\ vv\\- President Whjte LfBRARy, Cornell University. ^ylH!Lif9.3 fLflUJiffl Cornell University Library D 363.D57 Present position of European politics, 3 1924 027 804 107 The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027804107 THE PRESENT POSITION EUROPEAN POLITICS These articles, are rejpullisJte^ from ^7j« Foexnightlt Eevie'w, with necessary additions and emendations, together with a Preface and a concluding chapter ichich deals with the criticisms of the Press. THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS OR EUROPE IN 188T BY THE AUTHOR OF "GREATER BRITAIN" /,; Ac. r-Uc, LONDON: CHAPMAN AND HALL Limited 1887 3\ S'-kfl-E-H (\, M4-'2.Ur'^'^ PRINTED BT J. S- VIRTUE ASD CO., LIMITED, CITY BOAD. PEEFACE. To these six essays, wMcli have appeared in The Fortnightly Eeview, and which are here republished in book form, I have added, a concluding chapter dealing with the objections taken by writers in the Press to some of my statements and inferences. I owe my critics the frank acknowledgment that they have dealt more than kindly with my work, and I feel greatly indebted to them for their courteous treatment. To those who have found my conclusions too dogmatic, I would put forward the excuse that in trying to come to a practical solution of practical problems, something like dogmatism can hardly be avoided. I have honestly written to the best of my ability that which I believed would serve the highest interests of my country; have sought to avoid all that might embitter international hatreds, and from first to last have thought solely of how I might best help England and EngKshmen to accom- plish their work in all parts of the world. The Author op "Greater Britain." CONTENTS. — ♦ — CHAP. PAGE I. GEESiAirr .... 1 II. Pkance 56 III. ErssiA 118 lY. AUSTRIA-HUNGAET 179 V. Italy 225 VI. The United Kingdom 276 Vll. Conclusion .... .... 365 THE PEESENT POSITION OE EUEOPEM POLITICS. GEEMANY. The present position of the European world is one in wHcIl sheer force holds a larger place than it has held in modem times since the fall of Napoleon. The complications which have arisen out of the kidnapping of the Prince of Bulgaria and the mission of General Kaulbars, are only the most recent and obvious signs of the reign of force in European affairs, and the " colonising " mania which has lately- possessed several of the Great Powers is merely another indication of the same phenomenon. A few years ago there was perhaps the will to take and hold by force, but the intention was as completely wrapped up and concealed as now it is naked and undisguised; and as regards the extra- European affairs of the European Powers, the desire to grab the lands of the weaker races is also less enveloped now than it was earlier in the century in such specious forms of words as " the blessings of civilisation." It must 2 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. be Tinderstood, then, that In the course of the present work I shall not write so much of what I wish, or of what I may consider to he right or wrong, as of facts and tendencies — ^facts and tendencies which are not the less deplored because it would be wearisome to state in every line one writes that one deplores them. The predominance of Germany in Europe may be said to date really from 1866, and nominally from 1870. The present reign of force in Europe dates from the period of the Treaty of Berlin, or 1878. Although the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Q-ermany in 1871 was perfectly defen- sible, looking to the circumstances of the war, and necessary according to the opinion of the Prussian staff, not the less it must be considered to have been the real cause of that predominance of force- considerations which has been noted since 1878. The desire of France to profit by the iirst general war to recover her lost provinces, and the necessity as stated by Count Moltke for Germany to stand in arms for fifty years to defend the provinces which it had taken so short a time to win, were the leading factors in creating that race in armaments which has successively drawn, all the European Powers iato a rivalry in numbers of men, numbers of ships, and figures of military expenditure. The Treaty of Berlin in itself was, like all treaties at the end of a great war, in form an act of restitution as well as of peace. But the signature of the treaty was accompanied by a number of conversations among powerful people ; by secret agreements, some of which have since been published, and some not ; by the virtual annexation by one Great Power GERMANY. 3 of a Turkish island wMcli had not been conquered ; by the virtual annexation by another Great Power of two Turkish provinces which had not been conquered ; by a hint given to a third Great Power (France), that she should occupy another province of that empire ; (by hints given to a fourth Great Power (Italy), that she should occupy either an island (British hint) or Tunis (German hint) ; and that which ought to have been the basis of a long-standing if not of a permanent peaceful settlement in Europe, became the opening of a period of despair to the disciples of Richard Cobden. There was nothing very new in these proceedings ; what was new was that they were so little veiled or disguised. In 1866 — for the policy of pourboire was already known — Italy asked at Paris whether she was to join Austria or Prussia in the war, as both of them had made to her the same promise, that Venice was to be the price of her alliance. Italy received, curiously enough, an answer from the Emperor that as he intended to take the Phine when the combatants were exhausted, what mattered most to him was that the war should last upon pretty equal terms, and that Italy was to take the Prussian, which he, like the great majority of observers, believed to be the weaker side. In 1870, also, Italy was in some doubt as to her course, which also had its price, and Austria acted, or rather abstained from acting, with much deliberate violation of her word ; yet not even in 1866 or 1870 was there that public avowal of rapacity which in 1878 assembled Europe made eagerly, although in the name of peace. It is useless to comment at any length upon the most 4 THE PEESENT POSITION OP EITEOPEAN POLITICS. recent development of the reign of force in Europe, be- cause it is fresli in the reader's mind. The abduction of the Prince of Bulgaria, whether by the actual contrivance of Russian agents or only with a Russia ready to profit by the action of the Russian party, an autocracy helping to use the methods of the dynamo-revolutionists, reminds us of mediaeval Italy rather than of what were until recently the methods of modern Europe. Russia indeed has never shown much respect for her stipulations, but the repeated violations of her engagements — ^her defence for which we shall be able to consider when we come to the present position of Russia — ^violations of engagements in Central Asia and elsewhere, which themselves pale before her recent acts at Batoum, are. Central Asia, Batoum, and all of them, a trifle when compared with the audacity of her action against Prince Alexander and with the incidents of the Kaulbars mission. Napoleon the Great in his most ill-tempered moments appears to be the model that the Tsar has in view. The principles which he professes at home are those of the Holy Alliance ; the principles which his friends profess in Bulgaria appear to be, when necessary, those of the dynamite section ; and the latest of his actions reminds us of those which were ignored by the earlier but have been fully related by the Republican biographers of Napoleon. Turning to very different portions of the world which I couple with Bidgaria as instancing the reign of force in European affairs, namely, the distant spots where the Great Powers of Europe have been undisguisedly laying their hands upon the countries of various independent peoples, we GERMANY. shall see how those Powers, if any there were, who honestly did not desire to increase their territory and who did not believe that increase of territory was increase of strength, have been forced into following the example of others from the fact that violent hands were being laid upon all portions of the globe. In the case of France it was certain, and in the case of other Powers possible, that differential duties would be placed upon the goods of the Powers which refused to annex, and that the trade of the latter with all those parts of the world would thus be brought to a close. It is bad enough, by the way, to be robbed by those who rob, but it is harder still to be robbed of trade by ourselves. Perhaps it is poetic justice that has made us suffer heavily through the putting on by Austria of dif- ferential duties in Bosnia, the occupation of which we our- selves proposed through our plenipotentiaries, while for- getting to make stipulations for our trade. The Powers themselves were aware of what was likely to be the result to Europe of the annexation of Alsace- Lorraine, and both Austria and Russia sounded Great Britain upon the subject. Austria, indeed, had reasons of her own of a very special kind for so doiag. When we come to deal with the weak points of alliances in considering the military position of Germany in the centre of Europe, I may have to return to this matter. It is not only true that Austria had pledged herself to France to join her in the war, as is seen by the despatch which the Due de Gramont afterwards published, but also, what is less known, that the Archduke Albert had actually made 6 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. at Paris with tie Emperor Napoleon tlie arrangements for the campaign, and that General Lebrun had completed those arrangements at Yienna, passing indeed by way of Berlin in order to throw dust in the eyes of Germany. It is the fact that Austria and Eussia both, but indepen- dently, proposed to us, at London through Baron Brunow, and at "Vienna through Count Beust and the English Ambassador, to stop the outbreak of war between France and Germany by guaranteeing to both parties their territory. The proposal was that Europe should say, " Fight as much as you please, gentlemen, but you must understand that the danger to European peace in the future, if one of you takes ' away territory from the other, will be so great that we can- not allow that particular result of war to take place in this case." The negotiations did not indeed break down upon the merits of the proposal, but upon the mooting more or less indirectly by Russia at the same time of the question of the Black Sea clause of the Treaty of 1856, which it will be remembered she shortly afterwards denounced. Once for all let me say that in tracing to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 the evils which have subsequently occurred in Europe, I am not blaming that annexation, which was perfectly justified no doubt by the immediate facts in view, but I am trying to point out that the indirect and ultimate results have been very different from those which alone the military advisers of the German Empire had foreseen. 1 I now come to calculate, so far as may be, the forces and the policy of that European Power which is not only the most central in geographical position, but which is supposed GEEMANT. 7 to be tlie strongest — the Power whicli certainly dominates politically the European situation. The first inquiry to be made is, who are the men who guide and direct its policy ? and to this question in the case of Germany but one answer is possible, as not only at the present moment, but in my opinion whilst he lives. Prince Bismarck alone counts ; and although it may seem a bold statement, looking to popular beliefs in Russia and in Prance, it is far from unlikely that his sons — that is, his name and his policy — alone will count after he is dead. One doubt which may fairly be held to exist upon this point is raised by considering the future position and the well-known opinions of the Crown Princess. It is no secret that at times the Crown Princess has been unfriendly to Prince Bismarck. They are perhaps two personalities too strong to easily co-exist in the same court ; hvct in spite of perfect willingness to admit this future difficulty in Prince Bismarck's way, I am inclined to believe most confidently that when the Crown Princess of Grermany becomes the German Empress, complete accord will reign between Prince Bismarck and herself. Prince Bismarck's policy we shall have to consider in detail later on, but, roughly speaking, it may be stated to be a policy of maintaining that unity of Germany which is his work. Eor it, he is prepared when necessary, how- ever autocratic may be his language, to seek ] sufficient popularity among the people, even by favouring schemes of colonisation, of which he never hesitates in private to express his disapproval, and semi-socialistic schemes which he imperfectly understands. The idea that the Crown Prince has a different policy from his father, and that this 8 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EtJEOPBAN POLITICS, otter policy wiD obtain after the old Emperor's death, will suffice no douht to send up stocks in one country and to send them down in another upon the news of the Emperor's death, and to form the foundation of endless columns of big type leaded leaders, but it has no foundation in fact. The Crown Prince, it must be admitted, intellectually speak- ing, is, largely by his own will, the Crown Princess ; but that most able lady, when she shares the German throne, must inevitably have for her policy the Bismarck policy, the strength and glory of the German Empire. The Princess Royal is an interesting figure upon the European stage, and of her, in her political capacity, it is necessary to speak. She belongs to a familj'- in which there are many able members. Her mother is, considering the pressure of detail on her daily life, one of the most able persons, king or queen, that have ever sat upon a throne. But the Princess Poyal is in some respects the ablest mem- ber of the family, and in all respects the ablest member of the family except her mother. And the Princess Royal has that which her mother's perpetual hard labour upon Hmited and special work has necessarily kept from her — much deep reading and great knowledge of literary and general affairs, which have made her as strong a Liberal in many matters as the Queen is a powerful Conservative. The Crown Princess is not popular in Germany. The reasons of that unpopularity are upon the surface. She has been the patron of reputedly free-thinking clergymen, and popular gossip has accused her of being a complete free-thinker. This makes her unpopular in some quarters. She has often GERMAXT. 9 turned German prejudices into ridicule, and this makes her unpopular in others. She is very clever, a quality which in courts makes princes unpopular with fools. She is somewhat learned, which everywhere makes people unpopular with the ignorant. Her E,oyal Highness once asked a certain Prussian general, before his friends, who was consul at Rome in a particular year? Naturally that distinguished officer has from that day been more Bismarckian than the North German Gazette, or the Fost itself. The Crown Princess at one time used to excite hostility in Germany by proclaiming admiration for France, but that practice is a matter of the past. She still on occasion ruffles the feelings of the Court, as, for example, in her sympathy with the English admiration for the Prince of Bulgaria, who is a member of a family by no means popular at the German Court. But there can be no doubt, what- ever may be the dreams which have been cherished by some in France, that when she comes to reign in Germany she will come to the throne as a good German and reign as such. Political influence with her eldest son it is said the Crown Princess has not, but his reign is probably a long way off, although there are unpleasant stories abroad about the health of the Crown Prince. The son is Bis- marckian, and his wife is orthodox, and probably the diffi- culties which there may have been, were difficulties upon questions which affect these matters, and if so they are obviously difficulties which are likely to be softened or removed by time. Those who best know the Crown Prince himself say that 10 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUfiOPEAK POLITICS. he is conscious of the limitations of his abilities, limita- tions which are not so much of the mind as of habit. It would be a mistake to exaggerate the difficulties which haye existed between Prince Bismarck and himself. At times, as for example at the moment of the issue of a certain imperial rescript, against which the Crown Prince strongly protested, the differences have been sharp, but on the whole the Crown Prince has been content to defend his wife, and it is supposed that, like a good husband, he is pleased to be held by his more energetic consort in silken bonds. The most recent difficulties that have existed at the German Court have been those which have concerned the choice of persons. For example. Count Eulenberg, for many years Hof-Marschall to the Crown Prince, was appointed chiefly because he was a strong Conservative and a strong Bismarckian, holding opinions which are much opposed on m.ost points to those of the Crown Princess, and, in a less degree, therefore opposed also to those held by the Crown Prince. Naturally the result for many years was a good deal of friction, caused by the frequent conferences between Count Eulenberg and the Chancellor. There were matters which arose in connection with the proposal to appoint Count Eulenberg to a post else- where which it is tmnecessary to relate, but which at one time led to an open breach between Prince Bismarck and the Crown Princess. These difficulties, though still great, are not so considerable as they at one time were, and they may be safely counted upon to disappear. Prince Bismarck's reputation is so considerable that it is unnecessary to say very much about him. To ascribe to him the astuteness of a Machiavelli, or even of a Talleyrand, GERMANY. 11 is to give lilni credit for, or perhaps the discredit of a quality whicli lie does not possess. His strength is the strength of a man who knows what he wants, and who, having in years past played very holdly for high stakes, has happened to win, and having won is strong enough to hold his own. In 1866 Prince Bismarck risked everything, even the loss of his head, hut he justified the proud words which he flung at the head of the Prussian Parliament, when for the sake of the army he broke the law, and told the members that within a year an indemnity would be voted. Since that victory he has been supreme in Europe, and in a position to have little occasion for the use of diplomatic artifice. It is now, and perhaps in the last years of his life, that, through the growth of the military power of Eussia and of France, and through the recent revelations of Austrian military weakness. Prince Bismarck will be called upon to make more serious diplomatic efforts than he has ever yet had occasion to put forth. Those who look upon him as a type-man of the race must regret the neuralgia and the in- digestion, because above aU he is a strong man, and an almost ideal representative of Prussian power. The story of the interview at five o'clock in the morning in which the completion of the evacuation arrangements of the Treaty of Frankfort was brought about after much deliberation over a jug which contained champagne, porter, and various forms of ardent spirits, blended by the red-hot poker of the German Chancellor, and swallowed with a wry face by the Frenchman for his country's sake, is less familiar than the story of the Ferrieres interview, as recounted by M. Jules Favre, and is perhaps not one of dignity, but it is one of 12 THE PEESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. those which complete the figure of the man ; and I repeat that the neuralgia and the other ailments of Prince Bismarck detract somewhat from that triumph of Prussia which he personifies. A seeming paradox which possibly some day may come to look less like a paradox than it does at present, would consist in the confident assertion that Prince Bismarck after all is much such a man as his own son, who is well known in this country. Count Herbert Bismarck — that is, less an old-fashioned statesman than a strong and very decided person knowing exactly what he means to do and exactly how he means to do it. Prince Bismarck is not mortal, in the sense that his poHcy and even the impress of his peculiar personality wiU continue to direct Prussia after he in the flesh is no longer in this world. What is now said of the probable consequence of the death of the German Emperor is not after all unlike what used to be said of the probable consequence in Eussia of the death of the second Alexander, in the days when Aksakoff directed the political footsteps of the present Tsar, and made him fine those who spoke German at his card-table — a fine which his august father had frequently to pay. It was generally expected that there would be war with Germany the day that he ascended the throne, but it will be noticed that affairs have gone on since he came to the throne much as they went on before ; and so it will be in Germany. Given the Bismarckian policy, which is clear, the means to the end shift and change day by day. The first point to be considered is that of the relations of Germany to France. Germany permanently alienated all France in 1871, and pre- GERMANY. 13 vented tlie growtli in France of a peace party, by taking Alsace against the will of the population, and giving a great shock to what those who do not like France call vanity, but what I would call more politely patriotic feeling. The European problem then and henceforward became a military one, which forces politicians of the present day who desire to serve their country truly, and to be anything more than vestrymen, to spend their time in studying works of mili- tary strategy, as though they were so many sucking Jominis or Wapoleons. Germany occupies a vulnerable military position in the centre of Europe, with no natural frontier. Her territory is situate between that of three great military Powers, of which only Austria is certainly inferior to her in militarj"- strength. She has bound herself in a defensive league to the weakest of the three, chiefly because she cannot bind to her per- manently either of the others. France, indeed, was will- ing for some years to take her policy submissively from Berlin, a fact which was either not known in France, or more probably known, but quietly and patriotically ignored as a horrible necessity ; but France, so long as Alsace and half Lorraine are German, cannot be bound to Germany in such a way as not to turn upon her as soon as she is sufficiently strong. Russia, so far as alliances go, is not to be relied upon, because, shifty as may be alliances which rest upon the will of parliamentary majorities, they are stable by the side of those which depend upon the caprice of autocratic rulers. Germany is therefore bound to Austria. Tied thus to the weakest of the three, she is exposed to the 14 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. attacks of tlie more powerful two, with these further con- siderations, that the military weakness of Austria has lately- become apparent ; and that although Italy is also a compara- tively weak Power, it is impossible to say for certain that the assistance of Austria might not be partially or even al- together neutralised by possible though improbable Italian hostnity. Austria is mistress of the Trentino. Italy, which covets many things, especially covets the Trentino, and there is in this consideration an evident possibility of the neutrali- sation of the Austrian forces at any given moment. The lesser Powers may be left out of account, so small are the numbers of their forces in comparison with those of the great. England in a long war would count for much, but for little if anything in a short one. Not that any patriotic Englishman need feel that the blackness of the European sky at the present moment extends to Britain in an equal degree to that in which it darkens the Continent of Europe. Though might is right. Great Britain, too, in her way, is mighty, and it is my belief that England's real power is as great as, or even greater in proportion than, when she first went into the war against Napoleon Bonaparte, and as great in proportion as at the time of Waterloo. But, as I shall have presently to show, England is, though not weak, unready. The lesser Powers, in a military sense, I repeat, must be neglected. Some of them would throw in their lot with one or other group of great allies ; but it may be safely said that even at the moment when he was sending- the Crown Prince to Spain, to induce Spain to join the "League of Peace," which the Spaniards very prudently refused to do GEEMAKY. 15 Prince Bismarck did not attact mucli real importance to their services. The armies of the Great Powers are now so large that they can afford to detach sufficient territorial troops to watch the forces of the smaller Powers, if need be, without feeling the drain upon their field armies. We will consider presently the relative military strength of Germany and of France in detail, but obviously the main object of Prince Bismarck must be to prevent a Russo-French. alliance by all possible means. Even with a purely defensive attitude on the part of Germany, Russia would hold a German field army of 200,000 men upon the Vistula, and vast garrisons in the German eastern fortresses. Hence Prince Bismarck must be will- ing to help Russia in the further East, and to help her in the Balkans up to the point where Austria begins to kick. There has been a great deal of nonsense written upon the subject of the Austro-German alliance. The alliance, as agreed upon at Vienna in October, 1879, by a treaty which was ratified at Berlin on October 18th, 1879, was a defensive alliance, directed against Russia and against France, and this is the alliance which substantially stands, for it has survived the three Emperors' league. There is this weak point in the alliance, that it may not be very binding under a great strain ; and those who make alliances with Austria cannot but remember that the Austrian alliance with France in 1870 lured ITapoleon III. to his destruction. Still the Austro-German alliance has for some years past kept Europe quiet, and it would even now suffice to keep 16 THE PRESENT POSITIOX OP ETJEOPEAN POLITICS. Europe quiet ia the future but for the fact that it is impossible to count upon the policy of Russia, which is simply the personal policy from day to day of a very imper- fectly informed person who insists upon having his own way. The Austro-German alliance, of course, is limited to certain events. It does not refer to all Europe generally, and fresh alliances with a different grouping of the Powers have from time to time been proposed. In October last two great, refusals of alliances took place. France, I am told, declined a formal alliance with Russia, and Austria declined an alliance with Great Britain, although in both cases we ought to use the phrase "declined with thanks." France was anxious not to take any step which could precipitate a war, and Austria thought that she should accomplish the end which both her statesmen and Lord Salisbury had in view, namely, the prevention of a war with Russia, better by remaining free. The Standard the other day congratulated its readers upon the fact that, however much mischief Lord Randolph Churchill might work in home affairs, he was not allowed to interfere in the field of foreign politics ; and this seems certainly to have been the case, for it is not to be supposed that he has suddenly changed those opinions upon the slight value of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire to this country, which for so many years he consistently maintained. The reasons for the French refusal of a formal alHance with Russia are more obvious than those for Austria's refusal of an alliance with Great Britain. The former alliance was a war alliance, the latter alliance was an alKance for peace. All alliances are called alliances for peace • GERMANY. 17 out the Russo- Frencli alliance miglit practically liaye led to War, and the Austro-British alliance would, iu my belief, practically have secured peace, as Russia knows that whatever her earlier victories over Austria, England would iight on until she conquered. The view of M. de Freycinet in refusing a formal alliance with Russia was probably that, if war should break out between Austria and Russia, Russia would beat Austria easily, and that Germany would not move if the causes of war were carefully managed ; that if Germany did move, Russia could resist invasion even by the com- bined forces of Austria and Germany ; and that Germany would be weakened by such a struggle. But the dominant motive in M. de Freycinet's mind no doubt was that a war, even a successful war, would upset the Republic. This I shall attempt to explain at length when I come to write speciallj'' upon France. In the difficult position in which Germany finds herself placed, Prince Bismarck would be more than human if he were to regard with unmixed horror the prospect of a pro- tracted struggle upon equal terms between two of his great neighbours. If Austria and Russia were of something like equal strength, or if England and Turkey were likely to fight upon the Austrian side, still more if the small Slav principalities were to fight for Austria, there would be a long war, which would drain both countries, and leave Ger- many proportionately stronger. But England has a large peace party — most Liberals would oppose the war, and the Irish party would oppose it. It is far from certain that Lord Randolph Churchill would support it. England, 18 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. moreover, could not attack Russia by land, nor lend efiective land assistance to Austria in the earlier portion of tlie war. It would take England a montk to place a single army corps in Turkey. It would take her much longer to place there the two army corps, fuUy equipped with guns, without which she would hardly enter upon a Continental struggle. England, indeed, could strike at Russia, and, in the course of a very long war, although unable to reach Russia through the Black Sea, or the Baltic, or the "White Sea, might bleed Russia to death by attacking her at her extremities, and by repeating at Yladivostock and on the Amoor the poKcy of the Crimea. But European statesmen look nowadays to rapid mobilisation and to the first four weeks of a war. England is innocent of all knowledge of the rapid mobilisation of large forces, and would not count for a feather's weight in the first months of a Continental conflict. In the meantime the Austrian army would probably be overwhelmed. It may be safely said that although France was much mentioned in the Parliamentary debates upon the increase of the German army, that which was in the Chancellor's mind, when he proposed it, was the report of the German staff upon the military weakness of the Austrian Empire as compared with Russia. If Germany were willing to stand by and let Austria be beaten, Russia could probably find causes for a virtual attack upon Austria which would be outside the scope of the defensive alliance between Austria and Germany. It is in part the danger of the Russians attacking Turkey by Erzeroum, but in part, also, the promise of the exclusion of Austria from Bosnia and the GERMANY. 19 HerzegOTina after the " coming war," tliat has sometimes made the Sultan subservient to the wishes of the Russian Ambassador; but the obstacle to any rash action on the part of Eussia is that, autocrat though he be, the Emperor of Russia cannot go to war unless he is fully supported by Moscow or national opinion, and that Moscow opinion is excited about Bulgaria, and furious at the ingratitude — as it is in Russia held to be — of the Bulgarians and Southern Slavs, while it is indifferent for the moment to the grievances of the Armenians. Looking to the dislike of Russia ■which exists in Germany, and which unites even Prince Bismarck and the Crown Princess, and to the dislike of Grermany which exists in Russia, it is at least possible that Germany would back Austria ia any war with Russia into which Austria could be driven. It is less certain that Austria would back Germany in any war into which she might be driven. I have resolved not to write more of history than I can help on this occasion, but history is history after all, and I cannot forget that if dislike of Russia brings together even Prince Bismarck and the Crown Princess of Germany, knowledge of the hollowness of alliances unites two still more bitter enemies in the persons of the Empress Eugenie and M. Ollivier, who must well remember not only the settling of the plan of the campaign with Austria, not only the promises of alliances recorded in the despatches published by M. de Gramont, but the autograph letters from the 'Emperor of Austria and the King of Italy which are, I believe, still in the Empress's hands. I have asked those who best know Prince Bismarck's views c2 20 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. to tell me what they thought, not about the general principle of his policy, for that is ohvious, but about its details. They reply, "We shall not allow Austria to do anything calculated to precipitate a war between her and Russia." The view put forward, that the treaty of alliance between Austria and Grermany provides only for defence against a joint attack by two Powers, is not true. This would have been a leonine contract to the benefit of Germany alone, for Germany is more exposed to such danger than is Austria. But it is true that it does not bind Germany to espouse every quarrel of Austria's. Prince Bismarck will not threaten nor help to threaten Russia, and he will advise Russia that, if she wishes to advance, she must offer Austria her price, a price which, it may be added, Austria is at this moment most unwilling to receive. The Magyars, who govern the ruling half of the Dual Empire, are unwilling to add to the number of the Slav subjects of the Emperor. ISTot only as against Russia, but generally. Prince Bismarck will not fall into the errors of the first Napoleon. He will not bluster ; he will not dictate nor help to dictate to people ; and he will not embark in a reckless policy of adventure. Personal likes and dislikes he shows very strongly, especially the latter, and he is not at all above that ill temper with individuals which was one of the weaknesses of the first Ifapoleon ; but the Corsican's greater weaknesses of swagger and theatrical declamation are altogether avoided by Prince Bismarck, who, during the many years that he has been the arbiter of Europe, has used his power at all events with discretion. When the first Napoleon controlled the policy of GERMANY. 21 Germany, lie was never tired of letting the world know it, and at Waterloo he paid for his revelations. When Prince Bismarck for years controlled the foreign policy of France he kept the secret to himself. Moreover, in a military sense it is necessary for Germany to keep quiet. France is isolated unless she will accept a Russian alliance for purely Russian objects, but, if Germany found herself at war, of course at any moment she might have France upon her back. One of the great difficulties of the existing situation from the German point of view — that of avoiding a defeat for Austria and of keeping Austria in her place as an effective member of the group of Continental Powers — is that Russia is fully persuaded, and probably justly persuaded, that she can beat the Austrian armies in the field, and even beat Austria if allied to Britain before any help could reach her, and that she has the power to prevent that help in Europe being serious by making an effective diversion towards India. Russia is very timid about facing a European agreement, and the pressure put on by Prince Bismarck and the friendship between Italy and England have been . very precious to the cause of peace. Austria therefore possibly after all was right in declining, at Prince Bismarck's sug- gestion, a more formal alliance with Great Britain, inasmuch as while Russia does not greatly fear, in a short war, Austria and England, she does very greatly fear an even less militant demonstration by the four Powers. It is on the simplicity of Prince Bismarck's policy that all who consider it carefully, have to insist. It is a plain and straightforward policy of the defence of the German 22 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. Empire. People ask, is Prince Bismarck willing to see Eussia incorporate the Slav ' States ? will lie allow Iter to establish herself at Constantinople, or does he mean Austria to prevent Russian extension ? or is he willing that Russia should go to Constantinople on condition that pari passu Austria should ohtain Servia and part of Macedonia and Salonica? The answer is that in the present state of Europe a prudent poKtician is unable to look very far ahead. Where all is somewhat evil, one may be allowed to use the old phrase, "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," as singularly applicable to the state of Europe. At the present moment Russia is friendly with Turkey ; therefore there is no immediate question of Russia going to Constantinople. Russia has been frightened by the secret lectures of Prince Bismarck, and by the public declarations of the Italian Ministry, and does not intend even to occupy Bulgaria. Two or three months ago the danger of immediate war was greater than it is at present. "Why face the difficulties, when they are of an intangible kind, until they meet us ? Lord Beaconsfield once observed in conversation, " "We make our lives miserable by the anticipation of evils which never happen ; " and so it is with statesmen who are less gifted with solid strength than is Prince Bismarck. The answer to all the questions is that he will allow Russia to move if he cannot well help it, but that he would much sooner that she did not, and that he will do everything he can quietly to prevent her moving. If at any time she should insist upon doing so, he will have to consider whether he cannot best avert the destruction of the Austrian Empire GERMANY. 23 as a Great Power by forcing upon Austria a compensation at wliicli slie grumbles. National vanity is often more important than national strength, and even though it may be the case that it would be a positive source of weakness and danger to Austria to extend her boundaries, yet it may be necessary that she should do so, in order to keep up the national pride of the people, humbled as it would be by a great increase of Russian territory and an apparent increase of Russian power. In the meantime there is something laughable, although inevitable, in the way in which Austria waits on England and England upon Austria, or, as someone has wittily observed, in which Austria declares that she woidd be delighted to take the first step, as Lord Salisbury proposes, if Lord Salisbury will begin by taking the second. In considering from the point of view of Germany the policy of her neighbours, we must bear firmly in our mind that the policy of Count K41noky has never varied for one moment since the first day when he came into power, and that while his public words are known to everyone in Europe who is concerned in foreign affairs, his private words are to the effect that Austria not only has no desire to extend or add to the rights which she acquired under the Treaty of Berlin, but that the Emperor personally as well as the Government are of opinion that any such extension would be actually prejudicial to the Austrian Empire. If there is anything in words at all, this not only is an emphatic but sounds like a binding declaration. The relations of Germany to Turkey are rather indirect, through the bearing of the relations of Turkey to Austria 24 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. upon Germany, than direct from court to court ; still, from time to time Prince Bismarck lias carefully considered tlie condition of the Turkish Empire. During the last few years Turkey has three times sent special missions to Berlin, and to the Turkish ambassadors Prince Bismarck's language has always been the same. The Sultan's view of Germany is that he ought to seek for the help of German officers and of German financial guides, on the ground that all the other Great Powers want their pound of flesh from Turkey. Prance, which first took Algeria and then Tunis, and now desires to take Morocco from the Mahommedan world ; Italy, which from time to time casts glances upon Tripoli and upon Albania ; England, which took Cyprus and does not leave Egypt ; Austria, which took Bosnia and the Herze- govina; and E,ussia, of which nothing need here be said, are, if friends of the Turkish Empire, hardly disinterested friends. Germany, on the other hand, in the Sultan's view, from the very fact that she is not specially interested in the Mahommedan territories on the Mediterranean, will give him good advice, and may give him useful help. Prince Bismarck, in reply, is polite enough. He warns the Turks that while they may expect good advice from him, and any help which is not costly, he does not particularly value their alliance, because he knows that the Sultan has promised the favours of his alliance to every one of the Great Powers in succession. Priace Bismarck has lent the Sultan financiers ; he has lent him officers to improve the Turkish army, although not to serve with it in the field ; but he has told the Sultan that he must not dream of regaining any hold on Tunis or any GEEMANT. 25 practical power in Egypt ; he has warned the Turks that under no circumstances will Germany fire a shot for them, and has declared that Turkey must do the best she can with what is left to her, without attempting a grand policy. Prince Bismarck's advice at Constantinople for many years past has been friendly to this country, and England ought to view with pleasure the permanent character of German influence at Constantinople, which is always the second influ- ence there, though Russia, France, or England each from time to time exerts the first. "When the Sultan's fancy exalts the value of Russia's friendship to the skies, and when he snubs England, as he did once about Mr. Goschen, and lately about Sir "William "White — an almost incredible folly as regards the former, and a weak act of subservience to Russia's influence as regards the latter of these able and excellent ambassadors — he still keeps an eye on Germany. When, on the other hand, he is on the best of terms with England and is embracing Sir Drummond "WolfE, and when Russia is a demon in Moslem eyes, Germany is still consulted. German influence at Constantinople, in a word, is friendly to England, and it is the only influence there that never wanes. The one point which has brought Prince Bismarck into conflict with England as regards the Turkish Empire has been his extreme dislike of what he considers our senti- mental policy of forcing internal reform. The lectures he has addressed to successive English Governments upon this subject have never been published, and never will be ; but Prince Bismarck is not in the habit of making a secret of his opinions, and it is well known with what contemptuous 26 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. frankness lie continually speaks of tlie pressure exerted upon Turkey by Sir Henry Layard, by Mr. Groscben, and in a lesser degree ever since tbeir time by all Englisb Ministers at borne, Ambassadors at Constantinople, and Consuls in tbe Turkish Empire, to secure at all bazards internal reform. Prince Bismarck supports England in keeping tbe road to India clear, in keeping order in Egypt, in maintaining tbe status quo in tbe Mediterranean, but be despises England wben by baranguing tbe Sultan at every turn sbe sacrifices ber interests at Constantinople to wbat be tbinks tbe dream of improving tbe domestic condition of tbe Macedonians or of tbe Armenians. Prince Bismarck in speaking in public of course would defend bimself from tbe cbarge of tbe possession of a bard heart by saying tbat be tbinks tbat pressure at Con- stantinople does barm, in causing tbe Turks to resist tbe removal of bad functionaries, and in inducing tbem to delay reforms wbicb, if left to themselves, they would probably in- troduce; but while mentioning this defence I do not wish to be supposed to share the view, for I am too deeply impressed by all that reaches me from Constantinople that the one necessity of the Sultan is tbat of many people, namely funds, and that every other object is sacrificed to tbe desire to get money. Prince Bismarck has a certain admiration for the Turks as a military people, and considerable sympathy with tbeir view that reforms must wait when there is not money enough to pay the troops. As to that shortness of money, an anecdote is better than pages of statistics, and I will take leave to print two lines from the last letter I received from one of my ablest correspondents in Constantinople, who says, "The Turks GERMANY. 27 must be hard up, for they cannot afEord now to buy even necessaries, such as nev/ rifles." * "When political economists used to write of " necessaries," they meant food-stuffs, but no doubt in modern Europe torpedoes, new shells, and repeating guns are the necessaries of life. Prince Bismarck views with a smile the supposed recent increase of French influence at Constantinople. The giving of the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour to the Grand Vizier and the Marshal of the Palace, and the promotion in the order of other leading Turkish officials, were less a reward for services accomplished than a demonstration. The demonstration was a cheap one, and a very pretty reply to the equally cheap demonstration made by Turkey when the Sultan shortly before embraced a French admiral and ceased to mention Tunis. Prince Bismarck has not always been above suggesting the expediency of the occupation of various portions of the Turkish Empire to his friends among the Powers, but he has always abstained from grabbing for himself, and this is in his favour at Constantinople. : The labours of the Berlin Congress, or its festivities, so confused the minds of the plenipotentiaries that they have never been clear who offered what to whom ; but it at least seems plain, unless we are to believe that the diplomatists of the Europe of the day exceed Talleyrand himself in their powers of imagination, that a great deal of offering of other people's property, took place, and that some of those offers were sug- gested by Prince Bismarck. In one case, at least, the same ■ * The contract has, however, been signed since these words were penned. The German contractor seems unlikely to get his money. 28 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EXJEOPEAN POLITICS, thing was offered to two parties, whicli is an ingenious method of inducing complications which may lead to war. ^ It is not known what view Prince Bismarck took of the league for the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean which was proposed by Lord Beaconsfield m February, 1878. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the then Cabinet, consisting of Lord Beaconsfield, Lord Cairns, and Lord Salisbury, proposed at the instance of Lord Beacons- field the creation of a Mediterranean League. It was intended that France, Italy, and Greece should be con- sulted, and then, if they were found to be agreed, that Austria should be asked to join. Italy, however, declined, and the matter went no farther: v But the condition of the Mediterranean underwent immediately afterwards an essential change, and a fresh grouping of the Mediterranean Powers became inevitable. Prince Bismarck most steadily resisted the temptation to fall into any anti-French alliance with regard to Tunis. France was, no doubt, furious, after her occupation of Tunis, at the suspicion that England, Italy, and Turkey tried to set Germany at her, but it was mere suspicion, which was not justified, and Prince Bismarck, as indeed is usual with him in great affairs, never held in secret any different language from that of which he made use in public. At a later period, when Prince Bismarck believed in the imminence of a league between the Balkan States, he warned, I believe, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece that if they entered into such a league he could not answer for the movements of Austria and of Eussia, and that they could not be allowed to take steps which would GERMANY. 