BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF Mcnrg W. Sage 189X ..A^AJMJirA 9Jj±h3... IS HISTORY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HISTOEY OF FEDEEAL GOVEENMENT IN GEEECE AND ITALY EDWAED A. FEEEMAN EDITED BY J. B. BUEY, M.A. FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DtlBLIN SECOND EDITION iLonlron MACMILLAN" AND CO. AND NEW YORK 1893 All HgMs reserved A- ^5-M-M-2-- t Jc IS "Coiild the interior structure and regular operation of tlie Acliaian lieague be ascertained, it is probable that more light might be thrown by it on the science of Federal Government, thau by any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted." The Federalist, No. xviii. J^irst Edition^ptiblished i863,eniitled " History of Federal Government, from the foundation of the Achcuan League to the disruption of the United States. Vol. I. General Introdttctiou — History of the Greek Federations." PEEFACE BY THE EDITOE The first and only volume of Mr. Freeman's Histmj of Federal Government appeared in 1863. Soon after its appearance lie left the subject for that of the Norman Conquest, and never resumed it. It is much to be regretted that he did not carry out his design, at least so far as to tell the story of the Con- federation of the Swiss Cantons, and fully discuss Swiss Federal institutions, even if he had stopped short of the United States. The most recent Swiss historian of Switzerland, Dierauer, in his GeschicUe der sdhweizerisclien Eidgenossenschaft (i. p. 265), has expressed this regret. " Man kann es nur lebhaft bedauern dass der englische Historiker nicht dazu gekommen ist in einer Fortsetzung seines Werkes die Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, den ' angesehensten oder lehrreichsten ' Teil seiner Aufgabe, zu bearbeiten." But while the History of Federal Government as a whole was never completed, the fii'st volume has all the value of a complete work. In a letter written in 1861, in connexion with arrangements for the publication of his book, Mr. Freeman observed that even if the work were never finished " this one volume — an essay on Federalism and a history of its Greek form — would be a substantial work in itself." It was therefore after his death decided to reprint it as a History of Federal Government in Greece. The manuscript of an additional chapter, which was to have been the first in Volume II, and was written before the author deserted his subject, was discovered among his papers. It contains a full account of the defective forms of VI PREFACE BY THE EDITOR Federalism which have appeared in Italy, comprising the Leagues of early Italian history, and the Lombard Confederation of a later age. This discovery has enabled us to adopt the more com- prehensive title, A History of Jfederal Govm-nment in Greece and Italy. A fragment on the German Confederacy (which was to have been the beginning of Chapter XI) has been added. The present work, then, is merely a reprint of the older volume, with the addition of a new chapter on Italy, and a new fragment on Germany. The original text has not been altered, except in a few cases where positive mistakes — afterwards recognized as such by the author — had crept in. The references to authorities have been revised. No additions have been made to the footnotes by the editor, except such as were indicated by Mr. Freeman himself in an interleaved copy of his work. The editor has reserved for an Appendix all observations and corrections which seemed required to bring the history of Greek Federalism up to date. Inscriptions have been published since the appearance of Mr. Freeman's work, which throw considerable light on some points in the Achaian and ^tolian Constitutions. A work of much value, though hardly marked by the lucidity of exposition which we are accustomed to expect in French writers, has been devoted to these Leagues by M. Marcel Dubois, and has been found very useful. It may be observed that M. Dubois, while his views differ in many respects from those of Mr. Freeman, fully recognizes his " Erudition irr^prochable." The only matter of importance in which Mr. Freeman's account of the Achaian and j35tolian Federal systems needs modification is the Constitution of the Senates. We have now direct evidence that the ^tolian Senate was a body of Repre- sentatives chosen by the States.^ We have no such direct evidence for the Achaian Senate, but we have some distinct indications pointing in that direction, as M. Dubois has shown • and the analogy of the ^tolian League confirms these indica- tions. On the other hand, there is not an atom of evidence See Appendix II p. 651, note to p. 262. PREFACE BY THE EDITOR vii for Mr. Freeman's guess that the Achaian Boule was chosen' by the Federal Assembly.^ This being so, certainly for the ^tolian, and probably for the Achaian Senate, a parallel and contrast may be drawn between the Federal Assemblies of these old Leagues and the Federal Assembly of modern Switzerland. The object of both the ancient and the modern Federations was to provide that both each State as a whole, and each citizen individually, should have a voice in the Federal Assembly. They necessarily set about accomplishing this object in very diflPerent ways, because Primary Assemblies were the rule in the age of the Greek Leagues, and Representative Assemblies are the rule in modern times. The Federal Assembly, which met at Thermon or Aigion, consisted of two parts : the Bouleutai or Senators, elected by the States, and all the ^tolian or Achaian citizens who chose to attend. So, too, the Federal Assembly which meets at Bern consists of the "Council of States," composed of Representatives elected by the States, and the "National Council," composed of Representatives who are elected directly by the people in the electoral districts, into which each Canton is divided. Thus the Council of States,- corresponding to the Boul^, represents the States, while the National Council is the element which in an age of Representative Assemblies responds to the mass of citizens (ttXij^os) in an age of Primary Assemblies. Of course, the differences between the two systems are endless. The Greek system had, in particular, the advantage that un- represented minorities — even minorities of one — could attend the Federal Assembly and speak for themselves. And it is also evident that, as the Greek Bouleutai were almost certainly elected in the Assembly of each State, a Representative of Patrai might be assumed to represent the majority of his fellow- citizens in a measure in which the member of the Council of States elected by the State Government of Bern could not be assumed to represent the opinions of the majority of the Bernese. Consequently, the citizens of the Greek Leagues often con- 1 See Appendix II p. 6-13, note to p. 239. PREFACE BY THE EDITOR sidered it unnecessary to attend the Assemblies themselves, knowing that their interests were represented by the Bouleutai ; and hence the second part of the Assembly was of a very fluctuating kind. Sometimes the Assembly seems to have con- sisted altogether of the Boulg. Both the Greek method and the Swiss method resulted in dividing the Assembly into two constituent parts; but while the nature of Representative in- stitutions secures that both parts of the Swiss Assembly are permanent Chambers, under the Greek system, one part — the Representative — was permanent, while the other part fluctuated and sometimes vanished altogether. No references to contemporary events have been altered, and the reader must bear in mind that he is reading words which referred to the situation of Europe and America in 1862 and 1863. He must remember that the war between the North and the South had not yet been decided, and that two Federal Governments then existed together in America, the Confederate States and the United States. He must remember that France was in the hands of the " Emperor " Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, and the absurd proposal of a Confederation of Italian princes with the Pope at its head — put forth " only to become the laughing-stock of Europe " (p. 75) — was then an event of a couple of years ago. Elsass and Lothringen were then French (p. 273); the Ionian islands were under English "protection" (p. 270). If Mr. Freeman had himself issued a new edition of his work, he would doubtless have brought the book up to date in this respect, and substituted new comments on the historical developements in Europe which have taken place since he wrote. He ventured to foretell (p. 91) that "the United States and the Confederate States will have exchanged ambassadors before the year 1941, or even before the year 1869." He would have had something to say on the actual issue of the war which falsified that prophecy. He speculated on the theoretical possibility of a Federal State of monarchical constitution ; he would have had some observations to make on the great mon- PREFACE BY THE EDITOR archical Bundesstaat which was established in 1870, and which seems likely to last " longer than through a single generation " (p. 75). He would have pointed out that, though Federal in form, it is not " a real Federation." The position of Elsass and Lothringen, incorporated in the " Empire " as Prussian depen- dencies, but not members of the Federation, is another instance of subject districts in a Federal State, and one wonders whether they will be ultimately elevated, like Ticino, to the position of equal states. Mr. Freeman did not refer, in his Federal analogies, to the compulsory Eeferendum of the Swiss Constitution of 1848 ; but he would now, doubtless, have had some remarks to make on the optional Eeferendum introduced in 1874 — that curious and ingenious attempt to find a substitute for the advantages of the Greek EkklSsia, in circumstances in which such an Ekkl^sia is not possible. The Referendum may be said to constitute a fourth exception (see p. 53) to the Representative system in modern Europe and America. Touching South-Eastern Europe, the remarks with which Mr. Freeman closed his first volume are as applicable to-day as they were in 1863. Bulgaria is now only nominally a vassal state ; the Bulgarians have won their freedom, and have shown that they are, perhaps, more worthy to possess it than any other state in the lUyric peninsula. But the "tinkering" policy of the Treaty of Berlin has not made it less true, and further tinkering by any such treaties in the future will not make it less true, that the only safeguard against Austrian and Russian aggression is a South Slavonic Federation, just as the only safe- guard of Greece against absorption in the Macedonian monarchy was found in the Federal tie. In the present circumstances of the Eiiropean world, the Illyric peninsula seems naturally marked out as a field for a most interesting experiment in Federal politics. One may hope that the only question is whether the Margos or Washington of the Southern Slaves will delay his appearance until the peninsula has been entirely delivered from Turkish bondage, or whether a Federation will prove the instrument of that deliverance. PREFACE BY THE EDITOR Another question of the day which Mr. Freeman would, doubtless, have touched upon in a new edition of his work is that of an " Imperial Federation," as it is called, of the British Empire. The self- contradictory character of this idea, which he clearly showed, would have furnished him with a new illustration, by contrast, of the true meaning of Federalism. No one who masters his lucid exposition of the nature of Federal Government in Chapter II is likely either to be misled by such a phrase or to fall into the opposite error of the vulgar politician, who never loses an opportunity of confounding a bond of dependency with a tie of federation. To suppose that this error is due to a reminiscence of the fact that the states and kingdoms which the Romans termed "federate" were in every sense dependencies on Eome and not her equal allies, would be to credit those who commit it with more historical knowledge than they are at all likely to possess. The Index h.as been prepared by Mrs. A. J. Evans. TO SPYRIDON TRIKOUPES, LATE QEEEK MINISTER AT THE COURT OF LONDON My dear Me. Trikoupes, There is no man to whom I can inscribe so fittingly as to yourself a volume which deals mainly with the restoration of Grecian freedom after a period of foreign oppression. As the native historian of regenerate Greece, you fill a position strikingly analogous to that of the illustrious writer who forms my chief guide throughout the present portion of my work. Like Polybios, your youth was spent among men and exploits worthy of the countrymen of Aratos and Philopoimen ; like Polybios, too, your later years have been spent in recording, in the still living tongue in which he wrote, the great events of which you were an eye-witness and a partaker. You have helped to win for your own immediate country an honourable name among the divisions of the Greek race ; you have helped to place ^Etolia on the same level as Achaia, and to raise the name of Mesolongi to a reputation no less glorious than that of Megalopolis. And in one xu DEDICATION respect you are more happy than your great predecessor. Polybios lived to see a time when the freedom of his country was wholly extinguished, and when all that he could do for her was to procure for her some small alle\aa- tion of her bondage. You have lived to see your country answer the calumnies of her enemies by conduct which they cannot gainsay ; you have seen Greece once more draw on her the eyes of admiring Europe by one of the justest and purest Eevolutions in all recorded history. While all that he could do was to obtain some contemp- tuous concessions from an overbearing conqueror, you are called on to take your share in the deliberations of an Assembly where every honest heart in Europe trusts that twice -liberated Hellas will be at last allowed to fix her own destinies. Whatever may be the result of those deliberations, whether a King is again to sit on the throne of Theseus or a President again to bear the seal of Lydiadas, that they may lead to the full establishment of law and freedom in the land where law and freedom first arose is the earnest wish of Your sincere and obliged friend, EDWAED A. FEEEMAX. SOMEKLEAZE, WeLLS, January Srd, 1863. PEEFACE I TRUST that no one will think that the present work owes its origin to the excitement of the War of Secession in America. It is the first instalment of a scheme formed long ago, and it represents the thought and reading of more than ten years. All that late events in America have done has been to increase my interest in a subject which had already long occupied my thoughts, and, in some degree, to determine me to write at once what otherwise might have been postponed for some time longer. The present volume is mainly devoted, to the working of the Federal system in Ancient Greece. The Federal period of Grecian history is one which has been generally neglected by English scholars, and I trust that I may have done something to bring into more notice a period than which none is richer in political lessons. But it must be remembered that I am not writing a history of Greece or a history of Achaia, but a history of Grecian Federalism. From this difference of object it follows that I have treated my subject in a somewhat different manner from that which I should have thought appropriate to a regular history of Greece or of any other country. First, As a historian of Federalism, I look to everything mainly as illustrating, or not illustrating, the progress of Federal ideas. I dwell upon events, or I hurry over them, not according to their intrinsic import- ance, but according to their importance for my particular purpose. I have disposed in a line or two of battles which were of high moment in the history of the world, and I have dwelt at length on obscure debates and embassies, when their details PREFACE happened to throw light on the Achaian Constitution or on the mode of proceeding in the Achaian Assembly. It so happens that much of the information most valuable for my purpose comes in the form of details of this kind, which a general historian would, naturally and properly, cut very short. I mention this merely that I may not be thought to have either depreciated or overvalued subjects which, writing with a special object, I have looked at mainly from the point of vieAv dictated by that object. Secondly, In writing the history, not of a particular country, but of a form of government which has existed in several coun- tries, I have constantly endeavoured to illustrate the events and institutions of which I write by parallel or contrasted events and institutions in other times and places. I have striven to make the politics of Federal Greece more intelligible and more inter- esting, by showing their points of likeness and unlikeness to the politics of modern England and America. I should have done this, in some degree, in a history of any sort, but I have done it far more fully in a history of a form of Government than I should have done in an ordinary history of Greece or of any other country. And I trust that I have not compared ancient and modern politics in the mere interest of any modern party. I have certainly not written in the interest of either the North or the South in the American quarrel. I see too much to be said for and against both sides to be capable of any strong partizanship for either. Possibly this may not be a bad frame of mind in which to approach the history of the quarrel, when the course of my subject brings me to it. At present, what I have had to do has mainly been to argue against the false infer- ences on the subject of Federalism in general which some have drawn from recent American history. And, if I do not MTite in the interest of either side in the American dispute, neither am I conscious of writing in the interest of any English political party. I am conscious of holding strong opinions on many points both of home and foreign politics ; for historical study does more than PREFACE anything else to lead the mind to a definite political creed ; but, at the same time, it does at least as much to hinder the growth of any narrow political partizanship. A historical student soon learns that a man is not morally the worse for being Whig or Tory, Catholic or Protestant, Eoyalist or Republican, Aristo- crat or Democrat, Unionist or Confederate. He soon learns to sympathize with individuals among all parties, but to decline to throw in his lot unreservedly with any party. But he will not carry his political toleration so far as to confound political differ- ences and moral crimes. Indignation at successful wickedness is a feeling of which no honest man will ever wish to rid himself ; no honest man, above all no honest student of history, will ever bring himself to look on the Tyrant whose very being implies the overthrow of right with the same eyes with which he looks on the mere political adversary whose motives may be as honour- able as his own. In writing the present volume, I have endeavoured to com- bine a text which may be instructive and interesting to any thoughtful reader, whether specially learned or not, with notes which may satisfy the requirements of the most exacting scholar. In the text therefore I have, as far as possible, avoided techni- calities, and I have thrown the discussion of many points of detail into the notes. I have throughout been lavish in the citation of authorities, as I hold that an author should not require his readers to take anything on his bare word, but should give them the means of refuting him out of his own pages, if they think good. If I have overdone it in the matter of refer- ences, I am sure that every real student will allow that it is a fault on the right side. I have felt such deep gratitude to those authors who really act as guides and not as rivals to the original writers, and I have felt so aggrieved at those who follow another course, that I was determined to do all I could to avoid blame on this most important score. The nature of the authorities for this period of Grecian xvi PREFACE history has been explained in several passages of the volume itself, and the chief among them, Polybios and Plutarch, ought to be familiar to every scholar. But bes'ides the evidence of historians, there are few parts of history on which more light is thrown by the evidence of coins. In this branch of my subject, I am bound, at every step, to acknowledge the benefits which I have derived from the numismatic knowledge of my friend the Hon. John Leicester Warren. A careful comparison of his numismatic and my historical evidence has enabled us together to fix several points which probably neither of us could have fixed separately. I should have drawn more largely on Mr. Warren's resources, which have been always open to me, were scholars not likely to have the benefit of his researches into Greek Federal Coinage in a separate form. At the risk of ofiending some eyes by unaccustomed forms, I have spelled Greek names, as closely as I could, according to the Greek orthography. This practice is now very general in' Germany, and it is gradually making its way in England. Mi'. Grote first ventured to restore the Greek K; Professor Max Miiller, in the Oxford Essays, went several degrees further. For the Latin spelling, nothing can be pleaded but custom — a custom, which is merely a part of that unhappy way of looking at everything Greek through a Latin medium, which has so long made havoc of our philology and mythology. In exactly the same way, serious mischief — I believe I may say serious political mischief — has been done by our habit of looking at nearly every- thing in modern Europe through a French medium, and of speaking of German, Italian, and Flemish places by French corruptions of their names. Strange to say, while we clothe Italian names in a French dress, we usually clothe Modern Greek names in an Italian dress. Inexplicable confusion is the neces- sary result; names which have not altered since the days of Homer are written in endless ways to adapt them to a Western pronunciation which is hardly ever that of Englishmen. The island of MUos has never changed its name, and its name is PREFACE sounded in the same way by a Greek and by an Englishman. It seems eminently absurd to talk about MMos in the history of the Peloponn^sian War, but, if the island happens to be mentioned in a modern book or newspaper, to change its name into that of Milo the slayer of Clodius. The only way to preserve consist- ency is to write every Greek name, old or new, according to the native spelling, and to leave each reader to pronounce according to accent or quantity as he pleases. This I have done through- out, with two exceptions. When a name has a really English, as distinguished from a Latin or French, form, such as Philip, Ptolemy, Athens, Corinth, I should never think of making any change ; indeed I rather regret that we have not more forms of the kind. Again, a few very familiar names, like Thermopylae, Boeotia, etc., though the form is not thoroughly English, I have left as they are usually spelled. The change which has the most unusual look is the substitution of the Greek ai for ce in the ending of plural feminine names. In many cases, however, there is also a singular form in use, which I have preferred wherever I could. I trust that the second volume, containing the history of the Swiss and other German Leagues, will follow the present vnth all reasonable speed. But it involves a minute examination of some very obscure portions of history, and I cannot iix any certain time for its appearance. SOMERLBAZE, WeLLS, January 2nd, 1863. CONTENTS CHAPTER I GENEEAL INTKODTJCTION Object of the work Federalism a compromise ; therefore hard to define General definition for historical purposes Definition of a perfect Federal Government . Internal Sovereignty of the several members, combined Sovereignty of the Union in all external matters Wider range of the history .... Four gi'eat examples of Federal Government 1. The Achaian League, B.C. 281 — 146 2. The Swiss Cantons, A.D. 1291—1862 . 3. The United Provinces, A.D. 1579—1795 4. The United States, a.d. 1778—1862 . Characteristics of the Four Great Confederations The German Confederation .... Other ancient examples ; in Greece ; in Italy ; in Other GeJman Leagues ; the Hanse Towns . Other American Confederations . Lykia with the PAGE 1 1 2 2 2—3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 CHAPTER II CHAEACTEEISTIOS OF FEDERAL GOVEENMENT AS COMPARED WITH OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS Illustrations of the relations of the members in a perfect Federal Commonwealth Two conditions of a true Federal Government Two classes of Federal Commonwealths ; First, the " System of Con- federated States," where the Central Power deals with the State Governments only CONTENTS PACE Second, the "Composite State," where the Central Power acts directly on all citizens .,......••" The distinction one rather of means than of ends, and not always to be drawn in history 10 — H Different classifications of governments ; 1st, into Monarchy, Aiisto- craoy, and Democracy ; 2nd, into Absolute and Constitutional Governments 12 Need of a cross division . . 12 Federalism a compromise between Great and Small States ... 13 Division into Great and Small States irrespective of their several forms of government ...... . . 13 Definition of Large and Small States . . . . H Characteristics of the Independent City . . . 15 Patriotism confined to the^City .... . . 15 Full developement of city -independence in Greece .... 16 Early and comparatively unimportant approaches to Constitutional Monarchy and to Federal Republicanism . . . . .16 Municipal character of the Greek Commonwealths, aristocratic and democratic alike ... 16 — 17 Civic Tyrannies ... .17 Condition of Dependent Cities in Greece 18 Difference between a dependent City and a member of a Federation . IS Comparison of dependent cities with English Colonies .... 20 No means of general Incorporation supplied by the system of Inde- pendent Cities . . 21 Incorporation carried as far as possible by Athens in the case of the old Attic Cities 22 Its impossibility in the case of the later Athenian Empire ... 22 Dependencies of mediaeval and modern Italian cities, and of Swiss Cantons .23 Effects of incorporation at Rome 23 Town-autonomy in mediseval Europe ; the independence of the cities modified by the claims of the Emperors . . . . 24 25 General view of the system of Independent Cities .... 26 Varieties in internal Constitutions and in external relations . . 26 27 Different relations between the City and its Territory . . .28 Comparative gain and loss of the system ... 09 Advantages of small Commonwealths . . • ■ • . 29 Political Education of the individual Citizen . . 09 Comparison with the English House of Commons . . .31 Contrast with the Florentine Parliament 3j Connexion of Athenian history with the subject of Federalism . . 32 Greater responsibility of the Athenian citizen than of the English member • . 33 Position of the English Ministry ... -33 CONTENTS XXI Received duties of the private member ; different duties of the Athenian Citizen The Assembly a Government as well as a Parliament Functions of the Senate and of the Generals Nothing analogous to " Office " and " Opposition " Direct Diplomatic action of the Assembly . Effect of these powers on individual citizens Athens the highest type of the system . . . . Opportunity for the developement of genius . Intensity of patriotism in small States Identification of all citizens with the City .... Bad side of the system of city-commonwealths Their greatness less permanent than that of greater States . Common fallacy as to the ■weakness of small States Different positions of small States where they are merely exceptions, and where they are the general rule ..... Position of Free Cities in the Middle Ages .... Constant warfare among Free Cities .... Force of antipathy between neighbouring towus ; examples in Greece 34 35 35 35 36 36 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41—42 42 42 42- and Italy Comparison between citizen-soldiers and professional soldiers Severity of the Laws of War Increased bitterness of faction in small States Local disputes commonly more bitter than general ones General balance of gain and loss in small States . Definition of large States, irrespective of their forms of government Two immediate results ; smaller importance of the Capital ; represen tative character of National Assemblies Position of the Capital in a large State ; its influence either indirect or violent ......■•■•■ Necessity of representative institutions in a Free State of large size Representative Government not necessarily Cabinet Government . Exceptions to the representative system in modern Europe and America Election of Polish Kings Napoleonic Universal Suffrage ; its delusive nature English and American ways of attaining the same object Election of the American President practically another exception Its difference from Napoleonic Universal Suffrage General view of the system of large States . . . • Extent of local diversity in large States .... Opposite systems of Centralization and of Local Freedom independent of the form of the Central Government .... Difference between Municipal and Federal rights . General characteristics of large States ; balance of gain and loss Advantages of great States -43 44 45 46 48 48 50 60 50—51 52 52 53 54 55 56 56 57 57 58 59 59 60—61 . 61 CONTENTS PAGE 61 61 62 64 64 64 64 65 66 67 Peace secured to a large country . Lessening of local prejudices Lessening of the evils of War Lessening of party strife Disadvantages of large States .... Inferior political education ... Ignorance and corruption of many electors . Different forms of bribery at Athens and in England These vices inherent in the system Balance of advantage in favour of large States Federal Governmenta system intermediate between Great andSmallStates 69 It combines, though in an inferior degree, the special advantages of both systems ........... 69 Federalism a compromise ; therefore suited only to certain positions 69 — 70 Popular prejudices on the subject 70 No general deductions to be made from recent American events . . 71 Instance of similar disruptions in Monai-chies . . . . . 72 No case against Federalism in general, nor against the original American Union 72 Testimony of the Southern States to the Federal Principle ... 72 A large State may be a Republic without being a Federation . . 73 No argument to be drawn from failures in England and France . 73 A Federation may conisist of Monarchies ... . 74 Imperfect approaches to kingly Federalism in the Feudal system . 74 A strictly Federal Monarchy unlikely to last ... .75 Other approaches to Federal Monarchy 75 Instance of two or more Kingdoms under one King .... 76 Members of a Federation may be either Cities or States of considerable size 77 Difference of scale in Europe and America to be considered . . 78 General view of Federalism as an intermediate system ... 79 Intermediate position as regards government of the whole territory Intermediate position as regards Political Education . Comparison of a State with a Kingdom, and with a consolidated Republic Circumstances under which a Federal Union is desii-able General result of Modern Federalism .... Results of the American Union ..... Its comparative permanency as compared with France . Evils which the Federal Union has hindered . . Alleged weakness of the Federal tie ; true in a sense, but not necessarily injm'ious g~ Circumstances under which a Federal Union may be lasting . . gg Circumstances under which it may be useful as a transitional state gg Cases for consolidation, and for separation gg 79 80 SI 83 85 85 CONTENTS Easiness of separation when needed ; its good side .... 89 Probability that a Federation will be less anxious than a kingdom to recover revolted members 91 Inconsistency of striving to retain unwilling members .... 91 Witness of Switzerland in favour of the Federal system ... 92 Recapitulation .... 94 CHAPTER III OF THE AMPHIKTTONIC COUNCIL The Amphiktyonic Council not a true Federal Government ... 95 Origin of the Error ; opinions of modern writers 96 The Council a Religious, not a Political, body 97 The Delphic Amphiktyony only one of several 98 Its incidental political action .... Amphiktyonic Crusades The Council becomes the tool of particular States .... 100 No inherent force in its Decrees 100 Indirect importance of the Council in the History of Fedei-alism . . 101 Its close approach to a Federal system, without ever growing into one 101 Its constitution unsuited to historical Greece 103 The Amphiktyony an Union of Tribes, not of Cities .... 103 Unfair distribution of the Votes ; analogy of the unreformed ParUament 103—104 These incongruities less palpable in a religious body .... 104 Amphiktyonic championship of Philip 105 Reforms under Augustus ; new arrangement of the votes . . 105 — 106 Approach to Representative forms in the Council ..... 108 The Amphiktyonic body Representative, because not really a Government 10^ Political nullity of the Council during the greater part of Grecian History 109 CHAPTER IV OF THE MINOR CONFEDEKATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE § 1. Of the Northern Leagues An approach to Federal Government not uncommon among the ruder portions of the Greek nation 112 The Ph6kian League as described by Pausanias 113 Probably a revival of an earlier League 113 The Akarnanian League • H^ CONTENTS PAGE Various Notices, B.C. 431—167 114—115 Constitution of the League . .... . . 116 The Epeirot League . . 116 Early Repuhlioau developement in Ohaonia and ThesprStis . • H'' Constitutional Monarchy in Molossis 117 Foundation of the Federal Republic of Epeiros, B.C. 239 — 229 . 117 No real Federalism in Thessaly . 118 Position and Power of the Thessalian Tagos ... . . 118 Monarchy of Jas6n, B.C. 372 . . . ... 119 Undisguised Tyranny of his successors, B.C. 370 — 359 . . 119 Thessaly a dependency of Maoedouia ..... 119 Legislation of T. Quinctius Flamininus, B.C. 197 . . . 120 § 2. (y tlie Bceotian League History of the Boeotian League ; its warnings . . . 120 Dangers of an overwhelming Capital in a Federal State . . . 120 Legal and practical position of Thebes in the BoBotian League . 122 The circumstances of Jiiceotia suited to a SynoiMsmos, not to a Federal system 123 Effects on general Grecian History . . . 123 Three Periods of Boeotian History . . . 124 First Period, B.C. 776— 387 124 Bo3otia both an Amphiktyony and a Political League .... 124 Use of the words "Boeotian" and "Thehan" by Thuoydides and Xenophfin . . . 125 Constitution of the League ... . 125 Subject Districts or Subordinate Leagues . . . 126 Office of the Bceotarchs and of the Four Senates . . 126—127 128 Federal and Local Archons Theban Archon a mere Pageant ; real power vested in the Polemarchs 129 Power of Thebes shown in the History of Plataia .... Secession of Plataia from' the League Ill-feeling between Thebes and other Towns Thehan claims at the Peace of Antalkidas ... Dissolution of the Bojotian League, B. c. 387 Second Period, B.C. 387 — 334 The Peace carried out in the interest of Sparta .... Spartan garrisons in the Cities ; Restoration of Plataia Oligarchic and Democratic Parties Weakness of the Democratic element in Boeotia .... Thebes, hitherto the centre of Oligarchy, becomes, by her Revolution [B.C. 379], the centre of Democracy 133—134 Career of Pelopidas and Epamein6ndas . . • • . 134 Bad results of Theban supremacy . • • 134 Nominal revival of the League . . . . ■•<,, 129 129 130 131 132 132 132 133 133 133 CONTENTS PAGE Real subjection of the Lesser Cities to Thebes . . . 135 Destruction of BcEotian Towns .... 136 General dislike towards Thebes throughout Greece . . 137 Gradual growth of the Theban claims 138 Parallel between Thebes in Bceotia and Sparta in I,ak6uia . 139 The claims of Thebes exclude all true Federalism in Boeotia . . .140 Restoration of the destroyed Towns 140 Destruction of Thebes by Alexander [b.c. 335]. Zealous co-operation of the Boeotian Towns .... .... 141 Third Period, e.c. 335—172 . .... .141 Restoration of Thebes by Kassander, B.C. 316 .... 141 Restoration of the League with a modified Headship in Thebes . 142 Insignificance of Boeotia in later Greece ...... 142 Constitution of the League ..... ... 143 Dissolution of the League by Qnintus Marcius, B.C. 171 . 144 § 3. Of Farious Attempts at Federal Systems — Imiia, Olynthos, Arkaclia, etc. Unsuccessful attempts at Federal Union . . ... 145 Advice of Thales to the lonians . ' 14:5 Degree of connexion among the Ionian Cities; no true Federal Union 145 — 146 Their relation essentially Amphiktyonic ; its differences from the elder Amphiktyonies 145—146 Thales probably Intended a true Federal Union . ... 147 His advice not taken ; its rejection a striking illustration of Greek political ideas 1^7 Attempted League of Olynthos dissolved by Sparta, B.C. 382 . 149 Fatal results to Greece from its dissolution .... . 149 Views of Mr. Grote too favourable to the designs of Olynthos . . 150 Proceedings of Olynthos as described by KleigeuSs . . . .150 The terms offered acceptable to the Macedonian Towns, but rejected by the Greeks of Chalkidike 151 Their real nature not Federal Union, but absorption into Olynthos . 152 FederalUnionof Arkadia, B.C. 370 154 Little previous importance of Arkadia l64 History of Mautineia ; her destruction and restoration . . . 154—155 Arkadian Union hitherto merely Amphiktyonic 155 Lykomedes designs a true Federal Union .... ■ 155 Temporary success of the Federal scheme . . . • 156 Foundation of Megalopolis .... . • .156 General adhesion of Arkadia to the League .... • 157 Constitution of the League ; the Assembly of Ten Thousand . 157—158 Probable existence of a Senate 1"° Institution of a sole General 15^ Foundation of Megalopolis ; its advantageous position . . . 159 — 160 CONTENTS PAGE Decline of tlie Arkadian League ; history of Megalopolis . . 160 — 161 Pretended scheme of Federal Union in Euboia, B.C. 351 . . • 162 Evidence of the growth of Federal ideas in Greece . . .162 % i. Of the LyTcicm League The Lykian League ; its excellent Constitution 162 Strabo's description and testimony to its practical working 163 — 164 Merits of the Lykian Constitution ; no Capital 164 The Assembly Primary, not Representative .... . 164 Apportionment of votes to numbers 165 Approach to Representative Government 166 A Senate not mentioned, but to be inferred from analogy . . . 166 Federal Magistrates .166 Date and Origin of Federal Government in Lykia . 167 Relation of the Lykians to the Greeks . . . . . 167 Traces of Federalism before the subjection of Rhodes . . 167 Lykia subject to Rhodes, B.C. 188 167 Lykia independent, B.C. 168 168 Origin of the Constitution described by Strabo . . . 168 Destruction of the League by Claudius, A. D. c. 50 .... 169 CHAPTER V ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE § 1. General Character of tlie History of Federal Greece Common neglect in England of the Histoiy of Federal Greece . .171 Earlier Grecian History mainly the History of Athens ; nullity of Athens in the Federal Period 172 Comparison between the earlier and later History of Greece . . .174 Wide spread of Hellenic culture 174 Importance of this age in Universal History and in the History of the Greek race ........... 175 Eifects of Alexander's Conquests 175 Character of the age of Polybios 175 Comparison between Thucydides and Polybios 17g Beginnings of the Federal Revival, B.C. 281 I77 Gaulish Invasion -.178 Reconstruction of Macedonia under the Antigonids . . . .178 Revival of the Aohaian League I79 Opposite aims of Macedonia and Achaia ; position of the Antigonid Kings 179 Condition of Greece under Philip and Alexander, and under the Successors 179—180 Position of revived Macedonia and Greece 180 CONTENTS Comparison of Macedonia in Greece with Austria in Italy GSenerous aims of the Achaian League An eariier estahlishment of Federalism in Greece not desirable Effects of the League . . § 2. Origin aiid Early Growth of the League Growth of Federal ideas in Greece in the Fourth Century B.C. Further Federal reaction against Macedonian influences Early History of Achaia ; early Union of the Achaian Towns Probable greater laxity of the bond during the Old League Achaia during the PeloponnSsian War .... History of Pellene ; Tyranny of Chairon, e.g. 368 — 335 Achaia under the Successors and under Antigonos Gonatas, 288 Final dissolution of the Old League .... The Twelve original Cities ; loss of Helike and of Olenos Traces of Federal action under the Old League Beginnings of the revived League ; Union of Patrai and Dyme [b. i of Tritaia and Pharai Union of Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia, B. c. 275 . Extension of the League over all Achaia Loss sustained by Patrai in the Gaulish War Quiet and peaceful growth of the League .... Markos of Keryneia probably the true Founder of the League Iseas of Keryneia abdicates the Tyranny .... Nature of the Greek Tyrannies ; difference between their earli later forms 187- 314— 280]. and PAGE 181 183 183 184 185 185 186 187 187 -188 189 190 190 191 191 192 192 192 193 193 194 194 %S. Of the Achaian Federal Constitution Probable formal enactment of the Federal Constitution, B.C. c. 274 . 198 Sources of information 198 The Constitution formed for the Achaian Towns only . . . .198 Democratic Constitution of the League 198 Differences between Achaian and Athenian Democracy .... 199 Independence of the several Cities 199 Subject Districts or Dependent Towns 200 Tendencies to assimilation among the members of the League, both in Achaia and in America 200 The League really a National Government 202 No independent Diplomatic Action in the several Cities . . . 202 Comparison with America ; the restriction less strict in Achaia . 202—203 Particular Embassies by licence of the Federal body . . . .204 Later exceptions under Roman influence 204 The Federal Assembly ; its Democratic Constitution . 205 CONTENTS PAGE Aristocratic elements in Achaia .... ... 206 Contrast with Athens ; the Achaian Constitution a nearer approach to modern systems 206 Causes of the difference, arising mainly from the greater extent of terri- tory in Achaia ... ... . 207 The Assembly practically Aristocratic . . . 207 Its nature not understood by Continental scholars 208 Analogies in England . . 209 Practical Democratical elements . 210 Votes taken by Cities, not by heads 211 Advantages and disadvantages of this system of voting . 211 — 212 General merits of the Achaian Constitution . . . 214 Short and unfrequent Meetings of the Assembly ; consec[uent restric- tions on its powers .... . 214 — 215 The Initiative practically in the Government . 215 Place of Meeting ; first Aigion, afterwards other Cities ; advantages of Aigion ... .... . . 215—216 Greater power of Magistrates in Achaia than at Athens . 216 The Achaian Magistrates form a "Government" 217 Comparison with America and England 217 Various Federal Offices . . . . 219 The Ten Ministers ; probably chosen from all the Cities indis- criminately 220 Relations of the Ministers to the General 221 An Achaian ' ' Caucus " . 222 The President or General . . 223 Powers and number of the Generals in other Greek States . 223 Two Generals of the Achaian League reduced to One . . 223 Extensive powers of the Office ; comparison with a modern First Minister . ... . . 224 Comparison of Aratos and Perikles . . 225 Greater importance of Office in Achaia than at Athens . 226 Comparison of the Achaian General, the American President, and the English First Minister 227 Closer approach to the English system in Achaia, owing to the General being himself a Member of the Assembly 227 Greater power in the General necessary in a Federal than in a City Democracy . . . . • ■ . . 228 Chief Federal Offices unpaid, but without a property qualification 229 230 Power of summoning Assemblies vested in the General in Council 231 The Ministers act as Speakers of the Assembly . . . 231 Joint action of the General and Ministers in diplomatic matters . 232 Unrestrained power of the General in War .... 233 Union of military and political powers contrary to modern usage . . 233 The General's title military, but his badge of office civil . . 234 CONTENTS XXIX PAOE Athenian experience on the union of civil and military powers ; their gradual separation . . .... 234 — 235 The Achaian system a reaction ; its disadvantages .... 235 The Presidential interregnum aggravated by the union of powers . 235 — 236 Question of re-election of the President ; the Achaian General incapable of vmmediaie re-election . . . . . 236 — 237 The Senate ... 239 Financial and Military policy of the League . .... 241 Military Contingents ordered by the Assembly 242 Mercenaries ; Federal garrisons 242 General comparison between the Achaian League and the United States ; their close general resemblance 243 Differences between a Confederation of Cities and a Confederation of States 243—244 Analogies and diversities in the position of the President . . . 244 No exact parallel in Achaia to the American Senate . • 246 Closer analogy of the Norwegian Lagthing 247 Higher position of the Achaian Ministers .... . 248 Achaia the more democratic in theory, and America in practice . . 248 The American Constitution not a conscious imitation of the Achaian . 249 Remarkable treatment of the Achaian History in the " Federalist "J . 249 An unconscious likeness to the ancient parallel, more valuable than a conscious one . 251 CHAPTER VI ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE /ETOLIAN LEAGUE General resemblances and differences between the Leagues of Achaia and .ffltolia ; their practical teaching 252 Early History of .ffitolia ; probable early approach to Federal Union 254—255 Jltolian acquisition of Naupaktos, B.C. 338 255 The League in the reign of Alexander. b.o. 336—323 . . .256 Share of the jEtolians in the Lamian War. B.C. 323—322 . . .256 .Sltolia during the Wars of the Successors . .... 257 Glimpses of jEtolian Constitution at this time ... . 257 Share of the .ffitolians in the Gaulish War. B.C. 280 . . . . 257 Annexation of Herakleia 258 Earlier developement of Mtolia, in some points ; closer union of the Cantons 258 .ffltolia a League of Districts rather than of Cities .... 259 Democratic character of the League tempered with Aristocratic 1 elements 260-261 Powers of the Assembly • ■ ^61 The Senate or Apokletoi . . . • . . 262 COJiTTENTS PAGE Federal Magistrates 263 Powers of the General . . ... ... 263 Foreign Policy of the League ; contrast with Aohaia . 265 Variety of relations in the .ffltolian League . . ... 268 Differences of position among the concjuered states .... 269 Comparisons with the different relations of British Dependencies . . 270 Comparison between .ffitolia and Switzerland 271 CHAPTER VII HISTOKT OF FEDBEAL QEEEOE FKOM THE FOUNDATION OF THE ACHAIAN LBAOUE TO THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA. — B.C. 281 — 222 § 1. From the Foundation of the Achaian League to the DeliveraTice of Corinth B.C. 281—243 B.C. 284 — 272 Revolutions of Greece and Macedonia during the first years of the League ......... 276 State of Peloponnesos ; favourable position of the Achaian League ... 276—277 261 — 251 Ten years blank in Grecian history ... . 277 255 Institution of the sole Generalship . . . . 277 Biographical character of the Achaian history . . . 278 680—580 History of Siky8n ; its early Tyrants ... .279 365 EuphrSn founds Democracy . 279 308 — 301 SikySn under the Successors . . . 279 301—251 Second period of Tyrants .... 280 Administration of Timokleidas and Kleinias . . . 280 264 Tyranny of Abantidas ; escape of Aratos to Argos , 280 252 — 251 Tyranny of Paseas and of Nikokles 281 251 Deliverance and internal pacification of Sikyfiu by Aratos 282 — 284 251 Annexation of Siky6n to the Achaian League . . . 285 Importance and novelty of the step 285 Sikybn admitted on equal terms .... . jSrt 251 — 245 Position of Aratos ; his relations to Antigonos and Ptolemy . , 287— 2SS 245 Aratos elected General of the League ..... 2SS His permanent position and character .... 288^ 289 Effect of the union of civil and military powers . . . 292 245 — 244 First Generalship of Aratos . .... 292 War with .ffitolia ; defeat of the Boeotians at ChairSneia 292 293 243 — 242 Second Generalship of Aratos 293 294 Deliverance of Corinth, and its accession to the League . 294 Accession of Megara, Troizen, and Epldauros . . 294—295 CONTENTS B.C. PAGE Position of Athens and Argos 295 ■ Achaian invasion of Attica 295 Vain attempt to attach Athens to the League . . . 296 Condition of Argos : succession of the Argeian Tyrants . 296 Tyranny of Aristomachos the First 297 Aratos encourages conspiracies against him .... 297 Greek view of Tyrants and Tyrant-slayers .... 297 Death of Aristomachos the First : succession of Aristippos the Second 301 243 — 242 Vain attempt of Aratos on Argos 301 Suit at Mantineia between Aristippos and the League . . 302 Ptolemy Philadelphos becomes the ally of the League . . 302 Aratos' pension from Ptolemy 303 Illustration of the Achaian Constitution supplied by the first two Generalships of Aratos 303 — 304 § 2. From the Deliverance of Corinth to the Annexation of Argos B.C. 243—228 241 — 240 Third Generalship of Aratos 305 Eolations of the League with Sparta 305 Contrast between Agis and Aratos 306 Difference in their plans for the campaign ; Agis retires 306—307 Capture and recovery of PellenS 307 Truce with Antigonos ; alliance with .ffitolia . . 308 239 Death of Antigonos Gonatas 308 The DSmetrian War .... ... 308 239 Unsuccessful attempt of Aratos on Peiraieus . . .309 Illustrations of the position of Aratos 309 239—229 Various attempts on Athens ; feeling towards Aratos there 310 243—229 Attempts of Aratos on Argos . . . . 311 KleSnai joins the' League 312 Death of Aristippos the Second : tyranny of Aristomachos the Second 312 Rival celebrations of the Nemean Games . • 313 Extension of the two Leagues in Arkadia . . • .314 Revolutions of Mantineia 315 Union of Megalopolis with the Achaian League ; its effects . 315 Character of Lydiadas . 315 233 Lydiadas chosen General 317 Rivalry of Aratos and Lydiadas . . ... 318 231 Second Generalship of Lydiadas • • .319 CONTENTS B.C. PAGE 239 — 229 Affairs of Northern Greece ; Revolution in Epeiros . . 320 First political intercourse with Rome . . . . ' . 321 Hostility of the jEtolians towards Akarnania . . .321 239 — 229 Akarnanian Embassy to Rome . . ■ . . . 321 231 Siege and relief of Mede6n ; .ffltolian Assembly in the camp "... 322 230 Ravages of the lUyrians in Peloponnesos and Epeiros . . 324 Alliance of Epeiros and Akarnania with the lUyrians . . 324 229 Joint expedition of the two Leagues to relieve Korkyra . . 325 Death of Markos ... . . . . 325 Demetrios of Pharos . 326 Interference of Rome 326 229 Korkyra, Apoll6nia, and Epidamnos become Roman allies . 326 Humiliation of lUyria .326 228 Roman Embassies to the two Leagues, and honorary Embassies to Corinth and Athens 327 Eventual results of Roman interference . . . 328 229 Inaction of Macedonia ; death of Demetrios . . . 328 229 — 221 Protectorate and reign of Antigonos D6s6n . . . 329 Advance of the League after the death of Demetrios . 329 229 Application of the Athenians to Aratos when out of ofiRce . 330 Aratos buys the Macedonians out of Attica .... 330 Progi-ess of the League ; union of Aigina and Hermione . 331 Unauthorized negociations of Aratos with Aristomachos of Argos .... 331 Lydiadas interferes as General ..... 332 229—228 His proposal for the union of Argos rejected at the instance of Aratos, but carried on the motion of Aratos as General. .... ... 332—333 Aristomachos General . . ' . . . 333 Union of Phlious with the League . 334 Estimate of the conduct of Aratos . 334 228 Commanding position of the Achaian League . . 334 § 3. From the beginning of Hie loar with KleoiiienSs to the opening of negociations with Macedonia B.O. 227—224 371 — 227 Internal condition of Sparta 241 Reform and fate of Agis 236—222 Reign of Kleomengs 226 — 225 Revolution of KleomenSs Relations between Sparta and the League 335 337 337 337 388 Different position of Sparta from the cities delivered by Aratos 339 t War acceptable on both sides 340 CONTENTS B.O. PAGE Position of the ^tolians; their inaction throughout the Kleomenic War 34I Their acquisitions in Thessaly 34I 228 Spartan acquisition of the ^tolian towns in Arkadia . . 342 Aohaian interests involved in this annexation . . . 342 Deliberations of the Achaian Government .... 343 Attempt of Aratos on Tegea and Orchomenos . . . 343 227 Kleomenes fortifies Athenaion 344 Achaian declaration of war ; annexation of Kaphyai to the League 344 227 — 226 Generalship of Aristomachos ; battle hindered by the inter- ference of Aratos 344 346 226 Indignation against Aratos ; Lydiadas stands against him for the Generalship 346 — 347 226— 225 Twelfth (?) Generalship of Aratos 347 Aratos' campaign in Elis ; his defeat at Mount Lykaion . 347 Mantineia surprised by Aratos and re-admitted to the League 347_348 Results of the recovery of Mantineia ; temporary depression at Sparta 349 226 Battle of Ladokeia ; death of Lydiadas .... 350—351 Utter defeat of the Achaians ; indignation against Aratos . 351 Assembly at Aigion ; strange vote of censure on Aratos . 352 Aratos contemplates resignation, but recovers his influence . 353 225—224 Generalship of Hyperbatas 353 Kleomenes' Eevolution at Sparta 353 His successes in Arkadia ; he recovers Mantineia . . . 354 224 Third victory of Kleomenes at Hekatombaion . . . 354 Position of Aratos and of Kleomenes .... 355 — 356 Probable nature of the supremacy claimed by Kleomenes . 357 Aratos begins to look to Macedonia 859 Difference between his view and that of Plutarch or of modern writers 359—360 § 4. From the Opening of Negociations with Macedonia to the end of the War vnth KleomenAs B.C. 224—221 224 Twofold negociations with Sparta and Macedonia . . . 361 Beginning of negociations with Kleomenes .... 361 224 — 223 Aratos declines the Generalship ; Timoxenos elected . . 362 Beginning of negociations with Antigonos .... 362 Dealings of Aratos with Megalopolis ; commission from Mega- lopolis to the Federal Assembly 363 Megalopolitan envoys allowed to go to Macedonia . . 364 C xxxiv CONTENTS B.C. PAGE Their favourable reception by Antigonos ; letter from Anti- gonos read in the Federal Assembly ; speech of Aratos thereon 364—366 Negociations with KleomenSs ; strong feeling in his favour . 367 Negooiations interrupted by Kleomengs' illness . . • 367 Mission of young Aratos to Antigonos ; Antigonos demands Akrokorinthos 367—368 Kleomenes breaks off the negociations 369 Universal indignation at the thought of surrendering Corinth 370 Appearance of extreme factions in the Achaian cities ; they lean to Kleomenes ....... 370 — 371 His schemes appeal to Town-Autonomy against the Federal principle 371 223 Kleomen6s wins the Arkadian and Argolic Cities . . . 372 Violent proceedings of Aratos at Sikyon .... 373 Corinth calls in Kleomenes ; Megara joins the Bceotian League 373—374 No real argument against Federal Government to be drawn from these events 374 223 Effects of the loss of Corinth 376 Aratos Invested with absolute power, and defended by a guard 377 223 He refuses the offers of Kleomenes, and asks for help of .Stolia and Athens 378 223 Final vote of the League to invite Antigonos and cede Akro- korinthos 379 Estimate of the conduct of Aratos 379 Lowered position of the League from this time . . 379 Comparison between Cavour and Aratos .... 380 223 — 222 Change in the character of the War ; Kleomenes now the champion of Greece 382 Degradation of the League ; monstrous flattery of Anti- gonos . 383 223—222 Recovery of the revolted cities 384 Argos returns to the League ; execution of Aristomachos . 384 223 Antigonos put in possession of Akrokorinthos . . . 385 222 Fate of Mantineia 385 Tegea united to the League 38g Antigonos keeps Orchomenos 38g 222 KleomenSs takes Megalopolis ; first mention of Philopoimen . 386 221 Battle of Sellasia ; defeat and exile of Kleomenes . . . 387 Antigonos' treatment of Sparta , 357 221 Death and character of Antigonos , 337 New position of the League , 300 CONTENTS XXXV CHAPTER VIII HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA TO THE PEACE OF El'EIROS B.C. 221—205 B.C. TAOE State of Greece after the fall of KleomenSs .... 389 Grand alliance under Macedonian headship . . . .389 Internal and external condition of the Achaian League . . 390 Undiminished influence of Aratos ; his relation to the Mace- donian Kings 391—392 Character of Philopoimen ; comparison between him and Aratos 392—393 Withdrawal of Philopoimen from Peloponnesos ; probable explanation of his conduct 393 — 394 221 Accession of Philip 394 Causes of the Social War 394 § 1. The Social War B.C. 221—217 221 — 220 Third Generalship of Timoxenos 395 Phigaleia held by the .ffltoliana 395 221 Dorimachos plunders Messeng ; extensive incursions of the ^tolians 395-396 220 Invasion during a Presidential Election 220—219 Aratos General ; he enters on ofiBce before the legal time 220 Military Assembly at Megalopolis Disgraceful campaign of Aratos ; his defeat at Kaphyai Accusation and defence of Aratos in the Assembly Votes of the Achaian and iEtolian Assemblies Relations between .ffitolia and MessgnS . Achaian Embassies to Macedonia and Epeiros .ffitolian incursions in Peloponnesos Insincerity of the .Stolian Government Affairs of Kynaitha ; return of the exiles Horrible sack of Kynaitha by the ^tolians Unsuccessful attempt on Kleit6r . Philip at Corinth 222—220 Affairs of Sparta Philip sits in judgement on the Spartan parties at Declaration of Philip in favour of Sparta Aratos' liberal views of International right 220 Congress at Corinth ; war agreed upon Opening of the Social War ; decree of the Congress of Corinth 396—397 397—398 . 398 . 398 399 400 401 402 402 -403 403 403 404 404 405 406 406 -407 407 402- 406- xxxvi CONTENTS B.C. ^''°^ Philip's Letter to the ^tolians ; shifts of the jEtolian Government ^^' 220—219 Skopas ^tolian General 408 220 The Achaian Assembly ratiiies the decree .... 408 Behaviour of Akarnania, Epeiros, Messgne, and Sparta 408 — 409 Comparative strength of Coalitions and Single Powers . . 409 Warnings against general inferences as to forms of govern- ment 410 220—219 ^tolian Embassies in PeloponnSsos ; Machatas wins over Elis 411 State of Sparta ; parties of Old and Young . . • 411 Intrigues of the Kleomenists with ^tolia .... 412 First and unsuccessful mission of Machatas .... 412 220—219 Revolution at Sparta ; Agesipolis and Lykourgos chosen Kings 413 Second mission of Machatas ; Sparta joins the ^tolian Alliance, and begins war with^Achaia . . 414 219 Beginning of the Social War ; its character .... 414 Paramount importance of Phihp ; his virtues and military skill 414—415 219 — 218 Generalship of the younger Aratos .... 415 Successes of Philip 416 .Stolian ravages in the Cantons of Dyme, Pharai, and Tritaia 416 " Sonderbund " of the three Western Cities . . . .417 Loss and recovery of Aigeira . . . . . .418 219 — 218 Dorimachos .ffitolian General : sacrilege of the ^tolians at Dion and D6d6na 419 PsSphis annexed to the Achaian League .... 419 Philip's conquests of Phigaleia and Triphylia . . . 419 Relations between Philip and the League .... 420 Personal relations between Philip and Aratos . . 420 Plots of ApellSs against Aratos and the Achaians . . . 421 218 Philip's interferences with the Achaian election . . 422 — 423 218 — 217 Generalship of Eperatos ; connexion of this election with the events of the preceding year 423 — 424 Philip recovers Teichos 424 Further schemes of ApellSs ; Aratos restored to PhOip's favour 424 — 426 218 Influence retained by Aratos in the Achaian Assembly . . 426 Trea.son of Apellgs against Philip ; Philip crushes the plot 427 218 — 217 Weak administration of Eperatos 42s 217 — 216 Aratos general ; decrees of the Achaian Assembly . 428 i29 217 Aratos' mediation at Megalopolis ; combination of fuU Federal sovereignty with strict regard to State riglita 429 CONTENTS B.C. PAGE Philip's success in Northern Greece 430 218 — 217 Mediation of Chios and Rhodes ; failure of the proposed Con- ference 430—431 Second mission from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantion, and Egypt . 431 Philip turns his mind towards Italy 432 Opening of a new period ; close connexion of the history of Eastern and Western Europe from this date . . . 432 Influence of Demetrios of Pharos ; he counsels interference in Italy 433 217 Opening of the Congress of Naupaktos 434 Speech of Agelaos ; his policy compared with that of Iso- krates 435—437 Peace of Naupaktos 438 217—216 Agelaos iEtolian General 438 § 2. Frcmi the End of the Social War to the End of the First War with Rome B.O. 217—205 Analogy between the Peace of Agelaos and the Peace of Nikias -439 Connexion of the Macedonian and Punic "Wars . . 439 Beginning of Roman influence in Greece .... 439 Impolitic conduct of Philip 440 216 Philip's treaty with Hannibal; its various forms and prob- able explanation 441 Hellenic position assumed by Philip in the Treaty . . 442 Philip's relations with PeloponnSsos 444 215 Affairs of Messgne; interference of Philip and Aratos . 444—445 Last influence of Aratos over Philip 445 214 Philip's second attempt on Messgne 445 213 Death of Aratos ; comparison between him and Philo- poimen 446—447 214 Beginning of the Roman "War ; Roman policy of alliances . 447 211 Position of Rome ; her alliance with jEtolia . . . 448—449 Plots for the " reunion " of Akarnania 449 Roman conquests ^^^ Invasion of Akarnania ; heroic defence of the Akarnanians and retreat of the ^tolians 449—450 218 Condition of Sparte; sedition of Cheil6n . . . .450 218—217 Banishment and return of Lykourgos 451 Reign of Machanidas *"^ 210 .ffitolian and Akarnanian embassies at Sparta; speech of Lykiskos ^"^ Sparta in alliance with .ffitolia *53 XXXVUl CONTENTS 210 Naval warfare of Sulpicius ; desolation of Aigina . 209 The League asks help of Philip .... PhilopoimSn General of Cavalry ; he reforms abuses 209 King Attalos chosen General of .ffltolia Attempts at mediation on the part of Rhodes, etc. Philip at Argos 209 Conference at Aigion ; demands of the .ffltolians . Negociations broken off by Philip Philip repulses the Romans ... His alternate debauchery and activity . Exploits of Philip and PhUopoimen 208 — 205 Character of the last years of the War . 207 Philip's attempt on Herakleia .... 208 Philip's cessions to the Achaian League 208 — 207 Philopoimen General of the League; his reforms . The Three Battles of Mantineia .... 207 Third Battle of Mantineia ; complete victory Achaiaus ...... Philopoimen ravages LakSnia Nabis Tyrant of Sparta .... Peace between .ffltolia and Macedonia . 205 Conference at Phoinike ; general peace . Note on the Generalships of Aratos of PAOE . 453 . 453 453—454 . 455 . 455 . 456 456—457 . 457 . 458 . 458 . 458 . 459 . 459 . 460 461—462 . 464 the 464—465 465 465 466 466 468 OHAPTEE IX HISTORY OF FBDEKAL GEBBCE FROM THE PEACE OF BPEIROS TO THE DISSOLTTTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE Character of the Period 471 § 1. From the Peace of Epeiros to the Settlement of Greece under Flaminiiais B.C. 205—194 202 — 200 Aggressive proceedings of Philip ; his dealings with the Achaian League . . . . 200 His devastation of Attica .... Justice of the war on the Roman side . 200 — 197 Second Macedonian War .... Real good-will of Flamininus towards Greece Union of Greek States under Rome Relation of the Federal States to Rome Condition of .ffltolia ; Generalship of Damokritos 200 Indecisive Meeting at Naupaktos ; .Sltolians join the Romans . 472 473 473 473 474 475 475 476 476 CONTENTS xxxix B.C. PAGE Position of Achaia ; influence of PhilopoimSn . . . 477 205 — 204 Reunion of Megaia with the League 477 202 — 201 War with Nabis ; deliverance of Messeng .... 477 201—200 Generalship of Kykliadas 477 PhilopoimSn goes again to Crete 477 Philip at Argos ; his vain attempt to gain the League . . 478 199 His pretended cession of Triphylia and Oi-chomenos . . 478 198 The League joins the Roman Alliance ; terms of the treaty 479 Constitutional details supplied by the account of the debate 479 Share of the League in the war 480 Unsuccessful siege of Corinth by Lucius Quinctius . . 480 198 — 197 Argos betrayed to Philip and ceded by him to Nabis . . 481 197 Exploits of the Aohaian troops at KleSnai and in Asia , . 482 198 State of Epeiros ; attempts at peace ; Charops acts for Rome 482 197 Boeotia constrained to join the Romans .... 483 Firm adherence of the Akarnanians to Philip . . 483 197 Submission of Akarnania .... . . 484 196 Proclamation of Grecian Freedom . . ... 484 New Federations in Thessaly and Euboia . . . 484 195 Recovery of Argos 485 Relations of the EleutherolakSnic towns to Achaia . . 485 Nabis retains Sparta ; discontent of the JEtolians . 485—486 194 Withdrawal of the Roman garrisons 486 § 2. From theSettUineTd of Greece under Flamininus to the death of Philopoimin B.O. 194—183 486 486 486 487 487 488 488 Affairs of the Achaian League Eminence of Megalopolis ; parallel of Virginia Megalopolitan Presidents Absence of Geographical Parties Influence of Philopoimgn ; his internal and external policy Other Federal statesmen : Lykortas, Diophangs, Aristainos The Macedonian party extinct 194 Discontent against Philopoimen at Megalopolis ; he raises the smaller towns into independent States . . . 488 — 489 193—192 Philopoimen's fourth Generalship 490 War with Nabis ; independent action of the League 192 Antiochos invited by the .ffltolians .... Treacherous resolution of the .ffitolian Senate Murder of Nabis by the .ffltolians 490 490 491 491 xl CONTENTS B.C. •'A™ 192 Philopoimen unites Sparta to the Achaian League . . . 492 The union not forcible, yet contrary to Spartan feeling . . 4:92 192 Antiochos elected ^tolian General ; his relations with Achaia, Bceotia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Elis . . . 493 — 494 191 Defeat of Antiochos at Thermopylse 494 191—189 ^tolian War ; submission of ^tolia to the Koman " Faith " 494 "Working of the ^tolian Constitution 495 189 ^tolia becomes the Dependent Ally of Rome . . . 495 191 Union of Elis and MessgnS with the Aehaian League . ■ 496 Dealings of Flamininus with Mess§ne 497 Annexation of Zakynthos prevented by Flamininus . . 497 The League extended over aU Peloponngsos . . . 498 Eelations between Achaia and Rome 498 Roman intrigues with the newly-annexed cities . . . 499 191 First disturbances of Sparta composed by PhilopoimSn . . 600 189 Spartan attack on Las 500 Secession of Sparta ... .... 501 189—188 Embassy to Rome 501 190 — 188 Philopoim^n's two successive Generalships .... 501 188 ExecutionofSpartansatKompasion;changesintheSpartanlaws 502 Impolicy of Philopoimen's treatment of Sparta . . . 502 Continued disputes at Sparta ; policy of the moderate party there 503—504 Roman intrigues for the dissolution of the League . . 504 182 Formal reunion of Sparta 504 Quiet incorporation of Elis 505 183 State of parties in Messene ; revolt under Deinokrates . 505 Capture and execution of PhilopoimSn at Messeng . . 505 182 Re-admission of Messene to the League . . . 506 Three Messenian towns admitted as independent States 507 180 ?Schemes of Chair6n at Sparta . ... 507 191 — 183 Constitutional notices . . 507 189 Yearly meetings removed from Aigiou . . . 508 Constitution of the Senate ....... 508 185 Rejection of Eumenes' offer to pay its members . . . 508 Legal resistance to Roman encroachments .... 509 185 — 183 Assemblies refused to Q. Csecilius and to Flamininus . 610 511 § 3. From the DecUh of Philopoimin to the Battle of Pydna B.C. 183-168 Condition of the League at the death of Philopoimen . . 512 Parties in the League ; the elder Roman party not wilfully unpatriotic ... 5]^2 Growth of the extreme Roman party under Ealliki-atSs . . 512 CONTENTS xli B.C. PAGE 180—179 Presidency of Hyperbatos 513 Slavish doctrines of Hyperbatos and Kallikrates ; opposition of Lykortas 513 180 Embassy of Kallikrates to Rome ; rescript of the Roman Senate 513—614 179—178 Kallikrates elected General 514 172 — 168 Effects of the war with Perseus on the Federal states . . 514 Greek patriotic feeling now on the Macedonian side . . 515 Character of Perseus . 515 Character of L. jEmilius PauUus 516 173 Dependent condition of .ffitolia ; civil dissensions . . . 516 171 Roman and Macedonian parties ; Lykiskos General . . 517 169 Perseus in iEtolia ; part of the country joins him . . 517 — 518 167 Massacre by A. Basbius 518 Dissolution of the jEtolian League 518 157 Death of Lykiskos • . . .518 171 Affairs of Akamania ; debatein the Akarnanian Assembly 518 — 519 167 Leukas separated from Akamania 519 State of Epeiros ; parties of Kephalos and Charops . . 519 169 Geographical parties in Epeiros 520 167 — 157 Conquest and desolation of Epeiros ; tyranny of Charops . 520 173 Condition of Boeotia ; alliance with Perseus .... 521 171 Intrigues of Q. Maroius ; dissolution of the Bceotian League 521 — 522 Achaia during the war with Perseus 522 Decree of non-intercourse between Achaia and Macedonia . 522 174 Debate on Its proposed repeal 522 173 — 171 Missions of Marcellus and the Lentuli 523 Roman dealings with individual cities . ... 523 171 Demands of Atilius and Marcius . . ... 524 170 Mission of Popillius and Octavius . . ... 524 Further inroads on Federal rights 625 170 Convention of the Moderate Party 526 170—169 Archon General 526 Embassy from Attalos ; debate on the restoration of Eumenes' honours 526 169 Negociations with Quintus Marcius 526 Polybios opposes Appius Claudius 528 169—168 Embassy from the Ptolemies ; debate at Sikyfin on the Egyptian question 528 — 529 § 4. From the Battle of Pydna to the Dissolution of the Achaian League B.C. 167—146 Effects of the Conquest of Macedonia on the relations between Rome and Achaia .... 530 xlii CONTENTS E,C. PAOE 167 Embassy of Romans Domitius and Claudius ; demands of the 531 Challenge of Xen6n ; ; deportation of the Thousand Achaians . 631- -632 164. -161 Embassies on behalf of the exiles ; insidious reply of the Senate . 532 Position of Polybios at Rome . . . . 533 161 Release of the Exiles .633 Character of Roman dealings with foreign nations . . 534 Dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis .... 534 166 — 159 Mission of C. Sulpicius Gallus ; separation of Pleur8n from the League . . ... . 535 152 Debate on the Cretan Alliance . . . 535 151 Return of Stratios and Polybios . . . 536 Causes of the final war with Rome . . . 636 156 — 160 Disputes between Athens and OrSpos . . 636 Menalkidas of Sparta General of the League . . • 537 160 Achaian interference at Orfipos . . . . 537 160 — 149 Generalship of Diaios . . . . . 538 149 Disputes with Sparta ; Diaios before Sparta 538 — 539 Death of Kallikrates . ... 639 Damokritos elected General . . 539 149 — 148 Fourth Macedonian War ; mediation of Q. Caecilius Metellus 639—640 148 Victory and banishment of Damokritos .... 540 148 — 147 Second Generalship of Diaios ; suicide of Menalkidas . 640 — 541 147 Embassy of L. Aurelius Orestes ; tumult at Corinth . 541—542 Embassy of Sextus Julius Caesar 543 Kritolaos elected General ; sham Conference at Tegea . .543 147 — 146 Unconstitutional proceedings of Kritolaos . . . 644 Efforts of Metellus to preserve peace 545 146 Tumultuous meeting at Corinth ; violence of Kritolaos . 544 545 Beginning of war with Rome ; further efforts of Metellus . 546 Secession and siege of Herakleia 547 Battle of Skarpheia ; defeat and death of Kritolaos . . 547 Diaios succeeds to the Generalship 547 Negociations between SSsikrates and Metellus . . . 548 Cruelty and corruption of Diaios ; death of S6sikrates . . 549 Mummius at the Isthmus ; battle of Leukopetra and sack of Corinth 5^9 Achaia not yet formally reduced to a Province . . . 550 146—145 Dissolution of the League, and abolition of Democracy in the cities 55-^ 145 Polybios legislates for the Achaian cities ... 55^ Nominal revival of the League 552 CONTENTS xliii Devotion of the Peloponnesian people ; later parallels . Errors of the League, mainly the result of Roman intrigue General results of the Achaian League Roman opposition a witness to its value .... The Achaian League a natural model for liberated Greece Future of South -Eastern Europe; Monarchic Federalism probably the true solvent . . . . PAGE 562 553 554 554 554 555 CHAPTER X OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY Recapitulation . . . 557 Indirect iniiuenoe of Greece ; direct influence of Rome .... 557 Connexion of Italian history with the subject of Federalism . . 558 Italian history a transition between the Greek and the mediaeval Federalism 558 § 1. Of the Federations of Ancient Italy Prevalence of Federalism in Ancient Italy .... Its causes These causes of general application Instances of Confederations beyond Greece and Italy . Greater importance of the Italian Leagues .... Uncertainty of the ethnology of Ancient Italy Early existence of Federations in Italy — Nature of the evidence Late preservation of old Italian Constitutions League of Etburia The Twelve Cities Constitution of the States Amphiktyonic origin of the League Constitution of the Federal Assembly Traces of Federal Kingship . Laxity of the Federal tie Power of war and peace in the League, The accounts of our authorities how far Probable scheme of the League League of Samnium Absence of details The Samnite Cantons . Effect of the separation of Capua Analogy with .ffltolia and Switzerland and also in the States trustworthy . . 559 . 559 . 559 . 559 . 560 . 560 . 661 . 561 . 562 . 562 . 563 . 563 . 663 . 564 . 564 564—565 . 565 . 566 . 566 . 566 . 566 . 667 . 567 xliv CONTENTS Samnite struggle against Rome . Lessons of Samnite history .... League of Latium Abundance of untrustworthy details . Treaty between Rome and Carthage, B.C. 508 Nature of the League The Thirty Cities Relations of Rome to the League . Probable origin of Rome Latin proposals of union with Rome, B. c. 337 Close union of the Latin towns illustrated by the proposal Dissolution of the League, B.C. 334 .... PAGE 567 568 568 568 569 569 570 570 571 571 671 572 § 2. The Roman CommmiweaUh and the Italian Allies Rome not a Federal State ; but containing ytiost-rederal elements . 572 Gradual incorporation of other States with Rome 572 Three great classes in Italy : Romans, Latins, and Italians . . . 573 The nature of the struggle between Patrician and Plebeian . . 574 Swasi-Pederal nature of the Roman Tribes ...... 575 Near approach of the Roman system to Federalism and to Representa- tion 575 The greatness of Rome mainly due to her g"!«m-Federal elements . 576 The Social Wae, e.o. 90—89 576 Its historical importance ... 576 Probable'results on the Italian side . 577 Nature of the Authorities for the period . . . 577 Character of the Roman dominion 578 Condition of the Italian Allies ........ 578 Claim of Roman citizenship for the Allies .... . 579 Advantages and disadvantages of such admission 579 Difference of feeling among the Italians ; among the States near Rome ; among the Samnites and Lucanians ; among the Eti'uscans and Umbrians ........... 580 Federal or Representative institutions the true remedy . . . . 531 The claim of the Allies opposed by the worst, and supported by the best men of both parties at Rome 581 532 Tribuneship of Marcus Livius Drusus, b.c. 91 532 Beginning of the Social Wak, b.c. 90 533 Analogy between the Italian Allies and the American Colonies . . 584 Federal Constitution of the seceding States 535 Italicum the capital of the League ggg Constitution of the Federal Government bonowed from that of Rome . 585 Rome the great obstacle to a permanent Italian Federation . , . 586 The Social War, B.C. 90—89 6gg CONTENTS xlv PAGE Successes of the Allies ggy Movements in Etmria and Umbria 687 The Senate yields the demands of the Allies 587 The other States accept citizenship, but Samnium and Lucania still hold out 588 Legislation of P. Sulpicius, B.C. 88 689 lUu.sory nature of the franchise granted to the Allies . . . .589 Their discontent 589 Their cause embraced by Marius and Sulpicius 590 The Civil "War, B.C. 88—82 ... 590 The Samnite War still continues 590 Last stage of the war ; the Samnites before Rome, B.C. 82 . . . 591 Battle at the CoUine Gate 69X Permanent devastation of Samnium by Sulla 592 %3. Of the Lombard League Gradual incorporation of the Provinces with Rome .... 592 Rome forsaken by the Emperors 593 The Imperial succession always maintained 593 The Kingdom of Italy, A.D. 568—1250 593 Union of the Crown of Italy and Germany, a.d. 961 .... 594 Weakness of the royal authority, 1039—1056 594 The Normans in Apulia and Sicily, 1021 — 1194 ; condition of Rome ; Northern Italy in the twelfth century ; predominance of the Cities ; theii- practical independence ........ 594 Reigns of Lothar II. and Conrad III. (1125— 1152) . . . 595 Imperialist reaction ; election of Frederick (1152) . . . 595 Character of Frederick 597 His position not to be confounded with that of modern Austria . . 597 The War not strictly a national struggle, but a struggle between royalty and municipal freedom 598 Frederick enters Italy, a.d. 1154 599 Collision of claims between the Emperor and the Cities . . . 599 Early successes of Frederick 599 Destruction of Milan, A.D. 1162 600 Oppression of Frederick's agents 600 Four opportunities for the Union of Italy : (1) in the Social War ; (2) under the Lombard League ; (3) under Manfred ; (4) under Victor Emmanuel 600 Distinction of northern and southern Italy 601 The Campanian Republics, a.d. 839—1138 601 The Cities supported by the Pope, Eastern Emperor, and King of Sicily, A.D. 1166 601 Parallel with the revolt of the Netherlands . .... 602 xlvi CONTENTS PAGE First movements in the Veronese March, A.D. 1155 .... 602 Beginning of the Lombaed Lbagtie 602 Relations of Venice and the Lombard Cities 602 Action of the Emperor Manuel 602 Condition of the Eastern Empire 603 Manuel aspires to reunite the Empires ....... 603 Growth of the League, A.D. 1164— 1168 604 Accession of Lodi 604 Foundation of Alexandria 604 Indirect importance of the Lombard League in Federal History ; ana- logy with America and the Netherlands 605 Congress of the League ......... 606 The League not a true Federation ; and why it did not become such . 606 Personal character of Frederick ; he yields in time .... 607 Second Lombard League ......... 607 No definite moment of separation in Italy 607 No such tendency to union in Italy as in the Netherlands and America 607 The Lombard cities really sovereign ; the Dutch and American pro- vinces not so 607 — 608 Vigour and constancy of the Confederates 608 Peculiar policy of Venice ; siege of Ancona, A.D. 1174 . . . 609 Course of the war ; siege of Alexandria, A.D. 1174 — 1175 . . . 609 Negociations between the Emperor and the cities broken off by the Papal Legates 609 Battle of Legnano, a.d. 1176 610 Change in Frederick's policy ; negociations for peace .... 610 Frederick reconciled with Venice and the Church 610 Rights of the Empire as understood by the Lombards .... 610 Truce for six years between the Emperor and the League, a.d. 1177 . 611 Various cities join Frederick : Cremona, Tortona, and Alexandria . 611 Peace of Constanz, a.d. 1183 ; the treaty is in form a pardon, but amounts to surrender of direct sovereignty .... 612 613 The Second Lombard League 614 The First League primarily political ; the Second League primarily ecclesiastical 614 615 Union of Italy under Frederick or Manfred hindered by the Pope ; good and evil which it would have prevented .... 615 Italian nationality a purely modern idea gj^g Question of Italian Confederation or Consolidation • . . . 616 Italian Federation discredited by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte . . 616 Arguments on behalf of, and against, Federalism in Italy . . . 616 The question decided by the Italians 617 Federalism no longer appropriate in Italy ; local independence the true policy g;jy Future restoration of the Empire gl y CONTENTS xlvii FRAGMENT OF THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDEEATION OF GEllMANT FAOE Influence of the Empire on Germany 618 The three Imperial Kingdoms : Germany, Italy, and Burgundy . 618 — 619 Closest connexion between Germany and Burgundy .... 619 Connexion between Germany and the Empire growing into identity . 620 The German Confederation, a lax Staatentund ; its theory and practice 621 Its peculiarities : (1) Most of its members principalities ; (2) it arose from the splitting up of a more united State 621 Process of disunion in Germany 622 Germany really a Federation since Peace of Westphalia, a.d. 1648-1806 622 The Kingdom of Germany 623 Comparison with England and France 623 Origin of the German Kingdom 623 Different history of England, 800 — 1087; France, 888—1202; and Germany, 936—973, 1039—1056 . 624 Circumstances which strengthened the Royal authority in Germany . 624 Retention of National Assemblies in Germany and England, but not in France 625 The Royal Domain ; the Free Cities ; the Ecclesiastical Princes . . 625 Contrast between German and French Kings 625 Conti'ast between the later history of the Kingdoms .... 626 Causes of disunion in Germany : (1) The Crown elective ; chiefly owing to its connexion with the Empire 627 The Empire essentially elective 628 Ways in which the Imperial and elective character of the German Crown diminished the royal authority . . . 628 (2) The German Confederation mainly composed of Principalities . 629 Connexion between this cause and the weakening of the monarchy 629 Origin of the German Principalities ; royal officers become sovereigns ......•••• °29 The Diet a Federal Congress rather than a National Parliament . . 629 Governments, not peoples, represented in the Diet .... 630 The Diet sinks into a diplomatic Congress 630 Other peculiarities of the German Confederation 630 Loss of the ancient divisions 630 Comparison with England and France 630—631 Splitting up of the ancient Duchies 631 Constant partitions and annexations 631 Different position of the arriire vassals in France and in Germany . 632 Vast number, and singular disproportion in size of the German States . 633 Position of Austria and Prussia. Parallel with Boeotia . . .633 xlviii CONTENTS Appendix I. pao^ 1. Note on the Cities of the Aohaian League 635 2. Note on the Cities of the Lykian League 637 3. The Federal Coinage of Akamania 638 4. The Federal Coinage of Mtolm 638 Appendix II. Additional Notes by the Editor 639 Index 669 CHAPTER I GENERAL INTRODUCTION In undertaking to write the History of Federal Government, I propose to myself a task somewhat different from that which has fallen to the lot of any of those writers who have hitherto treated of the subject. It has been dealt with as a matter of political Object of philosophy, of International Law, and of local or temporary- ^^^ ^'"^^• political controversy. I shall draw upon the materials which have been gathered together by writers of all these classes ; but- my own object is not exactly the same as the object of any one of them. I purpose not so much to discuss the abstract nature of Federal Grovernment, as to exhibit its actual working in ages and countries widely removed from one another. The exact defini- tion, both of a Federation in general and of the particular forms of Federations, has often taxed the ingenuity both of political philosophers and of international lawyers. For the purposes of the historian a less rigid accuracy of definition may be allowed. History often recognizes both likenesses and unlikenesses which it would be hard to define with any precision, either legal or philosophical. Federal Government, as I shall presently attempt to show, is, in its essence, a compromise betiyeen two opposite Federalism political systems. Its different forms occupy the whole middle * oompro- space between two widely distant extremes. It is therefore only ' natural that some of these intermediate forms should shade off imperceptibly into the extremes on either side. Controversies may thus easily be raised both as to the correct definition of a Federal Government, and also whether this or that particular government comes within the definition. The examples of therefore Federal Constitutions which history supplies are scattered over define. GENERAL INTRODUCTION chap. widely distant ages and countries ; they are found among nations widely differing from one another in the amount of their political advancement and general civilization. But all of them agree m some points which history easily recognizes, though it may be hard to bring them within the gTasp of legal definition. There is what may be called a certain Federal ideal, which has some- times been realized in its full, ' or nearly its full, perfection, while other cases have shown only a more or less remote approximation to it. To establish a definition and a nomenclature for all these several classes of governments, is the business of the political philosopher. The historian, in recognizing the unlikeness, will also recognize the likeness, and will acknowledge them aU, perfect and imperfect alike, as forming natural portions of his subject. The first rude approach to any particular form of government is as much a part of the history of that form of government as the most fully developed shape which it can afterwards assume. I shall therefore not scruple to apply the name of Federal Govern- ment to many states to which philosophical and legal inquirers General would probably refuse it. The name of Federal Government definition may, in this wider sense, be applied to any union of component cal tiur-°"" msmbers, where the degree of union between the members sur- passes that of mere alliance, however intimate, and where the degree of independence possessed by each member surpasses anything which can fairly come under the head of merely municipal freedom. Such unions have been common in many ages and countries, and many of them have been far from realizing the full ideal of a Federal Government. That ideal, in its highest and most elaborate developement, is the most finished and the most artificial production of political ingenuity. It is hardly possible that Federal Government can attain its perfect form except in a highly refined age, and among a people whose political education has already stretched over many generations. DeRiiition Two requisites seem necessary to constitute a Federal Govern- of a perfect ment in this its most perfect form. On the one hand, each of Govern- *^® members of the Union must be wholly independent in those ment. matters which concern each member only. On the other hand, all must be subject to a common power in those Internal matters wMch concern the whole body of members collectively. indepen- Thus each member will fix for itself the laws of its criminal theTeveral jurisprudence, and even the details of its political constitution. members. And it will do this, not as a matter of privilege or concession DEFINITION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT from any higher power, but as a matter of absolute right, by virtue of its inherent powers as an independent commonwealth. But in all matters which concern the general body, the sove- reignty of the several members will cease. Each member is perfectly independent within its own sphere ; but there is another sphere in which its independence, or rather its separate existence, vanishes. It is invested with every right of sovereignty on one Sove- class of subjects, but there is another class of subjects on which reignty of it is as incapable of separate political action as any province or j^ ^11 city of a monarchy or of an indivisible republic. The making external of peace and war, the sending and receiving of ambassadors, ^''■tt^rs. generally all' that comes within the department of International Law, will be reserved wholly to the central power. Indeed, the very existence of the several members of the Union will be diplomatically unknown to foreign nations, which will never be called upon to deal with any power except the Central Govern- ment. A Federal Union, in short, wiU form one State in relation to other powers, but many States as regards its internal adminis- tration. This complete division of sovereignty we may look upon as essential to the absolute perfection of the Federal ideal. But that ideal is one so Very refined and artificial, that it seems not to have been attained more than four or five times in the history of the world. But a History of Federal Government must embrace a much wider range of subjects than merely the history of those states which have actually realized the Federal idea. We must look at the idea in its germ as well as in its Wider perfection. We shall learn better to understand what perfect ^^g^y° Federalism is by comparing it with Federalism in a less fully- torical developed shape. In order thus to trace the Federal principle view, from its birth, we shall have to go back to very early times, and, in some cases, to very rude states of society. But of course it will not be needful to dwell at much length on those common- wealths of whose constitution and history it would be impossible to give any detailed account. For some commonwealths, which may fairly claim the name of Federal Governments in the wider sense, a mere glance will be enough. Our more detailed examina- tion must be reserved for a few more illustrious examples of Federal Union. There are a few famous commonwealths which. Choice of either from having perfectly, or nearly perfectly, realized the fo^p^J-^Yal Federal idea, or else from their importance and celebrity in the uiustra- general history of the world, stand out conspicuously at the very tion. GENERAL INTRODUCTION CHAP. Four great examples of Federal Govern- ment. first glimpse of the subject, and whose constitution and history will deserve and repay our most attentive study. Four Federal Commonwealths, then, stand out, in four differ- ent ages of the world, as commanding, above all others, the attention of students of political history. Of these four, one belongs to what is usually known as " ancient," another, to what is commonly called "mediseval" history; a third arose in the period of transition between mediaeval and modern history ; the creation of the fourth may have been witnessed by some few of those who are still counted among living men. Of these four, again, one has been a thing of the past for many centuries ; another has so changed its form that it can no longer claim a place among Federal Governments ; but the other two, one of them among the least, the other among the ^eatest, of inde- pendent powers, still remain, exhibiting Federalism in a perfect, or nearly perfect, form, standing, in the Old World and in the New, as living examples of the strength and the weakness of the most elaborate of political combinations. The ACHAIAH League, B.C. 281- 146. Tlie Swiss Cantons, A.D. 1291- 1862. The United Pro- vinces, A.D. 1579- 1795. The United States, A.D. 1778- 1862. These four famous Commonwealths are. First, the Achaian League in the later days of Ancient Greece, whose most flourishing period comes within the third century before our own era. Second, the Confederation of the Swiss Cantons, which, with many changes in its extent and constitution, has lasted from the thirteenth century to our own day. Third, the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands, whose Union arose in the War of Independence against Spain, and lasted, in a republican form, till the War of the French Revolution. Foittth, the United States of North America, which formed a Federal Union after their revolt from the British Cro-\vn under . George the Third, and whose destiny forms one of the most im- portant, and certainly the most interesting, of the political problems of our own time. Character- Of these Four, three come sufficiently near to the full realiza- istics of tJQ^ Qf (;jjg Federal idea to be entitled to rank among perfect FOUR GREAT FEDERAL COMMONWEALTHS Federal Governments. The Achaian League, and the United the Four States since the adoption of the present Constitution, are indeed '^™''* C™- the most perfect developments of the Federal principle which yg^^™" the world has ever seen. The Swss Confederation, in its origin a Union of the loosest kind, has gradually drawn the Federal bond tighter and tighter, till, within our own times, it has assumed a form which fairly entitles it to rank beside Achaia and America. The claim of the United Provinces is more doubt- ful ; 1 their union was at no period of their republican being so close as that of Achaia, America, and modern Switzerland. But the important place which the United Provinces once filled in European history, and the curious and instructive nature of their political institutions, fully entitle them to a place in the first rank for the purposes of the present History. All these four then I purpose to treat of at some considerable length. Over less perfect or less illustrious examples of the Federal system I shall glance more lightly, or use them chiefly by way of contrast to point out more clearly the distinguishing characteristics of these four great examples. Thus, for instance, the modern The Ger- German Confederation is, in point of territorial extent and of ™*° *^'?°" the power of many of the states which compose it, of far greater importance than any of the European instances among the Four. But its constitution is so widely removed from the perfection of the Federal idea that, for our present purpose, this Union, which includes two of the Great Powers of Europe, is chiefly valuable as illustrating by contrast the more perfect constitutions of Achaia and Switzerland. On the other hand there can be little other doubt that there were in the ancient world several other Con- ancient federations, whose constitutions must have realized the Federal ^^*"P ^^ > idea almost as perfectly as the more famous League of Achaia. But some of these possessed so little influence in the world, that they can hardly be said to have a history. In the case of others we know absolutely nothing of the details of their constitutions. Northern Greece, especially, in the later days of Grecian freedom, m Greece ; abounded in small Federal States, but we have no such minute knowledge of their history and constitution as we have of those of Achaia. Even the great and important League of .^Etolia, so long the rival of Achaia, is far better known to us in its external history than in its internal constitution. Again it is clear that in Italy ; the Thirty Cities of Latium, and probably some other similar ' See Motley's Rise of the Dutch Republic, ili. 514. GENERAL INTRODUCTION CHAP. I in Lykia. Other German leagues ; the Hanse Towns. Other American Confede- rations. Leagues among the old Italian commonwealths, must have been united by a Federal bond of a very close kind. But we know hardly anything about them except what may be picked up from the half-mythical narratives of their wars and alliances with Rome. Lykia too, beyond all doubt, had a Federal constitution which was in some respects more perfect than that of Achaia itself. But then Lykia has nothing which can be called a history, and its Federal constitution arose at so late a period that its independence was provincial rather than strictly national. So, in later times, the Swiss Confederation was really only one of several unions of German cities, which happened to obtain greater importance and permanence than the rest. One of these unions, the famous League of the Hanse Towns, still exists, though with diminished splendour, in our own day. So, in days later still, the precedent of Federal union given by the English settlements in North America, has been followed, though as yet with but little success or credit, by several of the Republics which have arisen among the ruins of Spanish dominion in the same continent. All these instances, Greek, Italian, German, and American, will demand some notice in the course of our present inquiry. But they will not need that full and minute attention which must be reserved for Achaia, Switzerland, the United Provinces, and the United States. Before, however, we go on to describe in detail the constitu- tion and history of any particular Federal state, it wiU be desirable to make some further remarks on Federal Government in general, and to draw out at some length the points of contrast between that and other political systems. CHAPTER II CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED WITH OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS I HAVE already given something like a definition of Federal Government in its perfect form, premising that that perfect form is not to be looked for in all the examples which will come under our' present survey. We have seen that it is not to be found in all even of the four illustrious Confederations which I have selected for special examination. Compared with the con- stitutions of Achaia and America, the Federal compact of the Swiss Cantons before the French Revolution, and even the Union of the Seven Provinces, will appear to be only remote approaches to the Federal idea. But in the present Chapter, where I propose to contrast Federalism with other political systems, I shall take my picture of a Federal Government wholly from the most perfect examples. Much, therefore, that I shall say, will be quite inapplicable to the United Provinces or to the old Swiss League, much more so to the so-called German Confederation of our own day. A Federal Commonwealth, then, in its perfect form, is one which forms a single state in its relations to other nations, but which consists of many states with regard to its internal govern- ment. Thus the City of Megalopolis in ,old times, the State of New York or the Canton of Zurich now, has absolutely no sepa- rate existence in the face of other powers : it cannot make war or peace, or maintain ambassadors or consuls. The common Ilhistra- Federal Government of Achaia, America, or Switzerland, is the 'gjations*'''' only body with which foreign nations can have any intercourse, of thg But the internal laws, the law of real property, the criminal law, members even the electoral law, may be utterly different at Megalopolis ™g^g^^f ®°* and at Siky6n, at New York and in Illinois, at Ziirich and at common- Geneva, Nor is there any power in the Assembly at Aigion, wealth. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap Two con- ditions of a true Federal Govern- ment. Two classes of Federal Common- wealths. First, The" " System of Con- states," where the Central Power deals only with the State Govern- ments. the Congress at Washington, or the Federal Council at Bern, to bring their diversities into harmony. In one point of view there is only a single commonwealth, as truly a national whole as France or Spain ; in another point of view, there is a col- lection of sovereign commonwealths as independent of one another as France and Spain can be. We may then recognize as a true and perfect Federal Commonwealth any collection of states in which it is equally unlawful for the Central Power to interfere with the purely internal legislation of the several members, and for the several members to enter into any diplo- matic relations ^ with other powers. Where the first condition is not obtained, the several members are not sovereign; their independence, however extensive in practice, is a merely muni- cipal independence. Where the second condition is not obtained, the union, however ancient and intimate, is that of a mere Confederacy rather than that of a real Confederation. But another distinction will here arise. Even among those commonwealths which at once secure to every member full internal independence, and refuse to every member any separate external action, there may be wide diversities as to the way in which the Central Power exercises its peculiar functions. It is here that we reach that division of Federal Governments into two classes which has been laid down by most of the vn-iters on the subject.^ In the one class the Federal Power represents only the Governments of the several members of the Union ; its immediate action is confined to those Governments; its powers consist simply in issuing requisitions to the State Governments, which, when within the proper limits of the Federal authority, it is the duty of those 1 I reserve the exceptional case, to he discussed in the course of the history, of a particular State holding diplomatic intercouse with foreign powers by express licence of the Federal power. See an instance in Polybios, ii. 48. This is most conspicuously a case in which the exception proves the rule. 2 [Cf. Bluntschli, Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechtes, i. 554. "Der wahre Unterschied zwisohen Staatenbund und Bundesstaat ist in dem verschiedenen Organismns beider zu erkennen. Auch in dem Staatenbunde smd die Bmzelstaaten zu eiuem Staatsganzen verbuuden, aber dieses ist nicht in sich selber wieder als ein besonderer, von den Einzelstaaten ver- schiedener Zentralstaat organisirt, soudern die Bundesgewalt ist entweder einem Einzelstaate iibcrtrageu oder aus den staatlichen Spitzen der Einzel- staaten zusammeugesetzt. lu dem Bnndesstaate dagegen gibt es nicht bloss orgauisirte Einzelstaaten, soudern auch einen voUstiindig organisirteu Zentral- staat. So war der achiiische Bund zur Zeit von Philopoemen nicht mehr ein Staatenbund sondern ein Bundesstaat ; so sind die nord-americanischen Frei * staaten und ist ebenso die Schweiz seit 184S als Bundesstaat organisirt."] TWO CLASSES OF FEDERATIONS Governments to carry out. If men or money be needed for Federal purposes, the Federal Power will demand them of the several State Governments, which will raise them in such ways as each may think best. In the other class, the Federal Power Second, will be, in the strictest sense, a Government, which, in the other '^^ class, it can hardly be called. It will act not only on ^^^ posite Governments of the several States, but directly on every citizen State,'' of those States. It will be, in short, a Government co-ordinate ^^''^ ^^ with the State Governments, sovereign in its own sphere, as they power acts are sovereign in their sphere. It will be a Government with directly on the usual branches. Legislative, Executive, and Judicial ; with *^' citizens, the direct power of taxation, and the other usual powers of a Government; with its army, its navy, its civil service, and all the usual apparatus of a Government, all bearing directly upon every citizen of the Union without any reference to the Govern- ments of the several States. The State administration, within its own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no such thing as an Union ; the Federal administration, vidthin its own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no such thing as a separate State. This last class is what writers on International Law call a Composite State, or Sup'eme Federal Govermnent} The former class they commonly remand to the head of mere Confederacies, or, at most. Systems of Confederate States.^ Yet it is quite possible to conceive the existence of a Federal Commonwealth, in which the Federal Power shall act solely upon the several State Governments, which yet shall fully answer the two conditions of external unity and internal plur- ality. The American Union under the Confederation forbade diplomatic action to the several States ; ^ it therefore formed a single commonwealth in the eyes of other nations. Yet the Federal Power acted only on the several State Governments, and 1 This is what, in the Federalist, No. 9 (p. 47, ed. 1818) is called a Con- solidation of the States. But Hamilton is here only using the language of objectors, and the name consolidated would seem better to apply to non-Federal commonwealths, as distinguished from Federal. It is so used by M. de Tocque- ville. Democratic en Amerique, i. 271. 2 See Wheaton's International Law, i. 68 ; Austin's Province of Jurisprudence, p. 217 ; Calhoun's Works, i. 163 ; Federalist, Nos. 9, 21, 39 et passim. The distinction between the two classes is most fully and clearly drawn by Mr. J. S. Mill (Representative Government, p. 301), by Professor Bernard (Lectures on American War, Oxford, 1861, pp. 68-72), and by Tocqueville (Democratic en 'Amfrique, i. 250, 265 et seqq.). ^ Articles of Confederation, Art. vi. § 1. 10 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap The dis- not at all directly on individual citizens. The Swiss Confedera- tinotion ^Jq^ ^f ;^g;^5 g^gjj allowed diplomatic action to the several ofnfeans^'^ Cantons within certain prescribed limits.^ Yet, on the whole, than of even the Swiss Confederation, and much more the American ends. Confederation of 1778, had far more in common with perfect Federal, or " Composite " States, than with lax Confederacies like the German Bund. The real difference between the two classes seems to be that the one is a good, the other a bad, way of compassing the same objects.^ Both America and Switzerland found by experience that, without the direct action of the Federal Power upon individuals, the objects of the Federal Union could not be carried out. The several State Governments are indeed, under the other system, constitutionally bound to carry out all requisitions which do not transcend the limits of Inade- the Federal authority. But we may be sure that the State quacy of Governments will always lie under a strong temptation to dis- of requi^'" obey such requisitions, not only when they really transcend the sitions. limits of the Federal authority, but also when they are simply displeasing to local interests or wishes.* Such a compact, in short, may constitutionally be a Federal Union, but practically it will amount to little more than a precarious alliance.* Still a Confederation of this sort aims, however ineffectually, at being a true Federal Union. The American Confederation of 1778 professed, while the German Confederation does not profess,^ to form one power, one nation,^ or whatever may be the proper word, in the face of other powers and nations. The articles of Confederation wholly failed to carry out their own purpose ; and 1 See Wheaton, i. 90. ^ "The attributes of Congress under the Confederation and under the Con- stitution were (with some not very important exceptions) the same. What was done was to make them real and effective in tlie only possible way, by makin» them operate directly on the people of the States, instead of on the States them- selves. " — Bernard, p. 69. 8 See Mill, p. 301. * Mill; Cf. Bernard, p. 68. See also Marshall's Life of Washington, iv. 256-62. ' On the German Confederation, see Mill, p. 300. " I do not feel called upon, at all events at this stage of my work, to enter into the gi'eat American dispute between National and Federal, (see Federalist, Nos. 39, 40 ; Tocqueville, i. 268 ; Calhoim, i. 112-161 ; Bernard, p. 72). I con- fess that it seems to me to be rather a question of words. A power which acts in all its relations with other powers, as a single indivisible unity, is surely a nation whether its internal constitution be Federal or otherwise. So to call it in no way takes away from the independent rights of the several members. In the language of Polybios, the word IBvo^ is constantly applied to the Achaiau and other Federal commonwealths ; indeed he seems to use it as the special formal II SYSTEM OF REQUISITIONS 11 the closer union of 1787, under the existing constitution, was the result. Still, for my immediate purpose, it does not seem needful to attend very closely to the distinction between these two classes of Federations. In many of the ancient Leagues with which we shall have to deal, it is evident that, on the one hand, the League formed a single state in the face of all other states, and that, on the other hand, the independence of the several members was strictly preserved. But it is not always The dis- easy to say how far the Federal Assembly and the Federal tinction Magistrates exercised a direct power over the individual citizens " ° j,* ^■^jg of each city, and how far it was exercised through the Assemblies in history. and Magistrates of the several cities. We know, for instance, that in the Achaian League there were Federal taxes ; ■' we do not know whether they were directly gathered by Federal collectors, or whether they were merely requisitions to the several cities, which their Assemblies and Magistrates apportioned by their own authority. The latter arrangement is just as likely as the former ; but, if it could be shown to be the plan actually in use, it would hardly have the effect of degrading the Achaian League from the rank of a Composite State to that of a mere Confederacy.^ It is enough to enable a commonwealth to rank, for our present purpose, as a true Federation, that the Union is one which preserves to the several members their full internal independence, while it denies to them aU separate action in relation to foreign powers. The sovereignty is, in fact, divided ; title of such bodies. See, for instance, xx. 3, where IBvos, the Federal State, is opposed to t6\is, the single city-commonwealth. According to Tocqueville (i. 268) tlie American constitution is neither National nor Federal, but some third thing, for which no name exists. He calls it " un gouvernement national incomplet." The truest difference between a Federation and a perfectly consolidated Government is that already given. In a Federal state the several members retain their sovereignty within their own range ; that is, the Federal power can- not alter their internal institutions. In an ordinary monarchy or republic, the supreme central power, in whomever it is vested, can alter the institutions of any province or city. See Bernard, p. 71. ^ Pol. iv. 60 al Koival el(ropcd. 2 The system of requisitions is indeed in no way confined to Federal common- wealths ; it is quite compatible with monarchy, and indeed it has always been exceedingly common under barbaric despotisms. The Sultan requii-es a certain contribution from a district, which the authorities of the district levy as best suits them. The royal administration is thus eased of a certain amount of trouble, and the district at once acquires a certain amount of municipal freedom. But that freedom, great or small, exists merely by concession or sufl'erance, not of right, as in a Federal State. 12 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ohai-. Classifica- tion of govern- meut ; Moiiarcliy, Aristo- cracy, and Demo- cracy. Absolute and Con- stitutional Govern- ments. A cross division needed. the Government of the Federation and the Government of the State have a co-ordinate authority, each equally claiming allegiance within its own range. It is this system of divided sovereignty which I propose to contrast at some length with the other principal forms of government which have prevailed at different times among the most civilized nations of the world. Forms of government may be classified according to so many principles that it is needful to state at the onset what principle of division seems most suited for the comparison which I have taken in hand. The old stereotyped division into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, is sufficient for many purposes. A more philosophical division perhaps is that which does not look so much to the nature of the hands in which supreme power is vested, as to the question whether there is any one body or individual which can fairly be called supreme. This is the division of monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, respectively, into absolute and constitutional examples of their several classes.-'- Thus the old Athenian commonwealth, where all power was directly exercised by the People, was an Absolute Democracy. An American State, on the other hand, where the People is recognized as the ultimate sovereign, where all power is held to flow from the people, but where a delegated authority is di-yided in different proportions between a Governor, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, is said to be an example of Constitu- tional Democracy. In this way of looking at them, an Absolute Government of any of the three kinds has quite as many points in common with an Absolute Government of one of the other kinds, as it has in common with a Constitutional Government of its own class. But neither of these divisions seems suited to our present purpose.^ A Federal commonwealth may be either aristocratic or democratic ; or some of its members may be aristocratic and others democratic; those Aristocracies and Democracies again may exhibit either the Absolute or the Con- ' See Calhoun's Works, i. 28, 34 et seqq. ^ [Cf., on the classification of constitutions, Piitter, Historische Eutwickelnn^ der heutigen Staatsverfassung des teutschen Reiclis (3rd ed.) ii. 159. He observes that, in discussing the constitution of the "German Empire," "man dachte nicht daran, dass zum Massstabe der verschiedenen Eegierungsformeu sich ioch eine hohere Abtheilung einfaoher und zusammengesetzter Staateu denkeu liess und nur auf erstere jene dreyfache Eintheilung (namely, monarchic, aristocratic ' democratic) passte. " He failed to recognize the theoretic possibility of a Federal Monarchy.] CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENTS 13 stitutional type of their own classes; indeed, though Federal States have commonly been republican, there is nothing theoreti- cally absurd in the idea of a Federal Monarchy. The classifica tion of governments, which we must make in order to woi'k out the required contrast between Federalism and other forms, will be in fact a cross division to the common classification into Monarchies, Aristocracies, and Democracies. Federalism, as I have already said, is essentially a compromise ; it is something intermediate between two extremes. A Federal Government is most likely to be formed when the question arises whether several small states shall remain perfectly independent, or shall be consolidated into a single great state. A Federal tie harmonizes the two contending principles by reconciling a certain amount of union with a certain amount of independence. A Federal Federalism Government then is a mean between the system of large states * po™pro- and the system of small states. But both the large states, the tween small states, and the intermediate Federal system, may assume a Great and democratic, an aristocratic, or even a monarchic form of govern- ^"^'^ ment, just as may happen. The two extremes then, with which the Federal system has to be compared, are the system of small states and the system of large states. Speaking roughly, the one is the ordinary political system of what is called classical antiquity, the other is the or- dinary political system of modern Europe. The system of small states finds its most perfect developement in the independent city-commonwealths of Old Greece ; the system of large states finds its most perfect developement in the large monarchies of Europe in our own day. It is not too much to say that the large and the small state alike may be either monarchic, aristo- cratic, or democratic. As a general rule, small states have flourished most as republics, and large states have flourished most as monarchies, and the natural tendency of the two classes of states seems to lie in those two directions respectively. But The there is no sort of contradiction in the idea of a small state being pivision monarchic or of a large state being republican. Many small t^^g ^f principalities have enjoyed a fair amount of prosperity and good their government, and the experiment of governing a large country as pj^^^^ ^^ a single republic has been so seldom tried that we are hardly in (joyem- position to decide whether it is necessarily a failure or not.^ ment. 1 See Tocqiieville, i. 270, 271 ; ii. 250. 14 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOTERNMENT chap. But, this question apart, it is clear that a small republic may be either aristocratic or democratic, that a large kingdom may be either despotic or constitutional. And it is also clear that, while free states, great and small, have certain points of resemblance, large states and small states respectively have also some pomts of resemblance, irrespective of their several forms of government. It is in these points, where large states, whatever their constitu- tion, form one class, and small states, whatever their constitution, form another, that Federalism takes its position, as a mean between the two, sharing some of the characteristics of both, i may add, that while Federalism, as a compromise, is liable to some of the inherent disadvantages of a compromise, it mani- festly, in those positions for which it is suited at all, goes a good way to unite the opposite advantages of the two opposite systems between which it stands as a mean term. I shall therefore now proceed, first to contrast at some length the two great systems of large and of small states, and then to show the way in which a Federal Government occupies a position intermediate between the two.'- Definition Speaking roughly, I understand by a small state one in which of Large j^^ jg possible that all the citizens may, if their constitution allows States. 01' requires it, habitually assemble for political purposes in one place. By a large state I understand one in which such personal assemblage is impossible ; one, therefore, where, if the state be constitutional, the constitution must be of the representative kind. The large state, however, to have all the characteristics and advantages of a large state, must commonly be much larger than is absolutely necessary to answer the terms of this definition. But I by no means intend to confine the name to what are commonly understood by the name of Great Powers. All the Kingdoms of Europe, and even some principalities which are not Kingdoms, will count as large states for the purposes of this inquiry. All alike share the characteristics which distinguish them from the system of small states. The most perfect form of this last is found when every City, with its immediately sur- rounding territory, forms a commonwealth absolutely independent and enjoying all the rights of a sovereign power. ^ It may be objected that a Federation may consist either of small or of large states as they are here defined. I shall recur to this point presently. II CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDEPENDENT CITY 15 This was the political system usual in the commonwealths of ancient Greece and Italy, and it has been fully elucidated by the various great modern writers on Greek and Roman history, but most fully and elaborately by Mr. Grote. The rtfling idea of the politicians of those ages was what Mr. Grote calls the " autono- Charaoter- mous city-community." A man's " country," ^ in those days, 'j^'V'^°^*'"' was not a region, but a city ; ^ his patriotism did not extend (lent City, over a wide surface of territory, but was shut up within the walls of a single town. His countrymen were not a whole nation of the same blood and language as himself, but merely those who shared with him in the local burghership of his native place. A Patriotism man, in short, was not a Greek or an Italian, but an Athenian "^"^p.^*^ *° or a Roman. Undoubtedly he had a feeling, which may, in a ^ ' ^' certain sense, be called a patriotic feeling, for Greece or Italy as wholes, as opposed to Persia or Carthage. But this feeling was rather analogous to that which modern Europeans entertain for the great brotherhood of European and Christian nations, than to the national patriotism which an Englishman or a Frenchman entertains for England or France. The tie between Greek and Greek was indeed closer than the tie between European and European, but it was essentially a tie of the same kind. Real patriotism, the feeling which we extend to regions far larger than the whole of Greece, did not reach beyond the limits of a single Grecian city. This state of things is by no means peculiar to ancient Greece and Italy ; traces of it are still to be seen in modern Europe ; and it existed in its full force in some European states down to very recent times. But it was in the brilliant times of ancient Greece and Italy that this system found its • fullest developement, and that it made its nearest approach to being universal over the civilized world. In modern Europe independent cities have existed and flourished; a few indeed even now retain a nominal existence. But such independent cities have been, for the most part, merely exceptional cases, surrounded by larger states whose form of government was monarchical. In ancient Greece and Italy the independent city was the ruling political conception, and in ancient Greece, in the days of her greatest glory, it was the form of political life almost universally received. ^ Uarpls. The same use of the word is common in modern Greek. 2 Aristotle excludes from his definition of iriXis anything at all approaching to the size of a nation. Bahylon is hardly a city — ?xei irepiypatji^v iBvovs /iaXKoir ^ TTiiXeus.— Polit. iii. 3, 5. Cf. Polyb. ii. 37, CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap- Full de- velope- ment of city-inde- pendence in Greece. Early ap- proaches to Consti- tntional Monarchy, and to Federal Repub- licanism. Their com- parative unimport- ance before the Mace- donian period. Municipal character of the Greek' Common- wealths, Indeed the greater and more civilized the state, the more completely do we find the idea of municipal republicanism carried out. Neither of the other alternative forms of freedom, the constitutional monarchy and the Federal republic, was at any time absolutely unknown in the Grecian world. The pouty of the Homeric age, the King or chief of each town, with a Kjng of Kings at Mykene as suzerain over at least all Peloponnesos, might conceivably have grown into a monarchy, first of the feudal, and then of the modern constitutional type. And, in the half -Greek states of Epeiros and Macedonia, we actually find that the heroic royalty did develope into something which may be fairly called a rude and early form of constitutional monarchy. The Epeirot Kings swore obedience to the laws; the Mace- donian, though a subject of a king, looked on himself as a freeman, and there were Macedonian assemblies which, however great may have been the royal influence, did impose at least some formal restraint upon the royal will.^ On the other hand, the robbers of -^tolia, the respectable but obscure townships of the Achaian shore, and some other of the less advanced and less important members of the Hellenic body, possessed, as far back as we can trace their history, some germs of a polity which may fairly entitle them to rank among Federal commonwealths. But both the monarchic and the Federal states lagged for a long time far behind the purely municipal ones. In the Greece of Herodotos and ThucydidSs, they play no distinguished part. In the Greece of Xenoph6n and Isokrat^s, they still remain far from prominent ; for the greatness of Thebes is really a muni- cipal and not a Federal greatness. In short, constitutional monarchy never attained any full developement in the ancient world, and Federalism became important only when the most brilliant days of Greece were past. Both in Greece and Italy, the most important states so early threw aside regal government altogether that the idea of the King ruling according to Law, though certainly not unknown to Greek political thinkers, had no opportunity to assume any fully-developed form. And though a day came when nearly all Greece was mapped out into Federal Republics, that day did not come till the system of perfectly 1 On the Macedonians and their Kings, see Edinburgh Review, vol. cv. (April, 1857), 317-20, and the note and references in p. 327. See also Polybios, V. 27, 29 ; cf. Drumann, Geschichte des Verfalls, p. 23. Of the Molossian kingdom I shall have occasion to speak in my fourth Chapter. II THE GREEK CITY-COMMONWEALTHS 17 independent separate cities had run its short and glorious career. Throughout the most brilliant days of Greece, all the greatest Greek states were strictly sovereign municipalities. The political franchise of the state was co- extensive with the municipal franchise of the city. And this was equally true whether the form of government of that city was aristocratic or democratic. The difference between a Greek aristocracy and a aristo- Greek democracy was simply whether legislative power and j™*'° "l*^ eligibility to high office were extended to the whole, or confined to alike. a part, of the class of hereditary burghers. In no case did they extend beyond that class ; in no case could the freedman, the foreigner, or even the dependent ally, obtain citizenship by residence or even by birth in the land. He who was not the descendant of citizen ancestors could be enfranchised only by special decree of the sovereign Assembly. In the democracy and the oligarchy alike the City was the only political existence, the one centre of patriotism. To live at a distance so great that it was impossible to appear habitually at Assemblies held within its walls was felt to be equivalent to sentence of exile.^ The essentially civic character of a Greek state was not even affected by the occurrence of that irregular form of Monarchy to which the Greeks gave the name of l\jranny.^ Even the Tyrant is still civlo the Tyrant of the City ; however oppressive his internal rule Tyrannies, may be, he identifies himself with the military glory and out- ward prosperity of that particular city, and does not think of merging its separate being in any larger kingdom. He may conquer other cities by force of arms, but those cities are not incorporated like the annexations of modern potentates. Their inhabitants do not become the fellow-subjects of the inhabitants of the Tyrant's own city; the conquered city remains a dependency of the conquering capital. It was not till Greece had, in the " " The natural limit of a democracy, is that distance from the central point, which will but just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand."— Federalist, No. xiv. p. 71. This is equally true of all Greek commonwealths, aristocratic and democratic alilie. 2 I shall, in my iifth Chapter, have occasion to speak more at length of the Greek Tyrannies. I will here only remark that I use the word throughout in its Greek sense. The Greek ripavvos is one who holds kingly power in a state whose laws do not recognize a King. He differs from the King (^atriXeiis) in the origin of his power, rather than in the mode of its exercise. The King may rule ill ; the Tyrant may (though he seldom does) rule well ; still the authority of the King is lawful, that of the Tyrant is unlawful. In short, the word Emperor, in its modern sense, exactly translates ripavvoi ; but one cannot talk of an Emperor of Megalopolis. C 18 GHAEACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT •■hap. days of Macedonian influence, become familiarized with ex- tensive monarchies, that the old Tyranny of Dionysios gradually grew up, in the hands of Agathoklls and HierSn, into something like a Kingdom of Sicily. Everywhere, whatever might be the internal form of government in the particular city, the autonomous town-community, owning no sovereign, no feudal^ or Federal superior, beyond its own walls, was the ruling political idea of Greece in her best days, and the more advanced and civilized was the state, the more closely did it cling to that one favourite ideal of a commonwealth. Condition As in many other cases, we shall be better able to take in the of Depend- fQj,gQ j^jj(j prevalence of the rule by looking at cases which in Gree'ce. formed exceptions to it.^ The sovereign and independent city was indeed the political ideal of Greece, but there were many Grecian cities which were far from being sovereign and inde- pendent. But this was simply because the force of some stronger city stood in the way of their sovereignty and independence. There were many towns which were not independent ; but every town looked on independence as its right ; every town which was not independent deemed its loss of independence to be an injury, and was constantly looking out for opportunities to recover the right of which it felt itself deprived. The call to make all Greeks autonomous was the popular cry set up by Sparta against imperial Athens.^ But the condition of a city thus shorn of its sovereignty sets more clearly before us what the nature of the city-sovereignty was. Such a dependent city, as Mr. Grote has shown in the case of the allies of Athens, was by no means necessarily subjected to anything which we should call foreign oppression. It might, and in many cases did, retain its own laws, its own local administration, its own political constitution, oligarchic or democratic according to the strength, of parties within its own walls. It might, or it might not, be subject to a tribute to the superior State ; it might even, in some favoured cases, retain fleets and armies of its own, raised by its own government and commanded by its own officers. It Difference is clear that a city in such a condition retains a degree of local between a independence far greater than is allowed to any merely City anTa municipal body in the least centralized of European kingdoms. member of Its condition at first sight seems rather to approach to the a Federa- ^j(,2_ '■ On the relation of Dependent Alliance, see Arnold, Later Romau Common- wealth, i. 166. ^ ThuoydidSs, i. 139 et al. n DEPENDENT CITIES IN GREECE 19 purely internal sovereignty of a Swiss Canton or an American State. What it lacks of full sovereignty is exactly what they lack ; it lacks a separate being among the nations of the earth ; it cannot make war or conclude foreign alliances ; its public quarrels are decided for it by a tribunal external to itself. "Where t^en lies the difference ? It is this. The municipality in a Constitutional Monarchy, the State in a Federal Eepublic, has indeed no direct corporate voice in the general administration, but that general administration is carried on by persons or bodies in whose appointment the citizens of the municipality or of the State have a direct or indirect voice. But a dependent city in Greece had its foreign relations marked out for it by a power over which it had no control whatever. An English town, as such, has nothing to do with peace or war, or with general taxation and legislation. But then laws are made and taxes are imposed by an Assembly to which that town sends representatives ; peace and war are virtually made by Ministers who are virtually appointed by that Assembly. An American State, sovereign as it is within its own sphere, has no more corporate voice than a mere municipality in those high national concerns which are entrusted to the Federal Government.^ But then the Government to which those concerns are entrusted consists of a President and Congress in the choice of whom the citizens of that State have a voice no less than in the choice of their own local Governor and Legislature. Thus, in both cases, if national questions are not submitted to the smaller body in its corporate capacity, it is simply because, in relation to such questions, the citizens of the smaller body act directly as citizens of the larger. But in relation to this same class of questions, the citizens of a dependent Greek city had no means of acting at all. The most favoured ally of Athens, Chios, for instance, or Mityl^ng, quite as independent internally as an American State, had absolutely no voice, in any shape, in the general concerns of the Confederacy. So far were Chios and Mitylgng from themselves declaring war and peace that they had no sort of control over those who did declare war and peace. Their fleets and armies were at the absolute bidding, not of a } The Federal Senators in the United States are indeed elected by the State Legislatures, and are held specially to represent the State Sovereignties. But the State Legislatures themselves are not consulted, and the Senators, when elected, vote as individuals, just like the Eepresentatives. 20 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. President in whose election their citizens had a voice, not of a King governed by Ministers whom their citizens indirectly chose, but at the bidding of the Assembly of the City of Athens, an Assembly in which no Chian or Mitylensean had a seat. A public dispute between Methymna and Mityllne was not judged, like a dispute between New York and Ohio, by a Supreme Court nominated by a President of their own choice, but by the local tribunals of a distant city, over whose nomination they had not the slightest influence of any kind. In many respects the condition of a dependent Greek city resembled that of an English Colony. The two agree in most of those points which effectually distinguish both from the member of a Federation. Both, unlike the Confederate City or Canton, are strictly dependencies of a greater power. The Compari- Colony, like the Athenian ally, is independent internally, but its son with relations towards other nations are determined for it by a Cokinies power over which neither the Colony nor its citizens have any sort of control.^ But there is one all-important diiTerence between the British Colony and the Athenian Ally. The dis- qualifications of the colonist are purely local ; he is a British subject equally with the inhabitants of Britain ; he can come and live in England, and may become, no less than the native Englishman, elector, representative, or even Minister. The disqualifications of the Athenian ally were personal ; the Chian or Mitylensean was not an Athenian, but a foreigner ; if he transferred his residence to Athens, he lost his influence in his own city, while he acquired none in the city in which he dwelled. Partly because he personally remains an Englishman, partly because the instinct of perfect independence is not now so keenly felt as it was in old Greece, the colonist commonly acquiesces in the dependent position of his Colony. It is felt that dependence is more than counterbalanced by perfect internal freedom combined with the gratuitous protection of the mother- country. As long as the mother-country abstains from practical oppression, as long as the Colony does not become so strong as to make dependence palpably incongruous, an English Colony has really no temptation to separate. But, in a dependent Greek city, the citizens were personally in an inferior position to the citizens of the ruling state, while the city itself was deprived of a ^ See Tocqueville, Demooratie en Amirique, i. 254. ^ See Lewis, Groyernment of Dependencies, p. 155 et seqq. II DEPENDENCIES COMPARED WITH ENGLISH COLONIES 21 power to which the political instinct of the Greek mind held that it had an inherent right. The sway of Athens did not necessarily involve either actual oppression ^ or any loss of purely local freedom ; it was the loss of all share in Sovereignty in the highest sense which the Greek city deplored when it was reduced to a condition of dependent alliance. It follows therefore that a system like the Athenian Alliance or Empire always remained a system of detached units. A Greek city either remained independent, retaining its full sovereign rights, or else it became more or less dependent upon some stronger city. There was no means by which it was No means possible to fuse any large number of cities, like the members °^ ^°?'"'" 'DOI'R'tlOIl of the Athenian Alliance, into a single body with equal rights ^n^^r common to all. A Federal Union easily effects this end, but it the system effects it only by depriving each city of the most precious attri- °^ ^^^^' butes of separate sovereignty. A Constitutional Monarchy, by cities. means of the representative system, also easily effects it, though of course at a still greater sacrifice of local independence. Even under a despotism, there is not the slightest need for placing the inhabitants of a conquered, ceded, or inherited province in any worse position than the inhabitants of the original kingdom. But a Greek city had no choice but either absolute independence or a position of decided inferiority to some other city. It is clear that a city -commonwealth can incorporate only within very narrow limits. In such a commonwealth the city itself is every- thing in a way into which the inhabitants of large kingdoms can hardly enter. And the representative system, by which all the inhabitants of a large country are enabled to have a share in the government, is not likely to occur to men's minds in such a state of things. Every citizen in a Democracy, every citizen of the ruling order in an Aristocracy, deems it his inalienable right to discharge his political functions in his own person. Conse- quently incorporation cannot be carried out over an extent of 1 That there were isolated cases of opiwession on the part of individual Athenian commanders, like Paches, there is no doubt. But there was certainly no hahitual oppression on the part of the Athenian government. This has been forcibly brought out by Mr. Grote (vi. 47, and elsewhere). See also North British Review, May 1856, p. 169. Cf. Lewis, Government of Dependencies, p. 102. I have drawn my picture of a Greek dependent city from the most favoured of the Athenian allies. But the condition of different allies of Athens differed much ; and the position of a dependency of Sparta or Thebes in the next generation was far inferior to that of the least favoured subject of Athens. 22 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. territory so large as to prevent the whole ruling body from Incorpo- habitually assembling in the city. Athens indeed, in a remote ration ^^^^ unchronicled age, actually carried incorporation as far as a tax as vol- city-commonwealth could carry it. There is no record of the sibie by causes and circumstances of the change, but there is no reason- Athens, able doubt that the smaller towns of Attica, Eleusis, Marathdn, and the rest, were once independent states,^ which were after- wards incorporated with Athens, not as subjects of the ruling commonwealth, but as municipal towns whose inhabitants possessed the common Athenian franchise equally with the in the case inhabitants of the capital.^ But then Attica was not so large a of the old territory as to hinder all its free inhabitants from frequently Cities. meeting together in a capital whose position was admirably central. All Attica therefore was really incorporated with Athens. Athens became the only City, in the highest sense, in all Attica, and all the free inhabitants of Attica became her citizens. But this incorporation, which geographical position rendered possible in the case of old Attic towns, could never have been extended to all the members of the later Athenian Impossible Empire. If the jealousy of the Sovereign People could have "fth^Tt^ stooped to communicate its franchise to subjects, or even to Athenian allies, it was utterly impossible that the rights of Athenian Empire. citizens could have been exercised by the inhabitants of Rhodes or of Byzantium. Even a Federal Union, except one which admitted the representative principle, could hardly have bound together such distant members ; to unite them into a single commonwealth of the ancient type was physically impossible. 1 See North British Review, May 1856, p. 150. ^ There can be no donbt that this incorporation was the main cause of the great power and importance of Athens. As such, it is one of the great events in the history of the world. No other Greek city possessed so large an immediate territory, or so great a number of free and equal citizens. The territory of Sparta was much larger ; but then Sparta held the Lakonian towns as subjects ; their inhabitants had no voice in general politics ; whatever freedom they had was merely that of mimicipalities under a despotism. Thebes called herself the head of a Boeotian League, but the smaller Boeotian towns, as we shall see when we reach that part of her history, looked on her as a Tyrant rather than a President. A Boeotian town was practically a subject dependency of Thebes, but throughout Attica, a territory hardly smaller than Bceotia, the smaller towns were free muni- cipalities, and their inhabitants were citizens of Athens. This was a wonderful advantage, precluding all fear of internal treason or discontent. There is a dialogue in XenophSn, comparing Bceotia and Athens at length, in which the Athenians are always set against the Boeotians as a whole, not against the Thebans only. oiiKoOv olaBa, l(fn), Sri irXijte /liv ouSiv fuelovs eMv 'AByivtuoi BoiiOTun ; olda yhp, l(/>i). — Xen. Mem. iii. 5, 2. II INCORPORATION OF DEPENDENCIES 23 So in later times, wherever the system of city -commonwealths existed, we find subject cities and districts following naturally in the wake of other cities, which bear rule over them. We find Depen- the system of the Athenian Empire followed, even in cases yd.p h ivla.i.% [6Xt7apx's to the Sicilian Tyrants, but it may be doubted whether Herodotos, when speaking in his own person, ever distinctly applies the name to any Tyrant. This has been pointed out by a writer in the National Review 1862, p. 300. The Tyrannies, both in continental Greece and in the colonies, must be care- fully distinguished from the few cases of lawful Kingship which lingered on in a few outlying places, Salamis in Cj-prus for instance, long after its general abolition. ^ See the policy of Korkyra as set forth in Thucydidls, i. 32, 37. ^ This was the condition of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta during the great Peloponnesian War. Lacedsemon took the habitual lead, but matters of common interest were debated by the voices of the whole Confederacy, and each city was free to act, or not to act, as it thought good. See Thuc. 1. 125 ; v. 30 ; Grote, vi. 105. It is instructive to see how, after the temporary conclusions following the Peace of Nikias (b. o. 421 ), the different states gradually fell back into their old places and relations. Of. Xen. Hell. vii. 4, 8. * This was the condition of Chios, Mityl6n§, and the other allies of Athens which never exchanged contributions of men for contributions of money. See Grote, vi. 2. 28 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Different relation between the City and its Territory. Or they may even be without any fleet or army of their own ; they may pay tribute to some imperial city, which engages m return to defend them against all aggressors.^ Or some unhappy cities may have fallen lower still ; dependent alliance may have sunk into absolute subjection. Law and life and property may all be at the absolute command of a foreign governor, for whom even the domestic Tyrant would be a good exchange. And his yoke may be embittered rather than alleviated, when his power is supported by the intrigues of degenerate citizens who find their private advantage in the degradation of their native city. Again, as there may be every conceivable variety of relation between city and city, so we may also find, within the same narrow compass, every conceivable variety of relation between the city itself and its surrounding territory. In one district, as we have seen in the case of Attica, every free inhabitant, that is every man who is neither a slave nor a foreigner,^ enjoys the full franchise of the City, votes in its Assemblies, and is eligible to its honours. In another, the rural inhabitants may be per- sonally free, protected by the laws in all their private rights, but shut out from the political franchise, subjects in short, rather than citizens, of the sovereign commonwealth.* In the third, the City, the abode of free warrior-nobles, may be surrounded by lands tilled for them by serfs, Lakonian Helots or ThessaUan Penests, whose highest privilege is to be the slaves of the Commonwealth, and not the slaves of any individual master. But, in all these cases alike, the City is the only recognized political existence. Each city is either sovereign or deems itself wronged by being shorn of sovereignty. At a few miles from the gates of one independent city we may find another, speaking the same tongue, worshipping the same gods, sharing in the same national festivals, but living under different municipal laws, different political constitutions, with a difi'erent coinage, different ^ This was the condition of the great mass of the Athenian allies. ^ This was the condition of the extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta after the great victory of Aigospotamos (b.o. 405). On the harmosts and dekarchies, see Grote, ix. 271 et seqq. ; Isolc. Panath. 58. ^ It must be of course borne in mind that the children of a foreigner, though born in the land, still remained foreigners. This seems strange to us as applied to the question of nationality, but it is simply the rule of burghership as it was carried out in many an old English borough. ^ This is essentially the condition of the Lakonian veploUoL. They had towns, but all notion of their separate political being was so utterly lost, that their inhabitants had more in common with a rural population. ADVANTAGES OF SMALL COMMONWEALTHS 29 weights and measures, diiferent names, it may be, for the very months of the year, levying duties at its frontiers, making war, making peace, sending forth its Ambassadors under the pro- tection of the Law of Nations, and investing the bands which wage its border warfare with all the rights of the armies and the commanders of belligerent empires. Now what is the comparative gain and loss of such a political system as this ? There are great and obvious advantages, balanced by great and obvious drawbacks. Let us first look Compara- at the bright side of a system to which the nation on which *'™ S^™ the world must ever look as its first teacher owed the most t^^/ysteJ^^_ brilliant pages of that history which still remains the text-book of all political knowledge. First of all, it is clear that, in a system of city-commonwealths, Advan- the individual citizen is educated, worked up, improved, to the *^^^ °^ highest possible pitch. Every citizen in the Democracy, every common- citizen of the ruling order in the Aristocracy, is himself states- wealths. man, judge, and warrior. English readers are apt to blame such a government as the Athenian Democracy for placing power in hands unfit to use it. The truer way of putting the case would be to say that the Athenian Democracy made a greater number of citizens fit to use power than could be made fit by any other system. No mistake can be greater than to suppose Political that the popular Assembly at Athens was a mob such as gathers Elucation at some English elections, or such as the Assembly of the Roman individual Tribes undoubtedly became in its later days. It was not an Citizen, indiscriminate gathering together of every male human being to be found in the streets of Athens. Citizenship was some- thing definite ; if it was a right, it was also a privilege. The citizen of Athens was in truth placed in something of an aristocratic position ; he looked down upon the vulgar herd of slaves, freedmen, and unqualified residents, much as his own plebeian fathers had been looked down upon by the old Eupatrids in the days before KleisthenSs and Solon.^ The Athenian Assenibly was an assembly of citizens, of ordinary citizens ' This quasi-aristocratio position of the citizen necessarily follows from the nature of a civic franchise. The freedom of the city could be acquired only hy inheritance or by special grant. Biit in a great commercial and imperial city like Athens a large unqualified population naturally arose, among whom the citizens held a sort of aristocratic rank. Such an unqualified population m»y exist either in an Oligarchy or in a Democracy, and their position is legally the 30 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. without sifting or selection ; but it was an assembly of citizens among whom the political average stood higher than it ever did in any other state. Our own House of Commons, though same in either case. The difference between Oligarchy and Democracy is a difference within the citizen class. In a Democracy civil and political rights are coextensive ; in an Oligarchy political rights are confined to a portion only oi those who enjoy civil rights. The really weak point of Greek Democracy is one which I have not mentioned in the text, because I wish to make my remarks as far as possible applicable to city-commonwealths in general, whether iiristocratic or democratic. Each gives the same political education to those who exercise political rights ; the difference is that in the Democracy this education is extended to all the citizens, in the Aristocracy it is confined to a part of them. The real special weakness of pure Democracy is that it almost seems to require slavery as a necessary condition of its existence. It is hard to conceive that a large body of men, like the qualified citizens of Athens, can ever give so large a portion of their time as the Athenians did to the business of ruling and judging (fi/jx"" koI SiK&^av), without the existence of an inferior class to relieve them from at least the lowest and most menial duties of their several callings. Slavery therefore is commonly taken for granted by Greek political thinkers. In Aristotle's ideal city (Pol. vii. 10, 13) the earth is to be tilled either by slaves or by barbarian wepLoiKot. In an Aristocracy no such constant demands are made on the time of the great mass of the citizens ; in an Aristocracy therefore slavery is not theoretically necessary. It might therefore be argued that Democracy, as requiring part of the population to be in absolute bondage, was really less favourable to freedom than to Aristocracy. In the Aristocracy, it might be said, though the political rights of the ordinary citizen were narrower, it was still possible that every human being might be personally free. But the experience of Grecian history does not bear out such an inference. Slavery was no special sin of Democracy ; it was an institution common to the whole ancient world, quite irrespective of particular forms of government. And in fact, the tone of feeling, the general sentiment of freedom and equality, engendered by a democratic constitution, actually benefited those who were without the pale of citizenship or even of personal freedom. It must doubtless have been deeply galling to a wealthy fih-oi-Kos, whose ancestors had per- haps lived at Athens for several generations, to see the meanest hereditary burgher preferred to him on all occasions. It must have been more galling than it was in a city like Corinth, where strangers and citizens were alike subject to the ruling order. But Democracy really benefited both the slave and the stranger. The slave was far better off in democratic Athens than in aristocratic Sparta or Chios. (On the Chian slaves, see Thuc. viii. 40.) The author of the strange libel on the Athenian Commonwealth attributed to XeuophSn makes it a sign of the bad government of Athens that an Athenian could not venture to beat a stranger (/i^MOTs) or another man's slave ! (Xen. de Eep. Ath. i. 10.) This accusation speaks volumes as to the condition of slaves and strangers in aristocratic cities. [With the iiiromot at Athens, cf. the Natifs at Geneva ; Muller, Hist, de la Confederation Suisse (Continuation), xv. 275 sqq.] In modern times the experiment of a perfectly pure Democracy, one, that is, in which every citizen has a direct vote on all questions, has been confined to a few rural Cantons, where the demands on the citizen's time are immeasurably smaller than they must be iu a great city. The question of slavery therefore has not arisen. American slavery is, of course, a wholly different matter. On the general subject of ancient citizenship, see Arnold, Thuc, vol. iii. p. xv, (Preface. ) II POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE CITIZENS 31 a select body, does not necessarily consist of the 658 wisest men among the British people. Many of its members will Compari- always be mere average citizens, neither better nor worse ^™ '^'"^^ than many among their constituents. A town sends a wealthy jj^^ House and popular trader, an average specimen of his class. A county of Com- sends a wealthy and popular country gentleman, an average mons. specimen of his class. Very likely several of those who vote for them are much deeper political thinkers than themselves. But the average member so elected, if he really be up to the average and not below it, will derive unspeakable benefit from his political education in the House itself. He cannot fail to learn much from the mere habit of exercising power in an assembly at once free and orderly, and from the opportunity of hearing the speeches and following the guidance of those who are really fitted to be the leaders of men. This sort of advantage, this good political education, which the English constitution gives to some hundreds of average Englishmen, the Athenian constitution gave to some thousands of average Athenians. Doubtless an assembly of thousands was less orderly than an assembly of hundreds ; but it must never be thought that the Athenian Ekklesia was a mere unruly crowd, ignorant of all order and impatient of all restraint. The mode of proceeding was regulated by fixed rules just as much as the proceedings of our Parliaments. As far as we know the history of Athenian debates, breaches of order were rare, and scenes of actual violence — common enough in the Roman Forum — were absolutely unknown. It was surely no slight gain to bring so many human beings into a position habitually to hear — and that not as mere spectators, but as men with an interest and a voice in the matter — the arguments for and against a proposal brought forward by Themistokl^s and Aristeidfe, by Perikl^s and Thucydides, by Kleon and Nikias, by Demosthenes and Ph6ki6n.i It is the habitual practice of so doing which is the true gain. Popular assemblies which are brovight together only at rare intervals are incapable of wise political action, almost incapable of free and regular debate. The Parliament Contrast of Florence, for instance, was a mere tumultuous mob, which ^f^'^g^'j^g Parlia- ^ Tocqueyille, Dem. en Am. ii. 2il. "C'est en participant k la legislation ment. que I'Ani^ricain apprend i connaitre les lois ; c'est en gouvernant qu'il s'instruit des formes du gouvernemeut. " How much more truly could this be said of the Athenian. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Compari- son of the Athenian citizen and the English memher. Connexion of Athe- nian his- tory with the subject of Fede- ralism. seldom did anything except vote away its own liberties. Such a political franchise could give no political education whatever. But the Athenian citizen, by constantly hearing questions of foreign policy and domestic administration freely argued by the greatest orators that the world ever saw, received a political education which nothing else in the history of mankind has ever been found to equal.'- The ordinary Athenian citizen then must really be compared, not with the English ten-pound householder, but with the English Member of Parliament in the rank-and-file of his party. In some respects indeed the political education of the Athenian was higher than any which a private member in our Parliament can derive from his parliamentary position. The comparison is instructive in itself, and it is more closely connected with my immediate subject than might at first sight appear. When I come to the political history of the Achaian League, I shall have to compare the working of popular government, as applied to a large Confederation of cities, with its working as applied, on the one hand, to a single city like Athens, and, on the other, to a large country, whether a republic or a constitutional monarchy. I shaU then show how the principles of the Achaian constitution, no less democratic in theory than the Athenian constitution, were modified in practice by the requirements of the wholly different state of things to which they were applied. Athens, in short, is the typical City and the typical Democracy. A clear view of the Athenian constitution is absolutely necessary in order to understand, as we go on, the modifications which later Greek Federalism introduced into the old ideal of the democratic city. I therefore do not scruple, with this ulterior purpose, to enlarge somewhat more fully on Athenian political life than would be of ^ One of the few faults in M. de Tocqueville's Democracy in America is his failure to appreciate the Greek republics. Such words as the following sound strange indeed to one who Imows what Athens really was. " Quand je compare les republiques grecque et romaine a ces rupubliques d'Amerique ; les bibliotheques manusorites des premieres et leur populace grossiere aux mille journaux qui sillonnent les secondes et au peuple eclaire qui les habite," etc. (ii. 237). Fancy the people who heard and appreciated ^Eschylus, Perikles, and Aristophanes, called a "populace grossiere," because they had no newspapers to enlighten them ! And this by a writer who, in his own walk, ranks deservedly among the profoundest of political philosophers. It is some comfort that Lord iWacauky, at all events, could have set him right. See the well-known and most brilliant passage on the working of the Athenian System in his Essay on Boswell's Life of Johnsnu. II ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 33 itself necessary in a comparison between the system of separate city -commonwealths and the system of larger states. The Athenian citizen, the Achaian citizen, the English Member of Parliament, resemble each other in being members of popular bodies each invested with the most important powers in their respective countries. But the functions of the three are not exactly the same, nor is the political education received by the three exactly of the same kind. The Athenian had the highest political education of all, because he had the highest responsibility of all. The comparison between Athens and Achaia I will put off to another Chapter ; I will now rather try to show what the Athenian political education really was by comparing the powers and responsibilities of the ordinary Athenian citizen with those of an ordinary Member of our own House of Commons. There can be no doubt that an Athenian citizen who habitu- ally and conscientiously discharged his political duties was called on for a more independent exercise of judgement, for a more careful weighing of opposing arguments, than is practically required of the English private member. The functions of the Greater Athenian Assembly were in a few respects more limited,^ but, responsi- on the whole, they were much more extensive than those of the ^J \^q English House of Commons. The Assembly was more directly Athenian a governing body. Demos was, in truth, King, Minister, and ?i*'^™ ^, -r^°,. . n • T 1 Jv, -ii T than of the Parliament, all m one. In our own system the written Law Engiigij entrusts the choice of Ministers, the declaration of war, the Memher. negociation of peace, in general the government of the country as distinguished from its legislation, to the hereditary Sovereign. But the conventional Constitution adds that all these powers Position shall be exercised by the advice of Ministers who, as chosen by ^j^*!,'? j^ the Sovereign out of the party which has the majority in the jcnistry. House, may be said to be indirectly chosen by the House itself. These Ministers, a body unknown to the written Law, but the most important element in the unwritten Constitution, exercise royal power during the pleasure of the House.^ As long as they 1 Matters of Legislation, which we think so pre-eminently the business of a popular Assembly, were at Athens by no means wholly in the hands of the Ekklesia. Its powers were a good deal narrowed by the institution of the Nomo- thetes (see Grote, v. 500). On the other hand, the Assembly exercised exactly those functions of electing to offices, and declaring war and peace, any direct share in which we carefully refuse to the House of Commons. 2 With us a body which has no existence in the eye of the Law exercises the chief power in the name of the Sovereign and during the pleasure of the House D 34 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. retain the confidence of the House, they take the management of things into their own hands.^ The House asks questions ; it calls for papers ; it approves or censures after the fact ; but its vote is not directly taken beforehand on questions of peace, war, alliance, or other matters of administration. It leaves such matters to the Ministers as long as it trusts them ; if it ceases to trust them, it takes measures which practically amount to their deposi- tion. No Minister remains in office after a direct vote of censure, or even after the rejection of a Government motion which he deems of any importance. He may indeed dissolve Parliament ; that is, he appeals to the country. But if the new Parliament confirm the hostile vote of the old one, he has then no escape ; he is hopelessly driven to resignation. No Minister receives instructions from the House as to the policy which he is to carry out ; least of all, when he rises in his place in Parliament to advo- cate one policy, is he bidden by the House to go to his office and take the requisite administrative steps for carrying out another policy. Hence, under our present parliamentary system, the average member is in truth seldom called on to exercise a per- fectly independent judgement on particular questions of import- Received ance. He exercises his judgement once for all, when he decides duties of -svhether he will support or oppose the Ministry ; by that decision Member ^is subsequent votes are for the most part determined. Whether this is a high state of political morality may well be doubted ; it is enough for oiu' present purpose that it is the political morality commonly received. Matters were widely different in Different the Athenian Assembly. Every citizen who sat there exercised duties much higher functions than those of an English private member. Athenian He sat there as a member of a body which was directly, and not Citizen. indirectly, sovereign. His own share of that corporate sover- eignty it was his duty to discharge according to his own personal of Commons. We shall presently have to contrast this with the Achaian and American system by which a magistrate, chosen for a fixed time, exercises nearly the same powers in his own person. Athens differs from all these by what may be called vesting the royal authority in the House of Commons itself. 1 Tiie gradual change of political language and political habits is curious. The Sovereign no longer presides at a Cabinet Council, because the practical function of the Ministers is no longer to advise the Sovereign, but to act for themselves, subject to responsibility to Parliament. Therefore it has of late become usual to apply the name of "Government" to the body which used to be content with the humbler title of "Ministry" or "Administration." Its members are felt, subject to their parliamentary responsibility, to be the real rulers, II COMPARISON BETWEEN ATHENS AND ENGLAND 35 convictions. Athens had no King, no President, no Premier ; The As- she had curtailed the once kingly powers of her Archons till sembly a they were of no more political importance than Aldermen or ^"^t™^ Police Magistrates. She had no Cabinet, no Council of Ministers, well as a no Council of State.i The Assembly was, in modern political ^'''''^*- language, not only a Parliament but a Government. There was ™^°*' indeed a Senate, but that Senate was not a distinct or external Functions body : it was a Committee of the Assembly, appointed to put °^ *® matters in regular order for the Assembly to discuss. There ^^°°'*^ ' were Magistrates, high in dignity and authority — the ten Generals, on whom, far more than on the pageant Archons, rested the real honours and burthens of office. But those of the Magistrates were chosen by the Assembly itself for a definite Cl-enerals. time ; it was from the Assembly itself that they received those instructions which, in all modern states, whether despotic, con- stitutional, or republican, would issue from the "Government." There was nothing at Athens at all analogous to what we call Nothing " Office " and " Opposition." PerikMs, Nikias, Ph6ki6n, appeared analogous ^ in the Assembly, as Generals of the Eepublic, to propose what *° ^' « Qp! measures they thought fit for the good of the state. Their pro- position." posals, as coming at once from official men and from eloquent and honourable citizens, were doubtless always listened to with respect. But the acceptance of these proposals was by no means a matter of course; their rejection did not involve immediate resignation, nor did it even imply the rejection of their proposers at the next yearly choice of Magistrates. The Assembled People was sovereign ; as sovereign, it listened to its various counsellors and reserved the decision to itself. Perikles, Nikias, and Ph6ki6n, were listened to ; but Thucydid^s,^ Kle6n, and Demosthenes were listened to also, and their amendments, or their substantive pro- posals, had as fair a chance of being carried as those of the Generals of the commonwealth. A preference given to the pro- posal of another citizen involved no sort of censure on the official ' I cannot but think that Mr. Grote, to whom, more than to any other man, we are indebted for true views of the Athenian Democracy, has been sometimes led astray by his own English parliamentary experience. He clearly looks on Nikias and other oiBcial men as coming nearer to the English idea of a " Govern- ment, " and Kle3n and other demagogues as coming nearer to the English idea of a " Leader of Opposition," than the forms of the Athenian commonwealth allowed. I have tried to set this forth at some length in an article in the North British Review, May, 1856, p. 157. ^ I mean of course Thucydid§s son of Melesias, the rival of Perikles ; quite a different person from ThuoydidSs the historian. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cn\F. B.C. 415. Direct Di- plomatic action of the As- sembly. B.C. 343. EJfect of these powers on individual citizens. man who was thus placed in a minority ; it in no way affected his political position, or implied any diminished confidence on the part of the People. The Sovereign Assembly listened patiently to the arguments of Nikias against the Sicilian expe- dition, and then sent him, with unusual marks of confidence, to command the expedition against which he had argued. It was the Assembly which, by its direct vote, decided questions of peace and war ; it was the Assembly which gave its instructions to the Ambassadors of Athens ; and it was the Assembly which listened, in broad daylight and under the canopy of heaven, to the proposals which were made by the Ambassadors of other powers. In modern times, even a republican state has some President, Secretary, or other official person, to whom diplomatic communications are immediately addressed. The consent of a Senate may be needed for every important act, but there is some officer or other who is the immediate and responsible actor. ^ We shall see a very close approach to this system when we come to look at Greek Democracy as modified in the Federal constitution of Achaia. But in the pure Democracy of Athens there is no approach to anything of the kind. When King Philip has to communicate with the hostile republic, he does not commission a Minister to address a Minister ; he vsrites in his own name to the Senate and People of Athens.^ The royal letter is read, first in the Senate before hundreds, and then in the Assembly before thousands, of hearers, each of whom may, if he can gain the ear of the House, take a part in the debate on its contents. So, when the reading and the debate are over, it is by the sovereign vote of those thousands of hearers that the policy of the commonwealth is finally and directly decided. It is evident that the member of an Assembly invested with such powers as these had the very highest form of political education opened to him. If he did his daily duty, he formed an opinion ' By tlie American Constitution the assent of tlie Senate is needed for the treaties entered into by the President, and the power of declaring war is vested in Congress. But all diplomatic business up to these points is carried on after the forms usual with the Governments of other states. Despatches are not addressed to Congress, nor even to the President, but to a Secretary of State whose office is not mentioned in the Constitution. According to Athenian prac- tice, the letters of Earl Russell on the affair of the Trent would have been addressed, not to Mr. Seward, but to the House of Congress, and the liberation of the Southern Commissioners would have needed a vote of those bodies. " See the Speech of DSmosthen^s (or rather of Hggesippos) about Halonnesos (Oratores Attici, vol. iv. p. 82). II ATHESS THE HIGHEST TYPE OP CITY-COMMONWEALTH 37 of his own upon every question of the day, and that not blindly or rashly, but after hearing all that could be said on either side by the greatest of orators and statesmen. Of course he might blindly follow in the wake of some favourite leader — so might a Venetian Senator, so might an English Peer — but so to do was a clear forsaking of duty. The average Athenian citizen could not shelter himself under those constitutional theories by which, in the case of the average English member, blind party voting is looked upon as a piece of political duty, and an independent judgement is almost considered as a crime. The great advantage then of the system of small city- commonwealths, the system of which the Athenian Demo- cracy was the greatest and most illustrious example, was that it gave the members of the ruling body (whether the whole people or only a part of the people) such a political education as no other political system can give. Nowhere will the average of political knowledge, and indeed of general intelli- gence 1 of every kind, be so high as in a commonwealth of this sort. Doubtless to take Athens as the type is to look at the system in its most favourable aspect. The Athenian people Athens the seem to have had natural gifts beyond all other people, and the ii'g^est circumstances of their republic brought each citizen into daily J/'^^ contact with greater political affairs than could have been the system, case with the citizens of an average Greek commonwealth. At Rome, again, the vast numbers of the Assembly and the com- paratively narrow range of its functions must have effectually hindered the Comitia from ever becoming such a school of politics as the Athenian Pnyx. The Roman Tribes elected Magistrates, passed Laws, and declared war ; but they did not exercise that constant supervision over aifairs which belonged to the Athenian D^mos. The ordinary powers, in short, of a Government, as distinguished from a Parliament, were exercised by the Senate and not by the Tribes. It was not every city-commonwealth which could give its citizens such opportunities of improvement ^ General intelligence, not of course general knowledge, which must always depend upon the particular age and country in which the commonwealth is placed. The average Englishman knows far more than the average Athenian knew, because the aggregate of knowledge in the world is incomparably greater than what it was then. But the average Athenian probably knew far more in proportion to the aggregate of knowledge in his own day ; most certainly he had a general quickness, a power of appreciation and judgement, for which we should look in vain in the average Englishman. 38 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT oiiap. Oppor- tunity for the deve- lopement of genius. Intensity of patriot- ism in Small States. as were enjoyed by the citizens of Athens. But, in. estimating the tendencies of any political system, they must be estimated by their most perfect manifestations both for good and for evil. And undoubtedly even commonwealths which gave their citizens far less political education than was to be had at Athens must have given them far more than is to be had in any modern kingdom or republic. We idolize what is called the press, as the great organ of modern cultivation ; but, after all, for a man to read his newspaper is by no means so elevating a process as it is to listen with his own ears to a great statesman and to give his independent vote for or against his motion. And great statesmen moreover grow far thicker on the ground in common- wealths of this kind than they do in great kingdoms. Many a man who has a high natural capacity for statesmanship is, in a large state, necessarily confined to the narrow range of private or local affairs. Such a man may, under a system of small commonwealths, take his place in the Sovereign Assembly of his own city and at once stand forth among the leaders of men. In a word, it can hardly be doubted that the system of small commonwealths raises the individual citizen to a pitch utterly unknown elsewhere. The average citizen is placed on a far higher level, and the citizen who is above the average has far more favourable opportunities for the display of his special powers. This elevation of the character of the individual citizen is the main advantage of the system of small states. It is their one great gain, and it is an unmixed gain. It does not indeed decide the question in favour of small Commonwealths as against Federations or great Monarchies. These last have their advan- tages which may well be held to outweigh even this advantage ; but it clearly is unmixed gain as far as it goes. Less absolutely unmixed is another result of the system, which is closely connected with both its good and its bad features. A system of small commonwealths raises in each citizen a fervour and intensity of patriotism to which the natives of larger states are quite unaccustomed.^ It is impossible, even in a fairly homogeneous country, to feel the same warmth of affection for a large region ■press" in common language always means ^ It is ■worth notice that the newspapers and not books. 2 On the intensity of patriotism in small commonwealths, see Macaulay, Hist. Eug. i. 350 et seqq. INTENSE PATRIOTISM IN SMALL STATES 39 as for a single city or for a small district. An Englishman is patriotic ; a Dane, as a countryman of a smaller state, is more patriotic still; but neither England nor Denmark can awaken the same glow of patriotic zeal as the great name of Athens. ^ A man loves his birthplace, he loves his dwelling-place, he has a loyal respect for the seat of his country's government. But with the great mass of the subjects of a large kingdom these three feelings will severally attach to three different places. With an Athenian or a Florentine they all attached to the city of Athens or of Florence. In a smaller state, like Megara or Imola, the local patriotism might be yet more intense still, for the Athenian citizen might really be a native and resident, not of Athens, but of Marath6n or Eleusis. But the inhabitant of the rustic Demos was still an Athenian ; if his birthplace and dwelling-place were not within the city walls, they could hardly be far out of sight of the spear-head of Ath^nS on the Akropolis. In any case the Identifica City was far more to him than the capital of a modern state can *|°!^ °^ ''" ever be to the great bulk of its inhabitants. To adorn a capital ^^jj ^jje at the expense of a large kingdom is one of the most unjust City, freaks of modern centralization; but in adorning the city of Athens every Athenian was simply adorning his own hearth and home. Walls, temples, theatres, all were his own; there was no spot where he was a stranger, none which he viewed or trod by the sufferance of another. The single city will ever kindle a far more fervid feeling of patriotism than can be felt towards a vast region, large parts of which must always be practically strange. And this intensity of local patriotism is closely connected with all that is noblest and all that is basest in the history of city -commonwealths. Where the single city is all in all, no self-devotion is too great which her welfare demands, no deed of wrong is too black which is likely to promote her interests. The unselfish heroism of Leonidas and Decius sprang from the very same source as the massacre of M^los and the destruction of Carthage. For that there is a weak and a bad side to this system of Bad side separate city-commonwealths is as obvious as that there is a great °f ^}^^ and noble one. First of all, the greatness of such commonwealths J^^_ is seldom so enduring as that of larger states. A democratic city, common- above all, if it would preserve at once freedom at home and a wealths. high position abroad, has need of a certain high-strung fervour ^ Thuc. vii. 64 rb fij^ya, 6vo^a twv 'Adtjvujv. 40 CHAKACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Greatness of small states less permanent than that of greater ones. B.C. 508- 405. Common fallacy as to the weakness of small states. of patriotism which is not likely to endure through many genera- tions. This Mr. Grote has remarked in the case of Athens, when he compares the feeble resistance offered by the contempor- aries of Dgmosthengs to the growing power of Macedonia with the vigour displayed by their fathers in the Persian and Pelopon- nesian wars.^ A state again whose political franchise depends wholly on the hereditary burghership of a single city cannot so easily strengthen itself by fresh blood from other quarters, as can be done by a great nation. A conquest destroys a city ; it not uncommonly regenerates a nation. Of all city-commonwealths none ever had so long a day of greatness as Eome. One mam cause doubtless was because the Roman People was less of a purely civic body than any other city-commonwealth, and because no other city-commonwealth was ever so liberal of its franchise. Eome thus grew from a city into an empire ; other cities, aristo- cratic and democratic alike, have often seen their day of greatness succeeded by a long and dishonoured old age. Nothing could well be more miserable than the latter days of democratic Athens and of oligarchic Venice. During the period of Grecian history with which we shall chiefly have to deal, the once proud Democracy of Athens sinks into the most contemptible state in Greece. And surely the dregs of a close body like the Venetian patriciate afford the very lowest spectacle which political history can produce. Here then lies the real cause of the inherent weakness of these small commonwealths. Nothing can be so glorious as the life of one of them while it does live. The one century of Athenian greatness, from the expulsion of the Tyrants to the defeat of Aigospotamos, is worth millenniums of the life of Egypt or Assyria. But it is a greatness almost too glorious to last ; it carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. This kind of weakness, at all events this want of permanency, is inherent in the system itself. But another kind of weakness, vdih which the ancient commonwealths are often reproached by superficial observers, is not inherent, or rather it has no existence at all. Men who look only at the surface are tempted to despise Athens and Achaia, because of the supposed insignificance of what are called " petty states " in modern Eui-ope. There are men who, when they look at the colossal size of despotic France or Russia, are led to despise the free Confederation of Switzerland and the ' Grote, iv. 240. SUPPOSED WEAKNESS OF SMALL STATES 41 free Monarchy of Norway. How utterly contemptible then must commonwealths have been, beside which even Switzerland and Norway would seem empires of vast extent. Such a view as this involves the fallacy of being wholly physical and forgetting all the higher parts of man's nature. France and Muscovy have indeed incomparably greater physical strength than Switzerland or Norway, but the Swiss or the Norwegian is a being of a higher political order than the Frenchman or the Muscovite. And this view also involves another fallacy. It goes on a mistaken analogy between small states, when they are surrounded by greater ones of equal material civilization, and small states, when small states constituted the whole of the civilized world. There is a certain sense in which the interests of Switzerland are smaller than the interests of France, but there was no possible sense in which the interests of Athens were smaller than the interests of Persia. The small states of modern Europe exist by the- suffer- Different ance, by the mutual jealousy, possibly to some extent by the position of right feeling, of their greater neighbours.i But the small ^^tel commonwealths of old Greece were actually stronger than the contemporary empires ; they were less than those empires only in the sense in which Great Britain is less than China. The few where they free cities now left in Europe are mere exceptions and anomalies ; ^^^ merely they could not resist a determined attack on the part of one even ^'^'=^P*'°°5' of the smaller monarchies. Cracow could have been wiped out a.d. 1846, of the map of Europe at a less expenditure of force than the combined energies of three of the Great Powers. If Germany and Europe chose to look on, Denmark could doubtless annex Hamburg, and Bavaria annex Frankfort. So it must ever be when Free Cities are merely exceptions among surrounding Kingdoms, when every Kingdom maintains a standing army, when a city can be laid in ashes in a day, and when the reduc- tion of the strongest fortress has become simply a question of time. But when we discuss the merits of a system of Free Cities, we do not suppose those Free Cities to be mere exceptions to a ^ Just at this moment Federal Government in general has acquired a, certain amount of popular discredit from some of the acts of the power to which a momentary caprice has specially attached the name. It therefore cannot be out of place to point out the admirable union of dignity and modesty, the unswerving assertion of right combined with ^the absence of all unseemly bravado, which has distinguished all the acts of the Swiss Federal Government during the recent aggressions of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, both in the annexation of Savoy and in the more recent violation of Swiss territory in the Dappenthal. (February, 1862.) 42 OHARACTEEISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. and where they are the general rule. Free cities in the Middle Ages. Constant warfare among Free Cities. Force of antipathy between neighbour- ing towns. general state of things, mere relics of a political system which has passed away ; we suppose a state of things like that of old Greece, in which the independence of every city is the universal, or at least the predominant, rule of the civilized world. And even in much later times, in those centuries of the middle ages when Free Cities, though not predominant, were still numerous, a city surrounded by strong walls and defended by valiant citizens might successfully resist the resources of a great empire. Feudal levies could not be kept to constant service, and, before the invention of gunpowder, the art of attacking fortified places lagged far behind the art of defending them. A single city nowadays is weak as compared with a small kingdom, just as a small kingdom is weak as compared with a great kingdom. The fact that no state can resist a power which is physically stronger than itself proves nothing as to the merits of particular forms of government. Aristocratic Rhodes, democratic Athens, federal Achaia, and kingly Macedonia were all alike, as their several turns came round, swallowed up by the universal power of Rome. But there is a far greater evil inherent in a system of separate Free Cities, an evil which becomes only more intense as they attain a higher degree of greatness and glory. This is the constant state of war which is almost sure to be the result. When each town is perfectly independent and sovereign, acknowledging no superior upon earth, multitudes of disputes which, in a great monarchy or a Federal republic, may be decided by peaceful tribunals, can be settled by nothing but an appeal to the sword. The thousand causes which involve large neigh- bouring states in warfare all exist, and all are endowed vsdth tenfold force, in the case of independent city-commonwealths. Border disputes, commercial jealousies, wrongs done to indi- vidual citizens, the mere vague dislike which turns a neighbour into a natural enemy, all exist, and that in a form condensed and intensified by the very minuteness of the scene on which they have to act. A rival nation is, to all but the inhabitants of a narrow strip of frontier, a mere matter of hearsay ; but a rival whose dwelling-place is within sight of the city gates quickly grows into an enemy who can be seen and felt. The highest point which human hatred can reach has commonly been found in the local antipathies between neighbouring cities. The German historian of Frederick Barbarossa speaks with horror of the hate which raged between the several Italian CONSTANT WARFARE AMONG SMALL STATES 43 towns, far surpassing any feeling of national dislike between Italians and Germans. ^ In old Greece the amount of hatred between city and city seems to depend almost mathematically upon their distance from one another. Athens and Sparta are commonly rivals, often enemies. But their enmity is not in- consistent with something of international respect and courtesy. When Athens was at last overcome, Sparta at once rejected the b.c. 404. proposal to raze to the earth a city which, even when con- quered, she still acknowledged as her yoke-fellow.^ That pro- posal came from Thebes, between whom and Athens there reigned an enmity which took the form of settled deadly hostility.^ The greatest work that orator or diplomatist ever achieved* was when Demosthenes induced the two cities to b.o. 339. lay aside their differences, and to join in one common struggle for the defence of Greece against the Macedonian invader. But Examples even Athenian hatred towards Thebes was gentle compared with '" fr^^?^ the torrents of wrath which were poured forth upon unhappy ^^ ^ ^' Megara.^ So too in Boeotia itself ; just as Frederick entrusted the destruction of Milan, not to his own Germans, but to Milan's a,d. 1162. enemies of Lodi and Cremona,^ so Alexander left the fate of Thebes to the decision of his own Greek allies, and the ven- b.o. 336. geance, not of Macedonia, but of Plataia and Orchomenos, soon swept away the tyrant city from the earth. ^ A system of Free Cities therefore involves a state of warfare, and that of warfare carried on with all the bitterness of almost personal hostility. The more fervid the patriotism, the more intense the national life and vigour, the more constant and the more unrelenting will be the conflicts in which a city -commonwealth is sure to find itself engaged with its neighbours. The same causes tend also to produce a greater degree of cruelty in warfare, and a greater severity in the recognized law of war, than is found in struggles between great nations 1 See Radevic of Freising, iii. 39. Cf. National Review, No. XXIII. (January, 1861, p. 52.) ^ Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 19, 20. ' Circumstanoes led Athens and Thetes to receive help from one another in the very crisis of their several revolutions (b.o. 403 and 382) ; but when these exceptional causes had passed by, the old enmity returned. It never was stronger than during the later campaigns of BpameinSndas and during the Sacred War. * See Arnold's Rome, vol. ii. p. 331. ^ This comes out strongly in those scenes in the Aeharnians of Aristophanes, in which the Boeotian and the Megarian are severally introduced. ^ Otto Morena, ap. Muratori, vi. 1103. Sire Raul, ib. 1187. ' Arrian, i. 8. 8 ; 9. 9. 44 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Compari- son be- tween citizen soldiers and pro- fessional soldiers. A.D. 1631. A.D. 1576. B.C. 424. A.D. 1176. in civilized ages. An army of citizen soldiers is a very different tiling from an army of professional soldiers. Undoubtedly the citizen soldier never sinks to the lowest level of the professional soldier. He never attains that pitch of fiendishness which is reached when the professional soldier degenerates into the mercenary, and when the mercenary degenerates into the brigand. Old Greece was full of wars, of cruel and bloody wars, but she never knew the horrors with which France, Germany, and Belgium were familiar from the wars of Charles of Burgundy to those of Wallenstein and Tilly. Such scenes as the sack of Magdeburg and the Spanish Fury at Antwerp are all but without parallel in Grecian history, they are altogether without a parallel among the deeds of Athenian or Lacedaemonian citizens.-' But if the citizen soldier does not degenerate into the wanton brutality of the mere mercenary, yet the very feelings which elevate the spirit of his warfare serve, on the other hand, to render it far more cruel than warfare waged by a civilized army in modern times. The modern professional soldier does as he is bidj he does what is required by professional honour and professional duty ; he is patriotic, no doubt, but his patriotism would seem vague and cold to an Athenian marching to DSlion, or to a Milanese going forth to Legnano. In any case the war is none of his own making ; he is probably utterly indifferent to its abstract justice, and utterly ignorant of its actual origin. The enemy are nothing to him but something which professional duty requires him to overcome ; they never did him any personal wrong ; they never drove away his oxen,^ or carried off his wife. ' Two events alone in Grecian history at all approach what was almost the normal condition of European warfare in the sixteenth century. One occurs in the Greece of ThucydidSs, the other in the Greece of Polybios. But in the earlier instance the guilty parties were not Greeks at all, in the later they were the lowest of Greeks, the professional robbers of jEtolia. In B.C. 413 the little Breotian town of Mykalessos was fallen upon, and the inhabitants massacred, by Thracian mercenaries in the service of Athens (Thuc. vii. 29, 30). Even in the midst of the terrible Peloponnesiau war, this deed of blood raised a cry of horror throughout all Greece. The other case is the seizure of Kynaitlia by the .^tolians in B.o. 220 (Pol. iv. 18). They were admitted by treachery ; once admitted, they massacred friend and foe alike, and even put men to the torture to discover their hidden treasures. This last extremity of cruelty is unparalleled in Grecian warfare, and any Greek but an .ffitolian would have shrunk from it but it was a matter of every -day business with the Spanish soldiers of the sixteenth century. " II. A. 154. oi ykp irdnroT' i/Mas jSoOs ifXaaav, oiSi itjkv I'ttttous, oiSi TTOT iv ^6Lri ipi^dXaKi, poiTlaveipri, Kapirbv iSrjK'/icavT' . n CRUELTY OF THE WAE-LAW AMONG SMALL STATES 45 It is another matter when two armies of citizens meet together. The war is their own war ; the general is probably the statesman who proposed the expedition; his army is composed of the citizens who gave their votes in favour of his proposal. The hostile general and the hostile army are not mere machines in the hands of some unseen and distant potentate ; they are the very men who have done the wrong, and on whom the wrong has to be avenged. Defeat will at once involve the bitterest of evils, ravaged lands, plundered houses, friends and kinsfolk led away into hopeless slavery. Men in such a case fight for their own hands ; they fight, in very truth and not by a metaphor,, for all that is dear to their hearts, TTotdas, 71'cai/cas, deuiv re TraTpt^(av ^5?;, 6'^Kas re iTpoybvu)v,^ War of this sort is habitually carried on with much cruelty. A modern kingdom seeks in its warfare the mere humiliation, or at most the political subjugation, of the enemy. The Greek or Italian warrior, as we have seen, not uncommonly sought his destruction. A nation may be subdued, but it cannot well be utterly wiped out ; a single city, Milan or Thebes, can be swept away from the face of the earth. The laws of war, under these circumstances, are cruel beyond modern imagination. The life Severity of of the prisoner is not sacred unless the conqueror binds himself t^e Laws by special capitulation to preserve it. 2 To kill the men and sell the women and children of a conquered — at all events of a revolted — town was a strong, perhaps unusual, act of severity, but it was a severity which did not sin against the letter of the Greek Law of Nations, and which it was held that particular circumstances might justify. Even when the supposed rights of war were not pushed to such fearful extremes, the selling of prisoners as slaves was a matter of daily occurrence.^ In such 1 ^sch. Pers. 396. - See Thuo. i. 30 et passim. ^ The familiarity of this practice comes out strongly in an incidental notice in Polybios (v. 95). Certain ^tolians were taken prisoners hy the Achaians ; among them was one Kleonikos who had formerly been the irp6^ei/os or public friend of the Achaian State. On account of this personal claim on the regard of his captors he was not sold (5ia rb wpb^evos iirdpxc^" tUv 'Axaiw" irapavTO, /iif oiK ^irpdBri), but after a while released without ransom. The sale of the prisoners who had no such claims is assumed iis a matter of course. The same author elsewhere (ii. 58) distinctly asserts that the sale of the inhabitants of a conquered city, even when no special provocation had been given, was according to the laws of war, dWd, tovt4 ye [/lerd, t^kvuv Kal ywaiicwii TrpaBrji/ai] Kal rots iirjS^y dffeph iTTLreXeaafi^vots Karci, to'^'S toO iro\^/xou I'TTj/ceirat iradetv. 46 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. a state of things we can even understand the most fearful spectacle of all, the cold-blooded slaughter of the captive leaders at a Roman triumph. One shudders at the thought that Caius B.C. 291. Pontius was ^ — that Hannibal might have been — led in chains, scourged, and beheaded in a Eoman prison. But we should remember that Hannibal had been to every Eoman a deadly personal foe such as no hostile general has ever been to us. In our wars, the hostile sovereign, Philip or Lewis or Napoleon, has at most threatened at a distance what Hannibal had himself inflicted on the Roman at his own hearth and home. The received war-law then was one of terrible cruelty ; but the soldier was still a citizen soldier ; arms were only occasionally in his hands ; warfare was not his trade ; his heart was not hardened nor his conscience seared by a constant life of butchery and plunder. Hence, if one sort of cruelty was more rife, we find much less of another and a viler kind. We may believe that Charles the Fifth, or even his son, would have shrunk from pro- nouncing in cold blood such a judicial sentence as the Athenian Demos pronounced upon the people of Mitylen^, Melos, and Skion^.^ But then no Athenian army would ever have been guilty of the long horrors of plunder, outrage, torture, and wanton mockery which were the daily occupation of the soldiers of Bourbon and of Alva. The citizen soldier is a man, stern, revengeful, it may be even needlessly cruel, but he never utterly casts off humanity, like the mercenary soldier in his worst form. Increased Again, as the system of small commonwealths tends at once bitterness ^^g make wars more frequent and to aggravate the severity of the in small ^^^^ ^^ '^^'^> ^o i* ^^^ ^ similar result in aggravating the bitter- states, ness of internal faction. In saying this, I do not refer to any extreme or monstrous cases. The bloody seditions of Korkyra ' •* See Arnold's Rome, ii. 365. - I know of no modern parallel to these judicial massacres of a wliole people. The massacre at Limoges by the Blaclf Prince in 1371 (see Froissart, i. cap. 289, vol. i. p. 401, ed. Lyons, 1559) was the result of a vow, and was carried out by the Prince personally ; still, as being done in a stormed town, the case is not exactly the same. In much earlier times a nearer parallel is found in the execution of 4000 Saxon prisoners or rebels by Charles the Great in 782. Egin- hard, who does not scruple to blame his hero on occasion (Vit. c. 20 ; cf. Ann 792), records it without remark (Ann. 782) just as ThucydidSs (v.'ll6) does the massacre of MSlos. 3 KdpKvpa and not K4pKupa is the correct local form used on the coins of the island. It is always so written in Latin, as well as by Pausaniaa and Strabo. II BITTERNESS OF INTERNAL FACTION 47 no more represent the normal state of things in a Greek republic than the horrors of the great French Revolution represent the normal state of things in an European monarchy. Such scenes of blood as either point to some circumstances of position or national character, independent of particular forms of govern- ment. Civil conflicts have been, in all ages, far more bloody in France than in England. '^ So all Greek democracies virere not like the democracy of Korkyra ; all Greek aristocracies were not like those selfish oligarchs who took the fearful oath to be evil- minded to the people. But on the other hand all Greek demo- Athens cracies were not like the democracy of Athens ; all Greek aristo- ?°^ ^°''' cracies were not like the wise senates which bore rule at Rhodes tjemg and Chios. Athens, in its general obedience to law, in its strict cases for observance of public faith^, in its civil contests carried on, with s<>°^ ^^^ sharpness and bitterness indeed, but still within the known limits of a defined parliamentary law, stands doubtless at the very head of all Greek commonwealths. The brutal mob of Korkyra doubtless stands no less pre-eminently at the bottom of the scale. Some unusually bad elements in the national character, some monstrous provocation on the part of their former rulers, can alone account for the equally monstrous excesses of the reaction. The normal state of an ■ independent city-commonwealth doubt- Normal less lies somewhere between the peaceful debates of Athens and f^^^_°^j^_ the bloody warfare of Korkyra. It is a state of things in which monwealth something 1 The French Revolution at the close of the last century, as being the most ™ j^" t. recent and the most permanent in its results, is naturally the best known event of the kind ; but it is only one among several similar events in the history of France. The civil broils of France in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries read exactly like similar scenes in the eighteenth. In all cases we have refined and elaborate constitutional theories which in practice take the form of indiscriminate massacre. Our civil wars, again, in the seventeenth, the fifteenth, or even the thirteenth century, seem child's play beside the brutal strife of Burgundians and Armagnacs, and the long catalogue of internal warfare which may be almost said to form the civil history of France from Lewis the Eleventh to Lewis the Four- teenth. Philip of Comines, who had seen both lands with his own eyes, bears witness (M^moires, liv. iii. c. 5) to the comparative mildness of English civil warfare. Englishmen killed nobody except in fair fighting ; even in battle, as far as might be, they smote the leaders and spared the Commons. So the deeds of 1572, of 1792, of 1851, have no parallel in the worst times of English history ; Strafford and Cromwell alike, one might rather say any Englishman of any sort since the days of Stephen, would have shrunk from the crimes of Guise, or Robespierre, or Louis Napoleou Buonaparte. 2 Tofs SpKoii iiiiiiva o 3^/ios (Xen. Hell. ii. i, 43) is the witness of an enemy to the good faith of the Athenian Democracy under the most trying circum- stances. Thuo. viil. 97 ; Grote, viii. 122. 48 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. political enmity, though not reaching the fearful extremes of Korkyraian atrocity, will yet be far bitterer than it is in any modern constitutional kingdom. It will perhaps occasionally break out into deeds of open violence ; it will still more frequently lead to unjust judicial sentences, and to no less unjust legisla- tive enactments. Actual massacres will perhaps be unknown, and single judicial nlurders will not be very common ; but the general expulsion of the leaders of a defeated faction will be, if not so common as the resignation of a defeated ministry is with us, yet certainly more common than the extremer measure of impeachment has become in modern times. Doubtless the com- parison is hard to make, because we have to compare city-common- wealths of one age with kingdoms and federations of another, the Athens and Florence of a past time with the England and America of our own day. But, on the whole, the experience of ancient Greece, of mediaeval Italy, of states like Geneva down to our own time, certainly seems to show that the bitterness of political enmity is greatly heightened in these small common- wealths. In such a commonwealth men of all sorts, men of whom but few are kept in restraint by the checks of personal character and position, are brought together face to face, with the most precious interests of both sides directly depending on the result. A great addition to the fierceness of the civil struggle Local dis- can hardly fail to follow. We see that it is so among ourselves, putes more Far greater bitterness, at any rate far greater outward expres- aeneral ^° ^^°^ °^ bitterness, accompanies an election or a local controversy ones. of any kind than is ever to be seen among political leaders within the walls of Parliament. For the same reasons which make Enmities political differences in city-commonwealths more bitter, they are more per- ^Iso more apt to become hereditary, to be made a point of family Tm&n ^^ honour, at last to sink into mere watchwords of dislike without common- any rational political meaning. Even among ourselves it is not wealths. always easy to distinguish the Conservative from the Liberal or the Liberal from the Conservative ; but who can point out the real political difference between a Guelf and a Ghibelin at the end of the fifteenth century ? General We may then thus sum up the balance of gain and loss in a balance of small city-commonwealth, as compared with a greater state. A loBstn s™'^!! republic developes all the faculties of individual citizens to small the highest pitch; the average citizen of such a state is a superior states. being to the average subject of a large kingdom ; he ranks, not II BALANCE OF GAIN AND LOSS IN SMALL STATES 49 with its average subjects, but, at the very least, with its average legislators. It kindles the highest and most ennobling feelings of patriotism ; it calls forth every power and every emotion of man's nature ; it gives the fullest scope to human genius of every kind; it produces an ^schylus and a Demosthenes, a Dante and a Macchiavelli. But, on the other hand, the glory of such a state is seldom lasting ; it is tempted to constant warfare, and to warfare in some respects of a cruel kind ; it is tempted to ambition and acquisition of territory at least as constantly as a larger state ; and annexation by a city-commonwealth com- monly brings with it more evils than annexation by a kingdom. Again, civil strife is intensified, and party hatred becomes at once more bitter and more enduring. And we may add that city-commonwealths cannot really flourish save when they either have the whole field to themselves or else have a marked ad- vantage in civilization over the surrounding monarchies. The former was the case in old Greece, the latter in mediaeval Italy. In mediaeval Germany and Flanders the superiority of the cities was less marked ; their freedom therefore was less complete, and their career was less glorious. As the surrounding monarchies advance in power, as they become more settled and civilized — above all, when they take to the employment of standing armies — the city -commonwealths gradually vanish, or exist only by the contemptuous toleration of the neighbouring potentates. Be the. powers which surround them despotisms, constitutional kingdoms, or even coiisolidated republics, the tendencies of an age of large states are equally opposed to the retention of any practical independence by single unconfederated cities. I have dwelt the longer on the nature of these independent city-commonwealths, because the subject, as one remote from our own political experience, is especially liable to be misunderstood, and because a clear and full grasp of it is absolutely necessary to understand the characteristics of that old Greek Federalism which was a modification of the system of independent cities. On the system of large states with which we are all familiar I System of need not dwell at the same length. I will only point out one or ^^°^^ two of its direct political consequences, and then compare this system with that of independent cities and balance their com- parative loss and gain. And I would again remark that among large states I reckon not only great kingdoms, but all states E 50 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Definition of large irrespec- tive of their forms of govern- ment. Two im- mediate results ; smaller import- ance of the Capital ; repre- sentative character of National Assem- blies. Position of the Capital in a large State. which are too large to allow all their citizens habitually to meet in one place. And I include alike republics, constitutional monarchies, and despotisms of the modern European kind. In a modern European despotism, though the sovereign may be the sole legislator, yet there is such a thing as Law, and, in matters which do not touch the sovereign's interest, the administration may be as good as in a free state. But I exclude mere Eastern despotisms, in which Law and Government, in the true sense of those words, can hardly be said to exist at all. Two consequences immediately follow from the difference between a city-commonwealth and a large state as above defined. First, whatever be the form of government of a large state, there will be no such preponderating influence in any single city as exists under the other system. Secondly, if the state be free, whether as a republic or as a constitutional monarchy, its national assembly must assume the representative form. These two differences are direct, one might say physical, results from the increased size of the state. First then, as to the position of the capital. I assume that in the large state there will be an equal freedom or an equal bondage spread over the whole land. States like Rome, Carthage, Venice, or Bern, where a single city bears rule over a large territory, do not come within our present consideration. They are not legitimate large states, but a corrupted form of the city-commonwealth. In the large modern state there is no such overwhelming preponderance in the Capital. Indeed, the very use of the word Capital shows it. The Capital — the Hauptstadt — implies the existence of other cities,, with which it may be compared, and among which it has the pre-eminence. In a pure city-government there is strictly no Capital, because there is but one City, and that City is co-extensive with the State. In a state like Carthage or Venice, the ruling City is something more than a mere Capital ; it is absolute mistress over other cities. But the smallest European monarchy contains several cities, none of which is subject to any other, but of which one will be the Capital, the seat of Government, the official dwelling-place of the Sovereign. Still, that Capital is only the first among many equal cities ; the national life is not inseparably bound up with it; it is the seat of government, simply because the seat of government must be somewhere, because the requirements of modern politics do not allow the Sovereign and his Councillors II POSITION OF THE CAPITAL IN LAEGE STATES 51 to wander at large over the whole realm, like an old Teutonic King. The Capital will be the centre of politics, society, and literature ; its inhabitants will perhaps affect to look down upon the rest of their fellow-countrymen ; they may, especially when the Government is of a centralized kind, obtain an undue and dangerous political weight, but they will have no direct legal privileges above the rest of their fellow-subjects. The influence indirect of a Capital in a large state is almost sure to be for evil, because ^^^ violent it must be either indirect or violent. Even in the best regulated ^^ capMs states, an undue attention will often be given to the local in laige interests of the Capital, and advances from the national treasury states. will be more freely made in its behalf, than in behalf of other parts of the kingdom. But this is simply because they are more prominent and better understood, because they force themselves upon the notice of the Sovereign and the Legislature in a way in which the interests of other towns and districts cannot do. In a despotic state, where the Sovereign does what he pleases, where he is in no way controlled by the representatives of other parts of the country, money will be still more recklessly and un- justly squandered in adorning one town at the expense of a whole kingdom. The other form of the influence of a Capital is that by which we have so often seen a Parisian riot accepted as a French Revolution. A government is violently upset and another installed — it may be by the mere mob of the town, it may be by a perfidious magistrate who has a military force at his command ; in either case the people of the whole land, who have never been consulted about the matter, submit without resistance to the King, Republic, or ten-years' President thus provided for them. In the one case the influence of the Capital is indirect, in the other it is violent ; in either case it is illegiti- mate. The only legal weight of London or Paris consists in the representatives which those towns, in common with other towns, send to the common Legislature of the whole country. In a modern European kingdom, the Capital and the rest of the country are legally placed on perfectly equal terms. In a free state they are equally free ; in a despotism the yoke will not, avowedly at least, press more heavily upon one town or district than upon another. This state of things, where political rights and political wrongs are evenly spread over the whole extent of a large country, differs equally from the state of things in which the Capital bears rule over the whole land, and from that in 52 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. which the franchise of the Capital is extended over the whole land. An inhabitant of Eleusis was a citizen of Athens ; an in- habitant of Lausanne was a subject of Bern ; but an inhabitant of any English town or county is neither a citizen of London nor a subject of London ; he is a member of a great commonwealth of which the capital and his own dwelling-pl'ace are alike integral and equal portions. Necessity The second direct result from the increased largeness of ofrepre- territory is that, if the state be constitutional, its constitution institution ™iust necessarily take the representative form. The people, or in a free that portion of the people which is invested with political rights, state of Ytrill not exercise those rights in their own persons, but through arge size, gj^^ggj^ pgygons commissioned to act in their behalf. The private citizen will have no direct voice in government or legislation ; his functions will be confined to giving his vote in the election of those who have. This is the great distinction between free states of the modern type, whether kingly or republican, and the city- commonwealths of old Greece. It is the great political invention of Teutonic Europe, the one form of political life to which neither Thucydid^s, Aristotle, nor Polybios ever saw more than the faintest approach. In Greece it was hardly needed, but in Italy a representative system would have delivered Rome from the fearful choice which she had to make between anarchy and despotism. By Representative or Parliamentary Government I would not be understood as speaking only of that peculiar form of it which has grown up by the force of circumstances in our Eepresen- own country. A Cabinet Government, where the real power is tative vested in Ministers indirectly chosen by the House of Commons trovsrn- ment not — ^^^.t is, chosen by the King out of the party which has the necessarily majority in the House of Commons — ^is only one out of many Catmet forms of Representative Government. It suits us, because it is, j^gjjt like our other institutions, the growth of our own soil ; it by no means follows that it can be successfully transplanted whole into other countries, or even into our own colonies. ^ By a Repre- sentative constitution I mean any constitution in which the people, or the enfranchised portion of them, exercise their political rights, whatever be the extent of those rights, not directly, but through chosen deputies. Such a Representative ^ On this subject the eighth chapter of Earl Grey's Essay on Pai-liamentary Government (London, 1858) is well worth reading ; but of course there is another side, or rather several other sides, to the question. II NECESSITY OF REPRESENTATION IN LARGE STATES 53 constitution is consistent with the full personal action of the Sovereign within the legal limits of his powers ; it is consistent with any extent, or any limitation, of the elective franchise. I include the constitutions of mediaeval England and Spain, of modern Sweden and Norway, the constitutions of the United States and of the several States, even the old theoretical con- stitution of France in the days of the States-General. All these are strictly representative constitutions, though some of them differ widely enough from what a modern Englishman generally understands by the words Constitutional Government. A Repre- sentative constitution may be monarchic or republican, it may be aristocratic or democratic. The Representative system would be as needful in the case of a franchise vested in a large noble class scattered over the whole country, as it is in the case of a franchise vested in every adult male. But if political rights were confined to a hereditary body so small that its members could habitually meet together, say if our House of Lords possessed the whole powers of the state, the government would probably assume another form. The ruling aristocracy would almost unavoidably be led to take up their chief residence in the capital. The constitution would, in fact, become a city-aris- tocracy, like that of Bern or Venice, bearing rule over a subject district. The necessity of the Representative system in a large state is so universally accepted as the result of all European and American experience, that I need not stop to argue the point at any length. But it may be necessary to speak a few words on two or three Excep- real or apparent exceptions, in which political power is, or has been, ^j°°l*° j.^. directly exercised by the people, or the qualified part of them, sentative in large modern states. The exceptions which occur to me are : system in First, the way of electing the Kings of Poland under the old ™°^^^™ monarchy ; Secondly, the new-fangled Napoleonic fashion of and"^^ electing "Emperors," approving constitutions, annexing provinces, America, by what is called " Universal Suffrage ; " ^ Thirdly, the practical ^ The Florentine Parliaments and the Venetian Great Council are not real exceptions, as being found in the constitutions of single cities. The latter was a part of the ordinary system of government in an aristocratic state. But the Florentine Parliament, which I have already once mentioned (p. 31), may be well referred to again, as it is so strikingly analogous to the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage. The whole Florentine people, perhaps once in a generation, met together in the square and presently entrusted absolute power to some Commission, some- times to some Tyrant. 54 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Election of the Polish Nature of the Polish Nobility. (not the constitutional) aspect of the election of the President of the United States. In all these cases the people, or the qualified portion of them, takes a more direct share than usual in political action. But even in these cases the representative system, as the means of ordinary legislation and government, is not disturbed. The old Kingdom of Poland called itself at once a Kingdom and a Eepublic. In fact its constitution ingeniously united the evils of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, without the redeeming features of any of the three. The political franchise ■was vested in a nobility so numerous, and many so poor, that, while they formed a close aristocracy as regarded the rest of the people, they formed a wild democracy among themselves. Such a nobility, it need not be said, has absolutely nothing in common with the British Peerage. The Polish nobles were not so much a nobility in any common sense of the word, as a people, like the Spartans or the Ottomans, bearing rule over a subject race.^ Such a very numerous nobility differs from the electoral body of a constitutional state as a Greek aristocracy differed from a Greek timocracy. In the one case the political franchise can be obtained only by hereditary succession, and, when once obtained, it cannot be lost. In the other case, it is attached to the possession of a certain amount of property, and may be gained and lost many times by the same person, if his property, at different times of his life, rises above, or sinks below, the necessary qualification. The difference is analogous to that between the hereditary burghership of a town and a municipal franchise attached to ownership or occupation. According to all ordinary poKtical notions, the Polish nobility was a body which could not possibly meet together ; it was as much under the necessity of delegating its powers to representatives as the electoral bodies of England or America. And for most purposes it did so delegate them. The common functions of a legislature were entrusted to an elective Diet, a body which had some strange peculiarities of its own,^ which do not bear on our present subject. But, once in each reign, the whole body met to elect a King ; they met 1 I do not mean to imply that the Polish nobility was historically an aristo- cracy of conquest. Aristocracies which have grovm up gradually, like that of Venice, often become naiTower than those which really owe their origin to conquest. ^ The best known is the requirement of unanimity, which gave every member of the Diet a veto upon all its acts. See Calhoun, i. 71. He really does not seem wholly to disapprove of the practice. II NAPOLEONIC UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE 55 armed ; and, in theory at least, the assent of every elector present was required to make a valid election. It is not ■wonderful if election by such a body, like election by the Roman People in their worst days, often took the form of a pitched battle. That this mode of electing a King, or of discharging national business of any kind, was an absurd and mischievous anomaly few probably will dispute. It was in fact merely an innovation of the latest and worst days of the Polish Republic.^ And it was felt to be an evil by all wise and patriotic Poles. The constitution of 1791, by which Poland, in her last moments, tried to assimilate herself to other European nations, abolished election altogether, and instituted a hereditary monarchy. The Napoleonic Universal Suffrage, which has destroyed Napo- freedom in France and has reduced Savoy and Nizza to the same !.^°°'° , level of bondage, is simply a palpable cheat, which, had its results suffrage ; been less grave, would have been the mere laughing-stock of its delu- Europe. It is a mere device to entrap a whole people into giving ^'^^ an assent to proposals which would not be assented to by their lawful representatives. Hitherto it has been in every case a mere sham. There has been no free choice, no fair alternative between two or more proposals or between two or more candi- dates. The people have only been asked to say Yea or Nay to something which has been already established by military force. The election of a Polish King was a real election, a real choice between candidates; the pretended election of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte to the pseudo-Imperial Crown of France was no elec- tion at all. But supposing a vote of this kind ever offered a fair alternative, the system would be no less pernicious. A people cannot be fit to exercise direct political power, unless they are habitually trained to exercise it. In a great kingdom they cannot be so habitually trained. They may be perfectly fit to choose legislators ; ^ they cannot be fit to legislate themselves. Least 1 Till the extinction of tlie House of Jagello in 1572, Poland followed the common law of early European Kingdoms. There was a royal family, out of which alone Kings were chosen, but the Crown did not necessarily pass to the next in succession. The peculiarity of Polish history is that, in an age when other kingdoms had become purely hereditary, the Poles made their Crown purely elective. The practice of choosing Kings without regard to descent and by the voice of the whole nobility dates only from the election of Henry of Anjou m 2 It must be remembered that the Napoleonic " Universal Suffrage " has nothing in common with the use of the words "Universal Suffrage" in English political controversy. Nobody has ever proposed that every adult male should vote in the 56 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. of all can they be fit to legislate now and then on the most im- portant of all questions, the choice of a dynasty or a constitution. Such an occasional and, so to speak, spasmodic exercise of power must be utterly worthless. Undoubtedly a great exceptional power of this kind may well be entrusted, not to the ordinary Legislature, but to a body specially chosen for the purpose. _ In English the United States the meeting of such extraordinary Conventions and Ame- yj^jg,, certain circumstances is specially provided for both in the of°attdu^^ Federal Constitution and in the Constitutions of the several ing the States. In our own country it would doubtless be thought right same ob- j^y g^jj parties that the introduction of any great constitutional ^^° ■ change should be preceded by a Dissolution of Parliament. The election of the new Parliament in such a case would practically come to the same thing as the choice of a Convention in America. The whole body of electors would have, rightly and fairly, a special opportunity given them for considering the subject ; but the final voice of the nation would speak through its lawful representatives, and not through the mockery of "Universal Suffrage." The English and the American practice both give full scope to the popular will in a way consonant with the received principles of all modern constitutional states. The Imperial invention is simply a blind ; it is the device of a despot to deceive people by promising them something freer than freedom. Election The election of the American President is, not indeed formally, of the |j^^ practically, another exception to the rule by which, in all President modern free states, the political powers of the people are exer- praotically cised solely by their representatives. Formally, it is not such an another exception. The President is not chosen by the people at large, but by special electors chosen for the purpose.^ But as those electors exercise no real choice, as it is known before the election making of laws, but only in the choosing of lawgivers. Whether this is desirable is a separate question, quite unaffected by the results of the Napoleonic device. An impartial thinker will probably say that those, whether many or few, who are fit to use votes, ought to have votes ; that it is desirable that the whole people should be fit to use them ; but that, except 'possibly in the New England States, it would be hard to find a country where the whole people are fit to use them. See Tocqueville, Dem. en Am. ii. 120. 1 How those electors shall be chosen is left by the Federal Constitution (Art. ii. § 1, 2) to be settled by the Legislature of each State. Originally, in most of the States, the Legislature itself chose the electors ; but, in all the States, except South Carolina, this power has been gradually transferred to the people at large. There are -some good remarks on this subject in Shaffner's War in America, p. 1 87 et seqq. The Confederate Constitution (Art. ii. § 1, 2) copies the old provisions. II ELECTION OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT 57 how every candidate will vote if elected, this election of electors practically comes to much the same as a direct popular election of the President. There can be no doubt that this is one of the weak points in the American system ; it is the point in which the calculations of the illustrious men who framed the American Constitution have most signally failed.^ Still, the popular elec- tion of the President has several points of advantage over the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage. First, the mere form of electing Its dif- electors pays a certain outward homage to the representative ^^^™'!^^ system, while it is openly trampled under foot by the Napoleonic poieouic device. Secondly, the indirect mode of election, even as it is, Universal has at least this result, that the President who is elected need Suffrage, not have a numerical majority of the people in his favour. This alone is no inconsiderable check on the tyranny of mere numbers. Thirdly, regarding the election of the President as really placed in the hands of the people, still it is a very different matter from electing "Emperors" and voting the annexation of provinces. The election of a President is not an irregular, occasional business like saying " Oui " or " Non " to the perpetrator of a successful conspiracy ; it comes regularly at stated intervals, about as often as our Parliamentary elections. There is therefore no reason why the American people may not be as well trained to elect Presidents as the English people are trained to elect Members of Parliament. Still, the election of the President, as it is now practically conducted, though by no means such an evil as the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage or the election of the Polish Kings by the whole body of the nobles, is certainly a deviation from the representative principle, and is so far an anomaly in the practice of modern free states. We will then assume these two immediate results of the increased size of territory, the legal equality of all parts of the General country, and the necessity for representative institutions, if the ™7g° „f state be constitutional. Let us then pass, in imagination or in j^ge reality, through such a large state, through any kingdom, instates. short, of modern Europe. Its mere divisions, its Counties or 1 See Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 68. He remarks that "the mode of appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States, is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. Even when Tooqueville wrote, this particular evil had hardly manifested itself. Cf. Calhoun, i. 369, 385. 58 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. One such State answers to many City- Common- wealths. A.D. 1859. Extent of local di- versity in large States. Departments, may well be equal in size to the territories of several independent cities of old Greece or of medieval Italy. A glance at the map of modern Italy or modern Greece at once sets forth this difference. We look on the Kingdom of Greece as one of the pettiest states in Europe ; its weight in European politics is hardly so great as that of one of its smallest cities might have been in the days of Athens and Sparta. But a province of the Greek Kingdom is made up of what was once the domain of several Greek commonwealths. Corinth, Sikyon, PellSni, Phlious, are all found in a single department ; Orcho- menos, Mantineia, Tegea, and Megalopolis are all subordinate to the modern local capital of Tripolitza. So too the portion of Lombardy which free Italy has lately wrung from the Austrian Tyrant contains some ten or twelve cities, which once appeared as free republics, fighting for or against the Swabian Emperor. So again not a few cities, which once were free commonwealths under the suzerainty of the Empire, have been swallowed up during the six hundred years' aggression of the Kings and Tyrants of Paris against the old realms of Germany and Bur- gundy. We find then, in traversing a modern kingdom, that an extent of territory which, on the other system, would be cut up into countless independent commonwealths, is governed by a single Sovereign and is, in most cases, administered according to a single code of laws. If the state be despotic, the despot is equally master of the whole kingdom ; if the state be constitu- tional, the highest power in the land will be an assembly in which the whole kingdom is represented.^ But within these limits the amount of local freedom and of local diversity may vary infinitely. In one kingdom everything may be squared out accord- ing to the most approved modern cut-and-dried system. No man may be allowed to move hand or foot without licence from some officer of the Crown ; local liberties, local bye-laws, magistrates or public officers of any sort locally elected, may be something unknown and proscribed. In another kingdom all this may be reversed ; local and historical rights may be carefully respected ; the assemblies of towns and districts may retain extensive powers > The whole Idugdom, not necessarily all the dominions of the sovereign. Every integral part of the United Kingdom is represented in the British Parlia- ment — the disfranchisement of a Coimty would not be thought of for a moment but the Colonies and dependencies are not represented, not being parts of the kingdom. n DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MUNICIPALITY AND FEDERALISM 59 of locaj legislation ; magistrates and public oflScers may be elected by the districts which they are to govern, or, if they are ap- pointed by the Crown, they may be appointed according to a principle which gives them nothing of the character of Govern- ment functionaries.'^ These two opposing systems, of Centraliza- Opposite tion and of Local Freedom, do not at all necessarily depend upon Systems of the constitution of the central Government. Local freedom is t^^^^^^' quite possible under an absolute monarchy ; local bondage is of Local quite possible under a representative Democracy. A wise despot Freedom will humour his people by allowing them local liberties which p^n^ent of will not affect his real power, and which, by acting as a safety- the form valve, may really stave off revolution for many years. On the °^ ^^^ other hand many states nominally free have had no idea of free- e^vern- dom beyond giving each citizen that degree of influence in the ment. general Government which is implied in the possession of an electoral vote. That general Government may be one which he helps to choose, and yet he may be left, in regard to all those things which most directly concern him, as helpless a machine in the hands of an official hierarchy as if that hierarchy derived its commission from a despot. But, in any case, whether the local Difference Government be centralized or municipal, its character is wholly de- ^t^fen pendent on the general Law of the Land. Wherever there are and Fede- rights which are beyond the powers of King and Parliament, we rai rights ; have passed the bounds of strict municipality and are approaching the borderland of Federalism. ^ We might easily conceive the Municipal municipal principle carried much farther than it is in England ; "^ *^ "J^" ' An English County is an aristocratic republic ; the magistrates, though (jgjjg-„i formally appointed by Royal Commission, are practically co-extensive with the Leeisla- local aristocracy. An English borough, as regards its administration, is a repre- j„j.^_„ . sentative democracy, tempered in some degree by the indirect election of the ' Mayor and Aldermen. The borough magistrates, appointed by the Crown from among the chief inhabitants, introduce a slight aristocratic element into the judicial department. Rut neither Town-Councillors, nor Aldermen, nor County and Borough Magistrates, have the least analogy with the administrative hierarchies of foreign states. '^ England and Wales, though local bodies retain much local freedom, form a perfectly consolidated Kingdom. But the relations between England and Scot- land, where certain points are reserved under the terms of a Treaty between two independent kingdoms, malte a slight approach to the Federal idea. The rela- tions between the United Kingdom and the Colonies approach more closely to a Federal connexion, but they differ essentially from it. The Colony, as we have seen above (see p. 20), may have the same internal independence as the Canton, but it diifers in having no voice in the general concerns of the Empire. The relation therefore of the Colony to the mother- country is not a Federal but a dependent relation. See Lewis, Government of Dependencies, caps. ii. iv. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Federal rights in- dependent of it. General character- istic of States. one might conceive towns and couuties at home, no less than Colonies abroad, possessing nearly the same internal powers as a Swiss Canton or an American State. But such towns and counties would still possess their powers, not of .inherent right, but merely by positive law. Their rights, however extensive, would be delegated and not independent ; they would still remain mere municipalities, and would not become Sovereign States. That portion of sovereignty which is vested in the State or the Canton cannot, without an unconstitutional usurpation, be in any way touched by the Federal power. But the most extensive rights of a mere municipality are the mere creation of Common or Statute Law ; they may be legally altered or abolished without the consent of the municipality itself being asked. A vote of the national Legislature in a free country, a Royal Decree in a despotic country, can legally found, modify, or destroy all merely municipal institutions, just as it seems best to the sovereign power. A single Act of Parliament might at once cut down all English local rights to the level of French or Russian centraliza- tion. An Imperial Ukase might at once invest Russian towns and counties with all the rights enjoyed by those of England, or with rights more extensive still. The one measure would in no way deprive the English elector of that portion of influence over public affairs which he at present enjoys. The other measure would in no way infringe upon the sole legislative authority of the Autocrat. In any consolidated kingdom or republic, what- ever be the extent of local freedom, the variety of local law and custom, it exists purely on sufferance; it emanates from, and may be altered by, a central power external to itself. The local body is, in most cases, strictly confined to local affairs ; it has no voice, even by representation,^ in the general legislation of the kingdom ; if a local body takes any part in national affairs, its voice is purely consultative ; in most countries indeed it has not even a consultative voice, it can make its wants known to the Sovereign or the Legislature only in the form of a Humble Petition, a process equally open to every human being in the nation. The great state then, whether it be a despotism, a constitu- tional kingdom, or a consolidated republic, confines local action 1 The body holding local authority, the Town Council or the Quarter Sessions, is not represented, as such, in Parliament. The county or borough members represent the inhabitants of the county or borough, not the municipal govern- ment. Ti ADVANTAGES OF GREAT STATES 61 to purely local matters, and vests all general power in the national sovereign or the national legislature. That sovereign and that legislature may indeed derive their powers from the popular will, but in the exercise of those powers neither indi- viduals nor local bodies can have more than an indirect influence. Rights are equal throughout the whole land ; the capital has no legal privilege beyond any other city ; the constitution, where there is a constitution, is of the representative kind. From these characteristics of large states at once follows a chain of gains and losses which are the exact opposites of the gains and losses Balance of which attend on the system of city-commonwealths. ^^"^ ^'^'i First and foremost, the blessing of internal peace is at once Advan- secured to a large country. This alone is an advantage so great *^S'^J °^ that it must be a very bad central government indeed, under states. which this one gain does not outweigh every loss. A large modern kingdom will contain perhaps hundreds of cities, whose Peace districts, under the old Greek system, might continually be the secured to scene of a desolating border-warfare. All of these will, under country. the modern European system, repose safely under the protection of one common authority, which has power peaceably to decide any differences which may arise amqng them. And the same cause which hinders local quarrels, when they do arise, from growing into local wars, will also go very far to prevent local Lessening quarrels from arising at all. Towns and districts may indeed °^.g?^^J^gg often retain irrational local prejudices, and the clashing of com- mercial interests may often arouse local jealousies which are not irrational. But when, as in the best regulated modern king- doms, the inhabitants of every town and county are all citizens of a common country, when the inhabitants of one district may, without losing any civil or political rights, transfer their abode to any other, there can never be any very serious local differences between fellow-subjects of the same race and language. Even when such differences of race and language exist as may b.e found within the limits of France or of Great Britain, provincial diver- sities may now and then afford a subject for pseudo-patriotic talk, but it is in talk that they are sure to evaporate.^ Indeed, it 1 It has been gravely declared at a Welsh Eisteddfod that Her Majesty is properly Queen of Wales with the province of England annexed. However this be, the province and the kingdom have shown no tendencies towards separation for several centuries. 62 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMEKT chap. often happens that the country which fancies itself to be subject and degraded is, in very truth, a favoured district. Such a country often has its full share of the advantages of the common government, while it keeps its own local advantages to itself. When differences of race and speech assume a really serious character, it shows that they are real national diversities, and that the two countries ought to be under separate govern- ments. But mere local jealousies between town and town, between county and county, become of no political importance whatever. Towns which, in old Greece or in mediaeval Italy, would have sent armies against one another, towns which woidd either have lived in constant warfare, or the stronger of which would have reduced the weaker to dependence, have, in a large modern kingdom, hardly any disputes which require the inter- ference of the Legislature or the Law Courts. Under a good central government, which gives perfectly equal rights to all its subjects, peace and good brotherhood will reign throughout the whole realm. And a really good central government will not attempt to push union too far. It will not seek to extinguish that moderate amount of local distinction, local feeling, and local independence, which is both a moral and a political gain. The utter wiping out of local distinctions goes far to reduce the whole realm to that state of subjection to a single dominant city which, whether under a monarchy or a republic, is the worst political condition of all. Lessening The same system, again, which tends to take away all causes of the evils ^f dispute between different portions of the same nation, tends equally to diminish the horrors of external war between different nations. We have already seen that the recognized war-law between contending kingdoms is much less severe than it is between contending cities. The severity of its actual exercise between the disciplined armies of two civilized states is lessened in an almost greater proportion. But take war between great states in its worst form, take such a war as might be waged between Alva on one side, and Suwarrow on the other. Even such a war as this will inflict, in proportion to its scale, a far In Gaul matters seem to be different ; the existence of the Breton Archseo- logioal Society, wliich one would have thought was a harmless body enough, has been found inconsistent with the safety of the " Imperial " throne of Paris. 1 Scotchmen are eligible to the highest ofiBces in England, and they constantly fill them without any Englishman feeling the least jealousy. Englishmen are I suppose, equally eligible to offices in Scotland, but they hardly ever fill them. n LESSENING OF THE EVILS OF WAR 63 less amount of human misery than a really milder conflict between two rival cities. It will not recur so often; wars indeed, when begun, may last longer, but the intervals of peace will be proportionally longer still. And when war does come, it wiU be, so to speak, localized. A happily situated, especially an insular, nation may wage war after war, and spend nothing except its treasures and the blood of the soldiers actually engaged. To an Englishman war has long meant only in- creased taxation and the occasional death, what he deems the happy and glorious death, of. some friend or kinsman. It is quite another sort of thing to endure all this, and at the same time to have your lands ravaged by Archidamos or your city sacked by Charles the Bold. But there is one very important difference between the warfare of Archidamos and the warfare even of Charles the Bold. Archidamos could ravage every corner of Attica, Charles the Bold could ravage only a very small part of France. While Charles lay before Beauvais, the 1472. inhabitants of Bourdeaux might sleep, as far as Charles was con- cerned, in perfect safety and tranquillity. Even of an invaded territory it is only a very small portion which directly feels the horrors of invasion. Besides, the Great Powers have not un- commonly agreed upon the ingenious plan of sparing each other's territories altogether, and fighting out their quarrels on neutral ground. Thus, for a century or two, whenever there was a war between France and Austria, it was generally carried on by common consent on the convenient battle-ground of Flanders or Lombardy. The worst war of modern Europe, the War of the The Thirty Thirty Years, derives its peculiar horror from its having less Zf^''^ than usual the character of a war between two great nations. 1618-48. France, Sweden, and other powers, took a share in it, but it was primarily a civil war of religion. As such, it combined, in a great degree, the horrors of a war waged between small states with the scale of a war waged between great ones. The wars which we can ourselves remember, the Russian War of 1854-6 and the Lombard campaign of 1859, have been mere child's play compared with the great internal wars either of Greece or of Germany. The scale of the powers engaged of course caused a tremendous loss of life among actual combatants, but the general amount of misery inflicted on the world was trifling in proportion to what was caused either by the Peloponnesian War or by the War of Thirty Years. Cases of special cruelty 64 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Lessening of party strife. Disadvan- tage of large states. Inferior political education. Ignorance and cor- ruption of many electors. or perfidy in modern warfare have been almost wholly confined to local and civil conflicts, and those most commonly among the less civilized nations of Europe. On the whole, the substitution of large kingdoms for city- commonwealths has immeasurably softened the horrors of war.^ And as the system of large states abolishes local warfare and diminishes the severity of national warfare, so we have seen by implication that it very seriously diminishes the bitterness of political strife. These advantages form a great, indeed an over- whelming, balance of gain on the side of the large state. But it must not be forgotten that there is a reverse to this picture also. We have seen that the great advantage of the city-common- wealth is the political education which it gives, the high standard which it tends to keep up among individual citizens. This is the natural result of a franchise, like that of the city-common- wealth, which makes it at once the right and the duty of every man to exercise direct deliberation and judgement on public aiFairs. This education a city-democracy gives to all the citi- zens ; even an aristocracy or timocracy ^ at all liberally consti- tuted gives it to a large portion of them. But in a large state the only way in which the mass of the citizens can have any share in the government is by choosing their representatives in the Parliament or other National Assembly. It is plain that such a franchise as this, indirect in itself and rarely exercised, cannot supply the same sort of political teaching as a seat in the Athenian Assembly. A large number of the electors will always remain ignorant and careless of public affairs to a degree that we cannot believe that any citizen of Athens ever was. Under any conceivable electoral system, many votes will be given blindly, recklessly, and corruptly. Men who are careless about political differences, if well to do in the world and not devoid of a con- science, will not vote at all ; if they are at once poor and unprincipled, they will sell their votes. Many again who are not corrupted will be deceived ; a hustings speech has become almost a proverb for insincerity. This ignorance, carelessness, 1 See however, on the other side, an eloquent description in Sismondi, Rfeub. Ital. ii. 448. 2 In Greek political language a Timocracy (ri/ioKparia) is a government where the franchise depends on a property qualifloation, distinguished from the Demo- cracy, which is common to all citizens, and from the Aristocracy, which is in the hands of a hereditary class. n DISADVANTAGES OF GREAT STATES 65 and corruption among the electors appears to be the inherent vice of representative government on a large scale. There is probably no form of government under which bribery can be wholly prevented. It is a vice which occurs everywhere in some shape or other, but which varies its shapes infinitely. If bribery appears in a despotism or in a city-commonwealth, it commonly takes the form of bribery of the rulers ; in a repre- sentative government, it takes the form, the really worse form, of bribery of the electors. The ministers of despotic Kings, the chief citizens of aristocratic republics, have been open to bribes in all ages. The chief citizens of democracies lie equally under the same slur. At Athens we hear constant complaints of bribery ; but it is always bribery of that particular kind which is unknown among ourselves. We hear of demagogues and generals being bribed to follow this or that line of policy. The Different charge was probably in many cases unfounded, for charges of f°™^ "^ corruption are easy to bring and hard to disprove. But the Athem^ ^' fact that it was so often brought and so readily believed shows and in at least that it was felt not to be improbable. It is certain that England, any citizen who was known to be above corruption obtained, on that account, a degree of public confidence which sometimes, as in the cases of Nikias and Ph6ki6n, was above his general desert. But of bribery in -the popular courts of justice we hear very little, and of bribery in the Assembly itself we hear absolutely nothing. That Assembly doubtless passed many foolish, hasty, and passionate votes, but we may be quite sure that it never passed a corrupt vote. But we may believe that Kle6n or Hyperbolos often had his reward for the motion which he made to the People, and to which the People assented in good faith. Among ourselves the vice manifests itself in an exactly opposite shape. Kle6n was accused of receiving bribes himself, but never of bribing others. No recent English statesman has ever been suspected of receiving bribes, but few perhaps are altogether innocent of giving them. It is long indeed since any great English Minister has made a fortune by corruption of any kind. But in the last century Members of Parliament were bought with hard cash ; in the present century the representatives are no longer bribed themselves, but they do not scruple to bribe the electors. The example of Eome might possibly be quoted on the other side. Eome was a city-commonwealth, and yet, in the later and corrupt days of the republic, bribery at elections I' CHARACTEKISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. was as common at Eome as it is among ourselves. But this was evidently for the same reason which makes it common among ourselves. The Tribes were open to bribery, because they had, in those days, become little more than an electoral body ; their legislative power had long been hardly more than a shadow. There are then two forms of corruption, each the natural growth of a particular state of things, and each of which has its peculiar evils. The corruption of a single great Minister may do greater immediate harm to the state than the wholesale corruption of half the boroughs in England. But when electors generally come to look on a vote as a commodity to be sold instead of a duty to be discharged, when they look on a seat in Parliament as a favour to be paid for instead of a trust to be conferred, more damage is done to the political and moral instincts of the people than if a corrupt Minister took hostile gold to betray an army to defeat or to conduct a negociation to dishonour. These vices of ignorance and corruption in the electoral body seem to be the inherent evil of modern representative govern- These ment. There is no panacea, whether of conservative or of vices in- democratic reform, which can wholly remove them. Vote by theTys™ Ballot would probably do a good deal to lessen intimidation and tem. something to lessen corruption ; but there is no reason to think that it would entirely wipe out the stain. Nor can corruption be got rid of by limiting the franchise to some considerable property-qualification. Actual bribery may be got rid of, but not corruption in all its forms. Those whose social position sets them above being bribed with hard cash will easily find out ways of repaying themselves for their votes by appointments in the public service or by jobs at the public expense.^ And the vices of ignorance and prejudice are beyond the reach of Reform Bills. Ignorance and prejudice are the monopoly of no particular social class and of no particular political party. Eeally wise men and good citizens are to be found scattered up and down among all classes and all parties. No system has yet been found which will make them, and none but them, the sole possessors of political power. No class has any real right to despise any other class, whether above or below it in the social scale. In 1 Tooqueville (D^m. en Am. ii. 88) says that in the reign or Louis Philip the bribery of an elector was almost unknown in France. This was doubtless because the high qnalifioatiou at which the franchise was fixed engendered forms of corruption different from those which are rife in our own boroughs. II GENERAL BALANCE IN FAVOUR OF LARGE STATES 67 times of any widespread political delusion, a Papal Aggression, for instance, or a Russian War, the madness seizes upon all ranks and all parties indiscriminately. The few who still hearken to the voice of reason are a small minority made up out of all classes and all parties. Very little then is gained by mere legislative restrictions of the franchise. The vices of electoral ignorance and corruption are inherent in the system. They are the weak side of European Parliamentary Government, just as Athenian Democracy and American Federalism have also their weak sides of other kinds. But though the evil can never be overcome, much may be done to alleviate it. If well informed They may men will make it their business to diffuse sound political know- ^^ allevi- ledge among the people ; if they will deal with the people as ^ot'^Jj^Jii . men to be reasoned with, not as brutes to be chained or as fools removed, to be cajoled ; if as large a portion of the people as possible has some direct share in local matters however trifling; much may be done to raise the character of the electoral body. But it is in vain to hope that the average standard of the electoral body of a large state will ever stand so high as the average standard of the popular Assembly of a small one. We must not dream of ever seeing the every-day Englishman attain the same political and intellectual position as was held by the every-day Athenian. On the whole comparison, there can be little doubt that the Balance of balance of advantage lies in favour of the modern system of advantage large states. The small republic indeed developes its individual J,° j^™™ citizens to a pitch which in the large kingdom is utterly im- states. possible. But it so. developes them at the cost of bitter political strife within, and almost constant warfare without. It may even be doubted whether the highest form of the city-common- wealth does not require slavery as the condition of its most perfect developement. The days of glory of such a common- wealth are indeed glorious beyond comparison; but it is a glory which is too brilliant to last, and in proportion to the short splendour of its prime is too often the unutterable wretchedness of its long old age. The republics of Greece seem to have been shown to the world for a moment, like some model of glorified humanity, from which all may draw the highest of lessons, but which none can hope to reproduce in its perfection. As the literature of Greece is the ground- 68 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. work of all later literature, as the art of Greece is the ground- work of all later art, so in the great Democracy of Athens we recognize the parent state of law and justice and freedom, the wonder and the example of every later age. But it is an example which, we can no more reproduce than we can call back again the inspiration of the Homeric singer, the more than human skill of Pheidias, or the untaught and inborn wisdom of Thucydides. We can never be like them, if only because they have gone before. They all belong to that glorious vision of the world's youth which has passed away for ever. The subject of a great modern state leads a life less exciting and less brilliant, but a life no less useful, and more orderly and peaceful, than the citizen of an ancient commonwealth. But never could we have been as we are, if those ancient commonwealths had not gone before us. While human nature remains what it has been for two thousand years, so long will the eternal lessons of the great Possession for all Time,i the lessons which Periklfe has written with his life and Thucydides with his pen, the lessons expanded by the more enlarged experience of Aristotle and Polybios, the lessons which breathe a higher note of warning still as DSmosthen^s lives the champion of freedom and dies its martyr — so long mil lessons such as these never cease to speak with the same truth and the same freshness even to countless generations. The continent which gave birth to Kleisthenis and Caius Licinius and Simon of Montfort may indeed be doomed to be trampled under foot by an Empire iDased on Universal Suffrage ; but no pseudo- democratic despot, no Caesar or Dionysios ruling by the national will of half -a- million of bayonets, will ever quite bring back Europe to the state of a land of Pharaohs and Nabuchodonosors, until the History of Thucydides, the Politics of Aristotle, and the Orations of DSmosthenSs, are wholly forgotten among men. We have thus compared together the two systems of govern- ment which form, as it were, the poles of our inquiry. We have contrasted the city-commonwealth, which sacrifices every- thing else to the full developement of the individual citizen, and the great modern kingdom, which sacrifices everything else to the peace, order, and general well-being of an extensive territory. Each, if it be a really good example of its own class, ' KTijfi.a is dd. Thuc. i. 22. II FEDERALISM AN INTERMEDIATE FORM 69 attains its own object perfectly ; but each leaves much that is highly desirable unattained. May there not be a third system, intermediate between the two, borrowing something from each of them, and possessing many both of the merits and of the faults inherent in a compromise ? May there not be a system Fedebal which aims at both the obiects which are aimed at singly by Goveen- 11 o t/ t/ MJJNT EL the other two systems, a system which will probably attain system in- neither object in the perfection in which it is attained by the termediate system which aims at it singly, but which may at least claim ^et^een the merit of uniting the two in a very considerable degree 1 gmaji Such a third system, such a compromise, is to be found in that States. form of government which is the special object of our present inquiry, that namely of the Federal Republic. A Federal It com- Government does not secure peace and equal rights to its whole '™^^' . territory so perfectly as a modern Constitutional Kingdom. It an°iifferior does not develope the political life of every single citizen so degree, tlie perfectly as an ancient city- commonwealth. But it secures a special ad- far higher amount of general peace than the system of in- o{\or^ dependent cities ; it gives its average citizens a higher poKtical .systems. education than is within the reach of the average subjects of extensive monarchies. This form of government is a more delicate and artificial structure than either of the others ; its perfect form is a late growth of a very high state of political culture ; it is, even more than other forms of government, essentially the creation of circumstances, and it will even less than other forms bear thoughtlessly transplanting to soils where circumstances have not prepared the ground for it. For all these reasons there is no political system which affords a more curious political study at any time. And, at this present moment, the strength and the weakness which it is displaying before our eyes make its origin and its probable destiny the most interesting of all political problems. I have said that Federalism is essentially a compromise,^ an Federal artificial product of an advanced state of political culture. Near ^°^^™" approaches to it may be found in very early stages of society, compro- and yet it is clearly not a system which would present itself raise, at the very beginnings of political life. It is probable that both the great kingdom and the independent city existed before the system of Federations was thought of. It is quite certain that both great kingdoms and independent cities had ' See Bernard's Lectures, p. 73. 70 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. reached a high degree of splendour and of political importance before Federal Governments played any remarkable part in the only suited history of the world. Federalism is a form of government which to certain jg lively to arise only under certain peculiar circumstances/ and positions. .^^ warmest admirers could hardly wish to propagate it, irrespec- tive of circumstances, throughout the world in general. No one could wish that Athens, in the days of her glory, should have stooped to a Federal union with other Grecian cities. No one could wish to cut up our United Kingdom into a Federation, to invest English Counties with the rights of American States, or even to restore Scotland and Ireland to the quasi-Federal position which they held before their respective Unions. A Federal Union, to be of any value, must arise by the establish- ment of a closer tie between elements which were before distinct, not by the division of members which have been hitherto more closely united. All that I here claim for Federal Government — though, to be sure, no more can be claimed for any other sort of government — is that it may be looked upon as one possible form of government among others, having its own advantages and its own disadvantages, suited for some times and places and not suited for others, and which, like all other forms of government, may be good or bad, strong or weak, wise Popular or foolish, just as may happen. At this moment there is un- prejudioe reasonable prejudice abroad against Federal Government in subject. general. This is partly because we hold ourselves, and that quite justly, to have lately suffered a wrong at the hands of one particular Federal Government,^ partly because it is thought by many that the disruption of the greatest Federal Government that the world ever saw proves that no Federal Government can possibly hold together. A moment's thought will show the fallacy of any such inferences. They are exactly the sort of hasty conclusions which a knowledge of general history dispels. 1 The circumstances under -whicli a Federation is possible and desirable are discussed by M. de Tocqueville (Ddm. en Am. i. 269 et seqq) and by Mr. Mill (Rep. Gov. p. 298). It is curious to see the different aspects in which the matter is looked at by two such able writers. There is no contradiction between them, but each supplies something which is wanting in the other. 2 January, 1862. These errors are fostered by the strange habit which the newspapers have of calling the Government at Washington, "the Federal Government," as if it were the only one in the world, or as if the Government of the Confederate States were not equally a Federal Government. It would be about as reasonable to call any kingdom with which we had a dispute "fte Royal Government," and to make inferences unfavourable to monarchy. II NO CASE AGAINST {"EDERALISM IN GENERAL 71 All that these facts prove is the indisputable truth that a Federal constitution is not necessarily a perfect constitution, that the Federal form of Government enjoys no immunity from the various weaknesses and dangers which beset all forms of government. They undoubtedly prove the existence of mis- management in the conduct of the American Republic ; they probably prove that circumstances have rendered it undesirable that the whole Union should remain united by a single Federal bond. But they prove no more against Federalism in the No general abstract than the misgovernment of particular Kings and the ^^'^'^^^''^^'g occasional disruption of their kingdoms prove against Monarchy fmrn in the abstract. At this stage of my work I desire to keep recent myself as clear as possible from the tangled maze of recent ^^^6^=*° American politics. I postpone to a later stage any definite judgement on questions which have as yet hardly become matters of history. I am not now concerned to judge between North and South, to act as the accuser or the champion either of President Lincoln or of President Davis. I have to deal only with such mistaken inferences from recent events as affect the general question of Federal Government. I am not concerned to defend either Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Davis ; but I am concerned to answer any inferences which reflect on the wisdom either of Markos and Aratos or of Washington and Hamilton. The South has seceded from the North, whether rightly or wrongly I do not here pronounce. There can be no doubt that, to say the least, a plausible case can be made out on behalf of Secession on the ground of expediency.^ It is quite possible that there may not have been that degree of mutual sympathy ^ between the States without which a Federal Government cannot be successfully carried on. It is quite possible that the Union, as it stood, was too large to be properly governed as one Federal commonwealth, perhaps as one commonwealth of any kind. All these admissions would prove nothing, either against Federal Government in the abstract, or against the wisdom of 1 Mr. Spence's arguments (American Union, p. 198) to show the constitutional right o£ Secession carry no conviction to ray mind, hut his arguments on the ground of expediency deserve, to say the least, the most careful answer that the North can give them. , . . ^ t Professor Bernard's Lectures on the constitutional question seem to me to maintain a very just mean between the extreme views of Mr. Spence on the one side and Mr. Motley on the other. 2 See Mill, Representative Government, p. 298. 72 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. the founders of the particular Federal Government of the United States. Let it be granted that the continuance of the American Union was undesirable, that it was expedient and Similar just for the Southern States to separate. This proves no more disrup- jjjg^jj jg proved by similar disruptions in the case of monarchies, tlie case ^^ different ages of European history, Sicily has seceded from of Moil- Naples, Portugal has seceded from Spain, Greece has seceded archies. from Turkey, Belgium has seceded from Holland, Hungary, we all trust, is about to secede from Austria. These examples are not generally looked upon as proving the inherent weakness and absurdity of Monarchy. The secession of South Carolina and her sisters goes exactly as far and no further to prove the inherent weakness and absurdity of Federalism. What all these instances prove is merely this, that, both under Monarchies and under Federations, States are sometimes joined together which No case had better be separated. So far from the disruption proving against anything against Federalism in the abstract, it does not even prove in general, anything against the American Union as it came forth from nor against the hands of its founders. Those founders, when they legislated the on- for thirteen States on the Atlantic border, could not foresee the American enormous extension of the Eepublic from Ocean to Ocean. Nor Union. could they foresee those vast diversities of interest and feeling which have, since their time, arisen between the different sections of the original Union. The opposition between slaveholding and non- slaveholding States, between agricultural and manu- facturing States, is' an opposition which has arisen since the establishment of the Federal Constitution. Could they have foreseen all that has happened since their day, Washington and his colleagues would have been, not merely the wise but fallible men which they undoubtedly were, but unerring prophets. Testimony a character to which they laid no claim. And, after all, the of tlie Southern States have, in their very secession, paid the highest States^™ tribute that could be paid to the general principle of Federalism, to the They have seceded from one Federal Government only to set Federal up another. Their first act has been to re-enact the old Federal I86i!''^ ^' Constitution, with only such changes in detail as the experience Parallel of of seVenty years had shown to be needful.^ That Belgium, in Belgium separating from the Dutch Monarchy, still remained a kingdom, Und. ° proves far more in favour of Monarchy than its separation proves 1 See the Confederate Constitution in Ellison's Slavery and Secession (London 1861), p. 312. QUESTION OF A LARGE NON-FEDERAL REPUBLIC 73 against it. So the fact that the Southern States, in separating from the old Federal Union, forthwith set up a new Federal Union of their own, proves far more in favour of Federalism in the abstract than their separation proves against it. I abstain at present not only from entering on the details of the recent Secession, but even from entering on the details of the Federal Constitution itself. I refer to them here only to answer popular objections, to show that recent events in America prove absolutely nothing against Federalism in the abstract, and that we ought to be able to discuss the comparative merits and defects of Federalism and other forms of government as dispassionately in 1862 as we could have done in 1860. I have several times, when speaking of Federal Governments, assumed incidentally that their constitution will be republican, just as I have also sometimes assumed incidentally that the constitu- tion of a large consolidated state will be monarchical. I have done so simply because, up to this time, experience has shown that they commonly are so. There is indeed no absurdity in supposing that the government of a large country might per- manently assume the form of an Indivisible or Consolidated Republic. There is no reason in the nature of things why a A large large state, with an Assembly representing the whole nation, ^'''*^ ™*y might not intrust executive functions, not to a hereditary King „ut,iig directed by Ministers approved by the Assembly, but to an without avowedly elective Council of State or to a President chosen for ^^^'^S a a term of years. The attempts hitherto made to establish such (.jo^ a government have been so few that their failure by no means proves that some future attempt may not be successful. They have commonly been made under much less favourable circum- stances, and under much less worthy leaders, than the Federal Constitution of the United States. Some Cromwell or Buonaparte has commonly soon appeared to convert the Republic into a Tyranny. No one can mourn over the extinction of the Rump No argn- in England. The republican constitution was in no sense the ™^°' *° ^^ work of the nation ; the mockery of a representative body which f^^^ ordained it was in truth an oligarchy in no whit better than the failures in royal despotism which it succeeded or the Tyranny by which it England was followed. The last French Republic fell because of the prance. twofold madness of placing a born conspirator at the head of a free state and of entrusting a republican President with the 74 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. A Federa- tion may consist of mon- archies. Approach to kingly Federalism in the Feudal system. The theory never fully carried out, command of an enormous army. Instances like these certainly do not show that the Consolidated Republic is at all an impossible form of government for a large country. But since, as a matter of fact, all the greatest states of the -world are, and commonly have been, monarchically governed, I have, for convenience, m my comparison of the great state with the small commonwealth, assumed that the great state would be a monarchy. So, on the other hand, there is no abstract absurdity in supposing that a league of monarchies, especially constitutional monarchies, might assume the true Federal form. But, as a matter of fact, all the greatest and most perfect Federations, past and present, have always been Eepublics. I have therefore, in like manner often assumed, in contrasting Federal states with others, that the Federal state would be a Republic' The question of the possibility of a Federal Monarchy is one which it may be worth while to follow out a little further. The relation of lord and vassal between sovereign princes, if strictly carried out, would produce something very like a kingly Federa- tion.'^ The vassal prince is sovereign in his internal administra- tion, but his foreign policy must be directed by that of his suzerain. He must never wage war against him, and he must follow his standard against other enemies. But in truth this is an ideal which has never been fully carried out, and, if it were carried out, it would not produce a perfect Federal G-overnment. It has never been carried out, because the harmonious relation of lord and vassal which it supposes has never permanently existed. Sometimes a too powerful suzerain has reduced his vassals from the estate of vassals to that of subjects. Sometimes too powerful vassals have thrown off vassalage altogether, and have grown into independent sovereigns. The one process took place in France and the other in Germany. By annexing the dominions of their vassal princes, the Kings of Paris extended their territories to the sea, the Rhone, and the Pyrenees.^ In Germany the vassal princes and commonwealths gradually grew into practical independence of their nominal King the Emperor. The very name of the German Kingdom died out in popular 1 See Archdeacon Denison's Prize Essay on Federal Government (Oxford, 1829), p. 33. 2 See the Federalist, No. 17, p. 90. ' The Rhone and the Pyrenees, not the Rhine and the Alps, which have heeu reached by another process. See above, p. 24, note 2. QUESTION OF FEDERAL MONARCHIES 75 thought and popular language, i The old Germanic body is often spoken of as a Confederation, and it may fairly claim to rank among Confederations of the looser kind. But it was a Con- federation only so far as it had ceased to be a monarchy. Its modern successor, the so-called German Confederation, has but little of the true Federal character about it, and, so far as it is Federal, it is not monarchic. Some of its members are even now Republics, and it has not, like the old Empire, any acknowledged monarchic head. And, even if the feudal theory had ever been and, if harmoniously carried out, the relation of vassal principalities to carried an Imperial head would not of itself amount to the true Federal °"it'J!™''^ relation. It would rather resemble the relation of dependent duoe a true alliance in which Chios and Mitylene stood to Athens. To FeJera- produce anything like true Federalism, all national affairs should '™' be ordered in a National Assembly, an Institution which in feudal France was never attempted, and to which the Imperial Diet of Germany presented only a very feeble approach. It is indeed Scheme possible in theory that the powers of the American President, as 2f * *^'J'^ they stand, might be vested in a hereditary or elective King, and Monarchy ; that the functions of the Governors of the States, as they stand, might be vested in hereditary or elective Dukes. Such an Union would be a true Monarchic Federation. The connexion would be strictly Federal, and Kings and Dukes would be invested with reaUy higher powers than were held by a King of Poland or a Duke of Venice. But such a constitution has never existed ; it unlikely would be a political machine even more delicate and hard to *° ^''^'• work than a Federation of Republics. We may safely say that it could not last through a single generation. But kingly states have sometimes made a nearer approach to Other ap- true Federalism than anything that could practically grow out peaches of the relation of lord and vassal. We may pass by instances in Monarchy, remote ages and barbarous countries, of whose details we have no record. Such may, or may not, have been the Twelve Kings of Egypt ^ and the Five Lords of the Philistines.^ We may pass by the abortive scheme of a Confederation of Italian Princes with a.d. 1859. the Pope at their head, which was put forth by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte only to become the laughing-stock of Europe. A far ' The name however remained down to the last. The formal titles, even of Francis the Second, were " Erwahlter Romischer Kaiser, Konig in Germanien und Jerusalem. " These he laid aside, and, dissatisfied with his hereditary rank of Archduke, assumed the portentous title of ' ' Emperor of Austria. " '■' Herod, ii. c. 147. * 1 Sam. vi. 4. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. T*oor more Kingdoms under one King, A.D. 1603 1707. A.D. 1782- 1800. A.D. 1814- 1862. Spain ; The " Austrian Empire ; " Great Bri- tain and Ireland ; Sweden and Norway. nearer approach may be found in the case of the union of two or more kingdoms under one King.^ The kingdoms so joined may form one state in all their relations with other powers, while they may retain the most perfect independence in all internal matters ; they may keep their own laws, their own constitu- tions, and a distinct administration of the ordinary government. Such were England and Scotland during the century between the Union of the Crowns and the Union of the Kingdoms ; such were Great Britain and Ireland during the last eighteen years of the last century ; such have been Sweden and Norway for nearly fifty years past. But such unions have been few in number, and they have commonly been the result of accident. A Kingdom has been conquered or inherited by the King of another Kingdom; it has received the stranger as its sovereign, but it has retained its own constitution and laws. When many states have been so united, as by the Dukes of Burgundy, the Kings of Castile, and the so-called "Emperors" of Austria, had they been governed with any regard to right and justice, something like a Federal Monarchy might have been the result. But in Spain, the rights of independent kingdoms first sank into mere provincial liberties, and then were absorbed by the general despotism of the common Sovereign. Spain has risen again, not indeed as a Confederation, but as a constitutional kingdom, which lacks nothing except rulers worthy of the nation. In the case of the "Austrian Empire," long years of tyranny and faithlessness have produced a hatred of the central power which separation alone can satisfy. But, were this otherwise, it may be doubted whether a union of such utterly incongruous nations, even on the mildest and justest terms, could ever satisfy the conditions necessary for a Federa- tion of any kind. Where only two crowns have been thus united, a tendency to more perfect union has commonly arisen. This, in its best form, has taken the form of an equal fusion of the two kingdoms ; in its worst form it has degenerated into an absorption of the weaker kingdom by the stronger. In our own country, Scotland has first been united with England, and then Ireland has been united with Great Britain. Of cases where such more perfect union has not followed, the most permanent and beneficial has been the union of Sweden and Norway. That is to say, the terms of union preserved to Norway liberties which otherwise she might have lost. The union was a desirable mean ^ Mill, Representative Government, p. 303. ACTUAL APPROACHES TO FEDERAL MONARCHY 77 between mere absorption by Sweden, and an attempt at perfect independence which would probably have been fruitless. The union has worked well, through the indomitable love of freedom which reigns in the noble Norwegian nation. But it is hardly a system which a patriotic Norwegian would have hit upon as desirable for its own sake. On the whole the general tendency of history is to show that, though a Monarchic Federation is by no means theoretically impossible, yet a Republican Federation is far more likely to exist as a permanent and flourishing system. We may therefore, in the general course of our comparison, practically assume that a Federal state will be also a Republican state. When I speak of the Federal system as one intermediate between the systems of large and of small states, it may be ob- jected that the states which compose a Federation may be either large or small states, according to the definitions of large and small states which I have already given. It is undoubtedly true that Members the members of a Confederation may be either single cities or °^ ^ ^^'^''" states of a considerable size. The Achaian League was a League ^^ effli™^^ of Cities, the United States are a League of countries, many of Cities or which exceed in size the smaller kingdoms of Europe. It there- States of fore naturally follows, that in Achaia the internal governments ^bie'f ^^ of the several cities resembled those of any other Greek democracy, while the internal governments of the several American States follow the common type of modern European constitutions. That is to say, the Achaian cities had primary, the American States have representative Assemblies. It is clear that a great commonwealth, like the State of New York, is as much obliged to adopt representative institutions as England or Italy.^ But though the component parts of a Federation may be as large on the map as some European kingdoms, they are not likely to be states which really occupy the same position. This great size of ^ Switzerland exhibits an intermediate state of things. Some Cantons have primary, others have representative Assemblies. It is only in one or two of the largest Cantons that representation can have been absolutely necessary on geographical grounds. It must have been introduced elsewhere by the influence of the common type of European freedom. A Canton like Geneva, consisting of a large town with a very small surrounding territory, would have seemed the place of all others to revive a Democracy of the Athenian kind. But the constitu- tion of Geneva, though democratic, is representative ; Demos, in his purity, is to be found only in some of the small rural Cantons which contain no important town. 1 size. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Difference of scale in Europe and Ame- rica to te con- sidered. the States is peculiar to the American Union, and we must take into account the difference of scale between America and Europe. In a newly-settled continent, a country which covers as much ground as France or Spain may, in population, in everything in short except mere extent, be only on a level with a small Swiss Canton or German Duchy. The difference may be seen not only between Europe and America, but between the older and newer parts of the American Union itself. The area of Texas is between three and four times as great as the area of all the New England States ; the population of Texas, bond and free, is less than half the population of the one State of Massachusetts. ^ Though several of the States are of the size of kingdoms, it is only one or two in which it would not be perfect madness to set up as wholly independent powers. A Federal connexion with other states is just as necessary to most of them as it was to the Achaian cities, or as it now is to the Swiss Cantons. Still it undoubtedly makes a great difference in the character of a Federation, whether its members are single cities or states of such a size as to require Representative Assemblies. That is to say, while Federations, as a class, occupy a position intermediate between the two other systems, some particular Federations will approach nearer to one extreme, and others to the other. A League of the Achaian sort will share many of the merits and the defects of a system of independent city-commonwealths. A League of the American sort will share many of the merits and the defects of a system of large monarchies or republics. And yet the position of Federations as a class still remains distinct and intermediate. The position of Megalopolis and that of New York, both being sovereign in their internal affairs, and mere municipalities as regards foreign powers, have really more, of resemblance to one another, notwithstanding the difference of scale, than the position of Megalopolis has to the position of Athens and the position of New York to that of England. Though one Federation will incline more to one extreme and one to the other, it is still true that Federal Governments, as a class, occupy a middle position between the two extremes. Along with some of the defects inherent in a compromise, they have the 1 Area of Texas, 237,504 square miles, of all New England, 65,038, of Massa- chusetts, 7800. Population of Texas, 601,039, of all New England, 3,318,681, of Massachusetts, 1,231,065. I take my figures from Ellison's Slavery and Secession, p. 362. FEDERALISM AS AN INTEKMEDIATE SYSTEM advantage of a middle position in uniting, to a considerable extent, the merits of both the opposite systems.^ A Federal Government then secures peace, order, and unity General to a large territory, not so perfectly as a large kingdom does, ^'^w of but far more perfectly than can be done by a system of small as^an"^-"™ independent states. It affords to its citizens a political education termediate less perfect than is afforded to the citizens of a city-common- system. wealth, but far more perfect than is afforded to the subjects of a large kingdom. In theory indeed the Federal Government secures peace, order, and national unity just as well as the kingdom does. The Federal power supplies legal means for settling disputes between State and State, just as readily avail- able as those which a large kingdom supplies for settling disputes between district and district. The Federation is as truly sovereign in its own department as the State is in its own department. Resistance to the lawful commands of its Govern- ment is as much rebellion as resistance to the lawful commands of a monarch. An injury done by one State to another State or inter- to a citizen of another State is not a matter of international mediate wrong ; it is a mere breach of the peace, to be rectified by the ^°^j*^° "^g Federal Courts or, if need be, to be chastised by the Federal govem- army. The theory is exactly the same ; but the Government ment of of a Federation will have more difficulty in carrying the theory J^^^j^™^ into practice than the Government of a consolidated state. For Federal purposes the several States are merely municipalities or individuals, but they possess infinitely greater powers than can ever belong to municipalities or to individuals.^ If they wish to resist, the means of resistance are far easier. In the looser kind of Federation, that which works only by requisitions, disobedience to an unpleasant requisition will be a matter of course. Even where the Union is closest, the coercion, however just, of a recalcitrant State is sure to be a difficult and invidious business. The mere threat of nullification or secession by several States may weaken the action of the Federal power in a way which their constitutional opposition in the Federal Assembly could not • See Tocqueville, i. 278. L' Union est libre et heureuse comme une petite nation, glorieuse et forte comme une grande. Again, ii. 208. La forme federale que les Amerioains ont adoptee, et qui permet a I'Union de jouir de la puissance d'une grande riputlique et de la security d'une petite. " On these subjects there are many striking passages in Tocqueville. See especially, i. 241, 251, 252, 254, 256. Some of these passages have been strangely misunderstood by his English translator 80 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. do. There is therefore no doubt that a Federal Government is practically less efficient to maintain peace, order, and national unity than a consolidated Government. That it is more efficient to maintain them than a system of small independent states, which in truth does not seek to maintain them at all, needs no demonstration. Inter- In like manner it is easy to show that a Federal State will mediate afford its average citizens a degree of political education, greater position ^-^^^ ^jjgy. ^^^ obtain in a large kingdom, less than they can PolSfcal^ obtain in a city -commonwealth. Doubtless the amount of Education, developement and education which a Federal State gives to the individual citizen will mainly depend upon the size and the internal constitution of its several members. In a Confederation of Cities the several cities will approach to the character of independent city-commonwealths ; in a Confederation of large States the several States will approach to the character of large kingdoms or republics. Yet certain general tendencies will run through both classes. It is, impossible that any member of a Federation of either kind can give to the mass of its citizens such a degree of political education as may be given by a per- fectly independent democratic city. The Achaian Cities pos- sessed, some of the Swiss Cantons still possess. Democracy in its purest form, where every adult male citizen has a direct voice in the popular Assembly. But no such City or Canton can possibly give its citizens the same political education as was given to the citizens of democratic Athens.^ The very condition of the case forbids it. The mere existence of the Federal tie at once prevents the citizen of PellenS or of Schwytz from being called on to deliberate and decide on such important and in- structive questions as were laid before the citizen of Athens. It was the discussion of those high questions of imperial policy on which Perikles and Demosthenes harangued, which gave their hearers the very highest of all political teaching. But these questions, so far as any parallel to them can exist at all, are, by the Achaian and Swiss system, transferred from the Assemblies of each particular City or Canton to the Federal Assembly at Aigion or at Bern. The chief means of improvement is therefore at once placed out of the reach of the ordinary citizen of the 1 That pure Democracy is now confined to some of the most backwaj-d among the Cantons is purely accidental. The argument would apply equally if it existed at Geneva or Basel. II POLITICAL EDUCATION IN FEDERATIONS 81 Federation.! Still, the powers of the City or Canton are far more than municipal ; it is really sovereign in all purely internal matters. A share therefore in its government must afford a political education, if inferior to that of the Athenian, yet at least superior to any that can be obtained in the purely muni- cipal Assemblies of an extensive kingdom. Again, in a city or small district, the constitution may legally be representative ; the legal function of the private citizen may be, not to make laws, but only to choose law-makers. Still, in such a common- wealth, the people at large will always have a far greater insight into public affairs, and will always exercise a far greater influence over their course, than can possibly happen in a large kingdom. In a Confederation of larger States, where some members may Compari- be as large in geographical extent as some European kingdoms, ^°^ °' * the direct share of the people in the government cannot well be Kuigj^om. greater in kind than it is in a constitutional monarchy. It may be greater in amount, because more offices may depend upon popular election ; but in the State of New York, no less than in the Kingdom of Britain or of Italy, the direct influence of the people cannot go beyond the election of legislators and magis- trates. But their indirect influence will be far greater in the State than it can be in the Kingdom. Republican habits and feelings will cause appeals to the people to be far more common and far more direct than is usual in a monarchic state. Political meetings and regularly organized Conventions will be far more common and far more influential. There will not be the same wide difference as to regularity of proceeding and as to moral weight between such self-appointed bodies and the constitutional Assemblies of the country. And this indirect influence of the Compari- people will not only be greater than it can be in the constitu- son of a tional Kingdom ; it will be greater than it can be in the consoli- ^ consoli- dated Republic. It will doubtless be greater in the consolidated dated Ee- Republic than it can be in the Kingdom ; but it may be doubted public, whether in a consolidated Republic it will be at all more en- lightened or useful than it can be in a Kingdom. In a large Republic, say France in its short republican day, the danger is that the people will gain increased influence without increased means of improvement. The institutions of a smaller common ^ The Acliaian Assembly was in theory a Primary Assembly, but it had practi- cally much more of the character of a Representative one. This will be discussed at length in Chapter V. G 82 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. wealth, while they give the people the increased influence, give them the increased means of improvement along with it. No means of improvement, save the unattainable standard of the Athenian Assembly, is equal to that afforded by a good system Self- of local Self-Grovernment.i Now of all systems the Federal Govern- Republic is the most favourable to local Self-Government ; the Meral Consolidated Eepublic would seem to be less favourable to it States. than the Constitutional Monarchy. In such a Eepublic, the one Sovereign Assembly, the true and sole representative of the nation, will, in its natural love of power, be far from favourably inclined towards any authority which does not directly proceed from itself, towards assemblies or magistrates over which it has only an indirect control. The Parliament of a Monarchy, whose sphere is limited by its very nature, is not likely to have the same jealousy of local rights as the omnipotent National Assembly of a Eepublic. And both a Federal Congress and a Sta.te Legislature may be expected to have less jealousy still. Both Assemblies are accustomed to limitations of various kinds ; the Federal Congress indeed is limited in a way which prevents it from touching local rights at all. And the State Legislature, which might toucb them, is itself accustomed to limitations of one kind at the hands of the Federal body, and will therefore be more inclined to tolerate limitations of another kind at the h*nds of local bodies. The very model of the Federal Govern- ment, the perfect liberty retained by each State within its own walk, will naturally suggest the retention of a large amount of municipal liberty by the smaller divisions of which the State itself is composed. In the New England States, where the true Federal model is best carried out, local Self-Government seems to have reached its fullest developement.^ The Township, the County, the State, the Union, are wheels within wheels, govern- ments within governments, each lower office preparing and edu- cating for the office above it, from the Select-Man of the Township to the President of the United States. It is clear that no system, short of the Athenian Democracy, can give the mass of the people a political education at all comparable to this. It may indeed be that even the general diffusion of political intelligence is not ^ Tocqueville, ii. 208. Les institutions communales qui, moderant le despo- tisme de la majoritii, douuent en meme temps au peuple le goiit de la liberte et I'art d'etre libre. ^ See Tocqueville, i. p. 103 et seqq. SELF-GOVERNMENT IN FEDERATIONS 83 an unmixed good ; it is possible that where everybody is a statesman, nobody will be a great statesman ; it is possible that the constant occupation of the mind on political subjects may tend to diminish some qualities, even some political qualities, which may be no lefes practically useful than political intelligence itself. The English people are certainly not remarkable for a high average of political intelligence ; but they often display an amount of political good sense, of rational confidence in well- chosen leaders, which we might look for in vain among the busier spirits of America. But I believe that the faults, which, among many virtues,, have disfigured the political working of the United States are owing to the peculiar circumstances of that llepublic, and are not inherent results either of Democratic Grovernment or of Federal Government. For the discussion of these points I trust to find a more fitting place in a later stage of my history. It is enough now to refer to the counter- examples of Athens, Achaia, Holland, and Switzerland. My present position simply is that, as the tendency of a Federal State is to give each individual citizen ^ greater political powers and greater political responsibility, so it also gives him the opportunity of submitting himself to a more thoroughly edu- cating and improving process than lies within the reach of the ordinary subject of a great monarchy. But all that Achaia or Switzerland or America can give is utterly inferior to that politi- cal training, which the constant habit of ruling and judging, of hearing the greatest affairs discussed by the greatest men, offered to one and all of the twenty thousand citizens of Athens. Such then are the advantages and disadvantages which seem Gircum- naturally to belong to Federal Governments as such. But it stances must be remembered that, of all political systems in the world, wMch a the Federal Republic is the last which it would be prudent in its Federal admirers to preach up as the one political system to be adopted F^'^V/ in all times and places. It is a system eminently suited for some circumstances, eminently unsuited for others. Federalism is in its place whenever it appears in the form of closer Union. Europeans, accustomed to a system of large consolidated states, are apt to look upon a Federal system as a system of disunion, and therefore a system of weakness. To a Greek of the third century B.C., to an American in 1787, it presented itself as a ' In an aristocratic Federation this must of course be understood of those citizens only who are invested with the highest franchise. 84 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. system of union and therefore of strength. The alternative was not closer union, but wider separation. A Kingdom of Pelo- ponnisos or of America was an absurdity too great to be thought of. A single Consolidated Republic was almost equally out of the question. The real question was, ShaU these Cities, these States, remain utterly isolated, perhaps hostile to one another, at most united by an inefficient and precarious alliance ? — or shall they, while retaining full internal independence, be fused into one nation as regards all dealings with other powers? Looked at in this light, the Federal system is emphatically a system of union, and of that strength which follows upon union. The Federal connexion is in its place wherever the several members to be united are fitted for that species of union and for no other. It requires a sufiicient degree of community in origin or feeling or interest to allow the several members to work together up to a certain point. It requires that there should not be that perfect degree of community, or rather identity, which allows the several members to be fused together for all purposes. Where there is no community at all. Federalism is inappropriate ; the Cities or States had better remain wholly independent, and take their chance of the advantages and disadvantages of the system of small commonwealths. Where community rises into identity. Federalism is equally inappropriate ; the Cities or States had better sink into mere Counties of a Kingdom or Consolidated Republic, and take their chance of the advantages and disad- vantages of the system of large states. But in the intermediate set of circumstances, the circumstances of Peloponnesos struggling against Macedonia, of Switzerland struggling against Austria, of the Netherlands struggling against Spain, of the American colonies struggling against England, Federalism is the true solvent. It gives as much of union as the members need and not more than they need. At the present moment, by the confession of both sides, the Federal tie is the appropriate one to bind together New York and Massachusetts, South Carolina and Georgia. The only question is whether the requisite degree of community of interests, feelings, and habits exists between New York and Massachusetts on the one hand and South Carolina and Georgia on the other. If it does not, the interests of the world will be better promoted by the existence of two Federations instead of one. Even should a third Federation arise in the remoter West, the principle of Federalism will remain untouched, as long as the II GENERAL RESULTS OF MODERN FEDERALISM 85 Federal tie, and nothing tighter or looser, is applied to those States whose degree of fraternity with one another makes the Federal relation the appropriate degree of connexion. Wherever either closer union or more entire separation is desirable, Feder- alism is out of place. It is out of place if it attempts either to break asunder what is already more closely united,^ or to unite what is wholly incapable of union. Its mission is to unite to a certain extent what is capable of a certain amount of union and no more. It is an intermediate point between two extremes, capable either of being despised as a compromise or of being extolled as the golden mean. My object, at this particular stage of my argument, is, more General than anything else, to answer certain popular fallacies with ^^^ regard to my subject. I will therefore slightly forestall some -peie- things which are more appropriate to a later stage, and will ask raiism. what Federalism, applied in its proper place, has really done, and is still doing, before our eyes. What have been its real results in America ? I do not ask what have been the results of American institutions generally ; that is an inquiry which I post- pone altogether. I do not ask what has been the result either of a democratic state of society or of a democratic form of government. I ask, What has been the result of the Federal system, as such, in the United States ? I ask again, What has been its result in a land nearer to us though less closely con- nected ? What has a Federal Union done, or failed to do, for Switzerland, and, through Switzerland, for Europe ? No one who really understands the position of the United States at the time when their Federal Constitution was formed Results will doubt that the establishment of a Federal system '«^as^^^ J.^^^^ absolutely the only course open to the founders of the Republic, union. Thirteen independent, and possibly hostile, commonwealths hardly formed a desirable alternative. A consolidated State of thirteen counties was a notion utterly chimerical. The reasons which may now make two or three Confederations more desirable than one had not then shown themselves. Washington and his 1 I mean of course countries really united like England and France. Where the tie is merely artificial or violent, as in the lands unequally yoked together under Austrian or Turkish tyranny, Federalism may (or may not) be the proper relation for the different states on acquiring freedom.' The decaying Ottoman . Empire certainly afi'ords a most tempting field for the experiment of some form or other of monarchic Federation. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Its com- parative perma- nency as compared with France. Evils ■which the Federal Union has hindered. coadjutors did what wise men would do in the circumstances in which they found themselves. Like Sol6n, they established, not the best of all possible constitutions, but the constitution which was the best possible in that particular time and place. And what has been the result of their work ? Their constitution has at least outlived countless constitutions both in Europe and in America. When the American constitution was drawn up, France was still under the absolute and undisputed sway of a Most Christian King. The American Union has been contem- porary with a Constitutional King of the French, a Convention, a Directory, a Consulate for a term, a Consulate for life, an Emperor of a Republic, an Emperor of an Empire,^ a Constitu- tional King of France, an Emperor again, a Constitutional Eng of France again, a King of the French, a Provisional Government, a Dictator, a President for four years, a despotic President for ten years, an Emperor for what period no one can foretell. The constitution-making of Philadelphia has been at least more per- manent than the constitution-making of Paris. At all events, the American Union has actually secured, for what is really a long period of time, a greater amount of combined peace and freedom than was ever before enjoyed by so large a portion of the earth's surface. There have been, and still are, vaster despotic Empires, but never before has so large an inhabited territory remained for. more than seventy years in the enjoyment at once of internal freedom and of exemption from the scourge of internal war. Now this is the direct result of the Federal System. Either entire independence or closer union would have brought with it evils which the Federal relation has prevented. Had the thirteen States remained wholly independent common- wealths, had new States, equally independent, grown up to the West of them, we cannot doubt that the American continent would, before this time, have become the theatre of constant wars between so many independent and rival powers. Had the States formed a single Monarchy or Consolidated Republic, some attempt would long ago have been made to force upon the whole country one uniform law, either allowing or forbidding Slavery. Who can doubt that a Civil War, even more fearful than the present one, would have been the immediate consequence ? The 1 The early Imperial coins of the first Buonaparte bear on the reverse the legend " Eepublique FraU9aise," which in the later ones is exchanged for " Empire Fran9ais." ALLEGED WEAKNESS OF THE FEDERAL TIE 87 Federal Union has at least staved off either evil for no incon- siderable term of years. It has staved it off for a period as long as the greatest glory of Athens, for a period not far short of half the duration of the truest glory of Eome.i There have been bitter dissensions and bitter hatreds, violent words and violent actions, there have been nullifications and threats of secession and attempts at local insurrection, but, till this present outbreak, there has been nothing really deserving the name of Civil War. The Federal system has at least saved that vast continent for nearly three generations from the mutual slaughter of men of the same race and speech, from the sight of ravaged provinces and of cities taken by storm. During all these years, the amount of union between the several States, the amount of independence retained by each State, has been found to be exactly that amount which answered the required purpose. If the system has broken down at last, we may be sure that any other system would have broken down much sooner. And, after all, it has only broken down vBry partially. One Federation has been divided into two, just as one Kingdom has often been divided into two ; but neither of the powers thus formed has thought of setting up anything but a Federal system as the form of its own internal constitution. It is often said that the Disruption of the United States at Alleged once puts Federalism out of court by proving the inherent weak- weakness ness of the Federal tie. To make a general political inference Federal from a single example in history is not a very philosophical way Tie. of reasoning. The alleged weakness of the Federal tie is more- over, in a certain sense, a truism. The Federal tie is in its own nature weaker than the tie which unites the geographical divisions of a perfectly consolidated state. But what Federalism ought really to be compared with is not perfect union, but the com- plete separation which has commonly been its only alternative. I freely admit, in a certain sense, the weakness of the Federal tie. True in a But the real question is not whether the tie is weak or strong, sense, but but whether there are not certain circumstances in which a weak "riiy'infu'- tie is better either than a strong tie or than no tie at all. The rious. Federal tie is weak because it is artificial. It is hardly possible ^ From the Declaration of Independence in 1776 to the Secession of 1861 is 85 years. From the battle of Marath6n (B.C. 490) to the conquest of Athens by Lysander (b.c. 404) is 86. The period of Roman Histoiy between the settlement of the quarrels of the Orders (B.C. c. 337) and the beginning of the later struggles under the Gracchi (B.C. 133) is about 200 years. CHARACTEKISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. Circum- stances under ■which a Federal Union may be lasting. Circum- stances under which it may be useful as a Transi- tional state. Cases for Consolida- tion. Cases for Separa- tion. that a man can feel the same love for an ingenious political creation as he may feel either for a single great nation or for a single city-commonwealth. The Achaian League or the American Union can hardly call forth either that feeling of hereditary loyalty which attaches to Kings descended from Alfred or Saint Lewis, or that burning patriotism which the Athenian or the Florentine felt for the City in which his whole political and personal being found its home. A Federal IJnion, in short, must depend for its permanence, not on the sentiment but on the reason of its citizens. If circumstances remain as they were at the time of its formation, if the particular degree of union which it secures is found to be practically better than either closer union or more complete independence, a Federal Government may well be as permanent as any other. If circumstances change, if it be found that either consolidation or separation is desirable) then the Federal Union, essentially a compromise, may be found to have worked well as a system of transition. Let us suppose that the members of a Federal Union, by long connexion and familiarity, by the habit of united action for many import- ant purposes, have at last formed the desire for a still more complete union. To turn a Federation into a Consolidated state will be found at least as easy as to unite a group of isolated atoms into a Federation. The several States have already dele- gated a large portion of their rights to a common Grovernment of their own choosing ; all that is needed is to go a step further, and to invest that common Government with rights more ex- tensive still. Let us take the other alternative. Let us suppose that the union of a number of weak states has given to each a power and prosperity which it never could have obtained alone ; that, under the wing of the central power, its childhood has grown up into maturity, and its weakness has developed into strength. The several States may feel that they are able to go alone, that the Union, which once strengthened, now only restrains them. In such a case the impulse towards complete indepen- dence would probably be irresistible. Such a separation would in a certain sense prove the weakness of the Federal tie ; in another sense it would prove that there was strength in its very weakness. Or let us take the case which has actually happened. Let us not suppose a general disruption, a dissolution of the whole Union into independent atoms ; let us suppose that, through circumstances unforeseen when the League was founded RIGHT AND WRONG OF SECESSION certain parts of the Union have ceased to have that community of feeling and interest with certain other parts which it is essen- tial that the members of a Federal body should have with each other. Here too the weakness of the Federal tie may be said to come in. In either of these cases, the idea of secession ^vill pre- sent itself more readily, and the idea can be more easily carried out, than can happen when one portion of a consolidated state feels itself aggrieved by the common Government. When- ever the tendency in a Federation runs towards separation, the Easiuess oi tendency will be almost irresistible. The amount of political inde- separation pendence retained by the several States is so great that it may both ueeded. lead them to aspire to, and actually make them capable of, an independence still more complete. Each citizen will always enter- tain a warmer and more immediate patriotic feeling for his own State than he entertains for the whole Union. If he think that his own State is wronged by the Union, the idea of its perfect inde- pendence is one which may easily occur. And if the idea does occur, it will be found far more easy to carry out into practice than similar schemes of secession could be under any other form of Government. The secession of an English county or of a French department is something too ludicrous to think of. To say nothing of the inherent absurdity of the wish, to say nothing of the certainty of the rebellion being at once crushed, the new commonwealth would be utterly helpless. It has no political traditions apart from the whole country, it has no form of local government which it can at once convert into a sovereign power. But the American State has already a Governor and a Legis- lature on exactly the same model as the President and Congress of the whole Union. The Governor and Legislature already possess very large political powers; in the older States they are actually institutions of more ancient date than the Federal Government itself. It needs no great stretch of imagination to invest with greater powers a Government which possesses such large powers already, and for the State to enter alone upon the general stage of the world, to commission Ambassadors and to levy armies on its own account. So to do is, always in legal theory, sometimes in sober historic truth, only to fall back on the state of things when as yet the Sovereign State had ceded no portion of its powers to the Federal Union. This facility of Easiness of Secession is what is meant when the weakness of the Federal tie ^a^-^Vood is spoken of. But in truth it may be doubted whether this very side. 90 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ohap. weakness may not bring with it some incidental advantages. At any rate a plausible case may be made out in favour of this facility of Secession. Rebellion is sometimes necessary, and Secession is certainly the mildest form that Rebellion can take. For, beyond all doubt. Secession is, legally and formally, Re- bellion. The Federal Union is essentially a perpetual union ; a Federal Constitution cannot, any more than any other constitu- tion, contain provisions for its own dissolution. The Federal power is entitled to full obedience within its own sphere, and the refusal of that obedience, whether by States or by indi- viduals, is essentially an act of Rebellion. It does not at all follow that such rebellion is necessarily either wrong or inex- pedient ; but it does follow that Secession is not an every-day right to be exercised at pleasure. A seceding State may be fully justified in seceding ; but to justify its secession it ought to be provided with at least as good a case as the original States had for their secession from the Crown of Great Britain. Granting therefore that separation between- members of a Federation will be sometimes expedient, surely a system which supplies the means of a peaceable divorce is not vnthout its good side. It is, on every ground, far easier to secede from a Federation than Why it is from a Consolidated State. Some reasons I have already given. secedefrom ^^ *^® °^®® °-^ * Kingdom, a feeling vsdll often come in which, a Federa- unreasonable as it is, is none the less powerful for being un- tionthan reasonable. In many men's minds loyalty is simply a blind CousoU- attachment to a person or to a family, not a rational conviction dated of the duty of obedience to all lawful authority. To such minds State. the most reasonable rebellion against a King will seem a far more heinous crime than the most unreasonable rebellion against a Re- public. Again, Kings, whether despotic or constitutional, and Consolidated Republics too, can seldom indeed be got to give up a single inch of their territories, except by force. The supposed honour and the supposed interest of the Monarch require that, if he does not extend, he at least should not diminish, the boundaries of the realm which he has inherited. And nations have such a way of identifying themselves with their Kings that popular feeling will, in such cases, run for a long time in the same current with royal feeling. Every wise EngHsh statesman dis- liked the American "War ; but to George the Third on the one hand, and to the mass of Englishmen on the other, the honour of England seemed to require the recovery of the revolted II EXAMPLE OF AMERICA 91 colonies. The experience of Federal States on this point is not very extensive. But the reason of the case would lead us to expect that the members of a League from which one or more members have seceded would be less anxious to retain them, at all events less ready to make great sacrifices to retain them by force, than either a monarch or his subjects will be to recover a revolted province. Every Englishman thought his personal Proba- honour involved in the reconquest of Delhi ; it does not seem so ^'ii*^ *"* directly to concern a citizen of New York whether South Carolina tion will is, or is not, a member of the same Federal body as his own be less State.i The War in the United States has not yet lasted a year l^^^l^ and a half ^ ; it has hitherto been chequered by victories and liingdom defeats on both sides, and, after all, the real difficulty on the to recover part of the North is not to win battles or to capture towns, but '■^^'°™a ^ . . . '^ 111 members, to occupy, that is, to conquer m any practical sense, the whole of so vast a territory.^ It still remains to be seen whether the people of the Northern States will be ready to endure so pro- longed a struggle for the forcible reduction of their revolted brethren, as Spain or even as England endured for the forcible reduction of their revolted dependencies. It is dangerous to try to prophesy, but one cannot help thinking that the United States and the Confederate States will have exchanged Ambas- sadors before the year 1941 or even before the year 1869.* Besides the physical diflSculties of conquering a large country, besides the difficulty of seeing what interest the conquerors have in the conquest, there is the absurdity of the process of conquest itself. A Federation, though legally perpetual, is something which is in its own nature essentially voluntary : there is a sort of inconsistency in retaining members against their will. What Incon- is to be done with them when they are conquered? They can st^^ng °J hardly be made subjects of the other States ; are they then to retain unwilling ^' Of course the questiou of geographical possibility is here of great importance, members. It Kentucky or Tennessee had seceded all by itself, without the support of any other State, the thing would have been as ridiculous as a secession of North- amptonshire, and the nuisance would have been abated by the combined forces of the whole Union. But the secession of Maine or of Florida would not have so clearly touched the interests of other parts of the Federation. 2 July, 1862. 2 This is forcibly put in Mr. Spence's Seventh Chapter. ' The Dutch War of Independence began in 1568 ; the Thirteen Years' Truce was concluded in 1609, but the independence of the United Provinces was not formally recognized by Spain till 1648. Our own American War lasted eight years, 1775-83. 92 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT chap. be compelled at the point of the bayonet to recognize their conquerors as brethren, and to send, under the penalties of treason, unwilling Senators and Representatives to Washing- ton ? Either alternative is utterly repugnant to the first principles of a Federal Union. Surely the remedy is -worse than the disease. The revolted State, as a foreign power, may become a friendly neighbour; as an unwilling Con- federate, it will simply be a source of internal dissension and confusion. A State will hardly think of Secession as long as it is its manifest interest to remain in the Union. When it ceases to be its manifest interest to remain, there may at least be grave doubts as to either the justice or the expediency of retaining it by force. The Achaian League was weakened, indeed we may say that it finally perished, by nothing so much as by the attempt to retain members in the Confederation against their will. The truth is that the disruption of the United States has been mainly owing to their unparalleled prosperity. In that boundless continent, with no neighbour at once able and willing to contend with them on equal terms, Secession has been pos- sible. No despot stands at either end of the Union ready to swallow up each seceding State as soon as it loses the protection of its neighbours. Federalism cannot be said to have been found wanting, where it has not been really tried. What a Federal union really can do when it is tried is best seen by another Example example. From America let us turn our eyes to Switzerland, of Switzer- rpj^g territory of the Swiss Confederation is, both in a military and a political point of view, one of the most important in Europe. Lying between the two great despotisms of France and Austria, it is above all things needful that it should be held by a free and an united people. But disunion seems stamped upon the soil by the very hand of nature, no less than on the soil of Hellas itself. Every valley seems to ask for its own separate commonwealth. The land, small as it is, is inhabited by men of different races, different languages, different religions, different stages of society. Four languages are spoken within the narrow compass of the League. Religious and political dis- sensions have been so strong as more than once to have led to civil war. How are such a people to be kept united among themselves, so as to guard their mountains and valleys against all invaders ? I need hardly stop to show that the citadel of n EXAMPLE OF SWITZERLAND 93 Eui'ope could not be safely entrusted to twenty-two wholly inde- Perfect pendent Eepublics or to twenty-two wholly independent princes, separation But would consolidation answer the purpose ? Shall we give them j ""J ^g^. the stereotyped blessing of a hereditary King, a responsible solidation Ministry, an elected and a nominated House of Parliament 1 ^1"^^ i"^- Or shall we, by way of variety, give them some neatly planned P"^^'^^''- scheme of a Eepublic one and indivisible 1 Such a Kingdom, such a Republic, would but present, on a smaller scale, much such a spectacle as the Empires of Austria and Turkey. The Burgundian and the Italian provinces would rebel against a dominant German government, and would fly for support to their neighbours of kindred speech beyond the limits of the Kingdom. France would soon become to Vaud what Piedmont has been to the Italian provinces of Austria, what Russia has been to the Slavonic provinces of Turkey.' The Federal relation has solved the problem. Under the Federal system, the Catholic The and the Protestant, the aristocrat and the democrat, the citizen P™Wem solvscl UV of Bern and the mountaineer of Uri, — the Swabian of Ziirich, ^ Federal the Lombard of Ticino, the Burgundian of Geneva, the speakers Coustitu- of the unknown tongues of the Rheetian valleys — all can meet *'""■ side by side as free and equal Confederates. They can retain their local independence, their local diversities, nay, if they will, their local jealousies and hatreds, and yet they can stand forth, in all external matters, as one united nation, all of whose mem- bers are at once ready to man their mountain rampart the moment that the slightest foreign aggression is committed on any one of their brethren. The Federal system, in short, has here, out of the most discordant ethnological, political, and re- ligious elements, raised up an artificial nation, full of as true and heroic national feeling as ever animated any people of the most unmixed blood. An American State can secede, if it pleases : no Swiss Canton will ever desert the protection of its brethren, because it knows that Secession, instead of meaning increased independence, would mean only immediate annexation by the nearest despot. If any one is tempted to draw shallow infer- ences against Federalism in general from mistaken views of one single example, he may at once correct his error by looking at that nearer Federation which has weathered so many internal and external storms. No part of my task will be more delightful or more instructive than to trace the history of that glorious League, from the day when the Austrian a.d. 1315. 94' CHAKACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMEJMT chap, ti invader first felt the might of freedom at Morgarten to the day when a baser and more treacherous despotism still, in defiance of plighted faith and of the public Law of Europe, A.D. 1860. planted the vultures, of Paris upon the neutral shores of the Lake of Geneva. Recapitu- I have thus gone through the comparison which I designed latioii. between the two opposite poles of political being, and that ingenious and nicely- balanced system which is intermediate between the two. I have compared the small City -Common- wealth, the great Monarchy or Consolidated Republic, and the Federal Union, whether of single Cities or of considerable States. I have pointed out the inherent advantages and disadvantages of the three systems, and the circumstances under which each is preferable to the others. I now draw near to my main subject, to show the practical working of the Federal principle as it is exemplified in the history of the Federal Governments of the Ancient, the Mediaeval, and the Modern world. CHAPTER III OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL Before entering on that great developement of the Federal principle which marks the last age of independent Greece, it will be well to speak somewhat more briefly of certain less perfect approaches to a Federal system, which may be seen in the earlier days of Grecian history, and of which the noble work of Aratos was doubtless in a great measure a conscious improvement. And, first of all, it will be needful to say a few words as to an error which is now pretty well exploded, but which was of early date and which once had a wide currency. Many philosophical speculators on government have been led into great mistakes by the idea that Greece itself, as a whole, and not merely particular Grecian states, ought to be ranked as an instance of Federal union. The body which has been often mistaken for a Federal The Am- Council of Greece is the famous Council of the Amphiktyons pWktyonic at Delphi. Probably no one capable of writing upon the ^o^'true subject can have been so wholly ignorant of the whole bearing Federal of Grecian history as to take the Amphiktyonic League for a Govern- perfect Federal union after the Achaian or American pattern. '""" ' But it is easy to understand how such a body as the Amphiktyons may have been mistaken for a Federal Diet of the looser kind. It is certain that Dionysios,^ pretty clear that Strabo,- not unlikely that Cicero,^ supposed the Amphiktyonic Council to ' iv. 25. He goes on, in his usual style, to say how Servius TuUius founded the Latin League in imitation of the Amphiktyon.s. Now the Latin League, though probably not a perfect Federal Government, has a fair right to be classed among close approaches to the Federal idea. ^ ix. 3, 7. Strabo speaks of the League as consisting of TriXeis, Pausanias, (x. 8. 2) more accurately of 7^x1;. Strabo's expressions, irepl tS>v koivSiv PovXevaS/ievov and SUas Sirai irb\en irpis TrcSXeis eM, go far beyond the facts of the case. * The often quoted expression of Cicero, " Amphiotyones, id est, commune 96 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIO COUNCIL Origin of tlie Error. Opinions of Modern Writers. have been invested with far more extensive powers than it ever possessed, at all events during the best days of Greece. The error on their part was natural : the later history of in- dependent Greece was conspicuously a history of Federalism ; and it was easy to carry back the political ideas of the times with which they were most familiar into days in which those ideas were most certainly unknown. And indeed there seems some reason to believe that the Amphiktyonic body had, in the age of Strabo, really put on something more like the out- ward shape of a true Federal body than it had ever worn in the age of Dgmosthenes. From the later Greek and Latin writers the error naturally spread to modern scholars. In days when all " the classics " were held to be of equal value and authority, and when it was hardly yet discerned that all " the classics " were not contemporary with each other, men did not see how little the descriptions of Strabo and Pausanias, even though backed by an incidental allusion of Cicero, were really worth, when weighed against the emphatic silence of Thucydides, Aristotle, and Polybios. And in truth modern scholars, writing under the influence of political and historical theories, have often pressed the words of Strabo, Pausanias, and Cicero, far beyond anything that Strabo, Pausanias, or Cicero ever meant. The writers of the last century seem to have looked upon the Amphiktyonic League as a real political union of the Greek nation, and they sometimes highly extol the political wisdom of the authors of so wise a system.^ In a like spirit, the accidental and fluctuating supremacy of a single Bretwalda over the several Old-English kingdoms was, by writers of the same age, often supposed to be the deliberate result of calculations no less far-searching than those which are attributed to Amphi- ktydn the son of Deukali6n.2 The true nature of the Amphi- ktyonic League was, as far as I know, first clearly set forth by Grjedae Concilium" — an expression, by tlie way, wliicli in a certain sense is quite defensible — is a mere obiter dictum (De Inv. Rhet. ii. 23), and may or may not express Cicero's deliberate judgement. From Cicero's words, Raleigh doubtless got his phrase, "the Council of the Amphyctiones, or the General Estates of Greece." Hist, of the World, Part I. Book 4, Cap. i. § 4. 1 Compare the first two Chapters of Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, Book ix. He mentions the Amphiktyons but once, but he clearly has them in his mind throughout. On the other hand see the strictures on the supposed constitution of the League in the " Federalist," No. xviii. p. 91. 2 Rapin (Hist. d'Ang. i. 139) gi'avely discusses the Bretwaldadom at some length, and compares the Bretwalda to the Dutch Stadtholder. Ill THE AMPHIKTYONS NOT A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 97 Sainte Croix, in his, for the time, really valuable work on old Greek Federalism.^ The -work of Tittmann on the Amphiktyonic League ^ is somewhat retrograde after that of Sainte Croix. It is needless to say that in the works of our own great country- men, in the histories of Thirlwall and of Grote, no traces of the error can be discerned. The old notions as to the nature of the Amphiktyonic Council and the relations of the Greek states to one another may now be set down as an exploded mistake,^ a mistake arising partly from ignorance of the true_ nature of Federal Government, partly from inability to distinguish between the different degrees of authority to be allowed to different Greek and Latin writers. The Amphiktyonic Council then, there can be no doubt, was The in no wise an instance of Federal Government, even in the very Council a laxest sense of the word. It was not a political, but a religious noVf°"^' body. If it had any claim to the title of a General Council * of Political Greece, it was wholly in the sense in which we speak of General Body. ' Des Anciens Gouvernemens Federatifs. Paris, an vii. ^ Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen. Berlin, 1812. ' No scholar of [recent times has attempted to revive it, except Colonel Mure, in a pamphlet (National Criticism in 1858, p. 22) which that distinguished scholar probably regretted before he died. It is no disrespect to Colonel Mure, whose studies, most valuable in their own line, did not lie in a strictly historical direction, to say that he clearly had no idea what a Federal Government really is. Some of the particular arguments are very weak, and the Colonel does not seem to have seen how far the sUence of Thucydides outweighs the speech of a thousand Plutarchs or Dionysii. He refers us to the description of the Amphi- ktyons by Tacitus (Ann. iv. 14) as " quis prsecipuum fuit rerum omnium judicium, qua tempestate Grseci, conditis per Asiam urbibus, ore maris potiebantur. " Undoubtedly Tacitus, as Colonel Mure says, is "an author not accustomed to speak at random," but his oMter dictum is really not decisive as to the mythical ages of Greece. Colonel Mure goes on to say that the Amphiktyons erased the boastful inscription of Pausanias. This is on the authority of an oration attributed to DSmosthenSs, but generally looked on as spurious (c. Ne^r. § 128), while ThucydidSs (i. 132) makes the erasure the act of the Lacedeemonians them- selves. That ThemistoklSs (Plut. Them. 20) opposed the proposal to deprive the medizing Greeks of their Amphiktyonic franchise, is very probable, but it does not go the least way towards showing that the Amphiktyons were, in any sense, a Federal Government. * iEschinSs (Ktes. § 58) has the expressions koivoD avveSplov tOiv '"EKkip'jiv and afterwards 'BXXijpi/coO irvveSplov, The latter phrase, as it stands in the context, referring to Philip's admission to the Amphiktyonic body, certainly proves nothing. Nor does the former, which is quoted by Tittmann (p. 62), prove very much. Tittmann also quotes the Amphiktyonic decree in DSmosthenes (De Cor. § 198) where the Amphiktyons call themselves t6 Koivbv rCiv "WKKifiav avviifiov. Of these expressions one comes from ^schines, who is well disposed to magnify Amphiktyonic rights, and whose language is never imitated by H OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL The Delphic Amphi- ktyony only one of several. Incidental Political Functions of the Council. Councils in Modem Europe. The Amphiktyonic Council re- presented Greece as an Ecclesiastical Synod represented Western Christendom, not as a Swiss Diet or an American Congress represents the Federation of which it is the common legislature. Its primary business was to regulate the concerns of the temple of Apollo at Delphi. And the Amphiktyonic Council which met at Delphi and at Thermopylae was in truth only the most famous of several bodies of the same kind. An Amphiktyonic, or, more correctly, an Amphiktionic,i body was an Assembly of the tribes who dwelt around any famous temple gathered together to manage the affairs of that temple. There were other Amphi- ktyonic Assemblies in Greece, amongst which that of the isle of Kalaureia,^ off the coast of Argolis, was a body of some celebrity. The Amphiktyons of Delphi obtained greater im- portance than any other Amphiktyons only because of the greater importance of the Delphic sanctuary, and because it incidentally happened that the greater part of the Greek nation had some kind of representation among them. But th^,t body could not be looked upon as a perfect representation of the Greek nation which, to postpone other objections to its constitution, found no place for so large a fraction of the Hellenic body as the Arkadians. Still the Amphiktyons of Delphi undoubtedly came nearer than any other existing body to the character of a general representation of all Greece. It is therefore easy to understand how the religious functions of such a body might incidentally assume a political character. Thus the old Amphi- ktyonic oath ^ forbade certain extreme measures of hostility against any city sharing in the common Amphiktyonic worship. Here we get on that mixed ground between spiritual and DemosthenSs, who so profanely talks of i) in AeKipoU ina6,. The other comes from the Amphiktyons themselves, who certainly never had more occasion to magnify their office, than in the decree by which they invited Philip into Greece. Yet even they directly afterwards qualify the strong expression ty the words oi "EXXi^pes oi iieTixovT£S toD aweSplov tSiv 'A/j.4>i-KTv6vav. All those expressions, like those of Herodotos to be presently quoted, hardly amount to more than the name "EWijvordfjuai, as applied to certain officers, not of a Hellenic Federation, but of the Athenian Confederacy. ' The derivation from afi^iKHoves, quoted by Pausanias (x. 8) from AndrotiSn, is now generally received. Indeed the spelling AM*IKTIONBS occurs on the Amphiktyonic coinage at Delphi. ^ Strabo, lib. viii. c. 6, 14. "Hi/ S^ Kal ' A/upiKTvovla tis vepl rh Upbv tovto, ETTTa riXeaic, al fiereixov t^s Svirias, k. t. X. This gives the original idea of an Amphiktyony. 3 ^sch. Fals. Leg. § 11,5. Ill ITS INCIDENTAL POLITICAL ACTION 99 temporal things on which Ecclesiastical Councils have often appeared with more honour to themselves than in matters more strictly within their own competence. The Amphiktyonic Council forbade any Amphiktyonic city to be razed or its water to be cut off, with as good an intention, and with about as much effect, as Christian Synods instituted the Truce of God, and forbade tournaments ■"■ and the use of the cross-bow. But, more than this, the Amphiktyonic Council was the only delibera- tive body in which members from most parts of Greece habitually met together. On the few occasions when it was needed that Greece should speak with a common voice, the Amphiktyonic Council was the natural, indeed the only possible, mouth-piece of the nation. Once or twice then, in the course of Grecian history, we do find the Amphiktyonic body acting with real dignity in the name of United Greece. We naturally find this Instances more distinctly the case immediately after the repulse of the "^j^'^o^ig Persians, when a common Greek national feeling existed for action, the moment in greater strength than either before or afterwards. Then it was that the Amphiktyonic Council, evidently acting in the name of all Greece, set a price upon the head of the Greek who had betrayed the defenders of Thermopylae to the b.o. 479. Barbarians.^ But, in setting a price on the head of EphialtSs, the Amphiktyonic Council, as head of Greece, hardly did more than was done by the Athenian Assembly, if not as the head of Greece, yet as its worthiest representative, when it proscribed Arthmios of Zeleia for bringing barbaric bribes into Hellas.^ Sometimes again we find, naturally enough, this great religious Amphi- Synod, like religious Synods in later times, preaching Crusades '^^^^^^^ against ungodly and sacrilegious cities, against violators of the holy ground or of the peaceful worshippers of Apollo. And, whatever we may think of the pious zeal of ^schings against b.c. 340. the Lokrians of Amphissa,* we may at least fairly believe that the first sacred war under Solon ^ was a real Crusade, carried b.o. 595. 1 As at the Second Lateran Council. See Eoger of Wendover, ii. 400, Bng. Hist. Ed. 2 Herod, vii. 214 (so 213). Oi tSii'"EXK-/ipijiv UvXaySpoi iircKifipv^av . . . aftyvpiov. Professor Rawlinso'n, in Ms Translation of Herodotos, strangely strengthens the words of the historian into the " deputies of the Greeks, the Pylagorae." 3 .Ssch. Ktes. § 268. It is a favourite common-place with the orators. * JEsch. Ktes. § 118 et seqq. Thirl wall, vi. 80. 5 Pint. Sol. 11. JEsch. Ktes. § 108. In later times (B.C. 281) we find a Crusade against Mtoha, led hy the Spartan King Areus (Justin, xxiv. 1) on the same ground as this of SolSn, namely the sacrilegious cultivation of the plain of 100 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL The Council becomes the tool of particular States. No inhe- rent force in its Decrees. B.O. 371. B.C. 382. on with as distinct a sense of religious duty as ever sent forth Godfrey or Saint Lewis or our own glorious Edward. At other times the Amphiktyonic Council, just like other religious Councils, does not escape the danger of being perverted to purely temporal purposes. Nothing is easier than to see that the Amphiktyonic Council, in the days of Philip, had sunk into a mere political tool in the hands first of Thebes, then of Macedonia.^ And in all cases, whether the sentences of the Council were just or unjust, whether they were dictated by religious faith or by political subserviency, the Amphiktyonic body had no constitu- tional means at its command for carrying them into execution. The spiritual tribunal had no temporal power ; culprits had to be delivered to the secular arm, and the secular arm had to be looked for wherever it might be found. If no pious city like Thebes, no pious prince like Philip, undertook to act as the minister and champion of the Council, an Amphiktyonic judge- ment had no more inherent force than the judgement of a modern Ecclesiastical Synod. Sparta, the most devout wor- shipper of Apollo, took no heed to the Amphiktyonic fine which Theban influence procured as the punishment of the treacherous seizure of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas.^ So did PhilomSlos and his successors in Phdkis resist both anathemas and armies, till Kirrha. But I do not see the evidence for asserting, as is done by Droysen (Hellenismus, i. 645) and by Mr. P. Smith (Diet. Biog. art. Areus) that this was in consequence of a formal Amphiktyonic decree. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 53. There is an intermediate Sacred War (b.c. 449. See Thuc. i. 112) in which the Amphilityons are not spoken of at all. ' There seems however no ground for believing that the AmpMktyons took upon themselves to elect Alexander as chief of Greece against Persia. The statement of DiodSros to that effect (xvii. 4) is, I suspect, a confusion, most characteristic of DiodSros, with PhUip's appointment as chief of the Amphiktyonio Crusades. Both Philip and Alexander were chosen, so far as they were chosen at all, by the Congress of the Confederate Greeks at Corinth (Arrian, i. 1. Diod. U.S.). Diodoros is however followed by Mr. Whiston in the Dictionary of Antiquities, p. 81, and even by Mr. Grote (xii. 15). But Droysen seems to me to see the state of the case much more clearly. "Aber so dilrftig war diess einzige Analogou einer verfassungsmassigen Nationaleinigung [the Delphic Amphiktyony] dass Philipp selhst die neue Form eines Bundes in Korinth versuoht hatte, die Nation oder die nachsten Kreise derselben zu einigen." Hellenismus, ii. 503. Droysen's strong Macedonian bias must however be guarded against, just like the strong anti-Macedonian bias of Mr. Grote. 2 On this see the remarks of Mr. Grote, x. 275 et seqq. It marks the progress of vagueness and misconception that DiodSros, in recording the Theban accusa- tion of Sparta (xvi. 23, 29), merely uses the words is'A/upiKTiiovas iv ' Xfi^iKTvlmi, which in Justin (viii. 1) have grown into "commune Graeoise concilium" the phrase of Cicero without his explanation. Ill ITS INDIRECT IMPORTANCE IN FEDERAL HISTORY 101 the clear eye and strong hand of Philip saw and grasped his opportunity at once to avenge Apollo and to make his kingdom Greek and himself the leader of Greece. Otherwise a bull from Delphi or Thermopylae could have done as little to stay the b.o, 357- march of Onomarchos as bulls from the Vatican, unsupported ^*^- by the arm of the French invader, could do in our own day to stay the march of the first chosen King of Italy. But though the Amphiktyonic Council was in no sense a Federal Government, its importance in a History of Federal Government is of a high order. The negative bearings of the Indirect existence of such a body can hardly be overrated. Nothing 'mport- proves so completely how dear to the Greek mind was the coundl*''^ system of distinct and independent cities ; nothing shows more in the clearly how little the minds of early Greek statesmen turned History of towards a Federal Union of the whole or of any large portion ^^^^^^ ' of Greece ; nothing therefore shows more clearly how great was the work which was accomplished by the Greek statesmen of a later age. If the thought of a Federal Union of Greece had ever occurred, if the need of such an Union had ever been felt, the Amphiktyonic Council afforded materials out of which it might readily have been developed. As we find the ancient commonwealths coming to the very edge of a representative system, and yet never really establishing one, so we here Close find Greece coming to the very edge of a Federal system, and ^pp™** yet never crossing the limit. A body of Greeks, including council to members from nearly all parts of Greece, habitually met to a Federal debate on matters interesting to the whole Greek nation, and System. to put forth decrees which, within their proper sphere, the whole Grreek nation respected. The wonder is that, with such a body existing, the idea of a Federal Union never presented itself ; that no one ever thought of investing the Amphiktyonic body with much more extensive powers to be exercised for the common good of Greece. No more speaking witness can be Why it found to the love of town-autonomy inherent in the Greek ?^™'^ S^ew mind than the fact that no such developement of the Amphikty- Federal onic body was, as far as we know, ever thought of. Perhaps, Union, besides the love of town - autonomy, the constitution of the Council, so eminently unfair as a representation of historical Greece, may have had something to do with the fact that its proper functions were always kept within such narrow limits. But one difficulty which modern parallels may perhaps suggest 102 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL The Council an Eccle- siastical, but not a Clerical body. Special Objections to the develope- ment of a Federal System out of the Council. would not have occurred in this hypothetical transformation of the Delphic Amphiktyony into a real Federal Diet of Greece. The Amphiktyonic Council undoubtedly answers in its functions to the Ecclesiastical Synods of modern times ; but to have made the Amphiktyonic Council the sovereign Assembly of Greece would have been quite a different process from investing the Convocation of Canterbury with the immediate sovereignty of England or an (Ecumenical Council of the Church with the Federal sovereignty of Eiu'ope. We must always remember that in the ancient world the distinction of Clergy and Laity did not exist. There were spiritual offices and there were temporal offices, but there was no distinct spiritual order of men. The Amphiktyons were a religious body, but they were not a clerical body. The Council, after the manner of Greek Councils, had a larger Assembly attached to it, and this Assembly was of the most popular, not to say the most tumultuous, kind, consisting indiscriminately of all Greeks who might happen to be at Delphi to sacrifice or to consult the Oracle.! -q^^^ ^y^^ ^j^q members of the Council itself, the Hieromnemones and the Pylagoroi, possessed no permanent spiritual character. They appeared at Delphi and at Pylae as the servants of Apollo ; elsewhere they appeared as statesmen, soldiers, or private citizens. They were therefore just as competent or incompetent as any other body of Greeks to undertake the management of the general affairs of Greece. Their immediate functions as Amphiktyons were not secular but religious ; but those occasional functions in no way implied that their holders were personally or permanently isolatied from common temporal affairs. | But besides the general indisposition of the Greek mind to permanent union of any kind, there were some special causes why the Amphiktyonic Council was never developed into a Federal Union. It is true that deputies from most parts of Greece were in the habit of meeting together and of discussing questions, often perhaps trifling in themselves, but still cjuestions in which the whole of Greece was interested. Here was indeed the raw material for constructing a Federal Union, had any Greek felt the want of one. But the constitution of the Council was such that, before it could have been safely invested with the smallest political power, the most sweeping of Eeform Bills 1 ^sch. Ktes. § 124. Ill CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNCIL 103 would have been needed for its reconstruction. Its composition was of a kind which made it a most unfair representation of historical Greece. Historical Greece was, above all things, a system of Cities. The Amphiktyonic Union was an Union not Its con- of Cities but of Tribes. This alone, as Mr. Grote remarks,^ •^*^t'^t[°° ^^ shows the immense antiquity of the institution. Any League historical which had arisen, we might almost say from the time of Homer Greece, onwards, could hardly fail to have been a League of Cities. Any institution which had arisen since the time of the Dorian Migration could hardly fail in some way to represent the results of that great event. But though the list of members of the Council is given with some slight variations ^ by different authors, all agree in making the constituent members of the Union Tribes and not Cities. The representatives of the Ionic and Doric A Union races sat and voted as single members, side by side with °^j^Jj^^^ the representatives of petty peoples like the Magn^sians and cities. Phthi6tic Achaians. When the Council was first founded, Dorians and lonians were doubtless mere tribes of Northern Greece, of no more account than their fellows, and the pro- digious developement of the Doric and Ionic races in after times made no difference in its constitution. How the vote of each race was determined is an obscure point of Greek archaeology ^ which hardly bears on our immediate subject. What is im- portant for our present point of view is that Sparta and Athens, as such, were not members of the Amphiktyonic body. They were simply portions respectively of the Doric and Ionic aggre- gates, and they had legally no more weight than the smallest Doric or Ionic city.* The wish of the whole Doric race, the wish of the whole Ionic race, nay, the common wish, if we can conceive such a thing, of Sparta and Athens and their respective followings of Allies, might be at any moment set Unfair dis- aside by the votes of three or four petty tribes, some of which * j'^JJ^^™ 1 Hist, of Greece, vol. ii. p. 325, 7. ^°*^^' 3 The several lists are discussed at some length by Tittmann (p. 35), whose conclusions are followed by Mr. Grote (ii. 325). They differ chiefly in the enumeration of the insignificant tribes of Northern Greece. The omission by Pausanias of the Boeotians, a people so specially mentioned by ^sohines (Fals. Leg. § 122), must be an error. ' Cf. Grote, u.s. Strabo (ix. 3. 7) says that Akrisios settled the vote of each city, i^^^o;/ iKdffTxi Bovixu, rg fiiv Kad' aiir^fi/, t^ Si /ieS' Mpas, i) /ieri irXetSvijiv. We shall presently come to reasons for thinking that this system of Contributory Boroughs belonged only to the latest form of the institution. i ^sch. Fals. Leg. § 122. 104 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIO COUNCIL chap. were not even independent political communities. Perrhaibians, Magn^sians, PhtM6tic Achaians, had ceased to be independent states before the beginning of the historical days of Greece. They had sunk into mere subjects of the Thessalians, and their deputies in the Council must have voted as their ThessaUan masters bade them. Viewed as a political representation of historic Greece, the Amphiktyonic Council was something even more anomalous than was the British Parliament in its un- reformed state, when viewed as a representation of the British Analogy people. The presence of Gatton and Old Sarum, the absence of the pf Manchester and Birmingham, the two votes of Liverpool formed ^'Hd the fouT votes of East and West Looe, aU had their perfect Parlia- precedents in the constitution of the venerable body which met ™™*- at Delphi and Thermopylae. Or rather the defects of the Amphiktyonic system must have been practically by far the greater of the two. English rotten boroughs have at least often been the means of introducing into Parliament some of its most distinguished members, but it could only have been the deputies of these little insignificant tribes who gained for the whole body the contemptuous description given of it by Demosthenes. ^ But in a purely religious Assembly these in- congruities were probably not found so intolerable as they assuredly would have been found in an Assembly exercising Incon- real political power. The very anomalies were consecrated by gruities the traditional reverence of centuries. The very points in the a^ Religious constitution of the Council which made it so unfit for political body. action, made it only more venerable when looked at as a holy representative of past ages. What if certain tribes had sunk from independence to bondage 1 Statesmen might indeed, in their earthly policy, regard such merely political changes, but misfortune, without guilt, could not degrade any faithful worshipper of Apollo in the presence of his patron God. The zeal and piety of Athens and Sparta were not more fervent, doubtless they were far less fervent, than the zeal and piety of the little communities around the Temple, whose whole 1 Dem. Cor. § 190. 'Avepdnrovs iTrelpovs X67U1' Kal t6 /liWov oi5 irpoopa- idvovs, TOiis lepoiw-fjiiova^. Or are we to infer that the Hieromngmones were an inferior body to the Pylagoroi ? As .ffischines was one of the latter, we may infer that the greater members of the Amphiktyony sent deputies' in that capacity at least, who would not deserve the description. But in any case the majority of both orders would come from the petty tribes, and would doubtless be what Demosthenes describes. in ITS UNFAIR DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES 105 importance was derived from their share in its management. The God of Delphi was no respecter of persons ; he looked with equal favour on the devotion of the weakest and of the most powerful worshipper. A change in the constitution of the Council would probably have been looked upon by the mass of Greeks as a heinous sacrilege. But, while such a constitution existed, the Council was unfit for political power, and, whenever it did meddle with political matters, its inter- ference was invariably mischievous. Any power which could command the votes of the little tribes about Mount Oita could procure whatever decisions it chose in the Amphiktyonic body. Philip, the common foe of Greece, was welcomed by the Amphiktyons as a deliverer, a true servant of Apollo, a pious b.c. 352. Crusader against the usurping and sacrilegious Ph6kian. It Amphi- is not improbable that ^ many of the smaller Greek cities may |5,*y°""! really have shared, from shortsighted political motives, in this gj^jp of ill-timed goodwill to the Macedonian. But this only shows Philip. the more clearly the utter unfitness of the Council to act in any way as a political mouth-piece of Greece. When Demos- thenes had united Thebes and Athens in one common cause, the union of those two great cities did not command a single integral vote in the Amphiktyonic Council. It is certainly very remarkable that, long after the Council had ceased to be of any importance whatever, many of the defects in its constitution should have been reformed. Pausanias ^ describes the Council as it stood in his time, when, under the Roman dominion, the debates of the Amphiktyons must have been of considerably less moment than the debates of an English Convocation. Some at least of the changes which he mentions Reforms he attributes to the legislative mind of Augustus Caesar. The ™'i^'' Council, in this its later form, became at last, in a great degree, g p 3i_ ' a representation of Cities, when Greece had no more independent a.d. 14. Cities to represent. An attempt too was made, after the happy precedent set by the wise confederation of Lykia,^ to do what in modern political language is called apportioning members to population. In the old state of things the Dolopians, MagnSsians, Ainians, and Phthi6tic Achaians had formed a large proportion 1 Edinburgh Eeview, vol. cv. p. 319 (April, 1857). 2 X. 8, 5. ' The Lykian League will be described in the next chapter. 106 OP THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL B.C. 346. New ar- rangement of votes in the Council. of the Council. Now they lost their separate Amphiktyonic being ; the Dolopians indeed had ceased to exist altogether ; ^ the other tribes were made what we may call Contributory Boroughs to Thessaly. The votes thus saved were divided among several new and several restored members. The Ph6kians had, at the end of the Sacred War, lost their Amphiktyonic votes, which were transferred to Macedonia, as the due reward of Philip's Crusade in the cause of Apollo. In the new constitution Augustus found room both for Ph6kians and Macedonians, as well as for the inhabitants of his own new city of Nikopolis. Delphi, Athens, Euboia, now appear as substantive members. The two Lokrian votes were divided between the two divisions of the Lokrian nation. The Dorian votes, in like sort, were divided between the original Dorians of the North and the Dorians of Peloponn^sos, that is to say those of Corinth, Siky6n, Argos, and Megara; for Sparta, which shared in the exclusion of Ph6kis, does not seem to have shared in its restoration. The whole number of votes was raised to thirty, and, instead of each constituency, as before, possessing two votes, the votes were now distributed among the members of the League in various pro- portions ranging from one to six.^ Three of the members, Nikopolis, Athens, and Delphi, were single cities, and these, it is expressly said,^ sent representatives to every meeting. The other constituencies were still not cities but races ; their Amphiktyonic ^ Pans. u. s. Oi) yap (n Jjv AoXSirap yivo$. ^ The whole scheme is as follows : — Nikopolis . ..... Macedonia ....... Thessaly (with Malians, Ainians, Magnesians, and PhthiStic Achaians) ..... Boeotia ..... Ph6kis Delphi . . ....'. Northern DSris . ... Ozolian Lokrians Bpiknemidian Lokrians ... Euboia ........ Argos, Siky6n, Corinth, and Megara . Athens ...... 6 votes. 6 „ 30 ^ Pans. u. s. M fiiv Sti 7r6Xeis 'Adrjvai. Kal AcX0ol Kal ij NiK6iroXis, aSrai iJ.h dTOCT^XKovai. avviSpeicovTat es i,ti.cpiKTVovlai> iracrav aTi W ^dvav tQv KareiXey- fUviav iK&iTTri irUKu avh fjApos h ' kixij>iKTiovai Kal iv xP^vov TrepibStfi ffwreXeiv ((mv. I" REFORM UNDER AUGUSTUS 107 representatives were to be chosen by the several cities of the race in turn. Thus the vote of the Peloponnesian Dorians would be given in successive years by a Corinthian, a Sikydnian, a Megarian, and an Argive,i while every meeting contained one member for Athens, two for Delphi, and six for Nikopolis. Most of the cities in short were in the same position as the counties of Nairn and Cromarty ^ before the Reform Bill, when they sent a member between them who was elected in alternate Parlia- ments by Nairn and by Cromarty. This account of Pausanias is well worth studying, as setting before us a very curious piece of amateur constitution-making. Had the Amphiktyonic body in the days of Augustus still retained any practical functions to discharge, its constitution, as settled by the Imperial reformer, would seem to be by no means unhappily put together. The Council was not indeed a representation of the whole of Greece, but neither had it ever been so in earlier times. It still gave an undue advantage to the North over the South ; but something might be said for this in the case of a confederacy founded to manage the concerns of a Northern temple. We must also remember how completely Athens and Sparta had fallen from the position which they held in the days with which most of us are almost exclusively familiar. The weakest points of the Augustan charter are the enormous number of votes given to the new city of Nikopolis and the very scanty amount of repre- sentatives allowed to the Dorians of PeloponnSsos. Still, after all allowances, the new constitution of the Council was certainly a great improvement upon the old one. But possibly it was only because of the utter nullity of the Amphiktyonic body that any such constitution was bestowed upon it. The founder of the Empire could well allow so harmless a safety-valve to carry off the last feeble ebullitions of Hellenic freedom. While the firm 1 It would seem that disputes sometimes arose among the contributory cities about their Amphiktyonic rights. At least in an inscription in Boeokh's Collec- tion, No. 1121 (vol. i. p. 578), a certain Archenoos of Argos is praised for having, among his other good deeds, recovered the Amphiktyonic rights of his native city — /iera rit dvafftoffat aiirbv t6 SUatov TTJt 'A/MtptKTVoveias rrj iraTpidt, Another inscription (1124) commemorates an Argeian Amphiktyon named Titus Statilius Timokrates, the son of Lamprios — a curious illustration of " Greece under the Romans ; " Titus being doubtless an Argeian who had obtained Roman citizenship. Another hybrid of the same sort, Caius Curtius Proklos, is commemorated, in another inscription (No. 1058, vol. i. p. 559) as a Megarian Amphiktyon. " Besides these, the counties Bute and Caithness (a strangely chosen pair), and Clackmannan and Kinross also elected alternately. 108 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL Approach to Repre- sentative forms in tlie Council. The Council not a Govern- ment, but a mere Union for a particular purpose. grasp of Eoman Governors was pressed tight upon the provinces of Macedonia and Achaia, their inhabitants might safely be per- mitted to play either at Town- Autonomy or at Federal Govern- ment beneath the sacred shadow of the Delphian Temple. It can hardly fail to have been observed that the Amphi- ktyonic Council, both in its earlier and its later forms, makes a far nearer approach to the forms of Representative Govern- ment than anything which we find elsewhere in ancient Greece, whether in the constitutions of Federations or in those of single cities. In every Greek Government, as we cannot too constantly bear in mind, every qualified citizen was entitled to take his personal share and did not delegate his rights to another. No Greek city, no Greek Federation, presents an example of a real Representative Assembly. But the Amphiktyonic Council is strictly a Representative body ; in discussing its nature, it is impossible to avoid introducing the language which we familiarly employ in speaking of modern Representative bodies. It may indeed be said that, after all, the Amphiktyonic Council was merely a Senate, and that, in conformity with universal Greek precedent, there was an Amphiktyonic Popular Assembly, in which every worshipper of Apollo had a right to appear. But it is clear that the Amphiktyonic Council fiUed a much more exalted position in relation to the Amphiktyonic Assembly than the Athenian Senate, for instance, did in relation to the Athenian Assembly. In the Amphiktyonic Constitution it is the Council which is really the important body, and the Council is certainly representative. But a really representative Senate would be just as great an anomaly in an ordinary Greek constitution as a representative Assembly. The real reason why we find repre- sentative forms in the Amphiktyonic body, while we do not find them in ordinary Greek Governments, is that the Amphiktyonic body was in no sense a Government at all. The Amphiktyonic Council was not exactly a Diplomatic Congress, but it was much more like a Diplomatic Congress than it was like the governing Assembly of any commonwealth, kingdom, or Federation. The Pylagoroi and Hieromn^mones were not exactly Ambassadors, but they were much more like Ambassadors than they were like Members of a British Parliament or even an American Congress. The business of the Council was not to govern or to legislate, either for a single state or for a League of states ; its duty was Ill REPRESENTATIVE NATURE OF THE COUNCIL 109 simply to manage a single class of affairs, in which a number of independent commonwealths were alike interested, but which did not come within the individual competence of any one of their number. It is manifest that this could only be done by deputies from the several states interested, that is by repre- sentatives. The nearest approach to the Amphiktyonic Council in modern times would be if the College of Cardinals were to consist of members chosen by the several Roman Catholic nations of Europe and America. Such a body would be entrusted with business in which every Roman Catholic country is interested, but it would not form a Federal or even necessarily a local Government. The Amphiktyons were the guardians of the Delphic Temple, but they no more formed a local Government for the city of Delphi than they formed a Federal Government for the whole of Greece. The Council was representative, -just The Am- because it was not a Government, though again we may, if we pliiktyomo please, wonder that the employment of representative forms in representa- the Council did not suggest the employment of representative tive, be- forms in the Federal, if not in the City, Governments of Greece. "^^^^ ^' In like manner it would be a very interesting subject of inquiry Qovem- whether, from a similar set of causes, representative forms, or a ment. close approach to them, did not exist in Ecclesiastical Synods much earlier than they did in Secular Parliaments, and whether the founders of the representative system in modern Europe may not, consciously or unconsciously, have had ideas suggested to them by the constitution of the Assemblies of the Church. It belongs rather to a historian of Greece than to a historian of Federal Government to run through the whole evidence which so conspicuously shows the political nullity of the Amphiktyonic body during the best days of Greece. This has been amply done, to say nothing of the earlier work of Sainte Croix, both by Bishop Thirlwall and Mr. Grote. The Amphiktyonic Council Political is of no moment in the world of ThucydidSs, it is of no moment ^"^^^^ in the world of Xenoph6n, it is of no moment in the world of council Polybios. Its short and mischievous importance belongs wholly during the to the days of Demosthenes and Philip. ThucydidSs never once g^^^*^^ mentions it, though he has often occasion to mention the Delphian grecian Temple, to record stipulations for its management, and at least History, one war for its possession.^ It is clear that, in his time, the 1 The Sacred War in B.C. 449. Thflc. i. 112. See above, p. 99. 110 OF THE AMPHIKTYOWIO COUNCIL chap. Council so far from holding « any Federal authority over the general affairs of Greece, was not even independent in its own proper sphere of religious duty. And if we find it playing an important part in the days of Demosthenes and Philip, the difference is simply because Sparta and Athens, in the previous century, had not thought it worthy of any notice at all, while now first Thebes and then Philip found that even the Shadow at Delphi was capable of being made useful as a political tool. The Politics of Aristotle contain no mention of it. Polybios speaks of it twice,^ neither time in a way implying any sort of Federal power. The mistake of looking at the Amphiktyonic body as a Federal union of Greece arose only in times when freedom in all its forms, Federal or otherwise, had utterly passed away from the soil of Greece. Yet the Amphiktyonic Council is an institu- tion of no small importance in a general history of Federal Government. What it was and what it was not, shows more speakingly than anything else how utterly alien to the Greek mind, in the days before Macedonian domination, was anything like a Federal Union of the whole nation or even the most remote approach to it.^ 1 The first time (iv. 25) the Amphiktyons are simply mentioned in their proper character as guardians of the Delphic Temple. In this duty they had been inter- fered with by the jEtolians, and Macedonia, Achaia, and the other allied powers, agree to effect their restoration. The second passage (xl. 6) is very curious indeed ; it seems to set the Amphiktyons before us, not as a political, but as a literary body, a view which certainly did not occur to Demosthenes. Aulus Postumius wrote a book in Greek, and asked to be excused if, being a foreigner, he made mistakes in language. Cato tells him that if the Amphiktyonic Council had set him to write in Greek {d jiiv yap airif rb tuv 'A/j,(piKTv6vaii avviSpiov (TwiTHTTe ypd<)>eiv laroptav), his excuse would have been a good one ; but as nobody obliged him to write in Greek or to write at all, he had no excuse if he wrote badly. This story is also told by Plutarch, Cato Maj. 12. It reminds one of Jeffrey's criticism on Byron: "If any suit could be brought against Lord Byron, for the purpose of compelling him to put into court a certain quantity of poetry," etc. Edin. Rev. Jan. 1808. 2 On this subject of the Amphiktyonic Council, the eighteenth number of the "Federalist" should by all means be read. It is clear that the authors, Madi- son and Hamilton, had not the least notion of the true nature of the institution but it is most curious to see the strong political sagacity of the authors struggling with their utter ignorance of facts. They were politicians enough to see the utter political nullity of the Council in Grecian history ; they were not scholars enough to see that it never really pretended to any character from which anything but political nullity could be expected. Some of the particular comments and illus- trations are most ingenious. I shall have again to refer to this curious paper when I come to speak of the remarks of the same ^vriters on the Federal consti- tution of Achaia. M. de Tocqueville also seems to have misunderstood the nature of the Am- POLITICAL NULLITY OF THE COUNCIL 111 phiktyonio Council. He compares (i. 266) the position of Philip as executor of the Amphiktyonic decrees with the preponderance of the Province of Holland in the Dutch Confederation. Philip's position was really a great deal more like that of his French namesake when he undertook, hy commission from Pope Innocent, to wrest the Kingdom of England from the sacrilegious John. Tocque- ville's English translator does not point out the error. Still more recently an example of the same sort of union of political shrewd- ness with utter lack of historical knowledge is to be found in Mr. Spence's work on the American Union, a book not indeed to be compared with the writings of Hamilton or Tocqueville, but abounding in keen observation of facts and in sound inferences from those facts. But Mr. Spence's remarks on the Amphiktyonic Council and the Achaian League (pp. 7, 8) are merely Hamilton served up again. Of Mtolia, Lykia, and even Switzerland, he seems never to have heard. Mr. Spence too is without Hamilton's excuse ; if he could not read Polybios, he might at least have read Thirlwall. CHAPTER IV OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE An ap- proach to Federal Govern- ment not tincommon among the ruder por- tions of the Greek nation. § 1. Of the Northern Leagues. Phdkis, Akarnania, Epeiros, Thessaly I HAVE already remarked that the greatest and most civilized states of Greece were precisely those which clave most strenu- ously to the principle of distinct town-autonomy. The approaches to Federal Government which we find in the earlier history of Greece appear only among the more backward portions of the nation ; and, as we know but little of the details of their several constitutions, we can derive from them comparatively little knowledge bearing on our general subject. In fact some sort of approach to a Federal Union must have been rather common than otherwise in those parts of Greece in which the city-system was never fully developed.'- In a considerable portion of Greece the cities seem to have been of comparatively little consequence ; particular cities and their citizens are seldom mentioned ; we far more commonly hear of the district and its inhabitants as a collec- tive whole. Such seems to have been the case with the Lokrians, the Northern Dorians, and, so far as they can be said to have had any political existence at all, with those other little tribes of which we scarcely hear except as returning so disproportionate a share of members to the Amphiktyonic Council. The whole tribe is spoken of as if it had some sort of political unity ; yet they certainly were not monarchies, and we do not hear of the domination of any single city. There must have been a common power of some kind, and yet it would be hardest of all to believe that whole tribes formed indivisible republics, and that the ^ " The system of federation existed everywhere in the early state of society, and Achaia was ripe for its renewal at a later period, because no one town had so outgrown the others as to aspire to hecome the capital of the whole country." Arnold's Life, i. 273. IV EARLY FEDERALISM IN NORTHERN GREECE 113 villages or small towns whose inhabitants made up the tribe had no separate political existence at all. Some rude form of Feder- alism can hardly fail to have existed among them. Among other tribes, as the Ph6kians and Akarnanians, we have distinct evi- dence that some sort of Federal Union really did exist. But of the details of their constitutions we know nothing ; we have at best only a few scraps belonging to later times, when the examples of Achaia and ^tolia had given such an impulse to the Federal principle everywhere. Of the Phdkian League The nearly all our knowledge ^ comes from an incidental mention of Phokian Pausanias, who describes the building, the Ph6kikon, where the Federal body used to assemble.^ But the traveller is much more anxious to describe the pillars and statues which adorned the place of meeting than to give us any information as to the constitution of the League itself. We gather however from his account that the Phokikon did not stand in any town ; possibly the Phdkians may have taken warning by the example of their Boeotian neighbours. We also gather that these meetings at the Ph6kikon, like so many other old Greek institutions, preserved their nominal existence down even to the days of Pausanias. As to the date of the Phdkian Union, when we remember the utter destruction b.c. 346. of the Ph6kian towns after the Sacred War, it is clear that the League spoken of by Pausanias must have been an institution of a later age than the time of Philip. Indeed as all Ph6kis was, b.c. 196. for a short time, incorporated with ^tolia, and as all Greek b.c. 146. Leagues were for a while dissolved by the Eomans,^ the mimic League of Pausanias' times must have been actually established since the days of Mummius. But it would probably reproduce the forms of the constitution as they stood in the great Federal period of Greece. And this League again, like the Achaian Probably League itself, was probably only a revival of an older union, » revival so that what Pausanias saw may well have been the shadow of earlier League. ^ In this chapter I am chiefly concerned with the constitution and the earlier history of the several Minor Leagues. Their history during the great Federal period of Greece I reserve, like that of the Achaian League itself, for my more strictly historical chapters. " Pans. X. 5, 1. 'Bs di tt)v ivl Ae\4)Qv eiOelav avaaTpiij/avTi. ix Aav\lBos, Kal Ibvn iirl rb irpStro), (anv olKoSSurnia h ipidTepq. t^s oSoO KoXoifj.ei'Ov ^UKiKbp, H S oTri iKdffTT)! iriXeois ffwi.S.ini' ol $uKeis. Cf. Drumann, Geschichte des Ver- falls der griechisohen Staaten, p. 436. There is a pleasing simplicity in the notion of suddenly coming upon the seat of a Federal Government by the roadside. 2 See below, at the end of the next section. I 114 MINOR CONFEDERATION'S OF ANCIENT GREECE chap. the state of things which existed before the ascendency of PhilomSlos. The Ph6kians are always spoken of as a substan- tive whole ;^ we hear of embassies^ being sent, and business in general being transacted, in the name of the whole Ph6kian qifi ^^^~ body. Philomllos and his successors were chiefs, tyrants, or whatever we choose to call them, not of this or that city, but of the whole Ph6kian people.^ Yet the Phokians had numer- ous cities, as more than twenty were destroyed after the Sacred War. It seems necessarily to follow that some sort of Fedei'al Union had always existed in Ph6kis, and, as we hear of no dominant or presiding city, the Phokian- League was probably a better devised political machine than the far more famous League of Boeotia. The Akak- Of the Akarnanian League, formed by one of the least import- NAHiAH ant, but at the same time one of the most estimable * peoples in Greece, we know a little more than of that of Ph6kis, but still our knowledge is only fragmentary. The boundaries of Akarnania fluctuated, but we always find the people spoken of as a political whole. We pick up a few details from Thucydides, Xenoph6n, Polybios, and Livy, and we know that Aristotle treated of the Akarnanian constitution in that great political collection, the loss of which is one of the greatest of all the losses which the historical student has to mourn. The single fragment however which has been preserved ° unhappily contains Earlier no political information. We gather from the incidental notices Notices. jjj Thucydides that, in his time, Akarnania, or at least the great mass of the Akarnanian towns, already formed a Federal body of some kind. The Akarnanians are constantly spoken of as acting with one will, and forming one political whole. Yet their union, just as we shall find in the earlier days of the Achaian Union, 1 Dem. Pals; Leg. 92. '0 Stj/mos 6 tSui '^oiKiuv. ^ Xen. Hell. vi. 1, 1. 01 ^wKeis iirpiffPevov els t^v AaKcSai/j-ova. ^ Diod. xvi. 23. '0 iiMfaiXm,' niyurrov ^x"" ^'' ''■''S *w/ceO(ru' d^Iu/ia, Sie- X^X^?; rots 6fioedvi(Ti, lb. 24. ruiv 8k ^ujk^cov i'Kofiivojv avrbv {^LKd/^TJKovl ffrpcLT- ryybv airoKpaTopa. Cf. TMrhvall, v. 333. Tittmann, Staatsverfassungen, p. 709. Pol. iv. 30. 'AXKd fjLOi doKoOi> 'EXXiJi/up ^ttoii evpiffKovrai, SiaTerripriK&Tes, K.T.\. The Akarnanians must have improved since the days of Thucydides, who deserihes the Akarnanians, along with the .ffitolians and Ozolian Lokrians, as retaining the old harharous habits of robbery and going always armed. Thuc. i. 6, 5 Arist. Pol. p. 297, ed, Oxon, 1837. IV THE AKAKKANIAN LEAGUE 115 did not always exclude revolutions and changes of policy in particular towns. Thus, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian b.o. 431- War, the city of Astakos was governed by a Tyrant whom the ^^^• Athenians expelled and the Corinthians restored ; ^ and the city of Oiniadai was hostile to Athens, while the rest of Akarnania was firm in the Athenian alliance.^ But these instances were clearly interruptions of an established Federal order of things. Thucydides speaks, by implication at least, of the Akarnanian League as an institution of old standing in his time. The Akarnanians had, in early times, occupied the hill of Olpai as a place for judicial proceedings common to the whole nation.^ Thus the Supreme Court of the Akarnanian Union held its sittings, not in a town, but in a mountain fortress. But in Thucydidfes' own time Stratos had attained its position as the greatest city of Akarnania,* and probably the Federal Assemblies were already held there.^ In the days of AgSsilaos^ we find b.c. 391. Stratos still more distinctly marked as the place of Federal meeting. But in after times Akarnania was exposed to the inroads of the aggressive .TOS 6 ffrparijybs ■!ravSr]/j£l Tois 'AKappavas. Liv. xxxvi. 11. Clytum praetorem, penes quem turn summa potestas erat. ^ Rose, Insoriptt. Grfecc. p. 282. ^ ^5o|e T$ j8otiX^ Kal tQ koivQ t&v 'AKapvdvtov. * iirl ypafif^dTeoi rg, /SoiiX? Upolrov. ^ A irpo/ivdfucv and two cru/iir/ao/ixdjuopes. ^ Aristotle (Pol. 307) found the constitution of Epeiros, or at any rate of Thespr6tis, worthy of a place in his great collection, no small honour for a half barbarian state. [Cf. Blakesley on Herodofos, v. 92, ■>;'.] Epbieot League, IV THE EPEIROT LEAGUE 117 The Chaonians were in a state of political developement Early Re- of which both Greece and Italy afford examples in the course publican of the transition from monarchy to democracy. Two annual in°^t°hi^ magistrates, whose title is unknown, were chosen out of a single Chaonla ruling family. 1 So at Athens the Archons were for a long time and Thes- chosen exclusively out of the old royal house. So, if we believe ^^ the conjectures of Niebuhr, the Tarquinii ^ at one time and the Fabii ^ at another had a right, legal or prescriptive, to have one of the Roman Consuls chosen from among them. The Molossians, Constltu- on the other hand, were governed by Kings, but they were Kings ?,™*^ , of heroic Greek blood, and constitutional monarchy must have jq no- made some advances among them. The hereditary principle was lossls. so firmly established that a Regent could be trusted to act fpr a b.o. 429. minor King.* On the other hand, the Molossian King met his people in their National Assembly at Passaron, where the King swore to govern according to the Law, and the People swore to preserve his Kingdom to him according to the Law.^ The temporary greatness of the Molossian Kingdom under Alexander b.o. 350- and Pyrrhos is matter of general history. Our immediate ^'^■ business is with the republican government which succeeded on the bloody extinction of royalty and the royal line. Epeiros b.o. 239- now became a Republic ; of the details of its constitution we ^^' know nothing, but its form can hardly fail to have been Federal.^ The Epeirots formed one political body ; Polybios always speaks Federal of them, like the Achaians and Akarnanians, as one people acting ;^^J;peiros with one will.' Decrees are passed, Ambassadors are sent and received, in the name of the whole Epeirot people, and Epeiros had, like Akarnania, a federal coinage bearing the common name of the whole nation. Epeiros was, undoubtedly in all its dealings wth other nations, one Republic. But it is hard to see how a ' Thuo. ii. 80. Bdp^apot Si Xdoves x'^'oi i^aalXeuroi, Siv ryyovvTO iir iTrj(Tl' Kopbeioi jxkv koX Qri§aioi, .... /it; airivteffdai * A.d'qvaiois dXX' i^atpeip. ' lb. iii. 5, 3. Oi ^v rais Gii/Sais Tpoea-T&res .... welSovcn AoKpoiis. '' lb. iv. 2, 17 et seqq. 8 Tittmann (p. 696) seems to me to under-rate tbroughout the practical supremacy of Thebes dviring our first period. 8 Thuc. iv. 91. Tfix SXKav /SoiMTopx"". '^^ f'"'"' ^"Sexa, oi ^vvmuvoivTav /lAx^"^''-^ .... XlayiivSas o AloXdSov, ^MUTapxuiv ix Qti^uv fier' 'ApiavdlSov ToC Ami/iaxlSov, koI ■hyefwi'ias oiSa-ijs airov, k.t.X. where see Dr. Arnold's note, and compare Boeokh, vol. 1. p. 727, and Mr. Whiston in Diet, of Autt. art. 126 MINOK CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE chap. Subject Districts or Sub- ordinate Leagues. Office of the Boeo- tarchs. purpose the number is indifferent ; the important point for us is that Thebes chose two Boeotarchs,^ and each of the other cities one.^ The same narrative from which we learn this fact shows also that, besides the cities which were, in name at least, sovereign states, Boeotia, like Switzerland in the old time, con- tained districts which did not enjoy direct Federal rights, but which were connected, in some subordinate way, with some one or other of the sovereign cities.^ It may however be doubted whether these dependencies were, strictly speaking, subject districts, like the Italian possessions of Uri, or whether Boeotia was not, like the Grisons, a League made up of smaller Leagues. However this may be, the Boeotarchs, as representatives of the several Boeotian cities, were the supreme military commanders of the League,* and, as it would appear, the general adminis- Boeotarches. [The Bceotarchs are mentioned in Herodotos ix. 15. 01 yhp jSotwrapxat fieTeir^f^^avTo roiis irpoGX^P^^^ "^^^ ^AcrwTrtwp.] ^ Boeolih (u.s.) explains the second Theban Bceotarch to have been the representative of some town formerly a member of the League, but after- wards merged in Thebes. This is a highly probable explanation of the origin of the custom ; practically the double Theban Bceotarohy, like the four members for the City of London, represented the superiority of Thebes to the other cities. ^ Mr. Grote (vi. 523) spealcs of the Boeotarchs as consisting of "two chosen from Thebes, the rest in unlinown proportions by the other cities. " Certainly ThucydidSs does not directly say that there was one Bceotarch from each city, but almost every scholar seems to have taken it for granted (see Hermann, Pol. Ant. § 179, Eng. Tr.), and it is hard to imagine any arrangement by which any sovereign city would be left without its Bceotarch. This narrative of Thucydides, and another which will presently be referred to, are, as far as I know, our only authorities for the number and power of the Bceotarchs during this first period of the League. With the Bceotarchs of the days of Epameinfindas we have as yet no concern. [With the position of Thebes in the Bceotian League, compare that of Davos in the Ten Jurisdictions. See Histoire de la Confederation Suisse (translated from the History of J. von Miiller and continued), vol. xii. p. 612. Cf. also the privileged position of Chur in the Gotteshausbund, ib. xiii. 356 ; and the preponderance of the City of Zug in the canton of Zug, ib. xiv. 226, and Bluntsohli, Gesch. des schweiz. Bundesrechtes, i. 422.] ' Thuc. iv. 76. Xaipiimeiai' Si, fj is 'Opxi/J-evov .... fwreXci, where see Arnold's note. I cannot help thinking that tlie word ^wreKetv implies a greater degree of freedom in these dependent places than Dr. Arnold allows. See also Boeckh, i. 728. * It may be doubted whether the words frY^fwi'la.s oia-r/s airou, in the passage of Thucydides (iv. 91) quoted above, imply that the supreme command was always vested in a Theban Bceotarch, or whether it was merely the turn of Pag&ndas to command that particular day. It is worth notice that the Boeotian army at that time was not drawn up in any uniform order but the troops of each city followed their own customs. The Thebans were twenty-iive deep, the others in different proportions. Thuc. iv, 93. IV CONSTITUTION OF THE BCEOTIAN LEAGUE 127 trators of Federal affairs. This is the ordinary position of the military commanders in a Greek state, as we see by the au- thority possessed by the Ten Generals at Athens, and by the Federal General of the Achaian League. The Boeotarchs of course b.c. 424. command at Delion, but they also act as administrative magis- b.o. 397. trates of the League by hindering Ag^silaos from sacrificing at Aulis.^ We see something more of their functions in a narrative of ThucydidSs which gives us almost our only glimpse of the internal working of the Boeotian Federal constitution. During nearly the whole of our first period, the Boeotian government was oligarchic. Just as in Achaia each city had its local democratic Assembly and the League had its Federal democratic Assembly, so in Boeotia the Federal Government was oligarchic, and we cannot doubt that the government of each particular city was oligarchic also.^ The supreme power of the League The Four was vested in the Four Senates of the Boeotians.^ Of the Senates. constitution of these Senates we know absolutely nothing ; but it is most probable that the division was a local one, and that the Four Senates represented four districts. If so, it shows that the Federal bond in Boeotia must have been much laxer than it was in Achaia, and the necessity of consulting several Assemblies suggests resemblances between the constitution of Boeotia and the constitution of the United Provinces. Still less do we know how four co-ordinate Senates were kept in b.o. 421, harmony together ; but the only glimpse which we get of ^ Xen. Hell. iii. 4. 4. Oi ^oiiin-apxoi .... Tifi^avres iirT^as, k.t.X. This has a military sound, but it was doubtless in strictness a measure of police. " Mr. Whiston (Diet, of Antt. ) is doubtless justified by analogy in supposing that each Boeotian city had its own jSouX^ or Senate, and Sij/ios or Popular Assembly (see Boeckh, 1. 729), but the passage which he quotes from XenophSn hardly proves it (Hell. v. 2. 29). It merely speaks of a Theban jSouXtJ and that during the time (b. o. 382) when the Confederation was in abeyance. I am not clear about the existence of Popular Assemblies in the Boeotian cities during our first period. There is, as might be expected, abundant evidence for their ex- istence in later times, but I doubt whether any of the many inscriptions in Boeckh, which mention a S^/io$, belong to the days of the old oligarchic League. ^ Thuo. V. 38. Tats riacrapn ^ouXais tCiv Boiut&v .... aiTrep dirav rb Kupos ^x""'^"'- Tittmann (p. 695) assumes their representative, and denies their aristocratic, character. The latter at least is clear enough. A Federal Stj/jlos, like that of the Achaians, is mentioned in later inscriptions (see Boeckh, i. 728) ; but one can hardly fancy its having even a nominal existence earlier than the revolution of Pelopidas. 128 MINOR CONFEDERATION'S OF ANCIENT GREECE chap. Diplo- matic Action of the Senates and the Bceotarchs, Federal and Local Archons. them sets them before us as submissive and tractable bodies, which commonly did little more than register the edicts of the Bceotarchs. 1 Their constitutional powers seem to have been something like those of the American Senate ; the Bceotarchs propose to them a scheme of a treaty, which it rests with them to accept or to reject. We may even believe that the Senates were, on such matters at least, only authorized to consider proposals made to them by the Bceotarchs, and that they had no initiative voice of their own.^ It is clear that the actual negociation was carried on wholly by the Bceotarchs, just as it would be by an American President and his Ministry. In this particular case the Bceotarchs fully expected that the Senates would have ratified their proposals without examina- tion or explanation, and they were much surprised at finding the proposed treaty rejected.^ The whole story gives us a very poor impression of the management of the Boeotian Foreign Ofiice. Though the Bceotarchs were, like the Athenian Generals, practically the most important officers of the state, yet, like the Athenian Generals, they did not stand formally at its head. The nominal chief of the League was a magistrate called the Archon of the Boeotians,* whose name seems to have been used as a date even in purely local proceedings in the several cities.^ We also find local Archons in the several cities.^ Though many of the inscriptions which record the names of these Archons are doubtless later than the Peace of Antalkidas, or even than Kassander's restoration of Thebes, still the analogy of other states would lead us to believe that the Archons, both of the League and of its several cities, were magistrates of the highest antiquity. Probably ^ Cf. Grote, vii. 34. They must, as Boeckh (i. 728) remarks, have been assembled in one place. ^ See Arnold's note on Thuc. v- 38. * Thuc. ib. Oldfievoi. tt]v ^ovKtjv, k&v /mtj eiVwfftc, o^k dXXa i/'T^^teto'^at ij 8, ffcplai irpodiayvivTes irapaLvouaLv, * See the inscription in Boecldi, No. 1594 (vol. i. p. 776). Mr. Whiston infers from this inscription that the Federal Arohon "was probably always a Theban. " As the inscription specially mentions that the particular Arohon commemorated was a Theban, I should have inferred the contrary. This inscription is of a later date than the restoration by Kaasander. ^ See the inscription in Leake's Northern Greece, ii. 132. XapoTrlvui S.pxovTos BoLOTots, K.T.X. ^ See Rose, Insoriptt. Grascc. 264 et seqq. IV MAGISTRATES OF THE B(EOTIAN LEAGUE 129 the Boeotian, like the Athenian, Archon had once been the real ruler of the state, and had been gradually cut down to a routine of small duties, sweetened by the honoiu- of giving his name to the year. Of the particular Archon of Thebes, Thetan Plutarch ^ records an usage, which, though his mention of it Archon belongs to a time later than our present date, must surely have p^^nt been handed down from very early times. The Theban Archon, at least in the interval between the occupation of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas and the delivery of Thebes by Pelopidas, was b.o. 382- chosen by lot,^ and kept a sacred spear of office always by 379. him.^ These customs are not likely to have been of recent introduction ; they savour of high antiquity, and point to the Archon as a venerable pageant rather than as a magistrate possessing real authority. He is spoken of, not as a ruler Real power but as a sacred person, and it is clear, from the whole narrative °f the Po- of Xenophdn and Plutarch, that the main powers of the state ^™^° '■ were then in the hands of Polemarchs.* Yet, with all this show of good Federal Government, the true Federal spirit could have had no place in a League where every- Power of thing was carried on in the selfish interest of a single city. Thebes What the position of Thebes in the Boeotian League really was ^jje™is\° is shown by the whole history of the brave and unfortunate city tory of of Plataia. The Plataians set the first recorded example of Piataia. Secession from a Federal Union. But it was most certainly not geceggion Secession without a cause. The Plataians broke through their from the Federal obligations, they forsook the ancestral laws of all League, ' De Genio Socratis, 30. ^ lb. 6 KvdfitffTot dpx^^' " The sacred spear can hardly fail to have been an institution of the remotest antiquity, and it points to a time when the Theban Archon, like the Athenian Polemarch, had really been a military commander. But his appointment by lot is not likely to have been introduced at Thebes, any more than at Athens, until the office had become a mere pageant. When an office is disposed of by lot, it is, as Mr. Grote shows, a sign that the office is no longer thought to require special qualifications, but is held to be within the compass of an average citizen. The lot is not necessarily democratic ; as the great equalizer, it is just as likely to be introduced into an oligarchic body where the feeling of equality among the members of the ruling order is commonly very strong. Rotation, as practically adopted in the appointment of the Lord Mayor of London and of the Vice-Chancellors of the Universities, goes on the same principle as the lot. It implies that the office requires no special qualifications, but that one member of the class from whom its occupants are taken is as able to fill it as another. * See especially Xen. Hell. v. 2. 30. ToC vS/iov KeXeiovros i^eivai iroXe/idpxv \a^eiv, e( tls SokcI d^ia Oavdrov ttoluv. 130 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE chap. Ill-feeliug between Thebes and other Towns, n.c. 407. B.C. 423. Thespia. Boeotia,^ but it was because those obligations and tbose laws had been perverted into mere instruments of Theban domination. They found the Theban yoke too hard to bear, and they sought for aid against the oppressor, first at Sparta and then at Athens.^ Even thus early, Secession from the Boeotian League was looked on by impartial spectators as a right to be secured against the overwhelming ascendency of Thebes. The Corinthians, when called in as mediators, determine that Thebes has no right to control any city which does not wish to belong to the Boeotian Confederation.^ It is clear that language like this would never be used of any really equal Confederation in any age. If a mediator were to be called in to settle American differences, the form of his decree would not be that New York should leave the Con- federate States undisturbed. That the example of Plataian secession was not followed by other cities may be partly owing to geographical causes. No other Boeotian city, except Tanagra, lay so temptingly near to a powerful protector. And the events of the Peloponnesian War at once tended to beget a bitter feeling between Athens and the Boeotians generally and to show how little real help Athens was able to give to a dependency beyond Mount Kithair6n.* But towards the end of the war, we hear in general terms of strong disaffection towards Thebes on the part of the smaller cities,*^ and in one case, even before the Peace of Nikias, in the very year after the common Boeotian victory at Delion, the Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespia, on the ground of the "Atticism" of the inhabitants.^ The language of Thucydid^s would almost imply that this was a mere act of high-handed Theban violence, without even the form of ^ Thuc. iii. 66 et al. Ta irdvTOjv BoLbnuv Trdrpta. I cannot believe in any rivalry between Thebes and Plataia, such as Drumann (437) seems to imply, as if Plataia disputed the first place in the League with Thebes. Drumann also strangely omits all mention of the connexion between Plataia and Athens. 2 Herod, vl. 108. Tne^ei/ievoi iiirb Q-q^alav. Thuc. iii. 55. 6Ve QriPatoi ijficis i^idcravTO. ^ Herod, (u.s.) 'Bop Orj^atovs BoiutS;' roils fi^ ^ovKo/Jvovs is Boiuroi>s reX^et;', * See Grote, iv. 222. * Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 2. Boiuruc /iij/ yap ttoXXoi, irXeoveKToi/Kvoi. virt) Qti^aluv, SvaiJ.ivws airois ^X"""^'"' 'A9'^yij(ri Sk oiSiv opS toiovtov. The date of this dialogue, which I have already had occasion to quote (see above, p. 22), between SSkrates and the younger PeriklSs, is fixed to the year 407 by Periklgs being spoken of as a newly-elected General. He was one of the unfortunate com- manders at Arginousai. ^ Thuc.'iv. 133. Q-q^aloi Qea-TJav reixos TepieTKov, k.t.X IV POSITION AND CLAIMS OF THEBES 131 legitimate Federal action. He adds that the Thebans had long wished to destroy Thespia, and now found their opportunity. The city could not resist, because the flower of its warriors had fallen in the war with Athens. Such examples as this and that of Plataia might well cause a sullen acquiescence in Theban domination. Against Thebes backed by Sparta, resistance was hopeless. It was not till long after, when Thebes and Sparta orolio- were enemies, that, at last, on a favourable opportunity during menos, the Corinthian war, Orchomenos openly seceded.^ The event is ^■°- 3^^- recorded by XenophSn in the form commonly used to express the revolt of a subject or dependent state. But, long before this, in the famous pleadings as to the fate of Plataia, though piataia. the Thebans put prominently forward the general principles of b.o. 427. Boeotian Federalism, still the whole is practically treated as a dispute between Plataia and Thebes. The Plataians ask that they may not be given up to the vengeance of the Thebans ; they pray that Plataia may not be destroyed, and its territory not be annexed to that of Thebes.^ They prayed in vain ; the. captives were massacred, their city was destroyed, and their territory was confiscated, not to the profit of the Boeotian Union, but to that of the Theban State. ^ Thus the power of Thebes went on increasing,* and no doubt the discontent of the smaller cities went on increasing also, down to the time of the Peace of Antalkidas. Then we first find the Theban Theban claims formally put forth in all their fulness, but only, claims at as it proved, to bring utter dissolution upon the whole Con- ^\^^TT federacy. In the Plataian conference all that the Thebans had kidas, ventured formally to claim was a primacy, expressed by a word ^ b.o. 387. familiar to Greek diplomatic language, and not formally incon- sistent vnth the independence of the smaller towns. Afterwards we have seen the Boeotarchs, themselves Federal magistrates, going through at least the form of consulting the Federal Councils. But now the Thebans openly put themselves forward as the representatives, or rather as the sovereigns, of all Boeotia. ' Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 6. '0 /liv Aia-avSpos .... 'Opxofieylovs iir^ffTija-e Oripatav. ^ Thuc. iii. 58. 'T/ieis 5^ el Kreve^re iifias Kai x"/""" '■V UXarculSa QTi^atda TTOiTjtrere. ' lb. 68 (the whole chapter). * Manso, Sparta, iii. 150. Theben begniigte sioh nicht die erste, es verlangte die Hauptstadt im bootischen Lande und es in der Art zu seyn, wie in Lakonien Sparta. ^ Thuc. iii. 61. OiK ii^lovv oBtoi, Sxfirep ir&x^V rlnrpCiTov, ■qye/ji.oi'eiecrOai 132 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE chap. Antalkidas comes down with his rescript from the Great King, ordering that all Greek cities should be independent.'^ It suited the policy of Sparta ^ to construe this independence in the strictest sense everywhere except in Lakonia. When the Peace was to be sworn to, according to the usual Greek custom, by the representatives of every power concerned, Ambassadors from Thebes, not Bceotarchs or Ambassadors from the Four Councils, demanded to take the oaths on behalf of all Boeotia.^ The Spartan King AgSsilaos refused to receive their oaths, or to admit them to the benefits of the Peace, unless they formally recognized the independence of every Greek city, great and small. The Ambassadors had no such instructions from then- Government,* and it required a Lacedaemonian declaration of war to bring Thebes to consent to such terms. They were evidently understood as a formal renunciation of all Theban Dissolu- superiority in Boeotia, and apparently as a formal dissolution of tion of the the Boeotian League in any shape. As the Thebans consented CEO lan p^ ^j^g required recognition of independence,^ we may conclude B.O. 387. t^8,t every Boeotian city entered into the terms of the treaty as a sovereign commonwealth, and we may thus look upon the old Boeotian Federation as formally dissolved. Second The second portion of Boeotian history includes the splendid Period, day of Theban greatness under Pelopidas and Epamein6ndas. B.^0^ 387- As I am not writing a History of Greece, but a History of Federal Government, all that I have to do is to pick out from the general narrative such points as bear directly upon the Federal relations between Thebes and the other Boeotian towns. By the Peace of Antalkidas all Greek cities, great and small, became independent under the guaranty of Sparta. But Sparta seems, throughout Greece, to have interpreted independence The Peace after the same strange fashion as she had interpreted it after °^ tte'^ °"* the end of the Peloponnesian War. Either at once or, as is interest of «iore likely, gradually after some interval,^ the several cities 3^^387-2. ^ ■^^^' ^^\^- 1- 21- '^^^ S^aXXas BXXi;v£5as rdXeis Kal fUKp&s Kal /ieydXas 2 lb. V. 2. 16. EUbs i^as [Aa/ce5ai/ioc(ous] t^s /j^v Boioirlas imfisXtid^vai Stojs 117} Kad' §y e&/. ^ lb. V. 1. 32. Oi 5^ Oij/Snioi ti^Low iirip tt&vtuv BoiutSi' d/iviyau * lb. Oi di tOv OriPaiuv irp^o-^eis IXeYo;/ Sti oiK iTre(rTa\fjLij>a crtpln toOt' ^ lb. V. 1. 33. Qji^atoL 5' eis tois airovSh,^ da-eXeelv ipiayKiaBtiaav, airovS/Movs iv avSpwv Tois KoanioiTirovs eivofioOvrac ydp, k.t.'X. He does not call them eivofioviulvas simply as being oligarchic, as he goes on to blame the ill government of oligarchic Thessaly — eicei yhp 8t) TrXeiffTT] ara^ia Kal dKoXaaia, 2 Xenophon himself uses the strong word Smatrrela, only less strong than Tvpanh, meaning in fact a Tyranny in the hands of several persons instead of one only. 'Bk ifacrais yap rais 7r6Xe' dper^s. ^ See a noble passage in Arnold's Eome, ii. 331. " Pausanias (ix. 13. 2) evidently confounded the two occasions, as he intro- duces EpameinSndas as the Theban orator before the Peace of Antalkidas. ■* It is certainly hard at first sight to reconcile the accounts of this event given by XenophSn (Hell, vi, 3. 19) and by Plutarch' (Ages. 28) and Pausanias (see last note). But they do not seem to me quite so contradictory as Mr. Grote thinks them (x. 231, note). In Xenoph6n's story, the Theban Ambassadors first allow Thebes to be set down as having sworn, and on the next day demand (iKiXevov) to have the name " Thebans " struck out, and ' ' Boeotians " substituted. Mr. Grote asks " why should such a man as Epamein8ndas (who doubtless was the envoy), consent at first to waive the presidential claims of Thebes, and to swear for her alone ? If he did consent, why should he retract the next day ? " Now it strikes me that the proceeding is capable of another explanation, and that there is no " waiving of presidential claims, " and no " retracting the next day. " It is evident from the language of all the historians and orators, that the supre- macy of Thebes was now far more openly avowed than it had been under the old League, and that the word " Theban " was now constantly used where " Boeotian " would have been used in the preceding century. The Thebans might well swear as "Thebans," meaning to carry with them the whole of their confederates ; to say "Theban" rather than "Boeotian" might be meant not as any "waiving of presidential claims," but rather as the strongest way of asserting them. But Aglsllaos might very well choose to take it in a contrary sense ; he would call on 138 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE chap. each to swear in its own name '^ as a sovereign commonwealtli. The Thebans again refuse ; they are again excluded from the treaty, but this time with very different results. Their former refusal and exclusion had been followed by their submission, by the dissolution of the Boeotian League, at last by the occupation of the Theban Kadmeia by a Lacedeemonian garrison. The B.C. 371. present refusal and exclusion was indeed followed by a Lacedae- monian invasion of Boeotia, but that invasion was crushed at the B.C. 369. fight of Leuktra, and soon after repaid by the presence of the Theban invaders in Sparta itself. In this negociation, as in the former one, Thebes formally claims to be regarded as the head of Boeotia, the representative of the whole Boeotian body towards other powers. She demands to be looked upon as capable of contracting, by her single act, international obligations binding on all the Boeotian cities. In Gradual this negociation, as in the former one, the Spartan King refuses growth tQ recognize Thebes in any such character. He knows Thebes, Theban '^''^^J '^^ ^^ knows Orchomenos, as one Boeotian city out of several, claims. capable of contracting for herself alone, and whose obligations are binding on no other Boeotian commonwealth. Here is indeed a change on both sides since the Lacedsemonian judges sat to decide between the conflicting arguments of Theban and Plataian orators. Then all that Thebes formally claimed, whatever she practically exercised, was a mere supremacy implying no absolute subjection, and even that she grounded on old Boeotian custom, and on her own rights as the supposed metropolis ^ of the other Boeotian towns. Then, whatever Thebes claimed, Sparta, as her interest then dictated, was ready to allow. Now Thebes employs, even in her formal claims, the language, no longer of a metro- polis or of a Federal president, but of a sovereign, or rather of a tyrant, city. Now Sparta, in pursuance of what has now become her interest, denies not only the claims lately advanced by Thebes, but the general principle of any kind of Boeotian the other Boeotian cities to swear separately ; the Thebans would then demand to have the doubtful word " Thebans " changed into " Boeotians ; " that is, to have their oath taken as the oath of all Boeotia. Then would follow the lively dialogue between Epamein8ndas and Aggsilaos recorded by Plutarch and Pausanias, pre- ceded probably by some such reasoning on the Theban side as Mr. Grotu supposes. [Cf. Vischer, Kleine Schriften, i. 559, and see Appendix iii.] ' This is more clearly brought out by Pausanias (ix. 13. 2) than by any one else. ' Thuc. iii. 61. "B/idv Knai-VTUv TlXiraiav iiarepov rri^ dXXijs Boiwrias K.T.X. ' IV COMPARISON OK THEBES AND SPARTA 139 unity, a principle certainly as old as any other immemorial fact of Grecian politics. But if the claims of Thebes had grown between the siege of Plataia and the Peace of Antalkidas, they had again grown between the Peace of Antalkidas and the nego- ciations at Sparta.^ Here, on her own ground, Spartan pride Parallel received such a home -thrust from the audacious Theban as m^*^T^®° Spartan pride had never before dreamed of. Epameindndas Boeotia ventured on a parallel such as assuredly the most daring imagina- and Sparta tion had never ventured on before. Thebes will recognize the ™ Lakoma. independence of the Boeotian towns when Sparta recognizes the independence of the Lakonian towns. Thebes will allow Orcho- menos to swear as a separate commonwealth, when Sparta allows Amyklai to swear as a separate commonwealth. Here the claims of Thebes stand plainly before us in the naked form of unalloyed tyranny. We have already more than once seen the Boeotian cities described, in relation to Thebes, by the same name of sub- jection by which the Lakonian cities ^ are described in relation to Sparta. We now see this parallel in all its fulness formally avowed as a principle of Theban politics. The Boeotian towns are to be mere Perioikoi of Thebes, no longer sovereign members of a Boeotian League, of which Thebes was at most a constitu- tional President. The comparison was equally daring in the claims which it made on behalf of Thebes and in the threat which it implied against Sparta. No such revolutionary words 1 See Xen. Hell. vi. 3. 2. ^ Isok. Panath. 179. 'OvdfMat /j^v irpocayopevofjiivovs ws TroKets olKOvvra^, TTjv d^ Sij^afuv ^x°^'^°'^ iXoLTTOj twv d'^ifiuv twv irap' ijfup. The whole passage is a curious picture of the position of the ireploLnoi. Of course an Attic 5%os, as such, was politically nothing, hut its inhabitants severally wei'e Athenian citizens ; a Lakonian iriXis was also politically nothing, while its inhabitants severally were mere helpless subjects of Sparta. The Lakonian ttAXcis are mentioned in rather a different way in a curious passage of Herodotos (vii. 234) where Demaratos tells Xerxes of the many Lacedaemonian cities, among which he merely speaks of Sparta as the greatest, and inhabited by the bravest among the brave Lacedaemonians. Herodotos was not a politician like Thuoydides or Polybios, still less was he a pamphleteer like Isokrates ; such a description was quite enough for his conception of a picturesque dialogue between Xerxes and Demaratos, without bringing in political distinctions which Xerxes would not have understood. But a mere " English reader " might be led seriously astray as to the political condition of Lakonia by reading this single passage of Herodotos by itself. Yet strange to say, Professor Rawlinson, who discusses at large the population of the city of Sparta, and who adds to the Book a learned dissertation about Alarodians and Orthocorybantes, does not vouchsafe the " English reader " the least information as to the real political condition of Amyklai and Epidauros Limera. On these Perioikic TriXeis see Grote, ii. 484 et seqq. 140 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE cHAr. had ever before been heard in any Grecian congress. No Greek had ever yet questioned the absolute rights of Sparta over the Lakonian towns. No Spartan, probably no Greek, had ever before imagined that treaties requiring that every Greek city should be independent might be so construed as to make Amyklai independent of Sparta as well as to make Orchomenos independent of Thebes. Epameindndas now put forth a principle which at once loosened the very foundations of Spartan dominion, and he lived to carry out his principle in the most practical shape. Before his work was over, he had rent away from Sparta half B.C. 369. her territory, and had set up an independent Mess^nS in opposi- tion to Sparta, as Sparta had set up an independent Plataia in opposition to Thebes. It is impossible not to rejoice even at the mere humiliation of Sparta, and still more so at the restoration The claims of the heroic commonwealth of Mess^n^.i But it is clear that exclude ^all *^® words of Epameindndas contained a sentence of death against true Fede- Boeotian Federalism or Bceotian freedom in any shape ; 2 it is ralism in clear that, though he held back his unworthy countrymen from '^° '*■ the grosser acts of oppression, yet his life was devoted to the mere aggrandizement of the one city of Thebes, and not to the general good of Boeotia or of Hellas. Different as was the general character of our first and our second period of Boeotian history, the terminations of the two B.C. 338. were strikingly alike. After the defeat of Chairdneia, Thebes Restora- had to receive a Macedonian garrison into the Kadmeia, as she tiou of the had before had to receive a Spartan garrison. Plataia, Thespia, TownT*^ Orchomenos, and KorSneia now arose again,^ surrounding Thebes ■' The restoration ot MessgnS however, except as a mere blow to Sparta, proved a failure. The career of the restored Messlnians is inglorious, quite unworthy of the countrymen of the half-mythic Aristomenes, or of the gallant exiles of Naupaktos. The glory of Bpameinondas as a founder is to have been the creator of Megalopolis. ^ Mr. Grote thinks that the words of Epamein6ndas do not imply that he claimed that "Thebes was entitled to as viuch power in Boeotia as Sparta in Laconia" (x. 231, 234) but only that the Federal union of Bojotia under the presidency of Thebes should be looked on as being " an integral political aggre- gate " as much as Lakonia " under Sparta, " or as Attica — he does not venture to say "under Athens." Surely there is no analogy between a Federal head of several independent cities, a despot city ruling oVer several subject cities, and a country where the whole, is so to speak, one city, while the smaller towns are mere parishes. Unless BpameiuSndas meant his parallel between Thebes in Bceotia and Sparta in Lakonia to be exact in all points, it has no force at all, and it is open to an obvious retort. And certainly the position of Sparta in Lakonia was utterly inconsistent with Federalism or with freedom of any kind. ^ Paus. iv. 27. 10 ; ix. ^7. 8. He assigns the restoration to Philip, Arrian (i. 9. 10) to Alexander. / IV THIRD PERIOD OF BCEOTIAN HISTORY 141 with allies of Macedonia even more zealous and hostile than they had been in their former character as allies of Sparta. The troops of these cities served heartily with Alexander in his campaign against Thebes, ^ and it was by their voices ^ that the tyrant city was devoted to the destruction which she had so Destruc- often inflicted upon others. As Thebes had enriched herself '*"" «* with the territory of four of her Boeotian sisters, so, now that ^.Texander her own day was come, the Macedonian conqueror divided the b.o. 335. whole Theban territory among his Boeotian allies. Thebes now Zealous co- vanishes for a while from among the cities of the earth. As one °ftj,V'"^ of the bulwarks of independent Greece against Macedonia we Boeotian may lament her fate ; but the special historian of BcBOtian Towns. Federalism cannot weep for her. The third period of BcEotian history may be more briefly gone through. The part played by Boeotia in the later history Third of Greece is almost always contemptible ; and of the few im- Period, b.c. portant events in which she was concerned I shall speak else- where. Thebes did not long remain a ruin or a sheep-walk, an example of the fate to which she had herself once wished to reduce Athens.^ As she had found a Macedonian destroyer, she b.c. 405. now found a Macedonian restorer. Thebes was restored by Eestora- Kassander:* it would seem with some sort of formal consent ^ !j™°^ , . T1I6D6S DV on the part of the other Boeotian towns. They of course were Kassander deeply interested in a proceeding which might possibly threaten b.o. 316. them with a mistress, and which, in any case, involved an imme- diate surrender of territory. On the other hand, to say nothing of the power of Kassander and of the general feeling of Greece in favour of Theban restoration, it is quite possible that the ' Arrian, i. 8. 8. Diod. xvii. 13. Airian mentions also the Ph61iians. ^ Ajr. i. 9. 9. Tots 5^ fieraax^^'^^ "^^^ ^pyou ^vfifidxoLs {oh Si] Kcd iTr^arpe^ei/ 'AXi^avSpos rk Kara ras 6^j3os SiaffeTvai) T^f ixh Kad/j,elav ippovpg. kut^x^iv ISofe, TJiv TrSXiv S^ KaraSKd^ai sis ^dav. xxiii. 2. arpaTriyovvTos 'XtttIov. So Livy xlii. i3 talks of the Boeotian " Prator," his regular translation of ffrpaTTiySs. ^ Pol. xvili. 26. Liv. xxxiii. 27. Plut. Arat. 16. * Pol. xx. 5. ^ Liv. xxxiii. 2. Omnium Boeotia civitatum suffragiis acoipitur. ' The only expression which looks like it (Pol. xxvii. 5) Qri^alovs papeh ovras iitiKeiaBai., refers to the dissensions between the Eoman and Macedonian parties just before the dissolution of the League. ' See Pol. XX. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 335 et seqq. 8 Liv. xxxiii. 1. Thirlwall, viii. 336. 144 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE chap. Dissolu- tion of the League by Quintus Marcius, B.C. 171. the Macedonian Kings ; it was finally carried out in its fullest extent by the subtle machinations of Roman diplomacy. The course of the war with Perseus gave the Roman Ambassador Quintus Marcius an opportunity of bringing about the dissolu- tion of the League of Boeotia, which I shall describe more at large in a future chapter. His combined intrigues and violence gradually induced the several cities to desert their Federal Union, and to place themselves, one by one, under Roman protection. 1 Thus did the Boeotian League fall asunder,^ and I see no reason to infer from a casual expression of a single writer, that the political union between the Boeotian towns was restored at any later time.^ ^ Pol. xxvii. 1. 2. Liv. xlii. 43. 44. Thirlwall, viii. 437. ^ Pol. xxvii. 2. Td S^ rCiv BocwtQv edvos iirl iroKiv XP^^°^ ffVVTeTTjfyqKhs t'^v KOivi]p uv^TrdkLTelav, koI 7roX\oi)s koX ttoikIKovs Kaipods diaire^evybs irapaSo^us, rdre irpoTreTWs Kal aXoyiffTOJs ixdfjxpov ret, Trapb, H^pcreojs^ elKrj kclI TraLdapLuSws irrfyqd^v KareXidri KaX dtea-Kopiriffdr} /carA ird'Xeis. The difference between edvos and 7r6Xts, in the political language of Polybios, is that between a Federal State and a single city. See xx. 3, and many other passages. Livy habitually represents the words by "gens" and "civitas." He also often uses "populus" in the sense of State or Canton as a member of a League. Mommsen (i. 582) holds that the formal dissolution of the League did not take place till B.C. 146. I do not see how this can be reconciled with the words of Polybios and Livy. A Bceotarch is spoken of in the interval, but he is apparently a purely Theban magistrate — /Soiwrapxw" rriviKavTa h Qji^ait. Pans. vii. 14. 6. ' Pausanias (vii. 16. 9 — 10), describing the results of the victory of Mummius (B.C. 146) adds, avviSpiA, re Kara edvos Ti._eKdp, 'AxaiCiv Kal ri h ^uKevv 'lilivav. We may well doubt whether such a formula was commonly used. 2 Blakesley on Herod, vi. 7. "He would have selected TeSs somewhat on the principle on which the site of Washington was selected for the capital of the United States of America. Te8s could never become formidable to the inde- pendence of the members of the Confederation." IV PROJECTED LEAGUE OF OLYNTHOS 149 as Sparta or Athens to follow Phdkian or Akarnanian precedents of union ; they were rather as fully disposed as Sparta or Athens could be to cleave to the full possession of all those sovereign rights which the Hellenic mind held to be inherent in every sovereign Hellenic commonwealth. Far more important in Grecian history is the attempt made Projected by Olynthos, shortly after the Peace of Antalkidas, to organize ^^^S'^^ °f a general confederacy of the Greek and Macedonian cities in [g.c. 382], her own neighbourhood. Sparta, as the interpreter and executor of the Peace, made it her business to hinder any union, whether it took the form of Federation or of subjection, no less among the Chalkidic, than among the Boeotian, towns. A Spartan dissolved army was sent to Ghalkidik^ ; Olynthos was besieged and ^y Sparta, compelled to surrender, and the Olynthian union was dis- solved. The last great English historian of Greece has given to this Olynthian confederacy an interest which it certainly never possessed before.^ There can be no doubt that, seen from Fatal a general Hellenic point of view, the dissolution of the results to Olynthian confederacy was one of the most calamitous events j^^ Djsao- in Grecian history. An Olynthian League, or even an Olynthian lution. Empire, would have given Greece a strong bulwark at the very point where a bulwark was most needed. An Olynthian League, or even a liberally administered Olynthian Empire, would have united all the purely Greek cities of the Macedonian border, together with the most civilized and most Hellenized portions of Macedonia itself. Such an united body might well have formed an effectual barrier against the advance even of Philip and Alexander. Sparta in truth, by her conquest of Olynthos, betrayed the Greeks of Thrace to the Macedonian King,^ just as she had already, by the Peace of Antalkidas, betrayed the Greeks of Asia to the Persian King. It may indeed well be doubted whether, in a general view of the world's history, it would have been a gain to mankind to have cut off the energies of Alexander from any wider field than that of lUyrian and Scythian warfare. But, from a purely Greek point of view, there can be no doubt that the overthrow of the Olynthian power was a most unfortunate event for the whole of Greece. And there can be no more doubt as to the character of the Spartan intervention in ChalkidikS than as to the character of the > Grote, X. 67 seqq. = lb. x. 94. 159 TITVOB C05TBI)EILllI05r5 OF ASCJEST GMEECE cbjw. Spnfan •iw iiiri t.^ i i niiat in Bceolia. AD oar snpaiddfs fie mAk an am- snifniAies lie ~«i& Ae SKced Btul c£ Tkeibes afiks v^ai it ntaielied &rdi tO vkfinr at Leakna aad ^mhea fs- irartibai wt^ to d^^ at Cbironea. Bur ifc e anot&ar qcesii;- -wheshsr ^s^e nay not &: Toe aace rraBi* lie calkd upm tD sf^mpaiUie with Akanthri; and Ap iJtMiia a^iwsa (Hni&a% j^isG: ^ W9 srapalUie 'vtit Haiau ^zA Oi ' inwi ii even «gpiiii=fc tie T^di^ c£ Pdbfidas and VpsmsuiamiSis. V^wf cf It eafainir slnkes am Aat lb: G^rale kas drawn &r too ^^ ^fZ^ ^TDmal^ a |acliife oE ffce tetias on wfciA ehe CMjatfaam Tjo^jae, if Leagne -a-e are to call iiu vas denned to lie fnrmiBd. I eannot fcetp sD^ecm^ that tfae ^eaS^ h-"^.' ^?.- of Ai&sinan *J"~'^- DeBMiaaef bss r:rr of Boitf- a.c. ^4. daiBas of ^^SEsalos coming; to a^ — diis dnie ta xik in ^ain — inr Lsi^sd^DHwan k^ against Jason at FliaaL- In &m one ease f=.>dr:-tti nc^^JnBT- S^'^'^'^ hood, bodi &e^ and Haeedanian.' 3te «^ diavi^ Mbeta » Sm. Mill T. i 11— Ml ^1h.^Z.i. Ssr i-bne. fL lis. * Tte i cn«ri>riiwii af Tgst fflj ii iJMi UaaaB to 3la«&Bga c^es, a BAl, «te p<£l:£5: x TfiiiniiiTiM cSoes S^a. HdL t. ^ 13' s^ : Is^ Tfa£ liisrf T^^ E= ~ __ (feoee \ x. 7'i sages^ a &^^ ^ (saes: ^Scd, 'fhg"~'-'-» 3i>8>^ ss^via^sKed &a^ lT^a'««if mn ii^nlit i ^ soiK wiiufEi TTr'^g Ifee idiiifgB :«-i.aiihioL elal. 152 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE ohap. it would be well if we could compare the statements of the Akanthian Kleigenis with those of an Olynthian orator in reply. But one thing is plain; Olynthos offered her terms, liberal or illiberal, at the point of the sword.^ If Akanthos willingly consented, well; if not, Olynthos would make war upon her. And what, after all, did Olynthos offer? Unless the misrepresentations of the Akanthian orator are most Beal na- impudently flagrant, she offered, not equal union in a common ture of the Chalkidian League, but mere absorption into the particular ferS' not commonwealth of Olynthos. What form this absorption would Federal have taken may be doubted. A single expression of Demos- Union, but thenis looks, so far as it is worth anything at all, as if Olynthos into'^oi^. was intended to be the only City strictly speaking. The word thos. which he employs^ is that which denotes, not a League like Phokis or even like Bceotia, but the union of the Attic cities with Athens. But even if, as in the case of Attica, the full Olynthian franchise was to be communicated to all the allied cities, still such a franchise must have proved a mere delusion. Mere distance, and the greatness of some of the cities concerned, would have effectually hindered an union after the Attic pattern. A Federal union was doubtless just what was wanted ; such an union would have provided the needful bulwark against Macedonia without violating the independence of any Grecian city. But there is nothing that shows that any real Federal Council or Assembly was proposed. Akanthos is required to accept the laws and citizenship of Olynthos. The Akanthians naturally answer that they wish to retain their own laws and 1 Xen. Hell. v. 2. 13. Hifixj/avTes Si Kal irpbs ^/ms Kal irphs ' AiroWoividTas ol 'OXiii'^ioi Trpo€Lirov r]iiiv 5rt, el fiij Trapea-Sfj^da ' elxov Kal Mavnv^v ipaTurrji'. * Xen. Hell. v. 2. 1 — 7. 'KaBxipiBii fih t6 tuxos, Sl((ikIcBt) S' -q Mai/Tii/em rerpaxji, KaBairep t6 d.pxatov (^kovv. Cf. Pol. iv. 27. IV EARLY HISTORY OF ARKADIA 155 daemonian partisan Xenoph6n tells us, there were Mantineian oligarchs base enough to find a selfish satisfaction in this degra- dation of their native city.-'- It is more certain that, as soon as the Spartan power was broken at Leuktra, the members thus violently separated were again united. Mantineia appeared Its restora- once more as a city, and again began to take an important part *'5?' ^°' in the affairs of Arkadia and of Hellas.^ Mantineian patriotism now took a bolder flight than it had ever taken before. The reunion of Mantineia was only to be the precursor of the union Plan of an of all Arkadia. Up to this time there had been no real political Arkadian connexion between the difierent branches of the Arkadian name, (.jq^ The different cities and districts had retained some vague notions of national kindred, and some degree of unity, as in Ionia and elsewhere, had been kept up by common religious rites.^ Arkadia, in short, formed an Amphiktyony of its own, an institution per- Arkadian haps the more needful for a people who had no share in the™l°° general Delphic Amphiktyony. But hitherto the connexion merely had been purely Amphiktyonic ; we find no trace of any real Amphi- political union between the several Arkadian towns. Mantineia ktyomc. and Tegea, the two chief among them, were frequently hostile to one another. At this very time we find them in marked oppo- sition; Tegea adhered to the interest of Sparta, while Man- tineia naturally attached herself to the rising power of Thebes. Under such circumstances, the formation of a general Arkadian Federation was at once a noble conception and a most difficult undertaking. Its author appears to have been LykomMSs of Mantineia,* who certainly merits thereby a high place among the statesmen of Greece. His design for an Arkadian union em- pians of braced a plan for a real Federal Government, and it gave the Lykome- Federal principle a much wider scope than had ever before been ^' opened to it in Grecian affairs. The scheme of LykomMSs was a noble and generous one, and, though it bore but little imme- 1 Xeu. Hell. v. 2. 7. ^ lb. vl. 5, 3. *Ef S)v St] Kal ol MavTiveis, v wSXeoiv. The Lacedaemonian partisan is of course disposed to exaggerate the degree in which the Federal power trenched on the independence of the several cities. But in every Federal Government worthy of the name the central power is xipios Kal r&v TrbXew in all matters coming within its own competence, and it is cleax that the Arkadian Koivbv did not destroy the separate existence of the Ai-kadian cities as States or Cantons. U would have been well if Xenoph6n had told us how the process of vi.Kq.v iv tQ koiv$ was effected, whether the majority of the Ten Thou- sand was ascertained by counting heads, or whether each city had a distinct vote. The latter is more consonant with Greek Federal practice. ^ See the account of the Tegeau revolution in Xen. Hell. vi. 5. 7 et seqq Cf. Grote, x. 285. IV TEMPORARY FEDERAL UNION OF ARKADIA 157 League ; nearly all Arkadia, and a few towns whose Arkadian character was doubtful,^ entered into it with delight. Orcho- General menos indeed, and a few other towns,^ still clave to their com- ^tll^^sion of mi 1 n 1 T p 1 Arkadia to plete separate autonomy. 1 hat they were compelled by force ^ the League. to share the common destinies of the nation was doubtless not abstractedly justifiable, but we could hardly expect it to be otherwise. There are no signs of general compulsion on one side and general unwillingness on the other, such as we have seen in the cases of Thebes and Olynthos. With what zeal the scheme was adopted in most parts of Arkadia, we learn from an incidental notice in the hostile Xenoph6n.* Agesilaos reached the Arkadian town of Eutaia, and found in it only old men, women, and children. Every male of the military age had gone to attend the Arkadian Constituent Assembly, and to take his share in the formation of the Arkadian Federal Constitution.^ For the details of the Arkadian constitution we are, as usual, Constitu- left to incidental notices. Here we have again to deplore the L™„°e loss of the great political work of Aristotle. All that is pre- served of his account of Arkadian matters amounts to the fact that he mentioned the Assembly of the Ten Thousand ; not a detail survives.^ Xenoph6n, the bitter Lacedaemonian partisan, could have told us everything if he had chosen, but he does not even record the foundation of Megalopolis. The existence of the Great City, like that of its sister MessSn^, was so glorious for Epamein6ndas, so disgraceful and calamitous for Sparta, that the renegade Athenian had not the heart to insert their names in his history. Yet it is from Xenophdn's occasional notices that we have to glean most of the little which we do know of the details of the Arkadian Federal system. The League had a Federal Assembly which met at Megalopolis, and was known as 1 Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 26. So vii. 4. 12 (b.o. 365). KjiTa\a/J.piivov(ri.v oi 'HXeiM Aati'\ios, ffTpa.T7]ybs rdv 'ApKiSuiv y^yevrjfihos ; {Diod. xv. 62) AvK0fi.'^d7]s 6 MaPTU/eiJs, urpa/njyhi &v twv 'ApKadoji/. * From the language of Fausanias (viii. 27. 7) and Strabo (viii. 8. 1) it seems that some of the cities were actually deserted, while others were simply reduced to the condition of dependent villages or perhaps of municipal towns. These last were, at a late time (see p. 489), restored to an equality with the capital, as inde- pendent cantons of the Achaian League. ^ Pans. viii. 27. 5, 6. 01 ^v aOriov Kal Akovtcs dvdyKrf KaHiyovTO h tt]v 'M.eydXijv TrAXti', k.t.\, ' lb. viii. 27. 3 — 5. "Xir6 re irpoSvidas Kal did t6 lx8os t4 AaxeSainovluv •jrarpidas (rtpiffiv oHiras iKKtweiv iireidovTO .... (ruveX^yovro is t^v MeydXtjv 7r6\iJ' (TTrouS^, k.t.X. ' See above, p. 113. 160 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE ciiap. tion of the Federal Capital. national sanctuary, such as the great temple of the Arkadian Advanta- Zeus. But if Federal Arkadia was to have a capital at all, there ff°_"^Z°^'" can be no doubt as to the wisdom of the choice actually made. Here we may, with Pausanias,i discern the guiding genius of EpameinSndas. To have chosen Mantineia, Tegea, or any other of the ancient cities, as the Federal capital, would have opened the way to innumerable jealousies, and might even have led to the same evils of which the Arkadians had such a living example before their eyes among their own Boeotian allies. And Epa- mein6ndas himself, when acting as the ccansellor of the Arkadians, would doubtless see the danger as clearly as any Arkadian ; in Arkadia he would advise for the good of all Arkadia, and not be warped by that narrow local patriotism which led even him to sacrifice the general welfare of Boeotia to the selfish interests of Thebes. Had the Ten Thousand met at Mantineia or Tegea, the noble scheme of Lykom^des might only have led to the destruction of that which he had most at heart j he might have become the founder, not of a really equal Arkadian Confedera- tion, but of a mere Mantineian or Tegean Empire over Arkadia. Such a danger was much less to be dreaded from a new city called into being at the will, and for the purposes, of the Con- federation itself. And, besides this, the Great City, as its later history shows, occupied a most important military position. It commanded one of the main passes by which Sparta used to pour her troops into Arkadia. Some such bulwark as was supplied by Megalopolis was imperatively required for the safety of the country. And it was the more needed, because the other chief city of southern Arkadia, and that which commanded the other approach, was Tegea, so lately gained over from subserviency to Spartan interests, and still probably containing a party unfavour- able to the national cause. These considerations might reconcile even distant members to the position of the Federal capital, not in the centre of the Confederation, but on its most exposed border. With Epamein6ndas no doubt the chief object was effectually to shut Sparta in. Megalopolis keeping her in check from the north, and the other- new city of MessSnS from the west. The Arkadian League, as an important Greek power, did not Decline of the Arkadian League. ^ Pausanias distinctly recognizes BpameinSndas as the true founder of Mega-, lopolis. Pans. vUi. 27. 2. yvii/iri /liv TOia&rji trvvifKl^ovTO ol 'ApKdSes, t^s iriXcus 5^ oluffT^s ''Eira/iei.vilivdas 6 OijjSaios criv rip diKaltp KaXoiTO &v, toijs re yd,p 'A/wcdSas oStos fjv 6 iir^yelpas is rhv avvoLKKTixiv, k.t.X. IV DECLINE OF THE AKKADIAN LEAGUE 161 last long. We are not well informed as to the steps of its decline ; but, before the death of Epamein6ndas, Mantineia and b.c. 362. Tegea were again hostile cities. Their positions, during the last stage of his warfare, are singularly reversed from what they had been eight years before. Mantineia is now the ally of Lace- daemdn, and Tegea is the stronghold of the Theban interest in History of Peloponnesos. Megalopolis always remained a considerable city, Megalo- though it did not wholly answer the intentions of its founders, P°"''' either in its extent or in its political importance. At a later period we find it a zealous ally of Macedonia; later still it appears in the more honourable character of an important member of the Achaian League, illustrious as the birthplace of Lydiadas, Philopoim^n, and Polybios. The Assembly of the Ten Thousand survived the loss of LykomSd^s and of Epamei- b.c. 347. n6ndas ; ^schinSs and Demosthenes pleaded before it ; ^ and Demosthenes uses language which implies that it still at least professed to act in the name of the whole Arkadian people.^ Demosthenes himself pleaded the cause of Megalopolitan inde- b.o. 353. pendence before the Athenian Assembly,^ when the Arkadian city was again threatened by Sparta and defended by Thebes,* and when a faction in Megalopolis itself, as before in Mantineia, desired the dissolution of the Great City and the restoration of their own influence over its former petty townships.^ Later again, in the war between Agis and Antipater, all Arkadia b.c. 330. except Megalopolis took the patriotic side ; Megalopolis stood a siege in the interest of Macedonia,® and its losses were repaid by a pecuniary compensation levied on the vanquished cities.'^ Opposition to Sparta would naturally drive Megalopolis into alliance with Macedonia, and it may well be believed that, in the days' of Macedonian domination, selfish interests may have made the position of a powerful city in close alliance with Macedonia appear preferable to that of a Federal capital of Arkadia. Certain it is that, from this time forward, the Macedonian interest was very strong in Megalopolis, and equally certain that no general Arkadian League- existed when the Achaian League began to be organised. The great scheme of LykomMfe, the most promising that any Grecian statesmen had yet designed, had altogether fallen asunder. And yet his labours were far 1 Dem. F. L. 220. 2 g^e jb. 10, 11. ' In the oration inrip M.eya.\oTo\tTwv. * See Thirlwall, v. 367 — 70. i> Thirlwall, v. 368. ^ vEsch. Ktes. 165. ' Q. Curt. vi. 1. 21. M 162 MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE chap. Pretended scheme of Federal Union in EUBOIA. B.C. 351. Schemes of Kallias of Challsis. A.u. 1859. Evidence of the growth of Federal Greece. from being wholly fruitless. He had given a model for the statesmen of later generations to follow, and he had founded the city which was to give birth to the most illustrious Greeks of the last age of Grecian independence. After this Arkadian Confederacy, which, if it had a poor ending, at all events had a grand beginning, it may seem almost ludicrous to quote a mere abortive scheme, or pretence at a scheme, our whole knowledge of which is contained in a single sentence of a hostile orator. Kallias, the Tyrant of Chalkis, he who was defeated by Ph6ki6n at Tamynai, veiled, if we may believe ^schinls, his schemes of ambition under the pretext of founding a general Euboian Council or Assembly in his own city.^ Not a detail is given us, but the words employed seem to show that a pretence at true Federalism was the bait. A Federal scheme proceeding from such a source would probably have borne more likeness to the abortive scheme of an Italian League put forth by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, than to the noble works of Aratos and Washington. But in either case the bait of a Federal Constitution was an instance of the homage which vice pays to virtue. When a Greek Tyrant hit upon such a device to cover his schemes of aggrandizement, it is clear that the Federal principle was now gradually working its way to that influence over the Greek mind which it certainly did not possess in the preceding century, and which it emphatically did possess in the century which followed. The Ltkian League ; its excel- lent Con- stitution. ^ i. Of the Lykian League I will end this chapter with a notice of one Federation more, one not within the limits of Greece, and whose citizens were not Greek by race, but which was so clearly formed after Greek models that it may, in a political history, fairly claim a place in the list of Greek Federal Governments. I mean the wise and well-balanced Confederation of Lykja, whose constitution has won the highest praise from Montesquieu " in the last century, ' .35scli. Ktes. 89. KaXX/as 6 XdKKiSeds, fuKphv SiaXtiriiv xP^''o'', irdXui ^k( (pepS/ievos els ttJp eavroO iai.v, BijSoi/cJj' jxiv t$ Xlryqi awiSpLov is XoXkISo, avv&yav, Iffxvpi-v Si TTjv Etf|8oiac i4>' "^("Ss Ipyip vapaa-Kevdl^ay, i^aXperov S' airQ rvpcwvlSa irpoffTOLoiiievos. Cf. Diet. Biog. art. Callias. 2 Esprit des Lois, ix. 3. "S'il falloit donner un modele d'une belle r(5pnl)lique fdddrative, je prendrois la republique de Lycie." IV THE LYKIAN LEAGUE 163 and from Bishop Thirlwall^ in the present. The antiquities and the language of Lykia have lately attracted the atten- tion of scholars in no small measure. To the political inquirer the country is no less interesting, as possessing what was probably the best constructed Federal Government that the ancient world beheld. The account given by Strabo, our sole authority, is so full, clear, and brief, that I cannot do better than translate it.' The "ancestral constitution of the Lykian League," ^ is described by the great geographer in these words : — " There are three and twenty cities which have a share in the suffrage, and they come together from each city in the Strabo's common Federal Assembly,^ choosing for their place of meeting f™°L"k° n any city which they think best. And, among the cities, the constitu™ greatest are possessed * of three votes apiece, the middle ones of tion. two, and the rest of one ; and in the same proportion they pay taxes,^ and take their share of other public burthens. And the six greatest cities,^ according to Artemid6ros, are Xanthos, Patara, Pinara, Olympos, Myra, T16s, which lies in the direction of Kibyra. And, in the Federal Assembly,^ first the Lykiarch is chosen and then the other Magistrates of the League,^ and bodies of Federal Judges are appointed j^ and formerly they used to consult about war, and peace, and alliance ; this now, of course, they cannot do, but these things must needs rest with the Romans, unless such action be allowed by them, or be found useful on their behalf; and in like manner also judges and ' ii. 116. "The Lyoians set an example of the manner in which the advan- tages of a close federal union might be combined with mutual independence. . . . Had the Greeks on the western coast of Asia adopted similar institutionisi, their history, and even that of the mother-country, might have been very different from what it became." ^ Strabo, xiv. 3. 2. 'H ir6.Tpi.oi Swkria-is toC AvuclkoD ffvariiimTos. "ZiarqiM (Pol. ii. 41) is one of the technical names for a Federation. The Lykians also used the more formal designation Avdav t6 Koivbv (C. I. 4279) and the equally famUiar IScos (C. I. 4239 et al.) 3 Strabo, xiv. 3. 3. 'SvvipxoyTai 5i i^ ixda-Tris irSKeas els KOtviv avviSpiov. [For a list of the Lykian cities see Appendix II.] •* lb. Tpifflx ^ij^iiMi iarlv iKaan) Kvpla. " lb. Tis eliripopd.s daipipovai. rat rds &XKa.s \ciTovpylas. " It would be worth inquiring whether all of these six great cities rejoiced in the title of \a/i«rpoTin) /iTjrpiiroXis toO AvkIwv IBvovs. It wa-s certainly borne by TlSs, Xanthos, and Patara. See C. I. 4240c, 4276, 4280 et al. ' Strabo, U.S. 'Ev rip ffVPeSpl.vv AvkIoiv. See Boeckh, C. I. 4677 (vol. iii. 326), where the words oocnr in an inscription found in Egj'pt, the date of which comes between B.C. 188 and 181. So, immediately after the recovery of their freedom, the same Commune Ludorum dedicated its thank-offering at Rome. [See Boeckh, C. I. 5880 (vol. iii. 768), AvKitiJV t6 KOivbv Kof/.t(rdiJ,evov t7]v Trdrpioy StjfioKpaTiaVj K.T.X.] See Bachofen, p. 23. ^ Pol. xxiii. 3. 01 iiiv Afeioi irpeir^eiovTes ^kov. Pol. xxvi. 7. 'H (rii7- kKtjtos ^x/"?M'r^<'*E "^ots Trapct rwp AvkIwv -^kovctl irpetT^evraU, k.t.X. * lb. 01 yap %i.v6mL .... i^iveji^av Trpeir/SeuTas eis re ttji' 'Ax^tav Kal T-Jji' ''Piifoiv. These seem to be the same with the wapi, tS>v AvkIiiiv TJKovTes Trpea-^evTol. Possibly Xanthos acted, by tacit consent, in the name of the whole nation. ^ Pol. XXX. 5. 'H iriyKhiiTOS i^i^aXe S6yiJ.a Si6ti Set Kapas Kal AvkIovs ^Xevd^povs elvaL Trdvras, li Grote, xii. 529. " Lectures on Ancient History, iii. 352 (Eng. Tr.) et al. ' Gesohichte Alexanders des Grossen ; Hamburg. GeschicMe des Hellen- ismus, 2 vols. Hamburg : 1836. 172 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE uhap. Narrative of Bishop Thirlwall. Earlier Grecian history mainly the history of Athens. Nullity of Athens in the Federal Period. to its conclusion with unflagging powers. With him Aratos and KleomenSs are as essential a part of Hellenic story as Themis- tokl^s and PerildSs. His last volume must always lie before the historian of Grecian Federalism as the best of comments on the work of the illustrious Greek who has handed down to us the tale, too often fragmentary, of the last days of his country's freedom. The truth is that, in reading the earlier history of Greece, we are, for the most part, really reading little more than the history of Athens. We read events as chronicled by Athenian historians; we turn for their illustration to the works of Athenian philo- sophers, orators, and poets. We look at everything from an Athenian point of view ; we identify ourselves throughout with that great Democracy which was the true mother of right and liberty, of art and wisdom. We trace her fortunes as if they were the fortunes of our own land ; when we condemn her acts, we do it with that sort of reluctant feeling with which we acknowledge that our own country is in the wrong. Sparta comes before us as the rival of Athens, Macedonia as the destroyer of her greatness ; of other states we barely think from time to time as their fortunes become connected with those of the schooP and ornament of Greece. In turning to "the Greece of Polybios"^ we feel a kind of shock at finding ourselves in what is in truth another world. It is still Greece ; it is still living Greece ; but it is no longer the Greece of ThucydidSs and Aristophanes. The sea is there and the headlands and the everlasting hills ; Atheng still stands, spear in hand, as the guardian of her chosen city ; Demos still sits in his Pnyx ; he still chooses Archons by the lot and Generals by the uplifted hand ; but the fierce Democracy has sunk into the lifelessness of a cheerless and dishonoured old age ; its decrees consist of fulsome adulation of foreign kings ; ^ its demagogues and orators are sunk into beggars who wander from court to court to gather a few talents of alms for the People which once received tribute from a thousand cities.* Philosophers ^ Thuc. ii. 41. SweXii;/ re X^u r-fiv re iraaav vriXic t^s 'EXXdSos walSevaai eXva.1, K.T.\. 2 Grote, xii. 528. ** Pol. V. 106. 'AOrivatoL S^ , . . twv fUv fiXXaji^ 'T^Wtjvlkwv Trpd^etay oiiS' oTTOtas fiereixov, dKoXoudoOvres S^ Ty ruiv irpoeo'Tdmov aipiacL Kai rats roirtav ipixaXs els irdvTas roiis jSao-iXeis ^^eK^x""''''') ""■^ ndXurra roirav els IlToXefjuuov, kclI irav yivos iir^fievo!' frii.6pov iifitv aira.yov(nv. V DEGRADATION OF ATHENS 173 still babble in her schools about truth and wisdom and virtue and valour ; but truth and -wisdom and virtue and valour have, not indeed fled from the earth, not indeed fled from the soil of Hellas, but they have passed from the birthplace of Sol6n, of AristeidSs, and of Perikles to cities which they would have scorned to acknowledge as rivals, even to cities which had no place on earth when the warriors of Athens marched forth to victory at Marathdn and to defeat at Delion. A Greece in which Athens has ceased to be the first power, or rather in which Athens has sunk to be the most contemptible of all the cities of the Grecian name, seems, at first sight, to be unworthy to bear the name of Greece at all. We have to encounter unfamiliar names and to thread our way through unfamiliar boundaries and divisions. The first place among Grecian states is disputed between the obscure, if respectable, cities of Achaia, and the barely Hellenic^ robbers of ^tolia. States known only as sending some small contingent to swell Athenian or Spartan armies, cities which had themselves sprung into being since the glory of Athens sank at Aigospotamos, now appear as powers of greater weight than the Athenian commonwealth. Feeble Akarnania, new-born Megalopolis, liberated MessfinS, count for more in Grecian politics than the city of Theseus. The circle of Hellas is enlarged to take in lands which Thucydides and Dlmos- thenes despised as barbarous ; Chaonians, Molossians, Thesprfi- tians, take their place as members of an acknowledged Hellenic state ; the Macedonian himseK is indeed still dreaded as a King, but is no longer despised as a stranger of foreign blood and speech.^ The very language itself has changed ; fastidious scholars, fresh from the master-pieces of Attic purity, look down with contempt on the pages in which the deeds of Spartan and Siky6nian heroes are recorded by historians brought up in no politer schools than could be found at Megalopolis and Ghaironeia. It may at once be freely admitted that the later history of ^ Liv. xxxii. 34. jEtolos, tanquam Eomanos, decedi Grsecia jubere, qui, quibus finibus Grsoia sit, dicere non possint. Ipsius enirti .ffitoliaB Agrseos, Apodotosque et Amphiloohos, quae permagna eorum pars sit, Grseciam non esse. ^ Liv. xxxi. 29. .ffltolos, Acarnanas, Maoedonas, ejusdem linguae homines, leves ad tempus ortae oaussse disjungunt oonjunguntque ; cum alienigenis, cum barbaris, aternum omnibus Grseois bellum est eritque. Pol. vii. 9. MaKeSovlav koX ttiv &\\tiv "EWdSa . . . MaKeSSves rai tuv fiXXuc 'E>\-/}Vuv ol ffififiaxoi, /f.T.X. 174 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF AGHAIAN LEAGUE chap Compari- Greece, " the Greece of Polybios," has nothing like the life and sou be- richness and freshness of that earlier state of things which yfe elriier^nd ^'^^ ^^^^ ^^® Greece of Thucydidgs. The one still enjoyed the later native freedom of youth; the other at best clung to the recovered History of freedom of old age. The fervent lover of the earlier and fresher Greece. developement of Hellenic life is thus tempted to despise the records of a time which seems to him feeble and decrepit. Yet the recovered liberties of Achaia were a true shoot from the old stem ; ^ they were the reward of struggles which would not have disgraced the victors of Marath6n or the victors of Leuktra; and the very circumstances which make the later fortunes of Greece less interesting in the eyes of a purely Hellenic en- thusiast make them really more instructive in the eyes of a general student of the world's history. The early history of Greece is the history of a time when Greece was its own world, and when town-autonomy was the only form of political life known within that world. Beyond the limits of Hellas,^ all mankind were Barbarians ; they were to be ruled over or to be used as instruments, they were to be flattered or to be oppressed, but they were never to be admitted as the real political equals of the meanest man of Hellenic blood. Within the bounds of Hellas, the political struggle lay between single cities oligarchi- cally governed and single cities democratically governed. In either case the independent city-commonwealth was the one ruling political idea. Monarchy was unknown or abhorred ; Federalism was as yet obscure and undeveloped. The Greece of Polybios opens to us a much wider and more varied scene. Greece is no longer the whole world ; Greece proper, Greece in Character the geographical sense, is no longer the world's most important of the later portion. Rome and Carthage dispute the empire of the West ; peno . Syria and Egypt dispute the empire of the East ; Greece and Macedonia stand on the edge of the two worlds, to be swept in their turn, along with all other combatants and spectators, into the common gulf of Roman dominion. But if Greece had lost her political pre-eminence, she had won for herself a wider and Wide a more abiding empire. The Greek language, Greek art, general spread of Greek civilization, were spread over the whole East, and were Hellenic culture. ' Paus. vii. 17. 2. "Are & ShSpov 'XeXw^rifiJi'ov, av^XatTT-qnev ix t^s 'EXXdfos ^ Hellas, it should be remembered, [is wherever Greeks dwell, not merely Greece — ij irwex'?' 'BWis — in the geographical sense. V EARLIER AND LATER GRECIAN HISTORY COMPARED 175 before long to make a conquest only less complete of her Italian conquerors themselves. Philip, Alexander, and their Successors, the destroyers of Greek political greatness, had been everywhere the apostles of Greek intellectual life. The age of Polybios is, import- in fact, the age when the world's destiny was fixed for ever, ^^9" °^ when the decree of fate was finajly pronounced that for all time ia imiver- Eome should be the political, and Greece the intellectual, mistress sal history, of mankind. It is, in its true place in universal history, a period of the very deepest and most varied interest. And to the historian of the Greek race and language, as distinguished from and in the the historian of the soil of Hellas, no period in the whole range Jl!^*^'^ °l of Grecian history assumes a deeper importance. The age of ■s,3,ce. Polybios is the age which connects the Greece of Mr. Grote with the Greece of Mr. Finlay. Philip and Alexander were in truth the founders of that Modern Greek nation which has lasted down to our own time. If they destroyed the liberties of Athens, Effects of they laid the foundation of the general intellectual dominion of -f^®,^*"' Greece. By spreading the Greek language over lands into which quests. Greek colonization could never have carried it, they did more than any other single cause to open the way for the preaching of Christianity. In founding Alexandria, Alexander indirectly founded the intellectual life of Constantinople. By permanently Hellenizing Western Asia, he conferred on the Empire of Con- stantinople its great mission as the champion of the West against the East, of Christendom against the Fire- Worshipper and the Moslem.^ It is one of the many evil results of the shallow distinction popularly drawn between "ancient" and "modern" history that the whole later life of the Greek people, from Philip to our own day, is so utterly neglected. My present subject brings me only upon a very small portion of so vast a field. To the historian of Federalism the Polybian age is important mainly as the age of republican reaction in Greece itself against the Macedonian monarchy. And it is surely something, to put it on no other ground, to see what was the state of Greece herself in an age in which, though the freshness of her glory was gone, she was still important — no longer politically dominant, but Character intellectually more supreme than ever. The Greek history of °^ ^^ ^^^ this time is more like the history of modern times ; it is less bios, ' See the Edinburgh Review, vol. cv. p. 340, Art. Alexander the Great. History and Conquests of the Saracens, Chap. I. The World at the coming of Mahomet. 176 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF AGHAIAN LEAGUE chai'. Compari- son of Thuoy- didSs and Polybios. fresh than that of earlier days, but it is also less uniform, and for that very reason it is more politically instructive. It is no longer merely the history of single cities ; it is the history of a complex political world, in which single cities, monarchies, and Federations, all play their part, just as they do in the European history of later times. It is a time of deeper policy, of more complicated intrigues ; an age when men had lost the vigour and simplicity of youth, but had almost made up for the loss by the gain of a far more enlarged experience. Compare, for instance, the two great historians of the several periods. Thucydides never went out of the immediate Greek world ; but for his fortunate exile, he might never have gone out of the dominions of Athens; his reading was necessarily small; he spoke only one language ; he knew only one form of political and civilized life. But an inborn genius, an intuitive wisdom, a life spent amid the full youth and freshness of the first of nations, set him at once above all who have come after him in ages of greater experience. Polybios,^ on the other hand, is like a writer of our own times ; with far less of inborn genius, he possessed a mass of acquired knowledge of which Thucydidls could never have dreamed. He had, like a modern historian, read many books and seen many lands ; one language at least beside his own must have been perfectly familiar to him; he had conversed with men of various nations, living in various states of society, and under various forms of government. He had himself personally a wider political experience than fell to the lot of any historian before or after him. The son of a B.C. 222 or statesman of Megalopolis, he could remember^ Achaia a powerful 204. Federation, Macedonia a powerful monarchy, Carthage still free, Syria still threatening; he lived to see them all subject provinces or trembling allies of the great municipality of Rome. In his B.C. 183. youth he bore to the grave the ashes of Philopoimgn, a Grecian 1 On the character of Polybios as a historian, see Mommsen, Romische Geschichte, ii. 427. ^ Whether Polybios could, strictly speaking, remember all this, depends partly on the disputed question of the year of his birth. (See Diet, of Biog. art. Polybius.) B.C. 222 certainly seems too early, but there is no need to fix it so late as B.C. 204. The requirements on both sides would be met by such a date as B.C. 210.^ But even the reckoning which places his birth latest would bring all withm his life, and the intermediate one would bring all within the compass of his possible memory. The intelligent child of a distinguished statesman would surely have some understanding of such an event as the battle of Zama at the age of eight years. CHARACTER OF THE AGE OF POLYBIOS 177 hero slain in purely Grecian warfare ; he lived to secure some little fragments of Grecian freedom as contemptuous alms from b.o. 145. the Koman conqueror. A man must have lived through a millennium in any other portion of the world's history, to have gained with his own eyes and his own ears such a mass of varied political knowledge as the historian of the Decline and Fall of Ancient Greece acquired within the limits of an ordinary Ufe.i This revived life, this after-growth of Hellenic freedom, dates Begin- from about the year B.C. 280, a date marked out by Polybios f^° ^ °L„jX himself ^ as signalized by the nearly contemporaneous deaths of Revival, some of the greatest Princes of the age. The elder form of b.o. 280. Hellenic freedom and the universal empire of Macedonia were now alike things of the past. Those only who belonged to a generation already passing away could remember either the oratory of Demosthenes or the conquests of Alexander. The dominions of the great conqueror were divided for ever, and the first generation of his Successors had passed away. Antigonos and Kassander had long been dead ; D^m^trios Poliork6t§s, Seleukos, Lysimachos, Ptolemy the son of Lagos and Ptolemy ^ It is curious to see how Mr. prote, in his depreciation of ' ' the Greece of Polybios," looks at everything from a purely Athenian point of view. (See the close of his xcvith chapter, vol. xii. p. 627 — 30.) He sometimes almost reminds one of a remarkable passage of Polybios himself, lyhich, to be sure, goes almost as much too far the other way. SI Si riipovvTes tcl irpis rots TrarptSas SIkmo. Kpiff€L irpayfidruiv Sietp^povro^ vofiL^ovres oi) raiirb iTV/j,povpd,s eladyovres ds rds Tikeis, oi S^ rvpAvvovs ifi,VTeOVTe6av ripavvov) seems to be a sort of technical term. 182 OEIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. times, the Austrian annexation of Venice, the French occupation of Rome, have not involved the same permanent horrors as the local tyrannies of Parma and Naples. But the rule of Mace- donia, sharp as the scourge doubtless was, was certainly in some respects less irksome than the rule of Austria. It was not so completely a rule of strangers. The Macedonian Kings, and doubtless their subjects too, at least studiously claimed to be Greeks ; whatever the merits of the claim, it was prominently put forward on all occasions.^ If not Greek by blood — and Philip and Alexander at least were Greek by blood — they were rapidly becoming Greek in language and intellectual culture. Doubtless it was a poor substitute for the true independence of old times for the Greek to be able to say that his master was half a countryman; but it at least makes a wide difference between the lot of Greece under the half-Greek Macedonian, and the lot of Italy under the wholly foreign Austrian.^ Greece indeed soon found that Macedonia was far from being her worst enemy. During the whole of this period, ever since the Gaulish invasion, Macedonia at least efficiently discharged the functions of a bulwark of Greece against the restless barbarians on her northern frontier. And the time at last came when the Mace- donian King was felt to be the champion of Greece in a truer sense than when Alexander marched forth to avenge Hellenic wrongs upon the Persian. Every patriotic Greek must have sympathized with the Macedonian nation, if not with its con- ' See above, p. 174. So Alexander, in his letter to Darius, talks of MaKeSovlav Kal T^v SXh/jP 'BXXdSa (Arr. ii. 14. 4) and continues iyii Si tuv "EiWiivav -qye/jiaii Karaa-Taeels, k.tX So the style of the Confederacy of which Alexander was chief seems to have been 'A\4^avdpos Kal ol "EXXij^/es. Arr. ii. 2. 2, 3 ; 1. 16. 7, cf. 6. Isokrates fully recognizes Philip as a Greek (Phil. 10), but a Greek reigning over foreigners {ovx o/ioipiXov yivovs. § 126)— foreigners, so far un-Greek as to need kingship (§ 125), but still carefully distinguished from mere barbarians — 0wi yap yfiwaX v 5e ^appdpav ws irXeia-Tov dpxeiv, /ct.X. (§ 178). He was to conquer barbarians to give them the advantages of a Greek master. Cf. also Isok. Archid. 51 Arr. ii. 7. 4 — 7. 2 I am of course speaking here solely of the modern sway of the so-called "Emperors of Austria," not of the old Teutonic Casars, whose Imperial title and bearings they venture to assume. Otto, Henry, and the Fredericks were Emperors of the Eomaus and Kings of Italy, recognized by all Italians, zealously supported by many. Frederick the Second, the greatest of them all, was himself an Italian by birth, language, and temperament ; his Italian home was ever the dwelling-place of his choice. The Imperial claims doubtless gradually dried up into a mere legal fiction, but even a legal fiction is something ditferent from the high-handed usurpation of modern Austria. V OBJECTS OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE 183 temptible King, in the final struggle between Perseus and Kome. Through the whole history our feelings lie, naturally and rightly, against Macedonia and for republican Greece. But there is no reason for looking upon Macedonia with any special abhorrence, or for representing her Kings as perfect monsters, or even as barbarian invaders. The Great Alexander, with all his faults, still stands forth, alongside of the Great Charles, among the heroes of whom human natxu^e is proud. And, taking the common standard of royal virtue,^ the merits of Antigonos Gonatas and Antigonos D6s6n will assuredly not fall below the average. In extending their dominions and their influence they did but follow the natural instincts of their class, and Antigonos D6s6n at least sinned far less deeply in accepting Akrokorinthos than Arato.s and the Achaian Congress sinned in offering it. The object of the Achaian League, on the other hand, was Generous the union of all Peloponn^sos, or, it may be, of all Greece, into 'f^ °^ ^^^ a free and equal Democratic Confederation. Such at least was Lg^gug^ the wide scope which it assumed in the days of its fullest developement, under Aratos, PhUopoimen, and Lykortas. And surely no nobler vision ever presented itself to a Hellenic states- man. We shall soon see but too clearly the defects in the general constitution of the League, and the still greater defects in the personal character of its great leader. But the general objects of both were as wise, generous, and patriotic as any state or any man ever laboured to effect. Other Greek statesmen had worked mainly for the mere aggrandizement of their own cities ; Periklds lived for Athens, AgSsilaos for Sparta, Epameindndas for Thebes ; but the worthies of Siky6n and Megalopolis spent and were spent in the still nobler cause of Hellas. And they came at the right time. From one point of view we may be An earlier tempted to regret that their lot had not been cast in an earlier ^^^^ ^^ day, and that an effective Federal System had not been long Federalism before established in Greece. The establishment of such a system in Greece might indeed have saved Greece from many evils ; but it was at ^°gijai3ig_ once utterly impossible and, in the general interests of the world, utterly undesirable. How impossible it was we see by the whole ' " The station of kings is, in a moral sense, so unfayourable, that those who are least prone to servile admiration should he on their guard against the opposite error of an unoandid severity. " Hallam's Constitutional History, oh. x. vol. i. p. 647, ed. 1846. 