CORNELL . UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Cornell University Library B505 .Z51 1870 Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Tr. fr olin 3 1924 029 000 342 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029000342 THE STOICS, EPICUKEANS, AND SCEPTICS. TEANSLATED FKOM THE GERMAK OF DR. E. ZELLER PROFESSOB OF THE TJSIVEHSITT OF HEIDELBERG BY OSWALD J. REICHEL, B.C.L. & M.A. VICAR OF SPARSHOLT, VICE-PRINCIPAL OF CUDDESDEN COLLEGE, AND SOMETIME SCHOLAH OF QUEEN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD. LONDON : LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 1870. TO THE PROVOST AND FELLOWS OF THE QUEEN'S COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, TO ■WHOSE PAST CARE AND PRESENT KINDNESS THE TRANSLATOE O^WES THE PREFERMENT WHICH HE NOW HOLDS, ^is itolume is ^cbUateb GEATEFTJLLT AND RESPECTFULLY. PREFACE. The favoue with which a previous attempt to render one portion of Dr. Zeller's work accessible to English readers has been received, induces the translator to offer a further instalment. The former translation dealt with that part of Dr. Zeller's Philosophie der Oriechen which treats of Socrates and the Socratic Schools, thus supplying an introductory volume to the real philosophy of Greece as it found expres- sion in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. The present volume, taking up the history of philosophy at a time when the real philosophy of Greece was over, and the names of Plato and Aristotle had become things of the past, aims at supplying an introductory volume to another portion of the history of mind — the portion, viz. which may be collectively described as the post-Aristotelian. To the moralist and theologian no less than to the student of philo- sophy this portion is one of peculiar interest ; for the post-Aristotelian philosophy supplied the scientific moixld into which Christianity in the early years of viii PREFACE. its growth was cast, and bearing the shape of which it has come down to us. No complete history there- fore of either morals or theology is possible, which does not know something of the systems cotemporary with the first ages of the Church. In the present volume the translator has followed the same method of translation as in ' Socrates and the Socratic Schools.' In the hope of rendering it as intelligible as possible, he has made it his aim throughout to eschew all unnecessary technicalities. He wishes in conclusion to express his obligations to the Eev. Claude Delaval Cobham, of University College, Oxford, for his kind assistance in taking the MS. through the press. Chetin HotrsE, Hazlewood : January, 1870, CONTENTS. PAET I. STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAPTER I. THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF GREECE AT THE CLOSE OF THE FOURTH CENTURY, B.C. PAGE A. Merits and defects of the systems of Plato and Aristotle 1 B. Connection between the theories of Aristotle and the Greek character ..... 6 C. Greece after the battle of Chseronea . . . 13 CHAPTER II. CHARACTER AND CHIEF FORMS OF THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY. A. Causes forming the post- Aristotelian philosophy . 1 6 1. Political causes . . . . .16 2. - Intellectual causes . . . .18 CONTENTS. B. Character of the post-Aristotelian philosophy . 1. Theory subordinated to practice 2. Peculiar mode of treating the practical problem 3. These peculiarities illustrated by subsequent phi' losophy - . . . . C. Development of the post-Aristotelian philosophy 1. Dogmatic Schools — Stoics and Epicureans, Dogma^ tie Scepticism .... 2. Sceptical Schools — influences producing — Sceptic- ism and Eclecticism . . 3. Religious School of Neoplatonists . . PAGE 20 21 22 23 26 26 28 32 PART II. THE STOICS. CHAPTER ni. • HISTORY OF THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OF THE SECOND CENTUET, B.C. A. B. Zeno ...... Pupils of Zeno ..... 1. Cleanthes ..... 2. Aristo and Herillus 3. Other pupils .... 37 41 41 42 43 C. Chrysippus and the later Stoics . 1. Chrysippus ..... 2. Later Stoics .... 45 45 48 / CONTENTS. xi CHAPTEB IV. AUTHORITIES FOE THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY; ITS PROBLEM AND DIVISIONS. A. Authorities .... 1. Eeview of authorities 2. Use to be made of authorities • PAGE 52 52 54 B. Problem proposed to the Stoic philosophy 1. Its practical character • 2. -Necessity for intellectual knowledge 3. Attitude towards logic and natural science — of- Zeno and Cleanthes of Aristo 65 55 57 58 C. Divisions of philosophy . 1. Threefold division . 2. Relative importance of each part . CHAPTEE V. • 65 65 66 LOGIC OF THE STOICS. A. General remarks ..... 1. Field of logic .... 2. Words and thoughts B. Theory of knowledge . . 1. .General character of this theory . 2. Prominent points in the theory — perceptions — con- ceptions — standard of truths C. Formal logic ..... 1. Expression in general . . . 2. Imperfect expression — words — the categories 4. Perfect expression — -judgment — inference — fallacies D. Estimate of Stoic logic . . . . i 1. Its shojtcomings . . . . . 2. Its value ... . . 69 69 71 74 74 75 91 91 93 106 117 117 118 XU CONTENTS. CHAPTEE VI. THE STUDY OF NATURE : 1. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS. PAGE A. Materialism ...... 120 1. Meaning of the Stoic Materialism . . . 121 2. Causes which led to Stoic Materialism . . 127 3. Consequences of Stoic Materialism — individual perceptions — theory of universal mingling . 130 B. Dynamical theory of Nature . . . .134 1. Matter and force . . . . .134 2. Nature of force ..... 136 3. God — G-od as force — God as matter . . 141 C. Pantheism . . . . . .149 1. God identical with the world . . . 149 2. Helative difference between God and the world . 161 3. Views of Boethus ..... 161 CHAPTEE Vn. THE STUDY OF NATURE : 2. COUESE, CHARACTER, AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIVERSE. A. The General Course of the Universe 1. Origin of the world , 2. End of the world .... 3. Cycles in the world's course B. Government of the World 1. Nature of Destiny — as Providence — as Generative Eeason ..... 2. Arguments in favour of Providence 3. The idea of Providence determined C. Nature of the World .... 1. Its unity and perfection 2. Moral theory of the world . 153 153 165 167 160 160 164 166 173 173 177 conti:nts. yiii CHAPTER Vin. THE STUDY OF NATURE : 3. IRRATIONAL NATURE. TJiK ELEMENTS. THE UNIVERSE. A. The most general ideas on Nature PAGE 184 B. The Elements 187 C. The Universe ..... 191 D. Irrational parts of Nature 193 1. The stars ..... 193 2. Meteorology .... 3. Plants and animals 195 196 CHAPTEE IX. THE STUDY OF NATURE : 4. MAN. A. The Soul ..... 1. Materialistic nature of the soul 2. Divisions of the soul B. The Individual Soul and the Soul of the Universe C. Freedom and Immortality 198 198 201 204 206 CHAPTEE X. ETHICS : 1. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY. A. The Highest Good 1. Nature of the Highest Good 2. The Good and Evil 3. Pleasure and the Good 4. Negative character of Happiness , 5. The Highest Good as Law . B. Emotions and Virtue 1. The Emotions — their nature — varieties of 2. Idea of Virtue — position and negative aspects of- the virtues severally — their mutual relations- unity of virtue .... 210 212 216 221 22S 226 228 228 238 XIV CONTENTS. C. The Wise Man . 1. Wisdom and Folly . 2. Universal Depravity 3. Conversion . PAGE 251 251 254 258 CHAPTEE XI. ETHICS : 2. THE STOIC THEORY OF MOEALS AS MODIFIED- IN PRACTICE. A. Things to he desired and avoided 1. Secondary goods .... 2. Classes of things indifferent 3. Collision of modified and abstract theory . 261 263 264 267 B. Perfect and intermediate duties . 269 C. Emotions ..... 273 1. Permitted affections 2. Modification of apathy 3. The state of progress 273 274 276 CHAPTEE XII. ETHICS: 3. APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE. A. The Individual ...... 279 1 . Importance attaching to the individual . . 283 2. Cynicism of the Stoics .... 286 B. Social Eelations ...... 293 1. Origin and use of society .... 293 2. Justice and mercy ..... 296 3. Friendship ■ . . . . . .298 4. The family and civil life — aversion to political life — citizenship of the world . . . 301 C. Man and the Course of the World . . . 313 1. Submission to the course of nature . . 313 2. Suicide- ...... 316 CONTENTS. XV CHAPTER XIII. THE HELATION OF THE STOICS TO RELISION. PAGE A, -General connection of Stoicism and Keligion , . 322 1. Connection of Stoicism witli popular faith . . 324 2. !Pree criticism of popular belief . . . 325 3. The truth in Polytheism . . . .329 4. Doctrine of Demons .... 332 B. The Allegorising spirit ..... 334 1. Allegorical interpretation of myths . . 334 2. Interpretation of myths respecting the Gods . 337 3. Allegory appUed to heroic myths . . . 346 ^ C. Prophetic powers ..... 348 1. Divination ...... 349 2. Prophecy explained by natural causes . . 352 3. Causes of dlTination, .... 355 CHAPTER XIV. THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS. A. Inner connection of the system . 1. Ethical side of Stoicism 2. Scientific side of the Stoic system . 3. -Connection of the moral and scientific elements B. Relation of Stoicism to previous systems 1. Its relation to Socrates and the Cynics 2. Relation to Megarians and HeracHtus 3. Relation to Aristotle 4. Relation to Plato . C. The Stoic philosophy as a whole . 1. Its place in history 2. Its oneness . 359 359 361 363 364 365 369 374 376 377 378 379 xvi CONTENTS. PAET III. THE EPICUREANS. CHAPTER XV. EPICUREANS AND THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL. PAGE A. Epicurus ...... 382 B. Scholars of Epicurus ..... 386 C. Epicureans of the Eoman period .... 388 CHAPTEE XVI. CHAEACTEK AND DIVISIONS OP THE EPICUREAN TEACHING. THE TEST-SCIENCE OF TRUTH. A. Character of Epicurean system .... 394 1. Its power of self-preservation . . . 394 2. Aim of philosophy according to the Epicureans . 396 3. Divisions of philosophy .... 399 B. Canonic or the Test-Science of Truth . . .401 1. Sensation and perception . . . .401 2. Notions ...... 403 3. Opinion ...... 404 4. Standard of truth subjective . . . 406 CHAPTER XVII. THE EPICUREAN VIEWS ON NATURE. A. G-eperal Views on Nature . . . .410 1. Object, value, and method of the study of nature . 410 2. Mechanical explanation of nature . , . 413 3. Atoms and empty space .... 415 CONTENTS. xvil PAGE B. The World . ... 420 1. The swerving aside of atoms 2. Origin of the world 3. Arrangement of the unjverse 4. Plants and animals . 420 423 424 426 C. Mankind .... 426 1. Origin of the human race . 2. The soiil . .■i. Sensation . 4. Will 427 428 4:2 434 CHAPTER XVIII, VIEWS OP EPICURUS ON RELIGION. A. Criticism of the Gods and the popular faith B. The Gods according to Epicurus . , t 1. Reasons for his belief 2. Nature of the Epicurean Gods 436 438 438 440 CflAPTEE XlX. THE MORAL SCIENCE OF THE EPICUREANS; 1. GENERAL VIEWS. A. Pleasure . . 445 1. Pleasure the Highest 2. Ereedom from paiii . Good ■ 445 447 B. Intellectual Happiness . 449 1. Intelligence 2. Reasons for rising superior 3. Virtue to the senses , 449 . 4o'l 463 C. The Wise Man . . 455 XVUl CONTENTS. CHAPTEE XX. THE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED: 2. SPECIAL POINTS. PAGE A. The Individual ...... 458 B. Civil Society and the Family 1. Civil society 2. Family life C. Friendship 462 462 465 465 CHAPTEE XXI. THE EPICUREAN STSTEM AS A WHOLE. ITS POSITION IN HISTORY. A. Coherence of the Epicurean teaching B. Historical position of Epicureanism 1. Relation to Stoicism 2. Eelation to Aristippus 3. Eelation to Democritus 4. Eelation to Aristotle and Plato 471 475 475 480 482 483 PART IV. THE SCEPTICS: PYRBHO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY. CHAPTEE XXII. PYRRHO. U^fiistorical position of Scepticism r^lftelation to cotemporary dogmatic systems . 2. Caxises producing it . . . 3. Pyrrho and his followers . 486 486 487 489 CONTENTS. XIX B. Teaching of Pyrrho 1. Impossibility of knowledge 2. Withliolding of judgment . 3. Mental imperturbability PAGE 492 492 494 496 CHAPTER XXIII. THE NEW ACADEMY. A. Areesilaua ..... 499 1. Denial of knowledge 499 2. Probability ..... 504 B. Carneades ..... 506 1. Negative views of . 508 2. Positive views of . 522 C. School of Carneades .... 532 PART I. STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAPTEE I. THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF GEEECE AT THE CLOSE OF THE FOURTH CENTURY. GrREEK PHILOSOPHY had reached its greatest perfec- Chap. tion in Plato and Aristotle — the Socratic theory of ' conceptions having, in their hands, reached its most perfect development. The whole range of contem- a. Merits porary .knowledge had been brought within its '^'^^^f'^t^ compass, and grouped around definite centres, thus tems of affording a connected view of the world. The study '^stoof of nature had been supplemented by stringent en- quiries into morals ; whilst, at the same time, natural science in all its branches had been sensibly altered and enlarged. The concentration of all existing speculations had strengthened the intellectual foun- dation for a science of metaphysics. A multitude of phenomena, which had escaped the notice of earlier thinkers — in particular the phenomena of mental life — had been impressed into the service of science ; new questions had been raised ; new answers given. i^ B STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chap. Into every branch of knowledge new ideas had pene- ^" trated. The clearest and most' characteristic ex- pression of the intellectual life of Greece — Idealism —after being set forth by Plato with extraordinary brilliancy, had been brought into harmony with the most careful results of experience by Aristotle. Thanks to this union of theory and practice, construc- tive criticism had become an art. The machinery of thought had been improved by an invaluable addition in the scientific use of names, a use of which Aristotle was the real originator. In short, within a few years the intellectual treasm-es of Greece had been increased manifold, both in extent and value. Who would have recognised in the mighty system left by Aristotle to his successors, the scanty store of philosophic ideas which Socrates inherited from his predecessors ? Great, no doubt, had been the progress made by Greek philosophy in the fourth century before Christ. Not less great, however, were the hindrances with which that philosophy had perpetually to contend; not less diflScult the questions which were ever present- ing themselves to it for solution. Already Aristotle had pointed out weak points in the system of Plato, with which he had found it impossible to agree ; nor had their number been diminished by the criticism of advancing science. Even in the system of Aristotle himself, inconsistencies on some of the most impor- tant points were discovered; concealed, it is true, under a certain indefiniteness of expression, but fatal, if once brought to light, to the soundness of his entire DEFECTS OF PLATO AND AMISTOTLE. system. With all his skill, Aristotle had not sue- Chap. ceeded in blending into one harmonious whole all ^- the elements out of which his system was composed ; and therein lay the cause of the difference between Aristotle's own teaching and that of his immediate successors. Nor was the defect of a kind that could be easily removed. On the contrary, the more it was investi- gated, the stronger became the conviction that these weak points were embedded in the foundations of the systems both of Plato and Aristotle ; in short, that they underlay the whole tendency of previous philosophic thought. Leaving details and minor points out of consideration, these weak points might be referred to two main sources. They either arose from an imperfect knowledge and experience of the world, or they were flaws caused by an over-hasty attempt to enthrone Idealism as the knowledge of conceptions. To the former cause may be attributed the mistakes in natural science into which Plato and Aristotle fell, and the limited character of their view of history ; to the latter, the Platonic theory of ideas, with all that it involves — the antithesis of ideas and appearances, of the intellect and the senses, of know- ledge and ignorance, of the present world and the world to come — and not less truly the corresponding points in the system of Aristotle, such as the difficul- ties in the relation of what is particular and what is general, of form and matter, of Grod and the world, of the theory of final causes and of natural explanations, B 2 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chap. of the reasoning and the irrational parts of the soul, '. of speculative theory and practice. Both causes are, however, closely connected. The two great thinkers of Greece had been content with an uncertain and defective knowledge of facts. They had trusted to conceptions because the study of nature was yet in its infancy. Trusting implicitly to conceptions, they had failed to enquire how con- ceptions arose, and whether they would stand. The knowledge of history was as yet so limited that they were not aware of any difference between the results obtained by rigid observation and those obtained by ordinary unmethodical experience. They had failed to recognise how arbitrary most of their traditional principles were, and how necessary a more stringent method of induction had become. The fault com- mon to them both, which Plato and Aristotle had inherited from Socrates, lay in attaching undue pro- minence to mental criticism, in neglecting obser- vation, and in supposing that out of ordinary beliefs and current language conceptions expressing the very essence of things could be obtained by pure logic. In Plato this fault appears more strongly than in Aristotle, and finds expression in a theory characteristically known as the theory of recollection. And certainly if all our conceptions are inherent from the moment of birth, needing only the agency of sensible things to make us conscious of their exist- ence, it may be legitimately inferred that, to know the essence of things, we must look within, and not without) obtaining our ideas by development from DEFECTS DUE TO SOCJRATIC THEORY. the mind rather than by abstraction from experience. Chap. It may be inferred, with equal reason, that the ideas '. — drawn from the mind are the true standard by which experience must be judged. Whenever ideas and -, expeAence disagree, instead of regarding ideas as at fault, we ought to look upon the data of experience as imperfect, and as inadequately expressing the ideas which constitute the thing as it really exists. The whole theory of ideas, in short, and all that it im- plies, is a natural corollary from the Socratic theory of conceptions. Even those parts of this theory which seem most incongruous are best explained by being referred to the principles on which the con- structive criticism of Socrates is primarily based, and the onesidedness of which Aristotle only very imperfectly overcame. Undoubtedly he attempted to supply the defects in the Socratic and Platonic theory of conceptions by deriving knowledge from observation, although Plato's knowledge of the ex-X ternal world cannot for one moment be compared with Aristotle's use of observation, either in accuracy or extent. Undoubtedly Aristotle's attempt changed/ the whole character of the Platonic theory of concep- tions, ultimately securing for individual things a footing by the side of general conceptions, just as a footing had been already secured for experience byl the side of intellectual speculation. But Aristotle\ did not go far enough. In his theory of knowledge 1 he could not wholly repudiate the notion that the soul gains its knowledge by a process of development ) from within, being not only endowed by nature with l STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chaf. I. B. Con- nection be- tween the theories of Aristotle and Qreek character. jtte capacity of thinking, but possessing innate ideas. In his scientific method he frequently substituted enquiries into the uses of words, and into current opinions, in short, what he himself would call proof by probabilities, in the place of strict induction. His endeavours to harmonise the two antagonistic currents in Plato's teaching may have been under- taken in all sincerity, but the antagonism was too deep-seated to yield to his efforts, and not only reap- pears in the fundamental ideas, but colours the mi- nutest details of his system. At one time it shows itself in the antithesis between form and matter ; at another, in the antithesis between the world and a soul above the world. At another time, Eeason is regarded as something external to man, which can never be brought into, harmony with the lower parts of our nature. The above peculiarities are more immediately con- nected with the Socratic theory of conceptions. In many respects, however, they express the character of the nation to which Socrates belonged. The common characteristic of the Greeks consists in a harmonious union of the outer and the inner world, in a simple belief that mind and matter were originally connected, and are still in perfect har- mony with one another. When the whole social life of a .people bears this impress, its intellectual life may be expected to reproduce it also. Whilst the mind reaps many advantages from the close connection of the inner and outer world, it will feel the defects unavoidably connected with any view BBFECTS BUE TO NATIONAL CHARACTER. which makes their intimacy so close as to ignore Chap. a real distinction between them. A long period will have to elapse before the mind will be able to regard itself as something distinct from the notions it receives ; before it will rise to the notion of per- sonality; before it will feel that moral right and duty are independent of external circumstances ; be- fore it will believe that our ideas are the creations of our own will. And yet, until this result is at- tained, there will be no hesitation in applying what is felt within the sphere of mind to the sphere of the world without. There will be a tendency to regard the world from ideal heights reared within the domain of our own minds ; to accept our own notions of things as really true and actual, without sufficient enquiry, and even to treat them as the most trustworthy when they are opposed to the ex- perience of the senses. We shall be constantly con- founding the critical analysis of a notion with the experimental investigation of an object. Confusions such as these characterised the philosophy of Greece, even at the time when it was most flourishing. They were the cause of all the important mistakes in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Ought, then, the framers of these systems and their immediate suc- cessors to bear the whole blame of their mistakes? Ought not the chief blame to fall on the national peculiarity of the Greek tone of though^, Plato and Aristotle being only regarded as the exponents of that tone of thought ? In proportion as the close connection of the faults STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chap. of tlie Platonic and Aristotelian systems with the — '- Greek character becomes apparent, it will be felt how difficult and almost impossible it was for a Greek mind to rise superior to these faults. To compass this purpose, an entire change of the whole tjrpe of thought would necessarily have to take place. It would be necessary to institute a rigid enquiry into the origin of ideas, and into their original mean- ing; to make a sharp distinction between what is supplied from without and what is supplied from within ; and to test far more carefully than had yet been done the truth of several axioms ordinarily accepted in metaphysics. It would be necessary for thinkers to accustom themselves to accuracy of observation, and to strict processes of induction, which were never realised in Greece. It would be necessary to bring the sciences resting on observation to a pitch of completeness which it was vain to hope to reach by the methods and means then in vogue. The poetical way of looking at nature, which allowed questions as to facts to be answered by speculations on final causes, and vague language about the desire of nature to realise beauty, would have to disappear altogether. Enquiries into man's moral nature and functions would have had to be dissevered from simple considerations as to what is according to nature. There is ample evidence of the disturbing influence of these considerations, leading, as they did, to the national exclusiveness of the Greeks, giving to their morality a political character, and making them accept slavery as a state agreeable to nature. DEFECTS DUE TO NATIONAL PECULIARITIES. How great, however, was the change necessary Chap, before such a strict division of morality and nature _ would be possible ! Could it be expected that a strict science of nature would ever carry the day, so long as the tendency to look upon the life of nature as analogous to the life of man was kept alive by a religion such as that of Greece ? Or could moral science shake off the trammels of the Greek propriety of conduct, whilst in all practical matters those trammels were in full force ? Or could sharp distinctions be made between what comes from without and what from within in the formation of ideas — a distinction which we vainly look for in Aristotle — before an intensity had been given to the inner life, and the duty and value of the individual, as such, bad been recognised in a way which it re- quired the combined influence of Christianity and the peculiar Germanic character to bring about? The more vividly we realise the national character of the Greek philosophy, with all the characteristics of the national life, the more we become convinced that nothing short of an actual revolution in the mental tone of Greece would avail to heal its defects — defects which are apparent even in its greatest and most brilliant achievements. Vain would be all attempts short of a mental revolution, which history has at length seen elsewhere accomplished, after many vicissitudes and an interval of nearly three thousand years. On the platform of the ancient life of Greece such a change would have been impossible. Under rnore favourable circumstances, there was no I STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chap. reason, however, why a further expansion of Greek _ }■ thought should not take place, in the same course of purely intellectual enquiry, which had previously been struck out by its earlier representatives, and in particular by Aristotle. Nor can we estimate the results which might possibly have been attained in this way. Speculation is, however, useless. We can- not, in point of fact, ignore the historical circum- stances under which thought had to grow. The Socratic theory of conceptions, and the Ideal theory of Plato, presuppose the high culture of the age of Pericles and the brilliant career of Athens, which ensued after the Persian war. Not less do they presuppose the political degradation and the moral exhaustion of Grreece during and after the Pelopon- nesian war. With his purely intellectual attitude, despairing of anything like practical activity, with his broad view of things, with his knowledge of every kind,with a system, matured and elaborate, embracing all the results of previous enquiry, Aristotle appears as the child of an age which was bearing to its grave a period of great historical development. Hence- forth intellectual labour was to take the place of political action. The bloom of Greek philosophy was short-lived, but not more so than the bloom of national life. A closer examination shows that the one depended on the other, and that both were due to the operation of the same causes. With a high appreciation of freedom, with a ready aptitude for politics, with a genius for artistic creations, the Greeks produced, DEFECTS DUE TO NATION AE PECULIAHITIES. \\ within the sphere of politics, results unrivalled for Chap. greatness. They neglected, however, to lay their '. foundations broad and deep. No sufficient per- manence was secured for delicate and elastic institu- tions. Communities limited in extent and simple in arrangement sufficed for a Greek. But how could such simplicity include all branches of the Grreek family, satisfying at once the legitimate interests of peoples so diverse? Within the range of science the very same observation holds good. Advancing from isolated facts at once, without any mediating links, to the most general conceptions, they con- structed theories upon foundations of limited and imperfect experience — theories such as the founda- tion was wholly inadequate to bear. Whether, and in how far, the intellect of Greece, if left to itself, might have remedied these defects as it grew older, is a question which it is impossible to answer. That intellect was far too intimately bound up with the political, the moral, and the religious life of the nation, in short with the whole external culture of the people, not to be seripusly affected by any changes in these departments. The character too, and historical progress of the Greeks, was one adapted to have only a brief period of splendour; and that period was soon over. At the time that the philosophy of Greece was being raised to its highest point by Plato and Aristotle, Greece was in all other respects in a hopeless state of decline. Notwithstanding all the efforts of individuals to] resuscitate it, the old morality and propriety of! 2 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chap. conduct had disappeared since the beginning of the h. Peloponnesian war. Together with them, too, the old belief in the gods was gone. To the bulk of the people, the ethics of the rising philosophy afforded no substitute for the loss of their religious creed. Art, though carefully cultivated, could no longer come up to the excellence of the strictly classic period. Politics became more unsatisfactory every \.day. In the fifth century B.C. the rivalry of Athens and Sparta had, at any rate, ranged the states of Greece into two groups ; in the succeeding century disunion continually increased. It was in vain that the Theban Epaminondas attempted to found a new united confederation. His attempt only ended in a still further breaking up of Greece. Destitute of a political centre of gravity, the Greeks, of their own choice, drifted into a disgraceful dependence on the now declining Persian empire. Persian gold wielded an influence which Persian arms had never been able to exercise. The petty jealousies of little states and tribes wasted in endless local feuds resources which, had they been united, might have moved the world. With the decline of civil order the well- being and martial prowess of the nation declined a\so; and the technicalities of the art of war con- tinually increasing, the decision of a battle was more and more taken out of the hands of free citizens, and placed in those of mercenary troops. The system of mercenaries became one of the most injurious insti- tutions of this age, and a sure sign of the decline of freedom — a portent of the approach of a military DECLINE OF GREECE. 