^'V. CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Cornell University Library BD411 C14 1861 Phleaophy of the infinite: a treatise o I olin 3 1924 028 931 082 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028931082 PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. PBINTED BY THOMAS COKSTABLE, EDINBURGH, FOR MACMILLAN AND CO. CAMBPIDGE. Dublin : WILLIAM ROBBETSON. Bdinbchgh : BDMONSTON AND DOUGLAS. Glasgow : JAMES MACLEHOSB PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE : A TREATISE ON MAFS KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFINITE BEING, IN ANSWER TO SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON AND DR. HANSEL BY THE EEV. HENEY CALDEEWOOD, GEBYPRIARS UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, GLASGOW. Otfre T] iriffTts dvev yvdjaeias. SECOND EDITION, GBEATLT ENLARGED. MACMILLAN AND CO. ©amfiriBge : AND 23, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, Hon&on, JOR/b?Y PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. In the present edition, this work is very greatly en- larged. Besides contaiaing a distinct reply to the letter of Sir W. Hamilton, it embraces an answer, in detail, to Dr. Mansel's Bampton Lectures on the Limits of Reli- gious Thought. The course which the discussion has taken, since the publication of the former edition, has convinced me of the need for entering with much greater fulness into the consideration of those fundamental principles, to which I had previously been contented to appeal. I have accord- ingly attempted a careful examination into the nature and authority of our belief in the existence of the Infinite Being ; the relation of faith and knowledge ; and the characteristics of knowledge and thought. The chap- ters on these subjects may, I hope, prove an important addition. The only change of view to be noted, concerns our conception of Time and Space. The conclusions which I have been led to adopt, are sufficiently indicated in the chapter demoted specially to the subject. Every criticism which has come under my notice, vi PKEPACB TO THE SECOND EDITION. has received very patient consideration. The results of protracted reflection, must now be judged by my readers. I cannot allow this edition to pass into the hands of the public, without expressing profound reverence for the memory of Sir W. Hamilton, and a strong sense of the loss which the cause of Philosophy has sustained by his removal. The letter which he addressed to me shortly after the appearance of my volume, has been for some time before the public in the Appendix to his Lectures on Metaphysics ; the answer to it is to be found in the Appendix to this edition. The conviction that he could not be long amongst us, was the main inducement to me to adventure upon an early publica- tion of my views, that he might have the opportunity of replying to the arguments employed, if he thought fit tp do so. The letter which I had the honour to receive from him, is a valuable fragment ; and, though it has not abated my opposition to his doctrine, no antagonism of opinion can alter the ardent aff'ection I have cherished for my revered preceptor. I have to express my obligations to my brother, Mr. John Calderwood, Edinburgh, for his aid in revising the proof-sheets, and for some contributions to Appendix B ; and to Mr. John Gibson, Hamilton, for the carefuUy prepared, synopsis in the Table .of Contents, a,nd for the Index, besides help in the work of revision. H. C. Glasgow, lith March 1861. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. The work now presented to the public is intended as an illustration and defence of tHe proposition, that man has a positive conception of the Infinite. It is an attempt, by a careful analysis of consciousness, to prove that man does possess a notion of an Infinite Being, and, since such is the case, to ascertain the peculiar nature of the conception, and the particular relations in which it is found to arise. The discussion, therefore, belongs essen- tially to the sphere of the higher Metaphysics, and involves a course of speculation on many points not generally agitated by our Scotch philosophers, and even on some which have not hitherto, so far as I am aware, been contemplated in the philosophy of this country. However great is the fondness for truths and how- ever strong the desire for its attainment, it is felt as an unfortunate characteristic of aU our researches, that we have to advance to the determination of positive truth, in the midst of the conflict of contending opinions. This I have found to be painfuUy the case in the present in- stance. As I have prosecuted the argument in defence of what I firmly believe to be truth, I have found it necessary to differ from Sir W. Hamilton to a degree vni PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. which is painful to one "who has been indebted to the instructions of that distinguished philosopher. I feel for Sir W. Hamilton a degree of esteem and respect which can be thoroughly appreciated only by those who have listened to his prelections. Notwithstanding this, how- ever, I have endeavoured to pursue my investigations concerning the Philosophy of the Infinite, with, that -love of mental science, and that independence of thought, which have been imbibed under his influence, and which it is his peculiar honour to cultivate. And, although I have come to results difiering widely from those of Sir W. Hamilton, I know too much of the spirit of his philosophy to imagine that he will regard it as unbecom- ing or disrespectful. I have not the presumption to suppose that I have completely examined, and uneriingly determined, all the points involved in a question so difficult and mysterious. My end has been gained, if I have made some contribu- tion to the Philosophy of the Infinite, and have started speculations which may lead to the closer investigation of a theme so important and so grand. H. C. EuiNBUKGU, September 1854. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Statement of the Question, Natural inquiry, what are the limits of thought ? how it arises : the mind, though conscious of its own limitation, also recognises a Being, Infinite and Unrestricted — Apart fi-om his relation to this Infinite Being, man's existence inexplicaUe — What the nature and extent of this relation ; at once the most interesting and difficult question in Philosophy — The soul's intense and unquenchable longing after this knowledge — Have we a 6eZJe/in the Infinite Being? if we have, can we pass from the region of Faith to that of Knowledge ? As to the first question, two con- tending psirties ; as to the second, two parties — Seeming contradiction be- tween the Logical and Psychological answers to the question of possible Knowledge : reconciliation — Four opinions concerning the Uncondi- tioned. Kant's theory : a regulative recognition of the Infinite ; his docti-ine self-contradictory — Schelling's : sinking of consciousness in the Absolute ; baseless and absurd — These two to be set aside — Cousin's and Hamilton's : what? how connected with the preceding — Occasion of the present work — Quotation from Morell, expressive of the general feeling regarding Hamilton's Theory — Purposa of the present chapter, to state the question, and the grounds of its discussion — Hamilton and Cousin agree in admitting a necessary helief in the In- finite — Hamilton's view : denies the possible Knowledge of the Infinite ; how ; supported and developed by Dr. Mansel — Grounds of this denial ; thought only of the l^elative — " The Infinite as in thought," is conver- tible with ''Infinite thought," but not with "thought of the Infinite" — No one affirms the former absurdity : any number of contradictions may be evolved from it, but to no purpose — The possibility of a Knowledge of the Infinite as existing, the true question ; Hamilton at once denies and affirms it — Cousin's theory: ttie Finite and Infinite necessarily known together, as co-relatives ; it contains a central truth, though encumbered with much matter, useless and untenable — His doctrine of the Imper- sonal Eeason, false — Though upholding his central doctrine, the present theory differs materially — Statement of the author's views : negative view as well as positive — Positive : Sphere and method of inquiry ; Psychological ; why ? facts of consciousness bearing on the qiiestion ; primitivehelief in the Divine existence; how evolved ; knowledge im- mediate: mediate knowledge through finite existence ; partial, but cap- able of indefinite increase— Negative view : man cannot rise from the CONTENTS. finite to tlie infinite, by an indefinitely magnified image ; that the cog- nition of the " Unconditioned" is that of T6 "B:- Kal Hav, denied ; that the Ahsolute, if known, must be adequately known, denied ; a part of the infinite can not be known, because He is One — Theory more espe- cially opposed to Hamilton's — His definition of the Unconditioned base- less ; a mere abstraction cannot restrict us — Mansel has followed out Hamilton's speculations, and gone farther — Dangerous tendency of the speculations of both — what here essayed, . . ... CHAPTER II. Belief in,the Existencb op One Infinite Beinq. Upon what authority is the Divine existence affirmed? — Belief precedes knowledge : natural order of inquirj' — Consciousness reveals self and not- self: Idealism and Materialism equally self-contradictory — Man desider- ates an explication of existence, external, internal — Facts to be ex- plained manif ; Problem necessarily one — It must refer to all finite existence : error of natural theologians, one-sidedness — Paley : objective argument: subjective, 1, metaphysical, Clarke ; 2, moral, Sir W. Hamil- ton — Danger of this unnatural division of the problem ; leads to apparent insufBoiency and doubt — However, all acknowledge other evidence besides what they have specially set forth, excepting Hamilton — His state- ments : mental phenomena said alone to require a Divine Cause ; his qualification; position denied — Matter not contradictory of mind ; not tending to Atheism : Hamilton inconsistent — True process of thought regarding this problem — The hypothesis of eternity of matter was pre- sented to meet the question concerning the origin of evil, not the pre- sent ; metaphysically contradictory — The occasions on which our Belief - in the Infinite is awakened : Belief Natural and Necessary — Criteria of Necessary Beliefs applied — 1. This belief, like other first principles, rises when required, but not otherwise ; this condition of manifestation modi- fies the application of the two following tests — 2. This belief is necessary ; the necessity metaphysical, not logical : the belief belongs to man, as man : (1.) most men believe in God's existence, apart from all arguments for it ; (2.) arguments insufficient : A priori proofs involve a petiiio principii: Clarke's examined: arguments from design likewise invalid; from a, finite effect we cannot infer an Infinite cause : (3) the Atheist is a self-contradiction, out of harmony with himself and the world : meta^ physical and logical necessity : that the belief may be denied is no ob- jection — 3. This belief is universal : remarkable it should he so, con- sidering the first condition : conscience requires the recognition of God ; diverse and low views of Deity the natural result of moral degradation ; no objection, but rather a confirmation : Dr. M'Cosh denies the position here held— His "cumulative" theory of the belief in the Infinite ex- amined ; insufficient — Our belief is in an Infinite Personality : Dr. Mansel contradicts himself on this point — Importance of the admission of this belief by the Hamiltonian school : a great defect of their system is want of explicitness on the relation of Faith to Knowledge ; this of CONIENTS. xi PAGE utmost moment in tbe 4etermination ,of the controverted question — Statetnent of JlamiltQji's views,, eomewliat uncertain; of Dr. Hansel's, clear — Cbnclusions from their admissions : ,1. " Infinite", dpes not denote a mere negation of thought, hut the. Supreme Being; this sweeps away Hamilton's distinction of the Absolute and Infinite : 2. The Infinite is not the sum of existence; this subversive of much German speculation, and of many of Hamilton's and Mangel's. reasonings : 3. Not a Being of Infinite extension ; the false basis of many speculations thus swept away ; God has no parts : 4. Exists in relation, and in distinction from finite existence ; this overturns many of Br. Mapsel's contradictions,: 5. The Infinite can act and be unchanged : 6. Our belief does not deny the possibility of an essential relation within the Deity — Examination of contradictions said by Dr. Mansel to belong to the conception of the Infinite and Absolute — Conclusion, . . .... 29 CHAPTER III. The Pbovikce op Faith as related to that op Ksowledge. Impoitance of the subject : its compass ; distribution — I. The Provmae of Faith : its determination essential to the present inquiry — Method pro- posed, positive and negative — 1. What Faith includes — (a) It simply and absolutely afSrms ; this true of our belief in the Infinite — (6) Faith , receptive,' and declaratory, not constructive — If Faith declares that a thing is, it must reveal what it is, as distinct from other objects of con- sciousness— Dr. Mansel's view examined; Faith only " regulative and practical" according to him; his inconsistency — Faith makes revela- tions more or less full, according to the exigency of inquiry : this ac- counts for the obscure and meagre views of the Deity amongst savages and uiiinquiring minds — 2. What Faith excludes. — (o) Does not vindicate its own revelation — f}}) Faith does not reconcile its deliverance with any other standard of truth — II. The Selation hetween Faith and Know- ledge — Knowledge and Belief harmonize, even coalesce, but never con- tradict each other — 1. Knowledge prior in time — 2. Faith the basis of Knowledge — 3 . Faith is more extensive than Knowledge : in a twofold aspect ; (a.) As giving a wider revelation ; (6.) As not only heyond, but above Knowledge, authoritatively — 4. Faith and Knowledge are mutual complements, and necessarily connected — 5. They harmonize ; the mind is one — (a.) In so far as Faith underlies Knowledge, the harnaony is evident — (b.) In so far as it outstretches Knowledge, the harmony is not fully perceptible, but unquestionable ; all difficulties arise from the limi- tation of our cognitive powers — Three guiding maxims : 1. We are to seek all possible harmony between our Knowledge and Faith ; 2. What distinctly contradicts our Faith, is to be denied of the Deity ; 3. "^^Tien the harmony cannot be discovered, a contradiction cannot be affirmed — 6. All Faith impHes Knowledge ; a contested point ; destructive of Hamilton's doctrine of the Infinite — His inconsistency ; be treats of our beliefs as cognitive, and as primary conditions of intelligence — It is im- possible for Faith to regulate action without regulating thought ; Dr. Mansel's view untenable : the dogma of negative thinking supposed xii CONTENTS. PAGE to explain the apparent inconsistency — Our necessary belief in the In- finite Being involves an immediate Knowledge ; this statement to be tested only by an appeal to consciousness — We attain a mediate know- ledge of God through His works, and of Him as Infinite— T^he Absolute as such, a cause— Our belief in the Infinite God rises at once ; the knowledge, primary and immediate accompanying it, is unfolded gra- dually ; its development is the result of observing and generalizing under the guidance of our primary conviction — Faith is the basis of all reasoning concerning God — Conclusion ; the progression of Philosophy and Theology, ... 99 CHAPTER IV. Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Distinction of the Infinite and Absolute. Necessity for the present considerations ; the opposition of Hamilton's theory ; that thought can only transcend the relative in two ways — This theory is beside the question — The origin of the theory ; arrived at by a logical process— The Absolute, whole and part, Hamilton seeks, are in no sense absolute — His use of terms — The Infinite is also the Absolute, and his Absolute is not really such — Hamilton asserts that these two are con- tradictions ; all other philosophers identify them — The tei-m Absolute properly denotes the unrestricted ; Hamilton disciiminates another Absolute, the completed, perfected, finished— This definition is really not contradictory but inclusive of the Infinite ; for completeness is not a specific difference — There is no " Unconditionally Limited," which is a contradiction in terms — We cannot reach, by Hamilton's process, a whole which is not a part of a greater, but by reaching the Infinite ; such a whole, so constructed, would not be absolute — We cannot think of an " Absolute part" simply because thought cannot be of nothing : again, " part " is a relative term, and, therefore, there can be no "ab- solute part " — That which is " completed," must have been incomplete, therefore Hamilton's Absolute is an evolution of the Relative; Hamilton's Infinite and Absolute are not the boundaries of possible thought — The true Unconditioned or Absolute is unrestricted, but not unrelated ; that it is such, is assumed by Hamilton and Mansel — As applied to God, the Infinite denotes iUimitation ; the Absolute, independence; the Uncon- ditioned, both — Mansel's definitions coincident ; overturn his own theory — The Infinite, as predicated of God, not quantitative ; Mansel frequently evinces a. materialistic notion of the Infinite — The Infinite can be regarded as consisting of a limited number of attributes ; con- cerning this, our faith makes no positive declaration ; Mansel's illustra- tions materialistic, and wholly irrelevant — The Deity is not conceivable as "the sum of all reality;" Strictures on Mansel's statements — The Absolute, as absolute, can be a cause ; the contrary view combated — The Absolute can exist in relation ; God is related, though not the Eelar- tive — Because " the finite is out of the Infinite," it does not follow that "the Infinite is conditioned . . .finite" — Conclusion; the soul finds relief in rising from these subtilties of logic to the revelations of Faith, 158 CONTENTS. xiii CHAPTER V. The Characteristics op Knowledge and TiiouaHT as bearing on THIS Subject. Tlie main strength of the opponents lies in their assertion, that the condi- tions of knowledge and thought exclude any knowledge of, or thought concerning the Infinite : hence the importance of the present inquiry — I. Knowledge is simple recognition — Its characteristics and conditions are : 1st, The conscious relation of the mind with an ohject : this does not exclude a knowledge of the Infinite, for He can exist in relation : Relativity, as to the mind, simply involves the presentation of an object : as to the object, it does not involve any limitation of it, or influence upon it, etc. — 2d, Objects recognised by their qualities ; in themselves, immediate knowledge ; by their efiects, mediate : knowledge of the Deity, in both ways — 3d, Knowledge proportionate to cognitive power: all knowledge is finite : Finite knowledge of the Infinite possible — Examination of Hamilton's criticism of the Author's view — Knowledge not necessarily complete — Finite knowledge not necessarily of the Finite — Examination of Hansel's criticisOi of the Author's illustration : his objections apply to all material illustrations : how these are to be used : there may be a limited knowledge of the Infinite, as of the world : the points of analogy alone to be regarded — Knowledge may be of various degrees : distinguished by Leibnitz — Our knowledge of the Infinite, clear, distinct, but partial and indefinite — Partial, but not of a part : the Hamiltonian view erroneous — Indefinite, but clear and distinct ; and must be for ever indefinite, because the Deity is illimitable — The inde- finite, purely subjective ; the infinite, objective : Hamilton and Mansel, in many instances, lose sight of this fundamental difference : criticism of Hansel's theory — Our knowledge of the Infinite is capable of perpe- tual development — 4th, Knowledge either a priori or a posteriori in its origin — Without thoifrrmer there could be no knowledge of the Infinite : Hobbes, by his philosophy, shut up to Atheism : Locke, in holding at once that all knowledge comes from experience, and that we have an assurance (necessary belief or cognition) of the Divine existence, is in- consistent : Bishop Browne's analogical theory is equally insufficient — 5tk, Knowledge by analogy is mediate : Analogy implies a priori Knowledge, and a comparison of the resembling objects, consequently Browne's theory involves apetitio principii: further, we can judge of the extent of the analogy ; Browne's inconsistency ; we can decide where it fails ; we possess a knowledge of God above the analogical ; Browne is forced to bear testimony to this — Concluding remarks — II. Thought is comparison — All objects of knowledge inay be objects of thought ; therefore, the Infinite may be an object of thought — " To think is to condition," only in a subjective sense : we do not " think a thing" but of a thing, and to think is not to embrace the object of 'bought : this is a false assumption of the Hamiltonian philosophy : his vhree positions, as they should stand; interpose no obstacle to thought concerning the Infinite— Thought, in its two functions. Comparison and xiv CONTENTS. PAGE Conception, may be of an object, not under any general notion— (Con- cerning Eelativity of thought, see under Eelativity of knowledge)— Im- portant characteristics of thought— ls«, All things known may he matter of thought : consequently we may think of the Deity— 2cZ, The degrees of thought are those of the knowledge of its object : therefore our thought of the Infinite One is clear, distinct, but indefinite— We have an indefinite conception of an Infinite object : Hamilton's objection i considered ; Hansel's indefinite ;■ thought is not merely the withdrawal | of thought from limits, but may result from the nature of the object— 3d, All thought is positive : the Hamiltonian doctrine of Negative Thinking considered ; unfounded and inconsistent ; its bearing on the pre- sent discussion— The notion of the Infinite could not arise from negative thinking— God is not " unknown or unknowable ; " Eeligion is " a func- tion of thought" — Our knowledge of God is capable of endless advance- ment, but not of perfection ; God is neither wholly unknown, nor can be wholly known ; If we know and can think of the Infinite, we can reason concerning Him : Hansel's theory overturns all Systematic Theo- logy — Hamilton and Hansel's contradictions : if according to the Hamil- tonian theory, we can have no knowledge of the Infinite, we tiever can : if man, as finite, cannot now know God, he never can : Scripture does not support, as these authors would make appear, the Negative Philo- sophy,, . . • • 198 CHAPTER VI. Time and Space. The necessity for considering Time and Space as related to the present dis- cussion — Time is the consciousness of sequence in our mental states, . and involves memory — The mind also perceives ouitoarcZ succession, but the consciousness of Time does not thus arise — Every mental exer- cise involves the recognition of Time — There can ^e no conception of piire Time, for the mind is not conscious of simple succession, but solely, of successive mental states — Outward measures of succession — Con- sciousness of duration arises from our consciousness of personal identity, and is measured by succession ; there is also a perception of outward duration — Time is the duration of changing existence — The Infinite is out of Time, because unchangeable, but the successive changes of created existence may be a measure of His duration — It is objected to a kiiowledge of the Infinite that Time is a condition of the mind — The saccessiye changes of consciousness do not exclude a knowledge of the Unchangeable One; the mind can and does recognise enduring, un- changing existence^ — Divisions of Time are classifications of events according to succession — Time can only be pro-gressive, and is accord- ingly divided into past, present, and future — The present only is real' — A regress, though impossible in reality, maybe imagined, and in' this way, aided by our natural belief, we can form a conception of the Divine duration — So as to the future^Both excursions of thought end indefinitely ; we may combine them to form a conception, clear, distinct, OONTENTS. XV PAGE but indefinite, of the Eternal One — Summary of the author's views ; retractation of his former doctrine — ^Thought concerning the successive duration of created existence leads up, of necessity, to the Infinite Being — Time not being a separate existence, Hamilton's logical experiments with "whole parts," are inadmissible and nugatory; illustrations of this — That . the present can only be conceived of as a negation is absurd, and contradictory of consciousness^-" Time and Space must he excluded from the notion of the Infinite," but this does not prevent our knowledge of Him — Dr. Mansel's objections on this ground examined^ 1. Succession in consciousness does not involve transition or mutation in the objects recognised ; 2. Duration does not imply succession — Space ; the relative distance between objects, and only existent as a re- lation, being nothing in itself — Its consideration in no way concerns the present discussion — JRetractation of position formerly held — Space is " a certain correlation of existence ; " this being admitted by Hamilton, overturns as contradictory all speculations concerning it, as " a whole," "an infinite," "an absolute," etc.-^The experimental attempt to reach the ■ limits of Space is purely an efibrt of the imagination, and the "progres- sion " is imaginary — " Time and Space must be excluded from the no- tion of the Infinite," 299 CHAPTER VII. The Knowledge op the Ihpinite as Fikst Cause. The belief in the Deity as First Cause rises up into consciousness in reflect- ing on His works ; of the same extent in all minds ; involves a know- ledge capable of development in each — God as Infinite exists, and is known in relation — Hamilton's definition of the Infinite is incompatible with a belief in an Infinite God ; as denying all possible relation, is not applicable to Him, but to a mere ahstraction — Cousin's opinion of this theory — It involves a false method of philosophizing : the true method is psychological ; an inquiry into the facts of consciousness^- What the ■ true theory of causality — Hamilton makes our notion of cause and efiect spring from a mental imbecility ; we cannot conceive of anything as non-existing at any prior period, though we may think of it as under other forms— Merits of his theory — Objection ls«, It is possible to think of an object as previously having no existence ; illustration — 2d, There is no recognition of power as an element of our notion — Zd, It wrongly asserts a plurality of causes for every effect ; results from Hamilton's definition of a cause : contrary to the use of speech, and to our distinct consciousness — Atli, The causali judgment does not rise only on the presentation of " a new appearance ; "illustration ; — 5iA, The theory does not account for our necessary belief in a cause for every finite existence, apart from any immediate change — dtJi, The effect does not contain the cause (or " causes ") ; is not " the complement of being " previously making up the "concauses:" the material is not a cause; the efficient, or cause proper, does not exist in the effect; example — 1th, The theory incomplete, being physical merely : applied to mental XVI CONTENTS. PAGK phenomena, it fails in explication — 8th, Applied to speculation concern- ing the First Game, it involves Pantheism — It is not a truthful tran- script of consciousness : in thinking of creation, we do not conceive of God evolving the universe out of Himself: the case put; illustrated; Hamilton's objections answered : the universe is conceived of as an addition to existence, though we cannot think how it came into ieing : God as alone existent is conceivable, as Hamilton substantially admits — " Ex nihilo nihil fit," true or false, according to what is implied — ^th, The theory excludes a First Cause — Hamilton's hypothesis of a First Cause is borrowed ; on the contrary, his theory implies an interminable series of causes or evolutions — Further, this theory is falsely based on a mental weakness — The author's doctrine of Causality, the one commonly held : viz., That the belief in a cause for every event, is a first principle of the mind — The principle of causality is a belief in a cause, not only for every change in existence, but for every finite existence — The only adequate and tenable theory — Hamilton's objections answered : 1. It does not necessitate two contra- dictory deliverances of consciousness — 2. It does not imply a denial of Free Will: " Willing to will," is not a fact of consciousness — Cousin's theory ; that God the First Cause, must act ; cannot be vindicated ; falls before Hamilton's criticism — Every man is conscious of two pri- mary cognitions or beliefs ; every finite existence is caused ; secondly, the Deity is uncaused : we cannot think of an eternal chain of causes — Examination of consciousness ; must believe in some uncaused Origin — If it be said this is a fabrication, the appeal is to consciousness The existence of a First Cause may be denied, and has been, through abs- tract speculation, apart from the consideration of facts ; as also have some denied the existence of the Universe ; in both cases, the man's living contradicts and nullifies his theorizing — The existence of the First Cause transcends proof, being a natural revelation— Our belief involves that the First Cause is Infinite and Absolute : Mansel, contrary to his own definitions, asserts "the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause :" The relation of the First Cause to the effect is not necessary, and therefore not opposed to His Absolute nature— The apparent diffi- culty in Hansel's question, " How can the Infinite hecome that which it was not from the first? " arises from a confusion of language ; these con- siderations of his are irrevelant and perplexing — Belief in a self-existent First Cause implies knowledge— What is the nature of this knowledge : .:' -' What is our knowledge of a cause ?— It is the cognition of those qualities in an object, which involve power to produce the effect : sometimes, when the cause is not recognised, an hypothetical cause is framed irom experience— The process by which we are led up to the First Cause— The primary knowledge of the First Cause involved in our necessary be- liefs can only be developed through the contemplation of His works, . 336 CONTENTS. xvii CHAPTER VIII. The Khowledqe op the Infinite Beins as Mobal Goveenok. PAGE Man, moral as well as rational : God revealed in man's moral nature ; this nature requires a knowledge of God — Cognitions of Eight and "Wrong are fixed and universal — Utilitarian theory considered ; preposterous : happiness cannot he the sole end of life : the Eight often counter to our desire of happiness — The true theory founds morality in first principles : the complement of these constitute Conscience— The con- sciousness of responsibility implies a belief in, and hnowledge of, the Su- preme Being: we must know Him to whom we are responsible, as a distinct Personality : experience corroborates this — The moral emotions imply the same — On any other hypothesis, these mental phenomena are inexplicable and contradictory — Summary of facts of consciousness : God revealed m Faith as infinitely and absolutely holy and just : faith im- plies knowledge : knowledge supplies materials for a conception of the Supreme Moral Euler ; not attained by Mansel's method — Hansel's ar- guments considered : " word-juggling" on Relativity : Personality not limitation : all our notions of personality not from our own — There is a belief in an Infinite Personality: we have a knowledge of the same : there may be a "conscious self" and not a "thinker" — Mansel's view of our conceptions of personality false : there cannot be a " representative notion" without presentative knowledge — Eesult of Mansel's specula- tions ; that the Supreme Moral Governor is not revealed as the Infinite, false — Summary — Many questions concerning the Deity unanswerable — Conscience gives us our primary conception of the Deity, . . 388 CHAPTBE IX. The Knowledge op the Infinite Beinci as the Object op wokship. Man, by nature, a religious being, having feelings of reverence and dependence ; these not disproved to be natural because not invariable and absolutely universal — Man's religion may be theoretically denied, but such denial is contrary to the common consciousness of mankind — If this position be true, evidence of this element of human nature will be found in universal history: the inquiry prosecuted; no nation without a religion and some notion of a divinity ; images of wood, metal, and stone, only representa- tive ; illustrative fact ; testimony of Poetry, — of Philosophy — Religion possible only on the basis of intelligence ; Prayer the exponent of our Knowledge of the Infinite God^Browne's analogical theory of worship is obviously insufficient ; it is the worship of a god of our own making — ^Knowledge the true ground of worship ; many mysteries, however, beyond knowledge ; Prayer — ^Worship is not irrational, as the deniers of positive knowledge must maintain — Contrary to Mansel's doctrine — Eeligion is a function of thought, because of knowledge ; to this all xviii CONTENTS. PADS History bears witness ; Hansel's inconsistencies — There can be no reli- gious consciousness of the finite— The assertion, that God does not answer prayer, as the Inftmte, unfounded — Conclusion, . . . 419 CHAPTER X. The Testimony op Soeiptdke conoeksinq Man's KsowLKDaK OP THE Infinite. The opposing disputants have naturally turned to the Bible on this question ; but have generally erred in collating only such passages as seemed to favour their views — Two classes of Scriptural statements, 1. Concerning a knowledge we have ; 2. Concerning truth beyond our knowledge — The author's purpose ; difiSculties — The Scriptures, a Eevelation, not a proof, of the Bivine existence — presuppose our Natural Belief in God's Existence — At the same time, they admit men, in the folly of sin, may deny God — What do they reveal? God's Eternity ; Immateriality; not to be imaged forth'; His Infinitude — Concerning our possible knowledge, the Scriptures teach (1.) that God is Incomprehensible ; the word "unsearchable ; " the Apostolicv prayer for the Bphesian Church shows the hnoivledge of the Unsearchahle One in harmony with his Incomprehensibility; the word " comprehend : " they invariably teach (2.) that man has a knowledge of the Infinite God — The passage (1 Cor. xiii. 9, 10, 12) considered ; Hamil- ton's interpretation erroneous; Scripture does not sanction the possi- bility of Infinite Knowledge in the future ; Dr. Mansel's remarks on the passage, not correct — Bishop Browne's exegesis nearer the truth — Two clauses Teferring to our present, two to our future knowledge ; mutually explanatory — Concerning our present knowledge ; it testifies that we see, see darMy, and through a glass — -'Be alvly/iari, inadequately : parallel usages — The manner in which we know God ; " by means of a mirror," by a reflection, through His works — 'Ek /iipovs, in part, imperfectly : Hamilton's faulty exegesis examined — The passage testifies of our future knowledge ; " face to face," directly, and not merely through His works ; "even as also I am known" — Two questions: how are we known? and how is God's knowledge of us likened to our future knowledge of Him? — How are we known? parallel passages reviewed; conclu- sion. We shall know without moral hindrance : Hamilton's render- ing preposterous— Summary of results ; paraphrase of the passage : the. Bible does not teach that we shall receive new mental powers or laws, hut that the change wiU be in circumstances and in our moral nature — Corroborative passages : Old Testament testimonies ; Moses' (Dent. iii. 24), Jacob's (Gen. xxviii. 16, 17) : Mansel misinterprets it— New Testa- ment testimonies : Paul's at Athens (Acts xvii. 22-3) ; God known among the heathens (Eom. i. 18-21) — The anthropological analogy of Scripture implies a higher power of cognition; and so, our Lord's parables; iUustratiou — Christians are said to have a special knowledge of God ; it is this knowledge that is denied of unbelievers — Summary of Scriptural teaching : barrier to further knowledge, moral — Eevelations concerning the future : a fuller manifestation of Divine glory ; man CONTENTS. xix PAGE perfect, but still finite, and under the same conditions of intelligence Hamilton's iaconsistency on this point; his false exegesis: Hansel's contradictory views ; his theory of future knowledge not supported by Scripture — Eesults of the Hamiltonian Philosophy — Statements of the author's views 43^\ CHAPTER XI. CoNCLCDiNo Statement. Practical bearing of this discussion upon Philosophy and Theology — If the Negative Theory, or "Philosophical Ignorance" theory, be adopted, much hitherto regarded as valuable in the literature of Philosophy and Theology must be abandoned — Psychological consistency of the theory which vindicates a knowledge of the Infinite Being — General argument of Dr. Mansel against the doctrine here maintained ; reply — Quotations firom Howe in support of author's view ; quotations from Bishop Butler in support of the same — Warrant for free and reverent exercise of our powers of knowledge and thought concerning the Infinite Being — The three maxims, previously stated, for the guidance of human inquiry concerning the Infinite, insisted upon — All inquiry must be under the guidance of Faith — The value of the Divine works as illustrations of the Divine glory — Clear deliverance of philosophy from all that violates our necessary belief — Origin and nature of the mysteries in philosophy : some may be solved hereafter, others never can be — Warning against dogmatism in reference to the apparent want of harmony between facts known and truth believed — Plea for a reasonable latitude in the exer- cise of independent thought, if thoroughly subordinated to faith — " The knowable of God" — Prospect before us in the Future World, . . 480 Appehdix a, • • 497 Appendix B, . . . . . . . • • 512 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. CHAPTEE I. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. In the midst of the various ejfforts of the human in- tellect, the question is an interesting one, — what are the limits of our powers of thought ? We make our obser- vations in reference to the various phenomena presented in the external world, and in the world of mind. We speculate upon the many relations which present them- selves around and within us, and we seek to discover what are the laws by which aU things are regulated. This is an inquiry natm-al to the human mind, and one which is prosecuted from an inherent desire to find the explanation of the great system in which we exist. If we look upon the outer world, field after field of obser- vation opens before us ; and the objects of our thought increase, tUl the mind is startled by their magnitude. Still, these objects have boundaries, and aU things before us are subject to certain conditions. Let us turn our attention to the world within, and immediately we are I. I, ^ 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. conscious of similar restrictions, though of a kind suited to the special nature of the mental sphere. Starting from a point, the circle of observation may go on enlarg- ing ; with vigorous effort the mind may endeavour to embrace the expanding objects of thought; but still it is conscious of limits. Yet, its behef and knowledge rise above the things of matter. While, ia the consciousness of the limits of its own power, it looks upon a finite world, it is also conscious of the belief in an Infinite Beuig, who is subject to no restrictive conditions, but is all-perfect in Himself. Man exists in relation with the Infinite. The fact of his existence, and the end of his being, can be explained only on this admission. The union is indissoluble. Man cannot sever it, even though he would ; nor can he, by any effort of the mind, even conceive himself restricted to a relation with what is merely finite. The Infinite, therefore, is a prominent object in thought and feeling ; and its recognition has exercised a powerful influence throughout the entire history of the race. What, then, is the nature of our relation to the In- finite ? Upon what ground do we hold the existence of one Infinite Being ? What is the nature and extent of our knowledge of the Infinite God ? These are the questions which open up the important subject now to be con- sidered. The inquiry thus indicated is the highest to which the mind can aspire. The question is deeply interesting, but, at the same time, it is confessedly the most difficult within the range of philosophical investiga- tion, whether its purpose be to determine the precise limits within which the mind is restricted, or to discover STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 3 what knowledge of the Infinite is competent to man, if, indeed, such a knowledge be at aU possible. In ad- vancing to such an inquiry, we rise above the limits of this earthly scene; our thoughts venture to approach the presence of that Being, who regulates aU things, yet is Himself unrestricted ; and we endeavour to obtain some knowledge of that God, who can never be com- pletely known. The difficulties of the attempt are striking. The mind must be on the stretch ; the ques- tion is shrouded in mystery ; and yet, its very difficulty nerves us to the attempt, — its very mystery allures us onwards in the inquiry. Man desires to know something of the Infinite. He longs to trace his relation to the Supreme, to contemplate his connexion with the Omni- potent, to meditate on the attributes of the Divine Being, till he is lost ia their infinitude. He feels rising within him the increasing and unquenchable desire to know more of that God, and he often passes away in imagination to that eternity, throughout which the desire of his heart wiU continue to be gratified. On the very threshold of this inquiry, we are met by such questions as these : — Can we have any certainty of the existence of an Infinite Being ? And if we have the conviction of his existence, can we pass from the region of simple bdief, and obtain a knowledge of the Infinite One ? Can we have any knowledge of a God, Infinite in all his attributes ? The moment the first of these questions is raised, we are hurried into the arena of strife, and find ourselves among a host of combatants. In surveying the position, a most singular conflict is seen. There are two parties 4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ranged against each other. But, on both sides, each indi- vidual combatant is engaging in the strife according to his individual inchnation. On the one hand, there are arguments a priori, and arguments d posteriori, to estabhsh the existence of one Supreme Being ; and, on the other, there are the enemies of that truth, seizing upon the weapons of its friends, and with these seeking to gain the victory. Passing from the primary question concerning the existence of one Supreme Being, we come to the ques- tions regarding the possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite God. Here again we are in disputed territory, where it is impossible for us to reach any conclusion except in the face of opposition. We are vigorously assaUed with questions concerning the powers of our miud, the nature of the Infinite, and the possibility of it becoming the object of thought. In endeavouring to answer those which refer to our knowledge of the Infinite, it may seem that the decision of the judgment is at variance with the dehverance of consciousness ; that there is a want of harmony between the logical and psychological aspects of the matter. If the question were presented, — have we any notion of the Infinite, or rather, have we any notion of an Infinite Deity ? — the immediate deliverance of our consciousness would be, that we have, and that our notion of the Deity is not a mere negation of a finite creation, but something positive. If, however, the question were presented for determi- nation by the judgment, — can the finite embrace the Infinite ? the answer would as readily come forth that the thing is impossible. On the one hand, we should be STATEMENT OP THE QUESTION. 5 ready to answer, that we have a positive conception of the Infinite Being; and, on the other, we should as readily reply, that the Infinite cannot be embraced by the finite. In a psychological point of view, we might answer the question in the aflSrmative ; in a logical point of view, we might answer in the negative. Is there, then, any discrepancy in these decisions ? Or, are these different results obtained by viewing the question in different aspects ? Is there a common point of observa- tion from which both may be seen to harmonize ? When we examine consciousness, do we find that we have a notion of the Infinite, though not an adequate conception, such as is obtained by embracing an object ? And when we view it in a logical aspect, do we find that our deci- sion only involves the conclusion, that we cannot embrace the Infinite in aU its extent 1 If so, then the two posi- tions are perfectly compatible. These questions, however, have not been raised for the purpose of giving them immediate attention, but simply with the view of bringing the subject more clearly before the mind of the reader, and revealing some of the points which require careful consideration. The question is viewed in an aspect piu-ely philosophical, requiring that its determination be based upon the dehverance of con- sciousness, and be in accordance with the conditions which regulate human thought. The speculations of philosophers on this question have been various, and strongly conflicting. Some have asserted that a knowledge of the Infinite is possible, while others have resolutely maintained that it is entirely beyond the reach of human intelligence. Those who. 6 . THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. have admitted to man a knowledge of the Infinite, have adopted very different theories to account for its origin. Sir William Hamilton has given " a statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the Uncon- ditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought," which may be quoted, as presenting the matter with aU the precision for which that philosopher is so distinguished.^ He says: — "These opinions may be reduced to four, — 1st, The Unconditioned is incognisable and inconceivable ; its notion being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived. 2d, It is not an object of knowledge ; but its notion, as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the conditioned, dd, It is cognisable, but not conceivable ; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the Absolute, but it is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the different. Uh, It is cognisable and conceivable by consciousness and reflec- tion, under relation, difference, and plurality."^ The Jirst is the opinion maintained by Sir Wflliam Hamilton himself ; the second is that adopted by Kant ; the third is the doctrine of ScheUing; and the fourth is that of M. Cousin. The opinions of Sir WiUiam Hamilton and M. Cousin are those which are received at the present day, and divide philosophers generally. It wiU therefore be neces- 1 For the sake of any reader -who may is subject to no conditions, limits, or re- be unacquainted with the nomenclature strictions. The terms will he fully dis- of the question under discussion, it may cussed hereafter, and Sir William Hamil- he remarked that the terms Infinite, ton's definition of them considered. Absolute, and Unconditioned, are syno- ^ Sir William Hamilton's Discussions jiymous, and are used to designate what on Philosophy, p. 12. STATEMENT OP THE QUESTION. 7 sary, in the prosecution of the argument, to consider specially the opinions maintained by these two philoso- phers. In the meantime, a few remarks must suflS.ce regarding the other two theories, which have been more generally set aside. Kant attributes to man the power of reason in two different relations ; the one is speculative reason, the other practical reason, and the principles of both are adopted and applied by the judgment. Speculative reason is conversant with what man can know; practical reason, with what man ought to do. According to Kant, speculative reason does not give to man a knowledge of the Infinite God, but on the contrary, expressly involves the impossibihty of such knowledge. On the other hand, he asserts that practical reason gives to man the recognition of God, as a necessary postulate for proper moral action. Eeason, therefore, according to Kant, both denies to man the possibility of any knowledge of God, and, at the same time, affords to him a knowledge of God. On the one hand, it expressly aflfirms the impossibihty of any conception ; and, on the other, pahns upon man a certain fiction, under the name of a conception of the Infinite God. The latter it does, not because the existence of an Infinite Being is an absolute truth, but for the very philosophical reason, that such a conviction is necessary in order that man may exist as a moral being. Know, then, man ! that thy reason affords thee the recognition of an Infinite Being, only as a regulative principle of thy life. Who placed that principle there, reason doth not aflBrm, and it is no business of thine to inquire ! No wonder that when Kant proclaimed such a doctrine he 8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. failed in gaining general assent to it. There are few wto will become so far the dupes of their own abstrac- tions, as to condescend to speak of "the notion of a supreme Being," as " in many respects a very useful idea." The theory of Kant manifestly destroys itself, and in its nature tends to the destruction both of philosophy and rehgion. To make the statements of reason contradic- tory, is to prove it deceitful, and, consequently, is to overturn the basis upon which a sound philosophy rests. It is to assert that God has given us a power which deceives us, and consequently, to shake the confidence of that faith in God, which is the foundation of true religion. The doctrine of Kant must, therefore, be set aside as inconsistent with itself, and consequently un- tenable. The doctrine of ScheUing is, that we obtain our knowledge of the Infinite by sinking back into a state beyond consciousness, in which we are identified in being with the Absolute, and thus rise to a knowledge of it. It is difficult to say whether the presumption or the absurdity of this theory affords the greater cause for astonishment. To retire from consciousness, and consti- tute one's self a part of the one Absolute Being, is ven- turing to a degree of presumption happily not very common. Viewed as a philosophical theory it is baseless. If ScheUing thought fit to trust that he had obtained a knowledge of the Absolute, while he was not in a state of consciousness, — ^if he was contented to beheve that he had received a knowledge of the Infinite, which could not be retained on returning to a state of consciousness, it is not at aU probable that he shall obtain many sup- STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 9 porters. Men are not accustomed to assert that they possess a knowledge of which they are not conscious. Nor need it cause much concern how ScheUing passed from the finite to the Infinite ; or, being once Infinite, .how he again returned to the finite, since this important matter cannot be made known. This, at least, seems inconceivable. Setting aside the theories of Kant and ScheUing, there remain only those of Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin : Sir William asserting that we can have no positive knowledge of the Unconditioned, its only notion being a negation of the Conditioned ; M. Cousin assert- ing that we have a knowledge of the Infinite by relation, difiference, and plurality. Sir W. Hamilton's theory very clearly bears traces of the influence of Kant ; and that of M. Cousin as clearly shows the influence of ScheUing. As an explanation of the forms which their respective theories bear, I should say that Sir W. Hamilton has more traly set himself to devise a theory which should retain aU that is valuable, and avoid aU that is weak, in Kant's doctrines ; and that M. Cousin has more truly attempted to reagh ScheUing's conclusion, while avoiding his inconsistencies ; than either of them has set himself, without prejudice, to an adequate interpretation of the facts of consciousness. In reference to the discussion raised by these con- flicting theories, Dr. MoreU says, — " Here we have three minds standing severaUy at the head of the respective philosophies of Britain, France, and Germany, assuming each a difierent hypothesis on this subject, wMle Kant, the Aristotle of the modem world, assumes a fourth. 10 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Under such circumstances, he must be a bold thinker who ventures to pronounce confidently upon the truth or error of any one of these opinions."^ I lay no claim to the character of a bold thinker, — I certainly desire that my thinking should be characterized by all caution and humility ; at the same time, fidelity to recognised truth demands earnestness in maintaining it. I have no wish " to pronounce confidently" upon a subject so difficult. The following observations are presented as a contribution to the Philosophy of the Infinite, and if they tend in the slightest degree to elucidate the subject, and instigate to its further study, they shall have gained their end, though the result of the study thus increased should leave them far behind. In entering upon a subject so difficult, I am conscious not only of feelings of diffidence, but of regret that I am constrained to take up a position opposed to that of Sir WOliam Hamilton. Let me at once confess, that this fact, on the one hand, causes me the deepest regret ; and, on the other, strongly convinces me of the necessity for taking the step. Eespected and admired as Sir Wilham has been, and possessing, as I rejoice to .acknowledge, the very highest claims to such esteem, I cannot but regard it as unfortunate that he has propounded a doctrine con- cerning the Infinite so startling and hazardous. It is to be regretted that the influence of the first philosopher of the present day, should be given so strongly to maintain the doctrine that we can have no knowledge of the In- finite. And when there is an oft-repeated admission that the arguments of Sir W. Hamilton on this question ' History of Modern Philosophy, n. 504, second edition. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 11 are unanswerable ; when there is from others, only the feeble expression of a doubt that there may be error somewhere ; and when some are found taking up an opposite doctrine, without being able to give a sufficient reason ; it is obvious that there is room for further in- vestigation, and the importance of the question demands that such investigation be careful and minute. As a specimen of the manner in which the doctrine of Hamilton has been received by m^ny, the following quotation from Dr.. MoreU may be given. Considering the article on the Infinite as it first appeared in the Edinburgh Review, he makes the following observations : — "We freely confess that we are not yet prepared to combat, step by step, the weighty arguments by which the Scottish metaphysician seeks to estabhsh the negative character of this great fundamental conception ; neither, on the other hand, are we prepared to admit his inference. We cannot divest our mind of the behef, that there is something positive in the glance which the human soul casts upon the world of eternity and infinity."^ This statement is made by Dr. Morell in the first edition of his History of Philosophy, and again repeated in the second edition, and it is only a specimen of what has been com- monly felt and expressed on the point.: I confess to great uneasiness in reference to the conclusion at which Sir William Hamilton has arrived, — that man can have no knowledge of the Infinite God. It is mainly to test the validity of this conclusion that I have entered upon a strict examination of the arguments adduced. In order to accompHsh my purpose, it is of the utmost 1 History of Modern PhMosophy, n. 504, second edition. 1 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. consequence in this preliminary chapter to present a clear statement of the question here brought under review, and of the nature of the discussion essential for its satisfac- tory solution. In attempting this, I shall endeavour to give a careful and comprehensive representation of the conflicting opinions of Sir W. Hamilton and M. Cousin, with due regard to their most recent expressions of opinion, and thereafter, I shall indicate shortly the doc- triae maiutained in these pages. The trustworthiness of the following criticisms must depend upon a faithful account of the respective opinions of the two great champions who come into conflict concerning the possi- bility of any knowledge of the Infinite Being. In so far as the doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton is concerned, the need has become more urgent, since, in the letter which he was kind enough to address to me in reply to my argu- ments, and which is now pubhshed along with his Meta- physical Lectures,^ he expresses his regret that his doc- trines have been " so much mistaken." As in that letter he has been candid enough to state in what respects I have mistaken his doctrines, I shall allude to the points in proceeding. At the very outset here, it is necessary to observe, that Sir W. Hamilton and M. Cousin agree in affirming that we have a necessary belief in the existence of the One Infinite God. The statement of this fact is, for the present, sufficient ; the value of the admission in connexion with this discussion shall hereafter appear. Passing, then, from the region of faith, to that of knowledge, the real question in dispute arises, — "Can ' Lectwres, ii. 530-535. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 13 we have any knowledge of the Infinite Being ? " To this question Sir W. Hamilton answers most emphatically ia the negative. As accuracy here is of so much moment, the reader will accept a somewhat extended quotation of his own language. He says : — " The miud can conceive, and consequently can know, only the limited, and the con- ditionally limited. The unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the unconditionally Umited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed to the mind ; they can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself is realized ; consequently the notion of the unconditioned is only negative, — negative of the conceivable itself."^ Here there is the distinct assertion that the mind " can know only the limited," and therefore cannot know the Infinite ; but at the same time, it is aflBrmed that the mind has a " negative notion" of the Infinite, which is declared to be negative of the conceivable itself. In the Lectures on Metaphysics, he says, — " We must believe iu the Infinity of God ; but the Infinite God cannot by us, in the present limitation of oui* faculties, be compre- hended or conceived."^ More briefly, in. his letter to me, he has said, " I deny that the Infinite can by us be knonm."^ This doctrine has been fuUy accepted by Dr. Mansel in his work on the " Limits of EeHgious Thought." How truly he. has accepted the doctrine of Hamilton, may appear from such statements as these : — " The Infinite, from a human point of view, is merely a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is pos- 1 Discussions, p. 13. " Lectwes on Metaphysics, n. 374. ' Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 530. 14 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. sible :"^ and again, — The "Absolute and the Infinite are, Kke the Inconceivable and the Imperceptible, names in- dicating not an object of thought, or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible."^ Here, then, the Infinite is declared to be nothing better than the Inconceivable. As Dr. Mansel has appeared as the avowed vindicator of Hamilton's theory, I shall take frequent occasion to refer to the views which he has expressed on the question here under discussion. The quotations just given indicate the ground on which the impossibility of our knowledge of the Infinite Being is asserted. Such a knowledge is declared incon- sistent with the conditions of human thought. The following passage is sufiicient to explain the basis on which this assertion rests : — " Thought cannot transcend consciousness : consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and an object of thought, known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each other ; while, independently of aU this, aU that we know, either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the difierent, of the phenomenal."® Such, then, is the basis on which Sir W. Hamilton rests the assertion that the Infinite cannot be known ; and, as the purpose of this preliminary statement is exposition, not criticism, I con- tent myself with presenting the above as a fair and fuU declaration of his theory. He enumerates the conditions of thought, and thence deduces the startling conclusion, that all knowledge of the Infinite Being is impossible. • Limits of Religious Thought, second edition, p. 72. - Ibid. p. 95. ' Disaussions, p. 14. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 15 Here, however, it is necessary to consider thejirst of those points on which it is alleged I have made a mis- take in representing this doctrine. I give the passage, at fiiU length. He says : — " I do not think that you have taken sufficiently into account, that the Infinite which I contemplate is considered only as in thought ; the Infinite beyond thought being, it may be, an object of belief, but not of knowledge. This consideration obviates many of your objections."^ This is to me a most surprising position from which to attempt to turn aside my criticisms. According to this, all that he intended to affirm and defend was, that we cannot have infinite thought, and therefore we can have no thought about the Infinite Being ; in other words, there can be no Infinite in thought, therefore the Infinite God cannot be an object of thought. In reply to this mode of defence, I grant at once that Sir W. Hamilton has maintained and vindi- cated the assertion that there can be no Infinite in thought ; but I undertake to prove that he has not re- stricted himself to this point, and that the discussion cannot be thus restricted. This is a vital point in the controversy, and, in fact, affects the very natiire of the discussion itself. There is, therefore, need for being somewhat particular here. Sir W. Hamiltori's defence is this, — " The Infinite which I contemplate is considered only as in thought." If this be aU, the discussion is at an end, and there can be no need for writing six sentences on the subject, because no one ever asserted that human thought could in any case extend to such a measure as to become infinite thought. ' Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 530. 1 6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. No one ever dreamed of such a thing. If those who deny to man all knowledge of God, mean to afl&rm nO' thing more than the impossibility of the finite mind exer- cising infinite thought, or embracing the Infinite Being within its own consciousness, they might have saved the world the discussion which they have raised. If this be an that is meant, the plainest man may well scorn the metaphysical subtleties which have been uttered in con- nexion with such a seK-evident proposition, and cast them aside as completely worthless. Where in the "statement of opinions which may be entertained re- garding the unconditioned (absolute and infinite) as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought," which Sir W. Hamilton has himself drawn up,^ could he have found the declaration with which he professes exclusively to have entered into conflict, that the finite mind is capable of infinite thought? Not in Kant's theory, for he affirms that the Infinite is not an object of knowledge at aU ; not in the theory of ScheUing, for he declares that in order to know the Infinite, we must rise above thought, yea, above consciousness itself, and become one with the Absolute ; not in Cousin's doctrines, for his whole theory is counter to such a supposition. Sir W. Hamilton has expressly stated it as M. Cousin's theory that the Infinite is " cognisable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality." If we turn to Cousin himself, we find him saying, " Reason is in man, yet it comes from God. Hence it is indi- vidual B.n^ finite, while its root is in the Infinite."^ It 1 Discussions, p. 12. 2 The True, the Beautiful, and the Oood, Wight's Translation, p. 107. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 17 is this finiie reason which he speaks of rising " from the visible to the invisible, from the finite to the Infinite." He condenms with the utmost severity the theory which would suppose that the mind does not know God, " if it knows him only in his manifestations and by the signs of his existence," and which says that, in order to know him "it must know him directly," in fact, must be "united to him!" There can certainly be no dispute about the fact, that the existence of infinite thought in a finite mind must be a violation of aU the laws of human thought. If any man is inclined, however, he may write down the proposition which every man denies, either in the abstract form. The finite may embrace the Infinite ; or in the concrete. The finite mind may embrace the Infinite Deity, and from that as a fundamental postulate, he may legitimately deduce any number of contradictions he pleases. This is an exercise in which Dr. Mansel specially delights,^ though to what purpose, it seems im- possible to determine. But further. Sir W. Hamilton, so far from restricting himself to the needless assertion, that the Infinite cannot exist in thought, is constantly transcending it, . and ad- vancing to a very different assertion, which really raises the question in dispute, that is, the impossibility of any limited knowledge of the Infinite God. He cannot define the Infinite, without passing to the consideration of an object really existent apart from the mind ; and he can- not proceed to reason about it, without annihilating his own defence. He does, indeed, at times, endeavour to give an explanation of the use of the word Infinite, which ' Limits o/Meligicms Thought, pp. 49, 50, 58, 59, et passim. B 18 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. applies only because it is impossible for the mind to have infinite thought. Thus he says, — "The Infinite and Absolute are only the names of two counter imbecilities of the human mind:"^ and so Dr. Mansel says, — "The Infinite is merely a name for the absence of those con- ditions under which thought is possible."^ But both authors soon transcend this view of the Infinite, when- ever they begin to reason. Hamilton no longer speaks of the Absolute and Infinite as mere " imbecilities " of the human mind, but now he afiirms that one of these "must be admitted as necessary,"^ that is, our "im- becility " must have a necessary existence. In proceed- ing to criticise M. Cousin, he is found boldly declaring what the Absolute must be,^ and arguing that the Ab- solute " as known," must be different from the Absolute " as existing." Nay more, both in the Discussions and in the Lectures, he considers the possibility of our knowledge of the Deity, and here I suppose it will be confessed that there is a reference to something more than to the Infinite, "considered only as in thought." And finally, to put the matter beyond all dispute,' in the letter which he has addressed to me combating my views, he says, — " Nothing can be more self-repugnant than the assertion that we know the Infinite through a finite notion, or have a finite knowledge of an infinite object of knowledge." Here, then, is something entirely difi'erent from the infinite considered only as in thought, — here is the assertion that the Infinite, as existing, can- not be the object of human knowledge. This is the true - jjm^u^„m,«,, p. 21, » Discussions, p. 15. 2 lAmits of Religious Thought, p. 72. _, 4 jud. p. 33. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 19 question under discussion. Sir W. Hamilton has main- tained that a finite knowledge of the Diviae Being is impossible : I maintain that such a knowledge is a fact in consciousness. The discussion concerning the Philosophy of the In- finite cannot be restricted to the question whether the finite mind can be possessed of infinite thought. Sir W Hamilton has not succeeded ui restricting it thus, and still less has Dr. Mansel. The discussion really involves such questions as these : — Can we have any knowledge of that God m whose existence we necessarily beheve ? Can we form intelligent views concerning the nature and government of the Infinite Being — views which shall satisfy our mind of the surpassing glory of his natiu-e, and the perfect justice of his government 1 Or, can we only repeat certain propositions, sajdng that we believe them to be true, while we can never understand what they mean, nor draw a single inference from them ? What Hamilton says, in answer to this inquiry, is clear enough fi-om the last quotation. His theory affirms, — 1 st, that man cannot have infinite knowledge ; and 2d, that man cannot have a finite knowledge of the Infinite God. The former, nobody denies ; the latter, and only impor- tant part of the theory, is controverted in these pages. It is now time to proceed to a statement of M. Cousin's theory, which is the only one in Hamilton's enumeration of the different views on this subject that involves a positive knowledge of the Divine Being. I am far from acknowledging Cousin as the representative of aU who resist the doctrine that the Infinite is incognisable, yet I consider that the balance of truth is to be found with 20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the French philosopher, when he affirms a positive know- ledge of the Deity. As the apostle of Eclecticism, indeed, he has failed in his great purpose, and men remain as much persuaded as ever, that to travel through the various systems of philosophy, and gather out of each the mo- dicum of truth which they seem to possess, in order to construct an Eclectic system out of the accumulated mass, is not the true method of philosophizing. Passing this, however, let me state his doctrine concerning the Infinite, with which alone I am at present concerned. He agrees with the theory already explained, in acknowledg- ing that " an act of thought is only possible where there exists a plurahty of terms." At the same time, he affirms that our notion of the finite gives us also the notion of the Infinite. We caimot know the one without the other ; they are necessarily related in thought, as well as in existence. His theory therefore is, as Sir W. Hamilton has stated, that the Infinite is " cognisable and con- ceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality." While, however, he is found contending for what seems to me the true side of the question, he is an unsafe defender of it. I do not think that he has strictly confined himself to a delineation of consciousness. On the contrary, he has encumbered the doctrine Avith matter altogether untenable, and has thus laid it open to assault, so that, at a cursory glance, it might seem that even the citadel itself had been con- siderably shaken. I admire the gTeat central truth in the philosophy of M. Cousin, but I regard various points, which he has made to cluster around it, as so many out- posts, worse than useless, which ought to fall to atoms, STATEMENT OP THE QUESTION. 21 and which have so fallen under the eflfective assaults of the Scottish metaphysician. In endeavouring to establish that we have a knowledge of the Divine Being, he turns to the fundamental prin- ciples of truth and morahty, implanted in the mental nature, and because they are not subject to our will — because they are given to us, and not gained by us — ^be- cause they belong necessarily to aE men — he declares reason impersonal, and in a certain sense divine. This doctrine of the impersonality of human reason I utterly repudiate. It is but justice to M. Cousin, however, to say, that this is only a partial view of his theory ; for he does not shut himself up to only one Une, by which to obtain a knowledge of the Infinite. Take, for example, the following as a general statement : " We do not per- ceive God, but we conceive him, upon the faith of this admirable world exposed to our view, and upon that of this other world, more admirable stiU, which we bear in ourselves. By this double road we succeed in going to God."^ He does not assert such a doctrine as the exist- ence of an Infinite in thought ; he does not aflirm that we are able to comprehend the Infinite. In contradic- tion of such a view he says : " In order absolutely to comprehend the Infinite, it is necessary to have an infinite power of comprehension, and that is not granted to us. God, in manifesting himself, retains something in himself which nothiQg finite can absolutely manifest ; conse- quently, it is not permitted us to comprehend absolutely." I would remark further, that when M. Cousin passes from our knowledge to speak of the Divine nature, he often ■ ' The True, Beautiful, and Good, p. 109. 22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ventures beyond what the extent o£ our knowledge warrants, as when he subjects the Divine intelligence to the same conditions as human intelligence, and when he defines the Absolute in such a way as to imply that God must create. These are points in his theory which seem to me untenable. While, therefore, I uphold the central doctrine in the system of M. Cousin, it will at the same time be seen that I differ from him so very much as to make the theory here presented quite distinct. Having now given an exposition of the views of Sir W. Hamilton and M. Cousin, in such a manner, I hope, as to do justice to both, it now remains for me briefly to indicate what seems to me the truth on this great problem in philosophy. In doing this, it will be necessary, for the sake of maintaining clearness throughout, as well as meetiag adverse criticism, to state what I do not hold, as well as what I positively affirm. And here the reader will expect nothing more than the statement of opinions, the vindication and elucidation of which are left for subsequent parts of the work. In this, as in every other philosophical question, the inquiry is restricted exclusively to an examination of consciousness. This is the sphere of aU research ; and, in examining consciousness, our duty is to state aU the facts found there, bearing on the matter before us, and to refrain from any assertion which cannot be vindicated by an appeal to this tribunal. I hold, therefore, that if a knowledge of the Infinite be possible, it must be at- tained in harmony with aU the necessary conditions of our consciousness. What these conditions are is a matter of comparative agreement among philosophers. Knowledge STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 23 in all its forms, as embraced within consciousness, implies the conscious relation of the mind with the object of thought, and the recognition of that object according to the laws of mind. " Whatever we know, or endeavour to know — God or the world, mind or matter, the distant or the near— we know and can know, only in so far as we possess a faculty of knowledge in general ; and we can only exercise that faculty under the laws which control and limit its operations."^ In declaring, therefore, that we have a knowledge of the Infinite God, I assert that such a knowledge is attained in harmony with the con- ditions of our knowledge, and not " on the daring, the extravagant, the paradoxical supposition, either that Human Reason is identical with the Divine, or that Man and the Absolute are one."^ Whatever knowledge we have must be within consciousness, and this determines the sphere within which all our examination must be conducted. In thus determining the sphere of examination, the method of research is also fixed. The question concerning the possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite must be settled by a careful analysis of consciousness. If, on the one hand, it be asserted that we have a knowledge of the Infinite Being ; and if, on the other, such a knowledge be denied, the appeal must be to our consciousness, and to that alone. In every such reference the result can be satisfactory only on these conditions, — that everything is stated which consciousness reveals, and that nothing is aflfirmed which consciousness does not warrant. If the facts of consciousness are not fully recorded, the answer ' Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, i. 61. ' Ibid. ii. 375. 24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. is defective. It may be true and trustworthy so far as it goes, but it is only partial. If assertions are made which have no verification in consciousness, the answer is thus far erroneous. The method of inquiry, then, is nothing more than a careful interpretation of conscious- ness. This method Sir W. Hamilton has not followed, and therefore his theory is, as it seems to me, in many of its parts, a misrepresentation of consciousness. I shall now give a brief outline of what appear to me to be the facts of consciousness bearing upon this dis- cussion. I hold that there is in the mind a necessary belief in the existence of one Infinite Being. The con- sciousness of our own existence and the recognition of finite objects, give the occasion for bringing this behef into actual consciousness. If we seek an explanation of our own being, or that of the objects around us, we are forced upward till we rest in our faith in the Divine existence. This faith in one infinite all-perfect Beiug accordingly becomes the regulating principle in the whole current of our thought; in other words, our thought concerning this great Being, and the works of his hand, is determined by the faith which we find im- planted in our nature. The object of faith becomes in some sense the object of our knowledge and thought, that is, in so far as our limited knowledge and thoughts can be engaged with such an object. Our faith in God's existence necessarily implies a certain knowledge of God as existing, for, in truth, aU faith implies knowledge. Our necessary conviction involves a certain necessary cognition. •'^It further exercises a regulative authority over all our reflections concerning the dependence of the STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. 25 creatures on th,e Creator. The theory here maintained, therefore, is, that, as we have a necessary belief in the Divine existence, so we have a necessary, fundamental, or ongvaallc^wledge of his nature, which' knowledge is brought into consciousness, and unfolded there, according to the requirements of personal observation and reflection upon the revelation which God has made of himseK in his works. Further, as we have a knowledge of the Infinite Being, our understanding may be engaged on the ele- ments of our cognition, and we may form for ourselves a conception of the Infinite One, both clear and distinct, yet felt to be inadequate, though trustworthy in its nature, because resting on the authority of a bel^f native to the mind. To know the Infinite in aU its extent, must at all times be an impossibility. To assert that the finite could embrace the Infinite, is an absurdity too glaring to bear a moment's reflection. But a partial and ever-extending knowledge of God is possible for man. Such is an outline of the theory to be unfolded and vindicated in these pages. For the purpose of obviating mistakes, it is neces- sary to indicate some points not involved in the theory here maintained, which have been otherwise asserted, or severely criticised. I do not assert that our knowledge of the Infinite is obtained by commencing with a finite object, and gradually enlarging in imagination until we reach the Infinite. Such a theory would involve a two- fold error, that a finite object could be enlarged till it became Infinite, and that the Infinite can be the object of imagination ; both of which I deny. The Infinite^ as an object of knowledge and of thought, is entirelj^ 26 THE PHILOSOPHY OV THE INFINITE. shut out from the sphere of imagination, for there can be no image of the Infinite. I deny the possibility of rising from the recognition of a finite object, till the object contemplated, or the thought exercised, become infinite. "Departing from the particular, we admit," says Sir W. Hamilton, " that we can never in our highest generalizations, rise above the Finite."^ This I firmly believe ; but it is certainly a great mistake, if it be con- sidered that this shuts us out from all knowledge of the Infinite. Further, I do not " regard the notion of the Unconditioned as a positive and real knowledge of exist- ence in its all-comprehensive unity. "^ If M. Cousin ever held this as a part of his theory, which however I ques- tion, it has no vindication here ; but, on the other hand, I equally deny Sir W. Hamilton's assertion, that the "Absolute can only be known, if adequately known." And finally, by way of disclaimer, when Sir W. Hamilton says, — " It has been held that the Infinite is known or conceived, though only a part of it can be apprehended,"^, his remark does not apply to anything which is to be found in my statements. I hold that the Infinite Being as known by us is one and indivisible, and though our knowledge of him is only partial, it is not attained by the apprehension of a part of his nature. 'T With the convictions just stated in outline, it is clear that I am shut up to oppose the theory of Sir W. Hamilton. He has first laid down what he considers the conditions of thought, and though I am inclined to agree with his statement as a whole, I think he has indi- cated restrictions which do not belong to thought at all, IS, p. 15. ^ Ibid. p. 29. 3 Lectures, ii. p. 375. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION". 27 Having stated these conditions of thought, he next passes away from the sphere of all reality, and enunciates what he declares to be the true definition of the Unconditioned (though any one might weU ask how he discovered it), and then he affirms that the recognition of this Uncon- ditioned is quite impossible in harmony with the laws of thought. It is possible to confine us by an hypothesis to an extent much greater than we are in reality restricted ; it is possible to raise barriers which may seem to establish the impossibility of our obtaining or possessing any knowledge of what we can know ; nay, of what we do know. This I consider Sir William Hamil- ton has done in asserting the impossibihty of any know- ledge of the Divine Being. Instead of searching con- sciousness in order to determine whether we have any knowledge of Grod, he has passed by the facts of con- sciousness altogether ; and instead of presenting a view of the Deity as revealed to us, he has laid down a most gra- tuitous definition of the alleged nature of the Uncondi- tioned, for which there is not the least authority either in thought or in existence. In treating of the Infinite, he has dealt with a mere abstraction for the knowledge of which no one contends, which does not even exist, and by arguments, which are sufficiently valid as applied to the abstraction which he has himself enunciated, he has seemed to establish the impossibility of our obtaining any knowledge of the Infinite. Dr. Mansel has done more than follow Sir W. Hamil- ton. Both have lost themselves in a sea of abstractions, but Dr. Mansel, steering the ship which Sir W. Hamilton had previously piloted, has drifted farther from his 28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. reckonings than his master did before him. He has found it a hard thing to reconcile his wajward coxirse with the chart which he has acknowledged as the true guide. Man can have no knowledge of the infinite God! How strange a doctrine to reconcile with Bible teaching ! I am most strongly convinced that there is dangerous error in the course which Sir W. Hamilton has pursued, and Dr. Mansel has so boldly vindicated. With the ut- most earnestness, therefore, I address myself to the task of proving that the Infinite is a word unspeakably more precious in its significance to man than the Inconceivable;^ that we are not compelled to go through fife using nothing but unmeaning terms, when we speak of an In- finite God ; that human consciousness does not oscillate between counter "imbecilities," but involves a certain knowledge of the God whom we adore ; and that we are capable of advancing indefinitely in that knowledge, and thereby glorifying the Deity the more. • Maiisel's Limits of Religious Thcmght, p. 95. CHAPTER 11. BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF ONE INFINITE BEING. Before proceeding to discuss the question concerning the possibility of obtaining a knowledge of an Infinite Being, it is necessary to determine the authority upon which the existence of such a Being is asserted. The iaquiry here raised clearly supposes that there is a Being of infinite and absolute perfection, for it were folly to talk of the knowledge of an object which has no existence ; and if it be granted that there is an all- perfect Deity, it must be a matter of no small conse- quence, in conducting the present discussion, to discover the evidence upon which the admission is made, because such evidence must have a very important bearing on the possibility or impossibility of obtaining a know- ledge of his infinite attributes. Besides, in employing the one method already indicated for the guidance of the entire examination, namely, a careful and complete analysis of consciousness, the question which concerns our belief in the existence of the Deity is the one which comes logically first for decision. "In the order of nature," says Sir "W. Hamilton, " belief always precedes knowledge f^ that is to say, knowledge has in each par- .! • 1 Lectures on Metaphysics, I. p. 44. 30 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ticular instance faith as its basis, and all human know- ledge finds its resting-place on necessary belief. In en- deavouring to determine, then, whether human thought is concerned with the Infinite, it has first to be decided whether man has faith in the existence of one Infinite God, and if so, on what ground the conviction is held. As iateUigent beings, we are conscious of the recog- nition of two difierent classes of phenomena, the one belonging to an external world, with which we are con- nected; the other, belonging to the internal world of mind, in which we are conscious of our personal exist- ence, and where all thoughts, feelings, and desires are regarded as our own. There is, therefore, in conscious- ness, a clear and unmistakable classification of the facts recognised, which every man necessarily adopts ia the very exercise of his being, and which cannot be denied without a denial of the truth of consciousness on which every man acts. We are all conscious of the recognition of certain phenomena which are without us, that is, which do not belong to our own being, but to an external world ; and, on the other hand, we are conscious of cer- tain phenomena which do belong to our own being, — mental modifications which we call our own. This is the distinction between seZfand not-self, which is unmis- takably the first distinction involved in consciousness. Within this sphere. Scepticism is impossible, since it destroys itself in utterance, and contradicts itself in action. The man who doubts consciousness, at the same time trusts consciousness in declaring his doubt, and thereby prevents the need for any one contending with him. And besides, every attempted explanation of the BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 31 present state of existence fails, which either overlooks or contradicts one or other of these classes of facts, such as the Idealism, which blots out matter from existence, and affirms that mind is the only reality ; or the Mate- rialism, which takes its revenge by destrojdng mind en- tirely, and declaring that nothing save matter has any real existence. Idealism and Materialism are each par- tiial Scepticism, which it is impossible to vindicate. The facts of consciousness, involving the recognition of an external world and an internal,^ of material and mental existence, cannot be controverted. Fiuding, therefore, these facts in consciousness, the mind seeks an explanation of existence, both external and internal, as recognised by itself. Look, then, at the facts requiring to be explained. In order to do this, a more complete enumeration of the phenomena within the sphere of consciousness must be given. We recognise innumerable worlds around us, and that in which we dwell is contemplated as only one among a multitude. .^ Directing special attention to the world which we inhabit, as the one with which we are most familiar, we recognise it as a world of vast extent, with great varieties of surface, which cannot be altered or moulded according to human inclination ; while, connected with it, there are certain forces which we cannot control, and which are, neverthe- less, clearly obejdng fixed laws. Passing to another class of phenomena belonging to the external world, we re- cognise the singular provision it contains for supplying our bodily wants, so that there is a complete adaptation of our physical nature to the world in which we exist. Ad- vancing stiU further in'our observation, till we contemplate 32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the relation between the outer and inner world, we find ui the external world an adaptation to our mental con- stitution also, inasmuch as the various appearances of its surface, as well as all the forms of animal and vegetable life, are capable of rousing and gratifjdng in us the sense, either of the sublime, or of the beautiful. And finally, contemplating the mental phenomena alone, we discover the facts which are the most striking and important Here we find phenomena, belonging to our own being, which we recognise as essentially superior to everything merely external and material. Here are the powers of knowledge, bringing into subjection all external objects as matters of contemplation; here are fundamental beliefs, authoritative and final, not to be deduced from the widest experience ; here are the principles of moral rectitude, by which we are a law unto ourselves, the power of free- will, and the sense of obligation to a moral Governor ; and here are the feelings of dependence and reverential awe ; aJl of which together constitute the facts of our own mysterious personality. Such is a statement, in outline, of the co-existent facts, for which we must seek an explanation. They present to view a most complex accumulation of existences, among which each conscious intelhgence is a distinct personality, and yet all of them exist harmoniously in the constitution of one grand unity. Gather all these facts together as one object of contemplation, and the question is. How to account for their existence. The mind, while conscious that it is itself within this sphere, seeks an explanation of the re- cognised facts both belonging to the external world and the world within. The prohlem is necessarily one, and BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 33 cannot be legitimately divided into a series of problems, each of which shall give their partial contribution to the cumulative evidence warranting a general conclusion. Such a subdivision of this one great problem proceeds" on a mistake concerning its origin, and I humbly think that it has given a most unfortunate aspect to the whole of our hterature on this momentous subject. Let me ask the reader's careful attention to this point, which must appear one of very considerable im- portance. How does this problem concerning the exist- ence of the present system of things originate ? Not by the mind contemplating only the world without ; and still less by directing its attention only to a certain class of facts in the material world, as the chemist, the botanist, or the geologist may do : not by considering exclusively the phenomena which belong to the internal world; and still less by attending only to a certain class of facts in the mental world, as the logician, the metaphysician, or the moralist may do. Any one of these departments of inquiry may, indeed, present materials sufficient to raise the ques- tion in the mind ; but, so soon as it is originated, it becomes all-comprehensive, — that is to say, it embraces everything which consciousness recognises as existing within this limited world. Anything short of this is only a partial, and therefore an inadequate and illegitimate representa- tion of the true problem. The inquiry concerning finite existence, as known by us, is not fairly presented, if it be made to refer only to a part of what is knoAvn to exist. You may as well think to describe what human nature is, by speaking only of the mental powers, to the neglect of the physical frame, or by referring to the c 34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. bodily organs, without the sHghtest allusion to the mind. The problem, if raised at aU, must at once refer to all finite existence as known, and nothing can be supposed 'more gratuitous and unfounded than the attempt to separate one class of facts from another, as though the question could be restricted to some things known by us. And yet, if we look at the hterature of the question, do we not find that, for the most part, each writer has re- stricted his attention to a limited circle of facts, from which he has laboured to infer the existence of God ? In this way many of the arguments for the being of God involve only a partial and unsatisfactory view of the facts. We have those who look almost exclusively at the marks of design in the outer world, of whom Paley may be taken as the representative ; we have those who refer only to the fundamental conceptions of the human mind, and in their estimation everything must give way to an d priori argument for God's existence, of which class Clarke may be taken as an illustration ; and then we have those who elevate the mental phenomena in general, or some particular division of them, into the position of the only facts which can aff"ord a proof of the Divine existence, of which class Sir W. Hamilton is the most distinguished representative. He says, for example, " the only valid arguments for the existence of a God rest on the grounds of man's moral nature ;"^ and, again, he afiirms, " that the class of phenomena which requires that kind of cause we denominate a Deity is exclusively given in the phenomena of mind."^ This subdivision of the great problem is most unwarrantable, and tends, quite ^ Discussions, p. 623. » Lectures on Metaphysics, l. 26. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 35 unintentionally it must be acknowledged, yet not the less reaUy, to throw an appearance of insufficiency around the entire discussion. Inquiring minds, who have just raised the question for themselves, or who have had their early convictions shaken by doubts, betake themselves to the standard works on the subject, and read, it may be, on the argument from design, or on the d, priori argument, or on the argument from mental phenomena to the ex- clusion of the physical world altogether ; and while they are persuaded that there is a measure of force in the particular line of reasoning which they have considered, they have the uneasy consciousness that it does not satis- factorily decide the whole question. This must be the penalty of every attempt to divide into parts a great question, which must remain essentially one ; for if we are to satisfy the inquiry of the mind, we must include all the facts revealed to us in our consciousness. It is to be stated, however, in defence of those who have ad- dressed themselves to only a part of the question, that they have almost uniformly acknowledged that not only the facts to which they turn attention, but all known facts in the universe to which we belong, lead the mind to the recognition of the Divine Being. Sir W. Hamilton is an exception, as appears from the above quotations ; he speaks not only of certain arguments as " the only valid arguments," but,, what is stiU wqrse, he declares that the class of phenomena " which requires that kind of cause we denominate a I)eity is exclusively given in the phenomena of mind." This is an assertion which has no authority whatever, and so little did he find himself able to restrict the evidence in the exclusive manner indicated. 36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. that he has not advajiced twelve lines beyond the state- ment, before he is found saying, " that the study of the external world taken with, and in subordination to that of the internal, . . . may be rendered conducive to the great conclusion." In acknowledging this he embraces all the phenomena; but, in doing so, he destroys his assertion concerning a limited sphere of consciousness, within which alone the evidence for God's existence is to be found. What, then, is the consequence of Sir W. Hamilton describing mental phenomena as " exclusively" affording evidence for the existence of the Deity ? He speaks of the material world as not only presenting no evidence for the being of a God ; but, when taken by itself, as leading to a conclusion entirely adverse. His words are these : " The phenomena of matter, taken by them^- selves (you wiU observe the qualification, taken by them- selves), so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation."^ In accordance with this statement, he speaks of the " atheistic tendency" of the study of matter. Now, what authority is there for this assertion of an atheistic tendency in matter, regarded by itself? It supposes that matter can be contemplated, and the inquiry raised concerning its existence, without the slightest regard, on the part of the inquirer, to his own possession of intelhgence. Has Sir W. Hamilton forgotten, at tliis point, the. fundamental condition of thought, on which he has so strongly insisted elsewhere, that " consciousness is only possible under the antithesis ' Lectures on Metaphysics, i. 26. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 37 of a subject and an object known only in correlcdion, and mutually limiting each other ?" We cannot suppose that he had forgotten this, and therefore we must under- stand that he speaks merely of concentrating attention on the physical world alone, while the mind raises the inquiry concerning the origin of its existence. But we cannot conceive that any one, not wilfully attempting to shut his eyes to the truth, could be guilty of the folly of seeking an explanation of the origin of things, while he confined his attention to such a very limited sphere of observation. If any man can contemplate the phenomena of matter, in utter forgetfulness of his own exercise of thought, he may be left without anxiety to pronounce matter the only reality, and to call himself an Atheist. Let him get into raptures about the material world, and, grasping the dust in his hands, let him rejoice that he will soon be hke it,^ — nay, that he is at the very moment in all respects similar. The cause of truth cannot suffer, though he find such base satisfaction. Had he carried his reflections a httle further, he should have saved his reputation, by altering his conclusion. As it is, his fellow-men can regard him only as a fool, whose narrow reflections present a pitiful illustration of what Bacon has said, " that a little philosophy inchneth man's mind to Atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion." But this assertion by Sir W. Hanulton of the " athe- istic tendency" of matter implies, that if we withdraw our attention from our own exercise of intelligence, and fix it on the outer world alone, we shall find not only a want of harmony between mind and matter, but we 38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. shall find the one leading to a conclusion contradictory of that indicated by the other. The facts in the ex- ternal world are said to lead to the conclusion that there is no God ; while the facts of mind are said to declare exactly the reverse. On the supposition that God exists, one part of his works is made to contradict the other ; nay, is made to lead men to the monstrous conclusion that the Author of it has no existence. The basis on which this assertion rests is, that the outer world presents no signs of intelligence. What would Paley have said had he lived to read Hamilton's second lecture on meta- physics, in which it is taught that all the facts connected with the physical world, taken by themselves, lead to nothing else than Atheism ? With all deference to the high authority from which it comes, there is abundant reason for sajdng that a more groundless assertion could not have been uttered. That matter is not intelligent, every one grants ; but it cannot be questioned that matter may be made to assume forms, which are to us undoubted proofs of the action of intelligence upon it. And, if this be so, there are scattered around us, in mar- vellous profusion and variety, evidences of the work of a creating and disposing mind. What are the physical sciences, but structures reared by the long-continued labour of finite intelligence, to the glory of the supreme Mind, who had disposed the modes and relations of material existence in such a way as to admit of analysis and classification ? It is true, that we find dead matter subject to the operation of certain great laws ; but what warrant could this fact, taken by itself, give for an athe- istic inference ? If in any case the study of the external BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 39 world have an atheistic tendency, that tendency must be in the student, and not in the matter of his study. There are no rules of just inference which could warrant any one to conclude from the subjection of matter to certain fixed laws, that these are inherent in matter and not im- posed on it by a higher power. Every one must deny Hamilton's declaration, that " the phenomena of the ma- terial world manifest only the blind force of a mechanical necessity ;"^ and he himself quotes with the fullest appro- bation the statement of a French philosopher, who, when showing that philosophy originated ia the study of the physical world, says, " that the magnificent spectacle of the material universe, and the marvellous demonstrations of power and wisdom, which it everywhere exhibited, were the objects which called forth the earliest efforts of speculation."^ In truth, the history of philosophy itself, as sketched in Hamilton's own lectures, is a complete refutation of his assertion concerning the atheistic ten- dency of the exclusive study of the physical universe. But apart from this, I am most concerned to insist upon the principle, that it is in the highest degree unreasonable to separate the outer from the inner world, in any attempt to discover an explanation of finite existence. In this relation, an exclusive view of the external world is a wUfal limitation of the great problem which the human mind seeks to solve ; and the assertion that matter, per se, warrants an atheistic conclusion, is in every sense deserv- ing of condemnation, as not only groundless, but incon- sistent with facts, and fitted to mislead. While, however, Hamilton has made this strange affirmation, it is only ' Lectures on Metaphysics, i. 28. ' Ibid. i. 104. 40 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. fair to remember what has been akeady quoted m part, that he has added, " that the study of the external world taken with, and in subordination to, that of the internal, not only loses its atheistic tendency, but, under such subservience, may be rendered conducive to the great conclusion, from which, if left to itself, it would dissuade us."^ It is difficult for the external phenomena, or the study of them, to lose what they never had, but this statement goes far to take away the dangerous tendency of the former groundless affirmation, which should never have been written. Passing from this attempt to assert for a special class of facts an exclusive place in the great problem con- cerning the origin of finite existence, it is necessary to consider what the true solution of the problem is, and in what mode that solution is attained. The whole world of finite existence, material and immaterial, as known to us, raises within us the inquiry whence it has its being. It is impossible to rest satisfied with the fact of its exis- tence. Self-existent it cannot be. Everything around us is so liable to change, everything we look upon bears such clear marks of being corruptible, that it is impos- sible to assign to anything in the external world, an independent or uncaused existence. The supposition of the eternity of matter is self-contradictory. That which is eternal must be immutable, and no man can look upon the physical world, and think of it as free from influences afi"ecting the state of its existence, or as above the possibility of decay. The supposition of the eternity of matter was indeed a popular one among the ancients, 1 Lectures on Metaphysics, i. p. 26. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 41 but it was not adopted in the attempt to answer the simple question before us. How to account for the origin of evil in the world was the great difficulty in ancient speculation, and it was to meet this difficulty that the doctrine of the eternity of matter was proposed. In seeking to avoid the one difficulty, they ran into hopeless contradiction, making perishable matter eternal, and evil a necessary existence, thereby ending ia much greater perplexity than could have arisen from the simple acknowledgment of ignorance concerning the origin of evU in the world. To beheve that matter is eternal is to contradict the fundamental convictions of our mind, and no one could for a moment have maintaiued such a doc- trine, but for an ulterior end to be served by it. That the limited is independent, that the changeable is self- existent, that the perishable is eternal, — these are the transparent contradictions involved in the assertion of the eternity of matter. Look, then, upon the world so limited and corruptible, and yet so wonderful in beauty and grandeur, as the dweUing-place of the human family. Look upon man with his intellectual power, subduing all things under him, and making the forces of nature yield to execute his will, and mark thus the dominion which intellect has over matter. Look upon the moral nature of man, in- volving the great distinction between right and wrong in human conduct, as well as submission to authority enforcing that distinction. Look upon the religious nature of man, with the solemn awe which acknowledges a fear and reverence within, not due to any being around us. Look upon men in their social relations, influencing each 42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. other in innumerable forms, and regulating their conduct towards each other by certain great principles, which are not the re&ult of mutual agreement, but are recognised as having higher sanction. In short, look upon the com- bined facts connected Avith our existence in this earthly- sphere, and what is the explanation of aU ? What is the answer which the mind instinctively returns ? That there is one Supreme, Infinite Being, Creator, Sustainer, and Euler of all. Without any reasoning, or any doubt on the matter, the mind acknowledges One Infinite Being. The behef in his existence is a necessary part of our own nature. It is a conviction, which does not come to us from without, but is lodged within, and rises spontaneously in answer to every inquiry concerning the origin of finite existence. Call it a natural, necessary, innate, or intuitive belief, as you wiU, the belief in the existence of one Infinite Being belongs essentially to the nature of man. It is indeed a conviction which may He in many minds almost unnoticed, but if the inquiry concerning the origin of finite objects be once raised, the inquiring mind must needs repose upon this foundation, or be tossed about in continual unrest, discovering that his attempted unbeHef is a contradiction of his own being. If there be in the human mind certain funda- mental beliefs, treasured in the nature and not the pro- duct of experience, the belief in the existence of one Infinite Being is the foundation of them aU. Let con- sciousness be examined, and that belief will be found lying as a basis, deep and broad, on which the whole structure of human behef is reared. Let all the acknow- ledged tests of the distinction between convictions reached BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 43 by experience and those inherent in the mind, be applied in this case, and it will appear beyond all question that the belief in God's existence belongs to man by nature. That there are certain fundamental convictions im- planted in our mind, may be held as a settled point in philosophy, requiring no special vindication here. It is no longer necessary to dwell at length on the fact that we find in the mind convictions which could not have been reached by the widest possible experience, or the most patient and accurate reflection, and which must be accepted as self-evident. This being so generally ac- knowledged, the question may be at once considered, whether the belief in the existence of God is a necessary conviction. If this question is to be answered in the affirmative, as is here maintained, it must appear to be (l.) A belief rising into consciousness when experience and reflection are such as to require its application ; (2.) A necessary belief, that is, a belief essential to our nature, so that the opposite cannot be believed, when the real problem is presented to the mind ; and (3.) A universal belief, that is, a belief belonging to the nature of every man. The first particular is one which there is a peculiar proneness on the part of some to overlook in connexion Avith this matter, and it is here specially announced as an introductory consideration because it involves a most important modification of the other two. If the first particular be kept in view, it must be apparent that our belief in God has all the marks of a natural conviction. I. The behef in the existence of the one infinite God, rises into consciousness when experience and reflection are such as to require its application. Although the first 44 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. principles of reason are essential to the human mind, it is very erroneous to suppose that they constitute a stock of cognitions and beliefs of which the mind is conscious from the very first dawn of intelhgence. They are rather hid as treasures within the soul, than known to be there ; they are riches which the mind carries, without being aware of their existence, until the demands of observa- tion or reflection call them up into consciousness, when they are seen to possess all the value of necessary and self-evident truths. Hamilton has well said that " those notions or cognitions which are primitive facts are given us ; they are not indeed obtrusive; — they are not even cognisable of themselves. They lie hid in the profund- ities of the mind, untU drawn from their obscurity by the mental activity itself employed upon the materials of experience."-^ To attempt, therefore, to test the doctrine of innate convictions, by inquiring whether children appear in the world with certain first principles before their mind, would be to mistake the doctrine, and spe- cially the manner in which such principles are declared to be recognised within. Equally mistaken would it be to expect that, because such convictions are essential to the nature of man, they must be always present before each individual mind, or recognised with the same fre- quency by aU. What is affirmed is that they are natural possessions of the mind, that they rise into consciousness with aU the distinctness and authority of self-evident truths, but that the materials of observation or reflec- tion are needful to caU them before us for recognition. They have been given to us for guidance, and they rise • Lectures on Metaphysics, n. 351 . BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 45 before the mind only when its occupation is such as to require their direction. If this be characteristic of all the original convictions, it must apply also to the belief in the Infinite Being, if that belief is to be acknowledged as innate. In afl&rm- ing that the belief in God is found among the funda- mental convictions of the mind, it is not asserted that it must be uniformly and distinctly recognised. On the contrary, it is expressly declared that the conviction of the Divine existence will arise only when the mind is engaged with those considerations which require it for their explanation, or admit of its application. Man may be engrossed with objects, which do not appear before him in such a way as to call forth the belief in a Supreme Being ; his energies may be concentrated on occupations which absorb the attention, and do not de- mand the exercise of this fundamental conviction. We have abundant evidence in human experience that the belief in God's existence may be left very much unapphed. But this is nothing more than what occurs in the case of acknowledged first principles. It may indeed be shown on special grounds that man has a peculiar proneness to avoid the appeal to the conviction to which we are now referring, but it is not necessary to insist upon the fact here. It is in accordance with the law which regulates the apphcation of first principles, that they be recognised only when the facts of observation or reflection require it. And that the belief in the Divine existence does spontaneously arise to meet the inquiry or want of the mind, seems most obvious. At times, it comes into con- sciousness to satisfy an inquiry voluntarily prosecuted by 46 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. the intellect ; and at other times, it appears involuntarily, with irresistible authority, as a necessary complement for the healthy operations of our powers. Let a man ask the explanation of finite existence, and the intuitive belief in the One Infinite Being comes as the answer. Let htm be brought into circumstances where, conscience is in full exercise, and the conviction of the Divine exist- ence is with him, asserting its authority. If we inquire in what relation the belief in the Divine existence most frequently forces itself for the first time on the notice, there can be no question that with the great majority of men it arises as a natural accompaniment of the exercise of conscience, rather than as the solution of the problem concerning the origin of finite being. And, in refer- ence to the repeated instances of its recognition in indi- vidual experience, it is no less certain, that it is much more frequently present to our mind in connexion with its application within the moral sphere, than with a purely intellectual inquiry. II. The belief in the existence of the One Infinite God, is a necessary helief, that is, a befief essential to our nature, so that the opposite cannot be believed, when the real problem is presented to the mind. That problem con- cerns the origin of the finite existence as known to us, and whenever it is fuUy contemplated, the conviction of the Divine existence rises spontaneously within us, and that with irresistible authority. The befief in the One Infinite Being, is not the result of any process of reason- ing, but is given to the mind as a revelation ; it is not dependent on the measure of logical acuteness possessed by individuals, but belongs to man, as man. When, BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 4V therefore, it is said to be a necessary belief, it will be ob- served that the asserted necessity is metaphysical, not logical ; that is to say, it is a necessity of the higher reason, not of logical thought. 