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CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031444494 
 
From a Photograph ly Messrs. Russell & Sons, i 7, Baker Street, W. 
 
CH^lTIsrEIj TTJlTIsrEIj. 
 
 ET THE 
 
 RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. 
 
 IN THE 
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 On JUJVJE 27th, 1888 
 
 (j^s lasviSEX) BIT avns,. C3-X4.A.x)sa:oi;TE). 
 
 S0M&0M:; 
 
 PEINTED AND PUBLISHED BY 0. F. EOWOETH, 
 GREAT NEW STEEET, FETTER LANE. 
 
 1888 
 

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PREFACE 
 The Hon. FRANCIS LAV/LEY. 
 
 Five years ago I was honoured by an invitation to write 
 a Preface to the Speech delivered in 1883 by Mr. Bright 
 at Birmingham, in advocacy of the Channel Tunnel. 
 This task, which — however incompetent to treat so vast 
 and far-reaching a subject adequately — I have again 
 accepted con amove — the task, that is to say, of writing a 
 Preface to another Speech in favour of the Channel 
 Tunnel, which Mr. Gladstone delivered last June in 
 the House of Commons — seems to me far lighter than 
 that upon which I embarked in 1883 ; and for this 
 reason. The five years interposed between the speeches 
 of Mr. Bright and Mr. Gladstone have served at least 
 to show that the commercial advantages of uninterrupted 
 railway communication between England and the Con- 
 tinent are better understood at present in this countiy 
 than they were in 1883. 
 
 One brief quotation from '' Whitaker's Almanack " 
 for 1888 will suffice to illustrate my meaning. In 
 that universally popular manual I find the following 
 passage : — 
 
 "Imports and Exjwrts of Merchandise into and from the United 
 Kingdom, 1885-86. 
 "Perhaps no one cause in particular can be assigned for the con- 
 tinued depression of Britisli commerce, but tbe falling off is so 
 
 B 
 
( 6 ) 
 
 great that there must be some cause for it. The amount is now be- 
 coming very serious, and is affecting all classes of the community. 
 Compared with 1883 the difference is no less than £113,798,000 — 
 imports, £86,208,000; exports, £36,770,000— the loss being equal to 
 £4 a head all round. . . The chief cause no doubt is foreign competition, 
 direct by foreign merchants finding their way to our customers, and 
 indirect by foreigners manufacturing goods for themselves, not un- 
 frequently by means of British machinery, British coal, and even 
 British workmen. 
 
 "Putting exports and imports together, the total foreign trade of 
 the United Kingdom for the last two recorded years was : — 
 
 " Total Imports and Exports (1885) £642,371,649 
 
 " Total Imports and Exports (1886) £618,530,489 
 
 "A decrease in 1886 of £23,841,160." 
 
 Writing upon the same subject in July, 1886, 
 Mr. Owen Dalhousie Ross, CE. (one of our. ablest and 
 most painstaking statisticians), says : — 
 
 " Since the abolition of the Corn Laws in. 1846 the results contem- 
 poraneous with, and springing from, Free Trade require to be 
 divided into two epochs : (1) those which refer to the twenty-eight 
 years preceding 1872, and (2) those of the last fourteen years from 
 1872 to 1885. During the former period the' value of the exports of 
 British and Irish produce quadrupled in value, rising in 1872 to 
 £256,000,000, or to the proportion of £8 Is. per head of our popula- 
 tion, whereas during the latter period those exports have fallen back to 
 £213,000,000 sterHng in 1885, i. e., to only £5 17s. 3d. per head of the 
 population; a comparative decrease since the year 1872 in the value 
 of our exports in proportion to the population of no less than 
 27 per cent. The falling off is chiefly in all the most important 
 branches of our manufactures — cotton, woollen, and linen goods iron 
 and steel, haberdashery and millinery — and, but for the constantly- 
 gi-owing trade with India and the Colonies, the decrease would be 
 even more remarkable ; for the exports to foreign countries have fallen 
 since 1872 from £196,000,000, or £6 3s. 2d. per head of our popula- 
 tion, to £130,000,000, or £3 lis. 7d. per head in 1885, which shows a 
 decrease of more than 40 per cent." 
 
( 7 ) 
 
 That tlie alarming decrease in British exports to 
 foreign countries is directly attributable to the absence 
 of railway intercourse between England and her nearest 
 neighbour on the Continent, may be inferred from the 
 following table : — 
 
 Comparison of the Imports and Uxports at Liverpool and London in 
 1886 with 1877, and at Antioerp in 1885 with 1876, shoioinrj 
 the percentage of increase. 
 
 Liverpool Imports 
 
 Do. Exports 
 
 London Imports . 
 
 Do. Exports . 
 
 Antwerp Imports . 
 Do. Exports . 
 
 Tonnage of 
 
 Sliips 
 at present. 
 
 (1886) 
 5,017,815 
 4,714,654 
 6,810,647 
 5,215,984 
 
 (1885) 
 3,388,791 
 3,367,844 
 
 Tonnage of 
 
 Ships 
 
 Ten Years ago. 
 
 (1877) 
 4,553,425 
 4,487,782 
 5,684,700 
 4,421,873 
 
 (1876) 
 2,424,825 
 2,377,658 
 
 Percentage 
 
 of 
 Increase. 
 
 10-199 
 
 5-055 
 
 19-806 
 
 17-959 
 
 39-754 
 41-645 
 
 The advance made by Havre, Hamburg and Bremen 
 within the last dozen years is equally striking. 
 
 With these three brief statements of facts and figures 
 let me conclude the least agreeable portion of my task. 
 Englishmen are said to hate statistics, and it is not my 
 purpose to inflict any more of them upon readers to 
 whom they are generally unpalatable. The question, 
 however, of the expediency or inexpediency of uniting 
 England and France by a submarine tunnel involves a 
 conflict of opinion between the commercial and the mili- 
 tary authorities of the former. Speaking generally, every 
 commercial authority of weight in this kingdom is agreed 
 as to the loss inflicted on our trade by the absence of a 
 
 b2 
 
( 8 ) 
 
 Tunnel between Dover and Calais; while, on the other 
 
 hand, many of our most eminent military and naval 
 
 authorities are opposed to it, as likely to expose the 
 
 country to invasion. 
 
 It would be easy for me to follow the example of 
 
 Mr. Gladstone, who showed in his recent speech the 
 
 fallibility of military judgment, by quoting in the House 
 
 of Commons the allegations of eminent soldiers who, in 
 
 1860, assured us that Lord Palmerston's fortifications, 
 
 which cost about twelve millions sterling, would preserve 
 
 us from all future scares; whereas we have had more 
 
 poignant, startling and costly alarms within the last few 
 
 years than were ever before excited in times of peace, 
 
 and Lord Palmerston's fortifications are now regarded 
 
 with shame and contempt. 
 
 "If," continued Mr. Griadstone, "lam asked to believe tliat mili- 
 tary authorities are infallible, if I am required to surrender my poor 
 judgment into their hands, I must quote the case of Alderney. If 
 there is a creation on the face of the earth that is the creation of the 
 military authorities, it is that which is now represented by the rem- 
 nants and ruins and shreds and tatters of the works at Alderney. 
 (Hear, hear.) There are persons who say that all faults and defi- 
 ciencies that are committed by the military authorities are due to the 
 impertinent interference of civilians. Well, I had to do with' the 
 works at Alderney in the sense of yielding to the imperative demand 
 of the military authorities of that day, and excellent and very dis- 
 tinguished men they were — Sir John Burgoyne, Lord Hardinge, and 
 others. The first demand was, I think, for £150,000. They told us 
 that if we would spend £150,000 at Alderney, Cherbourg would be 
 sealed up so that no French fleet could issue from it. I agreed, accord- 
 ingly, that that sum should be voted ; but the matter did not end there. 
 The sums demanded increased, until they almost reached, I think, a 
 total of £2,000,000; and now there remain only the miserable frag- 
 ments of that work, more like a monument of human folly than of 
 human sense or skill. Although useless to us, perhaps the works will 
 not be absolutely useless to any enemies with whom we may at some 
 future period have to deal. They may possibly extract some small 
 
( 9 ) 
 
 portion of shelter and accommodation from those rains." (Laughter, 
 and hear, hear.) (a). 
 