184 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. tenor of Grecian history, by the nullity of the Amphiktyonic Council, by the failure of attempts, like that of LykomMSs, to establish even partial Federal Unions, by the little which, after all, Aratos and his successors were able actually to effect. And, if it had been possible, it was no less clearly undesirable. A Federal system in the days of Athenian and Spartan greatness might have spared Greece the miseries of Athenian and Spartan warfare ; it might have saved her from Macedonian conquest ; ^ it might even have warded off, or at least delayed, her ultimate subjection to Rome. But Greece united in a Federal bond could never have become the Greece which has challenged the love and admiration of all succeeding ages. The brilliant developement of Hellenic greatness, alike in war, in politics, in art, in eloquence, and in poetry, was inseparably linked to the system of inde- pendent city-commonwealths. The dissensions and the wars of Greece are the price which she paid for becoming the world's teacher for all time. Again, had Greece never sunk beneath the armed force of Macedonia and Rome, she would never have won the Macedonian and the Roman as the permanent apostles of her civilization and intellectual life. It was well that Greece was disunited ; it was well that Greece was conquered ; but it was well also that she should revive, if only for a moment, to give the world the first great example of a political teaching of yet Effects of another kind. Greece had already done her work as the land of t e eague. autonomous cities ; she was now to give mankind a less brilliant, but more practical, lesson in the way of free government on a more extended scale. Positively indeed but little was done ; all Greece was never united even in a nominal bond; even all B.C. 191. Peloponnfeos was at best only nominally united after the true glory of the League had passed away. Yet it was something, even in its own day, to restore freedom to a considerable portion of Greece, to give the liberated cities some generations of free and orderly government, to render the inevitable fall of Greece at once more gradual and less disgraceful ; and it was yet more, in the history of the world, to give to the political thinkers of after times one of the most valuable subjects for reflection which all ancient history affords. ^ Droysen, Hellenismus, ii. 503. Hatte sioh die delphische Amphiktyonie zii einer nationalen Verfassung auszubilden vermocht, so wurde Philipp nicht tei Chaironeia gekampft haben. EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL REVIVAL 185 § 2. Origin and Early Growth of the League In the last chapter we have seen the growth of Federal Growth of ideas in many parts of Greece during the fourth century before federal Christ. The evils caused by the disunion of the great cities Gr^oe°m made the smaller ones at last understand the need of a closer the fourth union among themselves. We have therefore seen several century, attempts, unsuccessful indeed, but still marking the direction in which men's thoughts were tending, at establishing Federations in several parts of Greece. Then came the days of Macedonian conquest and Macedonian influence. The policy of the Mace- donian Kings set itself against all Federations, against all unions of any kind. Even Philip and Alexander, chosen Captains of all Greece as they boasted of being, would have hindered any union among Grecian states which could in the slightest degree have interfered with their supremacy. Their Successors, the usurpers who rose and fell, even the more lasting and high-minded dynasty of the Antigonids, could afford still less consideration for Grecian freedom. They never ventured to put themselves forth as the chosen leaders of Greece, called to that rank by something which at least pretended to the character of a national vote. How they maintained their influence we have already seen, by foster- ing local divisions and by supporting local tyrannies. But this state of things naturally gave the Federal principle an influence Further which it had never before possessed. Modern Europeans, ^^"1^™ accustomed to the compact monarchies of modern Europe, are against apt to look on the Federal system as a system of weakness and Macedo- disunion : to a Greek of the third century before Christ, accus- f"™ tomed only to a choice between town-autonomy, local tyranny, and foreign bondage, it presented itself as a happy combination, by which freedom could be made to coexist with union, and therefore with strength. The Federal form of government henceforth became predominant, and at last almost universal, in the independent portion of Greece. Every city which achieved its own independence sought, by a natui'al instinct, to maintain that independence by an union with other cities. And that union was now freely made upon terms from which, a century before, nearly every Greek commonwealth would have shrunk as an unworthy surrender of its separate dignity and separate freedom. 186 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. Early- History of Achaia. Early- Union among the Cities. B.C. 391. Among the cities which had thus become disunited through Macedonian influence weve the cities of the Peloponnesian Achaia. If we may trust the half mythical history of the Dorian migra- tion, the Achaians of Peloponn^sos were the only independent remnant of that mighty race which, under the Pelopid Kings of MykSnl, had ruled over many islands and all Argos.^ The Achaians fill the most prominent place in the Greece of Homer and in the Greece of Polybios, but in the Greece of Thucydides they are utterly insignificant. Polybios, with a commendable national pride, collects several instances ^ to show that, if they were insignificant in power, they were at least highly respected for upright and honourable dealing. No people in Greece bore a higher character either for discretion or for good faith, and they were more than once called upon to act as mediators in the dissensions of more powerful states. We are, however, more concerned -with the degree of union which may have existed among their several cities in times before the growth of the Macedonian power. That Achaia then contained twelve cities, democratically governed,^ and united by some sort of Federal tie, admits of no doubt. But, as in the case of most of these early Greek Federations, we have no details of the old Achaian con- stitution. There is however no reason for the supposition that it was a religious rather than a political union, a mere Amphi- ktyony to the temple of Poseid6n at HelikS.* The whole history shows that a real Federal union existed among them, and that, even then, the League sometimes extended itself to take in cities beyond the strict limits of Achaia. Early in the fourth century before Christ we find the ^tolian town of Kalyddn not only an Achaian possession, but admitted to the rights of Achaian citizen- ship.^ Naupaktos also appears as held by the Achaians, but on what terms is not so clear.^ In every account of these transac- ^ Iliad, B. 108. noXXiJcrt vf)ijoLffi KaVApyei Travn avdaaetv. 2 Pol. ii. 39. [Of. Strabo viii. 7. 1.] ' Pol. ii. 41. MericTijcrav eis Sri/WKpaHar tV TroKirdav. Xo«r Jv ijSr] Tois ef^s Xpivovs I^XP^ ■'^s 'A\e^dvdpov Kal 0i\linrov Svi>a:rTeias SXKore /iiv fiXXws ixiip^i Tct irpdy/xar' airoLS Koj-h, tols wepicrTdaeis, r6 ye fi^v kolv6v iroKiTevfia Kaddwep elp'^Ka/j.€v, h brjiioKpaTit} avv^xet-v eireipwvTO, tovto 5' ^v iK SicSeKo, irSKewv. * Diet. Antiq. art. Achaicum Poedns. ^ Xen. Hell. iv. 6. 1. Merct Bi toOto oi 'Axaioi ^x""'''^^ KaKvSSiva, fi ri TraXatdp AtroiXlas ^v, koX irdklTas TreTOLTifi^voi rods "KaXudcoviovs, tppovpeiv ijvay- Kd^ovTo if air^. [So in Roman times a harbour in the region of KalydSn belonged to Patrai ; Strabo, x. 2. 21. "BcrTt d4 ns Kcd irpis rg KaXvSuin U/iVii iJ.eyd\ri Kal etfoi/'os, fjv ^x;"""'"' oi i" ndrpais 'Pa/ialoL. ] " Demosthenes says (Phil. iii. 44) that Philip promised to take Naupaktos V EARLY HISTORY OF ACHAIA 187 tions we find the Achaian people spoken of as one whole, acting with one will both in diplomatic and military affairs. They placed Federal garrisons in cities endangered by the enemy, -"^ and commissioned Federal ambassadors to foreign powers.^ At the same time it is easy to believe that the Federal tie may have been much less closely drawn than it was in the revived Con- ProbaMe federation of after-times. Still that Confederation, as we shall p"?;'^'^ presently see, was looked on as a mere revival of a past state of tjjg tond things interrupted for a while by foreign interference. We are during the hardly entitled to judge whether it was from any laxity in the 9^^ formal constitution, or only from the fluctuations of parties so common in all Greek states, that the Achaian League did not, Achaia any more than that of Akarnania, invariably act as an united pgjopoQ. ^ body throughout the Peloponnesian War. When that war broke nesian out, all the Achaian cities remained neutral, except Pellen^, War, which took the side of Sparta ;^ but at a later stage all twelve ^''^' were enrolled as members of the Lacedsemonian alliance.* • Yet, b c. 413. in an intermediate stage, we find Patrai at least on the side of b.c. 419. Athens, and, under Athenian influence, extending herself by Long Walls to the sea.^ During the wars of Epamein6ndas, PelltoS History of adhered firmly to her Spartan policy, at a time when the other ^^^^^°|^ cities were, to say the least, less strenuous in the Spartan cause.^ At the same time we also get some glimpses of the internal state of the several cities. We read of local oligarchies,' which Epamein6ndas found and left in possession, but which the home from the Achaians and to give it to the .Stolians ; oCik 'Axaiw"' Noi^TraKTo;' d/iti/iOKev AItuXoTs irapa.SJiaei.v ; Naupaktos, therefore, in B.C. 341, was an Achaian possession. But we read in DiodSros (xv. 75) that EpameinSndas, in B.C. 367, AiS/iTjK KOl 'SaiiraKTov KaX 'K.aXvBiava ^povpov/nhTfv iir 'Axa'S'' ■ijKev0ipa Thuc. ii. 9, of. v. 58, where we find PellSnS supporting Sparta against Argos after the Peace of Nikias. ■' Thuc. ii. 9. Cf. Arnold's note, and vii. 34, where the Achaians are in- cidentally mentioned as LacedtBmonian allies, 5 Thuc. v. 52. " Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 15, 18. Afterwards Pellgne is found on the Theban side. 2. 11. ' lb. vii. 1.42. STpareiovcri, irdnTes ol criiiimxoi. iir' 'Axatav, if/ov/i^vov 'ETra/ietv- (ivSov. irpoairejdvTuv S' ainfi Turn ^eXrlffrav ix t^s 'Axaias, ivSwaareia 6 'E7ra/Aetvc6i'5as, ioffre fiTj ^vyaSevffat roils KpaHffTous, fJ.'^e iroKirdav iieTaarrjaaij etc. 188 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF AOHAIAN LEAGUE chap. Grovernment of Thebes thought good to expel, and to substitute democracies under the protection of Theban harmosts. This policy did not answer, as the large bodies of exiles thus formed contrived to recover the cities, and to bring them to a far more decided Spartan partisanship than before.^ But these oligarchies, probably introduced by Spartan influence, seem to have formed a mere temporary interruption to that general democratic character of the Achaian polity to which Polybios bears witness. Certain it is that Achaia was democratic at the accession of Tyranny of Alexander. He established as Tyrant in Pelltoe one of her own 2^?^^^ ^* citizens named Chairdn.^ This Chairdn was famous as a wrestler; before ' ^^ ^^® ^^®° ^ Platonic philosopher, which leads AthSnaios B.C. 335. sarcastically to say that, in some of the worst features of his tyranny, he did but carry out his master's doctrines as to the community of goods and women.^ How PellenS had offended the Macedonian King we know not, but it appears that the establishment of the tyranny was accompanied by the expulsion of a large proportion of the citizens.* This seems to mark some special ground of quarrel with the particular city of Pelling ; for Alexander would hardly have thus punished a single town for the share which all Achaia had taken in the resistance to his father at Chairdneia.^ The presence of this domestic Tyrant prevented Pellene from joining with the other Achaian cities in the movement against the Macedonian dominion set on foot by B.C. 3-30. -^gis, King of Sparta.^ After the disastrous battle in which ' Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 41—3. Grote, x. 365. Helwing, Gesctichte des Ach. Bundes, p. 226. ^ Pseudo-Dgm. ir.T.ir. 'A\c|. 12. 'Axoiol fnh oi in JleKoTmvijaif iSriiioKpa- TOVVTO, Toirav S' iv MeKK-finrj vvv KaraXiXvice rhv Stjiwv 6 MaKeSii/ iK§a.\iiv tSiv itoKltSiv Toiis ttXcIittous, to, S' iKdvuv rots ok^rais SiSuKe, Xalpuiva. di rbv iraKauTT^ ripavvov iyKaTianicrev. Pans. vii. 27. 7. 'Karikvae [Xaipuv] iroKireiav, i/iol SoKeiv, ttjv in HeW-qvri, S&pov rh ^irujiBovibTaTov irapd. 'AXe^dvdpov Tov ^Mttttov XajSiliv, rdpavvos irarplSos t^s auroO KaraiTTijvai. This Chair6n could not therefore be, as Dr. Elder (Diet. Biog. art. Charon) thinks, the same as the ChairSn who is mentioned by Plutarch (Alex. 3), for the latter was a citizen of Megalopolis, while both Pausanias and Athgnaios distinctly mark ChairSu the Tyrant as a citizen of PelleuS. 3 Athen. xi. 119. [509J.] Xatpuv 6 UeWweis, Ss oi iibvtp XlXdravi iaxi- \aKev, iXKh Kal SevoKpaTW Kal oStos oSv ttjs Trarpldos TiKpas rupocc^iras oi) p,ivov Tois J,pl(rTovs tQv ttoXituv i^'/jXaa-ev, dXXct Kal tois roiTuv SoiiXois ra XP^IJ^a-ra tQv Seix-woTuv xapi(7-(iME''i'S) Kii tow iKuvav yvvtuKo.^ avvifKiaev 7r/)6s ydp-ov KOivwvlav, ravr' iicj>e\ri9ds ix ttjs /caXTJs JloKirelas Kal tQv' Trapav6p.o>v Ni/tw*-. _ * Pseudo-Dem. u. s. ^ Paus. vii. 6. 5. ToB fih iv Xatpavelg. ^Mtwov t' ivivna Kal MaKedSvoiv [ttoX^jHou] oi 'Axaiol piT^axov. * .iEsoh. Ktes. 165. 'HXeioi 8' aiirois [AaKcSai/ioviois] cvp-pxTt^aKovTO Kal V ACHAIA UNDER THE SUCCESSORS 189 Agis fell, the Achaians and Eleians are said to have been con- demned, by the anomalous body which then issued decrees in the name of Grreece, to pay a hundred talents as indemnity to Megalopolis, which had embraced the Macedonian cause and had stood a siege at the hands of the allies. "^ The establishment of Chairdn by Alexander was the beginning of the system which was more fully carried out by the succeeding Macedonian Kings. Kassander held several of the cities with his garrisons, which were driven out by Aristodlmos the general of Antigonos from Patrai, Aigion, and Dym^.^ In the case of Patrai and Aigion, b.c. 314. this expulsion is spoken of by our informant as a liberation,^ but ^''^^^\ the Dymaians resisted the liberators in the cause of what the successors ■ same historian calls their independence.* Whatever we make of this language, it at least points to a difference of political feeling in the different cities. DSmetrios also, in the days when the son of the King of Asia gave himself out as the champion of GrreciS,n freedom, expelled Kassander's garrison from Boura, and b.o. 303. gave to that city also something which is spoken of as inde- pendence.^ But when Dlm^trios became King of Macedonia, b.c. 294. he seems to have walked in the way of his predecessors, and both he and his son Antigonos are mentioned among the princes under whom some of the cities were occupied by Macedonian garrisons and others by local Tyrants.* At what moment the under League definitely fell asunder it is hard to say : the process, g™SoJios doubtless, was gradual ; but as Antigonos Gonatas ^ is mentioned circa B.C. 288. 'Axaiol TrdvTes irMjv IIcXXi)i'a((i)j' Kid 'ApKoSla iraaa TrX-f/x MeyaX-qs irSKem, aSrri 5^ ^troXLOpKUTQ, K.T.X. ^ Q. Ciirt. vi. 1. 19, 20. They were condemned by the "Concilium Grsecorum." So Diod6ros (xvii. 73) spealcs of rh Koivbv t&v 'E\\7}cw>' irwiSpiov. That is to say, Alexander's synod at Corinth. See ahove, p. 100. Yet it is possible that DiodSros may here too have been dreaming of the Amphiktyons. ^ Diod. xix. 66. ^ lb. ndrpas fiiv '^Xevd^puffe .... rots A.iyteO(n /caret ddyfMi, tV ^\evdepiav ^ov\6fievos diroKaTacrT7J(7at. * lb. JlapcLKoXitravTes dW^Xous AvtSx^^^^'' "^V^ (tiiTOj/o^a.^. ^ lb. XX. 103. Aij/Aijrpios .... 'BoOpay fih /card Kpdros efXe, Kol rots jroKlrais dir^SuKe t^v airovofiiaj/, • ^ Pol. ii. 41. Pausanias (vii. 7. 1) strangely says that no Achaian city but PellSnS was ever under a Tyrant, seemingly confounding the time of Alexander with that of the Antigouids ; rvpdvvtav re ydp ttX-^v IleXX^i'T^s al dXXat 7r6Xe[S rbv XP^'""' fiTaKTO aTrdpus lirx^icscrav. ' Antigonos Gonatas first began to play a prominent part during his father's lifetime, about B. c. 288, when he was left in command of DgmStrios' garrisons in Greece. This was probably the time when Antigonos completed the dissolution of the League. Its complete dissolution is expressed by Polybios (ii. 40, cf. 41) 190 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. among the Kings who had a hand in the evil work ; and, as it was at no very advanced stage of his reign that the cities began Final Dis- again to draw together, it would seem that the period of complete solution of isolation cannot have been very long, and that the work of League. reunion must have been found proportionably easy. Twelve The twelve cities of the original League, as enumerated by original Polybios,! were Helikg, Olenos, Patrai, Dym^, Pharai, Tritaia, cities. Leontion, Aigeira, Pellto^ Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia. Of these Helike seems to have been originally the chief ; its great temple of Poseid6n ^ was the seat of the religious meetings of the Achaian people, and the city was probably also the seat of the Loss^f_ Federal Government.^ But HelikS was swallowed up by an -^^^"^^ ^earthquake, and its site covered by the sea, long before the and of dissolution of the old League.* Olenos also was deserted by Olenos. its inhabitants ^ at some time before the revival of the League, so that ten cities only were left. Of these, since the loss of HelikI, Aigion was the greatest.^ It was the seat of the Federal Government under the revived League in the very latest times,^ as it most probably had been during the later days of the earlier one. Of the exact nature of the Federal union under the old system, of the titles and duties of in the words Karct, ivb\iv SiaXvSivros toO tS>v 'AxiiSv iBvovs iiri Tuiv eK MaKeSovlas paaiXiav. The formula iK MaKeSovias may well express DSmStrios and Antigonos when they were not in actual possession of the Macedonian throne. Cf. Niebuhr, Lect. on Ano. Hist. iii. 259, Eng. Tr. Strabo, viii. 7. 1. 1 Pol. ii. 41. 2 See Strabo, viii. 7. 2. Paus. vii. 24. 5. ' Not necessarily, for Kor6neia was the religious centre of Boeotia, while Thebes was the political head. ^ Paus. vii. 24. 6, et seqq. Strabo, u.s. Pol. ii. 41. This destruction is by Pausanias ascribed to the wrath of PoseidSu at some suppliants being dragged away from Ms altar. In this, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 88) says, "we perceive a symptom of some violent political agitation. " ^ See Leake, Morea, ii. 157. Thirlwall, viii. 90. The expression of Strabo (viii. 7. 1), oi avTuv havHm rb (rv/i^pov S.yeLv dXXijXois" e| o5 avviirecre rhs fiiv ifiv 'Axaiav sho-w the combined action of the Bourians themselves and of the con- federate cities. ^ lb. Xlpo(ridTiKe tV irdXiv irpbs rb tS>v 'Axaiui' v 'XxaiSiv S6ryiia) to reconcile the contending parties, which he effectually did. Here again there was no breach of the cantonal rights of Megalopolis. Aratos acted simply as a mediator. The two parties agreed on certain conditions, which the City of Megalopolis, not the Federal Government, caused to be engraved on a pillar in one of its temples. ('B0' oU ?\7jfo» ttjs Tpbs dXX^Xous Sia^opds, ypd\j/ayTes els aHjkriv . . . iviBeaav.) ^ Pol. iv. 18. ■* Pint. At. 44. "Aparos 5^ ffrpaTTiybs cdpedels itir 'Apyeiuv <^ir€L(xev airois, K.T.\. 200 ORISm AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. Districts subject to particiilar Cities. Tendencies to assimi- lation among the Members of League, both in Achaia and America. League. So little indeed did the Federal power meddle with the internal affairs of the several cities that it tolerated distinc- tions within their territories which seem hardly in accordance with the principles of universal equality on which the League itself was founded. That the League did not interfere with the peculiar relations between Patrai and her townships is not wonderful ; they probably did not interfere with the f uU Patrian citizenship of their inhabitants.^ But Megalopolis certainly,^ and Corinth probably,^ had subject districts, whose inhabitants appear to have had no direct share in the general Federal citizenship. We have seen this sort of relation among the aristocracies of Boeotia ; we shall meet with it again among the Swiss Cantons, aristocratic and democratic alike. But one would hardly have expected to find it amid the Equality and Fraternity of the Achaian League. But the toleration of such inequalities is really a necessary deduction from the doctrine of the sovereignty of each State within its own limits, just like the toleration of the "domestic institution" of the Southern States of America by a Federation which scrupulously excludes the word Slave from its own Constitution. But, though the several cities remained internally independent, we cannot doubt that their close union for all external purposes strongly tended to assimilate them to one another in their internal constitution and laws. It can hardly be supposed that the political constitution of any member of the League was other than democratic. We see the same phssnomenon in the United States. The Federal Constitution merely provides that each State shall have a republican govern- ment * and shall not grant titles of nobility ; ^ within these limits it may be as oligarchic or as democratic as it pleases. Any State that chose might transact all its affairs in a primary Assembly like those of Athens or Schwytz, and might give its chief magis- trate no higher powers than those of an Athenian Archon. Or ^ See above, p. 192. ^ Pint. Phil. 13. 6 ^L\oToi/n]v dTr^o'Tijtre TroXXis twv TrepLOLKlSciJV Kiafiiov. See Droysen, ii. 464. Thirlwall, viii. 364. Whether these townships were strictly subject to Megalopolis will be found discussed afterwards, p. 488, It is possible that they may have been more analogous to the Patrian townships men- tioned iu p. 192. ^ Strabo's account of Tenea in the Corinthian territory sounds very much as if it had been a Kci/i?; TrcpioiKls of Corinth, viii. 6. 22. Td S' iio-rara /col KaB' aOrods TroXtreiietr^at' xpoadiffdai re rots "Pw/ia£ots dwotTTdvras 'Kopivdltav, Cf. the MessSnian districts mentioned by Polybios, xxv. 1. * Art. iv. § 4. ^ Art. i. § 10. 1. V PRESERVATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 201 it might, as far as appears, make as near an approach to monarchy as would be implied in the creation of a Polish King or a Venetian Doge. For the existence of those Princes was never held to destroy the claim of Venice and Poland to the title of Eepublics, and if any State chose to elect its Governor for life, he would certainly fill a position of greater power than either of them. Or, to come to differences which have really existed, the elective franchise in different States has at different times varied from universal suffrage and no property qualification to the require- ment of a considerable freehold both in the elector and in the representative.^ And the Federal Constitution respects all systems alike; the Federal franchise belongs to those, few or many, who possess the franchise in their own State.^ But the different States have, since the establishment of the Federal Union, moved with remarkable unanimity in two directions. Nearly all have advanced in a democratic path by abolishing property qualifications, and all have advanced in what was once thought to be an aristocratic path by establishing two Legislative Chambers. So in Achaia a local oligarchy in any particular city could not possibly have kept its ground, while the constitu- tion of the League itself and the local constitutions of the other cities were all of them democratic. It seems certain also that a citizen of any Achaian city was admitted to at least the private rights of citizenship, those of intermarriage and possession of landed property, in the other cities of the League.^ But it is hardly likely that an Achaian citizen could, as a citizen of the United States can, exchange at will, or after a short time of residence, the franchise of his native State for that of another.* But the tendency to assimilation among the several cities was very strong. In the later days of the League it seems to have ' Smith's Comparative View of the Constitutions of the Several States, etc. (Philadelphia, 1796). Tables i. and ii. 2 Art. i. § 2. 1. Cf. § 4. 1. ' Thus much at least seems implied in the words ToXirela and iruiiToKiTeia, which are so often used. Accordingly we find that Aratos, a citizen of SikySn, had a house at Corinth. (Plut. At. 41. Kleom. 19.) So, when the League was broken up by the Romans, this intercommunion of property between different cities was forbidden. (Pans. vii. 16. 9.) It may be remembered that in the Olynthian Confederacy (see above, p. 151) these private rights were promised to the annexed -cities. * Aratos, as we have seen (p. 199), was once elected chief magistrate of Argos, but this was in a moment of great political excitement, and the fact hardly pi-oves that a less distinguished Sikyftnian could have held the office in an ordinary year. • 202 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. The League really a National Govern- ment. No inde- pendent Diplo- matic Action in the several Cities. Compari- son with America. developed with increased force, till at last Poly bios could say ^ that all Peloponngsos differed from a single city only in not being surrounded by a single -wall. The whole peninsula em- ployed the same coinage, weights, and measures, and was governed by the same laws, administered by the same magistrates, senators, and judges. But while the Achaian Constitution strictly respected the local rights of the several cities, it in no wise allowed their local sovereignty to trench upon the higher sovereignty of the League. The Achaian League was, in German technical language, a Bwndesstaat and not a mere Staatenbund.^ There was an Achaian nation,^ with a national Assembly, a national Government, and national Tribunals, to which every Achaian citizen owed a direct allegiance. The whole language of Polybios shows that every Achaian citizen stood in a direct relation to the Federal authority, and was in full strictness a citizen of the League itself, and not merely of one of the cities which composed it. The Achaian cities were not mere municipalities, but sovereign commonwealths.* But in all external matters, in everything which concerned the whole Achaian body and its relations to other powers, the Federal Government reserved to itself full supremacy. No single city could, of its own authority, make peace or war, or commission Ambassadors -to foreign powers. But it would appear that the separate action of the several cities was not quite so rigidly limited in the last respect as it is in the American Union. The cause of the difference is obvious. The American States, before their union into a Federal Republic, had been mere Colonies, mere dependencies of a distant Kingdom. In- dependent diplomatic action was something to which they had not been accustomed, and which they could cheerfully do without. It was a great advance in their condition when the right of acting on their behalf in dealings with other nations was transferred from a King over whom they had no control to a Federal President in whose appointment they themselves had a share. But the cities of the Achaian League, those at 1 See the famous passage, ii. 37. The identity there spoken of seems to me merely to express the result of the assimilation spoken of in the text. It need not imply any compulsory introduction of uniformity, still less any extension of the powers of the Federal body in later times. 2 Helwing, p. 237. See above, p. 8. Cf. Tittmann, p. 675. ^ "'ESvos. See above, pp. 10, 144. * In Greek phrase, irSXeis and not S^/j-oi. , V NO DIPLOMATIC ACTION IN THE STATES 203 all events which lay beyond the limits of the original Achaia, had heen, before their union, absolutely independent powers, accustomed to carry on wars and negociations in their own names without reference to any superior authority. Even the rule of a Tyrant did not destroy this sort of independence ; a single citizen indeed usurped powers which belonged of right to the whole body of citizens, but they were not transferred to any individual or any Assembly beyond the limits of the city. When the Tyrant was overthrown, this power, with the other powers which he had seized on, at once reverted to the people of the city. The right of direct intercourse with foreign powers is one of the last which an independent city or canton is willing to surrender to any central power, as we may see by the history of both the Swiss and the Dutch Confederations. For Siky6n, or Mantineia, or Megalopolis to forego this high attribute of sovereignty, and to entrust powers which it had once exercised without restraint to an Assembly in which it had only one voice among many, was really no small sacrifice for the public good. It is rather to be wondered at that it was so easily surrendered by so many Peloponnesian cities, and that the loss was for the most part so peaceably acquiesced in. But while an Ambassador Restriction sent to or from New York or South Carolina is a thing unheard l^^s strict of, an Ambassador sent to or from Corinth or Megalopolis was a thing rare indeed, and perhaps irregular, but not absolutely without precedent. The Corinthians, after their union with b.c. 228. the League, received separate Ambassadors from Rome,^ before Eome was dangerous. They came indeed on a purely honorary errand ; another embassy had transacted the political business between Rome and the League; still, whether of right or of special permission, the single city of Corinth did give audience to the Ambassadors of a foreign power. It is quite possible that for a single city to receive an embassy was not so strictly forbidden by the Federal Constitution as it was for a single city to commission an embassy. This last, it is clear, was ' Pol. ii. 12. On this Embassy (see p. 327) the explanation of the apparent breach of rule is probably to be found in the religious character of the mission. The Roman envoys were received by the Corinthians, not as members of the Achaian League, but as administrators of the Isthmian games. In this character, they must have been in the constant habit of receiving the BeapLai of Greek cities. As the administration of the games always remained a matter purely of State, and not at all of Federal, concern, the reception of this political sort of embassy — necessary in the presidents of the games — must have been held not to interfere with the general external sovereignty of the League. 204 OBIGiy Am) COSSTlTUnOy OF ACHAIA^ LEAGUE chap. Particolar Embassies by licence of the Federal body. RC. 224. Later ex- ceptions under Roman influence. B.C. 198. forbidden by the general h,w of the League, just as it is forbidden 1 hy the Constitution of the United States. Cases however occur in the course of Achaian history alike of the law being dispensed with and of the law being -violated.^ We have a full account * of one very curious instance of a single city entering into diplomatic relations with a foreign power by special permission of the national Congress. The fact of such a permission being asked shows that, without it, the proceeding would have been unlawful, but the fact of the permission being granted equally shows that the request was not looked upon as altogether unreasonable and monstrous. The occasion was no other than the fatal application to Macedonia for aid against Sparta, which was first made by an embassy sent from the single city of Megalopolis, but with the full permission of the Federal body.'^ This is perhaps the only recorded case of a breach of the rule dming the good times of the League ; and this took place in a season of extreme danger, and was the result of a deeply laid scheme of the all-powei-ful Aratos. In later times, when unwilling cities were annexed to the League by force, and when Eoman intrigue was constantly sowing dissension among its members, we shall find not unfrequent instances of embassies sent from particular cities to what was practically the suzerain power. The old law now needed special confirmation. It was agreed, in the first treaty between Achaia and Eome, that no embassy should be sent to Eome by any particular Achaian city, but only by the general Achaian body.^ But this agreement was of course broken whenever its violation suited Eoman interests. Sparta especially, and Messlne, cities joined to the League against their will, were constantly laying ^ The Constitntion (Art. 1 § 10. 1} absolutely forbids all diplomatic action on the part of the several States, and the confederate Constitntion (Art. i. g 10. 1) repeats the prohibition. The looser Confederation of 1778 only forbade the receiving or sending Ambassadors " withont the consent of the United States in Congress assembled. " Art. vL § 1. Cf. § 5. ^ Tittmann (678) mistakes these exceptions for the rule. 3 PoL ii. 43-50 ■* I shall narrate this cnrions proceeding in detail at the proper point of the history. ^ Pans. vii. 9. 4. 'AxoiSir fi-ev yap etprfro dirb rov Ktuvov irapa tV ^Fbi/iatbiv ^ovKrjr ainivaL wp4 s di axokw S.yiw Swa/ihovs Kal ^lov iKavbv KeKTr)fUyovs init^XetaBai tuv KoivSm lb(nrep olKiras. Aristot. Pol. ii. 12. "Jio-Trep TVpavvif T(? S^/upxapiti/^evoi. lb. iv. (vi) 4. Mivapxos ykp 6 Sijiios yberai, ffivBeros els iK ToWSv. [Compare the free democracy of Outer Appenzell and the action of the people in 1732 ; Mtiller, Hist, de la ConfMeration Suisse (Continuation) xiv. 186 1 2 See above, p. 33. V DEMOCEATIC THEORY OF THE ASSEMBLY 207 Assembly was held at a man's own door ; the Achaian Assembly was held in a distant city.^ It follows at once that the Athenian Causes Assembly was held much oftener than the Achaian Assembly ?^.*^ and was much more largely attended by citizens of all classes. arisSg""^' The Athenian Assembly was held thrice in each month ; the mainly Achaian Assembly was held of right only twice in each year. ^™™ *^ The poorest citizen could regularly attend at Athens, where a ^tent'^of small fee recompensed his loss of time ; the poor Achaian must Territory. have been unusually patriotic if he habitually took two journeys in the year at his own cost to attend the Assembly at Aigion. For the Athenian Treasury could easily bear the small fee paid to the citizens for attendance in the Assembly, but no amount of wealth in the Federal Treasury of Achaia could have endured such a charge as the payment of travelling expenses and recom- pense for loss of time to the whole free population of Argos and Megalopolis. The poor Athenian then was both legally and practically the political equal of his richer neighbour ; the poor Achaian, though he laboured under no legal disqualification, laboured under a practical disqualification almost bordering on disfranchisement. The Achaian Assembly practically consisted The As- of those among the inhabitants of each city who were at once ^^^^ wealthy men and eager politicians. Those citizens came together attended who were at once wealthy enough to bear the cost of the journey by rich and zealous enough to bear the trouble of it. It was, in fact, ^^\ practically an aristocratic body, and it is sometimes spoken of as sembly such.^ Its aristocratic character may have been slightly modified practically Aristo- ^ Some of the Attic Demoi are undoubtedly further from Athens than some of cratic. the old Achaian towns are from Aigion ; hut no point of Attica is so distant from Athens as Dyme, for instance, is from Aigion, so that, on the whole, the rural Athenians were nearer to the capital than the Achaians, even of the older towns, were to the seat of the Federal Government. Also the city of Athens and its ports must always have contained a very large proportion of the citizen popula- tion, while Aigion was merely one town out of ten or twelve. Still the old Achaia is not very much larger than Attica — in superficial extent it is probably smaller — and it might perhaps have been possible to have united it by a <7vvoiKitTii6s instead of by a merely Federal tie. The essential differences between Athens and Achaia begin to show themselves most clearly when the League began to extend itself over much more distant cities, which no tie but a Federal one could, according to Greek notions, ever have connected. ^ In Livy (xxxii. 21) the Achaian General Aristainos addresses the Assembly as Principes Acheeorum. But, especially as it comes in a speech, we cannot be quite certain that this expression really answers to anything in Polybios or any other Greek author. But it would fairly enough express the class of persons of whom the Assembly was mainly composed, for Principes (see Livy, xxxiii. 14) does not always mean magistrates, but leading men, whether in office or not. 203 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. by the possible presence of the whole citizen population of the town where the Assembly met. But we may doubt whether even they would, on ordinary occasions, be so eager to attend an Assembly of such a character as they might have been if the democratic spirit had been more predominant in it. But, if they did, though some effect is always produced by the presence and the voices of any considerable body of men, still, as they could at most control a single vote, their presence would be of but little strictly constitutional importance. The Congress, democratic in theory, was aristocratic in practice. This contrast of theory and practice, which Aristotle^ had fully understood long before the days of the League, runs through the whole of Not under- the Achaian institutions. By Continental scholars, less used to stood by ^]jQ -working of free governments than those of our own land, it nental seems not to have been thoroughly understood. They have Scholars, often imagined the existence of legal restrictions, when the restriction was in fact one which simply made itself. They see that the Assembly was mainly filled by members of an aristo- cratic class, and they infer that it must have been limited by law to a fixed body of representatives. They see that offices Polybios (iv. 9) has the phrase oi irpoeffTarcs tu>v 'Axaidv, hut this evidently means the Aa/Mopyoi as Presidents of the Assembly, not any aristocratic class. It is just possible that the words in Livy may be a formal address to the Aa/uop7of as Presidents, like our " Mr. Speaker. " 1 Arist. Pol. iv. [vi.] 5. Oi dei di Xavdavuv &tl iroXKaxov Krvfi^i^itKiv Hare tV /ih TrdkiTdav t^v Kard, rois vd/wvs /j-ti drjiJ.onKTji> ehai, Sia di rb ISos koI ttiv dyajTIv TToXiTeiieffStti Si;/xotikws, 6/io£ms Si wdXiv trap' fiXXois tt]v ij,h> Kari, Tois v6/iovs elvai iroKireiav drjf/.oTtKiaT^pai'f r^ 5' dyuy^ Kal rots ^detxiv dXtyapx^tadai fidWov. So again, in a passage which almost reads like a prophetic description of the League, and which indeed may have been true of the small Achaia of his times (Pol. V. [viii.] 8. 17) ; iwvaxUs 5k Kal hSix^TO-L dpia ehai SrnioKparlav koX dpicroKpariav . . . rb fih ydp e^tivai irdaLV &pxetv ST)iJ.oKpa,TiKbv, rb Sk rois yvaplfwvs dvai iv rats dpxais dpitTTOKpcmKbv. He says that this happens when offices are unpaid, as they were in Achaia. Compare Hamilton's remarks in the "Federalist," No. Iviii. (p. 318). "The people can never err more than in supposing, that by multiplying their repre- sentatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the govern- ment of a few. Experience will for ever admonish them, that, on the contrary, after securing a sufficient number for pui-poses of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic ; but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine may be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed." The Achaian Government however never deserved the name of an Oligarchy. It was an Aristocracy in the literal sense of the word. V ARISTOCRATIC ELEMENTS IN PRACTICE 209 were mainly confined to the rich and noble, and they infer that the rich and noble must have had a legal monopoly of office. To an Englishman both phsenomena are perfectly simple. What Analogies happened in Achaia is merely what happens daily before our own !" ^°S- eyes in England. Every Achaian citizen had a right to a seat in the Assembly, but practically few besides the high-born and wealthy exercised that right. Every Achaian citizen was legally eligible to the highest offices, but practically the choice of the nation seldom fell upon poor men. So the poorest British sub- ject is legally eligible to the House of Commons equally with the richest, but we know that it is only under exceptional cir- cumstances that any but a rich man is likely to be elected. Even while the property qualification lasted, it was not the legal requirement which kept out poor men, but the practical necessity which imposed, and still imposes, a standard of wealth much higher than that fixed by the old law.^ And moreover, it is in the most purely democratic constituencies, in the " metropolitan " boroughs for instance, that a poor man has even less chance of election than elsewhere. But though the Democratic Constitution of Achaia produced what was practically an Aristocratic Assembly, it must not be thought that Achaian democratic institutions were mere shadows. The working of the Federal Constitution was aristocratic, but it was not oligarchic. The leading men of Achaia were not a close and oppressive body, fenced in by distinct and odious legal privileges ; their predominance rested merely on sufferance and The As- conventionality, and the mass of the people had it legally in ^^™^^y their power to act for themselves whenever they thought good, cratic but The members of the Assembly, meeting but rarely, and gathered not oli- from distant cities, could have had none of that close corporate s^''<''ii<>- feeling, that community of interest and habitual action, which is characteristic of the oligarchy of a single town. An Achaian who was led astray from his duty to the national interests, was much more likely to be led astray by regard to the local interests of his own city than by any care for the promotion of aristocracy or democracy among the cities in general. And, of whatever class it was composed, every description of the Assembly sets it ' The original form of the property qualiflcation had at least an intelligible object. The requirement of real property was meant to serve a class interest. It included the landowner, even of moderate estate, while it excluded the merely monied man, however wealthy. But the property qualiflcatiou, in its later form, when real property was not required, seems to have been absolutely meaningless. P 210 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. before us as essentially a popular Assembly, numerous enough to share all the passions, good and bad, which distinguish popular Assemblies. It had all the generous emotions, all the life, heartiness, and energy, and all the rash impetuosity and occa- sional short-sightedness, of a really popular body. So our own House of Commons may, if we look solely to the class of persons of whom it is still mainly composed, be called an aristocratic body ; but, when it comes together, it shows all the passions of a really democratic Assembly. Contrast it with a Spartan or Venetian Senate ; contrast it even with our own House of Lords. So the Achaian Congress, though the mass of those present at any particular meeting might be men of aristocratic position, was still in spirit, as it was in name, an Assembly of the Achaian Practical People. Its members could not venture on any oppressive or "!°" exclusive legislation against men who were legally their equals, elements, and who had a perfect right, if they chose to encounter the cost and trouble, to take their places in the same Sovereign Assembly as themselves. We cannot doubt, and we find it distinctly affirmed of one occasion,i that, in times of great excitement, many citizens appeared in the Assembly who were not habitual frequenters of its sittings. Extraordinary Meetings, summoned by the Government to discuss special and urgent business, would, as a rule, be far more largely attended than the half-yearly Meetings in which the ordinary aifairs of the Commonwealth were transacted.^ And we must always remember that each city retained its independent democratic government, its Assembly sovereign in all local affairs, and in which Federal questions, though they could not be decided, were no doubt often dis- cussed.^ In the Assembly of the State, if not in the Federal Congress, rich and poor really met on equal terms, and many opportunities must have arisen for calling in question the conduct of those citizens who took an active part in Federal business. A Federal politician whose votes at Aigion were ob- noxious to his fellow-citizens at home might be made to suffer for his delinquency in many ways. Thus the people at large held many checks upon those who were practically their rulers, and it was legally open to them to undertake at any time the 1 Pol. xxxviii. 4. See atove, p. 205. Compare the description of the tumul- tuous Assembly in Livy, xxxii. 22. 2 See Pol. xxix. 9. ' Liv. xxxii. 19. Neque solum quid in senatu quisque oivitatis suse aut in communibus conciliis gentis pro sententia dioerent ignorabant, etc. V VOTES TAKEN BY CITIES 211 post of rulers themselves. One can hardly doubt but that those citizens of any particular town who attended the Federal Con- gress practically acted as the representatives of the sentiments of that town. Thus, though the mass of Achaian citizens rarely took any part in the final decision of national affairs, yet the vote of the national Assembly could hardly ever be in opposition to the wishes of the nation at large. The votes in the Assembly were taken, not by heads, but by Votes cities.^ On this mode of voting I have already had occasion to 'f.'^f'' ^^ make some remarks.^ It was one common in the ancient re- by heads. publics, and it has become familiar to us by its employment in the famous Assembly of the Eoman Tribes. Nor is it at all unknown in the modern world. It was the rule of the American Confederation of 1778,^ and the present Constitution of the Union retains it in those cases where the election of a President falls to the House of Representatives.* In a Representative Constitution this mode of voting must be defended, if it be defended at all, upon other grounds ; in a Primary Assembly, like that of Achaia, it was the only way by which the rights of distant cities could be preserved. Had the votes been taken by heads, the people of the town where the Meeting was held could always have outvoted all the rest of the League. This might Evils have been the case even while the Assembly was held at Aigion, ^^^}°^^,. and the danger would have been greater still when, in after system times. Assemblies were held in great cities like Corinth and guarded. Argos. The plan of voting by cities at once obviated this evil. It involves in truth the same principle which led the Patrician Fabius and the Plebeian Decius to join in confining the city- populace to a few tribes, and which has led our own House of Commons sfeadily to reject all proposals for an increase in the number of " metropolitan " members. The representative system would of course have effectually secured the League against all fear of citizens from a distance being swamped by the multitude of one particular town. But the representative system had not 1 See Niebuhr, Hist. Rome, ii. 29, Eng. Tr. Thirlwall, viii. 92. Kortiim (iii. 160) maintains the contrary ; but it is impossible to believe that passages like Liv. xxxii. 22, 23 and xxxviii. 32 merely mean that the citizens of the same town sat together in the theatre. ^ See above, p. 165. ' Articles of Confederation, Art. v. § 4. *' Art. ii. § 1. 3, and the 12th Amendment. The Confederate Constitution presei-ves the same rule, and introduces it in another case, namely the voting of the Senate on the admission of new States. Art. iv. § 3. 1. 212 OEIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. been revealed to the statesmen of Achaia, any more than to those of other parts of Greece. As matters stood, the only remedy was to put neighbouring and distant cities on an equality by ordering that the mere number of citizens present from each town should have no effect on the division. And of course the most obvious form which such a regulation could take was to give a single vote to each city. And probably, while the League was confined to the ten towns of the old Achaia, no bad conse- quences arose from this arrangement. Some of the towns were doubtless larger than the others, but there could have been no very marked disparity among them. But it was quite another matter when the League took in great and distant cities like Siky6n, Corinth, Megalopolis, Argos, at last even Sparta and Evils MessgnS. It was clearly unjust that such cities as these should of the liave no greater weight in the national Congress than the petty avT^se- to'^'^s of the old Achaia. It was the more unjust, because we ment of can easily conceive that questions might arise on which the old votes. ten towns would always stick close together, and so habitually out- vote five or six of the greatest cities of Greece.^ While the personal influence of Aratos lasted, questions of this sort seemed to have remained pretty much in abeyance, but to provide a counterpoise to this undue weight of the old towns was one great object of the administration of Philopoimin. The most effectual remedy would of course have been to let the vote of each town count, as in the Lykian League,^ for one, two, three, or more, according to their several sizes. But this was a political refinement which was reserved for a later generation, and it was one specially unlikely to occur to the mind of an Achaian legis- lator under the actual circumstances of the League. The cities external to the old Achaia were admitted, one by (5ne, into an Achaian League, already regularly formed and practically work- ing. In the earlier stages of its extension, above all when the first step was taken by the union of Siky6n, the admission of new towns into the League was doubtless looked upon as a favour ; in more degenerate times they were sometimes compelled to enter into the League by force. In neither of these cases was it at all likely that a city newly entering into the League should ^ Schorn, p. 61. In dieser Hiusioht strebte der Bund nacli vollig demo- kratischer Freiheit und Gleichheit, was zwar spaterhin einer Aenderung tedurft liatte, damit nicht die Herrschaft und Gesetzgebung bel den Schwachen gewesen ■<^Sre. 2 ggg above, p. 165. V CONSEQUENCES OE THE MODE OF VOTING 213 receive any advantage over those cities which already belonged to it. To have given Siky6n two votes and Corinth three, while the No fair small Achaian towns retained only one each, would have been no ^f°^^^ more than just in itself — if indeed it would have reached the strict against the justice of the case — but it would have been a political develope- League, ment for which there was as yet no precedent, and which we can have no right to expect at the hands of Aratos or of any other statesman.^ It was a great step in advance of anything that Greece had seen, when new cities were admitted into the League at all on terms of such equality as the Achaians offered. Greece had already seen petty Leagues among kindred towns or dis- tricts ; she had seen great Confederacies gathered around a presiding, or it may be a tyrant, city ; but she had never before seen any state or cluster of states offer perfect equality of political rights to all Greeks who would join them. The League offered to its newest members an equal voice in its Assemblies with the oldest ; it made the citizens of all alike equally eligible to direct its counsels and to command its armies. It is hardly fair to blame a state which advanced so far beyond all earlier precedent merely because it did not devise a further improve- ment still. Had that improvement been proposed, anterior to the experience which proved its necessity, it would have appeared, to all but the deepest political thinkers, to contradict that equality among the several members which was the first principle of the Federal Constitution. Had any patriotic Corin- thian claimed a double vote as diie to the superior size and glory of his native city, he would have seemed to threaten Dymi and Tritaia with the fate which Thespia and Orchomenos had met vrith at the hands of Thebes. Lykia made exactly the improvement which was needed, because her legislators had the past experience of Achaia to profit by. The Achaian principle was revived in all cases under the first American Confederation, and it is re- tained in one very important case in the actual Constitution of the United States. Nor is it in all cases an error ; the principle of equality of votes for every State, great and small, has always been adhered to in one branch of the Federal Legislature, and it has always been rightly defended as a necessary check on the supremacy of mere numbers. In short, though the Achaian ^ See Schorn, 67, 68. His strictures are perfectly just in themselves, hut they are rather hard on Aratos and the Achaians merely for not possessing premature wisdom. General merits of the Aohaian Constitu- tion. 214 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF AOHAIAN LEAGUE ohap. Constitution failed, in this respect, to attain to the full theore- tical perfection of the Lykian constitution, yet the League fully merits the enthusiastic praises of its own historian as the body which, without retaining selfish privileges or selfish advantages, first freely offered Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity to every inhabitant of Peloponnesos.^ Meetings of the Assembly, From B.O. 217, The same causes which made the Achaian Assembly practi- cally an aristocratic body served also to make its sittings short Short and and unfrequent. The League had no capital and no court ; unfrequeut there was nothing to tempt men to stay at the place of meeting any longer than the affairs of the nation absolutely required. Every man's heart was with his hearth and home in his own city : he went up to do his duty in the Federal Assembly, and to off'er sacrifice to the Federal God ; but to tarry half the year away from his own house and his own fields was an idea which never entered the head of an Achaian politician. The Assembly met of right twice yearly,^ in Spring and Autumn. The Magis- trates were originally elected at the Spring Meeting, afterwards most probably in the Autumn, s The Session was limited to three days.* Besides the two yearly Meetings, it rested with the Government to summon extraordinary Meetings, on occasions of special urgency. ^ From the shortness of the Assembly's 1 Pol. ii. 39, 42. ^ The two yearly Meetings are clearly Implied in Pol. xxxviii. 2, 3. The Koman Ambassadors come to the Antumn Meeting at Aigion {Si.d\eyo/iiiitjn> rots 'Axawis h TTj tG>v Alyiioiv 7r6Xei, c. 2). It is agreed that, instead of the Assembly coming to a decisive vote, the Ambassadors should meet some of the Achaian leaders in a diplomatic conference at i.Tegea. Kritolaos meets them there, and tells them that he can do nothing without the authority of the next Assembly, to be held six months after {els tV ^^s c6voSov, iJTis lyneXXe yevitr8(u /j-erh fi^i/as ^^). This was, of course, mere mockery, as a special Assembly could have been called, or special powers might have been obtained from the Meeting at Aigion, but the pretext shows the regular course of things. The Autumn Meeting appears in Pol. ii. 54 ; iv. 14 ; xxiv. 12 ; the Spring Meeting in iv. 6, 7, 26, 27, 37 ; v. 1. So seemingly in xxviii. 7, by the name of 7) TrpiAjTT] ayopd. ' See Sohorn, p. 210. Thirlwall, viii. 295. Cf. CUuton, Fast. Hell. A. 146. * Pol. xxix. 9. Liv. xxxii. 22. Both of these are cases of an extraordinary Meeting (cniyKXriTos). If this rule prevailed on such occasions, much more would it in the common half-yearly Meetings. Pol. V. 1. 6 S^ PaffiXei>s *i\nnros .... avpijye rods 'Axaiois 5ii tSv &px6pTav eis iKKXti^av. See below, p. 426. The words /caret rS/ious in the next sentence show that this was a perfectly regular proceeding. Cf. Pol. xxiii. 10. 12 ; xxiv. 5. In one case (Pol. iv. 7) we meet with a strange phsenomenon of a Military V TIMES AND PLACE OF MEETING 215 Sessions naturally followed certain restrictions on its powers, Conse- certain augmentations of the powers of the executive Govern- i^^f^\ Re- ment, which to an Athenian would have seemed the utter g^'?^g°" destruction of all democratic freedom. It has been thought, on Powers, the highest of all authorities,^ that, in an extraordinary Assembly at least — and an extraordinary Assembly would, almost by the nature of the case, have to deal with more important business than an ordinary one — a majority of the Executive Cabinet could legally refuse to allow any question to be put to the vote. This seems at least doubtful ; ^ but it is evident that, in a Session The of three days, the right of private members to bring in bills, or Initiative even to move amendments, must have been practically very much ^['i^g curtailed. No doubt the initiative always practically remained Govern- in the hands of the Government. In an extraordinary Assembly ment. it was so in the strictest sense, as such an Assembly could only entertain the particular business on which it was summoned to decide.^ And in all cases, what the Assembly really had to do was to accept or reject the Ministerial proposals, or, it may be, to accept the counter-proposals of the leaders of Opposition. The ordinary Assemblies were, at least during the first period piaoe of of the League, always held at Aigion ; but it seems to have been Meeting ; in the power of the Government to summon the extraordinary ^^^g- AssemWy, an idea iEtolian or Macedonian rather than Achaiau. The ordinary Meeting votes that the General shall summon the whole force of the League in arms, and that the army thus assembled shall debate and determine {(rvvdyeiv rbv i7TpaT7}yt)V toi)s 'Axatoits h rots 6ir\ots, 8 5' B.^ rocs (TvveK6ovv ijfieptoVj iv y Kard. roi>s v6fiovs ?5et tA ^jjipiir/xaTa Trpoff(f>ip€iv Toits ^ovXofJ^fOVS, K.T.X.) In the Assembly which he describes two quite different motions are made and discussed. Most probably the Government proposals were made on the first day, those of private members on the second, and the vote taken on the third. 216 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE ohap. afterwards Assemblies, as at any time, so in any place, which might be other convenient.'- Aigion had been chosen as the place of meeting for ' '^^' the original League ^ as being the most important of the old Achaian towns after the destruction of HelikS. In after times it was at least as well adapted for the purpose for an opposite reason. It might be the greatest member of the original League, but it was insignificant compared with the powerful cities which Advan- were afterwards enrolled in the Union. Aigion was a better tages of place for the Federal Government than Corinth or Megalopolis, ° ■ for the same reason that Washington is a better place for the American Federal Government than New York. There was not the least fear of Aigion ever being to the League of Achaia what Thebes had, in times past, been to the League of Boeotia. Still, however, a certain dignity, and some material advantage, must have accrued to Aigion from the holding of the Federal Assemblies, and from the probable frequent presence of the Federal Magistrates at other times. This may well have aroused a certain degree of jealousy among the other towns, and we shall see that, at a later time,''Philopoim^n carried a measure which left the League without even the shadow of a capital, and obliged the B.C. 189. Federal Assemblies to be held in every city of the League in turn.* I have several times, in discussing Achaian affairs, used the words Government, Ministers, Cabinet, and such like. I have done so of set purpose, in order to mark the most important of all the differences between the city-Democracy of Athens and the Federal Democracy of Achaia. In speaking of Athenian politics no words could be more utterly inappropriate ; Dgmos was at once King and Parliament ; the Magistrates whom he elected were simply agents to carry out his orders. This was perfectly natural in a Democracy whose Sovereign Assembly Greater regularly met once in ten days. Another course was equally power of natural in a Democracy whose Sovereign Assembly regularly met trafesin ""^^ twice in each year. It was absolutely necessary in such a case Achaia to invest the Magistrates of the Republic with far greater official ' See Helwing, p. 227. * Straho, viii. 7. 3. Kai Koivo^oiXiov els 'iva t6tov crwqyeTO airois (iKaKeiTO Sk'Afii.pwv) in $ Th KOi.vi, ixniianiov koX outol (cai'Iwpes irpdrepov, and ib. 5. Myiiiiiv 5' iarl Kal ravra Kal 'EXIkt/ Kal ri toO Aids &\v Koa/av. 2 See Helwing, 227, 228. Thirlwall, viii. 393. That it was actually carried, though Tittmanu (682) thinks otherwise, appears from Pol. xxiv. 12, where an ordinary meeting is held at Megalopolis. than at Athens, V POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT 217 powers than any Magistrates possessed at Athens from the days of KleisthenSs onwards. It was, in short, necessary to give them the character of what we, in modern phrase, understand by a Government, and to confine the Assembly to the functions of a Parliament. We must of course make one exception, required The by the universal political instinct of Greece ; the iinal' vote on Ap'^^'^" matters of Peace, War, and Alliance rested with the Assembly, trates This follows at once from the difference between a republican form a Assembly, sovereign in name as well as in fact, and the Parlia- "o™™- ment of a Monarchy, which in theory is the humble and dutiful Council of a personal Sovereign. All the differences between Athens and Achaia naturally flow from the differences between the position and extent of the two commonwealths. In the single City of Athens the democratic tl^eory could be strictly carried out ; in the large Federal territory of Achaia it could be cajried out only in a very modified form. The extent of territory led to the infrequent Meetings of the Assembly; the infrequent Meetings of the Assembly led to the increased authority of the Magistrates; for a ruling power must be lodged somewhere during the three hundred and fifty-nine days when the Sovereign Assembly was not in being. We therefore find the Federal Magistrates of Achaia acting with almost as little restraint as the Ministers of a modern constitutional state. They are the actual movers and doers of everything; the functions of the Assembly are nearly reduced to hearing their proposals and saying Aye or No to them. And, as the Magistrates were themselves elected by the Assembly, we should naturally expect, what the history at every step shows us to have been the case, that the vote of the Assembly would be much oftener Aye than No. The Achaian Assembly was addressed by Ministers whom its own vote had placed in office six months' before ; it would, under all ordinary circumstances, give them a very favourable hearing, and would not feel that sort of jealousy which often exists between the American Congress and the American President. In fact, the relations between an Achaian Govern- ment and an Achaian Assembly were in some respects more like Comparl- those between an English Government and an English House of ^™ '^}^^ Ani6ric£i Commons than the relations between an American President and ^nd Eng- an American Congress. The Achaian Magistrates, being Achaian land. citizens, were necessarily members of the Achaian Assembly ; so in England the Ministers are, by imperative custom, members of 218 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF AOHAIAN LEAGUE chap. Points of one or other House of Parliament. In Achaia therefore, just as greater jjj England, the members of the Government could appear to Eng- personally before the Assembly to make their proposals and to land. defend their policy. But in America the Ministers of the President are strictly excluded from seats in Congress,^ and the President communicates with that body only by a written Message. Again, as Congress does not elect,^ so neither can it remove, either the President or his Ministers; it therefore follows that the Legislative and Executive branches may remain, during a whole Presidency, in complete opposition to one another. In England the House of Commons does not either formally appoint or formally depose the Ministry, for the simple reason that the Ministry has no legal existence ; but it does both in a way which, if indirect, is still highly effectual. In Achaia, the Government was, not indirectly but directly, chosen by the Assembly. There was not, any more than in America, any constitutional means of removing them before the end of their term of oflGice ; a Government which had ceased to enjoy the coniidence of the House had therefore to be constitutionally borne with for a season. But, as their term of office was only one year instead of four, such a season of endurance would be much shorter than it sometimes is in America. Even in England, a Government must be weak indeed which, when once in office, cannot, by the power of Dissolution or otherwise, contrive to retain power for as long a time as an unpopular Achaian Govern- ment could ever have had to be borne with. Altogether the general practical working of the Achaian system was a remarkable advance in the direction of modern constitutional government. And it especially resembles our own system in leaving to usage, to the discretion of particular persons and Assemblies, and to the natural working of circumstances, much which nations of a more ^theoretical turn of mind might have sought to rule by positive law. ^ Constitution, Art. i. § 6. 2. This restriction is modified in the Confederate Constitution. ^ Congress never elects the President freely ; under certain circumstances (see Amendment 12) the House of Representatives have to choose a President from among three candidates already named. The President again may he (Art. i. § 3. 6 ; ii. § 4) deposed by a judicial sentence of the Senate on an impeachment by the House of Eepresentatives. But this of course requires proof of some definite crime ; there is no constitutional way of removing him simply because his policy is disapproved. V FEDERAL MAGISTRACIES 219 The Achaian Government then, when its details were finally Federal settled, consisted of Ten Ministers, who formed a Cabinet omaes. Council for the General of the Achaians, or, in modern language, the President of the Union. Besides these great officers, there was also a Secretary of State,i an Under-General,^ and a General General of of Cavalry.'* It is probable that the latter two functionaries Cavalry. were merely military officers, and did not fill any important political position. It is clear, for instance, that the Under- Under- General, was, in civil matters at least, a less important person General, than the Vice-President of the American Union. The American Vice-President is ex-officio President of the Senate, and, in case of any accidental vacancy in the Presidentship, he succeeds to the office for the remainder of the term. But of the Achaian Under-General we hear nothing in civil affairs, and if the General died in office, his place for the remainder of the year was taken, not by the Under-General, but by the person who had been General the year before.* The active officers of the League in civil matters were clearly the General, the Secretary, and the Ten Ministers. The exact functions of the Secretary are not described, but it is easy to guess at them. He was doubtless, as Secretary Secretaries of State are now, the immediate author of all public °^ ^***®- despatches, and in minor matters he may often have been entitled, as Secretaries of State are now, to act on his own responsibility. It is evident from the way in which both Polybios and Strabo speak of it, that the office was one of high dignity and importance. ^ Vpafi/iaTeis. Pol. li. 43. Strabo, viii. 7. The office was as old as the League. ^ 'TiroaTpiTTiyos. Pol. iv. 69 ; xl. 6. In t. 94 one Lykos of Pharai is called iTO(TTpiTTiyos T^s avvreXdas t^s iraTpiKris. This I take to mean a local magistrate of some little confederacy formed by Pharian townships like those of Patrai. See above, p. 192. Or, in the particular place where the phrase occurs, it may refer to the temporary union of Dyme, Pharai, and Tritaia in B.C. 219. See below, Chapter viii. Either of these views seems more likely than that he was " com- mander of the pure Achaian forces, as distinguished from those of the whole League." K. F. Hermann, 186. 9. Such a distinction is quite alien to the whole spirit of the constitution. But no explanation seems quite satisfactory. The use of iraTpiKTJs seems so very strange that, when one remembers the expression in Polybios (xl. 3), HaTpeis Kal t6 /xeri Toiriav (runTeXiKdv, one is strongly tempted to read IlaTpiicTJs. Yet would IlaTpiKds be a correct Gentile form, and could a citizen of Pharai be a Magistrate at Pharai ? There is certainly the case of Aratos' State-Generalship at Argos. See p. 201. ' 'Iirwdpx'i^. Pol. V. 95 ; x. 22 ; xxviii. 6. Sohorn (p. 62) supposes that this officer took the place of the second General, when the number was reduced to two. This may well be true in his military, but hardly in his civil, capacity. ^ Pol. xl. 2. 220 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. The Ten Ministers, the Cabinet Council of the President, are called by various names.'- They seem to have been the Federal Magistrates of the League in its earlier and looser state. Their number ten, as several writers have observed,^ evidently points to the reduced number of the old Achaian towns after the loss of The Ten Helikfi and Olenos. This at once suggests a question as to the Ministers. pQgj^JQn ^f these Magistrates when new cities were added to the League. The number remained unaltered ; ^ and it has hence been inferred that the Cabinet Council always continued to be filled by citizens of the old Achaian towns.* Yet it would be of itself almost impossible to believe that this important office was confined to citizens of the old Achaia, and that an Argive, a Corinthian, or a Megalopolitan would have been ineligible. Had such been the case, we should hardly have found Polybios, himself a citizen of a non- Achaian town, using such strong language as he does as to the liberality of the League in extend- ing full equality of rights to every city which joined it, and reserving no exclusive privileges to the elder members.^ In Probably conformity with these professions, the General, as we know, was from all ^6% chosen from any of the towns enrolled in the League, and the Cities, indeed he seems to have been, oftener than not, a citizen of a non-Achaian canton. These arguments alone would almost lead us to believe that, when the League had attained its full develope- ment, the old number Ten, though still retained, ceased to bear any practical reference to the ancient number of towns, and that Their formal title was d7}fii.ovpyolf Safiiopyolf Damiwrgi. Pol. xxiv. 5. Plut. Ar. 43. Liv. xxxii. 22 ; xxxviii. 30. Boeekh, 0. I. 1542 (vol. i. p. 711, of. p. 11). There were also local Sa/uofyyoL as Magistrates of particular cities. They are also more vaguely called S.pxovTes, dpxal (Pol. v. 1 ; xxiii. 10, 12 ; xxiv. 5 ; xxix. 9, 10 ; xxxviii. 4), and — with evident reference to their joint action with the General — a-mdpxovTes, axivapxlai. (Pol. xxiv. 12 ; xxvii. 2 ; xxxviii. 5) ; also ■n-poEHTurei (Pol. ii. 46 ; iv. 9), irpi^ovKoi (?) (Plut. Phil. 21), and, apparently, oi t9is yepovfflas (Pol. xxxviii. 5). See Thirlwall, viii. 92, 491. Neither Tittmann (683, 6) nor Kortiim (iii. 161) is perfectly clear about this last unusual title. Polybios uses the verb irweSpeiw to express a meeting of the Cabinet, xl. 4. 2 Schorn, 62, 63. Thirlwall, viii. 91. 3 n^y^ ^^^j^ 22. * I take this to be Bishop Thirlwall's meaning (viii. Ill) when he says, " Strange as it appears, we are led to conclude that the places in both these boards continued to be filled by Achaans." [The rule in the Swiss Bundesverfassung as to the constitution of the Bundesrath is different. Art. 84. "Die Mitglieder des Bundesrathes werden von der Bundesversammlung aus alien Schweizerbiirgern, welche als Mitglieder des Nationalrathes wahlbar sind, auf die Dauer von drei Jahren ernannt."] Pol. ii. 38. OiSevl yhp oiih iiro\ei.Troidv7i vXeoviKrqiw. tois ii'&pxv^, ^ca Si irAi/Ta iroi-oOcra tois dei Trpoa\a.iJ,§avoiiAvoi.i, k.t.X Cf. u. 42 throughout Cf K. F. Hermann, § 186, u. 10. V THE TEN MINISTERS 221 the office of Minister, as well as the Presidency, was open to every citizen of the League. It not uncommonly happens, in the growth of constitutions, that numbers of this sort are retained long after they have ceased to bear any practical meaning. So the Ten Achaian Ministers may have once really represented the Ten Achaian Towns, and yet, at all events after the accession of Siky6n, they may have been chosen indiscriminately from any of the confederate cities.^ But we are hardly left to argue the point from probabilities. There is a full description in Polybios of the proceedings in an Achaian Cabinet Council,^ with the names of several of the members. Four of the Ministers are mentioned, and, of these, three, besides the General, are citizens of Megalo- polis ; ^ the fourth is a citizen of Aigeira, one of the old Achaian towns. The exact relations of the Ten Ministers and of the Secretary to the executive Chief of the State are not very clearly marked. It must have been essential to the good government of the Relations League that they should be able to work together in tolerable Ministers harmony, and that their differences, if they had any, should not to the go beyond a debate and a division among themselves. For GS^eral. Achaian statesmen had certainly not reached that pitch of refinement by which a division in the Cabinet is held to be a thing not to be thought of. They had not discovered that all differences of opinion must be compromised or concealed, or that, if this is impossible, the minority must resign office. This is a political refinement which can exist only where, as among ourselves, the whole constitution of the Ministry is something wholly conventional, where the Cabinet has no legal existence, and where the rights and duties of its members are regulated purely by usage. But the Achaian Cabinet was directly elected to a definite office to be held for a definite time ; if diff'erences of opinion arose among its members, they were simply to be ' The only expression which looks the other way, is that of Damiurgi civi- tatium. Liv. xxxviii. 30. On the other hand, in xxxii. 22, he calls them Mctgistratus gentis, which tells at least as much for their strictly Federal character. 2 Pol. xxijj! 10, 12. These apxai, &pxovTis, summoned hy the General, must be the council of Ministers. Indeed we find nearly the same story over again in Pol. xxiv. 5, where the formal word drifdovpyol is used, clearly as synonymous with dpxovTcs. ^ Aristainos the General, Diophanes, Philopoimen, and Lykortas, all from Megalopolis ; ArchSn from Aigeira. The General himself takes no part in the debate, but his party is outvoted. 222 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE ohap. The Ministers probably generally united among tliem- selves. An Acliaian " Caucus.' settled by a "majority, like ditterences of opinion in the Senate or in the Assembly itself. In the United States the President chooses his own Ministers, and that with a much greater freedom of choice than is allowed to any Constitutional King. The Achaian President had his Ministers chosen for him; but then they were chosen along with himself, at the same time, and by the same electors ; the majority which carried the election of the President himself would probably seldom give him colleagues who were altogether displeasing to him. If, on some occasions,^ we find the General and his Cabinet disagreeing, the special mention of the fact seems to show that it was something exceptional. Altogether the science of electioneering seems to have obtained a very fair develope- ment in the League. Polybios in one place gives us a vivid description of an Achaian " Caucus,"^ where several leading men of a particular party met to discuss the general affairs of that party, and especially to settle their "ticket" for the next election. They agreed upon a President and upon a General of Cavalry. It is not expressly said that they agreed upon other Magistrates as well, but we may reasonably infer that they did. At least we cannot infer the contrary from the sole mention of an officer who does not commonly appear in connexion with politics. One cannot help suspecting that the President alone would have been mentioned, if his subordinate officer had not chanced to be the historian himself. In' comparing the constitution of the Achaian League with the constitutions of modern free states, it is difficult to avoid speaking of its Chief Maigistrate by the modern name of ^ See Pol. xxiii. 10 ; xl. i. But in the first case, the disagreement does not go beyond a division in the Cabinet itself. ^ Pol. xxviii. 6. Nothing can be plainer than that this was simply what the Americans call a " Caucus." Yet two distinguished German scholars, Schom (p. 6i) and Droysen (ii. 463), have built upon this passage a theory that the Safuopyoi (who are not mentioned) had the sole right of proposing candidates for the Presidency. Bishop Thirlwall of course sets them right (viii. 91). Indeed Schom himself, by the time that he reached the event itself in his actual narra- tive (p. 354), seems to have better understood the state of the ease. "What Polybios here describes is simply the preliminary process which must go before every public election. This is one of the many cases in which a citizen of a free country has a wonderful advantage in studying the history of the ancient commonwealths. Many things which the subject of a continental monarchy can only spell out from his books are to an Englishman or an American matters of daily life. V OFFICE OF THE GENERAL 223 President. But we must remember that Ms real official title The Pre- was StratSgos or General. In all the democratic states of sident or Greece there was a strong tendency to strengthen the hands **™®'^''^- of the military commanders, and to invest them with the func- tions of political magistrates. Thus, at Athens, the Archons remained the nominal chiefs of the state, but their once kingly powers gradually dwindled away into the merest routine. The Ten Generals, officers seemingly not known before Kleisthen^s,! po^erg of became really the most important persons in the commonwealth. Generals entrusted with as large a share of authority as Demos would i° °^^^^ entrust to anybody but himself. The transition between the gj^te ' two systems is clearly seen at the battle of Marath6n, where 3 ^ 490. Kallimachos the Polemarch, one of the Archons, is joined in command with the Ten Generals. Earlier, he would have been the sole commander ; later, he would have had no part or lot in the matter. In most of the later Grecian states, especially in the Federal states, we find the highest magistrates bearing the title of General. The number of Generals differed in Different different Leagues, but it was always much smaller than the numters in Athenian Ten. The Epeirots had at one time as many as different three,^ but the Arkadians under LykomMes,^ the Akarnanians,* and the .dltolians^ had each a sole General. The Achaians, rp^^ for the first five-and-twenty years of their renewed Confederacy, Generals elected two Generals. Then an important change was made °f '^^ in the constitution by reducing the number to one. In the -League" emphatic words of Polybios,^ " they trusted one man with all reduced their afiairs." " Now," he continues, " the first man who *» One. obtained this dignity was Markos of Keryneia." Markos, it ^'°' ^ Grote, iv. 181. ^ See atove, p. 118. ^ See above, p. 169. ' See above, p. 116. ^ See next Chapter. " Pol. ii. 43. Bfeoffi /ihi oSi> Stt) ri. irpdra koI irivre avvevokLTedaavTO fled' iaVTuv al irpoELf/ripLhat 7r6Xets, ypa^fiaria Koivhv iK irepibSov Trpox^tpi- t^dfievat. Kal Si5o ffrpaTTyyois' fierd. Sk ravra ir&Xiv ^So^ev aiiTots ^va KadLardveiv Kal rotjT(fi TTtffTeiJeip virip tuv 6\o)v, Kcd irpwros ^tvx^ ttjs TLfiTJs Ta.6njs MApKos 6 Kepweis. [Of. Strabo, viii. 7. 3. etra ISo^ev ha xeipoToveio-ffot (rTpaTr]y6v.] After reading this passage, and after considering the tendency in Federal Greece, in America, and in Switzerland, to give to every Federal body a single President, it is curious to find Calhoun (Works, i. 393) arguing against a single President, saying that no commonwealth ever retained freedom under a single President, wishing to bring the United States to a double Presidency, like that before Markos, and fortifying his position by the examples of the Soman Consuls and the Spartan Kings. It is curious to find all these American writers — Mr. Motley, indeed, is an exception — so thoroughly anxious to find classical precedents, and so constantly missing those which really bear upon their case. 224 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION Of AOHAIAN LKAGUE chap. will be remembered, was the gallant deliverer of Boura, and probably, more than any other one man, the true founder of the revived League. He obtained, like Washington, his due reward, to be chosen as the iirst chief of the land which he had delivered. The practical extent of the General's powers Extensive is here plainly set forth. Everything was entrusted to him ; powers of iig was not indeed to rule, like a Tyrant, with unlimited 6 Office. pQ^gj.g^ Qj. even, like a lawful King, for an unlimited time ; he was to govern for a single year with a commission limited by Law J but, while his term of office lasted, he was to be the Chief of the State in a sense in which no man, or body of men, had been chief under the elder Democracy of Athens. His will was indeed limited by the necessity of consulting his colleagues in the Government and of bringing all great questions to the decision of the Sovereign Assembly. The will of the most powerful Minister of modern days is limited by the same conditions. No Minister in a free state can legislate at his own pleasure, .in his own name or in the name of his Sovereign ; he can impose no tax, he can touch no man's life or estate : he may indeed, in his Sovereign's name, make war or peace without formally consulting Parliament, but he cannot venture to declare war or to conclude peace on terms which he knows Compari- will be offensive to the majority of the House. Yet it is son with a not the less true that such a Minister may be practically all- Pjjst™ powerful; that his colleagues in the Cabinet, and his fellow- Minister, members in the House, may accept all his proposals ; that he alone may be the real mover in everything, possessed of a practical initiative in all matters, and leaving to other powers in the state a mere right to say No, which they probably never think good to exercise. Such is a powerful European Minister in our own time ; such too was the General of the Achaians. The Kepublic trusted him with all its affairs; the Assembly of course reserved to itself the final power of saying Aye or No ; but every earlier stage of every affair — the beginning of all legislation, the beginning of every negociation,i the bringing of all measures up to the point at which they could be brought forward as motions in the Assembly — everything, in short, which a modern nation looks for at the hands of a strong '■ The process of negociation is clearly set forth in Pol. xxviii. 7. A diplo- matic commimioatiou is first made to the General, who is favourable to it ; he then brings the Ambassadors personally before the Assembly. V COMPARISON BETWEEN ATHENS AND ACHAIA 225 Government — all was left to the discretion of the General, in concert with a body of colleagues who commonly looked up to him as their natural leader. Now all this is utterly Compari- contrary to the practice of the earlier democratic states. ^°° °' PeriklSs exercised as great a power as Aratos; Perikles, like pgriHes^" Aratos, was practically prince;^ but PeriklSs ruled purely by the force of personal character and personal eloquence ; Aratos ruled by virtue of a high official position. It is true that the official position of Aratos was the result of his personal character; it is true that Perikles, like Aratos, held the most important office in his own commonwealth ; the difference is that the official position was necessary to the influence of Aratos and that it was not necessary to the influence of PeriklSs. Periklds was General of the Athenians, one General out of Ten ; he was General, both because of his personal inclination and capacity, and because, in that stage of the republic, a man who pretended to advise measures was ex- pected to be ready to carry them out himself. But the position of Perikles in the Athenian Assembly was not the result of his office ; it was a position wholly personal ; it was a position which was not shared by the other Generals ; it was a position which it was soon found that a man might hold without being General. The Assembly listened to Kledn influence as obediently as it listened to Perikles ; Kle6n became, no of men less than Perikles had been, the leader of the People, the officelt originator of all its policy ; but Kle6n was simply a private Athens, citizen with no official character whatever ; it was only towards the end of his days that he foolishly^ took upon him an office for which he was unfit, and which had not been needed to support an influence which ended only with his life. De- mosthenes again, without any official position, if he did not rule as effectually as Kle6n, yet contended on at least equal terms with the official chief Ph6ki6n, and often succeeded in carrying measures of which Ph6ki6n utterly disapproved. Now the power of Aratos undoubtedly rested on his personal char- acter ; the League trusted him officially because it trusted him ^ Thuc. ii. 65. ''Er/lyveTl) re \dy(ii ixh drjfioKparta,, ifyyif Si iirb roCj vpihrov ' dvdplis ipx/l- The words 6 irpCnos dr/jp are not an ofiicial title. * I do not refer to the expedition to Sphakteria, for which Mr. Grote makes out at least a plausible case, but to his last expedition to Thrace. Probably his success at SphaktSria had turned his head, and made him seek for an office which he had never before thought of. Q 226 ORIGIN" AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. personally ; indeed it trusted him in a way in which it trusted no one else ; other Generals, with the same legal powers, could never exercise anything like the same practical authority.^ This is simply the difference, with which we are all familiar, between Greater a weak Government and a strong one. But the influence of import- Aratos was nevertheless of a kind which could not be exer- Office°in ^i^^^ without a high official position ; he could not have ruled Achaia. the League, as KleSn ruled Athens, as a private citizen in the Assembly, any more than the greatest of statesmen and orators could govern England from the cross benches. During the whole history of Athens, we find the counsels .of the Republic directed by eloquent speakers in the Assc^'oly, who hold office or not as it happens to suit them personally. During the whole history of the Achaian League, we find its counsels constantly directed by those citizens whom it chose to its high magistracies. It is clear that an Athenian statesman could dispense with office if he pleased ; it is equally clear that an Achaian statesman sought office as naturally as an English statesman ; without it, he might indeed win fame as an opposition speaker, but he could not hope to be the real guiding spirit of the commonwealth. It is clear also that an Athenian General, though warfare and diplomacy formed his immediate department of the public business, was by no means the necessary originator of military and diplomatic measures. An Athenian General might, as Nikias and Ph6ki6n were, be sent, without any loss of official dignity, to carry out plans against which he had, as a citizen in the Assembly, argued with all his force. It is equally clear that an Achaian General was the very soul of the League, the prime deviser of every- thing. Aratos did not often see his proposals rejected, though that might happen now and then. But it certainly never happened that he was ordered, like Mkias, to carry out the opposite proposals of anybody else. The whole history then shows that the Achaian General really stood at the head of the League, in a way in which no one stood at the head of any of the earlier Greek jepublics, but in a way very like that in which a powerful Minister stands at the head of a modern constitutional state. He ■ ' See the account given by Polybios (v. 30) of the contemptible adminis- tration of Bperatos. Everybody despised him, nobody obeyed him, nothing was ready, etc. V COMPARISON OF ACHAIA, ENGLAND, AND AMERICA 227 resembled the American President in being formally elected Compari- f or a definite time, while the position of an English Minister ^°" "f *''^ IS at once conventional and precarious. But in many respects General his duties came nearer to those of an English First Minister the than to. those of an American President. The main diiference American is one 'vvhich has been already hinted at, namely that the ^nd the" ' Achaian President was a member, and the leading member, English of Congress itself, while the American President is something ^^^^} external to Congress. The Achaian President did not com- '"'^ ^^' municate his sentiments by a Message, but by a speech from the Treasury Bench.^ It follows therefore that he formally made motions on which the House voted, while in America the Houses vote first and send their conclusions to the Presi- dent.^ An Achaian Federal Law was a motion of the General cio.ser passed by the Assembly ; an American Federal Law is an Act approach of Congress confirmed by the President. In America, in short, ^ *^,^ there is no Ministry in our sense, because there is no King, system, Or, perhaps more truly, the President is a four-years' King, owing to a King with very limited powers, but who, within the extent the Gene- of those powers, really governs as well as reigns. Being a himself a King then, he cannot be a member of his own Parliament ; member all he can do is to recommend measures from outside, and, 5f*^^>,i when they are passed, either confirm them or send them back for reconsideration.^ Our monarchical forms really come nearer to the Parliamentary relations which existed in the Achaian Republic than is done by the Republic of the United States. An English Minister, being himself a Member of Parliament, ' The first two Presidents, Washington and Adams, opened each Session of Congress with a speech ; at other stages of the Session they sent messages. In both these respects they followed the common practice of Kings. JeflFersou extended the custom of the written message to the opening of the Session (see Tucker's Life of Jefferson, ii. iii. 2). Such speeches were "King's speeches," proceeding from an external power, not " ministerial statements," proceeding from a Member of the House. '•* The President may recommend measures to Congress (Constitution, Art. ii. § 3), just as a King does, but he cannot make a motion in Congress, like the Achaian General. Congress passes bills, and sends them to the President, for approval (Art. i. § 7. 2), as to a King. On the other hand, the Senate (Art. ii. § 2. 2) can confirm or reject many official acts of the President ; but here the Senate is not acting in a strictly legislative character, and the House of Repre- sentatives is not consulted. ' The President has no absolute veto, but a mea.sure sent back by him cannot be passed again except by a majority of two-thirds of both Houses (Art. i. § 7. 2). Triis is practically a more valuable power. 228 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGTJE chap. retains Ms power of making direct motions, and, as Minister, he practically acquires the sole right of making important motions with any chance of success. And, as the Royal Veto is never used, the decision of the Houses is practically as final as that of the Achaian Assembly. Greater TMs lofty position of the Achaian General, as compared power ^j^jj ^.j^^^. q{ a^jjy Athenian Magistrate, is the crowning example General of those tendencies which naturally arise from the different necessary position of a City Democracy and of a Federal Democracy. ina Federal jjj either case the Republic needs some centre, some visible aCit™ liead. At Athens the Ten Generals were really that head; Demo- some of them were always on the spot ; but if any unforeseen oracy. emergency took place, there was no need for them to act on their own responsibility ; an ordinary Assembly of the People could not be many days distant, and an extraordinary one might, if need be, be summoned even sooner. In such a state of things there was really no occasion to give the Magistrates any large powers. But turn to Achaia ; if an ■ unforeseen emergency arose; — if a foreign Ambassador, for instance, arrived with important proposals ; if King KJeomenis threatened or King Ptolemy made friendly advances — where was he to look for the Achaian League ? The Athenian Dtoos was never very far from his Pnyx, but the League was, for three hundred and fifty-nine days in the year, scattered to and fro over all PeloponnSsos. In such a state of things there must be some one to represent the nation ; some one who can be found at once ; some one who can enter into negociations, who has authority to give a provisional answer, and who can summon the Assembly to give a final one. Such a representative of the nation the constitution of the League provided in its General. Every application was first made to him; he con- sulted his Ministers ; in concert with them, he either brought the matter before the next ordinary Assembly, or, if the business was specially urgent, he called an extraordinary As- sembly specially to consider it. In that Assembly his proposals were not merely those of an eloquent citizen, they carried with them all the weight of a modern Government measure. On any weighty matter, it was his business to come forward and declare ^ his mind, exactly as it is the business of the Leader Pol. xxviil. 7. 'E/cctXet y^p rh irpay^ara tt/Z' tov arpaTTjyoG yi'd>fi7)V. Cf. Llvy, XXXV. 25. MuUitudo Philopamenis sententiam eocspectaiat. Prcetor V mCREASED POWERS OF MAGISTRATES IN A FEDERATION 229 of the House in our own Parliament. The main difference is that, if by any ill luck his proposals were rejected, the General on the one hand could not dissolve the Assembly, and on the other he was not expected to resign his own office. The same chain of reasoning, which shows the necessity of the large powers which were vested in the Achaian Government, leads also irresistibly to the conclusion that the members of that Government were always men of wealth and high social position. As every Achaian citizen was a member of the Achaian Assembly, Members so, in the absence of the slightest proof to the contrary, we ?f ^^^ cannot doubt that every Achaian citizen was legally eligible to ment every office in the Achaian commonwealth. But if only well-to- necessarily do citizens could habitually attend the Assembly, it is clear that '"^^it^y only very wealthy citizens could be commonly chosen to the high offices of the State. There is commonly, even under the most democratic forms, a tendency in the people themselves to give a preference to birth and wealth. It is only in days of strong reaction against oligarchic oppression that this tendency utterly dies away. In most ages and countries the aristocrat of liberal politics is the most popular of all characters. Even in the Athenian Democracy, though low-born Demagogues ^ might guide the counsels of the Assembly, the office of General was almost always conferred on members of the old nobility. In the Achaian League this natural tendency must have become a practical necessity. There is no evidence that any public officer offices of the League was paid ; there is distinct evidence that some ''' ^^^ important public officers were not paid ; ^ and the office of General appOTently is distinctly spoken of as one which involved great expense.^ unpaid Now none but men who were at once rich, ambitious, and zealous, is turn erat, el omnes eo tempore et prudentia et auctoritate anteibat. In both these cases the General, like an English Minister, does not speak till after several other speakers, and apparently not till the House began to call for him. ' I use this word in its original neutral sense, a Leader of the People, whether for good or for evil. An Athenian Sijiiayoiybs in later times is a citizen, be he Hyperbolos or be he Demosthenes, who is influential in the Assembly without holding oflice. But Isokrates (jrepi Eip. 126) applies the word to Perikles him- self. ^ This is clear in the case of the Senators. See Pol. xxiii. 7 and ThirlwaU, viii. 92. Of course I suppose only the great magistracies to have been unpaid. In Achaia, as everywhere else, there must have been plenty of paid subordinates. * Polybios (xxviii. 7) incidentally mentions the expensiveness of the General's office ; SlIi, tA ttX^Sos iKavbn ^(frriiiATav els t^/v apxiw SeSairavriKhai ['Apx'^""]- This passage alone would be enough to prove the unpaid nature of public office in Achaia. 230 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. would or could accept offices which involved onerous duties and large expenses, and which carried with them only honorary- rewards. We are ourselves familiar with an unpaid Magistracy, an unpaid Parliament, a Government not unpaid indeed, but whose highest members receive salaries barely covering their expenses, and therefore do not seek for office as a source of personal gain. We therefore can fully understand the working of a similar system in Achaia. We can understand how the system might be safely left to its own' practical working, how an unpaid Magistracy would necessarily be an aristocratic Magis- No pro- tracy, without the requirement of any property qualification. perty Here again, we see how great an advantage a student of ancient quahfioa- yg^Qj.y. derives from familiarity with the usages of a free state. One of the very best of German scholars,^ finding that in practice the men who held the high magistracies and who filled the Federal Tribunals ^ were always rich men, has supposed the existence of a property qualification for office, of whose existence no proof or likelihood whatever is found in our authorities. Had such a qualification been enforced by law, Polybios could never have spoken as he does of the strictly democratic character of the Achaian constitution. Our own great historian of this period,^ as usual, instinctively sees the truth of the case. Every Englishman knows that no law forbids the poorest man to become Natural a Member of Parliament, or even a Cabinet Minister. Yet, though no law forbids him, the poor man is so far from being likely to be elected a member himself, that he has small chance of being listened to even as the proposer of a candidate. Even where there is a qualification, as in the case of Justices of Peace, ^ Droysen, ii. 461, 2. I am quite at a loss to guess what the use of the word KTrifuLTLKot 111 ous of the passages of Polybios (v. 93) which Droysen quotes has to do with the matter. The historian is speaking of a local quarrel between rich and poor at Megalopolis. '^ One cannot doubt either that there were Federal Courts or that their members were commonly wealthy men. Poor men could not often appear in an unpaid court sitting at a distance. But I am not quite sure that the passage commonly cited in proof of the fact really bears on the matter. According to Plutarch (Phil. 7), the Knights (iinreis) were /tdXio-ra Kipioi ri/i^s Kal KoXiiffeus. This is generally taken to mean that the judges or jurors — the Greek SiKacrral are some- thing between the two — in the Federal Courts were commonly men of the eques- trian census. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 93. But I do not feel quite certain whether the KiXairis here spoken of may not be parliamentary rather than judicial, as the Ti|«5} clearly refers to the influence of the equestrian class in disposing of the great Federal magistracies. See the parallel passage of Polybios, x. 22. 3 Thirlwall, viii. p. 93. effect of unpaid V EFFECT OF UNPAID OFFICES 231 a man is seldom appointed who does not possess much more — or at least who does not belong to a class whose members com- monly possess much more — than the legal qualification for the office. In Achaia, as in England, these things doubtless settled themselves. There is everywhere a certain natural influence about birth and wealth, which does not spring from legal enact- ments, and which no legal enactments can take away. All that Democracy — legal and regular Democracy ^ — can do is to deprive birth and wealth of all legal advantage, and to let birth, wealth, talent, happy accident, all start fair and all find their level. This the Democracy of Athens and the Democracy of Achaia both did ; only circumstances, not laws, fixed the practical standard of eligibility at a much higher point in the Democracy of Achaia than in the Democracy of Athens. We will now attempt to gather what information we can from our authorities as to the exact legal powers of the Achaian General and his Councillors. It has been doubted ^ whether the Power of power of summoning extraordinary Assemblies rested with the summon- iUST ASSGIll" General or with the Ten Ministers. One can hardly doubt that i^i^gg vested it was vested in the General acting with the concurrence of his in the Ministers.^ This union of a Governor and a Council is not ^™®^'^J ™ unknown either in American States or in English Colonies. But the formal presidency of the Assembly, and the duty of The putting questions to the vote, clearly rested with the Ten Ministers Ministers and not with the General.* The reason is obvious, gpgakers of the ' A constitution which by legal enactments excludes any class, be that class j^ggemijiy. the rich or the poor, the patrician or the plebeian, has no right to the name of Democracy — it is essentially Oligarchic. '•^ K. F. Hermann, § 186, p. 392, Eng. Tr. " Pol. V. 1. (See above, p. 214, and below, 426.) Compare xxiii. 10 throughout. The General and Apxavres meet the Boman Ambassador and decline to call an Assembly. ■• See the passage in Livy (xxxii. 22) quoted already. If Bishop Thirlwall be right, as he clearly is, in thinking that ol ttjs yepowias in Pol. xxTXviii. 5 mean the dafitopyol (viii. 92, 491), we find them distinctly acting as Speakers of the Assembly. They seem to be the &pxovTes mentioned just before, and &pxovTes in Polybios means the Sajuopyol. They call the President of the Union, Krito- laos, to order for unparliamentary language. Tills was in very late, bad, and violent times ; one cannot fancy Aratos or PhilopoimSn receiving or needing such an interruption, though doubtless they were legally open to it, just as an English First Minister may be called to order by the Speaker. Drumann (p. 462) seems to confound this ycpovata with the povkr) or Senate. Tittmann (683) accurately distinguishes them, though he is not quite clear about their identity with the Sa/uopyol. 232 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. The General was necessarily an important speaker ; he had to explain and to defend his policy ; he would have been as unfit to act as President of the Assembly as the Leader of the House of Commons is to be at the same time its Speaker.^ Theoreti- cally the same objection might seem to apply to his ten colleagues; they were as responsible as he was for the measures on which they had to take the votes of the Assembly. But they were not so personally bound as he was to be active speakers on their behalf. Our own House of Lords presents a close analogy. The Lord Chancellor is Speaker of the House ; he presides, and puts the question. But, unlike the Speaker of the Commons, he is also a member of the G-overnment, an active member of the House ; he can vote, speak, bring in bills of his own, just as much as any other Peer ; one class of bills indeed it is his special duty to bring in rather than any other Peer. Still it is felt that the Speaker of the House cannot fittingly be the Government Leader in the House ; some other Peer is always looked upon as the special representative of the Cabinet in the House of Lords. This division of parliamentary duty exactly answers to what I conceive to have been the division of duties in the Assembly between the Achaian Ministers and the Achaian Joint General. Out of the House, the General and his Ministers di^lomatio "^o^l^tless acted in concert in all important civil business. On matters. some great occasions we distinctly see the whole Government B.O. 223. acting together. For instance, Aratos and his Ten Councillors ^ all went to meet King Antigonos, and to make arrangements with him for his coming into Peloponn^sos. In short, in all civil and diplomatic business the General acted together with the other members of the Government. He was chief of a Cabinet, and we know what powers the chief of a Cabinet has. He could not indeed get rid of a refractory colleague, as a modern First Minister can ; but we may be sure that, in the good times of the League — the days of Kritolaos are another matter — a General who was in the least fit for his place could always command a majority among his colleagues, and a majority was all that was needed. 1 That in some other Federations, as those of iEtolia and Alcarnania (see pp. 264, 484, note 1), the General presided in the Assembly shows the higher political developement of the Achaian System. The Achaian institution of the Ten Ministers seems to have no exact parallel elsewhere. To their existence it is prohably owing that we hear less of the Senate in Aohaia (see p. 239) than in some other commonwealths. Hut. Ar. 43. 'Aw^vra fierii, tCov dr)/uovpyav 6 "Aparos a.iT(fi. V UNRESTRAINED POWERS OP* THE GENERAL IN WAR 233 In military affairs the case was different. The Ten were a Unre- purely civil magistracy ; ^ the General, besides being the political strained chief of the state, was also, as his title implies, its military chief, P° ^^^ and that with far more unrestrained power than he exercised in General in civil affairs. The Sovereign People declared war and concluded War. peace; but while war lasted, the General had the undivided command of the Achaian armies. The Achaians, as Polybios says, trusted their General in everything : they did not hamper his operations in the field in the same way as was too often done by the Venetian, Spartan, and Dutch Republics. There was not the same reason or temptation for doing so. The hereditary^ Kings of Sparta were naturally looked upon with jealousy by the Ephors, who represented another principle in politics. And Venice, in her land campaigns, had commonly to do witii mercenary leaders, whose fidelity might not always be absolutely trusted. But if an Achaian General, a citizen chosen for a year by the free voices of his fellow-citizens, cannot be fully trusted by them, no man can ever be trusted at all. In fact he commonly was both fully and generously trusted. He was allowed to act for himself, subject only to the after-judgement of the Assembly, in which his proceedings might be discussed after the fact.^ But it is in this union of the chief military and the chief political Union of power in the same person that we see the main point of differ- military ence between the Achaian system and that of all modern states, tSal^func- repubUcan or monarchic' No First Minister of a constitutional tions monarchy thinks of commanding its armies ; it is felt that his ""like duties lie in quite another sphere. The American President is ^^teT" indeed, by the Constitution,* Commander-in-Chief of the Federal forces by sea and land ; that is to say, they are necessarily at his disposal as the chief executive Magistrate ; but it is not implied that the President shall always be the man personally to lead the armies of the Eepublic to battle. But in the Achaian League the General was really a General ; his command in the field was as much a matter of course as his chief influence in the ^ I only remember one instance (see p. 419) of the Jlinisters being mentioned in military affairs, and this is on the reception of a new city into the League, a business as much diplomatic as military. - Thirlwall, viii. 102. " He wielded the military force of the League in the field with absolute, though not irresponsible, authority. " ' I speak of the civilized states of Europe and America ; I do not answer for Mexican or South American Republics. * Art. ii. § 2. 1. 234 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. His title military, but his badge of office civil. Athenian experience on the union of civil and military powers. Assembly ; his only official title ^ was a military one ; though it should be noticed that the outward symbol of his office was one purely civil. We have seen a Theban Archon with nothing military about him, but whose badge of office was a spear ; ^ we now find, in curious contrast, that the badge of office of the Achaian General was the purely civil symbol, a seal. The General kept the Great Seal of the League ; and his admission to or resignation of office is sometimes spoken, of as accepting or laying down the Seal,^ much as we speak, not indeed of a Com- mander-in-chief, but of a Lord Chancellor. This union of civil «and military duties, which was usual in the later Greek Republics, looks at first sight like a retrograde movement, after the experi- ence of the Athenian commonwealth on the subject. At one time it was held at Athens that the functions of statesman and General shoiild go together. In Miltiad^s, Themistoklls, Aristeides, we see the union in its fulness. In the next gjpneration we discern the first signs of separation between the two.' Perikles and Kim6n indeed still unite both functions; Periklgs could fight and Kim6n could speak. But it is clear that, though the functions were united, they were not united in equal proportions in the two men. Periklls was primarily a statesman and secondarily a general; Kimdn was primarily a general and secondarily a statesman. The military abiKties of Periklgs were considerable, but they were a mere appendage to his pre-eminent civil genius ; and most certainly Kimdn was far more at home when warring with the barbarians than when contending with PeriklSs in the Assembly. It showed the good sense of both the rivals, when they agreed upon the compromise that PerikMs should direct the counsels, and Kimdn command the armies, of the commonwealth.* In the next stage of things the schism between the two callings becomes wider and wider. - 1 Polybios is singularly fluctuating in the various titles which he gives to the Assembly and to the Ministers, but I do not remember that the General is ever called anything but UTpariiyds, or, perhaps, its equivalent riye/juiy (see iv. 11 ; V. 1) ; Tpoea-riis (ii. 4.5) is hardly meant as a formal title. ^ See above, p. 129. * Pint. Ar. 38. 'E^ouXeiytraTO /jtiv eiBds [6 "Aparos] dTroWtrflat tV acjipayiSa. Kol Tiiv ffTpaT-nylav i^eivai. Pol. iv. 7. UapaXa^iiv [6 "Aparos] Tapi toO Tifio^hov T^v SrnioHav cr^ipaylSa. [So in Outer Appenzell. Mtiller, Hist, de la Confederation Suisse (Continuation), xiv. 213. Wetter, the Landammann, resigned his office; his son was elected in his stead and "recut le sceau des mains de son pere. "] " See Grote, v. 450. V UNION OF CIVIL AND MILITARY DUTIES 235 The versatile genius of Alkibiades indeed united both characters, or rather all characters, ; but Nikias was a professional soldier, whose position as a statesman is quite incidental, while the elder Demosthenes, an admirable soldier, does not appear as a states- man at all. On the other hand Kle6n and his brother Dema- Gradual gogues are mere politicians, who do not in any way profess to separation be military commanders.^ In the next century the callings military were utterly separated. Ph6ki6n is the only man in whom there functions, is the least approach to an union of them. Iphikratis and Chabrias were strictly professional soldiers, who eschewed politics altogether. D^mosthenls, ^schines, Hyperides, never thought of commanding armies. Indeed in their days it was but seldom that the armies of Athens were formed of her own citizens and commanded by her own Generals ; they were too commonly Employ- mere mercenary bands commanded by faithless soldiers of fortune, ment of It may have been the remembrance of the evils inflicted on ^^^^g^" Greece by these hireling banditti, which induced both the Achaian League and the other later Greek commonwealths to The fall back upon the old system, and to insist upon the union of ^<=l"*""* military and civil powers in the chief of the state. The arrange- reaction, •ment doubtless gave greater unity and energy to Federal action ; cisad- but it undoubtedly had a bad side. It by no means followed vantages either that the wisest statesman would be also the bravest and °^ ^^^ most skilful captain, or that the bravest and most skilful captain ' would be also the wisest statesman. Aratos was unrivalled as a diplomatist and parliamentary leader, but his military career contains many more failures than successes. Could he and Lydiadas have divided duties, as PerikMs and Kimfin did, the League might perhaps never have been driven to become a suppliant for Macedonian protection. It is also clear that the union aggravated one difficulty which perhaps can never be entirely avoided in any government where magistrates are elected for a definite time. Once a year, or once in four years, The Presi- what we call a Ministerial Crisis comes round as a matter of dental in- 1 Kle8n's command at Aniphipolis is, as we have seen, something quite exceptional. But of course a Demagogue, lilie another citizen, might be called upon to serve in war. Hence the point of Ph6ki6n's retort to a troublesome orator — iroXi/Mov iiiv foros I'yii aov, elp-Zfuris Si yei>o/i.ivr]S at) iixov &p^eis. Pint. Ph8k. 16. Compare also the story of PhokiSn and ArchibiadSs in the same life, 1^. 10. Demosthenes and jEschines both served in the army, and ^schines gained some credit for personal gallantry, just as SSkratfe did, but no one ever thought of choosing any one of the three to the office of General. 236 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. terregnum aggravated by the union of powers. B.C. 220. Question of re-elec- tion of tlie President. course. It is felt to be a practical fault in the American system that the President is chosen so long before he actually enters on his office.^ A- practical interregnum of some months takes place ; the incoming Government are still private men ; the outgoing Government, though still invested with legal powers, cannot venture to use them with any effect in the face of their desig- nated successors. A circumstance recorded by Polybios ^ shows that this difficulty was felt in Achaia also. The ^tolians chose for an inroad the time when the official year was drawing to its close, as a time when the Achaian counsels were sure to be weak. Aratos, the General-elect, was not yet actually in office;^ the outgoing General Timoxenos shrank from energetic action so late in this year, and at last yielded up his office to Aratos before the legal time. We know not exactly how long the Achaian interregnum lasted, but it is evident that we here find the American difficulty, and that aggravated by the fact that the President had himself personally to take the field. At Rome the change of Consuls seems to have sometimes had the same effect ; but, in the best days of Rome, the danger was tempered in two ways. It was lessened by that habitual devo- tion of every Roman to the public interest, to which neither ■ Achaia nor America nor any other state can supply a parallel. And the custom, by which a Consul whose services were really needed was commonly continued in his command as Proconsul, prevented the occurrence of any interregnum at all in the cases where it would have been most hurtful. It may perhaps be doubted whether, in another point, the practice of the League diminished or aggravated an evil which has often been pointed out in the American system. The power given by the Constitution, and, at one time, often exercised in practice, of re-electing the President, at least for one additional term of office,* has often been made the subject of grave com- plaint. It places, it is argued, the Chief Magistrate of the Union in the somewhat lowering position of a candidate for the ^ In tlie United States this evil is aggravated by the utter failure of the con- stitutional provisions for the double election of the President. The President not only does not enter on office immediately on his legal election, but, long before the legal election takes place, it is already practically decided who will be elected, and the interregnum at once begins. 2 iv. 6, 7. s See below, p. 397. ^ The Constitution puts no restriction upon re-election ; in practice no Presi- dent has ever remained in office for more than two terms. V PRESIDENTIAL INTERREGNUM 237 suffrages of the citizens ; it causes him too often to adopt a policy, which may not be in itself the best, but which may be the most likely to lead to re-election ; and it causes the latter part at least of a Presidency to be often spent in canvassing rather than in governing.^ The Achaian President held office Achaian for a year only ; he was incapable of immediate re-election, but ™^We of' he might be chosen again the year after. '^ In conformity with immediate this law, Aratos, during his long ascendency, was commonly elected re-election. seemingly quite as a matter of course, in the alternate years. In those years when he was not himself in office, he was often able to procure the election of some partisan ^ or kinsman,* whose policy he practically guided. We may well believe that, when he was not General, he often filled some other high office, and indeed it is not clear whether he was not sometimes, in defiance of the law, himself re-elected in consecutive years.^ It is certain that he was once, and that while another citizen was b.o. 223. in office, elected by a thin Assembly to the anomalous post of General with Absolute Power,* and that, in that character, he ^ On the other side see the ingenious arguments in the " Federalist," No. Ixxii. p. 390. Doubtless, as in most political questioas, there is something to be said on both sides, but practically the disadvantages of re-election seem decidedly to predominate. This view is strongly taken by Tocqueville, i. 228 et seqq., and Jefferson (see his life by Tucker 1.281) strongly objected to the power of re-electing the President, on the ground that a re-eligible President would be always re-elected, and would in fact become a Tyrant. That this fear was chimerical in America was proved by Jefferson's own case, but it was a very real one in Greece. See p. 238. The new Southern Confederation has made the President incapable of re-election, but has given him a longer term of office, namely, for six years. Art. ii. § 1. - '^ Plut. Ar. 24. 'BTTci /i?; xar' iviavriv i^fiv, irap iviavriv alpeiaBai tTTparn- yitp a^irbv [rbv "Aparov], ^pytp S^ Kal yvdjfiy 5ti iravT^^ Hpx^iv- So 30, 38. Kleom. 15. Three of these passages are strangely quoted in the Dictionary of Antiquities (p. 5, art. Achaicum Foedus) to show that ' ' persons of great merit and distinction were sometimes re-elected for several successive years." So Kortiim, iii. 162. The law may sometimes have been broken — it certainly was once in the case of PhilopoimSn (Liv. xxxviii. 33) — but Plutarch clearly means that the law forbade immediate re-election. (See Thirlwall, viii. 191. Droysen, ii. 438.) trap' iviavrbv, to make any sense, can only mean " every other year." ' Timoxenos (Pol. iv. 6, 7. 82. T6y TipUi^evov . . . rhv iwb tSiv ircpi rbv Aparov elaaybiKvov), Hyperbates, etc. seem mere nominees and instruments of Aratos. Even with Lydiadas and Aristomaclios he interferes in a strange way. / As his son the younger Aratos. Pol. iv. 37 ; v. 1. ' See Droysen, ii. 438. I shall examine this question in a note at the end of Chapter viii. ^ Plut. Ai". 41. T((J 5' 'Aparcp ffvvrjkdov els ^lkvuvo, jGiv 'Axcttwj/ oil TroXXoi [but Sintenis in his text gives oi TroXXof], KtjX yevofx^vqs iKKK7}0'ias -i^pidrj (jTpaTqybs aiiroKpdriopf Kal TrepieffTiJffaro ^povpcLV iK tojv iavrov ttoKltSiv. See Thirlwall, viii. 194. On the position of the (Trparriyis ai'iTOKpdrup, see below, p. 377. The 238 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF AOHAIAN LEAGUE chap. was, for a while at least, attended by a body-guard like a Tyrant. A man at once so fond of power, and so fully trusted as Aratos was, may probably have now and then ventured on violations of the letter of the law, especially when they took the form of illegal motions passed by the Sovereign Assembly. The question as to the working of the law against re-election was probably of more importance before the rise, and after the death, of Aratos. Where office is held for so short a time as a year, there is only one way which will absolutely prevent a Magistrate from shaping his conduct with a view to re-election. This is the extreme measure of forbidding the same man to hold office more than once in his life. An election in the next year but one is near enough to come pretty closely before his eyes and practically to influence his conduct in office. But the prohibition of re-elec- tion at any time, however distant, may lead to still worse evils. It was tried at Eome in the case of the Consulship,^ but it was afterwards given up. Such a rule, it is obvious, might often deprive the State of the services of its best citizens at the very time when they were most wanted. But the Achaian system of forbidding immediate re-election, though it could not entirely remove, probably did a good deal to lessen, the evil complained of in America. And it effectually stopped what was really the danger in Greece, that of the same man being elected, year after year, till he contrived to convert a permanent Presidency into a Special Tyranny. Aratos indeed, even when not in the highest office, position of was the practical ruler of the League ; still the alternation of Aratos. official and non-official years at least marked the distinction which separates the republican leader, however great his official power and personal influence, from the Tyrant reigning by force. If his government once, for a moment, assumed something like the outward form of Tyranny, even that extreme measure had some shadow of constitutional sanction, and it was ventured on only in a moment of extreme danger to the Union and its chief. The laws of the Achaian commonwealth allowed an able and eloquent statesman to exercise an almost unbounded influence, title was one familiar at Athens (see Thuo. vi. 26), but an Athenian arparriyiis airoKpdrup had no larger powers than an ordinary Achaian aTparriybs. It meant merely that exemption from the interference of colleagues and that absence of all instructions in detail which distinguish an Achaian from an Athenian General. On the other hand this title was the first step of Dionysios of Syracuse to the Tyranny. But the guard of Aratos was at least a guard of citizens, not of mercenaries. ' Liv. Epit. Ivi. RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT 239 but they supplied an easy means of checking him if he displayed the least tendency to abuse his power. Every alternate year at least he had to descend to the legal rank of a private citizen, and it rested wholly with his fellow-citizens whether he should ever rise above it again. It is clear that the Achaian League did not, as Republics are sometimes charged with doing, exhibit any jealousy of distinguished men. The whole career of Aratos shows the contrary. After his death no one inherited his full influence ; but we always find the Federal President a person high in both personal and oflftcial position. Unless it were Position during the few wretched years before the final Roman Conquest, °^ ^uc- the best men in the country never shrank from public affairs or generals stood aloof from the great offices of the State. Achaia, like all other countries, was not free from personal jealousies and party divisions ; but the several parties seem commonly to have fairly striven to place their best men in the chief office of the Common- wealth. It is only twice or thrice, and that, in one case at least, through an overwhelming foreign influence, that we find a con- fessedly incapable President set at the head of the League.^ It is a great problem in government to secure power enough in the rulers without trenching on the rights of the whole body. This problem the Achaian League seems very satisfactorily to have solved. Between the Government and the Popular Assembly there Tlie stood, as in all other Greek commonwealths, a Senate. Of this Senate Senate we have less knowledge than we could wish. Its men- tion in our authorities is not so frequent as one might have ex- pected, and in some passages it is hard to distinguish its action from that of the Popular Assembly.^ There are however other passages which make it clear that the Senate was a distinct body.^ 1 As in the case of Eperatos. Pol. iv. 82 ; v. 1, 30, 91. Cf. xi. 8. Pol. iv. 26 ; xxviii. 3 (a passage which I shall deal with hereafter), where ^oi/X^ might almost be taken for one of the many synonyms of the Assembly. So in xxiii. 9, ^oxAevrqpiov seems to be used for the place of Meeting of the Assembly, which elsewhere is a, theatre, xxix. 10 ; xxxviii, i. Cf. Tittmann, Staatsverfassung, 684. " In Pol. ii. 37, the /SouXeural are clearly mentioned as distinct Federal officers, just like the S,pxovTes and ducaaral, with whom they are joined. So in ii. 46, xxiii. 7, 8, xxix. 9, the j3ouXi} seems to be a distinct body. In xxiii. 7, 8, indeed, the /SouX?) of Polybios answers to the s 'Axaioils iKpivav /lerii, t^s /SouXijs. ^ In Pol. iv. 26, the ordinary meeting — ij Kad-^xovira crivoSos — is held ; King Philip attends it, but he seems only to have addressed the Senate {wpoaeKdbvTOi Tov ^aaCKiui^ irphs ttjv ^ovXijv iv Alyliji). * In Pol. xxix. 8, a body meets which is called ffivoSos and dyopa, and we hear of t6 ttX^Aos and ol iroXKol. Presently another special Meeting {aiyKkqros) is held, at which Polybios remarks, as if it were something un- usual, that not only the Senate, but everybody, attended ; iv -ri trvvi^aive /it] IjMvov (rvfiiropeiieaSm ttjv ^ovXtjc dXXa irdvTas rois airb TpcdKovra ctuiv. (See above, p. 205.) ^The former meeting can hardly have been anything except a Public Assembly, summoned as such, but at which few or none but Senators had actually attended. By the present Constitution of the University of Oxford, Convocation and Congregation are two distinct bodies, Congregation consisting of a certain class of the Members of Convocation. On exciting occasions a large body of Members of Convocation is drawn together, but it often happens that a meeting of Convo- cation is attended by none but Members of Congregation. So, in Cathedral Chapters, the smaller body of Residentiaries, by constantly V THE FEDERAL SENATE 241 last two considerations may help to explain the cases where the Senate and the Public Assembly seem to be confounded. In either case, the Senate would practically discharge the functions of. the Assembly, and the body so acting might be roughly called by either name. The Achaian Senate was no doubt legally pos- sessed of higher and more independent powers than the Senate of Athens ; still we doubt whether it exercised any very formid- able check on the will of an able and popular General. For the analogy of other Achaian institutions would lead us to believe that the Senators were appointed together with the Magistrates at the ordinary Spring Meeting, and that they were really elected by the Assembly, and not left to the lot, as at Athens. If so, the party in the Assembly which carried the election of a General and his Ten Councillors would doubtless be able to carry also the election of Senators of whom a large majority would be of the same way of thinking. On the financial and military systems of the Achaians it is Financial hardly my business to enlarge. But a few points must be men- ^'^^ '^''\" tioned which have a direct bearing on the Federal Constitution, of the That the Achaian League was essentially a national Government, League, that its laws and decrees were directly binding upon Achaian citizens, can admit of no reasonable doubt. But it is not equally clear that it had in all cases advanced beyond that system of requisitions from the particular members, instead of direct agency on the part of the Federal power, which, in modern politics, is held, more than anything else, to distinguish an Imperfect from a Perfect Federation.^ It would hardly have been in harmony with the common instincts of the Greek mind to have scattered an army of Federal officers, in no way respon- sible to the local Governments, over all the cities of PeloponnSsos. And, in truth, questions of taxation by no means held that important place in an ancient Greek commonwealth which is acting in the name of the whole body of Canons, has gradually drawn into its own hands nearly all the powers of the Chapter. So again, in England, when a Privy Council is held, it is not attended by all the Privy Councillors, but by those only who are immediately connected with the Government. In these last two cases the attendance of the whole body is so unusual that it would doubtless be resisted as something irregnlar. At Oxford, the whole body is contented to leave many matters in the hands of one class of its members, but it reserves to itself the undoubted power of assembling in full force whenever it pleases. The relations between the Achaian Senate and Assembly seem to have been very similar. ^ See above, p. 9. K 242 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. System of Requisi- tions pro- bably more conve- nient. Military Contin- gents ordered by the Assembly. Merce- Federal Garrisons. B.C. 243- 223. attached to them in every modern state. Probably, under the circumstances of the League, the requisition system was the more convenient of the two ; but it is perfectly plain that the Federal Assembly and the Federal Magistracy were powers to which every citizen owed a direct obedience, and not merely an indirect one through the Government of his own city. We once get a glimpse of the Federal system of taxation, when we find certain cities, and those too cities of the original Achaia, refusing to pay the contributions which were due from them to the Federal Treasury. '^ This seems to show that the Federal Assembly, or the Government acting by its authority, assessed each city at a certain sum, which the city had to raise by whatever form of local taxation it thought best. And really, though the United States prefer a system of more strictly Federal taxation, there seems nothing in the other method necessarily inconsistent with the strictest Federal Unity. ^ In military matters, we 'find the Assembly sometimes requiring particular cities to furnish particu- lar contingents,^ and sometimes investing the General with power to summon the whole military force of the League.* Beside these citizen soldiers, the League, according to the custom of the age, made large use of mercenaries, whose pay must have come out of the Federal Treasury. But they seem to have been kept strictly under the orders of the Federal General and his sub- ordinate officers ; we never see Achaia, like Florence and other Italian states, at the mercy of a hired Captain. Out of these two classes of citizen and mercenary soldiers, the League kept up a small standing army, enough at least to supply a few important places with Federal garrisons. The immeasurable importance of Akrokorinthos caused a Federal garrison to be kept there, after the deliverance of the city,^ as regularly as a Macedonian garrison had been kept during the days of its bondage. We also read of garrisons being kept in one or two cities, like Kynaitha^ and Mantineia,' whose loyalty to the 1 Pol. iv. 60. 'Zmepbvriaav oXMiKois els rb rks /ih Koivcis eiV^opis tois 'Axoiois /XT) reXeiv. Of. v. 30, 91. In v. 1, we see the Federal Congress dis- tinctly voting supplies, but we have no hint as to the way in which they were to be levied. ^ ggg above, p. 11. a Pol. v. 91. ^^ Pol. iv. 7. 'EtpifcfilcravTO .... avviyeiii riv arpaTiriyiiv Tois 'Axoioils h Tots birKots. See above, p. 215. s Four hundred heavy-armed foot, fifty hounds, and fifty huntsmen. Pint. Ar. 24. ^ Pol. iv. 17. *uXoKJ;i/ ^xoi-Tas tOv reix&v koL arparriyhv ttji iriXem i^ 'Axate. Three hundred Achaian citizens and two hundred mercenaries. Pol. ii. 58. ■ FEDERAL GARRISONS 243 League was doubtful, or whose local Governments required Federal help against a discontented party.^ But, beside what was necessary for these purposes, the League is not likely to have kept any force, whether of citizens or mercenaries, con- stantly under arms. But the extensive military reforms of Philopoimen^ show that the citizens must have been in the habit b-o. 210, of frequent military training, or he would hardly have had the opportunity of introducing such considerable changes as he did into both the cavalry and the infantry of the League. In considering the constitution of the Achaian League, it is General impossible to avoid comparing it, almost at every step, with the C°'"P*"- constitution of the United States. If I have pointed out some tween the points of diversity, it is because the general likeness is so close Achaian that the slightest unHkeness at once makes itself felt. The two ^^^^ constitutions are as like one another as, under their respective united circumstances, they could be. They arose in different quarters States. of the globe, among men of different races and languages, and Close with an interval of two thousand years between the two. The S™?^^' ^^' elder Union was a Confederation of single Cities, which had between once been strictly sovereign Republics, invested with all the the two. rights of independent powers. The younger Union was a Con- federation of large States, which had hitherto been mere colonies of a distant Monarchy, and which, before the War of Independ- ence, never thought of pretending to sovereign rights. Even the New England colonies, though the circumstances of their foundation gave to their early days much greater independence than European colonies commonly possess, were still colonies, and fully recognized their allegiance to the mother- country. With this difference of position to start from, it is much more remarkable that there should be any considerable degree of likeness between the two constitutions than that there should be some considerable degree of unlikeness. The chief differences Differ- between them are the natural results of the difference between a ^^gj^™ Confederation of Cities and a Confederation of large States, from the From this distinction at once follows the main difference of all, difference that the Achaian Congress was a primary Assembly, while the Qp^ede-* American Congress is a Representative Assembly. From this ration of again follow certain differences of detail ; the American Congress Cities and ' A similar power is given by the Constitution of the United States. Art. iv. § 4. = Plut. Phil. 7, P. 244 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE chap. a Confede- ration of States. Analogies and diver- sities in the posi- tion of the President. Different origin of the office in the two Systems. Kingly powers of the American President. could be, and is, bi-cameral, which the Achaian Congress could not be ; the Achaian President was chosen by Congress, or by the nation, as we choose to put it, while the American President is legally chosen by special electors ; the Achaian President was a member, and the leading member, of Congress, while the American President is a power external to Congress. On this latter very important point we have seen that the practical working of our own Constitutional Monarchy makes a nearer approach to the Constitution of Achaia than is made by the Constitution of the United States. From a Primary Assembly, where every citizen has a right to appear, it is obviously im- possible to exclude the Chief Magistrate of the State. So the forms of a modern Constitutional Monarchy require the actual, though not the avowed, wielder of the royal power to be himself a member of one or other House of the Legislature. But such a position would be hardly consistent with the office of a President whose kingly functions are conferred on him by Law and not by an unwritten conventionality. Still the general position of the Chief Magistrate in the two constitutions is strikingly alike, and the more so when we remember that the historical origin of the two offices was wholly different. The American President, like the Athenian Archon or the Roman Consul, inherited, under the necessary limitations of a republican system, the powers of which the Bang was deprived by the Eevolution. He answers very exactly to the Athenian Archon in his second stage, when a single Chief Magistrate was chosen for ten years. The powers of the President are essentially kingly ; he lacks indeed the power of declaring war, but it is his function to negociate treaties of peace ; he has the command of the national forces ; he has the mass of the national patronage; and he possesses a legislative veto, which is the more practical because it is only suspensive. All these powers are strictly royal ; only, when put into the hands of a republican magistrate, they are necessarily limited in various ways. In some cases the confirmation of the Senate is legally required for the validity of the President's acts ; he is, like the Consul, the sole mover and doer, but another power in the State possesses the Tribunician function of forbidding.^ In all cases his power is practically ^ This analogy is not quite perfect. The President's acts have to he formally confirmed by the Senate ; the Consul's acts needed no formal confirmation from the Tribunes. All that the Tribune did was to step in with his Veto when he V COMPARISON BETWEEN ACHAIA AND AMERICA 245 limited by the temporary tenure of his office, and by his personal responsibility^ for any illegal act. Still, limited as they are in their exercise, the powers are in themselves kingly ; ^ the President stepped into the King's place ; ^ he has really more power than a Constitutional King has personally, though less than belongs to a powerful First Minister acting in a Constitu- tional King's name. But the Achaian General did not succeed Nothing any King ; if there ever was one King over all the Old Achaian royal cities it was in a long past and mythical time ; the single General ^°^^^^ succeeded to the functions of the two Generals whom the League General. originally elected. There was therefore nothing kingly about his origin; the Achaians deliberately decided that one Chief thought good. But the right of confirmation, in the hands of a body which can originate nothing, is practically reduced to a right of rejection. ^ I mean responsibility in the old Greek and in the legal English sense, not in that in which we often speak of Ministers being " responsible to Parliament. " This last phrase simply means that the House of Commons may discuss their acts, and that, if it disapproves of them, it can easily drive them to resignation. But a Greek Magistrate was, and an American President is, liable to legal trial and punishment for his official acts. So is an English Minister, but not as a Minister. If it can be proved that the First Lord of the Treasury has been guilty of mal- versation at the Treasury, if it can be proved that he has, as a Privy Councillor, given the Sovereign illegal advice, the Law can in either case touch him, by impeachment or otherwise. But as " Prime Minister," with ii good or a bad "policy," the Law cannot touch him, because it knows nothing of his existence. In our system. Parliamentary responsibility has become so effective as to make strictly legal resiionsibility nearly a dead letter. But in the American system, there is no such thing as Parliamentary responsibility ; ten thousand votes of censure cannot displace the President, but an impeachment can. ^ Hamilton, in the "Federalist" (No. Ixix. p. 371), labours hard, as his argu- ment requires, to show the points of difference between the elective and responsible President and the hereditary and irresponsible King. That is, he brings forward the republican limitations of the President's powers more strongly than the kingly nature of the powers themselves. He then compares the President with the Governors of particular States, showing that the President's powers do not, on the whole, exceed theirs. But the powers of a State Governor are no less kingly vrithin their own range, and they are also kingly in their origin. The Governor of the independent State succeeded the Governor of the dependent Colony, and he, whether elected or nominated, was essentially a reflected image of Kingship. The Governor of the State retained the position of the Governor of the Colony, with such changes as a republican system necessarily required. It may be doubted whether republics which had had no sort of experience of monarchical institutions would have invested any single magistrate with the large powers possessed by the American Governors. 2 The fact that the chaotic period of the old Constitution, 1776-1789, inter- vened makes but little difference. The memory of Kingship had not died out, and the anarchy of the Confederation proved the need of a head of some kind. The Federalists were always charged by their Republican opponents with en- deavouring to restore Monarchy, and, in a, certain sense, the charge was im- doubtedly true. 246 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ACHAIAN LEAGUE ohap. General resem- blance of the two Presidents, No exact parallel in Achaia to the American Senate. Magistrate was better than two, and that it was well to clothe that Chief Magistrate with powers unknown to earlier Demo- cracies.^ But the general resemblance between the Heads of the two Unions is obvious ; whatever may be the differences in detail, we see, in both cases, that a highly democratic constitu- tion can afford to invest a single chief with nearly the whole executive power, and we see, in both cases, that so great an extent of legal power may be sufficient to gratify the ambition of the citizens who are successively raised to it. Neither Union hesitated to create something like a temporary King, and neither Union ever fell under the sway of anything like a permanent Tyrant.^ In both these respects the Achaian and American Democracies stand together, and are distinguished alike from the earlier Democracies of Greece and from the Democracies of mediaeval Italy. Florence indeed, and other Italian cities, invested their magistrates with far greater powers than those of either the Achaian General or the American President. But those powers could be safely vested only in a Board or College ; a single chief came in only as a temporary Dictator,^ and the temporary Dictator often contrived to convert himself into a Tyrant. The Achaian and the American Confederations stand together as the two Democracies which have entrusted a single Chief Magistrate with the greatest amount of power, and those in which that power has been less abused than anywhere else. The American Senate is an institution to which there is no exact parallel in the Achaian system. The founders of the American Constitution adopted the general principle of a Second Chamber from the constitution of the mother -country. They adapted it to republican ideas by making its seats elective instead of hereditary, and they invested it with some powers which the British House of Lords does not possess. It is the constitutional ^ The day.s when Athens had a single Archon were of course long before she became a Democracy. In fact the gradual advances of Democracy were largely made at the expense of the Ai'chonship. " The doubtful stretches of authority on the part of the President during the present struggle can hardly fail to remind us of the irregular proceedings of Aratos in the crisis of the Kleomenio war. See below, Chapter vii. But I see as little reason to suspect Mr. Lincoln, as there was to suspect Aratos, of any real intention to establish a Tyranny. ^ The Podesta of so many cities, the Roman Senator, and so forth, were origin- ally Dictators required by special emergencies, though those emergencies some- times lasted so long as to convert the Dictatorship into a permanent Magistracy. I do not remember any magistrate in a democratic city really analogous to the American President. V POSITION OF THE SENATE 247 check on the power of the President, and it is the special guardian of the rights of the several States. Each State, great and small, has its two Senators, while in the House of Representatives members are carefully apportioned to population. Where the Assembly is primary, a Second Chamber, in the same sense as A Second the British House of Lords or the American Senate, cannot exist. pl>ainber It is of the essence 6f such a Chamber that its members should ;„ ^ Pri- not be at the same time members of the Lower House. But in mary As- a constitution like that of Achaia, no citizen, whatever office he ^emWy. may hold, can cease to be a member of an Assembly whose very essence is that it consists of all the citizens. A Senate is neces- sary for many purposes; sometimes it prepares measures for discussion in the Assembly, sometimes it acts independently by commission from the Assembly ; but in either case it is a mere Committee of the sovereign body, a portion of its members acting on the behalf, and by the authority, of the whole. The special duties of the American Senate were, in Achaia, part of the duties of the Sovereign Assembly itself. The Assembly finally confirmed the treaties which the General negotiated ; the Assembly, in which each city had an equal voice, was itself the natural guardian of State independence. The principle of State equality which America confines, in most cases, to one branch of her Legislature, was applied in Achaia, in a more rigid form,i to her single Assembly. The Achaian Senate is Analogy of more analogous to the Norwegian Lagthing than to anything ^^^ .^°'^" in the constitution either of England or of America. The Nor- Lagthing. wegian Storthing is, like most other European Assemblies, Representative and not Primary ; it is indeed doubly representa- tive, being chosen by indirect election. But it so far approaches to the nature of a Primary Assembly that there is no distinct Second Chamber. The Storthing chooses a Lagthing from among its own members, and the body thus chosen discharges several of the functions of a Senate or House of Lords.^ But even here the analogy is very imperfect ; for the Lagthing, being a mere portion of the Storthing, exists only while the Storthing is sitting, while it is of the essence of a Greek Senate to act when the Public Assembly is not sitting. A less important difference ' In the Achaian Assembly, each city, great or small, had one vote. In the American Senate each State, great or small, sends an equal number of Senators, but the votes are not taken by States ; the two Senators of a State may vote on opposite sides of the question, like the two members for an English county or borough. , * Constitution of Norway, § 74-6 (Latham's Noiway, ii. 87). 2i5 OSIGHf AXD COysmmO^^ OF ACHAIAX LEAGUE csiF. Ij^weai the A«4iaiiaii and Am^^on Coosdnifians mav ^<^ se«ii in the far hi^io- 1^1 poadan o' the Urnkteis w CoandOikKs ol Hj^er die Achaian Geaeacai, as ecmp^red vith the Cat:'«~ers they must have been thioim scmewfaat into die bai^^roand. Bat at the Presidfflit's Cahin^ the Amoiean Ccnstitoticm makes no distinct m^itkBi at alL The difierent deparbnenfe <£ admini- stratimi vere arranged by an AcX oi the fiist Coiigiess.t Saefa are the chief paints of likeness and of mlikeiiess h^weoi the tvo great Federal Demoarad^ of die amaoit and the BHidan \nrid. It is singular that that vhich vas pnirtically die le^ dsnoczacic vl the two shoold he that which had theo- reiicdj the more d^nooatie coistitatioa.- Every Adaian citizim was himsdf a permanait membe' of Congr^s, vidi a vmee in aD Fedioal kgislation, in decbting peai% and var. and in electii^ die Magfetzates ol the Union. The Anmitan cidren. Afjtaia icc (m the odier hand, has only avote in dec^iing die Be^esoitatives "^^ ai his Siate, in decting dectats of die Preadai^ in decting die m Oenv ^^^^ L^ishtare vhidi again eieds the Senatos oi his State. and Abk- Yet nodiii^ if dearer than that tlm tone and feeling of goTtacn- ^^_|> meat and poik^is&r more democratie in the Fnited Stat^ dian it 'was in andrait Achaia. Here again comes in die di^aoice betwBen the Primaiy and the B^[iresaitative system. Hie Pnmaiy srstan, theoieticaDy die m(^^ damooatic system pasM^ that -wfaidi inTests every citiz^i idth a perstHial share in die Fedaal GoTemmait, bonmes, in a large tenitarr. |Hac- tie^y the less danosadc ci the nra The frandiise whMli it c lb. liv. (p. 298). V GREATER VALUE OF AN UNCONSCIOUS PARALLEL 251 thing in earlier Democracies, what an example they would have had before them to justify those large powers in the President for which they so strenuously contend.^ But it was really better for mankind, better for historical study, that the latter of these two great experiments was made in practical ignorance of the An uncon- former. A living reproduction, the natural result of the recur- ^°'°^? ^Hf' . .,., .° '^ . , . ,1 , ness to the rence of like circumstances, is worth immeasurably more than ancient any conscious imitation. It is far more glorious that the wisdom parallel and patriotism of Washington and his coadjutors should have '"^'^^, , led them to walk unwittingly in the steps of Markos and Aratos, than a than that any intentional copying of their institutions should conscious have detracted ought from the freshness and singleness of their °'^^' own noble course. Had it been otherwise, the later generation of patriots might have shone only with a borrowed light ; as it is, the lawgivers of Achaia and the lawgivers of America are entitled to equal honour. In truth the world has not grown old ; the stuiF of which heroes are made has not perished from among men ; when need demands them, they still step forth in forms which Plutarch himself might have pourtrayed and worshipped. The dim outline of Markos of Keryneia grows into full life in the venerable form of Washington ; a Timoledn, unstained even by Tyrants' blood, still lives among us under the name of Garibaldi ; it remains for us to see whether the modern world can attain to another no less honourable form of greatness, whether, among the rulers of later days, one will ever be found who shall dare to enter upon the glorious path of Lydiadas. ' lb. Ixix. (p. 371 et seqq. ). CHAPTER VI ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE iETOLIAN LEAGUE The Achaian Confederation is an object of such surpassing interest, both in Grecian history and in the general history of Federal Government, that I have dwelt upon its smallest begin- nings and its minutest constitutional details at a length which seemed no more than their due. But, alongside of the League of Achaia, there existed, during nearly the whole time of its being, a rival Union, differing from it but slightly in constitu- tional forms, equal or superior to it in military power, but whose general reputation in the eyes of the contemporary world General was widely different. The League of ^tolia preceded that of Resem- Achaia in assuming the character of a champion of Greece and Dif- against foreign invaders. But, in that period of Grecian history ferences vvdth which we are most concerned, the League of ^Sltolia most between commonly appears as an assemblage of robbers and pirates, the Leagues of common enemies of Greece and of mankind. The Achaian and Achaia and the ^tolian Leagues, had their constitutions been written down -«oha. jjj i^jjg giiape of a formal document, would have presented but few varieties of importance. The same general form of Govern- ment prevailed in both ; each was Federal, each was Democratic ; each had its popular Assembly, its smaller Senate, its General with large powers at the head of all. The differences between the two are merely those differences of detail which vrill always arise between any two political systems of which neither is slavishly copied from the other. Both are essentially Govern- ments of the same class. If therefore any general propositions as to the moral effect of particular forms of Government had any truth in them, we might fairly expect to find Achaia and ./Etolia running exactly parallel careers. Both Achaia and ^tolia were alike Federal states ; both were alike Democracies in theory ; both were alike tempered in their practical working HAP. VI COMPARISON BETWEEN ACHAIA AND yETOLIA 253 by an element of liberal Aristocracy. If therefore Federal states, Illustra- or Democratic states, or Aristocratic states, were necessarily *'™^ weak or strong, peaceful or aggressive, honest or dishonest, we tj^y Lyg should see Achaia and ^tolia both exhibiting the same moral of the characteristics. But history tells us another tale. The political s™pti°^ss conduct of the Achaian League, with some mistakes and some prmo&l^ faults, is, on the whole, highly honourable. The political conduct tions in of the ^tolian League is, throughout the century in which we P°lit'os. know it best, almost always simply infamous. The counsels of the Achaian League were not invariably enlightened ; they were now and then perverted by passion or personal feeling; but their general aim was a noble one, and the means selected were commonly worthy of the end. But the counsels of the ^tolian League were throughout directed to mere plunder, or, at most, to selfish political aggrandizement. Some politicians might tell us that this was the natural result of the inherent recklessness and brutality of democratic governments. If so, the same evil results should have appeared in the history of the Democracy of Achaia. If it be said that Achaia was saved from such crimes by the presence of an aristocratic element, ^tolia should have been saved in the like manner. For the tempering of democratic forms by aristocratic practice is as visible in the history of ^Sltolia as in the history of Achaia. If, on the other hand, it is argued that a Federal Union is necessarily weak, and that even Achaian history contains instances of such weakness, it is easy to answer that no Monarchy, no indivisible Eepublic, ever showed greater vigour and unity than the original ^tolian Confederation. There are absolutely no signs of disunion, no tendency to separation, visible among any of its members. If .