S5? (i^acnell Hittuctattg Siibrarg 3ltt)aca, Ntm Doth BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF HENRY W. SAGE 1891 Cornell University Library UA647 .S58 The colonies and imperial defence, iperi olin 3 1924 030 726 453 The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030726453 THE COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE THE COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE p. A. SILBURN, D.S.O. MEMBER OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF NATAL (LATE MAJOR, NATAL PERMANENT FORCES) LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA 1909 PREFACE The security of Britain and of her oversea dominions has, for some years past, been engaging attention. Public interest in the question is increasing, and many able writers, chiefly in the Mother Country, have approached the subject. I have thought much on the problem in its various bearings, and the follow- ing pages form my contribution to the dis- cussion. A contribution which, coming from a Colonial who has served in the field with Colonials, and who knows their views and feelings, and the work of which they are capable, may, I trust, not be altogether worth- less. Several of the Chapters appeared as Magazine Articles, and were written to stand alone ; hence, although some parts have been excised, there possibly may still be some reiteration or re- statement of points. My thanks are due to vi PREFACE John Stirling, Esq., for his valuable assistance and criticism, to Lieut. -Colonel Pollock, Editor of the United Service Magazine, and also to the Editor of the African Monthly, for their courtesy in sanctioning the republication with certain amendments of articles which appeared in their Magazines. P. A. SILBURN. Durban, Natal, S.A., February, 1909. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAOE; I. The Rise of the Empire i II. The Component Parts of Empire .... 28 III. The Empire-in-beinq loi IV. The Navy and the Colonies 134 V. England — The Navy 152 VI. The Empire — The Army 165 VII. Colonial Defences 178 VIII. The Political Element in Defence .... 194 IX. Problems bearing on Defence 212 X. Federation of the South African Forces . . 232 XI. Federation in Defence 248 XII. The Eastern Factor 259 XIII. An Imperial Council of Defence .... 277 XIV. The Organisation of our Imperial Resources . 291 XV. Wanted — ^An Imperial Defence Policy . . . 320 XVI. South Africa and its Defence 331 Index 349 CHAPTER I. THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. To facilitate the attempted solution of the all-impor- tant problem of Imperial Defence, it will be neces- sary to travel along paths that appear at the outset to lead in other directions. When one inquires closely into one or other of the numerous problems affecting the welfare of the Empire, it will be found that they all bear in a lesser or greater degree upon the principal problem of all — Defence. If this problem is once satis- factorily solved, the difficulties surrounding those of minor importance will fade into insignificance. By following the rise of the British Empire it will be noted that hardly a year has passed in its growth that the question of the means of a coherent form of defence has not been raised; it will likewise be found that when the importance of the subject has been neglected by Imperial statesmen, the Empire has suffered ma- terially as well as in prestige ; and that grave conse- quences have not seldom resulted to some section of the Imperial population. On a brief survey of the building of the Empire, I 2 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the frequent recurrence of sound Imperial suggestions by English and Colonial statesmen will be observed. It cannot but be noted that the Imperial idea is of no recent conception, for in the early administrations of the lost American Colonies, Canada and the West Indies, and even of South Africa, a full appreciation of what the future contained for the Empire was realised by the administrators of those days ; their unselfish labour, often unrequited, as in the case of Sir George Grey, would put to shame many of those misrepresen- tatives of the Crown we find in some of the smaller self-governing Colonies to-day. To enable us to arrive at some satisfactory basis, upon which the solution of the problem itself depends, it will first be necessary to inquire into that which has given rise to the subject ; the growth of the Empire itself By referring to our Colonial history, bringing into relief those land-marks that stand in the growth of the Empire, dwelling with equal force upon our discom- fitures as on our successes, and above all summarising and considering the strategic and defensive value of our varied possessions, we hope to be able to deduce some sound reasons or ideas which will help us towards a more complete consideration of the subject. The habit of swarming away from the parent stock at certain stages of life or when a certain strength has been exceeded, is common in some degree or other to all forms of animal life, and the term COLONY has been used to denote the infant community, be it of the THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 3 human race or among the lower orders of life. Colo- nies, however, in these senses are infantile communities which have severed all connection with the parent stock, and which in the natural order of things thrive and grow, in a short course of time, to the strength of the parent. In some forms of life, of which the human is not an exception, we find these " Colonies " rival the mother community ; this rivalry growing in intensity often to end in open strife which sometimes results in discomfiture, if nothing more serious, for the older community. In national life we have scenes illustrated in the case of Greece and her so-called Colonies. Coming nearer home, we have the case of the secession of our own American Colonies. If England's system of colonisation had its precedent in that of Greece, we might feel that the insurgent States were but repeating history ; that it was but the nature of things ; when, however, one more closely examines the history of the two nations it is found that the system of colonisation is as wide apart as the ages in which the two nations flourished. The Greeks formed settlements which we have most inappropriately called Colonies, that is if we wish to convey to the mind communities similar to what we possess to-day under the same name. As a matter of fact, Greece never colonised in the sense that we understand the term ; the emigration of com- munities from the parent State occurred ; these com- munities were but the nucleus of new States which grew up, often from their birth, in covert or open hostility to the parent, their only tie being that of I* 4 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE language and religion. The Greek term for these off- shoots {airoiKM) eloquently expresses their relationship to the parent country. In this sense we might well lay claim to the United States of America with its 80,000,000 inhabitants. Of Colonies, as we understand them, Greece did possess but few ; for with the de- parture from the shores of the motherland, the emi- grating community, among whom were many political exiles or dissatisfied citizens, generally cast off all their ties and had but the one idea of founding a State which would in the passing of time rival the older State. Another kind of Colony Greece did create by sending forth bands of military to hold certain outposts which served to collect round them some adventurers from Athens, but these were too ready to throw off con- nection with the mother country ; on the whole the so- called Colonies of Greece were to her a source of weakness. Yet despite the fact that navigation was in its infancy and its means were cumbersome, and that intercourse between the mother country and the settle- ments severed by sea was difficult, Greece did clothe many shores with these hiving-off swarms. Invariably we find that the first step in enterprises of any magnitude has been taken by the adventurer ; it is to this class of man that England owes most in Empire building. Search the history of all the nations who have risen above the common ruck and it will be found that the adventurer led the way. In the case of Spain her adventurers in seeking for wealth exploited lands beyond the seas and Colonies were formed, but THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE s of a different order to those of Greece, for these Colonies were purely of a military nature and may be likened to some of our own dependencies, made by conquest and held by the sword. These terror-stricken possessions of Spain never rose above the grade of dependencies ; the officials selected to govern them looked upon their office purely as a source of revenue to obtain the maxi- mum of wealth in the minimum time. Spain failed, and at the door of dishonest greed she must lay her blame ; had she been content to have laid the founda- tions of her oversea possessions securely, to have kept her home industries alive, and created a productive class in her new-found Colonies which would have in turn stimulated a shipping trade, her sea power would not have dwindled and the effect upon her national life would have been such that her position among nations would to-day have been very different. An improvement on the Spanish system of colonis- ing was that followed with some success by the Dutch — a system which we have followed but which we have also improved upon ; it is noticeable that laws insti- tuted by the Dutch two centuries ago in Colonies of which we have since obtained possession, are still in existence. Essentially a trading people, commerce was wrapt up in their official life ; from business men their officials were often most wisely selected. Factory writers from Holland were appointed fiscals to the Colonies, fiscals promoted to secundes, and when vacancies occurred the ambition, ability and worth of the secundes was rewarded with the honourable posi- 6 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE tion of governor, and, as in the case of Simon van der Stel, the high position of governor-general was obtained. As colonisers the success of the Dutch in the past cannot be questioned ; their governors, selected more often than not for business ability, were men of worth, and when it is remembered that unlimited authority was often placed in their hands, the varied duties of merchant, judge, soldier and sailor expected of them, it would be foolish to compare with them the spoilt pets of society or unsuccessful soldiers occa- sionally selected by English Governments of to-day for some of our smaller Colonies. Commerce was with the Dutch a calling of honour long before it had found its honourable position among other European nations, but with them it proved, like anything else if carried to excess, to be their downfall ; for it led to parsimony. Parsimony in a national life must bring in its train disasters. A great Dutch Minister had no little difficulty in obtaining sufficient money to keep the fleet in existence ; that fleet which had in less prosperous times contended with our own for the su- premacy of the sea for a century ; a fleet, too, that had actually sailed up the Thames and destroyed Sheemess, a fact which by the way the Germans have not for- gotten, and a feat they dream of emulating in the near future. With Sheerness the decline of the Dutch Navy commenced, the disintegration of what had given full promise of a Dutch Empire beyond the seas. On the ruins of Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch colonisation were laid the foundation of our own great THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 7 Oceanic Empire ; their errors were beacons to us, made all the more conspicuous by those we had ourselves been guilty of in South America and the West Indies. The three Powers from whom we have inherited oversea territory, expanded like ourselves by sea power, and through the cessation of that power they de- clined. The factors that brought about this downfall of three successive Powers are factors that are apparent in the British Empire to-day, and these factors we will refer to in following the growth of our possessions, whilst observing their similarity. We will endeavour to discover points of difference that may have in them the antidote for declining Empire. It has already been stated that Holland fell from her exalted position through lack of inclination to devote, in time of peace, a proper proportion of her wealth upon defence. Par- simony on the part of her rulers, as displayed by the Dutch, is a vice now becoming apparent among British statesmen, and it is as well to bear in mind the cause of Holland's loss of sea power ; not that even lavish expenditure would have put off the evil day for an indefinite period, for there were other causes at work which her geographical position, coupled with a limited population, could not overcome. Had the Dutch burgomasters, however, been as liberal in their ex- penditure in the preparation for defence during the period of peace as they were in their other pursuits, had they not procrastinated until war was upon them and then, when too late, spent lavishly in despera- tion, their power might have at least escaped the 8 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE humiliation they suffered; a humiliation that led to the rise to power of England. The British Empire, unlike most of the others, has rapidly expanded during peace, although, no doubt, each part of our territory has seen blood shed for its retention or in the course of civilisation. There is not a form of acquisition by which we have not gained possession ; Bombay by dowry, Mauritius by exchange, Canada and South Africa by conquest, Australia and New Zealand by right of occupation. During war or peace, since Elizabeth's reign our acquisition of territory has progressed ; checked oc- casionally, as if to take breath, but not for long, this steady expansion has gone on, and incredible as it must appear to our enemies with equal success by land as by sea ; from the sea-shores of India interior- wards, ever successful we marched, bringing to our ranks the natives themselves, in striking contrast to Spain's method in the Americas. In two and a quarter centuries we have secured the absolute control of the greater portion of Africa and 294,000,000 of its inhabi- tants own allegiance to the British Empire. From the sea-shores of the Cape of Good Hope, won for us by sea power, once a footing for our soldiery had been gained, fresh territory was acquired on that Continent, checked momentarily by native wars; the march of civilisation, however, could not be stopped. The Zulu despot, Chaka, when dying at the hand of the fratricide Dingaan, prophetically declared that he heard the tramp of the white man over the land ; onward towards THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 9 the heart of the Continent, obstacles as approached disappeared. Occasionally as fearsome statesmen held the reins of office, a halt would be called, but even then unauthorised progress, destined by a higher power, occurred, forcing the hands of the Government of the day ; far-seeing officials, not to be deterred, fear- lessly assumed authority, often to be recalled in dis- grace by adding to the Imperial heritage. Fully half of the sub-continent of Africa has been brought under the flag by the private and unauthorised enterprise of laymen ; call them adventurers or what you will, they have, as judged by us to-day, earned the undying gratitude of the Empire. The footing, true, was won by sea power, the expansion, however, was carried out by that characteristic of Englishmen which might be described as a craving to be ubiquitous. On reviewing our varied possessions to-day, it can- not but be admitted that the period taken in their accumulation has been short. The British Empire con- tains every conceivable geographical formation from continent to islet, people of every race, every language and every creed in the world, all bearing allegiance to one sovereign. It is not necessary to reiterate the facts so conclusively proved by Captain Mahan that the cause of it all is sea power, nor is it necessary to state that the secret of that sea power lay in the fact that England was able, and it is to be hoped ever will be able, to supply her seamen from among her countrymen, whereas Spain and those divers Powers who successively lost the command of the sea were lo COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE content to employ foreigners in their navies, principally Germans and Flemings. The year in which any practical idea of oversea posses- sions seems to have taken shape was i 578 ; for in that year we find a patent was granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, the terms of which are rather quaint ; he was empowered " to discover heathen lands not enjoyed by any Christian Prince and to hold and enjoy the same with all commodities, jurisdictions and royalties both by sea and land ". Five years later, in terms of this patent, Sir H. Gilbert took possession of Newfoundland, and the following year Raleigh took formal possession of Virginia. During the next two decades practically no progress was rtiade except in the increasing efficiency of the navy, the instrument to be used in Imperial ex- pansion ; in 1606, however, a charter was issued to the Virginia Company ; this charter ceded to the Company territory between 34° and 45° N. latitude. Little interest was taken in the Colony at home; it was governed by a resident council which was empowered to make laws at discretion, so that we need not wonder at finding that within twenty years there was practically no shred of dependence on the mother country left ; we may safely say that here is the genesis of the United States of America, though some writers fix it at a later period. In 1609 the Bermudas were settled and three years later were added to the territories of the Virginia Company. In 1619 we find the first mention of a Colonial Parliament, consisting of Governor Yeardley THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1 1 and his council of the Virginia Company together with burgesses elected by freemen from each planta- tion, each county of loo returning two members. On the 6th of September, 1620, the Mayflower set sail from Southampton with 120 passengers, who founded a new settlement at New Plymouth ; but as persecuted Nonconformists, these people took to new lands sentiments inimical to the British Constitution, and favourable to the creation of an off-shoot nation on similar lines to those communities emigrating from ancient Greece. In 1604 Port Royal in Canada was founded by the French, and four years later Champlain founded Quebec. Port Royal was captured a few years later by Argall only to be handed back with the rest of Canada to the French. Between 1628 and 1632 Nevis, Antigua and Mont- serrat were colonised. Up to now England, owing perhaps to her yet limited population, had not realised the value of oversea possessions, except as territories capable of providing commodities to the mother country. As homes for a surplus population, as sup- port in time of need for the parent country, Colonies were disregarded and little interest in their welfare was evinced at home. The result of this was that the New England Colonies were practically independent, Massachusetts even electing its own governors. In the year 1652, this Colony founded its own mint without any reference whatever to the mother country. The germ of independence, emanating in Virginia in 12 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE 1620, had in these thirty-two years grown rapidly, and 1 50 years later took shape in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America. In 1653 Barbadoes sounded a note of independence, when the English settlers there stated in emphatic language that they wished to make the Colony a free State, and not to run any fortune with England in peace or war ; this was the outcome of pique at representation in the House of Commons being dis- allowed, although that had been approved by the Committee of Foreign Affairs. Had the request been sanctioned, no doubt federation would long ere this have been an accomplished fact, and those territories now comprising the United States of America would have been an integral part of the Empire. Instead of our population numbering 50,000,000 whites we would have counted nearer 1 20,000,000, and Lord Rosebery's vision of the Court of St. James voyaging to Wash- ington would have been forestalled. As a slight indication of the monetary value of the American Colonies to England in the seventeenth century, we find that Virginia in 1677 sent home over ;^ 1 00,000. England was fortunate in her colonising possessions being comparatively near at hand, for grievances could be remitted to the mother country, and redress ob- tained within a reasonable period ; this, however, was not always given, as the sequel of the secession of the States showed — though it is undoubtedly their proxi- mity to the motherland that saved at that time the THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 13 West Indies and Canada to the Empire. In 1 660 we find that the interest in oversea possessions was in the ascendant, that an intelligent interest was being taken in their welfare and expansion ; their value as pro- ducers of something more tangible to national pro- sperity than precious metal or gems, was beginning to dawn upon the people of England, for we find that in that year a Council for Colonial Affairs was created ; this consisted of forty members drawn from among the merchants of the City of London. The duties of this Council were to study the wants, complaints, growth, trade and commodity of the Colonies ; immigration to these Colonies also came within their province. In 1670 the Hudson Bay Company was formed under charter of Charles II. Little, however, was done to colonise the territory. Five forts were built from which trading was carried on ; three of these forts were in 1 690 destroyed by the French. In 1 69 1 we find that owing to the restlessness displayed by Massachusetts over half a century prior to this date, and which had grown and spread to other States, it was deemed wise to re-adjust the boundaries and issue a new charter. This was done : New Plymouth and Maine were added to Massachusetts, the former that it might be "placed in a better condition of defence"; there were to be a governor, a deputy-governor and a sec- retary, appointed by the Crown ; these to be assisted by a council of twenty-eight members to be chosen by the assembly. Annual assemblies were to be held on a fixed day. It was hoped that this course would 14 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE allay the fast-growing discontent among the colonists, but unfortunately it added but another grievance, for the governor's salary became a bone of contention, the home authorities insisting that this should be ade- quate for the position ; on the other hand the colonials would vote nothing but occasional bonuses. In 1 7 1 3 under a Treaty of Utrecht, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were recognised by the French as English territory ; they recognised the right of all ter- ritory claimed by the Hudson Bay Company ; England, on the other hand, admitted the right of France to Canada, Cape Breton Island with Port Louisburg. The Treaty of Utrecht of 171 3 was the seal to Eng- land's sea power. The war preceding this treaty ruined the French and Dutch navies and their mercan- tile shipping. Both Powers had in addition to their navies, to man, equip and pay armies ; this in itself was a factor detri- mental to a successful struggle for sea power against a nation whose whole military energies, resources and ex- penditure could be devoted to the sea. The fact that Holland and France failed in the endeavour should be borne in mind by those who argue that Britain must have a large army as well as an all-powerful navy. In 1 7 1 1 we find the question of defence obtaining some prominence in the Colonies; in Pennsylvania a difficulty arose, which is common to this day in many of our Colonies, from the mixed character of the population. The Quaker section was strong in this State and they had religious scruples against bearing THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 15 arms ; this was made the most of for political reasons by the non-Quakers who had more sordid reasons for evading the obligations of defence. In 1709 the neighbouring States freely voted the Crown supplies of men, the Jerseys granting instead ;^3,ooo. Penn- sylvania would grant but ;£'50o. Two years later, however, this sum was increased to ;£'2,ooo. The hesitancy on the part of some of the Colonies made it clear that a Militia law was required " which shall oblige all to serve who can, and those that cannot, to contribute a due proportion to the expense ". A few years before this date we find that Lieut.- Governor Nicholson advocates in his despatches the union of the Colonies for military purposes under the headship of the loyal Colony of Virginia ; the recom- mendation was neglected. In 17 10 a statute (9 Anne c. ii.) establishing a General Post Office for the Colonies, any surplus from which should be expended on Colonial defence, was passed and found favour in all the Colonial Legislatures ; unfortunately the law remained a dead letter. In 171 5 the Board of Trade attempted to re- move one of the causes of complaint on the part of the Colonials by recommending that Colonial appoint- ments should, as far as possible, be given as rewards to well-deserving Colonials. This recommendation was, however, not given effect to. The year 1744 was one of importance for the American Colonies, for in this year war was declared between France and England, and by it the Colonials were to experience the confidence in their own strength i6 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE which was in another half century to bring them in- dependence. On the declaration of war, the French garrison at Cape Breton made a bold stroke and successfully raided Nova Scotia and captured Canso ; the following year plans were arranged between the American Colonies and the home authorities for re- taliation for the Cape Breton affair. The Colonials furnished 3,850 volunteers, eighty-five transports, eight 20-gun privateers, and ten smaller vessels ; these assembled at Boston and proceeded to Canso to await the covering squadron of four line-of-battle and other ships under Commodore Warren. As this is the first battle in which Colonials were employed collec- tively, and as the fighting was carried out solely by them, I will quote some of the details as given by Admiral Colomb in his Naval Warfare : — " On the 28th April the whole force arrived at Gabarnes Bay within four miles of the fortifications of Louisburg. The troops were immediately landed, being covered from the attack of a detachment sent to resist the landing by fire of some of the lighter vessels. The troops now marched directly on to Louisburg, while Warren blocked the entrance to the harbour and cut off all chance of reinforcements and supplies. Warren had been joined by three more sail of the line and was thus an absolute master of the sea. The land forces making successful progress, with full supplies coming to them from Gabarnes Bay, Warren deter- mined to push upon the harbour, and for that purpose made arrangements for the sudden storming of the THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 17 Island Battery. . . . When the operation was at- tempted the British were beaten off with severe loss — a single night's work, however, was sufficient to erect a battery near the lighthouse, which commanded both the Island Battery and the entrance to the harbour and was of the greatest assistance to the besiegers. Mean- while the failing ammunition and the stores of the British were replenished from over sea to Gabames Bay. . . . Deserters told the English commanders of great shortness of food and ammunition, while four ships carrying relief were captured by Commodore Warren's ships. His naval force was again reinforced, so that by June 1 1 he was at the head of four 60-gun, one so-gun, and five 40-gun ships besides a crowd of smaller vessels. . . . On the 15 th the Governor offered to capitulate and the terms being arranged the French flag was struck on the 17th, and the British entered into possession. The siege had lasted forty-seven days, during which time 9,000 shot and 600 shell had been fired into the place, causing a loss to the garrison of 240 killed, the loss to the besiegers was only 1 00." ^ The return of Cape Breton to France in terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle after the expenditure in blood and money by the Colonists added but another cause for discontent on their part. At this time the Colonists were labouring under the grave disadvantage of being ruled from home by men of incompetence. For twenty years the Duke of New- castle was the Secretary of State in whose department ^ Naval War/are, Colomb, pp. 353, 354. 2 i8 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the Colonies lay : his ignorance of Colonial affairs is notorious. Walpole in his memoirs of the last ten years of George II. credits him with saying, " Anna- polis ! Annapolis ! Oh, yes ! Annapolis must be de- fended. To be sure Annapolis should be defended. Where is Annapolis?" In 1748 this stupid Minister, responsible for the Colonial drift toward disloyalty, was succeeded by an equally incompetent person in the Duke of Bedford. The signs of growing dissatisfaction now so apparent in the State on the mainland were absent in the West Indies, yet both were recruited from the same stock, both ruled over by the same officials at home, but as islands, by the nature of things, they must be depen- dencies of a sea power. The ever-present fear of a negro rising among the greatly preponderant blacks kept the white settler's attention fixed on his affairs. The several conferences of Colonial Prime Ministers held in recent years had their precedent as far back as 1754, when, at the suggestion of the English Govern- ment, a congress of representatives from the different Colonies was held in Albany, " and although its con- clusions were arrived at with tolerable unanimity, it was at the same time generally recognised that the Montreal jealousies of the various Colonial Assemblies would prevent these conclusions from being generally accepted. . . . During the last year. Governor Shirley had called attention to the difficulty of uniting five or six different governments in acting for their common safety and interest. ... It would be impossible to THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 19 obtain proper contributions from the different Colonies unless the English Government gave peremptory directions. ... A general union becomes every day more necessary, the necessity more visible, for in the present disjointed way in which the Colonies act, and some will not act at all, nothing is done. . . ." Mas- sachusetts was sore because the contributions of other Colonies in men and money had been grossly insuffici- ent, and the Assembly assured Governor Shirley " Your Excellency must be sensible that an union of the several Governments of the enemy has long been desired by this province".^ No good result appears to have been the outcome of this conference, although it was at first thought possible to federate the Militia forces of the States. The differences between the States themselves seem to have been as serious as their grievances against the mother country, for in 1757 we find disputes between the States of Massachusetts and New York concerning their boundaries which did not end before blood was shed. In 175s General Braddock was appointed com- mander-in-chief with instructions to formulate some systematic method of raising levies from the different Colonies in case of attack, and to erect necessary forts. He, however, appears to have been hampered by want of funds. The home authorities expected the Colonies to bear the expenses of Colonial Defence, and the 1 British Colonial Policy, by H. E. Egerton, M.A., p. 171. o * 20 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Colonies objected whilst the home authorities exercised the controlling influence in the forces raised. The Seven Years' War broke out in 1756, and the struggle for the West commenced ; whilst the French had the assistance of the Indians, England was more fortunate in having a goodly Colonial army on her side. With the outbreak, past grievances were for the time forgotten in the excitement of the struggle now before them, and the American Colonies responded most loyally to the call to arms. Two thousand five hundred Militia were provided ; these were equipped, fed and paid by the States in proportion to their population ; this, too, in spite of the insulting regulation issued in 1753 and which now affected closely the Colonials — all commissions in the Royal Army above the rank of cap- tain took precedence of all commissions in the Colonial service. A century and a half later Colonial officers, however senior or with whatever qualifications, are con- sidered junior and inferior to all officers of the Imperial Army. No institution is so saturated with the feeling of self-satisfaction or with the spirit which disregards the claims or rights of others as a standing Army. " It was rules such as these that would have lost to England the services of Washington but for the wisdom of Braddock and Forbes in offering him staff" appoint- ments ; moreover the effect of such rules was greatly aggravated by the supercilious attitude generally as- sumed by the British ofificers." 1 ' A Short History of British Colonial Policy, by H. E. Egerton, p. 186. THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 21 As this criticism was expressed by an Englishman upon his countrymen, I cannot be accused of partisan- ship in quoting the passage, particularly as its tenor would have been amply justified in the next great war in which Colonial and British soldiers fought side by side in the interests of the same Empire. In both cases the treatment of the Colonial officers bore evil fruit. Lord Howe was the one man who realised the value of the American fighting material, and having survived the disastrous attack upon Ticonderoga no doubt he would have persuaded Pitt, then all powerful at home, to have moulded this Colonial material into a Colonial army, and thus to have converted into protec- tors of the Crown's interest a people who were shortly to secede. With the death of Howe the opportunity was lost, for there appeared to be no other Englishman broad-minded enough to look upon these Colonials as anything but foreigners, being used for the time being to fight a common foe. The war ended in 1763, and early in that year the Treaty of Paris was signed ; by it we obtained Canada, Nova Scotia, and all the islands of the St. Lawrence. We gave Cuba to Spain, in ex- change for Florida, we also ceded to France Martinique and Guadaloupe ; we retained Dominica, Tobago, St. Vincent and Grenada. At this time we find that the population of the Colonies consisted of 3,000,000 of the British race. The French numbered about 80,000. About 1766 it appeared as if the home authorities seriously recognised the urgent necessity, if the American Colonies were to be saved to the Crown, of 22 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE formulating some policy which Governor Bernard and William Knox, Under-Secretary of State, would favour, including the creation of an American aristocracy ; un- fortunately the experiment was not made, for had it been we should have at least had the opportunity of proving the value of an aristocracy in national life ; the suggestion has since been condemned, although the experiment was not made ; condemned under the belief that an aristocracy, to have its place in a healthy national life, must be musty with age. Another im- portant proposition and one that found some support among the publicists of the time, was that represen- tatives from the American Colonies should be given seats in the House of Commons. Procrastination, however, prevented any of these suggestions being brought into practice until it had become too late. Grenville was at this time at the head of affairs, and his one great aim was to create a British Army for the protection of the Colonies, to provide the revenue for the upkeep of this Army by taxing the Colonies, for whose protection it was to be ostensibly kept ; accord- ing to Macaulay and the American writer Churchill, the Stamp Act (6 G. III. c. 12) converted over 2,000,000 loyalists into rank rebels. But not only in the Col- onies was opposition shown to their taxation ; their grievance was championed by some of the leaders in the Home Commons ; we find Pitt and Camden de- claring that taxation and representation must go together. If the enactment of the Stamp Act was mischievous, its repeal a short time later upon proof THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 23 of its unpopularity was downright folly, for the manner in which the repeal was brought about was a clear proof of weakness. Small wonder then that when the duty of threepence per pound on tea was imposed, it was looked upon as the last straw by a people who already considered themselves overtaxed. It would have been thought that the Colonial attitude prior to and again after the Seven Years' War was a clear enough indication to the home authorities that if fancied or real rights were abused, if a slighting policy was fol- lowed, if incompetence and incapable officials were appointed, the colonists would not stop short of war, and long before war came the authorities at home saw it was inevitable ; yet no preparation was made, but a few months before the outbreak the Navy of 20,000 men was reduced by 4,000. England now entered upon the most humiliating epoch of her career, weak and incompetent statesmen and officials were to undo all that had been done by her sailors and soldiers. In 177 s the New Englanders committed the thirteen States to war ; these were Massachusetts, New Hamp- shire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. In this year, owing to the unpreparedness of the British, they were forced from Boston ; in 1776 New York was cap- tured and held by the Royalists as a base of opera- tions. In this year the Americans made an inroad to Canada, but were repulsed by the British. In 1777 reinforcements were sent from England to Canada ; 24 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE upon their arrival Burgoyne organised a force consist- ing of 7,200 regulars, half of whom were Germans, and 2,500 Canadians as auxiliaries ; this force as- sembled on the 2 1st of June, 1777, on the west side of Lake Champlain, with the object of marching south by way of the lakes, thence along the banks of the Hudson River. The British at New York were to send a strong force northwards along the Hudson and the two forces were to unite at Albany. It was hoped that these operations would effectually cut the com- munications between the northern and the central and southern insurgent Colonies. Ticonderoga, the scene of our defeat at the hands of the French in 1758, and a place of importance in Burgoyne's line of march, was successfully invested on the 5 th of July, and St. Clare, the Republican general, being driven back in the retreat, the Americans lost some of their artillery. So far the expedition promised well ; Burgoyne, how- ever, most unwisely employed Indians, and when too late he was quite unable to suppress the horrors ac- companying savage wars ; the atrocities perpetrated by these allies, instead of helping towards the subjection of the Americans, only incensed them the more, and moreover brought to their ranks men who would otherwise have remained loyal or neutral. The British successes were rudely interrupted at Bennington, Colonel Baum, with a large detachment of Germans, suffered a severe reverse, the colonel being killed and the British loss exceeding 600 men. On the 14th of September Burgoyne reached the heights of Saratoga, THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 25 only fifteen miles from Albany. The Americans were strongly posted at Stillwater, midway between the two places. Meanwhile Philadelphia had fallen to the British army under Lord Howe, operating from New York. In September Sir Harry Clinton, having received reinforcements from England, moved out of New York with 3,000 men to join hands with Bur- goyne at Albany. On the 19th of September Bur- goyne advanced, and when four miles from Saratoga encountered the enemy under Gates and Arnold ; the loss to both sides was heavy ; Burgoyne retained his position, which he deemed advisable to strengthen with earthworks and redoubts. Clinton's advance up the Hudson was seriously delayed by the American forts erected to bar his passage. The first week of October found Burgoyne's position a desperate one ; his force reduced to less than 6,000, Indians and Canadians continuously deserting ; on the other hand the American army was daily increasing in strength. On the 7th of October Burgoyne decided to make an attack on the enemy's position, and with that purpose formed a column of 1,500 picked men and moved out. His artillery consisted of ten guns ; the Americans did not wait for his attack, but advanced and very soon the battle became general, the English guns be- ing taken and re-taken ; towards evening the English, being outnumbered, were forced back upon their camp, losing six of their guns. During the night Burgoyne retired into Saratoga, leaving sick, wounded and bag- gage for the enemy. 26 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Unknown to Burgoyne, the previous day Clinton, advancing along the Hudson to his assistance, had met with success ; he had captured both forts on the Hud- son with severe loss to the enemy, and was now within 1 59 miles of the force he was to relieve — an advance column had indeed pushed on to within forty miles of Albany. With daylight on the 8th, Burgoyne found his force reduced to barely 3,000 English, his provisions exhausted, and no prospect, as far as he knew, of Clinton's arrival. He therefore had no alternative but to approach the enemy as to terms of surrender ; this he did on the 1 3th. General Gates at first demanded that they should surrender as prisoners of war ; this Burgoyne refused, threatening to ground arms and to rush on the enemy, " determined to take no quarter ". It was at last agreed that the troops under General Burgoyne should march out of camp with the honours of war to the verge of the river, where the arms and artillery were to be left. A free passage to be granted to the army under Burgoyne to Great Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North America dur- ing the present contest. This convention was agreed to on the 1 5 th ; on the evening of that day a messenger reached Burgoyne with news of Clinton's success ; this came too late, and on the 17th the convention was carried into effect — and thus ended one of the most momentous conflicts of the British Empire, for its effects are still travelling down the River of Time. Lord Mahon in referring to Saratoga, says : — " Even of those great conflicts, in which hundreds of THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 27 thousands have been engaged, and tens of thousands have fallen, none has been more fruitful of results than this surrender of thirty-five hundred fighting men at Saratoga. It not merely changed the relations of England and the feelings of Europe towards those in- surgent Colonies, but it has modified for all time to come the connection between every Colony and every parent State." Three months later France acknowledged the Inde- pendent United States of America ; Spain and Holland soon followed the same course — the combination was too strong for England who had entered half-heartedly and quite unprepared upon what she considered as nothing more serious than the suppression of a small rebellion. Dissatisfaction in Ireland and a depleted Treasury added to her discomfiture. In 1 78 1 Lord Cornwallis and the remainder of the British army surrendered to Washington, a man who had fought loyally on our side as a staff officer in the Seven Years' War. In 1783, by the Treaty of Ver- sailles, England acknowledged the United States of America as an independent nation. CHAPTER II. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE. In the foregoing chapter we have crudely traced the growth of the British Empire up to the first serious reverse in its expansion, a reverse which for many years affected its prestige. It will have been noticed that the loss of the American Colonies, so unnecessary, re- sulting in the creation of a new nation which in a few decades became a world Power, was solely caused by the inaptitude of a few English statesmen, indifferent to Empire and ignorant of its component parts — the dire consequences would appear to have been borne in mind by British Ministers in a more or less degree during the century of Imperial expansion which fol- lowed ; for although we find that many of the Colonies suffered neglect and have had serious cause to complain of injustice, it is only upon the advent of the present Liberal Government that British interests in the Colonies have been treated with open contempt, and that experiments in Colonial policy as dangerous as those of a century ago are being made, experiments that will not only result in inevitable disaster but which have already estranged a large body of Englishmen 28 THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 29 and their descendants, now suffering by the gross in- justice of these anti-Imperial experiments. To enable a satisfactory and efficient solution of the problem of the Empire's defence to be reached it will be necessary to discuss each component part of Empire in detail. Some of these parts, owing to their strategic importance, call for more detail than others. On the other hand, parts of Empire holding a position of first- class importance in the commercial world may be of but secondary importance in Imperial defence, and therefore call for little attention in any work dealing with that subject. CANADA. Fortunate, indeed, was England to have a man like Carleton at the head of affairs in Canada at a time when its possession by England hung in the balance. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, he it was who successfully defeated the insurgent expedition against Canada in 1775. It was mainly due to his tact and discretion that the insurgent States received little or no assistance from the Canadians ; Carleton was suc- ceeded by another able official in Haldimand, who, to strengthen the loyalist party in Canada, encouraged the immigration of loyal Americans from the insurgent States ; these were settled in the province of Ontario and numbered about 3,000. Great numbers of loyalists fled to Nova Scotia. " According to an order in Council of 1789, all loya- lists who had joined the cause of Great Britain before 30 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the Treaty of 1783, and their children, were to be dis- tinguished by the letters ' U.E.' (United Empire) and were to receive grants of land of 200 acres for every child of either sex. The letters U.E. became, and have continued to be, a badge of honour and dignity treasured by all who then enjoyed it, as it is now proudly clung to by their descendants.^ Here is an instance of something costing the home authorities nothing, yet which at the time, and in the years to follow, did incalculable good ; small in itself, yet there is a clear indication that had Knox's or Bernard's advice for the creation of an American aristocracy been listened to, there would have sprung up the eternal means for the prompt suppression of revolt. In 1791 power was given to the Crown to create in Canada a hereditary aristocracy. This, however, was never carried into effect." ^ Up to the year 1812 the relationship between the French Canadians, who were mostly of the agricultural class, and the British, mostly belonging to the mer- cantile community, was strained. French newspapers were published whose policy it was to widen any breach that had up to that time existed between the two communities sprung from inimical stock. With the outbreak of the war in 1 8 1 3 this hostility died down. The French Canadians' sympathy was given entirely to England ; the war had the effect of binding closer than ever to the mother country this her now eldest surviving Colony ; with the declaration of a naval ^British Colonial Policy, Egerton, p. 250. 'Ibid., 251. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 31 peace which was to last till the present day, the era of growth and expansion set in which was only rivalled in the neighbouring American States. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the population was barely 250,000; in 100 years it has increased to 6,000,000 ; her commerce has progressed in common with her population, and her position is to-day one to be envied by many of the old-established European nations. She indeed vies with many of them and is now worthy of the title of a Colonial nation. Con- taining a total area of over 3,500,000 square miles, her population rapidly increasing by immigration now drawn by wise statesmanship from the most desirable class in the mother-land and in the neigbouring Re- publican States, the possibilities of this vast country, so rich in natural gifts, are untold, and its rapid growth in the future may only be approximately measured by the neighbouring nation. Canada is particularly fortunate in her water com- munications, nor has she stinted artificial means of extending and improving what Nature has provided. In one year, 1906, we are informed that 32,817 vessels passed through the Canadian canals to the Atlantic ; up to 1906, 90,846,879 dollars had been spent in the making of canals. Her railway progress is only par- alleled in the United States ; every town and village of any importance is connected by rail, while rich agri- cultural districts are intersected and brought into touch with the markets of the world by this modern means of transport. In 1906 this Colonial nation owned 32 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE 21,518 miles of railway. An easy means of conveying to the mind some idea of the wealth of this section of our Colonial people, and one that appeals to most of us in this material age is a peep at their finances. In 1906 the average assets of the banks totalled 878,512,076 dollars; a surer indication of the popular property is given by the savings bank balance ; this in the same year stood at ;^I 1,209,391 or £1 17s. 4jd. per head as against £1 9s. 7d. per head for Holland, the people of which are noted for their industry and thrift. The revenue for the Dominion in 1906 amounted to 80,139,360 dollars, half of which was taken through the Customs. It has already been shown that a century's uninterrupted peace was solely responsible for this unparalleled progress ; moreover it is now an established fact that this long peace was obtained and secured on the high seas by the English Navy. Had Canada not been under the aegis of the British flag, those waterways, so bountifully supplied by Nature, would have proved the same danger to her that those useful means of communication proved to the Southerners in the Civil War ; the Mississippi admitted the enemy into the very heart of the Southern States ; and would not the St. Lawrence and the Hudson have done the same to any Power holding the sea before the population of the Colony had reached defensive strength ? Was not the Hudson the means by which Clinton was within an ace of saving Burgoyne's down- fall at Saratoga, and that in the days of sailing vessels? THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 33 Canada has spent much energy and toil to bring into being the advantages she is now enjoying, and it is not to be wondered at that the question of security should be lost sight of. Those now living have known no- thing but immunity from serious war on their own territory. To many the war spectre appears to be for uncivilised lands, for a country enjoying peace and quiet for well-nigh a century the risk of being at war is, they think, infinitesimal. It is only in those communities where the memories of war still exist that people realise the possibility of its recurrence. This proper realisation of war as an ever-present factor in national existence, brings with it, in degree, preparation. As the ravages of war fade, so do we find that invariably preparation dwindles, to be lost in the all-absorbing pursuits of monetary gain. Every decade of history enforces the lesson that it is folly to allow expensive preparation for war to fall behind the other duties of national life. It is quite impossible to fix the safe proportion of revenue for expenditure upon defence ; the one should bear no relationship to the other. The father of history tells us that the Athenians gave their all, even to the . melting of their precious metals and ornaments, to assist in the keeping of their fleet ; this may only emphasise their lack of foresight. England's expenditure upon defence, taking an average for the five years ending 1903 and excluding war expenditure, is 43 per cent, of her revenue, but the defence costing that sum is as much for the British Empire as it is for 3 34 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE England. The proportion of revenue expended by the Colonies for security from war varies, those in the front rank of the strategic line appear to be most neglectful, or dependent on an already heavily burdened parent ; Canada, the colony now under review, spends barely 2 J per cent, of her annual revenue on this which should be the primary question with a nation. Whilst admitting that it is not always the bloated defence vote that shows efficiency, yet the discrepancy between the 43 per cent, of revenue expended by England, and the 2 1 per cent, of revenue expended by her senior colony, does not tend to assure the Imperial public that the latter is prepared to shoulder her full share of the Imperial burden. The smallness of her Defence vote is not, however, a true measure of Canada's power in Imperial Defence, she has had the Imperial weal sufficiently at heart to adopt the necessary precaution of modified com- pulsory service — this takes the form of a Militia Act which has served in after years as a model for similar Acts in other self-governing colonies ; the effect upon the liberty of the subject, that blatant phrase behind which the coward seeks cover, and so assiduously preached by the twentieth century socialist and demo- crat, is so slight that it is barely felt. Canada in her early struggle for existence recognised that it is the individual's duty to defend in time of war the State from which he draws his sustenance ; and upon this principle the Militia Act has been drawn, which, should the occasion ever arise, would place in the field THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 35 every able-bodied man in the Dominion — the system is one of the few military systems that are to be found compatible with economy. The defence expenditure of Canada should be made upon the training (not the keeping) of the skeleton force which in time of war will be clothed by her partly trained manhood. The machinery for bringing this embryo army suddenly but smoothly into exist- ence should ever be in readiness ; and must, if disaster is to be avoided, be free from all political influence. FALKLAND ISLANDS. A group of islands in the South Atlantic, 300 miles east of Magellan Straits. The total area is about 6,500 square miles, the principal islands are East Falk- land, 3,000 square miles. West Falkland, 2,300 square miles, and South Gevyen, 1,000 square miles. Popu- lation (1901) was 2,043. The Falklands were discovered by Davis in 1 592 ; Hawkins visited them in 1594. The French took possession of them in 1 763, but later they were aban- doned. The Spaniards occupied the group until 1 77 1 , when the sovereignty of them was given to England. In 1820 the Republic of Buenos Ayres formed a settle- ment on East Falkland ; eleven years later this settle- ment was destroyed by the Americans. In 1883 they were again occupied and formal possession taken of them by Great Britain. Defence. — Dependent upon Royal Navy. A volun- teer force of 100 men exists. 3* 36 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE THE WEST INDIES. To the youthful reader of seafaring tales, the West Indies have ever had a charm. Whenever their name has caught the eye in print, they have called to mind naval adventure, piratical or legitimate. Naval actions in which we have been active, and nearly always vic- torious participants, have centred round them since their discovery. The naval peace of a century, and the evolution of strategic and tactical principles have not removed these possessions from the arena of naval strife in future maritime war ; on the other hand, the strategic importance of some of these islands will equal that of Gibraltar. Should a naval war be staved off until the comple- tion of the Panama Canal, we shall find Mediterranean naval history repeating itself in the Caribbean Sea. The importance of the West Indies in our struggle for the supremacy of the sea in the closing years of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth cen- turies, are historical facts emphasised by Admiral Colomb and Captain Mahan, who have rescued from obscurity the valuable lessons the struggle affords. By referring to the map of the Caribbean Sea it will be noticed that the British possessions in the West Indies stretch from British Guiana on the mainland of South America, in the form of a chain across to Bahama Island, off the coast of Florida. An important break occurs between Anegasa in the Virgin Islands and the Turk Islands in the Bahama Group, the foreign THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 37 possessions of Porto Rico and San Domingo interven- ing, thus giving an inlet to a probable enemy to the Caribbean via the Mona Passage. British Guiana on the mainland, lies between Venezuela, Brazil, and Dutch Guiana. Its seaboard on the Atlantic is 280 miles in extent. The area is 104,000 square miles. Like many of our possessions it was first colonised by the Dutch. In 1803 British Guiana was surrendered to the British and has remained in British possession since. The population in 1901 was 278,328, of whom 16,724 were whites. There are two ports in the Colony, Georgetown on the river Demerara, and New Amsterdam in Berbice, neither of which is fortified. The defence force consists of 426 Militia, with a reserve of 196. There is in addition a semi-military police force consisting of 1,975 of all ranks. Jamaica. — Area 444 square miles, population (1901) 770,242. This island was discovered by Columbus in 1494, in 1596 the British pillaged the capital. In 1655 the island was captured by us ; three years later the Spaniards attempted to re-take it but were repulsed. In 1674 the French under Ducasse invaded the island from Hayti ; they were repulsed by the Colonial Militia. In 1702 the French made another attempt, but were met by the English fleet under Benbow, and in the naval action which ensued the French were defeated, and it was in this action that Benbow was mortally wounded. In 1720 the Picaroons from Cuba invaded the island, and did considerable damage to life and 38 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE property ; this invasion brought into being " the De- ficiency Law," by which a fine was to be paid by each planter who did not supply a sufficient number of men to assist in the defence of the coast. In 1762 an ex- pedition was fitted out at Port Royal against Havannah and was successful in capturing that city. In 1776 Nelson fitted out in Jamaica an expedition against San Juan de Nicaragua. In 1782 Rodney defeated De Grasse in a naval action off Jamaica. To a maritime nation Jamaica is peculiarly valuable owing to her harbours, which number over thirty and are all accessible to the largest vessels. Kingston harbour is a naval dockyard and is strongly defended ; there are fortifications and batteries at Port Royal, Rocky Point, Apostles Battery, Fort Clarence, Fort Augusta, Rock Fort, and Salt Ponds Hill. In 1 90 1 the old depot-ship Urgent was stationed at Port Royal as guard ship. The Imperial troops numbered 1,866, and Colonial Militia 763. The foreign naval station of Santiago is but 120 miles distant. Trinidad.— Area 1,754 miles. Population (1901) 255,148, most of whom are of mixed European and African blood. The island was discovered by Columbus in 1496. The Spaniards did not occupy it until 1584; eleven years later the capital was captured and destroyed by Sir Walter Raleigh. In 1797 the English, under Admiral Harvey with a fleet of eighteen vessels, cap- tured the island. It was finally ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Amiens ; the cession was, however, THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 39 a bone of contention. Napoleon strongly opposed Great Britain retaining possession, on account of its geographical position, of which he fully recognised the value ; the first Consul was, however, over-ruled. The harbours are Port of Spain (the capital) Macaripe, and San Fernando — the latter is a very fine harbour. A volunteer force exists numbering about 700 all ranks, and a police force of 567. In 1834 the locally raised defence force consisted of 4,500 men, officered by loyal subjects of alien descent. From this it may be inferred that the material is at hand for a defence force of some strength. Tobago. — Twenty miles from Trinidad. Area 114 square miles. Population (1901) 18,750. This island was taken possession of by the British in 1580, oc- cupied by British settlers from Barbadoes; in 1625, however, these were killed or driven out by the Indians. In 1642 the Duke of Courland, ruler of an independent State on the Baltic, sent two ships with immigrants to form a settlement on the island. In 1654 the Dutch formed a settlement on the south coast of the island, and four years later the latter attacked and subdued the Courlanders. In 1666 an expedition consisting of four vessels was fitted out and despatched from England, at the expense of private individuals, and the island was attacked and taken after slight resistance; the Dutch commandant, and his garrison of 1 50 men, were made prisoners of war. In the same year a naval battle was fought off the island, between 40 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the English under Admiral Sir John Harnian, and the combined French and Dutch fleets, in which the latter were defeated. Towards the end of the year Tobago was captured by the French ; they, however, abandoned the island and the Dutch again occupied it. In 1673 the English again appeared on the scene, attacking and capturing the island. Sir Tobias Bridges taking away about 800 prisoners. On this occasion the British abandoned their capture, and the Dutch made another attempt at a settlement. In 1677 the French under Count d'Estries made an unsuccessful attempt to take the island from them ; later in the year the French were successful, and the island came under French rule, though they restored it to the Dutch in 1679. By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1684 Tobago was declared neutral. By the Treaty of Paris in 1762 the island was restored to England. In 1771 two in- surrections of slaves took place, but they were sup- pressed by the local Militia ; from this fact it would appear as if the force was well organised. In 1778 an attempt was made, by the American States, then fight- ing for independence, to capture the island, but they lost one of their four vessels in the attempt. In 178 1 the French attacked and captured the island, after a stubborn defence by the Colonists. It was ceded to the French by the Treaty of Paris of 1783. In 1793 Tobago was taken by the English, only to be handed back to France in 1802 by the Treaty of Amiens. When war broke out the following year, Tobago was captured for the last time by the British under THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 41 Hood, and was ceded to them by the Treaty of Paris in 1814. In 1854 the troops were withdrawn from the island, the Colonists taking the responsibility of their own de- fence ; and with this object in view, the Volunteer Act of 1854 was passed, though not brought into force until 1876, when two companies were organised. Barbadoes. — This island has an area of 166 square miles, and a population of 195,588. It was occupied by the British in 1625, and has remained in our pos- session since. The harbour of Bridgetown is an open roadstead ; there is, however, an inner harbour or careenage, pro- tected by a structure called the Mole Head. Bar- badoes is the headquarters for the European troops in the West Indies, the garrison consisting of thirty-eight officers and 753 non-commissioned officers and men. The total number of Imperial troops told off between St. Lucia and Barbadoes is 1542. The two Colonies have between them a local defence force of 600 men. Grenada. — The total area of this island is 133 square miles, and the population (1901) 64,288. It was discovered by Columbus in 1498 ; occupied by the French in 1650. In 1762 it was captured by the British. In 1779 a strong French force under the Count d'Estaing with a large fleet and 3,000 men, at- tacked the small garrison of the island, consisting of ninety men of the 48th Regiment assisted by 300 local Militia and 1 59 seamen. After a long and stubborn defence the island was taken by force of numbers. 42 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE In 1783 the island was restored to the British Government. In the days when the West Indies were the principal source of the "national wealth and mari- time power, Grenada was one of the most strongly fortified islands in the Caribbean Sea, and it often witnessed many a short encounter. In 1854, however, the military were removed from the island, and the fortifications have since then been dismantled. The hills overlooking the bay and harbour of St. George possess no less than five forts ; all built in stone. These now remain as so many monuments of departed glory. Fort George, the principal of these structures, commands the entrance to the careenage, and was built by the French in 1760. On eminences in various parts of the island are to be found the remains of small batteries." ' The harbour of St. George is situate in the middle of a large bay. In this bay it is estimated that 1,000 ships of 300 to 400 tons can ride at anchor comfort- ably and secure from storms. In 1780 it was contem- plated to erect a dock for the use of the Royal Navy in this harbour. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. The Grenadines. — Are a chain of small islands lying between Grenada and St. Vincent, and comprise an area of 8,462 acres with a population of over 7,000. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. St. Vincent. — This island lies fifteen miles west ' Her Majesty's Colonies, A. J. R. Trundell. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 43 of Barbadoes, and has an area of 132 square miles, the population in 1901 was 50,237. In 1783 it was secured by England. The capital, Kingstown, is situated in a bay which resembles that of Naples. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. St. Lucia. — An island containing an area of 233 square miles. The population is estimated at 50,237. In 1639 the island was occupied by British settlers ; the following year they were massacred by the Caribs. The French from Martinique next took possession. In 1 664 the British from Barbadoes, after an engagement with the French troops, captured the island. In 1667, with the Peace of Breda the island was handed back to the French. The second cession of the island at the Peace of Paris in 1765 was condemned as an unwise measure. On the renewal of hostilities it was one of the first points of attack, and again fell to Great Britain, to be later restored to France at the Peace of Versailles. In 1803 a small squadron under Hood attacked the island, and at the point of the bayonet carried the Morne which the French desperately held. Since then the island has remained under British rule. Amongst those sailors and soldiers who took part at one time or another in the fighting connected with the island, were Sir John Moore, Sir Ralph Aber- crombie, Lord St. Vincent, and Lord Rodney. Harbour. — Castries, the chief harbour, is one of the finest in the Antilles, possessing sufficient depth of 44 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE water to allow the largest vessels to anchor close to the wharfs. Its entrance is a third of a mile across between the headlands of the Tapim and the Vigis ; the largest fleet may safely lie at anchor within the basin. Castries is a fortified coaling station for the Navy. Defence. — Fortified. There are i , 5 4 2 I mperial troops stationed between St. Lucia and Barbadoes, and they have between them a local defence force of 600 men. Antigua. — The area of this island is 108 square miles. Population 34,941. The island was occupied by the Spaniards in 1620, but was abandoned. In 1630 it was occupied and colonised by the British. In 1666 it was captured by the French, but later again fell into the hands of the British. More fortunate than some of her sister islands, she escaped successive cap- tures and re-captures, due perhaps to the dangers of her coasts. The chief town, St. John, has not a convenient harbour. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. St. Christopher (St. Kitts), Nevis, and An- GUILLA. — Three islands lying to the west of Antigua, with an area of sixty-five, fifty, and thirty-five square miles respectively. The population of St. Kitts is 30,876, that of Nevis 13,087, and Anguilla has a population of 3,699. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. Dominica. — An island containing an area of 291 square miles with a population of 29,894. It lies THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 45 midway between the French islands of Guadaloupe to the north-west, and Martinique to the southward. Dominica was one of the islands in the Caribbean granted to the Earl of Carlisle by patent dated 2nd June, 1627. By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748 it is stipulated between the English and French that Dominica and some of the other West India Islands should remain neutral. In 1756 Dominica was seized by the English, and by the Peace of Paris was recognised as a British possession. In 1765 the French captured the island after a gallant defence by the Regulars and Militia. It was, however, returned to the British at the general peace. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. MONTSERRAT. — An island twenty-six miles south- west of Antigua, thirty-nine miles south-east of Nevis and forty north-west of Guadaloupe. Area thirty- two square miles. Population 12,215. The island was colonised by the English in 1632. It was taken by the French in 1664, but restored to the English two years later ; since then it has been in British possession. The island is extremely rugged, and has the dis- advantage of having no harbour. The chief town is Plymouth, the anchorage of which is an open roadstead with an excellent holding ground opposite the town. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. Virgin Islands. — This group of islets forms a connecting link in the chain across the Caribbean Sea. They lie to the extreme north of the chain and to the east of Porto Rico ; owing to submerged reefs they are 46 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE dangerous to navigation. St. Thomas, St. John, and Santa Cruz belong to Denmark ; the Spaniards possess one of the group, viz. Crab Island — the remainder, some thirty-two in number with numerous rocks, are in our possession ; the area of these is fifty-eight square miles, and contains a population of 4,908. The chief islands are Tortola, Virgin Gorda, Anegada, Jost van Dykes, Salt Island, and Peter Island. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. The Bahamas. — This group forms the larger half of the chain of British possessions, barring the entrance to the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. The group consists of a number of islands, islets, rocks, and coral reefs. The large and inhabited islands are. New Pro- vidence, Grand Bahama, Eleuthera, Andros, Abaco, Long Island, San Salvador, Ruan Cay, Inagua, Ragged Island, and Crooked Island. The Turks and Caicos, though a dependency under the Government of Jamaica, are geographically a portion of the Bahamas ; the area of the Bahamas proper is 5,450 square miles, with a population of 34,358. The area of the Turks and Caicos (thirty small cays) is 165I square miles, the population of these islets is 5,350. The Bahamas were discovered by Columbus on the 4th of October, 1492, and they were taken possession of in the name of Spain. The Spaniards made little use of their new possessions, beyond deporting the Caribs as slaves for the mines on the main. In 1632 a British settlement was formed in the THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 47 Bahamas by settlers from Virginia ; this was destroyed in 1 64 1 by the Spaniards. In 1680 the Bahamas were taken possession of by England; a settlement was formed in 1690, and a Government appointed. In 1 703 the British Colony on New Providence was surprised by a combined French and Spanish force — the fort destroyed and the town sacked ; the governor and principal inhabitants taken as prisoners to the Havannahs. The Bahamas were again occupied in the reign of George I., and again captured by the Spanish in 1781, but were restored to England at the Peace of Versailles. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. British Honduras. — This Colony is the only British dependency in Central America. The total area is 7,562 square miles, and the population 37,479. It is bounded on the north by Yucatan and Mexico, on the west and south by Guatemala, and on the east by the Caribbean Sea. In 1638 a few English settlers arrived from Jamaica. In 1786 they relinquished the settlement to the Spaniards. In 1796 England again took possession. On the I oth of September, 1 796, the Spaniards attacked the chief port, Belize, with a fleet of fifteen ships ; after two days' heavy fighting they were totally defeated. This fight is known as the Battle of St. George's Cay. The chief port, Belize, is practically undefended. A local volunteer force exists, numbering 191 all ranks. Defence, — Dependent on Royal Navy. 48 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE The Bermudas. — A group of about 360 small islands, only about twenty of which are inhabited, the remainder being little more than bare rock ; the total is less than fifty square miles, with a population ofi7>535- The group was discovered in 1 5 1 5 by a Spaniard named Bermudez. In 1609 Admiral Sir George Somers was wrecked on one of the numerous islets, and in the following year he died there ; his companions named the group Somers Islands, and they are still sometimes known under that name. Towards the latter half of the eighteenth century the importance of the Bermudas as a naval base began to be recognised. In the war between England and America they were of considerable value. Defence. — Bermuda is a strongly fortified naval base for the squadrons on the North American and West Indian Stations. The imperial troops stationed there number 3,243. The local Militia consists of a garrison company. Communications. — Connected by cable with Nova Scotia, Turk's Island, and Jamaica. Since the foregoing sketch of the West Indian pos- sessions of Britain was penned it has been proposed that the number of regular troops in the garrisons should be reduced, some garrisons being withdrawn. It is to be most earnestly desired that the colonists will realise that on them now lies a great responsibility, and that by creating and training strong Militia forces they will ensure their ability to make it impossible for THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 49 an enemy's cruisers to effect a landing or the destruc- tion of their ports. AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICA. If we except India we may with truth say that more blood and treasure have been expended by the inhabit- ants of the British Isles in the colonisation of this sub- continent than in the rest of the oversea possessions combined ; and when we compare the results with those of more recent acquisitions, small wonder that the patient British tax-payer doubts the wisdom of it all. Had mere doubts, however, deterred our fore- fathers in territorial expansion oversea, Great Britain would have been unheard of as a colonising Power. From Herodotus we gather that the Phoenicians doubled the Cape 611-605 B.C.^ From then onwards to i486 no further reference in history is made to the Cape. In that year Bartholomew Diaz, the Portuguese navigator, first sighted what promises to be one of our richest possessions, and two years later his country- man, Vasco da Gama, landed at Table Bay. Cape of Good Hope. — In 1652 the Dutch East India Company took possession of the Cape of Good Hope with the object of making it a port of call for their merchantmen trading with the East Indies ; Jan van Riebeck was placed there as first governor with a force of 100 men. Van Riebeck's first work was to build a fort. 1 Herodotus, iv., 42. 4 50 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE In 1688 some 300 French refugees arrived, and from these early settlers sprang those hardy farmers who have since pioneered the hinterland of this, until the last century, little known land. The early Dutch and French Huguenot immigrants, in leaving the land of their birth, centred all their affections on that of their adoption. Content to sever for ever their connection with the parent country, they took with them all those sentiments conspicuous in those immigrating com- munities from ancient Greece. The love of independ- ence rapidly grew to a passion, and we find that, though few in number, they were a continual source of trouble to the Dutch Administration. They found in every law passed for the better government of the community a fancied restriction on freedom, and constantly showed anxiety to escape from imaginary injustice, the result being a gradual expansion or movement towards the interior. In 1795 the Colony was captured, after little re- sistance, by the English, only to be restored in exchange for Ceylon eight years later by the Treaty of Amiens. War having again broken out, an expedition was fitted out in England for the capture of the Cape. The expedition arrived at the Cape in January, 1806 ; the Dutch governor, after a sturdy resistance, capitu- lated, and the Cape passed into the hands of the British. The first year of British rule saw an error in administration ; this was the means by which the abolition of slavery was carried into effect. At the time of the British occupation, the greater portion of THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 51 the settlers' wealth consisted of slaves ; the Colonial authorities undertook the payment, upon valuation, for the liberation of these slaves, but subsequently the notes accepted in good faith in payment were not met by the home authorities ; distrust in the new Adminis- tration was thus engendered and handed down to future generations. Upon the British occupation the population consisted of 8,000 men, 2,400 women, and 2,000 children. In 1 8 1 2 the Kafir War broke out, Colonial levies were formed, and the natives, after some severe fighting, were driven across the Fish River, which was now fixed as the boundary of the Colony ; a few months later, however, the natives made a determined attack upon Grahamstown ; but after a stout resistance, in which our women took part, the natives were driven off with great loss. In 1820 the first English immigrants arrived, and were settled in the Albany and Bathurst districts. Until now, the Dutch language was allowed in all official business — in this year it was decided that the English tongue should be instituted " wherever practic- able," and should be used in all official business. In 1834 began the Great Kafir War, to the whole- sale destruction of life and property on the borders ; numerous settlers with their families were butchered in cold blood ; the regular troops in the Colony were quite inadequate for the suppression of the rapidly spreading revolt among the Kafirs, Irregular corps were immediately raised among the settlers (Dutch 4* 52 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE and British), native levies were formed from among the loyal Fingos. After some severe fighting, the Kafirs were driven from the Colony, and the border was now extended to the Kei River, thus adding another stretch, sixty miles in breadth. The first large migration of Boers occurred in 1835-36. This is known as the "Great Trek ". Some 10,000, in various sized parties, trekked north, and, crossing the Orange River, settled on the high veld. One party making its way through what is now Natal, was massacred by the Zulus under Dingaan. The immigrant Boers now considered themselves as out of the precincts of British rule, and became a con- tinual source of annoyance to the authorities of Cape Colony. The Zand River Convention of 1852 ceded to the Boers the Transvaal State, and two years later the Orange Free Territory was acknowledged by the British. In 1853 representative government was instituted at the Cape. Sir George Grey was now governor, and in the ten years that followed there was rapid progress for the Colony. Vigorous methods for the adequate protection of the Cape frontier were instituted, a per- manent mounted force known as the Cape Mounted Riflemen was formed ; every encouragement for the development of agriculture and stock breeding was given, railway and telegraph construction commenced. In 1865 British Kaffraria was incorporated with the Colony without bloodshed, and in 1871 the Basutos asked for British protection and their country was formally annexed. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 53 In 1867 diamonds were discovered in Griqualand West ; the rapid immigration of the settlers to the new- found fields led to the annexation of this territory. In 1877 an Act was passed in the Imperial Parliament federating these South African possessions. The dis- covery of diamonds, and later of gold, whilst bringing capital to the country, and stimulating immigration from other parts of the world, had the retrograde effect of enticing from agricultural and pastoral pursuits settlers who by those means were building up a healthy national life. Until those discoveries were made, the Colonial population were wisely engaged in laying those sure foundations upon which security in the future can depend ; this was interrupted by the dis- coveries of mineral wealth, not in that form that goes towards the creation of manufactories and industries, which would in themselves recreate large labouring classes, but unfortunately in the form that stimulates greed — greed for speedy wealth drew all classes to the localities where it was expected wealth would be easily and quickly come by, all other industries were stifled almost at their birth, with the result that to-day — 1908 — South Africa with its 900,000 square miles of territory, and a white population of 1,135,616, is without a manufacturing industry of importance. The years 1877-78 saw the last Kafir war within the Colony. During British occupation nine Kafir wars had been successfully engaged in, the natural sequence to each being increased power and territorial expansion. In 1887 a conference was held in London for " promoting 54 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE a closer union between the various parts of the British Empire by means of an Imperial tariff of Customs ". It was at this conference that Mr. Hofmeyer suggested his Zollverein scheme, in which Imperial customs were to be levied independently of the duties payable on all goods entering the Empire from abroad. Mr. Hofmeyer stated that his objects were to promote the union of the Empire and at the same time to obtain revenue for the purposes of general defence. The scheme was not at the time found practicable. Simon's Bay, the headquarters of the naval squadron in South African waters, is fortified. During the Boer War the Colony placed over 20,600 men in the field. An abortive burgher law exists. The Volunteers number 5,835 of all ranks. The permanent force of Cape Mounted Riflemen number 767 of all ranks. There is also a mounted police force, numbering 2,7 5 2 officers and men available for defence purposes. The Colony contributes ;£^50,ooo per annum to the Royal Navy. The Imperial Government spends ;^3o6,3o8 on military defence. Walfisch Bay is in the centre of the coast-line of German West Africa, and is the only port along that coast; area, 430 square miles, population, 31 whites, 737 natives. The settlement is administered from Capetown as part of the Cape Colony. Natal. — Area, including the province of Zululand, 35,371 square miles. Population, 94,370 whites, 938,472 natives and 107,505 Indians and other coloured races. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 55 Natal was discovered by the Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, on Christmas Day, 1497, and was named by him " Terra Natalis ". The first Englishmen to visit the land were those wrecked near Delagoa Bay in 1683 ; they passed through Natal on their long tramp to the Cape, and upon their arrival reported favourably of Port Natal. In 1721, the Dutch formed a settlement there, but later abandoned it. The first British settlement of the Colony took place in 1823, when Lieutenant Farewell, with twenty settlers from the Cape, immigrated there. The Government of the Cape declined to recognise the immigrating community. Chaka, the Zulu despot, ruled with savage military vigour the native tribes from Delagoa Bay to St. John's River. This chiefs headquarters were but forty miles from Cape Natal. Mr. Fynn, one of Farewell's party, opened negotiations with Chaka, and succeeded in obtaining permission to form a trading settlement at Port Natal. Chaka was murdered by his brother Dingaan, and this chief re- senting the European inroad, drove the settlers back to the Cape. In 1831, however, Mr. Fynn succeeded in pacifying the Zulu potentate, and in 1835 Dutch immigrants from the Cape arrived in Natal ; three years later a party of 600 of these settlers was mas- sacred by Dingaan at Weenen. The Boer and British settlers combined, and marched into Zululand, there defeating Dingaan and his chosen impis ; this salutary lesson put an end to trouble with the Zulus for many years. In 1838 th§ authorities, fearing the immigrant 56 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Dutch would form an independent State in Natal, des- patched a battalion of the 72nd Highlanders to Port Natal ; they were, however, recalled in the following year; immediately upon their departure, the Dutch hoisted the flag of their Republic ; upon receipt of this intelligence at the Cape, a force of 200 infantry with two guns was despatched overland to Natal ; when this force arrived at Durban the Boers retired a short distance from the town. On the 23rd of May the British under Captain Smith attacked the Boer camp, but were repulsed with some loss ; ^ this was the first of several defeats the British soldiers were to receive at the hands of the Boer farmers. The British retired behind their stockades, and awaited the arrival of reinforcements. On the 24th of June, H.M.S. Conch and Southampton arrived and raised the siege. On the 5 th of July the Boers submitted to the British at Pietermaritzburg. Formal annexation by Great Britain took place in 1843 j the following year the Colony was constituted portion of the Cape. Twelve years later, on the ist of July, 1856, immigrants having arrived from the Cape and Europe, the settlement was formed into a separate Colony. A Legislative Assembly was constituted in 1856. ^ A curious incident is related in connection with the desultory fight- ing which now ensued. The enemy had three 6-pounder smooth bore cannon, and the British had two similar weapons ; powder was plentiful with both sides ; the British soon, however, ran out of round shot, they then collected that fired by the enemy, and upon his expending his supply, fired it back. The Boers followed the British example ; it is stated that the same shot was passed to and fro many times. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 57 The unsettled state of the neighbouring independent Boer States was a source of continual annoyance to Natal ; a few dissatisfied Boers would create trouble with the natives, which often seriously affected the English settlers ; at last it was decided by the home authorities to annex the Transvaal. This was carried into effect on the 1 2th of April, 1 877. This new pos- session was administered from home. The following year the Zulus gave trouble by raiding the borders of Natal ; this resulted in the Zulu War of 1 879, and the defeat and disruption of the Zulu nation, the most warlike people in South Africa. This war saw the employment of 1,200 Natal Colonists, among whom were a number of Boers who fought loyally for the British.! A year later the Transvaal Boers demanded the re- storation of their territory. England had not, as is still sometimes the case, been happy in the selection of her representative ; this gentleman, Sir Owen Lanyon, did not understand the settlers, friction resulted, and indiscreet handling of a people the most amenable in the world, if ostensibly (should conceit forbid actually) treated as equals, ended in open rebellion. The small English garrisons in the Transvaal were be- sieged, our troops at Laing's Nek, Ingogo, and Majuba, ^ We have here confirmation of the decadence of the military in- stincts in some of the Colonies. The population of Natal at the time of the Zulu War was 35,000 ; it will thus be seen that nearly every able- bodied man took the field ; twenty years later with a population of 100,000, with their Colony invaded, the Colonists onlyl placed 1,700 men in the field. 58 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE were defeated — all within a few weeks. Even in those days there were- to be found English politicians who failed to grasp the meaning of Empire ; in their opinion a Colonial war was not undertaken in the interests of the Empire as a whole, but solely for the benefit of a small community of settlers ; such poli- ticians made up Mr. Gladstone's Ministry of the day, and they accepted this defeat of the Imperial forces as purely the overthrow of a handful of British soldiers ; had the Boers been prevailed upon to regard it in the same light the more costly war to both sides of twenty years later would not have taken place. The Trans- vaal then having been fairly won in a few weeks' fight- ing, by force of arms, was handed back to the victors. With the ending of the first Boer War an era of prosperity and progress set in for Natal, an era which has continued to the present day. Railways are open- ing up the country, and agriculture is spreading. Responsible government was granted in 1893, but at a time when the Colony was far too weak to receive it. So successful had been the donation of responsible government to the other Colonies that the home authorities were only too anxious to grant the same privilege to any community that asked for it, forgetting that a Colony would have to be of a certain strength before it could supply a sufficiency of capable men to administer the government. Responsible government was granted to Natal fifteen years too early. The re- sult has been legislation of a parochial type. In the Boer War 1 899- 1 902 — the causes leading up to which THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 59 it is unnecessary to recount here — Natal was the scene of some of the most severe fighting ; at one time, in- deed, over one-third of the Colony was in the hands of the enemy. About 2,000 of the Colonists took the field (2 per cent, of the population) ; the only classes of the population in whom patriotism appeared strong at this juncture were the working-man and the farmer. One or two of the mounted regiments, containing the same material as that of the Imperial Light Horse, failed to emulate the gallant deeds of that distin- guished regiment, solely through the cautiousness of the political officer, a gentleman who is a curse when and where action is necessary ; in many instances the local military authorities were hampered by the inter- ference of their juniors, due to the latter's political power. With the conclusion of the war, a reaction set in ; a Defence Commission was appointed, and prompted by a recognition of the little the Colony had done in the war and the undue burden thrown on the shoulders of the few, a Militia Bill was passed. With the annexation of portions of Transvaal terri- tory the Colony obtained 7,000 square miles and her population was increased by 8,000 whites and 50,000 natives ; for these benefits Natal paid the Transvaal a sum of ;^7oo,ooo. Defence. — The defence force consists of a force of active Militia numbering 2,739 men ; 2,000 of these are mounted. There are two 4-gun batteries and one 6-gun battery of Field Artillery. The Militia Act, 1903, based on the Canadian and New Zealand Acts, provides 6o COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE for calling upon all able-bodied men in case of emer- gency ; it is estimated that should occasion require, 12,000 men could with ease take the field. As a re- sult of the labours of the Defence Commission of 1902, a most excellent system of cadet training has been initiated in all the boys' schools ; this training of scholars in the use of arms and to shoot is compulsory. When leaving school the cadets are drafted into senior cadet corps until old enough to join the first line of defence. In five years from the time of writing, judg- ing by present results, over 90 per cent, of Colonial young men of twenty-one will have received seven years' training. As the Natal Militia Act of 1903 falls short of what was originally anticipated, I will deal more fully with its provisions and its shortcomings in another chapter. The details of a port's defence are usually considered as strictly secret, and it will be noticed that in referring to all other parts of the Empire I have most religiously honoured that secrecy ; in the case of Natal the same regard would be shown had the Natal Parliament displayed that discretion which is necessary to make defence effective. It has, however, been remarked with astonishment that coast defences costing some ;^5 0,000 were openly discussed in detail in the local House of Assembly. The number, calibre, position, and effec- tiveness of the weapons were explained publicly, even the amount of ammunition available for each weapon was the subject for the display of rustic oratory to be fully reported in the local press ; under these circum- THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 6i stances no harm and perhaps a little good may ensue by referring to these defences. Durban has an inner harbour capable of holding vessels of practically any size; this harbour is ap- proached by a narrow entrance which is commanded from the south by a high over-shadowing bluff on the crest of which are mounted two 6-inch B.L. guns mounted en barbette ; the entrance is controlled by a floating boom supported by one i2-pounder Q.F. gun. To the north of the entrance and harbour the country is flat ; on this flat, three miles to the north of the en- trance, is situated a gun-group of two 6-inch Mk. VI. B.L. guns, mounted en barbette. It has been proposed to replace the bluff guns with two 7"S B.L. guns ; this should-be secret proposal has been publicly discussed and published. The urgency for improved defences has been accentuated by the addition to the port of a floating dock capable of dock- ing a second-class cruiser ; by the increased facilities for coaling, and the opening up of extensive coal-fields which are connected to the port by rail. Transvaal. — Area, 1 1 1,196 square miles. Popula- tion 303,000 Europeans, 24,000 Asiatics, and 1,030,029 natives. Defence. — Under the late Republic compulsory mili- tary service was the law of the land. The military organisation and training was entirely in the hands of district officers known as field-cornets. Each magis- terial division was divided up for burgher purposes into military areas under a field-cornet. 62 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE With the annexation of the Transvaal to Great Britain in 1902, a Volunteer system was gradually being introduced. The Colonial irregular corps having their headquarters in the Transvaal during the latter part of the war were retained as Volunteer units ; on attaining responsible government the defence policy was changed. The South African Constabulary, a fine mobile defence force of 6,000 men, was abolished. The Volunteer staff was gradually retrenched and the old burgher system of administration revived. But whilst this form of administration was effective under the compulsory service law of the old Republic, it is absolutely abortive under the present condition of affairs. The present Volunteer force consists of 5,000 active Volunteers and 5,000 Reserves. There were one brigade of artillery, five mounted and one infantry corps. Orange River Colony. — Area 50,392 square miles. Population 143,679 whites ; 244,636 natives. Defence. — Imperial troops are garrisoning the Colony. A Volunteer force is now being organised. Rhodesia. — This territory includes the whole of the region lying between the north-west of the Transvaal, and having as its eastern and western boundaries the Portuguese and German spheres. The river Zambesi divides it into two portions — Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia. — Area 144,000 square miles. Population 12,623 whites. Native population 619,000. North-eastern Rhodesia. — Area 109,000 square THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 63 miles, with a white population of 200 ; the native population is estimated at about 346,000. The native wars in Rhodesia of 1893 and 1896 were conducted by Colonial troops. Between 1895 and the present day over 2,000 miles of railways have been opened for traffic, built and worked by the Chartered Company. WEST AFRICA. Sierra Leone, sometimes called the Liverpool of West Africa, due to the large amount of shipping which holds communication with the territory. Area 4,000 square miles (population, 1901, 76,655, of whom 444 are whites), includes the Isles de Los, Yellaboi, and other islands to the north, Sherbro, and several other islands to the south. The territory was ceded to an English company by a native chief in 1757, and was obtained for the pur- pose of forming a settlement of freed slaves ; in 1 792 and 1 800 numbers of freed negroes from Nova Scotia and Jamaica arrived, and the Sierra Leone Company transferred its rights to the British Crown, 1 807. In 1865, it maybe noted, a Select Committee of the House of Commons recommended the gradual abandon- ment of all our West African Colonies, except Sierra Leone. Freetown, the greatest seaport in West Africa, is a second-class Imperial coaling station, and has a very fine harbour which is strongly fortified with several batteries of heavy guns. Freetown is also the head- 64 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE quarters of H.M. forces in West Africa, 800 men of the West India Regiment, and tlie West African Regi- ment, 630 all ranks, raised in 1898, besides engineers and artillery. Gold Coast. — Stretches for 350 miles along the Gulf of Guinea between the French Ivory Coast and German Togoland. The area, including Ashantiland, is about 71,300 square miles, with a population in 1901 of 1,486,433, of whom 6,660 are Europeans. The French appear to have been the first to have visited the Gold Coast, for in 1366 a company was formed at Rouen to trade with the natives, and in 1383 an establishment was formed at Elmina, with towers and batteries for protection; in 1470 the settlement was abandoned. In 1 480 the Portuguese established themselves at Accra, and they built a fort at Axim. In 1 637 the Dutch captured the settlement from the Portu- guese and retained possession until 1871, when they ceded to Great Britain all their Gold Coast possessions. England had, however, in the meantime, occupied portions of the coast ; independent adventurers had from the middle of the sixteenth century been regularly trading with the west coast of Africa ; the Royal Company of Adventurers was formed in London in 1662. On war breaking out between England and Holland the former captured Fort Witsen, Secondu, and Cape Coast Castle ; Admiral de Ruyter re-captured these places with the exception of Cape Coast. In 1672 the Royal African Company was formed, and trading stations were erected between Dixcove and THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 65 Accra ; these were fortified against the Dutch, and up to 1780 fighting continually occurred between the rival nations ; the English, as a rule, being successful. In 1 82 1 the British Government took over the forts and settlements and placed them under the govern- ment of Sierra Leone. In 1868 by a convention with the Dutch the territories were defined ; a line drawn due north from the mouth of the Sweet River to the Ashanti frontier was the boundary line, all places in Dutch possession to the east of this line were given over to the British, and all to the west held by England were handed over to Holland. In 1872 the Dutch ex- changed their portion of this territory for concessions in the east. Christianberg Castle at Accra and the fort of Quittah were obtained by us in 1850, by purchase, from the Danes. The transfer of Dutch possessions to England led to the Ashanti War in 1 878 ; the Ashanties invaded the Protectorate, and pushed down as far as Elmina Castle, but were here defeated by the sailors, marines, and local forces ; the Ashanti power was finally crushed by Sir Garnet Wolseley at Amoaful on the 20th of January, 1874. There are two battalions of the Gold Coast Regi- ment of the West African Frontier Force stationed at Kumasi and Gambaga, these consist of forty-eight ofiS- cers and twenty-seven European instructors (N.C. O.'s), 2,216 men; costing for the year ;^8 1,241. There is also a Volunteer force of 259 men, and a police force of 610, all ranks, 5 66 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Lagos. — A Crown Colony consisting of the Island of Lagos, and about 140 miles of coast lying between Dahomey and Southern Nigeria. The area of the Colony is 1,460 square miles, and we have the pro- tectorate over 25,450 square miles of adjacent territory extending to the French possessions on the Middle Niger. The population of the Colony and Protectorate is estimated at 1,500,000, of whom 308 are Europeans. In 1 861 Docemo, the native king, ceded to Great Britain the island and part of Lagos. A local defence force exists, consisting of 827 men with two European officers. The only safe harbour along 600 miles of coast is at Lagos ; a cable connects with England. Gambia. — A Crown Colony at the mouth of the river Gambia. Area of Colony proper sixty-nine square miles, including the Island of St. Mary, situated on which is the capital of the Colony, Bathurst. Popula- tion (1901) 13,456, of whom 198 are Europeans; the adjacent territory, consisting of 4,500 square miles, is under our protection, and has a population of 76,948. In 1588 Queen Elizabeth granted a charter to a party of Exeter merchants to trade with Gambia ; from then down to 1807 the possession was the resort of native slave-traders. A detachment of the West African Frontier Force of 220 men is stationed at Lagos. In addition to this body there is an armed police force of 100 men. A cable connects Bathurst with St. Vincent (Cape de Verde) and Sierra Leone THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 67 Nigeria. — By the Anglo-German agreements of 1885, 1886, and 1893, and the Anglo-French agree- ments of 1889, 1890, and 1898, the important region of Nigeria, comprising some 400,000 square miles and an estimated population of 25,000,000, was brought under British influence. The territory is bounded on the east by the German Kameroons, and on the west and north by Dahomey, and the French military territories. The principal ports on the sea-board are Old Cala- bar, Opobo, Degama, Bonny, Akassa, Brass, Burutu, and Wari. ;£'43,500 is now being expended on these harbours. The military force consists of 5,000 native infantry under British officers, these are equally divided be- tween Southern and Northern Nigeria. Communications. — A light railway runs from Zun- geru to Bari-Juko, and is being extended to the Niger. Ibadan is connected with Lagos by rail, and an exten- sion to the Niger is in progress. On the Niger are two Government stern-wheelers, three steam launches, and a steam pinnace. Telegraph lines are laid from the Lagos frontier to Jebba on to Lokoja, and up the Bonne to Ibi. A branch line crosses the Kaduna mouth to Bida, Zungeru, and Zaria. St. Helena. — An island in the South Atlantic, 800 miles south-east of the Isle of Ascension, and 1,200 miles from the coast of South Africa. Area forty-seven square miles ; population (i 901) 3,500. The island was the place of Napoleon's exile and death. 5* 68 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE The island was discovered by the Portuguese com- mander, Juan de Navo Costella, on 2ist May, 1501. In the year 1600 it was abandoned by the Portuguese, and the Dutch then occupied it. In 1673 it was cap- tured by the British under Sir Richard Munder and was granted to the English East India Company. In 1836 it was purchased by the Crown for ;^ 100,000. The strategic value of St. Helena lies in the fact of its being directly in the track of vessels rounding the Cape. Prior to the opening of the Suez Canal, it was the port of call for a great number of ships returning from the East, and on this account large military and civil establishments were maintained. As a coaling station for the Royal Navy the island is fortified, but the garrison, consisting of 500 British troops, was last year withdrawn. Communications. — The island is connected with Cape- town by cable ; this has been extended to St. Vincent. Ascension. — A small island in the Atlantic, area thirty-eight square miles ; population 400 ; 3,417 miles from Plymouth, 900 from coast of Africa, and 760 from St. Helena. Discovered by the Portuguese in 1 501. In 181 5 the island was occupied by a detach- ment of British troops. The island is entirely under the control and jurisdic- tion of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and is used as a coaling, victualling, and store depot for British warships on the west coast of Africa. It has been strongly fortified, and the discipline of a man-of- war is maintained on the island. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 69 Tristan d'Acunha. — Consisting of a group of islands in 37° 6' S. Lat. and 12° W. Long., Tristan d'Acunha, named after its discoverer, a Portuguese, was occupied by a detachment of British soldiers during Napoleon's exile at St. Helena. Population (1901), 160. Communications. — Connected with England and the Cape of Good Hope by cable. Ceylon. — Area 25,332 square miles, population (1901), 3,578,333, situated to the south-east of Hin- dustan, separated from the mainland of India by a channel of forty miles. The Portuguese under Alimyad in 1505 were the first to land on the island, they formed a trading establishment at Colombo. In 1656 the Dutch seized the island, expelling the Portuguese. In 179s Ceylon passed into the hands of the British, and was formally ceded to England at the Peace of Amiens. The harbour of Trincomalee on the east of the island is strongly fortified, the armament having been recently replaced with modern weapons at the cost of the Imperial Government. This port is the head- quarters of the British fleet in East Indian waters. Colombo on the west has been fortified at the expense of the Colony, the armament being supplied at the cost of the Imperial Government. The Imperial troops in the Colony consist of one battalion British Infantry, two companies Royal Garrison Artillery, two companies Native Artillery (not recruited locally), half Fortress Company, Royal Engineers, and a Native Submarine 70 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Mining Company, Royal Engineers. Total strength 1,665, all ranks. A Volunteer force numbering 2,425 all ranks, is maintained. The Colony pays the Imperial Government 1,975,061 Rs. per annum as the cost of the garrison. Mauritius. — An island in the Indian Ocean, 500 miles east of Madagascar, 1,300 miles from Natal, and 2,300 from Capetown. Area 708 square miles; population (1901), 378,195. The island was discovered in 1 507 by the Portuguese, Don Perro Mascarenhas ; it was not, however, occupied until 1 598 and then by the Dutch. In 1644 they built a fort at Grand Port. In 1710 the Dutch aban- doned the island, and five years later the French took possession. Mauritius during the wars with France at the latter part of the eighteenth and opening of the nineteenth centuries, was a source of great mischief to our mer- cantile shipping in that part of the ocean ; the island afforded facilities for sorties to be made upon our traders by French men-of-war and privateers. The East India Company fitted out an expedition which succeeded in capturing the island in 18 10. Situated midway between the British possessions in India and South Africa its strategic value is great. The island is garrisoned by Imperial troops num- bering, in 1906, 1,394. The Colonial contribution to the military expenditure for 1906 was £32,c,y6. The harbour of Port Louis is defended by two forts — Fort Adelaide and Fort George. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 71 Communications. — There is a cable communication between Australia and Natal, through Mauritius and Rodrigues ; a cable connects Zanzibar to the Seychelles and thence to Mauritius. The Seychelles Islands comprise eighty-nine small islands and islets, with an area of 148 square miles. The population in 190 1 was 19,237 ; the islands are 940 miles from Mauritius. The chief island Mah^ has a fine harbour (Victoria), this has recently been made a coaling station, and is connected by cable with Europe and Mauritius, the former via Zanzibar. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. Rodrigues. — An island 300 miles from Mauritius, is eighteen miles long and seven miles broad. Population (1901), 3,162. The island was used by British troops during and after the operations against the French in Bourbon and Mauritius at the beginning of last century. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. Communications. — Connected with Mauritius by cable. Diego Garcia Group. — Consists of four islands situated in the Indian Ocean between the entrance of the Red Sea and Australia ; the group is of some importance as a coaling depot, the chief island, Diego Garcia, has a very fine harbour. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. Straits Settlements. — Population (1901), 572,249, of whom 4,958 are Europeans. Defined by letters patent 17th June, 1885. Consists of the 72 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE island of Singapore, town and province of Malacca, territory and island of the Dindings, the island of Penang, Province Wellesley, and their dependencies, with other territories that may at any time be added to or become dependencies upon the Colony. The Cocos Islands have lately been added to the Colony, and consist of a group of twenty islands, 700 miles south-west of Batavia. Malacca is on the western coast of the Malayan Peninsula, consisting of a strip of territory forty-two miles in length, and from eight to twenty-four miles in breath. Singapore, an island twenty-seven miles long by fourteen wide, situated to the south of the Malayan Peninsula, from which it is separated by a strait of three-quarters of a mile. Penang, an island about fifteen miles long and nine broad, area 107 square miles, off the west coast of the Malayan Peninsula ; it is at the northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca. Malacca was taken possession of by the Portuguese Albuquerque in the year 1511. In 1641 the Dutch succeeded in capturing the possession and in expel- ling the Portuguese. In 1795 the Dutch were in their turn driven out by the British. In 1 8 1 8 it was restored to the Dutch. In 1824 the Dutch exchanged it with the British for Bencoolen on the west coast of Sumatra. The Straits Settlements are of some stra- tegic importance, inasmuch as they command the en- trance to the China Seas. Singapore has lately been THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 73 thoroughly fortified at an initial outlay of ;^ 100,000, which was borne by the Colony. The garrison com- prises two companies of Royal Garrison Artillery, one company of Asiatic Artillery, half a company of Royal Engineers, and a company of Malay Submarine Miners, two battalions of Infantry (one European and one Madras). Due perhaps to environment, local interest in defence is keen, and the Volunteer force consists of a battery of Artillery, a company of Engineers, and four com- panies of Rifles ; the total strength of the force is 600, all ranks. The Artillery, Engineers, and two com- panies of Rifles, consist of Europeans, the remainder being Straits-born Chinese. Penang has 150 Volunteers and Malacca fifty. The total defence force at the Straits Settlements in 1 90 1 was 2,751, of whom 1,215 were Colonial; the Colony contributes from revenue in aid of military expenditure, ;^i 29,000 per annum. Federated Malay States. — Area 26,500 square miles, population 678,595 (1,422 Europeans); are under British protection, and consist of Perak Selangoe, Negri Sembela, and Penang, which occupy a large por- tion of the Malay Peninsula. In 1 896 a treaty between the States and Great Britain came into force, by which the administrative federation of the States under a resident general, is provided for, the States agreeing to furnish a contingent of troops for service in the Colony, should His Majesty's Government be at war with any foreign nation. 74 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Defence. — Malay States Guides. Eleven European officers and 692 native officers and men. Police force, 2,146, all ranks, including forty European officers and inspectors. Labuan. — An island six miles north-west of Borneo in the Malayan Archipelago. Area thirty and a half square miles; population 8,411, of whom thirty are Europeans. The island was ceded to England by the Sultan of Borneo in 1 847. The island has a fine harbour (Victoria) and there are large deposits of coal on the island. Communications. — Connected with Hong-Kong and Singapore and the mainland by cable. Though coal exists in large quantities, and the capital, Victoria, has a very fine harbour, the island is dependent on the Navy for defence. Hong-Kong. — Sometimes styled the Gibraltar of the East, is situated off the south-eastern coast of China, at the mouth of the Canton River. Area twenty-nine miles. Hong-Kong was ceded by China to England in January, 1841. In 1861 the opposite peninsula of Kowloon, forming part of the mainland of China, was ceded to Great Britain and now forms part of Hong-Kong. In 1 898 England ob- tained a ninety-nine years' lease from China of terri- tory, in extent 376 square miles, including the port ot Kowloon. The population of Hong-Kong in 1906 was 319,803, of whom 1,200 are Europeans. Defences. — Hong-Kong practically commands the entrance to the China Sea; its strategic importance THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 75 in the East has been fully recognised, and its defences are complete ; it has a naval dockyard, and is the head- quarters of the Chinese squadron with its sixty vessels of all sorts. The Imperial garrison consists of 3,200 men and a locally raised force of 375 Volunteers.* The Colony contributes in money one-twentieth of her, revenue, exclusive of land sales; in 1902-3 the amount contri- buted was ;^78,ooo. Communications. — Hong-Kong is a cable station. AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH. Australia is one of our most important possessions, second in strength of population to that of Canada, and consists of the six Colonies known as New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, West Australia, and the island of Tasmania. The total area of the Commonwealth is 2,972,573 square miles. The population in 1901 numbered 3,771,715. The first sight of this island continent was made by the Portuguese in 1600. Six years later some Dutch sailors landed on the shores of the Gulf of Carpentaria ; in 1622 Cape Leeuwin was sighted and named by a Dutchman ; twenty years later, Tasman discovered the island which bears his name, but which he then named Van Diemen's Land ; later the same navigator discovered New Zealand. In 1770 Cook first sighted Australia, having the previous year visited New Zealand, and on the 28th of ' Statesmen's Year Book, 1904, p. 128. 76 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE April he landed at Botany Bay, taking possession in the name of George III. In 1787 it was decided to form a penal settlement in one at least of our oversea possessions ; and Australia, as yet unsettled, was decided upon. On the 1 3th of May of that year, 550 men and 200 women convicts were despatched to New South Wales, and by 1 800 some 5,000 convicts had been landed in the Colony, 1 ,000 of whom were women. Every inducement was offered to immigration from England, but with little result. In 1824 a Legislative Council was established, con- sisting of six members, to assist in the government of the Colony; and the next year we hear of "the voice of the Press making itself heard in the infant Colony ". In 1828 the antipathy at home to emigrate to a convict-settled Colony had to some extent been over- come ; for in that year the population had risen to 36,598. In 1846 railway construction began, and in that year gold was discovered. In the meantime, settlements had been made in various parts of the possessions. A branch penal station was formed at Hobart, Tasmania, in 1804. In 1824 Horton Bay, Queensland, was settled; in 1826 Western Australia received its first shipment of settlers; Victoria was colonised in 1834, and South Australia in 1836; in turn these grew into separate Colonies to be federated into the Commonwealth in 1901. The year 185 1 saw the formation of a local defence THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 77 force in New South Wales ; this consisted of a battery of Artillery, a troop of Cavalry, and six companies of Infantry. By 1906 we find that these possessions, barely a century old, had a revenue of ;^i 28,321,141, and a population of over 4,000,000. Defence. — Though from no fear of internal strife, the Commonwealth has long recognised its obligations in defence. In 1882 an Australian contingent served in the Egyptian Campaign, and in the late Boer War over 12,000 Australians served either in their own contingents or in various irregular corps formed in South Africa. The principal ports of the States are fortified, and forts have been erected at King George's Sound and Thursday Island ; the cost being shared by the dif- ferent Colonies. The local forces of the Common- wealth, consisting of paid, partly paid, and unpaid Militia, number 12,778, all ranks; there are in addi- tion 42,000 members of rifle clubs. In 1903 a Militia Act was passed instituting a modified form of compulsory service — under this Act practically every able-bodied man in the Commonwealth is liable for service should the occasion arise. Sydney, one of the finest harbours in the world, is a first-class naval station and the headquarters of the British Fleet in Australian waters. The local naval forces consist of 1,569 of all ranks, supplied by New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and South Aus- tralia, as follows : — 78 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Permanent Forces. Naval Militia. Naval Volun- teer Cadets. Total. New South Wales Victoria Queensland . South Australia . Western Australia Tasmania Total . 4 121 49 22 196 313 204 346 119 982 100 98 140 53 391 417 423 535 194 1.569' As an outcome of the Conference of Premiers held in London in 1902, the Commonwealth contributes towards the upkeep of the Royal Navy ;£'200,ooo per annum for ten years, terminable at two years' notice after the eighth year. The Imperial Government on their part undertake to keep a naval force on the Australian station of one first-, two second- and four third-class cruisers, and four sloops. A branch of the Royal Naval Reserve is to be formed in Australia, con- sisting of twenty-five officers, 700 men, and four of the ships (the other ships being kept in commission), to be manned by i ,000 Australians and New Zealanders, who will be paid at Australian rates. Communications. — Australia is connected with Eng- land by cable, via the Cocos, Mauritius, and Durban, whilst a second cable links Australia from Brisbane with England via Norfolk Islands, Fiji, Fanning Island, and Vancouver. Communication by cable with New Zealand by three lines ; one from Brisbane via Norfolk Island to Auckland, and by a double line THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 79 direct from Sydney to Wellington. A double cable connects Melbourne with Tasmania. NEW ZEALAND Consists of two principal islands, known as the North and Middle Islands, the South or Stewart Island, and several small islands. New Zealand is situated 1,260 miles east of Australia. The area of New Zealand, including the Cook and other islands, is estimated at 104,751 square miles. The total population in 1906 was 888,578. New Zealand was discovered by the Dutch navigator Tasman in 1 642. No further mention of the islands is made until 1769, when Cook first visited them, and made a complete exploration of their coasts. No at- tempt at settlement was made till thirty-seven years after Cook's last visit ; then it was that the English Church Missionary Society sent out some missionaries ; these landed in 18 14 in the North Island. The British Government was at this time bitterly opposed to form new Colonies ; when, however, a private company was formed in England to exploit the islands, the Government consented to despatch a consul ; Captain Hobson was selected, and he arrived in the Colony in January, 1840. In June, 1840, the settlement was made a Colony and Captain Hobson became first governor. In 1856 responsible govern- ment was granted to the Colony. Revenue. — The total revenue for the Colony for 1907 was ;6^8, 148,175. 8o COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Defences. — The Volunteer force of the Colony num- bers 179,989, all ranks. A permanent Militia force numbers 258, with a Torpedo branch of loi. By virtue of a Militia Act in force 160,000 men, consisting of the male population between seventeen and forty, can be called upon to serve in the defence of the Colony ; the Colony has, however, gone further in the interests of Imperial Defence, for a clause in this Act provides for an Imperial Reserve, the services of whose members may be used in any part of the Empire. The Colony has four Thornycroft torpedo-boats, and four steam launches fitted for torpedo work. By virtue of the provisions of the naval agreement between Great Britain and the Australasian Colonies, New Zea- land will provide a proportion of the Naval Reserve. The approaches to the principal ports are defended by batteries of heavy ordnance. Fiji comprises a group of 200 islands lying be- tween 15° and 20° S. lat and 177° and 178° long. The total area of the group is 8,045 square miles. The two main islands are Viti Levu and Vanua Levu ; the former the size of Jamaica, the latter 2,600 square miles. The population in igor was, Europeans 2,447, others 120,000. The Dutch navigator Tasman, to whom the honour of discovering most of our possessions belongs, was the discoverer of this group in March, 1643, he named them "Prins Willhems Eglanda". In 1806 traders began to visit the islands. In 1835 some missionaries landed and began their civilising labours. In 1859 the THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 8i sovereignty of the islands was tendered by the reigning chief to the British throne, but declined ; fifteen years later, however, the sovereignty was ceded to Great Britain, and in that year the islands were recognised as a separate Colony. There are numerous excellent harbours among the group ; Suva, the capital, has a very fine harbour. Tonga or Friendly Islands was declared a pro- tectorate of Great Britain in May, 1903. The kingdom consists of three groups of islands. Tonga, Hoapai, and Vavan, lying between 15° and 23° 30' south, and 173° west. The total area is 390 square miles. Population 22,011. Defence. — There is a Volunteer force numbering 200, otherwise dependent on Royal Navy. Communications. — The islands have a regular steam communication with New South Wales, Fiji, and New Zealand. The cable from Australia to Durban touches at Suva. New Guinea. — This large island, 324,347 square miles in extent, separated from Australia by Torres Strait, is divided between the Dutch, Germans, and ourselves. The total area belonging to England being 90,540 square miles, with a population of 350,000, of whom 250 are Europeans. In 1793 the island was formally annexed by the East India Company and Manapvari in Guloink Bay was garrisoned; it was shortly after abandoned. Though England had every right to take possession of the island, and was con- tinually urged by the Government of Queensland to 6 82 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE do so, it was not until 1887 that possession was taken of that portion not already laid claim to by Germany and Holland. In addition to those larger possessions in the Pacific already mentioned, Britain holds sway over numerous islands which would be of more or less value in the event of a maritime war ; those of likely importance are Santa Cruz Islands, a group of seven islands, the largest about fifteen miles long. DUFF or WiLSON Islands, the largest six miles in circumference (Star- buck Island), 5° 30' S. lat, 155° W. long.; area one square mile, uninhabited. Malden Island, 4° S. lat., 155° W. long. ; area thirty-five square miles. JARVIS Island, on the equator, 1 59° W. ; area one and a half square miles ; population thirty. Christmas Island 1° 57' N., 1 57° 27' W. ; area 234 square miles ; popula- tion thirty. FANNING ISLAND, 3° 50' N., 1 59° W. ; area fifteen square miles; population 150; a cable station, but undefended. WASHINGTON ISLAND, 4° 40' N., 160° 20' W., area six square miles. PALMYRA, 6° N., 162° 30' W. ; area one and a half square miles. Baker Islands, on the equator. Phoenix Group, consisting of eight islands between 2° 30' and 4° 30' S. lat., and 174° 30' W. long. ; area sixteen square miles ; population fifty-nine. LAGOON or Ellice Group, between 5° 30' and 11° 20' S. lat. and 176° and i8o°E. long. ; area fourteen square miles ; population 2,400. Gilbert Islands, on the equator, between 173° and 177° E. long. Sixteen islets; area 166 square miles; population 35,200. British Solomon Islands, 8° S. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 83 and 160° W. ; area 8,357 square miles; European population (1902) sixty-eight. Most of these islands have good harbours. No attempt has yet been made to make use of the natives for defence purposes. BRITISH NORTH BORNEO. British North Borneo is a territory occupying the northern part of the island of Borneo, and has an area of 31,106 square miles with a coast-line of 900 miles ; the population is estimated at 200,000. The Colony is under the jurisdiction of the North Borneo Company, a Royal Charter having been granted on the i st of November, 1 8 8 1 . The possession occupies an important position in the Chinese Seas and contains some very fine harbours and navigable rivers. The chief settlements are Sadakan (the capital), Kudat, and Gaya, all of which have fine harbours. Defence. — Consists of a native military force of 500 men under European officers. Communications. — Borneo is connected by a branch of the Labuan-Singapore Cable. GIBRALTAR. The Rock of Gibraltar is a Crown Colony; area one and seven-eighths square miles ; greatest elevation 143 feet. Population (1901) 26,830; this includes the garrison of 6,405 men. The territory consists of an elevated promontory, two and three-quarter miles long, extreme width three-quarters of a mile, in the southern 6* 84 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE extremity of the Spanish province of Andalusia. This possession, which strategically is the most important we have, is the key to the Mediterranean, over the mouth of which it has absolute command. The strategic importance of Gibraltar has been the cause of many struggles for its possession, and its loss has been and will be the signal of the decadence of the nation losing it. Gibraltar was taken from the Moors by Ferdinand, King of Castile, in 1302, but they re-took it thirty years later; in 1462 Henry IV. of Castile captured it; the Spaniards had it until 1704, when Admiral Sir George Rooke assaulted and took possession of it ; since then the Rock has remained in the hands of the English. Several determined attempts by the Spanish and French have been made to capture it. In 1727 Gibraltar stood a siege of five months. Proof of its impregnability was given in the "Great Siege of Gibraltar," which lasted from July, 1779, to March, 1783, during which time the garrison was twice re- lieved by the British fleet. The army of investment consisted of over 33,000 French and Spanish troops, the besieged garrison numbered 5,382. In September, 1782, the last serious attempt to reduce the garrison was made ; the attack was made by land and sea, and resulted in disaster for the attackers. Owing to its natural configuration, Gibraltar is one of the strongest fortresses in Europe ; it is the principal base of the Atlantic fleet, and a centre of trade for the Mediter- ranean and the northern coasts of Africa. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 85 MALTA. A group of three islands, Malta, Gozo, and Comino, in the Mediterranean ; Malta is fifty-eight miles from Sicily ; the total area of the islands is 1 1 7 square miles ; population in 1901, 188,141. Like Gibraltar, the possession of Malta signifies the command of the sea. The Phoenicians are stated to have formed settlements at Malta 1,400 B.C., and the island was, according to Diodorus Siculus, a most prosperous and important Phoenician colony. Carthage upon her development of sea power obtained possession of the islands, and during the Punic Wars these became alternately the property of the Romans and the Carthaginians ; but upon the former obtaining command of the sea Malta passed to them. Upon the decline of Roman sea power the islands fell into the hands of the Goths, and later were taken by the Saracens, who in their turn were expelled by Count Roger the Norman. The House of Aragon held sway over the group from 11 90 to 1530, when the islands were conferred upon the Order of the Knights of St. John, in whose hands they remained for two centuries. In 1 798 Napoleon Bonaparte captured Malta on his way to Egypt ; two years later it fell to the English and was confirmed to Great Britain in 1814 by the Treaty of Paris, and has remained in their possession since. Defence. — Malta is one of the most important ports of call in the world, and is the base and resort for 86 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE repairs and refitment of our fleet in the Mediterranean. Its harbour is, however, small. Malta as a fortress is strongly garrisoned; the troops numbering 10,692, including 735 Royal Malta Artillery; in addition to the permanent garrison, there are 1,752 local Militia, and a Submarine Mining Company of 61. CYPRUS. Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean, sixty miles from the coast of Asia Minor, and forty-one miles from Syria, is under the administration of Great Britain. The voters are all male Ottomans or Brit- ish subjects. Area 3,584 square miles. Population (1901) 236,022. Cyprus is one of the seats of early civilisation, for about 900 B.C. the island was divided into States and boasted towns of some size, as Citimun, Paphos, and Salanio; in the tenth century B.C. the Phoenicians formed settlements on the island. In 1 1 00 B.C. the Egyptians with their rise to sea power ob- tained possession. The Assyrians captured and sub- dued the island 720 B.C. In 550 B.C. it again fell under the control of Egypt. With the subjection of Egypt by the Persians under Cambyses, Cyprus became a Persian province. With the conquest of Persia by Alexander the Great, Cyprus practically became in- dependent until 3 1 o B.C., when it was attached to the Ptolemaic Kingdom of Egypt. With the ascendance of Rome, Cyprus passed into the possession of that Power in 58 B.C. Upon the division of the Roman Empire, this island of many masters became part of THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 87 the Byzantine Empire. To England, Cyprus is of unique historical interest, for in 1191 a.d. Richard Coeur de Lion, King of England, captured the island on his way to the Holy Land, and there married Berengaria of Navarre. Richard sold the island to the Knights Templars for the equivalent of ;^30o,ooo ; a few years later it again came into Richard's hands ; he, however, made it a gift to Guy de Lusignan. In 1489 the island was ceded to the Venetian Republic ; it was conquered from them by the Turks in 1571 and remained in their possession until 1878, when by pro- vision of a convention between England and Turkey it became an English possession. Defence. — Dependent upon the Royal Navy. The island is practically undefended ; the Imperial troops numbering but 1 34, all ranks. An armed police force of 700 men exists. The two chief ports are Lamaca and Limasol. INDIA. At first sight it must appear as if that Eastern Empire which contains the greater part of the King's subjects must be outside the scope of this work ; and it will be remarked, perhaps, that, with the exception of Sir Charles Dilke, writers on the subject of Imperial De- fence have preferred to treat India as a factor outside of the problem. In theory, no doubt, they are right. Who, for instance, ten years ago would have stated India would save South Africa for the Empire ? Had writer or orator predicted what actually happened in 88 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE 1899 he would have been politely requested to re- study his subject ; practice and theory in war are often inimical ; it is rare indeed to find the same man ex- celling in both qualities. It was left for a civilian to grasp the strategic value of India at the critical period in the history of South Africa. It was only at the urgent protestations of Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson and Sir John Dartnell that 10,000 troops were de- spatched from India to South Africa. India in the South African War proved herself only second to Eng- land as a base of operations. She stepped down from her Imperial isolation, practically illustrating that a British Colony's quarrels were her own ; it would, then, be obviously misleading, in the treatment of this sub- ject, not to consider India as one of the main factors in the great problem of Imperial Defence. Due perhaps to the policy which governs that country, as well as the nature of her population, India is little known to British Colonials. England, on the other hand, is in close touch with the Asiatic Empire by reason of old-established commercial relationship, and secondly by reason of the policy which provides the numerous officials entrusted with the government of that great possession, and the continual drafts of English troops passing between the two countries. Strange as it may seem, yet the fact remains that the Anglo-Indian and the British Colonial are of different types ; environment has brought this about ; for whilst the former is the embodiment of despotism, the latter is essentially a democrat. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 89 Whilst British influence pervades the whole of India, it would be beside the subject to deal with those native States outside of British control. The British Empire covers a territory larger than the Continent of Europe, if we exclude Russia. The total area of British India is 1,087,249 square miles, containing a population of about 232,000,000. The British born population in India in 1901 was 96,653. The political boundary of India marches with Persia from the sea to near Sulfikar on the Harirud ; then with the Russian Empire along the frontier laid down by agreement in 1885, as far as the Oxus at Khamiab, thence along the Oxus by the Panjah branch up to the Victoria Lake ; from the east of that lake by a line demarcated in 1895 up to Chinese territory on the Taghdumbash Pamir. From here the frontier, in many parts not clearly defined, touches the Chinese Empire, mainly along the crest of the Himalayas, till the territory under French control is reached on the Upper Mekong. From here the Indian frontier marches with Siam till it reaches the sea half-way down the Malay Peninsula. From the very slight reference made to India, in works dealing with sea power, it might be inferred that she is of little value in this our first line of defence ; yet beyond the sea, the Indian Empire includes several places of great strategic value ; the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the Laccadive Islands, Aden and Perim, besides protectorates over Socotra, Bahrim, and various chiefships along the coast from Aden to the Persian Gulf. 90 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE To obtain the material we are in search of and to enable us to throw light upon the problem now under consideration, it is not necessary to trace the history of India from date prior to the sixteenth century. Towards the close of the sixteenth century, England began to recognise the necessity of freeing herself from dependence on others for commercial intercourse with the East. At that time, the Dutch, having overthrown the Portuguese power in India, practically held the monopoly of Indian trade. In 1 615 Sir Thomas Roe was despatched as am- bassador from James I. to the Emperor Jehangir, and his influence greatly improved the position and pros- pects of British trade. In 1639 England acquired a narrow strip of land, six miles in length and one mile broad, on the coast below Masulipatam ; a factory and fort were built ; this was the beginning of what became fourteen years later the Residency of Madras. In 1 66 1 Charles II., upon his marriage with Kath- erine of Braganza, received as part of her dowry the Island of Bombay ; this was made over by the king to the East India Company for the sum of ;^io per annum. In 1689 the East India Company bought Fort William, which has developed into the fine city of Calcutta. With the War of Austrian Succession in 1744, the Indian Companies of England and France came into collision. In 1745 an English fleet attacked Pondicherry, but was warned off by the Nawab of the Carnatic, who claimed that the French settlements were in his territory ; the next year a French fleet THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 91 attacked and captured Madras. With the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, Madras was restored to Great Britain in exchange for Louisbourg. France was fortunate in having a brilliant leader in Dupleix at the head of affairs in India ; in the short war now ended, he had defeated the British and Nawab's troops, and was likely to become master of India ; one factor was wanting, however, and that was the command of the highway from France. England held the command of this, and was therefore in a position to become mistress of India at such time as she saw fit. In 1748 the Nawab of the Carnatic was killed and his domains were at once disturbed. The English and French took opposite sides ; Clive immediately seized Arcot and held it with 500 men against 10,000 for seven weeks; with the raising of the siege, he marched against the nearest French army and defeated it twice with great loss. In 1 76 1 the ruin of the French Company in India was completed by the British capture of Pondicherry. In 1780 Warren Hastings repelled Hyder All's memorable invasion of the Carnatic and defeated the triple alliance of the Nizam, the Mahrattas, and Hyder Ali ; this probably saved British India. From 1798 to 1805 the administration was under the Marquis Wellesley ; at this time France under Napoleon (then engaged in Egypt), and well established in the Indian Ocean by holding Mauritius and Bourbon, was in secret corre- spondence with Tippoo : this led to the fourth Mysore War, which ended in the capture by Wellesley of Serin- gapatam in 1 799, and the death of Tippoo. 92 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Lord Wellesley developed a system of subsidising alliances with native States which tended to greater security. In 1824 the first Burmese War broke out which cost 20,000 lives and ;^i 4,000,000, but which gave us Assam, Aracan, and Tenasserim ; 1839-42 began the first Afghan trouble with its fatal retreat from Cabul. In 1843 Sind was captured by Sir Charles Napier; 1844-46 saw the first Sikh War, end- ing with Sobraon (1864). In 1848 the second Sikh War broke out, to end with the enemy's severe defeat at Chilianwala, 13th January, and Goojerat, 20th February, 1849. Their country was annexed, and later that of Tanjore. In 1852 the second Burmese War gave us the sea-board provinces of Burmah. In 1856 Oudh was annexed without bloodshed. On the loth of May, 1857, the great Mutiny broke out among the native troops at Meerut, and spread through the whole Bengal Army ; in a very short time the country between the Punjaub and Bengal was in a state of anarchy. Fortunately the Sikhs stood loyal ; the British officers of the mutinied regiments raised Sikh levies, and these assisted in the quelling of this memor- able revolt. By May, 1858, the Mutiny was over. Six months later, ist November, 1858, the old rigime of the East India Company was done away with, and the last governor-general of the Company, Lord Canning, became the first viceroy of the Queen. The year 1876 is memorable, for in it Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India. The years 1878-80 saw the second Afghan War, and the British occupation of Cabul. By THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 93 the treaty of Gundamuk we secured the districts above Quetta and the passes west of Peshawar. To secure the buffer State of Afghanistan the Indian Government placed Abdurrahman upon the throne, and took in hand the delimitation of the Russo-Afghan frontier ; negotiations lasted from 1884 to 1895, and more than once nearly broke off in threatened war with Russia ; the frontier was at last defined from the Persian border to the Pamirs. As it appeared that if invasion was con- templated it would come by the Herat line and Kandahar, arrangements had been made in 1876 that British troops should occupy Quetta, and in 1883 the districts of Quetta and Bolan were made over by the Khan of Kelat to the British on a quit rent of 25,000 rupees and 30,000 rupees respectively. Quetta is now connected by rail. The North-Western railway enters Beluchistan near Jhatpat, crosses the Kachli plain to Sibi, there bifurcating, one branch going to Harnai and the other by Quetta, re-uniting at Bostan, then running to Charman. A light line from Charman to Mushki is now in course of construction. Defence. — The defended ports of India are : Bom- bay, a naval base, with a dockyard ; Karachi, Madras, Calcutta, and Rangoon. There is a small fleet of coast defence turret iron- clads belonging to the Indian Marine ; these are the Magdala, station ship (2,137 tons) four 8-in. 14-ton guns, and Abyssinia (1,874 tons) with the same chief armament ; two first-class torpedo gun-boats, Assaye and Plassey (735 tons), and seven 90-ton torpedo 94 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE boats built in 1889. A submarine mining flotilla, con- sisting of eight vessels, and a number of troop vessels, surveying ships, etc. The table on next page gives the established strength of the European and Native Army in British India — exclusive of Volunteers, Imperial Service Troops, native artificers and followers. ^ The whole of the Native Infantry, with the excep- tion of six regiments, have been provided with -303 magazine rifles (Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield) ; and the Native Cavalry, with the exception of fifteen regiments, have been provided with -304 magazine carbines. The British Army is now entirely equipped with magazine Lee-Enfield rifles and carbines. The equipment of the remainder of the Native Army is progressing. The Act of Parliament (56 & 57 Vict, cap. 62) passed in 1893 for the abolition of the Indian Presid- ency commands came into force on the ist of April, 1895. On that date, the military control, hitherto exercised by the governors in Council of Madras and Bombay, ceased. Since the advent of Lord Kitchener as commander- in-chief, the Indian Army has been undergoing con- tinual reorganisation. In 1904 the four commands were formed into three (Northern, Eastern, and Western), with the separate divisions of Burmah and Secunderabad. In 1907 a further reduction in com- mands was made, and the whole of the forces in India are now divided into two " armies," the Northern Army ' Statemen's Year Book, igo8. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 95 Corps (1907-8). Numbers. European Officers. Non-com. Officers and Privates. Total. European Army. Royal Artillery Cavalry .... Royal Engineers Infantry Total European Troops . 547 261 365 1,508 14,116 5.391 215 52,238 14,663 5,652 580 53,746 2,681 71,960 74,641 Corps (1907-8). Numbers. European Officers. Native Officers, Non-com. Officers and Privates. Total. Native Army. Artillery. Artillery serving vifith British units Cavalry .... Sappers and Miners Infantry . . Indian Army (not regi- mentally employed) . General List, Cavalry . General List, Infantry . General Officers, unem- ployed Total Native Army Total European and Na- tive Army . 53 544 76 1,845 871 I I 20 3,493 3,792 24,450 4,988 115,138 3,546 3.792 24,994 5,061 116,983 871 I I 20 3,4" 151,858 155,269 6,092 223,818 229,910 96 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE and the Southern Army. The former comprises the Peshawar, Rawal Pindi, Lahore, Meerut, and Lucknow Divisions, with the three independent frontier brigades of Kohat, Baunn, and the Derajat ; the Southern Army contains the Quetta, Mhon, Poona, and Secunderabad divisions, the troops in Burmah and the Lascar garrison of Aden. Since 1858, when the Indian Army consisted of 40,000 European soldiers and 215,000 natives, the numbers have changed approximately to 74,000 Europeans and 1 50,000 native soldiers, and the con- centration or mobilisation of troops has been greatly facilitated within the Empire or on its frontier. A regular transport service now exists, and a method has been organised for the supply of animal carriage, hos- pital servants, and other fixed establishments sufficient to place a large army promptly in the field. Prior to the Mutiny the death rate among European soldiers was 6-g per cent., and among native soldiers 2 per cent. ; owing to improved sanitary and barrack arrangements this is now i"46 and i'40 per cent. The number of Volunteers in India is approximately as follows ; — ^ Punjaub .... 2,083 Bengal .... 13,398 Madras .... 9,711 Bombay .... 5,606 Total . . . 30,798 The feudatory and dependent States of India have ' Statesmen's Year Book, igoS. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 97 armies numbering 132,426 men and 3,111 guns. In 1888 the native chiefs loyally offered large sums of money towards the cost of Imperial defence, the Indian Government, however, elaborated a scheme for the training and equipment of picked contingents of troops in certain States with a view to enabling the chiefs to bear a direct share in the defence of the Empire, Measures have been taken which will enable the chiefs to furnish contingents of troops to take their place in line with the regiments of the Indian Army. The special contingents, known as the Imperial Defence Troops, now number about 14,300 men, excluding sappers and miners, camel and transport corps. Nine- teen British officers, including an inspector-general, have been appointed. The table on next page shows the States and con- tingents with which they have to deal.^ ANDAMAN ISLANDS. The Andaman Islands are a group of islands lying in the Bay of Bengal, 590 miles from the mouth of the Hooghly, 120 miles from Cape Negrais in Burmah, the nearest point on the mainland, and about 340 miles from the northern extremity of Sumatra. Great Andaman consists of five of these islands grouped to- gether ; round this group are about 200 islets, the two principal groups of which are known as the Andaman Archipelago and the Labyrinth Islands. The area of the whole group is about 2,000 square miles. The ' StaUsmen's Year Booh, 1908, 7 98 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE State. Cavalry. Infantry and Sappers. Various. Total. Kashmir . Patiala . Jhind Nabha . Bahawalpur Kapurthala Faridkot . Bhanongar Sirmur Maler Kotla . Alwar Jodhpur . Bikanir . Bharatpur Jaipur Gwalior . Junagarh Bhopal . Indore Mysore . Nawangar Haidarabad Rampur . Total . 151 60s 231 573 750 1,891 100 394 200 518 127 787 313 2,799 1,181 578 595 593 172 189 170 884 485 594 1,923 177 420 507 470 797 523 494 3,370 1,786 578 595 507 593 172 231 i8g 170 1,457 750 485 1,064 797 4,337 100 394 377 1,012 127 787 313 6,640 10,340 3,211 20,igi islands contain a number of safe harbours, among which are Port Blair, Port Cornwallis and Stewart Sound. The population numbered in 1901, 24,499. Defence. — Dependent on Royal Navy. NICOBAR ISLANDS. This group is situated to the south of the Andaman, ninety-one miles from Pulo Brasse off Achin Head in Sumatra. Of the nineteen islands in the group, seven are inhabited. The islands are divided into three groups ; THE COMPONENT PARTS OF EMPIRE 99 southern, central and northern ; the chief islands being Great Nicobar, Comorta and Nancowry ; this latter is known as Nancowry Harbour. The total area of the group is 635 square miles with a population of 6,310. Nancowry Harbour is a very fine land-locked harbour. Defence. — Dependent upon Royal Navy. LACCADIVE ISLANDS. A group of fourteen islands, only six of which are inhabited ; about 200 miles off the west coast of the Madras Presidency. This group lies in the main trade route through Suez to the East. Population 14,440. Defence. — Dependent upon Royal Navy. ADEN AND PERIM. Aden controlling the entrance to the Red Sea, and covering the foreign naval station of Obock, is of great importance. British occupation took place in 1839, and with the opening of the Suez Canal it has acquired more than its old importance, for it has now developed into a great coaling station, and is one of the strongest fortified naval stations commanding the Red Sea. The settlement includes Little Aden and the settlement and town of Shaikh Othman on the mainland, with the villages of Imad, Hiswa and Bir Jabir. The settle- ment also includes the island of Perim at the entrance of the Red Sea. Area of Aden seventy-five square miles. Population, 41,222 in 1901. SOCOTRA, off the coast of Africa ; an island under loo COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE British protection, attached to Aden. Area, 1,382 square miles. Population about 12,000. KuRiA MuRiA Islands. — A group off the coast of Arabia, attached to Aden. Importance is lent to these islands by reason of the Red Sea cable landing here. CHAPTER III. THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING. In the preceding chapter we have dealt in detail with the component parts of Empire ; we have now followed its expansion territorially and politically from that small group of isles lying in the North Sea. In that survey, however, little direct reference was made to our greatest asset — sea power ^ — ^though its influence was noticeable in the story of every unit that came under review. Sea power, including as it does not only fight- ing power, but likewise also the commercial wealth and earning power of the mercantile marine, is England's greatest Imperial asset. Its influence extends beyond the borders of her own possessions, it thrusts greatness under the very eyes of rivals, friendly and hostile alike. This preponderance of sea power has caused us to be looked upon, even by our own subjects, as a great maritime nation only, and the greatness of our terri- torial possessions is either unknown or forgotten. The British Empire-in-being occupies nearly one- fourth of the 52,500,000 square miles of the earth's surface, and these vast possessions divide between them almost equally the seasons of the year, one half experiencing summer whilst the other is in winter. 102 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE The Empire enjoys all hours of time and periods of season and has all varieties of soil, climate, and tem- perature, it is in brief a world in itself, containing all geographical features, important rivers, some of the highest mountains and largest lakes in the world. It produces within itself all that humanity calls for ; Canada, but six days' steam from the hub of the Empire, alone can produce, if encouraged to do so, all the wheat necessary for the Imperial population ; Australia and New Zealand are able to supply the rest of the com- bination with wool, meat and dairy produce ; coal, ores, wines, sugar, tea, coffee, and hemp are all produced within our possessions. Yet, through lack of judicious direction, a large proportion of these productions drift to foreign markets, nay, are often produced at the call of foreign capital. The population of the Empire is estimated to be over 430,000,000, of whom 52,000,000 are white. In proportion, her population conforms with her share of the earth's surface, for it is about one-fourth of the estimated population of the world and includes every type of race and language under the sun. These various parts and diversified peoples are bound together by the sea. An important speech or action of any is known in all parts simultaneously, this, too, by means contained within the Imperial bounds — science has in this respect been a greater benefactor to the inhabitants of this ocean-knit Empire than to any other people in the world ; for without the electric cable or fast ocean steamers delay in com- THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 103 munication between these far removed outposts would necessarily have developed neglect and indifference which must have resulted in a repetition of the history of our lost American Colonies. To-day, however, thanks to the evolution of science, we hardly consider the distance that separates the different units. From London to the Cape of Good Hope the distance is 5,840 nautical miles, yet the details of the battles in the late war were known throughout England a few hours after the fighting. From the Cape to Bombay it is 4,610 miles, Bombay to Melbourne 5,630, Melbourne to Auckland 1,863. Auckland to Vancouver 6,210, Halifax to Liverpool 2,744. From London direct to Bombay, by way of the Mediterranean, it is 6,272 miles ; from London by the same route to Sydney is 1 1,548 miles. With the development of steam propulsion these great distances called for coaling stations along the trade routes. Long-forgotten islands came into pro- minence, possessions held because of strategic impor- tance became of two-fold value. The true Imperial value of Colonies became recognised. The Bermudas, for example, Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Labuan, Hong-Kong, complete the con- necting chain on the Eastern route. On some of the other routes the lesser West African stations. Ascension, St. Helena, Mauritius, Seychelles, the Falklands, and a few groups in the Western Pacific — some, though not all, of these are fortified and are proof against capture except by organised invasion. (Gibraltar and I04 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Malta are to all intents and purposes impregnable fortresses.) To a maritime nation like England, islands hold that value which the Arab places upon the oasis of the desert. England in 1582 was without a single Colony ; since then she has acquired over seventy possessions, some of which have outgrown what are still termed nations on the Continent of Europe, others are but dependencies, barely emerging from their former state of barbarism, controlled by a few officials and still awaiting development, whilst all '^hold in the future undreamed of possibilities. Along with the mother country all these daughter States en- joy one commonage ; upon the sea each has a propor- tion of its wealth of which up to the present the parent State has been guardian. It is this commonage " the control of the high seas " — that is viewed by every Britisher as the most precious asset of the Empire, and the responsibility of guardianship becomes daily more grave. In less than fifty years the Imperial trade (trade within the Empire) has increased from ;^89,392,ooo to ;^224,304,ooo ; within the last decade this inter- Imperial trade has increased by nearly ;^5 2,000,000 sterling per annum. Coming to the means by which •this commerce is borne — the symbol in fact of the Empire's greatness — its shipping — we find that the world's shipping numbers a grand total of 29,943 , steamers and sailing vessels — their total tonnage being no less than 33,643,131 tons — of this the British Em- pire owns 11,134 vessels of 16,006,374 tons, almost half the world's shipping. There is not a port in the THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 105 world of even minor importance that does not harbour a vessel flying the British flag ; when, too, we remem- ber that the remaining half of the world's shipping is divided among all the other maritime nations — the United States with one to our four, Norway one to our five, Germany with one to six, France with one to ten, need we wonder at foreign acknowledgments of British supremacy of .the seas ? Lest, however, we for- get, and in forgetting neglect those precautions that are necessary to hold and hand down to our descend- ants this sea-won, sea-girt, and sea-held Empire, made for us by our fathers, we must keep alive the memory of those occasions when the command of the sea was wrested from us; when a Dutch fleet sailed up the Thames, and when, more recently, this command, so essential, was in doubt ; if we neglect these lessons more disastrous results may accrue in the future. The ocean highways do not exhaust the means of travel within the Empire, for in our possessions are over 100,000 miles of railroad, and in the case of Canada, railways connect the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific. The possession of this vast network of railways simplifies to the holders the question of the defence of the territories through which they run. The railroad construction which is being carried on in all parts of the Empire, with daily increased vigour, makes more secure some outpost of the Empire. But yesterday it seemed we read with wonder verging upon incredulity Dr. Livingstone's description of the Victoria Falls, on io6 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the Zambesi River, and our imagination viewed it as in darkest Central Africa — to-day we read of reduced railway fares to those falls, and a telegram will be de- livered there a few hours after its despatch in London. In India we are pushing on our rails as if to meet the Russian from the Caspian ; from both the south and the north of Africa we are pushing on railways to meet each other somewhere in the heart of the Conti- nent. This all means greater wealth, greater comfort to some, but it involves greater responsibility ; railway extension brings us into closer touch with rivals, ac- centuates the contiguity of territories, brings into pro- minence differences and local grievances that before were obscured by distance and lost their bitterness in time of transit. This railway and electric telegraphic extension may also be taken as meaning greater security — for it in- creases the mobility of our forces, it adds considerably to our striking power. Each mile of rail completed brings in touch of our striking point, it may be tens or it may be hundreds, of men able and willing to fight for Empire, it makes available resources before unobtainable, except at heavy cost or by loss of time. Railway extension has a bearing too upon the effici- ency of our Navy and mercantile marine, for ports that were useless to steamers in want of coal have been, in some instances but lately, connected with coal-fields by rail, and coal at these ports is now obtainable in abundance. THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 107 It may be said : " This Empire-in-being, a world in itself, containing a quarter of the world's population, universally acknowledged as mistress of the seas, is surely supreme and has nothing to fear ". If England were true to herself there would be nothing to fear ; if the units of Empire were true to themselves, to each other and to the mother country, there could be nothing to fear. We will, however, inquire into the means of pro- tection available for Imperial defence and considered as an asset of the Empire-in-being ; we will com- pare this with the means adopted by Powers whose interests are insignificant compared with our own. The Navy, that instrument responsible for the crea- tion and retention of the Empire-in-being, has appar- ently been made of greater Colonial interest by virtue of the fact that some of the Colonies now contribute directly towards its up-keep ; the combined contribu- ' tions are barely i per cent, of the naval vote. The grave objections to this form of contribution to Imperial defence are dealt with elsewhere. Our position upon the high seas will be gauged by reference to the following table. From this table, however, must be deducted those losses sustained by Russia and Japan. These losses strengthen our posi- tion, as Russia, a partner in the dual alliance, was a factor affecting our naval standard. On the other hand, it will doubtless cause Russia to build battle- ships with all possible speed, and so restore her naval strength to what it was in 1903. io8 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE FLEETS OF PRINCIPAL MARITIME POWERS. Effective fighting siiips built, building and pro- jected. Battleships — Modern Older Armoured Cruisers — Big Lesser ..... Protected Cruisers — Class I Class 2 Class 3 Scouts ..... Torpedo Craft- Only large modern Torpedo boats, Torpedo gun-boats and Destroyers included Submarines .... S3 I-* d & *— > i at S 5 a 1 ■=2 DM 41 IS 22 12 II 27 29 13 6 5 5 6 4 4 16 16 13 15 12 {" "} II 10 5 10 , 7 — 10 18 19 28 10 14 37 13 15 6 — — — — — 4 ~ 7 272 98 410 156 126 152 58 49 88 72 15 5 19 The war between Russia and Japan has recorded no marked alteration in the application of the principles of naval tactics. The submarine was not used, therefore its value against a blockading fleet is so far purely speculative. That some foreign naval authorities have a great belief in it in this respect, is evinced by the number indulged in by France. The personnel of our Navy consists of 135,000 officers and men with a naval reserve of 60,01 1. Our great strength, however, lies in the reserve obtainable 1 The modern battleships include those captured from Russia. THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 109 from our mercantile marine. It was the press-gang that won for us the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar ; it may yet happen that the press-gang will help to save the Empire. Of the 430,000,000 subjects of the Empire, barely one in 450 is under existing conditions available for its defence. The mother country has determinedly set herself against either the compulsory military training of her citizens or obligatory military service in time of need. Fortunately for the future of the Empire, it will have been seen that several of the Colonies have recognised man's first duty to his State, and there are signs that in Great Britain commonsense and patriotism will join hands, and that a wise system of compulsory military training and obligatory service in time of need will be enacted. The following table will illustrate the paucity of the land forces responsible for the keeping of the British Empire : — ESTABLISHMENTS (ALL RANKS) igo8. Regular Forces, Home and Colonial . . . 161,303 Colonial and Native Indian Corps .... 9.251 Army Reserve 128,984 Militia, U.K 90,138 Militia, Reserve Division 2,321 Militia, Channel Islands 2,921 Militia of Malta and Bermuda .... 2,349 Yeomanry 25,812 Volunteers 239,876 Regular Forces in Indian Establishment . . 76,091 739,045 no COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE The territorial army now in course of formation is to be formed from the Volunteers and Yeomanry, and it is expected that this force will attain a strength of 300,000. It is to supply 2,170 Yeomanry Cavalry, and about 5,100 to the Transport and Medical Corps. For the purposes of comparison we will briefly consider the military systems of four large Powers. France. — The military forces of France are organ- ised on the basis of laws which enact universal liability to arms. The liability to service extends from the age of twenty to the age of forty-five. Under the law of the 2 1 St of March, 1905, the term of service in the ranks of the first line or " active " army is now two years. The soldier then passes into the reserve for eleven years, after which he serves in the territorial army for six years ; finally completing his service with six years in the territorial reserve. The reserves of the active army are called upon for training twice in their period of reserve service, for four weeks on each occasion. The territorial army have one training of two weeks, and those of the territorial reserve are not called upon for training, though they are liable should it be considered necessary. The standing army of France for 1908 consists of 662,000 of all ranks. This includes a Colonial Army of 86,000. In the event of war France could muster an army of 1 ,290,000 of all ranks, that is, men efficiently trained. Germany. — The military forces of the German Empire are founded on the constitution of the i6th of April, 1 87 1, by which it is enacted "That every THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING in German is liable for service ". Liability extends from the age of seventeen to forty-five. The soldier serves for two years with the active army, he then passes into the reserves for five years ; during this reserve service he is regarded as belonging to his corps, and during that period has to undergo two trainings of six weeks with his corps. The soldier passes from the reserve of the active army to the Landwehr or second line army for five years. This reserve is twice called upon for training, for eight or fourteen days on each occasion. On completing his five years with the first line of the Landwehr he passes into the second line of that force and remains with it until he has completed his thirty-ninth year. This line is not trained. The active army of Germany in 1908 is 28,331 officers and 586,506 non-commissioned officers and men. In event of war the mobilised field army (com- batants only) would be 1,840,000 of all ranks. The army vote for 1907-8 was ;£■ 3 5,000,000. Russia. — In Russia military service is obligatory for all men from their twenty-first year. In 1 874 the military forces were organised on the German model. The Russo-Japanese War only illustrated how incom- pletely the model was followed. The soldier serves for three years in the first line of the active army. He then passes into the reserve (Zapas) in which he serves for fourteen years ; here he does two trainings of six weeks each. On completing his fourteen years with the Zapas, the soldier passes to the " Opolchenie," the territorial army ; here he completes his service. 112 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE which should be in the forty-third year of his age. The Russian Army on a peace footing numbers 1,100,000 of all ranks. In time of war the total mobilised strength of the field army (combatants only) would be 1,800,000. The Russian army vote for 1 907-8 was ;^39,ooo,ooo. Japan. — In 1885 the organisation and training of the Japanese army was placed in the hands of German officers, hence the German model has been closely followed. Military service is universal and compulsory and commences at the age of seventeen, ending at forty. The soldier joins the active army for continuous service for three years, he then passes into the reserve (Yobi) for four years and four months ; here he has two trainings of sixty days each. This completes seven years and four nlonths in the first line. He now passes into the second line (Kobi) for ten years, with two trainings of sixty days each. At the end of this service he is now in his thirty-eighth year, and he is then passed into the territorial army (Kokumin). He serves in this force for two years and eight months by which time he will have completed his twenty years' service. The peace strength of the Japanese Army is 220,000. In the event of war the total mobilised strength of the field army (combatants only) would be 500,000. The army vote for 1907-8 is ^7,500,000. Here we have taken at random four Powers whose responsibilities can in no way be compared to our own ; whose combined wealth, shipping, or population falls far short of that of the British Empire. With them, how- THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 113 ever, the first law of Nature predominates. If we except Japan — for the analogy between that recently elevated Power and ourselves is indeed striking — we find Powers whose existence does not depend upon the keeping open of ocean routes, building navies out of all pro- portion to their maritime responsibilities. With them we notice that their people consider defence the most serious question in their policy, yet with them the question is not so vital as to the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. We have shown all the advantages that the Empire-in-being is blessed with, rich in all that man requires, consisting of one quarter of the earth's surface. Therefore, theoretically capable of sustaining one-fourth of the world's inhabitants ; still, in practice, these possessions fail to supply sufficient food stuffs for the sustenance of 42,cxx),ooo inhabitants of the United Kingdom ; this, too, in face of the fact that her own eldest Colony — Canada — but a few days' steam from her shores, contains the largest and finest area of wheat-producing land in the world. It will be remembered that at the coronation of our present King, one of the most noticeable objects in Whitehall at the time was the splendid arch erected by the Canadian Government, which had inscribed on it " Canada, the granary of the Empire ". It is to be fervently hoped that the inscription is a forecast of the near future. At present the requirements in the way of wheat of the United Kingdom amounts to 200,000,000 bushels annually, of which less than 50,000,000 is grown by 8 114 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE home farmers, the remainder being supplied by foreign or Colonial producers. In 1906 the imports of wheat into the British Isles amounted to 22,703,000 quarters, drawn from all parts of the world, but principally from the United States of America, a possibly hostile nation. Upon the basis of the Canada wheat crop for 1 906 the Dominion might have supplied the United Kingdom with fully one half of their wheat requirements for that year. The pro- vince of Manitoba in 1 906 alone had approximately 3,000,000 acres under cultivation, out of a cultivable area of 23,000,000 acres; these 3,000,000 acres were cultivated by 38,000 farmers, and produced 54,000,000 bushels of wheat — that is, more than the production of the United Kingdom in the same year. With the opening up of these wheat lands by rail, and the rapid increase of the population by immigration, there can be little doubt that the time is not far re- moved when Canada will supply the mother country at least with all the wheat she requires. The most disturbing element, when considering the results of a maritime war in which the Empire may be involved, is the question of the supply of food to the inhabitants of the British Isles. Its seriousness is ap- parent to every other unit of the Empire, and has been detected and is as clearly understood by our possible enemies as ourselves. The Colonies realise, and these probable enemies know, that the most vulnerable part is the heart of the Empire. They know too, that it is possible, though we hope highly improbable, to cause THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING "5 the destruction of the Imperial fabric by successfully cutting off England's supplies. Any discussion on the subject of the staying power of England in the next great naval war must be purely problematical, for the very good reason that We have no parallel to guide us. Captain Stewart L. Murray, in a lecture delivered before the Royal United Service Institute in 1901, exhaustively reviews the question of our food in time of war, and in the following table he gives a result of his research, which investigation only too truly confirms ; — Length of Time to which the Necessaries of Life actually IN the Country would Last if We were Thrown on Our Own Resources. Time of year. Bread. Meat. Potatoes, Barley. Data. 1. Blockade es-, tablished di- 1 rectly after j harvest. •' 2. Six months \ after harvest. / 3. Nine months J after harvest. 6J months supply. I year. I year. 8 months. 10 months. 4J months. I year. I year. 3 months. 6 months. 3j months, new crop at 7 months all told. I year. I year, or till next harvest. 2 or 3 months of feed barley only. 3 months, or till next harvest. Some authorities in and out of oificial circles are pleased to quote the Napoleonic wars, stating a fact, common knowledge to us all, that though corn rose 8* ii6 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE in price, yet England not • only survived but emerged from those exhausting wars victorious. The argu- ment applied to existing conditions is not only ex- tremely illogical but it is a dangerous fallacy. Not only the industrial, but the social conditions have entirely changed. At the end of the eighteenth and the be- ginning of the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom contained only 18,000,000 inhabitants, all of whom could be sustained by the land of their occupation. A century later, and that population has grown to 42,000,000, and owing to the decrease of the agrarian classes they are now dependent upon oversea sources for three-fourths of their food supply. We have in Imperial Rome a dangerous precedent of oversea dependency for the necessaries of life. Alison, in his History of Europe, says : " No nation can pretend to independence which rests for any sensible portion of its sustenance in ordinary seasons on foreign (who may become hostile) nations, and if we would see a memorable example of the manner in which the greatest and most powerful nation came to be paralysed by this cause, we have only to cast our eyes on Imperial Rome, when the vast extent of the Empire had prac- tically free trade in grain with the whole civilised world, and the result was that cultivation disappeared from the Italian plains, the race of Roman agriculturists, the strength of the Empire, became extinct, the legions could no longer be recruited but from foreign lands ; vast tracts of pasturage overspread even the fields of Lombardy and the Campagna of Naples, and it was THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 117 the plaintive confession of the Roman annalist, that the mistress of the world came to depend for her sus- tenance on the floods of the Nile ". It is here that our altered social condition will have its bearing ; to-day our government is more democratic than the govern- ment of a century ago, and as such must be actuated by the will of that class of the people upon whom the stress of war will fall most heavily should the price of food be to any extent influenced by a naval war. A hundred years ago the Empire was in embryo stage ; to-day it is in being. In the former state, though at war, the inhabitants of the United Kingdom suffered less than they are likely to in a maritime war in the present or the near future. The working classes of those days were barely sufficient to supply those markets — open, though the nation was at war. How different it is to-day we know by the difficulty ex- perienced in obtaining markets for our products and labour, though at peace with the whole world. With our foreign and possibly our Colonial markets closed by a maritime war, it is safe to estimate that at the very least 3,500,000 of the working class will be thrown out of work, the men of whom have a vote in the government of the country, and in the conduct of the war that will be an Imperial campaign. But there is a still larger proportion of the voters to be reckoned with ; these are at present living in poverty — according to Mr. Charles Booth, in his Life and Labour of the People, the proportion for London is 307 per cent. ; by applying these figures to the urban population of ii8 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the United Kingdom, it will be found that approxi- mately 8,000,000 people, at present living precariously, will be quite unable to bear any appreciable increase in the cost of food ; add to these the 3,500,000 thrown out of work, and we have one-fourth of the population in a starving condition. We have seen that one of the most serious problems confronting Russia in her war with Japan is the fear of anarchy among her poor, yet her internal resources are suiificient to keep her inhabitants alive. England is less favourably situated. A former First Lord of the Admiralty 1 has stated that all steamers under twelve knots will, in war, be laid up for fear of capture ; this means that under existing conditions three-fourths of our carrying power will be idle ; it means too, that our factories will cease work for want of raw material ; that their hands will be dis- charged ; the power of earning will cease, and with it the power of purchasing. Upon the other hand we must bear in mind the fact, that war will bring with it increased activity in other directions ; it will create callings that are in peace unknown ; dockyards and arsenals will call for men, fallow lands will immediately be placed under cultivation, and it is but reasonable to suppose that fully half those discharged will find fresh employment in these directions, though such employ- ment would not necessarily remove them and their families from want, should the enemy succeed in in- juring our commerce sufficiently to drive up the price ' Lord George Hamilton, THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 119 of food. Considering the subject in the most favour- able light possible, minimising figures to the utmost extent, and placing the most optimistic construction on authoritative statements, we are confronted with the fact that at least one-fourth of the inhabitants of the British Isles would be brought to the verge of starvation should a maritime war involving the British Empire occur. It is then the duty, not only of the statesmen resi- dent in those isles, controlling as they do the destiny of the whole of the Empire, but of every politician in the Colonies to aid the solution of a problem having in it the greatest danger. We have seen how rich in natural resources the Empire-in-being is ; its very ascendency is proof of the talent, manly vigour and fighting power of its possessors. We also, however, see a Damocles' sword suspended over it and by a very slender thread. When, therefore, the subject of the defence of the Empire is considered by the authorities at home, by Colonial politicians in Parliament, or Cabinet assembled by the local Defence Committees, or by the various societies, consisting mostly of laymen, who have thequestionof Imperial defence truly at heart — societies such as the Navy League, the Imperial Feder- * ation Society, and many others having branches in all our possessions — when these bodies or individuals con- sider and discuss the subject, it is to be most earnestly hoped that consideration, discussion, and aim will be directed upon the questions of the food supply of Britain, and thus lay a secure foundation upon which I20 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the fabric of Imperial defence and federation is to be built. Much time, labour, and genius is wasted in the preparation of schemes for attacks oversea, the mobil- isation of expeditions, while the main question — the security of the United Kingdom — is neglected. Theor- ists in the preparation of their academic schemes lose sight of the fact so often reiterated by able pens, that it is possible for England to fall by starvation within a few months of the commencement of a maritime war in spite of fleets-in-being, and of a navy of three-Power standard. It may be well to note here some figures as to our food. In the first place we must consider the foreign supplies last year (1907), for the 49,066,800 cwt. of wheat imported from her own possessions, the United King- dom imported from foreign countries 58,102,000 cwt, and this was supplied to her in the following order : United States of America, 20,696,900 cwt. ; Russia, 10,900,300 cwt; Argentine, 2 1 ,900,600 cwt. ; Germany, 310,175 cwt; Roumania, 3,140,727 cwt; Turkey, 459,104 cwt ; other countries, 866,132 cwt. The quantity of flour imported in 1907 was i3,297j3S7 cwt, of which 9,324,554 cwt came from the United States. At first sight it may appear reassuring that one of the greatest foreign exporters of food to the British Isles is a people closely allied to ourselves in blood, and sharing with us the English language. The phrase " acerrima proximorum odia " has in the past, when applied to the Americans and ourselves, unfortunately been amply justified, and it may be so THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 121 in the future; nor must it be overlooked that only thirteen years ago the United States and Britain were on the brink of war. If unfortunately such a war broke out, Russia, even in her crippled condition, would probably join our enemy. The most favourable conduct we could expect at her hands would be the closing of her markets to us. There is, however, a more certain danger threatening the food supply of the United Kingdom in the event of a maritime war, and this has its seat in America, whether that country be hostile or not. For some years now the civilised world has watched with astonishment the startling methods employed in all parts of the world by the financiers of that country ; combinations, consisting sometimes of but one or two individuals, have lately succeeded in controlling universal industries to such an extent that even in peace time they have been able to regulate prices of certain commodities. It must then be conceded that in any war which must in the nature of things create an abnormal demand for certain articles that this danger, a creation of the nineteenth century, will at once become active. Lately we have had several illustrations of what single individuals can do by market rigging ; an American all but succeeded quite lately in cornering wheat, raising its price ap- preciably ; had he succeeded, this necessity of life might have risen above the reach of the moderately poor. Cotton, a staple responsible for the purchasing power of a large proportion of the population of the United Kingdom, was by the machinations of one man 122 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE carried for a time above the reach of the manufacturer, passing into the hands of the speculators. War, or the prospect of war, would place a hostile nation be- hind the financiers ; they would in fact become agents of that nation, and success to them would be assured. A navy, even if supreme, and an army, however effective, cannot make unwilling foreigners open their markets to us. They can appreciably hamper us and weaken our security by restricting our supplies of food and certain raw material. We cannot retaliate, for they are not dependent on us for food at least. / Canada, the granary of the Empire — ^herein lies the solution. The Colony boasting this description is strategically with regard to the mother country the most favoured Colony from the strategical point of view. The route from port to port lies well out on the high seas. The distance between Quebec and Plymouth is 2,620 miles ; between Halifax and Ply- mouth, 2,430 miles. It is manifest that this route is of all our inter-Imperial trade routes the most easily protected during a naval war; the run across the Atlantic can be accomplished in less than six days. The solution of this vexed problem of food supply during war was suggested to the United Kingdom, all her dependencies as well as to her covert enemies, on the day his Majesty was crowned. The Canadian arch was the emblem that England could be freed from dependence on foreigners if she elected to accept that freedom. The encouragement, development, and expansion of THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 123 the Canadian wheat and flour exports to England, is not only the duty of Imperial economists, but must be the first consideration of all defence bodies ; in it lies the foundation of the Empire's security. With the development of the Canadian wheat supply there is re- moved from the problem of Imperial defence its most knotty point. There remains, however, the question of the defence of the trade route that is to supply the British Isles with an assured means of subsistence, in fact, the staying power of the Empire. If we accept the belief that the United Kingdom is the heart of the Empire, that its fall means the dis- ruption of the Imperial fabric, and that this fall may be brought about by cutting off its food supply or seriously interrupting it, then it must be acknowledged that the question of primary importance to us all is, the main- tenance of a steady flow of food to that centre. There must not be any ambitious attempt to keep all our commercial routes open in time of war, with the ex- travagant idea of retaining our present proportion of the world's commerce. By unreservedly accepting the short Canadian route as the main supply route, the vexed question of commerce protection is simplified. It is admitted by British Naval authorities that though the St. Vincent plan of blockading her enemies' ports be successfully adopted, it is highly probable that some fast cruisers will elude the vigilance of the blockading fleets and prey upon our commerce. In oflScial circles on the Continent it is freely admitted that this use of fast cruisers is a main plank in their plan of campaign 124 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE in the event of a war with England. The successful evasion of the blockade by fast cruisers, though the blockading fleet has command of the sea, was de- monstrated in the Russo-Japanese War by the success- ful raids made by the Russian cruisers from Vladivo- stok. Such commerce destroyers have a radius of 8,000 miles ; sufficient to cross the Atlantic and return. By narrowing down the responsibility of our fleet for commerce protection to the guardianship of one short route from Quebec or Halifax to Plymouth, we increase the chances of our fleet being able to preserve that all- important quality, homogeneousness. This it might have to lose if required to protect half a dozen longer routes, parts of which would pass through the enemy's narrow waters and close to hostile ports, out of which torpedo boats would steal during night and lie in wait for our merchantmen, in spite of the most effective blockade. The nearest possible hostile port in European waters to the Canadian route would be Brest. This being known, increased strength would be given to the fleet blockading this port. As the breadth of the Channel from Brest to Devonport is but 147 miles, hostile cruisers evading the port blockades in any of the French ports to the north-east of Brest, would yet have to pass the blockade of the latter port ; the Canadian route passing the mouth of the Channel is therefore doubly guarded. At the Canadian end of the route there are the French possessions of Miquelon and St. Pierre ; these groups have not as yet been THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 125 placed in a state of defence. Had the likely import- ance of this trade route been fully recognised in Eng- land, it is probable that more important cessions to France in other parts of the world would have been made in return for these places. It may be argued that Miquelon is but eighty-three square miles in area, and St. Pierre but ten, and that they lie close to our possession of Newfoundland. But if they are fortified and there- after attacked by us, no doubt the defenders will en- deavour to stand a siege such as we have in past days stood at Gibraltar. It is reasonable for us to suppose that France had foreseen the importance to England of the Canadian trade route, and consequently the strategic importance of these two groups. Their fortification at an early date may be expected, and if such defence includes a naval detachment, the protection of this end of the route will call for a small squadron of cruisers. The question of the defence of that Imperial com- merce not bearing directly upon the sustenance of the United Kingdom in time of war, is touched upon in that chapter dealing with the defence of oversea pos- sessions, and there the adequate fortification of all our oversea ports is advocated as greatly simplifying the problem. Barely fourteen years ago certain militant writers on the Continent dwelt elaborately on the fact that in the event of war between England and any combination, of which France might be one, great inconvenience would be caused to the former Power if the shipping (mostly loaded with food-stuffs or the purchasing power 126 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE of such) lying at Devonport, Portland, Portsmouth and in the Thames could be destroyed by raid. These writings were no mere vapourings, for they brought into being the following torpedo boat depots : Brest, Douarnenez, Morlaix, Lezardreux, St. Servan, Cher- bourg, St. Vaast, Quistreham, Tancarville, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais and Dunkerque ; by reference to the accompanying diagram it will be seen that these are direct threats upon certain English ports. -^-4 \ E N c L A E If/Jc 1 5 O HI 3 cJh \ V BOULOCIl \ \ imppc /y^ORLAixm — ' - -i / 4 (Mr ^^^^^\ V 1 I i—Ji:^ T/incMWiLU '-v / / \- H A N C E CHtoouASNENEZ ■■??5CT«AfP kJ No matter how stringent the blockade of these French ports on our part may be, the probability of torpedo boat raid upon the shipping in our harbours lying opposite, and within striking distance, is not re- moved. If the result of such raid be confined to the destruction of empty shipping, then the effect to Britain might be moral only, the material effect might be important if the shipping destroyed contained in any quantity a proportion of the means by which people live. THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 127 It is at this juncture tiiat the necessity for adequate means of corn storage presents itself to those con- cerned in the security of the United Kingdom and the defence of the Empire. Various authorities have re- peatedly advocated a food supply department, and elaborate schemes have been worked out. The bureau- cratic control of a civilian population numbering but a few thousands always meets with many diiificulties ; when the population is over 40,000,000 it becomes impracticable, and the energy and skill expended upon the elaboration of this much-advocated scheme is so much energy and skill directed wide of the goal aimed at. Wherever the Government of a country trespasses into the fields of commerce, they experience ignomini- ous failure, and wasteful expenditure is always the re- sult. The life of a large majority of the people being spent in, or closely connected with commerce, any attempt to officially control even for the good of the nation any branch having commercial relations will be resented by the very people for whose benefit it is to be carried on, and any attempt to institute any form of departmental food supply or to officially control the daily actions of the people, will in its way be most dangerous. At the time when unanimity among the masses is needed, the working of such a department would tear up by the roots some of those institutions which help to keep 42,000,000 in that state of concen- trated interest and determination so necessary if suc- cess is to be achieved in war. This is said without prejudice to any scheme which may be brought for- 128 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE ward with the object of storing food-stuffs as a national reserve, but which would find its way to the people through normal channels. The average wheat stocks awaiting debarkation at English ports is said to be about 2,000,000 quarters, equal to twenty-five days' supply. In the event of war food-stuffs might be granted priority of discharge over other cargoes. Government dep6ts might with reason be erected for the storage of grain in transit from the Atlantic coast of Canada and at the ports with a view to making these depots secure from attack. It will, with the best of reasons, be asked, is the question of food supply the only important point in the problem " How to make England secure " ? Doubtless there are other points which, if we are to solve the problem, must engage our most earnest attention. It has been stated that 75 per cent, of the inhabit- ants of the United Kingdom are born and bred amid the squalor of great cities, and when we realise that nearly one-fourth of the corn-producing land in Eng- land has been thrown out of cultivation since 1874, it will at once be seen that the agricultural class has considerably diminished, and with its gradual extinction an alarming deterioration in the physique almost in- evitably follows. An authoritative statement was recently made in a letter to the Times to the effect that the poor Board-school boy at twelve averages to-day three inches less in stature and two pounds less in weight than did the factory boy of thirty years ago. THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 129 The conditions that have brought this physical altera- tion about will act concurrently upon the mental characteristics. Some hold that compulsory education has raised the mental standard of the population of to-day above that of the last generation ; but among the classes upon whom this education of to-day is forced, is one that is now physically and mentally weakened by environment, overwork, and insufficient food, and so incapable of bearing the strain of com- pulsory learning. After all, what is the value of this compulsory education to Britain ? Is it the education that will ensure the security of the Empire-in-being ? If so, how is it China is a nonentity, except in num- bers, among the nations of the world ? Education let all classes have by all means, but let it be in a form that works for Imperial efficiency. No nation can survive without patriotism. Our forefathers had to a great extent the advantage of an out-of-door life, their love of country matured amidst woods and fields, but these are now closed to three-fourths of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. If the British race is to sur- vive under the altered conditions which now prevail, patriotism must be inculcated and matured. It must be instilled into our young at the Board schools, secondary schools, colleges, and universities, and with must be given that which is to uphold patriotism — physical culture. Let patriotism and all that pertains to it be preached from the pulpit, whatever the creed of preacher and congregation ; let it be the theme of the writer, the lecturer, the professor ; the lesson of the 9 I30 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE teacher, and, still further reaching, the subject for the journalist's pen. The Empire, though in-being, is so far as its centre is concerned not too healthy. Its strength is not in the size or wealth of its territories, but in the fighting power, the defensive strength of its citizens, and in its preparedness for war. If these are deficient, its wealth and size become a danger and a weakness. The increasing difficulty in finding the personnel for our fighting forces is an alarming feature in the problem of defence. The difficulty may be success- fully met, but the legislator should here again have the hearty co-operation of the clergy, the teacher, and the journalist ; and perhaps the time may come when the women of our nation will look with anything but admiration upon the man who has not fitted himself for the defence of his country and womanhood. The fallacy that peace and progress are synony- mous, that war is retrograde, has lately been in vogue. This doctrine is peculiar to a section of the British race : it finds few followers among any of the other great nations. We find around us probable enemies armed to the teeth, watching an opportunity of divid- ing amongst themselves this our Empire-in-being. And it is the preaching of this cowardly and senseless doctrine that may yet open the door for them. Wherever civilisation has found its way, there it has been carried by the sword — every nation that has risen has carved its way up by the sword, and retained its position only by force of arms ; when once its weapons THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 131 have been laid aside, then has been the signal for de- cadence. Ruskin truly says : " We talk of peace and learning, and of peace and plenty, and of peace and civili- sation ; but I found that these were not the words which the Muse of History coupled together ; that on her lips the words were peace and sensuality — peace and sel- fishness — peace and death. I found in brief that all great nations learnt their truth and word and strength of thought, in war; that they nourished in war and wasted by peace, taught by war and deceived by peace : trained by war and betrayed by peace : in a word, that they were born in war and expired in peace." The pages of history admit of no doubt, " The betrayed of peace " — " Expired in peace ". Portugal, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Greece, compare with them in their present position — Japan, a nation born yester- day. She could to-day, so far as Western civilisation is concerned, annex by force of arms the five combined. There they are, these nations betrayed, standing as beacons to guide us, the proud possessors of an Em- pire-in-being, but an Empire entering upon the stage of peace adoration which has signalled the decline of many races. Other nations, among them our probable foes, have long recognised that the greatest evil at- tendant upon civilisation is abhorrence of war — and they have taken in time those steps necessary to counteract the dislike of fighting and of getting ready to fight. Germany, through the thrift, intelligence, and prosperity of her people, illustrates to mankind the advantages of training in their youth her manhood to 9* 132 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the use of arms ; the habits of discipline and the order and cleanliness of person are carried into after life by all classes of modern Germans ; this permeates the whole nation and is to-day recognised as the national characteristic. The womanhood of the nation look with reproach upon the men ignorant of military train- ing. Germany at least is true to herself; and is she not well to the fore in all that belongs to twentieth- century civilisation ? Is she not a growing rival to ourselves in commerce? Has she not successfully competed with us in many branches of trade that be- fore were exclusively ours ? And her success is due to thte physical and moral education so necessary to a nation if it is to survive and progress. It is only when this education is given in early youth that it will benefit the nation at large, and it is here that the Government of the day can help to awaken the country to its needs. Several of the self-governing Colonies have recog- nised the necessity of the physical development of their youth as the basis for mental and moral im- provement in the community, and compulsory educa- tion includes service in school cadet corps. The improvement in the standard of the Colonial youth within the last decade, both morally and physically, is marked, the habits of discipline have taught these youths that freedom is not licentiousness. The blatant cry " Freeborn Englishmen " is often yelled from the platform by the fanatical democratic ranter, who more often than not is a sad illustration, physically and THE EMPIRE-IN-BEING 133 morally, of what this misuse of freedom is bringing the Empire to. It is said that these ranters are to some extent responsible for the difficulty experienced in obtaining men for our small fighting services. If so, their efforts must be counteracted. How many of these socialistic preachers will take up arms and fight for this boasted freedom ? Freedom we want, but freedom in its proper sense is only gained, and when gained only retained, by an exercise of disciplined strength ; once the strength fails, freedom is lost. To this state of undisciplined weakness those mentally and often physically deformed ranters are endeavour- ing to persuade us to approach. If compulsory edu- cation be tempered with discipline, with the instilling of patriotism and with physical culture, mind and body will be made healthy, and the democratic speaker may yet be preaching the gospel of Empire. He may come to be of the opinion that the results of war are not wholly abhorrent, and that no matter what we think of its results, we must as an Empire be ever in a state of absolute readiness for war. CHAPTER IV. THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. It is a matter of surprise to the inhabitants of the United Kingdom, that Colonials do not share with them the feeling that the very existence of the Empire depends absolutely on the Navy. Inhabitants of the Colonies recognise that the extent of dependency upon the Navy is regulated by the geographical position, economic conditions, density and nature of the popula- tion. The population of the Empire is of such varied races, that it is only to be expected that their loyalty to the Crown will be shown in varied forms ; and be- cause it is more difficult to persuade the bushman of Australia, the rancher of Canada, and the farmer of South Africa, than the fisherman of Newfoundland or boatman of Deal, that the inviolability of the Empire depends on the Navy more than the rapid concentra- tion of numerous Colonial contingents, it does not follow that the Australian, Canadian, or African lands- man hold this inviolability less dear than the seaman of Newfoundland or Deal. It is but an instance of the influence of environment upon ideas. In the case of some of the larger Colonies, the character of whose 134 THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES 135 seaboards have perhaps militated against a large sea- faring community, the plains of the interior, long dis- tances and sparse communications have favoured and fostered an equestrian community whose knowledge of the sea is remote. It is therefore hardly a matter for surprise that a people knowing so little of the sea should show some want of belief in the statement that this security and welfare depend on sea power or command. The questioning of the importance of the Navy as the supreme means of the Empire's defence, has fathered the axiom emanating from the Colonies, that a Navy of present or future strength is the requisite of England alone, be she the possessor of Colonies or not; and, therefore, the Colonies should no more be called upon to contribute to this Navy than they should con- tribute to the London County Council. That this opinion is held by a number of Colonial statesmen, and that it is gaining ground in the Colonies, is evi- denced by the attitude taken by at least one Colonial premier at the Conference of 1902 ; it is also reflected in the debates in the Colonial Parliaments on the Colonial naval contributions ; while articles in the lead- ing English papers by Colonials of standing, against Colonial contributions to the Navy, are becoming more frequent. The first part of the axiom quoted is ob- viously correct, viz., that the Navy is necessary to Eng- land, whether she has Colonies or not; but before affirming or denying the second part, that the Colonies should not contribute to the Navy, it will be well to 136 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE attempt to accurately and dispassionately inquire into the naval requirements of the Colonies themselves. The main argument brought forward by the naval authorities themselves, in favour of Colonial contribu- tions, is that if the Navy was retained for home pro- tection alone, the Colonies would be bound to provide separate navies for their own defence ; some of the American Republics and certain European nations which have had to create navies are given as instances. During the last few years some most interesting, instruc- tive, and able articles have been appearing in some of the English Service papers, placing before the reading public reasons for and against Colonial navies. The recognised naval authorities invariably, and with apparent sound reason, strongly and in no unmeasured tone denounce as folly any policy which would give the Colonies small self-owned navies ; the deprecation of all these writers is, however, based on the idea of strategic control, and I have searched in vain for dis- approval of this policy on other grounds, although there are other grounds, and these very strong ones. It must appear to the most sanguine Imperialist that once a Colony creates an independent Navy, there is at once brought into being a new element antagonistic to federation and perhaps hostile to Imperial unity ; this element will be strengthened as the independent Navy grows. Created for coastal defence and the defence of Colonial commerce in the Colonial seas, the responsi- THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES 13; bilities at first may appear light, but the cost will be con- siderable, and the creation of a Colonial Navy may bring with it a plea for secession on the score that Imperial re- sponsibilities endanger the Colonial Navy. The Colony owning its own Army and Navy may wish to curtail as much as possible the dangers to these expensive machines ; and the dangers of embroilment in war, they may think, will be diminished if the example set by the American Colonies is taken. The steps — Crown Colonies, Responsible Government, a Colonial Army, Treaty-mak- ing Powers, a Colonial Navy, Secession, Republic — look natural. The rise of Colonial navies could in no wise result in a diminution of the naval programme of England, for the strength of her Navy must ever lie in its homogeneity, a quality intensified by the present system of drawing the personnel from the British Isles ; the traditions of the British Navy belong solely to the United Kingdom, the morale gained by Drake, strengthened by Howe and Cochrane, and finally moulded by Nelson and his captains, is now an attri- bute of the British-bom seaman. The personnel of a Colonial Navy would have no past traditions to act up to — in all probability such seamen would be of mixed extraction and representatives of many nations. This in itself would be an element of great weakness, and must of necessity militate against that efficiency that can alone spell success in naval conflicts. As the natural result of environment, the insular continent of Australia is the first Colony to seriously discuss the advisability of creating a Navy of her own ; 138 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the independent spirits in that Colony chafe at the non- control of a squadron of war-ships ostensibly kept for their protection ; the rapidly increasing importance of Australasia, just emerging from the mists of discovery, her marvellous resources, her advantageous position geographically, mark her out for a high position among the future nations of the Southern Hemisphere. The successful naval policy follow^ed by Japan, crowned by their maritime victory over Russia, is an argument in favour of an independent Navy not likely to be ignored by its advocates. Although it is freely recognised by Australians that naval defence is necessary, there is not that blind belief in its absolute efficiency that is yet to be found in naval official circles in England ; had such belief been general the direct contribution of money would greatly have exceeded the sum of ;£'200,ooo per annum. By reference to the debate raised in the Federal Parliament upon this vote to the Royal Navy, it will be seen that the sum was somewhat grudgingly given, not from any feeling of disloyalty or even of parsimony, but because of the growing feeling that these direct grants are far from the best means to be adopted in aid of Imperial defence. The majority of Aus- tralians would prefer to pay more if the result was to give them a Navy of their own, and unfortunately, as I think, there are specious arguments in favour of that idea. The system of monetary contribution by the self- governing Colonies to the Navy, which results in a bare ;^400,ooo, or I per cent, of the naval vote, is a griev- THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES 139 ance to the United Kingdom and the Colonies alike ; to the former because the primary object of the Navy is forgotten, viz., self-preservation, and it is felt that four- fifths of the population of the Empire is bearing the cost of the protection of the whole. To some people at home it appears an injustice that the Colonies should not bear an equal share of taxation, not only for the Navy, but for the Army as well ; it seems to them unfair in the extreme that whilst they pay i6s. per head for naval defence, the colonist pays but 4d. These apparent injustices have been brought before the British public by numerous writers, some of whom have distorted the facts. As an instance, it is stated that the Colonies pay but 4d. per head of the white popu- lation ; this figure is obtained by adding the non-paying to the paying Colonies ; Natal with a white population of 70,000 gives £1 5 ,000 per annum or i os. per head, Canada with a population of 4,500,000 contributes nothing ; at the same time I contend that she contri- butes materially more than her sister Colonies. The grievances that most Colonies have against the direct contribution, is : — I St. That when asked for, no proper basis for contri- bution was suggested ; it was left for the Colonies to grant what they thought fit, thus placing them in a very ambiguous position with regard to the mother country, the other self-governing Colonies, and the Empire generally. 