 Or, again, I might follow Sir Edward "Watkin's 
 
 example, and answer military objections to the Channel 
 
 Tunnel by arraying one soldier against another, as 
 
 there are many soldiers among us who openly dissent 
 
 from, and even ridicule, the opinions of the Duke of 
 
 Cambridge, Lord Wolseley, Sir Edward Hamley, Sir 
 
 Lintorn Simmons, and others. For my present purpose, 
 
 however, I will assume that commercial men in this 
 
 country are all but unanimous in favour of a Channel 
 
 Tunnel, and that a vast majority of our soldiers are 
 
 against it. The final decision, then, at which sooner or 
 
 later— and it will not be long delayed — the country will 
 
 have to arrive must rest with the people of England, to 
 
 whom Mr. Bright appealed in 1883 and Mr. Gladstone 
 
 in June last. In order to assist their judgment, let me 
 
 endeavour to show what military authority is worth, and 
 
 how far it owes its paramount influence to the support 
 
 of civilian journalists, writing for the most part from 
 
 instructions given them by other civilians, who are 
 
 (o) The following letter appeared in "The Meld" of July 28, 1888:— 
 ' ' The Daugees of Axdeeniet Haebotje. 
 
 " Sir, — Tou will be doing my brother yachtsmen good service by 
 warning them against entering this harbour without special pre- 
 cautions as to the dangers from the broken down breakwater. There 
 is absolutely nothing to guide you as to the point where the stones 
 end. A buoy has been placed in former years, I know, but it has 
 disappeared for some unaccountable reason. 
 
 " I came in last night, after a sharp run from Cherbourg, and had 
 it not been for the shouting of the men on the breakwater should 
 have been wrecked. Fortunately my captain just had time to put the 
 helm hard a starboard, and we only grazed. But 3 ft. off the false 
 keel and sundry copper plates ripped off, wiU compel an immediate 
 return to Cowes to repair the damage. 
 
 " Orelia, off Alderney, July 25. "Edwd. B. Forbes." 
 
( 10 ) 
 
 ignorant that the landing of a great' force of armed 
 men, witli artillery, horses, ammunition, and provisions, 
 on a hostile coast (which with or without a tunnel would, 
 as Colonel Hozier shows, still be necessary) is without 
 any exception the most difficult, the slowest, and the 
 most dangerous operation of war ; who have never seen 
 a campaign, a battle, or even a skirmish ; and who are 
 always prone to believe that panics, and a lively credulity 
 and alacrity in entertaining them, are the surest evidences 
 of patriotism and intelligence. 
 
 Let me begin with the opinion of the Duke of Wel- 
 lington, who in his declining years was the greatest 
 alarmist that this country ever produced, and who pro- 
 claimed in the House of Lords that if 12,000 fully- 
 equipped French soldiers were landed in England he 
 saw nothing to prevent their marching on and taking 
 London ! About the " Iron Duke," when in his prime, 
 no Englishman, from the highest to the lowest, would 
 ever say a disparaging word. But it is an incontro- 
 vertible proof of the slight weight attributed to the 
 Duke's senile alarms that neither Lord Wolseley, nor any 
 of those who believe in the possibility of invasion, with 
 or without a Channel Tunnel, has ever thought it worth 
 while to reproduce, and to scatter broadcast through the 
 land, the Duke's " Letter upon our National Defences," 
 written five years before its author's death, and thirty- 
 two years after his last experience of active hostilities. 
 
 " In Life's last stage, wliat prodigies arise ! 
 Fears of the brave, and follies of tlie wise." 
 
 Who would believe that the following words came 
 from the hand which " curbed the might of Bonaparte, 
 
( 11 ) 
 
 rolled the thunders of Assaye" — from the hand of 
 England's greatest soldier ? "I am bordering," he 
 wrote, in 1847, "on seventy-seven years of age, passed 
 in honour. I repeat, then, that there is not a spot on 
 our southern coast, unless it be immediately under the 
 guns of Dover, upon which infantry might not be 
 thrown ashore at any time of tide, with any wind, and 
 in any weathdr." 
 
 To criticise this obviously extravagant statement would 
 be an insult to the understanding of Englishmen. There 
 are miles upon miles of our southern coast upon which 
 no row-boat could land under any circumstances. Mr. 
 Cobden pointed ou.t, in his "Three Panics," published in 
 1862, that if anybody but the Duke of "Wellington had 
 stated that there was any shore in the world on which a 
 body of troops could be thrown "at any time of the 
 tide, with any wind, or in any weather," he would have 
 been deemed a madman. Coming from the great Duke, 
 the assertion was unchallenged; his entire letter was 
 quoted as an unanswerable proof that the country was 
 in danger. "To have ventured," added Mr. Cobden, 
 "on criticism ,or doubt would only have invited the 
 accusation of want of patriotism." Even these "fears 
 of the brave" could not, however, induce the Duke to 
 regard the ground lying under the guns of Dover as 
 liable to be occupied by an enemy ; and what is there to 
 prevent the hole in which the English end of the Channel 
 Tunnel debouches — a space about as big as the bear-pit in 
 the Zoological G-ardens — from being commanded by Dover 
 Castle and Dover Breakwater? If it is argued^ — as it has 
 been by the Duke of Cambridge and Lord Wolseley — that, 
 
( 12 ) 
 
 assistedhy treachery, an enemy might seize Dorer Castle, 
 would it not be equally easy to seize it whether there was 
 or was not a Channel Tunnel ? If it comes to treachery, 
 do we not stand in jeopardy every hour ? For months 
 and months prior to the assassination of William the 
 Silent at Delft, in 1584, Balthasar Gerard plotted to get 
 into the domestic service of his victim. No life in this 
 or any other country is safe against a crafty and resolute 
 assassin; and there is no command, and no place of 
 trust, civil or military, which may not fall into the hands 
 of a traitor. It is absolutely inconceivable, however, 
 that the entire garrison of Dover Castle, or of any other 
 military fortress, should be traitors, or that under any 
 circumstances the traitors should bear more than an 
 infinitesimal proportion to the honest officers and privates 
 of the garrison. To oppose such a great and beneficent 
 work as the Channel Tunnel on such flimsy grounds is 
 an insult offered to the British Army, which the Duie 
 of Cambridge has commanded for two and thirty years 
 without ever coming across such an instance of treachery. 
 In the long and splendid annals of that Army, there is, 
 happily, no case of desertion which, as regards all the 
 worst elements of treachery and ingratitude, can com- 
 pare with that of General Bourmont, who commanded 
 the leading division of Napoleon's grande armee in 1815, 
 and went over to the enemy three days before the Battle 
 of Waterloo. 
 
