itvw-.y.'i''.':^%^''''?yA't?>. fjfar.rni^a i ASIA *?-^,. **» Ki'...-.-, ■ ■ '1!' " ,■■ I, "^'i^' #-%^^.:^-:%_; ,^-■4, «. i "»/-#" s* .Jt ♦#. ^m^m %r0^^^^^^^ BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF 1891 AmMS- : f/i^..^.^. 5474 Cornell University Library HC 447.B49F4 1895 The financial and economical condition o 3 1924 023 511 607 «»...« The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924023511607 THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICAL CONDITION OF JNTETHERLA^KDS INDIA SINCE 1870 AND THE EFFECT OF THE PRESENT CURRENCY SYSTEM BY N. P. YAN DEN BERG, LL. D, .Third Edition (Revised and worked up to date)' THE HAGUE POINTED rOK THE MbMBEES OP THE NeTHEBLANDS ECONOMICAL AND STATISTICAL SoOIETY 1895 ^e^ THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICAL CONDITION OF NETHERLANDS INDIA. THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICAL CONDITION OF NETHERLANDS INDIA SINCE 1870 AND THE EFFECT OF THE PRESENT CURRENCY SYSTEM BY P." VAN DEN BERG, LL. D. LATE PUBSIDENT OF THE JAVA BANK PRESIDENT or THE METHEULANDS BANK HON. MEMBEE QV THE INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE, LONDON MEMBER or THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS CENTRAL COMMISSION OE STATISTICS Third Edition (Revised and worked up to date) THE HAGUE POINTED rOR THE MeMBEES OP THE NeTHBKLANDS ECONOMICAL AND STATISTICAL SOCIETY 1895 3) F I^ B F J^ O B. In August last the following letter to his address ,was handed me by Mr. N. 'MoNBiLL, "H. B. M. Consul at Batavia: Simla, the 2™. July 1886. Dear Sir. In 1873 the Grovernment of Holland, in view of the demonetisation of silver by other European countries, suspended the free coinage of silver, and in 1875 Holland adopted a gold standard on the basis of 1 to 15.62, by permitting the free coinage of gold at that ratio and continuing the prohibition, of the free coinage of silver. The adoption of similar measures has been more than once pressed on the Grovernment of India and on the Secretary of State for India; but the decision has always been to make no change,, and this decision was based partly on a consideration of the peculiar economic conditions of India, and partly on the belief that the fall in the relative value of silver was probably due to the appreciation of gold rather than to the depreciation of silver. The Government of India has no intention of proposing any change in the monetary standard of India, but is for many reasons anxious to obtain information regard- ing the economic condition and progress of Java under the gold standard. The information on the subject which is available in India is extremely limited, and Lord Dufferik has requested me to apply to you in the hope that you may be able to assist the Government of India in this matter. "What we are specially anxious to know is the course of wages, prices, profits, imports, and exports, as well as of the public revenue and expenditure since 1870. II It is more than probable that full information on these points will not be forthcoming; but I will indicate the nature of the information required, and trust that you may at any rate be able to supply it in part. As regards wages, the government of India would like to obtain figures showing the rate of wages every year, since 1870, of labourers, handicraftsmen, such as carpenters and masons, etc*, domestic servants, clerks, and the lower classes of public servants. The prices which the Government of India are most anxious to ascertain are those of the more important articles produced in Java, whether intended for export or for local consumption, or partly for the one purpose and partly for the other, and these prices should if possible be given for each year from 1870 to the present time. But the Govern- ment will also be glad to have similar information regarding the prices of the chief articles of import. We do not know whether it is possible to obtain figures showing for each year the profits of the chief industries of Java,, whether manufacturing or agricultural, but there will probably be no special difficulty in stating for each year what industries were prosperous or the reverse, and in indicating the causes of prosperity or depression. In the case of imports and exports, we should like to have a statement of imports and exports in detail for each year, giving, if possible^ both the quantity and value of each article, and a note explaining the cause of any remarkable variation in quantity or value. Of the revenue and expenditure, we should also like to have a full statement for each year since 1870, in as great detail as may be practicable, with a brief note ex- plaining in general terras the causes of any material rise or fall in revenue or expenditure, and drawing special attention to any increase or reduction of taxation, or alternation in sys- tem which practically involved an increase or reduction of the burden of taxation. I may also mention that it would be very desirable to have a statement of the rate of exchange on Holland for each year since 1870, and of the total yearly import and export of gold and silver, distinguishing between gold and silver in the form of coin which is a legal tender in Java, and gold and silver in the form of bullion or foreign coins. I can not help feeling that in asking for this information, the Governjnent of India is imposing a heavy tax on you ; but the question involved is one of very great public importance, and there is no means of obtaining the necessary information in a reasonable time except through your assistance. I need hardly say that the Government of India will gladly defray any expenditure you may think it desirable to incur in collecting or arranging information, or in having it translated into French or English. Besides the facts and figures which I have indicated above, we should be very glad to have an expression of your own opinion and of that of any persons resident in Java, who have given their attention to, the subject, as to whether the condition of Java Ill has been prosperous or the reverse during recent years, and as to what effect the adoption of a gold standard may have had on the v^elfare of the country. In particular the Govern- ment of India are very anxious to obtain an expression of the views of Mr. Yan den Berg, President of the Java Bank^ on this portion of the question, and trust he will not object to give them the benefit of his opinion. I remain Dear Sir, Yours faithfully, D. Mackenzie Wallace. Private Secretary to the Viceroy. Being in possession of most of the information desired by the Government of India, and knowing from experience how extremely difficult it would be for anybody not having thoroughly investigated the matter before to collect all the material required, I did not hesitate in offering my assistance to Mr. McNeill, as may be shown from the following pages. Batavia, 31 December 1886. K P. VAN DEN Berg. THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICAL CONDITION OP NETHERLANDS INDIA. Batavia, October 25, 1886. (Amsterdam, August 31, 1895.) To Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, Batavia. ^e£i-v Si 1Z, ,1. Some time ago, when you handed me a letter to your address from the Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy of India, dated Simla the 2°'' of July last, I readily undertook to assist you as soon as possible in collecting the information the Government of India was anxious to obtain regarding the economic condition and progress of Java, but the compilation of the necessary statistics and collecting other information has required much more time than I at first anticipated. Por this delay in fulfilling my promise, I have in the first place to express my sincere regret. 2. The information desired by the Government of India more especially applies to the island of Java. I have endeavoured to limit my researches to this portion of the Dutch dominion in the Malay Archipelago accordingly, but although separate statistics of the commercial movement of Java might be produced, still in the regard to financial statistics no separate account being kept of the expenditure for Java and the other islands, I have thought it more to the point to extend my enquiry to the whole of the Netherlands Indian dominion, of which Java, although of less area than the other islands, is the most important and conspicuous as regards population, revenue and trade, as shown by the following statement : tTava. Area 2388 \J Geogr. miles. Population 1893 24.642.985 Revenue, 1895 (estimate) ') . / 87.094.450 Imports, 1893 // 115.226.000 Exports, 1893 // 129.806.000 Ot/ier Islands. 32.398 n <^eogr. miles. 7.127.433 / 20.439.511 // 44.238.000 // 41.178.000 ') Home revenue excepted, see appendix A. — a — 3. Having thus defined the scope of my enquiry in reply to the questions put by the Government of India, I shall first consider the revenue and the expenditure of our colony, of which, as desired, a full statement shall be given in as minute detail as may prove practicable within reasonable limits, at the same time drawing special attention to any increase or reduction of taxation or alteration in system) practically involving an increase or reduction of the burden of taxation. 4. A general statement of the revenue and expenditure of the Government of Netherlands India for the years 1871 — 1893, the last year for which the accounts are available, will be found in appendix A, and from this statement the following table of the yearly surpluses or deficits has been compiled. Years. Eevenue. lixpenditure. Surplus. Deficit. 1871 / 135.530.969 ./■ 105.536.737 / 29.994.232 1872 // 127.213.295 // 112.052.358 // 15.160.937 __ 1873 // 134.550.870 il 122.469.276 // 12.081.594 — 1874. // 144.422.607 „ 126.494.011 17.928.596 — 1875 // 147.668.058 ff 129.089.732 // 18.578.326 — 1876 // 139.895.577 // 155.818.758 — / 15.923.181 1877 // 154.842.224 // 156.780.554 — 1.938.330 1878 // 144.429.740 // 148.729.472 — // 4.299.732 1879 II 144.515.945 // 156.043.420 — 11.527.475 1880 II 146.838.108 // 146.936.103 — // 97.995 1881 II 137.802.360 // 151.232;#666 — // 13.430.306 1882 II 130.315.166 „ 149.582.897 — // 19.267.731 1883 II 141.627.040 ff 149.963.705 . — // 8.336.665 1884 II 142.266.359 ff 143.573.732 — 1.307.373 1885 II 133.981.453 ft 130.872.967 3.108.486 1886 II 131.259.253 // 128.884.913 2.374.340 1887 II 143.350.743 // 117.896.174 25.454.569 1888 II 119.690.117 // 128.348.703 // 8.658.616 1889 II 130.832.182 // 129.133.208 1.698.974 1890 II 136.289.482 tl 127.736.738 8.552.744 1891 " 115.666.932 r, 130.638.830 14.971.898 1892 // 126.718.214 // 135.993.166 9.274.952 1893 // 135.176.289 // 127.574.832 7.601 457 / 142.534.255 / 109.034.254 5. Apart from the great change that came over the state of the finances of Netherlands India in 1876, when the regular surpluses of former years suddenly turned into an important deficit, the most striking feature of the figures given above is undoubtedly the great instability of the revenue. Instead of showing a regular increase in accordance with enhanced taxation, which will be treated of later on, the revenue advanced from /' 132 millions in 1872 to /154 millions in 1887, only to fall again to /■ 130 millions in 1882, and even to / 116 millions in 1891, a fall the more striking when the figur of the closed Accounts are compared with the figures of the Budget Estimates as voted by the H Parliament, viz: es ome — 3 — Years . Estimates . Closed Accounts. Years . Estimates . Closed Accounts. 1871 /■ 119.307.048 / 135.530.969 ]883 / 139.238.402 / 141.627.040 1872 // 119.758.338 // 127.213.295 1884 // 142.836.197 // 142.266.353 1873 n 115.922.863 // 134.550 870 1885 // 142 . 640 . 786 ,, 133.981.453 1874 II 126.018.199 „ 144.422.607 1886 // 134.217.669 V 131.259.253 1875 tf 125.413.275 „ 147.668.058 1887 // 133.561.6-32 // 143.350.743 1876 1/ 132.894.294 „ 139.895.577 1888 // 133.735.560 // 119.690.117 1877 II 136.116.146 ff 154 . 842 . 224 1889 // 126.292.204 // 130.832.182 1878 II 138.962.364 ff 144.429.740 1890 „ 132.653.477 // 136.289.482 1879 II 141.439.166 ff 144.515.945 1891 „ 113.852.345 II 115.666.932 1880 II 142.450.020 ff 146.838.108 1892 „ 119.599.713 // 126.718.214 1881 II 142.602.554 ff 137.802.360 1893 // 129.094.898 „ 135.176.289 1882 II 142.640.786 ff 130.315.166 1894 // 125.135.594 still uncertain. The cause of the great disparity between the estimated revenue and the amount realized is due to the system introduced in 1867, by which the Netherlands-Indian budget has to be submitted to and sanctioned by the States General at home. This system necessitates the budget of say the year 1895 being framed by the Colonial Authorities in the first months of 1894, and forwarded to the Home Gov- ernment during the first days of March, as it is compulsory that the estimates of revenue and expenditure be brought before the Council of State at the Hague on the 15*'' of July of each year at the latest. Now, the colonial revenue depends to a great extent upon the sale of the produce delivered to Govern- ment as part ,of the taxation levied upon the native community, and it being impossible some twelve or eighteen months beforehand to state the prices that produce will fetch, it has been customary for a number of years to assume so low a valuation as to render a greater or smaller surplus afterwards almost a cer- tainty. Thus the Accounts used to show a rather important advance on the Budget Estimates, but in 1881, 1882 and 1884 the reverse was the case, as it had been impossible to foresee the great fall in the price of coffee to be sold on Government account. The following statement, showing the profits made by Govern- ment on the sales effected, will account to a great extent for the variable character of our Indian revenue: Profits on the sales of Profits on the sales of . Years. Government produce. Years. Government produce. 1871 / 48.536.900 1883 / 27.443.100 1872 // 38.383.400 1884 // 20.393.000 1873 // 47.276.000 1885 „ 23.198.000 1874 '/ 47.334.900 1886 20.918.000 1875 // 56.770.500 1887 // 42.264.000 1876 // 37.872.300 1888 ,/ 18.201.000 1877 // 54.904.200 1889 II 27.396.000 1878 II 42.287.300 1890 38.832 000 1879 II 34.992.000 1891 „ 13.424.000 1880 II 45.161.800 1892 " 14.687.000 1881 29.442.900 1893 /, 29.383.000 1882 II 19.059.800 1894 // 16.369.000 1871/82 41 . 835 Average 000 I ). a. 1883/94 24.376.000 — 4 — 6. The same disparity as sliown above with regard to the revenue also exists between the estimated and the real expenditure, as will appear from the following returns: Years. Estimates. Closed Accounts. Years. Estimates. Closed Accounts. 1871 f 107.655.347 / 105.536.737 1883 / 147.700.121 / 149.963.705 187a n 109.0ia.75a „ lia. 052.358 1884 // 145.290.361 // 143.573.732 1873 // 107.374.868 „ ia2.469.a76 1885 // 144 . 099 . 594 V 130.872.967 1874 /I iia.053.6ao /, 126.494.011 1886 // 139.655.706 // 128.884.913 1875 ff 117.071.590 // 129.089.732 1887 // 134.099.953 // 117.896.174 1876 II 130.170.839 ,/ 155.818.758 1888 ff 141.285.360 ,/ 128.348.733 1877 II 143. 929. a7 4 " 156.780.554 1889 ff 136.090.867 ,/ ia9.133.a08 1878 II 138.883.3a4 " 148. 729. 47a 1890 ff 140.16a.8ia // 127,736.738 1879 II 150.145.753 " 156.043.4a0 1891 ff 137.178.84a // 130.638.830 1880 II 145.083.494 .. 146.936.103 1892 ff 137.451.954 // 135.993.166 1881 II 144.671.160 " 151.a32.666 1893 „ 136.588.058 ,/ 127.574.832 1882 II 144.099.594 '/ 149.582.897 1894 ff 139.079.682 still uncertain. Thus for the years 1871 — -1882 an expenditure of / 1550 millions was voted, whereas the exigencies of the State necessitated an outlay of ./'1660 millions, a difference of /"llO millions, or a yearly average of about ,/ 9 millions during that period, resulting from circumstances which either had not been or could not have been taken into account at the time the Estimates were framed. One of these circumstances has been the war with Acheen, which commenced in the spring of 1873, and by which the aggregate expenditure of the Array and Navy Departments was affected as follows : Army and Navy Army and Navy Army and Navy Departments. Departments. Departments. 