29 produce a general European conflagration. Nothing, in short, could have been more straightforward and more uniform than the Turkish policy of Germany. No doubt Prince Bismarck may view without dissatisfaction the jealousies between France and the United Kingdom arising out of Mediterranean questions, but he has never shown his satisfaction, and he has often done much to diminish friction. We shall have to consider the Egyptian difficulties between England and France when I write of France, and it is sufficient at this moment to say that they are not thought worthy of any great attention at Berlin, inasmuch as it is regarded as certain that they will not lead to war. A sup- posed circumstance which has perhaps caused more hostility in France towards England than even the Egyptian question, connects itseK with Germany in a curious way. It is a ludicrous fact, but still it is a fact, that of the several matters which have estranged France from England, of which the Egyptian question is not even the principal one, perhaps the chief is a belief in France that the Queen is anti-French in feeling and especially anti-French-Eepublican, and that her Majesty's feeling upon this point has dominated the foreign policy of this country. It is not necessary in writing in England to discuss seriously this French popular belief ; but although dislike to France, if true, would be supposed to take the form of affection for, or at least sympathy for, Germany, there is no corresponding feeling of close ties on the part of the Court and Government of Berlin, because at Berlin the truth of the case is more exactly appreciated. In fact, some unpopularity at the German Court is attached to certain 30 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. ceremonial acts of the Englisli Government for -which her Majesty most improperly has, in German opinion, been held responsible ; as for example, the sending of Garter missions to small German courts. Moreover, their Eoyal Highnesses the Duke of Cambridge and (in a less degree) the Prince of Wales are looked upon as friends of the Hanoverian par- ticularists, and are said to be not too popular in certain circles at BerHn. Nothing is too trivial or, it may be added, too absurd to be taken into account in dealing with either national or personal likes and dislikes. It would be impossible to discover a more ideally perfect ambassador than is Lord Lyons, but the Republic is not popular in Paris "smart" society, and while Lord Lyons himself does not " go out," the Embassy is, like all embassies, in touch with smart society, which is in opposition, and not with the society, if society it may be called, of Government. Just as in Spain, when Castelar came into power, the English Legation did "not know " Castelar, so in Paris, though Lord Lyons does his best by frequent hospitality to meet the difficulty, the British Embassy does not know the houses of the governing people. This is true, no doubt, of aU the embassies, but as the Eng- lish are in Paris most in view, and as the English have a reputation for being disagreeable, well established, though it is to be hoped not well founded, the estrangement which is the consequence fixes itself upon the Government of England. The relations between France and Russia are of the hio'hest interest to Prince Bismarck. As I have already stated, M. de Freycinet told his friends that he would not be a party to the formal alliance with, Russia which he left them to sup- GERMANY. 31 pose she had solicited. In this he followed the policy of his great rival. M. Grambetta declared times without number to his intimates that Russia was always pulling him by the coat, but he would not stop to listen. There is this difference, however, between De Freycinet and Grambetta, that the latter was deeply prejudiced against Russia, and the former is not prejudiced. Gambetta would have joined an alliance against Russia, even though, as he said, it should be "an alliance at Berlin," although no doubt he had his own hopes as to that restoration of territory which a possible war — in which France should save Germany — might bring about. M. Gambetta had been brought up in the old Polish Republican traditions, which were popular at one time among the French Republicans. His opinions had grown up with him in oppo- sition, and the Poles were always popular with French oppositions. M. de Freycinet's public life has been spent in government, and he knows how necessary it is to France to make use of the dim figure of the Russian power, even if she does not actually ally herself with Russia. I mention merely to reject it the supposition that M. de Freycinet while at the Quai d'Orsay deceived his friends in order to mislead the world, and that an actual alliance between France and Russia has been lately signed. Prince Bismarck knows well enough that there is no alliance between these Powers, but still it suits France to show Russia in the background, as it suits Russia to show France, and while German writers point out that Russia would, if she could, only make use of France for her own ends, still the mere existence of two such military powers upon the two flanks of Germany 32 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. cannot for one moment be out of the mind of the German staff. Rumours of wars are bad enough, but it is not easy to see whence at this moment actual war is likely to come. France does not intend that war shall grow out of the Egyptian question. France is not going to attack Germany in a single-handed struggle. Germany is not going to attack France. Russia is the one power which is a comet of eccen- tric orbit rather than a planet in the European system. The power of Russia is wielded by a single man, or shall I say by two — the Emperor, and the Moscow newspaper emperor, Katkoff. Single-handed war between the United Kingdom and Russia is unlikely, at present and were it to break out the other Powers would be unlikely to be afterwards drawn in. This country has allowed Russia to violate her engagement of 1878 as to Batoum, and she probably would allow Russia to set at naught the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and to violate her other engagement of 1878, if it can be held to be still binding. There are in Europe no secret engagements which are hkely to endanger European peace. This country is not under any, as is known, and the engagements that Russia is under towards us are pacific in their nature, though probably worth but little. I have said that war is not likely to arise even out of that which is in itself improbable, a direct disregard by Russia of the conditions of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The Stan- dard may denounce Lord Randolph Churchill's interference in foreign affairs, but Lord Randolph Churchill's power in the country is not merely dependent upon his personal GERMANY. 33 ability and vigour, remarkable as tbese are. It is still more largely due to the fact that lie more or less faithfully interprets, and almost invariably attempts to interpret, the prevailing opinion of the country. If Lord Randolph Churchill declares now, as he used to declare far and wide, that this country ought not to fight for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, it is because he believes, and perhaps rightly believes, that the country would not fight for it. There remains Bulgaria. I have already pointed out that while we may make con- fident prediction as to the course of action of other Powers by calculating their necessities, and by taking into account their prejudices and their feelings, and arrive at so accurate a result that if we are far wrong the error is due to our own stupidity, as regards Russia it is impossible to predict what she will or will not do, because the destinies of Russia are practically in the hands of a single man whose temper is that which the temper of autocrats usually is, overweighted as they are with responsibility. Although feeling in Great Britain is all one way, still it has frequently and ably been pointed out of late that there is a good deal to be said upon the other or Russian side about Bulgaria. It is true that Bulgaria is politically the child of Russia, that Russian sacrifices during the last war with Turkey created Bulgaria, and that assembled Europe at the Berlin Congress agreed to allow her much power there. On the other hand, Bulgaria now for practical purposes virtually includes Eastern Roumelia, in which it was the intention of the Congress that the Sultan's power should prevail, the result being that D 34 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. Turkey was given control of the militia, while the Balkans were to he held hy her troops. But Russia answers that it is rather late to have regard to these provisions now, inasmuch as they aU went hy the board so long ago as 1879. On the other hand, Russia would not have lost her hold upon Bul- garia had she not abused the situation by first drilling the newly-freed Bulgarians on autocratic lines, and then, when she came to dislike the German prince, by applying to the revolutionary party. On the whole it seems probable, in the opinion of those who know the Russian Emperor best, that Russia will not take any step in Bulgaria that is likely to force Austria into war. Should, however, war at any time prove the issue from the Bulgarian question, a good deal will turn upon the attitude of Italy. Russia is as unpopular in Italy as in Great Britain, and perhaps there is in Italy rather less dislike to the idea of actual fighting over the Bulgarian question than there is with us. Italian opinion has been utterly disgusted by the Bulgarian proceedings of Russia, and Italy is prepared for an alliance with England and Austria against Russia, though " not gratis." Italy would expect English moral assistance in the Harrar, and she would ask from Austria the Trentino, which Austria would of course refuse, but would refuse in such a way as to enable the grant of a strip of territory in the form of an improved frontier line to be given if it could not be avoided. I have said already that it is necessary for the politician in these days to consider power of armament, and it is impos- sible to adequately deal with the European position of Ger- GERMANY. 35 many without taking an exact survey both of her absolute and of her relative miKtary strength. Both Germany and France intend to keep out of war, but war between them vrill some day come, and it would come the sooner if there were an obvious disproportion of power between them. France has done a fabulous amount of military work since 1870. She has built miles upon miles of fortresses behind which the least instructed of her men could fight. She believes that she has a force of 3,408,000 instructed, and 701,000 untaught men, or 4,109,000 in all. As I shall show when I go on to consider the military force of France in detail, partly in the present and partly in the next chapter in this volume, these figures are subject to great deductions in the opinion of competent foreign critics, but, to summarise what I shall have to say, it is probable that France possesses an army of 2,600,000 men, with artillery and cavalry proper for an army of 2,000,000, able at once to stand in line upon the frontier, and to carry on simple, though not complicated, movements in the field. The Germans could only put upon the ground a force inferior in numbers, if we count the whole of the reserves upon both sides, but the Germans have more thoroughly trained men, and they have or had, until lately, more confidence. In the case of a complete mobilisation the German forces would be more easily handled, because the regiments would consist less largely than the French of men not permanently with the flag, but it is doubtful, even in the opinion of the German staff, whether Germany could make any but a merely defensive war against France, except by a policy which I shall presently describe. D 2 36 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUEOPEAN POLITICS, The recent speeches to the German Parliament upon the proposed increase of the army should go for nothing. In every country the people explain the speeches of Minis- ters by the home or parliamentary necessities of their posi- tion, but they seldom accept that simple explanation of what is said in other capitals by the Miaisters of other countries. If the German staff thought it necessary that a particular increase in the army should take place, the War Minister and the head of the staff would be likely to use in Parlia- ment the alarmist language by which it was most likely that that increase would be carried. Still, a careful examina- tion of the subject has led foreign officers, looking to the present condition of the French army and also to that of those of Austria and Russia, to agree in the necessity for the increase. As has already been pointed out the most immediate cause for an increase in the German army was the discovery by the German staff of the military weakness of Austria, a factor to which I shall have to recur in the chapters upon Russia and upon Austria. While the Austrian army is much weaker than was supposed a year ago, while the Russian army has been enormously increased of late in numbers, and while the French military system has been maturing itself by lapse of time, the army of Germany, though splendid, has comparatively speaking been standing still. Germany in a military sense has been living a little upon the prestige of her mobilisations in 1866 and 1870. In 1867, when the figure of 1,300,000 men for the Con- federation was given, M. Thiers replied that the numbers were illusory ; that if they were true, France must despair, GERMANY. 37 but tliat luckily the accounts of tlie German army were all fables, and tbat tbe men could not be found. In 1870 they "were found. Nearly a million of men were present in ten days, and the forces of the Confederation very soon reached the figure of the book:s. There can be no doubt that in 1874, and again in 1875, when Russia prevented a war between Ger- many and France, and England took credit for having done so, Germany could have crushed her rival. It is much more doubtful now. It is little known what efforts were suddenly made in 1874-5 with a view to war, but the time went past. Since that date the Germans have been able to keep the number of men present with the flag exactly equal on the average to the number of men nominally present. Every man who is sent away for any reason is immediately replaced, and the figures which were true in 1870 are equally true with regard to a far larger force in the present day. On the other hand, it is impossible to be certain what deduction upon this point has to be made in the case of France and Russia. The corruption which, still exists in Russia, and the wastefulness which prevails in French finance, lead to a considerable shrinkage in the number of men present. It is difficult to find in France the real number of " days of men present " with the flag, but the point is one which is worth care, inasmuch as it affects the national confidence, which is a serious matter in the case of France, and the solidity of the army under mobilisation. A perusal of the German military budget and a com- parison of it with the French are flattering to Germany in one respect and to France in another. France is entitled to credit 38 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. for tlae sacrifices whicli slie lias made to her ideal of national honour, and for the comparative cheerfulness with which the tremendous charges of her budget have been borne. In the case of Germany, on the other hand, we find machine-like precision ; also strict and rigid justice in paying to the last farthing, for example out of the military extraordinary budget— that is, out of the French funds obtained from the indemnity— the pensions of the French Legion of Honour and the French military medal to old French soldiers inhabit- ing Alsace and Lorraine. We find also that the German stafE have made over £20,000 by writing a big book, which is more than most writers can say, and have speculated prudently with the indemnity funds, and greatly increased their sum by fortunate operations on the Stock Exchange. The reason for the difference lies partly no doubt in national character, partly in the fact that in Germany the men who are at the head of the army have spent their lives on the general staff. In France there is a perpetual change of ministers, and there is too much jealousy of individuals to allow much hope that any one man will be suffered to very long control the destinies of the French army. Germany has an enormous advantage in the fact that the German Parlia- ment allows (it could hardly, if it would, prevent) perma- nence in military arrangements, and that the German Emperor retains in military power a group of men who form a training school of war, and who are at least as remarkable in their offices as upon the field of battle. At the same time, it is difficult to share the pessimism from a French point of view of the generality of French military writers. Their object is sometimes that which we have just been considering GBEMANr. 39 in the case of the Grerman staff, namely, to obtain votes from an unwilling opposition. French military critics write that Grermany really has, not 427,000 but 454,000 or 468,000 men actually with the flag, and that these are real figures, for if a man dies or falls ill another man is put in his place, which is not the case in France; that France only instructs 117,000 a year, while Germany instructs 151,000 ; that the Germans have 680,000 more instructed men than has France, and that the German cavalry exceeds the French by 6,000 sabres. Taking the French nomiaal figures at 523,000 men, they deduct officers and military police and thirteen per cent, as absent, and reduce their numbers to 414,000 with the fiag, of whom they say 71,000 are abroad, chiefiy in Algeria, Tunis, and Tonquin, while Germany has all hers at home, and they finally bring out as the result that France has only 343,000 men available in time of peace, to set against the far larger number named above for Germany. The errors committed by many of these pessimistic French military writers are obvious even to the uninstructed eye. They omit officers and military police upon the French side, and count the former, and sometimes the latter, upon the Ger- man, and so forth, but it must be conceded to them that, although Algeria has now ceased to be a source of military weakness to France, Tunis and Tonquin, to say nothing of Madagascar, will long continue to make a drain upon her strength in Europe. After the greatest care in the application of figures, it seems necessary to conclude that, making every allowance for the ill effects of a foolish poHcy of so-called "colonial" 40 THE PEESENT POSITION OP EL'EOPEAN POLITICS. annexation, and admitting that France in the event of a complete mohHisation would have a larger number of half- trained men in her companies and a smaller proportion of fully-trained men than Germany, and would there« fore be less able to undertake difficult operations in the field at the beginning of a war, nevertheless France could put a larger force of infantry in the field than Germany, and possesses cavalry and artillery enough for an army of two milKons of men. If we pass from quantity to quality it is more difficult to speak. Most troops will fight well behind walls, and the French frontier is now one great earthwork. Some of those who are disposed to lay down general rules as to the aptitudes of foreign nations, declare that the French never fight well except when they are in good spirits, and that it is absolutely necessary for France that the first battles, however trivial, should prove a success ; but Montmirail in old days and Faidherbe's campaigns of December and January, 1870-1, show that Frenchmen can sometimes splendidly fight a losing battle even with untrained troops. The two great rivals of the Continent are now each too strong for the other. France, even with a Russian alliance, could not easily pass Metz and Strasburg, or cross the Rhine, could not pass through Switzerland, and could not safely pass through Belgium. Germany, on the other hand, except through Belgium, cannot now get into France at all. As late as 1879 France was open to the Germans up to the gates of Paris, and they could have occupied Champagne, fortified its cities against the French, and waited quietly, had they chosen to adopt that plan of campaign. Now Nancy alone is open. GERMANY. 41 and a short distance behind tlie nominal frontier there is a real military frontier, which is inexpugnable. The new French frontier has been made as strong by art as it is weak by nature and by the intention of the German stafE who chose it. The French army has been increased tUl it is superior in numbers to that of Grermany, and rapidity of possible mobili- sation is now the same upon both sides. The powers of railway concentration are equal. The French fortresses, Hke the Russian fortresses upon the east, are now superior to the German. For sixty miles in a stretch along the frontier every single spot is under defensive fire by heavy guns. Of a miUtary frontier towards Germany of 270 kilometres, 200 are under fire, and the two gaps which are left have been left on purpose, and in German military opinion are impassable. The French fortresses in the next war, it is safe to say, wiU be defended, if they are attacked, as Bitche and Belfort were in 1870, and not surrendered in the manner in. which the others, from Metz and Strasburg down to Toul and Longwy, were handed over to the enemy. It was the civil population which demoralised the troops and forced the surrender of the fortresses in 1870. In the next war the fortresses will be detached forts, and there will be no civil population to be taken iato account. There will probably, also, be the employ- ment of the repeating rifle to be faced, and the repeating rifle is more important ia the defence of earthworks than in the attack. At the worst, the French would lose Nancy in a direct attack, and the real problem — and it is one of singu- lar importance to us ia England — is whether the Germans will stand on the defensive upon the French as they will 42 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. upon the Russian frontier, or -whether they will pass through Belgium. It is a singular fact that the most important point to the future of Britain for the next few years, namely, whether Belgian neutrality will be violated by Germany in the " com- ing " war, and what England will do if it is violated, had not till lately been discussed in England. One thing may safely be asserted, namely, that if Belgium would make proper preparations for her own defence her neutrality would not be violated ; but these preparations have not been made.* While an attack on Germany by France through Belgium is, iQ a military sense, improbable, an attack on France by Germany through Belgium is highly probable if the Belgians continue to keep so small an army as they do, and to contem- plate its withdrawal under the guns of Antwerp. For Bel- gium to fortify Antwerp on an enormous scale, and to prac- tically fortify nothing else, and to contemplate withdrawal there with the EJing and Parliament and half her forces, is, if we leave foreign help out of account, much as though England should fortify a portion of the county of Sutherland as the best means for her defence. Antwerp is near the northern extremity of the kingdom, and at the poiat most absolutely removed from aU possibility of attack. Antwerp might be held by any number of troops by the whole Belgian and the whole British army, for example — without the holding of it being very dangerous to an army of a million of men advancing upon Paris from Coblentz * A great discussion took place on this subject in Belgium shortly after the appearance of this article, and ultimately a Government Bill for the fortification of the towns upon the Mouse was introduced. GERMANY. 43 througli the province of Namur.* I am aware that the Intelli- gence Branch of the "War Office defend in their latest volumes, which are published for the benefit of the world, the selection of Antwerp as agaiast Brussels ; but Brussels itself lies towards the extremity of the kingdom, and if Belgian neutrality is to be safeguarded, it must be safeguarded at Li^ge * or upon the Upper Meuse. England, unless she turns over a new leaf in military matters and adopts a system more in accordance with modern ideas than her present old-fashioned military organi- sation, could only place a single army corps at Antwerp in the time that it would take Germany to place nearly two millions and France to place two and a haK mi].lions of men in the field. Antwerp cannot be taken, and the defence of Antwerp is not worth thinking of. It is only necessary to consider an army which can fight in the open field or advance upon the communications of the army of the Power which has violated the neutrality of Belgium. Great Britain, no doubt, could rapidly place a large number of infantry and some cavalry in Belgium, not properly organised for war, but in a position to make a demonstration in what would be a friendly country, where there would not be much difficulty about supplies; but no such force could advance, without high risk of destruction, upon the line of the Meuse, and the war might be decided before two English army corps and a third corps composed of half of the Belgian army could appear in the neighbourhood of Liege or of the Upper Meuse. The temptation to the German stafE is strong, and will remaia so until the French frontier south of Maubeuge has been * It has since teeu decided to fortify Namur aad Li^ge. 44 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. made as strong as the frontier towards Germany, wMcli will take millions of money and many years. It must be remembered tbat tbe FrencL. frontier towards Germany is sbort, while the French frontier towards Belgium is long, for France and Belgium have a common frontier of over 380 miles. Of course I may be told that the plan for the defence of Belgium is the best that can be adopted ; that the razing of the fortresses on the Meuse was wise, because they could not have been held by Belgium against either Germany or France ; that Belgium is guaranteed by all the Great Powers, which maybe expected to come to her assistance ; that Antwerp would be the point at which their troops would land ; that when a large force had been collected there the offensive could be taken towards the south ; and that Germany is too strict an observer of international engagements to make it likely that she should violate the neutrality of Belgium, which even by my own admission it would be to the mili- tary advantage of France if possible to respect. Is it quite certain that in a duel between Germany and France any of the Powers would think of coming to the assistance of Bel- gium ? Would not they excuse themselves upon the ground that the treaty is not in the most modern form, and that although in 1839 the country was declared by the Powers to be neutral, when it was practically desired to protect that neutrality in 1870, special and temporary treaties were wanted for that purpose ? * In the event of a fresh war similar treaties would at once be entered into if it was not intended to risk the violation ; but if it were, delays would • A Diisunderstatiding of this passage ia the Frencli translation caused hostile criticism in France and Belgium, hut it contains no inaccuracy. GERMANY. 45 take place in the consultations of the Powers during which the neutrality itself would be at an end. The official English book upon the armed strength of Belgium gives as a reason for expecting the presence of a British army at Antwerp after the violation of Belgium's neutrality that England is " supposed to " have an interest in preventing the annexation of Antwerp by a Great Power. This is hardly a sufficiently wide view of the problem. If the defence of Belgium by Great Britain is only to be justified on the ground that it might be dangerous for England if either France or Germany were ultimately to hold Antwerp, it must be admitted that there would not be much more danger in their holding Antwerp than in France holding Cherbourg, and that the increase of danger would pro- bably not be worth the risk of taking part in a great Continental war. That England is bound by treaty to defend Belgium, and must maintain her treaty obligations, would have been a stronger argument for the compilers of the military handbook to have made use of, but in itself would hardly be a sufficient argument to induce the British Parlia- ment to contemplate an isolated intervention. The public law of Europe is an important matter, but people would be inclined to answer that we ought not to stand forward by ourselves to be its guardians. Moreover, suppose the case of a sudden revelation at the beginning of a war of a kind of virtual acquiescence by the Belgian Government in the occupation of a portion of their territory, which is not absolutely inconceivable. In that case it is certain that English opinion would not allow interference, unless all the 46 THE PEESENT POSITION OE EUROPEAN POLITICS. Powers were willing to interfere together, wMcli under the circumstances of the case would not be probable, and certainly could not be arranged in time. The subject is a very serious one, because there can be no doubt that if certain statesmen who might be named were in actual and not merely nominal power at the time, England would be committed to war in defence of Belgian neutrality the moment it was threatened, whereas with other statesmen, such as, for example, it may be safely prophesied. Lord Randolph Churchill or Mr. Chamberlain, England would think twice as to the drift of public opinion before the fatal plunge was made. Now such a matter ought not to rest upon the chance of any particular individual holding power in this country, but some decision in advance ought to be taken upon the question if our foreign policy is not to be subject to per- petual shifts and doubts. Mistakes — and in such matters grave mistakes — loss of national dignity, destruction of belief in public faith, and risk of war, can only be avoided by firm adherence to ground taken up beforehand. The course fol- lowed in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone for the defence of Belgian neutrality was approved by public opinion at the time, but it is far from certain, considering the change in the electorate that has since occurred, and the redistribution of political power, and looking to the growth of democracy in both the great parties in the State, that electoral and Parliamentary opinion now would be in accord with the opinion manifested then. Belgium is, whether justly or unjustly, not only con- sidered less of a British interest now that the memories of GERMANY. 47 Waterloo have become more dim, as well as tlie memories of the treaty of 1839, hut Belgium., justly or unjustly, is not quite so popular in this country at the present moment as she was a few years ago. The Congo business, and the rumoured secret negotiations of the King of the Belgians with France and Germany successively about the eventual sale of his indefinite African territories, have robbed Belgium of some English sympathy. One point, however, there can be no doubt about, namely, that if we must fight for Belgium against Germany it will be well to lessen the chance of having to do so by inducing Belgium to keep up a proper army to defend her dangerous position, and to arrange a plan for defence which shall admit of the rapid concentra- tion of a suflScient force within striking distance of the Meuse. When once Belgian neutrality is violated by either party, whatever promises are made, her independence will be gone. I have ventured to forecast the probability in a military sense of German violation of the Belgian frontier as com- pared with the improbability of French violation. Belgium covers the longest and most vulnerable stretch of the French north-east frontier. It covers more than half the line which France would have to defend, and protects the half which nature has done nothing to guard for France. On the other hand, the shortest, best, and safest line from Central Prussia to Paris goes through Belgium, down the Oise to Creil. The road and railway from Berlin through Maubeuge to Paris are at once the best line of attack and the safest line for retreat in the event of German defeat. But whichever party 48 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. triumplied, Belgium would have to pay the cost, and either the whole or the greater portion of her territory would pass to one or other of the belligerents, or partition would be her lot. If the Belgians could be counted upon not to fall back at once upon Antwerp, but to fight sufiiciently to force the hand of a possibly unwilling Government in England, Ger- many would not make their country a battle-field. But the Belgians do not seem inclined to increase their army. Surely this consideration ought to show the prudent among French politicians the folly of angering England against France by silly annexations, as in the New Hebrides, or by impossible demands ; for to defend Belgium against Germany would be represented to the British electors, by those who objected to the war, as saving France from Germany, which would add to the unpopularity of the war itself if France were unpopular at the time in England. It is not that there is any desire ia Germany to annex. The considerations which we have been discussing are military considerations, not political. It is true in one sense, as has been assumed in recent discussions in Belgium with regard to the Bill for establishing a wider military service there, that the greatest danger to Belgium comes, not from Germany, but from France. True in a sense, because there is little danger of the incorporation of the whole or greater part of Belgium in the German Empire, and the greatest possible danger of the incorporation of the whole or part in France. If once France should be attacked through Belgium, then, no doubt, in the event of ultimate French success, Belgium, or part of Belgium, would go to France. GEEMANT. 49 There remains the possibility that the next war between Germany and France may be a waiting war in which Germany and France may substantially both stand upon the defensive. The armies of Denmark, of Sweden and Norway, and of Spain are not large enough to cause anxiety to the greater Powers, as the frontiers of France and Germany would be defended against the attacks of the smaller Powers by territorial troops and fortresses. But suppose a waiting poKcy were adopted by the great belligerents towards each other, they having drifted into war without either of them desiring to attack : which could the better bear the strain ? Had it not been for the French follies of Tonquin, and even, as I think, of Tunis, although Tunis is less distinctly folly than Tonquin, and for reckless expenditure upon all sides by France, there would have been no doubt that at present and for many years to come France would have been the better able to wait. It would be impossible for either to wait long in a complete mobilisation. The next war will in all Continental countries suspend trade except in a few branches, and it becomes more important than ever to the Continental Powers that it should be short. England alone of the Great Powers could maintain a long war, which is lucky for us when we remember how entirely unfit we are to play a part in a short one. Russia, curiously enough, in spite of what is said of her finances, comes next ta England in ability to " last," for her army, enormous as it is,, forms a smaller proportion of her working population than is the case in Germany, France, Austria and Italy ; and her population are used to hardship, and are moved by a patriotism, which is simply marvellous." £ 50 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. For any one of the four Powers, a long war is a terrible calamity to contemplate. The dangers of war to Austria are well known in Austria, and they are both military and political. France, which could, were she prudent, best stand the strain, has allowed her iinances to become de- plorable, partly by spending too much money, and partly by wasting it in costly so-called " colonial " adventures. She would have it in her power to bring her finances into order and to greatly diminish the weakness of her army in trained troops were she boldly to abandon positions which wt)uld be lost to her in the event of any future war between England and France. On the other hand, France is now, for the first time since 1870, fully aware of her strength upon her frontiers towards Germany, and, while unwilling to fight, full of spirit as regards a necessary war. Gambetta once said that his Cherbourg speech, which caused a stir in Europe, was the first glass of wine given to the convalescent. After Gambetta's death the convalescent had a relapse, and it is General Boulanger who has first made him hold up his head for good. The gratitude for his cure, due to Providence or to the strength of the patient's constitution, is, as often happens, bestowed by the patient upon the doctor. In surveying once more the entire field, a fact that must strike the observer is that while the uncertainty of Russia's policy presents the principal danger to peace, there is one obvious consideration which makes against an attack by Eussia upon Austria. In simple language it may be ex- pressed by the phrase, " It is heads I win, and tails you lose," for Austria against Russia, for however completely GERMANY. 5] beaten tlie Austrian forces might be, Germany could not, without an intolerable loss of prestige in Europe, allow Austria to be seriously dismembered. It is the knowledge possessed in Russia of this fact which, more than the speeches of Austrian and English and Italian ministers, has caused Prince Bismarck's advice to be up to the present time followed in the main at St. Petersburg. Lord Salisbury's language, therefore, which seemed imprudent to many, both of his English and of his foreign critics, was a fairly safe example of th^ use of what is known to us as Jingo language when its use is wise. The new generation of Tory-Democratic states- men are believed to advocate as popular a combination of Beaconsfieldian language with Cobdenic secret action ; " talk Jingo, but act Manchester " is supposed to be their watchword. But Lord Salisbury is still supreme in the conduct of foreign affairs for the Tory party, although that supremacy may not long continue, and Lord Salisbury is not so imprudent a politician nowadays as he was some years ago. I have spoken throughout this chapter as though Lord Salisbury and not Lord Iddesleigh was our foreign minister ; but I believe that I violate no confidence when I say that Lord Iddesleigh does not profess to carry out in the Foreign Office a policy of his own, and that upon all matters of importance he acts under the direction of Lord Salisbury.* If I am to give an average outside opinion, free from party bias, upon foreign questions, I ought to congratu- late the country upon the fact that in the hands, under the Liberals of Lord Rosebery or under the Conservatives of * First published before Lord IddesleigK's lamented death. e2 52 THE PEESBNT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. Lord Salisbury, the foreign affairs of the country are in highly skilled, competent, and wise control. It now only remains to be discussed whether there are any special considerations affecting England, besides those which have been mentioned, which should be here named. Some few years back it was supposed that Prince Bismarck had taken such a dislike to the English Liberal party as to make the holding of office by that party a matter of danger to the country. It should be remembered that the London press is mainly hostile to the Liberal party, and that when the Liberals are "in " many quotations appear from German newspapers not friendly to this country, which are made to express a hostility seemingly confined to the Liberal party, when as a fact it applies to England under any rule. The Cologne Gazette in October last, with the Conservatives in power, was sneering as bitterly at England as it ever did in Mr. Gladstone's days, and declaring that before the Treaty of Berlin and up to the present time England had been of no account in Europe. If we look to the opinions of the German Chancellor and not to the expressions of the German press, it is unnecessary to state that Prince Bismarck has never had any quarrel with the Liberal party as such, nor any love for the Conservative. The new men, the men of the future, as regards foreign affairs, on the Liberal side — or shall I say Liberal sides ? — Lord Eosebery on the one hand and Lord Hartington and Mr. Chamberlain on the other, are as acceptable to Prince Bismarck as is Lord Salisbury. Prince Bismarck differs in one point from those about him : GERMANY. 53 lie does not rate too low the military capacity of England. The German staff, knowing the weakness of our force, the slowness of our mobilisation, the fewness of our guns, the general imperfection of our equipment for rapidly enteriag upon war, distinctly underrate the power of this country. Prince Bismarck is aware that, although we may have rejected until lately the repeating gun — the introduction of which by all the Great Powers has been slow, for the American cavalry was partly armed with it more than twenty years ago, and it has been occasionally used in war both by the Turks and the Chinese — and although we may not be manu- facturing the new shells, or taking any very active steps to fit ourselves for immediate war, we have such wealth, such energy, and such manufacturing power that, whatever may be the ultimate danger to our position in the world, we could crush in a lengthy war the greatest of the European Powers, _ except Germany, which is absolutely invulnerable by us. One point about which Prince Bismarck has in recent years come into collision with this country is due to his changed colonial palicy. It is a well-known fact that Prince Bismarck for many years was in the habit of expressing his profoimd disapproval of German colonisation, but of late he has found it necessary to gratify the public taste for " running into something cheap." "With singular prudence he has avoided the mistakes of France, and while the countries that he has acquired may not be of any immediate use, at all events their acquisition has been far from costly. They all are countries which have been refused by us, although probably, in the face of the imposition of differential duties against 54 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. British goods by certain Powers, the refusal will be seen to have been founded upon old-fashioned grounds unfortunately- inapplicable to the circumstances of the day. The non-Dutch half of New Guinea we might have had at any time for the hoisting of a flag (Holland has hardly so good a tenure for its part) ; but half of the half has been allowed to go to Germany. The Cameroons were offered to England by their chiefs, and the offer had not been finally accepted at the moment at which the German annexation took place. The shadowy French and German country reachable by' the Congo might have been English had not Lord Carnarvon refused to ratify the annexation of December, 1874 ; and Zanzibar's rights over the mainland might have been acquired by England without difficulty, inasmuch as the Sultan had for many years, in one form or another, pressed for our protection. If these coun- tries were not to remain unoccupied, and were not to be occupied by ourselves, it is not a bad thing for us that they should be occupied by Germany. A German annexation or a German protectorate must for England be preferable to a French, so long as Germany does not, like France, place differential duties upon foreign goods. The countries in which the German flag has recently been hoisted are at present in truth only nominally German. The view of the Chancellor's opponents in favour of German colonies as necessary for the development of German trade, has been modified by him into a system of paper annexations in districts where German trading houses were already flourishing, at Angra Pequena, in Central Africa, on the Zanzibar coast, in Northern New Guinea, and ia some Pacific islands. "We might have antici- GERMANY. 55 pated Germany by liaving recourse to tlie same system of paper annexations, against wliicli Germany might have protested, tut would not have fought. Still, it is impossible to view with much regret, except in cases which interfere with Australian interests, the nominal annexation by Ger- many of these territories. In the case of the Cameroons, the main ground upon which it was proposed that this country should accept the cession was that otherwise the territory would be taken by the French, whose commercial policy ' would destroy our trade ; but as German and not French annexation has taken place, the English trade there will probably be safe enough. The point upon which alone any serious danger Wa^ likely to arise, namely, the advo- cacy by Germany of land claims in the Pacific islands, which, though preferred by German subjects, are often of an utterly indefensible kind, has been tided over by Com- missions, and time, precious in such cases, has been gained. On the whole, therefore, with the reservation of Australian interests, far more threatened by France, with its commercial and its convict policj', than by Germany, little harm to English interests has been done by Germany since she became the foremost of Continental Powers, and few occa- sions of serious difficulty between the countries are likely to arise. II. FEANCE. We have seen in the previous chapter how Germany and Austria are bound over to keep the peace, and will do nothing warlike unprovoked; how England is past her fighting days, unless moved by a very powerfully irritating cause ; how Russian policy alone is not to be foreseen, and how the erratic impulses of the Tsar may affect the future of Europe. "We have now to consider the same phenomena from the French point of view, and it will also be my duty to try to make plain in what way the personality of the leading Frenchmen may influence the policy of their country. Thoroughly as force now reigns in Europe, at least three of the Great Powers, the first three of the four which have just been named, whatever be the amounts they spend upon their armies and navies, are now as peaceable in general inten- tion as the United States. Italy obviously will never be- gin a war, and the only Powers that are thought likely to provoke one are France and Eussia. What of France ? It being admitted that the French peasant or the ordinary PRAKCE. 57 French elector is generally of a peace-loving and thrifty disposition, is there in France any man who is likely to play upon national vanity in such a manner as to hurry on a war ? A distinction must here be drawn between words and acts. A large proportion " of the gOTerning men of France come from its southern provinces, and the Gascon and Provencal are proverbial for the use of language which in England is called Jingo, in Northern France Chauvinistic, but in Southern France is regarded as the ordinary speech of the people. The French Patriotic League not only talks big, but writes big, and publishes statements from which it might be gathered, were they to be taken literally, that Europe is upon the brink of a general war. It will already have been seen, from the necessary anticipations of the previous chapter, that I do not share the view that it is probable that France will voluntarily enter upon war. On the contrary, I go so far as to think that, if Russia were to begin war with England, or with Austria, or with England and Austria combined, France would, if possible, look on, content to reap profit from it at a later moment, if she could do so. The late Cabinet showed by the official declaration of its chief that it was anti-Chauvinist, although it contained one member supposed to be of a Chauvinist turn. The declaration made by ministers on taking office said nothing of foreign policy, except in vague and general terms, and only named the army incidentally. Nevertheless the French and German, newspapers are full of rumours of impending war. It is said that M. de Courcel, the ex-ambassador at 58 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. Berlin, gave as his reason for refusing the Foreign Office, that he "-would not be the Due de Gramont of the Eepuhlic." Yet the whole of the persons who count in France, have counted latterly, or are likely to count, are, with one pos- sible exception, admittedly peaceable. 'The President, who bears a much closer resemblance than does Mr. Bright to the ideal member of the Society of Friends ; M. de Freycinet, a model of cautious statesmanship ; M. Spuller, German not only by race, but by turn of mind ; M. Cl^menceau, en- lightened, friendly to England, and by no means pro-Russian — all these men are most unlikely to countenance a policy of adventure. M. Ferry, who may come back again some day, burnt his jSngers in Tonquin, and is now as cautious as M. de Freycinet himself. The one exception, of course, is General Boulanger, and it must be admitted not only that he excites in Germany and in Russia fears or hopes as the case may be, but that he arouses very general public atten- tion even in France. The personality of the man is strong. He has come very suddenly to the front. Gambetta, indeed, used to speak of him as one of the best four officers in France, but he put him rather below than above at least two of the four. General Boulanger is still young ; he is handsome, and a good speaker. He owes his advancement to M. Cl^menceau, but he has eclipsed his patron, who indeed never was especially popu- lar. General Boulanger is supposed to have violated the gen- tlemanly code of honour, but it is universally admitted that what has happened has not done him any harm. I shall be disbelieved when I state simply that his personal popularity TEANCE. 