1. The great majority of men are beheving in God without any reference to the arguments which have been used to establish his existence. This is one of the very obvious facts which harmonize only with the admission of the necessity of the conviction. There are multitudes believing in the One Infinite Being with unwavering confidence, who have never even attempted to inquire carefully into the ground on which their conviction rests. They have no more tried to explain to themselves their belief in the Divine existence, than their conviction that there must be a cause for every change. So strong is their consciousness of the necessity of their befief, that they assert it unhesitatingly ; and yet so httle have they attempted to discover its authority, that if any one were to require them to account for it, they might feel com- pletely at a loss. They have never tried to test for them- selves the vahdity of the argument d priori, or of the argument from final causes. Were they entering upon the one, it would only be walldng in a labyrinth of per- plexity ; were they entering upon the other, they might take every step with anxiety, fearing that some objector would declare it insufficient. They want no arguments, and they need none. They are satisfied, because their belief meets the wants of their nature and of their life ; whereas, they are conscious that a denial of that belief would at once bring injury and confusion to both. Let any one affirm, then, that a belief in the Divine existence 48 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. is to be reached only by a certain process of reasoning, and he will find it impossible to reconcile the facts of human faith with his theory. Such arguments have always been a matter of interest to the few, and not to the many, and it must remain so stiU. Thousands around him will continue to believe, and thousands more will grow up to believe, in one Infinite Being, without knowing anything about his argument, however clearly stated or acutely reasoned. 2. There are no arguments for the being of God sufficient to warrant the belief as it is found among men. All arguments are not only unnecessary, as shown by the fact that many believe without them ; but they are insufficient to lead to the conclusion which thej^ profess to reach. We have a surer conviction than any process of reason can lead to. There can be no higher conviction from which we could infer the Divine existence, and no measure of finite existence can lead to the conviction of the One Infinite God. Any argument d priori must virtually assume the point in starting. Any argument d posteriori must fall short of the conclusion altogether. It is a well-known fact, that very many have ex- pressed the gravest doubts concerning the validity of arguments d priori. So far from having carried up the mind to an immovable conviction, they have left many convinced of the necessity for surrendering them. If we have certain essential conceptions concerning the Infinite, these presuppose some satisfactory foundation in the mind ; in other words, some recognition of a Being to whom they apply ; and thus we are still left to fall back upon a fundamental belief. And, further, if we BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 49 can have no adequate conception of the Infinite, the pos- session of such conceptions as we have, cannot be the key- to the beHef we maintain. Our inadequate conceptions must draw their authority from a primary belief, instead of our conceptions originating a belief which shall out- stretch themselves. To suppose that certain fundamental conceptions, such as those concerning existence, or time, or space, are the highest facts in consciousness, from which we must infer the existence of an Infinite Being, is not only to turn to a mode of argument which virtually assumes the conclusion to be proved, and consequently the validity of which may be doubted, but is to reverse the natural order of dependence established between our conceptions and behefs. Sir William Hamilton has very well said — " In the order of nature, belief always pre- cedes knowledge, . . . and even the primary facts of in- telligence — the facts which precede, as they afford the conditions of, all knowledge — would not be original were they revealed to us under any other form than that of natural or necessary beliefs."^ The most careful scrutiny of the operations of our mind must convince us that this is the established relationship between even our most general conceptions and our fundamental behefs. The real explanation of the force which d priori arguments carry with them is that they have pilfered from a primary behef certain conceptions with which, by a process of insufficient reasoning, they attempt to return to the point from which they secretly started. Take, for example, the two fundamental propositions in Clarke's argument, — (l) That something has existed from eternity; and (2) » Lectures on Metaphysics, I. 44. D 50 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. That there has existed jfrom eternity some one immutable and iadependent Being ; and what are these propositions but a virtual assumption of the poiut to be proved 1 Who would acknowledge that something has existed from eternity, except on the authority of a faith already in the mind, and needing no such argument as that of Clarke ? And agaiu, who can assent to the assertion that there has existed from eternity some one immutable and iade- pendent Being, except upon a much wider basis of behef on which his conceptions have rested long before he knew anything of an argument d priori ? Facts show that the argument d priori has had little to do with the faith of men, and a scrutiny of the argument, in what- ever form it be presented, must convince us that it is insufficient to account for our behef. If, then, the argument d prioi'i fail us, shall we turn to the argument from design ? But this also is insuf- ficient to account for the faith which we acknowledge. For, iu the first place, the marks of design can only warrant the inference of a designer, and must leave altogether unexplained the fact that we beheve in an Infinite Being, independent of aU, and creator of aU. And further, aU that we discover concerniag proofs of design in the world, can only entitle us to infer a cause adequate to produce the results observed, and again must leave unexplained the fact that we believe in a God, not only able to produce far greater works than those which we behold, but reaUy possessed of boundless power. And finally, we find that men who have a very partial acquaint- ance with the marks of design in the world, and those who have carried out a most extended course of observation, BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 51 have nevertheless the same faith in one Infinite God. Their belief does not present the character of a conclusion continually enlarged as the sphere of their observation widens ; but, whether their observation has been little or much, their faith is the same. These facts are enough to settle the point concerning the argument d posteriori, and to show that it is unquestionable, that " a demon- stration of the absolute from the relative is logically absurd ; as in such a syllogism, we must coUect in the conclusion what is not distributed in the premises."^ Arguments d priori and d posteriori are alike un- necessary and unsatisfactory. They are both insufl&cient as arguments, and yet they come so much into harmony with what we beheve, that we must regard them both as concerned with the truth, though inadequate to establish it. But, of the two, the argument from design, or final causes, has always been the most popular, not merely because it is the simplest, but because it really presents the problem concerning the origin of finite existence, to which the mind brings forth the answer from the depth of its own beliefs. If, then, all the reasoning to prove the being of God is insufficient to gain its purpose, and yet men acknowledge that the Deity exists, we are shut up to admit that the belief is a necessary one. 3. The denial of the existence of God involves a vio- lation of the fundamental principles of our reason. In affirming that the belief in one Infinite Being is a neces- sary belief, I indicated that the necessity is metaphysical and not logical, and it now becomes important that attention be given to the difierence between these two. ' Hamilton's Discussions, p. 16. 62 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Logical necessity is that which belongs to the under- standing, or to thought proper, as for example, that the whole is greater than a part. If I understand what a whole and a part are in relation to each other, I must think that the whole is greater than a part. Metaphy- sical necessity is that which belongs to the higher reason, or our natural convictions, as for example, that with which we are now concerned, — ^that there is one Infinite Being, and if this be a necessary behef, we cannot deny it without contradicting our own nature. In the one case there arises an impossibihty in thought, as — that a part is greater than the whole ; in the other there is a violation of our reason, by aflfirming what is incapable of application to our life and observation, as — that there is no Infinite Being. When, therefore, I say that the belief in one Infinite Being is a necessary behef, I mean that it is essential to our nature, so that the opposite cannot be beheved, when the real problem is presented to the mind. And on the other hand, the assertion that there is no Infinite Being, wUl be found to be out of harmony with our hfe and experience, so as to cast the mind into disquiet whenever any attempt is made to satisfy the understanding concerning the origin of finite beings, or to ascertain the authority on which the deci- sions of conscience rest. Let a man contemplate the outer world with the won- derful proofs of wisdom abounding everywhere in it, and then look in upon the constitution of his own mind, and let him. ask how the world has been originated and maintained, and he will find that his mind instinctively presents the conviction of an Infinite Creator and Sus- BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 53 tainer. It wiE yield to the authority of this belief, as a satisfactory answer to aU his inquiry ; while, on the other hand, it will be felt impossible to present any other solution of the problem. Nowhere save in a necessary behef can the human mind find rest in answer to its questions concerning the known forms of existence. Let him deny this, and aflSrm that he has no evidence that there is an Infinite Being, but must be contented to be without such a conviction, and his unbelief will involve him in endless confusion, both in. thought and action. He has put himself out of harmony with the world, and even with his own nature. He can, give no theory of the universe ; he can believe m no science without inconsis- tency, for analysis and classification are possible only on the principles of mind, that is, presuppose an intelli- gent Originator of the oljjects which admit of analysis and classification ; he cannot acknowledge the dictates of his own conscience without inconsistency, for conscience has no authority except there . be a Supreme Euler ; he cannot insist that all men should be regulated by moral law, without attempting to force his inconsis- tencies on others. And, as the penalty of his unbelief, he cannot seek to . satisfy either his understanding or his conscience, without being tossed on a sea of doubt, with continual disquiet. The innumerable contradictions which emerge from professed unbelief in an Infinite God are unmistakable proofs that our belief in the Divine existence is a necessary one. A critic has asked what kind of necessary belief that is which has been so frequently denied ? And to his question I answer, that it is of the ordinary kind. It 54 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. has been often denied that there is an external world, but who hesitates on that account to aflfirm that our behef ia the outer world is a necessary- one 1 Human personaKty has been denied, and all our experience reduced to a series of sensations, but who hesitates on that account to believe in his own existence 1 It is unhappily the misfortune even of our primary behefs, to be d.enied by some men, but these convictions stand unharmed by the contradiction, and hold their sway over the human family. If our belief m the Deity be at times denied, it is nothing more than has happened to other necessary convictions, and in almost all cases in which such denial occurs, it will be found that the mind instead of looking upon the facts which naturally awaken behef, is either working with some assumed and false defini- tion, or is involved in the intricacies of some elaborate theory. It is not the man who is looking upon the fields, rivers, and mountains, who is found denying the existence of an outer world. It is not the man who is moving amongst his feUow-men, who is found denjdng his own personahty. And so, it is not the man who is really contemplating the facts to be explained, who is found denying the Divine existence. The proof, then, of the necessity of our behef is not to be found in the impossibihty of men in any way denying it, but in the contradictions which arise, if they do. I am very far from asserting that, since the Divine existence is a necessary behef, it is impossible for men either to neglect or deny it. And any one who argues that such impossibility is an inevitable consequence, mistakes the nature of the necessity involved. Let a BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 55 man refuse or neglect to turn his attention to the facts of the question, and he may maintain anything to his own satisfaction, no matter how monstrous it may seem to others. Let him refuse to apply his mind in the re- lation in which a necessary conviction is said to arise, and he may negligently overlook what his nature con- tains, and dogmatically contradict what is nevertheless a primary belief. Nay more, he may reason with great acuteness and power to a conclusion directly subversive of our fundamental belief. Let him start with false pre- mises, — let him do as Spinoza has done, — ^let him give certaia false definitions, and the conclusion may be attained, but only at the expense of reason. Any one may reach a Pantheistic conclusion, making aU things God, if he only, like Spinoza, define substance and attri- bute in a sense ia which other persons never employed them. He may arrive at his conclusion in such a case with logical accuracy, and yet that conclusion be meta- physically untrue. Define a substance "that which exists in itself, and is conceived by itself," and an attri- bute " that which is the essence of a substance," and a man may make nonsense of the universe. But in aU this he is only working among his own fancies, and is never looking at the facts before him. Let him maintain Atheism or Pantheism as he may, he cannot live in har- mony with his theory. Conscience will work despite his theory, whether atheistic or pantheistic, which it could not do, if either theory were true. The inquiry will often arise in his mind, — Whence came I, and whence have come all these objects around me ? And with such questions before his mind, he will find the truth pressed 56 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. upon him. He may stifle the inquiry, and escape from it by turning his thoughts to other objects ; but, let him prosecute it, and as he is an intelligent being, with the soul of humanity within him, and possessed of all its principles, he must believe. III. The belief in the existence of one Infinite Being is a universal belief, that is, a belief belonging to the nature of every man. In connexion with this statement it is necessary to take what has been said concerning the first-mentioned feature of our natural convictions. It has been shown that these convictions while in the mind, are brought up in consciousness by the demands of observation or reflection. In accordance with this law regulating their rise, the flrst consideration illustrative of the universality of our belief in the Divine existence is, that all men are capable of having this conviction awakened within them. By this it is meant, that a simple turning of the attention to the facts connected with finite existence, or guidance of the reflections upon these facts, is enough to raise this belief before any mind. This is the evidence that there is a conviction within, harmonizing with all things in human observation, and giving the key to_ their explanation. In bringing men to the acjknowledgment of this great truth, no reasoning is needed. The reference to facts is enough, where no rea- soning could sufiice, and experience testifies that we escape the difiiculties which are raised against such a belief, by a direct appeal to the mind of one previously negligent of such a primary fact, or professedly unbelieving. In fuU verification of the fact that all men are Capable of having the belief in the Infinite Being awak- BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 57 ened in their mind, is the other fact, that in all ages and in all conditions this belief has been found swaying the minds of men. If we go back upon the history of the past, we find this conviction appearing at all points, and that more or less distiactly according as the minds of men were found looking upon the facts of their observa- tion, freed from the influence of acquired habits of thought. And even where the reign of such habits was undisturbed, we find among all the gods of the people, homage done to one who is supreme and all-powerful. Yet, with this recognition of a supreme god, there is such a combination of degrading forms of thought as to make it plain that the behef in the Supreme was not allowed to stand freely out before the mind, and exercise a due regulative power over the modes of thinking. This admits, however, of a natural explanation in accordance with the law regulating the rise into consciousness of the primary beliefs Ijdng in the depths of the mind. But, pass- ing from this, aU the researches of our own day concerning the condition of the tribes sunk in the debasement of heathenism show that they have retained, in a very marvel- lous manner considering their circumstances, the behef in one great Supreme Spirit. Dr..M'Cosh has said that, in order to vindicate the assertion of a primary belief in the Divine existence, it will be necessary to reconcile the doctrine " with the known facts of history, and, in par- ticular, with the degraded views which have been enter- tained in most countries of the Divine Being." ^ This I perfectly acknowledge, and in endeavouring to do so, 1 know not that I can do better than quote Dr. M'Cosh's ' Intuitions of the Mind, p. 428. 58 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. words in another part of the same work. Referring to the fact that we are prompted to strive after perfection, he says, — " It is this impulse, I apprehend, which makes even the heathen speak of their gods, or at least their supreme god, as ineffably good and immortal; then- actual conceptions of his excellence and duration may be extremely inadequate, still they will not allow that there could be any increase made to his attributes ; and, under fostering circumstances, the conviction will come out in a more decided form."^ It could have been little cause for wonder, on the admission of a necessary behef in the Divine existence implanted in human nature, if, in their state, that conviction had never been brought into application. I inchne to believe that this might have been the result in many cases, but for the fact that the belief in the supreme Divinity is a first principle in things moral as weU as intellectual. But for the action of con- science, requiring the recognition of a Supreme Governor, there might have been few inquiries concerning the be- ginning of things, caUing forth the belief in an infinite Creator. As things are, it is a very siirprising fact that books of travel and research among savage tribes, without their authors having the least reference to the controversy concerning the source of human belief, are found containing the most distinct statements in testi- mony of the fact that the most uncivilized are found possessed of a behef in a Supreme Being. It would un- duly retard the course of argument to introduce a long series of extracts bearing on the point, but as their testi- mony is important they will be found in an Appendix.^ ' Intuitions of the Mind, p. 222. ! See Ajipendix B. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 59 There is one fact which seems at first sight to be adverse to the doctrine that man's belief ia God is a necessary one, viz., that the views concerning God are in many cases low and unworthy. But this is only a natural result of the degradation of men's nature, and the explanation of the influence which their debasement has had upon their thoughts concerning God, may be found in the fact that the belief in the Infinite Being is a primary belief both in the moral and in the intellectual spheres. As, then, the recognition of God arises more frequently in connexion with the operations of the moral faculty than of the intellect, the debasement of man's moral nature was certain to afiect his thoughts concerning the Divinity, even when the necessary belief continued in the mind. This wiU appear still more distinctly when the law determining the influence of our behef upon our conceptions comes to be considered. In no case can our conceptions come up to the measure of our faith, and the more debased the moral natiire becomes, the more unworthy of the primary behef must the thoughts prove. The admitted tests of the primary convictions of our mind have thus been appKed to our belief in the Infinite God, and I hold its claim to the rank of a necessary conviction established beyond aU question. If there be fundamental beliefs implanted in our nature, this is the foundation of them aU, — the one requisite for enabling the mind of man to find the harmony of things known. That there is one Infinite Being is the highest and grandest truth, to which no lower truth could by any possibility lead us. As the result of this conclusion, the entire reasonings of the sensational school, in making all the 60 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. possessions of the mind dependent on experience and reflection, are set aside. And not only so, but all argu- ments a priori, or d posteriori, or a combination of the two, are declared unnecessary and insufiicient. In op- position to this conclusion. Dr. M'Cosh, in a recent valu- able contribution to our philosophical literature, says that we are not obliged " to call in separate intuition to dis- cover and guarantee the Divine existence ; "^ while it is here maintaiued that the facts of consciousness declare that we do actually rest upon such a necessary belief. I cannot admit that Dr. M'Cosh has been successful in presenting an argument for the being of God, such as may enable us to dispense with a necessary belief His theory is that our behef is the combined product of ob- servation, and of the application of certain necessary con- victions, such as our belief in causality, personality, and infinity. In this way, he denies that the belief in the Divine existence is original, and makes it rest on various convictions for a foundation. He lays the basis of his argument by declaring that " there are facts involved," in observing which, man discovers "phenomena which bear all the marks of being effects.'"^ In another part of his work, when treatiiig of the relation of cause and effect, he states what are the distinguishing marks of an effect, leading every one to regard it as such. He says — "An effect is known as either a new substance, or as a change in a previously existing substance."^ Now, if the effects observed are only changes in a "previously existing substance," they cannot lead to the inference that there was a Creator. On the other hand, if the ques- ' Intuitions of the Mind, p. 429. = Ibid. p. 420. " Ibid. p. 269. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 61 tion be raised concerning the origin of finite existence, the worid as known to us cannot be known as " a new substance." We cannot even prove that the world began to be ; and we cannot receive the testimony of any eye- witness of the fact, for there were no members of our race who saw the world come into existence. It must, there- fore, on the above definition, be unknown to us, and a matter of doubt, whether the world is " an efiect," and accordingly Dr. M'Cosh is found saying, that " it maybe admitted that there is a possibility of doubt as to whether the phenomenon is an effect."^ Does our author mean to say that there can be the shadow of a doubt on the matter ? Does he admit any doubt ia his own mind ? Does he find such a doubt prevalent among men, though not one of them can have the least evidence that the world, as such, is an efiect ? What does our author mean by saying that " the object being ofiered," "it is a prohability" ihdit the object was an efiect? A proba- bility ! Is this all that can be said of it ? Who is dis- posed to say that, it is only probable ? But, further, what can be meant by declaring in the same sentence that it is " a moral certainty of the highest order" ? Are probabilities and moral certainties identical ? And, if not, how is the same thing here declared to be a proba- bility and a moral certainty ? Dr. M'Cosh's argument seems to me insufficient in its very first stage, for, taldng his own definition, the world is not known to us as an effect. The confusion into which he has been led, betrays the instability of the foundation which he was attempting to lay. So far from fortifying his own posi- ' Intmtions of the Mind, p. 269. 62 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. tion, he has exposed its weakness. The fact that the world is not known to us as an effect, that is, as a new substance ; and the fact that it cannot be proved by any evidence in our possession, that it once was a new sub- stance ; taken along with the additional fact, that men nevertheless generally acknowledge it to be an effect, present very strong confirmatory testimony in favour of the doctrine that we have a necessary belief in the Divine existence. Insufficient, however, as the first stage ia Dr. M'Cosh's argument is, an examination of the second betrays similar defect. His second poiat is that " the principle of causa- tion is involved."^ In stating what this principle im- plies, he says very accurately " that it is an essential part of the internal law, that it requires the cause to be adequate to produce the efiect." But, supposing it be granted that the world is an efiect, as we aU believe it is, if we infer from its existence, that of a cause " adequate to produce the efiiect," we do not reach by such an in- ference the belief in an Infinite God. On the contrary, we only show the insufficiency of such an argument to account for that general belief in the existence of the Infinite One, which is found among men ; for God is not identical with a cause adequate to produce the world. This is the weak point in the argument from design, which Hume has seized upon, and demolished, by reasoning which must be acknowledged unanswerable. He says, " The cause must be proportioned to the efiect ; and if we exactly and precisely proportion it, we shall never find in it any quahties that point farther, or afibrd an infer- ^ Intuitions of the Mind, p. 434. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 63 ence coneernirig any other design or performance. Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what is merely re- quisite for producing the effect which we examine. Allow- ing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe, it foUows, that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears ia their workmanship ; but nothing further can be proved, except we call in the assistance of exagger- ation and flattery, to supply the defects of argument and reasoning."^ No sober-minded man can feel any sympathy with the spirit in which these last words are written ; but, at the same time, no candid reasoner can refrain from admitting that his criticism is unanswerable. It seems surprising that Dr. M'Cosh should adopt the old form of argTiment, and content himself with a mere statem.ent of it. Once more, I must say that his argu- ment lends indirect testimony to the need for the admis- sion of an original belief. Our author, so far from sa3nng anjrthing concerning the glaring insufficiency of the application of the law of causality, slips on from the inference of " a Being ade- quate to produce the whole effect," to say that, " if, on the contemplation of the nature of that Being, we find no marks of his being an effect, the intuition makes no call on us to go farther ;" and thence, he slips easily into the declaration, that " the mind reaches the All-powerfuJ Being." ^ Here again the argument fails, for though we infer a cause adequate to produce the world, it is im- possible to contemplate " the nature of that Being," and " find no marks of his being an effect ;" and Dr. M'Cosh 1 Essays, n. 153. ^ Intuitions of the Mind, p. 432, 64 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. has unwarrantably transformed his adequate cause into an " All-powerful Being." .It is unnecessary to follow the author at great length through the third and last stage in his reasoning, in which he declares, that " other intuitions take hold of other facts, and confirm the argument, and clothe the Divine Being with a variety of perfections" (p. 435). It might easily be shown how unsatisfactory, whether as a mode of expression, or as a description of a mental process, it is to speak of us making an application of certain intui- tions, whereby we " clothe the Divine Being with a variety of perfections." There must be mistake in the process of reasoning concerning the origin of our belief, which could make it seem appropriate to use such phraseology, as though it were part of the work of each man to make up a god for himself. It is in this section of his argument, however, that our author seeks to reach the conclusion that God, whose existence he endeavours to prove, is Infinite, and it may be important to inquire on what grounds, and with what consistency, he brings in this as a link in his argument for the Divine existence. Of the " other intuitions " brought into requisition in this branch of the reasoning there are three : first, that of " intelligence and per- sonality," which, it is said, "suggests the idea of God who is a spirit ; " second, that of moral good, on account of which, it is said, " that the mind feels something wanting till it hears of a Moral Governor ; " and, third, the " conviction that there is an infinite existence," which is held to apply to space and time ; but it is said " in- finite extension and duration, and our belief regarding BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 65 them, are felt to be void and empty till we are able to place in them infinite substance with infinite attributes." In viewing this somewhat dubious form of progress toward a conclusion, it is only reasonable to ask how long it may he till the consciousness of our " inteUigence and personality suggests the idea of God who is a Spirit;" and how long our moral nature may be in operation " till it hears of a Moral Governor ;" and how long the " con- viction that there is an infinite existence" maybe in our mind "till we are able to place" an infinite substance in extension and duration as their occupant ? And it were no less reasonable to inquire hoiv the suggestion is made in the first case ; and how the mind hears of a Moral Governor in the second ; and how we become able to fiU- up infinite extension and duration with an infinite sub- stance ? AJl these are most important questions which must be answered, in order to insure the success of the argument, and yet not one of which Dr. M'Cosh has attempted to answer. But I am more concerned to show that the steps embraced in this section of his argument are inconsistent with what he has very satisfactorily established in other parts of his able work. A reference to the mode in .which he seeks to reach the fact that God is infinite may suffice. It is a leading feature and a special excellence in Dr. M'Cosh's work, to maintain that "the intuitions of the mind are primarily directed to in- dividual objects." Now the conviction concerning the Infinite is one of the intuitions to which he appeals for completing his argument concerning the Divine existr ence; when, therefore, he says that. "the mind has a strong conviction that there is an infinite existence," he E 66 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. must mean that we have a conviction that there is an "individual object" which is infinite. If he assert less than this, he tosses to the wuids all his declared principles; if he mean this, as he must if he be consistent, he declares all reasoning towards the Infinite needless and insufficient, and overturns his own argument by the act. So conscious, indeed, is our author of the fact that the conviction con- cerning the iadividual infinite object is originally given in the mind, that we find the acknowledgment in earher parts of his work, before he came to the straits of his argument for the Divine existence. In a very early part, under the general head in which he enunciates the fact that intuitions are directed to " individual objects," this statement is found : The mind " does not form some sort of vague notion of a general infinite,, but fixing its atten- tion on some individiial thing — such as space, or time, or God — it is constrained to believe it to be infinite" (p. 32). Again, when he comes to treat of our " primitive behefs," his first proposition concerning the Infinite is, that "we have sen.. intuitive belief in regard to the infinity of certain objects ;" and, though he first unfolds it in reference to space and time, he does not finish without writing two fuU pages in application to the Deity (pp. 220, 223). It is true, indeed, that his second proposition runs thus — " We beheve in infinite space and time, and in the possi- bility of infinite substance or being." But this latter portion of the sentence is a glaring inconsistency. Where now is the fundamental position that " the intuitions of the mind are primarily directed to individual objects?" Is it to be altered ? Are there some cases in which the intuitions of the mind imply only the "possibility" of the BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 67 existence of certain objects ? I leave these questions with, my readers for impartial consideration, while I once more afl&rm that no argument can be sufficient for establishing that behef in. the Divine existence which we necessarily hold. The words of Dr. M'Cosh himself are fitly expressive of this, when he says : " If the intelli- gence does not find the Infinite in the perception with which it sets out, it never could fashion it by cutting or carving, by constructing or suprasupposition" (p. 216), Dr. M'Cosh describes his argument as the process by which he "would build up the cumulative idea." It seems to me that the "building" is very far from secure. It is too complicated to be the true explanation of the simple belief which is everjTvhere found among men ; it even confoimds the distinction between our behef in God's existence, and our conceptions regarding His nature; and, last of aU, it is totally insufficient as an argument. So far from having presented satisfactory reasons to show why he is " not convinced that we are obhged to call in a separate intuition to discover and guarantee the Divine existence," I submit, with aU deference, that a reconsider- ation of the argument wlU lead its author to join the ranks of those who hold by a necessary conviction in the mind, as the only adequate explanation of human belief. The limits of our own nature, and of all the objects around us, reqtdre for their explanation the recognition of a Supreme Being. The problem is one, and the soIut tion is found only in the assent of the mind to the ex- istence of One Infinite God ; and, as this cannot be reached by any sufficient proof of His being, our acknow- ledgment of it is really a fundamental principle in our 68 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. mind. This recognition of an Infinite Being is essentially of the nature oi faith, wMcli is a simple exercise of mind that does not admit of logical definition. Though the Infinite One is not among the objects of perception, His existence is a matter of belief to man. The mind re- cognises a Deity, and thinks, and feels, and acts on the basis of its belief. This being the nature of the act of mind by which we recognise the Divine existence, it is necessary to inquire what this belief involves. And, beyond aU dispute, it is the recognition of the Infinite Being as a Person. It is not a belief in The Infinite or The Absolute, as abstractions, but in a living, conscious; active being. If any one choose to say that an Infinite Personality is a contradiction, and yet that " it is our duty to think of God as personal, and it is our duty to beheve that He is infinite," as Dr. Mansel has done •} he says that it is our duty to think what is a contradiction of our belief, than which nothing could be more inconsistent. A careful consideration of what is involved in our belief in the Divine existence will show that we believe in Grod, not only as infinite, but also as personal. Our belief is in an Infinite Personality, and not in an infinite abstrac- tion, or an infinite universe. And so Dr. Mansel himself, reasoning against the Pantheistic system, afiirms that we are not "justified, even on philosophical grounds, in deny- ing the Personahty of God."^ A closer attention to the estabhshed relation between behef and thought would have saved Dr. Mansel, not only from this asserted con- tradiction, but from a multitude besides, with which his pages are covered, to the great confusion of the discussion 1 Bampton Lectures, p. 89. » IMd. p. 85. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 69 in which we are involved. But, passing this for the present, if regard be had to the remarks previously made concerning the mode in which the necessary belief in the Divine existence is brought into consciousness, it will be admitted that it arises primarily as the acknow- ledgment of a Supreme Being ruling over the world ; and as we proceed further with its application, it most distinctly involves the recognition of Him as infinite and absolute. We adore a God supreme, unlimited, and self- existent. Such is the Being recognised by the funda- mental belief in human nature,^ — the Beiug before whom men must bow in deepest reverence, — ^the Being of whose greatness there is some acknowledgment even among the most unthinking and morally debased tribes of earth.- Whatever disputes have been raised by Sir WiUiam Hamilton, and others, concerning the question whether we can have any knowledge of the Infinite, none is raised by them concerning the fact that we believe m the ex- istence of the Infinite One. It is admitted that the Infinite in the fulness of His excellence is the object of faith ; in other words, that faith involves the recognition of the really Infinite. This fact is one of very great im- portance in connexion with the discussion which is to follow concerning man's knowledge of the Infinite. Our faith in the Infinite God is a common basis from which we may reason, and to which we may return at aU times for the purpose of testing the harmony of our reasoning with our fundamental belief. It is the more urgent that this fact should be kept distinctly in view, because both Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Mansel, while admitting a belief in the One Infinite God, have almost entirely failed 70 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. to take any account of the beaj^ng whicli that belief must have on the question concerning the possibility of a know- ledge of the infinite. The one glaring defect in Hamilton's system, as a system, seems to me to be the uncertainty which attaches to the exact position he intended to assign to the belief in the Infinite God, and the total want of any exposition of the relation which that belief hears to our thought concerning God. The latter defect is also conspicuous throughout the entire reasoning of Dr. Mansel, in which, with a much more frequent reference to our faith, there is stiU no satisfactory investigation concern- ing the relation between faith and knowledge, which so clearly affects the discussion. A careful study of Hanul- ton's system, and of the later reasoning of Dr. Mansel, must convince every one, that, if we are to advance to any settled results in this discussion, nay, if we are clearly to understand the two opposite theories, there must be a more distinct indication of the exact territory of faith, and the relation which it bears to that of know- ledge. I do most earnestly call attention to the necessity for this, that we may be saved from needless strife arising from a confusion which keeps the ground in a haze. The conviction of this necessity has made me dwell at length on the authority and nature of our belief in the Infinite, and constrains me to attempt something more in the way of indicating the relation between faith and knowledge. Before doing this, however, it is important to mark what has been said by Hamilton and Dr. Mansel in reference to our behef in the Infinite. It cannot fail to be a matter of regret to every one interested in the progress of metaphysical discussion, that BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 7 1 Sir W, Hamilton has left so mucli uncertainty around his views concerning our behef in the Infinite Being, and has not distinctly explained the bearing of his reasonings con- cerning the Unconditioned on the questions of Natural Theology. It is a singular fact, that notwithstanding the very lengthened discussion concerning the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Unconditioned, found in his writ- ings, there are extremely few references to our behef in the existence of one Infinite Being, and the relation in which we stand to Him. This clearly shows that Sir W. Hamilton entered upon the discussion much more with the view of presenting a logical refutation of the theories of continental philosophers concerning the Ab- solute, than for the purpose of instituting an original analysis of the facts of consciousness bearing on our rela- tion to the Infinite Being. A careful comparison, how- ever, of the few passages applying to this subject favours the conviction that he held by a necessary belief in the Infinite God. That he resolutely maintained a belief in the Divine existence, there can be no doubt, and that he decidedly affirmed the inconsistency of every denial of that belief, is equally certain. The only doubtful point is whether he held that belief to be produced by an in- ference from the facts of experience, or to be a necessary and fundamental belief of the reason. That the lattier is the correct view may be safely inferred, although it must be acknowledged that there are some parts of his writ- ings which seem to lead to an opposite conclusion. Re, has, indeed, reasoned so strenuously concerning the impos- sibility of our thought being in any way conversant with the Infinite, that it would seem inevitable as a result of 72 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. that reasoning that the belief in "the Infinite must be a necessary conviction above all reasoning, and yet the matter is not so clear as might have been expected. The most distinct afiirmation on the subject is found in the letter which he addressed to me as a criticism of the first edition of the present work. He there says, " When I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed."^ The asserted necessity/ of the befief in the Infinite which is found in this passage seems to indicate that he held it to be a fundamental, original, and natural conviction in the mind ; and the more importance is to be given to this statement, as it was written expressly for the purpose of indicating the mode in which the human mind is assured of the existence of an Infinite Being. If any doubt attaches to the point, it arises chiefly from a passage in his Metaphysical Lectures, where, in- stead of ranking the behef among the necessary convic- tions, he says that it is " a regressive inference, from the existence of a special class of effects, to the existence of a special character of cause." ^ There is, however, through- out the lengthened passage to which the above is the in- troduction, so much of what appears to be inverted reason- ing, that the whole ■ seems to me rather a dissertation illustrative of the application of a primary belief, than a process of reasoning to be tested by the requirements of an exact logical demonstration. Though he speaks of it as an "argument," he says "it hinges on the. fact — Does a state of things really exist such as is only possible through the agency of a Divine cause ?" If this be the Lectures mi Metaphysics, ii. 530. 2 ^,y_ ^ 26. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 73 state of the question, does it not really imply that the existence of a "Divine cause" is already a settled point, and that the only inquiry is whether the aigency of that cause is needful to account for the facts known to us by experience ? If the problem be how to explain the uni- verse as known to exist, how is it that Hamilton says, " we must first of all consider what kind of cause it is which constitutes a Deity, and what kind of effects they are which allow us to infer that a Deity must be." ^ This is a siQgular mode of carrjdng on a " regressive inference." Instead of beginning to inquire what the facts are, and then asking what is the legitimate " inference" from them, he sets himself to determine first, what is the nature of the Deity, and what is the kind of effect which we can attribute to his agency. If we foUow our author farther, his course is no less strange, for we find him " attempting to infer" the "absolute order of existence in itself" from "the particular order within the sphere of our ex- perience."^ Again he is found declaring that "with the joroo/ofthe moral nature of man, stands or faUs the proof of the existence of a Deity," whereas our moral nature can only be accepted by us, and cannot be proved, as he himself acknowledges when he says, that " intelli- gence reveals prescriptive principles of action, absolute and universal,"^ and that "without philosophy, a natural conviction of free agency lives and works in the recesses of every human mind."^ It seems impossible to account for these inconsistencies except on the supposition, that, though he speaks of it as a "regressive inference" and an " argument," he intends nothing more than to indicate ' Lectwres on Metaphysu-s, i. 26. ^ Ibid. i. 30. s jUd. i. 29. * Ibid. I. 33. 74 THE PHILOSOPHY 0? THE INFINITE. the fact that the phenomena of mind are those which awaken most readily the primary belief in the Diviae^ Being, which is hid in the depth of our nature. It were injustice to his great reputation to suppose that here he attempts an inference from the particular to the univer- sal, from the relative to the absolute, and any one who woidd incline to do so may be restrained by the apparent approval with which Sir W. Hamilton quotes the opinion of Kant that " a demonstration of the Absolute from the Eelative is logically absurd "^ and still more, by these words, "Departing from the particular, we admit that we can never, in our highest generalizations, rise above the Finite."^ It seems to be the only reasonable conclu- sion that Hamilton held a primary belief in the infinite God. At aU events, this is certain, and it is aU that is required for my purpose, he held that the Infinite " is, must, and ought to be, behaved." In passing to ascertain the views of Dr. Mansel con- cerning the nature and authority of our faith in the Divine existence, there is no difficulty. He most dis- tinctly declares the conviction that our behef in the In- finite One is necessary and fundamental. Concerning the authority of our belief, he says that it is not reached through a process of reasoning : " It must be allowed that it is not through reasoning that men obtain the first intimation of their relation to the Deity." ^ Again, he says that we are shut up to it by the nature we possess; "We are compelled, by the constitution of our minds, to believe in the existence of an Absolute and ' Discussions, p. 16. 2 Jbid. p. 15. 3 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 102. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. VS Infinite Being :"^ that it is a necessary conviction; as when, speaking of " the Principle of Causality" and " the beHef in the existence of God," he says, " both are principles inherent in our nature, exhibiting, whatever may be their origin, those characteristics of universality and certainty, which mark them as a part of the inalienable in- heritance of the human mind -.'"^ and finally, that "the denial of its existence involves a contradiction." ^ Concern- ing what we are to acknowledge as involved in this neces- sary belief, he not only says, as has been seen above, that it is a belief in the existence of " an Absolute and Infinite Being," and a belief in a First Cause, but also that " we are compelled by our religious consciousness to believe in the existence of a personal God ; "* and further, concern- ing the existence of the Infinite in relation, these words occur, " Though our positive religious consciousness is of the finite only, there yet runs through the whole of that consciousness the accompanying conviction that the In- finite does exist, and must exist, . . . and that it exists along with the Finite"^ In all this, I perfectly agree with Dr. Mansel, and I feel highly gratified that we have a basis so broad and distinct, from which we may start, and to which we may return on every occasion when it is necessary to appeal to the foundation of faith. How- ever much I may difier from the distinguished author of The Limits of Religiotis Thought, as I must do to a very great extent, and almost at every step henceforth, I rejoice that we have such agreement concerning the deliverance and authority of our belief in the Infinite, as wiU save us fi-om needless disputes on that point, 1 Limits o/SeUffurus Thought, p. 67. ' Ibid. p. 95. * Ibid. p. 122. 2 Ibid. p. 172. ' Ibid. p. 120. 76 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. It is necessary, however, to consider at once what bearuig our behef in the One Infinite Beiag may have on many of those questions which have been raised concern- ing the Infinite and Absolute. Having contemplated the dehverance of an authoritative behef in the Infinite, a position has now been reached from which it is possible to clear the discussion of much reasoning which has only confused and encumbered it. As I have already had occasion to remark, Sir W. Hamilton has written much on this subject which applies to a mere abstraction, and to nothing else ; while Dr. Mansel has written a very great deal which has not the least apphcation to what he ac- knowledges to be the one object of our Faith. To use the expressive phrase of the latter, applied by him to Pantheism, I would say that the reasonings which both authors have presented concerning the Infinite are per- plexed and encumbered with " lifeless abstractions and sophistical word-jugglings," which require to be com- pletely cleared away, before there can be any hope of coming out to a fair combat on the important questions at issue in this controversy. I shall, therefore, endeavour to indicate some of those conclusions which foUow from what both authors admit, namely, that we must beheve in the Infinite Being, and which must very largely afiect the whole discussion. The common admission between us is, that we must beheve in the existence of one Infinite God ; and the conclusions foUowing from that are most important. 1. The term Infinite is not a mere form of expression to indicate our inability to think in a certain manner ; but, on the contrary, is exclusively applicable to one great BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 77 Beitig, whom we adore as supreme. This completely sweeps away Sir W. Hamilton's distinction of the Uncon- ditioned into the Infinite and the Absolute, as I shall here- after show somewhat more at length. Here it is enough to indicate, without special criticism, that many passages in the writings both of Sir W. Hamilton and of Dr. Mansel must be pronounced inconsistent and unwarrant- able. The former is found saying that " the Infinite and Absolute are only the names of two counter imbecilities of the human mind -"^ and the latter says, that "the Abso- lute and the Infinite are, hke the Inconceivable and the Imperceptible, names indicating not an object of thought, or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which thought is possible."^ These quo- tations, which are only specimens of many such, betray how completely both authors have occupied themselves with abstractions borrowed from German speculation, and how little they have been regulated by that funda- mental belief which they both acknowledge. In reply, it is enough to say that, according to the testimony of our primary behef, Sir W, Hamilton is doubly wrong in applying the terms Infinite and Absolute respectively to two opposite extremes, and in making them refer to a mental imbecility, instead of to the. one seK-existent Being. In reply to Dr. Mansel, it must be said that every passage in the Bampton Lectures which refers to our belief in the Infinite Being, contradicts the above opinion, and reproves it as venturing on a line of argu-. ment in which it has been unwarrantably presumed that " the vague generalities of the Absolute and the Infinite » Discussions, p. 21. ^ Limits of Religious. Thought, p. 95. 7? THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. may be more reverently and appropriately employed than the sacred names and titles of God."^ Every one who approaches these profound discussions in the proper spirit will honour Dr. Mansel for the feeling which made him. shrink from using the name of the Deity ia his abstract disquisitions, but that feeling, which is so admirable in itself, cannot shield the metaphysical argu- ment from searching scrutiny concerning its truth as appljong to the Divine Being. The " vague generalities" — the Absolute and the Infinite — are made to represent the Deity, and it must be allowable to transpose the terms, in order to test the argument, "When, therefore, he says that " the Absolute and the Infinite are names indicating the mere absence of the conditions under which thought is possible;" when he says that these names are hke the Inconceivable and the Imperceptible ; and when, on another occasion, he afl&rms that "the Infinite, from a human point of view, is merely a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible,"^ and "the Absolute is a term expressing no object of thought, but only a denial of the relation by which thought is constituted," — he places entirely out of account what he has written concerning our necessary belief in one Infinite and Absolute Being. Every one acquainted with the subject will interpret the above passages in accordance with the theory of the author, that the Infinite or Absolute cannot be an object of thought ; but, while they harmonize with that part of his theory, it seems to me that they jar most unpleasantly with the other part of it, which affirms that the Infinite 1 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 64. ' Ibid. p. 72. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 79 and Absolute Being is the object of helief. Nay more, they seem to show that his theory concerning the possi- bilities of thought, leads to statements contradictory of our beHef, which is necessary and authoritative. I do not 'at present hnger to inquire how he speaks of the Infinite and Absolute as names which do not indicate " an object of thought or of consciousness at all" whereas, in another place he says that " it is hy consciousness alone that we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer ffim any service."^ But, agreeing as we do, that the Infinite and Absolute God is the object of human behef, I say that these expressions — the Absolute and Infinite — are not names iadicating " the mere absence of the conditions under which thought is possible," are not names " like the Inconceivable and the Imperceptible," — and that " Infinite, from a human point of view," is not merely a name "for the absence of the conditions of thought." " The Inconceivable and the Imperceptible " do not designate any distinct object, or any number of distinct objects, in the existence of which we believe ; whereas, the Infinite and Absolute God, " fi-om a human point of view," is the object of faith to aU men. In perfect consistency with his theory. Dr. Mansel may affirm that the Infinite God, as infinite, is to him incon- ceivable ; but he -cannot, consistently with his theory, maintain that the mental inability to conceive is equiva- lent to the Infinite God as he is believed by us to exist. He must admit that the one belongs to the human mind, whereas the other apphes to God himself ; and, therefore, that the terms Inconceivable and Infinite, so far from ' Limits of Religicnis Thought, p. 86. 80 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. being " ]ike,".are in every respect diverse ; in other words; that he is inconsistent in attempting to degrade the words Infinite and Absolute to the level of Inconceivable and Imperceptible. Whether the Infinite . can be the object of thought may be matter of dispute, but it i&- un- questionable that the Infinite and the Absolute are de- scriptive of inherent excellencies in that Being whom we reverently adore as Supreme, and are believed by us to be characteristic of .His nature. 2. The Infinite is not equivalent to the sum of all exr istence. Our belief is exclusively in the existence of one Infinite Person, distinct from aU creation, and above it aU, the originator and sustainer of all. This being acknowledged, a large part of the reasoning in the Gerr- man philosophy concerning the Absolute, falls to be set aside as irrelevant, and along with it disappears much of what Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel have penned. Every attempt to represent the Infinite as "the one and the many," or as "the sum of all reality," or as " containing the sum of aU possible modes of being," or as " potentially everything, though actually nothing," must be simply denied as subversive', of the necessary- belief, which alone gives us any assurance of the existence of the Infinite. Sir W. Hamilton, in his reply to certain criticisms of mine, is found saying " that there is a funda-- mental difference between the Infinite {to 'Ev km Ilav), and a relation to which we may apply the term infinite." Now, this definition of the Infinite — the One and the All (to "^Ef Koi Ilav) — does not at all apply to the one Infinite Being in whose existence we believe. If this be the Infinite about which Sir W. Hamilton reasoned, there »««««tlll BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 81 is none such, and it becomes impossible to appeal to any fundamental belief in proof of its reality. Yet here too Dr. Mansel is found following in the same path, with such words as these : " The metaphysical representation of the Deity, as Absolute and Infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reahty."^ That the profoundest metaphysicians have speculated on this question, and have maintained the view asserted, I do not deny ; but, when Dr. Mansel refers his readers to Spinoza, "Wolf, Kant, ScheUing, and Hegel, in proof of the assertion, every one sees at a glance among what class of philosophers the opinion has been maintained. For them, to reason about the Infinite and the Absolute, was to deal with mere abstractions, giving free allowance for forms of argument which do not bear the test of our fundamental belief, and which bring out their legiti- mate result at last in the declaration of Hegel that the Absolute is equivalent to pure nothing. It may be con- sistent for those who treat of the Absolute as a mere ab- straction, involving the absence of aU variety — the free- dom from aU relation — to reason as if it were tantamount to the sum of all reality, in which aU things are absorbed and lose their identity ; and then to show, as Hegel has consistently done, that aU their reasoning applies to nothing. But, if Dr. Mansel indorse the opinion, it is inconsistent with his own definitions of the Absolute and Infinite,^ and specially with his assertion of a neces- sary conviction that " the Infinite does exist, and must exist, and that it exists ahvg with the Finite." If this do ' Umits ofRdigmis Thought, p. 46. ' Md. p. 45. F 82 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. not mean that the Infinite exists apart from the finite, and does not contain the finite world in the sum of its being, it means nothing. It is still more surprising to find our author quoting from Hegel to the foUowing efi"ect : " ' What kind of an Absolute Being is that,' says Hegel, ' which does not con- tain in itself all that is actual, even evil included ? ' We may repudiate the conclusion with indignation, but the reasoning is unassailable." ^ In connexion with this pas- sage, 1 do not here raise the question, whether, " if the Absolute and Infinite is an object of human conception at aU, this, and none other, is the conception required." I shall not commingle different elements of discussion, as I should do by inquiring at this stage whether a con- ception of the Absolute and Infinite be possible to man ; but I cannot forbeai^ remarking that it seems to me un- accountably strange that an author, who maintains so strenuously that such a conception is altogether impos- sible, should so positively affirm what the conception must be, were it attainable. What specially requires consideration here, however, is, that this quotation intro- duced from Hegel, with the accompanying assertion, really involves a definition of the Absolute, and thereby trenches on the region of faith, on whose authority alone any trustworthy definition can be given. Though Dr. Mansel declares that, in the quotation from Hegel, " the reasoning is unassailable," most of his readers must have difficulty in discovering any reasoning in the pas- sage. It is a simple attempt to impose upon us a cer- tain definition of the Absolute in the form of a question. 1 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 46. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 83 It is a virtual assertion that Absolute Being must contain all actual being, whicb is inconsistent with Dr. Mansel's own definition of the Absolute. His words are these : " By the Absolute is meant that which exists ia and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being." ^ Now, mere finite being cannot exist in and by itself, and cannot belong to the Absolute, and still less is it possible that evil should belong to such a Being. What kind of an Absolute Being would that be which could be de- clared to be absolutely perfect, yet embraced all imper- fection f If the question be asked, " "What kind of an Absolute Being is that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, evU included ? " the declaration of that fundamental belief, whose existence in. the mind I have endeavoured to point out, supplies the answer. That answer is most obvious, and very easy to state : He must be a Beiug perfectly holy, without any sin ; a Being perfectly happy, without any misery ; a Being ab- solutely perfect, that is to say, without any imperfection. In a defence of this passage which occurs in the preface to the third edition of the Bampton Lectures, the author calls attention to the fact that he "designed to show that to speak of a conception of the Absolute implies a self-contradiction at the outset." That this is his mean- ing I have been specially careful to note ; but what I aflBrm * is, that the statement made, reaUy involves assumptions concerning the nature of the Absolute, as well as state^ ments concerning the characteristics of human conception. Moreover, it seems to me that the illustration which is given by way of explanation and defence, only brings out I lAmits of ReUgious Thought/ p. 45. 84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the error more clearly, and makes the case worse. He says : — " Suppose that an author had written such a sen- tence as the following : ' A circular parallelogram must have its opposite sides and angles equal, and must also be such that all hnes drawn from the centre to the circum- ference shall be equal to each other. The conclusion is absurd ; but the reasoning is unassailable, supposing that a circular parallelogram can be conceived at all.' Would such a statement involve any formidable consequences either to geometry or to logic ? " What is the value of this illustration of the author's theory of human concep- tion, I shall not at present inquire. But, is it not manifest that the reason why a circular parallelogram cannot be conceived, is that the thing is a contradiction in itself ? Does Dr. Mansel then mean that an Absolute Being is as really a contradiction as is a circular paral- lelogram, and that philosophy and theology can suffer no more from reasoning concerning Him as such, than geo- metry and logic suffer from any reasonings concerning, a circular parallelogram? This unfortunate illustration shows clearly that, with whatever success the author is reasoning concerning the conditions of human con- ception, when treating of the Absolute he is speaking of a mere abstraction — a " pure nothing." In the whole passage in the Bampton Lectures, from which the above quotation is made, there is a covert con- tradiction of the definition of the Absolute, given only on the preceding page, and a manifest violation of the authority of faith, as it is acknowledged throughout the entire Lectures. What is written as applying to " human conception" comes to involve distinct assertions concern- BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 85 ing the Absolute as existing. One other example may be given, the criticism of which may be taken as iadi- cating the objections I would, urge, on the authority of a fundamental helief, agaiast Dr. Hansel's mode of dealing with the subject in aU those instances in which he revels among the apparent contradictions resulting from the relation of the Infinite with the finite. The extract which I am now to give is one whict seems to involve the assertion that the Infinite is equivalent to the sum of aU existence. " That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of aU actual, but of aU possible modes of being. For if any actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode, and limited by it."^ I have put certain words in italics for the purpose of showing clearly that the author is treating of the conception of the Absolute, and, in so far as his words refer exclusively to such a conception, I do not at present touch them, though I must again marvel that one who maintains so stoutly the impossibility of any conception of the Absolute, nevertheless asserts so dogmatically what the conception mtist be, could we reach it. But what is required at present is, to mark whether there be anything here inconsistent with our belief in the One Infinite Being, as distinct from His own creation. At first there is a very careful restriction of the assertion to a conception of the Absolute and Infinite, without apply- ing it to the Absolute as existing, which is declared to be only the object oi faith. But, when it is said that " if any actual mode can be denied of it (the Infinite), it is ' Hansel's limits of Religious Thought, p. 46. 86 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. related to that mode, and limited by it," there is reason to inquire whether the author means this to apply to the Infinite as existing, and whether it is asserted on the authority of our faith, or is admitted to be completely contradictory of our faith. The statement is presented in such a manner as to convey to the reader the impres- sion that, if the Infinite be related to anything not within its own being, it is limited by it, and it is this general principle, underlying much of the reasoning ia the Bampton Lectures, which it is necessary to point out and condenm. If there be any truth in it at aU, it must apply to the Infinite as existing, quite as much as to the Infinite as an object of thought ; and anything more un- warrantable, on every ground, can hardly be conceived. If the distinguished author be not dealing with a mere abstraction, to be classified under the happy category of "pure nothing," is he prepared to change "the vague generalities" of the Infinite and the Absolute, for the name of the Deity, and try the sentence by simply read- ing it ? This is the test to which every one of those numerous passages on the contradictions, springing from the relation of the Infinite to the finite, must be sub- jected ; and, if this sentence be tried in such a manner, how can it be defended ? "If any actual mode of being can be denied of God, he is related to that mode, and limited hy it." Our fundamental belief affirms the exis- tence of One Infinite Being ; that is, denies that any mode of finite being belongs to Him. Does it thereby limit God ? Does it, in the same deliverance, declare Him at once finite and infinite, and thus contradict itself ? Must the Infinite also be the Finite ? Must the BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 87 Absolute also be the Relative ? Must the Unconditioned also be the Conditioned ? And aU this that the abso- lutely Infinite may be absolutely Infinite ? On the con- trary, our belief presses upon us with unquestionable certainty the fact that God is infinite ; that he is desti- tute of aU finite modes of being, and, though related to all such, is not limited by them. 3. The Infinite Being in whom we believe is not a Being of infinite extension. The primary belief on which we rest for the assurance of the existence of the Infinite, is, as has been shown above, the belief in an Infinite Intelli- gence, and not in a Being infinitely extended, and pos- sessing the qualities of matter. It is from the singular neglect of this fact, that speculations concerning the In- fijiite involve so . frequently the covert supposition that the Infinite cannot exist in relation, as though finite ex- istence could have no place for itself without restricting, and hampering the Infinite One. It is upon an essentially materialistic basis that aU such arguments rest. The whole question must, therefore, be completely separated from aU speculation concerning extension as such, if there is to be trustworthy progress towards a satisfactory solution of the difiiculties connected with inquiries into our relation to the Infinite. Dr. Young, in his criticism of the Bam/pton Lectures, has very ably shown the false assumption concerning the nature of the Infinite lying at the root of much of the reasoning in The Limits of Re ligious Thought. ' Drawing the distinction between a " supposed infinite" in extension, and the One Infinite Being in whose existence we beheve, and, maintaining that distinction under the designations of a quantitative 88 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. infinite, and the qualitative Infinite, he most successfully brings up to view the real answer to all those arguments which insist upon the impossibihty of the Infinite exist- ing in relation.^ Our faith in One Infinite Being has no reference whatever to an infinite extension, and, as a ne- cessary consequence, aU Sir W. Hamilton's reasoning in this matter concerning an " absolute whole," and " absolute part,"^ concerning a " protensive quantity," and an " extensive quantity,"^ must be declared beside the ques- tion, however much it bears on abstract speculations that had been started by previous, philosophers. For the same reason, I unhesitatingly maintain that " the In- finite is one and indivisible," whatever advantage the admission may give to Sir William in the criticisms to which he has subjected my arguments concerning a par- tial knowledge of the Infinite.* What knowledge we can attain of an Infinite Being, is not a question to be considered at this point. The fact to be noted now is that the Supreme Intelligence, who rules over aU finite existence, is one and indivisible. Nothing can be con- ceived more materiahstic in its tendency, more incon- sistent with our belief, or more dishonouring to the Great Supreme, than to speak of the parts of His Divine nature. 4. The Infinite Being, in whom we believe, does exist in relation, and is distinguished from all finite existence. Many of my readers may think it needless to occupy time in presenting a statement so self-evident, but the necessities of the discussion require it. A great part, if not the whole, of the reasoning which has been em- > The Provinee of Reason, pp. 72-82. '■' Dismsdons, p. 606. = Discussions, p. 13. « Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 532. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 89 • ployed to show the impossibility of any knowledge of the Infinite, has been based upon the assumption that the Infinite cannot exist in relation, an assumption which is nothing less than a contradiction of an unques- tionable fact. Both Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel admit that we must beHeve in the Infinite Being as exist- ing in relation with His finite creatures, and yet both affirm that the Infinite cannot exist in relation. The contradiction is a glaring one, and there can be no doubt, which of the two contradictory opposites is to be cast aside as false. The authority of our faith cannot be gain- said, and all these passages in which it is affirmed, or impHed that the Infinite cannot exist in relation, must be set aside. Thus, when Sir W. Hamilton says, " that the Absolute, as absolutely universal, is absolutely one ; ab- solute unity is convertible with the absolute negation of plurality and difi"erence,"^ the latter part of his statement applies to nothing whatever, and is to be set aside as essentially inconsistent with that necessary behef in one Infinite and Absolute Being, which he admits. So, in like manner, many passages in the Bampton Lectures on The Limits of Religious Thought, must receive the same treatment at the hands of justice, as manifest viola- tions of the authority of our fundamental belief Dr. Mansel is found saying that the Absolute " can neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextric- able dilemma."^ The author may in this be carrying out a course of abstract reasoning, valid enough as based on • Disomsions, p. 33. ^ Idmits of Religious Thought, p. 50. 90 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. • certain definitions, but this seems a wonderfully odd way of getting into a dilemma, and it is much to be feared that our author is the only one who is Likely to experience in this case the peculiar sensations connected with such a position. If others escape, however, there is little cause for regret on his account, as he clearly has a certain de- light in presenting the horns of a dilemma, and then writing "inextricable" between them. Dr. Mansel must admit that, in the words just quoted, he is writing about the Divine Being, or he is writing about nothing. If he be writing about nothing, then his words have no mean- ing whatever ; if he be writing about God, he is contra- dicting his own acknowledgment of the deliverance of our primary behef,^ by which the " inextricable dilemma" is made to disappear in the certainty that the Absolute Being is " distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings." To take only another passage ; what can Dr. Mansel mean by saying that " it is obvious that thej^n- finite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the'^Finite, by the absence of any quality which the Finite possesses ; for such absence would be limitation." If the Infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the^Finite, can it be distinguished from the Finite as something else than the Infinite ? If the Infinite cannot be distinguished by the absence of any quality which the Finite possesses, is it the only way to escape contradiction, to say that the Infinite is finite ? Such writing as this is indeed " word- juggling," which can never advance the cause of philo- sophy ; and one thing is clear, that what is here said to be " obvious," is, beyond aU possibility of question, false, ' Limits of Religious Thowffhl, p. 120, BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 91 and declared, to be so on the authority of a primary belief. 5. It is possible for the Infinite Being to put forth power, and to act, while He continues unchanged. In putting forth power, there is only an exercise of His own nature, and He does not thereby change either for the better or the worse. The transition (if such it can be called, for human language is inadequate to such appli- cations) from one state to another, from non-activity in this particidar direction, to positive action resulting in the creation of finite beings, involves no change in Him. And so in Kke manner His actions regarding His creatures imply no change in the Infinite One. How this can be, is not a question to be considered at present ; but it is essential to mark at this point, that our primary behef in the Divine existence positively afiirms the fact. Our belief rises into consciousness in connexion with the re- cognition of finite existence, and points to God as the First Cause, Sustainer, and Governor of aU. It distinctly involves the assertion that God did begin to act, and does continue to act, while He is stiU Infinite and un- changeable. To affirm that it is not as Infinite, that the Deity acts, must be a contradiction, for though He only put forth a measure of power adequate to produce a certain finite result, aU His actions must be those of a Being essen- tially Infinite. To affiran this, concerning the nature of the Being who acts, is nothing more than to say, that it is as an Infinite Being and not as a finite being that God acts. We are, therefore, by the authority of faith, debarred from all reasoning concerning the act of creation, or any one of God's acts, as though it implied a change in God 92 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. Himself, or the necessity " to pass either from the better " to the worse, or from the worse to the better." In Hke manner, Dr. Mansel is unwarranted in his positive decla- ration that " a Cause cannot, as such, be Absolute : the Absolute, as such, cannot be a cause." ^ In these words, he may intend to speak only of what is involved in the con- ception of a cause, and of the Absolute respectively, but it involves a distinct affirmation concerning the Absolute, as such, that not only is unwarranted, but contradicted by our faith. Nay more, it is even inconsistent with his own definition of the Absolute. He says, "By the Abso- lute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being." I accept the definition most unreservedly, but I add that so far from being a definition of something contradictory of a First Cause, it most distinctly applies to the First Cause, by which unquestionably " is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation." To this it is answered that it is not the Absolute, as such, which acts as a cause, for " the Absolute, as such, cannot be a cause," to which I reply that it is most certainly not the Eelative, as such, which acts as First Cause, and that it is the Ab- solute, as such, and nothing else ; or, more appropriately, that it is the Absolute Being, in all his essential excellence, who acts as First Cause. This is the simple declaration ' of faith, testifying to a matter of fact ; and, though act- ing as First Cause does imply a relation, it is not a " ne- cessary relation," and, therefore, involves nothing incon- sistent with the nature of the Absolute. The whole truth on this point is most simply and admirably put by Sir 1 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 47. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 93 W. Hamilton in these few words : " The Divine nature is identical with the most perfect nature, and is also identical with th.Q first cause. If the first cause be not identical with the most perfect nature, there is no God, for the two essential conditions of his existence are not in combination."^ 6. Our belief in the Bivifie existence does not declare, whether there may, or may not he, a relation within His own being. The deliverance of the fundamental behef implanted in our nature is, that the Absolute and Infinite cannot exist in any necessary relation to anything beyond His own being. In other words, the existence of some object beyond Himself, cannot be an essential condition of the Di%'ine existence. But, if the question be raised concerning the possibility or impossibility of any relation within the essence of the Absolute Being, all inquiry on philosophical grounds must be stayed, for the dehverance of faith involves no declaration on the matter. With a just regard to the requirements of the inquiry, Dr. Mansel has embraced, in his definition of the Absolute, what I had omitted in the former edition of this work, namely, that when it is said that the Absolute is that which has no necessary relation, it is meant, that it has no neces- sary relation " to any other Being." This is certainly an accurate statement of what we believe to be true of the Absolute ; but we have no means of determining whether there may be certain essential relations within His own nature. We do, indeed, believe that the Divine Being is possessed of certain attributes, and in so far as the term " necessary relation " may be appHed to these, it is no 1 Disc/ussums, p. 36. 94 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. doubt expressive of a fact ; but the primary belief im- planted in our nature does not conduct us to tbe recog- nition of any such essential relations within the Diviae Being, as revelation has made known in the doctrine of the Trinity. Philosophy neither affirms nor denies any- thing concerning the possibility of such a relation. I hold, therefore, that Dr. Mansel has gone beyond the bounds of his own definition of the Absolute, and ventured on an assertion wholly unwarranted, when he says, — " Not only is the Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary re- lation to anything else, but it is also incapable of con- taining, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself ; as a whole, for instance, composed of parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious subject in antithesis to an object."^ It is somewhat singular that our author, who argues so strongly that there can be no conception of the Absolute, should nevertheless so unhesitatingly affirm what is true of " the Absolute as conceived," and still further what must be true of the Absolute " by the constitution of its own nature." But passing this, it is distinctly contra- dictory of a necessary conviction in our mind to deny to the Absolute the possession of attributes, and, on other grounds, it is altogether unwarranted to assert, that the Absolute is " incapable of containing an essen- tial relation within itself" After having thus indicated the most important con- sequences that clearly flow from the acknowledgment of a necessary belief in the existence of the Infinite God, it seems necessary to glance at the chain of contradic- ' Limits of Religious Thought, p. 49. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 95 tions said to be involved in the relation of the Infinite to the Finite. Dr. Mansel is distinguished for a very frequent reference to these, and remaxkable facility in linking them together ; but the reader of The Limits of Religious Thought may observe, that while the almost innumerable contradictions pointed to, are said to arise in connexion with the assertion of a conception of the Infinite, the statement of them is made to embrace certain distinct declarations conceming the Infinite as existing. One group of contradictions, from amongst the many given by Dr. Mansel, may be taken by way of illustration. He says : " The conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears en- compassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction m. supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others ; and there is a contradiction ia supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one ; and there is a contradiction in con- ceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiv- ing it as personal ; and there is a contradiction in con- ceiving it as impersonal. It cannot without contradiction be represented as active ; nor, without equal contradic- tion, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of aU existence ; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that existence."^ I do not at present inquire what may be the bearing of aU this on the question, whether it is possible for man to form a conception of the Infinite and Absolute ; but, nothing can be more obvious than the fact that we are aU able without the least hesitation to choose between the relative contradic- ' Limits of Religious Thought, p. 58. 96 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INPINITE. tions presented in this chain. If we have any belief at all in an Infinite God, it must enable us to make certain affirmations concerning His existence, and that so dis- tinctly as to enable us to pronounce definitely on any such array of alleged contradictions. Will our author consent to remove " the vague generaKties of the Absolute and the Infinite," and employ, instead of these, "the sacred names and titles of God," altering the sentences, to suit the difierence in phraseology, and stiU stand responsible for the assertions they contain ? Any man looking down the list can teU at a glance which of the respective alternatives he wiU accept as most certainly applicable to the Divine Being, and which he will reject as undoubtedly false. In fact, nothing more is necessary for this, "than to read down the first clause in each sentence as distinct assertions, and thereafter the second clause ia each, as certain violations of truth concerning the Deity, until the last sentence is reached, when both clauses must be set aside. The series of affirmations is nothing more than this : that the Divine Being does necessarily exist ; has existed from all eternity, for an immeasui'able period alone, and now exists in conjunction with finite beings ; that He is one ; that He is personal ; and that He is active. I unhesitatingly deny the assertions that the Deity "does not exist," that He is "many," that He is " impersonal," and that He is " inactive ;" and it is gratifying that it may be added. Dr. Mansel denies them aU too.^ In reference to the last sentence in the quotation given, it is to be observed that both clauses are to be rejected as containing assertions inconsistent ^ Limits of Religious Thought, pp. 45, 120, etc. BELIEF IN THE INFINITE BEING. 97 with the Divine existence. God is not " the sum of all existence," nor yet is He " a part only of that sum ;" and though I am not at present concerned with the qiiestion in what way we may conceive of the Divine Being, it may be remarked that it would be nothing wonderful if contradictions were found surrounding attempts to think of God as He is not, that is to say, to think of Him in a way which is contradictory of His own nature. To speak of the " sum" of existence, or of its "parts," is to speak exclusively of finite existence, as distinguished from the Infinite Being, for a " sum" implies " parts" of which it is composed, and a " part" implies a whole made up of parts. But all this has no application whatever to the Deity, who is necessarily separate from all finite exist- ence, and immeasurably raised above it. It may be consistent enough to speak of the sum of finite existence which He has created, or of any part of that sum ; but, to speak of Him as if He absorbed aU His works in His own being, or as if He could be classified along with His works, is altogether inconsistent, as a manifest violation of that primary belief, on which aU must depend for an authoritative declaration of the truth concerning the Divine existence. The contradictions which Dr. Mansel has so industriously accumulated have no existence what- ever when brought to the test of faith. He says that " a contradiction thus thoroughgoing teUs with equal farce against aU belief dind. aU unbehef," Now, as I have been carefiil to indicate, I do not here inquire what bearing these contradictions may have on the operations of the understanding when attempting to deal with The Absolute ; but I say that the professed thoroughgoing 98 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. contradiction tells with no force at all against our belief in the One Absolute God. In all declarations concerning the Infinite Being there must be uniform reference to the fundamental conviction of the mind as the test of their validity. The question, what do we believe concerning God, must al- ways precede the question, how can we conceive of Him. A careful examination of the nature of our belief must, I apprehend, lead to the conclusion that it is a funda- mental datum of consciousness, ki other words, a neces- sary conviction of the mind, equally above aU proof and all doubt. A searching consideration of what is con- tained in this primary belief in the Divine existence, reveals to us the only Infinite and Absolute Being — the one Infinite Intelligence, the Holy God, the self-existent, aU-powerful First Cause, Sustainer, and Euler of all finite existence. CHAPTER III. THE PKOVINCE OF FAITH AS EELATED TO THAT OF KNOWLEDGE. After having shown that the being of God is held by man on the authority of a primary belief, it becomes necessary to consider what bearing such faith has on human knowledge. Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel both agree that we must believe in One Infinite Being, and this admission is certainly one which must carry with it the most important results, when it is brought to bear on the question concerning the possibihty or impossibility of any knowledge of the Divine nature. It is, however, a singular fact that both of these authors make compara- tively small account of our belief in the Infinite, and do not even attempt anything like a formal exposition of the relation which subsists between faith and knowledge, if such relation there be. It is not enough on the part of any one, who seeks to carry out a complete investiga- tion of this subject, merely to say that " the Infinite is, must,, and ought to be beheved." There are many im- portant questions raised by such a statement, which require to be answered, if the ends of philosophical in- vestigation are to be gained. What place does such a necessary behef occupy among the operations of the mind ? Does it exercise any influence over other 100 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. mental operations, and if so, what is the nature and extent of that influence ? More particularly, has it any part to fulfil in connexion with the exercise of our thought ? Does it exist in consciousness, and exercise its appointed influence there, in harmony with the necessities of thought ? If there be any apparent want of harmony between our belief and our thought, how is the want of harmony to be explained ? Does our faith warrant to any extent a sure knowledge of the Infinite God 1 These questions, and many more besides, arise naturally so soon as we have admitted the existence of a necessary belief iu the Infinite One. A careful examination of the 'nature of such iuquiries shows that they may be embraced under two divisions, which shall, therefore, determine the arrangement of the considerations to be included in the present chapter. I. The Province op Faith. — It is essential for trust- worthy progress in the present inquiry, that there be an attempt at least to mark out by clearly defined bound- aries the exact province of faith, in order to contemplate satisfactorily the relation in which it stands to that of knowledge. In this way alone is it possible to decide whether our primary behefs are altogether separated fi-om the sphere of thought proper, or reaUy exercise an autho- rity over our thoughts, determining their character, and, to some extent, their course of evolution ; and securing a certain measure of knowledge in accordance with the actual nature of the object as it is revealed to us by faith. For the purpose of greater distinctness, I shall attempt to mark ofi" the province of fundamental belief both posi- tively and negatively, indicating first what it embraces. PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 101 and thereafter what it excludes. It is necessary to pre- mise that in. treating at present of the province of faith, I refer exclusively to that exercise of faith which is found in the consciousness of our primary or fundamental beliefs, among which I hold our belief in the Divine existence to be the most important. Faith may also find exercise in connexion with the facts of experience, or the infer- ences drawn from these ; but the illustrations now to be given of its proviace are intended to apply to those necessary beliefs which are implanted ia our nature. Such beliefs, if they have any value at aU, are nothing less than the foundation and guarantee of all our thoughts. 1. What the province of faith includes. It is the province of faith simply to affirm the existence of the object whose reality it declares, or assert the truth of the judgment which it imposes on the mind. It announces that a thing is. It arises in consciousness positively to affirm its own fact, and this it does without hesitating or halting, so long and so often as an appeal is made to its authority. When, therefore, we find a necessary be- lief in an Infinite God rising in our mind, the province which it occupies is exclusively that of affirming the ex- istence of one self-existent, infinite, inteUigent, and holy Being. It places this fact before the mind as a pure and positive assertion, which caimot be abjured, without wil- fully violating the appointed foundation of all human reasoning. So far as it comes to us from our Creator in the form of a revelation, faith may be described as re- ceptive ; in so far as it presents that revelation in con- sciousness according to the exigencies of our reason, 102 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THK INFINITE. faith may be described as declaratory. It is in the former view that Sir W. Hamilton, when speaking of our fundamental beliefs, says they " are given us." It is ia the latter view that he speaks of them as lying " hid in the profundities of the mind, until drawn from their obscurity by the mental activity itself, employed upon the materials of experience." In the former view, I agree with Dr. Mansel when he says that " faith, pro- perly so called, is not constitutive, but receptive." I agree with him again when he says that " we are com- pelled to beheve in the existence of a personal God," for this is only to say in another form that our primary be- lief comes into exercise as a* simple assertion of the Divine existence. If then, as is admitted, it be the province of faith to declare that a thing is, it is undoubtedly within that same province to declare what the iking is. These two are not identical, but they are necessarily connected, that is to say, the one cannot be without the other, and they are, therefore, to be found in every act of faith. The asser- tion that a certain object exists, involves a declaration concerning what the object is, else it could convey no revelation to the mind. When a primary belief rising in consciousness affirms that an object exists, it affirms the existence of a particular object, as distinguished from others, and the only possible way in which an object can be distinguished from others, is by a declaration of cer- tain distinct characteristics of that which is. revealed. When, therefore, it is said to be the province of faith to declare at once that a thing is, and what the thing is,, nothing more is implied than the very simple and ob- PROVINCE OV FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 103 vious fact, that it is the province of faith to affirm the existence of a certain object, as distinguished from others. I do not say that faith declares to the mind all that a thing is, because nothing more is needful to secure the revelation of an object, than the announcement of such characteristics as suffice to distinguish it from others, but this much there must be in every belief. To deny this, were to deny the power of faith to make any revelation to the mind, and consequently to reduce every- one of our beliefs to a nullity in human consciousness. Faith, as the possession of an intelligent being, must be an intelligent behef, else it can have no place in the mind, and no application there. If a primary belief testify to the existence of the Deity, it is not by any means necessary that it should declare all that is charac- teristic of the Divine nature, but it must at least affirm what God is, in such a way as to enable the mind to distinguish from aU else, the one object revealed. This is a fundamental point, around which a struggle must be fuUy and fairly waged, by the defenders of the opposite theories concerning the Infinite. Here, as it appears to me, is to be found one of the prominent fallacies in Dr. Hansel's reasoning. He broadly affirms that we have a necessary belief in the existence of the One Infinite Being, and yet he denies that this belief declares to us what God reaUy is. He teUs us that " Faith, however well founded, has itself only a regulative and practical, not a speculative and theo- •* retical, application,"^ by which he means that it is fitted only for our guidance, without involving any express 1 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 146. On thia point see Professor Fraser's Essays ore Philosophy, p. 190. 104 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. revelation concerning the nature of God, or, in Ms own words, the highest principles to which we can attain " do not teU us what things are in themselves, hut how we must conduct ourselves in relation to them."^ In this way he afiirms that we are assured certain things exist, and that we are related to them, but what these things are, our belief does not testify. Or, to come to the particular point before us, he holds that faith reveals to the mind that God exists, and yet gives no testimony concerning what God is. In what, then, do we beheve ? Either in nothing, or in something. If it be in nothing, we have no behef ; if it be in something, it is in a Being distin- guished from other beings, and therefore revealed to us by what He is. If we have a primary belief in God's existence, we believe in Him as distinguished from other objects, and in doing so, we believe in His existence either as it is not, or as it is. If it be a belief in God's existence as it is not, it is not a belief in God ; and if it be a belief in God's existence as it is, our primary behef declares not only that He is, but what He is. And yet Dr. Mansel maintains that faith does not teU us what God is. How, then, does he maintain his consis- tency 1 By scattering through his writings such asser- tions as these, that "we are compelled, by the consti- tution of our minds, to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infinite Being;" and that "we are com- pelled to believe in the existence of a personal God." How does he affirm that God is infinite and not finite ; that He is absolute and not relative ; that He is personal and not impersonal, if faith do not testify that these are < Limits of Religious Thought, p. 141. PROVINCE OP FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 105 essential characteristics of the Divine existence ? If faith be simply " regulative and practical," how is it that he goes beyond the assertion that we believe in the existence of some Being whose nature is unrevealed, but whom we are to obey and adore, and upon whom we are to de- pend 1 To keep by such vague references to the Divine Being, I beheve to be altogether impossible, and that because it is not true that faith is only " regulative and practical." In truth, faith is "regulative and prac- tical " for us, only because it reveals an infinite, absolute, and holy God, and did it not make this revelation, it would be insufficient to regulate us in anything, or to guide our practice in attempting to serve Him. A more inconsistent and untenable position I cannot imagine than that of Dr. Mansel, that " faith, however well founded, has itself only a regulative and practical, not a speculative and theoretical, apphcation ;" that it declares to us that God is, but not what God is. I believe that God is infinite, and that that is true of Him as He exists, as well as a truth " regulative " of my thought, and feeling, and action in relation to Him. I beheve that God is absolute, and that that is true of Him as He is, as well as a truth " regulative " of my mind and con- duct. I beheve that God is personal, and that that is true of Him as He is, as well as a truth for my guidance in life. I challenge Dr. Mansel to produce the least shadow of evidence for his assertion that our faith does not reveal God as He is, but only declares what is enough for our guidance in connexion with the relation which we bear to Him. When he affirms that our faith in one infinite, absolute, and personal God, tells us only " how 106 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. we must conduct ourselves in relation to " Him, and not what is true concerning God himself, he must make this assertion either on the authority of some higher faith revealing what G-od reaUy is, or without any warrant whatever. If he be able to declare that the testimony of faith does not reveal God as He really is, he can do so only by attaining in some manner to a superior reve- lation testifying to the real nature of God. He must have a faith in God as He is, which is speculative and theoretical in its application, besides the faith which is only regulative and practical. He must be able to com- pare the two, and on the ground of that comparison prove that the one is distinct from the other, before he can be warranted in asserting that our faith is only such as to tell us " how we must conduct ourselves." But in denying the possibility of a faith which reveals the Deity as He is, he contradicts his own assertion, and betrays his total want of authority for the declaration that faith is "only regulative and practical, and not speculative and theoretical." Faith is the declaration of what actually exists. Our belief in the Divine existence is the revelation of what God really is, carrying in itself its own authority, and assuring us that God is what its testimony declares. I appeal to the facts of our con- sciousness for a vindication of my statement concerning the province of faith, as embracing an authoritative declaration of the peculiar characteristics of the object whose existence it affirms. This is the only legitimate appeal, and I am satisfied that a careful prosecution of it places it beyond all dispute, that the declarations of faith point to distinct objects, and even Dr. Mansel himself PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 107 has been unable to avoid repeated acknowledgments that this is true of our faith in God. These are the facts involved in the act of faith ; the declaration that an object exists, and that it exists in the possession of certain qualities or attributes by which it is distin- guished from other objects in whose reality we believe. Less than this is not to be found in any act of faith, and, ia truth, the want of either of these elements would render a belief in an object impossible. There is, however, a certain restriction on the tes- timony of faith, which has been aUuded to, but which requires more complete explanation ; that is, the state- ment that faith, though declaring what the object is, does not necessarily reveal all that the object is. The applica- tion of what has been previously said concerning the appearance in consciousness of. any primary belief, is enough to explaia this. A fundamental conviction arises in consciousness, when the facts of experience, or the necessities of reflection, caU for its application. What- ever, then, be the circumstances requiring the apphcation of our belief in an object, faith wiU bear its testimony, in a measure proportionate to the requirements of the case. For example, if the problem before our mind be how to explain the occurrence of events above human control, which, nevertheless, are seen to determine the course and duration of human life, our faith may simply bear testimony to the existence of God as supreme. If, in the spirit Of doubt,, the mind raise the question, whether God may not Himself be under the dominion of some great controlHng forces, our pri- mary belief forthwith declares that God is absolute. 108 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. If we marvel over some startling display of the adapta- tion of means to ends in the world, our faith is a witness to the infinite wisdom of God. If we seek an explanation of the stupendous works of creation, faith gives its tes- timony to a God of infinite power. Thus it is, in perfect harmony with the law which regulates the rise of our primary beliefs into consciousness, that our faith in the Deity makes its declarations to the inquiring mind. This seems to me the true explanation of the fact that to many uninquiring minds, and among many heathen tribes, the behef in God appears to be little more than a belief in one Supreme Being ; and the reason of this plainly is, that the facts which force themselves on their notice, and require an explanation, are those which pre- sent a hindrance to the fulfilment of their personal desires, or make them conscious of their obligation. It is easy to see from this, why that faith, which is the same in all minds, should, in the case of the unreflecting, appear as little else than a testimony to the existence of a Supreme Being. To very many this is the aspect which faith generally wears, and only at occasional seasons, when the mind is carried into some unusual current of thought, does it testify to the fact that God is infinite or holy. But of this there can be no doubt, that if the mind only seek the full explanation of things as they are known to exist, our primary behef will be found to involve the declara- tion of the being of one infinite, absolute, holy, and all- perfect God. And, if we contemplate aright the law regulating the rise in consciousness of our necessary belief, it must be acknowledged by us that the faith we possess may contain a still wider revelation of the Divine TROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 109 nature, which only awaits an enlarged experience on our part to afford the occasion for presenting it to the mind. When we see what faith declares to those who exercise their intelligence enough to call for its wider applica- tions, and how much more ample its testimony is to such minds than to those less reflective, it is impossible to say what nobler and wider revelation faith may yet be char- tered to convey to men, were the sphere of their observa- tion among the works of God only further enlarged. 2. Wliat the province of faith excludes. In such a discussion as that now occupying our attention, any hope of establishing sound conclusions, and thereby advancing towards the discovery of acknowledged truth, must de- pend upon a clear distinction , between the various opera- tions of the mind included within the sphere of the in- quiry. "Where these are complex, and capable of being- reduced to their simple elements only by a philosophical process, clearness of separation between one fact m. con- sciousness and another, is to be sought after as a thing of special value. On this account, as well as from the obvious necessities of the discussion, it is of particular importance to mark off those mental processes, which are related to faith, and are concerned with it, whUe they belong to a province altogether distinct. This may be most readily done here by showing what is beyond the sphere of our belief {a.) It is not the province of faith to vindicate its own deliverance. When faith testifies to the truth of a certain principle, or the existence of a certain being, its declara- tion is not thereafter to be established by any process of reasoning for the satisfaction of the understanding. Faith 110 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. is authoritative, and admits neither of being doubted, nor of being vindicated, by reason. It imposes its testimony on the mind as unquestionable, and is by its very nature an express declaration of what really exists. A fact of experience is established by observation and testimony. An inference of the judgment depends for its vahdity on the certainty of the data from which it was deduced, and the accuracy of the process by which it was reached ; but, a primary behef contains its own authority, and is simply to be accepted. It is not the declaration of a fact discovered by us, but a revelation given to us, which has the fuU sanction of Him who gave us our mental constitution. When, however, it is said that a primary belief con- tains its own authority, it is necessary clearly to under- stand what is the kind of authority belonging to it. This is to be discovered simply by considering what is the nature of its own declaration, or, in other words, how it comes into consciousness, and what part it performs there. This, then, has already been established, that a primary belief is a simple affirmation that an object exists ; as, for example, that there is an infinite and absolute God. When, therefore, it is said to be authoritative in con- sciousness, it is meant thereby to indicate that its tes- timony is indubitable. It has not the mere authority of a law, declaring what must be accepted by us in accord- ance with the conditions under which we have been placed. This undoubtedly it has, but also much more than this. It has the authority of a positive revelation, presenting unquestionable testimony concerning reality in existence. Its testimony is not in any way the product PKOVINCE OF FAITH ANB OF KNOWLEDGE. Ill of our conditions of thought, and capable of being altered or removed by an alteration in these, but a declaration of what reaUy exists altogether apart from us. It is, therefore, not only regulative in respect of human thought, but also true in respect of what is beyond thought. This being so, it clearly follows, that it is not the province of faith to viadicate its own testimony, but simply to impose its authority upon the mind, and posi- tively to aflBrm the reality of that whose existence it reveals. (&.) It is not the province of faith to harmonize its ovm testimony with any other standard of truth. As our belief is simply receptive and declaratory, it is not within its, sphere to reconcile its own dehverance with evidence coming from any other source. It is not needed for any such work, and by its very nature it is incapable of performing it. Difficulties may be raised by the .understanding concerning what is involved in the nature of our belief, or more probably concerning what seems to be required by its application, but faith itself gives no heed to such difficulties, offering no explanation, yet not abatrag in the least degree the un- wavering decision of its testimony. It may not be ahle to afford a solution of the difficulties, or to indicate the harmony between itself and human thought in its limited capacity, but to look for any such result would be to ex- pect its operation in another sphere than its own. To accept and declare is the work of faith ; to compare and harmonize, must be the work of the understanding ; and the result in any case must be only such as the under- standing can reach, which, therefore, cannot in the least 112 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. affect our belief, whatever influence it may have on our speculation. This is a consideration of very great im- portance as bearing upon subsequent points in the dis- cussion, and I am glad to find the acknowledgment of it from Dr. Mansel, in these words : " Faith alone cannot suggest any actual solution of our doubts : it can offer no definite reconciliation of apparently conflicting truths ; for in order to accompHsh that end, the hostUe elements must be examined, compared, accommodated, and joined together one with another ; and such a process is an act of thought, not of belief." ^ Faith is in itself a distiact standard of truth, it is not, and cannot be, the source of any of the difficulties which arise in the mind in con- nexion with its declarations ; and it does not come withia its province to give a solution of difficttlties, which it has done nothing to raise. If contradictions are said to arise in connexion with the testimony of faith, as Dr. Mansel so frequently affirms,^ they are the product of the under- standing alone, iq its attempts to regulate thought in harmony with the standard which faith gives. They must arise exclusively from attempting the comparison of some " idea," or conception of the infinite, with the conception of the finite, although this seems rather a singular exercise for one who continually affirms the im- possibiLity of any conception of the Infinite. II. The Eelation subsisting between Faith and Kjstowledge. — Those who deny the possibility of any knowledge of the Infinite, seek in our belief a refuge from aU the doubts concerning the reality of the Infinite. The difficulty may be pressed in this manner : If the » Limiis of Religious Thought, p. 8. a Ibid. p. 58, et passim. PROVINCE OP FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 113 Infinite cannot be known, because it cannot exist in re- lation, how then can it exist at all ? If the Infinite can- not exist in relation, it is equally impossible that it should exist, as that it should be known. It will be found that the escape from this difiSculty is in every case efiected in the same way. The defence is this : " When I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am very far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed."^ The authority of our faith has been distinctly indicated in these pages, and I therefore acknowledge the validity of every appeal which is made to its testi- mony ; but I thoroughly repudiate and condemn the attempted divorce between faith and knowledge. Is there a gulf fixed between our belief and our know- ledge, rendering it impossible for the territory of the one to meet and harmonize with the other ? Must our know- ledge be constantly at variance with our fundamental belief ? Must we be involved in endless contradictions and inconsistencies by the attempt to think concerning the Infinite ; and, in order to escape these, must we be contented simply to believe in the Divine existence, without inquiring or reasoning in any way concerning his relation to us 1 Must the respective regions of behef and knowledge be involved in continual feud, so that the one shall spread out before us what is real, and the other present only a succession of treacherous quagmires, de- ceitful in appearance, through which we must stumble with unceasing confusion and anxiety 1 Is the mind safe only when it has abandoned aU attempts to think concerning the Infinite God ; when it has surrendered ' Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. p. 530. H 114 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the exercise of reason altogether, and confined itself en- tirely to the exercise of faith ? Is this the result of the conjoint possession of faith and reason, that "we are compelled by our religious consciousness, to believe in the existence of a personal God ; though the reasonings of the Eationalists, logically followed out, may reduce us to Pantheism or Atheism?"^ Does our reason neces- sarily lead us into error, and our faith alone save us from resting in the error ? Is our understanding such in its nature that reasoning, " logically followed out," guides us to Pantheism or Atheism, whereas faith expressly declares that there is an Infinite and Personal God 1 Every one of these questions I answer most unhesitatingly ia the negative. Consciousness is falsified, and not interpreted, when such results as these are said to be obtained from a comparison of the decisions of the reason, and the declarations of faith. The Philosophy is a false one, which finds reason and faith at variance. It is not a record of the facts of consciousness, but a con- tradiction of them. Kjiowledge and belief invariably harmonize, and even to a certain extent coalesce, but never contradict each other. Whenever a professed system of philosophy appears, declaring that thought and behef are contradictory, its unsound construction is to be accounted for, either by a misinterpretation of consciousness, or by a total neglect of it. In the latter case, the reasoning employed finds its coherence only from the use of definitions which apply to nothing, and of symbols which represent nothing, both of which involve a contradiction of faith at the outset. There ' Limits of Religious Thought, p. 122. PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 115 is sufficient warrant for pointing to many arguments, in which the Infinite, Absolute, and Unconditioned play the part of logical symbols, and nothing more, as illus- trations of reasoning altogether at variance with the data of consciousness. Nothing can be more contra- dictory of the facts of consciousness, than to declare that thought, " logically followed out," leads to results inconsistent with the testimony of faith. Most heartily do I sympathize with Dr. M'Cosh when he says : " I grieve over the attempts for the last age or two, of a school of thinkers who labour to prove that the under- standing or the speculative reason leads to scepticism and nihili sm, and then appeal to faith to save us from the abyss before us."^ I consider that the human mind is a harmonious whole, in which aU the faculties work in con- cert ; not a bundle of antagonistic powers, held together by some strange bond. It does, indeed, show traces of injury done to it, but even that injury has not betrayed any signs of antagonism between the powers originally communicated to it. My purpose, then, is to attempt to indicate the relation subsisting between thought and belief, and the harmony of their operations. 1. Knowledge comes first in the order of time. We start with knowledge in the earliest efibrts of mental activity. Our perceptions, sensations, and self-conscious- ness are first in exercise, and give us the earliest ele- ments of our knowledge. The knowledge here spoken of is knowledge derived from experience ; and as it does not particularly apply to the subject of discussion, little more is needful than the simple reference to it. In this ' Intidtions of the Mind, p. 200. 116 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. knowledge there is embraced the recognition of self, and of objects distinct from self. 2. All knowledge rests on faith. There are in the mind certain fundamental convictions which regulate our powers iu the acquisition of knowledge, and upon which our knowledge must rest for sanction, as they afford the necessary conditions for the exercise of the mind. These have been called "beliefs" and "cogni- tions" indifferently — a fact to which there wiU be particular occasion to refer immediately. But what is specially to be observed at present is, that knowledge becomes a firm and compact structure only by restiag upon faith as a foundation. In the very exercise of its powers of knowledge, the mind rests on the belief that our senses and consciousness are trustworthy and not deceptive witnesses. In contemplating and comparing objects, aU knowledge is accepted and arranged on the conviction that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time. Through aU the varieties of thought, feeling, and volition, we believe in our own identity. Among aU the changes continually occurring around us, we find order, and discover the mutual dependence of events, by observ- iug and reasoning on the conviction that every change must have a cause. For the existence of the universe as known to us, we find an explanation only by resting on the great fundamental behef that there is one infinite, self-existent, holy, and all-perfect God. From these illustrations it is obvious enough that there is a measure of faith in connexion with all knowledge, affording to knowledge a firm foundation on which to settle. The facts of knowledge axejirst recognised by the mind, and PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 117 yet our fundamental convictions are first in the mind, affordiag the conditions necessary for the acquirement of experience. To adopt an old distinction wMch M. Cousin has illustrated and applied with striking abihty, knowledge is chronologically first, whereas faith is logically first.^* I perfectly agree with Sir W. Hamilton when he says, — " In the order of nature, belief always precedes knowledge — it is the condition of instruction. The child (as observed by Aiistotle) must beheve in order that he may learn ; and even the primary facts of intelligence, the facts which precede, as they afibrd the conditions of, aU knowledge, would not be original were they revealed to us under any other form than that of natural or necessary beliefs."^ "Hence it is," he says again, "that our knowledge has its commencement in sense, external or internal, but its origin in intellect."^ 3. The province of faith is much more extensive than that of Tcnowledge. Belief affords a foundation for know- ledge, and at the same time stretches far beyond it. Where knowledge stops, faith continues, affording to the mind the assurance of reality which is out of the reach of the understanding. Thought may advance far with its re- search, but at length it must discover its own powerless- ness in attempting to struggle onwards. Even then, however, faith declares the certainty of much beyond the boundaries of thought, and the mind may be satisfied with truth which it cannot understand. If we con- template faith in the twofold aspect indicated above,, it will afford an explanation of its peculiar appearance ' See Cowrs de PMlosophie, Lesou 17. ' Ibid. ii. p. 351. ' Lectures on Metaphysics, i. p. H. 118 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. when it is recognised as stretching beyond our know- ledge. It may be viewed either with regard to what it reveals to us, or the authority it has over us. In the former case we are enabled to rest in the certain existence of much that we cannot discover by any re- search of our own ; and in the latter we* are compelled to believe in much that we cannot understand. It may be well at this point formally to distinguish this twofold aspect of the province of faith, as more extensive than the sphere of knowledge, for it has most important bear- ing on what is to foUow. {a.) Faith leads the mind outwards to what is beyond knowledge. The mind may contemplate the manifesta- tion of power in che world. Beginning from some par- ticular indication, it may strive to advance to a loftier and wider conception ; it may advance far in its con- templation, but at length it must yield to the conscious- ness of its insufficiency for further progress ; but even then, faith leads on the mind to the assurance that Divine power is infinite. We may direct our attention to the various influences at work in the physical world, and from these we may advance to the world of mind, and in relation to all we may contemplate the authority of God ; but here, as everywhere else, thought can only advance to a certain measure, whereas faith leads us outward and onward with the assurance that God is absolutely supreme. Let us consider in this way, what- ever manifestation of the Divine nature we choose, we are conscious of the province of faith spreading forth with a far wider expanse than that of knowledge. In this respect faith is essentially a revelation of truth, PROVINCE OP FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 119 whicli it is beyond the power of experience and reflection to discover ; it is, in a certain sense, the supplement of what the understanding cannot complete. (6.) Faith authoritatively declares what the under- standing cannot adequately interpret. This is what is meant when it is said that we are compelled to believe much that we cannot understand. In the former case, we advance from the region of knowledge to the recog- nition of an outstretching province of faith : in this, we look back from the declarations of faith to the sphere of knowledge. When it is said that the province of faith is much more extensive than that of knowledge, it is implied that the sphere of belief is not only beyond that of knowledge, in respect of what it reaches, but also above it, in respect of the authority it possesses. It be- longs to faith to declare what may seem inconsistent with knowledge, and it does so with an authority which compels submission, and requires the homage of the understand- ing. This it does solely because of the incapacity of the imderstanding adequately to interpret its decisions, and not because of any actual inconsistency between the facts of knowledge and its own testimony. And it is further to be observed, that the apparent inconsistency between faith and knowledge does not arise in the progress of the mind from the conceptions it forms concerning God, to its belief in the attributes of His nature ; but in the attempt to reconcile certain distinct facts of knowledge, applying to other objects, with what faith testifies con- cerning Grod. For example, we know that man is free, and yet, on the authority of faith, we are assured that God is supreme. In this, then, the testimony of faith may 120 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. seem inconsistent witH man's knowledge, but to say this, is nothing more than to aflfirm that the understanding cannot adequately interpret and apply what faith declares concerning Divine sovereignty ; whereas faith, by its very- nature, implies that there is a harmony between the two, though the understanding fails to discover it. To take another example, we know that there is much suffering in the world, while faith declares the absolute goodness of God. Here also there may seem to be inconsistency, but this is nothing more than to say that the understand- ing cannot reach what belongs to the region of faith ; whereas our belief implies that there is harmony, though, as has been shown, it is altogether beyond the province of faith to reveal it. If the harmony cannot be reached by the understanding, it cannot be reached at all, and the same explanation applies in all cases — the region of thought is more restricted than that of faith. In thus declaring that the province of faith is much more extensive than that of knowledge, I am but agree- ing with what Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel have written on the matter, though it seems to me that they make a very imperfect and unsatisfactory use of the fact. "Wbat bearing it has on the present discussion may appear shortly, but it is important to mark the measure of agreement here. I gladly quote at this point what Sir W. Hamilton has written on the subject in his letter to me. He says : " The sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge."^ Dr. Mansel presents the same view in these words : " We learn that the provinces of Reason and Faith are not co- ' Lectures on Metaphysics, li. 530. PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 121 extensive ; that it is a duty enjoined by Reason itself to believe in that which we are unable to comprehend."^ 4. The provinces of faith and knowledge meet each other, and are necessarily connected. Faith and know- ledge are not dissevered, as though these two elements in our consciousness were antagonistic, or even entirely independent of each other. Even though we advance in the sphere of knowledge until we become conscious of the impossibility of further progress, there is no such thing in the operations of the mind, as ceasing at that point, for the purpose of changing entirely the line of research — turning the mind round, and beginning anew in a totally different sphere of mental activity, without any consciousness of the relation subsisting between the two. Such separation could be maintained only on a materialistic basis, altogether inconsistent with the nature of mind. That knowledge and faith are so distinct from each other as to be capable of being separated in a pro- cess of mental analysis, is most certainly true ; that they are so severed from each other as to have no mental co- herence, is as certainly false. Viewed as mental opera- • tions, they combine, and often unite to form a single mental act ; viewed in relation to the provinces which they occupy, the one is the complement of the other. Knowledge finds its resting-place on faith ; while faith finds its application in supporting knowledge, by giving it a sure basis on which to rest, — in regulating thought, by the authority of its testimony concerning the reafity of that which is beyond thought,— and in extending know- ledge, by prompting the mind in its search after truth, ' Limits of Religious Thought, p. D6. 122 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. and affording the assurance that the search shall not be fruitless, if pursued in the direction to which it points. AH knowledge, in recognising some object as distinct from our own personality, involves a belief in the trust- worthiness of our powers of knowing ; all thought is to be traced back to certain fundamental convictions on which it rests ; and all inquiry proceeds at length from observation and reasoning to the beUef of that which cannot be fuUy understood. I therefore hold it un- questionable that faith and knowledge meet each other, and are necessarily connected. Faith in part underlies and sustains knowledge, in part stretches beyond it, but in either case it is connected with it. Belief is really the basis of the mental operations. Knowledge imphes de- pendence upon the adequacy of our powers for the dis- covery of what really exists ; reasoning involves imphcit confidence in the truth of the fundamental principles of reasoning, which we accept ; and faith, in its highest and widest sphere, by assuring us of the reality of that which we cannot interpret and explain, gives the mind a quiet resting-place from the doubts and questions which it cannot solve. 5. The provinces of faith and knowledge harmonize with each other. The fact that they are necessarily con- nected in our mind is the guarantee for their harmony. There is no internal feud among the powers of our mind, or collision between the results to which their exercise leads. The mind is one, and in whatever direction its energy be put forth, its working is harmonious, and all its results are capable of being accurately arranged in their own appropriate position, showing the most PROVIKCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 123 striking unity in all the variety. What is true concern- ing the whole, is at once apparent by a comparison of any two of the correlative provinces into which the phenomena of consciousness are divided. The more care- fully we search, compare, and contrast the provinces of knowledge and belief, or reason and faith, as they have commonly been called, the more obvious this fact wUl become. A knowledge which, while it is the product of experience, leans upon faith for support, must needs be in harmony with it ; and a knowledge which is stimulated and regulated by belief, must have its own harmony with that faith whose authority it owns. For the purpose of expounding how the provinces of faith and knowledge harmonize with each other, it is necessary to consider the facts just indicated, that faith in part sustains knowledge, and in part stretches far beyond it. These two facts lead to a twofold distinction concerning the harmony between knowledge and faith, which must now be stated. (a.) In so far as faith simply underlies knowledge, the harmony is clearly recognised. Our belief may apply merely to the facts of experience, and in that case the unity subsisting between the two becomes a matter of consciousness. For example, take our belief in the law of Causality. A person may hear a loud concussion, which he necessarily believes must have been produced by some cause ; and if he walk in the direction from which the sound came, when he reaches a quarry and discovers that a charge of powder had been fired for the purpose of blasting the rock, he is satisfied of the con- sistency of his belief with the experience which called it into exercise. If a spectator observe a dark shadow 124 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. pass over the surface of a distant mountain, he is con- vinced that there must be a cause for the phenomenon, and immediately when he lifts his eye and beholds the fleeting cloud, he is satisfied that the conviction im- planted in his nature had not been deceptive. In all such cases, where faith simply underlies and sustains knowledge, the harmony subsisting between the two is clearly discerned. (6.) In so far as faith outstretches knowledge, the harmony may be only partially discovered, hut cannot he questioned. This maxim applies to our belief in the Infinite Beiag, in all its applications. It is universally acknowledged that, as applied to the Infinite, faith far outstretches the sphere of our knowledge, and there is, therefore, no need for raising any question here coiicem- ing the nature and extent of our knowledge of the Divine Being. There are difierences concerning this question which must very shortly come under review, but they ofier no obstruction at present, and may be left in abeyance till the next stage in this exposition. The admitted facts are these, that knowledge is always limited, and that faith reveals what is infinite. As has already been shown,^ it is not within the province of faith to reconcile its own testimony with the facts of know- ledge. To compare and harmonize belongs to the sphere of the understanding as such, but as faith reveals much which the understanding cannot adequately interpret,^ it is manifest that there cannot be a, full harmony obtained between our knowledge and belief The understand- ing being limited, cannot reach to the measure of faith, ' See p. 111. , 2 See p. 119. PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 125 and therefore cannot test the harmony of the measure of thought with the full extent of behef . But the understand- ing, by its very nature, searches for a harmony of the facts of knowledge and of the forms of reasoning, with the testimony of faith. In many cases it may recognise the signs of agreement, and, when it fails in the search, it is invariably conscious that the failure springs from the limitation of its own power. Here, then, come clearly out to view certain principles which are of the utmost consequence for the guidance of speculation concerning the relation of the finite to the infinite. Knowledge, inasmuch as it is knowledge, may in- ■ valve what is recognised as harmonizing with the deliver- ances of faith. "What we know of the manifestations of God's power in the world, though very limited in comparison with what is to be known, nevertheless har- monizes in every respect? according to its own measure, with the declaration of our fundamental behef, which reveals an Almighty God. So in like manner, what we do know of Divine goodness and wisdom harmonizes with the nature of the Deity as the object of faith. That there is a harmony capable of being easily recognised by the understanding is obvious ; but, at the same time, it is to be remarked that the harmony is necessarily only of such a degree as is compatible with the limited nature of our knowledge. But, as the understanding is often conscious of perplexity in its attempts to reconcile know- ledge and faith, another principle afi'ords the explana- tion of the difficulty. Knowledge, inasmuch as it is limited, may not emr- brace all that is needful for the discovery of its harmony 126 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. with faith. This limitation is the single source of all the difficulties which arise in the attempt to reconcile the facts of knowledge, and the inferences of the understanding, with the revelation which faith makes. These difficulties must be manifold, and must appear greater or less, ac cording as the facts and inferences seem less or more to approximate towards reconcihation. According as the lines of observation and reflection seem to diverge from the province of faith or incline towards it, the perplexities of the mind must vary. Like the traveller in the rugged highland districts, who finds, in pursuing the winding path, that his face is often set for one glen, whereas his destination is one altogether diflferent ; so it often is in • the search for truth. There must often seem to be dis- crepancies between thought and belief; and this is nothing more than to affirm that thought is necessarily limited, and must raise many problems* which are to itself in- soluble. There is very much gained for the cause of philosophy by the acknowledgment that such difficulties must arise, simply because the sphere of thought is much more restricted than that of faith. The prominence which Sir W. Hamilton has given to this, is one amongst many excellencies for which the friends of philosophy must honour him. Let us advance as far as we may in the exercise of thought, we must still, as the result of every efibrt, come to admit the limitation of our powers, and be contented to rest in the testimony of faith for all that is beyond. At whatever point we stop, however, difficulties must arise, only to continue unanswered. But, it is to be observed that these do not in the least shake the authority of faith. They are the product of PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 127 the understanding alone, and do not in any sense come from the nature of faith, which, by the authority of its revelation, distinctly implies that every difficulty is ca- pable of the most satisfactory solution, although it be impossible for our limited powers to discover it. This is the conviction upon which the understanding can rest, and be at ease, in presence of a startling array of insoluble problems. With an intelligent belief to lean upon, we can be satisfied that insoluble problems are so only to us, and not in themselves. There is suffi- cient warrant in the authority of faith, for believing that there is perfect harmony between the nature of the In- finite God and aU the manifestations He has given of his glory. We may not be able to discover how God's un- limited knowledge and power harmonize with the commu- nication of freedom to a large race of creatures, or how the Absolute holiness of God is to be reconciled with the permission of evil ; but the fundamental belief implanted in our nature, distinctly involves the declaration that harmony does exist, though we fail to discover it. This is equally true concerning all the difficulties which arise from the limited nature of the understanding. The acknowledgment of the limits of the understanding, as a controUing principle in all speculation ; a careful regard to the actual boundaries of thought, especially in every instance where it is concerned with themes stretching far into the unexplored territory of faith ; and a uniform cultivation of reverence and humility in all inquiry, are alike essential for a true philosophic spirit, and the right- ful acknowledgment of that God, whose glory it is our highest attainment to contemplate. With these con- 128 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. siderations in view, it is equally important for phUo- sophy and religion, to urge forward earnest inquiry, in the assurance that, if our powers be capable of develop- ment, the sphere of research is boundless ; and, at the same time, to refrain from proud and dogmatic assertion of contradictions between the provinces of faith and knowledge, which cannot be adequately compared. There are, therefore, as it seems to me, three funda- mental maxims to be laid down for the guidance of all philosophical inquiry concerning our relation to the In- finite God. (l.) The harmony of faith and knowledge is to be sought to the utmost extent to which the understanding can carry us. This is the vindication of unwearying research, even as applied to the highest and grandest spheres to which the mind of man can turn. Certain difliculties we may legitimately hold to beybr ever insoluble to us, inasmuch as their solution would imply a full knowledge of the infinite itself, But it is in the highest degree imreason- able to suppose, that research has already been carried to its utmost ia any sphere, or that any one has attained to the exercise of the full measure of power appointed for man. If thought be exercised in submission to the authority of faith, it may be applied in any sphere, even the highest, and that with boundless scope for research. With faith as our guide, there need be no timid shriak- ing from reflection and reasoning concerning things divine, as well as human. I perfectly agree with Dr. Mansel in saying that reason is not without restriction, but I also hold that system in the highest degree un- PROVINCE OP FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 129 philosopHcal, which attempts to restrict the mind of man to the contemplation of what is human, to the ex- clusion of the truth concerning the Divine perfections. It is not, indeed, the province of human thought to attempt ^n impossible task, in trying "to remove the boundary which separates the comprehensible from the iacomprehensible ;"^ but it is most certainly equally possible and warrantable to extend the region of know- ledge still further into the boundless expanse of the un- known. Though it is not the work of human philosophy " to 'produce a coincidence between what we believe and what we think," ^ it is most certainly the legitimate work of a soimd philosophy to carry forward the discovery of that coincidence without wearying. I cast aside with surprise the assertion that " action and not knowledge is man's destiny and duty in this life."^ Strange work it is in the annals of philosophy, to attempt the dissever- ance of knowledge and action. A new ambition it is, to strive for success in inducing men to act without knowledge. Is intelligence' of so little worth to man that unintelligent action is to be regarded as his " duty and destiny in this life" ? Is it not rather clear that it must be stupid action indeed, which is action without knowledge? And, while it is the duty of man to beheve much that he cannot understand, it must be very unsatisfactory action which proceeds on g, faith which declares that God is, without revealing what He is. Faith, knowledge,, and action have a common har- mony, and they will be found most completely in exer- cise according as their agreement is discovered. The \ Limits of Jleligious T/wuffht, 1:1. 9. ^ Ibid. a Hid. p. 149.^ I 130 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. mail who has reflected most patiently and solemnly on the applications of his belief in the all-perfect God, is the man whose action will be found most satisfactory, because he is the man who has most completely dis covered the practical apphcation of his faith. A man may, indeed, know much, and, from moral perversity, fail in the apphcation of his knowledge ; but it will be found that he who has reflected little on the testimony which faith presents, is far from satisfactorily fulfilliag the part of a moral and rehgious being. If our funda- mental behef reveal to us an Infinite and Absolute God, and our observation present the indications of His various excellencies, there is open for us a clear and safe method for extending our conceptions concerning the Divine Being. Were we altogether without compass, chart, or sounding line, we might hesitate to sail away into unexplored seas. Without any fundamental behef concerning the Divine nature, we might be constrained to restrict ourselves to the boundaries of the finite crea- tion, and refuse to think or reason concerning the Infin- ite Being. But with a necessary belief to guide us, we may find exercise for thought, if it be prosecuted with the caution and humihty befitting a theme so vast, yet with the earnestness and hope of those who are assured that thought is directed to grand and eternal reahty. (2.) That which is clearly inconsistent with our faith, may he pronounced contradictory of the Divine nature. Every essential characteristic of material objects, and every imperfection or restriction belonging to what is essentially finite, may be unhesitatingly denied of the Infinite God. This our faith most clearly warrants, and PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 131 it is in this way that we avoid thinking of God in a manner inconsistent with His immeasurable excellence. Dr. Mansel strangely enough denies this maxim. He not only declares that we are unable to discover what God is, but warns us that "we are to beware of the opposite extreme," — that of mistaking " the inability to aflfirm for the ability to, deny ,"^ I submit that our author discovers a mental inability where none exists. We can assuredly take up one by one the degraded conceptions of the Deity held by heathen nations, both ancient and modern, and condemn them aU, as incon- sistent with the nature of the Infinite One, degrading to men, and destructive of aU true religion. And notwith- standing his singular efforts unreasonably to restrict human thought, it is satisfactory to add that Dr. Mansel, as much as others, condemns the " Pantheism of India," and the " Polytheism of Greece."^ All such reasoning as that which maintains that " no mode of being," not even the finite, can be denied of the Infinite,^ is at once to be set aside as clearly inconsistent with our faith, and therefore contradictory of the Divine nature. Such reasoning deals only with logical symbols, and not with the object of faith, and really violates aU truth, while it maintains an accurate logical form. (3.) That which is a'pparently irreconcilable with our faith, cannot be pronounced contradictory of the Divine, nature. Objects not fully known cannot be adequately com- pared, and, therefore, cannot be declared contradictory 1 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 146. a IWd. p, 151. 3 lUd. p. 46, et passim. 132 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. of each other. If, for example, our knowledge embrace certain facts within Our own observation apparently irre- concilable with the goodness of God, it is to be remem- bered that the infinite perfection of God is vastly beyond our comprehension, and that we are clearly excluded from making our inability to reconcile, a reason for declaring that a contradiction exists. When the distance at which an object is seen is such as to prevent the clear recog- nition of it, we are precluded from contradicting one who has visited the spot, when he says it is a tower, even though the apparent proportions of the object seem to us incompatible with the assertion. In like manner, aU must be agreed that, since we necessarily come far short of comprehending the Infinite, it is im- warrantable in us to pronounce the seemingly incon- sistent, really contradictory. This is clearly a general maxim for the guidance of aU our thought concerning the Infinite. We may accept unreservedly whatever is embraced within the sphere of knowledge, but human knowledge cannot by any possibility be raised into a standard of aL. truth. Here I am at one with Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel. I agree with Sir W. Hamil- ton in aU the importance he attaches to this maxim when he says, — " We are taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence, and are warned from recognising the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith." ^ Great indeed would be the advantage both to philosophy and theology were this truth rigorously apphed. In no discussions is this ' Hamilton's Discussions, p. 15. PEOVINCE 0¥ FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 133 maxim of more importance than in those which concern the Infinite. A little consideration may show that it is enough to sweep away a whole host of those asserted contradictions, which have been so dogmatically affirmed as springing from the relation of the Finite and the In- finite. While it clearly prohibits the assertion of contra- diction between objects not fully known, it is sufficient to indicate the limits of human thought, and mark out the point at which the sphere of the understanding terminates. Thought may advance indefinitely in its attempts to discover harmony between the province of the understanding and the deliverance of faith ; but it cannot advance a single step towards the assertion of actual contradiction, in any case of apparent dis- crepancy. 6. All faith implies knowledge. The connexion be- tween the two is necessary : it is, therefore, equally true to affixm that aU faith implies knowledge, and that all knowledge imphes faith. The latter position has already been estabhshed and illustrated •} it is the former which now requires consideration. "What I affirm here is, that faith and knowledge are invariably united in conscious- ness. They combine to form a single act of the mind, and are separated only by analysis, which is the result of subsequent reflection. " Neither is faith without know- ledge, nor knowledge without faith."^ Behef in an object is possible only inasmuch as a certain knowledge or under- standing of the nature of the object is possible. There may be innumerable objects in existence concerning which even faith can afibrd no testimony, simply because we ' ' See p. 116. 2 Clemens of Alexandria, Strom, v. 1. 134 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. can form no conception of their nature. On this account, higher intelligences may h-ave a much wider range of faith than we have, because of the greater powers of knowledge which they possess. But faith can exist in an intelligent nature only because of its possible harmony with the intelligence which that nature exercises. A belief can arise in consciousness, only if it be possible for the mind to form some conception of the object to which it points, and there can be nothing more inconsistent with the nature of an intelligent being than the supposition, that it is possible to believe in what is essentially incon- ceivable. Faith can be nothing to an intelligent being, unless it can guide the thought in seeking an extension of knowledge. This is another of the fundamental posi- tions around which a battle must be fairly waged by the defenders of the opposing theories concerning man's knowledge of the Infinite. I maintain that that philo- sophy violates the most obvious necessities of our inteUi- gence, which affirms a belief in an Infinite Being, while it denies the possibifity of any conception of His nature. Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel have saved their reason- ings from ending in scepticism, only by affirming a neces- sary belief in the Infinite God ; but, in doing this, they have overturned their own systems. Sir W. Hamilton has complained that I have done his reasoning injustice, by arguing that a denial of any knowledge of the Infinite virtually involves the overthrow of our faith in the Infinite. He says, referring to some points which he alleges I have not taken sufficiently into account : " The sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge ; and therefore, when I deny PROVINCE OP FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 135 that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed. This I have indeed anxiously evinced both by reasoning and authority. When, therefore, you maintain, that in denying to man any positive cognisance of the Infinite, I virtually extenuate his behef in the infinitude of Deity, I must hold you to be whoUy wrong in respect both of my opinion and of the theological dogma itself." ^ Not- withstanding this strong statement from the lamented and venerated author, I still maintain that a denial of " ^^J positive cognisance of the Infinite" virtually over- throws our belief in the infinitude of the Deity. But I am happy to accept, and formally to quote at this point, the assertion that the Infinite "is, must, and ought to be helieved." Accepting this, however, only shifts the criti- cism to the opposite side, and now I maintain that Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine of a necessary behef in the Infinite God, Avith which I perfectly agree, completely overturns his theory concerning the impossibihty of obtaining any knowledge of the Infinite. Where faith is, there knowledge is; and our belief in the Infinite God necessarily involves a knowledge of God as Infinite, I maintain that it is a fact in consciousness that faith is always united with knowledge, and that belief in an object is a mental impossibility without some cognisance of the object in which we beheve. The two doctrines, that we believe in the Infinite, and that we cannot know the Infinite, are m.utuaUy destructive. In looking for some vindication of the philosophic consistency of holding both doctrines, it is necessary to ' Lectwes on Meiaphysics, II. p. 530. 136 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. search the metaphysical system of Sir W. Hamilton for some evidence of the possibihty of a complete severance between faith and knowledge. It is a singular fact, how- ever, that in the whole course of his metaphysical system, the possibihty of this is never formally considered. More striking stUl, iu view of the above quotation, is the fact that, if his distribution of the mental phenomena be ex- amined, it appears that faith has either no place whatever in the classification, or is included among the acts of cog- nition themselves. He adopts the Kantian distribution, which embraces the mental phenomena under the three divisions' of Cognition, Feeling, and Appetency.^ The first embraces the phenomena of knowledge ; the second, of pleasure and pain ; arid the third, of wiU and desire. If, then, faith has any place iu this distribution, it is to be found among the phenomena of knowledge. It is not only classified with these phenomena, but is held to be a certain aspect of knowledge itself. Here, then, it seems to me apparent that it is impossible to reconcile Sir W. Hamilton's pecuhar theory concerning the Infinite, with his own distribution of the mental phenomena, adopted by him after a careful analysis of the entire sphere of consciousness, and without reference to this special dis- cussion. But every one who is acquainted with the writings of this distinguished philosopher knows, that the threefold distribution of the mental phenomena has not been adopted by him in total neglect of such a mental exercise as that of faith. Sir W. Hamilton is distinguished for the pro- minence he has given to certain necessary beliefs which ' Lectures on Metaphysics, i. pp. 183-9. PROVINCE OP FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 137 are found in our mind, and for his elaborate elucidation of their nature and vindication of their authority. It is one of the chief excellencies of his philosophy, that it has, with great power and clearness, vindicated these primary convictions as necessary and universal. When, therefore, he says that the Infinite " is, must, and ought to be be- lieved," he simply places that belief among the fundamen- tal convictions of the mind. Having seen that these are embraced, in his general distribution, under knowledge, the next inquiry must concern the position and relative influence which he ascribes to them among our cognitions. An examination of his classification of the cognitive powers shows that he considers aU our fundamental con- victions as the product of a special cognitive faculty, forming the sixth and last in his enumeration, and to which he has very appropriately given the name of the Regulative Faculty. His introductory remarks, illustra- tive of the need for admitting the existence of such a facility, are these : — " The mind is not altogether indebted to experience for the whole apparatus of its knowledge, — its knowledge is not aU adventitious. . . . But there are cognitions in the mind which are not contingent, — which are necessary, — which we cannot but think, — which thought supposes as its fundamental condition."^ What, then, did Sir W. Hamilton understand to be the nature of the mental act involving the recognition of any one of those truths which "is, must, and ought to be behoved " ? The answer may be easUy obtained from a glance at the large number of expressions which he em- ployed indiscriminately as descriptive of these truths. ' Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. p. 15. 138 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. He gathered from the writings of previous philosophers, and personally adopted and used, such designations as these, — " first principles, self-evident or intuitive truths, primitive notions, innate cognitions, natural knowledges (cognitions), primary or fundamental laws of human behef, natural belief," etc. etc.^ Here, then, the fundamental convictions of the mind are indiscriminately called cog- nitions and beliefs, and that without any sense of contra- diction. He says they are " intuitive cognitions, notions, judgments,"^ inasmuch as they involve an immediate recognition of the truth. Agaia he says "these data are in rigid propriety, Behefs or Trusts," — "instinctive behefs, cognitions, judgments," ® — inasmuch as they are inexpHcable, or incapable of proof ; and, to restrict quota- tion, he says once more, " that the principles of our know- ledge must be themselves knowledges," * and hence he calls them "cognitions, notions, and conceptions." If faith and knowledge are to be held as distinct in nature, and as having distinct provinces in the wide range of mental operations, how is it that the first principles of consciousness admit of being designated by such appa- rently contradictory names as beliefs and cognitions 1 It is simply because of the fact which I have indicated above, that knowledge and behef combine to constitute the single mental act. Let men treat of the first principles of the mind, and they cannot fail to speak of them, now as cog- nitions, and again as beliefs, for both elements are found mingling in the one operation of the mind. As Sir W. ' Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. p. 350 ; ^ Hamilton's Eeid, p. 759. seealso, in Reid's works, Hamilton's i)is- ^ Ibid. p. 760. sertation on the Philosophy of Common * Hid. p. 763. Sense. PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 139 Hamilton has very accurately indicated,^ they have their light side and their dark. They afford to us a certain measure of light, and in that respect they communicate knowledge ; they fail to show the mind how they are to be accounted for, and in that respect they are acts of faith. While they are beliefs, they reveal what is true ; and while they reveal truth, they neither vindicate nor explain their own revelation. In perfect consistency with the representation which Sir W. Hamilton has given of the nature of our fun- damental convictions, is the explanation he gives of their relation to other cognitions. He says : " These native, these necessary -cognitions, are the laws by which the mind is governed in its operations, and which afford the eonditions of its capacity of knowledge."^ They are "necessary laws, or primary conditions of in- telligence." Thus our author admits that they have a value to man, only in so far as they involve a reve- lation of truth, which suffices for the guidance of the mind in the extension of its knowledge. In this Sir W. Hamilton most clearly, and most truly, as the great majority of thinkers will admit, affirms that aU faith implies knowledge. By the very same process he over- turns the unphilosophical assertion of Dr. Mansel, in saying that " faith, however well founded, has itself only a regulative and practical, not a speculative and theo- retical application ;" that " the highest principles of thought and action" " do not serve to satisfy the reason, but to guide the conduct; they do not tell us what things are in themselves, but how we must conduct 1 Hamilton's Keid, p. 760. ' Lectmes on MetapJiysics, ii. p. 15. 140 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ourselves in relation to them."^ It may well be cause for wonder how " the highest principles of thought" nevertheless fail to regulate thought; and surely action without knowledge must be uninteUigible and irra- tional. I have already shown the untenable nature of the doctrine, that faith reveals that a thing is, without revealing what the thing, is. And now, it must be manifest that, if faith testify to the reality of a certain object, it cannot do so without involving a knowledge of the object. That faith has a regulative power in the mind no one can deny, but to speak of it as regulating action, without regulating thought, is a philosophical in- consistency. Further, if our faith apply only to action without applying to thought, we can never know that our conduct is in harmony with our faith ; and, without this, faith is useless, even according to Dr. Mansel's own showing, and loses its power over the conduct. In order that faith may regulate the conduct, we must be able to compare our actions with our belief ; and, in order to make such a comparison, we must as truly know what our faith reveals, as what our action is ; and, if we can have such knowledge, and apply it in such a way, Dr. Mansel's attempt to show that faith has " only a regula- tive and practical, not a speculative and theoretical ap- phcation," altogether fails. To try to regulate the con- duct, even by the very best standard, without the aid of thought, is a hopeless task. If this be the last resort for escape from the philosophical necessity of admitting that we have a knowledge of the Infinite Being in har- ' On this theory there is a singularly suggested by his recent criticism of Dr. able and successful criticism in A Letter Mansel's Bampton Lectures. By the Rev. to the Rev. F. D. Maurice on someimnts C. P. Chretien, M.A., pp. 15-32. PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 141 mony with our faith, it is most obviously a failure. Faith is practically nothing to an intelligent being, except in so far as it operates through the intellect ; and the only consistent position on the subject is that which Sir W. Hamilton maintains, in direct opposition to Dr. Mansel, that our fundamental convictions are " the laws by which the mind is governed in its operations, and which afford the conditions of its capacity of knowledge." If our faith be regulative and not speculative, as Dr. Mansel affirms, then aU our thought is false, and all action based upon it is wrong — an assertion which is obviously self- destructive ; and further, if faith be regu- lative only of action and not of thought, as Dr. Mansel affirms, it must ever remain impossible to compare our action with our belief ; and this again is a doctrine which is self-destructive. The theory of the Bampton Lec- tures on the Limits of Religious Thought is saved from scepticism only by its doctrine of faith ; and if that doc- trine is broken down, the bridge is gone which delivers' it from the hopeless abyss. There is but one way of escape, and that is a reversal of the pecuHar doctrine of faith which has been maintained, and a consequent surrender of aU that has been written concerning the impossibility of a knowledge of the Infinite, and man's inabihty to think and reason concerning it. But how does Sir W. Hamilton secure his con- sistency ? He has taken up a different position concern- ing the nature and authority of faith from that of Dr. Mansel, and his position I consider unassailable ; but does he thereby escape philosophical inconsistency, in^ volving the overthrow of his own special theory concern- 142 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. ing a knowledge of the Infinite ? I consider that by his appeal to a necessary behef in the existence of the Infinite God he has saved his system from scepticism, but, at the same time, has laid level with the dust aU the imposing and elaborate structure which he has reared to prove that the Infinite is incognisable and inconceivable. He has maintained that the fundamental principles of the mind are at once beliefs and cognitions ; that they bear so essentially the character of cognition, that they are to be classified among the phenomena of knowledge, and at- tributed to a special cognitive faculty ; that they are " the primary conditions of intelligence ; and, therefore, that the priaciples of our knowledge must themselves be knowledges." Now, he declares that our behef ia the Infinite Being is one of the fundamental principles of the mind, which is not the fruit of observation, but bears all the marks of a necessary belief " The Infinite is, must, and ought to be believed." It therefore follows that the behef in the Infinite is to be included, under his system, among the phenomena of knowledge ; that it is to be re- garded as a cognition as truly as a belief ; that it must govern the operations of the mind in relation to the In- finite ; and that, being a principle of knowledge, it must itself be a knowledge of the Infinite. Here, then, is the complete destruction, by the author's own hand, of aU that he has written to prove that the Infinite, though the object of faith, cannot be known. There is no escape from such iaconsistency on the part of any one who denies a knowledge of the Infinite, save by a denial of our faith in the Infinite, thereby landing in scepticism. But Sir W. Hamilton expressly declares such a denial of PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 143 faith impossible; and, if his system of philosophy is to be accepted, our belief in the Infinite must be classified among our cognitions, and be held reaUy to involve a knowledge of the object beheved. There is, indeed, one dogma of the HamUtonian philo- sophy which is thought to provide an escape from the difficulty ; but a very httle consideration is enough to show its complete insiifiiciency. I refer to the doctrine concerning "Negative Thinking," which has been so much insisted on in connexion with this subject. It is said that the Infinite cannot be positively known, and, at best, is only the object of negative thought. If, then, the question be raised, what is the nature and relation of this negative thinking concerning the Infinite ? there seems an established order of reply from which there can be no deviation. " Thinking is negative when existence is not attributed to an object." Negative thinking is, therefore, " in propriety, a negation of thought ;" but it would be a mistake to suppose that a negation of thought is therefore " a negation of aU mental activity," for it is an attempt to think, and a failure in the attempt. This is obviously no thinking at aU, and " the result is,— Nothing ;" but, as nothing can rest on something, this "Nothing," otherwise designated "Negative Thought," rests on a necessary behef in the Infinite Being. ^ This is the circle round which every critic of the philo- sophy of the conditioned is made to course, as though it contained an answer to all difiiculties which can be raised. But when it is admitted that our necessary 1 Compare Discussions, p. 602, and Lectv/res on Metaphysics, ii. p. 630. Letter to the author, section second. 144 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. belief in the Infinite is itself a cognition ; that, being a principle of knowledge, it is itself a knowledge of the object revealed, the circle is broken, and placed out of account as beside the question. It has already been shown, ^ that a fundamental principle rises into consciousness only when the necessi- ties of experience are such as to require its application ; and it is so with our belief in God, which implies, a cer- tain knowledge which is the product of experience, and a knowledge which is not. We have a knowledge of God which is mediate, and a knowledge which is im- mediate.2 In connexion with a single act of observation involving the simplest evidence of design, as for example the growth of a blade of grass, the belief in the Infinite Being arises, embracing an immediate knowledge of God. The very simple act of observation is accompanied in the mind by a belief and knowledge, which cannot be ex- plained except by granting that they are original. Our faith is clearly not the product of an inference, and our knowledge is certainly not the fruit of observation. The faith and knowledge spring up from within, and are embraced in a single act of mind. The one is a funda- mental befief and the other is an immediate knowledge. This knowledge every man has, however restricted his inteUigence, if he only exercise his faith in the Divine Being, for it is the necessary complement of his faith. Besides this, . however, we may extend our observation among the works of God; and, tracing in these the marks of power, and wisdom, and goodness, we obtain a mediate ' Seep. 43. ledge, mediate and immediate, see '' For the distinction between Itnow- Ciiaptev V. PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 145 knowledge, wMch is the product of experience. This knowledge enlarges as our research extends, and with its expansion there is a conscious increase in the distinctness of our immediate knowledge. The mediate knowledge gained by observation is enlarged by research and scien- tific inquiry, and the harmony between the results of the exercise of the understanding in this way, and the direct knowledge given in our primary cognition, is seen in this, that the more widely the former is extended, the more distinctly the latter shines. It is necessary to contemplate both of these aspects of our knowledge of God in their order. Our necessary belief in the Infinite Being involves a direct or immediate knowledge. I hold it to be true concerning our belief in the Absolute God, what Sir W. Hamilton has shown in a general way concerning aU our primary beliefs, that it is in itself a cognition, or, in other words, involves an immediate knowledge of the Deity, for as a principle of knowledge it must itself be a know- ledge. In this, I maintain, we have a cognition of the Infinite One, not drawn from observation and reflection, but completely above both ; not obtained by a distinct faculty, but given to us in our primary belief, and neces- sary in order that faith may be the possession of an intelligent being. By our necessary behef it is expressly involved that the Infinite is not incognisable. In this it is, that " our highest idea of the Deity" is given us ; in this are found our "conceptions" of the Infinite and Absolute, which have afforded the origin and basis of aU the discussion that has been raised in connexion with this question. Our faith affords us a higher know- K 146 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ledge than our limited experience of the works of God ever can give, and a knowledge which nevertheless unfolds only as the necessities of experience require. This is the law which regulates the rise of our funda- mental belief itself, and it is also the law which determines the development of the knowledge given in that belief. For as our faith may operate more or less powerfully in the regulation of our thought and action, so the cognition involved in that behef may be more or less distinct, and may, in order to meet the demand of enlarged observa- tion and extended reflection, come out with more decided clearness. The hght which is in faith may thus shine forth with iacreased brightness, while faith stiU retains its dark side, testifying to the reality of much which the light does not reveal. The light is such as can shine within the compass of our limited iatelligence, brightening and diffusing more widely, according as our observation and reflection enlarge its appointed sphere. It is sent into the mind through faith, as through a doorway, testif3ong to the existence of undiscovered and im- measurable brightness beyond ; and though it be a narrow stream as it shines forth upon us, it is the true light which comes direct from the glorious God himself. This knowledge is, and can be, nothing but a know- ledge of the object which faith reveals, yet it is to be observed that it is a limited, and therefore imperfect, knowledge.^ It is such as an intelligent being must have of the object of belief, since it is impossible to believe in the existence of an object of which we can have no conception : it is, as has been said, a knowledge ' See Professor Fraser's Essays in Philosophy, p. 195. PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEBGE. 147. capable of unfolding within the mind, and however far it extend it stUl leaves a dark side to oux faith. It is in truth capable of indefinite expansion without reaching to the full measure of our belief. But it is a knowledge of the Infinite God to whose existence faith bears testi- mony. When, however, it is said to be limited, it is not meant that it is embraced within certain clearly marked boundaries ; nor can its outlines be laid down like those of a logical conception, which can be measured and its exact contents described. It bears no analogy to such logical conceptions as those of " man," " ruler," or " angel," which by their nature involve the combination of a de- finite number of clearly distinguished individuals, to the exclusion of others. It is no product of the logical faculty, and is not to be tested and criticised by logical rules. Whatever reasoning may be deduced from it is subject to the necessary laws which regulate aU reason- ing, but there is a total misconception concerning the nature of this knowledge on the part of any one who in- sists that it must be embraced in a conception clearly rounded ofi", or brought within certain complete boun- daries. I perfectly concur with Professor Fraser, when he says that " philosophy and theology, in as far as they are regions of faith, and yet regions of mystery, can neither, on the one hand, be whoUy consigned to the unknown, nor, on the other hand, be conquered by reasoning."^ Our knowledge is indeed limited, but it is as real, as trustworthy, as authoritative, as our faith is, and the two must stand or fall together. No valid argument can be taken against this know- ] Essays in Philosophy, p. 135. 148 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ledge on the ground that it is limited, for, as the author just quoted very well observes, "faith may consist with an imperfection of knowledge," but it wUl tax the ability of any philosopher to show how we can believe in an object of which we. can know nothing. The reality of that knowledge which is here maintained must be tested by a simple examination of consciousness, and if its existence be admitted, its validity can be questioned only by means of a higher knowledge, or by showing that this imperfect knowledge is contradic- tory of our faith, both of which are impossible. Further, we find in the works of God, illustrations of His revealed attributes. It is in connexion with the con- templation of these that we find at once the application of our fundamental behef, and the unfolding of that primary knowledge which is involved in it. Every thing which God has created or done must be a manifestation of His nature to His intelligent creatures. We are capable of observing and comparing the works of God, and by this means we are able to form certain conceptions not only concerning these works themselves, but also concern- ing the Being by whose agency they have been origin- ated ; and if in all our observing, forming of conceptions, and reasoning upon them, we only regulate the mind in submission to our necessary belief, our observations, conceptions, and reasonings wiU all involve a discovery of truth concerning the Divine nature. It is indeed clear, that the works of God are only a limited manifestation of His nature, and therefore equally clear, that by means of these we can only obtain a hmited knowledge, but it is impossible on that account to deny that we reach a PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 149 positive knowledge of the Infinite God. A3 well may it be argued, because God's works are limited, therefore they can involve no manifestation of the Infinite One ; as reason that because human thought is finite, therefore it can embrace no knowledge of the Deity. It is not won- derful, however, that as the- latter position has been so strongly maintained, the former should also be asserted. Consistency in logical " word-juggHng" naturally requires it. Dr. Mansel accordingly meets us with the assertion that it is not as the Absolute that God creates. This he does in these words : " A cause cannot, as such, be Ab- solute : the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause." ^ If this be true, what follows ? Either in creating, God has ceased to be Absolute ; or, God has not created at all. Dr. Mansel must choose one of these alternatives. If God has created, He has given a manifestation of Himself in a finite creation. If so, what follows 1 Either God has revealed Himself in His works, as He is ; or, He has re- vealed Himself, as He is not : His works are not in accord- ance with His nature, and we are deceived. The learned author of The Limits of Religious Thought must take one of these alternatives. Or will he say, that he need not adopt either ? Will he maintain that there is another al- ternative, and that God has revealed Himself, neither as the finite, nor as the Infinite f Then, as what has He revealed Himself 1 What is there between these two ? The assertion that the Absolute cannot as such be a cause, is in direct violation of Dr. Mansel's own definition of the Absolute. He says that "the Absolute is that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to ^ lAmits of Religious Thought, p. 47. 150 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. any other Being." He admits that the Absolute may exist in relation if it be not a necessary relation, and therefore God may exist in the relation of cause to a finite creation. If God has created, His works of creation have been performed in harmony with His own nature, and a finite creation is a manifestation of the Infinite God to His intelligent creatures. Our observation of the -W-orks of creation is not prose- cuted for the purpose of rising by slow stages to the con- viction of the Divine existence. Our belief, as necessary, arises by the simple contemplation of any object.^ We therefore start with the conviction that there is One Infinite Being, and aU our observation is prosecuted for the purpose of enlarging our knowledge of His nature. In this we must be continually regulated by our funda- mental belief, which, as we have seen, involves an imme- diate knowledge of God. With it to guide us, we are saved from attributing the marks of power, or of wisdom, which we behold in the world, to a Being possessed only of the measure of power or wisdom needful for the accomphshment of these results. Among all the works of nature, our observation presents to view nothing more than the finite, and the only reason why we believe in an Infinite Being, or look on the objects around us as the works of such a Being, is that the recognition of the Infinite One is given us in our very nature. This alone explains why it is that the finite creation is not attributed to a finite cause, or why we do not think of God, only as a being able to accomplish aU that we see around us. Whatever exercise of our logical faculty there may be ' Seejirevious Chapter. PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 151 upon the works of God, leading to the formation of certain conceptions concerning the Divine nature, is regulated by a primary belief which is completely above the logical faculty, and not liable to be tested and criti- cised by its rules. This being kept in view, the way is clear for a consideration of the legitimate exercise of human thought in connexion with this subject. In the entire works of God, the logical faculty finds a basis from which it may rise up to meet the declarations of faith. Since by the authority of an original belief within us, testimony is borne to the existence of one Infinite Originator of all finite existence, man as an in- telligent creature must seek to form clear and satisfactory conceptions in harmony with his faith. Every form of existence is to him a field of inquiry in which to learn somewhat of the Great Being who has created all. While our nature may involve a revelation concerning the Divine existence and attributes, we must discover, arrange, and interpret for oiirselves the facts which are disclosed in the works of God. This is the province of the logical faculty ; and by earnest, laborious efforts we must seek to extend our study, and gather for oiirselves new conceptions of the Divine glory, that will call forth paore fully the light shining from within. It is to be observed, however, that there are here two distinct lines of contemplation which the logical faculty may pursue— ^rsfZy, what the facts of nature are ; and secondly, what the facts of nature teach concerning the great Creator. These two are quite distinct, and may be so completely separated, that the first may be considered without the least regard to the second ; but the second can be prosecuted,, only 152 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE, in the degree in which the first is pursued. The first leads to the discovery and classification of certain facts, which go to constitute a body of scientific truth ; the second, making use of these classified facts, rises by then- aid to the formation of certain conceptions concerning the Infinite Creator. In this way Sdence is the handmaid of Philosophy and Eeligion. The deeper we carry our research into the wonders which nature discloses, the farther do we extend our acquaintance with the works of God, and accumulate the materials that enable us to en- large our conceptions of the Divine attributes. In this way we can re-classify for ourselves facts from all the sciences, according as they present marks of the power, or the wisdom, or the goodness of the Infinite Creator. We can thus form separate conceptions of the power, wisdom, and goodness of G-od, and, gathering aU these together, we can form a conception, the most grand and awe-aspiring, of the Infinite and Absolute Being. Here, as everywhere else, there is a reward for careful and wide observation and reflection. By means of these, more extended, accurate, and impressive views of the Deity are reached, than are ever attained by those who lack the spirit of inquiry, or are contented to leave it unsatisfied. As the study of the works of the Creator is prosecuted, faith shines more clearly on the intellect, and makes the discovery of truth more easy and satisfying. To use the language of Malebranche; as quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, " faith is a gift of God, which we earn not by our merits ; but intelligence is a gift usuaUy only con- ceded to desert. . . . For without the labour of attention, we shall never comprehend the grandeur of religion, the PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 153 sanctity of morals, the littleness of all that is not God. ... It is true that faith guides and supports, but it does so only as it produces some light by the attention which it excites in us.'" There is a knowledge given in faith, and that knowledge is at once primary and ultimate. With it we start in all our observation ; by it we are guided in the entire course of reflection ; and in it we stm rest at the end. In the study of God's works we trace the marks of His power, and, gathering aU that comes under notice, we form an enlarged conception of the marvellous power of the Creator. Thus, through the works of God, we attain a mediate knowledge of the Deity himself ; or rather, in the facts of nature we find illustrations confii-matory of the primary knowledge al- ready possessed. Since, however, aU observation volun- tarily prosecuted must foUow a certain method, we are led to a conception of the various attributes of Deity apart, such as Avisdom, goodness, hohness. By a subse- quent and more general process, we are able in some measure to gather these conceptions into one, thereby, obtaining the notion of the one God. This is a con- ception which may be more or less frequently present, according as the mind is interested in it, whether from an intellectual, moral, or religious impulse, and may be found rising in consciousness with some one attribute more promiuently regarded, in harmony with the special relation in which the general notion has been brought into consciousness. As, therefore, our faith is regulative of aU our reflec- tions concerning the perfections of the Deity, and as that ' Lectures on Metaphysics, i, p. 260. 154 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INPINITE. faith involves a primary knowledge of His nature, it affords a basis from which to reason accurately concern- ing God. This is the natural and legitimate deduction from what has been already maintained. Dr. Mansel insists upon the very opposite opinion, as the whole structure of his theory requires him to' do. He main- tains that we have neither the ability to afl&rm, nor the ability to deny anything concerning God.^ He believes in a personal God, but he is terrified at the thought of venturing on the slightest effort at reasoning concerning His nature. His behef is no guide to his iatelligence, and if he wanders into the labyrinth of rationalistic reasoning, he cannot find any method of escape ; but, as the last resort, he cries out that we should not reason concerning what our faith reveals. He is bold in declar- ing our belief in a personal God ; but when he falls into the hands of a rationalist, he can only surrender at dis- cretion, saying that "the reasonings of the rationalist, logically followed out, may reduce us to Pantheism or Atheism."^ The rationalist may reason in either of the ways he feels iuclined to adopt, and the lamentable conclusion is, that his logic is unanswerable, whether he concludes that aU things are God, or that there is no God at all. Dr. Mansel cannot answer ; he can only deny the right of man to use his reason concerning the nature of the God who gave it. The only defence which he has against the wildest rationalism is that, which denounces as equally unwarrantable the most " sober and reverent " reasoning concerning the nature of God. His distinctive ground is, " that our indirect belief in the ' Limits of Religious Thought, p. 116. ' Ibid. p. 122. PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 155 infinite, whether referred to an impotence or to a power of the mind, is not of such a character that we can deduce from it any logical consequences available in philosophy or theology." ^ Nothing less than this is the legitimate result of the Hamiltonian philosophy, and here it is openly avowed by one of its most distiQguished adherents. In the words which Berkeley has put into the mouth of the sceptical Lysicles, it may be said, that, according to this theory, "the very notion of God is taken away, and nothing left but the name, without any meaning annexed to it." The Deity is " an unknown subject of absolutely unknown attributes." ^ If we in- quire what may be the result of such a theory as this, the answer may be found in the words of this same Lysicles, — " I could wish, indeed, the word God were quite omitted, because, in. most minds, it is coupled with a sort of superstitious awe, the very root of aU religion. I shall not, nevertheless, be much disturbed, though the name be retaiued, and the being of God allowed in any sense but in that of a mind, which knows aU things, and beholds human actions, like some judge or magistrate, with infinite observation and intelligence."^ I see not how such a sceptical spirit . as this is to be discouraged, under a theory which confesses that the Pantheist and the Atheist are both invincible in their logic. As I have maintained against Dr. Mansel that faith not only involves a declaration that a thing is, but also what the thing is, I also assert, in opposition to him, that the authoritative testimony of faith affords the ground- 1 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 326. = Minute PhMosopher, Dial. iv. § 17. ' Ibid. § 16. 156 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. work from which we may safely reason concerning God. It is impossible for us to believe in the Divine Being without being able to teU in what we believe, or, m other words, what our meaning is when we speak of a Divine Being. And if this be possible, it is also possible to draw iaferences, available in philosophy and theology, concerning the nature of God, in which the mind can rest with certainty. By this means we are able to aflfirm what is true concerning the Deity, and to deny what is false. It is easy to affirm, without the least hesitation, that the God in whom we believe is not the God of the Epicurean, or of the Pantheist, or of the Deist. It may be affirmed with perfect certainty that God is a spirit, one and indivisible, that He is a holy God, and that He is the preserver and ruler of all. Having laid down these propositions, it is easy to reason clearly and accurately against every opinion in philoso- phical speculation, or theological teaching, which is an- tagonistic to them. It must appear a marvellous thing that any one has been found to deny this, and more especially that he should be an earnest and reverent believer in revelation, and an upholder of its authority. But the defenders of the negative doctrine have found it impossible to avoid affirmation and denial, argument and inference, concerning the Deity. Sir W. Hamilton has asked us to " consider what kind of cause it is which constitutes a Deity." And though he is the upholder of the doctrine that the Infinite is for us nothing else than the negation of the conditions on which thought is possi-- ble, we find him reasoning about God's nature in the following clear and forcible manner : — " Tho' notion of PROVINCE OF FAITH AND OF KNOWLEDGE. 157 God is not contained in the notion of a mere First Cause ; neither is this notion completed by adding to a first cause the attribute of omnipotence ; it is not until the two attributes of intelligence and virtue, or hohness, are brought in, that the behef in a primary and omni- potent cause becomes the belief in a veritable Divinity."^ If we turn to the pages of Dr. Mansel, still more numerous declarations about the Divine nature are to be found. It seems to me that there can be no doubt of the power which the mind possesses to reason accurately concerning the Infinite One. And if aU our reasoning be strictly regulated by the authority of faith, there can be little hazard from its free, continued exercise. With the high testimony of faith to sustain us, we can descend to meet the Atheist, and the Pantheist, and the so-called Rationalist, on their own ground, and use our reason as freely, and perhaps mu'ch more efi'ectively than they can do. And, stUl under the same high sanction, philosophy may carry forward the inquiry concerning the glorious perfections of the Deity, and theology may sketch out the course of systematic truth, provided always there be the wisdom to confess that neither philosophy nor theo- logy can be regarded as a completed science, but only a body of ascertained truth, which is to be vastly enlarged by subsequent inquiry throughout the endless existence which has been allotted to man. > Metaphysical Lectures, p. 26. CHAPTER IV. EXAMINATION OF SIR W. HAMILTON'S DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. The entire course of investigation hitherto has in- volved exclusively the recognition of the One Infinite Being. The testimony of faith points to none other, and expressly involves the impossibihty of more than one such Supreme Creator. He who is the One Infinite God is alone the Absolute. This might have been regarded as self-evident ; and, without further delay, I might have advanced to contemplate the knowledge which the mind possesses of the great object of faith ; but Sir W. Hamil- ton has interposed a special theory, which stands as a barrier to progress, and which must be encountered be- fore going farther. He argues that if thought can tran- scend the relative, there are only two methods by which this is possible. But the reader will observe that this single assertion raises an entirely new element into the discussion, which seems to turn the current of inquuy away from its proper channel. The question presented is not whether thought can transcend the finite — that is to say, whether it be. a possible thing for the human mind to contemplate an infinite object of thought ; but whether thought can transcend the relative — that is to say, whether DISTINCTION OF INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 159 we can reach, by the exercise of thought, an obj ect free from relation to other objects, and entirely independent in being. Out of that, as very readily appears, springs the ques- tion whether thought itself be not a relation, and with this starts up an endless number of logical quibbles which henceforth gather around every point ia the dis- cussion, like a swarm of furious wasps round an enemy. He who would penetrate iuto the Philosophy of the In- finite must rid himself of these, else he will soon be paralysed, and smarting in every limb. The iuteUectual explorer of the tangled forest is suddenly assaUed in this manner : Is thought not in itself a relation ? is not every object of thought necessarily the relative ? however much you increase the object, is it not still the relative 1 how- ever much you diminish the object, is not the same still true ? whatever faith declares, how can thought out- stretch its own limits ? Such is a specimen of the form of assault which is to be encountered. And if any inquirer, feeling somewhat bewildered by this mode of attack, were to ask what has the relativity of human thought, and the increase or diminution of finite ob- jects, to do with the grand problem whether, in the exercise of thought, we can rise to contemplate the One Infinite God, I should think his question in every way sensible and pertinent. The Infinite Being does exist in relation, and it can be no contradiction of His nature that he should be recognised in relation. But, before advancing to this stage of inquiry, it is necessary to ask how this form of objection has arisen ; for in this way it is most likely that a satisfactory view of the opposition may be obtained. Even while protest- 160 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ing against the introduction of this quibble concerning relativity, it is necessary to discover from what origin it is sprung. The fundamental assertion of the Hamiltonian philo- sophy, in so far as it refers to the Infinite, is, that thought cannot rise above the relative. Behind this, though un- expressed, there is the unwarrantable assumption that the Infinite cannot exist in relation, or, as Hamilton would have preferred to express it, as appearing more formid- able, the Infinite is not the Eelative, which may either mean the same thing as the former statement, or quite a different thing. It may hereafter appear that the double meaning attachable to the latter form of the assertion is the only possible ground of dispute, and is the real origin of the host of logical quibbles to which reference has just been made. That thought cannot rise above the relative, I may readily admit, and yet maintain -that thought does contemplate the Infinite. But, in the eyes of Sir W. Hamilton, the former simple statement finally established the impossibility of any knowledge of the Infinite. The process is short and direct. Thought cannot rise above the Eelative : the Infinite is not the Eela- tive ; therefore thought cannot rise to the Infinite. This is the simple process by which the gates are at once closed against the human intellect in its inquiry concerning the One Infinite God. If any man is rash enough to attempt to advance, that syllogism is uttered in his hearing, and straightway he must turn and content himself with gazing on tilings finite, or he may sit down to indulge in hopeless grief, for that terrible impossibility must remain for ever. The reader may thus see to what the philosophy of DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 161 Sir W. Hamilton is shutting us up, and if he have any doubt as to the issue, let him turn to Dr. Hansel's Limits of Religious Thought for the development of its results, and after reading again, and again, and again, he may wonder, as I have done, how there can be any such thing as religious thought at aU, on such a theory. With this feeling, the reader will not think it unnecessary or dull work, if I seek to examine each step, from the turning- poiut onwards, along the short path, tiU we reach the gates so strongly barred. The course is essentially a logical one, and is no longer than a single syllogism. After having asserted that human thought cannot rise above the relative, Sir W. Hamilton proceeds with a logical experiment to illustrate the impossibility. He argues that if it be possible for thought to rise above the relative, it must be in one of two ways ; either by dis- covering a, finite object, which is out of relation as " per- fect, complete, total," or, by reaching an infinite object. Having said thus much, our author immediately occu- pies himself with an experiment among logical wholes and parts, which seems very far away from the subject. He seeks to ascertain whether the mind can reach a whole so large, that, although it be limited, it cannot be the part of a larger whole ; or apart so small, that it cannot itself be a whole made up of parts. AU this, I must with de- ference say, is nothing more than an encumbrance of this very important philosophical inquiry. There is no reason, indeed, why such experiments should not be conducted by those who are curious enough to prosecute them, but they have no bearing whatever on the possibility or im- possibility of a Philosophy of the Infinite. The logical 162 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. exercises involved can never lead to the Infinite, and the hypothetical object sought, an unconditioned whole and part, have not only no existence, but involve a con- tradiction in the attempted distinction between them and other logical wholes and parts. In this process. Sir W. Hamilton professes to investigate what thought can do, but at the same time he treats of certain objects for which he professes to search. It is impossible to con- sider what thought can reach, without considering the objects with which thought is engaged. Either the whole and part professedly sought are objects really existiag, and affording an illustration of what the Absolute is, or the author was altogether astray in the experiment with which he has occupied so much of his discussion concern- ing the Unconditioned. What I maiutairi is, that these professed absolutes are in no sense absolute, if they were found ; or, if you wiU, that these two forms of logical experiment can never lead to the Absolute, and that there is but one direction in which the mind can turn, that is along the path which Hamilton declares is barred at the very entrance. We may indeed attepapt an ex- periment to test what thought can do by enlarging or diminishing the objects it has ia possession, but this is not the method in which the great question involved is to be decided. The real starting-point of the discussion is the inquiry whether we recognise any object but the Finite ; whether we believe in the existence of an Infinite God ; and, if so, what conception we form of His nature. This is altogether a metaphysical, and not a logical inquiry. If the course thus indicated is not the only one to be DISTINCTION OP THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 163 pursued, Sir W. Hamilton comes in some mode to dis- tinguisli two different objects, nan^ed absolute, both of wMch are nevertheless declared unattainable by the mind. They are .the mere products of a gratuitous definition, formed by a process altogether inadmissible, the qombi- nation of contradictory attributes, the absolute and the relative, and presented without any regard to the reality of being, or the facts to be found within the horizon of faith. Whether it be an absolute whole or an absolute part which is referred to, the thing is a contradiction. An absolute part there cannot be, and the Absolute cannot be made up of parts. The course which Sir "W. Hamilton has followed has led him to adopt a singular use of the terms, ordinarily employed to describe that which is above the finite. An examination of the manner in which he uses the descrip- tive terms, embrq,cing a view of his logical experiments with wholes and parts, is the best method of determining the value of the opposition which he has raised to the declaration, that we do possess a knowledge of the Infinite. In connexion with this subject there are three terms in common use — ^the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Un- conditioned. These are usually regarded as sjrnonymous. The Infinite is that Which is absolute, that which is un- conditioned, that is to say, limited or restricted by no conditions. But in the language of Sir William, the In- finite is the " unconditionally unlimited," the A hsolute is the " unconditionally limited," and the Unconditioned is the genus of which the Infinite and Absolut;e are the species. According to this distinction, the Infinite is 164 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. that wLicli is without beginniiig or termination, — which is circumscribed by no boundaries, — which is determined by no limits. The Absolute is that which, while limited, is finished, perfect, or complete in itself ; and consequently is subject to no conditions. The two constitute, accord- ing to this theory, the opposite poles, between which alone all thought, as conditioned, is possible. If there be such a thing as unconditioned existence, it must be one or other of these, but to decide which, is beyond the power of human thought. Both are, therefore, to be logically in- cluded under one genus, unconditioned. That which distinguishes them from each other is, that the Infinite is unlimited, the Absolute is limited. In contradistiction to this, others have usually regarded the Infinite and Absolute as one and the same, and have not recognised the possibihty of any other Absolute than the Infinite. With aU deference to Sir W. Hamilton, I consider that the problem of the Unconditioned is one, and not twofold as he has maiataiued ; and, in confir- mation of this opinion, I shall endeavour to show that the Infinite, is also absolute, and that the Absolute as defined by him is not really absolute. I. The Infinite is in its nature also absolute. Sir W. Hamilton makes the Infinite and Absolute not only essentially distinct, but even contradictory opposites, consequently, it seems from this doctrine that philo- sophers, in regarding the Infinite as at the same time Absolute, must have been attributing to it that which does not belong to it. The question to be answered, therefore, is, — Do philosophers in general include in the Infinite that w^hich does not pertain to it ; or, does the DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 165 author of tliis distinction exclude from it that which really belongs to it ? It is necessary first to define the term Absolute. The plain and etymological meaning of the term is freed or loosed, and hence it means freed from restriction or con- dition. In this sense it is evident that the Infinite must be absolute, for that which is not limited does not afibrd the possibility of restriction. This is the sense in which philosophers have uniformly used the word ; and, in this sense, Sir William admits that " the Absolute is not opposed to the Infinite."^ Thus far, then, there is no difference. If philosophers, therefore, are chargeable in. the matter, it is not in respect of positive error, but in respect of neglect. But, is it warrantable in Sir William to take a term which naturally, and by common consent, expresses a certain notion, and apply it to that which is entirely distinct ? If it be true, as our author admits, that, in the primary sense of the word absolute, the In- finite, from its very nature, is absolute, is it warrantable to take the word absolute and apply it to that which is asserted to be even contradictory of the Infinite ? The question might be pushed farther, — If the Infinite be necessarily absolute, can that be reaUy absolute which is contradictory of the Infinite ? But this is to anticipate what shall be afterwards considered. The meaning of the term absolute, as employed by Sir WiUiam, will shortly appear ; but what requires to be observed in the meantime, is that he admits that philosophers are correct in regarding the Infinite and Absolute as convertible, if the latter term be used as expressive of entire freedom 1 Discussions, p. 13. 166 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. from all restriction. His objectio^ is, not that philo- sophers have put their Absolute in the wrong place, but that they have failed to recognise an Absolute in another sense which he marks out. The sense in which Sir William Hamilton employs the term absolute, when he distinguishes it as contra- dictory of the Infinite, is what hs, finished, perfected, completed ; so that the Absolute ia this sense is " what is out of relation, etc., as finished, perfect, complete, total."! In reference to the application of the word absolute in this sense, it may be remarked, _^rs^, that even this definition of the Absolute, so far from excluding the Infinite, or being contradictory of it, in reality includes it. This is sufficiently plain, for it is obvious that the Infinite is perfect and complete. If anything be " per- fect" or "complete," the Infinite must, for if it were imperfect or incomplete it would be no longer infinite. If anything be "total," the Infinite must, for if there were any want in its totality it would cease to exist. Even with this second definition, then, philosophers were right in including the Absolute with the Infinite, and considering them applicable to the same existence. Yet Sir William says that, " in this acceptation, the Absolute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the Infinite." On this ground, I remark, secondly, that, since Sir William's Absolute is pronounced contradictory of the Infinite, and yet it is apparent that the definition of the A.bsolute in reality embraces the Infinite, there has not ' Dismissions, p. 13. DISTINCTIOK OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 167 been drawn a sufficiently clear verbal distinction. If the definition of the Absolute presented by our author, indicates that which is contradictory of the Infinite, it, at the same time, indicates what as reaUy belongs to the Infinite, and, therefore, includes too much, that is, in- cludes so much that it destroys the asserted contradiction. That which is presented as the specific difference of the Absolute, namely, perfection or completeness, belongs as much to the Infinite as to the Absolute, and, therefore, constitutes no specific difference. That perfection, and not limitation, is the specific difference between the In- finite and the Absolute as distinguished ia this theory, is sufficiently plain. Limitation is the specific difference between the finite and the Infinite, and this quality be- longs to the Absolute only as a finite object, and distin- guishes it from the Infinite, not specially, but only as it distinguishes the whole crowd of finite objects. Perfec- tion or completeness is thus the quality which belongs to the Absolute as unconditioned; it is presented as the specific difference between the Absolute and the Infinite ; and inasmuch as this quality belongs to the Infinite, equally with the Absolute, there is no specific difference established, and the distinction breaks down. Of course, these remarks are based upon the admission that there is such a thing as this absolutely perfect or complete existence, apart from the Infinite and contradictory of it. This I admit only for the sake of criticism, and for the purpose of showing that the nomenclature employed in other systems of philosophy is, at least, more exact than that of the theory which distinguishes the Infinite and Absolute as contradictory opposites. 168 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. II. There is no such Absolute as that which Sir W. Hamilton postulates, and which he asserts to be contra- dictory of the Infinite. It is necessary here to recal Sir Wilham's definitions of the Infinite and of the Absolute ; the Infinite is the unconditionally unlimited, the Absolute is the unconditionally limited. Now, I cannot understand in what sense the Absolute can be called the uncondi- tionally limited. How can anything be called uncondi- tioned, which is at the same time limited f Is not limita- tion a condition of existence ? May we not as well speak of the unlimitedly limited, or of the unconditionally conditioned, as of the unconditionally limited ? If the Infinite is unconditioned, inasmuch as it is unlimited; must not the Absolute be conditioned, inasmuch as it is Hmited ? But, to be more particular, it may be well to look at the illustration of the Absolute which Sir WUHam gives. He says : — " For example, on the one hand, we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a whole so great, that we cannot conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole ; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small that we cannot also conceive it as a rela- tive whole, divisible into smaller parts." Sir William says, that we cannot realize in thought the Absolute which he distinguishes, any more than we can the Infinite ; but, if we could, there are two instances in which it might be reached: 1st, "A whole so great, that we cannot con- ceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole," that is, a whole perfect in itself, complete, and not standing related as a part to a greater whole ; 2d, "A part so small, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 169 divisible into smaller parts," that is, a part perfect m itself, complete, and wMle a part, at the same time a whole, one and indivisible, and not standing related to any parts of which it should be the sum. These, if they could be conceived, would both present examples of what have been distinguished as the Absolute. Let me direct attention to these in their order. The Absolute, in the sense in which Sir W. Hamilton employs that term, is exemplified in a whole so great, that it forms no part of some greater whole. Imagiae a whole so small as to be confessedly conditioned, because related both to certain parts which it contains, and to a whole in which it is contained. Extend from this whole, to the greater in which it is contained ; and again to that which is stiU greater ; and, proceeding in this manner, I ask if the absolute whole, which is the object of search, can be reached ? The answer to this question must be twofold. In ike first place, the Absolute never can be attained except by reaching the Irfinite. Whatever the extent of the whole, with which, on account of the limited charac- ter of our mental powers, we have terminated, it must be related to another beyond, and this must be the case with every whole short of the Infinite. The only Absolute which can exist is that which is at once infinite and indivisible. And in speaking of such a Being, the term whole, if applied at all, must be used in a manner com- pletely distinct from its logical significance. There cannot be anything more incongruous and irrelevant than the introduction of discussion concerning logical wholes and parts, into a metaphysical inquiry concerning 170 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the existence or non-existence of a knowledge of the Infinite God. Whatever be our differences of opinion on this subject, and they are sufficient in number without needless multiplication of them, there is no dispute about the fact that the mind does not rise to the recognition of the Infinite by such an ascending logical process. It is not in an ascenditig scale formed by the logical relation of whole and part, that an acknowledgment of the Divine existence is to be secured, or a knowledge of His nature attained. If Sir W. Hamilton meant to indicate this as only one of the possible ways of reaching the Absolute, let it be granted at once that it is an impossible way, and that here at least there can be no dispute between those who embrace the opposite theories on this import- ant subject. Anjrthing more contradictory of our own nature, or more inconsistent with God's glory, there could not be, than to suppose that by starting with the relative, we could by any effort of ours produce an Absolute. In the second place, such a whole as that indi- cated by Sir W. Hamilton is not Absolute. If we be- gin with a limited whole, and extend from it to one stiU larger in which it is contained, and, advancing in this manner from less to greater, imagine such a whole as would accord with the Absolute as defined, viz., a whole which is perfect and complete in itself, because not related as a part to some greater whole, — ^have we obtained a whole which is reaUy absolute ? Assuredly not. Though such a whole were free from all relation as a part, it is related to the parts which it contains ; and the combination of parts is thus a necessary condition of DISTINCTION OP THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 171 its existence. If such a whole could exist, it would be unconditioned or absolute only on one side, by being free from relation to a superior whole ; whUe it would be conditioned on the other side, by being related to certain component parts of which it would be the sum. But the Absolute is that which is entirely unconditioned ; the whole indicated by Sir W. Hamilton is conditioned ; therefore, it is not absolute. Turn now to "the other example of the distinction, and see if there be any better foundation for an Absolute, distinct from the Infinite, and opposed to it as contra- dictory. The example is, " an absolute part, that is, a part so small that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts." If, then, we imagine the part of a limited whole, and thereafter take a part of this part, and thus proceed diminishing, could we ever in thought reach a part which would be absolute and final, by not being itself divisible into parts ? In ik& first place, the answer must be given in the same manner as in the previous instance, that we cannot; but in the present case the answer proceeds on different grounds. The absolute whole indicated above, never could be reached in thought, unless we reach the Infiniie; the absolute pa;rt now indicated never can be reached, unless we can think of nothing, and, since to think of nothing is not to think at aU, it never can be attained. We cannot think of an act of division resulting in no- thing, therefore everything regarded as a part, is thought under the condition of divisibility. Division is a process of diminxxtion, and if, in descending through this process, we were to reach the absolute part hypothetically indi- 172 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. cated, it would be the smallest possible part — the point just next to nothing — any diminution of which would re- sult in nothing. Suppose, then, that the least possible part is found. Though it cannot in thought be divided into two, is it not possible that there may still be a diminu- tion of existence ? Clearly there may. So long as there is existence, there may be diminution of it, until it is annihilated altogether. What is it, then, which hinders the mind from thinking of a part too small to be divided ? In other words, what is it which renders it impossible for us to imagine a part so small that any diminution of its existence would result in annihilation ? Simply the impossibility of conceiving or imagining annihilation — the impossibihty of thinking of nothing. It is the necessity for having something as the result of each act of thought. It is nothing more nor less than the condition that aU thought, implies an object of thought. In the pre- sent instance, therefore, I do not say, as in the former case, that we cannot reach this Absolute unless we conceive the Infinite ; because, were it possible to talk of an In- finite in the case, it would be an Infinite entirely different from that of which we speak in endeavouring to imagine an absolute whole. In attempting to rise to an absolute whole, the object of thought is always extending, that is, approximating towards an Infinite object, in the low and materialistic sense of infinite extension. But, in trying to descend to an absolute part, the object of thought is always lessening, that is, receding from an Infinite object. If then, in this relation, we can at all use the term In- finite, it must be in reference to the process of division. In the one case, it is an Infinite object towards which we DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 173 proceed ; in the other, if such were possible, it would be an In/imte process along which we advance. In attempt- ing, therefore, to reach an absolute part, the difficulty is not identical with that of reaching the Infinite. Still farther, I deny that the impossibility of reaching an absolute part arises from the difficulty of carrying out an Infinite process. On the one hand, it is glaringly absurd to imagine that b, finite part could afibrd ground for an infinite process of division •} on the other, the real difficulty exists at the very first stage of the division, as truly as at the fiftieth. The difficulty of reaching an absolute part, that is, a part which is one and indivisible, really consists in the impossibility of thinkiug of nothing. As the mind carries out a process of division, the residt in each case must be, either a part which is again divi- sible, or a part so small that it cannot be again divided. As already shown, the former cannot always continue, and it is impossible to realize the other iu thought, siace any attempt at the division of such a part would result in annihilation, and since the mind cannot realize nothing as an object of thought, the only change of a part of which it can think, is division. In the second place, the definition given of an absolute part, is not a definition of what is really absolute. An absolute part is a contradiction in terms, for a part is only the term of a relation. Such a part is obviously related to the whole of which it is a part, and, conse- quently, it is not absolute, but conditioned. Taking the two examples of the Absolute thus affijrded, viz., an ' Hume has presented the common on HrniMn Nature, Book i. pavl_ ii. sense view of the matter. — Treatise section 1. 174 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. absolute whole and an absolute part, it is obvious that they are conditioned, and that upon the converse sides, the absolute whole being necessarily related to the parts of which it is the sum, and the absolute part being re- lated to the whole of which it is a part. In confuting the arguments of the French philosopher, the Scottish metaphysician has argued " that the Absolute, as defined by Cousin, is only a relative, and a conditioned ;" by a similar course of reasoning, the argument may be turned with equal force against the Absolute indicated by Sir W. Hamilton, as contradictory of the Infinite. Here again, therefore, I conclude that philosophers are right in considering the Unconditioned as only a single exist- ence, which is both Infinite and Absolute. Once more, I remark that Sir W. Hamilton defines the Absolute, not only as what is perfect, complete, or whole, but also what is finished, perfected, completed, thereby indicating progression and the exercise of causal energy, which, at its termination, results in the production of the Absolute. Now, does not aU this indicate some- thing essentially relative ? The Absolute, which is subject to no conditions, is thus made dependent for its existence upon a foregone relation. That which is finished, must have been previously unfinished ; that which is perfected, must have been imperfect ; that which is completed, must have been incomplete. That which is progressing, but is not finished ; that which is in process towards perfection, but not perfected ; that which is in course of completion, but is not completed, — is in its very nature relative and subj ect to conditions. The very definition of the Absolute, as given by our author, is fatal to his argument. This DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 176 Absolute is evolved out of the relative, and is thus a con- tradiction. Having thus shown what is the Absolute as dis- tinguished by Sir W. Hamilton, it is worthy of note that, in reference to this Absolute, he says it is " diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the Infinite." Now, in so far as this professed Absolute is finite, it is contra- dictory of the Infinite, but this it is in common with every other finite object. If it were absolute ia the sense of being perfect and complete, and out of aU relation, which it is not, it would not be contradictory of the In- finite, since the Infinite is also perfect and complete. But this absolute is not unconditioned, and the dis- tinction between the Infinite and Absolute has not been established. Had the difference between those professed contradictories been presented fully in a verbal form, the fallacy would have been quite apparent. In such a form the Infinite would be the absolute-absolute, or the abso- lutely absolute, that is, the Absolute on both sides, the really Absolute ; the Absolute as distinguished by Sir W. Hamilton, would be the relatively absolute, which is a contradiction in terms, and no absolute.^ III. Even if the Absolute, which Sir W. Hamilton distinguishes,^ be granted, it caimot be pronounced an extreme between which and the Infinite aU positive thought lies. Thb author contrasts an absolute whole, with an infinite whole ; and, on the other hand, an absolute part, with an infinite process. The latter must be put entirely out of account, since in that instance the Absolute is not contrasted with what is truly infinite, ' See Dr. Young's Province of Reason, p. 64. 176 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. The only real comparison attempted is that between the Infinite and an absolute whole. Passiiig the fact that the Infinite cannot be represented as a whole, and that the comparison is iUegitimate, I would ask if it be true that aU positive thought lies between these two extremes ? Sir W. Hamilton describes thought as the conditionally limited ; does that lie between the unconditionally un- limited, and the unconditionally limited ? The terms of the question are a sufficient answer. So far from Sir W. Hamilton having presented an Absolute, which is an extreme opposed to the Infinite, he has attempted by abstracting a quality from the unconditioned, that is, completeness, and joining it to a quality of the condi- tioned, that is, limitation, thus to obtain a connecting link between the conditioned and the unconditioned. If, on the other hand, you turn from the object which is named the Absolute, to the process of thought by which an attempt is made to discover it, that process must be declared altogether inadequate for reaching the Absolute. Sir W. Hamilton had little warrant, from such a basis as this, to assault preceding philosophers. His distinction of the Absolute from the Infinite is altogether inde- fensible. There is nothing to warrant it among the facts of observation, no valid reasoning to vindicate it, and no authority in faith lending the least sanction to it. As an essential element in a propounded theory of thought, it fails, and the theory fails with it. I have thus presented the grounds on which I agree with those who consider that there is only one existence to which we can apply the term unconditioned. The only unconditioned Being for whose existence we have the DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 177 warrant of a primary belief, is at once Infinite and Ab- solute, Tinlimited in His own nature, and unrestricted by any other being. In seeking to determine the possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite, Sir W. Hamilton has set out on a false method, and the entire logical discussion concerning wholes and parts does not involve the sHghtest contribution towards a solution of the question, but is altogether an encumbrance to our phHosophical research. The term Unconditioned has been employed by Sir W. Hamilton, and the term Absolute by Dr. Mansel, in a twofold signification, as denoting either the absence of aU restriction, or, more widely, the absence of aU relation. These two meanings have been used as convertible, and, without the least warning, have been transposed, involv- ing the discussion in endless confusion. As if to gather increased difficulties around a subject in itself difficult enough, a fictitious definition has been used to conjure up innumerable contradictions in existence and thought, which it is affirmed the human mind cannot explain nor escape. Like a band of undying enemies they are con- tinually made to confront the mind, looking fierce enough, and yet doing no execution. Dr. Mansel has done his utmost to marshal the host, and the result is an array of contradictions which would be very formidable, were it not that they have no place except in the author's theory. The refutation of the whole is found in the fact that the Absolute is made to imply the absence of aU relation, whereas such an Absolute has no existence. God himself is not Absolute in this sense, and the designation can apply to no other being. The only legitimate meaning which can be attached to the terms Unconditioned and M 178 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Absolute, is freedom from all restriction. The Absolute is that which, though actually related, is free from aU necessary relation, thkt is, free from relation as a con- dition of existence. It is certainly a possible thing for thq Absolute to exist in relation., but the relation must be such as can be removed, without impairing its ex- istence. If this be true, not the slightest sanction can be adduced for the use which Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel have made of the terms Unconditioned and Absolute. Professor Eraser, commenting on the foregoing criti- cism, has spoken as if it were unnecessary. He says, — "We do not think these chapters,^ however, the most satisfactory part of the book. Instead of recognis- ing two unconditioned beings, the chief defect of Sir W. Hamilton's theory seems to be, that it hardly leaves room for the recognition of any."^ My reply is, that we are looking at Hamilton's system from different points of view. In the above criticism, I have been considering what it is in starting ; Professor Eraser has been contemplating what it is in its conclusion. There can be no doubt that he begins by indicating a twofold method by which the mind may reach the Uncon- ditioned, and that this involves two definitions of the nature of the Unconditioned, and to these defini- tions, as well as the proposed logical method from which they have sprung, do my criticisms apply at the present stage of the investigation. I certainly agree in the opinion expressed concerning the Hamiltonian system, ' Referring to this and a succeeding Chapter on Negative Thinking. J Essays, p. 218. DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 179 that it hardly leaves room for the recognition of one Unconditioned Being, nay, it most certainly leaves no room whatever for any such recognition ; but I think Professor Eraser wrong, if, for that . reason, he considers any argument against the twofold definition either need- less, or groundless. Sir "W. Hamilton positively affirms, that the Absolute which he distinguishes is " diametri- cally opposed to, is contradictory of the Infinite." When such an assertion is made, it is surely warrantable to inquire what this Absolute is, and how it is proved to be not only distinct from the Infinite, but contra- dictory of it. The object of the present chapter is to show that there is and can be no such Absolute. I use the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Uncon- ditioned as applicable only to the Deity. As referring to God, they are nearly synonymous, though each has its own peculiar shade of meaning. The Infinite ex- presses the absence of all limitation, and is applicable to the one Infinite Being in all His attributes. The Ahso^ lute expresses perfect independence both in being and in action, and is applicable to God as self-existent. The Unconditioned embraces both, and indicates entire free- dom from every restriction, whether in its own nature, or in relation to other beings. I think it were well that the term Unconditioned were altogether abandoned, as there is no special need for its use, and it is very apt to mislead. There is a sense in which the term cannot be applied to God, — a sense in which it involves not only the absence of necessary relation, but of all relation. This wide signification of the word must be laid aside, and over all the reasoning based upon it, should be written 180 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. the title, — Abstract speculations, wMcli apply to Bothing. Dr. Young, in liis vigorous work, entitled The Province of Reason, seems inclined to suggest that even the terms Infinite and Absolute have such a slight shade of difference, that we may be contented to speak only of the Infinite. But true as it is that the Infinite must be the Absolute, and that the Absolute must be the Infinite, the difi"erence of their apphcation is marked, and of very great value. The Infinite is the expression to be used when we seek to indicate that the Deity is un- limited in all His attributes ; but the term Absolute is the one to be employed when we speak of God in re- lation to His creatures, and would seek to convey the truth, that while related to all, He is necessarily related to none, that is, dependent on none. Dr. Mansel, after quoting the definitions of the Abso- lute and the Infinite which I have given above, adds the following criticism : — " The definitions may be accepted, though they lead to conclusions the very opposite of those which the ingenious author has attempted to estabHsh. The Absolute, as above defined, is taken in the first of the two senses distinguished by Sir W. Hamilton,^ and in this sense it is the necessary complement of the idea of the Infinite. The other sense in which the Absolute is con- tradictory of the Infinite is irrelevant to the present argument."