1871 / 28.700.000 1879 / 50.933.000 1887 / 40.896.000 1872 // 29.900.000 1880 // 49 . 065 . 000 1888 // 4a.iao.ooo 1873 // 44.600.000 1881 // 45.049.000 1889 // 42.230.000 1874 ,/ 45.400.000 1882 // 43.943.000 1890 // 44.628.000 1875 // 51.473.000 1883 // 42.905.000 1891 // 43.099.000 1876 '/ 59.617.000 1884 // 43.644.000 189a // 42.308.000 1877 // 59.357.000 1885 // 45.5a7.000 1893 // 42.811.000 1878 // 53.967.000 1886 // 40.166.000 1894 // 43.379.000 (Budget estimate.) Before the beginning of the Acheen war the normal military and naval expenditure may be taken in round numbers as having averaged- /30. 000. 000 per annum. During the period of 1873—1894 the yearly average increased to about / 46.000.000, thus showing a difference of 16 millions a year, or /350 millions in the course of the last 22 years, which amount may be taken as the actual cost of the Acheen war, apart from the expenses for civil purposes in the newly annexed territory, which appear under other heads of the budget. Next to tlie Acheen war the outlay for State 'Railways in Java and Sumatra, for the new Batavia Harbour Works (Ta,ndjong Priok) and for Irrigation purposes has contributed in no slight degree to the increase of our Indian expenditure. Before 1875 no entries on account of these items appear in the budget, but since then the following amounts have been paid, viz: Eailways, Railways, Railways, Years .. Harbour- and Irri- Years. Harbour- and Irri- Years. Harbour- and Irri- gation works. gation works. gation works. 1875 / 765.500 1882 / 10.663.000 1889 / 6.731.600 1876 V 3.644.4.00 1883 // 8.751.000 1890 // 8.603.600 1877 „ 9.655.000 1884< // 6.816.000 1891 // 10.144.200 1878 // 7.136.000 1885 n 7.533.000 1892 // 9.554.900 1879 „ 9.877.000 1886" // 6.171.900 1893 // 7.772.000 1880 „ 11.181.600 188.7 // 3.459.400 1894 // 14.071.000 1881 // 10.596.800 ' 1888 // 6.1.10.300 1895 // 9.819.000 This last expenditure was sanctioned beforehand by the Home Government in accordance with the proposals of the Colonial Government, and consequently appears under the estimated expenditure as speci- fied above, but this has not been the case with the expenses the Government has had to incur in order to prevent the cattle disease from spreading. During the years 1879 — 1882 this fearful calamity raged in the Western part of Java, involving an outlay of ./' 14.366.000. Altogether, the expenses incurred for the Acheen war, for the construction of Railways and Harbour and Iri'igation Works, and for the measures taken to suppress the cattle-disease, amount in round numbers to about ^432 millions, a sum fully accounting for the deficits, which since 1875 have been one of the prominent features of the Nederlands-Indian budget. 7. These deficits, together with the diminished profits on the sale of Government coffee and other produce, would have proved much more important still but for the unremitting zeal displayed by the Government in strengthening the revenue by rendering existing taxes more productive, and by imposing new taxes to the extent specified in appendix B, giving a comparative statement of taxes and duties levied in the years 1871, 1886 and 1895. It will be seen at a glance that any sensible reduction in taxation has been quite out of the question, — and that on the contrary the total burden of taxation has been raised from / 48.383.310 in 1871 to / 79.658.750 a year in 1885, an increase of nearly 65 percent; — the population during the same period having advanced from 22 to 28 millions, an increase of only 28 percent. The general burden of taxation therefore has been increased fi-om / 2.30 per head in 1871 to about f 3 per head in 1886 j ') ') Since then however another policy with regard to taxation has prevailed. The landtax has been materially reduced, as has been the case also with the tax on trades and professions pursued by natives, and the figures for 1895 as given iji appendix B, show also a not unimportant falling off in the revenue derived from farming out the opium monopoly. Consequently the estimate for the current year is almost exactly the same as the estimate for 1886, and the population in the meantime having increased to 31.770.000, the incidence of taxation in Netherlands India at present will be aboiit / 2.50 per head. The figures, however, given in the appendix only represent part of the burden of taxation, the native community being subject to a system of personal labour, which in many cases presses more heavily than monetary taxes. In latter years it has been the policy of the Government to reduce the burden of the personal services, and, according to available statistics, the number of 31.194.717 daytasks, which had to be performed in 1871, was reduced in 1884 to 25.330.028 and in 1893 to 20.648.960 "), tlius showing a diminution of about 10| millions of daytasks; but for this remission of part of their personal labour, the Natives of Java have been saddled with a poll tax, amounting at present to f 2.876.000, as stated in appendix B. This has been one of the material alterations in the existing system of taxation. Besides a tax on furniture etc., imposed upon Europeans and foreign Asiatics, such as Chinese, Arabs, etc., and a license tax on commercial, agricultural, and manufacturing enterprise, carried on by Europeans, was introduced in 1879, foreign Asiatics being subject to the tax on trades and professions imposed on Natives, at the rate of 2 percent on their income. Among the other new taxes imposed since 1871, the most prominent are the excise duties ^) and the tax on pawnshops. The latter had been formerly in existence for many years, but was abolished in 1870, in which year pawnshops might be opened by anyone who obtained a license, which was delivered on payment of a stamp duty of ./' 30, valid for one year. The experiment however proved unsuccessful, as it soon became apparent that the enlarged opportunity to pawn had a demoralising effect on the native community. Government besides having no control over the pawnbrokers to prevent them from charg- ing a perfectly usurious rate of interest. In the course of 1880 it was therefore deemed advisable to reintroduce the former system of farming out the privelege of opening pawnshops in certain localities with the result, according to the estimates for 1895, that Government now obtains a revenue of ./ 729.000 a year from the farmers, as against only / 54.300, received in 1878 as proceeds of the stamp duty on the pawn licenses mentioned above, but the benefit thus obtained does not outweigh the objections that on moral grounds are brought forward against the raising of the tax. With regard to the system of taxation, I do not think any further remarks necessary, it being self" evident that in a country, altogether destitute of provincial or municipal institutions or funds, the general budget must comprise lots of minor taxes of quite a local character, as shown by far the greater number of the items, appearing in the list given in appendix B. 8. As stated above the increase in taxation has made it possible to provide for most of the extra expenditure the Government has had to incur during the latter part of the period under record, and even regular surpluses might have been obtained if the current annual revenue had not been saddled with the outlay required for the construction of State Railways and the Batavia Harbour Works as shown by the following remarks regarding our present financial position. ') In addition to the compulsory labour in the Government coffee plantations, now requiring the attendance of about 320.000 families (as against more than 700.000 families some years ago), the Natives of Java are also subject to a system of village services, of which no statistics are available. ^) Excise duties have been introduced: on native made spirits {f 50 per hectoliter of 50% proof) in 1873; on native and China tobacco in 1873; on petroleum {j 2 per hectoliter) in 1887 (estimate for 1895 more than /■ 3 millions), and on matches in 1891 (estimate for 1895 /■ 910.000). — 7 — According to the detailed statement given under § 4 the aggregate surpluses of the period 1871 — 1893 amounted to ' / 142.534.255 to which the surpluses of former years, still available at the beginning of the year 1871, must be added, say ') // 16.809.263 together . . . . / 159.343.518 which amount was disposed of as follows: Contributioii towards covering the expenses of the Home Govern- ment / 51.778.832 Eedemption of debts of the Home Government // 20.000.000 Covering the deficit of the Home budget for 1871 and 1872 . // 2.048.177 Contribution towards the cost of new fortifications at home. . n 8.000.000 // 81.827.009 thus leaving available an amount of f 77.516.509 against an aggregate deficit of '/ 109.034.254 Eemaining deficit at the end of 1893 therefore / 31.517.745 To make up for the deficiency the colony has been debited with _/ 46.350.000, as pai-t of the Dutch 4 percent loan of /" 60.900.000, issued in March 1883 (and converted in 1887 into a 3^ per cent loan), involving an annual charge of about /'1. 854. 000 for payment of interest and gradual redemption. The Netherlands Indian debts of former years have all been paid off in full out of the colonial sur- pluses, which during the period 1831 — 1871 were at the disposal of the mother-country, up to an amount of/ 725.000.000. The debt to the mother-country of ./ 46.350.000, as stated above, incurred to cover the deficits of 1876 and following years, but of which now only an amount of ,/ 44. 201. 547 is still outstanding, is the only liability of the Netherlands Indian treasury, and it is obvious therefore that no deficit at all would have ensued if the outlay for the construction of the great public works of recent years had been provid- ed for by special loans, instead of being charged to the current revenue, as has been the constant policy of the Home Government ever since the time when it became indispensable, in the interest of the further development of the colony, .that a beginning should be made with the execution of works, which had already been far too long postponed. 9. The details asked for, regarding the revenue and expenditure of Nethei-lands India will be found ') The former accounts stand thus: Aggregate surpluses for the years 1867—1870 / 45.684.263 Contrihution towards covering the expenses of the Netherlands treasury (according to the laws of 1868, Stbl. n° 182, of 1869, Sthl. n° 212, and of 1872, Stbl. n° 3) „ 16.375.000 f 29.309.263 Reserve for working capital to carry on the administration of Netherlands India, as fixed by Royal Decree of 12 September 1835 „ 12.500.000 f 16.809.263 in appendices C and D, but only for the years 187], 1876, 1881, 1886 and 1895 as I have not had sufficient time at my disposal to compile a separate statement for each year since 1870, as desired. It is to be specially observed that all the figures under the different heads of revenue and expend- iture apply to the Budget-Estimates of each of the five years quoted, and not to the closed Accounts, the task of compiling the necessary items from the Accounts as far as already published, having proved too arduous, nay next to impossible. The existing discrepancy between the Estimates and the closed Accounts has been already sufficiently explained in §§ 5 and 6, and it may be taken for granted that any material difference between the actual and estimated revenue may be traced to the results of the sales of Government produce, while any important deviation from the estimated expenditure has been caused by the Acheen war and the cattle-plague. 10. Eull details regarding the revenue derived from taxes and duties, will be found in the com- parative statement of appendix B, but apart from the explanations given already in § 7 a few more remarks on some of the taxes of less recent date may prove useful. The land-revenue has always been the chief source of income of the colonial treiasury, and nearly the whole amount of that revenue arises from, the tax on the ricefields of the Natives, iis introduced by Raffles, under the name uf landreutal, tending to commute by conversion into a landrent on fixed prin- ciples, the exactions to which the people had been, subjected formerly, all sawahs (irrigated fields) being estimated by the paddy or unhusked rice they could produce, and all tegal (unirrigated) fields by their produce in maize and other crops, according to the following scale: Por Sawah lands : 1°' class One half of the estimated produce a-"! // Two fifths of ditto 3'^ // One third of ditto For Tegal lands : 1^' class Two fifths of the estimated produce a"'' ,/ One third of ditto 3"-^ // One fourth of ditto Since that time the essential character of the tax has been left unaltered, though many changes have been made in its application, the principle now adhered to being that fields are divided into ten classes, according to the average gross-produce during the three years preceding the assessment, which may be altered every year, if thought necessary by the Government officials. The lowest class includes the fields with a gross produce of from _/10 to /'20 per bouw (a Java bouw or bahoe being equivalent to l^/^ acres), whilst the highest class includes the fields giving a gross produce of above ./lOO per bouw, the tax itself being fixed at /2 per bouw for the lowest and /20 per bouw for the highest class. The collection of the land rental is entrusted to village-chiefs, who receive a remuneration of 8 percent of the amount collected. Another contribution to the general land-revenue, though of secondary order, arises from the leases of waste lands ceded to private parties, for a maximum of 75 years, on the terms of an annual emphy- teutic rent, which as a rule varies according to circumstances fi-om /I to /6 and even more per bouw, the land brought under cultivation being furthermore subject to the tax on landed property, which will be treated of presently. Under former administrations, larger and smaller estates were sold in full property to private indivi- duals, and all the house-property in the different towns and localities is oWned on the same terms chiefly by Europeans or foreign Asiatics. These properties, as also premises for industrial or agricultural purposes, such as sugar mills etc., are subject to a tax, called //verponding", which since the year 1830 has been fixed at '/4 percent of the estimated value of each estate, the valuation being revised every three years, in order that the treasury ihay turn to account the improvements the owner of the estate may have in- troduced at his own risk. As the detailed statement of appendix B shows, the revenue from this tax has increased from / 1.055.000 in 1871 to / 1.773.000 in 1886, and / 1.898.000 in 1895, and, sup- posing the valuations to have been correct, the aggregate value of landed property and houses in Nether- lands India must have amounted' to ./140 millions in 1871 and /"250 millions in 1895, thus showing an advance of some 110 millions during the last twenty five years. 11. With regard to the third item of revenue, the Customs Duties, it is to be observed that the tariff in force in 1871 was still based on the system of differential duties, Dutch goods as a rule being subject to an import duty of 10 and foreign goods to a duty of 16 percent, whilst the following export duties were levied: Articles liable Tariff valuation. Export duty to to Duty. the Netherlands. Foreign Countries. Birds'nests Coffee , Hides .... Ad valorem. do. do. Kilogram. Ad valorem. 100 Kilogram. 