2nd. That when granted, there is no control by the Colonies on the expenditure. 140 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE 3rd. That it gives in return no guarantee of naval protection. 4th. It is felt in some Colonial quarters that these naval grants would be more effectually used in the interests of Imperial defence by being expended on local defences. The first grievance then is that when the First Lord of the Admiralty asked the Premiers of the self-govern- ing Colonies to increase their naval grants, he did so without giving them any business-like basis upon which to work ; here was the first rift in the discussion that ensued ; various bases were suggested but each was found to be impracticable. An apparently feasible basis was the tonnage of shipping ; Australia, however, owns six times the shipping of India, yet the latter pays ^413,000 in naval defence. Population was found an impossible basis, due, of course, to the varied races varying in wealth, from India with 4s. 6d. per head of its population, to the Transvaal with £^ 14s. per head. Mercantile tonnage was likewise abandoned as a basis, as involving extreme inaccuracy, as when the volume of trade for a given Colony was estimated by adding the exports and the imports together, the in- creasing volume of inter-Colonial trade adds to the difficulty in obtaining reasonably accurate figures. It would appear then that it was left to the individual Premiers to decide upon the amount each Colony should contribute, for it is quite impossible to discern any system governing the amounts granted, not even strategic importance to the contributors. THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES 141 These direct contributions coming from the Colonial revenues further raise the question in the Colonies of control in this expenditure ; it takes but a moment to see how impossible it is to have such control ; the Colonies must be content to know that the amount has gone to the Admiralty and must remain content until they are prepared to bear an equal proportion of ex- penditure ; then, and not till then, can they expect to have a voice in its control. That the naval contributors do not get in return a guarantee of local Navy protection, is a grievance that at iirst sight appears to have some force in it. The Colonies object to being shuttle-cocks. The theory held by the Admiralty authorities, " That the safety of Colonial ports can be best secured by the operations of a fleet somewhere away out on the high seas," has yet to be confirmed in actual war ; the past is full of his- torical examples, but the matter-of-fact Colonial mind looks for something fresher than the musty pages of history. To him it appears a matter of rash specula- tion to risk the safety of Australia in the hands of the Admiralty alone. The Colonial sees many elements of danger in placing his whole trust for personal safety in the hands of a defence force provided by the in- habitants of the United Kingdom ; to them the loss of a Colonial possession would but mean the loss of a prestige, or at the worst the partial and perhaps tem- porary disruption of the Empire. Is it to be expected that the safety of the 45,000,000 of inhabitants, those people who for years have been 142 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE heavily taxed in order to keep the command of the element over which they draw their sustenance, is to be jeopardised in order to ensure the security of a thinly populated Colony, which, should it fall into the hands of an enemy, would fall back again should the com- mand of the sea be regained, retained, or obtained ? Naval authorities will readily admit that it is idle for Imperial statesmen to declare that the Colonies are the cause of an increased Naval Budget ; the geo- graphical position, limited area, and increasing popula- tion of Britain makes her absolutely dependent for life on oversea territories, the sea-routes are her arteries of life ; once these are closed she is at the mercy of her enemy. Thanks to the common application of education, and the liberal supply of newspapers, the British public fully recognise that to them supremacy at sea means existence, not as an Empire so much as a British nation ; it is idle then for Colonists to think that any contribution by them, short of an equal pro- portion on the basis of white population, can ob- tain for them power to call for a proportion of that Navy to be detailed for local defence, while under such a condition they would be placing at a great disad- vantage, and greatly weakening, the machine they had secured at a cost of heavy taxation. Can it be expected that interests divided by oceans, people with different outlooks whose environments are different, can be brought into harmony over the administration of a common machine ? Is it not more likely that many notes of discord will occur which at THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES 143 the very outset will result in disaster, disaster that may go further than the mere disruption of the Empire ? The first real bond of unity between the Colonies and the mother country was the practical illustration of trust by the latter when granting responsible gov- ernment to those Colonies ready to receive it ; had the statesman of the day looked forward and seen the rise in the Colonies of the democratic party, he might have successfully forestalled their machinations by the careful creation of a Colonial nobility ; the monarchical sentiment would thus have gained fresh impetus, and the true, though hidden, motive force that had success- fully governed England for a thousand years, would have likewise found its way into the Colonies. Since the institution of self-government, so long ago advocated by Burke, and which would have saved our American Colonies, numerous other bonds of unity between the parent and her offspring have been welded ; now, however, arises a question of importance upon which the Colonies and the mother country are likely to dis- agree. It is one, too, that neither party can allow to wait, for by so doing the breach is likely to widen. By assisting Australia, or any other self-governing Colony, to own an independent Navy, even though under imperial officers, England may be counten- ancing an idea the fruit of which may be secession. By accepting direct monetary contributions to the Navy, England is weakening the Empire's defences, unless the amount granted (and that is quite impossible) is surplus to the Colonial defence vote. 144 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE The lesson given to the world in the salvation, growth, and expansion of England by her Navy is one that is apt to be illogically applied, especially so in the case of Australia ; when advocating a Navy the cry is, we are an island, and the history of England is our guide ; when advocating an Army it is pointed out that we are a continent, though truly unique, for it is a self-contained continent, yet the interests of imperial defence demand that the latter idea be taken. History does not contain an island continent ; if it had, Alexander would have been baffled in its conquest ; Australia with her 700,000 men of a fighting age, her internal resources, could well defy the strongest European Power, and that without the aid of a Navy. No more practical illustration of this is needed than the difficulty experienced in overthrow- ing the Boer Republics. The feeling of national responsibility in Australia is similar to a rapidly growing instinct in Canada arising from the proximity of foreign Powers and the increas- ing commercial relations with them ; in the past it was customary for all negotiations, whether commercial or otherwise, to pass through the Colonial Secretary ; trade, however, is a poor respecter of persons, until difficulties arise ; then the official is still quickly re- sorted to for assistance. In the Pacific we find both Germany and Holland in their New Guinea possessions neighbours of Aus- tralia. She is also in juxtaposition with France and Germany in New Caledonia and Samoa ; the war THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES 145 lately proceeding in the East brought Australia nearer to the naval and military powers of Russia and Japan, and she is but a few days off America in Hawaii. Her intercourse with those Powers is ever becoming more brisk, and the possibility of conflict with one or other of them is becoming apparent and is directly responsible for the rise of a national instinct which, if diplomatically guided, will mean strength rather than weakness to the Empire. Although her intercourse with these foreigners is conveyed by sea, and her sea-borne trade is considerable, after due deliberation, it cannot be acceded that the plea for an independent Navy is even reasonable ; it would pro- voke rather than prevent naval attack. Further it should be kept in view that a war in which this seaborne commerce was threatened, would not mean that the whole of that commerce was in danger, as a considerable portion would be carried under neutral flags. An argument advanced by some of the advocates for this Australian Navy, is that Holland, surrounded by likely hostile Powers, is content with a Navy costing her ;^7 50,000, and that by its means she is able to hold her Colonies, but where this reasoning is used it is forgotten that by the Treaty of Utrecht Holland's independence is practically guaranteed by the Powers of Great Britain and Germany. A glance, too, at Holland's Navy list, shows that but one vessel is built for sea-going pur- poses, and that all the others are purely guard ships for coast defence and are even unsuitable for commerce 10 146 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE protection. The safety of her Colonies lies in the jealousies that exist between her most likely foes, but a European war of any magnitude, whether she be involved or not, may mean their loss. Should Germany be a combatant the loss is practically inevitable. But Australasia's position can in no way be compared to that of Holland. To mould a defensive policy for Australia on the matter of a European State seems unwise, there is too little analogy in the respective circumstances. A Navy naturally aims at sovereignty over adjacent and common waters, and the eye of suspicion is ever upon a rising neighbour whose base, at the most, is but a few days away and may be but a few hours. The rapid rise of Japan may cause some un- easiness to Australia, and certainly would do so if the Colony ever contemplated seceding ; even then it does not appear that her resources would enable her to provide a Navy which could ever hope to compete with' that of Japan. Further, the advocates of an Australian Navy should keep in view that command of Australian seas by the Japanese would not in itself be disastrous to Australia, any more than it would be disastrous to Canada if the United States held the command of the sea in a war. The commerce of either Colony certainly would be affected to the extent of her self-owned shipping. All contraband of war will be self-supplied ; an invasion of Australia would be disastrous to the invaders, and now that the strain of naval war is financially greater than in the past, the command of the Australian waters would but react THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES 147 upon the holders. Under present conditions, Australia with adequate land forces is unassailable to any naval Powers. There is yet another weighty argument against Australia weakening herself by the creation of an independent Navy, and that is her national character. The rise of all sea powers, with the single exception of Rome, is directly attributable to the sea-going pro- clivities of the inhabitants, and this characteristic had brought with it wealth, and wealth, where rapidly gained, proved the zenith, and then brought with it decay. The sea powers of Spain and Portugal are notable instances of this, wholly and solely due to a misuse of their power and their greed for rapid wealth ; England's sea power is more lasting because its growth has been the more gradual, and a greater proportion of her inhabitants have been and are employed in sea- callings. In the past this maritime characteristic has been fostered by foreign nations in the employment of English shipping, thus strengthening her sea power. The calling of a people bears directly upon their fighting qualities. In Australia the calling of the bulk of the population is pastoral, and this calling, due to large areas of uncultivated land, is likely to grow at a greater ratio than her shipping can possibly do. On the sea lies a field for the competition of all the sea- faring communities of the world. Even though from a growing population she succeeded in drawing suffi- cient mariners to man a fleet, where would she find that reserve which is absolutely necessary if that fleet 148 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE were to have any fighting value ? It was this lack of a reserve that allowed the overthrow of Napoleon, after the defeat of Villeneuve at Trafalgar. Would Australia be content to risk her all in one naval battle ? The effect of her national characteristics upon fighting qualities is plain ; the pastoral pursuits, the prosperity found in land, the healthy and comfortable means of livelihood to be obtained from the soil, and that at no great distance from the sea-board, militates against the growth of a sea-going community likely to be of any power. Captain Mahan has pointed out how little the size of a population is responsible for sea power, but for a very long time to come Australia cannot hope to possess a sea-faring community of sufficient size to supply her with a personnel for an efficient Navy. The expenditure upon a Navy, which would be of little value either to herself or to the Empire, is weaken- ing her true rdle in Imperial defence ; the value of the pastoralist as a soldier has been proved in ancient history and Middle Ages ; and it was brought home to us in the late South African War, not only by the fine work of the Boers, but with satisfaction to Britain by the equally good service of our Colonists. The evol- ution of war with its increasing call upon the physical senses and mental activity makes the healthily bred and reared man an asset of the greatest value. With the gradual but steady decline of agriculture in Eng- land, and the equally steady increase of that industry in the Colonies, it appears but reasonable that a THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES 149 transfer of military responsibilities must take place. Australia has the nucleus of a very fine force indeed ; the value of their fighting powers was fully felt at a critical time ; it is then the development of her powers in that direction that Imperial defence requires, and not an immature scheme in the form of an independent Navy, which would only invite the attack it would be powerless to repel. But a well-trained and thoroughly equipped little Army would soon make an invader's task very diiificult. The question of cost prohibits the creation of a Navy in addition to the possession of such a land force. By the full development of her re- sources in the shape of men and horses for war pur- poses, Australia would be in a position to give a quid pro quo for all the naval defence from the Royal Navy she should ever require; such a reserve of fighting force would be to the Empire of greater value than any direct monetary contribution she could give to the Navy, it would further relieve the British tax-payer of a proportion of the expenditure he is now called upon to give to the Empire's Army. As the creation of the Empire is directly attributable to the Navy, and as that Navy has been a recognised force for over 400 years, we must look forward to the Empire being retained by it ; any deviation of a policy which centres the control of the Empire's first line of defence in the United Kingdom would be fatal to the Empire, though not necessarily fatal to the Colonies or to England. An attempt to depart from a policy that has stood the test of past wars must be as strenuously 150 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE opposed by Colonials as by England. It has been suggested that the scheme of Colonial contribution to the Navy introduced a disturbing element into the policy successful in the past, namely, the policy by which the control of the Navy is centred in the United Kingdom. The contribution scheme had not had the effect expected of it, for it carried with it the stamp of taxation without representation. As the naval policy of the Empire has been, is, and, it is trusted, ever will be the primary question of importance in England, there is in that country a greater tendency to forget that naval defence is only one out of many items that require to be considered in connection with federation. The Colonies, whilst recognising the primary import- ance of naval defence, also recognise that there are numerous other factors that have to be taken into con- sideration before federation is actually accomplished. It is, however, freely understood that a great distance has been travelled towards the goal when Imperial defence will have been placed upon a proper basis, and in clearing the ground for this, the clashing of rival interests must be avoided. It may sound para- doxical to say, yet the clashing elements at present are within the Navy and Army, due to the latter draw- ing its material from a wrong source, a source that should supply the former ; naturally, the result is one of two equally wrong principles, either starvation of the services or starvation of the tax-payers. It is not the writer's object in this work to reiterate and enlarge upon those fixed principles which have THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES 151 governed warfare from time immemorial; principles which history clearly shows us are dangerous to ignore. Captain Mahan, by his invaluable works, has deduced lessons from the past and has handled those lessons in a masterly manner which no previous naval historian has equalled. Captain Mahan, Admiral Colomb, Sir George Clarke, Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Thursfield, and Colonel May have each in their own way emphasised the principles of Imperial defence ; they have shown us by varied examples how rapid and sure the retribu- tion is when and where the fundamental principles are abused. The inhabitants of a Marine Empire like our own should not require repeated exhortation as to the absolute necessity of holding the command of the sea. CHAPTER V. ENGLAND— THE NAVY. " Royal" to the Navy and " Imperial" to the Army are two prefixes which, though granted before the full meaning the words now bear was understood, will, it is to be trusted, attain a still more ample significance in the very near future. By the prefix " Royal," we of Greater Britain beyond the seas understand that pertaining peculiarly to the British Isles ; " Imperial," on the other hand, whilst conveying to the mind something more extensive, has up to the present embraced a service more restricted in its constitution than that of the Navy. The Army, for reasons best known to the authorities at home, has been less Imperial than the sister service, it has ever been conservative, whereas the Navy, supposed in name to be recruited from Englishmen in the true sense of the term, at various times numbered among its distin- guished officers gentlemen of Colonial birth. In the eighteenth century there were not less than three flag officers and eleven captains of American birth serving in the Royal Navy. At various times in the history of the Army there have been spontaneous outbursts of 153 ENGLAND— THE NAVY 153 affection for the Colonies, but affections warm in war become cool in peace. In the late Boer War numerous commissions were given to Colonials in the Imperial Army ; with the conclusion of that war the Colonial gentlemen met with the same cold reception meted out to the Colonial cousin in the past, until his position becoming unbearable — he had no alternative but to leave a service where he was only appreciated in time of war. To-day, six years after peace, not 5 per cent, of the Colonials who were granted commissions in 1900-2 are to be found in the service. The means adopted by the British regimental oilScer to rid his regiment of the Colonial met with such success that the subject called forth protest from New Zealand, Canada, and the Cape of Good Hope. The sister ser- vice has ever been far more hospitable to the Colonial. The life of the naval cadet and the Colonial boy are both strenuous, the open air and the early companion- ship of their own sex has at an early age fostered the love of manly attributes ; the Colonial youth is there- fore accepted in naval circles for his personal merits. The great responsibility that must devolve upon the Royal Navy during any European war in which England may be involved, is reflected in the physical and mental efficiency of its personnel, qualities which carry the holder above petty prejudice. It carries the naval service as a whole above methods so common in other services. Influence — family or political — may be useful to a member of the naval service, but it is not of that urgency for advancement that it was in 1 54 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the Navy a century ago, or that it is in the other services of Empire to-day. It has in the past been continually asserted that the Colonies have shown a lack of interest in the greater questions of Imperial Defence ; but they are now evinc- ing a much more intelligent interest in questions of Imperial import. No more opportune moment than the present can be chosen to stimulate this interest ; the recent close of a great war, the first in the history of man in which a people divided by oceans have united as a nation against a common foe, has revealed a vista of possibilities for the Empire, never before dreamt of by the most sanguine Imperialists. Prior to the closing of the past century, the man who spoke of Imperial Federation was considered a visionary ; the elements inimical to Empire were up to the outbreak of the Boer War considered of insuperable difficulty. Not very long ago Colonies were only looked upon by a number of inhabitants of the British Isles as valuable assets for commercial purposes ; by others as useless appendages ; and by a few — a very few we are pleased to hope — as a dangerous responsibility. But their rapid growth, the sturdy manhood and the inde- pendent characteristics of the Colonials, have proved in unmistakable language that they have reached an age when responsibility can no longer be on the side of the parent State only. Through the increasing facilities of communication between the mother country and her Colonies a better ENGLAND— THE NAVY 155 understanding as to what is necessary for mutual de- fence is coming about ; both sides have the very best intentions, but sometimes there are misunderstandings. The question, what is the most advantageous part each Colony should take in order to effect successful cohesion in defence, is one of primary importance. Of the Premiers who discussed the subject with the Colonial Secretary at the Conference of 1902, it would appear from the official records that Sir Wilfred Laurier alone had grasped the idea of the Colonies' respon- sibilities in time of war. Canada contributes nothing in specie to the Royal Navy, but in an indirect and more practical way she contributes to that Navy, and therefore to the defence of the Empire, more than all the Colonies combined. She is responsible for her own defence ; her ports are defended by herself; she has harbours of refuge fortified by herself. An outbreak of war will find her independent of the Navy for the protection of the Imperial merchant shipping on her coasts, nor is it conceivable that she will allow her responsibility to cease here, for owing to her geo- graphical position she of all the British Colonies is the most convenient supply dep6t for the United Kingdom. Canada recognises that in helping herself apparently she is helping the Empire materially, whereas the other Colonies do not recognise yet that helping the Empire apparently the help is barely material, for this apparent help in the shape of a small contribution to the Navy (the total contribution is i per cent, of the naval vote) 156 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE is accepted at a tremendous cost to the Empire in that time of need which has several times within the past few years been so narrowly averted, and of which the shadows are now before us. The questions which the Empire has to consider in common are : — (a) What are the defensive resources of the self- governing Colonies ? (J)) What self-governing Colonies are independent of Imperial assistance, and what residue in men and material can be spared to the Empire ? (c) What self-governing Colonies are dependent upon direct Imperial assistance, and by what means may they be made independent of such assistance ? It will, I think, be acknowledged that, in the event of a naval war within the next decade, the Colonies individually must act upon the defensive ; whereas all offensive operations, however insignificant, must be undertaken by the sea or land forces of the Empire. This brings us then to — (a) What are the resources of the self-governing Colonies in time of war? The following table will show. ENGLAND— THE NAVY IS7 2S 2^. "XI 3 § 30 58 s « is? S o_; U oZ to 'S s ° o o q in S? Sum S o > . £iS! •* d ■R O 3 ° O "jl o 9 „i..£ii .a 3 w c o a uU o ar^ -c -€ & » B 9 9 O . U73US X « o M^ B .9 S6 Og "2 a a, 01 "•a o K ^ ■»-» S gg S u J3 " ti CO lu c c > >-• o S " o_cs ^- J3 ^ c •o loo .2 i« « S3 CO OJ C s "o .> c a 'S " O '^ 00 8 -S u o rt "-5 S eg .2x1 _u CO u c 4-1 H d .2 i > u S c " S «-5 g "> H c n O . ^3 di oj ^ £ o| « o S CO tfjja 2 CO *^ tt H •^ M 3 bo'* ^ Q 3 73 "O S ^ I z c 158 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE There can be little doubt that the foregoing table is a reflex of the popular feeling prevailing in these Colonies, the expenditure upon defence being regulated by popular vote. A remarkable feature revealed in the table is the fact that some of the Colonies most open to attack, in one or two instances surrounded by a possible hostile people, have devoted less attention to their de- fence than some of those who by their geographical position are situated in comparative security. (J)) What self-governing Colonies are independent of Imperial assistance, and what residue in men and material can be spared to the Empire ? Canada and New Zealand alone can be said to offer conditions that will allow of them being considered under this head. Canada spends a thirty-third of her residue upon her defence, her sea-board and position in commerce, and geographical position with regard to the United Kingdom, must needs make that defence more Imperial than Colonial, and it will be readily conceded that this Colony is the first sound link in Imperial defence. As to surplus men and material, at the conference in 1902 it was stated that Canadian Ministers were of opinion " That on the sea-coasts of Canada there is a large number of men admirably qualified to form a Naval Reserve, and it is hoped that at an early day a system may be devised which will lead to the training of these men and to the mak- ing of their services available for defence in time of need". Now it is apparent that the sum total of Canada's ENGLAND— THE NAVY 159 responsibilities would be filled if these men (an unstated quantity) were trained and made available to fill vacancies in the Navy upon the outbreak of or during war, or to man that fleet of blockade runners which should be created ere the necessity for their services arises, this fleet, which might be termed the auxiliary fleet, should be in peace time naval revenue earners and should be an Imperial asset ; if a self-governing Colony can make railways earn revenue to ease the tax-payers, what argument can be used against a State- owned fleet lightening the income-tax ? Canada will be mainly responsible in the first phase of the next war for the feeding of the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom, and as long as we are able to confine the enemy in his own ports, there will be little interference with inter-Imperial commerce, but we may not be able to blockade the enemy entirely, the scheme may fail, as did the War Office scheme of taking the Boer Republics with 20,000 men in six weeks. It is well that we admit the possibility of the proposed blockading line being penetrated in half a dozen places without a battle, and the enemy making for our com- munications, the most vital line of which will be from St. John's to Ireland. Would it then be asking too much from Canada to suggest that she add to her present admitted responsibilities, and guarantee the security of the Newfoundland ports in time of war? New Zealand spends upon defence more than double the proportion of her revenue when compared with Canada, yet her geographical position in the Empire i6o COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE precludes that defence from being as Imperial as that of the latter Colony, her position is secure, her most generous contribution to the Empire defence is her own independence of naval protection. Out of her 150,000 men liable for service, it is supposed that a fair proportion are sea-faring men whose service may be depended upon to fill vacancies caused by casualties on board our war-ships operating in Australian waters. Canada and New Zealand may therefore be looked upon as the two sound links in the chain of Imperial defence ; it is to be presumed that it is such over-sea possessions as these that Captain Mahan refers to in his article, " Why We Must Have a Greater Navy," when he says that such possessions in limited numbers and in well-chosen positions are in themselves a source of naval strength, and enable fewer ships to do the same work which it would take a larger number of ships to do without them. (c) What self-governing Colonies are dependent upon direct Imperial assistance, and by what means may they be m,ade independent of such assistance? The remaining Colonies come more or less under this heading. The Commonwealth of Australia contributes directly to the Royal Navy a sum of ^^200,000 per annum, barely sufficient to pay the interest on cost and upkeep of two battleships ; what return is she going to ask for this in time of war? A squadron of five or six war vessels (in addition to her local coast defence boats supplied by the British Government at one-fourth the ENGLAND— THE NAVY i6i cost price). Australia is therefore dependent upon direct Imperial assistance, and is weakening the fighting line accordingly, possibly these boats would give the very preponderance of weight required to decide some decisive action. Would it not be infinitely more to the point if this annual contribution was capitalised and expended upon : {a) the adequate defence of har- bours ; (b) training ships for the personnel to man the auxiliary fleet or for drafts for the Navy ; (c) dockyards and coaling facilities. There is a strong feeling in favour of a local Navy, but does the population justify it? Can the revenue stand its initial cost and upkeep ? And what would be its functions ? It is argued that an enemy might seek harbours of refuge among the inlets along the coast. This might have been the case in the days of sails, but the harbour of refuge in future wars must be a coaling station, and as such should be adequately fortified. For Australia to take rank with Canada and New Zealand as assisting in the Empire's defence it is necessary that she should make herself quite independ- ent of the Pacific Squadron, train an annual quota of seamen for service in the Navy, and fortify with modern armaments all her ports. When this is accomplished, surplus revenue might be spent on a local Navy (to be a unit of the Royal Navy), in preference to a direct contribution to the latter. Here should the Australian responsibilities in Imperial defence halt for a time. How do the two South African self-governing Colonies meet th^ir Responsibilities? Possessing five II 1 62 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE ports which, assuming the Suez is blocked, are on the direct road to India, covered and flanked by foreign naval bases, with the possibility of internal and border strife fomented by the European enemy, the outbreak of war would see these ports crowded with Imperial shipping seeking protection. Will that protection be given by the Colonial forts or the Royal Navy ? The answer is given in the following extract from the memoranda of these Governments read at the last year's Conference : " Recognising, as we do, the absolute necessity for the maintenance of an efficient Navy if the Empire is to be held together, and regarding the Navy as the first security for the preservation of the people of South Africa, and especially of those residing in the two coast Colonies ''. The italics are mine. The Cape Colony contributes ;£'5o,ooo per annum, and Natal ;^3 5,000 to the Navy; it is for a naval authority to say to what extent this contribution will weaken the Navy. It is indeed reversing the responsi- bility. If these contributions had to be capitalised and spent in defences, docks and coaling arrangements, the Navy would be strengthened by the squadron that may have to be used for the protection of South African ports, all of which are favoured by Nature for defence purposes ; making naval coast defence quite unneces- sary. Port Natal has lately developed into one of the Empire's important coaling stations, and is the only harbour of refuge on the south-east coast. If these two Colonies have not made themselves independent of ENGLAND— THE NAVY 163 the Navy for their defence, then their responsibilities are not being met by their direct naval contributions ; for more, far more, value will be expended in the naval defence of their coasts and shipping ; and the naval energy thus expended has to be drawn from the fleets, that would otherwise be used on the high seas to greater advantage. The ruggedness of the coasts of these Colonies has militated against the rearing of a sea-faring community ; therefore it can never be hoped that an appreciable proportion of South Africans can give personal service to the Navy ; and whilst it is ex- pected that Canada, Australia, and New Zealand may a few years hence possess a few locally owned and manned vessels as component parts of an Imperial Navy, such can hardly be the case with either of the South African Colonies ; yet their responsibilities will not have been fulfilled until they, in addition to im- pregnable port defences mannedby Colonials, docks and coaling arrangements, keep at their own expense, train- ing vessels (useful for coast defence purposes) for train- ing of the sea-faring youths obtainable. It should be a recognised responsibility that casualties in the personnel of the Navy shall be replaced at the first Imperial port, and the larger self-governing Colonies having become independent of the Navy for their protection, at once become a source of great strength. When this is fully recognised by British and Colonial statesmen, the final details of Imperial defence will indeed be an easy solu- tion ; these details should be considered before finally submitting tp Home and Colonial Parliaments by an ^ ■' II* i64 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Imperial Defence Committee, which might contain a member of each Colonial Defence Committee ; such a body of men would naturally do more in the interests of Imperial defence than conferences of Premiers, for at the latter meetings defence is but one of many subjects to be considered. CHAPTER VI. THE EMPIRE— THE ARMY. It was fondly believed by all Imperialists that the vexed problem of the so-called Imperial Army would, with the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War, be satis- factorily solved, that in fact war would have obliterated those divisions between Colonial, British, and Indian troops. Regulars, Volunteers, Militia, and Yeomanry, that are so noticeable during peace. When within the United Kingdom the Army is spoken of, it is rarely prefixed with the embracing term Imperial ; or, if it is, without that full meaning of the term justified by the varied constitution of the Imperial Army serving in the South African War. The Home authorities, of whatever grade, when re- ferring to the Imperial Army, mean that very small portion of it more correctly known as the Regular Army of the United Kingdom, with some it may in- clude the Indian Staff Corps, but the term " Imperial " extends no further. It is just in this wilful misunderstanding of the term " Imperial," not only with reference to our fighting forces, but in other services in our complex system of Empire, that our greatest weakness lies, and with our 165 1 66 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE fighting services the title is arrogated to itself by the smallest branch, and indeed that least entitled to it. With the conclusion of the Boer War there remained the opportunity for an Imperial organiser to have brought into being with a stroke of the pen that which it may now take some time and trouble to create — an Imperial Army. On the appointment of a Royal Commission on the Militia or Volunteers (of the United Kingdom) in 1904, some sanguine Imperialists believed that the Commissioners would have called Colonial evidence, and that the Report would have been drawn with a view to Imperial defence, but these hopes were ill- founded. No breadth of vision characterised the Commission. The gentlemen signing the majority report of that Royal Commission must surely have known that the temper of the people would not have allowed any Government to adopt that report. Conscription is only accepted by a nation in the hour of dire need, the yoke is put on when the nation is grovelling in the dust. The evidence taken, which was called from all parts of the United Kingdom, and comprised no fewer than 24,150 questions and answers, was more than sufficient to convince the unbiassed that conscription was only necessary if the United Kingdom meant to look for her security as much to the Army as to the Navy. The Commissioners did so look, and to them the United Kingdom embraced or was the Empire, and her Army the only one. They saw no Britain beyond the seas, THE EMPIRE— THE ARMY 167 containing small Armies that were but waiting to be federated with those land forces of the United King- dom with whom they had fought side by side, often brigaded together. On service one set of troops had done as well as the others, had shown as good spirit, there had been no difference between these sons of one Empire, except that the " outsider " was non- eligible for the higher offices, owing to want of official status, which the member of the " Imperial " Army could alone obtain. Had the Royal Commissioners treated the subject as an Imperial one, their conclusions would have been arrived at with greater ease, many points would have come before them which they might have regarded with favour, their report might have been more lucid, and undoubtedly would have contained an agreeable alternative to conscription, an alternative acceptable to the British public. It is still a sore point with Colonials that prior to the outbreak of the South African War the Intelligence Department at home should have so grossly under- estimated the number of Colonials available for service abroad ; but even now, in the face of the fact that one- eighth of the Imperial troops employed were Colonials, how few service men in high places are aware that these contingents were but slight indications of the dormant Colonial strength. That strength may in the past have been despised, because of its being unskilled in warfare as it was then known, the standard of which had been fixed by the Franco-Prussian War ; but there 1 68 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE are fashions in war as in other things, and the change in war's fashions takes place almost imperceptibly. A nation content to keep to a fashion thirty years old will be forcibly ruled out of date by one with a fashion of a later pattern, but, alas ! the Conservative in politics is easy of conversion when compared with the regular officer, and the latter will to-day, in face of undeniable facts brought to light by the Anglo-Boer War, contend with pen and tongue that a man must yet have years of training to make a perfect fighting machine. The scientist, the inventor, the schoolmaster, can, in his opinion, afford no compensation for lack of long periods of barrack-square drill. Open-air life on veldt or ranch, rifle shooting for a livelihood, or for recreation in place of cricket, football, or tennis, will never in his mind be a substitute for a fortnight or a year on Salis- bury Plain or in the Long Valley. The problem of earning one's living in competition with one's fellows is, in the opinion of the regular soldier, but a sorry training for the officer; and there are those who would yet contend that self-resource is a danger in the junior ranks. For the reasons cited above recruiting grounds for an Imperial Army which in the Colonies are available are to be left untouched. It seems to be feared by some that the somewhat free and easy manner of Colonials might lower the standard of dis- cipline of the service, as that standard is known in the United Kingdom. When the British tax-payer learns that, by the pro- posed Defence Act to be introduced next year (1909) THE EMPIRE— THE ARMY 169 by the Federal Parliament of Australia, 974,000 men are liable for defence purposes, that Canada can, under its existing Act, place over 1,000,000 men in the field should the necessity for self-defence arise, and that the other Colonies of the British Empire likewise have Acts by which their manhood can be compelled to defend their several parts of Empire, what an unfair anomaly it must appear to him that he has to keep an Army costing as much as the Navy upon which his very existence depends. In view of the ever-increasing needs of the Navy in men and money, it requires little foresight to see that if an Army is to be provided for Imperial needs by the United Kingdom upon anything like the pre- sent scale, the limit to both Navy and Army is not far off. It means that the former, the very life of the Empire, is being starved for what is of very second- ary importance, and for what could and should be provided by the Colonies. It must be a matter of deep regret that at the Con- ference of Colonial Prime Ministers in London, held on the coronation of His Majesty, no satisfactory solu- tion of the problem of Imperial defence was arrived at. The memorandum from the War Office, whilst giving some valuable information, was hardly as explicit as it might have been ; it did not contain that tone of re- liance on Colonial resources warranted by facts brought to light in recent years. The minutes rendered by the Intelligence Department gave but an approximate reflex of Colonial capabilities ; such a return of Colonial i^o COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE units available for service abroad might have held good thirty years ago. It would naturally have been thought than an Army reform scheme would have been suggested, showing that the Home Government relied materially upon the Colonies for aid ; the broad principles of such a scheme might, with advantage, have been discussed at such an important Conference ; yet all that was done in this direction was the laying on the table of a statement which said to the Colonial Premiers : " This is as much as you can do among you and no more". Admitting that the information was obtained from the Colonies themselves, a great deal depends in what spirit that information was asked, for what end and by what con- ditions framed. The Admiralty memorandum and the First Lord's statement resulted in the Colonies rising to the occasion, and from the attitude assumed by more than one Colonial Premier at the opening of the Con- ference there is reason to believe that a like spirit would have prevailed in discussing an Army reform scheme had such been brought forward. As to contribu- tions, I have in a previous chapter indicated that it is unwise to divide Colonial contributions towards Imperial defence between the Navy and the Army ; better results would be obtained if these contribu- tions were to one branch only, and that the Army. Whatever the contribution is it must be made whole- heartedly and from calculation rather than sentiment, from a sense of duty, not as an act of grace, as fulfilling Colonial obligations in Imperial defence and THE EMPIRE— THE ARMY 171 relieving the British tax-payer of part of his heavy burden. If the conditions of warfare that existed thirty-five years ago were the same to-day, the consummation of the idea of the Empire finding the Army, and the United Kingdom the Navy, would have been impossible, but science and the inventor have made the training of the soldier less lengthy and arduous ; initiative and resource play an important part towards success in the fighting of to-day. Acknowledging then that the Colonies should bear part of the burden of the defence of the Empire of which they are an integral part, it may be asked. What should be the first step towards placing the theory into practice? The question is answered in one word — Responsibility. The larger Colonies have responsible government, but it does not mean responsibility for own defence in all cases. In these Colonies from which British troops have been withdrawn, the question of defence is playing an important part in their politics. Where, however, troops are still stationed, the question of local defence is one that is rarely discussed ; and the reason for this is that a feeling of irresponsibility pre- vails, greater attention is paid to the satisfying of selfish aims, the Army is looked upon from purely a commercial point of view, so much money is brought into the Colony by the soldier, and he is valued accordingly. It is not likely, then, that where such motives exist a Colony will deprive itself voluntarily of a valuable customer by creating a local defence force, and in no 172 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE single instance has a Colonial defence force worthy of the name been brought into existence until after the withdrawal of the regular troops. It is a strange fact, that the presence of troops in the Colonies never has any effect in arousing military ardour in the Colonial youth. Immediately regular troops are withdrawn from a Colony, however, a sense of responsibility is diffused throughout the land, and local forces are at once brought into existence. It is for these reasons that one must deprecate the agitation now so rife in certain circles for the quartering of an army corps in South Africa ; those in its favour can have but lightly con- sidered the broader principles of Imperial defence. That an army corps of the Imperial Army should be per- manently quartered in South Africa, one readily admits is necessary. Such would be of greater value in the issue aimed at if made up of South Africans found by the South African States ; the army corps thus saved in men and money to the United Kingdom would be but an additional contribution to the Navy. The nucleus of this much-discussed army corps has already been started by one of the South African Colonies introduc- ing into its House of Assembly a Militia Bill making every able-bodied man, with certain exemptions, liable for military service ; a proportion of these men will be trained. The Bill also provides for an Imperial Reserve for service abroad. These men will be paid by the Colonial Government. The main object in introducing this Bill was to be prepared for the expected with- drawal of troops from South Africa ; the Bill had hardly THE EMPIRE— THE ARMY 173 been presented to the House by those responsible for its drafting, before the news arrived of the agitation proceeding in England for the quartering in South Africa of an army corps. The opponents to the Militia Bill immediately gained strength, and a very strong argument was then brought forward against the neces- sity for such a Defence Act. If the Bill is passed into law, no doubt the other South African Colonies will follow the example thus set, with the result that 60,000 trained men will be at hand, and just twice that number of partially trained men will be liable for service. As has already been shown, the stumbling-block in the past to a truly Imperial Army was the undue im- portance placed upon long-continued training, that stumbling-block was rather rudely thrust aside by the untrained Boer farmer at Magersfontein, Colenso, Spion Kop, Vaal Krantz, Stormberg, and quite a number of smaller engagements where numbers and training were no match for common-sense and initiative ; these rude reverses, quite contrary to text-books, brought back to the unbiassed military student incidents in previous wars, where success lay with that side untrammelled with fixed ideas of principle and detail, and therefore able to grasp more rapidly the peculiar requirements of the situation. It is to be hoped that a standard of training will be fixed ; that it will keep automatic pace with the times, and that it will be such as to enable partially paid forces to become an integral part of the Imperial Army. When this is done, and a notice ap- pears in the London Gazette, stating that in future the 174 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Imperial Army shall include all the auxiliary forces of His Majesty's dominions, the following Colonials for service abroad in time of war should be available : — Population. Militia. Imperial Militia for service abroad. Canada Australia . New Zealand Cape Colony ' Transvaal ' . O. R. Colony Natal > 5.371.315 4,119,481 936,309 579,741 289,952 142,679 97,000 1,074,263 823,896 187,261 115.990 57.990 28,535 19,400 53.713 41,194 9.363 5.797 2,599 1,426 970 11.536.477 2,307,293 115.362 This of course does not include any of the coloured population of the Empire ; it will be seen from the minute of the Intelligence Department already referred to, that native races are not to be considered seriously in the organisation of Colonial troops for Imperial service. Can the Empire afford such magnanimity? Will reciprocity in this respect be shown by the Power or Powers we have to fight in the future? If any Power approves of our self-denial it will be because of the old advantage of fighting against one who has voluntarily tied up one of his arms. To be the de- cisive fighting machine the size of the Empire demands, the Army must include every available man, irrespective of race, creed, or colour ; and we can only afford to be magnanimous when our prestige will suffer by being otherwise, as might have been the case in the late war. 1 Approximate white population. THE EMPIRE— THE ARMY 175 Native races, the subjects of His Majesty, must then be considered in the organisation of our Army. The South African Colonies should between them ear-mark from among the tribes within their borders a force of 30,000 men. TMs, then, brings the strength of the Colonial forces available for Imperial service up to 122,000 and should release a like number of men from the present Regular Army for service on the Reserve, or with the Militia, in which their services would not be lost, and by restricting recruiting for the Army would allow the Navy to get good men with ease. The tangible reduction in the Army vote by this transfer of obligations should appear as the Colonial contribution to the Navy. It has already been stated that some attempt by at least some of the self-governing Colonies to form their unit of an Imperial Army has been made. What then is wanted to bring the Colonial section of the Imperial Army into being is, firstly, a clear understanding as to the principles involved by its creation, and, secondly, the principles and details of its working and its rela- tionship to the Regular Army. In the first place it must be shown that there is a distinct advantage to both the mother country and the Colonies ; to the mother country it lessens the burden of expense, it lessens the drain of her manhood and increases the re- cruiting ground for her Navy, it permanently stations within striking distance of any of her probable enemies, mobile forces, and it permanently garrisons her Colonies. The advantages to the Colonies are a complete sense 176 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE of security in the knowledge that by their action the Navy is materially strengthened in men and money ; a sense of responsibility will prevail throughout the Colonial population ; a truer knowledge and apprecia- tion of international politics will come about, and that ignorant and erroneous idea that the mother country's quarrels do not necessarily concern the Colonies will disappear. The main principle involved then is, " should the United Kingdom become embroiled the Colonies stand or fall with the mother country " ; in any case this has to be so, for it is not expected that in the event of the command of the sea being wrested from us, any single Colony or group of Colonies stand- ing apart, even though she or they hoisted a Republican flag, would escape the just fate of annexation by the conquering Power. The principle involved is one then that in reality already exists. The creation, principles, and working of this Imperial Reserve should, at as early a date as possible, be taken in hand by the Colonial Defence Committees or Councils of Defence ; where the former still exist they should _ be converted into the latter. Self-governing Colonies have questions of importance in defence matters that can hardly be satisfactorily dealt with by a committee ; delegates from the Council of Defence of each Colony, with powers to act, should meet in conference with the Central Defence Committee in London. This Conference should bring about the creation of a Coun- cil of Imperial Defence, to take the place of the present mis-named Imperial Defence Committee which was THE EMPIRE— THE ARMY 177 lately established ; it is questionable whether any of the gentlemen sitting on that Committee have any personal acquaintance with the Colonies ; it would be just as reasonable to expect the Horse Guards to be controlled by a committee of Uganda gentlemen who had never left that country, as to expect those officials constituting the present Central Defence Committee to efficiently grasp the varied requirements of the Colonies' defences. With the institution of an Imperial Council of De- fence consisting of men selected for their intimate knowledge of Imperial defensive requirements, and not by reason of any official position they may hold or influence they may possess, a new era will, un- doubtedly, begin in the relationship of the Colonies to the United Kingdom. Annual or bi-annual con- ferences of delegates from the Colonial Councils of Defence will draw nearer the bonds already existing between the Colonies and the mother country ; an in- timate acquaintance with each other's needs, each other's resources, and each other's plans will result, which, when the trying time of war comes, will give increased confidence to the units of the Empire. 