59 in France is greater ttan that enjoyed by any man since JSTapoleon was at the height of his power, with the possible exception of Lafayette at the moment of the Revolution of 1830. General Boulanger excites a good deal of prejudice in society, but society in France counts less than it does in any other country in Europe. He is probably more popular with the Army than was the Prince-President in 1849 and 1850, and the dislike felt for him by a large number of the superior officers was felt also, and even more in- tensely, for the Prince-President. So popular is he with the private soldiers and, generally speaking, with the ma- jority of the electors, that it may be said that, in com- parison with him, no one else in France, with the doubtful exception of old M. de Lesseps, is popular at all. The politicians are afraid of him, and yet, somehow or other, he is never mentioned without a smile. In spite of his extra- ordinary popularity no one takes him quite seriously, and the newspapers are able to ignore his real standing with their readers and to go on writing of him as a ring-master, which character they pretend he resembles. It must be admitted that the circus element is not wanting in General Boulanger's composition. He is not only a much advertised man ; he has done a good deal to advertise himself. At the same time he is an able "War Minister, and the constant kindness which he has shown to the private soldier is probably an honest kindness, with a calculation of the good results of which towards himself he cannot with any fairness be charged. Although General Boulanger's popularity in France is far greater than that enjoyed by Gambetta in his lifetime, he has 60 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. never attained in European estimation the same position, nor does he deserve it. But in Germany there is an uneasy- feeling with regard to General Boulanger's popularity, and hy some Germans and by the German newspapers he is thought to be a War Minister who means war. There never was a greater mistake made than to think that General Boulanger is warlike. He seems to me to have done his duty as War Minister with no special view of undertaking an aggressive war, but, on the contrary, to have shown, in constantly limiting the expeditions intended to conquer so- called " colonies," a prudence which is laudable from every point of view. I cannot agree with those who think that the strong personality of General Boulanger in any way affects the situation of France in Europe and her probable future. A very considerable time ago I asked a friend of mine who was going to Paris to find out for me whether General Boulanger, who was beginning to excite attention, was a man, a soldier, a mountebank, or an ass. The report was of no great practical value because it was to the effect that the " Bonaparte without a victory " was at once all four. But although probably, for the reasons which I have given, an excellent War Minister, General Boulanger has shown by his last considerable speeches that his English blood is strong in him and that he is not a man, as the French say, "to break windows." I gave in my first chapter my reasons for thinking that while France is not likely to move first in a warlike sense, she is, for defensive purposes, very strong. There are many drawbacks to her position. The instability of her Govern- FRANCE. 61 ments, although it perhaps has some slight influence in pre- venting a cessation of financial waste, does not check her military preparations. The durability of the Republic itself is often called in doubt. The Republic may be looked upon as being more safe against internal revolution than would be any other form of government that could be set up, and as being, indeed, quite certain to endure as long as peace itself endures. A foreign observer of France must come now to believe that what are known as the old parties which compose "the Right" are very weak. M. Raoul Duval's attempt to form a new Conservative party which should thoroughly support the Republic proved a failure, because it did not suit the personal declarations of the leaders of the so-called Conservative party ; but nevertheless he expressed the view of almost all the reasonable men in the Conservative ranks. There are many of those who are ridiculously labelled " Orleanists " by the " Republicans," who say that, if they wanted a constitutional king at all, they would as willingly take M. Poubelle as the Comte de Paris. " M. Poubelle and his wife are popular," they declare ; " he is better-looking than the Comte de Paris, and she is nicer-looking than the Comtesse, and more French : they already live in the Pavilion de Flore, the temporary prefecture de la Seine, that is in the Tuileries, so that they would not have to move." But then these gentlemen, as may be gathered from their irony, though classed as Monarchists, really prefer the Republic. The division of the Monarchists into clerical Bona- partists, democratic and anti-clerical Bonapartists, Legi- timists and Constitutional Monarchists, some clerical and 62 THE PRESENT POSITION OE EUROPEAN POLITICS. some non-clerical, would have fatally weakened the Monarcliic party if it had not in any case been so weak as hardly to be worth taking into account. Those who for one reason or other, whether they represent what is called Orleanism or what is called Legitimacy, are in favour of the restoration of the House of France are far stronger than the Bona- partists, but they owe their nominal strength in the Chamber and the number of their supposed supporters among the electorate only to the fact that they poll a large Catholic vote, a large economic vote, and a large discontented vote — votes which are in no sense truly monarchical. The probability is, that if ever France should want a master, a new man will have a better chance than any member of the families that have reigned in France. As the Journal des Bibats has lately said, the moderate Con- servatives with the Comte de Paris at their head, if he pleases to be there, will separate from the Cassagnacs, who may find a saviour of society in the "dynasty of the Bou- langers." If Prince Victor should ever be within a measur- able distance of the French throne, it will not be through any help that his party gives him, but because he is a sharp, pushing, good-looking man. That there should exist persons desirous, as the Comtesse de Paris is said to be, of ascending or of sharing the French throne, is in itself a singular fact. It may be safely asserted that the existence of a king in France would at the present moment, and in any state of French feeling that can be foreseen, only serve to strengthen the revolutionary party. 'So government in France is likely, for any long time to- FEANCE. 63 gether, to be more conservative than the existing Republic has been during the last fifteen years, and all true French Conser- vatives admit in private, whatever language thej' may hold in public, that the best chance for French society, and the best chance for French religion, against anarchy or spoliation, lies in a moderate Republic. The consciousness of this would, if they were free agents, lead them to join and help the moderate Republican party. There is a great deal of ignorance upon this subject amongst ourselves. The natural regret which some feel for the fate of the Empress Eugenie, the ties of others to the excellent members of what is known in England as the Orleans family, even since it has become the House of France, and the somewhat widely-spread feeling of pre- judice in favour of a constitutional Monarchy as compared with a Republic, all concur, with irritation at certain recent political action on the part of France, to produce a feeling against the French Republic. That feeling very naturally takes the form of a belief that somehow or other the Republic is to be brought to an end. All governments in Europe, and several in America, are now in this position, that they may at any moment be upset by revolutionary forces, and the French Republic is not bej'ond the danger. It is conceivable that the Socialists may upset the Third Republic. It is also possible that they may indirectly overturn it by making the Government itself a Socialistic Government, and so producing a violent reaction. But in my opinion France is less exposed to immediate danger from the Socialists than are several of the Monarchies, and I expect to see tho Republic, unhurt either by Socialism on the one side, or 64 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. by Monarcliisin on the other, last as long as peace is maintained. Even in 1848 the weak Second Eepublic proved itself for a time better able to resist violence than was the Consti- tutional Monarchy, although the latter was no doubt weakened by the extreme limitation of the suffrage. No Republic would have fallen so easily as fell the Monarchy of July : — no Monarchy could have survived even for a time the days of June. At the moment of that remarkable insur- rection the Socialists were stronger in France and possessed abler leaders than at the present time, and it is an extraor- dinary testimony to the power even of a weak Republic that it should have crushed them, although indeed it perished later on. The French Third Republic is not likely to die of Socialism, or to die at all except by war. The English people are — thanks to the English press — so much better informed upon foreign affairs than are the people of other countries, and are in fact so well and fre- quently addressed upon the subject by thoroughly competent men, that only prejudice can account for the mistaken view which widely prevails in England among the wealthier classes as to the durability of the Republic. The expulsion of the Princes from France was all but unanimously, if not quite unanimously, condemned by the English Press. If it had been simply condemned as unjust, I should have had nothing here to say, because I am here not expressing opinions upon what is just or what is unjust, or giving my personal pre- ferences, but attempting only to state facts. The English newspapers did not content themselves with arguing that the FRANCE. 65 measure was unjust, but almost all of them went on to prove by the most conclusive arguments that it was inexpedient from the point of view of the French Republic. This is an excellent example of the class of delusions of which I speak. It has turned out that the French Republicans knew their own business best, and that the Conservative reaction, which a year ago was shown by the results of elections to have reached a considerable height, has been checked by the expulsion of the Princes. The French electors, as was notably displayed in the recent elections in moderate departments, have welcomed what they regard as a necessary act of national dignity and of commendable vigour. We saw just now that General Boulanger is not likely to be any especial danger to peace. Is he likely to be a danger to the Republic ? I have said that in the event of France . desiring a master, she is more likely to look to a new man than to a member of the late royal families ; and, when this is said, people begin to ask, with that attraction which is always felt for the element of personalitj'-, " Have you such a person in view ? " I have in view, not the present War Minister in particular, but the Generalissimo of the French forces in the event of war, whenever that may come. France is unlikely to be badly beaten in the next war, for the reasons which I have given in the article upon Germany, If, however, she is to have any chance of success, her Ministry must trust the best general that they can find, and let him virtually assume a dictatorship during the continuance of the war. A Generalissimo, thus placed with full powers at the 66 THE PEESENT POSITTON OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. head of an army of some four millions of men, may be suc- cessful. If so, all will admit that the Eepublic will run a danger through his success. If he is not successful, the strong probability is that France will not be driven back far within her froHtier, and to some extent will be able to hold her own, with an ever-increasing amount of suflfering caused by the pressure of taxation, and the withdrawal of men from agriculture and from trade. If the Generalissimo has been fairly cautious, is he not likely, even in these cir- cumstances, to be almost as formidable a person to his colleagues as he would be in the event of a successful war ? In case, however, of a severe defeat of France, the Republic would certainly be upset in favour either of the House of France, or of some individual who had been less compromised in the failure than had others ; some general, for example, who had made a gallant stand. I cannot but think that a calm observer must fear that war, either successful or unsuc- cessful, must be fatal to the French Republic. Not necessarily in name, however ; not even probably in name. The next man who upsets the French Republic will, if he is a prudent man, retain Republican forms. Under ordinary circumstances, that is to say, supposing that there is no war soon, General Boulanger will not rise higher than he has already risen. "With his popularity, with his face and figure, he would have a good chance of being elected President if the election of President were by a national vote; but he has little or none as matters stand, the election being made, as is well known, by both Houses sitting together in congress. Like the popularity of the FRANCE, 67 Prince-President in 1850, General Boulanger's popularity is one whicli lessens as you go upward in the social scale. Those who wish to know his weaker side will find it described in an article lately written by M. Cherbuliez (under his other name of Yalbert) on " M. Oambon." It was the circus- master's side of General Boulanger that came out in Tunis, but during the war of 1870 he showed that he was a brare colonel, and lately, as minister, he has proved that he pos- sesses both sense and prudence, though " he is only the more dangerous when he is prudent " is the observation made to me by Republican politicians. General Boulanger's popu- larity has survived his disavowal of the D'Aumale letters, but his enemies lately thought that they had him on the hip. An attack was made upon General Boulanger, M. Clemenceau and others with regard to the circumstances under which Dr. Cornelius Herz received the cross of a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour. This foreign gentle- man was stated to be a shareholder in La Justice and a subscriber to M. Cl^menceau's election fund, as well as the entertainer of General Boulanger. It seems to have been thought by the latter's enemies that he would not survive a financial scandal, but, unfortunately for them, they failed to prove his connection or that of M. Clemenceau with any discreditable financial transactions. No doubt there is a good deal of monetary corruption at Paris, for, with the exception of the short-lived Second Republic, the Restora- tion was the last pure governmental period in France. The Monarchy of July, the Second Empire, and the Third Republic have all been marked by considerable financial f2 68 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. scandals, but M. de Freycinet's enemies admit that his handS" are clean, and General Boulanger's opponents failed to show- that his connection with Dr. Herz, even assuming for the sake of argument that there was anything wrong about the schemes of Dr. Herz, was any closer than that of M. de Freycinet himself, or than that of Greneral Menabrea, the Italian Ambassador. The net result of the efforts of General Boulanger and of his enemies has been that, whilst he is still a young man, the General's popularity greatly exceeds that of the next most popular Frenchman, who has been many more years before the country. M. de Lesseps cannot well be Generalissimo ; General Boulanger could and would be Generalissimo if there were war at any short interval from the present time. Some suppose that there may be civil commotion in France, and that he may be the general who will put it down, and that in this way, as well as in war, there may be danger to Republican institutions. In my opinion that is not so. If there should be civil troubles, put down by force, the general who puts them down will have incurred violent resentment and will not be popular enough with the whole country to found for himself a dictatorship, supposing that he wished to do so. But with war it is different. Whilst an unlucky war might even restore the House of France, and a doubtful war might produce a dictatorship, a successful war would give to the Generalissimo who brought to France Alsace or Belgium, a supreme power veiled under Republican forms. It is certain that the next French Cassar will have no arch- chancellors in breeches and silk stockings about him, and it FRANCE. 69 is probable that he will be styled President of the Republic. But the virtual autocracy of a strong man is not by any means out of the question. In spite of General Boulanger's present popularity, it is quite possible that within a few years, as he grows older, he may be forgotten. In France men, even useful men, are thrown aside more easily and more completely than is the case with us in England. In England almost all the men able and willing to give useful service to their country are " in," or " out " and certain to " come in next time ; " otherwise they are " in the running," to use our most ex- pressive phrase. In France, not only are the declared partisans of the House of France, or of the Bonapartes, excluded, as well as men, however remarkable, who have failed, as, for example, M. OUivier, but even men such as M. L^on Say, perhaps the most eminent of French statesmen. In France, M. L^on Say seems to be looked upon as destined never again to hold power, for no sufficient reason that any Englishman can see. The men of small compromises and of expedients hold on the best, or those of extraordinary caution, like that three-times Minister,* " the little White Mouse." Given not the fact, but a belief on the part of the Presi- dent and of the more cautious of his advisers, that war would upset the French Republic, we must cease to wonder at the refusal of a formal alliance with Russia, and we must expect that, whatever may be the language used in various countries, peace will last. The understanding between * Written before 25th May, when he •was again called upon to foim a Ministry. 70 THE PEESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. France and Russia was last autumn strong enough, with- out any formal alliance, to produce in many respects the consequences of a real alliance. The pressure of the con- federates at Constantinople was immensely strong, and one noticeable fact about it was that, to judge by the attitude of the German Ambassador there. Prince Bismarck did not appear to mind it in the least. Twice within the last six months there suddenly arose the story of a Eusso- German alliance, which was believed, because not contradicted at Berlin or St. Petersburg, but only at Vienna. Just as there was in the autumn no formal alliance with France, so there was in the spring no formal alliance with Germany on the part of Russia. Prince Bismarck and the Russian Emperor both gain by the assertion being made, but Prince Bismarck must contrive to contradict it at Vienna, for he could not tolerate that disruption of the Austrian Empire which would be caused by the revelation of an alKance which, if complete and formal, would be really directed by Russia against the Austrian policy in the East. The Russians have set the report going at Constanti- nople that the English Conservatives now agree with the English Liberals that the possession of Constantinople by Russia would not be a danger to this country. They tell the Turks that England is now altogether indifferent to their fate, and that the only chance for them, if they wish to avoid absorption into Russia, is to be what is called good neighbours; that is, to allow Russia absolutely to direct their policy. With the apparent assent of Germany, the Sultan is rapidly coming to play the part of a Bey of FRANCE. 71 Tunis to Russia's France. At tlie same time the private relations between Paris and Berlin are not of the nature which might be expected from the recent coquetting between Paris and St. Petersburg. Whilst the first-class clerks whom the French Foreign Office sends to Berlin as Ambassadors now no longer draw the Foreign Minister's policy from the German Chancellor, yet there has been no apparent change in the good private relations which exist between the countries, both at Paris and at Berlin. Count Munster is not an ambassador in whom Prince Bismarck confides, and therefore it is the communications at the Berlin end which count ; but M. de Courcel met with no serious difficulties during his residence in Berlin, and the same has been the case, I believe, with M. Herbette. Although people in this country are inclined to flatter themselves that Germany must be really friendly to Great Britain at all times, yet even as late as when Lord Salisbury was Prime Minister in 1885, the relations between France and Germany were distinctly better than the relations between Germany and England. Sir E. Malet has been able to some extent to change this state of things, but it is a fact that for some years France was taking her policy from Berlin, whilst England was too proud to do so, and a good deal of friction was the result. The personal relations between Prince Bismarck and Lord Ampthill were always excellent, but Lord Ampthill was not allowed to bend the knee, and the dislike which his attitude occasioned fell not upon himself, but upon the country which employed him. Lord Eosebery was looked upon as being very German, and 72 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUEOPEAN POLITICS. his tenure of office coincided witli a great increase in the military spirit of France, which led to an attitude of in- dependence on the part of that Power. While no breach in the relations of Paris and Berlin has yet occurred, and while Germany will avoid one as long as possible, the relations with England have become more close. I see no occasion to modify the estimates of the relative aimed strengths of France and Germany, which I ventured to make in drawing some comparison between them in the first chapter. The French army is becoming more democratic, whilst the German army in this respect is not undergoing change. The one-year volunteer system in Germany is so carefully regulated that its effects upon all sides are excellent. In France, abuses have from the first crept in, and the consequence is that the system itself will be destroyed, and service for a uniform period made universal. The failure of the one-year volunteer system in France appears to show that the French, although both a warlike and a scientific nation, are behindhand in the combination of science and war, or the application of scientific principles to war. The small number of German one-year volunteers become in nearly all cases most valuable non-commissioned officers, or officers of reserve. This is not the case with the vastly larger number of one-year volunteers in France, and the impatience of the French character dis- plays itself in the probability that the system will be swept away instead of being modified until it becomes good. Some doubt has been expressed as to the accuracy of my figures. One writer thinks that a reduction of 40 per cent. PEAJS'CE. 73 should be made on the 4,000,000 Trench soldiers ; but a reduction of 40 per cent, on the actual figure, which is above 4,000,000, gives that 2,600,000 men of which I wrote as the real force. It is well known that on the twentieth day of war, which is the last day for complete mobilisation, France will have 1,200,000 in the front line, 400,000 in the depots, and all her fortresses full of men, without counting the Algerian and Colonial forces — figures from which the same total of 2,500,000 men is reached. Much criticism has been aroused in Belgium by what I have said of the military (not the political) prospect of an attack on France by Germany through Belgium. The Belgian writers who treat this subject, such as the editor of the chief organ of opinion at the capital, General Brialmont, and that other distinguished general who, previously to the appearance of my article of January last in the Fortnightly Review, had written the series of leading articles in the Revue de Belgique, but who, though signature is the rule in that periodical as in the Fortniglitly Review, preferred like myself to keep his anonymity, — all think the violation of Belgian neutrality almost certain, and difier from my view, where they differ at all, only because they think the danger is from both sides, and not from Germany alone. This difierence does not affect, unless to strengthen, the warning which I addressed to England. The enormous accumulation of supplies of every kind in the entrenched camp of Cologne is of itself enough in military eyes to prove the truth of what I said in the last chapter. Belgium is not disinterested, and it might be said that Belgian arguments are the arguments of alarmists. I 74 THE PRESENT POSIXION OF EUROPEAN' POLITICS. am content then to rely upon an almost universal consent o£ military opinion in disinterested countries. As regards political considerations, I would ask tliose who believe in the value of the " neutralisation " of Belgium to read the correspondence of 1870, at the time when Austria and Russia declined to support our action in defence of Belgium, until, France being hopelessly beaten, they found that it in- volved no responsibility. I would also refer them to the Prussian circular of Dec. 3rd, 1870, in which Prussia declared that the Royal Government would "no longer consider itself bound to any consideration of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy" (of Luxemburg) "in the military operations of the German army," and which contains illus- trations of the difficulty Luxemburg and even Belgium would experience in maintaining their neutrality in the event of another great war. France is forced to trust solely to her army and her navy for her strength, for she cannot rely upon friendships. The Emperor of Russia detests the French Republic, but is of course very willing to make a certain use of the military power of France for his own ends. The Sultan merely follows the Russian lead ; but where in Europe can we say that France now has real friends ? As regards governments, nowhere ; for the traditional friendship of Sweden for France is checked by the understanding between France and Russia, Sweden's hereditary foe. In the event of a general war, Sweden would be compelled to make choice between her old sympathies, and her desire to attack Russia in her own former province of Finland, and would probably be neutral. FRANCE. 76 as she was under even more powerful temptation during the Crimean War. Austria follows Grermany ; Italy is hopelessly estranged from France ; Spain is condemned to immobility by her internal circumstances and her geographical position. Spain is ruled — although this is one of the facts that are disguised from us by correspondents who are amenable to hospitality — ^by an unpopular, because a foreign, queen. The Spanish people are divided into Republicans and Indif- f erents, and the spirit of the country is upon the Republican side. France cannot find an ally in Spain, but, on the other hand, Germany will not be able to make Spain march so long as France resists the temptations which lead her to Morocco. Not only the most interesting to ourselves of questions which concern the friendships or the enmities of France, but the most important even from a French point of view, and the most difficult, is the question of her relations with England. So many are the points at which French and British interests come into contact in various parts of the world that conflicts between the two countries continually arise. Had the Monarchy of July, or the Second Empire, taken as little trouble to avoid circumstances of irritation as has been taken of late years by the Third Republic, there would have been war between the two countries in the middle of the present century. That there has not been war in recent years has been due to the strong peace feeling in England, and to the inward consciousness on the part of French Ministers that there is, underlying a good deal of hostility towards England, also a real peace feeling in France. 76 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. Sufficient causes of war have been continually arising, and they have not been dealt with in all cases with discretion. Take, for example, the New Hebrides. The conduct of the French Government in this matter has looked at times as though it were purposely intended to exasperate English feeling. In the Madagascar case the treatment of British subjects was of such a nature, that had the telegraph line to Tamatave been in existence, so that the facts had been published day by day in the English papers, war wpuld probably have broken out. But the first of all questions in men's minds when they talk of the relations of England and France is that of Egypt. I shall write on this question with all the moderation that I can command, because I know that if I say but half as much against the policy of France as has been said against it in leading French newspapers by leading French- men, I shall be thought to be yielding to national prejudice, and not to be writing with the impartiality which ought to be shown by one who professes to write of facts alone. The French will bear from Frenchmen — like M. "Weiss for example, " the first pen of France," as M. Gambetta called him when he made him despatch-writer to the Foreign Office — that which they will not bear from Englishmen. The editor of the Times cannot with impunity contrast the Germany of the day with the France of the day, somewhat to the disadvantage of the latter, or describe the German officer as walking among his men with the " demeanour of a god." Thus far does M. "Weiss go in his last book, and even in his reassuring preface he cannot say more for his FEAIfCE. 77 own country than tliat it is "not substantially inferior" to Germany. In this book, by the way, too, M. Weiss admits that which has never before I think been admitted in writing by a leading man in France, that Prince Bismarck had been, whenever he wished it, the real Foreign Minister of the French Eepublic. If I were to say but one-tenth of what M. "Weiss has said, I fear that if ever again I wished to visit Paris, and my identity were to become known, I might find myself conducted back between two constables to Boulogne or Calais. Let us try to appreciate the French position with regard to Egypt. Russia, France, and Turkey, are now pressing us to say how long we intend to stay there ; and we reply as we have replied for years, that we do not intend to stay per- manently, but that we do intend to stay until our work is done.* It is useless for us, so far as affecting French opinion goes, to say that France backed out of her share in the protection . of the Government of Egypt (after having, by suggesting the dual note, given that protection a militant character), and that she has refused to spend her money in preserving order there. It is open to the French negotiators to reply that they personally regret that their country did not take a more active part, but that the previous absten- tion cannot be allowed to affect the future. Now, England has by far the greatest interest in the Canal transit, and she has the same interest in the land transit through Egypt, because the land transit, which existed before the Canal, might replace Canal transit at the time of a * Written of course before the negotiation of May. 78 THE PRESENT POSITION OE EXJEOPEAN POLITICS. Chinese war or of an Indian insurrection, if the Canal were blocked, as by accident or pretended accident it might easily be. France, however, is attempting to raise an empire in the further East, she has military necessities arising out of her difficulties with Madagascar and with China, and she is not prepared to allow that the question of Egyptian transit is not also vitally interesting to herself. Looking to the splendid ports possessed by France upon the Mediterranean, and to the difficulty England would have in using the Mediterranean in a time of general war, it might even be argued that in certain eventualities Egypt might be of greater use to France than it ever could be to England. Stni, free transit has always been the object which England has had in view in Egypt ; and it will be remembered that in the famous conversation between the Emperor Nicholas and Sir Hamilton Seymour, the latter refused Egypt in the words that " English views upon Egypt do not go beyond the point of securing a safe and ready communication between British India and the mother country." In refusing a later offer of Egypt by Napoleon III., Lord Palmerston said, in words which ought to be remembered to his credit in these days of general spoliation, " How could we combine to become unprovoked aggressors, to imitate, in Africa, the partition of Poland by the conquest of Morocco for France, of Tunis for Sardinia, and of Egypt for England? and how could England and France, who have guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish Empire, turn round and wrest Egypt from the Sultan ? . ... As to the balance of power to be maintained by giving us Egypt, in TEANCE. 79 the first place, we don't want to have Egypt. . . . "We want to trade with Egypt and to travel through Egypt, but we do not want the burden of governing Egypt, and its possession would not, as a political, military, and naval ques- tion, be considered in this country as a set-off against the possession of Morocco by France." It will be seen that Lord Palmerston did not set the value of Egypt to this country high. In 1878 Lord Salisbury declared that we did not desire to establish any territorial settlement in Egypt, and similar declarations have repeatedly been made since the destruction of the joint control. The interest of this country in Egypt is the interest of free communication both by the Suez Canal, and, as an alternative, by land across the isthmus, and the interest of British trade. As thfe means to the end, we think it desirable that Egypt should continue to be indirectly part of the Ottoman Empire, and essential that no other Power should effect a settlement there. We think the honour of this country bound to the present Khedive, but France, which is also bound to him by a solemn declaration of her own suggestion, has, from time to time, proposed his deposition and the substitution for him of Prince Halim. Our interest in Egyptian finance is not a peculiar interest, and might be entirely provided for by general European stipulations. Under the Goschen control, it wiU be remembered, England had the higher position, but France was largely represented ; under Lord Salisbury's control, the English comptroller had still, at first, the chief place of authority, but there was a 80 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EITEOPEAN POLITICS. closer similarity between tlie functions of the two men ; and under Lord Salisbury's control as modified in November, 1879, the distinction between the two comptrollers ceased, and they became of equal standing. At Christmas, 1881, Eng- land and France declared together to the present Khedive that they considered his maintenance on the throne as alone able to guarantee the present and future good order and general prosperity of Egypt, in which England and France were equally interested, and they stated in menacing terms that the two Governments were closely associated in their resolve to maintain the present ruler by their united efforts against all causes of complication, internal or external, which might threaten him, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them. M. Gambetta, who had suggested this declaration, fell, and was succeeded by M. de Freycinet, who was opposed to armed intervention, and who, after long opposition, agreed too late to a naval demonstration by England and France and armed interven- tion by the Porte, having first proposed the deposition of the present Khedive, which was refused by England. M. de Freycinet attached much importance to the employment of Turkish troops not being mentioned, and he finally backed out, or was disavowed by his colleagues, a proceeding which indeed caused the revolutionary movement in Egypt to come to a head. After this he agreed to a small Anglo- French demonstration, but the French Chamber refused the money. That which followed is well known, and so is the fact that after the French occupation of Tunis the Sultan's alarm and FRANCE. 81 indignation at the proceedings of France were such that he also followed the example of the Emperor Nicholas and of the Emperor Napoleon III., in offering Egypt to this country, only to be once more refused. The Sultan has, indeed, throughout been of two minds, sometimes inclining to the view that it would be best for him to frankly recog- nise the fact that he has lost all real hold over both the Egyptian and the Arabian populations and to compound for tribute, and sometimes inclining to the view that it would be possible for him, after the English troops had quitted Egypt, to reassert there some actual authority. The intention of England when she went to Egypt to put down a military insurrection, was to leave that country as soon as possible. The delay in leaving was caused by Turkey's refusal to allow troops to be raised for the Khedive within the Turkish dominions, and by the diffi- culty of organising an Egyptian army that could stand alone. The proposal for the absolute annexation of the country which was strongly pressed by some persons in the autumn of 1882, was steadily resisted by Mr. Grladstone, and the policy was laid down of gradually withdrawing the army of occupation to Alexandria, and of reducing it to under 3,000 men, which, although it has been delayed by events in the Soudan, continues to be the policy of the present Government. The decision not to accept Egypt for ourselves had virtually been taken long before this time. The annexation" of Egypt, which would have been possible at any time between 1870 and 1875, or 1876, was set aside by the Conservative Government of 1874 — 80, in the G 82 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. successive steps by which they established the Anglo-French joint control, and recognised the high position of French interests, which they ultimately admitted to equal recogni- tion with our own. Another difficulty in the way of those who would indefi- nitely hold Egypt is the self-denying protocol of the Con- ference of the summer of 1882, while the strongest fact of all is that we have voluntarily but repeatedly informed the Powers that we intend to leave the country when our work is done. On the other hand, we cannot forget the rejection by an enormous majority of the French Chambers of the Bill making provision for carrying out the agreement to which even M. de Freycinet had come with us for a limited French concurrence in the military steps to be taken against Arabi in Egypt. It is of course held in England that by abstention from taking her part in the restoration of order in that country, France forfeited her rights. At the end of 1882 the proposal to give France a certain share in the Egyptian Government, although a comparatively small share, was rejected by France, which took up the position that after our intervention in Egypt the institutions which had been upset revived, and amongst others the Anglo- French control. The French Government were on strong •ground in maintaining that obligations regularly entered into by three States could not properly be abolished or modified without the concurrence of all the contracting O parties. The position of England was that the appointment of the comptrollers was the act of the Khedive, and that there was no engagement that the control should be per- FEANCE. 83 petually maintained. The control was abolished under French protest, and has disappeared for the last four years. In the summer of 1884 it will be remembered France offered to renounce the idea of re-establishing the dual control, undertaking also not to substitute a French for the British occupation, nor to send French troops to Egypt without a previous understanding with England ; in return for which England was to express her willingness that the withdrawal of British- troops from Egypt should take place at the beginning of 1888, provided that the Powers should then be of opinion that such withdrawal could take place without risk to peace and order. These arrangements were to be subject to the success of financial proposals to be made by England to the Conference ; but the Conference itself broke down. The financial views of the English and the French were laid upon the Conference table, and subse- quent experience has shown that the French were more nearly right than ourselves. In connection with the Conference of 1884, the English Government announced its intention of proposing a schemf for the neutralisation of' Egypt on the basis of the principles applied to Belgium. It is probable that if the English troops ever leave Egypt, that country will, in spite of the objec- tions of the Sultan, be declared an independent and per- petually neutral State, bound to observe neutrality towards all other States, and placed under the guarantee of the con- tracting parties. The shadow of connection with Turkey and the payment of tribute to Turkey are not incon- sistent with neutrality, as is shown by the case of the g2 84 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. Lake district of Savoy, and other cases wHcli might be adduced. The present position of the question is, that when the French ask us to name a date for leaving Egypt, we reply that it is impossible for a weak native government to rule the country so long as the low-class Europeans who inhabit Alexandria in great numbers, and in lesser degree the other towns, cannot be dealt with by the ordinary law ; and as it is known that the French object to modify the Capitulations so long as we remain in Egypt, we in turn charge them with doing nothing to facilitate our leaving it, but on the contrary with making the difficulties which are the cause of our staying there. As long ago as 1857 this question of Europeans of bad character in Egypt "had become urgent, and it is a curious fact, though only historically curious, that the opposition to proper police control over low- class Europeans in Egypt came originally from England. It is to be feared that a subject very important in itself is being used now upon both sides deceptively. As to the duration of the English occupation, there is this thing to be said, that, so long as the French violently denounce the occupation, it is likely to continue. Some of the more moderate and more reasonable of the French news- papers have themselves pointed out that England went to Egypt with the consent of Europe to re-establish order ; that she went alone and at some risk and with much cost, and, indeed, they might add that we asked first France and then Italy to go with us, and went alone only after our invitation had been refused by both; refused, in the case of the FEANCE. 85 former, by the Chamber after acceptance by the Govern- ment. These moderate journals argue that the English must judge for themselves whether it is yet safe for them to leave the country which they undoubtedly mean some day to leave ; that it would be a folly for France to court refusal by asking questions too definite in form, and a still greater folly to fight for such a cause. These journals have pointed out the extraordinary reversal of French policy which is involved in the proposal to use the Turks to morally drive England out of Egypt, France having always been through- out her history the most reluctant of all the Powers to admit the existence of Turkish sovereignty in Egypt. Is France willing, they ask, to restore the supremacy of the Sultan in Tunis or Algeria ? It is indeed true that the French agitation against the English occupation of Egypt, which reached its height in November last, may well be pleasing to Russia, and has awakened illusions for the future, as well as cynical thoughts about the past, in the Sultan's mind. The class of feelings which it has aroused in Turkey finds expression in harmless notes to the British Government, which I take it are hardly read, although they are occasionally replied to. The feeling aroused in Russia by the action of France may possibly bode more danger to European peace, because although there is no alliance between Russia and France, yet if France backs all the proceedings of Russia in Bulgaria, Russia in return will find herself forced to back all the proceedings of France with regard to Egypt, and the result may be some wound to Btitish pride which conceivably may lead to war. Except as 86 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. regards Eussia and Turkey, France of course only increases her isolation by her Egyptian policy. Italy is forced if pos- sible farther away from France, whilst Austria and Germany remain indifferent, or think only of themselves. It would almost seem as though no real calculation of interest presided over the policy of the French Foreign Of&ce. Provided that France can show herself able to make a sufficient noise in the world, it -would seem as though French politicians were indifferent to the driving of Italy and England into the arms of Germany and Austria while France secures only the approval of Turkey and the Platonic alliance of Eussia. Clearly French politicians do not adopt that elementary maxim of diplomacy vi^hich rivals in simplicity the "Ifever prophesy unless you know" of daily life; namely, "Never make a fuss unless you see your way ahead." Obviously, France, in telling England to leave Egypt, only postpones the date of the evacua- tion. Lord Eandolph Churchill, whose power, so long as he terrifies the Tories by sheer energy, and paralyses the Liberal party by receiving Mr. Chamberlain's support, it is difficult to over-estimate, does not, unless he has strangely and suddenly changed his views, believe in the expediency of a British occupation of Egypt, much less in the necessity. But Lord Eandolph Churchill is an Opportunist even more distinctly than a peace-loving Democrat, and he knows that the English will not leave Egypt as long as France bids them do so, so that he will probably not oppose Lord Salisbury's policy. The net result of the French demand is simply to court refusal, and drive England into alliance with Germany, Austria, and Italy. PRANCE, 87 The real value of a position in Egypt, whilst it is admit- tedly important as regards an Indian rising or a war with China, is easily exaggerated. In a great war in which France was against us, or in which Italy (though, in the present circumstances of Italian friendship, this may be neglected) was one of a coalition of hostile Powers, the Suez Canal would be useless. (It is practically impossible to run past France and Corsica on the one side and Algeria and Tunis on the other, and to command the Mediterranean suffi- ciently to convoy troops, supplies and goods, while keeping our command in the Channel and patrolling the seas of the whole world.) "We cannot, in short, safely carry troops through the Mediterranean against either Italy in a combina- tion or France alone, and this whether Russia be or be not at Constantinople, and be or be not at war with us. In a war in which France was against us, it may safely be asserted that France could not communicate with her Eastern posses- sions at all, and we with ours only by way of the Cape, and that the Suez Canal, as regards belligerents, would virtually be closed. But nations do not fight for points which are vital and neglect all points which are not. Nations generally fight for sentiment; and it is certain that in the present frame of the British mind and state of the British temper we shall not go out of Egypt so long as France orders us to go. The raising of the Egyptian question has confirmed the prospects of peace, by placing on the one side four Powers and on the other side two units. In the next chapter I may have to consider whether an arrangement between England 88 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. and Russia is or is not possible, and whether Europe is likely to arrive at a lasting peace based on the isolation of France. Since the raising of the Egyptian question by France, Germany has ceased to find it necessary to proclaim a constant willingness to help French interests in all parts of the world. The change was not coincident with the return of the Conservatiyes to power in Great Britain. If it had been, we should have been incKned to ascribe it to the dislike felt by Prince Bismarck for some English Liberal politicians. But while three years ago Prince Bismarck by no means completely endorsed our Egyptian policy, and occasionally joined with France to slight us, as he also did at one time as regards the Congo ; and although he backed up French aggression in the case of the New Hebrides, yet the change which took place on his coming to an agreement with us about Zanzibar — an agreement distasteful to France and made without consulting her in advance — was rather coinci- dent with the revival of strong feeling between England and France about the Egyptian question than with the change of government. Even after the present Government came into power we seemed to be floundering between the hostility of France and the hostility of Germany. France was flout- ing us about the New Hebrides, and Germany was openly ridiculing us through her official press. It pleased Mr. Ashmead Bartlett to ascribe the isolation of England as well as her feebleness to Mr. Gladstone, but it must be admitted by any fair observer that its causes lay deeper than party. We seemed unable to mollify either France or Germany, and yet still to want the one or the other as our friend, and to be FRANCE. 