100 do. 6 % 6 // 2 " /O.IO free. /3.50 6 °/o 9 // 2 // Indigo Sugar Tin Tobacco /0.15 3 °/o On the 1^' of January 1874 a new tariff was introduced, abolishing all differential duties and enact- ing a duty of 6°l^ on most of the goods imported (only liquors, tobacco, arms, and a few other articles to be taxed at a higher rate). The export-duties were fixed as follows: Articles liable to Duty. Tariff valuation. Export: Diity. Articles liable to Duty. Tariff valuation; Export Duty. Ad valorem. 100 Kilograms. Ad valorem. Kilogram. 6 7o 2 7o /O.IO Sugar Tea 100 Kilograms. 100 do. 100 do. 100 do. / 0.30 // 1 HnffpA Hides... ........ Indigo Tin Tobacco // 3.50 // 1.— This tariff remained unaltered till the last of June 1886, when a new tariff was fixed' by which the import-duty of 6 °/o '"'^.s raised to 10°/o for several articles, the former rate of 6 °/q for all cotton and woollen piece goods, earthenware, etc. however, being maintained. On the other hand, export-duties on 10 — coffee and sugar were reduced, and altogether repealed on tea, and since the first of July 1886 the fol- lowing duties have been levied: Articles liable to Duty. Tariff valuation. Export Duty. Articles liable to Duty. Tariff valuation. Export Duty. Birds'nests Coffee Hides Ad valorem. 100 Kilograms. Ad valorem. Kilogram. /I- — /o.io Sugar Tin Tobacco 100 Kilograms. 100 do. 100 do. /0.15 „ 3.50 // 1.— Indigo After having been suspended from the 1'* of June 1887 until the last of December 1893, the export duty on sugar was levied again during the year 1894, but another suspension for one year has been granted recently from the 1^' of June 1895. Under the working of the tariff introduced in January 1874 the gross amounts derived from the customs were as follows : Years. Import duty. Export duty. Years. Import duty. Export duty. 1874 / 6.579.515 / 2.540.472 1884 /■ 7.470.519 /■ 2.543.147 1875 // 6.289.817 // 1.717.486 1885 // 6.800.517 /■/ 2.620.630 1876 // 6.444.373 „ 1.990.490 1886 // 7.001.289 // 1.530.284 1877 ,, 6.551.042 „ 2.070.872 1887 // 6.993.386 // 1.052.684 1878 „ 6.251.501 „ 1.832.166 1888 // 7.233.812 ff 958.505 1879 // 6.775.831 // 1 . 854 . 490 1889 // 7.779.707 It 1.045.803 1880 „ 6.647.230 // 2.094.253 1890 // 7.831.496 f/ 923 . 494 1881 „ 6.798.565 » 2.175.969 1891 // 8.595.468 ff 1.076.268 1882 „ 6.980.114 // 2.326.717 1892 // 8.622.956 ft 1.138.537 1883 // 7 . 486 . 843 // 2 520.622 1893 // 8.896.839 tf 905.274 To prevent any wrong conclusion being arrived at from these figures, it should be borne in mind that the expected change of tariff caused many importers to keep their goods in bond during the last months of 1873, so as to benefit from the milder duty of the new tariff, and that during the first months of 1874 an amount of _/ 592.000 was received on account of duties on goods shipped in 1873 to home ports, but which had found their way to other countries, and on which the higher differential duty had therefore still to be paid. The other taxes and duties levied in Netherlands India do not appear to call for any further special remarks. 12. As to the Government monopolies appearing in the list of revenues, attention may be drawn to the fact that the revenue derived from the sale of Opium has almost doubled between the years 1871 and 1886, but since then has been on the decline. As regards the way in which the opium-revenue is collected the following may be mentioned. — 11 — The opium required for the annual consumption is bought on Government account, partly in British India, and partly in Turkey. The retail sale is given to farmers, who have to buy from the Government the quantity placed at their disposal, and to pay a premium for the. farm, which is put up at auction and granted to the highest bidder. According to the estimates for 1895 the right of selling opium has been farmed out for / 14.074!. 000, and the quantity to be supplied to the farmers estimated to realize / 3.594.000, against which the expenditure for buying in the drug stands estimated at/ 1.232.000, thus leaving a net profit of _/ 2.362.000 on cost price. The farming oiit of the opium monopoly has always met with very serious objections, which lately have induced the Government to make a trial with another system, viz of taking the retail sale of opium under their own management. In the course of 1894 the new experiment has been introduced in the island of Madura, and it having answered the purpose its gradual extension elsewhere can only be a question of time. The manufacture of Salt and its retail sale is a monopoly, which Government has kept entirely in its own hands. At present the manufacture of salt is only carried on in the island of Madura, manu- facturers being bound to deliver all the produce to Government at a fixed rate of / 10 the coyan of 30 peculs. Erom Madura the salt is forwarded at Government expense to the stores built all over Java and the other islands, where it is sold by European and native officials at a price varying between / 6 and / 6.72 the pecul, according to the different localities. The revenue to be derived from the sale of salt is estimated for 1895 at f 8.510.000, against an outlay for cost of manufacture and transport of f 2.447,000, thus leaving a net profit of about / 6 millions. The quantities sold were the following: 1871 32.599 coyans. 1883 35.258 coyans 1872 31.952 tr 1884 37.928 II 1873 32.979 „ 1885 38.100 II J874 35.527 // 1886 38.200 II 1875 36.655 /, 1887 39.400 tl 1876 33.466 // 1888 39.100 ff 1877 33.964 It 1889 40.700 ff^ 1878 34.109 // 1890 42.300 tl 1879 38.051 II 1891 41.100 " 1880 37.172 II 1892 42.190 If 1881 1882 35.375 36.260 II II 1893 42.760 ff These figures do not show any material increase in the consumption of salt, but it need scarcely be mentioned that in many of the farther-ofF islands the illicit manufacture of salt by people living on the seashore is of very difficult detection. Even with regard to Java, however, where control is more efficient, the available figures point to a stationary consumption, the average yearly sales for the period 1870 — 1881 having been 28.810 coyans, and in the next twelve years (1882 — 1893) 33.070 coyans, an increase of 4260 coyans, or 15 percent, whilst the population during the same period increased at least by 20 percent (average for 1870—81: 27.920.000, for 1882—93: 21.995.000). The average" consumption of salt in Java during the last years therefore has not exceeded 2^/4 kilogi-ams per head of the population, against 4 '/a kilograms, the estimated annual consumption of salt in British India. — 12 — 13. The most important part of the Netherlands Indian revenue has been for years the sale of the produce delivered in kind to the Government, according to the principles of the so-Called culture system , introduced by Governor General Van den Bosch in 3 831, and of which a complete, though not altogether unbiassed account may be found in chapters III and lY of J". W. Money's volumes Java, or how to manage a colony, published in London in 1861. It would be put of place here to enter into historical details about a system, which beyond doubt has greatly contributed to the development of Java .in growing tropical produce; but in the long run it proved untenable, being too much at variance with the acknow- ledged interests of the native community. Thus the culture of indigo, tea, cinnamon, cochineal, tobacco and pepper on Government account has entirely been given up. The Government cinchona plantations, started in 1855, have always been worked by free labourers, and this has also been the case with the tin Government obtains from its mines in the island of Banca. Even sugar planting with Government intervention has since 1891 been abandoned altogether as will be explained further on, and coffee-culture therefore may be considered as the only relic of a system that in its time has proved so exceedingly remunerative to the mother-country. The coffee is planted in the hill-tracts of . Java at an altitude of from 1000 to 4000'feet, the villagers being required to plant a certain number of trees per head of family, in regular gardens, and to maintain a sufficient nursery of young trees to keep the plantations in full bearing. Careful preparation of the gardens and nurseries, and subsequent attention to the coffee-trees, is secured .by regular supervision by, European and native officials, who also superintend the gathering of the crop,, leaving the villagers to dry, clean and sort the coffee and deliver it into the neighbouring Government coffee-stores at their own con- venience. There the coffee is packed and afterwards transported at Government expense by private con- tractors, who contract for periods of from 2 to 3 years. The contractor has to supply bags and covered carts, to pay for all expenses, and to deliver the co!Tee at the central coffee-stores on the sea-shore in as dry and good a condition as he has received it. The same system, slightly modified, has been also introduced into part of the island of Sumatra and in the Menado-district in the North-Eastern part of Celebes, the coffee-planters everywhere receiving payment from the Government at the rate of _/ 15 per pecul first quality, and half that price for inferior produce. The quantity delivered to' Government has been (in peculs of 61.76 kilogr.) Java. Sumatra. Menado. 1883 1.080.614 150-127 10.284 1884 1.012.288 89.660 17,070 1885 499.919 102.274 23.561 1886 817.716 48.211 22.484 1887 254.534 83.627 4.511 1888 564.976 99.107 7.716 1889 577.561 48.336 21.498 1890 95.686 65.050 960 1891 381.048 44.834 • 4.114 1892 692.784 59.766 7.257 1893 69.066 56.724 3.703 1894 363.960 34.000 900 1895 tax. 330.000 tax. 40.000 tax. 1.500 — 13 — The Government: coffee is sold locally at public auction to an extent of 100.000 peculs Java coffee, as well as the whole of the Sumatra crop. The Menado crop, and the balance of the Java crop are shipped to Holland and sold on Government account through the agency of the Dutch Trading Company (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappii), established in 1824, with a capital at present amounting to/35,783.000. 14. In 1871 the sugar culture system was still in full working, the Government having contracted with 97 mill-owners to have an area of about 39.000 bouws (70.000 acres) planted vpith sugar-cane, for which the labour of 223.000 native families was required, who on that accouut had to be remunerated by the mill-owners to, an extent of /■ 5^ millions, or about /25 per family. Of the sugar thus obtained about one third had to be delivered to the Government at the rate of _/ 8 for number 16, Dutch standards the other two thirds being left at the disposal of the mill owners who could freely, sell it in the open market, or ship it -to foreign markets at their own option. On these terms the Government received in the five years 1866 — 1870 a total quantity of 5.227.526 peculs of sugar, costing- /48. 494. 615, or/ 9.27 per pecul, and netting /" 14.52 per pecul, "thus leaving a net profit of f 26.137.630 or about /5. 475. 000 per annum. As early as 1870, however, a transformation of the then-existing system of sugar-growing had been decided upon, it being enacted by the bill of the 2i'' of July of that year, that on no account the interference of Government in regard to the planting of sugar was to be extended, but that on the contrary in the year 1878 a beginning should be made with the gradual contraction of the area planted by Government, the reduction agreed upon being fixed at one thirteenth every year, so that after 1889 the interference of the Government was to cease altogether, the industry being transformed into a perfectly free one, it having from the first been intended that mill-owners should use their best endeavours to contract with the Natives for the plantation of the canes, which formerly used to be supplied by Government. At the same time it was decided that all sugar made by mill-owners should at once be left at their free disposal against a payment in cash to the Government, which was fixed at an average of about/' 100 per bouw for the cane still to be planted by Government during the course of the contract, in addition to payment due to the Natives for the use of. their fields and the labour bestowed upon tilling and planting the lot assigned to each of them. Also for the canes planted by the mill-owners on their own account on the fields rented from the villagers, a tribute had to be paid to Government of / 25 per bouw i), and accordingly the following entries appeared in the Budget Estimates for 1886 : Tribute on sugar-cane planted by Government / 1.85 5. 271 — rdo — planted on private account ; . . , . ,, . . . , , // ■ 634.000 together . . . . / 2.489.271, this being the Government's net profit on the business. Por using the fields and having them planted, mill-owners had to pay to Govern- ment in 1886 // 3.193.103 making a total amount of . . /5. 682. 374, as appears in the detailed statement of appendix G. ^) In December 1886 the tribute to Government for tbe planting of sugar-cane on private account has been abrogated. — 14< — It will now be clear why no such entry for sugar appears in appendix C for the years 1876, 1881 and 1886, as is given for 1871, and why in the following years a regular falling off in the revenue on account of sugar-culture had to be registered until 1890, when the sugar-revenue altogether disappearred from the budget, the amount of / 4X3.260 under the estimated revenue of 1895 relating to deferred payments due in former years. 15. The Government Tin-sales comprise the whole of the production of the Banca mines worked on Government account under the control of Government officials by Chinese labourers, who have entered into contracts with the Government, — and a share of five eights in the net profits of the Billiton-tin- mines, held on lease by a private company, to which in 1852 a special concession was granted for a period of 40 years, the concession being renewed in 1892 for another period of 35 years. All Govern- ment tin is shipped to Holland to be sold at public auction by the Netherlands Trading Company, the tin left in the hands of the Billiton Company, on the contrary, being always sold at periodical public auctions at Batavia. The production of tin has been: Banca : Billiton : 1871 67.391 peculs. 49.851 peculs. 1876 62.912 // 59.532 „ 1881 64.189 „ 66.330 // 1886 77.090 // 89.193 // 1890 107.190 // 97.693 // 1891 93.623 // 94.860 // 1892 121.736 // 85.586 // 1893 119.513 „ 85.451 // , 16. The contribution to the general revenue of the colony by the sale of Coals has until lately never been of any importance, the expenses of working the Borneo mines, the first that where opened, generally exceeding the proceeds, and it was therefore decided in 1884 to stop the working altogether, private enterprise being found unwilling to risk a further trial. Better results may be expected from the working of the newly opened Ombilien mines in Sumatra, with an output of 1758 tons in 1892, 46075 tons in 1893 and 72451 tons in 1894. The output for 1895 will probably be about 132.000 tons, with an approximate receipt of _/' 1.530.000, and an approximate expenditure of f 1.419.860, thus leaving an estimated net profit of some /' 110.000. 17. The revenue derived from the Eorest-department is specified as follows in the Budget Estimates : for 1886 for 1895 Rent for leased forests / 312 . 000 / 1 . OOO . 000 Sale of timber // 250 . 000 // 38 . 000 Timber supplied to Naval and other departments // 200.000 n 70.000 Licenses for cutting timber ,, 21 . 000 // 52 . 000 Miscellaneous // 48 . 200 // 619 . 