13 despotism. When in imminent danger of such a Chap. despotism from the threatening rise of the Mace- ' donian power, patriots in Greece might still console themselves with the hope that their self-devotion would avert the danger ; it needed, however, but an unbiassed glance at history to predict the failure of their attempts, that failure being the natural and in- evitable consequence of causes intimately connected with the Greek character and the course of Greek history. Hence not even the most heroic exertions of individuals, nor the resistance of the divided states, which came too late, could for one moment render the final issue doubtful. By the battle of Chseronea the doom of Greece C. Greece was sealed. Never since then has Greece been really flattie of free. All attempts to shake off the Macedonian Charonea. supremacy ended in disastrous defeat. In the sub- sequent struggles Greece, and Athens in particular, was the toy of changing rulers, the scene of per- petual warfare. In the second half of the third century a purely Grecian power was formed — the Achaean League — round which the hopes of the nation rallied. How inadequate was the attempt to meet the real wants of the country ! How in- evitable the disappointment when the league proved, in the issue, powerless to heal the prevailing ills ! That old hereditary failing of the Greeks — internal discord — rendered it still impossible to be inde- pendent of foreign interference, and to be united and settled within. The best resources were lavished in perpetual struggles between Achseans, .^tolians, 14 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chap. and Spartans. The very individual who had led ^' the Achseans against the Macedonians, in the canse of independence, summoned the Macedonians back to the Peloponnesus, to gain their support against Sparta. At length, the supremacy of Macedonia was broken by the arms of Eome, when a more avowed dependence on Italian allies succeeded ; and when, in the year 146 B.C., the province of Achaia was incorporated under Roman rule, even the sha- dow of freedom, which had been previously enjoyed, vanished for ever. Sad as was the state of Greece at this period, the decline of its internal resources being palpable, a single redeeming feature may be found in the ex- tension of its mental horizon, and the more general diffusion of its culture. The Macedonian ascendency, whilst dealing a death-blow at the independence of Greece, also broke down the boundaries which had hitherto separated Greeks from foreigners. It opened out a new world before the gaze of Greece, and offered a vast territory for her energies to ex- plore. It brought her into manifold contact with the Eastern nations belonging to the Macedonian monarchy, and secured for her culture the place of honour among the nations of the East, producing at the same time a tardy, but, in the long run, im- portant back-current of Oriental thought, traces of which appeared in the philosophy of Greece a few centuries later. By the side of the old famed centres of learning in the mother country of Hellas new centres arose, suited by position, inhabitants, and DECLINE OF GREECE. 15 peculiar circumstances, to unite the culture of East Chap. and West, and to fuse into one homogeneous mass " the intellectual forces of different races. By the number of emigrants who left her shores to settle in Asia and Egypt, the population of Greece became sensibly diminished ; but, at the same time, by their agency intellectual victories were secured to Grreece abroad over nations before whom she had politically succumbed at home. , 16 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAPTER II. CHAEACTER AND CHIEF FORMS OF THE POST-ARISTO- TELIAN PHILOSOPHY. Chap. II. A. Causes forming the post- Aristote- lian pkUo- (1) Politi- cal causes. The circumstances which have been hastily sketched in the preceding chapter, were of the greatest influ- ence as affecting the character of the post-Aristo- telian philosophy. Greek philosophy, like Greek art, is the offspring of Greek political freedom. In the activity of political life, in which every one was thrown on himself and his own resources, in the rivalry of unlimited competition at every step in life, the Greeks had learned to bring all their powers into free use. The consciousness of dignity — which a Greek connected far more closely with the privilege of citizenship than we do — and the feeling of inde- pendence in the daily affairs of life, had engendered! in his mind a freedom of thought which could boldly attack the problem of knowledge, reckless of ulterioi^ results. With the decline of political independence,! however, the mental powers of the nation received a fatal blow. No longer knit together by a powerful esprit de corps, the Greeks lost the habit of working for the common weal ; and, for the most part, gave) themselves up to the petty interests of home life and INFL UENCE OF POLITICS ON PHILOSOPHY. 17 their own personal troubles. Even the better dis- Chap. posed were too much occupied in opposing the low ! . tone and corruption of the times, to be able to devote themselves, in their moments of relaxation, to a free and speculative consideration of things. What could be expected in such an age, but that philosophy would take a decidedly practical turn, if indeed it were studied at all ? And yet such were the political antecedents of the Stoic and Epicurean systems of philosophy. An age like this did not require theoretical know- ledge. What it did want was moral uprightness and moral strength. But these desiderata were no longer to be met with in the popular religion ; and amongst all the cultivated circles the popular faith had been gradually superseded by philosophy. Hence it became necessary to look to philosophy to supply the pressing want ; to enquire of philo- sophy what course it was alone possible for moral energy to take under the circumstances, and what course was then especially needed. Nor was it diffi- cult for philosophy to reply. There was no need of creative ingenuity, but there was a need of resolute self-devotion ; no demand for outward actions, but for inward feeling ; no opportunity for public achieve- ments, but for private reforms. So utterly hopeless had the public state of Greece become, that even the few who made it their business to provide a remedy, could only gain for themselves the honour of martyr- dom. No other course seemed open for the best- intentioned, as matters then stood, but to withdraw 18 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chapi II. (2) Intel- lectual causes farming the post- Aristo- entirely within themselves, to entrench themselves behind the safe barrier of their own inner life, and, ignoring the troubles raging without, to make hap- piness dependent on their own inward state alone, - Stoic apathy. Epicurean self-satisfaction, and Scep- tic imperturbability, were the doctrines which re- sponded to the political helplessness of the age. They were the doctrines, too, which met with the most general acceptance. The same political help- lessness produced the sinking of national distinc-si tions in the feeling of a common humanity, and the separation of morals from politics which charac- terise the philosophy of the Alexandrian and Eoman 5 period. The barriers between nations, togethet with national independence, had been swept away. East! and West, Grreeks and barbarians, were united in large empires, being thus thrown together, and brought into close contact on every possible point. Philosophy might teach that all men were of one blood, that all were equally citizens of one empire, | that morality rested on the relation of man to his fellow men, independently of nationalities and of social ranks; but in so doing she was only explicitly ^ stating truths which had been already realised ia part, and which were in part corollaries from the existing state of society. The same result was also involved in the course ' which philosophy had taken during the last century : and a half. Socrates and the Sophists, in different ways no doubt, had each devoted themselves to the practical side of philosophy ; and more definitely ' INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES ON PHILOSOPSY. 19 still the Cynic School had paved the way for Stoi- Chap. cism, the Cyrenaic for Epicureanism, although it is true that these two Schools were of minor import- ance in the philosophy of the fourth century taken as a whole, and that sophistry by the close of the same century was already a thing of the past. Nor can Socrates be at all compared with the post-Aristo- telian philosophers. The desire for knowledge was still strong in Socrates, although he turned away from physical enquiries ; and although he professed to busy himself only with subjects which were of practical use in life, his theory of knowledge involved a reformation of the speculative as well as of the practical side of philosophy — a reformation which was accomplished on a grand scale by Plato and Aristotle. On the whole, then, the course of develop- ment taken by Greek philosophy during the fourth century was far from being the course of its sub- sequent development. And yet the speculations of Plato and Aristotle^ helped to prepare the way for the coming change. The chasm between the ideal and phenomenal worlds which Plato brought to light, and Aristotle vainly j attempted to bridge over, leads ultimately to an op- position between thought and the object of thought, I between what is within and what is without. The j generic conceptions or forms, which Plato and Aris- ' totle regard as most truly real, are, after all, fabrica- tions of the human mind. The conception of reason, even in its expanded form as the divine Eeason, or 'reason of the world, is an idea formed by abstraction c 2 20 8TATM OF CULTURE IN OBEECE. Chap, from our inner life. And what is really meant by — — identifying form in itself with what is, and matter. with what ip only fossible, or even (as Plato does) with wha,t is not, or by placing Grod over agaiagt and , in qontrast to the world, except that man finds in his, own mind a higher and more real existence than any which he finds outside of it in the world, and that what is truly divine and unlimited must be in the mind in its ideal nature, apart from and independent; of all iiftpressions from without ? Plato and Aris- . totle, ia fact, declared that reason constitutes the real essence of man — ^reason coming from above and uniting itself with the body, but being in itself su- perior to the world of sense and life in time — and that man's highest activity is thought, turned away from all external things, and meditating only on the 1 inner world of ideas. It was only one step further I in the same direction for the post- Aristotelian phi- losophy to refer man back to himself, thus severing him most completely from the outer world, that he may find that peace within which he can find no- where in the world besides. B. Cha- This step was taken by the Schools of the \^^st- Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, which appeared in Aristote- the first half of the third century before Christ* lanjp 1 0- ^gggj^-j,g i-jjgjj, supremacy over the older Schools, while in the main they preserved their teaching unaltered, these Schools continued to exist xintil the, beginning of the first century; and, however else, they may differ, they at least agree in two funda- mental points — in subordinating theory to practice, THEORY SUBOni>INATE TO PRACTICE. 21 and in the peculiar character of their practical Ch^p. philosophy. The former point appears most clearly, as will be ^^^ Theory seen, in the School of Epicurus. It is nearly as imted to clear in the case of the Sceptics, who, denying all ^^'^ ^"' possibility of knowledge, left as the only ground of action conviction based on probabilities; and both these Schools agree in considering philosophy as only a means for securing happiness. By the Stoics, on the other hand, the need of a scientific theory was felt more pressingly ; but in their case this need was not felt simply and for its own sake, but was sub- ordinated to practical considerations, and determined by practical wants. The Stoics, like the Epicureans, restricted themselves, in the theoretical part of their system, to the more ancient views — a fact of itself significant, and proving that speculation was not the cause of their philosophical peculiarities, but that other points, in which they considered themselves proficients, were looked upon as of greater impor- tance. Moreover, they expressly stated that the study of nature was only necessary as a help to the study of virtue. It is also beyond question, that their chief peculiarities, which give them an im- portance in history, are ethical — the other parts of their system, in which their distinctive teaching appears, being only regulated by practical considera- tions. Hereafter, these statements will be substan- tiated in detail. It may therefore suffice to observe here, that the most important question in the logic of the Stoics — the question of a standard of truth 22 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chap, — was decided by a practical postulate. The fun-' ■"• damental principle of the Stoic metaphysics is only intelligible from an ethical point of view. For natural science the Stoics did very little, preferring to explain nature by moral considerations, and by that theory of final causes on which they so much insisted ; even their theology bears ample testimony to the practical tone of their system. Standing in advance of the Epicureans by their higher intel- lectual position, and decidedly opposing the dogma- tism of the Sceptics, the Stoics nevertheless agree with both these Schools in the essentially practical character of their teaching. (2) Fecu- This agreement is strikingly seen in the way in of treating which they approached the practical problem. The thepr<^- Epicurean imperturbability is akin to the imper- blem. turbability of the Sceptics ; both resemble the Stoic apathy, All three Schools are agreed that the only way to happiness consists in peace of mind, and in avoiding all disturbances — disturbances sometimes arising from external causes, at other times from internal emotions ; they are only divided as to the means by which peace of mind may be secured. They are also agreed in making moral activity inde- pendent of external circumstances, and in separating morals from politics, although the Stoics were the first who avowedly taught the original unity of the whole human family, and insisted on being citizens of the world. Through all the Schools runs the common trait of referring everything to the subject, of withdrawing everything within the sphere of mind LATER PHILOSOPHERS. 23 and of the inner life, one consequence of which is to Chap. attacli prominence tO practice over theory. But, at ■— the same time, practice was made to depend on an internal self-consciousness, and on a peace of mind which could only be attained by the exercise of the will and the cultivation of the intellect. In the centuries succeeding the rise of these three (3) Their schools, philosophy still retained the same charac- nesUlus- teristics : nor were the circumstances out of which i'^ated by subsequent they arose materially altered. In addition to the ^MLoso^hy. followers of the old Schools, Eclectics were now to be met with, gathering from every system what was true and probable. In this process of selection^ their decision was swayed by regard to the practical wants of man, and the ultimate standard of truth was placed in our own immediate consciousness, everything being referred to the subject as its centre. For their ethics and natural theology the Eclectics were also greatly indebted to the Stoics. A new School of Sceptics also arose, not differing in its tendencies from the older one. Neopythagoreans and Platonists appeared, not satisfied with human knowledge, but aspiring to higher revelations. All these philosophers appealed to the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. Their connection with the post-Aristotelian Schools is clear, however, not only because they borrowed extensively from the Stoics the material for their theology and ethics, but far more from the general character of their beliefs. Knowledge is for them far less even than for the Stoics an end in itself, and they are further from 24 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chap. natural science than the Stoics. Philosophy is sub- "• servient to the interests of religion, its aim being to bring men into proper relation with Grod. The re- ligious needs of mankind are the highest authority for science. The same remark applies also to Plotinus and his successors. These philosophers do not lack a broad basis for their metaphysics. The care, too, with which they cultivate metaphysics leaves no doubt as to the lively interest they took in scientific complete- ness and systematic correctness. But with Plotinus the scientific side of philosophy bears the same relation to the practical side as with the Stoics, who in point of learning and logical treatment are otherwise not at all inferior to the Neoplatonists, Undoubtedly a real interest in science was one of the contributing causes which brought Neoplatonism into existence, bub it was not strong enough to counterbalance other elements — the practical and religious motives. The mind was not sufficiently independent to be able to get on without appeal- ing to intellectual and theological authorities ; the scientific procedure was too unsettled to lead to a simple study of things as they are. The ground on which Neoplatonism actually rests is, as in the case of the Neopythagoreans, a religious one. The divine world of which they speak is, after all, only a portion of human thought projected out of the mind, and incapable of being fully grasped by the under- standing. The highest business of philosophy is to reunite man to the divine world external to his THE NEOPLATONISTS. 25 mind. To attain this end, all the means which Chap. science supplies are employed. Their philosophy 1__ endeavours to explain the steps by which the finite gradually came to be separated from the original infinite being ; it seeks to bring about a return by a regular and systematic course ; and in this attempt the philosophic spirit of Greece, by no means extinct, proved its capabilities by a result of its kind unrivalled. No doubt, in the first instance, the problem was so raised as to impress philosophy into the service of re- ligion ; but, in the long run, it could not fail to be seen that, with the premises assumed, a scientific solution of the religious questioil was impossible. The Neo- platonic notion of an original being was a conception which reflected certain religious sentiments, without their being based upon scientific research. The doctrine of a mystical union with a transcendental being assumed a religious postulate, the incompre- hensibility of which betrays its origin in the mind of the thinker. Neoplatonism, therefore, in its whole bearing, stands on the same ground as the other post-Aristotelian systems. It is hardly necessary to point to this relationship to show how, in other respects, it agrees with Stoicism, and especially in ethics. These two systems standing the one at the beginning the other at the end of the post-Aristo- telian philosophy, and differing therefore widely in their subject-matter, nevertheless both display one and the same attitude of thought; and we pass from one to the other by a continuous series of inter- mediate links. The character of the post-Aristotelian 26 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Ghap. philosophy naturally assumed various modifications ^^- in course of time, passing from School to School; but, nevertheless, it reproduced certain common elements. Such was the neglect of intellectual originality, which drove some thinkers to a sceptical denial of all knowledge, and induced others to take their knowledge at second hand from older authorities. Such was the prominence given to practical over speculative questions. Such was the disregard for natural science, and, in comparison with former times, the greater importance attached to theology, appearing not only in the controversy between the Epicureans and Stoics, but also in the apologetical writings of the Stoics and Platonists. Such, too, was the negative morality which aimed at independence of the outer world, at mental com- posure, and philosophic contentment ; the habit of separating morals from politics ; the distinguishing a morality suited for all from a citizenship of the world; and the going within ourselves into the depths of our souls, our will, and thinking powers. There was, on the one hand, a widening of the mental horizon ; but there was, at the same time, also a nar- rowing of it, since mental isolation was accompanied by a loss of lively interest in the world without. C. Develop- This mental habit, first of all, found a dogmatic post-Xis- expression in philosophy. But soon not only moral totelicm Science, but logic and natural science were treated (1) Dm- ^'^ ^ corresponding way, though partially built on matic the older teaching. In the treatment of moral science in particular, two Schools, markedly different and DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY. 27 decided in their peculiarities, stand opposed to each Chap. other — that of the Stoics who insisted almost exclu- : sively on the universal element, and that of the («) '^^"'f* •' and Ept- Epicureans who gave prominence to the individual cureans. element in man, pursuing happiness by looking within. The Stoics regarded man exclusively as a thinking being, the Epicureans as a creature of feel- ing. The Stoics, again, made happiness consist in a subordination to a general law, in a suppression of all personal feelings and inclinations, in virtue ; the Epicureans in the independence of the individual, in the unruffled serenity of the inner life, in being proof against pain. The theoretical assumptions on which this teaching was based corresponded with its ethical principles. Violent as was the contest between these two rival (J) JDoff- Schools, both, nevertheless, rest on the same founda- jj^jsm. tion. Absolute composure of mind, freedom of the inner life from every external disturbance, was the goal at which both Schools hoped to arrive, although they followed most diiferent courses. This use of different means, however, whilst the aim is the same, proves that the common aim must be regarded as the essential part of the philosophy of this period. If the speculative axioms of these systems contradict one another whilst they have a common aim, it follows that the aim may be attained independently of any definite dogmatic view, and that we may despair of knowledge in order to pass from the knowledge of our ignorance to a general indifference, and to an unconditional repose of mind. Thus 28 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chap. II. (2) Scep- tical Schools, (a) In- jltiences prodv/sing Scepticism. (a) Politi- cal in- Hvence of Home. Scepticism is connected with Stoicism and Epicu- reanism, constituting by their side a third system—' a Scepticism distinct, however, from that of Pyrrho^ and most influential in the form which it subse- quently assumed in the New Academy. The history of the rise, growth, and conflict of these three Schools, by the side of which the older Schools sink down to a position of secondary import- ance, occupies the first portion of the period of post- Aristotelian philosophy, extending from the end of the fourth to the beginning of the first century before Christ. The distinctive features of this epoch consist partly in the predominance of the above tendencies, and partly in their separate existence, without being modified by intermixture. After the middle of the second century a gradual change took place. Greece was then a Eoman province, and the intellectual intercourse between Greece and Eome was continually on the increase. Many learned Greeks resided at Eome, frequently as the com- panions of families of high birth ; others living in their own country, were visited by Eomans. How, in the face of the clearly defined and sharply ex- pressed Eoman character, could the power and inde- pendence of the Greek intellect, already unquestion- ably on the decline, assert its ancient superiority ? How could Greeks become the teachers of Eomans without accommodating to their requirements, and experiencing in turn a reflex influence ? Nor, indeed, was the philosophy of Greece exempt from such an influence. With its originality — long since in abey^* BOME AND ALEXANDRIA. 2f ance — it now openly avowed Scepticism, declaring Chap. that it could not depend even on itself. To the '- practical sense of a Roman no philosophical system gould afford satisfaction which did not lead to prac- tical results by the shortest possible route. To a Eoman practical needs were the ultimate standard of truth. Little did he care for rigid logic in a scientific procedure. The difference between one system and another was for him unimportant, so long as it had no practical bearing. No wonder that Greek philosophy bent under the influence of Eome, and lent itself to Eclecticism, Whilst on the one side of the world the Greeks (;8) Intel- were experiencing the influence of the nation that pj^ce^} had subdued them, on the other they were asslmila- ^lepan- ting the views of the Oriental nations whom they had conquered alike in the conflict of warlike and in- tellectual power. For two centuries, in philosophy at least, Greece had held her own against Oriental modes of thought. Now, as her internal incapacity continually increased, those modes of thought gained for themselves, a hearing in her philosophy. Alex- andria was the place where first and most completely the connection of Greece with the East was realised. In that centre of commerce, for three centuries, East and West entered into a connection more intimate 9,nd more lasting than in any other centre ; nor was this connection a mere accident of circumstances ; far more was it the result of political forecast. From its founder, Ptolemy Soter, the Ptolemsean dynasty inherited as its principle of government the maxim 30 STATU OF CULTUBE IN GREECE. Chap. II. ticism and Eclecti- of always combining what is native with what is' foreign, and of clothing things new in the old and venerable forms of Egyptian custom and religious ceremony. At Alexandria, accordingly, there arose, towards the beginning of the first century before Christ, a philosophical school calling itself at first Platonic, afterwards Pythagorean, and still later,' gaining, in the shape of Neoplatonism, a supremacy over the whole domain of philosophy. The very fact, however, that such a change in philosophic views did not appear before, is of itself enough to prove that this School of philosophy was occasioned and called for by external circumstances. At the same time, unless in the course of its own development" the intellect of Greece had been ripe for the change, such a School could never have come into existence at all. The same remark holds good of that practical Eclecticism which we have before traced to the influ- ence of Eome, Even in the period of its greatest decline, Greek philosophy, far from being reduced by the force of its surroundings to utter helplessness, was, under the aid of those very surroundings, deve- loping in a direction to which its previous course pointed. If we except the lingering remains of a few small Schools, which soon expired, there existed, after the beginning of the third century before Christ, only four great philosophic Schools— the Peripatetic, the Stoic, the Epicurean, and the School of Plato- nists, converted to Scepticism by Arcesilaus. These four Schools were all permanently established at SCEPTICISM AND ECLECTICISM. 