 Far be it from me to speak disrespectfully of soldiers, 
 with whom I have passed many of the happiest years of 
 my life, and in whose company I have, as a special 
 correspondent, witnessed every possible operation of 
 
( 13 ) 
 
 war, including battles, skirmishes, sieges, marches, 
 retreats, surprises, ambushes, passages of rivers, blockade- 
 running, and attempts to land men on a hostile coast. 
 In the practical management of soldiers in action and 
 upon parade, a drill-sergeant undoubtedly knows more 
 than any civilian that ever lived. When, however, we 
 recede from these professional details, and contemplate 
 the strategy of a General, and the resources at his com- 
 mand, it cannot be doubted that there are civilians — 
 among whom I may mention the late Dr. Thomas 
 Arnold, Head Master of Rugby School — who are as well 
 able to grasp military subjects and problems as any 
 soldier in existence. Neither Jomini, nor Matthieu 
 Dumas, nor Hamley, understood the principles of war, 
 and the moral, political, and material influences which 
 affect its general conduct, better than Dr. Arnold, or 
 the still living Mr. George Hooper, whose '' Italian 
 Campaigns of General Bonaparte in 1796-97," pub- 
 lished in 1859, together with his " Waterloo : A History 
 of the Campaign of 1815," published in 1862, are unsur- 
 passed in scientific grasp by the writings of any soldier. 
 "I would advise you," said Mr. Bright, in 1883, "never 
 ta take the opinion of high military authorities, except 
 on the question of what should be done when you are 
 actually at war." Need I remind the Duke of Cambridge 
 that if his visionary fears had commanded general atten- 
 tion in 1851, the Great Exhibition would never have 
 taken place ? Last month Sir Edward Watkin read a 
 letter in the House of Commons expressing astonish- 
 ment that the English Cabinet did not insist upon the 
 Queen retiring to Osborne, in 1851, because 3,000 men 
 
( 14 ) 
 
 of the Frencli National Griiard were permitted to parade 
 the streets of London in nniform, and wearing their side 
 arms! At this moment there is in existence a still 
 wilder letter (I have myself seen it), which if published 
 would cover its still living writer with more confusion 
 and ridicule than he would care to face. There are, 
 added Sir Edward Watkin, thirty safe modes of closing 
 or flooding the Channel Tunnel, against the employment 
 of any one of which it is an idle bugbear to whisper 
 the single word — treachery. Who that has ever read 
 Erckmann-Chatrian's story of "Waterloo" can have for- 
 gotten the graphic description of the hurried retreat of 
 the French to Charleroi ? 
 
 " In spite of tlie fatigue, wMch almost broke us down," exclaims 
 Joseph., "BuclLe and I started again to tlie left, whilst on the right, 
 behind us, in the direction of Charleroi, the cries and shots redoubled, 
 and all along the road we saw nothing but men fighting. About one 
 in the afternoon we repassed the Sambre by the Chatelet Bridge, and 
 arrived about three o'clock at a little village. We must have been an 
 iU-looking pair, especially Buche, with his bandaged head, and his 
 fceard of a week's growth, thick and rough as the bristles of a wild 
 toar. "We stopped at a forge, and the blacksmith, a tall, dark man, 
 told us to go into the tavern opposite, where he would give us a jug 
 of beer. When we had sat down, the room was so full of people, 
 who came to hear the news, that we could scarcely breathe. They 
 asked us, when we had come to an end of eating and drinking, if it 
 were true that the French had lost a great battle. I was ashamed to 
 confess our disaster, but Buche exclaimed, ' We have been betrayed. 
 Traitors gave up our plans. The army was full of traitors, who cried, 
 " Sauve qui peut f" How could you expect us not to be beaten ?' This 
 was the first time I had heard treason spoken of ; it is true some of the 
 wounded had cried, ' We are betrayed ! ' but I had not taken any 
 notice of their words ; and when Buche got us out of the difficulty 
 in this way, I was at once pleased and surprised. 
 
 "These good people then joined with us in indignation against the 
 traitors. Buche said the Prussians had arrived through the treason 
 of Marshal Grouchy. This did appear to me a little strong ; but when 
 
( 15 ) 
 
 the peasants, filled with emotion, made us drink more beer and gave 
 us tobacco, I ended by saying the same as Buche. It -was not till 
 afterwards when we had left the place that the idea of our abominable 
 falsehoods made me ashamed of myself, and I exclaimed,— ' Do you 
 know, Buche, these lies of ours about traitors are contemptible things ? 
 If every one says the same sort of thing, in the end we shall all be 
 traitors, and the Emperor the only honest man ! It's a shame to our 
 country to say we have so many traitors amongst us — and it's not 
 true ! ' 
 
 " ' Bah ! bah ! * said he, ' we were betrayed ; but for that the English 
 and Prussians could never have forced us to fly ! ' " 
 
 Are not the imaginary excuses for their defeat put forth 
 bj Buche and Joseph — excuses which, in 1815, were on 
 every French tongue — akin to Lord Wolseley's sugges- 
 tion that, if the Channel Tunnel be made, ninety-nine 
 English soldiers out of every hundred will advise their 
 friends to invest in American securities rather than in 
 those of a country so liable to invasion as England would 
 then be ? 
 
 As regards the United States, Lord Wolseley cannot 
 be unaware that there is probably not a single American 
 officer who took part on either side in his country's great 
 Civil War, between 1861 and 1865, but scouts the idea 
 that a hole in the ground — an exaggerated rat-hole — can 
 by any possibility be a danger to this country, which is 
 defended by eight millions of adult men of the same race 
 as George Washington, Andrew Jackson, Winfield Scott, 
 Admirals Hull, Farragut and Porter, Stonewall Jackson, 
 W. T. Sherman, U. S. Grant and Eobert E. Lee. Lord 
 Wolseley may imagine that the counsel of American 
 soldiers, among whom are some of the ablest military 
 engineers in the world, is not always benevolent to this 
 country. A pretty large experience of American officers, 
 
 c 2 
 
( 16 ) 
 
 naval and military, has, however, taught me that there is 
 
 not one of them but would give his judgment on such a 
 
 subject from purely professional grounds, and that those of 
 
 them likely to be animated by ill-will towards the home 
 
 of their ancestors are few indeed. Turning to Grermany, 
 
 we know that Field Marshal Von Moltke, the ablest 
 
 book-soldier and strategist in existence, holds that to 
 
 attempt to attack England through a tunnel would be 
 
 tantamount to invading her through his library door. 
 
 Colonel H. M. Hozier, again, who knows German 
 
 military men as well as any English soldier alive, says 
 
 that to them arguments against the Channel Tunnel 
 
 appear to spring from a disordered imagination. Colonel 
 
 Hozier is quite unanswerable when he says : — 
 
 " Our military authorities seem to have heen placed in a most 
 unfair position. It was the duty of the Grovernment of the country to 
 decide whether, for commercial reasons, a Channel Tunnel should be 
 permitted or not. If a Channel Tunnel is a commercial necessity, the 
 military and naval authorities should he told to find the means for 
 defending it ; and we may be perfectly certain that in that case they 
 will find the means to do so. To ask the military authorities, ' Is it 
 an advantage in a military sense or not ? ' only places them in a 
 position of being obliged, out of caution, to object to it; but if the 
 military authorities are told that, for commercial reasons, the Tunnel 
 must be formed, they will easily find means to defend it." 
 
 Moreover, Lord Wolseley greatly deceives himself 
 when he imagines that out of every hundred English 
 officers ninety -nine are opposed to the Channel Tunnel. 
 If he will take the trouble to ascertain the genuine 
 opinions of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer oificers — 
 irrespective of their impressions that it is ' fashionable to 
 denounce the Channel Tunnel, and might injure them, 
 professionally were they not to do so — he will have his 
 eyes opened in a way that he little expects. It was an 
 
( 17 ) 
 
 artillery officer who said recently that objectors to the 
 Tunnel resemble a timorous householder, "who imagines 
 his home to be open to a burglar's attack because a 
 gimlet hole is driven through his front door. 
 