12 CHAPTER VII. COLONIAL DEFENCES. For a full appreciation of the defensive value and ef- ficiency of the Colonial possessions, it will be necessary for the Empire to be at war with one or more naval Powers. A century has now elapsed since she faced a first class Power on the seas, and then the Colonies, owing to their infancy, were a responsibility that added to the obligations of the Navy, though even then the East and West Indies were some indication of the value of oversea possessions to a naval Power. As relays in the shape of coaling stations, as harbours of refuge for mercantile shipping, as re-fitting stations for disabled ships of war, oversea possessions were in those days unthought of, their value was solely judged by their exports ; but their importance in the defen- sive sense is only brought home to us if we carefully examine the meaning of Captain Mahan's words when he tells us " that such possessions, by providing Naval bases, enable any given work to be done by fewer ships ". Had this been more fully understood in the past, no doubt more strenuous efforts would have been made on the part of the enemy of the day for their possession for future use. In the days when wind 178 COLONIAL DEFENCES 179 was the propelling power for ships, no one could fore- tell the importance oversea possessions would play in the age of coal and steam. Unconsciously perhaps our steady acquisition of territory, following as it has done the Englishman's natural element — the ocean — has unfolded to the astonished and envious eyes of our rivals and also to ourselves, a strategic plan, the full power and possi- bilities of which will be fully revealed to the enemy and ourselves alike in the next naval war. A century of naval peace has not been idly spent by us ; the pre- paration for war has been unintentionally carried out by those from whom it is least expected ; the peaceful mariner intent on commerce carrying, and the opening of new markets ; the missionary bent on converts, the trader, and lastly the immigrant. When too late, our rivals see that all available territory for the creation of that necessity in modern naval war, coaling ports and harbours of refuge, has long been acquired by the British Empire. By more rapid means of transport than existed in the period of sails, and by electrical communication, distance has been killed, so that the world of to-day is considerably reduced in size compared with the time of Nelson. With the advent of wireless telegraphy, those numerous possessions dotted over the face of the globe will be linked together, and the dispositions and move- ments of the enemy in any part of the world will be instantly known to each and all of these possessions 12* i8o COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE of the British Crown. A long peace has enabled England to outflank in all parts of the world her prob- able foes ; hardly a seashore that does not contain a fortified port hostile to our foes ; not a seaboard without its harbour of refuge, with a reserve of men, ammuni- tion, and that essential of naval warfare, coal, for our Navy ; and this at little, and in the case of some self- governing Colonies, no expense to the British tax-payer. To what extent all these untold advantages will add to the power of the Navy it but wants a maritime war to prove. Some idea of the value of this absolute command of coaling stations was illustrated in the Russo-Japanese War by the difficulty experienced in moving the Baltic Fleet to Eastern waters, although the intervening ports were neutral. Japan would have had the same difficulty if she had desired to move a fleet into her enemy's European waters. That the points selected as points-d^ appui have been fortunately selected, is apparent by a glance at the map of the world, and that few, if any, were the out- come of foresight, is shortly to be proved by our posi- tion in the Caribbean Sea on the completion of the Panama Canal ; for then this American Sea attains to the same importance as the Mediterranean, and as we hold the entrance to an outlet from the latter with Gibraltar, so will we command the Caribbean Sea with Jamaica, Barbadoes, the Bahamas, and Trinidad ; but when these islands were occupied, was it ever thought that America would be divided by a waterway destined to be a main trade route for the world ? Had England COLONIAL DEFENCES i8i but dreamt of such an engineering feat, she un- doubtedly would have taken Hayti, Guadaloupe, and Cuba at the time she had an excuse and was able to do so ; these possessions would have completed her command of the promised American Mediterranean. Once again were we found napping, and that was when we allowed France to possess herself of Mada- gascar ; yet by right of a naval victory on her coasts that island belonged to us. This island, the third largest in the world, with its fine harbours, practically masks our east and south coasts of Africa ; it threatens the Cape of Good Hope, Aden, Mauritius, the Sey- chelles, and Ceylon, and may act as a stimulating re- serve to New Caledonia in a threat upon Australia. These contingencies can only arise if France elects to make some use of the natural advantages the island contains. Energy and money are now being expended in the fortifications of Diego Suarez, a natural harbour situated on the extreme north of the island, 1,650 miles from Aden and 1,600 miles from Port Natal. No doubt with the re-organisation of the French Navy, the supreme importance of Diego Suarez will be fully recognised. The naval force now stationed there is anything but a threat on even our commerce, consisting as it does of one obsolete cruiser of the Secelie class and two paddle gunboats. There is every indication of coal on the island — lignite having been found. Should coal be discovered and the fields developed, the importance of this pos- session would be greatly accentuated, i82 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE The most effective neutralisation of the threat that a naval base at Madagascar would hold over our African ports, would naturally be adequate land defences. The British ports that would come within the sphere of naval attack from Madagascar are Port Natal, East London, Port Elizabeth, and Capetown on the south-east and south coast of Africa ; Mauritius and the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean. Of these but three are fortified, Port Natal, Capetown, and Mauritius ; the geographical position of Seychelles calls for fortification. An abor- tive attempt at bombardment of these ports on the part of the enemy would keep a portion of his fleet engaged to the advantage of our Navy. The incentive would be the anxiety to destroy some of our many points-d' appui and to obtain local command of the coast-line, the success of which would tend towards the balance of seaports ; for the loss to us of a coaling port is equivalent to the loss of warships ; and the loss of prestige is greater if that port belongs to a self- governing Colony. The ravages of a hostile fleet operating from Madagascar would be less restrained if the Suez Canal be closed, the enemy's area of opera- tions would in that case be extended and in all proba- bility part of his fleet would command the Indian Ocean and a portion of the Pacific until a decisive naval battle had been fought in the Mediterranean or Atlantic. During the period that would elapse the enemy's plans would call for determined attacks upon our ports crowded with our mercantile marine; coal at the water's edge in readiness for our naval squadrons. COLONIAL DEFENCES 183 docks for the repair of disabled ships of the squadron, and electrical means of communication. Had we unfortunately become embroiled in a naval war of any importance concurrently with our South African Campaign, and undoubtedly such would have been the case had Germany's naval programme been complete — the naval enemy would have found some of our South African ports — if not entirely undefended — so weak in their defences that little trouble would have been experienced in their capture. With the request, however, made by the First Lord of the Admiralty at the Conference of Colonial Premiers in 1902, for the Colonies to increase their direct contribution to the Navy, the subject of Imperial defence was more closely examined by the Colonists themselves, and the ques- tion was at once asked, "Does a direct contribution guarantee naval protection of the ports and shores of the contributing Colony ? " When this question was most reasonably answered in the negative, some inquiry re- sulted in most of the Colonies as to the effectiveness of the existing coast and harbour defences. In many cases the inquiry was followed by reorganisation and increased armaments — Natal, for instance, at once voted an additional ;^40,ooo for the defence of Durban. Canada has but recently taken upon herself the defence of Esquimault, thus relieving the British tax-payer of the cost of 350 men; the importance of this naval station is realised when it is remembered that it pro- tects the coal-fields of Vancouver Island and commands the western terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway. 1 84 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE The responsibility of holding this important point is therefore not light if seriously undertaken. ItbutremainsfortheDominiontoundertakealikeduty at Halifax;! the relief to the British tax-payer would be the cost of 1,784 men. But such a responsibility must not be entered upon lightly, or half-heartedly — the defence of either of these coaling stations, is just as vital to Eng- land, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa, as it is to Canada ; and the inhabitants of those far-removed parts of Empire have as much right to demand that these defences are adequate as the Canadians have of insist- ing upon the proper defence of England and the sister Colonies. Imperial defence is the one problem which cannot allow of Colonial exclusiveness — inter-Colonial jealousies cannot be tolerated if defence is to be tangible — political indifference or ignorance of the subject on the part of Colonial politicians must be stimulated or eradicated, as the case may be, by Colonial con- stituencies. Geographically, then, Canada is responsible for the defence of Esquimault, Halifax, and St. John's ; it may be that, as the bonds of Imperial defence are tightened up, she may go farther afield, assume a greater re- sponsibility still, and garrison Bermuda ; her excuse for this would be sound, inasmuch as Bermuda com- mands the foreign naval port of Boston, which threatens her shores. Australia has no less than ten defended ports — those on the east coast are threatened from New Caledonia 1 TJiis has sinpe beep done, COLONIAL DEFENCES 185 or New Guinea ; Thursday Island directly so, by the latter place, while supports to these threats would be available from Madagascar or Bourbon. The armament and up-keep of these ten defended ports are undertaken by the Australian Commonwealth with its population of 4,000,000. The importance and efficiency of these defences have of course been brought home to every inhabitant of the Island Continent by the Russo-Japanese War. The rapid rise of Japan as a naval Power ; her prox- imity to Australia and the biter's restriction against Asiatic immigration, though Japan be an ally of Great Britain, must, however, call for increased vigilance on the part of the Australians. Are any of these defended ports in a position of covering under their guns the refitting of one or more disabled cruisers of, say, the Pacific Squadron ? The mere defence from destruction of the towns, or the prevention of hostile landing makes them of little real value in Imperial defence ; they must be in a position to undertake those responsibilities they expect from Halifax, Durban, and Simon's Town. At first sight of New Zealand on the map, it would appear as though she was the embodiment of supreme isolation ; sheltered by distance from the effects of the world's changing politics ; troubled little by quarrel- some neighbours ; her lot would seem the envy of peace-loving communities. Yet we find that her four ports of importance are defended, and wisely so ; the rapid annihilation of distance and time by the science of the age, have unfortunately for those islands brought 1 86 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE them well within the area of the probable strife ; on the other hand their remoteness in the Pacific makes them of value to our Navy ; the foreign port nearest to New Zealand is in New Caledonia, and may be con- sidered a threat on Auckland ; as a counter-threat to this French naval base some arrangement between New Zealand and Australia should be arrived at for the defence of Norfolk Island ; such a step would add to the security of mercantile shipping in that quarter of the Pacific during a naval war ; Norfolk Island, if properly defended, would be of as great importance to Australia as to New Zealand. Its importance to the Navy would be considerable, and by closing to the enemy a likely refitting station, Imperial defence is strengthened. In the interests then of the Empire, these two Pacific Colonies should share the expense of defending that strategically important island. Round the coast of Africa the map also shows a chain of red spots denoting Imperial defences ; yet two only are of Colonial up-keep ; those of Capetown and Natal. Simon's Town is defended at Imperial expense. The negro Colony of Sierra Leone, which must ever remain a Crown Colony, cannot, in the meantime at least, be given any responsibility in Imperial defence. Its importance as a second-class naval station is accen- tuated by the proximity of the French naval base of Dakar, the most important foreign Colonial naval base in the Atlantic, seeing that it threatens the East Indies, British Guinea, and our South African Colonies ; and COLONIAL DEFENCES 187 is almost centrally situated as far as Halifax and the Cape are concerned. Two undefended British pos- sessions in the Atlantic, which might prove of great strategic value, are those of Tristan da Cunha — lying midway between South Africa and South America — and Walfisch Bay ; on the south-west coast of Africa this latter place could well be defended by the Cape, and supplied with coal from that Colony this roadstead might be made of as much importance to the Empire as Dakar is to France. To the landsman who looks closely into the axiom that " Oversea possessions are a source of strength to a naval Power by enabling a given amount of work to be done by fewer ships," and historical research fully confirms this, it appears strange indeed to find how many seemingly important possessions are neglected in this respect by us, and Tristan d'Acunha is one of these. The coalfields of the Cape are within i ,800 miles of these three islands, and means of relieving the garri- son are near at hand. If it was considered necessary to garrison these islands at the beginning of last cen- tury, when the need for coal as an implement of war was not felt, surely the reasons for their fortification to-day are intensified. One can readily conceive cir- cumstances arising in a naval war when their retention by land defence might be equivalent to a proportion of naval Power. It is but reasonable to suppose that in her next naval war, England's enemies will pursue a guerre de course. Her present situation of reliance on over- 1 88 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE sea trade for sustenance suggests this. The more numerous our oversea defended ports are the more safe must be our mercantile marine. However im- minent an outbreak of war appears, our merchantmen will sail, and the farther apart our harbours of refuge are, greater must be the chances of their capture. With a view to minimise the risk it is probable that our unarmed shipping will break away from the great trade routes. It is then that the value of our numerous possessions would be felt, assuming these were forti- fied. Wireless telegraphy could notify to the calling merchantmen the whereabouts of an enemy's cruiser, and thus from fortified port to fortified port would our mercantile marine pass with the minimum amount of risk, and without weakening our Navy for convoy duty. It is perhaps due to our very wealth in oversea possessions that we fail to fully appreciate their great worth in naval warfare. That the foreigner does not agree with us in this respect, is evidenced by the energy with which he fortifies what over-sea posses- sions he was fortunate enough to have left him by us as worthless, or which we have exchanged with him for something more in keeping with our commercial instincts. We find that our merchant shipping is greater than that of the next three maritime nations combined ; naval authorities contend that this fact is a strong argu- ment in favour of strengthening our Navy. Every assistance must be given by the Colonies at all reason- able sacrifice, to make that Navy, which is to hold the COLONIAL DEFENCES 189 Empire together, supreme ; this they can best -do by fortifying their ports, and possessions still held as Crown Colonies should be similarly treated, thus re- lieving the Navy of a two-fold responsibility, the safety of the possession itself and the safety of the mercantile marine which may be in the neighbouring waters. Such a policy will enable the Navy to carry out unham- pered that vigorous defence which all Englishmen so confidently expect, the only defensive policy in fact the Empire can adopt if she elects to remain intact. The fact that there would thus be fortified coaling stations under our flag wherever the enemy could be found, would have inestimable value, while the realis- ation by the enemy that if disabled they could not reach their naval bases would be demoralising. Economy, that watchword of all Oppositions aspiring to office, must commend the policy of fortifying avail- able British possessions, because the self-governing Colonies, if encouraged, will, for numerous reasons allied to those of defence, undertake at their own cost the fortification of naval ports within their sphere of influence. It has been argued by some writers on this subject that the influences of fortified ports does not extend beyond the range of the guns of the forts ; that " strategic port " is but a theoretical term where naval war is concerned. Now, at no period of maritime war can this be said to have held good ; to-day there is less strength in the argument than in the past — the evolution that has taken place in weapons may have I go COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE altered the application of principles underlying tactics, and in a somewhat less degree the application of prin- ciples upon which strategy is founded, but the princi- ples themselves remain the same, and will ever be so until the end of time. The moral influence of a forti- fied port must extend far beyond the range of gun-fire, and this moral influence must affect the strategy of friend and foe. The value of Jamaica, Barbadoes, Tobago, Trinidad, and Antigua to Nelson, during the period that Villeneuve attempted to gain command of the sea, is historical proof of the importance of fortified ports. The fortification of the Seychelles, to the north of Madagascar and situated midway between the French naval stations of Diego Saurez and Obok would exercise considerable influence on both of these bases ; it would enable an inferior British naval force to watch the movements of a greatly superior force of the enemy, in the vicinity of either of these ports — while if a favourable opportunity occurred, attacks on an inferior force of the enemy could be made. Port Louis (Mauritius), would likewise act as a menace on Mada- gascar, so that geographically that island is outflanked by the British possessions ; yet up to the present little advantage has been taken of these strategic positions. In India we have eight ports in which our shipping in those waters can seek protection — while there is but one port (Saigon), from which commerce destroyers can operate. With the command of the sea uncertain, COLONIAL DEFENCES 191 and the Suez Canal closed, our Indian merchantmen would make their way to England by a series of rapid flights between our defended ports. Thus Colombo would be the point of departure for Mauritius, with the fear when off" the latter place of falling in with an enemy's cruiser from Diego Saurez — from Port Louis, Durban could be made ; thence in comparative safety via East London ; Port Elizabeth to Capetown, then Walfisch Bay to St. Helena, Ascension, and Sierra Leone ; when this port is reached the merchantmen should have arrived well within waters commanded by the British fleet, for, with Dakar and the European ports blockaded, the run to the British Isles will be open. The scene of operations of commerce de- stroyers will likely be in the waters deserted by our own warships, whose attention for the most part must be directed towards the enemy's home ports, and to the European waters, which will be the scene of decisive actions. With the completion of the Panama Canal within sight, there arises the question of fortifying some of the Pacific Islands, notably Fanning Island, lying as it does midway between Australia and Central America ; for whilst the Atlantic coast of South and Central America contains five fortified British ports, the Pacific coasts have none; and our Pacific shipping would be likely to suffer from the ravages of commerce de- stroyers. Under existing conditions Australian and New Zealand shipping would take their departure from Perth, as being the last defended port in that quarter, 192 COLONIAL AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE and make for Mauritius, and then follow the route to the Cape. And what about the cost ? As one who had some- thing to do in the preparation of the estimates for the defence of one of our harbours, the writer presumes to speak with a little authority upon the question of expense in connection with the fortification of these various undefended posts, some of which lend them- selves admirably to the skill of the engineer and the garrison gunner. Tristan d'Acunha, for instance, would give greater defensive power for a less expen- diture than would Walfisch Bay or some other places, but at an average expenditure of about ;£'76,ooo per fortified post, practical immunity from the ravages of a guerre de course would be obtained. The question of the personnel is a matter that re- quires a little attention. In 1902, a sub-committee of experts reported to the Natal Defence Commission on the subject of the Port Defences of Natal, and in the course of these recommendations drew attention to the untapped recruiting field of Zululand. The sub-com- mittee suggested that the personnel for the coast de- fences should be mainly made up of this fine fighting material ; and pointed out, to allay the fears of the hyper-nervous, that in training these natives to the use of big guns, they were being trained in the use of weapons they could at no future date use against our- selves. The negro has proved himself a most excellent gunner ; the Haussas in this respect are hard to excel. In the case of the Zulu it would perhaps be unwise to COLONIAL DEFENCES 193 teach him the use of small arms; although, in 1888, the Zulu regiments led by Colonial officers fought well against their own people ; they were then armed with the Martini-Henry carbine ; and in the revolt many loyal natives fought excellently against their own colour. There, however, remains the fear, not ground- less, that to teach and encourage the use of the rifle by the native races may result in trouble if not disaster. In making use of their martial instincts for garrison artillery purposes, however, there would be no fear of this training being to our detriment at any period after their term of enlistment had expired. The defended ports along the South African coasts, Seychelles, and even Tristan d'Acunha might economic- ally be garrisoned by natives of Africa, officered by Europeans — numbers of these natives can be obtained for military service at rates of pay ranging from 6d. to \s. per diem ; their rations costing Sd.per diem. It must not be inferred that because this form of personnel is economical, it is of an inferior quality — far from it. I repeat that for gunnery work the native of Africa can be made an ideal soldier. n CHAPTER VIII. THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IN IMPERIAL DEFENCE. Whilst a purely autocratic government may be able to give the highest form of efficiency to an Army, it does not necessarily follow that all forms of Democracy carry inefficiency into the defence forces of countries, for evidence to the contrary has been given. The Armies of most Republican governments, however, suffer dur- ing peace from political interference in matters of detail, which must insidiously undermine the effectiveness of the machine and seriously militate against the pre- paredness for war. For a period of 2,400 years we are fairly well able to compare the constitution, organisa- tion, discipline, training, fighting quality, and results in war of the armies of various forms of government from the Republican States of Greece and Carthage; the Empires of Alexander, Persia, and Rome ; the kingdoms of Sweden, England, France, and Spain in their auto- cratic age ; down to the present century, when we have the Empire of Great Britain ruled by a limited mon- archy, the Empire of Russia still governed by absolut- ism, France, the United States of America and several American Republics with constitutions the very essence of ultra-republicanism. By a. careful review of the 194 POLITICAL ELEMENT IN DEFENCE 195 military achievements of those numerous nations which have passed away, having merged into the conquering nation or remaining independent in name only, we find such achievements have been more substantial under that form of government which was removed from democracy. We find, too, that decay, where such has occurred, was the result of military disaster presaged by some political movement which directly affected the military organisation, and that the greatest successes in military and naval campaigns were gained by those Powers whose fighting organisations have been least trammelled by the politician. The principle is as in- variable as any one in strategy, it is in fact the basis upon which strategy is founded. When Alexander, Xerxes, Caesar, or Napoleon marched to war they took with them all the power that was to govern the campaign they themselves thought fit to wage. The resources of the country they governed were, by their individual will, behind the Army they commanded ; the result of a defeat or a victory was more accurately estimated by them than by any of their subjects ; the laws of the nation con- formed for the time being to the military exigency of the moment. In a lesser degree the same order of things reigned with our monarchs down to the pass- ing of the Bill of Rights in 1689, and wherever our Armies and Navies fought under such conditions they met with unvaried success. It is not, however, in later years only that defeat is directly attributable to the trespassing of the politician into paths he does not 13 * 196 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE know, for we need but point to the overthrow of the Barcha brothers in the Second Punic War, and the con- sequent decline and extinction of Carthage, to show the danger attendant upon political interference in all things connected with war when once the last resort of nations is appealed to. In this war the sovereignty of the world was at stake, and its loss to Carthage was solely due because the senators at home withdrew the country's support from their general in the very hour of his need ; they, 600 miles away from the scene of the war, with but tardy means of communi- cation, presumed to know the exigencies of the hour better than Hannibal. Even when the latter sent his brother Mago from the front to Carthage for the purpose of interviewing the Senate with the object of obtaining simply the pay of the soldiery, which was then much overdue ; when, too, he brought proof of Hannibal's successes, his proximity to Rome ; the in- terests of person and party in the Senate rose superior to those of country, and we find it recorded that at the meeting of the Senate, convened to hear Mago deliver his brother Hannibal's urgent request for assistance in men and money to complete successfully the war, necessary for the succour of his country, the leader of the opposition in the Senate, Hanno, said : " I still repent (of this war), and shall do so until I see peace made again ". When peace was made through Hanno and his party's neglect, it was upon Rome's own terms, which but presaged the downfall and utter annihilation of Carthage, a power that had had the opportunity of POLITICAL ELEMENT IN DEFENCE 197 being mistress of the world, and solely failed because of the political immorality of one or two senators. The Romans looked matters in the face and acted wisely. Defeat after defeat having been experienced, a success- ful Army commanded by a general of rare genius being at their very walls, the citizens of the Republic took that course which could alone have promised success. Unlimited power was placed in the hands of the two most able men the Romans possessed — political inter- ference in the personnel or movement of the Army, in the fear of defeat, was for once overcome. Sir Walter Raleigh tells us that " The people of Rome were now quite otherwise affected than they had been when L. Aemilius Paulus and G. Terentius Varro were sent against Hannibal. They did no longer take upon themselves to direct their generals, or bid them despatch and win the victory betimes ; but rather they stood in fear, lest all diligence, wisdom, and valour should prove too little." The Senate re- commended the people to elect as one of their consuls Caius Claudius Nero ; he had served during the pre- ceding years of the war, both against Hannibal in Italy and against the younger Barcha, Hasdrubal, in Spain ; but no mention is made in the histories we possess of any particular success or political power or influence enjoyed by him before or after his campaign of the Metaurus. The election of the second consul shows how communities in time of war forget the in- juries they themselves have done to those who may aid them ; Marcus Livius, a taciturn sullen old man, 198 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE had been consul the year before the war, and had then gained a victory over the Illyrians ; after his consulship, his political opponents had impeached him before the people on a charge of peculation and unfair division of the loot ; the verdict of guilty had been obtained by the officers of the law by bribery, and the sense of the wrong and of the indignity rankled unceasingly in the breast of Livius ; for eight years he had taken no part in his countrj/s affairs. Remembering his past victory in war and forgetting in the hour of danger their own gross injustice, the senators resolved upon nominating Livius ; he, how- ever, opposed this, he taunted them with their incon- sistency in employing the services of a man they had from malice, envy, and hatred convicted of a base crime. "If I am innocent," said he, "why did you place such a stain on me? If I am guilty, why am I more fit for further employment than I was for the first?" The senators persuaded him to accept the post of danger, quoting the example of the great Camillus, who, after an unjust condemnation on a similar charge, both served and saved his country. We know the result. Rome as a last resort placed absolute power in the hands of the consuls Nero and Livius. The resources of the nation were behind them, the Senate for the time was powerless to interfere with their actions. It was recognised by the great Republic that if the nation was to be saved, absolute obedience to the will of the two consuls must be ob- served. Upon the other hand, the greater commander. POLITICAL ELEMENT IN DEFENCE 199 Hannibal, the general of a richer country, was paralysed in the very hour of victory by the intrigues of poli- ticians at home. Success in war calls for more than the obedience to a single will during the period of actual action. It is no idle boast of the Germans, when they declare that the Franco-Prussian Campaign was fought years before in their bureaus, and this, too, by two men. It was the ability and energy, untrammelled by politicians, of Schornhorst that built up the fabric that successfully allowed of the war. We have the parallel cases of great Republics, separ- ated in time by over 2,000 years, sinking their demo- cratic principles in the time of danger. With the out- break of the Civil War in America the Northern States found their Army seriously unprepared. McClellan found himself in command of an Army absolutely powerless to move for want of organisation ; a Demo- cratic Administration had allowed democratic ten- dencies to permeate those forces upon which the Re- public had to rely for its security ; legislators had grown accustomed to consider the defence forces of their country as but one of the many shuttle-cocks in the game of politics. No more despotic leaders can be found than the leaders of democracy. The elevation of their positions invariably deceives them into credit- ing vain ideas of their ability in all paths of life. McClellan found himself in command in name only, even his plan of campaign was dictated to him by the Administration, consisting of lawyers, bankers, farmers. 200 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE or corn merchants. As an instance of the despotism displayed by President Lincoln and his Cabinet, we need but the issuing of an order, dividing the Army into corps and assigning to each its commander with- out the knowledge of the commander-in-chief. Al- though the subject had been discussed between McCIellan and the President and Cabinet, the former desired to appoint the corps commanders himself, but wished to delay doing so until he should be able to judge of the relative merit of his officers by their actual performance in the field. As further proof of the bureaucratic interference with the Army of a demo- cracy even in war, we need but quote McClellan's statement in his Memoirs, " The fears of the Adminis- tration and their inability to comprehend the merits of the (Urbana) scheme, or else the determination that I should not succeed in the approaching campaign, induced them to prohibit me from carrying out the Urbana movement. They gave me the choice between the direct overland route via Manassas and the route with Fort Munro as a base. Of course I selected the latter." The inference drawn from the tame accept- ance by McCIellan of this political interference, is that he himself was but a political puppet ; no soldier worthy ofthe name is justified under any circumstances in accepting dictation as to the course ofthe campaign, the conduct of which he is responsible for. If peace could be assured to a country by any other means than by the maintenance of an instrument ever ready for war, there is no valid reason why legislators POLITICAL ELEMENT IN DEFENCE 20i should not tinker and interfere with the Navy or Army of their country to their heart's content. Peace ap- pears to drive from the minds of politicians and public alike the reason for the upkeep of Army and Navy, and these services are looked upon by the democratic poli- tician as legitimate subjects with which to interfere ; the result is, that the longer the peace is enjoyed by a country governed by such a constitution the more in- efficient becomes its defence forces. The administrative heads have gradually evolved into academic professors, and they naturally surround themselves with kindred spirits. The practical soldiers or sailors have given way to the student, closely allied in political sentiment to the legislator responsible for the evolution. Can it then be wondered that the characteristics of the latter predominate ? An Army organised and trained under such peculiar conditions, McClellan was called to com- mand ; this Army was powerless to act. McClellan's officers, mostly selected by political favour, were in- capable ; his own actions, as we have already seen, con- trolled even to detail by the Administration. It is not to be wondered at, that the opening phases of the war were disastrous. Defeat showed the country the weak points of their Army ; reform was insisted upon in time to save the North ; the generals were given more latitude in the conduct of the campaign, with the result that the best men forged ahead. Grant, by sheer ability, rose from a much disparaged officer to be general-in-chief; further reforms were placed in his hands, obedience to a common will in all things 202 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE connected with the campaign was recognised. It but wanted this for success to be achieved. The price of the opening phases of blunder in blbod and money is common knowledge. The moral is obvious, not only in this campaign, nor in the one that preceded it by over twenty centuries, but in every war that intervened — political interference in the military affairs of a State is disastrous. It is not the writer's intention to infer that it is in any way desirable for any unit of the British Empire to depart, even in the spirit, from the provisions of the Bill of Rights of 1689, but he wishes to impress upon his readers' minds that it is just possible to exaggerate the rights of the Bill and to carry its provisions to a dangerous extreme, not so much in the United King- dom as in some of the self-governing Colonies. It is but lately that the tendency has become apparent, a tendency which if not tactfully and discreetly checked may result in separation from the Empire, and will thereafter undoubtedly lead to the absorption of the separating Colony by a foreign Power. The spirit of democracy is not an attribute of the nineteenth cent- ury civilisation, we have seen its advantages and its drawbacks in the ancient Grecian States, in Rome and Carthage. Nothing new or in favour of such a government has been forthcoming ; with the rise of the Republics of our present time, rather have we seen the repetition in an exaggerated form of all the advantages of such form of government, and the in- strument in which all this is more clearly discernible. POLITICAL ELEMENT IN DEFENCE 203 is that of defence. The reason for this is obvious. Democracy, by preaching equal rights, disavows disci- pline; yet recognising that the fighting value of an Army or Navy is discipline, a contradiction is preached which must seriously undermine both the constitution of the government and the organisation of the forces which are kept up for the express purpose of uphold- ing and safeguarding that constitution. In all Re- publics it is a noticeable fact that the Army often becomes an active foe, more often than not, in the hands of an ambitious legislator. The unprepared state of the British Army upon the outbreak of the Boer War brought prominently before the British public the danger of an exaggerated idea of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. It illus- trated, too, that a long peace tends towards nullifying the practical element in the administration of the defence forces of the Empire. It was but history re- peating itself; the same heavy and wasteful expenditure resulted, the same course was pursued that had been followed in every war that every century brought forth ; success was only attained when unlimited control was placed under a single head upon the scene of action. It is not necessary to point out how vastly different things would have been had the preparation likewise been placed under an individual brain. Reverting again to peace, some of the more democratic portions of Empire are still pleased to view their several defence forces as but a leaf in the political programme, the administration of which is to conform with their 204 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE views of parochial policy; this works its way down until it reaches the individual in the form of political appointments, promotions, and dismissals. In the time of peace the dissension thus caused is not of an ap- parently dangerous nature, war is wanted to reveal it in all its enormity. It is from the individual that the danger rises and spreads until it ultimately affects the whole of the defence forces of a State. The longer the peace the more insidious becomes this bureaucracy, and the more disastrous must be the consequences with the breaking of that peace. The one branch of a State's service which history shows us, with tiring reiteration, cannot, except with heavy cost in blood and money to the nation, allow of political interference in any portion of its working, is that of defence. The relationship between statesman and Army should be similar to that existing between master and servant ; the latter is only worthy of his hire when capable and competent, and, being so, he must enjoy the trust of his employer, who ultimately benefits. The interfering master cannot retain the services of a capable work- man, the result is that he has to content himself with the refuse of the labour market ; under such conditions it is quite impossible for him to compete with those served more capably. It is but within recent years that the judges and magistrates of England and some of our larger Colonies have been placed securely above political influence ; this came with the recognition of justice to the in- dividual. It yet wants the full recognition of justice POLITICAL ELEMENT IN DEFENCE 205 to the State, with its future generations, to place the defence forces of that State above political influence, interference, or spite. The law-givers of our larger portions of Empire must sooner or later realise, as other communities have in the past realised to their cost, the terrible consequences that follow bureaucracies in matters military. The average common-sense man will say that the remedy is in the hands of the people, that they can insist upon their representatives admin- istering without interfering with the services of the State. History shows, however, that the voice of the people is only raised as a last resort, and the result has only been achieved when that voice was unanimous, and unanimity but gained when the danger was press- ing. In the British Empire itself, how often we see some fearless, energetic official pilloried for advocating some necessary reforms in a service he may be peculi- arly fitted to advise upon. In some portions of the Empire, Government officials are prohibited from plac- ing on record, in any form whatever, their opinions of needed reforms ; progressive officials are relieved of their duties upon some pretext or other. Occasionally we hear of a man rising above his fellows, and, regard- less of the consequences, showing up some of the evils he is cognisant of Even in the civilised British Empire of the twentieth century, such a man has little further to live for ; his enemies become legion ; his iniquities magnified beyond recognition. Yet most reforms experienced in the Colonies have been obtained at such sacrifices. With the spread of democracy in the 2o6 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Colonies, the personal influence of the politician has become a factor to be reckoned with in all Government services. No great, or any service, appears to be above the reach of his smile or his displeasure ; the weight of either is greater in those Colonies cursed with party government, for, with the change of Government which occurs in some Colonies with the monotony familiar to certain American Republics, the adherents of the old Governments suffer. Experience, however, has brought into being a veritable crop of Vicars of Bray. In the entourage of the political campaigns incessantly occur- ring in the Colonial portion of the Empire the most serious questions are, more often than not, forgotten. Defence, the aim of which is by the nature of things uncertain, is the first service the importance of which is not recognised or acknowledged by the average Colonial politician ; its offices have too often been looked upon as sinecures for political friends or rela- tions. A legislator may himself covet rank ; he therefore assumed that title he considered most appropriate. There are signs, however, that reason is prevailing ; new Defence Acts and amendments to old ones are but indications that the existing system is not alto- gether satisfactory, in some of the Colonies at least. The advisability of politicians serving in the defence forces has been questioned. Some officials, though at the cost of their positions, have fearlessly given con- crete cases of glaring interference by legislators, in matters of discipline and organisation, and have ur- gently appealed for reform; the protest is spreading POLITICAL ELEMENT IN DEFENCE 207 and growing stronger throughout the Empire, until one is constrained to hope that the time is not far distant when we may see an Imperial Army containing all the Colonial forces, raised into the atmosphere of Imperial politics. Then, and not till then, will we find Colonial politicians leaving to the professional man the care of, and holding him responsible for the effi- ciency of, the fighting services that are but units in the Empire's defence forces ; then, too, we may reach that ideal, when war is inevitable, when diplomacy has cast its very last card, of hearing the statesman say to the commanders, as was said to Moltke : " Diplomacy has failed ; go and do the work you have been paid to study and prepare for". No self-respecting soldier wishes to see the statesman or politician don a uniform and sword and take the field, for experience of the past has illustrated that the politician takes into the field his political views ; he carries, too, a sense of his power ; suggestions are given with an irritating sense of authority, which are often accepted by a servile commander with an eye to the time when his pension is discussed in the House. The want of organisation displayed by the British Army at the outbreak of the Boer War came as a rude shock to the British public ; it had almost the desired effect of laying bare the recondite causes ; but not quite. A commission was appointed, and this com- mission resulted in an interesting and valuable report containing recommendations for much-needed reform. The commissioners failed, however, to push their 208 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE inquiries into those bureaux indirectly influencing the defence services. With the successful termination of the war, public feeling was allayed ; success had been achieved by our Armies, at what cost or how narrowly was not popu- larly appreciated, and the public might still have remained in ignorance of the interference by civilians in the preparation and conduct of the campaign had it not been for the pen of the late commander-in-chief Lord Wolseley denounced in no measured terms the political interference he had to contend against through- out his term of office. Fortunately for England, the campaign had to be conducted at considerable distance from the seat of politics, which safeguarded, to a certain extent, interference with the conduct of the campaign in the field by civilians at home, though we are all aware that the deference to some of their opinions protracted the war. In England it is yet impossible for the insidious influence to assume the proportion it has reached, and is yet reaching, in the self-governing Colonies, for the mother country is protected by an insurmountable barrier, a barrier the Colonies cannot feel the protection of until closer union is effected, and that is the House of Lords. A few years ago any question afl"ecting the efficient training, organisation, and administration of a Colony's defence forces was considered as of purely local import, but the recognition on the part of all the units of the Empire of inter-Imperial dependency has made it apparent to the inhabitants of all parts of the Empire POLITICAL ELEMENT IN DEFENCE 209 that the question is now a general one ; the causes militating against efficiency in defence in any particular part of the Empire are causes detrimental to Imperial defence in its broadest sense. It therefore behoves the supreme Imperial authorities to try and remove by precept and advice evils likely to have far-reaching and disastrous results. With the creation of the Army Council, the United Kingdom, with its four-fifths of the Empire's white population, has an assurance that the British Army is to be placed above the bane of undue political interfer- ence. The Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia have now substituted the office of Com- mandant-General with that of Inspector-General, and have created Defence Councils. The democratic ten- dencies of these Colonies forbid this alteration (for in these particular cases it cannot be termed a reform) from being substantial ; the members of the Defence Councils will in all probability be politicians, members of the party in power for the time being. If anything, the political administration will be more pronounced than heretofore. Where then lies the remedy. With the parent State, and with the parent State alone, rests the solution, as rests the solution of all Imperial prob- lems. Every Colony within the Empire recognises the potency of union in defence. Its urgency is realised by our Pacific Colonies. The pity is, that the lines for this union were not laid before the present uneasy time ; still, the step is a short one, and one that need take but little time in making. 14 210 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE All that is required to obtain spontaneously practical unity in defence among the parts of the Empire is Colonial representation on the Army Council. The scope of that body should be increased to embrace the Colonial forces; the sense of the responsibility thus given would raise the moral tone of Colonial politics ; it would bring into being an element inimical to the lower tendencies of democracy; it would check the political inroads into the province of defence. The duty and responsibility of the council would be solely to provide a highly efficient instrument to enforce the last demands of the statesman. When the latter has failed to protect his country's interests by all other means, and war is decided upon, it is for him to step aside for the soldier, who now relieves the statesman of his country's burden ; and, while war wages, if success is to be achieved the soldier must be as supreme as the statesman is in peace. The Colonial statesman, if such exist, does not recog- nise the defence force of his Colony as purely an instru- ment to enforce his Government's will ; it will be necessary for his Colony to be in danger for him to understand that as an instrument the defence service must be kept in good order by professional men. In many instances he is far too intimate with it — a success- ful politican parochially, a rising lawyer ; he therefore is of opinion that he must shine as a soldier, and he often ostensibly succeeds by the artificial assistance of his two other callings. This and its attendant evils, then, would be removed should the Colonial forces be POLITICAL ELEMENT IN DEFENCE 211 controlled, even though in an advisory manner, Im- perially. Where the Empire's defence is concerned generally the council, it is hoped, would have executive powers. No more fitting time than the present could be wished for. The Army itself is in a transition stage, or as the senior member of the Army Council termed it, in the melting-pot ; why not melt all the Empire's land forces and let them cool in the one mould ? In- creased strength must result, and a healthy feeling of Imperial responsibility be engendered in one and all of the Colonies. 14* CHAPTER IX. PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE. The question of defence is unfortunately considered as one of minor importance in the Parliaments of the younger self-governing Colonies. In those Legislatures it only receives attention when the Budget is well on the credit side, and when other subjects considered locally of burning import are quiescent. It is first shelved when the Budget is on the wrong side, or a branch railway, redistribution or immigration restric- tion Bill is brought forward. The heat and turmoil of debate, discipline of party, and the importunities of Colonial constituents preclude most Colonial politicians from examining closely any questions from a point of view other than that of expediency. This is all the more apparent when one examines closely the political history of the Colonies, for one then notes the similarity of methods existing between Colonies at like stages of development. This subserviency of Imperial to local questions in the younger Colonies is accounted for by reason of the youth at which responsible government is given ; great difficulty is then experienced in ob- taining suitable or capable men to undertake the work of administration. This is, of course, attributable to PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE 213 the fact that in youth the Colonies are sparsely popu- lated, and with men bent on the building of their own fortunes. A large percentage of these men, and generally the most able, having gained their object, elect to return to the land of their birth ; a few of those left prefer to end their days in peace and quiet away from the strife of politics. Having made their own way in the world and learnt the value of money, they invariably insist upon their sons following in their footsteps, and impress upon these sons the American gentleman's advice of eschewing politics. Age and steady growth, as evidenced by Canada, are rectifying this Imperial danger ; a leisured and educated class from which most able statesmen are drawn can only be found in those Colonies that have been colon- ised for more than two generations ; it is the third and succeeding generations that are reaping the fruits planted by their forefathers in immigration. Here and there, however, are to be found able and highly respected politicians who are proud of being self-made and self-educated men ; these men, whilst being of the greatest value from the local point of view, yet by reason of their limited area of vision, are quite incap- able of judging impartially upon matters of broader policy. Some of the younger Colonies are not even fortunate enough to constitute their Parliaments of such locally considered desirable members ; but, owing to the dearth of candidates, have to content themselves with that undesirable type known in the Colonies as the political adventurer, a supercilious gentleman who 214 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE fights for office solely for its monetary advantages, and whose opinion on an amendment to a Divorce Bill would be of more practical value than his views of Imperial unity ; yet with age and the steady progress and prosperity of the Colonies there are coming for- ward for political and official honours a type of man that must make for Imperial efficiency. The ease with which ocean distances are now covered has brought all the advantages of European Universities to the Colonial youth who has in him those grand qualities with which his forefathers made the land of his birth ; in him their shrewdness and common-sense are toned and broadened by the old world's education, and there is given to the Empire a type of man some of whose characteristics distinguish him from all preceding types. The benefit of this evolved characteristic is but now being felt in Canada and Australia, and a glimmer of it is being seen in the Cape Colony. The problems that confront us while considering Imperial federation, defence, or unity, have their solu- tions in three orders : — 1. Those the solution of which lies with the Home Government. 2. Those the solution of which lies with the particu- lar Colony faced with the problem or problems. 3. Those the solution of which lies with the Home Government and the Colony concerned mutually. The problems under the first category are common to the Empire, irrespective of self-governing Colonies, and instances of their nature will be given first. PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE 215 The staying power of all monarchical governments is an aristocracy. The aristocracy brought over from Normandy by William, whatever their faults were in those days, as judged by us to-day, were the moulding of the Empire of the present ; their descendants ex- panded the power then gained, and it is the descend- ants of the mixed Norman and Saxon nobility who have made and kept the Empire ; but with the swarm- ing from the central hive there has not been the pro- portion of nobility to keep alive in the newly-formed Colonies that distinction of classes which is absolutely necessary for the stability of institutions. That this is necessary for the security of government is evidenced by the rigid respect for all officers enforced in the military institutions of the two great Republics. No- where in the world perhaps is greater respect shown for ancient lineage, rank, and good birth than in that centre of democracy — the United States of America. The democratic tendency of the Colonies is directly attributable to a lack of aristocracy, and if there is anything that will kill for ever that Republican spirit, it will be the creation of a Colonial nobility, for by its creation will be revived all the traditions of Monarchy. It alone can give new life to Imperialism ; and no greater assurance of its value can be given than India, for it is the native nobility of that Empire that makes loyalty a tangible symbol. In the older Colonies there are men well fitted for the dignity, and in the unborn generations of the younger Colonies there will be men equally fitted. 2i6 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Canada has now reached an age when the want of this leaven is acutely felt in the low yet growingly distinct murmurings for secession which one hears from that Colony; one recognises all that presages democracy; it is that phase of discontent that over- takes communities of one class reaching a certain strength. It will be remembered that the American Colonies contained a population of 3,500,000 when they seized upon the first pretext that offered itself to shake off their allegiance to Great Britain. It should be a noticeable fact in connection with their secession that the time chosen for this renunciation was when the hands of England were full — at war with three large European Powers ; a war in India and a depleted Treasury and unrest in Ireland made it an impossibility to hold Colonies bent on severing. It cannot, however, be denied that diplomacy could have saved to the Crown those rich possessions, just as diplomacy has staved off, past the minimum seceding strength, the evil day of the secession of several of our larger Colonies ; it is in the province of diplomacy that all must look for the complete eradication of the spirit of democracy which is at present so completely on the ascendant in all the Colonies. In the case of Canada the problem must be faced at once, or it will be found to be too late ; when a dependency of the Empire arro- gates to itself the powers of forming treaties with foreign nations, forced into it no doubt by grave disappointments and neglect and the subserviency of equity to diplomacy, there but remains the thread of PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE 217 dependency, which may snap upon the probability of a naval war likely to interfere with the commercial intercourse of Canada. A stumbling-block to a better understanding be- tween the mother country and the Colonies is the habit the former has of treating all the problems as of one order, viz., of a purely local nature. Illustrations are at hand in the case of Canada and the Alaska award, Cape Colony and the suspension of the constitution, and the importation of Chinese into the Transvaal ; yet in each of the above cases the matter is of Imperial import, having its bearing, too, upon Imperial defence. The Alaska case might have involved Britain in war — a war that might possibly have ended in the absorp- tion of Canada. In the second case, looking back by the aid of that calm reason which time alone can give, it must be ad- mitted that the hasty and ill-advised suspension of a constitution would by the creation of a dangerous pre- cedent in Imperial politics have loosened the ties of Imperial unity. The importation as labourers of Chinese for the mines of the Transvaal is a matter of Imperial import, though the community directly affected prefer to deny this. One can see that there are elements in these and other problems that have in them the power of shaking to its foundations that disjointed fabric — the British Empire. Ever since the royal sanction was granted authoris- ing the importation of coolies from India into the 2i8 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Colony of Natal, the question of Asiatic immigration has disturbed the minds of South African Colonists. It has taken the form of public protests, organised demonstrations against the landing of the immigrants, and prohibitive resolutions in the Legislatures. The successful passing of a Bill in the Natal Parliament, enforcing the return or re-indenture at the end of the term of indenture, in 1898, relieved the Colonists of what was a serious menace. The recent sanction of an ordinance allowing the introduction of Chinese labour into the Transvaal, an interior Colony, has, how- ever, re-opened the grievance with increased feeling, for the methods brought to bear in its passing revives a danger of graver import to South Africa and the Empire than is to be feared from the terms of the instrument itself. The influence of the gold industry, with all the speculation which surrounds it, upon the future of the African Colonies and the Empire generally, is fully prophesied by the past history of those Powers that have possessed gold- or gem-bearing Colonies. The downfall of Spain dates from the exploitation of her gold mines in Mexico and Peru ; the thirst for rapid gain drew thousands of Spaniards of the working and upper classes to those Colonies, with the result that her industries suffered, dwindled, and finally decayed. This, in the opinion of the Spaniard, was more than compensated for by the large amount of specie remitted from these rich Colonies to the mother country ; but mark the result— with the decay of her industries and PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE 219 manufactories, with the throwing out of employment and consequent starvation of a large section of her population, there set in the sure precursors of a nation's decay — a decreasing birth-rate and an increasing death- rate. Altering the maxim that, what is one man's meat is another's poison, we find that England and Holland were the gainers, and the rapid rise to power of these two nations dates from here. The denuding of the Spanish manufacturing population by the glamour of her gold mines, necessitated the purchas- ing of her commodities from the merchants of England and Holland, and trade in these two countries was greatly stimulated ; it added increased life to the manufacturing and shipping communities, and the gold and silver won by the lives of the Spaniards went to build up the foundations of the British Empire ; it is in fact from here that our sea power takes its start. The history of Portugal, that country which has given us many of our present possessions, is identical with that of Spain ; the zenith of her power was reached with the exploitation of the mines of Brazil, According to an old historian : " The mines of Brazil were the ruin of Portugal as those of Mexico and Peru had been to Spain". Manufactories fell into insane contempt ; ere long the English supplied the Portu- guese not only with clothes, but with all merchandise, all commodities, even to salt, fish, and grain. After their gold the Portuguese abandoned their very soil ; the vineyards of Oporto were finally bought by the English with Brazilian gold which had only passed 220 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE through Portugal to be spread throughout England. It is stated that of iJ 100,000,000 extracted from these mines, ;^7 5,000,000 found its way to England. In the foregoing historical records we have but to read England for Germany and America to describe accurately the dangerous influence the gold and diamond fields are to the Empire. Prior to the discovery of diamonds and gold South Africa was growing from the felt want and natural im- pulses of her Colonies ; she was drawing to herself an agricultural class, and with steady progress would have brought into being a manufacturing class. Under such conditions her foundations would have been solid and her subsequent growth sure ; with the find- ing of precious stones and metal there arose not only throughout the sub-continent but in England an insane greed for rapid wealth ; the overcrowded population of England could well bear the strain — not so South Africa. Productive farms were deserted, — "They abandoned their very soil," and to-day may be seen ruined farm-steads and bethrottled orchards deserted by their owners in their search after wealth. With in- creased discoveries the distemper has grown ; hundreds of thousands of square miles lie barren except for the mark of the prospector's pick. The very natives are enticed away from their natural pastoral and agricul- tural pursuits in order to assist in this more rapid means of obtaining wealth. To the individual this wealth may be tangible, to the nation it is fictitious, and this is proved by the fact that part of this wealth PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE 221 goes to foreign countries ; to the Argentine for grain that could be well grown in South Africa ; to Mada- gascar and America for cattle and sheep that could be raised in this country ; and to Germany and Switzerland for machinery ; yet iron, lime, and coal, found side by side with the gold, could well produce all the machinery required. The history of Portugal is here repeated ; the very gold taken by English Colonists from South Africa is being used by German, French, and American firms to repurchase businesses and farms in South Africa. This insane greed for fictitious wealth reaches its height with the importation of Chinese labour ; hitherto a portion of the wealth won from the earth was kept in the country in the wages paid the natives for their labour, now this and even more is taken not only from the Colonies, but from the Empire ; the progress of South Africa is hampered, and an element dangerous to the unity of the Empire is introduced. To those whose sole care is the prosperity of the moment, Chinese labour is a necessary evil, when the future is considered, however, it is an evil that means ruin, which even pre-shadows the decay of the Empire. The daily newspapers contain undeniable evidence of the intoxication to which the speculative instincts of the nation have grown with the development of the gold mines of Africa and Australia. Although arousing the passion for rapid gain and bringing loss to individuals, the mines of Australia have not thrown their bane over legislation ; the fields 222 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE had been discovered in the days when individual might was right. Alluvial diggings with its form of gold extraction lent itself to payable small workings ; legislation was before the rise of the capitalist; re- sponsible government was given before his power was able to direct its course for the benefit of his class ; he therefore had to confine himself to the regions of finance and conform politically to that course which would benefit the majority of the population of the country from which he drew his wealth. Science lent its aid, new methods of gold extraction were discovered, labour-saving appliances invented ; all the labour re- quired was on the spot in the form of those diggers and miners who had successfully mined for themselves ; for a fair wage they were willing, nay, anxious, to work for the capitalist, and under climatic difficulties not experienced in the Transvaal. In the South African Colonies, due perhaps to the numerous, varied, and more recent discoveries, the specu- lative fever spread to a greater extent than it did in Australia; it permeated official circles, upset profes- sional life, and stamped out agriculture as an industry ; it nipped in the bud those industries beginning to make headway, and it created a being before unknown as a power — the gold magnate — his advent into Imperial politics was inopportune, for political differences were rife in South Africa, and he was enabled to shape the destinies of the Colonies there for good or bad. As the interests of his own class were ever predominant in his mind, there can be no doubt to those who care to PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE 223 enquire closely into the workings of South African politics during the last ten years that his influence has been for evil, not only to the Colonies but to the Empire. With no interests in the land from which he draws his wealth, save the extraction of the gold as cheaply and rapidly as possible, his insane anxiety for this, or criminal selfishness, blinds him to all thought of Imperial in- terests. It is a matter of opinion as to whether or not the recent war in South Africa was directly attributable to the rapid rise of the capitalist ; it must be admitted that opinion, and expert opinion, is equally divided on that point ; evidence on both sides is equally strong. There is, however, overwhelming evidence to satisfy every Britisher, if he only cares to examine it, that whatever part the capitalist played in precipitating it, that war was bound to occur in the interests of Empire as apart from gain. America is realising, when late, the growing danger which lies in the influence of capital amassed in the hands of a few unscrupulous men. Its power for evil has been felt for some years in South Africa, but the extent of that power was undreamt of prior to the issue of the unique " Chinese " ordinance. The problems which confront South Africa contain elements of great danger to herself and to the Empire. The racial feeling between the English and the Dutch is one that time is eradicating ; it is giving place to political feeling conveniently hidden under the term racial, for the ranks of the Republicans contain as many 224 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE English and Colonial-English as Dutch and foreigners. The overshadowing " native danger '' to the white is having the effect of allaying racial prejudices between people of one colour and one religion. In the past, and up to recent times, safety to the vastly outnumbered whites lay in tribal jealousies ; in no native war of the past was it possible for any com- bination of tribes to be effected, and in all those wars it was possible to make good use of rival tribes as allies. At the date of these wars the natives had few serious grievances, the restriction of the territory over which they might roam was slight, the administration of native law was wisely left in their own hands. With a rapidly increasing white population, however, and the consequent march of civilisation, there came greater restrictions to native liberty, the black man's territory was encroached upon, his laws administered by Euro- peans, taxation fixed and enforced, armed resistance was ineffectual, owing, as I have already stated, to want of unity. It but needed education to show the native where he failed ; this was given with the advent of the missionary and the discovery of the diamond mines and gold fields. The mission schools created a class of natives before unknown ; the young natives learnt to read and write and to inquire for literature of their own ; to-day there are no less than twenty-four news- papers in South Africa printed in the native language. Semi-education has had the effect of breaking through old-time customs ; eradicating a number of native superstitions that had in the past kept tribes apart, PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE 225 it enabled natives to exchange ideas in a manner that before had been impossible. The compounds of the mines brought together thou- sands of natives drawn from various tribes, from dif- ferent parts of South Africa, and whilst faction fights were of common occurrence, our stringent laws have had the effect of decreasing these. By nature the native is gregarious, and he is, when at peace, good natured ; ideas taken from the native missionaries are exchanged and discussed between members of various tribes in these compounds, to be disseminated among the tribes upon the native's return home. With the spread of Christianity among the natives of South Africa there arose the desire for a native denomination, and this was met by delegates from the Ethiopian Church of America ; the large coloured population of South Africa presented to those native missionaries a vast field for labour. Among all nationalities the dividing line between religion and politics is so fine that it is easily obliterated ; and the native mind, yet wanting centuries for develop- ment, mingles one with the other; the Ethiopian Church in South Africa is as much a native political institution as it is a religious denomination. Its doc- trines are dangerous in the extreme to the European population. The fundamental doctrine is South Africa for the blacks, and the material its exponents have to work upon is susceptible ; lovers of justice, as justice is measured by the native mind, and of martial instinct, by them an imagined breach of the former will be IS 226 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE defended and revenged to the utmost with all the barbaric instincts of the savage. The numerous defeats experienced by the natives in their wars with Europeans were to some extent due to the superstitious awe in which they held our weapons ; cannons and maxims were considered by them the work of magic. The lengthy campaign against the Re- publics had the effect of disabusing the native mind of this fiction ; the large army of natives employed by both sides as camp followers gave their observant minds every opportunity of studying European methods of warfare ; the sage criticisms passed by our dusky followers showed that the illustrated lessons were taken to heart; isolated incidents in which natives were engaged proved their value as fighters with the rifle. Unlike the aborigines of America, Australia, and New Zealand, the native of South Africa is on the in- crease, and that out of all proportion to the European population ; a census, questionable no doubt, fixes the native population of South Africa at 4,100,000 (it is authoritatively stated that the native population of South and South-Central Africa is 8,000,000) whereas the white population is barely 1,000,000. Within twenty years the natives have increased 100 per cent. Under the beneficent rule of the white man, devastating wars between themselves are impossible, medical science has checked the ravages of small-pox, and a fatherly Government imports grain when crops fail or cattle diseases carry off their stock. Under such conditions would it not be remarkable if, where polygamy is a PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE 227 recognised institution, an increase in the population out of all proportion to that known in other communities did not take place ? Confessedly the numerous privileges he now enjoys tend to make the native dislike work ; the soil tilled by his wives, the flocks and herds herded by his numerous progeny amply provides for his wants ; the limited amount of ready money required to pay his hut tax is earned by the sale of a few bags of mealies, a goat or two, or perhaps a pony. The traditions of the wars of his forefathers, the warlike experiences of those yet alive, recounted with elaboration, tend to keep kindled the martial instincts of a warlike people, and, as has already been stated, the recent war has tended to lower in the opinion of the natives the fighting qualities of the European. The division be- tween the tribes of South and Central Africa is being rapidly narrowed. Education, rapid communication, a more free and easy intercourse is showing them that their strength lies in unity; the native missionaries are driving this home to the native mind. Gun running is as lucrative a trade as it ever was in the past ; numerous weapons and ammunition, the property of the Boers, have fallen into native hands ; so that when the time comes it will be found that the native will take the field well armed, and that he will fight with rash courage and with experience. In all savage wars the danger lies in the sudden- ness of the rising, and the unpreparedness of those Europeans who may be scattered over the territory. 