89 without a friend in the whole world. It looked as though Italy were our only friend when Mr. Gladstone was in power, but as though we had none at all when he was succeeded by Lord Salisbury. Suddenly all this was changed, and we became firm friends not only once again with Italy but also with Austria, and through Austria with Germany. This change may partly have been aided by wise policy on Lord Salisbury's part, but the most important factor in producing it was aggression on the part of Russia and aggressive lan- guage on the part of France — the action of Russia in Bul- garia, and the language of France upon the question with which we are here concerned. If England had been inclined to let the Egyptian debt take care of itself; to insist during the occupation on defying the Capitulations, as French generals would have defied them ; to take her own course, which she firmly believes to be the wise and scientific course, as to quarantine ; to insist on simple justice as regards the taxation of foreigners, France would have grumbled, but probably would not have fought, and Egypt would have been the better for the action of England and none the worse for the grumbling of France. England did none of these things. Throughout the occupa- tion she has been courteous and, internationally speaking, law-abiding to the verge of weakness. On only one occasion has she allowed of the faintest infraction of international agreement, and then under the pressure of necessity, and her action was immediately succeeded by an apology and explanation, and condoned by the general opinion of Europe. The French, instead of quietly holding the English Liberal 90 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPBA.N POLITICS. party to its declarations, and, through it, the country, noisily stepped in and greatly increased the difficulties in the way of withdrawal. The Conservative party in England would have left to the Liberals the unpopularity, whenever they should next come in, of actually quitting Egypt, and so risk- ing a fresh rising, or the trouhle of carrying out the arrange- ments for neutralisation. But, under the rumour of Erench menace, the neutralisation scheme of the Liberals, with any personal leaning towards it of Lord Randolph Churchill, temporarily vanished, and both parties (pace Mr. Labouchere) were for the illogical but safe status quo. " II n'y a que le provisoire qui dure," and it looks as though a temporary occupation had been given a longer life by the recent lan- guage of France and Turkey, and by the demonstration of the existence of a Franco-Eussian understanding at Con- stantinople. Powers and parties are human, and self-interest itself is often a less strong human motive than the desire to annoy one's neighbours. Bentham somewhere proves that there is such a thing as disinterested malevolence, and I fear that if it exists at all it is occasionally to be discovered in nations, at all events as highly developed as in the prover- bial dog in the manger. There are in England a great number of persons who are persuaded that the military occu- pation of Egypt is a source of strength to England. But a large, majority of these, who are themselves not a majority of the electorate, are persuaded that we are bound by promises voluntarily made to Europe that the occupation is to be temporary, and for practical purposes these count on the side FRANCE. 91 of the persons yfho are against tte occupation. France her- self has greatly increased the number of those who will strain a point to avoid giving immediate eflfect to our promises, and must have increased the number of those who persuade them- selves that the remaining in Egypt is a British interest. If France would help us in Egypt; if she would strengthen the hands of such men as was M. Barrere, as is M. d' Aunay, in resisting the selfish action of individual Frenchmen at Cairo, when they behave in a manner really hostile to the higher interests of the French nation ; if the French Grovern- ment would give up the Capitulations and replace them by a proper system of police and a just criminal law ; if we were aided and not thwarted — evacuation or neutralisation at an early date might indeed become possible. So different has been French action, that many, after seeing M. Barrere unable to cope with the JBospJiore Egyptien, and M. d' Aunay in later times forced to support his compatriots, jump very wrongly to the conclusion that M. Barrere, as well as M. d' Aunay — that,, in fact, the French Consul-General as such — must be the centre and soul of French resistance to the occupation. Both M. Barrere and M. d' Aunay are very able men, neither of them perhaps too much burdened with pedantic principle, while both of them speak and write English perfectly, and have lived long in England, which is a help towards understanding English ways and modes of thought. M. Barrere indeed is a man who found himself equally at home on the barricades supporting the Commune at the age of twenty and, at the age of thirty, on the European Commission of the Danube, 92 THE PEESENT POSITION OP EUEOPEAN POLITICS. patronising aristocratic Austria herself, a man to whom English is so familiar that a drawing-room at Albert Gate, when he already held the rank of minister, once presented the singular spectacle of a French ambassador and a French minister discussing between themselves in the English tongue, into which, in the course of their conversation, they had uncon- sciously dropped, the problem how their country might best get the English out of Egypt. M. d'Aunay inherits from his direct ancestor Lepelletier a habit of courteous give and take, and speaks and writes English, if not with the British vigour of M. Waddington and M. Barrere, at least with great skill. These men understand how to get the English out of Egypt and how to keep them there, and if they have had to keep them there, it is because persons in France, incompetent to judge of policy, have imposed on them, as well as on their masters, a line of action of which they see the folly. Some of the Foreign Ministers of France of recent years have been of the calibre of chairmen of the Metropolitan Board, but M. de Freycinet was a cautious statesman of European fame, and whatever faults he may have had, knew perfectly — as well as M. Barrere, whom he detested, or as M. d'Aunay, whom he trusted — how mistaken the policy was which he was forced to pursue. The Opportunist politicians, or successors of Gamhetta, composed the party which was most active in the anti-Eng- lish outcry. Just as, the moment after their leader died, they advocated alliance with that Russia which he abhorred and against which he looked to Germany to protect the world ; so, while Gamhetta followed the earlier statesmen of France TEANCE. 93 in detesting tlie presence of the Turk in Africa, and was a representative of the Frenchmen who backed Mehemet Ali, his party, immediately after he was gone, began to prompt the Turk to express to England his desire to return to Cairo. The change in the Egyptian policy of France, when she began to back up the Sultan's supremacy, is perhaps more extraordinary in suddenness and completeness than any modern national change of front except England's when Lord Beaconsfield offered Herat to Persia in 1879. It is assumed by the English press that the word was passed by the French Government to the French press to attack England about Egypt. The Temps, however, which is the organ of the Foreign Office, was very moderate in its language. The most violent papers are not under Government influence. This violence, as I have shown, was calculated to do harm to the interests of France, as M. de Freycinet, who is a wise man, must have been well aware. I believe, therefore, that, so far from being desired, it was inconvenient to the Govern- ment of France. The French Government lagged behind public opinion in place of leading it, and the Government position, as expressed to England, was as follows: that France, which made the Canal, and has a large amount of money invested in it, and which is also historically and sentimentally interested in Egypt, does not desire to press England to leave Egypt at once, but merely reminds her of her promise to leave it, and asks, not for a fixed date, but for some sort of approximation to a date at which the Eng- lish troops will leave. France is willing to engage that French troops shall not go to Egypt, and desires to enter into 94 THE PEESEXT POSITION OF EUKOPEAN POLITICS, an engagement to secure the absolute neutrality of tte coun- try, or to carry out the restoration of the " status quo ante Arabi," but with some security taken against the Arabis of the future. The moderation of the French demands is, however, the result of failure to bring pressure to bear upon England, except, indeed, at Constantinople, and it is possible that, if French views had received more support, the language offi- cially employed would have been much more emphatic. In the meantime France does not help us to withdraw. She protects seditious newspapers published by French subjects ; she insists upon maintaining to the letter the Capitulations, by which the administration of Egypt, not only by England, but after England is gone, should England incline to go, is rendered dangerous in the extreme. At the bottom of the unwise and somewhat illogical action of France there lies, as there almost always lies at the bottom of unwise acts on the part either of nations or of individuals, a fit of temper. France knows that, if England was to go to Egypt at all, France should have accompanied her. France agreed to go, but the Chamber rejected the agreement. It was M. de Lesseps who really prevented France from doing that which she had promised to do, and, after the collapse of Arabi, leading French politicians blamed M. de Lesseps for misleading them as to Arabi' s power. And so the French, profoundly dissatis- fied with the inevitable consequences of their own inaction, have striven to avenge their mistake by thwarting the Eng- lish in Egypt ; and every check to the French arms, whether in Madagascar or Tonquin, has but intensified their malevo- lence. Mutual sulkiness on the part of France and England FRANCE. 95 in regard to Egypt is likely to continue. France does not mean to fight for Egypt, and yet is not satisfied to have been ousted from it. And England will stay there, although nearly all Liberals and many Conservatives desire the neutra- lisation of the country, just because England will not leave Egypt under pressure, and there will continue to be pressure enough exerted by France to make it impossible for England to leave. The troops will be brought from Cairo to Alexan- dria, and be reduced to under three thousand men, but com- plete evacuation will not take place. In the writings of French newspapers upon Egypt there is a great deal of exaggeration. The popular belief in France, which is not shared by the men who control her destinies, is that England is an annexing Power, anxious to lay hands upon all possible portions of the world, and checked only here and there by France and Germany. As a matter of fact, for many years past, with the exception of the movement upon Burmah, which was caused by the action of the French agent there, England has made no annexations except in self-defence against the annexation poh'cy of Germany or France, and has declined to annex the Cameroons, Zanzibar, and Egypt itself, not to speak of other countries, over and over again.* I have assumed that France, however much she grumbles, does not intend to fight for Egypt. If France intended even to risk war for Egypt without actually provoking it, she would take one step which, is always in the minds of French politicians. She would take England out of the most favour- * The recent annexation of Zululand has been caused solely hy the neces- sity of protecting the natives against the Boers. 96 THE PEESENT TOSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. able and place her in the most unfavourable column of the French tariff, at the same time allowing free entry into France for certain classes of yarns which are absolutely needed in the French cotton-spinning industry. Everything else that France absolutely needs and that she at present gets from us, she could, it is argued, get from Germany and Belgium, and a very slight rise in the price of certain goods would only be an inconvenience of the same nature as the inconvenience which she bears already in the form of duties for the sake of protection. Another step that France would take would be to raise some pretext in Egypt for inter- ference, and French troops would be landed, nominally as against Egypt, at some point on the Egyptian coast, with a declaration of perfect friendliness towards England, but with the intention that they should remain there as long as our troops remained. The friendship of Italy and our joint naval power prevent all chance of a sudden attack by France on Egypt, and make it impossible for France to hope to hold Egypt in the event of war. It is true, however, that we ourselves in that case should derive little or no benefit from its possession. But no strength of our own and no strength on the part of Italy could prevent a landing of French troops in Egypt on pretence of some violation of the Capitulations against a French subject, and it is not very easy to see how a termination could be put to a virtual joint occupation except by that neutralisation which France herself demands ; a neutralisation, the name of which scares people here, though in my opinion, if properly secured, it would ofEer nothing but advantages to this country. PEANCE. 97 There is another view of the action of France with respect to Egypt, which is, that when M. de Freycinet talked of Egypt it was the Canal that he really had in view, and that, knowing as he did that he would not be able by pressure to get his way in regard to Egypt, he must have meant only to get it with regard to the Canal. The most authoritative statement of the French views upon the subject is M. de Freycinet's own, when he said that England and Italy had put forth one view and that France had put forth another, but that the other Powers insisted that England and France should agree, and that he hoped that it would not be long before that agreement was reached. The only difficulty in settling the question of the Canal is caused by the fact that the Conservative Cabinet somewhat hesitates to settle it for fear of Parliamentary attack. Everybody seems to mean the same thing with regard to the Canal. There is no real difference of opinion upon the subject itself, but only a divergence of language between the proposals which England and France have made respectively. Proposals to secure by international agreement the freedom of the Suez Canal at all times for all ships, whether of trade or war, have been made by England at least twice. Now France can come to an agreement with England upon this subject whenever she pleases, and if she uses language of insistence it is only for the purpose of breaking through a door which is already open, so as to be able to celebrate a triumph. The other Powers, with the exception of Russia, which wUl do what is most agreeable to France, in order to keep up the shadow of an alliance, think the English H 98 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. Canal proposals sufficient and satisfactory, and the only difficulty lias been a difficulty about words, and the only reason why there has been no agreement has been because there was no real desire for agreement, inasmuch as each Government is afraid of its Parliament. The statement which has been repeatedly telegraphed to various journals that England declined to entertain French proposals for a neutralisation of the Canal which would prevent the passage of the English fleets in time of war, is a mere confusion, for France has never made and never intends to make any such proposition. The Powers agree that the Canal should be made free to all, and should be protected against blockade, but no one of them desires to limit its use by excluding ships of war. The disputes about words have been formidable, no doubt, and have been intensified by the pecu- liarity of the problem, for there is no diplomatic question in the world similar to that of the Suez Canal. According to a witty remark ascribed to Baron Solvyns, the Belgian minister at this Court, a diplomatic career consists in passing one's life in explaining to others things which you do not understand yourself, and there has been a good deal of that kind of diplomacy employed upon the questions relating to the Suez Canal. It is rather a startling statement, but one which is perfectly true, that the Canal has been neutralised from the first, and is neutral at this moment. Its neutrality is read into the original firman by a reference to the Act of Concession. The action taken by France during the Franco- German .war constituted an admission of this neutrality, and was con- PRANCE. • 99 sistent with something more than that which we have always meant by it, namely, equal freedom for the use of the Canal by all Powers. In the Russo-Turkish war, Russia engaged not to bring the Canal within the sphere of operations. M. de Lesseps at one time made a proposal for the neutralisation of the Canal in terms which were approved by the French Government, but to which the English Government saw objections which they did not explain. After Arabi's insurrection, further plans for dealing with the Canal were discussed between the Governments, but an ambiguity arose from the use of the word neutralisation in two different senses. England at one time rejected a suggestion of neu- trality, understanding that neutrality meant the closing of the Canal against all vessels of war at all times, which was never, as a matter of fact, intended by France ; but England proposed as her own, in a subsequent communication, a measure precisely similar to that which had been proposed by France in 1877. The English proposal is that whilst all ships at all times should be allowed to pass through, there should be a limit of time as to ships of war of belligerents remaining in or about the Canal ; that no hostilities should take place in the approaches to the Canal; that no fortifications should be erected on or near it ; and that the Canal and its neigh- bourhood should not be made the base of military operations. I repeat that there is no real difference of opinion between England and France, and that an arrangement could be concluded at any moment if there were on both sides a wish to come to terms. h2 100 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. There are a good many diflferences between England and France besides tbose which concern Egypt and the Suez Canal. In the New Hebrides there was a violation of an engagement with us, as well as that complete disregard of native rights which has now become usual on the part of European Powers. In Madagascar, where the Grovernment of England have decided not to interfere, there is carried on in the name of France a violation of every principle which keeps civilised mankind together, an outrage which rouses the indignation of English High Churchmen, Congrega- tionalists, and Quakers, who are all strongly represented in the Madagascar missions, and attracts to their views upon the subject the sympathy of members of other religious bodies. Moreover the formation of a French military esta- blishment at Diego Suarez or British Sound, is regarded by English naval men as directed against this country. On the Upper Niger the French are coming into conflict with the interests of the British traders established on that river, as they are also upon the Congo. The French are annexing other islands in the Pacific besides the New Hebrides group, and are threatening to use them for convict stations, to the intense dissatisfaction of our Australian colonists. In. some of these cases France has annexed islands the independence of which she had engaged herself to this country to respect, as for example, Eaiatea. On the other hand, in China as in Egypt, and as in Madagascar indeed, but that Madagascar is an evident case of wolf and lamb, the French consider FEAKCE. 101 ttat they have grievances against us. In the case of the Newfoundland fisheries and " French Shore " questions, each country finds grave fault vrith the other. It is necessary for us to examine these questions at some little length, because out of almost any one of them war might easily arise. ( The French nation is not united upon /* these questions. The most powerful newspapers in France by no means adopt the "Colonial policy." M. Clemenceau, one of the strongest of French politicians, condemns it, as it is condemned also from the other side by the Monarchical Opposition, and by independent financial reformers. \ With a deficit in every Budget for the last four years, which has risen from two millions sterling, five years ago, to ten mil- lions sterling last year, and about ten millions this, France cannot afford to pour out gold upon Tonquin, and Mada- gascar, and Senegal, and other pestilential places, which will never bring in a tithe of what they have cost. The " Colonial policy " greatly weakens the military position of France in Europe, and disorganises her finances, while it compromises the efficiency of the only thing which really counts in modern European war, the rapidity of the mobilisa- tion of the reserves. The " Colonial policy " has obviously increased the work to be performed by the French army and navy in time of war, and has given hostages to England, who would be able to cut the communication between France and all these so-called colonies, as soon as war had been de- clared. France has acted in Tunis in a way that has irritated Italy ; she has incurred the lasting resentment of the Australian colonies of Great Britain, which one day will 102 THE PEESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. form the third Power in the world, and she has permanently- alienated that which will probably be one of the strongest military empires — China. The Tonquin policy of France has increased the chance of China joining England when- ever France joins Russia, and a Chinese alliance in the Pacific is certainly not to be despised. The French Colonial policy has always been a very costly one. French subjects in the French dominions outside of Algeria and France cost France about £1 per head per year. British subjects in the British dominions outside of the TJnited Kingdom cost us about 2d. per head per year, exclu- ding indirect naval expenditure upon both sides. The French Colonial policy from the time of Colbert to the present day has been closely connected with the French doctrines of protection, and the dominant idea in connection with the extension of French rule is to place difierential duties upon foreign goods. In some cases, but not in all, a religious persecution on a small scale also plays its part, and the French flag, which does not protect Catholic interests at home, gives them something more than an equal chance abroad. I suppose it is useless to speak of the rights of the native inhabitants of the countries which are annexed by France. Looking to our own past, it does not come well from an Englishman to do so. But we may hope that when the historian of the future comes to deal with the times in which we live he will point out that England in this respect grew better whilst France grew worse. It is necessary to bear in mind, in considering the subject, that the French colonies are all of what we should call the Crown colony FRANCE. 103 type, and that none of them resembles Canada or Australia or the Cape in getting its own way. Where the supposed commercial interests of France come into conflict with the interests of the colonists, as seen by the colonists themselves, colonial interests have to give way, and where the colonists have desired to buy in the cheapest market, the French have frequently compelled them to buy, by means of differential duties, the dearer goods of France. The present difficulties between France and China, in which the French suppose, rightly or wrongly, that the Chinese have us behind them, have grown gradually out of the difficulty which arose during the Tonquin war. English sympathies will naturally go with China in her desire herself to undertake, in concert with the Holy See, the protection of Catholic interests. We know how in the past these real interests have been placed in jeopardy by their connection with the political interests of France. We know that on the whole the London Missionary Society has succeeded perfectly of recent years in dealing directly and peacefully with the Chinese ; and we desire to see the causes of future quarrel lessened, as they would be if Catholic interests in China received the peaceful protection of the Vatican rather than the gunboat protection of the French Republic. In the long run, China, upon this subject, is certain to get her way. China is now too strong for France to take Pekin without a struggle which would greatly reduce her continental fighting power. But France could, single-handed, still take Pekin, because the Chinese will not yet make an intelligent modern use of their splendid men, and their officers are still silly beyond 104 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. description. "War between France and China, if a real war, and not the ambiguous state of things which prevailed on a recent occasion, would be so serious for us, with eighty per cent, of the China trade in our hands, as against the three per cent, which France possesses, that it may be considered that an effective blockade of the Chinese coast could not be enforced by France without the certainty of such irri- tation arising on our side that we ourselves should be drawn into the vortex. As the French have something to say for themselves upon the Egyptian, so, too, with regard to the Chinese question. It is true that our influence at Pekin is great, and that it is not of a description very friendly to the French. If our influence there is menaced, it is not by the influence of France ; and it is not a Frenchman who is likely to obtain the key of the position by becoming the future Tsung Shui "Wu Sze, or Inspector-General of Imperial Maritime Customs. As regards the French position in non- Algerian Africa, it is well known that vast sums of money have been spent in Senegal in the attempt to lay out a railroad towards the Upper Niger, and much also has been expended in trying to found an empire upon the Congo, efforts which Grermany has done all in her power to promote, because she agrees with English observers as to the weakening effect upon the French power in Europe of the new French colonial policy. In the case of the Niger, French and British interests at one time came sharply into conflict, but the "West African Conference held at Berlin in 1884 laid down the respective spheres of influ- ence and established the principle of commercial freedom for FRANCE. 105 the Niger, so tnat difficulties are at an end for the present. At the same time if the French choose to go on spending sufficient money, they will ultimately, although at yast cost, reach Timbuctoo both from the side of Senegal and from that of Algeria. The French expenditure in the district is, however, probably connected in some degree with hidden designs against the empire of Morocco, which form a source of possible European complications for the future, inasmuch as Spanish pride would be greatly wounded by the conquest of Morocco by the French, whilst England possesses in Morocco a considerable trade. As regards the Congo, I know that I attempt to swim against the stream of English opinion in regard to the help given by this country to the exclusion of Portugal from what I belieTe to have been her ancient possessions upon the Congo coast, and I also diflfer from many in England in thinking that the International Asso- ciation, which has now become the personal Congo kingdom of the King of the Belgians, has by no means shown by its past that it was any more worthy than Portugal, which was not thought worthy, to receive the control of yast districts in the interior. While by the policy of the West African Conference and by the assistance given by Prince Bismarck both to France and to the King of the Belgians in 1884, France has been admitted to the Congo on one bank, an enormous district in the heart of Africa has been made over to the King of the Belgians, with, however, the happy con- dition of freedom of trade. Engagements between two Powers with respect to African annexation, or, indeed, with regard to any of the countries 106 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. of the world whicli are what is styled " unoccupied," that is, occupied by the black people to whom they properly belong, are apt to be of very little use. For example, in 1862 there was an agreement between England and France that neither would interfere with the independence of Zanzibar, but Germany has now taken away the greater portion of the Sultan's nominal territory there. And there is always this risk of a third Power stepping in. On the other hand, whatever the French may think, English interests in Africa are secured when freedom of trade has been secured, and the extension of the principle laid down in the conference at Berlin in 1884 would suit England better than increase of territorial responsibilities. These considerations leave out of view questions of right or wrong ; but while England has not in these matters always acted upon the principles which at all events a large portion of her public men. have professed, in the case of other countries there has never been much desire to take questions of ethics into considera- tion in dealing with weaker peoples. In the days of the Holy Alliance, when Christianity was nominally laid down as the guiding principle of the great Continental Powers, it was nevertheless England which had invariably to take the first step in all matters which concerned the suppression of slavery and of the slave-trade, and her suggestions were viewed frequently with as little private favour, whatever may have been the public language held, as is extended now by Prince Bismarck to English views upon the subject of Turkish reform. Just as England led the way with regard to the slave-trade, and was followed FEANCE. 107 for very shame by the rest of Europe, let us hope that now that her own desire for annexation has passed away, she will gradually be able to induce the Continental Powers to show some small regard for the independence of the dark-skinned races. The real interest of Europe as such is the same as the interest of civilisation, that these countries should be open to healthy trade, not a trade confined to arms and liquor. But to the Protectionist Powers open trade has hitherto meant British trade, and it is a remarkable fact that Germany should have had the prudent courage in 1884 to make a new depar- ture in proclaiming herself the champion in such countries of free trade. France, however, in her annexations has always in view the exclusion of British and German trade by means of differential duties, and this fact heightens the regret with which her aggressions in Madagascar and other places are viewed by the English people. So long as the dark-skinned races are treated as they now are, it must be sorrowfully admitted that in the foreign affairs of the Powers, as too often in the business affairs of individuals, that common Christianity disappears which is practised in some, at least, of the daily affairs of life by most men in the United Kingdom and the United States and Hussia, and in a less degree in Germany and the Austrian Empire. No one asks what is right, what is just towards natives. All look only to what is selfishly best from the narrowest and most grasping point of view. Of Madagascar I need hardly speak, the circumstances are so well known in England, and there is the less necessity to dwell on them, because it seems improbable that France will 108 THE PEESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. for the present make a serious attempt to carry into effect the designs which all the writers upon her colonial policy openly proclaim. There is, however, the fact to be borne in mind that the English Government have evidently decided not to resent a Prench occupation of Madagascar, or even the creation of a Gibraltar at British Sound. Bat, in the case of some of the French annexations in the Pacific, there is a direct interference not only with the interests but with the treaties of Great Britain, and also with the interests of the Australian colonists. Of such annexations it is necessary to say a word. The Australian colonists have for years protested against the transportation of French convicts to the penal settlement in New Caledonia. The first great quarrel between Australia and France was caused by a custom of the Governor of New Caledonia, who used to grant free passages to time-expired convicts intending to proceed to the British Australian colonies, a custom which somewhat reminds one of a former practice of the Channel Islands, when they transported their convicts to Southampton. The Australian colonies have fol- lowed the lead set by Victoria, a free colony from the first in resenting bitterly the effects of the transportation system. Victoria it was that stopped the transportation of English convicts, first to Tasmania, afterwards to "West Australia, and thus, at last, altogether. In 1882 there were frequent debates in France upon the subject of the transportation of habitual criminals, which had been strongly recommended by M. Gambetta, and the rumour spread that it was to the New Hebrides they were to be sent. Now in 1878 an agreement TRANCE. 109 had been made between England and France wblcb formed a distinct pledge on the part of these two Powers not to annex these islands, and this agreement has latterly been renewed. Yet in spite of it the French flag has been hoisted in the New Hebrides, and France appears in the most distinct manner to have broken her twice-pledged word. The view of the Australian colonists is that the French intend to do to them what in 1872 we prevented the French from doing to ourselves. After the suppression of the Com- mune the French Grovernment began to make England a penal settlement by expelling people from France whom Germany and Belgium and Switzerland and Italy would not receive, and who, destitute and without papers, were sent away from Calais and Dieppe to be landed in English ports and to become chargeable upon the English poor rates. The Australians believe that France intends to ship large numbers of habitual criminals to islands in the neighbour- hood of Australia, and then, by keeping a very lax guard upon them, to allow them to escape and so to avoid the cost of their detention. To suppose that this is likely to be done upon a large scale as part of a system is, no doubt, to exaggerate, but it is certainly the belief in Australia, where panic upon this subject has of late years been frequent. In 1852, an Act was passed in Yictoria to protect that colony against even pardoned or time-expired convicts, and although it was disallowed, the Governor was afraid to make known the fact of its disallowance. A temporary Act was afterwards passed, to which another Governor assented, on the ground 110 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLlTrCS. that, if he had not done so, the colonists would have taken the law into their own hands. Ultimately, the Home Government gave ia, and the colonists were allowed to pass Acts upon this subject which were contrary to every prin- ciple of English law, and the Stockade near Melbourne was filled with persons who were, no doubt, many of them, undesirable colonists, but who, according to British principles, were properly free men. When the French first occupied New Caledonia, the Government of New South Wales informed the mother country that they feared the occupation of these islands by a foreign Power would, at no distant date, be a source of much trouble and anxiety, both to the Aus- tralian colonies, and to the British Government. This prediction has proved too true, and it is likely perhaps to be even more completely justified in the future. The strength of Australian feeling upon the subject of transportation has never been kept within the limits of law, and for this country to insist upon its strict rights towards Australia in the matter, and still more, for it to maintain the strict rights of France, or of any other foreign Power, against the out- burst of Australian feeling, would be simply to produce separation, if not separation coupled with war. To take a somewhat similar case, when the Irishmen who had given evidence against criminals in their own country, and had 1o be protected by the Government, were shipped quietly to Yictoria, the Yictorian Government refused to allow them to land there, although they could not even pretend that they were legally justified in their refusal. It is in the light of what has happened in the case of New FRANCE. Ill Caledonia that we are compelled to regard Frencli action in the New Hebrides. In the case of the New Hebrides the Australian objectors will have their hands strengthened by the fact that the French occupation of New Caledonia was legitimate according to the accepted view, whereas the occupation of the New Hebrides was, had our Grovernment chosen to resent It, a casus belli. The French are behaving in regard to the New Hebrides now as they have behaved, since 1879, In regard to the Society Islands, and our Grovern- ment have met their action with a protest, but with a protest only, for which the French do not seem very much to care. The New Hebrides were discovered by Captain Cook. They were partially civilised by English and Scotch mis- sionaries. In 1857 the chiefs of the largest island requested the protection of this country. In 1858 the expediency of the protection was recommended by the officer commanding the naval forces upon the station. In 1858 and 1860 the chiefs again offered the cession of their island, which was formally declined. In 1865 the colony of New South Wales began to interest Itself in a movement for excluding from the New Hebrides any other European Power, without annexing the group ourselves. In 1876 it was pointed out that there was a large Presbyterian mission in the group, and that there were sixty Englishmen, three Swedes, and only one French- man residing in the islands. It was also in 1876 that the French Government informed us positively " that there did not exist, and never had existed, any Intention, on the part of France, to take possession of the New Hebrides." In 1878 the French Government spontaneously proposed a declaration 112 THE PEESENT POSITION OF ETJEOPEAJf POLITICS. of the intention not to annex the group, and a French statement was replied to by a similar statement on the part of England. In 1878 also the New Zealand Government set up a claim that the islands were actually theirs, and also remonstrated against the joint declaration, but were promptly replied to by the Government at home. The New Zealand Government still, however, held that the New Hebrides were theirs by the charter of 1840, and that the Home Government had acted without consideration in 1878 in agreeing to the joint engagement. In 1879 the French declaration was renewed ; as it was again in 1883. The breach by France is not, as in the case of Eaiatea, the breach of a somewhat old agreement (the date in that case is 1847), but the breach of a brand new engagement pro- posed by Prance herself in 1878, and renewed in 1879 and 1883. The case of the New Hebrides is almost as interesting to the English religious world as is that of Madagascar, in which, however, there is no breach of treaty. English missionaries have for thirty-eight years been working in the New Hebrides, and a very large proportion of the natives have now become civilised and Christian. There can be no doubt, from the concurrent testimony even of travellers who are favourable to the French, that the population are as opposed to the idea of French annexation as are even the population of Madagascar. There are large holdings of land in the New Hebrides by British subjects. There is a great amount of British money expended in churches, schools, and mission stations. There are over a hundred British subjects FRANCE. 113 in the group, and fewer French, except the troops who have lately been sent there to form three military posts. It is a serious matter to quarrel with France about anything, and certainly about an island which we do not want ourselves, and which we have over and over again refused, but it is a still more serious thing to allow a solemn declaration volun- teered to this country, and accepted by her, to be contemp- tuously set aside ; and if the Government condone this action on the part of the French, it must be because an occupation of Egypt weights us with a heavy burden in our dealings with France in other portions of the world. Clearly it is useless for us to enter into engagements with other Powers in the future, if we allow engagements thus to be set at naught ; and there are circumstances in the case of the New Hebrides which make the aggression such as even the greatest of lovers of peace may properly resent. The case of the Ecr^hous rocks, near Jersey, is a curious one. They have always been looked upon as belonging to Jersey, and have been occupied every summer, from time im- memorial, by Jersey fishermen and Jersey seaweed-gatherers ; they have never been claimed by France in the past, whilst they are actually included in a Jersey parish and have a few permanent inhabitants who are Jersey men. Crime in Ecr^hous has been punished in the Jersey courts, and no attempt was ever made until quite lately to raise any ques- tion about the matter. In this case no act of aggression has been committed by France, and no false claim has been asserted by the Government of France, as such, but the violence of the French press in its declarations that the 114 THE PEESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. Ecr^lious have been lately seized by England is founded upon a complete misapprehension of the facts. This ques- tion is closely connected with that of the fisheries upon the coasts of the United Kingdom, into the intricacies of which I will not enter here, for it, like the Newfoundland question, would claim an entire and not very interesting article to itself ; but I will merely mention them among the causes of dispute between this country and France which may become serious at any moment. Some French Chauvinists have lately been setting up pretensions more extravagant than even those which have led to the French action in the New Hebrides which I have described. Just as in the case of Italy there is an Italia [Irredenta, of which the boundaries are continually stretching out, so in the case of France there is now a Francia Irredenta, a Gallia Irredenta, or what shall we style it ? French Canada has not yet been asked for, but the Newfoundland grievance is kept alive, and the " French Shore '' wiU continue to be claimed until there comes a day when a proposal will be made to us for the exchange of St. Pierre, Miquelon, and the " French Shore " for the Mauritius. There is no doubt that those Frenchmen who pushed on the Madagascar expedition expect that one day the Mauritius will fall under French rule, and believe that the French- speaking inhabitants of the Mauritius ardently desire the coming of that day ; in which belief, according to the infor- mation at my disposal, they are entirely wrong. It is wonderful, looking to the number of the causes of difference between England and France, that the two TRANCE. 115 countries should manage, as the phrase has it, "to get along" at all. That they have done so during the years in which French Chauvinist feeling has, in order to for- get Germany, been turned against England, is largely due to the tact and caution of Lord Lyons. May I he allowed, without the ascription of any but patriotic motives for so doing, to deprecate the proposed shelving of our most able and most representative diplomatist, at a critical period, by the application of a hard and fast superannuation rule.* Lord Lyons may be seventy, and he has never been physically a very active man, but intellectually he is in the prime of his vigour, and we shall not know how much we lose in him till he has gone, if, unfortunately, he is made to go. It is difficult to overestimate the effect which Lord Lyons' admirable direction of the British Embassy in Paris has had upon the relations of England and France. They arc far from good, it is true, but it is really difficult to say how bad they would have been by this time had it not been for the ability, the unfailing courtesy, the splendid hospitality, and, above all, the patience of Lord Lyons. England is well served in many ways and by many men, but it must be admitted by all who know what Lord Lyons has done for us, that it is not possible to find a man to efficiently replace him. Lord Lyons is a man of a very curious type, not only unenergetic, but, shall I say, even lazy physically, hating to put his head outside his door. He is, officially, the most energetic of men. Always seeing the right people * The danger now appears to te over for the moment, though I fear that Lord Lyons means to leave Paris at the new year. I 2 116 THE PEESENT POSITION OP EUEOPEAN POLITICS. at the right time ; writing as mucli as all the other ambassa- dors and ministers of Great Britain put together, in the enormous private correspondence which he constantly carries on ; writing always with his own hand, never writing an unnecessary word, for his letters are always clear and always to the point. Lord Lyons has never practically been a lazy man, except indeed when pressed by his G-overnment to say or do something which he thought would Irritate the French without really benefiting British Interests. Then Lord Lyons is a lazy man. The patience of the most energetic or of the most obstinate of Foreign Ministers would wear itself out before he Induced Lord Lyons to actively press at Paris a claim or an object of this nature ; for Lord Lyons possesses a staying power and a power of resistance which are the most British of all his British qualities. I believe that Lord Lyons has never but once been known both to be really angry and to show It in the course of his career. This was when It was stated In Parliament by one of the Irish members that he himself had been followed by Government spies In Paris, and when It was not at the same time explained that the spies — if spies there were — had not been employed by the Embassy, and had not reported to Lord Lyons. This anger is characteristic, because Lord Lyons Is essentially an English gentleman, and has managed in the course of a long life to deal successfully with a great many people who were not what we call gentlemen, without ever forgetting his own position for one moment, or letting them forget it either. In a capital where ministers set spies on one another, and ambassadors set spies on their own friends. Lord Lyons did FRANCE. . 117 not like to be even for one moment so muct as suspected of having set spies upon those who were at that time the confessed enemies of his country. He has no illusions upon the subject of the Governments of France, or indeed upon any subject of any kind, and some might call him cynical, but he is as kind as he is courteous ; and if fairly peaceable working relations are to continue to exist at all between England and France, it is Lord Lyons who must preserve them, as long as he will consent to do so. III. ETJSSIA. In the two preceding chapters it has been shown how Gfermany and Austria from the fear of a Franco-Russian alliance, how England from preference for peace and want of sufficient motive, and how France, from the real peacef ulness of the majority of its electors, are unlikely to begin a war. There remains Eussia, the country which, intensely patriotic hut not yet very sure of its position in the world, ridiculed as barbarous, and therefore very sensitive, and ruled by an autocrat of imcertain temper, is alone in a position to provoke a conflict. Will it do so ? There appeared lately in a number of Russian news- papers some remarkable articles on the same question on which I am writing here — the present position of the Great Powers. These articles, indeed, teach us nothing except the arrogance, or the consciousness of strength, of Russia, which scarcely seems to care what other Powers may or may not do, and the extraordinary ignorance which prevails among even the best-informed real Russians in the empire. I say real Russians, because there are at St. Petersburg a number of able and highly cultured persons RUSSIA. 