000 / 831.200 / 1.779.500 against an estimated expenditure of // 730.136 // 650.156 thus leaving a net revenue of / 101.064 / 1.129.344 — IS- IS. The only remaining heads of revenue deserving special notice are the Railway receipts, which from / 57.600 only in 1871 have expanded to / 8.683.000, according to the estimates for the year 1895. On further examination of the figures given under this head in appendix C, it will appear that in 1871 and 1876 there was, properly speaking, no railway-revenue in the colony itself, the receipts registered resulting from payments effected in the mother-country. The explanation is to be found in the circum- stance that before 1877 no Government railways existed in Netherlands India, the only lines then open for public traffic, viz . the Batavia-Buitenzorg line (58 kilometres = 36 English miles) and the Samarang- Djokjokarta-Ambarawa line (203 kilometres = 126 English miles) being in the hands of a private com- pany, who had contracted with the Government to pay back the advances received during the construc- tion of the lines, and a share of possible net profits. On this account the Company had to pay in 1871 ./ 57.000 and in 1876 _/ 700.000, and these payments have been effected in Holland, as has also been the case with the amounts due in 1886 and 1895, respectively estimated at /'1. 015. 000 and/" 890.000. Both lines have proved very profitable undertakings, the Company having been able to declare a dividend of 8Vjo7o for 1891, 8^/10 °/o for 189a> ^'lio lo for 1893 and 9^/,o °/o for 1894, on the shareholders' capital of / 11.4.50.000. The construction of Government railways was commenced in 1875, as stated already in § 6, and at the end of 1892 the following lines were open for traffic: Java. a. Western lines 298^ Kilometres b. Eastern lines 485| // c. Line Djokja-Tjilatjap 187^ // 9 71 1 Kilometres Sumatra. Line Emmaharbour-Moeara-Kalaban 173 >> total 11444 Kilometres or 711 English miles, at a cost of/ 73.022.029 or / 79.837 per kilometre (/ 128.500 per mile) for the Java lines and / 16.674.170 or / 96.382 per kilometre (/ 155.000 per mile) for the Sumatra line. Further particulars with regard to the traffic and revenue of the State and other railways wiU be found in appendix E. The main results are summarised below for all railways : 1893. Mean mileage open for traffic. . . Number of passengers carried. . . Goods carried (tons) Gross receipts Working expenses Net receipts 655 kilom. 3.759.320 563.093 /■ 6.754.108 ■// 2.631.707 // 4.122.401 1347 kilom. 9.185.480 1.166.781 /■ 10.122.185 V 5 . 066 . 322 // 5.055.863 10.699.669 1.682.505 / 12.015.279 '/ 5.821.021 // 6.194.257 — 16 — 19. The detailed statement of the Expenditure, as given in appendix D, speaks for itself; the fol- lowing items only may perhaps want some further explanation: The increased expenditure on account of Judicial Establishments, and of prisoners and convicts, is a natural sequel of two most important reforms. One of these reforms is due to the appointment of gra- duated lawyers to the Presidency of the //Landraad" (the principal civil as well as criminal court in the judicial organisation, as far as it affects the Natives), an office formerly entrusted to the Residents as the heads of the central administration in each Residency. Uy the latter reform all corporal punishment has beein abolished, such as flogging, which for many years was customary for misdemeanors and all kinds of minor offences. The prisons accordingly had to be enlarged and a number of new ones erected in places where formerly they could easily be dispensed with. Tlie most important increase in the expenditure of the Financial Department is caused by furlough allowances and pensions, at present amounting to /' 10.4<42.000, or more than double the amount of twenty years ago, viz:/" 3.890.000. The gradual expansion of the administration can scarcely fail to lead to a subsequent increase. Provincial and native administration in the colony, conducted by the Department of the Interior, at present requires about / 4 millions more than in 1871, the expenditure on account of Public Safety having nearly doubled in the last ten years. As to the cost of the Steam-packet service in the Archipelago, amounting in 1871 to / 326.101 1886 // ,/ 379.303 189.5 „ V 731.746 it is to be observed that the contract with the Netherlands India Steam Navigation Company, which had been in force since' 1864, expired on the 31 December 1890, and that, with the sanction of the States- General a new contract for the conveyance of troops and Government goods and passengers was entered into with a new company (Koninklijke Nederlandsche Paketvaart-Maatschappij) on more liberal terms, the subsidy to be paid by Government ranging from / 1.50 to / 30 per geogr. mile, according to the more or less importance of the different lines of communication, and averaging /" 6.92 per geogr. mile, against a fixed subsidy for all lines of/' 3.90 as stipulated in the contract with the old Company. The expenditure of the Department of Education, Public Worship and Industry shows how much has been done by the State in latter years towards the instruction of both Europeans and Natives, it now being the avowed policy of Government to afford to the native aristocracy of the country the oppor- tunity of making themselves acquainted with the ordinary elements of European education, and to, render the primary notions of learning, such as reading, writing and arithmetics, accessible also to the common people. The Civil Medical Service now requires more than double, nearly treble, the amount of 1871, the expenditure under this head showing also a steady tendency to expand, many requirements having now to be met which in former years were never cared for. The treatment of lunatics alone, on behalf of whom an establishment on a large scale has been opened at Buitenzorg, now requires an outlay of /' 355.000 against / 14.400 only in 1871. 20. In the above I have attempted to give an idea of the ■ revenue and expenditure of Netherlands India in as minute detail, I think, as will be found practicable within reasonable limits. Before however proceeding to other matters, I would again call attention tot the general statement, given in appendix A, as to the manner in which the regular surplus of the Home revenue over the Home expenditure is used to — 17 — meet the constant deficit between Colonial revenue and Colonia] expenditure, making a total of /430. 342. 000 for the years 1871/1893. • Two methods are adopted, viz: the shipping of coin by the Home Government to the Colonial Government and the drawing of bills by the Colonial Exchequer on the Home Government, as stated below. Specie Shipments Bills drawn by the Specie Shipments Rills drawn by the Years . by the Colonial Years. by the Colonial Home Government . Government. Home Government, Government. 18?1 / 10.508.000 / 9.213.000 1883 / 23.338.000 1872 // 6.046.000 „ 1.73.J.000 1884 — '/ 18.639.000 1873 // 25 .-346.000 // 6.750.000 1885 — // 7.822.000 1874 // 1.000.000 // 10.675.000 1886 — " 5.060.000 •1875 // 4.245.000 // 7.558.000 1887 — ,/ 3.113.000 1876 500.000 /,• 27.881.060 1888 — // 1.044.000 1877 ., 17.500.000 // 22.744.000 1889 / 8.000.000 — 1878 n 10.000.000 „ 25.563.000 1890 // 4.000.000 79.000 1879 // 6.500.000 ., 30.250.000 1891 // 1.000.000 _.,. 1880 „ 3.000.000 .. 22.014.000 1892 // 2.000.000 — 1881 — ' ., 27.933.000 1893 // 1.000//000 — 1882 n 1.300.000 ., 27.718.000 During the whole period under record the colonial treasury has thus been reinforced by way of specie shipments and bills sold with an amount of /382 millions, to cover an aggregate deficit of / 430 millions as stated above, tluis leaving a balance of /^48 millions or ,/2 millions a year, an amount mostly compensated by postbills, money orders (delegaties), etc i). 21. Eeverting to Imports and Exports as alluded to in the letter of the Yiceroy's Private Secretary, I have first to observe that in 1874 an entirely new system of commercial statistics was introduced, and that consequently any comparison of the figures of former years with those of the last ten or twelve years would be altogether fallacious. Statistical accounts of the trade of Java have been regularly kept and published since 1825, showing not only the imports from and the exports to E ;rope and other foreign countries, but also including the trade carried on between Java and the other, islands of the Archipelago, thus mixing foreign trade with a good deal of the coasting trade, in so far as not relating to Java ports reciprocally. In 1874 however it was deemed advisable to collect statistics about the trade between the whole of the Netherlands Indian possessions with foreign countries alone, and these statistics only can be of any value for the present purpose. The figures for 1874 moreover are left out of account, as it is an admitted fact, that they are unreliable on account of serious mistakes having been afterwards detected. Our review accordingly only includes the period 1875 — 1893, complete statistics of 1894 not being available yet. ') In 1893 tte receipts of the colonial treasury on account of postbills payable in Holland and foreign countries amounted to f 1.697.923; on account of foreign telegrams to f 166.286, and on account of money remittances by way of „delegation" to f 455.000. 3 — 18 — 22. The figures of the trade for the years 1875 — 1893, including Government transactions stand thus: Years. Imports. Exports. Total. Years. Imports. Exports. Total. 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 / 125.672.253 // 121.511.700 // 153.704.416 // 140.449.359 // 154.651.613 ', 173.413.920 // 158.660.319 // 162.962.179 // 145.823.285 // 162.018.937 / 177.075.966 ,- 213.519.768 // 220.509.336 // 179.967.621 // 175.744.266 // 174.649.857 // 177.125.760 // 199.860.827 // 199.561.501 // 189.715.797 / 302.748.219 // 335.031.468 // 374.213.752 // 320.416.980 V 330.395.879 ,/ 348.063.777 // 335.786.079 // 362.823.006 // 345.384.786 // 351.734.734 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 / 138.867.785 // 126.736.427 // 126.279.400 // 139.630.050 // 173.384.771 ./ 160.173.717 // 177.430.907 // 170.888.924 // 177.357.471 ■ /■ 188.071.688 // 186.220.166 // 187.158.787 ,/ 184.097.433 // 197.662.614 „ 176.549.620 // 224.160.170 // 214.954.504 // 192.431.651 / 326.939.473 // 312.956.593 // 313.438.237 ,/ 323.727.483 // 371.047.385 // 336.723.337 // 401,591.077 // 385.843.218 // 369.789.122 The expansion of trade, as shown hy these figures, has been very limited, the ratio of increase in the last five years compared with the first five years being only about 12 percent. Taken separately, imports show an increase of 21 percent, exports of 4 percent only. The following table shows the total value of merchandise and treasure imported into and exported from Netherlands India from and to foreign countries, including Government stores, produce and treasure : Imposts. E X P R T,S. Years . Merchandise. Treasure. Total. Years . Merchandise. Treasure. Total. 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 /111. 948.040 // 113.581.362 „ 122.367.258 // 115.970 634 // 136.806.693 // 157.813.179 // 148.109.480 // 150.242.050 „ 138.494.355 // 149.279.229 // 123.368.695 // 116.687.311 // 119.655 958 // 123.477.975 // 144.924.250 // 146.924.438 // 165.586.007 // 158.858.672 // 166.059.174 / 13.724.213 „ 7.930.338 // 31.337.158 // 24.478.725 // 17.844.920 // 15.800.741 // 10.550.839 // 12 720.026 7.328.930 // 12.739.708 „ 15.499.088 „ 10.049.116 6.623.442 // 16.152.075 '/ 28.460.521 // 13.249.279 // 11.844.900 // 12.030.052 // 11 298.297 / 125.672.253 „ 121.511.700 // 153.704.416 // 140.449.359 // 154.651.613 ,/ 173.413.920 ,/ 158.660.319 „ 162.962.179 „ 145.823.285 '/ 162.018.937 // 138.867.783 n 126.736.427 // 126.279.400 // 139.630 050 V 173.384.771 // 160.173.717 // 177.430.907 // 170.888.724 // 177.357.471 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 /172.243.414 // 205.397.492 // 218.980.121 // 172.490.316 // 171.874.316 // 171.070.818 " 175.871.349 // 196.785.859 // 198.801.528 // 188.631187 // 185.129.219 // 183.256.021 •. 186.422.294 // 183.428.617 // 197.203.222 // 175.895.700 // 210.828.445 // 204.417.611 // 191.400.980 / 4.832.552 // 8.122.276 // 1.529.215 // 7.477.305 // 3.869.950 // 3.579.039 // 1.254.411 // 3.074.968 759.973 // 1.084.610 // 2.942.469 >/ 2.964.145 736.493 // 668.816 459.392 653.920 // 13.331.725 „ 10.536.893 // 1.030.671 /177. 075.966 // 213.519.768 // 220.509.336 // 179 967.621 // 175.744.266 // 174.649.857 // 177.125.760 // 199.860.827 // 199.561.501 „ 189.715.797 // 188.071.688 // 186.220.166 N 187.158.787 >, 184.097.433 // 197.662.614 // 176.549.620 // 224.160 170 // 214.954.514 // 192.431.651 — 19 — 23. The total value of imports and exports on Government account is shown by the following table: Imports. Exports. Years. Merchandise. Treasure. Total. Years. Merchandise. Treasure. Total. 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 / 3.774.817 // 4.403.938 " 9.671.954 " 12.579.565 // 8.640.039 " 12.514.860 " 8.260.764 " 8.564.975 „ 8.001.585 "11.315.163 " 4.215.579 " 3.804.593 " 3.274.397 " 4.141.871 " 5.009.445 " 5.602.351 // 8.147.703 " 6.633.294 " 6.585.534 / 4.245.000 // 715.000 // 17.966.000 // 10.000.000 " 6.500.000 // 3.425.000 " 250.000 " 1.700.000 420.000 920.000 „ 8.000.000 " 4.000.000 " 1.000.000 " 2.000.000 " 1.000.000 / 8.019.817 „ 5.118.938 "27.637.954 "22.579.565 "15.140.039 // 15.939.860 // 8.510.764 " 10.264.975 " 8.421.585 "11.315.163 " 5.135.579 " 3.804.593 " 3.274.397 " 4.141.871 "13.009.445 " 9.602.351 " 9.147.703 „ 8.633.294 " 7.585.534 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 /41. 474. 490 // 51.168.108 "57.116.672 "38.290.204 // 37.382.782 "37.177.478 "32.180.804 "29.811.785 "50.721.409 " 34.383.324 "16.379.870 . 25.185 390 "19.802.907 " 20.358.278 " 33.072.175 "17.148.178 "22.160.395 "26.298.479 "20.377.312 — /41. 474. 490 "51.168.108 "57.116.672 "38.290.204 "37.382.782 "37.177.478 " 32.180.804 "29.811.785 " 50.721.409 "34.383.324 ,,16.379.870 "25.185.390 "19.802.907 "20.358.278 "33.072.175 "17.148.178 "22.160.395 "26.298.479 "20.377.312 These figures show a large increase in the value of Government imports of goods since 1876, the greater part of this increase being due to the value of railway plant and rolling stock, and building ma- terial for the Bal^avia harbour works. The imports of treasure on the contrary point to a large con- traction of Government specie shipments in later years, as shown already by the figures given in § ao. Government exports consist only of produce shipped on its own account to Holland by the agency of the Netherlands Trading Society. Since 1875 exports have been limited to coffee, tin and cinchona bark, as already explained. The quantities exported are valued according to the average market pri'je of the year, which for coffee has been fluctuating between 50 cents per kilogram in 1881 and 97 cents in 1877, for tin between y 0.70 and./ 1 per kilogram. After all the total value of Government export is as much affected by the quantities exported as by prices, the coffee-crop in particular being of a very variable character. The export of Government produce for the period under review stands thus: 20 Years. Coffee. Tin. Cinchona . Years. Coffee. Tin. Cincliona. kilograms. kilograms. kilograms. kilograms. kilograms. kilograms. 1875 42.649.000 3.090.000 43 . 000 1885 23.659.000 3.625.000 216.000 1876 51.879.000 4.476.000 46.000 1886 35.094.000 3.877.000 263.000 1877 55.885.000 4.133.000 49.000 1887 21.170.000 5.741.000 352.000 1878 37.362.000 6.664.000 60.000 1888 21.739.000 5.958.000 371.000 1879 41.874.000 4.716.000 53.000 1889 31.565.000 4.525.000 352.000 1880 45.599.000 5.446.000 54.000 1890 13.579.000 4.185.000 267.000 1881 56.805.000 5.537.000 82.000 1891 17.229.000 5.710.000 257.000 1882 51.609.000 3.977.000 127.000 1892 20.957.000 6.295.000 312.000 1883 59.129.000 4.323.000 208.000 1893 13.445.000 7.528.000 257.000 1884 59.010.000 5.065.000 200.000 24. The following table shows the total value of imports and exports on private account only: Imports. Exports. Years. Merchandise. Treasure. Total. Years. Merchandise. Treasure. Total. 1875 /1 08.173.223 / 9.479.213 /117. 652.436 1875 /130. 768.924 / 4.832.552 /135. 601.476 1876 // 109.177.424 n 7.215.388 // 116.392.762 1876 // 154.229.384 ., 8.122.276 // 162.851.660 1877 // 112.695.304 // 13.371.158 // 126.066.462 1877 ., 161.868.449 // 1.529.215 // 168.892.664 1878 // 103 391.069 ./ 14.478.725 . 