^tolia fell, and fell before Achaia, it fell through causes whoUy unconnected with its Federal constitution, through war with an irresistible foreign foe, through grievous errors of its own committing, but errors to which Consolidated and Federal states. Monarchies and Republics, Oligarchies and Democracies, are all alike equally liable. The history of .^Etolia indeed shows that the Federal form of Government is no panacea for all human ills ; it shows that a well-planned constitution at home is no guaranty for wise or honourable conduct in foreign afiairs ; but these propositions are so self-evident that we need hardly go to ^tolia for the proof of them. But the combined history of the two great Greek Confederations certainly does show the utter fallacy of 254 OEIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ^TOLIAN LEAGUE chap. all general propositions as to the good or evil moral effect of political forms. It proves, above all, the utter fallacy of the declamations in which it is fashionable to indulge against Republican, and especially against Federal, Governments. National character, national circumstances, no doubt both influence the political constitution and are influenced by it. But the two things are essentially distinct from one another. The Achaians, an upright and highly -civilized people, capable of noble and patriotic designs, but somewhat deficient both in moral and military vigour, lived under nearly the same political constitution as the ^tolians, an assemblage of mountain hordes, brave, united among themselves, and patriotic in a narrow sense, but rude, boastful, rapacious, and utterly reckless of the rights of others. The forms of a Democratic Federation did not hinder, among either people, the developement of its characteristic virtues and vices. Neither have we any reason to suppose that their developement would have been hindered by the forms of a pure Democracy, of an Oligarchy of birth or of wealth, or of a Monarchy either despotic or constitutional. Early' His- tory of .aitolia. B.O. 426. Probable early The early history of the ^Etolians is very obscure, and it is hard to say at what time a Federal system was first organized among them. Our chief knowledge of them in ante-Macedonian times comes from the account which Thucydides gives of the unlucky campaign of the Athenian Demosthenes in their country.^ They there appear as the most backward portion of the Hellenic race; their language was difficult to understand, and their greatest tribe, the Eurytanes, were said to retain the barbarous habit of eating raw meat.^ Above all, they still lived in de- tached and unfortified villages.^ Indeed at no time do the ^tolians seem to have attained to the. full perfection of Greek city-life. When their League was at the height of its power, we still find but small mention of .iEtolian towns ; indeed we may distinguish the jEtolian League, as an union of districts or cantons, from the Achaian League, which was so essentially an union of cities.* Some sort of union would seem to have existed ^ Thuc. ill. 94 et seqq. ^ lb. ' Kyv(i}(rTln-aTOL Sk y\Q)(!(7a.v koL liiMiipiyoL etfflv, lis 'K4yaiiTai. See Nie- buhr's Anc. Hist. ill. 270. ^ lb. OIkoSv Si Karh, Kiifias aTEixiiTTous Kal rairas Stk ttoXXoO. » Strabo, ix. 4. 18 seems to make the opposite remark as to the Homeric ^tolians. AtruXois d' "Oin}pos liiv id hi 6v6imti. "kiyei, 7r6Xeis, oix iOvri T&TTiav VI EARLY HISTORY OF ^TOLIA 255 among them even in the fifth century before Christ. Thucy- union didgs speaks of the ^tolians as a nation,^ and his whole narrative ^°?.^ *^ shows that they were not quite capable of combining for common tribes. defence against an invader. The historian however gives no de- Kingship scription of their form of government, except that he incidentally not extinct mentions one Saljmthios as King over one of their tribes, namely ^^ *® ^^"^ the Agraians.^ The ^tolians of this age certainly do not seem b^ at all in advance of their Epeirotic neighbours ; yet Thucydid^s fully accepts them as Greeks ; at least he never applies to them the name Barbarian, which he freely bestows on the Chaonians and Thespr6tians. In after times indeed we find the Hellenic character of a large portion of the nation called in question,^ and that, strange to say, by the last Philip, who, unlike his earlier namesake, would certainly have had great difiiculty in tracing up his own pedigree to any Hellenic stock.* In the period dwelt with by Xenophdn we hear but little of ^tolia. He mentions the occupation of Kalyd6n by the Achaians,^ and b.c. 391. he tells us that the jEtolians were anxious to obtain possession of Naupaktos, which also was then in Achaian hands. This , they hoped to gain through the agency of Ag^silaos,^ but it iEtolian does not appear that it ever came • permanently into their pos- acquisition session, till it was given them by Philip after the battle of Lktos Chairdneia.'' The language employed in speaking of this cession b.o. 338. shows that the -iEtolians already formed one body, capable of receiving and holding a common possession. So, before that time, there were public monuments at Thermon, dedicated in the common name of the ^tolian nation.^ On the other hand, uw' airois, k. r.X. This is one of several signs that the historical ^tolians had gone backward, at all events comparatively, from their position in the heroic ages. The distinction between the Achaian Federation of Cities and the .^tolian Federation of Districts — the Stadtebund and the Sauembund — is well put by Kortiim, Gesohichte Griechenlands, ii. 146. Cf. 149, 166. ^ Thuc. iii. 94. T6 yd.p ^Bvos [i4ya, fiiv elvac rd rGtv AlrotKiov koX fuixtfiov. " lb. 111. _ 3 Pol xvii. 5. * Pol. V. 10. '0 3^ [^iXtTTTTOs] iva fih Kal triryyo'T;? 'AXe^dvdpov Kal ^iXiTirov (palvTjTaL, fieyii\7jv iiroLelTO Trap' SKov rbv ^iov ffTrovdijVj tva S^ i^rjXojTTjs, oOd^ rhv AdxiffToc ^ff^e \byQV, » Xen. Hell. iv. 6. 1. See above, p. 186. " lb. 14. ' Dem. Phi!, iii. 44. Oi5k 'Axai-uiv 'NaiTaKTov dfui/ioicei' [6 iiXiTTTros] AiTuXots TapaSiiaeiv ; Strabo, 1. ix. o. 47. l(m Sk ['SaiiraKTos] vvv AlraXSv, ^Mtttov irpoaKplvavTos. See Thirlwall, vi. 20. ' See the inscription which Strabo, x. 3. 2, quotes from Ephoros, a writer contemporary with Philip ; 'EvSvtdayos iralS' AlruXbv t6vS' a,vidi]Kav AhaXol (nperipas /ivij/i dper^s impfv. See Tliirlwall, viii. 226. 256 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF iETOLIAN LEAGUE chap. B.C. 335. Arrian speaks of ^tolian embassies to Alexander in a way which has been supposed to imply that no ^tolian Confedera- The tion then existed.^ But the passage may be explained in other League ways, and it is clear that, if the League did not exist at the E '» f beginning of the reign of Alexander, it had acquired a good deal Alexander, of consistency before his death. The acquisition of Naupaktos B.C. 336- -(vas only the beginning of a long series of jEtolian annexations, which stand out prominently in the later history of Greece. While Alexander was conquering Persia, the ^tolians had com- pelled Oiniadai and some other portions of Akarnania to unite themselves, on some terms or other, with the ^tolian body.^ Vengeance for this aggression was strongly denounced against the offenders by Alexander himself,^ and either he, or Antipater and Krateros after him, formed the scheme of transporting the Share whole ^tolian nation into some distant part of Asia.* Certain of the {I js tjjat either dread of Macedonian vengeance, or, as we ;„ tjjg may hope, some nobler feelings of Hellenic patriotism, led the Lamiau War, ^ Arrian, 1. 10. 2. AZrwXot 5^ irpe(r^eias, a^Qv Kara ^Ovrj, Tr4fi^avT€s ^vy- B.C. 323-£. yviifjoris tux"" iSiovro. [Arrian's Kara ^6vq is the exact opposite of Strabo's remark about TriXeis.] On this Schorn (p. 25) says, "In der ersten Zeit der Eegierung desselben [Alexanders] fand diese [die Confdderation] noch nioht Statt ; denn als sie sich ihm unterwarfeu, schiclcte jeder Stamm fiir sich Gesandte zu dem Kdnige." So Manso, Sparta, iii. 292. But considering the evidence the other way, one might rather he tempted to suppose that the Ambassadors were sent on behalf of the whole .fitolian nation, but that it was thought desirable that there should be an Ambassador from each tribe. Kortiim (iii. 149) takes the IBvT] to be the three chief tribes, which he holds to have themselves formed separate Leagues (Sonderbtinde). . This would agree with u, common use of the word IBvos, and would make the League of .Stolia, at this time at least, some- thing like that of the Orisons. [Cf. Pol. xvii. 6. AutSk yhp MTiSKSyv o6k etcrlv "EWr}ve! ol TrXe/ous' t6 ycLp t&v 'KypaQv IBvos Kal t6 tuv 'AttoSotujc, ?ti di tS>v ' Afiv AItoj\Siv SiKMoXoyriadiievos wpoerpi'/'aTO rd TrXijffij ^orjScTv rois 'Avnybvov Tpdynafftv. S 258 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ^TOLIAN LEAGUE chap. Annexa- tion of Hlrakleia. Earlier Develope- ment of ^tolia in some points. Its causes. federacy, and they now, says our informant, fought for it as for a possession of their own.^ We also come across the names ^ of several ^tolian officers, and apparently of at least one General of the League. Every mention of the people gives the strongest impression of national unity. It appears then that, if we looked only at the Federal period of Grecian history, we might be inclined to give the palm of antiquity to the -^tolian rather than to the Achaian League. The Federal system of ^tolia was clearly in full working before the first four cities of the original Achaia had begun to draw together. The whole ^tolian nation was united, as one body under one head, for years before the ten Achaian cities invested Markos of Keryneia with the Presidency of the whole Achaian nation. But this was merely the natural result of the violent separation of the Achaian cities by the Macedonian power. The Achaian League was the revival of an ancient union after a season of forced disunion. No such blow ever fell upon ^tolia, though, as we have seen, a heavier blow stiU was threatened. The ^tolians were thus enabled to improve and to enlarge, at a time when the Achaians were driven to rebuild from the founda^ tion. It is not wonderful then if some steps in the developement of Federalism were taken in .^tolia earlier than they were in Achaia. It is certain that ^tolia was united earlier than Achaia under the presidency of a single General, but it appears, on the other hand, that the legal powers of the ^tolian Chief Magistrate were more restricted than those of his Achaian brother. It should be remembered that the precedent of a single General at the head of a Federal State had been long before set by the Arkadians in the days of Lykom^d^s.^ Closer There can be no doubt that the union , among the members ™'™ , of the ^tolian League was still closer than the union among the Mma.ns^ members of the Achaian League. This is clearly true of all the original jEtolians, whatever may have been the case vnth the ' Pans. A". 21. 1. "Brei yap irp6repov Toiroiv ol AhiaXol avvTeXetv Tois 'Hpa/cXec6ras 'rjvdyKacrai' is rb AlruXiKbv' rdre odv ijn^ivovTO c&s irGpi 7r6Xews oiShf TL 'HpaK\e(i)TaLS ixaXXov ^ Kal aiiTois TrpofftjKo^crTjs. " lb. 20. 4. AhaKoiis d^ ijyov noXiiapxos Kal noXitppav re Kal AaKpinis. Polyarchos was probably the General of the League, and PolyphrSn and Lakratfe his subordinates. Another General, Eurydamos, is more distinctly mentioned by the same -writer, lb. x. 16. 4. Eiipidafwv Si crrparriybv re AiruKav /cal a-TparoS toS TaXarCiv h&pna iiyrivoovi>res roits S.\\ovs iToWiovni'. He then goes on to liken them to the Trlballians, oOs diravTh ^acriv d/j.ovoeiv ibs oii8^vas AXXous d.vdpdy7rovs, dTToXXiJj'ai S' oi fibvov roM i/iipovs Kal rods vXriatov oiKoCcTos, dXXa koI Tois dXXoKs SiriiiK &v iipixiaSai Swqiianv. He might have said nearly the same of the ..Stolians. 260 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ^TOLIAN LEAGUE chap. Demo- cratic character of the union was, and what measure of independence was left to each of the constituent members of the League.^ But it seems pro- bable that those cities which were incorporated with the League did not lose those rights which were essential to the existence of any Greek city. The exact terms of admission will be discussed presently ; but it would be far easier to believe that Naupaktos and H^rakleia were reduced to the condition of dependencies, without any share in the general deliberations of the ^tolian nation, than that they lost the universal rights of local legisla- tion and free choice of local magistrates.^ The relation of dependent alliance was familiar in Greece ; the sacrifice of local independence in exchange for a share in the general government was an idea confined to the pre-historic statesmen of Attica. The constitution of ^S^tolia was Democratic in the same sense in which the constitution of Achaia was Democratic. That is to say, the supreme power was vested in the Popular Assembly, the Panait61ikon,' in which, as in Achaia, every citizen had a vote.* But it is evident that, in so large a country as even the 1 Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 226) goes so far as to say, " Nor indeed is it quite certain that it is more correct to consider the whole body as a league than as a single republic. " What follows at least is true. " It seems that the union of the .ffitolians was still closer than that of the Achaians ; that there was a deeper consciousness of the national unity, and a greater concentration of power in the national government." ^ In the two inscriptions 2350, 2351, in Boeckh (C. I. ii. 280), the Canton of Naupaktos (6 Sa^ios 6 NayTra/cWwi') votes all the private rights of citizenship to the people of Keos ; ded6a-6ai. S' airoTs Kal iroXireiav iv NainrdKT(fi Kal 7as Koi oldas iyKTaaiv, Kal t&v &\\uy airdvTtiiii Svwep Kal oJ &\\oi NavirdKnoi yuer^- X0VI71V, Tois Keious p.erix^"'- But the .ffitolian Union {iSo^e roh MniXois) seems to promise them nothing more than exemption from plunder at the hands of all iEtolians and aU persons sharing in ^toliau citizenship (iiriBiva &yav AlraXuv //.TlSi T&v iv AlToklq, voKiTivbvTW Tois Keious). It may however be that a grant of citizenship lurks in the words us AiTuXS;/ 6vTav rue Kelay. ^ llavaiTuiKiKd (Boeckh, 0. I. ii. 632) or Pancetoliaum, Liv. xxxi. 29. Livy (xxxi. 32) seems to use the word Pylaicum as synonymous. Possibly PancBtoU- cum means an .ffitolian Assembly, if held in its proper place in the old capital Thermon, or seemingly even at Naupaktos (Liv. xxxi. 29, 40), while Pylmaam is the same body held, as it sometimes was, at HSrakleia or elsewhere in the neighbourhood of ThermopylaB. ^ See Schorn, p. 26. Thirlwall, viii. 226. Diod. u.s. (see p. 257). TJ Koivbv TOP MtuiKwv, Th, irMiBri. Pol. iv. 5. 'H koivti rSiv kh-diKwi aivoho's. The nature of the .^tolian Assembly is plainly set forth in the description of Livy (xxxvi. 28, 29). Censebant et ex omnibus oppidis conmcandos ^tolos ad concilium; Omnis coacta multitudo, etc. This comes from Poly bios (xx. 10), ypdoK\ijs M.e\edyp(fi, us Kalruv AItwXwv ras ipxp-s Kva'/iev 6vTWV SieKKi]povv di airas Ku6.iuf, koX 6 rbv \iVKhv \a^iiv iXdyxavev ii/dyet Si Tois XP^"""^' '"'S f"' ^'' 'Jvdxif KvaiJ.o^b\ov diKa(rTTii>. There is not a word here about the Assembly nominating candidates who drew lots. If the words of H6sychios prove anything, they prove that the election of all jEtoliau magi- strates was left wholly to the lot. To make us accept so improbable a story, we should need some much better authority than Hesychios. The lot was never applied, even at Athens, to really important offices, like that of General, and we hear nothing of it in Polybios or any trustworthy author. No doubt Sophokl6s, as usual, transferred the practice of Athens in his own day to the mythical days of ^tolia, and Hesychios, by way of explanation, transferred it to historical .ffitolia also. " Pol. ii. 3. Aiov rg Karh irdSas ilpApq. yeviaSai ttjv aXpenv Kal rijv ■n-apdXijfiv t^s Apxv^, KaddTrep Iffos iffrlv AItoAois. iv. 67. Tlapd Si tois VI FOREIGN POLICY OF iETOLIA 265 mthout the delay which took place between the election of an Achaian General and his actual entrance upon office. Besides Com- the General, there were, as in Achaia, a Commander of Cavalry mander of and a Secretary of State. These three seem to be spoken of as an™Seore- the three chief officers of the Kepublic.^ tary of State. Our notices of the internal constitution of -lEtolia are so Foreign slight, and they present so few important points of contrast with Policy that of Achaia, that a more interesting field of inquiry is opened League with regard to the foreign policy of the League. One point which calls for special examination is the relation of the League to those non-^tolian states which were induced, or more often compelled, to become, in some sense or other, members of it. The history of ^tolia is conspicuously a history of annexation. So, it may be said, is the history of Achaia also. From Markos to PhilopoimSn the League was ever extending itself over a wider territory, ever increasing the number of the cities which formed its component members. Some of the Achaian annex- ations may have been unjust and impolitic ; those at all events were so which were effected against the will of .the annexed cities. But it does not appear that any city, when once Contrast admitted, by whatever means, into the Achaian League, was with ever placed in a position of dependence, or of any kind of formal ° ^^' inferiority to those cities which were in the League before it. The object of the League was to unite Achaia, Peloponngsos, if possible all Greece, in a single free and equal Federation. The end at least was noble, even if over -zeal sometimes misled Achaian statesmen into the employment of questionable means. But it is hardly possible, by the widest stretch of charity, to attribute such a broad and enlightened patriotism to the brigands of the .iEtolian mountains. It is true that their character is known to us only from the descriptions of enemies, and some- thing may fairly be abated from the general pictures of ^tolian depravity ^ which we find in our Achaian informants. But the facts of the case plainly show both that powerful men in ^tolia AiruXots ijdTi Tuv apxaipeirluv KaB-qKbvTiav arpaTriybs TJiiiBii Aupl/w.xos, Ss TrapairrUa t^v ipx^f Trapa\apd>y, k,t.\. ^ Pol. xxii. 15. Liv. xxxviii. 11. The .ffitolians (B.C. 189) are required to give hostages to Eome, but these three great officers are exempt. ^ Pol. ii. 45. AItuKoI Sia t^v l/upvTov dSim'ac Kal TrXeove^iav, k.t.X. Cf. ix. 34 et seqq. xviii. 17, and especially iv. 3. SrjpuiSr] fffliri fiiov, k,t.\. The favourite process of "rehabilitation" has not failed to be extended to the 266 OEIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF ^TOLIAN LEAGUE chap. Treason against Greece. B.O. 211. could venture upon the grossest breaches of International Law without any fear of restraint from the national G-overnment/ and also that the avowed policy of. the Government itself was seldom swayed by any regard to good faith or to the rights of others. Notwithstanding the gallant behaviour of their ances- tors both in the Lamian and in the Gaulish War, the ^tolians of the times with which we have most to do could make less claim than any other people in Greece to a character for extended Hellenic patriotism. The Greek commonwealth which deliberately introduced the strong arm of Eome into Grecian warfare^ was far more guilty than even the commonwealth which gave up Akrokorinthos to the Macedonian. Long before that time, ^tolia had agreed upon a partition, first of Akar- nania and then of Achaia, with a Macedonian King ; ^ she now agreed with Eome to make a series of conquests at the expense of Akarnania * and other Grecian states, in the course of which the soil of the conquered countries was to remain an ^tolian possession, while the moveable spoil was to be carried off by the barbarians of Italy. ^ Aratos made at least no such infamous j^Etolians. They have found vigorous advocates in Lncae (Ueber Polybius Dai'- stellung des Aetolischen Bundes. Konigslaerg. 1827) and Brandstater (Die Geschiohten des Aetolischen Landes, Volkes, und Bundes. Berlin. 1844). No doubt the judgement of Polybios about the iEtolians, just like his judge- ment about Kleomenes, must be received with some caution ; but I see nothing to shake one's general confidence in his narrative. The worst deeds attributed to the iEtolians are too clear to be denied. ^ See above, p. 261. Compare the curious declamation of Philip in Pol. xvii. 5. Tois AiVuXots l8os iwipxei /it; iibvov, irpbs oOs hv airol TroXe/aain, Toihovs airois Hyeiv Kal tV to6tiov x'^P"'"' n^Xa, k&v frepol nves TroXe/iiSiri irphs dXXijXous, ivres MtoKZv 0/Xot Kal aiiifxaxoi, ia)Siv fp-rov ^eivai rois AiVuXois dvev KOLVov ddyfiaros Kal irapeivai ifi^oripois rois iroXe/ioSo-i. Kal t^v xcipcti' S,yeai T7]p dfj.(f>OT^po3P' ibare irapk fj,^v toTs AItuXols fiijre tfyOdas 8povs vwdpxei-v P-^t* ex^/ias, dXXa Train Toh dp^iff^'qTovtn irepi tlvos iroifiovs txdpoiis ctvai roiyrous /cat iroXefdovs. Brandstater (272) calls on us to distinguish between the piratical doings of individuals and the national action of the League, but the charge is that the Federal Government did nothing to stop the piratical doings of indi- viduals. ^ The first diplomatic intervention of Eome in Grecian affairs was indeed made at the intercession of Akarnania (see the next Chapter), and, curiously enough, it was in support of Akarnania against iEtolia. But the ^tolians were un- doubtedly the first to bring Eoman fleets and armies into Greece, and the first to plan and carry out the destruction of Grecian cities in partnership with Eoman commanders. 3 Pol. ii. 43, 45 ; ix. 38. See the next Chapter. * Pol. ix. 38 ; xi. 5. So Livy, xxvi. 24. Darent operam Eomajii ut Acar- naniam JJItoli haberent. ^ Pol. ix. 39. (Speech of Lykiskos the Akarnanian.) 'HSri irapriprivTai. p,iv 'AKapydyai/ OlpidSas Kal N^troc, Karicxov Si irp(lir)v t^v t&v ToKaiiribpav 'Aim- VI ACHAIAN AND ^TOLIAN ANNEXATIONS 267 terms as these with his Macedonian patron. In all this we see a system of mere selfish aggrandizement, quite different even from the mistaken policy which occasionally led Achaian statesmen to enlarge their League by the incorporation of un- willing members. The annexations made by Achaia were at Compari- least made on terms of perfect equality ; the annexations of J°° ^^■ .lEtolia were, in many cases, simple conquests by brute force, ^tolian As might be expected, there were wide differences in the con- and dition of the annexed countries, and in their relation to the Achaiaa .^tolian state. That relation seems to have varied, from yg2g_ full incorporation on equal terms, to mere subjection, veiled under the specious forms of dependent alliance. It should be remembered that the Achaian League, besides the generous principles which it professed, and on which, in the main, it acted, had a great advantage in the continuity of its territory. The League gradually spread itself over all Peloponnlsos ; under more favourable circumstances it might have spread itself over all Greece ; in either case its territory would have been one continuous sweep, an inestimable advantage in the process of fusing the whole into one political body. No Achaian Continuity citizen, however remote, had, in the best days of the League,^ °^ *^? to cross a foreign territory in order to reach the seat of the territory • Federal Government. No Achaian citizen, with the single scattered exception of the people of Aigina, had to expose himself, even ^f'^^ during the shortest voyage, to the risk of capture by sea. ^tolian. Achaia then knew only two forms of political connexion — the alliance of wholly independent powers on equal terms, and the incorporation of cities as equal members of the national Achaian League. But the - Macedonian times, the unhappy city was handed over from one oppressor to another. During the wars of the Successors Siky6n siky6n had its share of calamities as well as other Grecian cities. At under the one stage of those days of sorrow, Siky6n had to endure the ^ c'^s^OS-' ignominy of being ruled by a female usurper. KratSsipolis, the 301. widow of Alexander, son of Polysperch6n, held possession of the city, and proved herself a worthy rival of her fellow-oppressors of the other sex.* At another time it was garrisoned for five years by Ptolemy, when he liberated Greece.^ When D6m6trios came to liberate Greece back again,^ he not only expelled Ptolemy's garrison, but persuaded the Sikyfinians to change the site of their city and even to alter its name to Dem^trias. This inno- vation probably lasted no longer than the power of its author. ' KleisthenSs of SikySn was, through his daughter Agariste the wife of Megaltles, the grandfather of KleisthenSs of Athens. See Herod, vi. 126-131. » Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 44. Diod. xv. 70. ^ Pint. Ar. 2. Els ffrdireis ivirtce Kal ^iXoTi/xtas SriiMyuyCiv. * Diod. xix. 67. = lb. xx. 37. « lb. XX. 102. Plut. DSmStr. 25. HBTOST OF FEDEBAL CSEECi Afi» nik. we Sod Ssirr.a in die Iniids v£ lool offtraanrj, « fJ*^ v^ose appanoce seaas TO haT* neaiiT KiscSied wilk die &I1 ^^^_ of dte pow^ ■;: I'^-^—Ice at ^peos.» " TjmHt now SGL«ceBded li- XTiant and TjnaaiS. ^re may wdl lidiefe, ef a tst di^rait onla' beaa Ori&^xai and Sliiiiie'e?-- At ^as: a ^eaiB ;£ aiqpeared i-Y a mameiit. KleHi, the Tynnt, was ^ain. ^eemiii^T in some pt^nbr imnmmi^t, and nro cminait dtizeie^ named Ijmeidcjdas and Elcfrias. vsre Aiaifii- pbeed ty «:=:i:i;- oonsent ac ire Iiad «f aSirs-^ Tbe esaet natme <:« their c&ee is nolr disaibed : our Inrf r>jdee of it I leadb fike an eatiaotdinanr (sommkaon, for life or €ar saae isiidersHe iim&. i»:- lefomi aod p3Tan the ea^uncHwed^- Unda- th«ir adminktiatian somedui^ like siadted arde- and pra^arity had lie^an onee is-irt -.: appar, vhoi Skr^iffi vat- ha^^h- 1(^ bodi her patnotic ma^tiaies. Tru.UeiG:^ died: T^— r -.-• KWni»s 7^ mnrdoed by a dtizHi named Jklnnlida^ ^rho sased the TyrsLiiry and again subjected ISkrcn to a i^^ of tarrar. The E:;er.-ii «" Sleiiiii ■»«€ for die most part Inni^ed or pot to dealk: fab yooi^ son.^ Aiato^ then 9eT@& yeais cM, vas destined to die same &le :* but he fmud a friaid in Ae ^E^eiE hmSy v£ hK paseentnr. S-'<~''^ the si^ier <£ Ahantida% was ^»»^«- raanaed to Pro^ianttK the brodicr of Klciri^ : the child so«^ nfoae in ^s ocele s hoose. and S=^V^j- «f ^e ;u^ (k^agorife; aad, if %e -nrds sie te te oneSivai qjoSe ^:;erxny. AnSos aiiitsrff bhsI le leebaed zbsb^ ik Ttti^i^ K is -=y 1&^ -r>.T.- s:aDe of -Lbsa^ TfTiH~ k^ * Br 3HK sSnage eenf^sm, F^iKasns (^ 5. -? Bsks Tiwi«ifrViM«i, sSerlte an of d^B, r?^ K joirt-Triat vid x kt^^iz:: £adij«tteiK. Ik faffe TTs z«\zTaB acrawTSSv f^BW Smaev^ Tt^BK\aiB .est miTWim i l , crjk. ^ Ib xrrsT iiBs. 6be local kguii s llTjii haii^iBi is ■oder Ai^odaBa a She f.rrx «f a diagta. An& £. M. 3; IT. li S. ' ^^^ S. S. 3. 'A/anv if 'A^amiiii; ^rjvfc es«B|cer, t xsS arris rargp^f^eer 'Ajc-ts;#€\;j-75. He viS sct ^t«s voas aU. FSbS. Ac. 2. YOUTH OF ARATOS 281 from her brother, and to send him in safety to Argos, where his father had many powerful friends. Here he was brought up till his twentieth year. His literary education seems to have Education been neglected, but it is quite possible that the neglect may °^ Aratos have been no real loss. That Aratos was an eloquent and per- suasive speaker we need no proof ; without eloquence of some kind no man could have remained for life, as he did, at the head of a Greek commonwealth. Perhaps the very absence of rhetorical and sophistic training may have left room for some- thing more nearly reproducing the native strength of ThemistokMs and Perikles. His physical education was well cared for ; the future deliverer of Siky6n and Corinth contended in the public games, and received more than one chaplet as the prize of bodily prowess. It is possible that this devotion to bodily exercises may not have been without influence on his future career. The discipline of the athlete and the discipline of the soldier were inconsistent,^ and these early laurels were perhaps won at the expense of future defeats of the Achaian phalanx. Further than this we have no details of his early life ; but we find him, at the age of twenty, vigorous, active, and enterprising, full of zeal, not only against the Tyrants who excluded him from his own home and country, but against all who bore usiu:ped rule over their fellows in any city of Hellas. Meanwhile matters in Siky6n went on from bad to worse. Succession Abantidas had a turn for those rhetorical exercises which Aratos °^ g.'^*?*^ neglected ; he frequented the school of two teachers of the art named Deinias and Aristotel^s, who, from what motive we are not told, one day assassinated the Tyrant in the midst of his studies. His place was at once filled by his own father Paseas, b-o. 252-1. who was in his turn slain and succeeded by one Mkokles. The eyes of men in Sikydn now began to turn to the banished son of their old virtuous leader. Aratos was looked to as the future Expecta- deliverer of his country, and NikokMs watched his course with a *'°°^ *^^°™ degree of suspicion proportioned to the hopes of those whom he held in bondage. But, as yet, the Tyrant deemed that he had little to fear from the personal prowess of the youth. Indeed Aratos purposely adopted a line of conduct suited to throw NikoklSs ofi" his guard. He assumed, at all events when he knew ' See Plut. Pha. 3. The remark however is as old as Homer. II. xxiii. 668-671. Certainly Alexander of Macedon (Herod, v. 22) and DSrieus of Rhodes combined the two characters (see Grote, viii. 217 and cf. x. 164), but one can hardly fancy Perikles stripping at Olympia, 282 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. that agents of the Tyrant were watching him, an appearance of complete devotion to youthful enjoyments and frivolous pursuits. Men said that a Tyrant must be the most timid of all beings, if such a youth as Aratos could strike fear into one.i But the real fears of Mkokl^s were of another kind. He did not so much dread the personal prowess of Aratos as the influence of his father's name and connexions. The position which the family of Kleinias must have held is marked by the fact that the Kings both of Macedonia and Egypt were among his hereditary friends.^ We may see also the first signs of a weakness which pursued Aratos through his whole life, when we Early hear that he at first hoped to obtain freedom for his country Schemes of through royal friendship. To look for the expulsion of a Aratos. Tyrant at the hands of Antigonos G-onatas was a vain hope indeed.' It appears however that the King did not absolutely refuse the new character in which the inexperienced youth prayed him to appear: he put him off with fair words; he promised much, but performed nothing. Aratos then looked to Ptolemy Philadelphos of Egypt, whose rivalry with Mace- donia seemed to guarantee his trustworthiness as an ally of Grecian freedom, and whose actions did not always belie his pretensions. But in leaning on Egyptian aid Aratos soon found that he was leaning on the staff of a broken reed ; whatever might be the good intentions of Ptolemy, he was far off, and the hopes which he held out were slow to be fulfilled. The young deliverer at last learned no longer to put his trust in princes, but only in the quick wits and strong arms of himself and his fellow-exiles. A Siky6nian exile named Aristomachos, and two Megalopolitan philosophers named EkdSmos and Demo- Deliver- phan^s,* are spoken of as among his principal advisers. The ance of details of the perilous night -adventure by which Aratos and 1 Hut. Ax. 6. ^ Schorn (p. 70) suggests, ingeniously enough, that the connexion between the house of Kleinias and the Ptolemies began during the Egyptian occupation of Sikyon in B. c. 308-3. But how came the same family to be on such terms with both the rival dynasties at once, with the descendants of Ptolemy and with the descendants of DSmetrios ? ' Something may be allowed to the inexperience of a youth of twenty ; it is indeed hard measure to bint, as Schorn (p. 70, note) does, that Aratos at first merely wished to be Tyrant himself instead of Nikold6s. Every act of his life belies the imputation. Niebuhr (Lect. Anc. Hist. iii. 277, Eng. Tr.) does Aratos more justice. * The names are variously given. They are Ekdemos and DSmoplianes in Pol. X. 22. (25). Plut. Phil. 1. Suidas, v. ^Ckoirolix-qv ; EkdSlos and Mega- VII DELIVERANCE OF SIKYON BY ARATOS 283 his little company surprised and delivered Siky6n have all the Siky8ii by interest of a romance. ^ Here, in the last days of Greece, our Aratos, path is strewed with tales of personal character and personal ^'°' ' adventure, such as we have met with but seldom since we lost the guidance of Herodotos. For our purpose it is enough that all Sikyon lay down at night under the rule of Mkoklfis, and heard at dawn the herald proclaim to the delivered city that Aratos the son of Kleinias called his countrymen to freedom. Never was there a purer or a more bloodless revolution ; SikySn was delivered without the loss of a single citizen ; the very mer- cenaries of the Tyrant were allowed to live, and MkoklSs himself, whom public justice could hardly have spared, contrived to escape hj an ignoble shelter. Never did mortal man win glory truer and more unalloyed than the young hero of Siky6n. Sikydn was now free, but she had dangers to contend against from within and from without. Antigonos, , to whom the youthful simplicity of Aratos had once looked for help, now hardly concealed his enmity.^ The infection which he External thought he could afford to neglect while it spread no further ^^^ ™" than the petty Achaian townships, was now beginning to ex- difficulties tend itself to cities of a higher rank. And, within the walls of Sikyou. of Siky6n, Aratos had to struggle against difficulties which were hardly less threatening. With the restoration of freedom came the return of the exiles. Under this name are included both those who had been formally banished, and those who had voluntarily fled from the city, during the days of tyranny.^ NikoklSs, during his short reign of four months, had sent eighty into exile ; those whose banishment dated from the days of earlier Tyrants reached the number of five hundred. Some of these last had been absent from their country fifty years.* lophanes in Paus. viii. 49. 2 ; Ekdelos in Plut. Ar. 5. Suidas also turns Nikokles into NeoklSs. ^ One is strongly tempted to tell the tale once more ; but tie Greek of Plutarch, the German of Droysen, and the English of Thirlwall are enough. It should be remembered that all the details rest upon good authority, namely the Memoirs of Aratos himself. ' Plut. Ar. 9. 'BTTi^ouXeuo/t^njc /iii> l^oiBev Kal tfSovovixivqv vir' 'Avnydfov TT)v Tr6\Lv opwvTL [t(^ 'Apdrtij] Stct TTjv iXevdepiav, TapaTrofjLivif)v 5' v(f aiiTTJs Kal (rrcurLdi^ovffav. ' The word tjivyis includes both classes. Many fled to escape death, but some were formally banished. Tois /iiv ^|^/3aXe, toi5s 5' dvei\ev [6 'A^avHSasJ. Plut. Ar. 2. [Cf. Cicero, De Off. 11. c. 23.] ^ So says Plutarch (Ar. 9) ; but why did they not return during the admini- stration of Kleinias and Timokleidas ? 284 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. Many of these men had lost houses and lands, which they naturally wished to recover, but which their actual possessors as naturally wished to keep. Doubtless, in so long a time, much of this property must have changed hands more than once, so that the actual possessor would often be an honest purchaser, and not a mere grantee of a Tyrant's stolen goods. The young deliverer was expected to satisfy all these opposing claims, as well as to guard his city against Antigonos and all Internal other enemies. What was chiefly wanting for the former paoiflca- purpose was money ; and here the friendship of King Ptolemy Aratos^ really stood him in good stead. He obtained, at various times, a sum of one hundred and seventy-five talents, partly, it would seem, as a voluntary gift,^ partly as the result of Aratos' own request, for which purpose he made a voyage to Egypt in person. By the help of this money he contrived to satisfy the various claimants. Some of the old owners were glad to accept the value of their property instead of the property itself ; some of the new ones were vnUing to give up possession on receiving a fair price for what they resigned. We are told that by these means he succeeded in pacifying the whole city.^ It is added, as a proof of his true republican spirit, that, on being invested with full and extraordinary powers for the purpose, he declined to exercise them alone, but, of his own accord, associated with himself fifteen other citizens in the office.^ Against danger from without Aratos sought for defence by that step which first brings him within the immediate sphere of this history. He annexed Siky6n to the Achaian League. ^ Pint. Ar. 11. '^H/ce 5' a^ty i^^^ XPVf^"^^^ Sbjpek Taph tov /3a(rtX^ajs. ^ See Plutarch (Ar. 9-14) and the well-known passage of Cicero (De Off. ii. 25), who winds np, as a Roman of his day well might, " virum magnum, dignumque qui in nostra repnblioa natus esset. Sic par est agere cum civihus, non (ut bis jam vidimus) hastam in foro ponere, et bona oivium voci subjicere prseoonis. " ^ Pint. Ar. 14. 'ATToSetx^^^^ y°-P a.dTOKpdTiijp SiaWaKTTjs Kal K^ipios 6'Xws iirl ras tfyvyaSiKCis oiKovop-ias pJivos oOx vir^p^eivev, oKKk TrevreKaideKa t(2v toXltwv irpoaKariXe^ev eavrlp, k.t.\. So Cicero ' ' Adhibuit sibi in consilium quindecim prinoipes." This is hardly done justice to by Schorn (p. 72) in the words, "Naoh Hause zurtiolcgekommeu setzte er eine Commission uieder, an deren Spitze er selbst trat." These internal measures of Aratos, or some of them, seem to have been later than the annexation of SikySn to the League. But it seemed better to finish the account of the deliverance and pacification of Sikyon before entering on the career of Aratos as a Federal politician. \ VII ANNEXATION OF SIKY6n TO THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE 285 This of course implies both that he prevailed on his ow^n Annexa- countrymen to ask for admission to the Achaian body, and ti°° °^ that he persuaded the Achaian Government and Assembly to to'^^g'' grant what they asked. It is much to be regretted that no Achaian record is preserved of the debates either in the Siky6nian or League, the Achaian Assembly on so important a proposal. The step ^'"^ was a bold and a novel one. For a Greek city willingly to sur- render its full and distinct sovereignty was a thing of which earlier times presented only one recorded instance. Corinth and Argos had once removed the artificial limits which separated b.c 393. the Argeian and the Corinthian territory, and had declared that Argos and Corinth formed but a single commonwealth.^ But so strange an arrangement lasted only for a short time, and it was offensive to large bodies of citizens while it did last. Still Argos and Corinth were, at least, both of them Doric cities ; their citizens were kinsmen in blood and speech, sharing alike in the traditions of the ruling race of Peloponnlsos. It was a far greater change when Siky6n, a city of the Dorian import- conquerors, stooped to ask for admission to the franchise of ance and the remnant of the conquered Achaians.^ Federalism, as we "j^Jgjgp" have seen, was nothing new in Greece, but the Federal tie had as yet united only mere districts or very small towns, and those always districts or towns of the same people. For one of the greater cities of Greece to enter into Federal relations with cities belonging to another division of the Greek race was something altogether unknown. But now the Doric Siky6n was admitted into a League consisting only of small Achaian towns,^ any one of which singly was immeasurably her inferior, and whose united strength hardly equalled that of one of the great cities of Greece.* The Sikydnians were to lose their national name^ and being; Sikydn indeed would survive as an inde- ^ Xen. Hell. iv. 4. 6. See Grote, ix. 462. The change, in the opinion of XenophSn and the Corinthian oligarchs, amounted to a wiping out of their city ; aladavbii^voi d^tpavi^ofjAv-qv Ty}v t6\lv. The whole description is very curious. 2 Paus. ii. 8. 4. Toils ^iKvuviovs h ro 'Axatw*' auvSdpiov ia-fiyaye Acijpieh dvras. ^ Plut. Ar. 9. Awpteis 6vt€s viri^vaav eKovtriiiJS 6vo/jLa Kol iroKiTeiav tt;v 'Axa""'" o'^Te o^loifM Xa/iTpbv oUre ixiy&kqv lax^" ^X^"''''^" ''■6Te" /uKpoToXhai y&p fjffav ol TToXXof, k.t.X. * lb. OJ [o£ 'A-xnioi] t9js iiiv irdXai tCiv 'EXX'^kuc d/c^i^s oihkv, us ^hruv, jiipot dvm, iv Si Tip rdre /«as A,^i6\6yov TriXeus ffifiiravres o/iov Sivajuv oiiK ^Xovres. ' lb. So PolybiOB (ii. 38), ttus oSv Kal Sid, tL hOv evSoKoOnv o!rrol re Kal 286 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Beginning of a new Epoch. General extension of the League and its Objects. Siky8n admitted on equal terms. pendent canton, untouched in the freedom of her local govern- ment ; but in all dealings with other states the name of Siky6n would be sunk in the name of Achaia. The warriors of Siky6n would be commanded by Achaian Generals,^ and her interests would be represented in foreign Assemblies and at foreign courts by Ambassadors commissioned by the whole Achaian body.^ Such a change must have given a complete shock to all ordinary Greek feeling on such subjects. The accession of Sikydn to the League was the beginning of a new state of things in Greece. No more striking testimony could be borne to the prudent and honourable course which the League had hitherto followed within its own narrow limits.' This first extension beyond the limits of Achaia at once put the League on quite a new footing. Hitherto it had been a merely local union; it now began to swell into Pan-hellenic importance.* When once Siky6n had joined the League, other cities were not slow in following her example. From the moment of the admis- sion of Sikydn, it was an understood principle that the arms of the League stood open to receive any Grecian city which was willing to cast in its lot among the Confederates. The League now became the centre of freedom throughout all Greece; the supremacy of Macedonia in Peloponn^sos was doomed. Siky6n was admitted to the League on perfectly equal terms. She was subjected to no disqualifications as a foreign city, and she claimed no superiority on account of her power and fame being so vastly superior to those of any of the old Achaian towns. Like other Achaian cities, she obtained one vote, and no more, in the Federal Congress. The evil of this arrangement rb \oiwbv Tr\TJdos t(Sv UeXoTroyi/Tja-iav dfw, tt)v iroKirdav tov 'Kxaiuv Kol tt]v TpoffTjyopiav /j,eTeL\Tj(p6Tes ; ' Pint. At. 11. '0 5' "Aparos . . . Kaiirep itv/jl^oXcls ti? Koivip /leydXas SeSuKiis rijv iairrov S6|aj/ jcai t^p tijs irarplSoi S6yafi.iv, as ivl twc iinrvxivTinv XpijtrSai Trapetx^" <^^tQ tQ id a-Tparriyouvn rdv 'Kxailav, elre Av/juuos, efre Tptraietis, ehe /UKporipas rivbs Civ t6x<"- tAXeus. 2 Aratos seems to have gone to Alexandria in a purely private character to ask help of King Ptolemy as a friend of his family. 3 See Plutarch's panegyric on the League (Ar. 9), and Polybios passim, especially ii. 38 and i2. * Droysen, ii. 369. "Durch den Beitritt von Sikyon und duroh Aratos Verhiudung mit Aegypten war die EoUe, welche die Achaier zu iibemehmen hatten, bezeichaet ; Arat war es, der die Thatigkeit des Bundes zuerst nnd vielleicht nioht ohne Widerstreben der bisher nur fiir die innere Euhe und Selbststandigkeit bedachteu Eidgenossen uach Aussen hin wandte." VII IMPORTANCE OF THE ANNEXATION OF SIKYON 287 has been already ^ spoken of. It was right that Siky6n should possess no privilege which could endanger the common rights of all ; it was wise to avoid making Siky6n the seat of government, or in any way giving her the character of a capital ; but it was not abstractedly just that her large population should possess in the national Assembly only the single vote which belonged equally to Dymg and Tritaia.^ Siky6n, whose strength must have been equal to half, or more than half, that of the League as it then stood, could at any moment be outvoted ten times over by the petty Achaian townships. Not that we are at all entitled to blame, or even to wonder at, the omission. Federal- ism was then, not indeed exactly in its infancy, but still making its first experiment on a large scale. It could not be expected to hit upon every improvement at once, and this particular im- provement had been as yet suggested by no practical necessity. To give Sikydn a double vote would have seemed to sin against the great principles of freedom and equality among all the members of the League. We may well believe that, though the accession of Sikyon was such a clear gain to the League, there were Achaians who looked on its admission on any terms as a sort of favour. A proposal for giving Siky6n a double vote in the Federal Congress would doubtless have met with great opposition, and would probably have shipwrecked the whole scheme of annexation. It is still more probable that the thought of such a proposal never occurred either to Aratos or to any one else. For five years Aratos remained, either ofiicially or through b.c. 251- his personal influence, at the head of the local Siky6nian govern- 245. ment, the Governor, so to speak, of the State of Siky6n, but Position only a private citizen of the Achaian League. Now it was that °^ Ai'atos. he pacified the factions in his native city ; now it was that, while serving in the Achaian cavalry, he won the admiration of his new countrymen by his strict discipline arid punctual obedience ' See atove, p. 212 et seqq. " Niebulir, Lect. Anc. Hist. iii. 277. " The Sicyonians made a great sacrifice in joining tlie Achaeans, because each of the insignificant Achaean towns had the same rights and the same votes as Sicyon, which was itself as large as several of the Achaean towns put together. Achaia, on the other hand, gained consider- ably by the accession." This is perfectly tme as a statement of one side of the case ; but it is evident that Sikyfin gained also by the union, even if it were not made on perfectly equitable terms. 288 HISTOKY OF FEDERAL GREECE His rela- tions to Antigonos and Ptolemy. Aratos elected General of the League, B.C. 245. His per- manent position and influ- to orders. The deliverer and leader of Siky6n was never -wanting, as his biographer tells us, even when command was vested in citizens of the pettiest Achaian towns.^ We can well understand with what eyes King Antigonos watched his growing fame. He did not however profess open enmity ; he rather professed his admiration of the young statesman; he showed him marked personal honours ; ^ he talked ostentatiously of his good will towards him, and professed to believe that Aratos entertained an equal good will towards himself. Thus he hoped either really to win over Aratos to his interest, or at all events to make him suspected at the court of Alexandria. This last effect was actually produced, at all events for a season. At last Aratos received the noblest tribute of confidence which his new countrymen had it in their power to pay ; he was raised to the highest office in the Achaian commonwealth. At the age of twenty-six he was chosen General of the Achaians, that is, as we have seen. President of the Achaian United States. He thus became, not only the executive chief of the League in all civil and diplomatic affairs, but also its parliamentary leader and its personal Commander-in-chief. This office, from that day onwards, he held, as a general rule, in alternate years, till the day of his death, thirty-two years later. During all this time he was the soul of the League,^ the first man of independent Greece. As such the merits and defects of a singularly mixed character had full scope for their developement.* ^ See above, p. 286. ^ Pint. Ar. 15. 'Avrtyovos 5' 6 ^atriXeus avt(jfievot iir' aury Kal ^ov\6fievos ^ /j.eTdyeiv HXcos ry ^tX/^t irpos ahrbv ^ Sia^dXKeiv irpbs rbv TlToKeficuov flXXas re i)v koX Trdrpiov i'KeuBeplav. Plut. Ar. 24. 'Eiipuii yap airbv oi irKovrov, oi Sb^av, o6 ipMav pajriXiKiiv, o6 tA t^s aiiTOv varptSos ffvfupipov, oii/c AXKo n t^s ai^aeus tSiv 'Axailov iTrivpoadev TTOiOifl€VOV. U 290 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE J'aults of his civil character. Ill effects of his con- nexion with the Ptolemies. spent. And again, in this also resembling Periklls, he was wholly free from the fault which upset so many eminent Greeks, which ruined Themistokl^s, Pausanias, and AlkibiadSs, to say nothing of Alexander and D^mStrios— incapacity to bear success. Aratos, like AristeidSs and Perikl^s, remained, till his last day, the contented citizen of a free commonwealth. Even in the times of his worst errors, we can stiU see the difference between the pure gold of the republican chief and the tinsel of the Kings and courtiers with whom he is brought in contact. But these great and good qualities were balanced by several considerable defects. The ambition of Aratos was satisfied with being the first citizen of Achaia and of Hellas, but he could as little bear a rival near his throne as any despot. It was, in his view, absolutely essential, not only that Achaia should be the first power of Greece, but that Aratos should be the first citizen of Achaia. National envy made his foreign policy unjust to Sparta ; personal envy made his home policy unjust to Lydiadas ; a mixture of the two converted a national struggle' between Sparta and Achaia into a personal rivalry between Kleomen^s and Aratos. His hatred to Tyranny, his zeal for freedom, his anxiety for the extension of the League, often carried him too far. He did not scruple to seek noble ends by dishonourable means ; he did not avoid the crooked paths of intrigue and con- spiracy ; he was thus led into many unjustifiable, and some illegal, actions. And, clear as his hands were of actual bribes, he cannot be acquitted of fostering, or at least of not withstand- ing, the most baleful habit of his age. He allowed his country- men to look to foreign aid, when they should have looked only to their own wits and, their own arms ; he allowed them to trust to foreign mercenaries and foreign subsidies, and, for their sake, to practise an unworthy subserviency to foreign princes. As long las this subserviency took no worse form than that of flattering successive Ptolemies, the nation was indeed humiliated, its feelings of independence were weakened, but no actual danger to freedom could arise from friends at once so distant and so prudent. But had not Aratos and the Achaians already ac- quired the habit of looking to Ptolemy, they might never have fallen into the far more grievous error of looking to Antigonos. This fatal habit of putting trust in princes, com- bined with national and personal envy carried to an extreme point, led Aratos at last to the great error of his life, the VII MILITARY CHARACTER OF ARATOS 291 undoing of his own work, the calling again of the Macedonian into Greece. Such was Aratos as a man and a statesman. As a military Character commander, the contradictions in his character are more glaring °^ -^'o^ still. No man was more skilful or more daring in anything like ral. a military adventure ; no man risked his life more freely in His skill a surprise, in an ambuscade, in a night assault ; no man knew fi"l faring better how to repair failure in one quarter by unexpected success tures. in another. But then no man who ever commanded an army His inca- had more need of the faculty of repairing failures. When Aratos paoity and led the Achaian phalanx to meet an equal enemy in a pitched j^^^ "^^ battle, he invariably led it to defeat. It was not the fault of open field, the men whom he commanded. Their discipline indeed was, in his age, very defective, but they had good military stuff in them, and Philopoimen, when it was too late, converted them with very little trouble into efficient soldiers. Nor was it mere want of military skill in Aratos himself. The true cause lay deeper. Strange as it sounds, this man, so fearless in one sort of warfare, the deliverer who scaled the walls of Sikydn and Corinth, was, in the open field, as timid as a woman or a slave who had never seen steel flash in earnest. One understands a similar phaeno- menon when irregular troops are suddenly called on to practise a mode of warfare to which they are unaccustomed. In the G-reek War of Independence, some of the warriors who were most valiant in their own way of fighting, where personal strength, personal daring, and personal skill were all that was wanted, fairly ran away when they were expected to stand still in a line to be shot at. But Aratos was not a klepht from the mountains ; he was a soldier and a general of a civilized Greek state ; and if he and his countrymen had not reached the full perfection of Spartan or Macedonian discipline, they must at least have known the ordinary tactics common to all Pelopon- n^sian armies. The marvellous inconsistencies of Aratos' mili- tary character were the subject of much curious disputation in his own age ; ^ it may be left either to soldiers or to philosophers to explain the fact how they can; but history puts the fact itself beyond doubt — Aratos in the open field was a coward. And he was worse than a coward, he was a meddler. Accus- tomed, in political life, to exercise unbounded influence even when not in office, he carried the same habit into the camp, and 1 See Plut. Ar. 29. 292 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Effect of the union of ClTil and mili- tary powers. Fiist General- ship of Aratos, B.C. 245- 244. War between Achaia and .£tolia. Alliance of the Achaians with often interfered with and spoiled the plans of commanders more skilful and more daring than himself. Anyhow, as his devoted admirer Polybios is driven to confess, he allowed Peloponnesos to be fiUed vnth trophies commemorating not his victories but his defeats.^ That the League could not reap the benefit of his political skill, without at the same time reaping the evils of his military incapacity, is a speaking comment on that part of the Achaian system by which the functions of Commander-in-Chief and of Leader of the House of Commons were inseparably united. And yet it would naturally take a long time, and would require much sad experience, before a nation could fully realize that the deliverer of Siky6n and Corinth was a man utterly unfit to command an army in the open field. The first ofllicial year of Aratos was not to pass away without actual service ; but as yet it was service of a kind which did not reveal his deficiencies. The two great Greek Leagues were at war; we know not whether the quarrel was of older date than the union of Siky6n with the Achaian body, or whether a feud between ^toHa and Sikyon had grown, now that Sikyon was Achaian, into a feud between ^Etolia and Achaia. It is certain that the Jiltolians had made an attempt upon Sikyon in the time of the Tyranny of Xikokles;^ it is certain that the two Leagues were now in such a state of hostility that the Achaians ventured on ofiensive operations on the otier side of the Corinthian Gulf. One can hardly fancy this happening without previous ^toUan incursions into Achaia, and the good character which Aratos had already won, as a private horseman or as a subordinate officer, was probably won in resisting some of their plundering expeditions. It was more Kkely at this time than at any other that the . (m arpanr^bi alpeSeis ri SeOrepov, that is, the eighth year from the deliverance of SikySn. 294 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. of them the most important point in Peloponnesos, irere added to the Achaian Union. TVe left the League at war with Anti- gonos, and on friendly terms with his rebellious vassal Alexander Position of of Corinth. We know nothing of Alexander's personal character ^™*^ or of the nature of his government ; but we may believe that Alexander, the rule of a kinsman of the royal house, one too who came of a good stock, the grandson of Krateros and Phila, may have been some degrees less irksome than the rule of mere local oppressors Kke the Tyrants of Sikyon. However this may be, Alexander died just at this time, poisoned, as some said, by the and his emissaries of Antigonos. His widow Nikaia succeeded to his Nikail power; the King of Macedonia did not scruple to make her the victim of a ludicrous deception, by which he contrived to tion of "win Corinth for hims elf 1 The enemy was now brought to the Corinth by very gates of the League, and Aratos' own city was the most ■^^^'sonos, exposed of all. Another brilliant enterprise of his own peculiar ' '. ■ kind, a night-adventure as perilous as that which had rescued anee of' Siky6n, restored Corinth to freedom.^ For the first time for Corinth nearly a hundred years the Corinthians were masters of their and its g^^j, city.^ Aratos easily persuaded them to join the League ; ^ to tjjg' their mountain citadel now became a Federal fortress ^ instead of League, a Stronghold of the oppressor. The port of Lechaion at once B.C. 243. shared the fate of the capital; that of Kenchreia remained for a time in the hands of the enemy.* So great a success raised aUke the fame and the power of the Achaians and their Accession General. Megara was occupied by a Macedonian garrison ; ' o egara, -^ people now revolted, probably with Achaian help, and at . ' The tale is well told by Plutarch, Ai. 17. It naturally moves the indigna- tion of the Macedonian Droysen (ii. 371). According to him the story comes from Phylarchos, and therefoi-e is not to be believed. Why may not Phylarchos have sometimes told the truth ? and why may not the story have come from the Memoirs of Aratos ? - Pint Ar. 18-23. The tale is brilliantly told by the biographer. Cf. Pol. ii. 43. 3 Pint. Ar. 23. See above, p. 195, note 2. ■* The scene in Plutarch (c. 23) is a fine one. Aratos, weary with his night's labour, appears in the Corinthian theatre leaning on his spear, unable for a while to speak, amid the cheers of the delivered people. Then, avrayayim iambi' Si€^Tj\de 'Kdyov vwip Tiov 'Axotw*' t^ irpd^ei. 'jrp^Trovra Kal ffw^ettre rods ^opLvdiovs 'Axaioiis yeviffdtu. ' Pint. At. 24. See above, p. 242. ° It must have been acquired soon after, as we find it Achaian a few years later. Plut. Ar. 29. ^ Plut. At. 24. 'M.eyapeis re yhp dirofrrdvTes ^Ayriybvov ti^ 'Apdrtp irpoffiOeyTtK CT. Pol. ii. 43. VII ATTEMPTS ON ATHENS 295 once joined the League. Within PeloponnSsos, the cities of Troizen, Troizen and Epidauros ^ followed their example. The territory ^""^ ^P^" of the fifteen Confederate cities now stretched continuously from the Ionian to the -i51gaean Sea, from Cape Araxos to the extreme point of the Argolic peninsula. The key of Peloponn^sos was now in the hands of the Union — the fetters of Greece ^ were broken. But, immediately beyond the new Achaian frontier, two of the most famous cities of Greece were still in bondage. To win Corinth, Athens, and Argos to the League in a single year would have raised Aratos to a height of glory which the heroes of Marathdn or Thermopylae might have envied. Athens, fallen Position of as she was, still retained her great name and the shadow of her Athens ancient freedom, and she was now beginning to assume the ^" ^^°^' character which she held under her Eoman lords as the sacred city of literature and philosophy. How far this last claim spoke to the heart of the Sikyonian athlete it is hard to say, but certain it is that to win Athens to the cause of Grecian freedom was an object on which the heart of Aratos was always strongly bent. To Argos he was bound by still closer ties ; his youth had been spent within her walls ; her deliverance was the payment which he owed her for the shelter which she had given him in the days of his adversity.3 The condition however of the two cities was different. Athens seems to have been at this moment in posses- sion of as much liberty and democracy as was consistent with the presence of Macedonian troops, not indeed in the City itself, but in the other fortresses of the Attic territory.* The Acliaian League was at war with Macedonia ; and Attica was, under invasion such circumstances, clearly liable to be dealt with as an enemy's ° country. Attica was once more, as in the days of Archidamos, invaded by a PeloponnSsian army ; even the isle of Salamis occupied as it was by a Macedonian garrison, was ravaged by the Achaian troops. But Aratos took care to show that it was not against Athens, but against her oppressors, that he was warring. He released all his Athenian prisoners without ■ransom. This, it must be remembered, was, according to the 1 Pint. Ar. 24. 2 Corinth, Chalkis, and Demetrias, so called by the last Philip. ^ Pint. Ar. 25. 'Apyeiots d^ dovXedovffiv d.xO^f'^os iire^oOXevev dpeTieiv rhv ripavvov air&ni 'Apurrdfiaxov, ifw, t^ re irbXa Bpetrr'fipi.a, ttjv i\ev8eptav iiroSoOvai i\oTtiwiti,evos Kal Toiijl Axaiols TpojKO/dcrai. tt\v v6\u>. * See Thirlwall, viii. 99, 100. 296 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Vain attempt to attach Athens to the League, Condition of Argos ; succession of the Argeian Tyrants. B.C. 272. received rules of Grecian warfare, a piece of extraordinary favour. The ordinary fate of prisoners of war was to be sold as slaves ; even to put them to death, though a rare and extreme act of severity, did not actually violate Greek International Law.^ It was not likely that Aratos should show any special harshness towards a people who were enemies only through their mis- fortune; but his extreme lenity might fairly be expected to call forth some marks of Athenian gratitude. Aratos doubtless expected by this means to open negociations which might lead to the union of Athens with the League.^ No such result happened ; Athens gave no sign. Fear of Antigonos may well have been a stronger feeling than hope from Aratos, but this was not all. The Federal charmer always charmed in vain in Athenian ears. No Greek city ever needed the help of Confederates more than did Athens in the days of Aratos ; but the Athens of the days of Aratos had, unluckily for herself, not quite lost the memory of the Athens of the days of Periklgs. The once imperial city could not bring herself to give up the shadow of her old sovereignty ; she could not endure to see her citizens march at the bidding of a General from Sikyon; she could not endure to exchange absolute independence for a place in a Peloponn^sian Assembly where the vote of Athens might be neutralized by the vote of Epidauros or of Keryneia. A degrading subserviency to Macedonia and Rome, an abject worship of every foreign prince who would send alms to her coffers, was not inconsistent with a nominal independence and a nominal Democracy. Incorporation with the League would have given her the substance at the expense of the shadow; Athens would have been once more really free, and the borders of liberated Greece would have been advanced to Kithair6n and Orfipos. But the shadow of independence must have been sur- rendered, and to that shadow Athens clave to the last. The position of Argos was different. That famous city was now ruled by a Tyrant named Aristomachos. Either he had first risen to power, or else the character of his government had become more distinctly oppressive, since the days when Aratos himself dwelt at Argos and there organized his schemes for the deliverance of Siky6n. When Pyrrhos attacked Argos, the ^ See above, p. 45. ^ Plut. Ar. 24. 'Affj^Kaiois Si toi)s i\ev8^povs dfJKev &vev Xirpoiv dpxas VII ATTEMPTS ON ARISTOMACHOS OF ARGOS 297 supreme power was disputed between his partisan Aristeas and Aristippos a partisan of Antigonos."- But it does not appear quite certain whether Argos had been continuously ruled by Tyrants ever since. ^ There may have been an interval of freedom there, like that at Sikyon under Kleinias and Timokleidas. But at any rate Argos was now subjected to a grinding tyranny ; Aristo- Tyranny machos forbade the possession of arms by the citizens under °* A"sto- heavy penalties.^ Against Aristomachos Aratos did not think it the First. necessary to employ the same means of open warfare which he had employed against Antigonos and the ^tolians. He found men in Argos willing to take the Tyrant's life, if they could only Aratos get swords to take it with. The General of the Achaians ^°<=°"" presently provided them with daggers. We must not judge spiracles of this action by our modern English notions. English feeling against revolts against assassination under any circumstances. Some- '^™' times it goes so far as to see more guilt in the conspirator who plots the slaughter of a single public enemy than in the con- spirator who plots schemes of treason which involve the slaughter of innocent thousands. Greek feeling was very different. The Greek Tyrant, that is, the successful conspirator, the triumphant plotter '2™ °^ of a ccwp d'dtat, the man who had overthrown the freedom of his and country, who had sacrificed the property, the liberty, and the Tyrant- lives of- his feUow-citizens, was looked on as no longer a man but ^i^y^'^^- a wild beast. He who had trampled all Law under his feet, whose power rested wholly on the destruction of Law, had no claim to the protection of Law in his own person. As his hand was against every man, so every man's hand might righteously 1 Plut. Pyrrh. 30. ^ Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 124) suggests that Aristomachos was the son Ox Aristippos. IThe order of the names, Aristippos, Aristomachos, Aristippos, Aristomachos, certainly looks very like a family succession, and Phylarchos, as quoted by Polybios (ii. 59), distinctly calls the second Aristomachos a descendant of Tyrants {ire(t>vKbTa. iic Tvp&vvav). On the other hand, had Aristippos the Second been the son of Aristomachos the First, one might have expected Plutarch to introduce him with some mention of his kindred to his predecessor, and not simply as a worse Tyrant than he was {i^a\4(rTepos iKelvov ripavvos. Ar. 25). The enterprise of Aratos on SikySn also seems to show that Argos was free, or at least not under any very oppressive or inquisitorial government, in B.C. 251. Still, if the dynasty was a hereditary one, we may well believe that it was less oppressive than the common run of Tyrannies, till the advance of Aratos and the League began to put all Tyrants on their guard. If Aristomachos had any border feud with Nikokles, especially if he thought that Aratos merely intended to substitute himself for Nikokl6s as Tyrant of Siky6n, he might even have encouraged his design. » Plut. Ar. 25. 298 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. be against him. Against a criminal who, by the very greatness of his crimes, was placed beyond the reach of ordinary justice, every citizen was entitled to act as at once accuser, judge, and executioner. As Tyranny was the greatest of crimes, if for no other cause than that it involved all other crimes,^ so the slaying of a Tyrant was looked on as the noblest of human actions.^ The Tyrannicide, the man who had broken the yoke, who had jeoparded his life to free his country, who had abolished the dominion of force and had brought back the dominion of Law, received honours among the foremost benefactors of man- kind. In such a cause the ties of blood went for nothing ; the rights of a man's kindred weighed as nothing against the wrongs of his country ; Timole6n himself, the purest of heroes, the deliverer of Corinth and the deliverer of Syracuse, scrupled not to slay the brother who held his native city in bondage.^ The glory of the deed admitted of no doubt or controversy ; Tyranni- cide was as undoubtingly inscribed on the list of Hellenic virtues as Tyranny was inscribed on the list of Hellenic crimes. The Tyrant-slayer had votes passed in his honour by free common- wealths ; philosophers argued, and rhetoricians declaimed, in his praise ; poets twined their choicest wreaths of song upon his ^ Pol. ii. 59. Airrb yap Toiivoixa [t6 Tipavvoi'\ inpUxei. ttji> cure^eaTdniv ^fiipaatPj Kal TTiia-as trepteiXTj^e tols ^v avdpthiroLS ddiKias Kat Trapavofilas. ^ Mr. Grote (iii. 37) has collected some of the most important passages bearing on Greek feeling towards Tyrannicide. So also Isokrates {wepl Wp. 91), tuv piv yhp cLpxiivTav ipyov earl Toi$ apxap^ivovs rais airuv i7n/i,eKelai,s woieTv eiSaifiofetr- r4povs, Toti 5^ TvpdvpoLs ^6os KaB^ffTTjKe roh rujv &W(av wdvots Kal KaKots airoTs ridoyds TrapaffKevd^etv. dvdyKT] 5^ Toifs rotoiVois ^pyoLS iirix^LpovvTas TvpavviKaTs Kai Tais ffvixattack on Corinth or to forbear was a question for the General to settle on his own responsibility. That re- sponsibility, like that of a modern Minister, came after the fact. These great powers vested in a single man undoubtedly tended to give the policy of the League a character of unity and con- sistency, above all of secrecy, where secrecy was needed, which could not possibly exist under the older form of Democracy. On the other hand, an officer holding such great powers was vii RELATIONS BETWEEN ACHAIA AND SPARTA 305 exposed, almost by the Constitution itself, to a constant tempta- tion to overstep them. The invasion of Argos, if not a crime, was certainly a blunder ; but it was a blunder which no Athenian General could ever have been tempted to make. § 2. From the Deliverance of Cwinth to the Annexation of Argos B.C. 243 — 228. Aratos may now be looked upon as the permanent chief of the League. He filled the highest magistracy in alternate years, and, even when out of office, he was still practically the guiding spirit of the commonwealth. In his third year of office we find Third the League still at war with ^tolia, but now in close alliance Ct^neral- with Sparta. Agis was now one of the Spartan Kings, Agis the Iratos pure enthusiast and the spotless martyr, who perished in a cause b.o. 241. than which none could be either nobler or more hopeless, the King Agis, attempt to restore a corrupted commonwealth to the virtue and simplicity of times long gone by. His whole career is one of the most fascinating pieces of later Grecian history; but his attempts at reform, his selfish adversaries and his no less selfish friends, the beautiful pictures of his domestic life, of his self-sacrifice and his martyrdom, do not directly bear on the history of Achaian Federalism. It is enough for our purpose that Sparta and the Relations League were now closely allied, that the ^Etolians were expected °^ "^^ to enter Peloponndsos by way of the Isthmus, and that Agis .^^^ appeared at Corinth at the head of a Lacedaemonian contingent.^ Sparta. ' Those who have studied the history of these times know well that the circumstances of this war are involved in much confusion. According to Paii- sanias (ii. 8. 5) the League was, some time or other, at war with Agis, who took Pellene, and was driven out by Aratos. This account Droysen (ii. 380) adopts, and supposes that the alliance between Sparta and the League was concluded after this campaign, because the LacedEemonians, in Pausanias, depart iivbairovSoi. Pausanias also elsewhere (viii. 10. 5 — 8 ; 27. 13, 14) tells us of a siege of Megal- opolis by Agis, and also of a pitched battle near Mantiueia, in which Aratos and Lydiadas command the Achaians, and in which Agis is killed ! This tale is utterly absurd ; all the world knows that Agis was not killed in any battle at Mantineia or anywhere else. The whole question has been thoroughly sifted by Manso (Sparta, iii. 2. 123), who is confirmed by Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 127, 148). The supposed capture of PellSng by Agis is a stupid perversion of the real capture of Pell§n6 which will presently be mentioned. His imaginary Arkadian campaign comes from a confusion between this Agis and his predecessor of the same name in the century before (see above, p. 188), who really besieged Megalopolis and fell in battle near Mantiueia. I might add that the details of the battle in Pau- X 306 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Contraat between Agis and Aratos. The two allied commanders were singularly contrasted. Agis was a hereditary King, yet he was, in a certain sense, a revolu- tionist ; Aratos was a republican chief, the sworn enemy of Tyrants, and no lover of Kings, but he was at the same time a politician essentially conservative and aristocratic.^ Both were reformers ; the reforms of both consisted in restoration not in innovation, but while Aratos aimed at, and succeeded in, possible political reforms, Agis dreamed of social changes, the restoration of a past state of things, which it was as hopeless to attempt as to turn back the planets in their courses. Both were young — Aratos was still only thirty — but Aratos, even ten years before, had an old head on young shoulders, while Agis had all the best qualities of youth, its hopefulness, its daring, its pure and un- selfish enthusiasm. One is tempted to believe that Aratos looked on Agis as a hare-brained fanatic, and that Agis looked on Aratos as a cold - blooded diplomatist, intriguing, disin- genuous, and cowardly. The gallant young king longed for an opportunity to win credit for himself and his army ; military renown would be of all things the most valuable towards his ulterior objects at home ; to his Spartan heart war meant victory or death in the open field ; schemes, surprises, night-adventures, were not his element ; above all, if Lakonia had just before been Difference pitilessly ravaged by these very iEtolians, every feeling of "" *''°"' honour and revenge led him to wish for a decisive action. Aratos, on the other hand, looked on a battle as the last re- source of an ignorant general ; he had never fought a pitched battle yet, and he was not going to fight one now to please the young man from Lacedsemon. Let the ^tolians come; the sanias seem to he a mixture of those of the battle last mentioned and of those of the battle of Ladokeia, to be hereafter spoken of, where Aratos and Lydiadas did command against a Spartan King, though that King was not Agis but KleomenSs. There is also a story, alluded to more than once, but never directly narrated, both by Polybios and by Plutarch (Pol. iv. 34 ; ix. 34. Plut. Kleom. 18), about a great Jitolian inroad into Lakonia, in which the plunderers carried off a wonder- ful amount both of spoil and captives. No date is given ; Schoru (p. 91) and Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 135) place it later than this. It is, to say the least, very tempting to put it, with Droysen (ii. 387), about this time. It seems to agree well with a time when Sparta and Achaia are allied against .ffitolia. This is one of the many things which make us wish that Polybios had begun his detailed history earlier. 1 I have already often shown that the Achaian Democracy was practically an Aristocracy in the best sense of the word, an ipia-TOKpaHa as distinguished from a mere dXiyap^la. in their plans for the cam- paign. VII CONTRAST BETWEEN ARATOS AND AGIS 307 harvest was gathered in ; the country people might take refuge in the towns till the storm had passed by ; the enemy could not do so much damage in a passage through Achaia as they would do if they won a battle at Corinth.^ Agis, unconvinced, yielded to the superior authority of the Achaian General,^ and, soon Agis after, for some reason or other, he and his army retired.^ The '^^t™^- common feeling of the Achaian army was strongly with Agis. Aratos had to bear many bitter reproaches on his supposed weakness and cowardice.* But military and constitutional dis- cipline prevailed ; the chief of the League was obeyed. The Capture ./Etolians passed the Isthmus undisturbed : they passed throuah ^^^ ''^" „ ^ cov6rv oi the Sikydnian territory ; they entered the old Achaian land ; pgugne. they burst on the city of Pellen^, took it, fell to plundering, and were scattered about the town, fighting with one another and carrying off the spoil and the women. ^ This was doubtless the moment for which Aratos had waited ; in a surprise he was as much in his element as in a battle he was out of it. The plunderers soon heard that the Achaians were in full march ; before they could recover discipline and form in order of battle, they were attacked by Aratos and utterly routed. The whole army retreated, and we hear no more of -^tolian incursions for , some time. The result in this case was of course held to approve the Estimate foresight of Aratos. It is certain that he obtained a great and °^ *^ lasting success at a comparatively small price. But we may Aratos in doubt whether it is the part of a patriotic ruler to stand by and this cam- allow even one city of his countrymen to be sacrificed rather P^'g"- than run the risk of defeat in the open field. And we may feel ^ Here Plutarch definitely quotes the Memoirs of Aratos. (Agis, 15.) 'B^Xtiqv TjyetTO, rods Kapiroiis crx^Sbv &iravra.s ffvyKCKOfUfffi^vuv Tutv yetapyuVf irapeKdeiv toi)s TToXe/Ltfous ^ IJ-^XQ SiaKivSweOffat irepl rijov SXaiv. ^ lb. "^E^t; [6 ^Ayts] . . . •jroffjo'eiv rb doKoGv 'Apdrty, Kal yhp irpeff^i^Tepdp Te elvai Kal (rTpaTTjyeiv 'Axaiwj', oh oi')(i irpoo'Td^ojv oiid^ TiyTjaSfievoSj dXXcfc {rv- ffTpaTevtr6/j£ifos tjkol Kal ^(yri6ij(Tij)V. ^ Aratos dismissed them — roils ffvfipAxovs iiraiviaas diatpiJKe (ib.). But why ? Droysen (ii. 390) malces Aratos afraid of the revolutionary principles of his allies. This is quite possible ; but it seems simpler to suppose with Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 128) that Agis, " considering his presence useless if no battle was to be f9ught," "requested leave to withdraw," and received it. * Plut. Ar. 31. IloXXi /ih ivdSri, ttoXXoi 6' ds naXaKlav Kal iToKulav (TKibniuiTa Kal x^Ei''"''/'^'' iToixelvas oi irpo^Karo t6v toC trvfupipovTos \oyi(rfiiiv Si6, t6 ^atp6fievop ahxpliv. How differently would Plutarch have had to write if the policy of Aratos had failed ; KX^wi' II/Jo/ii;9eils iarl iiera Tk Tpdy/iara. " See the pretty story of the daughter of Epiggthgs. Plut. Ar. 32. 308 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Truce with Antigonos. Alliance between the two Leagues. Death of Antigonos (Jonatas, B.C. 239. The Deme- trian War. sure that, if the policy of Aratos had been unsuccessful, had he failed to recover Pellene, or even failed to deal some decisive blow at the enemy, such failure would have been probably far more disastrous, and certainly far more ignominious, than any possible defeat in a pitched battle. The case is not like that of Perikles allowing the Lacedaemonians to ravage Attica undis- turbed. Athens was strong in her fleet, but utterly unable to resist the PeloponnSsian land-army. To be passive by land and active by sea was her only means of defenca But the com- bined forces of Sparta and the extended League ought to have been a fair match for any .^tolian invaders, and probably any other General than Aratos would have fought a battle at the Isthmus. Aratos, whether in prudence or in cowardice, judged otherwise. He ran a greater risk than that of any battle, but he succeeded, and, of course, as he succeeded, he added to his fame. This relief of PeUSne and defeat of the ^tobans was in its results a very important event. Antigonos ^ concluded a truce with the League, which remained in force tiU his death. W^ith the ^tolians the League, either then or soon after, concluded not only peace but aUiance. This was brought about by Aratos and Pantaledn, who is spoken of as the most powerful man in .^toUa, and who was doubtless the General of the year.^ After the death of Antigonos, the combined forces of the two Leagues carried on a war with his successor Demetrios,* of which hjutily any details have been preserved. It was now, most probably, that the ^toUan power extended itself over so many of the towns of Thessaly and the Phthiotic Achaia.* It is certain that Aratos fought a battle with the Macedonian Bithys, at a place which there is every reason to believe was- in Thessaly.^ This seems to have been his first pitched battle, and he lost it. It is also certain that the Boeotians, for fear of an invading Macedonian army, now forsook the ^tolian for the Macedonian alliance.® TXeiGTOv AlrcoKiav divaft^i^ ffvp^/ryi^ -xsrqffoii^fK '■ This is implied in Pint. Ar. 33. 56i'as, /c.r.X. " lb. ^avTaK4ovTL rf^ [o 'ApoTos]. Cf. Pol. ii. 44. ' Pol. ii. 44, 46. '0 Ati/irfr/naKii rdXe/ios. * See Schorn, p. 88. He reckons up Hypata, Lamia, the Phthiotic Thebes, Melitaia, Pharsalos, Larissa Kremaste, and Echinos. 5 Phylakia. Plut. Ar. 34. See Thirlwall, viiL 133, for an eiamination of several small controversies which have arisen about the details of the Demetrian War, but which do not at all bear upon the subject of this history. ^ Pol. XX. 5. See above, p. 142. VII ALLIANCE WITH ^TOLIA 309 Altogether, the little that we hear of this war does not give us the notion of any great glory won by the Achaian arms in war- fare so far from home, nor does it supply any details which illustrate constitutional questions. It is far more interesting to trace the progress of the League in Southern Greece. The two objects dearest to the heart of Aratos were stiU the Unsnc- deliverance of Athens and the deliverance of Argos. Over and cessful at- over again did he attempt both.'^ Peiraieus was still held by its Aratos "on Macedonian garrison. Even before the death of Antigonos, Peiraieus, while the League was still at peace with Macedonia, Aratos did ^-^^ 239- not scruple to cause one of his agents to attempt a surprise of the fortress. In his own Memoirs he strove to make the world believe that this man attacked Peiraieus on his own account, and that, when he was beaten back, he affirmed that Aratos had sent him. His name was Erginos, a native of Syria, but doubt- less of Greek or Macedonian descent, who had been one of the instruments of Aratos in the capture of Akrokorinthos.^ He was therefore a tried and trusty agent of the Achaian General, very likely to be employed by him on such an adventure, but hardly the man to attempt to capture cities on his own account. So unlikely a story met with no credit at the time, and Aratos suffered somewhat in reputation among his countrymen^ for bringing on the League the discredit of a breach of truce. This piece of information is valuable on many grounds. It shows us the true position of Aratos as chief of the League. It illustrates the great powers which were vested in an Achaian General. The attack on Peiraieus must have been made wholly on Aratos' own responsibility, or he could never have attempted to throw off that responsibility on the shoulders of a private foreigner. Aratos had undoubtedly exceeded his legal powers, but it was Illustra- only the legal extent of those powers which gave him the oppor- ^°^ °{ tunity or the temptation of exceeding them. But it also sets yon of him before us as the really accountable chief of a free common- Aratos. wealth. Great as Aratos was, he had to undergo the free criti- cism and censure of a popular Assembly, and to meet and answer orators who evidently did not scruple to withstand him to his face. But it would seem also that the Assembly was satisfied with such criticism and censure; the permanent influence of ' Pint. At. 33. Oil SU oidk Tpis dXXi TroXAi/ns, fi6rriTa KoXaKdas rijs irpbt MaKeddvas iTrep^iX- "Kovres i<7Te^avt}(l>bpy]tTa.v, fire irpurov jjyyiXdri TedvijKiJis, VII ATTEMPTS ON ATHENS AND ARGOS 311 The would-be deliverer was cut to the heart that Athens should look, or even pretend to look, upon him as an enemy ; but he allowed himself to be persuaded by an Athenian embassy, and he retired without doing-hurt to the city or its suburbs^. Meanwhile the Achaian leader was not a whit less anxious to Attempts restore freedom to the city where he had spent his own days of °^ -^^tos exile. After Aratos' iirst attempt in his second Presidency, a °°p 243°! constant warfare seems to have gone on, not so much between 229. Argos and the League as between Aristippos and Aratos.^ The Tyrant was always plotting the death of the patriot, at which indeed we cannot wonder when we remember that the patriot had equally plotted the death of the Tyrant's predecessor, possibly his father. But one would rather not believe that King Antigonos was a fellow-conspirator, and it may well be that the report to that effect was only an unauthorized conjecture of Aratos himself.* On the part of Aratos, every sort of attack, secret or open, was employed for many successive years. The war was of the usual kind ; Aratos fought and lost one or two pitched battles, but in diplomatic dealings, in surprises, in night- marches, he was as skilful and as daring as ever. In the open field, by the banks of the river Charts, the General of the Achaians ran away, when victory was declaring for his army ; * yet the same General could in his own person scale the walls of Argos, fight hand to hand with the Tyrant's mercenaries, and only retire when disabled by a severe wound.^ Bitter was his disappointment when he found that the Argeians, whom he came to deliver, stirred not hand nor foot in his behalf, but sat by and looked on at his exploits as if they were sitting to adjudge the prize in the Nemean Games.® But if he ran away at the Chares, if he had to retire from Argos, he presently gained the city of ^ Plut. At. 34. llpbs dpy^v eudiis ^K(rrpaTe6o8pbs ?jv ical dTrapairT^ros ^v t<^ fuffetv Toi/s Tvpdvvovs. ' Bishop Thirlwall (vili. 136) connects these Arkadian acquisitions of .^tolia with the great ^tolian invasion of Lakonia. See above, p. 806. 3 Pol. iv. 3. ' lb. 17. See above, p. 242. We may suppose that the failure of Aratos before Kynaitha, mentioned incidentally by Polybios (ix. 17), tooJ place at some early stage of these events. Aratos was v^os dK/iiJj', which can only refer to the time of one of his earliest Generalships, or possibly to some subordinate command before he was General. See Brandstiiter, p. 237. VII LYDIADAS TYRANT OF MEGALOPOLIS 315 learn the fact only from afterwards finding them incidentally spoken of as Achaian towns.^ Mantineia went through a series Revolu- of revolutions, of which we should like to know the exact dates.^ M'°r°^- She first united herself to the Achaian body, and then — our first recorded instance of secession — deserted it for a connexion, on whatever terms, with ^tolia. We have no certain informa- tion when this revolt took place, except that it was before the war with Kleomenes, and therefore at some time within our Before present period. Mantineia was perhaps induced to forsake the '^■°- 227. League, when the League admitted to its fellowship a city which was Mantineia's special rival. For we have now reached the time when the League made, in point of actual strength, its greatest acquisition since that of the Corinthian Akropolis, and one which proved in its results the greatest of all its acquisitions since that which made Aratos himself its citizen. Megalopolis, Union of the Great City, once the Federal capital of Arkadia, now became Megaio- a single canton of the Federation of Achaia. No greater gain ^j^j^ ^-^^ did the Achaian Union ever make than this which gave her one Achaian of her greatest cities, and a long succession of her noblest citizens. League, It was a bright day indeed in the annals of the League which gave her Philopoimen and Lykortas and Polybios, and, greater than all, the deathless name of Lydiadas. Lydiadas, Tyrant of Megalopolis, and thrice General of the Character Achaian League, is a man of whom but little is recorded, but °^ Ltdia- that little is enough at once to place him among the first of men.^ We know him mainly from records tinged with the envy of a rival, and yet no fact is recorded of him which does not in truth redound to his honour. In his youth he seized the Tyranny of his native city, but he seized it with no ignoble or unworthy aim. We know not the date * or the circumstances of his rise to sovereign power, but there is at least nothing to mark him as ^ See Pol. ii. 52. 55 ; iv. 19. Polyainos (ii. 36) records a stratagem by which the Achaian General Dioitas obtained possession of Heraia. It is a silly story enough, and Polyainos shows how little he understood the Achaian constitution, by making the Heraians offer themselves as subjects of the Achaians ; iKereiovres aTToka^eiv ttjc TrarpfSa, a;s elaavdis ifirijKooi yevrjffdfievoi Tois 'Axatoh. But the tale preserves to us the name of an otherwise unknown Achaian General. On the date of the acquisition of HSraia, see p. 470, note 1. 2 Pol. ii. 57. ' Besides the account of Lydiadas in Plutarch's Lives of Aratos and Kleomenes, and the brief mention of Polybios (ii. 44), there is an admiring picture of him drawn by Pausanias, viii. 27. 12. * Droysen (ii. 372) places it about B.C. 244, soon after the seizure of Corinth by Antigonos, but this date rests on no certain evidence. 316 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. one of those Tyrants wiio were the destroyers of freedom. He is not painted to us as a midnight conspirator, plotting rebellion against a state of things which made him only one free citizen among many. Still less is he painted as the chief magistrate of a free state^ bound by the most solemn oaths to be faithful to its freedom, and then turning the limited powers with which his country had entrusted him to overthrow the liberties of which he was the chosen guardian. We do not read that he rose to power by driving a lawful Senate from their hall by the spears of mercenaries, or by an indiscriminate massacre of his fellow- citizens in the streets of the Great City. We do not read that he reigned by crushing every nobler feeling, and by flattering every baser passion, of his subjects ; we are not told that every man of worth or talent shrank from his service, and left him only hirelings and flatterers as the agents of his will. There is no evidence that the dungeons of Megalopolis or the cities of free Greece were filled with men whose genius or whose virtue was found inconsistent with his rule. We do not hear that his foreign policy was one of faithless aggression ; that he gave out that Tyranny should be Peace, and then filled Peloponngsos with needless wars. It is not told us that he seized on city after city, prefacing every act of plunder with solemn protestations that nothing was further from his thoughts. Still less do we find that he ever played the basest part to which Tyranny itself can sink ; that he stretched forth his hand to give a hypocritical aid to struggling freedom, and then drew back that he might glut his eyes with the sight of a land wasted by anarchy and brigandage to which a word from him could at any moment put an end. No ; Lydiadas was, in the sense of his age and country, a Tyrant, but it was not thus that he either gained or used a power which in formal speech alone deserved to be called a Tyranny. Others had reigned in the Great City far less worthy to reign than he ; he felt within himself the gifts and aspirations of the born ruler ; and, in a city which had long been used to the sw'ay of one, the vision of his youthful imagination took, pardonably enough, the form not of a republican magistrate but of a patriot King. Men told him that the sway of a single man was best for times like his, that his heart and arm could better guard his native land than the turbulence of the many or the selfish narrowness of the few. He looked on sovereign power as a means of working his country's good and of winning for VII LYDIADAS RESIGNS THE TYRANNY 317 himself a glorious name ; he would fain be a King of Men, a Shepherd of the People, like the Kodros of legend or the Cyrus of romance. He grasped the sceptre, and for a while he wielded it. But he soon found that his dreams of patriotic royalty were not suited to the land or the age in which he lived. And soon a nobler path stood open before him. He saw the youth of Siky6n enter upon a higher career than that into which he him- self had been deluded. He saw that a man might rule by better means than an arbitrary will, and might rest his power on better safeguards than strong walls and foreign mercenaries. He saw Aratos, the chosen chief of a free people, wield a power greater than his own, purely because his fellow-citizens deemed him the wisest and the worthiest among them. He saw how far higher and nobler a place in the eyes of Greece was held by the elective magistrate of the great Confederacy than by the absolute master of a single city. He heard himself branded by a name which he shared with wretches like Nikoklgs and Aristippos ; he saw the arm raised against him, which was, whenever the favour- able moment came, to hurl him from power by a doom like theirs. Aratos had already marked Lydiadas for the next victim, and Megalopolis as the next city for deliverance.^ The Lord of Megalopolis, like Iseas at Keryneia, had now his choice to make, and he made it nobly and wisely. He called his rival to a conference, he laid aside his power, he dismissed his guards, he went back to his house, Tyrant now no longer, but one free citizen of the free commonwealth of Megalopolis. The first act of that commonwealth was naturally union with the Achaian League ; the name of Lydiadas was passed from tongue to Lydiadas tongue through every city of the Confederation,^ and at the next q°^^^^-^ annual election of Federal magistrates, the self-dethroned Tyrant b.c. 233. of Megalopolis was raised to the highest place in his new country as the General of the year. Lydiadas, in resigning absolute power, did not wish to resign power altogether, but only to hold it by a tenure at once worthier and safer. He lived to be three 1 It should be noticed that Plutarch, following doubtless the Memoirs of Aratos, puts this motive far more prominently forward than Polybios and Pausanias, who represent Megalopolitan traditions. The words of Pausanias are especially strong ; ^irei Si fipx^To ippovciv, Kariiravev iaxrrbv Miiv TvpavvlSos, Kalwep is rb &a- can well believe it to have been among a people only half Republic Greek, and utterly unaccustomed to regular freedom. The young Republic soon became involved in a chain of events which brought quite new actors upon the stage of Grecian politics. The pirates of Illyria now begin to be heard of, and a common interest in repressing their depredations first brings the Greek commonwealths into any practical relations with the Senate and People of Rome. These were, in their results, First great events in the history of Greece and of the world. But political just now we are more interested in the glimpses which are ^itb^RoME given us of the political life of the Confederation of -ZEtolia. We are introduced not only to a siege by an jEtolian army, but to an election and a debate in the ^tolian Assembly. Characteristically enough, the army and the Assembly are but the same persons invested with two different functions, and the subject of the debate turns, as we might have expected, on questions of plunder and annexation.^ The restless hostility of the ^tolians towards their neighbours Hostility of Akarnania seems to have been in no way relaxed by the "f *? friendly relations between -^tolia and Achaia. Not long before, towar™^ at least at some time during the reign of D^metrios, the Akar- Aicar- nanians had, in a fit of desperation, applied for help to the "ania. great commonwealth on the other side of the Hadriatic. They Akar- alone, so they pleaded, among all the Greeks, had no share in p^"JJ'° the war waged by Greece against the Trojan ancestors of Rome ; to"Kome the Akarnanians were not enrolled in the Homeric Catalogue b. c. 239 - even as an independent people, much less as countrymen or '^'^'^• subjects of their ^tolian oppressors.^ The Akarnanian embassy ' Pans. iv. 35. 5. '^irapSyrai hi lis iTra.isa.vTO /3o(riXei;eir9ai, t(£ re dtXXa 6 S^/ios C^/)ife KoX d/cpoSo-ffai tG>v h rais &pxepoixivri irptis TTf ijireipov. Yet Patrai has become a great port in later times. * This may well have been among the wpd^eis oiK duajKaiai. jiroposed by Lydiadas. ^ See above, p. 268. ' This seems implied in the words ris 5^/ca I'aCs. 326 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE DSm^trios of Pharos. Inter- ference of Rome. Korkyra, ApoUfinia, and Epi- damnas become Roman allies. Humilia- tion of lUyria. had to surrender ; she received an Illyrian garrison, commanded by a man who was one of the chief pests of Greece and the neighbouring lands, Dgmetrios of Pharos. This man, a Greek of the Hadriatic island from which he took his name, here began a career of treachery which lasted for many years. He was now in the service of Queen Teuta, but he soon found that her cause was not the strongest. Eome had declared war against the pirate Queen, in what was in truth the cause of all civilized states on both sides of the sea. The Consul Cnasus Fulvius came against Korkyra with the Eoman fleet; DSmfitrios, who was already out of favour at the Illyrian court, ■'• joined the citizens in welcoming the invaders, and surrendered the Illyrian garrison to Fulvius. Korkyra and, soon afterwards, Apoll6nia and Epidamnos, became the first Eoman Allies ^ — a condition which so easily slid into that of Eoman subjects — on the Greek side of the Ionian Sea. The Illyrian kingdom was dismembered, and the adventurer D^mStrios suddenly grew into a consider- able potentate, a large portion of the dominions of Teuta being conferred upon him by the Eoman conqueror.^ In the small part of her kingdom which she was allowed to retain, she was hampered with conditions which effectually hindered her from being any longer dangerous to Greece. Not more than two Illyrian ships, and those unarmed, might appear south of Lissos. This is the first real interference of Eome in Grecian affairs. The former haughty message to the -i35tolians had no effect. But now Eome appeared as an active, though as yet only as a beneficent, actor on the Greek side of the sea. She had broken the power which was just then most dangerous to Greece, and had delivered three Greek cities from a barbarian yoke. The wrongs of Akarnania and the defiance of ^tolia were doubtless by this time forgotten, ^tolia, like Eome, was an enemy of Illyria, while Akarnanian galleys, if they had not sailed to Troy at the bidding of Agamemn6n, had undoubtedly swelled the numbers of the pirate fleet of Teuta. Aulus Postumius, the ^ Pol. ii. 11. 'Be dia^oKais &v Kal (po^oijievos r'hiv leirav. ^ Polyljios (u.s.) uses a somewhat different word for the reception of each of the three. 01 KepKvpdtot . . . aural re (r0as ofjio6v/j,ad6v §S(OKav "jrapaKXTjdhTes els T7JC T&i/ 'Voifmlav irlaTiv. . . . 'PwKttioi di TrpoaSe^ifieiioi toi)s KepKvpalov! els t'>]V cjiMav (wKeov iirl rrjs ' A.iroW(iivlas koX To&riav iiroSe^aidvinv Kal S6vTav invTotis els rV ennTpowriv, . 'Vapauoi. di Kal Tois ''EindaiiAovs irapa- Xa/36jTes els tt}v wlimv irporiyov, k.t.X. [For Eoman "faith" cf. below chap. ix. p. 494.] 8 See Thirlwall, viii. 140, note. VII INTERCOURSE WITH ROME 327 final conqueror of the Illyrian Queen, sent Ambassadors to the Roman two Leagues, who explained the causes of the war with Teuta, Bmtassies and of the appearance of Eoman armies in a quarter where their Leagues^" presence might seem threatening to Greece.^ They then related b.o. 228. the events of the campaign, and read out the treaty which had just been concluded, the terms of which were so favourable to the interests of every Greek state. The Eoman envoys were received, as they well deserved, with every honour in the Assem- blies of both Confederations. The political embassy was followed Honorary by one, apparently of a religious or honorary character, to Embassies Corinth and to Athens. The Corinthians bestowed on the *° ^'"■'°*'^ Romans the right of sharing in the Greek national festival of the Athens. Isthmian Games.^ This was equivalent to raising the Eoman People from the rank of mere barbarians to the same quasi- Greek position as the Epeirots and Macedonians.^ It shows also that the administration of the Isthmian Games was still in the hands of the State of Corinth, and had not been at all trans- ferred to the general Achaian body. As administrators of those games, the Corinthians might lawfully receive and honour a Eoman Embassy which was charged with no political object, but merely came on a pilgrimage to Corinth and its holy places. Such an Embassy in no way interfered with the Federal sover- eignty in matters of foreign negociation ; those had been already dealt with by the Federal Assembly.* And truly Eome might just then seem worthy of any honours on the part of Greece. Not but that a feeling of shame ^ might arise in the breast of ^ This seems implied in the expression of Polybios (ii. 12), aireKoyiffavTo ras alHas Tou ToX^fjLov kclI ttjs Sta^daeus. '' Pol. ii. 12. 'AttA 5^ Taiirjjs t^s KaTapxns 'Poi/uuol /liv eiiBioii SXKovi irpea- /Seuras i^airiffrciKav Trplis KopLvdiovs Kal irpbs 'ABrjvaiovs' Bre Sij Kal Kopivdiot irpwrrov dtreS^^avTO ^rex^iv 'Fdjfiaiovs tou tu>v 'IffOfdcov dyQvos, " Soon afterwards the Eomans sent other embassies to Corinth and to Athens, with no other object, so far as appears, than of introducing themselves to some of the most illustrious states of the Greek name, which many of the Romans had already learned to admire. " Arnold's Eome, iii. 40. ' Arnold, u. s. Thirlwall, viii. 140. The act, though done by a body of less authority, had somewhat the same effect as the admission of Macedonia to the Amphiktyonic franchise. * Ti tSv 'AxoiwK Wi/os. Pol. ii. 12, of the other embassy. See above, p. 203. ' ' ' Man kann fragen, ob der Jubel in Hellas grosser war oder die Scham, als statt der zehn Linienschiffe der achaeischen Eidgenossenschaft, der streitbarsten Macht Griechenlands, jetzt zweihundert Segel der Barbaren in ihre Hafeu einUefen und mit einem Schlage die Aufgabe losten, die den Griechen zukam und an der diese so klaglich gescheitert waren." Mommsen, Rom. Gesch. i. 371. 328 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Eventual results of Roman inter- ference. any patriotic Greek, when he thought that the freedom of three cities, which the two greatest powers of independent Greece had in vain attempted to deliver, had now to be received as a gift from a barbarian conqueror, i The conduct of Eome throughout this war was thoroughly just and honourable ; there is no reason to charge either the Senate or individual Eoman leaders with any ulterior views of selfish aggrandizement ; but it is clear that, when the Eoman arms had once been seen before a Greek fortress, when the wiles of Eoman diplomacy had once been listened to by a Greek Assembly, a path was opened which directly led to the fight of KynoskephalS and to the sack of Corinth. Inaction of Mace- donia. Death of D^metrios, B.C. 229. The inaction of Macedonia during all these events is remark- able. Since D^mStrios first engaged the Illyrians to help MedeSn, we hear of absolutely no Macedonian interference, either warlike or diplomatic, in matters which would seem to have very directly touched Macedonian interests. We are not told with what eyes Macedonian statesmen looked upon the first appearance of so formidable a power as Eome in lands so closely bordering upon their own. Nor do we hear that Eome thought it necessary on this occasion to enter into any relations with the Macedonian Kingdom. Eoman embassies went on political errands to Aigion and Thermon, and on honorary errands to Corinth and Athens, but no envoy seems to have been dis- patched in either character to the court of Pella or to the sanctuary of Dion. This apparent temporary insignificance of a power lately so great, and soon to be so great again, is explained by the unusual activity of the restless northern tribes, and by the commotions which commonly attended a change of sovereign in Macedonia."^ The reign of D^m^trios ended about the time when the Eomans first crossed into Illyria.' He appears to have died in battle mth the Dardanians ; certainly he had lately been defeated by them.* The heir to his crown was his young son ^ "In the course of this short war, not only Coroyra, but Apollonia also, and Bpidamnus, submitted to the Romans at discretion, and received their liberty, as was afterwards the ease with all Greece, as a gift from the Roman people." Arnold, iii. 39. ^ See Plathe, Gesch. Mac. i. 143 et seqq. ' Pol. ii. 44. Arj/ajTpioti di ^aa-CKeda-auTOS diKH fidvov Iri) Kal iJ.eTa\\d^avTos Thv ^iov Trepl tt]V TrptHyrqv SLd^acnv elt t^v 'IXKvpida 'Pwjaatwp, * See Thirlwall, viii. 141. VII AFFAIRS OF MACEDOKIA 329 Philip, but the royal authority was assumed — first, it would seem, as Protector and then as King for life ^ — by Antigonos, Protecto- surnamed D6s6n,^ a distant kinsman of the royal house, but with ™'? ""'l a distinct reservation of the rights of young Philip as heir- Antio-onos apparent. A new King of Macedonia seldom ascended the D6s6n, throne without some disturbance, and a Eang reigning on such ^°- ^"^~ terms as these was even less likely than usual to find his power perfectly undisputed. We hear vaguely of fresh Dardanian inroads, of commotions in Macedonia itself, and even of some movements in Thessaly of which one would gladly know some- thing more.'^ All these it appears that the energy of Antigonos sufficed to put down ; but his hands, like those of Demetrios during the last years of his reign, must have been far too full for him to give much attention to the advance either of Achaia or of Rome. It is evident that the death of DImltrios, and the events Advance which followed it, must have greatly shaken the Macedonian °* ^^^ influence in Southern Greece, and must have given a propor- after the tionate advantage to the cause of Greek independence.* The Death of two great desires of Aratos were now to be gratified ; Athens Demetnos. and Argos were both to be delivered. It would seem that Aratos and the Athenians had at last come to an understanding. The Achaian chief was no longer looked on as an enemy at Athens, and he no longer pressed for the incorporation of Athens with the League. Both sides agreed to be satisfied if Deliver- all Macedonian garrisons were withdrawn from Attica, and if ^^ Athens, again restored to freedom, became the ally of Achaia. b.c. 229. The way in which this desirable end was brought about curiously illustrates the position and character of Aratos. He was not then in office, the Presidency of the League being held by his rival Lydiadas.^ But it was not to Lydiadas, but to Aratos, that ' Jiistiu, xxviii. 3. ^ '0 Aii(ruv, he who is about to give, that is, he who promises and does not perform. It does not appear how he came by the nickname, as his general con- duct is honourable and straightforward. ^ Justin, xxviii. 3. See ThirlwaU, viii. 164. ^ Pol. ii. 44. A7jfi7}Tplov S^ . . . fi^ToXXd^avTos rhv ^lov . . iyiverS Tis ettpota TpayfiaTwv irphs t^v i^ apxv^ eTn^oXijtf tG}v 'AxctttDy. Plut. Ar. 34. Kai MaKe56yti)i/ jLt^ aax6\u3v 6vtojv Sid rivas irpoffolKovi Kal o^povs Tro\4fiovi, AItwXwv S^ (rvfifiaxoOfTCijv , iiridocnv fieydXtjv 7} rStv 'Axcttwi' ^Xdfj-^ave d'^va/us. * So Flathe, ii. 156. Plutarch (Ar. 34) says ouly eripov niv-, Apxovros rin-e tQv 'XxatSv, but it clearly was Lydiadas. This year, B.C. 229, is that of his third and last Generalship. 330 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Applica- tion of the Athenians to Aratos when ont of office. Aratos buys the Mace- donians ont of Attica. the Athenians applied for help.^ To them Aratos, whether as friend or as enemy, had always appeared as the one representa- tive of the League ; we hear of no application to the Achaian General, of no audience given to Athenian Ambassadors by the Achaian Assembly ; he who had delivered Siky6n and Corinth is prayed to deliver Athens also somehow or other. Probably the Macedonian garrisons would have hindered the progress of avowed Athenian envoys on such an errand ; but nothing need have hindered Aratos from communicating the message which he had secretly received, if not to the Assembly or to the Senate, yet at all events to the Chief Magistrate of the year. But so to have done would have been to run the risk of winning glory and influence for a rival ; it would have been giving the rash ex- Tyrant a fresh opportunity to propose some of his needless enterprises. Lydiadas might have gone the length of an open attack on the Macedonian garrisons, and have exposed the armies of the League to all the hazards of a pitched battle. Aratos, as ever, is zealous for the deliverance of a Greek state, above all for the deliverance of Athens ; to promote that deliverance he is ready to undergo any amount of personal cost, personal exertion, and personal danger; he will gladly free Attica from the presence of the stranger, but he must be allowed to free her himself, and to free her -in his own way. This time he did not try a night escalade ; a long illness, which obliged him to be carried in a litter, prevented him from leading an attack on Peiraieus or Mounychion ; probably, as the Macedonians occupied four distinct fortresses, even a successful attack on one garrison might have done little more than increase the watchfulness of the others.^ His way of compassing his end was simple but daring. He went in his litter to a private con- ference with Diogenes, the Macedonian officer of whom we have already heard,^ and negociated a bargain, by which, in considerar tion of a sum of one hundred and fifty talents, Diogen§s restored Peiraieus, Mounychion, Sounion, and Salamis to the Athenians. At this particular juncture the position of Diogenis must have been very precarious and ambiguous. Macedonia had lost her King, and was in a state of utter confusion ; he could expect no ^ Pint. Ar. 34. 01 5' ^A.Bi)vtuoL (rufi^povrjaavTes aiVoG ['Apctrov] rV afisTi^Vj iirel Ati/MTyrplov Te\evr/}a-avTos lip/iiiaav M ttjv ^Xevdcpiav, iKetvov eKiXomi. ^ Pans. ii. 8. 6. Oij ykp ij\Ti^e Sivaadai Tpbs ^iav aira i^eXew. ^ See ahove, p. 310. vii DEALINGS OF ARATOS WITH ATHENS AND ARGOS 331 aid from home, nor could he tell what might be the policy of the new reign. The idea of such independence as Alexander had enjoyed at Corinth might have occurred to him, but one hundred and fifty talents in ready money may well have seemed more valu- able than such a hope accompanied by so many risks. The money was paid ; Aratos himself contributed a large sum,i either out of his private estate or out of the accumulations of his Egyptian pension. The Macedonians departed ; Athens was again free, but her incorporation with the League was not pressed. Aratos had won a victory after his own heart ; he had achieved one of the foremost and noblest objects of his ambition. He had delivered a famous city, and had won a new ally for his country, and that without shedding a drop of blood, and at no one's risk or cost but his own. But we can well understand that Lydiadas might be displeased at seeing a private citizen do even such good deeds, without deeming the Chief Magistrate of the League worthy of any share in them ; and he may have looked on the de- liverance of Greek cities by gold instead of steel as an unworthy substitution of the merchant's craft for that of the warrior. Though Athens had not actually joined the League, yet this ex- Progress ploit of Aratos, and the consequent close alliance of Athens, greatly °^ ^^^ raised the Achaian credit and influence. Aigina at once joined union of the League ; ^ Xendn, Tyrant of HermionS, followed the example Aigina and of Lydiadas, laid down the Tyranny, and made Hermionfi another Hermione. member of the Achaian body.^ We may also infer from a vague notice in Plutarch that some more of the Arkadian towns were gathered in at the same time.* And now came the great acquisi- tion of Argos. In the narrative of this event we have the rivalry between Aratos and Lydiadas more vividly set before us than ever. Lydiadas was General of the League ; but Aratos Unautho- did not think it inconsistent with the duty of a good citizen to ".™? ""^S"' make private advances to Aristomachos, to send messages to Aratos him, to invite him to follow the example of Lydiadas in laying witii Ari- down his Tyranny and uniting his city to the Achaian League, stomachos Private action of this sort had long been familiar to Aratos, and it had never been, at all events when successful, very severely scrutinized by his countrymen. But then the chief place in the 1 Twenty talents, according to Plutarch (Ar. 34) ; twenty-five, according to Pansanias (ii. 8. 6). ^ pjuj ^.r. 34. ^ Plut. u.s. Pol. ii. 44. ■• Plut. U.S. "H re irXeiirri) ttjs 'ApKaSlas airois toTs ['AxaioTs^ nveriXci. interferes as General. 332 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. League had never before been filled by a personal rival, and a rival who was at least his equal in ability and ambition. Aratos continued his negoeiations with the Argeian Tyrant ; he enlarged to him on the miseries of absolute power, and on the far loftier position of a General of the Achaians, a post which, on the union ' of Argos with the League, Aristomachos might aspire to fill as well as Lydiadas. Aristomachos agreed to the proposal, on condition of receiving fifty talents to pay off his mercenaries. Money seems never to have been any difficulty with Aratos ; he undertook to provide this large sum, and began to collect it, from what sources we know not. Large as was doubtless his private estate, and inexhaustible as was the wealth of his friend King Ptolemy, it was a bold undertaking so soon after his large con- tribution towards the ransom of the Attic fortresses. While the money was collecting,^ the negociation came to the ears of the Achaian General. As Chief Magistrate of the League, Lydiadas Lydiadas was naturally and rightfully offended that a private citizen should undertake these unauthorized negoeiations with foreign powers. As the personal rival of Aratos, we can hardly blame him for wishing that the glory of winning Argos, especially in his own year of office, should fall, not to Aratos, but to himself.^ He entered into communication with Aristomachos ; Plutarch — that is, of course, Aratos — tells us that he counselled the Argeian Tyrant to trust him, Lydiadas, the ex- Tyrant, rather than Aratos the sworn foe of Tyrants.* However this may be, Lydiadas simply did his duty, as head of the League, in taking the matter into his own hands. His position was that of an Ameri- can President or an English Foreign Secretary who should find that his predecessor in office and rival in politics was busily engaged in planning treaties and alliances with foreign states. Lydiadas arranged the terms of union with Aristomachos ; he His pro- laid them before the Assembly for confirmation, inviting Aristo- thruSon "^^'''1°® himself, as his own Ambassador, to plead his own cause of Argos before the Achaian People.* A proposal was thus made, in the most regular and constitutional way, to bring about an object ■' Plut. Ar. 35. Tuc xP')M''wi' iropi^ojjthuv. - lb. ^L\oTLiJ.o}jfj.€vos idiov aifTov TToKirev^a tovto 'irp6s toM 'Amatol)? yecctr^oi. ' lb. ToC fiiv 'Apdrov KaTtyybpei wpis ' Api(TT6iJ.axov us Suo-jaecfis koX dSiaX- \6.KT03s dei irpbs roiis Tvpdvvovs ^xo^'^o^- ^ lb. Airifi di Trelcras ttjv irpa^ai iTnTpixjjai wpoiT'/iyaye tois 'Axaiois rbv &vepuirov. Helwing (p. 102), the idolater of Aratos, sees in all this only a very improper interference with Aratos on the part of Lydiadas. vii ACCESSION OF ARGOS TO THE LEAGUE 333 which had been for years one of the darling wishes of the heart of Aratos, and -which he had himself been endeavouring at some sacrifice to effect. We can understand the natural disappoint- ment of Aratos at seeing the accomplishment of his own cherished scheme transferred to his rival ; but this in no way justifies the factious and unpatriotic conduct to which he now stooped. What arguments could have been brought, above all by Aratos, against a Government proposal for the annexation of Argos, history does not tell us, and it is certainly very hard to guess them by the light of nature. He could hardly have had the face to argue that the General of the League had no right to discharge one of his constitutional functions, because a private citizen or an inferior magistrate ''■ wished unconstitutionally to usurp it. But it is certain that Aratos spoke in strong opposi- rejected tion ; that on the division the Noes had it, that the Government ?* ^^^ motion was thrown out, and that Aristomachos was dismissed j^^j-atos from the Assembly, apparently with a degree of disrespect which, [b.c. 229- Tyrant as he was, he certainly had not deserved.^ But, before ^l long, things are quite altered ; Aratos is again General ; ^ he has biit carried made his peace with Aristomachos ; he brings forward, and °^ tj^e triumphantly carries,* the very motion which a few months ™°^J™ °g before he had caused to be ignominiously thrown out ; Argos General, is united to the League ; and, at the next election of Federal p-c- 228. Magistrates, Aratos is succeeded in his ofiice, not, as had now Aristo- become the rule, by Lydiadas, but by Aristomachos himself. ™achos This election was doubtless made through the personal influence b™^227 of Aratos, and the narrative seems rather to imply that it was part of the bargain between him and Aristomachos. Along with Argos and Aristomachos, Phlious and its Tyrant Kleonymos^ 1 It is always possible that Aratos may have filled some other Federal magis- tracy in the years when he was not General. " Plut. Ar. 35. ' A.vTei.ir6vTos /i^v yap airoD ['Apdrou] 5i' dpyriv diriJXaffac Toi)s irepl Tbv 'ApiffrS/iaxoi^- 3 See Flathe, ii. 157. Thirlwall, viii. 166. The Assembly at which Lydiadas produced Aristomachos was probably the regular Spring Meeting of the year 228. At that meeting Aratos would be elected General for the year 228-7. When he came into office, he might either summon a .special Assembly for the discussion of the question, or might introduce it at the regular Autumnal Meeting. ^ Plut. Ar. 35. 'En-ei 5^ av^treiffQiU ttoXlv airbs ijp^aTO Trepl airG}v dia- \^y€iT0aL irapCoVy irAvra rdx^ws Kal Trpo8v/j.us itpTitpiaavro /cat irpotred^^avTo fdv roijs ^Apyetous /cat ^Xiofrious els t^v iro\Lreiav, IviavTi^ Bk vcrrepov Kal Tbv ' KpiaTbiiaxov eiXofTO ffTparrjydv. ^ Pol. ii. 44. 334 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. Uniou of were also admitted into the League, which thus included all Phlious Argolis. By these annexations Aratos doubtless gained much League''* fame, but it was at the expense of his true honour. Plutarch tells us of the wonderful proof of the national goodwill and con- Estimate fidence which the Achaian Assembly showed to Aratos. i One of the .^^jjQ jg jjot a professed biographer of heroes might be tempted Aratos. ° *° ^^7 *^^* neither Aratos nor the Assembly ever showed them- selves in a more paltry light. It is perhaps not quite unknown in other constitutional governments for a statesman's view of a measure to differ a good deal, according as he is in office or in opposition. But to an impartial spectator this proceeding of Aratos will perhaps appear an extreme, not to say shameless, case of such sudden conversion. One cannot help wondering how any Assembly could be got to follow him to and fro in such a course. But, granting that some ingenious misrepresentations, some fervent declamations, had once beguiled the Assembly to reject the proposal of Lydiadas, yet afterwards to accept the pro- posal of Aratos was, on the part of the Assembly, whatever we say of Aratos himself, merely a return to common sense. Com- The League was now at the height of its glory. Days were manding indeed in store when its territorial extent was to be far greater, of the ' ^^* those were days when its true greatness and independence Achaian had passed away for ever. But now it was wholly independent League, pf foreign influences ; the Egyptian connexion did not practically hamper its action, and, in the political morality of those times, it carried with it no disgrace. The League was now the greatest power of Greece. A Federation of equal cities, democratically governed, embraced the whole of old Achaia, the whole of the Argolic peninsula, the greater part of Arkadia, together with Phlious, Siky6n, Corinth, Megara, and the island of Aigina. Within this large continuous territory we hear of no discontent, no hankering after secession, save only in the single turbulent city of Mantineia. Achaians, Dorians, Arkadians, had forgotten their local quarrels, and lived as willing fellow-citizens of one Federal state. Tyrants and Tyrannicides confined their warfare within the limits of parliamentary opposition, and appeared in alternate years at the head of the councils and armies of the League. The rival League of ^tolia was still a harmonious ally ; its alliance carried with it the alliance of Elis ; Athens was bound to the 1 Plut. Ar. 35. 'EvBa St] ixoKiara (pavephv eTroir]avecrTa,Triv Sk 'Klyyif, Toi)s 'Adrivaiovs T^yoOfxat, /icydXovs yiyvofUvovs Kal tpb^ov wap^ovras Tois AaKeSaifwvlois, d.v!iyKd(Tai. es rb TroXe/xeiC ai S' is rh (pavepiv Xeyd/ievai alHai. aiS' ijirav iKaripwi. This is as true of Orohomenos and Atlilnaion as of Bpi- damnos and Korkyra. ^ Plut. Kl. 3. '0 ykp "Aparos . i^oiXeTO /liv ^| ^PXV^ f^' M"'" ciii'Tafu' dyayeLV Il€\oTrovv7}aiovSj K. r. X. vii SPECIAL POSITION OF SPARTA 339 deliverer was at last beginning to share some of the feelings of a conqueror. Elis, Sparta, and some Arkadian towns ^ were still wanting to the completion of his great work. Now Sparta, and Different Elis also, stood in a wholly different position from the cities P°^'''™ which Aratos had incorporated with the League in earlier days, from the Sikyon, Corinth, Megara, Argos, had every reason to rejoice in cities de- their annexation. Instead of foreign or domestic bondage, they ^'^^^^'l ^y obtained freedom within their own walls, and true confede- rates beyond them. Sparta had no such need ; she had no foreign garrison, no domestic Tyrant ; she lived under a Govern- ment which, whether good or bad, was a national Government, resting on the prescriptive reverence of eight hundred years. No enemy threatened her, and, had any enemy threatened her, she was fully able to resist. She was far greater than any one city of the League ; indeed the event proved that she was able to contend on more than equal terms with the League's whole force. Her immemorial polity, the habits and feelings of her people, were all utterly inconsistent with the position of a single member of a Democratic Confederation.^ What was deliverance arid promotion to Corinth and Argos would to Sparta have been a sacrifice of every national feeling, and a sacrifice for which no occasion called. Sparta was never likely to enter the League as a willing member, and Aratos had yet to learn that none but willing members of a League are worth having. Sparta was too strong to be herself directly attacked ; but she might be weakened and isolated, till she was either actually conquered, or else led to think that accession to the League would be the less of two evils. On this point Aratos, Lydiadas, and Aristoma- chos would be of one mind. To Lydiadas the matter would seem very simple : Sparta was the old enemy of his city ; Sparta and Megalopolis had, as usual, border disputes ; territory was said to be unjustly detained on either side ; ^ the hope of Achaian help against Sparta was doubtless one among the ^ Plut. Kl. 3. ' AireKeiirovTO AaKeSaifi6vL0i Kal 'HXetoi Kal buoi AaKedaifioviots 'ApKcidui' Tpoaelxov — that is, doubtless, Mantineia, Tegea, and Orohomenos. Phigaleia,' too, and perhaps some other Arkadian towns, were not yet incor- porated. He should also have added Messen& ^ See the remarks of Schom, p. 96. ^ Plut. Kl. 4. 'B/x/SoXt^ 5^ TTJs AaK(tJvtKTJs rb x^p^o^ iarl, Kal rbre irphs Tois M.€ya\ovoKlTas fjv ivlSmov. Pol. ii. 46. T4 Ka\oiiuvov 'ABrjvaiov hi t% rSv iS.eya\oTro\iTwv X'^Pf- '^° ^^^ Megalopolitan historian the right of Megalopolis to Athenaion did not seem open to those doubts which were intelligible at the distance of Chair3neia. .340 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE War ac- ceptable on both Ambigu- ous rela- tions of jEtolia to Sparta and to Achaia. objects whicli had led him to join the League at all. To Aristoma- chos, if he had in him a spark of the old Argeian spirit, Sparta would be the object of a hatred no less keen than it was to Lydi- adas. The day was at last come when the old wrong might be redressed, when Argos, if not, as of old, the head of Pelopon- nesos, might at least see Sparta brought down to her own level. The three chief men of the League would thus be agreed, or, if there was a difference, it would be a difference as to the means rather than the end. We can well believe that, while Aratos was weaving his subtle web, Lydiadas and Aristomachos would be clamouring for open war with Lacedsemon, and setting forth the standing border-wrongs of their several cities. To Kleo- menis, on the other hand, war was just as acceptable as it could be to the most warlike orator at Aigion. He had not as yet appeared as a revolutionist ; he was a young and orderly King, humbly obeying his masters the Ephors. But he was doubtless already meditating his daring plan of carrying out the dreams of Agis with the strong hand. A war in which he might win the popularity and influence which attend a victorious general, a war in which he might show himself forth as the retriever of Sparta's ancient glory, was of all things that which best suited his pur- pose.i He rejoiced at every hostile sign on the Achaian side, and nourished every hostile disposition among his own people. Small as was the actual authority of a Spartan King, all Spartan history shows that his position was one which allowed an able and active prince to acquire a practical influence in the state far beyond the formal extent of his royal powers.^ KleomenSs, even thus early, was evidently popular and influential ; Sparta felt that one of her old Kings, a Lednidas or an AgSsilaos, had again arisen to win back for her her ancient place in the eyes of men. The position of the j^tolian League just at this time is singular and ambiguous. If we may believe Polybios, that is, doubtless, the Autobiography of Aratos, -ZEtolian intrigue was at the bottom of the whole mischief. The ^tolians, urged by their natural injustice and rapacity,^ stirred up Kleomenes to ^ Plut. KT. 3. OtdfJ^pos 5' &v h iroKifM^ fiaXKov ^ Kar' dfyqvrpf fieraarTjaaL tcl irapbvTa avviKpovae Trpbs rois 'AxMoiJs ttjv irbXiv airois diSSvras ^yKKiHi&TW irpo^dffeis. The whole state of the case could hardly be more tersely expressed. See also Droysen, ii. 478. 2 See Oxford Essays, 1857, p. 154. ^ Pol. ii. 45. AiruXol Sict ?-))» ^lupvTou dSiday Kai irXeove^iav (j>8ovl)(ravTe^, K. T, \. VII WAR ACCEPTABLE ON BOTH SIDES 341 make wrongful attacks on the Achaian League ; they once more plotted with Macedonia to partition the Achaian cities ; it was only Aratos who, by skilfuUy winning over Antigonos to the Achaian side, saved the League from being overwhelmed by three enemies at once. On the other hand, we have the facts that the two Leagues were still on friendly terms, and that there had been, to say the least, no open war between Achaia and Mace- donia since the beginning of the reign of Antigonos. It might be doing the jJItolians too much honour to suppose that a scrupulous regard to the faith of- treaties would have kept them back from any aggression which might be convenient at the moment. But there is the fact that the ^tolians did not strike inaction a blow throughout the whole Kleomenic War, even though the %} y Achaians were, at one stage of it at least, at war with their through- cherished allies of EUs. There is the other fact, which we shall out the come to presently, that Aratos himself, before he took the final ^'^°'"™'° step of asking for Macedonian help, first asked for help from -iEtolia. Had the two Leagues been on the same cordial terms on which they were a few years before, that help would never have been refused ; but had the j3Etolians been such bitter enemies to Achaia as Polybios represents, that help would never have been asked for. In the latter case they would doubtless have taken an open part against the League long before. The truth doubtless is ^ that the -.Sltolians were jealous of the pro- gress of the Achaian League in Arkadia, but that, just now, Peloponngsian affairs seemed to them of secondary moment. Their hands appear to have been at this time full of enterprises ^tolian for extending their power nearer home. They were hostile to f^T^'j' Macedonia, and were occupied in some of their Thessalian con- Thessaly. quests. This extension of their continuous territory was a more important object than the retention of a few inland towns in PeloponnSsos. They were doubtless well pleased to see the two great PeloponnSsian powers at war with one another ; they may even have taken such steps as were likely to embroil them together ; but their agency was clearly something quite secon- dary throughout the matter. It is evident that, in the explana- tion given by Polybios of the causes of the war, we have not the historian's own statement of matters of fact, but only the best apology which Avatos could think of for his own unpatriotic conduct. In fact, no very remote causes need be sought for to 1 See Thirl wall, viii. 168. 342 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Spartan acquisition of the jEtolian towns in Arkadia, B.C. 228. Acliaiau interests involved in this an- nexation. account for the Kleomenic War ; Sparta and Achaia, Kleo- menSs and Aratos, were shut up within one peninsula ; and that was enough. It will be remembered that the ^tolians had certain posses- sions in Arkadia, the nature of whose relation to the League, whether one of real confederation or of subjection, is not very clear. 1 One of these towns, Mantineia, had, as we have seen, from whatever cause, forsaken the Achaian for the ^tolian con- nexion. Mantineia now, together with Tegea and Orchomenos, was, on what ground or by what means we know not, induced by Kleomenes ^ — he is already always spoken of as the chief doer of everything — again to exchange the ^tolian for the Lacedsemonian connexion. On what terms these towns were united to Sparta, whether as subjects, as dependents, or as free allies, does not appear. But in any case their new relation was one which involved separation from the ^tolian body. The -iEtolians however made no opposition, and formally recognized the right of Sparta to her new acquisitions.^ Such distant possessions were doubtless felt to be less valuable to the ^tolian League than the certainty of embroiling Sparta and Achaia. For it is evident that their occupation by Sparta was a real ground for alarm on the part of the Achaians. As the territory of the League now stood, these cities seemed naturally designed to make a part of it. As independent commonwealths, or as out- lying dependencies of ^tolia, they had doubtless been always looked upon as undesirable neighbours. But it was a far more dangerous state of things now that a long wedge of Lace- daemonian territory had thrust itself in between the two Achaian cantons of Argos and Megalopolis.* But however much such a frontier might in Achaian eyes seem to stand in need of rectifi- ' Pol. ii. 46. TAs AhaKols oi fidvov v 'Axaifii/, xKevalifievos Si Kal Kara- 0po!'oiJ|UEvos iwb Twv Aaxedaifiovlav oiSi irevraKitrxMoiv ri ttMjBos 6vt(i1v. This clearly comes from Phylarohos. ^ Ar. 35. 'TttA AuSidSou KaT7iyop-/i6ri. Was this a legal impeachment, or merely an opposition speech in the Assembly ? ^ See note to Chapter viii. VII LYDIADAS REJECTED FOR THE GENERALSHIP 347 Aristomachos in the Generalship. ^ But the indignation of the General- Achaian people against Aratos was never a very lasting feeling ; ^'"P> he had the same gift of recovering a lost reputation that he had of retrieving a lost battle. Lydiadas stood for the Generalship Twelfth (?) in vain ; the force of habit was too strong ; to elect Aratos in ^^eneral- alternate years was so old a prescriptive custom that it seemed ^^ratos to have the force of law. And thus the man who dared not b.o. 226-5. look an enemy in the face on the field of battle was for the twelfth ^ time chosen General of the Achaians. The campaign opened by an attack on Elis on the part of Aratos' Aratos.^ How the Eleians had become engaged in the war campaign does not appear.* Their close connexion with ^tolia would seem to show either that the Northern League was already looked upon as hostile, or else that the ^tolians were held to be so completely occupied with Thessalian and Macedonian affairs that their hostility was not dreaded. The Eleians are not said to have asked for help from ^tolia, but they did obtain help from Sparta. KleomenSs marched to their aid ; the Achaian army was now on its return from Elis,^ and its course seems to show either that Aratos entertained offensive designs against Sparta or else that he found it necessary to take measures for the safety of Megalopolis. The two armies met unexpectedly Kleomenes near Mount Lykaion, in the western part of the Megalopolitan defeats territory ; Aratos could not avoid a battle ; the Achaians were ^j Mou^t utterly routed ; Aratos himself escaped, but for several days he Lykaion. was beKeved to be dead, just as after his former defeat at Phylakia.^ This battle, one of the most disgraceful failures of Aratos, was characteristically followed by one of his most brilliant successes. He had lost a great battle ; he would atone for it by recovering a great city. With such portions of his Aratos scattered army as he could collect, he marched straight upon surprises Mantineia, where no one expected an attack from a routed army ^ Ar. 35. llepl rijs ffTpaTTiyias eh dywva Kcd dvTnrapayyeXiaf aiJrt? [AudtddTj^ KaracTTcis [6 "Aparos] iKpdTTja-e ttj xe^porovig. Kcd rd dud^Karov -Qp^Bri arparriySs. ' According to the reckoning of Plutarch. I shall elsewhere give reasons for supposing that it was more probably the tenth. 3 Plut. Kl. 5. '' " Die Aitolier haben ihren alien VerbUndeten keinen Beistand geleistet ; war es nur ein Raubzug, den Arat geraacht ? oder versuchte er auch die Elier zum Eiuti-itt in den Bund zu nbthigen ? " Droysen, ii. 482. ' Plut. Kl. 5. Uepl ri AiKaiov aTnomiv 7J5ri Tois 'Axaiois iiri^dXav &Trav jiiv irp^^aro Kal SLeirT&ricrey aiirCjv rb aTpdrevfia. « lb. Ar. 36 (of. 34). 348 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Mautiueia readmitted to the League, with some changes in its con- stitution, and a dead General. The city was taken, probably not without some co-operation from an Achaian party within.^ This was the first time that the League had to deal with a city guilty of the sin of Secession. But Aratos treated the conquered Mantineia almost as gently as he had treated the rescued SikySn or Corinth.^ He summoned a Mantineian Assembly ; he neither inflicted nor threatened any hardship ; he simply called on the citizens to resume their old rights and their old duties as members of the Achaian League. .But he did not trust wholly either to their gratitude or to their good faith. There was at Mantineia a class of inhabitants^ who did not possess the full political franchise. These Aratos at once raised to the rank of citizens. He thus formed a strong additional party, attached by every tie of interest and gratitude to himself and to the Union. From a Mantineian commonwealth thus reconstituted it was not difficult to obtain a petition to the Federal Government* ^ The expressions Kara Kpiros (Pol. ii. 67) and the like do not exclude this supposition, which is so probable in itself. " I again form my narrative from the different statements of Polybios (ii. 57, 58) and Plutarch (Kl. 5. Ar. 36). Here too the colouring is diiferent, hut there is no actual contradiction. Plutarch does not enlarge on the free pardon given to the revolted city, on which Polybios is so emphatic ; neither does Polyhios mention the changes in the Mantineian constitution which Plutarch distinctly records. ^ Pint. Ar. 36. Toi)s fierolKovs iroKlras iiroiTja-ev airGiv. Wliat fiirotKos means at Athens everybody knows. Everytliing at Athens fostered the growth of a large class of resident foreigners, whose children, though born in Attica, were, according to Greek notions, no more citizens than their fathers. Thus there arose at Athens, mainly in the city itself and its ports, a large class, personally free, but enjoying no political rights. But can we conceive the growth of any large class of /i^toi-koi. in this sense in an inland city lilte Mantineia ? One is tempted to think that Plutarch here uses the word /xeroi/fos loosely, in much the same sense as TepioLKos. He seems to do the same in a following chapter (38), where he speaks of KleomenSs as woKKoiis rdii iieroiKav iii^aXCiiv els t^v iroKiTelav. Now any large class of /xiroiKoi in the Attic sense is still less likely to have existed at Sparta than at Mantineia. And in the parallel pass^e in the Life of Kleomenes (c. 11) Plutarch himself says, oi.vair\ripuaas rb iroKh-evim tois XapieffrAToif twv Trepiolnoii'. I am therefore inclined to think that these Mantineian iiAromoi were really ireploiKoi, inhabitants of districts subject to Mantineia, like those subject to Megalopolis and other cities spoken of already. See above, p. 200. According to Appian (Mithr. 48), Mithridates, besides the usual policy of enfranchising slaves and abolishing debts, gave citizenship to the fi^ToiKoi in the Asiatic cities which submitted to him. This reads like the proceed- ings of Aratos at Mantineia, but the existence of a considerable class of ixiroiKoi in the Attic sense is far more likely in the great commercial cities of Asia than in an inland Arkadian town. ^ Pol. ii. 58. Meri 5e raOra, Trpooptbfxevoi rets ev avToh aTd(reLS Kal rets uir' AItiiiKuv Kal AaKcSaj-fwiiiuv iirL^ovKks, vr/aeff^eiJcrocTes Trpbs toi>s 'Axo'ois ij^iiiiirav VII ARATOS RECOVERS MANTINEIA 349 asking for a permanent Federal garrison.^ Polybios extolls, and and it was natural that he should extol, the wonderful mag- secured nanimity of the Achaians and their General towards the revolted presence of city. Undoubtedly it stands out in honourable contrast to the a Federal cruel treatment of revolted dependencies at the hands of Athens, garrison. But he does not clearly bring forward the fact that this mag- nanimity was mainly exercised on behalf of the Achaian party in Mantineia itself. Indiscriminate massacres or banishments in a city where there was one class already favourable to the League, and another which could easily be attached to it, would have been no less impolitic than cruel. It was enough to change the constitution in a way at once liberal in itself and favourable to Achaian interests, and to secure the domination of the Achaian party by the presence of a Federal garrison. The loss of Mantineia was a heavy blow to the Spartan Results interests, at least as Spartan interests were understood by °^ *^^ Kleomenes. Now that Mantineia was again Achaian, Orcho- Mantineia" menos was left quite isolated, and the hold on Arkadia which had been gained by the possession of the three contiguous districts was utterly lost. There was a party in Sparta, of Temporary whom the Ephors were at the head, who opposed the war, depressiou and who doubtless looked with special jealousy upon the young conqueror of Lykaion. The loss of Mantineia depressed the national spirit ; and it required the use of every sort of influ- ence 2 on the part of Kleomenis to obtain leave from the Sovi/at TrapatpvXaKTjv avTois. This seems to imply a petition to the Achaian Assembly (such is the general meaning of oi 'Ax<"oi) or at any rate to the Senate, and some little time must have elapsed between the taking of the city and the sending and answering of such a message. Plutarch (Ar. 36) says that Aratos (ppovpkv hi^aXe (so in Kl. 5, elXe t^v tSXiv Kai Kuriax'^) before he goes on to mention anything else. Probably Axatos left some troops at once, as a mere military precaution, and this more solemn embassy came somewhat later. For Mantineia, now once more a city of the League, to send Ambassadors (irpeff/SeiiffovTes) to the League, as if to a foreign state, has an odd sound, but we shall find the expression again. Why, it may be asked, could not the business be despatched by those Mantiueian citizens who might attend the Assembly ? Probably, when a city of the League wished to obtain some special object at the hands of the National Government, it was thought that more weight would attach to the demand, if it were made by citizens specially deputed by the State Government, than if it were brought forward as an ordinary motion by those citizens who might be present in their Federal capacity. [In Art. 81 of the Swiss Bundes- verfassung, it is specially provided that the Initiative which belongs to every individual member of the Nationalrath and of the Standerath may be also exercised by the Cantons, by correspondence.] ' On the Achaian Federal garrisons, see above, p. 242. ^ He is said to have bribed the Ephors ; his mother KratSsikleia married 350 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Battle of Lado- KEIA, B.C. 226. Ephors to continue the war. But it was continued. '^ Kleo- men§s now directly attacked Megalopolis ; he took the border town of Leuktra, and threatened the Great City itself. Aratos could not refuse help, and the whole force of the League marched to its defence. Close under the walls of Megalopolis, at a place called Ladokeia, the armies again met face to face. Aratos again shrank from battle. Lydiadas and his country- men demanded it; they at least would not tamely see their lands ravaged, their city, it might be, taken, because an in- competent commander had been preferred to their own gallant and true-hearted hero. And doubtless the men of Megalopolis did not stand alone; in the wide compass of the League other cities must have sent forth warriors as little disposed as Lydiadas himself to turn themselves back in the day of battle. The fight began ; the Lacedaemonians were driven to their camp by the light Achaian troops; the heavy -armed were marching to support their brethren, now broken in the pursuit, and perhaps engaged in plunder.^ But when they reached a torrent-bed, the heart of Aratos failed him, and he made them halt on the brink. This was too much for the gallant soul of Lydiadas ; to be called on, at the bidding of a successful rival, to throw away a victory at the very gates of his native city, was a sacrifice to strict military discipline which it was hardly in human nature to ofFer.^ He denounced the powerful Megistonous in order to secure his influence on her son's side. Here also comes in the story of Archidamos, the King of the other house, murdered, some said hy Kleomenes, some said by the Ephors. I will not enter at large into the question, hut I see nothing to inculpate Kleomenes. I must again, on matters not immediately bearing on Federal history, refer generally to the History of Bishop Thirlwall. See also Droysen, ii. 484, 5. 1 Droysen (ii. 483) infers, though doubtfully, that a truce was concluded with the League. But this rests only on the expression of Pausanias (viii. 27. 15), K\eofiii'T]t 6 Aeavidov MeydXrjV irdXiv KariXa^ev h crwovSaXs. But Pausanias deals with the history of Kleomenes much as he deals with the history of Agis. The battle of Ladokeia and the death of Lydiadas in B.C. 226 are jumbled up with the capture of Megalopolis by Kleomenes in B.C. 222. 2 Pint. Ar. 37. Tlepl tAs (rKT\vas Siaa-n-aphiTttiv. ' Schorn (p. 110) seems to expect it of him. Helwing (p. 131), the worshipper of Aratos, gets quite indignant that any one should doubt his hero's valour. "Lysiades aber, der bestaudige Gegner des Arat, beschuldigte den Peldherrn, der bei Sikyon, Korinth, und Argos genngsam persiinliche Tapferkeit bewiesen hatte, ofifen der Feigheit," etc. In the next page Lydiadas is "der unvorsichtige Lysiades, " " der unbesonnene Befehlshaber," etc. It is hard for a brave and good man to be maligned after so many ages. VII BATTLE OF LADOKEIA 351 the cowardice of the General; he called on all around him not to lose a victory which was already in their hands; he at least would not desert his country ; let those ■yho would not see Lydiadas die fighting alone against the enemy follow him to a certain triumph. ^ At the head of his cavalry ^ he dashed on, but at the head of his cavalry alone ; the Lacedae- monian right wing gave way before them; the ardour of pursuit carried them upon ground unsuited for the action of horse ; the fugitives turned ; they were reinforced by other divisions of their army,^ and by the King in person ; and, after a sharp struggle, Lydiadas fell fighting within sight of Death of the walls of Megalopolis.* The rout of the cavalry followed I'^J^i^i'-^s. the loss of their chief, and the rout of the cavalry carried with it the rout of the heavy-armed, who seem to have stood all the while on the other side of the torrent^bed, without striking a blow or advancing a step. The victory on the side of Utter de- Kleomenes was complete ; the Achaians fled in every quarter ; ^^^^"^ns ** and their army finally marched away, bitterly accusing the cowardice of Aratos, and openly charging him with the wilful Indigna- betrayal of his valiant rival. ^ The charge was doubtless *'™jjgt groundless ; Aratos acted at Ladokeia only as he acted in all Aratos. his battles ; the torrent-bed and the enemy together were obstacles too fearful to be encountered, and personal courage and common sense alike deserted him. Lydiadas was left to perish by an act of combined cowardice and folly, but there is no reason to believe that, while he was fighting in the forefront of the hottest battle, the Achaian phalanx was bidden to retire from him that he might be smitten and die. But the noblest spirit of the League was gone ; the best life of the nation was — sacrificed to the incompetence of its chief ; Lydiadas had fallen, and it was left for an enemy to honour him. The hero of Sparta could recognize a worthy foe in the hero of Megalopolis ; ^ Plut. Ar. 37. '0 5^ AvSiddTjs TepiwadiHv irphs to, yivd/xeva Kal rbv "Aparov Kadl'oii' iveKoKeiTO Tois 'CTrTreTs us airbv. ^ Was Lydiadas iTiripxv^ of the League, or only commander of a Megalo- politan contingent ? * Plut. Kl. 6. '0 KXeofihris ayTJKe roils Tapavrbovs Kal roils Kpijras Itt' ainbv. That is, not natives of Tarentum, nor necessarily natives of Crete, but descriptions of troops so called, like modern Hussars and Zouaves. See Thirlwall, viii. 298. ^ Plut. Ar. 37. ''Siireae \afj,irpus ayuvurinevos rbv KoKKiarov tuv iyiliyuv itri Bipais ttjs TrarplSos. ^ lb. Alriav d^ fi€yd\7}v b "Aparos ^\a^e db^as Tpoiffdtu rbv AvdiddTjv. 352 HISTOKY OF FEDERAL GREECE Assemtly at Aigion. Strange vote of censure on Aratos. and the body of Lydiadas, clothed in purple and with a garland of victory on his brow, was sent by Kleomenes to the gates of the Great City.^ The robe of royalty which he had thrown away in life might iittingly adorn his corpse, now that he had gone to the Island of the Blessed to dwell with Achilleus and Diomed^s and all the Zeus-born Kings of old. Almost immediately after the defeat of Ladokeia an As- sembly was held at Aigion. The account of it in our only narrative reads as if the army had itself formed this Assembly, or had compelled the General to summon it against his will.^ Never had the Achaian people come together with such feelings of indignation against their Chief Magistrate. Bitter indeed must have been their regret when they remembered the results of their last election. Aratos had been preferred to Lydiadas ; and now the choice of Aratos had led to two disgraceful defeats, and Lydiadas was gone, some said betrayed to death by his rival, at any rate sacrificed to his rival's cowardice and in- competence. The indignation of the Assembly spent itself in a strange vote, which, while it shows their intense present dissatisfaction with their General, shows also the marvellous sort of fascination which he had acquired over the national mind. The Assembly passed a resolution that, if Aratos thought good to go on with the war, he must do it at Ms own cost ; the Achaian nation would give no more contributions and would pay no more mercenaries.^ This vote is not to be looked upon as a mere sarcasm. Aratos had carried on so many wars at his own cost and risk that for him to carry on a private war with Sparta seemed a thing by no means impossible. It would only be doing on a great scale what they had over and over again seen him do on a smaller one. They would not take upon themselves to run directly counter to his judgement on a matter of war and peace; he might, if he chose, go on with the war in his own style ; he might win over Orchomenos or Tegea or Sparta herself either by diplomatic wiles or by nocturnal surprises ; his own wealth and the contributions of King Ptolemy might possibly supply 1 Plut. Kl. 6. ^ lb. Ar. 37. 'Biairdels i-jrl) rCiv 'Kxa'.wv i,T€pxoiiivoiv irpis dpyrjn tj/co- . XoOdTifrev a&rois ds Aiyiov. ^ lb. 'BKet Si (TvveKOdvTes i\pT]^lffavro jmtj SMvai x/"iM<"'« "-^t^ M^^ lus koX TrapaKoKeiv Tr^inreiv Trpbs rhv 'Avrlyovov iw^p ^OTjSelas. oi fiiv oSv MeyaKoiroKirai KaTiffTr/ffav airods irepl rbv 'SiKo^dvr) Kal rbv KepKiSdv Trpeir^euras irpbs re rods 'Axo^o^s K^Ketdei' eii$iws Trpbs rbv ^Avriyovov, Sk airdis (TvyKardSrirai, rb Idpos. The same account, according to Plutarch (At. 38), was given by Phylarchos. On these special commissioners from particu- lar cities to the Federal Assembly, see above, p. 349. ^ Pol. U.S. ^atpCjs S^ yivdjo-Kuv olKeiojs StaKetp^vovs avToiis irpbs ttjv MaKeSbvuv olKlav iK Tujv Kara rbv ^Afiivrov ^iXiinrov e'uepyeatuv. * One against Agis, B.O. 330 ; another against Polysperchon, B.C. 318. See above, p. 161. ' I do not feel at all certain as to the exact date. It should be remembered that we have no annah of these transactions. Polybios gives, almost incidentally, 364 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE They are allowed to go as Megalo- politan envoys to Mace- donia. Their in- terview with Anti- gonos. permission for which they asked, permission namely to go into Macedonia, not as Federal, but as Megalopolitan, envoys. One would be well pleased to have some record of the debate which must have followed on such a request ; but it is easy to understand that it would not meet with the same strenuous opposition which would certainly have befallen a proposal to send a regular Federal Embassy on such an errand. Megalopolis had a fair claim to ask for Macedonian help ; if Antigonos chose to bestow on the hereditary friends of his house a body of troops for their protection, or a few talents to hire mercenaries for themselves, the League, as a League, might not seem to be dishonoured or endangered. But Aratos had gained his first point, that of familiarizing the Achaian Assembly with the notion of Macedonian help. He seems now to have withdrawn for a moment from public life ; he refused to resume office, alleging that he felt the public indignation against him too strongly to allow him to serve with honoiu'.^ Such a plea, coming from the deliverer of Siky6n and Corinth, the man who had been twelve times General, would be, of all others, the most likely to touch the hearts of his hearers, and to pave the way for his speedy restoration to his old influence. The avowed negociations between the League and KleomenSs must have been going on at the time when Nikophanis and Kerkidas, probably carrying with them much less of the public attention, went on their strange errand to Macedonia. They reached the coxu-t of Antigonos ; they briefly set forth their ostensible commission from their own city ; they described its dangers, and asked help from their old ally. They then went on to tell at much greater length the tale put into their mouths by Aratos.^ The interests of the League and of the House of Macedon were the same ; Kleomenes and the ^tolians together threatened Achaia, they threatened all Greece, they indirectly threatened Macedonia. Nothing short of a the account of the Macedonian negociations ; Plutarch gives the account of the Spartan negociations. Each narrative is clear enough in itself, but it is hard to arrange the two series side by side, and to fit each stage into its exact place. Some of the expressions of Polybios (ii. 51) might make one think that this whole negociation took place before the battle of Hekatombaion, but the passage, if construed strictly, might imply that it took place not only before Hekatombaion, but also before Lykaion, which it is impossible to believe. 1 Plut. Ar. 38. See above, p. 362. ^ Pol. ii. 48. SttouS^ dk (rvfi/d^avTes ol irepl riv TSLKOtp&vq rifi ^airiXei SieXi- yovTO irepl ij,h Tfjs eavrdii Trarpldos aird, TavayKcua Sili, ^paxfiav koX Ke(f>aKa,uiiSm, rd. Si TToXXA irepl tQv SXuv Karh t4s ^ktoXos rks 'Apirov Kal Tcks viro64eiyci.v, oi fiivov ij^oiXero di airov yeviuBu tt]v KKrinv, en Sk imWoi/ i^ awdvTai' tQi/ 'AxaiSv. * lb. Ei Trapayevdfiems 6 ^atriXei/s Kal KpaTiiaat rip TroK^/up toO KXconivovs Kai tSiv AaKeBaLfiovlav oKKoibTfpkv n ^ovKeiaoiTo irepl t^s koii'^s TroXirelos, p.'fi TToB' ofwXoyovfiivas rdv (ni/i§ai.v6vT0iv airbs avaXi^ji r^v ahlav. vii NEGOCIATIONS WITH KLEOMENES 367 Assembly ; but lie warned tbem not to be too hasty ; let them make one more struggle to save themselves by their own exertions ; it would be much better to do so if they could any- how manage it ; if they failed in the attempt, let them then call in the help of their royal friend. The Assembly applauded the speaker ; they agreed to save themselves if they could — if not, to ask King Antigonos to save them. To account for this disposition of the Achaian Assembly, we must suppose that the favourable intentions of Kleomenes, of which Polybios says not a word, were not as yet generally known. The General Timoxenos, as a partisan of Aratos, would doubtless conceal them as long as he could. But when it was known how mild a supremacy Kleomenes sought for, men began Negooia- once more to doubt whether Antigonos would not, after all, be ^^ ^'*^ more dangerous as a friend than Kleomenes was as an enemy. A menes. Special Assembly was called to meet at Argos.^ Public opinion throughout the League was now so strongly in favour of Kleo- Strong menes that there could be little doubt that peace would be con- Jf.^^f ^ ^^ ,11,. 1 • 1 1 >i -rr- 1 1 "'^ favour. eluded on his own terms, that is, that the Spartan King would be accepted as Chief of the League.