31 Athens, and thus a lively interchange of thought. Chap. and a thorough comparison of each other's teaching ! were rendered comparatively easy among them. That they would not long exist side by side without making some overtures towards union and agree- ment was a perfectly natural prospect; and these overtures were hastened by Scepticism, which, deny- ing the possibility of knowledge, only allowed a choice between probabilities, leaving that choice to be decided by the standard of practical needs. Hence, towards the close of the second century before Christ, these philosophic Schools may be observed to emerge more or less from their exclusiveness. An eclectic tendency stole over philosophy, aiming not so much at scientific knowledge as at attaining certain results of a practical kind. The distinctive doctrines of each School were suffered to drop ; and in the belief that infallibility resided solely in the mind itself, such portions were selected from each system as seemed most in harmony with the selecting mind. In Scepticism this eclectic mode of thought was concealed in germ. On the other hand, Eclecticism also involved doubt, and suggested a new phase of doubt, which appeared soon after the Christian era, in a peculiar sceptical School, and continued until the third centu,ry. Thus Scepticism and Eclecticism, the one openly, the other secretly, betrayed the need which was felt by philosophers of scientific know- ledge in the interests of morals and religion. At the same time they also disclosed a feeling of distrust towards the existing knowledge, and, in fact, towards 32 STATE OF CULTURE IN OJREECE. Chap. knowledge in general. When brought into mutual ^^' relation, they further suggested the thought that truth, which could not be attained in the form of intellectual knowledge, might be discovered by some other means. Possibly it might exist concealed among the religious traditions of the early days of G-reece and the East, or it might be reached by immediate divine revelation. Connected with this thought, a notion of God, and of His relations to the world, had gained ground, which confirmed the be- lief in the possibility of revelation. Eegarding truth as something external to themselves, and doubting their own capacities to attain to truth, men had come to look upon God as far removed from themselves, and to look up to Him as the absolute source of truth. Convinced, moreover, that truth to be known must be revealed, they had peopled the interval between God and the world with intermediate beings, who were sometimes conceived of as purely meta- physical entities, and at others appeared, according to the popular belief, as demons. This mental habit, connected with the Platonic and Pythagorean sys- tems more immediately than with any other ancient system, forms the transition to Neoplatonism, Neo- platonism itself being the last stage in the historical development of the philosophy of Greece. (3) Eeli- Yet even this last phase of Greek philosophy was Soolof °°* uninfluenced by the circumstances of history. Neopla- The decline of the Eoman Empire, the dangers which threatened it on all sides, the pressure and the neces- sity of the time, were steadily advancing since the toniets. FOREIGN WORSHIPS. 33 end of the second century after Christ. All means Chap. of defence hitherto employed had proved unavailing to stem destruction. With ruin everywhere staring in the face, the desire and longing for some higher assistance increased. Such assistance could no longer be obtained from the old Grods of Eome or the reli- gious faith of the day, notwithstanding the. existence of which circumstances were daily becoming more hopeless. Stronger and stronger became the longing, which had been gradually spreading over the Roman world since the last days of the Eepublic, and which the circumstances of the Empire had greatly favoured, to have recourse to foreign forms of worship. The highest power in the state had, moreover, favoured this longing under the Oriental and half Oriental em- perors who for nearly half a century after Septimius Severus occupied the imperial throne. The state and the Gods of the state were continually losing their hold on the respect of men, whilst Oriental wor- ships, mysteries new and old, and foreign heathen religions of the most varying kinds, were ever gaining fresh adherents. Above all, Christianity was rapidly advancinsT to an extent w^hich would enable it to o enter the lists for supremacy, and to claim a recog- nised position as the religion of the state. The attempts of a series of powerful monarchs about the middle of the third century to build up the Empire afresh, could not have for their object a restoration of a specifically Eoman form of government. Their only aim could be to bring the various elements which composed the Empire under one sovereign will by 34 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. Chap. fixed forms of administration; a result which was "• actually reached under Diocletian and Constantine. The Eoman character asserted itself, indeed, as a ruling and regulating power, but it was at the same time subordinate to another of an originally foreign character. The Empire was a congeries of nations artificially held together, and arranged on a carefully- designed plan ; not concentrated round a national centre, but round the will of a prince, standing above all rules and laws of state, and deciding everything without appeal and without responsibility. In a similar manner Neoplatonism united all the elements of existing philosophical Schools into one comprehensive and well-arranged system, in which each class of existences had its definite place as- signed it. The initial point in this system, the all- embracing unity, was a being lying beyond it, soaring above every notion that experience and conception can supply, unmixed with the process of life going on in the world, and from his unattainable height causing all things, but himself subject to no con- ditions of causality. Neoplatonism is the intellectual reproduction of Byzantine Imperialism. As Byzan- tine Imperialism combines Oriental despotism with the Eoman idea of the state, so Neoplatonism fills out with Oriental mysticism the scientific forms oft Greek philosophy. It is clear that in Neoplatonism the post-Aristo- telian philosophy had lost its original character. Self-dependence, and the self-sufficingness of thought, Jmve made way for a resignation to higher power^ FALL OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 35 for a longing for some revelation, for an ecstatic Chap. departure from the domain of conscious mental ac- _ tivity. Man has resigned the idea of truth -within for truth to be found only in God. God has been removed into another world, and stands over against man and the world of appearances, in an abstract spiritual world. All the attempts of thought have but one aim — to explain how it was that the finite proceeded from the infinite, and under what con- ditions its return to God is possible. But neither the one nor the other of these problems could meet with a satisfactory intellectual solution. That even this form of thought bears undeniably the personal cha- racter of the post-Aristotelian philosophy has been already seen, and will be seen still more in the sequel. With it the creative powers of the Greek mind set for ever. After defending her national existence for centuries, after losing her intellectual prestige step by step, Greece saw the last remaining fragments torn from her grasp by the victory of Christianity. But these fragments she did not surrender before she had made one more futile attempt to rescue the forms of Greek culture from her mighty rival. With the failure of that attempt Greek religion and Greek philosophy set together. D 2 Chap. UI. A. Causes of post- Aristote- lian philo- (1) His- iorical PART II. TSJS STOICS. CHAPTER III. HISTOKT OF THE STOICS rNTIL THE END OF THE SECOND CENTURT B.C. A STRIKING feature characteristic of the history ol the post-Aristotelian philosophy, and one which at the same time brings home most forcibly to us the altered circumstances of Greece, is the fact that sc many philosophers come from countries situated to- wards the East, in which Greek and Oriental modes of thought had already met and mingled. Never- theless, for centuries Athens still continued to havt the glory of being the chief seat of Greek philo- sophy ; nor did she renounce her claim to be the mosi important seminary of philosophy, even when shf had to share that glory with other cities, such a| Alexandria, Rome, Rhodes, and Tarsus. Yet ever at Athens there were many teachers whose foreigr extraction proved that the age of pure Greek philo- sophy was over; and such teachers, besides being found amongst the Neoplatonists, were in particula| THE STOICS.— ZENO. 37 to be met with in the ranks of the Stoics. An occar- Chap. rence so characteristic of the then state of the world, it might seem natural to attribute purely to external circumstances. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to do so. Nay, more, it deserves notice how fre- quently the absence of national feeling is found in connection with the Stoic philosophy. Nearly all the most important Stoics before the Christian era belong by birth to Asia Minor, to Syria, and to the islands of the Eastern Archipelago. Then follow a line of Roman Stoics, among whom the Phrygian Epictetus occupies a prominent place ; but Greece proper is exclusively represented by men of third or fourth rate capacity. The founder of the Stoic School, Zeno ' by name, A. Zmo. was the son of Mnaseas,^ and a native of Citium ' in Cyprus. Leaving his home, he repaired to Athens,* , 4 ' For the life of Zeno, Diogenes of Zeno, was, according to Diog. is the chief authority. Diogenes vii. 1, a ■nixiaii.a 'EWricHcii' *o/- appears to he chiefly indebted for vikos iiroiKovs etrxijKbs, i.e. Phoe- his information to Antigonus of nician immigrants had settled Carystus, who lived about 250 B.C. there by the side of the old In proof of this, compare the ac- Greek population, whence its in- count of Diogenes with the ex- habitants are sometimes called ' e tracts given by Athenaeus (viii. Phoenicia profeeti' (Cic. Pin. iv. 345, d ; xiii. 563, e ; 565, d ; 20, 56), and Zeno is himself 603, e; 607, e; and, in parti- called a Phoenician (2*105'. vii. 3 ; cular, ii. 55, f) from Antigonus' 15; 25; 30; ii. 114. Suid. Zi]v. life of Zeno. Of modern au- Athen. xiii. 563, e. Cic. 1. c.). thorities, consult Wagen/mann, in * The details are differently Paiih/s Eealencyclop. given by Diog. 2-5 ; 31 ; Flut. ' Diog. vii. 1. Suid. Zj]vav. Inimic. TItil. 2 ; and Sen,. Flut. Plac. i. 3, 29. Pausan. ii. Tranq. An. 14, 3. Most ac- 8, 4. He is called by others counts relate that he came to Demeas. Athens for trading purposes, and ' Citium, which the ancients accidentally became acquainted unanimously call the native city with Crates and philosophy after 38 THE STOICS. Chap. III. about the year 320 B.C.,' where he at first joined the Cynic Crates,'' but not till he had been previously disgusted by the extravagances of the Cynic mode of life,3 With a keen desire for knowledge, he could find no satisfaction in a teaching so scanty as that of the Cynics.* To supply its defects he had repaired to Stilpo, who united to the moral teaching of the Cynics the logical accuracy of the Megarians* being shipwrecked. According to other accounts, he remained at Athens, after disposing of his merchandise, and devoted him- self to philosophy. Demetriiis of Magnesia {Themist. Or. xxiii. 295, d) further relates that he had already occupied himself with philosophy at home, and re- paired to Athens to study it more fully — a view which seems most likely, because the least sensa- tional. ' The dates in Zeno's life are very uncertain. He is said to hare been thirty when he first came to Athens {Biog. 2). Per- sseus, his pupil and countryman, however, says twenty-two. But these statements are of little use, since the date of his coming to Athens is unknown. If it is true that he was for ten years a pupil of Xenocrates, who died 314 B.C. {Biog. 2), he must have come to Athens not later than 32B B.C. But this fact may be doubted. Zeno's whole line of thought re- sembles that of Crates and Stilpo. How then can he have been for ten years a pupil in the Academy ? He is moreover said to have frequented the schools of different philosophers for twenty years in all before opening his own {Biog. 4). According to Apollon. in Biog. 28, he presided over his own school for fifty-eight years, which is hardly reconcileable with the above data, even if he attained the age of ninety-eight {Biog. 28 ; I/iwian. Maerob. 19). According to Persaeus {Biog. 28), he only at- tained the age of seventy-two, and was altogether only fifty years in Athens. In his own letter to Antigonus {Biog. 9), however, he distinctly calls himself eighty; but the genuineness of this letter may perhaps be doubted. The year of his death is likewise un- known. His relations to Anti- gonus Gonatas prove at least that he was not dead in 278 B.C., and probably not till long afterwards. It would appear from the calcu- lation of his age, that his death did not take place till 260 B.C. He may, then, have lived circa 350 to 260 B.C. ; but these dates are quite uncertain. ^ Biog. vii. 2; vi. 105. ' Biog. 3 : ivrevSep ^koihte to5 KpoTTjTos, &\Kois iiep iirovos Trpcis plav, cuSi]fui>v Sk i>s irpJs T^iv KvviK^v avaiirxwTiav. * Conf. Biog. 25 and 15: ^v Se CvvTiKhs Kai Trepl irivTau outpi- ZENO.—THE PORCH. 89 He had also studied under Polemo ; it is said like- wise under Xenocrates and tlie captious Diodorus, and he was on terms of intimacy with Philo ^ the pupil of Diodorus. After a long course of intellec- tual preparation, he at last appeared as a teacher, soon after the beginning of the third, or perhaps during the last years of the fourth century B.C. From the Stoa -n-oLKikr), the place which he selected for de- livering his lectures, his followers derived their name of Stoics, but previously they were called after their ra aster Zenonians.^ The universal respect inspired by his earnestness, moral strictness,^ and simplicity of life,'' and the dignity, modesty, and affability of his conduct,* was such that Antigonus Gronatas vied Chap. Ill, ' Siog.Vu. 2; 4; 16; 20; 24; ii. 114; 120. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 9; 6, 6. Polemo is called his teacher by Cic. Fm. iv. 16, 45; Acad. i. 9, 35. Strabo, xiii. 1, 67. How ready he was to learn from others is proved by Diog. 25 ; Flut. Fragm. in Hesiod. ix. ' Biog. 5, according to whom, he gave instruction walking to and fro, like Aristotle. It is not probable that he gave any formal lectures. ^ Which, however, must be judged by the standard of that time and of Greek customs. Conf. Diog. 13; Athen. xiii. 607, e; 563, e. ■■ See Musonius in Stob. Serm. 17, 43. His outward circum- stances also appear to have been very simple. According to one account {Diog. 13), he brought to Athens the fabulous sum of 1000 talents, and put it out to interest. Themist. Or. xxi. says that he forgave a debtor his debt. Ha is said to have paid a logician 200 drachmas, instead of the 100 which he asked for (Diog. 25). Nor is there any mnntion of a Cynical life or of poverty. Ac- cording to Diog. 5, Plut. and Sen., however, he had lost his property nearly altogether. According to Sen. Consol. ad Helv. 12, 6, he had no slave. Had he been well to do, he would hardly have ac- cepted the presents of Antigonus. = Goof. IHog. 13; 16; 24; 26; Athen.; Said.; Clem. Strom. 413, A. It is mentioned as a pe- culiarity of Zeno, that he avoided all noise and popular display {Diog. 14) ; that, though generally grave, he relaxed over the wine ; and that he was very fond of epi- gi'ams. He is said to have car- ried his parsimoniousness too far 40 THE STOICS. Chap. m. with the city of Athens in showing his appreciation of so estimable a philosopher .* Although lacking smoothness of style and using a language far from pure,^ Zeno had nevertheless an extensive following. By a life of singular moderatioi^ he reached an ad- vanced age untouched by disease, although he natu- rally enjoyed neither robust health nor an attractive person.^ A slight injury having at length befallen him, which he regarded as a work of destiny, he put an end to his own life.* His numerous writings^ have {Biog. 16). He tore the loss of his property with the greatest composure (-ZJJo^'. 3; Pfai.l; Sen.). ' Antigonus (eonf. Athen. xiii. 603, e; Arrian, Diss. Epiet. ii. 13, 14 ; Simpl. in Epict. Enchir. 283, c; Ml. V. H. ix. 26) was fond of his society, attended his lectures, and wished to have him at court — an offer which Zeno de- clined, sending two of his pupils instead. The Athenians honoured him with a public panegyric, a golden crown, a statue, and burial in the Ceramieus. The offer of Athenian citizenship he declined (Plut. Sto. Eep. 4, 1). Nor did his countrymen in Citium fail to give signs cf their appreciation (Diog. 6 ; PHn. H. N. xxxiv. 19, 32), and Zeno always insisted on being a Citian. ' He himself [Biog. vii. 18) compares the \6yoi arniprifffi^vot of the iuT6\oLKoi to the elegant Alexandrian coins, which, instead of being better, were often lighter than the Athenian coins. He is charged in particular with using words in a wrong sense, and with inventing new ones, whence Cic. Tusc. V. 11, 34, calls him 'igno- bilis verborum opifex,' and Chrys- ippus has H. treatise irepi toG kv- piojs K6;^p^(r0a( Zriywya rots ovit- /iairiv. He is also charged with maintaining that nothing should be concealed, but that even the most indelicate things should be called by their proper names. He is further charged with having propounded no new theory, but with having appropriated the thoughts of his predecessors, con- cealing his plagiarism by the use of new terms. In Diog. vii. 25, Polemo says : k\6Vtii)c tA S6y- fiara ^olvmqis fxerafxtpievvis ; and Cicero frequently repeats the charge (Fin. v. 25, 74 ; iii. 2, 6 ; iv. 2, 3; 3,7; 26; 72; v. 8,22; 29, 88. Acad. ii. 5, 15. Legg. i. 13, 38; 20; 53. Tusc. ii. 12,29). ' Diog. 28, 1. The statement that he was &voaos must be taken . with some limitation, according to Diog. vii. 162; Stob. Floril. 17, 43. •■ Diog. 28; 31. Lucian, Mac- rob. 19. Lactant. Inst. iii. 18. Siob. Floril. 7, 45. Suid. ' The list of them in Diog. 4, to which additions are made I>!0^. 34; 39; 134. The Aiorpi/Soi PUPILS OF ZENO.—CLEANTHES. 41 been lost, with the exception of a few fragments. Chap. Some of them no doubt date from the time when he " was a pupil of Crates, and was more deeply imbued ^-^P^^ with Cynic ideas than was afterwards the case,' nor ought this point to be forgotten in sketching his teaching. The successor to the chair of Zeno was Cleanthes,* (i) C?«- a native of Assos in the Troad,^ a man of a strong and solid character, of unusual perseverance, laboriousness, and contentment, but also slow of apprehension, and somewhat heavy in intellect. Eesembling Xenocrates in mind, Cleanthes was in every way well adapted to uphold his master's teaching, and to recommend it by the moral weight of his own character, but he was incapable of expanding it more completely, or of establishing it on a wider basis.* Besides Cleanthes, the best known among the {Biog. 34 ; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 205 ; ^ MohniJce, Cleanthes d. Sto. : 245;Matli.xi. 90) may perhaps be Greifsw. 1814. Cleanthis Hymn, identical with the 'ATro/ivn/wysi- in Jovem, ed Stum, ed. nov. cur. ;iiaTaKpiiT7)Tos(Z)Ki5'.4),theT6X'^ Memdorf.: Leips. 1835. ipuTiicii (JKog. 34), with Tex"!! ' SiraJo, xiii. 1, 57. Diog.^i. (JKog'. 4). 4 n exposition of Hesiod, 168. iE&a«, Hist. Anim. ti. 50. which had heen inferred to exist, How Clemens, Protrept. 47, a, from do. N. D. i. 14, 36, Krische, comes to call him liiaaSeis, it is Forseh. 367, rightly identifies hard to say, nor is it of any with the treatise irfpl tov i\ov, moment. Mohnike, p. 67, offers and this with the treatise irepl conjectures. Mohnike also rightly T^s (piffias {Stob. Eel. i. 178). maintains that Cleanthes 6 Hov- Other authorities are given by riitir in Diog. ix. 15 must he the Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 580. same as this Cleanthes. ' This appears at least prob- * According to Antisthenes, in able from IMog. 4 : etos i^iv oiv Biog. 1. c, Cleanthes was a pu- Tivhs fiKovae Tov KpdTiiTos • Bre gilist, who came to Athens with Kol T^v iro\iTetav avrov 'yp6.-^avTQS, four drachmas, and entered the Ttvis %\ejav TraiCovres M Trjs tov school of Zeno, in which he Kiwis oipSs alir^v yfypaipeyai. studied for nineteen years (Biog. 42 Chap. III. (2) Aristo and Htrillus. THE STOICS. pupils of Zeno are Aristo of Chios,i ^nd Herillus of 176), gaining a maintenance by- working as a labourer {Dibq. 168 ; 174; Plut. Vit. Mr. Al.' 7, 5; Sen. £p. 44:, 3 ; Krische, Forseh.). A public maintenance, which was offered him, Zeno induced him to refuse {Biog. 169). On the sim- plicity of his life, his permanent diligence, his adherence to Zeno, &c., see J)iog. 168; 170; 37; P^Mi!. De Audi. 18; Cic. Tusc. ii. 25, 60. He also refused to be- come an Athenian citizen (Plut. Sto. Eep. 4). He died of self- imposed starvation (Diog. 176; Liudan, Macrob. 19 ; Stoh. Floril. 7, 54). His age is stated by Diog. 176, at eighty; hy Lueian and Valer. Max. viii. 7, at ninety- nine. Diog. 174, gives a list of his somewhat numerous writings, mostly on moral subjects, which is supplemented by Fabric. Bibl. iii. 561, and Mohnike, p. 90. Cle- anthes was held in great esteem in the Stoic School, even in the time of Chrysippus {Diog. vii. 179 ; 182 ; Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126). At a later time, the Koman Senate erected a statue to him at Assos (Simpl. in Epict. Enchir. c. 53, 329, b). ' Aristo, son of Miltiades, a Chian, discussed most fully by Krische, Forseh. 405, known as the Siren, because of his per- suasiveness, and also as the Bald- head, was a pupil of Zeno {Diog. 37; 160; tto. N. D. i. 14, 37; Acad. ii. 42, 130 ; Sen. Ep. 94, 2), but is said to have afterwards joined Polemo (Diocl. in Diog. 162). It is a better established fact that his attitude towards pleasure was less indifferent than it ought to have been, ac- cording to his principles (Erato^, and Apollophanes in Athen. vii; 281, c) ; but the charge of flattery appears not to be substantiated {Athen. vi. 251, c). His letters show that he was on intimate terms with Cleanthes {Themist. Or. xxi.). His loquacity is said to have been displeasing to Zeno {Diog. vii. 18). He appeared as a teacher in the Oynosarges, An- tisthenes' old locality (Dio^'. 161). Of his numerous pupils {Diog. 182; Plut. C.Princ. Philos. i. 4), two are mentioned by Diogenes : Miltiades and Diphilus. Athen- seus names two more : Apollo- phanes, and the celebrated Alex- andrian sage, Eratosthenes. The latter is also named by Strabo, i. 2, 2; Suid. 'Eparoa-e. Apollo- phanes, whilst adopting Aristo's views of virtue in Ding. vii. 92, did not otherwise adopt his ethics. His natural science is mentioned by Diog. vii. 140, his psychology by Tertul. De An. 14. Since Erastosthenes was born 276 B.C., Aristo must have been alive in 260 B.C., which agrees with his being called a cotemporary and opponent of Arcesilaus {Strabo, 1. c. ; Diog. vii. 162 ; iv. 40). Ac- cording to Diog. vii. 164, he died of sunstroke. Not only had his School disappeared in the time of Strabo and Cicero {die. Legg. i. 13, 38; Fin. ii. 11, 35; v. 8, 23; Tusc. V. 30, 85; Off. i. 2, 6; Strabo, 1. c), but no traces of it are found beyond the first genera- tion. The writings enumerated by Diog. vii. 163, with the single exception of the letter to Clean- thes, are said to have been at- tributed by Pansetius and Sosi- ARISTO AND HERILLU8.—0THER PUPILS. 43 Carthage,' who in their teaching diverged in the Chap. most opposite directions, Aristo confining himself ' rigidly to the Cynic teaching, Herillus approximating to the leading positions held by the Peripatetic School. The remaining pupils of Zeno were Persaeus, (3) other Aratus, Dionysius, and Sphserus. Persseiis was a P^i"'*- countryman and companion of Zeno;^ Aratus the orates to the Peripatetic; but Krische's remarks raise a partial doubt as to the accuracy of this statement. The fragments, at least, of the 'OfioK^fiara preserved by Stobseus seem to .belong to a Stoic. Perhaps to the "O/iom be- long the statements in Sen. Ep. 36, 3 ; 115, 8 ; Plut. De Aud. 8 ; De Sanit. 20, 1 ; De Exil. 5 ; Prsec. Per. Eeip. 9, 4 ; Aqua an Ign. Util. 12, 2. ' Herillus's native place was Carthage {JMog. vii. 37; 165), but he came as a boy under Zeno (Dioff. 166 ; Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129). Dioff. 1. c. enumerates the vraitings of Herillus, calling them, however, oMySarixa fiev Svvd- ttEMs Se fiecrrd. Cic. De Orat. iii. 17, 62, speaks of a School bearing his name, but no pupil belonging to it is known. " Citium was his birthplace. His father's name was Demetrius (Dioff. 6 ; 36), and his own nick- name Dorotheus [Said. Tlepn."). According to Diog. 36 ; Sotion and Nicias in Atken. iv. 162, d; Gdl. ii. 18, 8 ; Orig. C. Cels. iii. 483, d ; he was iirst a slave of Zeno's, which agrees with his being a pupil and inmate of his house {Diog. 36; 13; Cic. K D. i. 16, 38; Athen. xiii. 607, e; Fausan. ii. 8, 4). It is less prob- able that he was presented by Antigonus to Zeno as a copyist (Diog. 36). He subsequently lived at the court of Antigonus {Athen. vi. 261, e ; xiii. 607, a ; Themist. Or. xxxii.), whose son Halcyoneus {JElian, V. H. iii. 17) he is said to have instructed {Diog. 36), and with whom he stood in high favour {Plut. Arat. 18; Athm. vi. 251, e). He al- lowed, however, the Macedonian garrison in Corinth to be sur- prised by Aratus, in 243 e.g., and, according to Pausan. ii. 8, 4 ; vii. 8, 1, perished on that occasion. The contrary is asserted by Plut. Arat. 23, and Atken. iv. 162, 0. In his teaching and manner of life, he appears to have taken a very easy view of the Stoic prin- ciples {Diog. 13; 36; Athen. iv. 162, b; xiii. 607, a). It is therefore probable thaf he did not agree with Aristo's Cynicism {Diog. vii. 162), and his pupil Hermagoras wrote against the Cynics {Suid. 'Ep/wry). Political reasons were at the bottom of Menedemus' hatred for him {Diog. ii. 143). Otherwise, he appears as a genuine Stoic {Diog. vii. 120; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38; Philodem.' De Mus., Vol. Here. i. 44 THE STOICS. Chap. III. well-known poet from Soli.' Dionysius belonged to Heraclea in Pontus, and afterwards joined the Cyrenaic or Epicurean School ; =' and Sphserus from the Bosporus, after studying first in the School of Zeno, and afterwards in that of Cleanthes, was the friend and adviser of Cleomenes the unfortunate Spartan reformer.^ The names of a few other pupiU of Zeno are also on record ; * but nothing is known eol. 14). The treatises mentioned by Dioff. 36, are chiefly ethical and political. In addition to these, there was a treatise on Ethics (Biog. 28); the opas. that Chrysippus had written ' Dioff. 185, mentions it as de- against Epicurus in rivalry [Diog. serving of especial notice, that x. 26, and the criticism of Apol- he refused the invitation of Pto- lodorus in Diog. vii. 181). lemy to court, and dedicated none " Baguet, p. 114-357, discusses of his numerous writings to a the subject very fully, hut omit- prince. ting several fragments. On logical ^ JHog.n^; 183. treatises, of whiehalonethere were ' Quid enim est a Chrysippo 311 {Diog. 198), see Nicolai, De prsetermissum in Stoicis? Cic. logicis Chrysippi libris: Qued- Rn. i. 2, 6. linb. 1859. Prantl, Gesch. d. ' According to Diog. 1 80, there Log. 1. 404. Petersen (Philosoph. were not fewer than 750. Conf. Chrysip. Fundamenta : Hamburg, Valer. Max.mi. 7; Lucian, Her- 1827) attempts a systematic ar- motim. 48. rangement of all the known * This appeared to the Epi- books, cureans disparaging to the honour ' See Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 50. 