15* 228 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE To-day the danger is greater than in the past, for then the traders and farmers were few and mostly prepared for flight upon the least signs of hostility. To-day a long peace with the native races of South Africa has allayed suspicion ; ^ numbers of these natives are scattered as squatters over the farms of the Europeans and are yet in touch with their tribes ; the daily habits of the whites are intimately known to their native servants. Colonial history confirms the opinion that the pos- sibility of a contemplated rising among the native races becoming known to Europeans before the country- side is in flames is remote in the extreme. The ruling characteristics of savages are secrecy and diplomacy ; instances of old and trusted servants warning their masters of the approach of a rising are rare ; upon the other hand, instances of these servants being the first to undertake to murder those for whom they have worked for years are numerous, and such were regret- table features of the recent Matabele and Mashona Wars. Similar instances were common in the Indian Mutiny, the Indian wars of America, and the Kafir wars during the first half of last century ; and it is likely to be even more common in a native war of the future, where most of these native servants are semi-civilised, the process of which has given them the bad qualities of the Europeans, eradicating the good and leaving the evil of their natural, state. A noteworthy feature of civilising 1 The disturbances in Natal and Zululand can hardly be considered a breach of that long peace, although the native casualties were 3,746 (ofificial), for we find that only fourteen Europeans were killed by the sp-called enemy, PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE 229 wars — for such it is but right to consider these conflicts between a civilised and a savage or semi-savage people — has been the frequency with which those authorities most conversant with the native, his language, habits, and manners, have been misled as to the situa- tion. At the time of the Indian Mutiny this ignorance on the part of those best able to judge is evidenced throughout. The advisers of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Frederick Halliday, would not believe that Patna was in danger ; Canning had surrounded himself with those believed to be most conversant with Indian character, yet they would not credit that the sepoys meant mutiny. Mr. Cracroft Wilson, the special com- missioner appointed after the suppression of the mutiny to inquire into its causes and report on the guilt of the natives, proved by evidence that the 31st May, 1857, was the day fixed for mutiny, and that there were committees of three members in each regiment to conduct the duties of the mutiny. This commissioner goes on to say that " Major Williams, to whom I have repeatedly referred as an authority, did not believe that any plot was formed for a general mutiny ". Then again. Sir Hugh Wheeler, possessing considerable knowledge of the Indian character, up to the moment of the mutiny would not believe that the sepoys at Cawnpore would attack him. The small wars between the red-skins and the settlers in America confirm the fact that the native character contains sufficient diplomacy to hide success- fully from those most intimate with them their plans 230 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE for war. In every native war that has occurred in South Africa, the native commissioners, men born and bred among the natives, were those most successfully misled by the natives, and in many cases a few hours after these authorities had predicted that the natives were never more peaceful, the country was in flames. It will be seen then that the history of South Africa gives ample reason for believing that the native ques- tion is a serious problem, and one which it will tax the ability of Colonial statesmen to solve, for its suc- cessful solution rests in their hands alone, and, how- ever well meant any interference from England or the sister Colonies, such must but add to the difficulty. The basis of its solution is adequate defence, for the maxim that "to be prepared for war is the surest means to avert it," appeals equally to the savage as to the civilised mind. As an example of a question the solution of which lies with the mother country and a Colony, take the question of the early incorporation of Newfoundland with the Canadian Commonwealth. This if carried out will extend the responsibility of the Colonial Govern- ment and bring them into diplomatic touch with France, a nation with which a large section of their population has inherited sympathy ; it is a matter for serious conjecture as to whether or not the provision made in the Treaty of Utrecht, whereby the French retain some right, though widely deiined, to land fishermen on the northern and western shores, would not be resented by the Canadians. The question has caused concern to English and French statesmen, and PROBLEMS BEARING ON DEFENCE 231 if left in the hands of the Colonials might be summarily treated, resulting in serious difficulty for the Empire. The solution then should be in the hands of the com- bined Governments of England and Canada, and the voice of the latter should be of equal volume with that of the mother country. As a general rule those problems in which a foreign Power is a factor must be taken in hand by the mother country, in conjunction with the Colony concerned, and it will add to the ease of the solution if a full share of confidence be given to the Colony. Problems of this order are likely to be of annoying frequency where our possessions, having been successfully col- onised, march with the official-ridden territories of foreign Powers. In the Pacific our large self-govern- ing Colonies, Australia and New Zealand, are daily coming into closer touch with the possessions of France, Germany, and the United States of America. The great attention that the Japanese traders and labourers have paid to Australasia, the rapid rise of that eastern nation, coupled with anti-Asiatic legislation on the part of the Colonies, is evidence enough that problems of this nature are likely to be of a recurrent nature. As our possessions in Africa, bordering upon those of France, Germany, Portugal and Belgium, reach, as they will do at an early date, the dignity of self-governing Colonies, problems will arise. By that time, however, it is to be hoped that an Imperial Council, in which there will be Colonial representation, will have been formed, and the solution of all Imperial problems resting in the Council's hands. CHAPTER X. FEDERATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COLONIAL FORCES. At a time when the federation of the South African Colonies is being seriously considered and discussed, not only by Colonial politicians but also by Imperial- ists at home and in other parts of the Empire, the question presents itself as to what form the first step will take in this much-desired amalgamation. At various times in the recent history of South Africa Customs conventions have been entered into by two or more of these States, and inter-Colonial Conferences have provided the germs of federation which, however, have so far failed to fertilise. With the annexation of the two late Republics the dependency of each South African Colony upon one or more of its neighbours has become more apparent. The advantages enjoyed by the two maritime Colonies at the expense of the hinter- land States will grow in ratio to the increase of the population of the interior Colonies. Factors are working for the speedy federation of the South African Colonies which were absent in the federations of the Canadian and Australian groups. In the case of Australia, sentiment played a greater part than necessity in bringing about federation ; Canada, 232 FEDERATION OF COLONIAL FORCES 233 on the other hand, was hastened into a Dominion by the proximity of a growing foreign and possibly hos- tile nation. But in both cases the Federal party cry was " Unity is Strength," and truly no other words carry with them greater truth. The South African Federals are still in the embryo state and are yet deeply immersed in the commercial aspect of the question. The advocates of federation in the various Colonies are beset by the local difficulties that present themselves ; each Colony is anxious to obtain commercially, through its railway tariffs or Customs dues, the advantage over the would-be partners in the Confederacy. At present the two maritime States hold the advantage in these forms of revenue, and owing to their geographical position thrive upon a forwarding trade to and from the three interior States, the Transvaal, Orange River Colony, and Rhodesia ; the Transvaal is to a certain extent able to keep the tariffs within reasonable bounds by using the foreign port of Delagoa Bay. Now, it is not at all likely that the three interior States will remain content with the position of milch cows solely for the benefit of two other communities, however plausible the arguments put forward by the latter may be ; for, whilst there is no very great disparity in the European population of those five Colonies (the total population is but that of a first-class English town), there is not that feeling of a small minority greatly benefiting to the detriment of a majority. But the growth of the European population 234 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE of the three interior States, attracted there by the great mineral wealth awaiting development, is far more rapid than in the two coast Colonies. According to the returns of the last census the European population of the Transvaal promises to exceed the rest of South Africa ; and these Colonists will at once demand, and justly so, some form of communication with the rest of the Empire other than at heavy cost to themselves, and undue advantage to those of the same race more fortunately situated geographically. It has already been stated that there are factors actively at work for federation, and these are of a more pressing nature than commercial needs. First and foremost. South Africa is confronted with the racial problem, similar but even more acute than that in the United States of America. The native tribes of South Africa are yet in a state of barbarism, and still enjoy a certain amount of independence ; they are controlled by a code of native law administered by hereditary chiefs. The natives outnumber the Europeans by ten to one ; polygamy is a recognised institution through- out the. sub-continent. We find, too, as stated in the last chapter, that the native races of South Africa, unlike the aborigines of America, Australia, and New Zea- land, are rapidly increasing ; of fine physique, with strong martial instincts, they have in the past proved themselves foes of no mean order. The policy adopted in dealing with the native races by South African poli- ticians has up to the present been eminently success- ful, large tribes as soon as the opportunity offers by FEDERATION OF COLONIAL FORCES 235 the death of a chief, are split up ; tribal jealousies con- fine any unrest among themselves, the European ofificial is brought in as arbitrator, and in this capacity respect is obtained and held. It is worthy of note that there has not been a native war in South Africa in which the Europeans have not received material support from one or more rival sections, brought into being by wise policy. With the advent, however, of so-called Christianity there has been introduced into the native problem a disturbing element. Christianity, so long as it took that practical form so successfully followed by the Roman Catholic and Nonconformist missionaries, carrying with the creed the tenets of usefulness, such as the teaching of handicrafts and husbandry, tended towards a peaceful solution of the native problem. Unfortunately, however. South Africa is no exception to the rule proved in other parts of the Empire, that the misguided missionary enthusiast, preaching the equality of blacks and whites, but makes work for the soldier. The Kafir, in his natural state of barbarism, so-called, follows a very strict code of honour, his morals are above those of the average European ; but given the slightest veneer of civilisation, he displays all the bad characteristics of both races. The writer well remembers proving this to a most enthusiastic Church of England missionary, now a bishop. A raw native selected at random and a care- fully selected convert, were each sent to a village for a sum of money. The same day the raw native returned with the money intact. Four days went by and 236 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE anxiety was apparent at the mission station at the non-appearance of the convert, a gentleman, they told me, making great progress with Virgil and Horace and qualifying for deacon's orders. Messengers were des- patched in search of the truant ; he was at last dis- covered, very drunk and incapable, minus the money. The so-called education given to the native by the well-meaning missionary is logically applied by the former to the position he now occupies in the land of his birth and of his forefathers. In the light of his learning he looks upon the European as an invader, he further sees through our native policy and recognises the stupidity of ancient tribal jealousies. He is beginning to understand that federation is not a monopoly for the use of the European only, that where men of his own colour so greatly outnumber the men he now considers as aliens, the unity of his race might, with a supreme effort, again obtain the land for its original owners. This idea was perhaps but the dream of a few of the more advanced in civilisation, and it would have remained a dream had it not been for the advent of a number of men of the Kafir's own colour and origin, though of a differ- ent language. Highly educated negroes from America have within the last decade immigrated for missionary work to South Africa ; here they quickly discovered the native preponderance in numbers, the scattered and lonely position of the whites. Accustomed in their own country to mix politics with religion, less restraint and eager converts encouraged them to preach open sedition to a dangerous degree. An independent FEDERATION OF COLONIAL FORCES 237 denomination of the Ethiopian Church has been estab- lished, a negro bishop appointed, and its missionaries scattered far and wide among the native tribes of South Africa. The text of their teaching is South Africa for the natives. These Ethiopian missionaries recognise how strong is unity, and they are energetically work- ing for the union of the native races of South Africa. The growing danger has been recognised by South African politicians, and several proposals for its sup- pression have been made. These, however, fall far short of the possibility, for the reason that the seed sown has taken hold in soil peculiarly fit for its reception ; the seed has grown and the roots are rapidly becoming entwined in the national growth of the native races. History goes to prove how stimulating opposition is to institutions having their birth with the populace. Opposition fostered Christianity in its early stages, oppression was responsible for the healthy and rapid spread of the varied denominations of that religion. The danger of the Ethiopian movement, now so active in South Africa, will be accentuated by legislative attempts to directly suppress its spread. The institu- tion must be acknowledged, watched, and its dangers provided against ; under such conditions it will prove itself not altogether an unmixed evil, for it will bring about the amalgamation of the South African Colonies, the first step towards which will be the federation of the defence forces of these Colonies. At present the administration and constitution of the defence forces are somewhat varied and have little 238 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE in common. The parent Colony, the Cape, possesses a defence force consisting of a permanent corps. Cape Mounted Riflemen, 1,000 strong. A mounted police force of 2,000 members, and a Volunteer force of 1 2,000 men. The Burgher Law of 1878 provides that every able-bodied man between eighteen and fifty is subject to military service beyond as well as within Colonial limits. But for want of a training clause the Act is practically worthless. The expenditure upon Colonial defence by the Cape for 1900-1 was ;^468,839, ex- clusive of police. In 1898 the Imperial military ex- penditure upon the Colony was ;^3o6,3o8, and naval expenditure for the same year ;^200,000. Natal, profiting by the experience of the costly invasion of her territory during the Anglo-Boer War, an invasion which would have been impossible had compulsory service then been in force, drafted a model Militia Bill, an 'improvement upon those Acts in force in Canada and New Zealand. Unfortunately a few fearful legislators and a weak leader of the Opposi- tion somewhat marred the Bill in its transit. The Act, however, provides for an active Militia of 5 per cent, of the European population. This force is highly trained (for Militia) and at present consists of 2,700 men, three- fourths of whom are mounted ; the remainder of the male population are divided into second, third, and fourth lines of defence, according to state and age. All schoolboys are trained in Cadet Corps and receive training at least three times a week ; these Cadet Corps are administered by a Cadet Department with a FEDERATION OF COLONIAL FORCES 239 Commandant of Cadets at the head. Between the Cadets and the Active Militia a Senior Cadet Corps is a connecting link. The result will be that in a few years practically the whole manhood of Natal will have re- ceived a practical training in arms. Of the five South African States Natal alone has a Militia Act. Of the Colonies of the Empire, Natal and New Zealand are the only two in which Imperial Reserves are provided for in the Defence Acts. The Transvaal, Orange River Colony, and Rhodesia have local defence forces provided for under Volunteer Acts or ordinances ; these are administered by Volunteer departments controlled by commandants who are re- sponsible to their respective Governments. In the case of Natal the control is nominally in the hands of the Commandant of Militia, actually, however, the defence force is administered even to detail by the secretary to the Minister in charge of defence for the time being. The principle is dangerous, its results upon efficiency are unfortunate, for its opens the door to outside influence. The defence administration of the Cape Colony is of a more reliable character. The Minister in charge of defence has the services of a permanent military secretary, an officer selected for his wide experience and ability. Here, appointments in the defence department are not looked upon as sinecures for ruined farmers, clerks, or schoolmasters, whose claims are founded on for assistance rendered at an election, and who are absolutely ignorant of the rudiments of the profes- 240 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE sion they are suddenly pitchforked into. Consequently in the Cape the administration is economical, and better results accrue from less expenditure. Had the Cape a Militia Act in force similar to that of Natal, administered under present Cape conditions, and if on the other hand Natal had as efficient a defence administration as the Cape, for the application of her Militia Act, then these two Colonies would undoubtedly possess a defence system a model for the Empire, economical and effici- ent. In 1902 a Defence Commission presented to the Natal Government a report with a proposed Militia Bill ; the report was adopted and the Bill passed into law with certain material amendments. The commis- sioners recognised that the success of the proposed Bill lay in its pure and efficient administration ; political interference has upset some of these pious hopes, and commissioners are now not surprised to find that the Militia Act, which promised so well if administered by professional men, is not proving that success it had with reason been expected to prove. Yet the cause of failure is one that will right itself with the growth of population and the subjection of personal interests in political questions for the interests of State. The lines upon which the British War Office has been recently re-organised have been but lately fol- lowed by Canada and Australia. The defence forces of these Colonies are now controlled by Defence Councils — an inspector-general being responsible to the Council for training and discipline. No more appropriate time could be selected for the FEDERATION OF COLONIAL FORCES 241 federation of the South African forces than the present, when we find three of the largest sections of the Imperial land forces in a transition stage. Compulsory service, so distasteful to all Britishers, is to all intents and purposes non-existent in the Natal Militia Act ; certain clauses certainly savour of com- pulsion, but only as a last resort. The proposals, then, which the writer in all humility puts forward for the favourable consideration, not only of those politicians in South Africa who are bold enough to look a little further than personal interest, but of those constituents who take an interest in the safety of their lands in the present and its security in the future, are the following : — That the Imperial Defence Committee submit, through the High Commissioner of South Africa, a sug- gestion that the Colonies under his administration as soon as possible appoint a joint Defence Commission to consider the amendment of the Defence Acts of their respective Colonies, with the object of the formation of an inter-Colonial Militia and the Federation of the present Colonial forces. That the Commission consider the advisability of the creation of a Council of Defence for South Africa, the fair representation upon which appears at first sight to be : — 2 members. Transvaal . £. iiiciiiucia. . I member. Orange River Colony . I member. Natal I member. Rhodesia . I member. Imperial nominee . . I member. Total . 7 members.' ' This essay appeared in print in 1903. In 1906 a Defence Com- mission as is here suggested was appointed by Lord Selborne. 16 242 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE That the Commission consider and make recom- mendations on the scope of such a Council's work, the advisability of its sessions being held at Pretoria, Bloemfontein, or Capetown, the necessity of a per- manent secretary and staff, and the headquarters of this staff. The adoption of any scheme such as I have sketched here would call for supplementary reforms, amongst others the appointment of an inspector-general. This office would naturally fall to the present Commandant- general of the Cape Colonial forces, the commandants of Natal, Transvaal, Orange River Colony, and Rhodesia would in consequence have their titles altered to assistant inspector-generals. The inspector-general would be directly responsible to the Council for all matters, connected with the train- ing and discipline of the federated Colonial forces. The Council would in turn be responsible to the High Com- missioner, who would then send down to the various legislatures his requests or instructions concerning that particular portion of the federated force supplied by the Colony concerned. There are several pregnant reasons for the speedy federation of the several defence forces. Economy would be wisely effected. Greater efficiency would be ensured, and it would once and for all remove from the reach of political intrigue the one question or policy in which impure or selfish methods may be an absolute danger to life and property. Further the fact stands out that this must be the first sound step towards a FEDERATION OF COLONIAL FORCES 243 general political and commercial federation of another important group of His Majesty's possessions; a further clearing of difficulties that yet beset the wished- for federation of the Empire. The practical Colonist is sometimes apt to look upon all schemes of federation as an exaggeration of altruism, the wild fancies of the visionary. The troubles that are still being experienced by the Australian Common- wealth, after federation is an accomplished fact in law if not in sentiment, confirm the objections of the scep- tical or the foolishly impatient, whereas those troubles merely prove that federation like everything else must be of steady growth. The federation of the Australian Colonies was somewhat of mushroom growth, therefore a number of smaller problems that, prior to the amalga- mation of the group, would have been of easy solution have by delay grown into questions more difficult to settle. But the cases of Australia and South Africa are far from parallel, for whilst sentiment was the pre- dominant factor in the federation of Australia, necessity and inter-Colonial reliance is the motive power driving South Africa towards federation. The first sound step — ^federation of the Colonial forces — will have almost the same effect on the rest of the Empire as if the ideal itself had been reached. It will bring into being a large Army, an Army that even under present conditions would be adequate for all South African purposes, and which would relieve for service elsewhere those troops now paid for by the already too heavily taxed British tax-payer. If the 16* 244 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE title of Imperial Army is stretched to embrace the pro- posed South African section, as it should all sections of Colonial troops, then the Empire's military strength will be greatly increased. The permanent disposition of the South African section of the Imperial Army would be of strategic value in a European war of any magnitude. Basing the federated defence force upon that of Natal, excluding the third and fourth lines of defence, the following figures are arrived at : — .2'oia 'SSl.a- 14 .ti - f o .S tL> U 2 s^s^ K-2.SS £ S " .5 W |s.§ •0 >. IS-S| S nt 1 Line.— untary- ation, g ballc ne. Line. betwe erving rtioQ i cent. .2 ■;s°=-s- "§ S " Q.«- o& 1 D,a M "il&S; Hg Cape Colony . 28,000 28,000 56,000 ;f742,ooo Transvaal 14,000 14,000 28,000 371,000 0. R. Colony 5,000 5,000 10,000 133,000 Natal 4,000 4,000 8 000 106,000 Rhodesia Total . 1,000 52,000 1 1,000 2,000 53,000 52,000 2 104,000 ' 144,000* The only financial aid the mother country should offer on the carrying out of the steps projected in this ' Active Militia, s Emergency Total. 2 Second Line. * Total Cost to Confederacy. FEDERATION OF COLONIAL FORCES 245 chapter might be represented by the renunciation of the direct naval contributions paid by the two mari- time Colonies — the Cape and Natal — ;£'5o,ooo and ;^3 5,000 respectively. It would, as said in a previous chapter, be a necessary condition that these two Colonies undertake, as a duty to the Empire, to the States con- federated, and to themselves, the adequate defence of the ports upon their coasts. The above figures are based upon the recently re-organised defence admin- istration of Natal. It must not be forgotten, however, that at the time of writing the staff of this force is ex- cessively overmanned and over-paid when compared with that of the Cape, Orange River Colony, Rhodesia, and other parts of the Empire, with the result that avoidable waste has crept into other branches of this small service ; these extravagances will have been multiplied in estimating the expenditure for the pro- posed confederacy. There is no doubt in the writer's mind that a federal force would cost the combined Colonies considerably less than the sum quoted. In all the Colonies expensive police forces are maintained with the dual object of defence and police duties. The reorganisation of the defence forces would at once remove the former object from the sphere of the police and thus permit a substantial reduction in their strength. Expensive living in South Africa necessitates a comparatively high rate of pay to the members of these forces, so that a reduction in strength would entail a substantial saving to the Colonial revenue. To secure the services of such discharged 246 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE members of the Colonial police forces to the Colonies, some form of land settlement might be substituted. A mistaken idea is prevalent among a number of Colonial politicians, that Crown lands are a sign of the prosperity of the Colony possessing them ; accordingly they advocate a policy of hoarding and keeping barren countless acres, to the exclusion of valuable settlers whose labours would bring wealth to the Colony. Occa- sionally small blocks are sold by public auction, but so rarely that competition is keen, and the blocks fall into the hands of the wealthy legislators by whose means they have been placed upon the market. The Colonies suffer great disadvantage from this systematic exclusion of desirable settlers, and hundreds of men who have become well acquainted with the Colonies through years of service in the various police forces are annually lost to South Africa. Wise legislation might well have attracted a highly desirable class of men to these Colonies, by the grant of a small farm at the ex- piration of three years' exemplary service in a Colonial police force. The money paid them for their service would in most cases have been saved for investment in stock, etc., for the benefit of the Colony. The few ex-policemen who have, in spite of Government neglect, taken to farming, afford proof of the prosperity that would have ensued had such a system been instituted in the past. To the agricultural department of the South African Colonies the defence force will look for a certain amount of support. From the agricultural class the backbone FEDERATION OF COLONIAL FORCES 247 of all Armies is drawn, and the greater the proportion of this class the Army of a nation contains the more efficient as a fighting machine must that Army be. The conditions under which farming has to be carried out in South Africa are particularly favourable for giving us men admirably suited to be members of an efficient and mobile force. Let us then try to return to the land, to agriculture, all the retired non-commissioned officers of the permanent staff of any Militia and Volunteer forces and the ex-members of the police. The writer trusts that he has succeeded in making out a fair case for the speedy federation of the varied and disjointed Colonial forces of the South African Colonies. As a South African, he recognises the urgent necessity for the step as a purely defensive measure, and is convinced of its advantages from the point of view of economy. But to those deeply im- bued with Imperialism the suggestion will appear in its true perspective ; they at least will see that Imperial federation is to be arrived at only after successive federations of the component parts in some particular region of the world. An important step towards the federation of the South African States will be the federation of their Colonial forces. CHAPTER XI. FEDERATION IN DEFENCE. The strength of the European armaments of to-day is regulated by the varying responsibilities of the Govern- ments possessing them plus the defensive power of the other Government or Governments with whom their interests, geographically, diplomatically, or com- mercially are likely to clash. The strenuous efforts made by some of the greater Powers to become supremely strong in defensive power increases the suspicions of their neighbours, and the result is an ever-increasing warlike activity, detrimental to alliances that alone can assure a lasting peace among the dominant races of the world. There lacks that confidence among neighbouring nations necessary to fix the maximum strength required to safeguard each country's interests ; the result is, that the larger Powers are draining their strength in a nervous anxiety to raise and maintain armaments totally disproportionate to their responsibilities or their requirements, the object to be attained being lost sight of in ambition to eclipse a probable enemy, not so much in actual fighting power as in the amount of bullion expended, thus transferring the sphere of FEDERATION IN DEFENCE 249 offensive operations from the battlefield to the appar- ently less though more deadly field of taxation. In one or two cases an available and equally effective means for assuring defensive power, perhaps because less expensive, is neglected in this unreasonable anxiety for a heavy naval and military budget. None of the Powers pursue this suicidal course more obstinately than does Great Britain ; created and de- veloped by the sea and held by sea power, it would have been logically thought that by sea power she would elect to exist ; her policy for the last few years is, however, in direct contradiction to this ; an annually increasing Army vote has culminated in being almost equal to that of the Navy. It needs but a glance at past Budgets to note with concern the growing in- terest given to the Army, necessarily to the detriment of the Navy. Beyond the necessary calls upon our Army in India and a small war such as we had lately in Somaliland, it is difficult to understand for what purpose we require a standing Army, and why we should spend such a stupendous sum as that provided for the Army in this year's Budget. An Army of 240,000 kept on continual pay for what ? Invasion — the Navy can repel ; once the Navy fails in this, no Army can save Great Britain ; and as for the Colonies, what becomes of them should the Navy fail depends upon themselves, their strength, and their hinterland resources. It must be acceded that the ever-growing Imperial needs include an Army of a certain strength. It is a matter of reasonable doubt, 2SO COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE however, whether such an Army cannot be found by other and fairer means than that of the exorbitant taxation of one section of the Empire. Should Great Britain be shorn of her Colonies, her existence would still demand a Navy of the strength it is to-day ; the need for an Army, on the other hand, would disappear. It must, therefore, appear an anomaly that the contributions which are at present made by the Colonies to Imperial defence are given to that in- stitution of which they themselves are less directly in need. The Colonies, however, of course recognise that the true safety of the Empire lies in protecting its most vital part, and that that protection is the Navy, which, by maintaining the command of the sea, furnishes the only means of securing the forty odd millions of inhabitants of the United Kingdom from starvation. It was openly said by members of the late Govern- ment (Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget speech, 1 903) that the Colonial contributions are dis- appointing ; but has it ever seriously occurred to Ministers that if the whole question of Imperial de- fence had been carefully considered by them, or pre- ferably by a committee of experts with fair Colonial representation, a far more equitable means of Colonial contribution to Imperial defence would have long ere this been forthcoming ; and that, as a first step in a satisfactory arrangement, the land forces of the Empire would have been federated into an Imperial Army, the cost of which would have been equally borne by every British subject ? FEDERATION IN DEFENCE 251 The Colonies have a stronger military than naval sentiment, and they are in a position to train a very large percentage of their manhood as soldiers, and further to give that training over an area of country unobtainable in Great Britain. Owing to the circum- stances of Colonial life being analogous to campaign- ing, this training calls for little expense, when made compulsory by Acts such as are enforced in most of the Colonies. However fondly we cherish hopes of the Colonies being able to contribute in personnel to the Navy, such hopes must, by the circumstances surrounding Colonial life, be doomed to disappointment, except perhaps in the case of Newfoundland. Upon the other hand. Englishmen, as apart from Colonials, like all islanders, are naturally seamen, and every man recruited for the British Army in England is a man possibly lost to the Navy. The Anglo-Boer War illustrated to the world at large the value of Colonies governed by local respon- sibility — Burke's advocacy of governing Colonies as free countries has been amply justified — and it further proved how fallacious was the belief, that in time of trouble for the parent country those Colonies enjoying self-government, and therefore practically autonomous, would give no assistance beyond that of sentiment. The value of the Colonies in Imperial defence, how- ever, was acknowledged long before the term " Im- perial" was thought of, for as far back as 1756 — the " Seven Years' War" — we find that 25,000 Colonial 252 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Militia were supplied by our North American Colonies, and upon terms far more generous to the mother country than the terms upon which the Colonial con- tingents were supplied in the late Boer War, for they were actually raised, clothed, fed, and paid by the Colonies. Little is now heard of this practical illus- tration of loyalty. With the close of the war the prowess of the Colonials was forgotten by English statesmen, though from odd passages in history we find that these New Englanders did yeoman service. The time had not then arrived for any attempt to federate the land forces of the one or two Colonies then possessing them with the land forces of the United Kingdom ; the Colonies and their gifts of men were rapidly forgotten, and there were those who strongly advocated their abandonment. The second opportunity that occurred for federation was during the Soudan Campaign of 1885 ; most of the Colonies offered assistance, and a few troops were actually accepted from Australia — it was stated by those who should have known better that this acceptance was a precedent. In Egypt these Australians upheld the reputation gained by the Canadians more than a century before. They were thanked for their services, and to all appearances that was the end of it as far as the Empire was concerned. The practical sentiment evinced even then promised development into a Feder- ated Army. One and a half centuries had elapsed between the first Colonial contingent that served in Empire-making, and the last Colonial contingents FEDERATION IN DEFENCE 253 serving in Empire-keeping, and during that period nothing has been done by the authorities at home to bring the latter any closer to the British Army than the former were. It would have been thought that when the Army estimates began to overhaul in amount those of the Navy, British statesmen would have com- menced to study the complex forces of the Empire beyond the seas, with the object of bringing them to- gether for the purpose of federation into an Imperial Army, obtaining a greater Navy and giving lighter taxation in the United Kingdom, and a more just taxation to the Colonists. A more just taxation to the Colonist, because there is no room for doubt that he is more lightly dealt with in taxation, whether direct or indirect, than the less fortunate inhabitants of the United Kingdom ; though he is a partner in the privilege of temporary safety that the latter ob- tain by payment of an undue proportion of the cost. Whilst the increase in taxation was confined to the growing needs of the Navy, the British tax-payer had nothing to complain of. His own existence demanded an unrivalled Navy with or without Colonial appen- dages. It is a debatable question whether British sea-borne commerce would be much less than it is to-day, were the Colonies foreign possessions. The Navy, then, is the effect of the United Kingdom, as it is the cause of the Empire. Can this be said of the Army ? How many wars within the last century has England had that have not been in the interests of colonisation, or shall we say Empire-making? But 254 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE has not the goal been now reached ? Without fear of contradiction we can say that the Empire has been made, and that there no longer exists the need for the mother country to keep the secondary instrument that assisted in its creation. Her duty to herself calls for her to hand over the responsibility of the greater part of its upkeep to those for whose safety it is still required, and who are now yearly becoming better able to bear that responsibility. There is just the fear of the same neglect being shown to the Colonial forces to-day as was shown to Canadians in 1763. By "neglect" is meant that the material at hand in those forces will not be made use of in the moulding of a Federated Army, will not be reckoned an Imperial asset until a crisis arises, and then, through neglect in organisation and unity, their services may be valueless, for it may be that our future foe will not be as neglectful of his opportunities as was the Boer. In our smaller wars the Colonials are not given an opportunity of training themselves for greater things, and when greater things occur the Colonial has not, in the eyes of the authorities, obtained that experience to fit him for anything but a subordinate position ; and thus it is that he has not the opportunity of showing the higher qualities he may possibly possess. As a step in the direction of the federation now advocated, a proportionate share in the responsibilities should be allowed the Colonies. The argument against this in the present state of affairs is that the present FEDERATION IN DEFENCE 255 Army is kept by the British tax-payer ; the Colonial contributes nothing to it, and it is then but fair to give the responsible positions to those who have to bear the burden. But now that burden is increasing in weight in addition to that immovable and necessary load, the Navy, it is but fair to transfer a part of it to those upon whose behalf it has been carried for so long, now that they are in the position to carry it with ease. It will, perhaps, be asked as to how the transfer of burden or responsibility is to take place without revolutionising our long-cherished system of Empire governing. The principle should first of all be recog- nised that the Colonies contribute '\n personnel to the Imperial Army in proportion to their population, and that they share in proportion the privileges of Empire ; at present these privileges are barred them, except they accept the alternative of casting aside their Colony (an integral part of the Empire) and adopting England as a domicile. This course is open to any foreigner. The Colonist, by right of his relationship, the prestige he has given to the mother country by his enterprise in the exploitation of her possessions, and the wealth he sends to the motherland, has, in the past, deserved better treatment than this. If the Colonies had been allowed to take their share (in proportion to their population) in Imperial control in and from the sphere in which they had been brought up, they undoubtedly would have considered it their unquestionable duty to have shared in the responsibilities of Empire ; it indeed speaks well for their loyalty, and promises well for 2S6 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the future, for the crisis has passed, that they have stood the strain of indifference for one and a half centuries. To bring about the federation aimed at, there must, first of all, be a uniformity of ideas upon the subject. To obtain this, localisation must be neutralised to allow the Imperial idea to predominate. It has been argued that Colonials are not fitted by education and experience for the higher Imperial posts ; but do not Education and Experience stand for influence? I quite fail to see why an Australian should not do good diplomatic service in Egypt armed with an Australian University degree in lieu of a Cambridge or Oxford one. Will a Canadian make a worse governor of an Imperial possession because he has been educated at a Canadian College? Or a New Zealander or South African command troops in India with less skill or courage because his education and experience is Colonial ? I presume to think not. Give, therefore, to the Colonies a proportion of these offices equal to the proportion they contribute to the Empire's defence. What their proportion should be the Colonials themselves cannot very well determine — and who is to fix it for them ? Not the Imperial Defence Com- mittee, for it is hardly in sympathy with the Colonies ; its province goes no further than revising Colonial schemes submitted from year to year, and such re- visions are made under War Office methods. The lines upon which each Colony should travel to arrive at defensive federation must be carefully laid out by a council of experts — by experts is meant men intimately FEDERATION IN DEFENCE 257 acquainted with the Colonies and their resources. The object to be achieved should be union in substance ; not a mythical one of sentiment, something of an un- known quantity, as it has been in the past. The term " Federation " is in itself an elastic definition ; where- as prefixing " Defensive," it should involve at least universal service, uniformity of training, weapons, interchangeability and army rank of oflficers, an Im- perial Intelligence Department with a proportion of Colonial officers, and a proportion of Colonial officers on the headquarters staff. At present there are not two Colonies in the Empire whose defence system is controlled in the same manner ; one Colony has a Portfolio of Defence, another a Council of Defence, a third a Defence Committee, and a fourth is controlled by a Military Secretary. In some, appointments and offices are insecure promotions depending perhaps upon the wilfulness of a Minister or a member of the local House of Parliament, here to-day and gone to-morrow. In many instances these vety members are junior officers in the defence force they themselves control for a time, and the career of many good Colonial officers has been wrecked by the animosity of such individuals, caused often by personal feeling. The fault is due to the restricted responsibility of the Colonies, which in many cases (notably those but recently elevated to responsible government) is purely parochial. It is perhaps worthy of record here, as illustrating the low ebb Imperial politics can reach in the smaller 17 258 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Colonies, and showing the class of men Colonial poli- ticians are recruited from, to quote a recent political crisis that occurred in one of our Colonies. There were two questions before this particular Colony, one a Militia Bill that marked a departure in Imperial defence worthy of the Empire's attention, and the other question was, whether or no a new railway should be built. The Government went to the country on the latter question and was returned on that question alone. Few speeches were made on the Militia Bill then before the country, and two were against the passing of it into law, as interfering with the liberty of the subject ! Apparent apathy is due to ignorance, and that alone can be removed by the subject being raised from a local sphere into the atmosphere of Imperial politics, and this should be effected before indifference grows into real live antagonism caused by long neglect. The first step towards this wished for federation will be the formation of an Imperial Council of Defence with Colonial representation. The second step will be the remodelling of the War Office on Imperial lines. A Federated Defence Force centred in an Imperial War Office, such as is here advocated, would in a very short time weld together the varied land forces of the Empire into one Army, strengthened by its common interests. The British tax-payer would have his burden lightened, and the safety of the Empire would be secured by the presence of troops in every possession controlled for the good of the Empire. CHAPTER XII. THE EASTERN FACTOR.i In the sympathy which the love of justice and fair play has aroused among the Anglo-Saxon race for the Japanese in their war with Russia, it must not be for- gotten that it may be the means of reviving in Asiatic minds a hope of universal dominion. The policy suc- cessfully adopted at Marathon, Arbela, Zama, Chalons, and Tours, and the ascendency of the Europeans over the Asiatic horde under Abdurrahman at the battle of Tours, appeared to destroy forever the ambitious hopes of the Eastern races ruling the world with an Empire such as Cyrus and Xerxes had built. For 2,400 years the Western nations have succeeded in directing the pro- gress of the world, and, happily for mankind to-day. Orientalism was successfully checked at each of those momentous battles, adding renewed energy to civilisa- tion and securing the arts and sciences on a basis that enabled them to thrive and expand. Had the result of any one of those battles between the Eastern and Western races been different, the religious doctrines of Mahomet and Buddha would have been preached and 'This chapter was written during the early part of the Russo- Japanese War. 259 17 * 26o COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE followed throughout the world to-day, slavery and polygamy would have been common institutions, and it is left for the imagination to depict the position of the various nations at the present time. History is replete with monotonous instances of how after all the conquering Power enters upon a period of rapid ex- pansion until she in turn is overthrown. Persia, Athens, Carthage, and Rome are notable instances. The two Powers now confronting each other have undergone a like experience. Russia, up to the reign of Peter the Great, was content with internal progress ; she was satisfied with the extent of her borders, and it was not until in self-defence, at the battle of Pultowa, that she gained the power she now so unjustly exer- cises — that battle was the starting-point of her terri- torial expansion. In the two centuries that have elapsed, she has more than doubled her possessions, and she is to-day in a similar position to her antagonist, that she herself held to Sweden. Charles and his army despised the Russians and looked upon their conquest as a certainty ; the result was the beginning of a career of expansion for the weaker, and the rapid decline of the stronger Power. The ascendency of the Western races was gained in a battle of a few hours' duration, at Marathon, and for twenty-four centuries that ascendency has been retained, though seriously threatened by succeeding wars. It is a question, how- ever, whether the threat has been as serious as it is to-day, for the sympathy of a large section of the civil- ised race has gone out to that plucky little nation that THE EASTERN FACTOR 261 has been forced to fight for her existence, and that sympathy will greatly assist in the ultimate issue. If, as may be reasonably expected, the issue of the struggle between Russia and Japan is consummated by the union of the yellow races, half the population of the world comes under the Occidentalised Jap (the precedent lies in the unity of the Greek States under Athens) ; then will the East change places with the West by force of arms, Christianity will not even exist as it does in the Balkans, and the rapid decline of civilisation must result. The ultimate ascendency ofthe yellow races, though scouted by many as the idea of the hyper-nervous, is yet viewed with grave concern by all authorities on the Asiatic races, all of whom agree that ambition and knowledge of their past strength alone is required to cause them to swarm westwards. General Gordon proved that, with intelligent leadership, the Chinese made excellent soldiers, and our own Chinese regiments were only excelled in the last Chinese war by the Japs, in fighting and staying powers, though competing with international troops. Is it then to be supposed that once the road is open for their expansion westwards, the overcrowded yellow races, under the intelligent and able leadership of the far-seeing Jap, will not overrun their borders — is not the history of the world full of such instances? In view of the momentous and terrible events that must be brought into being by the defeat of a Euro- pean Power by an Asiatic nation, and by the advent 262 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE of a naval and militaiy Power with conquests to make, it must appear as if the wiser course would have been for England to have renounced her alliance with Japan, and insisted upon a compromise, or to have joined her and fought Russia and France for the safety of Europe ; such a course would have kept from Japan the intoxicating experience of independent conquest which has in the past always led to expansion by land and sea. The Occidentalisation of Japan is due to the astute people of that country recognising and appreci- ating the power of civilisation, rather than from any love of its moral attributes. Japan holds the unique position of being a civil- ised nation without that mainspring of civilisation — Christianity ; to attain her ascendency over the yellow races she will adopt the religion of Buddha ; this re- ligion, differing so slightly from that of Brahminism, is already taking a firm root in that country. It cannot be denied that there were more than ordinary causes to awaken the sympathy of all justice- loving people with the Japanese in their struggle with Russia ; and it is one of those instances that are to be met with in the history of mankind where sentiment overrules calm reason. Had newspapers existed at the time of Zama, those of the English language would undoubtedly have championed the cause of Hannibal and his veterans — his greatness yet appeals to us, and soldiers regret that he was defeated by the Consul Nero, a less worthy general — but the progress of civilisation demanded that defeat, as urgently as it THE EASTERN FACTOR 263 demands a check to Japanese territorial expansion to-day. It has been asserted that Japan will never follow a policy of aggression, that her past career proves that she will be content to retain her commercial policy, to renounce all ideas of territorial acquisition, and to develop her internal resources. Now the history of nations is fairly well known for at least three thousand years ; not a century has passed that an obscure nation has not gradually, or suddenly, gained ascendency over its neighbours. Does history contain a single instance of a nation once gaining that ascendency renouncing its power of territorial expansion? No, but, on the other hand, it relates how the conquered have been deprived of part or all of their territory by the successful enemy. Whilst sentiment and the higher sense of justice required that Russia should be beaten, reason and the experience of history demanded that intervention by the Western races should have occurred in time to prevent Japan from acquiring a foothold on the main- land of Asia ; once there, it would not be long before the marshalling of the yellow races for further expan- sion occurred. We need only measure the future of Asiatic expansion by that of Japan within the last twenty years to get some idea of what may be ex- pected should the dormant yellow races be awakened to a knowledge of their vast strength ; their very pas- siveness is an element of no mean danger, inasmuch as it will make them more amenable to the dictates of 264 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE their ambitious leaders. With the expulsion of Russia from Manchuria, Japan rids herself of a dangerous European neighbour ; she also accomplishes more than this, for the Chinese are brought under her moral in- fluence, and she assumes authority over all the latent power that vast host possesses. The creative power alone if once placed in motion and directed would pale that of Europe and America combined ; and it is in this productive power that China, if intelligently organ- ised, and in the hands of dictators, can be a menace to civilisation. War and the preparation for war with the Occident nation is restricted to the power of pro- duction of the means of modern war. The building of an ironclad is the work of many months, and the earnings of many years to some nations ; even the richest of the Powers are restricted, for the cost of labour limits the output. The manufacture of the munitions of war is a costly matter, and is so by reason of the cost of labour. The economic conditions under which a civilised nation prepares for war is such that the standard of effective- ness is regulated by the labour market. The labour that mines the ore, the labour that converts this ore into steel, and the many processes it passes through before finally becoming a fighting instrument, calls for great expense even to a populous nation, for the labourers, workmen, skilled artisans, and engineers are only obtained by the payment of wages which are regulated by the supply of this particular form of labour. If England had at her disposal, practically THE EASTERN FACTOR 265 concentrated, a reserve of 400,000,000 people, the men of whom she could place into mines, foundries, arsenals, and dockyards at an average wage of 2jd. per diem ; if, too, these labourers should be quick and intelligent, making excellent mechanics, becoming with instruc- tion clever engineers — if, then, England could control all that power, how easy it would be for her to create a fleet at little cost, which instead of being of a three- Power standard would outnumber that of the rest of the world. It is believed that Japan will be satisfied to quietly recover from her supposed exhaustion, and to renounce for the time further military glory. Her own past history will forbid her to take this retrograde step, as is borne out in the following paragraph in a remarkable memorial sent by the Daimyo of Mito to his Govern- ment on the 1 5th of July, 1853, advocating the forcible prevention of Perry's landing : — " Peace and prosperity of long duration have ener- vated the spirit, rusted the armour, and blunted the swords of our men. Dulled to ease, when shall they be aroused ? Is not the present the most auspicious moment to quicken their sinews of war ? " ^ The belief that Japan will seek ease upon the conclusion of the present war is founded upon what any European nation would be anxious to do in the present state of Western civilisation, but the fighting qualities displayed by the Japanese indicate that their idea of war is of a standard differing from that entertained by Western ' Nitobes, Intercourse between the United States and yapan. 266 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE races to-day ; their total disregard for death is a factor that gradual civilisation has eliminated. In Japan we iind all or more of the cultivated intelligence supposed until now to be the peculiar attribute of Europeans, successfully directing that fanatical bravery before supposed to belong to savages. Japan, like ourselves a maritime Power, will look for expansion by sea. It may be that she will content herself for a few years indeveloping Manchuria, even though the latter be retained in name by China. Her first care, however, will be to place her Navy upon a basis becoming the maritime Power her success in the Russian war entitles her to be considered. Her foresight has been revealed to the world by the preparedness exhibited in her recent struggle, which is but one of the many wars she is yet to engage in before attaining that rank all nations at some period of life aspire to. To satisfy the flutter of fear which must arise in the breast of every intelligent thinker, with the hope that Japan will be content to make no use of that material she has at hand for the elevation of herself to a world Power, or with any promise that she will not seek to increase her possessions, is folly to ourselves and criminally dangerous to our near descendants. Even granting that when the promise was made her states- men were sincere, she has by those great qualities she has displayed a perfect right to aspire to the highest goal it is possible for a nation to reach. Further, she has every right to make use of the material which circumstances have placed at her disposal. THE EASTERN FACTOR 267 From national experience, we, as Englishmen, know the great moral power given to us by victory. We know the individual pride that has grown to national pride and which is now growing into Imperial pride. And can we as Britishers imagine our present Government's tamely acquiesciixg in any foreign legislation against our immigration into the lands of foreigners? Did not Japan herself rescind her early laws on this very subject, and has she not a perfect right to demand that the doors of the world be opened to her citizens, be they labourers or nobles? With the evacuation of Manchuria by Russia, the possessions belonging to Western Powers and lying in proximity to Japan will be the Australasian portion of the British Empire, the Philippines belonging to the United States, and some minor possessions in the Pacific belonging to Germany, France, and Holland. It will be many years, however, before the Philippines reach that importance in the eyes of Japan that our own Pacific possessions hold. For some time Australia has been the land of adoption of numerous Japanese ; these men have toiled at the gold fields, they have competed successfully in nearly every calling engaged in by the Colonials, and, due to their thrift and abstemious habits, have made themselves rivals to be feared by the most assiduous European worker. The fact that by hereditary qualities their wants are reduced to a minimum enables them to thrive well upon what would not maintain men of another race. His inherited fatalism enables the Asiatic to undergo the maximum of toil with the minimum of 268 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE rest, sustenance, or reward ; this inbred fatalism too makes him the terror in battle. Sincere anxiety to die for one's country has long ago ceased to be the popular desire of any nation ; when such a sentiment honestly pervades an Army, that force, if intelligently directed, becomes irresistible. Owing to the intercourse that has for many years previous to the Asiatic Immi- gration Restriction Act occurred between Japan and Australia, the latter country has become intimately known to the inhabitants of Japan, and the want of sympathy existing between Colonist and Asiatic is reciprocal. It can well be imagined that the returned emigrant paints in glowing colours the land in which he had acquired wealth, which would arouse in his fellow-countrymen a desire to emigrate to a land of great promise. We find in Thursday Island and British New Guinea connecting links between Asia and Australia, veritable stepping-stones from the one Continent to the other. Indeed Thursday Island is practically in the hands of the Japanese, and at one time the pearl fisheries of Torres Straits threatened to pass into their posses- sion until licences were restricted to British subjects. Australia, then, among the inhabitants of Japan, is regarded as a land of promise, just as America was looked upon by the Irish some half century ago. The sovereignty claims which were made by Spain over America in the seventeenth century appear, viewed in the light of those days, as legitimate as the claims we hold over our own large possessions to-day. Can THE EASTERN FACTOR 269 it be authoritatively asserted that these claims in the light of two centuries hence will not to the future race appear as hazy as those bygone claims of Spain do in our eyes. With the allaying of the Russian threat the Japanese will be enabled to follow the natural bent of their maritime inclinations. From history we know that expansions must take place after a successful war, and we also know from our own experience and from that of Greece that expansion will follow the element upon which the victory was gained. At the moment it would directly appear to both the British and the Japanese public as if the two countries are sworn allies for all time. In Waterloo days the same apparent friendship was believed in between the Teutons and ourselves ; who can foretell the propinquity of a breach of this peace of 100 years? Yet there has not been present anything of that contentious nature which must at an early date present itself to Japan and our- selves. The analogy between the two countries is striking, Japan, owing to her rapid Occidentalisation, might with truth be termed a hot-house variety of Great Britain. Japan has in forty years attained cer- tain aspects of civilisation, a point reached by us through the growth of seven centuries. The Magna Charta that was given to Japan by her nobles, as we obtained ours by the patriotism of our barons, was granted by the Mikado in the year 1869. The five articles of that charter, which embody the principles responsible for Japan's success in her war with Russia, are as follows : — ■ 270 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE 1. A Deliberative Assembly shall be formed and all measures shall be decided by public opinion. 2. The principles of social and political sciences shall be constantly studied by both higher and lower classes of the people. 3. Every one in the community shall be assisted in obtaining liberty of action for all good and lawful purposes. 4. All the old absurd usages of former times shall be abolished, and the impartiality and justice which are displayed in the working of nature shall be adopted as fundamental bases of States. 