117.869.794 1878 „ 134,200.112 ,/ 7.477.805 // 141.677.417 1879 // 128.166.654 nW .344.920 .. 139.511.574 1879 // 134.491.534 '/ 3.869.960 // 138.361 484 1880 n 145 298.319 n 12.175.741 „ 157.474.060 1880 // 133.893.340 // 3.579.039 // 137.472.379 1881 .. 189.848.716 ,.10.300.839 „ 150.149.555 1881 /, 143.690.545 // 1.254.411 // 144.944.956 1882 n 141.677.075 „ 11.020.529 // 152.697.604 1882 // 166.974.074 // 3.074.968 n 170.049.042 1883 // 130.492.770 // 6. 908. 530 // 137.401.300 1883 // 148.080.119 759.973 // 148.840.092 1884 " 137.964.066 // 12.739.708 „ 150.703.774 1884 // 154.247.866 // 1.084.610 // 155.332.476 1885 n 119.153.116 " 14.579.088 ,/ 133.782.204 1885 „ 168.749.349 n 2.942.469 // 171.691.818 1886 " 112.882.718 // 10.049.116 // 122.931.834 1886 // 158.070.631 // 2.964.145 // 161.034.776 1887 // 116.381.561 // 6.623.442 // 123.005.003 1887 // 166.619.387 786.493 ,. 167.355.880 1888 // 119.336.104 // 16.152.075 // 185.488.179 1888 n 3 63.070.339 668.816 // 163.739.155 1889 // 139.914.805 / 20.460.521 // 160.875 326 1889 // 164.131.047 459.892 „ 164.590.439 1890 // 141.322.087 // 9.249.279 // 150.571.366 1890 // 158.747.522 653.920 // 159.401.442 1891 // 157.438.301 // 10.844.900 „ 168.283.204 1891 // 188.668.650 // 18.331.725 // 202.000.575 1892 '/ 152.225.378 " 10.080.052 „ 162.255.430 1892 // 178.119.132 // 10.586.898 // 188 656.025 1893 // 159.473.640 " 10.298.297 „ 169.771.937 1893 // 171.023.668 // 1.030.670 n 172.054.339 Full details of private merchandise imported and exported in each of the years 1875, 1880, 1884 and 1893 (further particulars not being deemed necessary to obtain a pretty complete insight into the commercial movement of the colony) , may be found in appendices P and G , giving both the value of each article, and quantities as far as can be ascertained. As to the causes of the variations in quantity or value the following may be observed. — 21 — 35. The most important articles of import are cotton piece-goods, wliich do not show any material increase in value. Their value however now represent a larger quantity than a few years ago on account of the goods having become so much cheaper, in harmony with the important fall in price of all cotton and woollen goods in Europe. Next to piece-goods, petroleum has become of preponderating importance in the import trade, there being scarcely any country where the use of petroleum has extented as much as in Netherlands India. At all events the contrast with British Ind,ia is very striking, the imports of kerosine oil there averaging about 66.000.000 gallons in the last three years (1892/3 — 1894/5), at 4.54 liters per gallon represent- ing a consumption of 1 liter per head, with a population of 290 millions, whilst in Netherlands India, with a population of 37 millions, the consumption of petroleum is close on 4 liters per head. The steady increase of the imports of salted and dried fish is certainly a rather remarkable feature of our import statistics, which perhaps accounts for the rather stationary consumption of Government salt mentioned in § 12. The imports of all other sorts of provisions also claims notice, the amount in 1893 being fully double the total of 1874. More than one half came from China and the Straits, chiefly for consumption by the Chinese in Netherlands India, numbering in 1884 about 365.000. The Chinese have also their share in the imports of European provisions and drinks, and no doubt the increase in the imports of European butter is due in a great measure to the article having become more popular amongst the higher classes of Chinese and Natives. As regards coal it has been found difficult to trace the exact causes of the great fluctuations in value and quantities imported, which ia 1884 stood as high as 200.000 tons, and in 1890 and 1893 amounted only to 153.000 and 124.000 tons respectively. An increase of the imports of rice may, as a rule be considered a rather unfavorable feature, indicat- ing a short rice crop insufficient for local requirements; but the rule does, not hold good with regard to the year 1893, the rather large import of 173.645.000 kilogr. (the greater part of which viz 101.720.000 kilogr. found its way to Java alone) coinciding with a plentiful crop in Java, as the following figures will show (for other parts of Netherlands India no reliable statistics about the rice crop are available): Java rice crop. Imports of rice in Java. 1881 29.854.000 peculs. 2.261.000 peculs. 1882 31.414.000 - 2.222.000 1883 28.615.000 // 1.767.000 1884 34.205.000 '/ 1.026.000 1885 35.820.000 v 482.000 1886 34.296.000 „ 15.000 1887 34.940.000 n 7.000 1888 33.120.000 „ 152.000 1889 31.948.000 // 451.000 // 1890 30.446.000 n 742.000 // 1891 30.696.000 // 887.000 ; 1892 34.569.000 v 1.290.000 „ 1893 36.735.000 // 1.647.000 // The reduction of the stocks, consequent on the short crop of the years 1890 and 1891, may account in a certain mesure for the increased imports of the two following years. — 32 — ae. Appendix G, being a detailed statement of quantities and values of private exports, shows sugar to be the only article which has materially increased in latter years. Nearly all other goods, with the exception of tobacco, have remained stationary, coffee showing even rather an important falling off in value. As to coffee-exports on private account, it is to be observed that the figures given include coffee, sold locally by Government to exporters to an extent of 100.000 peculs Java coffee, and the whole of the Sumatra crop, the latter averaging at present about 50.000 peculs a year, against some 100.000 peculs ten years ago. Taken together the Government coffee annually sold at public auction in Neth .-India represents a quantity of 150.000 peculs more or less, or about 9.250.000 kilograms, and this quantity being deducted from the figures given* in the statement for the year 1893 i) a quantity of about 16.000.000 kilograms remains as the produce of private plantations in Java and Sumatra, and of native grown coffee in other parts, where the Government does not interfere witli the cultivation of the berry. Indigo-cultivation in Java has been extending since 1871 and exports have increased accordingly, but since a couple of years great damage has been done to the indigo plantations by catterpillars , causing a reduction in the yield, and a shrinking of the exports, which, from 720.129 kil. in 1891, fell back to 607.345 k. in 1893 and 516.588 k. in 1894. Katjang or earthnut oil has gradually become an export-article of some importance since a regular outlet has been found in the Straits, out of 5.121.000 liters (1.140.000 gallons), exported in 1893, 4.584.000 liters having found their way to Singapore and 587.000 to Hongkong; but far more impor- tant are the exports of petroleum, since the opening in 1890 of the oil fields in the Langkat district (Eastcoast of Sumatra) , which in the beginning was the reverse of successful , has lately given splendid . results, the monthly output at present amounting to about 4.000.000 liters (ab. 900.000 gallons.) Sugar, as already stated, is by far the most important export-article of the colony, the trade of which, without it, would soon fall to the level at which it stood half a century ago. Nothing is more natural therefore than the anxiety with which the question of the future of cane sugar industry in general. '') The Java coffee crop of 1893 lias been an exceptionally poor one, both for Q-overnment and for private planters, the production only having heen 69.037 and 156.891 peculs respectively, as against 692.784 and 345.983 peculs in 1892. Full particulars about the outturn of the Government plantations during the last years have been recorded already in § 13, and with regard to the production of private estates and of native grown coffee the following figures are available : Year. Private estates. Native grown coffee in .Sumatra , Java. Sumatra. Menado. Celebes, Bali, etc. 1890 78.294 p. 12.409 p. 833 p. 160.095 p. 1891 303.655 „ 10.741 „ 1560 „ 122.700 „ 1892 345.983 „ 15.340 „ 3000 „ 182.900 „ 1893 156.391 „ 12.870 „ 1980 „ 71.000 „ 1894 523.000 „ 6.700 „ ? „ ? „ — 23 — and particularly in Java, is discussed by everyone interested in the welfare of the country; the working of the system of bounties., by which beetroot sugar production in Europe has artificially been extended, having proved most disastrous to Java planters and to all parties concerned in their industry. On treating of the general welfare of the colony we shall have occasion again to revert to the matter, and to explain the causes and effects of the present sugar crisis , which has already caused a good deal of harm and mischief. For the moment we have only to attend to figures, and in this respect the following table, showing Java sugar-production since the new regulations, alluded to in § 14, have come into force, may be found useful: Java Sugaii Crop, in Peculs. Years. Mills working under Government contract. All other mills. Total. 1874 2.539.000 692.000 3.230.000 1875 2.580.000 706.000 3.286.000 1876 2.707.000 1.010.000 3.717.000 1877 2-893.000 1.155.000 4.048.000 1878 2.601.000 1.100.000 3.701.000 1879 2.674.000 1.169.000 3.843.000 1880 2.559.000 1.035.000 3.593.000 1881 3.189.000 1.417.000 4.606.000 1882 3.234.000 1.575.000 4.809.000 1883 3.606.000 1.743 000 5.348.000 1884 4.045.000 2.448.000 6.493.000 1885 3.795.000 2.464.000 6.259.000 1886 3.718.000 2.621.000 6.339.000 1887 3.954.000 2.615.000 6.569.000 1888 3.775.000 2.483.000 6.258.000 1889 3.670.000 2.246.000 5.916.000 1890 4.181.000 2.686.000 6.867.000 1891 4.094.000 2.891.000 6.985.000 1892 — — 6.955.000 1893 — — 7.967.000 1894 — — 8.042.000 Another satisfactory feature in the export statistics is the increase in tobacco shipments, to which Java now contributes about one half, and the Deli district (Eastcoast of Sumatra) fully the other half of the- whole quantity. Some twenty years ago tobacco cultivation had become very important in Eastern Java but it gradually declined, the quality in the long run proving undesirable and prices unremunerative. Only in a few districts planters were able to get through these difficulties, which at one time threatened extinction of the whole industry. In Deli, on the other hand, tobacco planting has proved a great succes since starting in 1870. The number of estates has gradually advanced to 118 in 1893 and the production of tobacco has grown from 8.288.000 kilogr. in 1882, 7.768.000 kilogr. in 1883, and 11.135.000 kilogr. in 1884, to l3.176.000 kilogr in 1892, and 15.392.000 kilogr. in 1893. As a rule the whole quantity is shipped to Holland on planter's account, the average prices realised in the public sales held in Amsterdam never having fallen for many years below 113 cents per ^ kilogram since 1870, — 24 — when the quantity brought to market only amounted to 205.000 kilogr. But in 1891 an adverse tide set in, the average price obtained that year for the quantity offered (about 18 millions kilogr.) not exceed- ing 70^ cents, against an average of 148 cents for the 13 millions kilogr. sold in 1890. The effect of the heavy fall in price was most disastrous for many estates, some of them being wound up in consequence ; but a new era of prosperity has ensued lately, the tobacco sold in 1893 averaging 124 cents and 144| in 1894. Many of the e,states are owned by joint stock companies, the most important being the Deli- Company, established at Amsterdam in January 1870, who more than once were able to declare a divi- dend of 100 percent and above upon their capital of ,/ 4.000. 000. In 1891 howewer the dividend was nihil. Exports of Java tea have scarcely advanced at all, notwithstanding both climate and soil of Wes- tern-Java have proved admirably suited to the cultivation of the shrub , and planters having gradually succeeded in producing a very desirable quality. No doubt the fiscal charges to which tea planters, in common with other private planters, have been subject and still remain subject (although since the 1st of July 1886 the export-duty on tea of f 1 per 100 kilogram has been repealed) , materially interfere with the extension of an industry, which in British India and Ceylon has made such wonderful progress. 27. In § 20 a full statement of the impoits of Treasure on Government account has already been given. As to imports and exports of treasure on private account of which the Government of India is also desirous to get a statement , making a distinction between gold and silver in the form of legal tender coin, and gold and silver in the form of bullion or foreign coins, it is in the first place to be observed, that a sharply defined difference is to be made between specie imports and exports from and to Holland, and specie shipped from or to neighbouring ports, such as Singapore and Penang. A regular current of specie, originally forwarded from Batavia, is always going on from several ports in the islands of Sumatra, Banca and Billiton to the Straits, whence it find? its way back to Batavia or other ports, through the agency of the Exchange Banks, operating both in the Straits and in Java. Thus a circular movement of specie between the Dutch Possessions and other ports of the Malay Archipelago is established, which does not at aU affect the stock of specie required for the use of the public. In this respect only specie ship- ments from or to Holland are of any real importance, and the figures already given in § 20 about specie- imports on Government account may be completed by the following table: Impokts and Exports of Silveii Coin from and to Holland. Years. GOVEUNMENT ACCOUNT. Pjuvate' account. Imports. Exports. Imports. Ex])orts. 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 / 10.508.000 6.046.000 // 25.346.000 1.000.000 4.245.000 — / 3.420 ..000 930.000 120.000 ./■ 2.480.000 35 — Impouts and Expoets o¥ Silver Coin from and to Holland. Years. Government account. Private account. Imports. Exports. Imports. Exports. 1876 /' 500.000 / 3.560.000 / 5.850.000 1877 '„ 17.500.000 — — — 1878 „ 10.000.000 — — // 6.720.000 1879 6.500.000 — — " 2.750.000 1880 3.000.000 — — // 2.760.000 1881 '■ — — // 600.000 1882 1.300.000 — — // 2.300.000 1883 — — — — 1884 — — 500.000 — 1885 ; — 500.000 // 600.000 1886 — — — 1887 — 200.000 — 1888 — 8.690.000 — 1889 8.000.000 — 9.510.000 — 1890 4.000.600 — 2.630.000 — 1891 1.000.000 — — " 9.650.000 1892 2.000.000 — — " 8.800.000 1893 1.000.000 — — — 1894 1.000.000 - "^ ~ To the / 42. 510.000 remitted to Holland since 1875 is to be added a considerable amount from the Straits to Holland, either direct or via London, which of course does not appear in the official sta- tistics, and therefore the amount of the specie sent back to Holland may certainly be taken at about / 60 millions altogether, being only / 25 millions short of the amount imported on Government and private account. It certainly is a most striking fact, that during the last twenty years the balance of specie imports into Netherlands India has been of so slight importance, whereas it was taken for grant- ed at the time that in case of Holland demonetising part of her silver currency, an outlet for a large quantity of the metal would easily be found in the colonies. As to imports of specie both on Government and private account, it may be further mentioned that the figures given only refer to legal tender coins, silver bullion being of no use, there being no mint in the colony M. Foreign silver coins never circulate among the public, the Government alone occa- sionally importing a small quantity of Mexican dollars (about 100.000 dollars annually) on behalf of the Chinese labourers in the Banca tin-mines. Foreign gold coins, and Sovereigns more particularly, are in regular demand for making ornaments and for hoarding purposes on the part of the Natives, some of the Banks also importing Erench twenty- 1) As to the question of the establishment of a mint in Java some particulars are to he found in Supplement I. 4 — 36 — francs-pieces for tlie use of mail-passengers. Altogether however the ainount of gold imported is of no real importance, the figures for the years 1891/93 being the following: 1891 . . .