119 ■wto are in the Russian service, and have no illusions upon the subject, but are either not of Russian race or are so much in touch with foreigners through constant travel or long residence abroad that they have ceased to share the more dangerous among the illusions of their countrymen Unfortunately, however, it is the Russian Emperor who governs Russia, and not these gentlemen. Some of them, as for example MM. de Giers, Jomini, and Vlangaly, are occasionally consulted by way of form, but their private opinions do not receive official sanction or become that policy of the Russian Empire which in public (and most conversations at St. Petersburg may be looked upon as public) they defend. To justify what I have said about articles in the Russian journals, let me quote the doctrines of one from the Nome Vremya upon " The Western Powers and Russia." The phrase "the Western Powers" does not apply only to Grreat Britain and France, the meaning which it used to bear, but it includes five Powers, or what we style the two central and the two western Powers, with the addition of Italy. The writer states that if Prussia has managed to make an apparent German unity towards the exterior, it must be remembered both that German Austria is not yet included within Germany, and that there is no internal unity even among the kingdoms that are included. South and Catholic Germany, he declares, detests Prussian and Protestant Ger- many more than ever, and the southern states will seize the first opportunity to throw ofE the hegemony of Prussia, and once more make Austria supreme in the German Empire. Schleswig-Holstein too is a serious weakness to the Empire. 120 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. Germany is hated by Austria as well as by France, sbe suffers iaternally from Socialism, she has alienated Grreat Britain by her colonial policy, and she could not even depend on Italian friendship unless she were willing to help Italy to take away from Austria the Tyrol, the Trentino, and Trieste itself, and this she will not do. Germany therefore is absolutely isolated. The Emperor and Prince Bismarck himself will die before German unity has made a step, and the only chance they have of maintaining themselves lies in a Russian alliance. A somewhat flattering picture this, indeed, of what Prince Bismarck has done for Germany ! The writer passes on to Austria. Austria desires to regain leadership in Germany, she refuses to become a Slav Power and insists on remaining German, she is waiting only for the death of Prince Bismarck, but is too wretchedly weak to harm Hussia. Turning to France, the writer points out that she has quarrelled with England and stands alone, whilst his glance at England, as might be expected, reveals to him the impossibility of her defending either her colonies or her trade, the danger that she incurs from Ireland, and the certainty that she will put up with anything rather than fight. The conclusion of the article, of course, is that Russia alone among the Powers is quiet, strong, and really great, that if she gave to Germany her alliance she could wipe out Austria from the face of Europe, and force France to remain at peace. If, on the other hand, she chooses a French alKance she can destroy Germany, whilst the destinies of England are in her hands, inasmuch as she could easily deliver India from the British yoke. The writer thinks it laughable to suppose that Russia RUSSIA. 121 will ask tlie consent of any Power to settle tte Bulgarian question in the sense which she may prefer. It is hardly necessary to indicate the weak points of this article, and I shall haye occasion to deal with the strong points, and to reveal the grain of truth that it may contain, in demonstrat- ing the immense power of the Russian Empire. That with which I am here concerned is only to show in what a fools' paradise those Russians live who really direct the external policy of their country — the Emperor himself and the leading journalists, who, however, it must be observed, are themselves powerless, except through the immense influence of one of them, the autocrat of the Moscow Gazette. I am aware that much that I say in the course of this chapter will produce protest, for while I shall offend those who believe in the moderation or truth of Russia, I shall, on the other hand, displease those too patriotic Englishmen, if there be such a thing as an overdose of patriotism, who dislike Russia so much that they cannot recognise either her power or the patriotism of her people. All that I shall try to do in this, as in my other chapters, is to ascertain the facts, and the exact bearing of the facts with which we have to deal. I address myself to those, if there be such in these days, who are free from party prejudice, from prejudice personal or national — to those, in short, who try to see things as they really are. The fact upon which it is necessary to insist in considering the position of Russia is that she has of all the European Powers by far the largest homogeneous population. There are about as many Great Russians, speaking the same 122 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. language, without any dialects, as there are real Germans in all Germany. In addition to these there are millions upon millions of closely-connected Russians of other Russian tribes, of which the fourteen millions of Little Russians are the most numerous and the best known, furnishing as they do the picked men of the Russian guards. Some careless observers are apt to make seriously an exactly opposite statement, namely, that there is such a diversity of races under the Russian flag that Russia must be bound but loosely together, and be always on the point of tumbling to pieces. No doubt there are great numbers of picturesque peoples of various races, tongues, customs, and religions who are under the Russian rule. Travellers affect their provinces, and are rather repelled by the uniform black dulness of Russia proper ; but all those peoples bear to the mass of the Russians only about the same numerical and political importance as the sotnias of Persian, Armenian, Georgiaii, Mingrelian, Circassian, Bashkir, and TJralian Cossacks, who figure in the Emperor's body guard at a great review at St. Petersburg, bear numerical and military importance to the fifty or sixty thousand men of the guards who are upon the field. ITo doubt the Pins of Great Pinland and the Samoyeds of Northern Siberia, and the Sarts of Central Asia and the yellow-faced and slit-eyed Kalmucks of Astrakhan, the Golden-Horde Tartars of Kazan, the Turcomans of the Caspian steppes, the Tchuvassi, Vatiki, Mordwa, and other Asiatic Pins upon the Volga, and countless other tribes and peoples who might be named, differ very greatly the one from the other, and all of them from the RUSSIA. 123 Russians ; but on the wliole they do not form a weakness to the Eussian Empire, and their existence within its con- fines does not detract from the essential fact that there are some sixty millions of Russians who speak virtually one tongue. This nation, numerically the superior of any nation except the Chinese, and China is not yet organised for modern war, is also more religious and more patriotic as a hody than is any of the other Great Powers of Europe. The accuracy of this remark will be contested, but hardly I think by those who know Russia well. The Russians are as religions at the least as are the people of the English colonies or of the United States, and they are as patriotic as the citizens of the latter country. In the union of patriotism and of religion they present, I know no nation in Europe which can approach them, although they may be rivalled by the people of the United States. "We have here in Russia, obviously, from the facts which I take to be admitted by careful observers, a Power which, by the very nature of things and apart from any move- ment which she may make, is formidable in the highest degree. There are some fossil politicians in England who stni think that Russia is weakened by the existence of a Poland. Poland died in 1863, and died for ever. The men who, either in their own persons or in the persons of their ancestors, have illustrated literature by their genius, and countless battle-fields by their splendid courage, may refuse to recognise the extinction of their country ; but the Poles, considered as an anti-Russian force, were an aristocracy, in the best as well as in the common sense of the word. The 124 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. Polisli peasantry, though often led by them against Russia, were never" anti-Russian to an unpurchasable degree, and a large portion of the Polish peasantry have now become as attached, through agrarian legislation, to the Russian Empire as the German peasantry of Alsace were to France by the agrarian legislation of the Revolution. At the time of the Crimean War Poland did not rise; but looking to what afterwards happened in 1863, it is impossible to say that it might not have been roused. Poland could now no longer be raised against the Russians; and in spite of the fairly successful attempts which have been made by Austria to conciliate the GaKcian Poles, there are Slavonic subjects of Austria who could far more easily be raised against the Dual Monarchy than any Polish or other Slavonic subjects of Russia could be raised against the Tsar. It is difficult for us to realise the attraction of Russia for some of the weaker members of the Slavonic races. Where, as once in Servia and lately in Bulgaria, Russia has had a comparatively free hand, she has often alienated Slavonic feeliug ; but where Slavs have been the subjects of another Great Power, and especially where they are subjects of Hun- gary and Austria, Russia is to them a friend on whose power they build their hopes. The Ruthenians of the Dual Mon- archy are so many Russians lost within its boundaries. There is no similar German or other colony lost in Russia, for what aliens there are are too few and too much dispersed. Some think that Russia is weakened by the German element in the Baltic provinces. Here, agaia, those who think so are behind the times. The Baltic provinces were never German, so far as EUSSIA. 125 the peasantry are concerned. A German aristocracy, with. German traders in the towns, ruled over a peasantry of the Esthonian, Lettish, and Lithuanian races. To this peasantry the Russians, with all their despotic measures against the landowners and against the German tongue, have come as deliverers. Because Russia is very violent in her language and in her acts, we too often fail to see how a peasantry which an aristocratic government or a government of political economists could never win, is won over by her to her rule. The Moscow men failed in Bulgaria, but in Poland they succeeded, and in the Baltic provinces, too, their methods and their policy have not been found wanting, and the problems that have so long perplexed this country in her relations with Ireland would have been solved in a week by Samarin, or Miliutin, or Prince Tcherkassky. Some are disposed to think that Nihilism constitutes a great danger to the Russian Empire, weakening not only her offensive but even her defensive force. There can be no doubt that in Russia, in spite of the recent so-called cadet and stafE conspiracy, the general belief of the best informed is that at this moment Austria and Germany have more to fear from Socialism than Russia has to fear from Mhilistic con- spiracies. I shall have to return to the subject generally when I come to my Austrian chapter ; but as regards Russia I may say that my latest information leads me to agree with Russian writers upon this point.* There can be no doubt, I think, in the mind of any reasonable observer as to the real and lasting strength of * This statement has proved to be erroneous. 126 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. Bussia; and the question whicli it is more interesting to consider is in wliat manner ttat strength is likely to be used. Russia is, though old in some senses, politically as young a country as the United States, and has not yet by any means passed the growing period. She is strong even while grow- ing fast, but will be still stronger in her prime. In consider- ing her power let me, in the first place, protest against the action of those Englishmen who allow themselves to be scared out of a policy which a short time ago they thought right and wise. The fact that a number of gentlemen have come to realise the strength of Russia has led them to begin to declare that they were quite wrong a few years ago in saying that this country ought to keep Russia out of the Balkan Peninsula and away from Constantinople, and out of Herat and away from the Persian Gulf ; and that on the contrary England should embrace Russia with open arms and enter upon an alliance with the Power which a short time ago they thought to be their country's mortal foe. No doubt it is impossible to maintain the principles of Lord Beaconsfield's speeches of 1878 ; and it is a waste of time to examine how completely the so-called settlement of that year has broken down. All that has happened was prophesied by clear-sighted observers at the time. Sir Samuel Baker then stated that our policy " might terminate in a friendship between the Russians and the Turks to the detriment of British interests and to the confusion of the assumed protectorate." He was alluding to the Asia Minor Convention and the appointment of military consuls through- out the Turkish Asiatic provinces, and his prophecy has RUSSIA. 127 come true to the letter. In 1878 we were told that England had restored to Turkey the greater portion of her provinces, but Eastern E-oumelia was counted into what was " restored," and Bosnia and Herzegovina were not counted into what was taken away, so that the inquiry need hardly be pursued. We were told that our action had not only restored her provinces to Turkey, but had insured the reform of their administration. No one I suppose can imagine that much progress has been made in that direction. We were told that Turkey had been given in the Balkans an " impregnable frontier ; " that the power, " military and civil," of the Sultan in Eastern Eoumelia was complete, and that it was " absolutely necessary for secur- ing the safety of Constantinople." All these considerations, however, were examined at the time, and the only extra- ordinary thing is that, even by a portion of the public, and even for a few months, they should have been believed. The whole fabric of our policy in 1878 having sunk in collapse, we are now told, by some of the same per- sons who were instrumental in misleading us on that occasion, that Bulgaria is not a British interest, that Con- stantinople is not a British interest, that the continued existence of the Turkish Empire is not a British interest, and generally, that nothing is a British interest which our own military unreadiness would make it difficult for us to protect by force of arms. Just as a large portion of the public refused to accept the guidance of these gentlemen in 1878, so it is possible that a portion of the public will refuse to accept their guidance now, and will insist on examin- ing the question for themselves. When we all but went 128 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. to war in 1878 for the Sultan's supremacy in Eastern EoumeKa, and were told that we had secured it, we soon found that we had only secured it upon paper, and we were then assured that the idea must be replaced by another. British policy, we were asked to believe, had shifted, because circumstances had shifted, and the spirit of freedom fouiid to exist in the Bulgarian race, and especially in Eastern Eoumelia, was to form the new bulwark against Eussia — a bulwark better than the Balkan line. But as soon as Austria declined our alliance, and Eussia refused to make terms with the Bulgarians, then our instructors began to tell us that even Bulgarian independence was not a British interest, and it seems now to be generally understood that Constanti- nople itself is not to be defended by this country, unless Hungarian feeling should make Austria fight, and unless a scratch pack of other allies can also be obtained. Just as in the Belgian question, which I discussed in my first chapter, and to which I shall return in the last, it is desirable that England at all events should know what she means to do and should make up her mind, so too in this question of the Balkans and of Constantinople. Not that the question is likely to be raised at present in an aggravated form. The Sultan, knowing that he is now deserted by the most influential men in both the English parties, and that Austria wUl not fight for him if she can help it, because she knows that she is not a match for Eussia in a military sense, — expecting also, as he does, a rising in Crete, a Greek advance upon Janina, and a rising in Southern Macedonia whenever he is attacked, — is forced to pretend to make terms ETJSSIA. 129 witli Russia, which practically means that his empire is to last his time. This habit of trying to make things last their time is common with the pashas. A Turkish plenipotentiary once said to a representative of one of the Great Powers, " Why cannot the Greeks and Bulgarians keep quiet a little? They will get all the territory they want some day." The Sultan is forced to sit still whilst his empire crumbles. He is at this moment only asked to permit what he cannot pre- vent, the nearer approach of Russian influence ; nothing really under his rule is for the moment to be taken from him ; and he can persuade himself that after all he will be no worse ofE in any point than he was as early as 1879, when the Eastern RoumeKan part of the Treaty of Berlin was seen to be a dead letter. There is nothing new in the friendship of Russia and Turkey. Russian troops held garrison in Constantinople when it was menaced by the Egyptians under Mehemet Ali, and the two countries worked cordially together under the auspices of " MahmoudofE " in the winter of 1879—80. The Russians have been slow upon their way. Baron Blumberg, as long ago as 1684, called Turkey that " body condemned to death, which must very speedily turn to a corpse ; " but the corpse is not yet laid out. The Russian advance, however, though slow, is sure. From time to time she makes one long step further towards her goal. At the time of "Peace with Honour," Lord Beaconsfield, speaking of the danger of Russia gaining " such a prize as Constantinople " — such was the language of the instructions which he received, curiously enough from Mr., now Lord, Cross — puzzled the Protocolists by alliteratively styling it K 130 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. "the capture of Constantinople." We shall have presently to consider the chances and the probable results of a struggle between Austria and Eussia, and also of a struggle between England and Eussia ; but it must, I think, be recognised that neither France nor Germany shares the view that the " cap- ture of Constantinople " by Eussia is any danger to the world, provided that, in the case of Germany, it can be reconciled with the continued existence of Austria as a Great Power. In order to estimate the probabilities of a contest we shall have briefly to consider the internal condition of Eussia, and to compare it in some degree with that of Austria, which will be further investigated in the next chapter. I spoke just now of Eussia as being, above all, a patriotic country. France is a patriotic country. Frenchmen are patriots, from M. Gr^vy down to M. Drumont ; but probably neither M. Grevy nor M. Drumont possesses that kind of patriotic courage which would lead him to get himself qmetly killed for his country's sake if he could well help it. The Eussians have a different sort of patriotism from the patriotism of other European peoples — there are few Eussians who would hesitate to die if their death could help their country's cause. Possibly this may be a mark of barbarism ; some pale-faced philosophers, I have no doubt, may think it so ; but it is a factor in the present position of the European Powers. Poland and the Baltic provinces and Nihilism may not be sources of weakness worth counting ; Eussia's real weakness is the absence, inevitable under an autocracy such as hers, of a trained upper and middle class. The sharp contrast EUSSIA. 131 between the simple piety of the Eussian peasant, which makes of every meal a celebration of a Sacrament, and his occasional outbursts of drunkenness and violence, is excelled by one still sharper between the piety of the peasants and the profound scepticism of the upper classes. I do not speak of religious scepticism alone, but of that practical scepticism which thinks nothing worth doing well for any cause, and which while in Russia consistent with the use of patriotic language, and perhaps with the existence of certain patriotic sentiments, makes of the class which is undermined by it a feeble instrument for the purposes of the Russian Father- land. I said in the first chapter that in Russia there are only two men who count — but the second whom I named counts in a double way, both as an individual of ability and as the editor of a newspaper, which, in a sense, may be described as the most powerful in the world, because it is all-powerful or nearly all-powerful in one great empire. The Russian press is only powerful through KatkofE's power. The official and semi-official papers say only what might be expected of them, and, as a rule, do but mark time. The Moscow Gazette, which asserts that there is no free press in the world except the Russian, enjoys a freedom which is, however, personal to itself or to its great editor. In con- stitutional countries, it declares, the whole press is enslaved by party. The Moscow Gazette knows no party, for Russia knows none that is worthy (or unworthy) of the name. It succeeds in doing what it pleases in Russian home affairs ; but although in foreign affairs its anti-German sentiments k2 132 THE PRESENT POSITION OF BTJEOPEAN POLITICS. are contradicted by Le Nord and do not prevail, at all events it is allowed to utter them. KatkofE counts as KatkofE, and counts also as the mouth- piece of the Moscow, or national " party," which may better be styled the Moscow Group. This " party " is composed of a knot of men, who may have their differences, but who to the outside world appear to hold opinions which are identical, because they are identical as against the outside Avorld. Aksakoff, Samarin, MiHutin, and Tcherkassky, belong to a past generation, and now represent Moscow in the Elysian fields. Prince Vassiltchikoff, and others who could be named, have continued their traditions, but whether in the Conservative shade of the Moscow Gazette or in more Liberal journals, the expression of Moscow or National opinion has always been substantially the same in questions which concern the outer world. We talk of the Moscow party, but one great strength of Russia lies in the fact, which I repeat, that it has no parties. Russians nearly all agree, with the exception of those whose hand is against everything — agree, that is, in a large number of general views which are almost peculiar to Russia. Even the Nihilists and all other Russians are at one upon some points, as, for example, in ridiculing Parliamentary government. The dominant note with all is confidence in the future of Russia, and a pro- tective affection for the Slav races outside the empire, pro- vided they will look up to Russia, take their policy from Russia, and profess the orthodox religion. The late Emperor was affected and controlled by Moscow opinion, but the present Emperor shares it, which is a very different thing. The present Emperor is as national as EXJSSIA. 133 was Peter the Great ; but, unfortunately, lie hardly shows Peter the Great's ability. In a family where all the members have been made by absolute power unlike other men, he resembles rather, in the type of mind, Paul and Nicholas than Alexander the First or Alexander the Second. Both the Alexanders were melancholy Germans as contrasted with the present obstinate and thoroughly Bussian Tsar. In spite of the fact that he was trained by luen who knew Russia well, I fear that, like the traditional Irishman, he might remark with truth that he himself knows nothing of his own country and still less of any other. Those who surround, and mainly advise him, are strongly Conservative in tone, Pobedonostchieff, Count Tolstoi, and KatkofE are men who are accused by the re- formers of being the somewhat pretentious exponents of an ignorant old Tory obscurantism, but to a foreign observer there is not much difference between a Russian Liberal and a Russian Conservative. In the English sense of the word. Liberalism is somewhat out of place in Russia. Parliament- arianism, so dear to us, wiU probably never be fully adopted there, and it must be admitted that Russian patriotism holds it not so much in aversion as in contempt. The one great weakness of Russia, the absence of a really trained middle or upper class, is intensified by a kind of pro- scription, which is a result of autocracy. Half those men of ability that the country does possess are shut out of office because they, not being in the least able to help themselves, used to bow somewhat low before the lady who since the death of Alexander II. has been in foreign countries styled his widow ; to whom indeed the Imperial family themselves, 134 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. also because they could not help it, used to bow rather low in the late Emperor's lifetime. This proscription is in itself a consequence of the obstiuacy of the Tsar, who likes to be served by submissiye or by pliant men, but who in spite of his liking for pKancy does not himself know how to forgive. M. de Griers, as one of his colleagues once told an English- man, who knew him well, " stands at ' Attention,' one thumb on the seam of his trousers and the other at his cap, and says (the minister was speaking in French), ' Oui, sire; oui, sire.'" When we talk of " spread-eagleism " we are generally thinking of the United States, but the real spread-eagleism is that, not of the American Republic, but of the Russian Empire. The Russians habitually talk of the time when they wUl be masters of the whole world, and if, instead of writing of the facts of our time, I were tempted to prophesy con- cerning the next century I should have to admit that, if we exclude America and Australia and confine our thoughts to the Old World alone, it is at least conceivable that their dreams should one day come true. The only foreigner who is known to the Russian peasantry is the German, and the name for German and for. foreigner with the peasantry is the same, and the hatred of the " dumb men," as they call their German neighbours, is intense. The peasantry know little of the English, and if you listen to their sentiments you discover that it is their belief that one day there will be between them and Germany a war compared with which, their soldiers say, that of 1870 will be child's play, and that if Germany wins this will not be the end, but that war after war wiU RUSSIA. 135 follow until Germany is destroyed. This feeKng is to some extent held in check by the Russian Court, although one day they may take it up and use it ; but court dislikes are turned for the present less towards Germany than towards Austria. "We will consider presently the military strength of Russia as compared with that of her great neighbours. Russia, in spite of her enormous debt and its tremendous annual charge, is growing in power, and that power, great in itself, gains by being surrounded by the terrors that encompass the unknown. She has by far the largest army in the world, and, with a complete mobiKsation of her forces, has upon paper a force at once of four and ultimately of six millions of men. Some are inclined to think that the men will not be found when wanted, but great progress has been made by Russia since 1878. Her artillery has as many guns as that of Germany or of France, her cayalry is perhaps more numerous than that of France and Germany together, cer- tainly more numerous than that of Germany and Austria combined. This cavalry force is admittedly the best there is for that service to which cavalry in modern war is limited, if it is not to be destroyed on use. "With moderate prudence the resources of Russia cannot but grow and grow, for Russia from many points of view is a young country, and Siberia, territorially considered, is almost another United States. "With her magnificent natural position, and with her unrivalled chain of fortresses upon the German frontier, Russia can always wear out German patience. It may be true, as Count Moltke says, that 200,000 men upon the Vistula, along with the German fortresses, might prevent Russia from 136 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUEOPEAN POLITICS. invading Germany ; but even in that case there would be 200,000 men withdrawn from the French frontier in face of a French army more numerous than the Grerman, and they would not suffice to prevent Russia from crushing Austria. It is a curious commentary upon the repeated protesta- tions of affection which have passed between the Emperors of Germany and of Russia during the last few years, that since 1870 Konigsberg has been converted into an entrenched camp upon an enormous scale, that the forts of Thorn have been iron-plated and topped with iron turrets, that Dantzic has been greatly strengthened, that Posen has been greatly strengthened, and that Ciistrin is being strengthened now, as is also Glogau. Russia, growing daily in military strength, sets in the scale against the Germans m^ore than Austria can bring to restore their equilibrium. It may be confidently asserted that it is now far too late for Germany to strike her possible enemies one at a time. For Germany to attack either France or Russia now would be madness if not suicide, and Germany wiU go on with her declarations of friendliness towards Russia although with a perfect willingness to see coalitions formed against the Northern Power. Prince Bismarck has one immense advan- tage in dealing with the Russians ; he is face to face with the worst informed of European Powers. The Russian Emperor has some of the best-trained men in Europe at his back if he would use them, but they are retiring from business or growing old. One of them is not what he was when Minister in China ; another is not what he was when he settled certain private difficulties in the Imperial family, ETISSIA. 137 ■which, needed more tact and even wisdom for their settle- ment than do the afEairs of nations. In the concerns of the Powers blunders are repaired by the simple process of casting swords into the scale, and the most solid of arguments after all is based upon the adding together the troops and fortresses of allies, and deducting the troops and fortresses of the enemy. This simple plan of dealing with affairs of state is inapplic- able to the affairs of courts, but Baron Jomini has an heredi- tary understanding of the one class of considerations, and an inborn power over the other, which make of this Yaudois- Swiss "bourgeois" of Valangin the best foreign servant that wears the livery of the Slav, whose very tongue he can- not speak. But he is old, and set aside for clerks and sergeants. Prince Lobanoff, who is a really great diplo- matist, is allowed no power. Were I to say how great, I should fear to be read by M. Katkoff, or by M. de Giers, and to do the ambassador hurt by causing his patriotism to be suspected. M. Zinovieff, of the Foreign Office, is also a good man and also has no real power. Prince Bismarck, I repeat, is to be congratulated upon having to hold his own against the worst-informed of Powers. Austria could not exist at all, if she were not well-informed ; with her mixed nationalities and with her servants of many tongues, she is well-informed, as if by the law of her being ; and Grermany is well-informed, because it is her business to be well-informed, and she does all her business well ; but Russia and France are by far the worst- informed of all the Powers. The Russian Emperor now reads nothing, whatever he may have read when only 138 THE PEESEXT POSITLOX OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. Tsarevitch, and rejecting the advice of the men of ideas, who are suspected of the deadly sin of " Europeanism " or " Westemism," is advised by those who are mere sergeants by obedience and discipline, and by the old Tory bureau- crats and pedants. Eussia need only be pointed out as a country in which every foreign newspaper is tabooed. France, I am sorry to say, though she allows foreign news- papers to enter freely enough in all conscience, is, for practical purposes, almost as ignorant. M. John Lemoinne may know, the Temps may know, but France as a country does not know, and the electors and the Assembly are vain enough to suppose that they know better for themselves by natural lights than they could be taught by those who have been trained to teach or govern. So greatly is the instability of governments in France displeasing to Russia, that there have been dreams of late of bringing about an arrangement for a lasting peace by a revival of the Three Emperors' League and the complete isolation of the French. This is possible rather than pro- bable. In order that Russia should cease to menace Germany and Austria with France, it is necessary that Russia shoidd be completely contented in all parts of the world, and it is difficult to see how Austria can willingly be a party to contenting her. There is no great love lost between the English Conservative Cabinet and the Bulgarian Government. The most prominent member of the English Tory party would count it a cheap way of pacifying Europe, if peace could be aided by the isolation of France, through letting Russia work her will in the neighbourhood of the Balkans. ETJSSIA. 139 Lord Randolph Churcliill was one of the steadiest foes of Lord Beaconsfield's foreign policy in 1877—8. On the other hand Lord Salisbury is not a man to throw away the possibility of a good alliance, or to leave Austria in the lurch, and he keenly sees the possibility of making an anti-Russian policy in the Balkans popular by using the popularity of the Roumanians and the Bulgarians. MoreoYor, there is an argument by which an anti-Russian policy in the Balkans can be recommended and which appeals to John Bull with peculiar strength. It is the breeches' pocket argument. Every country annexed or virtually annexed by Russia is closed for ever to our trade by means of heavily protective duties, although, as I have shown in the case of Bosnia, I fear that I must admit that the same is very nearly true of our Austrian allies. Russia, it may be seen by what has been said, is really working her will on Bulgaria by Prince Bismarck's help. Austria is hardly strong enough to resist. She is terrified at the prospect of a war with only an English alliance. She expects Prince Bismarck to back her policy at St. Petersburg, and he himself is not strong enough to do so. From time to time the Russian Emperor pretends friendship with France, or at all events shows France in the background, in the way in which a fowler " shows a dog " to drive wild fowl here and there. There is not and there will not be a Russo-French alliance till a European war has begun, if even then, but France is necessarily always ready. The less decided of the opponents in England of Russia's Bulgarian policy (for it has in England not one single 140 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. friend) extenuate it by a comparison with Britisli action against Arabi in Egypt. Now, granting that Arabi repre- sented Egyptian feeKng as much as the Sobranje represents Bulgarian, an assumption which the British Government would deny, and putting out of sight the fact that the organized Government of Egypt was in part destroyed by Arabi, whereas in Bulgaria the Regents have taken charge, by consent of the last Prince, of the organized Government of the country ; yet, even so, no fair comparison is possible. An English Kaulbars has yet to be discovered. In going to Egypt England did not act alone. The ultimate action taken was the consequence of the joint note, and the joint note was proposed to the English Cabinet in 1881 by France ; France moreover agreed to take part in the expedition, and would have done so had her Chamber been willing to vote the funds. "When France refused to go, England applied to Italy, and Italy all but consented. England, in fact, moved with the unofficial approval of most of the Powers, whilst all the Powers, without exception, officially congratulated her on her success in restoring order. From the moment when Great Britain, through Lord Salisbury, saved the Prince of Bulgaria at the Constanti- nople Conference it became certain that Russia would de- throne him. He was dethroned accordingly, but merely to dethrone was not sufficient to restore the Russian prestige in B ulgaria, and further steps were necessary. Prince Alexander had done nothing against the Tsar of late, and nothing at all that has been proved, though I am aware of much that has been asserted. He had even been unduly submis- EUSSIA. 141 sive. But he had been independent, and Bulgarian inde- pendence, whether in tongue, in religion, or in the sphere of foreign affairs, is intolerable to Russian patriots. I am one of those who are unwillingly driven into a position of hostility to Russia, for I have much sympathy with the aspirations of the Slav race in general, and even with those of the Russian people in particular. Strongly anti-Russian as I am, there are, as has already been seen in this chapter, many points upon which I have the highest possible opinion of the Russians ; but I must admit that the outrage to Europe of the Kaulbars mission, after the circumstances of Prince Alexander's deposition, is tremendous, and I fear irretrievable. It is a death-blow to the smaller states, and the proclamation or consecration of the doctrine that might in the affairs of nations makes right. The Russian press is now claiming Bulgaria as virtually a province of Russia : its concerns are a matter of internal policy with which the Powers have nothing to do; and resistance to orders from St. Petersburg is the same thing in Bulgaria as in Poland. Whether or no the Russian policy has been wicked, it certainly seems to have been foolish from the Russian point of view. There can be no doubt that the Bulgarians are alienated from Russia by that policy. They adored Russia, or rather the figure of the late Emperor, before the Russians came. The Governor of Bulgaria during the Russian advance, the leader of the Moscow party himself, wrote during the war to one who was once the friend of himself and Samarin, and of both the Miliutins and both the YassiltchikofEs, that the Bulgarians 142 IHE PRESENT POSITION OF EtJEOPEAN POLITICS. would not commit what lie called the folly of the Poles, but would resemhle the Euthenians of Galicia in welcoming the Slavonic headship of Russia. Now the Russians had this advantage in Bulgaria, that there was practically no religious difficulty. The English Quakers are loved by the Bulgarians for the quiet good that they have done in the burnt villages, and there is much American Protestant influence, besides that of Dr. "Washburn's people from Bobert College; but, neither the Quakers nor Robert College have tried to prose- lytise, and all Bulgaria is Orthodox. At the same time it is democratic, and those who welcomed the Russian liberator did so with a strong belief that their local independence would be preserved to them. The Bulgarians, according to the majority of ethnographic writers, are not of Slavonic race, but I will at once admit that this matters little. They are as completely Slavised as the Slavs of old Prussia have become Germanised. If Prince Bismarck himself, like Justinian and Belisarius, is a Slav by race, he is as German in fact as Justinian and Belisarius were Roman. The Bulgarians undoubtedly came from what is now the heart of Russia, and had their empire upon the Yolga, from which they take their name ; but although when they came in the fifth century they were not Slavs, by the eighth or ninth century they were almost as completely Slavised as they are now. On the other hand the Russian Governor of Bulgaria and his young men from Moscow, who came with him, failed to understand that the Bulgarians had not risen against the Turkish rule for the purpose of substituting one sort of pashas for another. The Bulgarians gloried indeed in the RUSSIA. 143 marvellous strengtli of Eussian patriotism and tlie Russian desire for extension and for increase of strength, but they did not want them exerted at their own expense. The Rus- sians, on the other side, feel that Bulgaria is now, from some points of view, so close to Moscow that absolutism in Russia will be at stake if Liberalism is to prevail within Bulgaria. Russia is a country without a Liberal party. The old- fashioned Tories there are weak, and the empire ought to please Lord Randolph Churchill, for, being without Liberals and almost without old-fashioned Tories, it is a sort of para- dise for a Tory-Democrat. The descendants of the Dekabrists are dead ; the old Anglo-maniacs and aristocratic Liberals are dead ; and all the Russian politicians of the day belong to the Moscow national school, although some of them affect a Tory and some of them a pseudo-Liberal strain. I call it pseudo-Liberal when I remember their policy in the occupied provinces during the Turkish war, when they insisted that all opinion should be Orthodox, and that all opinion should be subject to the Emperor's will. It was always certain that Russia could not easily absorb a Catholic population, and it was always doubtful if she could ever hope to absorb an Orthodox population belonging to the Hellenic branch of the Eastern Church, but the Bulgarians were not supposed to be endowed with so much love of independence and power of resistance that they were likely to stand out against Russia. By doing so they have embarked, however, in a hopeless struggle in which the sympathy that is bestowed upon them is hardly likely to find expression in action. There are some persons in England, haters of Russia, who believe that the Bulgarians have nothing to do but to hold 144 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAK POLITICS. out some time, and that Russia will fall to pieces of herself or undergo some remarkable change. But even a great disaster in foreign war, which alone would upset the established order there, would not in overturning it make much difference in external questions of this kind. Men point to the assassination of the late Emperor, or the acquittal by a St. Petersburg jury of officials and nobles of the assassins of the Grand Police Master, Count Trepoff, but the stone-throwing spirit, the self-depreciation of the capital, and the occasional outbursts of violent Nihilism are only the natural results of the autocratic system. Like Malet's con- spiracy before the campaign of France, they reveal weak- ness, but their existence is not inconsistent with that of a wide-spread patriotic feeling, or of the power to make patriotic sacrifice. Cold comfort, I fear, all this for the Bulgarians and for the weaker generally in the Balkan States and in the world outside ; and yet the Bulgarians have deserved better things of us. By their wise and prudent policy, and by the self- restraint which has been exercised by the whole people, they have on the one hand held their own, and on the other, made an armed occupation difficult. Their spirit of independence was well known, but the ability which they have displayed in war and in finance was somewhat of a surprise. Russia believed that the withdrawal of the Russian officers would disorganise them, and . immediately afterwards they were successful in a very serious war. Through all the provoca- tions of the Kaulbars mission, and in the total absence of a supreme direction of their affairs, although under a ETJSSIA* 145 monarchic system, perfect order has never ceased to reign, nor the taxes to come in with regularity. Yerily, the Bulgarians deserve the thanks of all free men in Europe. It used to be said by Russian officers that the road to Con- stantinople lay through Vienna, but it now seems as though there were a still greater difficulty in Russia's way in the unconquerable spirit of independence of the Roumanians, the Bulgarians, and the Southern Slavs. Every attempt at coercion only makes them more permanently hostile to autocratic rule, and when the opposite policy is pursued and they are left to themselves, they do not appear to repent at all. The possession of such remarkable qualities of self-govern- ment by these small peoples has led many to try of late to force to the front in practical politics that which has long been one of the favourite dreams of political specula- tion. It may be considered to be the policy of the more liberal elements in English Conservatism and of the more prudent amongst English Liberals, to set up, if there is a possibility of doing so, some kind of Balkan confederation. If, indeed, a Balkan confederation, even with the support of Austria and of England, would not in a military sense be strong enough to hold its own against Russia, nevertheless, in any time that may be left to us, before Russia once again, presses on, it may be possible to bring about, if not con- federation, at all events a cordial understanding. Certainly the Greeks, the Roumanians, the Bulgarians, and the Serbs are young peoples, worth helping to defend. One of the difficulties in the way of producing anything like settle- ment in the Balkan question, or, let us say, in the European L 146 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUEOPEAN POLITICS. brancli of the Eastern Question, has been the existence of mutual jealousies or even hatreds. The Greeks dislike the Austrians, partly because the Austrians are supposed to intend some day to go to Salonica, and so to cut Greater Greece in half, partly because the Austrians are the pro- tectors of Servia, and the Servians claim some part of Macedonia and Albania, which the Greeks expect rather to come to their share. On the other hand, although both the Greeks and the Bulgarians have been at various times somewhat pro-Russian and anti- Austrian, there is the most violent hatred between these two races, because Bulgaria was promised in the Treaty of San Stefano many districts which are claimed as Hellenic by Greece; and because, in short, both peoples have a longing for the same parts of Macedonia. A confederation in the Balkan provinces must mean the confederation of Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and Roumania, of which Roumania, Greece, and Servia almost equally dislike Bulgaria. Such an arrangement seemed at first sight to resemble a confederation between three not very friendly cats and an altogether hostile dog. The difficulties are still very great, but they are not so great as they were, for the dislikes are now distinctly less accentuated. King Milan has even privately suggested a personal union between Servia and Bulgaria, thus raising questions which I will dis- cuss in the next chapter. Bulgaria, too, has appointed a diplomatic agent at Athens. Unless Hungary, with her anti-Russian policy, should prevent it, Austria would still look with disfavour upon a Balkan confederation of the EUSSIA. 147 smaller Powers, and would be mclined to' join with. Russia to preyent her own permanent exclusion from the Mediterraneto coast, to which she does not at present desire to go, hut from which she does not wish to be entirely shut off. By our action at Berlin we cut the Southern Slavs in half by plant- ing Austria between Servia and Montenegro, an arrangement which does not seem likely to be permanent. The Austrian difficulty is, perhaps, the greatest difficulty which now remains in the way of confederation, and it is no difficulty in the way of the formation of a Balkan confederacy under Austrian headship. There is another incident, beside the one just named, which shows that the relations of Greece to Bulgaria are better than they were. An arrangement had been con- cluded between M. Tricoupis and the Bulgarian Govern- ment, before the deposition of Prince Alexander, for the delimitation on a map of the respective spheres of influence of Greece and Bulgaria in Macedonia. This divid- ing the skin of the beast before he is dead, which is as a rule imprudent, is perhaps necessary in the case of Turkey, to prevent those conflicts of interest, occasionally threatening even armed struggle in the field, which break out from time to time between the Greeks, the Servians, and the Bulgarians. Unredeemed E,oumania is chiefly Austrian, and therefore we hear little about the completion of the unity of the Boumanian people, although, curiously enough, the majority of the Roumanian people live outside Boumania, but the other three principal states of the Balkan peninsula are bitterly at enmity among themselves about Macedonia — Servians arrayed against Bulgarians, and Greeks against both. The troubles 148 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. in Macedonia wHcli were expected by Lord Salisbury in January last came, bowever, from none of tbese, but from Eussia as be believed. Tbe deKmitation of tbe spbere.of influence wbicb bad been arranged, of course meant an agree- ment in advance wbetber Bulgaria or Greece sbould conduct insurrection in particular villages wbenever Turkey was in extremis, and wbicb sbould annex tbem wbenever Turkey was extinct. Tbere would not be mucb desire, it appears, on tbe part of Greece to burry matters if once sbe bad a clear agreement upon tbis point. Tbe present Greek Prime Minister, at all events, would be content tbat Greece sbould wait for any number of years, provided tbat tbis question were not to be settled against ber in tbe interval. Greece asks, of course, for Janina wbicb was promised ber by tbe Powers and wbicb is one of tbe cbief cities of ber people. Sbe believes tbat Albania will gravitate towards ber, altbougb sbe is apprebensive botb of Austrian and of Italian ambition in tbat quarter ; but tbe point to wbicb sbe attacbes tbe most importance is delimitation in Macedonia, and tben sbe will be content to wait a century if need be, for, as one of ber cbief statesmen lately said, " A bundred years is notbing in tbe life of tbe Greek nation." Apparently tbe Greek dream of Constantinople is dead ; at all events it is no longer put into words. As Balkan confederation is not likely for many years to come, or is not likely soon enougb to be of effective value to stay tbe approacb of Eussia to Constantinople, we bave to admit tbat if Eussia is to be kept out of tbe Macedonian plain, Austria, witb or witbout alliances, must bar ber KUSSIA. 