48 THE STOICS. Chap. was brought to completeness ; and when he died, in "^- the year 206 B.C.,' the form was in every respect fixed in which Stoicism would be handed down for the next following centuries. (2) Later A cotemporary of Chrysippus, but probably some- ^^°^^- what his senior, was Teles, a few extracts ^ from whose writings have been preserved by Stobseus,^ in the shape of popular moral considerations written from a Cynic or Stoical point of view. The same age also produced the Cyrenaic Eratosthenes,* a man distinguished in every branch of knowledge, but particularly celebrated for his mathematical attain- ments, who was gained for Stoicism by • Aristo. Another cotemporary of Chrysippus, and perhaps his fellow-student,^ who in many respects approximated Diont/s. Hal. Dioff. vii. 180 ; x. Chremonides being in the year 27. ffffi^CTi, Differ. Puis. ii. 10; 263 B.C., Teles' treatise irepl vol. Tiu. 631 ; Hippoer. et Plat, (pvyfis must have been written Plac. ii. 2 ; iii. 2 ; and Baguet. between 260 and 250 B.C. Nor See also Plut. Sto. Kep. 28, 2 ; is there any reference in the and .BeryA, Commentat. de Chrys. fragments preserved to persons lib. irepl oiro(f>oTiKtSi' : Cassel, or circumstances later than this 1841. _ date. The philosophers to whom ' The circumstances of his reference is made are the Cynics death are related differently in Diogenes, Crates, Metrocles, Stil- Diog. 184 ; but both authorities po, Bio the Boiysthenite, Zeno, are untrustworthy. The story of and Cleanthes (95, 21 ), the latter the ass is also foimd in Lucian, being called 6 "haaios. Macrob. 25 ; the other version in ' Floril. 5, 67 ; 40, 8 ; 91, 33; Siog. iv. 44 ; 61. On the statue 93, 31 ; 98, 72 ; 108, 82 and 83. of .Chrysippus in the Ceramicus * According to Suid., bom e. see Dmg. vii. 182 ; do. Pin. i. 11, 275 B.C. He died in his 80th 39; Vausan. i, 17, 2; Flut. Sto. year. Eep. 2, 5. 5 Conf. Biog. 54 : 6 Si Xpiiff- ■= In 40, 8, mention is made of ittitos Sio<()ep,<^£i/os irpbj amliv. .-„ the honourable position enjoyed /cpir^^piri ,(,,o-iv ^Ivai avtrtiai5 Beotptas irapaXTiTTTris oiftnts ^ irp&s r^v Trepi ayadav ^ kclkuv Sid- trraffiy. ' Chrys. in Pint. Sto. Eep. 3, 2 : 3(rof 5e viroKafi^tivovtrt tpt\Q~ aSipois eTTL^dWeiv ii&Kiara rhv cxo^atTTiKhv ^iov air' apx^s, wBroi fioi SoKovffi diafiaprdyetv inrovoody- Tes Siayaiyijs tlvos ei/eKCV SetvrovTO •Kot^v ^ &\\ou Tivhi Toirtp irapa- tAi)0-(0U, Kol Tin- SKov $ioV oBtK TTus SieKK^itTai ' tovto S' eariv, i,v traipSis ^ewpijSp, 7]54a)S. ^tayay^ had, it is true, been treated by Aristotle as an end in itself, and the reference here meant is to Aristotle ; but Aristotle had carefully distinguished Siayuyii from ^Soi'^. STOIC DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE. 57 philosophy to each other agree, although there is Chap. a certain amount of vagueness about them, owing to ' - reasons which will shortly be mentioned. Indeed, on no other hypothesis but that of a belief in the iden- tity of philosophy and virtue can the internal struc- ture and foundation of their system be satisfactorily explained. It is enough to remark here that the most important and most peculiar principles esta- blished by the Stoic School belong to the domain of ethics. In logic and natural science that School displays far less independence, for the most part following older teachers ; and it is expressly noted, as a deviation from the ordinary teaching of the School, that Herillus, the pupil of Zeno, declared knowledge to be the highest good, thus raising knowledge rather than virtue to the chief rank in philosophy.' A further illustration of this view of the business (2) N(ccs- of philosophy is to be found in the Stoic doctrine of *^J|^^"'^f ' virtue. Philosophy should lead to right actions and knuwUdge. to virtue. But right action is, according to the • Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129 : Heril- Ssepe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto lum, qui in cognitione et ecientia mirabiliter est laudata per se summum bonum ponit : qui cum ipsa rerum scientia. Hoc uno Zenonis auditor esset, vides quan- captus Herillus scientiam sum- turn ab eo dissenserit, et quam mum bonum esse defendit, nee non multum a PlaLone. Fin. ii. rem uUam aliam per se expeten- 13,43: Herillus autem ad scien- dam. Diog. vii. 165: "HpiAXos tiam omnia revocans unum quod- . . . reXos el-ne riiv ^iriirT^/iTjy. dam bonum Tidit. iv. 14, 36 : lu Ibid. vii. 37. With less ac- determining the highest good, curacy, it is asserted by Iamb, in the Stoics act as one-sidedly, as Stob. Eel. i. 918, that we are if ipsius animi, »t fecit Herillus, raised to the society of the gods, cognitionem amplexarentur, ac- Kora "HptWoy, eiriirT^/uj). tionem relinquerent. v. 25, 73 : 58 THE STOICS. Chap. IV. ^ I Stoics, only rational action, and rational action is 1 action which is in harmony with human and ina,ni- j mate nature. Virtue consists therefore in bringing I man's actions into harmony with the rest of the ! universe, and with the general order of the world. I In order to render this possible, man must know the order and law of the universe ; and thus the Stoics are brought back to the principles of Socrates, main- j taining that virtue may be learnt ; that knowledge is I indispensable for virtue, or rather that virtue is iden- tical with right knowledge. They define virtue in so many words as knowledge, vice as ignorance. If sometimes they seem to identify virtue with streng;th I of will, it is only because they consider strength of will to be inseparable from knowledge, so that the one cannot be conceived of without the other. The practical conceptions of the business of philosophy con- ducts us of itself to its intellectual aspect ; philosophy being not only virtue, but all virtue being impos- \^ sible without philosophy.' The attainment of virtue, wards'loqic ^^^ the happiness of a moral life are the chief ends andnatu- -which the Stoics propose to themselves; but the ral science. . . • .-r- ^ ^ j ■ s,.-f< possession oi a comprehensive scientinc knowledge is views. the only, and yet an indispensable, means thereto. From these remarks it is clear that the Stoics regarded that kind of scientific knowledge as more immediately necessary which has to do with life, the morals, and the actions of mankind. As to the ne- (3) Posi titn to- ' Sen. Ep. 89, 8 : Nam nee 8 : We all lie in the slumber lA philosophia sine virtute est nee error : sola autem nos philosophij sine philosophia virtus. Ibid. 53, excitabit , . . illi te totum dedica IV. LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 59 cessity of further scientific knowledge in addition to Chap. ethicSj the earliest adherents of the Stoic teaching expressed different opinions. Zeno's pupil, Aristo of Chios, held that the sole business of man is to pursue virtue,* and that the sole object of speech is to purify the soul.^ This purifying process, however, is neither to be found in logical subtleties nor in natural science. Logic, as doing more harm than good, he compared to a spider's web, which is as useless as it is curious;^ or else to the mud on a road.'' Those who studied it he likened to people eating lobsters, who take a great deal of trouble for the sake of a little bit of meat enveloped in much shell.' Convinced, too, that the wise man is free from every deceptive infatuation;^ and that doubt, for the purpose of refuting which logic had been invented, can be more easily overcome by a healthy tone of mind,'' than by argument, he felt no par- ticular necessity for logic. Nay, more, he considered that excessive subtlety transforms the healthy action of philosophy into an unhealthy one.^ Just as little was Aristo disposed to favour the so-called encyclical knowledge: those who devote themselves to this ' Lact. Inst. Tii. 7 : Ad virtu- = Ibid. 7. tem capessendam nasci homines, ° Diog. vii. 162: piAxurTa Zi Ariston disseruit. See Stoh. Kcl. Trpoctixe STwi'/c^ SfJy/iOTt ry rbv 4, 111. ffdtpov aSo^affToy etj/at. * Plui. De Andiendo, c. 8, p. ' See Dioff. vii. 163. 42 : oSre yitp Pa^.avelov, (priirlv S ' Aristo (in the 'Oiwi^fiora) in 'Apiffrav, oSrt \6yov iiH) KaBai- Stob. Floril. 82, 16 : d iWefiopos povTos tf^eArfy iariv. 6\oirxepetTrepos fjiij/ \7ii\offo- * Stob. Floril. 82, 1 1. iav \ejrTOhoyia. «0 THE STOICS. Chap. knowledge instead of to philosophy he compared i '- — the suitors of Penelope, who won the maids but n( the mistress.' Natural science would probably ha\ received a more favourable treatment at the hands ( Aristo, had he not shared the opinion of Socrate that it is a branch of knowledge which transcenc the capacity of the human mind ;^ and having one embraced this notion, he was inclined to pronount all physical inquiries useless. His attitude towarc science has therefore been generally expressed I saying that he excluded from philosophy both log: and natural science, on the ground that both ai useless ; the former being irrelevant, and the latt( transcending our powers.* Even ethics was limite by Aristo to most fundamental notions — to inquiri( as to good and evil, as to virtue and vice, as 1 ' wisdom and folly. The special application of thes notions to the moral problems suggested by part cular relations in life, he declared to be usele and futile ; proper for nursemaids and trainers ( young children, but not becoming for philosophers ' Siob. 4, 110. 5e Tcc SiaXcKTixd • /ij) yap avu^i '' do. Acad. ii. 39, 123 : Aristo Aeirflai irpbj ^irav6pdaai.v /3(o Chius, qui nihil istorutn {sc. phy- imlp rinas Sh rh tpvaiKd, ■ aSiva sicorum) sciri putat posse. yhp iyvaaBat ko! ouSe irapix' ' Diog.vu. 160: t6v re ^vcri- j(pelav. Mirmc. Fel. Octav. 1 Kbv T6irov Kol rhr \oytKhv awfpci, audiactani. Inst. iii.20,attribll ^e'-yaiv Tov p.iv cicai iirip riii,as, this utterance to Socrates. A rhv 5' ouS^v irpbs viuis, fidi/ov Si cording to Cu!. De Nat. D Thil iiBmhr/ elvat irphs rifias. Stob. Aristo expressed doubts abo Floril. 80, 7 : 'AptirTai/ lipri rav the existence of a God. (nrovpLfvaiv jrapA tois ipt\oa6, anraKKorpiovvra Se Ka- Kias, KararpexovTa 5e twv /xera^ij Tointcv,irep\ & ol iroAAol nTortBeeres KaKoBaifwpovffiv. Seneca, Ep. 94, 1 : Earn partem philosophise, quae dat propria cuique persons prse- cepta .... quidam solam rece- perunt . . . . sed Ariston Stoicns e contrario hano partem levem existimat et quse non descendat in pectus Tisque ; ad illam habentem praeeepta [? ad vitam beatam] plurimum ait proficere ipsa de- creta philosophise constitutionem- que summi boni, quam qui bene inteUexit ae didicit, quid in qua- que re faciendum sit, sibi ipse prgeeepit. ' Seneca, § 12, asks for whom should such exhortations be ne- cessary — lor him who has right views of good and evil, or for him who has them not? Qui non habet, nihil a te adjuvabitur; aures ejus contraria monitionibus tuis fama possedit ; qui habet exactum judicium de fugiendis petendisque, scit, quid sibi facien- dum sit, etiam f e taeente ; tota ergo pars ista philosophise sub- moveri potest. In § 17, he con- tinues : A madman must be cured, and not exhorted; nor is there any difference between general madness and the madness which is treated medieallv. 62 THE STOICS. Chap, /physical inquiries. Among their number must have ^^- been Zeno and Cleanthes ; for had not Zeno set the example to his School of dividing philosophy into logic, ethics, and natural science ?' Do not the titles of his logical and physical treatises ^ prove this fact ; as also statements in reference to theoretical know- ledge and natural science which are expressly attri- buted to him? Moreover, Zeno himself recom- mended to others, and himself pursued, logical inquiries.^ Indeed, his whole mental habit, with its keen appreciation of even the subtleties of the Megarians, bears testimony to an intellectual line of thought which is far removed from that of Aristo.* It was, moreover, Zeno who chose that dry and unadorned logical way of giving his teaching, which is found in its greatest perfection in Chrysippus.* Logical and scientific treatises are also known to have been written by Cleanthes,^ who allotted separate ' Biog. vii. 39. ■ The Catalogue in Diog. 174, ' Logical treatises, those irepl mentious logical treatises irepl Xe^ewi', \iffeis Koi €\eyxoi, irepi K6yov, irepl ^iriaT'fi/JiTJs, irepl ISlttiv, A6yov — physical treatises, those Trgpl ruv aTrdptav, irept Sia\eKTtK7is, Trepl &\ov and Trepl ovffla^. vepl KCLTTfyopTiiJ.ilrav. To these » Plv.t. Sto. Eep. 8, 2 : e\ve Si may he added, from Athen. 467, aotplffimTa koI tjjj/ StaKeKTiK>iv, iis d ; 471, h, the rhetorical treatises TOVTO "jvoteiv Svvafi4t/7]Vf iK4\eve -jrcpl Tpdncov and irepl fieraK'fiij/eus. irapaXa^Pdveip robs fiaBTirds. Of greater importance were the ♦ According to Diog. 32, he physical and theological treatises: declared the ^yK^K\ius iraiSeia to Trepl t^s tow Z-fivtovos v(rio\oylas be useless— a testimony worth (2, B.); rSy 'HpoK\efTou ^IriT^ireis very little ; for it is a moot point, (4, B.); irphs ArnidxpiTov, irepJ in what sense Zeno made this 6eS)v, xepl juoxtj/ctjj (Cic. Divin. i. statement. Perhaps he was only 3, 6) ; nep\ yiydrraiv (in Plut. De anxious to exclude those studies FJum. 5, 3) ; and the fivButh from the narrower sphere of phi- {Athen. xiii. 572, e), which is losophy. prohahly identical with the op- " Proofs will he given later. x'"'''*'''7''' of Diogenes. CLEAJSITHES. 63 parts to logic, to rhetoric, and to natural science, Chap. in his division of philosophy. The name of Cle- — -— — anthes is one otherwise of frequent occurrence in discussing the natural science, but more particularly the theology, of the Stoics. Still more exhaustive inquiries into logic and natural science appear to have been set on foot by Sphserus ;• all proving that the energies of the Stoic School must have been directed to this subject before the time of Chrysip- pus, although these branches of science were no doubt subservient to ethics, and ethics held the most important and highest place in their philosophy. At i a later time, when Chrysippus had expanded the system of the Stoics in every direction, especial at- tention was devoted to logic ; and the necessity for logic and natural science came to be generally recog- | nised. More especially was this the case with regard \ to natural science, including ' theology.' All ethical i inquiries must start, according to Chrysippus, with considering the universal order and arrangement of, the world. Only by a study of nature, and of what Grod is, can anything really satisfactory be stated about good and evil, and other kindred topics.^ ' Biog. vii. 178, mentions (1) ra eJSlB^o, irtpl alffSriTripiav, vepl logical and rhetorical -writings : 'HpaKAeirou (5, B), vepl fiavrixris. Trepl Tuv 'EperpMmv ^i\o(r6(pav, ' Chrys. in the 3rd B, irepi Trepl diwliov, irepl Sptov, irepl c|Ea>s, flewy (in Flut. Sto. Eep. 9, 4): ov irepl tSv htniKsyoiifViev (3, B), yip icnv flipetii t^s SkKaioaivris irepl \6yov, rexvri Sia\eKTiiiii (2, &h\riv apx^f ovS &\\iiv -yhftsiv ^ B), TupX Ko.Tiiyopriii.drai', irepl a/i- t^v ^k toS Aihs koX r^v ex rrj! ■ 0i;aoAii5v; (2) treatises on science: koivtjs ipicretos ■ ivrevSev -yhp Si! mpX Koffiiov (2, B), irepl aToix^iaiv, irav -rh toiovtov ri/v i-px^" 'X"". vepl ffweppiaTos, irepl Tvxvs, irepl «' lJ-iM\-onai ti ipeiv vepX AyoflSi' i\axi effri irphs t $oi\oi>Tat • the terms Kiyov 4panav (Diog. TOis S' iirLffT-niinv evepya^ofifmis, vii. 186), interrogatio (Sen. Ep. Kaff V dfioKoyov/iivas t:m(rSfi.e0a 82, 9; 85, 1; 87, 11), interro- T&. evamla aroix^wvv. gatiuncida (Cic), which are em- ' Cic. Parad. Prooem.: Cato ployederenwhentheirarguments autem perfectus mea sententia were not in this form. Stoicus . . . in ea est hseresi, quae * Called fi.4pri, T6wot, rfSrj, y^nn. nullum sequitur florem orationis ' Diog. 39 : Tpifuprj :\>affiv elvai neque dilatat argumentum ; mi- t}iv Kai ^ tjiiKoffo^lay Kdyou • tlyai nutis interrogatiiinculis, quasi yap avToS Th /ieV ti (j>u(riKhi/, rh Se punctis, quod proposuit efficit. i)0iKhv, to Se XoyiKov. oSrai 5k Cic. Pin. iv. 3, 7 : Pungunt quasi irpwios SieTAe 7,i]vvv 6 Ktrieis ev aculeis interrogatiuuculis angus- t^ Trtpi K6yov /cal Xpiirntiros c» lis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur t^ a' irepl Koyov Ka\ iv rp a' nihil commutantur animo. See rav ipvaixwi', xal 'A7roAXi' koX t^v SiaKexTt- to the palm of the hand, and Dia- KijVTOV 6pBusSia\4yeaOta'rafievav KeKrav. Compare with this the words of Diodes, in Diog. 49 : apioKei toTs 2tui- Kols irepl (bavratrlas Kal alfrfi^trews Trporarreiv \6yov, Ka66ri rh Kpi- r-t]piov ^ 7] a\'fi6eia rav irpayp-drotv yivdiaKerai, Karh. ^eVos (fiavrairia itrrX KOi Ka96rt 6 Trepl ffvyKara- Becreas Kal 5 irepl KardKii^fieas Kal voi]ffeas K6yos irpoiiyav rav &\\av ovK fij/€u ^avraalas avviffrarai. According to this passage, the branch of dialectic which treated of avrairla included the theory of knowledge. ' Our information on this head is very small. In the words ^r|- TopiKT) verba curat et sensus et ordinem, a division of rhetoric is WORDS ANB THOUGHTS. 71 with enquiries referring only to precision of expres- sion. Dialectic was defined, in short, as the science or art of speaking well.' Now, since speaking well consists in saying what is becoming and true,^ dialectic is used to express the knowledge of what is true or false, or what is neither one nor the other,' correctness of expression heing considered inseparable from correctness of thought. Words and thoughts are, according to Chap. V. •implied by Seneca, little differ- ing, except in the position of the chief parts, from that of Aris- totle. A fourth part is added to the three others by Siog. 43 — on Delivery — iivai 5' auTijs tV ^^oX- psffiv eis Te T^v eSpetric KaX €ts r^v (pdiriv, KOL eis rd^tv koX els rijv im6icpioptKhs, a dis- tinction subseq^uently employed by Philo and the Fathers, and really identical with that of Aristotle (Anal. Post. i. 10, 76): ov irphs rhv e|aj \6yov^ aWct Trphs rhv iv Tj if'^XJ. On this distinc- tion, see Heraclit. AUeg. Horn. c. 72 ; SnrAoDs b Kdyos • To-iiruv &' ot i\6{Toipoi (the Stoics are meant) Tbv fJLey ij/SnidfTOv Ka\ov(Tif rhv 5e •jrpoopiKQs. They are also referred to hjPlut. C. Prin.Phil. 2, 1 : rb 5e Keyeiv, '6ti SiJo Koyoi eialv, 6 fihv ivhiaOerhs, 7iyeiJ.6vos 'Epftov Sapov^ d S' ii/ Trpotfiop^, Std- KTopos Koi opyaviKhs eoi\6v iffTi. The double form of Hermes ig explained by Heraclitus as refer- ring to the twofold Adyos — 'Ep;u^s TiBopLos representing \6yoii ivSid- fleTOK, and the heavenly Hermes (SiiKTopos) representing the irpo- (popM6y. The distinction passed, from the Stoics to others, like Flat. Solert. An. 19, 1; Galen, Protrept. i. 1. ^ Diog. 43 : t^v 5ia\eKTiKi]v Siaipuff6aL eXs re rhp irepi r&v crr]- fiaLVOfievwi/ Kol ttjs fpuvrjs rdwoif. Ibid. 62: rvy^dvet b' aSryj, &s d Xpiifritnris 'riffi, irepl tnjpiaivovTa Kal artfjM,iv6fj.eya. Seneca : Sia- AeKTiK^ in duas partes dividitur, in verba et significationes, i.e. in res, quae dicuntur, et vocabula, quibus dicuntur. The distinction between rb a-qfiatvov and rb ittj- fjLaiv6fieyov, to which rb rvyxdvov (the real object) must be added as a third, will be hereafter dis- cussed in another place. A much narrower conception of dialectic, and more nearly approaching to that of the Peripatetics, is to be found in the definition given by /Srai!. Pyrrh. ii. 213. The division there given is also found in the Platonist Aloinous, Isag. c. 3, aa Fabricius pointed out. It appears, therefore, not to belong to the Stoic School, but, at most, to a few of its later members. ^ Seneca continues : Ingens de- lude sequitur utriusque divisio, without, however, giving it. DIALECTIC. 73 which are only imperfectly known to us.^ The part of dialectic dealing with the means of expression, which was generally placed before the part dealing with the ideas expressed,^ included, according to the Stoics, not only the theory of the voice and of utter- ance, but also the theories of poetry and music, these arts being ranked under the head of sound on purely external considerations,' The teaching of the Stoics on this part of dialectic consisted solely of a series of definitions, differences, and divisions ; and has so little philosophical value, that it need not detain our attention longer.^ Two parts only of the Stoic logic Chap. V. ' There is nrncli which is open to doubt in Petersen's attempt (Phil. Chiys. Fund. 221) to settle these divisions. At the very heginning, his referring the words of Sext. Math. viii. 11, to the parts of logic is unhappy. Nicolai (De Logic. Chrys. Lib. 21) has acl^d with greater caution, but even much of what he says is doubtful. ' Diog. 56. ' Biog. 44 : elvai Se ttjs 5io- Ae/CTiKTjs l^toy t6tiov koX rhv irpoei- pTifievdV trepl avTTJs ttjs (f wj/^s, iv ^ SeiKVVTaL T) iyypdfi/jLaTOs utvij KoL rlva ra rov \6you fiepTj, Kol Trepl aoKoiKtfffjLOv koI ^ap^apifffiov Kal tioirjfidTuv Kal &p.ipi^o\tuT/ Kal irepl ifjLfie\ovs tpaivrjs Kal TrepI i^ov- (TtKTjs Koi Trepl Upwv Kard Ttvas Kal diatpeffewv koX A€|etui/. ' Further particulars may be obtained in Schmidts Stoicorum Grammatica (Halle, 1839); Lersch, Sprachphilosophie der Alten ; Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft, i. 265-363 ; Nioolai, De Log. Chrys. Lib. 31. This part of dialectic began with enquiries into sound and utter- ance. Sound is defined to be air in motion, or something bearable — h/tjp irCTrATjyfifvos ^ rh iSiop OiV- Qfirhv oKOTJs ; the human voice, as evapdpos Kal airh Sidvoias 4Kirefjt.no- /teVn, is distinguished from the sounds of other animals, which are a^p inrh dp/j.ris TreTrKrjyfievos {Biog. 55 ; Simpl. Phys. 97 ; Sext. Math. vi. 39 ; Gell. N. A. vi. 15, 6). That sound is some- thing material is proved in vari- ous ways {Biog. 55 ; Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2 ; Galen, Hist. Phil. 27). Sound, in as far as it is %vapBpos, or composed of letters, is called \eJif; in as far as it expresses certain notions, it is \6yos {Biog. 56; Sext. Math. i. 155). A pe- culiar national mode of expres- sion (Ae|is Kix^po-yp-^v^ iQviKas T€ Kal 'EWriviKas ^ Ae|is noran^) was called Bid\eKTOs {Biog. 66). The elements of Xe^ts are the 24 letters, divided into 7 (^oiviteyTa, 6 &ava, and 11 semivowels {Biog. 57) ; the K6yos has 5 parts. 74 THE STOICS. Chap. possess for US any real interest — the part which dis- '■ cusses the theory of knowledge, and that part of dialectic which treats of ideas, which in the main agrees with our formal logic. B. Tlwory The Stoic theory of knowledge turns about the °Udg^' enquiry after a criterion or standard by which what (1) Gene- ^^ ^^'^^ i'l 0^1" notions may be distinguished from ralclmmo- vvhat is false. Since every kind of knowledge, no matter what be its object, must be tested by this standard, it follows that the standard cannot be sought in the object of our notions, but, on the con- trary, must be sought in their form. The enquiry after a standard becomes therefore identical with another — the enquiry as to what hind of notions supply a knowledge that may be depended upon, or what activity of the power of forming conceptions carries in itself a pledge of its own truthfulness. It is impossible to answer these questions without investigating the origin, the various kinds, and the value and importance of our notions ; and hence the called ffToix"" by Chrysippus — ever, observes (in Varro, L. Lat. Svo/ia, irpoiTiiyopia, ^rj/ia, aivSecr- ix. 1) that the same things bear lios, &i>8pov — to ■which Antipater different names, and vice vers4, added the iiea Koi Traaav KaTdArifiv i)pTria9at tiSv aio>'- PERCEPTION. 77 understood this definition so literally, that he com- pared the impression on the soul to the impression made by a seal on wax.' In this comparison he ■was probably correctly rendering the views of Zeno, since he was himself one of his most careful fol- lowers. The difficulties of this view were recognised by Chrysippus, who accordingly defined a perception to be the chanpe (^Ti^pni'mrTi.v) produced on the soul by an object, or, more accurately, the change pro- duced in the ruling part of the soul ; ^ and whereas his predecessors had only considered sensible things to be objects, he included among objects, states and activities of the mind.^ The mode, however, Chap. V. Toffia Tinraxris iv ^vxy. The same in Siog. Tii. 45 and 50. ' Sext. Math. vii. 228 : KAecJi-- Qri^ fxeu yitp iJKOvffe tJjv rviraffiv Kara ^iffoxh^ t6 koX ^^oxV Starirep Kal Sia TWV SaKTv\iti)v yLvo^iv7}v Tov KTipov ThraffiV, Conf. Ibid, vii. 372 ; viii. 400. ' Sext. vii. 229, continues : XpifftTTiros Se &TOTrot/ T]ye7T0 Th toioCtoi' • — according to this view, it would be necfssary for the soul to receive at once many dif- ferent forms, if it had to retain different notions at the same time — ainbs ohv T^y Tvirwo'tv etpij- ffBai virh tov Tjhvavo^ imev6it (U/tX Trfs erepotdxreas, Sirrre eit/ai rotov- Tov t})V K6yov ' (pavToffia 4(tt\v eTepoiaxris ypvxv^- Objection had, however, been raised to this de- finition, on the ground that not every change of the soul gave rise to a perception, and there- fore the Stoics had defined a per- ception more accurately : av- ratrla iirrl rinrua-is iv ifiuxv ^' &>' iv 'pvxfi, which was equivalent to saying (jyavraaia itrrlv irepoloKris iv T)yeiioviKip' or else in Zeno's definition of tpavTa(ria as tuttuijis iv ^ux^ they had taken i/zuxf? i^ a restricted sense for tA riye/iovi- Koy, which really came to the same thing. Even this definition had, however, been found too wide, and hence erepoiaiffis was limited to mean change in feeling {erepoiuffLS Karct irtiinv). But the definition is still too wide, as Sextus already remarked; for a perception is not an isolated feel- ing of change in the soul. The statements in Sext. Math. vii. 372 ; viii. 400 ; Biog. vii. 45 and 50; Alex. Aphro.'De Aaxm. 135, b; Boeth. De Interpret, ii. 292 (Schol. in Arist. 100), are in agreement with the above re- marks. = Chrys. in Plut. St». Eep. 19, 2: iTi.piivyhpal(r6TiT6,i(fTtra,ya6h KaX Tot KaKctf real ro^TOiS iKtrotet \4yeiv ' ov yap n6vov Th irddTj 78 THE STOICS. Chap. V. (J) Con- ceptions formed from pel - ceptions. in which the change was produced in the soul did not further engage his attention. It follows, as a necessary corollary from this view, that the Stoics regarded sensation as the only source of all our perceptions : the soul is a blank leaf, sen- sation is the hand which fiUs it with writing. But this was not all. Perceptions give rise to memory, repeated acts of memory to experience,^ and con- clusions derived from experience form conceptions wliich carry us beyond the immediate objects of sense. These conclusions rest either upon the com- parison of perceptions or upon actual combination of them, or else iipon analogy ; ' some add, upon iinXv oXffB^Th ffvyTols etSearty, oTop Kintf) KoL Plut. Plac. iv. 11, 2: aiVfla- v6^ivoi ydp TLVos olov AeukoD aireA.- 66vTOS avTOV fivhfvqv exovfftVf iirav Se dfweiheis iroWal /xf^^uat y^i/uy- raL t(Jt6 ipaffly ex^tv 4fnreipiay, ' Dioff. vii. 52 : ^ 5e KoraATji/dj ylperai kot' aiiTohs aitrSijaei niv, ws XevKwv Kal ^eXdvtav Kal Tpax^osir Kal \iiui' • \6ycjj 5e rav 5t avoSei- |ewF aufayofievuv, Qo'irep rh Beobs elvai Kal -Tpovoeiv Toirous ' Tav yhp voovfievutv tA ^ev Karh irepi' TTTaaiv (immediate contact) evoij- Bjj, -rk 56 Koff dfioi6T7iTa, ri, 5e kbt' am\oyiav, -rh, Sh koto fierdeea-it/, Tct Se Kara aipBffftv, Ti 8e kot" ivavTiua-iv . . . yosirai 5c ko! kot4 jU6Taj3ao-i>/ (transition from the sensuous to the supersensuous) TITO, is T^ \eKTh Kal S tiJttos. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 42: Compre- hensio [ = KariiATujiij] facta sensi- bus etvera illi [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur : non quod omnia, quse essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in earn posset relinqueret, quodque na- ture quasi normam scientise et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur. Ibid. Fin. iii. 10, 33 : Cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu (experi- ence) aliquid cognitum sit, aut CONCEPTION. 79 ontact and transposition,' The formation of con- Chav. options by means of these agencies sometimes takes ' )lace methodically and artificially, and at other imes naturally and spontaneously.' In the latter I (o) Koirai ray are formed the primary conceptions, ''''poT^'^^i'S\for^^ )r KOivaX svvoiai, which were regarded by the Stoics | »« IS the natural types of truth and virtue, and as the listinctive possession of rational beings.* To judge yj many expressions, it might seem that by primary inceptions, or Koival svvoiai,,^ innate ideas were neant; but this view would be opposed to the iyhole character and connection of the system. In mnjunctione, aut similitudine, l^eoUationerationis: hoc quarto, juod extremum posui, boni no- titia facta est. Sext. (Math. vii. 10 ; ix. 393) also agrees with the Stoic doctrine of the origin of conception?, in saying that all our ideas arise either kot' ifai- \tuTiv rwv fvapycSv or ttarct r^u a-jrh Tav ivapyuv fiera^afftv (cf. Diog. yii. 53), and in the latter ease either by comparison, or actual contact, or analogy. ' Siog. and Sen. ' Plut. Plac. iv. 11 : tSv S' ev voiuv (d fihv tpvatKoi yivovrai Kork Toils elprt/jLevovs Tp6trovs (accord- ing to the context, this must mean by memory and experience) Kal Bbve-TTirexyfl'^^s ' a! S' fjSrt Sl' TllifTtpas hiSaffKoKias Kol ^iri^e- Keias • aSrai iitv oiv evuoiai Ka- XouvTM n6vai, ixeTvai Se Kal irpo- K^eis. Diog. Tii. 51 : [tSk ^av- TaffiSv] al jiiv eio-i Tex^K"', <«' 5e ' Plut. Plac. ir. 11 : i Se K6yos Kofl' hv irpoffayopevd/ieSa hiyyinoX ixTav irpoTJf^ioiv avimKi]pov(r9ai \4ysTaL Kara t^v irp(iTr}v ^$do- fidSa (the first seven years of life). Comm. Not. 3, 1, says that to the Stoics belonged rh irapa ras ii/voias Kal t^s irpoK-fi^eis rets Koivcts tpiKoffo^iiv, ct^' S)v fidhiina T^v cUpefftv . . . Kal fi6v7ii/ 6fiO\0' yeiy Tp {piffet \4yovffit/. Sen. Epist. 