5. Wisdom and knowledge shall be sought after in all quarters of the civilised world for the purpose of firmly establishing the foundations of Empire. In 1875 a Senate was formed, and in 1890 the first Parliament was established. Fourteen years later this suddenly enlightened nation successfully engaged in war the most powerful (numerically) Western nation, thus asserting, by might unmistakable, all those privi- leges enjoyed by the civilised nations of to-day. The very rapidity of their rise is all the more likely to make them chafe at those restrictions they must meet with to their expansion, and their ally England is the Power with whose interests and ideas their own will first clash. It has been fondly considered that diplomacy on our part had successfully coped with those delicate questions of restricting Japanese immigration into our Australian Colonies, refusing them licences to fish in our waters, and, in fact, treating them as they had THE EASTERN FACTOR 271 wished to treat us in their uncivilised age of barely half a century ago. The care, energy, and skill dis- played in the preparation of their war with Russia make it appear as if the diplomacy in their relation- ship with us was all on their side. The overshadow- ing danger of Russia called for undivided attention in that direction ; that danger has now been removed and Japan is at liberty to redress wrongs or fancied wrongs in other quarters, and to assert that authority and claim those rights she may consider her due as the victor in a war of the first magnitude. The difficulties that confront England in Japan's probable expansion in the Pacific are accentuated by the fact that two of her possessions in that ocean have now grown into small nations, and the views held by the Colonists on the question of Asiatic immigration are strong in the extreme. With the first note of protest sounded by Japan at the wholesale exclusion of her citizens from Australia friction must arise. Whatever form that protest may take we know, from what has already transpired with Russia, that such will be no idle request for an alter- ation of our laws; and however willing the mother country might be to accede to what might appear to her a reasonable request, the Colonists, governed by a democratic form of Government, would most em- phatically refuse to depart from that course considered absolutely necessary for self-preservation. If by any means strained relationship existed between England and a Western Power, her position would indeed be a 2/2 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE difficult one. The position for our Pacific Colonies would be unpleasant ; Australia and New Zealand, as self-governed, would at least be sure from conquest — if their defences were in order. Measuring Japan's advance by the standard of her progress in the past, it cannot be deemed improbable that within the next decade events may so shape themselves that Australia may yet be called upon to withstand an armed invasion of her shores. The rise of a naval Power in Eastern waters is far from being an unmixed blessing for ourselves, and it will be looked upon with the greatest satisfaction by our probable foes in Europe ; there is reason for the hope on their part and the fear on ours that out of regard to our im- portant interests in the Eastern Hemisphere we may divide our naval force, considerably weakening ourselves in both quarters of the globe ; any estrangement that may occur between Japan and England will be helped on by our Continental neighbours with every hope of seeing that long-predicted downfall of the British Empire, which may mean the redistribution of one- fourth of the earth's surface. For Australia, the rise of the Japanese naval power to its present strength is indeed a serious matter ; it threatens to bring about that Power's supremacy of the Pacific, it foretells her commercial invasion of Pacific ports, it predicts her successful competition in the Pacific trade. But it also indicates the possibility of considerably damaging Australian trade in the event of a war in which Japan is ranged on the other side. THE EASTERN FACTOR 273 To what extent Australia is to suffer in such a war depends solely upon herself. The more; immediate her preparation the more successful will she be in the issue ; at present her internal political strife, more damaging than bloodshed, is weakening her morally, and physi- cally ; morally, for the legislation now indulged in is of that parochial type which makes for disloyalty. She is so engrossed in legislating for the immediate present that all idea of providing for the future is neglected. The tenets of Socialism, more universally accepted in Australia than in any other Colony under the British flag, are when used by the ignorant a most dangerous weapon against good government. Australia has lately acceded to the almost impossible requests of the Social- istic leaders, and since the rise to power of the Labour party, laws benefiting the idle and unworthy have been and are still being enacted to the detriment of the workers, the landholders, and those with a stake in the Country, and with the result that the threatening Eastern danger is lost sight of. Before their country is really threatened the machinations of the professional politician may have done its work. If, however, as it is to be hoped, the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War and the magnitude of its importance to the Western race in general and the Australians in particular be realised in time, and calm reason can again obtain the ascendency, then there is yet time for Australia to prepare herself for that inevitable struggle which con- fronts her. For her, a non-maritime community, to have any ambitious ideas of ever possessing even the nucleus 18 274 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE of a navy which can assist in any way in the defence of her shores in any conflict with Japan is worse than idle — it is mischievous. If she be true to herself and accept whole-heartedly that role which Nature has fashioned her to, then she has little to fear. With nearly 1,000,000 fighting men, vast resources in food and horses, even a partial invasion of her territory is impossible. We have seen how impotent naval bom- bardment has been in the late war. It has shown us the superiority of guns mounted on shore over guns at sea. Let then Australia take these lessons to heart and prepare her defences in time. One great truth politicians should recognise, whatever shade of political opinion they may hold, however bitterly they may op- pose their political opponents, and that is, that there is a far graver danger than their party's defeat, and that is the defeat of their country. Let there be unanimity in at least one thing — the security of their country. It stands out above all other national ques- tions, and yet is the one which generally gets but little consideration. If unanimity cannot be arrived at, then the subject should be removed from the field of politics and placed above the influences and counter-influences of those ignorant of its proper place in national life. Defence must rise superior to all else in the minds of every Australian, be he labourer, farmer, Socialist, or capitalist. Can we, remembering our own rise to Empire, the manner of our acquisitions and method of expansiveness ; knowing that our claims, considered valid by ourselves but invalid perhaps by those upon THE EASTERN FACTOR 275 whom we have made them, were more often than not enforced by the sword ; can we object or refuse to be- lieve that such will occur, if Japan or any other suddenly elevated Power attempts to enforce with the sword, to us, invalid claims upon our territory ? How can we object except by the sword, and that to-day is, as it was in the beginning of history, and as it will be in the end, the ultimate resource of nations. No, let us not be carried into false security by the pen of the Altruist ; let us remember that in the midst of peace we are in war, and that salvation is only in preparedness ; then, and only then, can we hope to secure our existence as an Empire. If Australia and New Zealand did not exist, no doubt the alliance between England and Japan would continue firm for a very long period indeed ; ultimately oceanic supremacy would have to be contended for. As, however, they do exist, and may be considered at an early date by certain Japanese statesmen as geo- graphically more the property of Japan than any other Power, it is well within the range of practical politics that the one attempt at acquisition may be made, similar to that we ourselves made on French territory or that Philip of Spain made on England. It is not for us to declare that history shall not repeat itself because such might be unpleasant for ourselves ! And it is our own fault if the lessons given so repeatedly by that history be ignored. The elements of trouble between Japan and ourselves have their parallel in the past. Australia's proximity to Japan and her antagon- 18* 2/6 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE istic legislation against Asiatics, justifiable doubtless, single her out as the object of attack and perhaps attempted annexation ; therefore it is for her to place her defences in that order the Empire and the urgency of the moment demand. CHAPTER XIII. AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL OF DEFENCE. Reference has elsewhere been made to Councils of Defence and local Defence Committees already existing in those self-governing Colonies which are beginning to appreciate the need for self-defence, and are recog- nising it as a prelude to Imperial defence ; mention has also been made of the advantage that would ensue if the few Colonies yet retaining Defence Committees converted them into the more comprehensive and more largely empowered Councils of Defence ; a sug- gestion has also been made for a Supreme Council to act as an Advisory Board upon all matters relating to the Empire's defence. No doubt one of the arguments likely to be brought against the creation of such a council would be that there already exists a hybrid Advisory Execu- tive Board in the shape of the lately appointed Im- perial Defence Committee, the personnel of which consists of the most eminent men in the Empire ; it is also likely to be urged that a better selection could not very well be made for the consideration of the few important questions that may come before 277 278 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE them. The question at once arises as to the wisdom of appointing Crown Ministers and heads of depart- ments to a committee of this description ; it can hardly be alleged that such hard-worked officials are in a position to afiford the time from their own particular departments to deal with any questions of Imperial defence, except, perhaps, of the very gravest import- ance. And at the time that such questions would arise, the work requiring personal supervision in their several departments would be greatly augmented ; and though the work of these departments might be bear- ing directly upon the Empire's defence, yet the threads held by the committee would be bound to drop, to be irretrievably tangled, or the duties would devolve, as they often have in the past, in parallel cases, upon some official totally unacquainted with the subjects he has to consider. In either case it would mean neglect for the Colonies, and a weakening in Imperial defence. To any one who has, since the late Boer War, seriously considered the question, and has come to the conclusion that the Colonies are worthy of positions as separate links in the chain of Imperial defence, it must appear an error that an Imperial Defence Com- mittee, consisting of officials, was appointed instead of an Imperial Council of Defence being created which would consist of gentlemen selected by virtue of their intimate knowledge of the Colonies, or for the interest they have taken in the Empire's defence. The very success of such a council, committee, or board, should. AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL OF DEFENCE 279 of course, lie in the study by every individual consti- tuting it, of the principles applicable to and governing the defence of the Empire, and every detail under- lying those principles. It is but within very recent years that anything of Imperial, as apart from local, defence has become understood in the Colonies, and its study so far has been but in the abstract. The Colonies are beginning, however, to recognise in theory at least what their obligations to the mother country and to one another are. In the late war they carried these theories into practice and gave an indication of what they could and what they would do should a more urgent occasion arise. Each year sees the population of the Colonies increase at a greater ratio than that of any of the European States, so that every year of peace makes the Empire a more formidable enemy to a European foe. Hardly a month elapses that does not see some law passed in one part of the Empire or another, directly or indirectly bearing upon Imperial defence — directly, by a Compulsory Service Bill, or the appointment of a Defence Commission ; indirectly, by the passing of a preferential tariff in favour of the mother-country or of a sister Colony, and by such means drawing nearer bonds that are already close ; and thus we see the principles, both in theory and practice, accepted on all sides. The time, then, is certainly ripe for a full consideration and discussion of all the details of this all-important subject. It will, I think, be readily admitted that the details of such an exhaustive and far-reaching scheme as 28o COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE successful Imperial defence cannot with any hope of success be undertaken by any one section of the Empire ; and it is for that very reason that the method of selection of the present members of the lately formed Imperial Defence Committee is to be deprecated. If the Colonies are to be seriously acknowledged as part of the Empire, where and when defence is concerned, then the Committee is far from being representative ; but, apart from that fact it must, as already pointed out, be a matter of doubt whether the gentlemen in question can afford the time or interest to do justice to this all-important question. In every individual case their work on this committee must be subordinate to their ministerial or departmental labours, yet it is of vital importance to the Empire at large, as will be amply proved by the next war, that the work of this committee should be, in itself, of primary importance. Most Governments, foreign and Colonial, have con- demned as bad in principle the appointment of persons to standing committees, commissions, and boards by right of any official position they may hold. Nothing tends to deadlock more rapidly than this, for official dignity has no reason. If properly constituted, and as a council rather than a committee, far-reaching would have been its effects and great results would have been obtained. The creation of an Imperial Defence Council might have been taken in hand with due con- sideration of the Colonies, and above all things, its personnel should have had an intimate knowledge of Colonial capabilities, requirements, and sentiments, and AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL OF DEFENCE 281 not have been selected in view of any official position they may at the time have been occupying. The type of Imperialist that one immediately connects with any council of an Imperial nature is of that school repre- sented by Lord Strathcona, Sir George Clarke, Sir Charles Dilke, and Mr. Spencer Wilkinson, gentlemen in whom the Colonies would feel the greatest confidence, for nowhere in the Empire is it more readily admitted than in the Colonies that such men have practically contributed to our defence by their writings, their speeches, and their actions ; the influence of which has extended beyond the United Kingdom. The object of this chapter, then, is to plead for an Imperial Council of Defence, with 2, personnel consist- ing of gentlemen holding such sentiments, and having the ability to carry them into practice. Then, and not till then, will the principle and detail of the problem be successfully dealt with, and a clearer understanding as to the requirements, responsibilities, and resources of each of the Imperial family result. Upon the sup- position that, instead of the present Imperial Defence Committee, an Imperial Council of Defence had been appointed, consisting of say seven well-known Im- perialists, chosen with due regard for their Imperialistic ideas and services, it is only reasonable to believe that Mr. Brodrick's Army reform scheme would have been founded upon Imperial lines ; the data placed before the Secretary of State for War by such a council would have enabled this to have been done, and the confidence felt in the council would alone have prevented controversy. 282 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE The functions of such a council would of necessity be broader than those exercised by the present com- mittee. It would be their duty to consider the means of drawing more closely together the Imperial forces, both military and naval. It would be within their pro- vince to investigate the indirect influences bearing upon defence; at present only those directly apparent are considered, for time prevents more ; and as a higher intelligence department, owing to its peculiar construc- tion, this council would be invaluable. It is, perhaps, due to the peculiar and erratic growth of the British Empire, a formation that has taken place without any previous design, that a disjointed system of govern- ment and control exist here, or there a piece of contin- ent annexed for political reasons without warning, an island added here through force of circumstances, and more often than not territories practically taken pos- session of by the peaceful British immigrant or trader — the annexation of these being the only solution to the problem of protection and safeguarding of interests. Such a system of Imperial expansion, so entirely differ- ent in its process to that of any other Empire ancient or modern, makes it exceedingly difficult to meet the demands incumbent upon its defence. A military system that met the responsibilities dependent on an island kingdom, but which proved unworkable for either Empire-making or keeping as far back as 1781. is, strange to say, the system still adhered to. If there be one policy more than another in which a disjointed system is a grave danger to the Empire at large, it is AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL OF DEFENCE 283 that of defence. To be even safe we must have unity, and that, in the proper sense, we have not. Every Eng- lishman knows that we have it in sentiment ; in times of peace it may pay very well, but a week or two of war under present conditions will cost the savings of years of peace. In this all-important matter, we must have unity in practice, for it is in the lack of it in practice that our probable foes hope for their success in time of war. We have not far to look to see that that hope does exist, and in authoritative circles. General von der Goltz, in an article published in the Deutsche Rundschau of March, 1900, says: "Great Britain is forced to distribute her fleets over many seas in peace as well as in war, and her Home Squadron is surpris- ingly weak in comparison with her fleets in the Mediterranean and in India, the Far East, Australia, the Red Sea, South Africa, the West Indies, and the Pacific. In that necessary distribution of her strength lies Great Britain's weakness. Germany is in a better position ; her Navy is small, but it can be kept together in Europe; our Colonies want no protection, for a victory in Europe would give us our Colonies back at the conclusion of peace. With Great Britain matters are different. If India, Australia, or Canada should be lost in a war, they would remain lost for ever." Surely a more urgent hint is not required for unity in the Empire's defence than that given by a man of General von der Goltz's standing on the active list of Germany's Army. It is not to be expected that the unity asked for can 284 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE be obtained through the War Office direct, nor can we look for it through the Imperial Defence Committee, as it is now constituted. It must, then, come through the efforts of an Imperial Council of Defence, con- stituted somewhat on the lines already suggested. The necessity for this council is, perhaps, at present more apparent in the Colonies than in England ; most, if not all, the Colonies are anxious to strengthen their defences. The late war would appear to have had a more impressive effect upon the Colonists than upon the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. In some instances the energy and money spent upon the reorganisation of defence forces and the erection of defence works is not as advantageously expended as it would probably be if a council were in existence to advise and to assist in bringing about a uniformity of action on the part of all the Colonies, or to recommend that individual defence policy to each Colony which would result in harmony for the Empire. The pro- posed council should be the advisers of the War Office on all Colonial defence matters, and should, on the other hand, interpret War Office requirements in land defences, forces, and armaments to the Colonies ; they should be responsible for the drawing up of all mobilisation schemes in which any or all of the Colonies would be concerned, the collecting of returns, and act generally in all matters relating to the better govern- ment, training, equipment, etc., of the Colonial forces, ever bearing in mind a standard of Imperial efficiency. It would be necessary for this council to hold the same AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL OF DEFENCE 285 relationship to the Admiralty as it should to the War Office, and it would be within its province to say whether any particular Colony would benefit the Empire more by direct contributions in money to the Navy or Army, by contributing in personnel, or by strengthening her local defences, either military or naval. At present all the Colonies are judged alike, irrespective of the difference in their geographical position, size, population, wealth, or communications. Does it not then stand to reason, that as the Colonies themselves are blindly groping to assist in the Empire's defence, the advice of such a council, formed for the Empire's good, would be most loyally followed by one and all of the Colonies if the personnel of the council were men likely to show real interest, and be in sympathy, rather than adhere to the present hazardous disjointed system of each Colony doing that which appears best from a local view? A Colonial Government would with confidence vote the necessary funds for a local Navy, if such a council, after due con- sideration of evidence, and in consultation with dele- gates from the Colonial Defence Councils, considered that its existence added to, rather than weakened, the Empire's defence. In the same way a Colony would capitalise its naval contribution, and use the money thus raised with confidence upon such form of defence as the council might recommend for Imperial safety. At present, though each and all the Colonies are more than anxious to do what they can for the defence of the whole, there lacks a directing body to make 286 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the right use of the various energies and resources available in the Empire. The proposed council would be in touch with the Defence Councils existing in the self-governing Col- onies ; these, in most cases, consist of seven members, selected for their knowledge of local defence require- ments. At present their deliberations go no further than their respective Colonies. This in itself is short- sighted, and is a waste to the Empire of energy, and, in many cases, ability. There are, no doubt, many able men serving upon those obscure councils who but want the opportunity to serve the Empire beyond their restricted areas, and in these cases it would be only as delegates to the Central Council that the oppor- tunity would occur for the exhibition of dormant talent. Those Colonial Councils of Defence, though not possessing executive powers, have been found of the greatest value as advisory bodies to their Governments, and in all cases they are a hard-worked body of men ; if the scope of their labours and their outlook be extended beyond their immediate surroundings, the Empire will adequately realise the strength it possesses within itself. Individually, the gentlemen sitting on these Colonial Councils are influential in their own Colonies, their opinions carry weight among their own people, and, as a body, their recommendations are given the greatest consideration, and are invariably carried into effect by their respective Governments. It will be readily admitted that delegates from each AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL OF DEFENCE 287 of these councils, meeting in conference with the Central Council, will be able to perfect the Imperial scheme of defence ; that well-thought-out plans must be the result ; and at the end of the conference the delegates will return to their Colonies with a full knowledge of the part each of the Imperial family will take when war breaks out upon us, and well aware of every detail necessary for their own individual Colonies to make perfect. It then but remains for the Colonial Councils to mature the plan as discussed at the conference, and as affecting themselves, and submit the expenditure to be authorised, as it un- doubtedly would, by their respective Governments. The Central Council, strengthened by its conference, will be in a position to submit to the Admiralty and War Office an accurate statement of the defensive ability or power of each and all of the Colonies, and any re- commendation bearing upon the subject. But it is not to be supposed that the Central Council would cease its labours with annual or bi-annual conferences ; some at least of its members should make themselves practic- ally acquainted with the Colonies by periodical official visits, and thus seeing for themselves the conditions surrounding the organisation and training of the forces of the Colonies ; such visits must of necessity keep alive the Imperial sentiment, and would be a tangible token of it. The value of an Imperial Council of Defence, and the work pursued by it in peace, could only be fully appreciated in time of war, when that time does come, 288 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE as most assuredly it must, and that chaotic state, so familiar in the past, would be absent, and for once in the history of the Empire we would be prepared, and well prepared. The labours of the Imperial Council of Defence, if properly carried out, would then practi- cally cease with a full consciousness of Imperial security. Since the foregoing was written, the Defence Com- mittee of the Cabinet has been re-constructed, and is now constituted as a department presided over by the Prime Minister, who appoints its members. The per- manent or non-political members are : A secretary appointed for five years, two naval officers selected by the Admiralty, two military officers chosen by the War Office, two Indian officers nominated by the Viceroy, and one or more representatives of the Colonies, all these officers being appointed for two years. The duties of this department will be to con- sider all questions of Imperial defence, to obtain information, to prepare documents, to furnish advice, and to keep records. The representation allowed the Colonies must as- suredly have been based upon a population basis, and not upon their relative importance in Imperial defence. " One or more representatives from the Colonies " — the numerical expression " one or more " is indeed vague ; should the representation be fixed at the minimum, what particular part of the Colonial pos- sessions will the representative be selected from ? If Canada, as it is but fair to suppose, what expression of AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL OF DEFENCE 289 Colonial opinion other than Canadian can be heard ? In what way will the remaining Colonial opinion be voiced ? If Colonial opinion is earnestly looked for in matters connected with the Empire's defence, if the British authorities are honestly concerned with the de- fence of Colonial possessions, then fair Colonial repre- sentation should in all reason be granted. It is not asked that the Colonial representatives should have executive authority, nor is it suggested that their vote should carry the same weight as the British or Indian members ; their opinion would, however, be welcomed by their colleagues, for such would be of assistance in formulating a policy likely to make for efficiency. No minimum in Colonial representation on the Defence Committee is worth seriously considering that does not reflect the opinion of at least the large sections of the Colonial Empire, and this would mean one member from Canada, one representing Australia, including the Pacific Islands, one member from New Zealand, one from South Africa, representing also South-Central Africa, and one from the West Indies. At the time of writing, though provided for, no Colonial representatives have been elected, and it is presumed that at no far distant date the British Govern- ment will be calling upon the Colonial Governments for nominees ; in doing so, it is to be sincerely hoped, in the best interests of the important subject they will be called on to deliberate upon, that it will be pointed out in unmistakable terms how His Majesty's Government desire nominations to the Imperial Defence 19 290 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE Committee or Council to be made free of all political or personal bias. It may be contended that such a re- quest, however carefully wrapped up, would be regarded as want of courtesy, or even undiplomatic. Colonial legislators as a rule, certainly those in the smaller Colonies, have been moulded in a rough school, and whilst often showing very fine qualities, they also at times display very low ones, and but those of uneasy conscience would resent a very reasonable request, though resentfully the request would be acceded to. If such a wish were not expressed by the Home authorities, there is more than the possibility of the committee or council being burdened with one or more unsuitable gentlemen selected for party reasons. The re-organisation of the old Defence Committee is, it is hoped, but the prelude to the creation of the Im- perial Council of Defence so anxiously advocated here — for until then it will be quite impossible to keep from its deliberations the bias of politics, and defence to be effective must be secure from political discord. Under the heading of " Organisation of Imperial Resources" further reference will be made to this proposed council. CHAPTER XIV. THE ORGANISATION OF OUR IMPERIAL RESOURCES. Of Commodore Perry's visit to Japan in 1853, Genjo Vume Monatari, a contemporaneous writer, says : — " The military class had, during a long peace, neg- lected military arts, they had given themselves up to pleasure and luxury, and there were very few who had put on armour for many years, so that they were greatly alarmed at the prospect that war might break out at a moment's notice, and began to run hither and thither in search of arms." In an exaggerated form this describes our own un- prepared condition at the outbreak of the Boer War. To meet what must be considered a very small call upon an Empire so large as ours, England in the year 1900 was left with few regular troops ; a hostile Army corps might with the greatest of ease have marched victoriously through England. She had practically depleted herself of trained men, and also, astounding as it must appear, of the implements and munitions of war. To meet an enemy of farmers, that never numbered more than 80,000, England depleted herself of men and material and laid herself open to invasion. A nation numbering over 40,000,000 of people, with 291 19 * 292 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE barely 200,000 men at the seat of war, said to be de- fenceless, seems incomprehensible, at a time too that their puny enemy, not numbering a trained man among them in the sense that our military authorities under- stand the term, was scoring success after success. Truly if from among the population of the United Kingdom there are not forthcoming 3,000,000 men of a fighting age, trained sufficiently to make invasion of territory during a temporary diversion of the Navy im- possible, then the fault is solely want of organisation. The writer is well aware that the suggestions put forward will be severely criticised, because radical re- forms are advocated and a departure from the long and well-beaten paths is suggested. The Brain of Imperial Defence. — At present this portion of our defensive anatomy is filled by the De- fence Committee. In Chapter XII. it will be seen how this department is at present constituted, and of what its labours are to partake. That the constitution of this Advisory Board is a step in the right direction must be admitted by all. We have here the co-ordina- tion of the two services in deliberative matters ; it is in fact the only point in our defence scheme where the two services are brought into touch, and then the senior service is only represented by two members. The pre- ponderating element on this board, which one some- times sees prefixed out , of courtesy "Imperial," is composed of gentlemen belonging to the Army, a service that can hardly be termed " Imperial " in the ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 293 full acceptance of the term. In matters connected with the Empire at large there can be little doubt that the naval officer has a broader idea of the subject; his training is " Imperial". In the course of his career he is continually visiting all parts of the British possessions, and by the time he has reached flag rank, there is little left connected with Imperial defence that he has to learn. This is not always the case with those of the sister service ; their experience of the Empire is often very restricted, seldom indeed extending beyond the British Isles and India ; they, therefore, are only able to judge the subject from the points of view given by the requirements of those two portions of our posses- sions. The value of their judgment also depends on the branch of the Army the members of the Defence Com- mittee have served in. The Engineer and the Garri- son Artilleryman have had to look more seriously upon their profession than the average Linesman. The representation given to India on the committee is no doubt fair and equitable, and from the great number of able soldiers that portion of the Empire con- tains, the Indian representatives will be of the greatest value. But it is impossible to discover upon what principle two soldiers from India, in addition to two military officers selected by the War Office — who, it is but reasonable to suppose, have served in India for some considerable time — are called to serve upon a committee constituted to advise upon the broad ques- tions of Imperial Defence, while only two officers are taken from that service which is admittedly the first 294 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE line of defence — a service that is directly responsible for the security of the Empire. It may be that this Defence Committee is but a temporary measure, for in the past advisory bodies, as distinct from bodies with executive power, have not proved successful. It is in- variably found by Governments resorting to this loose form of obtaining lines of policy, that the result is un- satisfactory, for it more often than not happens that the line of policy advocated by the Advisory Board is found, for some political divergence of opinion in the Cabinet, unable to be followed, reforms are not adopted, and existing measures are allowed to drift still further into the obsolete and inefficient stage. In all large business concerns there is no such thing as a board not having executive authority, and so it is with the more efficient and up-to-date Governments in the world. The circumstances governing the defence of the Empire as a whole are so entirely different from those upon which the defence of any other country depend that it would be folly to base our organisation upon that of any foreign nation. The independent policy so successfully followed by the naval authorities is one that might with success be adopted by the other branches of the defence system. In the re-organi- sation of our defence system it will be necessary to commence at the head, and we propose to start with the suggested abolition of the Defence Committee, creating in its place a permanent Imperial Defence Council, constituted as follows : — ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 295 Imperial Navy Imperial Army Home Section Imperial Army Indian Section Imperial Army Australian Section , Imperial Army Canadian Section Imperial Army South African Sec. New Zealand Three Members. Two Members. Two Members. One Member. One Member. One Member. One Member. I Nominated by the British j Cabinet. Nominated by Indian Govt. Nominated by Australian Commonwealth. Nominated by Dominion. Nominated by the High Commissioner pending the Federation of the S.A. Colonies. Nominated by the New Zealand Government. In all eleven members. The members of this council should be appointed for a period of five years, and not be eligible for a further period. At least one of the permanent secretaries should be a naval officer and one a Colonial. Such appointments would of course be made by the council. A council constituted as here suggested would com- mand the utmost confidence of the entire Imperial population, every member haying the interest of at least one section of the Empire particularly at heart. Each part of the Empire would vie with the other in sending their most able men. The Governments of Great Britain, India, and the Colonies would be satisfied that a policy requiring professional direction was in the hands of a professional body. The executive powers vested in this council must be such as not to vitiate its labours, nor should they clash with the powers of the Admiralty, War Office, or Colonial Defence Coun- cils ; such could not happen if its labours were confined 296 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE to that sphere containing the policy of Imperial de- fence, a policy at present divided between the British Cabinet, Defence Committee, periodical commissions, Colonial Governments, Admiralty, War Office, and Colonial Defence Committees. Imperial Navy. — The Navy estimates for 1908-9 amount to ;^32,3 19,500, an increase of ;£'900,ooo over last year ; when we add to this the estimate for the Army for the same period, viz., £l i ,042,366, the burden of defence on the population of the United Kingdom totals .£'63,361,866 — truly a stupendous sum. If this sum were constant then 15,000,000 tax-payers would know their liability and prepare for it. The continuous expansion in the heavy defence votes, out of all pro- portion to the increase of tax-payers, is disturbing ; this, too, when it is realised that these votes are regu- lated by the votes of two or more foreign Powers whose armies of necessity are proportionately less expensive, and whose navies are threats upon our long-retained oceanic supremacy. For some years Russia and France have been re- sponsible for our annually increasing naval vote. With the conclusion of a war which proved very expensive to Russia in war vessels, there was some promise of breathing space in our building programme, as every vessel lost to Russia was a boat gained to England. Germany, however, threatens to forge ahead. Her naval estimates for the year 1908 amount to ;£■! 6,966,1 86, as compared with ;£■! 3,628,247 in 1907. ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 297 The vote for new construction included under the special ordinary estimates is ;^3,477,942, and the pre- vious year the amount expended under this head was ;^3>S47>972. The rise of Germany to naval rank adds but another factor in a probable combination formed for the purpose of wresting the command of the sea from us, and our only hope is to build abreast of those likely to combine against us. To accomplish this successfully it is impossible to fix the naval estimates and to refuse to exceed such a fixed sum. It does not follow, however, that the total defence estimates might not be kept within bounds. For a maritime Power such as Great Britain, boasting continental Colonies, each containing land forces approaching small Armies, to keep a standing Army costing nearly as much as the service upon which she depends for safety, appears upon the face of it — absurd. It is but necessary for our naval estimates to remain stationary for a few years for a likely combination of three or even two Powers to be slightly superior on the seas to ourselves ; when once that happens, good-bye to diplomacy, until called in to fix the terms of peace. The unpalatable truth must be faced that a naval vote is an increasing one ; possibly compensated for, however, by a proportionate decreasing Army vote when the Colonies have been persuaded to shoulder their legitimate portion of the burden. The self-governing Colonies have evinced a desire to take some share in the annual expenditure upon the Navy, though by no means a proportionate share ; at 298 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE least one of the large Colonies has contemplated the creation of a separate small fleet for the protection of her coasts. It has already been pointed out how futile this policy must be, and what wasteful expendi- ture in obtaining only a small proportion of that security guaranteed by a powerful homogeneous Navy controlled at the fountainhead of naval supremacy — the British Isles. England's best has been given to her Navy, generations upon generations have adopted this service as their hereditary profession, their sons and grandsons will follow their ancestors' calling as an un- questionable duty, quite content that their ability will be rewarded with that promotion deemed fitting to their capacity. By this means England has bred her Navy, the efficiency of which depends upon that breed being kept pure. To sully it with that political dis- cord rampant in the small self-governing Colonies is insidiously to undermine that discipline upon which naval strength relies. The Empire's absolute reliance upon the command of the sea is a proposition almost self-evident, and one wonders at the thoughtlessness, almost amounting to treason, which is exhibited by political partisans when debating the naval estimates ; for they must be credited with some share of ordinary intelligence, by the light of which they shall see the more than probable coalition that at an early date will be brought against us. Their knowledge of history has surely told them that when a continental nation feverishly pushes on an extensive naval programme, such as Germany has but lately ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 299 adopted and is now doing, there is an ulterior motive. Rome recognised that her only means of crushing Carthage would be by means of a Navy ; she developed a naval programme, and then pushed a maritime war against her ancient enemy to the gates of Carthage itself. These lessons are always repeated ; we have an in- stance within the memory of those not yet old. The Federals recognised that naval power would be abso- lutely necessary to overthrow their opponents effectu- ally, and therefore hastily developed a naval pro- gramme ; by these means — the naval support afforded Grant — Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, was captured. With Germany adopting an ambitious naval pro- gramme out of all proportion to her normal diplomatic needs, the diplomat, soldier, or sailor is purblind who fails to recognise that Germany's ulterior object is to assist in bringing about the disruption of the British Empire, and fight for her share when the dismember- ment occurs. Our sympathy with Japan has widened an already wide breach between Russia and ourselves. It may be said that Japan has, by the annihilation of a large portion of the Russian fleet, made matters easier for us. A large proportion of the crews remain, how- ever ; the officers and men have now that experience of naval war which no other European Navy has ; the lesson learned will permeate the Russian Navy, and will go a long way in re-organising their service on very efficient lines. It will not take long for Russia to re- place her lost vessels, and it must not be forgotten that 300 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the more expensive the lesson the more to heart it will be taken. A formidable coalition, in which will be Russia and Germany, formed for the purpose of humiliating the British Empire, has to be expected sooner or later. It has already been shown that the rise of Japanese naval power in the East is not an unmixed blessing, for at the very time that her assistance might be looked for it is well within the range of possibility that strained relationship with our ally will have occurred, due to Colonial legislation against Asiatics. No, England's need for building more ships and pro- viding more men for her Navy is greater than ever, any joint control in which would admittedly tend towards weakness. We do not want a devastating war to bring the Colonies to realise their true position with regard to the Navy ; yet it would appear as if there were still in some of the Colonies those small-minded individuals holding political office for its monetary benefits, and whose idea of Imperialism is measured by the financial gain to self In 1904 Port Natal indulged in a float- ing dock ; a few months after its arrival the Colonial Secretary of Natal promised to approach the Admiralty for the purpose of making Durban a naval base, be- cause of the monetary advantages such would bring to the Colony. It is just this anxiety for personal gain that is the greatest danger in Imperial defence ; every shade of lie is used in hopes of procuring a naval base at a certain port because it will make coal rise ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 301 in price, yet strategically the particular port may be peculiarly unfitted ; it may lie away from the line of operations, and would serve its purpose in the general scheme if but adequately defended. Such ports on the South African coasts are Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban. Simon's Town is strategically the naval base lying directly across the Cape route to and from the East. It would be for the suggested Imperial Council to counteract these unwholesome political schemes for the deviation on personal grounds of some of the most important principles in Imperial Defence. Oversea Defences. — In the Naval Annual'^ for 1904 occur these words : " If by leaving our mercantile ports without fortifications, we can tempt an enemy to attack them, let us do so by all means, in order that we may capture him. The people who want to be safe at all points never seem to realise that we ought not to wage war without holding out tempting morsels to the enemy, even as we go fishing — we bait our hooks." From the above words it would appear as if certain naval authorities considered that the end justified the means, however costly. Mr. Carlyon Bellairs, in ex- pressing this opinion, could hardly have realised the very far-reaching effects of such a policy in a naval war of any magnitude. We are advised to bait our hooks for the capture of what ? A commerce destroyer with, we will say, Sydney, Capetown, or Durban as a bait, " in order that we may capture him ". Is there ' Naval Annual, 1904, p. 163. 302 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE any guarantee that this will be effected after he has destroyed anything between ;^ 10,000,000 and ^20,000,000 worth of property, not to mention coal- ing appliances, dockyards, etc. ? Even if that capture was effected it is but reasonable to suppose that the enemy will consider he has had the best of that par- ticular round. From the context of the paragraph quoted it would appear as if we were advised to leave all our mercantile ports without fortifications that they may act as baits. Truly a costly policy. It may well be imagined that the enemy would gladly risk a dozen of his ships to complete the destruction of Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Wellington, Lyttelton, Port Louis, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban. It is to those very ports that the British shipping in their vicinity would naturally fly for protection ; if the ports be inadequately defended they must fall a prey prior to, during, or after the destruction of the port. To leave the great Colonial seaports undefended is to surrender the command of the sea ; for is not such retained by the Navy for the sustenance of the 42,000,000 of people of the United Kingdom, and would not the enemy's object be as effectually achieved by the destruction of those ports (and the means of transport from those ports) from which that sustenance was derived ? If self-governing Colonies were expected by the home authorities to adopt such a self-sacrificing role in a maritime war there can be little doubt that they would prefer to secede and pay more for self- defence. It is questionable whether there is a port in ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 303 the Empire of sufficiently small importance to play bait profitably to an enemy's commerce destroyer, or even an enemy's squadron. To adopt such a course is deliberately to hand over to the enemy the very weapons that should, if properly used, ensure our supremacy. If every port flying the English flag is sufficiently fortified to be immune from successful attack, and to be able to give protection to our mer- cantile shipping, the commerce destroyers will be help- less. Unless they obtain coal from pre-arranged meet- ings with their own colliers on the high seas, they stand the risk of becoming impotent, and it would only be a matter of time for our own cruisers, hearing of the enemy's whereabouts by cable from one of our many fortified ports, to hunt him down. The most necessary link in our Imperial organisa- tion is the complete fortification of not only our mercantile ports but every possession that can in any way shelter our shipping or refuse a harbour for our enemy. We should keep him out of every place in which he may meet his colliers and from which he may bounce out upon our commerce. It was owing to the damage done to our commerce in war by the privateers operating from the West Indies and Mauritius that Pitt decided on the capture of these places ; of the former only Barbadoes, Jamaica, and St. Lucia are now defended ; the others being helplessly at the mercy of an enemy's cruiser. Many of those islands, if once occupied by an enterprising enemy, would prove a menace to our shipping, and could under existing 304 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE conditions be made a formidable point d'appui. The Falklands, too, lying directly in the Cape home route, extensively used by our sailing trade, would prove tempting bait to our enemy. Among other posses- sions calling for fortification are the Seychelles, Rodrigues, Tristan d'Acunha, Walfisch Bay. It has already been pointed out that the fortification of our sea-exposed possessions is added strength, and is at the same time an economical form of security. In many of our Colonies the defence of ports has been treated in a separate manner to that of either general or local defence, being taken in hand directly by a Minister of the Cabinet of the day, the executive officers of the Defence Department knowing nothing or little of the scheme until asked to supply the men. Here then is another weak point in Imperial organisation, a weak- ness that can only be eradicated by central control. The Imperial Army. — An Empire built up by and owing security to sea power should not be spending as much upon its Army as upon its Navy. On the other hand that the Navy for Imperial needs would be impotent without having behind it a striking force in the form of an efficient, mobile, and strong Army is a fact that should by this time be universally under- stood. That the Army as at present organised is an extravagant implement in peace and in war, is not as effective as its great cost might promise, is now known by the very children of the nation. For the year 1 903-4 the British Empire expended upon its land forces ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 305 some ;£'5 3,000,000 sterling, for which she could com- mand the services of 300,000 trained effectives and 670,000 inefficiently trained men. The organisation of these forces is as varied as the colour of their members, from the very strict discipline enforced by the King's regulations, interpreting the Army Act, to the very loose discipline of the Burgher Bill of the Cape. There is little in common between these numerous forces, but all are kept for one end, for service against a common enemy. The daily increasing difficulty in supplying the very small permanent Army of barely 200,000 men, the all- round loosening of the standard in order to obtain the comparatively few required, indicates the fact that so-called education, made general by law, has had the effect of diverting the inclination of that class who before sought anxiously for military employment. To-day the Army has to look for its members from among the rejected of all other callings ; obviously then the Army must be inferior in mental and physical qualities to all those equally large bodies otherwise employed. This is indeed the reverse of what should be. We have always been taught to regard the soldier as typical of the manhood of his country, as the very flower of his nation. In England to-day we have to visit the football or cricket field to impress the foreigner with the physical qualities of our manhood. The sporting inclinations of England's manhood, indulged at the expense of military training, have within recent years drawn forth severe criticism from a few of our 20 3o6 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE own people, and has been referred to by Continental writers. Undoubtedly the Press panders to the in- clinations of the people, and does little in the wa}' of pointing out what the indulgence costs. Cables giving the result of a cricket match, a good score, the winner of a horse or boat race, are given a more important position in the daily paper than the result of a battle, even when our own people have been the victor or vanquished; a casualty list appears to some editors as of secondary importance when compared to the figures of a big gate at Sheffield or Manchester. In this age of advertisement the Army has suffered and the auxiliary forces have languished, while sport in all its branches has been boomed until the craze has now become deeply rooted in English national life. To attempt to eradicate this would be folly. It is the instinct of sport upon which we should base our re- organised Imperial Army. By all means let our future battles be fought out on the playfields of our schools, be they public or private. Universities or Board Schools ; the staying power, patience in a los- ing game, dash, judgment, all developed in the good sportsman, are the very qualities required in the vic- torious soldier. The trained cricketer, footballer, or polo-player is three-fourths a trained soldier, whatever the foreigner may say to the contrary. The land forces of England have long ceased to be looked upon as a national institution in that sense that such forces are considered in all other countries. Even the commissioned ranks have long ceased to draw the ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 307 more promising sons of English families. This is due to the fact that initial errors have been perpetuated, obvious abuses have grown into institutions, and initia- tive has been so long discouraged that it is conspicuous by its absence. Another weakness of the Imperial Army lies in its varied classification. The official divisions are : — 1. Regular Forces, Home and Colonial. 2. Colonial and Native Indian Corps. 3. Army Reserve. 4. Militia, United Kingdom. 5. Militia, Reserve Division. 6. Militia of Channel Islands. 7. Militia of Malta and Bermuda. 8. Territorial Force. 9. Yeomanry. 10. Volunteers. 1 1. Regular Forces on Indian Establishment. As the strength of the Navy lies in its homogeneity, with the Army it is the want of this wholeness that has so considerably detracted from its strength, and until these divisions are done away with, there is little hope for its efficiency or even stay of that decay which at present is so perceptible. But a few years since, the English public were in- dignantly astonished and the Colonial public agreeably surprised at the recommendations embodied in the majority report of the Esher Commission ; the former because anything approaching conscription is abhorrent to the deep-rooted prejudice to what is considered a 20 * 3o8 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE foreign institution ; the disadvantages of obligatory service in the ranks of the country's defence force have been so embellished that the nation is impatient at any reference to it. This was illustrated with the publication of the commission's report, for the daily Press criti- cised the recommendations adversely before it was possible to peruse the evidence that had prompted the recommendations. The public mind is made up against conscription, just as we find that public mind giving priority to sport over military training or achievements. Let military authorities recognise this fact once and for all, and not waste precious time in trying to convert the large majority of 42,000,000 people, for even though their efforts ultimately meet with success it can only be after a very severe lesson, and the chances are all in favour of such coming too late. Rather let the authorities, eager for reform, make the most of the material at hand. It may be found that the British craze for sport will, if judiciously applied, compensate in a certain measure for the public anti- pathy to conscription. Sport has received a great deal of impetus within the last decade from senior official support, and if the true sportsman is three parts the soldier, we but want to add the remaining and surely the lesser part to our man to give to the Em- pire an Army which will consist of four-fifths of her manhood, or, in other words, an Army comparatively as strorig as that opposed to us in the late Boer War. The practical deductions that one obtains from all this theorising has long ago been given to us by some of ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 309 our small Colonies. We see how any new departure in business life is experimented on in a small way, and if found impracticable it is rejected at that stage. For the purposes of legislative experiment some of our small self-governing Colonies should prove of peculiar value to the Empire at large, and more particularly so in this very subject of defence. Australia has experi- mented with labour legislation, and stands out as a sad and memorable example to the mother country and the sister Colonies alike. Canada, New Zealand, and Natal have experimented with obligatory service in various forms, and surely all that is good in the experiment is now known ; the many flaws have long ago been detected, and in many instances have been rectified by the Colonies concerned. Australia has likewise, though late in the day, followed the example of the other three Colonies. It is on the principle of one of these four Militia Acts that the Empire might with advantage remodel her at present disjointed Army, making the whole as homogeneous as is her Navy ; the efficiency thus gained is bound to reflect with increased vigour upon that Navy. The most recently drafted Defence Act based on the principle of obligatory service, is that of Natal. Those responsible for its drafting were confronted in a minor degree with the difficulty that was before the Esher Commission, the popular horror of anything resembling conscription. The Colonial Commissioners realised that no Defence Bill would pass into law un- less backed by public opinion ; therefore the Act was 3IO COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE so drafted as to divert popular antipathy into that course which would ensure not only the safe passage of the Bill but also success in its operation. The European population of the Colony was taken as 100,000, of whom 12,000 men were looked upon as always available for its defence. It was found that barely 2,000 recognised their obligation by preparation. As the native population of the Colony at the time was estimated at 1 ,000,000 and the whites were out- numbered by ten to one, it was deemed necessary to take further precautions for defence — hence the Act. The European male population was divided into four classes : — ■ A. Active Militia consisting of all European males between the ages of eighteen and fifty who may volun- teer for this class. B. Militia First Reserve ; all European males be- tween eighteen and fifty and not serving with A, unmarried — certain exceptions allowed. C. Militia Second Reserve; all male Europeans between eighteen and thirty not serving in A or B who are married — certain exceptions allowed. D. Militia Third Reserve ; all male Europeans from thirty to fifty-five not serving in A, B, C— certain exceptions allowed. Class A is a highly trained force and carries 50 per cent, commissioned rankers in excess ; certain non- commissioned officers and privates are also noted for commissioned rank with the Reserves in the event of mobilisation. ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 311 Classes B and C are also liable for training, and are given every opportunity and encouragement to volun- tarily attend training with the Active Militia. The Active Militia is the skeleton which can be clothed with the Militia Reserves in twenty-four hours, and the force becomes an efficient fighting . machine within a few days. Unfortunately few Colonial legislators consider the Imperial importance of local defence, hence little at- tention has been given by them to the training and equipment of the Reserves. When approached on the subject their reply is that England will send her soldiers to fight our battles. If the British tax-payer were to close his pockets for a few months the Colonial would necessarily open his a little wider than hereto- fore. The most important portion of the Natal Militia Act of 1903 was that part dealing with the Cadet and Senior Cadet Corps. It was at once recognised that the natural source of supply for the Defence Force must be from the youth. It was therefore laid down that every school in the Colony be compelled to have its own Cadet Corps, that the instructors be appointed by Government, and that every boy over ten years of age attend drill at least three times per week for a period of not less than one hour at each drill ; each boy has likewise to fire sixty rounds at the butts each year — they may obtain ammunition in excess of the sixty rounds at cost price. The Government allows a capitation fee to each school of from los. to 15 s. per 312 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE annum ; from this uniform is provided. Upon leaving school the Cadet is drafted into the intermediary corps known as the Senior Cadet Corps ; here he remains from two to four years. The Cadets and Senior Cadets attend a camp of training of not less than ten days under canvas each year. A portion of the Senior Cadets is mounted, and there are several maxim gun detachments. The Senior Cadet on reaching the age of twenty is passed into the Active Militia. In no way has his military training interfered with the call that sport has made upon his time, and on the other hand sport has materially assisted the instructors in turning out a serviceable soldier of the Empire. The educa- tional staff bear universal testimony as to the value of physical training. It does not want medical science to testify that a healthy body tends towards a healthy mind ; common-sense enlightens us on that point. The Cadet Corps of Natal is administered by a separate department with a commandant at its head; this officer is responsible to the Commandant-general for the organisation and training of the Cadet Corps of the Colony ; he is assisted by a staff of instructors. The masters of the schools are eligible for commissions in the Cadet Corps, and rank as officers of the Militia force of the Colony ; only those gentlemen competent to take the field in a Militia regiment are appointed. With the obligatory Militia training such as we ad- vocate there must not be confounded that hybrid form of military training that has been in vogue for many years in the Militia Service of the United Kingdom — ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 313 most of the material of which was and still is made up of the rejects of an already too low Army standard. In the system that has just been described the material that is beginning to fall into the hands of the Active Militia Staff is moulded material ; a year in the Active Militia and the man is a finished soldier ; the average in training, intelligence, education, and physique being far above that of the average to be found in the Regular Army; this is obtained at a cost of ;^22 los. per annum per man for the Active Militia. The in- fantry averages only ;^io per annum ; with an increase in strength the cost would be considerably less, because the staff is over-large, over-paid, and certainly under- worked. The Active Militia serves the Militia Re- serves in the same way that it is served by the Senior Cadets each year ; a goodly number of trained men are passed into classes B, C, and D, most of whom having imbued a taste for military training, voluntarily elect to attend the annual encampments for training. Where- ever a few men can muster, there parades are held periodically. Butts are erected in various parts of the Colony and weekly shoots take place. The fifteen best shots of the Colony are eligible each year for a free passage to England and back with all expenses paid. The same man cannot go two years running. It will thus be seen that the Natal Colonial Govern- ment has taken to itself those responsibilities which are in very truth the obligations of all Governments. It is in shooting that sports shade into military train- ing, and vice versa ; and to-day more than ever it is the 314 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE man behind the gun who tells in battle. Let those in authority over the 15,000,000 eligible fighting men of the United Kingdom divert the sporting instincts of the greater proportion into the course of shooting, the desire for training will follow and quickly, as sure as the night follows day. Associations, societies, and leagues have done stupendous work for our Empire's defence ; but with them, blessed with bare official re- cognition only, their labour of love has been indeed up-hill work. Taking into consideration the following facts :■ — 1. That our scattered possessions to be retained as an Empire call for a Navy, which taxes to their utmost the financial resources of the United Kingdom. 2. The varied systems of the land forces of the parts of Empire. 3. The disproportionate expenditure on the land forces of the United Kingdom, to the indirect detri- ment of the Navy. 4. The need for a system by which the Colonies can bear a proportionate share of the responsibility of the Empire's defence. It would appear as if the oft-mooted scheme for a Pan-Britannic Militia was a sound solution of the problem. Admitting that the Imperial Defence re- quires a striking force behind the Navy, it does not necessarily follow that this should be kept in con- tinual pay for decades of peace ; however sudden the attack, it is quite impossible that such would first fall upon our Army of the United Kingdom. If it was ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 315 impossible to make the partially paid as effective as the wholly paid man, then the question would call for an entirely different answer. We are, however, deal- ing with social conditions that have considerably changed within the last century, while scientific changes have altered the conditions, and, strange as it may seem, have increased the value of the partially trained man ; partially trained only in that sense that applied before the inventions in modern weapons. Conscrip- tion being out of the question for many years to come, and an Army of anything like present proportions yearly becoming too expensive with the necessary increase in the Navy, placing also on one side the fact that the men for the Army are becoming more scarce each year — it appears as if some decided reform in the whole system of our Army would be a wiser course to temporising between public opinion on the one hand and Army conservatism on the other. The writer submits his suggested reforms with all humility, knowing full well the avalanche of indignant, able, and apparently sound criticism they will call forth. History fails to show a single occasion where Eng- land has had to despatch a striking force across the seas, on notice shorter than would allow her to have collected the necessary force from among her Militia. At no time and under no circumstances does it appear necessary for the United Kingdom to keep on her pay list more than 50,000 soldiers of all arms. With the reduction of the Regular Army to that number and the 3i6 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE creation of a Militia Army with obligatory service and embodying with it the at present varied forces of the Empire, there should be set loose some ;^ 15,000,000 sterling, which in addition to relieving the British tax- payer will add to the efficiency of the Navy. Basing this calculation upon the experience of the Colonies, and making due allowance for the difference in social conditions, the creation of an Active Militia would find sufficient favour to enrol within its ranks for service at twenty-four hours' notice in any part of the world some 1,250,000 men physically and mentally superior to those embodied in the Regular Army of the present, at a cost of ;^5, 000,000 sterling per annum. The cost would come within this limit should the Militia Army become Imperial, and co-responsibility be accepted, for the Colonies of Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand are better able to carry a greater proportion of mounted men to Infantry than is the United Kingdom. It would rest then for the latter to supply the dismounted branches of this Imperial Army. With the organisation of Cadet and Senior Cadet Corps under the administration of the general staff, each year would see the standard of military and physical efficiency of the Active Militia improve ; each year would lessen the possibility of enforcing the obligatory clauses in the Militia Act, for all the good, and few if any of the bad qualities of militarism would be adopted as national characteristics. It would be indeed a good omen if a Pan-Britannic Militia Army Act marked a departure in Imperial ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 317 legislation presented from the throne, not only to the parent Parliament but to all our Colonial legislatures, many of whom need but amend their present Defence Acts to bring them into line. In no way can this ap- parently radical change affect existing social condi- tions. In the Colonies the Militia obligations do not press hardly upon any section of the community. So far the unwilling have in no way been interfered with, all the information needful is obtained in the course of ordinary census taking. The willing to serve have filled the ranks of the Active Militia to overflowing, and in the case of Natal this class has been closed for further recruits ; a proportion of the community only is considered necessary for the defence of the whole. Selection is therefore possible. It is found that 6 per cent, of a Colonial community are anxious to volunteer to undergo the stringent requirements of Active Militia training, and there is nothing to prove that a like proportion would not be forthcoming in the United Kingdom ; this would allow of careful selection. The establishment of the Regular Army fixed for a few years to come at 50,000 of all branches, would allow of the standard, mental and physical, being raised. Further, it would be the mainspring upon which the organisation of the Militia Army would at first greatly depend. The first flaw that critics will find in this rank heresy will be the supply of regular European troops for India ; yet it is this necessary call that will add to the efficiency of the Imperial Militia Army. No difficulty will be 3i8 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE found in furnishing India with corps of Active Militia drawn proportionately from each part of the Empire, providing the term of service does not exceed two years for the individual. India to certain classes resident in the United Kingdom, and to nearly all Colonials, is a little understood country. The suggested alteration in the method of providing its garrison will bring her more intimately in touch with all classes in the Empire and may be looked upon as but another lesson in Im- perial education ; one of the many lessons we are yet to learn before federation is finally achieved. The im- mediate result of an Imperial Militia Army will be the eradication of the secession idea growing apace in at least one of our Colonies ; it will add fresh impulse to Imperialism, sufficient indeed to cast out all inimical elements. The effects will travel farther ; they will find their way into the Cabinets of our covert enemies and will make their Ministers hesitate in any policy aimed against ourselves. It is one thing to prepare for war against a nation whose expenditure for naval supremacy has reached breaking point, the strength of whose Regular Army is known to be less than half of most of the European Armies, yet costing more, and whose reserve resources are based upon sentiment ; but quite another thing to prepare for war against an Empire-in- being with an efficient Army of over i ,000,000 fighting men with an inexhaustible reserve behind it, an Army controlled or set in motion by centralised machinery organised homogeneously, strategically situated in all parts of the world, and able to move with absolute ORGANISATION OF OUR RESOURCES 319 impunity wherever a ship can float, thanks to a Navy which no longer would be starved for the upkeep of a small Regular Army. The greatest Imperial statesman the Empire has had has exhorted us to learn to think Imperially ; un- fortunately it is already too late in life for many of us to learn the lesson ourselves. But it is not too late for any of us to see that our children are taught not only to think but act Imperially. The most important action in individual life is to live righteously, and the same holds good in Imperial life. With the organisation of the manhood of the Empire for its defence, Imperial thinking will have passed from the realms of theory into the practical paths of Imperial action. CHAPTER XV. WANTED— AN IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY. In Chapters IV. and V. I have endeavoured to de- monstrate the need for the Navy being controlled, as a homogeneous body, from the British Isles, and there would be little excuse for emphasising this, the essential principle in Imperial defence, but for the fact that a policy in favour of independent Colonial Navies is be- ing assiduously advocated by many Colonial politicians, and this policy is finding support in certain quarters in the United Kingdom. It will have been observed in the preceding pages that the weakness in Imperial defence is due to an entire absence of any cognate scheme bom of a stable policy. In the periodical conferences of Colonial Prime Ministers which have taken place from time to time in London, Imperial defence has not been given that prominent position on the agenda paper and in the discussions the vital importance of the subject rightly claims. Each Colony — big and small — pursues its own inde- pendent course in defence, yet several of these Colonies, some of them self-governing, with an independent de- fence policy, occupy territory contiguous to that in the possession, or under the influence, of a foreign Power. 