149 advance. Unfortunately Austria is not strong enough. As Austrians and Russians have not been tried the one against the other, it is impossible to accurately gauge quality, but roughly speaking it may be said that putting quality on one side the Russian army ought to be equal to the armies of Germany and Austria combined. The Russian annual con- tingent of the regular peace army has risen to 227,000 men, which is only slightly under those of Austria and Germany together. The Russian peace army is nominally in the present year 840,000 men, but, really, if we take into account the Cossacks permanently embodied, it amounts to 890,000 men, whilst even the smaller figure exceeds the peace armies of Austria and Germany combined. The total force of trained men which ought to be easily and rapidly mobilised by Russia, considering the figures of her contingents and the character of her miUtary system, is about 4,000,000 as against 2,000,000 for Germany, and 1,250,000 for Austria. More slowly, if she has gims for them — and guns if not in stock could probably be pretty easily obtained — Russia could place six millions of men in the field. The power of Russia to realise in fact the promise of her paper figures has recently been denied, but the necessity of taking into account the Russian military movement which began after the failures of 1878 has not been sufficiently kept in mind. If we were to credit the figures given by the German Government to the German Parliament in January last, we should believe that these results were secured by Russia at a cost exceeding the annual charge of the united army budgets of Germany and of Austria, for the official German 150 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. figures give 785,906,259 marks for Russia. But Prince Bismarck deceives the German Parliament by estimating the rouble at three shillings when it is worth less than two. It is the Russian " gold " or " metallic " rouble that is worth a little over three shillings of our money. The "silver" rouble is the paper rouble, now worth but twenty-one pence three farthings. Rau, Marga, and most, if not all, of the authorities, except the Intelligence Department book, have made the same mistake, and reckon the rouble at from 3*75 francs to 3'50 francs. On the other hand, there is a large extraordinary military expenditure in Russia which it is not easy to find in the Russian Budget, as, for example, a large part of the expenditure upon the Transcaspian Railway now being rapidly constructed by General Annenkoff ; and calls are made upon both the village communities and the provincial Zemstvoes for matters which in other countries would be at the charge of the State. In any case, however, the figure given by the German Government as 785,906,259 marks, is the figure of the Russian budget which should have been stated at 495,428,078 marks only (at the rate at which the rouble then stood ; now less) — a pretty consider- able deception practised towards the German people. Men are cheap in Russia. By whatever test we take, excepting quality, which has not yet been employed, Russia ought to be from two and a half to three times as strong as Austria. The trained cavalry of Russia is even stronger in proportion than are her numbers generally. It outnumbers the trained cavalry of Germany and of Austria together, and is sometimes even JRUSSIA. 151 said to be more than three times as numerous as that of the Dual Monarchy, although Austria-Hungary is strong in cavalry, and has almost as large a cavalry force as France. It may be assumed that Germany will not only give no cause of offence to her tremendous neighbour, but will try to avoid being compromised by Austria or by England. If she had ever to intervene as against Russia she would try to do so when Russia was already weakened by a long struggle. There are no very probable causes of war between Russia and Germany, except indeed the intensely bitter feeling between the two peoples, for Germany has ceased to concern herself with the Russification of the so-called German pro- vinces of Russia, and is herself engaged in the similar policy of Germanising Prussian Poland. Russia is well protected by fortresses against a possible German advance whilst she might be engaged elsewhere, especially by the Polish quadri- lateral, in which of Modlin, Demblin, and Terespol, the last- named is familiar to us now as Brest-Litovsk, but the others are hardly recognisable at all under their new names. Russia has lately taken to the Japanese system of frequently changing the names of cities, just as the Town Council of Paris changes those of streets. Towards Austria Russia has till lately had virtually no fortresses, and the difference is instructive, for Austria is far more likely to be her enemy than Germany. Lutzk, now to be called Michailograd, and Dubno, old places of arms, are to be re- fortified, and there is a talk of an entrenched camp, but substantially the Russian frontier towards Austria is an open one, where, instead of fortresses, Russia has troops, especially a numerous cavalry. 152 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUKOPEAN POLITICS. And yet it is on this frontier that she expects to have to fight. The meaning of this absence of fortresses upon one frontier and of their presence upon the other is, that in a war with Austria Russia expects to act on the offensive, assisted hy a Ruthenian insurrection in Gralicia ; and so she no more fortifies her frontiers against Austria than she fortifies them against Turkey. On the other hand, it may be noted that she fortifies her frontier towards Germany, so as to be able quietly to attack Austria at her will. Russia proudly refuses to fortify her capital, a fact which would be significant of her consciousness of strength, were it not that Yienna also is virtually an open town, for the fortifications were stopped owing to the objections of the town council in 1867. The probabilities are that, in the event of a war with Austria, Russia would be able to enter Gralicia, along an open frontier of more than 600 miles, and take Przemysl, Lemberg, and Cracow, in spite of the fortifications now being pressed forward with feverish haste.* Looking to the nature of the Polish climate it is to be hoped that it will not be discovered when spring comes that snow- works form the bulk of the new fortifications. The disposition of the Russian railways alone is sufficient to plainly show that she means to take the offensive. She has special reasons for occupying Galicia. She would be glad enough to keep it, because it is at the present time a gathering-place for dis- affected Poles. She would easily gain popularity there, by giving to the peasantry the lands of the Polish nobles, and thus could raise the Ruthenians. Galicia forms the road * Published 1st March. ETJSSIA. 153 towards Yienna, where the Eastern Question is to be settled. In the vast plains of G-aKcia 200,000 Russian cavalry would find a splendid field for war, and there they would be able to carry out against Austria those wonderful manoeuvres of the new dragoons with horse artillery, which the foreign officers, in 1886, were not allowed to see. The Russian manoeuvres of 1886 were conducted by forces of 40,000 men at Krasnoe Selo (for the edification of the foreign officers), and of 162,000 men, of whom nearly 20,000 were cavalry, with 528 guns, between Wilna and "Warsaw. Grermany does not put 202,000 men with 650 guns in the field at the annual autumn manoeuvres. Austria is miserably equipped with fortresses and is trying in haste to repair her deficiencies in this respect. Austria in a Gralician war with Russia would have no special advantage that I can see, save one, that, namely, of being able to raise a splendid but not very large fighting body of aristocratic Poles from other lands to serve against the hereditary enemy of their race on behalf of the least unpopular of the three partitioning Powers. No doubt Germany, with- out actually appearing to move, would quietly coUect troops on the Polish frontier and watch Russia, but it is doubtful whether she would be able to detain a very large force of Russian troops in Poland proper, except militia and garrison battalions. She could not prevent the loss of Galicia to Austria, though she might interfere to prevent the ultimate destruction of Austria as a Power. A partial dismember- ment of Austria, by a Russian annexation of Galicia, Germany might not very much regret, because Austria in Galicia protects the Poles, a course which is a permanent slur upon 164 THE PDESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. the action of Gfermany in this matter. But a further or really considerable dismemberment of Austria Germany could not permit, unless under downright fear of France. Italy would possibly not have the will, and England and the small Balkan States, (even if not divided amongst themselves or partly neutral), would not have the power, to give rapid and effective assistance to Austria in the field. Italy would be to her a more useful friend than England or the Balkan States. I have already said, in a previous chapter, that Itsilj would not save Austria gratis ; but it is not improbable that she might save or try to save her for a price, and although a curious fact, it is a fact, that Vienna is more likely to be saved from a temporary Russian occupation by Italy than by Germany. Russia is anxious to weaken, and if she cannot really weaken, then to hamper Italy, and is not unacquainted with the origin of the recent attacks upon Massowah, a fact which the French press denies, but of which the Russian newspapers boast. It is certain that Italy regards the Russian policy in the Balkan peninsula as iniquitous, as harmful to European interests generally, and as hurtful to Italian interests in particular, and that Italy would join a group of Powers to oppose it by force. If opposition by force is impossible, owing to the weakness or the fears of Austria, or even to the buying off of Austria by Russia, then Italy would join England in putting on the drag as much as possible. "Whatever may be the feeling in Hungary, it must be admitted that Austria will put up with a good deal from Russia rather than fight. She has done so in the past ; and to give a single example of RUSSIA. 155 liumiliatioii out of many, I need only mention how at various times and on various questions she had to remonstrate with the Bulgarian Government in the days of the "Russian Ministers" in Bulgaria, and received from the latter replies couched in terms of gross and intentional discourtesy. I have assumed that England would be unable to rapidly assist Austria in the field. In such a war our part, if we were drawn in, woidd probably be the same as in a single- handed war against the Russians, namely, to defend India in Central Asia, to try to raise China against Russia, and to adopt the policy of exhausting Russia by a very strong attack on Vladivostock ; but if Italy were with us, it is probable that we should be tempted by the possession of a formidable allied fleet to attack Russia in the Black Sea — an enterprise in which we should undoubtedly fail. The Russians expect to be attacked in the Black Sea, but a careful examination of the character of that sea, as well as of the Baltic, shows that not by -the strength of her fleets, but by the natural strength of her position Russia is in those directions virtually impregnable. There are some who think that the Mahom- medan population of the Caucasus might still be made use of against Russia, but this view is as obsolete a superstition as the belief in Poland. The Russian colonists of the Caucasus have now become Cossacks for military purposes, and Russia has no more patriotic people than the Black Sea and the Caucasian Cossacks. Those who think that while India could defend itself upon the Helmund the troops from England, with a Turkish army — if the Turkish alliance were obtained — should be thrown into the Caucasus in order to 156 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. prevent the despatch of troops by the Caspian towards Herat, are proposing a course which the highest authorities reject. Colonel Malleson is the chief exponent of the view which I wish to combat. I know not which, indeed, it is that he proposes — a landing at Anapa and march on Stavropol, or a landing at Poti and march on Tiflis. In the latter case we should be destroyed by fever, and in the former crushed by Russian numbers. Colonel Malleson seems to think that the Caucasus has not long been Russian. Stavropol and its district have been Russian since the seventeenth century, and Tiflis since 1801. It is the Circassian highlands which alone held out against the Russians, and into them we cannot penetrate. Or does he wish us to repeat Hobart's 1877 experiment of a Soukhoum KaH landing ? This is mere map-maker's warfare. Prom Soukhoum Kali we could go nowhere, and our spies when sent into the mountain valleys would discover that the Circassians are gone and replaced by Kouban Cossacks. But even during the Crimean War the Caucasus did not rise, though Schamyl was in his home. The Jingo plan appears to be to march on Tiflis in winter, but the Vladikavkas military road, which I know well myself, is perfectly passable in winter for Russian troops, and even the Giographie Militaire, which asserts that it is sometimes blocked by ice, admits that the interruption of communica- tions does not average more than seventeen days a year. I cannot agree in the Yate or MaUeson proposals, and feel that there is indeed no arguing with gentlemen who believe that we can make use of Persians against Russian troops.* • I -will refer in the last chapter to an answer, " The Fortnightly Eeviewer and Eussia," which appenred in Blackwood's Magazine for April. RUSSIA. 157 Whilst the Austrian military position, in spite of the desire of the Emperor for military reform, is still weak, I cannot find words too strong to praise the political ability with which the Austrian Empire is being kept at peace and kept together. The Austrian Empire is a marvel of equilib- rium. The old simile of a house of cards is exactly applic- able to its situation, and just as in the exercises of acrobats, when seven or nine men are borne by one upon his shoulders, it is rather skill than strength which sustains them ; so if we look to the Austrian constitution, which we shall have to consider in the next chapter, it is a miracle how the fabric stands at all. At the same time it is impossible for Austria, although she can maintain her stability in times of peace, to impose upon either her Russian or her Grerman neighbours as to her strength for war. Prince Bis- marck is obliged, with whatever words of public and private praise for the speeches of the Austrian and Hungarian statesmen, to add the French and Russian forces together upon his fingers, and to deduct from them the Austrian and the German, with doubts as to the attitude of Italy, and doubts as to the attitude of England. If Austria could have presented Prince Bismarck not only with an English alliance, but with an English, Turkish, and Italian alliance, he might possibly have allowed her to provoke a general war ; but with the difiiculties at- tendant upon a concession of territory to Italy, except as the last resort, and with Turkey at the feet of Russia, it was difficult for Prince Bismarck to go further than to say to Austria, " Fight by all means, if you feel your- self strong enough to beat Russia single-handed. France 158 THE PEESENT POSITION OF ETTEOPEAN POLITICS. and Germany will ' see all fair,' and you can hardly expect anybody effectually to help you." Prince Bismarck deals with foreign affairs on the principles upon which they were dealt with by King Henry VIII. of England, when that king was pitted against the acutest intellects of the Empire and of France. His policy is a plain and simple policy, and not a policy of astuteness and cunning, and almost necessarily at the present time consists in counting heads. A good deal of indignation has been lately wasted in England upon the Turk. The Turk may be frightened by Russian pressure from the Caucasus, a territory which, instead of being a military weakness to Russia, as the ill- informed suppose, is in fact a splendid base for offensive operations ; or the Turk may be bribed by the promise of getting Bosnia back ; but in reality his position is a very painful one, for he is weak, and he would be between the hammer and the anvil whichever side he took, and woidd suffer about ec[ually either way. No one who knows the present state of the Turkish Empire can suppose that Turkey could effectively deal with a Russian attack by Erzeroum and an insurrection in Macedonia, not to speak of a rising in Crete and a permanent revolution in Arabia. The efforts of the last war have left Turkey weak ; and although in the course of a few months, if they were given to us, we could collect and ourselves arm and equip a Turkish army which would prove a formidable force, the time would not be given to us, and long before anything could be done Macedonia would be in flames and Asia Minor would be overrun. ETTSSIA. 159 Bosnia attracts the Sultan most. It is usual to say that his first consideration is for his fears, hut his Majesty has a temper, too, and the loss of Bosnia is laid to Lord Salisbury's account, and Lord Salisbury has never been forgiven. The Sultan has always maintained, to his intimates, that he was led to assent to the Asia Minor Convention under false pre- tences, because he had not been told that England was going to propose at Berlin that Bosnia should go to Austria, an alienation of his territory which the Russians had not suggested in the Treaty of San Stefano. He says he had not been told that the territory was to be taken, and that still less would it have occurred to him that the proposition was to be made by England to the Powers. It is a curious fact that by giving Bosnia to Austria England offended equally the Slavs and the Turks. Russia reassures the Sultan as to the probability of war, and for the present reassures him with some truth. In spite of the stories which have lately gone the round of the Euro- pean press as to Russian mobilisation on the frontier of Roumania, it is probable that Russia will no longer pursue the policy of tearing off bits of Turkey, in order to set up small States which forthwith turn against her, but will sup- port Turkey's life-interest in that property which she regards as her own in reversion. As I pointed out in the second chapter, the Sultan may become a dependent, like the Emir of Bokhara. The Russians at this moment desire most a friendly Turkey, which will keep England out of the Black Sea in time of war. I grant to Colonel Malleson that the Russians themselves thiak that we could harm 160 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. theni in the Caucasus and keep them out of Asia Minor by cutting their maritime supply-line across the Black Sea. The day to which they look forward, in which they could prevent our sending our troops to Kurachee by the Suez Canal, in a war in which France was not with them, and by their advances in Asia could prevent our making the Euphrates road, lies further in the future. "We have now to consider the direct bearing upon English policy of the subjects which have come before us in this chapter. England is free from engagements; for that to Turkey, as regards the Armenian frontier, is conditional, and the condition has never been fulfilled. "We are free to select our alliances as we please. But we are so little prepared for war that no Power thinks our alliance worth having for a short war, and it is the first days of a war that count at the present time. Making a virtue of necessity, there are many in England who begin no longer to regard Constantinople as a British interest of the first magnitude, although they stiU talk of joining Austria for the purpose of defending the independence of the Balkan States. The Turk's disappear- ance, they say, should be as gradual as possible, in order to give time to the Christian States to consolidate their interests and form a confederacy. Bulgaria would have gone to Russia of herself, they think, as Servia. has gone a long way towards Austria, if the Russians had not foolishly alienated, by their autocratic fashions, the affections of the Bulgarian people ; but as they have done so we should take advantage of the sentiment, and while we should allow Russia to work RUSSIA. 16X her will upon Asiatic Turkey, we should protect the young States of the Balkans. Eussia could reach Constantinople through Asia, not so directly, but more surely and more safely than through Europe. There is this additional danger to England in her going by way of Asia, that she does not interfere with Austria, and that, on the other hand, she does interfere with the Canal route through Egypt, If Russia were once to establish herself in Palestine she could easily reach the Suez Canal by land, and although the distances are great, if we look to what has been accomplished by Russia in the Caucasus, towards Persia, in Central Asia, and towards China, in the last hundred years, we shall not feel that in the days of telegraphy and railroads such an advance is in the least impossible. By whatever route the Russians go, there are certain obvious drawbacks to this country attendant upon their possession of Constantinople. The military value of the Suez Canal, as I have shown before, may easily be exaggerated, and so may the importance, therefore, to us of our power of passage in time of general war through the Mediterranean. But there is one loss by a Russian occupa- tion of the remainder of the Turkish dominions which no British Grovernment would willingly face. It is the loss of trade. In the Asiatic provinces acquired by Russia at the end of the last Turkish war, where there used to be a con- siderable British trade, there is now none, for it has been killed by protective duties. Russia at Constantinople would mean our exclusion from the Black Sea trade, except the wheat trade out of Russia. Our commercial interests in M 162 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUEOPBAN POLITICS. Asia Minor are very large, and they are placed in jeopardy by a further Russian advance. There are many who declare that they would be willing to bring about an Anglo-Russian alliance upon the terms of giving Russia her head in the direction of Constantinople, on the understanding that our north-western Indian frontier should be secured and our temporary hold on Egypt regular- ised and made permanent. It is pointed out that the Emperor can have no great love for an alliance with French Republicans and ex-friends of Poland against his great-uncle and the military monarchies of Central Europe; and that what this new policy on our part would mean would be the adoption by us, under stress of circumstances, of the Russian policy advocated , by the Emperor Nicholas to Sir Hamilton Seymour. In the present state of parties in England, where the pure Conservatives are unable to obtain a clear majority, and where the Liberals are supposed to have more or less pro-Russian sympathies, the opinions of Lord Randolph Churchill become of special interest, and, except as regards Egypt, he is supposed to incline in the direc- tion which has just been indicated. He used to hold that Lord Beaconsfield's policy of 1878 was a mischievous and foolish policy. He was opposed at the time of the Berlin Treaty to any attempt to reconstruct the Turkish Empire. He always ridiculed the predominance on the Conservative side of the doctrine of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire ; and, in short, he thought that in the days of Jingoism the English Conservative party had gone mad. There can be no doubt that the old-fashioned ideas RUSSIA. 163 of English policy in tlie East are at a discount ; and although I do not myself agree in the novel views which have lately been put forward with regard to the possession by Hussia of Constantinople, it is impossible to deny that they have been stated with much ability and by journals of great influence, and that they have weight with an increasing section of the public. Moreover, the English electors have a natural and a growing dislike to war. On the other hand, I am inclined to think that a policy which would risk the loss of a trade which is almost exclusively English, namely, the foreign trade of Asia Minor, is not likely to be popular in the manufacturing centres of the north of England. There are other points which should be considered. If the Black Sea can be forced by our fleet, or entered through the permission of Turkey acting as our ally, the Russians in any future war with England will have to keep in the Caucasus a vast force which would otherwise be available for service in Afghanistan and Persia. This would be the case even though I should be right in my belief that we could not succeed in harming Russia in the Caucasus; she certainly must and would guard against the danger. The possession by Russia of a magnificent military and naval base within the Dardanelles would destroy our present power of using the Suez Canal, even in a war with Russia in which France was neutral, and would also make of the pick of the maritime Greeks, who are now our friends, her servants. Russia once at Constantinople, our future hold on India must be by the Cape route alone, and it is a long way round by the Cape to m2 164 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. the points where we shall have to fight for India — the Helmund and the Persian Gulf. The causes of difficulty between this country and Eussia are worth examination, and those which have nothing to do with the continued existence of the Turkish Empire or with the possession of Constantinople are very numerous. One standing difficulty between Eussia and all Liberal countries concerns the extradition of political offenders. The question has been very useful to Prince Bismarck in the past, because he has always tried to give full satisfaction to the Eussian feelings upon this point, a satisfaction which never could be fully given by any other country. For many years this question prevented all chance of a Eusso-French alliance, and maintained a close friendship between Germany and Eussia. As regards ourselves, our laws have always been an enigma to Eussian emperors since the days of Matveief's creditors and "Whitworth's special embassy. After 1848 the whole of the European Powers united in making representations to us with regard to the proceedings of the foreign refugees, and from 1851 up to Mazzini's death, repeated representations, often menacing, were addressed to us with regard to supposed incitements to assassination. The fall of Palmerston on the Conspiracy to Murder Bill was not encouraging to future ministers in regard to interfering with the right of asylum, and no more was the verdict of "not guilty " returned by the jury in the case of Dr. Bernard and the Orsini attempt to assassinate the Emperor of the French. The Eussian •Government in the last few years has made repeated appli- RUSSIA. 165 cations to the Governments of France and England for protection against conspirators who made Paris or London their residence, but the English Government has turned a deaf ear to the requests made for legislation. A subject which has done more to separate the countries than the refusal to modify our law upon the subject of the extradition of political offenders has been the recent Russian action with regard to Batoum, and the confirmation given by that action to the English belief that Russia will never be bound by promises, however solemn. Those who pretend that Russia's declaration with regard to Batoum was really a spontaneous act can never have read the protocols of the Berlin Congress. The latter portion of Lord Beaconsfield's speech upon p. 208 of the English Blue Book, and the speeches upon the same and next page of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, and Turkey, show that the whole of Europe took the view that Russia had promised, rather than break up the Congress, to maintain Batoum as what Lord Beaconsfield called " a commercial port for all nations " by " the transformation. ... of a disputed fortress into a free port." It is really idle for any friends of Russia to argue that a formal engagement has not been broken, indeed it is almost an insult to our intelli- gence that they should do so, and in the interest of Russia herself it would be wiser for them to admit that Russia has violated a binding declaration, only the more binding in honour because it professed to be voluntary in its nature. Similar bad faith has been shown from time to time 166 THE PEESENT POSITION OE EUROPEAN POLITICS. by tte Russians in Central Asia, and has exasperated Englisli feeling. The first of the marked instances of the disregard by Russia of her own assurances to us concerned, oddly enough, the occupation of Herat by Persia, an occupation which forty years later an English Conservative Government themselves proposed. The deceitful conduct of Count Simonich was imitated in the disregard of Prince Gortscha- koff's assurances to Lord Clarendon in 1869 as to the evacuation of Samarcand, in the violation of the promises made to Lord Granville as to the Khivan expedition, in the disregard of the memorandum communicated to Lord Derby in 1875 as to advance beyond the then frontier of the Attrek, and in the disregard of the repeated assurances with regard to Merv. The story of the successive steps by which Persia has been made to quit the Turcoman desert and has come more and more under Russian influence will never be fully known, but we have learned at least one fact, that it is not prudent for England to enter upon a game of secret treaties. In 1878 the proposals made to Persia to occupy Herat were at once made known to Russia, whereas the secret articles by which the territory down to Sarakhs was ceded by Persia to Russia were never made known to us. The fact is that Persia does not believe that we both can and will support her against Russia, and Turkey has now only become another Persia in this respect. Afghanistan, which was going the same way, has been secured by a direct guarantee of her frontiers, a fact which is not encouraging to those politicians who object to entanglements of the kind. ETJSSIA. 167 Another cause of difference between Russia and Gfreat Britain lies in the unsettled condition of the Afghan frontier question, which has for a long time made little progress. The boundary between the Heri-Rud and the Oxus has not yet been settled, and that on the Upper Oxus is altogether in dispute, while Russia is giving trouble to the Ameer by intrigue at Balkh and throughout Badakshan. The feeHng in Russia against England is strong, but not of extreme strength. It is nothing like so strong as the popular feeKng in Russia against the Germans. It is not so strong as the permanent aversion entertained in France towards the English. Still as regards the armies and the upper classes of both countries, there can be no doubt about the mutual feeling. The national badge of Russia and of England is the George and Dragon, for St. George is a national saint of both the countries, but in Russia for the last fifty years the dragon has meant England, and in England for the last fifty years the dragon has meant Russia. As regards the military situation between the countries, its dangers are both exaggerated and imperfectly appre- ciated here. The very same people will often be found to think that we could easily, if we would, act upon the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Convention and keep the Russians out of Turkish Asia Minor, that we could defend Constantinople, harry the Russians in the Baltic and the Black Sea and the "White Sea, and yet that Russia could invade India without much difficulty. It may be confidently asserted that they are wrong upon both these heads. 168 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. England unassisted cannot keep Russia out of Turkey, sHe cannot get at ter in Europe, but on tlie otter liand she may feel assured that Russia is unable to effectively attack her in her Asiatic empire at the present time. It must be admitted that in the race for Herat Russia has undoubtedly beaten us, and that therefore we must con- template -the possibility of the ultimate occupation of Herat by Russia. But as she came on towards India from Herat the tables would be turned. She would be further and further away from the country where her government was established or where the people were friendly to her rule, and she would plunge into defiles inhabited by hostile populations. It is a serious responsibility for a writer who is not a soldier to imdertake to pronounce a confident opinion of this kind, for it is a point upon which the ablest and best-instructed soldiers differ. English officers as a rule maintain the possibility of. a formidable Russian invasion of India, and on the other hand Russian officers as a rule deny that it is practically possible ; but it must be confessed that, whilst military writers generally take a pessimistic view of the prospects of their own country, the indications afforded by the writings of officers belonging to neither of the two countries make against my personal view as set forth above. Foreign military writers, as a rule, do not so highly estimate the difficulties of a Russian advance upon India as do the Russians themselves. They maintain that forces advancing from the Oxus and from the Cau- casus would meet at Sarakhs, and would easily occupy RUSSIA. 169 Herat, and then bring the railway almost to Herat, before the English could have put 40,000 men at Quetta. Another Russian army would take the more difficult line of advance southward from Siberia through Balkh. They calculate that England, did she give up all idea of fighting in Europe and on the Pacific, and did she confine her atten- tion to the advance on India, would only be able to place another 40,000 men in the field at the end of three months from the declaration of war. These would be troops sent from England, and the calculations of foreign writers may be affected by the promised reform in our arrangements for the prompt mobilisation of two army corps. The continental writers assume that by the use of Goorkhas and other special native troops the native army could be kept quiet, that is kept from turning against us in the field, and even used for keeping up communications, but that its quality is not good enough to allow of its being used against Russian troops. They assume that the Eng- lish position in India being perfectly known to the Rus- sians, while the Russian position in Central Asia is not well known to the English, the Russians might be able by the use of money to produce some troubles which might lead to railway and other difficulties upon the lines of communication. It is assumed also that the English con- centration would take place on the Helmund or at Kandahar, and that the Russians could advance, without serious molestation either from the English or the Afghans, up to near that point. The Russian numbers in the Caucasus being practically without limit, it is assumed that by the use 170 THE PEESENT POSITIOK OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. of the steam tramway* wHicli they are rapidly making towards their frontier over a very easy country the Russians could place any conceivable number of men upon the Upper Mur- * The following letter, founded upon this passage, appeared in the Eort- nightly Eeview for 1st April : — Sm, — Allow me to correct a statement made in the March number of the !Fortnightly Eeriew in Part III. of the series of papers entitled, "The Present Position of European Politics." The author, whilst speaking of the Eussian means of communication with Central Asia, calls the Trans- caspian Eailway a steam tramway, an expression which I cannot pass over in silence for the two following reasons. (1) I published in the preceding number of the same periodical a paper entitled, ' ' The Transcaspian Eail- way," in which I tried to give a detailed account of the construction and of the importance of this new iron link of connection between Eussia and her Central Asian possessions ; a road which deserres by no means the trifling appellation of a steam tramway, being as it is a solidly well-built line of three hundred and thirty-five versts in length, and having cost 40,050,000 roubles. (2) Without any right to inquire into the authorship of the said series of papers which have excited so much attention throughout Europe, there are many reasons for the supposition that the man who penned them must have been or is intimately connected with State afiairs, or at least with State papers, which are not accessible to everybody. The author was, or is therefore, a man of important position, and such a man cannot be allowed to mislead public opinion by sUghtiug a formidable arm in the hands of your rival. The mistake evidently has arisen from the fact that the first portion of the Transcaspian Eailway, planned for the transport of ammunition and provisions to the Russian army operating before Geok- Tepe, was in reality a narrow-gauge railway built for temporary use during 1880 — 81, and the calming words used in Parliament in 1882 by the then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs were, as the present shows, not quite justified. But since that time things have greatly changed. The provisional line from Mikhailowsk to KizQ-Arvat has had to be totally reconstructed, and, far from being a steam tramway, it is now a well-built railway fuUy able to answer aU expectations of Eussia in a future war against England. Tours faithfully, A. VAMBfeT. Professor Vambery is wrong. I do not call "the Transcaspian Eailway a steam tramway." At page 150 I speak of " the Transcaspian Eailway now being rapidly constructed by General Annenkofl." Here I speak of ' ' the steam tramway which they are rapidly making towards their frontier over a very easy country," and of "the Upper Murghab." The earlier reference is to the line now being made from Chaharjui to Bokhara and RUSSIA. 171 ghab,* wliere they would be faced by au EngKsh force of 80,000 men with 200 guns at Kandabar. Assuming tbat we were at war with Russia only, the troops would come through the Mediterranean, but if we were at war as one of a coalition with a coalition in which either France or Italy was against us, this route could not be used, and they must come round the Cape. If we were trying to hold Egypt against France the whole of these calculations fall to the ground, inasmuch as the force which could otherwise be sent from England to India would have to be kept in the Mediterranean or in Egypt. The foreign observers assume that the native army is not sufficiently trustworthy to allow those few regiments which are capable of fighting against Russians to be sent out of India, but that if the Goorkhas and the best of the Punjaub cavalry were to be sent to Kandahar the number of the army there must be diminished by an equal number of British troops left in India to take care of the communications and of the ordinary Sepoys. The Russian army advancing from Balkh, which would bring with it light guns only, would occupy Cashmere and threaten the Punjaub sufficiently to require an increase in the Punjaub frontier force and in the garrison of Peshawur, but the main struggle would take Samaroand, which runs not towards ' ' their frontier, ' ' or towards the ' ' Upper Murghab," but away from both. The later reference is to the steam tram- way which is being constructed towards the south-east from Askabad. This is at present a narrow-gauge, light, cheap line. * The willingness of the Russians to spend money freely upon their Cen- tral Asian railroads is remarkable, as we may see from their laying down hundreds of miles of piping to bring water from the mountains for the engines which work them. 172 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. place in the neighbourliood of Kandahar. Foreign writers think that Russia, having in the eyes of the Indian people the advantage of the advance and of the attack against a Power remaining on the defensive only, would have the sympathies of the Oriental population on her side. They assume that the Turcoman cavalry, which are excellent, and which, while animated hy strong Mahommedan feelings, are now enthusiastically Russian, would mask the Russian advance with a force which would conciliate the native population. They believe that the Russian organisation in Central Asia has been a marvellous success, and that the native princes of India think that the Russians would respect the usages of the people more thoroughly than we do. They assert that the late Maharajah of Cashmere was, as might be expected, in Russian pay, a fact confirmed by my own knowledge of recent Russian intrigue with deposed and exiled princes from the Punjaub.* The whole of these views, though they are held by many foreign writers, appear to me exaggerated. I believe in the superior popularity of England among the native princes to any which may be thought to be enjoyed by Russia. I doubt whether the Russians have more than a few hun- dred Turcoman cavalry ready for a long march; but, above all, I think that Russia would have, for some years to come, far more difficulty in finding the enormous train which would be necessary for marching 100,000 men across from Herat to Kandahar than we should find in supplying an army of 80,000 men at Kandahar, which * One of these intrigues has lately become puhlio property. RUSSIA. 173 would be sufficient to hold in check the advance of 100,000 Russians from the Caucasus and 20,000 from Turkestan. The difficulties of ohtaining camels and mules enough to move large armies in such deserts are largely, no doubt, money difficulties, but they are partly difficulties which even money will not meet, unless the money is spent for many years in advance in the formation of a permanent train upon an enormous scale. Keal danger to India can only come after some revo- lution in Herat, or a dexterous use of Ayoub Khan, has brought Russia there as peacemaker, after years of Russian possession of the Herat valley have restored it to its former fertility under irrigation, and Herat has been made a secure base for an advance, connected by railway both with the Caspian and with Turkestan. Herat will doubt- less be taken one day by a sudden rush, for though something in the way of fortification has been done there of late, it is not properly protected by a suffi- cient number of detached forts, and cannot stand. But the end will not be yet. The present ruler of Afghanistan, in spite of his long residence in Russia, never was pro- Russian, and may be trusted in the event of a Russian in- vasion. He, if stUl on the throne, would ask us to supply his army with the newest arms, and would place a large force in line with us at Giriskh or Kandahar, as well as do something to defend Herat. He is a powerful and able king. But he has an internal disease ; his end may be hastened by poison, and in any case he is not likely to live long. Herat lies out of the Afghan country, and is an Afghan post, a little in the air, which, with a "mobilisa- 174 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. tion" on foot, which takes six months to accomplish, the Afghan cannot efficiently defend. Our troops would reach Giriskh from England before the Ameer would reach Herat from Kandahar or from Cabul. I shall, however, consider in the last chapter whether it has not become necessary for England to adopt a more modern military organisation, which, without imposing upon her heavier monetary sacrifices, would enable her better to perform her obligations— such as that defence of the Afghan frontier to which she is now resolutely bound. In the great efforts which England would put forth in the event of war with Russia, an attack upon Yladivostock could only be a matter of time. Even if we had to pour the whole of our available forces into India to be sent up to Kandahar, the embodied militia and the new forces raised in England would within a few months give us troops for an expedition of the kind. Those foreign observers who doubt the possibility of our holding our own upon the Afghan frontier admitted the significance of our occupa- tion of Port Hamilton, and have been amazed at its abandon- ment. The Russians, creeping down the coast after the • annexation of the district round Yladivostock, and of the island of Saghalien and the archipelago between Saghalien and Kamschatka, were casting eyes towards the Corea. Port Hamilton was wisely occupied as a base from which, with or without a Chinese alliance, Russia could be attacked on the Pacific, No doubt the occupation of windy and desolate stations is a nuisance to the navy in a time of peace ; but to let Port Hamilton go, upon any promises. RUSSIA. 175 unless witL. the clearest possible treaty understanding that it would at once be strongly fortified by China, and that China would continue to be friendly to ourselves, was, in face of the difficulty of successfully attacking Russia in other portions of the globe, simple madness. It is vital to us that we should have a coaling station and a base of operations within reach of Vladivostock and the Amoor at the beginning of a war, as a guard-house for the protection of our China trade and for the prevention of a sudden descent upon our colonies ; ultimately as the head station for our Canadian Pacific railroad trade j and at all times, and especially in the later stages of the war, as an offensive station for our main attack on Russia. But it must be, of course, a defended station, and not one to which our fleet would be tied for the purpose of its defence.* It is possible that Japan might be tempted, by the offer of Saghalien, which we could easily detach from Russia, to join us in the war, and her alliance would be useful. But that of China would be essential, and whether she required to be guaranteed in the possession of our conquests in the Pacific and on the Amoor, or whether she asked for Upper Burmah, her alliance ought at all hazards to be secured. China and England have identical interests in Asia, and they are menaced by Russia in an equal degree. They trade together to an extraordinary extent, and are more closely alHed by trade than are any other two countries in the world. Surely these considerations point to a permanent * Sir William Dowell, referring to Sir Cooper Key's opinion in favour of the occupation, Bays that if it were "made a first class fortress, I should certainly advocate its retention." 176 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. alKance between the countries. England could have no objection to the increase of German influence in China ; but the test of the success of English influence at Pekin will be found from time to time in the choice of Sir Robert Hart's successors. The conclusion, then, to which we come is, that such is the patriotism of the Russian people, such the certainty that in the event of war Nihilism would disappear, and every Russian support the policy of his Tsar, such the defensive strength of Russia in Europe, such her offensive power from the Caucasus towards India, that not only is war with Russia to be deprecated as a terrible calamity, but that it would strain the powers of the British Empire to the utmost. At the same time I hold, as will have been seen, that even in a single-handed struggle we should ultimately win ; that we should be able, although only by a tremendous effort, to hold our own in the neighbourhood of Kandahar, to prevent insurrection in India, and to check invasion; that we could not unassisted save Turkey, if Turkey were menaced in the war ; that as against other Powers we could not hold Egypt or save the Mediterranean route ; but that, holding India and the Mauritius and the Cape, we could carry the war into the enemy's country on the Pacific and destroy, at all events at any time during the life of those now living, Russia's power on the Pacific, and, indeed, probably tear away the Pacific provinces from her empire. With all respect to Lord Randolph Churchill, this hardly seems the time for reducing the defensive power of the Empire. It was with Lord George Hamilton that at Christ- EUSSIA. 