^ Dr. Mansel thus expresses no opinion con- cerning Sir W. Hamilton's Absolute, which I have endeavoured to show is not the Absolute ; but it is gratifying to have the acknowledgment that the Abso- lute, in its ordinary signification, is "the necessary com- ' Discussions, p. 1-1. 2 Limits of ReUgious Thought, p. 300. DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 181 plement of the idea of the Infinite." I have no desire to lay too much force on mere phraseology, but it is at least worthy of notice that, notwithstanding the strong assertions of the impossibility of such a thing, Dr. Mansel has " an idea of the Infinite" to which he can appeal, and the Absolute is the necessary complement of it. When, however, the author says that my definitions " lead to results the very opposite of those" which I have attempted to establish, it is a pleasant thing for me, in replying to the unsustaiued assertion, to use the words of one who is his critic and mine, and who, after having quoted the above, says, " we should have liked to see some reason assigned for this sweeping statement, for assuredly it is far from self-evident."^ It would certainly have been desirable that at least some reason for his assertion had been given. In the absence of this, perhaps those who have studied the controversy may not be surprised if I simply return the criticism, as I now do, and afl&rm that Dr. Mansel's definitions carry in them the overthrow of his own theory. The truth is, that we are agreed concerning the very im- portant and fundamental point of definitions; those which I had given, are practically the same as those which Dr. Mansel has presented ; and, this being the case, I can have no hesitation in admitting that they must overthrow the theory of one or other. As it is in connexion with his own definitions that he presents the criticism of mine, it may be jveU to quote his, and the reader will observe their similarity to what has been laid down above. " By the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to ' British and Foreign, Evangelifol Review, No. 28, p. 437. 182 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. any other Being, By the Infinite is meant that which is free from, all possible limitation ; that than which a- greater is inconceivable ; and which consequently can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity."^ I willingly accept these definitions, and I say that they contain the elements of my defence at many of the points on which I have been assailed, and the complete destruction of many of the contradictions which are said to spring from any attempt to know the Infinite and Absolute. While, however, they express the characteristics upon which we are agreed, it may be that they afibrd cover for assertions on which we may hereafter differ. It is oftentimes difficult within the dimensions of a definition to em- brace everything, which the subsequent exigencies of discussion may show to be necessary, and I shaU not say that these' definitions completely shut out aU pos- sibility of "word-juggling." Sometimes definitions them- selves need to be defined, because of the discovery that common statements, accepted sincerely and without the least reserve on both sides, have been diff"erently. under- stood in certain respects. Whether it will be so in the present instance, the result must show ; and I am not without the fear, that while our definitions are almost identical, there is still some lurkiag difference. In re- ference to the meaning of the Absolute, I have no dis- pute with Dr. Mansel, nor. do I think that the language employed to express it, admits of the least difference. There is also evident agreement between us concerning the meaning of the term. Infinite ; but I am not without ' Limits of Religious Thought, p. 45. DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 183 apprehension that some diversity may arise on the signi- •fication attached to the word "limitation." I had said that " the Infinite expresses the entire absence of all limitation ;" Dr. Mansel says, " By the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation." The agreement seems complete ; but, lest there should be any need for it, I subjoin a somewhat ample paraphrase, which may help to mark more sharply the outlines of the definition. When we say that the Infinite is the un- limited, we simply employ synonymous terms ; in using them we speak of the nature of the self-existent Being, but these terms do not in the least explain what that nature is ; they leave His real nature unexpressed, and they merely imply that whatever that nature is, or what- ever it contains, it is unrestricted in measure ; it has, and can have, no restriction within itself, and there can be no restriction of its nature from without. It may be that the need for throwing up this outwork around the defini- tion of the Infinite is not at once apparent ; but, if I mistake not, the necessity for it must shortly appear. It consists chiefiy in this, that there are various possible applications of the term " infinite," which are completely inapplicable to the only Infinite Being. The very pre- valent tendency in philosophical speculation on this subject, to argue as if " our idea of infinity arises from the contemplation of quantity, and the endless increase the mind is able to make in quantity, by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleases,"' has led to various uses of the term " infinite," which are not only inapplicable to the Divine Being, but even contradictory > Locke's JSssay, B. ii. chap. xvii. sect. 7. 184 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. of His nature. Such, for example, are these, — " an infinite line," — " an infinite surface," — and " an infinite number.". All such expressions have obviously been used from a tacit admission that " our idea of infinity arises from the contemplation of quantity." But, as I have said, the terms "infinite" and "unlimited," while they apply to the nature of G-od, do not explain what that nature is, and as soon as the nature of the Deity is indicated, all these expressions immediately disappear. Whenever it is declared that God is a spirit, it is affirmed that God is not extended, and that all references to quantity are in- applicable to Him. Locke's statement is immediately set aside, and, unless I greatly mistake, much that has been written on the subject of the Infinite since the days of Locke, falls to be expunged. Men have spoken and written as if God were an extended surface, and as if the existence of any other being must necessarily prove a fimitation of His nature. So far has this materialistic notion of the Infinite One been carried, that it is impos- sible to speak of what is within God's nature, and what is without or beyond that nature, without the risk of being charged with contradiction. What is within the Divine nature is immediately dealt with, as though it were a circle in space ; and what is without is regarded as existence also occupying space, and rendering the expanse of the Deity restricted and partial. It has thus become necessary to insist upon the fact that the term "infinite," when applied to God, does not reveal His nature, and when that nature is declared to be spiritual and not extended, the term Infinite is to be interpreted accordingly, and puri- fied of ever3rthnig which bears the least trace of materialism. DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 185 When, therefore, we speak of what is within the nature of God, we do not refer to what is within certain physi- cal boundaries, but to all that belongs to the nature of the Deity, whereas what is without the Divine natvire is that form and measure of existence which is distinct from God, and by which He caniiot be restricted or limited. Dr. Mansel has very frequently written in accordance with a materialistic notion of the Infinite, and he has no sooner presented his definitions of the Absolute and Infinite than he proceeds to violate them. I shall be careful not to content myself with bare assertion, but shall present illustrations of what I mean. The first words he has written after his definitions are these, — " The Infinite, as contemplated by this philosophy, cannot be regarded as consisting of a limited number of attri- butes, each unlimited in its kind."^ To this I reply that the term " Infinite" does not express the nature of God, but simply the measure of that nature ; it does not declare what the attributes of God are, and how many they are in number, but simply affirms that, whatever they be, they are unlimited in degree. Infinity is not in itself an existence, it is a characteristic of the nature of God, and of aU His attributes.^ I consider that philo- sophy wrong in its contemplation of the Infinite, which declares that it " cannot be regarded as consisting of a limited number of attributes, each unHmited in its kind." The number of attributes belonging to the Deity is not to be determined, either in one way or another, by a definition of the word " Infinite ;" and no human philo- 1 Limits ofRdicfimis Thought, p. 45. ° Dr. M'Cosh has hinted at this, Intid- tions of the Mind, p. 227. 186 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INPIjSTITE. sophy can map out the Divine nature by any such process. "Whatever the definition given of the Infinite, it is utterly unwarrantable on the ground of that, to make any assertion concerning the number of the Divine attri- butes, though it is manifest that, whatever these attributes be in number, or in nature, "each is unlimited in its kind." Our faith in the Divine existence is the" only explanation of the use of the term Infinite ; it is the only authority by which we are able to define its mean- ing ; but we must turn to seek further testimony from the same authority, concerning the attributes of God, before any affirmation can be made regarding them. If this be carefully done, I think it must be admitted that our primary belief gives no declaration of the exact number of attributes belonging to the Divine nature. It testifies most decidedly to the reality of certain attri- butes, such as power, wisdom, and goodness, but it makes no declaration concerning the complete number. We are quite certain that the Infinite "is free from all possible limitation," that is to say, whatever belongs to the Infinite Being is infinite; but whether the perfections of the Infinite One are infinite in number, we have no means of deciding. We are sure that God is possessed of all perfections ; but whether " all perfections" consist of a limited number, or are infinite in number, it is impossible for us to say ; and even on the supposition that they are Hmited in number, it cannot be said that limitation in number, is any limitation in God's nature. If any one assert the contrary, he is dealing only with logical symbols, without regard to the testimony which faith gives concerning the one Infinite Being. God is DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 187 infinite in. His nature, in so fax as He is possessed of all perfections ; and every attribute in His nature is infinite, in so far as it is unli m ited in degree. In the former application, infinity may be called an attribute of God's nature ; in the latter, an essential characteristic of every attribute in the Divine nature. It is necessary to follow the remarks of Dr. Mansel somewhat farther. His next statement is intended to illustrate the assertion on which I have just been com- menting, that the Infinite " cannot be regarded as consisting of a limited number of attributes." His words are these, — " It cannot be conceived, for example, after the analogy of a line, infinite in length, but not in breadth ; or of a surface, infinite in two dimensions of space, but bounded in the third." ^ A fine f A surface ! The Infinite is neither of these, and it cannot be con- ceived as either. Here we are dragged down to illustra- tions essentially materialistic, and certain to lead astray if they receive the least regard. Not any one of the thi-ee " dimensions of space" is applicable to the Infinite, — neither length, breadth, nor thickness, — and the want of these is no possible limitation of the Infinite. There is, indeed, a tempting opportunity for " word-juggling," which may be kept up by a dexterous use of the single term " limitation ;" but I content myself with the simple declaration that God, the only Infinite, is infinite because possessed of aU perfections, and each perfection is infinite in itself. Let any one disprove that, if he can. "When, in the next clause, Dr. Mansel proceeds to speak of the Infinite as "an intelligent being/' I have no ' Limits of Religious Thought, p. 45. 188 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. objection to offer to his statement, that " it cannot be conceived under the analogy of an intelligent being, possessing some one or more modes of consciousness in an infinite degree, but devoid of others," if it simply mean, that the Infinite One must be possessed of every perfection belonging to intelligence. "When, however, he advances to the following statement, we are once more at variance. He says, — " The metaphysical repre- sentation of the Deity must necessarily, as the pro- foundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality." Without professing to question the profundity of these metaphy- sicians, it may be doubted if the acknowledgment here mentioned can be regarded as one of the proofs of that quality of mind. With aU admiration of the ability of. the men, I may venture the statement, that it seems to me they are wrong in this particular ; and I regret that in his letter to me. Sir W. Hamilton has accepted this definition, making the Infinite equivalent to to *Ei/ Koi Ilav} It win be observed that in the above statement Dr. Mansel speaks expressly of " the metaphysical repre- sentation of the Deity," and in applying the words to God, there can be no charge of giving to them a reference which they were never intended to bear. So deeply sensible am I of the wrong done to Eeligion and Philo- sophy, by the declared necessity of such' a representation of the Deity, that I could have wished that some other interpretation of the words could have been found. But this seems impossible. It is the Deity of whom the author speaks ; and if you inquire why the Deity must be ' Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. p. 531. DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 189 represented as " the sum of all reality," tlie answer is, because He is Infinite, and this He must be conceived to be, in order "to conceive the Deity as He is." " The metaphysical representation of the Deity must necessarily amoimt to nothing less than the sum of all reality ! " It must amount to the changeable and the unchangeable, the material and the spiritual, the finite and the infinite, the evil and the good, aU in one ! I can scarcely venture on the use of the name of the Deity, in criticising such an assertion as this ; and yet I must ask, Is this metaphysically true ? Is this the necessary repre- sentation of " the Deity as He is ? " Is this the product of Dr. Mansel's definition, that the Infinite, instead of being one and indivisible, is a conglomerate of aU things? If so, the similarity between our definitions covers ex- treme diversity of opinion. I consider that the Infinite is distinct from all that is finite, and that the want of the changeable, the material, the finite, and the evil, is " no possible limitation of the Deity." I am well aware that there are those who wiH argue that the want of limi- tation is a limitation of the Deity, and it will be said that if any actual mode can be denied of the Infinite, it is related to that mode and limited by it.^ I know that it can be affirmed that the want of an}'i;liing is a limitation, even though that want be the absence of aU imperfection, and therefore I suppose the " word-juggling" with logical symbols must still go on, though the symbols apply to nothing. With aU the respect I have for Dr. Mansel, because of his reverence for things sacred, and aU the admiration I have of his great powers, it does seem to I Limits of Religious Thought, p. 46. 190 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. me that a love of logical subtlety has in this case obscured his eyes to the recognition of metaphysical truth. It is useless to reason with any one who affirms, that the Infinite must be Hmited unless it be also finite; that is to say, unless it contain in its nature contradictory charac- teristics. I am contented that both doctrines go forth to be subjected to the tests of criticism, and the result will declare which opinion is in accordance with the common sense of mankind. The next application which Dr. Mansel makes of his definition, is to quote with approbation the question of Hegel, " What kind of an absolute being is that which does not contain in itself aU that is actual, even evil in- cluded ? " As I have already commented on this coinci- dence with Hegel, I shall not dwell upon it here. But there is evidence enough of the need for Dr. Mansel defining his definition, for the purpose of explaining the meaning of "freedom from all possible limitation." My under- standing of the meaning is plain enough when I say, that it implies the possession of aU perfections, freedom from limitation in any of His attribiites, and freedom from restriction by other existences. Having said thus much, the usual play with symbols must be continued. The want of any mode of being is limitation ; if the In- finite be not evU, it is Hmited ! I imagine that few of those who study the Philosophy of the Infinite, can look for an answer to such " unassailable reasoning." . The last of the deductions which Dr. Mansel draws from his definitions, to which I shall aUude, is this, " A cause cannot, as such, be absolute ; the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause." Stated formally, this argument DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 191 stands as follows : — A cause is related to its efiect ; the Absolute is that " which exists in. and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being ;" therefore the Absolute cannot be a cause. The argument has only to be stated in order to expose its insufficiency. Dr. Mansel can find no warrant for it, from his own definition of the Absolute. If the Absolute be that " which exists in and by itself," it does not foUow that other beings may not derive their existence from the Absolute : if the Absolute be that which has "no necessary relation to any other being," it may exist in a relation which is not necessary, that is to say, may exist as a cause, provided the relation be not a necessary condition of existence. The " appa- rent contradiction" has no existence, and does not need the introduction of succession in time ia order to escape from it. I am willing to accept without question Dr. Man- sel's definitions, both of First Cause and of the Absolute. They are these,^ — "By the First Cause is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the Absolute is meant that which exists ia and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being." Instead of seeing in these any " apparent contradiction," they appear to me to harmonize most completely. They show that the First Cause is the Absolute, and that the Absolute is the First Cause. " The Divine nature is iden- tical with the most perfect nature, and is also identical with 1^Q first cause." ^ It is one of the most common, and, at the same time, one of the most deceptive statements, made by those who deny the possibility of any knowledge of the Infinite, that ' Discussions, p. 36. 192 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the Relative is contradictory of the Absolute. The asser- tion bears aU the appearance of an accredited maxim in philosophy, and is applied in such a manner as apparently to involve the affirmation that the Absolute cannot exist in relation, — a doctrine which is most certainly false. And yet it is repeated as if it were an axiom. If it be said that the Deity gave being to a finite creation, the reply is, that the Relative is contradictory of the Absolute ; if it be said that God continues to be the Ruler of the uni- verse He has made, the answer is the same ; if it be said that He continues to be the preserver of His creatures, the answer is repeated. Nevertheless, the Absolute One is the Creator, and the Ruler, and the Preserver of the world, and in these respects does exist in relation. That definition of the Absolute is pitched too high, which does not embrace an acknowledgment of these facts, and all reasoning based on such a definition is irrelevant and false. When we speak of God and His creatures as dis- tinct from each other, and yet related to each other, it is irrelevant to insist that the plural is the Relative, and contradictory of the Absolute. " The Relative," is the abstract term employed to embrace everything dependent on a certain relation for its existence ; it is, therefore, another designation for the finite, since aU finite existence is dependent on the Infinite. When, however, the Infinite and Absolute One exists in a relation, He does not thereby assume a nature which can be embraced under "the Rela- tive." He is related, but not the Relative. He is not dependent for His being, or any measure of His glory, on that relation. It does not add. to His glory, ifdoes not abstract from it, — ^it does not in the least affect it. To DISTINCTION OF THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 193 say, that distinction from any mode of existence is relation to it, and that relation to it is limitation of it, and there- fore inconsistent with the nature of the Absolute, all of which Dr. Mansel says, is nothing more than stringing to- gether logical forms without any logical sequence. And to quote from Spinoza, as Dr. Mansel has done, is "not to improve the matter, but only make it worse." ^ Whether Spinoza has been successful in his exposition of what constitutes the finite, need not engage attention at pre- sent ; but his definition, with its reference to extended body and the limited operations of the human mind, has no bearing whatever on the nature of the Absolute, whether in relation, or out of it. It is very true, as Spinoza points out, that material bodies in proximity to each other, are seen to be limited ; and, that the rise of one cognition after another, proves the limitation of both; but what is the value of such illustrations to Dr. Mansel in attempting to illustrate what is involved in the relation of the Absolute to finite existence ? If these simple facts be observed, that the relation of material objects reveals their boundaries, and the succession of thoughts their termination in consciousness, what do they prove con- cerning the Absolute ? Is it from such facts as these that Dr. Mansel would teach men how to discover what must be true concerning the Absolute ? Is Spinoza's definition of the finite the foundation of that structure of assertions, which Dr. Mansel has reared concerning the Absolute ? Is it upon such authority as this that men are to accept the sweeping assertion, that, " if any actual mode of being can be denied of the Absolute, it is related ' Limits of Religious Thought, pp. 46, 304. N 194 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. to that mode, and limited by it " ? Anything more illo- gical in reasoning, anything more certainly false as a matter of fact, anything more fitted to cast philosophical investigation on this subject into confusion, cannot be conceived. For it must be self-evident, that the relation between the Absolute and the finite, if such there be, must be entirely different from the relation of finite objects ; and further, that the relation of the finite to the Absolute, must be quite difi"erent from the relation of the Absolute to the finite. In all such attempts to argue, that to be related is to be limited, in the case of the Absolute, as well as of the finite, there is a constant for- getfulness of the fact, that " the Divine nature is identical with the most perfect nature," and that relation can be no hmitation, no mark of imperfection, in the case of the Absolute. Hear how Sir W. Hamilton vindicates the singular course in which Dr. Mansel has been tempted to follow him ! He addresses to me a question, and points out the alternatives which may be adopted. " Does not the In- finite contain the finite? If it does, then it contains what has parts, and is divisible ; if it does not, then is it exclusive : the finite is out of the infinite ; and the infinite is conditioned, limited, restricted— _^mie."^ So manifest did it appear to Sir W. Hamilton that to exist in relation is to be hmited, that he was ready to main- tain, that the Infinite must cease to be infinite in order to exist in relation. And if you ask. How then did he reconcile his opinion with his own existence and that of finite creatures generally ? hear his oAvn words,— The In- » Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. p. 532. DISTINCTION OP THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 195 finite is " an entity, which, not excluding, in fact includes, the worlds of mind and matter." Sir W. Hamilton has charged me with misunderstanding the sense in which he spoke of the Infinite, but I certainly never thought of attributing to him any such use of the term as this. If he ask me the question — " Does not the Infinite contain the finite V — I need not hesitate to answer, and shall not think it a hard thing to escape both of the alternatives he has presented. Nothing but ..the use of a logical, instead of a psychological method, could have made these two alternatives appear to afi'ord the only possible answers, and even the logical process must have a mate- rialistic basis in order to bring out any such result. The Infinite does not contain the finite ; the finite is essentially distinct from the Infinite, and yet the Infinite is not " conditioned, limited, restricted," by the relative existence dependent upon it. I deny the doctrine which Sir W. Hamilton seems to favour, that the Infinite con- tains the finite, and therefore I escape the absurd alter- native that the Infinite contains what has parts and is divisible. On the other hand, I deny that there is any logical sequence between the proposition that " the finite is out of the Infinite," and the attempted inference that " the Infinite is conditioned, limited, restricted, — finite." If the Infinite is an extended surface, the logical sequence is unquestionable ; and if such unworthy views are main- tained concerning the Infinite One, such philosophy may pass current in the world. But, before such logic is accepted, it is necessary that those who use it show the authority on which they maintain that the Infinite is extended. I am not aware that a shadow of authority 196 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. exists ; and if not, whatever the Infinite be, the mere existence of other beings can be no " condition, limita- tion, or restriction" of the Infinite. The expression, " out of," as employed by Sir W. Hamilton, has a materialistic application, and certainly one material object existing " out of" another is a proof that both are limited. But if the expression "out of" be taken as equivalent to "distinct from," then I say that the existence of objects distinct from the Infinite can be no " limitation, condi- tion, or restriction" of the Infinite. Existence in sub- ordination to the Infinite can be no limitation of His nature ; the only possible limitation is that which may arise from superiority to the Infinite, which is an im- possibility. The only possible limitation of infinite power, must come from greater power ; the only possible limi- tation of infinite wisdom, must come from superior wisdom ; the only possible limitation of the all-perfect nature, is a more perfect nature ; than which hypothetical propositions no greater absurdities could be named. The existence of subordinate beings, possessed of limited power, wisdom, goodness, and holiness, cannot by any form of logic be shown to be a restriction of the Infinite One. There is a sense of relief in passing away from the cold logic, dealing with dry, dead forms, which finds its exercise in raising difficulties that have no application to the grand subject engaging attention. It is refreshing to turn to the simple, broad testimony of our faith, assuring us of the existence of the All-perfect One, at once the Infinite and the Absolute. He may scatter w;orlds from His hand with the greatest freedom, and DISTINCTION OP THE INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE. 197 gather together His works of creation in the greatest pro- fusion, and all shall still be dependent on His Will, and subordinate to Him during their entire existence. The exceUencies of His glorious nature may be to us un- searchable, but it is the satisfaction of our intellect to contemplate the fact, of which our faith assures us, that all finite existence is no restriction to His greatness. The being of His creatures can no more subject Him to con- dition, than the falling of a shadow can stay the world in its course. This at least is beyond the assaults of all human logic, and plain enough to every intelligence who chooses to exert His gifts, that in all the works of His hand God has spread out before us the unmistakable evidence of their complete subordination to Himself. CHAPTER V. THE CHAEACTBEISTICS OP KNOWLEDGE AND THOUGHT AS BEARING ON THIS SUBJECT. The whole strength, of those who deny the possibihty of the Infinite becoming an object of knowledge or of thought, is expended upon the attempt to show that the essential conditions of both are such as to make a know- ledge of the Infinite, or thought concerning the Infinite, equally an intellectual impossibihty. It is necessary, therefore, to enter somewhat carefully upon a considera- tion of the conditions and characteristics of knowledge and thought, in order to lay open to view the basis on which aU reasoning on this matter must rest. This is the only method which can be pursued for a satisfactory- solution of the question ; and there is this obvious ad- vantage in foUowiag the method closely, that it narrows the line of investigation to a point at each stage of ad- vancement, and gives to those who difier a clear view of the exact points of diversity, so that there may be a fair and open debate upon them. There is indeed a summary logical method, which seeks, by presenting a single syl- logism, to block up the way of inquiry entirely : — " To think is to condition ; the Infinite is the Unconditioned ; therefore, the Infinite cannot be thought." This was the chosen barrier behind which Sir W. Hamilton entrenched CHAEACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 199 himself, when attempting to turn back every effort to prove the possibihty of a knowledge of the Infinite. But inquiry is not to be checked by any such summary process. Men wUl ask what is meant by those two authoritative declarations — that to think is to condition, and that the Infinite is the Unconditioned. The latter proposition I have already considered, and I now proceed to inquire what are the conditions of knowledge and thought — an inquiry which all must admit, as Dr. Mansel has done, is clearly open to us, as a province of investi- gation. It is essential to consider what knowledge is, and what thought is, as distinguished from knowledge, in order to decide whether the Infinite Being can be the object of knowledge, or of thought. I. Knowledge is the recognition of objects as existing} As distinguished from what is denominated thought, it is the perception of an object, or simple apprehension of a trutL " By knowledge is understood the mere posses- sion of truths."^ On this matter there is no diversity of opinion, and nothing to hinder immediate consideration of what is involved in the act of knowledge ; in other words, what are its characteristics and conditions. 1st, Knowledge implies the conscious relation of the mind with an object. If the mind be conscious, it must be conscious of something. This is the very simple and obvious feature of our knowledge, which has been de- nominated the condition of relativity, of which not a Uttle use has been made in vindication of the doctrine, that a knowledge of the Infinite is impossible. It has afforded ' Knowledge, as being a simple exer- stood that I am here engaged with ex- cise of mind, does not admit of logical position, not with definition, definition. It will, therefore, be under- ' Lectures on Metaphysics, i. p. 8. 200 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the occasion for casting down before us the chosen logical barrier in another form ; — AH knowledge is relative ; the Infinite (or, the Absolute) cannot exist in relation ; therefore, the Infinite cannot be known. So irresistible did this syllogism appear, that it forced the speculation of Germany into the absvird theory which maintains that we reach a knowledge of the Absolute by rising into unity of consciousness with the Deity. Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel agree in afiirmiag, that the condition of relativity insures the overthrow of every theory, which declares a knowledge of the Infinite a possible thing. And here it will be observed, that their argument is not met by any attempt to favour the German hypothesis of a knowledge which is not relative. Notwithstanding all that Sir W. Hamilton has made of my admission that knowledge is relative,^ I abide by the admission as manifestly declaring the fact ; but the difierence between the upholders of the opposite theories does not concern this fact, that aU knowledge is relative. It must apply to the miaor premiss of the syllogism, which asserts that the Infinite cannot exist in relation,^ — an assertion which is emphatically denied on grounds already indicated. The Infinite does exist in relation, and it can be no vahd argument against the possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite, that all knowledge implies relation. This is the final answer, and presents the simple point on which those interested in this discussion have to decide, in de- termining which view they will accept. At the same time, if the whole matter of difference concerns the question whether the Infinite can exist in relation, it ' Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. p. 532. 2 /bid. CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 201 seems impossible for any one to deny that the Infinite does exist in relation. Upon this matter of fact it is impossible to differ, and it seems inevitably to foUow, that the whole dispute is nothing better than a strife of words, originated by a definition of the Infinite which has no application to any object. If this be enough to settle the dispute, I willingly admit that there can be no knowledge of an object which cannot exist in relation. But perhaps the matter is not improved, when I add that there is no such object, and assuredly the Infinite Being is not such in His nature as to make existence in relation an impossibdity. I have already said aU that is necessary conceming the true definition of the Infinite, and the authority on which the definition rests ; and what is required here is, a closer consideration of the fact, that aU knowledge implies the conscious relation of the mind with an object. The fact admits of being con- templated from both sides, as it concerns the miad exercisiug the power of knowledge, and as it concerns the object known. (a.) Relativity as it concerns the mind. All that is involved in the condition of relativity as applying to the knowing subject is, that in order to exercise the power of knowledge, it must have something to be exercised upon ; in order to know, there must be an object to be known. So far as yet appears, therefore, there is nothing to pre- vent the Infinite God from being an object of knowledge, if the fact of His existence come within the sphere of human apprehension, as I maintain it does by the very necessities of our being. (6.) Relativity as it concerns the object known. 202 THE PHILOSOI*HY OP THE INFINITE. While it determines that the object known is for the time being consciously related to the mind, the condition of relativity exercises no influence whatever upon the object, inasmuch as the condition is purely mental. Whether an object is known or not known to a particular mind, makes no difference to the object, which has an external existence. If the object known be itself a mental phe- nomenon, the knowledge of it is dependent on its exist- ence in the mind, instead of its existence being dependent on the knowledge. The nature of the phenomenon, as thought, feeling, or appetency, is not in any way deter- mined by the fact that it must be known as a phenome- non, in order to exist as such. The measure of the pheno- menon, as, for example, the extent of the thought, or the depth of the feeling, is not in any way regulated by the fact, that the mind must be conscious of its existence. It is true, as wiU shortly appear, that the measure of the phenomenon is determined by the power of the mind itself, but it is not regulated by the condition which requires that it be consciously present in the mind, in order to exist as an object of knowledge. I am specially concerned here with objects which exist apart from the mind, and the point upon which it seems necessary to insist is, that the condition of knowledge which has been denominated relativity, does not exercise the slightest in- fluence upon the external object of knowledge. It makes no difierence whatever to the stone, or the tree, or the horse, or the river, whether they are observed by some passer by, or unnoticed by any one. The object is the same in existence, whether it be an object of knowledge or not. So far as this condition of knowledge is concerned, CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 203 therefore, there is nothing to render a knowledge of the Infinite impossible, nothing to exercise the least influence on the Infinite Being, nothing in the requirements of our knowledge to infringe upon His attributes as the Infinite One. If He become the object of knowledge, He is re- lated to our mind, or, more accurately, our mind is brought into relation with Him ; but such relation, so far from being inconsistent with His Infinity, does not affect it in the least. Of course, if the Infinite involve the negation of aU relation, there can be no relativity what- ever. This is an unassailable position. It has this mis- fortune, however, for aU who choose to occupy it, that it teUs with equal force against the existence of the mind, as against the' exercise of its knowledge ; and equally against the existence of the universe, as against the ex- istence of the mind. In connexion with the bearing of the relativity of knowledge on the object, there is a singular tendency on the part of some, to write as though the object were in- volved iu some contradictory or disastrous position, so soon as it ceases to be recognised by the mind. Take such a passage as this, — " The perceiving subject alone, and the perceived object alone, are two unmeaning ele- ments, which first acquire a significance in and by their conjunction."^ It seems equally impossible to discover what authority there can be for such a statement as this, and of what service it could be, if there were authority for making it. If it mean nothing more than, that an act of knowledge is possible only by the relation of the sub- ject knowing and an object known, it is of no use ; in ' Umita of Religious Thought, p. 143. 204 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. SO far as it affirms more than this, it has no sanction. External objects are something more than " elements" of knowledge, since they have a separate existence, and dis- tinct ends to serve, apart from our recognition of them. There is in the sentence just quoted, an uimecessary play upon the distinction between the same beiug, considered as an object of thought, and as a separate existence. Whether it be an object recognised by the mind, or main- taining an existence unrecognised, it is a being complete in itself, and to call it " unmeaning," either before it is known, or after it ceases to be an object of knowledge, is unwarrantable. To adopt a mode of criticism in favour with our author, it might be argued, that he who declares an existence " unmeaning, " when unknown, must do so, either because he knows it to be unmeaning, or without any such knowledge. But he cannot know it to be un- meaning, for, ex hypothesi, when known it is not unmean- ing ; and he has no authority to declare it unmeaning, when he does not know that it is so. 2d, Knowledge implies the recognition of an object hy its qualities. It is the recognition of an object by what it is, that is to say, the observation of the qualities which it possesses. In immediate connexion with the act of perception, there may be an act of comparison, dis- tinguishing the object known from other objects, but of this I do not now speak. The act of knowledge is the simple perception of an existence, which is accomplished in the recognition of the quahties belonging to it ; or the simple apprehension of a truth, whether it arise from the native possessions of the mind, be discovered by personal research, or be enunciated by another. In this view, CHARACTERISTICS OP KNOWLEDGE. 205 knowledge has again a twofold distinction, according as it is immediate or mediate. (a.) Immediate knowledge is the recognition of qualities in themselves. If I perceive a stone lying before me, and in that act observe its shape, colour, thickness, and hard- ness, this is immediate knowledge. All knowledge which is obtained by contemplating the object in itself is direct or immediate. When a man looks upon external reah- ties with the eye, when he is conscious of the existence of a certain phenomenon in the mind, when he discovers a truth by personal observation, or when the first prin- ciples of knowledge rise into consciousness from within the mind, in aU those casgs there is immediate know- ledge. Unless the Infinite One, either from the necessi- ties of His nature, or by the exercise of His free wUl, be entirely shut out from aU direct contact or communion with the human mind, which few wUl maintain, there is nothing to prevent the Deity from being the object of immediate knowledge. (6.) Mediate knowledge is the recognition of quali- ties by their effects, or through some medium by which a knowledge of them may be conveyed. In so far as the qualities of being are capable of producing a certain im- pression upon other forms of existence, they are capable of being recognised by the results which they produce, and this is mediate knowledge. If any one see a distinct mark on the damp sand of the sea-shore, he thereby ob- tains a mediate knowledge of the size and form of that which caused it, so that he may be able at once to declare that the mark was made by the foot of a man, or a quad- ruped, or a bird. AU knowledge acquired in this way. 206 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. not directly, but through a medium, is mediate know- ledge. Unless the Infinite Being have not brought any of the attributes of His nature into exercise within the sphere of our observation, there is nothing to prevent us having a mediate knowledge of His attributes. Whether He be not in possession of attributes which He has not exercised in such a manner as to place their effects within our observation, it is impossible for us to determine. It is, however, to be observed, that it is only in a secondary or subordinate sense, that what has been called mediate knowledge, is to be regarded as knowledge at all. In aU mediate knowledge, there is an imm,ediate element ; that is, the recognition of the effeqts, or observed facts. And these effects only give us a mediate knowledge of their cause, because we already possess a knowledge of the kind of cause capable of producing such results. All mediate knowledge, then, presupposes an antecedent and immediate knowledge of the object. What may be called a mediate knowledge of the Deity is thus the recog- nised illustration in His works, of the operation of attri- butes origiaally revealed in the mind. Having given this brief statement of the distinction between immediate and mediate knowledge, it is enough for the present to declare that I hold that we attain to a knowledge of the Infinite Being, in both of these forms. If I am right in maintaiaiag that we have an d priori cognition of the Divine existence, that is an immediate knowledge. In so far as the attributes of God are shown forth in the works of creation, we have through these a mediate knowledge of the Deity. 3d, Knowledge implies a measure of recognition pro- CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 20 7 portionate to our powers of knowing. Man cannot by his greatest efforts stretch beyond the power which he possesses. The objects of knowledge may be such in their nature as to be easily recognised, or they may be quite the reverse, and in the latter case the knowledge must be proportionate to man's power to know. There are mul- titudes who never rouse themselves to any strenuous effort, to reach a knowledge of what is difficult and per- plexing, and consequently they never know the full measure of the power they have. But the utmost any man can do is to reach the full exercise of his powers, and thereby attain such a knowledge as they are capable of acquiring. This manifest condition of human knowledge brings out some important considerations, full of interest in reference to the possibility of a knowledge of the In- finite Being. (a.) All our knowledge is finite. This is self-evident, and in announcimg it, it fs clear that a vital point in the discussion is here reached, for the claims of the opposing theories must be decided by the answers to the question : Can there be a finite knowledge of the Infinite ? Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel both answer emphatically in the negative; I, as decidedly, in the afiirmative. In vindicating the opinion which I hold, I wiU consider Sir W. Hamilton's criticism of what I have written on the matter. In quoting from it, I wiU present only that which refers to knowledge, omitting meanwhile the re- ference to " thought and conception." He says, " You maintain that knowledge is and must be finite, whUst the object of knowledge may be Infinite. This appears to me to be erroneous, and even contradictory. An ex- 208 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. istence can only be an object of knowledge, inasmuch as it is an object known." And then, after an explanation of partial knowledge, to which reference shall be made shortly, he adds, " Nothing can be more self-repugnant than the assertion, that we have a finite knowledge of an infinite object of knowledge."^ This seems to me a form of criticism springing much more obviously from a logical use of the words "finite" and "infinite," as correlative and contradictory terms, than from an analysis of the facts characteristic of human knowledge. If closely examined, it will be seen that this doctrine involves two distinct assertions, which I maintain to be false interpre- tations of the facts of our consciousness. It imphes, first, that all knowledge must he complete knowledge. It is affirmed that there cannot be a finite knowledge of the Infinite, simply because the finite cannot embrace the Infinite ; in other words, knowledge must be co-ordinate with the object, else there can be no knowledge at aU. The authority for this declaration is the following : " An existence can only be an object of knowledge, inasmuch as it is an object known." This is manifestly ambiguous, and may receive the assent of those who give to it a difier- ent interpretation. It may mean, either that " an exist- ence can be an object of knowledge, only inasmuch as it is an object {fully) known," which is the only sense that can be of service in Sir W. Hamilton's criticism, and which I deny ; or, it may mean that " an existence can only be an object of knowledge, inasmuch as it is an object {in some measure) known," which I readily admit, but which can be of no service in Sir W. Hamilton's criticism. Let ' Metaphysical Lectures, ii. p. 531. CHAEACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 209 it be said that an object of knowledge must in every in- stance be an object completely Icaown, and I suppose every one will deny it ; but, let it be said, on the other hand, that an object of knowledge must be an existence of which the mind knows something, and I suppose every one will admit it. There is stiU nothing here to shut us out from a knowledge of the Infinite. But Hamilton's doctrine implies, secondly, that finite knowledge is identi- cal with the knowledge of a finite ohject. This I deny, on the basis of what I have already indicated concerning knowledge, viz., that it does not affect the object in respect of any of its qualities. When I say that I have a finite knowledge, the limit is clearly in my knowledge, and there must be some evidence palpable to my mind, that there is also a hmit in the object, before it is possible for me to believe that there is. So far from these two being identical,- — that I have a finite knowledge of an object, and that I have a knowledge of a finite object, they really involve two quite distinct elements of know- ledge, first, that I am conscious that my knowledge is Kmited ; and secondly, that I know that the object is limited. A person who looks along a telegraphic wire, stretching away from him in opposite directions, sees it so far quite clearly, and thereafter he sees it dimly in the distance, until he loses sight of it entirely. His know- ledge is limited, but, so far as he knows, the object is not limited at the farthest point of vision ; if it be, he must advance a certain distance in both directions before he can know that the wire actually terminates, so different is a consciousness of the limits of our knowledge, from a knowledge of the limits of the object. A traveller going 210 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. over certain portions of the earth's surface, has his direct personal knowledge continually hmited by the line of his journey, and the various points at which he turns, but nothing could be more ridiculous than for such a traveller to maintain that the world is limited by his knowledge. Since, therefore, the limits of our knowledge are not iden- tical with a knowledge of Hmits in the object, I maintain that, thus far, the conditions of knowledge leave it a possible thing to know the Infinite. In so far as the condition of limitation is concerned, it makes no practical difference ia regard to the possibility of knowledge, whether the object stretching away beyond the measure of our knowledge be hmited or unlimited, except that, in the one case, our knowledge may at length reach limits in the object ; in the other, it never can. In accordance with these views, there was, in the first edition of this work, a passage which Dr. Mansel has criticised, and which I insert at this point, for the pur- pose of presenting a reply. It was to the following effect : — No more do I believe that the mind, as finite, can oidy recognise finite objects, than I believe that the eye, because limited in its power, can only perceive those objects whose entire extension comes within the range of vision. As well teU us that because a mountain is too large for the eye of a mole, therefore the mole can re- cognise no mountain : as well tell us that because the world is too large for the eye of a man, therefore man can perceive no world, as tell us, that because the In- finite cannot be embraced by the finite mind, therefore the mind can recognise no Infinite. Before quoting the above passage. Dr. Mansel introduces an extract CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 211 from Cudworth's Intellectual System, wMch I shall also insert, as placing the matter completely before the reader. "Though we cannot frilly comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the Infiniteness of His perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a Being abso- lutely perfect ; such a one as is nostra moduh conformis, * agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scant- ling,' as we may approach near to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable is nothing ; but not whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect understandings."^ Dr. Mansel's criticism is the following : — " The illustrations employed by both authors are unfortunate. The part of the mountain touched by the hand of the man, or seen by the eye of the mole, is, ex hypoihesi, as a part of a larger object, imperfect, relative, and finite. And the world, which is confessedly too large for the eye of a man, must, in its unseen portion, be apprehended not by sight, but by some other faculty. If, therefore, the Infinite is too large for the mind of man, it can only be recognised by some other mind, or by some faculty in man which is not mind. But no such faculty is or can be assumed. In admitting that we do not recognise the Infinite in its entire extension, it is admitted that we do not recog- nise it as infinite."^ The objections taken by Dr. Mansel to the two "unfortunate" illustrations, in reaHty apply not merely to these two, but to aU illus- trations drawn from the external world. It must be ' Intellectual System, n. 518. Ed. Harrison. ^ Limits of ReHigims Thought, p. 333. 212 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. acknowledged that there is a difficulty connected with the use of any illustration, taken from our knowledge of extended body, which may be employed to indicate any feature in the knowledge we have, or are declared to have, of the Infinite Being. The difficulty springs very clearly from the contradictory nature of the objects with which our knowledge is conversant. The one is extended, and the other unextended, — the one is divisible, the other indivisible ; if, therefore, there be a recognition of both forms of existence, and it be found that our knowledge of both has certain common features, it is inevitable, from the different natures of the objects, that there will be certain features of dissimilarity. If,' then, an Ulustration be taken from the knowledge of extended body, to explain some feature in our knowledge of the Infinite Spirit, it is manifest that in estimating the value of the illustration, we must place out of view those points of diversity which spring from the opposite natures of the objects, and concentrate attention upon the alleged points of similarity in the forms of know- ledge. Any criticism which neglects to concentrate attention on the points of asserted similarity between the illustration and the declared fact, instead of ad- vancing philosophical inquiry, only perplexes the dis- cussion. This, as it seems to me, is the sole result of Dr. Hansel's criticisms on the two " unfortimate " illus- trations. Yet, notwithstanding the danger of misin- terpretation arising from the extreme diversity of the objects, I cannot think that such illustrations should be entirely surrendered, since I believe that they give to the patient critic important aid in testing the validity of CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 213 the metaphysical doctrine maintained. It is through such hazards that we come at length to the truth. So far then am I from being inclined to admit that Cudworth's illustration is an unfortunate one, or to with- draw the one which I had used, as coming under the same category, that it seems to me that both illustrations, in common with a multitude more which may be used, are satisfactory, and serviceable for the end contemplated. The point here maintained, in the process of reasoning intended to establish a knowledge of the Infinite Being, is that it is possible to have a knowledge of an object, that far outstretches the boundaries of that knowledge. In this way, it is affirmed, man may have a finite know- ledge of the Infinite God, and, in order to show more clearly what is understood to be the form of such an exercise of cognitive power, it is maintained that, in many other instances, such, for example, as our recogni- tion of extended bodies, we have a knowledge of objects whose full extent is far beyond our observation. That there may be a searching test of the alleged fact in con- sciousness, illustrations can be given. That which Cudworth has employed may be taken as a specimen, and many more are lying around us in aU directions on the surface of ordinary experience. I have said that we may have a finite knowledge of the Infinite Being, just as we have a limited recognition of the world we inhabit, which is too large to be fuUy recognised by the mind. The point of similarity between the objects, which alone renders the Ulustration allowable, is foimd in their re- lation to our powers of knowledge, that is to say, in the fact that as the one outstretches the widest range of 214 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. cognitive power in. any man, so does the other go far be- yond any man's power of perception. In so far as the world is extended, whereas the Infinite Being is imex- tended ; in so far as the one is divisible, whereas the (rther is indivisible ; in so far as a line could be drawn around the extended surface embraced in knowledge, whereas no such boundary can be even imagined in the other, as indicating the measure of our knowledge ; in so far as the act of perception may be regarded as em- bracing a part of the extended surface, whereas the knowledge of the Infinite Being, if such knowledge there be, cannot be a recognition of a part related to a whole, there is no diversity but what springs from the contradic- tory nature of the objects : and aU these contradictory features must clearly be placed out of account in judg- ing of the illustration drawn from the analogy of our perception of the one, to our knowledge of the other. There is only one point of analogy between the illustra- tion and the truth it is intended to elucidate. As the world is far more immense than our power of perception can embrace, so the Infinite Being in His transcendent excellence is far greater than our cognitive power can embrace ; nevertheless, as the world is the object of per- ception, so is the Infinite Being the object of knowledge. This is the exact form of illustration intended to show that we may have a cognition of an object outstretching the boundaries of our knowledge. Let the reader now turn back to the criticism of Dr. Mansel, and say how much of that criticism is relevant. All that it contains concerning the relation of part to whole is beside the question, inasmuch as it touches upon CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 215 the essential differences of the objects, not at all upon the alleged analogy in the form of knowledge. Then, what is said concerning the possibility of the Infinite being "recognised by some other mind, or by some faculty in man which is not mind," may be set aside, as rather above human philosophy. And after these two deductions are made from the criticism, what remains ? Positively nothing, but that last assertion, that " in ad- mitting that we do not recognise the Infinite in its entire extension, it is admitted that we do not recognise it as infinite." My reply to this is based upon the second particular in this analysis of the conditions of knowledge. If we have some knowledge of an object, it is either a knowledge of that object by what it is, or by what it is not ; but a knowledge of a thing by what it is not, is impossible ; therefore knowledge, of whatever degree, is knowledge of an existence by what it is. (6.) Knowledge, so far from being always complete, may be of various degrees. There may be different degrees of knowledge of the same object possessed by different men, on account of the varieties of intellectual power which they may have received; and the degrees of knowledge of the same object may vary in the experience of the same individual, as the result of mental develop- ment; but what I wish at present to indicate is the fact, that there may be different degrees of knowledge, accord- ing to the relation which our power of cognition may bear to the object to be known. AU knowledge implies a recognition of the objects, proportionate to the power of the mental faculties by which they are known. From this condition of the exercise of cognitive power springs 216 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the admitted fact, that knowledge is in one case complete, in another inadequate. The facts of consciousness are entirely against those who seek to embrace the results of every cognitive act within a sharply drawn outline, as though they were capable of being crushed within the boundaries of an exact definition, and thereby liable to aU the severity of logical tests in every use which may be made of them. Where such exactness is possible, it is of the utmost consequence that it should be secured ; but as the necessary conditions of our knowledge make it impossible that this should be always attained, a sound and complete philosophy must embrace and explain the facts concerning the indefiniteness often characteristic of our knowledge. The Kmitation of our powers does not restrict us to a knowledge only of those objects which can be clearly known, but admits of a partial or incomplete knowledge of those which cannot be brought entirely within the capacity of human cognition. This has led to the uni- versally admitted distinction of opposite characteristics of human knowledge, variously expressed by such terms as, clear and obscure, distinct and indistinct, definite and indefinite, adequate and inadequate, partial and complete. It is obvious that these terms have been employed to indicate a distinction in knowledge from somewhat varied points of view. Leibnitz has shown that the various degrees of knowledge admit of classification. He says "knowledge is either obscure or clear; and clear is again either confused or distinct ; and distinct is either inadequate or adequate, also either symbohc or intuitive ; and if it be at the same time adequate and CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 217 intuitive, it is perfect."^ He thus makes " obscure and clear" the general classification embracing various modi- fications. Obscure knowledge is that which implies the recognition of the object, without enabling us to distin- guish it from other objects ; as, for example, one among a bed of flowers, or one among a herd of animals. Clear knowledge is that which enables us to distinguish its object completely from other objects ; but that which is clear may be either confused or distinct, according as we are, or are not, able distinctly to recognise the various qualities or attributes belonging to the object ; and even if we do distinguish these attributes, our knowledge of them may be either adequate or inadequate, according as we are, or are not, able to recognise them in aU their extent. Every one who has studied the subject must acknowledge the masterly and successful manner in which Leibnitz has here distinguished and classified the facts of consciousness. Aiid I imagine that the majority of readers must be convinced that this classification em- braces all those characteristics of knowledge which I have maintained as belonging to our recognition of the Infinite Being. As apphed to the distinctions which Leibnitz has drawn between the different degrees of knowledge, the doctrine here maintained, is that our knowledge of the Infinite Being is a clear knowledge, that is, we clearly distinguish the object of knowledge from every other existence ; and, besides this, our know- ledge is distinct, inasmuch as we are able to distinguish from each other the various attributes of the Divine nature ; but, while distinct, our knowledge is inadequate, ' Meditationes de Cognitione, Veriiate fit Ideis, {Opera ed. Erdmann, p. 79.) 218 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. b.ecause our power of .cognition is insufficient to embrace the Infinite in the fulness of His immensity. The Infinite Being is assuredly the object of knowledge, since He is distinguished by us from aU other beings, and is known by His possession of essential attributes, but no one will affirm that the knowledge to which we can attain is ade- quate. Such an assertion, however, is by no means necessary in order to viudicate for the human miud a knowledge of the Supreme Being, since the conditions of knowledge admit of a knowledge which is inadequate. But the analysis of the form of knowledge requires to be carried a step farther, for the purpose of indicating that our inadequate hnowledge is, on the one hand, partial, on the other, indefinite. It is a partial knowledge, in so far as it does not embrace or comprehend the Infinite within its boundaries ; it is an indefinite hnowledge, in so far as it does not terminate iu a sharp boundary line, such as might have been recognised as the exact limit of our cognition. The hnowledge which the mind possesses of the Infinite Being is a partial hnowledge. Though it is manifest, because of the testimony which faith gives to the exis- tence of the Deity, and the necessary relation subsisting between faith and intelligence, that the mind must have some knowledge of His nature, it is not less certain both from the conditions of our knowledge, and from the facts of our consciousness, that we can have only a partial recognition, which does not embrace the Infinite in aU His extent. The facts of consciousness seem to me to be such as to enable every one, who makes them the object of the slightest consideration, to say, that he knows CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 219 sometliiiig of a Being infinite in power, and wisdom, and moral purity ; so that any one who declares that the knowledge of such a witness is, after all, only of a Being limited in power, wisdom, and purity, ventures upon an assertion which is altogether inconsistent with con- sciousness. But while it is maintanied that he knows something of an Infinite Being, the witness can have no hesitation in declaring that the knowledge he has is jpartial. If the objects are many with which we have only a limited acquaintance, it is manifest that the Infinite Being must be one of these ; and not only so, but whatever be our advancement in the know- ledge of His excellencies, its iucreasiag expansion must ever continue to be recognised as only partial in its measure. Self-evident as this seems to me, it has been heavily assailed by those who deny the possi- bility of a knowledge of the Infinite. In writing to me on this subject, Sir W. Hamilton uses the follow- ing words : — " A thing may be partly known, conceived, thought, partly unknown, etc. But that part of it only which is thought, can be an object of thought, etc.; whereas the part of it not thought, etc., is, as far as thought, etc., is concerned, only tantamount to zero. . . . But you assert (passim) that we have a knowledge, a notion of the Infinite ; at the same time asserting (passim) that this knowledge or notion is ' inadequate,' — ' partial,' — ' imperfect,' — ' limited,' — ' not in aU its extent,' — ' incomplete,' — ' only to some extent,' — ' in a certain sense,' — ' indistinct,' etc. etc. Now, in the first place, this assertion is in contradic- tion of M'^hat you also maintain, that the ' Infinite is 220 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. one and indivisible,' that is, that having no parts, it cannot be partially known. But, in the second place, this also subverts the possibility of conceiving, of know- ing the Infinite ; for as partial, inadequate, not in all its extent, etc., our conception includes some part only of the object supposed Infinite, and does not include the rest."^ So it is Dr. Mansel argues, " To have a partial knowledge of an object, is to know a part of it, but not the whole. But the part* of the Infinite which is supposed to be known, must be itself either Infinite or finite. If it is Infinite, it presents the same diflSculties as before. If it is finite, the point ia question is conceded, and our consciousness is allowed to be limited to finite objects." ^ Before replying to these criticisms, I may be peimitted to call the attention of Dr. Mansel to an extract on this -subject from an author whom he is rather fond of quoting as an authority. Bishop Browne had to encounter the same argument, coming from the atheists of his time, and see how he deals with it, while attempting to vindi- cate his own favourite but one-sided doctrine of know- ledge by analogy. " The atheists themselves find their account in laying aside and confounding this analogy ; for thus they argue. If God is Infinite, no finite human understanding can have any knowledge at all .of him. It cannot know him in the whole, because nothing finite can comprehend Infinity ; nor can it know any part of him, there being no part of Infinity. To which I return the Apostle's answer, that though we cannot be said to know any part of him ; yet we are truly said to know ' Lectwes on Metaphysics, ii. pp. 531-2. " Limits of Religious Thought, p. 76. CHARACTERISTICS OP KNOWLEDGE. 221 him in part, as we see the reflection of a substance in a looking-glass."^ If the bishop held a very defective theory concerning the knowledge of the Infinite, as I believe he did, he had at least the right answer to this criticism, based as it is on the logical distinction between parts and wholes. The fundamental position of Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel is clearly this, that a " partial knowledge" is a knowledge of a part, and their criticism is to be met by denying this proposition, which can be accurately done on the clearest possible evidence. Most assuredly I hold by the doctrine that " the Infinite is one and indivisible," and I am prepared to accept aU the consequences which foUow from legitimate reasoning on this truth. But I deny that a partial knowledge is necessarily a knowledge of a part, and that we are, therefore, shut out from a partial knowledge of the Infinite One. If, for example, I see an object at a great distance, I have a partial know- ledge of it as an object existing ; I may recognise its form, and general appearance, so far as to declare that it is a house ; but it is only when I have reached a near point of view that I obtain an adequate knowledge of the details in the structure. In the first case, it is a partial knowledge which is obtained ; in the other, the knowledge is complete. So it is, in like manner, that our observations of the heavenly bodies, and aU the researches of astronomy, give us only a partial knowledge of the individual planets, leaving many questions un- answered and open for discussion. But partial as the knowledge is which astronomy afibrds, who would think 1 Procecl/wre, Extent, and lAimts of the Human Understanding, p. 30. 222 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. of saying that it gives only a knowledge of parts of tlie heavenly bodies? Again, to advance towards the present subject, every one who believes in an Infinite Creator, at the same time admits that the world is a finite mani- festation of His nature. It must be true, therefore, ia this case, as it is in reference to our knowledge, that, beiag finite, it can only be an incomplete or partial manifestation of the Infinite Creator. This beiag ad- mitted, it necessarily foUows that the universe, as a partial manifestation of the Infinite Being, is either a manifestation of a part of His nature, or it is not ; but, as the Infinite nature has no parts, it cannot be a mani- festation merely of a part of His being ; therefore, the universe is a partial manifestation of the Infinite One as He exists. So it is that our knowledge, being finite, is only partial ; but a partial knowledge is not necessarily a knowledge of a part, and there is nothing either in the conditions of knowledge, or in the nature of the Infinite God, to prevent a knowledge, incomplete or partial as it must be, of His transcendent excellencies. This is so very simple and obvious, that I should not have thought of insisting upon it, but for the fact that Sir W. Hamil- ton and Dr. Mansel have maintained the very singular opinion, that a partial knowledge is necessarily a know- ledge of a part. Were it of any consequence in prose- cuting the present discussion, I might linger to inquire whether, in multitudes of cases, a knowledge of a part could be regarded as really a partial knowledge of the whole, since such an inquiry would afford a sufficient number of ludicrous illustrations of what the upholders of the doctrine must be contented to accept as a partial CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 223 « knowledge of an object ; but, more important subjects of investigation await attention. The knowledge which the mind possesses of the Infinite Being Ss an indefinite knowledge. It has been abeady indicated that the quality of indefiniteness may belong to human knowledge, and our knowledge of the Infinite has certainly this characteristic. When we speak of an indefinite knowledge, it is manifest that the quahty speci- fied belongs essentially to our knowledge, and not in any case to the object known, which cannot by any possibility be indefinite. If it be affirmed that, in a particular in- stance, our knowledge is indefinite, this is only an abbre- viated manner of expressing these two facts, that the object is recognised within the sphere of knowledge, and yet that our exercise of cognitive power, when put upon the utmost stretch at a particular moment, terminates obscurely, in the consciousness of the insufficiency of the knowledge obtained. In this way our knowledge of the Infinite Being is ever indefinite. If I might venture on another illustration from the knowledge of extended ob- jects, without fear of the essential difference between them and the Infinite being seized upon for the purpose of illegitimate criticism, it might be said that our knowledge of the Infinite is not like the recognition of the sharp out- line of the distant mountain range, seen against the clear blue sky ; but is like our view of the vast expanse of waters, appearing to our restricted vision as if fading away more and more obscurely far in the distance. Of course, in attempting such a mode of illustrating the indefiniteness of our knowledge, the Infinite is not com- pared to the vast ocean, any more than to the dis- 224 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. tant mountain range ; it is only asserted that, keeping out of account the essential difference between the objects, the indefiniteness of our knowledge of the Infinite is simi- lar to that which characterizes our recognition »of the waters of the sea, when the eye discovers no shore. An analysis of this form of knowledge may reveal certain facts worthy of distinct recognition in connexion with this part of the subject. There is a positive know- ledge possessed by the mind — a knowledge, therefore, of a particular object, and, at the same time, a consciousness of a peculiar characteristic adhering to the knowledge obtained. This knowledge may be regarded in a two- fold aspect, according as it is considered as a knowledge of a certain object, distinguished from others, or as a pecu- liar ybrm of knowledge, distinguished from other kinds of knowledge. In so far as it apphes to the object, it is a knowledge of the Infinite Being, recognising certain attri- butes as belonging to His nature ; and which, while it is limited, does not involve the recognition of limits in the object, but, on the contrary, impKes a consciousness that there are no boundaries in the object, at that point where the mind sensibly reaches the fuU measure of its abihty. In so far as the form of knowledge is exclusively considered, it is an indefinite knowledge, limited most assuredly, yet incapable of having its limits sharply marked out. In this exercise of cognitive power, the mind is struggling with an object too vast for it, and therefore never reaching limits which it can embrace within the range of its capacity, and around which the mind could take its survey, conscious of possessing a complete and definite knowledge. The mind mav, time CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 225 after time, resume the effort to extend its knowledge of the Transcendent Object, and may return in each instance with an increased knowledge of the wondrous excellence which must inspire all hearts with awe ; still, the mind is conscious that the knowledge possessed does not appear within exact limits, such as may be clearly recognised by itself, or accurately defined to others. The knowledge is both clear and distinct (using these terms according to the distinction drawn by Leibnitz), but it is indefinite in its outline. It is a clear knowledge of the Infinite Being, as distinguished from aU other beings; and a distinct knowledge of certain attributes, at once infinite in them- selves, and distinguished from each other ; but, an in- definite knowledge of these attributes, and of the entire Divine nature. The generally received principle, that the sphere of our faith is much wider than that of our knowledge, has its highest application in reference to the Infinite Being ; we cannot know to the fall extent the immeasurable excellence to which our faith bears testimony ; but, inasmuch as we have a necessary belief in His existence, we must have some knowledge of the Infinite One ; whereas, because the object of knowledge is infinite, the knowledge we have must ever be indefinite. One fact more requires to be observed, that our knowledge of the Infinite, however far extended, must he equxdly indefinite. From its very commencement, our knowledge must be clear, that is, it must involve a recognition of the Infinite God, as quite apart from, and altogether above, every other being ; in proportion as our knowledge extends, it becomes more and more distinct, that is, it involves a more ample recognition of the vari- p 226 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ous attributes of the Deity, in their nature, their distinc- tion from each other, and their mutual relation to each other ; but, however it may extend, it will continue in- definite in exactly the same degree as before, and from exactly the same cause, that there are no limits discovered or discoverable, which could give definiteness to our knowledge. Hence it is, that whUe all know God, there are in the possession of men, according to the gifts they have received and the use they have made of them, dif- ferent degrees of that knowledge, that is to say, know- ledge varying in distiuctness, but, iu the case of all, the knowledge is equally indefinite. And so, in like manner, the same individual may advance further and further in knowledge of the Infinite Being, yet he must constantly feel that his knowledge is of "that of which there is always something beyond ; " for, whatever may come forth more distinctly into the sphere of knowledge, he is con- scious that the boundary of his knowledge fades away gradually and indefinitely, in the earnest struggle of the mind to know more of what immeasurably outstretches the highest efforts of finite inteUigence. Before passing from this portion of the subject, it seems necessary to remark, that those who hold the doc- trine advocated in these pages, are oftentimes represented as confounding the indefinite with the infinite. This representation is made both by Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel, and in both instances, singularly enough, it is done in connexion with the prosecution of a logical ex- periment concerning the possibility of thought advancing from the smaller to the greater, and not really in con- nexion with any searching inquiry into the possibility of CHARACTEEISTICS OF KNOWLEBGE. 227 a knowledge of the One Infinite Existence. Hamilton presents it in connexion with an experiment concerning the possibility of conceiving "the infinite regress of time ; " Dr. Mansel introduces it in connexion with a similar experiment concerning the possibility of representing a hiunan attribute "magnified to infinity." In neither of these cases is, the question concerning the possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite Being properly introduced; but on this fact there is no need to dwell, as I desire simply to lifb a protest against any attempt to confound the indefinite with the infinite, or to compare the two together, as though they were both objects having an independent existence. The Indefinite is a quality of knowledge, which an object cannot have : the Infinite is a quality of an object, which the knowledge cannot pos- sess. This Sir W. Hamilton affirms most explicitly,^ and he is bound in consistency to acknowledge it in all his rea- soning. So far from doing this, however, it wUl be found that he has violated the distinction. After referring to the experiment concerning a conception of the infinite regress of time, he says : " If we dream of effecting this, we only deceive ourselves by substituting the indefinite for the infinite, than which no two notions can be more opposed."^ This very assertion of their distinction m- volves a violation of the distinction itself, ' when -the indefinite and the infinite are spoken of as "two notion's." We may have an indefinite "notion," but we cannot have an infinite "notion." Surely no man can, by any possi- bility of reasoning, mistake an " indefinite notion" for an " infinite object ;" but any man pleads for the truth, as it » Discussions, p. 14, and Logic, i. p. 103. ' Discussions, p. 30. 228 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. seems to me, who argues that we have an " indefinite notion" of an " infinite object." Dr. Mansel also treats of this distinction in a way- fitted to mislead. Speaking of an attempt to represent human attributes " magnified to infinity/' which of course would be a human effort to make an infinite, and altogether absurd even as an hypothesis, he says, — " We can conceive such attributes, at the utmost only inde- finitely ; that is to say, we may withdraw our thought, for the moment, from the fact of their being limited, but we cannot conceive them as infinite; that is to say, we cannot positively think of the absence of the limit." ^ I should fancy that there is no one who would maintain that we reach a knowledge of the Infinite Being by at- tempting to represent in thought human attributes "magnified to infinity," therefore there is no need to dwell upon a theory which has yet to go a-begging for a supporter, but it is needful to take a glance at the use made of the two terms, and thereafter at the corre- lative exposition of them. It is better that this should be done now, rather than that it should be delayed till I am considering the characteristics of thought proper. The first thing to be noticed is, that Dr. Mansel is here treating of what it is possible and what impossible for us to " conceive." K it be his real purpose to determine this, the object •msij be kept out of view meanwhile, and this may be aU the more readUy done as a human attri- bute "magnified to infinity" is a very questionable object ind«ed. The assertion, then, takes this form, — "We can conceive, at the utmost, only indefinitely, but we ^ Limits of Religious Thought, p. 91. CHARACTERISTICS OP KNOWLEDGE. 229 cannot conceive as infinite." The mere sound of that last expression, if the sentence be heard uttered, or the very appearance of it, if the sentence be read, is enough to betray the lurking ambiguity. Either the object is com- ing in upon us under false pretences, or the statement does not lead to the conclusion the author obviously in- tends. If, in the one case, he speaks of the quality of conception, and in the other of the quaHty of the object, there is no right comparison instituted, either between the degrees of conception, or the qualities of objects. If the comparison be really between different degrees of concep- tion, when it is said that " we can conceive, at the utmost, only indefinitely," I grant it ; and if it be said that " we cannot conceive infinitely," which is the real contrast, I also grant it ; for it is virtually saying the same thing in different words. Because our mind is finite, we can neither know infinitely, nor conceive infinitely, as every one ad- mits ; but, this does not prove what the author intended. However, this does not seem completely to indicate Dr. Hansel's meaning, and accordingly it may be considered whether the first clause is not to be understood as apply- ing to our conception, and the other to the object. If this be meant, the statement is the following : " We can con- ceive, at the utmost, only indefinitely ; but we cannot con- ceive (the obj ect) as infinite." If this last expression is not equivalent to " infinitely," the statement must imply an argument from the indefiniteness of conception, to deter- mine the measure of the object, which conception cannot reach. Because, at the utmost, we can conceive only in- definitely, we cannot conceive an object "as infinite." To this I reply, that it is impossible te reason from the in- 230 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. definiteness of our conception to a conclusion that the object is either finite or infinite. The object may be either the one or the other, but the fact that our con- ception is indefinite cannot prove that it is either. Dr. Mansel is entirely astray in attempting such proof, and I think no injustice is done to the logic of the Limits of Religious Thought in saying, that the reason- ing in this case is an exact type of what is generally employed by its author to prove the impossibility of a knowledge or conception of the Infinite. It is unwar- rantable to infer, because our conception is indefinite, that the object must be finite ; that is, that our concep- tion cannot be a conception of the Infinite, or that which exists " as infinite." Since it is admitted on both sides that we can conceive, at the utmost, only indefinitely, this quality of our conception must be understood as applyiag iu the last clause, which, fully expressed, must stand thus, — " We cannot {indefinitely) conceive (the object) CLS infinite." Now, the only way of determining the truth of this statement is by simply inquiring, what is the object ? Is it infinite, or is it not ? As we have a conception of the object, and as our conception is in- definite, that is to say, does not involve the discovery of limits iu the object, the question whether the object be limited or not, must be determined on some other authority. Here, as it seems to me, it must be felt by every one, the diflSculty arises which Sir "W. Hamilton has pressed upon my attention in his criticism, — If our knowledge or conception be limited and indefinite, how can we be assured that the object is infinite % His words are these : " Neith* can I surmise how we should ever CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 231 come to know that the object thus partially conceived is in itself infinite ; seeing we are denied the power of knowing it as infinite, that is, not partially, not inade- quately, not in some parts only of its extent, etc., but totally, adequately, in its whole extent, etc. ; in other words, under the criteria compatible with the supposition of infini tude. For, as you truly observe, "everything short of the Infinite is limited." ^ The difficulty is mani- fest, and there is but one way of removing it ; to my mind, a, way which removes it entirely. Since it is maintained that our knowledge of the Infinite Being is partial and indefinite, it must be difficult for any one to surmise how we can ever come to know the object in all the extent of its infinitude ; but, knowing as we do only partially, we must have some assurance that the object known is infinite, and this assurance is faith, — a ne- cessary belief implanted in the mind, — which Sir W. Hamilton admits has a sphere "much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge," on account of which the Infinite " is, must, and ought to be, believed." There appears to me the most perfect consistency in the theory which I had maintained, and which I stiU defend with unabated confidence in its truth. We have the testimony of faith to the existence of the Infinite Being, and on that testimony the whole form of our thought and emo- tion concerning the Deity is moulded. We have a know- ledge of the Infinite One as distinguished from aU other beings — a knowledge which, though partial and inde- finite, is still a knowledge of Him as He is ; and, since His transcendent excellencies far outstretch all that our ' Lectweson Metaphysics, ii, p. 532. 232 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Kmited power can attain, our knowledge — clear in its recognition of His existence, distinct in its recognition of different attributes of His nature, but iudefinite in itself, because inadequate — is a knowledge which rests securely on the basis of a necessary behef in the Infinite God. The passage from Dr. Mansel's work, on which I am at present commenting, raises its difficulties altogether in connexion with a hypothetical object, which every one must repudiate, " a human attribute magnified to ia- finity." But, in testing the validity of the reasoning, it may be well to admit the questionable object to its place in the author's statement, that it may appear how the object bears its part in the argument. This may be worthy of a moment's delay, if it enable the reader to obtain a more searching glance into the real merits of the question at this vital part in the discussion. I will, therefore, insert the author's designation of the object, which thus assumes the following form : " We can con- ceive attributes magnified to iufinity, at the utmost, only indefinitely; but we cannot conceive attributes magnified to infinity as irifinite" A critic has nothing whatever to do with the possibihty of magnifying human attributes to infinity ; but, if the argument is worth anything, these objects designated attributes are infinite; and, besides, these infinite "attributes" are indefinitely conceived. Either they are indefinitely conceived as what they are, or as what they are not; but, as they cannot be conceived as what they are not, they are indefinitely conceived as infinite, or, what is exactly the same thing, we have an indefinite conception of attributes which are infinite, or " have been magnified to infinity." And now, if the CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 233 reader will turn to the author's exposition in the two subsidiary clauses of the quotation, it must be apparent that Dr. Mansel has completely perverted his own illus- tration. The assertion, that we can conceive attributes " magnified to infinity" only indefinitely, and not as in- finite, is there represented in the following form : " We may withdraw our thought, for the moment, from the fact of their being limited, but we cannot positively think of the absence of the limit." Now, ex hypothesi, the attributes are "magnified to infinity." And, this being the case, we conceive of them indefinitely, not because we withdraw our attention from limits which are there, but because, with the utmost struggle to reach limits, we find none there. (c.) Our knowledge of the Infinite Being, while limited and indefinite, is capable of continuous expansion. As we are conscious of no limits in the Deity, but rest in the certain assurance of His infinitude, we are conscious of no restraiut, such as would finally terminate our ad- vancement in the knowledge of His boundless excellence. We discover no impassable barrier to farther progress, staying us in our contemplation, and saying, thus far shall ye go, and no farther, — ^thus much shall ye know, but nothing more. We are, indeed, restricted by the conditions which have been attached to the operation of our cognitive powers, and which it is necessarily impos- sible for these powers on any occasion to overleap, but these are no hindrance to continuous progress. In har- mony with these conditions, we find that persevering contemplation and study secure for us continuous pro- gress in knowledge ; ever as we return to renewed effort, 234 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. ■we find the same freedom granted to us, for the enlai-ge- nient of the sphere of our acquaintance with the Divine excellence; and still as we advance, we see more and more clearly before us, the soul-inspiring prospect of the indefinite expansion of this form of knowledgCj which, to an intelligent creature bearing the image of God, must ever seem transcendently attractive. With eternal exist- ence before us, the prospect is intellectually, morally, and spiritually a glorious one. The conditions which the Creator has attached to our cognitive powers, serve only to guide and not to hinder them in their exercise ; and if the restraints of a feeble body, the distractions of manifold cares, and the darkness of a sinful condition, be only taken away, we have faculties which fit us for ceaseless progress in the sublimest of all human studies. With the knowledge we have now, with the advance we make in it, and with eternity before us, we are already in the course which leads onward toward all this. And herein we discover that the dictates of a sound philo- sophy are in perfect harmony with the authoritative decla- ration of Scripture, — " This is life eternal, to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." 4:th, Knowledge is either d priori or d posteriori in its origin. It comes either from the depths of man's own nature, or it is the result of observation and reflec- tion. There is a fountain of knowledge in man himself, giving forth the first principles of all knowledge ; and there is a constant drawing of knowledge from the streams of experience. This twofold doctrine concern- ing the origin of knowledge must now, I think, with aU deference to the remaining disciples of the sensational CHARACTERISTICS OP KNOWLEDGE. 235 school, be regarded as finally estabUshed ; and my readers are already aware tbat the theory here main- tained concerning the possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite Being is based upon the acknowledged distinc- tion between these two sources of knowledge. It seems to me, indeed, that but for the fact that man possesses in his own nature the first principles of knowledge, placed within his being by the Creator himself, and superior to individual experience, we could not by any possibihty have attained to the recognition of an Infinite Being. "We could only have known our existence and the facts connected with the existence of the universe around us, but we could not have inferred even the existence of a cause adequate to produce aU that our knowledge em- braced ; we certainly could not have attained to the knowledge of a Being essentially infinite. Starting from a purely sensational basis, it was not wonderful that Hobbes should have denied that we can have any " idea or conception " of the Infinite ; and that Locke, labour- ing to struggle free from such a result of the theory, should have involved himself in manifold contradictions ; and that Bishop Browne should have settled in the in- sufficient theory of knowledge by analogy, as the highest attainment of man in seeking for a knowledge of the Deity. The following is the argument of Hobbes : — " Whatever we imagine is finite. There is, therefore, no idea or conception which can arise from this word In- fi/nite. The human mind cannot comprehend the idea (image) of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite force, infinite time, or infinite power. When we say that anything is infinite, we only mean by 236 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. this that we are not able to conceive the bounds or limits of that thing, or to conceive any other thing except our own impotence. Therefore, the name of God is not employed that we may conceive of Him, for He is in- comprehensible, and His greatness and power inconceiv- able, but that we may honour Him. And since, as I have said above, what we conceive has been first per- ceived in sensation ; there is no conception of a thiiig possible to man which has not first been perceived by the senses. Therefore, nobody is able to conceive any- thing except as in a certain place, and distinguished by some finite size, and divisible into parts." ^ Here is the legitimate fruit of the sensational theory, which the men of the seventeenth century were invited to pluck as the wholesome production ' of a sound philosophy. Is the speculation, andj above all, is the " word-juggHng " among the conditions of thought, prevalent in the nine- teenth century, to carry us back to the same miserable results 1 Axe we to go down low enough in these days to take our position where Hobbes and the disciples of his sickening materialism were contented to halt, de- claring that " the name of God is not employed that we may conceive of Him, but that we may honour Him" ? It is unnecessary to inquire what kind of honour it was which Hobbes ascribed to the Deity, but it is not un- reasonable to ask what kind of honour that can be which is divorced from intelligence ? Nay, rather, how is it possible to honour a Being of whom we cannot form the slightest conception 1 There is no room to marvel, if the practical result of affirming that the intellect can have ' Lemathan, Cap. 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE, 237 no conception of the Deity be, that the heart renders Him no honour. Such a theory concerning the name of God was quite consistent with the fundamental position of Hobbes, that " what we conceive has been first per- ceived in sensation." If it be true that " no conception of a thing is possible to man which has not been first perceived by the senses," it will follow that all know- ledge is restricted to things material, and we are shut up to deny the existence of mind, and therefore of the Infinite Spirit. Hobbes did not hesitate to accept the results of his theory, but we are happUy far past the time when the theory is regarded as worthy of serious consideration. It may be accepted as a settled poiat in philosophy, that all knowledge does not come from ex- perience, and, much less, exclusively from sensation. But, besides, I apprehend that, while escaping the material- ism of Hobbes, no attempt at tracing a path through a labyrinth, which doubles incessantly among the con- ditions of thought, can bring us back to his doctrine, that "when we say that anything is infinite we only mean by this that we are not able to conceive the bounds or limits of that thing," and " that the name of God is not employed that we may conceive of Him." It may well appear strange that we are at the present time discussing once more, questions which were agitated centuries before the philosopher of Malmesbury was bom ; but I believe the result will show, that they who seek now to impress on the public mind the conviction that a knowledge of the Infinite is impossible toman, are engaged in a hopeless task. Locke enlarged the statement of the origin of know- 238 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ledge to embrace not only sensation, to which Hobbes had restricted himself, but also reflection, though he in like manner maintained that all knowledge comes from experience. He widened the basis of the sensational philosophy to that extent which alone gives the chance of its assuming in the eyes of men generally an appear- ance of plausibility. But, if all our knowledge come from experience, it is plain that there is no source by which a knowledge of the Infinite Being can be said, with any show of consistency, to come to the human mind. Locke knew too much of what is really involved in human nature to be able to confine himself to the tram- mels of his system, and to his honour as a man, though,, to the injury of his theory, he insisted upon much im- portant truth which unaided experience cannot give. The consequence is, that the assertion of what he neces- sarily beheved, and the attempt to inaintain the com- pleteness of his theory of the origin of knowledge, in- volved him in numerous inconsistencies, nowhere more numerous than when he came to treat of Infinity. It is of Infinity that he speaks, and not of the Infinite ; and he holds that we have an idea of Infinity, but no idea of what is infinite. After affirming that " our idea of space, duration, and number come from sensation and reflection," he says, that " even the idea we have of In-, finity, how remote soever it may seem to be from any object of sense, or operation of our mind, has neverthe- less, as all our other ideas, its original there."^ The. result of attempting to bring an idea of Infinity from such an " original," may be seen from the following ex- . . _ ' -BsOTj/j.chap. xvii..p. 22. CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. "' 239 tract : " Finite and Infinite seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the modes of quantity, and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts, and are capable of increase or diminution, by the addition or subtraction of any the least part ; and such are the ideas of space, duration, and number. 'Tis true, that we cannot but be assured, that the great God, of whom, and from whom, are aU things, is incomprehensibly infinite. But yet, when we apply to that first and supreme Being, our idea of Infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it pri- marily in respect of His duration and ubiquity ; and, I think, more figuratively to His power, wisdom, and good- ness, and other attributes, which are properly inexhaus- tible and incomprehensible, etc. For when we call them infinite, we have no other idea of this Infinity, but what carries with it some refiection on, or intimation of, that number or extent of the acts or objects of God's power, wisdom, and goodness, which can never be supposed so great, or so many, which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our thoughts as far as we can, with all the infinity of endless number."^ To affirm that "Infinite" is a mode of quan- tity, that it is primarily attributed only to those things which have parts ; things capable of increase or diminu- tion ; things to which there can be an addition of parts, or fi:om which there can be subtraction of parts, is to make statements which may come naturally from a system which declares that all knowledge is drawn from sensation and reflection, but they are altogether indefen- ' Essay, chap. xvii. p. 1. 240 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. sible, and assuredly involve the use of the term Infinite very " figuratively." These must be curious specimens of infinite " things," which can be increased and dimi- nished ; and that must be a very novel way of attaining to an idea of the infinity of these " things," which is obtained by the singular mental feat of adding to them, or sub- tracting from them, certain quantities of their existence. Equally untenable is the attempt to carry this sensational mode of reasoning into application regarding our know- ledge of the Deity, when it is said that we attain to the idea of the Infinity of His attributes, by "reflection on' and intimation of" the " number or extent of the acts or objects" of these attributes. It is an admitted fact that the " acts, or objects" which have sprung from the exer- cise of the Divine attributes are limited, and therefore- cannot of themselves lead to a conception of the infinity of such attributes ; while, at the same time, it is manifest that' there must be a preceding conviction that these at- tributes are infinite, before we can be satisfied that no acts or objects can be "supposed so great" as to exceed the accomplishment of such attributes. But the noble and profound John Locke shook himself free from the restraints of a system far too narrow for the fulness of the truth, and uttered no longer the deliverance of a poor sensational philosophy, but the irrepressible conviction which sprang from the depths of his own nature, when he said, " We cannot but be assured, that the great God, of whom, and from whom, are all things, is incomprehen- sibly infinite." Bishop Browne, whom Dr. Mansel often quotes as an authority, has his whole theory invalidated by the insuf- CHARACTERISTICS OP KNOWLEDGE. 241 ficiency of the sensational basis on which he altogether rests it. The Bishop was an unshrinking upholder of the sensational maxim, — " Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuit prius in sensu." He says : " Our five senses, though common to us with brutes, are however the only source and inlets of those ideas, which are the entire groundwork of all our knowledge, both human and divine."^ With Browne, an "idea" is a " similitude or resemblance" of an object recognised by the senses. ^ It may well be cause for wonder, how, from such a starting point, men rose to the acknowledgment of an Infinite Being. Browne supposed that he had surmounted the difficulty, and explains his method in the following terms : " Properly speaking, we have no idea of God ; insomuch that we come to the knowledge of His very existence, not from any idea we have of Him, or from any direct intuition of the intellect, but from the obser- vation and reasoning of the mind upon the ideas of sensation ; that is, from our reasoning upon the works of this visible creation, and for want of any simple and direct idea of Him, we from thence form to ourselves an indirect, analogous, and very complex notion of Him."^ This is the description of what is clearly a very insuffi- cient process by which to reach a notion of the Divine Being. Undoubtedly the works of God help us greatly in attaining a knowledge of the Deity himself, but if we can reach nothing more than inferences from the facts pre- sented by our senses, there can never be any explanation of our behef in the Infinite One. And yet, so strangely ' The Procedure, Extent, and Lvmils = lUd. p. 5i). ' Ibid, p. 81. of the Human Understanding, p. 55. Q 242 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. have sensational philosophers forgotten their five senses, and trusted to something else than their theories, when emergency required, that the very next words after those just quoted from Browne are these, — " God is in himself simple and uncompounded." In so far as the senses provided the materials for all Browne's philosophy, they gave him no warrant whatever for such a declaration as this; in so far as the author ventures upon the statenient as self-evident, he rises, hke Locke, above his theory, and bears testimony to the existence in human nature of something better than sensationalism. Browne held many opinions similar to those which Sir W. Hamilton advocated, and it was natural enough for Dr. Mansel to quote from him as an authority ; but it is necessary to remember that the grounds on which Browne rests his whole theory, and argues agaiast any direct knowledge of the Infinite, are quite different from those taken by Hamilton and Dr. Mansel. Browne maintained that we can have no direct knowledge of God, simply because we cannot see Him, just as he held that we cannot have " even the least direct idea or perception of the purely spiritual part of us, nor do we discern any more of its real substance than we do that of an angel."^ Browne needed an argument to prove the existence of his own mind, before he could be persuaded that he had any mind. So little did he admit a direct knowledge of his own mind, that, by some ingenious method, his mind had to " argue and infer" its own existence ; in other words, he " argued and inferred" the existence of that power by which he " argued and inferred." 1 The Procedure, Extent, and Zimiis of the llutrwm. Understanding, p. 97. CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 243 5th, Knowledge by analogy is a special form of mediate knowledge. The distinction between knowledge mediate and immediate was briefly indicated above, and now, before closing this review of the characteristics and conditions of human knowledge, it is necessary to con- sider the nature of knowledge by analogy, and the theory which its distinctive features have led Bishop Browne to propose, in explanation of the knowledge which we can have of the Deity. The Bishop's theory is, that we can have no direct knowledge of God, and that the only knowledge of the Deity possible to us is that which may be obtained from a recognition of the analogy subsisting between our own intellectual nature and that of the Divine Being. This theory is a superstructure raised upon the sensational basis. Bishop Browne held that the mind is originally a tabula rasa, like a sheet of white paper, upon which not even a single mark could be found ; and therefore the mind is entirely dependent upon what comes in to it from the outer world, and upon the use which it .can make of these materials by exercising its own powers. It seems to me altogether unaccountable, how, on such a basis as this, it was found possible to rise to any sure conviction of the existence of G-od at all ; and still more unaccountable, how it could be established, on the supposition of the Divine existence, that there is an analogy between Divine nature and human nature. But, passing from the insufiicient foundation on which the Bishop's theory rests, I am more concerned, at this point, to inquire what is involved in knowledge by analogy, which is alleged to be the only foim of know- ledge which man can attain of things Divine. 244 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Any theory which affirms that our knowledge of God is altogether attained by analogy, must in some way imply that God exists, and that there is some analogy between our nature and His. Let us suppose these two propositions granted as most certainly true, although the evidence of their* truth may be held to rest on very different grounds from those on which Browne has attempted to place them, and the way is open for a critical examination of this theory of knowledge by analogy. The Bishop presents us with the following definition : " Analogy in general, is the substituting the idea or conception of one thing, to stand for and repre- sent another, on account of a true resemblance and cor- respondent reality in the very nature of the things compared."^ Applying this definition to the doctrine, that it is by such analogy alone we attain to a know- ledge of the Deity, these three things are affirmed, — that the Divine nature and human nature are " com- pared," — that, as the result of that comparison, " a true resemblance and correspondent reality" are fjaund to exist " in the very nature of the things compared," — and that, on account of the discovery of this " true resem- blance," "the idea or conception" of the one nature is made "to stand for and represent" the other. This theory, like that which makes beauty depend upon association, answers itself If it be by a comparison of the objects, that we discover the resemblance subsisting between them, we are not dependent exclusively on analogy for the knowledge we possess of them. All that > Thi'tigs Divine and Supernatwal conceived hy Analogy with Things Natwral and Hwnian, p. 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 245 is needed to prove the insufficiency of this theory, is to illustrate the apphcation of this criticism. Analogy cannot be the origin of our knowledge of anything, for it presupposes a knowledge of both of the objects, in order that they may be compared, and their resemblance discovered. Analogy, may help us to a fuller knowledge of that which is already known in some measure ; but it cannot give us a knowledge of that which is otherwise entirely unknown. In this way Butler has very properly used Analogy to show the similarity between the moral system of things, as manifested by natural reason and by revelation. But the very attempt to trace the analogy between the light of nature and that of revelation, implies that both are separately known, distinguished, and com- pared. So it must be in the case before us. If we have a knowledge of the Divine nature by analogy, we must have a knowledge which is above analogy, and Bishop Browne's theory breaks down. That there is such an analogy between human nature and the Divine, as that which he has so ably indicated, I certainly admit, — that we do, by means of this analogy, attain to clearer views of the Divine nature, is no less certain, — but, that ana- logy gives us ithe only form of knowledge we possess, I unhesitatingly deny, A few observations may suffice to indicate in what respects Bishop Browne's theory comes* short of a fuU explanation of the facts of con- sciousness. (a.) We are able to decide .to what extent the analogy holds. The comparison between the Divine nature and the human, which must be possible from some wider basis than Browne acknowledged, and which is necessary 246 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. in order to discover resemblance between them, implies the power to recognise the degree of similarity existing in the various aspects of resemblance. So conscious was our author of this fact, that he is frequently found explaining the measure of analogy between the human and Divine in a particular instance. Aiid yet he declares that we do not know the ground of the analogy, or the degrees of it. For example, he says : " Wherein the real ground of this analogy consists, and what the degrees of it are, is as incomprehensible as the real nature of God."^ And again : " The particular similitude and precise cor- respondency which is the ground of that Divine analogy by which we transfer our conceptions and words from earth to heaven, and from man to God, is not actually unknown, but as inconceivable to us as those Divine things themselves which it serves to represent."^ In this way, the author declares that we know God by analogy, and nevertheless " the particular similitude and precise correspondency" between the human nature and the Divine, is asserted to be not only " unknown," but even " inconceivable." A more complete contradiction there could not be, than to affirm that we know by analogy, while we do not know what the analogy is. If this were true, the Bishop might have embraced his theory within very short compass ; but a perusal of his works is aU that is needed, to show that he was not able consistently to maintain the doctrine that the ground of the similitude is unknown. Any discovery of analogy must be a recognition of the similitude really subsisting between ' The Procedure, Extent, and Limits ' Analogy, p. 5. of the Human Understanding, \i, 31 . CHAKACTEEISTIOS OP KNOWLEDaE. 