the con- 
 cept of reason are arranged according to the number 
 seven, the first two terms in the triad, or the terms 
 which correspond respectively with Being and Life 
 being subject to a threefold division, while the 
 third term remains undivided." ^ The human soul, 
 according to Proclus, does not commune with God 
 immediately but mediately, through daemons, or spirits 
 next in rank above it. The union of each order of 
 being with that next above is effected by love. Hold- 
 ing, as he did, that the soul is farther removed from 
 God and in closer connection with matter than Plotinus 
 had conceived it, Proclus rejected the Plotinic (Stoic) 
 doctrine of apathy. The relation of the individual to 
 the universal in the system of Proclus is mystical. The 
 system is theological rather than philosophical in its 
 aim. — As an illustration of his application of the 
 "geometrical method," — probably under the influence 
 of Euclid, — we give the seventh Proposition in the " Ele- 
 ments of Theology " ^ with its demonstration. " Every- 
 thing productive of another is more excellent than the 
 nature of the thing produced : For it is either more 
 excellent, or worse, or equal. Let it be, in the first 
 
 ' Ueberweg, Vol. I. p. 258. 
 
 ^ Translated by Thomas Taylor. 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 29S 
 
 place, equal. That which is produced from this, there- 
 fore, will itself also either possess a power productive of 
 some other, or it will be entirely barren. But if it be 
 barren, it will on this account be worse than its produc- 
 ing cause : and because of its inefficacy it will be 
 unequal to that which is prolific and possesses a produc- 
 tive power. But ;f it be productive of other natures, it 
 will either produce that which is equal to itself (and this 
 will be the case in all things, and all things will be equal 
 to each other and nothing will be more excellent than 
 another, since the productive nature always constitutes 
 the thing produced equal to itself) or that which is 
 unequal. But in this case, it will not be equal to its 
 producing cause ; for it is the property of equal powers 
 to fabricate equal effects. But the productions of these 
 are unequal to each other, since in this hypothesis the 
 producing cause is equal to that which is prior to itself. 
 It is requisite, therefore, that the thing produced should 
 not be equal to its producing cause. But neither can 
 the producing cause be ever worse than the thing pro- 
 duced. For if the producing cause confers essence on 
 the thing produced, it bestows power also, according to 
 essence. And if it is productive of all the power which 
 that posterior to itself possesses, it can also make itself 
 such as its production. But if it can do this, it will also 
 make itself more powerful ; for impotence cannot hinder, 
 since a fabricative power is present, nor defect of will. 
 For all things naturally desire good. Hence if it can 
 form anything else more perfect, it will also perfect 
 itself before it perfects that which is posterior to itself. 
 The thing produced, therefore, is neither equal to nor 
 more excellent than its producing cause, and hence 
 
PHILOSOPHY. 109 
 
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 Dictated Portions of the Latest Lectures (at Gottingen and Berlin) of 
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