 Lord Wolseley, who will not hear of a tunnel from 
 England to France, cheerfully promises his aid and 
 encouragement to those who would make a tunnel from 
 Scotland to Ireland. It is not likely that he will be 
 taken at his word ; for, despite its ineffable political 
 advantages, a tunnel from Port Patrick, in Wigtonshire, 
 to Donaghadee, in County Down, would never pay, 
 unless in connection with a Channel Tunnel. The dis- 
 tance is only twenty -two miles, but it would cost three 
 or four times as much as the Channel Tunnel, for which 
 Nature seems to have specially provided by laying down 
 a stratum of grey chalk, or chalk and clay mixed, which 
 is impervious to water and as easily scooped out as a 
 Stilton cheese. Scotland and Ireland, on the other hand, 
 are divided at the bottom of the sea by the hardest trap 
 rock, composed of felspar and hornblende, which it 
 would puzzle Captain Beaumont to pierce, and which 
 blunts the chisels of a boring machine after a few strokes. 
 In addition, there is in the middle of the sea a huge 
 cliff, or chasm of unknown depth, which would either 
 have to be filled with concrete, assuming the depth not 
 to be too great, or bridged by an iron tube similar to that 
 which crosses the Menai Straits. If, however, the Irish 
 Tunnel should be built before that from Dover to Calais 
 is undertaken, Lord Wolseley would have cause to regret 
 his advocacy of the former, as it would inevitably lead 
 to the construction of the latter. 
 
( 18 ) 
 
 There is no passenger and goods traffic reaching 
 England which can compare in wealth and importance 
 with that coming from the United States. It was but 
 the other day that the Umbria brought 600 first-class 
 passengers from New York to Liverpool, and the City of 
 New York, the latest addition to the Inman Line, is con- 
 structed to carry 850 first and second-class passengers. 
 The ships of the Inman and International Line are said to 
 have been built chiefly by American money, contributed 
 by Philadelphia. Some years since, certain dry goods 
 firms in Philadelphia complained that their imports were 
 delayed at the New York Custom House, and formed a 
 company to build or buy some American steamers, 
 which were put on the line between Liverpool and 
 Philadelphia. The Philadelphia Central Railroad 
 guaranteed interest on the bonds of the Steamship 
 Company, and had to pay it. After working for some 
 years, several ships of the Liverpool and Philadelphia 
 S. S. Company were lost or condemned, and it became 
 necessary to charter English steamers to fill the gap. 
 Some two or three years since a statement of its affairs 
 appeared in print, showing that while the American 
 steamers did not pay their worldng expenses, the 
 English steamers paid 10 per cent. By this time 
 the Philadelphia Central Railroad was heavily com- 
 mitted, and Mr. Peter Wright resolved " to make 
 a spoon or spoil a horn," by suggesting that it should 
 increase its responsibility by guaranteeing interest 
 upon some of the capital spent in building the City 
 of New York and the City of Paris in England — the 
 two largest passenger ships ever turned out since the 
 
( 19 ) 
 
 Great Eastern. The City of New York sailed from 
 Liverpool to New York on August 1, and the City of 
 Paris will be ready in a few months. This circumstance 
 shows the anxiety of the Americans to compete with 
 England on the Atlantic, although their best ships 
 are at present of English make, and sail under the 
 English flag. The day, however, is near at hand 
 when citizens "of the United States will be permitted to 
 buy as many English ships as they like, and to sail 
 them under the American flag, as the legislation 
 which now forbids them to do so will shortly be 
 abrogated. Nor will it be long before the Americans 
 are able to build iron passenger steamers in their own 
 country, capable of competing with the finest and 
 largest vessels of the Cunard, the White Star, the Guion 
 and the North German Lines. In the opinion of those 
 who are best qualified to judge, the Atlantic passenger 
 trade is still in its infancy ; and England will lose most 
 of it, if she is so insane as to listen to the alarmists who 
 forbid her to make a Channel Tunnel. Already a far 
 greater proportion of the letters despatched from New 
 York to England and Europe come by the North German 
 than by any English Line. Concessions and privileges 
 are now given by Americans to German, and withheld 
 from English, lines, for the simple reason that Berlin is 
 a better market for American securities and enterprises 
 than London, which has ceased to be the great financial 
 centre of the world. Our manufactm^es are being trans- 
 ferred from England to settle in Belgium, France and 
 Germany, and our financial business is following them. 
 It is poor consolation to reflect that while England 
 
( 20 ) 
 
 is being ruined, the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Wolselej, 
 and a few other soldiers, who always disclaim any desire 
 to be regarded as statesmen, are fiddling over her ruins. 
 
 Now, if there were tunnels from Ireland and Scotland, 
 and from Dover to Calais, can it be doubted for a 
 moment that every American passenger coming from 
 the New to the Old World would land in Ireland ? The 
 voyage from Sandy Hook to the west coast of Ireland 
 will soon be accomplished in five days ; and no one 
 who knows the Americans, of all classes, will doubt 
 that they would all elect to land at the nearest European 
 j)ort connected with England and the Continent by 
 railway. " The shop-keeping nation," says Emerson, 
 in his " English Traits," '' has, to use a shop-word, a 
 good stand. England is anchored on the fiank of 
 Europe, right in the heart of the modern world. As 
 America, Asia and Europe lie, these Britons have pre- 
 cisely the best commercial position in the whole planet." 
 
 These words were written in 1848, when railways and 
 steamboats were still in their infancy. The lapse of 
 forty years has covered the Continent with railways, and 
 built up great ports at Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremen and 
 Havre, to which lines of magnificent steamers now run 
 without paying tribute to England. Nevertheless, she 
 has still " the best commercial position in the whole 
 planet," if she would consent to make use of it. " Our 
 country," says Colonel Hozier, " is the landing-stage of 
 the great traffic between America on the one side, and 
 the continent of Europe on the other— between South 
 Africa on the one side and Europe on the other — and also 
 for the vast trade which comes from Australasia and the 
 
( 21 ) 
 
 far East." All these branches of enriching commerce are 
 threatened by our want of railway communication with 
 the Continent. Twenty-five miles of submarine tunnel 
 from England to France would restore this nation to her 
 ancient commercial supremacy; and would lead ex 
 necessitate to another tunnel from Scotland to Ireland, 
 which would yield ample dividends if American trade 
 and passengers flowed through it, and would for ever 
 settle the Irish question. The increase in our wealth 
 and comfort would be untold, and Ireland would be a 
 sharer in both. All these advantages are obvious to the 
 meanest understanding, and are insusceptible of contra- 
 diction. Against them are to be set the craven fears of 
 a few soldiers and the sentimentalism of a few jour- 
 nalists. I am acquainted with one of the latter — a man 
 whom to know is to love, and for whom one line of 
 Shakespeare, 
 
 " This precious stone set in a silver sea," 
 
 outweighs all material considerations and arguments. 
 
 Sir Michael Hicks-Beach admits that, for want of 
 better communication with the Continent, we are losing 
 the dep6t trade of the world. ''I will tell you," he 
 continued, "how to retain that trade by a better and 
 cheaper mode. It is so to improve your harbours as to 
 make them better and more accessible to large ships 
 than the harbours of your Continental rivals, and in 
 doing so you would have the additional advantage of 
 benefiting your mercantile marine." Can any sane man 
 deny that Sir Michael Hicks-Beach's proposal was 
 pulverised by Mr, Gladstone's reply to his suggestion? 
 
( 22 ) 
 
 Mr. Grladstone said, ''The Eight Honourable Baronet 
 objects to a Channel Tunnel, but proposes that the 
 harbours of this country should be enlarged. He has 
 no apprehension on this subject. Well, my apprehension 
 is not great; but, if I am to conjure up any prospect of 
 danger, I tell the Right Honourable Baronet deliberately 
 that his plan of easily accessible harbours, and great 
 ships, and of making the Channel a high road to be 
 crossed with 'wonderful rapidity, presents ten times the 
 danger that the prospects of a tunnel could possibly 
 awaken in the most excitable mind." All the bugbears 
 of our predecessors, who kept on prating " Steam has 
 bridged the Channel ! " have lost their terrors for Sir 
 Michael Hicks-Beach, who can see nothing but objections 
 to localising invasion, so that its dangers shall be con- 
 fined to watching a hole twenty feet broad, in the event 
 of our again being at war with France. 
 