320 WANTED— IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY 321 The large self-governing Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, one of the most important strategic posts in the world, shares a frontier line with the Germans. This ambitious nation is pushing the colonisation of its vast possessions in West Africa. As time proceeds con- flicting interests may arise between the Cape Colony and Germany, or it may be that a dominant section in South Africa, hostile to British interests in that sub-con- tinent, may stretch out their hands to their kinsmen oc- cupying West Africa, and such overtures would receive a ready response from that nation, only too anxious to possess Colonies of the wealth of those of British South Africa, opening the door to the very heart of Africa. Out of the conflicting interests between Teuton and Anglo-Saxon already existing in South Africa, and of those looming large in the future, we can readily per- ceive a repetition of English and French history in India in the days of Clive, and also in Canada, saved to the Empire by Wolfe. In those precedents, where Englishmen fought a European foe in British oversea possessions, the military policy was dictated by Great Britain herself, and what- ever criticism at this distant date we may level at that policy, we have the satisfaction of knowing that it was successful. Whilst the obligations of Great Britain have grown from National to Imperial, the policy of safeguarding these obligations has not grown in unison. An Imperial Navy centred in and controlled from the capital of the Empire, was responsible for the 21 322 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE creation of that Empire, and it is to the homogeneity of that Navy that thanks are solely due for the solidity and intactness of the British possessions to-day ; and anything which, in time of peace, tends to destroy or weaken that homogeneity will lay the Empire open in time of war. Those Colonial enthusiasts anxious to bring into being small independent Navies are appar- ently ignorant of the first principles of Imperial defence ; their view is restricted by their own shores. That the very existence of their own particular Colony may be dependent upon a naval battle fought in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, or the Atlantic, is to them incomprehensible. The great struggle indicated each year by the budgets of first-class Powers for the com- mand of the sea, tacitly admitted by the world at large to be England's to-day, has for them no significance. Because Great Britain, geographically small, has at- tained and kept, after centuries of struggling, this command, some of the ambitious Colonies believe a like destiny to be theirs, forgetful that like conditions do not exist, unless, perhaps, we make an exception in favour of Newfoundland. The cause of England's Navy was her insular position, with a comparatively large seaboard, and, necessarily, a sea-faring people ; the effect has been the British Empire of to-day. With the granting of responsible constitutions to the larger Colonies, and by the grouping of many of these Colonies into commonwealths, federations, or dominions , the spirit of independence has grown, but one bond of unity, and the strongest, yet remains ; that bond is the WANTED— IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY 323 Navy. It has ever been free from the bane of local politics ; it is something above the interference of the Colonial legislator; all loyal Colonists look to it as being emblematical of the Sovereign himself Whilst the Colonial is proud of his independence and his power to make good or bad laws for the Colony to which he belongs, he has a feeling of security in the knowledge that the Navy is responsible for the integ- rity of the Empire ; it is to him a matter of satisfaction that no local legislation on the part of the Colonial legislator can interfere with the efficiency of that foundation upon which the whole fabric of Imperial defence rests. The Colonial edifice is of the Colonial's, or at most his grandfather's, fashioning, part of a de- sign made possible, and eventually secure, by a Navy built up by generations of the Colonial's ancestors with the prestige of centuries and of great deeds be- hind, it, and it has never failed to meet the exigency of the moment. Now, whilst the average Colonial is deeply proud of the glorious traditions won for the Empire, of which he is a co-partner, by the Navy, his Colonial environment has deprived him of certain characteristics necessary to fit him to man a Navy of his own, and it has given him other characteristics, valuable in the field, but dangerous at sea. His love of independent action makes him chafe under the rigid discipline so necessary in a ship of war ; his daily life of stockmaster, planter, miner, lumberman, or agriculturist, it may be many hundreds of miles from the sea, whilst fitting him for an irregular soldier, only goes to unfit 21 * 324 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE him for sea life. A very small percentage of Colonials belong to a sea-faring community, for the population inhabiting the seaboard of the large Continental Colonies is necessarily small compared with that of the interior. It will, therefore, be readily seen that the material from which it is suggested to create local Navies is far from promising, even though the need for such really existed. But is there a real need for an independent Navy for any one of the British Colonies ? It is an acknow- ledged axiom in Imperial defence that, before a British Colony can be successfully invaded by an oversea enemy, the command of the sea must pass from Eng- land ; if that should happen, can any Colony hope to retain, by a local Navy, the command of its own waters ? It is true that Australia has an Asiatic neighbour who has rapidly advanced in civilisation, having territorial ambitions, possessing a first-class and highly efficient Navy, added to which is the prestige of having unaided defeated a first-class European Power. If Australia were dependent upon oversea supplies for her existence, as is the case with the mother-country, or shared her territory with a possible enemy, then an independent and progressive naval policy, demanding the larger portion of her revenue, would be readily understood, more especially, too, as her anti-Asiatic policy, in common with that of the other Colonies of the Empire, must sooner or later bring her into conflict with Japan. But the fact tliat she is self-contained, that her natural line of defence is on shore, and not at sea, makes a WANTED— IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY 325 local naval policy not only unnecessary, but, to my mind, dangerous, for it can only be adopted at the expense of the more necessary branch of the defence service. Australia need only study the history of the Anglo-Boer War to satisfy herself that the invasion of Australia is an impracticable proposition, and is each year, by the increase of her manhood, becoming more impossible. Not alone will the creation of a local Navy be a most regrettable waste of effort in the de- fence scheme of Australia, but the waste applies to Imperial defence itself. The existence of Australia as a British dependency will be more secure out of sight of her shores, and will be effectively decided on the high seas by that service responsible for Australia being an integral part of the British Empire. Had the whole question of Imperial defence been taken seriously and practically in hand by the Imperial Government at the Conference of Colonial Prime Ministers in 1897, or at any of the succeeding confer- ences, I doubt whether this question of independent Colonial Navies would have ever arisen. Imperial de- fence has been discussed at these Colonial conferences, but solely in an academic manner. The only tangible outcome of these discussions has been the direct monetary contributions to the Navy by Australia, the Cape Colony, Natal, and New Zealand, Canada prefer- ring to contribute to Imperial defence in the more practical form of bearing the expense of the fortification of the naval bases on her shores, and by adequately defending her harbours, relieving the Navy of the burden of those defences. 326 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE These direct monetary contributions to the Navy are, undoubtedly, a source of annoyance to the Colonies, and again a source of weakness in Imperial defence, inasmuch as they are a serious drain on the defence expenditure of the Colonies contributing. The sum is shown on the Colonial Budgets under the defence votes ; therefore defence is debited with a large sum which is not expended in the Colony in the training of men or in the fortification of the harbours and coasts, and these have to suffer. Does the Navy, and, therefore. Imperial defence, gain in proportion? I think not. Had the first Colonial conference been responsible for bringing into being a truly Imperial Defence Council upon which the larger Colonies had direct representa- tion, the peculiar fitness of each Colony for some particular form of defence would have been taken ad- vantage of; each Colony would have had its proper function to perform in the general scheme of Imperial defence, and in this each unit in the Empire possesses some original qualification through want of co-ordina- tion now wasted. Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand are in a position to relieve the mother-country of a great deal of her military burden. A very large proportion of the Imperial Army should be supplied by these large pastoral Colonies. Then, again, each of these Colonies should be responsible for the adequate land defences of their coasts, the absolute security of the coaling ports and harbours of refuge. In undertaking this at their own expense, and with their own Colonial manhood, they are giving a far WANTED— IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY 327 more practical contribution to the Navy than can be represented in cash, and more effective defence to themselves and the Empire, than by the selfish and ineffective policy of local and independent Navies. By assuming a proportion of responsibility for the Imperial Army in men, money, horses, and equipment, the Colonies will release a very large proportion of Imperial expenditure, which should go to strengthen, even yet, the Navy. It is felt in the Colonies that the Imperial Government resents very strongly any recom- mendations from the Colonies in its Imperial policy. If this supposition is founded upon fact, then there is little hope for a truly efficient scheme of Imperial defence in which each unit is apportioned its own share, peculiar to its own particular resources. At pre- sent the relationship of the Navy to the Colonies is not understood by the Colonials. No single Colony understands its position in Imperial defence ; the term to them is an abstract one, as it is to many statesmen, soldiers, and sailors at home ; yet it should not be. Imperial defence should be a very practical policy in- deed, and in the forefront of Imperial politics. The only effective way to bring this about is, to my mind, by the appointment of a Royal Commission on Imperial defence. Let such a commission consist of active-minded men, appointed for what they will ac- complish, not for what they will shelve ; let this com- mission investigate and report on the peculiar fitness of each unit of the Empire for the Empire's defence, and let that report, with a comprehensive scheme, be 328 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE ready for the next conference of Colonial Prime Ministers. It may be said that there already exists an Imperial Defence Committee, that it sits periodically and re- vises an Imperial defence scheme. Beyond tabulat- ing certain information, which it calls for annually from the Colonies, its functions are abortive, and its schemes are not worth the paper they are written upon, for the Colonies are in no shape or form consulted in the matter, and are in no way aware of what part they are to play in the event of war. Any scheme which leaves in entire ignorance all the partners except one must fail. It is understood that the next conference will meet in London in about three years from now ; this leaves ample time for a Royal Commission to go most closely into the whole subject of Imperial de- fence, from the question of food supplies to the United Kingdom to the part to be played by hinterland states, like the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal. The relationship between tlae United Kingdom and Canada in Imperial defence is, perhaps, more apparent to the inhabitants of those two countries than is the relationship between any other Colony and the mother- country, for in the event of a European war, or a war in which England's command of the sea is to be chal- lenged, upon the premier Colony would devolve the grave responsibility of supplying the sustenance of the 45,000,000 people inhabiting the British Isles. Efficient coast and harbour defence, undertaken by Canada herself, can alone make this responsibility WANTED— IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY 329 successful as far as Canada is concerned, the responsi- bility of keeping the ocean trade routes resting with a homogeneous Navy, the homogeneity of which would be impaired if Canada attempted to add to her respon- sibility for coast defence by adopting an independent naval policy. It is within the range of possibility that, in addition to having to defend her harbours, Canada might be called upon to defend an inland frontier line of over 3,000 miles, not an impossible feat if her present excellent military policy is adhered to, and not impaired by launching out upon an am- bitious policy foreign to her geographical requirements. South Africa, the Colonial cockpit, was persuaded at the Conference of Prime Ministers in London, last year, to adopt a make-shift Colonial naval policy. It was wrapped up in the form of a Royal Naval Volunteer Bill. This Bill passed into law in Natal, but was not introduced into the Cape House, although it was understood that the two coast Colonies were to combine in this naval farce. South Africa is least suited of all the Colonies for a naval programme. Her coast-line is rugged, her harbours inhospitable, and her sea-faring community limited to a few Malays, who make a precarious living by fishing. Expenditure upon floating defence is, therefore, so much money drawn from expanding her natural role in Imperial defence, viz., efficient coast and harbour defences, and the training of her land forces. Unlike the other self-governing Colonies, she is sharing her territory with subject races more numerous by far than the 330 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE governing class. Like Canada, too, she shares a frontier line with a possible enemy, for Germany is pushing her colonisation of West Africa, and one can well conceive the history of England and France in India and America being repeated between England and Germany in South and South- West Africa, more especially when we find active Germanic sympathisers in those States lately at war with Great Britain, but now about to govern South Africa on anti-Imperial lines. Little or no attention has been given to South Africa as a factor in Imperial defence, except, as I have already stated, in an academic sense. Simon's Town is a naval base, Durban a coaling station ; yet there are possible coaling stations farther north — Umhlatuzi, St. Lucia, Port Durnford, and Kosi Bay — with good coal-fields within a few miles of each, and all possible harbours. In a comprehensive scheme of Imperial defence, which should embrace the pro- tection of British shipping at sea, these harbours and ports should be equipped as harbours of refuge. No such scheme can be thoroughly efficient which does not place a minimum of responsibility upon the Navy for coast defence, giving the maximum latitude to that service to act on the high seas. The measure of the one, and the extent of the other, can only be ap- proximately arrived at after careful inquiry into local conditions, and with a full knowledge of Imperial re- quirements, by a Royal Commission, upon whose shoulders should rest the responsibility of drafting a practical scheme of Imperial defence. CHAPTER XVI. SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS DEFENCE. South Africa is now on the eve of a constitutional change. The four self-governing Colonies comprising the greater portion of the sub-continent known as South Africa are about to amalgamate their separate legislative and administrative services and endeavour to become one people under one Central Government. The future of this federation can in no way be gauged by the Canadian or the Australian precedents ; seeds of discord unlike those which grew out of previous federations may lie hidden, and may be brought to life by the peculiar conditions which characterise South Africa and the varied races inhabiting this sub- continent. South Africa with a European population of barely one million has an indigenous race of over five millions still in a state of comparative savagery. The European population but seven years ago was divided against itself in an exhausting war, the scars of which are only now healing, but the memories must remain for several decades. The geographical position of South Africa, and the conditions under which the country is inhabited, demands that the question of its defence organisation should occupy 331 332 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE more than ordinary importance in the deliberations of not alone its Colonial statesmen but also of the Imperial Government. The varied forms of war to which South Africa is open makes the question of South African defence more than a Colonial one. What these varied forms of armed aggression are will be seen later. At the present time, whilst the constitutional change of Government is proceeding, the question of the country's defence, and the position in Imperial defence South Africa is to take, is not having that attention at the hands of statesmen or public which its importance demands. In time of peace, when the shadow of war is dim, the machinery responsible for a country's security is neglected ; the error of this has time and again been demonstrated in other countries by the shameful extravagance displayed by hurried prepara- tion for an unexpected war, which when entered upon has further resulted in great waste of lives, humiliation and defeat, and in some cases even loss of independence. The efficiency of the defence service of the future South African dominion will be dependent upon the nature of the Constitution finally adopted. Should the suggested scheme of complete union, with the obliteration of States, be brought about, then the de- fence policy of the future Government of South Africa is clearly indicated by that now being gradually adopted by the present Government of the Transvaal, a herit- age from the late Republic. If on the other hand the more practical form of union — federation — be accepted. SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS DEFENCE 333 leaving intact as healthy stimulants the present indi- viduality of States, then it is to be expected that the best in the existing Defence Acts or Ordinances will be taken as a model for the future Defence Act. It may be urged as an argument in favour of adopt- ing the defence policy of the late Republics that their burgher forces were able to withstand for a period of three years the might of the British Empire, and therefore the burgher organisation should be a sound model for the future South African Army. But the more able leaders of these forces are themselves the first to admit that faulty organisation, or rather an entire absence of organisation, was the one weak link in their campaign. The burgher system went no further than the compulsory service, in time of war, of the male popu- lation between certain ages, the only preparation for service insisted upon being the possession of a rifle and a certain quantity of ammunition by those liable. The strenuous fight made by the Republics in defence of their independence was due to the inherent patriot- ism of the Boers. Their individual courage, self-reli- ance, mobility, knowledge of country, and indeed many other causes independent of organisation or even system, were some of the reasons for their early suc- cesses and for the great fight made against overwhelm- ing strength. Had all these fine fighting qualities been systematised, had there been even an attempt at organisation, then it is impossible to estimate what the ultimate cost of the war in lives and money would have been to Great Britain. 334 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE A grave weakness displayed in the late war by the Boer side was the lack of able leadership in its early stages. As the war progressed it was discovered that there were many Boers possessing the genius of generalship ; these men, too late in the day to turn the tide, came to the fore. Organisation would not have wholly prevented this error, but it would have provided competent leadership in the beginning, and the recognition of ability in the early stages of the campaign. The inefficiency and weakness of the burgher system of military organisation have been illustrated in those small native wars undertaken by the late Transvaal Republic. The Sakakunie Campaign of 1876 soon exhausted the resources of the Govern- ment, many of the burghers refused to meet either their military or monetary obligations to the State ; therefore aid from Great Britain was called for by the Republic, followed later by the voluntary surrender of independence. Later on again the Malaboch War re- sulted in the complete breakdown of the military system of the Transvaal, and the many injustices meted out to the Uitlanders, the majority of whom were British, in the commandeering of their persons or of their be- longings under the burgher law, was one of the many causes which resulted in the late Anglo-Boer War. The complete inefficiency and extravagance of the burgher system of defence has time and again been proved in the Cape Colony in those native wars, where calls have been made under the Burgher SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS DEFENCE 335 Act. The hasty and ill-assorted mobilisation of un- trained men, together with their hurried equipment, by machinery inexperienced either in mobilisation or of the mobilisation of this particular material, leads to ab- normal extravagance, followed later, when in the field, by unnecessary waste of life, due to lack of training and organisation. A regrettable instance of this was the cutting up of the Colonial Yeomanry in the Basuto Campaign of 1880. The burgher system of military organisation is a relic of the old Dutch administration of the Cape, instituted at a time prior to the migration south of the Bantu hordes, and when the settlers were liable to nothing more dangerous than the depredations of small bands of Hottentots or Bushmen. The raids of these savages, armed with the most primitive of weapons and entirely lacking any fighting quality, called for sudden punishment at the hands of twenty or thirty farmers at most. The authority for the mobilisation of these farmers, known as burghers, was in the hands of the landrosts or magistrates, and there was little need for organisation or training. By the time the more martial and powerful Bantu tribes had reached the confines of civilisation, and came into contact with the border settlers, the Colonial de- fence force had been strengthened by regular troops from England or organised Colonial corps which in those days were recognised units of the Imperial Army. The burgher force was then in the inefficient and extrava- gantly conducted condition I have already described, and was used as an auxiliary line. 336 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE In view of the many possible forms of aggression that have to be provided against in South Africa its Defence Act cannot possibly be modelled upon any Burgher Act with any hope of its fighting forces being efficient for South Africa's defence or an efficient unit in Imperial defence. There is no other part of the Em- pire, unless it be India, calling for such a rigid observ- ance of the preparedness for war, nor any Colonial Government whose monetary obligations in the matter of defence are as great. Those responsible for the drafting of the Defence Act for the future Union will be called upon to con- sider and to make provision for those forms of armed aggression South Africa is peculiarly liable to, and these are : — (a) Civil war, i.e., revolt against the Constitution. (b) Invasion from seawards with co-operation from German West Africa. (c) Bombardment of seaports. {d) Invasion from seawards by naval Power other than Germany. {e) Land invasion from German West Africa. (/) Native rebellion. (^) Native war. {a) Civil War, or a Revolt against the Constitution, is a danger which all nations in embryo are peculiarly liable to. We find a comparatively recent instance in the Civil War of America, and the cause of that war may at this stage interest us; for certain conditions existing in America prior to the war are to be found in SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS DEFENCE 337 South Africa to-day. It is commonly believed that the Civil War was due to the slave question ; it should, however, be known that hostilities were brought about by an attempt on the part of certain Southern States to break away from the Union. The Northerners fully realised the value of the sympathy of civilisation in resisting this attempt, and therefore pleaded abolition of slavery as a pretext for a war undertaken to uphold the Constitution and save the Southern States to the Union. The Asiatic labour question of Natal may be the means of creating a parallel case in history. The sympathy of civilisation is rightly against this iniquitous form of labour, and any refusal on the part of Natal to join a Union which she might consider to be but the prelude to secession from the Empire, or, having joined the Union, discovered sound reasons for breaking away, might be met by forcible annexation or retention under the plea of the abolition of a modem form of slavery more degrading and brutal than that practised by the South American planters. There are, however, other elements which may work for revolt against the Constitution, and which would call for the armed protection of that instrument. It is possible for dissatisfaction to arise on the part of one or more of the absorbed States at the policy of the Federal Government, followed by an attempt to break from the Union ; an efficient defence organisation would place the armed power in the hands of the Govern- ment, yet the magnitude of the struggle would depend upon the size of the State or States seceding, 22 338 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the justice of the cause, and the state of public feeling. Any attempt made by a section of Parliament or of the people to depart from the essential provisions of the Constitution might likewise call for armed inter- vention resulting in an upheaval of popular feeling and in civil war. Here we have a contingency far from im- probable ; recent events and present conditions in South Africa lead one to fear this form of revolt ; therefore its possibility must not be evaded for sentimental reasons, but be seriously considered in the drafting of the future Defence Act. {b) Invasion from Seawards with Co-operation from. German West Africa. — In considering this form of armed aggression we are called upon to presuppose war between England and Germany and the temporary loss by England of the command of the sea, or at least such a contingency as would deplete for a time South African waters of British warships. German troops previously mobilised at German East Africa would possibly be embarked there and landed at some of the unfortified South-Eastern Cape ports or on the Natal coast, but such an invasion from seawards would be primarily for the purpose of diverting troops from resisting the more serious invasion from German West Africa. It is difficult to estimate what active co- operation would be given by sympathisers within the territory to be invaded. We have two precedents in the history of the British Empire for this form of aggression, viz., in India and in Canada, yet in neither SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS DEFENCE 339 case did Great Britain surrender the command of the sea to France even temporarily. The difficulties France had to contend with in her attempt to wrest these two countries from England were greater than would be those confronting Germany should she con- template a similar attempt upon British South Africa whilst the Colonial defence organisation is in its present unsatisfactory condition, and the martial spirit of the British at its present low ebb. Under the cloak of suppressing native risings the German base of opera- tions at a point near the Cape frontier could with ease and with Httle suspicion be strengthened, a similar pretext for augmenting the German garrisons in East Africa is also feasible. However determined such an invasion might be, the danger of its success lies solely in ignoring it as an absurdity, and therefore being unprepared with organisation to meet it. In war almost invariably the unexpected happens, and the loss of Metz was mainly due to the incredulity of Marshal Bazaine. The military resources of South Africa should be ample to successfully meet such an invasion, providing these resources are organised. The invading forces would suffer under the great disadvantage of immo- bility ; it would be called upon to operate over a large area, and the lines of communication would be weak. Such diverting force as might be landed from seawards would be liable to have its sea communications cut before joining hands with the western columns. (c) Bombardment of Seaports. — South Africa may 22 * 340 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE reasonably expect this form of aggression in the event of a naval war in which Great Britain is involved. Such predatory attacks by commerce destroyers does not imply that England's command of the sea is even, en dangered. Too little attention has up to the present been given by the South African Colonies to harbour defences. The Colonists fail to realise that in this form of defence their responsibilities are not limited to the protection of their own lives and property, but extend to the protection of such shipping as may seek succour under their walls. A naval war against Great Britain will mean a systematic attempt to destroy her commerce for the two-fold purpose of the great damage such will entail and an attempt to weaken the British fleets by the detailing of ships for coastal and com- merce protection. No South African defence scheme can be complete that does not provide adequate harbour protection. It is reasonable to suppose that within a few days of the outbreak of war the fortified harbours of South Africa would be crowded with shipping, followed later by one or two hostile cruisers seeking their destruction. The modern commerce-destroying cruiser has a coal capacity of 8,000 miles, but it has these disadvantages against land defences — the ammunition supply is limited, its fire is from a floating platform against in- casements whose only vulnerable target is the gun ; it further presents to the land defences a large and vulner- able target to be fired at from a solid platform enabling the use of mathematically accurate range-finders. SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS DEFENCE 341 {d) Invasion from Seawards by Naval Power other than Germany. — It is possible, though highly improb- able, for Great Britain to temporarily lose the command of the sea to a naval Power other than Germany. In such an event an ambitious Power might seriously endeavour to capture and temporarily occupy the prin- cipal seaport towns of South Africa ; the main object for such an invasion would be the strategic value of the Cape and Natal, and the value of such in future peace negotiations. The abandonment of the captured positions must necessarily follow the regaining by England of the command of the sea, yet loss and damage to the Colonists would have resulted ; therefore the Colonial Defence Organisation is called upon to make such a form of occupation both difficult and costly, and anything more than the occupation of one or two seaport towns impossible. To-day England and France are the best of friends. Such genuine cordiality has never before existed be- tween these two nations. But it is possible for the scene to change — the statesman, diplomat, or soldier who acts under the belief that peace between these at present friendly nations is assured forever is criminally neglectful of his duty. War between France and England would result in the continual harassing of the South African ports by French cruisers from Madagascar. {e) Land Invasion from the West. — All the black pages in South African history are directly or indirectly attributable to Liberal Administrations at home. It 342 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE was the fearsome policy of a Liberal Government that placed England's future foe in South-West Africa and in such a strategic position as makes Germany a continual threat to British South Africa. Presuppos- ing war between Germany and England, or the forces of England so engaged elsewhere as to leave Germany free to act against such British Colonies as she is able to invade by land, the importance strategically and the material value of British South Africa is such that Germany would not hesitate in an immediate invasion from her West African possessions. Nor must it be forgotten that the Cape Colony and the hinter- land states are inhabited by a kindred race, and a section of these people are ever liable to show discon- tent with a settled government. There is, as was pointed out by Mr. Chamberlain in 1888, when address- ing the London Chamber of Commerce, the possibility of the Germans being invited to join hands with these people, an invitation not likely to be declined where the hope of acquiring such rich possessions as South and South-Central Africa is held out. (/") Native Rebellion. — South Africa, unlike other British Colonies, has an indigenous race increasing at a greater ratio than its European population, and she is peculiarly liable to the danger of armed aggression on the part of her subject races, more particularly so in the form of a local native rebellion. Apparently insignificant as many of these local disturbances may be, the firm and successful repression of them in their earliest stages calls for the highest organisation of the SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS DEFENCE 343 Colonial defence forces, for upon this rests the responsi- bility of extinguishing the flame before it has spread into a conflagration, and in such an efficient manner as will not leave sparks of sedition, caused by need- less brutality (such as the indiscriminate slaughter of loyal and disloyal), to smoulder, only to break out again in an unexpected quarter with renewed force and energy. Past experience has shown us that these revolts are of varying degree — from the mere tribal affair to be dealt with by a police patrol to that rising of one or more tribes against the authority of the Government, and calling for immediate suppression by a large section of the Colonial defence force. It is here that the position of the Colonial Mounted Police forces should be carefully considered as an active branch of the Imperial defence service. In the quell- ing of these incipient revolts, before they have grown into rebellion, and spread to war calling for large ex- penditure to meet and suppress, the Mounted Police forces of South Africa have been of inestimable value. The valuable services of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, the Cape Mounted Police, and Natal Mounted Police, in this respect have not received that recognition they are justly entitled to. It is quite impossible to estimate the expenditure of lives and money saved to South Africa by these corps being ever ready to deal with the lesser revolts ; because they have been successfully dealt with the public hear nothing of them. That the value of these 344 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE corps can be increased is beyond doubt, but only in so far as to their allotment of a proper place in the general scheme of South African and Imperial defence. (g) Native War. — By native war as distinguished from native revolt is understood an organised com- bination of tribes fighting for a common object. Such a war may, providing the defence organisation is efficient, be localised and restricted to well-defined areas in its early stages. This was successfully accomplished in the Zulu War of 1879, and the Basuto War of 188 1. All acts, ordinances, or orders in council concerning South African defence have been framed to meet the danger of a native war. So far the strain upon the organisation under such acts has not been made by a combination of the native races ; this want of organisa- tion has been mainly due to tribal jealousies and lack of communication. The policy of native administration is killing the first, and natural progress and advance- ment is doing away with the second. Education, carrying in its wake discontent, is spreading among the people ; the reason for their ill success in past revolts is now to them becoming more clear. Owing to the partition of South Africa into States and the varied native policies followed by the Governments of each, no common grievance coincidental has animated the natives of the sub-continent, therefore their revolts have been met and quelled in detail, and, owing to the varied nature of the defence systems, in a more or less efficient manner. With the advent of a common native policy there SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS DEFENCE 345 may arise elements for a common grievance, in the form of taxation, land laws, interference with tribal customs or labour legislation, grievances which may- culminate in war, the extent, cost, and duration of which must depend upon the organisation of the federal defence forces. Another disturbing element which may make itself felt in South Africa at any moment may arise out of the need to alter the position and status of the semi- independent native States of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. It is not to be expected that four States, constitutionally one dominion, will sanction their geographical separation by the small native States of Basutoland and Swaziland ; apart from the break in the geographical homogeneity of South Africa by the separate governance of the native States, there would be the spectacle of native policies, possibly in conflict with that followed by the federating States, being adopted by the Imperial Government in these adjoin- ing and separating native States. The result could only be harmful and dangerous to the whole of South Africa. It therefore does not appear wise for union to be brought about until the Imperial Government sanctions the absorption of these native States by the future federation. Basutoland, a small mountainous country, resembles Switzerland in many respects, especially in its situa- tion to its neighbours and in the hardy and inde- pendent character of its indigenous people. The prestige gained by this native race in their war with 346 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE the Cape in 1880, resulting as it did in their gaining their independence from that Colony, has raised them to a very high position as a fighting people in the opinion of the rest of the native races of South Africa, and in a war between the Basutos and the Europeans the former could depend upon the active support of other tribes even in remote parts of South Africa. The inclusion of this native State in the South African Federation will, in all probability, result in war ; the inaccessibility of their country and the mobility of their fighting men means that their struggle for inde- pendence will be strenuous, calling for the efficient organisation of the South African defence forces to meet it and to confine the struggle within the borders of Basutoland itself. It must be borne in mind that with the granting of the new Constitution to South Africa there will be a gradual withdrawal of Imperial troops, and on the expiration of five years from its enactment the country will be without that service it has in the past looked to for moral and physical support in time of trouble. South Africa's duty to the Empire demands that the withdrawal of Imperial troops is made possible. We have seen that the dangers of war to which South Africa is open are far from imaginary, and we are therefore called upon to provide a rigid system of de- fence. Hard experience has borne in on the most stubborn minds that compulsory service is essential in South Africa. Coupled with this there must also be a form of compulsory training ; the extent of this SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS DEFENCE 347 latter condition being open to question is liable to cause controversy. Personally, I am of opinion that this obligation to the State need not extend beyond the age of eighteen, for, providing the defence organisa- tion is efficient, a very large proportion of the man- hood will be induced to undergo voluntary training in those corps to which their names are attached for active service. The remarkable results achieved in Natal by the compulsory Cadet system goes to show that military training engendered in youth creates a martial spirit in the community sufficient to keep the defence forces at full strength, providing the slightest encouragement is given by the authorities. The compulsory Cadet system, if introduced into the federal defence scheme, will obviate the need for extending compulsory train- ing beyond the age of eighteen. Under a Federal Constitution there are two forms of political control of the defence services — that fol- lowed by the United States of America, where the organised Militia is not federal, but belongs to the various States and territories comprised in the Federal Union ; they maintain the units of all arms with the aid of grants from the Federal Government. Or that followed by Canada and Australia in which there is no State control whatever. In South Africa the American system would fail hopelessly ; the strongest form of control and the closest system of organisation is required in a country where mobilisation may be called for on the shortest notice. 348 COLONIES AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE The cost then of the South African forces under the future Constitution should fall upon the Federal Government, and therefore be borne by indirect taxation. The great difficulty which confronts legislators in the framing of defence measures is to obtain the maximum efficiency with the mimimum interference with the liberty of the subject. In matters of defence economy should not receive the greatest consideration, for such is liable to result in the gravest extravagance in time of war, perhaps be the very cause of war. In those countries liable to sudden outbreaks of hostili- ties, especially on the part of savages, the subject has to realise that the security and liberty of himself and the community at large demands a certain sacrifice on his part. The legislator has to see that that sacri- fice is as light as is compatible with efficiency and the requirements of the country. The modern appliances of war make long and rigid training unnecessary, the daily conditions of Colonial life still more so. Therefore, providing prominence to the early training to arms is given in the Federal Defence Act, there is no reason why compulsory training should extend beyond that in a Senior Cadet Corps, and the obliga- tion in this respect ends at the age of eighteen. But every encouragement must be given for voluntary training after that age, and it will be found that the duty to South Africa and to the Empire will not be neglected. INDEX Abbrcrombie, Sir Ralph, 43. Accra, 64, 65. Aden and Perim, settlement of, 99. Admiralty Office, the, advised by Imperial Council of Defence, 284, 285, 287. Afghan Wars, the, 92. Afghanistan, 93. Africa — Central — Railways in, 106. South — Colonisation of, 8, 9, 49-63. Council of Defence of, 241, 242. Defensive resources of, 172, 173, 326, 329, 330. See also under Separate States. Effect of gold industry in, 220, 221. Federal Defence Act, 347, 348. Future Government of, contingencies which may arise under, 332 et sqq. Bombardments of seaports, 339, 340. Civil war in, 336-38. Invasion from seawards, 338, 339, 341. Land invasion from West, 341, 342. Native rebellion, 342-44. Native war, 344-46. West- Colonisation of, 63 et sqq. Agriculture, decline of, in England, 148. Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of, 17, 40, 45, 91. Alaska, 217. Alison, Sir Archibald, cited, 116, 117. American Civil War, the, conduct of, 199 et sqq. ; possible analogy between, and a South African, 337. American Colonies, secession of, 3, 12, 27, 28, 216; condition of in 1744, 15, 16 et sqq.; in 1766, net sqq.; Militia supphed by, 252. Amiens, treaty of, 38, 59, 40, 50, 6g. 349 350 INDEX Andaman Islands, 97, g8. Anguilla, Island of, 44. Antigua, Island of, 11, 44. Argentine, wheat exporting, 120, 221. Aristocracy, lack of, in Colonies, 22, 215. Army Council (British), 2og, 210, 211. Ascension, Island of, 68. Ashantiland, 64. Ashanti War (1878), 65. Asiatic immigration, question of, 217, 218 ; Restriction Act, 268, 300, 324- Australian Commonwealth, the — Acquisition of, 8. Characteristics of, 75-79. Defence Act (proposed) introduced by Federal Government, 168, 169. Defended ports of, 184, 185. Defensive resources of, 148, 149, 160, 161, 168, 169, 174, 274, 324 325, 326. Democratic tendencies in, 209. Federation of, 232, 243. Gold industry in, 221, 222. Japanese in, 267 ; excluded from, 268, 270, 271 ; possible results of exclusion, 272, 273. Naval questions in, 78, 137, 138, 143, 144 et sqq., 161, 273, 274, 324. Autocracy, in relation to efficiency of defence, 194, 195. Bahamas, the, 46, 47. Baker Islands, 82. Bantu Tribes, the (South Africa), 335. Barbadoes, 12, 41. Basuto Campaign (i88o-8i), 335, 344. Basutoland, description of, 345, 346. Basuto tribes, 52. Baum, Colonel, death of, 24. Bazaine, Marshal, and loss of Metz, 339, Bechuanaland, 345. Bedford, John, 4th Duke of, succeeds to Colonial Secretaryship, 18. Bellairs, Carlyon, cited in Naval Annual, 301. Benbow, Admiral, 37. Bermuda, possible Canadian defence of, 184. Bermudas, the, 10, 48, 103. Bernard, Sir Francis, Colonial policy of, 22, 30, Bill of Rights (1689), 19s, 202, 203. Boers, the, the " Great Trek," 52 ; instinctive mihtary skill of, 173, 333 ; burgher system of, working of, 333-35. 336. Boer War (the first), 57, 58. Boer War (the second) (1899- 1902), 58, 77, 148, 165, 166, 167, 168, 173, 203, 207, 208, 223, 251, 252, 278, 291, 308, 325. Bombay, acquisition of, 8, 90. Booth, Charles, his Life and Labour of the People cited, 117. INDEX 351 Botany Bay, 76. Braddock, General, ig, 20. Braganza, Katherine of, her dowry, go. Brain of Imperial defence, the, 292 et sqq. Breda, Peace of, 43. Brest, port of, in relation to food supply in war time, 124, 126. British Colonial Policy, Egerton, cited, 18, 19, 20, 29, 30. British Guiana, 36, 37. British Honduras, 47. Britishj North Borneo, description of, 83. British Solomon Islands, 82, 83. Brodrick, Rt. Hon. William, his Army Reform Scheme, 281. Buddhism, 262. Burgoyne, General, defeat of 24-27, 32. Burke, Edmund, cited on Colonial self-government, 251. Burmah, 92. Burmese Wars, 92. Cabul, British occupation of, g2. Calcutta, port of, 90, 93. Canada- Acquisition of, 8, 21. Alaska, case of, and, 217. Defensive resources of, 157-60, 169, 174, 183, 184, 326, 328, 329. Democratic tendencies o^ in relation to Defence Councils, 209. Federation of, 232, 233. " Granary of the Empire, the," 113, 114, 122-24. Newfoundland and, 159, 230, 231. Relations between French and British in, 14, 30, 31. Revenue of, in relation to defence, 32-35. Secession, question of, 216. Wealth and natural advantages of, 31, 32. Canning, Charles John, Earl, viceroy of India, g2, 229. Cape Breton Island, 14, 16, 17. Cape Colony — Contribution of, to Royal Navy, 162. Defence resources of, 157, 238, 239, 240, 244. Suspension of Constitution in, 217. Cape Mounted Riflemen, the, 52, 54, 238. Caribbean Sea, in relation to the Empire, 180, 181. Carleton, Guy (ist Baron Dorchester), work of, in Canada, 29. Carnatic, the, struggle between French and English in, go, 91. Carthage, fall of, instanced to show danger of political interference in war matters, 196, 197 ; and Roman Navy, 29g. Ceylon, 6g, 70. Chaka, Zulu chief, 8, S5- Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, on German danger in South- Western Africa, 342. China, a nonentity, I2g ; Japanese influence in, 264. 352 INDEX Chinese, the, and Transvaal question, 217, 218, 221, 223 ; make good soldiers, 261. Christmas Island, 82. Clarke, Sir George, 151, 281. Clinton, General Sir Harry, 25, 26, 32, Clive, Robert, Lord, Indian victories of, gi. Coaling stations, importance of commanding, 178, 180, 181, 183, 187, 330. Cocos Islands, the, 72. Colomb, Admiral, quoted on battle of Gabarnes Bay, 16, 17 ; cited, 36, 151. Colonial — Affairs, Council for, 13. Defence Committees, in relation to Imperial Council of Defence, 176, 177, 277. Mounted Police, 343. Navies, question of, 136, 137, 143, 320, 322, 323, 324, 325. Parliaments, usual constitution of, 212-14. Prime Ministers, Conferences of, 18, 155, i6g, 170, 183, 320, 325, 328, 329- Colonials, the, and higher Imperial posts, 256, 257. Colonies, the, and Imperial defence, 138 et sqq., 154 et sqq., 325 et sqq. ; independent, 158-60 ; others, dependent on the Empire, 160-64 ; responsible government granted to, 143. Colony, definition of, 2, 3. Columbus, Christopher, discoveries of, 37, 38, 41, 46. Cook, Capt., at Botany Bay, 75, 76 ; visit of, to New Zealand, 7g. Cornwallis, Charles, 2nd Earl of, 27. Cost, of fortifying undefended posts, 192, 193 ; of war, 264, 265. Costella, Juan de Navo, 68. Cotton, speculation in, 121, 122. Cuba, given to Spain, 21. Cyprus, Island of, description and history of, 86, 87. Dakar, a French naval base, 186, 187, igi. Dartnell, Sir John, and Indian troops in South African War, 88. Democratic Governments, in relation to efficiency of defence, 194, 195, igg et sqq. Deutsche Rundschau, the, 283. Diaz, Bartholomew, 49. Diego Garcia Group, the, 71. Diego Suarez, fortification of, 181, igo, igi. Dilke, Sir Charles, and Indian affairs, 87 ; and Imperial defence, 151, 281. Dingaan, Zulu chief, 8, 52, 55. Diodorus Siculus, cited on Malta, 85. Dominica, 21, 44, 45. Duff (or Wilson) Islands, 82. Dupleix, Governor, and French interests in India, 91. Durban, 56, 61, 183, 185, 300, 301, 330. INDEX 353 Dutch Colonies, characteristics of, 5, 6. Dutch East India Company, the, 49. Dutch nation, the, in Tobago, 39, 40 ; in Cape of Good Hope, 49, 50 ; in Natal, 55 et sqq. ; and the Gold Coast, 64, 65 ; in India, 90 et sqq. Education, in relation to Imperial efficiency, 129. Egerton, H. E., cited, 18, 19, 20, 29, 30. Elizabeth, Queen, 8, 66. EUice Group (or Lagoon), 82. England, sea power of, g ; acknowledges independence of United States, 27. English East India Company, 68, 70, 81, go, 92. Esher Commission, the, report of, 307, 308, 309. Esquimault, strategic importance of, 183, 184. Ethiopian Church, the, in South Africa, 225, 237. Falkland Islands, history of, 35 ; defence of, 304. Fanning Island, 82 ; fortification of, desirable, igi. Farewell, Lieutenant, 55. Federated Malay States, description of, 73, 74. Fiji Islands, 80, 81. Food, question of, in war time, 114, 115 et sqq., 127, 128. Foreign Powers, questions relating to, and Colonies, 231, 320, 321. France, and sea power, 14; acknowledges independence of United States, 27 ; and Gold Coast, 64 ; naval strength o^ 108 ; military system of, no; and Madagascar, 181, 341. Franco-Prussian War, the, 167, 168, 199. Freetown, 63, 64. French East India Company, go, gi. Friendly Islands (or Tonga), 81. Fynn, Mr., and Zulu potentates, 55. Gabarnes Bay, battle of, 16, 17. Gama, Vasco da, 49, 55. Gambia, description of, 66. Gates, General, 25, 26. Germany, naval strength of, 108 ; land forces of, no, in ; wheat ex- ported from, 120 ; advantages of compulsory military training shown in, 132 ; naval programme of, 2g5, 2g7, 298, 299, 300 ; her colonisation of West Africa, 321, 330; leading to possible aggression, 338, 339, 341, 342. Gibraltar, history and description of, 83, 84 ; importance of, 103, 104. Gilbert Islands, 82. Gilbert, Sir Humphrey, 10. Gladstone, William Ewart, his South African policy, 58. Gold Coast, the, 64, 65. Gold industry, influence of, in various countries, 218 et sqq. ; " gold magnates," 222, 223. 23 354 INDEX Goltz, General von der, cited on scattered disposition of British fleet, 283. Good Hope, Cape of, 49 et sqq., 321. Gordon, General, on Chinese soldiers, 261. Grant, General, rise of, 201. Great Britain, food question of, in war time, 114, 115 et sqq. ; naval strength of, 107, 108; land forces of, 109, no. Greece, colonies of, 3, 4, ir ; decadence of, 131. Grenada, 21, 41, 42. Grenadines, the, 42. Grenville, George, and American Colonies, 22. Grey, Sir George, 2, 52. Griqualand West, discovery of diamonds in, 53. Guadaloupe, ceded to France, 21. Gundamuk, treaty of, 93. Gun running, trade of, 227. Haldimand, Sir Frederick, work of, in Canada, 29. Halifax, short route between, and Plymouth, 122, 124 ; defence of, 184, 185. Halliday, Lieut.- Governor, and Indian Mutiny, 229. Hamilton, Lord George, on fate of slow steamers in war time, 118. Hannibal, ig6, 197, 198, 199, 262. Harnian, Admiral Sir John, 40. Hastings, Warren, defeats Hyder Ali, 91. Hely Hutchinson, Sir Walter, and South African War, 88. Her Majesty's Colonies, Trundell, cited, 42. Herodotus, cited, 49. History of Europe, Alison, cited, 116, 117. Hobson, Capt., ist Governor of New Zealand, 79. Hofmeyer, Mr., his Zollverein scheme, 54. Holland, parsimony of, 7; iher Navy, 14, 145, 146; acknowledges inde- pendence of United States, 27 ; decadence of, 131. Hong-Kong, 74, 75. Howe, Lord, and Colonial Army, 21. Hudson Bay Company, 13, 14. Hyder Ali, 91. Imperial — Army, the, 304 et sqq. ; in relation to Colonials, 152, 153 ; spirit of, too exclusive, 165 et sqq. ; Militia, schemes for, 316 et sqq. Council of Defence, in relation to Colonial Defence Committees, 176, i77i 241, 242, 256, 258, 277 «i sqq.; proposed constitution of, 295. Defence Committee, constitution of, 292, 293 ; proposed abolition of, 277 et sqq., 294. Federation Society, the, 119. Light Horse, the, 59. Navy, the, 296 et sqq. INDEX 355 Imperial (continued) — Railways, 105, 106. Rome, not self-sustaining, 116, 117. Trade, increase of, 104, 105. Value of Colonies, 103. India, in relation to Colonies, 87, 88 ; boundaries of, 8g ; history of, 90 et sqq. ; marine forces of, 93, 94 ;»European and native Army, strength of, in, 94, 95-97, 98 ; representation of, on Imperial Defence Committee, 293 ; Imperial Militia Army and, 317, 318. Intercourse between United States and jfapan, Nitobes, 265. Italy, naval strength of, 108. Jamaica, description of, 37, 38. Japan, naval strength of, 107, 108; military system of, 112, 113 ; com- parison of, with decadent nations, 131 ; and Australia, 146, 185, 270, 271 et sqq.; British sympathy with, 259, 260, 261, 299; apparent unwisdom of sympathy with, 262, 263, 300; in- fluence of, in China, 264 ; fighting qualities of, 265, 266 ; rapid Occidentalisation of, 269 ; Magna Chaita of, 269, 270. Jarvis Island, 82. Kafirs, morality of the, 235, 236. Kafir wars, the, 51, 52, 53. Kaffraria, British, 52. Karachi, Port of, 93. Kitchener, Lord, commander-in-chief in India, 94. Knox, William, Colonial policy of, 22, 30. Kuria Muria Islands, 100. Labuan, Island of, 74. Laccadive Islands, the, 99. Lagos, description of, 66. Lanyon, Sir Owen, administers the Transvaal, 57. Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, and Colonial responsibilities, 155. Liberal Government, the. Colonial policy of, 28, 29 ; smd South Africa, 341. 342- Life and Labour of the People, Booth, cited, 117. Livingstone, Dr., his description of Victoria Falls, 105, 106. Livius, Marcus, 197, 198. London Gazette, the, 173. McClellan, General, hampered by political interference, igg et sqq. Madagascar, strategic importance of, 181, 182, igo, 341. Madras, Residency of, rise of, 90 ; history of, 90, 91 ; port of, 93. Mahan, Capt., cited 9, 36, 148, 151, 160, 178. Mahon, Lord (5th Earl Stanhope), cited on Saratoga, 26, 27. Malaboch War (South Africa), 334. Malacca, 72, 73. Maiden Island, 82. 23 * 356 INDEX Malta, description and history of, 85, 86 ; importance of, 103, 104. Manchuria and Japan, 264, 266. Marathon, battle of, 259, 260. Martinique, 21. Mascarenhas, Don Perro, discoverer of Mauritius, 70. Massachusetts, independence of, II ; defence of, 13 ; disputes in, ig. Mauritius, Island of, 8, 70, 71, 303. Mayflower, sailing of the, 11. Miquelon, in relation to Canadian-Plymouth routes, 124, 125. Missionaries, in South Africa, 224, 225, 227, 235, 236, 237. Moltke, General, 207. Mona passage, the, 37. Monatari, Genjo Vume, cited on military unpreparedness, 291. Montserrat, 11, 45. Moore, Sir John, 43. Munder, Sir Richard, 68. Murray, Capt. Stewart L., cited on food supply during war, 115. Mutiny, the Great, 92. Mysore War (the 4th), 91. Napier, Sir Charles, 92. Napoleon I., referred to, 39, 67, 85, 148. Napoleonic Wars, price of corn during,^ii5, 116. Natal, history of, 54, 55 et sqq. ; defensive resources of, 157, 162, 163, 174, 238, 239, 240, 241, 244, 245 ; port defences of, 192 ; floating dock at, 300 ; Defence Act of, 309 et sqq. ; Cadet Corps in, 311-13, 347, 348; Asiatic labour question in, 337. " Native danger," the, 224, 227, 228, 230, 234, 235, 237. Native races, and Imperial defence organisation, 174, 175, 192, 193 ; comparative federation of, in South Africa, 224 et sqq. Naval Annual, the, cited, 301. Naval Budget, and Colonies, 142, 297, 298 ; increase in, 296, 297. Naval Warfare, Colomb, 16, 17. Navy, British, statistics of, 107-109. Navy League, the, 119. Nelson, Admiral, value of " strategic ports " to, igo. Nero, Caius Claudius, 197, ig8, 262. Nevis, Island of, 11, 44. Nevifcastle, Thomas, Duke of, 17, 18. New Englanders, the, 23, 252. Newfoundland, acquisition of, 10, 14 ; Canadian Commonwealth and, 159, 230, 231; exceptional situation of, 322. New Guinea, British, 81, 82, 268. New South Wales, colonisation of, 76, 77 ; defensive resources of, 78, 157- New York, State of, 19. New Zealand, 8 ; description of, 79, 80 ; defensive resources of, 157-60 174, 326; defended ports of, 185, i86. Nicholson, Lieut. -Governor, 15. INDEX 357 Nicobai Islands, g8, gg. Nigeria, 67. Norfolk Island, defence of, 186. Norway, decadence of, 131. Nova Scotia, 14, 16, 21, 29. Obok, naval station of, igo. Occidentalism, victory of, 259 ; in relation to war, 264, 265. Ontario, 2g. Orange River Free State, 52; defence of, 62; defensive resources of, 174, 23g, 244, 245 ; relations of, to Maritime States, 233, 328. Orientalism, 259, 260, 261, 266 et sqq. Oversea defences, 301 et sqq. Palmyra Island, 82. Panama Canal, i8o, 181, 191. Pan-Britannic Militia, scheme for a, 314 et sqq. Paris, treaties of, 21, 40, 41, 45, 85, Peace, ill effects of, 130, 131. Penang, Island of, 72, 73. Pennsylvania, 14, 15. Perry, Commodore, visit of, to Japan, 265, 2gi. Philippine Islands, 267. Phoenicians, the, 49, 85, 86. Phoenix Group, the, 82. Police, Mounted, South African, 245-47, 343> 344- Pondicherry, siege of, go, gi. Portugal, 131 ; and gold industry, 219, 220. Portuguese Colonies, ruins of, 6. Port Louis (Mauritius), igo, igi. Port Royal, founded, 11. Punic War (the 2nd), 196 et sqq. Punjaub, the, 92. Quakers, 14, 15, Quebec, founded, 11 ; route, to Plymouth, 122, X24. Queensland, Colony of, 75, 76, 77, 78 ; defensive resources of, 157. Quetta, 93. Raleigh, Sir Walter, 10, 197. Rangoon, port of, 93. Regular Army, relation of, to Imperial Army, 153, 165 et sqq. Revenue, in relation to defence, 33, 34. Rhodesia, description of, 62, 63 ; in relation to Maritime States, 233 ; defensive resources of, 239, 244, 245. Rodney, Lord, 43. Rodrigues, 71 ; defence of, 304. Roe, Sir Thomas, in India, go. Roumania. wheat exported from, 120. 358 INDEX Royal African Company, 64. Royal Commission on Imperial Defence, 327, 328, 330. Royal Commission on Militia or Volunteers, 166, 167. Royal Company of Adventurers, 64. Royal Naval Volunteer Bill (South Africa), 329. Royal Navy, and Colonies, 322, 323 ; less conservative than the Army, 152, 153. Ruskin, John, quoted on evils of peace, 131. Russia, and Afghanistan, 93 ; naval strength of, 107, 108 ; military strength of, in, 112 ; wheat exporting, 120 ; Navy of, in relation to British Navy, 296, 299, 300 ; war of, with Japan, 259 et sqq. Saigon, port of, igo. Sakakunie Campaign (South Africa), 334. St. Clare, General, 24. St. Helena, Island of, 67, 68. St. John's, defence of, 184. St. Kitts, 44. St. Lucia, description of, 43, 44. St. Pierre, and Canadian-Plymouth route, 124, 125. St. Vincent, 21, 42, 43. St. Vincent, Lord, 43. Santa Cruz Islands, 82. Saratoga, disaster of, 25, 27, 32. Sea power, importance of, loi et sqq., 134, 135. Seringapatam, capture of, 91. " Seven Years' War," the, 20 et sqq., 27, 251. Seychelles Islands, the, 71 ; fortification of, desirable, 182, 190, 193, 304- Sheerness, Dutch fleet at, 6. Shipping, English, 104, 105. Shirley, Governor (North American Colonies), 18, ig. Sierra Leone, description of, 63, 64 ; defensive resources of, 186. Sikh regiments, loyalty of, 92 ; wars, 92. Simon's Bay, port of, 54. Simon's Town, strategical importance of, 185, 186, 301, 330. Singapore, Island of, 72 Socialism, growth of, in Australia, 273. Socotra, Island of, gg, 100. Somaliland, war in, 24g. Somers, Admiral Sir George, 48. Soudan Campaign (1885), Australian troops in, 252. South Australia, defensive resources of, 157. Spain, loses command of the sea, 9 ; acknowledges independence of United States, 27 ; and gold industry, 218, 2ig. Spanish Colonies, characteristics of, 4, 5, 6. Sport, importance of, in England, 305, 306, 308. Stamp Act, the, 22, 23. Starbuck Island, 82. INDEX 359 statesmen's Year Book (1908), cited 94, 96, 97. Straits Settlements, the, description and history of, 71-73. " Strategic ports," importance of, 189, 190. Strathcona, Lord, 281. Stel, Simon van der, 6. Suez Canal, possible blockade of, 162, 182, 191. Swaziland, 345. Sweden, decadence of, 131 ; and Russia, 260. Sydney, Port of, 77. Tasman, Dutch navigator, discoveries of, 75, 79, 80. Tasmania, discovery of, 75 ; penal station in, 76 ; defensive resources of, 157. Thursday Island, 268. Ticonderoga, battles of^ 21, 24. Tippoo SsJiilj, death of, gi. Tobago, 21, 39, 40. Tonga (or Friendly Islands), 81. Torpedo boat depSts, diagram of, 126. Tours, battle of, 259. Trafalgar, battle of, 148. Transvaal State, the, ceded to Boers, 52 ; annexed by British, 57 ; re- turned to Boers, 58; present condition of, 61, 62; defensive re- sources of, 174, 239, 244, 332 ; and Chinese question, 217, 218, 221, 223 ; relations of, with Maritime States, 233, 328 ; popu- lation of, 234 ; wars undertaken by, 334. Trinidad, description of, 38, 39. Tristan d'Acunha, 69 ; defence of, 187, 192, 193, 304. Trundell, A. J. R., cited, 42. Turkey, wheat exporting, I20. Turks and Caicos Islands, the, 46. United States, the Declaration of Independence of, 12 ; committed to war by New Englanders, 23, et sqq.; independence of, ac- knowledged, 27 ; naval strength of, 108 ; wheat exported by, 114, 120; financial methods o5 121, 122. Utrecht, treaty of, 14, 145 , 230. Van Riebeck, Jan, 49. Versailles, treaty of, 27, 30, 43. Victoria, Colony of, 75-78 ; defensive resources of, 157. Victoria Falls, Dr. Livingstone's description of, 105, 106. Victoria, Queen, proclaimed Empress of India, 92. Virgin Islands, the, 45, 46. Virginia Company, the, 10, 11. Virginia, acquisition of, 10; independence and wealth of, 11, 12; loyalty of, 15. Vladivostok, raids by Russian cruisers from, 124. 36o INDEX Walfisch Bay, 54 ; defence of, 187, 192, 304. War, and civilisation, 130, 131. War Office, Intelligence Department of, 167, i6g, 170, 174; reorganisa- tion of, 240, 258 ; cannot enforce unity, 283, 284 ; to be advised by Imperial Council of Defence, 284, 285, 287. Warren, Commodore, 16, 17. Washington, General, 20, 27. Washington Island, 82. Wellesley, Richard CoUey, Marquis of. Viceroy of India, 91, 92. West Indies, 18 ; history and description of, 36 et sqq. See also under separate geographical headings, Wheeler, Sir Hugh, 229. Wilkinson, Spencer, 281. Williams, Major, and the Indian Mutiny, 229. Wilson, Cracroft, Special Commissioner on the Mutiny, 229. Wireless telegraphy, advent of, 179. Wolseley, Sir Garnet, and Ashanti War, 65 ; on political interference, 208. Yeardley, Governor, 10, 11. Zama, battle of, 259, 262. Zand River Convention, the, 52. Zululand, invaded, 55 ; a recruiting field, 192. Zulu War (1879), 57, 344. ABERDEEN ; THE UNIVERSITY PRESS