247 human nature and the Divine. Speaking in a general way of the knowledge we can have, he says : " The analogy by which we form conceptions of the Diviae nature and perfections is, comparatively speaking, very remote and faint, in proportion only to the present frail and imperfect state of our humanity, who can form con- ceptions of God no otherwise than from those conceptions we find in ourselves."^ In so far as he treats of the analogy as it is known to exist in special instances, Browne betrays how impossible it is to keep by his assertion of complete ignorance of the ^iegree of analogy. For example, when referring to the analogy which may exist between our emotions, and those of which God is the subject, he says : " Though our passions are not transferred to the Divine nature as fully as the opera- tions of the intellect and will, yet is God not so grossly represented by them as by our bodUy parts ; nor is the language of our passions then purely figurative and metaphorical, but carries in it a good degree of analogy. For though there are, literally speaking, no such passions in God as love or hatred, joy or anger, or pity ; yet there may be inconceivable perfections in Him some way answerable to what those passions are in us, under a due regulation and subjection to reason."^ There is a strange mixture of positive assertion and uncertain hesitation in this passage, which is the natural result of want of harmony between the different parts of the theory main- tained. Our passions are not transferred to the Divine nature " as fuUy" as some of the other mental character- istics, yet between them and the emotions of the Divine 1 Analogy, p, 37. " lUd. p. 45. 248 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Being there is "a good degree of analogy." How did Browne come to affirm this, if, as he declares, the degrees of analogy are incomprehensible ? But still further, how are we to account for the bold affirmation, accompanied by the trembling hesitancy, in the next sentence ? How could Browne ascertain that there are no such emotions as love, hatred, joy, anger, and pity in the Di^^dne nature; and, when he had maintained that there is "a good degree of analogy" between these passions in us and similar emotions in God, how did he veer round to an uncertain form of language which seems to leave all in doubt, declaring only that " there may he inconceivable perfections in Him, some way answerable to what those passions are in us" ? Either we do know that some analogy exists, and we can declare what it is ; or, we are unable to discover any "good degree of analogy" between emotions human and Divine, and have no warrant to assert its existence. On account of these two contradictory statements, that we know by analogy, and that we do not know the ground or measure of that analogy, Browne has been led to maintain that our knowledge of the intellectual and moral perfections of the Deity is nothing more than a transference of our own intellectual and moral powers to God. He asks whether, when a man " would think or speak of the intellectual and moral perfections of the Divinity, he doth not proceed after this manner, by first observing what are the faculties, and operations, and ex- cellencies of his own mind, and then transferring the-m likewise to the Divine Being, by substituting them as so many images or representations of those infinite perfec- CHARACTEEISTICS OF' KNOWLEDGiE. 249 tions in him ?"^ This is a most astonishing description of the method of acquiring knowledge by analogy. It does not indicate the discovery of any analogy whatever, or even the acquisition of any kind or degree of know- ledge. For a man to attempt in thought to " transfer" his " faculties, operations, and excellencies" of mind, to the Deity; to " substitute" them as images of infinite per- fections in God, instead of regarding them,as what they are, is to carry out a course of thought which inevitably leads to the most glaring error. In this way each man would be left to represent for himself a god of his own making, which cannot be the case, and the mere sug- gestion of which is at complete variance from any concep- tion of God. If the highest possible effort of the mind to conceive of the Deity be an attempt to transfer our own qualities to another being, the possibility of the concep- tion of a God vanishes ; our reverence for the Deity comes to an end ; and the whole structure of our own moral and religious nature is levelled in the dust. A belief in God's existence, coming from a source higher than experience or inference, there must be ; and also an intelligent recognition of the nature of that God, in perfect harmony with the original beHef, before it is possible for us to discover any simiUtude between our own nature and that of the Infinite One. Analogy cannot extend the sphere of our knowledge, though it is of much value in helping us to a clearer degree of know- ledge already possessed, but imperfect in its measure. And the first condition ,of such analogy is, that we be able to determine the extent of resemblance between the ' Analogy, p. 61. 250 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. objects compared. The discovery of analogy may cer- tainly advance from one degree to another, but the recognition of a definite degree of similarity between objects, is the first requisite of knowledge by analogy. The fact that we possess not only an intelligent, but also a moral nature, certainly enables us to attain clearer views of God's excellence than we could otherwise have done ; but a, conception of the Deity must first be given us in our intelligence, before it is possible for us to make use of analogical reasoning concerning the resemblance between our nature and the Divine. (b.) We are able to decide where the analogy fails. In comparing the human nature with the Divine, the recognition of similitude in certain aspects, involves also the discovery of diversity in other respects, and thereby implies a knowledge of both, in some manner distinct from analogy. If Bishop Browne overlooks this conclu- sion, he at least admits the facts upon which it rests. Though we know God as the Infinite Intelligence, and have a clearer recognition of Him as such, from the analogy which subsists between our own intelligent nature and His, we do not attribute to Him such pro- cesses as those of reasoning, or remembering, and in these respects we perceive that the analogy fails. And so, in like manner, Browne admits that while we recognise an analogy between goodness and justice as they exist in man and in God, we also discover that the resemblance is not complete, and that justice and goodness in human nature are, in many respects, quite distinct from what these attributes are in God.^ If this truth be not dis- ' Analog;/, pp. 331, 336. CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 251 covered by a knowledge superior to that which is ana- logical, I know not how it can be acquired. (c.) We are in possession of truth concerning the Deity, altogether above what the analogy involves. Not only do we discover that there is very much in human nature which is not true of the Divine nature, but we are in possession of knowledge regarding characteristics of Divinity, which are completely above everything which belongs to man. It seems very singular how Bishop Browne could fail to see the insufficiency of his theory in this respect, and overlook the very powerful acknow- ledgment of a Supreme Being which hes deep in the nature of man. His sensational philosophy bhnded his eyes to the true authority for the being of Grod, and logical consistency in carrying out his theory, made him overlook very much of what is actually in possession of man, which could not be shown to spring from analogical research. Yet both of his works contain very frequent admission of elements of knowledge quite above analogy. For example, he affirms that "there axe iacomprehen- sible perfections in the Divine nature, answerable to what power, and wisdom, and goodness are in us," and, risiug above analogy, he declares God's power to be different from that which we possess, and His wisdom different from that which we have, and His goodness altogether distinct from that which belongs to us.^ In all this it is manifestly impHed that his comparison of the two has led, not only to the discovery of similitude, but also to the recognition of characteristics of immeasurable excellence in the Divine nature, entirely above what is • The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Hwmam, Understcmding, p. 84. 252 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. human. How such knowledge could be attained on a theory exclusively sensational and analogical, it seems to me impossible to discover. And true, as it is, beyond all doubt, that omnipotence, omniscience, and omni- presence belong to God, it is difficult to see how Browne could affirm this, when he declared that we can have no knowledge, either direct or by analogy of such attributes,^ and he had nothing but his five senses to appeal to as the guarantee of positive tnith. But there can be no clearer proof of the inadequacy of his theory, than his attempt, in accordance with it, to explain how we con- ceive " the several relations Grod bears to mankind." He says, that in thinking of God as our Creator we conceive the work of creation "by that of a man's making a statue, or any other work of art ;" that our conception of God as " our Governor" is taken from that of an "earthly monarch ;" that our conception of the " Supreme Deity" as our "Judge" "is taken originally from that we have of a man's sitting upon a bench for the trial of criminals, and pronouncing an impartial sentence of absolution or condemnation, according to the forms in our courts of judicature."^ Every one must be conscious in a moment of the inadequacy of such explanations of the conceptions we have of the Deity. So far from admitting that we know God by such analogy, I should take each one of these cases of comparison to illustrate, by very contrast, the high superiority of our conception of God to that which we have of every other being. I have thus at considerable length investigated the ' Analogy, pp. 281-4. 2 The Pmcediwre, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding, pp. 457-9. CHARACTEEISTICS OF KNOWLEDGE. 253 Conditions and characteristics of human knowledge, and I maintain that none of these interposes a barrier to the knowledge of the Infinite Being. I hold that the mind is conscious of its relation to the Infinite One, and in testimony of this it is beyond dispute that the emotions of our nature, operating according to their own laws, find special exercise in connexion with this recognised relation. The Deity, being thus in conscious relation with the mind, is immediately known by a primary and native cognition, which is the essential accompaniment of our necessary belief in the Divine existence, and He is mediately, known through His works ; while these two forms of knowledge, immediate and mediate, respectively unfold and expand together, and invariably harmonize according to their nature and degree. By the nature of the human mind, the knowledge we have, while clear and distinct in the recognition of the Divine Being him- self, and of those attributes of His nature which are revealed to us, is, in both of its forms, limited and in- definite, and must ever continue to be so throughout our eternal existence, notwithstanding the continued advance we shall make. In our present condition there is much diversity of knowledge among different individuals, and the same person is capable of advancing from one degree of knowledge to another ; but however much our primary cognition unfolds, and however far the study of the works of God be carried, whether in this world or the next, man's knowledge must ever continue limited and in- definite. II. Thought is the act of the mind in comparing the objects of knowledge. The simple act of perception by 254 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. which we recognise an external object, such as a stone, is the act of knowing ; but if the stone be compared with other objects around, or if the different properties of the stone be contrasted, such as its length, and its breadth, this is an exercise of thought. The consciousness of our own acts of mind, is knowledge; the comparison of different mental acts or states, is thought. All compari^ son of the objects of knowledge is thought. This is its widest definition, and Avith this before us it seems very- obvious, that all objects known can be compared or contrasted. The materials of knowledge are all capable of being used by the understanding ; whatever comes within the sphere of the one, may come within the pro- vince of the other. Turning, then, to the application of this to the ques- tion before us, I hold that the Infinite One, being, as it seems to me, the object of knowledge, may also be the object of thought, and that there is nothing in the nature of thought which renders its exercise impossible in reference to the attributes of the Deity. But here we encounter the logical barrier, to which I referred in the opening of this chapter. Sir W. Hamilton has a short argument by which to dispose of all exercise of thought concerning the Infinite. " To think is to condition ;" the Infinite is the Unconditioned ; therefore, the Infinite cannot be the object of thought.^ The grounds upon which I have maintained that the Infinite, while un- limited and all-perfect, is not the Unconditioned, have already been indicated. The Infinite Being is possessed of certain attributes and not of others, and the attributes ' See Discussions, p. U. CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 255 He possesses ai-e capable of being compared and con- trasted with those from which they differ. But I shall endeavour now to show that there are no such conditions attaching to the exercise of thought as render it impos- sible to think concerning the Infinite. And for the pur- pose of clearing the way, it is necessary to consider first Sir W. Hamilton's dictum, — " To think is to condition." This is an incomplete and ambiguous proposition. It may mean either that " to think is to condition " the objects of thought, or to think is to put forth mental energy, according to the conditions of onr own under- standing. The latter is the only signification which the proposition can bear, with the least chance of vindication. Our thought does not "condition," or affect, the objects about which it is conversant. On the other hand, no- thing can be more obvious than that our power of thought can find exercise, only in harmony with the conditions of our understanding. But of this truth Sir W. Hamilton's proposition is not only an incomplete, but an inaccurate, statement. If I may express a judgment, formed after much deliberation, I must say, with all deference to the memory of the revered and beloved philosopher, that the affirmation, "to think is to con- dition," is a proposition without meaning. " To condi- tion" must mean to impose conditions, if it mean any thing, and our thinking imposes conditions on nothing. The whole truth in the matter is this, that thought is the exercise of the understanding according to its own con- ditions. It is necessary stOl further to call attention to another peculiarity in Sir W. Hamilton's mode of ex- 256 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. pression, in dealing with this question. I refer to his peculiar use of the word " think." It cannot fail to strike the readers of his works that there is a uniform recurrence in them of the phrase " to think a thing ; "^ and, underneath this, lies the assumption of his theory. There is a fallacy lurking in the expression. We do not think a thing, but we think of a thing. That is to say, the thing is not embraced in our thought, but our thought is occupied upon the thing, or concerned with it. The tree, or the river, or the mountain of which we think, is not ta the least affected by our thought concerning it ; all that is involved in thought being, an exercise of our understanding concerning the qualities known by us to belong to the object. Knowing a particular mountain, we may compare it with some other mountain familiar to us, and pronounce it higher or lower than the other. The object of thought is identical with the object thought of, and the act of thought involves simply an operation within our own minds, which does not in any way affect the object, and which does not necessarily extend to all that belongs to the object, but may be concerned with only a particular quality of it. I hold, therefore, that it is inaccurate to say that we think a thing ; and besides, that the expression contains a misrepresentation of the facts of consciousness, if it is intended to convey any- thing more than that we are conscious of thinking about an object. There may be very different degrees of thought about the same object, say a mountain; but even when our thought about it may be pronounced full or complete, we do not think the mountain. We do not ' Logic, I. p. 76, ct passim. CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 257 think a man, however much we may think about him ; and so we do not think the Infinite Being, however much we occupy our thought regarding Him. We do not think Infinity, since that were nothing else than to think infinitely; for infinity is not the quality of any object, but, as Dr. M'Cosh has said, it is only the measure or degree of a quality or attribute such as be- longs to the Deity, and about which, I maintain, we are able to think. What these attributes are, is not matter of inquiry here, but aU of them are infinite, and in so far as their existence comes within our knowledge, they may be the objects of thought. I therefore repudiate the expression that " we think a thing," as involving the assumption, which I deny, that to think is to embrace the object of thought, upon which assumption it is argued that the Infinite cannot be the object of thought. This assumption may be traced through the whole of Hamilton's reasoning against the possibility of the Infinite being the object of thought. It is seen under its next aspect in these words, " Conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibihty of thought."^ This is the third parallel in Hamilton's philosophical trenching against what has been called, the Philosophy of the Un- conditioned. They He ia this order : — " to think is to condition;" in thinking "we think the thing" itself; and now, " the fundamental law of the possibility of thought is conditional, limitation." Now, this last pro position is as incomplete and ambiguous as the first. For the sake of definiteness, it may be stripped of the word " conditional," as all " limitation" must be condi- ' Discussions, p. 14. R 258 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. tional, or caused by certain conditions belonging to, or connected with, the object limited. The word may be the more freely dropped at this point, as I have already stated in what sense it seems to me true, that to think is to condition. Hamilton's third position may, there- fore, be viewed in the following aspect : — the funda- mental law of the possibility of thought is limitation. The question immediately arises, where is this limitation? or, in other words, to what does it apply 1 Does it apply to our thought alone, or to the object alone, or to both ? All are agreed that limitation is a condition of human thought ; but I deny that the limitation of our thought imposes any limitation on the object, or implies any such limitation in it. Our thought, as I have shown, does not "condition" the object of thought; therefore, thought does not impose limitation on its object. Our thought, as I have shown, does not embrace the object of thought, nor does it necessarily involve co-extension with the object ; therefore it does not necessarily imply the limitation of the object of thought. All that is in- volved, then, in Hamilton's " fundamental law " is, that limitation is an essential characteristic of human thought. The whole dispute, therefore, concerning the possibihty of the object being unlimited, is left untouched by the conditions of thought ; and the question must be decided as a matter of fact, whether an unlimited Being comes within the sphere of knowledge, and thereby becomes the object of thought. Hamilton's three positions must be transformed into these : — thought is the exercise of the understanding according to its own conditions ; thought does not imply CHARACTERIwSTICS OP THOUGHT. 259 that "we think a thing/'^ but that there is an "object about which we think ;"2 and limitation is an essential characteristic of thought, whatever be the object about which it is exercised. These three propositions do not involve the exclusion of the Infinite as an object of thought : they do not interpose any obstacle to the exer- cise of thought about the Infinite, as may appear still more clearly from a closer examination of the character- istics of thought. In its simpler form, thought is the comparison of the qualities existing ia the same object, or the comparison of different objects ; in its higher form it is either the act of the miad, in comparing and gathering together the qualities belonging to an object, and thereby forming a conception of it ; or the act of recognising the points of resemblance between individual objects, to the exclusion of their points of difference, and thus embracing the objects under a general notion. Every act of thought is thus a cognitive act under a special aspect. To think, is to acquire knowledge by comparison, and an act of comparison as really involves the attainment of know- ledge, as an act of perception or self-consciousness. For philosophical purposes, however, we must distinguish that which is by comparison as an act of the- understanding ; and that which is by simple recognition as an act of per- ception ; the one being an act of thought, and the other an act of knowledge : and the product of the one, a con- ception ; of the other, knowledge. It is necessary, there- fore, to inquire what are the characteristics of the mental effort by which, in the exercise of comparison, we rise to » Logic, I. p. 76. * IHd. p. 73, 260 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. a classified knowledge. Sir W. Hamilton says : " In an act of thinking, there are three things which we can dis- criminate in consciousness, — 1st, There is the thinking Subject, that is, the mind or ego, which exerts or mani- fests the thought ; 2d, There is the object about which we think, which is called the matter of thought ; and, Sd, There is a relation between subject and object of which we are conscious — a relation always manifested in some determinate mode or manner ; this is the form of thought." 1 On these points there can be no dispute, save that thought, being an act of comparison, supposes at least two objects, as Hamilton afterwards expressly affirms, though, after the comparison of the qualities be-; longing to an individual, in course of which each quality is a distinct object, the individual distinguished by these qualities may be declared the object of thought. When, however, Hamilton says that " the distinctive peculiarity of thinking in general is, that it involves the cognition of one thing by the cognition of another,"^ I am not pre- pared to admit it. The statement is true concerning the more complex form of thought, but, in my apprehension, it is not true of thought in its simpler form. If every act of comparison be an act of thinking, every act of comparison is not the cognition of one thing by another. If it be true, as I beheve it is, that " when we think (of) a thing, this is done by conceiving (of) it as possessed of certain modes of being or qualities, and the sum of these qualities constitutes its concept or notion,"^ then all thinking is not the cognition of one thing by another. "AH thought is a comparison, a recognition of similarity 1 Loffic, I. p. 73. 2 Md. p. 75. » Ibid. p. 76. CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 261 or difference, a conjunction or disjunction ; in other words, a synthesis or analysis of its objects ; "^ but in order "to think, to compare, to conjoin, or disjoin," it is not, "neces- sary to recognise one thing through or under another." If we contrast the quahties belonging to an individual object, we do not "recognise them through or under another ; " but if we think of an object by embracing it under a " general notion," this is recognising it "through or under another," as when we consider an object not simply in regard to its individual characteristics, but as belonging to a certain species, such as river, mountaia, body, or mind. When, for example, I observe the table before me simply as an object in existence within the sphere of my vision, this is knowledge acquired by an act of perception ; when I contrast the length, breadth, and height of the object, this is a simple act of thought; when I close my eyes and think of the table, I do so through the individual notion which I have formed of it, by the combination of those impressions which its various quah- ties have made upon the mind ; but, when I think of it under the .general notion, to which the word " table " is attached as the symbol, I do so through that notion alone, which leaves out of account the characteristics distinguishing the object from others belonging to the same species. What I mean to insist upon here is, that there is a more simple and a more complex form of thought, and that thought may be engaged with an object which cannot be .classified under a general notion. I.maintain, that as we can know the Infinite Being, so He can be the object of thought. We are able to con- ' Logic, I. p. 13. 262 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. trast the different attributes which we know to belong to His nature, and are further able, by a higher exercise of thought, to combiae in one conception our notions of the distinct attributes, though it is impossible that the Infinite One should be the object of such an exercise of thought, as that by which we classify different objects under a general notion. There is not the slightest necessity for lingering to examine the use which Sir W. Hamilton makes of the statement that aU thought is relative. Eelativity applies to thought, as to knowledge ; the argument by which the attempt is made to exclude the Infinite from both is the same ; and the answer is the same. I must, therefore, refer the reader to the reply contained in the previous part of this chapter, as embracing those considerations on which a judgment is desired. Nor is there any need for illus- tration in detail of aU those characteristics which belong to thought, in common with knowledge ; such as, that thought imphes the conscious relation of the miad with certaia objects, that it involves a measure of recognition proportionate to the mental power possessed, and that such recognition, though always finite, may vary in de- gree. The application of these is sufficiently manifest to admit of exclusive reference here to those features of thought as such, which are most important iu their bear- ing on the question at present engaging attention. 1st, All the facts of knowledge are capable of being used as the materials of thought. This is the law which regulates the objects of thought. The mind is capable of comparing everything which comes within the sphere of knowledge, and also within that of imagination, the CHAKACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 263 exercise of wHch involves simply new combinations of things known to exist, and introduces no new element of consideration in connexion with the present subject. All that is known affords materials for the exercise of thought. Whether the knowledge come through external perception or self-consciousness, whether it be mediate or immediate, whether it be d priori or d posteriori in its origin, all the facts recognised can be employed in the process of comparison by the understanding. It is, therefore, mani- fest that the whole contest concerning the question, whether the Infinite can be the object of knowledge, thought, or reasoning, must be waged at the first stage of the discussion. It is impossible for any one to show that some objects of knowledge are necessarily restricted from becoming objects of thought or of rea- soning. If it be established, as I certainly beHeve it is, that the Infinite Being is the object of knowledge, the second position is impregnable, that the Deity is the object of thought. According to the knowledge which the mind possesses of His nature, must be our thought regarding Him. As, however, He is essentially distinct from aU other beings, and above them aU, there is plainly one exercise of thought which can have no application to the Deity, namely, that by which one object is classified with a multitude of others under a general notion. It is manifest from the very nature of the Infinite Being, that He cannot be thought under any higher or more general conception. But, as He is recognised by us as a Being of infinite power, wisdom, goodness, and holiness, we are able to compare these attributes , together, to contrast them with such finite qualities as belong to man, and to gather 264 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. together our distinct conceptions of the several attributes into one notion, which we accept and maintain as our notion of the Deity. These are processes of thought not .only possible, but actually prosecuted by most intelligent men, although there may be amongst such men a con- .ception of distinct attributes more or less wide, and therefore a notion of the Infinite Being more or less extended in its degree and impressive in its influence upon the mind. 2d, Thought may he definite or indefinite, according io the degrees of our knowledge of its objects. Our know- ledge becomes more complete according as we concen- trate attention on the object, and thereafter our thought becomes more exact according as we exercise our power of comparison upon its qualities, or upon its relation to other objects. Thought must, therefore, take its character from the knowledge with which we start, though every exercise of thought, being a cognitive act, conducts the mind to a higher knowledge. According to our knowledge of the qualities of an object, is the com- parison we are able to institute between, them ; accord- ing to the comparison instituted, is the notion of the ob- ject which we carry away with us ; and according to the comparison of that notion and others already possessed, is the power to classify the object under some general notion. If, for example, a person discover a rare bird, his knowledge of it is determined by the attention he gives to its , appearance ; his thought, by the comparison he makes of its qualities in their nature and relation to each other ; his notion, by retaining in unity the sum of conception resulting from the comparison of the various CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 265 qualities ; and finally, his thought finds its ultimate exercise in classing the animal under the general notion " bird." It is thus manifest that our thought must be more or less complete, according to the knowledge we possess of the objects. If our knowledge be definite, our thought Tnay or inay not be definite ; if our knowledge be indefinite, our thought must also be indefinite. Our knowledge of the Deity is clear, recognising Him as separate from aU other beings, and above them aU ; it is distinct, recognising different attributes of His nature ; but, it is mc^e^m^e, being necessarily inadequate in its degree ; and so, in like manner, our thought concerning the Deity is clear and distinct, but indefinite. Thought is indefinite when our comparison is inade- quate. "When sailing at some distance from the shore, objects may be seen both clearly and distinctly, so that we can distinguish them, and in some measure compare them, though it is impossible for us to institute a com- parison which will be adequate. We may contrast the yaUey and the hill, the woody knoU. and the projecting cliff", but we cannot fully compare the different qualities of the objects, or the exact relations of these objects. Yet, we may be conscious of a most impressive sense of the beauty of the whole, and carry away with us a clear and distinct notion of it, often to be recalled because of the pleasure it affords. This is a simple illustration of in- numerable instances of indefinite thought, occurring con- tinually in our experience, in complete antagonism to the theories of those who maintain that thought essentially involves that the object be embraced within definite boundaries, or exact logical forms. Thus Sir W. Hamil- 266 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. ton says, " That the mind only thinks (of) an object by separating it from others, that is, by marking it out or characterizing it ; and in so far as it does this, it encloses it within certain fixed limits, that is, determines it. But if this discriminative act be expressed in words, I predi- cate the marks, notes, characters, or determinations of the thing ; and if, again, these be comprehended in one total thought, they constitute its concept or notion."^ In looking at this description of thought, it is necessary to keep distinctly in view that " separating an object from others ;" " markip.g it out ;" and " characterizing it," are purely mental operations which leave the objects un- aflfected. The separation is accomplished only mentally, that is, by separating our thought concerning a certain object froni that regarding other objects known in rela- tion with it. And so the " marking out," or " character- izing" an object is nothing else than our conception of the marks or characteristics known by us to belong to the object. This being true, any exercise of thought on our part leaves the object of thought uninfluenced by us, and I most unhesitatingly deny that in thinking of an object " by separating it from others, that is, by marking it out, or characterizing it," the mind necessarily " encloses it within certain fixed limits." There are very many instances of the exercise of thought, in which the mind is conscious of utter inabUity to enclose the object " within certain fixed limits." In every such act of thought, the mind does " separate" the object from others, thus render- ing our thought clear,; it does " mark out" the character- istics of the object, thus rendering our thought distinct ; ' Lof/ic, I. p. 78. CHAEACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 26 Y but the mind is conscious of the impossibility of enclos- ing the object within certain boundaries. If our know- ledge of an object be indefinite, our thought regarding it cannot be definite, else our thought must superinduce on our knowledge something which does not belong to it. Our thought, Hke our knowledge, must always, indeed, have certain recognised boundaries ; but in thought, as in knowledge, we may be conscious that the object is not " enclosed" within the boundaries by which our intellec- tual effort is restricted. To be conscious of the limits of the act of conception is one thing, and to conceive of limits in the object, is quite another thing ; but these two have not been sufficiently distinguished by Sir W. Hamil- ton. Any explanation of human thought is insufficient which faUs to note the fact that the fixed limits of thought may not enclose the object of thought; in other words, that thought is not the measure of existence. All thought implies a conception of qualities belonging to an object, and any existence is an object of thought only in so far as its qualities are embraced within our conception, but thought does not necessarily involve a conception of the full measure of the qualities. In multitudes of cases,, I maintain, our thought is indefinite, involving a conception of qualities belonging to the object, but not of the measure of such qualities ; that is to say, the mind, while forming a notion of the object, does not attain to the conception of its limits. Of such an indefinite form is our thought concerning the Infinite Being. As the mind in thinking does iiot necessarily enclose its object "within certain fixed hmits," the Infinite Being is not excluded from the 268 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. objects of thought. As a Being known by us, He must be the object of thought to us ; and, our knowledge of Him is such that we are able to form a conception of His nature, both clear and distinct, using these words in the sense established by Leibnitz, though all our thought concerning Him must be indefinite. In answer to such a view as that now advanced, that the Infinite is not excluded from the sphere of human thought, Hamilton maintains, in the most singular man- ner, that " we only deceive ourselves by substituting the indefinite for the Infinite, than which no two notions can be more opposed." In connexion with this must be. taken the author's definition of the two terms here dis- tinguished. He says, the Indefinite " is subjective," the Infinite " is objective ;" the Indefinite " is in our thought," the Infinite "is in its own existence." It must be accepted as self-evident that the Indefinite is a charac; teristic of thought, while the Infinite is an attribute, or rather the measure of the attributes, of an object about which we think. This being admitted, it seems to me that it must be a most unaccountable mistake on the part of any one to afiirm that he has a conception of the Infinite, merely because his thought is indefinite. It is surely very far from being a likely thing that any man, simply because he had an indefinite conception of a wide- stretching sea-shore, or of some great tempestuous ocean^ would declare either of these objects infinite, mistaking the indefiniteness of his thought for infinitude in the object. When, therefore, Hamilton maintains, that if in any instance we imagine that we obtain a conception of the CHARACTEEISTICS OP THOUGHT. 269 Infinite, " we only deceive ourselves by substituting the inde/imte for the Infinite," I reply that it is just because they are distinct, that I maintain the possibility of a conception of the Infinite. I admit that our notion is indefinite, but it is an indefinite conception of an infinite object. Dr. Mansel, as usual, foUows Sir W. Hamilton, and repeats, in his own way, the same assertion. The state- ment occurs in connexion with the inadmissible hjrpo- thesis of a human attribute "magnified to infinity," which I have already criticised. If the assertion have •any application at aU, it must be to the Divine attributes. Dr. Mansel says, " We can conceive such attributes, at the utmost only indefinitely; that is to say, we may withdraw our thought, for the moment, from . the fact of their being Umited"; but we cannot conceive them as infinite, that is to say, we cannot positively think of the absence of the hmit."^ I entirely concur with Dr. Mansel, when, in the sentence immediately preceding that quoted, he says concerning " human attributes," that "we cannot represent in thought any such attribute magnified to infinity," and since the magnifyiag process cannot be attempted otherwise than by an exercise of thought, it is altogether an impossibility, and there is no such thing as a human attribute " magnified to infinity." When, therefore, in the quotation just given, the author proceeds to tell how " we can conceive such attributes," his words must either apply to nothing, or to the Divine attributes. Either alternative may be accepted. If the former be taken, the necessity for criticism is removed ; ■ Limits of ReUgirms Thought, p. 91. 270 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. if the latter be preferred, I hold the sentence to be a mixture of truth and error. Taking, then, the statement as appljdng to the Divine attributes, I agree with Dr, Mansel in sajdng, that " we can conceive such attributes at the utmost only indefinitely;" but his explanation of indefinite conception must be set aside as inapplicable. To say that we can conceive such attributes indefinitely, is not to say that " we may withdraw our thought for the moment from the fact of their being limited," — ^the fcict being, that they are not limited, — a fact which we both admit as resting on the authority of a fundamental belief placed within the mind. It is a very partial view of " indefinite thought" which represents it as a deliberate change in the form of thought, produced by an act of the will, withdrawing attention from the recognised limits of an object, and concentrating it on certain quahties without regard to their Hmits, According to this view indefinite thinking is a product of that which is definite, the indefiniteness being the result of a volun- tary act of attention, which no sooner ceases, than the indefiniteness disappears, and the thought relapses into its original definiteness. Most of those interested in this discussion will be inclined to say that this is by no means what is most generally contemplated as indefinite thought. If indefiniteness of thought were in aU cases the efi"ect of a voluntary determination of the mind, we might be in some respects a happy race, with few per- plexities and doubts ; but we should certainly be a race more to be pitied, restricted to a low sphere, within narrow bounds, and shut out from the wider and nobler spheres in which thought may be clear and distinct. CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 271 though always indefinite, because of the nature of its ^ objects. I am very far from denying that there are two senses iu which thought may be indefinite, and that one of these is accurately described when it is represented as a voluntary concentration of attention on certain quahties of an object, to the neglect of the limits within which these qualities are restricted ; but much more frequently does the indefiniteness of our thinking spring from the nature of the object of thought, than from a voluntary determination of the mind. That is, in truth, pre-emi- nently and specifically, " indefinite thought," when the indefiniteness springs from the fact that the object of thought far outstretches our thinking power. I therefore maintain, against Dr. Mansel, that an indefinite concep- tion is not obtained merely by "withdrawing our thought" from the recognised limits of an object. Nevertheless, the acknowledged ability which the mind has of forming a conception of an object without em- bracing its limits, demonstrates the fact that the recogni- tion of limits is not necessary for the exercise of thought, and shows that an unlimited object is not excluded from the province of thought. Having, therefore, maintained that the Infinite Being is the object of faith, and know- ledge, and now of thought, it is very evident that thought concerning such a Being, though necessarily indefinite, must be something altogether different from that indefi- niteness which may characterize our thought concerning any limi ted object which we have seen. While conscious of the limits of our conception, that conception does not embrace limits in the object, and this remains true how- ever much our conception of the Deity may be enlarged. 272 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Our belief in the Deity is belief in an Infinite Being, and our conception is in harmony with that belief, for while it is necessarily indefinite, it is a conception of the Infinite One. The greater part of Dr. Mansel's stateinent must, as it seems to me, be entirely reversed, the truth being, that while we conceive of the Divine attributes only indefinitely, we conceive of them as infinite, that is, we positively think of the absence of any limit. ?>d, All thought is positive. Thought is nothing else than the comparison of objects known; and as knowledge is always positive, so also must our thought be. All know- ledge implies an object known ; and so, in like maimer, all thought involves an object about which we think, and must, therefore, be positive, that is, must embrace within itself the conception of certain qualities as belonging to the object. This may seem little more than a mere truism to those unacquainted with the discussion con- cerning the Absolute and Infinite ; nevertheless, it has been most strenuously denied. In laying down the above proposition, I am once more brought into complete anta- gonism with Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel. While they deny the possibility of any positive knowledge or conception of the Infinite Being, th-ey do not mean to deny the existence of certain facts of consciousness which point to an Infinite Being, and which have a certain application to His nature and His relation to us; but all these facts of consciousness are transferred by them to the region of , what is called " negative thought." I apprehend that Hamilton did not intend to maintain that the mind had no recognition of the existence and attributes of the Deity ; or, in other words, that there are CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 273 no facts in consciousness whose presence there is trace- able to the recognition of an Infinite Being. There are, indeed, in his writings certain extreme and very ex- traordinary statements, which, if taken by themselves, might seem to warrant the conclusion that Hamilton held, that the human mind was incapable of discovering any traces of the Divine glory, or possessing any recog- nition of the Deity, But this was not the case. I consider that there are certain facts in consciousness, springing from a recognised relation between ourselves and the Infinite Being, which are accepted as facts by thos6 who oppose each other on the question concemiag a positive knowledge of the Infinite, and that Hamilton has attempted to include these facts within " negative thought." There is common ground between us as to certain mental facts, even though it be true that those who vindicate a positive knowledge and conception of the Infinite, plead for the presence of certain facts denied by their opponents. So undoubted is the existence of such common ground, that I am satisfied that if Hamil- ton had been convinced that thought could not exist in a " negative " form, he would not have been found denying aU knowledge of the Infinite, but would have asserted a positive recognition of His existence and attributes. Every word of this declaration concern- ing Hamilton, admits of appHcation to his distinguished vindicator. Dr. Mansel. "Negative thought" is a re- gion of the same extent and significance in the writ- ings of both. Were Dr. Mansel dislodged from that, I imagine that his whole philosophy, so full of reverence in thought and in language, would lead him to take a place among those who hold not only a necessary belief, s 274 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. but also a positive conception of the Infinite Being, He has vindicated Hamilton with a profound ability" and earnestness which must lead every admirer of the de- ceased philosopher, whether agreeing with his doctrine of the Unconditioned or not, to feel that a share of the admira- tion cherished for Hamilton himself, is to be extended to the author of the Limits of Religious Thought. This feel- ing I have a satisfaction in recording as my own, even while, in the same sentence, I must declare that Dr. Man- sel's defence seems to me unsuccessful, and that I am constrained to attempt another blow at a system deemed philosophically false, and dangerous in its influence. The province of " negative thought " is a region very vaguely defined, and its characteristics have been described with no little vacillation; but I would adventure an examina- tion of the mist-clad territory, and make an attempt to show that all that is real withia it is actually enclosed by the boundaries of positive thought. An inquiry into the defence which can be made of what has been called " negative thioking," makes it neces- sary to glance back upon the connexion between know- ledge and thought. If thought be the comparison which the understanding iustitutes between different materials of knowledge, the possibility of negative thought must depend upon the existence of certain negative elements of knowledge, such as "negative attributes" in an object perceived, or in certain mental facts within our con- sciousness. Hamilton has not, so far as I remember, attempted to trace this connexion between the materials of knowledge and the form of negative thought ; Mansel has tried it, and in doing so, has insisted upon the " dis- tinction between what are vaguely enough termed posi- CHAEACTERISTTCS OP THOUGHT. 275 tive and negative ideas." ^ Certainly the designation is vague enough to admit of needless dispute. I have shunned the use of the word " idea," as a treacherous symbol, -which has been employed in so many ways that it is scarcely serviceable in any case where exact discri- miuation of the mental phenomena is necessary. Dr. Mansel generally avoids it, but it finds a place occasion- ally; and in his Prolegomena Logica, from which I am now quotiug, he says, " As it is sometimes convenient to have a general term, indifferently appUcable to any object of internal consciousness, I have in the present work occasionally availed myself in this extent of the term idea, rejecting, however, the representative idea of per- ception."^ There can be no doubt of the value of such a general term as that described, but to use the expres- sion idea in a sense so wide, when engaged in the con- sideration of " negative thinking," is to complicate what should have been kept simple and distinct. The question to be considered is really this. Is there any such thing as negative knowledge, and are we able to rise from that to a negative concept ? Does our power of knowledge pre- sent to us, at times, negative materials, from which we can rise to a negative act of conception or thought ? Treating of the distinction between "positive and negative ideas," Dr. Mansel makes the following state- ment : " A positive intuition is one which has been pre- sented to us in actual consciousness, real or imaginary : a positive concept is one whose component parts are capable of being so present in combination. A negative concept, on the other hand, which is, in fact, no concept at ' Prolegomena Logica, p. 45. ^ Ibid. p. -33. 276 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. all, is the attempt t6 realize in thought those combina- tions of attributes of which no corresponding intuition is possible."^ We are here first told what is the positive element both in knowledge and in thought, and that in a manner in every way satisfactory ; but, when the author comes to treat of the negative element, the two- fold distribution is dropped, and we are told only of a negative concept, and even that " is in fact no concept at aU." In contrast to the positive concept, there is set down a negative concept ; but, in contrast to the positive intuition, the author could not venture to place any- thing. A negative intuition would have been a contra- diction too glaring to pass, even with the saving clause that such an intuition was " in fact no intuition at aU." Dr. Mansel had previously laid down the declaration that in every intuition "the object is immediately related to the conscious mind,"^ "the subject and the object stand- ing in present relation to each other." ^ Every one will accept the declaration ; but it clearly shuts out the baxe mention of such a thing as a negative intuition, and estabhshes the fact that in knowledge or experience, all must be positive. With what consistency any author can plead for negative thought, who admits that aU know- ledge is positive, may be matter for immediate inquiry. Meanwhile, it is necessary to notice that Dr. Mansel is here " throwing some light" on the distinction between "positive and negative ideas." In immediate connexion with the foregoing couplet of positives and the solitary negative, this illustration is given : " A blind man may be said to have a negative idea of colour, when he attempts ' Prolegomena Logica, p. 45. ' Ibid. p. 9. ' Ibid. p. 10. CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 2 77 to supply the defects of his experience by analogy from other sensations ; as in the case mentioned by Locke, of the man who supposed the colour of scarlet to resemble the sound of a trumpet."^ Here the term idea is "vaguely enough" introduced, when the necessity of the discussion expressly requires the distinct statement that the example given is either that of a negative intuition, or a negative concept. But does Dr. Mansel really mean us to take seriously what Locke meant us to laugh at, when he spoke of the " studious bhnd man, who," as he quaintly says, " had mightily heat his head about visible objects," and " bragged one day that he now understood what scarlet signified " ? It was certainly not without some result that the poor man " had mightily beat his head," when he thought that scarlet " was like the sound of a trumpet ; " but is this really to be accepted as Dr, Mansel's view of the " negative idea " of scarlet ? If so, I should fancy there may be some little difficulty in say- ing whether this is to be regarded as a negative intuition or a negative concept. If we be only contented to call it an idea, we may be saved from " mightily beating our head " about it, and escape imder cover of a generality, Locke used the illustration to show that the" bhnd man could get no idea of scarlet, Dr, Mansel uses it to show that he did obtain some idea, Locke used it to prove that " simple ideas are only to be got by those impres- sions objects themselves make on our minds, hy the pro- per inlets appointed to each sort ; "^ Dr, Mansel takes it to prove that a man who has no positive intuition, " may be said to have a negative idea of colour, when he at- ^ Prolegomena Logica, p. 46. ^ Essay, B. lu. ch. 4, sect. 11. 278 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. tempts to supply the defects of Ms experience by analogy from other sensations." I hold Locke's position to be the only tenable one. Dr. Mansel's statement requires the de- fence of these three propositions : — that a man may have an " idea " of colour, who has no knowledge of it by ex- perience ; that a man has only to transfer his sensation of sound to another quahty altogether unknown, in order to have a " negative idea " of the vmknown quality ; and that a man may discover an analogy between a known quahty and a quality unknown ; and these three proposi- tions I hold to be indefensible. The bhnd man has the sensation of sound, and he transfers that sensation as also applicable to the word " colour," so that he has ia his vocabulary two words as the symbolic representatives of one sensation. But, ia doing this, he only accepts an- other word to represent the same sensation, and there is nothing else in his mind than the positive sensation of sound. If the " studious blind man " was in the habit of hearing a military band perform, and was told that the performers were dressed in scarlet uniform, it is easy to see how in his mind there would be an associa- tion between the sound of a trumpet and the word scar- let ; but it was altogether impossible that he could trace any analogy between his sensation in hearing the sound of the trumpet, and the colour of scarlet. When, there- fore, Dr. Mansel, extending from this illustration, says, " If I have never seen objects of any other colour than white and red, I have a positive idea of these, a negative idea of blue and yeUow," the truth is simply this, that I have a " positive idea " of white and red, but no " idea " whatever of blue and yeUow. This " negative idea " is. CHARACTERISTICS OP THOUGHT. 279 in fact, no "idea" at all, and the phrase is fictitious, standing ,as a symbol for nothing. A negative act of knowledge is an act of negative knowledge, and that is no act, and no knowledge, but a negation of knowledge. This, then, is certain, that all knowledge is positive ; and this is nothing else than the truism, that all knowledge is a knowledge of something. Having thus determined that all knowledge is posi- tive, the positive nature of all thought follows by ne- cessity. The understanding can be exercised only on objects known ; in other words, our power of thought can be occupied only with the materials of our know- ledge. Objects unknown cannot be the objects of thought, but all the facts in our cognitive experience may be the objects of thought. In this way it is manifest that all thought must be positive. As Sir W. Hamilton has said, " In an act of thinking there are three things which we can discriminate in consciousness : there is the thin k ing subject ; there is the object about which we think ; and there is a relation between sub- ject and object of which we are conscious." These three there must be in. every act of thought, and this is only to say, in other terms, that aU thought is positive. Over- looking meanwhile Hamilton's peculiar use of the term think, which has already been made subject of remark, nothing could be more explicit than the statement, that " thought can only be realized by thinking something ; that this something, as it is thought, must be thought as existing ; and that we can think a thing as existing only by thinking it as existing in this, that, and the other determinate manner of existence, and that whenever we 280. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. cease to think sometliing, something existing, something existing in a determinate manner of existence, we cease to think at all."^ Nothing more explicit than this could be wished, as a statement of what is necessarily involved in an act of thought, and with this statement every one wiU agree. Notwithstanding this, however, both Sir W. Hamil- ton and Dr. Mansel speak of "negative thought," and make very frequent reference to it throughout the entire discussion concerning the Infinite. By both of these authors the most conflicting declarations are made re- garding what is called " negative thinking." On the one hand, it is the " negation of thought ;" and, on the other hand, we are warned against supposing that it is a " negation of all mental activity." Both authors have shown the same desire to give a prominent place in their writings to " negative thinking ;" both agree in declaring that this negative thinking is a " negation of thought ;" that the " negative concept" is, " in fact, no concept at all ;" and yet both have maintained, with equal earnest- ness, that it is not to be confounded with " the absence of all mental activity." I hold that " we cease to think at aU," unless the understanding be occupied with known facts ; that all that has been written regarding " negative thinking" finds no vindication whatever from an analysis of our mental operations ; and that the prominence given to this fictitious symbol has done nothing more than perplex our inquiries. How either Sir W. Hamilton or Dr. Mansel could vindicate "negative thinking," in consistency with the ' Logic, 1. p. 76. CHAEACTERISTIOS OF THOUGHT. 281 exposition they have given of the nature of thought, I cannot understand. It seems to me that by the clearest and most accurate statements concerning the essential characteristics of thought, they have manifestly shut out the contradictory thing called " negative thought." Nevertheless, Hamilton has maintained that negative conceptions are as numerous as those conceptions which are positive ; that, in fact, they go in pairs — the positive and negative always heing liaked together, so that they cannot be separated any more than a man can escape from his shadow when the sun shines. He says, " Every positive notion (the concept of a thing by what it is) suggests a negative notion (the concept of a thing by what it is not)."^ A negative notion is a concept of a thing by what it is not ! A rare concept this ! How is it possible to form a concept of a thing by thinking of what it is not 1 We may indeed secure increased dis- tinctness for a positive concept; by contrastuig it with different concepts, but there is nothing negative in such an exercise of mind, while we observe that certain qualities recognised in other concepts are not embraced in this. But " a concept of a thing by what it is not" is as- great an inconsistency as can be imagined. Take Hamilton's definition of a concept, and apply it to this singular description of a peculiar member of the species. He says : " When we think a thing, this is done by con- ceiving it as possessed of certain modes of being or quahties, and the sum of these qualities constitutes its concept or notion"^ Where, then, is the " negative concept V It has vanished like a Will-o-'the-wisp in the ' Discussions, p. 28, ' Logic, i. p. 76. 282 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. mist-land of negations. " When we perform an act of negative thought, this is done by thinking something as not existing in this or that determinate mode."^ Think- ing something as not existing in this or that determinate mode ! . Well, let that pass, and what then 1 " And when we think it as existing in no determinate mode, we cease to think at all; it becomes a nothing."^ What kind of rebuke any one would have received from Hamilton who ventured to speak of a " something" becoming " a nothing," is pretty well known ;^ but when a feat of negative thinking is to be illustrated, a little "word- juggling" is allowable. Does any one imagine that with this declaration, that "when we perform an act of negative thought," " we cease to think at aU," the illustration of " negative concepts" has ended ? Not at aU. Hamilton maintains, in connexion with this, that there are certain correlatives in the mind, the one of which is a positive notion, and the other "an abstraction of thought itself." I shall present the passage before quoted, in its connexion with this additional and wider view of the matter. He says, " Correlatives certainly suggest each other, but correla- tives may, or may not, be equally real and positive. . . . Every positive notion (the concept of a thing by what it is) suggests a negative notion (the concept of a thing by what it is not) ; and the highest positive notion, the notion of the conceivable, is not without its correspond- ing notion of the inconceivable. But, though these mutually suggest each other, the positive alone is real ; the negative is only an abstraction of the other, and in 1 Logic, I. 76. ' Ibid. ' See Discussions, p. 610. CHARACTBEISTICS OF THOUGHT. 283 the highest generahty even an abstraction of thought itself."^ How Sir W. Hamilton has overturned his own declaration on this matter may appear by simply pre- senting another quotation. He says : " The conception of one term of a relation necessarily implies that of the other; it beiag the very nature of a relative to be thinkable, only through the conjunct thought of its cor- relative. For a relation is, ia truth, a thought one and indivisible ; and while the thinking a relation necessarily involves the thought of its two terms, so it is, with equal necessity, itself involved in the thought of either." ^ The alternatives which remaiu are manifest. The " negative concept," said to be a correlative of the positive concept, has either no existence, or it is a positive concept under a false name. Either way, we are rid of the discussion concerning " negative thought." Dr. Mansel presents the same course of declarations concerning " negative thinking " that Hamilton had done, and the same criticism applies. If, as he says, " a nega- tive concept is in fact no concept at all," let us agree to admit this, and then proceed to the discussion of some- thing more positive. When he says that "thought is only operative within the field of possible experience, i.e., upon such objects as can be presented in an actual intuition, or represented in an imaginary one," let us agree in the admission of it, as I most heartily do, and then it must also be admitted that there are ho " nega- tive ideas "^ in the field, as forces for him to rely upon, or for me to contend against, and no chance of defending > See DiscMssions, p. 28. ' Reid's Works, Sup. Dissert., p. 911. ' Prolegomena Logica, p. 23. 284 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. such a fanciful thing as that fictitiously called "negative thinking," There is, however, no consistency in first defining " thought," as Dr. Mansel has done, and then discoursing on "a class of notions which may be distinguished as essentially or absolutely negative,"^ each one of which " is in fact no concept at all,"^ and then finishing with the declaration that "such negative notions must not be confounded with the absence of aU mental activity. They imply at once an attempt to think, and a failure in that attempt."^ I do not for a moment deny that we may attempt to think, and fail in that attempt, as when we try to obtain an adequate conception of the relation of objects which we cannot adequately compare, or strive to carry forward our thought till we find ourselves re- strained by the essential limits of our understanding. But " thought is only operative within the field of pos- sible experience," and must admit of being verified by application to some individual existence. "Negative notions " imply " an attempt to think !" An attempt to think about what ? It must be about some object, and that a known object, else there can be no attempt to think, and once more the defence of " negative notions " is overturned. If, in order to think, it is necessary to have " an object about which we think," we can only "attempt to think," by having some recognised object about which we make the attempt. To tiy to think without having an object before the mind is as impos- sible as to think without having anything about which to think. All that is within the sphere of knowledge I Logica, p. 48. ' Hid. p. 45. 3 Ibid. p. 48. CHAEACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 28 5 may be made the object of thought, and it is impossible for us even to make an effort to exercise our understand- ing without having something before the mind upon which our thought may be engaged. If an object be not within the sphere of our knowledge, there can be no such thing as attempting to think about it, but if it be really among the objects of experience it may be made the object of thought at pleasure. But to have no object before the mind, yet attempt to thioik, and fail in that attempt, is a mental impossibility. Inconsistent as is the description given of "negative thinking," it is to this alone that Sir "W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel refer, as all that is within the reach of the human mind in seeking to form a notion of the In- finite Being, They affirm that we can have no positive conception of such a Being, but can only attempt to think about Him, and . fail in the attempt. We can think of Him "only by the thinking away of every character" which can be conceived, and of course we must faU in that attempt ; we can form only a " nega- tive concept," " which," we are told, " is in fact no con- cept at aU;" we can form only a "negative notion," which, we are informed, "is only the negation of a notion." This is, to my mind, the most lamentable restdt which the philosophical inquiry and speculation of the present century has produced. If it be the reaction from the daring speculation of the German philosophy, we are paying a fearful price for the philosophical ex- cesses of Schelling and his followers. If the philosophy which maintains only a " negative notion " of the In- finite Being, and denies that anything more is possible. 286 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. find acceptance among the thinking men of our country, I cannot hesitate to avow the conviction that a heavy- blow is struck against philosophy and theology too. But I beheve that the majority of those who study this matter wUl repudiate entirely what has been called " negative thinking," as inconsistent with the facts of a sound philosophy, and wUl set aside the lengthened dis- cussion in its support as an obstruction to patient in- quiry. No one wiH deny that what is " impossible to thought," may be quite possible in existence, but it can- not be admitted that " the impossible to thought " is to be designated, a form of thought under which certain facts of consciousness are to be embraced. The bearing of the question concerning "negative thinking" on the discussion regarding the. Infinite, is made sufficiently plain from Sir W. Hamilton's lectures,: — "Now here it may be asked, how have we then the word Infinite f How have we the notion which this word expresses 1 The answer to this question is con- tained in the distinction of positive and negative thought, We have a positive concept of a thing when we think it by the qualities of which it is the complement. But as the attribution of quaUties is an affirmation, as affir- mation and negation are relatives, and as relatives are known only in and through each other, we cannot, there- fore, have a consciousness of the affirmation of any quality, without having at the same time the correlative consciousness of its negation. Now the one conscious- ness is a positive, the other consciousness is a negative, notion. But, in point of fact, a negative notion is only the negation of a notion ; we think only by the attri- CHARACTERISTICS OP THOUGHT. 287 bution of certain qualities, and the negation of these qualities and of this attribution, is simply, in so far, a denial of our thinking at all. As affirmation always suggests negation, every positive notion must likewise suggest a negative notion ; and as language is the reflex of thought, the positive and negative notions are ex- pressed by positive and negative names. Thus it is with the Infinite. The finite is the only object of real or positive thought, it is that alone which we think by the attribution of determinate characters ; the Infinite, on the contrary, is conceived only by the thinking away of every character by which the finite was conceived ; in other words, we conceive it only as inconceivable."^ This passage may be taken as a fuU statement of the " nega- tive" theory, and, I must add with all deference, it con- tains a fair specimen of the contradictions and incon- sistencies which must cleave to a statement attempting to describe what is admitted to be "nothing." The central doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, as it has been accepted and applied by Dr. Mansel, is before the reader in these unqualified terms: — "The finite is the only object of real or positive thought." In this way the In- finite is completely shut out from the sphere of human thought. The result of the theory is this, that neither knowledge, nor thought, nor reasoning bear any testi- mony to the existence of an Infinite Being, and though faith assures us beyond all doubt that such a Being does exist, we can neither know, think, nor reason in the least degree concerning His existence. To our faith He is the supreme object in existence ; to our intelligence ' Logic, I. p. 102. 288 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. He is "nothing;" and, according to this philosophy, faith and iatelligence are necessarily and for ever divorced; Such a doctriae as this may have a short season of popu- larity, but the doctrine itself has no vitahty in it, and must soon disappear. But, whether the theory be right or wrong, if it be maintained that "the finite is the only object of real or positive thought," there remains nothing. to be said con- cerning the Infinite, but the correlative statement, that it is not the object of thought at all. And yet Sir W. Hamilton, in the paragraph quoted, proceeds to iaquire not only how we have the word infinite, but how we have " the notion which this word expresses." He who says we can have no such notion, asks the question how we have it. And in attempting to explain the use of the term " infinite," he does not trace its appearance in language to our faith in the existence of an Infinite Being, — ^a faith which he admits to be an essential part of our mental constitution,' — but actually refers it to the exer- cise of thought, which, he says, has nothing to do with the infinite. We are told that " relatives are known only in and through each other;" that is to say, that such relatives as finite and infinite are known necessarily in the same act of thought, and that the knowledge of the one is as necessary as the knowledge of the other. To make it manifest that the positive exercise of mind embraces both elements in the relation, it is said that we cannot have a "consciousness" of the one, without "the cor- relative consciousness" of the other. The one "con- sciousness" is then declared a "positive notion," and the other "consciousness" a "negative notion," on what CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 289 ground is not very obvious when both are " conscious- ness ;" but the whole is ended at once by the declaration that " a negative notion is only the negation of a notion," and " is simply, in so far, a denial of our thinkiag at aU." After stringuig together a series of contradictions, the branch is cut on which they hang. The whole theory concerning " negative thinking," seems to me altogether false, both in itself and in its application to the Infinite. It seeks to classify among the facts of consciousness, and under a special name, what has no existence in consciousness. In so far as it refers to the Infinite, the theory points altogether in a wrong direction, in attempting to indicate the possible origin of a " notion" of infinity. Such a conception never could arise from a simple knowledge of the finite, and an effort to classify with the finite, its negation, ver- bally denominated the infinite. Thought in any form must be the exercise of the understanding on the mate- rials of knowledge. Some knowledge, either d priori, or d posteriori in its origin, there must be, before the operation of thought is possible; if such knowledge exists, there may be the exercise of thought on the facts which it involves ; and if such thought be possible concerning the Infinite, it is possible for us to reason legitimately from its results. Holding as I do, along with Hamilton and Dr. Mansel, a necessary belief in the Infinite Being, I hold, against them, as an essential accompaniment of this belief, a necessary hnowledge, and from that I argue the possibility of legitimate thought and reasoning con- cerning the nature of the Infinite One. When, therefore. Sir W. Hamilton says that "the 290 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. last and highest consecration of all true religion, must be an altar — 'AyvwffTa @em — ' To the unknown and unknowable God,'" I reject the statement with a thorough conviction of its falsehood, and abhorrence of its consequences, both to philosophy and theology. That a full knowledge of the transcendent glory of the Deity is now, and ever must be, completely beyond the reach of every created mind, I admit with the most thorough assent of understanding and awe of heart. But when Hamilton says that God is " unknown and unknow- able," and Dr. Mansel says, that " religion is not a function of thought," 1 1 deny both assertions with the concentrated ■ earnestness of my whole being. I prefer to feel some share of the emotion experienced by the Apostle Paul at Athens, when he witnessed that altar " to the unknown God," and felt his " spirit stirred within him," rather than to bow to the authority of the men, who now proclaim that altar " the last and highest consecration of all true religion." With all my admiration and esteem fo» the men of distinguished ability who, in our day, have attempted to vindicate this dogma on philosophical grounds, I cannot consider it as anything else but " philosophy falsely so called ;" and, that rehgion which is " not a function of thought," I prefer to denomi- nate " superstition" and not devotion. When Sir W. Hamilton says, — "The Divinity, in a certain sense, is revealed ; in a certain sense, is concealed : He is at once known and unknown," I perfectly agree with the statement. This I believe to be the actual truth in the case ; but when he attempts to raise in our ' Proleg. Logica, p. 276. CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 291 land the old pagan altar, with the pagan inscription — ^Ayvwar^ @ea> — and to write under it, the English rendering in this form, " To the unknown and unknow- able God," and then proclaims this "the last and highest consecration of aU. true religion," I humbly think that he simply contradicts his preceding sentence, and engages in a very pagan act of consecration. If the Divinity be " in a certain sense revealed ; in a certain sense con- cealed ;" we can advance in our knowledge of that revelation, and the Deity can enlarge the revelation of Himself at pleasure. If God be " at once known and unknown," our knowledge is something positive, and capable of advancing still further into the glory of the unknown. I agree with Dr. M'Cosh when he says, — " They are in error who conclude that they cannot know an Infinite God, but they are equally in error who suppose that they can reach a perfect knowledge of Him. There is a sense in which He may be described as the imknown God, for no human intellect can come to know aU the attributes of God, or even know aU about any one of His perfections ; but there is a sense in which He is emphatically the known God, inasmuch as He has been pleased to manifest and reveal Himself, and every human being is required to attain a clear and positive, though at the same time a necessarily inadequate know- ledge of Him."i After having entered carefully into an examination of the characteristics of knowledge and thought, it is unnecessary that I should spend much time, endeavouring to estabhsh the fact that it is possible to reoLson accurately ' Intuitions of the Mind, p. 230. 292 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. concerning the nature of the Infinite God. Reasoning is the exercise of the understanding, by which truth is in- ferred from the facts of experience and the results of thought. All the facts which our knowledge contains, and all the products of our thinking, may be brought before the understanding and compared, for the purpose of discovering truth which does not lie immediately in view, but which may be inferred from what has already been discovered. If, then, it has been established that the Infinite Being is known to our mind, and is the object of thought, it foUows inevitably that we can reason legitimately from our knowledge, and it is lawful for us to do so. Dr. Mansel's argument to the contrary, if it were valid, would, as it seems to me, not only restrict Philosophy, but involve the condemnation of Systematic Theology. The author of the Limits of Religious Thought may be prepared for this, but I suspect there wiU be few indeed ready to cast away our stores of Systematic Theo- logy, as accumulated through a daring violation of the necessary laws of thought. Dr. Mansel's condemnation of all reasoning concerning the Infinite, is based entirely on the foundation that a knowledge of the Infinite is im- possible, and if the foundation be overturned, as I appre- hend has been done, the whole structure falls. Those who know the Infinite Being, and form a conception of His attributes which have been revealed, are able to consider the relation between things finite and the In- finite One, and infer with the greatest accuracy not a little truth concerning the nature and government of God, which has not been immediately revealed. While Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel have so CHAEACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 293 strenuously maintained the doctrine concerning " nega- tive thinking," and have referred to such " negative thought" as the only possible exercise of mind concerning the Infinite, I am very far from admitting that they have been at aU successful in preserving consistency with their theory, throughout their writings. The very reverse of this is the case. I apprehend that there' is little which would prove more difficult in connexion with this discus- sion than the attempt to reconcile their statements con- cerning the nature and attributes of God, and those con- cerning the powers and destiny of the human mind, with the theory of the impossibility of a knowledge of the In- finite. The theory does not rest on any very sohd foun- dation, nor is it by any means a firm structure ; but, it is pleasing to find two of the leading builders of it, most earnestly dealing out against it heavy blows, well fitted to bring about its complete destruction. Their efi"orts in this direction, by which benefit must be done to the cause of Philosophy, show the triumph of truth over the authority of a theory. A single quotation, by way of illustration, may not be uninteresting^ as showing what can be said regarding the Deity, by the upholders of a negative Philosophy. Sir W. Hamilton says, " God only exists for us as we have faculties capable of apprehending His existence, and of fulfiUing His behests."^ By what process can such a statement as this, which is only a specimen of many more, be brought to any apparent harmony with the theory which makes the Infinite negative of the conceiv- able itself? In the Limits of Religious Thought, a hun- ' Lectv/res on Metaphysics, i. p. 63. 294' THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. dred such passages may be found. For example, Dr. Mansel says, " It is by consciousness alone that we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer Him any service. It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can stand in any rehgious relation to Him at all."^ WUl our author maintain that " consciousness" is no knowledge ; or wiU. he assert that conceiving of God as a conscious Being is " in fact no concept at all," and that we do not stand in " any religious relation to Him at aU" ? Another brief quotation may be given, where examples are so numerous : " ' Know thyself,' was the exhortation of the Christian Teacher to his disciple, adding, ' if any man know himself, he wiE also know God.' He wiU. at least be content to know so much of God's nature as God himself had been pleased to reveal."^ Had any other author written these words. Dr. Mansel would have replied that "to know so much of God's nature" is to possess a " partial knowledge," and a partial knowledge is a "knowledge of a part," whereas the In- finite is indivisible, therefore this is not a knowledge of God at aU, or at least not a knowledge of an Infinite God, and surely no being is God who is not infinite. But the special inconsistency to which I here refer on the part of both authors, is that they declare without the least hesitation that this impossibility of knowing the Infinite wiU not always continue in the history of the human mind. If the very nature of the human mind, — if the necessary laws of thought, render it impossible to know God, must not the nature of the mind continue what it is, and the laws of thought remain what they are ? 1 Limits of Religimis Thought, p. 86. ' Ibid. p. 266. CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 295 If it be true that the finite can have no knowledge of the Infinite, must we not for ever continue finite, and a knowledge of God be for ever impossible ? This is a most manifest and necessary consequence of the theory, and he who is not prepared to assert the perpetual im- possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite Being, overturns the Hamiltonian theory, which Hamilton does himself. Hear Sir W. Hamilton declare what the Scriptures teach concerning a future life, and implicitly accept that teaching. " The Scriptures explicitly declare that the Infinite is for us now incognisable ; they declare that the finite, and the finite alone, is within our reach. It is said (to cite one text out of many), that ' now I know in part' {i. e., the finite) ; (!) ' but then ' (i e., in the life to come) ' shall I know even as I am known' {i. e., with- out limitation) !" As an example of Scripture exposi- tion, this passage may call for consideration hereafter, but it is adduced now as an indication of the consciousness of the utter insufficiency of the Negative Philosophy to account for what the Scriptures clearly indicate as the measure of knowledge awaiting us in a higher world. It is to the honour of Sir W. Hamilton that he openly avowed his conviction that the teaching of Scripture implied that we should know the Infinite God in the world to come, although such an avowal is completely destructive of the theory he has maiutanied concerning the impossibility of a knowledge of the Infinite by a finite mind. That the Scriptures declare that we shall know God in the world to come, and that more fully than He can be known by us now, no one can deny who has studied them ; but how Sir W. Hamilton came to 296 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. affirm that we should there possess a knowledge " with- out limitation," I cannot understand. Either the finite mind is capable of infinite thought, which Hamilton ex- pressly denied ; or we shall ourselves become infinite ; or there has been a misinterpretation of Scripture, as I be- lieve there is, in. the rendering given of both clauses of the verse quoted. But this at least is admitted, that in another state, we shall have a clear positive knowledge of the Infinite Being, and if so, the theory is overturned which declares such knowledge impossible for a finite mind. Dr. Mansel makes the same admission concerning the possibility of reaching a positive knowledge of the Divi- nity in another world, which he does to the complete overthrow of his whole theory. He says, " The time may indeed come, though not in this life, when these various manifestations of God, ' at sundry times and in divers manners,' may be seen to be but different sides and par- tial representations of one and the same Divine reahty ; when the light which now gleams in restless flashes from the ruffled waters of the human soul, will settle into the steadfast image of God's face shining on its unbroken surface. But ere this shall be, that which is perfect must come, and that which is in part must be done away." This is truth beautifully presented ; but, if there be even now "Hght which gleams in restless flashes from the human soul," it is more than we have any account of in his philosophy. • Besides, the reference to the " image of God's face shining on the unbroken surface of the soul," suggests the inquiry whether that image was not there in the soul of man in its original state, and if man was CHARACTERISTICS OF THOUGHT. 297 not then a finite being, able to think only in accordance with the condition of relativity to which all thought is subject now ? And is that image of God not in our soul yet, depraved as we are, and unable to think unless there be an object about which to think ? Unless he be prepared to maintain that in the next world we shall be able in some way to think of the Deity, without being conscious of His relation to our mind as an object of thought, or that the Infinite Being may exist in such a relation, which is a direct contradiction of what he has written, he cannot plead for a knowledge of God even in the next world. In another passage having the same application, it is said, " I believe that Scripture teaches, to each and aU of us, the lesson which it was designed to teach, so long as we axe men upon the earth, and not as the angels in heaven. I believe that ' now we see through a glass darkly,' in an enigma ; but that now is one which en- compasses the whole race of mankind, from the cradle to the grave, from the creation to the day of judgment : that dark enigma is one which no human wisdom can solve ; which Beason is unable to penetrate ; and which Faith can only rest content with here, in hope of a clearer vision to be granted hereafter." Passing the considera- tion that the hope of a " clearer vision"^ hereafter imphes the admission of some vision here, there is no one of the whole host of logical quibbles which Dr. Mansel has launched against the possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite Being now, which may not be launched with equal force, (and that is no force at all,) against the pos- 1 Limits of ReligitMs Thought, p. 263. 298 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. sibility of any vision of the Infinite One, since that must be a recognition of the Deity as distinguished from self, and therefore related. If the Infinite cannot exist in relation ; if the relation of a thinking mind, and an In- finite Being is an impossibility ; complete ignorance of the Deity must be the lot of our miserable race, not only " from the cradle to the grave," but from the cradle to eternity. If the angels know God, as Dr. Mansel implies, is their knowledge of such a kind that they are not con- scious of their relation to the Infinite One 1 If, as is maintained in the Limits of Religious Thought, men must " imagine that they can be conscious without variety, or discern without differences," before they "can attain to a rational knowledge of the Infinite God;"^ it must be for ever impossible to know the Deity. This dark theory I hold to be baseless in Philosophy, and des- titute of a shadow of authority from Scripture. I hold that we have now a knowledge of the Infinite One ; that, with the aids of experience, we may advance greatly iu the exercise of thought concerning His attributes and authority ; that in a higher state, with a purified nature, and a nobler revelation before us, we shall rise to a grander acquaintance with His gl6ry ; and that through- out eternity, our knowledge shall be ever advancing and widening, but never complete. ' limits ofReligicMs Thought, p. 264. CHAPTER VI. TIME AND SPACE IN THEIR EELATION TO DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE INFINITE. Speculations concerning Time and Space raise at once around us the succession of contradictions ingeni- ously suggested as involved in the correlatives, finite and infinite. The logical whole and part are brought into use, the process of " word-juggling " begins, and the ordi- nary series of experiments is repeated under the new name of " time and its parts." When this is completed, the same thing is once more produced under the de- nomination of " space- and its parts." It is said we cannot conceive time beginning, and we carmot conceive it ending, yet we conceive of it as relatively limited, so that there may be finite times, while time itself is reaUy infinite. Here is scope enough for logical subtlety. We look back upon the past and call it infinite, or say it stretches back to eternity, and yet that eternity is bounded by the present. We look into the future, and say there is an eternity to come, yet what we thus call eternity has a beginning in the present. It is easy to see that a multitude of curious problems may be pro- duced from such materials as these, and it is quite essential for a full discussion of the subject that there be 300 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. some consideration of the relation which the discussions on time and space have to the question regarding our knowledge of the Infinite. In the exercise of our mind there is the continual consciousness of a succession of mental states. Percep- tion, reflection, thought, reminiscence, imagiaation, emo- tion, desire, vohtion, may follow each other in the most diversified order, and we are not only conscious of each act of mind as it arises, but also of the relation which the present act bears to those which preceded it. It is this consciousness of succession in our mental states which is really and in itself our consciousness of time, or what we are accustomed to call the succession of events in time. This recognition of time, therefore, involves an act of memory. If the mind were capable only of the consciousness of a present object, without any recollec- tion of the objects previously engaging attention, or of the preceding exercise of its own power, there could be no consciousness of time. But, inasmuch as conscious- ness involves a change of mental states, and a very fre- quent change of the objects presented before the mind, it necessarily implies, in its continued exercise, the re- cognition of succession. In perceiving an object, for example, the act of perception is possible only as we are conscious of it, and consciousness is always of a present act. We are, moreover, conscious in entering upon any such exercise of mind, that we make a transition from a previous mental act which is still remembered by us. Each effort of mental energy is, therefore, recognised as standing in the relation of succession to some other which has preceded it. The recognition of time is thus TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 301 a constituent element in the operations of consciousness, and it is purely because of the recognised relation of our successive mental acts that the conception of time springs up within us. WhUe, however, this is true concemiag the origui of the conception, it is further to be noticed that the mind in many cases observes a course of succession in the existence of external objects which are seen to pass through dififerent phases of beiag. The mind not only perceives a relation of succession in the order in which objects are presented before its attention, or rather, in the order in which the attention is directed upon the objects, but oftentimes a relation between events affecting the existence of objects, external to itself. In the exer- cise of the understanding, memory, imagination, and other mental powers, the succession of which we are conscious, is purely in the mind. In so far, however, as we are conscious of it in the exercise of our cognitive power, as ia perception or observation, it may be either exclusively in the mind, or both in the acts of observa- tion and in the facts observed. In the latter case, suc- cession in the external forms of existence is a matter of observation, quite distinct from that succession of which we are conscious in our mental operations. In so far as the mind is active, it is habitually conscious of succession in the different states through which it passes, and out of this truly springs its conception of time. In. so far as the mind recognises a succession of external events, it applies its own conception of time to objective existence, as weE as to the operations of its own powers. But such external succession is a matter of simple observa- 302 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. tion, and not by any means necessary for the exercise of the cognitive powers. There may be a succession of events in the external world contemporaneous with that which is passing in my mind, and capable of being measured from the standard of consciousness, but these may or may not be matters of observation, and my re- cognition of time springs essentially from the operations of consciousness itself. Setting aside, then, the succession of events in the external world, as only occasionally engaging the atten- tion, it is really in the operations of the mind that the continual consciousness of time is found. Every mental exercise implies it. In perceiving an object, for example, the act of perception is possible only as we are con- scious of it in the mind, and its presence is for us the recognition of present time. So it is in every mental exercise, thereby revealing that this recognition of time is a constituent element in every act of consciousness. As the various objects, one after another, come up before the mind, each in its own order is known as present, and the recognition, by aid of memory, of the place which they hold in relation to each other, is the dis- covery of succession in our mental states, which makes the consciousness of time a necessary accompaniment of mental activity. But, while it is true that we cannot perceive or think of an object, except in the relation of time or succession, it is equally true that we cannot be conscious of time except in the relation of successive mental states. That is to say, consciousness of succession is possible only in the consciousness of successive operations of the mind, TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 303 and consequently in connexion with distinct objects. We cannot be conscious of pure time, that is of time simply and in itself, and we have no knowledge of any such existence, notwithstanding the constant references made to it. Simple succession there cannot be, for aU succession must consist of changes in the states of experience, or in the forms of existence. Knowledge of time, therefore, is nothing else than the consciousness of such changes. But inasmuch as subjection to such change is a universal necessity of the human mind, invariably recognised in consciousness, this succession in personal experience is distinguished by the name of time. As the result of what is esteemed a more careful ana- lysis, I am constrained to abandon the position formerly maintained, and now hold that time is the designation given to our consciousness of continued succession in our mental states. I, therefore, speak exclusively of our consciousness of succession, and cannot retain the reference to a conception of time. For if conception be the gather- ing up into one notion of certain characteristics which may be attributed to a distinct existence, then I cannot plead for a conception of time. I do not find it possible to present before the mind any notion of pure time, which can be attributed to a distinct existence within the sphere of consciousness, or of external perception. The con- sciousness of the incessant changes in our mental states, is the true origin of our knowledge of time, or succession. When, however, we look beyond the inner circle of mental experience upon the external world, we find that there is change or succession as real, as incessant, as regular, going on there, as there is in the current of 304 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. mental energy. Tlie mind must acknowledge the reality of the outward succession, as implicitly as the reality of that which self-consciousness reveals. There are certain promiaent marks of succession in outward existence, which cannot faU to arrest our attention, in the rela- tion in which we stand to the world we inhabit, and which, as outward realities constantly patent to our observation, may be taken as measuring the course . of what we call time, or succession. Such are the succession of light and darkness, which we call day and night, or the phases of the moon. It is easy to see that these things recognised by us as inhabitants of this world, may be no standard of succession to the inhabitants of other worlds, within whose observation they do not come. But they are reahties in our experience, and as they apply to our whole world, and to men as its inhabitants, they may be very weU taken, and fall naturally to be accepted, as measurements of succession common to all. They are really world-measurements of succession, and therefore suitable for universal use, notwithstanding the variations which they involve. The existence of the conscious inhabitants of the globe may be as accurately measured by these outward marks of succession recognised by them, as men may compute the existence of outward objects by the course of their own consciousness. The standard of measurement is equally accurate whether it be taken from the facts within, or the facts without, though the scale be different. The succession of events may be as truthfully computed by reference to the annual revolutions of the earth, the reign of sovereigns, facts in domestic history, or facts in self-consciousness ; TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE, 305 and men will apply all these, and many more besides, according to their convenience, though that which is open to universal observation must come to be the final stan- dard of appeal. Wherever succession is, this is what we denominate time, and it may be computed according to the form of change recognised. Besides our consciousness of succession in mental experience, and along with it, we have the ^ionsciousness of continued personal existence through all the changes in our mental states. This, as in the former case, in- volves the exercise of memory, but in a more extended degree. In this way, we have the consciousness of duration in existence, and as this is conscious duration through these changes, it is capable of being measured hy the succession of changes. Further, as in looking out upon the external world, we recognise the continued existence of objects, during the variations of personal experience, or the successive changes going on in the world, we have thereby the knowledge of duration of external existence. AH that is involved in what we have been accustomed to denominate time, and which may be measured by various standards, is embraced in these two things, — succession in the forms of existence, and, continued existence through these changes. What we call time is the duration or continuance of changeable existence. If this be true, it began when changeable existence was originated by the Creator, and it continues, in its suc- cessive stages of measurement, as long as such existence is maintained by His will and power. From these considerations it is manifest, that when u 306 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. we say that the Infinite Being is not subject to the law of time, we say only in other terms that he is unchange- able in His existence. We say nothing whatever affect- ing the continuance of His existence, but only that He is necessarily aU-perfect, and therefore cannot change. If, therefore, He is not subject to change, it is easy to under- stand how His continued duration is not in itself mea- sured by successive epochs. Where there is no succession in the forms of life, there is necessarily in that existence no stages by which to reckon continuance in being. We compute the duration of our life by the changes through which we pass in experience, external or internal ; and we can see plainly enough that without change thete could be no computation. It is thus unmistakably clear that in the being of God there is nothing by which to estimate duration of existence. And yet it is no less certain, that, since we and the changeable universe to which we belong, exist in relation with the all-perfect God, and in subjection to Him, we can truthfully, for our own guidance, estimate His continued existence, by the different stages of our own duration, or of the dura- tion of His works. And this measurement of Divine existence, is not merely truth relatively to m, as some would have us admit, but actually true in the existence of God. It is as true that the great Deity exists in relation with us, as that we exist in relation with Him ; and therefore it is tiiie that our existence is thus far, and in its own manner, a measurement of the continued and unchangeable existence of God. The most ai'dent der fenders of the "imbecility" of the human mind in its application to such questions as this, will find consider- TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 307 able difficulty in any attempt, to show where there can be mistake in computing the continued existence of the Deity from the first exercise of creative power tUl the day we live. I have endeavoured briefly to sketch what seems to me the true doctrine concerning Time, and now it is necessary to consider what use has been made of the fact that the human mind is subject to what has been called the condition of Time. Merely to name that word "con- dition," is to warn us that we are again in the neighbour- hood of an old snare, and doomed to go through the same course of logical fencing we have gone through often enough already. Time itself " is only a form of the conditioned ! " Ah, yes! Here we are, stopped once more with a dead wall right across the path. The old syllogism is again fixed up in a new place. Time is " only a form of the conditioned ; " the mind is neces- sarily subject to this condition ; therefore, the mind cannot know or conceive the unconditioned. Very con- clusive this may be in form, but very inconclusive in argument. It is of little consequence whether we say that Time is a condition or a law of mind, since either expression indicates a fact, which, I suppose, is universally acknow- ledged. But it is of the utmost importance for the dis- covery of the truth, that we seek a fair statement of the fact, and that there be placed alongside of it, a simple statement of what is thought to be the nature of the Divine excellence, as superior to the law of Time. When, then, we say that the human mind is subject to the law or condition of Time, the fact which is thereby indicated 308 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. is simply this, that the operations of the mind necessarily imply the consciousness of a continued succession of mental states. This is admitted by all, and must be accepted as common ground by those who hold the naost opposite views concerning its consequences. The fact concerning the perfection of the Deity is no less certain. When it is said that the Infinite Being is not subject to the law of Time, the fact thereby indicated is simply this, that in His existence there is no transition from one state to another; in other words, the Deity is essentially unchangeable. This also is a fact upon which both par- ties in the discussion are agreed. The question then arises. Does the constant succession of mental states, pre- vent the human mind from attaining any knowledge or conception of the Unchangeable God ? Or, presented from the other point of view. Does the unchangeableness of the Deity necessarily prevent His being in the least degree the object of knowledge or of thought ? That r question I answer in the negative. If we are to avoid the mere construction of logical forms, by the use of contradictory terms, such as the con- ditioned and the unconditioned, it is necessary, in answer- ing such a question as that before us, to show what bear- ing this condition of mind has on the object of knowledge or thought. Separated from the special application in view, the question is really this. Does the mind impose on the object the condition of its own activity ? or, must the mind recognise in every object a succession of differ- ent states, similar to that in its own consciousness, in order that the object may be known ? To such a ques- tion, as it seems to me, there is but one answer possible. TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 309 and that completely adverse to the position of those who seek to establish that God must be unknown, because mind is subject to the law of Time. The mind does not impose its own conditions on the objects known ; it does not invariably recognise in objective existence, a succes- sion analogous to that which exists in consciousness; and consequently the recognition of change in the object is a distinct matter of observation. Succession is certainly a law of things, as well as a law of thought ; and, as has been said, there are certain world-measurements of suc- cession, by which the duration of aU things in this world of change can be estimated. But it is worthy of notice just at this point, that matter is not subject to the law of succession in the same way as mind. Succession does not mean the same thing in reference to a stone, as in reference to a man, and consequently if the stone be the object of perception, the mind, in that act of knowledge, does not recognise in the object subjection to the same law, of the operation of which self-consciousness gives testimony. The truth is plainly this, that while the mind is uniformly conscious of succession, and cannot escape from it, it may or may not recognise, sttccession in the object of knowledge. When I look upon a picture, I may be conscious of successive acts of attention in mark- ing the details brought out on the canvas, and I may be conscious of a succession of pleasurable emotions, as I stand to contemplate the general result of the artist's skiU ; but in all this the mind does not observe any change in the object, and does not by any means fall into the mistake of supposing that a course of successive forms of existence is passing in the object, analogous to 3.10 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. that which is experienced in the mind. While, then, the mind is uniformly conscious of succession in the exercise of its own powers, it does not invariably recognise suc- cession in the forms of external existence, and it does not impose upon the object contemplated the changes which are distinctly recognised as belonging to its own states. If there be change in the external object, such change must be matter of separate observation, as quite distinct from the course of succession in self-consciousness. ■ If there be no recognised change in the external object, the want of such change is no obstruction to a knowledge of the object. The simple statement of these facts clears the way considerably, and enables us to turn somewhat more easily to the question. Whether the mind, on account of its subjection to the law of time, is or is not altogether precluded from a knowledge of the unchangeable God ? The question, it will be observed, does not in this case refer in the least to the infinitude of the Divine nature, but exclusively to the unchangeableness of the Deity ; in other words, to His essential superiority to the law of change, otherwise called, the law of time. Now, from what has been said above, it is apparent that, while the mind is essentially and invariably subject to change, it is altogether immaterial to the exercise of its cognitive power, whether the object contemplated be recognised as passing through successive forms of mutation. If this be so, the unchangeableness of the Divine nature is not in itself a hindrance to the exercise of our cognitive power. The logical barrier raised at this point in con- nexion with mental subjection to the law of time falls to TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 311 the grotlnd, leaving the way clear, and there is no need for lingering to examine the fragments. If, then, the condition of time or succession to which the mind is subject, does not present an obstruction to knowledge concerning the Infinite Being, it is ne- cessary to prosecute our inquiry further for the purpose of discovering what bearing the facts concerning Time, as a law of mind and of matter, may have on the general subject here under consideration. I have already spoken of time as the succession of different states in the same existence, and, besides, of the duration of that existence through aU these forms of change. These two, succes- sion as to state, and duration as to existence, raise a multitude of most interesting and important questions concerning the relation subsisting between the change- able and the unchangeable. Here comes into view the fact that duration in time, or through a course of succes- sive stages, is capable of being divided, in the expe- rience of a conscious subject, into past, present, and future. Since time is only the succession of changes or events, it is manifest that there can be a measurement of time from any point, and in any proportions. And as there are certain regular courses of- succession palpable to aU, these afford the best standards of computation, inasmuch as they are capable of universal application. What we have called our divisions of time have been nothing else than the notation of events occurring in regular succes- sion, such as the darkness and the light ; the relative positions of the sun in the heavens ; the revolutions of the moon ; the revolutions of the earth round the sun ; 312 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. or, rising to a view perhaps more phUosophical though not equally exact, we have reckoned by epochs, dating from great events in the history of our race. These divisions of time are nothing more than a classification of events according to their succession. From the very nature of time, it is next to be ob- served as self-evident, that the continued course of change in which it consists can be only in one direction, being necessarily by succession. There can be no such thing as a "regress process," of which we have heard not a little, and by the false admission of which, logical acumen has found some needless exercise. If the succession of events constitutes what we denominate time, there have been events which are past ; there are events now occur- ring ; and, by a natural principle of mind, we beheve that these events will still be followed by others. Time is, therefore, naturally divided into past, present, and future. Inasmuch as time is recognised by us in the succes- sive states of self-consciousness, the present is the only actual time. We can never by any possibility recede in consciousness into the past, that is, exist in past time ; nor advance in consciousness into the future, that is, exist in future time ; for we exist only as we are con- scious, and consciousness is only of the present. The present is, therefore, the only reality. There are, however, certain experiments in which the mind, possessing the powers it does, has a tendency to indulge, in connexion with the succession of events. Gifted with the power of memory, by which it can recall the past : and with the power of imagination, by which it can represent in consciousness facts previously ob- TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 313 served, or entirely new combinations of events, the mind inclines to make excursions for itself, out of the sphere of the present and actual. While bound essentially to the present, beyond which it is impossible to pass at any moment, it can advance through a succession of states applying either to the past or to the future. When these apply to the past, there may be either a combined exercise of memory and imagination, or purely of imagination. When they apply to the future, it is the imagination exclusively which finds exercise. While actually advancing by a course of succession in con- sciousness, the imagination may go back upon the past, tracing in a regressive order a course of supposed events. This is wholly an exercise of imagination, which ter- minates only by an exercise of wUl, or by necessity, under the conscious inability to trace a connected chain further. If we seek an explanation of the vast line of events which must have preceded what consciousness reveals in the present, our natural belief arises to bear testimony to the existence of the unchangeable Originator of aU finite being, and who is " from everlasting to ever- lasting." Does the mind, then, rest contented with the simple deliverance of faith concerning, the origin of finite and changeable existence, which is the declaration of a self- existent Being ? Does it at once and willingly cease all further experiment in the exercise of imagination ? Not at all. There is nothing in the nature of the mind, or of things, to prevent us going back in imagination, at a single step, to the creation of the finite universe, and thereafter exercising our thoughts concerning the existence of the Deity before that creation. Just as we may concentrate 314 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. attention upon a particular object, to the exclusion of every other, so that all others are to us for the time as if they had no being ; so we can imagine the entire universe out of existence, involving the annihilation of everything, except the conscious self. Can we, then, think of duration without change in the object of thought? Nothing more simple. We do it every day, as has already been shown. I may imagine everything out of existence except myself and the Deity ; but, while I imagine or think, it is impossible to think of non-exist- ence on my own part, since to think is consciously to exist, and, by the laws of my own mind, while I think, I must acknowledge the existence of the Divine Being. If, then, I can imagine the whole universe out of exist-" ence, and God the sole object of contemplation, how can I think of His continued existence as being duration with- out change ? While contemplating the glorious attri- butes of His nature, I can estimate His duration by the continual succession going on in self-consciousness. So far, this mode of computation concerning the Divine existence, is quite the same whether applied to duration since the world began, or before the origin of finite existence. This is, moreover, a completely accurate and trustworthy standard of computation by which to esti- mate the duration of any being, so long as it is the object of thought. But, besides this, the mind may attempt to think of the duration of the Deity "from everlasting," and in doing so it may transfer in imagina- tion the marks of progress which the history of the world affords, so as to make these the measure by which to compute a duration equally long before the world began, TIME AND SPACE IN- RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 315 and from that point reached in imagination, we may go further back again, in Hke manner, proceeding onwards in the vast eternity, until progress is stayed by the con- sciousness of our inability to advance further. In this way we form a conception of the continued existence of the Deity, or, in other words, a continued conception of the Divine existence, for these are the same. And in doing so, we rest exclusively on the authority of faith for the simple testimony of the eternity of the Divine exist- ence, and the reality of that duration we attempt to conceive. What we can do, by an exercise of imagination, in regard to the past, we can do with equal ease in reference to the future, in attempting to think of a possible con- tinuance of existence. Essentially restricted as we are to the present, we can carry forward our thought from one imaginary stage to another in possible succession, and thus repeat exactly the same experiment as in refer- ence to the past, with exactly the same results. Our individual existence is conscious progress in a vast eter- nity ; at a particular period in the past, the course of suc- cession was originated ; in our experience, it continues now ; but how long it will continue, consciousness does not enable us to determine, though our natural belief bears decided testimony, that He who is " from everlasting " is " to everlasting." That the mind which carries out these experiments concerning the unbeginning and the unend- ing existence, wUl itself continue in being for evermore, is what Revelation has disclosed to us. In accepting this as a matter of belief, we can form a distinct concep- tion of such existence, in contrast to the existence of 316 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE.. material forms around us, which shall cease ; and a clear conception of the forms of life we shall have as intellec- tual, moral, and religious beings ; and an indefinite con- ception of the continuance of that existence for ever. The conception which we can form of our own continued existence to eternity, is that which we can also form, in like manner, of the necessary existence of the Deity, there being no difference as to the exercise of mind, in the fact that in the one form of continuous existence there is con- stant succession, and in the other there is none. AVTiile there is conscious succession in carrying out such an exercise of thought, it must be a matter of observation whether there is succession in the existence of the object; whether there will be succession in the continuance of any existence must, as in this case, be a matter of faith. It will be seen, from what has been said concerning the excursion which the mind can make in attempting to conceive of the continuance of known existence, that I hold that in these excursions it comes into contact, by the laws of intelligence, with the existence of the Infinite Being. It does not, and cannot, rest contented with an attempt to measure the continuance of the various forms of changeable existence, but rises from that to the Un- changeable One. With the Infinite Being as the sole object of contemplation, the mind can apply its ordinary forms of measurement to the continuance of His exist- ence, and that indefinitely both in the past and in the future. In each case, the mind finishes the excursion of thought indefinitely, and altogether from the con- sciousness of its own inability to proceed further, without the least recognition of hmits in the existence contem- TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 317 plated. Such limits could not be reached as a mental result, since the experiment is a repetition in thought, either according to personal determination or personal ability, of voluntarily selected symbols of duratiorf. Any limit which can be attained, therefore, must be simply the cessation of the mental effort. On the other hand, such limits there are not,, and cannot be, in the Divine existence, as we are assured on the authority of a primary belief of oup own nature. The attempt, then, by the use of ordinarily accepted signs of duration, to form a con- ception of the continued existence of the Eternal One, is perfectly legitimate according to the laws of thought, and sanctioned as in harmony with the reahty of the Divine Being, by that fundamental conviction on which we rest for the assurance of the being and glory of the Deity. By the combination in the mind of the results of the excursion into the past and into the future, we attain to a conception clear, distinct, but indefinite, of the eternity of God's existence. The reader is now in possession of the doctrine con- cerning Time, and its relation to discussions on the In- finite, which I have been ultimately brought to adopt, as the result of patient reconsideration of aU the facts connected with this branch of the subject on hand. Our knowledge of Time arises exclusively from the recogni- tion of actual succession both within the mind and in the world without. We are aU necessarily conscious of the succession of distinct mental operations, and in this it is that aU have the original consciousness of what we have called Time. In turning attention to the external world, we perceive there also a regular succession of events con- 318 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. stantly continuing in various forms, and in this we have the original knowledge of Time or succession, apart from that which belongs to our own consciousness. But the question arises, How do we find the unity of all the dif- ferent forms of succession ? By the traces of harmonious progression easily discovered, we come to the conception of a Cosmos, and we are led to acknowledge that the suc- cession of events has some uniform and harmonious order, apart from our own consciousness, by thinking of these events as recognised by some great Intelligence who con- trols them. Succession implies power to produce the events which occur in order. It is so in our own con- sciousness, and we believe it to be so in reference to aU the events of the external world ; and, therefore, succes- sion and duration among the changeable forms of being are possible only because of the existence of a great and unchangeable Intelligence. From the above considerations, it wUl be seen that all defence of a recognition of a distinct Infinite in pure Time is herewith abandoned. As it does not in any case come before the mind as a distinct object of thought, — as it is not recognised as a separate existence, — as it consists only in the relation of things in their order of succession,— I cease to speak of infinite Time, or to argue for such a conception, though I still insist that we have a belief in the everlasting existence of the Deity, and an indefinite knowledge of that eternity of duration. But time or succession exists only inasmuch as an object exists ; and duration is possible only inasmuch as an object continues to exist. So soon as these facts are recognised, the mind may be roused to an inquiry con- TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 319 cerning the progress of past events, and, going back in thought, stage by stage, contemplating the relation of events recorded in history, it may come to think of the origin of finite existence. From that, it rises by the very necessities of our intelligence to the recognition, both in belief and thought, of the one Infinite Being. In this way, thought concerning Time, that is, thought concern- ing the succession and duration of changeable existence, though not itself involving a recognition of the Infinite, leads necessarily to the Infinite Being, who existed before succession, or what we call Time, had a beginning, and whose duration is essentially eternal. In taking the view presented concerning the nature of Time, I hold that it is " a certain correlation of exist- ences," but not, as Sir W. Hamilton has said, " the image or the concept of a certain correlation of existences." But this simple view of Time, as it seems to me, sweeps the field clear of the whole subsequent discussions con- cerning Time, in which Hamilton has indulged. If time be even only the " image or concept of the correlation of existences," as he has said, it is altogether inadmissible to deal in logical subtleties concerning " whole and parts," as though Time were a separate existence, capable of division both in fact and in thought. A few illustrations must suffice to show how Sir W. Hamilton's first statement concerning Time, disposes of all his other arguments in reference to it. If Timei be only " the concept of a certain correlation of existences," we cannot conceive of it as " unconditionally limited," and the discussion concerning absolute time disappears. Nor can we speak of infinite time, since we are only 320 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. conscious of the " correlation of existences ; " therefore, the whole discussion concerning infinite time is set aside. What has been said concerning the " regress of time " is self-contradictory, and there are no such things as " the infinite regress and infinite progress, taken together, (to) involve" the triple contradiction — of "an infinite con- cluded, — an infinite commencing, — and of two infinites, not exclusive of each other." If time be only the rela- tion of dependent events in their order of succession, it can be in no sense whatever absolute or infinite ; though in attempting to go back in thought upon the events of the past, we may reach the origin of such relative succes- sion as that to which we give the name of Time, and from that origin of dependent existence, we must rise to the Absolutely Unchangeable Being, with whom there is no succession. Before leaving this part of the question it is neces- saxy to remark upon one of the most singular statements which Sir W. Hamilton has made in reference to time. He says : " In regard to time past, and time future, there is comparatively no difficulty, because these are positively thought as protensive quantities. But time present, when we attempt to realize it, seems to escape us alto- gether, — to vanish into nonentity. The present cannot be conceived as of any length, of any quantity, of any protension, in short, as anything positive. (!) It is only conceivable as a negation, as the point or line (and these are only negations) in which the past ends and the future begins, — in which they Hmit each other." ^ I do not profess to understand how, on Hamilton's theory, ' Discussions, p. 581, Appendix. TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 321 time can be called a "protensive quantity ;" but that any view of time should lead to the practical annihilation of time as a present reality, is surely a very strong pre- sumption against its validity. There are said to be two senses in which time is aU-important, that is, as either past or future ! Present time is a negation ! The point or hne in which the past ends and the future begins ! The point in which our past thoughts terminate and our future thoughts commence, but in which we have no exercise of thought ! Let any man examine his own consciousness, and say if his recognition of time be not precisely the reverse of what Sir William has stated ? Is it not true that we realize time only as present, and not as either past or future ? I leave the question for decision by each man's consciousness. From the view which has been given of our concep- tion of time, it wiU be seen that I now acknowledge the validity of the position laid down by Sir W. Hamilton in his letter to me, where he has said that " Time and Space must be excluded from the supposed notion of the Infinite." But when he adds that " the Infinite, if posi- tively thought it could be, must be thought as under neither space nor time,"^ it is needful to observe, that I hold that, while succession is a necessary condition of our exercise of consciousness, we do not necessarily recognise in the object of knowledge or of thought, any successive modifications in the form of its existence. The Infinite Being, as unchangeable, is above all succession, yet has He duration in existence, and He recognises the succes- ' Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 531. X 322 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. sion which is characteristic of dependent existence. But siace succession is only a condition of our thought, and not necessarily a condition of the object of thought, the simple fact that the Infinite Being has an existence above succession, does not shut Him out from recog- nition. What Sir W. Hamilton has only hinted at, Dr. Man- sel has broadly stated ; it is, therefore, important here to turn to the passage in the Limits of Religious Thought on this subject. Though it is long, justice to the author seems to require that it be given without the omission of even a single clause which he thought needful. It is the following : " AH human consciousness, as being a change in our mental state, is necessarily subject to the law of time in its two manifestations of succession and dura- tion. Every object of whose existence we can in any way be conscious, is necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time to some former object of conscious- ness, and as itself occupying a certain portion of time. In the former point of view, it is manifest from what has been said before, that whatever succeeds something else, and is distinguished from it, is necessarily apprehended as finite ; for distinction is itself a limitation. In the latter point of view, it is no less manifest that what- ever is conceived as having a continuous existence in time is equally apprehended as finite. For continuous existence is necessarily conceived as divisible into suc- cessive moments. One portion has already gone by, another is yet to come ; each successive moment is related to something which has preceded and to some- thing which is to follow, and out of such relations the TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 323 entire existence is made up. The acts by which such existence is manifested, being continuous in time, have, at any given moment, a further activity still to come ; the object so existing must therefore always be re- garded as capable of becoming something which it is not yet actually, as having an existence incomplete, and receiving at each instant a further completion. It is manifest, therefore, that if all objects of human thought exist in time, no such object can be regarded as exhibiting or representing the true nature of an In- finite Being."' The reader has now the full advantage of perusing Dr. Mansel's complete statement, and of possessing the necessary materials for judgment concerning the vaHdity of his reasoning. The last sentence contains the conclu- sion to which the whole paragraph is intended to lead, and I shall now endeavour, as briefly as possible, to indi- cate the objections which I have to urge, equally against the preliminary statements, and the conclusion itself We are perfectly agreed in reference to the fact that all human consciousness is " subject to the law of Time, in its two manifestations of succession and duration." But, in opposition to what is either distinctly stated, or mani- festly implied, I shall endeavour to maintain these three propositions : (1.) That succession in consciousness does not necessarily involve the recognition of transition or mutation in the objects presented ; (2.) That duration in existence does not necessarily involve succession ; and (3.) That the Infinite Being, as above succession, and yet having an eternal duration, is not beyond the sphere of 1 Limits of Religious Thought, pp. 77-79. 