 Let it not be forgotten that, in the event of a war 
 between England and any other power than France, a 
 Channel Tunnel would emancipate this country from the 
 most formidable peril to which jpi'otracted hostilities 
 could possibly expose her. Of all that English men, 
 women and children eat and drink, a vast and rapidly 
 increasing proportion comes from foreign countries ; to 
 say nothing about raw material, upon which the very 
 life of our manufactures depends. Assuming that we 
 were at war with Russia, can it be doubted that some of 
 our American brethren, " a little more than kin, and less 
 than kind," would avenge such "Anglo-rebel pirates" as 
 the Alabama, by fitting out privateers to sail under the 
 Russian flag ? American ships of high speed, and with 
 
( 23 ) 
 
 formidable batteries, would be sold to Russia, and Ame- 
 rican officers would enter ber service, as Paul Jones did, 
 after the cessation of the Revolutionary War which 
 ended in the establishment of American independence. 
 If, on the other hand, a Channel Tunnel were in exist- 
 ence, all danger of starvation, or even of short commons, 
 would be averted from this country were she at peace 
 with France. ' I do not envy the feelings of those 
 English soldiers who have terrified their countrymen into 
 forbidding the construction of a Channel Tunnel, if we 
 are soon engaged in a long-protracted war with a strong 
 maritime Power other than France, and are forced by 
 starvation, or the dread of it, to come to terms with an 
 enemy whom, with a Channel Tunnel, we might defy 
 for years. 
 
 Who, then, are the true enemies of their country ? 
 On the one hand we have men who tell us that the 
 danger of our being invaded, in case of war with France, 
 through a hole — -which even Lord Wolseley admits could 
 be held by fifty forewarned soldiers against a world in 
 arms — is intolerable ; and on the other, we have a host 
 of commercial authorities and Chambers of Commerce 
 proclaiming that, without a Channel Tunnel, the volume 
 of our trade will dwindle and decline more and more, 
 until our manufacturers are compelled to slip away one 
 by one, and establish themselves in Grermany, or Belgium, 
 or France, or Italy, or Japan, or in North or South 
 America. With France we have had no war for nearly 
 three-quarters of a centu.ry ; and, thanks to her fears of 
 Germany, which are not likely to be soon removed, she 
 has entered into heavy recognizances to keep the peace 
 
( 24 ) 
 
 with us. The pacifying and harmonising influences of 
 increased intercourse between England and France are 
 so obvious that it is unnecessary to waste a word upon 
 them. 
 
 Sir Walter Scott tells us, in his "Life of Dean Swift," 
 that in the Dean's lunacy he had some lucid intervals, 
 on which occasions his physicians and guardians took him 
 out for the air. On one of these days Swift remarked 
 a new building near Dublin, and asked what it was 
 designed for. "That, Mr. Dean," answered Dr. Kings- 
 bury, "is a magazine for arms and powder, built for 
 the security of the city." The Dean made no reply, 
 but on returning home wrote down the following lines — 
 the last that he ever produced : — 
 
 " Beliold ! a proof of Irisli sense ; 
 Here Irisli wit is seen ; 
 Wlien nothing's left that's worth, defence, 
 We build a magazine." 
 
 The opponents of the Channel Tunnel are doing all 
 that they can to reduce these islands to a condition 
 " When nothing's left that's worth defence." Who, then, 
 I ask again, are their country's chief enemies ? It is for 
 the people of England to answer; and with them, and 
 fortunately with them alone, the ultimate decision will 
 lie. 
 
^^m^ of 
 The Right Son. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. 
 
 The appeal which has heen made to me by the right hon. 
 gentleman is a very fair appeal. He has a right to know, and I 
 will endeavour to explain to him, why, having been at the head of 
 the Grovernment in 1884, and having voted against proceeding 
 with the Channel Tunnel Bill, I do not take the same course on 
 the present occasion. The right hon. gentleman has spoken for 
 the Grovernment to which he belongs, and so far he is in the same 
 position as was my right hon. friend the member for West 
 Birmingham when he asked the House to put a negative upon the 
 Bill. But the right hon. gentleman will at once perceive the 
 broad and vital difference between the speech which he has now 
 made in stating the grounds for his proceeding and the speech 
 which was then made by my right hon. friend. The right hon. 
 gentleman has opposed the Channel Tunnel Bill, I am sorry to 
 say, upon its merits, upon grounds which will be as good in any 
 future year as they are at the present moment. (Ministerial 
 cheers.) My right hon. friend the member for "West Birmingham 
 is not in the House, but I have had within the last week or ten 
 days an opportunity through his kindness of going over the whole 
 ground and testing our several recollections, and I believe I am 
 correct in saying that in the speech of my right hon. friend there 
 was not one word of objection to the Channel Tunnel upon its 
 
( 26 ) 
 
 merits, and that his opposition was art opposition of time, and of 
 time only. (Hear, hear.) For my part, I could not have taken 
 then any other position, and I will presently state why it was that 
 I was a party to opposition on that ground. It is indeed nothing 
 less than a matter of justice to the hon. memher for Hythe and the 
 promoters of the Channel Tunnel, after what happened in 1884 
 and 1885 — I believe these were the years — that I should explain 
 the view which I toot of their case and the reasons which induced 
 me at that period, without any doubt or hesitation, to join in the 
 opposition to the progress of the Bill. 
 
 I am very glad. Sir, to feel assured, after the debate of last 
 night, that we are now engaged in a discussion of a very different 
 kind. I do not think that any person who agrees with me will 
 vote against the Grovernment from any desire to displace it, or that 
 any gentleman who will vote with the Grovernment will do so upon 
 the ground that this is one of the sacrifices required from them to 
 protect the country against the danger of a Liberal invasion of the 
 benches opposite. (Laughter.) So far, the debate has favourable 
 characteristics. But there is also something in it which inspires a 
 feeling of despair. I am afraid the arguments in this matter on the 
 one side and on the other are looked upon by those who do not accept 
 them, not only as unsatisfactory, but as something worse. On political 
 questions we always feel that at any rate there is something in what 
 the other man says, but on this occasion we seem to get at certain 
 ultimate principles and modes of thinking which are fixed on one 
 side and on the other. The right hon. gentleman has stated his 
 case with great clearness and ability, and yet I frankly own — and 
 frankness is a great virtue — the whole of the consideration he has 
 advanced and his arguments against this tunnel are (I hope he 
 will pardon me for the phrase I am about to use) neither better nor 
 worse than mere and sheer bugbears. (Cheers.) 
 
 And now, Sir, having done homage to the virtue of frankness, I 
 will endeavour to fall back upon the virtue of courtesy. I will 
 relate to the House the manner of my first acquaintance with this 
 subject. It was placed before me by a deputation which had a Tory 
 
( 27 ) 
 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer at its head. Not that he tore that 
 title at the time, for I was myself then, in 1865, Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer under Lord Palmerston. But he succeeded me in that 
 office. He was a gentleman whose name has always heen men- 
 tioned with respect in this House — I mean Mr. Ward Hunt. 
 (Hear, hear.) He came to me as the leader of a deputation and 
 endeavoured to induce — or perhaps I should say seduce — me 
 (laughter) to support the promotion of this (we are told) dangerous 
 project. Mr. Ward Hunt was totally unaware of all those dangers 
 which have been opened up by the right hon. gentleman. But 
 here I am obliged to correct a statement of my hon. friend the 
 member for Hythe, who stated that I alone among the ministers of 
 that day was disposed to give a guarantee in some shape or other 
 to the promoters of the project. I never was disposed to give a 
 guarantee, to the extent of a single farthing to the promoters of 
 this scheme or any other scheme of a similar kind. (Hear, hear.) 
 On the contrary, Sir, I was instructed on behalf of the Grovern- 
 ment, and with my own full concurrence, to refuse a guarantee. 
 But we did so without giving the slightest indication of any oppo- 
 sition on the merits to the Tunnel scheme. A series of other 
 Grovernments followed; and every one of those Grovernments 
 officially committed itself on the merits of the Tunnel. Lord 
 Grranville on the part of the Grovemment of -1868, Lord Derby on 
 the part of the Government of 1874, and, I think, the senior Lord 
 Derby, the distinguished Prime Minister of a former period, 
 expressed precisely similar sentiments ; and every one of those 
 Grovernments acting unanimously was engaged so far in the pro- 
 motion of this project that they gave it their unequivocal sanction. 
 (Hear, hear.) 
 