117, 6: multum flyai • every sentence containing an assertion or nega- tive, and therefore being opposed to every other. Ibid. viii. 70 : il^ioW ol ^TCOlKol KOtVUS 4v \eKT^ vh aKTtSes €ivai Kal t^ i^evBos ' ^GKrhv 8e inrtipx^i'^ ^curl rh Ka?^ \oytK^v tpavrairlav inpiffrd^vov ' ?ioytKT]v Sk elvai tp^avTaffiay Koff %; Tb tpaVTaaQfv iffTi Kiytf irapa- ffTTicrcu. Tuv ti XexTay tA fiev ^WllTTJ KafiOVfft T& §€ avTOTe\^ (conceptions and proposition ; conf. Sioff. vii. 63) . . . irpoir- ayopeiovfft Be riva tSov avroreK&v Kol a^i^fiara, tivep Keyovres Ij^oi B\Tl9ciio/if y ^ ^vS6fie8a. Ibid, 74 ; Biocf. vii. 65 : 4|(wjuo 84 iariy, S 4ffTiv aAT]0es fl ijfEuSos ^ irpay/ia avToreK^s a-aoipavThv bffov i(p^ 4- ayr^' &s i Kpiffnnr6s 5 Tl/iaiov c^riyoificvos, &Trh T^s tptaroeifiovs S^^ieas ifara- Kaiifiiverai, fi ik (pay^ iirh rrjs aepoeiBovs &fco^s, oStw Kal tj ray &\ay fpiffis &irh nvyyevovs otf^elKet KaTa^a/iPiveaBcu rod f.6yov. Conf. Plato, Kep. vi. S08, B. PERCEPTION AND CONCEPTION. 83 ceptions of what is good and of God. And since, according to the Stoic teaching, a material object alone possesses reality, the same inconsistent vague- ness may be also observed in their teaching, which has also been noticed in Aristotle — reality attaching to individual objects only, truth to general notions only. This inconsistency, however, assumes a much cruder form with the Stoics than it did with Aristotle, for, adhering to the Cynic nominalism, they reso- lutely asserted that no reality attached to thoughts.' Such an assertion makes it all the more difficult to conceive how greater truth could belong to concep- tions, conceptions of unrealities included, than to perceptions caused by actual and material objects. Chap. V. ' Diog. 61 : ivv6riiia S4 Ian ^Avrafffia Btavolas, oijre rl %v aire iroihvj Sjtravel 5e rl tty koL &iffave\ Ttot6v. Stob. Eel. i. 332 : ri iv- Viyfjfiara tpTjffl ju^ti Ttvct elvai fiiyn iroict, &ffavei Se Ttvii Kol affayel irotit avTd(rfiaTa i|/w^^s * toCto Se inrh rStv apx^^^^ (Beocs vpotra- yopeieffOai . . . ravra Se ol Srajt- Kol (lti\6tro^ot ibaffljf avvirdpKTovs elvaif Kol Tuv fihy h'vovfJidTUiif &s S^ Tfpoffiyyopias KdKovfft, Tiry- Xilwav. Pint. Plao. i. 10, 4 : oi OTri Ziivavos 2t»iko1 ivv(ytiimTa ^fierepa rets ISeas G^affav. Simpl. Gateg. 26, e : XprfffiTnros vnropci irepl Trjs iSeas, ei riSe ti ^rjA^o-erai. trvp.iTapaKTyrr4ov Se Kal t^i/ irvtnj- Beittv rai> Stcoikwi' irepl tSiv y^vi- Kuv voiuv irws at irTUffets (for atnoits irpo(ftepoVTai Kal vws oSriva t4 Kotrk irap' airoU Xe'-ycTai. Syrian on Met. p. 59 : ins &pa rh «?8i) . . . oSt6 vphs riiv fivffiv ttjs ruv &voftdrciop trvprjdeias Tap^yerOf a &s Xpifftmros Kol 'Apx^STjfios Kol oi Tr\e£ous TcSc "^TtoLKav SffTepov ep'flBTja'av . . . ou fi'^v ooBe vo-t\pMTOL eitri Trap' abToiis at iSeai, us K\e- dvOris Vffrepov ^prjKe. It does not appear to be intended by Stobseus and Plutarch that the Stoics re- garded their conception of the ivv6-i)ii.a as identical with the ideas of Plato, but that they asserted that these ideas were only imoiifjiaTa — an assertion which had also been made by Antisthenes. Sext. Math. Tii. 246, quotes, as belonging to the Stoics : oifre 5e a\T]6iU oSre f^iev- dets eltriv at yeviKal \(j>avTaiTiai'] ' &v '}kp Tct etStj Toio ^ To7a Toirav ra yevti oiSre rota aire rota ' if mankind were divided into Greeks and barbarians, the 76C1- Khs &vSpmros would be neither one nor the other. The more a conception dispenses with in- dividual limitations, the further it is removed from truth. i>-tJ^cjSL-.C "* 84 THE STOICS. Chap. Accordingly, if they were asked in what the peculiai character of conceptions consisted, the Stoics, follow- ing Aristotle, reply that, in thinking a conception, the idea of universal application is present ; whereas perceptions are only of particular application,' More importance was attached by them to another point oi difference between conceptions and perceptions — the greater certainty which the thinking of conceptions carries with it than the mere presence of a percep- tion. All the definitions given above point to the unassailable strength of conviction as the charac- teristic of knowledge. The same strength of con- viction is implied in the language attributed to Zeno,^ according to which, he compared sensation to the extended fingers, assent, as being the first activity of the power of judgment, to the closed hand, conception to the fist, and knowledge to one fist firmly grasped by the other. According to this story, the whole difference between sensation and knowledge is one of degree, depending on the greater or less strength of conviction, on the straining and attention of the mind.^ It is not an absolute difference of kind, but a relative difference, a gradual shading off of one into the other. (c) The It follows from these considerations, that the etandard existence of a standard by which, in the last resort. of truth. •' ' ' Diog. vii. 54 : Itrn S' fi ■irp6- ^ die. Acad. ii. 47, 145. Xt;i(/is ivpoia ov- ed. Mein. iv. 236), Nr. 34 : Xpi.ems [6 Xpi(r- iTnros] ovK oiiTav avToreXTJ tt)? avyKaradeffeus aiTiav airodeiKPvetp ^pijicei/ 8ti' PKcafiovati' oi rro(pal tfifvSeTs (payTOffias ifiwoiowres, hv at ^uvTOtrlai Ttomffiv auToreAois T&s avyKaToSiaeiS, k.t.K. Id. 1 3 : aZOis Se (/)ijo't Xpivtinros, Kal rhv 6ehv flievSeis ifiiroieLv ^avTOffias Kcil Tbv ao^hv . . . TjfjLas Se tpa{i\ovs Hvras avyKaTteriBeffdat Ta7s rot- oiJtois ^avToiylats. Id. Fragm. De An. 2 : ou^ i "(""X^ rpeirei eavT^v els r^v rwv Trpar/fjidTQJv KardKii^iv Hal aTr6.'niv, KaT&, roi/s airh TTJs (TToas. Spictet. in Gell. N. A. xix. 1, 16 : visa animi, quas i/)ot/TO(r£asphilosophi appellant . . . non voluntatis sunt neque arbi- trarise, sed vi quadam sua in- f erunt sese bominibus noscitandse ; probationes autem, quaa irvy- KaraOiireis vooant, quibus eadem visa nosountur ac dijudicantur, voluntarise sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu : the difference between a wise man and a fool consists in (TuyKOTOTiSecrflai and irpoirE7ri5o|(i- (eiv. The freedom of approba- tion must of necessity be so understood as to harmonise with the Stoic doctrine of freedom. '' The difierence between the conception of eihoyov and that of kotoAtjitthc^ ^avraffia consists in the fact that the latter alone never fails. See Athen. viii. 354, e; Biog.yn. 177. 38 THE STOICS. Chap. V. (7) Pri- mary con- ceptions a standard as well as percep- they are accordingly termed irresistible perceptions. Whenever a perception forces itself upon us in this irresistible form, we are no longer dealing with a fiction of the imagination, but with something real ; but whenever the strength of conviction is wanting, we cannot be sure of the truth of our perception. Or, expressing the same idea in the language of Stoicism, these irresistible perceptions, or (jtavToa-iai, KaToXriTTTiKal, are the standard of truth.' The test of irresistibility {/caToXTj-^lns) was in-, tended to apply more immediately to perceptions derived from without, such perceptions, according to the Stoic view, alone supplying the material for knowledge. But an equal degree of certainty was ' Cic. Acad. i. U, 41 : [Zeno] visis ( = ipavTOfflais) non omnibus adjungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quse propriam quandam haberent dedarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur : id autem visum, cum ipsum per se cemeretur, eompre- hensibile {KaraKryKTiK^ (l>avTaat7l rvyx^v^ty t^v Kara- 8e Xpiffliriros Sla^epofievos irphs AijTTTtK^y tpaVTaffiav, rouTeart r)]V avrhf 4j/ ra irp^tf irepl \6yov diri vndpxovTos, KoBd ehat rh Kara t^ai'Tacrfaj/ Aoyt/cV iKpiaTd- uevoy. rS)v 5e \GKrS>v ret fikv Xe- yovffiv eXvai auToreX^ ot ^uiiKol, TO 5^ ^AXlTT^ . ^AAiTT^ ^kv oZv effTL TCt hvatrdprltTrov ^x°^'^°' "^^^ ^Ktpop^v, oXov Tpdipet ' iTn^Tjrovfiev yap, Tis ; avroreXri S' itrrl ra ajrqpTiff^hriV txovra t^v iK(pop&i/, oToc Tpd(pei 'S,i»Kpirtis. Frantl uses the term judgment as most nearly representing Keicr6v but it must be remembered that AcKTiv has a wider meaning than that of a logical judgment. The latter (ojiajyuo) is only one form of XeKTct avTOTtXri. Kskt^v may be better rendered by predication. ' Plut. au. Plat. X. I, 2 : A judgment (irp(jTO{ris or a^iuifm) 4^ ov6imTOS Kol ^■^/iOToj awciXTr\Kev, S)y TO juew TTTOKriv ot SmAe/cn/col, Tb 5e KaTriy^pfjfia Ka\uv(rti^. The terms jTrSiri! and xarriydiiTiiw are peculiar to the Stoics, and there- fore the Stoics must be meant by 01 SiaKeKTiKoi. In the first class of words they distinguish Svofia and Trpoirrryopia, limiting Svo/^a to proper names, and understanding by irpoaiTfopia all general terms, whether substantives or adjectives (Diog. 58 ; Bekier's Anecd. ii. 842). According to Stab. Eel. i. 332, XTwiris was only used to ex- press irpmrTiyopia. JDiog. 192, mentions two books of Chrys- ippus Trepl Twv irpoinyyoptiiSiv. Por the meaning of HaTiryip^ixa or f>rip.a, consult Biog. 68 and 64 ; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14 ; Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 21 ; Forphyr. in Ammon. De Inter. 37, a. According to Apollon. De Const, i. 8, ^Vfia was used in strict accuracy only for the infinitive, other forms being called KaTTiyop^fiaTa. ' The distinction between iiyo- lici and KaTi)7iip7)/io was somewhat bluntly referred to their logical and metaphysical antithesis by the Stoics, as may be seen in Stob. Eel. i. 336: alrLoy S' 6 Z^jvajK T](rlv fivat 5t' &, ov 5e oXtiov ffvpi.- j8e8r|K(!j • Kol t6 ft.'kii cUtioh ff&im, 94 THE STOICS. Chap. V. of subdivisions and varieties.' To this part of logic the enquiry into the formation and division of con- ceptions, and the doctrine of the categories, properly belong; but it cannot be said with certainty what place it occupies in the logic of the Stoics.^ Certain it is that the Stoics introduced little new matter into their enquiries on this topic; all that is known of their teaching, in reference to the formation of con- ceptions, in reference to their relations to one an- other, and their divisions, being the same as the teaching of Aristotle, and differing only from the o5 Se t^TLOv KOn-TiySpTjfia. . . . Xlo- ffeiSdji/ios . . . rb /zey oirtoi/ iv Kol ffufjia, uvSi airiov oi^re hvoire aufia, d\\a (rvfi^e^-riicbs koX KaT7iy6p7ina, Hence the latter were called ffifi- fiafxa and Trapatrvfi^afxa. ' The eases of nouns were dis- tinguished, the nominative, ac- lording to Ammon,, being called Svop.a, and the other cases jrTe6ireis • a statement, however, which does not agree with the usual use of those terms. In Dioff. 65, the cases {yepiKii, Sotik)), oitiotikj)) are called vAtiyiat vT^ffets. Chrys- ippus wrote a distinct treatise on the five cases, Diog. 192. Similar were the divisions of the Karify6- prip-a. According to Biog. 66, the Stoics distinguished between transitive verbs (hpBk), such as Ap9, iiaKeytrai ' passive verbs (Stttio), such as bpSimi • neuter verbs (^oiiSerepa), such as ((tpovetv^ wepiTrareiy • and middle verbs (^&t/rLTmrop86Ta), KfipeffBai^ Tref- 6eir0ai, &c. Consult on this point Philo. De Cherub. 121, c ; Orig. C. Cels. vi. 57 ; also Bionys. Thrax. § 15. Simpl. Categ. 79, u, f ; Diog. 191 ; Lersch. ii. 196; Steinthal, Gesoh. der Sprachw. i. 294. They also distinguished between ']. It is, enquiry being entirely based on however, more usual to find -ri. the idea of their co-ordination. Thus Flotin. Enn. vi. 1, 25 : koi- ' It will thus be understood vbv ri khI iir\ irivTtiiv %v "yhos how the ancients could at one XaiLfiivovai. Alex. Aphrod. Top. time speak of iv, at another of 165 ; Schol. 278, b, 20 : oStoj 5€i- ri, as being the highest concep- Kviois hv 8ti ii^ KoKas t6 t( ot tion of the Stoics. The former airh ffruas y4vos rod Svtos (tI as is found in Dioff. 6 1 : 76!'iK66TaToi' the genus, of which iv is a species) Se idTiv 1> yeyos iv yivos ovk exei, T/flevTai ■ el yap rl, StjAok 3ti koI otov rh iv. Sen. Ep. 58, 8 : Nunc tv . . . nX\' ixe'ipot mno0eri)iTavTes autem genus illud primum quse- outois rh iv Kara (xaiidTiiiv ii6vu)v rimus, ex quo ceterse species sus- \4yetr8(u Staipeiyoitv tiv rh rJTropr). pensae sunt, a quo nascitur omnis /iftiov • Sik toDto yhp rh tI yevmi- divisio, quo universa comprehensa repoy ta/Tov ipaffiy klvat KaTijyopoi- FORMAL LOGIC. THE CATEGORIES. 97 place of the conception of Being, and intended, as Chap. the highest conception, to include every kind of ■ notion. This indefinite Something comprehends alike what is material and what is not material — in other words, what has being and what has not being ; and the Stoics appear to have employed this twofold division as a basis for a real division of things. For the class-conceptions referring to differences in kind — the Categories, as they were called — other points were singled out, which have no connection with the division into things material and things not material. Of this kind are the four highest con- ceptions, or summa genera' — all, however, subor- dinate to the conception of the indefinite Something ; nz. the categories of subject-matter or substance (to w-*^— m. hroKslfisvov ), of property or form {•n_:vQmv), of '^"-^^^ variety (to trios exoy), and of variety of relation (to vx^jc:.^ 1[P0S Tl irO)9 EJ(OV). uvov oi Korrh trandray fiSmy aWli could not have been raised, that col lurtniiiiTav. Schol. in Ariet. we can think of what has not 14, h, 11. Sext. 'Pjirh.ii. 86: rh being. Probably the change was 1, fctp v 6vTtav irdi'Ttov wpdi- Ttiv tKt\v, rairTjv Bk iraffav atSiou Koi o^re TrXeloj yiypofievTiy oUre iKdrrof, rh S^ fiepf} TaWris oi/ic ctel ravTO. Stafi4veiv, ctWh Siaipeiadat teal avyx^iffBai. The same was held by Chrysippus, according to 8tob. Eel. i. 432, who says : Posi- donius held that there were four varieties of change, those fcarh diaipefftv, Kar* aKKoitoiru/ (water to air), Karh ffvyxvctv (chemical comhination), kot' avdKuiriv, the latter also called t^v i^ Shwv /A€Ta)8o\^v. TO^TQJV Se tV f'tT' aWoianTiv irepl r^v ovfflav yiyve- ffBai (the elements, according to the Stoics, changing into each other) rAff Se fiAXa; rpets irepl Tohs iroiovs Keyofiivovs rovs iirl T^y obfflas ytyyofievovs. aKo\o6- 0as 8^ Toirots Koi ras y^veaeis avfi^aiyeiv. r^u yhp ohaiav o^t' at^cffQai odre fiCtouffOat . . . iirl Se T&v iBiws irotay (not the pro- perties, but the materials out of which individual things are made) otoy Aioavos xai @4ayoSj Kal av^ifffets KoX fieidaaeis yiyyetrOai. Bih Kal Ttapafiiyeiv t^v eKdaroy 'irot6T7ira aTrh ttjs yeveinas fi^xpt T^y &yaip4y eKaffrSs iffriy uTroKeijuera, rh fi\y oi/ffla, rh Se [iroidy]. Kai rh fiey del ^e? Kal (peperai, fii}!' aii^6- fievoy fiiire fxeto^fievov, fi-fire ^Kofs oToy iffrt diafieyoy, rh Se Sia/J.4y€t Kal ai/^dverai Kal fieiovrat Kal irdyra irdcx^i ravavria Qarep^ a'Vfi.'ir€(l>VKh5 Kal ffvvTip/jiOfffievov Kal ffvyKexvfieyov, koI r^s Statjiopas rfj alaBriffei /X7}Bafji.ov irapexoy ai^affOai. The latter is the ma- terial itself, of which individual things are made; the former is matter in general, in reference to which Plutarch had just said : Tct \'f]fji.fiaTa O'vyxoipovffiv otroi, ras [/ACf] iy fi4pei Trdtras ohfflas Pe7y Kal ^4p€ffdai, rh fiey 4^ avrav fieBeiffaSj rh Se iroOhy iirioyra TrpoffBexofJi'4vas ' oJs Se irpSceiffi Koti direiaiy hpi0yi.o7s Kal vKijOeaty, h2 100 THE STOICS. Chap. V. The second category, that of property' or form, comprises all those essential attributes, by means of oateam^ of ^^i*'^ ^ definite character is impressed on otherwise property or indeterminate matter." If the definite character /orm. TavTa fi^ Stafievetj/, aW' erepa yiyvetrSai rais elfnifievats irpoffd' Sots, i^dK\ay))v tt^s avtrias \afji- fia.voisT\s. It may appear strange that this perpetually changing material should be said to be /i^T* av|($jU6i'oi/ /A^TC fieia6fievov, but the meaning is this : a ma- terial can only be said to increase and diminish by being considered as one and the same subject, as an iBfttij iroihv during the change ; but the material itself cannot be properly so regarded, since it is always changing. * Troihv or tokJttjs, and also irmhs (sc. \iyos). According to fHinpl. 55, a, many Stoics assign a threefold meaning to iroiXi/. The £rst, which is also the most extensive meaning, includes every kind of quality, whether essentiid or accidental — the iris ex"" *s well as the Trot6v. In the second meaning iroihv is used to express permatient qualities, including those which are non-essential— the crxeireis. In the third and narrowest sense it expresses rois aTraprl^ovTOS (Kara t^ji/ ^Kfpophv) Koi 4fjLiJ.6vas ovrai Kar^ SiiKpopav iroioh, i.e. those qualities which faitiifully represent essential at- tributes in their distinctive fea- tures. The substantive Troidrris is only used in the last sense. ' Simpl. 67, E (the passage is discussed by Fetersen, p. 85, and Trendelenburg, 223): oi Si Xtui- Kol rh Koivhv TTjs iroiSrrjTQS rh iirl T&v fftafidray K4yov(Ti SiatpopiLv (Ivai itvaias six aitoiiaKiiTrr1)v (separable, i.e. from matter) icaff eavr^v, aAX' els ev v6ijfia fcai lSi6' TTjra a'iroK'l]yovffay olh-e XP^¥ oSre ItTx^'i elSoTToiovfieinjv, &Wit Tp i^ air^s toioiit({tiiti, Kaff V voiov u^iVrarat y^vearis. The meaning is, that iroi^rijs con- stitutes no independent unity, but only a unity of conception. Non-essential qualities were by the Stoics excluded from the category of iroihi', and reckoned under that of fir ^X""- The same distinction between what is essential and what is not essential is indicated in the terms 6|(s and 0'xe(Fis • noidTTyres, or es- sential properties, being called es- sential forms (ejeis or I«ct(£); non- essential qualities being called features or varieties (crxeireii)- See Simpl. 54, y ; 65, e. Attri- butes, according to Simpl. 61, ft are declared to be essential, not owing to their permanence, but when they spring from the nature of the object to which they be- long: tAs ikiv yhp axefffts reus ^TrixriiTots KaTcurTiifffffi xnpfm)- pffcfffloi ris Si ?|eis toTs ^| lavrui' ivepyeiats. A very limited mean- ing, that of local position, is given to (TxfVis in Stob. Eel. i. 410. The distinction between evuirts and (Tvvoipii also belongs here. Anything the union of which depends on an essential quality is Tiiiaiievov everything else is either ffvvTjp/iej/ov or dK Sietrrt^Tav. Sext. Math. ix. 78 (also in vii. 102): rav re ffufidruv rh, fiiv iariv rivaiiiva rk Se Ik avvairro- FORMAL LOGIC. THE CATEGORIES. 101 be one which belongs to a group or class, it is called a common form — koiv&s iroiov — or, if it be something peculiar and distinctive, it is called a distinctive form — ihitos TTotoi'.' Forms combined with matter con- stitute the special materials out of which individual things are made ; ^ and when a form is thus combined Chap. V. jievav Tct'Se ^k bieffri&Tav' Tjifu- fieya fihv odv ecrrt rk vvo fuas e^eus Kparoifieva, KaOdnep ^urcb Kat i$a- (rvvd(j)eia applies to chains, houses, ships, &c. ; com- bination iic ^lejTt&Toiv to flocks and armies. Seneca, Ep. 102, 6, Kat. Qu. ii. 2, says the same. Conf. Alea. De Mist. 14:3: avdyK-n 54 T^ li/ (Ta/jta avh juias &s ^atriv e^eas crwEXCcrflai. Simpl. 66, e: rhs 7ckp votdrTrras Ikto \4yovTes oSroi ivl Tuv Tjvoifiivotv fi6vtMH/ e/cra oaroKeivouirLV ' ^1 Sc ray Kara (Twaipijv, olov veits, Kol ewl twv Kori StdiTTatTiy, otov ffrparov, fitj- iev slvai iKrhv fiTjSk evpiffKeffBai irvevfiaTLK6v ri ^u €Tr' avrav juijS^ eVo \6yoif exov Sere 4iri riva \m6ffTa(nv i\6eiv fitas e^eus. Those e|eis which admit of no increase or diminution {hFiraffis and Aveffis) are called otaBeaeis, or p^manmt forms. Virtues, for instance, -which, according to the Stoics, always exist in a per- fect form where they exist at all, are Su>Siy is a ^fS>im, the e£is, or form of AevKbp, is iiO' KpvTmhv i^eats. ^ This follows of necessity from the Stoic doctrine of the material nature of properties and of the mingling of material things. The mechanical com- bination of material things (/iifis and Kpaffts' chemical combination is expressed by vapiSeais and ffiyxvtris) is deiined to be a complete interpenetration of one material by another, without giving rise to a third new ma- terial {Stob. Eel. i. 376 ; Alex. Be Mixt. 142; Plut. C. Not. 37, 2). Properties are said to be ma- terial; and in all cases when they are combined, each property retains its own peculiarity, and yet is inherent in the subject- matter and in every other pro- perty belonging to the same sub- ject-matter. These statements can only be explained by accept- ing a mutual interpenetration of properties with each other and with their subject-matter, in the same way that it appears in mechanical combination. ' The proof of this will be given subsequently. But com- pare p. 91. ■■ Simpl. 56, S, and 5i, /3 : oi fiarucas, tuv 5e affap.^Tuv ctira/id- Tovs elvaL Xeyovai rhs TTot^TTjTas. The (TcefiartKal ■KoUr'qres are alone wevfjLaTiKttl. Incorporeal pro- perties were called e/trh, to dis- tinguish them from 6|fis (es- sential forms). Dexipp. in Cat. p. 61, 17, Speng. : eoti^ndfoj Se airh rav eKray ' ^frc^juara y^Lp fjtT) TTopctSexif^ej/OL Kccff eaur^, '6Tav ipeiTxeXe'i' Se6y ^, ^jrl t&j TOiairas 8ia\^i/iEis ipxovrai. But this use of terms appears not to have been universal among the Stoics {Simpl. Categ. 64, y) ; and dif- ferent views prevailed about the extent of the conception of ticrdv. 104 THE STOICS. Ohap. to themselves of these incorporeal attributes, when : reality was considered to belong only to things corporeal, it is, of course, impossible for us to deter- mine.* (S) The The two remaining categories include everything o/^We^ which may be excluded from the conception of a andmriety thing on the OTOund of being either non-essential or of relation. , „ , , . , i ^ .i accidental. In so far as such thmgs belong to the object taken by itself alone, they come under the category of variety (•n-w j s^ov) ; but when they belong to it, because of its relation to something else, they come under the category of variety of relation (wpbs Tt iras sx°^)- Variety includes all accidental qualities, which can be assigned to any object independently of its relation to any other object' — such as size, colour, place, time, action, passion, possession, mo- tion, state. In short, all the Aristotelian categories, with the exception of substance, whenever they apply to an object independently of its relation to other objects, belong to the category of variety* {irms s'xpv). jl. 57, e, after giving a latoKoKiev iss tv toij iiroKeinepois definition of quality, continues : ?x'""''" "^''^ toSto rh ireSis e^eu'. it/ Si ToiiTois, fi /ii) ol6v re kotcI ' jDaripp. in Cat. 41,20, Speng.: rhv iKeivuv \6yof Kotvhv elvai et Se rts eis rh iris exov trvvrdTTOi ffifjiirrotfia ffafiaruv re Koi Slitu- rhs irXelffTos Kwnfyopias, &airep ot luniv, ovk4ti ?(rTOi yhos ^ iroi6- StwVcoI iroiovaiv. Flotin. vi. 1, TJ)S, aKK' eripas fiiv inl tuv ffoi- 30 : Jr£s 8e |y rh iriis ex'"', "'oAA^i fjATwy erepas 56 4irl tSov aaap.6,Ttav Siaijiopas 4y auTois oStrrjs ; nies yap aVrrj u^eCTi^Ke. rh rpirrixv koI rb Kevxhv els ev ' Simpl. 44, S: i Se riiv OTiirtv \yevos BeTeov], to5 liiv ttoitoB toC Kai T^v KaBinv /ij) irpocirotoiiievos Se ttoioD iyros ; ir&s Se rh xore (include) lome iruixy rtvi ffwii- koI -rh iroS ; irSj 8J S\as viis 6flif avii^TrecrBai owS^y &\\o ^ rh ^xoi'tcl rh x^es ««J t^ irepvai koX inroKelfjievov elvcu voiii^v, Tcks Se rh iv AvKelip Kol ir 'AKaSjiylcf ; ir^pl ttiirh Suupopiis iymoirriTovs Kol Skat ttSs Be 6 yp6voi iris rryoififiios koI iris exoyra airo ex" ; . ■ • rh Si iroieiv irSr iris FORMAL LOGIC. THE CATEGORIES. 106 On the other hand, those features and states which are purely relative — such as right and left, sonship and fatherhood, &c. — come under the category of variety of relation (jrpos ri irios sx"") 5 * category from which the simple notion of relation (irpos tI) must be distinguished. Simple relation (ttjoos rl) is not spoken of as a distinct category, since it includes not only accidental relations, hut also those essential properties {iroi^) which presuppose a definite relation to some- thing else — such as knowledge and perception.' Ohap. V. ^X**^ • ■ . i^f'-^ ^ vdffxoy ov vits '^Xov . . . iffoas ^ hv fiSvQV apti6cr€t iirl Tov KeiffBat rb viis exov kcH inl TOV ^x^^^ ' ^'^^ ^^ "'"*'" ^X^"' **" iris ix"" i^^tk ^x""- Simpl. Categ. 94, e : The Stoics include ^X"" under iris ^x""- Simpl. 16, 8, says that the Stoics omitted quantity, time, and place ; which means that they did not treat them as separate categories. TrmdeUnbwrg, p. 229, -with jus- tice, observes tliat noahv comes under irowic. ' 8mij)l. 42, « : oi S« 2Tmi«ol avff ephs yevovs Bio KaroL rhv r6~ TTov Tovrov &pi6fjLovi'Tat, TO, fiev 4v Tots ■trp6s Ti TifleVres, tS 8' iv toTs 7rp6s tI irBS (x'""'''> ""' ^ Z*^" vp6s Ti 6.vTtSmtpovvTei tois Kaff airii, Tct 86 irpiis Ti iras txovTa TOIS KBTci Sta^opdv. (Ibid. 44, j8 : oi SriuiKoi yo/ij'fowTi iniir7)S t^s kotA Suut>opii» ISiorrrros dirrjA- \dxSai Toi irpds t( iras Ix""""") Sweet and bitter belong to tA. irp6s T( ■ to the other class belong Sefiis, iroT^p, &c, Kori Suupoplu/ Se ^lun tA Kori ti eJBoi xapoK- TT)pi(6ii.eva. Mvery Koff airh is also KaTh Stafophy (determined as to quality), and every irpiis tI not conversely. el Bi Sei s exui'Ta enumerated as a third uTTo/cel/iera iruii irais ^x""'''''" for category, since irivra irfpl tV the fourth, fiiroKef/nc™ iroick irpds S\nv irij exovra ; The Stoics tI Trass ^x"""""- In support of will probably say that voia are this, he refers to Simpl. 43, o; Trcpl tJivBatji' iris ^X""^". whereas eVeroi S^ airrois Kaifcico Aroirav ri the iris cx<"^<>, in the strict sense irMera iroieiii ri y4vri ix Trportpuv of the term, are irtpi Tct voii. Twwv Kai SevTepav as rh vp6i ti This may be true ; but since the 4k TToiov Kal Tov irpSs ti. Plut. iroi^ themselves are nothing more C. Not. 44, 6 : rerTapii ye iroioCtrii/ than BAt) irajs ?x<""''«,all categories vTOHelfieva irepl 'ixaaTov, fuiWov must be ultimately reduced to Sk rerrapa, evaffTov Tifiuv. Plot. Batj. Enn. vi. 1, 29: eiToiros ti Sialpeffts » Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. . . , ^i' darepip Twy eiSav rb ertpoy 440-467. FORMAL LOGIC. JUt)GMENT. 107 different forms of syntax, were enumerated by the Stoics with the greatest precision.' Detailed in- formation is, however, only forthcoming in reference to the theory of judgment (afiw/ia), which appears to have engaged the greatest and most important part of their speculations. A judgment is a perfect expression, which is either true or false.'' Judgments are divided into two classes: simpie judgments, and composite judgments.^ ij a simple judgment the Stoics understood a judgment which is purely cate- gorical.'' Under the head of composite judgments are comprised hypothetical, corroborative, copulative, disjunctive, comparative, and causal judgments.^ In Ghaf. V. • In Dioff. 66 ; Sext. Math. viii. 70 ;' Amman. De Interp. 4, a (Schol. in Aiist. 93, a) ; Simpl. Cat. 103, a; Boeth. De Interp. 315 ; Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. iii. 267, a distinction is drawn be- tween &|jMf«t (a judgment), ipopav ol Sia\€KTiKol Koff %v Ta /X6I/ ^riv avT&v a-jrXa ri 5' ohx air\a. Ibid. 95 and 108; Oiog. 68. * Sext. Ibid. ; Diog. ' Diog. 69 : 4v Si rots ovx ot- Ao/s Td iTuVTififieyov Kal rd vapa' ffvt^fifievoy Kal rd ffufiTreirKeyfievotf Ka\ TO oiTiwSes Ka! to SifCevyiievov Kal T(J Staffcupovv ro fxaWov Kai riy Sttttratpovif rh ?ittov, For the 108 THE STOICS. Chxb. V. (a) Simple the case of simple judgments, a greater or less de- finiteness of assertion is substituted by the Stoics in the place of the ordinary difference in respect of quantity ; ' and with regard to quality, they not only make a distinction between aflSrmative and negative judgments, ^ but, following the various forms of lan- guage, they speak of judgments of general negation, judgments of particular negation, and judgments of double negation.^ Only ' affirmative and negative judgments have a contradictory relation to one an- other; all other judgments stand to each other in the relation of contraries.'' Of two propositions which ■napavvvT^fifievov — a conditional sentence, the first part of which is introduced by eVeiS}) — see Biog. 71 and 7i; for the ffvjjnreirXey- lUvov, the characteristic of which is khX, see Biog. 72 ; Sext. Math, viii. 124 ; GM. N. A. xvi. 8 and 9 ; Ps. Galen, ^.laay. 8iaA. p. 13; Bexipp. in Cat. 27, 3, Speng. ; for the oitimSm, which is charac- terised by a SkJti, Biog. 72 and 74 ; for the Suufa(pom rh /tSA^ov and the Ziaffo^ovv t& ^rrov, Biog. 72 ; Oramer, Anecd. Oxon. i. 188 ; Apollon. Synt. {Bekker's Anecd. ii.), 481. These are only some of the principal forms of com- posite judgments, their number being really indefinite. Chrys- ippue estimated that a million combinations might be formed with ten sentences. The cele- brated mathematician, Hippar- chus, however, proved that only 103,049 affirmative and 310,962 negative judgments could be formed wii that material (Plut. Sto. Eep. 29, 5 ; Qu. Symp. viii. 9, 3, 11). ' There is no notice of a divi- sion of judgments into general and particular. Instead of that, Sext. (Math. viii. 96) distinguishes iopifffiiva as oiros KddTjToi, adpiWa as t\s KdBTjTcu, and fieffa as &V' Bpavos KiBriTcu, ^coxpiiTTis irepi- iroTei. When the subject stood in the nominative, apitriiei/a were called KarayopevTiKk, the others KaTTiyopiKii ' a KarayopevTiK^y is oStos TTGpinaTeT' a KaTtjyopiK^Vf Aluy VipiiraTeT. ' An affirmative judgment was called KaTcu^ariKov. a negative airo^aTiKbi/, by Chrysippus and Simpl. Cat. 102, S, (. Aptd. Dogm. Plat. iii. p. 266, renders these terms by dedicativa and abdicativa. See Bo'eth. De Interp. 