-. . / 1.059v000- - 1892 . . . // 772.000 1893 // 1.160.000 The. Java-Bank used to import a certain quantity of Dutch gold coin (ten-guilder-pieces) , the amount on hand at the close of 1894< being about/' 3.750.000 millions. Although gold be a legal tender, no payments in gold have till now been made by the Bank, her actual stock being kept in reserve for fu- ture contingencies. 28. Turning to exchange we first have to observe that all commercial transactions with Holland or other countries in Europe are settled by bills drawn on Amsterdam or London , and it may be worth noting that the way of quoting the rate of the former paper is quite the reverse of the quotation adopt- ed for sterling paper. Por the latter, the Indian currency is the fluctuating term, the quotation con- sisting of a varying number of guilders and cents to be paid for the pound sterling. In the exchange between Batavia and Amsterdam, on the other hand, the latter place gives the fluctuating term , a quotation of 101 meaning that f 100 Netherlands Indian currency is equivalent to /" 101 Netherlands currency, and it is obvious therefore that a rise in the quotation of bills on Amsterdam of course cor- responds to a fall in sterling quotations , as the following table shows : Batavxa Rates op Exchange fob, Bankbills. Amsterdam London Amsterdam London V' 6 1 months date. 6 months sighl t^ 6 months date. 6 months sight. I 1 i ID -a ft 1-^ 1 bO en 1 1-q 1 1 < 1871 100 103 '/4 101% 11 .90 11.375 11 65 1883 10074 101'/, 101'/, 12.05 11.875 11.975 1872 101 104'/, 102% 11 70 11.375 11 .55 1884 100'/, 101'/, 101 12.— 11.85 11.925 1873 101 V, 104 102 V, 11 .90 11.525 11 .70 1885 100'/, 102 1017. 12.— 11.80 11.90 1874 100', 102'/, 101'/, 11 .85 11.60 11 725 1886 100 '/4 1017, 101 12.— 11.826 11.90 1875 99 V, 102'/, 100'/„ 12 . — 11.60 11 .80 1887 100 '/^ 102'/, ioi7« 11.925 11 . 75 11.825 1876 99'/. 102^/4 101 12 .12^ 11.70 11 90 1888 101% 103 1027, „ 11.85 11.675 11.75 1877 99'/« 101 =/8 100'/, 12 .10 11.725 11 90 1889 100'/, 102'/, 101'/, 11.975 11.70 11.825 1878 99'/, 101 '/4 100-74 12 .07'^ 11.80 11 95 1890 9974 102 1007. 12.05 11.80 11.925 1879 99'/, 101 lOO'/i 12 05 11.75 11 90 1891 0974 101 1007, 12.05 11.925 11.975 1880 99^/4 10174 100 '/2 12 125 11.825 11 975 1892 9974 101'/, 100% 12.10 11.90 12.— 1881 100'/, 101'/, 101 12 10 11.875 12 — 1893 100 102 'Z,, 101 'L 12.05 11.825 11.925 1882 100 '/4 101 100=/, 12 10 11.975 12 05 1894 100 101'/, 1007, 12.05 11.90 11.975 During the whole period the extreme rates for Dutch bills have been 99^4 and 1041/,, and for Eno-lish bills / 12.125 and / 11.375, thus showing a fluctuation of only 5V4 percent for the former and 6 percent for the latter bills. For the last 10 years rates have not been fluctuating more than 2 J or 3 percent, owing to the Netherlands Indian currency regulation, to which we shall revert in a subsequent paragraph. — 27 Closely connected with rates of exchange is the rate of discount which has also shown great steadiness during the whole period under review, the standard bankrate for 3 months private bills having been in the following bankyears (running from the 1'* of April to the last of March): Highest. Lowest" Average. Highest. Lowest. Average. 1870/71 6 5i 5.95 7o, 1882/83 6 6 6.- °U 1871/72 6 5 5.83. // ' 1883/84. 7 6 6.52 n 1872/73 6 6 6.— // 1884/85 7 6 6.94 " 1873/74 6 5 5.93 „ 1885/86 7 6 6.37 // 1874/75 8 6 6.82 // 1886/87 6 4 4.68 „ 1875/76 8 6 7.08 // 1887/88 5 4 4.50 „ 1876/77 9 5 6.99 // 1888/89 5 5 5.— " 1877/78 5 5 5.— // 1889/90 5 5 5.— // 1878/79 6 4 5.35 // 1890/91 4 4 4.— // 1879/80 6 5 5.97 // 1891/92 4 4 4. — " 1880/81 6 6 6.— // 1892/93 7 4 5.42 // 1881/82 6 6 6.— // 1893/94 5i 5 5.28 // The influence exercised by specie shipments, and fluctuations in the rate of exchange and the rate of discount, on the position and the operations of the Java-Bank (the only Bank that holds the privilege of note-issue for the whole of Netherlands India , as explained in my pamphlet on The money -market and pa^er-cmrency of British-India, pages 7/18, of which I beg to enclose a copy ^) ), may be traced from the figures given in appendix H, regarding discounts and outstanding loans, notes in circulation, and its reserve in coin and bullion. 29. The desire of the Government of India to obtain information as to the course of prices of the more important articles of export and import will be met, I hope, by the statement given in appendix I, showing the wholesale market-price of coft'ee, sugar, indigo, pepper, arrack and tin, all articles of export, and rice, the only article of local consumption dealt in wholesale on the spot. Market quotations of Java tea and tobacco cannot be given, these goods being never sold on the spot, but always shipped to Europe on planters' account. In appendix K may be found similar information in regard to prices of the chief articles of import, such as cotton piece-goods, metals and petroleum. 30. About the rate of wages, alluded to in the letter of the Yiceroy's Private Secretary no reliable figures as far back as 1870 have been obtainable. Regular statistics of wages in the different localities have only been published in the oificial reports on the ■ administration of the colony since 1874, a com- pendium of which for the three chieftowns of Java (Batavia, Samarang and Sourabaya), and some districts in the interior of the island, will be found in appendix M., but to draw a general and reliable con- clusion from the figures registered is next to impossible , wages having fallen in some parts of the island, and risen elsewhere, according to local circumstances. On the whole however the general level of wages has remained rather stationary, although in many instances a not uninportant rise in the i)' A reprint of the pages q^uoted will be found in Supplement I. — 28 wages of skilled labour , such as that of carpenters, masons, overseers, etc. has taken place. The influence of railway-construction on the rate of wages has been particularly conspicuous in the resi- dency of the Preanger "Regencies, where coolie labour at the time (in 1880) has been paid as high as 60 cents a day, or more than double the amount that was paid before or since the opening of the Regarding wages of clerks, and the lower classes of public servants, no material alteration of the rates ruling twenty years ago has to be recorded. If any change has been made it is in the line of increased pay to some Government officials. Mercantile and industial salaries have until lately remained the same as in former years, but under the pressure of the crisis through which Java is passing at present many salaries have been rather seriously curtailed. In some cases the incomes of managers of sugarmills , etc. have been reduced by fifty percent. 31. I am not aware whether in any country reliable information is obtainable as to the profits of the chief industries, such as the Government of India have in view with regard to this colony, but in any case I am unable to meet their wishes in this respect. The individual profits of manufacturers and agriculturists are as a rule kept secret; but it would not be impracticable to state in general terms what industries have been prosperous or the reverse during the last few years, and at the same time to indicate the causes of prosperity or depression. A few preliminary observations,' however, may be necessary. Por anyone familiar with the econom- ical condition of our colony, it is a well known fact that nearly all industrial enterprise is carried on by Europeans, and that the Natives themselves, apart from the coffee grown by them for account of the Government, as explained in § 13 already only contribute in an almost imperceptible degree to the exports of .Java. In this respect scarcely any contrast can be greater than that between the state of affairs in British India and Java. About four fifths or eighty percent of the export of British India represent the result of native labour and industry, without any assistance from European capital or European intel- lect; whereas, with the exception of some rice, kapok, hides, pepper and the forest -produce from neigh- bouring islands, such as gums and rattans, — the total value of which does not exceed 5 or 6 millions of guilders a year, — all the principal Java exports, such as sugar, coffee, indigo, tea, tobacco, arrack, tin, are planted, prepared or worked by Europeans utilising the productive forces of nature by means of salaried native labour. Thus the prosperity and the welfare of our colony is entirely dependent upon European enterprise, exactly as in Ceylon , whilst the same element occupies rather a subordinate rank in the economical development of the Indian Empire. Native industry in Java is almost exclusively agricultural, the planting of rice and other food grains, such as maize, pulse {phaseolms vulgaris, pisum sativum, soja hispida, araehis hypogaea etc.) and sweet potatoes {batatas eduUs), being the chief occupation of the people. Cotton is also grown on an extended scale in nearly every locality, but merely for domestic use. native women being in the habit of providing at least in part for the clothing of the family. European enterprise in Java has also developed itself more particularly in the agricultural line, there being no other industries of any importance in the whole island, with the exception of a couple of workshops in the chief towns, and in certain places of the interior, where the managers of sugarmills and other concerns may get their machinery and other implements repaired. It is only at Sourabaya that a few establishments on a more extensive scale are to be found; for the rest the manufacture — 29 — of artificial ice for local consumption is the only brancli of industry which has gradually become of some importance. A match factory at Samarang, which commenced working in 1893, has been wound up, it having been found impossible to compete with imports from Japan. 32. The export statistics of appendix G will give a pretty good insight into the importance of agricultural industry in this colony, and as regards the relative prosperity of the chief industries car- ried on in Java, the following may be observed. Up to the year 1883 the Sugar industry was in a most prosperous condition, owing to the high prices paid for sugar by the export houses, who for years had been keenly competing to get their proper share of the annual crop. The high price of course acted as a powerful stimulus in developing the in- dustry, which by and by became by far the most important factor of the welfare of the colony. Large amounts of capital were invested in new machinery to improve the older mills, and at the same time (between 1872/1884) over fifty entirely new mills were erected, generally on as efficient a scale as re- quired to compete with sugarmaking in other colonies. The results were indeed striking. The produc- tion of sugar, which in 1871 did not exceed 2.725.000 peculs, amounted to 6.493.000 peculs in 1884, thus showing an increase of 140 percent in twelve years, a result the more gratifying as it was obtained without any direct help or assistance from the Government, such as has been the case in all beetroot-growing countries through the bounty system, alluded to already in § 26. Thus sugar-making in Java was in a most flourishing condition , with a bright prospect of subsequent prosperity before it, when the great fall in prices in the course of 1884 threatened to destroy all future expectations. The position of the great majority of mill-owners became most critical, the more so as several of the Banks and other financial establishments which used to supply working-capital against consignment of the crop , got into serious difiiculties as soon at it had become apparent that in their turn they had to rely to a great extent on the credit they had till now generally and un interruptedly enjoyed, but which could scarcely fail at once to collapse in consequence of their being so largely inter- ested in sugar estates. Fortunately for all concerned, the 1885 crop realized a rather important advance on the price obtained for its predecessor, but erelong prices gave way again to such an extent, that the position of by far the majority of sugar-planters grew extremely precarious. It soon became evident that the industry would inevitably have to succumb, if it were to remain saddled with the charges Govern- ment had never ceased to levy according to the arrangements made in former years with most of the mill-owners, as explained already in § 14. Some relief was given by Government by the reduction ot the export duty of sugar from 18 to 9 cents per pecul from the 1^' July 1886 and at the close of the same year the remaining export duty was suspended for the next five years , while the tribute to Govern- ment of /' 25 per bouw of canes planted without Government interference was provisionally suspended, and a delay of five years was granted for payment of 50 percent of the tribute due on canes planted in pursuance of the contracts with the Government (see § 14 quoted above). About the same time the so-called //sereh" disease in the sugar cane became a sourse of much anxiety to planters. It first appeared in the Gheribon-residency , and from there the disease gradually extended its ravages, proceeding eastward, till at last the greater part of the island was infected. As to the causes of the plague different theories have been mooted, but the best method of treatment hitherto discovered is the planting of carefully selected healthy cane shoots, imported from places where the dis- ease has not made its appearance, viz the west-end of Java, and the hill-tracts in the interior of the island. — 30 — This measure is neccessarily a very costly one, making an extra outlay from about/ 50 to/ 100 per bouw often indispensable; but the energy displayed by planters in their struggle against the common ennemy, and in their endeavors to keep abreast of the times by the introduction of the newest appliances for simplifying and perfecting the manufacture of sugar, and thereby reducing the cost of production to its utter limits, enabled them to tide over a period of depression, which in the long run might have proved fatal to all interests concerned. In the meanwhile prices of sugar, having partially recovered from the great fall in 1884, proved as a rule sufficiently remunerative for Java planters to make the prospects of their industry rather pro- mising; but the abnormally large beetroot crop of 1894 caused another serious fall in the value of sugar, the prices now current being the lowest on record. The actual position of the Java sugar industry which, as stated already, is a matter of vital importance to 'the welfare of the island, has become rather critical again. Some mills have been closed already by the owners and unless a material improvement of prices sets in, it may be taken for granted that others will have to follow suit, and that the year 1896 will bring ruin on more than one estate which till now has been able to keep up the struggle, on the issue of which the future of the colony so largely depends. 