^ It marks the diplomacy of the time that Kleomenes, like Aristomachos,^ was to plead his own cause before the Achaian Popular Assembly. A sudden illness on the road rendered him incapable of speaking. As a Negocia. sign of his good will, he released the chief among his Achaian J^Yd*^"^ prisoners, and the Meeting was adjourned till he was able to by Kleo- attend. This illness of Kleomenes decided the fate of Greece, mengs' It was probably during this interval that Aratos, having '''°^^^- found the Macedonian King a less implacable enemy than he had expected, ventured to enter into direct communication with him. He no longer needed the roundabout way of dealing through NikophanSs and Kerkidas. He sent his own son, the Mission younger Aratos, as ambassador — seemingly his own private ^^f™? ambassador * — and arranged all necessary matters with Anti- Antigonos. gonos.5 To be sure there was one difficulty ; Antigonos was no ^ See above, p. 361. ^ Plut. Kl. 15. Bov\oii4vav Si tuv 'Axaiw" efi Toirois Six^<^Sai tci,s Sia\i(reis Kal Tbv WKeoiiiPT) KoKoivTuv is Aipvav, and (still more strongly) Ar. 39, iriiJ.vuv eidbs ^0' ijyefioviif rbv KXeo/iivrj KaXoOvres is "Apyos. 3 See above, p. 332. ** Pol. ii. 51. UpetT^evrT^i/ rbv vibv i^aToareiXas "Aparos Tpbs 'Avriyovov e/3e/3atti(raro ra irepl ttjs ^07j6eias. ^ Plut. Kl. 17. "HS?; SiOjfioXoyTjfiii'uv aiiT<^ wpbs rbv 'AvTiybvov tuv fieyiixTuv. HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Antigotios demands Akro- koriutlios. more disposed than later potentates to do his work for nothing. The price which he set on that work was one most natural for him to ask, but most unnatural for Aratos to pay, the reunion to Macedonia of Akrokorinthos. No one can blame Antigonos for making the demand. He had not volunteered to meddle in Peloponngsian affairs ; KleomenSs had done him no harm, and the Achaians had done him no good; if any sentimental tie bound him to Megalopolis, it did not extend beyond that single city, and indeed it might be held to be cancelled by the union of Megalopolis with the League. It was as much as could be expected if the King of Macedonia merely sat still, and did not attack a people who had destroyed so large a portion of the influence of his house ; at any rate, he could not be expected to serve them for nothing. The terms on which his services were to be had were simply that Aratos should restore to Antigonos D6s6n the invaluable fortress of which he had deprived Antigonos G-onatas. In all this Antigonos acted in a perfectly straightforward way, worthy of a ruler of the nation who called a spade a spade.i Macedonia did not profess to make war for an idea ; her King made no rhetorical flourishes about liberating Peloponnesos from the Isthmus to the Cretan Sea. Antigonos, like an honest trader, named his terms ; his price was fixed, no abatement would be taken from the simple demand of Alo-okorinthos. But how was Akrokorinthos to be had ? Aratos seems to have been ready even then to make the sacrifice ; but it would be hard to carry through the Achaian Senate and Assembly a resolution for surrendering the most important Federal fortress ; it would be harder still for the League to compel the Corinthians to admit a foreign garrison into their city. Was Aratos to reverse the exploit of his youth, and once more to scale the mountain citadel, but this time to drive out an Achaian, and to bring in a Mace- donian, garrison? And, beside this, the Achaian people were evidently ready to accept lOeomen^s as their chief ; if his terms were once accepted, Akrokorinthos could be won only by a struggle for life and death against the combined force of Sparta and Achaia. Aratos seems not to have dared to make any open proposal to the Assembly ; but he contrived that such deadly offence should be given to Kleomengs ^ that the Spartan King ^ ' Plut. Apophth. Phil. 15. S/caioils 107; [6 SftiTTTros] iiTu KoX dypoUovs elvai MaKeddvas Kal r^p (TKciip'qp (TK(i(f>7]v X^yovras. 2 The Accounts given by Plutarch in his two biographies (Ar. 39 and Kl. 17) VII ANTIGONOS DEMANDS AKROKORINTHOS 369 broke off the negociations, and, instead of appearing personally Kleo- to plead his cause in the Assembly at Argos, he sent a herald to ?™t^ declare war against the League. Here again Aratos contrived to tj^ nego- get his work done for him by other hands. All hope of a fair ciatlons. accommodation with Kleomengs was now at an end. Aratos would not now have to endure the disgrace of seeing the Spartan youth installed as his acknowledged Federal superior ; he was several degrees nearer to the more pleasant prospect of acting as the counsellor or the slave of a foreign master. And the final step, the breaking off of all negociations, the last blow, as it seemed, to any plan of union between the League and his rival, had come, not from Aratos, but from Kleomenes himself In all this web of cunning intrigue the practised diplomatist of Siky6n had overreached himself. What he had really done was to proclaim the dissolution of the League. The Achaian Union had hitherto advanced and prospered by strictly adhering to its principles of perfect brotherhood and equality. Every city, great or small, old or new, had equal rights ; each member was alike precious to the whole body ; an injury done to one was an injury done to all, and to be redressed by all alike. By this course of action Aratos had, now for nearly thirty years, won honour and power and influence for himself and for the commonwealth at whose head he stood. But he had now gone away backwards ; he was not only willing to bring foreign New posi- armies into Peloponnesos ; he was ready to give up, as the price ^"'^°^ of their aid, a city of the League, one of the great cities of Greece, a city which was the very gem and flower of the Con- do not exactly agree. The first makes Aratos send ambassadors {irpiff^eis) to Kleomeufs, who had advanced with his troops as far asLerna, bidding him come, as to friends and allies, with only three hundred followers, and offering hostages, if he felt any distrust. The other version is that he was to come alone, and to receive three hundred hostages. This, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 192) hints, looks like a conlusion with the number of followers in the other story, which, though Droysen (ii. 507) thinks otherwise, seems decidedly the more probable. But one does not see in either story, as told by Plutarch, any ground for the excessive indignation which he attributes to Kleomenus. There must have been something specially offensive in the tone or form of the message. This was followed by some more epistolary sparring between Kleomen^js and Aratos, such as Plutarch gave some specimens of at an earlier time. The two chiefs seem at last to have got very abusive towards one another, and that on very delicate points ; ^ipovTo \oi5oplixL Kal ^aff7}filai fJ.ixP^ ydfiojv Kal yvvaiKwv dW-^\ovs KaKus \ey6vTU)v. ( Ar. 39. ) We know nothing of the domestic life of Aratos, but what could any man have to say about the noble wife of Kleomengs ? 2 B 370 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE CHAP. Universal indigna- tion at the thought of sur- rendering Corinth. Appear- ance of extreme factions in the Achaian Cities. federacy, a fortress which was the key of the whole peninsula, a spot whose name always suggested the most glorious exploit of his own life. The moment it was suspected that the surrender of Corinth had been hinted at by a Federal politician, the tie was at once broken, a whole storm of concealed passions biu-st forth. Secession, as Secession, had never been dreamed of ; but if the League was about to cede its cities to the Macedonian, it was high time for those cities to take care of themselves. No one wished to separate from a League of free and equal Greek cities, but, if they were to have a master, men would have Kleo- menes for their master rather than Antigonos. The Assembly had not deemed it its duty to hinder a single Canton, which it could not protect, from asking and receiving aid from a heredi- tary friend. But the Assembly had never dreamed that a measure apparently so harmless really meant the surrender of Akrokorinthos to the Macedonian King. If Corinth was to be thus betrayed, who could answer for the freedom of Sikydn or of Argos? Even a conservative Federal politician might con- sistently argue in this way : The object of the League is to preserve the liberties of its several cities ; if the League fails to discharge that duty, those cities are at once absolved from their Federal allegiance. And now parties began to show themselves, which, in the quiet days of the League, had kept themselves concealed. The practical working of the Achaian Constitution threw all power into the hands of respectable well-to-do citizens, led by chiefs whose ambition looked no higher than the rank of an elective and responsible magistrate. Tyrants, oligarchs, Eed Republicans, were all alike without sympathizers in the Achaian Congress. The two extremes of political faction, hitherto kept • in check by the legal restraints of the constitution, now burst forth. 1 There were powerful men who hated the sway of La-w- in any shape, who would fain rule as Tyrants or as members of some narrow oligarchic body. Then there were extreme Demo- crats, Socialists, men of wild theories or of broken fortunes, who longed for the abolition of debts and the division of lands. ^ Plut. Ar. 40. 'Hr/i^/iei 7aifi o6dh oidi IffTepyev iirl Tois tcapovaw, oKKh, Koi 'ZLKVU)vlii3v a'urQv Kal KoptvOtuv iyivovro TroXXoi Karaipavets SieiXeyiJ^i'oi tiJj KXeo^a^i'et Kal iraKat irpbs r6 Koivov Idiojv ein8vfii<;L dwacTCLwy virovXuts ^xo''7'cs. Kl. 17. 'Eyeydvei Si kIvihio, t&v 'AxaiS;" Kal wpbs d7r6ffTa aJ TriXeis, Tdv^p.ii', &i)ii.ijiv voiiiiv re x'^pc" faX XP^^" iiroKoirhs i\iri.% iirdyoyra tj IleXoTro^- VII VAEIOUS PARTIES LEAN TO KLEOMEN^S 371 Others, of all ranks and parties, were thoroughly tired of Aratos, and thought Kleomenes, if only as a novelty, the more promis- ing leader of the two. The disappointed men of rank and wealth hoped that Kleomenes, whose foes called him a Tyrant, might, like Antigonos Gonatas, patronize Tyranny everywhere, and might set them up to lord it as his vassals over their several cities. The populace, on the other hand, heard of his revolu- tionary doings at home ; they longed for the day when a bonfire of promissory notes should be kindled in the market-place of Both ex- every city,^ and when the lands of the wealthy should be divided themes into equal lots for the benefit of the poor. Both parties mistook jjig^. their man. Whatever Kleomenes had done at Sparta professed menes. to be the restoration of the old laws and discipline of the country ; it therefore by no means followed that he would appear as an apostle either of Tyranny or of confiscation anywhere else.- And it is easy to conceive that another set of motives, different from any of these, might attract some partisans to the side of Kleomenes. The question was no longer whether certain terms should be agreed upon between Kleomenes and the League as a The whole ; it now was whether each particular city should adhere schemes to the Achaian connexion or should embrace that of Sparta, menes Now the schemes of Kleomenes, if they were at all grounded on appealed the old Pan-hellenic position of Sparta, would hardly include a *° Town- true Federal Union, a Bundesstaat. The tie by which he would against tl^ unite his conquests would be alliance rather than incorporation ; Federal they would form a Confederacy rather than a Confederation.^ Principle. Into such a Confederacy it was indeed quite possible that the Achaian League, retaining its internal constitution, might enter as a single member ; it was highly probable that the ten towns of the old Achaia would, if they entered it at all, enter it as a ^ Plut. Agis, 13. Kai tcl trapa twv xpcworw** ypafxfiaTeta avvev^KavTGs eh 6,yopi.v, B, xKipia KoXoCffi, Kul ttAvto. trvvSivres e/s Iv ffvviirprricrav. d.p8eiv ttji' Xeyo/iivriv 'Akt^v KaToiKoivTWi' KoX ras 7r6Xets iyx^i-pLO'di'TOjv. ^ Pol. ii. 52. '0 Si K\eopJvT}s Ka.TaTXTj^d/j.evos rots irpoei.priiiii'oi.s eiTVX'tl'-<^<^' Xoiirbv dSews iTreiropeieTO ras TriXeis, Ss /lii/ irdBoiv, aXs Si riv v 'Axaiuv. But this would be a strange way of expressing a very unlikely fact ; in the old Achaia at least KleomenSs had no VII SECESSION OF ARGOLIC AND AKKADIAN CITIES 373 indeed it preceded the fall of its own smaller neighbours. Argos, the old rival of Sparta, Argos, which no Spartan King had ever been able to subdue, Argos, which Pyrrhos had found as un- conquerable as Sparta herself,^ now opened her gates to a Lace- daemonian master. The Achaian force had been withdrawn from Kleo- the city to protect the Federal interest in Corinth and Sikyon, ".^""^^ and Aratos had gone with it, armed with some strange arbitrary Argos, commission, how obtained we know not.^ KleomenSs appeared b.o. 223. before Argos ; Aristomachos, the former Tyrant, and late General of the League, espoused his cause ; ^ he hoped, so his enemies said, to gain more by submission to Kleomen^s than by fidelity to the League. Through his influence the city was surrendered, hostages were given, a garrison was received, and Argos was admitted as an ally of Sparta, recognizing her supre- macy. The whole Argolic peninsula followed its example. Meanwhile Aratos, armed with his new authority, put to death Violent some whom he called traitors in his native city * — the first ?™°^^®f " recorded instance of civil bloodshed in the name of the Federal Aratos at power. He then went on a like errand to Corinth, but there he SikyBn. found the whole city stirred up against him. He and his Federal troops were at once ordered to depart ; ^ according to one account he had to flee for his life." The Corinthians then sent Corinth for KleomenSs ; '' he entered the city, and besieged Akrokorinthos, partisans. Possibly oi cppoupoOvTe^ may mean the mercenary garrison, and ol 'Axaiol the citizen militia. Was Timoxenos (see Schorn, 118) then in Pellene, or does Plutarch use the words 6 arpaTiiybs tCov 'Axaiwi' (Ar. 39) loosely for the Federal commander in the town ? ^ Plut. Kl. 18. Otfre ykp oi;7rdXai /SocriXeis A.aKeStu/ii.oi'tuv TroXXd vpayfia.- TevffAfJLefOL irpoaayay^ffdai rb "Kpyos /3e/3atws TjdvvqdtjffaVj 6 re SeivbTaroi ruv aTpaTtiydv Hippos fli\an8piinriiiv vapa, vbdas, lirel fUKpbv iwLKvSeffTipas l dTroo-irdffas 6,Trb tuv 'AxaicGy in rots i,vay- KaiordToi! /caipois Trpoa-iveific Tois ix^pois. Plutarch does not mention Aristo- machos in the business. * Plut. At. 40. Toi)s /ih h 'Si.Kvuyi Siev ^A.x'^lQv yvibfiTjs. Megara afterwards again left the Bceotian for the Achaian connexion (Pol. ib. ). In Roman times Megara again Boeotian. Cains Curtius Proldos, whom we have already met with (see above, p. 107, note 1) as a Megarian Amphiktyon, was also a Megarian Bcfiotarch. Boeckh, C. I. No. 1058. Among his merits was that of treating the Megarians to a show of gladiators, a sight which would have somewhat amazed either Kleomenes or Aratos. VII NO JUST INFERENCE AGAINST FEDERALISM 375 proposal to cede Corinth to Antigonos derived its chief sting from the peculiarities of the Federal relation. For a League to pretend to cede to a foreign power one of the Sovereign States which compose it is clearly more monstrous, more threatening to the rights of every other portion of the whole, than it is for a Monarch to cede one of the provinces of his Kingdom. It is, as the event showed, far more likely to excite general indignation and rebellion. Yet it is easy to conceive that, even, under a Monarchy, the cession of a province might raise serious disturb- ances, and might even lead other provinces to offer their allegiance to a master who seemed better able to protect them. And, after all, for a Federal power to pretend to cede one of its members is not more iniquitous than the practice, so common among Princes, of disposing of territories with which they have not even a Federal connexion, without consulting either their rulers or their inhabitants. Federal G-overnment, like all other human things, is imperfect, and there is a certain pressure to which it will give way. But could any other form of government have stood the trial better in that particular time and place 1 A Kingdom of No other Peloponn^sos was not to be thought of ; the idea would have So^m- shocked every feeling of the Greek mind, and it could not have ment then stood for an hour on any ground but that of naked brute force, possible in Town -autonomy had had its fair trial ; it had been found to ^'^^'^■ mean, in that age, the presence either of local Tyrants or of Macedonian garrisons. But the League had hitherto completely excluded both evils ; even in the degenerate days on which we are now to enter, it completely excluded one and greatly restrained and modified the other. And the cities which fell oif from the League asked neither for Monarchy nor for strict Town-autonomy; they were ready for a relation with Sparta, which, if not in accordance with the most perfect Federal ideal, might still be called Federal as distinguished from either of the other systems. The truth is that, if the Federal Government of Achaia now Real gave way, it gave way only because it for a moment deserted its * j\°^^°^ own principles. There was clearly no general wish to secede, no jiistory in wish to exchange the Achaian for the Spartan connexion, as long favour of as those who were at the head of the League did their duty as ^^-^^^ Federal rulers. When they were guilty of treason against Greece by invoking Macedonian help, when they added the special treason against Federal Law implied in the proposal to alienate a Sovereign State of the Union, then, and not till then, did the 376 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Secession only par- tial and temporary. Union begin to fall asunder. The fact that a Federal Govern- ment, hitherto united and prosperous, fell in pieces as soon as it deserted strict Federal principles, is surely rather an argument for the Federal system than against it. And, after all, the breaking -up of the League was very partial. Except at Corinth, where no explanation need be sought for, the tendency to Secession was confined to those cities which had lately joined the League, and which may not as yet have become fully accustomed to Federal principles and habits. The Old-Achaian towns stuck closely together through the whole tempest; Megalopolis stood firm, like an isolated rock against which every wave dashed in vain. Even in the seceding cities the party which desired separation from the League on any respectable political ground seems to have been nowhere the strongest. Everywhere Secession was brought about mainly by the very worst of political factions, by those classes whose impotence up to that moment is the most speaking witness to the general good govern- ment of the League. The opponents of Federalism are perfectly welcome to ally themselves either with the would-be Tyrants of Siky6n or with the Socialist rabble of Argos. It was only at Corinth, in the city which Aratos offered to betray, that the names of Aratos and his League stank, as they deserved, in the nostrils of every citizen. Everywhere else the movement towards Secession was either merely partial or merely temporary. It is clear that at Siky6n the mass of the inhabitants still clave to their old deliverer amid all his short-comings ; ^ at Argos we shall presently see that the very party which urged Secession soon turned about and repented of it. The League, in short, was, before long, reconstituted, with somewhat diminished extent and with greatly diminished glory, but still in a form which, imper- fect as it was, was better either than absolute bondage to Mace- donia or than Town-autonomy, as Town-autonomy had in that age become. Effects of the loss of Corinth, B.C. 223. The loss of Corinth — the remark is that of Polybios, in other words that of Aratos himself — was felt by Aratos as a gain.^ It took away all difficulties and all scruples as to the contemplated ■^ See the description of the state of feeling at SikySn in Plut. Ar. 42, a remarkable contrast to the reception of Aratos at Corinth. ^ Pol. ii. 52. Tolls 5' 'Axaioils diriXvffe toC fieyldTov TpopXri/xaTOS ; and, directly after, impcdddT] rots 'Axatois a,(popii^ xal irpbipaai.s cffXoyos, k.t.X. VII DICTATORSHIP OF ARATOS 377 surrender of Akrokorinthos. The Corintliians were now rebels with whom no terms need be kept ; their mountain-citadel was now a fortress held by Achaian troops in an enemy's country ; it could now be handed over to the King without let or hindrance, if only he would come with his army and take it. The loss of Corinth and of so many other cities had also another result ; — Aratos could now do what he pleased in the Federal Councils. He had no longer to deal with a great PeloponnSsian Confedera- tion which gave him rivals like Lydiadas and Aristomachos ; the Achaian League once more meant ten cities on the Corinthian Gulf. Their citizens, or some of them, met at Sikydn, elected Aratos Aratos General with absolute power, and voted him a guard for i"™s'«ii the defence of his person.^ To such a depth of degradation had absolute the deliverer fallen, that now, after living for thirty years as power and citizen and magistrate of a free state,^ he needed a Tyrant's pre- ^efended cautions to defend his life. And yet Aratos was not a Tyrant ; ^^^_ 223!^ ' he was not intentionally a traitor ; he was simply blinded by a mischievous and obstinate prejudice, by a pride which, even in such a moment, could not stoop to submission to Kleomenes. He had brought his country into a state where her only choice was a choice of evils ; he now stubbornly persisted in choosing the greater evil ; he sacrificed the external independence, he risked ' See above, p. 237. ^ Plut. Ar. 41. TpiiKovTa /j.ii' irq Kal rpia [I shall consider these numbers elsewhere] TreTroXcTevjj^vo's iv rots 'Axai-ols ireTporrevKus dk Kal Svvdfjiei Kal Sd^ji Toiv ^"EWTjVujVf T&re 5' ^ptjfios Kol S.Topos, (rvvTerpLfifUvos, iijffirep ^trl vavayiov ttjs irarpiSos iv rocroiiriy l(ravTo S' &\K(fi /xt; ypdei.v /SatriXei firiSi 7rp«r(3ei5«i' irpbs 4\XoK &KOVTOS 'AvTiy6vov, rpiipuv re Kal iu(t0oSotSv iivayKA^ovTO toi)s Ma/ceSivas, dxiala^ Si Kal Troiivht Kal d^fivas 'Xvnybvif awiTiXom. So Kl. 16. AiaS^fmn Kal Tropipipif Kal MaKeSoviKois Kal a-arpainKoU irpoaTdy/ianv i)irippL\j/e lari. T?}? 'Axaias airbv, iva /lii KXeo;i4^»ei iroi-eiv SoKr; rb irpocrTaTTdixevov, ' ApTcybveia Biav Kal iraidvas JSoic a&rbs iareipavwiiivoi els &v6puirov iirb ''' KcCKeirai' Kal So/cef d(,' iKeXvov i] ii.iv ipareiv^ 'Kavrlveia TravT&Tvacnv l^a\TJKldaj., Bia/iivei d' ii 7r6\is eTTiim/Mos rwv diroXerriij'TMC Kal dvi\6i'T0»' rods TroMras. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 204, ^ Pol. ii. 70. 'A7ro5oi>! t^v irdrpiov ToKiretav. This was after the battle of Sellasia, but the city was taken before. See c. 54. ^ iv. 6. * Pol. ii. 55. Plut. Kl. 23. ^ So says Plutarch (Phil. 5. Kl. 24), who makes the Megalopolitane inclined to accept Kleomengs' offer till they are dissuaded by PhilopoimSn. Phylarchos, whom Polybios (ii. 61) seems to follow, describes them as hardly needing such dissuasion. They would not hear KleomenSs' letter to the end, aud could hardly be kept from stoning the bearer. vii CONCLUSION OF THE WAR 387 It was on the field of Sellasia,^ one of the saddest names Battle of in Grecian history, that the final struggle took place between Sellasia, Sparta and Macedonia for the headship of Greece. One hardly ^°' ^^^' knows whether to count it as an aggravation or as an alleviation of the blow that it was partly dealt by Grecian hands. Philo- poimSn and the Achaian cavalry had a distinguished share in winning the victory. Philopoimen, like Lydiadas at Ladokeia, charged without orders, but he was somewhat better supported by Antigonos than his great countryman had been by Aratos. After a valiant struggle, the Lacedaemonians were defeated ; Defeat and KleomenSs endured to survive, and to wait in vain, in the de- ^'^* °^ spotic court of Egypt, for better times. Sparta now, for the menSs. first time since the return of the Hgrakleids, opened her gates to a foreign conqueror. Antigonos treated her with the same politic lenity which he had shown everywhere except at Man- tineia. It would be his policy to represent the war as waged, not against Sparta, but against her so-called Tyrant. The innova- Antigonos' tions of KleomenSs were done away,^ but Sparta was not required treatment to join the Achaian League. Her compulsory and useless union ° ^^ was reserved for a later stage of our history. The death of Antigonos soon followed his settlement of Pelo- Death and ponn^sian affairs. Aratos, who had sung paeans in his honour, character gave him a bad character in his Memoii's.^ It is hard to see the gonos, reason for this in his acts, and it clearly was not followed by b.o. 221. Polybios. Antigonos, a King and a Macedonian, was far less blameworthy than Aratos, a Greek and a republican leader. An ' The battle of Sellasia is commonly placed in the year B.o. 222 ; but the succession of summers and winters given by Polybios (ii. 54) would rather bring it to 221, in which it is placed by Bishop ThirlwaU. On the whole, B.C. 221 seems the most probable date ; at the same time it requires the battle of Sellasia, the settlement of Sparta and some other cities, the return of Antigonos to Mace- donia, his death, the accession of Philip, and the events which led to the Social War, to have followed one another with unusual speed. And in Pol. iv. 35, the Spartans are said, seemingly in B.o. 219, to have been ToXt-revofifvoi Kard, rd, iriTpM (Tx^Sbv ijdri rpeTs iviavTOvs fieri, tV KKeofjL^vovs iKiTTuaiv. This, however, might possibly be satisfied by a period of two years and a frac- tion. As the exact date does not bear very immediately on my own subject, I would recommend the question to the attention of professed chronologers. ^ Pol. ii. 70. XioKlreviia t6 v6.Tpi.ov airoh /caToo-TTjo-as. Cf. Plut. Kl. 30. It is doubtful whether Antigonos did, or did not, leave Brachyllas the Theban, for a time at least, with some authority at Sparta. See Pol. xx. 5. ThirlwaU, viii. 218. If he did, it must have been only with some temporary commission, like that of Prytanis at Megalopolis. ' Plut. Ar. 38. 'E;* tois iiro/iD^iian XoiSopuv SieriXa. Kl. 16. 'Xvrlyovov eljyriKiis kokA /ivpla Si Siv diroXAoiTrec iivoiivrnxiruv. But see Pol. ii. 70. HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE opportunity was oflfered him for recovering an old and precious possession of his house, and of vastly extending the power and influence of his Crown. That he accepted it no man can wonder ; one would be half inclined to blame him if he had not. And, if we do not see in his career the wonderful magnanimity ascribed to him by Achaian admirers, it was at least something to win so many cities with so little needless cruelty. Both Sparta and Athens, in the days of their power, had shed Grecian blood far more freely. Altogether Antigonos D6s6n was a King who need not shrink from a comparison with any but the selected few, the Alfreds and the Akbars, among those whom the accident of birth has called to rule over their fellows. Himself only a distant kinsman of the royal house, born a subject, and called to the throne by popular election, he better knew how to deal with freemen than the mass of Kings and their satraps. We shall soon see how both Macedonia and Greece could be made to suffer at the hands of one born in the purple. B.C. 281- We have thus, for sixty years, traced the growth of the 221- League, from the union of two small Achaian towns, till it became the greatest power of Peloponnesos and of Greece. We New posi- have seen it fall from its high estate through the envy of the tiou^of the man who had done most to raise it. We leave it now restored " ■ nearly to its full extent, with the exception of that mountain citadel, that key to its whole position, without which its extent was a mockery, and its freedom ■ little better than a name. We B.C. 221- have still, in the following Chapter, to continue its history for another period of seventy-five years, retaining its internal consti- tution, vastly increased in territorial extent, but, in external affairs, with only a few very short intervals, reduced almost to the condition of a dependent ally, first of Macedonia and then of Rome. 146, CHAPTER VIII HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA TO THE PEACE OF EPEIROS. B.C. 221 — 205 The Macedonian intervention in PeloponnSsos, and the results of the battle of Sellasia, had wholly changed the aspect of Grecian state of affairs. The greater part of Greece was now united in an Greece alliance, of which the King of Macedonia was the real, if not the f^u ^f acknowledged, head. Beside the Macedonian Kingdom and Kleo- the Achaian League, this Confederacy included all the Federal menes. powers of Northern Greece,^ with the exception of ^tolia. The spectacle of so many Federal Commonwealths thus closely Grand allied, both with one another and with a Government of another AUianoe kind, gives this Confederacy a special interest in the eyes of a jiace- historian of Federalism. The formal relations between the donian several allied powers were apparently those of perfect equality, headship. The extraordinary authority which the Achaians had conferred upon Antigonos seems to have lasted no longer than the dura- tion of the Kleomenic War. It certainly did not descend to his successor Philip. But Achaia and other republican members of the Confederacy were exposed to all the dangers which com- monly attend alliances between the weak and the strong. It would be too much to say that they stood to Macedonia in the relation of dependent alliance ; but they seem to have stood practically in the same sort of subordination in which the Pelo- ponn^sian allies stood to Sparta at the beginning of the great Peloponnlsian War.^ Sparta had now, by the fall of Kleo- ' Pol. iv. 9. "Eti yap IvopKos Hixeve ira.cri.v t} yeycvri/iii>ij ffD/ijitox'a St' ^ApTLySvov Karh Toi>s KXeofieviKoiis Katpods 'Axatow, 'HTreiptirais, ^w/ceOtrt, MttKeSiffi, BoiuTors, 'AKapvda-i, QerraKoU. lb. 15. ^Hv Si t& Sb^avra Tois 'Ax^iois ToOra, Trpeo'/Seiieu' irpbs 'HTreipiiras, BoiutoiSs, ^lOK^as, 'AKapvavas, ^IXiTirov. The Thessalians, as nominally independent, were enrolled in the alliance ; but, as practically Macedonian subjects, they were not thought worthy of a formal embassy being sent to them. ^ See above, p. 357. SS9 MlJ'lUgr Qg FEPBS,4y, taEKBTE esse. nee^ teat t a toea i »» sa iHniiBig «^ib in^ ^e A&&^ Q^^^ aamang taOB.'^ Xiis euMmtftxasm. 'msssztis TpeBSf ■eaEijr sa SiBtes. &«aee. eiKi^ As&ai^ @e iciHii we loEiv "sc ^mt h» BsafiiRE. and lifiB,. vMdk «£ ^:cc:^sr rnnfmni rs cZd mmih ii~ ^eaetefKs. ^ans. s s&ese ables «M^ bad &Bea awajr i» KEeeaaea^ ami bad %ee» leeoveced %- Aa£%esao6eaaK!aB^s-aB&ea4. ifia^ «e ^aB gEeaen^ leap itew (ML T. 9^ seen «» fanv bm 31^ safe 9» Bsne feem at aff toBBesSei «i& K&gsai ^tBsiams. VIII CONDITION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE 391 or, if free, they might have abused their freedom and wasted their strength in ceaseless border --warfare with one another. The League, even as it now stood, was a power with which Macedonia, and Rome herself, felt it prudent to deal cautiously, to respect constitutional forms, and to abstain, for a long time to come, from high-handed acts of violence. But the old strength and dignity of the League were gone. Its dimensions were cur- tailed ; Megara was now Bceotian, and, what was of far more moment, Corinth was now Macedonian. Orchomenos too, in the heart of the Federal territory, was held as a Macedonian outpost. The whole position of the League was changed ; it well nigh lost its power of independent action, when it sank into a single member of a great Alliance under Macedonian headship. The Achaian League, in short, still remained an important and well- governed Federal Commonwealth, more important than Akar- nania, better governed than Boeotia. But it had wholly given up its old and glorious office as the destroyer of Tyrants, the humbler of Kings, the deliverer and the uniter of Hellas. Aratos still retained his old position and his old influence. Undi- One would think that he must have bitterly repented the day mmished when he preferred Antigonos to Kleomen^s. One might have ^f Aratos. expected that the events of the Kleomenic War would have utterly overthrown his power. But he still remained, the same man in the same place. He was still the chief of the League, regularly chosen to its highest Magistracy as often as the Law allowed his election. He still retained his faculty of losing battles in the field and his faculty of winning votes in the Assembly. We find indeed a party hostile to him,i which, as before, could take advantage of his errors to raise a momentary storm against him. But, so often as this happened, he was still able to display his peculiar gift of allaying complaints and of strengthening his position by e^'ery attack made upon him. For his old career of surprising cities, of overthrowing or converting Tyrants, the present state of things allowed no room. It gave him instead an opportunity of displaying his peculiar powers in a way, less glorious indeed, but, as affairs now stood, no less indispensable.^ The republican chief had stooped to become a courtier and a Minister ; he had to act, if sometimes as the ^ Pol. iv. 14. Twi' dvTLWoKtTsvofUviov KarriyopoivTOiv avrou, /c.t.X. ^ Pint. Ar. 48. 'E56k€l re iraaw 6 'Aparos oi fibvov STi/WKparias dXXo Kal /SaffiXet'os 070^65 eixai iraidaywyos. 392 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Relation of Aratos to the Mace- donian Kings. Character of Philo- POIMEN. obsequious flatterer, yet sometimes also as the honest adviser, of two successive Kings. Putting aside his one great error, assum- ing the ignominious position in which his own fault had placed both himself and his country, his conduct in his new office is honourable enough. We must now look on him as a sort of Minister for PeloponnSsian Affairs, first to Antigonos and then to Philip. In this position, we find his obsequiousness mainly confined to acts of homage which, if degrading, were merely formal. The counsels which he gives are commonly both prudent and honourable ; even in his new and fallen position, the personal worth and dignity of the old republican leader stand forth in marked contrast to the utter viUainy of the Macedonian courtiers. He paid the penalty of royal friendship ; ^ like the Jehoiada of Jewish, and the Seneca of Koman, history, he under- took the guidance of a lion's whelp whose harmlessness was con- fined to the days of childhood.^ Yet at this very moment the League possessed a citizen, perhaps not endowed with all the varied gifts of her old chief, but a man, on the whole, of higher aims, and especially eminent in those very respects in which Aratos was so lamentably wanting. Megalopolis, the city of Lydiadas, had produced, in PhUopoimfin, a worthy successor of that hero. Assuming, as a native of Megalopolis could hardly fail to assume, that KleomenSs was to be resisted to the uttermost, PhilopoimSn had displayed, in the last stage of the Kleomenic War, every quality of a great citizen and a great soldier. A discerning historian has well remarked that the natiu'al places of the two successive chiefs of the League seem to have been transposed by fortune.^ Had Philopoimin been in the place of Aratos, fewer surprises and diplomatic triumphs might have been won ; but the Achaian phalanx and the Achaian G-eneral would never have become the laughing-stock of Peloponn^sos. What Philopoimen might have made of the Achaian army in better times we may judge by seeing what he did make of it when Achaian armies were beginning to be useless. As a general, he needed only a wider field to have been the rival of his contemporaries Hannibal and Scipio. The man who at once transformed such military materials as Aratos had left him ^ Pint. Ar. 52. TaCr', etTev, S) 'Ke^aXuv, iirlxetpa rris jSoffiXiK^s (pCKias. 2 JUsch. Ag. 699. 'Edpc^ev Sk Xiovra, k.t.X. Aristopli. Frogs, 1427. OS 3 Thirlwall, viii. 406. Of. Liddell's History of Rome, ii. 80. VIII CHARACTER OF PHILOPOIMEN 393 into an army capable of winning a pitched battle over Lacedae- monians was, in his own sphere, as great a commander as either of them. His policy, as well as that of Aratos, sometimes erred on the side of too great eagerness for the extension of the League. This error took a characteristic form in each of the two men. Aratos sometimes pushed the arts of the diplomatist almost to Compa- the verge of treachery ; Philopoim^n sometimes pushed the "^^ honest vigour of the soldier beyond the verge of violence and p^iiopoi- vindictiveness. In internal Federal politics, we find him the mSn and author of reforms designed to carry out in greater fulness the Ara'os. true ideas of Federal union and equality. These great qualities might have been of eminent use in the days . of Aratos ; in the days of Philopoim^n they were nearly thrown away. During a great part of his life, all that he could do was, by a policy neither servile nor obstinate, to mitigate the bitterness of Roman en- croachment, and to ward off the day of final bondage. For this purpose we can hardly doubt that the unrivalled diplomatic powers of Aratos would have been more useful than the straight- forward energy of Philopoimen. He was a brave soldier and an upright citizen, but he had no special gift of influencing the minds of Macedonian Kings or Roman Proconsuls. Philopoimen, in short, was one of the heroes who struggle against fate, who are allowed to do no more than to stave off a destruction which it is beyond their power to avert. It is very remarkable that, for several years after the begin- Temporary ning of our present period, we lose sight of Philopoimen alto- jf^'^-^ gether.i His conduct at Sellasia procured him the marked notice ^f pj^jij,. of Antigonos. The King made him the most splendid offers ; '^ poimgn wealth and high command were ready for him, if he would only from Pelo- enter the Macedonian service. That Philopoimen utterly refused P™"*^"^- to sell himself for all that Macedonia could give is no more than we should have expected from his general character. But his conduct in other respects is not so intelligible. He went into Crete to learn the art of war amid the constant local struggles of that island. While there, he contrived to do his country some at least apparent service, by extending her alliance among the 1 Brandstater (358) strangely introduces him, without any explanation, into the middle of the Social War, transferring thither an exploit which happened ten years later. See Pint. PhU. 7. Thirlwall, viu. 290. ^ Pint. Phil. 7. He refused, according to his biographer, iiSKuxra rriv iavroO (piffiv KaTHimeHiv irpis rb ipx^ffSai SvfflHr %e Tsaml :s» iffls. Pi^Tilt imTwuitias. araJl it &i*w*»fflr adtaedfaaiK x ivsi Tjasjc* nt "vinKt Ji iasnt v^asieeS sosais 3» HnuKTL i a ^"sjr ?iTff ^ I^BH§BrS ll£o:^ IB jbii siz^S?{nn~ afc.nfTo^iir- lJj»i«„iS «tiIi&' Tin &sci ic ^TTTgnnK *i swit jmsF Irs xis^tr^ ac S«^i^ -Fiijsx aHiMiwwtlk- jcaenost a riisaus «t ^tes n 3liBS&mL ll«BB^nd%kwii>i^r3aiBSM^£B» :£ih ::ir-nis ^vi^iac rooot^ant. ^ wrrinRE 1^^^ i |R9^a«s » :iir*i -^tsi iir^«i 3» ipnic wrsay ^^*™- Sd52?£ nt j^i>St7«i^ai^ itt rnrnjc-nnifcr 5ir zm ^ts^fs wlradk^ ^BSsiL «¥ kniw- :sc 3br» •!£ ~m leaSs iif i^fe mss; :;^ifix « ::aaE vni CAUSES OF THE SOCIAL WAR 395 wliich ended at Sellasia. But its inherent interest is far less. It has none of the heroic charm which attaches to the names of Lydiadas and KleomenSs; and the Achaian League itself no longer acts the primary part. It will be enough for our purpose here, as throughout the history, to run hastily over the purely military events, stopping only to comment on points which either illustrate Federal politics or throw light on the characters of the great Federal politicians. § 1. The Social War B.C. 221—217 We have seen that most of the ^tolian possessions in Pelo- Timoxenos ponnSsos had fallen into the hands, first of Kleomen^s, and then General of the Achaians or their Macedonian protector. The ^tolians ° ^ 22I- however still retained the smaller city of Phigaleia, lying on the 220. confines of Arkadia, MessenS, and Elis. The town stood to the Piigaleia MtoM&n League in that doubtful relation in which we find so ^tolians many of its outlying possessions ; its inhabitants bore the name of citizens,^ but their condition probably approached nearer to that of subjects, or, at best, of dependent allies. Phigaleia could not have been valuable to ^tolia in any way but as a military post ; it was held by an j^tolian Governor,^ and therefore doubt- less by an ^tolian garrison also. Soon after the accession of Dori- Philip, Dorimachos, the .^Etolian commander at Phigaleia, began ™*"=^°s to be guilty of various acts of plunder on the neighbouring and MessenS, friendly territory of Mess^nS. A strange diplomatic quarrel b.o. 221. followed,^ which led to the most bitter hatred on the part of Dorimachos towards those whom he had injured. In conjunction with a kinsman and kindred spirit named Skopas, and with the connivance of the ^tolian General Arist6n,* but without any ^ Pol. iv. 3. 'EriJyx^''^ ^^ t&t^ (TVfj.To\i.Tevo/j,iinj tois AlruXoh. But we soon afterwards (iv. 79) find the Phigaleians dissatisfied with the ^tolian connexion, which there is called crv/ifiiixicL. ^ Dorimachos was sent, acooriling to Polybios (iv. 3), \6y(fi ixiv irapav\d^uv T^v re x^^po-^ f^°-^ "^^ irbXiv twv ^tyaX^wp, ^pycfi Se KaTOffKOTVov rd^iv ?x^^ "^^^ ^^ \l€Korrovvii(T(f irpayfiATUv. Brandstater (312) asks, with some simplicity, " War das etwas so Schlimmes ? " There is something really amusing in this writer's half apologies for his clients. ' See Pol. iv. 4 and, more briefly, Thirlwall, viii. 233. * Ariston had some bodily infirmity {Sta Tivas (rajfuiTLKas afrdeveias) which disqualified him from service ; he was a kinsman of Dorimachos and Skopas ; practically the chief power was in the hands of Dorimachos. Pol. iv. 5. HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Extensive incursions of the ^tolians. sort of authority from either the Popular Assembly or the Senate,-^ he planned a series of incursions which amounted, as Polybios expresses it, to a declaration of war against MessSn^, Achaia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Macedonia, all at once.^ Various acts of aggression on aU these states followed ; among other things, a fort named Klarion, in the territory of Megalopolis, was seized upon, but the ^toHans were soon driven out by the Achaian General Timoxenos, with the help of Taiu-idn, the Macedonian commander at Corinth. An ^tolian army also passed through the western cantons of the old Achaia ; its leaders indeed dis- claimed all hostile intentions, but their followers passed on to Phigaleia, plundering as they went, and from Phigaleia they began the devastation of Messen© in good earnest. May, B.C. 220. The narrative of these events brings forward one or two points of political interest, of which I have already spoken in my general description of the Achaian Constitution. The ^toKans chose for the time of their inroad the season when the Achaian official year was drawing to its close, when Achaia, in short, was in the throes of a Presidential election. Timoxenos, the General actually in office, was a friend and partisan of Aratos, and apparently no opposition was expected to the election, according to the usual custom, of Aratos himself as his successor.* Still the ^toUans ^ Pol. U.S. Kara Koivhv fjtkv ovk iT6\fia wapaKoXuv rods AItoAoijSj k.t.X. oihe KoiVT}v tQv AItuAQv TrpotrSe^dfji.eyot. a^oSov oOre rots aTro/cX^rots ffu/iywra- 56vTes, K.T.X, 2 Pol. U.S. Kara 8^ rets avrwv opfias koZ Kpiaeis diaXa^dvTes B.fia Metrffi/ytots, ''H.ir€Lp(jlrTatSj 'Axaiots, 'AKapvatri, Ma/ce56(rt, irdXe^v i^veyKav. Of course tMs does not imply, but excludes, any formal declaration of war by JBtolla against all these powers. ' Polybios' (iv. 6) words are, ii> if XoiirAs ?» Tifw^ivifi /xiv dXiyo! Itl xP^os Tfjs apxv^, "Aparos S^ KadlffTaro ^ els rhv htavrbv rbv iirtSvTa arpwrqyhs virb tOiv 'Axatwy, o^TTiii 8k l/icXXe rV ^PXW '^^eiv. These words, by themselves, would most naturally imply that Aratos was already actually General-Elect. But, directly after (c. 7), ^ KodiiKovaa. iK tuv vbpjaii aimohos — ^that is, surely, the regular Spring Meeting of the year b. o. 220 — comes together. At this Meeting the injured cantons complain of the jEtolian aggression ; the inroad therefore must have been before the actual day of meeting. After the Meeting, Timoxenos is still actually in office, though Aratos is known to be his successor. We must therefore infer that Aratos was formally elected at the meeting mentioned in c. 7, and that the words of Polybios in c. 6, only imply that his election was, before the Meeting, an understood thing, to which no opposition 'would be made. He was then, at the time described in c. 6, not General-Elect, but what some people would call General-Designate. So in the American Presidential interregnum there are two stages. There is iirst the interval between the election of electors (which practically determines the VIII ^TOLIAN INVASION OF ACHAIA 397 knew ^ that even so slight a change would cause some additional Invasion weakness in the Government, and that the holding of the regular durmg a Spring Assembly for the election would draw away most of the ^ential leading men from the defence of their homes. At this moment Election. the -(Etolians marched, plundering as they went, through the cantons of Patrai, Pharai, and Dym§. The Assembly met ; Aratos Aratos was elected General for the next year, but he would not. General, by Achaian Law, immediately enter upon his office. The g^g Assembly also decreed that help should be sent to MessSn^, that the existing General should summon the whole military force of the nation in arms, and that the body thus gathered together should be invested with the ordinary powers of the regular Assembly.^ Timoxenos was unwilling to enter upon any import- ant business, whether civil or military, just before the end of his term of office.* Moreover he distrusted the military efficiency of his countrymen; their defeats in the early part of the Kleomenic War, and the habit of looking for Macedonian help which had grown upon them during its later years, had greatly relaxed the courage and discipline of the nation.* Timosjenos therefore delayed carrying out the resolution of the Assembly. Aratos, on the other hand, seems to have been seized with a sudden fit of military enthusiasm. He who had been the quench- coal to the warlike ardour of Lydiadas and Aristomachos now election of the President) and the formal election of the President himself ; there is secondly the interval between the formal election of the President and his actual " Inauguration. " ^ That the .^tolians really had an eye to all this, is manifestly implied in the words of Polybios (iv. 6), irapaT-qpi^aavTci t6v Kcupiv. 2 Pol. iv. 7. See above, pp. 215, 216. The small attendance at the regular Meeting may be understood, if no opposition was to be offered to the election of the General. * Pol. iv. 7. "Oa-OK oHiroi \Tiyoiffr)S ttjs i-pxv^- Ii tlie American War, in the year 1777, we find the operations of part of the American force hampered by a cause which, though not exactly the same, reminds one of this affair of Timoxenos and Aratos. "The usual difficulty of obtaining the service of the militia was at this time very much increased, by an event by no means common. The time for which the governor [of New Jersey] was elected had expired, and no new election had been made. The late executive, therefore, did not think himself authorized to take any measures as an executive, and had not General Dickinson ventured to order out the militia by his own authority, they could not have been put in motion." Marshall's Life of Washington, iii. 206. ^ Pol. U.S. "A^a 5i Tois 'Axu'o's liTic™" Stb. rh jx/Bifxas airoii icxtjicivai, Kara t6 ■wapbv TTcpl Tijv iv tocs SirXois yviaiaalav , k.t.\. So Plut. Ar. 47. 'EBLffBhres yip aWoTplais ' in the sense of "disbanded" or "separated" — "gingen auf dem Isthmus auseinander." He adds, " wo also fiir sie, etwa in Megara, freundliches Gebiet sein mnsste." But Megara was now (see above, p. 374) part of the Boeotian Confederation, therefore VIII DISGRACEFUL CAMPAIGN OF ARATOS 399 An Achaian Assembly was held a few days after the departure Accusation of the uSltolians. The national feeling was strong against Aratos. f^^ ^^• He had displayed unusual zeal for action ; he had seized on ^atos office prematurely and illegally ; and his haste had led only to in the greater national ignominy, and to the display of greater military Assembly. incapacity, than ever. His political adversaries strongly pressed all the disgraceful points of the campaign, in accusations of which Polybios has preserved to us the heads.i One would be still more anxious to read the answer of Aratos. For answer he did, and with wonderful eflfect. Helpless as he had been on the battle-field of Kaphyai, in the parliamentary campaign of Aigion he was' irresistible. We gather from Polybios that he denied some of the charges, asked indulgence upon others, and was eloquent about his old exploits. Anyhow he contrived, as he had so often done before, to turn the tide of popular feeling in his own favour. He succeeded in diverting the public indignation from himself to his accusers, and he again found himself directing the counsels of the League with all his old influence.^ At the same time the Assembly passed a series of decrees for Votes the conduct of the war.^ The General was to gather a fresh °/ J"^! army, and to concert measures with the Governments of Lace- dsemon and MessSnS for the common defence against the ^tolians. Ambassadors were also sent to all the members of the Grand Alliance,* at once asking for help and proposing the admission of Messene into the Confederacy. An ^Sltolian Assembly was held about the same time, and it passed a decree which, on first hearing, sounds incredibly strange and contradictory.^ The and ^tolians, allies of the Achaians, allies of the Messgnians, voted -^toli^" to keep the peace with the LacediBmonians, Messtoians, and i^ugg everybody else, the Achaians included, unless the Achaians admitted the Messenians into their alliance. This last course part of the Macedonian Confederacy. Also the Isthmus would be in any case a strange place to disband, with a Macedonian garrison at Corinth, and the hostile territory of Bceotia to be passed through. 1 Pol. iv. 14. "" Pol. U.S. Ilepi Twv €^s Trdvra ^ovKeijeadaL Kara r^v 'ApArou yviitfiTjv, Schorn (p. 142) might have spared the remark, " Wie anders wiirde sein Loos aasgefallen sein, wenn er ein Athener gewesen ware !" — at least if it is meant as a censure upon Athens. Surely Athenian confidence in Nikias and Ph6ki8n was wellnigh as blind as Achaian confidence in Aratos. 3 Pol. iv. 15. ■* See above, p. 389. * Pol. iv. 15. Tlpay/ia TrdyTwc a.\v 'IWvptuiv. lb. 1 / . ApiffTOjv 5' 6 Twy A/rwXwp crpaTTiybSj oii irpoairoLoOfievos oid^v tu)V yiyvoixhav, 9iye ttjii T]v irXelovos d^iuv. On this excess of cruelty, so unusual in Grecian warfare, I have made some remarks in my second (Chapter, p. 44. * lb. 19. AiroffTdvTas twi/ 'Axacwv alpeiffdat t^v irpbs ainoits ffVjxiiaxf'O'V. This sounds as if the Kleitorians were offered mere alliance, and not incorporation on any terms. But see above, p. 395, note 1. 404 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Philip at Corinth. Affairs of Sparta, B.C. 222- 220. The young King of Macedonia had by this time made up his mind to assist his allies in earnest. He marched with an army to Corinth — now his own city — but he came too late ; the ^tolians were already gone. He then sent letters summoning a general Congress of all the allies at Corinth, and he meanwhile advanced into Peloponnesos as far as Tegea, with a view of settling the affairs of Lacedsemon. We here sadly feel our want of a Spartan historian, or at least of one not writing whoUy in the Achaian interest. During the Kleomenic War, Plutarch's Life of the Spartan King gives us at least an echo of the reports on the Spartan side ; but now we have to trust wholly to Poly- bios. In his view, Antigonos and the Achaians had been the greatest of benefactors to Sparta ; they had freed her from a Tyrant, and had restored to her her ancient constitution and laws.i Sparta was bound to the Macedonian Alliance by every tie of thankfulness, and every step on her part contrary to Achaian or Macedonian interests was a sin of the blackest ingratitude. Since the departure of Kleomen^s, the throne had been carefully kept vacant,^ a fact which may surely be taken as implying that Sparta still looked upon him as her lawful King. Kleomenes was not a Harold or a Sebastian, living only in the fond imagination of a heart-sick people ; the hero of Sparta still lived, dwelling indeed in the house of bondage, but not without hope of being one day restored to his home and kingdom.^ The government was in the hands of a College of Ephors, whose opinions are described as being divided, three favouring the ^tolians and two favouring the AUies.* The jEtolian party was also the Kleomenic party, not assuredly out of any love towards ^tolia for her own sake, but because ^toUa represented opposition to Philip and the Achaians. In this 1 Pol. iv. 16. 01 S^ AaKeSai-tiMvioi, ■!rpocriTtoi fiiv ■/jKevBepa/jiivoi. Si' 'AvTiySyov Kal 5i4 TTJs tCov 'A-XMav (piXorc/das, 60eiXocTes Si MaKedoai Kal ^Almrifi ii,r)Siv iiirevavTiov irpaTretv. He repeats the "words Trpoa^drus -^XevdepwiJL^voL Si 'XvTt- y6vov in c. 22, and in the same chapter, in the speech of Adeimautos, we read of MaKGSdvas roiis edepy^ras Kal auTTjpas. ^ lb. 22, 35. The later passage is more emphatic ; ■iro'\i.Tev6/ievoi Kara rd, Trdrpta ffxeSov ijSri rpets ivtavrods fieTd, ttjv KXeofji^vovs ^Kirrtaaiv, oiS* ^Trev&qffo.v oiSitrore ^acnXeh Kdraarriffcu t^s ^Trdpryjs. A strange turn is given to the fact by Pausanias (ii. 9. 3) ; AaKeSai/idvioi, Si dtr/ievoi. KXeo/iivovs diraXKayhres (Sairi- Xe6effdai fjiif oxik^ti -rj^iiocrav, ' Pol. iv. 35. Oi)x ^KKTTa Sik KXeojueci; Kal t^v irpM iKclvov eihoiav, iXTi^ovres del Kal irpoaSoKlav ^X'"'"' '^s iKdvov irapov(rias S/ta Kal (rarriplas. * lb. 22. viii AFFAIRS OF SPARTA 405 divided state of things, troops were sent to support Aratos in his unlucky campaign, but Polybios implies that there was no real intention of giving the Achaians any effective help,^ and he even goes so far as to charge the Lacedaemonians — that is, doubtless, the majority among the Ephors — with concluding a secret treaty with the -^Etolians.^ More violent measures now Disturb- foUowed ; Adeimantos, one of the philippizing Ephors, was ^"^l^ ^' murdered, together with some citizens of his party, with the ^^^ *' connivance — so our Achaian historian tells us — of his colleagues of the other party.^ Other citizens of Macedonian politics fled to Philip, who gave audience at Tegea both to them and to an Embassy from the de facto Government.* The envoys affirmed that the persons who had been killed had been the real cause of the disturbance, and they professed their own full intention to discharge towards the King every obligation of faithful allies.^ The debate which followed is well worthy of attention. It sets Philip sits Philip before us in a light personally honourable, but it shows ™ i'^^e^- how effectually Aratos had done his evil work. The Macedonian ^q ^jjg King sits in one Greek city to decide the fate of another. That Spartan it rests with him to preserve or to destroy Sparta no one seems P^^'t'^^ ^'^ to doubt. Everything is made to depend on the King's personal sense of justice and expediency ; we as yet see only Philip sober and are not introduced to Philip drunk, but we see that, drunk or sober, Philip is equally master of Peloponn^sos. There were not wanting counsellors who exhorted him to make an example of Sparta, such as his great predecessor had made of Thebes. No reasonable man could doubt that those now in power at Sparta were wholly in the interest of ^tolia, and that the victims of the late disturbance had perished solely on account of their attachment to Macedonia. Sparta had once been spared ; she had abused the mercy of Antigonos ; her day of grace was now past, and her destruction would be only an act of exemplary justice. But the counsels which finally prevailed with the young King were of a milder kind. According to Polybios, Aratos was their inspiring spirit.* This we may well believe, ' Pol. iv. 9. 'E0^5puc Kal dtuipwv iiaXKov ij a-vfifiix'^'' ^X<»"'es Ti^iv. So o. 19, (TTOxaibixivoi ToD doxein /i6vov. 3 lb. 16. ' lb. 22. " lb. 23. Oi Trpoeo-Twres tuv Aaicedaiixovlav : a formula applied to the Spartan Ephors, as to the Achaian Siiiuovpjol. " lb. Ilcij'ra S' inncrxi'oSpTai, Troiijcreu' airrol T$ iMTTifi ri, Karit T^v irw/i/iax'o'' 6 lb. 24. 406 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Declara- tion of Philip in farour of Sparta. Aratos' liberal views of Inter- national right. but we may also well believe that Philip, young and as yet un- corrupted, was himself disposed to take the more generous part.^ Aratos, save in that one terrible year of Secession, had never been a man of blood or an advocate of violent measures. We may fairly ascribe to him the answer which was finally given by the King, one which forestalls some principles of international right which modern diplomatists are only just beginning to understand. As such, it does him the highest honour. But one cannot help wishing that it had been dictated by him in the Assembly at Aigion, as a free President of the Achaian League, rather than suggested in Philip's council-chamber at Tegea in his new character of Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs. King Philip was made to answer that the Lacedaemonian Govern- ment had been guilty of no crime against the cohimon Alliance ; that he accepted their professions of faithfulness to it, and exhorted them to continue in the same mind ; that the internal crimes and revolutions of any allied city were matters which did not come under his cognizance, so long as the city itself adhered to its public obligations. He might exhort and recommend as an ally, but he was entitled to go no further, except when the common alliance was violated, and then only in concert with aU the other allies.^ Sounder doctrines were never put forth in any age ; pity that their accomplishment depended solely on the will of a youth, of precocious talents indeed, and who had as yet given no signs of any but generous dispositions, but who was in danger, as the event proved, of being led astray by the cor- rupting influence of unrestrained power, and by the advice and example of some of the worst counsellors with whom any prince was ever cursed. Congress at Corinth. War agreed upon, B.C. 220, Autumn. Meanwhile the deputies of the allies were assembling at Corinth. King Philip presided at the Congress ; each member of the Confederacy set forth its own wrongs, and war was agreed ^ So Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 243), "Philip was of the age to which popularity is most attractive, and a liberal sentiment most congenial." ^ Pol. iv. 24. '0 yd.p ^LXcinros ra fih Kar' ISiav ti2v avfifidx^^ ^^^ airroi-s a.BiK'/ifMTa Ka6ijKei,v l^crev airf jU^xP' X1S70U Kal ypafiiiAriiiv SiopSovv Kai nmein- (TTifiaiveadaL' to, S^ irpb^ t^v kqiv^v dv^Kovra av/xfjiaxiav raOr ^(pTj jx6va deiif KOtvTJi ^7rt(rTpo0^s Kai SiopBihffeojs Tvyxdvstv iirb irdvTWv. Philip and Aratos here keep the just mean between meddling interference in the affairs of foreign countries and the ostentatious selection of great public criminals as special objects of personal honour. DECLARATION OF WAR BY THE ALLIES 407 upon by common consent. Juster grounds for war no state ever had ; every one of the allied powers had wrongs to complain of, any one of which would be looked upon by the most peacefully disposed modern nation as supplying abundant reason for appeal- ing to arms. Achaia, Epeiros, Phokis, Akarnania, Bceotia, each had to tell of some territory ravaged, some venerated temple despoiled; Philip himself had as good a grievance as any; a Macedonian ship had been seized by ^tolian pirates, and the crew sold into slavery.^ The decree passed by the Congress was worthy of the occasion. The Allies agreed to recover whatever Opening territory any of them had been deprived of by the enemy since °^ *'^® the death of King Demgtrios ; to set free all cities which had ^°^^^ been joined to the ^tolian League against their will ; ^ and to Decree restore to the Amphiktyons their lawful authority over the °^ *** Delphian Temple, which the ^tolians had usurped. But the of°c^j^^tjj Treaty still needed ratification by the sovereign Assemblies of the several Federations which made up the Alliance.^ While Embassies were sent round to obtain their assent, Philip wrote PhUip's a spirited letter to the ^tolians. If they had any real defence I'^^}^^ to make, let them send and make it ; but he and his allies could ^Etoiians. not listen to any excuses of the old sort. It would no longer do, when ^S^tolian fleets and armies were ravaging all Greece, to say that it was the mere act of private men, for which the .^Etolian G-overnment was not responsible. They must not expect either to escape by means of such transparent sophistry, or to throw upon the Allies the odium of beginning the war. The ^tolian Government, in answer, proposed a Conference at shifts Ehion, expecting that Philip would not come. But when they °i"l! ^ Pol. iv. 6. Hetparcts ^I^TreyU^av, ot iraparvx^vres TrXofy ^airL\LK(^ riav ^k Govern MaKedovtas Tepl Kidripa toOt6 re ds MTwKlav KarayaydfTes airavSpov, toi)s re ment. vavKKiipovs Kol Toiis iiripdras, aim Sk To&rois r^v vavv iiribovTO. Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 234), as any one would, translates dir^Sovro, "sold." Schorn and Helwing pass it by. Brandstater (p. 345) objects to this translation, and would have us believe that aviSovTO here means only "released on the payment of ransom" {Die SeerUvher . . . geben dann in Aetolien nw gegen Losegdd Schiff und Mannschaft frei). Be it so ; the barbarity would, on this showing, be somewhat less, but the breach of the Law of Nations would be just the same. ^ lb. 25. Tia.paTrkrjaltjJS 5k Kai Toiis iirh Tuy Katpujv ijv ay Ka.ffp.hovs aKovffiois uerkx^f-^ "^V^ A.Itci)\wv ffvpuroXireias, Htl irdrras to^tovs diroKaTaffT'^ffovaiv els rk Tdrpia TToXireiJyttaTa, xiitpav ^x^"^"^^^ '^^^ TriXets r&s ai^rcuy, d^povpiirovs, i.opo\oyrfTovs, iXevSipovs Svras, TroXiTeiais Kal vbp,0is XP'^I^^""^ ™' Trarpiois. See Thirlwall, viii. 232, note. ' Pol. iv. 26. 01 Si ffiveSpoi irapaxpv!'^ Trpeff^evT&s i^aTr^areWov irphs Tois iTV/ipuixovs, tva irap iKiaroLS Si6, t5v ttoXXwc kwiKvpuBivTOs tov S/ryftaros iKvpov iweK-qpv^av Kara T&v AhuXdv. ^ Polybios, when, at a later stage of his history (vii. 12), he records the degeneracy of Philip, can hardly find words to express the admiration which^he excited in Greece at this time ; Ka.06Xov ye fi^v, el Set lUKphv iirepPokmiTtpov elireiv, olKeidTar' if oX/mu irepl iiKlirirov tovto puiSijvai., Stirt KOirds Tis ohv ^pdjfievos iySvero twv "BWiJi/wy Sta r6 t^s aXp^treois eiepyeriKbv, * lb. 30. It is now that the historian pronounces that emphatic eulogy on the Akamanian people which I have quoted in an earlier chapter. See above, p. 114, vm BEHAVIOUR OF THE VARIOUS FEDERATIONS 409 It has been aptly remarked that what remained of independent Phokis was actually surrounded by the ^tolian conquests, and that the Boeotians, like the Thessalians, were too dependent on Macedonia to have a real voice in the matter.^ At Mess^nl, though it was really in defence of Messenian interests that the war was first undertaken, the envoys met with an ambiguous and chilling answer. The mass of the people were well disposed MessSne, towards the allies ; but the oligarchic chiefs, led by the Ephors Oinis and Nikippos, caused an answer to be given, saying that the possession of Phigaleia by the ^tolians hindered Messing from joining the Allies till the ^S^tolians should be driven out of that dangerous post. 2 At Sparta the Ambassadors had to depart and without any answer at all.^ Other envoys were sent to King Sparta. Ptolemy, not to ask his alliance, but merely to request him to send no money or help of any kind to the enemy.* This last embassy seems to have been successful, as the neutrality of Egypt was strictly preserved throughout the war. These diplomatic proceedings illustrate one or two very Com- obvious truths. It is clear that the actual strength of ^tolia parative was far inferior to that of the Allies. It is equally clear • that o/c"^;. the ^tolian League derived from its strong national unity an tions and immeasurable advantage over the scattered members of the Single Macedonian Confederacy. The policy of ^tolia was determined by a single vote of a single Assembly ; the Allies, before they could act in concert, had first to gather together the represents^ tives of half-a-dozen powers, and then to send about to ask for ratifications — which, after all, might be refused — from a King here and an Assembly there.^ We may also see the danger of ' " Die noch selbstatandigeDj von den Phodem waren ringsum von atolischer Herrscliaft eingeschlossen ; von der Erklarung der Bdoter kann nicht die Eede sein, denn sie gehorcliten ohne Widerrede den Befehlen ihrer Schutzherren, " Schoru, p. J.48. - Pol. iv. 31. ^ lb. 34. Ti\os yicp toi)s Tapli rCiv cu/i/icixwp irpicr^eis AvaTOKpirovs AvicrreiKav. * lb. 30. I do not at all understand Brandstater's comment (p. 367). " So vfar es also allem Ansehn nach nur ein Kampf des Philipp und der Achaer mit Hiilfe eines illyrischen Seeraubers gegen die Aetoler, da Ptolemaus Philopator, der neue Kdnig Aegyptens, niobt die Freundschaft seines Vaters fiir Kleomenes fortsetzte, und, mehr duroh eigne Angelegenheiten als duroh Philipps Bitte bewogen, dem Kampfe fern blieb." Does tliis refer to the winning over of Dgmetrios of Pharos by Tauri6n (see above, p. 403), or what ? ^ Dr. Arnold (History of Rome, ii. 245), comparing the strength of Eome and of Samnium in the fourth century B.C., says : — 410 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. Warning drawing general inferences for or against particular forms of agamst government. Monarchy never looked better than it did at the C6Ilfir£ll 111- ferenoes as Congress of Corinth ; we there see a King acting as moderate to forms of and honourable a part as any man could act. We shall soon see Govern- ^.j^jg game King degenerate into a cruel and faithless tyrant. Single city-commonwealths, in the form of Messto© and Sparta, appear in the poorest possible light. But we have whole centuries of earlier and later history to set against any rash inferences against Town-autonomy in the abstract. Federalism appears in every sort of light at the same moment. The dis- reputable filibustering of the ^tolians, the double-faced policy of the Epeirots, the honourable unanimity of the Achaians, and the heroic devotion of the Akarnanians, aU proceed from nations whose political constitutions were very nearly the same. All alike were citizens of Democratic Federa- tions. The. only inference to be drawn is that Federal Governments, like all other Governments, are capable of any degree either of good or of evil. But the perfect unity and vigour, alike of Akarnania for good and of .iSitolia for evil, is quite answer enough to the common talk about Federal Government being necessarily weak government. That the ^tolian Government did not restrain Dorimachos and Skopas was no sign of weakness. It was the received policy " A single great nation is incomparably superior to a coalition ; and stiU more so when that coalition is made up not of single states but of federal leagues ; so that a real unity of counsels and of public spirit is only to be found in the individual cities of each league ; which must each be feeble, because each talcen separately is small in extent and weak in population. The German empire alone, setting aside the Spanish, Italian, and Hungarian dominions of the house of Austria, could never, even with the addition of the Netherlands, have contended on equal terms with France." Our present narrative amply confirms Dr. Arnold's general remarks upon coalitions, but it hardly bears out what he says specially about Federal coalitions. In the present case the states in which a "real unity of counsels and of public spirit " is most clearly wanting are certainly the non- Federal cities of Sparta and MessSnS. See also Lord Macaulay's vivid description (Hist, of England, iv. 12, 13) of the difficult position of William the Third as chief of the coalition against France in 1691 :— "But even William often contended in vain against those vices which are inherent in the nature of all coalitions. No undertaking which requires the hearty and long continued co-operation of many independent states is likely to prosper Levris could do with two words what William could hardly bring about by two months of negociation at Berlin, Munich, Brussels, Turin and Vienna. Thus France was found equal in effective strength to all the states which were combined against her." ^TOLIAN EMBASSIES TO ELIS AND SPARTA 411 of the nation, such as it was. It was not the power that was lacking, but the will.i But the ^tolians, strong as they already were, both in their own power and in the fears of their neighbours, were not to remain much longer without allies in Peloponn^sos itself. If the ^tolian soil of ^tolia was fertile in robbers and pirates, it was also by Embassies no means barren in able diplomatists. While Dorimachos and !!l£fl°"„ bkopas undertook the plundering department, a certain Machatas b.c. 220- was the ordinary representative of the League towards foreign 219- powers. He easily persuaded Elis, the old ally of iEtolia, to Machatas declare war against Achaia.^ His mission to Sparta is more ™^ "^"^ worthy of notice, as it is closely connected with important changes in that now turbulent and revolutionary city. Political State of parties in Sparta seem now to have been mainly determined by Sparta ; the respective ages of their members.^ In the present condition oid'and" of the city this was just what one could expect. To the old men Young. KleomenSs had from the beginning naturally seemed a reckless innovator ; they would now as naturally argue that his innova- tions had led to nothing but the ruin and disgrace of the state. We may perhaps doubt whether they felt that fervent gratitude towards Macedonia which the historian attributes to them ; * but they would certainly wish to adhere to the Macedonian alliance, if only as the side of quiet — they might add, in the immediate dispute with -iEtolia, undoubtedly the side of justice. To the young, on the other hand, KleomenSs was the hero of Sparta and of Hellas. His kingly and soldierlikeMrtues had won every heart ; his single deed of violence was atoned for by its motives and by its results ; his victories had revived the old feeling of Spartan glory and greatness ; his defeat, after a hard contested struggle against overwhelming odds, had assuredly diminished nothing from his fame. But the iight of Sellasia, and its results, had made the names of Achaia and Macedonia, of Aratos and Antigonos, hateful in the ears of every true-hearted Spartan. As long as Kleomenes lived, though in exile or in bondage, he Effects of was still their King ; when the news of his death was announced, ^j -g-j^g they would no longer crouch under the timid yoke of oligarchic menSs. Ephors ; they would again have Kings according to the old laws 1 What a well-disposed jEtolian General could do we shall see presently. See Pol. V. 107. ^ Pol. iv. 36. ' See the frequent mention of trpea^inpoi, vioi, veavl.r)aav ^tI t6 jSairiXeis KaBi.aT6.vai rd re ■trX'/jSri Kal rb t&v ApX^'tov, ^ It) tK-^Sos, ol iroWol, are the terms used hy Polybios, iv. 34. ' Pol. U.S. Avcrapea-Toifievoi Tols SXois irpiy/iacrLV. VTii STATE OF PARTIES AT SPARTA 413 only lawful constitution of Sparta, and he demanded an audience before the Sovereign Assembly of the Lacedaemonian people. The Ephors feared to refuse; they would consider about the restoration of royalty ; but in any case the ^tolian Ambassador might address the Spartan Assembly. The Assembly was summoned, and Machatas addressed it. He strongly called on the people to embrace the alliance of ^tolia ; he enlarged on the merits of his own countrymen and on the crimes of the Macedonians ; that his speech was impudent, false, and unreason- able ^ in the eyes of Polybios we are in no way surprised to learn ; but we have neither the speech itself, nor the comments of an -^toUan or Kleomenist historian. The debate began ; some Lacedaemonian speakers strongly advised their countrymen to throw in their lot with ^tolia. The old, the prudent, spoke — so we are told — of the mercy of Antigonos, and of the old wrongs wrought by ^tolian hands against Sparta ; ^ let Sparta remain as she was, and observe the terms of her alliance with the Macedonian King. Age and prudence prevailed ; thfe Assembly resolved to adhere to the Macedonian alliance, and Machatas departed unsuccessful. But presently — we are reading Revolu- the accounts of enemies — the party which had been defeated in □ ™ ?■' argument had recourse to violence ; they murdered the Ephors go. 220- and certain Senators of the same party, disregarding in the act 219. even the sanctity of their venerated temple of AthSne.^ They then chose Ephors of their own party ; they voted an alliance with jSItolia ; and — Kleomen^s being now dead — they determined on the restoration of royalty. Two Kings, according to the old precedent, were chosen, Agesipolis and Lykourgos. Agesipolis AgSsipolu was the lawful heir of the Agid Kings, and, as he was a child, ^"^ ^y''" he was placed under the guardianship of an uncle who bore the °^ofen auspicious name of KleomenSs. The other royal house was not Kings, extinct ; but Kleomen^s had passed it by when he took his own brother Eukleidas for his colleague. The second throne was therefore filled by eleetion ; — Polybios says by bribery, and adds that Lykourgos was no Herakleid by birth, but became one by ' Pol. iv. 34. livvaxBivTos Si toO ttX^Aous irapeXBibv 6 Maxaras TapexdXei Sii. irXeidvan airoiis alpeiaBai Tiif Trpbs AiVuXoiis avft-fiaxiav, ei/cj fiiv Kal Bpacreas KorrjyopQi' W-axeddvoiy, a,\6yas Si Kal \j/cvSios iyKuiui^uv toi>s AlTdikois. 2 See atove, p. 306. ' The temple of AthgnS of the Brazen House (XaX/cfoiKos), famous in the history of the Regent Pausanlas. See Thuc. i. 128, 134. 414 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Second mission of Machatas. Sparta joins the iEtolian alliance, and begins war with Achaia. Beginning of the Social War, B.C. 219. Character of the Virtues and mili- tary skill of Philip. paying a talent to each of the new Ephors.^ On hearing of this revolution, Machatas gladly returned to Sparta, and exhorted the Ephors and Kings, now the allies of ^tolia, at once to declare war on the Achaians. According to our Achaian informants, Lykourgos first made incursions into Argolis, took some towns and failed before others, and then, and not before, the Lacedae- monians publicly proclaimed licence of reprisals against the Achaian League.^ The Social War now fairly began. On the one side was the whole Macedonian Alliance ; for Epeiros joined with some zeal as soon as the war actually began, and MessenS joined also as soon as its course had removed the bugbear of Phigaleia. On the other side was the ^tolian League, with Elis and Lacedsemon as its Peloponngsian allies. The war lasted between two and three years, and many of its military details are highly interesting, those especially which illustrate the extraordinary and precocious genius of the young King of Macedonia. His quick and enter- prising spirit, his rapid marches, his winter campaigns, no less than his as yet generous and conciliatory demeanour, all marked him as a worthy successor of the Great Alexander, and make us the more deplore the fall which followed upon such a beginning. The daring and successful generalship of the young prince seems to have taken his contemporaries by surprise, much as the disciples of German military routine were taken by surprise at the irregular victories of the first Buonaparte.^ And this glory at least was wholly his own ; Aratos may have prompted many of his just and conciliatory actions, but it was certaiiily not in the school of Aratos that Philip learned the art of war. But this very aspect of the Social "War gives it a less attractive character in the eyes of a historian of Federalism or of Greek freedom in any shape. We cannot dwell on it with the same interest as on the parliamentary strife between Aratos and Lydiadas, or on the diplomatic and military strife between Aratos and Kleomenls. The foremost figure of the picture is no longer a Greek citizen, but a Macedonian King. Greece has lost both her heroes ; her practised and wily diplomatist survives, ' Pol. iv. 35. "Os dois inaarif tSv icpbpav ToXavrov 'HpaxX^ous d7r670i'0S koX ^ See Maoaulay's Essays (Moore's Life of Byron), p. 146, 1 vol. Ed. On Philip's campaigns see Pol. iv. 67. Finlay's Greek Revolution, i. 109. VIII CHAEACTER AND POSITION OF PHILIP 415 but he has sunk from the President of a free people into the Para- Minister of a foreign sovereien. Philip is palpably the master ; mount im- !• . i-j_ i,i- portance he IS not as yet an unjust or an ungenerous master, but he is a ^f pyiip. master still. He acts as Commander-in-Chief of the whole Alliance ; he dispatches orders to the Achaian cities,^ which, five years before, they would have received from none but the General of their own choice. The General himself becomes little more than his Vice-gerent, and receives orders from him as from his superior. ^ On one occasion Aratos himself, the de- liverer of Siky6n, the father of Peloponn^sian freedom, had to stand as something like an accused criminal before the throne of his master.^ He was indeed honourably acquitted, but that did not in the least diminish the ignominy of being tried. The influence of Aratos can hardly be said to have been sensibly weakened ; but his influence was now exercised far more in the way of private counsel in the closet of the Macedonian King than of open parliamentary eloquence in the Federal Congress at Aigion. When the sunshine of royal favour was for a moment withdrawn from him, popular favour was withdrawn also, and the President of the League was chosen at the bidding of Philip, no longer at the bidding of Aratos.* The true hero of Achaia was absent; PhilopoimSn was studying his art, and indeed serving his country, in the distant field of Crete ; the state of things in PeloponnSsos, between the Macedonian King and his Siky6nian counsellor, left no room for the true successor of Lydiadas. The war was spread over the Presidencies of three Achaian General- Generals, of the younger Aratos, of EpSratos of Dyml, and of ^^^^ °^ *''® Aratos himself for the fourteenth time.^ The younger Aratos, Aratos the son of the deliverer, was chosen to succeed his father at the b.c. 219- Spring Congress of the year 219, just as the war was beginning ^^S- in earnest. Philip was on his march from Macedonia ; the ^tolians, under their General Skopas, were continuing their depredations against Epeiros and MessSnS, states which as yet did not venture to stir in their own defence.® King Lykourgos of Sparta, in imitation, we are told, of KleomenSs,' began his 1 Pol. iv. 67 ; V. 17, 102. (?) = lb. iv. 67. » lb. 85. » lb. 82. ^ According to the arrangement of the Presidential years of Aratos to be here- after discussed. _ ^ lb. 37. "^ lb. AvKovpyoj 6,'irb tG>v ofioiojv ^ov\6fi€vo^ Apx^/Tcs rk yeyoi'lyra Kai Sei/ievoi (riplaL PorideTy, /ieri Si TaOra Trpen^evrhs i^aT^ffreWov Toiis irepl Tuiv aiiTwv d.^njb(ravtas. A distinction is here evidently drawn between the 4776X01 and the Trpea-pevral. The ^775X01 may have been mere messengers, bearing any sort of hasty and informal message ; VIII SONDERBUND OF THE WESTERN CANTONS 417 ing for help. But he was not in any position to help them. Achaian military affairs were, at that moment, at a very low ebb. "We have seen how much the military spirit of the national troops had decayed, and the League had just now great difficulty in obtaining the services of mercenaries. Large arrears of pay were still owing to those who had served in the war with Kleo- menSs ; and, under these circumstances, few were disposed to enlist under such bad paymasters. Thus deserted by the Federal authorities, the three States most in danger set up a sort of Sonderbuiid of their own. They were among the oldest members " Souder- of the League. It was the union of Dym^ with Patrai which ^^"i °^ had been the first step towards its reconstruction,^ and all three Western were among the four whose union had formed the nucleus of the Cities. revived Federation. Perhaps they may have felt themselves specially aggrieved, when the Siky6nian strangers whom they had allowed to become their citizens and their Presidents either could not or would not help them in their need. They did not secede ; they did not proclaim a new Confederation or a new President ; but they did agree to refuse for the time being all contributions to the Federal Treasury.^ The money thus saved was to be spent in hiring mercenaries, horse and foot, for their own defence.^ The historian gravely censures this act,* which the irpeiTpeural, one would think, were regularly commissioned by the State Governments of the three cities. They remind one of the irpea-pcvTal whom we have seen, on one or two occasions (see above, pp. 349, 363), commissioned by the State Governments, to the Federal Congress. At the same time, Polybios uses the word irpeapevriji somewhat loosely ; In one place (v. 27) he applies it to the persons who carried a message to King Philip from a division of the Macedonian army, and he calls the messengers sent by Flamininus to the Roman Senate irp^(r/3eis. xvii. 10 ; xviii. 25. ' See above, p. 191. 2 Pol. iv. 60. See above, pp. 11, 241. ' If these cities could hire mercenaries when the Federal Government could not, are we to infer that in Aohaia the credit of particular States stood higher than that of the Union ? * Pol. U.S. ToOro Sk wpd^avres {iT^p iih twv Ka8' airois Tpayiidroiv ipSexil'^'"^^ ^So^O''' jSejSovXeuffflai, irepl 5^ tuv koi,vwv ravavrla' iroviipas yap id)6Sov Kal irpo^dffeoK TOis /Soi/Ao/ifrois diaXieiy rb IBvos iSdKovv apxtyol Kal KaStiyc/J^ves yeyovivai. He then draws out this position at some length. Schom (p. 153) says, "Polybius tadelt zwar diesen Schritt, aber wie kann man es den Stadten verdenken, dass sie nicht langer zahlen woUen, da das Geld nicht zweckmassig angewandt wurde ! " This is rather dangerous ground to be taken by tax-payers, in any state. Federal or otherwise. Brandstater (p. 360) goes further still ; " Der Geschichtschreiber ereifert sioh gegen diesen Entschluss der drei Stadte mit dem grdssten Unrechte, indem er nur den VortheU des Bundes im Auge hat. " What else should he have in view ? This is the doctrine of Secession with a vengeance. 2 E 418 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. he looks on as specially unworthy of cities which might claim the honour of being the founders of the League. In such an emergency they were, he holds, justified in hiring mercenaries on their own account,^ but not in refusing to pay their Federal taxes. Such a refusal was not Secession, but it was Nullification ; it was, as Polybios says, dangerous as a precedent for any who might hereafter wish to secede. The Federal General, who was unable to protect them, was naturally equally unable to punish them. Their separate union probably lasted no longer than the immediate occasion. At the next election, a citizen of one of these very cities ^ was chosen President of the Union, and, soon after that, the j5]tolians were expelled from their post by King Philip, and the fort restored to the Dymaians.^ The choice of a Pharaian General, while it was probably an act of special con- cession to these cities, shows that they were not looked upon as rebellious or suspicious members. The Western Sonderbimd, if it is ever mentioned again, is mentioned only in one very obscure passage,* and then not in a way which implies that it was looked upon as a hostile or unconstitutional body. Loss and Among the military exploits of this year the most interesting, recovery from our point of view, is one in which we find an Achaian city ° ' really acting for itself, and not begging for Macedonian, or even for Federal, help. The main body of the ^tolians,^ under three of their chief leaders, Dorimachos himself being one, fell upon the Old-Achaian town of Aigeira, the defences of which seem to have been strangely neglected. The enemy were admitted in the night by a deserter, ^ and, while in the full swing of mas- sacre, they were attacked and driven out by the people of Aigeira themselves. This reminds one of Aratos' old exploit at PellSng,'' only the people of Aigeira had not wilfully allowed the enemy to occupy their city. Two of the -lEtolian leaders, 1 They ■would almost be justified by the provision in the American Constitu- tion (Art. i. § 10. 2) which forbids any State to Iceep troops or engage in war, unless actually invaded, etc. But the same article specially forbids any State to enter into any agreement or compact with any other State. Neither American nor Achaian foresight provided for the particular grievance of which these cities complained, namely that of an incapable Executive presiding over a bankrupt Treasury. 2 Epgratos of Pharai. Pol. iv. 82. = lb. 83. i lb. v. 94. See above, p. 219. ^ lb. iv. 57. Ti 7r\?)flos T(3v AlTaXup. " An jEtolian, who had deserted to the Achaians, and who now sought to win his pardon at home by this double treason. Pol. iv. 57. ' See above, p. 307. VIII LOSS AHD RECOVERY OF AIGEIRA 419 Alexander and Archidainos, were killed ; Dorimachos escaped, Dori- and his reputation among his countrymen does not seem to have machos been permanently damaged, for at the next election he succeeded Genera" his friend Skopas as General of the ^tolian League.^ Skopas b.o. 219- had distinguished his year of office by an inroad into Macedonia 218. and a barbarous devastation of the Macedonian sanctuary of Dion.2 Dorimachos began his year by a still more flagrant Sacrilege breach of Hellenic religion, the destruction of the venerated °^ t^? temple of Zeus at Ddddna.^ Philip's brilliant campaign in Pelo- ^d\o°^ ponnSsos is chiefly interesting to us, because, on the surrender and of the once Arkadian, but now Eleian, town of Ps6phis, he made D6d5na. it over, with many expressions of good will,* to his Achaian allies. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must Ps&phis suppose that Psdphis, like other Achaian acquisitions, was annexed admitted as a member of the League, with a vote in the ^ r"^ Achaian Assembly. But, as in other cases where strategic League. position or doubtful loyalty required the precaution, both the citadel and the town were secured by the presence of Federal garrisons.^ PsSphis was, as Philip took care to inform his friends, a valuable gift.^ An Achaian garrison there would do something to cover the exposed canton of Tritaia, and to hinder any more ^tolian visits to that of Kynaitha. But it does not appear that Philip now made over to the League any of the other cities which he took in Triphylia and the Eleian territory.' Phigaleia itself, the cause of the war, soon after the cession of Philip's Psdphis, dissatisfied with the jEtolian connexion, gladly sur- conquests rendered to Philip.* Apparently he kept this important position Lieia'^and in his own hands. In short, between Corinth, Orchomenos, and Triphylia. the Triphylian towns, the League was pretty well hemmed in by outlying Macedonian possessions. In all this there is nothing for which Philip can reasonably be blamed ; but who had caused the presence in Peloponnisos of Kings or of Macedonians at all ? 1 Pol. iv. 67. ' lb. ix. 62. s lb. 67. * rb. 72. 'ATeXoylffaro Si Kal rijv alpeinv xai t^i> eSvoiav fjv ^x<" "'P^s '''^ * This was done by authority of such of the 'Axai'Ko! Apxovres (Pol. u. s. ) as were present. The word would properly mean the Sri/j-iovpyol, but I do not remember another instance of their interfering in purely military affairs. * Pol. u. s. TV ixvplyrifra Kal T^v eixaiplav iiredelKUve t^s 7r6Xews tt/jAs rbr ij/e(TT&ra Tr6\€fiov. ^ The Triphylian towns remained Macedonian till B.C. 208, perhaps till B.o. 198. See Livy, xxviii. 8. Cf. xxxiii. 34. « Pol. iv. 79. 420 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE B.O. 219- 218. Relations between Philip and the League. Relations between Philip and Aratos. Dissatis- faction of the Mace- donian courtiers. It is also during the presidential year of the younger Aratos that we come across the beginnings of a remarkable story, which forms the best illustration of the unhappy policy of his father. We have seen that the alliance between Achaia, Macedonia, and the other allies was, in name at least, an equal alliance. The King of Macedonia seems, as a matter of course, to have been accepted as Commander-in-Chief of the whole Confederacy, but, whatever might be his practical powers, whatever might be the final results of so dangerous a partnership, nothing had yet been done which formally violated the independence of the League. The King of Macedonia might recommend, and it might be imprudent to neglect his recommendations ; still the Achaian Assembly really discussed and voted upon them ; the Achaian General was still the independent chief of an allied army, not merely the officer in command of a Macedonian division. The prudence, perhaps the generosity, of Antigonos had respected constitutional forms ; the lord of Corinth knew that his friend- ship or enmity was of vital moment to the League, and that any direct interference with its liberties would not repay the cost and the shame of the undertaking. Philip was young ; the evil that was in him had not yet shown itself ; he had accepted Aratos as his chief counsellor. The Sikydnian, with all his faults, was not a wilful traitor ; he had no pleasure in undoing his own glorious work; he had no temptation to sacrifice the dignity or the interest of his country, now that there was no KleomenSs to awaken national and personal rivalry. He had brought his country into what was practically a state of bondage, but he at least did what he could to lessen the bitterness of that bondage. As the adviser of the young King, he preached strict observance of justice and mercy, strict fidelity to treaties, strict respect for the rights of the Achaian League, and of every other power, allied or hostile. There were no more Tyrants whom it was lawful to get rid of at all hazards, and, when dealing with Com- monwealths or with lawful Kings, Aratos was as sensible as any man of the obligations of International Law. There was nothing galling in all this either to the mature prudence of Antigonos or to the- youthful generosity of Philip. But to some of the Mace- donian courtiers such a state of things was eminently unpleasing. In their eyes the Macedonians were the natural masters of the world ;' at all events they were the natural masters of Greece ; they had not come all this way to spend their blood and toil and vni RELATIONS BETWEEN PHILIP AND THE LEAGUE 421 treasure, merely as the equal allies of a cluster of petty republics. The Achaian League was, after all, little more than an associa- tion of rebels against the Macedonian Crown ; the restoration of Corinth had only put that Crown into possession of a part of its just rights ; no satisfaction had been made for the original insult and injiu-y of its capture, or for all the other sins of the League and its chief against the dignity of Macedon. It was unworthy of the successor of Alexander to act on terms of equality with republican Greeks ; if the Achaians wished for Macedonian help, let them become Macedonian subjects. They might keep their constitutional forms, if they pleased ; they might amuse them- selves by electing a General and meeting in a Federal Assembly. The Thessalians did something of the kind ; they too fancied themselves a republic, and piqued themselves on their re- publican freedom.! But they were practically Macedonian sub- jects all the same. The Achaians must be reduced to the same level. No one had thought of consulting a Thessalian Assembly as to any wrongs which Thessaly might have suffered from the ^tolians, nor must the Kjng of Macedon be any longer exposed to the indignity of consulting an Achaian Assembly either. The Thessalians obeyed the royal will without dispute or examination, and the Achaians must learn to do the like. Such thoughts, we may be sure, passed through the mind of many a Macedonian courtier and captain, beside him to whom the historian directly attributes the scheme for upsetting the liberties of Achaia. This was Apell^s, one of the great officers whom Plots of Antigonos had left as guardians of the young King, and who Apelles naturally had great influence with him. With the view of Achaian breaking in the Achaians to slavery, he began to encourage the freedom. Macedonian soldiers to insult and defraud their Achaian com- rades in all possible ways. Meanwhile he himself constantly inflicted corporal punishment on Achaian soldiers for the ^ Pol. iv. 76. BouXTj^eis rb twv 'A%ai(3i' ^6vos A/yayeiv eIs irapawXTja^ay Stii- $£ffLV Ty QeTToKwv . . . GerraXoi yhp iSdKovv pht Karot vdfiovs iroXiTeijetv Kal TToXi Si,a.(j>ipeiv M.aKeSbvwv, 8i4(p€poi' S' oidh, iXKh irav o/wim iiraaxo" Mafce- Sifft KoX irav inroiovv rh irpoffTaTTdfievov rots ^affiXtKols. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 255. We have seen already an illustration of their position in the fact that they were enrolled in the Macedonian Confederacy as an Independent power, but that no one thought it necessary to ask for the consent of the Thessalians to any of its acts. See ahove, pp. 389, 400, 409. In another place (vii. 12) Polybios speaks of Thessaly almost as of an integral part of the Macedonian Kingdom ; jueroi t6 irapaKa^eiv tt]v ^OffiXeiav rd re Karh QeTTdXiav Kai MaKedoviav Kal ep6vT(iis. ■' lb. 84. AokSiv '^vmivai n t^s irpoSiaews r& Si' airov KaBesTiiaBai rhv rav 'Axaiw^ (r7pa,TT)ybv, VIII ACCUSATION OF ARATOS BEFORE PHILIP 425 Eleian prisoners, captured Amphidamos, the General of the Affair of Eleian commonwealth.^ He dismissed him without ransom, ^^^^' and employed him as a messenger to invite his countrymen to exchange the ^tolian for the Macedonian alliance, promising in such case to respect their liberties and constitution.^ These offers were rejected at Elis, but the transaction seems to have awakened some suspicions against Amphidamos in the minds of his countrymen, for, shortly afterwards, while Philip was ravag- ing the Eleian territory, they determined to arrest him and send him prisoner to -lEtolia. Meanwhile ApellSs accused Aratos to Apelles the King as the cause of the refusal of the Eleians to treat, accuses He had, so his accuser said, dealt privately with Amphidamos, treason. and exhorted him to use his influence on the anti-Macedonian side, because it was against the common interest of Peloponn^sos for Philip to become master of Elis.* This last was certainly, in itself, a proposition too clear to be disputed by any patriotic Peloponnlsian, and it was quite reason enough for keeping Philip out of Greece altogether. Still such arguments would not, in the actual position of Aratos, have justified him in underhand dealings contrary to the general interests of the Confederacy. On this charge, Aratos, the deliverer of Pelopon- nSsos, the man who had been thirteen times President of the Achaian League, had to stand something like a trial before the Macedonian King.* He and his country could not have been subjected to greater indignities, if they had made up their minds to submit to the Federal headship of KleomenSs. Apelles brought his accusation ; he even ventured to add that the King, having met with such ingratitude at the hands of Aratos, would ^ Pol. iv. 84. '0 Tui' 'HXe/u:' a-Tpaniy6s. This need not necessarily imply that this General was the chief magistrate of Elis, and in earlier times the Eleian magis- trates bore other titles. See Tittmann, p. 366. Still it is not unlilcely that the Eleians, though their constitution was not Federal, may now have so far imitated the practice of other Greels states as to place a single General at the head of their commonwealth. ^ lb. AiJTOi)s i\ev0ipovs, d^poupijrous, d^o/JoXoyiJTOUs, XP"/'^"""' ™' ISlois iro\iTciiJ.as ^IXiitmi, ivSei)? &v (tItov Kal xP'lM''"'' e^s Tcls Swi/teis, avv^ye roiis 'AxaioiSs Std, top ApxiPTUv €k iKKX-qHav . This last phrase is the formula used elsewhere (see above, p. 214) to express the calling of an Assembly by the Federal General. [Cf. the relations of the Swiss Federation with France in 1777, and the Diet at Solothurn, summoned at the instance of Louis XVI., Blnntschli, Gesoh. des schweiz. Bundesrechtes, i. 293-4.] ^ Pol. U.S. 'Op&v rolls iiiv wepl rhv "Aparov ISeXoKaKovvras dtb, tV Te/)' tos apxaipeixlas yeyevir)idi'T)V els airoiis tCiv irepl ric 'AtteXX^;' KaKOTrpayiuxTirrjV. * Pol. V. 1. 'AJdpoiaBivTOs Si toO t\-/iBovs els Myiov Kark rods vS/iovs . . . ireicras oSv Tois dpxopras iierayayeiv t^p iKKlvrjirlav els ^tKvava. ' lb. Aa^i:v tI>v re irpea^irepov Kal rhv veiirepov "Aparov els rhs x^'/""- VIII TREASON OF APELlIs AGAINST PHILIP 427 blame upon Apellds, and begged them to be his friends as of old. Such an appeal was irresistible. In the adjourned Congress at Siky6n the influence of Aratos was used on behalf of Philip, and a liberal money-bill was the result. "^ ApellSs now took to schemes which, in a Macedonian officer, Treason of were even more guilty than any of his former evil deeds. He -A-pelles now entered on plans of direct treason against his own sovereign, pfaip. He had already alienated the King's mind from Alexander and Tauri6n, two of his best officers, and both of them among the guardians named by Antigonos. He now, in concert with the other two, Leontios and Megaleas, devised a plot by which all Philip's enterprises might be thwarted, till he should at last be sufficiently humbled to put himself wholly under their guidance. The details of this vile scheme, and the general details of Campaign the campaign, belong rather to Macedonian than to Federal °fB.o. 218. history. Philip and the Achaians fitted out a fleet and attacked KephallSnia, which had long acted as the ^tolian naval station. An all but successful assault on Palai, one of the towns in that island, was hindered by the arts of the traitors. Philip was as ubiquitous as usual ; he invaded Lakfinia ; he invaded ^tolia, and avenged the destruction of Dion by the destruction of Thermon.^ By rare prudence and forbearance he gradually Philip discovered, crushed, and punished the hateful plot of which he crushes had been the victim. Throughout, Aratos acted as his wisest ® P ° " counsellor, and was therefore made the constant object of insult, sometimes growing into personal violence,^ at the hands of the conspirators. It is interesting to trace, in the course of the The relations between Philip and the younger Arato.s gives us one of those strange glimpses of Grecian manners which we come across ever and anon. 'ESAicei d' 6 veavlffKos ipav toO ^Mirwov. (Plut. Ar. 50. ) Compare the relations of Kleomenes with Xenares (Kl. 3) and with Panteus. (c. 37. ) ^ Fifty talents down, as three months' pay for his army, seventeen talents a month as long aa he carried on the war in Peloponngsos, and com in ahundance {(tItov /ivpidSas, Pol. v. 1). If the Federal Government, a year before, could not pay its mercenaries (see above, p. 417), where did it find the materials for such a subsidy now ? But the passage is remarkable as showing the full power of taxation which was in the hands of the Federal Congress. It is a pity that we are not told how the money was to be raised. See above, p. 241. • * Polybios (v. 9-12) censures this act at great length, and doubtless with good reason. Yet it is not fifty years since British troops destroyed the public build- ings of Washington, and much more lately we have heard the savage yells of English newspapers crying for the destruction of Delhi and Peliin. * Pol. V. 15. Plut. Ar. 48. Brandstater's comment ; (p. 374) is curious, "Aratus wurde von der anti-achaischen Partei fast gesteinigt und nur durch des 428 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Weak adminiB- tration of Bplratos, B.C. 218- 217. Aratos General, B.C. 217- 216. story, several notices of the substantial, though perhaps rather unruly, freedom which the Macedonians still enjoyed under their Kings. Polybios carefully points out the almost equal terms on which the Macedonian army, not of assumption but of ancient right, addressed their sovereign,^ and we find one of the culprits, just as in the days of Alexander, tried and condemned by the military Assembly of the Macedonians.^ It is more important for our subject to trace one or two points connected with the domestic history of the League. The Pharaian General did not secure the safety even of his own and the neighbouring cantons. His utter incapacity, and the general lack of discipline which prevailed during his year, are strongly set forth by Polybios.^ Doubtless we here read the character of Ep^ratos as given by his political opponents, but, though there may be some exaggeration, there must be some groundwork for the picture. The .^tolians in Elis continued and increased their devastations in the western districts, and the cities in that quarter paid their contributions to the Federal Treasury with difficulty and reluctance.* The expression however shows that they were paid, so that the most objectionable resolve of the Sonderbund of the year before must have been rescinded. At the next election the elder Aratos was chosen General,^ — we now hear nothing of Macedonian influence either way — and then things began to brighten a little. Incapable as Aratos was in the open field, his genius was admirably adapted for winning back men's minds, and he seems easily to have allayed all discontents. He Kdnigs speoielle Theilaahme gerettet ; iiber die Beweggriinde sind verscMedeue Verniuthungen moglich." ^ Pol. V. 27. Wxov y^p del ttjv Tota&rijv Icnyyopiav MaKe36pes irpbs toi)s ^acriXeis. See above, p. 16. ^ lb. 29. UroKeiAmov . . . Kpivas iv roh 'M.aKeS6yiJ,a irepl roirav. 2 See above, p. 242. * Pol. iv. 69. See Brandstater, 365. « Pol. v. 93. See above, p. 199. ^ lb. 94. *0s [Ei)pt7rf5as] TTjp^ffas t^v tuv 'Axctiwv aivoSov, See above, p. 397. * Polybios (v. 94) gives as a reason for this selection, dta rb tovtov iiroaTp&r'qyov ilvai r/yre Tfjs s dirrii'TTiK/n-as tuv trv/j.fuix'oi' oi t4 irpis SiaXiaeis vpi.aaei.v dXXa TBI. irphs t6v irdXefiov, k.t.X. 2 I have not enlarged on Philip's campaign in PhSkis, or on his general rela- tions to the PhSkian League. There are some good remarks in Schorn, p. 164, note. Between .ffitolian enmity and Macedonian protection, it would seem that the Ph6kians had pretty well lost their independence. They are reckoned among the States which needed liberation after KynoskephalS. Liv. xxxiii. 32. Cf. c. 34 and Pol. xviii. 30. 3 Pol. V. 100. * See above, p. 409. * Schorn (169) remarks that the war injured Ptolemy by hindering him from hiring .iEtolian mercenaries as usual. Cf. Pol. v. 63, 4. 432 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Philip turns his mind towards Italy. B.C. 332- 326. B.o. 280- 274. Opening of a new period. Close con- nexion of the history of Eastern and "Western Europe from this date. indeed the mediators returned, tidings had reached him which changed his purpose. He was as anxious for war, as ambitious of conquest, as ever ; but his heart now began to be bent on war on a greater scale than the limits of Hellas could afford ; he began to dream of conquests greater than the destruction of Thermon or the colonization of Phthi6tic Thebes. Other Greek Kings had before now sought glory and conquest on the other side of the Hadriatic. Alexander of Epeiros had lost his life in battle against the invincible barbarians of Italy. Pyrrhos him- self, after useless victories, had returned to confess that the Macedonian sarissa had at last found more than its match in the Eoman broadsword. But the might of Philip was far greater than the might of either of the Molossian knights-errant. As King of Macedonia and Head of the Greek Alliance, he might summon the countrymen of Alexander and Pyrrhos as merely one contingent of his army. And Italy was now in a state which positively invited his arms. While he, the namesake of the great Philip, the successor of the great Alexander, the un- conquered chief of an unconquered nation, was wasting his strength on petty warfare with ^tolia and Lacedsemon, Hanni- bal was advancing, in the full swing of triumph, from the gates of Saguntum to the gates of Rome. It is with a feeling of sadness that the historian of Greece turns at this moment to behold the mighty strife which was waging in Western Europe, the struggle between the first of nations and the first of men. He feels that the interests of Achaia and .lEtolia, of Macedonia and Sparta, seem small beside the gigantic issue now pending between Eome and Hannibal. The feeling is something wholly different from that paltry wor- ship of brute force which looks down on " petty states," old or new. The political lessons to be drawn from the history of Achaia and .lEtolia are none the less momentous because the world contained other powers greater than either of the rival Leagues. Still it is with a mournful feeling that we quit a state of things where Greece is everything, where Greece and her colonies form the whole civilized world — a state of things in which, even when Greece is held in bondage, she is held in bondage by conquerors proud to adopt her name and arts and language — and turn to a state of things in which Greece and Macedonia form only one part of the world of war and politics, and that no longer its most important part. We have already AFFAIRS OF ITALY 433 seen the beginning of this change ; we have seen Eoman armies east of the Hadriatic ; we have seen Greek cities receive their freedom as a boon from a Eoman deliverer. ^ From this point the history of the two great peninsulas becomes closely interwoven. Greece and Macedonia gradually sink, from the position of equal allies and equal enemies, into the position, first of Roman de- pendencies and then of Roman provinces. We have now entered upon that long chain of events reaching down to our own times the History of Greece under Foreign Domination.^ Our guide synchro- has already begun diligently to mark the synchronisms of Greek nisms of and Roman history. Hannibal first cast his eyes on Saguntum ^reek and at the same time that Philip and the Congress of Corinth passed history. their first decree against the ^tolians.^ He laid siege to the city b.c. 220. at the time that the younger Aratos was chosen General* He ^'^"'S'„ took it while Philip was on his first triumphant march through Autumn -iEtolia.^ He crossed the Alps about the time that the first b.o. 219. Chian and Rhodian envoys came to Corinth.^ He defeated b.c. 218. Flaminius at Lake Trasimenus while Philip was besieging b.c 217. Phthi6tic Thebes.^ The news was slow in reaching Greece ; a Philip letter — from whom we know not — brought the important tidings '^^ ■^^^°^' to the King ; it was sent to him in Macedonia, and, not finding him there, followed him to Argos, where he was present at the Nemean Games.^ His evil genius was at his side ; D^m^trios of Influence Pharos, the double traitor to lUyria and to Rome, expelled from ° . ™®' his dominions by the Romans, had taken refuge with Philip, and pharos, was gradually supplanting Aratos as his chief counsellor. To him alone the King showed the letter ; the adventurer at once counselled peace with .^tolia and with all Greece ; but he coun- selled it only in order that Philip might husband all his strength for an Italian war. Now was the time, now that Rome was He fallingjifor the King of Macedonia to step in at once and to claim po""sel3 his share of the prize. We could have wished to see the argu- ence in ments of the Pharian drawn out at greater length. He could Italy. 1 See above, pp. 326-328. ^ This subject is at last concluded in the two final volumes of Mr. Finlay's great work, the most truly original history of our times. 3 Pol. iv. 28. * lb. 37. = lb. 66. « lb. v. 29. ' lb. 101. ^ lb. 101. The Nemean Games must therefore have been restored to Argos (see above, p. 313). When Argos became a city of the League, the Federal power could have no interest in asserting the rights of Kleonai, one of the smallest members of the Union, against Argos, one of the greatest. 2 F 434 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. not have looked upon Eome as completely overthrown ; for in that case Macedonian intervention would have been mere inter- ference with the rights of conquest on the part of Carthage. Hannibal's position must have seemed not so perfectly secure but that he would still be glad to accept of Macedonian help, and to yield to Macedonia a portion of the spoil. As Philip gave him- self out as the champion of Greek interests, the liberation of the' Greek cities in Italy and Sicily would afford him an honourable pretext for interference.^ To unite them to his Confederacy, perhaps covertly to his actual dominion, would be a natural object of his ambition. The Greek cities of Italy, which Car- thage had never possessed, would naturally fall to the lot of Macedonia. Even Sicily would hardly prove a stumbling-block. The surrender of the old claims of Carthage to dominion in that island would hardly be thought too dear a price for an alliance which, by rendering Italy no longer dangerous, would eifectually secure the Carthaginian dominion in Spain and Gaul. But the views of Philip at this time are mere matters of speculation. Before he actually concluded any treaty with Hannibal, the state of affairs had materially changed. When Philip was thus disposed, the negociation of peace was Opening not difficult. Without, as it would seem, even waiting for the Couoress i^^turn of the mediating envoys, he entered into communication of Nau- with the ^tolian Government,^ and gathered a Congress of his P^'^'"-'- O"*^!! Allies at Panormos.^ But he was determined that no man should think that he sought peace because he dreaded war. He again ravaged the territory of Elis ; and, while waiting for the arrival of the plenipotentiaries, he made the important conquest of Zakynthos. The ^tolian Assembly* met at Naupaktos; the Congress of the Allies was assembled on the opposite shore of Achaia. Philip sent over Aratos ^ — such is the language now used — with his own general Taurion ; their mission soon led to ^ See Platlie, GesohicMe Makedonieus, ii. 279. Thirlwall, viii. 278, note. See also the speech of Agelaos just below. ^ This was done through Kleonikos of Naupaktos, the Trpo^evos of Aohaia in MtoUa,, who was therefore exempted from slavery. See ahove, p. 45, note 3. The employment of Kleonikos for such a purpose is like the similar employment of Amphidamos of Elis. See p. 425. ^ P°'- J- 102. Upbs /j.h ras irviJ,iJ.axiSas iroXeis ypa/ifiaroipopovs i^anr^ffTciXc, TvapaKoKuiv wijj,ireiv rois (rvvedpeiaovTas Kal ixeBi^ovras Tiji iiirip tuv diakiffeuv KOLVoKoyias. ^ Ih. 103. Tois AiTMXois iravi-qiid crwriSpoiv\oi, while the Romans are dis- tinguished as . was not to be wholly despised. He was no longer needed as a principal ; still he might, especially with his fleet,^ be useful as an auxiliary. For such services it would be reward enough if the Roman possessions in his own neighbourhood were to be transferred to himself or his friends, and if Carthage, in any future war, gave him such help as he was now to give Hannibal. This seems to be the simple meaning of the Treaty in Polybios, and its terms agree very well with the position of things at the time. Position In this Treaty, P'hilip negociates as a Greek King, the head of assumed a great Greek alliance. How far he was justified in so doing, ■'^th'^*^'^ that is, how far his negociations were authorized by the Federal Treaty. Assemblies of Achaia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Boeotia, we have no means of judging. We have now lost the continuous guid- ance of Polybios, and we have to patch up our story how we can from the fragments of his history combined with the statements of later and inferior writers. Happy it is for us when the Roman copyist condescends to translate the illustrious Greek of whom he speaks in so patronizing a tone.^ But whether authorized or not, Philip speaks in this treaty as the head of a Greek alliance, almost as the acknowledged head of all Greece. As such, he demands that Korkyra, Epidamnos, and Apoll6nia be released from all dependence on Rome. Probably they were to be formally enrolled as members of the Grand Alliance ; practically they would most likely have sunk to the level of Thessaly, or even to that of Corinth and Orchomenos. As chief of such an alliance, Philip may not have been unwilling to stipu- late for Carthaginian aid in any future struggles with ^tolia. All this would practically amount to making himself something like chief of Greece, a chief who would doubtless be, in name, the constitutional head of a voluntary alliance, but a chief whose position might easily degenerate into practical Tyranny, or even, before long, into avowed Kingship. But no such schemes could possibly find a place in a public treaty concluded by Philip in his own name and in that of his Greek allies.^ In the later ^ Liv. xxiii. 33. Philippus Rex quaiii maxima olasse (ducentas aiitem naves videbatur effeotnrus) in Italiam trajiceret. ^ lb. XXX. 45. Polybins, hMvdquaguam spemendus auctor. lb. xxxiii. 10. Polybium seouti sumus, non incertum auctorem. ' One of Philip's envoys (Liv. xxiii. 39) was a MagnSsian. Does tHs simply shovr the utter subjection of Thessaly to Philip, or was S5sitheos armed with any commission from an imaginary Thessalian League ? viii EXPLANATION OF THE TREATY 443 writers, the simple terms recorded by Polybios gradually develope into much larger plans of conquest. The Treaty in Polybios provides for a joint war with Rome, but it contem- plates the possibility of that war being ended by a treaty with Rome, and it provides that, in such a case, certain definite cessions shall be made to Philip or his allies. After this, if Philip ever stood in need of Carthaginian help, Carthaginian help was to be forthcoming. In the copy in Livy these terms Livy'a swell into something widely different. Italy is to be definitely "f^^^ conquered for the benefit of Carthage by the joint powers of Treaty. Carthage and Macedonia; the allied armies are then to pass over into Greece ; they are to wage war with what Kings they pleased, and certain large territories, somewhat vaguely expressed, are to be annexed to Macedonia. PhiUp is to take all islands and continental cities which lie anywhere near to his Kingdom. ^ All this has evidently grown out of the stipulated cession of Korkyra and the Greek cities in lUyria. Appian goes a step further. In his version the Carthaginians are to possess all Appian's Italy, and then to help Philip in conquering Greece. ^ This was version, just the light in which the matter would look to a careless Greek writer of late times, who probably had his head full of Demosthenes and Alexander and the earlier Philip, and who had no clear idea of the real position of the Greek states at this particular time. Philip no doubt aimed at a supremacy of some sort over Greece, but, when negociating in the name of a great Greek Alliance, he could not well have publicly asked for Carthaginian help for the subjugation of Greece. In Z6naras we Version of reach a still further stage ; Hellas, Epeiros, and the islands are ^onaras. to be the prize of Philip, as Italy is to be the prize of Carthage. Now, in the genuine copy, Philip counts Macedonia as part of Hellas, and acts in the name of the Allied Powers, of which Epeiros was one. To ask for the subjugation of Hellas and Epeiros would have been quite inconsistent with his own language. There may of course have been secret articles, or the Romans may have tampered with the treaty ; these are questions to which no answer can be given. But the copy as given by 1 Liv. xxiii. 33.. Perdomita Italia, navigarent in Grseciam, bellumque cum quibus Regibiis placeret, gererent. Quae civitates ooiitinentis,"quffi insulae ad Maoedoniam vergunt, ese Philippi regnique ejus essent. " App. Mao. 1. *£Xi7nros . . (Te/iwe irpbs 'Arvlpav . . itnax'"'^/^''''^ "■^'^V ffu/x/iaxijo'c"' ^Ti Ti/v 'IrdKlav, el kS,k6ivos air^ avvBovro KarepyAffaffdaL riiv "EXKdSa. 444 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Import- ance of this Treaty in Federal History, Polybios seems perfectly to suit the conditions of the case, and the variations of later writers seem to be only exaggerations and misunderstandings naturally growing out of his statements. This Treaty had the effect of placing all the Federal States of Greece, except ^tolia, in a position of hostility towards Rome. It is therefore an event of no small moment in a general history of Federalism. It was the first step towards the overthrow of the earliest and most flourishing system of Federal common- wealths which the world ever saw. From the moment that any independent state became either the friend or the enemy of Rome, from that moment the destiny of that state was fixed. The war which I am about to describe made Achaia the enemy, and jEtolia the friend, of Rome ; but the doom of friend and of enemy was alike pronounced ; as it happened, the present friend was the first to be swallowed up. On the eve of such a struggle, a struggle in which the republican Greeks had certainly no direct interest, one would be glad to know how far the difierent Federa- tions really committed themselves to it by their own act, and how far Philip merely carried out ApelMs' principle of dealing with Achaia and Epeiros as no less bound to submission than Thessaly herself. However this may be, the Treaty was, in its terms, one which Philip contracted on behalf of his allies as well as of himself ; Rome therefore,- as a matter of course, dealt with all the allies of Philip as with enemies. It was however some time before the war directly touched any of the states of Pelo- ponnSsos. Philip's immediate object was to secure those cities on the lUyrian coast which were in alliance with Rome. They were to be, in any case, his share of the spoil ; if he stiU cherished any thoughts of an expedition into Italy, their possession seemed necessary as the first step. But he still found leisure to meddle in the affairs of Peloponnisos, for which his possession of Corinth, Orchomenos, and the Triphylian towns ^ gave him constant opportunities and excuses. His character was now rapidly cor- rupting; his adviser was no longer Aratos, but DSm^trios of Pharos. The first time that we hear of his presence is at Messing. In that city, the oligarchical government, which was in possession during the last war,^ had lately been overthrown by a democratic revolution.^ But there was a powerful discontented See above, p. 419. See above, p. 401. Pol. vin PHILIP'S INTERFERENCE AT MESS^Nfi 445 party, and new troubles seemed likely to break out. Botk the interfer- King of Macedonia and the President of the Achaian League, a p°^j.°^ place now filled by Aratos for the sixteenth ^ time, hastened to gf Aratos. MessSnS, both, we may suppose, in the avowed character of mediators. Certainly neither of them could have any other right to interfere in the internal quarrels of a city which was neither subject to the Macedonian Crown nor enrolled in the Achaian Confederation. Aratos, we may well believe, went with a sincere desire of preventing bloodshed, and not without some hope of persuading both parties that their safety and tran- quillity would be best secured by union with Achaia.^ With what views King Philip went was soon shown by the event. He arrived a day sooner than Aratos, and his arrival is spoken of in words which seem to show that he was anxious to outstrip him.3 The day thus gained he is said to have spent in working Disturb- on the passions of both parties, till the result was a massacre in ^^'^^ which the magistrates and two hundred other citizens perished.* phuip. The younger Aratos did not scruple to express himself strongly about such conduct ; ^ but the father still retained influence Last in- enough to persuade Philip, for very shame, to drop an infamous ^^™°g °*^ scheme, proposed to him by DSm^trios, for retaining the Mes- over sSnian citadel in his own hands."' The next year Philip's crimes Philip, increase ; he sends DSmetrios, on what pretence we know not, to Philip's attack Messing, an attempt in which the perfidious adventurer ^^°°°p^ ^^ lost his life.^ We next find him charged with adultery with Messing, B.C. 214. ' Ot fifteenth. See note at the end of the Chapter. ^ Plutarch's (Ar. 49) expression of pm)0u>v may mean anything or nothing. ^ Pol. vii. 13. 'kp&Tov KaSvarep-qaavTos. Plut. Ar. 49. "0 /i^» "Aparo! {laripu. Cf. aboye, p. 293. ■■ It seems quite impossible to reconcile the details of Plutarch's story (Ar. 49) with the direct statements of Polybios (vii. 9). Plutarch makes Philip ask the magistrates {^(rrpaT-qyol) if they have no laws to restrain the multitude, and then a.sk the multitude if they have no hands to resist tyrants. A tumult naturally arises, in which the magistrates are killed. Tliis story implies an oligarchic government, yet it is clear from Polybios that the government of Messene was now democratic, and Plutarch himself gives the magistrates the democratic style of ffTparriyol, not the aristocratic style of t^opoi. Still it is perfectly credible that Philip played, in some way or other, a double part between two factions, and encouraged the worst passions of both. * Plut. Ar. 50. '0 veavlaKos .... rSre X^7ui' eirre wpbs avrhv, us oiSk KcCKbs In (palvotTO ttiv 6\pi.v airif roiaCra Spdaas, dWA TdvTUiy ala-xu^ros. (See above, p. 426, note 5.) Was the subsequent business of Polykrateia at all meant as revenge for this insult ? •> See the story in Pol. vii. 11. Plut. Ar. 50. '' Pol. iii. 19. See Thirlwall, viii. 282, note. Cf. Paus. iv. 29. 1, who 446 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Death of Aratos, B.O. 213. Last days of Aratos, B.o. 213. Polykrateia, the wife of the younger Aratos, and lastly, stung by the reproaches of her father-in-law for his public and private misdeeds, he filled up the measure of his crimes by procuring the death of the elder Aratos by poison, i Aratos himseK believed that such was the cause of his death ; he spoke of his mortal illness as the reward of his friendship for Philip. ^ Philip was no doubt, by this time, quite degenerate enough for this or any other wickedness ; but one regrets to hear that his agent was Tauri6n, whose conduct has hitherto stood out in honourable contrast to that of the other Macedonian chiefs. Either now, or at some later time, Philip carried off Polykrateia into Mace- donia, and gave her husband drugs which destroyed his reason.^ In short, the gallant young King and faithful ally has de- generated into a cruel tyrant and a treacherous enemy. Thus died Aratos, the deliverer and the destroyer of Greece, while General of the League for the sixteenth or seventeenth time. His career had been spread over so long a space, it includes so many changes in the condition of Greece and of the world, that one is surprised to find that at his death he was no more than fifty-eight years of age.* Sad indeed was the fall of Philip's friend and victim from the bright promise of the youth who, thirty -eight years before, had driven the Tyrant out of characteristically confounds Demetrios the Pharian with Demetrios the son of Philip. 1 Pol. viu. 14. Plut. Ar. 52. ^ Poly bios (viii. 14) makes him say simply, raOra Ta-n-lx^Lpa rijs Mas, ffl Kc^dXwy, KeKOfjdff/JieBa ttjs irpbs ^CKiinrov. In Plutarch (Ar. 52) this becomes, ravT, c3 Ke^dX&w, Mx^i-pa ttjs /3a(riXiK^s s irapoLKoOvTas ifuv, oi l\ovs ixiv fx^ic Kal (rvfu/idxam iiroi.ii. xal t4 fiiv riKva koX ras ■yvvaiKas iiri.yovffi 'Fco/jloiol, ve(.(r6iieva dri\ov6n iiirep ei(c6s iari irdaxftv rots iirA ris tSk iWotpiXuv ireaoSaiv i^ovfflas' rk d' iSdtpTi KXtipovo/iOvn tuv ip-vxilKlmiiv MriiiKoi. 2 G 450 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Heroism of the Akar- Retreat of the jS)tolians. But the invaders met, at the hands of a whole people, with a resistance like that of the defenders of Numantia or of Mesolongi. Every inhabitant of Akarnania stood forth with the spirit of a Hofer or an Aloys Reding. Akarnania was a Federal Demo- cracy, but here at least Federalism did not imply weakness, nor did Democracy evaporate in empty vaunts. Women, children, and old men were sent into the friendly land of Epeiros ; every Akarnanian from sixteen to sixty swore not to return unless victorious ; their allies were conjured not to receive a single fugitive ; the Epeirots were prayed to bury the slain defenders of Akarnania under one mound, and to write over them the legend, " Here lie the Akarnanians, who died fighting for their country against the wrong and violence of the ^tolians." ^ Not that this heroic frame of mind at all led them to despise more ordinary help; they sent messengers praying King Philip to come with all speed to their aid. The invaders shrank and paused when they found the frontier guarded by men bent on so desperate a resistance.^ When they heard that Philip was actually on his march, the invincible ^tolians, harnessed as they were, turned themselves back in the day of battle. They departed, apparently without striking a blow, to enjoy the easier prey which the. Roman sword had won for them, and the difficulties and complications of Akarnania remained for the present unsolved. Condition Among the Peloponnesian states, Elis and Mess^n^ readily of Sparta, joj^etj the Roman and JEtolian alliance ; ^ but it was an important object vidth both sides to obtain the adhesion of Sparta. A series of revolutions had taken place in that city, some of them while the Social War was still going on, and some since its conclusion. Sedition of One Cheilon, a member of the royal family, who deemed himself to be unjustly deprived of the kingdom, raised a tumult, begin- ning his revolution with what was now the established practice of killing the Ephors. But he failed in an attempt to surprise King Lykourgos, and, finding that he had no partisans, he fled to Achaia.* A short time afterwards, the Ephors suspected King Cheilfin, B.O. 218 ^ Liv. xxvi. 25. Hie siti sunt Aoarnanes, qui, adversus vim et injuriam jBtolorum pro patria pugnantes, mortem occuhuerunt. Cf. Pol. ix. 40. ^ Liv. U.S. .ffitolorum impetum tardaverat primo conjurationis fama Acar- nanicae ; deinde auditus Philippi adventus regredi etiam in intimos ooegit iines. 3 Pol. ix. 30. J Ih. iv. 81. VIII RESISTANCE OF AKARNANIA 451 Lykourgos himself of treason, and he escaped with difficulty into Banish- ^tolia.^ Afterwards they found evidence of his innocence, and ™™' ™? sent for him home again.^ The other King Ag^sipolis is said to Ly^. have been expelled by Lykourgos after the death of his guardian ourgos, uncle KleomenSs.^ Certain it is that he is found as an exile and ^■°- ^^^' a wanderer many years after. Lykourgos left a son, Pelops,* AgSsipolis. who seems to have retained a nominal royalty in common with Pelops. a certain Machanidas, who is of course branded by Achaian jiacha- writers with the name of Tyrant.^ We must remember that the nidas. same title is freely lavished on KleomenSs himself.* It was jEtolian during the reign of Machanidas that the Ambassadors of the and Akar- rival Leagues of ^tolia and Akarnania came to plead their j;^t,asgigg respective causes at Sparta. Machanidas, Tyrant as he was, at Sparta, must have respected popular forms, for it is clear that the b-o- 210. speeches given by Polybios on this occasion ^ were addressed to a Popular Assembly. The .^tolian envoys were Kleonikos,^ of whom we have before heard, and Chlaineas, who was the chief speaker. He; sets forth the good deeds of jiEtolia, which are chiefly summed up in her resistance to Antipater and Brennus, and also the evil deeds of Macedonia, which fill up a much longer space. He tells the Lacedaemonians that whatever Antigonos had done in PeloponnSsos was done out of no love either for Achaian or Spartan freedom, but simply out of dread and envy of the power of Sparta and her victorious King. The speech of Speech of Lykiskos, the envoy from the Federal Government of Akarnania,^ ^ '^ °^' ' Pol. V. 29. It is worth notice that the vioi, who always figure conspicuously in the Spartan revolutions of this age, appear on this occasion on the side of the Ephors. The young were the party of Kleomenes, and Lykourgos was suspected of unfaithfulness to his principles. ^ lb. 91. ' Suohmustbe the meaning of Livy, zxxiv. 26. But he confounds this KleomenSs with the great KleomenSs ; Pulsus infans ah I/ycurgo tyranno post mortem Cleomenis, qui primus tyrannv^ Lacedcemone fuit. But what shall we say to a writer who tells us that Sparta had been subject to Tyrants per aliquot cetates ? Livy's seeeral generations stretch from the great Kleomenes to B.O. 195, about thirty years. * About Pelops, see Manso, iii. 369, 389. I do not however see the contradiction between the two passages, Livy, xxxiv. 32, and the fragment of DiodSros, 570 (iii. 105, Dindorf). But the matter is of very little importance. " I can see no ground for the violent description of Machanidas given by Mr. Donne in the Dictionary of Biography. He seems to fancy that Machanidas was a Tarentine by birth, heedless of Bishop Thirlwall's warning, viii. 298. ^ Pausanias (iv. 29. 10), by a strange confusion, makes Maclianidas immediately succeed Kleomenes. ' Pol. ix. 28-39. * lb. 37. See above, pp. 45, note 3, 434, note 2. ' lb. 32. See above, p. 115. 452 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE ohap. is more remarkable. It is an elaborate accusation of ^tolia and eulogy on Macedonia. It is worth notice, as showing that there was, on every question, a Macedonian side, which was really taken by many Greeks, and that we are not justified in looking at the whole history purely with Athenian eyes. In the eyes of Lykiskos, the representative of one of the most honourable and patriotic states in Greece, Macedonians, Spartans, and Achaians are equally Greeks ; ^ the elder Philip is the pious crusader who delivered Delphi from the PhSkian ; ^ Alexander is the champion of Hellas against the Barbarian, the hero who made Asia subject to the Greeks.^ Antigonos is of course the deliverer from the Tyranny of Kleomen^s, the restorer of the ancient constitution of Sparta.* The speaker sets forth with more force the services of Macedonia as the bulwark of Greece against Illyrian and Thracian Barbarians.^ The old sins of Mtoliik against Akarnania, Achaia, Bceotia, Sparta herself, are all strongly put forward ; * the orator enlarges on the late infamous treaty with Rome, the capture of Oiniadai and NSsos and Antikyra, their inhabitants carried off into barbarian bondage, and their desolate cities handed over to ^tolian masters.' He warns his hearers against the common peril ; war with Achaia and Mace- donia was, after all, a struggle for supremacy between different branches of the same nation ; war with Rome is a struggle for liberty and existence against a barbarian enemy. The ^toUans, in their envy and hatred against Macedonia, have brought a cloud from the west,^ which may possibly overwhelm Macedonia first, but which will, in the end, pour down its baleful contents upon the whole of Greece. The eloquence and the reasoning of Lykiskos were of no avail against that feeling of hatred towards Macedonia and ^' Pol. ix. 37. 'E^iXoTi/teicrfle jrpbs'Axauiiis Kal MaKeS6t'as 6ij,o(j>i\ovs. Cf. above, p. 437. Cf. Dion. xi. 13. MaKeddvuv Kal rwv fiXXwi' twv GvaTpaTevhvrtav 2 Pol. ix. 33. "'' lb. 34. 'Tirijicooj' iirolTiaB tV ' A-alav ToV'EKkrfai.v. * lb. 36. ''Sx§o.\ij>i> rbv Tipavvov Kcd rois vd/wvs Kal to Tdrptop iyXv airoKar- ^ffTTitye ToXiTevfia. ^ lb. 35. MaKed6ves ot rbv irXeiai toO /3£ou xpbvov oi) Traiovrai. Si.ayuvi^bp.aioi, irpbs Tois ^appipovs iirip rijs twv 'EXK^vuv iff^aXdas. Cf. Pol. xviii. 20. " lb. 34. See above, p. 306. ' lb. 39. See above, p. 449. * lb. 37. 'EinffTrairifJiei'OL ttjXikoCto c^0os dTri rijs iinripai. The same metaphor is found in the speech of Agelaos at Naupaktos seven years eai-lier. See above, p. 436. vin DEBATE AT SPARTA 453 Achaia, which had been the ruling passion at Sparta ever since the Kleomenic War. Sparta joined the ^tolian alliance ; under Sparta in her sole and enterprising King — I see no reason to refuse him alliance the title — she soon began to take a vigorous share in the war. ^joHa. Achaia was now pressed by Sparta and Elis, just as she had been in the Social War. But she soon found that she had also to deal with an enemy far more terrible than any that could be found on her own side of the Ionian Sea. Publius Sulpicius now Naval succeeded Lsevinus in the command of the Eoman fleet. He and g ^J*™.® °^ Dorimachos first attempted to relieve Echinos, one of the ^tolian b.c. 210.' possessions on the Maliac Gulf, which was now besieged by Philip. The attempt failed, and the city soon after surrendered to the King.^ An easier enterprise was presented by the Achaian Desola- island of Aigina. The city was taken ; by the terms of the 'j?" °^ treaty, the moveables belonged to Rome, the real property to .^tolia. Thus the whole AiginStan population became slaves, and it was with a very bad grace that Publius allowed them even to be ransomed.^ As for the soil and buildings of the island, those the -^tolians sold for thirty talents to their ally King Attalos.^ Thus did an illustrious Greek island, a Canton of the Achaian League, see its inhabitants carried away by barbarian conquerors, and its soil become an outlying possession of a half- barbarian King. Meanwhile Machanidas was attacking the Achaian territory from the south, and the ^tolians were, as usual, plundering the north-west coast.* The President Euryle6n, whatever may have been his political merits, was in warfare only too apt a disciple of the school of Aratos.^ The League was once The more driven to ask help from Philip.* League Possibly they might have dispensed with his help altogether ; *!''p,'?f.''' at all events they might have confined themselves to asking for g.c. 209.' a fleet to guard their coasts. The League was now fully able to contend single-handed against any enemies that PeloponnSsos could send forth. If a new KleomenSs had arisen to threaten her southern frontier, that frontier was now guarded by a new Lydiadas, and there was no Aratos to thwart or to betray the plans of the new-found hero. Now that Aratos was dead, Philo- P'i^jio- poimSn had returned to his native land. He was at once elected q^™™] ^f Cavalry. > Pol. ix. 42. 2 lb. Cf. xi. 6. ' lb. xxiil. 8. ■* Liv. xxvii. 29. " Pol. X. 21 (24). Eipv\4ui' 6 tQv 'Axatuv arpaTniyis firoXjuos ^v Kal To\efUKijs Xpelas dWdrptos. * Liv. xxvli. 29. 454 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Abuses in the Achaian Cavalry. Philo- poimSn's reforms. to the office of Master of the Horse, or Commander of the Federal Cavalry/ a post which was generally understood to be a step to that of General of the League.^ The whole military system of Achaia had become utterly rotten during the long administration of Aratos, but the ease with which Philopoim^n was able thoroughly to reform it shows that the nation must have had in it the raw material of excellent soldiers. He began, as a wise man should do, by reforming his own department. His predecessors had allowed every kind of abuse. Some had mis- managed matters through sheer incapacity, some through mis- guided zeal ; ' some had tolerated lack of discipline to serve their own ambitious purposes. The cavalry was composed of wealthy citizens, of those whose favour had most weight in the disposal of political influence, and whose votes would commonly confer the office of General.* Some Masters of the Horse had knowingly winked at every sort of licence, hoping to make political capital out of a popularity so unworthily gained. Men bound to personal service were allowed to send wretched substitutes, and the whole service was in every way neglected. PhilopoimSn soon brought the young nobles of Achaia to a more patriotic frame of mind. He went through the cities of the League ; ^ by every sort of official and personal influence he worked on the minds of the horsemen, he led them to take a pride in military service, and carefully practised them in the necessary lessons of their craft. An efficient body of Achaian cavalry seemed suddenly to have sprung out of the ground at the bidding of an enchanter.^ 1 'Iwirdpxris. See above, pp. 219, 429. - This is implied by Polybios, x. 22 (25) ; ol d^ ttjs (TTparriylas dpeyS/ievoi. Sia rairris ttjs dpxvs, k.t.X. Cf. Plut. Phil. 7. ^ Pol. X. 22 (25). Aik ttjv Idlav advvafiiav . . . Sid ttjv KO.Ko^tjki(iVf k,t.\. ^ See above, p. 230, note 2. = Plut. Phil. 7. Tas TriXeis iirLiiiv. ^ Paus. viii. 49. 7. "EiiraviiKav Se is Meyd'\7)v wSKtv airUa iirb tQv 'Axaiwv ■^priTO S,pxew [xai] toC linnKoO Kal (TS.s ipiarovs 'SW'/ivui' diritpaivev Iwireiiieui, PhilopoimSn was more fortunate in his reform of the Achaian cavalry than Washington in his attempt to raise a volunteer cavalry of the same sort in 1778. " Sensible of the difficulty of recruiting infantry, as well as of the vast import- ance of a superiority in point of cavalry, and calculating on the patriotism of the young and the wealthy, if the means should be furnished them of serving their country in a character which would be compatible with their feelings, and with that pride of station which exists everywhere, it was earnestly recommended by Congress to the young gentlemen of property and spirit in the several states, to embody themselves into troops of cavalry, to serve without pay till the close of the year. Provisions were to be found for themselves and horses, and compensa- tion to be made for any horses which might be lost in the service. This resolution VIII PHILOPOIMEN REFORMS THE ACHAIAN CAVALRY 455 The Achaians had placed the worthiest man of Greece in the King second place of their commonwealth, with every prospect of -^ttalos rising before long to the first. The rival League meanwhile made general of a stranger election. The Achaians had once given' to a Ptolemy jEtolia, the nominal command of all their forces;^ the ^tolians now ^■''- 2''^- invested Attalos with what seems to have been meant to be a more practical Generalship.^ For, as the King of Pergamos was taking an active part in the war, his election was quite another matter from the purely honorary dignity which the Achaians had conferred upon Ptolemy Philadelphos. Attalos first sent troops into Phthi6tis, and then came in person to what was now his own island of Aigina. Philip, on his march towards Pelopon- nSsos, defeated near Lamia a combined Eoman, .^Etolian, and Pergamenian force, and compelled the defeated .^tolians to retreat into the city. Things had strangely turned about since b.o. 323- the days when Lamia had been the scene of a war in which 322. Macedonians appeared as the oppressors, and ^tolians as the defenders, of Greece. Before Attalos had reached Aigina, Attempts ambassadors from Egypt, Rhodes, and Chios appeared in Philip's *.' m^dia- camp to offer their mediation ; and one almost smiles to read ^ ^f that the diplomatic body was on this occasion swelled by an Rhodes, envoy or envoys from Athens. We seem to be reading over ^tc again the history of the Social War. All parties seemed inclined for peace ; men's eyes began to open to the folly of letting Greece become the battle-ground of Macedonia, Rome, and Pergamos.^ The ^tolians brought forward as a mediator a power of whom we have seldom before heard in Grecian affairs, Athamania and its King Amynander. This chief was the prince of a semi-Hellenic tribe, whose territories were surrounded by those of the ^tolian and Epeirot Leagues and of the Thessalian did not produce the effect expected from it. The volunteers were few, and late in joining the army. " Marshall's Life of Washington, iii. 492. 1 See above, p. 302. 2 Livy's statements are exceedingly confused. He says first (xxvii. 29), Attaliim quoque Regem Asice, quid, ^toli summum gentis sum magislratum ad eum proximo concilio detulerunt, fama erat in 3wrop(im trajeclitrum. Presently (c. 30) we iind ^toli, duce Pyrrhia, qui prwtor in eum annum cum dbsente A Italo creatus erat. This might mean either that Attalos was chosen to be the regular General of the League, with Pyrrhias for his Lieutenant, or that Attalos W.1S made crpaniybs airoKpaTiap (cf. above, p. 377), Pyrrhias being the regular General of the year. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 288. ^ Liv. xxvii. 30. 07nnium autem rum tanta pro JEtolis cura erat . . . quam ne Philippus regnumque ejus rebus Graiciee, grave libertati futurum, immisceretur. So, just aSter, Ne caussa aut Romanis aut Attalo intrandi Orcedam esset. 456 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. dependents of Philip. The Athamanians took a share on the patriotic side in the Lamian War,^ but since then their name has not been mentioned. Probably the tribe rose to independence during the decay of the Molossian Kingdom, and, on its fall, continued to form a separate principality, instead of joining the Epeirot League. Of Amynander himself we shall often hear again. Under his mediation, a truce was agreed upon, and a diplomatic • Conference was appointed to be held at Aigion, simultaneously, it would seem, with a meeting of the Achaian Federal Assembly.^ Any treaty which might be agreed upon could thus be at once ratified by the two most important members of the Macedonian alliance, by Philip himself and by the Achaian League. Meanwhile King Attaios was to be warned off or hindered from an attack on Euboia, which he Philip at was supposed to meditate. Philip spent the time of truce at •^g°s. Argos. It would have been very hard for any member of the Antigonid dynasty to make out his descent from the old Macedonian Kings, but, on the strength of such supposed connexion, the Argeian origin of Philip was asserted and allowed. In compliment to this mythical kindred, Philip was chosen to preside both at the local festival of the HSraia and at the Pan-hellenic Games of Nemea.^ The management of this great national festival was wholly a matter of Cantonal and not of Federal concern ; it was a vote of the Argeian people, not of the Achaian Government or Assembly, which conferred this high honour upon Philip.* Between the two celebrations, the King attended the Conference at Aigion. Conference But meanwhile Attaios had reached, not indeed Euboia, but **^lo9°' ^^^ °^^ island of Aigina; the Roman fleet also had reached Naupaktos ; the presence of such powerful allies drove away any feelings of Pan-hellenic patriotism which were beginning to arise in the minds of ^the -(Etolians. The war had certainly not been glorious for them ; all that they had done had been to enter into possession of empty cities conquered for them by the ' Diod. xviii. 11. [On the Athamanians of. Strabo, ix. 4. 11.] ^ This seems to be the meaning of the two expressions of Livy (xxvii. 30). De pace dilata consultatio est in concilium Achceorum ; concUio et locus et dies certa indicia. And, just after, ^gium profectus est [PhUippus^ ad indicium multo ante sociorum concilium. ' See above, pp. 313, 433. ^ As in the case of the Isthmian Games, wlien Corinth was Achaian. See above, p. 327. VIII INEFFECTUAL CONFERENCE AT AIGION 457 Roman arms. Philip had taken Echinos in their despite ; he had beaten them and their allies before Lamia ; their attack on Akarnania had been baffled by the heroism of the Akarnanians themselves. But, with the forces of Eome and Pergamos on either side of Greece, they recovered an even greater degree of presumption than usual. It was perhaps through an affectation Demands of disinterestedness that they made no demands for themselves, °!,*,? but they made very inadmissible demands on behalf of their several allies. Besides some cessions of barbarian territory to their Illyrian friends, Atintania was demanded for the Romans; and Pylos for the Messenians. It is not very clear in whose hands Atintania then was ; it was demanded for Rome as a " reunion," ^ yet it does not seem ever to have been in the possession of the Republic ; at an earlier time it seems to have been Epeirot,^ at a later time we shall find it Macedonian. At all events, Philip, who so ardently desired to expel the Romans from Apoll6nia and the neighbouring cities, and who had so lately defeated Romans, jEtolians, and Pergamenians both in sieges and in the open field, was not willing to allow a strip of Roman territory to be interposed between himself and his Epeirot allies. And, whichever Pylos is intended,^ it is hard to see on what grounds MessSn^ could just now claim an increase, or even a restitution, of territory. A spontaneous offering on the part of Philip might have been a graceful atonement for former wrongs ; but it was hardly a cession which could be demanded of a victorious prince at a diplomatic conference. It is not Negocia- wonderful that, on the receipt of such an ultimatum, Philip ''°°J abruptly broke off the negotiation. He retired to Argos, and there began the celebration of the Nemean Games, when he ' Liv. xxvii. 30. Postremo negarunt dirimi 1561111111 posse, nisi Messeniis Aoliffii Pylum reddereut, Romanis restitueretur Atintania, Scerdilsedo et Pleurato Ardysei. ^ See Pol. ii. 5, 11. It was admitted to Roman friendship in B.C. 229; liardly ground enough for the phrase restitueretur twenty years later. ^ According to Livy, the Achaians were to surrender Pylos. But it is quite impossible that either the Triphylian or the Messenian Pylos can now have been in the hands of the League. Philip had conquered Triphylia in the Social War, and he had not yet given it to the Achaians. (Liv. xxviii. 8.) It is quite possible that Philip may have seized on the other Pylos in one of his Messenian expeditions, but it is still harder to conceive that this can have been an Achaiau possession. Whichever Pylos is meant, it is clearly of Philip that the cession was demanded. Here, as throughout the period, we have to deplore the loss of the continuous narrative of Polybios. Sohorn (p. 186) accepts the Achaian possession of the Messunian Pylos. 458 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Philip repulses the Romans. His alter- nate de- bauchery and ac- tivity. Exploits of Philip and Philo- poimSn. heard that Sulpicius had landed between Siky6n and Corinth. With that activity which he could always show when he chose, he hastened to the spot with his cavalry, attacked the Romans while engaged in plunder, and drove them back to their fleet, which retired to Naupaktos. He returned to Argos, finished the celebration of the festival, and then, casting aside his purple and diadem, affected to lead the life of a private citizen in the city of his ancestors. But, if he laid aside the King, he did not lay aside the Tyrant ; he made his supposed fellow-citizens s'ufi'er under the bitterest excesses of royal lust and insolence. ^ He was roused from his debaucheries by the most threatening of all news for the Achaian cities, the news that an j3Etolian force had been received at Elis.^ The luxurious Tyrant was at once changed into the active King and the faithful ally;^ he marched to DymS, where he was met by Kykliadas the General of the League, and by Philopoimte, who was still the Commander of the Federal Cavalry.* In a battle by the river Larisos, the -iSltolians were defeated, and PhilopoimSn slew with his own hand Damophantos, who filled the same post in the Eleian army which he himself did in that of Achaia.^ In another battle, the allies unexpectedly found that they had Romans to contend with as well as j3Etolians and Eleians, and after a sharp struggle, in which Philip displayed great personal courage, they had to retreat.* The advantages of the fight however seemed to remain with the allies, who ravaged Elis without let or hindrance. One of the constant invasions of Macedonia by the neighbouring barbarians called Philip back to the defence of his own kingdom, 1 Pol. X. 26. Liv. xxvii. 31. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 289. ^ Livy's notions of Grecian politics may be estimated by his idea that Elis was a State which had seceded from the Achaian League ; Eleorwm accensi odio, quod a ceteris Achceis dissentirent. (xxvii. 31.) What can he have found and mis- understood in his Polybios ? ^ "Durch die Verhaltuisse gezwungen erduldeten die Biirger nnwtirdige Schmaoh und Beschimpfung ; denn Philipp war ihr Schutzherr gegen Peinde, denen der Staat die Spitze uicht bieten konnte." Schorn, 189. '' One is almost tempted to believe that Philopoim§n filled the office of Master of the Horse for two years together, as we shall find that he afterwards did with the Generalship itself. But, if we accfept the belief of Schorn (210-4), considered probable by Thirlwall (viii. 295), that the Achaian Federal elections were now (ever since B.o. 217) held in the Autumn, it is possible that all the reforms and exploits of Philopoimen may have taken place during the one Presidency of Kykliadas, from November, 210, to November, 209. There would not however be the same political objection to the re-election of the irirdpxn^ which there was to that of the v, Ai>a\apiii> ttjv diva/uv iK t-?s 2,icoToicy7is flp/iijire aTeiduiv KaTaTaxv""-^ Kal TTTO^aas Siaffvpai t^ aivoSov airiov. rod fiiv odv ffvW6yov Ka6vi7T^p€L. Liv. xxviii. 5. Eo nuntiatum est, concilium .ffltolis Heracleam indictum, Regemque Attalum, ad consultandum de summS belli, venturum. Huno con- ventum, ut tnrbaret . subito adventu, magnis itineribus Heracleam duxit. Et concilio quidem dimisso jam venit. Both Schorn (191) and Thirlwall (viii. 292, 293) take this meeting for a General Assembly. Certainly aivoSos and Concilium are the regular words for such an Assembly, yet the words of Polybios seem to imply that the S.pxovT€s themselves formed the aiipoSos, and did not merely summon it. 460 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE to bring about a peace, and their envoys, as well as others from Eome, sent doubtless on an opposite errand, were present at the meeting at HSrakleia.'^ We have before seen the jEtolians select the time of meeting of the Achaian Federal Congress as the time best suited for a safe and profitable inroad into the Achaian territory.^ Philip now sought to repay them in their own coin ; he hoped to surprise them in the act of debate, as the Mede6nians had once surprised them in the act of election.' He came however too late ; the meeting, whether of the whole ^tolian body or only of the Senate, had already dispersed. The Egyptian and Ehodian ambassadors still continued to labour for peace, but it is almost impossible to follow their movements in detail,* and as yet both the contending parties still preferred to make themselves ready for battle. We soon after find Philip at Aigion at an Achaian Assembly. He there made over to his allies certain Peloponn^sian districts which had been in Mace- donian possession since the Social, some perhaps even since the Kleomenic, War.^ These were the Arkadian city of H^raia, which had once been a member of the League,^ and the whole district of Triphylia,'^ which had never before been part of the Achaian body. Philip also restored to the State of Megalopolis the town of Alipheira, which he had taken in the Social War. This was an old possession of Megalopolis, which Lydiadas, in the days of his Tyranny, had exchanged with the Eleians for some compensation which is not distinctly ex- plained. ^ This increase of territory would extend the boundary ' Liv. xxviii. 7. ^ See above, pp. 397, 429. ^ gg^ above, p. 323. ' Livy (u.a.) makes the Egyptian and Ehodian envoys meet Philip at Elateia ; he tells them that the war is not his fault, and that he is anxious for peace ; the conference is broken up by the news that Machanidas is going to attack the Eleians during the Olympic Games. Philip goes to oppose him, Machanidas retreats, and Philip then goes to Aigion. Now this is evidently one of Livy's confusions. The Eleians were allies of Machanidas and enemies of Philip. Livy's narrative also gives no place for the speech of the Rhodian envoys (Pol. xi. 5) addressed to an -ffitolian Popular Assembly (oS iroWoi, o. 6), which cannot be the one at Herakleia, because the presence of Macedonian ambassadors (oi irapa toO iiXlirirav 7r/j^(r/3eis) is distinctly mentioned. I can really make nothing of the account in Appian, Mac. ii. 1, 2. See Thirlwall, viii. 295. One thing however is clear ; from about this time (Livy, xxix. 12) Rome, Pergamos, and Carthage take no active share in the war ; it is reduced to the old Greek limits of the Social War. 5 Pol. ii. 54 ; iv. 77 et seqq. « See above, p. 314. ' Liv. xxviii. 8. See above, p. 419. ° Pol. iv. 77. 'HXeioi TTpo(xeKa§ov7o Kal rr]v t(2v ^AXupupiwv ir6\i.v, odaav viii PHILIP'S CESSIONS TO THE ACHAIANS ' 461 of the League to the Ionian Sea, and would interpose part of Achaia between Elis and Mess^ne. If it was really made over to the League at this time,^ it was an important acquisition, and one made at an opportune moment. The League could now, as of old, afford to liberate Grecian cities, for it was now able to withstand any Grecian enemy by its own unassisted force. Philopoimen was now at last chosen General of the League.^ Philo- For the first time since Markos and Lydiadas the Achaians had po""^n at their head a man capable of fighting a battle. Aristomachos, ^j ^jjg it may be remembered, had once wished to fight one, but he was League, hindered by Aratos.^ During the long administration of Aratos, ^•°- ^^^~ pitched battles were rare, and victories altogether unknown. The Old-Achaian cities had never been distinguished for martial spirit ; and the Arkadian and Argolic members of the League seem generally, on becoming Achaian, to have sunk to the Achaian level. At Megalopolis and Argos indeed things were in a better state ; we have seen the League, on one occasion, calling, in a marked way, for Argeian and Megalopolitan contingents ; * and the Megalopolitan phalanx had been, even in the days of the Kleomenic War, reformed after the Macedonian model.