373; Schol. in Arist. 120. ' A judgment of general ne- gation was called apvriTiKhr — for instance, o&Sely irepnroTe** one of particular negation, iTTepriTiKliv — as, cttl>ih.dv6puTr6s iarLv oZros ' one of double negation, uirepoiro^oTi- Khv — as, ouxl rinepa ovx iirri. See Biog. 69. * Sext. Math. viu. 89 ; Biog. 73 : avTiKeineva are Si> rh ctc|)oi' FOMMAL LOGIC. JUDGMENT. 109 Chap. V. are related as contradictories, according to the old rule, one must be true and the other false.' The most important among the composite judg- (j3) Com- ments are the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments, ^"^l^ents but, as regards the latter, next to no information has reached us.^ A hypothetical judgment {awrjfifiJvov) is a judgment consisting of two clauses, connected by the conjunction ' if,' and related to one another, as cause and effect; the former being called the leading (fiyovfievov), and the latter the concluding clause {Xrjyov).^ In the correctness of the inference the truth of a hypothetical judgment consists. As to the conditions upon which the accuracy of an rov eTfpoVj either 4ffTlv Airo^ori- Khv or aTFO(pdffei vKeopA^et — as, It is day, and It is not day. Aiie- totle called contradictories ii/rf- fotris, and contraries ivavriirris, putting both under the class con- ception of ivriKiiiifva. The Stoics reserved caniKelneva for express- ing contradictories, and used lio- xiluB/a, instead of ivamiov, for contraries (Apollon. Synt. p. 484, Bekk.). Otherwise, foUomng Aristotle, they distinguished be- tween ivavriov and ivuvrlm tlx""' ivatnla, are conceptions which are in plain and immediate contrast, such as ip6viiu>s and ii^pav (Simpl Categ. 98, 7). The former, therefore, apply to ab- stract, the latter to concrete notions. See the fragment of Chrysippus irep\ airofaTMoS. > Simp?. Categ. 103, P; dc.De Fato, 16, 37; N. De. i. 25, 70. . 2 Viz. that the members of a disjunction, as well as their con- tradictory opposites, must also be contraries (adversa or pug- nantia), and that from the truth of the one the falsehood of the other follows. A disjunction which does not satisfy one or the other of these conditions is false (napaSieieuyneyov). Gell. N. A. xvi. 8, 12 ; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 191 Mex. Anal. Pr. 7, b. ' JHog. 71 ; Sext. Math. 109 Galen, De Simpl. Medicamen. ii, 16; Ps. Galen, E'uray. Sm\. p. 15, The Stoics distinguish most un- necessarily, but quite in harmony with their ordinary external for- mality, the case in which the leading clause is identical with the inferential clause (ei Tifiipa itrrlv, 7)n4pa eanv) and the case in which it is different (« fi/iepa iarlv, i/)£s effTiv). Conditional sentences of the first kind are called Siipopoifieva ffvvi]iifUva. Sext. viii. 281 ; 296 ; and 466 ; Pyrrh. ii. 112; Tiii. 96; IHog. 110 THE STOICS. Chap. V. inference rests, different opinions were entertained within the Stoic School itself.' The leading clause was also called a suggestive or indicatory symbol,^ ' 8ext. Math. viii. 112 : koivSs /ier ydp ^airiv S-wavres ot Aia\eK- TiKoi vyiks eTvai o'vi'i7ju^^i/oi/, tirav cLKoXovB^ Tcp iv a,hTi^ Tiyovfiei/tfj rh ev aiiTi^ KTJyoj/. irepl Se rov vSre aKoKovBet /cal n-us, ffTaffid^ovat trphs AWtJaow Koi fiax^fJ-eya ttis axoAovdlas ^(crfflECTai KpiT'fipia. Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 143 : In hoc ipso, quod in elementis dialectiei docent, quomodo judicare opor- teat, rerum falsumne sit, si quid ita connexum est, ut hoc : Si dies est, lucet ; quanta contentio est ! aliter Diodoro aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. The Philo here alluded to— the same Philo against whom Chrysippus wrote his treatises {Diog. vii. 191 and 194), the well-known dia- lectician, and pupil of Diodorus — had declared all conditional sentences to be right which had not a false inferential clause drawn from a true leading clause. According to this view, con- ditional sentences would be right, with both clauses true, or both false, or with a false leading clause and true inferential clause (8ext.\m. 245 and 449; Pyrrh. ii. 110). According to Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 104, the view of Philo appears to have gained acceptance among the Stoics, perhaps through Zeno, who was connected with Philo {IHog. vii. 16). But, in any ease, the meaning appears to have been (Diog. vii. 81), that, in the cases mentioned, conditional sentences might be right, not that they were right. Others more appropriately judged of the correctness of con- ditional sentences by the connec- tion of their clauses, either requir- ing that the contradictory opposite of the inferential clause should be irreconcileable with the lead- ing clause, or that the inferential clause should be potentially con- tained in the leading clause (Sexi. Pyrrh. ii. lU). The first requirement which is mentioned by J)iog. 73, as the only criterion of the Stoic School, was due to Chrysippus, who refused to allow sentences in which this was not the case to be expressed hypo- thetieally (Cic. De Fato, 6, 12 ; 8, 15) : it was not right to say, Si quis natus est oriente canicula, is in mari non morietur; but, Non et natus est quis oriente canicula et is in mari morietur. It may be observed, in connec- tion with the accuracy of con- ditional sentences, that a true conditional sentence may become false in time. The sentence. If Dion is alive now, he will con- tinue to live, is true at the present moment ; but in the last moment of Dion's life it will cease to be true. Such sentences were called awepiypiitptas fiiTairlirrovTa, be- cause the time could not be pre- viously fixed when they would become false (Simpl. Phys. 305, a). Chrysippus also wrote on the fi€TCLirlTrTova. Diog. vii. 105, mentions two treatises of his on the subject, characterising them, however, as spurious. ' According to Sexi. Pyrrh. ii. 100, Math. viii. 143 and 166, the Stoics distinguished between o-i)- Hf!a uirofU'UffTiKek and irnneia iv- FORMAL LOGIC. JUDGMENT. Ill Chap. V. because it made an assertion, the existence of which indicates something of the inferential clause. The modality of judgments occupied a great deal (7) Mo- di attention in the logic of Aristotle and his imme- ^-^^^^t^ diate pupils, and was no doubt treated by the Stoics at considerable length ; but, on this branch of the Stoic logic, likewise, those rules are only known to us, which were laid down by Chrysippus in his contest with the Megarian Diodorus,' and relate to possible and necessary judgments. They are in themselyes SeiKTiKci. The definition of the latter was evSeiKTiKin/ a^ioi/ta iv vyiet trwijfifiey^ KaBijyoiiievov iiC' Ka\viTriKhv tov K^yoyros ' the iyth odevTiKas ci/Mi Kol iKKa\virTtKus ' itpodemtKas when the premisses rest upon faith (tticttij and /ii/^;U7)) ; iKKaKmri- kSs when they are based on a scientific necessity. ' According to Siog. 79, 8ext. Pyrrh. ii. 167, others added other forms of &vo7r(i5eiKTOi. Cic., in adding a sixth and seventh (Top. 14, 57)1 must have been following these authorities. * Consult Diog. 79-81 ; Sexi. Pyrrh. ii. 156-169; 201; Math, viii. 223-227; Cic. Top. 13; Simpl Phys. 123; Ps. Galen, £10-07. 5««A. 17; Prantl, 473, 182; 8ext. Pyrrh. i. 69 ; Cleomed. Meteora, pp. 41 and 47. ' Two cases are distinguished in which this is so. The first class are called Si a ; 53, b; Top. 7; Schol. in Arist. 294, b, 25 ; Cic. Acad. ii. 30. 96 ; Prantl, 476, 185. * Oic. Top. 16, 57: ex his modis conclusiones innumera- biles nasountur. Sext. Math. viii. 228, in which passage it is striking that ai/aTrSBeiKTot should be di- vided into aTr\o! and ovx ojrXoi. It has been suggested that mro- SuKTiKav should be substituted for oj/o7roSc(KTa»', but the latter word may be used in => narrow as in a wider sense. * Diog. 78 : a-uWoyia-TMol [\6- yoi] fiev oZv ^Iffiv oi ^roi hvair6- SetKTOt ^VTes ^ avaySfieyoi iwi robs avaiTo^elKTOvs Kara ti twu Ocfid- Totv fi rird. Chrysippus had taken great pains in reducing the com- FORMAL LOGIC. INFERENCE. 115 Among the composite forms of inference, those com- posed of similar parts are distinguished from those composed of dissimilar parts/ but in the treatment of the former such a useless love of form is shown, that it is hard to say what the Stoics thereby in- tended.^ If two or more inferences are combined, in such a way that the conclusion of the one is the first premiss of the other, the judgment which con- stitutes the conclusion and premiss at once being omitted in each case, the result is a Sorites or Chain- inference. The rules prescribed by the Peripatetics for the Chain-inference were developed by the Stoics with a minuteness far transcending all the wants of science.* Chap. V. posite forms of inference {Diog. 190 and 194; Gden, Hipp, et Plat. ii. 3). ' Sext. 229-243, who quotes the example used by ^nesi- demus, thongh he is no donbt following the Stoic treatment. Prantl, 479. 2 Sext. ; Prantl. ' Jlex. on Anal. Pr. i. 25, after speaking of the Sorites, continues (p. 94, b) : iv tJ TOiouTp tSc Trpo- rdffewv (Tuvexeia r6 tg ffvvQeriKov iari eetiprina ... /col oi Ka\oi- fievoi inrh rwv veoyreptav ivi^dK- Aoj/Tc's Te Kol iiriPa\7i6iievoi. avv- e^TiKhv BedpifiiM (or chain-argu- ment), the meaning of which is next investigated, must he an expression of the Peripatetics. The same meaning must attach to iin$d\\oin4s te koI iinfia\\6- Hevoi, which are to be found if Tois cruvex"* \afiPavoii4vais irpo- riatffi xiapXsruv ffvinrepair/idTaf for instance, A is a property of B, B of C, C of D ; .-. A is a property of D. iiri^aWifievos means the inference, the conclu- sion of which is omitted ; in- PdWuv, the one with the omitted premiss. These inferences may be in either of the three Aristo- telian figures KOTcb t6 irapaieio- fjLej/ov ffvyBeriKhv Sed^pTjfjLa. t ot fihif irepl 'ApnTrore\rij/ r^ XP^W •Trapaixerpftfravres irapeSoirav, itft' Hffov auT^ awi^rei, ot 8^ &Trh ttjs ffToas Trap' iKeit/uy \a^6vr€s Koi Sie\6vT€s iTroiittrav ^| aiirov rb KaKoifxevov irap* avTois Seirepoy Kol Tplrov fle/Ao koL reraproy, difie' X'furavres fiev tou xPV<^^H-°^i "'"'' S^ Th 6-noiffQvv Bvvdfievov AeyeffOat iv T^ rotairri Oeapit^, k&v &xpvo'Tos ^, 4irs^e\66vTes re /cai ^7j\ti^ffayTes. Eeferenoe is made to the same object in Si/m/pl. De Ccelo ; Schol. in Arist. 483, h, 26 : ^ Si roiairn avd\vffis Tov \6yav, 7} rh irvfi' iTfpatTfia \afi$dvovffa KoL vpo(r\afi' Pdvovaa AkKiiv itporairiv, icaTck rh I2 116 TSE STOICS. Chap. V. {S)In. ference from a am- gle pre- (c) Befu- tation of fallaeies. With these composite forms of inference other forms having only a single premiss' were contrasted by Antipater, who thus made an addition to the field of logic of very doubtful worth. On a few other points connected with the Stoic theory of illation, some very imperfect information exists.^ The loss of better information will, however, be felt all the less, since in what we already possess we have con- clusive evidence that the objections brought against the Stoic logic were really well founded. The petty littleness and minuteness with which the Stoics fol- lowed out even the most worthless logical forms' is truly astonishing. Next to describing the inferences which were valid, another subject seemed to demand the greatest care on the part of the Stoics, and to afford at the same time an opportunity for the display of their sub- tlety. This subject was no other than the enumera- tion and refutation of false inferences,* and in par- ticular the exposing of the many fallacies which had rpirov \ey6fievov irapi to7s Srwi- Kois Bi/m irepaiveTtti, the rule of which is, that -when a third pro- position can be concluded from the conclusion of an inference and a second proposition, that third proposition can be con- cluded from the premisses of the inference and the second pro- position. This appears to have escaped the notice of Frantl. The expressions iiA. Sio rpoTriKuv^ ^ih Tpiap TpoiriKwc (Galen; Sext, Pyrrh. ii. 2), appear to refer to such composite inferences. • Called ii,ovo\iiniMTot avWo- juriwl. Such were iiiAepa %ari, (pus &pa %aTiv • and avairvtis, fjfi Spot, See Alex. Top. 6 ; Anal. Pr. 7, a; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 167 ; Math, viii. 443 ; Apiil. Dogm. Plat. iii. 272 ; Frantt, iTJ, 186. " Compare the remarks of Prantl, 481, on Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2 ; Mex. Anal. Pr. 53, b ; Gcden ; Ps. Galen. ' Conf. Alex. Anal. Pr. 95, a; Galen. * Diog. 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which can only have been raised for the purpose of being refuted. ESTIMATE OF STOIC LOGIC. 117 become current since the age of the Sophists and Chap. Megarians. In this department likewise Chrysippus, ^ as might be expected, led the van.' But Chrysippus ■was not always able to overcome the difficulties that presented themselves ; witness his remarkable attitude towards the Chain-inference, from which he thought to escape by withholding judgment.^ The fallacies, however, to which the Stoics devoted their attention, and the way in which they met them, need not occupy our attention further.' In all these researches the Stoics were striving to d. Esti- secure a solid basis for a scientific process of proof. ^.^ . "•' Grreat as was the value which they assigned to such Logic. a process, they nevertheless admitted, as Aristotle \]^or^ had done before, that everything could not be proved, comings. Here, then, was the weak point in science ; but in- stead of strengthening this weak point by means of induction, and endeavouring to obtain a more com- plete theory of induction, they were content with conjectural data, sometimes involving their own truth, at other times needing to be established by inferences of which they were themselves the premisses.* Thus, ' The list of his writings con- other fallacies (Simpl. Cat. 6, y). tains a number of treatises on Prantl, p. 489, connects h,pybs fallacies, among them no less x6yos {Cic. De Fato, 12, 28) with than fiye on the iJieuSd/ieyos. \6yos ijs\6yos, pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto by means of which the Stoic prius, quam ad multa perveniat, fatalism was reduced ad ab- quiescere, id est, quod ab iis di- surdum, did not commend itself citur ^ffuxiifeii'. The same re- to Chrysippus. mark is made by Sext. Math. vii. ' Prantl, pp. 485-496. 416 ; Pyrrh. ii. 253. The same * Sext. Math. viii. 367 : ix^' ov argument was employed against S«, ^aaX, irivruv oir(iSei|i>' aiTeii', 113 THE STOICS. Chap. like their theory of knowledge, their theory of method V. pnded by an ultimate appeal to the individual feeling. (2) Its No very high estimate can therefore be formed of the formal logic of the Stoics. Comparatively little as is known of that logic, still that little is enough to decide our judgment absolutely. We see that since the time of Chrysippus the greatest care was ex- pended by the Stoics in tracing into their minutest ramifications, and referring to a fixed type, the forms of intellectual procedure. At the same time, we see that in doing this the real business of logic was lost sight of — that business being to portray the opera- tions of thought, and to give its laws — whilst the most useless trifling with forms was recklessly indulged in. No discoveries of importance were even made as to the logical forms of thought, or they would have been recorded by writers ever on the alert to notice the slightest derivations from the Aristotelian logic. The whole activity of the Stoics in the field of logic was simply devoted to clothing the logic of the Peripatetics in new terms, and to developing certain parts of it with painful minuteness, whilst other parts were neglected. The part treating of inference ob- tained unusual care ; but it was no improvement on the part of Chrysippus to regard the hypothetical rather than the categorical form as the original form Tivh 8e Kol ef uirofleVeus Kafi^ivetv, wr68ftriv rh oK'nBes evplep6iJ,evov ■ el yap rh Toii- avTov Tvyxiiveiv. Ibid. 375 : a\\' tois aico\ou6odv tVrtv iyiks, xaKelva eMainv iroTvyxdrnvres Xiyeiv oh aKoKoviei ahnBrj Kul Ava/icjil- bri TriiTTis ^(TtI rov i^^&aSai rijv KeKTa KaOetrTTjKsv. ESTIMATE OF STOIC LOGIC. 119 of inference. It was quite the reverse. Making all Cms. allowances for the extension of the field of logic, • ' logic lost in scientific precision more than it gained by the labours of Chrysippus. The history of philo- sophy cannot pass over in silence this branch of the Stoic system, which was so carefully cultivated by the Stoics themselves, and was so important in de- termining their intellectual attitude. Yet, when all has been said, the Stoic logic is only an outpost of their system. The very care which was lavished on it since the time of Chrysippus only betokened the decline of intellectual originality. 120 THE STOICS. CHAPTEK VI. THE STUDY OF NATUKE. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS. Chap. Of far more importance in the Stoic system than the —5: — study of logic was the study of nature, a branch of learning which, notwithstanding their constant appeal to older views, was treated by them with more inde- pendence than any other branch. The subjects which it included may be divided into four groups, and arranged under the four heads of: 1. Funda- mental positions ; 2. The course, character, and go- vernment of the universe ; 3. Irrational nature ; and 4. Man.' The present chapter will be devoted to considering the first of these groups — the fundamental positions held by the Stoics in regard to nature ; among which three are specially characteristic of their system — ' Natviral Science was divided ground which is shared by the by the Stoics themselves {Bioff. mathematician; and the third, 132) : (1) «5iKws into r6Tvoi irepl ground which is shared by both ttafiirav kbX wcpj apxZv Kal otoi- the physician and mathematician. Xiimv Kal Beav Kal irepaTmi HaX The precise allotment of the sub- T<(irou ical KEvou ■ (2) yiviKm^ into jeet into these divisions is not three divisions, irepl K6(riwv, ircpi known. At best, it would be a (rTotxeiuv, and the aiTio\oyiK6s. very uncomfortable division. The first of these divisions covers STUDY OF NATURE. MATERIALISM. 121 their materialistic notions; their dynamical view of Chap. the world ; and their Pantheism. ^^' Nothing appears more striking to a reader fresh A. Mate- from a study of the philosophy of Plato or Aristotle ?^^Mean- than the startling contrast presented to it by the ingofthe Stoic 771Q,~ Materialism of the Stoics. Whilst so far following terialism. Plato as to define a real thing ' to be anythinsr pos- ('^)J^<'*^- ° ./ox yi^rti or C07- sessing the capacity of acting or being acted upon, poreal the Stoics nevertheless restricted the possession of °l^^- this power to material objects. Hence followed as a corollary their maxim, that nothing real exists except (») Reality what is material ; or, if they could not deny existence material in some sense or other to what is incorporeal, they o^Jf^' ^ ■' only. were fain to assert that essential and real Being only belongs to what is material, whereas only a certain modified kind of Being can be predicated of what is incorporeal.* Following out this view, it was natural that they ' Soph. 247, D. c^riov elvai \eyei St' 8. Kal Th ' Plut. Com. Not. 30, 2 : Svra ixiv ofriov %v koI auiia, k.t.X. yoip fiiva Ta adt^aTa KaXovffiv, TloffeiSiivtos Se oSras. oXtiov S' Jn-eiS^ 6vTOS rh iroieiv ri Kal irdtr- itrrl rivos St* & iKeivo, ^ rh apxH' •vfiv. Plac. i. 11, 4; ol SxttftKol ybv iroi^imos, koL tZ) /tey aXrtov ^v ir&vTO. rh. odria ffaifiaTLKd, ' irvei- Kal (T&fjLa, oS S€ c^rioy oUre hv oiSre fiara ydp. iv. 20 : ol Se ^uiKol trufia, aWci trujUjSejSrjKb; Kal Kart]- ffiifJia tV ipfvfii> ■ vav yltp rh Spii- y6pT)fji.a. Diog. vii. 56 : According fievov i) Kol noiovv (ra/ia' ^ Se to Chrysippus, the Toice is ma- dicov^ Totet Kal Sp^ . . . %rt Trav terial, irav ykp rh iroiovv ffwfxoi t!) KixoEf Kal ivox>^ovv aapii, iariy iffn. Ibid. 150 : oiaiav Se ^aai . . . ?Ti Trav rh KivovfjLevov aufid tuv ^vtoiv aTr&vrwv t^v Trp^TTjv iariv. C&. Acad. i. 11, 39 : [Zeno] JfATjy, iss Kal XpiaiirTros iv rp wpd- nullo mode arbitrabatur quid- tj) rav ^vaiKaiv Kal Z'^i/cuf ihri quam effici posse ab ea [natura] 8e ^(TTtK, ^| ?s dTtSTjiroToBf yiverai quae expers esset corporis ffUfMSe icri- Kar' airolis ri nee vero aut quod effioeret ali- oiala. Hippolyt. Eefut. Haer. i. quid aut quod effieeretur posse 21 : (rtHiiara Se irdura ividevro, esse non corpus. Seneca; Stob. k.tJK. Eel. i. 336 and 338: Xpiamnos 122 THE STOICS. Chap, should regard many things as corporeal which are '- — not generally considered so; for instance, the soul and virtue. Nevertheless, it would not be correct to sayi that the Stoics gave to the conception of matter or corporeity a more extended meaning than it usually bears. For they define a body to be that which has three dimensions,^ and they also lay themselves out to prove how things generally considered to be in- corporeal may be material in the strictest sense of the term. Thus, besides upholding the corporeal character of all substances, including the human soul and God, they likewise assert that properties or forms are material : all attributes by means of which one object is distinguished from another are produced by (fi) Theory j^jjg existence of certain air currents,^ which emanate oj aw cur- rents, from the centre of an object, diffuse themselves to its outer limits, and having reached the surface, return again to the centre to constitute the inward unity.* Nor was the theory of air currents confined ■ As do fitter, iii. 677, and nviv^a i,vTurTp4' Iout<{. Schleiermacher, Gesch. der Philos. Apx^Tai fikv ykp cari ray /iiirav 129. iirl TO irepaTa reiveiTdait ^avffay ' Dioff. Tii. 135 : aZua 5' itrri 5e &Kpas 4Trt(t>aveias i.vaxiiatrei (^tUtIk ' hTtow6hapos iv rf Auffiitp) iriKiv, &xpis kv iirl rhv avrhy cupt- rb Tpix^ Siaffrarhy, k.t.\. Ktyrai T6'irov, a<^' oS Th Tparoy wp- ' Sen. Ep. 102, 7, remarks, in fiip.ma Ttomvaiv. the soul and the body. The * PMo, Qu. De S. Immut. p. unity of the universe is proved 298, D: ^ S^ [ejis =iroi(iTT)s] ia-rl by the fact that the Divine Spirit STUDY OF NATURE. MATERIALISM. 123 to bodily attributes. It was applied quite as much to mental attributes. Virtues and vices are said to be material,' and are explained to be atmospheric bodies residing within the soul, and thereby imparting to it varieties of tension.'' For the same reason the Good is called a body, for according to the Stoics the Good is only a virtue, and virtue is a definite state of that material which constitutes the soul.^ In the same sense also truth is said to be material, personal and not independent truth being of course understood Chap. VI. pervades it. See Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a : Tji/ucrdai [lev {mo- tIBctou [XpiSctToros] r^v cifx-Koaav ottriav •ir]/e6fj.ar6s tlvqs Slol Trd(rTis auTTjs SftjKOVTOS, vs, acrl. toutI fiiv yh.p a^itepA ^ffri, rh Se a^fcojua KeK- rhv^Th 5^ KiKT})V affittfiaTOV ' avi- iraKiv S^ 71 a\'fi6Gia (rapA ^ctlv Trap' Sffov hriffriifiTi irAyTooy olK7]Buv aTrotpayrtKii SoKet Tvyj(_dvettr • iraira ik itriffr-fip>7i wis ex°^ iarlp iiye- fioyiKhy , . , rh Se TjyefiovtKhv tr&fjia Kara Toirovs {mripxe. Ibid. Pyrrh. ii. 81. 2 Flut. Com. Not, 45, 2 : Sto- iroy 7&P ed fidKa, rhs opercts Kal Tcts Kavias, vphs 6e Toirais ras t4xvols Kal T&s fijrfjfjLas Trciira?, en S^ (paVTOffias Kol TrdBTj Kal dpfjLiis Kal (TvyKaTadefTets ffd^fiara ttolov- fievovs 4v fiTiSevl (pdvai KeicrBatj K.r.\. ... 01 5' ov ixdvov t^s aperas Kal rks KaKias ^^a eJvat KeyoviTiv, ohhe ret Trcidi} fi6vov, op- y^s Kal (l>66vQvs Kal \{nras Kal ent- XaipeKUKlas, o4Be KaraX^i/ffis koJ avTaa'las Kal ayvoias ouSe t&s re^yas f^o, tV irKVTOTOiu«'>]v, t^v Xa^KOTvnK'lli' ' oA\ti vphs roirois Kal T^s ivepyeias fft&fiara Kal ^^a iroiovffi, rhv irep'nraTOv ^QoVy r^v ipXfliTiv, T^v inr66ecTiv, r^v irpofra- ydpevaip, t^v \otSoplav. Plutarch is here speaking as an opponent. Seneca, however (Ep. 106, S), observes : Non puto te dubita- tnrum, an adfectus corpora sint . . . tanquam ira, amor, tristitia : si dubitas, vide an vnltum nobis mutent. . . . Quid ergo? tam manifestas corpori notas credis imprimi, nisi a corporef Stob. Eel. ii. 114: The Stoics consider virtues to be substantially iden- tical [rhs aiiT^s Ko9' iir6a'Ta(riv) with the leading part of the soul [riyeiiovMhii), and consequently to be, like it, aifiaTa and jj^o. Seneca, Ep. 113, 1, speaks still more plainly: Desideras tibi scribi a me, quid sentiam de bac qusestione jactata apud nostros : anjustitia, an fortitude, prudentia ceterseque virtutes animalia sint. . . . Me in alia sententia pro- fiteer esse. . . . Quse sint ergo quae antiques moverint, dicam. Animum constat animal esse. . . . Virtus autem nihil aliud est, quam animus quodammodo 8TUBY OF NATURE. MATERIALISM. 125 Certain actions, however, such as walking and Chap. VI. dancing, can hardly have been called bodies by the Stoics, any more than being wise was called a body ; ' (7) The but the objects which produced these actions, as actions indeed everything which makes itself felt, were con- '»«'«^^- sidered to be corporeal. To us it appears most natural to refer these actions to the soul as their originating cause ; but the Stoics, holding the theory of subject-matter and property, preferred to refer each such action to some special material as its cause, and to consider that an action is due to the presence of this material. The idealism of Plato was thus reproduced in a new form by the materialism of the Stoics. Plato had said, a man is just and musical when he participates in the idea of justice and music ; the Stoics said, a man is virtuous when the material. producing virtue is in him ; musical, when he has \ the Tnaterial producing music. Moreover, these materials produce the phenomena (S) Wide of life; hence, not content with calling them bodies, of mate- the Stoics actually went so far as to call them- living »^'<*'- beings — a truly startling assertion. It seems, how- ever, not less startling to hear the name of bodies given to such things as day and night, and parts of the day and parts of the night, to months and years. Be habens : ergo animal est. animal, the soul ; they are ac- Deinde : virtus agit aliquid : agi cordingly not many (multa), hut autem nihil sine impetu (Vm?) one and the same viewed from potest. If it is urged : Each in- different sides : idem est animus dividual ■vriU thus consist of an et Justus et prudens et fortis ad innumerable number of living singulas virtutes quodammodo se beings, he replies that these habens. animalia are only parts of one • See page 91, note. 126 THE STOICS. Chap. even to days of the month and seasons of the year.' '- — But by these singularly unhappy expressions Chry- sippus appears to have meant little more than that the realities corresponding to these names depend on certain material conditions : by summer is meant a certain state of the air when highly heated by the sun ; by month the moon for a certain definite period during which it gives light to the earth.^ But from all these examples one lesson may be gathered — that the Stoics found it impossible to assign reality to anything that is not material. {I) The in- In carrying out this theory they could not, as "m'mm- might be expected, wholly succeed. Hence a Stoic could not deny that there are certain things which it is absurd to call material. Among such are in- cluded empty space, place, time, and expression {Kbktov),^ all of which are allowed to be incorporeal ; ' Fhtt. Com. Not. 45, 5 : 'Xpva- Bepos Se &pav tV ihAKutt' luj>' lirjrov fiytifioveiovTes 4v t^ Trp^Ttf) 7i\iov5taKeKavfi4yriv' fierdirapoy Sk Tuv tpvffLKwv ^UTTifuirwv aSra &paj/ erouy t^v juercfc Oepos fiev vph 'irpoff6.yovTOS ' ov^ t) jxkv vh^ trafui x^i^vos 5e K€Kpa^4v7iv • x^tfi&va icTiv, fi S' kavfpa Kal 6 hpffbs Kal Sh S>pav %tovs tj)!/ iiiXiaTa kotc- ri fietrov Trjs vvKrhs ff(6/Atwo ovk ^vyfievTjy, ^ t^u t^J Trepl 7^v aepi MffTiv ohH 7] fieu Tjfxepa ff&fjui rcaretf'iryjuei^i/, Ibid.: AccordlDg iiTTiv, obx^ 5e Kol ri vov/irivia aS/M, to Empedoeles and the Stoics, Kol 71 SeKdrri, Kal irEtTeKoiBe/cdTT) the cause of winter is the pre- Koi 7) TpMKas Kal d (iHiv ffwfui iaTi valence of air, the cause of Kol t!) Bipos Kol rh 6ip6irapov Kal summer the prevalence of fire. d iviavT6s. Ibid. S56 : juels 8' ia-rl, (jynal ' Diog. 151 : x^'M"'"' M^" ^^val [XpuiriTrjros] rb ipaivdiievov ttjs affi rhv iirep yTJs &epa KaTtxjiuy- \^n)s irphs n/itas, f) ireKiivTi n4pos iiivov 5i& Tfly Tov 7i\tou irpSaa exovffa (l)aiv6^evov Trphs Ti^as. HipoSoy, ?op 5h tV eiiKpatrlav roS Cleomedes, Meteora, p. 112, dis- hipos Kara tV Tp^s Tifms iropelav, tinguishes four meanings of juV- Bepos Se rhv uirlp 75;$ a.4pa Kara- * Diog. vii. 140 ; 8tob. Eel. i. BaK7r6iJ.evov, K.T.