33. Coffee-planting in Java, which twenty years ago looked exceptionally promising, has also since then experienced rather hard times. Many planters have found themselves in very great straits owing to the continuous fall in coffee prices since 1879; but what has affected their financial position much more still, has been the gradual spread, in Central Java at least, of leaf-disease, by which the greater part of the once so promising coffee plantations of Ceylon have already been ruined. Several plantations, some years ago still in a most flourishing condition, have had to be abandoned altogether, and though the rise in the price of coffee since 1886 has proved the salvation of a good many estates in the more Eastern part of the island where fresh land is being continually opened up and leaf-disease has till now been of a milder character , there was some time ago very little chance that in Central and Western Java coffee cultivation on private account by European planters would ever recover its former prosperity. But quite an unexpected revival of the industry was caused by the cultivation of the Liberia bean, the satisfactory results obtain- ed from its introduction becoming year by year more apparent, as the principal difficulties attending the preparation of this coffee for the market are gradually being successfully surmounted. As a result a marked improvement in the appearance and quahty of the coffee is noted, and its favor is becoming more and more assured. The continued recurrence of the leaf-disease in the Java cofiee on low-lying lands, from which the Liberia still preserves comparative, though by no means nntire immunity, causes more confidence to be felt in the latter, and many lands which have suffered most severely from the ravages of this disease in the Arabian plant, are being replanted with Liberia '). Until the year 1885 the cultivation of Indigo was one of the most promising industries of Java, on account of the high prices paid for the article during the period 1879/1884, and no wonder therefore that several coffee planters in Central Java, despairing of the future of their industry, took to indigo-manufacture wherever the soil was been found suitable to its growth. Consequently the production of indigo expanded from 248.000 kilogr. in 1875 to 657.000 kilogr. in 1885; but the fall in prices of the dye that since occurred has already put a stop to any further extension of indigo-planting, ') Report on the trade and commerce of Java by Acting-consul Maclachlan. Foreign office, annual series N 1522. — 31 — and caused great disappoiutment to the majority of planters , who on the whole have no particular reason at present to rejoice in the prosperous condition of their industry. This latter remark also applies in full to Tea planters , who for many years already have been strug- gling against the competition ,of India and lately of Oeylon, where the tea-industry is extending with such rapid strides, that the quantity exported has already become the tenfold of the whole produc- tion of Java, notwithstanding that a beginning had been made with tea-planting in Java more than sixty years ago, whereas in Oeylon the introduction of tea-planting barely dates from fifteen years ago. No doubt Java tea-planters have had good years before prices began to fall in 1876 and continued to de- cline, until in 1882 and 1883 they reached a level, at which it was impossible to sell without loss, aver- aging scarcely 50 percent of the prices ruling before 1876. Since then prices have continued to rule on a comparatively low level, which rather darkens present prospects, and this the more so for Java planters, as they do not benefit from the fall in exchange, which in India and Ceylon more than neutralises the baneful effect of the fall of tea prices in the London market. One of the few industries which at the present moment may be called prosperous is Tobacco planting in the Deli district in Sumatra, about which particulars have been given already in § 26. In former years tobacco-planting in many districts of Java enjoyed similar prosperity, though it was of short duration only on account of the heavy competition by which the costprice of the leaf was driven up to such a level, that it was soon found impossible to get a remunerative price for the manufactured article. Thus a regular collapse of tobacco-planting ensued in the Kediri and Probolingo residencies, where for many years it had greatly contributed to the welfare of the people. The Bondowosso district (residency of Bezoeki) and the Soerakarta residency are at present the only localities in Java where tobacco-growing for the European market is really of some importance. The only other branch of agricultural industry carried on by European enterprise is Cinchonabark- planting, which a few years back seemed to promise wonders; but it has already become evident, that at present the realisation of these wonderful promises is perhaps farther off than ever. Certain planta- tions may still prove a financial success even at the extremely reduced value of the bark , but it may be taken for granted that a good deal of capital has been invested in estates, which in the long run will not be able to continue the struggle for existence. 34). The conclusion to be drawn from what has been said in the preceding paragraph is, that on the whole the state of affairs, as far as European enterprise is concerned, can not be called prosperous, and considering the prominent place European enterprise occupies in the economical development of this colony, it is scarcely surprising that the same conclusion also applies to the general welfare of the country. No doubt the crops of rice and other foodgrains have been very plentiful for many years, and it is not to be denied that part of the native population have been benefited by the low prices ruling accordingly; but low prices of rice are no unmitigated boon to people who have to pay their landrental and other direct taxes, not in kind, but in money. When there are no buyers to be found for the rice in store, money must be procured by the sale of other things, such as household furniture, clothes, domestic anim- als, etc. in order to meet the exigencies of the tax collectors, and thus a plentiful crop may become a source of distress for the many. At all events the precarious position of many planters, who to make head against their present diffi- culties have to observe the strictest economy in regard to wages and other expenses, causes a good deal of harm to the native population by limiting their means of subsistence. Both Natives and — 3a — Europeans have more than once been experiencing very hard times during the last years, and the pro- gress in the general welfare of the country has therefore been a very slow one. 35. About the main cause of this state of affairs there can be sparcely any difference of opinion. The general depression from which trade and industry in almost every country of the world have been suffering , has not only made itself felt in oar colony to its full extent , but it has in no slight degree been aggravated by the effects of the crisis which broke out over Java in the last months of 1884, and which at one moment threatened to bring irretrievable ruin over the whole colony. All would have gone on well as before, had it not been for the prices of nearly all the principal staple articles of export, coffee alone excepted, falling to a level scarcely leaving any profit at all. Moreover the pros- perity of many parts of Java would not have been impaired, but for the disastrous effects of the diseases by which so many plantations have lately been attacked. Now, legislative action on the part of the Government has been unable, of course, to provide relief from these evils; but the question may be raised (as it has been done by the Government of India in its letter of the 2"^ July 1886), whether the actual currency system of the Dutch colonies has been conductive to their welfare, or whether the adoption of gold as a measure of value may perhaps have intensified the effects of the adverse circumstances, to which the country has lately been subject. There is scarcely any question more difficult to solve than the one, as to what effect a depreciation or appreciation of the currency may have on the welfare of a country. In British India for instance, amongst the mercantile community at least, it is pretty generally admitted that the fall in exchange, resulting from the fall in the value of silver, has been a benefit to the Empire by stimulating production and exports ; but on the other hand high authorities hold the opinion, that nothing of the kind has been the case, because the exporter does not actually receive a larger rupee retiirn for his goods, than he did when exchange was higher, that consequently he cannot and does not give a better return to the cultivator, and that low exchange therefore has not specially stimulated production '). The same difference of opinion may be met with in regard to the state of affairs in Netherlands India, some people alleging that the currency policy of the Government has proved a most decided benefit to the general community in protecting its interests from the disastrous consequences of a fluctuating standard of vahie, such as silver has become during the last twenty years, — and others inclined to endorse the opinion that the planting interests of the coun- try have been sacrificed by the policy of the Home Government in making gold the regulator of the currency in the Eastern possessions of the realm. I certainly do not pretend to solve the question, but I will try to give my opinion as concisely as possible, craving reference in the first place to a Memorandum on the state of the Currency Question in Holland and Java, published in June 1879, a copy of which I beg to enclose ^). That Memorandum will show that i myself have been instrumental for a good deal in bringing about the currency reform, the effects of which we will now have to study. 36. In my views on the currency question ') 1 have always been guided by the principle, that ') J. E. O'CoNOK, Indian trade and exchange; Simla, 1886; p. 1. 2) A reprint of the Memorandum quoted will be found in Supplement 11. 3) My remarks on the currency question have in the main heen left unaltered, all that happened with regard to monetary matters, since the first publication of the present work (1887), viz, the repeal of the Sherman hill in America the closing of the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver, the reform of the Austrian currency, rather confirming than — 33 — fixity of value, as far as attainable, is the indispensable characteristic of a monetary standard for every country in the world, and that it is a primary duty of every Government to neglect no reasonable means of keeping the currency once imposed upon its subjects at the standard value. My conviction in this respect has remained unaltered, as I am still of opinion, that under circumstances existing at a time when there was no appearance yet of a sensible appreciation of gold, it was a good and honest policy of the Home Government to do all that lay in its power to protect the currency of the colony against depre- ciation by declaring gold to be its monetary standard for the future. I cannot, however, possibly shut my eyes to the injury which this same measure has caused to a section of the community, and I do not hesitate candidly to confess, that in the adjacent countries, where no change in the currency system was effected, and silver has remained the only standard of value, things have taken quite another turn from what I anticipated when writing my Memorandum of June 1879. ') 37. Regarding British India it is not to be denied that, so far as the effect of the fall of silver on the financial position of tlie Government is eoncerned, the worst expectations have been fully invalidating the arguments I have brought forward against the boycotting of silver, a policy, according to my views, of . the most dangerous character, as it lies at the bottom of the unsatisfactory condition of trade, agriculture and industry throughout a good deal of the world during the last twenty years. The closing of the Indian mints for instance is the unreserved acknowledgement of the soundness of the theory, that legislative action on the part of Governement is the pa- ramount factor in regulating the value of the currency , as has been so manifestly proved by the Netherlands-Indian cur- rency experiment. If the law of England had declared silver, instead of gold , to be the standard of value, as advocated at the time by Michel Chevalier and Eichard Cobden , quite another ratio between the yellow and the white metal and quite another level of prices in general would have ensued than the one actually prevailing, and no doubt the breakdown of the ratio that for more than seventy years has been the basis of all commercial transactions would have been avoided, if an international arrangement had been entered into .by the leading monetary powers in the old and the new world by which their mints might have been opened to the free coinage of gold and silver at the ratio that for nearly a century practically proved immutable, notwithstanding the relative production of both metals was absolutely inverted during the same period. My belief in the eflciency and the beneficent working of such an agreement remains unshaken, it being my firm con- viction, that universal gold mono-metallism for the whole world is an unattainable Utopia, a delusion as great as the proposal that gold should be the standard of the rich and civilised nations, silver that of the nations which are back- ward and relatively uncivilised, — that, in a word, gold is for the western peoples, silver for the eastern. With the enormous international trade now going on, stability of the international medium of exchange is an absolute necessity, and the solution wanted, is to secure such stability as much as possible, unless it can be demonstrated that sudden and violent exchange fluctuations are desirable in themselves, and that is in an advantage to a trading nation to do business with customers the value .of whose currency is fluctuating from day to day. ' I In other respects my original anticipations as to the probable effect of the depreciation of silver on Eastern trade have been fully confirmed by facts. From the moment the monetary question came to the front, I have always opposed the theory upheld by the majority of Dutch and English economists, amongst whom the late Walter Bagehot has been one of the most eloquent and powerful advocates , viz : „that in case of a further decline in the price of silver, Asia would require much more of that metal, and that the immense Asiatic silver market would prove itself powerful enough to give us a sufdcient guarantee against any further important decline of silver". In a paper on the proposed reform of Dutch currency and its consequences to Netherlands India, read as early as the 16th June 1873, I took the liberty to protest against these views, and to defend my opinion, that India could not possibly absorb all the silver for which there would be no longer an immediate use in Europe, and that, therefore, the Asiatic silver market would by no means be able to secure to silver that relative firmness of value, which, according to the principles of monetary science it ought to possess to serve as a permanent standard measure of value in. Europa as well as in Asia and everywhere else. And now, what does experience prove in regard to the point at issue? To this question the follow- 5 — 34 ■— realized, the uncertainty in respect to silver entirely neutralising the most carefully paade forecasts for the future, and rendering the task of budget-making in India almost illusory, as pointed out by Sir Auckland Colvin in § 25 of his Financial Statement {Gazette of India extraordinary , March- 24, 1886). Bat according to the same authority there can be no reasonable doubt whatever about the general pros- perity of the Empire, the Indian agriculturist being, able to compete at great advantage with the agri- culturist of those countries which have repudiated the use of silver in their currency, except for pur- poses of subsidiary coinage. Thus instead of ruin and disaster, which the action of a depreciating cur- rency would, it was thought at the time, bring on the people of India ^), the fall in price of silver has, according to Mr. Barbour's opinion {The TJieonj of Bimetallism; London, 1886, p. 154) //conferred a boon of immense value on the country" -^). In Ceylon a new era of prosperity seems to have been entered upon since tea-planting has taken such a remarkable start ^), and as to the actual state of affairs in Singapore and the Straits ing figures as to the annual average of net imports of silver into British India and the price of harsilver in the London market are giving the proper reply: Periods. Fiscal years. Net import of silver. Price of harsilver. 