 Nor did they stop there, but they entered upon international 
 proceedings. Communications were established with France. A 
 joint commission was appointed on the part of the two coim tries, 
 and I do wish to bring home to the minds of hon. and right hon. 
 gentlemen the degree to which our honour and our dignity in an 
 international aspect are involved in the question before the House. 
 
( 28 ) 
 
 I must say that that is one of the most serious considerations that 
 operate on my mind with regard to the promotion or rejection of this 
 Bill. (Hear, hear.) The two Governments instituted a com- 
 mission to consider the details of the schemes by means of which 
 this great project could be best advanced. The priaciple of the 
 project was taken for granted on the one side and on the other, 
 when we entered into these formal proceedings in unison with the 
 French Grovernment. The commission laid down conditions 
 which were to be the basis of a treaty between the two countries, 
 and the actual signature of the treaty was suspended, not upon 
 the ground of any political apprehension whatever, but simply, I 
 believe, upon the ground that financial considerations did not at 
 that moment favour the progress of the scheme. Now, Sir, what 
 presses rather disagreeably upon my mind is this — that there was 
 perhaps something of the character of an engagement of honour 
 in these proceedings between England and France, and that it is a 
 matter of some difficulty to justify the recession of a kingdom, 
 such as this from a position of that kind, after we had voluntarily 
 and deliberately made it the subject of such international pro- 
 ceedings. ^ 
 
 The right hon. gentleman says there are serious objections 
 raised by the military authorities against the scheme. Well Sir 
 at the time I am speaking of, the opinion of the military autho- 
 rities consulted by the "War Department was in favour of the 
 /Tunnel. (Hear, hear;) The two Governments did not act in 
 respect of the Tunnel without consulting military authorities and 
 those military authorities whom the Government did consult were 
 distinctly favourable to the Tunnel. (Hear, hear.) But I think 
 I may go a little further than that and may venture to read, at 
 least for the purpose of challenging contradiction, a short extract 
 from a very well-informed memorandum with which I have been 
 supplied on the part of the promoters of the measure. The. ex- 
 tract to which I refer says, " It was not until the autumn of 1881 
 that any military opinion adverse to the Tunnel was expressed." 
 (Hear, hear.) '^^ 
 
( 29 ) 
 
 Now, Sir, that is a remarkable fact. The Tunnel was then a 
 scheme twenty years old. It had heen discussed in every possible 
 form. It had been the subject of much official correspondence, 
 and it had received the assent of a series of administrations. 
 Those Governments did not assent without the authority of the 
 military department and the advice of its military advisers, and 
 until the year 1881 these portentous discoveries, which have taken 
 possession of the mind and imagination of the right hon. gentle- 
 man, and of those who sit near him, were never heard of. 
 (Cheers.) Surely that is rather a staggering statement. By 
 1881, however, we find that the military authorities had com- 
 menced their operations, and a great ferment began to prevail. A 
 combination of powers was brought into operation. The literary 
 authorities were brought to back up the military authorities. 
 Great poets evoked the muses (laughter) and strove, not as great 
 poets in other times used to do, to embolden their countrymen to 
 encounter dangers that existed, but to intimidate their country- 
 men by conjuring tip phantoms of danger that did not exist. 
 (Laughter and Cheers.) The military host and the hterary host 
 were backed by the opinion of what is called "society," and 
 society is always ready for the enjoyment of the luxury of a good 
 panic ("hear, hear" and laughter) when that panic is based on 
 the contemplation of a latent contingency which is not in the 
 slightest degree likqly to arrive. (Laughter.) These panics in 
 the air > have an attraction for certain classes of minds that is 
 indescribable, and these classes of minds, I am bound to admit, 
 are very largely to be found among what are termed the educated 
 portion of society. But the terrors which have been evoked in 
 connection with this plan never touched the mind of the nation. 
 Such terrors very seldom find access fo the mind of the nation. 
 But they took hold of certain classes, and it had required twenty 
 years even for these classes to discover them. They wers' repre- 
 sented by what is called the public opinion of the day — that is to 
 say, public opinion manufactured in London (hear, hear) by great 
 
( 30 ) 
 
 editors and clubs who are at all times formidable and a great 
 power for the purposes of the moment, but who are a greater 
 power and become overwhelming in their strength when they are 
 backed by the threefold forces of the military and literary autho- 
 rities and the social circles of London. (Hear, hear.) 
 
 These powers among them created at that period such a panic 
 that even those of us who were most favourable to the Tunnel 
 thought it quite vain to offer a direct opposition to the torrent. 
 We therefore proposed the appointment of a joint committee, and 
 the issue of that proceeding has been very fairly stated by the 
 right hon. gentleman. 
 
 I am bound to make a fair admission — that, although in the 
 Government of 1868 there never was a question as to the propriety 
 of the Tunnel, and Lord Granville even instituted communications 
 with France, yet when we come to the Government of 1880 and 
 the circumstances of 1881, 1882, and 1883, a change of opinion 
 did find its way even into the Cabinet. Some of us were not what 
 I should call quite sound. If I am asked why under these cir- 
 cumstances I took part in throwing out the Channel Tunnel Bill 
 my answer is to be supplied by reverting to the general situation 
 of affairs at the period. "We, the Government, were engaged in 
 arduous undertakings. Powers were put into action agaiast us at 
 that time within the walls of this House which are now happily in 
 abeyance. "We deemed that it was our duty to have some regard 
 to the time of Parliament. We knew it was impossible to pass 
 ' the Bill. It was a time of tempest, and as during a tempest a 
 j prudent man often finds it well not to trust to his frail umbrella, 
 but to take shelter in some substantial building, so we deemed it to 
 be best for all parties to seek at the moment a covert from the storm. 
 (Laughter.) At all events we thought it idle to persevere in a 
 hopeless struggle. We did not in the least enter into its merits. 
 We did not think there was the slightest chance of proceeding 
 with the Bill to the end, and we, therefore, deemed the discussion 
 perfectly useless. That was the principle on which we proceeded. 
 
( 31 ) 
 
 I will now say a little upon the arguments of the right hon. 
 gentleman, but I am not going to attempt to follow those argu- 
 ments as if we were engaged in a debate like that of last night. 
 I do not think it desirable to make this discussion resemble a set 
 debate between both sides of the House. There are some on this 
 side of the House who are probably unsound. (A laugh.) I do 
 not now refer to the general unsoundness which we find to preYail 
 with some who were once our friends, but to unsoundness on this 
 particular question. On the other hand, I hope there are some on 
 that side who are sound on such an argument as this. But there 
 was one observation which fell from the right hon. gentleman 
 which I regret. It was his comparison between the internal con- 
 dition of France at the present time and the internal condition of 
 France some sis or seven years ago. I think it was an error to 
 enter upon that chapter of the subject, even if the right hon. gentle- 
 man really entertains the opinion which he apparently does enter- 
 tain. But as he has said that he thinks there is not the same 
 prospect of stability in France now as then, I must give myself 
 the satisfaction so far of expressing a rather different opinion. 
 (Cheers.) And I may remind the Government and the House of 
 this fact, that the French Eepublic never, since 1870, has been 
 called upon to pass through so severe a crisis as the crisis — not yet, 
 I think, twelve months old — with respect to the appointment of 
 President. That was the most trying experience which it has had 
 to go through, and the approach of the crisis made many of its 
 friends and well-wishers tremble. (Hear, hear.) It made every 
 sound and right-minded man in France apprehensive; but I 
 rejoice to say that France, and the institutions of France, came 
 through the struggle with a calm tranquillity and solidity, which 
 cotild not have been exceeded in any coimtry in the world. (Cheers.) 
 That is the one thing I would say in answer to the right hon. 
 gentleman. 
 