^ Else- where, whatever military spirit there was had died away under ineffi- Aratos. His successors, Eiu'yledn, Kykliadas, and Nikias, seem ciency to have been as incapable as himself of commanding in the open Achaian field, and not to have redeemed the deficiency by his diplomatic army. powers or his skill in sudden siu'prises. Polybios ^ speaks with utter contempt of the Generals of this time, and w,e have seen ^1 dpx^s vir' 'ApKaSlav Kal Heyd\r]!> viXtv, AvSidSov toG MfYoXoTroXfTou fcarck rijv TvpavvLda irpds rtvas iSias Tpd^eis dX\a77^i' SdvTOS Toh 'HXefots. ' I speak thus doubtiugly, because we find these towns, at a later time, again in the hands of Philip, and again ceded by him to the League. Liv. xxxii. 6 ; xxxiii. 34. ^ See Schorn, 195; Thirlwall, viii. 295. That Philopoimen commanded at Mantineia as General of the League is clear from the whole story, and follows from Plutarch's words (Phil. 11), (rTparriyovvTa t6 Stircpov, which otherwise are not very clear. According to Schom's view, he would be elected in November B.C. 208, so that he would be best called the General of the year B.C. 207 ; whereas, under the earlier system, the greater part of the ofiBcial year fell in the same natural year as the election. The succession seems to have been 211-0 Euryleon ; 210-9 Kykliadas ; 209-8 Nikias (Liv. xxviii. 8) ; 208-7 Philopoimen. 3 See above, p. 346. * See above, p. 429. 5 PoL iv. 69. See Brandstater, p. 365. ^ He says (xi. 8) that there are three ways of attaining to military skill, by scientific study [Sib, twv {/TofivTifidTtav Kal rijs iK roiiTtav KaTaffKeurjs), by instruc- mens Reforms, 482 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. that one common path to the highest office in the state was a course of gross and wilful negligence in the administration of the post next in importance. ^ The League had learned, in the early days of Aratos, to trust to Egyptian subsidies, to diplo- matic craft, or, at most, to midnight surprises ; latterly they had trusted to Macedonian help,^ and to mercenaries, who never fought with real zeal in the service of a common weath.^ But the League had now at its head a man who was a native of the most military city of the Union, who had given his whole life to the study of the military art, and whose most ardent desire was to see the League really independent. Philopoim^n longed to see his country defended by the arms of her own citizens, not by mercenaries indifferent to her cause, or by foreign Kings who used the Achaian League only as an instrument for their own Philopoi- purposes. As Master of the Horse, he had reformed the Achaian cavalry ; as General, he determined to reform the whole military system of the League.* After so long a period of neglect, reform might have seemed almost hopeless. Philopoimen had first to carry proposals for improvement through a democratic Assembly ; he had then to impose a course of severe discipline upon men who were in the least favourable condition for it. He had not, like his contemporary Hannibal, to bring brave but untutored warriors under the restraints of military order ; he had the more difficult task before him of making soldiers out of the citizens of a highly-civilized and somewhat luxurious nation. The forms of the Achaian constitution probably helped him in his work. If he gained his first point, he gained everything. In the three days' session of the Achaian Assembly, it was possible that his proposals might be wholly rejected ; it was not likely that they tion from men of experience, and by actual experience of a man's own. The Achaian Generals at this time were altogether unversed in any one of the three ; irdvTiiiv fiaav Toirav a.vevvkTp-01. ol rav 'Kxaiuv ffTpaTTjyol airXus, ^ See above, p. 454. ' Plutarch (Phil. 8) gives a good picture of the state of things in these respects. ' Pol. xi. 13. Under a Tyranny, he tells us, mercenaries fight well, because their master will reward them, and will use them, if victorious, for future con- quests ; but citizens fight ill (cf. Herod, v. 78), because they fight for a master and not for themselves. Under a Democracy, on the other hand, citizens fight well, because^they fight for their own freedom, but mercenaries fight ill, because, the more successful the commonwealth is, the less it will need their services. * The admirable summary of Philopoimgn's reforms by Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 295-8) makes one almost shrink from going again over the same ground. I have tried to bring out a few special points into prominence. VIII PHILOPOIMEN'S REFORMS 463 should be criticized, spoiled, patched, and pared down in detail. When his proposals were agreed to, it was doubtless a hard task to carry out his scheme in practice ; yet his position had several marked advantages. He had already reformed the service which was fiUed by the highest class, and he had something like a model infantry to show in the contingent of his own city. And, when he had once received the necessary authority from the assembled People, he had almost imliniited powers for the execution of his plans. There was no King and no Ministry to thwart him ; there were no Councillors or Commissioners to meddle ; there was no mob of a metropolis to be cringed to ; above all, there were no Special Correspondents to vex the soul of the hero.^ He had simply to deal with a people whose intellect he had already convinced, a people who had themselves raised him to his high office, a people whose fault was certainly not that of disobedience, fickleness, or ingratitude towards the leaders whom they placed at their head. One vigorous speech in the Assembly ^ — probably at the Meeting where he was chosen General — settled everything. Let the Achaians, he told them, retain their fondness for elegance and splendour; but let it be turned towards fine arms rather than towards fine clothes and fine furniture ; ^ let men vie with one another, not in objects of mere luxury and show, but in those whose possession would of itself prompt them to vigorous and patriotic action. Eight months of severe training put Philopoim^n at the head of an Achaian phalanx which he could really trust. Their short spears and small shields were exchanged for the full panoply and long sarissa of the Macedonians ; they were practised in every evolu- tion of the phalanx; and, before his year of office was over, Philopoim^n assembled at Mantineia a force with which he did not dread to meet the power of Sparta in the open field. He did not wholly give up the use of mercenary troops, but strangers and citizens had now changed places. His mercenaries were now mainly Illyrian and other light-armed soldiers ; the real strength of his army lay in the native phalanx and native cavalry * of the League. 1 Contrast the good luck of Philopoimen iu these respects with the position of a Spartan, Byzantine, Venetian, or Dutch General in past times, or of an English or American General in our own day. 2 Pol. xi. 10. » Pol. xi. 9. Plut. Phil. 9. * As the Tarentines (Pol. xi. 12. Liv. xxxv. 28, 29. Thirlwall, viii. 298) on both sides were not natives of Tarentum, but only a particular sort of cavalry, 464 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE The Three Battles of Mantineia : B.C. 418. B.C. 362. Third Battle of Mantineia, B.O. 207. With this new force the Achaian General met the Spartan King in a pitched battle near Mantineia.^ It was the third great battle fought on the same, or nearly the same, ground.^ Here, in the interval between the two parts of the Pelopon- nesian War, had Agis restored the glory of Sparta after her humiliation at Sphaktiria ; here Epamein6ndas had fallen in the moment of victory ; here now was to be fought the last great battle of independent Greece. One regrets that, at such a moment, the forces of the two worthiest of Grecian states should have been arrayed against each other ; still it cannot be without interest that we behold the last act of the long drama of internal Hellenic warfare. Rome, Carthage, Pergamos,^ even Mace- donia, had for a while withdrawn from the scene ; the struggle was to be waged, as of old, between Grecian generals command- ing Grecian armies. If there were foreigners engaged on either side, they were mere auxiliaries, like the barbarian troops which had appeared in PeloponnSsos even in the days of Epamein6ndas.* And we have no reason to doubt that Machanidas was a worthy foe, even of Philopoim^n. His name of Tyrant he shares with the great Kleomenis ; but he was as clearly a real national leader as Kleomen^s himself. It is the old strife, the old hatred, between Sparta and the city founded by Epamein6ndas. Machanidas marched forth, expecting a certain victory ; like earlier chiefs of his nation, he looked upon Arkadia as his destined prey.^ And no doubt it was with a special feeling of delight that Philopoimin, the follower of Epameinondas,^ stood ready, with the force of Megalopolis and the whole Achaian League, to engage a Spartan King on the ground on which his model had conquered and fallen. The details of the battle are given at length by Polybios,^ who probably heard them from there is no reason why they may not have heen a citizen force on both sides. Polyhios does not imply that they, but rather that the eS^oiroi, were mercenaries. And, in any case, PhilopoimSn would have the native Achaian cavalry, which he had himself organized. ■' Poly bios (xi. 10) uses the name Mantineia, which doubtless still remained in familiar use, and not the more formal title of Antigoneia. ^ On the three battles of Mantineia, see Leake's Morea, iii. 57-93. ^ Attalos had been called back to his own kingdom to repel an invasion of Prusias, King of Bithynia. Liv. xxviii. 7. ^ Dionysios sent Celts and Iberians to the support of Sparta. Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 20. ^ Herod, i. 66. 'ApKaSirjv /j,' alreTs; liiya fjC alrets' o6 Toi diiffa, k.t.X, « Plut. Phil. 3. ^ Pol. xi. 11-18. Cf. Plut. Phil. 10. Paus. viii. 50-2. VIII BATTLE OF MANTINEIA 465 Philopoimen himself. It is enough for my purpose to say that, after a hard fought field, victory remained with the Federal army. At the battle of Larisos, Philopoimen, Master of the complete Horse of Achaia, slew with his own hand the Master of the victory Horse of Elis ; now, as General of the League, he slew with ^(.^g^ans his own hand the King of Sparta. Had he been a Roman, he might have boasted of the Spolia Opima, like Romulus and Cossus and Marcellus. The death of Lydiadas was now avenged ; but we regret to find that the Achaians, in their day of victory, were far from showing the same respect to a fallen foe which KleomenSs had shown to their own hero. The corpse of Lydiadas had received royal honours from his con- queror ; the head of Machanidas was cut from his body, and held up as a trophy and an encouragement to the pursuers. It was a victory indeed ; four thousand Lacedsemonians lay dead ; as many were taken prisoners ; the whole spoil remained in the hands of the victors ; and all this was purchased by the most trifling loss on the Achaian side. In point of military glory, it was the brightest day in the history of the League. For a Lacedaemonian army to be defeated in a pitched battle, for Lak6nia to be ravaged at will by an invader, were now no longer the miraculous events which they had seemed a hundred and sixty years before. But the fight of Leuktra and the Pelo- ponnesian campaigns of Epamein6ndas were hardly more wonderful than for a Spartan army, bred up in the school of Kleomengs, to be defeated by a native Achaian force, com- manded by an Achaian General, without the presence of a single Macedonian soldier, and without the help of a single Egyptian talent. The Achaian army, with its General at its head, now pjiiio- marched as freely through Lakdnia as had been done by Epa- poimen mein6ndas, by Pyrrhos, by Antigonos, or by either Philip. A "■^^f^? prouder moment in a soldier's life can hardly be conceived than when Philopoimen crossed the hostile border at the head of the army of his fellow- citizens which he himself had trained to victory. The remaining events of the war may be hastened over. Natis Machanidas was succeeded at Sparta by one Nabis, a Tyrant g^™f * °^ in every sense of the word, but who did not as yet make him- self formidable to the League. Philip, now that the Romans and Attalos were gone, easily drove the .iSltolians to a separate 2 H HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Peace peace, a proceeding on their parts which gave deadly offence at tietweea Rome.^ It was certainly a breach of the engagements towards audMace- Rome into which they had entered at the beginning of the war, donia, but the fault lay with the Romans themselves, who had wholly B.C. 205. neglected their Greek allies for two years.^ Shortly afterwards the Proconsul Publius Sempronius landed at Epidamnos. Unable to persuade the ^Sltolians to break the peace — a rare scruple, which shows how much they must have suffered in the war — and unable to contend against Philip without their help, he gladly listened to proposals of peace. They first came from the Epeirots, who, if it be true that Philip had possessed himself of Ambrakia,^ once the capital of their great Pyrrhos, had almost as much reason to complain of him as of Romans or ^toUans. Conference Conferences took place at Phoinik^ in Epeiros between the Pro- at Phoi- consul Sempronius, the Kings Philip and Amynander, and the Magistrates of the Akarnanian and Epeirot Leagues. The lead in the negociation was taken by the Epeirot General Philip, supported by his two colleagues Dardas and Aeropos.* By the General terms of the peace Rome obtained some Illyrian districts ; Philip ^^*°9nfi obtained Atintania, hardly to the advantage of the mediating power ; and it was probably now that he made over to King Amynander ^ the island of Zakynthos, his own conquest during the Social War.^ The best modern guide to these times "^ marvels, and with reason, at this last "rectification" of territory. Amynander's kingdom lay wholly inland, and he could not possibly visit his new dominions without the goodwill of the possessor of Ambrakia. It was even stranger than for a Duke of Savoy, who was at least master of Nizza, to be made King of Sicily or Sardinia.^ The other allies seem to have had no repre- sentatives in the Conference, but they were equally included in the treaty. Philip stipulated for his own Thessalian dependents, for Prusias of Bithynia, whom it was needful to secure against his neighbour Attalos, and for the Leagues of Achaia and Bceotia, as well as those of Epeiros and Akarnania. The allies on the 1 Cf. Pol. xviii. 21. Liv. xxxi. 29. ^ Liv. xxix. 12. ' See App. Mac. ii. 1. The ^tolians had taken it some time hefore. ■* Liv. xxix. 12. See above, p. 118, note 3. ° Liv. xxxvi. 31. It was the price of a free passage through Athamania. ^ Pol. V. 102. See above, p. 434. !" Thirlwall, viii. 300. " It was as if the Prince of Montenegro should receive one of the Greek Islands still in Turkish bondage, as compensation for the Ihirkish military road through his dominions. PEACE OF EPEIROS 467 Koman side were Elis, Athens, Messen^ King Attalos, King Pleuratos in lUyria, Nabis the Tyrant,^ and Rome's metropolis Ilion. This last piece of mythical diplomacy rivals the claims which Akarnania had once made for Roman support. The -(Etolians were enrolled on neither side ; Philip had granted them peace, but not alliance ; Rome looked on allies who had made peace without her sanction as unworthy of her protection or care. This was the first great lesson which the Greeks learned in the school of Roman diplomacy. To become the ally of Rome was the first step towards becoming her subject ; it in- volved the entire sacrifice of independent action. The peace was confirmed by the Roman Senate and people ; it was accepted, tacitly at least, by the allies on both sides, and the land had rest for a short space. ^ It was afterwards pretended that the treaty was concluded, not with Nabis, but with the lawful King Pelops. Liv. xxxiv. 32. 468 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE NOTE OB" THE GENERALSHIPS OF ARATOS It is not easy to reconcile the number of Generalships attributed to Aratos by Plutarch with the distinct assertion (see above, p. 237) of the same writer that Aratos was elected General in alternate years, because the Law did not allow the retiring General to be immediately re-elected. Droysen (ii. 438) holds that the Law was broken in favour of Aratos, and that he served for several consecutive years. Schorn (107) rather suspects an error in Plutarch's enumeration. Aratos was first elected General in b.o. 245 ;■' in 226 he was, according to Plutarch (Ar. 35), General for the twelfth time ; in 213 he died, according to the same authority (c. 53), in his seventeenth Generalship. Among the inter- vening years, there are some when Aratos is mentioned as General, some when other persons are mentioned, and some where the name is not preserved. The statement that he died in his seventeenth Generalship would, in itself, present no difficulty ; if he was elected in alternate years beginning with 245, then 213 would be his seventeenth year. But it is certain that his alternate re- election, though the comjnon rule, was not adhered to so strictly as to exclude occasional deviations (see Pint. Ar. 38 and Pol. iv, 82 compared with iv. 37), and the twelfth Generalship in 226 cannot possibly agree with a system of alternate elections beginning with 245. Aratos was General in 245, 243, and 241. "We then lose the succession for some years, and recover it in 234. From that date onwards we have as follows : 234 Aratos (viii.) 229 Lydiadas (iii.) 233 Lydiadas (i.) 228 Aratos (xi.) 232 Aratos (ix.) 227 Aristomachos. 231 Lydiadas (ii.) 226 Aratos (xii.) 230 Aratos (x.) If 226 were Aratos' twelfth Generalship, it follows that 234 was his eighth. But, as 241 was his third, the six intervening years, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235 do not give room for the four required Generalships (fom'th, fifth, sixth, and seventh), in alternate years. If Plutarch be right in calling 226 the twelfth Generalship, it follows that Aratos must have held office for four out of those six years, a clear violation of the law as stated by Plutarch himself. Droysen (ii. 435. 8) - truly adds that in those years, only one General besides Aratos, namely Dioitas, is mentioned.' Again, though the seventeenth ' By the year of a General, I raean the year B.C. in which he was elected ; his official year took in parts of two years of our reckoning. Thus the Generalship of B. 0. 234 extends into B. c. 233, and so throughout. 2 [iii. 2. 33, 2nd edition.] ' Polyainos (ii. 36, see above, p. 315, note 1) mentions Dioitas as General, but gives no clue to the year to which his Generalship should be referred. viii NOTE ON THK GENERALSHIPS OF ARATOS 469 Generalship in 213 would agree perfectly with a system of alternate re-election throughout the whole time, yet the iirst three Generalships are in odd years, 245, 243, 241, while the series beginning with 234 are in even years. Aratos must therefore, between 241 and 234, have either been in office or out of office for two years together. Again, he was not regular General in 224, nor General at all in 218, which, on the alternate system, he should have been. He certainly was General in 220, 217, 213. In 221, 219, 218, 216, we MA other names. If then Pliitaroh be right in calling 226 his twelfth, and 213 his seventeenth, Generalship, we must not only supply two more Generalships in the years 222 and 215, but we must also suppose four Generalships between 241 and 234, that is, we must suppose, as Schom says, that Aratos held the Generalship for three years together, in manifest breach of the law. But, by supposing two slight and easily-explained errors in Plutarch's reckoning, it is possible to arrange the years, so as not to imply any breach of a Law so distinctly stated by Plutarch himself. His mention of a seven- teenth Generalship in 213 may have been a mere careless inference from the number of years and the common practice of alternate election. Or it may be explained in another way. The twelfth Generalship in 226 is the great difficulty. If for SaSiKarov, in Pint. Ar. 35, we might substitute Sixanv, we should then have to suppose that, between 241 and 234, Aratos, instead of being in office for three years together, remained once out of office for two years together,^ as we know that he once did at a later timef We have then to suppose that Plutarch counted Aratos' Extraordinary Generalship in 224-3 ^ (Ar. 41) as one of his regular years, and we have, between 224 and 213, to place Generalships in those years where it is allowable, namely in 222 and 215. This gives sixteen Generalships without any two being in consecutive years. Now in 219 the younger Aratos was General, and Plutarch may easily, in running his eye over a list, have mistaken his year of office for another year of his father's, and so have made the whole number seventeen. The whole list would then stand thus : ' That this should be the case is not at all unlikely, when we remember (see above, pp. 309, 310) the indignation excited by his attempt on Peiraieus during the truce with Antigonos. That attempt must have been made either late in the official year B. c. 241-0 or early in B. c. 239-8. It is not an improbable conjecture that it was made when Aratos was General in 239, and that, in consequence of the popular feeling against him, he remained out of office during the years 238 and 237, and was elected for the fifth time in 236. On. the other hand it should he remarked that the time to which Droysen attributes the illegal elections of Aratos, and to which, if they occurred at all, they must he attributed, is precisely that when the power of Aratos was most unbounded. From 241 to 234, from the acquisition of Corinth to the acquisition of Megalopolis, Aratos was, with the exception of his temporary discredit about Peiraieus, at the very height of his glory. Earlier, he was merely growing into power, later, he had rivals in Lydiadas and others. ^ Aratos' election as ffrpaniyis aiiroKpiruip (see above, p. 377) was in the natural year B.C. 223, but before the expiration of the official year 224-3. 470 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap, viii 245 Aratos (i.) 228 Aratos (ix.) 244 — 227 Aristomaolios, 243 Aratos (ii.) 226 Aratos (x.) 242 — 225 Hyperbatas. 241 Aratos (iii.) 224 Timoxenos (i.) '240 — 224-3 Aratos {arpaTiiybs airoKpdrap) (xi. ) 239 Aratos (iv.) ? 223 Timoxenos (ii.) 238 — 222 Aratos (xii.) ? 237 — 221 Timoxenos (iii.) 236 Aratos (v.) ? 220 Aratos (xiii.) 235 — 219 Aratos the Younger. 234 Aratos (vi.) 218 EpSratos. 233 Lydiadas (i.) 217 Aratos (xiv.) 232 Aratos (vii.) 216 Timoxenos (iv.) 231 Lydiadas (ii.) 215 Aratos (xv.) ? 230 Aratos (viii.) 214 — 229 Lydiadas (iii.) 213 Aratos (xvi.) The question reduces itself to this. Was Plutarch more likely to go wTong in a reckoning of iigures or in a distinct statement of constitutional practice 1 To me the former supposition certainly seems the easier of the two. That Plutarch is by no means infallible in his chronology of the life of Aratos is plain from his strange remark that Aratos had been, in 224, i thirty-three years ^ an Achaian politician {rpidKovra ^ttj koX rpia TeTroKLrevfiivos iv Toh 'Axcuots, Ar. 41), whereas, in 224, only twenty-seven years had elapsed since the very beginning of his career in the deliverance of SilcySn. The only marked period of thirty-three years in the life of Aratos is that between his first Generalship in 245 and his death in 213 ; this is probably what Plutarch was thinking of. A mistake in reckoning up the Presidential years is one of exactly the same kind, and it is one, I certainly think, far more likely to occur than a direct and often-repeated blunder on "■ point of constitutional law, committed by one who had the Memoirs of Aratos before him. ' The Generalship of Dioitas would come in one of the years 240, 238, 237 or 235, but I know of no evidence to fix it to any particular year. ^ I do not at all know what Mr. Fynes Clinton means (iii. 36) by transferriug this remark from the year 224 to 222, and adding " The thirty-three' years of Aratos must be computed from the first pr^tor Marcus, B.C. 255." What have the years of Markos and Aratos to do with each other. CHAPTER IX HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE PEACE OP EPEIROS TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. B.C. 205 —146 With the interference of Rome in Grecian affairs, the main Character interest of our Federal history ceases. Hitherto we have seen °^ *.''® Greek Federalism in the days of its glory ; we have seen Greek ^^"°' ' Federal commonwealths acting as perfectly independent powers, and we have seen them acting in close union with Greek states possessing other forms of Government. What is now left to us is to trace Greek Federalism in its decline ; a decline, indeed, in no way peculiar to the Federal states, but one which they shared with all powers, whether kingdoms or commonwealths, which once came within the reach of Rome's friendship or enmity. The chief importance of this period for our purpose is indirect. We have now come within the life-time of Polybios ; we shall soon come within the range of his personal memory. His narrative of events which he had seen himself, or had heard of from his father, is naturally much fuller than his narrative of events which rested on the traditions or the written records of a past genera- tion. Unfortunately we now have his history only in fragments, but the fragments are often of considerable length, and there are also several narratives in Livy which are evidently translated from Polybios to the best of Livy's small ability. As these later transactions were recorded by Polybios at great detail, the frag- Import- ments of his history of these times contain a great mass of ^^'^f °^. *^^ political information, and supply many constitutional details which Federal" we might otherwise never have known. We have several vivid History pictures of debates in the Achaian and -lEtolian Assemblies, such chiefly as we do not get in the history of earlier times. Still, when we read minute reports of debates in which Aristainos and Kykliadas, or Kallikrat^s and Arch6n, were the chief speakers, we cannot 472 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE restrain a wish to exchange them for equally minute reports of the parliamentary combats of Aratos and Lydiadas. I shall therefore touch comparatively lightly on this last period of Greek Federal history, leaving, as before, the details of warfare to the general historians of Greece and Rome, and stopping only at those points where the narrative affords us any important constitutional information. Aggres- sive pro- ceedings of Philip, B.C. 202- 200. B.C. 202. His dealings with the Achaian League. § 1. From the Peace of Epeiros to the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus B.C. 205—194 We left Greece at peace ; that she did not long remain so was again the fault of the King of Macedonia. Philip, whose youth- ful promise had been so bright, was gradually sinking from bad to worse. It was open to him to play the part of Piedmont in Greece ; he preferred, of his own choice, to play the part of Austria. Every step that he took alienated some old friend, or provoked some new enemy. In defiance of his treaty with Rome, he still continued his dealings with Hannibal, and Mace- donian soldiers are said to have fought for Carthage at Zama.^ In defiance of his treaty with MioMs,, he attacked various cities, in Asia and elsewhere, which were allies or subjects of the League,^ and, by his cruel treatment of his conquests, he de- graded himself, in the eyes of all Greece, almost below the level of the ^tolians themselves.^ He seems to have defrauded his old allies of Achaia of the Peloponn^sian districts which he had professed to cede to them during the Roman war ; * he is even charged with an attempt to poison Philopoimgn,^ as he was believed to have poisoned Aratos. He engaged in hostilities, which seem to have been altogether unprovoked, with the Rhodian Republic,^ with Ptolemy EpiphanSs of Egypt, and with ^ Liv. XXX. 26, 33, 42. But Polybios does not mention them. * Lysimacheia, KalchedSn, Kios. See Pol. xv. 22 ; xvii. 2, 3. 3 See Pol. xvii. 3. Cf. the somewhat later siege of Abydos, Pol. xvi. 29-34. Liv. xxxi. 16, 17. * See above, p. 460. That they were detained or recovered by him is clear by his again restoring, or pretending to restore, them at a later time. Liv. xxxii. 5. ^ Plut. Phil. 12. "'EiTTiixfev els "Apyos K/jiJ^a toi>s dvcupi^iTovTas airbv. This need not imply that poison was the means to be used. * Philip's war with the Ehodians produced several important sea-fights. See the description of those of Lade and Chios. Pol. xvi. 1-9. IX SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 473 Attalos of Pergamos, the cherished ally of Eome. He engaged Philip's in a war with Athens, for which something more like an ^^^^^f'- excuse could be pleaded ; ^ but he shocked the universal feeling Attica, of Greece by practising the same barbarous and useless kind of b.c. 200. devastation of which he and his ^tolian enemies had alike been guilty during the Social War.^ Athens, politically contemptible, was already beginning to assume something of that sacred and academic character which she enjoyed in the eyes of the later Greeks and Romans. The destruction of Athenian temples and works of art doubtless aroused a feeling of general indignation even stronger than that which followed on the like sacrilege when wrought at Dion and Thermon. It was this attack on Athens which finally drew Rome into the strife. The justice of Justice of the Roman declaration of war cannot be questioned. Philip had the war clearly broken the Treaty ; he had helped the enemies of Rome Roman and he had injured her allies. He had put himself in a position side. which enabled the Romans to assume, and that, for a while, with some degree of truth and sincerity, the character of the libera- tors of Greece. It was wholly Philip's own fault, that a Roman, a Barbarian, was able to unite the forces of nearly all Greece against a Macedonian King, and to declare, at one of the great Greek national festivals, that all Greeks who had been subject to Macedonia received their freedom from the Roman Senate and their Proconsul. There is no need to suspect the Senate, Phil- still less to suspect Flamininus personally, of any insincerity in ^ell™ic the matter. That liberty received as a boon from a powerful ^f piami- stranger can never be lasting is indeed true. But it does not ninus and follow that the philhellenism of Flamininus was a mere blind, a °*^'' mere trap for Greek credulity, or that the gift of freedom was deliberately designed from the beginning to be only a step towards bondage. One might as weU suppose that the servants of the East India Company who first mingled in Indian politics and warfare deliberately contemplated the Affghan war and the annexation of Oude. The second Macedonian War — the second Roman War, as we Second may call it from our point of view — was carried on by three Mace- successive Roman commanders, Publius Sulpicius, Publius -war B.C. 200- ' Two Akarnanians were put to death at Eleusis for an unwitting profanation 197. of the mysteries. The Akarnanian League complained to their ally King Philip, who invaded and ravaged Attica. Liv. xxxi. 14. 2 See above, pp. 419, 428. 474 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Real good- will of Plaml- ninus towards Greece. Villius,! and Titus Quinctius Flamininus.^ Of these three, Titus became something like a Greek national hero. Plutarch ^ does not even stop to argue whether Titus or Philopoim^n deserved the larger share of Grecian thankfulness ; the merits of the Eoman allow of no dispute or comparison. Titus * shone alike as a diplomatist and as a warrior; he showed him- self as superior to Philip in the conference of Nikaia ^ as he did upon the hill of Kynoskephalai. His real goodwill towards Greece there seems no just reason to doubt. He lived at a time peculiarly favourable to the growth of such a feeling. In earlier times the Romans despised the Greeks with the contempt of ignorance. In later times they despised them with the con- tempt of conquerors. Even Titus himself lived to change from the friend into the patron, and from the patron there are very few steps to the master. But, just at this moment, all the pro- ducts of Grecian intellect were, for the first time, beginning to be opened to the inquiring minds of Rome. Greece was a land of intellectual pilgrimage, the birthplace of the art, the poetry, and the science, which the rising generation of Romans were beginning to appreciate. The result was the existence for a time of a genuine philhellenic feeling, of which the early conduct of Titus in Greece is the most illustrious example.^ Titus Quinctius was a Roman, and we may be quite certain that he would never have sacrificed one jot of the real interests of Rome ^ I take Villius, in Greek OWXXios, to be the name intended by the 'OriXios of Pausauias (vii. 7, 9). See Schorn, 240. ^ For ^Xa/iivtyos, Pausanias (u.s.) and Appian (Syr. 2) have ^Xa/iicios ; Anrelius Victor (c. 51) and, after him, Orosius (lib. iv. f. iii. ed. Venice, 1483) turn the nomen Quinctius into the preenmtien Quintus, so as to change Titus Quinctius into Quintus Flaminius. Aurelius moreover makes him the son of Caius Flaminius who died at Trasimenus. This is not very wonderful in a late and careless compiler, but it is wonderful to find the error repeated by a scholar like Schorn, p. 237. 3 Comp. mi. et PI. 1. ' One can hardly help, when writing from the Greek side, speaking of him by his familiar prEenomen, as he is always called by Polybios and Plutarch. It is not every Roman who is spoken of so endearingly. = See Pol. xvii. 1-10. ^ Mommsen, in his Roman History, very clearly brings out this fact, but be is very severe both on Flamininus and on his countrymen for yielding to such foolish sentimentality. I confess that I cannot look on a generous feeling as dis- graceful either to an individual or to a nation. But Mommsen's history of this period, as of all periods, is well worth reading, if the reader will only reserve the right of private judgement in his own hands. A truer and more generous estimate of Flamininus will be found in Kortiim, iii. 251. IX PHILHELLENIC FEELINGS OF FLAMININUS 475 to any dream of philhellenism. But, within that limit, yhe was disposed to be more liberal to Grecian allies and less harsh to Grecian enemies than he would have been to allies or enemies of any other nation. He would have Greece dependent on Rome ; but he would have her dependent, not as a slave but as a free ally ; the Greeks should be Plataians and not Helots ; the con- nexion should be one, not of constraint, but of affection and gratitude for real favours conferred. He mshed in short to make Rome become, what Macedonia ought to have become, the chosen head of a body of free and willing Greek confederates. For a few years he really effected his object. Macedonia did not Union of retain a single ally, except the brave League of Akarnamia, ever Greek faithful to its friends in their utmost peril. The two great ^^^^^ Leagues of Achaia and ^tolia did good service to the Roman Eome. cause ; Epeiros and Boeotia, though not friendly in their hearts, did not venture openly to oppose it. Consistently with his whole system, Titus never pushed any Greek state to extremi- ties. Philip received what, after such provocations as his, may be called favourable terms. When the jEtolians, like the General Thebans after Aigospotamos, called for the utter destruction of modera- Macedonia, Titus showed them how expedient it was that Mace- p°^°. donia should remain independent and powerful, the bulwark of ninus. Greece against barbarian inroads. '^ Philip was deprived of his conquests, and prevented from injuring the allies of Rome, but the original Kingdom of Macedonia suffered no dismemberment. Nor do we hear of the exercise of any severities against Philip's gallant allies of Akarnania, a marked contrast to the later treat- ment of the Epeirot cities after the fall of Perseus. A like indisposition to deal harshly with any Greek state may even account for Flamininus' over-lenity towards the Tyrant Nabis, the portion of his career which, at first sight, is the most difficult either to justify or to understand.^ The way in which the several Federal States of Greece stood Relation affected to Rome during this war throws a good deal of light on 2f *'"' Federal politics. It will therefore be worth dwelling on a little ^^^^^^ more fully than the purely military history. The .^tolians were to Rome. the first among the Greek Leagues to embrace the Roman cause, ^tolia. They had good grounds for anger against Philip, because of his ' Pol. xviii. 20. See atove, p. 452. ^ Liv. xxxiv. 34, 49. 476 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Condition of ^tolia,. B.C. 200. Damo- kritos General. Indecisive Meeting at Nau- jEtolians join tlie Eoman side, B.O. 200. destruction of Kios and other of their allied or subject towns. On the other hand, they were not allies of Eome, and they had no special reason to be friendly to her after she had so carefully excluded them^ from the Peace of Epeiros. ^toha was per- haps just now a little more inclined to peace than usual. One main element of confusion in the country, Skopas, was absent. It was just after the Peace that he and Dorimachos received their special commission as legislators, and their legislation seems to have led only to internal commotions.^ Skopas was now at Alexandria, in the service of the young Ptolemy EpiphanSs,^ and we just now hear nothing of Dorimachos. The General in office, Damokritos, seems to have been a moderate man, which was perhaps the reason why he was suspected of being bribed by Philip.* During the first campaign of Sulpicius, an ^tolian Assembly was held at Naupaktos,^ under his presidency, which listened to Macedonian, Athenian, and Roman ambassadors, but came to no definite vote.^ The policy of Damokritos was to wait a little longer, and to see to which side success was likely to turn. He therefore exhorted the Assembly to pass no vote either way just yet, but to entrust the General with the power of calling a Special Assembly, when he should think fit, to settle the question of peace or war.'' Shortly after, when the Eoman arms seemed to have decidedly the advantage, Damokritos called his Assembly, and procured the adhesion of the people to the Roman cause. ^ The ^tolians, after this, took a prominent part in the war, and their cavalry contributed not a little to the victory of Kynoskephalai. ^ See above, p. 467. 2 See above, p. 263. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 302. » Pol. xiii. 2. '' lb., xxxi. 32. Pecunia, ut fama est, ab Eege accepta. • 5 lb. 40. s lb. 29-32. '' Liv. xxxi. 32. Cum legibus oautiim esset, ne de pace bellove, nisi in Pan- ffitolico et Pylaioo oonoilio, ageretur, decernerent extemplo, nt PrEetor sine fraude, cum de bello et pace agere velit, advocet concilium ; et quod turn referatur de- ceruaturque, ut perinde jus ratumque sit, ac si in Panaetolico aut Pylaico conoilio actum esset. This seems to mean tbat, by the JStolian constitution, only the regular Annual Meeting could entertain questions of war and peace ; a Special Meeting, whatever were its powers, could not do that. The Assembly now passes either a general law for the future or a resolution for this particular case, allowing the General to call a Special Meeting with the full powers of the regular Assembly. On the Pancetolicum and PylaHcwm, see above, p. 260, note 3. ^ Livy (xxxi. 40) says proximo amcilio. This cannot possibly mean the next Annual Assembly. IX RELATIONS BETWEEN ROME AND iETOLIA 477 In Achaia the struggle with Sparta still continued ; but Aohaia. whether the League acted vigorously or not in any matter Import- depended wholly on the presence of Philopoim^n in office. He p"°^ °' was twice General between the first and second Macedonian poimgn. Wars. It seems to have been during his second Generalship'- b.c. 205- that the Megarians, disgusted with the state of things in the ^"^ • Boeotian League, of which they then formed a part, returned to Eeimion their old connexion with Achaia.^ As for Nabis, he continued "^-^wf,"* his piracies, robberies, and domestic cruelties, on a scale such as League. Peloponnesos had never before seen. But he received several War with defeats from the -Federal arms. The Tyrant surprised MessSn^, ^*^'^- when Lysippos was General. Lysippos, like another Aratos, b.c. 203- would do nothing, but Philopoimen, at the head of the militia ^^: of his own city, made him retreat.^ Next year, being himself ^nce of again General, he gathered the forces of the whole League MessSn?. together by a secret manoeuvre, and then, suddenly entering b.o. 202- Lak6nia, defeated the Tyrant in a considerable battle.* 201. The policy of Philopoimen was to keep the League, as far as might be, independent of all foreign powers. With this object he endeavoured to procure a peace between Philip and the Ehodians by Achaian mediation before the Romans stepped in.^ But Roman policy kept the allies of Rome from all separate negociations ; his labours were therefore fruitless. He was General- succeeded in the Presidency by Kykliadas, a man devoted to ^"?,?^, PhiUp. Philopoimen seems then to have thought that Pelopon- ^ ^ 201-''' n^sos was no longer a place for him, and, as in the days of 200. Aratos, he went to find employment among his old friends in Philo- Grete.® As before, one may be inclined to think that he would P°i™™ . have acted a more truly patriotic part by staying to defend his ^ creet. country against Nabis, if only as a single soldier in the ranks ; but there is at least no ground for supposing that Philopoimen was offended because he was not allowed to hold office two years together.'' During his absence, while Kykliadas was still 1 Plut. Phil. 11. Thirlwall, viii. 303. It was in this Generalship that he exhibited his phalanx at the Nemean festival. - Pol. XX. 6. See above, p. 374. ^ Plut. PhO. 12. lois iavToG iroXlras i.va\a§iiv. This means, I suppose, the citizens of Megalopolis only. So Thirlwall, viii. 305. ■* See the whole story in Polybios, xvi. 36. 5 Pol. xvi. 35. 1 " Plut. Phil. 13. Paus. viii. 50. 6. ' Schorn (p. 230, of. Kortiim, iii. 237) says, "Bin dritter ungiinstiger Um- stand war die Erbitterung Philopdmens, welcher vergebens darnach gestrebt hatte, die Strategie nooh ein Jahr zu behalten. " This is, to say the least, a great deal to get 478 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE in office, an Achaian Assembly was held at Argos.^ This was, seemingly, a little before the first Eoman Embassy to ^tolia. Philip At this Meeting Philip suddenly appeared. He offered to carry at Argos ; on the war with Nabis on behalf of the League, if the Achaians attempt would serve in his garrisons at Corinth and in Euboia. That to gain the is, he asked them to take his part against Rome.^ This the League. Assembly was not ready to do ; so Kykliadas, to save appear- ances with his patron, put aside the King's request on a point of order. The Meeting was a Special one, summoned to con- sider the war with Nabis; at such a Meeting nothing could lawfully be discussed except the war with Nabis.^ The present Assembly therefore was incompetent to declare war against Rome, or even to engage to send Achaian soldiers to Corinth or Chalkis. With this answer Philip was obliged to be content. His pre- The League preserved its neutrality for some time longer. tended During the Consulship of Villius, Philip made another attempt CBSsiou or i. ' X J- Triphylia ^0 secure the fidelity of the League * by ceding, or at least pre- and Oreho- tending or promising to cede, those Peloponnesian districts which raenos, j^g j^g^^j q^^^ already professed to cede to Achaia.^ To the Triphylian towns his present offer added the yet more important cession of Orchomenos,^ which had not been mentioned on the former occasion. It would seem that the League did not, even now, really obtain possession of them,'' but the mere hope may have prevented the Achaians from actually joining the Roman side. This final step did not take place till the Consulship of Flamininus. The then President, Aristainos,^ was a strong out of the words of Pausanias (ii.s. ), ii\oTrolta]v Si, us e^fjKh oi crrpaTTiyoSi'Ti o XP^vos, Kal &px^iv dWoi Tutv 'Axcttwz/ rjpTjVTO, aWts h 'Kpi}T7]v Si^^rj, or out of those of Plutarch, ^iryo/xaxwy -^ (piXoTifiodfievos aKaLpu)s irpbt er^pous. I do not rely so much as I should have done at an earlier time on the unconstitutional nature of the scheme attributed to PhilopoimSn, as there is one instance some- what later — whether by a change in the law or hy a breach of it — of his actually holding office two years together. ^ Liv. xxxi. 25. ^ Liv. U.S. Cf. Pol. xvi. 38. '0 Si HXiriros opdv rois .'Axaiois eiSXo^us SiaKetfjt.4t^ovs irph^ rhv Kara 'Pajfiaiwif irbXefioVy ^ffiroiSa^e Kaixf](yev els roiis 'Axaiois riiv irb'Ka/. IX ANNEXATION OF SPARTA TO THE LEAGUE 493 To Philopoim^n and the Ackaians it naturally seemed the greatest and most glorious of aU acquisitions, when the city which had so lately threatened the whole League, was, without striking a blow, by the mere effect of a speech from an Achaian magistrate, changed into a peaceful member of the Federal body.^ As matters now stood, Greece needed union above all things ; to join all Peloponnisos into one body was a patriotic and a generous project. Unhappily it proved the greater of two evils. Sparta, as a member of the League, proved more troublesome than she had ever been as a border foe. Her affairs as an Achaian Canton gave a more constant handle for Roman inter- vention, and for intervention in a worse form than they ever could have done had she retained the position of an avowed enemy. The annexation of Sparta took place before Antiochos landed Antioclios in Greece. On his coming, he was elected General — seemingly ^^^^ General-Extraordinary ^ — of the -s BaviiA^eiv ikv ixt] irphs airoiis TjySvrai. Is it possible that the use of the word Sij/ios instead of irdXts was itself an insidious hint to the assumption of increased independence by the several cities ? ^ Ib.^ Tairriv Si t^v a.ivl)Kpi(nv iKdi/ievoi. Krip&yiMTOi Ixouo-ax Si.ad(ai.v tois ^ovkoiUvois heKev 'Tufw.tai' S,(plffTa(rSai t^s Tav 'Axauiv TroXirelas. ^ lb. XXV. 2. Met-A raOra arfjKTis irpoypa^elffTis <7vveiro\i.TeieTO fiera tS>v *Axatu)j/ ^ ^TdpTTj. IX SECESSION OF MESSENE 505 seems to have been the scene of no disturbances, but to have Quiet in- settled quietly down into its place as an Achaian Canton. There <=pi'Pora- is no sign that the Eleians distrusted the Federal Government, jjug or were distrusted by it. We have seen a Federal Assembly held in their city,i and the Ambassador sent by Philopoim^n to Rome to excuse his doings at Kompasion was an Eleian named Nikod^mos.^ At MessenS the question of Union or Secession State of had become identical with the question of Democracy or Oli- Pf^rties m garchy in the State Government. When MessSn6 was admitted to the Union, some changes in the State constitution were made by the influence of Philopoim^n,^ which, we cannot doubt, were changes in a democratical direction. But there was a strong oligarchic party, which hoped to recover its power by Roman help. Its leader was one DeinokratSs, who is described to us as a good soldier, but as, in other respects, a man of profligate and frivolous, though showy, character.* This man visited Rome as an envoy,^ seemingly not from the Mess^nian Government, but merely from his own party. He received no open encoiu'age- ment, yet he contrived to obtain a certain degree of countenance from Titus himself. He returned to Greece in his company, and Revolt of presently he caused a revolution at Messgn^ and proclaimed Messene Secession from the League.® PhilopoimSn, in his seventieth j)^i^g. year, after forty years of political life, was now General of the hratSs, Achaians for the eighth time.^ He was then lying sick at Argos, ^■<'- i^^- but he roused himself at the news. He at once sent Lykortas to reduce the rebels. He himself hastened to Megalopolis, and there collected the cavalry of his native city, the sons of the men who had fought beside Lydiadas at Ladokeia and had followed himself to victory at Sellasia. But it was the last campaign of the old hero. His immediate object was to relieve a loyal Messenian town — either Kor6n^ or Koldnides^ — lying to the south of the revolted capital. In a skirmish with Deinokrates, Capture he was at first successful, but afterwards, surrounded by numbers, ^"J^. ^^^' the Achaian General was thrown from his horse, and was carried phi^o- poim6n at 1 Liv. xxxviii. 32. See above, p. 501. " Pol. xxiii. 1. Messene, ' lb. 10. Ti ToS Tirov Sidypa/ifia Kal TTtv ToO 0L\oTroii^eDos di6pBoi. a prisoner to Mess^n^. But it soon became evident that popular feeling was wholly in his favour ; DeinokratSs and his Senate therefore hastened to remove their noble captive to a surer keeping. Philopoimgn drank the cup of hemlock '^ in a sub- terranean dungeon — the last hero of Achaia, the last hero of Greece, the last whom Plutarch has thought worthy of a place on the beadroll of the worthies of his country. According to the Achaian constitution, Lykortas, who had been General of the year before, succeeded Philopoimin in office for the remainder of his term. This seems to have been near the end of the official year, and he was re-elected at the next regular Meeting of the Assembly, which was shortly afterwards November, held at Megalopolis. ^ It was soon evident that the revolt of B.C. 183. Messing and the death of Philopoimen were the work of a mere faction, and that the guilt was in no way shared by the mass of the Messinian people.* In the course of the next year, popular Read- feeling compelled Deinokratis to sue for peace.* It was granted, "f^M™" '• ^^ ^^^ •i^®*' °^ favourable terms. Lykortas, by the advice of to the ^^^ Cabinet,^ required the surrender of the guilty persons, the League, reception of a Federai garrison into the citadel of Messene, and B.C. 182. ^ijg unreserved submission of all questions to the Federal Assembly. The persons surrendered died, at Lykortas' order, by their own hands, and the Assembly ^ decreed the readmission ^ Plut. Phil. 20. Liv. xxxix. 50. Plutarch adds that some of the MessSnians proposed to torture him to death, and that they were afterwards stoned to death at his tomb (c. 21). There is no authority for either statement in Polybios or Livy [of. Pol. xxvi. 2.] It reminds one of the crimes which Quintus Curtius and writers of that kind have impartially heaped alike upon Alexander and upon his enemies. ^ This seems to me the only way to reconcile the statement of Plutarch that Lykortas was elected General (i\6/j,€V0L rrrpaTTj-yby AvKdprav, Phil. 21) soon after Philopoim6n's death, with what we know, from the direct witness of Polybios (xl. 2, see above, p. 219), to have been tlie constitutional practice of the League. By the death of Philopoimen, Lykortas, as General of the years, o. 185-4 (see Livy, xxxix. 35, 36), became at once, without election. General for the remainder of the year B.C. 184-3. But, if the death of Philopoimen took place very shortly before the November Meeting of B.c. 183, Lykortas would need an almost immediate re-election to continue him in office during the year B.C. 183-2. See Schorn, 318, 21. 3 Liv. xxxix. 49, 50. Plut. Phil. 19, 20. Pol. xxiv. 12. * Pol. xxiv. 12. ■'' lb. '0 arpaTTjybs rQ)v 'Axatwi/ TrapaXajSdjj/ rous avvApxovTas. ** lb. "Uairep ^Triri/Ses avvi^aive riyre irdXiv avvdyeaSai Toiis 'Axaiois eh MeydXiriv irdXiv M tt}v Seuripai' aivoSov. This I take to be the regular Spring Meeting of B.C. 182. Now that the ofBcial year began in November, the May Meeting would be the Sevripa criVoSos. IX DEATH OF PHILOPOIMEN 507 of Messene to the League. In consideration of the damage done b.c. 182. to its territory by the war, the restored State was, seemingly at a later Assembly, exempted from all Federal taxes for three years.^ But, in accordance with the policy which Philopoimen Three had followed .even with his native city,^ three of the smaller Messeman o ' towns MessSnian towns, Abia, Thouria, and Pharai, were detached from admitted the capital, and were admitted to the Union as independent as inde- States, each setting up its own pillar like Argos or Megalopolis.^ States"' These towns all lie between Mess^iiS and the LakSnian frontier,* ^ ^ 132. a district which it was specially important to occupy with members attached to the Union both by gratitude and interest. It was during this eventful Presidency of Lykortas that Sparta was, at a Meeting at Sikyon, finally reunited to the League.^ The news was announced at Rome both by a Federal and by a Lacedaemonian Ambassador, the latter, one Chairon, being probably sent by consent of the League.^ It must have Schemes^ been in a later year that this same Chairdn entered on a series °^ Chairon of demagogic measures at Sparta with an evident view to thegoigo? Tjrranny. When the State Government instituted an inquiry into his conduct, he procured the murder of the chief commis- sioner.^ The Federal power now interposed. The General, probably Lykortas, went, by order of the Assembly, to Sparta, and procured the condemnation of Chair6n, seemingly by a Spartan tribunal. Our direct information during the period between the war Consti- with Antiochos and the death of Philopoimen chiefly relates to *"y™^' those external affairs of the League of which I have just attempted ^.o. ig'i- a summary. But many important constitutional points are 183. brought out incidentally in our narratives. The detail at which 1 Pol. XXV. 3. 'ZvviB^vro ttjp Trpbs Tois Meffa-rivtovs (jrijkqvi (jvyxypijtravTe^ airois Tpis roTs ftWois (piXavBpdnroiS Kal rpwi/ irdv aTi\ei.av. ^ See ahove, p. 489. s Pol. XXV. 1. 'ISlav Si Sifnevat ffrriXriv cKdaTrj fi.emx^ Trjs KOivijs a,s 7ro\Xoi>s a.i)T<^ cvvdyetv els ^KKk'qaiav. ' Pol. xxiii. 12. Liv. xxxix. 33. IX THE LEAGUE AFTER PHILOrOIMEN 511 Roman Senate and the Achaian Assembly did not answer to one another. Great as were the powers of the Roman Senate, it was not, like the Achaian Assembly, the body which actually de- clared war and i3eace. That last attribute of sovereignty belonged to the Roman People in their Tribes, and they were certainly never assembled to hear the communications of an Achaian envoy. Similarly, when Titus himself, on his way to a mission in Asia, took the Messenian Deinokrat^s back with him as far as Au As- Naupaktos, he wrote thence to the Achaian Government, requir- ^,®?^^^ ing an Assembly to be summoned. PhilopoimSn was now in to Flami- the last year of his office and his life. The answer sent was ninus, the same as that given to Csecilius ; the Assembly should be ^■'^^ summoned if Titus would, according to law, state the business which he had to lay before it. Titus had no statement to make, and the Assembly was not held.^ § 3. From the Death of Fhilopoimin to the Conquest of Macedonia and Epeiros B.C. 183—167 With Philopoimen died out the old race of Achaian statesmen, the race which had seen the League in the days of its glory, and indeed of its growth. Philopoimen was born about the time of the deliverance of Siky6n and the b.o. 253. first great extension of the League. He was born when Megalopolis was still a detached unit, the subject of some of the earlier and baser Tyrants who preceded Lydiadas. He was a grown man when his native city joined the b.c. 234. League ; his youth was contemporary with the last days of Markos and with the full prime both of Lydiadas and Aratos. And he had lived to see a state of things which might have made him wish that either Kleomen^s or Antigonos could come back again as lord over Peloponn^sos. But he was taken away before the worst evils came on the land he loved ; he had gone through the allotted span of man's life ; it was well for him that he was not reserved for the sad old age of Isokrat^s. And ^ Pol. xxiv. 5. 'ETrei . . ^ypa^pe t<^ trTpaTtjytp Kal Toh dTjfUovpyois twv 'AvaioSj', KEXejjojy ffwdyeiv to^j *Axatoi)s elt ^KKXtjo'lav, dvT4ypa\pav a{iT^ Si&n. irocTiffova-iv, &•> yp^i'V '"'^P^ rlvwv ^oiXeTat, SiaXexSv'"'''' ''■"'s 'A-xaiofs' toi>s ySip vbfiov^ Tadra toTs &pxov(rtv ^TnTdrreLV' tov Sk fiT] roX/AtUi'TOS ypd^eiv, K. T. X. 512 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Condition of the League at the death of Philo- poimen. B.C. 281- 146. Parties in the League ; the elder Roman party not wilfully unpa- triotic. Growth of the extreme Roman party under Kalli- Itrates. he 'left the League, if not what it had once been, yet as flourish- ing and as independent as any state could hope to be in those evil times. Achaia was still the first of existing republics, the compeer of any existing kingdom. The League was stQl spared the worst forms of Roman interference; some respect was still paid to the constitution and laws of an equal ally ; and the internal administration was less meddled with by Rome than it had been by Philip. PhilopoimSn too left his country to the care of statesmen formed in his own school, who had imbibed his prudent maxims of avoiding at once indiscreet defiance and still more indiscreet servility. Lykortas of Megalopolis had the state as it were bequeathed to him by his great fellow-citizen, and Lykortas' son Polybios, to whom we owe our best know- ledge of these times, carried the urn of the hero at his funeral pomp. Thus three men's lives embrace the whole history of Federal Greece. Polybios sat at the feet of Philopoimin, and Philopoimin may have sat at the feet of Markos of Keryneia.^ The exact age of Lykortas is not known ; he must have been much younger than PhilopoimSn, but still quite old enough to remember when the Achaian League was a really independent power. The statesmen of his generation differed, as we have seen, among themselves ; the policy of Aristainos and DiophanSs was less dignified, and really less prudent, than the policy of Philopoimto and Lykortas ; still Aristainos and DiophanSs were certainly not wilful traitors. But, under the debasing influence of Rome, a brood of men was growing up throughout Greece who knew nothing of republican or patriotic feelings, and whose only thought was to advance their own selfish interests by the basest subserviency to the dominant power. Such, among the Achaians, was KallikratSs of Leontion, such, in Epeiros, was the younger Charops. These were men of essentially the same stamp as those whom, a century before, the Macedonian Kings had set up as Tyrants in the PeloponnSsian cities. Rome was a Republic ; she therefore could hardly establish her slaves as Tyrants, and probably they served her better by exercising a practical Tyranny under republican forms. Charops, it is clear, was the author of ^ Polybios was contemporary with Philopoim^n, and PhilopoimSn contem- porary with Markos, as grown men. This alone is really fit to be called contemporary existence. If a child born just before Chair6neia is reckoned as contemporary with Isokrates, three men's lives might be sjjread over a much wider space. IX SERVILITY OF THE ROMAN PARTY 513 cruelties hardly inferior to those of Nabis himself ; ^ but Law reigned in Achaia down to the moment of her fall ; KallikratSs could not rob or banish or murder ; he could only act as a vile cross between Tyrant and Demagogue, the opponent of every patriot, the supporter of every measure which could exalt his own power at the cost of the national degradation. We first hear of this wretch under the Presidency of Hyperbatos,^ him- Presidency self seemingly a man of the same stamp, or perhaps only of the °^ Hyper- school of Aristainos. At any rate, he agreed with KallikratSs b^o.^^iso- in openly avowing the doctrine that no constitutional impedi- 179. ment ought to stand in the way of implicit obedience to the Slavish Roman Senate.^ This doctrine, of course, had to be maintained of Hyper- in the teeth of a strong opposition on the part of Lykortas and batos and the patriotic party. The immediate occasion on which Kalli- K^allj- krat^s is first introduced to us is one of the interminable dis- opposi- putes about the Lacedaemonian exiles. The Senate required tion of their restitution, which Lykortas opposed as unconstitutional. Lykortas. It was determined to send an embassy to Rome to lay the objec- tions of Lykortas before the Senate. By what chance it happened that KallikratSs himself was nominated one of the envoys does not appear.* Perhaps he had not yet displayed himself in his full colours, and it may have been thought desir- able that the embassy should not wholly consist of avowed partizans of Lykortas. Of his colleagues we know only that they bore the most glorious names in the history of the League ; they were Lydiadas of Megalopolis and Aratos of Siky6n.^ Kallikrat^s of course betrayed his trust ; he invited the Senate Embassy to exercise a more direct authority in Achaia and the other °^ Kaiu- Grecian states ; there were in every city men who were ready jq Rome. ^ Pol. XXX. 14 ; xxxii. 21. " lb. xxvi. 1. Hyperbatos is probably a grandson of the person of the same name who was General in B. c. 224. See above, p. 363. Plutarch however writes the name 'TwepPaTas and Polyblos 'Tirip^aTos. ' lb. 01 di nepl rhv 'TiripPaTov Kal KaWiKpdTiiv ireidapx^iv Tots ypa^po- fUvoLS TaprrjvovVj Kal fji/i^e vSfiov iiijrre arijkqv fxifr' 6XKo ^tjS^v to&tov vofjU^eiv dvayKadyrepotf. * Sohorn (p. 323) says, "Anstatt aber den rechtschaffenen Lykortas, welcher den Rath gegeben hatte, an die Spltze der Gesandtschaft zu stellen, erwahlte die Regierung, wie von einem Damon verblendet, zu diesem Posten den Kallikrates." Why " die Eegierung " ? Surely Ambassadors were elected by the Assembly. See Pol. xxix. 10. * Aratos was certainly (see Pol. xxv. 7) grandson of the great Aratos, and son of the younger General of that name. And analogy makes it almost certain that Lydiadas was grandson of the illustrious Tyrant. 2 L 514 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Rescript of the Roman Senate. Kalli- krates elected General, B.O. 179- 178. Effects of the war with Perseus on the Federal states, B.C. 172- 168. to do its work ; these men ought to be encouraged, and the men who talked about oaths and laws and pillars should in like manner be made to feel the displeasure of Rome.^ The Senate hardly needed such counsel ; ^ yet it is clear that from this moment there begins another marked change in the way in which Rome treated the Grecian commonwealths. While Philip and Antiochos were formidable, Achaia was treated as an equal ally ; with their fall she sank to the position of a dependent ally ; now she had to feel what it was to be, in all but name, a subject dependency. From this time forth, Kallikrat^s and his fellows received their orders from Rome, and communicated them to the Assemblies of the several states. Kallikrates himself came back ■s'ldth a rescript from the Senate, ordering the restora- tion of the exiles, and recolnmending himself as the model for all Greek statesmen.^ The Senate wrote also to the four other Leagues — jEtolia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Bceotia, — and to Rome's humble slaves at Athens, bidding them all co-operate in restoring the exiles, that is, bidding them all to pick a quarrel with the Achaians if they could. The patriots were awed, and Kallikrates brought with him a new means of influence, of which we have as yet heard nothing in the history of Greek Federalism. At the next election the traitor was raised to the Presidency, and the historian directly attributes his success partly to decep- tion and partly to bi'ibery.* As soon as he entered upon his office, he at once restored the exiles both at Sparta and at Messene. Our next business is to trace the way in which the Federal states of Greece were affected by the war between the Romans and King Perseus, the Third Macedonian War of Roman history. In the course of that war, three of the Greek Leagues were wiped out of the list of independent states, and Achaia received a blow from which she never recovered. By this time Greece had learned what Roman friendship and alliance really meant. The philhellenic dreams of Flamininus on the one side, the feeling of gratitude for recovered freedom on the other, had ' Pol. xxvi. 2. 2 Thiriwall, viii. 414. ^ Pol. xxvi. 3. Ilepi 5^ ToO KaXXt/cpdtTous aOrov Kar Wiav, Trapaciwir^a'affa roiJs (rvfiTvpefj^evrks, Kar^ra^ev els r^v dTdKpifftv diiyn Set TOtoiiroi/? Owcipxetv iv rots iroKtreifiatTiv dv8pas ol6s iffn 'KaXKLKpaTrjs. We may infer from this that Lydiadas and Aratos had acted somewhat more worthily of their illustrious names. * lb. KaTaTrXijfd/iecos Kcd ffwrpt^pas roils SxKovs dia rb /irjdip dS^vm tCiv VTr' a^ToO /car* dX-^Oeiaj^ elpTj^vuj' 4v ttj (nry/cXiJry Toiis TroWoirs, irpGyrov p.h Xtp^dri (rrpnTTjybs, irpbs tols &XKols kclkois /cat dwpodoKTjdeis. IX WAR BETWEEN ROME AND PERSEUS 515 now utterly passed away. Things had so changed since the famous Isthmian Games that Rome was now felt to be the enemy of Greece, and Macedonia to be her natural bulwark. Macedonian and Eoman lordship had both been tried, and the yoke of Macedon had been found to be the lighter of the two. And indeed, with Eome standing by the side of both. Mace- Greek donian headship over Greece was not now likely to be oppressive. Patriotic If not Perseus personally, yet at least the gallant nation which uo^^" ^ he so unworthily ruled, was felt to be the champion and the Mace- bulwark of republican Greece. Some states openly espoused ""' 0iXAX7)>', Kal ffU(pp6vus dvrl i/uIStis Kai rpv^iji tLpx^t- This is certainly rather hard measure. 516 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Character of L. PauUus. iEmilius in the war with Perseus, ^milius seems to have been quite as well disposed towards Greece as Titus, but his personal goodwill had no longer the same influence, and he was often made the unwilling instrument of cruelties which he abhorred. As before, I will not enter upon the military details of the war, but only trace its events so far as they bear upon the politics of the Federal states of Greece.^ Depen- dent con- dition of ^TOLIA. Civil dis- sensions, B.O. 173. We have seen that .^Etolia was as yet the only com- monwealth of continental Greece which had entered into any formal relations of dependence upon Rome. Achaia, Boeotia, Epeiros, Athens, were all, in name, equal allies of Eome; but ^tolia had agreed -to reverence the Majesty of the Eoman People, and to have no friends and enemies but theirs.^ -(Etolia, then, was now a Roman dependency, free in its internal administration, but, in all its foreign relations, bound to follow the lead of Rome without inquiry. This state of things had at least the advantage of hindering the ^tolians from practising their old piracies upon other Greek states ; but, according to our Achaian and Roman informants, it had at home only the effect of turning their arms against one another.^ The forms of the constitution were trampled under foot,* and the strife ^ After the fall of Perseus Macedonia was divided into four Republics. The size of each district, and some expressions of Polyhios and Livy, may lead us to believe that the internal constitution of each had something of a Federal form. Polybios speaks of their dnj/wKpaTiKr] kuI truceSfiia/fi; iroXirela, xxxi. 12, cf. xxxv. 4 ; xxxvii. 4. (This (jvveSpiaicT) TvoKnela must be distinguished from the PaaCKia^ avviSpiov, or ^aneSbvoiv avviSptov, in iv. 23 and xxvii. 8, which is merely the King's Privy Council.) Livy (xlv. 18, 29) speaks of the Condlmm of each commonwealth, a word which he commonly applies to the Assemblies of Federal states. He afterwards (xlv. 32) speaks of Synedri as the Senators of the several commonwealths. On the whole then it is most probable that each of the four new Republics had some shadow of an internal Federal constitution. But I doubt the theory of Braudstater (490) that the four together formed a Federation of four Cantons. This probably comes from the words commune Concilium gentis in c. 18, and Macedonice concilium in c. 32 ; but the former must be explained, or perhaps held to be cancelled, by the more detailed description in c. 29, and in the latter the concilium is the ^ao-iX^ws (rvviSpiov mentioned above. There was no connuMum or commerciwm between the Mace- donian districts (Liv. xlv. 29), and it suited the general policy of Rome to isolate them from one another. Cf. Kortiim, iii. 311. Probably Livy had no very clear idea of the matter himself. - See above, p. 495. ^ Pol. XXX. 14. Liv. xli. 25 or 30 ; xlii. 2. ^ Pol. U.S. 'Erol^ot Tph$ irav fjaav^ aTroreBfjpLWfi^ifOL rhs ^l^vxa^, &(ft€ fiTjSk ^ouXt)!' diSSiiai Tois Trpoea-Tiiinv. It is not easy to see exactly what this means. IX AFFAIRS OF ^TOLIA 517 of factions led to mutual bloodshed. It does not appear that these contending parties exactly coincided with the respective favourers of Rome and of Macedonia ; debt is mentioned as one cause of dissension ; ^ it is hinted that both parties appealed to Perseus as an arbiter ; ^ it is certain that, when the Roman envoy Marcellus contrived to appease their differences, he took hostages of both parties alike.^ There were however in ^tolia Eoman the same parties as elsewhere. The place of KallikratSs and and Mace- Charops was filled there by one Lykiskos, who was elected parties. General through Roman influence.* Hippolochos, Nikander, Lykiskos and Lochagos seem to have answered, as nearly as jSltolians ^^^ra^' could, to Kephalos and Lykortas. .^Etolian troops served against Perseus under the Roman Consul Licinius, but, when ^■°' ^'■'• he was defeated by the Macedonian cavalry, the .iEtolians made convenient scape-goats ; the blame of the defeat was laid on Hippolochos and his friends, and they, with two other .lEtolian officers, were, at Lykiskos' suggestion, sent off to Rome.^ After this, Caius Popillius and Cnseus Octavius visited both ^tolia and other Grecian states, with a decree of the Senate, forbidding b.o. 169. supplies to be furnished to any Roman officers without its authority. In the Assembly held at Thermon to receive them, they asked for hostages, which they did not obtain. At this Meeting, Lykiskos and Thoas raised insinuations against the patriotic party, and were guilty of gross flattery towards the Romans. A tumult arose ; Thoas was pelted ; and Popillius had the pleasure of rebuking the ^tolians for the breach of order.^ Soon afterwards Perseus himself entered .^Etolia. Perseus The calumnies of Lykiskos had driven a leading citizen named ^ .. Archidamos openly to take the Macedonian side. He offered b_c. ig'p. to admit the King into Stratos, but the other chief men of that city shrank from so bold a step ; they called in Popillius from Ambrakia, and Perseus came before the town only to find it in the hands of his enemies. Deinarchos, the .lEtolian Master of the Horse, had also been on the point of joining Perseus, but he soon found it expedient to change sides, and to join the Oue is tempted to guess that some Magistrates had tried to procure, either for themselves or for some other accused persons, a legal trial before the Apokletes, but that popular fury prevented them by a massacre. 1 Liv. xlii 5. ^ In the speech of Enmenes, ib. 12. 3 Ib. 5. * Ib. 38. = Pol. xxvii. 13. Liv. xlii. 60. App. Mao. 10. ^ Pol. xxviii. 3, 4. Liv. xliii. 17. 518 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Part of the country joins him. Massacre by A. Bsehius, B.O. 167. Dissolu- tion of the League, B.O. 167? Death of Lyliiskos, B.C. 157. Affairs of Akar- NANIA. B.O. 171. B.C. 169. Roman army which he had come to oppose. ^ But, though Stratos was lost, and occupied by Popillius, the whole district of Aperantia, where Archidamos had great influence, openly joined Perseus, and Archidamos himself appears among those who clave to the Macedonian King to the last.^ In the rest of ^Etolia, Lykiskos, with a comrade named Tisippos, continued his career. After the battle of Pydna, ^milius was met in Thessaly by a crowd of suppliant -ZEtolians, who told him how Aulus Beebius, a Roman officer, had, at the instigation of Lykiskos, massacred five hundred and fifty Senators or leading men in the council-house,^ how he had driven others into exile, and seemingly divided the property of both classes among the chiefs of the Roman party. The Roman Commissioners — the hands of ^milius are clear from such iniquity — sat at Amphi- polis, confirmed both the banishment and the murders, and merely punished Bsebius for employing Roman soldiers on such a business.* Other ^tolians, suspected of patriotism, were summoned to Rome to take their trial there, and a leading man named Andronikos was beheaded on the spot for having borne arms on the Macedonian side.^ It has been supposed that the ^tolian League was now formally dissolved ; ^ at all events the country sank into utter insignificance ; we only hear that civil strife continued till the death of Lykiskos ; when the land was rid of him, it enjoyed a time of at least comparative prosperity.' Of Akarnania we hear but little. That gallant and faithful ally of Macedonia was warned at the beginning of the war ^ that she had now an opportunity of wiping out her old errors by loyal adherence to Rome. Two years later we find the Roman Cominissioners, Popillius and Octavius, meeting an Akarnanian Assembly at Thourion,^ which was divided between two parties 1 Liv. xliii. 22. ^ ji^^ ^liv. 43. ' Ih. xlv. 28. " lb. 31. Cf. Pol. XXX. 10. ° Liv. ib. Duo securi peroussi viri insignes ; Andronicus Andronici Alius iEtolus, quod, patrem seoutus, arma contra populum Eomannm tulisset, et Neo Thebanus. One is strongly tempted to read Archidami for Andronici, as we have heard nothing of any .^tolian Andronilios. The persons of that name in Liv. xxxvii. 13 and xliv. 10 seem to be native Macedonians. ^ Brandstiiter (493) and Kortiim (iii. 315) quote, from Justin (Prol. xxxiii.), the words JEtolian civitatcs db unitate corporis dcdtwice. In every edition that I Icnow of they stand simply, Mtoli oppressi. ' Pol. xxxii. 20, 21. » Liv. xlii. 38. ' Pol. xxviii. 5. Liv. xliii. 17 or 19. IX AFFAIRS OF AKARNANIA A.ST) EPEIROS 519 answering to those of Lykortas and Kallikrat^s in Achaia. The Roman party, led by one Chremes, went further even than Debate their Achaian counterparts, as they asked- for Roman garrisons ™ ^^^ in the Akarnanian towns. The patriots, led by Diogenes, J,iJ^^ ^^. pleaded that Akarnania was the friend and ally of Rome, and sembly. that none of her cities needed to be dealt with like conquered enemies. The Roman hesitated for the present, but, after the defeat of Perseus, when the Roman Commissioners at Amphi- polis sat in judgement on all the states of Greece, Akarnanian as well as ^tolian victims were sent off to Rome. But no Leukas change was made in the constitution of the League, except separated that its capital Leukas was taken from it.'^ Chremes after- nania wards played in Akarnania the same part as Lykiskos in b.o. 167. jEtolia, and his country was delivered from him about the b.c. 157. same time.^ Epeiros and Bceotia suffered yet more severely during and State of after the war with Perseus. In Epeiros we find the same parties Epbieos. as elsewhere, namely the three described by Livy,^ devoted partizans of Rome and of Macedonia, and the moderate men who simply wished to retain as much dignity and independence for their country as such evil times allowed. The Lykortas of Parties in Epeiros was Kephalos : its Kallikrat^s was one Oharops, a grand- 5P®!F°^' son of the elder Charops,* whom Polybios describes as the vilest ^^^ of his vile class.^ Of Kephalos as a politician we hear the best Charops. possible character. He was an old friend of the house of Macedon, but he knew that Epeiros was the ally of Rome ; he prayed that peace might endure between the two powers ; if war did come, he was ready to discharge towards Rome the duties of an honourable ally, but not to degrade his country by any base subserviency.^ Theodotos, Antinoos, and Philostratos represented the more decided Macedonian party.'^ At first, 1 Liv. xlv. 31, 34. '■' Pol. xxxii. 21. ^ Liv. xlv. 31. Tria genera principum in civitatibus erant ; duo, quse adulando aut Romanorum imperium, aut amicitiam Eegum, sibi privatim opes oppressis faciebant civitatibus ; medium unum, utrique generi adversura, libertatem et leges tuebatur. Tliis is candid for a Roman, but the adherents of Rome and of Macedonia must not be put on a level. •■ See above, p. 482. ° Pol. XXX. 14. 'B0' S(TOV yap oi iroWol tSv aiiBptlnrwv [eV 'Hireipij)] /lerpui- repoi rr/v Kara rV AlruXlav ^trav, iirl ToaoOrov 6 irpoccrTiis airav aae^idTepoi Kai wapavofitiyrepos virijpxe tiSv dWuv, doKta yap iiTi yeyov4vat firjS' ^ffeaBai dripiud^ffrepov &v6pttiTov fjt.7]d^ frKaidrepov XrfpoTTO?. " lb. xxvii. 13. ' lb. 14. Cf. Liv. xlv. 26. 520 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. Epeiros was true to Rome ; ^ that she did not remain so was the fault of the ultra -Roman party. The constant calumnies of Charops, the fate which they saw fall upon their fellow-patriots in jEtolia, at last drove Kephalos and his adherents openly to B.C. 170. take the Macedonian side. Some of the more zealous partizans of Macedonia went so far as to make an attempt, in which they nearly succeeded, to seize the Roman Consul Aulus Hostilius Geogra- and deliver him up to Perseus.^ During the war, the different phical districts of the League seem to have been divided. "While in Epeiros, Phanot^ in Chaonia stood a siege in the Macedonian interest, B.C. 169. Thesprdtian auxiliaries served in the Roman army against it.^ But, on the whole, Epeiros decidedly took the Macedonian side. Molossis had to be conquered as a hostile country by the Pr£etor Lucius Anicius. Theodotos and Antinoos died in defence of the old capital Passar6n, and Kephalos himself in defence of the Conquest Molossian town of Tekm6n.* The vengeance of Rome was ^^ terrible, and it was marked by equal baseness and cruelty, tion of Lucius .^Emilius, a man whose heart abhorred the vile business Epeiros, On which he was sent,^ was the unwilling instrument of the B.C. 167. wicked will of the Senate. By the foulest treachery all sus- picion was lulled to sleep, and, in one day, seventy towns, mostly in Molossis, were destroyed, and one hundred and fifty thousand persons sold into slavery.^ An Assembly was then held, representing what was left of the Epeirot League ; some selected victims were carried to Rome, and Charops was left to Tyranny tyrannize over the rest. What constitutional forms were pre- B^o^'l*67-^' ^^^■^^^ ^°^ ^^^ *o abuse, we know not ; ^ practically life and pro- 157. perty were at the mercy of an oppressor who, whatever may have been the title he bore, was essentially of the same class as Nabis and Apollod6ros.^ The fate of Boeotia was the most remarkable of all. It most 1 Liv. xlii. 38 ; xliii. 5. = Pol. xxvii. 14. 3 Liy_ y^ij^ 21 or 23. * lb. xlv. 26. To judge from Livy's account, the heroism of the chiefs would seem not to have been shared by the people. But one would like to have an Epeirot historian. ' Plut. ^m. 30. Ai/u'Xios toSto x/adfos fidXurra vaph t^v airoS i lb. 37. 524 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Demands of Atilius and Mar- Mission of Popillius and Oc- tavius, B.O. 170. failed ; no Achaian city was tempted to fall away ; the mission of the Lentuli excited only indignation mixed with contempt. For, in going through the several cities of the League, they addressed their praises of past fidelity to several commonwealths where they were wholly out of place. Elis and Messen^, which had fought for Antiochos against Eome, and, we may suppose, Sparta also, came in for the same praises as the elder cities of the League.^ Shortly afterwards, Atilius and Marcius themselves came into PeloponnSsos. They had an interview with the Achaian General Archdn and his Ministry,^ and demanded a body of a thousand Achaians to act as the garrison of Chalkis till the Roman army landed. To this Arch6n consented. Considering the alliance between Achaia and Rome and the large powers of the Achaian General, this course was perhaps not absolutely illegal ; Arch6n was one of the sounder Achaian statesmen, and he was not likely to yield to any requests which directly contradicted the Federal Constitution. But it was a dangerous precedent for the Government thus to act upon its own responsibility, at the bidding of a foreign power. This again, like the mission of the Lentuli to the separate cities, may be looked at as another blow struck at the unity, and thereby at the independence, of the Achaian body. Next came the mission of Popillius and Octavius,^ which was ostensibly designed to .stop such requisitions for the future. Such an order was in its place when addressed to ^tolia, which had become a Roman dependency, but it was a monstrous insult when it was addressed to an equal ally like the Achaian League. 1 This is the meaning which I get out of Livy's words (xlii. 37), A chceis indignan- tibus eodem se loco esse . . . quo Messenii atgue JEllei, etc. Livy, as \isual, does not understand Federal politics. The Achaians could not complain that two of their own cities were put on a level with themselves ; but the whole body might complain that particular cities were dealt with at all, and the other cities might complain that such inappropriate praise was addressed to Elis and MessSne. Livy does not fully realize that Elis and Mess^ne were now Achaian cities, much as he once before (p. 458) fancied Elis to be an Achaian city hefore it tecame one. Cf. Schorn, p. 342. ^ Pol. xxvii. 2. ^'EtxfyniJ.&Ti.aa.v rah crin'opxiais rals tSiv 'Kxaiwv Kal irapeKaKeaav " Kpxava rbv arpaTfiytiv, k.t.X. This language clearly implies that it was an act of the General and his Cabinet (the Btiiuovpyoi) only. Livy indeed says, Argis prsebitum est lis concilium, uti nihil aliud a gente Achieorum petierunt, etc. (xlii. 44). He prohalily misunderstood the term trvvapxlai, which is equivalent to ffvvdpxofTes, and that to Srnuovpyol. See above, pp. 220, 506. ^ See above, p. 518. IX CONVENTION OF THE MODERATE PARTY 525 The decree forbade any city to grant military help to any Eoman ofiBcer, except by order of the Senate.^ This clearly implied that it was the duty of every Greek state to obey every order which really had the Senate's authority. Again, in defiance of Further all Federal rights, the Eoman envoys went through the several inroads on cities, publishing the decree, enlarging on the virtues of the rights^ Senate, and threatening all who were not avowed supporters of Rome.^ It was not till after this that they condescended to attend the Federal Assembly at Aigion. It was currently believed that they came with the design of accusing Lykortas, Polybios, and even Arch6n, before the assembled People, as enemies of Rome. But they did not venture upon an accusa- tion for which they found that there was absolutely no pretence. They therefore did not appear before the Assembly, but contented themselves with addressing a few words of compliment and exhortation to the Senate.^ The intentions of Rome towards the League were now made Conven- manifest. Every Achaian statesman who was not Rome's abject ^^ °^ ^^^ slave might feel himself threatened by the behaviour of the p„jy Roman envoys both in Achaia and in other Greek states. The Autumn, leading men of the moderate party now held a Convention, to ^■°- ■'^''*'- settle their general course of action, and, among other things, to determine what candidates they would propose at the next Federal elections.* Lykortas exhorted to strict neutrality; it was not advisable to help either Rome or Macedonia in a struggle in which it was certain that the conqueror, whichever he might be, would prove a dangerous foe to Grecian freedom. On the other hand, to oppose Rome would be too great a risk ; he at least would not venture on it ; he had already too often opposed the most distinguished Romans and with too little success. Apoll6nid^s of Sikyon and Stratios of Tritaia took a ^ Liv. xliii. 17. Senatus - oonsultiim . . . per omnes Peloponnesi urtes circumtulerunt, Ne quis uUam rem in bellum magistratibus Bomauis oonferret, prseterquam quod Senatus censuisset. 2 Pol. xxviii. 3. '•' This seems on the whole to he the most likely meaning of the narrative in Polybios, where there certainly seems a marked opposition between (rwaxSelaris TYJi Tuiy 'AxottcSi' iKK\Tj(rias and (TvvaxS^i di'aicex'i'piiKeKrai' els t^v rilifiriv iirpaKTOi Te\4ois, ^ lb. 'AviSuKav rois dpxovat, ^ lb. xxx. 10. IX EFFECTS OF THE CONQUEST OF MACEDONIA 531 truth there was no sort of excuse for summoning them ; nothing had been found among the papers of the fallen King which implicated any Achaia,n citizen.^ Therefore, instead of the Emtassy Achaians being sent for like the other Greeks, two of the Eoman °f Domi- Commissioners, Cnseus Domitius and Caius Claudius, were sent Claudius as Ambassadors to the Achaian Assembly. The share of ^milius b.c. 167. in this business was wholly against his will ; he was an honest man and hated wretches like Lykiskos and Kallikratgs.^ But his colleagues were too much for him, and here, just as in Epeiros, he was made the instrument of iniquity which he abhorred. The envoys came, but unluckily no contemporary account of their reception has been preserved. There is here a sad gap among the fragments of Polybios, and we have no longer so much as Livy's translation to fill up the blank. Our sole authority for details is the late and careless antiquary Pausanias. Accord- Demand ing to him, one Roman Commissioner, whose name he does not °* *^® mention, was introduced into the Assembly by Kallikrat^s.^ The Eoman affirmed that the chief men of Achaia had helped Perseus during the war with supplies of money and in other ways. He called on the Assembly to condemn them to death ; when they were condemned, he would name them. An Assembly whose older members could remember the days of Aratos had not quite sunk to such degradation as this. If any Achaians had aided Perseus, let the Eomans name them; at all events no citizen of the League should be condemned unheard. Prompted by Kallikrat^s, the envoy answered that all the former Generals of the Achaians were guilty, all were partizans of Macedonia.* Up started Xenon of Patrai, a name already known to us as a Challenge statesman of the moderate party ; ^ " Then I am one who come °^ X^"""- under the charge ; I have been General of the Achaians ; yet I have never done any wrong to Eome or shown any favour to » Pol. XXX. 10. So Livy, xlv. 31. ^ lb. '0 iTTpaTTjybs [AeiJ/ctos AijufXtos] .... oiiK e^SoKo^fievos Kard ye t^v ai/TOv yvdjfiijv rah twv irepl rbp KiKiffKov koX KaWiKpdTTjv dta^oKats, ' Pans. vii. 10. 7. "Eva S4 riva 4^ airdv, &v5pa oiSa/uis h SiKoioaivqv irpbBvuov, rovTOV rbv dvSpa irpotreiroL'qaaTO 6 KttXXt/cpdrjjs ^s TOffovTov IbffTC airbv KoX 4s rh avviSpiov iaeXSeiv rd'AxaiCiii Iweiirev, On awiSptov see above, p. 205, note 1. ^ lb. 10. 9. 'AT€T6\iJ.Ti(r€v eltretv t»)s ol 4ffTpaT7iyriKbres^ Ax^^^v 4v4xov7anr6,vTes ry cUrlif. But it must be meant, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 466) says, of those only who had been Generals since the beginning of the war. KallikratSs himself had filled the office. ^ See above, p. 526, note 1. 532 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Depor- tation of the Thousand Achaians, E.O. 167. Embassies on behalf of the exiles, B.O. 164- 151. Insidious reply of tlie Senate. Perseus ; I am ready to be tried on such a charge by the Assembly of the Achaians or even by the Eomans themselves." The conscious innocence of Xen6n had carried him too far.^ The Roman caught at the imprudent challenge ; he demanded that all whom Kallikratgs named should be sent for trial to Rome. Sent to Rome they were, above a thousand of the best men of Achaia ; whether they were carried off by sheer force, or whether the Assembly was so cowed as to pass the required vote, does not clearly appear. Most probably some sort of vote was passed ; for the Senate had the mean hypocrisy to reply to one — perhaps the first — ^of the many Achaian embassies sent on their behalf, that they wondered at the Achaians applying in favour of men whom they had themselves condemned.^ Now the Achaian Assembly had most certainly not condemned these men ; it had at most sent them to Rome for trial, though indeed to send them to Rome for trial might be looked on as much the same thing as condemning them. Still such an answer seems to imply an Achaian vote of some kind ; even the diplomatic impudence of the Roman Senate could hardly have ventiired on such an assertion, if the victims had been carried off by mere Roman violence. It is clear that the Achaians were simple enough to believe that their countrymen would receive some sort of trial ; nay, as there was really nothing whatever to compromise them, they seem to have gone so far as to hope that a trial would prove their innocence, and that they would be restored to their country. Instead of this they were quartered — under what degree of restraint does not appear — in various Etruscan towns, in a dull provincial solitude, out of the reach of either Greek or Roman political life. Several embassies applied in vain for their release. One, which is described by Polybios, pleaded, in rejoinder to the Senate, that the exiles had never been condemned, and directly begged that the Senate would either bring them to trial itself, or allow the Achaians to try them. Nothing could less suit the Senate's purpose. A fair trial, whether at Rome or in Achaia, could only lead to an acquittal ; and a release of the victims, whether after trial or without, was held to be dangerous to the interests alike of Rome herself and of the Roman party in Achaia. The Senate, thus driven to unmask itself, distinctly declared that their release was inexpedient both for Rome and for Achaia. ^ Pans. vii. 10. ^ Pol, xxxi. 8. 10. "0 fih St) iirb avveiSdros iTappijffidl^ero dya^ov. POSITION OF POLYBIOS But, in the very form of its answer, it took care to strike another blow at that Federal unity which it so deeply hated and dreaded. The legal description of the Union was carefully avoided, and a form of words ''■ was employed which could only be meant as another insidious attempt to stir up division. At this answer the people everywhere mourned, not only in Achaia but throughout all Greece.^ But Kallikrat§s, Char ops, and their fellows rejoiced, and ruled everywhere still more undisturbed, while the flower of the Greek nation languished in their Etruscan prisons. One only among these victims of Roman treachery seems to Position have been less harshly dealt with than his fellows. Polybios, °^ Polybios through the friendship of ./Emilius and his son the younger Scipio, found a shelter in that great patrician house,^ and there, by familiar intercourse with the greatest men of Rome, he had those wide views of politics and history thrown open to him of which we reap the fruit in his immortal work. But by thus becoming a citizen of the world, his patriotism as a citizen of Achaia was somewhat dulled. He still loved his country ; he lived to do her important services ; but, from this time onwards, his tone becomes Roman rather than Achaian. He looks at Greek afiairs rather vrith. the eye of a Roman philhellen, a Flamininus or an ^milius, than with the national patriotism of PhilopoimSn or Lykortas or himself in his earlier days. The Senate refused his release and that of Stratios,* when they were the only men of importance surviving. Yet it was at last through his influence ^ that, in the seventeenth year of their bondage, after many fruitless embassies,* such of the exiles as Release still survived, now less than three hundred in number, were °^}}^^ ' fiXllfiS allowed to return to their homes.' b (,_ X51. The treatment of these kidnapped Achaians was probably the most brutal and treacherous piece of tyranny of which a civilized state was ever guilty towards an equal ally which had faithfully ^ Pol. xxxi. 8. "Yiypa^pav dirdKpLfftv TOiairriVj Htl ijfieis oix viroKa^^d.vo^cv ffvfKp^peiv [otfre ijpiiv^ odre rots iffier^poi^ d-^fiois ro^TovsToifS dvdpas iirave\6€Lv ris oTkov. Now ol ip-irepoi Sijfioi can only mean the several cities separately. But the interest of the several Achaian cities was no aifair of the Roman Senate. It was only with the IBvos or Kombv tSv 'A-xai&v that they could have any lawful dealings. ^ Pol. U.S. Kara 5^ t^p 'EWtiSa Sia.yyekBela'qs rijs dnroKpiffeiiK TTjt rots 'Amatols deSo/jL^VTjs itir^p TUtv KaTaiTiad^vTujv, to, fikv irXrjdTi avferpi^tj rats Siavoiais, k.t.\. 3 lb. xxxii. 9. ■" lb. 7. " Plut. Cat. Maj. 9. •* Paus. vii. 10. 11. Pol. xxxiii. 1, 2, 13. ' Paus. vii. 10. 12. 534 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE Dealings of Rome with foreign nations. discharged all the duties of alliance.^ Eome, in her dealings with foreign nations, knew neither mercy nor justice. It is in this unfavourable light that the City and most of her citizens appear to a student of Grecian history ; but it must not be for- gotten that Eoman vices and Roman virtues sprang from the same source, and that the men who sacrificed the rights of other nations to the interests of Eome were often equally ready to sacrifice themselves and all that they had in the same cause. The man who, in dealing with strangers, appeared only as a brutal conqueror or a base intrigii.er, often retained every old Eoman virtue at the hearth of his own house and in the fonun of his own city. It had long been held to be the duty of every Eoman to use every means to break the power of any state which still retained strength or independence inconsistent with Eome's claim to universal dominion. The deportation of the Achaian patriots was only one act, though the basest, in a long series of treacherous attempts against the union and freedom of the League. It is even possible that it was only with a sinister purpose that the Senate at last consented to their release. Their advocate Cato obtained their enlargement by an appeal to the contemptiious pity of his hearers rather than to any nobler feeling.^ It may be that the Senate foresaw what would come, and set free its victims mainly in order to secure fresh oppor- tunities for intrigue and for final conquest. Fresli intrigues of Rome. Dispute between Sparta and Mega lopolis. Even while the flower of the nation was thus detained in Italy, Eome did not cease from her intrigues against the integrity of the Achaian Union. It is impossible to conceive a greater tribute to the importance and benefit of the Federal tie than these constant attempts to dissolve it on the part of the enemy of all Grecian freedom. The discontent of Sparta, never perhaps fully appeased, once more furnished the occasion. There was a dispute about frontiers between the Cantons of Sparta and Megalopolis,^ perhaps the old dispute which PhilopoimSn had ^ Mommsen, wlio cannot understand that a weak state can have any rights against a strong one, does not forsake his friends even in this extremity. The deportation of the Achaians is recorded by him (i. 596) without a word of dis- approval ; indeed he seems to think it all right and proper ; the object was " die kindische Opposition [is that German?] der Hellenen mundtodt zu machen. " 2 Plut. Cat. Maj. 9. ' Pol. xxxi. 9. Pausanias (vii. 11. 1) makes it a dispute between Sparta and Argos. See Schorn, 377. Considering that the maritime towns of Lak6nia were IX CHARACTER OF ROMAN FOREIGN POLICY 535 somewhat arbitrarily decided in favour of his own city.^ Caius Mission Sulpicius Gallus, one of the most distinguished Romans of his °*^-. . time, was going into Asia to collect accusations against King gaUus Eumengs ;^ for friendly Kings, when they had served their turn, b.o. 166- fared no better at the hands of Rome than friendly common- 1^^- wealths. He was ordered to stop and settle this little matter on his way, and also, if report says truly, to detach as many cities as he could from the Achaian League.^ Sulpicius thought it beneath him personally to decide a matter which, as Pausanias remarks,* the great Philip had not thought beneath him ; he bade Kallikrates judge between the two contending Cantons. The other part of his commission almost wholly failed. All the cities of PeloponnSsos — Sparta, it would seem, included — knew their interest too well to listen to any intrigues against an Union to which they owed whatever amount of freedom and prosperity they still retained. The JEtolian Pleurdn alone, an outlying Separa- Canton unnaturally attached to the Peloponn^sian Confederacy, ^J"' °^ asked for licence to secede. Sulpicius bade his envoys go and from the ask leave of the Senate, which of course gladly granted it.^ League. Yet even now the League retained a degree of power which made its alliance or enmity of importance to foreign states. And in truth the union of all PeloponnSsos formed a power which could have held its own against any kingdom or commonwealth then existing, except Rome itself. There was now a war between Rhodes and Crete. Each party asked for Achaian help ; the Debate Ambassadors were heard ; ® the Assembly was strongly disposed ?f * to assist Rhodes ; but Kallikrates said that the League ought not alliance, to make war or alliance with any one without the consent of b.c. 152. Rome. No such engagement had ever been entered into : Achaia was not a dependency like .^tolia, but an equal ally ; and nothing in the treaty with Rome forbade the League to take any part it chose in such a quarrel. But the voice of Kallikrates was cer- now independent of Sparta, it may be doubted whether the Cantons of Sparta and Argos were conterminous. 1 See above, p. 503. ^ Pol. xxxi. 10. ^ Pans. vii. 11. 3. npoffe-jreffTiiXr] 5^ i/irit r^s ^ouXrjs t^ PdW^ 7r6\ets 6Tr6aas iarlv ot6s re us irXelffras d^ivai iSluiKev h Toh 'Axaiofs BcLPdrov SIktjv. It is dangerous to 'draw political inferences from the language of Pausanias in the way that we do from that of Polybios. Do the words Trav ti 'Axai-ods ij KaKWV a(l>l(ri.v iyiv€To fuil^6vo)v dpx^- Dr. Elder (Diet. Biog. art. Callicratea) some- what oddly translates this, " His death being, for aught I know, a clear gain to his country." ^ lb. 9. Toi)s fj^i/ S'rj \_'Axo.tods] Trap^jyev 6 AlaLos us t6. irdvTa 'iireffBat KaKeSaiii&VLol ripoV oi irplv re ijpiu fieravoeiv, oiS' 'Apxi^cuis iirip * 9°°^'^'^®' find several towns or districts acting together as a single people, ^gyg^d especially when, as among many peoples of Spain and Gaul, the Greece and Italy. ' Cantu, Histoire des Italiens, i. 82 [Storia degli Italian!, i. 118, ed. 1874]. " Les i^tats gouvemes par un seul on plnsieurs . . . continuent entre eux les luttes commencees entre les tribus ; les plus forts envahissent les plus faibles ; les montagnards se precipitent sur les habitants des plaines, et les uns pour se d6- fendre, les antres pour attaquer, forment des confederations. Cette forme, tres ancienne en Italic, est naturelle dans uu pays divls^ par des montagnes et des fleuves ; aussi n'y trouve-t-on pas les conditions propres aux vastes empires qui furent pour I'Asie une cause de servitude, ni I'unite nationale qui a rendu puis- sants qnelques peuples modemes." 560 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP. Greater importance of the Italian Leagues. Uncer- tainty of the ethnology of Ancient Italy. government clearly was republican, it is impossible not to suspect the presence of some sort of an approach to Federal union.^ In this way we may get glimpses of rude Confederations in many parts of the ancient world, any special examination of which the political historian may be content to leave to the minuter researches of the antiquaries of the several countries. We have no evidence for any constitutional details, and the common- wealths themselves are of no direct importance in history. It is enough for my purpose barely to record their existence, as illus- trations of the working of a general law. But the Federations of Ancient Italy stand on a different footing. It is indeed almost as impossible to recover any political details as in the obscure commonwealths of Gaul and Spain ; stiU the fame, even if partly mythical, of Etruria, Latium, and Samnium, and their intimate connexion with the history of Rome, and thereby with the history of the world, make some slight mention of those Leagues, at once so famous and so obscure, an appropriate portion of a general survey of the progress of Federal ideas. I must, once for all, decline all inquiries into the ethnology of the early Italian nations. On no subject have more daring and more unprofitable speculations been hazarded ; on no subject have they more fully met with their due reward. Ingenious men have striven to reconstruct a lost history from their own power of divination, and to reconstruct a lost language from a single unintelligible inscription. But their crude theories have been scattered to the winds by the wit and wisdom of the same hand which has since dashed in pieces the still frailer fabric of 1 Thus the ^dni in Gaul had a Republic under a yearly President with large powers, called a Vergobret (Csesar, Bell. Gall. i. 16), and Mr. Merivale (1. 302) does not hesitate to apply the name of Confederation both to their commonwealth and to that of the Arverni. Caesar also speaks of a GoncUium Gallwe (vi. 3) and even totius Gallim (i. 30). Here we have the familiar Federal formula. Doubt- less, as Mr. Merivale says, the word totms is not to be construed very strictly, but the expression at least points to some sort of union, however lax, among several Gaulish states. The Druidical religion seems also to have united a con- siderable portion of Gaul in a religious Amphiktyony (Cses. vi. 13), which might easily form the germ of a political League. Of course when I apply the words " Federal " and " Union " to these obscure commonwealths, I do so in the laxest sense of the words, not as implying the existence of regular constitutions, like those of Achaia and Lykia. It is here important to mark any approaches, however distant, to the Federal system, just as when treating of the Delphic Amphiktyony, it was important to distinguish between such mere approaches and a perfect Federation. X EARLY FEDERATIONS IN ITALY 561 Egyptian and Babylonish delusion.^ It is but lost labour to dispute, and it is profoundly indifferent to my subject if ascer- tained, whether the Etruscans were Lydians, Ehsetians, or Armenians ^ ; whether the Tyrrhenians were the same people as the Rasena or a subject Pelasgian race. All that concerns me is that, in the course of Roman history, we find glimpses which Early are quite enough to convince us that a near approach to Federal **£ 'p.'^°^ ideas was made, at an early time, by more than one Italian rations people. We see clear indications of the existence of Leagues of in Italy. some kind among the Etruscans, Samnites, Hernicans,^ and Vol- scians,* while we can hardly doubt that the Thirty Cities of Latium were united by a tie which came nearer still to our con- ception of a true Federal Government. Our evidence indeed Nature comes immediately from the suspicious records of half-mythical of the times, records which it is impossible to trust for details, and whose testimony must at once be cast aside whenever it bears the stamp of falsification in the interests of national or family pride. But incidental testimonies to the constitution of foreign states are far less suspicious ; such accounts are more open to unconscious error, but much less so to wilful misrepresentation. And we must not forget that these early constitutions did, in Late pre- some sort, survive far down into strictly historical times. The servation Italian states were not incorporated with Eome ; they remained n^n^^ distinct, though dependent, commonwealths as late as the wars Constitu- of Marius and Sulla. They were in much the same position as tio^is. the dependent commonwealths of Greece, and retained much the same sort of shadow of their ancient freedom. Etruria, till her conquest by Sulla, retained her internal constitution and her native literature. Samnium, in the very last stage of the war, b.o. 82. brought Rome nearer to destruction than she had been brought ' Sir G. C. Lewis, Credibility of the Early Roman History, 1855. Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, 1862. ^ The Armenian Origin of the Etruscans, by Robert Ellis, B.D., London, 1861. ^ Of the Hernicans Livy uses exactly the same formulas which he applies to the Federal states of Greece. Concilium populorum omnium habentibus Anagninis in circo quem Maritimum vocant, prater Aletrinatem, Ferentina- temque, et Verulanum, omnes Hernici nominis populo Romano bellum indixe- runt. Liv. ix. 42. Cf. the Boeotian dissensions, xlii. 38 (above, p. 521). ■* Dionysios (viii. 4) describes a Federal Congress of the Volsoians, from which Niebuhr, Roman History (ii. 28, Eng. Tr. ), endeavours to extract some details as to the Volscian constitution. In this I cannot follow him ; but that Dionysios looked on the Volscians as a Federal state is clear beyond doubt. 2 O 562 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY by Hannibal himself. Even the Latin commonwealths in the later sense, Eoman colonies and dependencies as they were, still kept up a faint shadow of the famous Latin League of earlier days. The historians who serve as our authorities had therefore in their hands better materials than might at first sight appear for a knowledge of the constitutional antiquities of the old Italian states. Livy indeed was too careless, and Dionysios too wedded to preconceived theories, ever thoroughly to understand what they saw or what they read ; still Livy and Dionysios wrote with earlier and better informed writers before them, writers who had themselves seen Etruria and Samnium in the condition of separate, although dependent commonwealths. We may therefore fairly look in their writings for occasional hints which may give us some general notion of the constitution of these ancient republics. Minute details it would of course be hopeless to expect. League of Eteubia. The Twelve Cities. I pass by the traditions of Etruscan settlements, and indeed of Etruscan Confederations, in Campania and in Cisalpine Gaul.^ These traditions are indeed highly probable in themselves, but they belong to an age before the faintest approaches to authentic history. I confine myself wholly to the well-known Etruria on the banks of the Tiber and the Arnus. Here we find a picture, the general outlines of which are surely trustworthy, of twelve cities, each forming an independent commonwealth, but all united by a lax Federal bond. The number twelve is so con- stantly given ^ that there can be no doubt of its accuracy ; " the Twelve Cities " was evidently a familiar formula, and it is con- firmed by the existence of twelve as a political number in the most remote parts of the world.^ And it derives confirmation from the fact that the number twelve is one not easy to recon- cile with the lists of the Etruscan towns as handed down to us. 1 Liv. V. 33. Polyb. ii. 16, 17. See K. 0. Miiller, Etrusker, i. 131, 136, 345. Niebulir, i. 88, 95. ' ^ Liv. U.S. So iv. 23, wtere duodecim populi is used as equivalent to the Etruscan State. See also Dionys. Hal. vi. 75 ; cf. ix. 18 and Niebuhr, i. 94 sqq. The Federal style of populi remained in use in the Haunibaliau War both in Etruria and Umbria. Liv. xxviii. 45. It remained even in Imperial times, when we meet with Hetiurice quindecim populi (see MiiUer, i. 368), an increase reminding one of the Augustan Beform of the Amphiktyonio Council. See above, p. 105. * As in Palestine, Egypt, Achaia, Ionia. We might add the " Twelve Peers " of mediaeval or romantic France. X LEAGUE OF ETRUKIA 563 More than twelve towns are spoken of in our narratives ; either then the number must, as in some other Federations, have fluctuated from time to time, or the twelve sovereign members of the League could not in every case have consisted of a single Constitu- city only.i Either the several States may have themselves con- *'.°'J °* ^^^ sisted of smaller Confederations, or the great cities may have had smaller towns attached to them, whether as subjects, as dependent allies, or as municipalities sharing in the franchise of the capital. Our Greek experience has supplied us with examples of aU these various relations.^ The States, however constituted, seem to have preserved strict Federal equality among themselves ; except in the mythical days of Lars Porsena, we hear nothing of any predominant capital. Indeed the Federal Meetings, like those of Phdkis and of Akarnania in early times,^ seem not to have been held in a town at all, but within the precincts of a venerated national sanctuary. The Amphi- Etruscan League has every appearance of being one of those ''*.y™"' political Unions which grew out of an earlier religious Amphi- jj^g ktyony.* The religious centre of Etruria was the temple of League. Voltumna,^ a place whose site is uncertain, and there the poli- tical assemblies of the nation were held also. The religious * synod was doubtless held at stated times ; whether every religious synod involved also a political Congress, or whether secular affairs were dealt with only from time to time as occasion served, is a question which it would be dangerous to determine either way. But it seems that a power was vested somewhere to summon special meetings, as we find them held both at the request of particular cities ^ and at that of foreign allies.'' Of the constitution of the Federal Assembly we can say nothing, Constitu- except that it doubtless was, like the constitutions of the several ^"^ oittie 1 This is suggested by Miiller, i. 352, 360. AssemWy. 2 See above, pp. 126, 200, 489. ' See above, pp. 113, 114. •' Mommsen (i. 86) calls Volsinii the " Metropole " of Etruria, but he explains it to be so only in a religious sense, "namentlich fur den Gotterdienst," and he strongly asserts the independent position of the States. ° Liv. iv. 23, 25 ; vi. 2. He regularly uses Gcmciliv/m for the Federal As- sembly and populi for the States, just as he does when speaking of Achaia. " lb. iv. 23. Gum duae civitates, legatis circa duodecim populos missis, impetrassent ut ad Voltumnae fanum indiceretnr omni Btruriae concilium. ' lb. X. 16. (Samnites) Etruriam pulsi petierunt ; et quod legationibus nequicquam ssepe tentaverant, id se tanto agmine armatorum, mixtis terrore precibus, acturos efiScacius rati, postulaverunt principum Etrurise concilium. The Assembly is held, the Samnites address it, and we read presently after (c. 18), Tusci fere omnes oonsciverant bellum. 564 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP. Traces of Federal Kingship. B.C. 400? Laxity of the Federal tie. Power of war and peace in the League, cities, strictly aristocratic.^ In mythical times we hear of Kings in the several cities, and of a sort of a Federal King, at least in war time, attended by a liotor from each of the Confederate towns.2 This is a state of things which is by no means im- probable in itself, though it would be dangerous to set it down as a piece of authentic history. We may feel sure that, in Etruria, as well as in other parts of Italy and Greece, kingly government existed before Aristocracy ; the further change from Aristocracy to Democracy seems in Etruria never to have been made. There is a remarkable story in Livy that the Veientines, weary of the excitement of annual elections, fell back upon Kingship, and thereby offended the other cities. The rest of the League at once disliked royalty and had personal objections to the particular King chosen.^ This is a sort of story which neither Livy nor any other Roman annalist was likely to insert ; we doubtless have here, however much spoiled in the telling, a genuine bit of internal Etruscan history. The Federal tie between the several States seems to have been lax. If we may venture so far into detail, it would seem that the relations among the Etruscan cities with regard to peace and war were nearly the same as those among the members of the Lacedsemo- nian Confederacy.* They were however modified by the absence of any city possessing the presidential and pre-considering powers of Sparta. War might apparently be decreed by the Federal body, in which case every city would doubtless be bound to send its contingent.^ In such a case it seems to have been held to be a breach of Federal Law for any city to conclude a separate 1 See Mtiller, i. 366, 362. Livy constantly uses the word PHnceps, with which we have been so familiar in the history of Federal Greece, to designate the memhers of the Etruscan Assemblies. Dionysios (iii. 5) speaks of an iKKXrja-la at Tarquiuii in mythical times, and it has been thought, by a very doubtful refinement, that this iKKkqala is opposed, like the Roman Plebs, to the yivq or Patrician houses. See Niebuhr, i. 99. Miiller, i. 362. But nothing can be plainer than that Dionysios, as Niebuhr himself suggests, merely transferred Roman language to Tarquinii. ^ Dion. iii. 61. 'TvpprivbvyhpeBoiiSbKei,eKa.(n-ovTuv Kark irbXiv ^atriXiiiv ha. irporiyeldBai fia§So6poi', Hfia ttj S^tr/x-rj tQv p6,(iSat> wiXeKw (pipovra,- el Se Kow^ ylvoiTO T&iv SibSeKa 7r6\eMi' (TTpareia, Tois diiSeica ireX^Keis hi wapadldoadai. TCp Xa^SvTL T7]P a6TOKp6.Topa apxh^. * Liv. V. 1. Veientes contra tajdio aunusB ambitionis, quaj Interdum dis- cordiariim causa erat, Regem creavere. Offendit ea res populorum Etrurise animos, non majore odio regui, quam ipsius Regis. '' See above, p. 357. ^ Dion. iii. 57. •^■^(puxiJ.a ■KoiodvTO.i. iriaa^ IvpprivCrii irSXeis Koivjj rbv Karh 'Poi/mioiv irdXefiov iKtfiipew • t^v Sk ixt) iierixovtra-v ttjs arpareias iKffirovSov etcai. X LAXITY OF FEDERAL TIE IN ETRURIA 565 peace with the enemy.^ But it is clear that the several cities retained, under all other circumstances, the right of separate diplomatic and military action. If the Federal body neglected to take up the quarrel of any particular city, that city might, and also alone or with such cities as chose to join it, carry on war on its S *^g own account.^ One narrative, if we may trust it, describes the Federal body as, on one occasion, refusing to declare war in the b.c. 479 ? name of the League, but expressly authorizing the service of volunteers from any Confederate city, seemingly whether such city itself declared war or not.^ Altogether, the picture which Diony- sios and Livy give us of the state of things in Etruria must be The taken at what it may be worth, according to the amount of ^°'='"^°^^ authentic materials which we may hold to be preserved in their authorities writings. They are of course not to be received as containing a how far trustworthy narrative of events which are placed before the '"^"^Jj, beginning of authentic history. The question is, How far did the annalists whom they followed carry back into these times the real constitution of Etruria in later times 1 The general picture which they draw is quite consistent with what we know of other states in a similar position, and does not need to be pieced out by any random conjectures or attempts at divination. It sets before us the perfectly probable spectacle of twelve cities, Probable united by a strong religious and national feeling, fully accus- ^j j.™" tomed to common political action, but among which the Federal League. ti6 was not strong enough to extinguish the separate action of the States or to weld Etruria together into a perfect Federal commonwealth like Achaia. The Etruscan Union, as described to us, was laxer even than that of the United States under their first Confederation ; but it may well have been as strong as that which unites the members of the existing Confederation of Germany, or even as strong as the union of the Swiss Cantons in some of its earlier and laxer forms. Of the Samnites, the worthiest foes whom Rome ever met 1 Dion. ix. 18. Tvpfnivav al fi^i /ierairxoOo-ai rijs dpifirqt ^vSeKa TriXeis, 6.yoptLv TotTjcrdfievOL KotvTjv, KaTTjydpow rod OdieTaviov ^dvovSj^Sri rhv irpbi '^upiaLovs TToXefiov ov fiercL KOLvijs 7^(6/^775 KareXOaavro. ^ This seems clear from several of the passages already quoted from Livy, and indeed from the whole history of the wars between Rome and Veil. ^ Dion. ix. 1. Xvv^x^V ^^ kolj'tjv eKKKrjffiav rb ^dvos' Kal TroXXct OO't'eTavuiv SeriBivTuv avvalpeaBai aiplffi tov koto 'VapjiXav toK^/jlov, tAos i^TjviyKav i^tivai, ToTs ^ovKoixhiois Tuppijcuv /mt^civ ttjs (TTpaTelas. 566 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY CHAP. Absence of details. The Samnite Cantons, League of within her own peninsula, we know even less than we know of Samnium. tjjg Etruscans. There can be little doubt that they possessed a Federal Constitution, but of its details we can say absolutely nothing. There was, in war-time at least, a military head of the League, with the title of Emh-atwr or Imperator ; ^ but we know not whether he was merely a Commander-in-Chief appointed for the occasion, or whether Samnium, unlike ^tolia and Achaia, possessed a permanent Federal President. That the Samnite G-overnment was Federal we might almost infer from the mere extent of the country without any further evidence. The Sam- nite nation constantly acts as a whole ; but a consolidated republic on such a scale would be without parallel among the ancient commonwealths, and it is still clearer that Samnium was not a case of a single city ruling over a subject or dependent territory. The names of two Cantons, the Caudini and the Pentri,^ are distinctly mentioned by Livy ; the Hirpini,^ Cara- ceni,* and Frentani ^ are added by modern writers with more or less of probability. But the great city of Capua,® though a portion of its inhabitants were of Samnite blood, seems at no time to have been a member of the Samnite League. This was a most important fact in Samnite history. It debarred the Confederation from ^ Liv. ix. 1. Samnites eo anno Imperatorem C. Pontium, Jlerennii JUium, lidbuerunt. Mr. Bunbury (Diet, of Geog. Art. Samninm) infers from Livy, ix. 3, viii. 39, the absence of a Federal Diet, which Niebuhr (iii. 108) assumes without hesitation. It is hard to see how Mr. Bunbury's references bear upon the point. In Liv. ix. 3 Caius Pontius consults his father on a military question, which was surely within the competence of the Imperator ; in viii. 39, I should rather have found a distinct proof of the existence both of Federal and local Assemblies. The words omnia concilia may well imply the latter, while the Federal Assembly seems implied in De eo coacti referre Prcefores decretum fecerunt, A Senate too seems implied in the phrase, ol irpS^ovXoi t(ov Sawirfij', Dion. Pr. ii. (Bxo. de leg. p. 739 c). See Niebuhr, ii. 25. ^ Liv. xxiii. 41. Agrum Hirpinum et Samnites Caudinos. xxiv. 20. Cau- dinus Samnis gramus devastatus, cf. ix. 1, et seqq. So ix. 31, Bnvianus . . . caput Pentrorum Samnitium. xxii. 61, Samnites prsster Pentros. ^ See Mr. Bunbury's Article ' ' Hirpini " in the Dictionary of Geography. The Hirpini are never distinctly mentioned during the days of Samnite independence, but throughout the Hannibalian War they appear as a distinct people. Doubt- less Rome had practised the same system of dismemberment in Samnium of which we have seen so much in the Greek Federal States. ■• See Diet, of Geog. in voo. ■■ Diet, of Geog. in voc. Niebuhr, iii. 107. The Frentani appear in history only as a non-Samnite people. ' Livy describes the Samnite occupation of Capua in iv. 37. In vii. 38 the people of Capua pray for relief against Samnite incursions. The original filibusters must therefore have quite separated themselves from the Samnite League. X LEAGUE OF SAMNIUM 667 both the good and the evil which might have sprung from the Bfifect presence of one of the great cities of Italy within its borders, of the It freed Samnium from all fear of a predominant or tyrant city, of Capua. such as Thebes became in Boeotia ; on the other hand it must have cut ofi' the Samnite people from many of the civilizing influences to which other parts of Italy were open. Samnium remained an isolated mountain district, without a sea-board ^ and without any city of importance.^ Its position resembled that of Analogy the original .lEtolia and of the original Switzerland. Civic life, with that is, among the ancient commonwealths, the only fully civilized ^^^ ^* life, must, in such a country, have lagged far behind its develope- switzer- ments, not only in the Greek cities of Italy, but in Rome, land. Etruria, or Latium. The long struggle of the Samnites with gtrngrfe Rome, never flinching, never yielding while hope of success against lasted, sinking only before irresistible force, and rising again Rome, whenever the least glimmer of hope or help appeared — the war b.c. 340- which lasted, we may say, from the days of Valerius Corvus to ^^• the days of Sulla, is worthy of the men of Morgarten or the men of Mesolongi. Their resistance to the conqueror ceased, as we shall see, only with the devastation of their land and the exter- mination of their race. The Pontius who led Rome's army and b.c. 319. whom Rome led in chains and beheaded,^ and the Pontius who, b.o. 82. generations after, fell in the last struggle by the Colline Gate,* remind us of the Reding who first taught the Austrian despot what a.d. 1315. freemen could do and suffer, and the Reding who struck the last a.d. 1798. blow for the true Democracy of the mountains against the sham Democracy of the bloody city. The internal history of such a people, could we recover it, would be a contribution of the highest value both to the general history of the world and to the general history of Federalism. It would of course be vain to dream of perfection in Samnium any more than elsewhere. We must never let the external heroism of a nation delude us into the hope that we should find its internal history free from those dissensions and crimes which disfigure every history. What we know of the Samnite League sets its people before us in a far fairer light than the kindred League of .iEtolia ; still we cannot 1 Unless possibly the district afterwards known as that of the Picentes. See Niebiihr, iii. 543-4. 2 Bovianum is called by Livy (ix. 31) longe ditissim,um et opuUntissimum armis mrisqve. But could Bovianum have been compared to Rome and Capua or the great Etruscan cities ? 3 See above, pp. 45, 46. * See below, § 2. 568 OF FEDEKALISM IN ITALY Lessons of Samnite history. suppose that it was wholly free from those errors which are common to all political communities, kingly and republican, Federal and Consolidated. But, just as in the case of iEtolia, the long endurance of Samnium, the abiding energy displayed by its people, the absence of any sign of wavering on the part of any section of the people — all show that the Samnite League formed a really united people, acting with a common national will against a coinmon enemy. Thus the history of Samnium supplies another of the many answers with which our history abounds to shallow declamations about the inherent weakness of Federal states. The utter lack of all detailed history of such a Federation — a Federation too, like that of ^tolia, mainly rural and not xu-ban — is one of those losses which the student of ancient history will ever lament, but which, if he is wise, he will not attempt to supply by arbitrary conjectures or divinations of his own. worthy details. League of Of all the principal Italian powers, that which, as far as our Latium. scanty information goes, has the best claim to be looked on as a real Federal Government is the League of the Thirty Cities of Latium. Our position with regard to the Latins is exactly Abundance opposite to our position with regard to the Samnites. We have of untrust- abundance of details, if we could only bring ourselves to look upon any of those details as trustworthy. Dionysios, if we choose to believe him, is ready to give us an account of the Latin League almost as minute as Polybios could give us of the Achaian League. He knows the name and date of its founder, the objects of its foundation, and the earlier models which the founder had before his eyes. Servius Tullius founded the Latin League in imitation of the Amphiktyonies of Greece,^ and he accompanied his founda- tion by an Inaugural Address, full of political precepts which might have fallen from the lips of Markos or of Hamilton.^ Into this mythical abyss I must decline to plunge ; nor yet can I undertake to correct the ever-fluctuating lists of the Confederate Cities, even with the help of the divining-rod of Niebuhr. Such minute descriptions of unhistoric times are worth incomparably ^ Dion. iv. 25. See above, p. 96. ^ lb. 26. A670>' Si£^7j\8e TrapaKXtiTiKhv o/iovolas, SiSiffKoiv us KoKbi/ fiiv XprjfjLa, ToWal irSXeis yu/^ xp^f^^^^^ y^^l^V' atVxp^^ 5^, ^i^t.s crvyyeviov dXX'^Xois dtaipepofJ^vojVf oXribv re la'x'JOS iikv rots atrdiveacv airo^aivuv ofio^poffivijv, TaireivoTTjTOS S^ /cat dadeveias Kal rots itr^wpordTots dW7JKo(f>doviav. X LEAGUE OF LATIUM 569 less than those genuine bits of information which are ever and anon to be extracted from the unconscious witness either of chroniclers or of poets. About Latium indeed we have one piece of real direct evidence in the form of the treaty concluded between Rome Ti-eaty and Carthage in the first year of the Eepublic, a document which ^^t™^"" serves to refute so much of what has commonly passed for Eoman carthage, history. This treaty, whose genuineness there is no reason to b.c. 508. doubt, was read by Polybios in its own obsolete Latin, and is preserved by him in a Greek translation.^ But unluckily it tells us nothing as to Latin Federal history ; the Latin cities which it speaks of are described, not as Confederates, but as subjects of Eome.^ Still the Thirty Cities of Latium, like the Twelve Nature Cities of Etruria, are mentioned far too often, and in far too °^ *''® regular and formal a manner,^ to leave any reasonable doubt that there really was a group of thirty Latin towns, united together by a Federal tie. That tie, there is every reason to believe, was much closer than that which united the Twelve Cities of Etruria. And, as the Latin towns, though most of them were small, seem to have occupied the country far more thoroughly than the few and scattered towns of Samnium, we may well believe that the Latin Confederation presented much more likeness to a real League of Greek cities than anything to be found either in Samnium or in Etruria. The Latin League clearly had common religious and political meetings,* and, in war-time at least, a common chief with the title of Dictator.^ The number of Thirty 1 Pol. iii. 22. ^ lb. Ka/3X'?56i/tot dk fiT} adiKeirwaav Srjfj.oif ^Apdearuv, ^AvTiarutv, Aavpef- tIvojv, KipKauTwv, TappaKtviruiVf fxrjd' dWov pLtjd^a AarlviDV, 6itol B,v vtt'^kooi' ihv di Tii'cs /i7) Sffiv iir^Koot., k.t.\. The heading of the treaty indeed speaks of Eome and her ffinnaxoi; but (riiJ,/mxoi is a flexible word, which must be explained by the more definite iiri/Koos. That word implies something more than the mere Trpoffracrla of a League spoken of in Dionysios. 3 Dion. iii. 34 ; vi. 63, 74, 75. See Niebuhr, ii. 18. * The Ferial Latince survived, as a well-known Eoman Festival, till very late ■ times. See Dion. iv. 49 ; viii. 87. The political meetings come out in iii. 34, al 5k Tujv Aarivuv irdXe.ts Idig fjL^v o^dkv aireKplvavro irpbs Toits 7rp^(r/3eis, KOLvrj dk ToO ^Bvovs d/yophv ^v ^epsvTlvi^ iroiTjffdfievoif ^tj^L^ovraL pLTj irapaxiapeiv ''PojfxaioLS T^s dpxvs, V. 61 i\ov Kal TToX^/uov TTfhaiixBai Apoiffif, Kal fi'/p-e ^lov nifre riKvuv koX yovidiv /jLnide/xms tpelffaffdat ^vxtjs, ioLV fiij av/Kpipri Apoifftp re koX rbv ainhv 8pKov ofidffacnv. ^av ti yivaiiai iroKlTi)i rij) Lpoiaov vS/up, iranplSa iif/icrofuit tt)v 'Pii/iiiv Kal /ieylffrriv eiepy^TTjv ApoOtrov, 2 Aur. Vict, de Vir. 111. Ixvi. 12. Floras, iii. 18. 8. ' He seems (App. Bell. Civ. i. 36) to have in some degree lost the affections of the Italians. They thought themselves threatened by his law for founding colonies, which they feared might be endowed at their own expense. Drusus, in fact, offended all parties in turn — one of the best proofs of his honesty, though perhaps not of his worldly wisdom. * App. BeU. Civ. i. 37. Aur. Vict, de Vir. lU. Ixxii. 11. ^ The immediate discovery (see App. u.s. 38) was caxised by the sending of a hostage from Asculum in Picenum to another town. This was of course a direct attack on the Boman system of isolating the several cities. Livy (Bp. Ixxi) seems to have given a full account of the internal movements in the Italian states — Eorum coitus conjwrationesque et orationes in conciliis prindpwm, « Liv. Bp. Ixxii. App. Bell. Civ. i. 38. 584 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY Analogy between the Italian Allies and the American Colonies. proceeded to organize a Government for themselves. Their position was, in everything but its geographical aspect, singularly like the position of the North American Colonies in 1775.^ What the colonists demanded was, not separation from the mother-country, but an acknowledgement of their claim to all the natural rights of Englishmen. What the Italians demanded was, not separation from Eome, but admission to the full privileges of Romans. Of course the form of the demand was not the same in the two cases. The Italians asked for closer incorporation, the Americans asked for fuller acknowledge- ment of local liberties. This difference was the natural con- sequence of the geographical difference. The Italians demanded Eoman citizenship; the analogous demand on the part of the - Americans would have been a claim for representation in the British Parliament. Had England and America formed one peilinsula, they probably would have demanded it; but, with the Atlantic between the Colonies and the mother- country, American patriotism necessarily took another shape. But, in other respects, the relations between the ruling country and its dependencies were closely analogous in the two cases. In both cases, the dependent commonwealths possessed a large share of internal independence, while their external affairs were ordered for them by a power over which they had no control. In both cases they were kept isolated from one another, with no common bond save that of common dependence on the dominant power. Even the complaints as to the position of the Italian allies in the Roman armies find a parallel in the complaints made by the Provincial officers in America as to the superiority over them claimed, even on their own soil, by officers of the same rank who bore British commissions.^ In both cases no doubt there were men who foresaw and desired separation from the first ; in America indeed such foresight and desire were confined to a few individuals, while in Italy they clearly extended to whole commonwealths : still separation was neither openly sought for, nor probably generally desired, till all constitutional means had failed, till separation was forced upon the discontented depend- encies by the conduct of the ruling state. The Americans, as being not conquered enemies but British colonies, clave longer than the Italians did to the names of loyalty and union. Still, ^ See Mommsen, ii. 216. ^ See Marshall's Life of Washington, ii. 36. X ANALOGY BETWEEN ITALY AND AMERICA 585 when Congress had once raised troops, when the Allies had once set up their counter-Government, the ruling state in each case had no choice but to yield every point at issue, to acknowledge the independence of the seceders, or to reconquer them by force. As the policy of Eome and England differed, so the event of the war differed ; but between the origin and the earliest stages of the two there is a close likeness. The Constitution which the seceding Allies now established Federal was beyond doubt intended to be a Federal one. This is taken Coustitu- for granted by most modern writers,^ and it seems involved in geceding the nature of the case. The various nations which joined in the States. revolt might indeed stoop to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome or to merge themselves in the Roman Commonwealth, but they were not likely either to acknowledge the supremacy of any other state or to merge their national differences in an Italian Republic one and indivisible. They chose a particular city as the seat of the Federal Government; but there is no evidence that it was intended to be anything more than the seat of the Federal Government.^ Their new capital was Oorfinium, in the Pelignian territory, a position admirably central for the whole of Italy, and probably chosen in the hope that the northern states which as yet stood aloof would before long join the League. As the Federal capital, Corfinium exchanged its old name for italioum that of Italicum.^ The League took for the present the form of the a Confederation of eight * States, each doubtless retaining its full ^^^^^ internal sovereignty, and some of them probably assuming a League. Federal form in their internal constitutions.^ In the details of Constitu- the central Government they closely followed the Roman pattern, *j™ °^ ^^^^ a pattern in truth in no way inconsistent with Federal institu- e-overn- tions. For, had each of the Roman Tribes possessed the internal meut iDorrowsd. 1 See Merivale, Fall of the Roman Eepublio, p. 84, Cantu, Hist, des It. f^^m Q^^t i. 408. Cf. Mommsen, ii. 216-17, 220-21. DiodSros (Exc. Phot. 1. xxxvii. ) uses ^j Rome. the Federal word aiveSpoi. ^ Mommsen (ii. 221) seems to think that every citizen of the League received the citizenship of Italioum. I see no proof of this. ' 'IraXiK^, Strabo, v. 4. Italicwm, Veil. ii. 16. ^ The number eight seems to rest on good numismatic evidence. The lists vary in different authors. Livy's list is Picentes, Vestini, Marsi, Pdigni, Marrucini, Samnites, I/ucani. Add the Hirpini, who appear as a distinct people from the Samnites (App. i. § 1 ; see above, p. 566, note 3), and we have the eight states needed. ^ The several states of Samnium and Lucania, isolated by the Boman policy, could hardly fail to return to the old Federal connexion, and the Samnites and Lucanians act throughout as wholes. On Leagues within Leagues, see above, p. 126. 586 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY chap. sovereignty which belonged to each Achaian City, the power of the Consuls, the Senate, and the Assembly would have been a good deal curtailed, but all three would have been just as neces- sary as they were under the actual system. At the head of the League stood two Consuls and twelve Praetors, and the affairs of the Confederation were administered by a Federal Senate of five hundred.^ This was the nearest approach to a Federal union of the whole peninsula which Italy has ever beheld. It might be a matter for curious speculation what would have been the result if the Italians had finally conquered, as at one Eome stage of the war they seemed likely to do. Eome, so far greater the great j^ every way than any other Italian city, would perhaps have ^.g ^ been found to be an insuperable obstacle in the way of any permanent lasting Federation of all Italy. Had the Roman armies been Italian finally overthrown, had Eome, instead of admitting the allies ■ to citizenship, been driven to seek admittance into the Italian League, she could never have sat down as an equal and con- tented member of a Federal body. It would have been as when Sparta, in the later days of the Achaian League, was required to sit down as an equal confederate alongside of her own revolted subjects of Mess^n6 and the Eleutherolak6nic towns.^ The Samnite Pontius gave utterance to a real, though terrible, truth when he said that, if the Italians would be free, they must root up the wood which sheltered the wolves which so long had ravaged Italy.^ He, we may be sure, had looked to separation from the first, and had held the rejection of the Italian claims by the Eoman Senate to be matter for nothing but rejoicing. As it was, it is hard to say whether Eome conquered or was conquered; but it is certain that, so far as she can be looked upon as successful, her victory was due far more to her diplo- The macy than to her arms. As usual, I must decline entering into Soaal military details. It is enough for my purpose to say that Eome B.C. 90- drew on all her resources both in Italy and in the Provinces. 89. As the British Government strove to reconquer America by the help of German mercenaries and of Indian savages, so Rome called to her help the fierce warriors of Numidia and Maure- tania. As the revolted colonists sought for aid from France, so 1 Diod. Exc. Phot. 1. xxxvii. 2. - See above, pp. 485, 492. ' Veil. ii. 27. 2. Telesimis dictitans adesse Eomanis ultimum diem, vocifera- batur eruendam delendamque nrbem ; adjiciens numquam defuturos raptores Italics libertfftis lupos nisi silva, in quara refugere solerent, esset excisa. X ROME THE OBSTACLE TO ITALIAN FEDERATION 587 the revolted Italians sought for aid from Mithridat^s. But, in the case of Italy, these extraneous aids had less influence on the struggle than they had in the case of America. The Numidians were rendered lukewarm in the Eoman cause by an ingenious stratagem,^ and MithridatSs, less wise than the counsellors of Lewis the Sixteenth, gave the Italians no efiectual support.^ The Roman and Italian armies, thus left to themselves, were, on the whole, equally matched ; and the victories and defeats on Successes the two sides were nearly equally balanced. Indeed, as long as °^J}'^ the League retained its full proportion, the Italians had clearly the advantage. Their successes emboldened the Etruscans and Movements Umbrians; that is, most probably, the mass of the people jn™™"'"* those states, whose interests lay in separation, showed that they umbria. would no longer be kept down by the local aristocracies, whose interests bound them to the Eoman connexion. At all events. Secession began to be threatened among the Etruscan and Umbrian commonwealths.* The Senate now yielded ; citizenship The was ofiered to the Latins, to the AUies who had remained faithful, Senate finally to all the seceders who should lay down their arms.* demands^ That is to say, Rome was really defeated, but she contrived to of the preserve the appearance of victory. The Allies had in truth Allies, extorted from her at the point of the sword all that any of them had openly demanded, all that many of them had actually wished > App. Bell. Civ. i. 42. ^ Died. Exc. Phot. 1. xxxvli. 2. '0 Si MidpiSdrris iirSKpuriv Sldoiffiv fifeu' t&s dvvdfiets eU t^v 'IraX/av, ^TeiSdiV aiiTtf KaraffTiJcrp T^y 'A(riav' toOto yap lirpaTTe. Out of this Dr. Liddell (ii. 282) makes the following ; " He bade the Samnites hold out firmly ; he was, he said, at present engaged in expelling the Romans from Asia ; when that work was done, he would cross the sea, and assist them in crushing the she-wolf of Asia. " The wolves of Pontius Telesinus speak for themselves ; those of Dr. Liddell are wholly inexplicable. It should be observed that this application to MithridatSs was only made in the last stage of the war, by the Samnites and other real enemies of Rome. Probably those states which sincerely sought for Roman citizenship would not have consented to such a negociation. 3 App. Bell. Civ. i. 49. ^ lb. Aetcracra oSv if ^ovXt} . . . 'iTaXLoyruv Toiis ^ri ^v rrj (Tu/i/tax^^ irapafjijii'ovras 4yl/rj^iffaTo elvai. iroXtTas. This must be the Lex Julia, See Cic. pro Balbo, 8. Merivale, p. 92. The words of Appian do not distinctly mention any offer of citizenship to those who should lay down their arms ; but it seems implied in the fact that those who did so did receive it (see Arnold, i. 174), and perhaps in the words of VeUeius (ii. 16), Paullatim delude recipiendo in oivitatem, qui arma aut non ceperant, aut deposuesrant maturius, vires refectas sunt. Probably promises to that effect were made, of which the later Lex Plautia- Papiria (see Cic. pro Archia, 8. Merivale, p. 94) was the formal confirmation. 588 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY chap. for. But that policy which never failed the Eoman Senate was able to put another face upon the matter. Eome no doubt well knew the real diversity of objects which lurked under the apparent unanimity of the seceders. The commonwealths nearer Rome, to which she was an object of envy rather than of hatred, had now all that they had wished for freely offered to them — offered to them, it might well be said, as the reward of their own prowess in arms. Citizenship was what they had all along striven for ; they had been driven into revolt and the establish- ment of a rival Government only by the pertinacious refusal of the wished-for gift. When citizenship was really to be had, there was no need to prolong the struggle for their own sakes, and the Italian Confederation was hardly old enough for them to wish to prolong it for the sake of the Union. It would have been an excess of self-sacrifice beyond all parallel, if Marsians and Pelignians, when their own point was gained, had gone on fighting purely for the sake of Samnites and Lucanians. With The other the exception of those two gallant nations, all the revolted states States gradually returned to their allegiance, and received the full citizenship citizenship of Eome. And, received as they were, one by one, ofteji after some success of the Eoman arms, Eome was even now able formally to maintain her own principle of yielding nothing to those who resisted and negociating only with the conquered. but But the Samnites and Lucanians still held out ; when they had Samnium Qj^^g taken Up arms, when they had once again won victories Lucania and suffered defeats, their old enmity towards Eome was not so still hold easily quenched. The Confederation was now reduced to two °"*'gg members, but those two members still resisted; Italicum sank again into Corfinium, but the Samnite town of ^sernia succeeded to the rank of the Federal capital.^ Sulla himself, notwithstand- ing several victories, failed wholly to subdue them; they still prolonged a guerrilla warfare, hoping that, among the factions of the Eoman state, some favourable opportunity might still turn up, or that the great King of Pontos might at last land in Italy, and summon them to his banners, as Pyrrhos and Hannibal had summoned their fathers. And for a while they were not wholly disappointed. The Social War had now dwindled into such small proportions that it might be left to a subordinate commander, while the ^ Diod. Exo. Phot. 1. xxxvii. 2. But App. u. 51 calls Bovianumthe ko^vo^oSSiov tSiv diroaTdpTuv. X ILLUSORY NATXJEE OF THE ROMAN FRANCHISE 589 threatening aspect of MithridatSs demanded all the attention of the EepubUc and its chiefs. Metellus Pius was left to deal with the remnants of war^ which still lingered in Samnium and Lucania, while the great prize of the Eastern command was disputed between Marius and Sulla. It fell to Sulla ; he was chosen Consul, and bidden to recover Rome's Eastern dominions from her terrible enemy. But just then arose the disputes and Legislation tumults which attended the legislation of Publius Sulpicius. '^^■. . The Allies had been admitted to the Roman franchise ; but they b^o^Ss"^' had been admitted to it in a shape which made its political rights whoUy illusory. The new citizens were equal in number Illusory to the old ; but they were all massed together, in eight Tribes nature only, so that, according to the Roman manner of voting, they franchise coidd, at the outside, command eight votes only out of thirty- granted five, perhaps only out of forty-three.^ Considering their numbers '° ^'^^ and weight, they were fully entitled to command twice as many.^ They were naturally discontented with their position, and their Their discontent. ' App. Bell. Civ. 68 rd "Kel-^ava toO -qv firefi,ire, ■ireipa8a\iilt<-'V dpxVt k.t.\. 604 OF f EDERALISM IN ITALY Growth of the League, 1164-8. Accession of Lodi, 1167. Founda- tion of Alexan- dria, 1168. More than one embassy -was sent from Manuel to Alexander demanding a Eoman Coronation, and though this request was, as might be expected, always evaded, still the Eastern Emperor continued, throughout the war, to give important help to every enemy of his Teutonic rival. That Manuel then was actually the first mover in the formation of the Lombard League is a statement which we may readily accept. But if it were so, his promptings were merely the occasion and not the cause; his embassies and his gold did but enable the discontented cities to do a little sooner and a little more effectively what they would assuredly have done sometime without his help. Manuel caused the formation of the Lombard League only in the sense in which the Persian King caused the Corinthian War ; ^ the Italians received his gold as Aratos received the gold of Ptolemy, as Algernon Sidney received the gold of Lewis, merely as the con- tribution of an ally towards a purpose which suited the objects of both. Anyhow the League,^ such as it was, was formed, and grew, till it included most of the Lombard cities. Pavia indeed stood firm in her loyalty ; but Cremona,* lately almost as zealously Imperialist, was not long in embracing the cause of freedom ; Lodi, small, weak, and isolated, clave to the cause of her Imperial founder, but, when her existence was perilled, she unwillingly became a member of the Confederacy.* Milan, destroyed like Mantineia, rose again, like Mantineia, from her ruins ; ^ and, as if to repeat every detail of the Arkadian parallel, the combined powers of the League founded what might seem to be meant as a Federal city, a second Megalopolis.® The new city received the name of Alexandria, in honour of the Pontifi" whose cause was incidentally linked with that of Lombard free- dom. But Alexandria resembled Megalopolis only in its strategic position ; it stood as an outpost against Pavia, as Megalopolis stood as an outpost against Sparta, but it never was meant to become a Federal capital or a member of a true Federal body in any shape. 1 Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 1. 9. See Grote ix. 400. ^ The Confederacy is at first Veronensis Societas (Vit. Alex. iii. 456), after- wards Societas Lmribardice or Lombardorum, Lombardonm Cmnmunitas or Confede- ratio (ib. 461, 4, 7), Societas Lomhardim et Marchice et Veronce et Venetue. (Conventus Venetus ap. Pertz, iv. 151.) ' Vit. Alex. iii. 456. Acerbus Morena, 1133. ' See the details in Acerbus Morena, 1135-43. 5 Acerbus Morena, 1135. Otto St. Bl. c. 20, 22. Cf. Ursperg, p. 309. ^ See above, p. 159. X LOMBARD LEAGUE OF INDIRECT FEDERAL IMPORTANCE 605 For in fact the importance of the Lombard League in Federal indirect history is of exactly the same kind as the importance of the importance Amphiktyonic Council. It is important simply because it never Lombard became a Federal Government. Yet its beginnings closely League in resembled the beginnings of two of the great Federations of ??'\®'^*' history. The Lombard League was analogous to the union of Analogy the Belgic Provinces or the American Colonies before their with respective Declarations of Independence. The oaths of the -^-merica Confederate cities may be paralleled with the early acts of the jjether- American Congress, with the early engagements among the lands. Provinces of the Netherlands, such as the separate alliance of Holland and Zealand,^ or the general agreement of all at the 1575. Pacification of Ghent.^ All agree in being unions of revolted 1576. subjects against Princes whose authority, within its lawful bounds, there was no avowed, and probably no real, intention of shaking off. All alike are they distinguished from the struggle of the PeloponnSsian towns against Macedonia, where of course no sort of legal right was acknowledged in the oppressor. The Lombards indeed guarded the rights of the Prince against whom they were contending, even more scrupulously than the Americans or the Netherlanders. The cities agree to maintain strict alliance with each other, to wage war against the Emperor with their united forces, to make no peace or truce with him except by common consent, but all is done with the most careful reservation of their faith and allegiance to the Empire itself.^ The Lombard League, ^ Reoueil des Traites, iii. 397. ^ lb. iii. 366. Motley's Rise of the Dutch Republic, iii. 85 (ed. 2). ^ This feeling appears strongly in the first beginnings of the League, but it seems gradually to have been weakened, though the event shows that the idea of perfect independence of the Empire could never have been reached. The rights of the Empire are formally reserved on the accession of Cremona and Lodi to the League. According to Sigonius (1. 14, p. 595) the Confederates describe themselves to the Cremouese as non Friderico adversaturi, sed communem libertatem adversus immanem pranfectorum ejus impotentiam tutaturi, and the agreement with Lodi is made salvafide Friderico Ccesari data (lb. p. 596). This last fact at least rests on the sure authority of Acerbus Morena (1143) : Fcedus . . . salva Imperatoris fdelitate, sicutpalam tunc dicebatur, inierunt. In the oath of the cities in 1167, given in Muratori's Antiquitates Italiose (Diss. 48, vol. iv. p. 262), the formal reservation is not made, but the rights of the Empire are implicitly reserved. They agree to resist any addition to their obligations as they stood at the accession of Frederick contra quod velit nos plus facere quam fecimus a tempore Henrici Regis usque ad introitum Imperatoris Friderici. This language clearly implies that some obligations towards the Empire were recognized. Also in this oath they do not bind themselves to make war on the Emperor by name, but only on any one who may violate their rights, contra omnem Iwrninenn quicumque noMscum facere voliieriid giierram aut malum. But in the later oaths they engage to make 606 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY of the League. The League not a true Federa- tion. Why the League did not develope into a true Federa- tion. in short, was not a Federal union, even of the laxest kind, it was a mere temporary agreement of certain cities to employ their united forces to accomplish a common object. While the war lasted, the League had its Congress ; ^ the Kectors ^ of the Con- federate cities met, as, in the nature of things, some one must have met, to arrange the measures to be taken by the Confederacy. Now and then they seem to have interfered in disputes between two Confederate cities, to defend the weaker against the stronger.^ But there was no Federal Government, no formation of an luiited state, nothing, in short, but an alliance of an unusually close kind.* Why then should such an ephemeral union claim any place in a history of Federalism ? Because, I would answer, it is instructive to mark the contrast, and the causes of the contrast, between the subsequent fate of the Lombard, the Belgian, and the American Confederacies. The early stages of all three were remarkably alike. But, in the two later cases, a lasting Federal Government rose out of what was, in its beginning, a mere Con- federacy for a temporary purpose. At first sight the circumstances of Italy might seem just as favourable for the formation of such a Government as the circumstances of America or the Netherlands. Why then did not a real Federal State grow up out of the promising elements of the Lombard League such as grew up out of the elements^ — at one time not more promising — which developed into the Belgian and American Confederations 1 Several causes at once present themselves ; one of them indeed war on him by name, and to make no peace or truce with him, his sons, or his wife, without the common consent. See Sigonius, pp. 606, 607, 613. Muratori, Ant. iv. 266,271. I transcribe Muratori's comment (279): "Ceterum antea Societas Lombardorumpropriamtantummodo tutelam in suis fosderibus prseferebat, volebatque illasam jidelitatem Imperatoris. At hie sine ulla tergiversatione ab eo discedit, atque ipsum ejurat, hostemque decernit. Bum nempe uti depositum et anathemate peroulsum ab Alexandro III. Papa jam tandem omnes exsecra- bantur." ^ Vit. Alex. III. 461. Pontifex ... ad Lombardos literas et nuntios festinauter direxit, et eorum dubia et nutautia corda firmavit, ut ex singulis civitatibus unam discretam et idoneam personam, quae vicem generaliiatis kaberet, ad ejus prsesentiam destinarent . . . Unde factum est quod quidam fideles et sapientes viri a Lombardorum communitate sunt electi, etc. ^ lb. 466. Rectores civitatum Lombardi^. ' Cantii (Histoire des Italiens, iv. 558) quotes a case in which the Congress of the League annulled a sentence of the Consuls of Bellagio to the prejudice of the people of Civenna and Lamonta. Would they have ventured on such an act of justice, had the offender been Milan or Verona ? This whole chapter of Cantu should be read, especially the remarks on subject districts in p. 563 et seqq. * See Sismondi, ii. 184-9. Cantu, iv. 531. X LOMBARD LEAGUE NOT A TRUE FEDERATION 607 lies quite on the surface. Frederick Barbarossa was more under Personal the dominion of reason than either Philip the Second or George character of the Third. When Frederick saw that the maintenance of his claims in their full extent was hopeless, he had the wisdom to surrender a part in order to save the rest. The Belgian and the American insurgents had to do with princes who would yield nothing till they were obliged to yield everything. Thus the original demand for just and legal government gradually changed into a demand for total separation. The prudence of Frederick He yields prevented matters from reaching this stage. " But this personal ™ '"^^• difference by no means touches the root of the matter. The Second Lombard League was renewed against Frederick the Second, by ^°™'^^i''i which time one might have thought that the need of union would 1228. ' have been more strongly felt; but the second League was, if anything, still further removed from a true Federal Government than the first. It is indeed possible that, had the struggle with Frederick Barbarossa gone on much longer, the cities might have been tempted to throw off their allegiance to the Empire altogether. In that case an united Government of some sort, whether a League or a national Kingdom, could hardly fail to have taken its place. As it was, the Imperial power in Italy died out No definite gradually, without any definite act either of revolt or of abdica- ^om'^nt tion at any particular moment. There was therefore no particular tionTn™' moment when it was clearly imperative to substitute any other Italy. Government for it. There was therefore no such distinct opportunity or rather necessity for the formation of a real Federation in Italy as there was in America and in the Nether- lands. And, what was of still greater moment, there was not No such in Italy the same predisposition towards union of any kind which tendency there was in the other cases. The Lombard cities were in truth jjj -^g^y in a position far too closely resembling that of the old Greek as there cities to feel the need of union. Their feelings and their patriot- ™^ ™ ^^^ ism were more strictly local than in the Netherlands or in the ig^^^g American colonies. In Italy we have to do with cities ; in the and in other two cases with provinces. The Dutch cities indeed retained America. a most extraordinary amount of independence, still the immediate component members of the Confederation were not cities but provinces. Again, the Lombard cities, in the practical abeyance The of the royal power, had actually exercised all the rights of Lombard independent sovereignty ; probably no wrong seemed to them "g^'^v so great as when the Emperor required them to give up their sovereign ; 608 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY the Dutch and American provinces not so, 1429-33. Vigour and constancy of the Confede- rates. darling privilege of private war. But the American Colonies had never possessed any sovereignty at all ; and the separate sove- reignty of the Belgian Counties and Duchies — sovereign at any time only with the reservation of the rights of the Empire ^ — had been altogether lost since their union under the House of Burgundy. There may have been local jealousies in either case, but there was nothing like the bitter hatred which reigned between Milan and Lodi. The American and the Dutch States had infinitely more to gain than to lose by union ; the Italian cities, like those of old Greece, would have lost by any effective union all that was dearest to them. In days when the names of Rome, and Caesar, and Augustus had not yet lost their magic influence, we can, almost believe that a more complete subjection to the Empire would have been felt as less irksome than the establishment of a Federal G-overnment strong enough to deliver Lombardy from the curse of local warfare. To have preached Federalism to the Italians of the twelfth century would have been like preaching it to the Greeks before the days of Alexander. Indeed it would have been a vainer attempt still, for experience did at least teach a large portion of Greece the necessity of union, while Italy never learned the lesson till our own times. The Lombard League then was a mere Confederacy, a mere close alliance to obtain a common object ; a Confederacy so close that it might easily have been developed into a real Confedera- tion, but which, in point of fact, never was so developed. As a Confederacy, it claims our deep admiration for the unity and vigour with which so many independent cities acted together during so long a struggle, for the constancy with which they refused all offers of separate terms, all temptations to break the ties which bound them to their external allies, the Pope, the King of Sicily, and the Emperor of the East.