\. ySioJ. Eel. i. 392; Sari. Math. x. 218 and 237 ; 260: Chrysippus defines Jap ^Tous viii. 11; vii. 38; Pyrrh. it. 81; Upav KCKpafiivTiv ck x^'P^vos otto- iii. S2. \i]yovTOS KOl Bipovs apxoiiivov . . . ^ STUDY OF NATURE. MATERIALISM. 127 and yet they did not wish to assert that these things Chap. do not exist at all. The denial of existence to all I ^^' incorporeal things is an assertion belonging only to isolated members of the Stoic School, and for which they must be held personally responsible. How they could bring belief in incorporeal things into harmony with their maxim that existence alone belongs to what is material is not on record. The question next before us is : What led the (2) Causes Stoics to take such a materialistic view of things? ^^^^^f;^"' It might be supposed that their peculiar theory of Stoic ma- knowledge based on sensation was the cause; but this theory did not preclude the possibility of ad- vancing from the sensible to the super-sensible. It might also be said that their theory of knowledge was a consequence of their materialism, and that they referred all knowledge to sensation, because they could allow no real being to anything which is not material. The probability therefore remains that their theory of knowledge and their materialistic view of nature both indicate one and the same habit of mind, and that both are due to the action of the same causes. Nor will it do to seek for these causes in the in- (a) The fluence exercised by the Peripatetic or pre-Socratic f^^ philosophy on the Stoic School. At first sight, indeed, 'not an ex- it might appear that the Stoics had borrowed from ^^^etio Heraclitus their materialism, together with their ''*^*- other views on nature ; or else it might seem to be an expansion of the metaphysical notions of Plato and Aristotle. For if Aristotle denied Plato's dis- ]28 THE STOICS. CHip. tinction of form and matter to such an extent that '- — he would hardly allow form to exist at all except in union with matter, might not others, following in the same track, deny the distinction of form and matter in conception, thus reducing form to a property of matter ? Were there not difficulties in the doctrine of a Grod external to the world, of a passionless Reason? Were there not even difficulties in the antithesis of form and matter, which the system of Aristotle was powerless to overcome ? And had not Aristoxenus and Dicsearchus, even before the time of Zeno, and Strato immediately after his time, ad- vanced from the ground occupied by the Peripatetics to materialistic views? And yet we must pause before accepting this explanation. The founder of Stoicism appears from what is recorded of his intel- lectual growth to have been repelled by the Peri- patetic School more than by any other ; nor is there the least indication in the records of the Stoic teach- ing that that teaching resulted from a criticism of the Aristotelian and Platonic views of a double origin of things. Far from it, the proposition that everything capable of acting or being acted upon must be ma- terial, appears with the Stoics as an independent axiom needing no further proof. (5) 7%e The supposed connection between the Stoics and fnalism Heraclitus, so far from serving to explain their mate- not dm to rialistic views, is itself based on the presumption of Herac itm. ^ j^y^^gl resemblance between them. Yet long' be- fore the appearance of Zeno the philosophy of Hera- clitus as a living tradition had become extinct. No STUDY OF NATURE. MATERIALISM. 129 historical connection therefore, or relation of original Chap. dependence, can possibly exist between the two. " Sympathy only with a kindred spirit, which must at best have been gained at second-hand, can have directed Zeno to the study of his predecessor. Zeno's own view of the world was not a consequence, but the cause, of his sympathy with Heraclitus. In short, neither the Peripatetics nor Heraclitus can have given the first impulse to Zeno's materialism, although they may have helped in many ways to strengthen his views on that subject, when already formed. The real causes for these views must therefore be (f) -?'■««- sought elsewhere, and will be found in the central "jthe stoic idea of the whole system of the Stoics — the practical pj^^osophy •' /-> • 11 "^ came. view which they took of philosophy. Originally devoting themselves with all their energies to prac- tical inquiries, in their theory of nature the Stoics occupied the ground of ordinary common sense, which knows of no real object excepting what is grossly sensible and corporeal. In all their speculations their primary aim was to discover a firm basis for human actions. In actions, however, men are brought into direct contact with external objects. The objects then presented to the senses are regarded by them as real things, nor is an opportunity afforded for doubting their real being. Their reality is prac- tically taken for granted, because of the influence they exercise on man, and because they serve as objects for the exercise of man's powers. In every such exercise of power, both subject and object are K 130 THE STOICS. Chap, material. Even when an impression is conveyed '■ — to the soul of man, the direct instrument is some- thing material — the voice or the gesture. In the ? region of experience there are no such things as non-material impressions. This was the ground occupied by the Stoics : a real thing is what either acts on us, or is acted upon by us. Such a thing is naturally material ; and the Stoics with their practical ideas not being able to soar above what is most obvious, declared that reality belongs only to the world of matter. (3) Con- From this material view of nature, it follows 7ftheStoic ^^^^ individual perceptions are alone true, and that mate- all general conceptions without exception must be (a) In- false. If each kind of expression {Xsktov) is in- dividual corporeal, and consequently unreal, will not ab- alme true; sence of reality in a much higher degree belong y^t'^I^V^ to the expression of what is general? Individual signed to expressions refer to perceptions, i.e. to something csracOT- incorporeal; nevertheless they indirectly refer to tions. the things perceived, i.e. to what is material. But general expressions do not even indirectly refer to anything corporeal; they are pure fabrications of the mind, which have nothing real as their object. This is the purport of the Stoic argument. And yet they attribute to these general conceptions, to which no real obj ects correspond, a higher truth and certainty than belongs to the perceptions of individual objects. Here was a gross inconsistency, but one which the Stoic system made not the slightest attempt to over- come. STUDY OF NATUBE. MATERIALISM. 131 In another respect, within the domain of natural Chap. science, the materialism of the Stoics led to results ' producing some most astonishing assertions. If the attributes of things, the soul and even the powers of ofuniver- the soul, are all corporeal, the relation of attributes ^^„™'^ to their objects, of the soul to the body, of one body to another body, is that of mutual intermingling. Moreover the essential attributes of any definite ma- terial belong to every part of that material ; and the soul resides in every part of the body, without the soul's being identical with the body, and without the attributes being identical with the material to which they belong, or with one another. Hence it follows that one body may intermingle with another not only by occupying the vacant spaces in that body, but by interpenetrating all its parts, without, how- ever, being fused into a homogeneous mass with it.' This view involves not only a denial of the impenetrability of matter, but it further supposes that a smaller body when mingled with a greater body will extend over the whole of the latter. It is known as the Stoic theory of universal intermingling (jcpaaLS St' oSmv), and is alike different from the ordinary view of mechanical mixture and from that of chemical mixture. It differs from the former in that ' Let a piece of red-hot iron presence of some material pro- be taken, every part of which is ducing it, there is no avoiding heavy, hard, hot, &c. Not one the conclusion that there must of these attributes can be con- exist in the iron, and in each part founded with another, or with of it, as many various materials the iron itself, but each one runs as there are attributes, without through the whole iron. Now, any one of them losing its own if each attribute is due to the identity. k2 132 THE STOICS. Chap; VI. every part of the one body is interpenetrated by every part of the other ; from the latter, because the bodies after mixture still retain their own properties.' This peculiar theory, which is one of the much debated ' Diog.Yn. 151 : koI tAs xpiaei^ Se SidXou ylvtadai, xadi, ipi\(!iv 6 XpiffLTTiros iv rp rpirri rwv tpvffL' K&v, Hal /iii Kuril irepi7pa<()V ""1 irapiSeaiv xaX •yh.p ils 7r4\a-yos hxiyos olvos ;8\r)eels eir! irdffov &.VTi'irapeKra6'fi^ Karci t^s iiritpavuas; for instance, the combination of various kinds of grain. Mifis is Siio ^ Kal Tr\eL6vctiv ffw^drwv avri- TrapeKraffis Si' 5\»v, inrofiej/ovffav Tav (TVfjitpvwv trepl avrh irotoriyrtev ; for instance, the union of fire and iron, of soul and body. Such a union is called fu^is in the case of solid bodies, xpaffts in the case of fluids, ^iyxva-is is Sio ^ Kal irKeiSvuy ■jroior'fiTotv irepl tqi ■(Tc^jUaTa jUETajSoA^ els ercpas Sia- (pepoiffris tovtqii' iroidTijTOS yeve- aiv, as in the making up salves and medicines. According to Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a, Chrysippus distinguished three kinds of /iijis : vapdSeffis, or union of substances, in which each retains its oiiceia oi/aia or itoiSttjs Kaia t^v irepiypaipiiv ; ffiryxvcis, in which both sub- stances, as well as attributes, are destroyed {d- fieyos, oivov trra^ayfi^v eVa Kepdirai r^y ddKarray, or even eis &\ov rhv K6afjL0y SLareveiv ry KpdffeL rhv ara\ayn6y{Plut. 10;^?OT. 142,b; Diog.). The greater body is said to help the smaller, by giving to it an extension of which it would not otherwise be capable. Never- theless, the bodies so united need not necessarily occupy more space than was previously occupied by one of them {Alex. 142, b; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8). The absurdities which this theory involves were exposed by Arcesilaiis {Plitt. 7), and in detail by Alexander, Plu- tarch, Sextus, and Plotinus (Enn. ii. 7, '"epl rris Si' SXuy xpd- aews). STUDY OF NATURE. MATERIALISM. 133 but distinctive features of the Stoic system,' cannot have been based on scientific observation. On the contrary, the arguments by which Chrysippus sup- ported it prove that it was ultimately the result of speculative considerations.^ We have, moreover, still less reason to doubt this fact, inasmuch as the mate- rialistic undercurrent of the Stoic system affords for it the best explanation. Chap. VI. ^ Tro\Aoi ^uev yhp keyerai nepl Kpdffews Koi (TX^^^v avfjvmoi irepl Tov TrpoKeifieyov ffK4fifiaT6s eiat vapcL rots Aoy/iartKots crdffets. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 56. ' According to Alex. 142, a, the following arguments were used ty Chrysippus: — (1) The argument from Koipal evvoiai — our notion of Kpaais is diflFerent from that of ffiyxvois or TTap6,Qi(Tts. (2) Many bodies are capable of extension, whilst retaining their own properties ; frankincense, for instance, when burnt, and gold. (3) The soul penetrates every part of the body, without losing its properties. (4) The same holds good of fire in red-hot metal, of fire and air in water and earth, of poisons, and of light. It is clear that the first of these arguments does not embody the real reason in the mind of Chrysippus; it might, with equal justice, have been used to prove anything else. Just as little does the second ; for the pheno- mena to which it refers would be equally well explained on the theory of mechanical (TrupiSiais) or chemical {aiyxvas) mixture. Nor does the fourth argument, taken independently of the theory of the corporeal nature of pro- perties, necessarily lead to the idea of Kpatrts as distinct from TrapaBsfrts and avyxvo'ts. Even the fact, greatly insisted upon by the Stoics, that things so mixed could be again separated into their component materials (Alex. 143, a ; Stob. i. 378), is not con- clusive. On the other hand, the relation of the soul to the body, of property to subject-matter, of tpicns to av rpenr^f fAera^dK?iOvffrjs V\Tjy. re rairris ylveTai tci Tiaaapa ^ Flut. Sto. Eep. 43. VL DYNAMICAL THEORl OF NATURE. ]35 space is, according to the Stoics, something derivative. Chap. the consequence of tension ;' tension keeping the different particles apart in one or the other particular way. Just as some modern physiologists construct nature by putting together a sum of forces of attrac- tion and repulsion, so the Stoics refer nature to two forces, or speaking more accurately, to a double kind of motion — expansion and condensation. Ex- pansion works outwardly, condensation inwardly ; condensation produces being, or what is synonymous with it, matter ; expansion gives rise to the attributes of things.^ Whilst, therefore, they assert that every- thing really existing must be material, they still distinguish in what is material two component parts — the part which is acted upon, and the part which acts, or in other words matter and forced ' Simpl. Cat. 67, e (Schol. 74, the language of Plutarch (Def. a, 10) : tJp Toivw (rxw" "' Stwi- Orac. e. 28), in reference to Kol rijv rdaiv vapsx^ffBai \4yovcnv, Chrysippus : TroWdxis eipTiKiis, &(Tirep T^jv [xera^b raiv CTjueicov Srt Ta7s eis rh avTris (leffov i] ovtrla Sidarairiv. Stb koL evOetav dpi- koL rats oKh rod avriis fietrov Siot- ^otfraL ypafifi^v t^v eis &Kpov Ketrai Kol avvex^Tat Kivija-ecrt. Tcrafieynv. ' Oiog. vii. 134 : 5oK€i S' avTo7s ^ Simpl. Cat. 68, e : ol de Srwi'- apx^s elvai tuv 3Awi/ 5j5o, rh notovv Ko\ SvvafJLiVj ^ fxaWov KivrjcTLV r^y Kal rh Trdfrxov. rh [lev odv irduxov fiavuriitiiPKaLTrvKVOffTtK^VTiOevTat, ehai t)\v ^ttoiov ovaiav r-^v ii\Tiv, rijp fxep iir\ Tcfe effw, t^v 5e iirl tA rh 5e Troiovv Thy iv avT^ \6yov e|aj ■ kclI t^v fJi-ev Tov eli/ai, Ti]v Se rhy de6v. rovroy yhp Syra &iStoy rov iroihy etyai yoiJ.i(ovffty cuTiav. Si^trdaris avTTJsSrjfjLtovpyeiy'^Kaara. Hemes. Nat. Horn. c. 2 : ei Se Ae- Such is the teachin'g of Zeno, ■yoi€v, KoBdirep ot StwikoI, royiirljv Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Aiche- Tico eivcu Kivr]inv Trepl t& a-iifiaTa, demus, and Posidonius. Ses:t. €ij rb eaa dfia Kal els rh eJw Kiyov- Math. ix. 11: ol airh ttjs n Toas fievTjy, Kal r^y fiev eis rh e^u fie- Siio \eyoyres apx^s, 6ehy Kal yedwv Kal Trot6rT)Tajy airoreXeaTi- ^irotoy ji\rjy, rhy fiey 6ehv voteiy K^y eiyai, rijv Se eis rh eaw kvu- vTrei\-fi ivepyovv yiverai rh airor^KeiTfia — expresses a narrower conception — the conception of efficient cause, which is the only essential one for a Stoic. ' Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 15, distin- guishes between (rweKriKci, avv- airia^ and rriivipya atria, all of which are, however, subordinated to the St' t, which he is there alone discussing. Seneca main- tains that, with the definition given above, time, place, and motion should be reckoned as causes, since nothing can be pro- duced without these. He allows, however, that a distinction must be made between causa efficiens and causa superveniens. This agrees with what Cicero (De Eato, 18, 41) quotes from Chrysippus relative to causae perfectae et prineipales, and causse adjuvantes et proximse, and with the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction of airiov Si' i and ot ovk &v€v. In the same way, Flnt. Sto. Bep. 47, 4, distinguishes between airia avTOTe\i}s and TrpoKaTapKriK-fi. Alex. Aph. De Eato, p. 72, blames the Stoics: anwos yhp atriuv KaTa\4yovfft, tA fieu irpoKOTapKrt- Ko, T^ Be avvairia, rh Se e/CTt/cA, ri 6e ffWfKTMot, to 5e iAA.0 ri. DYNAMICAL THEORY OF NATURE. 137 The form is due to the workman, and is therefore Chap. only a part of the efficient cause. The type form is '. only an instrument, which the workman employs in his work. The final cause or end-in-chief, in as far as it represents the workman's intention, is only an occasional cause ; in as far as it belongs to the work he is about, it is not a cause at all, but a result. There can be but one pure and unconditional cause, just as there can be but one matter; and to this cause everything that exists and everything that takes place must be referred.^ In attempting to form a more accurate notion of {b)CMra.c- what the Stoics understand by efficient cause, the efficient first point which deserves attention is, that every kind '"^^^• of action ultimately proceeds from one source. For how could the world be such a clearly-defined unit, such a harmonious whole, unless it were governed by one and the same force ? ^ Moreover, since every- thing which acts is material, the highest efficient cause must likewise be considered material; and since all qualities and forces are produced by atmo- ' Seneca, after enumerating i^rjirlc €?voi 5i' 4 . . . Xpianriros the four causes of Aristotle, t^rim/ ehai Keyei Si^ % . . , Tlo(ret- adds : This turba eausarum em- Sdvios Se ovrtcs • aXnov S' iari "braces either too much or too riyos 5i' t ^ksIvo, i) t6 irpuroj/ little. Sed nos nunc primam et voiovi' ^ rh apxny^" iroiiiffeus. generalem quaerimus causam. ' Cic. N. De. ii. 7, 19, after ^ Hsec simplex esse debet, nam et speaking of the consentiens, materia simplex est. Quserimus conspirans, eontinuata cognatio qiiae sit causa, ratio scilicet rerrnn, continues : Hseo ita fieri faciens, id est Deus. Ita enim, omnibus inter se coneinentibus qusecumque retulistis, non sunt mundi partibus profecto non multae et singulae causae, sed ex possent, nisi ea uno divino et ima pendent, ex ea, quae faciet. continuato spiritu continerentur. Stob. Eel. i. 336 : alTTioc S' i Ziivav See Sext. Math. ix. JS. 138 THE STOICS. Chap. spheric or igneous elements, can it be otherwise with '■ — the highest acting force? In everything nourish- ment and growth, life and motion, are connected with heat; everything possesses its own degree of heat, and is preserved and endued with life by the heat of the sun. What applies to parts of the world must apply to the world as a whole ; and heat or fire is the power to which the life and the existence of the world must be referred. • This power must be further conceived as being the soul of the world, as being the highest reason, as being a kind, beneficent, and philanthropic being ; in short, as being God himself. The universal belief and the universal worship of Grod proves this beyond a doubt.^ It is, however, confirmed by a more accurate investigation. Pure matter can never move itself or fashion itself; nothing but an inherent power such as the soul is can produce these results.^ The world would not be most perfect and complete unless Eeason were inherent in it;* nor could it contain ' Cic. N. D. ii. 9, 23, says, ap- Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes parently as the view of Cleanthes : mundi partes eustineantur calore. All living things, plants, and mundum etiam ipsum simili pari- animals, exist by heat : nam que natura in tanta diuturnitate omne quod est calidum et igneum servari : eoque magis quod intel- cietur et agitur motu suo. Diges- ligi debet, calidiun ilium atqxie tion and the circulation are the igneum ita in omni fusum esse result of heat : ex quo intelligi natura, ut in eo insit proereandi debet, eam caloris naturam vim vis, &c. habere in se vitalem per omnem " On the argument, ex con-' mundum pertinentem. Moreover : sensu gentium, consult Pint. Sto. omries partes mundi . . . calore Eep. 38, 3 ; Com. Not. 32, 1 ; fultae sustinentur. . . . Jam vero Cic. N. D. ii. 2, 5 ; Seneca, Benef. reliqua quarta pars mundi, ea et iv. 4; Sext. Math. ix. 123 and ipsa tota natura fervida est, et 131. caeteris naturis omnibus salut- ' Sext. Math. ix. 75. arem impertit et vitalem calorem. • dc. N. D. iii. 9, 22 : Zeno DYNAMICAL THEORY OF NATURE. 139 any beings possessed of consciousness, unless it were conscious itself.' It could not produce creatures endowed with a soul and reason, unless it were itself endowed with a soul and reason.^ Eesults surpassing human power could not exist, unless there were some higher power equally surpassing human power.^ The subordination of means to ends which governs the world in every part down to the minutest details would be inexplicable, unless the world owed its origin to a reasonable creator.* The graduated rank Chat-.. VI. enim ita concludit : quod ratione utitur, melius est, quam id, quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius. Eatione igitur mundus utitur. IMd. ii. 8, 21, and 12, 34. Sext. Math. is. 104: et rh \ojiKbv tov fi^ KoyiKov KpnTr6v ijTLVf ov5ev 5e ye k6(T}xov KpeiTT6v etTTi, KoytKhv &pa, 6 K6ff- fJ.os . . . rh yctp voepbv rov fi^ voepov Kol ep^^vxov rod p.^ ip.^- Xov Kpslrrdv eimv ' ouSey 5e ye xStTfiov KpeiTTOv ' voephs &pa Kai %p.^vx6s iffriv & k6opp,^v XajSeijc oircafrl ffvve- pojT^' rh irpoiefieyov fnr4ppa \oyi- Rov Kol aijTb XoyiK6v iffTLV ' d Se K6(rp.os irpoierai (nrepp^ \oyiKov, \oyiKhv &pa iffrlv d K6(rpos, The same proof in Sext. Math. ix. 77 and 84 ; Cic. Ibid. ii. 31, 79 ; 6, 18. See also Sext. ix. 96 ; Xen. Mem. i. 4, 8. = Cic. Ibid. iii. 10, 25: Is [Chrysippus] igitur: si aliquid est, inquit, quod homo effieere non possit, qui id eflficit melior est homine. Homo autem hsec, quae in mundo sunt, effieere non potest. Qui poterit igitur, is prsestat homini. Homini autem prsestare quis possit, nisi Deus Est igitur Deus. ' Oleanthes made use of argu- ments from final causes to prove the ■existence of Gods. Of this nature are all the arguments which he employs in Cic. N. D. ii. 5, but particularly the fourth, based on the regular order and beauty of heaven. A building cannot exist without a builder; no more can the building of the world exist without a ruling spirit. See Cic. N. D. ii. 32-66 ; Cleomedes, Meteora, p. 1 ; Seneca^ 140 THE STOICS. Chap. VI. of beings would be incomplete, unless there were a highest Being of all whose moral and intellectual perfection were absolutely unsurpassable." This per- fection belongs, in the first place, to the world as a whole; nevertheless, as in everything consisting of many parts, so in the world the ruling part must be distinguished from other parts. It is the part from which all acting forces emanate and diffuse them- selves over the world.^ By Zeno, Chrysippus, and the majority of the Stoics, the seat of this eflScient force was placed in the heaven,^ by Cleanthes in the De Provid. i. 1, 2-4 ; Nat. Qu. i. ; Sext. Math. ix. Ill ; Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i. 2 ; Plut. Plae. i. 6, 8. ' See the expansion of this thought by Cleanthes (in Sext. Math. ix. 88-91) and the Stoics (in Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33). Cicero distinguishes four kinds of beings —Plants, Animals, Men, and God. 2 Sext. Math. ix. 102: vians yhp tpiffeois Koi ^vxvs V Karapx^ TTJs Ktvfjaeus ytvecQai Sokgl airh Tiye/jLOvucov Kai iraffat at itrl ret jUepTj TOv &\ov i^a/jroffreWSfievat duvdfieis &s a.ir6 rtvos •Jnjyrjs tqv TjyefjLOVLKOv i^atroffTeWovTai. Cic. N. D. ii. 29 : omnem enim na- turam necesse est, quse non so-, litaria sit, neque simplex, sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere aliquem in se principatum [= Tiy^luiviKhv] ut in homine mentem, &c. . . . Itaque ne- cesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturae prinoipatus, esse omnium optimum. ' Oic. Acad. ii. 41,126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus Deus, mente prseditus, qua omnia regantur. N. D. i. 14, 36: (Zeno) sethera Deum dicit. 15, 39 ; ignem prse- terea et eum, quem antea dixi, sethera (Chrysippus Deum dicit esse). Biog.-vii. 138: ovpavhs St iiTTiv 7] iffxarr] Trepi(j>4peta, ev jf Trai/XSpvrai rh 8etoi>. Ibid. 139: rhv li\oy KdiTfiov ^^ov 6yTa Kal ^/i^uxov Kal \oyLKbv ^X"" vy^- l^oviKhv liiv rhv aiBipa, KaBd <^i\(riv 'AvriiraTpos . . , Xpifftniroy 5* . . . Kal Uoffet^divtos . . , Thv ovpavSv tpaffi rb TjyefioviKhv rov Kdfffxov. He continues : & hcvtoi Xpiv Kal \iBav KoX f^oii', Sxpi Kal ruv o.Tifi.ar6,TOiP. Tertullian, Ad Nation, ii. 4 : Zeno makes God penetrate materia mundialis, as honey does. Clemens, Strom, t. 591, a: ipatrl yhp ffSifjia elvat rbv 6ebv ot SrwiKol Kal TTj/evfio, nar^ ovffiav, SuTTTep h^eKa Kol r^v ^vx^v. i. 295, c: {pi SrwiKol) atafxa. 6vTa rdv 0e6v 5tA rrjs aTi/iOTOTrjs iJ\7js TTCf^oiTT^Kepai \eyovSLV ou Ka\us. Protrept. 44, A : robs cmd rrjs (TTOas, 5io Trdur'qs vKrjs, koI Sia rTJs aTi/ioTdTTjs, T& Beiov Si'tjiceij/ A€- 7oj'Toj. Oriff. c. Cels. ti. 71 : rav ^Tu'CK&y <\>affK6vTtiiV Srt 6 Beits •nj/ivfid iffTt Sioi irdi/Taiy Sie\Tj\v$6s Kal irdvr' ivtavr^ ireptex^"- Op- ponents like Origan, Alexander, and Plutarch naturally attack them for their materialistic views. ' iSiJoJ. Eel. i. 58. Diocf. 138: t6v b^ KSfffjiOv olKeiffdat KOTct vovv KOI irpSvoiav . . . ets d-rav aurov [j.ipos BiijKojnos tou vov KaBdirep iij)' ruiuv rrjs if't'X'Js- tt^^' ^^1 *'' &v fihii /iaWov, Sl' Si/ Be Iittov. Ibid. 147 : Bein ehai (ffov cSdva- Tov KoyiK^v reKetov ^ yoephy iv ei/Sai/ioyia, kokov Tvavrhs avent^eK- TOV, irpOVOTlTlKhv Kiff^OV T€ Kal rav iv Kda'fUfi, fi^ eiyou /levTOL av- Qpay7t6^op^ov. eiuat Se Thy fiiv Srifjiiuvpyoy ray S\oiy Kal &a"irep irarepa irdvruv Koivas tc koI rh fjtepos avrov rh itrjKOV Sict TrdvTWVj ft troWais irpoffriyopiais Tvpoovo- fid^effOat Karb. tcls dvydfiets. Phtsd. Nat. De. Col. 1 : According to Chrysippus, Zens is Koivii (jtiins, etfuapfifyn, avdyKY], k.t.\. Ibid. Col. 3 : He considered y6/ios to be God. Themist. De An. 72, b : ToTs airh TAiyMVos . . . Btk Trdo'7js oitffias tretpoiTTiKeyai Thy Oehy nOe- jueVoif, Kol -TTOv fi^v elvat yovy, irov Se ^^vxhy^ I'ou Se ^iSffty, ttov Se e|ii/. Cio. Acad. ii. 37, 119 : No Stoic can doubt hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quse se et ipsum fabricata sit, et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Id. N. D. ii. 22, 68 : ipsius vero mundi . . . natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur, consultrix et pro- vida utilitatum opportunitatum- que omnium. . . . Natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarias conatusque et appetitiones, quas tpiiks Graeci vocant, et his con- sentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmet ipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus, on which account the mens mundi is called Trp6voia. M. Aurel. iv. 40 : its ei/ fiyov rhv Kiv Sick ras ttjs S\tjj, Si' fis KfX'^PI'" /u6Ta\A.ii|eis. Follow- ing the same source, Athenag. Deg. pro Christ, c. b: ei yhp i fiev Bebs irvp rexvtKhv, k.t.K , . . rh Se Trvev[j.a abrhv diijKfi St S\ou TOV Kotrp-ov 6 Bebs eis ko.t' avrobs, Ze{;y p.ev Kar^ rb ^eov ttjs ii\Tjs ovofia^Sfieyos, "Hpa Se Kori rbv aepa kkI t^ AoiirA Kaff eKaCTOv T^s SA.I7S fiepos, oi' ris Kex^PV^, Ka\oiiievos. The latter passage is explained by JHog. 147 : A^o fihv yip ipcurt Si' ^v rat TrdvTa ' Zrjva Se KaKovcrt Trap' ticrov tov ^^v a^Tids iffrtv ^ Sict tov ^fju Kextipv- K€y. 'Ad7]vav Se Kar^ t^i/ els al6epa Stdraunv rov iiyepoviKou avTov. ^Upav Se Karh t^v eis aepa. Kal "Ht^oHTToi/ /caret t^v eis rb rexviKbv irvp. Kal n.o(reiSava Kara ri]v eis rb {>yp6v. /col Aitfirtrpay KOTci r^v eis yrjif dfioitos Se Kal Tcty ^A\a? Trpoiri]yopias ex^lievoi Tivos 6fjLoi6T7iros atreSocrav. Plut. 0. Not. 48, 2 : rbv Behv . . . aufia voepbv Koi vovv ev T^Kri Troiovvres, M. Aurel. 6, 32: rbv Sict rris olirlas SiTiKofra Kiyav, K. r. \. Porphyr. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 16, 1 ; rbv Se Qebv . . . irvp voepbv eiirdvres. Orig. c. Cels. vi. 71 : Kark fihv olv robs airb rrjs (Troas . . . /cal b \&yos rov Qeov d fiexpt avOpdwav /col ruv iAaxiffrwv Kara- ^aivojv ouSei' &K\o ia'rlv ^ nvevfia aaii,a,rt«6v. The same combina- tion of nature and mind is found DYNAMICAL THEORY OF NATURE. 145 These expressions, as used in the Stoic system, Chap. generally mean one and the same thing. It is an unimportant difference whether the original cause is called an Air Current or Ether, or Heat or Fire. It is rightly called an Air Current, since Air Currents are the causes of the properties of things, giving them shape and connection. It is also rightly called Fire, for by fire is meant the warm air, or the fiery fluid, which is sometimes called Ether, at other times Fire, at other times Heat,* and which is expressly distinguished from ordinary fire.^ Moreover the terms. Soul of the world, Eeason of the world. Nature, Universal Law, Providence, Destiny — all mean the same thing. Even the more abstract names, Law, Providence, Destiny, have with the Stoics an essen- tially real meaning, and imply not only the form according to which the world is arranged and governed, but also the substantial existence of the world, as a power exalted above all its particular and individual parts.