 I do not touch on the engineering question. Neither will I 
 touch upon the commercial question, except to say frankly that 
 
( 32 ) 
 
 I believe the commercial advantages to be enormous. I have 
 nothing, however, to do with engineering or commercial questions. 
 Neither do I touch the finance of the scheme. That is no affair of 
 mine. I am here simply as a member of Parliament to see 
 whether there is any reason why I should withhold my assent to 
 the plan. I have used a familiar term as to sheltering from the 
 storm. After hearing the speech of the right hon. gentleman I 
 am not quite sure whether the storm is still going on, but I have 
 recently been under the impression that the panic had passed 
 away. My impression was that the literary alarm, the social 
 alarm, which backed up the military alarm, was at an end, and 
 that there was now a chance of a fair, temperate, and candid 
 discussion. The right hon. gentleman refers us to a land frontier 
 as if that were an unmixed evil. No doubt it is less secure upon 
 the whole than a sea frontier, but he must not forget that a land 
 frontier has enormous advantages with respect to intercourse 
 between man and man, which are of great consequence in the view 
 of those who believe that peace and not war is the natural and 
 proper condition of mankind, and is to be to a great extent for this 
 country, at least, the ordinary, normal, and habitual condition in 
 which we live relatively to foreign countries. But on the question 
 of procuring a land frontier, if it is a land frontier, which I do not 
 think it is, the advantages of a land frontier in peace are enormous 
 compared with its disadvantages and dangers ; and the effect of 
 this plan, I believe, would be, without altering in any way our 
 insular character, or insular security, to give us some of the 
 innocent and pacific advantages of a land frontier. 
 
 With regard to the political and military objections, I must say 
 I feel pained, as an Englishman, in considering the extensive 
 revolution of opinion that has taken place within the past twenty 
 years on this question. (Hear, hear.) There were then doubts as 
 to the financial success of the Tunnel — but on that matter I do not 
 enter — but there was no doubt cast upon it as to the question of 
 our security. Now, Sir, a sharp transition has taken place. A 
 
( 33 ) 
 
 transition from darkness to ligM is often inconvenient, yet it is 
 good. The question is, whether our transition has been from light 
 to darkness ; and it is rather a serious question for us to consider 
 whether the English nation and Government from 1860 to 1880, 
 or whether the influences which acted during the years 1883-4 and 
 1885, and which are to some extent acting now, lead us in the 
 right or the wrong direction. Speaking of the dangers of a land 
 frontier, the right hon. gentleman said that this end of the Tunnel 
 must always be th^ subject of great anxiety. Well, if this end of 
 the Tunnel is to be the subject of great anxiety, what will the 
 other end be? (Cheers.) But, strange to say, I find that the 
 other end of the Tunnel is the subject of no anxiety at all. 
 (Laughter and cheers.) Many persons consider the French nation 
 as rather light-minded ; as a people with great resources and great 
 ingenuity, but still light-minded ; unlike ourselves — solid, con- 
 sistent, perhaps rather heavy, but at any rate a very steady-going 
 people, who make up our minds slowly and resolutely, and do not 
 change them. (Ironical laughter.) Oh ! I am not speaking for 
 myself. (Loud laughter.) I am only speaking on behalf of my 
 country. But I would ask gentlemen to apply this test to the 
 case of the French people. I must say that they have treated this 
 matter with the most dignified self-restraint and consistency 
 throughout. (Hear, hear.) I am bound to give my opinion, and 
 I think the French, had they any other than friendly dispositions 
 with regard to ourselves, might have made serious complaint of 
 the manner of their treatment in having been invited to embark in 
 this enterprise to an extent only short of the signature of the 
 treaty and then having found that we had receded from the 
 ground and left the light-minded people standing in their original 
 attitude while we have very considerably altered ours. Well, 
 but, you will say, the question of our invading France is 
 not a matter to be considered at all. (Hear, hear.) There- 
 fore the other end of the Tunnel does not seriously enter 
 into the question. The real question that we have before us 
 
( 34 ) 
 
 is the likelihood of the coming of that unhappy day — I 
 agree it is a perfectly possible thing, I think and hope it is 
 nothing more than a possible event, still it must be taken into 
 consideration — when England will be invaded by France. I am 
 very much behind the age in a great many respects ; and I am 
 very much behind those representatives of the age who sit on the 
 opposite side of the House, for I have the habit of being guided in 
 my anticipations of the future partly at least by considerations of 
 the past. I know that is a mode of looking at a subject entirely 
 dismissed from the consideration of the Conservatism now in 
 fashion. It never much regarded the future ; if it now discards the 
 past, it has nothing to depend upon but the present, which flits 
 away as I am speaking. Let us, however, for once glance at our 
 history. For about 800 years, beginning from the Conquest, I 
 want to know which country has oftenest invaded the other, and I 
 will state this proposition, that the invasions of France by England 
 have been at the least tenfold more than the invasions of the 
 British Islands by France. Do you believe in a total revolution 
 in the means of action between the two countries ? There has, 
 indeed, been a great change in one matter^that of population. 
 Now, Sir, during the Revolutionary wars what happened ? The 
 great Napoleon — the most wonderful general and strategist of 
 modern times — the man of whom Dr. DoUinger says that he 
 raised war almost to the dignity and attitude of a fine art — 
 addressed the whole of his resources and his thoughts to the inva- 
 sion of England. Ireland was tried three times by the Directory, 
 and three times there were miserable failures. Two other fleets 
 had set out, one from Holland and one from Spain, and they had 
 been destroyed by the power of British arms at sea. But Napoleon 
 made it a study nightly and daily to devise and arrange the means 
 of invading England, and he was obliged to recede from his design. 
 Let me now touch another topic. It is worth while for those 
 who have these portentous ideas of the power of France 
 and so small an idea of our means of defence, to consider the 
 
( 35 ) 
 
 relative population of the two countries. At the time when 
 Napoleon prosecuted his schemes the population of Great 
 Britain was ahout 10,000,000. The population of France was 
 then 22,000,000. I will not count the population of Ireland, 
 for at that period unfortunately, as at others, it added nothing to 
 the military resources of this country for repelling invasion. Well, 
 10,000,000 of Englishmen constituted the sum of those whom 
 Napoleon had to invade, and he could not manage it. (Cheers.) 
 At the present moment this island contains far more than 
 30,000,000 of men not less strong, not less determiaed, not less 
 energetic than the 10,000,000 of Napoleon's time, and they are 
 close in mere numbers upon the population of France. Here, then, 
 are two countries, and the question is whether one will invade the 
 other by means of the Channel Tunnel. This is a country that 
 has incessantly invaded France, and I am not sorry to say 
 that, though we did it with marvellous success 600 years ago, 
 we have not always been equally successful ia recent years. 
 Doubtless, there is the paramount case of 1815, with respect to 
 which, if a case could be quoted on the other side parallel to the 
 action of England and of Wellington, I would admit that there 
 would be something more in the argument of the right hon. 
 gentleman than I can allow that it contained as matters stand. 
 I shall, however, be told that Napoleon had no steam. That 
 appears to be a strong argument; but it is capable of being 
 used both ways. (Hear, hear.) I believe that the invention of 
 steam and the great revolution that we have seen in ship-building 
 have in the aggregate enormously increased our means of defence 
 as compared with the means possessed by France. I believe that 
 our defensive power in times of crisis would develop itself with a 
 rapidity, to an extent, and with an efficiency that would surpass 
 all previous examples and would astonish the world. (Hear, 
 
 hear.) 
 