^ It was only when the war was over, when they had seen Caesar himself fly before them, that any of the true Lombard cities began to fall away. 1 Of the Crown of France in Flanders ; of the Empire everywhere else. ^ See Vit. Alex. iii. 965, 6, told with much papal partiality. It was however forbidden for any particular city to make any private agreement with the Eastern Emperor. See the oaths in Cantii (iv. 616). M ego nidlam co-ncordiam fed vd faciain cum imperatore Constantinopolitano. The League might negociate with Manuel as an external power ; for a single city to negociate with him could hardly fail to involve an admission of his sovereignty, which would be at once dangerous for the other cities, and inconsistent with the rights which they still acknowledged in the Western Emperor. POI.ICY OF VENICE 609 Venice indeed seems to have put a laxer interpretation on her Peculiar engagements ; but then Venice stood in quite a different position, policy of and was actuated by quite a diiferent spirit, from the cities of '''"™' the mainland. Venice did not scruple to aid Frederick the Siege of enemy of the League against Manuel its ally, when Frederick Ancona, attacked, and Manuel defended, her commercial rival Ancona.^ " Perhaps, as Ancona was not a member of the League, the island city did not actually violate the letter of any engagement ; still her conduct at least displayed something like sharp practice on the part of her merchant princes. The details of the war are matter of Italian history. At one Course of time, before the decisive stroke which ended the war, there ^^^ ''*''• seemed a fair hope of settling matters by peaceful negociation. „. , Frederick had failed — the only failure in his life which can be Alexan- called disgraceful — before the mud tvalls of Alexandria. A dria, pitched battle seemed impending between the Imperial army and ^l' *~°- the forces of the League. But, gallantly as they had resisted him when he appeared as an aggressor beneath their walls, the Italians still shrank from meeting their King and Emperor as an enemy on the open field. Negociations were opened ; each side was ready, saving its own rights, to entrust its cause to the Negocia- decision of chosen commissioners. ^ The question to be debated tions be- would of course have been as to the extent of the Imperial rights, t^^^i ^^^ as no one denied the Emperor's possession of some rights. As and the far then as Frederick and the cities were concerned there seems Cities no reason why the disputed points might not have been settled (l^^S) then as well as nine years later. That they were not so settled seems to have been no fault either of the Emperor or of the Eepublics. Possibly indeed Frederick was not yet humbled enough to make such concessions as he afterwards made. But it was neither by King nor Commonwealth that the negociations broken off were actually broken off; the cities might have made terms with ^ *'l® Csesar, but the Church was unwilling to make terms with the Legates, schismatic.^ The war was renewed ; the next year saw the ' Kinnamos, p. 314. Otto St. B. u. 20. Sismoudi (ii. 195) seems to me to attach far too much value to the account of the siege by Buoncampaguo (in Muratori's sixth volume), a rhetorical critic of the next century, to whose rhetoric he now and then adds a touch of his own. ^ Vit. Alex. iii. 465. See the text of the Concordia Imperatoris et Societatis Lombardice in Pertz, iv. 145. s Alex. ui. 466. Of. Rad. Mil. 1192. Romuald, 216. 2 R 610 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY Battle of Leonano, defeat of Frederick, 1176. Change in Frederick'i policy. Negooia- tions for Peace, 1176-7. Frederick reconciled with Venice and the Church, 1177. Rights of the Empire as under- stood hy the Lomhards. famous fight of Legnano, where, for perhaps the only time since the days of old Roman conquest, the Italian overcame the German in the open field. Not sheltered hy ramparts, not strengthened by auxiliaries, the forces of some half-dozen Lombard cities, gathered round the carroccio of Milan, put to flight the armies of the Roman Empire.^ Csesar himself was left to skulk, unattended, and, like Aratos,^ already mourned as dead, to the shelter of his still faithful Pavia. Frederick now knew that he was vanquished ; the plans of more than twenty years were utterly shattered; from that day he no more drew his sword against Italian freedom; he confined his exertions to securing by diplomatic skill as large a portion as he could of his disputed rights. Then followed long negociations which we have the advantage of having narrated in detail by an eye-witness and principal actor.^ A year earlier the cities had seemed less inflexible than the Church ; now that Frederick was pre- pared to renounce his schism, Alexander did not escape the charge of forsaking the cause of the cities.* In that famous and much misrepresented interview at Venice,^ Frederick received absolution from Alexander and came to terms with his temporal enemies. He concluded a separate peace with Venice,® as an independent pbwer, and the Republic thereby incurred some ill- will on the part of the Lombards for what was held to be a desertion of her allies.'' He also concluded a truce for fifteen years with the King of Sicily, and entered into negociations with the Lombard League.^ The cities set forth their claims ; they were ready to acknowledge in the Emperor aU such rights as had been held by his predecessor Henry the Fifth. These 1 Vit. Alex. iii. 467. Bad. Mil. 1192. Otto St. B. ^. 23. The Urspeig Chronicle (p. 310) has a curious euphemism. Imperator rursus impugnare coepit Lombardos, commissumque est prcelium inter eos prid. kal. Julii. De quo tamen sine ■mctoria recesswn est, ^ See ahove, p. 310. " Rom. Sal. 217-240. This Prelate was the Ambassador from the King of Sicily at the Congress. * Rad. Mil. 1193. Deserendo fldem quam Longobardis promiserat. " The strange Venetian fables about this interview are refuted by Sismondi (ii. 227) and Raumer (ii. 218). They are accepted by Daru (Hist, de Venise, ' lib. iii. c. 18), and revived by Cantii (iv. 552). * See the text of Pax cum Venetis in Pertz, iv. 151. ' Rom. Sal. 222. Lombard! autem e diverse suspectos habebant Venetos, asserentes illos paois cum lis initae foedera violasse, et ssepe Iraperatoris nuncios contra hoc quod statutum inter eos fuerat recepisse. This of course includes earlier breaches of the engagement, as in the case of Ancona. See above, p. 609, 8 See Pertz, iv. 151-7. X TRUCE BETWEEN FREDERICK AND THE LEAGUE 611 rights they seem to have limited to the personal services and personal gifts which were usual when the K^ing of Germany came to claim the Italian crown at Milan and the Imperial crown at Rome.^ They claim, on the other hand, to retain their League with one another, and to retain the fortifications of their cities ; the right to choose their own consuls they do not claim — they seem to have so completely taken it for granted. This was asking more than Frederick was at once prepared to yield ; peace was not made, but a truce for six years was agreed on Truce for between the Lombard League on one side, and the Emperor and ^^'^ y^'"-'^ the princes and cities of his party on the other. ^ And, now ^j^^ j^_ that the war was over, the Emperor regained his advantage ; the peror and magic of the Imperial name, the attraction of Frederick's personal the League, character, began again to do their work. More than one city of the League forsook the common cause, and made private terms Various with its now gracious and placable sovereign. Cremona had ^^^^^ J?™ returned to its Imperialist loyalty even before the Congress of cremona Venice.^ And, in the interval between the truce and the final 1176. peace, Tortona, which Frederick had destroyed, and which had Tortona, been rebuilt in defiance of his power ; * Alexandria, whose very ■'^■'^®^' existence was a standing record of enmity to his cause, were both admitted to Imperial favour. Alexandria, the city of the ^riTTl83 patriotic Pontiff, submitted to be formally refounded, and to receive from her Imperial parent the name of Ceesarea.* At ^ See Rom. Sal. 221 et seqq. and the Pelitio Societatis in Pertz, iv. 169. On the Royal rights see Raumer, v. 78, and Cantu, iv. 509. Frederick's agents demanded the rights as they stood under Henry the Fourth (Third of Italy), but the Italians insisted on'the standard of Henry the Fifth, ITenricus posterior, postremus (Pertz, 151, 169), a description which evades the difference between Italian and German reckoning. They rejected Henry the Fourth as a tyrant and schismatic. — Item Imperator Henricus (saZva auctoritate Imperii) non debet Dmninus sed Tyrannus vocari, etc. Rom. Sal, 223. ^ See the Treuga cam Lombairdis, Pertz, iv. 156. * Vit. Alex. iii. 469. In diebus illis Cremona respiciens retro absque grava- mine turpiter dejerando a confoederatione aliarum civitatum impudenter recessit, et ad Imperatorem non sine magna infamia se convertit ; unde indignationem Ecclesiie et aliorum Lombardorum odium et inimicitiam juste inonrrit. Tlie Recondliatio Oremonce in 1186 (Pertz, iv. 183) must not be confounded with this. It belongs to much later events, which will be found in Sicard's Chronicle, 603, and Sismondi, ii. 620. * See the Recondliatio TerdonoB, Pertz, iv. 165. The Cardinal of Aragon (Vit. Alex. iii. u.s. ) goes on to say, "Terdona quoque non post multum temporis id ipsum reprehensibiliter fecit, et eadem infamia contumeliose se involvit. " It is clear, however, that an interval of seven years, including the whole negocia- tions at Venice, came between the reconciliation of Cremona and that of Tortona. ° Sigonius (p. 632) places the reconciliation of Alexandria in 1184 after the 612 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY last, terms of peace were agreed on in a negociation at Placentia,^ Peace of which led to the final conclusion of the Peace of Constanz, that Constanz, famous Charter which closes the great volume of the Civil Law.^ It shows how great was the abiding influence of the Imperial name that this treaty, concluded by a prince with rebellious subjects, by whom he had been defeated in battle, and to whom The treaty he yielded all their most important demands, was at last drawn takes the ^j- ^^ ^jjg ^^^.^ ^f 3^ pardon. The merciful Emperor extends his lonn or 3. pardon, grace to certain cities which had offended him, and he grants them certain rights and privileges of his Imperial favour.^ But Peace of Constanz, and the same date is given in Pertz, iv. 181. But as C^esarea is reckoned among the allies of the Emperor at the Peace (see Pertz, iv. 180 and note), Sismondi (ii. 242) is doubtless right in placing it in 1183. The change of name from Alexandria to Caasarea may be likened to the changes from Mantineia to Antigoneia, from Siky6n to Demetrias, and from Thebes to Philippopolis. See above, pp. 279, 386, 430, 464, note 1. None of these changes seems to have been permanent. New Amsterdam, however, has kept its name of New York. 1 See Pertz, iv. 167-175. '^ It is to be found at the end of the Corpus Juris Civilis, Amsted. 1663 ; also in Pertz, iv. 175. Cf. Sigonius, 629. ' The Charter begins thus : Imperialis olementise mausneta serenitas earn semper in subditis suis dispensationem favoris et gratije habere consuevit, ut quamvis districta severitate excessuum delicta debeat et possit corrigere, magis tamen studeat propitia tranquillitate pacis et piis affectibus misericordi* Romanum Imperium regere et rebellium insolentiam ad debitam lidem et debitse devotionis obsequium revocare. Ea propter cognoscat universitas fidelium Imperii tarn prsesentis setatis quam successurse posteritatis, quod nos solita benignitatis nostrse gratia ad fidem et devotionem Lombardornm qui aliquaudo nos et Imperium nostrum offenderant, viscera innatas nobis pietatis aperientes, eos et Societatem eorum et fautores in plenitudinem gratife nostrse recepimus, offensas omnes et culpas quibus nos ad indignationem provocaveraut clementer eis remitteutes, eos- que propter fidelia devotionis suie servitia quaj nos ab eis credimus certissime reoepturos, in nuraero dilectorum fidelium nostrorum computandos censemus. Pacem itaque nostram quam eis clementer indnltam concessimus, prsesenti pagina jnssimus subterscribi, et auctoritatis nostrse sigillo oommuniri. It is almost more amusing to mark the high Imperialist tone of the Swiss writer Tsohudi in the sixteenth century. A Landaraman of Glarus might have been expected to sympathize with the Confederates, but the Swabiau blood and speech were too strong in him. He tells the tale thus : "Anno Domini 1183 Melt Keiser Pridrioh Barbarossa ein grossen Riohstag sambt sinem Sun Ktinig Heinriohen dem Sechsten zu Costenz in der furniim- bisten Statt Alamannije uud beschreib daselbshin alle Fursten, und namhafftisten in ganzem Lamparten, ouch aller desselben Lands-Stetten fiirniimiste vollmachtige Gewalthaber und Rats-Botten, dass Si allda Im und sinem Sun huldetind von des Riohs wegen. Also wareud Si gehorsam, erscheineud alle zu ingehndem Christ- monat December genant, und schwurind Inen nachfolgenden Eidt, wie Si von Recht uud alter Gewonheit zu tun schuldig warend den Romischen Keiseru und Ktinigen." Tsohudi, Chron. Helveticum, i. 90. (Basel, 1734.) The Abbot of Ursperg, nearer the time, lets out a little more. "Eo tempore X THE PEACE OF CONSTANZ 613 these rights and privileges extended to an entire abolition of all but direct sovereignty on the part of the Emperor. From this amounted moment the King of Italy became a mere external suzerainty to render^' his Lombard subjects, and, in the course of less than a hundred of all years, his very suzerainty died away. Frederick recognized the "^i™"* complete internal independence of the Lombard commonwealths ; ^ rdmty. they were to choose their own Consuls ; the Consuls, however, and all the citizens, were to swear allegiance to the Emperor,^ and in the more important civil causes there was to be an appeal from the magistrates of the cities to the Emperor or the Judge whom he should appoint. Further than this, the royal rights were limited to the ancient services due on the Imperial progress to Rome. On the other hand, the cities retained the right of fortification, and the Lombard League was to be retained and renewed ^ as often as its members thought good. The League is distinctly recognized as a contracting power — somewhat more distinctly in the oath of allegiance * than in the lofty language of the Charter itself. Still every magistrate and every citizen recognizes Frederick and his successors as Emperors and Kings ; they will bear them true allegiance ; they will reveal all plots jam bellis nimis fatigatus Imperator, Lombardis omnibus condixit curiam apud Constantiam ubi Principes et potestates eorum se repraesentaverunt, et pacta qusedam de faoiendo servitio Imperatori de singulis civitatibus Lombardite ibidem statuta sunt, quae adliuc dicunt se teuere in scriptis nee ad serviendum ultra bseo compelli volunt. Sicque pax reformata est " (p. 311). ' This is clearly the effect of the first two clauses of the Charter. 1. " Con- cedimus vobis, civitatibus, locis, et personis Societatis, regalia et consuetudines vestras tam in civitate quam extra civitatem, . . . videlicet ut in ipsa civitate omnia habeatis slcut hacteuus habuistis vel habetis. 2. Extra vero omnes con- suetudines sine contradictioue nostra exerceatis, quas ab antique exercuistis vel exercetis. 3. Scilicet . . . m exercitu, in m/unitionibus civitatum, in jurisdictioue tani in criminalibus caussis quam in pecuuiariis, intus et extra, et in cseteris quae ad commoditatem spectant civitatum." ^ This oath might easily sinli into a mere form, or, at most, would only exclude violent and avowed enemies of the Empire. The essential power of choice remained to the cities. Frederick's own claim, in the days of his power, had been much wider. Ab omiiibus judicatum et recognitum est in singulis civitatibus Potestates, Consules, ceterosque magistratus assensu populi per ipsum [Imperatorem] creari debere. Ead. Fris. iii. 6. But even this allowed the citizens some share, though it is not clear what, in the choice of their magistrates. ^ Clause 20, 28. Sigonius (p. 637) describes the renewal of the oaths two years later. * Pertz, iv. 180. Pacem Domini Friderici Imperatoris et iilii ejus Regis Heinrici et suse partis factam cum Societate Lombardorum, et civitatibus ejus Societatis. This makes the League, as a League, far more prominent than it is in the passages already quoted. A body so spoken of was surely on the high road to becoming a real Federation if the need of union had been felt in the least. 614 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY The Second Lombard League 1228. The First League primarily- political. 1159. against them; they will preserve to them the crown of the Empire and of the Kingdom ; ^ if they should lose either, they will help them to recover it. But all these obligations were, as the terms of the Charter itself show, consistent with practical independence on all those points on which independence was prized most dearly. By the Peace of Constanz the kingdom of Italy, in the old sense, was reduced to a mere name, and no Federal Republic, no .national monarchy, was substituted for it. As the importance of the Lombard League in Federal history is so purely negative, it is hardly necessary to follow out its career, when it was revived in the next century against Frederick the Second.^ I have dwelt on its first period at some length, because it seemed important to show how a real Federal system might arise, or might fail to arise, out of circumstances very closely analogous. The Peace of Constanz took away all excuse for the formation of any central Government ; each city gained the acknowledgement of that full local sovereignty which it prized far more dearly, without giving up its formal allegiance to the Prince whose lofty titles Italy still reverenced. A true Federal Government therefore never arose in Italy. In the next century we again find a Lombard League fighting against an Emperor and on the side of a Pope. But the circumstances of all three are greatly altered. The struggle of the twelfth century was primarily a struggle for freedom ; the ecclesiastical question came in only as something quite accessory. Though the League itself was not formed so soon, yet the war began before Frederick had any dissensions with the Church at all. That, in a disputed election to the Popedom, the Emperor took one side, and the cities another, was the natural result of their several positions, but the quarrel had in no sort an ecclesiastical origin. In short, Frederick Barbarossa was an enemy of the Eoman Church only ^ Pertz, iv. 180. '' Hanorem coronm" Coronam Im/perii vd Regni. The still more distinct phrase, Regnum Italice et hnnorem coronce, which occurs in the. separate oath of Tortona (Pertz, iv. 166), does not occur in the general oath imposed by the Charter. - It is worth notice however tha.t, in the reconciliation between Frederick and the Lombard cities (Pertz, iv. 258), while the Lombards themselves set forth the League strongly as a whole {Rectores Societatis Lmibardicc, Marchice, Romaniolce totaque ipsa Societas), the Emperor seems to recognize them only as separate cities — Quidam de cimtatibtis, locis, et personis de Lombardia, Marchia et Romaniola. This is quite in harmony with Frederick's policy in his German Kingdom, which I shall have to speak of hereafter. X FIRST AND SECOND LOMBARD LEAGUES COMPARED 615 in so far as he attached himself to the Pontiff, who in the end failed to be successful. But the strife between Frederick the Second and the successive Popes, Gregory the Ninth and Inno- The Second cent the Fourth, was primarily an ecclesiastical strife. The Pontiffs ^'^^S^^ did not ally themselves with cities which had already revolted ; ecciesias- they rather stirred the cities up to revolt for their own purposes.^ tical. In fact while, in the twelfth century, Italian unity, or an approach to it, would have been best found in a Confederation of Republics, in the thirteenth century the fairest hope for Italy seemed to lie in union under the sceptre of Frederick or of his son. This Union of union was hindered by Papal ambition; the result was a period Italy under of unrivalled glory for three or four fortunate Republics, com- ^^ Manfred bined with the handing over of Southern Italy to a foreign hindered invader and of Northern Italy to domestic tyrants. Venice, ^ *^® Florence, Genoa, Pisa were far greater, far more glorious, as q^^^ ^nd independent Commonwealths, than they ever could have been as evil which cities of an Italian Kingdom or even of an Italian League. But snch union the worst cemented Italian League, the worst governed Italian jj^ye Kingdom, would at least have relieved Milan and. Naples and prevented. countless smaller cities from the far worse oppression of the Visconti, the Angevin, and the Spaniard. The truth is that the Italian idea of Italian nationality is an idea of purely modern growth ; 'lationahty it is an idea which has arisen only through the experience of modem long ages of foreign oppression and internal discord. The cause idea. of Italian union is one to which every lover of freedom must wish. Godspeed in our own times, but we shall read history wrong if we carry back the conception, or any inferences derived from it, into the days of the Hohenstaufen. Italian patriotism, like old Greek patriotism, was felt only for a city and not for a nation. The days of Macedonian dominion taught Greece the need of Union ; the longer ages of French, Spanish, and Austrian oppression have at last taught the same lesson to the Italy of our own day. But, long after Greece was comparatively united, the Macedonian still held the Fetters of Greece,^ and they were wrested from his grasp only to be handed over to the stronger hand of Rome. And, now that one realm stretches from the Alps to the Libyan Sea, a baser oppressor than Antigonos or 1849-63. Philip still holds the Fetters of Italy. Let us hope that the day may yet come when Italy shall recover her own, not by the gift ' See Sismondi, ii. 474-7, iii. 1 et aeqq. ' See above, p. 484. 616 OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY of another Flamininus, but by the might of a strong arm and a righteous cause. One word more before I take leave of Italian history. From Question my point of view, the question can hardly fail to present itself of Italian whether a Federal Union, instead of a consolidated Kingdom, tion^or**™" would not have been the proper form for the regenerate Italy of Consolida- our own times. For the practical statesmen it is enough to *i°"- answer that the Italians, who alone have the right to decide the question, have already decided it otherwise. But this answer is hardly enough for the political historian. That the name of Italian Federalism has a bad odour in Italy no one can wonder ; for the Federation -^^ord has passed through the lips of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, by L. N. When Italy was striving to be united, her bitterest enemy, like Buona- Kallias of old, preached up a sham Federation as a means of parte. perpetuating weakness and disunion. And, repulsed as he was at the time, the Tyrant seems never to have quite given up this darling scheme of mischief ; his pamphleteers have ever and anon brought it forward again as what, in their detestable jargon, is called "the Solution of the Italian Question." Of course, from the day when the betrayer of Italy proposed an Italian Con- federation, with the Pope at its head, and the Austrian for one of its members, the very name of Federalism has been utterly Ai'gu- discredited in Italy. But all who have ever spoken or dreamed behalf of °^ ^^ Italian Confederation must not be involved in his con- Federalism demnation. Long before Magenta and Solferino, long before the in Italy, freedom of Milan and Florence had been purchased by the bondage of Savoy, while all Italy, save the little realm of Pied- mont, groaned under foreign or domestic tyrants, an Italian Con- federation was the cherished hope of some of Italy's warmest friends. The historic greatness of her cities, the wide diversities among her several provinces, the difference in feelings, manners, and even language, between Sicily, Eome, Tuscany, Venice, and Piedmont, all pointed to a Federal Union as the natural form for Italian freedom to assume. It seemed, on every ground, to be the form of unity under which Italy might look for the highest amount of internal prosperity and contentment.^ On Arguments the other hand stood the question, whether the greater strength against it. ^f g^ consolidated Government might not be needed to resist the brute force of Austria and the hypocritical friendship of France. ^ See Oxford Ess.iys. X ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FEDERALISM IN ITALY 617 Between these two opposing arguments, the Italians, who alone had the right to choose, have made their choice, and those who once hoped for a Federal Union of Italy have no right to com- The plain. It may be indeed that, when they see the difficulty with ^™?*'™ which the several provinces are welded together, when they see , ^■^^^ the jealousies aroused among the great Italian cities as to the will ot the choice of a capital among them, they may be tempted to think Italians, that, after all, something was to be said on behalf of a scheme by which these difficulties at least would have been altogether avoided. But it is too late to recommend an Italian Federation now ; Italy has chosen to be a consolidated State, and she must improve and develope herself as such. The rule with which I set Federalism out 1 here applies. Federalism is in its place whenever it appears '^° longer in the form of more perfect union ; it is out of place whenever ^tJ'in^" it appears in the form of separation of what is already more Italy ; closely united. But it is not too late to say that the true policy of the Italian Kingdom will be to approach as near to the Federal type as a Consolidated state can approach. It should but Local keep as far as possible from the deadening system of French Ii"lepen- centralization ; it should give every province, every city, every gyji j^g district, the greatest amoiuit of local independence consistent true with the common national action of the whole realm. Naples policy. and Florence and Milan must not be allowed for a moment to feel themselves in bondage to an upstart rival like Turin. It is only by establishing perfect equality, and therefore perfect local independence, through every corner of his realm that the King of Piedmont can grow into a true King of Italy, or can make good his claim to a yet more glorious title. For we must hope that the Tyrant of the West may one day pass away along with Future his Barbarian fellow, and that the Old and the New Rome may restoration alike open their gates- to the chosen Princes of free peoples. Then Empire, will the title which has been too long degraded by the impostors of Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Elba, Mexico, Brazil, and Hayti pass of right to the true successor of Charles, of Berenger, and of Frederick. And none will be more ready than those who once looked forward to a Confederate Italy, once more to wish Life and Victory to an Augustus crowned by God, a King of Italy and Emperor of the Romans.^ ' See above, pp. 83-85. - See National Review, January 1861, p. 68. FRAGMENT OF THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY Infl^ienoe of the Empire on Germany. The' three Imperial Kingdoms, A CONSIDERATION of those imperfect approaches to Federal Union, which are all that the later history of Italy contains, has involved some mention of the great central point of all mediaeval history, the continued existence of the Roman Empire.^ And the great Imperial idea, without a full understanding of which all mediaeval history is nothing but an insoluble puzzle, has had an effect on the destinies of Germany even more important and more permanent than the effect which it has had on the destinies of Italy. The German Kingdom and the Roman Empire were indeed at all times distinguishable in idea. But, from the days of Charles the Great onwards, the history of the two institutions cannot be separated, and, long before the final dissolution of both, the Empire and the Kingdom had come to be two inappro- priate names for something which had become quite different from either. In the full-grown conception of the mediaeval Empire, three Kingdoms were inseparably attached to the Imperial Crown. The Emperor of the Romans was of necessity King of Germany, of Italy, and of Burgundy. Four separate corona- tions ^ were needed to put the chosen King and Caesar in full ^ Since my last chapter was written, the whole subject of the Holy Raman Empire has been treated with wonderfnl power and clearness in Mr. Bryce's volume hearing that name, >i. volume which originally grew out of an Oxford Prize Essay. To that volume, as the best — indeed the only — English exposition of the whole matter, I refer once for all. I had myself, before Mr. Bryce's book appeared, dealt with several portions of the subject in various articles In the (now defunct) National Review, to some of which I have referred in earlier chapters. I would also venture to refer to a review of Mr. Bryce's book in the North British Review for February 1865. I had once dreamed of attempting the History of the Western Empire as a distinct work, but I am glad to leave so great a subject in younger hands. ^ At Aachen for Germany, at Monza for Italy, at Aries for Burgundy, at Rome for the Empire. The Burgundian coronation however was commonly omitted. Frederick Barbarossa however was crowned at Aries in 1178 (Vit. Alex. III. ap. ruAGMBNT THE THREE IMPERIAL KINGDOMS 619 possession of all his realms. But the constitutional relations of the three Kingdoms to the Empire differed from one another, and the historical destinies of the three Kingdoms differed more widely still. Germany was the hearth and home of the Empire. Germany The German King, elected by German Princes only, claimed the crowns of the Empire and of the two other Kingdoms by virtue of that sole election. Italy was a distinct, in some sort a de- Italy, pendent Kingdom ; ^ the King of Germany, as such, assumed the Crown of Italy as his right, and, as King of Italy, presided in Italian Diets wholly distinct from those of his native King- dom. In Italy therefore the Imperial power gradually died out, without any formal separation of the Kingdom from the Empire. Emperors who were strangers to the soil of Italy, and who never permanently resided within her borders, gradually ceased to exercise any effective authority over their Italian Kingdom. The Kingdom of Italy thus split asunder, and in its stead there arose a system of independent principalities and commonwealths, not united by the bond of any common Assembly, nor owning any common head or centre, whether Federal or monarchic. The Kingdom of Burgundy,^ whose connexion with Germany and was in theory far closer than that of Italy, split asunder also. Burgundy, but in a somewhat different way. Most of its provinces gradually fell away from the Empire by annexation, formal or practical, to some other power — the Kings of Paris taking the lion's share. But those Burgundian States which still remained attached to Closest the Empire were in some measure incorporated with the German ™°°^xion Kingdom. No Burgundian Prince indeed held the rank of Germany Elector, but those who retained their allegiance to the Empire and Burgundy. Murat. torn. ill. p. 447), and so, strange to say, was Charles the Fourth (1365). The four seats of Empire are well described by Godfrey of Viterbo (Miirat. vii. 418) : *' Scribere vera volens, quot sint loca prima coronae, Quatuor Imperii secies video ratione, Komina propouam, sicut et acta sonant. Primus Aquisgrani locus est, post haec Arclati, Inde Modoetise regali sede locari, Post solet Italige summa corona dari. Cseaar Bomano cum vult^diademate fungi. Debet Apostolieis manibus reverenter inuugi." 1 The different positions of Italy and Burgundy are well explained by Ptitter. ^ See above, p. 24. For the various uses of the word Burgundy, see Mr. Bryce's Appendix. 620 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY feag- Counexion between Germany and the Empire growing into identity. retained with it their seats and votes i in that Assembly which might now be looked upon indifferently as representing either the Eoman Empire or the German Kingdom. But the third Imperial realm, the German Kingdom itself, the Regnum Teutoni- cum, the Kingdom of the East-Franks, underwent a very different fate. Its connexion with the Empire was, from the beginning, closer than that of either of the other Kingdoms, and this close connexion gradually grew into identity. As Burgundy and Italy fell away, the Eoman Empire of the West became identified with the German speech and the German nation, just as, by the loss of Egypt, Syria, Africa, and Latin Italy, the Roman Empire of the East became identified with the Greek speech and the Greek nation. After the great Interregnum of the thirteenth century, the Emperor of the Romans remained simply a German King, who, once in his reign, travelled out of his realm to receive a ceremonial exaltation which added not a jot to his real power. He might even omit the journey and the ceremony altogether, and the only consequence was that he remained only King of the Romans, and did not venture to assume the title of Emperor. From the sixteenth century on- wards journey and ceremony were permanently disused, and the King of Germany, by virtue of his German election and German coronation, received the formal title of Emperor-Elect,^ the popular title of Emperor without any qualification at all. The Empire, thus become conterminous with the German Kingdom, was driven to express the anomaly of its twofold position, practical and formal, by that most paradoxical and yet most accurate description — " The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation." With the Holy Roman Empire, distinctly as an Empire, the historian of Federal Government has no concern. But, ' Tlius, for instance, the County of Burgundy; the inheritance of the Empress Beatrice, remained formally an Imperial fief till its final annexation by France in 1679. But, held as it was successively by the Kings of Prance, the Dukes of Burgundy, and the Kings of Spain, its connexion with the Empire was very slight for several centuries. Savoy again always remained an Imperial fief, but its connexion in various ways with Italy, France, and Switzerland was much more important than its allegiance to the Empire. Of that large part of the Burgundian Kingdom which was gradually incorporated with the S,wiss Con- federation I shall speak elsewhere. But even Allies of the Confederation, such as the Bishop of Basel, retained their position as members of the Empire down to the wars of the French Revolution. ^ "^nuaAZfer Romischer Kaiser," " Eomanorum Imperator eZectos.'' MENT THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION 621 indirectly, the position of the Empire has had no small share in producing a state of things which the Federal historian cannot leave unnoticed. Germany, at the present hour, calls itself a The Confederation ; its Princes and Commonwealths profess to be S®""^™ united by a Federal tie. That tie is, even in theory, a very lax y°^ f ''™' one ; what it has become in practice Germany and the world know too well. At the very best, the German Confederation is no Bundesstaat — the German language alone can express the distinction ^ in a single word — but only a Staatenbund of the a lax laxest kind. Still a Staatenbund it does profess to be ; it has ^taaten- Federal Laws, administered by a Federal Diet, to whose authority, ' within its own competence, every member of the League is, in theory, bound to yield obedience. That the mass of the German States are practically dependent on two of their own number, its theory does not affect the Federal theory : every interference of Austria ^""^ i*^ or Brandenburg with the lawful authority of the German Diet is, in Federal theory, as undoubted rebellion ^ as the secession of Messeng or the secession of South Carolina. Small as is the competence of the Federal power in Germany, within that com- petence it is as much entitled to the loyal obedience of every member of the League as the Federal powers of Achaia, America, or Switzerland. Germany then, in its present state, is a phsenomenon which an historian of Federalism cannot pass by. It forms an essential, though a secondary, part of his subject, if only to point out the diiference between its awkwardly con- stituted arrangements and the better ordered Federal systems of Peouliari- other lands. And here two important differences present them- 1'^^ of tlJ" selves between the German Confederation and any other Con- confedera- federation on record. First, the mass of its members are not tion. Commonwealths but Principalities. Secondly, it arose, not, like ^'''st. other Confederations, through States which had once been more J^°^i3°].s ^ widely separated seeking a closer union, but through States are prinoi- which had once been more closely connected gradually falling palities. apart. In both these respects, but especially in the latter, the it^aroae^' present condition of the modern German Confederation has been from the largely influenced by the history of the defunct Holy lioman splitting E'^p--- ... . r/^ These two peculiarities are closely connected with each other ; united indeed the first may be looked on as, in some sort, a result of State, ' See above pp. 8, 9. ^ See above, p. 89. 622 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY feag- Process of disunion in Ger- many. Germany really a Federation from the Peace of West- phalia, A.D. 1648- 1806. the second. A Confederation, as I have already remarked,^ stands at an intermediate point between a system of wholly independent States, and a consolidated Kingdom or Common- wealth — in German political language, an Einlieitsstaat. In theory, it is clear that this middle point may be approached alike from either extreme ; but while, in all other cases, the middle point of Confederation has been reached by detached units making advances towards closer imion, Germany has reached it by the opposite process of members of an once more united body detaching themselves partially, but not wholly, from the central power.^ All other Confederations have been formed by the union of previously independent States ; ^ the German Con- federation alone has been formed by the dissolution of the German Kingdom. Long before that Kingdom was formally dissolved, the relation between its several members had become much more truly a Federal one than anything else, and this fact was ever and anon revealed to the world, either by the indus- trious researches of a native jurist,* or by the insolent plainness of speech of a foreign conqueror.^ From the Peace of West- phalia onwards the Kingdom of Germany was in truth no King- dom, but a Confederation, and that a very lax Confederation. The princes and commonwealths which composed it possessed and exercised independent powers at least as extensive as those ' See above, pp. 69, 79. ' Of oourse, at the actual moment when the present Federal compact was drawn up, the powers which united to form it were, in theory, absolutely inde- pendent. At that particular moment no common tie. Imperial or Federal held them together. But the beginnings of the German Confederation must be looked - for, as we shall soon see, in much earlier times. The years between 1806 and 1814 must be looked on as an anomalous period, like the Athenian dvapxia, interposed between two periods of regular order. The final establishment of the Confederation in 1814 was the natural sequence of the dissolution of the Empire in 1806, and, in point of fact, the dissolution of the Empire was actually followed (or, more accurately, preceded and caused) by the establishment of a professed Federal system in the shape of the elder Buonaparte's Rlieinbund. 8 The States of the American Union were, in theory, absolutely independent dnrmg the ideal interval between their rejection of British authority and their union in a Federal body. The States of Achaia and Switzerland had of course been historically, as well as theoretically, independent. And the Federal Union did historically bring the American States into a much closer union than existed in the Colonial period when they had no tie but that of a common dependence , .?.^^ the very remarkable chapter in Piitter's Teutsche Staatsverfassmig, vol. 111. p. 156, especially pp. 159, 161. ^ See Buonaparte's Supplement to the Act of Formation of the Eheinbund ■ Le hen /etferafo/ (between the States of the Empire) n'offrit plus de garantie a personue, etc., etc. a " ' MBKT ORIGIN OF THE GERMAN KINGDOM 6^3 possessed by a Dutch Province or a Swiss Canton.^ The only difference was that the German Confederation still continued to give to its elective President the sounding titles of King and Emperor, Csesar and Augustus, titles which, while they gave him the first place among the princes of the earth, clothed him with less real power than was held by a Dutch Stadtholder. The Acts of 1806 and of 1814 were in truth only the formal acknowledgements of a state of things which had practically existed ever since 1648, and the germs of which may be seen centuries earlier. In truth the disunion of Germany has lasted so long, the The authority of its central power. Imperial or Federal, has so long Kingdom been hardly more than nominal, that men in general find a diffi- ^^ny'' culty in understanding that these severed states, feebly united by a feudal or Federal tie, are merely the scattered members of an once united Kingdom. It is hard to make men believe that there was a time when the Kingdom of Germany was as united Compari- as contemporary England, far more united than contemporary s°" '^^^^ France. The three countries, in short, started from nearly the ^^| same point, and have diverged in three different directions. France. The Kingdom of England was formed by the gradual welding together of various independent, though kindred principalities. The King of the West-Saxons obtained a certain external supre- 800-836. macy over his neighbours : a dependent King of Mercia or Northumberland succeeded an independent one. In the next 878-954. stage the dependent King gave way to an Earl, possessing vast local authority, but still a subject, though often a turbulent sub- ject, of the one King of the English. The Kingdom of the Origin Franks, the Empire of Charles the Great, was formed by nearly °^ *^^ the same process. Dukes of Saxony and Bavaria, of Burgundy Kingdom and Aquitaine, succeeded to the ancient Kings ; or, if the royal 483-888. digiiity was allowed to survive, it was confined to princes of the royal house, who held their dependent Kingdoms as appanages with the head of the family and the Empire.^ Eastern and ' The Confederations of Switzerland, America, and the United Provinces, are the analogies specially chosen by Piitter to illustrate the constitution of the Empire. Switzerland and America were then (1786) under their older and laxer Fedei-al system. 2 Thus Charles the Great made his sons Kings over Aquitaine (Binhard, Annales, sub A.r. 781, Pertz, i. 161) and Italy, and towards the end of the Caro- lingiau period we find a whole crowd of these reguli. So in England Kent for some generations was held by a King of the royal house of Wessex. 624 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY fkag- Different history of England, 800-1087, France, 888-1202, and Germany, 936-973, 1039- 1056. Circum- stances which strength- ened the royal authority in Ger- many. Western Francia — Germany and modern France — fell asunder ; ^ after the partition of 888 no King ever reigned over both together. But much the same state of things existed in both Kingdoms. In both the King was only the first among several Princes, who held their Duchies and Counties of him as of their feudal superior. But the later history of England, France, and Germany differed widely. In England the tendency to union, which had been at work ever since the days of Ecgberht, was powerfully strengthened by the Norman Conquest. The King- doms shrank into Earldoms, and the Earldoms shrank into territorial administrative divisions. The Earldom of Chester and the Bishoprick of Durham alone retained some faint shadow of the independence of continental Dukes and Prelates. In France the great vassals became, for every practical purpose, independent sovereigns ; ^ the utmost amount of submission obtained by the nominal King was to have the years of his reign used as a date. Normandy was in a constant state of war with France ; France and Aquitaine seem for long periods to have forgotten one another's existence. With the thirteenth century a change began ; the forfeiture of Normandy was the first of a long series of annexations, which, by conquest, by inheritance, by marriage, by escheat, by every conceivable means, fair or foul, gradually* reunited the great Duchies and Counties to the Royal Domain. In Germany the case differed from either. In the tenth century, under Otto the Great, and in the ' eleventh, under Henry the Third, the Teutonic Kingdom was undoubtedly the most united realm of the three. A Duke of Saxony or Bavaria, like an Earl of the Mercians or the North- umbrians, might be a very powerful and a very troublesome subject ; but he was still a subject liable to be called to account, to be judged and punished, by his Sovereign and the assembled Estates of the Realm. But it would be an abuse of language to call the lords of Rouen and 1 A German poet uses (with perfect truth) a stronger word, which has since become technical : " Bt siraul a nostro secessU Gallia regno, Nos priscum regiii morem servamus." Ligurinus de Gest. Prid. lib. i. 2 On this whole period see Edinburgh Eeview, July 1860. 5 The favourite French phrase of reunion, is perfectly admissible when applied to provinces which had ever been, even in name, flefs of the Parisian Crown ; it is objectionable only when applied to provinces pilfered from Germany or Burgundy. A rlunicm of Barcelona would have been one degree less intoler- able than a Hunion of Savoy. MENT ROYAL AUTHORITY IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 625 Bourdeaux the subjects, though they might be the nominal Retention vassals, of the King of Laon or of Paris. Germany, like Eng- °^ National land, always retained her national Assemblies. The JFitenagemot j^ Qer- and the Marzfeld gradually developed, without any sudden many and change, into the British Parliament and the Imperial Diet. ?°^^''"'^'. But in West-France, after the great partition, a national as- pjanoe. sembly was something unheard of ^ till Philip the Fair devised 888-1302. the States General as an invention wholly new, not a develope- ment out of something old. The German Kings again long The retained a domain which was scattered through various parts of ^°y^'. the Kingdom ; the French Kings retained nothing but their own Duchy of Paris and some districts conterminous with it. Again the system of Imperial Cities, holding immediately of the The Free King, and acknowledging no inferior lord, made the German Cities. King at once at home in aU the chief towns of -his dominions. Again the great ecclesiastical Princes, naturally more loyal or The more subservient than the lay Princes, all held in Germany ^":^®^'" i/ ' V fL^Tlffl.1 immediately of the King. In France the Archbishops of Rouen prinoes. and Bourdeaux and the Cities of Eouen and Bourdeaux stood in no relation whatever to the King ; whatever powers and posses- sions either Prelates or citizens might enjoy, were held of their immediate lord, the Duke of Normandy or of Aquitaine. Through all these means the authority of the German King and the unity of the German Kingdom were kept up, while the King of the French retained no authority beyond Paris and Orleans, and the Kingdom itself seemed fast hastening towards utter dis- memberment. There can be no greater contrast than between Contrast a German King,^ ever in motion, ever visiting every corner of t^e^Qg" the land, holding a national Assembly in one City, keeping an man and ecclesiastical festival in another, appointing this Bishop and the French Kings. ' This expression may perhaps sound too strong for the period between 888 and 987, when Assemblies of some kind were certainly held, for instance that which elected Hugh of Paris in 987. (See Richer, iv. 12. ) Bat that they were really national assemblies, like those of England or Germany, seems very doubtful. Hugh was made King over "Gauls, Bretons, Danes, Aquitanians, Goths, Spaniards, and Gascons," but the counties south of the Loire seem to have had no hand in the matter. After the accession of the Parisian dynasty there seems to have been no pretence at anything like a national Assembly. ^ The amazing activity of the German Kings is familiar to every one who has read the national chronicles. Take for instance one year of Henry the Fourth as recorded by Lambert of Herzfeld. He kept the Christmas of 1073-4 at Worms, thence he went to Herzfeld, held an Assembly at Goslar, kept Lent at Worms and Easter at Bamberg, met Papal Legates at Nitrnberg, set out on an expedition into Hungary, but turned back at Regensburg for fear of " Willehelmus cogno- 2 S 626 THE KINGDOM AND COKFEDERATION OF GERMANY fkag- deposing that Duke, and a King of the French, retaining a dominion smaller than that of many of his vassals, never stirring beyond the three or four cities of that immediate domain, never presiding in any national Assembly, with no Free Cities, no immediate Prelates, no detached royal possessions, nothing to make the existence of the King practically felt in the furthest corners of his Kingdom. But the great point of difference of all is that Germany retained her National Assemblies, while Contrast France lost hers. From this cause, more than from any other, between though the royal authority in Germany sank to a mere name, history^"^ yet the national unity never utterly perished. The Kingdom of the changed into a Confederation, the King changed into a President ; Kingdoms, -[jut the Confederation and its President still remained, and formed a bond of union which hindered utter separation. The France of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, where no National As- sembly ever brought King, Nobles, and People together, did not. even stop at the half-way house of Federation ; the practical separation was total. France indeed was reunited, and, when once reunited, France became far more closely united than Germany. But this closer union was in truth rendered possible only by her former disunion. The King of the French con- quered or inherited a Duchy, and that Duchy was at once incorporated with the royal dominions. It might retain some local rights and customs, but it retained no means of communica- tion with those Duchies which remained independent. Step by step did the Eoyal Domain and the Kingdom become coex- tensive ; but national unity was purchased at the cost of both national and local freedom. In France, in short, the Princes fell into complete isolation, and the Crown swallowed them up one by one.^ In Germany the Princes reduced the royal authority to a shadow ; but they never threw aside either their formal allegiance to the Crown or their formal brotherhood towards one another. Thus, in a word, the early disunion of France led to her later mento Bostar (sic) Eex Auglormn," kept Pentecost at Mainz, went on divers affairs to Andernaoh, Aaclien, and Worms again, then invaded Hungary, returned to Worms, thence to Kegensburg, and spent the rest of the time till Christmas iu going through the cities of Bavaria and Swabia. ' It was doubtless a great advantage to the French Kings that some of their annexations took the form of national wars. Thus the Duke of Aquitaine was also Kiug of England, and Aquitaine was won for France in a national war against England. MENT CAUSES OF DISUNION OF GERMANY 627 centralization ; the early union of Germany hindered Germany from ever becoming centralized. So far from her Principalities being absorbed into the Royal Dominion, they gradually changed from fiefs of a Kingdom into members of a Federal body. ■ No other Kingdom on record has gone through the like process. And why was Germany destined to a fate which placed it, in Causes : point of national strength, below all other Kingdoms ? Mainly, which led I believe, because Germany was the first and noblest of King- . ® ."*' 1 1 ■ • 1 • 1 1 union 01 doms, because her crown was inseparably united with the crown Germany. of the Roman Empire. One obvious cause greatly contributed to the diminution of the royal power in Germany ; the crown of The Germany was elective, while the crown of France was hereditary, crown of That is to say, of the two elements which were united in the *^^™™y idea of the ancient Teutonic Kingship, one triumphed in Ger- many and the other triumphed in France. The old Teutonic kingship was hereditary so far as that, under all ordinary circum- stances, the King must needs be the descendant of Kings ; it was elective so far as that there was no distinct law of succession, but the will of the people or of his chiefs selected the worthiest member of the royal house. Of these two principles, Germany developed one till no hereditary claim was acknowledged, France developed the other till the idea of election was wholly for- gotten. Several causes combined to strengthen the elective through element in Germany and to strengthen the hereditary element in several France. The son of the last King had everywhere a marked ' preference over every other candidate,^ and every King of the French, like every King of Judah, left, for three hundred years, a son of his loins to sit on his throne. In Germany, on the other hand, one royal house after another became extinct, or was continued only in illegitimate or female representatives. This cause doubtless had its weight in determining thc' elective character of the German Kingdom ; but this cause was by no chiefly means all ; of all the combining circumstances none so decisively because influenced the course of events as the fact that the King of connexion Germany was, or had an exclusive right to become. Emperor of with the the Romans. Now the Empire was elective in its very nature. Empire. It had been elective both in the Old and in the New Rome, and 1 In England the eldest son of the late King seems to have been regularly chosen, unless there was some manifest reason to the contrary. For instance, an adult brother was always preferred to a miaor son. The succession of William Rufus and Henry the First is perhaps the only case of a younger son being pre- ferred to an elder. 628 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY fuag- The Empire essentially elective. Ways ill ■wMcli the Imperial and] elective character of the German Crown diminished the royal authority. it remained equally elective at Aachen and at Frankfurt. In the fully developed conception of the mediaeval Empire an hereditary Emperor would have seemed as great an absurdity as an heredi- tary Pope. The Lord of the World, the temporal chief of Christendom, held a place which could never be left to the accidents of hereditary succession ; it must be, like the office of his spiritual colleague, held forth as a prize for the worthiest of the faithful, an object of possible, however remote ambition, for every baptized freeman. In this case, as in the whole history of the Empire, the very grandeur of the theory was the immediate cause of utter weakness and failure in practice. Because the King of Germany was also Roman Emperor, Caesar, Augustus, Lord of the World, he came to have less authority in his own King- dom than any other King. He was in fact too great to act with effect as the local King of a particular Kingdom. His functions as Eoman Emperor and King of Italy led to constant absences from Germany, to constant defeats and humiliations in his Italian pro- gresses, which could not fail greatly to lessen the weight of the royal authority in Germany itself. And, as the Empire was essentially elective, the Emperor King saw his authority exposed to diminution from another cause. When a Kingdom is elective, the electors will soon learn to make terms with the candidate as the price of his election, and the royal power will be diminished with every vacancy. This will be especially the case when, as in Germany, the election is vested in a small oligarchy," each member of which is strong enough to make his personal influence distinctly felt. Again, when estates fall into the Crown by escheat or forfeiture, it is the manifest interest of an hereditary King to incorporate them with the royal domain. The utmost that he will do in the way of alienation will be to use them as mere appanages for the younger members of the royal house. But, when an escheated or forfeited fief falls into the Crown in an elective monarchy, the King, uncertain of his son's succession, is tempted to employ the vacant benefice, not to enrich the Crown, which may pass to a stranger, but to provide his son with something to fall back upon in case he fails of a Kingdom. From these, and from many other causes, the royal power in Germany dwindled away. The Kingdom changed into a Con- federation, and its change into a Confederation was owing to no cause so much as to the fact that the Kingdom aspired to be an Empire. MENT GEEMAN CONFEDERATION A UNION OF PRINCES 629 The other point of peculiarity in the German Confederation, The other as distinguished from all others, is, as was before said, that the Poi°t °f great majority of its members are, and always have been, not ^rity ; commonwealths, but principalities. A few Free Cities still exist, the Ger- and a far larger number once existed ; still, even in the most ™j" *^°"" I6CL6]r£lulOIl flourishing days of the Hanseatic League, princely government mainly a was the rule, and the republics were the exception. This Confederal peculiarity of character is, as was before said, closely connected Jj°° °^ with the other peculiarity of origin. It may be doubted whether connexion a group of perfectly independent Princes would ever have joined between themselves together in a Federal Union : but it was not un- *i'f 'r'^f;''' natural that Princes who became sovereign only by the gradual and the weakening of a central monarchy should stop at the point of other. Federalism, and shrink from asserting their absolute independ- ence. Setting aside the Free Cities, whose course runs parallel Origin with that of the Princes, the division of the German Kingdom Qgrmln took place through the acquisition, first of an hereditary right Princa- of succession, then of all the practical rights of sovereignty, by palities. officers who, in their origin, were merely magistrates appointed by the King and liable to be removed by him. Counts, Dukes, Royal Palsgraves, each class designed as a check on the encroachments of °™°^™ the other, all followed the same law. Counts, Dukes, Palsgraves, sovereigns. all gradually grew into sovereign Princes. The Count ^ was originally a royal officer, and the Duke a royal officer with authority superior to that of the Count. But the Duke gradually grew into an immediate hereditary vassal of the Crown, and the Count gradually grew into an hereditary under-vassal of the Duke. The Duchies, in most cases, became extinct, and the Counts became immediate vassals of the Crown. But by that time the relation of immediate dependence on the Crown had become a relation of practical independence. Thus each princi- pality, great and small, gradually acquired the practical rights of The sovereignty ; the only common tie was the common Diet of the pgjg^jjj nation, still presided over by the common Imperial head of all. Congress But when that Diet came to consist mainly of sovereign, though rather nominally vassal. Princes, it became something far more like a jj^yo^g^j Federal Congress than a National Parliament. Then, by the parlia- very fact of its origin, the German Diet was essentially a Con- ment. gress of Governments only. Except so far as the Free Cities ^ Gra/ is the same as the Old English gerefa, grieve, reeve, a magistrate or officer of any sort, great or small. 630 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY fbag- Goveru- ments only, not peoples, repre- sented in the Diet. The Diet sinks into a diplo- matic Congress. Other peculiari- ties of the German Confedera- tion. Loss of the ancient divisions. Compari- son with England, formed a partial exception, the German Diet in no way repre- sented the German people. The modern Diet of the Confedera- tion represents them as little as the old Diet of the Empire did. In like manner the Old Swiss Diet of &e Thirteen Cantons, the first American Congress of the Thirteen States, immediately re- presented the Governments, and not the people, of the States which composed the Confederations. But then those were Governments on which the people, or, as in the oligarchic Cantons, a certain class of the people had more or less of in- fluence. A German Prince represented only himself ; ^ the people were not represented directly or indirectly, unless the personal wisdom and patriotism of this or that Prince made him practically the representative of his subjects. Gradually both the Emperor and the Princes left off personal attendance, and the Imperial Diet became, what the Confederate Diet still remains, a mere Congress of Ambassadors. The one body which professes to speak in the name of Germany still represents nothing but the policy of German sovereigns ; the voice of the German people has no constitutional means of utterance. One or two other general peculiarities in the nature of the German Confederation may here be mentioned. Every observer must be struck with the great number, even after many re- ductions, of the independent States of Germany and at their striking disproportion in extent and power. Every careful ob- server will also remark the way in which ancient landmarks have been wiped out through the greater part of Germany. The States which make up the present German Confederation, the States which made up the German Kingdom at the time of its dissolution, in no way answer to those great national divisions which existed before the formation of the Kingdom, and which remained as the chief provincial divisions long after its forma- tion. In no country have the old historical divisions more utterly perished than in Germany. In England several of the old Kingdoms still survive as Counties, with their old names and pretty nearly with their old boundaries. Others have been divided into several Counties. But those Counties, in a large part of England, represent ancient Principalities subordinate to 1 Some of the votes given in the Diet, those of the Benches of Prelates for instance, were representative of the class, bnt not in any way representative of the people or of any part of it. There is something analogous in our own Parlia- ment, in the position of the Scotch and Irish representative Peers. MENT HISTORICAL DIVISIONS BLOTTED OUT IN GERMANY 631 the ancient Kingdoms. Even where the Counties are of later origin the Kingdoms have been, for the most part, simply sub- divided ; the ancient and the modern divisions do not often cross one another ; it seldom happens that a modern English County runs into two ancient English Kingdoms. ^ So in France, as the and Crown annexed one great fief after another, those fiefs remained as France. local divisions, Provinces, or Governments, retaining, in some cases, very extensive local liberties. It was only the revolution of 1789 which wiped the ancient names from the map, and even then, as in England, the ancient divisions were, for the most part, only subdivided and not confused. But in Germany, though most of the old names remain on the map, they have lost their meanings, and, in many cases, they have changed their places. The modern Kingdom of Saxony has not a rood of ground in common with the Saxony which was subdued by Charles the Great. Modern and ancient Bavaria do indeed con- tain a large territory in common ; still the modern Kingdom takes in a great deal which was not part of the ancient Duchy and leaves out a great deal which was part of it. Lotharingia has vanished ; Swabia, Franconia, Westphalia, survive only as new-fangled provincial divisions of upstart monarchies. The modern German Confederation is not a Confederation of the ancient national Duchies ; it is not a Confederation of the old Electorates ; it is not a Confederation of the Circles of Maxi- milian. All these successive divisions have vanished. The modern Confederation is an vxnion of States, great and small, which have been formed by endless partitions and endless annexations, but all of which have assumed their present shape in very recent times. In short, not only the Kingdom, but the Splitting Duchies which formed the primary divisions of the Kingdom, "P ?^ ^^® have been split up into fragments, and those fragments have Duchies, often been conjoined with fragments of other Duchies. The German law of succession allowed of endless partitions of territory, endless treaties and family arrangements, through which, in this case, one State has been divided into several, in the other case several States have been united into one. Changes of this sort Constant took place regularly and peaceably according to the Laws of the partitions Empire. But to these we have to add the' high-handed doings atioM™^^' ^ Several of the Western Counties of Meroia had u portion of Welsh territory added to them when the Principality and its Marches were finally settled under Henry the Eighth. 632 THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY feag- 1814-5. 1801. Different position of the vassals in France and in Germany. of the present century. This principality has been mediatized i altogether ; that, rather too large for such a process, has been compelled to surrender half its territory to the greed of a more powerful neighbour ; princes who had been compelled to yield their own dominions to the common enemy have indemnified themselves at the expense of their own weaker brethren. Bishopricks have been secularized ; Free Cities have been deprived of their freedom ; and every change, just or unjust, expedient or inexpedient, has involved the removal of some ancient landmark, the vnping out of some ancient memory. Thus were formed States like Prussia, Hannover, and Baden, answering to no ancient divisions, suggesting no ancient associa- tions, and which would seem as strange in the eyes of a Saxon or Frankish Emperor as to see one portion of Swabia forming part of an independent republic and another incorporated with a hostile monarchy. But though so much of this geographical confusion is owing to very modern arrangements, the change had largely taken place long before the dissolution of the Kingdom. This striking peculiarity in German historical geography, as compared with that of France, has its origin in that gradual splitting of the Kingdom and its great divisions which had been going on for ages. In England then the process of dissolution never took place ; in France a temporary total dissolution was followed by the closest of reunions ; in Germany dissolution stopped at a certain point. It is an important difference between Germany and France that in France the Crown was able to annex the great fiefs as wholes, before the mediate vassals had found time and opportunity to make themselves independent of their immediate lords. In Germany the vassals of the Dukes became immediate vassals of the Crown at a time when immediate vassalage was fast becoming synonymous with sovereignty. The smallest tenant-in-chief acquired, or at least strove after, independence ; and his independence has been at all times much more liable to be endangered at the hands of some more powerful neighbour than at the hands of the common suzerain. Again, each of these 1 The German phrase of inediatimtion is as delicate an euphemism as the French phrase of rhinion. To the student of constitutional law there is some- thing singularly grotesque in the use of the word after the dissolution of the Empire, when no such distinction as " mediate " and " immediate " any longer existed. MENT DISPROPORTION IN SIZE OF GERMAN STATES 633 small principalities was liable either to be subdivided or to be united with any other. Hence follows the vast number of the Vast German States and the diminutive size of so many of them. 1'°™!'^'' Even now that so many of them have been swallowed up by larger German States, the mention of some of them almost raises a smile ; and, States. before the dissolution of the Kingdom, they were incomparably more numerous and some of them incomparably smaller. Hence again follows the wiping out of ancient landmarks, and the Their singular disproportion in extent and powers between the difiFerent smgnlar members of the former Kingdom and now Confederation. The ^1^^^°^ ^ ancient Duchies of Saxony, Swabia, and Bavaria fairly balanced size, one another ; but there is no proportion between Prussia and Lippe-Detmold. Here, as we shall see, lies the great vice of the existing Confederation. Most of the existing States are purely artificial ; they answer to no national, geographical, or historical divisions. Again their disproportion in size is so great that even the secondary States cannot hope to maintain their inde- pendence by their own strength ; their only hope — a faint hope Position of indeed^lies in the mutual jealousy of the two dominant powers, •^^'istria A great disproportion indeed has often existed between the prnssia. several members of Federal bodies, between Megalopolis and Tritaia, between Bern and Zug, between Virginia and Rhode Island. But nowhere has disproportion been carried to so great a pitch as in modern Germany. And the Federal and brotherly feeling which has tempered the disproportion in republican Con- federations is hardly to be looked for in the sovereigns of either great or small German States. The only parallel is to be looked Parallel for in the worst arranged and most unfortunate of the Greek g^^yg Confederations. Germany, tossed to and fro between Austria and Brandenburg, is like the Boeotian League in the days when Thebes had not yet definitely got the better of Orchomenos. APPENDIX I 1. NOTE ON THE CITIES OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE^ (See Head, Historia Numoram, p. 350 sqq, and Leicester ^VarreD, Greek Federal Coinage) In the folloM-ing list of the cities of the Achaian League, those are marked with an asterisk for which numismatic evidence exists ; those whose existence as members of the League is known only from the evidence of coins are put in Italics. It may be stated here that on the obverse of the Federal silver coins the head of Zeus Homagyrios was represented ; on the reverse the Achaian monogram X, and around it "various letters, monograms, local symbols, names of magistrates or of cities, usually abbreviated, " all surrounded by a WTeath of bay. The bronze coins have the name of each city in full, preceded by the name of the Achaians {e.g. AXAinX ATilAIOX). On the obverse is a " full length figure of Zeus Homagyrios holding Nike and leaning on sceptre" ; on the reverse " Demeter Panachaia (?) seated, holding wreath and resting on sceptre." SAME or CITY. DATE B.C. OF ACCESSION. PACE. * Patrai I'SO 191. * Dyme 280 191. Tritaia . u. 279 191. Pharai . c. 279 191. Aigion 275 192. Boura 275 192. * Keryneia . 275 192. Leontion . — 192. Aigeira . 274 (?) 192. PeUenS . 274 (?) 192. SikySn . 251 285. Corinth . 24-3—223 196—146 - 294, 484. Megara 243—223 204—146 2 . 294, 477. ^ This note, with the list of cities, appeared in an Appendix to the original edition, but has been recast by the Editor. The other notes in this Appendix are added by the Editor. ' Corinth was out of the League from 223 to 196, and Megara from 223 to 204. (Freeman.) 636 APPENDIX I NAME OF CITY. DATE OF ACCESSION. VKSB. B.C. Troizen .... 243 . . . • 295. Epidauros , 243 .... 295. Hgraia . Between 240—235. 208 ? . • 31*> 480. Kynaitha . _ 314. Stymphalos 314. K.leit6r . 314. Pheneos . 234 .... 314. Alea _ 354. Telphousa ^ _ 314. Maiitineia before 222 315. Mantineia or Antigoneia . 222 ... 315. * Megalopolis 234 315. Aigina 233 (?)— 2 10 331, 453. * Hermione 229 331. *Kle8nai . 229 312. * Argos 228 333. * PMious . 228 333. * Kaphyai . 227 344. * Tegea 222 386. Ps6phis . 219 419. *Pagai 208? 2 489. * Phigaleia ^ 208 or 196 Lepreon * . 208 or 196 460, 478, 484. Orchomenos 199 or 196 478, 484. '' Alipheira 194 \ * Asm 194 \ 488. * Dipaia 194 J * Misphasioi 194 * Gortys 194 488. * KalUsta . 194 (?) * Pallantion 194 488. * Theisoa . 194 488. * Sparta 192 492. * Slis . 191 496. * MessSni . 191 496. * Kmtnt . 184 506. Hypana . ? * iMsai ? * Methydrion ? ^ Spelt Thelpusa on coins. ^ Pagai most probably became a distinct State on the second incorporation of Megara. (Freeman. ) ' Phigaleia was probably annexed along with Triphylia. (Freeman.) • I insert the name of Lepreon as the only city in Triphylia. (Freeman. ) APPENDIX I NAME OF CITY. DATE OF ACCESSION. B.C. Teathis . . . . ? Abia \ Thouria I 182 Pharai J Gythion ? . TeiithrSng ? . Asine (in Messenia) ? Pyrrhiohos ? KainSpolis % Oitylos? . Leuktra 1 . Thalamai ? Alagonia ? Gerenia? . H95 As6pos ? . Akriai Boiai ? . Zarax ? . Epidauros Limera ? Brasiai ? . Geronthrai ? . Marios ? . lasos ? ? . J 637 507. 485, 540. 2. NOTE ON THE CITIES OF THE LYKIAN LEAGUE (See Head, Historia Numorum, p. 576 sqq) Stuabo states that twenty-three cities belonged to the Lykian League. This statement corresponds exactly to the numismatic evidence. We have Federal coins issued by twenty -three cities, viz. Antiphellos, Apoll6nia, Apulai, Araxa (?), Arykanda, Bubon, Gagai, Kragos, Kyang, Kydna (?), Limyra, Masikytos, Myra, Olympos, Patara, Phellos, Piuara (autonomous coins of Federal type), Podalia, Rhodiopolis, T16s, Trebenna, Tymena, Xanthos. Strabo states that Phaselis was not a member of the second Lykian League ; and this "is not contradicted by numismatic evidence" (Head). We have also Federal coins of Trabula and Telmessos, but only in conjunction vrith Kragos. This shows the existence of monetary leagues or Sonderhunds of separate pairs of towns which are supposed to be meant by the words avi).To\iTevl>ix€voi S?/noi which occur in Lykian inscriptions (Le Bas - Waddington, As. Min., 1290-92). 638 APPENDIX I 3. THE FEDERAL COINAGE OE AKARNANIA (See Head, Historia Numorum, p. 278 sqq) In the fifth century, after the formation of the Akarnanian Confederacy, the coast towns issued Corinthian staters (obverse. Head of Pallas ; reverse, Pegasos). The towns of the interior, including Stratos, the chief city of the Confederacy, issued small silver coins with their own types. In the end of the third century we find a regular Federal coinage (obverse, Head of the river god AchelSos ; reverse, the Aetian Apollo) instead of the Corinthian staters. Leukas was probably the place where these coins were struck, as (about 300 E.c.) it had taken the place of Stratos as the most important Akarnanian town. In 167 B.C. Leukas was separated from Akarnania, and issued her own coins. Thyrrheion continued for some time the type of Federal coinage, though not in the name of the Confederacy, but on her own account. 4. THE FEDERAL COINAGE OF jETOLIA (See Head, Historia Numomm, p. 283 sqq) The Federal coinage of .ffitolia began soon after the invasion of that oountiy by the Gauls. None of the .ffitolian towns issued coins of their own. APPENDIX II ADDITIONAL NOTES BY THE EDITOR P. 35.' " Theue was nothing at Atliens at all analogous to what we call ' Office ' and ' Opposition.' " On the S-fitiov TpoariTris at Athens and Syracuse, see Mr. Freeman's History of Sicily, vol. iii. p. 116, where he says : " The d-/i/iov Tpoardrris comes nearest to the Leader of Opposition, but with this difference, that the Leader of Opposition, though not at the time in office, is sure to belong to the official class." P. 53. As a fourth "exception to the representative system in modern Europe and America " we may count the Referendum in Switzerland. P. 56. "Election of the American President." Mr. Bryoe has described {American Oominonwealth, i. 52) how it has happened that ' ' the presidential electors have become a mere cogwheel in the machine." Their voting is now a mere matter of form. lb., note 1. South Carolina is no longer an exception since 1868. P. 74. Since Mr. Freeman wrote, a Federal monarchy has come into existence, namely, the Cierman Empire. See remarks in Editor's Preface. P. 104, line 6 from foot. Insert "as" between "such" and "merely." P. 105. W. Vischer, in a valuable review of the History of Federal Government, published in the Neues Schweizerisches Museum (iv. pp. 281-328), and reprinted in the reviewer's Klei'iie Schriften, i. 534-587 (to which reference is here made), pointed out that light is thrown on the condition of the Delphic Aniphiktyouy, before its refonn by Augustus, by an inscription found at Delphi by C. Wescher. At the time of this document there were twenty-four votes (as in the time of Aischines) among seventeen peoples, distributed in such a way that ten peoples had one vote each, and the remaining seven two votes each. The possessors of two votes were the Dolphians, Thessalians, Phbkians, Bceotians, PhthiStic Achaians, Magnetes, Ainianes ; while those with one vote were the Dorians of Parnassus, Dorians of Peloponn&os, Athenians, Euboians, Malians, Oitaiaus, Dolopians, Perrhaibians, Epiknemidian Lokrians, Western Lokrians. Thus the Dorians, the lonians (Athenians and Euboians), and Lokrians, who were originally classed as one people and gave one vote, had been severally divided into two. 640 APPENDIX II At an earlier period, about the beginning of the third century, ^tolian influence was predominant at Delphi. See below p. 651, note on p. 257. P. 112. See Vischer, in the review mentioned in last note, p. 553-4. He refers to the inscription, found in the Tread and now in Cambridge, which was published by E. Curtius in Gerhard's Archaeol. Zeitimg, 1855, p. 33 sqq., where kolvA of the Oitaian Dorians, the Ainianes, the Athamanes, the Oitaians, the Eastern Lokrians, are mentioned. For the Ph6kian League too there is now new epigraphic material available, in tlie Delphic inscrip- tions, published by Wescher and Foucart. P. 118. Vischer criticizes Mr. Freeman for denying that there was any real Federalism in Thessaly (p. 554). Cf his account of a "Bundes- organismus" in Thessaly, in an essay "Ueber die Bildung von Staaten und Biinden" (Kleine Schriften, i. p. 335 sqq). But after reading Vischer's strictures, Mr. Freeman thought that the difference between his own view and that of Vischer was mainly one of words. P. 125. The remarks in the text on the use of " Theban " and " Boeotian " shoidd be modified, as Vischer (p. 558) pointed out. ' ' Was den Namen des Gesammtstaates betrifft, so scheiut er officiell als der thebanische bezeichnet worden zu sein, oi Gij^aim. So wenigstens steht in der bekannten Steinur- kunde jener Zeit iiber den unter Archon Nausinikos geschlossenen gi'ossen athenischen Bund, der einzigen mir bekannten, wo eine ofiicielle Unterschrift sioh findet. [See Rangabe, Antiq. Hell. n. 381 and 381 b.] Damit stimmt auch wohl iiberein, dass, wahrend bei Thukydides, also in den Zeiten des peloponnesischen Krieges, Boiotien als Staat immer mit BoiwtoC bezeichnet wird, und bei Xenophon bis zur Zeit des antalkidischen Friedens der Gebrauch zwischen Boiuxoi xiud QijjSaioi schwankt, seit der Befreiung vom spartanischen Joch bei diesem Bti^cuol das regelmassige ist, und ebenso bei den Eednern immer Q-q^aioi. vorkommt." He explains Xen. Hell. vi. 3. 19 in the same way as Mr. Freeman, but from his own different standpoint ; and deprecates stress being laid on the expressions of Diodorus {koivt] aivoSoi tSiv BoiutCc, XV. 80, and Koivbv tS>v Boiurwy, xvi. 85), who was not always accurate in his terms. P. 134. Vischer (p. 557 sqq.) plausibly argues against the view of Grote that in 378 the Thebans "revived the Boeotian Confederacy,"— a view which Mr. Freeman accepted as the theoretical, but not as the practical, aspect of what happened. Vischer holds that the Thebans tried to introduce in Bojotia the same state of things which had prevailed in Athens since Theseus. As all the inhabitants of Attica were Athenians, so all the inhabi- tants of Bceotia were to be Thebans ; and he quotes the passage in IsokratSs Pled. § 8 (quoted p. 136, note 2) in support of his theory. But Vischer's observations, while they considerably affect Grote's statement of the case, affect Mr. Freeman's account but little. P. 143. For the constitution of the Boiotian League in the Third period, see the investigations of M. Holleaux in the Bulletin de Cm-respcnidwncc APPENDIX II 641 helUnique, xiii. , 1 sqq. , and 225 sqq. The President of the League was called ipxuf. There were functionaries called d^eSpioTeiioKT-es, apparently seven in number, and delegated by the cities. No city could send more than one ; but the right of sending them seems to have been confined to a certain number of the cities. Orohomenos, Thebes, Plataia, Tanagra, Thespiai, were always represented. Bceckh identifies these ofBcials with the Bceotarchs of Polybios and Livy ; but there is not yet sufficient evidence to decide this point. P. 145-6. Stein, one of the best interpreters of Herodotus, takes a some- what different view of the passage, i. 170. " Thales schlug fiir den ionischen Stiidtebund eine Buudesverfassung vor, nach der sioh die einzelnen Stiidte ihrer politischen Selbstandigkeit begeben und einem Bmidestage (j3ouX£iiTi)/3toi») sioh unterordnen, daneben aber nach wie vor als gesonderte Stadtgemeinde bestehen bleiben (okeo/x^cas) und in ihrem Verhaltniss zur Bundesstadt so angesehen werden sollten (no/d^ecBai) wie anderswo (z.B.) in Attika die Landgemeinden {Sfj/ioi od. kSiiuu) zur Stadtgemeinde (iriXis). Kurz er woUte an die Stelle des bisherigen Stadtebundes eine Bundesstadt (und zwar Teos) setzen." Stein evidently thinks that the proposal of Thales involved a much greater loss of independence for the cities of the Federation than is assumed by Mr. Freeman. It is not clear that in using the word Sij/ioi Herodotus was necessarily thinking of the demes of Attica. P. 156. Arkadia seems to have tried Federal Government before any other part of Greece. There are Federal coins which seem to date from the sixth century (see Essay on Federal Coinage by the Hon. Leicester Warren, now Lord de Tabley, p. 11 ; where it is also pointed out how the foundation of Megalopolis gave a great impulse to coinage in the PeloponnSsos). It is significant that of Federal coins dating from the period of the Achaian League, twenty-three were struck in Arkadian towns, twenty-eight in the rest of Peloponn&os. M. Dubois (Les ligues itolienne et acMenne, p. 53) notices that the Arkadians were those who were most zealous to join the second Achaian League (see Pausanias, Arcadica, 6. 1), and concludes that "it is impossible to give too much weight to the Federal antecedents of the Arkadian people." P. 187, notes, line 7. "Can we tnist a writer who seems to think that Dyme needed deliverance from Achaian oppression ? " M. Dubois (p. 20) replies that at this period Achaia was divided and governed by local oligarchies which Epameindndas permitted to continue in order to keep the Peloponn6sos disunited (the Arkadian union being the sole exception). This consideration may explain the odd phrase of Diod6ros. P. 188. M. Dubois writes (p. 57) : "M. Freeman s'etonne qu' Alexandre ait traits si rigoureusement les Achtens de Pelltee ; U suffit peut-Stre de rappeler que la ligue des villes d'Achaie avait combattu centre son pere Philippe k Ch&onee." A reader would naturally infer from this that Mr. Freeman had ignored or forgotten the action of the Achaian League in 338 B 0. But if M. Dubois had read on to the next sentence he would have seen 2 T 642 APPENDIX II that Mr. Freeman mentions the fact, and considers it to be an insufficient explanation. P. 192. M. Dubois complains that Mr. Freeman (as well as other historians of the period), in discussing the origin and significance of the Achaian League, has not given sufficient weight to the Peloponnesian history of the previous century. He regards the union of 281 B. c. as the final result of a series of struggles of the lesser Peloponugsian peoples to throw off the yoke of Sparta. "De I'ensemble de oes luttes sortira I'union fdderale qui sera le triomphe d'un« vleille tradition de haine contre Laceddmone " (p. 5S). If this statement goes a little too far, we may still be ready to believe that the "tradition constante d'indepeudance et de groupement" in Peloponn^sos, on which M. Dubois justly insists, was a condition in the absence of which the second Achaian League could hardly have come into being. It is con- jectured by Mr. Mahaffy [Greek Life and Thought, p. 8) that the sudden rise of the Achaians and jEtolians into prominence in Greek polities is to be accounted for by an influx of wealth acquired by them iu mercenary service in the wars of Alexander. P. 194, note 1. It is now generally believed that Margos, not Markos, is the right form of the name of the Founder of the League, and Mdpyos appears in modern texts of Polybios. As, however, Mr. Freeman had evidently given the matter his consideration, I have not ventured to change " Markos " in his text, though I have no doubt that Margos is correct. P. 197. On the constitution of the Achaian League there are two special treatises, Merleker's Achaicorum lihri tres (1837) and Wahner's De Achceorum fcederis origine atque institulis (1857). Mr. Freeman does not refer to them, and probably made no direct use of them, but they are still worth consulting. The most recent exposition of the Achaian constitution is in the work of M. Dubois already quoted. P. 198. " The gi-eater cities . . . were admitted into a body the relations and duties of whose members were already fixed and well understood. " But it must be remembered that each to-\vn which joined the League had to sign a special Federal treaty, and it is highly probable that in lesser details the conditions of membership were sometimes modified. (See Dubois p. 92. ) For an example of a Federal treaty, see below, p. 647. P. 202. " No independent diplomatic action in the several cities." "While Mr. Freeman thinks that the rule was that no state could of itself send ambassadors to foreign powers, but that the Federal Government might sometimes dispense from this rule, M. Dubois (p. 181, 182) holds the rule to have been that each city had perfect liberty to commission ambassadors but that the League could restrain this liberty in special cases. (Cf. p. 183, "En matiere de relations exterienres, I'autonomie de ohaque Etat restait intacte, pourvu que I'union ne fut pas compromise.") Pausanias, vii. 9. 4, is not decisive, as it may be interpreted to suit both opinions (see above, p. 204, note 5). M. Dubois supports his view by the circumstance that the Spartan embassy to Kome in which the restored exiles Areos and Alkibiades took APPENDIX II 643 part, is not censured by Polybios as illegal, but solely on the ground of ingi-atitude to tbe League and PhllopoimSn (Pol. xxiii. 11. 7, 8). There does not seem to be sufficient evidence for deciding the question definitely. In this connexion it is interesting to observe that each city might have its own proxenoi, independently of the League. See Bulletin de Corre- spondance helUnique iv. p. 98. [ P. 205. " The Assembly of the League." t P. 239. "The Senate." M. Dubois takes a very dififerent view of the Assembly and Senate, and their relation to one another. He has not expounded his view very clearly, but as far as I understand him he holds that (1) The Assembly or Congress {(rivoSos) was composed of four classes : [a) the BouXiJ ; (6) the Tspovala, another "senate," of which we hear and know very little ; (c) the people, oi iroWol ; (d) the Federal magistrates. (2) The influence of these four bodies varied at different periods in the history of the League ; but the importance of the BouXi; was the most abiding. In the early years of the League the presence of the BouXi} was what con- stituted a Congress. Other citizens, not members of the BovX-i), could come if they chose, but as a rule they did not attend, and the Congress practically meant the BouXiJ acting in conjunction with the magistrates. So far, the view of M. Dubois is not opposed to that of Mr. Freeman. (3) The BouXi) was not a body chosen at the Federal Assemblies (consist- ing, as Merleker held, of magistrates, ex-magistrates, and prominent citizens), but was a regular Chamber of Representatives, chosen from time to time by each state in its local Assembly. The evidence on which M. Dubois chiefly relies for this is apparently Livy xxxiv. 48, where we read of omnium civitatium legationes in conaionis inodum circwmfusas at the Congress of Corinth in 194 B.C. (cf. xxxii. 22), combined with the fact that a regular Congi'ess sometimes seems to have consisted altogether of the BouXi} — the presumption being that this could not have happened unless every city was represented in the BouX'^. (4) Each city sent more than one Representative — how many, or of how many the whole Senate consisted, is unknown. These Representatives were like our Members of Parliament. Although they were chosen by the cities because they were practically pledged to certain lines of policy, they were per- mitted to exercise their private judgment. They were not mere mouthpieces of the assemblies which appointed them. See Livy xxxii. 22, where the Argive Representatives are divided in opinion (Dymsei ac Megalopolitani et quidam . tuv This statement was criticized by Mr. H. J. Smith in his notice of Federal Government in the Minburgh Review. Bishop Thirlwall wrote as follows in reply to a question of Mr, Freeman : "It seems to me that there are not suffi- cient data to determine whether ayopd. or t6 kowIiv or some other word was the proper ' fonnal ' or ' constitutional ' title of the Achaean General Assembly, or perhaps even whether there was any such title ; but I agree with Mr. Smith that ayopi would be — if not the — a proper name for the thing, whereas t6 Kotvbv would be properly the commonwealth, and could only have been applied to the Assembly in a secondary sense as the commonwealth by representation. For of course, though the Assembly was primary, as not elective, it could only represent the whole body of the nation." It may he observed that in Polybios the terms Tas ^a(pov 'A%ai av KoX trT/JOT]a7ds Kal 'IwTapxos Kal vaiiapxos (v S[i 'Opxo/J^vm ol ipxovTes TUV 'Op- XOfievluv.] 6\ji]viu Ala 'AnApiov, 'Mivav 'Ximplav, 'A0[/)o5]i[Ta;' Kal toi>]s 6[eoii irivras ^Hav iii\ vainv ^/i/ie[y]eo' h Toi (rrdXai Kal tSi op-oKoylai. KaX Tut ^a^lff/iarli TUL ye^'o /iivwi Tui KOiJi/fui] TiSt T[i3]x 'AxaiiSv Kal et rh Ka jj,!) ifiptiyTi iote iiriTpiif/o) els diva/iliv Kal e6opK^]ovn iiiv /loi. etrj Td7a9a iiriopKiovri. Si rivavHa. tQv Si \afi6vTUV iv 'Oplxo fieflois Hj] KXdp[o]i> fi oUlav d0' o5 'Axniol iyivovro jjA] i^ivTW ii-qBevl AiraWoTpiQ \iTU> X'X'os Sp&xjMs Kal a SUa driXr/s iarui . Xiep I Si tSLs Tpairi^ajs tSLs xP^^K^"]^ '"o^ ^^^^ "^^^ 'OirKoffiilov hy Karadivres ivix^P^ ol MeSu Spieis ol fi.eTaa-T-/i]' wepl fiiv ras %ii/)as S/jois xpV^"" Tois yey paiiiiAvois Kal ^X""'''^^ dTroTopevicrSoiv jSovXeuTic iva Kal rh ddveia aw- aTTOTivdvTia Sera Ka a iriXis dcpeCKy, Kara tA M^aXKov /lipos [t]ov PovXevra, Kai ifujieplivTa TO, iv roils XhinXois yLv6/j,(va /caret tIh' povXeirrdv. (I take the text from Fick's edition of the .ffitolian Inscriptions in voL ii. part i. of CoUitz, Sammlung der gr. Dialdd-Inschriften, p. 22.) The inscription belongs to the end of the third century. We learn from it that the Secretary was the eponymous officer of the Assembly. The witnesses of the act are (1. 34) rj (TwiSpiov A[irfc?X]wi' rb iirl ypafinarios AiKov Kal ol irpocrirTdTai roO a-weSplov K.r.X. P. 263, note 3. The unproved reading of the sentence quoted from the Keian decree is as follows (Fick, op. cit. p. 18) : el Si ris Ka S,yeL Tois Kelovs rbv iTTparayhv del riy hi,(rxpVTa rk h AhuXlav Karaydfieva [avairpdtTa']ovTa K^piov eTfiev k.t.X. In the T^ian decree Fick reads (p. 19) : ra phi ifi^avij dvairpda-ffeiv rbv (T\Tp^aTa{y6v^ Kal rods trvviSpovs del roi>s ivdpxovs. lb. note i. Omit a before dviipam and davKla, and read ev rois vbnovs. P. 264. A. Mommsen has shown (PMlologus xxiv) by a careful examina- tion of Delphic inscriptions that the strategic year of the .Stolians began — that is, the General came into office — in the Delphic month Boathoos, which the .ffltolians therefore called irpoKiKXios, the month beginning the cycle of office. It corresponds partly to our September. P. 268, line 10. " Delphi must have been seized in some way or other." See above, note to p. 257. An .ffitolian decree found at Delphi (published in 1881 in the Bulletin de Correspondance helUnique, vol. v.) enacts that none of the Delphians shall be exempt from the money requisition unless such immunity be granted by the city of Delphi. See Dittenberger, Sylloge 325, and Fick in CoUitz, Sammlung der gr. Dial.-Tnschr. ii. 1. 18. tTTpaTayiovTO! Ti/xaiov l5o|e tois AItuXoIs ' firideva t&v iv AeXv 'Axaiwi' is mentioned, is supposed to date from shortly before this event. Bull, de Corr. hell. (1886) p. 136 sqq. P. 385. The statement that the Argives received Mantineia from Antigonos and founded the colony Antigoneia depends on the reading in Plutarch's Aratos, 45 (cited in the note), tu>v yap 'Kpyelinv. But E. Curtiiis reads 'Axaifiy, which is adopted in the text of Sintenis. P. 386, line 10. " It [Orchomenos] had never belonged to the League." It seems to me (cp. Dittenberger in Hermes xviii. 178 sqq.) that the words of Polybios, iv. 6. 5 [6 /3a(riXei>s ' kvTiyovos] 'Opxo/xe^'iv Kara Kpdros eXdv oiK aTTOKaricTTTjiTe rots 'Axatots dXXd (Tte, and 639 appoints Governor Rutledge dic- tator, 377 note Carthage, Treaty of, with Philip and his allies, 439, 441 Treaty of, with Rome, 569 compared with Rome, 576 note Cathedral Chapters, attendance at, 240 note Cato, his reply to Aulus Postumius, 110 note obtains release of Achaian exiles, 534 "Caucus," Achaian, 222 INDEX 669 Caudini, the, 566 Cavour, compared with Aratos, 380- 382 Chairou, Tyrant of Pelleng, 188 ChairSn of Sparta, ib. Chairoueia, Bceotian defeat at, 293 Chalkidikg, Greeks of, reject Olynthiau terms, 151 Spartan intervention in, 149 seqq. Chalkis, Roman garrison in, 484 ^toliau attempt on, 491 ChalouphSs Nikephoros, 602 Chambers, two, impossible in Primary Assemblies, 247 Chancellor, Lord, his position in the Honse of Lords, 232 Channel Islands, their relation to Great Britain, 271 Chaonians, the, 116 Chares, battle of the, 311 Charles the Great, his execution of Saxon prisoners, 46 note Charles IV., Emperor, crowned at Aries, 619 note Charops, of Epeiros, supports Eome, 482, 494 Charops the Younger, of Bpeii'os, his Tyranny, 512, 519, 520 CheilSn of Sparta, 450 Chersou, Eepublic of, 25, 169 Chios, nature of its alliance with Athens, 19, 27 note position of slaves in, 30 note mediates in the Social War, 430- 432 offers mediation to Philip, 455 Chlaineas of MtoMa., his embassy to Sparta, 154, 181 note, 451 Chremes of Akarnania, 519 ChremSnidean War, 276 Christianity, Alexander the Great, the pioneer of, 175 Chiir, its privileged position in the Gotteshausbund, 126 note Cities, dependent, condition of, in Greece, 18 compared with Federal common- wealths, 19 with English colonies, 20 Cities, Free. See City-commonwealths Cities, Free, of the Empire, 625 City - commonwealths, characteristics of, 15-18 full developement of, in Greece, 16, 24 City-commonwealths in Italy, 23 in mediseval Europe, 24 general view of the system, 26 seqq. varieties in internal constitution, 26 in external relations, 27 varying relations with surrounding territory, 28 position of the individual citizens in, 29, 36, 38 system of, a political education, 37, 48, 64, 80 highest type of, at Athens, 37, 47 intensity of patriotism in, 38 bad side of the system, 39 in the Middle Ages, 42 constant warfare among, ib, results of the system in war, 43 bitterness of political enmities in, 48 the Amphiktyonic Council a wit- ness for, 101 strong feeling for, among Ionian Greeks, 146 and among great Greek cities, 148, 151 union among, compared with that of districts, 259 Clackmannan and Kinross, sent members alternately to Parlia- ment, 107 note Claudius, Emperor, Lykian League destroyed by, 169 Claudius, Appius, Lykortas' answer to, 500 demands help from Achaia, 527 refused by the League, 528 Claudius, C, 531 Clergy and Laity, no such distinction in ancient times, 102 Coalitions, as to the strength of, 410 note Colonies, English, compared with Greek dependent cities, 20 relations to the United Kingdom, 69 note Columbia, district of, 273 note Commons, House of, compared with the other Assemblies, 209, 210, 217 seqq. Commonwealths. See City and Federal commonwealths, 4 Confederation, Swiss. te Federal and National, dispute as to the terms, 10 note Federal Commonwealths, examples of, 4-6 relations of the members, 7 two classes of, 8-12 classification of government in, 12 Federal Government. See Federalism Federalism, a compromise, 1, 13, 14, 69, 78 definition of, 2 examples of, 3-6 conditions of true Federalism, 8, 11 early approach&s to, in Greece, 16, 112 seqq., 145 its connexion with Athenian his- tory, 32 approach to, in English relations with Scotland, 59 note advantages of, 69 only suited to certain conditions, 70 popular prejudice against, ib. American civil war no proof against, 71, 72 testimony of the Southern States to, 72 whether possible in monarchies, 74 viewed as an intermediate system, 77-79 as a political educator, 80, 83 favourable to local Self -Govern- ment, 82 desirable in certain circumstances, 83 inappropriate in others, 84 results of, in the United States, 85 its alleged weakness, 87 seqq. facilities for secession, 89 example of the system in Switzer- land, 92 close approach of the Amphiktyonic Council to, 101, 147 dangers of an overwhelming capital to, 120-122 Thalfe' advice in favour of, 145-148 INDEX 673 i'ederalism, evidence of the growth of, in Greece, 162 history of, in Greece neglected in England, 171 German writers on, ib. revival of, in later Greece, 177 early establishment of, in Greece not desirable, 183 a reaction against Macedonia, 185 fullest and purest shape of, in Achaia, 199 unwilling members a source of weak- ness, 205 argument as to, deduced from break-up of Achaian League, 374- 376 importance of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 444 in Greece, swept away by Rome, 651 monarchic, the true solvent for the Byzantine peninsula, 555 germs of, in ancient Italy, 558-559 in Spain and Gaul, 559 in Italy, agreemeni:s for and against, 616 in Germany, 621, 622 "Federalist," the, on the Amphilcty- onic Council, 110 note treatment of Achaian history in, 249 Feudalism, approach to kingly Fede- ralism in, 74 Flamininus, T. Quinctius, his legisla- tion in Greece, 120 his philheUenism, 473, 474 his moderation, 475 his terms refused by Philip, 482 proclaims the freedom of Greece, 484 his settlement of Grecian matters, 484-486 withdraws his garrisons, 486 his letter to Achaian Assembly, 490 his embassy to Greece, 491 his dealings with MessgnS, 496 with Zakynthos, 497 marches against Sparta, 500 his demand for an Achaian Assem- bly refused, 511 Flanders, a fief of the Crown of France, 25 note the common battle-ground of France and Austria, 63 Florence, dependencies of, 23 Parliament of, 31, 53 note powers of the magistrates, 246 2 Fosoari, Francesco, 168 France, civil wars in, 47 and note frequent changes of government in, 86 local divisions represent ancient fiefs, 601 Kingdom of, compared with that of Germany, 623 seqq., 630-632 as to National Assemblies in, 625 process of re-union in, 626 Kingship hereditary in, 627 Francouia, 631 Francis II., Emperor, calls himself " Emperor of Austria," 75 note Frankfort, German confederation meets at, 122 Frederick Barbarossa, Emperor, as to his election, 595 note authorities for his reign, 596 note his character, 597, 607 his position not to be confounded with that of modern Austria, 597 his alleged breach of faith, 597 note his war with the Lombard Cities, 698, 599 besieges Ancona, 609 defeated before Alexandria, ib, negociates with the League, 609, 610 his defeat at Legnano, 610 reconciled to Venice and the Church, ib. his truce with the King of Sicily, ib. with the League, 611 joined by various Cities, ib. concludes the Peace of Constanz, 612 crowned at Aries, 618 note Frederick II., Emperor, his strifes with the Popes, 614 Frentani, the, 666 Fulvius, Cn., delivers Korkyra, 326 Fulvius, M., intervenes between the League and Sparta, 501 at the Special Assembly of Argos, 508 note Gabinics, A., 545 note Gallus, C. Sulpicius, 535 Gardiner, Capt. Thomas, his plea to Charles II. "for relief," 299 note Gauls, rude approach to Federalism among, in Asia, 165 Twte invade ^Etolia, 178, 192 and Macedonia and Greece, 178, 257 Confederations in, 559, 560 note 674 INDEX Gelnhausen, seat of Imperial Govern- meut, 593 Generals, Greek, powers of, 223 Genoa, dependencies of, 23 Germany, influence of the Empire on, 618, 621 its close connexion with Burgundy, 619 its identity with the Empire, 620, 627 Confederation of, 5, 10, 75, 122, 621, 622 process of disunion in, 74, 622, 627, 630-632 compared with England and France, 623 seqq. origin of the Kingdom, 623 power of the royal authority in, 624 retention of National Assemblies in, 625, 626 a Confederation mainly of princes, 629 Diet of, ib. loss of its ancient divisions, 630 its arriere vassals compared with those in France, 632 vast number of its states, 633 paralleled with Bceotia, ib. Gessler, Tell's slaughter of, 300 noU Gibraltar, its relation to Great Britain, 270 Glabrio, M. Acilius, his campaign against Antiochos, 494 his treatment of ^tolia, ib. Godfrey of Viterbo, 596 note Gortys, 489 note Goslar, seat of Imperial Government, 593 "Government" the, use of the name in England, 34 note Gracchi, the, supports the cause of the allies, 582 Graf, original meaning of, 629 note Grand Alliance under Macedonian headship, 389 Messene asks for admission to, 398, 399, 401 holds a Congress at Corinth, 406 its strength compared with that of jEtolia, 409 Congress of, at Panormos, 434 Philip's Treaty with Hannibal as head of, 442 Great Britain, its union with Ireland, Great Britain, dependencies of, com- pared with those of jEtolia, 270 Greece, small Federal States in, 5 city-commonwealths in, 13, 15-18, 24, 101 early forms of Constitutional Mon- archy and Federalism in, 16, 112, 145 Civic Tyrannies in, 17 condition of independent cities in, 18 warfare in, compared with that of mediaeval times, 44 republics of, a model for mankind, 67 position of the Amphiktyonic Council in, 98, 99 indisposed towards Federalism, 101, 102 results of Theban supremacy for, 134 results of dissolution of Olynthian League, 149 earlier and later history of, 172, seqq. change in the language of, 173 wide spread of her culture, 174 effects of Alexander's conquests on. 175 Gaulish invasion of, 178, 257 under Philip and Alexander, 179 under the successors, 180 and under the Antigonids, 180- 182 early Federalism in, undesirable, 183 effects of the Achaian League on, 184 lUyrian invasion of, 324 state of, after fall of Kleomen6s, 389 alliance in, under Macedonian head- ship, lb. becomes gradually dependent on Rome, 432, 433, 439 Roman goodwill towards, 473, 474 freedom of, proclaimed by Flami- ninus, 484 acquisition of territory in, by pur- chase, 497 note Federalism in, swept away by Rome, 551 Revolution of 1862, 553 the Achaian League, the natural model for, 554 INDEX 675 Greeks, no desire for real Federalism among, 147 (see ante) Gregory IX., Pope, his strife with Frederick II., 615 Grote on autonomous city-communi- ties, 15 on the Olynthian League, 150 his depreciation of the "Greece of Polybio.s," 177 note Guerhsey, its relation to Great Britain, 271 Gunther, his account of Frederick's campaigns, 596 Tiote Gythion, besieged by Nabis, 490 Hague, the, meetings of United Pro- vinces at, 121 Haliartos, 522 Hannibal, his campaign against Rome, 433 his alliance with Macedonia, 439, 441 seqq. called senex by Llvy, 446 note Hanover, State of, 632 Hanse Towns, League of, 6 Hekatombaion, battle of, 354 Helikg, 190 Hellas, wide signification of, 174 note Henry III., Emperor, 695 Henry IV., Emperor, regarded as an old man, 446 note his activity, 625 note Heraia joins Achaian League, 314, 315 note taken by Kleomenes, 354 ceded to Achaia, 460 joined to Achaia, 485 Herakleia, Traohinian, annexed by iEtolians, 257 relation of, with the League, 260, 268 iEtolian Assembly at, 260 note acquired by Achaia, 496 secedes from Achaian League, 547 besieged by-Kritolaos, ib Hermion6 joins Achaian League, 331 secedes to Sparta, 372 Hernicans, traces of a League among, 561 Hierokles of Zakynthos, 497 HieromnSmones, the, 102, 104 note, 108 "Highness," attempt to confer the title on Washington, 166 note Hippolochos of Mtolia, 517 Hirpini, the, 566 History, "ancient" and "modern," as to the evil result of distinction between, 175, 274 Hostilius, A., 520 Hugh Capet, his election, 625 note Hypata, 269 note Hyperbatas, Achaian General, 853 Achaian General, his policy towards Rome, 513 opposes Egyptian appeal for help, 528 Iasos, plundered by Menalkidas, 540 lUyrians relieve Medefin, 323 their ravages in PeloponnSsos, 324 occupy Korkyra, 326 kingdom of, dismembered by Rome, ib. Innocent IV. , Pope, 615 Ionian Islands, their relation to Great Britain, 270 lonians, advice of Thales to, 145, 146 Amphiktyonib relation of their colonies, ib. feeling of town-autonomy among, 146 their request to HelikS, 191 note Ireland, g"Kass-Federalism not to be desired for, 70 its union with Great Britain, 76 Iseas of Keryneia abdicates the Tyranny, 192, 194, 196 and note Ismenias of Bceotia, 521 IsokratSs, his policy compared with that of Agelaos, 437 Isthmian games, administration of, not Federal, 203 note Romans admitted to, 327 Italians, ancient, their relations to Rome, 573, 578 claim Roman citizenship, 679 seqq. their war with Rome, 576, 587-590 difference of feeling among, 580 their claims supported at Rome, 582 compared with the American colon- ists, 584 League formed by, 585 receive citizen.ship of Rome, 588 nature of the franchise, 589, 590 Italicum, capital of Italian League, 585 becomes Corfinium again, 688 Italy, Federalism in, 6, 558-561, 586 676 INDEX Italy, city commonwealths in, 15-18, 23, 24 designs of Philip V. of Macedonia on, 432, 434 uncertainty of its ethnology, 661 three great classes in, 573 Rome the great obstacle to perma- nent Federation in, 686 kingdom of, 693 union of with Germany under Otto the Great, 594 four opportunities for the union of, 600 no tendency to union in, 607 as to a union under Frederick II. or Manfred, 615 Italian nationality a modern idea, ib. as to a Federal union in, 616 local independence the true policy for, 617 its connexion with the Empire, 618, 619 Jas&n of Pherai, 119, 151 Jersey, its relations to Great Britain, 271 John, Duke of Burgundy, his murder of Lewis, Duke of Orleans, 299 note John of Salisbury, his defence of Tyrannicide, 299 note Jus Latii, origin of, 573 note, 657 Kadmos, Tyrant of K6s, 196 note Kalaureia, Amphiktyony of, 98 Kallias, Tyrant of Chalkis, 162 Kallikrat§s of Leontion, growth of Roman party under, 512 his embassy to Rome, 613 his election as General, 614 opposes Egyptian appeal for help, 528, 529 at the Assembly of Amphipolis, 630 supports the demands of Rome, 531 opposes an alliance with Crete and Rhodes, 535 popular hatred of, 636 note supports the appeal of OrSpos, 537 impeaches Menalkidas, ib. sent to Rome, 539 his death, ih. KalydSn occupied by Aohaia, 186, 255 Kaphyai joins Achaian League, 314, 344 secedes to Sparta, 372 Kaphyai, Aratos defeated at, 398 Karia subject to Rhodes, 167 set free, 168 Kassander, King of Macedonia, re- stores Thebes, 141 garrisons Achaian cities, 189 Kassander of Aigina inveighs against the offer of EumenSs, 509 Keians, their dealings with ^tolian Assembly, 263 note, 652 • Kenchreia, 294 KeSs, 267, 268 KephallSnia, its relations with ^tolia, 270 with Great Britain, ib. attacked by Philip, 427 taken by Rome, 496 Kephalos of Epeiros, his policy to- wards Rome, 619 joins Macedonia, 520 his death, ib. Kerkidas, his embassy to Macedonia, 363 seqq. Keryneia, in the original Achaian League, 190 joins in the revival, 192, 196 Kibyra, 165 note KimSn, his military powers pre- eminent, 234 Kinnamos, on Western and Eastern Emperors, 603 note Kingship elective, tends to weaken royal authority, 628 Kinross and Clackmannan, sent mem- bers alternately to Parliament, 107 note Kios, JEtolian dealings with, 267, 325 Kirrha, plain of. Spartan Crusade about, 99 note Klarion, 396 KleigenSs of Akanthos, 150 Kleinias of Siky&n, 280 Kleisthenfis of Sikyon, 279 KleitSr joins Achaian League, 314 cleaves to it, 372 note withstands Dorimachos, 403 KleomenSs, King of Sparta, his revolu- tion, 337, 353 position as regards Achaia, 340 fortifies AthSnaion, 344 invades Argolis, 345 his victory at Mount Lykaion, 347 his alleged murder of Archidamos, , 350 note INDEX 677 Kleomenes, King of Sparta, attacks Megalopolis, 350 his victory at Ladokeia, ib. his treatment of the body of Lydi- adas, 352 his successes in Arkadia, 354 his victory at Hekatombaion, ift. his popularity in Greece, 355 his policy and schemes, 356-358, 371 his uegociatiODS with Achaiau League, 361, 367 his illness, 367 breaks off negociations, 369 vrins Arkadian and Argolic cities, 372 joined by Argos and Corinth, 373 his offers to Aratos, 378 the champion of Greece, 382 his war with Antigonos, 384 seqq. takes Megalopolis, 386 his defeat and exile, 387, 404 effect of his death, 411, 413 Kleomenes, guardian of King Agesi- polis, 413, 451 Kledu, his position in the Athenian Assembly, 225, 235 Kle8n of Sikydn slain, 280 KleSnai joins Achaian League, 312 claims presidency of Nemean Games, 313 secedes to Sparta, 372 battle of, 482 Kleonikos of Naupaktos, 269 note exempted from slavery, 45 note, 434 note at Congress of Naupaktos, 434 his embassy to Sparta, 451 Kleonymos, Tyrant of Phlious, 333 Klytos, Akarnanian General, 494 Kompasiou, 501 Korkyra, among the worst of Greek commonwealths, 47 besieged by lUyrians, 324 surrenders, 326 alliance of, with Rome, ib. KorOneia, meeting of Boeotian Am- phiktyony near, 124 destroyed, 136 restored, 140 religious centre of Boeotia, 190 rwte supports Perseus, 522 Krateros, Tj-rant of Corinth, 276 Kratesikleia, 349 note Kratlsipolis of Siky6n, 279 Kritolaos elected Achaian General, 543 his action at the Conference of Tegea, 544 his unconstitutional proceedings, ib. his violence in the Assembly at Corinth, 545 besieges Herakleia, 547 his defeat and death, ib. Kykliadas, Achaian General, joins Philip against iBtolia, 458 supports Philip, 477, 478 banished, 479 Kynaitha, Polemarchs of, 199, 403 Federal garrison at, 242 joins Achaian League, 314 return of the exiles, 403 sacked by the jEtolians, 44 note, 403 Kynoskephalai, battle of, 476 Ladokeia, battle of, 306 note, 350 Lsevinus, M. Valerius, repulses Philip, 447 at the ^tolian Federal Congress, 448 Lagthiug, Norwegian, 247 Laity and Clergy, no such distinction in ancient times, 102 LakSuia, towns of, their relations to Sparta, 22 note mentioned in Herodotos, 139 note ^tolian inroad into, 306 note ravaged by PhilopoimSn, 465 towns of, granted to Achaia by Plamininus, 485 Lamia, victory of Philip near, 455 ' Lamian War, 257 Lamponins of Lucauia, 591 Larisos, battle of, 468 Las, Spartan attack on, 500 Latin Colonies do not represent Latin League, 513 note Latins, the, their relation to Home, 573 Latium, League of, 5, 95 note, 568- 572 Lechaion, 294 Legnano, battle of, 610 Lentuli, Publius and Servius, their mission to Peloponnesos, 523 Leontion, 190, 192 Leontios of Macedon, his crimes, 384 note plots against Philip, 427 INDEX Lerua, 362 note Leukas, Akarnanian Assembly held at, 115, 483 besieged by Lucius, 484 separated from iEtolia, 519, 638 Leukopetra, battle of, 549 Leuktra, battle of, 137 Lewis, Duke of Orleans, his murder, 299 note Lioinius, P., his campaign against Perseus, 515, 517 Limoges, massacre at, 46 note Lincoln, Abraham, 246 note Liudprand, his Antapodosis, 593 Livy, his version of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 443 Loohagos of iEtolia, 517 Lodi, 604 Lokrians, the Amphiktyonio votes assigned to by Augustus, 106 Lombard Cities, predominance of, 594, 607 at war with Frederick Bai-barossa, 598 seqq. League formed by, 602 their internal independence recog- nized by Frederick Barbarossa, 613. See also Lombard League Lombard League, beginning of, 602 growth of, 604 its indirect importance in Federal History, 605 analogy of with America and Nether- lands, ib. obligations towards the Empire recognized by, 605 note, 610 its congress, 606 not a true Federation, ib. renewed against Frederick II., 607 a mere Confederacy, 608 sovereignty of Manuel not admitted by, 608 note negociates with Frederick, 609, 610 victory of, at Leguano, 610 truce made with Frederick, 611 recognition of by Peace of Con- stanz, 613 revived under Frederick II,, 614 first League primarily political, ii. second primarily ecclesiastical, 615 Lombardy, the battle-ground of France and Austria, 63 Lords, House of, its analogy to the Achaian Assembly, 232 Lot, appointment by, 129 note Lothar II., Emperor, 595 Louisiana, its purchase by the United States, 498 note Luoanians, their feelings towards Rome, 580 hold out against her, 588, 590 Luzern, influence of on Swiss' League, 272 Lydiadas of Megalopolis, his character, 315 gives up his Tyranny, 317 chosen General of Achaian League, ■0). his rivalry with Aratos, 318, 331, 345 his enmity to Sparta, 319 sends help to Korkyra, 325 his action with regard to the union of Argos, 332 declaims against Aratos, 346 stands against him for Generalship, 347 his death at Ladokeia, 351 treatment of his body by Kleomenes, 352 Lydiadas of Megalopolis, grandson of above, his embassy to Rome, 513 Lykaion Mount, battle of, 347 Lykian League, 6, 162-169 list of the cities, 163, 637 merits of the Constitution, 164-166 origin and history, 167, 168 destroyed by Claudius, 169 method of voting, 165, 212, 213 Lykians, their relation to the Greeks, 167 of Homer, 169 note last teachers of old Greek philosophy , ib. Lykiaroh, President of Lykian League, 166 Lykiskos of Akamauia, 451 Lykiskos, JStolian General, 517 instigates the massacre of Bsebius, 518 his death, ib. Lykomedes of Mautineia, 155 seqq. LykomgdSs of Tegea, 156 note Lykortas of Megalopolis supports Philopoimgn's policy, 488, 490 his answer to Appius Claudius, 600 his embassy to Eome, 501 sent against MessSne, 505 his treatment of the rebels, 506 INDEX 679 Lykortas of Megalopolis withstands the demand of Csecilius, 510 his embassies to Rome, 510, 513 exhorts to strict neutrality, 525 supports Egyptian appeal for help, 528, 529 Lykos of Phavai, his ofBce, 219 Tiote defeats ^toliaus, 219 and ravages Elis, 429 Lykourgos chosen King of Sparta, 413 invades Argolis, 414 seizes Athenaion, 415 his banishment and return, 451 Lysippos, Achaian General, 477 Lyons, a free city of the Empire, 24 note Mablt on the Achaian League, 229 Macedonia, early form of constitu- tional monarchy in, 16 represented in the Amphiktyonio Council, 106 her supremacy over Thessaly, 119 her dealings with Olynthos, 150 seqq^. alliance of Megalopolis with, 161 Gaulish invasion of, 178 under the Antigonids, 178, 180, 189 aims of, opposed to those of Achaia, 179 her power in Greece compared with Austria in Italy, 181 seqq., 196 Federal reaction against, 185 result of Achaian annexation of SikySn, 286 the DemStrian "War, 308 inaction of, 328 bought out of Attica by Aratos, 330 Megalopolitan Embassy to, 204, 366 seqq. Achaian Embassy to, 401 feelings of, towards Achaian League, 421 relation of the army to the kings, 428 becomes gradually dependent on Rome, 433, 439 union under, desirable for Greece, 437 allied with Carthage, 439 first war with Rome, 447 seqq. second war with Rome, 473 seqq. policy of Flamininus towards, 475 third war with Rome, 514 seqq. Greek feeling on behalf of, 515 seqq. Macedonia, divided into four Repub- lics, 516 note intercourse with, forbidden by Achaia, 522 fourth war with Rome, 539 becomes a Roman province, 540 Machanidas, king of Sparta, 451 attacks Achaia, 453 his defeat and death at Mantineia, 464, 465 Machatas wins Elis over to ^tolia, 411 his embassy to Sparta, 411-413 success of his second mission, 414 Malta, its relation to Great Britain, 270 Man, its relation to Great Britain, 271 Mantineia, destroyed by Sparta, 154 its restoration, 155 hostile to Tegea, 155, 161 ally of Sparta, 161 Federal garrison at, 242 joins the jEtolian League, 268 suit at, between Argos and the Achaian League, 302 revolutions of, 315 joins Sparta, 342 taken by Aratos, 347 readmitted to League, 348 as to the /iirmKoi at, 348 note and the embassy to Achaian Assem- bly, 349 note revolts to Kleomenes, 354 taken by Aratos, 385 his treatment and renaming of, ib. battles of, 464 Manuel Komnenos, Eastern Emperor, his action towards the Lombard Cities, 602 aspires to reunite the Empires, 603 his sovereignty not admitted by Lombard League, 608 note defends Aucona, 609 ' Marcellus, Roman envoy, 517, 523 Achaian negociations with, 627 his letter to the League on the Egyptian question, 529 Marcius, Q. , dissolves the Boeotian League, 144, 521 Marius, C, supports the cause of the allies, 582, 590 his war with Sulla, 590 680 INDEX Markos of Keryneia, chosen General of Achaian League, 193, 223, 277 his death, 325 Marks, instances of the growth of, 571 Marseilles, a free city of the Empire, 24 note Medeon, ^tolian attack on, 268 note [ besieged by ^tolia, 322 . relieved by lUyria, 323 decree of the Assembly, ib. betrayed to Antiochos, 494 Mediatization, use of the phrase, 632 note Megaleas of Macedonia, plots against Philip, 427 Megalopolis, city of, no separate in- ternational existence, 7, 78 helps to restore Thebes, 142 foundation of, 152 note, 156, 159 BepcrtKtov at, 159 note advantageous position of, 160 later history of, 161 indemnity paid to, by Achaia and Elis, 189 subject districts of, 200 joins Achaian League, 315, 317 her disputes with Sparta, 339, 344, 534 attacked by Kleomenes, 350 death of Lydiadas at, 351 commissioners from, to Federal Assembly, ,363 her embassy to Autigonos, 204, 364 envoys' report to Assembly, 365 cleaves to the League, 372, 376 taken by KleomenSs, 386 military assembly at, 398 special decree as to its troops, 429 mission of Aratos to, 199 note, 429 Alipheira ceded to, 460 supports Philip, 480 discontent in, towards Philopoim6n, 488 his dismemberment of the town- ships, 489 her pre-eminence in the League, 486, 489 note designed as a Mark against Sparta, 160, 571 note Megara, Athenian enmity towards, 43 joins Achaian League, 294 joins Boeotian League, 374 Megara, later secessions of, 374 note rejoins Achaian League, 477 surrenders to Metellus, 548 Megistonous, 350 note MSlos, massacre of, 46 Memn6n of PellSne, 479 Menalkidas, Achaian General bribed, 537 impeached by Kallikrates, ib. plunders lasos, 540 commits suicide, ib. Mercenaries, employment of, 235, 242 MessenS, helps to restore Thebes, 142 foundation of, 140, 152 note plundered by Dorimachos, 395 her relations with -Stolia, 399 asks for union with Grand Alliance, 390 note, 398, 401 note action as regards Social War, 409, 414 disturbances in, caused by Philip, 444, 446 joins Rome and ^tolia, 450 delivered by Philopoinien, 477 united to Achaian League, 496 secedes from the League, 605 execution of Philopoimen at, ib. readmitted to the League, 506 her exiles restored, 514 refuses to wage war with Rome, 648 Metellus, Q. Caecilius, mediates be- tween Achaia and Sparta, 540 again attempts to preserve peace, 545 his efforts on behalf of Achaian League, 546 his sentence on the Thebans, 547 his negociations with SSsikrat6s, 548 Metellus Pius, his war with Samnium, 589, 690 Methydrion, taken by Kleomenes, 345 iUtoikoi, as to, at Mantineia, 348 note MikiSn, persuades Athenians not to help Aratos, 379 Mikkos of Dyme, 416 Milan, destruction of, 43, 600 seat of Imperial government, 593 joins Lombard League, 604 crowning-place of kings of Italy, 611, 667 Ministry, English, its position, 33 INDEX 681 MithridatSs, gives citizenship to fii- ToiKoi in Asia, 348 note supports Italians against Rome, 587 MitylSne, nature of its alliance with Athens, 19, 27 note massacre of, 46 Kuasilochos, 494 Molossis, constitutional monarchy in, 117 conquered by the Romans, 520 Mommsen, on the philhellenism of Plamininus, 474 note, 499 note Monarchies, secessions in the case of, 72 Monarchy, Federal, scheme of, 75 approaches to, 74, 75 Mouza, crowning - place of Italian kings, 596 ?wte, 618 note, 599, 657 Morena, Otto, 596 Mounychion restored to Athens, 330 Miihlhausen, 273 note Mummius, L,, sent against Achaian League, 546 his Tictory at Leukopetra, 549 sacks Corinth, 550 fine imposed on League by, ib. Mure, Colonel, on the Amphiktyons, 97 note MykalSssos, massacre at, 44 twte Mys&n of Sikyon, 279 Nabis, Tyrant of Sparta, 465 defeated by Philopoimen, 477 Argos ceded to, 481 his socialist measures, 481 note allowed to retain Sparta, 485 his conference with Titus and Aristainos, 485 note besieges Gythion, 490 murdered, 491 Nairn and Cromarty, sent members alternately to Parliament, 107 National and Federal dispute as to the terms, 10 note National Assemblies, retention of, in Germany and England, 625, 626 Naupaktos, held by Achaia, 186 acquired by ^tolia, 255, 268, 269 note relations of, with the League, 260 congress of, 434 peace of, 438 J5tolian Assembly at, 476 Nemean Games, rival claims to cele- bration of, 313 restored to Argos, 433 note N6sos, taken by Rome, 449 Netherlands, United Provinces of. See United Provinces New York, state of, no separate inter- national existence, 7 its position compared with that of Megalopolis, 78 not the seat of government of United States, 121 Niebuhr, sets forth the importance of Greek Federalism, 171 Nikaia, widow of Alexander of Corinth, 277, 294 Nikander of .ffltolia, 617 Nikias, peace of, compared with that of Agelaos, 439 Nilcodemos of Elis, his embassy to Rome, 505 Nikokles, Tyrant of SikySn, his dread of Aratos, 281, 282 escapes from SikySn, 283 NikomSdeia, seat of Imperial govern- ment, 593 Nikophanes, his embassy to Mace- donia, 353 seqq. Nikopolis, 106 Nikostratos, Achaian general, his vic- tory at Kleonai, 482 Nizza, cession of, compared to that of Akrokorinthos, 380 Normans in Apulia and Sicily, 594 Norway, its position compared with greater states, 40 its union with Sweden, 76 Numidians, support Rome against the Italians, 586 OoTAVius, Cn,, sent as Commissioner to Mtdlm, 517, 518 to Alcarnania, 518 Offices, unpaid, effect of, 230 Oiniadai, hostile to Athens, 115 joined to iEtolian League, 256 taken by Rome, 449 restored to Akamania, 495 Olenos, 190 Oligarchy, definition of, 231 note Oligarchy and democracy, 133, 134 Olpai, seat of the Akarnanian Council, 115 Olympian Games, rival claims to cele- bration of, 313 682 INDEX Olynthos attempts to form a League, 149-151 its dissolution fatal to Greece, ib. views of Mr. Groti on, 150 her relations with Macedonia and Thrace, 161 note real nature of her " League," 152 OnchSstos, 124 note Orchomenos (Bceotian), secedes from Bffiotian League, 131 destruction of, 136 restoration of, 140 Orchomenos (Arkadian), compelled to join Arkadian League, 157 joins ^tolia, 314 joins Sparta, 342 attempt of Aratos on, 343, 353 kept by Antigonos, 386 pretended cession of, by Philip, 478 Eoman demand concerning, 541 Orestes, L., his embassy to Achaian League, 541 protests against a breach of Inter- national Law, 542 Orikon taken by Philip, 447 Or&pos, disputes of, with Athens, 536 appeals to Achaian Assembly, 537 help decreed to, ib. Orthagoras of.SikySn, 279 Otto the Great, Emperor, union of Italy and Germany under, 594 Otto of Freising, 596 Otto Morena, ib, Oxford University, meeting of con- gregation and convocation, 240 note, 241 note Padua joins Lombard League, 602 Pagai, 490 note Palermo, seat of Imperial government, 593 Pallantion, 346, 489 Panormos, congress at, 434 Pantale6n of jEtolia, 308 Papirius, On. , his embassy to Achaian League, 545 Paris, kings of, extent of their power, 74 the Mark of Gaul, 571 Parliament, British, members of, com- pared with the Athenian citizen, 32, 33, 34 its analogy to Amphiktyonic Council, 104 Paseas of SikySn, 281 Passaron, 117 Patrai, an ally of Athens, 187 expulsion of Macedonian garrison, 189 in the early Achaian League, 190 joins Dyml in reviving the League, 191 helps jEtolia against Gauls, 192, 197 restored by Augustus, 192 note alleged party of Antiochos in, 496 note Patricians, their strife with the Plebeians, 574 Patriotism, confined to the city in ancient Greece and Italy, 15 its intensity in small states, 38 Paulus, L. ^milius, his character, 516 ^tolian appeal to, 518 sent to devastate Epeiros, 520 his friendship towards Polybios, 533 Pausanias on the Amphiktyonic Council, 105 mentions the PhSkian League, 113 Pausanias of Epeiros, 482 Pavia, seat of Imperial government, 593 Peace, internal, secured by large states, 61 Peiraieus, attempt of Aratos on, 309 retired to Athens, 330 Pelopidas, career of, 134 Peloponnesian War, neutrality of Achaia, 187 PeloponnSsos, 202, 552 extension of the League in, 498 Pelops, king of Sparta, 451 Pelleng, an ally of Sparta, 187, 197 of Thebes, 187 note tyranny of Chairon at, 188 in original Achaian League, 190 recovered by League, 192 supposed capture of by Agis, 305 note taken by iStolia, 307 recovered by Aratos, ib. occupied by Kleomenes, 372 Pentri, the, 666 Peraia, Rhodian, 482 Periklgs, his position compared with that of Aratos, 225 his civil powers pre-eminent, 234 Perikl§s, the younger, his dialogue with SSkratSs, 130 note INDEX 683 Perseus, King of Macedonia, effect of his war with Rome on Federal Greece, 514 seqii. his character, 515 ^tolians said to have appealed to, 517 enters ^tolia, Hb. Boeotian alliance with, 521 his letter to the Achaiau League, 622 Petit, John, his defence of Tyrannicide, 299 note Phaineas, ^tolian General, 494 Phanote, siege of, 520 Pharai, member of the Aohaian League, 190 ravaged by jEtolia, 416 Sonderbimd formed by, 417 an independent member of the League, 507 Pheneos, joins Achaian League, 314 secedes to Sparta, 377 Phigaleia, its jelations with -lEtolia, 270 joins jEtolia, 314 hu;a by ^tolia, 395 surrenders to Philip, 419 Philinos of Corinth, tortured by Diaios, 541 note Philip of Maoedon, enforces Amphi- ktyonic decrees inPhSkis, 100, 105 his embassy to the new Boeotian League, 134 Tiote founder of the modem Greek nation, 175 his policy towards Greece, 179 Philip, son of Dtraetrios of Maoedon, 329 succeeds Antigonos, 394 his treatment of the Phthi8tic Thebes, 269 note, and above summons a congress at Corinth, 404, 406 deals with Spartan affairs at Tegea, 404-406 his letter to the ^tolians, 407 spealts at the Achaian Assembly, 408 his military skill, 414, 416 and paramount importance, 415 restores Teichos to DymS, 418, 424 his PeloponnSsian campaign, 419 annexes Ps8phis to Achaian League, ib. his relations with the League, 420 Philip, sou of D6m§trio8 of Macedonia, his relations with Aratos, ih. redress obtained from, by Aratos, 422 influence of ApellSs on, ib. interferes in Achaian election, 423 Apellfis accuses Aratos to, 42S his action in the matter, 426 Apelles plots against, 427 attacks Kephallenia, and destroys Thermon, ib. his success in Northern Greece, 430 embassy from Chios and Rhodes to, 430, 431 his designs on Italy, 432 hears of Hannibal's successes, 433 advice of Demetrios to, ib. gathers a Congress at Pauormos, 434 his negooiations with iEtolia, 435 regards himself as a Greek, 437 concludes peace, 438 his alliance with Hannibal, 439 seqq. his impolitic conduct, 440 position discussed by, in the Treaty, 442 disturbance at MessSne caused by, 444 his second attempt on Mess§n&, 445 charges brought against, 446 regarded as older than he was, 446 note attacks Illyria, 447 besieges Echinos, 453 his victory near Lamia, 455 embassies of mediation to, ii>. honours paid to, at Argos, 456 at the Aigion Conference, ib. breaks off negooiations, 457 repulses the Romans, 458 defeats the ^tolians, ib. his attempt on HSrakleia, 469 his cessions to Achaian League, 460 makes peace with iEtolia, 466 at the Conference of Phoinike, ib. his aggressive proceedings, 472 his dealings with Achaian League, ib. devastates Attica, 473 his war with Rome, 473-475 attempts to gain over Achaia, 478 Philip, General of Epeiros, at the Conference of Phoinike, 466 Philippopolis, name of Phthi&tic Thebes changed to, 430 684 INDEX PhiloklSs of Macedonia, 481 Philomelos of Phokis, 114 PhilSn of Thessaly, envoy of Metellus, 548 PhilophrSn of Rhodes, 167 Philopoim^n, 212 and Assemblies, 216 his military reforms, 243, 454, 462 first mention of, 386 his share in the victory of Sellasia, 387 his character and policy, 392, 393 refuses the offers of Antigonos, 393 withdraws to Crete, ib. compared with Aratos, 447 chosen general of Achaian cavalry, 453 his exploits against the JEtolians, 458, 459 chosen General of the League, 461 his victory at Mantineia, 464 slays Machanidas, 465 ravages Lak6nia, ib. Philip's alleged attempt to poison, 472 exhibits his phalanx at Nemea, 477 note drives back Nabis, 477 delivers Messene, ib. retires to Crete, ib. his policy towards Rome, 487 feelings against at Megalopolis, 488 his policy of equality among the townships, 489 his war with Nabis, 490 unites Sparta to the League, 492 as to his Generalship, 501 note withstands the demand of Csecilius, 510 his embassy to Rome, ib. refuses Titus' demand for an Assembly, 511 Philostratos of Epeiros, 519 Phlious joins Achaian League, 333 secedes to Sparta, 373 Phoibidas, his seizure of the Kadmeia, 100, 183 Phoinikg, lUyrian capture of, 324 restored to jEtolia, ib. Conference at, 466 Ph6kian League, described by Pausanias, 113 Ph6kian League, probably revival of an older League, ib. PhSkians, 431 note PhSkiSn, his position in the Athenian Assembly, 225 Ph6kis, Amphiktyonic decrees enforced by Philip, 100, 105 votes restored to, by Augustus, 106 damages paid to, by Thebes, 547 PhStos Tzabellas, 117 note Pindar, his use of pcunXeis, 27 note Pisa claims presidency of Olympian Games, 313 Placentia, negociations of peace at, 612 Plataia secedes from the Boeotian League, 129 subsequent fate of, 131 her restoration, 133 destroyed by 'Thebes, 136 restored by Macedonia, 140 Plebeians, their strife with the Patri- ciaus, 514 Pleuron annexed by Achaia, 496 secedes from Achaian League, 535 Plutarch, his account of the Theban Archon, 129 Poland, election of kings of, 53, 54, 55 note nature of the nobUity, 54 institution of hereditary monarchy, 55 Polybios, his mention of the Amphi- ktyonic Council, 110 and note his account of Bceotia, 142 neglect of, in English Universities, 171 character of the age of, 175 compared with Thucydidgs, 176 as to date of his birth, ib. his Macedonian bias, 179 his sketch of the Achaian Constitu- tion, 198 on unity of PeloponnSsos, 202 his account of an Achaian Cabinet Council, 221 of a Caucus, 222 of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 441 at the funeral of Philopoimen, 512 his speech as to the restoration of EumenSs' honours, 526 chosen Master of the Achaian Horse, ib. his embassy to Marcius, 527 INDEX 685 Polybios opposes Appius Claudius, 528 supports Egyptian appeal for help, 628, 529 sent for trial to Rome, 533 effect of sojourn at Rome on, ib. his return, 536 legislates for Achaian cities under Rome, 651 Polydamas of Pharsalos, 151 Polykrateia carried off by Philip, 446 PolyphrSn of Pherai, 119 PolysperchSn, his policy towards Greece, 180 Pontius of Samnium, his march against Rome, 591 Popillius, C, sent as Commissioner to ^tolia, 517, 618 to Akarnania, 518 Postumius, his excuse as to writing in Greek, 110 note his embassies to the two Leagues, 326 Praetor, Latin origin of the office, 570 note Presidency, easily developed into Empire, 135 President, agreement against a single President, 223 note President of the United States, method of his election, 56 his relations to Congress, 218, 227 note compared with Achaian General, 227, 244 seqq. evil of the interregnum after his legal election, 236 question as to his re-election, ib, longer term of office in the Southern Confederation, 237 note Congress, 244 his kingly powers, ib. Prime Minister compared with Achaian General, 224, 227 his position compared with that of American President, 245 note Principalities, small, on the incorpora- tion of, 178 note Prisoners of war sold as slaves, 45 Privy Council, attendance at, 241 note Proklos, a Megarian Amphiktyon, 107 note Proklos, Cains Curtius, 374 note Property, intercommunion of, in the Achaian League, 201 note Property qualification, 209 non-existent in Achaian League, 230 Provence, 25 note Prussia, formation of, 632 Prytanis of Megalopolis, 199 note Psdphis, its incorporation with Elis, 416 note annexed to Achaian League, 419 Ptolemies, PhilomgtSr and Euergetes, appeal to Achaian League for help, 528 embassy sent to, 529 Ptolemy, garrisons SikySn, 279 Ptolemy Epiphanes, King of Egypt, his war with Philip, 472 Ptolemy PhilopatSr, fails to keep Aratos, 282 his gifts of money, 284, 302 suspicions with regard to, 288 gives Aratos a pension, 289 note, 302 his alliance with Achaian League, 302 supports KleomenSs, 378 note mediates, 430-442 Pylagoroi, the, 102, 104 note, 108 Pylos, its cession demanded by ^Stolia, 457 Pyrrhos of Epeiros, 178 his wars with Antigonos Gonatas, 276 Pytheas, Theban Bceotarch, 546 note QniNCTins, L. (brother of Titus Flami- ninus) besieges Corinth, 480 wins over some Akarnanians, 483 Quinctius, T. See Flamininus Radbvio, continuer of Otto of Freising, 596 n^te Ralph of Milan, 596 note, 597 note Ravenna, seat of Imperial government, 593 Representative Government, approach to, in the Amphiktyonic Council, 108 Representative system, necessary in large free states, 62 exceptions to, in Europe and America, 53 Republics, usually confined to small states, 13 686 INDEX Republics not necessarily Federations, 73 small, on the incorporation of, 178 note Requisitions, inadequacy of the system, 10 system of, in the Achaian League, 11 common under despotisms, 11 note system of, in Achaian League, 241 seqc[. Reunion, use of the phrase, 624 note Rhodes, subjection of Lykia and Karia to, 167 deprived of this power, 168 mediates, 430-442 offers mediation to Philip, 455 its war with Philip, 472 concludes alliance with Achaian League, 480 asks help against Crete from Achaia, 535 Rhion, proposed conference at, 407, 430 Rome, effects of incorporation at, 23 power of the Assembly compared with that of Athens, 37 bribery at, 65 voting of the Tribes, 164 embassy of, to Corinth, 203 embassies to, of Achaian cities, 204 ambassadors from, at Aigioii, 214 note change of Consuls, 236 as to re-election of Consuls, 238 ^tolian hostages to, 265 note ^tolian agreement with, 266 Akarnania applies for help against ^tolia, 321 mandate of, to ^tolia, 322 declares war against lUyria, 326 Greek alliances made by, ib. dismembers lUyria, ib. sends embassies to Greece, 327 honours granted to by Corinth, ib. result of her interference in Greece, 328 history interwoven with that of Greece, 433 beginning of her influence in Greece, 439 effect of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 444 her policy of alliance, 447 her connexion with jEtolia, 448 he ■ alliance with ^tolia, 449 Rome, her conquests in Greece, 449, 453, 456 repulsed by Philip, 455, 458 cessions at Peace of Epeiros (Phoinike), 466 her treatment of the iEtolians, 467 declares war against Philip, 473 philhellenic feeling at, 473, 474 union of Greek States under, 475 seqq. campaign of, against Antiochos, 494 treatment of ^tolia, 494-496 her Treaty with ^tolia, 495 retains Kephallenia, 496 her intrigues against the Achaian League, 499, 564 Achaian and Spartan embassies to, 501 her encroachments resisted by the Achaian League, 509-511 requires the restitution of the Lacedsemonian exiles, 513, 514 war of, with Perseus, 514 seqq. action of, towards iEtolia, 518 towards Akarnania, 519 conquers and devastates Epeiros, 520 intrigues of, in Boeotia, 521 dealings of, with Achaian cities, 523 her further inroads on Federal rights, 525 her policy towards Achaia, 530 demands the condemnation of the chief Achaians, 531 her treatment of the exiles, 532, 533 her dealings with foreign nations, 534 her intrigues against Eiimenes and the League, 535 her 4th Macedonian War, 531 seqq. sends an embassy to Corinth, 541 demands dismemberment of the League i6. treatment of, by Kritolaos, 543 her war with Achaian League, 546- 550 reduces Achaia to a dependency, 550 treatment of the country, 550-552, gwJsi-Pederal elements of, 558, 572 575 intrigues, ante, 553 treaty of, with Carthage, 508 B.C., 569 INDEX 687 Rome, her relations of the Latin League, 570 probable origin of, 571 Latin proposals for union with, ib. dissolves the League, 572 her gradual incorporation of other states, 572, 592 Importance of the Social War, 576 character of her dominion, 578 as to the claim of citizenship with, 579 seqq, analogy of this claim with that of American Colonies, 584 the great obstacle to a permanent Italian Federation, 586 yields to the demands of the allies, 587 wars of, with Samnium, 588, 590- 592 provincial policy, 592 forsaken by the Emperors, 593 Eoman "Faith," 494 Bomuald of Salerno, 596 note Rotation, appointment by, 129 note Roufos of Patrai, 553 Rutledge, Governor, absolute power granted to, 377 note Sainte Croix on the Amphiktyonic League, 97 Salamis in Cyprus, kingdom of, 27 note restored to Athens, 330 Salynthios, King of the Agraians, 255 Samnites, their feelings towards Rome, 580 hold out against her, 588 , 590 their defeat by Sulla, 591 devastation of their country, 592 Samnium, League of, its position under Rome, 561 League of, 565-568 Savoy, cession of, compared to that of Akrokoriuthos, 380-382 a fief of the Empire, 620 note Saxony, Kingdom of, not identical with ancient Saxony, 631 Soipio supports the cause of the allies,' 582 Scotch Universities, voting of the Nations in, 164 Scotland, her relations with England slightly Federal, 59 note 5«(m- Federalism not to be desired for, 70 its union with England, 76 Seal, badge of office in Achaia, 234 badge of office in Outer Appenzell, 234 note Self-6ov(ernment, local, in Federal states, 82 Sellasia, battle of, 387 Sempronius, Publius, lands at Epi- damnos, 466 makes peace with Philip, ib. Senate of Achaian League. See Achaian League Senators in the United States, 19 note Sforza, Lewis, betrayed by his Swiss Guards, 273 Sicard of Cremona, 596 note Sicily, Tyrannies in, 18 Normans in, 594 Sigonius, de regno Italice, 596 note Siky6n joins Achaian League, 278, 285-287 sketch of its history, 279 seqq. admitted on equal terms, 286 traitors at, killed by Aratos, 373 cleaves to the League, 376 Federal Assembly at, 377 alliance with Rome, decreed at, 479 debate at, on the Egyptian question, 529 nominated to arbitrate between Athens and OrSpos, 536 Skarpheia, battle of, 547 Skerdilaidos of lUyria, 402, 435 note Ski6n6, massacre of, 46 Skopas, 263 of^iBtolia, 315 his ravages in PeloponnSsos, 402 destroys Dion, 419 elected general, 408 LaBvinus negociates with, 448 legislation of, 476 at Alexandria, ib. Slavery, a necessary condition of pure Democracy, 30 note Slaves, prisoners sold as, 45 Social War, causes of, 394 decreed at Corinth, 407 beginning of 414 between R)me and Italians, 576, 583-587 SSkrates, his dialogue with Perikles the younger, 131 note Soldiers, citizen and professional, compared, 44-46 SolSn, sacred war under, 99 INDEX SosigenSs of Rhodes, 509 note S6sikrat§s, his negooiations with Metellus, 548 tortured to death by Diaios, 549 S&sitheos of Magnesia, envoy of Philip, 442 note S6s8, shelters Aratos, 280 Sounion, restored to Athens, 330 Spain, absorption of the various king- doms in, 76 Confederations in, 659 Sparta, position of the LakSnian towns under, 22 note her relations to her PeloponnSsian allies, 27 note position of slaves in, 30 note her rivalry with Athens, 43 disregards the Amphiktyonic fine, 100 as such, not a member of the Amphiktyony, 103 her policy at the Peace of Antal- kidas, 132 her garrisons in the Boeotian cities, 133 Thebes puts herself on a level with, 139 humiliation of, by EpameinSndas, 140 averse to Federalism, 148, 149 dissolves the Olynthian League, 149 destroys Mantineia, 154 and Megalopolis, 204 repulses Pyrrhos, 277 its alliance with Achaian League, 305 her independence, 335 causes of war with Achaian League, 338 seqq. acquires iEtolian towns in Arkadia, 342 Achaians declare war against, 344 effect of loss of Mantineia on, 349 its supremacy sought for by Kleo- men§s, 357 treatment of, by Antigonos, 387 joined to the Confederacy, 389 political parties in, 404, 411 disturbances at, 405 Philip's judgment with regard to, 405, 406 vouchsafes no answer to Corinthian Congress 409 ^tolian embassy to, 411, 412 Sparta, state of the Government, 412 refuses jEtolian alliance, 413 revolution in, ib. joins ^tolia against Achaia, 414 jEtolian and Akarnanian embassies to, 451 joins iEtolia, 453 retained by Nabis, 485 ^tolian attempt on, 491 annexed to Achaian League, 492 Philopoimin settles differences at, 500 attacks Las, ib. secedes from the League, ib. treatment of by Philopoim§n, 502 continued disputes at, 503 formal reunion with League, 504 exiles from, restored, 514 her dispute with Megalopolis, 534 sends an embassy to Rome, 538 at war with the League, 538 seqq. Roman interference in the matter, 541 war declared against by Kritolaos, 546 LakSnian towns reunited to, 550 Spear, badge of office of Theban Archon, 129, 234 Special Correspondents, 463 Spence, Mr. , on the American Union, 111 note State Composite, the, 9 States, large and small, system of, 13 definition of, 14 small and large, definition of, 14, 49 seqq. large, definition of, 14, 50 intensity of patriotism in, 38 common fallacy as to small ones, 40 results of the system of, 50-53 influence of the capital in, 51 general view of the system, 57 local diversity In, 58 advantages of, 61-64 disadvantages of, 64-67 balance in favour of, 67 ' large, not necessarily monarchical, 73 large division of, 489 note States Confederated, system of, 8, 9 Storthing, Norwegian, 247 Strabo, his account of the Lykian League, 163 INDEX 689 Stratios of Tritaia, 525 sent for trial to Rome, 533 released, 536 accused of treason, 546 Stratos, seat of theAkarnanian League, 115 Stymphalos joins Achaian League, 312 Stymphalos, 377 note Successors, wars of, 180, 257 Achaia under, 189 Suffrage, Universal Napoleonic, 55 Sulla, L. Cornelius, his war witli Samnium, 588 with Mithridates, 589, 590 with Marius, 590, 591 overthrows the Samnites, 591 and devastates Samnium, 692 Sulpicius, Publius, his naval warfare in Greece, 453 repulsed by Philip, 458 Commander in Second Macedonian War, 473 his legislation, 589 supports the cause of the allies, 590 killed, ib. Swabia, 631 Sweden, its union with Norway, 76 Swiss Confederation, 4, 5, 6 action of, as regards external matters, 10 its action as regards Napoleonic aggressions, 41 note as to its seat of government, 121 sketch of its history, 271-274 compared with jEtolian League, 271 seqq. its diet not representative of the people, 630 Swiss Cantons, dependencies of, 23 Switzerland, its position compared with greater states, 40 both primary and representative Assemblies in, 77 note, 80 problem as to its government solved by Federalism, 92 League, its analogy with that of Samnium, 567 ' ' Switzerland, French " a misnomer, 273 note Synods, Christian, compared with the Amphiktyonic Council, 98, 99, 102 early representative forms in, 109 Tabbntinbs, use of the name, 351 note, 463 note Tarquinii, Consuls chosen from, 117 TauriSn, Macedonian commander, 396. 403 plots against Philip, 427 sent to negociate with Aratos, 434 his share ia the poisoning of Aratos, 446 Taxation, Federal system of in Achaia, 242 Taxes. See Requisitions Tegea, its relations with Mantineia, 155, 161 joins the Arkadian League, 156 ally of Thebes, 161 joins iEtolia, 314 joins Sparta, 342 attempt of Aratos on, 343 united to Achaian League, 386 Philip at, 404, 405 Congress of, 490 sham Conference at, 543 Teians, their dealings with jEtoIian Assembly, 263 note Teichos, occupied by jEtolia, 416 restored to Dyme, 418, 424 Tell, William, his slaughter of Gessler, 300 note Telphousa joins Achaian League, 314 Tenea joins Metellus, 549 TeSs, suggested by Thales as a seat of government, 145 note, 148 its connexion with .^tolia, 268, 270, 325, 652 Teuta, Queen of lUyria, invades Pelo- ponngsos, 324 treatment of, by Rome, 326 Thales, his advice to the lonians, 145, 148 TheaitStos of Rhodes, 167 Thearidas, his embassy to Rome, 542 " Theban, " use of, by ThucydidSs and XenophSn, 125 Thebes, her greatness, 16 her position in the Boeotian League, 22 note, 122, 129 her enmity towards Athens, 43 destruction of, ib. seizure of the Kadmeia, 100 efl'eots of her position on Greek history, 123 her superiority represented by two Boeotarchs, 126 note 2 Y 690 INDEX Thebes, Arclioii of, a mere pageant, 129 her treatment of Thespiai and Plataia, 130, 131 her claims at the Peace of Antal- kidas, 131 oligarchic government in, 133 becomes the centre of Democracy, 134, 135 results of her supremacy, 134 destruction of smaller towns by, 136 general Greek hatred of, 137 claims the headship of Bceotia, 137, 138 puts herself on a level with Sparta, 139 claims exclude true Federalism, 140 Macedonian garrison in, ib. destroyed by Alexander, 141 restored by Kassander, ih. her modified headship, 142 supports Macedonia against Rome, 143 Federal Assembly meets at, ib. her policy towards Achaian cities, 188 Thebes, Phthi6tic, treatment of by Philip, 269 note, 430 name changed to Philippopolis, 430 Theisoa, 489 note Theodotos of Epeiros, supports Mace- donia, 519 his death, 620 Thermon, public monuments at, 255 jEtolian Assembly at, 260 note, 617 destroyed by Philip, 427 Thermopylae, Roman victory at, 494 Thespiai destroyed by Thebes, 130, 136 restored, 140 ThesprStis, constitution of, 116 note early republican development in, ib. Thessaly, contributory boroughs to, in the Amphiktyonic Council, 106 no real Federalism in, 118 Tagos of, 118, 119 a dependency of Macedonia, 119, 181, 421, 442 note legislation of Flamininus, 120 ^tolian conquest in, 341 new Federations in, 484 Thirlwall, his History of Greece, 171 Thirty Years' War, character of, 64 Thoas of vBtolia, 517 Thouria admitted to Achaian League, 507 Thourion, meetings of Akamanian League at, 115 besieged by Antiochos, 494 Roman Commission at, 518 Thrace, her relations with Olynthos, 160 note Thucydides, his use of "Bceotian"' and "Thebau," 125 compared with Polybios, 176 Thyrrheiom, her coinage, 638 Ticino, Swiss annexation of, 273 Timocracy, definition of, 64 note Timokleidas of SikySn, 280 Timokrates of Pelleng, 485 note an Argeian Amphiktyon, 107 note Timole8n, as to his slaying his brother, 298 Timophanfe, Tyrant of Corinth, 194 note Timoxenos, General of Achaian League, 236, 362 re-elected General, 377 note, 396 his unwillingness to proceed against the ^tolians, 397 Aratos makes him resign ofSce, 398 his unsuccessful candidature, 423, 424 Tisippos of iEtolia, 518 Tittmann on the Amphiktyonic League, 97 Titus Flamininus. See Flamininus Tocqueville, de, on the Greek republics, 32 note on the Amphiktyonic Council, 110 note Tortona, attitude to the Emperor, 595 joins Frederick Barbarossa, 611 Town-autonomy. See City-common- wealths Tribunes, power of, 244 note Triphylia, conquered by Philip, 419 pretended cession of, by Philip, 460, 478 joined to Achaia, 485 Tritaia, in the original Achaian League, 190- joins in the revival, 191 ravaged by jEtolia, 416 Sonderbund formed by, 417 Tritymallos of MessSn^ 378 note INDEX 691 Trolzen, joins Achaian League, 295 secedes to Sparta, 372 Twelve, its existence as a political number, 562 Tyrannicide, Greek view as to, 27, 297, 298 French and English defence of, 299 Twte Tyrant, Tyranny, meaning of the word, 17 and note, 195 "to plant," use of the term, 181 note nature of, in Greece, 194, 297 earlier and later compared, 194 voluntary abdication by, 196 and Twte Umbrians, their relations towards Rome, 580 threaten secession from Rome, 587 United Provinces, their union, 4, 5 meetings of, at the Hague, 121 compared with Lombard League, 602, 605, 607 United States, their union, 4, 5 their action as regards external matters, 9, 10 method of electing the President, 56 civil war in, no proof against Federalism, 71 nor against the Union, 72 a league of countries, 77 representative Assemblies in, ib. scale of the States compared with those in Europe, 78 results of the Union, 85 the Union compared with govern- ment in France, 86 evils hindered by the Union, i6. war between North and South, 91 seat of government at Washington, 121 tendency to assimilation in, 200 difference of franchise in, 201 diplomatic action compared with that of Achaia, 202 seqq. relation of Congress and the Presi- dent, 217, 218 election and deposition of the Presi- dent, 218 note general comparison of, with Achaian League, 243-251 as to the Senators' votes, 247 note democratic feeling in, 248 United States, not an imitation of Achaian Leagiie, 249 as to Presidential interregnum, 396 iMte its provision as to dividing large States, 489 moie first Congress (of thirteen States) not representative of the people, 630 Valerius, L., 494 Veientines, their resort to Kingship, 564 Venice, dependencies of, 23 lier relations to the Eastern Empire, 25 her degradation in later days, 40 Great Council of, 53 note new relations with the Lombard cities, 602 her policy towards the tvo Empires, 609 concludes peace with Frederick Barbarossa, 610 Verona, march of movement in, against Frederick Barbarossa, 602 Vicenza joins Lombard League, 602 Villius, P., 474 Virginia, appointment of a Dictator contemplated, 317 note analogy of, with Megalopolis, 486, 489 note Volscians, traces of a League among, 561 and note Voltumna, the religious centre of Etruria, 563 Votes, apportionment of, to members, 105, 164, 211, 212 Wak, constant state of, among City- commonwealths, 42 severity of the Laws of, 45 evils of, lessened in large States, 62 Washington, George, his attempt to raise a volunteer cavalry, 454 note Washington, seat of government of United States, 121, 216 Westphalia, 631 Peace of, 622 William, the Bad, 601 note William, the Good, 601 note Xanthos, embassies sent by, 168 destruction of, 169 692 INDEX Xenarchos, Achaian General, 522 Xenon of Hermiong gj ves up liis tyranny, 331 Xenon of Patrai, challenges the Eoman envoys, 531 Xenoph8n, his use of *' Boeotian'' and "Theban," 125 bare mention of Arkadian League in, 157 Xerxes, his dialogue with Demaratos, 139 note Zaktnthos taken by Philip, 434 Zakynthos, invaded by Eome, 449 ceded to Amynander, 466 dealings of Titus with, 497 Zama, battle of, 472 Zeuxidas, Akarnanian General, 484 Z6naras, his version of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 443 Zug, canton of, 165 note City of, compared with Thebes, 126 note Zurich, Canton of, no separate Inter- national existence, 7 THE END Printed by R. & R. Ci.ahk, EdinhurHi