324 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. knowledge and thought, because of the subjection of consciousness to the law of Time. Succession in consciousness does not necessarily in- volve the recognition of transition or mutation in the objects presented. Consciousness, as embracing continual change in mental state, is a consciousness, at one and the same time, of the recognition of the object presented be- fore the mind, and of the order of succession in the mental states. But the invariable succession involved in consciousness has not necessarily its counterpart in a similar succession in the external existences which become the objects of attention. Succession is an invariable mental fact, but succession may or may not be observed as an external fact affecting the existence of the objects presented before the mind. If we stand at any point ia a crowded street to watch the multitudes who hurry past, there is succession equally in the current of our obser- vation, and in the events observed. But if we stand gazing upon some quiet landscape, where not a movement is seen, there is still succession in our acts of conscious- ness, though there is none recognised in the objects con- templated. The reader will perceive at once what ob- jection I have to urge, when Dr. Mansel makes the tran- sition from consciousness, to treat of the objects before the mind. It seems to me that there is a transparent fallacy in the second sentence of the above passage. He says, " Every object, of whose existence we can be in any way conscious, is necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time to some former object of consciousness, and as itself occupying a certain portion of time." I deny that " every object is necessarily apprehended by us as TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 325 ' succeeding in time to some former object of conscious- ness." It is a very broad distinction which exists between acts of consciousness, and objects of conscious- ness, admitting of two different forms of succession, which are not necessarily co-ordinate. This distinction admits of a twofold assertion concerning succession. It may be said, on the one hand, that every act of miad is recognised as succeeding to some former act ; and it may be said, on the other hand, that " every object is neces- sarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time to some former object." The first of these statements is univer- saLLy admitted as true, the second is most certainly false. If Dr. Mansel only mean to affirm that objects are recog- nised in succession, this is still nothing more than the declaration that we are conscious of a succession of mental acts, conversant with different objects. To say that ex- ternal existences become objects of perception or of know- ledge one after the other, is only to say, that the mind exercises its cognitive power on different objects iu suc- cession ; and, by this statement, the law of time, as a law of succession, is perceived only as applying to con- sciousness, and not to the objects with which our cogni- tive powers are engaged. If Dr. Mansel mean, that succession in our acts of cognition involves succession ia the order of external existence, the assertion is indefen- sible, as being contradictory of the admitted facts of con- sciousness. The statement in the first sentence of the passage quoted, which refers to consciousness being sub- ject to the law of Time, and the statement in the second sentence concerning every object being apprehended as succeeding in time to some former object, are either iden- '326 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. tical in meaning, and refer exclusively to the conscious- ness of succession in our mental acts, or the last state- ment is altogether a mistake. In the last clause of the sentence now under review, when it is said that " every object is necessarily appre- hended by us as itself occupying a certain portion of time," this " apprehension" cannot be the recognition of an3rthing in the object, but must be simply the conscious- ness of the time occupied in the contemplation of it. That is to say, if an object is apprehended by us " as itself occupying a certain portion of time," this can mean nothing more than that the mind is conscious of " occupy- ing a certain portion of time" with its apprehension of the existing object. Every one who believes in the existence of external reality, believes, of course, that each distinct existence " itself occupies a certain portion of time," that is, has a certain duration, and this I hold most firmly ; but, when we are speaking of how an " object is neces- sarily apprehended," our knowledge of Time is obtained in that case, as in every other, from our own conscious- ness. Every existence has a duration of its own, whether that existence be an object of apprehension or not ; but in every act of apprehension, what the mind recognises, as external to itself, is simply the existing object, whereas the knowledge of duration is obtained exclusively from the consciousness of its own operations. But, if it be said that not only is consciousness subject to the law of Time, in the sense of duration ; but that duration in the object itself is a necessary law for its apprehension, I reply, that in so far as the mind is concerned, this dura- tion in the object is nothing more than its existence; if TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 327 it be said that an object has a duration, this is only to say that it has continued existence ; and if it be said that duration in the object is a law of our apprehension, this is only to repeat the truism that an object must exist in order to be apprehended. When, therefore, it is said that an object is apprehended "as itself occupying a certain portion of time," it is not true that there is any division of time into portions, or that there is any recog- nised occupancy, but simply that the miad is conscious of protracted attention having been given to an existing object. Time is still recognised and measured by con- sciousness, and not by anything in the object. When Dr. Mansel says, by way of deduction from the preceding statements, " that whatever succeeds some- thing else, and is distinguished from it, is necessarily apprehended as finite," I think he altogether fails in the attempt to exclude the Infinite ' Being from our appre- hension, because of the acknowledged subjection of the mind to the law of succession. The declaration that " distinction is itself a limitation," belongs to another part of the discussion, and may be passed as a matter already considered. But^ in so far as our author speaks here only of the order of succession, in which external existences become objects of apprehension, and not of any recognised succession in the order of .their being, it is manifest that the law of succession, as applying to our mental operations, has no application whatever to the objects themselves. He does not mean to say that objects have existence only as they are apprehended by us ; and, if this be not meant, the succession spoken of is no limitation of the existence of the objects, and cannot 328 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. be in the very least degree an indication whether the object be finite or infinite. I have, however, admitted that, though all forms of existence may not imply succession in themselves, every form of existence has a certain duration. To this must now be added that, duration does not necessarily imply' succession. Our consciousness involves submission to the law of succession, because it is the consciousness of continual change. But, while we are able to measure duration of existence in external objects, by making them the objects of observation at different periods in the course of our mental experience, and thereafter exercising memory concerning what has passed, our ob- servation does not invariably imply the recognition of succession in the object, while we attempt to mark the duration of its existence. In passing a particular rock we may remember having passed it some years before, and though unable to discover any trace upon itself of change in the form of its existence during our absence, we are able to form a conception of its duration through- out the period which has elapsed in our personal history since we visited it. Though our conception of duration is obtained by the use of accepted symbols of succession, it does not imply any cognition of corresponding succes- sion in the object whose duration is the matter of con- templation. If, then, our belief in the Infinite One testify that He is above the law of succession, because free from all mutation, there is nothmg in that fact to debar us from some conception of His duration. I deny the truth of Dr. Mansel's declaration, that " continuous existence is necessarily conceived as divisible into sue- TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 329 cessive moments." This is once more the transference of a mental law beyond its proper sphere. It is an attempt to impose the laws of conscioTisness, upon forms of exist- ence independent of consciousness ; and, if carried to its legitimate results, will involve philosoplucal inquiry in endless confusion. While we carry on our observation in accordance with the laws which regulate our con- sciousness, it is possible to recognise with the greatest accuracy that these laws do not apply to the objects to which we direct attention. Though the exercise of our consciousness imply succession, it is a very simple thing for us to observe that there is no trace of the sub- jection of the object of cognition to the same law. When, therefore, it is said that " continuous existence is necessarily conceived as divisible into successive mo- ments," one of two things must be meant. It is either intended that in our conception of contiauous existence there is necessarily the consciousness of succession in the mental operation, which can be marked out by the suc- cessive stages which characterize it ; or, it is intended, that in addition to this consciousness of succession in the mind, there is necessarily the conception, or, in its primary form, the cognition, of successive changes in the existence of the object. The former is the truth in the case ; the latter is altogether false. While I admit that our consciousness of the duration of any object always implies succession, because all consciousness does so, I deny that duration necessarily implies succession in the existing object. If such succession there be, it must arise from the nature of the object, and the condi- tions to which it is subjected; not by any means from the 330 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. consciousness which we have of succession in our mental states, while we observe it. The law of consciousness regulates consciousness alone, and does not prescribe con- ditions of existence to the object of cognition. Nothing can be more manifest as an element in the standard of philosophical truth, than that any property attributed to an object recognised as distinct from the mind, must be recognised in that existence as apprehended, and not gratuitously assigned to it by the forced application of a law, which is admitted to have its proper sphere in thought. Our consciousness of succession imposes no hke condition on the object whose existence is recognised as independent from our own ; nor does it in the least hinder us in the recognition of an object whose existence presents no traces of successive changes. Consciousness, therefore, though always operating in submission to the law of time or succession, is not thereby hindered from the apprehension of an unchangeable beiag, which the Infinite One is ; nor from the apprehension of eternal duration, which implies the absence of aU succession, as in the case of the Deity. Will Dr. Mansel maintain that all duration implies succession ? I maintain the contrary. I have shown that duration is only continued existence ; and if so, existence does not necessarily involve succession, continued exist- ence does not necessarily involve a course of change. If, then, succession belong to the existence of an object, that succession must be estabhshed on other grounds than on the fact of its simple existence ; again, if an object have continued existence, subject to a series of changes, that course of change must be established on other grounds TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 331 than on the fact of its continued existence. The Infinite Being has necessary and continuous existence — an eternity of existence; but neither does His " continuous existence" involve division into " successive moments," nor is His continuous existence "necessarily conceived as divisible into successive moments." After having dwelt at such length on Time, I shall content myself with a very brief reference to Space, which may very readily suffice, as I do not apprehend that any discussion which can be raised concerning space has any relation to the Infinite. What we have been accustomed to denominate Space is the recognised relation of ex- tended objects, and as it applies exclusively to what is extended, it has no application whatever to mind and its operations. If we admit of the distinction between empty space and occupied space, what is called empty space is the relative position of two bodies, or the dis- tance which separates them, and is capable of being measured by the same standard as the extended surface of the objects themselves. If extension be considered as equivalent to space, which I am inclined to deny, then it is a perceived quality of objects, and it may be said in a sense capable of vindication, that we see space. In this application alone can it be said with appreciable meaning that space is an " extensive quantity." I conceive, how- ever, that the term space is more usually and properly applied to what has been designated empty space, in contrast to extended surface. And such empty space is nothing more than the relative distance of extended objects from each other, measured on a standard similar to that which applies to the bodies themselves. In this 332 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. way it is equally accurate to say that there is a certain specified distance between the bodies, and that there is nothing between them, because space is nothing but then- relation to each other. This being, as it seems to me, the true doctrine con- cerning space, I no longer plead for any knowledge of the Infinite in this relation. I yield to what I now re- cognise as the force of Sir W. Hamilton's criticism of the opinions formerly maiatained, and admit that " time and space must be excluded from the supposed notion of the Infinite."'^ But whUe admitting without the least reservation that Sir W. Hamilton's criticism has dis- lodged me from my former position, I consider at the same time, that it also overturns the whole course of his own reasoning concerning space, whether regarded as whole or as part. If we take Sir W. Hamilton's defini- tion of the nature of space, he says : — " Space, like time, is only the intuition or the concept of a certain correlation of existence." Now, though I do not admit that space is itself an " intuition or a concept," I grant that it is "a certain -correlation of existence." But if this be acknowledged, everything is granted that is necessary for overturning Hamilton's subsequent state- ments. Little more is needed in order to show this than simply to quote them. If space be only a correlation of objects, how can he speak of it as a whole, a unity, a totality ? Immediately after giving the definition, he says :■ — " Thought is equally powerless in realizing a notion either of the absolute totality, or of the infinite immensity of space." What is meant by an absolute 1 Lectwressii Metaphysics, n. p. 531. TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 333 totality, or an infinite immensity of a "correlation of existence V Or take this passage : " Considered in itself, space is positively inconceivable, — as a whole either infinitely unbounded, or absolutely bounded ; as a part either infinitely divisible, or absolutely indivisible. . . . We can think it either as an indefinite whole, or as an indefinite part." If space be only the " correlation " of separate existences, it can neither be a whole nor a part, and the entire set of logical subtleties sviperinduced on the fanciftd whole and part have no appUcation whatever. Finally, all that is said concerning the impossibility of reaching the limits of space, proceeds upon a complete subversion of the explanation given of its nature: If it be simply a correlation of existence, it can be contem- plated only in so far as such correlation is recognised or known. Wherever our contemplatioh of such correlation ceases, we fail to have any further recognition of space. And when it is said that we caimot in thought reach the limits of space, the reference is clearly to an efibrt of the imagination in stretching out one beyond the other a succession of marks sjrmbolic of limitation, such as ima- ginary pillars, or constantly enlarging circumferences of circles. In such an effort of the imagination we are not dealing with space at all, since space has no application to our mental energies. It is not true here, as it is in the case of those experiments concerning time, that while prosecuting them we are conscious of the very relation with which the experiment deals. The attempt to ad- vance the pillars still farther onward, or to enlarge the • circles, is purely an effort of imagination working with 334 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the symbols of external realities, and nothing more. In prosecuting the effort there is progression in time, or the succession in mental states, but there is positively no progression whatever in space. The experiment is no- thing more than a repetition of the experiments at- tempted in connexion with the relation of succession or time, only it has received a new name, and is falsely represented as applying to the relation of extended existence, designated space. That which has a reality in reference to time, has none whatever in reference to space, since the imaginary progression has no application to a real existence, as in the case of time, when we seek to compute the existence of the Deity ; and, still further, while attempting to carry out such an effort to reach limits in some professed object called infinite space, we cannot plead the authority of faith, or any other autho- rity whatever, in support of the reality of such an existence. The considerations thus presented are sufficient to show the grounds on which I now give unreserved assent to Sir W. Hamilton's declaration that time and space must be excluded from the alleged notion of the Infinite. I grant that neither time nor space is known as infinite, therefore we have not a conception of infinite time, or of infinite space. And besides, space being recognised as the relation of extended bodies, and the Deity being known as spiritual or non-extended, our knowledge of the Infinite Being is not the knowledge of existence in space. And further, as the energies of mind are not subject to the law of space, that condition of extended existence never comes into view Avhile the mind is con- TIME AND SPACE IN RELATION TO THE INFINITE. 335 cemed with the Infinite Being. But since time is a law of mind, as well as a law of external existence, we are conscious of the relation of time, both in our knowledge and in our thought, though the object of knowledge an^ of conception be recognised as superior to the law which regulates our mental activity. While there is necessarily succession in our consciousness, there may be no recogni- tion on our part of succession in the object known. CHAPTER VII. THE KNOWLEDGE OP THE INFINITE BEING AS FIRST CAUSE. When engaged with the consideration of the source of our behef in the existence of an Infinite Being, I endea- voured to show, that any attempt to account for the origin of finite existence, material and mental, raises in the mind a necessary belief ia an Infinite Intelligence as the First Cause. That this belief is found among the first principles originally communicated in our mental consti- tution, is the doctrine here maintained ; and, after what has been said concerning the established relation between faith and knowledge, it is necessary to indicate the nature of that knowledge of the Deity which is attained by con- templating him as First Cause. If all faith implies knowledge, and if each necessary belief arises in the mind when the facts are contemplated which require its application, it is manifest that in the study of the works of God, we may attain a knowledge of the Great Creator. And, stUl further, this knowledge will not be of the same measure in all men, nor wUl it continue of the same measure in any mind, but will be found unfolding within us, as we discover the wonders of creation. The Infinite Being exists in various relations toj His KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 337 creatures, according to the nature which they have re- ceived from His hand. These relations, I maintain, afford to the mind the opportunity of acquiring a knowledge of the Infinite One, and of extending that knowledge after it has been obtained. The assertion that in such rela- tions God is not known as Infinite, seems to me nothing more than a logical quibble, sprung from a false defini- tion of the Infinite. If the Deity exists in such rela- tions, and is still infinite in His nature, if known in these relations, we have a knowledge of the Infinite One. It is especially at this point of the discussion, that I feel constrained to lift a decided protest against Sir W. Hamilton's definition of the Infinite, as unconditioned, that is, free from aU relation. He defines the Infinite as the unconditionally unlimited, that is, unlimited in nature, and free from aU conditions or relations. He maintains that the relative is necessarily restrictive. Accorditig to this definition, therefore, it must be main- tained that, before the act of creation, God was infinite ; by. the act of creation. He ceased to be infinite, that is, He became finite. No one wiU attribute to the distin- guished author the doctrine that God, as now existing, is not an infinite God ; but, either his definition of the In- finite must be set aside as erroneous, or the belief in the . existence of an infinite God must be surrendered. There are few who wiU find any difficulty in making a choice. That before the act of creation God did exist as an in- finite God, must be admitted as beyond aU question; for I do not argue with any one who would attempt to deny this, inasmuch as I do not believe that it can be philosophically denied. Granting that, before the crea- 338 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. tion, God did exist as an infinite God, what was there in the act of creation, or what is there in the existence of created objects, which proves that God has ceased to be infinite, or which in any way prevents Him existing as infinite ? God, indeed, exists in relation to His creatures, but who will assert that He is in any sense limited by themi In so far, therefore, as the term " unconditioned" is defined as indicating what is unrestricted or u nlim ited, it is apphcable to God ; but, in so far as it is defined as indicating the negation of all relation, it is not applicable to the Infinite Being. If, therefore, it be asserted that the Infinite is that which is unrestricted and unlimited, I admit it, but rejoin that the Infinite may nevertheless exist in relation. If, however, it be asserted, as Sir W. Hamilton has done, that the Infinite is that whose existence involves the negation of aU relation, I reply that no such infinite exists, and, consequently, the argu- ments to prove the impossibility of any knowledge of such an Infinite, are entirely apart from the question. Sir W. Hamilton, in defining the Infinite, and in arguing in reference to it, plainly deals with a mere abstraction, for which no one pleads, either in existence or in thought. It is the Infinite which he considers, rather than the only Infinite Being. He takes the ie?'m Infinite, to designate an abstraction which he charac- terizes as unhmited, unrelated, unconditioned. What, then, is this Infinite ? It is nothing. It has no existence, either externally or in thought. The gratuitous intro- duction of such an abstraction as this into the specula- tions concerning the Infinite, favoured as it has been by KNOWLEDGE OF THE PIEST CAUSE. 339 philosophers both German and British, though it rday have given scope for much acute and ingenious reasoning, has resulted in perplexity, from which philosophy can escape only by sweeping away the thing itself, as less than a shadow, and reaUy a nonentity, on which words have been only wasted. M. Cousin has very weU remarked that there is a tendency towards two false and opposite extremes in contemplating the Infinite God. The one is that which arrives at Pantheism, and identifies God with all crea- tion ; the other is that which makes God a mere Abstrac- tion, whose existence requires the negation of everything else. Pantheism, while it does not separate God from the world, makes it impossible for Him to exist except in essential union with it. A metaphysical Abstraction runs to the very opposite extreme, and makes it impos- sible for God to exist in relation to anything else. On this definition, God becomes an " absolute unity, so far superior and prior to the world, as to be foreign to it, and to make it impossible to comprehend how this unity could ever depart from itself, and how, from a principle like this, the vast universe, with the variety of its forces and phenomena, could proceed."^ It is wholly with this abstraction that Sir W. Hamilton deals, and it appears to me cause for deepest regret that such a philosopher, by taking this unwarrantable view, has endeavoured to establish the impossibility of any knowledge of the Infinite, and, consequently, of the Infinite God. Most assuredly, while such an Infinite as that described does not exist, God does exist, and, though in direct violation ' Preface to second edition of M. Cousin's Fragments Philosophiques, 340 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. of the definition, He exists as infinite, and yet in relation. In this mistake of the abstract for the real, seems to me to lie the key to almost the whole of Sir W. Hamilton's arguments against a knowledge of the Infinite. AU such reasoning proceeds upon a false method. We are not to give forth a definition, and, from this fictitious basis, proceed to draw certain inferences, as if these must coincide with the facts of consciousness. The method must be essentially psychological. From amongst the facts of consciousness, the entire inquiry should take its rise, while an attempt is made to ascertain whether, in these facts, there is to be found a knowledge of some- thing more than the finite. It is not an abstraction with which we deal, but a knowledge of a great reahty for which we seek. God is not a Being whose existence prevents all being besides. He is not an exclusive Unity, who is bound by a mysterious necessity, which prevents the existence of aught else. In the eloquent language of M. Cousin, — " The God of consciousness is not an abstract God — a solitary monarch exiled beyond the hnaits of creation on the desert throne of a silent Eternity — an absolute existence, which resembles even the .negation of existence." ^ The Infinite God does exist in the relation of cause ; and I hope presently to vindicate for man a knowledge of Him in this relation. Before endeavouring, however, to determine what is the nature and extent of our know- ledge of God as the great First Cause, it is necessary to consider what is the correct doctrine in reference to our notion of causality ; in other words, What is the true • Preface to first edition of Fragments Philosophiques. KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE, 341 theory of cause and effect ? Here, too, Sir W. Hamilton holds a doctrine at variance from that of other philoso- phers ; and here again I regret to differ from him. According to his doctrine, " a cause is simply every- thing without which the effect would not result." As a necessary consequence of this definition, it is asserted that a plurality of causes is necessary for the production of an effect. " A new appearance" is said to be the oc- casion for our judgment of causality. " When aware of a new appearance, we are unable to conceive that therein has originated any new existence, and are therefore con- strained to think that what now appears to us under a new form, had previously existence under others. These others (for they are always plural) are called its cause ; and a cause (or more properly causes) we cannot but suppose. . . . We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished. We cannot conceive either, on the one hand, nothing becoming some- thing, or on the other, something becoming nothing, . . . The mind is thus compelled to recognise an absolute identity of existence in the effect and m the comple- ment of its causes,-- -between the causatum and. the causa. We think the cause to contain aU that is con- tained ia the effect ; the effect to contain nothing but what is contained in the causes. Each is the sum of the other." It thus appears that Sir W. Hamilton makes our notion of causality convertible with the necessity of thinking continuance of existence. It is said to result from the condition of our thought, by which we are re- quired to thiak everything as existing, and existing ia 342 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. time; and, as we cannot think a thing beginning to exist, we must think that it previously existed under a different form, that is, that it had a cause. This theory, therefore, analyses "the judgment of causality into a form of the mental law of the conditioned," as appKed to a thing, thought under the form of existence relative in Time. It is thus stated,— "We cannot know, we cannot think a thing, except under the attribute of Existence ; we cannot know or think a thing to exist, except as in Time ; and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time, and think it absolutely to com- mence or terminate." This doctrine has certainly many of the merits which its author claims for it. It has simplicity, and it postu- lates no new power to account for the phenomenon. These are undoubted advantages, and ought to insure its preference over all others, provided the doctrine be in accordance with facts, and sufficient to account for them. But, unless this be the case, no degree of simpli- city or of unity can save it ; and, as it appears to me insufficient, I am again constrained to take an antagon- istic course. 1. The notion of causality is not convertible with that of continued existence. In other words, our notion of .causality cannot be reduced to simple compliance with that condition of thought, which requires that we think every thing as existing. Sir W. Hamilton says, that we cannot conceive a thing beginning to be, because we cannot think a time when the object did not exist. This I consider a fallacy. In a previous Chapter, it has been shown that time cannot be recognised apart from KNOWLEDGE OP THE PIRST CAUSE. 343 an object. Now, it is true, that the one term of the rela- tion, namely, the object, cannot be dropped, while the mind continues to contemplate time, apart from the object. It does not thence follow, however, that we cannot think of a time when this object did not exist. There is a fallacy in the fundamental principle upon which this doctrine is built,, Adz., that the causal judg- ment is only an instance ia which our thought complies with the condition that every thing must be thought as existing. For example, a sculptor gets a block of marble, out of which he forms a statue. When viewing the statue, we recognise a new form of existence, or, in the language of this theory, we recognise " a new appearance." There has been some change, and, if the doctrine of Hamilton be true, the manner in which the miad satisfies itself concerning the production of this change, is by pass- ing to the form under which the object previously existed. This is the process which is usually called the mental ne- cessity for thinking a caiise for " a new appearance." Let any one trace out the following course of thought, and say, if in so doing, the mind is conscious of the notion of causality. A statue beautifully cut in marble stands before us ; it cannot always have existed in that form ; it was formerly a rough block of marble. Think of a statue as formerly a block of marble, and you have all that this doctrine grants as involved in the notion of causahty. I venture to affirm that the phenomenon which we de- nominate the causal judgment, is never here realized, far less explained. Hamilton says,—" We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has either been increased or diminished." 344 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. Without inquiring whether this be true, which, however, I question, it may be admitted in the case before us that what is not now hard marble, hes as dust at the base of the statue. Further, it is said, — "We are constraiued to think that what now appears to us under a new form, had previously existence under others." The ordinary forms of expression on this subject would have led us to say, under another, but let that pass. We conceive that statue and the dust at its base as previously existing in one block ; I ask, what then ? AH has been admitted, but what has this to do with the cause which produced the change ? We recognise this change ; we observe the statue and the dust at its base ; we think of them both as previously existing iu one block of marble ; but that there was a cause which produced this change, and that we must think of such a cause, are facts apart from aU this. But it may be argued that I have, after all, taken only one of the forms under which the statue previously existed. Where else, then, is another to be found ? It wiU be said that the image of it previously existed in the mind of the sculptor. To this the reply might be given, that the image of the statue, and the statue itself, are two very different things. The statue is without us, but the image originally in the mind is still there, and can never pass beyond it. But, for the sake of brevity, it may be simply remarked, that there are many images in the mind which are never realized in external reality, and it is thereby manifest that the image is not the catise of the external manifestation. The image had certainly an important relation to the object produced, but not the relation of cause. Again, it may be asserted that KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 345 the operative energy of the sculptor has gone forth from him, and is embodied in the work. But who will affirm that this energy exists in the statue 1 If it be true that the effect is only the complement of what previously existed in the causes, what is there in that statue, besides what was previously in the marble, which once belonged to the sculptor ? "We can see how much of the block of marble exists in the statue, but not how much of the sculptor is there. And, besides all this, the recognition of the change in the form of existence does not reahze in us our notion of cause. On this ground, I consider that the doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton does not embrace the phenomenon, far less account for it.^ 2. The theory fails to recognise the element of power, which necessarily belongs to our notion of causality. This naturally follows from what has been said ia the previous paragraph. In the example there given, it has been shown that to think of the effect under the form in which it previously existed, is not to think of its cause. It may be true that what now exists as an effect, is thought as previously existent in some' different form ; but this does not by any means embrace that mental phenomenon by which we necessarily beheve that there must have been some cause for the change ; in other words, that there has been some power ia opera- 1 1 woiild call special attention to an amination of Sir W. Hamilton's theory article of striking ability on the Philo- of causality, and I most willingly ao- sophy of Sir W. Hamilton, which is to knowledge having heen, in part, antici- be found in the North British Review, pated in my objections to Sir William's vol. xviii. It is pervaded by the true theoiy on cause and effect, by the able philosophic spirit, manifests extensive and much esteemed author of that article, learning, and is characterized by tho- This article is now reprinted in the col- rough grasp of thought. Some portion lected Essays in Philosophy, by Pro- of the article is occupied with an ex- fessor Fraser. 346 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. tion to produce the result. If we examine our conscious- ness, we shall find that there is always an element of power in our notion of a cause, — a fact of which the theory entirely fails to take any account. Our notion of causality cannot be reduced to the notion of mere ex- istence, it is not embraced under the notion of a mere continuance of existence, it is not even convertible with an acknowledgment of a change in ike. form of existence. A cause is that on account of which the change occurs ; it is that which produces the change. Take the example of a stone broken in two by the stroke of a hammer. We perceive the two pieces of stone, we think of them as having previously existed in one whole, but we have yet to think that a certain power has separated them before we have obtained our notion of causaHty. Thus, and thus only, can we recognise a cause. Without hav- ing in the mind the necessary behef that there has been an operation of power, we fail to experience any notion of causality ; and, as neglecting this fact, the theory of Sir W. Hamilton does not embrace the phenomenon to be explained. 3. The theory errs in asserting & plurality of causes for every efiect. Is it true, as is asserted, that we think of two or more causes for every effect ? Common lan- guage does not seem to indicate that this is the common belief The author has scarcely announced it, when, in the very next clause, he feels the difficulty of simply expressing it, and says, — "a cause (or more properly causes) we cannot but suppose." The singular finds ex- pression, notwithstanding the theory. But how does the theory agree with the facts of consciousness ? Out of a KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 347 piece of iron a man makes a ploughshare. It is asserted that our notion of causality results from the necessity of thinking of the object as existing, and this led naturally to the doctrine of a duality of causes. In the case pre- sented, to think of the ploughshare as previously existing, is to think of the iron in its unwrought state ; do we, then, think of the iron as one cause, and the man as another? Is the iron in any way contemplated as a cause of the ploughshare ? Hamilton defines a cause as " simply everything without which the eflfect would not result ;" no doubt, then, without the iron there could have been no ploughshare ; do we, therefore, consider the iron a cause, and admit the above definition to be correct ? There can be no hesitation in the answer. The assertion that the iron is a cause of the ploughshare, is a palpable violation of our consciousness. No man was ever heard to speak thus. Our notion of a cause is that of an operating power, and we do not consider the iron as such. There is but one cause, that is, the agent whose personal exertion changed the rude material into a useful instrument of husbandry. There is, therefore, manifest error in defining a cause as " everything with- out which the effect would not result." There ^re many such things, which we, nevertheless, do not regard as causes, simply because, notwithstanding their existence, the effect could not have been brought about without the exercise of some power to apply them aright. Take another example. Some water falls upon a sheet of paper and spoils it. Without the water, the paper could not have been spoilt ; without the paper, there would have been none to spoil. The presence of both of these was necessary for 348 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. the occurrence of the result. But who thinks of saying that this paper has been spoUt by the combined influence of the paper and the water, for without the presence of either the effect could not have resulted ? The thing is ridiculous. The water, or more properly, the spiUing of the water, was the cause of spoiling the paper. These three assertions, that we are necessitated to think of a cause, be- cause we must think of the effect as previously existing ; that a cause is everything without which an effect could not result ; and that a plurahty of causes is necessary for every effect, embrace the foundation of Sir W. Hamilton's theory, and fall together. There may, or there may not, be a plurahty of causes, but such plurality is no necessity in the case.-^ 4. The theory errs in asserting that " a new appear- ance" or " event" affords the only occasion on which the causal judgment arises in the mind. There can be no doubt, as this theory asserts, that we can think of an object only as existing \ but there is another point which is fatal to this theory, of causahty, we may think of an object existing in its present form, and, without any observation of a change in the mode of its being, we thiuk of a cause for its existence in its present form. Take an example. A steam-engine" stands before us, entire in every respect ; we recognise no change from the rough materials to the beautiful mechanism; our first glance reveals the thing complete ; there is no change going on, nor is there any new appearance being gradually evolved, yet we necessarily affirm, that there ' Esse debet aliquid unde fiat, deinde a quo fiat ; hoc est coma; ilhid, materia. —Seneca, Epist. 65. KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 349 must originally have been some cause for its existence in its present form. We do not think of it as pre- viously existing, so that our notion of a cause is not originated by that means ; we think of it as now existing, but still our notion of causality is not in that ; but, while we think of it existing, we also think of it as having a cause. A relative change in the form of existence — a new appearance — is not necessary to originate in the mind the notion of cause. Nay more, not only do we think of a cause, though we perceive no change, but we beheve that there must be a cause why there is no change. We necessarily think, for example, that there must be a cause for aU the parts of the steam-engine remaining combined, for a body continuing at rest, and for the particles of matter adhering. It is erroneous, therefore, to assert that the causal judgment consists " in the uni- versal necessity of which we are conscious, to think cav^es for every event." The causal judgment really consists in the universal necessity, of which we are conscious, to think a cause for every finite existence. This declaration, by which I abide, as most certainly sustained by the facts of consciousness, has been severely assailed by some critics, and that, as it appears to me, in a most singular manner. I consider it as clear, that we believe there is a cause which keeps my hand closed, as that there is a cause by which it was closed ; that there is a cause which keeps the balloon fast to the ground, as that there is a cause for its flight ; that there is a Cause above me to whom I owe my existence, as that there is a cause within me producing the succes- sion of phenomena. 350 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. 5. The theory fails to account for the necessity of believ- ing that there is a cause for every finite existence. This assertion is virtually involved in the preceding observa- tions, but it is necessary formally to distinguish it. The mere perception of the existence of a finite object, neces- sitates the conviction that it had a cause. In attempting to explain the causal judgment, by declaring that it is nothing else than the conscious necessity to think of some new appearance as previously existing under an- other form, Hamilton entirely overlooks the fact, that we believe that there is a cause, not only for every change in the form of existence, but for every finite existence, apart from aU change. His theory fails to recognise all the instances in which the causal judgment originates, and, in doing so, fails to explain them. Hamilton's theory implies that there is only a necessity to think of causes for every change. I assert that the- mind is necessitated to believe in a cause for every finite' existence, whether there be a manifestation of change or not. 6. The theory errs by asserting that the efiiect is the complement of being contained in the cause. It is said, • — " We think the causes to contain aU that is contained in the efiect; the efiect to contain nothing but what is' contained in the causes. Each is the sum of the other." This assertion, naturally growing out of the doctrine, carries its destruction in itself. It has been already shown that the mere material out of which the effect is formed is not regarded as a cause at all. In so far, therefore, as the material exists in the effect, it is not the cause existing in its effect. But, if we consider KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIEST CAUSE. 351 the real cause, that is, the efficient cause, it will be found that Hamilton's statement is inapplicable. The cause, even as a cause, is not either partially or completely absorbed in the effect. The power of the sculptor re- mains after his statue is finished. If it be said, that the particular exertion of power is gone, this is true ; but it has not passed into the statue. If cause and effect be " each the sum of the other," it necessarily foUows that when the effect begins to exist, the cause must cease to exist. The sculptor will cease to possess his power after his first effort. For the rest of his life he may stand to gaze at. the weU-finished and smoothly polished piece of dead matter, into which his power has passed, if, indeed, his whole existence be not transmuted into that of the cold stone. On this theory each individual must, in absolute verity, be a being of one work, and a man of one idea.^ 7. The theory errs ia viewing causality only in the physical world, and not in the inental. According to Hamilton's system, we attribute the various mental phe- nomena to a distinct individual, which we call mind. Let us, then, apply his doctrine of causality in this in- stance. We are conscious of some mental phenomenon. According to this doctrine, we must not only think of it as existing, but it is even impossible for us to be conscious of it beginrdng to exist. Is this true ? I more than doubt it, but let us follow the author in the proof He says, we must be conscious of the phenomenon existing in time, and we cannot conceive a time in which it did ^ On this theory how can we account evolved?— out of the previous state of for the cause of motion ? When we see a rest ? wheel moving, out of what is the motion 352 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. not exist. I have already pointed out what I consider the fallacy in this, and it were easy to do so now ; but, for the sake of argument, let the assertion be admitted. Let it be granted, that we cannot conceive a time when this phenomenon did not exist, though it seems to me that the statement is plainly contradictory. We are conscious of the phenomenon coming into existence ia the mind at the present time. Where was it before? Was it in the mind, though not in consciousness ? Have we been wrong in considering that the phenomena rising in consciousness are newly originated existences ? Did these phenomena all exist in the mind before ? This were indeed a transcendent doctrine of " innate ideas." We fear, that this would be a proud assertion of human wisdom, rather than, what its author so appropriately designs his doctrine to be, " a discipline of humility." But, the author says somewhat of causes for every effect; if, then, the mental phenomenon be the perception of an external object, as for example, a stone ; did that mental phenomenon find previous existence in the stone? If this be true, there may yet be hope for a system of Materialism. 8. On the hypothesis of a First cause, and the ap- plication of the theory to the work of creation, it involves a system of Pantheism. It may seem strange, yet it is not the less true, that, at one extreme, Hamilton's theory makes the Infinite such an abstraction as to render the whole creation impossible ; and, at the other extreme, by implication, identifies the whole creation with God, and thus finishes in Pantheism. If extremes meet, it is with terrible inconsistency that they do so in the present in- KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 353 stance. No one, however, will for a moment suppose that I mean to affirm that Sir W. Hamilton was a believer in Pantheism. The illustrious thinker, in my humble opinion, often bowed to the authority of a belief reaUy in advance of his theories. Most assuredly he had not in his mind a single trace of sympathy with Pantheism. Nevertheless, it seems to me that his doctrine involves the assertion that we are necessitated to think of the creation in accordance with the Pantheistic theory ; in other words, that Pantheism, as a necessity of our consciousness, is, for us at least, true philosophy. I fear it must now be added, that Dr. Mansel has unfor- tunately drawn out a course of argument tending in the same direction, inasmuch as more than once he presents Pantheism on the one hand, and Atheism on the other, as the only alternatives open for om- choice, if we attempt to reason concerning the origin of finite existence. I certainly agree with those who insist upon the weakness of the human mind ; but I do not believe that the limits assigned to the mind are such as, in any one instance, to necessitate a false conclusion, that is, a conclusion anta- gonistic to the necessary belief implanted in our nature. Were this the case, it would involve an admission, which may be expressed in the language of reprobation apphed to certain theories by Sir W. Hamilton, that God had made " our nature a lie." After Hamilton has stated that our mode of thiaking of a cause for any effect is by thinking of the effect as pre- viously existing under another form, he says : " We cannot conceive, either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or, on the other, something becoming nothing. 354 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. When God is said to create the universe out of nothings we thmk this by supposing that He evolves the tmiverse out of himself ."'^ Such is his doctrine on this point, and such, I am sorry to add, is also the doctrine of M. Cousin. They both present this assertion in reference to the manner in which we think of the act of creation, and thus equally maintain that we can in thought realize the act of creation only in accordance with the Pantheistic system ; in other words, that Pantheism is the transcript of our consciousness, and, therefore, true philosophy. Every one wiU be ready to accept M. Cousia's indignant disclaimer of Pantheism, as presented in the Second Edition of his Philosophical Fragments, in reply to some of his opponents, and to admire the earnestness of it. Certainly I do not think that a personal belief in Pan- theism is to be attributed either to Sir William Hamilton or to M. Cousin. But it seems to me that their theories, nevertheless, lead to Pantheism. It would have been gratifying, had I seen sufficient grounds to warrant it, in deference to the opinion ex- pressed first by Professor Fraser,^ and thereafter by Dr. Mansel,^ to withdraw the assertion that Hamilton's rea- soning leads logically to a Pantheistic conclusion. But, after careful reconsideration, I cannot see any escape from such a result, when it is maintained that creation adds nothing to existence. Take an example of Sir W. Hamilton's mode of dealing -with the matter : " You can conceive the creation of a world as lightly as you can conceive the creation of an atom. , But what is a creation? ' Discussions, p. 585. 2 Essays, p. 237. ' Metaphysics, p. 272. KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIEST CAUSE. . 555 It is not the springing of nothing into something. Far from it ; it is conceived, and is by us conceivable merely as the evolution of a new form of existence, by the fiat of the Deity. Let us suppose the very crisis of creation. Can we realize it to ourselves, in thought, that the moment after the universe came into manifested being, there was a larger complement of existence in the uni- verse and its Author together, than there was the moment before, in the Deity himself alone 1 This we cannot imagine." I do not find in such a passage as this, any evidence of Professor Fraser's statement that Sir W. Hamilton " expressly confines the application of his hypothesis to finite causation-" In reply to the generally accepted declaration, that in the act of creation God created aU things out of nothing, Sir W. Hamilton says, "We cannot conceive nothing becoming something." This every one wiU admit, but the first half of the assertion reaUy embraces the whole truth in it, when it is said that " we cannot conceive nothing." To think of nothing is not to think at aU. When we are able to think of nothing, it may be time enough to inquire whether it be possible to think of nothing becoming something. I do not suppose any man would say that the act of creation is construed in thought by thinking of something evolved out o/" nothing. The absurdity of such a statement is manifest, and by what- ever method the act of creation is conceived, it is at once admitted that it cannot be in this manner. Does, then, Hamilton's theory give the true account of the manner in which we think of the act of creation ? He says : " When God is said to create the universe out 356 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. of nothing, we think this by supposing that He evolves the universe out of himself." Is this the manner in which we think of the creation 1 I most distinctly deny it. Anything more thoroughly inconsistent with the actual form of our thought there could not be, than to say that we think of the creation as evolved out of God ; that we think of these mountains and valleys, these rocks and rivers, the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, the fish of the sea, as evolved out of God, and there- fore previously existing in God, and now part of God. This universe evolved out of God ! Anything more un- satisfactory as an explanation of the mode in which the mind attempts to realize the act of creation could not have been suggested. Better far that it had been de- clared a mental impossibility to conceive a creative act, than that anything should have been proposed so in- sufficient, and fitted to mislead, as the statement that we conceive of the work of creation by thinking of the universe as evolved out of the Divine nature. It was necessary for Sir W. Hamilton to make such an asser- tion in order to save his theory of causality ; but it was dangerous to test the validity of the theory at such a point ; the assertion of it here is a fatal error, certain to insure its universal rejection. It requires no reasoning or demonstration to establish its falsity. It requires only to be stated and brought into contrast with our consciousness in order to show that it cannot be main- tained. Let us imagine that we stand at the point of creation, and perceive the material universe dart into existence. We are conscious of the origin of this new existence. We necessarily believe that it had a cause, KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 3 5 7 — that some operating power has brought it into being. But do we believe that this material substance previously existed in the cause ? Do we believe that the cause is material f The testimony of our consciousness distinctly contradicts such a statement. But, by way of shutting us up to the theory, it is argued that we cannot conceive nothing becoming something. Certainly not, for that were to think nothing, which is impossible. But, it is added, " Creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity." " The evolution of existence from possibility into actuality !" " Existence " is nothing, except an individual existence be indicated. In this case, therefore, it is either nothing, or it is the material -universe itself. It cannot be the universe, for that has just begun ; and if it be not that, it is nothing, and to talk of its evolution is absurd. But, granting that it is the material universe, if it be the evolution of that universe, whence is it evolved ? From " possibility," says Sir W. Hamilton. And where is that? This is a use of general terms altogether unsatisfactory. If the meaning be, that ia creation God put forth into action or " actuality," the power to create, which He pre- viously possessed the " possibility " of doing, it expresses a doctrine sufficiently correct, were it not for the accom- panying assertion that God exercises this power by evolving the universe out of Himself. This expression, .however, gives it an entirely different aspect. Applying the phraseology to second causes, it would be said that the formation of a steam-engine "is the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality." In this case 358 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. it is quite true that the man had previously the ability to make an engine, and the materials had the capability of being made into an engine, but out of what was the engine evolved ? Out of the materials certainly, and not out of the man. Where, then, were the materials out of which God evolved the universe 1 There were none ; therefore, in the work of creation we cannot talk of the evolution of the created object. Were I to express what I hold to be our mode of thinking or imagining the work of creation, I should say that creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the origin of finite existence, by the power of the Deity. We think of the fact of the existence of the universe whenever it springs into beiug, but it is beyond our abUity to understand how it began to be. From the existing universe we rise to a con- ception of God. We thus think of the world as ex- isting in time up to the point of creation ; and if, in thought, we pass beyond that, the world as the one term of the relation is dropped, that is to say, we withdraw our thoughts from it, and in this manner it ceases to be an object of thought, while God is contemplated as existing alone. On these grounds, we say that creation is the origin of finite existence by the fiat of the Deity. To such a statement as the above Sir W. Hamilton replies, that we cannot conceive of the origin of existence, therefore we must think that the universe previously existed in God, since it did not previously exist in a created form. Now, it is admitted, that we can think of, or imagine, the universe as beginning to exist in its present form. What is there, then, which necessitates KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIEST CAUSE. 859 ■US to believe that it previously existed in anotlier form ? We feel no such necessity. But, says Sir W. Hamilton, we cannot think of a time when it did not exist, that is, a time when there was nothing, that is to say, no created existence. To this I reply, that while we cannot iniagine a time when nothing existed, yet we can easily think of a time when the world did not exist — a time when God alone existed. I have already shown, that time is the consciousness of succession in thought, and that we cannot think, without thinking of an object existing in time. When we think of the universe existing in time, it is impossible to drop the one term of the relation, namely, the universe, and think of time apart from any object. By a necessity of our nature, this is impossible. But this does not render it impossible for us to think of a time when the world did not exist, and when God alone existed. In the one case, we conceive of the universe and the Deity existing together ; in the other, we think of God existing alone before the universe, but there is no mental necessity to think, much less to beheve, that " the sum of existence" in the one instance, is identical with " the sum of existence" in the other. There is, therefore, no mental necessity to think that the universe was evolved out of God. In direct antagonism to the doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, I hold that there is a mental necessity to beheve that the material universe could not have pre- viously existed as part of the Great Spirit. Let us attempt to imagine the work of creation, and mark the facts of consciousness, which arise in making the attempt. We imagine the universe beginning to exist, that is to say, its existence is contemplated as a 360 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. present phenomenon. We then endeavour to satisfy our mind concerning the inquiry, how did it come into exis- tence ? A little reflection is enough to prove that the method in which the effect is produced does not belong to our observation, and is, therefore, beyond the range of our speculation. To attempt to answer the question, were to violate the first principle of sound philosophy. All that we can affirm is, that we contemplate the world springing into existence, and we think of an operating power, the Great First Cause, as producing it. We thus consider the universe a new existence — really an increase in the sura of being. It is of no avail to tell us that we cannot go back in thought to a time when there was no existence. When we are asked to think of the time before a certain house was erected, we conceive of that time, simply by thinking of events which occurred, or of objects which existed, before that house was buUt. So it is with the Creation ; we think of the time when the world did not exist, by thinking of the time when God alone existed. We have no more difficulty in thinking of a time when the world did not exist, than in thinking of a time when a house did not exist. Nor need any difficulty be raised in reference to the possibility of our conception of God as He existed before the creation, since Hamilton's own theory implies such a conception. If, as he says, we think of the world as evolved out of God, it is plainly implied that we think of God as previously existent. I certainly admit that we cannot understand how God operates without materials, for we have no experience of such an exertion of causal energy ; but we think of God as the cause which produces- the effect ; and we have no KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 361 difficulty in thinking of the object as beginning to exist. A greater absurdity there could not be, than the assertion that God separated from himself a part of His essence, and so operated upon it as to produce the universe. Hamilton himself recognises this, when he speaks of the creation of the universe, as its evolution from possibility into actuality. This is a quiet admission that it did not previously exist, but that there was previously in God the power to produce it ; which is a very different doc- trine, indeed, from that involved in the assertion, that we conceive of the act of creation by supposing that God " evolves the universe out of himself." "When, therefore, it is said that God made all things out of nothing, it is not meant that nothing became something. It is meant that God operated without materials, and that the world was originated by an act of power. Ex nihilo, nihil Jit, is either a truth or a falsehood according to the relation in which it is taken. If by it be meant that nothing cannot become some- thing, it is true. If by it be meant that God cannot without materials originate a new existence, it is false. To direct Hamilton's words against his own doctrine, it may be said,—" On his theory, God is not distinct from the world ; the creature is a modification of the Creator." " On this hypothesis, one of two alternatives must be admitted ;" God must " pass either from the better to the worse, or from the worse to the better," both of which are absurd. 9. On this theory, the conception of a First Cause is an impossibility. It has been shown that, on the hypo- thesis of a First Cause, the theory is pantheistic, but 362 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. even that hypothesis is altogether inconsistent with the theory. In the theory of Sir W. Hamilton, the notion of a First Cause is a borrowed conception. Its author speaks of the universe as evolved out of God, but how has he obtained the conception of God, or of a First Cause ? Not in accordance with his own theory, most certainly. According to that, the causal judgment arises from the fact that " we are constrained to think, that what now appears to us under a new form, had previously an existence under others." Now, if we account for a new appearance by thinking of it as it previously existed, we must again account for that previous existence by thinking of it as having existed under a different form at a time stiU more antecedent, and so on for ever. On this theory, we are dealing with a constant chain of causes, without the possibility of reaching an absolute cause; we are engaged upon the ever-varying forms of existence, without the possibility of reaching absolute existence. Suppose, then, that the point is reached at which the universe is created ; according to the theory under consideration, we think that the universe previously existed under a different form. Now, if this be all that is involved in our conception of the cause of the world, for aught we know, that form may also be the result of a change, and the previous form may also have been the result of a change, and so on for ever. The alleged necessity for thinking of a present existence as previously existing under a different form, can never give the neces- sity for thinking of an original and absolute existence. How, then, does Sir William obtain the conception of that First Cause, from whom all things are said to have KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 363 been evolved ? Not in accordance with his own theory assuredly. He can reach it only by reverting to the notion of a First Cause as a necessary conviction of the mind, and thus must overturn his whole theory. That we have a necessary knowledge and conception of a First Cause, we consider the tme doctrine ; but of this hereafter. For the reasons thus stated, I consider that Sir W. Hamilton's theory of causality does not account for the phenomenon, and is altogether unsatisfactory. Consider- able space has been occupied in discussing this question, but it was deemed necessary, inasmuch as the theory of the causal judgment concerns the true account of our notion of God as the great First Cause. Other objections might have been presented, but I have already dwelt at sufficient length on the matter. For example, it might have been remarked that Sir William's theory erroneously professes to be based upon a weak- ness of the mind. Does it prove weakness of mind, that in order to think, we must think of something existing f Does it prove weakness of mind that we cannot think of nothing ? What a power of mind it would be to be able to think of nothing ; to think and yet not to think ! To think, and to think of existence, are convertible terms ; and is not thought precisely the power of the mind ? The doctrine of causality which I adopt, is in the main that held by the majority of modern philosophers, though it may be with some variations in the manner of state- ment and in the mode of defence. The doctrine is this : That it is a necessary condition of human intelligence — a first principle of the mind — to believe in, and there- 364 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. fore to tMnk of, a cause for every finite existence. I do not merely say, in the language of some, " that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause which produced it." While accepting this as involved in the causal judgment, I do not regard it as a fuU expression of the law of caus- ality. Though it is true, that we believe there must be a cause for every new appearance, it is also true that the mind is necessitated to beheve that there is a cause for every finite existence, even though we should not recog- nise it beginning to exist. By the law of causality, we are not only necessitated to think of a cause for every object which we recognise as beginning to exist ; but we are also necessitated to believe that every finite object which we recognise as existing, must have begun to exist, and must have had a cause for so beginning. The world in which we live is not brought under our observation as beginning to exist, yet we necessarily believe that it did begin to exist, and that it was the operation of a cause which realized its origin. I consider that the law of causahty cannot be carefuUy analysed, without the dis- covery of the fact that essentially, and at its root, it is a testimony to the existence of the Infinite First Cause. At the same time, in harmony with the consciousness of power in ourselves, it involves the behef in a cause for every new appearance, which, if carried out in its fuU application, leads back at length to the Divine Origina- tor. I hold, therefore, that to think of a cause for every finite existence is a necessary condition of human intel- ligence, a first principle of the mind, an ultimate datum of consciousness, which cannot be demonstrated, yet cannot be doubted, but must be accepted by all men. KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIEST CAUSE. 365 In reference to this theory Sir William says, that it "certainly does account for the phenomenon." Since, therefore, I consider that the causal judgment is neces- sary to all men, and that all other theories, Sir William's included, have failed to account for the phenomenon, I maintain the theory now stated as fully accounting for the phenomenon, and as the only tenable theory on the question. Notwithstanding, however, Sir W. Hamilton's admis- sion of the sufficiency of the theory, he urges against it one or two objections, a reply to which I feel constrained to attempt. The first objection is stated in the following terms : " If there be postulated an express and positive affirma- tion of intelligence to account for the mental deliverance, — that existence cannot absolutely commence ; we must equally postulate a counter affirmation of intelligence, positive and express, to explaia the counter mental deliverance, — that existence cannot infinitely not com- mence. . . . But they are contradictories ; and, as con- tradictories, they cannot both be true. On this theory, therefore, the root of our nature is a lie."^ To this I reply that I do not admit the existence of any such contradic- tion in our nature. I deny the existence of any such thing as a " mental deliverance, that existence cannot absolutely commence," if by " existence" here, be meant Unite existence. Upon ground already stated, I alto- gether deny that our notion of causality is convertible with the thought of continued existence, or with the belief that every object which we recognise as beginning 1 Discussions, p. 695. 366 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. to exist, must have previously existed under a different form. I therefore altogether reject the asserted "mental deliverance, that existence cannot absolutely commence." It is no part of the theory here defended, consequently I am not chargeable with the inconsistency of holding both contradictories. I hold it as a mental deliverance that all finite existence did absolutely begin to exist, that nothing but God has had infinite existence, or, in the more awkward language of the quotation, "that finite existence cannot infinitely not commence." I do assert the fact of two mental deliverances, involved in the causal judgment, but certainly not of two which are mutually contradictory. They are these : — First, That there is a cause for the existence of every finite object in its present form : Secondly, That all finite existence had an absolute commencement,^ that is, that there was a self-existent First Cause. These two are not contradictories ; and against the doctrine which embraces these, the objection is inapplicable. If, how- ever, the objection to Sir William's theory, indicated above, be admitted as valid, namely, that the necessity to think of existence is not a weakness, but a power, the present objection, which he urges against the theory here defended, turns with destructive effect upon his own, since he asserts that the two contradictories are both the deliverances of consciousness. The next objection is expressed thus, — " To suppose a positive and special principle of causality, is to suppose ' By " alsoluU commencement,'" iTHBim former I regard as Sir William's mean- the origin of being without previously ing ; on any other supposition, the as- existing materials ; not origin without serted contradiction vanishes, dependent relation on a cause. The KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 367 that there is expressly revealed to us, through intelli- gence, an affirmation of the fact that there exists no free causation ; that is, there is no cause which is not itself merely an effect, existence being only a series of determined antecedents and determined consequents.'" Does then the doctrine which makes the causal judg- ment a principle of intelUgence, imply a denial of free will ? I am persuaded that it does not. Let us examine our consciousness, and ascertain what facts are therein presented. We are conscious of an act of voHtion. In accordance with the theory here ad- vocated, we necessarily refer this phenomenon to a cer- tain power which we call Mind. Some may say that it is referred to the power of will as its cause. But it is to be remembered that the division of the powers of the mind is merely theoretical, and instituted for philo- sophical purposes. These powers are not separate exist- ences. When we speak of the various faculties of the mind, we mean thus to indicate only the several relations in which the mind can operate. When, therefore, we are conscious of an act of will, we refer it to some cause, and that cause we call Mind. Is then the mind, as a personal existence, distinct from the successive states of consciousness, itself an effect ? Yes. It was created by God. Does this involve the impossibility of freedom, that is to say, of the mind having been created a free cause ? I recognise no such impossibility. We are con- scious of an act of volition, by which we mean, that we are conscious of coming to a certain determination by our own personal choice ; and we refer that vohtion to a ' Discussions, p. 595. 368 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. cause which we call mind ; but, in so doing, there is nothing fatal to the freedom of the mind. There is no difl&culty in thinking of the act of volition as a new existence, which did in consciousness absolutely begin to exist; and we have no difficulty in believing, nay rather, we are conscious, that the mind was the originating power.. So essentially is this the case, that we hold ourselves responsible for our personal determinations. I acknow- ledge the necessity for referring the phenomenon to a cause ; but I recognise no necessity for affirming that the cause of the phenomenon was another previously existing phenomenon ; and so on ad infinitum, Such "a series of determined antecedents and determined consequents" would be essential, in order to establish Necessity or Fatalism, and invalidate Freedom, but con- sciousness reveals no such series. Let us, however, hear Sir W. Hamilton again on this point. He says : " Moral liberty does not merely con- sist in the power of doing what we will, but in the power of willing whai we will. For a power over the determina- tions of our Will, supposes an act of WlU, that our WUl should determine so and so ; for we can only freely exert power through a rational determination or vohtion."^ Now, what is meant by "willing to wiU ?" "Was any one ever conscious of this, of willing to wiU what he wiUs ? No man ever was, or ever could be. And if no one is conscious of it, by what right is it affirmed that such a series is necessary in order to exercise volition ? We are not at aU conscious of willing to will, in order to that freedoSi of will of which we are conscious. Look again ' Keid's Works, p. 599. KNOWLEDGE OP THE FIRST OAUSE. 369 at Sir William's statement. He says, — " We can only freely exert power through voHtion/' If, then, we freely exert power through volition, the act of volition is itself a free exertion of power, and no previous act of volition is necessary to secure freedom. If, as is asserted, we freely exert power through volition, it is utterly ridicidous to affirm, that for the free exertion of power in volition, we require a previous act of volition. This objection, therefore, entirely breaks down, while the theory of caus- ality stands uninjured, and presents no obstacles to free- dom of will. Having thus essayed a vindication of the doctrine of causality, here maintained, from the assaults of Sir W. Hamilton, I shall now briefly state M. Cousin's opinion iu reference to our notion of God as First Cause. His assertion is, that we think of God not only as a cause, but as an absolute cause, by which he means, a cause which must act. According to his theory, it is not merely a fact that God has put forth causal energy in the act of creation, and that He now exists as the cause of every other existence ; but, by the very constitution of His nature, God was necessitated to put forth causal energy, or, in his own language, was necessitated to "pass into act." According to this doctrine, therefore, God was not merely able to create, but necessitated to create : Creation was a necessary act.'^ In defence of such a doctrine nothing can be said. When we consider the influence of the transcendental philosophy upon M. ' According to M. Cousin's doctrine, exist in relation. Botli are vicious ex- God must act as s cause. According to tremes. Sir W. Hamilton has challenged Sir William's doctrine God camwt act as the statement. For his criticism, and a cause, for the unconditioned cannot my reply, see Appendix A. 2 A 370 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Cousin, it is not difficult to understand how he was led to propound a doctrine so untenable. Attracted by the beauties of German transcendentalism, yet painfuUy con- scious of certain marks of failure, he sought to obliterate the , defects, and, by a few clever touches, to fill in the parts in a manner conformable with the whole. But, woe to the efforts of Eclecticism ! What had been pro- fessedly improved, had only been made worse than before. It is unnecessary to dwell upon this error of M. Cousin, which is only one of many faults into which he seems to have been led by too ardent admiration of a system. The doctrine has been demolished by Sir William Hamil- ton with a master's hand. Never was artillery more powerful, directed with more terrible effect. In passing from the opinion of M. Cousin, I proceed to the completion of the purpose of the present Chapter. I have said that, by a first principle of our mind, we ne- cessarily think of a cause for every finite existence. Do we, then, think of every such existence as a mere link in an eternal chain of causes ? We do not. Without rea- soning upon the matter, the mind instinctively perceives the absurdity of such an assertion. While the general principle that there is a cause for every finite existence is implanted in the mind as a native possession, there iS placed along with it, as a necessary principle of the mind, the revelation of one Being, the Cause of all causes, himself uncaused. No man, who even cursorily reflects upon his own consciousness, can assert that these two principles are unknown to him. I do not intend to dwell here at great length upon the position of Atheism, in denying the existence of God. Atheism is a lie in the KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 371 utterance, and a lie against the clearest of all evidence — the consciousness of one's own mind. Let a man examine his consciousness, and say if he do , not find there the necessary beliefs, that there must be a cause for every event, and that there must be a First Cause for every finite existence. Any man who examines his own consciousness, will find these principles in his mind, and though he cannot begin to demonstrate their truth, he cannot doubt their authoritative testimony. Upon any other ground than that of a necessary prin- ciple of the mind, these words were open to the charge of dogmatism ; but, with that foundation, they are . the simple expression of the authoritative nature of an d priori principle.^ Let us examine our consciousness, and attempt clearly to dehneate the facts revealed. • The mind thinks of the wide world, on whose broad surface we seem so small — of the high towering rocks, which, in dread silence, stand as tokens that man below and they above are equally subject to a higher power — of the vast expanse of waters, by some mysterious tie hung freely in the hollows of the earth — of the host of stars, midst which our world is but 1 When I speak of a necessary prin- the facts of Scripture are such. These ciple of the mind, as the only ground two, the facts of the internal revelation, which waiTants uncompromising asser- that is to say, the necessary principles tion, apart from demonstration, I mean of the mind, and the facts of the exter- in the sphere of mentivl philosophy, nal revelation, that is to say, the truths which finds all its materials in the re- of the Bible, we may maintain with un- velations of consciousness. And why do compromising steadfastness, apart from these necessary principles of the mind all demonstration. They are both the stand supreme and beyond the reach of revelations of God. The singular har- dispute ? Because they are implanted mony, and mutual adaptation of these in the mind by God — they are a direct two, seems to me to present strong evi- revelation from God. May we not, then, dence of the Divine origin of the Scrip- liave other facts of equal certainty, other- tures— a course of proof which might be wise revealed ? Undoubtedly. The factp developed with great advantage to the of an external revelation, in other words, Christian evidences. 372 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. a speck — of that mysterious power by which the earth is rent and made to quake — of the shade which creeps athwart the central luminary, and, with a power beyond our control, wraps us in thick darkness. By a necessity of our nature, we must believe that all these had a cause. But, was that cause itself an effect 1 and, if so, must we go back in a regressive process from effect to cause, never coming to an end 1 This is an absurdity which cannot recommend itself to our reason. Let us endeavour to realize an unending chain, in which each cause is itself an effect, developed by some previously originated cause, and we shall fail. Let us endeavour to imagine an eter- nal chain of causes — a succession of operating powers, without some originating power, and we shall find that we not only cannot realize such a thing, but we cannot believe in its existence, inasmuch as it is in direct viola- tion of a necessary conviction of our mind. A course of operations without an originating power ; — a process of development without some beginning of the process,^ — is necessarily regarded by us as an impossibility. It is the acknowledged necessity of the human mind to beUeve in some uncreated source, as the Origin of aU things. We find, then, these two necessary convictions both involved in the conviction of causality, as a ruling principle of our intelligence : that there is a cause for the existence of every finite object in its present form ; and that there is a primary Cause for the origin of all finite existence. On the one hand, we cannot believe in an unending regres- sion of finite causes. The attempt is felt to involve something antagonistic to our nature — something which our constitution stamps as iinpossible. On the other KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 373 hand, we have a necessary belief, which establishes posi- tive truth, and which affirms that there is an uncreated Infinite Being, who by His own power originated all things. The testimony of such an original conviction must be accepted. We may wish that it were false ; by vainly directing the mind to curious speculation, we may turn our attention from it ; but, while we endeavour to accoimt to ourselves for the origin of all finite things, we must beheve in an infinite and eternal Creator. We must repose in the existence of a primary Cause for all finite causes ; an unbeginning Origin of all finite exist- ence ; a central Power from which comes aU the restricted activity of creation ; an everlasting Fountain of Life, from which flows aU vitality, which is recognised exist- ing in limited forms. Such is the revelation of consciousness, in presenting which, exclusive attention has been given to the internal phenomena, regardless of the objections which may be urged against the statement of their nature. It may, however, be asserted, that aU this is a fabrication. In answer to such an assertion, I can only ask each one to examine his own consciousness ; to attempt satisfactorily to account to his own mind for the origin of aL. things ; and he will find that he instinctively rests in the ex- istence of an uncreated Power, as the originator of everything hmited. Are we asked whether we have for- gotten that there are men who assert that there was no First Cause ? I admit that there are such men. As there have been men who have denied the existence of the external world, so there have been men who, admit- ting its existence, have denied that of a First Cause, 374 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Men have theoretically maintained that there is no universe, and have yet confessed that they found them- selves necessitated to believe in its existence. And so men have denied the existence of a First Cause — have theoretically maintained that there is no such Being — and have accomplished this simply by withdrawing their attention from facts, and fixing it upon the forms of a theory. But this I must take leave to say of such men, that if they were as honest as the former class, they would admit that they feel themselves practically necessi- tated to believe in the reality of the First Cause, whose existence they theoretically deny. Let a man refuse to turn his attention to the facts of the question, and he may maintain anything to his own satisfaction, no matter how monstrous it may seem to others. Let him refuse to apply his mind to the circumstances in which the con- viction described is said to arise ; let him abide by his own peculiar forms of thought, and refuse to examine their foundation, and he may assert his unbelief with perfect satisfaction. But, let him theoretically maintain Atheism as he may, he cannot live consistently with his theory. If he be at aU a reflective man, the inquiry must often arise in his mind, whence came I, and whence have come all these objects around me ? And, with such thoughts, he will find the truth pressed upon him, how- ever anxious he be to escape from it. The voice of consciousness saith, that there was an Infinite and Eternal Creator of aU finite things. Man may rush from the truth, or stifle the inquiry, or escape from it by turning his thoughts to other objects. But, if he raise the inquiry at all, as he is a living, intelligent being, with KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 375 the soul of humanity within him, and possessed of all its principles, he must believe. The upholder of Atheism will observe that I do not profess to prove, the existence of a First Cause. I do not attempt to demonstrate such a fact. I maintain that it is above proof — that it is beyond all demonstration ; capable of being neither doubted nor demonstrated, but a truth necessary to the mind. It is not, iadeed, a truth always present to the mind — not a truth which cannot be shunned ; but a truth which must be admitted if we seek to account to ourselves for the origin of all finite things. It is a principle which, when raised in the mind, cannot be doubted, but from its very nature stands un- questionable. I do not uphold the argument from de- sign as a demonstration logically exact. On the contrary, we never can have a logical demonstration of the ex- istence of God. The creation of the universe is only a finite manifestation of power, and from that we can never infer the Infinite. Every such argument is incom- petent, as embracing more in the conclusion than is in- volved in the premises. I therefore do not profess to present any argument which will be a satisfactory de- monstration of a First Cause ; but no such profession is made, because I -believe that, in every such attempted demonstration, the notion of the First Cause is involved in the very first step. All the use here made of what has been called the argument from design is as an illus- tration — as presenting a course of thought in which the conception of a First Cause is certain to arise— as originating an inquiry which, if prosecuted, must termi- nate in belief. 376 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. I hold, then, that a necessary conviction of a self- existent First Cause is an ultimate fact in consciousness.' It is, therefore, involved in this conviction, that the First Cause is absolute and infinite, that is, essentially free from restriction such as could spring from the existence of any being external to Himself, and also essentially un- limited in His own nature. In this view of the Divine nature I understand Dr. Mansel to agree, and yet it is an argument upon which he lays much stress, that the Absolute cannot exist as cause, "A cause cannot, as such, be absolute; the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause." 1 Now, if the Absolute be defined as "that which cannot exist in any relation," it is self-evident, that it cannot exist in the relation of cause. Under no other definition of the Absolute does Dr. Hansel's assertion admit of vindication, and in that case his statement refers to nothing, since there is. no such Absolute. Most as- suredly, this is not the Absolute which is acknowledged as the object of a necessary belief, and yet Dr. Mansel him- self makes the above declaration concerning the impossi- bility of the Absolute, as such, being a cause. With him the First Cause is, "that which produces aU things, and is itself produced of none ;" the Absolute is " that 'which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being." With these definitions I perfectly concur, but I am at a loss to perceive how, upon such definitions, the assertion was made, that "a Cause cannot, as such, be Absolute ; the Absolute, as such, cannot be a Cause." Let us withdraw the words "Absolute" and "Cause," inserting in their place the above definitions, and . ' Limits of Religious Thought, p. 47. KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CATJSE. 377 the aflBrmation is : " That which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being," cannot be " that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none." Why not ? It seems to me that the very re- verse of this must be the truth. " That which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being," alone can he " that which produces all things, and is itseK produced of none." Dr. Mansel's own definitions overturn his statement. It is very true, indeed, that any being can be re- garded as a cause, only in so far as he exists in relation to an effect, but such relation is not necessary to the Self-existent One. It is- confessedly true, in point of fact, that the Deity does exist in that relation to His creatures, but He is not necessarily a cause. In saying therefore, that " the cause as such exists only in relation to the effect," and applpng that statement to the Ab- solute One, Dr. Mansel only perplexes the discussion needlessly, and misleads the mind. When apphed to the Absolute One, the statement is equivalent simply to this : " That the Absolute Being exists in the relation of First Cause, only by his relation to His creatiires ;" which is a very simple and self-evident assertion, having none of the dreadful consequences in it which the author would lead his readers to suppose. While it is true that the Absolute Being is the First Cause, it is not held that He is ne- cessarily a cause. It is simply affirmed that He does exist i!a the relation of Cause by the exercise of His power and wisdom ; and we believe that the power and wisdom thus exercised belong to His necessary existence. Again, I must submit, with aU deference, that Dr. 378 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. Mansel only perplexes the discussion, : and misleads the inquirer, without rendering the least perceptible service to us in our search after truth, when he speaks of the In- finite Being becoming a cause, and asks, " How can the Infinite become that which it was not frona the first V All agree in holding that the Infinite Being cannot be- come anything else than He has been — that from ever- lasting to everlasting He is unchangeable. And since this is a matter of necessary belief with aU, it can be nothing else than confusion of language which seems to throw any doubt upon it. There is the clearest possible distinction between acting in a particular relation, and becoming something else in nature, or passing from one mode of being into another. To becoTne something, is to change the nature ; to do something, is to put forth power, whUe retaining the same nature. Before engaging in "word-juggling" with the verbs "to cause," and "to become," it behoved Dr. Mansel to show that, in actuig as a cause, the nature of the ejB&cient agent is changed, which he has not done, and cannot do. Every man knows that to put forth causal energy is not necessarily to change the nature, and he who argues as if change of being were necessarily involved in acting as cause, only makes difficulties, instead of helping to remove those which really exist. To argue as if causation were a " mode of existence," and not a mere relation, as if it implied the addition of a new attribute to the Absolute, or transition from one state to another, such as from "qui- escence" to " activity," is in every way unwarrantable. Our knowledge of the Absolute is certainly obtained by the recognition of His existence in relation, but our KNOWLEDGE OP THE FIRST CAUSE. 379 knowledge is one and does not recognise in any of the relations contemplated, any change in His nature. We may not be able to explain how God creates, but we necessarily believe that in creating there is no change in His existence, and all our knowledge of His nature, and aU our thought concerning Him, harmonize with this belief. If, then, it be true that we have a natural belief in a self-existent First Cause, and that all faith implies a mea- sure of knowledge, inquiry remains to be made concern- ing the nature of the knowledge which we possess. In prosecuting such an inquiry, there are two questions re- quiring to be answered, What is our knowledge of a cause as such ■? and what is our knowledge of the First Cause ? When we perceive an event, for example, in the ex- ternal world, we may at the same time observe the cause which produces the event. In such a case, our know- ledge of the cause is our recognition of those character- istics of the object which iraplj power competent to pro- duce the observed result. There may, however, be other qualities which go to make up the sum of being in the object, which is regarded by us as a cavjse in the particular relation at the time under our consideration.. The object as a whole is certainly known, but this particular act of knowledge, in so far as it is distinctively the recognition of the object as cause, involves more expressly the cognition of those qualities which involve the power to produce the effect. In some cases, the cause of. a particular occurrence may not be recognised, and the mind, guided by the na- tive law of causality, not only believes in the existence of a cause, but, out of the materials of its own experience, imagines the particular nature of the cause, or adopts a 380 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. sufficient hypothesis, until the reahty is discovered. In such a case there is only such knowledge of a cause as the nature of the effect, and the materials of personal ex- perience in other cases, may afford. But the true know- ledge of a cause springs from the recognised relation between the effect and the cause itself. Both effect and cause are known as objects presented to the mind, and our knowledge is the cognition of their relation. In this way we have the knowledge of finite causes in operation around us, and the great law of causality neces- sarily involves the acknowledgment of a self-existent First Cause. Every finite cause either leads at once to the First Cause, or is a fink in the chain of causes which guides the mind at length to the Absolute Being, accord- ing to the nature of the exercise in which human inteUi- gence is engaged. It is impossible to explain the being of an individual existence, except by a reference to the Eternal One. On the other hand, if we perceive or sup- pose that a certain cause has been itself modified by some previously existing cause, and that again by another, we cannot believe that there is an unending chain of such finite causes. We must repose at last in the existence of a Being possessed of infinite power ; that is, whose power is not hmited by any other power, but who is the source of aE. finite causation. While, then, all finite existence conducts the mind to the self-existent Being, we have in the works of creation a relative manifestation of the power, wisdom, and good- ness of that Being. Such being the case, it is as certain that we can attain to a knowledge, in some measiire at least, of the Deity, as First Cause, as that we do possess KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. 