 There is one other question that I should Like to ask — What is the 
 ground taken up by those gentlemen who point to our security as 
 
( 36 ) 
 
 the main matter which we have to consider ? Do they mean on 
 that ground to limit our communications with France ? Do they 
 mean, as in the time of Queen Anne, to " abate " our trade with 
 France as being a thing mischievous in itself — a source of danger 
 and insecurity ? " No," says the right hon. gentleman opposite ; 
 " extend your communications to the uttermost ; give every 
 facility by which men and material can pass from one country to 
 the other, but do not sanction the construction of this Tunnel." 
 That is the plan of the right hon. gentleman. He proposes that 
 the harbours of the country should be enlarged. He set no limit 
 to the range of his philanthropy and enlightened views upon this 
 matter. He has no apprehension upon this subject. "Well, my 
 apprehension is not great ; but, if I am to conjure up any prospect 
 of danger at all, I tell the right hon. gentleman deliberately that 
 his plan of vast harbours and great ships, and of making the 
 Channel a high road to be crossed with wonderful rapidity, presents 
 ten times the danger that the prospects of the Tunnel ought to 
 present to the most excitable mind. (Hear, hear.) 
 
 Now one word about the opinion of the military authorities. I am 
 not going to speak of them with contempt ; on the contrary, I must 
 say that I have the deepest respect for the profession of the soldier, 
 and especially for the function of the commander in the field, charged 
 with the care of men and material in great masses, with the duty 
 of making the most of the resources of his country, and with the 
 enormously difficult task of bringing them to bear at particular 
 points, at particular times, in particular circumstances, for the 
 purposes of war. I deem that to be one of the highest and most 
 extraordinary trials to which the human mind can be subjected, 
 and I do not know any position in which the demand for energy 
 and every great quality of manhood is equally tremendous and 
 overpowering. Therefore, for Lord Wolseley, whom I believe to 
 be a man extremely valuable to his country in the possible con- 
 tingency of military danger and military effort, for him and the 
 other military authorities I have the most profound respect ; but 
 
( 37 ) 
 
 that respect is due to them cliiefly in connection witli operations 
 of war and operations directly connected with war. In respect of 
 operations not so directly connected with immediate war, I know 
 that their judgment will always carry, and deserve to carry, much 
 weight ; hut it is impossible to overlook the fact that military 
 authorities are not infallible, and it often happens that the pre- 
 scription which they recommend to you one day is disowned and 
 reversed on another. We were told, for example, in 1860, that 
 Lord Palmerston's fortifications would give us such security that 
 we never need be alarmed again ; but within the last few years 
 we have had more poign£\.nt, startling, and costly alarms than have 
 ever, perhaps, excited us before in times of peace, and those fortifi- 
 cations are regarded with the greatest indifference. If I am asked 
 to believe that military authorities are infallible, if I am required 
 to surrender my own poor judgment into their hands, I must 
 quote the case of Alderney. If there is a creation on the face of 
 the earth that is the creation of the military authorities, it is that 
 which is now represented by the remnants and ruins, and shreds 
 and tatters of the works at Alderney. (Hear, hear.) There are 
 persons who say that all faults and deficiencies that are committed 
 by the military authorities are due to the impertinent interference 
 of civilians. Well, I had to do with the works at Alderney in 
 the sense of yielding to the imperative demand of the military 
 authorities of that day, and excellent and very distinguished men 
 they were — Sir John Burgoyne, Lord Hardinge, and others. The 
 first demand was, I think, for £150,000. They told us that if we 
 would spend £150,000 at Alderney, Cherbourg would be sealed 
 up so that no French fleet could issue from it. I agreed, accord- 
 ingly, that that sum should be voted, but the matter did not end 
 there. The sums demanded increased, until they almost reached, 
 I think, a total of £2,000,000, and now there remain only the 
 miserable fragments of that work, more like a monument of 
 human folly than of human sense or skill. Although useless to 
 lis, perhaps the works will not be absolutely useless to any enemies 
 
( 38 ) 
 
 with ■whom we may at some future period have to deal. They 
 may possibly extract some small portion of shelter and accommo- 
 dation from those ruins. (Laughter and " Hear, hear.") 
 
 Again, Sir, everybody knows that, in the case of a great war, the 
 one reaUy appalling difficulty and danger for us is fewness of men, 
 and not scantiness of any other resource whatever. "When we 
 were in military occupation of the Ionian Isles, they used, I think, 
 to require a garrison approaching 6,000 men in time of peace ; and 
 in war, if we include the necessary reserves at home, they would 
 have had to be debited probably with a force of 12,000 men on 
 our military establishment. I do not believe that there is a man 
 in this House who at this moment would say that it was desirable 
 for us to be charged with the responsibility of reserving 12,000 
 men in a time of war for the purpose of retaining our hold upon 
 Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, and the other Ionian Isles ; but at the 
 time the military authorities were unanimous in strongly urging 
 that to keep our hold upon the Ionian Islands was a great if not 
 an essential element of the maintenance of our power in the Medi- 
 terranean. Something must, of course, be allowed for the profes- 
 sional zeal of men who set no limit to the sacrifices they are 
 personally prepared to make when their country calls upon them 
 for their services ; but much must also be allowed for the fallibility 
 of human judgment. It seems ludicrous for a person like myself 
 to pretend to give an opinion upon the military dangers of the 
 Channel Tunnel in opposition to the military authorities ; but not- 
 withstanding that, I must point out that it is not a safe thing for 
 us to say, " We have military authorities who tell us this, that and 
 the other," and to be thereupon satisfied, when we have before our 
 eyes many authenticated eases in which the predictions and injunc- 
 tions of the military authorities have been falsified, and when we 
 know that what is taught and preached by them at the present 
 day with respect to many points is the direct reverse of what was 
 felt and taught and preached by their predecessors thirty years 
 ago. (Hear, hear.) Under these circumstances, I trust the timp 
 
( 39 ) 
 
 has arrived when we may consider the question in a state of com- 
 parative calm. In 1883 that was totally impossible. If I may 
 use an old homely proverb, I would say that " Philip was then 
 drunk." (Laughter.) I trust that he is now sober, and it is in the 
 sobriety of Philip I place my whole reliance. (Hear, hear.) I 
 hope I do not go beyond the limits of Parliamentary debate when 
 I express my hearty congratulation to you. Sir, who now so worthily 
 preside over our debates, on account of your having affixed your 
 signature to the report of the minority of the committee which 
 vindicated and approved the Tunnel. (Hear, hear.) My belief is 
 that now we have arrived at a happy time when the gallant enter- 
 prise — for I must call it a gallant enterprise, arduous and difficult 
 as it is — of my hon. friend the member for Hythe has some chance 
 of receiving the fair judgment and opinion of the nation. It may 
 have against it that factitious opinion which sometimes passes for a 
 moment as the opinion of the nation, which has been too strong on 
 this point, as I admit it was too strong for me, at a former period ; 
 but now I trust it is so far reduced, weakened, and brought within 
 moderate bounds that there is some chance for common sense, and 
 for that spirit of enterprise, which has been at all times among the 
 noblest characteristics of this country. (Cheers.) 
 
arW9508*'""'""""^"y"''""» 
 Channel tunnel; 
 
 oiin,an? 1924 bsr 444" 494"