177 mas last he had his sharpest struggle. Now Lord George Hamilton was unduly optimistic ia his recent speeches. The defences of the empire have for some time past been played with a Kttle by the two great parties ia the State. Taking the navy for example, when the Liberals are in, the Tories declare that the fleet is non-existent, but the moment their turn comes the Tory First Lord informs us that the British navy is equal to any three navies in the world. So too with the occupation of Port Hamilton and the fortification of our coaUng stations generally. But the navy is not the only part of our warlike services which even Liberals should have in view. We m.ay dislike the fact as much as we choose, but we are not now an island Power. By the, in my opinion, unfortunate prolongation of our Egyptian occupation we have increased our military responsibilities, and without that occupation they were none too light. Even disregarding the Anglo-Turkish Convention, as it is gener- ally admitted we must, our responsibiKties are still very great. The defence of India we cannot disregard ; and the defence of India of itself will, as I have shown, in the opinion of foreign observers, prove too much for us ; and in the opinion of qualified English military judges at all events tax our powers to the utmost. There is cause for anxiety in the stiU unsettled condition of the Central Asian frontier question, on which Parliament has been kept in the dark since the appearance of "Central Asia, No. 5 of 1885." No. 6 was laid on the table and was ordered to be printed, but it was, I believe, afterwards withdrawn, and Parliamen- N 178 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. tary curiosity seems to have been confined to quarters nearer home. The Russians are at this moment strongly entrenched at Zulfikar* and at Akrobat, and the boundary is still unsettled. War, however, not between England and Eussia only, but war generally is it may be hoped likely to be avoided. Ifo sufficient cause has been shown for the coming upon Europe of so terrible a calamity ; but war will not be made less likely by our weakly yielding to the other Powers upon such questions as that of the violation of engagements to us in the case of the IN'ew Hebrides ; and the interests of the empire will not be best promoted by attempting to save sixpences upon the artillery or upon the navy. With regard to the army, we should be led too far if we attempted at this point to discuss the principle which ought to preside over its reorganisation. This may be left by me for treat- ment in the last chapter, that on the position of England. It is enough for the present to say that the reduction in the British horse artillery is not only the death-knell of British intervention for the preservation of Belgian neutra- lity, but constitutes in itself an increase of the standing temptation to Russia to attack us in Hindostan. Horse artillery is the most difficult of all arms to improvise under pressure. * In tlie middle of April a Eeuter's telegram announced ia England that theJJuBsiaus were advancing to Zulfikar, but they have teen there for a long time, and in the month of March the commandant at Zulfikar -was received in audience by the Emperor at St. Petersburg. IV. AUSTRIA-HUNGAEY. The appearance of this chapter * is synchronous with the expiration of that compromise between Austria and Hungary as to customs duties, which lies at the root of the finan- cial position of the Dual Monarchy. The resignation of the Hungarian Finance Minister and the fresh arrange- ments between the Cis-Leithan Empire and the Trans- Leithan Kingdom upon the basis proposed by the Hungarian Prime Minister form not only a victory of M. Tisza over Count Szapdry, but a gain of power to the former, which makes him master for the time being in the Empire. He holds, or virtually holds, for the moment as many great ministerial offices as the Duke of Wellington held at the time when " H. B." represented a meeting of the Cabinet at which all the ministers had the well-known nose. The Hungarian Cabinet appears to the world to consist of M. Tisza only, who when he came to power some twelve or thirteen years ago was expected immediately to fall, but who seems only to have become more powerful day by day. Both halves of the Empire have now adopted the measures of defence which the * Fortnightly Meview, 1st April, 1887. n2 180 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. Austro-Huiigariaii Government considered necessary. The fortifications of Cracow, upon which vast numhers of civilian workmen were employed in February and March, are now complete. The Landwehr and the Honveds have been armed, and coats have been purchased for the Landsturm. The war preparations which have been made are such as ought to have been made some years ago, such as it was most dangerous to have been without, and the absence of which in the past was caused solely by the difficulties of the financial situation. Even under the terror inspired by the recent concentration of Russian cavalry upon the frontier of Galicia — a concentra- tion officially denied in Austria, but well known to the Austrian Government to exist — the votes granted have been less in proportion than the votes secured by the Roumanian Government from the Chamber of Deputies in that country. Yet no one can suppose that the danger which menaces Austria is less than that which overshadows Roumania, for the Polish Jews, who according to Prince Bismarck were created by Heaven for the express and sole purpose of serv- ing as spies on Russia, have done their work too accurately. If we wish to obtain an authoritative view of the situation in Austria-Hungary, it is not so easy, as it is in the case of some other countries, to know whom to consult or where to turn. Strong as may be the Austrian and Himgarian states- men who are in power ; strong in the possession of parlia- mentary popularity and parliamentary majorities as may be the Hungarian President of Council ; the Austrian President of Council, Count TaafEe ; the Common Minister of Finance, M. Kdllay; or the Common Minister for Foreign Affairs, ATJSTEIA-HTJNaARY. 181 Count Kalnoky ; they are all of them compelled by the difficulties of the situation of the Dual Monarchy to use temporising language, and to avoid anything like frankness of speech or expression of real intention. On the other hand, although Buda-Pest has at least one very powerful journal in the Pester Lloyd, and although Vienna is of all the capitals of Europe essentially the newspaper capital, yet there is a very marked difference of tone between the newspapers of the Austrian and those of the Hungarian capital. In the absence of guidance it is by no means certain to which we ought to look as indicating the probable lines of the future policy of the Empire as a whole. The Fremdenhlatt, Neue Freie Presse, and many others that could be named of almost equal power, have, like the Pester Lloyd, an European fame ; but then, unfortunately, the great Hungarian journal and those well-known Yienna sheets contradict one another, not so much in words as in the general tone of their writing. Looking to the fact that some of the journals which write above all of the necessity to Austria of peace, and some of those which call at times for instant war with Russia, should she place a single soldier in Bulgaria, are equally supposed to enjoy official inspiration, it is useless to try to gather the policy of the Austrian Empire from the journals of the two capitals. One paper, indeed, there is in Vienna, the Politische- Correspondenz — if I may be permitted to speak of that most secret-revealing of all European sheets as a newspaper, as it is in fact in the highest possible degree, though hardly, perhaps, in form — which tells us much, and is always well worth reading, but tells us more of facts than of tendencies. 182 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. Tie difficulty is very largely explained when we remember that Austria and Hungary do not in reality agree, and that neither of them very clearly sees her way. Hungary, partly from old traditions, partly from the memories of '48-9, partly from her exposed situation in the middle of an enormous mass of Slavs, is bitterly anti-Russian, and therefore warlike. Austria is anti-E.ussian too, but with a distinct peace note, and with a certain desire to patch up matters of dispute, and to make ties of friendship, if they will not last for ever, at all events last some time. There is always a doubt which of the two policies is to prevail. Parliamentary control grows stronger in the Dual Monarchy year by year ; yet this does but increase its difficulties. The Magyars are a military people, and proud of their king and of his army. The Croats of the Banat share these views, but detest their Magyar exponents, and the Diet of Agram is a thorn in the side of Hungary. The Tsechs of Bohemia and the Poles of Galicia also support the army and the Austrian Emperor, although with a desire to see the Emperor crowned king of the kingdoms of Bohemia and Galicia respectively, and a tripar- tite or a quadrilateral form given to the Dual Monarchy. But these feelings of loyalty to the sovereign and of glory in the army, which have hitherto held Austria-Hungary together, are greatly weakened by constitutional control; for even as matters stand Ministers are pulled both ways by combinations of minorities, forming what we may call scratch majorities without a common guiding principle. They are driven to attempt to meet their difficulties, like the Federalist Prime Minister, of Austria, Count TaafEe, whose Irish extrac- AUSTEIA-HUNGAEY. 183 tion is perhaps too remote to account for his Home Rule views, by further concessions to nationalities and further divisions of Parliaments, and in any case the increase of parliamentary activity and power will tend to increase the existing division between Hungary and Austria. Count Kdlnoky's concessions in the Hungarian Delegation, which have increased the constitutional element in the practical working of the Hungarian Constitution, are not, therefore, viewed with unmixed satisfaction even by the Constitution- alists of Austria. The necessities of the situation which lie upon the surface are those which have been iadicated iu the first and third chapters. Austria-Hungary needs quiet ; first and above all because of the state of her finances, and in the next place because, as has been seen in the last chapter, she is not in a military sense equal to the strain of war with Russia. But unfortunately for her she is in a domestic situation which further enforces the necessity of peace. The mixture in the Austrian Empire of the Slav and German races, and in the Hungarian Kingdom of the Slavs, the Mag- yars, and the Roumans ; the strong Catholicism of a great part of old Austria and Croatia and Bohemia; the strong Protestantism of a large section of the Magyars — all these are securities against downright rapacity on the part of the two most powerful neighbours of Austria-Hungary. But on the other hand they enormously increase the difficulties of government. Germany cannot wish to tear from Austria the Archduchy of Austria or the Duchy of Styria, or Carinthia, or Salzburg, or North Tyrol, where there are 184 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. altogether between four and five millions of Germans, on account of the violent Slav feeling in the Margraviate of Moravia and in the Kingdom of Bohemia, which separate Grerman Austria from Germany. Prince Bismarck perfectly knows that the Slavism of the Tsechs would become Russianism if they were annexed to Germany, and he can hardly desire to iacrease his religious difficulties by annexing Catholics so strong as the Catholics of German Austria and of the inter- vening strip, or his other difficulties by annexing the Socialists of the suburbs of Vienna. Russia, too, which might easily swallow the Ruthenians of Eastern Galicia and of part of Bukowina, and possibly, although with more difficulty, the Catholic PoKsh Slavs and the Jews of Western Galicia, certainly could not digest the Magyars of the Hungarian plain, nor even the Roumans and the " Saxons " of the ex-Principality of Transylvania. Just as Germany cannot step across Bohemia and Moravia and a corner of Silesia, where there are seven mUlions of Slavs, to get to Central Austria, so the Russians cannot swallow up the Magyars and the Roumans to get to the Croats of the Banat and the Slovenes of the Engdom of Dalmatia. "When nationalities are considered from the annexing point of view, that excellent Berlin professor, unrivalled for his combination of map-making and ethno- graphy — Dr. Kiepert — becomes a sort of saviour of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But there is the reverse of the medal, and that mixture of races and reKgions, which in one sense secures the continued existence of a something which shall be called Austria, makes that Austria full of discordant ATJSTEIA-HUNGARY. 185 elements, wliich have difEerent sets of powerful friends out- side her territory to whom they turn for advice and with whom they continually intrigue. The result is that Austria- Hungary is, of aU the countries in the world, by far the most difficult to govern, and that as a necessity of her condition she must before aU things long for peace. The German and Italian alliance was for Austria not a matter of choice but of absolute necessity, and however little direct advantage she may appear to gain from it, it may be confidently asserted that that alliance will continue. The more doubtful point is, given the fact that Germany, menaced on the one flank by Russia and on the other by France, is now only strong enough to hold her own, how far Austria will go in the direction of concession to Russia rather than draw the sword. A few months ago some sanguine and belligerent English- men were disposed to think that the prospect of an English alliance, even standing by itself, was likely to put an end to the hesitation and the doubts of Austria. Now, an Italian alliance may be of great value to Austria, as I shall attempt to show in the next chapter. An English alliance, for those military reasons which I shall have to discuss in my concluding chapter, and which are perfectly known to Austrian statesmen, would, I fear, be regarded by them as of less instant value than an alliance with Roumania. The power of England at sea is absolutely useless in an Austrian alliance to save Austria from the immediate con- sequences of war. The power of England upon land, during the two months which probably would be sufficient for the Russian advance, may be looked upon as non-existent; 186 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. whereas the Eoumanians can place 150,000 men in line, who are admirably officered and trained, and have the solidity of German troops. The view which I have taken of the military power of Russia is looked upon as exaggerated. The subject is worth inquiry, as the chances are that we shall find ourselves at war with Russia one of these days ; and the comparison of Austrian and Russian military forces is also of much interest, inasmuch as war between these two Great Powers is not likely to be long avoided. It is also personally important to ourselves, inasmuch as, if we have to look forward to the possibility of having to fight Russia, it would obviously be better to fight her with allies, that is with Austria, than to fight her alone. I fear that time will show that those who believe that Austria can hold her own against Russia are as wrong as are, I believe, those who hold, upon the other hand, that Russia is invulnerable by Great Britain in a single- handed war. Various military writers compute the real military power of the various countries of Europe in very different ways; and it is not easy to arrive at a common standard. "When, for example, we discuss the military power of Italy we have to some extent to deal with the unknown. Italy pretends to have a number of " instructed men " far more than double that of Austria, and exceeding by 100,000 the number possessed by Germany ; but this may be looked upon as a statistical romance ; and we are obliged to consider in detail the speeches of General Ricotti, who is at least a competent authority upon military figures, and who well knows the real strength of that army which many years ago AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 187 he himself did much to create. He talks about the possibility of mobilising twelve corps, and of putting in aU 600,000 men under arms, which is a very different thing from 2,862,000. But in the case of Italy also there is another difficulty, which is that the fighting power of the Italian army is in dispute. I myself believe in the gallantry of her soldiers, which has indeed been proved in their recent conflict with the Abys- sinians ; but there is more doubt about their heads. The Italian officers are said by some high military authorities to be wanting in steadiness, and to be the sort of men who when beaten will always take their beating bravely, but who are not likely to win their battles. This remains to be seen. On the other hand, in dealing with Russia, Germany, and Austria, if I count the quality of the troops as equal on all three sides, I shall be giving a little weight in the scale against my own opinion. No skilled military observer ventures now to assert that the army of the Dual Monarchy is superior to that of Russia, man for man. Some think that Russia is very short of officers, but they remember Inkermann, and neglect too much what has been accomplished by Russia since 1878. The Austrians do not now possess the advan- tage of having great generals who command the confidence of officers and men. If we put aside quality, which in this case may not unfairly be taken as being pretty equal, there are tests of strength which are of value. We know the expenditure upon the armies, and are certain, for example, that Austria-Hungary spends a little more than Italy, and rather less than two-thirds of what is spent by Germany, 188 THE PEESEKT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. upon the army. We know that she possesses a "Budget- peace-efEective " rather greater than that of Italy, and rather less than two-thirds of that of Germany — that is in the same proportion as the expenditure. Austria-Hungary has rather more field-guns than Italy, and rather less than two-thirds of the field-guns of Germany, which is again in the same proportion. These tests are pretty sound ones so far as they go, and by all these tests Russia seems equal in military strength to Austria and Germany combined. As regards expenditure I cannot prove my case. Austria and Germany together spend rather over thirty millions sterling upon their armies. Russia, at the present rate of the rouble, appears to spend less upon her land forces ; but as I pointed out in the Russian chapter, the charge of the War Ministry in Russia is very far from including the total army expenditure. If we look to the " Budget-peace-efEectives," excluding constabu- lary and customs guards, but adding one-year volunteers, Russia has "850,000," or, as I think, 890,000, against 749,000 for Germany and Austria ; and while Russia in field- guns is sKghtly inferior to Germany and Austria together, she is superior to them in cavalry. I must maintain, there- fore, the accuracy of my statement previously made and hotly contested, that Russia is as strong in numbers as Germany and Austria, and between two and three times as strong as Austria alone. No doubt her troops are scattered over an enormous territory, but it is chiefly a territory that needs no guarding, and she could put half her force in Austria and yet have plenty of men to garrison Poland and the Caucasus. The Austrians, in spite of the rapidity with which they ATJSTRIi.-HirNGAEY. 189 have been spending money during the last few months, have not yet taken all those precautions which they should have taken considering that they share a very long common frontier, which is purely arbitrary, with a tremendous mili- tary Power. Cracow and Przemysl are not even now fortresses by which an army of inferior strength would be enabled to defend Gralicia against a stronger power. As a great foreign military writer, Marga, has consolingly observed of Austria- Hungary, in that which is the first of all the military works of the day, "After several defeats she can retire into the wooded Carpathians ;" but, he adds, " the road to Vienna is thus uncovered." Neither can Gefmany be trusted to defend Vienna by menacing the long line of the Russian advance, because when Germany ceases to be neutral the neutrality of France in turn will cease, and Germany will have enough to do to defend the Rhine. Italy, and Italy alone, can protect Vienna, supposing that the Roumanians confine themselves to defending their own neutrality, and Italy will have to be paid for doing it. Paid, too, in coin more valuable than a mere promise of help against the Pope and the Pope's friends, in whose desire to regain the temporal power the Italians now no longer believe. It is almost incredible that Austria, whatever her financial difficulties, should not have fortified herself in Galicia, with its seven hundred and twenty miles of winding, artificial frontier towards Russia ; unless indeed she had made up her mind that she must lose Eastern or Ruthenian GaHcia whenever she goes to war, and that the Northern Carpathians form the true frontier of her eastern provinces. 190 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. So far from having under-rated the military strength of Austro-Hungary, I myself have been inclined to thinlc that I have not set it low enough. There may be elements in the Austro-Hungarian ranks which may not fight heartily against Russia, as for example the Red Russians and Little Russians of Northern Bukowina and Eastern GaKcia. There can be no doubt as to the unpopularity of both Austrians and Hungarians in Croatia and the Dalmatian Kingdom. Some observers think that the Croats, who are among the best of the Austro-Hungarian troops, would not, although Roman Catholic in religion, fight for Hungary against Russia unless a real federalism were promised them, and unless the King of Hungary were crowned at Agram. The Bohemian news- papers were some of them alarmingly pro-Russian not very long ago ; but I believe the Tsechs may be counted on to fight for Austria, although, or perhaps because, Bohemia is an Ireland under limited Home Rule (and with a German Ulster). Count TaafEe has given extended suffrage, increased power to the clergy, the ofiicial use of the Tsech tongue, and a Tsech university, yet the Tsechs ask for more. One of the best executed of foreign works on European armies, that of Colonel Rau, points out that Austria- Hungary and England are, as compared with Russia or Germany, suffering from paralysis in military matters caused by a divided rule: — England through the division of responsibility between the Secretary of State and the General Commanding-in- Chief, and the Dual Monarchy (in a less degree, because it is a division which does not extend, as Colonel Rau shows, to the affairs of the " active army ") AUSTRIA-HUKGAET. 191 by the division of the control of the Landwehr and the Honved militia between Austria and Hungary. There is a joint "War Minister, but there are also separate Austrian and Hungarian Ministers of Defence. The Emperor of Austria, who has given a great deal of time and patient labour to the reorganisation of the Austro- Hungarian army, is, it is understood, pleased with the recent development of the powers of mobilisation of the Austrian cavalry. But this is rather a case of shutting the stable- door when the steed is stolen. The Russians had a very long start, and it is probable they still maintain it. There was a grave danger for Austria in the presence on her frontier of an overwhelming force of the new Russian dragoons, which, as I think, combine the best features of cavalry and mounted infantry, and in the existence in Little Russia and the Don Cossack Steppe of numerous Cossack reserves. There was, and I think there still is, the danger that a few hours before the declaration of war an immense horde of Russian cavalry will swarm through Gralicia, will cut the railroads and the tele- graph wires, avoid the regular armies, but destroy the whole mobilisation arrangements of Austria, and beat the less numerous Austro-Hungarian cavalry, who are now stationed in wooden barrack towns upon the line between Cracow and Lemberg. The Austro-Hungarian cavalry have been in- creased of late for the purpose of meeting this danger, by covering the mobilisation and the concentration of the army, and by defending the strategic railroads of Galicia. But they have not, I believe, achieved the first condition of success— that of being able to present themselves on the 192 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. frontier witli a superior force. The steps taken in Austria- Hungary have been to place a large number of independent cavalry divisions on the frontier and to give the regiments of which they are formed a peace-efEective which is really a war-effective; also to arrange for sending forward all the cavalry towards the frontier immediately upon the receipt of the mobilisation order. The Austrian cavalry regiments will be able to start for the frontier at a moment's notice with nine hundred sabres each. But difficulty was tiU lately found in keeping a large force actually upon the frontier in time of peace. The climate on the Gralician frontier is very bad. There are no large towns and few large villages, and the plains are extremely unhealthy in. the spring. The Austrians have now, however, placed on the frontier two independent cavalry divisions, with fifty-four squadrons ; and on the moment of the receipt of the order of mobilisation the railways will be employed for the purpose of carrying more cavalry to the front along the Yienna-Cracow line. On the other hand, the Russians have had for many years a large force on their frontier, and have lately, as the Polish Jews will have told the Austrians, greatly increased that force, although this fact has been denied. But the Austrians will not at present be able to place in the field more than a nominal force of 61,000 sabres, aU told, and those who know the Russian army best must feel that such a force will be unable to make head against the regular cavalry of the Russians, even without taking the Cossacks into account. It is not of much • use to discuss what may be called the " grand possibilities " of Austria under circumstances such AUSTEIA-HUNGAEY. 193 as those whicli I have attempted to describe. No doubt she should have been the " heir of Turkey ; " the protector of a Greece extended to include Albania and Macedonia and the islands and the coast to Constantinople and down Asia Minor ; the friend of Servia and Eoumania ; the president of a Balkan Confederation — and what not. But Austria is naturally slow to move, and under her many difficulties has become constitutionally timid. Moreover, to be able to look to such a future she would have to contemplate becoming that which her ethnic constitution ought to make her, but which both Gfermans and Magyars are determined she shall not become — a mainly Slavonic Power, in which the Tsechs and the Croats, if not the GraHcian Poles, would take their share of government with the Magyars. The outlook for Austria then, is, in my opinion, far from pro- mising. She will do all she can to avoid war with Russia, but if she avoids it she will probably be greatly humbled in the process. If she fights, I fear she will be humbled also, and humbled with the loss at least of Bukowina and the eastern portion of Galicia. Germany cannot save her, for Germany cannot interfere because of France. Italy, which could save Vienna, would have to be given South Tyrol as far as the language boundary, that is, up to within six or seven miles of Botzen ; and nothing could exceed the pain to the Emperor and his Court and many patriotic Austrians of being saved by Italy. On the other hand, the idea of danger to Austria from any desire on the part of her German population to join their fortunes to those of Germany may be set aside. The interest of Germany, like the interest of Austria, is to keep 194 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. quiet and let things alone. Germany does not desire the disruption of Austria, for the German provinces, Tipper and Lower Austria, and the rest, do not lie next to Germany, but are, as I have tried to show, cut ofE from it by a district in which the most enterprising of all Slavonic peoples hate the Germans with a deadly hatred. The recent retirement from the Diet of Prague of the seventy German members of the Diet shows the present state of feeling in the Bohemian Kingdom between the Germans and the Tsechs. "War now rages upon every point, and as the Tsechs are at present triumphant I suppose this book will be " seized " because I have not written Pralia, though I have carefully avoided writing Praag. It is difficult for any one except an Austro-Hungarian statesman to realise the difficulties of governing the Dual Monarchy. Cis-Leithania has, as is well known, a E.eichs- rath and seventeen Provincial Diets. The two Austrias, Styria, Carinthia, and Salzburg present no difficulties, but causes of trouble are abundant in the other districts. The Emperor will probably end by getting himself crowned King of Bohemia, although it will be difficult for him to lend him- self to a proscription of the German language by the Tsechs as he has been forced by the Magyars to lend himself to the virtual proscription in parts of Hungary of Pouman and of various Slavonic languages, the teaching of Magyar in ele- mentary schools being now compulsory. But how far is this process to continue? The German Austrians are as unpopular in Istria and Dalmatia as in Bohemia ; and Dalmatia is also an ancient kingdom. These territories were originally obtained by the election of the King of Hungary to the crown of the ATJSTEIA-HUNGAET. 195 tripartite kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalinatia. Is "Ferencz Jozsef " to be crowned King of Dalmatia ? And is i)almatia to have its separate Ministry and its separate oflScial language, and its completely separate laws ? And what then of Fiume, the so-called Hungarian port ? Then, again, Galicia is also an ancient kingdom, although it has at other times formed part of Poland ; and the Emperor is King of Galicia, as he is King of Bohemia and Dalmatia. Is he to be crowned King of Galicia ? And if so, is the separate existence of Galicia to be a Polish or a Ruthenian existence, or, indeed, a Jewish ? for the Jews are not only extraordi- narily powerful and numerous there, but are gaining ground day by day. The Ruthenians complain as bitterly of being bullied by the Poles in Galicia as the Croats complain of the Magyars. Even here the difficulties are not ended. The Margra- viate of Moravia contains a large Tsech population, and will have to be added to the Bohemian kingdom. Buko- wina may go with Galicia or Transylvania, Austrian Silesia may be divided between the Tsechs of Bohemia and Moravia on the one part, and the Poles or Euthenians or Jews of Galicia on the other. But what is to become of that which, with the most obstinate disregard of pedants, I intend to continue to call the Tyrol ? Trieste must go with Austria and Salzburg, and the Northern Tyrol and Styria and Carin- thia no doubt ; but it is not difficult to show that Austria would actually be strengthened by giving up the Southern Tyrol, where the Italian people, or at least the Italian lan- guage, is gaining ground day by day. There really seems very little left of the iategrity of the Austrian Empire at 2 196 THE PEBSENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. the conclusion of our survey of its constituent parts. Matters do not look much better if we turn to Trans-Leithania. Hungary has its Reichstag (which is also known by some terrible Magyar name), its House of Eepresentatives, and its House of Magnates, and, although there are not so many Provincial Diets as in Austria, Slavonia and the Banat of Croatia possess a Common Diet with which the Magyars are far from popular ; and the former Principality of Transyl- vania also possessed separate local rights, for trying com- pletely to suppress which the Magyars are at present highly unpopular. Transylvania is now in fact an unwilling " inte- gral part " of Hungary without Home Rule. The ex-Prin- cipality, although under Magyar rule, is divided between "Saxons" and Roumans, who equally detest the Magyars, and the Croats and Slovenes who people the Banat are Slavs who also execrate their Ugrian rulers, inscriptions in whose language are defaced whenever seen. Croatia is under-represented at Pest, and says that she goes unheard, and the Croats, who have partial Home Rule without an executive, ask for a local executive as well, and demand Fiume and Dalmatia. If we look to the numbers of the various races, there are in Austria of Germans and Jews about nine millions to about thirteen miUion Slavs and a few Italians and Rou- mans. There are in the lands of the Crown of Hungary, two millions of Germans and Jews, of Roumans nearly three millions, although the Magyars only acknowledge two and a haK millions, and of Magyars and Slavs between five and six millions apiece. In the whole of the territories of the Dual Monarchy it will be seen that there are eighteen AIJSTEIA-HTJNGART, 197 millions of Slavs and only seventeen mUlions of the ruling races — Germans, Jews, and Magyars — while between three and four millions of Roumans and Italians count along with the Slav majority as being hostile to the dominant nationalities. It is difficult to exaggerate the gravity for Austria of the state of things which these figures reveal. Count Kalnoky is a very able man ; he has had a wide experience of men and things. He served his country first at Berlin and then at London ; he has been ambassador at Rome and at St. Petersburg ; and no one knows better than the Common Minister for Foreign Affairs how extraordinarily artificial is the existing state of things. The common army and the common navy are really controlled by the Delegations. The Delegations consist of a hundred and twenty members, of whom sixty are chosen by the Austrian Parliament and sixty by the Hungarian Parliament, which is thus vastly over- repre- sented. Although Hungary only contributes a fraction over 30 per cent., Austria contributing 70 per cent., towards the joint expenditure, the twenty gentlemen selected by the Hungarian magnates and the forty gentlemen selected by the Magyar majority in the Hungarian House of Representatives hold in their hands half the power of the Empire. These gentlemen really represent only six millions out of the whole population of the Empire, and they are only 38 per cent, in their own half of it ; while the Germans are only 38 per cent. in their own half. The Dual Monarchy is ruled by two minorities. All these figures may be contested. Austria and Hungary both habitually and purposely underestimate what may be called the foreign element in each of the two countries respectively. The Hungarians exaggerate the num- 198 THE PEESENT POSITION OP ETJEOPEAV POLITICS. bers of tlie Magyar population, which is imdoubtedly gaining ground, and set it as high as 46 per cent., and the Austrians exaggerate the number of the Germans. It must be admitted also that the majority of the Slavs of the Dual Monarchy are Eoman Catholics in religion, and are not in any strong degree, with the exception of the Euthenians, pro-Russian. Still, whatever deductions may be made it is impossible to upset the main contention that the present state of things is artificial in an extraordinary degree and unlikely to continue. All States are peopled by what may be termed, in an uncomjplimentary word, mixtures. Just as, for example, the French, although a curious mixture, are a mixture that has been well mixed, so the people of Austria-Hun- gary are a mixture badly mixed. The Germans and the Magyars rule the country, but the Germans are not much more than a fourth, and the Magyars are not nearly one- sixth of the population, while the Slavs and Eoumans have far more than a majority. There is a German park or Ger- man preserve in the two Austrias and their neighbourhood, and a German belt round the Tsech portion of Bohemia ; but even in the Austrian Duchies there is a large popidation which is really Croatian-Slav. We are used to look upon the Duchy of Styria as German, but the southern portion of the Duchy is Wendish or Slovene. So, too, with the old kingdom of lUyria, which comprises Carinthia and Carniola, the latter of which provinces is mainly Slav, Wendish or Slovene. The Slovenes have an anti-German majority in the Carniolan Diet. In so-called Austria-Hungary upon the Adriatic there are neither Germans nor Hungarians. The Slovenes meet the Italians at Trieste, and the whole Dalma- AUSTKIA-HUNGAET. 199 tian coast is Slav witli an "Italian" upper class, itself Croatian by race. In Central Boliemia the German lan- guage is being now proscribed, and German judges bave to enter at an advanced age upon the study of Tsech. Moravia, which is three-quarters Tsech, is likely to fol- low suit. In some parts of the lands of the Hungarian Crown the Slavs and in other parts of the Hungarian provinces the Roumans are gaining ground. In Croatia the present " language compromise " is that all public documents shall be written both in Croat and in Magyar, tongues which are about equally unintelligible to Germans or other peoples of the West. In GaHcia, while the western h^ is Polish and Catholic, the eastern half is Little Russian and Orthodox. The Ruthenians call themselves Russians and their country the Russian land; and they are, in fact, a very good repre- sentative specimen of a Little Russian people. " It is diffi- cult to be a patriot in Austria," said a distinguished Austrian to me, the other day, " for one does not know to the repre- sentatives of what race, religion, tongue, or principle one's allegiance is due." No solution of the ethnic difficulties presented by Austria considered from a nationality point of view, is really possible at all. If Germany should ever come by Bavaria and the Bohemian Highlands to Yienna, Tsechish Bohemia would .drive a Slav wedge into the German Empire of the future. But, on the other hand, if Slav unity should ever be con- templated, the German rim round Bohemia would prove a terrible difficulty in the way. Both German concentration and Slav concentration seem impossible. The Germans of Transylvania are far indeed from the Fatherland. The 200 THE PEESENT POSITIOX OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. Roumans and the Magyars cut off the Serbs and Bulgars, and cut in half the Wends or Slovenes or Croats even accord- ing to the Pan-Slav maps of Moscow. The Eoumans, in cutting the Slavs in half, only fulfil their duty as the for- gotten outposts of ancient Eome. They were put there on purpose. According to one's fancy one may look at Tsechish Bohemia as a Slav arm thrust into the side of Germany, or upon the Grerman part of Moravia and upon the German Duchies of Austria as two German arms thrust into the side of Slavdom. No ethnographic frontier in these districts can be good or lasting. The difficidties are insuperable. Many of these countries, the disposal of which is difficult, were ruled once by Poland. If you look at the map of Cromwell's Europe, in which France and the United Kingdom are alone of the terri- tories of the Great Powers substantially unchanged, you see a gigantic Turkey as diverse as the Austria of to-day ; a tiny Prussia under another name ; a vast Poland ruling Red Russia, White Russia, Lithuania, and half of Little Russia. For reasons given in the preceding chapter, I regard the reconstitution of Poland as impossible. Certainly, a reconstitution of a Poland which might be friendly to Ger- many and form a barrier against Russia is out of the question altogether. I know something of the sad years that followed the repression of the last Polish insurrection, and I have a strong opinion in regard to their events. I have crossed Siberia from Perm with the long lines of Polish exiles, and on my return have met their endless chain still going on their eastern way. But I frankly admit that in Russian AtrSTEIA-HTJNGAHT. 201 Poland in the present day tlie German is more hated than the Russian, and that the Pole, like every one else who is of Slavonic race, seems born with an instinctive hatred of the Teuton. "Were there any possibility that Slavonic unity would be achieved, it certainly would be a formidable matter for all Europe. There are at least one hundred and twenty millions of Slavs in Europe — that is, of Slavs who are still Slavs in sentiment, without counting the Germanised Wends of Styria or of Prussia. Moreover, the Slavs are gaining ground. The progress of the Tsechs has been extraordinary. I once saw Palacky at Moscow, and assisted, as it were, at the new birth of the Tsech nation. The Tsechs re-entered Parliament in 1879, after having for some years abstained from taking any part in its deliberations. In 1880 they obtained the right of equality of language; but by 1886 they had got so completely their own way that the Germans quitted the Bohemian Diet. A great French geographer has described Austria-Hungary as being a personal union of fifty-six States. Historically it is no doubt a Christian union against the Turk, but in modem times it has become an attempted Magyar and Jewish union against the Russian. This pretended union is mined by violent hatreds — Italian against German, Slav against German, Slav and Rouman against Magyar. The Tsechs, who are the best of all the Slavs, habitually describe their German fellow-countrymen in Bohemia as the "bugs," whilst the Germans of Bohemia style the Tsechs the " liars " or the " reptiles." The favourite memories of Bohemia are memories of a civil war, and celebrate the national rising 202 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS, under a leader wliose name the Slavs pronounce as " Goose," whilst we insist upon talking of the Hussites. These uncom- promising Tsechs are gaining ground even outside Bohemia. There are at the present moment more Tsechs in Vienna than in Prague itself. In the Adriatic, Italy is faced by an Italianised Slav country in Dalmatia, just as Greece is faced by a Greek country on the Asia Minor coast ; for, while waters such as great rivers and arms of the sea are commonly taken as frontiers by modern statecraft, waters fuse just as mountains divide ; and whilst mountains commonly separate civilisation from barbarism or one civilisation from another, you generally find the same race or the same manners on the two sides of a great river or of an easily traversed sea. There is hardly a German or Mag- yar in all Istria and Dalmatia who is not a mere official tem- porarily there. Hungary, which is ruled by one of the most interesting of peoples, which ought to be preserved tmder a glass case as the only powerful non-Aryan race in Europe — Hungary is torn by the dissensions caused by the hatred which these Christian Turks provoke in the minds of Eoumans, Slovacs, Croats, Serbs, and, Slovenes, who all oppose the Magyar policy, whilst the Germans themselves are not hearty in its support. At the same time, the Hun- .garians will fight to the death for their own views, because, as they say, they are not like the Eoumans, the Slavs, and the Germans, who have all of them a possible existence outside of the Dual Monarchy. The Eoumans have their brothers of Eoumania to look to ; the Germans have the ■German Empire ; the Slavs have Eussia, or their dream of AXTSTRIA-HUNGABT. 203 a great Slav Power ; but " we Magyars have no relations in all Europe ; we liave nothing but the rag of soil which our ancestors conquered by the sword ; outside the plain of Hungary there is nothing for us but death, and we will not perish. Hungary fought throughout the Middle Ages to defend its existence against the Turks, but fighting for itself at the same time saved Europe. Hungary will fight again to the death to defend its existence against Russia ; and again in so doing she may save Europe, and at all events we shall know we have played our historic part." After surveying the whole field of Austrian politics, I fear we must conclude that the Dualism of the Monarchy is very nearly dead, and that if Austria is to exist at all she must rapidly become tripartite, and ultimately resolve herself into a somewhat loose confederation. The probability is that both the Austrian statesmen and the wearer of the Imperial Crown will favour the nationalities (as Count Taaffe does already) against the Germans and the Magyars from day to day more and more ; but there are other dangers unfortunately besides the ethnic dangers by which the very existence of Austria is menaced. Austria is exposed to all those dangers of the unknown which exist in constitutional countries with a, very limited electorate. The Taaffe Grovernment policy of decentralisation and encouragement of nationalities is a wise one, although M. Tisza will not follow it, and the Empire can only be maintained at all by such means ; indeed, the autonomy of the provinces is likely to be still further increased. But the weakening of the Central Government increases the danger from Socialism, and Socialism is perhaps 204 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. a greater and more present danger in the Dual Monarchy than in any other country. A few years ago the Vienna police had a very unpleasant surprise in the information with regard to Socialistic activity and organisation in Vienna which reached them from London. Socialism, too, thrives in Hungary, where it has only been driven underground by the new anti-SociaKst law. At Gratz in Styria, at Klagenfurth in Carinthia, at "Wiener I^eustadt, at Florisdorf near Vienna, at Reichenberg in Bohemia, and at Briinn in Moravia, Socialism is almost universal among the working men. The SociaKsm of Austria is not, indeed, in its public expression very violent. The writings of Austro- Hungarian Socialists are conscientious, heavy, and dull ; but there seem to be two sorts of Socialists in Vienna — the reading and thinking Socialists and the party who answer to our dynamite con- spirators. It is a curious fact that whilst all Europe has been occupied with Russian Nihilism, though the number of miHtaiit Nihilists in that coimtry is small. Socialism has been making extraordinarily rapid progress in England and Aus- tria, as well as progress, steady but more moderate in nature, in the German Empire. Of all the great European cities, it is in Vienna that the Socialists are strongest at the present moment ; but even there as yet they are within control. It is a question, however, whether the loose cohesion of a federa- tion can deal with them effectively. I have nothing to add to what I said in my first chapter in regard to the nature of the Austro- German alliance, and it will be seen from what I have said in the present chapter that I think the most Germany can do is to keep France neutral, AUSTEIA-HTJNGAET. 205 and to allow Italy, if she will, to help Austria for a price. Of course, Prince Bismarck has not bound Grermany to espouse all the quarrels of Austria no matter where and with whom. Of course he will not bring Russia and France upon himself by threatening Russia, or by heading or leading the European opposition to Russia in matters in which Grermany is not the Power most concerned. Austria, therefore, is left to bear the brunt. To use Prince Bismarck's phrase, he " gives Austria the preference." He explains that he yields to Austria because, while he wishes to uphold the sanctity of treaties, he must leave it to the Powers who have the most direct interest in their strict observance in each case to enforce the necessary respect for their provisions. We have seen, in the course of the present chapter, what are the reasons which make the honour which Prince Bismarck offers to the Austro-Hungarian Empire so embarrassing. Military weak- ness; race quarrels; Socialism ; financial difficulties : these are the reasons why Austria-Hungary is unable to move in war. In the first chapter I briefly considered the question whether, owing to her inability to fight imless absolutely attacked, the Dual Monarchy would be driven to accept from Russia that territorial compensation which she does not want, and of which she is in fact afraid. The oc- cupation of Bosnia is already a sufficiently troublesome matter, although it has, among many drawbacks, the inci- dental advantage of keeping Montenegro quiet, and of preventing Prince Nicholas from attacking King Milan of Servia, in order to make himself prince of that country as a Russian satrap. By going forward to Salonica, Austria 206 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. would increase her military weakness; she would deeply ofEend the Servians .and the Greeks and the Bulgarians ; and she would by increasing the number of her Slavonic subjects only hasten her own. break up. The country which some think she covets, but which as a fact she fears — Macedonia — ■ is the battlefield of races. Even if we put aside Great Albania as a dream, and agree in the, I think, reasonable view that, as there are already great numbers of Albanians who are contented subjects of King George, Albania might well join Greece under a personal union, yet Macedonia is claimed by the Greeks, the Servians, and the Bulgarians. It is an unfortunate fact that while the young peoples of the Balkan Peninsula have each of them a splendid vision of the future founded upon the memory of a more or less glorious past, their ambitions are terribly in conflict. There is in Transylvania, Bukowina, and Bessarabia, a Greater Roumania enshrined in every Rouman heart, and the Bulgarians, the Servians, and the Greeks respectively have their Greater Bulgaria, their Great Servia, and their Greater Greece. But while each of these ideas has admirers among us in England, their admirers must admit that it is difficult to reconcile them. Roumanian ambitions are chiefly disagreeable to the Hungarians and to the Russians; but the Bulgarians and the Serbs and the Greeks lay claim to the same territory. All of the four small Powers may be regarded as equally hostile to the great ones. Montenegro is, of course, an outpost of Russia, but the other Balkan States hate Austria and ■ Russia pretty much alike, although their anger from time to time AUSTEIA-HUNGARY. 