^ If Nature must be distinguished in the hymn of Cleanthes (in thority of Zeno ; Cic. N. D. ii. Stoh. Eel. i. 30), Zeus being de- 15, 40, on that of Cleanthes. scribed as the opxiT^* (^iaeus. Both state that the difference who directs the Koicij hiyos %s consists in this : Ordinary (Srex- Sih TrdvTuv itns for its first, and eliiapij.4vn fato, (3) a natura. Flut. C. Not. for its second production. 36, 6: Xfyfi ymv Xpitniriros, ioi- " Plut. Sen. Ep. 9, 16: Jovis, Kevai Tip p.(v avepdmqi tov Aia kuI cum resoluto mundo et Diis in riv K6ap.ov, ti? 8e ij/ux^ ^hv irp6- unum confusis pauUisper eessante voiav fJTOv aZv iic vipaais 76i'i)Tot natura acquiescit sibi cogitationi li6vov &^6aprGV Svto t6i/ Aia tUv bus suis traditur. DYNAMICAL THEORY OF NATURE. Ul another Ether, at another Fire ; ' definitions all of which appeared to them equally indispensable, and - which become identical as soon as the Stoic premisses are granted.^ According to these premisses the infinite character of the divine Keason depends on the purity and lightness of the fiery material which composes it. Seneca is therefore quite in harmony with Stoic theories when he speaks of its being indifferent whether Grod is spoken of as Destiny or as an all- pervading Air Current.^ Those who would charge] the Stoics with inconsistency for calling God at one 1 time Eeason, at another Soul of the universe, at \ another Destiny, at another Fire, Ether, or even the j Universe,'' forget that they are attaching to these I Chap. VI. ' Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39 : (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam na- turam. Diog. tu. 156 :' Sok« 5J avTOiS TTjv fikv (\>it(riv eTvat %vp re-j(y^*^^^ ^S^J ^aSi^ov els yevetriv, Swep ^(TtI iTVsvfia wvpoeiSes Koi TexvoeiSis. Stob. Eel. i. 180: Xpiffiwiros Zivafuv irvivfiaTiK^v T^v ov(rlav ttjs etfiapiJieyTjs rd^et ToiJ Tiavrbs SioMifruel\v ; or, ac- cording to another definition: eifiapp.iyTj iffrlv & rod k6(Tiiov \6'yos, ^ Kiyos tUv iv t^ K6ap.ii: Trpovolc^ StoiKOvpeyuVf k.t.\. In- stead of \6yos, he also used a\li- Beia, (piffis, ahia, aviyxri, &c. ■' Cio. K D. ii. 11, 30: Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior, perlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad seusus commovendos quam hie noster calor, quo haee quae nota nobis sunt, retjnentur et vigent. Ab»- surdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiseque hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ae sentiant, mundum esse sine sensu, qui integro et puro et libero eodemque aeerrimo et mo- bilissimo ardore teneatur. Ar. Bidymus, page 124. = Consol. ad Helrid. 8, 3 : Id actum est, mihi credo, ab illo, quisquis formatio universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per omnia maxima ae minima Eequali intentione dif- fusus, sive fatum et immutabilis causarum inter se cohserentium series. * Cio. N. D. i. 14 : Zeno calls natural law divine, but he also calls the Ether and the all-per- vading Beason God; Cleanthes gives the name of God to the world, reason, and the soul of the world ; Chrysippus to reason, to the soul of the world, to ruling reason, to communis natura, des- tiny, fire, ether, the world-whole, and eternal law. l2 148 THE STOICS. Chap, terms a meaning entirely different from those in '- — which they were used by the Stoics.' (J) God as ^ The more the two aspects of the conception of original God — the material and the ideal — are compared, the matter. clearer it becomes that there is no difference between God and original Matter. Both are one and the same Being, which when conceived of as universal subject-matter, is known as inert matter ; but when conceived of as acting force, is called universal Ether, all-warming Fire, all-penetrating Air, Nature, Soul of the world, Eeason of the world, Providence, Des- tiny, God. Property and material, matter and form, are not as with Aristotle things radically different, though united from all eternity. Far from it, the forming force resides in matter as such ; it is in it- self something material ; it is identical with ether, or fiery matter, or atmospheric current. The difference, I therefore, of material and efficient cause, of God and | i matter, resolves itself into the difference between lAir Currents and other materials. It is in itself no original ultimate difference. According to the Stoic teaching, every particular material has deve- loped in the lapse of time out of the original fire or God, and to God it will return at the end of the world. The difference is therefore only a temporary and passing one — one with which we have here nothing to do. The conception of God, however, taken in its full meaning, includes the original matter, as well as the original force. The sum of all real existences constitutes the divine Air Current, extending beyond ' Krische, Forseh. i. 365. PANTHEISM. 149 its own limits, and withdrawing into them again.' Chap. Grod is the original fire, containing in Himself the ^^' germ of force and of matter;^ He is the World in its atmospheric condition,* the Universal Substance changing into definite materials, and returning to itself again, which regarded in its real form as God includes everything, but is more often regarded under one or other aspect only, as including only a part of real existence.* From all that has been said it follows that the c. Pan- stoics did not think of Grod and the world as difi"erent n^^^J^ beings. Their system was therefore strictly pan- identical theistic. The world is the sum of all real existence, y,orld. and all real existence is originally contained in God, who is at once universal matter and the creative force which fashions matter into the particular materials of which things are made. We can, therefore, think of nothing which is not either God or a manifestation of God. In point of Being, God and the world are the same, the two conceptions being declared by the Stoics to be absolutely identical.' If they have ' CKrysiH'as. Seep.l45,notel. 'Besides the quotations al- '^ Aristooles. Seep. 141, note 3. ready given from Chrysippus ' Mnesarchus, in Stob. i. 60. and Cleanthes, compare FhcBdr. * Orig. c. Gels. iii. 75 : Stoji- Nat. De. {Fhilodem. vepl einre- kS>v Bibv ipOapriv eiaay6vTav Kal fielas), Col. 5 : Au>y4vr,s S' 6 Bo- T^v ovffiav avrov \ey6vrav ffUfia 0v\i^utos iv t^ irepl ttjs 'A07jyaj Tpenriv Sii\ov Kal aWouorbii Kol rbv K6a'iiOii ypdipei t# Ait rhv fiera^\T]T^v Kal irOTe irdfra v yeyovdrav. \e76Tat 5' erepcos kSit^s 6 debs, Koff hv ^ SiaKSafiTjffts yiperat Kol TeKeiovrai. Diog. vii. 137: Kpyovui i\ K6 Kara t^v Sia- Quid ergo interest inter naturam K6aiaiiTiv riiv Toia\n-i\v KoX SiiJtoJic Dei et nostram ? Nostri melior eX""- In tli^ former sense, the pars animus est, in illo nulla world is eternal, and the same as pars extra animum est. Totus God ; in the latter, created, and est ratio, &c. subject to change. ^ The connection of the two, ' See p. 141. The two ideas like the connection between soul blend into each other. Thus and body, is a xpaa-is Si' Saoii'. Seneca, Nat. Qu. Prol. 13, says 152 THE STOICS. CHip. and the world. Agreeing with the other Stoics in '- — considering God to be an Atmospheric Substance,' he would not allow that God resided, as the Soul, within the whole world, and, consequently, he re- fused to call the world a living being.^ Instead of doing this, he declared that the highest of the heavenly spheres, the sphere O'f the fixed stars, was the seat of God, and that from this abode God acted upon the world.* The opposite view detracted, in his eyes, from the unchangeable and exalted character of the divine Being. How anxious Boethus was to vindicate that character will also be seen in the way in which he differed from his fellow- Stoics in reference to the destruction of the world. ^ Stob. Eel. i. 60 : Bdrjdos rhv Trepl (piffews ohfflav Qeov t^v t&v al64pa 0ehj/ &-rre(piivaTO, ctTr^ai'Ci)!/ u^aCpav the TjyefjLoviKhv ' Diog. 143: B6ri8os S4 ipn 1: ^ire will consume the fikv oZv Kaff atirhv Svra [rhy Behi/'] world : hunc evanidum considere, Tpeireiv t^v iraaav ovcriav 8i' aepos et nihil relinqui aliud in renim eis SSaip • Kol Sffirep iv rp yoj/f -rh natura, igne restincto, quam hu- mep/ia jreptex^Tcu, oStui kbI toB- morem. In hoc futuri mundi TOf ffirepp-ariKhr \6yov Syra to5 spem latere. Stob. Eel. i. 372 K6(TfJL0V roiovSe inroKt-nttrQai 4y Ty and 414. 6yp$ iyepybv avr^ voiovui-a -riiv ' Stob. i. 370 : Z^yaico 8^ oBtmj SKtjv Tp6s T^v rtov e|i)s yeyeffty, airotpaiyeaQaA, SiappiiSriv ' roiairiiv K.T.A. Seneca, Nat. Qusest. iii. Seiiaei cTcoi iv ittpUStp t^v roS 154 THE STOICS. Chap. VII. round earth as a centre,' by the action on the chaotic mass of the heat which is developed out of water.^ Now, for the first time, by this division of the elements, a distinction between the active and '6\ov SiaK6l(rTatr8at Kai yrfv ffwicTaffOai, 4k tov Kotirod Sk ri )Ltev Siafjieyetv SSaip, 4k 5e roV arfii^ofievov aepa ylvetrBai^ e/c rivos Si TOV ispos irSp 4^dirreiv, Diog. vii. 142 : ylveaBai Sh riiv K6fffU)v trav 4k Trvpbs 7i ovffia rpair^ St' aepos cis vyp6n]Taj eJra r6 Tra^u- fjtepis avTOV trvinav anoreKeffd^ 7^ rh Sh KeTTTOfiepes 4^a€pu6^ Kal tout' 4ntTr\4ov KeiTTVpShv TTvp airo- yevyfjirri; elra Karh, fiiitv 4k tov- riov (^ura t€ koL ^^a Kcu &\\a y4vq, Chrys. in Flut. St. Eep. 41, 3 : ^ Be irvpbs iJ.era^oK'fi eCTt Tota^tTTj ' St' hipos eis SScop Tpewerat ' KaK TotJTOu yrjs {itpiffTaixevris a^p 4vdv- fitarat ' KevTvyofieyov 5e tov ctepos 6 cdd^p irepixftTai KiK\if. The same writer observes, in the Scholia on Hesiod's Theogony, v. 459, 8Ti KaBvypwv imwv tup b\av Kal 6fi^pwp KaTa(f>epoij.4vuv ToWiiv T^v eKKptffiv roiruv Kp6vov uyO' fidaBai. Conf. Clemens, Strom, v. 599, c, and Stob. i. 312. ' Stob. Ed. i. 442, also affirms that the creation of the universe begins with earth. ' Stob. Ibid.: K\edi>eris Sk oStb irdis tpT}Se7- aav tj/ux^'' Tp6irov riva eis ffw^a Kai tjivxh" liiT4$a\ev Surre am- effrdyat iK TotiTwy, &K\ov Ti>/ct ' NoTnes. Nat. Horn. C. 2 : \i- yovp. Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2. From this passage a further insight is ob- tained into two points connected with the Stoic philosophy, which have been already discussed. It can no longer appear strange that the active power, or Gf-od, should at one time be called Fire, at another Air-Current, for both represent equally the acting force; and the statement that properties are atmospheric cur- rents — as, indeed, the whole dis- tinction of subject-matter and property — follows from this view of things. ■* The Stoics, according to Liog. 141, prove that the world (Sio- K6fffir]ais, not Kdfffias, in the ab- solute sense) will come to an end, partly because it has come into being, and partly by two not very logical inferences : o5 r& fiepTi 6apTci itni, Kai rh B\ov ' ra Se fieptj rov K6eapir(a. > Plut. St. Eep. 39, 2 : \Xfia- tmros] iv T^J Trptiry trepi trftovoias rhv Ala, rh ^a$Siov ix"" ^M'" KaB-rtfievois oiirca Kal tc^ ^KKa ir6.vTa dfiolas e|et, Kal rhy XP^^°^ eiS\oy6y iiTTi rhv airhv chat. The Stoics appear to have borrowed this view from the Pythagoreans, and it commended itself to them as being in harmony with their theory of necessity. Hence they taught; jucTirV cKiriipaffiv ir(£\i>' •Kavra Tofirct iv t^ KdiTficp yevtffdai Kttr' api6ti})v, as Kal rbv ISlus iroihv irdKtv rhp avrhv tQ Trp6ff6iV flvai re Kal yiyecrOat ^Keivfi) Ttf K6trii!p {Alex. Anal. Pr. 58, b). Toirov 5^ oiirus l^x^^'^°^' StJAov, &s oirS^v &S{iyaToy, Kal Tifias fier^ rh Te\evTriffai ttAkiv TepidScov TLvSiv elKJiiiiihaiv XP^""" ^'5 ^'' vvv ifffiev KaTOffT^treffflat (rxT?)Ua (Chrysippus, irepX npovoias, in Lactant. Inst. vii. 23). This is to apply to every fact and to every occurrence in the new world, at the ira\i,yye!'ev TQio{iTiat/ TTspLddoiv i^ &t5fou yivo- fievtav ctKaTaTraiitTTaJS. oSre yhp T7)s apxvs airiav Kal trafftv 6l6v T6 yiviffQat, offre tou SioiKovrros aifT(£. ovffiav re yap tois ytvo^ fjifvois i4- varo rhy Kda-fwv. Boethus denied the destruction of the world with vigour, his chief reasons being the follow- ing: — (1) If the world were de- stroyed, it would be a destruction without a cause, for there is no cause, either within or without, which could produce such an eifect. (2) Of the three modes of destruction, those kotoi Sialpe- ffty, /caret avaipea-tv ttjs iirexodffTjs TToidTriros, Kara a^x^^^^t not one can apply to the world. (3) If the world ceased to exist, the action of God on the world would also cease ; in feet. His activity would altogether cease. (4) If everything is consumed by fire, the fire must go out for want of fuel. With that, the possibility of a new world is at an end. The resolution of the world into indefinite vacuum, attributed by Plut. Plac. ii. 9, 2, to the Stoics in general, is no doubt the same as the condensation and expansion 160 THE STOICS. Chap. VII. B. G(mem\ Tnent of the world. (1) Naitire o ' destiny. (a) Destiny as Fro- was further supposed that the world was periodically- destroyed by floods ; ' but there was a difference of opinion on this point, some holding the whole uni- verse subject to these floods, others restricting them to the earth and to its inhabitants ^ One point established as a matter of fact by the generation and destruction of the world is, the un- certainty of all particular things, and the uncon- ditional dependence of everything on a universal law and the course of the universe. This point is a leading one throughout the Stoic enquiries into of matter. Bitter, iii. 599 and 703, supposes it to be a mis- apprehension of the real Stoic teaching. Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil, ii. 391, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Philos. p. 129, absolutely deny that the Stoics held a periodic destruction of the world. ' The flood and its causes are fuUy discussed by Sen. Nat. Gu. iii. 27-30. Kain, inroads of the sea, earthquakes, are all supposed to contribute. The chief thing, however, is, that such a destruc- tion has been ordained in the course of the world. It comes cum fatalis dies venerit, cum ad- fuerit ilia necessitas temporum, cum Deo visum, ordiri meliora, Vetera finiri ; it has been fore-or- dained from the beginning, and is due not only to the pressure of the existing waters, but also to their increase, and to a changing of earth into water. The object of this flood is to purge away the sins of mankind, ut de integro totae rudes innoxiseque generentur [res humanse] nee supersit in de- teriora praeceptor; peraetojudido generis bumani exstructisque pariter feris . . . antiquus ordo revocabitur. Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris, homo inscius seelerum : but this state of innocence wiU not last long. Seneca appeals to Berosus, according to whom the destruction of the world by fire will take place wheh all the planets are in the sign of the Crab, its destruction by water when they are in the sign of the Capricorn. Since these signs correspond with the summer and winter turns of the sun, the language of Seneca agrees with that of Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11 : Cujus anni hiems summa est cataelysmus . . . ffistas autem ecpyrasis. Heraclit. Alleg. Horn, c, 25: When one element gains the supremacy over the others, the course of the world will come to an end, by iKiripaxris, if the element is fire ; et S' &dpovi/ bdtop iKpayeirj, Kara- KKvtr^ rhv Kdafjiov aTro\e'ia'0ai. ' The former view is held by Heraclitus and Censorinus, the latter by Seneca. OOVERNMENT OF THE WOULD. DESTINY. 161 nature. Every particular thing, by virtue of a natural and unchangeable connection of cause and effect, flows from the nature of the universe and the general law which governs it. This absolute necessity, regulating all Being and Becoming, is expressed in the conception of Fate or Destiny (j^ slfiapfievT}).^ Viewed as to its nature. Destiny is only another name for primary Being, for the all- pervading, all-producing atmospheric current, for the molten fire which is the soul of the world.^ But since the activity of this Being is always rational and according to law, Destiny is also identical with the Eeason of the World, with uni- versal Law, with the rational form of the world's course.' Primary Being, or universal Law, when e/ Semper paret, sem^g* Chap. VII. ' Diog. Tii. 149 : koB' elfiapfi,4- sequitur. V71V Se (paai rh -n&vra yivetTdai jussit. Xprftrnriros, k.t.\. effTL S' tl^ap- fievv alHa t&v i^vraif elpofiep-rj fj \6jos naff iv S K6ffnos Sie^dyirai. A. Gell. vi. 2, 3 : (Chrysippus) in libro Trepl irfovolas quarto eliiap- fienrip esse dicit <^vaiK'i]v riva, aiv- 2 Stoh. Eel. i. 180: XpicriTTros Svyafitv TTvevfiartK^y t^j/ ovffiav Tris etfiapfi4t/'rjs ri^et rod iraprhs StOlKriT.K'ffv. ' Hence Chrysippus' defini- tion ; elfjMpfievri iffrlv 6 rov K6afj.ou ra^iv TcSf h\aiv e| aiZiov rS)v ere- Xiyos ^ vo^s tuiv eV Tip K6(Tfjiti) puv rots krepois sTralio\ov6o{iyraiv irpoyoic^ StoiKOvixevuv fi \6yos Kad' Kal fjLerb, TroKh )ney o^v airapa^^Tou tv ra ftei/ yeyov6ra yeyoj/e, ra Se o^ffvs Tjjs roLa6rT}S a-vfJ.Tr\0K7Js. yiyv6iJ.eva 7£7veTal, to Se yet^ff6~ Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125: Fatum, or fifva y€vi]airai. Instead of Aiiyos, el/iapiiivTi, was called ordinem Chrysippus also used ahiiBeia, seriemque causarum, cum causa alrla, ^vcris, avdyKri. Theodoret. causae nexa rem ex se gignat. Cur. Grr. Aff. vi. 14: Chrysippus > Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 36 : Quid enim assigns the same meaning to f intelligis fatum ? existimo neces- elfiaofxevov and KarrivayKaff^^vov^ sitatem rerum omnium actionum- explaining ei/iapfi^i/i) to he xlvriffis que, quam nulla vis rumpat. De aiSios irvyexhs Kal rtrayixivq ; Prov. 6, 8: Irrevocabilis humana Zeno defines it as Siva/us Kiirq- pariter ac divina cursus vehit. rmrli rris BAijs ; also as ipiffis or llle ipse omnium conditor et TTp6voia ; his successors as \6yos rector scripsit quidem fata, Bed / t&v iv r^ xSfffuf irpovoit} Sioikou- M 62 THE STOICS. Chab. I thought of as being the groundwork of natural ^'^^' -\ formations, is called Nature ; but when it appears as the cause of the orderly arrangement and de- velopment of the world, it is known as Providence ; ' or in language less technical, as Zeus or the will of Zeus ; and in this sense it is popularly said that nothing happens without the will of Zeus.^ In action as the creative force in nature, this universal Eeason also bears the name of Grenerative Eeason {Xoyos o-irspfiaTiKos). It bears this name more immediately in relation to the universe, as being the generating power out of which all form and shape, aU life and reason, in the present ar- Irangement of the world, has grown, and by which all things were produced out of primary fire as b) Ves- iny as •enerative lieifuVj or as elpiJ-hs aiTlaij/. Even riX'li ^^ continues, is explained as a God ; but this supposes it to be essentially identical with eifiapixivTi. Chrysippus, in Flut. Sto. Eep. 34, 8 : ttjs yap Kowijs ^^ffeois eiy ir6.uT0. Siareivoiiffris Se^ffet Trau rh &nw(rovp yivi/ievop iv T^ hKcf) Kal Twv fxopliav drtpovv ko.t' iKelvqv yeviffdai Kal rhv ^Kfi- PTjs \6yoj/ KttTct t1 e|7)s ok«\i5tws • SiGt Th ju^t' e^wQev eJvat rh ivtrrlj- ffdfievov Ty otKovoixit} |U-^Te tuj/ fispuf /iTiShv ex^tv Sttws KivTidijaG- rai fi o'x^o'ei &\Kas ^ Kara T^y Kow^v ifiiinv. Cleanthes, Hymn, (in Stob. Eel. i. 30) v. 12 ; M. Aurel. ii. 3. ' It has been already demon- strated that all these ideas pass into one another. 2 Flut. Com. Not. 34, 5: ei S^, &s {iffty t^v iSlav voffouvTes, «jfT6 Tr€7r7ip«)/A€i/oi, eYre ypa^fj-aTLKol ytyovSres fl fiovfftKol . . . Kara toutov he rht/ \6yov t,& TTapa-TThiiffia epovixeu Kal irepl rrjs aperris TipiSiv KoX irepl ttjs KaKios KoX rb ftKov TUV rexfup Kal ruiv arexvilav^ as i^riv . . . ov&ev yap etTTH/ &\\ws TW Kara fiepos ye- veadai, ou5e rovK&XKfrov, oA.V ^ Ka-rb, riiv KOivi)v ^iaiv Koi Kark rhv eKeivris Kiyov. Ibid. 47, 4 and 8. Cleanth. Hymn. v. 15: ovZi TL yiyverai tpyov ^ifi x^o^i aov Sfxcc, ^aifiov, oijTs KaT* aidepLOV Geiav 'jr6\ov otfr' ^ul •k6vt(p, •kK^v dTr6tra ^e^ovffi kkkoI ff^erepri- See Sioff. vii. 136 ; Stob. Eel. i. 372 and 414 ; Cic. Ts. D. ii. 10, 28 ; 22, 68 ; Sext. Math. ix. 101 ; M. Aurel. iv. 14: iva(\>m>iB9i]aTi Tip yevvfiffavn, fxaWov Se ai/a\Tj<^- Biiari eis rhv Kdyov avTuS t!)» mrep- juaTiKby Kmk liiTa^oK-tjv. Ibid. 21: al l|/uxai . . . ets T^v TWi/ o\- Qriffav els roi/s ai/roiis tov KSfffiov (rirepfjuiTiKohs K6yavs. Biog. vii. ] 48 : eiTTi Se ^iais ejis i^ ainris Ku uv/jLevr^ Kark CTrepfiartKovs \(J- yovs, K.T.K. Ibid. 157: itttprj Sh i|/u;fT5s \iyovaiV o«tc!), ras irevre aiVS^irets KoL Tohs ej/ Tjfuv ffTreo- fj.aTiKuvs \6yovs Ka\ rh tpwvT]rtKhv KOi rh KoyLfTTtKOV. 164 THE STOICS. CHtP. VII. (2) Argu- ments in favow of JProvidence. (a) Argu- ment from the general convicticns of man- kind. and creating element in things, the Eeason of the world or the Soul of nature; so in the seeds •of individual things, the atmospheric substance, in which the generative power alone resides,* is in it- self the germ out ©f which the corresponding thing is produced by virtue of am inherent law.* The inward form is the only permanent element in things, amid the perpetual change of materials. It constitutes the identity of the universe ; and whereas matter is constantly changing from one form to another,' the universal law of the process alone continues unchangeably the same. All parts of the Stoic system lead so unmis- takeably to the conclusion, not only that the world as a whole is governed by Providence, but that every part of it is subject to the same unchange- able laws, that no definite ai'guments would appear necessary to establish this point. Nevertheless, the Stoics lost no opportunity of meeting every objec- tion in the most explicit manner.^ In the true spirit of a Stoic, Chrysippus appealed to the general conviction of mankind, as expressed in the names used to denote fate and destiny,^ and to the lan- ' As the primary fire or ether is called tide seed of the world, so, according to Chrysippus (in Biag. 159), the a-vepfna in the seed of plaats and animals is a irvivfia Kar' ovaiav. 2 ffirepfiaTtKhs \6yos is also used to express the seed or the egg itself. Thus, in Plut. Qusest. Conviv. ii. 3, 3 and 4, it is de- fined as y6vos ^vSe^s ytviffaos. ' This is particularly manifest in the doctrine of the constant change of the elements. ' Heme, Stoieorum de Tato Doctrina (Novemb. 1859), p. 29. ' Compare what the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Eiis. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7) and Stob. (Eel. i. 180) ob- serve on the derivations of et/iap- liivn, Treirpafihri, Xpeiiv, MoTpai, KKuBii; alsoPs. ^mi.DeMundo, GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD. PSOVIDENCE. 165 guage of poetry.' Nor was it difficult to show'^ Chap. that a divine government of the world followed of '- necessity from the Stodc conception of the perfection of God. Besides, in proving the existence of a {b)Argu- God by the argument drawn from the adaptation ^^p{l°™ of means to ends, a providential government of fection of the world had been already assumed.* Chrysippas . " also thought that a providential government of the mentfmm world could be upheld in the same strictly logical of nece^ manner by the theory of necessity. For must not «%• every judgment be either true or false?* And does not this apply to judgments which refer to future events, as well as to others ? Judgments, however, referring to the future can only be true when what they affirm must come to pass of necessity; they can only be false when what they affirm is im- possible ; and, accordingly, everything that takes place must follow of necessity from the causes which produce it.^ The same process of reasoning, applied to the (0 Argu- inner world of mind, instead of to the things of fg^e- ^°™^ the external world, underlies the argument from ^^''wwledge Qj God. the foreknowledge of God.^ If it may be said that whatever is true before it comes to pass is necessary, e. 7. The argument for Provi- thought differently, denee, drawn from the consensus ' die. De Fato, 10, 20. gentium in Sen. Benef. iv. 4, fol- " Alex. De Pato, p. 92, Orel. : lows another tack. rb Se Keyetv etKoyov ehai rovs ^ Homeric passages, which he deohs ri ^aofieva irpoetSivat . . . was in the habit of quoting. ical tovto \aii,$dvomas xarairKevd- ' See Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 76. (ew ireipSo-flai Si' outoS to vivra ' The two are generally taken €| avwyKits re yiveffSai koI koA' together. etfiapu.ev7}v oiSre AAtjAcs o{?t€ e£?- ■* Aristotle and thePeripatetics \oyoy. 166 THE STOICS. Cha?. VII. (e) Argu- ment Jrom the exist- ence, of dimnation. (3) The idea of Providence deter- (a) Provi- dence as necessity/. it may also be said that whatever may be truly known before it comes to pass is necessary. To these arguments may be added a further one to which the Stoics attached great importance — the argument from the existence of divination.' If it is impossible to know beforehand what is acci- dental, it is also impossible to predict it. But the real key to the Stoic fatalism may be found in the maxim, that nothing can take place without a sufficient cause, nor, under the given cir- cumstances, can happen differently from the way in which it has happened.^ It is as impossible, ac- cording to the Stoics, for anything to happen dif- ferently from what has happened as it is for some- thing to come out of nothing.^ If such a thing were possible, the unity of the world would be at an end — that unity consisting in the chain-like de- pendence of cause upon cause, and in the absolute necessity of every thing and of every change.* The ' Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 162; De Fato, 3, 5 ; Diogenian (in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 1 ) : Chrysippus proves, by the existence of di- vination, that all things happen Ka6' etnapfiivriv; for divination ■would be impossible, unless things vpere foreordained. Alex. De Fato, c. 21 ; ot Se vfivovvTes T^v fiavrLK^jV Kol Kari rhy auruy \6yov ft6vov fftfi^ffffloi Xe70vT-ey aurV Kol Ta^T77 iriffTei tov trdura ■naff el/iapiifyriv ylveffBat xp'^f^'"'!, K.T.\. 2 Pint. De Fato, 11: /toTa Sh rhv ivavrlov [Kdyov] fidKiffra fiev Kol irpSnov Avai io^eie rh ixTjbey h/airias ytyifcBai, &\\ck koto irpoTjyovfjLevas curias ' SetSrepor Se rh (piirei ^loiKeLcrBai r^vSe rhv KdtTfiov, ffii/xTTVovy Kal (rvfiiraOTJ ahrhv avT^ hvra. Then come the considerations confirmatory of that view — divination, the wise man's acquiescence in the course of the world, the maxim that every judgment is either true or false. Hemes. Nat. Horn. c. 35 : el yh.p TUP avTuv aiTiuv irepietT- TiiKirup, &s ' Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 46 : Singulis fx^'" T'' '"P^ ouTou, § iis alrltp non adest [Jupiter], ettamen Tim ffvyfiprriTat ■ /iTjScc yiip avanlcus et causam et manum omnibus /i^T€ etvai /iilTe yiveffSai rav in dedit. Cfc. N. D. 66, 167: Magna T^ K6ffii<( Si^ rb liifiev eivoi Iv Dii curaut, parva negligunt. fluTiji a,woKi\vii,evov re xal K^xapia- Ibid. iii. 35, 86 : At tamen minora fifvov TUVTrpoyeyov/iTav a,TT&VTav Dii negligunt . . . ne in regnis iuunraaScu yap xaX SiaipeiffBai xal quidem reges omnia minima ^rjKeVi rhv KSafwv €va fieueiv ciel, curant. Sic enim dicitis. Karci jiiav rd^ty -re Kal oMovoniav 168 THE STOICS. Chap. VII. the universe, in the first place, to individuals only secondarily, by virtue of their connection with the universe, as being contained in the universe, and having their condition decided by its condition.' The Stoic notion of Providence is therefore entirely based on a view of the world at large; individual things and persons can only be considered as them- selves dependent parts of the universe, (c) Diffi- The Stoics were thus involved in a difficulty "neMwUh ''^I'ich besets every theory of necessity — the dif- the theory of neces- sity. (a) State- ment of ficulty of doing justice to the claims of morality, and of vindicating the existence of moral respon- sibility. This difficulty became for them all the greater the higher those claims were advanced, and the greater the number of persons who were brought under the lash of their condemnation." Chrysippus appears to have made most energetic efforts to overcome this difficulty.^ He could not allow the existence of chance, it being his aim to prove that • Cicero uses the following argument to show that the pro- Tidential cai:e of God extends to individuals : — If the Gods care for all men, they must care for those in our hemisphere, and, consequently, for the cities in our hemisphere, and for the men in each city. The argument may he superfluous, but it serves to show that the care of individuals was the result of God's care of the whole world. M. Aurd. vi. 44 : ei \Av a%v i&ovKiiaax'ro ircpl IjUtv Kal Tuv ijiol ei- \6yrwv ol 6so\, Ka\as ^^ovKeiaav- TO . . . €1 S^ fi^ i^ov\ei(ravTO kot' iSiav irepl inoS, irepl ye tuv Koipuv irdt/Tois i^ovKeiffavTOy ols /car' i'iraKo\oi6ri(Tiv Kal ravra ffvfi- fiali'ovTa affTrd^eirOaL Ka\ (TTepyetv o^d\a. Similarly, is. 28. It will he seen that the Stoics consider that the existence of divination, which served as a proof of special providence, was caused by the connection of nature. ' As Mex. fitly observes. ' The great majority of the Stoic answers to iroWk fr)T^/ioTa