381 a knowledge of His works. With a fundamental belief in His existence, which of itself implies such a recogni- tion of His nature as His works could not give, the con- templation and study of these works must, by the laws of mind, unfold within us the original knowledge we have received. The forms of existence in this finite universe are the facts which require explanation, and such explana- tion can be obtaiaed only in and through the deliverance of an original belief, which again implies an origiual knowledge, capable of opening indefinitely in conscious- ness, according to the demands of our intelligence. It wiU therefore be observed that there can be no knowledge of a self-existent cause, except through an original beHef, and that such knowledge cannot arise in consciousness, or be developed there, without the contemplation of the Divine works. In other words, the Infinite Being can be known only in relation, and our knowledge of Him as First Cause is possible only m the recognition of the re- lation He bears to His works. That we have a belief in the infinite First Cause, is a fact universally admitted among philosophers, how- ever they differ concerning the origin of such belief; but, what is here maintained, in opposition to Sir W. Hamil- ton and Dr. Mansel, is that we have, and must have, a knowledge of the First Cause, in whose existence we believe. I hold that if, for explanation of finite' existence we repose by faith in the existence of an Infinite and Absolute Being, the necessary laws of our intelligence imply that we must have a knowledge of the nature of that Being. And if there be any such knowledge, it must be a knowledge of the Deity both positive and real, 382 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. certainly not merely negative, nor simply regulative. If there be any knowledge of the Infinite One, it must be a knowledge of His real nature, since a knowledge of Him hy what he is not, is no knowledge whatever, and is regu- latively useless, as it is actually nothing. That there is a positive knowledge of the First Cause, seems to me one of the most manifest facts in conscious- ness. Lying in close and necessary connexion are these two facts, which it is essential to distinguish : — (a.) a knowledge of the works of the Deity apart from their re- lation to the Creator ; and (&.) a helief in the existence of the Infinite Creator. But these two facts do not em- brace the entire results of the analysis of consciousness. There is a third fact, quite as certain and clear as the two just named, — (c.) that we have a knowledge of the Infinite Being, who is the object of faith. This fact, ■which I hope to establish by a reference to operations of mind patent to all, cannot by any possibility be con- founded with the knowledge of the works of God, nor can it be confounded with our faith. The most impor- tant point, therefore, is to mark the difierence between the fact I seek to point out, and the belief in the Divine existence. This is to be done by indicating the dis- tinctive characteristics of faith and knowledge. Faith is the conviction that an infinitely powerful, wise, and good Being exists ; knowledge is the recognition which the mind obtains of the nature, harmony, and operations of these attributes. Faith is complete and final whenever it arises in the mind, knowledge is capable of expan- sion ; faith is the same at every moment, knowledge is progressive ; faith is the same whether it arise in con- I KNOWLEDGE OF THE ElEST CAUSE. 383 sciousness to account for the existence of a blade of grass or of a world, knowledge expands according to tlie study of the works of the Creator. With these distinctive characteristics of faith and knowledge presented to view, I ask whether it is true that the Infinite Being is only the object oi faith ? Is there no other exercise of mind concerning God, save that wliich is complete and final, and which is therefore the same at every moment, whether we contemplate the smallest herb or the wide universe ? I confess it impos- sible for me to see how an adequate record of the facts of consciousness can be attempted without acknowledg- ing that, besides the permanent and uniform conviction of the existence of the Infinite Being, there is another exercise of mind concerning God, which is continually enlarging, as the result of ovoc patient and reverential contemplation of His works. Here inquiry, research, and contemplation are all possible, and as the result of these, the mind finds itseK possessed of a more complete acquaintance with the Divine nature than before. This is knowledge. And such knowledge, in its very least measure, is in harmony with our faith, and, so far, a knowledge of the Infinite Being as He is. Knowledge by its expansion is coming near to fill up the measure of faith, though it be true, as I hold it is, that the spheres of the two will never be co-extensive. But if any one would deny that such knowledge is a cognition of the Infinite Being as He really is, he must prove that it is knowledge which is not acquired under the guidance of faith, which, 1 submit, cannot be done. That this knowledge is really a knowledge of the 384 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Infinite Being, may, I think, be made manifest. Though the worlcs of the Deity are limited, we do not recognise anything which bears the least trace of His power hav- ing been retarded or obstructed, but quite the reverse. Our observation is limited at every point as we advance, and our knowledge is consequently limited ; but how- ever far it extend, there is no recognition of even the shadow of limitation. Notwithstanding these facts, that His works are limited, and that our knowledge is limited, we cannot even imagine or suppose that He is finite. We cannot assign the boundaries of our knowledge to the nature of the Deity, for we are conscious of nothing more decidedly than this, that the knowledge which recognises limits in the object, is not a knowledge of the First Cause. If it were attempted, even by a mental experiment, to impute limits to the Being who is con- templated as the cause of the universe, we should ac- knowledge at once that this restricted Being is not the First Cause. Our knowledge, unfolding as it does by the contemplation of the relative testimony of our faith, and the illustration of the Divine works, is essentially a knowledge of the Infinite Being as He reaUy exists; That knowledge is not obtained by a consideration of the testimony of our faith alone, nor by an examination of the works of creation alone, but by a consideration of the relation of these two, that is, of the bearing of our faith on facts recognised. In this way, it appears, that the more we study the appfication of our fundamental befief to the compficated forms of existence presented in the universe, the more does our original knowledge of the self-existent Being open up in consciousness. KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIEST CAUSE. 385 This knowledge of the First Cause is a clear know- ledge, since it is the cognition of power which has pro- duced the most stupendous results ; of wisdom, which has employed the most ingenious and complicated con- trivances for the attainment of desired ends; and of goodness, which has provided with profuse benevolence for the wants of every living thiag. And, besides, this clear knowledge is also a distinct knowledge, in respect both of the recognised distinction between the attributes knowji and the form of knowledge itself. In the whole circle of knowledge otherwise obtained, we have no cog- nition of power, wisdom, or goodness which admits of the least comparison with these attributes as we know them to exist in the Deity. And in no other instance are we conscious of attaining to a knowledge of existence under the guidance of a necessary belief testifying to the infinite perfection of the Being, We are thus able to discriminate this knowledge from every other knowledge by marks of distinction the most broad and easily re- cognised. While, however, this knowledge is clear and distinct, it is always inadequate, and from the very nature of the mind must for ever continue to be so. Knowledge of the First Cause, however far it reaches, never involves the recognition of limits ; on the contrary, it implies distinct consciousness of the impossibility of measuring the ob- ject by the cognitive power exercised upon it, or of attributing the limits of knowledge, to the existence of the object known. KJuowledge, as has been stated, is progressive, but in advancing from stage to stage, and embracing still more within its sphere, there is never at ■ 2 B 386 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. any point the, slightest, variation in the' .consciousness that our knowledge, is far short of theiobject We may dwell among the works of God, and contemplate them assiduously as displaying :very marvellously the ex- cellencies of the Great :- Creator.; but, guided by the necessary belief in His infinite perfection, we never can, by any degree of progress, come to contemplate the ful- ness of His glory. How much our knowledge of His transcendent attributes may expand, every one knows who has concentrated the attention upon the revela- tion He has given of His nature, in the works of His hand. While the wonders of creation open to our admiring, view, still greater wonders are found rising within the mind as our necessary recognition of the Deity unfolds, giving to the outer world a meaning, which only those . who study it to this end, can see ; and?'clothing it; with a grandeur, which nothing save the contemplation of its .Creator could convey. Though the external, works of . creation, even in;, their grandest aspects, give but an imperfect iUustrafibn of. the great-^ ness of that God whose word usherq.d them into being ; the mind, with its own special ,and richer treasure of faith, can advance indefinitely in the attainment of fresh knowledge, without finding the means of such progress fail. , What shall be the method of advancing our know- ledge' in a future state, is very faintly indicated to us ; but our faith in the infinite excellence of the self- existent Creator will abide as the inheritance: of j our mind ; and the works to be contemplated there,-.however much more glorious than those spread out before us here, KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIKST CAUSE. 3 8*7 as being still the works of the same Grod, will be in har- mony with the illustration of the Divine nature, afforded to us ia the creation contemplated now. And as it is self-evident that our knowledge and thought will still be regulated by all those mental laws which spring from the limited nature of created mind, it is manifest that, in the attainment of our knowledge of the Deity now, we are on the line along which we shall continue to advance throughout eternity, however much more rapid our progress, and magnificent the results of our study. If we tread a nobler world, if we listen with more raptur- ous delight, to harmony more exquisite, if we hold con- verse with minds ennobled, our knowledge shall even then be only such knowledge as finite minds can have of an Infinite Creator. CHAPTER VIII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFINITE BEING IN THE RELA- TION OP MORAL GOVERNOR. Man is not merely a being gifted with a power of reasoning, who pursues courses of elaborate iavestigation, and inquires into the origin of things. He is, indeed, attracted by the marvellous appearances of an external universe ; by the wonders of vegetation, now retiring into dormant stillness, and again with new vigour stretch- ing forth its arms to welcome the summer's sun, and move to the sweet music of the breezes ; by the comph- cated organism of the animal creation ; and by the huge masses of material form, rolling in the expanse of space. With feelings of admiration and awe, he beholds such objects, and rises from them to think of the Being from whom they came ; and thus his mind comes into relation with the great First Cause, — with the wisdom which devised, with the power which created, with the might which sustains aU things. WhUe, however, this is one relation in which man comes into contact with the In- finite Being, it is not the only one. He has within his own mind, independently of everything else, a necessary knowledge of a Being infinite and supreme. Man is endowed with a moral nature, necessarily discriminating KNOWLEDGE OP THE MORAL GOVEENOR. 389 between right and wrong, possessed of a conviction of moral oUigation, conscious of merit and demerit, and therefore possessed of the knowledge of a supreme Moral Governor. The position which I maintain is, that m the moral nature of man, God has given a certain manifesta- tion of His glory, which, when taken in relation with our belief, in His perfect holiness, necessarily affords us a knowledge of His nature. And, still further, I affirm that man can be a moral being, only on the ground of a knowledge of the God who governs, and of the law according to which He governs. There are in the mind many first priaciples which we cannot demonstrate, the truth of which we never thought of attenlpting to prove, and yet they are principles which we cannot doubt. Even from a logical point of view, it is manifest that this must be the case, for, since the act of reasoning is an act of comparison, it is plain that there must be certain fixed and original principles upon which comparison is instituted, and aU reasoning proceeds. As truly as the stream must have a fountain, and the building a foundation, so must each mind have its fountain of truth, a blessed communication from the fountain of all truth ; so must each process of reasoning have in the mind a sure foundation, upon which the validity of the whole must be estabhshed. Among these first principles we find some which mark off for themselves a peculiar sphere. They do not exist as the basis of intellectual truth; they do not belong to the same sphere as those first principles which afford the criterion by which to test the validity of the operations and decisions of the judgment. They refer to 390 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the actions of men, and find their application by viewing these actions in a pesculiar relation. They do not distin- • guish the intellectually true, but the moraUy good. They are not concerned with what man can hnow, but with what man ought to do. Locke has said : " Whether there be any such moral principles wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys." This appeal I desire to meet in a way quite the reverse of that which a sensational philosophy represents as possible. We find in consciousness the recognition of a peculiar quality as belonging to our actions. By the constitution of our nature, that is to say, by a necessity of our mind, we distinguish between the right and thewrong — between the moraUy good and the morally bad. If we are asked, what is this quality of goodness or badness in actions ? —we cannot reply. A logical definition is impossible. We can find no answer except that we are conscious that certain actions are good, and others evil. Within the mind there is a standard by which we test our actions ; conformity to this standard distinguishes an action as right ; antagonism to this standard marks out. the action as wrong. The principles which constitute this standard are implanted in our nature, and we admit them, for no other reason than that we must. They are part of our being, and we can no more deny them, than we can deny our own nature. It is true that they may not be recog- nised in the mind of each individual in a systematized order. The great majority of men, not being given to reflection upon their own consciousness, may have no KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORAL GOVERNOR. 391 very distinct knowledge of. their individual import, but their existence and / authority are nevertheless tacitly acknowledged. . In .the ordinaiyj experience of men, these principles leadlto the discrimination of actions as morally*, right or wrong. Each man finds in himself cthe':;cbjd-^V* sciousness of the necessity to rhake this distinction, and he perceives its recognition on the part of all those who are around him. The principles of right and wrong are the spontaneous deliverances of the soul — the free utter- ances of our moral constitution. The principles of morality are thus an essential part of our being, authoritative and final, and in no way de- pendent either upon individual experience, or upon ex- ternal circumstances. They draw their entire authority from the Creator who implanted them in the mind. To deny this, were to overturn the foundation of aU morality, and make an ethical system an impossibility. If there be no fixed principles, then, there can be no morality at aU, and each man must be allowed to foUow his inclina- tion. On this supposition, there can be no uniform standard of right. An action wUl be approved of by some, wMle it is condemned by others, and pronounced a matter of total indifierence by a third party. There -can be no public opinion uniformly approving of one •class of actions, and as uniformly condemning another ; and men must fail to discover any fitness between action -and punishment.. ■ -But things have not come to such a pass among men. t Every individual is conscious of the exercispj of ijudgment on- moral actions, and if he observe and analyse vtheseinental acts, he will find that they must be traced 392 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. to certain principles, which have always been beHeved, just because they must. Look around upon society, and the same fact is at once apparent. Notwithstanding that there are points of detaU upon which men may differ, the great leading outlines of moraUty are so fixed and unwavering, that it is clearly manifest that there are certain universally admitted principles — certain ne- cessary truths — constituting the basis of morality. Along with these principles of right and wrong, there is the consciousness of obligation to perform what is right, and to shun what is wrong ; and both taken together, along with our belief in the perfectly holy Being, imply in the mind the knowledge of the Supreme Being, who has drawn the line between right and wrong, and to whom we are responsible. Some, indeed, have maintained that the happiness or misery resulting from actions is that which detemunes their character, and that our moral judgments are based upon experience. Such a doctrine proceeds upon a very partial examination of human nature ; it is glaringly one-sided, and self-destructive in its results. Look at such a doctrine, as it professes to determine what constitutes virtue, and what constitutes vice. A virtuous action is said to be that which leads to happi- ness ; and a vicious action, that which leads to misery. Does this constitute the moral character of actions, and is it thus we invariably judge of them ? The slightest reflection may show that this is not the case. Let us only reflect upon our own consciousness, and we shall find that we often pronounce our judgment upon actions altogether irrespective of consequences, and this fact KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORAL GOVEENOE. 393 again forces upon us the conclusion, that there are in the mind certain fixed principles by which we judge. We find that in the action pronounced virtuous, there is something which we admire and commend irrespective of consequences ; that in the action declared wrong, there is somethiag which an internal authority condemns, apart fi^om results to ourselves or others. There are certain actions which harmonize with the constitution of the mind ; and there are others which cause an entire revulsion. Again, who wiU afl&rm, that the purpose for which God made man an inteUigent and moral being, was simply to follow after happiness ? Who will assert that happiness is the one great aim which has been set before men, and in attaining which they shaU have gained the grand purpose of their being ? The whole character of our moral beiag is against such an assertion ; its consti- tution is based upon a more exalted foundation ; it has an apphcation inexpressibly more lofty and noble. It is unnecessary to enter into detail, or dwell at great length upon this question, but the daily incidents of life cleaily show the insufficiency and incompleteness of the doctrine of happiness, as a basis for a moral system. Take into account the depravity of man's nature, and you find but too many instances in which a man must resist his desire after happiness, if he is to adhere to what is morally right. The individual feels ail the tendencies of his nature impelling him in one direction, while the alluring charms of pleasure dazzle his eye ; yet the cahn, stiU voice within, proclaims the action wrong. Nay more^ how many instances do we find, in which man must 394 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. resist not only the evil tendencies of Ms nature, but even the better emotions of the soul, when he must set aside the claims of affection, when -he must waive his desire for the approbation of others, and when, under the guiding influence of stedfast principle, he must advance on his course, thoiigh he I have to endure the grief of friends, and the scorn ;of a- multitude of) observers. There are innumerable instances in which present happiness does not determine ^what is morally right, and a calculation of future happiness is not the source of our decision. Moreover, if .we ' seek to determine^ the charapter of an action by the nature of its conseq-uences, we cannot take into account the self-approbation or^rei morse which may be experienced, after the action is done since this were to beg the whole question. Self-appro- bation is ' felt only when an action is done, previously judged to be right ; and remorse is felt only when an action is done, previously judged to be wrong. Both self-approbation and remorse are possible only aft&r^ a determination of the character of the action. It is ithus apparent, that the possibility of either of these^ emotions arising in the mind, can become evident only after a decision has heen given upon the moral 'character of the action. To attempt to take these into consideration in judging of the character of the action is absurd. I certainly do not consider that the doctrine of hap^ piness gives anything approaching to a complete view of our moral nature, though it possesses a share of truth. I admit that there is a principle in our mind by which we approve of those actions which lead to the greater hap- piness of our feUow-men, but it is an exceedingly imper- KNOWLEDGE OP THE MOBAL GOVERNOR. 395 feet examination of our mental constitution which ter- minates with this as the entire sum of our moral nature. There is no doctrine sufficient to explain the facts of our consciousness except that which has been stated, that our judgment of the moral character of .actions is based upon certain universal and necessary principled implanted in our mind. These are the first principles of morality, appointed to regulate aU our actioiis. The complement of these principles is what I would call conscience, and, in strict philosophical propriety, I think this name should have no other application. It is true that the term Conscience is used by many philosophical writers in a much wider, signification. It has been made to embrace the judgment, memory, and such feelings and emotions as shame, remorse, and self-approbation. Such a compli- cation of phenomena under a single term, and applied to, a single faculty, is in total violation of the principle which must regulate the classification of all mental phenomena. An investigation into the, nature of the mind, cer- tainly leads to the conclusion, that we are endowed with the faculty of Conscience, that is to say, that we possess certain necessary principles by which we determine the moral charact^ of actions. These principles havingcbeen implanted in the human mind, are a universal . posses- sion. I do not mean to assert that they are always con- sciously present in the mind. I even admit that," by a determined course of perversity in thought' and action, they may be kept in temporary concealment ; but stiU, these principles are there, and however morally hardened any man may. be,, the calm declaration of 396 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. them will compel him to admit their authority. Man may, by a constant ejffort, keep these principles out of view, but if his attention be directed to them, he wiU find himself unable to resist their authority, even though he would. Nay, even his best efforts will not succeed in keeping the first principles of morality from his mind ; as a moral being, his very life involves the conscious re- cognition of their authority. It is thus evident that man is a being possessed of fixed principles, by which the moral character of actions is determined. But this is not all ; there is also in the mind a principle by which man recognises that he is under obligation to the Supreme Being, to perform what is right, and avoid what is wrong. Possessing, as he does, the knowledge of right and wrong, he is also conscious that this knowledge implies duty, for he feels himself responsible to the Infinite Grod. Duty, obliga- tion, responsibility, are terms which do not admit of a logical definition, though they express what is constantly recognised by aU. Here, then, is another relation in which arises a knowledge of the Infinite G-od, — a know- ledge which, I maintain, is necessary to the human mind, necessary that man may exist as a moral being. Some, indeed, who have admitted that man has a moral nature, have nevertheless denied that he has a necessary belief in the existence of God ; but a more contradictory position could scarcely be conceived. A moral being who has no belief in the existence of Grod, is an impossi- bihty. If there be no God, how can there be any moral- ity,— how can there be any virtue, — how can there be any responsibility ? How can our actions be right or KNOWLEDGE OP THE MORAL GOVERNOR. 39*7 wrong, if there be no Supreme Being, whose nature is the standard of afr right 1 How can we be responsible for our actions, if there be no supreme moral Governor, who has fixed the character of aU actions, and who shall call us to account ? The knowledge of right and wrong, and the consciousness of obligation, necessarily imply the belief in a Supreme Being. This must be the basis of the whole moral system, else the structure falls. It will be granted, then, that man, as a moral being, must have a belief in a supreme moral Governor ; but, it ■wiU be denied, that we have a knowledge of that Infinite Being. That we know the Supreme Being as moral Governor, I consider no less clear, than that we believe in His existence. Anything more absurd can hardly be imagined than the assertion made by Hobbes, that " the name of God is not used that we may conceive Him, for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power in- conceivable, but that we may honour him."^ How can we honour a being, of whose nature and attributes we can form no conception ? If there be in the mind cer- tain first principles by which to determine the character of actions, and, besides, a principle by which to recognise responsibihty for our actions, it is perfectly plain, that we must know the Supreme Being to whom we are re- sponsible. We must recognise Him as a distinct person- aliiy, whose moral nature is known to us. In order to act upon the moral principles implanted in our mind, and, in order at all to feel our responsibihty, we must so know the Supreme Being, as to be certain that the moral principles which we are necessitated to recognise, are in 1 Leviathian, c. 8. 398 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. accordaape with His moral nature, and are thus conform- able to the standard to which we are*responsible, and by which we shall be judged. God's nature, is the ultimate standard of aU right, and His will is the expression of His nature, so that it matters not, whether it be said that a thing is right, because it is in accordance with God's nature ; or, because it is in accordance with God's will, — the standard being the same in both cases. But this is rhanifest, that fixed principles of morality, and a con- sciousness of obligation, in order to exist in the mind, must be accompanied by a knowledge of the Supreme Being who has imposed the standard. These, two : the knowledge of moral principles ; and the knowledge of a supreme rdoral Governor, are the inseparable terms of a relation essential for the existence of a. subordinate moral being. Take away the one, and you destroy the other. Since, therefore, man is in possession of moral principles, he must also be in possession of the knowledge of a supreme moral Governor, and be, capable of forming a notion of His moral excellence. The testimony of experience gives satisfactory evidence of what is- here afiirmed. When we recognise an action, the performance of which is clearly marked as a part of our duty, the mind comes naturally into contact with the Supreme Being. We recognise our relation to Him, and perceive that His will demands our performance of the action. Nay, more, so positive is our knowledge of the Infinite God, that our whole emotional nature is iijflu- enced by the consciousness that He is observing us. There is ho negation here. These thoughts and emotions are too real, their impression is too deep, their influence KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORAL GOVERNOR. 399 is too solemnizing, to be referred to a negation as their originating cause. Agaia, when we feel tempted ^ to com- mit an action which conscience condemns, om^ depraved tendencies may incline us to the deed, and circumstances may favour us ; but the consciousness of Grod's presence may overawe us, and that in a way which they cannot explain who turn the Infinite into a negation. I do not say that these thoughts are always realized ; on the con- trajy, I acknowledge the darkening influences of habitual violation of the moral standai?d ; but there are times when aU men feel what has laeen described; . Nor are the facts of consciousness exhausted which establish my position, We have not merely certain ne- cessary principles of moral rectitude, accompanied by the cohscioushess of obligation ;' we have also special emo- tions, which perforni! an iraportant part within the moral sphere. There aTe'Iee]iia.gs,{oi self-approbation anc^ re- morse which rise in the mind according to the character of our actions. When we are condemned and scorned by those around us for the discharge of'jwhat we perceive to be diity, what is that feelingj of satisfaction experienced by the mind conscious of rectitude, ■but the sense of ap- proval from; the Supreme Being! 1 And when we have done wrong, what is the vexation and misery felt within ? What is the bitter feeling of remorse, but the confession of the soul to the consciousness of the presence, and of the moral character, and of the disapprobation, and of the power of the Infinite Being ? ' Such are the mental phenomena recognised as belong- . uig to the moral sphere. We are conscious of a moral distinction between actions^of obligation to perform the 400 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. one class, and shun the other ; of self-approbation in doing what is right ; and of self-condemnation in doing what is wrong, — :and, according to the character of our actions, peace soothes the soul, or remorse troubles the heart. Let us try to explain these mental phenomena, without admitting the knowledge of the One Infinite Being, and the task will be found impossible. On such a hypothesis, these prin- ciples and emotions become inexplicable, and even con- tradictory. But admit the real and positive knowledge of the Infinite Being, and the difficulty is solved, since you have the great central fact, which gives order and unity to the whole. Give us the knowledge of the supreme and infinite Personality, supreme in moral authority, infinite in purity and holiness, and then we can think of moral right and wrong as that which He has ordained ; then we can form the notion of obligation, as that^ which He demands ; then we have peace, because He approves ; then we have fear, because He condemns. The knowledge of the supreme moral Governor is a ne- cessity of our nature. Let it not be said that we have no knowledge of the Infinite Being, when our conscious- ness contradicts the assertion, when the universal experi- ence of humanity is against it, and when, in multiplied instances, the knowledge of His character, and actual presence is so vivid, as to make the soul exult in the approval of a satisfied God, or tremble m an agony of dismay under the frown of the Almighty. After the analysis of the facts of consciousness just given, it will be comparatively simple to present the results in a systematic form. First, as the manifest basis of the whole, comes our belief in the existence of the KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORAL GOVERNOR. 401 Supreme Moral Governor, or in other words, the testi- mony of faith to the reality of a Being infinitely and absolutely holy and just. This is a fundamental and necessary belief of the mind. It is a fact given to us as beyond doubt, that there is a Supreme Moral Grovernor ; and, in testifying that He is a Moral Governor, it reveals the Deity as holy and just ; in declaring that He is the Supreme Moral Governor, it reveals that He is infinitely and absolutely holy and just. Nothing less than this is the belief which we find implanted in our mind, a fact which is abundantly confirmed by experience, since the most ordinary applications of the conscience involve the admission of all this, as presented on authority superior to our own nature, and not dependent on the deductions of our reasoning power. Dr. Mansel admits this as the real ground of assurance to us concerning the Deity, and grants that " it is our duty to beheve that He is infinite. "^ In this special relation, he says, " We are compelled, by the consciousness of moral obligation, to assume the existence of a moral Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right and wrong, as constituted by the nature of that Deity." ^ Here, then, is the admission, that, by a necessity of our nature, we have the conviction of the existence of a moral Deity, of an absolute standard of right and wrong, and of the identity of that standard with the Divine nature. We necessarily beheve that the Divine holiness and justice are quite above those quali- ties as they exist in us. While our holiness is obedience to God's law, His Tioliness is purity without any obedi- ence ; while our hohness is right feeling towards Him, » Limits of Religious Thought, p. 89, ^ Ibid. p. 112. 2 C 402 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. as the Deity, His holiness is absolute moral exceUenee, without the feeling of reverence or submission towards any superior being ; while our justice is equity towards fellow -creatures and fellow -subjects, who have claims upon us by their relation to us. His justice is the exer- cise of his authority over us, according to the moral purity of His being, and in harmony with the law which He has given us, and the relations He has appointed us to sustain. In a word, faith proclaims the existence of a beiag absolutely holy and just. Secondly, this belief in the Absolute Moral Euler, necessarily imphes a certain knowledge of His nature. By the uniform laws of mind it is impossible to have a behef ia some Being, who is distinguished from all others, without some knowledge of His distinguishing attributes. If, then, our belief in a moral Deity be a necessary con- viction belonging to the mental constitution which our Creator has given us, there must be, in the ordinary experience of life, and exercise of consciousness, facts which call this behef into exercise. And further, by means of these facts, our knowledge of the Deity, as a moral Euler, must be expanded. What these facts are, has been made sufficiently obvious in the course of this chapter. The moral nature which we have received — in- volving, .as it does, a distinct moral law, a conviction of moral obhgation, and the conflicting emotions of moral approbation and remorse — is God's revelation to us of His own moral nature. Though the sad traces of de- pravity are everywhere present in our heart, they are easily enough recognised as evils, which our moral nature itself condemns ; and we are able clearly to KNOWLEDGE OP THE MORAL GOVERNOR. ' 403 distinguisli what are the essential elements of our moral condition, originally communicated to us by God. Not- withstanding the injury which depravity implies, the moral law in our nature remains clear, the consciousness of obligation to the Deity continues, and the capacity for seK-approbation or remorse is not gone. With such a moral nature, and circumstances continually arising which require its exercise ; and with a necessary beUef in the absolutely holy and just Euler ; we have a revelation of the Deity, which imphes on our part knowledge of His nature, and the power to advance in that knowledge. If, in the daily operations of our moral nature, we seek to exercise holiness and justice according to our relative position, and thereby call regularly into consciousness our original belief in the absolutely holy and just moral Governor, the knowledge, which that behef necessarily imphes, must unfold within us. Here, as everywhere else, observation and reflection lead to increased know- ledge. Our knowledge of the Supreme Moral Governor is a clear knowledge, being the knowledge of a Being holy and just. It is a distinct knowledge^ iavolving as it does the recognition of a form of holiness and justice, not known as belonging to any other being — hohness and justice altogether above our own, to which there is no recognised restriction because of obhgation to any superior, while faith expressly testifies that there is and can be none such. But, whUe this is a knowledge clear and distinct, it is as obviously a knowledge inadequate. We can know, only so far as our relation of moral creatures reveals the Deity ; and we do individually know, only in so far as we reflect upon what our relation to the 404 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Moral Governor actually reveals concerning His moral nature. Whatever diversity in the degree of knowledge of the Deity there be among men, He is not, and can- not be, in any instance known as possessed of holiness and justice identical with our own ; but He is known as having such a moral nature as harmonizes with ours, to the extent to which the nature of the absolute Moral Euler can. But He is not known as possessed of a nature " after the model of the highest human moral- ity ;" nor is it true of the Divine nature, that " its sole and sufficient type is to be found in the finite goodness of man." No one who considers the facts of conscious- ness, would think of describing our knowledge of the Moral Governor by such expressions. " The model of the highest human morahty " is nT)thing more than the model of human morality after all, and the moral nature of the Deity is known as distinct from what is human. " The finite goodness of man " is one thing ; the abso- lute hohness of God is quite a different thing. They are revealed to us as essentially difierent, and the knowledge of them is completely distinct. " The finite goodness of man" is in no sense whatever the "type" of the absolute goodness of the Deity, far less " the sole and sufficient type." No one having the least regard to the testimony of faith, in its application to the operations of our moral nature, could dream of affirming that the absolute goodness of the Supreme Being is after the " tjrpe " of the " finite goodness of man ; " however true it may be, in a very subordinate sense, that " the finite goodness of man " is after the type of the Divine goodness, or that man has been created " in the image of KNOWLEDGE OP THE MORAL GOYEENOR. 405 God." I therefore repudiate these expressions, as used by Dr. Mansel/ and deny that they give the sUghtest indication of the theory on which a positive knowledge is maintained, or that his arguments based on them have the least application to the merits of the case. It is here- with most unequivocally declared that the knowledge of the Supreme Moral Governor is not, and cannot be, attained by attempting to impute to God " the model of the highest human morality ; " for, in the first place, such an attempt is a mere intellectual device, altogether dis- tinct from knowledge ; and, in the second place, such a device cannot be attempted without a violation of our own moral constitution. And yet, it is herewith as unequivocally declared, on the authority of the facts of consciousness already stated, that we have a positive knowledge of the absolute goodness and justice of God, as essentially distinct from " the finite goodness of man." Thirdly, This positive knowledge afibrds the materials for a conception of the Supreme Moral Euler. "Whatever is the object of knowledge, may also be the object of thought, or the object about which the mind thiuks, contrasting it with other objects, and marking the points of difference. Whatever is presented in knowledge may be represented in thought. As I have endeavoured to show, it is not necessary in conception, any more than in knowledge, that the characteristics of the object be fully embraced. As we know the absolutely holy and just One, so we can carry up the materials of our knowledge into a conception of the Supreme Moral Euler, such as can be represented to the mind at any time, for the purpose of reasoning 1 Limits of Religious Thought, Preface to Third Edition, p. x. 406 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. concerning the Being to whom it applies, or the relations in which He must stand to His creatures, who possess a finite moral goodness. It will be observed, that it is here aflfirmed, that without positive knowledge, there could be no conception of the Deity ; and therefore, that this con- ception is the product of a positive knowledge, actually existing ia consciousness. It is because we have a clear knowledge of Grod as holy and just, that we have a clear conception of a Being possessed of these attributes ; it is because we have a knowledge of His holiness and justice as absolute, that is, unrestricted by subjection to a higher authority, that we have a distinct conception of a Being possessed of hohness and justice, quite different from these qualities in man ; and it is because our know- ledge is iaadequate, that our conception must be so too. It win, therefore, be kept in view by the reader, that while a positive conception of the Supreme Moral Go- vernor is here maiutained and defended, it is not professed that this conception is attained by the " attempt to sepa- rate the condition of finiteness from the conception" of the " finite goodness of man," though Dr. Mansel affirms that such a conception can be attained ia no other way. If a man were to make such an attempt, he could not come to any result, far less keep a result before his mind, " tUl criticism has detected the self-contradiction involved in the attempt."'^ I maintain that there cannot be a belief in the existence of an absolutely holy and just Being, without at the same time a certain knowledge of His nature ; and, if there be such a knowledge, the possibility of a relative conception of His nature is certain. » Liimits of Religious Thought, Pref. to Third Edition, p. xvi. KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORAL GOVERNOR. 407 Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to consider somewhat more particularly the arguments of Dr. Mansel on this branch of the subject. There is, first, the usual "word-juggling" about relatives, which can never be dispensed with, however often it is to be repeated ; and there is, secondly, an argument from the knowledge and conception we have of Personality. We must, of course, say a few words over again about the first point, as this little piece of fencing seems al- ways necessary for our author, before coming to more special debate on the particular aspect of the question presented. " The consciousness of the Infinite is neces- sarily excluded ; first, by the mere existence of a relation between two distinct agents."^ The necessary belief of our mind, the authority of which Dr. Mansel admits, de- clares as beyond all dispute, the fact that the Infinite Being does exist in relation with other agents, and this argument as involving not only a neglect, but an actual violation of faith, is wrong from the foundation. Since, therefore, the Infinite Being does exist in relation. He is not excluded from the sphere of knowledge by the fact that aU knowledge implies, relation. But, these remarks are quite by the way, as the established introduction to the real debate. It is true, that if this first position were of any value whatever, there could be no need for our author going further ; but he never does stop short with this general statement. The special position defended by Dr. Mansel is the following : — The Moral " Lawgiver must be conceived as a Person, and the only human conception of person- ' lArrdts of Religious Thought, p. 119. 408 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. ality is that of limitation."^ This assertion of an alleged fact is to be met by a counter assertion, and thereafter it win be needful to lead evidence concerning the fact. I admit, then, that the Moral Lawgiver is known and conceived of as a Person, but I deny that the knowledge and conception of personality, are identical with the knowledge and conception of limitation. If we know a finite person, our conception must be that of a finite person ; but if we know an Infinite Person, that is, if personality be known apart from limitation, then our conception must be that of an Infinite Person. What I seek to show is that personality is not limitation. "Our knowledge of mind," says Dr. Mansel, "is governed by the condition of personality." And a per- son, according to him, is " a conscious self," — a " being who is not identical with any one of his attributes, but the common subject of them all." Though I object to this way of designating personality as a condition of knowledge, I am quite willing to accept the definitions of " person," and to grant that our knowledge of mind is the knowledge of a " conscious self." These definitions being accepted, the point demand- ing special attention is, what persons are known to us, and how Dr. Mansel explains the transition from know- ledge to conception, or from presentation to representa- tion, in such a way as to come to the sweej)ing conclu- sion that "personality" is identical with "limitation," or that every conscious intelligence must be finite. Let us see how Dr. Mansel accomplishes this. The whole result is summarily attained in one brief sentence. 1 Limits of Religious Tliought, p. 119, KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORAL GOVERNOR. 409 Here it is : " Our own personality is presented to us as relative and limited ; and it is from that presentation that all our representative notions of personality are de- rived."^ This is a most singular method of reaching a conclusion, which is certainly deserving of some httle consideration. When it is said that " our own person- ality is presented to us as relative and limited/' I grant it, as beyond all doubt. Consciousness in our mind is the relation of our mind to its own states, and we are certainly restricted in the exercise of our own conscious- ness. But true as this is of our personality, how does Dr. Mansel come to affirm that from our own person aHty are derived all our notions of personality ? This is assuming the very thing which is to be established ; and besides, is the assertion of a fact, the reality of which I deny ; the mere assertion of which, moreover, I regard as a violation of the laws of thought. It is all-important in such discussion to keep the different parts of the sub- ject distinct, and therefore I shall glance at the testi- mony of faith, and the facts of knowledge, and those of conception, separately. In the first place, then, there is a necessary belief in. our mind which bears testimony to the existence of an Infinite Intelligence, that is, "a conscious self," not limited in itself, and not restricted by any existence out of self. If, then, a person is " a conscious self," our ne- cessary belief in the Deity declares the fact that there is a Personality essentially unlimited. Dr. Mansel takes no account of this fact in the present connexion, and yet, without doubt, he admits it. It is, however, to be 1 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 84. 410 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. observed that while faith reveals an Infinite Intelligence, it gives no revelation to us regarding the manner in which that inteUigence acts, though it expressly declares that the all-wise One is not, and cannot be, subject to the same conditions as those under which our finite minds act. The second consideration here is, whether our know- ledge involves the recognition of any personality except our own. I have granted the truth of the statement that " our own personahty is presented to us as relative and limited," in other words, our consciousness involves relation and limitation. But have we no knowledge of any " conscious self" except such as is similar to our own ? In opposition to Dr. Mansel, I say that there is such a knowledge in human consciousness. Having a behef in an Infinite Personality, and having a moral nature, the exercise of which brings us into direct con- tact with Him, we have a knowledge of that all-wise Beuig, and are conscious of those emotions which natu- rally arise when we are in the presence of a fiving Per- sonality. It seems to me that Dr. Mansel, instead of inqu.iring carefully whether this be not a fact in con- sciousness, has set himself to weave ingenious logical perplexities, drawn from false premises. Our author does not content himself with saying that a person is " a conscious self," — " a being who is not identical with any one of his attributes, but the common subject of them all," both of which statements I accept, but proceeds immediately to declare that " personality, as we conceive it, is essentially a hmitation and a relation." As this assertion is made concerning " personality as we conceive KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORAL GOVERNOR. 411 it," I presume it is intended to apply also to " personality as we kriow it." In this case, " personality " is identical with "limitation;" a new element is thrown into the definition of personality, and that an element which I deny ; and this is done by commencing to speak only of human personality, and thereafter adopting the general term "personality," as though some wider application were given to the argument, whereas there is in reality no reference to anything else than human personality. When he says " personality is essentially a limitation and relation," he says nothing more than that human person- ality is such. And when he proceeds with the universal assertions, there is stiU nothing more than a particidar reference. He says, " There is no personality in abstract thought without a thinker ; there is no thinker unless he exercises some mode of thought." Now, what authority has oxxx author for the assertion that there is " no person- ality" "without a thinker?" To think is to compare, and reach truth by the slow process of reasoning. By what authority is it afiirmed that such limitation applies to every personality ? Either Dr Mansel is speaking only of human personality, and not of all personality, or he applies the remark to the Infinite Being, and tran- scends his own theory in doing so. If the assertion that there is no personality without a thinker, be nothing more than the statement that every human mind is a thinker, it is a very harmless one. But if the assertion be that there is no "conscious seK" without a thinker, or, in other words, that the Infinite Being must be a thinker subject to the conditions of one who compares and rea- sons, I reply that such a statement contradicts the neces- 412 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. sary belief of our mind, by which the Deity is revealed to us, and is besides a violation of Dr. Mansel's own theory, as it professes a knowledge where he is constantly proclaiming that there can be nothing but ignorance. Our faith which reveals God as an all-wise Being, ex- pressly involves that He does not compare and reason. But the knowledge we have of the Deity is a knowledge of the nature of His attributes, and not of the manner of their operations. We really know nothing which enables us to answer the question how the Infinite Intelligence acts ; whether we shall ever attain to such a knowledge is a question equally beyond our power to answer. When Augustine says, " God is not a spirit as regards substance, and good as regards quality, but both as regards sub- stance ; the justice of God is one with His goodness and with His blessedness, and all are one with His spiritu- ality ;" I perfectly agree with Dr. Mansel when he says that " we have no means of judging " whether this asser- tion be literally true. And so, in like manner, we have no means of judging concerning the manner in which the Divine Intelligence operates. We do know that God is just and good and blessed, but whether these are one, or in some way distinct, we cannot tell. And so, that God is aU-wise is certain; that He is not "a thinker" is equally certain, but how His intelligence operates we cannot tell. That He is conscious, we are certain ; that His consciousness does not involve limitation is equally certain ; and therefore His Personality is not limitation, and of that Personality, I hold, we have a knowledge. But now, in the third place, it is necessary to glance at the manner in which Dr. Mansel deals with our con- KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORAL GOVERNOR. 413 ception of Personality. This brings us to contemplate the relation of the two clauses in the sentence originally quoted. He says : "Our own personaUty is presented to us as relative and limited ; and it is from that presenta- tion that all our representative notions of personality are derived." When in this last clause it is affiraied that " all our representative notions of personality" are drawn from oiir knowledge of our onm personality, this must mean either, that " all our representative notions of per- sonality" are notions of human personality ; or, that our representative notion of the Infinite Personality is formed from the knowledge of our oum personality ; and both of these positions I deny. If Dr. Mansel mean simply to declare that " all our representative notions of Personality" are notions of human personality, I deny that this is an accurate state- ment of the facts of consciousness. I have endeavoured to show that we have a knowledge of the Supreme Law- giver ; and, as we can form conception of all that we know, we have a conception of an Infinite Personality. The Supreme Moral Ruler is presented to our mind, and what is presented may also be conceived in a represen- tative notion. But if Dr. Mansel mean, and it is this which I under- stand him to mean, that our " representative notion" of the Infinite Personahty, or " conscious self," is formed out of the knowledge of our own personality, I cannot imagine a more flagrant violation of the laws of human thought, than this attempt to explain our notion of the Infinite Being as Moral Ruler. It is the one manifest and unmistakable law of thought, that we can only have 414 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. a " representative notion" of that which has been a fact presented in consciousness. It seems a very simple and self-evident thing, that only that which has been pre- sented can be represented. In other words, any concep- tion or notion which we have can be formed only from the materials of our knowledge, and can be a conception or notion only of the object known. And yet, if I am right in my interpretation of Dr. Mansel's meaning, he holds that our " representative notion" of the Deity is a notion formed from the knowledge of " our own per- sonality," which is " presented to us as relative and limited." Our "representative notion" of the Infinite Euler is formed by us from the knowledge we have of our own finite personality. If this be the doctrine main- tained, I shall perfectly agree with Dr. Mansel in sayiag, that such a notion cannot contain any " absolute truth" concerning the Infinite Ruler ; and I should like to add that it does not contain any "regulative truth," since such a "representative notion" would be certain to "re- gulate" us in the wrong direction ; and, finally, that it does not contain any one particle of truth of any kind. How can we have a " representative notion" of one thing, drawn from the knowledge of a totally different thing ? How can one and the same " notion" be the "representa- tive notion" of our own finite personality, and of the Infinite Personality ? If it be unflinchingly maintained that there is not, and never can be, in the human mind, any knowledge of the Infinite Being ; and that there is not, and never can be, any representative notion of the Deity, or of anything more than humanity, there is at least con- sistency in the dismal doctrine. But, if it be affirmed KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORAL GOVERNOR. 415 that we have a " representative notion" of the Infinite Being, from what is " presented " to us in consciousness as our own limited and relative personality, the doctrine, as I humbly think, is self-destructive. It must require more than ingenuity to show how the presentation in consciousness of what is relative and limited, can afford the materials out of which to construct a " representative notion" of the Supreme Lawgiver and Euler. We must have a knowledge of the Infinite Being himself, else we cannot have any representative notion of such a Being. And since Dr. Mansel denies aU knowledge of the In- finite Being, he is required in consistency to deny the possibility of any representative notion of Him. To what result, then, has Dr. Mansel's reasoning on this point led him ? Does he maintain that the moral nature of man involves no revelation of the Moral Law- giver and Euler ? Hardly that. Only this : " It is not as the Infinite that God reveals himself in His moral government."^ That is to say, " It is as the Finite that God reveals himself in His moral government." These two declarations seem to me exactly convertible, since there is no intention, I imagine, to deny that God does reveal Himself in His moral government ; and, if he do not reveal Himself as Infinite, there is only the one alter- native, that He reveals HimseK as Finite. If the author of The Limits of Religions Thought wiU. bring proof from the moral nature of man, or the moral government of God, to show that the Deity has revealed Himself as Finite, he will open up a new line of rehgious thought, certain to awaken a very deep interest in our land. ' Limits ofReligitms Thought, p. 128. 416 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Here, then, seems to be the natural result of this Philosophy. " It is our duty to think of God as per- sonal ;"^ and " Personality, as we conceive it, is essentially a limitation and a relation."^ I challenge Dr. Mansel to prove that " it is our duty to think of God as limited." Whose conscience imposes on him such a duty as this ? When does conscience make it a duty to think one thing, and to believe another ? What evidence is there to show that " it is our duty to think of God as limited ; and that it is our duty to believe that He is infinite 1" Where are we taught to think concerning our God, in a way diametrically opposed to our belief in His real nature ? If it be admitted that there is no appeal to the authority of conscience in the matter, and, therefore, that it is not our duty to think of God as fijiite, in other words, that there is no such moral obligation resting on us, it may be said that the mind is under the necessity of thinking concerning the object of faith. I admit that this is true, and a very important truth. But if we think about a finite object, we do not think about the object of our faith ; if we exercise our thought regarding the repre- sentative notion of a limited being, that notion does not represent the Being in whom we believe as the Supreme Moral Governor. In opposition to the distinguished author of The Limits of Religious Thought, I continue to maintain that we have an inadequate, yet clear and dis- tinct knowledge of the Moral Lawgiver, and conse- quently a distinct and clear, though imperfect concep-' tion of the real object of faith. There are indeed many questions which arise concern- 1 Limits of Religious Thought, p, 89. ^ Ihid. j?. Zi. KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORAL GOVERNOR. 417 ing the nature of the Deity, which it is altogether im- possible for us to answer, and which must be left without the slightest attempt to afford an answer, unless we would transcend our actual knowledge. We know that the Deity does not reach truth by a process of reasoning, but we do not know in what manner all truth is present to His mind at the same moment. We know that He is a conscious Being, but we do not know how there is con- sciousness without succession and change. We know that He is the Supreme Euler, but how His supremacy is compatible with human hberty, we know not. We know that He is absolutely holy, but why evil is permitted to exist in the world, is, for the present at least, a mystery. We know that He is absolutely just, but why it is that men are permitted to suffer for obeying their conscience, while others prosper iu despising its authority, we cannot fully discover. These are only a few illustrations of the mysteries which lie around us on every hand, in connexion with the Moral Government of God, any attempt to ex- plain which must transcend the limits of human know- ledge, and prove futile, or, it may be, lead to dangerous error. Our conscience does not afford an explanation of these mysteries, for it is not the province of conscience to give a complete revelation of the moral nature of the Deity, nor could such a revelation be found in the fact of our finite consciousness. But our moral being is such in nature and exercise as to lead to the unfolding within us of the necessary knowledge of the Supreme Moral Euler, which belongs to our mental constitution. It is in connexion with the exercise of the moral nature, that we have our knowledge of the Lawgiver, and that 2 D 418 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. that knowledge enlarges in measure. And, still further, as a necessary consequence, " it is true," as Dr. Mansel has said, and I rejoice to agree mth the esteemed author ia this, "that to our sense of moral obhgation "we owe our priinary conception of God as a moral Governor." ^ ' Limits ofSeligious Thought, Preface to Third Edition, p. ix. CHAPTER IX. THE KNOWLEDGE OP THE INFINITE BEING AS THE OBJECT OE WORSHIP. I proceed now to indicate the final instance in which I consider that a knowledge of the Infinite Being is obtained by us, Man is not merely an intelligent and moral being, he is, by his very nature, a religious being. Not only must he account for the existence of all things, and thus rise from the creation to the great First Cause ; not only is he conscious of moral judgments and a sense of obligation, which must be accompanied by a knowledge of the supreme moral Governor ; but there are also emo- tions of reverence and adoration passing through the mind, and a sense of complete personal dependence, which have for their immediate object the one true God. In examining consciousness for the evidence of the existence and universality of these phenomena, it is not necessary that it be proved that they are recognised in the constant experience of all, or that they invariably exercise a regulating influence over the actions of men. Careful observation will show that the emotions of vene- ration and awe are natural to man, that they spring up in the mind from conscious dependence upon the Deity, and that they find utterance in the words of prayer. 420 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. While, however, such emotions are natural to man, because he is by his constitution a religious being, I do not by any means deny that emotions the very reverse may predominate in the minds of many, untU all trace of a religious nature might even seem to have been obliterated from the soul. These emotions may be restrained, and their existence in the nature al- most forgotten, until it may be supposed that they are gone for ever. Though experienced in early life with a full flow of vigour, they may have gradually receded, until they have been lost from the view, just as the stream, gurgling from the rock, has slowly diminished under the powerful rays of the summer's sun, until its refreshing waters have ceased to flow, and left a parched channel. But as the waters of the fountain may be treasured in the store-house below, though no longer springing forth to the view, so the principles and emo- tions which constitute man a religious being are hid deep in his nature, though adverse influences have restrained them from their appointed exercise. And as the brook bursts forth again, when favourable influences return, so do the religious emotions spring up in the heart of man, sounding from the depths of his nature like the noise of many waters. While maintaining the position that man is by his constitution a rehgious being, I do not overlook the facts which seem so strongly to contradict the existence of a religious nature in many. I do not forget that there are some who maintain that man has no religious nature ; that what are called the religious emotions are the effects of illusions pressed upon the mind by a designing priest- KNOWLEDGE OP THE OBJECT OP WORSHIP. 421 hood ; and that the Deity himself is a fabrication and nonentity. Such a position has been held by some, but as weU might it be atifirmed that hunger and thirst are fictitious desires, originated and fostered by designing men, whose business it is to supply our wants. If the sceptical doctrine be true, how have men been so long deceived ? Sceptics have not been wanting throughout the whole course of the world's history, who have declared that religion is a delusion, and yet how is it that men still insist upon beheving the contrary ? How is it that men have always admitted the authority of religion, and do still continue to admit it ? The fact cannot be ac- counted for upon any other ground than upon the ad- mission that religion is an essential part of man's nature. In individual instances men may deny it if they choose, yet it is a fact well known to any one accustomed to reflect upon the opetations of his own mind, that the feeling of reverence, and the sense of dependence, come at times upon the soul with the utmost power, and awaken us to such consciousness of the reality of our relation to the Deity, as not to admit of the shadow of a doubt. The disposition to doubt, and even the possibility of doubting, have passed away, and the soul is filled with the awful consciousness, that it is in the immediate pre- sence of the infinite and eternal Spirit. Men can war against such feelings, and endeavour to banish them from the mind ; but the fact that it reqiiires an effort, is a proof that such emotions are deeply rooted, and that they readily spring up in consciousness when circumstances tend to call them forth. This position may be theoretically denied, and is, in 422 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. fact, often enougli thus treated, but it is practically impossible, and men are betrayed into its admission, how- ever contrary to their inclinations. I hold that the plain testimony of consciousness is, that it is in accordance with the constitution of our nature to adore a Supreme Being, and to supplicate blessings of Him. If this be so, the Infinite Being is an object present to our mind, or known by us, and our knowledge of His existence and nature is such, that He becomes the object of deepest reverence, and the contemplation of His attributes raises within us the most powerful emotions of the heart, which find their natural expression in the language of fervent devotion. These are phenomena essential to the human mind, and consciousness is the witness to which appeal is made. As the facts are common to mankind generally, it may be referred to. each individual, whether the state- ment of them be in accordance with his own experience. The facts referred to are, indeed, more liable to be con- cealed from notice, than the primary facts of intelligen'ce, inasmuch as they belong to the moral and rehgious part of our nature, which has become perverted in a manner which cannot be affirmed of the reasoning powers. Yet, notwithstanding the peculiar difficulty connected with appeal to these facts as evidence, notwithstanding that the depravity of our nature involves some facts glaringly antagonistic to those which are now selected, I maintaia that the religious emotions are so essentially a part of our nature, that they cannot be torn from the mind, and that they will, and must, arise in consciousness, when circumstances favourable to their development are pre- sented. KNOWLEDGE OF THE OBJECT OP WORSHIP. 423 If it be true, then, that the religious emotions are essential to the nature of man, it is to be expected that we shaH find obvious proofs of the universality of their existence in the experience and history of all ages. It is to be expected that we shaU find traces, at least, of the religious element of man's nature, even though that ele- ment has had aU along to struggle against moral corrup- tion, in order to obtain its natural manifestation. I acknowledge the propriety of such an expectation, and shall willingly, though briefly, consider whether such evidence is to be found. I do not ask that the most favourable instances be con- sidered ; I need not specially demand that the effects of the Christian religion be taken .into account, although it is obviously the work of that .-religion to revive the reh- gious nature of man, to free it from the bonds of corrup- tion, and to raise it to its proper eminence. I ask only, whether we find traces of the existence of rehgious faith, of religious emotions, and of religious worship, among men in general, however much they are morally and religiously debased. Does not a man, however de- graded, just because he is a man, possess a religious nature, which involves the belief in an Infinite God, a knowledge of that God, the emotions of awe and vene- ration, and the sense of dependence, which leads to devout adoration, and fervent supplication for mercy and favour ? If we examine the entire course of history, we find among all nations, and in aU ages, the practice of religious rites and ceremonies, forming an unbroken line of evi- dence by which it is proved that man is, by his very 424 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. constitution, a religious being. It is true that we find in many of these religious rites much which we, with our enlightenment, condemn. Yet, in the midst of all the darkness and immorality, we detect the working of neces- sary religious principles and emotions, which struggle for expression in external forms. If these principles and emotions were only the result of education, then would they disappear when men sink into a state of ignorance and barbarism. They would vanish as the arts and sciences do when man falls into heathenism. But how- ever deep the degradation into which man may have sunk, we have never yet discovered a race altogether destitute of the notion of a Supreme Being. We have found the religious emotions darkened ; we have found them injured by prejudices, and weakened by vices ; but still, we have had no difficulty in detecting the traces of their existence. In the midst even of heathen darkness, we have noticed the faint pencUs of Hght coming forth from the depth of the human soul ; despite the superin- cumbent, mass of corruption, we have found the reHgious element in man's nature retaining its vitality, and ever struggling forth into notice. It has indeed been per- verted ; it has fallen from its pristine glory ; the notion of the Deity has become debased; yet, perverted and weakened though it be, the rehgious element is still there, and man, even in his most degraded state, has a concep- tion of the Deity. A closer examination will stUl more strongly confirm our position. The evidence already adduced is demon- strative of the fact, that man is, by a necessity of his nature, a religious being. But let us look a little more KNOWLEDGE 01? THE OBJECT OF WORSHIP. 425 closely into the religious history of the race, and it will be found, that even debased tribes have much higher notions of the Supreme Being, than external manifesta- tions would seem to indicate. It is true, that we find heathen nations having such low conceptions, as to repre- sent the Deity in an external form. But, though this be the case, I am very doubtful if an instance could be found in which the block of carved wood or stone was taken as the actual Deity, and not merely as a representative of the Supreme Being. It is true, that we find the people in heathendom bowing down before these blocks of wood, but in this we discover only a known characteristic of the human mind. For, the more the mind is uncul- tivated and debased, the more difficult does it become to engage the thoughts upon an object purely spiritual, and the more strongly is the necessity felt for having an external representation of the internal conception. In such a state, the external and objective predominate over the internal and subjective. This is plainly the principle by which to account for the uniform tendency of barbarous nations to adopt a material representa- tion of the Deity, which is more or less rude, accord- ing to the degree of degradation to which the mind may have sunk. It is a further perversion in the same direction, when men proceed to ascribe to distinct divini- ties the different powers, or spheres of action, pertaining to the one Supreme Being. When this tendency of the mind is kept in view, it will at once appear that there is need for caution before we infer, that those who bow be- fore some graven image, always consider it to be the true divinity. That this is the natural tendency of image- 426 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. worship, I readily grant ; that it is the predomiaating state of mind of the more degraded, seems no less obvi- ous ; yet there is evidence that this is not the primary- conviction, common to every worshipper, which (some- times consciously, sometimes unconsciously, it may be) forms the foundation of their distorted religious system. As we see the savage bow before an image, and manifest all the signs of fear as he approaches it, we verily believe that, for the time, the image is to him no mere repre- sentation, but the real Divinity. But when we see that same savage looking upon his image broken to atoms, and yet realizing that his God is not destroyed ; that His powers to bless, or to injure, are not diminished; when we find that he trembles at the accident, and hastens to set up a new image ; when we find him worshipping this image, or another one, as his God ; we again detect the fundamental conviction struggling iato notice and asserting its reality. In aU the phases of external development manifested by the religious element in man's nature, we discover the traces of the recognition of an aU-powerful and omniscient Supreme Being. We find that such a Being is feared, as seeing and knowing what men cannot discover, and as possessing unlimited power to inflict punishment upon those who offend. Everywhere may we discover more or less evident tokens of this natural tendency of the human mind to worship a Supreme Being, finding ex- ternal manifestation in some rude representation, or imaged forth in the Jupiter of the Eomans, or in the Zeus of the Greeks. Altering now our sphere of observation, and looking KNOWLEDGE OP THE OBJECT OF WORSHIP. 42 Y around for any common expression of the natural feel- ings and emotions of the human mind, we readily turn to the Poetry and the Philosophy of mankind. Listen to the voice of Poetry from the earliest ages, and you will hear it, in stately accents, address the Deity, and plead for guidance from above. Listen, as it breathes the deepest emotions of the heart, and you will hear it swell forth in notes of exultation, as it sings of a love which is infinite. Follow it as it wanders through the scenes of surround- ing beauty, and you will be gradually wafted upwards to the Father of aU Goodness. Listen to its description of the commotions of nature, and you will hear the solemn tones guide with reverent awe to the presence of the Almighty. Listen as it tells of mortal woes and miseries endured, and you will hear it plead in tones of agony for mercy to the wronged, and cry aloud for vengeance on the vicious and the vile. Trace the course of Philosophy for the last two thousand years, and you will find it ever resting in the one great centre. Without the fundamental conception of an infinite God, man is a contradiction, and Philosophy an impossibility.^ Thus it is that Philosophy has ever recognised this great truth, and has all along given utter- ance to this necessary conviction of the human mind. J^st as -surely as Philosophy has given expression to the language of consciousness, just so surely has the recogni- tion of a Supreme Being been decided and strong. And if at any time the voice of Scepticism has been raised, and the existence of God has been theoretically denied, ' In the language of M. Cousin; "La religion est la philosophie de I'espece humaine." 428 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. -it has totally failed to drive the conviction from the mind, and exclude its statement from its due position m Philosophy. Scepticism may have attempted to shake the conviction which leads us to trust in an infinite God, but it has only called forth a more searching scrutiny, which has overturned its own system, and has left the challenged principle immovable as before. Never was there a more complete and satisfactory course of evidence than that which may be traced throughout the whole history of man, in proof of the universal recognition of the Infinite God. Everywhere you may recognise the outlines of the evidence, stretch- ing before you into all ages, a great and obvious fact, which can be accounted for on no other theory than that here maintained — ^that man has a positive knowledge and conception of a Supreme Being, whom he reverences and adores. I might still further enlarge the sphere of evi- dence. I might rise to the higher stand-point afi"orded by the Christian rehgion ; mark its effects in awakening and reviving the rehgious nature of man ; disclose the lofty conceptions of the Deity, which it has afforded even to its humblest disciples ; and then fairly conclude, that the very first step in this process supposes a positive knowledge of the infinite God. But meanwhile I refrain. The position, then, which I maintain here .is, that rehgion is possible only on the basis of intelligence. It cannot consist in feeling alone, since all feeling must take its rise from some object presented to the mind, or, in other words, known by it. But if our heart is moved with reverential awe, making the exercise of adoration the natural expression of our emotion, this emotion pre- KNOWLEDGE OP THE OBJECT OP "WORSHIP. 429 supposes a knowledge of a Supreme Being, and lofty conceptions of His nature. And if we have a conviction and sense of complete dependence upon a holy but loving God, who has cause to be pleased or displeased with us according to our conduct, so that it is an instinct of our natuTe to pray to Him for protection and mercy, these presuppose a knowledge of the adorable Being. With our belief in His existence, and our conviction and sense of complete dependence upon Him, there must be a positive knowledge of His nature ; and if there be such a knowledge, a positive conception foUows by necessity. He is known to us as the absolutely holy, wise, powerful, loving, and merciful Being. FeUow-creatures we may know who are holy, wise, powerful, loving, and merciful too ; but not one who can for a moment bear comparison with Him. Nay, we recognise that His hoUness, wisdom, power, love, and mercy, are quite different from theirs, and unspeakably higher. In our knowledge of Him there is the recognition of that which is essentially distinctive, a nature which could not, even by any effort of imagination, be attributed to another. Try even in thought to limit or restrict the object of worship, and you instantly destroy the conception. A God restricted is manifestly no God at aU. Any finite being, however holy, wise, powerful, loving, and merciful, still leaves to the mind the conscious necessity of rising to a higher Being, who is supreme and infinite. The mind must come into conscious relation with the Divine Being, before He can become an object awakening our reverence and affection, and to whom we address our entreaties. There is no method of escaping this conclusion, and an 430 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. impartial examination of consciousness can present no motive for attempting it. Consciousness reveals the knowledge of the Deity, and prayer is the external and undeniable manifestation of the reality of the knowledge. This is a clear knowledge, involving the clear recognition of the attributes which belong to the Divine nature ; it is a distinct knowledge, involving the recognition of His attributes as essentially distinct from all others ; yet it is an inadequate knowledge, involving, at best, only such a recognition of the Divine excellence as a finite being can have, though it is capable of indefinite enlargement, according . as we advance to a closer acquaintance with the glory of the Deity. How utterly insufficient is the analogical theory of worship, must be apparent at a glance ; for if, by a mere intellectual device, we attempted to use the con- ceptions of human holiness, power, wisdom, love, and mercy, as */"they apphed to another being designated a Deity, we could not offer intelligent worship to such a Being. Some other conception of the Deity there must be, else it is irrational and impious to offer worship. To say, as Bishop Browne does, that our feelings of reverence and affection, and our adoration are awakened by the con- templation of a Being to whom in thought we transfer our own intellectual and moral qualities, is manifestly self-contradictory, for our awe and dependence can never find their proper object in a being fike ourselves. "Thus," says the Bishop, "are our love, joy, fear, hope, desire, gratitude, employed, not immediately upon any direct ideas of the real perfections of God or heavenly bliss, which are incomprehensible; but upon the ana- KNOWLEDGE OF THE OBJECT OP WORSHIP. 431 logous conceptions we form of the goodness and power of God, and of a future bliss, from the best notions of that goodness, and power, and happiness, which we ex- perience here."^ While granting that there is a certain analogy between our intellectual and moral attributes and those of the Deity himself, it is very manifest that there must first be a positive knowledge, not only of our own nature, but also of the Divine nature, before we could discover the analogy. And, besides, even after we have discovered the analogy, we at the same time so clearly recognise the distiaction, that we could not even attempt to impute our best notions of human goodness and power to the JDeity, and then worship this object of our own creation. WhUe, however, I maintain that we have a positive knowledge of the Divine Being, as the object of worship, it is very manifest that this knowledge is not a complete knowledge, as indeed it never can be in any finite mind. Though we have a positive knowledge of the Deity, such as is sufiicient to afibrd the explanation, and is the only sufficient explanation, of our religious feelings and exer- cises, it cannot be an adequate or aU-comprehensive knowledge ; and besides, it is not sufficient to answer all the questions which our intellect may raise concerning the nature and procedure of the Absolute Being whom we worship. Here, as everywhere else when knowledge and thought are concerned with the Infinite Being, mys- teries must arise, necessarily inexplicable to our mind, and such in their very nature that we only attempt to transcend the limits of our knowledge and thought, » The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Unman Understanding, pp. 201, 202. 432 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. in attempting to solve them. These mysteries must re- main mysteries to all men, because of the limits of our mind, and such mysteries there must be hanging out before the human mind to all eternity. This is the true lesson which comes to us from the recognised limits of our own mind, and true philosophy will not only accept the lesson, but regard it as part of its task to mark out those questions which are to be left unsolved, as pointing to what is necessarily mysterious to us. That the Infinite Being is the fit object of worship, we know and are sure, without the slightest trace of mystery in the matter. But while we know that He is the Being to be adored, and essentially the hearer of prayer, our knowledge of His nature is not such that we can explain, to ourselves, how \h.Q unchangeable One does, in perfect consistency with His unchangeable excellence and purposes, answer prayer. This is to us a mystery, which we must be contented to leave unexplained, even while we believe that the harmony is complete, and would be recog- nised as such, were the recognition of it a possible thing for us. But, while it is very manifest that the limits of our knowledge concerning the Deity, necessarily imply that our intellect will raise insoluble questions, that is, come to points of reflection essentially mysterious, it is equally clear that we must have some positive knowledge of the Absolutely holy One, in order to render to Him an intel- ligent worship. They who deny all positive knowledge of the Infinite Being, not only acknowledge mysteries where they reaUy exist, that is, in relation with questions which must carry us beyond the limits of knowledge and KNOWLEDGE OF THE OBJECT OF WORSHIP. 433 thought in order to find their solution ; but they create mysteries where there are none, that is, in relation with facts which are within the Hmits of our knowledge and thought. For if we have no positive knowledge of the object of worship, that worship is a mystery ; that is to say, an exercise of mind which is to ourselves inexplic- able, and, therefore, irrational. By such an indefensible theory, religion is not only divorced from intelligence, but diametrically opposed to it. It is with extreme regret that I find myself inces- santly constrained to come into conflict with an author whose ability all must admire, and the spirit of whose discussions must have gained for him the esteem of all who appreciate the grandeur of the theme with which he deals ; but, I must once more indicate, and that quite as decidedly as in former cases, my dissent from the conclu- sions drawn by Dr. Mansel. He broadly affirms that "religion is not a function of thought,"^ and asserts that " the history of mankind in general, as well as the consciousness of each individual, alike testify" to this. I cannot forbear from expressing my painful sense of the humbling position which any philosopher occupies, who makes it his task to proclaim the divorce of rehgion from intelligence. But it is more properly my part to repeat, what I have already said above, that "the history of mankind in general," as it seems to me at least, and my own consciousness, " alike testify" that religion is a func- tion of thought. If rehgion be a function of knowledge, it can also be a function of thought ; and, if it be neither a function of knowledge nor of thought, in accordance ' Prolegomena Logica, p. 276. 2 E 434 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. with what law of mind can it be a function of emotion ? If intelligence have no part in our religion, wiU Dr. Mansel explain how our religious emotions arise ? If the object of worship — the absolutely H0I7 One — be not presented to the mind, how can we cherish certain feeliags towards Him, or offer Him any intelligent service ? If we can know Him only by tvhat He is not,— do we feel towards Him as we do, because of what He is not ? — do we worship Him because He is not such as anything known to us ? Is this the kind of negative religion war- ranted by a " negative knowledge of the Infinite " 1 And, if a harmony of the theory of the author of The Limits of Religious Thought is to be found (without asking how he came to write a book concerning the limits of religious thought, since "religion is not a function of thought" at aU), it may be asked, how it is that he has declared, that " it is by consciousness alone that we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer Him any ser- vice. It is only by conceiving Him as a conscious Being, that we can stand in any religious relation to Him at aU."^ If it be borne in miad that our knowledge of God does not imply that His consciousness involves sliccession of states, I cheerfully accept this statement ; but, while I hold the doctrine so admirably stated in this quotation, I cannot also hold that " rehgion is not a function of thought." Again, I find Dr. Mansel say, that " our positive re- ligious consciousness is of the finite only ;"^ in answer to which I reply, that consciousness which is " of the finite only," cannot be religious consciousness, for there can be ' lAmits of Religious Thought, p. 87. ' Ibid. p. 120. KNOWLEDGE OP THE OBJECT OP WORSHIP. 435 no religious element whatever in our consciousness of a finite being. That whicli is known as " finite only," can- not, by our mental constitution, awaken religious emotion within us ; and it cannot, by the authority of our con- science, warrant us in rendering to it any religious ser- vice. And when the same author affirms that " it is not as the Infinite that God promises to answer prayer," it follows that it must be " as the finite" that He reveals Himself, when He promises to answer prayer ; in other words. He must reveal Himself to us a^ He is not, and that expressly for the purpose of giving a promise, the consistency of which with His own nature is of vital importance to us, if we are to rest on His promise. It is very true, that it is a mystery to us, that is, a thing not within the hmits of our knowledge, how God is at once unchangeable and the answerer of prayer ; but that it is iu perfect harmony with His nature to be at once unchangeable and the answerer of prayer, is the testi- mony of our necessary behef in His existence and rela- tion to us. But when it is asserted that " it is not as the Infinite that God promises to answer prayer," it seems to me that the assertion is destitute of the shght- est authority, and is, besides, an attempt unwarrantably to explain, what we must be contented to leave unex- plained. In conclusion, I maiutain. that the Infinite Beiug, wlule the object oi faith, is also known to us as the ob- ject of worship, and that we have thereby a clear and dis- tinct, though inadequate conception of His nature. As expressive, so far at least, of the ground on which this doctrine rests, I am glad to quote the words of Dr. 436 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. Mansel : " ReKgious thought, if it is to exist at all, can only exist as representative of some fact of rehgioiis intuition, — of some individual state of mind, in which is presented, as an immediate fact, that relation of man to God, of which man, by reflection, may become dis- tinctly and definitely conscious/'^ • Limits o/Seligious Theught, p. 108. CHAPTER X. 7HE TESTIMONY OP SCRIPTURE CONCERNING MAn'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE' INFINITE BEING. The question regarding the possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite One has naturally carried the upholders of the conflicting theories iato the sphere of Bible research. It is impossible to prevent the discussion from extending to an inquiry concerning the testimony of the Scriptures on the point. If the assertion that man can have no positive knowledge of The Infinite, have any meaning at all, it must refer to the Deity ; and, if so, since the Bible professes to be a revelation from God, it becomes neces- sary to inquire in what measure the Scriptures reveal the Infinite Being, and what knowledge of His nature they admit as possible to man. Accordingly, the discussion has been greatly extended by the quotation, on both sides, of passages of Scripture, to which appeal has been made in vindication of conflicting doctrines. It must be admitted, however, that instead of carefal research into the whole teaching of Scripture on the subject, the con- tending parties have simply seized on a few passages which seemed to favour their respective opinions, and to overturn those maintained against them. In this way, M. Cousin is found quoting passages which teach that 438 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. God has made HimseK known to us, while Sir W. Hamil- ton has gathered together some few illustrations of Scrip- ture statement, in which it is taught that God is " un- searchable." The very different aspect of the quotations given by the two authors, so far from showing that either has satisfactorily determined the actual testimony of ■ Scripture on the matter, only shows that both have been one-sided in their examination, and that neither has taken sufficiently into account .the fact, that there are two classes of passages bearing on the subject before us, the one referring to a knowledge which we have, and the other to a measure of knowledge which is beyond our reach. . It is necessary, before concluding this treatise, that I endeavour to present some view of what God teaches in the Bible concerning His own nature ; in other words, what revelation He has made of Himself in His Word. It is not without apprehension that I enter upon this part of my task. Every one who has a deep reverence for God's Word must regard with extreme aversion, even the sKghtest hazard of wresting the language of Scrip- ture from its true signification, for the defence of any philosophical theory, however strong the conviction of its accuracy. The only legitimate province of a,ny inquirer in this sphere is that of an interpreter, and to that I desire exclusively to confine myself, in the hope that I may be saved from using any passage in a manner which . the strictest rules of interpretation do not warrant.. Moreover, every Bible reader must be conscious of the need for more than ordinary caution in seeking to decide the actual bearing of scriptural statements on philosophi- cal discussions, ' inasmuch as it is self-e^ddent that the TESTIMONY OP SCRIPTUKE. 439 Divine revelation is presented in language such as is common to aU, and without regard to the niceties of philosophical distinction. This fact must be continually taken into account, if the interpreter of the Scriptures would avoid undul/ straining verbal differences in the sacred text. At the same time, the language of God's Word is so completely in harmony with the ordinary operations of the human mind, which all men are accus- tomed to recognise, that any philosophical theory con- cerrdng the Infinite Being, which professes to be based on the facts of consciousness, may be easUy brought to the test of the written Eevelation. The whole structure of the Bible is such as to make it manifestly a revelation which the Deity gives of Him- self, and not a, proof of His existence. Here God is found in direct communication with His intelligent creatures. The words are His words ; the statements of truth are His statements. The Bible is either a Divine communi- cation of truth to man, or it is in its entire nature de- ceptive. I am not at present dealing with those who deny that the Bible is a Divine Eevelation^ and it is not my province here to turn aside for an examination of its evidences. The present inquiry implies the acceptance of the Bible as God's Word. Having acknowledged it as such, when we proceed to examine its contents, we find no attempt to demonstrate the Divine existence, for the sake of those who profess to deny it. As a revelation from God, it pre-supposes the existence of the Being from whom it comes. Besides this, however, there is in the Bible no trace of an admission that men need to have the existence of the Deity demonstrated to them. Man is 440 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. appealed to as a being who has such a belief in his own nature, and who has only to be referred to the forms of finite existence, for illustrations of the certainty of the being of God. " The heavens declare the glory of God ; and the firmament showeth his handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth know- ledge."^ If there be a mind to observe and to think, it is impossible to contemplate the firmament in its splen- dour, without the conviction that God exists. But what is said of those who have sunk into such intellectual and moral debasement, that they are slow to recognise the lessons which the works of nature are fitted to convey ? " The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against aU ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness ; because that which may be known of God is manifest in them ; for God has showed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead ; so that they are without excuse ; because that, when they knew God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful ; but became vain in their imagiua- tions, and their foolish heart was darkened."^ It is not necessary at the present point to inquire very particu- larly into the exact significance of the phrase, "that which may be known of God" (to yvcoaTov tov 0eov), or of the statement that the heathen nations are " without excuse" {avairoKoyrirovi) ; but it is sufficiently obvious that in this passage all are held responsible for a behef in " the eternal power and Godhead" of the Creator. That ' Psalm xix. 1. 2 Romans i. 18-21. TESTIMONY OP SCRIPTURE. 441 much more is implied in this scriptural declaration, I think certain ; but I content myself with a reference to the forcible testimony it presents in favour of a universal belief I may, however, state in passing, that Alford's view of the passage seems to me beyond question the right one, when he says that " to yvmarov tov 0eov wtH mean, that universal objective knowledge of God as the Creator (the italics are AKord's) which we find more or less m every nation under heaven, and which, as matter of historical fact, was proved to be in possession of the great Gentile nations of antiquity." While, however, it is plainly declared in the Bible that a behef in the Divine existence is natural to man, it is at the same time admitted that men may, in their folly and sin, deny the Being of God. Thus, "The fool hath said m his heart, There is no God."^ It has been no imusual thing for men to say this, and yet the Scripture standeth true, they are " without excuse." The saying of such a " fool," or of any number of such fools, in no way invalidates the words of Divine truth, that "the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." I cannot do better than quote the words of Lord Bacon on this passage. He says, — " The Scripture saith, ' The fool hath said in his heart. There is no God / it is not said, The fool hath thought in his heart ; so as he rather saith it by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly beheve it, or be persuaded of it ; for none deny there is a God but those for whom it ' Psalm xiv. 1. 442 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. maketh there were no God."^ This is, indeed, the Scrip- tural explanation of the denial of the Divine existence on the part of men. None deny that there is a God but those whose conduct and character are such as to make it a desirable thing for them that there were none. "The fool hath said in his heart. There is no God. They are corrupt ; they have done abominable works ; there is none that doeth good." If, then, it be ascertained that the Scriptures teach that the works of creation are evidence enough of the Divine existence, and that every man is iaexcusable who denies it, the next question is. What revelation of His nature has the Divine Being given in the Scriptures? He is declared to be "eternal, immortal, invisible ;"2 Him "no man hath seen, nor can see."^ We are thus taught to regard the Deity as essentially invisible, be- cause " God is a spirit,"^ and warned to cast away from our thought and feeling, every tendency to contemplate God as material ; and to banish from our worship, every material form intended to represent the Deity. In the same way we are debarred from attempting to place be- fore the imagination anything intended for a represen- tation of the Divine Being. The object of faith, and knowledge, and thought, and feehng. He may be, but the object of imagination He cannot be. " To whom, then, will ye lihen God ? or what Kkeness will ye compare unto him? "5 "Even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God."^ " Thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is holy.'"^ "Great -Atheism . " 1 Tito. vi. 16. ^ Isa. xi. 18. 2 1 Tim. i. 17. * John iv. 24. « Psalm xc. 2. 7 Isa. Ixii. 15. TESTIMOJify OB" SCRIPTURE. 443 is the Lord, and of great power, his understanding is infinite."^ "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty."^ " With God all things are possible."-^ He "knoweth all things;" with Him "is no variableness, neither shadow of tm^ing ;" He is '* glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders." These are only a few illustrations of the manner in which the Deity reveals the excellency of His nature. The ex- amples have been selected with a special regard to their brevity, and at the same time to their sufficiency as representative of the general modes of expression- to be found in the Bible. The readers of the Sacred Word win recognise them as but specimens of the passages scattered profusely throughout its entire extent. That they must be regarded as a direct revelation of God as infinite and absolute, seems to me unquestionable. They certainly do not present "a finite manifestation" of thes Deity, nor are they a revelation of the Infinite Being under " a finite form." They are such as to warn us of the utter impossibility of regarding God as finite. And most certainly when the Deity is said to be " invisible," " a spirit," " everlasting," " infinite," " almighty," " glori- ous in holiness," these are not mere representative " sym- bols " of what God is, but a simple declaration of what He really is. Whatever opinion be held concerning the knowledge man can have of such a Being, there can be no doubt that, as revealed in the Bible, He is declared to be in every respect absolute or perfect. Having thus seen what revelation the Bible gives of 1 Psalm oxlvii. 5. ° Bev. i. 8. ' Matt. xix. 26. 444 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the Divine nature, it is necessary now to inquire what the Word of God teaches concerning the knowledge which we can have of His nature. And here, I remark JiTstf that the Scriptures most emphatically declare that it is the glory of God that He is incomprehensible by the finite mind, that is to say. He is such in His nature that He caimot be fully known by any created iateUect, This is declared to be a necessary fact which must regu- late the thought and the worship of both angels and men. " Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised ; and his greatness is unsearchable."^ The expression "unsearch- able " (ipn p«) refers to that which it is impossible fully to contemplate or examine. It is the same expres- sion which is apphed in the book of Proverbs to the height of the heaven, the depth of the earth, and the pur- poses of a king. It is there said, " It is the glory of God to conceal a thing, but the honour of kings is to search out a matter. The heaven for height, and the earth for depth, and the heart of kings is unsearchable" This passage shows that the expression is applied to any object which is beyond the compass of measurement on our part, or cannot be fuUy comprehended. As apphed to the Deity, it indicates the essential glory of His nature, which is siich as to be iacomprehensible to all His intelligent creatures, and must continue so for ever. The conditions of our knowledge are such, that we must invariably and reverently acknowledge this truth. And this Divine " greatness " must be held to embrace aU His attributes, since the same language is adopted m speaking of His power, wisdom, goodness, love, mercy, ' Psalm cxlv. 3. TESTIMONY OP SCRIPTURE. 445 and every excellence which is declared to belong to His nature. Another passage of Scripture may be given, to show how it is taught that there is perfect harmony between the fact that the glory of God is unsearchable, and the assertion of a knowledge of the unsearchable One. In the prayer of the apostle Paul for the Ephesian Church, the following words occvir : " That ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be able to comprehend with aU saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height ; and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with aU the fulness of God."^ This passage presents an instance of the need for the careful application of the manifest principle, that the language of Scripture is not to be interpreted by a rigid adherence to scientific distinctions in the use of terms. "To comprehend" {KaTa\aj3eadai) signifies, in general, to perceive, to know, to understand, to appre- hend, and to comprehend ; and, therefore, the use of the word " to comprehend," ia the English version, is not to be taken as impljdng a complete knowledge or concep- tion of the object. On the contrary, it is distinctly aflfirmed that the love of the Deity " passeth knowledge ; " and yet, the prayer of the Apostle is, that the members of the Ephesian Church may know that love, an attain- ment which is declared to be a common possession of " all saints." This leads me to remark, secondly, that the Bible uniformly declares that man has a knowledge of the Deity. So far from teaching that God is a Being from ' Epbesians iii. 18, 19. 446 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. whom we are entirely separated in knowledge, the Scrip- tures expressly teach that man has a measure of know- ledge of the Divine excellence, and is capable of making constant advancement in it, according as he contem- plates the works of God, and seeks, in religious exercises, spiritual communion with the Most High. There is one passage of Scripture which has been so much adverted to, in connexion with this discussion^ that it seems essential that it should have immediate con- sideration, since appeal is made to it as completely con- tradicting the possibility of any knowledge of the Infinite Being, in the present state at least. It is the passage in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, where it is said : " We know in part (e/e fiipov^), and we prophesy in part ; but when that which is perfect {ro jeKeiov) is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. . . , For now we see through a glass darkly {iv alvijixan), but then face to face ; now I know in part (e*; /Mepov;), but then shall I know even as also I am known." ^ Before at- tempting any exegetical remarks on this passage, I deem it proper to present to the reader the interpretation given by Sir W. Hamilton. He says : " The Scriptures ex- phcitly declare that the infinite is for us now incogniz- able ; they declare that the finite, and the finite alone, is within our reach. It is said (to cite one text out of many), that 'tww I know in part' {i.e., the finite; 'but then ' {i.e., in the fife to come) ' shall I know, even as I am known' {i.e. without limitation). "^ This is certainly a singular specimen of Bible interpretation, and a very summary way of disposing of the testimony of Scripture ' 1 Cor. xiii. 9, 10, 12. = Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. p. 375. TESTIMONY OP SCRIPTURE. 447 on this important subject. In the passage quoted from the Word of God, it seems manifest, in the first place, that the Apostle is treating of different degrees of hnow- ledge of the same Being, and not at all of the knowledge of different objects. On this account I deem the inter- pretation given by Sir W. Hamilton inconsistent with itself. To make the first clause apply to the measure of the object, and the second to the degree of knowledge, is an inconsistency. When the Apostle says : " Now I know in part, but then shaU I know even as also I am known," he says that his knowledge is "in part," and that his knowledge shall be even " as he is known," But, besides being inconsistent in his mode of interpretation, it seems to me, in the second place, that Sir W. Hamilton has given a misinterpretation of both clauses. When the Apostle says, " Now I know in part," I deny that his statement is equivalent to that into which it is rendered by Sir W. Hamilton — "Now I know the finite." For, in respect of the object, it is the same object which he says he now knows " in part," and which he shall afterwards know " as he is known," and that object is whatsoever is unseen and eternal, and more especially, the unseen God. Again, in respect of his knowledge, when the Apostle says he knows " in part" the statement is equivalent to the correlative clause in the first part of the verse, when he says, " Now we see through a glass darkly " (S^' hro-K- rpov Iv euviyfLaTi), that is, we do see God, but it is imper- fectly, and through, or by the aid of, a reflection of His glory. But, still ' further, it seems to me that Sir W. Hamilton has fallen into a misinterpretation of the latter portion of the quotation, when he represents the words. 448 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. " then shall I know even as also I am known " as equi- valent to " then shall I know without limitation." For, in respect of God's knowledge of man, it is knowledge of a finite being, and therefore a knowledge which has boundaries or limitation. It must, from the very nature of the case, be a mistake to represent the Divine know- ledge of a human creature as an infinite knowledge. Again, in respect of the possible expansion of man's knowledge in the future world, it cannot be knowledge " without limitation." Though it be a knowledge of God " as we are known " by Him, it will not be knowledge "without limitation ;" and there is no sanction in Scrip- ture for such a doctrine, as that we shall at length attain to infinite knowledge. In reference to this same passage of Scripture, Dr. Mansel writes as follows : " I believe that Scripture teaches to each and aU of us the lesson which it was designed to teach, so long as we are men upon earth, and not as the angels in heaven. I believe that ' now we see through a glass darkly' — in an enigma ; but that now is one which encompasses the whole race of man- kind, from the cradle to the grave, from the creation to the day of judgment : that dark enigma is one which no human reason can solve ; which reason is unable to penetrate ; and which faith can only rest content with here, in hope of a clearer vision to be granted hereafter."^ In respect of the knowledge we have in our present state, all are agreed that "we see through a glass darkly" certainly this is true from the first dawn of intelligence, till the hour of departure from this world. But, though * Limits of Religious Thought, p. 263. TESTUiIONY OF SCRIPTURE. 449 it be seeing through a glass dai-kly, it is still sight; and if we have, as there can be no doubt we have, sufficient ground to hope that there is " a clearer vision to be granted hereafter," this involves the admission that we have a certain imperfect vision now. In respect of the knowledge of God which man possessed at " the crea- tion," I do not feel competent to speak with certainty ; but I incline to think that man's knowledge of God before the faU, was so much superior to that which we have now, and so like to what the angels have in heaven, that Dr. Mansel is wrong in assigning to it the same imperfection, which adheres to the knowledge every man has now " from the cradle to the grave." It seems to me that this classification of the knowledge of God which man has now, with the knowledge which he had at the creation, must involve a misinterpretation of the Scriptural statement : " So God created man in his own image : in the image of God created he him ;" and also of that other striking, and to us mysterious reference to " the voice of the Lord walking in the garden in the cool of the day." I shall consider hereafter the reasoning of Dr. Mansel, in connexion with this passage, regarding the knowledge of the Infinite Being, possible to man in another state. Bishop Browne, though constantly restrained by his analogical theory, concerning man's knowledge of the Infinite Being, comes nearer an interpretation of the Apostle's words. In seeking to vindicate knowledge by analogy, he says, " The Atheists themselves find their account in laying aside and confounding this analogy ; for thus they argue : If God is Infinite, no finite human 2 F 450 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. understanding can have any knowledge at all of him. It cannot know him in the whole, because , nothing finite can comprehend infinity ; nor can it know any part of him, there being no part of infinity. To which I return the Apostle's answer, that though we cannot be said to know any part of him, yet we are truly said to know him in part, as we see the reflection of a substance in a looking-glass."^ Bishop Browne enters very fully into a critical examination of this passage from the First Epistle to the Corinthians ; but, though agreeing with him on many points, and differing on others, I cannot afi"ord space for criticism.