207 is turned against one or other of the two Powers whom they look upon as the great confederates. If we examine the conditions of the four smaller Powers one by one and look first at Eoumania, we find that the posi- tion of the King and of the Government of Roumania is one of refusal of a regular alliance with Austria-Hungary, but of determination to refuse a passage to Russia and firm inten- tion of fighting in defence of neutrality should that neutrality be attacked. There would be a good deal to say in favour of the policy of Roumania making common cause with Austria- Hungary in any event — that is, for the policy of a defensive alliance. Should Russia annex Bukowiaa, a large portion of Roumania would be absolutely uncovered and left stand- ing in the air ; and the result might be that Austria having been beaten first, Roumania would then be plundered in her turn. On the other hand, if Roumania were to ally herself to Austria she would probably be the first invaded^ and the Russians might content themselves with the occupation of the Lower Danube without attempting to cross the Southern Carpathian chain. In other words that would happen which generally happens in alliances, namely, that the weaker Power in the end would pay the piper. The real consideration, however, which has dictated the refusal of an Austro-Hungarian alliance by Roumania is the natural resentment which is felt at the manner in which Roumania has been treated by Austria-Hungary in the past. Austria, in the hesitation of Roumania as to making common cause with her, reaps her reward for her foolish and aimless opposition to Roumania's Danube policy, which in her own 208 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. interest slie ought to haye supported. If from the moment of the termination of the last Russo-Turkish war Austria had made common cause with Roumania, she would have had without cost or damage to herself an all-important and per- manent ally. There have even heen Roumanian statesmen who have considered the possibility of Roumania voluntarily joining the Austro -Hungarian Power. Nearly one-half of the Rouman race inhabit the dominions of the Dual Monarchy, and the Roumanians would make great sacrifices to unite their ancient people under a single rule. Russia has incurred the lasting hatred of the Roumanian race by stripping them of Southern Bessarabia, a country inhabited almost entirely by Roumans ; but the feeling of the Roumanians as regards the two Great Powers has been recently expressed by one of their most distinguished states- men thus : " We detest the Russians, but the Austrians we both detest and despise." Roumanian feeling towards the Dual Monarchy has not been improved by the suppression of Transylvanian autonomy by the hated Magyar. When Austria asked at Bucharest and at Berlin for a dis- tinct Roumanian alliance, the Roumanian Government made a counter request for a distinct guarantee of Roumanian neutraKty. The formal treaty of neutraUty having been refused, Roumania immediately began to spend money on fortifications. She has now determined to depend upon her- self alone, and her army is so remarkably powerful that for a short war it stands sixth in Europe ; so that it is possible her neutrality may be respected. It is now certain through Russia's action that if Russia occupies Bulgaria without ATJSTRIA-HUNGAEY. 209 intending directly to attack Austria-Hungary, she will liave to conduct her operations by sea, and of course with the consent of Turkey. The spirited policy of the Roumanian Government is popular in the country, and instead of shooting their Prime Ministers as though they were partridges on the 1st of Septemter, which was the recent diversion of the Rou- manians, they are now supporting them by almost unanimous votes in the Chamber. It is a point I think in Lord Salisbury's favour that he has secured the representation of Great Britain at Constantinople at the present time by an ambassador who has had great experience of Roumania, and Sir William White, indeed, is fortunate in having served in Warsaw, in Eastern Germany, and in Servia as well ; although it is perhaps a pity that he has not through his past services learnt to know the Greeks personally as well as he knows the Roumanians and the Slavs. That the Sultan should have refused to welcome so distinguished a diplomatist and a man so free from anti-Turkish prejudice as Sir William White only shows his blindness or the strength of Russian influence at the Porte. When the Sultan made difficulties about receiving Mr. Goschen he had a particular object in view ; but when he at first objected to receive Sir WilHam White he can have had none, and all that his Russian prompters wished was to show their influence to the world and to make England look ridiculous. One of the several insuperable difficulties which lie in the way of a Balkan Confederation is the personal dislike of the King of Roumania for the King and Queen of Servia. The King of Roumania is every inch a king, and no more able P 210 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPEAN POLITICS. and accomplislied sovereigns sit upon their tlirones than King Charles, and the remarkable writer, Carmen Sylva, whose poems and novels and maxims go the round of the literary- World, and who is his Queen. On the other hand, King Milan and the Queen of Servia are what may be styled third-class sovereigns, and unfortunately for them the King's mother and the Queen herself were both originally con- nected with Eoumania and with what may be called the Roumanian Opposition. The feelings of King Charles of Eoumania towards the King and Queen of Servia might he imagined if one were to try to picture to oneself what would be those of the King of England towards the King of Holland, if the latter's father had married into the family of Cobbett, and he himself into that of Mr. Labouchere. The isolation of Roumania from her neighbours is, as will have been seen, complete ; but she is isolated by the very fact of her existence. Whether the Roumanians are as they assert, and as I believe, the actual descendants of the Roman legionaries, or whether they are, as Moscow professes to believe, Slavs who have been partly Romanised, they at all events are entirely separated from their neighbours by language and by race or fancied race, and are connected with them only in that religion which comes to them from abroad in a Slav form. Isolated as they are, cutting as they do the Slavonic world in half, the Roumanians need to be a tough race ; and they are a tough race. I fancy that in toughness and permanency of national characteristics they are equal even to the gipsies or the Jews. A very different people are the Servians next door, who AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 211 are mucli the same people as the Croats of Hungarian Croatia, though belonging to the Eastern instead of the Eoman Church. Dreams or memories of Great Servia led them to attack the Bulgarians, as we know, and led to a defeat which was all the more pleasing to those who dislike aggression in that, owing to the better organisation of the Servians, it was unexpected. The Servians claim a large portion of Macedonia in their Great Servia, and parts of it, indeed, are looked for by the Bulgarians, and others are included by the Greeks in their Greater Greece. Unfortunately for the future, these Greats and Greaters overlap. The King of Servia is sup- posed to be the tool of Austria, and is known to be disliked in Russia. It is a curious fact that Russia turned the Xarageorgevitch family off the Servian throne and restored the family of Obrenovitch because the former were too Austrian, but is now suspected of an intention to perform the opposite operation for precisely the same reason. King Milan is unpopular in his own country, and sooner or later will probably be displaced by Prince Nicholas of Montenegro or by the latter's son-in-law, who is, however, a feeble youth. At the end of 1883 there was a rising in Servia, which threatened the existence of the Servian throne, and which was the outcome of discontent produced by uncon- stitutional acts of the King. There was also much feeling with regard to the great pecuniary loss to Servia through the Bontoux railway contract and the failure of the Union Generale, and on account of the increase of taxation and of the subservience of the King to Austria. It was urged by the Radicals of Servia that the King was practically p2 212 THE PRESENT . POSITION OF ETJEOPEAN POLITICS. leading the Conservative party in that country, and that the Radicals in the Chamber were improperly excluded from all voice in the Grovernment. The Radicals had obtained a majority at the general election, and the King had followed the example of the King of Denmark and refused to listen to the Skuptschina. The mode in which the insurrection was stamped out in 1883 was one of the principal causes of the complete and deserved defeat of King Milan's forces by the Bulgarians in the recent war. There is some doubt as to whether the majority of the Macedonians are Serbs or Bulgars. The probability on the whole is that the Russians are right in their contention that they are Bulgars ; but the various races speaking the Southern Slavonic tongue which exist in the Balkan Peninsula melt imperceptibly the one into the other. The future of that portion of Eastern Macedonia which is still Turkish probably Kes with the Bulgarians, although the Turks might have contiaued to rule it with the assent of all, had they been wise in time. The King of Servia recently expressed to the representatives of Bulgaria his desire for a personal imion, which only shows that King Milan is even more blind to the signs of the times than his worst enemies could suppose. The notion that the Bidgarians would willingly select as their ruler a prince who had violated the constitution of his own country, who had shown a complete disregard of all constitutional traditions, and who had also been conquered in the field by an inferior force, was a singular one ; but had the Bulgarians listened to Kiag Milan's suggestion, there can be no doubt that its adoption would only have hastened AUSTEIA-HUNGART. 213 the coming of the inevitable day when he himself will be driven from the Servian throne. To place King Milan on the throne of Bulgaria and to make him governor of Eastern Roumelia would be impossible without a general war, and if they are to have a general war, the Bulgarians would prefer some one more popular than King Milan. These Bulgarians are the Japanese of Europe. Pleasant, courteous to strangers, all apparently young like the Japanese states- men, prudent and yet full of ideas, the English-speaking men of Robert College certainly inspire one with confi- dence. Greece, like Eoumania, has this remarkable advantage over Servia and Bulgaria, that whilst Bulgaria has a monarchic constitution but cannot find a king, and Servia is provided with an unpopular ruler, Greece and Eoumania have kings of real ability, and, I may add, equally charming queens. Not that the King of Greece is " popular." Greece is perhaps too intensely democratic for any king to be per- sonally much liked in Athens, but that he is able there can be no doubt. Lord Beaconsfield once said of him, " He will be a remarkably clever fellow who can teach anything to that young man," and this was said, not with regard to book learning, but with special reference to the power of governing. To estimate the progress of Greece it is only necessary to compare, for example, Thackeray's picture of Athens in 1844 with Athens to-day ; but what the Greeks have done within their terribly contracted boundaries is hardly a sufficient guide to what they would do were they given 214 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEA.N POLITICS. even Epirus and the wholly Greek part of Macedonia. No doubt the Greeks have obtained Ossa as well as Pelion, but they naturally want Pindus and Olympus too. The rest of Epirus with the completely Greek town of Janina and the Islands they are certain to get, and would obtain, as I think, even at the hands of that Austria of which they are so deeply jealous. Just as the Servians, the Eou- mans, and the Bulgarians have no friends among their neighbours, so too the Greeks. It is difficult to say whether they more dislike the Austrians or the Italians, and their latest fancy is to declare that not only does Italy covet the Albanian coast, but that she has fixed her view on Rhodes. One great difficulty of the Greeks is in Albania. The Albanians are a separate people, with a language imlike any other, and they have a strong sentiment of nationality; but I repeat that the Albanians might well accept of their own free choice a personal union with Greece under the King of the Hellenes. No Greeks fought harder for the Hellenic cause against the Turks than did the Albanian Souliotes, and the Albanians are not numerous enough in the coveted position which they occupy, to stand alone. The Greeks have already become prudent in their policy. Their present able minister, M. Tricoupis, reduced the number of their Chamber from, roughly speaking, two hundred and fifty members to about one hundred and fifty, and this pro- ceeding has met with extraordinary success, for it has made of their Parliament a practical and working body. At the AUSTEIA-HUNGAEY. 215 same time it is impossible for them to rest content within the boundaries of the present kingdom. There are only about two million Greeks in Greece. There are three mil- lions in the Greater Grreece outside, without coxmting those in Asia Minor, which is fast becoming completely Greek. There is every reason why England should view with pleasure the rapid development of Greece. An enlarged and strengthened Greece would be a maritime Power, almost an island Power, dependent upon English favour, trading chiefly with Great Britain, and the glad servant of the poKcy of the United Kingdom. The Greeks are sanguine of their ability to accomplish the process of which I spoke just now — the Hellenising of the Albanians. They say that the southern Albanians are not only largely Greek in reKgion and in dress, for they wear the Greek fustanella, but that they are Greek in their leanings, and would very easily become completely Hellenised. But the Greeks are afraid of Italy and of Austria. They declare that an Italian squadron has of late been continually at Rhodes surveying and landing parties, and of course all remember the Italian intrigues in Albania not very many years ago. As regards Austria, they try to make Austrian statesmen understand that if Austria goes to Salonica, without wishing to go there, under Russian pressure, because she desires to satisfy national vanity by a show of compensation for the Russian advance, it will be only a weakness to Austria in the future. What Russia gives, Russia will some day take away. The extension of Austria would, they point out to us, be damaging to British trade, and 216 THE PKESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. the division of the Balkan Peninsula between Austria and Russia almost disastrous to it. On the other hand, the Greeks, who are commercial, would he good traders with us even if we should ultimately fail in keeping Russia from Constantinople. The Greek islands, which mask the Darda- nelles, produce 50,000 of the best sailors in the world — certainly the best sailors in the Mediterranean ; and if the Russians should, by confining Greece within narrow limits, ultimately cause her Government to break down, and should gradually absorb these islands, it would be disastrous to British trade in the Levant. The Greeks in the past have made enormous sacrifices for the Greek idea. They have borne well the heavy blow of the denial to them of Janina after it had been promised to them by the collective voice of Europe; but Austria at Salonica, or Italy in Albania, would be a blow to the Greek idea which the Greek monarchy could not bear. Austria, they point out, has made herself as unpopular in Bosnia as has Russia in Bulgaria. She has called down upon her the detestation of the Slavs by cutting through the old Servian land. Bosnia is not happy under Austrian rule ; all except the Roman Catholic people there are discontented ; but this long strip of territory is apparently held by Austria because it is the road to Salonica and to prevent Austria from being cut off from the south. In the Turkish provinces which Austria administers there lurks still that brigandage from which Greece has succeeded of late years in absolutely ridding her own territory, and Greeks proudly contrast the progress which has been made in the recently occupied parts AUSTEIA-HUNGAEY. 217 of Thessaly witL. what they think the failure of Austria in Bosnia and HerzegoTina. Nevertheless, if Russia should advance in the Balkan Peninsula or should occupy Bulgaria, Austria will be driven to fight, and even with such help as she may receive is likely to be beaten ; or else she might advance to Salonica as a necessary compensation for the wound to her national vanity, Greece getting the rest of Macedonia behind her, and either Greece or Italy the Albanian coast. This advance on the part of Austria might mean, however, her ultimate destruction through the predominance of the Slavs ; but should she go to pieces, no very great change can be expected in the countries out of which the Dual Monarchy is at present formed, inas- much as no power can hold down the Magyars, and no rearrangement of boundaries can, as I have shown, meet the case of the Southern Germans and the Slavs of the surrounding districts. It has been of late suggested that the whole ques- tion of Bulgaria and the dangers which grow out of the Bulgarian situation should be referred to an European Con- ference. It has also been suggested lately that the Con- ference should meet, but should be more general and should consider the question of the disarmament of Europe. I believe that when England was "sounded " in February upon the meeting of the proposed Conference on Bulgarian affairs she objected on the ground that it was useless to have such a Conference unless the Powers knew pretty well beforehand what it was they were about to do. It is generally somewhat dangerous to go into conference unless the basis of discussion is clearly defined beforehand. To meet without a defined 218 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EtJEOPEAN POLITICS. basis is always more likely to provoke war than to lead to the preservation of peace. It is useless to read the translations of the Turkish native papers, as they are not allowed to publish anything except obvious lies, or such items of news as that the Queen of Spain has a cold. But there have lately been some interesting articles in the Levant Herald upon the future relations of Austria to the territories now comprised in the Turkish Empire, and on the possibilities of forming a Balkan Con- federation. These articles, besides being of value in them- selves, should be also looked at for other reasons, as their publication under a severe censorship may reveal something of the secret opinions of the Porte. It m.ust be remembered that the censor sits in the office of the Levant Scrald whilst the paper is being " made up," and acts as a sort of editor. As the statements of the articles are made under so sharp a censorship, they must clearly be articles which the Turks think it wise to have seen and read. In these articles it is pointed out that the advance of Russia on Constantinople by Asia is more likely and more dangerous than the advance by Europe. In Asia Russia has no enemies behind her. As regards Europe, the " pure and patient patriotism " of the Bulgarians gives ground for hope in the possibility of the formation of a powerful Balkan Confederation under Turkish headship, but England has cut the future Balkan Confedera- tion in half by presenting Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria at BerHn. The vast number of Serbs in the Banat and in Bosnia, and the vast number of Roumans in Transylvania point, in the opinion of the Levant Herald, to the necessity of AUSTKIA-HUNGAEY. 219 some rearrangement of boundaries between the Balkan Con- federation of tlie future and the Dual Monarchy. The weakest point in the suggestion of the Levant Serald for a Balkan Confederation under Turkish headship, is that Eoumania, expecting the brunt of any attack to fall upon herself, would probably prefer to keep clear of any such arrangement. In the second place, the Servians would not improbably be stirred up by Austria to resist it ; and in the third place, on the side of Greece, the proposal of such a confederation at the present time would virtually constitute a request to Greece to guarantee Turkey in her present dominion, and to give up all hope of receiving Janina itself. I fear that a Balkan Confederation, whether under Austrian or Turkish headship, is a dream, and about as little possible of realisation as that union between Servia and Bulgaria for which King Milan longs, and which would only lead to his deposition in favour of some one else — as, for example, the Prince of Montenegro, who could unite all Greater Servia and Slavonic Macedonia, and thus overshadow Greece. Of all the Balkan States, Bulgaria is the only one which would be inclined to come into confederation at the present time ; and it is of no use to even talk of such a scheme at a moment when the Continent is bristling with bayonets. The only real question worth asking is the one which I have asked before, namely, Will Austria resist Russian preten- sions ; and will she, if in danger of conquest, be supported by allies, or will she yield and take her share of the spoils ? Much fault has been found with what I said on a former occasion as to Russia at Constantinople, and as to whether 220 THE PRESENT POSITION OP EtTEOPEAN POLITICS. Constantinople is a Britisli or an Austrian interest. A good deal depends upon how Russia reaches Constantinople. From one point of view it may almost be said that if Russia gets to Constantinople by Asia it will be a great blow to England, and that if she gets there by Europe it will be the destruction of Austria. Some are inclined to argue thus : "What does any present influence at Constantinople give us that an understanding with Russia would not give us ? The answer is, that the history of the past, and indeed of the present, will show that understandings with Russia are not worth much. The fact that Turkey is pro-Russian at the present time, that the Levant trade is not just now very profitable, and that the Turkish railways are not paying and are not being pushed forward — aU these considerations concur to make the English taxpayer and the English investor inclined to be neutral, and he has come to think that it would be better to agree than to fight. Germany will not fight to keep Russia from Constantinople, and we are told we should be as practical. "We are also told of our want of power to cany on the struggle, which is a somewhat dangerous argu- ment. As a matter of fact we are not in numbers relatively weaker now than we always were, though I admit and have shown that we are more vulnerable. There is, however, less danger of a mere rush for Constantinople at the present moment than there has been for some time. The small peoples of the Slav races which were expected to help Russia towards Constantinople are now alienated from her, and as long as she remains a military autocracy that alienation, once provoked, is likely to continue. On the other hand, AUSTEIA-HUNGAEY, 221 she cannot advance through Asia as long as she professes to be friendly to the Turks. Why not, then, wait and watch, and without exaggeration on either side keep our hands free for the future ? "We are not bound to make up our minds upon this particular case, irrespective of the considerations of the moment. We are not here bound by treaty obliga- tions ; for the conditions of the Anglo-Turkish Convention have certainly not been fulfilled. Let us only avoid inviting Russia to Constantinople, as some of our writers and speakers do, to the possibly great detriment of British trade. Two views have been taken of Lord Salisbury's speech of November last : the one that he expected at that time that Austria would play the main part in barring the approach of Russia to Constantinople ; the other that he already knew that Austria would avoid war by all means in her power. The latter is the true view, as I showed in the first chapter. There is nothing new in this shrinking back on the part of Austria. Lord Salisbury has experienced it once previously in the course of his career. An arrangement was discussed by Lord Beaconsfield and Count Andrassy, at the time of the Treaty of Berlin, by which Austria and England were jointly to guarantee the integrity of Turkish territory — ^Austria in Europe and England in Asia Minor. Turkish territory, it should be remembered, at that time meant practically, as it does still theoretically, Eastern Roumeha and the Balkan line. Moreover, there was behind this the understanding that England was to come to the assistance of Austria in Europe, and Austria to make common cause with England in the event of Turkey being attacked in Asia 222 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. Minor. But this offer of an English alliance to Austria fell through in the same way in which the suggestion of England in October last failed to receive encouragement. If the Austrians would adopt a policy of friendliness and consideration towards the Greeks, the Roumanians, and the Servians ; if they would abandon all idea of advancing under any circumstances towards Salonica ; if they would strengthen the internal condition of the Dual Monarchy by converting it into a loose confederation, with equal rights conferred on Bohemia and Croatia and Polish Gralicia, while holding fast to the Italian alliance, to be paid for, when the time arrives, by the Southern Tyrol — if they did this, they would be able to maintaia themselves as a Great Power. Very naturally as matters stand they are in mortal fear of Russia, and the result is that Count Kalnoky and all the leading ministers of the country, great as are their abilities, get a reputation for weakness which they do not deserve. The courage and energy of the Magyars are a very important point in Austria's favour, and so also under a tripartite or federa- tive system would be the energy of the Tsechs; for the Austrian Slavs, with the exception of the Little Russians of Euthenia and Northern Bukowina, do not sympathise with Russia to any great extent. At the same time they detest both the Germans and the Magyars; and Slavs, Germans, Magyars, and Roumans cannot be permanently held together in the Empire except by the adoption of the federative system. Here lies the danger of the Eastern Empire, which many used to think was menaced by Prince Bismarck, who as a AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 223 matter of fact is, of all men in Europe, the man who most desires to keep Austria alive. It is a necessity to him that she should continue to exist. Once destroy Austria, and Germany is left to fight it out with France and Eussia without assistance ; for in this case Italy would not move. Austria gains on the one side by this feeling in Prince Bis- marck's mind, or let us say in the German mind. She gains on the other hy the existence of a som.ewhat better feeling towards her of late in the minds of the Bulgarians and of the Balkan Slavs, and by a thorough and clear conception on the part of the Hungarians that their very existence would be menaced by the downfall of the Dual Monarchy. After the division of the respective spheres of influence of Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia in Macedonia, Austria might gradually increase her influence in the Balkan States ; and if she would take the bold step of making an arrangement for evacuating part of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, so as to show she had no intention of going southwards to Salonica, she might bring together in a general under- standing with herself the small States and the Turks ; but this unfortunately is impracticable, as Austro-Hungarian pride will effectually prevent the abandonment of any portion of Bosnia. While Balkan confederation is out of the question, Balkan alliance is possible, and will offer the advantage of helping to prolong Austria's existence. The division of the Balkan Peninsula between Austria and Russia would, on the contrary, only make the downfall of Austria the more certain. For Austria to go to Salonica would be for her to embark in the most irritating kind of warfare 224 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS. with the whole people of Macedonia — Greek, Servian, and Bulgarian; and when she got there she wo\ild only have increased her unwieldiness and the number of her Slavonic subjects, and could not after all maintain herself in Mace- donia one day longer than Russia chose to allow. The ultimate result would only be her downfall and the establish- ment of Russia upon the Adriatic. V- ITALY. It seems to Englishmen an extraordinary fact that a Ministry with a bare majority, and that majority itself disappearing so fast that Parliament had to be twice prorogued to give time for bringing new men into the Cabinet, should be able to sign a treaty of alliance involving obligations the extent of which is not fully known. This is what has been lately done in Italy, where a feeble Ministry directed a falling Minister to sign a treaty of strict alliance with Powers so unpopular with the unrepresented mob that effigies of Prince Bismarck were carried about the streets of the Italian cities at the Carnival. This treaty was signed, too, at a moment when a majority of the principal organs in the Italian press were in favour, not of reversing the previous policy, but of keeping the hands of Italy free. How comes it that such temerity is possible? In England it would be impossible. England is far more directly menaced in her interests, at all events in her Indian Empire, by Russia than Italy is menaced by France or Russia, yet no weak English Ministry could enter in time of peace into an alliance with Austria and Germany against 226 THE PKESENT POSITION OF EDEOPEAN POLITICS. France and Russia, and assuredly no Ministry could do so without facing Parliament. The Opposition in Italy is not wanting in vigour, but it would seem at first sight as though Signor Crispi must be singularly inferior in offensive power to Lord Randolph Churchill for the conclusion of such an alliance to have been possible. It is difficult to understand the phenomenon unless we remember that weak as may have been the late Government in Italy they were faced by a divided Opposition, and unless, also, we trace at length the effect upon Italian foreign poKcy of the occupation of Rome in face of the continual protests of the Yatican. To attack the Government upon their failures in Abyssinia was an easy task, but to incur the wrath of Prince Bismarck was too much for the courage even of the- " Lord of the Rats and Mice," as Signor Crispi, the most powerful man tmtil last month in the Opposition, and the most powerful man since last month in the Government, is called by those respectable politicians of the Italian Right who look upon all the Southerners as bandits, and upon Signori Crispi and Mcotera as the leading brigands. "While there are no true parties in the Italian Chamber, but only a number of personal groups, so, too, there are no real parties in Italy as regards foreign policy, and until a great change shall be publicly known to have taken place in the counsels of the Roman Curia, almost the whole Italian electorate will remain \m.ited in support of a pro-German policy. So far as they can be said to exist at aU, the Italian parties going by the name of the Right and Left may, roughly speaking, be said to be the successors of the ITALY. 227 Cavourian and Garibaldian sections of ItaKan Liberals The advocates of Italian unity having been divided into two parties, whose adherents were respectively in sympathy with Constitutional Monarchy under the house of Savoy and with republican institutions, the old names adopted in former days have been retained while the distinctions between Bight and Left have disappeared, and are now applied to agglomerations of groups which have personal rather than political significance. For many years after the death of Cavour power continued in the hands of the moderate men who held his views. Between the Right represented by Signer Minghetti, and the extreme Left which contained the adherents of Mazzini and Garibaldi, there gradually arose a kind of third party, the Left Centre, of which Signer Eattazzi was a prominent member. From this group, when the Left itself came into power, it took the present Prime Minister, Signer Depretis, in whom Italy foiind that it had obtained a Parliamentary leader who possessed the tactical art of Parliamentary government in a high degree, and who has been willing to constitute at various times Governments of the most diverse elements, supported in turn by every section in the chamber, from the Right to the extreme Left. It cannot be too strongly or too often stated that in Italy nominal adherence to the Right or Left does not necessarily imply the holding of any definite set of views. The Right is in general supposed to contain the more Conservative politicians, but leaders of the Right like Signer Bonghi habitually describe themselves as Liberals, and on not a few questions are in fact more Liberal than are many members of q2 228 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. the Left. There are tTnionists to be found both in the Right and in the Left. There are Federalists divided in the same manner, and free traders and protectionists are not confined to any one group. The only section which contains a com- plete body of adherents to any set of views is the extreme Left, but then it is a very small section, and naturally the groups contained in it are smaller stiU. The extreme Left contains at once the uncompromising Irredentists, and the mere handful of peace-at-any-price Radicals who are their bitterest opponents. That which ought to be the real Right is absent from the Chamber although present in large numbers among the town councillors of municipalities — the Clerical Conservative party. The most Conservative of the Right who sit in the Italian Chamber we should call Whigs, or high and dry doctrinaire Liberals, and they closely resemble the Belgian Liberals, with whom many of them agree in their strongly anti-clerical feeling. Much confusion is caused, of course, in foreign countries n the minds of those who attempt to follow Italian politics by the use of the phrase " The Left " for a body of poli- ticians who form the vast majority of the Chamber, and who are in part supporters and in part opponents of the present and of all recent Ministries, and who contain representatives of the most opposite classes of opinion. Among the Left are to be foimd some Radicals, some Socialists, some Republican Anti- socialists, and even some Conservatives. Composed as it is of heterogeneous elements, the Left is broken up into personal fractions, and it is high time that a new division of the Italian Chamber ITALY. 229 should be attempted. "Want of distinguishing principle leads to the most curious apparent changes of personal grouping. For example, when Signor Depretis first came into power with a Cabinet representing the moderate Left, Signor Cairoli, another of the leaders of the Left, saw no reason why he should not make a coalition with the Right, but finally decided to give a general support to the Depretis Ministry. After this Signor Depretis brought into his Grovernment representatives of the Eight, and obtained the support of the greater portion of the Eight, while he lost the support of a large section of the Left. Later again, the opposition to Signor Depretis was led by the " Pentarchy," or alliance of five leaders of the Left. This combination brought together at the head of the majority of the Left Signori Cairoli and Crispi, who had often opposed each other ; but later still Signor Depretis has taken two of the Pentarchs to his side in the persons of Signori Crispi and ZanardelH. The three other Pentarchs have been considering during the last few weeks whether they shall ask for embassies as supporters of the Government (it being understood that Signor Cairoli would like to come to London), or shall lead a re-constituted Opposition. It will be seen that in spite of the coalition between the moderate Left and the Right, which is known in Italian politics as " The Transfor- mation," the transformation of parties and party names, unfortunately for the cause of clearness, is not yet complete. It was after the fusion of the chief part of the Right with that portion of the Left which was represented in the Depretis Ministry, that is, after the elections of 1882, that 230 THE PEESENT POSITIOK OF EUEOPEAN POLITICS, Signor Depretis began to take what may he called a strongly Conservative line, and to adopt as the cardinal points of his policy those main objects for which the Italian Eight had all along contended. These were the support of the Mo- narchy and of the law of Papal guarantees, and the mainte- nance of the alliance with Germany and Austria. At the same time, the Pentarchic Left which was opposed to him, although containing elements really hostile to the Monarchy and elements opposed to friendliness or neutrality towards the Church, was not willing to frankly attack Depretis on any of these grounds. We may conclude, then, that whatever may be the party names in Italy, the great majority of Italians, or at all events the great majority of their representatives in the Chamber, are really united upon all the larger questions that are likely to come up. Along with the existence of a great and predominant mass of good sense, there is a little eccentricity in Italian politics, shown by the occasional return of swindlers, libellers, lunatics, and murderers to sit at Montecitorio. The special local causes which tend towards these peculiar elections are aggravated by that very absence of direct party issues and of parties, in the English sense of the term, of which I have just now spoken. While parties and distinguishing principles are wanting, men are plentiful. The deaths of Minghetti and of Sella were a tremendous loss to the Eight, but these statesmen left behind them Signor Bonghi, and Italy was able to find in Depretis and Magliani Ministers of remarkable ability, and in Cairoli an Opposition leader of high honour. ITALY. 231 Tke recent reconstitution of tte Depretis Ministry will, it is understood, make no change at tlie Consulta, for foreign affairs have passed into the hands of the Prime Minister himself, who is not Kkely to reverse a policy which was in fact his own. In taking back Signer ZanardelK, whom he had lost once before, his Ministry may seem to have become less Conservative, for when Zanardelli and Baccarini left him to become two of the Pentarchic chiefs, the former Depretis Ministry was transformed into a Conservative Ministry, resting upon the support of the Eight and of the Conserva- tive section of the Left; but while taking back his more advanced ex-colleague Zanardelli, and taking also Crispi from the ranks of the Opposition, he has also taken in a Minister of "War who belongs to a very different section, so it cannot even be said to be clear that Signor Depretis has once more turned back towards that Left from which he came. The difficulties of his Grovernment before the change were caused, not by differences of opinion upon points of policy, but by the withdrawal of active support by a portion of the Right, owing to the unpopularity of the Abyssinian campaign. The personal nature of Italian politics is clearly seen from the manner in which the Italian Prime Minister " sheds off " his colleagues instead of making common cause with them ; and Italy wUl never find Ministerial stability until the English and Belgian system of standing or falling together is rigorously enforced. While the great majority of Italian politicians support the Austro-German alliance, for reasons which we shall presently consider, they have to face a minority which, though as 232 THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. small among the electors relatively as it is in Parliament, makes nevertheless a great deal of noise. The more numerous opponents of the Austro-German alliance are those who declare for the policy of "free hands," and who are really supporters of the very " German policy " which they de- nounce; men, that is, who, while refraining from signing treaties in time of peace, would, were war to hreak out, enter for themselves into the same alliance. On the other hand, some of the young men burn Bismarck in effigy, and profess friendship for France. These are mere " savages " or " wild men," as the Germans would say, and are not worth counting, any more than are the ultra-Irredentist faction, who would quarrel at one and the same time with England about Malta, with France about Savoy, with Austria about the Tyrol, with Switzerland about the Ticino, and with Turkey and Greece about Albania. They have received, however, few as they are, a certain amount of practical support from some Opposition newspapers, which are contin- ually asking very disagreeable questions about the amount of good which the Austro-German alliance has wrought. It is difficult to explain that, besides working good, this alliance may have prevented mischief in the past and may bring tangible benefit in the future, because it woidd be equally inconvenient to have to explain what had been the dangers averted and what were to be the benefits received. Besides the Austro-German alliance, there is a feeling in favour of close friendship with England which is also popular with the electorate. Lord Palmerston's assistance in the Garibaldian expedition to Sicily; England's steady ITALY. 233 friendship continued for many years to the young kingdom ; Mr. Gladstone's offer of a joint occupation of Egypt, haye all contributed to make this feeling strong, l^ot long before his death, Signer Minghetti complained most bitterly of the refusal by Signer Mancini of the English proposal for the co-operation of Italy in arms with England with regard to Egyptian affairs. There never was a greater surprise than that refusal. At the time when the proposal was made, not only the English Government but the whole of the Italian Embassies were under the impression that it would be ac- cepted. But the good was done by the offer itself, for it is always gratefully remembered. No doubt the Italian states- men are abler men as a rule than the ItaKan diplomatists, but some of the latter are clever, and Count Corti, if he, as Signer Bonghi, I beHeve, once told him, can hardly think himself the equal of Prince Bismarck, is a man of remark- able ability. But on the occasion of which I speak, the diplomatists were right, the statesmen were wrong, and an Italian alliance with England would have given to Italy without risk that position which the Red Sea expedition was intended, but has failed, to gain. In August, 1884, there was a development by England of the policy of consulting Italy with regard to Egypt. The Erench always defend their claim either for exclusive influence or more often for joint influence with ourselves in Egypt by pointing to the large number of subjects and "protected subjects " they possess in that country. But there are more real Italians than real French in Egypt, and the proper way to meet undue French claims is to point to 234 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. those of Italy and Greece. I cannot but think that it must hare been Germany which warned Italy to keep out of Egypt, for Italy in recent years has taken her policy as subraissiTely from the German Empire as in 1866 she took her policy from France. Still, the refusal of the offer and the subsequent regret at the refusal have not made the Italians angry with us but only with themselyes ; and if Germany did give bad advice, that advice has not had seriously bad results. It is then clear that not the slightest modification of Italian foreign policy may be expected to result from any changes which may occur from time to time in the occupancy of the Consnita. Since Signer Depretis has been Prime Minister, there have been as many changes at the Italian Foreign Office as there have been in the constitution of the Govern- ment majorities; but the foreign policy of Italy has not varied, and will not vary. The attitude of the Italian Government towards the European Powers is not affected whether the Foreign Office is presided over by a politician like Signer Mancini, who was Foreign Minister when the Austro- German alliance was first made, or by a soldier and diplomatist of very different views, like General Count di Robilant. Count di Robilant, in spite of his early training, borne witness to by his armless sleeve, which is I believe a reminiscence of Novara, is said to have been very Austrian in his sympathies since his residence at Vienna and his marriage with an Austrian lady; but the least Austrian of Italian politicians, were he to replace the General at the Consulta, would carry out the same, that is the Bismarckian policy. HALT. 235 Italian foreign policy may be said to be so thoroughly accepted by the electorate as to be independent of Par- Kamentary groups or parties, and no Tariation in the policy is to be looked for because any given politician is at the head of the Cabinet or is Minister for Foreign Afiairs. The proceedings in the Chamber, after the recent disaster at Saati, may be taken to exemplify this. The GroTernment of Signer Depretis demanded a vote of confidence. Signor Bonghi and other influential members of the Right consented to vote with the Government on the Abyssinian question, although they withdrew their support in the next division, not as approving or disapproving of the African policy, but merely because certain personal modifications in the Ministry had not taken place. The news of the disaster came upon the Chamber while it was in the midst of a stormy discussion on the votes for public works. The suddenness of the news could not fail to call forth a great deal of demonstrative rhetoric in an assembly of Italians; but although the Minister obtained eventually only a diminished majority, the speeches which were made on the reception of the news all breathed identical sentiments of patriotism, though pro- nounced by men belonging to all the different groups. The money asked for was voted almost unanimously in the Chamber, and quite unanimously in the Senate. The subse- quent demand for a vote of confidence prevented a unanimous manifestation of patriotism, but the African policy was never really in question. Like all divisions in the Italian Chamber, this one was determined on personal grounds, and it was Generals di Eobilant and Ricotti who were personally attacked. 236 THE PEESENT POSITION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. The colonial poHcy of the Italian Government, as well as its foreign policy, is likely to maintain its continuity notwithstanding the changes in the Cabinet. A military disaster of course always brings down upon the ministry in power more or less popular indignation, and the satirical priiits of Rome have been full of pictures displaying Signer Depretis with a background of skeletons in Italian uniforms bleaching in the African desert. The disaster in Abyssinia will, however, probably not seriously check Italian colonial enterprise. The ItaKans have hitherto emigrated to the colonies of other nations rather than colonized for themselves. There are said to be at present two millions of Italian subjects abroad. Many of them, of course, are only temporary emigrants, who have left Italy for France or for Egypt, in the hope of making a fortune with which to live at home. In the South American republics, however, there are a vast number of Italian permanent settlers. In the Argentine Republic there are one million, and more than one-third of the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres are Italians. The tide of emigration, too, is increasing. Two hundred thousand people left Italy last year, of whom the greater portion went to this part of South America, and the Argentine Republic is rapidly becoming an Italian state. Irish, British, Scandinavian and German settlers thrive only in temperate latitudes, in which there are no new coun- tries left to annex ; but the Italians are able to endure hot cb'mates, and it is not impossible therefore that, late as it is in the day, an Italian policy of colonization may succeed. This is the reason which induces them to persevere in their ITALY. 237 Red Sea policy. The main motive whicli the Italians have in attempting to open up a portion of the African coast is commerce. Italy wishes to establish important posts which will bring into its hands the commerce of central Africa, which is now diverted to the north, to the Congo, and to Zanzibar. But Italian designs on Africa are not confined to the Abyssinian coast. 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