^ The points of difi"erence will appear as I proceed. There are two clauses in the verse, which refer to our present knowledge, and are explanatory of each other ; and, in like manner, there are two clauses which refer to our future knowledge, and are also mutually explanatory. I shall glance at the respective clauses in the order of their apphcation, as they refer to present, or to future, knowledge. " Now we see through a glass, darkly ; but then face to face : now I know in part ; but then shall I know even as also I am known." It is necessary, _^rsi, to consider the testimony of this portion of Scripture concerning the knowledge we have in the present. Of the two clauses, the former aflSxms (1.) that we see; (2.) that we see darUy; and (3.) that we see darkly through a glass. When it is said that we see (^Xewo/Mep), there can be no doubt that this indicates knowledge of God, and is exactly equivalent to the ex- 1 The Procedwe, Extent, and Limits = Ibid. p. 112 ; and Analogy, p. 37, of the Hvman Understanding, p. 30. and again, p. 184. TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 451 pression in the correlative clause " now I know." But the Apostle affirms that we see darkly {ev alviyfian). This word rendered darkly, is properly in an enigma or riddle; and the meaning of the clause, "we see darkly," is manifestly, we see the Infinite One inadequately or imperfectly, as a fact is partly disclosed, partly hid, in a riddle. That this is the real meaning is increasingly apparent, if it be observed that the word here used {alvlyfjui) is that given by the Septuagint in the passage (l Kings X. 1), "And when the queen of Sheba heard of the fame of Solomon, concerning the name of the Lord, she came to prove him with hard questions" {ev alviyfiaai). The questions which the queen wished to put were hard questions to the majority, and yet questions which men could solve, for we read that Solomon " answered aU her questions." What we see in an enigma, therefore, is what we see darkly, but may come to see more clearly. The Septuagint afibrds us another example, stiU more strik- ing, in its rendering of the passage where God declares the manner in which He has revealed Himself to His servant Moses (Numb. xii. 8) ; "With him will I speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in dark speeches {8i alviyfiaTtov) ; and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold." These " dark speeches" are such as to reveal the Deity very inadequately, and yet, even in this world, God. gave it to Moses as a privilege, to see more clearly and fuUy than is common to men in the present state. The Apostle, however, not only indicates the nature of the knowledge we now have, but also the manner in which we come to the exercise and expansion of this 452 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. knowledge. He says, " We see darkly through a glass" {Si eaowrpov). The glass here spoken of is not a trans- parent glass, not a medium through which we see, but a looking-glass or mirror. It is the same word which is employed by the apostle James, when he says, " If any be a hearer of the word, and not a doer, he is like unto a man beholding his natural face in a glass; for he be- holdeth himself, and goeth his way, and straightway for- getteth what manner of man he was." When, then, the apostle Paul, speaking of the knowledge of God, which we have in the present state, says we see darkly through a glass, his words are not such as to lead any one to suppose, that, by looking through some external medium, we see God. His words mean, that we see or know God through, or by means of, some reflection of His glory on the surface of a mirror, which we are accustomed to behold. The works of God are, to an intelligent creature gazing upon them, a mirror, in which is seen shining a reflection of the glory of the great Creator. These three, the act of seeing God, seeing darkly, and seeing darkly through a glass, are equivalent to a knowledge of God ; a knowledge which is inadequate ; and an inadequate knowledge, attained and extended through means of the contemplation of His works. In perfect, accordance with this view of the text is the correlative clause in the latter part of the verse, — "Now I know in part" (e« /lepovi), literally of a part, but adverbially, as in this case, " in part, partly, i.e., im- perfectly," as Robinson says. Anything more incon- sistent than Hamilton's rendering, "now I know the finite," can hardly be conceived. The expression, " in TESTIMONY OP SCRIPTURE. 453 part," does not describe any division of the object, but indicates a mode of knowing, in contrast to that mode, or full measure of knowledge which God has of us. This clause of the verse is an explicit declaration that we do know God, though it be only imperfectly. A few verses before that which is engaging attention, we find the Apostle saying, " We know in part, and we prophesy in part." It is impossible to make this mean, " we know the finite, and we prophesy the finite." But it does very clearly imply that the restriction which belongs to our knowledge, belongs also to the prophecy itself; in other words, the revelation is imperfect, and our know- ledge is like it. We have received a revelation of the Deity, but even those who have prophesied, have done so only imperfectly. We do in the present state know God, but ours is a partial knowledge. It is time to consider shortly the clauses of the verse which refer to the measure of knowledge which the Apostle declares will be enjoyed in the future state. Though now we see only through a glass darkly, we shall then see "face to face." What interpretation is to be given to this expression ? The phrase, " face to face," occurs in other passages in the Word of God, and from these we may receive aid in deciding upon the true rendering of the passage before us. In the very striking description we have of the wresthng of Jacob by the brook Jabbok, when it was said to him, " Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel : for as a prince hast thou power with God and with men, and hast prevailed," we find these words used by the patriarch : ^ — " I have ' Gen. xxxii. 30. 454; THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. seen God face to face, and my life is preserved." The same thing is also said concerning Moses, " There arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face."^ And again it is said, "And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speak- eth unto his friend."^ From these passages it is mani- fest that to see God "face to face" {irpoa-mirov trpo<; eari), it is not meant that we shall see the full measure of His glory, but only that we shall see accord- ing to the power which our perfected nature will have, for the contemplation of the Divine excellence. To quote the words of Alford on the passage, " The word {(rfoiieOd), however understood, has for its limit, that no created eye, even in the glorified body, can behold the Creator : that beyond its keenest search there will be glory and perfec- tion baflfling and dazzling it : but this incapacity does not prevent the vision, as far as it can reach, being clear and unclouded : being, to the utmost extent of which our glorified nature is capable, ws eaTiv, a true and not a false vision of God." The full tenor of the passage, therefore, is, that we shall not only have an immediate knowledge of God, but that, being " entirely like Him — ethically like Him"^ — perfect in holiness, we shall be able to contem- plate His glory in a manner impossible in the present state. The human intellect will then be delivered from 1 1 Cor. XV. 49. ^ 1 John iii. 2. * Alford in loco. 472 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. all the restraint of sin, and placed in circumstances the most favourable for the development and exercise of all its powers. Our destiny in a future state is thus repre- sented as glorious, chiefly because of these two considera- tions which have been adduced, that God will then give a higher revelation of Himself, and that we shall be perfect in holiness, and shall feel the manifestation of the Divine excellence to be the chief joy of existence. (c.) In the heavenly land, human nature will still he finite, and the mind he subject to all the conditions of finite intelligence. The Bible certainly teaches that our present knowledge of God is much more defective than is necessary to beings possessed of such power as we have; and that future knowledge will be much more elevated in degree. We are not taught that the Mn- drance to higher attainment here, is to be found in the conditions which belong to our nature as finite, but in the moral evil which clings to our nature as sinful. This being the case, there is nothing in Divine revelation which implies that the present laws of knowledge and of thought are to be overturned, and other laws substituted for our guidance in reaching a more exalted knowledge. We are taught that we shall be perfect as human creatures, but not that we shall be infinite ; that we shall rise to a knowledge unattainable here, but not that we shall know God in the fulness of His glory ; that we shall at once be introduced to a grander revelation of the Deity, but not that our entrance into heaven will introduce us to the fuU measure of knowledge, leaving nothing to be attained thereafter. We are told that those who dwell in the heavenly TESTIMONY OF SCEIPTUEE. 473 land " are equal to the angels,"^ and from this statement we may infer somewhat concerning the manner in which we shall exercise our intellectual powers. This equality with the angels plainly refers to the spirituality of nature. In this respect we shall be equal, while we are dwellers together in the same state of existence. There is not, however, any distinct indication that we shall be equal to the angels in intellectual gifts ; but, whatever may be true in this respect, there is nothing to warrant the supposition that we shall surpass the angels in powers of knowledge. There are some traces in Scripture of the manner in which the angels exercise their intellectual nature, and of the measure of their knowledge. When the apostle Peter writes concerning the salvation into which " the prophets have inquired and searched diligently," and of the preaching of the gospel " with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven," he adds, " which things the angels desire to look into."^ Again, when our Lord speaks of coming judgment, he says, " Of that day and hour knoweth no man ; no, not the angels of heaven, but my Father only."^ From these quotations two facts are clearly indicated : First, That the angehc intelligence, in acquiring knowledge of God's excellence, is engaged in observation of His works, and reasoning from recognised facts. Secondly, That there is not only much hid from the angels, requiring patient study for its discovery, but also much so completely hid that it cannot be discovered by their most careful research. These things being true now, concerning " the angels of heaven," though we be " equal with the angels" when we are saints in heaven, ' Luke XX. 36. ' 1 Peter i. 12. « Matt. xxiv. 36. 474 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INEINITE. we shall not have powers of knowledge highei? than theirs. In connexion with our destiny in the future state, it is gratifying that those who have maintained the impos- sibility of any knowledge of the Infinite Being, very decidedly assert that we shall attain to such knowledge hereafter. Sir W. Hamilton expressly declares this, and Dr. Mansel says, that it is only " so long as we are men iipon the earth, and not as the angels in heaven," that it is impossible for us to know God. Indeed, when it is remembered how strongly these authors maintain that the finite mind cannot know the Infinite . Being, it is altogether singular what measure of knowledge they assign to man in a future state. To maintain that a knowledge of God will be impossible to men in the future state, is what no believer in the Bible could venture to do ; and yet to maintain that such knowledge there will be, is a glaring inconsistency on the part of any upholder of the theory that the finite mind cannot know the Infinite Beiag. In this way Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel have preserved their orthodoxy, and have reached the culminating point in their inconsistency. Sir W. Hamilton's assertion concerning the measure of future knowledge, occurs, as I have mentioned, in the interpretation of a scriptural statement which he quotes. " The Scriptures explicitly declare that the Infinite is for us now incognisable ; they declare that the finite, and the finite alone, is within our reach. It is said (to cite one text out of many), that ' now I know in part {i.e., the finite) ; but then {i.e., in the life to come), shall I know even as I am known' {i.e., without limitation)." TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 475 This, as I have shown, is altogether a perversion of Scrip - ture. But it is maintained as a philosophical doctrine — the cHmax of the Hamiltonian theory concerning the unconditioned. " In the life to come," we shall know "without limitation !" This from Sir W. Hamilton ! If we shall know without limitation, we must ourselves be unlimited, else the limited may know " without limita- tion," than which there could be no clearer contradiction. Must we, then, suppose that in the future world we shall become infinite 1 And, if so, shall we coalesce with the Infinite Being, and lose our personality ? Or are we to co-exist as infinite beings with the Infinite Euler ? There is no end to the contradictions which spring from such an assertion as this, that in the life to come we shall know without fimitation. Dr. Mansel, in connexion with his assertion of the impossibility of a knowledge of the infinite " so long as we are men upon the earth, and not as the angels in heaven," gives a summary of the obstructions to such knowledge, so long as we are here, all of which must, of course, be removed, according to his theory, in order that we may know God in heaven. I give the passage at fuU length. " If there be any who think that the laws of thought themselves may change with the changing know- ledge of man ; that the limitations of Subject and Object, of Duration and Succession, or Space and Time, belong to the vulgar only, and not to the philosopher : if there be any who believe that they can think without the con- sciousness of themselves as thinking, or of anything about which they think ; that they can be in such or such a mental state, and yet for no period of duration; that 476 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. they can remember this state, and make subsequent use of it, without conceiving it as antecedent, or as standing in any order of time to their present consciousness ; that they can reflect upon God, without their reflections fol- lowing each other, without their succeeding to any earher, or being succeeded by any later state of mind : if there be any who maintaiu that they can conceive Justice and Mercy and Wisdom, as neither existing iu a just and merciful and wise Being, nor in any way distinguishable from each other : if there be any who imagine that they can be conscious without variety, or discern without dif- ferences ; these and these alone may aspire to correct Revelation by the aid of Philosophy ; for such alone are the conditions under which Philosophy can attain to a rational knowledge of the Infinite God."^ I perfectly sympathize with the earnestness of Dr. Hansel's opposi- tion to all who " aspire to correct Revelation by the aid of Philosophy," though, as it seems to me, he has taken a mistaken course to defend EeHgion from their assaults, and has thrown down a very inefiectual barrier to the continuance of their dangerous speculations. The safety of Religion and Philosophy alike, is to be found in laying down, on clear psychological data, the restrictions of thought, as subordinate to our necessary beHef. But when Dr. Mansel enumerates those characteris- tics of human thought, which he aUeges prevent a know- ledge of the Infinite Being now, and thereby indicates what conditions must be removed that we may know God hereafter, he presents a view of the knowledge which belongs to the future state, altogether without Scriptural > Limits of Religious Thought, pp. 263-4. TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 477 testimony in support of his doctrine. When we are no longer as " men upon the earth," but " as the angels in heaven ;" when we are no longer within that period of life which stretches " from the cradle to the grave," but are beyond it ; shall we be freed from the laws which now regulate the exercise of our intellectual powers? Upon what authority can such a theory be maintained ? Are not these laws a necessary part of our nature ; in some respects, at least, essential to all finite intelligence ; and not the mere product of present circumstances ? Since it is admitted that, in the future world, we shaU know God, shall we then " think without the conscious- ness of ourselves as thinking, or of anything about which we think ;" shall we be "in such or such a mental state, and yet for no period of duration ;" and shall we " reflect upon God, without our reflections following each other, without their succeeding to any earlier, or being suc- ceeded by any later state of mind " ? Anything more thoroughly destitute of authority, and more inconsistent ia itself, can hardly be conceived. It is admitted as beyond dispute concerning the exer- cise of thought now, that aU thinking imphes, (l.) a mind which thinks, (2.) an object about which it thinks, and (3.) a conscious relation between the two. Will aU this cease when the mind passes into another stage of its existence ? If men can know God, only when " they can think without the consciousness of themselves as thinking, or of anything about which they think," what is the con- sequence ? Either they must be identified with God, and lose their individuality, in which case they do not know God : or God must be identified with them, and lose his 478 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. individuality (a monstrous supposition !), in which case, God is not known. These are the only possibihties, if we are to be " conscious without variety, or discern with- out differences." The absence of all " variety" or " dif- ference/' must be identity. And on this hypothesis concerning knowledge in the future, we shall not be " as the angels in heaven," for we are told that there are cer- tain things which they " desire to look into," and they must recognise these things as distinct from themselves, that is, they must be conscious with variety, and discern with differences, wMle they unquestionably know God. The inconsistencies of this theory, concerning know- ledge in the future state, multiply as we advance in the consideration of the conditions of thought which, it is said, must be removed in order that we may know God. For such a knowledge we must be able to be " in such or such a mental state, and yet for no period of duration," and able to " remember this state, and make subsequent use of it, without conceiving it as antecedent, or as stand- ing in any order of time to our present consciousness." Is it by such a radical change in our mental constitution, that we are hereafter to be " as the angels in heaven " ? Then, when these angels " desire to look into " certain things, that desire can never be gratified, since "looking" would occupy a " period of duration ; " or, if it were gratified, the results of their observation could not be remembered by them, since that would make their pre- vious mental occupation stand in a certain " order of time to their present consciousness ; " and they can make no progress in knowledge, since such progress would imply a certain degree of knowledge "as antecedent," and a TESTIMONY OF SCEIPTURE. 479 wider degree of knowledge as subsequent. On such a theory, perhaps it should be said, that the angels cannot be supposed to desire anything, since such a desire would involve existence in a mental state for a certain period of duration, and though these angels are to exist for ever, it would be inconsistent with their nature to occupy any " period of duration," " in such or such a mental state." What shall be said of a philosophical doctrine which leads to such results as these ! Humbly, but decidedly, do I reject it, as unwarranted in Philosophy, and contra- dicted by Scripture. I beheve that when the gates of heaven are passed by any human spirit, a revelation of the Divine glory, inconceivable to us in our present state, is presented to view ; and that the soul, on entering the abodes of bhss, is perfect in holiness. That soul continues to exercise its intellectual power, under the laws which now regulate its operations ; and, more especially, knows God, in recog- nising the Deity as distinct from itself ; continues in a course of eternal progress, in which each mental state occupies a certain period of duration, and is distinguished from that which preceded it, and from that which follows it ; and, at every point in the ceaseless advancement, remembers its previous experience as "antecedent" to the measure of attainment reached in present conscious- ness. CHAPTER XL CONCLUDING STATEMENT. The general conclusion adopted on the merits of the controversy concerning the possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite Being, must involve the most important practical results both in Philosophy and in Theology. The literature of both must take one of two diverging currents, according as it is held that man has no know- ledge of the Deity, or that the Infinite Being is known to us. If the former view be adopted, it must in truth be announced that the literature of Philosophy and Theology is greatly overgrown, stretching its long boughs into for- bidden territory, calling for the immediate use of a strong and sharp pruning-knife. Philosophers must now write books to prove that too many books in Philosophy have been written, and that their predecessors have reasoned at great length on matters utterly beyond the power of man to conceive. Philosophy must content itself with recording the fact that the human mind has a necessary behef in the Infinite Being ; while, by clearly pointing out the conditions of knowledge and thought, it demonstrates that we can know nothing of His nature, and understand nothing of His government. Theology must surrender its stores of systematic doctrinal dissertation, and acknow- CONCLUDING STATEMENT. 481 ledge that all that has been written concerning the holi- ness and justice and mercy of the Deity must be con- sidered baseless speculation, by which thousands have been betrayed into presumptuous intermeddling with things too high for them. Such, must be the fruit which the tree will yield, if the pruning-knife of the pMlosophy of ignorance be applied to literature. That such devas- tation wiU be tolerated, I cannot imagine ; that either Sir W. Hamilton or Dr. Mansel has presented anything approaching sufficient ground for the restrictions they have attempted to impose on philosophical inquiry, T al- together deny ; those barriers, whether logical or meta- physical in nature, which they have thrown in the way of further research and speculation, I have made an honest attempt to help in removing ; that the sphere of know- ledge and thought concerning the' Infinite Being is open to those who approach with reverent footsteps, it is my joy to believe ; and that I have drawn at least the outline of a sound philosophy of the Infinite, based on consciousness^ I hope may yet appear, as the issue of a searching and just criticism. The roots of such a philosophy are deep in the mental constitution of man, in the form of a necessary belief, which soon sends up through the young and cultivated soil a vigorous shoot. This first' growth gains strength through aU the vicissitudes of mental experience, until it attains to the' stature of a goodly tree, sending forth its branches over aU parts of the field of scientific research. And its destiny is, not to wither and then decay, but to be transplanted in the' very soil in which it grows, to another region, where, under the balmy atmosphere of an eternal 2 H 482 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. summer, and in a soil then cleared of every impurity, and far more liighly cultivated, it will flourish for ever. The simple outline of such an imperfect philosophy of the Infinite as man can have, may be given within very short compass. We have in the mind, as the very basis of our fundamental convictions, a necessary behef in the Infinite Being. When this belief arises in con- sciousness, asserting the existence of the Deity, it ne- cessarily involves an original knowledge of His viature. There cannot be given to us a beKef that God is, without some knowledge of what He is, because we can believe in an existence, only as we can distinguish it from other existences. Knowledge in some degree there must be, though it is not essential that such knowledge be com- plete. As, however, our belief arises, only when the facts of observation, or the inquiries of the understanding, are contemplated in such manner as to require it ; so is it, in like manner, that we become conscious of our know- ledge of His excellence. AU finite existence presents the facts requiring the application of our faith ; and, as such existence is believed to be the work of God's power, so it affords the illustrations of the Divine nature, in the con- templation of which our knowledge expands. It is proper that I should, before concluding, present Dr. Hansel's criticism of this theory as a whole, and the reply which I have to offer. He says, " An able attempt has recently been made by Mr. Calderwood to re-construct in opposition to the theory of Sir W. Hamilton, a Philo- sophy of the Absolute on the basis of consciousness. While admitting the ability of Mr. Calderwood's work, and the merit of many of his details, I cannot help CONCLUDING STATEMENT. 483 thinking that he has faUed in his main purpose. He de- fines the Absolute, which he rightly identifies with the Infinite, as ' that which is free from all necessary rela- tion ;' it ' may exist in relation, provided that relation be not a necessary condition of its existence.' Hence he holds that the Absolute may exist in the relation of con- sciousness, and in that relation be apprehended though imperfectly by man. On this theory, we have two Ab- solutes ; the Absolute as it exists out of consciousness, and the Absolute as it is known in consciousness. Mr, Calderwood's theory rests on the assumption that thesfe two are one. How is this identity to be ascertained ? How do I know that the Absolute, is my Absolute ? I cannot compare them ; for comparison is a relation, and the first Absolute exists out of relation. Again, to com- pare them, I must be in and out of consciousness at the same time ; for the first Absolute is never in conscious- ness, and the second is never out of it. Againj the Ab- solute as known is an object of consciousness ; and an object of consciousness, as such, cannot exist save in rela- tion. But the true Absolute, by its definition, can exist out of relation, therefore, the Absolute, as known, is not the true Absolute. Mr. Calderwood's Absolute in con- sciousness is only the Relative under a false name."^ Two Absolutes ! and my theory "rests on the assump- tion that these two are one!" There is mistake here. There are not two Absolutes in my theory, and therefore it cannot rest " on the assumption that these two are one." The ingenious criticism of Dr. Mansel misses the mark. Because I maintain that we have a knowledge ' Lectv/re on the Philosophy of Kamt, p. 38. 484 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. of the Absolute, Dr. Mansel argues that such professed knowledge, implies an Absolute "as it exists out of con- sciousness," and " an Absolute as it is known in con- sciousness." If such reasoning has any value, it must be on the principle, that all knowledge implies an object in consciousness, and an object out of it. The application of such a principle will lead to very novel results in philosophy. If I say that I know a certain person, does that imply that there is a person in my consciousness, and a person out of my consciousness, and that these two are one 1 There can be no knowledge except in con- sciousness, but the objects known, though they be said to be objects of consciousness, are not themselves in con- sciousness. Consciousness is the sphere in which all mental operations exist, but not a sphere into which ex- ternal realities are introduced, when known. While, then, it seems plain that to assert a knowledge of the Absolute, does not imply that there is an Absolute in consciousness, I do maintain that the mind is capable of being engaged with the Absolute, as an object of knowledge. If, then, I am asked, how we are assured that the object known is the Absolute, the question is a reason- able one. I refer exclusively to the authority of faith, for the assurance that the object known is the Absolute Being. It is on a necessary belief that my theory rests, and not on the assumption that an Absolute within, and another without, are one. Since we have a neces- sary behef, assuring us that the Absolute Being exists, that belief itself uxvolves a necessary knowledge of the Absolute Being ; and this necessary knowledge is con- CONCLUDING STATEMENT. 485 firmed and expanded by the contemplation of the works of the Absolute Being. This is the chain, formed, as it seems to me, with the utmost philosophical consistency, and which I continue to think cannot be broken. The last point in Dr. Mansel's criticism is as in- effectual as the first. His argument is this : " An object of consciousness, as such, cannot exist save in relation ; but the true Absolute, by its definition, can exist out of relation ; therefore, the Absolute, as known, is not the true Absolute." The first proposition, if fully stated, would stand thus, — Any existence can be an object of consciousness only inasmuch as it comes into relation with the mind. The truth of the proposition, thus stated, is very manifest, but it determines nothing what- ever concerning the existence of the object, it simply describes when we can be conscious of its existence. It is as true of the Absolute, as of every other existence, that it can be an object of consciousness, only if it come into relation with the mind. But it is a totally differ- ent assertion which is covertly implied, when the propo- sition is stated in the terms given in the above quotation, where it is said, — "An object of consciousness, as such, cannot exist out of relation." It is quite true that it cannot exist out of relation, and at the same time be an object of consciousness, but that truth is of no value in the argument. Every external object of consciousness can exist out of that relation which our consciousness implies, and so may the Absolute. Does Dr. Mansel mean to afl&rm that after an existence has come into relation with our consciousness, it cannot again exist out of that relation ? He cannot mean anything so very 486 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. extraordinary, and yet he must mean this in order to secure the validity of his argument. The incoherence of the reasoning will be apparent if the only justifiable signification of the first proposition be presented in other terms. It will stand thus : Any existence can be an object of consciousness, only inasmuch as it comes into relation with the mind, but the true Absolute can exist out of relation, therefore the Absolute as known is not the true Absolute. The professed argument is no argu- ment at all. The only legitimate conclusion to be drawn from the two propositions is, that the relation to our mind implied in the consciousness of an object, cannot be essential to the Absolute. It is certainly true that the Absolute can exist out of relation ; but, it Tnay exist as an object of our consciousness, and the former truth be untouched. Objects known as distinct from self can all exist out of the relation of our consciousness, and Dr. Mansel's argument fails, which seeks to infer from the relation of consciousness, that its object cannot be the Absolute. The whole argument which has been brought to bear against the position, that we do in our present state pos- sess a knowledge of the Infinite Being, seems to me a failure. From the necessary relation subsisting in the. mind between faith and knowledge, I regard an oiigiual knowledge of the Deity as a necessity of our being, aud hold that such knowledge is capable of indefinite expan- sion, in harmony with the admitted laws of mind. To quote the language of Howe, in his answer to Spinoza, when accounting for apparent ignorance of the Deity on the part of many, — " Were it not for slothful CONCLUDING STATEMENT. 487 neglect of most to study themselves . . . they might take notice without being told, that . . . they can form a conception, however imperfect, of this absolutely perfect Being whereof we are discoursing, which even they that acknowledge not its existence cannot deny, except they will profess themselves blindly and at a venture to deny they know not what, or what they have not so much as thought of."^ And, once more, from the same author, "Let them that judge the notion of in- finiteness inconsistent, therefore, reject it if they can. They will feel it re-imposing itself upoii them whether they will or no, and sticking as close to their minds as their very thinking power itself."^ I prefer rather to agree with the doctrine of Butler, in his Analogy, that along with " the moral nature which God has given us," there is in the mind a " natural notion of Him as right- eous governor of those His creatures to whom He has given this nature;"^ than hold with Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel, that there is no such natural notion. I accept, as harnlonizing in every way with our mental constitution, the argument of Butler : " As our under- standing can contemplate itself, and our affections be exercised upon themselves by reflection, so may each be employed in the same manner upon any other mind ; and, since the Supreme Mind, the Author and Cause of aU things, is the highest possible object to Himself, He may be an adequate supply to aU the faculties of our souls, a subject to our understanding, and an' object to our affec- tions."^ Such is the sound teaching .of Butler, and I 1 lAving Temple, part i. chap, iii, sec. 11. ' Analogy of Religion, part i. ch. lii. 2 Ihid. part. i. chap. iv. sec. 8. , ■* Sermon xiv. 488 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE, humbly apprehend that nothing has been done to lessen its force by the upholders of the theoiy of " philosophical ignorance," in their attempts to maintain that "the knowledge of nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy." In holding that there is a necessary relation between faith and knowledge, and that our original belief in the Divine existence implies a knowledge of the Divine na-. ture, a consistent philosophical doctrine is presented which gives warrant for the free and reverent exercise of all our powers of observation, research, and reasoning, that we may enlarge the measure of our acquaintance with the nature and the government of the Deity. It is with a sense of relief and gladness, that I rest in the distinct conviction that this field is legitimately open to us, notwithstanding aU the attempts which have been made to close it en- tirely. Far beyond the range of present knowledge, is the grand truth concerning the glor}?- of the Infinite Being to which faith bears testimony within us. But we have a knowledge in harmony with our faith, and the power to extend that knowledge, by the contemplation of all the aspects of that revelation which God has given of Himself in the present state. It is the high mission of a humble but earnest philosophy to carry forward the acquisitions of knowledge still further into the region of faith. This is the ceaseless task of the race, so long as we are permitted, in the exercise of our inteUigence, to behold the works of the great Creator. However far the extent of our knowledge may be advanced by any in- quirers, the results which they attain only widen the circumference, from which others may take their start. CONCLUDING STATEMENT. 489 In observing, reflecting, and reasoning in this lofty region, the highest importance seems to me to belong to the three fundamental maxims previously laid down : (1.) The harmony of faith and knowjedge is to be sought to the utmost extent to which the understanding can carry us ; (2.) That which is clearly inconsistent with our faith, may be pronounced contradictory of the Divine nature ; (3.) That which is apparently irreconcilable with our faith, cannot be pronounced contradictory of the nivine nature. The Jirst of these maxims indicates not only the warrant to seek a knowledge of the Infinite -Being, but also the method in which we must proceed. All inquiry and reasoning must be prosecuted under the guidance of faith, and must tend towards this as its result, a v/ider discovery of the harmony of the facts of observation, and the deductions of the understanding, with the testimony of our belief. In accordance with this maxim, we regard all the works of God spread out before us, as illustrations of His nature, from the study of which we may rise to a fuller acquaintance with the Divine glory. Every form of finite existence, from the lowest to the highest, has a significance concerning the nature of the Infinite Creator. The facts which aU men see, are facts which have a tes- timony to bear for God. Physical and Mental Sciences disclose fields of observation, upon which the believer iu the Deity may enter reverently, in the assurance of hav- ing his knowledge of the Infinite Being enlarged. All these have, a value to us in this relation, apart from their distinctive worth as sciences ; and to aU those which are • still very partially developed, we look with peculiar in- 490 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. terest, in the tjonviction, that they have yet many facts to disclose, still further illustrative of truth already known, or indicative of higher truth hitherto unrecog- nised. And, above all sciences, stand the Scriptures with their inexhaustible treasure, from which many things of high value are yet to be brought forth by the hands of diligent workers in this the richest of aU the mines which have been opened to us in this earthly state. The second maxim points out the truth, that there is a wide sphere within which we can ajBSbrm unhesitatingly, and reason with perfect certainty, concerning the nature of the Infinite Being. That which is clearly inconsistent "with our faith, may be pronounced contradictory of the Divine nature. Here, as in every department, faith is our guide, and it is one of the valuable appliances to which it can be put by us, as its intelligent possessors, to save ourselves from error in thought and feeling con- cerning the Deity. It is on this maxim, that we de- nounce the Polytheism of ancient Greece and Eome ; lament the Idolatry of modern heathenism ; sweep aside vnth. equal ease, and unmingled condemnation, aU Athe- istic and Pantheistic reasonings ; overturn, as irrational, aU misnamed Eationahsm, which ventures to restrict by a theory the power of the Almighty ; and search out for repudiation all traces of Materialism in the teaching or the worship of modern times. From all these, the neces- sary belief given to us in our mental constitution, com- pletely delivers us. And, on the same authority, we are enabled to set aside as fallacious, all reasoning which as- sumes the complete similarity, and neglects the revealed distinction, between the attributes of our finite mind, and CONCLUDING STATEMENT. 491 of the Infinite Intelligence. If any one reason as if Divine justice were identical with human justice, and as if the dealing of the Supreme Euler with His subject creatures, must be exactly similai? to the dealing which justice requires between man and man, we can discover with certainty a fallacy in the reasoning. And the power given to us, by our original belief, to judge of reason- ing concerning Divine justice, is equally a,ppHcable to reasoning regarding the Divine goodness, or mercy, or any other of the Divine attributes, to which faith bears witness. The third maxim indicates the one grand lesson which comes from the manifest limits of our powers of know- ledge and of thought. While faith is the guide m all our acquisition of knowledge, it testifies to truth which far outstretches our cognitive power. The human mind, therefore, has naturally within its own sphere the means suflGlcient to lead the intellect to raise problems, though there are not within that sphere the means by which to solve these problems. While the province of faith is much more extended than that of knowledge, there must be mysteries before the mind. All mysteries are the product of these two facts ; a power to discover a diffi- culty, and a powerlessness to solve it. They are pro- blems which our intellects raise, but the solution of which cannot be discovered, not from any want of observation or reflection upon materials within reach, but manifestly and essentially from the limits of our mind, when dealing with the materials we have. Our intellects, in starting the questions, point in the direction in which the solution is to be found, although they are unable to proceed in 492 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. the direction indicated, far enough to discover it. We are holding the threads -which have somewhere a firm fastening, although we can see but a little way along the line in which they stretch. Of these recognised mysteries, some are capable of solution to our intellect, some incap- able of any such solution. In so far as they arise, be- cause of the insufficiency of the facts presented to our view in this world, they are of such a nature, that our difficulties may be removed by the presentation of addi- tional facts in another world. In so far as they spring from the fact that our mind is finite, and the object of knowledge and faith Infinite, they must continue mys- teries for ever. While, therefore, we prosecute our inquiries concern- ing the Infinite Being, in accordance with the first maxim, this third maxim saves us from dogmatizing, where re- cognised facts are not sufficient to warrant us in drawing any conclusion. If we are conscious that we are free, yet beheve that God is Absolutely Sovereign, we are not warranted to affirm that these are contradictory; but must hold, on the authority of our faith, that they are re- concilable, in some way at present beyond our under- standing. When we recognise moral evil abounding in the world, and beheve that God is Absolutely Holy, we cannot conclude that these two are antagonistic, but must beheve quite the contrary. When we behold the distress- ing forms of human sufiering, and consider all the perplex- ing questions which these raise, yet believe in the Abso- lute Goodness of God, we cannot legitimately question the possibihty of any harmony between the two, but must hold that such harmony is certain. It is on the clearest CONCLUDING STATEMENT. 493 ground, in every way satisfying to our understanding, that we allow all such, problems as these to stand un- solved. As the late much loved and highly gifted Dr. George Wilson of Edinburgh was wont to say, such difficulties in human speculation are like knotted cords let down from heaven. We can hold the cord, and feel the knots, but we must have hoih ends of the cord, before we can undo these knots. While, then, the numerous perplexities attendant on human speculation must debar us from aU dogmatic assertion concerning those problems, for the solution of which we do not possess sufficient materials ; they will not by any means damp the ardour of our desire to know more, nor hinder us from an earnest and humble attempt to advance the boundary of our knowledge, however arduous the task, and however slow the pro- gress. But the number and the force of such perplexi- ties are sufficient to present a strong plea in behalf of a charitable latitude for free thought and discussion, so long as the views advanced are not manifestly contra- dictory of our belief. There can, indeed, be no place for the charity of a " multitudinist " theory, recently pro- mulgated in our country, which would embrace all behef and aU unbelief. If, indeed, it is to be admitted that we can have no knowledge whatever of the Infinite Being, that the " knowledge of nothing is the principle or result of aU true philosophy," that our faith has no speculative significance, but is inapplicable for the guidance of thought ; if, on these grounds, it is to be allowed that any guess may be as near to the truth, or as far from it, as any other, without our being able to teU ; then, but not 494 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE .INFIOTTE. till then, will there be hope for the " multitudinist " doc- trine of charity. But if we have a faith sufficient to in- volve knowledge and to guide thought, the " multitud- inist" doctrine is doomed, and we have clear ground from which to claim a reasonable latitude for independent thought, and encouragement enough to resume, in all quietness and perseverance, our arduous studies on the most perplexing themes. We rejoice now in that which, on authority equally Philosophical and Scriptural, is to us " the knowable of God," — to yvoxnov tov 0eov ; we desire here, under the guidance of a necessary belief, and the authority of a Divine Revelation, to advance our acquaintance with that which may be known ; and if hereafter the gates of heaven are thrown open to us, and we are freed from the restraints of this frail body, and from the darkening clouds of moral evil, a more glorious manifestation of the Divine excellence wiU be spread out before us, the territory of the Knowable will be im- mensely extended, and upon it we shall then be more capable of gazing. APPENDIX. APPENDIX. APPENDIX A. SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S LETTER TO THE AUTHOR, AND THE AUTHOR'S REPLY. The letter with which Sir William Hamilton favoured me shortly after the publication of the first edition of the present work is one of such importance and inherent value, as indicative of his views upon the entire question, that I feel I shall only do justice to my readers, and show my unfeigned respect for the memory of the great philosopher, by presenting it here in fuU. On the other hand, the letter enters so completely into the details of criticism on my position, that it gives me a gratifying opportunity of illustrating, somewhat consecutively, the manner in which I endeavour to meet the objections brought against the views advocated in the foregoing treatise. It is hoped that, though presented in the form of an Appendix, this part will be found to give completeness to the work. For the purpose of bringing each part of the criticism and of the reply more thoroughly under the reader's judg- ment, it is deemed desirable to insert the reply in each instance imme- diately after the paragraph in the letter, to which it is intended to refer. I shall, however, content myself with the insertion of the simple heads of reply, leaving the reader to turn to the body of the work for its amplification. The letter is to be found at full length in Hamilton's Metaphysical Lectures, vol. ii. pp. 530-535. " CoKDALE, 26th Sept. 1854. " My deak Sir, — I received a few days ago your Philosophy of the Infinite, and beg leave to return you my best thanks, both for the pre- sent of the book itself, and for the courteous manner in which my opinions are therein controverted. The ingenuity with which your views are maintained does great credit to your metaphysical ability ; and however I may differ from them, it gives me great satisfaction to recognise the independence of thought by which they are distinguished, and to acknowledge the candid spirit in which you have written. • " At the same time I regret that my doctrines (briefly as they are 2 I 498 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. promulgated on this abstract subject) bave been now again so much mistalcen, more especially in their theological relations. In fact, it seems to me that your admissions would, if adequately developed, result in establishing the very opinions which I maintain, and which you so earnestly set yourself to controvert. " In general, I do not think you have taken sufficiently into account the following circumstances : — " 1°- That the Iniinite which I contemplate is considered only as in thought, the Infinite beyond thought being, it may be, an object of be- lief, but not of knowledge. This consideration obviates many of your objections." Reply. — It will be observed that " this consideration " in reality embraces two considerations ; the one indicating the way in which Sir W. Hamilton contemplated the Infinite in his discussions re- garding it ; and the other indicating the opinion he held concern- ing the Infinite as an existence distinct from thought. It is better to view these two apart, and for this purpose to reproduce them in order. " The Infinite which I contemplate is considered only as in thoughf" Reply. — (1.) There is, and can be, but one Infinite, and that not in thought, but heyond thought, whether it be the object of thought or not. To speak of any other Infinite is to treat of that which has no existence. (2.) The Infinite in thought, if such were possible, must be infinite thought; and it is granted, and never was denied, so far as I know, that the finite mind cannot have infinite thought. On this there is no dispute. (3.) If Sir W. Hamilton's argument be only against the possibility of infinite thought in our finite mind, the whole of his elaborate discussion must be regarded as positively useless, inasmuch as it is the defence of a truism which never could be denied. (4.) The discussion concerning the Infinite cannot be limited in the manner proposed, and Sir W. Hamilton did not restrict his own reasonings on the subject in the way he affirms ; in proof of which, see five distinct instances referred to below. But now, let it be observed, that after Sir W. Hamilton has said " that the Infinite which he contemplates is in thought," he adds, " the Infinite heyond thought being, it may be, an object of beliefs but not of knowledge.'" Reply. — (1 .) This second declaration involves a manifest contradiction of the first, and shows that Sir W. Hamilton did not contemplate the Infinite « only as in thought." To say (a) that there can be no Infinite in thought is one thing ; to say (6) that the Infinite heyond thought, or the Infinite as existing, is an object of faith, is another thing ; to say (c) that the Infinite as existing is not an SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's letter. 499, object of knowledge, is an assertion quite distinct from the other two, and involves the real ground of discussion. (2.) While I grant that the Infinite as existing-^that is, the Infinite Being — ^is the object of faith, I give the most unqualified denial to the assertion that the Infinite Being is not the object of knowledge. My whole purpose in writing has been to show that a careful analysis of consciousness discloses a knowledge of the Infinite Being, and that all the arguments against such knowledge are only logical or formal objections, based on a false definition of the Infinite, instead of being attempts to interpret consciousness. (3.) In saying that he contemplated the Infinite " only as in thought,' Sir W. Hamilton did not obviate one of my objections ; for, in i^Si first place, he did not confine himself to the assertion that our mind cannot exercise infinite thought ; and, in the second place, not one of my objections had the least reference to such an assertion. " 2°- That the sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge ; and, therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be Jenown, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed. This I have, indeed, anxiously evinced both by reasoning and authority. When, therefore, you maintain that, in denying to man any positive cognisance of the Infinite, I virtually extenuate his belief in the infinitude of Deity, I must hold you to be wholly wrong, in respect both of my opinion, and of the theological dogma itself." Reply. — (1.) I grant that the sphere of faith is much more extensive than that of knowledge. But, for reasons immediately to appear, I do not admit that faith embraces, within its wider sphere, objects which are not in any measure within the sphere of knowledge. When, therefore, I acknowledge that the sphere of our faith is more extensive than that of our knowledge, I mean simply that our feith may have a much wider application to an object, than the measure of our knowledge of that object; in other words, our faith may be the fuU assent of the mind to truth concerning an object, which the mind can only partially know or conceive. (2.) I accept, with peculiar satisfaction, Sir W. Hamilton's declaration that the Infinite " is, wMst, and ought to be believed," but I lament that he has stiQ left it doubtful whether he held this to be a derived or a necessary belief There are conflicting passages m his writings, the reconciliation of which, it is to be feaxed, can- not now be found. I cannot, however, allow myself to suppose, notwithstanding quotations that might be adduced, that Hamilton woidd have vindicated any attempt at a logical deduction of the Infinite from the finite. That he held by a necessary belief in the Infinite is the most natural opinion, and the paragraph just quoted favours the supposition. (3.) All faith implies a measure of knowledge, and if we must believe 500 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. in the Infinite, we must also possess some knowledge of the object of faith. I, therefore, still hold, that to deny to man " any posi- tive cognisance of the Infinite" is virtually " to extenuate his be- lief in the infinitude of the Deity." The only method of escape from this conclusion is a demonstration of the possibility of faith without knowledge, which Sir W. Hamilton never attempted. (4.) That all faith implies knowledge, and is even in itself at once the assent of the mind to the reality of an existence, and a certain knowledge of that existence, is virtually admitted (a) in Hamilton's classification of aU the mental phenomena into " cognition, feeling, and appetency;" and (6) in the fact that he designated our neces- sary beliefs also necessary " cognitions," and included that power by which the mind possesses such beliefs, among our " cognitive powers." (5.) This whole paragraph clearly applies to the Infinite " beyond thought," — the Infinite as existing, that is, the " Deity ;" and is thus the second contradiction of the defence " that the Infinite which he contemplated was considered only as in thought." " Assuredly, I maintain that an infinite God cannot be by us (posi- tively) comprehended. But the Scriptures, and all theologians worthy of the name, assert the same. Some indeed of the latter, and, among them, some of the most illustrious Fathers, go the length of asserting, that ' an understood G-od is no God at all,' and that, ' if we maintain God to be as we can think that He is, we blaspheme.' Hence the asser- tion of Augustin : ' Deum potius ignorantia quam scientia attingi.' " Reply. — (1.) I admit that it is the very glory of the infinite God that he cannot be " comprehended," that is, fully known, by our finite minds ; the Scriptures teach this, and all theologians, whether worthy or unworthy of the name, believe it. It is nothing more than a repetition, in a different form, of the truism that our finite minds cannot have infinite knowledge or thought, about which there is, and can be, no dispute. Not a line in the preceding pages, either as they originally appeared, or as they are now, was written to prove that the finite could " comprehend" the Infinite. (2.) I unreservedly accept the quotations from the Fathers, except that from Augustin, as expressive of the conviction I adopt. But many of the Fathers made assertions of a most singular kind re- garding the Deity, which are not received in the present day, even though they come to us with aJl the authority of the Fathers. (3.) Concerning the quotation from Augustin, with all deference to his great name, I must say that, to my humble apprehension, it appears at least sophistry, and little short of absurdity. (4.) Whatever array of names could be adduced in favour of such a view as that expressed by this Father in the Church, it settles nothing to attempt to override an opponent with a regiment of authorities. SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's letter. 501 (5.) This paragraph in Sir William's letter applies professedly to " an infinite God," and is the third contradiction of the defence, " that the infinite which he contemplated was considered only as in thought.''' " 3">. That there is a fundamental difference between 2'he Infinite (to "El/ Ktti nSv), and a relation to which we may apply the term infi- nite. Thus, Time and Space must be excluded from the supposed no- tion of The Infinite ; for the Infinite, if positively thought it could be, must be thought as under neither Space nor Time." Reply. — (1.) The Infinite is not to "Ev koI IISv, — « The One and the AU." This is not the Infinite which " is, must, and ought to be believed." (2.) If this be the Infinite which Sir W. Hamilton contemplated, it is not the Infinite " considered as in thought," for certainly " the One and the AU" are not " in thought ;" and this is the fourth contradiction of his first and most general form of defence. (3.) If the Infinite be "the One and the All," surely Time and Space must be included in this all-absorbing existence. Either the defi- nition of The Infinite is wrong, or the author is wrong in saying that Time and Space are excluded from it. Admission. — (1.) I surrender at discretion under the force of Sir W. Hamilton's criticism concerning Space and Time, and I give up entirely all my arguments in support of a knowledge of the Infinite in these relations. I herewith acknowledge myself indebted to this criticism for being led to what appears to my own mind a more satisfactory doctrine concerning both, and I gratefully add this to the already large number of instances of deep obligation to the revered and lamented philosopher. (See Chapter "vi.) (2.) I admit, with the clearest conviction of the truth indicated, that the Infinite, if it be really the object of knowledge and thought, must be known and thought " as under neither Space nor Time." "But I would remark specially on some essential points of your doctrine, and these I shall take up without order, as they present them- selves to my recollection. " You maintain (passim) that thought, conception, knowledge, is and must be finite, whilst the object of thought, etc., may be infinite. This appears to me to be erroneous and even contradictory. An existence can only be an object of thought, conception, knowledge, inasmuch as it is an object thought, conceived, known ; as such only does it form a constituent of the circle of thought, conception, knowledge." Beply. — (1.) As to knowledge, we may have the knowledge of only certain qualities belonging to a particular existence, and our know- ledge of the several qualities may be in different degrees. In such a case we have a knowledge of the existence ; in other words, the existence is the object of knowledge to us, though it is not an 502 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. object fully known. That is to eay, all knowledge is not neces- sarily complete knowledge. (2.) As to thought, we do not think existence, but think about a particular existence, that is, make it in some measure the object of thought. Any number of qualities belonging to an existence, or any single quality, or any aspect of a quality, may be made the matter for comparison with some other object. That is to say, while we think about an existence, our thought does not invariably apply to the totality of that existence. (3.) As to conception, we may have a clear conception of an exist- ence, embracing the recognition of certain qualities belonging to it, though they be not all its qualities ; and that clear con- ception may also be distinct, that is, most sharply distinguished from other conceptions j and yet that conception, clear and distinct though it be, may be regarded by our own mind as in- complete. Therefore, though we have a conception of a particular existence, it does not necessarily foUow that our conception is adequate. Though we have a knowledge of an object, it may not be fully known ; though we think about an object, our thought may not apply to it in its totality ; though we have a conception of ex- istence, that conception is not invariably adequate. The reverse of aU these three positions must be demonstrated, before Sir W. Hamilton's criticism can be shown to have any force ; and such a demonstration, I believe, cannot be presented. " A thing may be partly known, conceived, thought, partly unknown, etc. But that part of it only which is thought, can be an object of thought, etc. ; whereas the part of it not thought, etc., is, as far as thought, etc., is concerned, only tantamount to zero." Reply. — (1.) A partial knowledge is not necessarily a knowledge of a part. I should be inclined to question whether it be so in any instance. Partial knowledge does not imply that an object has been separated into parts, and that one only of these is known. If a man see only a slight twig, which has been broken from a tree, can he be said to have a partial knowledge of the tree ? Can a man, who hears only a single note of music; be said to know a part of the bar to which that note belongs t, (2.) Partial knowledge is an inadequate knowledge of the whole. It is such knowledge as we have of objects to which our attention is imperfectly directed, or of such objects as require more careful examination than has been given to them, in order that a thorough knowledge of their properties may be attained. (3.) When I say that we have a " partial knowledge " of the Infinite One, I mean that we have a knowledge of God as He is ; most certainly I do not mean, nor can the statement be shown to imply, SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's letter. 603 that we have a knowledge of a part of the Divine nature. The doctrine here vindicated is, that we have a knowledge of the In- finite Being, which is dear and distinct, hut which always is, ami must be, even to eternity, inadequate. " The Infinite, therefore, in this point of view, can be no object of thought, etc. ; for nothing can be more self-repugnant than the asser- tion, that we know the infinite through a finite notion, or have a finite knowledge of an infinite object of knowledge." S^lt/. — (1.) As the view of " partial knowledge " just given by Sir W. Hamilton has bees shown to be mistaken, this criticism is powerless. (2.) I expressly deny that our knowledge is the measure of the ob- ject, and that an object cannot be known unless whoUy or ade- quately known. In like manner, I deny that our thought is the measure of the object about which we think, or that our conception is the measure of the object which the conception represents. I consequently deny the doctrine of Hamilton, that there js no alternative for the mind in the exercise of its cognitive power between a complete knowledge of an existence, and a division of that existence into such parts, as may admit of a complete know- ledge of one of these parts. It is on this point that the proof must turn, and for that the reader is referred to the body of this work. (3.) There is an essential difference between infinite knowledge and the knowledge of an Infinite Being ; and unless it can be shown, which has not been done, that knowledge is necessarily commen- surate with its object, the assertion of a finite, and therefore inadequate, knowledge of the Infinite One, cannot be proved " self-repugnant." (4.) The above is presented as a complete vindication of my position, but it is important, for the sake of advancing the discussion, to observe, that it involves, in part, only an apparent difference; and in part, a vital difference between Sir W. Hamilton and my- self ; whUe confusion has arisen from argument being conducted in two distinct lines, applying to matters altogether different. Let, the following be taken as an attempt to rid the marches : — Sir W. Hamilton has primarily dealt with what he, and many others, have called The Infinite, that is, Infinity taken abstractly, without its being regarded as the measure of an actual quality or attribute belonging to a recognised existence. Contemplating this exclusively, which is only a word, or, at best, a definition, he has said that Infinity cannot be embraced within our knowledge, which is neither more nor less than the assertion that our know- ledge is not infinite, which again is the simple declaration that infinity is not a property of our being,— all of which, it may be 504 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. added, in simple repetition of what was said in the opening chapter of my first edition (p. 14), are self-evident propositions. In reference to Hamilton's discussions on this matter, these things may be observed, (a) that The InfinUe contemplated is not The Infinite which " is, must, and ought to be believed," and has no existence, that is to say, there is no such infinite ; (6) that the discussions regarding it are of no value whatever in the interests of philosophical or theological inquiry ; (c) that these discussions are a mere intellectual gymnasium, — beating the air for the sake of gaining dexterity in the use of weapons ; and (d) they have this disadvantage, even as an intellectual gymnasium, that the conclusion is self-evident before you begin. \ The real difference, and the only ground of discussion, so far as I am concerned, has arisen from the fact that Sir W. Hamilton has imported the result of his arguments concerning the know- ledge of Infinity in the abstract, into the sphere of inquiry con- cerning the knowledge of the Infinite Being, who is the object of belief. What he did for the most part indirectly, and only occa- sionally by distinct assertions. Dr. Mansel has now done formally. The sole purpose for which the first edition of the present work was published, was to show that what is at once true and use- less in reference to Infinity in the abstract, is at once false and pernicious in reference to the Infinite Being ; and that purpose is unchanged now. The simple doctrine which I desire to take an humble part in vindicating is, that a finite knowledge of the Infinite Being is a fact in consciousness. It is simply because Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel have assailed this doctrine, that I am found among the number of their antagonists, now happily increasing in number. After the declaration that " nothing can be more self-repugnant than the assertion, that we know the Infinite through a finite notion, or have a finite knowledge of an infinite object of knowledge," the letter is continued in the following terms : — " But you assert (passim) that we have a knowledge, a notion of the infinite ; at the same time asserting (passim) that this knowledge or notion is ' inadequate,' ' partial,' I imperfect,' limited,' ' not in all its extent,' ' incomplete,' ' only to some extent,' 'in a certain sense,' 'indistinct,'" etc. eta ^epZy. — The defence of the doctrine, that we have a knowledge of the Infinite Being, is found above. All the expressions quoted are accordingly retained as thoroughly applicable, save that I now prefer using the correlative terms, "distinct" and "indistinct," in the Leibnitian sense, to denote what may or may not be distin- guished from other forms of knowledge, exercises of thought, or conceptions. SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON S LETTER. 505 " Now, in the first place, this assertion is in contradiction of what you also maintain, that 'the infinite is one and indivisible' (pp. 25, 26, 226) ; that is, having iw parts, it cannot be -partially known." Reply. — A partial knowledge is not a knowledge of parts, and there is no contradiction, therefore, in speaking of a partial knowledge of that which is indivisible. " But, in the second place, this also subverts the possibility of con- ceiving, of knowing, the Infinite ; for as partial, inadequate, not in all its extent, etc., our conception includes some part of the object sup- posed infinite, and does not include the rest. Our knowledge is, there- fore, by your own account, limited and finite ; consequently, you implicitly admit that we have no knowledge, at least no positive know- ledge, of the Infinite." Reply. — Inasmuch as the Infinite is " one and indivisible," and partial knowledge is not the knowledge of a part, the possibility of conceiving, or of knowing the Infinite Being, is not sub- verted by acknowledging that such knowledge or conception is inadequate. " Neither can I surmise how we should ever come to know that the object thus partially conceived is in itself infinite ; seeing that we are denied the power of knowing it as infinite, that is, not partially, not inadequately, not in some parts only of its extent, etc., but totally, adequately, in its whole extent, etc. ; in other words, under the criteria compatible with the supposition of infinitude. For, as you truly observe, 'everything short of the infinite is limited'" (p. 223). Reply. — (1.) It is by a necessary belief implanted in our nature, that we have the assurance of the existence of the Infinite Being. (2.) The knowledge of the Infinite Being which I have represented as existing in consciousness, rests upon the authority of that neces- sary belief. All faith implies knowledge, in proof of which see Chapter in. (3.) I herewith renew my protest against the doctrine once more repeated, that the only possible knowledge of the Infinite One must be a total or adequate knowledge of His nature, in all the extent of its infinitude. (4.) The paragraph under review involves a total neglect of the province of faith ; and of the relation between faith and know- ledge, which Hamilton has not attempted to trace ; and of the distinction between Infinity as an abstraction, and the Infinite Being whose existence " is, must, and ought to be believed." "Again, as stated, you describe the infinite to be 'one and indi- visible.' But, to conceive as inseparable into parts, an entity which, not excluding, in fact includes, the worlds of mind and matter, is for the human intellect utterly improbable. And does not the infinite contain the finite 1 If it does, then it contains what has parts, and is 506 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. divisible ; if it does not, then it is exclusive : the finite is out of the infinite ; and the infinite is conditioned, limited, restricted, — -finite.^' Reply. — (1.) The Infinite which " is, must, and ought to be believed," is not " an entity which includes the worlds of mind and matter.'' The assertion that it is, involves a violation of our faith, and pre- sents a gross and materialistic view of the Infinite, as if it were infinite extension. (2.) The Infinite, of whose existence we are assured by a necessary belief, is distinct from the worlds of mind and matter, and Supreme over both. (3.) In making the assertion that the Infinite " contains what has parts and is divisible," Hamilton makes a statement without the shadow of authority on which to rest it. (4.) When it is argued that if " the finite is out of the Infinite," the Infinite is conditioned, Umited, restricted, — finite ; the argument is accurate only on the gross and baseless supposition that the Infinite is an extended substance ; it is fallacious, if we accept the testimony of faith, when it reveals the Infinite Being as an Infinite Intelligence, (p.) This definition of the Infinite is not the Infinite "as in tliought" and is the fifth contradiction of the original defence, that the Infinite is contemplated exclusively in that aspect. "You controvert (p. 233, alibi) my assertion, that to conceive a thing in relation is, ipso facto, to conceive it as finite, and you main- tain that the relative is not incompatible with infinity, unless it be also restrictive. But restrictive I hold the relative always to be, and, therefore, incompatible with The Infinite in the more proper significa- tion of the term, though infinity, in a looser signification, may be ap- plied to it. My reasons for this are the following :— A relation is always a particular point of view ; consequently, the things thought as relative and correlative are always thought restrictively, in so far as the thought of the one discriminates and excludes the other, and like- wise all things not conceived in the same special or relative point of view. Thus, if we think of Socrates and Xanthippe under the matri- monial relation, not only do the thoughts of Socrates and Xanthippe exclude each other as separate existences, and, pro tanto, therefore are restrictive ; but thinking of Socrates as husband, this excludes our conception of him as citizen, etc., etc. Or, to take an example from higher relatives : what is thought as the object, excludes what is viewed as the subject, of thought, and hence the necessity which compelled Schelling and other absolutists to place The Absolute in the indiSerence of subject and object, of knowledge and existence. Again, we conceive God in the relation of Creator, we do not conceive Him as uncon- ditioned, as infinite ; for there are many other relations of the Deity under which we may conceive Him, but which are not included under SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON S LETTER. 507 the relation of Creator. In so far, therefore, as we conceive God only in this relation, our conception of Him is manifestly restrictive. Further, the created universe is, and you assert it to be (pp. 175, 180, 229), finite. The creation is, therefore, an act, however great, of finite power ; and the Creator is thus only thought in a finite capacity. God in His own nature is infinite, but we do not positively think Him as infinite, in thinking Him under the relation of the Creator of a finite creation. Finally, let us suppose the created universe (which you do not) to be infinite ; in that case we should be reduced to the dUemma of asserting two infinites, which is contradictory, or of asserting the supernal absurdity that God the Creator is finite, and the universe created by Him is infinite." R^ly. — The reader will observe that the point of dispute referred to in this lengthened paragraph concerns the question, whether to conceive a thing in relation is, ipso facto, to conceive it as a finite existence ? Sir W. Hamilton has answered the question in the affirmative, I answer it in the negative. (1.) The question is not, whether relation in thought implies re- striction in thought 1 This is admitted on both sides. Therefore (a) whether " the thoughts of Socrates and Xanthippe" exclude each other, or (6) whether the conception of Socrates as husband, excludes our conception of him as citizen, or (o) whether the thought of the object excludes the thought of the subject, or {d) whether the conception of Gpd as Creator, excludes the conception of Him as Moral Governor, are not questions which have any ap- plication to the point in dispute, and therefore are all to be set aside. (2.) The question is, whether relation in thought necessarily implies restriction in existence ? And as the restrictions of our thought do not influence external existence, objects are not restricted in existence, because they are related in thought. The relation of objects in thought, therefore, does not necessarily imply restriction in existence. If Socrates and Xanthippe were separate existences, standing in a certain restrictive relation to each other, they were not so because we think of them as separate existences thus re- lated ; but, we think of them as separate existences, thus related, because they are recognised as having been such in reality. (3.) The question, whether objects related in thought are restricted in existence, must be determined on grounds altogether distinct from their mere relation in thought. That the relations of hus- band and wife restrict each other is a fact in our knowledge. That the relation of husband and citizen also restrict each other, is no less certainly a matter of knowledge. That the relation of creature and Creator is a restriction of the creature without being a restriction of the Creator, is matter both of faith and knowledge. (4.) If it be granted that the existence of God, who " in his own 508 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. nature is infinite," " is, must, and ought to be believed," it must be admitted that He cannot be restricted, in whatever relation He exists, (o.) Though the created universe is finite, implying in its creation only an act of finite power, we think of God not merely accord- ing to His works, but according to our belief in His own infinite nature, which "is, must, and ought to be" accepted by every man. Under the guidance of that faith alone are we saved from thinking of the Creator merely according to the measure of His works, and led to think of Him as One not only sufficient for these things, but all-powerful. (6.) The final supposition in the above paragraph needs no reply. " In connexion with this, you expressly deny Space and Time to he restrictions, whilst you admit them to be necessary conditions of thought (pp. 103-117). I hold them both to be restrictive. " In the first place take Space, or Extension. Now, what is con- ceived as extended ? Does it not exclude the unextended % Does it not include body to the exclusion of mind ? Pro tanto, therefore, space is a limitation, a restriction. " In the same way Time — is it not restrictive in excluding the Deity, who must be held to exist above or beyond the condition of time or succession 1 This, His existence, we must believe as real, though we cannot positively think, conceive, understand its possibility. Time, like Space, thus involving limitation, both must be excluded, as has been done by Schelling, from the sphere — from the supposed notion of the infinito-absolute, ' Whose kingdom is where time and space are not.' " Since the publication of my first edition, and because of Sir W. Hamilton's criticism, I have been led to adopt a different opinion from that originally advocated. And as I no longer plead for a knowledge of the Infinite in the relation of Space or Time, this acknowledgment is sufficient in the present instance. " You ask if we had not a positive notion of the thing, how such a name as infinite could be introduced into language (p. 58) 1 The answer to this is easy. In the first place, the word infinite (infinitum, aireipov) is negative, expressing the negation of limits ; and I believe that this, its negative character, holds good in all languages. In the second place, the question is idle ; for we have many words which, more directly and obtrusively expressing a negation of thought, are extant in every language, as incogitahle, unthinkable, incomprehensijble, inconceivable, um/magirmble, nonsense, etc., etc. ; whilst the term infinite directly denotes only the negation of limits, and only indirectly a ne- gation of thought." Reply. — If the answer seemed so easy to Sir W. Hamilton, I must SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's letter. 509 perform the unpleasant duty of admitting that his answer seems to me very far from satisfactory. I cannot withhold some expres- sion of surprise, that what he deemed a sufficient explanation of the existence and very frequent use of the word, was, first, that it was a negative teitn ; and, secondly, that there are many words expressive of negation. (1.) If the word be negative in form, it is applied by us to an existent Being, yea, the one Self-existent Being ; and its use is not accounted for by any manifest need for a term simply to express a negation of the finite, unless there be a general recognition of some existence distinct from all finite existences. (2.) The term infinite cannot by any possibility be classified among terms which merely express a "negation of thought," since Sir W. Hamilton has expressly admitted that there is an Infinite Being, whose existence " is, must, and ought to be believed." " I may here notice what you animadvert on (pp. 60, 76), the applica- tion of the term notion, etc., to what cannot be positively conceived. At best this is merely a verbal objection against an abuse of language, but I hardly think it valid. The term notion can, I think, be not im- properly applied to what we are unable positively to construe in thought, and which we understand only by a problematic supposition. A round square cannot certainly be represented ; but understanding what is hypothetically required, the union of the attribute round with the attri- bute square, I may surely say, ' the notion round-square is a repre- sentative impossibility.' " Eeply — (1.) We can form a notion of a round object, and a distinct notion of a square object ; but to speak of the notion round-square is simply to use language without meaning. If language be only the symbol of thought, " round-square " represents nothing. (2.) I still regard " negative notion," both word and thing, as inde- fensible. Let Hamilton's definition of a notion be accepted, and there seems no way of explaining how there can be such a thing as a notion of a thing " by what it is not." "You misrepresent, in truth, reverse my doctrine in saying (p. 169) that I hold ' God cannot act as a cause, for the unconditioned cannot exist in relation.' I never denied, or dreamed of denying, that the Deity, though infinite, though unconditioned, could act in a finite relation. I only denied, in opposition to Cousin, that so He mmt. True it is, indeed, that in thinking God under relation, we do not then think Him, even negatively, as infinite ; and in general, whilst always believing Him to be infinite, we are ever unable to construe to our minds positively to conceive — His attribute itself of infinity. This is 'unsearchable.' This is 'past finding out.' What I have said as to the infinite being (subjectively) inconceivable, does not at all derogate from our belief of its (objective) reality. In fact, the main scope of my 510 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INFINITE. speculation is to show articulately, that we 7nust believe as actual much that we are unable (positively) to cmiceive as even possible." Reply. — (1.) I grant that Sir W. Hamilton, in his argument against Cousin, simply reasoned against the doctrine, that the Deity rmist act as cause ; but I argued that Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine, that the unconditioned cannot exist in relation, led naturally to the conclusion that the Deity cannot act as cavM. The logical validity of that inference stiQ seems to me unshaken. (2.) One of these two things must be surrendered, that the Infinite Being can create, or that the relative is necessarily restrictive, or contradictory of the nature of the Infinite Being. ' (3.) It is gratifying to receive from Sir W. Hamilton the clear and decided assertion that the Infinite Being can exist and act in relation. But how is the assertion consistent with the definition of the unconditioned ? How is it that in this very letter the statement is repeated, that " the relative is always restrictive ?" (4.) If the Infinite Being can exist and act in relation, we can know Him in such a relation. (5.) If in thinking of God under relation we do not think of Him as infinite, we must think of Him as He is not, that is, as finite, and, therefore, as not-God. In such a case we do not think of God at all. (6.) While it is maintained that we can know God only as he is, and not as finite, it is granted, and never was denied, that the infinite measure of His excellence is " unsearchable "• — is " past finding out." (7.) " Infinity" is not an "attiibvie" in the Divine nature, but the measure of all His attributes ; therefore we may have a certain knowledge of the attributes, such as power, wisdom, etc., though our knowledge does not embrace the infinitude of their measure. (8.) Instead of agreeing with the " main scope " of the theory " that we must believe as actual much that we are unable (positively) to conceive as even possible,'' I consider the accurate statement of the fact to be, that we must believe much that we cannot adequately know or conceive. " I should have wished to make some special observations on yom' seventh chapter in relation to causality ; for I think your objections to my theory of causation might be easily obviated. Assuredly that theory applies equally to- mind and matter. These, however, I must omit. But what can be more contradictory than your assertion ' that creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the origin of existence by the fiat of the Deity?' (p. 156.) Was the Deity not existent before the creation 1 or did the non-existent Deity at the creation originate exist- ence ? I do not dream of imputing to you such absurdities. But you must excuse me in saying that there is infinitely less ground to wrest SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON S LETTER. 511 my language (as you seem to do) to the assertion of a material Pan- theism, than to suppose you guilty of them." Reply. — (1.) I did not impute, or "dream of imputing," to Sir W. Hamilton the doctrine of a material Pantheism as an article in his philosophical creed. Every one acquainted with his writings knows how decidedly he rejected Pantheism. (2.) But I did argue that, notwithstanding Sir W. Hamilton's well- known rejection of Pantheism, his doctrine that creation adds nothing to the " complement of existence," leads to Pantheism as a natural inference. And I must repeat, though with pain, iu the face of this strong disclaimer, and of the objection made both by Dr. Mansel and Professor Fraser, that I am stiU unable to see any legitimate escape from such an inference. Either, as it seems to me, Hamilton's doctrine of causality falls to the ground, or this inference foUows naturally from the acceptation of it. (3.) The doctrine which I maintained, and still continue to maintain, is, that creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, as the origin of new existence by the fiat of the Deity ; in opposition to Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine that creation " is conceived, and is by us con- ceivable, merely as the evolution of a new form of existence by the fiat of the Deity." I must continue most earnestly to deny that we cannot " realize it to ourselves in thought, that the moment after the universe came into manifested being, there wasalarger complement of existence in the universe and its Author together, than there was the moment before in the Deity himself alone." (Metaph. ii. p. 406.) (4.) The criticism of my doctrine is frivolous, since every reader of the passage in which it occurs must see that I was treating of the origin oi finite existence. "Would any thus criticise the language of Scripture when, for example, it said, "All things were made by Him ?" (5.) The simple insertion of the word "finite," which every one must have seen was implied, renders the criticism powerless. The doc- trine is this, creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the origin oi finite eimtence by the fiat of the Deity. " Before concluding, I may notice your denial (p. 108) of my state- ment, that time present is conceivable only as a line in which the past and future limit each other. As a portion of time (time is a protensive quantity), the present, if positively conceived, must have a certain dura- tion, and that duration can be measured and stated. Now, does the present endure for an hour, a minute, a second, or any part of a second 1 If you state what length of duration it contains, you are lost. So true is the observation of St. Augustin." Jieply. — (1.) Time or mccesdon is one thing, the duration of an exist- ence, called duration in time, is quite another thing ; and to speak of measuring the duration of the act of succession, is to confound things which differ. 512 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. (2.) If, as Sir W. Hamilton has granted, time is succession, then succession is always the present and actual, and cannot be occur- ring either in the past or in the future. (3.) Succession is a fact constantly recognised in consciousness, and consciousness is always of the present, never of the past or the future. (4.) The observation of St. Augustin is one with which, I should ima- gine, few will be inclined to rest satisfied, unless it be taken simply to mean that time or succession is a thing always known in con- sciousness, however difficult to explain. " What is time ? If not asked, I know ; but attempting to explain, I know not." The conclusion of this valuable fragment, from the pen of the great philosopher who has departed from us, touchingly reminds me of the feeble frame which contained the noble mind, and at the same time of the consideration which he invariably showed to the humblest antagonist, the remembrance of which will always be cherished, while the image of the revered preceptor comes up in , memory. " These are but a few specimens of the mode in which I think your objections to my theory of the Infinite may be met. But, however scanty and imperfect, I have tired myself in their dictation, and must, therefore, now leave them, without addition or improvement, to your candid consideration. — Believe me, my dear Sir, very truly yours, (Signed). " W. Hamilton." APPENDIX B. In connexion with the discussion concerning the question. Whether our belief in the Divine existence is a necessary conviction, it may be interesting to the reader to peruse some of the statements of travellers regarding the religious belief found among heathen races. The extracts are such as have been casually noted in the course of reading. MungoParh's Travels. Edin. 1816. 2 vols. — The Mandingo Afri- cans (vol. i. p. 408). — " Some of the religious opinions of the Negroes, though blended with the weakest credulity and superstition, are not unworthy of attention. I have conversed with all ranks and conditions on the subject of their faith, and can pronounce, without the smallest shadow of doubt, that the belief of one God, and of a future state of reward and punishment, is entire and universal. It is remarkable, however, that, except on the appearance of a new moon, the Pagan natives do not think it necessary to offer up prayers and supplications to the Almighty. RELIGIOUS BELIEF AMON& HEATHEN TRIBES. 513 " They represent the Deity, indeed, as the Creator and Preserver of all things ; but, in general, they consider him as a Being so remote, and of so exalted a nature, that it is idle to imagine the feeble supplications of wretched mortals can reverse the decrees and change the purposes of unerring wisdom. But it is not often that the negroes make their reli- gious opinions the subject of conversation ; when interrogated, in par- ticular, concerning their ideas of a future state, they express themselves with great reverence, but endeavour to shorten the discussion by ob- serving — Mo mo inta alio — ' No one knows anything about it.' " The testimony of Mr. Moffat, the missionary in South Africa, is ad- verse to the doctrine which I have maintained. I present it meanwhile without comment. Moflfat's Missionary Labours and Scenes in South Africa. London, 1842, p. 265. — " I am aware that the popular opinion is, that ' man is a religious creature ; ' that wherever he is to be found there are to be traced the impressions and even convictions of the existence of a God. . . . Such were my views when I left my native land ; and entertaining such views, I persuaded myself, or rather tried to persuade myself, that I could discover rays of natural light, innate ideas of a Divine Being, in the most untutored savage ; — ^that I could never be at any loss to make appeals to something analogous to our own faith in the religious notions even of those among whom not a vestige of temple, altar, image, idol, or shrine was to be found. When I was unsuccessful, I attributed it to my ignorance of the language, or the paucity of competent interpreters. So great was the force of early prejudices, that it was a long time before I could be induced to embrace what I once considered an erroneous view of the subject." ..." One of the most convincing proofs that the minds of the people are covered by the profoundest darkness is, that after the missionary has endeavoured for hours to impart to them a knowledge of the Divine Being, they not unfrequently address to him the question, ' What is it you wish to tell me ? ' And if anything were wanting to confirm this conviction, surely this fact win be sufficient, that even when he has succeeded in convey- ing to the vacant mind of the savage, ideas which he considers as paramount to aU. others, he is told that certainly these fables are very wonderful, but not more so than their own." In connexion with this statement from Mr. Moffat, the following ex- tract from a letter of the late Professor George Wilson may be presented. The letter is published in the memoir by his sister. Edinburgh : 1860. — "I have another thing to tell you, which I read with rery great pleasure some time ago, and have always resolved but forgotten to communicate. You remember, in relation to Mr. Moffat and his Bechuanas, we both believed — I from a mere ' theopathetic ' instinct, you from a clearly-perceived and analysed necessity of thinking — that no people or tribe could be found altogether destitute of the idea of a God. Well, it has been again and again declared that the New Hol- 2 K 514 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE. landers have no idea of a God, and the phrenologists were able to show that their brains had no cranny or crevice in which such a thought could by possibility lurk. Very good ! and yet a recent traveller who has visited the tribes in the interior, where little communication with Europeans has left them in their unsophisticated state, finds that these poor brainless people have minds subtle enough to conceive the idea of a future state, and do actually believe in a metempsychosis of souls. It appears that the first white strangers were supposed to be transmigrated beings of their own tribe come back in a new incarnation. " A most affecting proof of the depth and reality of the belief is afforded by the traveller, whose name I have forgotten. Wandering one day into the village of a secluded tribe, an old woman walked up and looked at him with evident signs of agitation and pleasure. After gazing a whUe anxiously, she said, ' Yes, it is he !' and clasped the stranger in her arms. He learned by and by that she looked on him as the fleshly ghost or avatar of a lost son ; and he was introduced to sisters, uncles, and others, as their long-lost relation returned to dwell with them." The following testimony is regarding the Fiji Islanders : — " The idea of Deity is familiar to the Fijian, and the existence of an invisible superhuman power controlling or influencing all earthly things is fully recognised by him. Idolatry, in the strict sense of the term, he seems to have never known ; for he makes no attempt to fashion material representations of his gods, or to pay actual worship to the heavenly bodies, the elements, or any natural objects. . . . The god most generally known in Fiji is Ndengei, who seems to be an impersonation of the abstract idea of eternal existence." — Fiji and the Fijia.ns. By Thomas Williams, late Missionary in Fiji. Edited by George Stringer Eowe, pp. 215-17. " The Ormas have far more expanded and purer ideas of religion than other heathen tribes of Eastern Africa ; and it is also certain that they, like the others, have no visible idols, for throughout the whole of Eastern Africa such are not known. The fear of evil spirits is not wanting among this heathen nation ; and this has led to the idea of the necessity for an atonement, and to the ceremonial of sacrifice. It is certain, also, that these nations in general maintain the idea of a Supreme Being, whom they universally distinguish by the name ' Heaven ' (Waka Mulimgu), since, by their own conceptions, and without a higher reve- lation, they cannot ascend beyond the sky, the loftiest and most exalted of created objects, nor lift up their eyes to contemplate the One Almighty and Living God. They made an approach, it is true, to such a con- ception, but stopped short of it when they halted at a material heaven, and could at most only dimly foreshadow the existence of a Supreme Being. So certain is it that man left to himself, without the aid of revelation, can never attain to the image of the One Trae God." — RELIGIOUS BELIEF AMONG HEATHEN TRIBES. 515 Travels, Researches, and Misdonary Labours in Eastern Africa. By the Kev. Dr. J. L. Krapf, p. 80. Eeferring to a pigmy race four feet high, Krapf says, they " live in a completely savage state, like the beasts, having neither houses, temples, nor holy trees, like the Gallas, yet possessing something like an idea of a higher being, called Yer, to whom in moments of wretchedness and anxiety they pray — not in an erect posture, but reversed, with the head on the ground, and the feet supported upright against a tree or a stone." —P. 52. There is a passage in Dr. Livingstone's work which is full of interest : — " There is no necessity for beginning to tell even the most degraded of these people of the existence of a God or of a future state — the facts being universally admitted. Everything that cannot be accounted for by common causes is ascribed to the Deity, as creation, sudden death, etc. ... On questioning intelligent men among the Backwains as to their former knowledge of good and evil, of God, and of the future state, they have scouted the idea of any of them ever having been without a tolerably clear conception on all these subjects. Respecting their sense of right and wrong, they profess that nothing we indicate as sin ever appeared to them as otherwise, except the statement that it was wrong to have more wives than one ; and they declare that they spoke in the same way of the direct influence exercised by God in giving rain in answer to prayers of the rain-makers, and in granting deliverance in times of danger, as they do now, before they ever heard of white men. The want, however, of any form of public worship, or of idols, or of formal prayers, or sacrifice, make both Oafires and Bechuanas appear as amongst the most godless races of mortals any- where." — Dr. Livingstone's Misdonary Travels and Researches in South Africa, p. 158. The following extracts, bearing on the beliefs of the American heathen, are from the Abbd Em. Domenech's Seven Years' Residence in the Great Deserts of Nmth America, 2 vols., London, 1860 : — " AU the savages of the New World, without exception, believe in the existence of a Supreme Being, whom they call the Good or Great Spirit ; they adore and pray to him, as we adore and pray to the Creator of aU things."— Vol ii. p. 376. " This theory " (that the forests, lakes, rivers, and other natural objects have a life and spirit), " as well as the habit the savages have of carrying amidets under the name of medicine-bags, has led some writers to suppose that they are idolaters, polytheists, or pantheists ; but a profound study of their religion proves that this is not the case, for the worship and veneration they accord to images, to thunder, to the elements, to inferior spirits, and to everything they call medicine or mystery, are very different from those of which the Supreme Being is the object."— Vol. ii. p. 377. 516 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE INPINITE. " The tribes who dwell near the mouth of the Columbia also admit the existence of a beneficent and all-powerful Spirit, by whom all things were made. . . . These tribes being, together with those of California and the Great Basin, the most degraded and ignorant of the desert, it is stiU a remarkable fact, that not one amongst them is whoUy atheis- tical, and that they believe, one and all, in a Supreme Being, the Creator of the universe. On this great truth we shall make no comment ; we only wish to point it out for the edification of some of our unbelieving philosophers who look upon the savages as the models of man in his natural condition." — Vol. ii. pp. 397-8. " The Navajas as well as the Lunis" (Indian tribes of New Mexico) " believe in the existence of a Great Spirit, the wise Creator and Go- vernor of the universe, and the righteous Judge of the actions of men, which will be weighed and punished, or rewarded immediately after death. The Navajas offer up sacrifices of meat and flour to the Supreme Being."— Vol. ii. p. 402. These extracts are sufficient as illustrations of what may be found scattered through our books of modern travel. In the very lowest tribes of heathendom, the acknowledgment of a Supreme Euler is found. The testimony of Mr. Mofl^at is, indeed, different from that of the great majority of writers, who take any notice of the matter ; and his opi- nions are very deliberately and strongly stated. Yet, I incline to thinli that Mr. Moffat has been led to judge rather of the slowness of the heathen tribes to receive the higher revelation which Christianity gives, than of their positive lack of faith in the existence of a Deity. The testimony of his own son-in-law is completely against him ; and there is good reason to give weight to the evidence of an inquirer so cautious and patient as Dr. Livingstone. To me it seems marvellous that, in such moral degradation, travellers should have found so readily the clear evidence of a religious belief INDEX. Absolute (The), 179 ; Hamilton's dis- tinction between, and Infinite, 163 ; as such, a Cause, 149, 190 ; is the In- finite, 164; Hamilton's denial of this, 166 ; is the unrestricted, 177 ; not un- related, 178 ; Hamilton's, the com- pleted, 166 ; a contradiction in terms, 166 ; Hamilton's process of reaching an " absolute whole" fails, 170 ; " ab- solute part," incogitable, 171 ; Abso- lute Sovereignty and human freedom, 492 ; Holiness and moral evil, 492 ; Goodness and human suffering, 492. Analogy, what, 244; Blnowledge by, mediate, 243 ; can determine its ex- tent, by a knowledge he/ore and above it, 243 and 251, 252 ; also, wherein it fails, 250. A priori arguments for the Divine Ex- istence, 48. Atheism, a violation of our nature, 51, 55, 374; condemned by our natural belief, 490. Attributes, The Divine, may be thought of as limited in number, 186. Axiom, The, " Exnihilo, nil fit" either true or false, 361. Belief precedes knowledge, 29 ; when, arises, 42-46 ; necessary beliefs, 43 ; criteria of, 46 ; universal, 43, 56 ; all, cognitive, 138 ; belief hannonizes with knowledge, 122 ; Belief in the Infinite, 3 ; rises at once, 150 ; accepted without reasoning, 47 ; though necessary, may be denied, 53; Hamilton's view con- cerning, 71 ; belief in an Infinite Per- sonality, 409. Browne's (Bishop^ theory, _?41-242 ; in- volves a petitw prindpii, 244, 245 ; self-contradictory, 246. Butler (Bishop) supports a positive know- ledge of the Infinite, 487. Cadbb, An Infinite, not to be inferred from finite existence, 51 ; how know- ledge of First, arises, 336 ; Hamilton's theory of causality, 341, 342 ; objections to, 342-363 ; does not recognise power, 345, 346 ; physical only, 351, 352 ; his doctrine of a plurality of causes, not true, 346-348 ; causal judgment, not merely of " new appearances " or " events," 348 ; of every finite exist- ence, apart from change, 350; the cause (" causes") not contained in the effect, 350, 351 ; his theory leads to Pantheism, 352-361 ; excludes a First Cause, 361-363 ; falsely based on " a mental imbecility," 363 ; the common doctrine, the true, 363, 364; Hamil- ton's objections to, answered, 363-369 ; does not make consciousness self-con- tradictory, 365, 866; not a denial of Free Will, 367-369; Cousin's doctrine, God a necessary cause, confuted, 369- 370 ; Causes, an eternal chain of, in- cogitable, 370 ; existence of the First — -transcends proof, 375 ; our know- ledge of Him, 379 ; process leading up to, 380; two primary cognitions con- cerning Causality, 372 ; a psycholo- gical problem, 371. Clarke's a priori argument, 34-49. Completeness not essential to knowledge, 215. Conception (Indefinite), possible of an In- finite object, 265-267 ; Hamilton and Mansel's objections, 268-269. Consciousness reveals self and uo1>self, 80. Conscience, what, 895 ; reveals the abso- lutely holy God, 401 ; our conceptions of the_ Moral Ruler, 405, 406 ; Man- sel's view of, 413. Contradictions, Accumulation of, by Dr. Mansel, 95. Corinthians (I.), chap. xiii. 9, 10, 12 — consideration of the passage, 446-458 ; Hamilton and Mansel's exegesis, false, 446-449; Bp. Browne's, 449-450; Author's, 450-456 ; paraphrase, 457. Cousin's theory of the Infinite, 9, 19. 518 INDEX. Creation, not conceived of as an evolution from the Deity, 360; but as an ad- dition to existence, 360. Cudworth's doctrine of our knowledge of the Infinite, 211. Definitiohs of Absolute, Infinite, and Unconditioned, Hamilton's, 163, 337- 340 ; Hansel's, 181 ; Author's, 179. Deity, how regarded among the heathen, 57; App. B. ; inconceivable as "the sum of all reality," 81 ; nature of, in- divisible, 88, App. A ; existence of, 29. Design, Argument from, 34. Difference between "the Infinite as in thought" and "thought concerning the Infinite," 15. Duration, conception of, arises from the consciousness of personal identity, 305 ; measured by succession, 305; outward, perceived, 305 ; of changing existence is time, 305 ; not necessarily implying succession, 328. Duty, the sense of, implies knowledge of the Deity, 396-398. Eternal, The, recognised by the mind, 307-311. Evil cannot belong to the Absolute, 190. Existence, the problem of the origin of finite, 31-42 ; necessarily one, 32 ; must refer to all finite existence, 35 ; danger from its division, 33. Faith not sufficiently contemplated by Hamilton, 69, 99 ; bearing on the pre- sent discussion, 99 ; province of, 100 ; what it includes, 101 ; receptive and declaratory, 101; Hansel's view of, " regulative and practical " only, 103 ; degrees in its testimony, 107, 139-141; what it excludes, 109 ; not self-vindi- catory, 109 ; not explicative, 111 ; re- lation to knowledge, 112 ; the basis of knowledge, 116: more extensive than, 117; supplemental, 118; authoritative, 119 ; if regulative, cognitive, 140-141 ; basis of reasoning, 153-156 ; relation to knowledge according to Hansel, 70, 1 03; in the Infinite, Hamilton's view con- cerning, 71, 134-143 ; declares that a thing is, and therefore what it is, 101 ; notnecessarily alia thing is, 107 ; neces- sarily connected with knowledge, 121 ; and harmonizing with it, 122 ; what is contradictory of our faith is to be denied of the Deity, 130 ; what we cannot re- concile with our faith, may not, 131. Finite, The, and Infinite, necessarily cor- related, 20 ; out of the Infinite, but not conditioning Him, 89 ; finite know- ledge of the Infinite possible, 194-196 ; App. A ; not necessarily of the finite, 209 ; illustrations of this, 209 ; Han- sel's objections to these considered, 210-15 ; all finite existence a testi- mony for the Creator, 489. Fraser (Prof.), 178, 345, 354, 511. Freedom of thought and discussion, plea for, 493. God, not "unknown and unknowable," 290 ; may be conceived of as alone existent, 313 ; arguments for the Being of, insufficient, 48. Goodness, Absolute, and human suffer- ing, 492. Hamiltou's theory of the Infinite, 9; argument for Divine existence, 34; method pursued by, 26 ; doctrine of primary beliefs, 137-141 ; distinction between Absolute and Infinite, con- futed, 159-176; theory of causality ex- amined, 337-355 ; theory of creation, 355-361 ; answer to his letter to the author, App. A. Harmony of Faith and Knowledge, 122; faith underlying, evident, 123 ; in every case, unquestionable, 124 ; to be sought after to the utmost, 128. Heathen notions of God, 57; App. B. Hegel's doctrine of the Absolute, ap- proved by Hansel, 82 ; Hansel's vin- dication considered, 83. Hobbes' theory of the knowledge of the Infinite, 235. Holiness, Absolute, and moral evil, 492. Howe's views of the knowledge of the Infinite, 486. Idealism contradicts consciousness, 31. Idolatry condemned by our natural belief, 490. Inconceivable (The), cannot be an object of Faith, 79 ; 133 ; this destnictive of Hamilton's theory, 134-143. Indefinite (The), subjective, the Infinite objective, 227 ; 268 ; Hamilton and Hansel's erroneous views on this point, 226-233. Indivisibility of the Divine Nature, 88. Infinite (The) " as in thought," meaning of the phrase, 15 ; when belief in the Infinite arises, 42-46 ; not a negation of thought, 76 ; not the sum of existence, 80 ; 188 ; not extended, 87 ; exists in relation, 88 ; is the Absolute, 164 ; not quantitative, 183 ; knowledge of, clear, distinct, — partial, indefinite, 217-218 ; must be everindefinite, 225 ; Infinite Personality, 68 ; the Infinite INDEX. 519 distinguislied from all finite existences, 88 ; auration of, measured by tlie changes of the universe, 306. Justice, Divine, erroneously confounded with human, 491. Kaht's theoiy of the Infinite, 7. Knowledge, Eelation of faith and, 112 ; necessary, 121; harmonizes with faith, 114; prior in ime, 115; mediate of God as Infinite, 148-155, 205 ; im- mediate, 145-147, 205 ; gradually deve- loped, 150-153 ; knowledge is simple recognition, 199 ; by qualities, 204 ; its characteristics and conditions, 1 99 ; its relativity, not excluding the Infinite, 200 ; relativity, what, 201 ; the act of knowing does not afiect its object, 201 ; knowledge in degree as cognitive power, 206 ; finite, of the Infinite, 215; not necessarily com- plete, 215; degrees, according to Leibnitz, 217 ; partial, not of a part, 220 ; capable of endless development, 233, 291 ; but not of perfection, 234, 291; & priori, and. 5, posteriori, 234; of the Infinite, a priori, 235 ; of the Infinite, if not now, never can be, 294- 298 ; rests on faith, 125 ; may plainly harmonize with it, 125 ; may not, 125 ; no rational action apart from know- ledge, 129 ; finite, 207 ; limits of, analo- gous to those of vision, 210; reply to Manselon this point, 211 ; of the In- finite, clear, distinct, but inadequate, 217 ; partial, 218 ; indefinite, 223 ; in- definite, what? 224 ; always indefinite, 225 ; of the Supreme Moral Governor, 402-405; of an Infinite Personality, 410-412 ; a special knowledge of the Infinite promised to Christians, 465- 466 ; future, of the Infinite, according to Scripture, 468-474; Hamilton and Hansel's inconsistency on this point, 474-479 ; knowledge (the) of God, 494. Leibnitz's enumeration of degrees of knowledge, 216. Limits of thought, inquiry concerning, 257-264 ; bearing on philosophical in- quiry, 491. Literature, how influenced by the de- cision of the question under discussion, 480. Locke on the idea of infinity, 183, 238._ Logical (The) faculty: its function in flie development of our knowledge of God, 157. Mansel supports and vindicates Hamil- ton, 13 ; his definitions of the Infinite and Absolute, contrary to his own theory, 376 ; their materialistic ap- plications, 183 ; his illustrations, 185- 189 ; objections to the Author's illus- trations, 211,212; on Infinite Person - ality, 68 ; view of faith, 74 ; view of a negative idea, 275 ; his general criti- cisms of the Author's theory, 482 ; reply, 483-486. Materialism contradicts consciousness, 31 : condemned by our natural belief, 49.' Matter not tending to Atheism, 36 ; hypothesis concerning eternity of, 40. Maxims for the guidance of philosophi- cal inquiry (Three), 128 ; their applica- tion to the present discussion, 489, 494. M'Cosh (Dr.) opposes the theory of a necessary belief in Deity, 57 ; his "cumulative " theory examined, 60-67 ; he supports a positive knowledge of the Infinite Being, 291. Mental phenomena alone, require a di- vine cause, according to Hamilton, 34. Metaphysical necessity, 47, 62. Method of inquiry, 23. Morell's "History of Philosophy,'' 9, 11. Moral, Man is, 388 ; moral principles, 390, 395 ; fixed and universal, 391 ; utilitarian theory of morality, 392-394; moral obligation implies belief in and knowledge of God, 396-398 ; the moral emotions imply the same, 399 ; notion of the Supreme Moral Governor, 405 ; revealed as Infinite, 415. " Multitudinist" theory of charity, 493, 494. Mysteries, Divine, 431, 432 ; what, 491 ; origin, 491 ; two classes, 491 ; some capable of solation in another world, some incapable, 492. Necessaky beliefs, criteria of, 46 ; in the Infinite, 24, 46, 56. Necessity, metaphysical, 47 ; distinction between, and logical, 52. Negative idea, 275-279. Oneness of the mind, 122. Order of inquiry, 29. Origin of fmite existence, problem con- cerning, 31, 32. Paley'b argument for the Divine exist- ence, 34. Pantheism, a violation of consciousness, 55 ; condemned by our natural belief, 490 ; personality. Infinite, 68 ; per- sonality, not limitation, 408 ; Man- 520 INDEX. sel's opposite view considered, 407- 415. Polytheism condemned by our naturjil belief, 490. Qdahties, known in themselves, or by their effects, 205, 206. Question, statement of the, 1, 12, 19. Rationalism condemned by our natural belief, 490. Eeasoning, possible concerning the In- finite, 291, 292. Relativity as a condition of thought, 262 ; possible to the Infinite, 177, 337-340 ; whether existent within the Deity, not a matter of testimony by our natural belief, 98 ; how the relative may be transcended, according to Hamilton, 161. Religion, " a function of thought," 290, 433 ; natural to men, 419, et passim ; proved from consciousness, 419-422 ; history, 423-426; poetry and philo- sophy, 427 ; in all religions, the re- cognition of a Supreme Being, 426 ; religion possible only on the basis of intelligence, 428, et passim ; Browne's analogical theory of religion utterly in- sufficient, 430 ; can be no religious consciousness of the finite, 434-435. Scepticism impossible respecting the facts of consciousness, 30. Schelling's theory of the Infinite, 8. Science, physical and mental, bears tes- timony to a Grod, 489. Scripture against the Negative philo- sophy, 295-298 ; bearing of Scripture testimony on the question, 437-438 ; nature of the Scriptural revelation, 439 ; witnesses to an universal belief, 440 ; teaches that denial of God is pos- sible, 441 ; what it reveals concern- ing God, 442-443 ; what concerning our knowledge of Him, 444, et passim; passages considered, 458-262 ; meta^ phors and analogies imply a, higher knowledge, 462-465. Self and not-self, 30. Sovereignty (Absolute) and human free- dom, 492. Space, a relation only, 331 ; inconsist- ency of Hamilton's speculations con- cerning space, 333-335 ; must be ex- cluded from the notion of the Infinite, 321 ; Hansel's objection, 322-330 ; di- mensions of space not applicable to the Infinite, 187. Sphere of inquiry, 22. Spinoza, theory of, 55. Succession, measure of, 304 ; subjective succession does not involve objective mutation, 324-328. Supreme, belief in the, 69. Theoloqt, systematic, overturned by Mansel's speculations, 292, 480. Theory, Author's, 24-26. Thought is comparison, 253 ; the Infinite an object of, 254 ; " conditions " only subjective, 255 ; Hamilton's dogma concerning, 254-258 ; comparison and conception, the two functions of, 259- 262 ; its object need not be under any general notion, 261 ; characteristics of, 262 ; every object of knowledge may be one of, 262-264 ; in degree, as know- ledge, 264 ; not necessarily determina- tive, 265-267; indefinite, notnecessarily a withdrawal of thought fi-om limits, 269-272 ; necessarily positive, 272 ; ne- gative, considered, 143, 273 ; its bear- ing on the present discussion, 143 ; thought concerning successive dura- tion leads up to the Eternal, 319 ; thought of an object as previously non- existent, possible, 342-345. Time, what, 300, 305 ; its recognition involved in every mental exercise, 302 ; " pure," inconceivable, 303; the Infi- nite out of, 306 ; as a mental condi- tion, not excluding the knowledge of the Infinite, 307, 311, 330; divisions of, 311 ; jwogressive only, 312 ; only the present real, 312 ; present, not a negation, 320, 321 ; the imagined re- gress and progress of time give an in- definite idea of the Divine duration, 312-317 ; summary of the Author's views on time, 217-218; Hamilton's experiments with " wholes and parts," 319, 320; time must be excluded from the conception of the Infinite, 318- 321; Hansel's objection on this ground, 322-330 ; consciousness of time does not arise irom the perception of out- ward succession, 301. Unchakgbable, The Infinite is, 91. Unconditioned (The), 179, 333 ; not t6 "Ev Kal Har, 26 ; "the Unconditionally limited" a contradiction, 168. Whole, Hamilton's " Absolute," 169. Wilson's (Dr. Geo.) illustration concern- ing the mysteries of human philosophy, 493 ; reference to necessary belief, 513. Young's (Dr.) argument against a quan - titative Infinite, 87 ; criticism on the terms "infinite" and "absolute," 180. BDINBUROH : T. COHSTABLB, PEINTEB TO THB QUBBIf, AND TO THE USIVBR8ITT.