5 years. 5 " 5 „ 5 „ i ' 1854/55—1858/59 1859/60—1863/64 1864/65—1868/69 1869/70—1873/74 1874/75-1878/79 1879/80—1883/84 1884/85—1888/89 1889/90—1893/94 Rs. 78.489.000 „ 101.817.000 „ 99.811.000 „ 35.982.000 „ 64.086.000 „ 61.992.000 „ 88.966.000 „ 121.407.000 61)i6 61"^/, 60% 60% 54% 513/, 466/, 39^ It is therefore beyond dispute that during the period of twenty years preceding the decline in the price of silver, viz. from 1854/55 to 1873/74 inclusive, India has been importing silver, amounting to the average value of 79.025.000 rupees per annum, at the average price of 6I73 pence, whereas these imports, during the following twenty years, did not "exceed 84.013.000 rupees, the average price of silver then heing 4878 pence per oz. st. Is it possible, I should wish to ask, to show in a more convincing manner the utter hollowness of the theory, „that there would be a demand for „silver for the East consequent on its cheapness — that this demand would grow with its cheapness — and then an „almost indefinite quantity, if supplied, would in time be taken off the market"; — or, to use the words of the same author, „that by letting things take their course, a new demand of great magnitude would eventually relieve the silver „market?" (Walter BagehOt, Some articles on the depreciation of silver, and on topics connected ivith it, London, 1877, p. 10, 55 and 80). ') „With a continuing silver currency the outlook for India must be into the darkness of Erebus, the gloom of des- pair." A Handbook on Gold and Silver by an Indian Official; London, 1877; p. 167. 2) „It may be safely asserted that India is now more prosperous than at any former period in the annals of British rule and this exceptional prosperity has been shown to be in a great measure due to the depreciation of silver.'' J. M. Maclean, Boycotted silver, in the Asiatic Quarterly Review, of April 1886. 3) „In calling you together for the resumption of our Legislative duties, I may, I think, congratulate you on the continuance of the steady, though slow, progress of the Colony towards recovery from the prolonged depression under which it has so severely suffered." Speech of H. E. the Governor of Ceylon on opening the Legislative Council October 8, 1886. — 35 — Settlements generally, the extracts from the Straits Times given at foot ') maj be deemed conclusive. 38. With all this striking and quite unexpected evidence before us , and comparing the prosperous times our neighbours seem to enjoy with the depression but too often prevailing in our colony, it is scarcely to be wondered at that the opposition on the part of our producers against our actual currency regulation has been very serious, as they are but too well aware that the policy of maintaining the currency at a high figure , relatively to the value of the dollar and the rupee, renders competition with other producers more and more difficult. Low exchanges, such as have been ruling in British India, in Ceylon, in the Straits, and in China , although they may prove detrimental to many interests of the countries in which they pre- vail, afford, it is argued, the means of protecting interests that otherwise would run the risk of being trampled down, and in this respect experience shows that the argument holds good so far as all adjacent colonies are concerned. It may bs quite true, as Mr. O'Conor concludes in his Note on the ejffect of a low rate of exchange on the Indian export trade, quoted above, that the fall in exchange does not benefit the Indian producer; that low exchange is the outcome of the same cause to which the general and heavy fall in prices in the consuming markets may be brought home, namely the appreciation of gold; that a rise in the rate of exchange would of course be attended by a corresponding rise in gold prices, and that things after all would remain quite' the same even if exchange were to run up again to its former par; — but according to his views, which the Government of India have in the main endorsed by ordering their publication in the Official Gazette, low exchange has at all events had the effect of counteracting for a good deal the loss to Indian trade from low prices, and in this respect has been one of the elements to prevent the great depression of Indian trade, that otherwise unavoidably would have ensued. Now, in this respect, things in our colony have been quite the reverse. Exporters and pro- ducers have got no compensation whatever for the steady fall in goldprices in the consuming mar- kets, because rates of exchange here have almost remained stationary for the last twelve years, as shown by the figures given in § 28. A shipment of Java sugar, coffee or tea, netting in London say ^ 10.000, does not bring into the hands of the Java planter or merchant a larger amount of guilders than it used to do before the fall in the price of silver set in, viz f 117.500 or ,/ 120.000 Netherl. Indian cur- rency; but at the same moment a similar amount of £ 10.000, remitted to India at the present rate of about 1 sh. 1 d. per rupee is equivalent toEs. 184.615, whilst in former years, at a rate of 2 sh. per rupee, it would have been equivalent only to Es. 100.000. Thus the fall in exchange actually leaves a profit of about 80 percent to the producer in British India, a margin quite real and palpable, instead of ima- ginary as some people pretend, so long at least as it is not shown, that the rupee has lost in the same proportion the purchasing power it used to have formerly, and that prices and wages in India have experienced a proportionate increase. This has not been the case, as is pretty generally admitted ^), and ') „Th6 prosperity of tbe Colony during the year 1885 lias been steady and gratifying in the extreme, and there is every confidence of its continuing. The finances are on a thoroughly satisfactory footing and the Colony is increasing in population and extent." Straits Times, Decemher 31, 1885. The future of the country is now becoming apparent, and everything pointi to an expansion of the trade of the Colony and its dependencies such as was never dreamed of in the most sanguine estimates of its possible greatness." Straits Times, December 9, 1886. 2) A rise in prices, owing to the depreciation of the silver ctirrenoy, has not taken place." Despatch of the Govern- ment of India to the Secretary of Slate; Simla, the ^Ih September 1886. — 36 — therefore, whatever detriment the depreciation of the exchange value of the rupee may have caused to the general interests of the country, or more especially to the financial position of the Government, it is altogether beyond question that up to the present moment it has been of immense benefit to the plant- ing interests of the Empire. 39. A similar benefit has been withheld from planters in Netherlands India by the adoption of gold as a measure of value. Per although theoretically the appreciation of gold ought to have caused a proportionate decline in prices and wages, experience has made it manifest that the appreciation or the depreciation of the whole currency is a very slow process in countries like the British and Dutch Pos- sessions in Asia '). The purchasing power of our guilder, in relation to wages and to commodities for daily use, has increased as little, as the purchasing power of the rupee in India can be said to have diminished, and although, if silver remains low, the laws of supply and demand will in the long run raise prises in India till the present benefit . of the planters , through the exchange , will be lost , — quite as long a period no doubt will be required to restore the equilibrium there, as most certainly will elapse before the general level of prices and wages in Netherlands India will have fallen in accordance with the gold value of the currency. In the meantime our planters have to submit to every fall in the gold price of their goods, without finding any adequate compensation in a low rate of exchange, by which exporters and planters in India and Ceylon have benefited so largely. With silver quoted at 30 d. pr. oz. standard in the London market, the par of exchange between London and Batavia would move from /"IS, the actual rate, to about/' 34 per pound sterling, in case free coinage of silver, either for the whole realm or for the Indian Possessions only, were again allowed by the Home Government. Thus exporters would be enabled to pay 100 percent more than at present for all the sugar, coffee, indigo, etc. they buy from the planters, and without any rise of prices in the consuming markets our local prices for exports would go up , say for sugar from _/ 7. — to about _/' 14. — pr. pecul // coffee // '/ 40. — „ n „ 80. — " // // indigo // // 4. — // n n 8. — // lb. // tea // // 0.50 // n n 1. — // // etc. etc. ; a rise more than sufficient to remove the evil effects of the crisis under which agricultural enterprise in Java was and actually is suffering. 40. It is evident therefore that a return to the silver standard would prove an indisputable benefit to the planting interests of the colony, but I do not feel in any way induced to advocate a similar reform of the existing currency-system, fully convinced as I am that, to use the words of Stuart Mill {Principles of Political Economy; Book III, chapter XIII, § 5) //there is no way in which a general rise of prices, or in other words, depreciation of money, can benefit anybody, except at the expence of somebody else". We have also to look at the reverse of the medal, and in so doing it will become 1) The same remark applies also to Russia. „Paper money lias been issued by the Eussian Government in suoli enorm- ous quantity that the credit rouble, always falling, lost between 1864 and 1882 twenty nine percent of its buying power in the world markets. Yet in the interior market, especially in the villages, it has hardly depreciated at all." The Russian Agrarian Question, by Stepniak, in the Times weekly edition of 20 August, 1886 p. 9. — 37 — evident that a change, such as the one alluded to, would so seriously aifect a number of important in- terests, that any proposal to undo the measures taken in 1877, and to leave the coinage of silver in behalf of Netherlands India free, may be considered as quite out of the sphere of practical politics. First of all the general community as consumers of imported articles are to be considered. With a rate of a 100 percent to the disadvantage of importers, prices of imports must be raised propor- tionately, if trade is to be continued at all, and the bulk of imports being destined for consumption by Natives, the latter would for the greater part have to bear the burden of the general rise in prices consequent on the readoption of silver as a standard of currency. Suppose the native community pays / 100.000.000 a year for cotton goods, petroleum, haberdashery, salted fish, not to mention rice, which often has to be imported from abroad to make good occasional short crops in Java, more than double that amount would have to be spent on the same quantity of com- modities in case the rate of exchange should be regulated by the actual value of silver. These figures will make it altogether superfluous to expatiate any further on the baneful effect of a reform, such as the one suggested, on the condition of the people. It may be that the prejudice resulting from a general rise in prices of imports would not have been so very pernicious, if people had got accustomed to it gradually, as must have been the case in British India and other adjacent countries, but it is impossible to think seriously of a change being effected at a blow, the result of which would unavoid- ably upset all existing contracts and transactions; and bring confusion over the whole system of social and commercial intercourse. The interests of home and other capitalists who have put capital at the disposal of the colony by^ investing in sugarmills, coffee and other plantations , banks and similar concerns , railways, etc. etc. have next to be taken into account. Without any exaggeration, the total capital thus invested may be esti- mated at over 150 or 200 million guilders, the owners of which would be literally despoiled of half of their capital if the currency, on the relative stability of which they had ventured to rely, were to be depreciated through legislative action by one hundred percent or more. It may be argued, that by means of such a depreciation the general situation would be more prosperous, and that many concerns, now doomed to irretrievable ruin by the decline in prices of exports, would continue to pay good returns to the owners or the money-lenders; but still the mischief caused to others would be so overwhelming, the number of victims thereby would be so great, that on this account also a change such as the one alluded to, may be considered as utterly impossible. Besides other interests of no less magnitude are at stake, for what will become the position of Government officials, from the highest rank to the lowest, and of all other persons living on fixed sala- ries, the moment they find their incomes mulcted in proportion to the general rise of prices they will have to make head against? The same hardships will fall to their share as have made the condition of so many Government officials and other private persons in India unbearable, although in one respect people here will be better off than their Indian fellow-sufferers, in as much as our Government will not have to resort to enhanced taxation in order to recoup the loss the Indian Government has to sustain owing to the low exchanges ruling there. On the contrary: the case is exactly the reverse, as the Government of Netherlands India derives part of its revenue in kind from forced coffee-cultivation, the produce of which is sold in the open market, either locally or in Holland. Now, the effect of a fall in exchange on the sale of coffee, or on the sale of bills drawn against proceeds of coffee sold in Holland, would of course procure to our Government a profit just as it makes the Government of India losers on the bills — 38 — thej have to pay ou account of home charges , to be met at the expense of the Indian treasury. The sale of coffee, tin and cinchona-bark, which according to the Budget Estimates for 1895 was calculated to yield to the N. I. Government / 26.005.000, would certainly have brought into its treasury some twenty five millions more, if buyers could have taken into account a rate of exchange, such as has been ruling for the whole year in India and China, and a similar profit might easily enable the Government to raise the salaries of their officials, as a compensation for the loss they would incur as their share on account of the falling rates of exchange. 41. The force of the arguments thus far brought forward against abandoning the actual currency system is, of course, more or less impaired by tlie observations which, for impartiality's sake, had to be added; but the strongest, and in my eyes absolutely irrefutable objection lies in the fact, that with regard to the currency of the colony, no change whatever could possibly be effected, without disturbing at the same time the monetary system of the mother-country. That system has been the outcome of the almost universal conviction that Holland could in no wise retain its silver standard, the moment all its neighbours adopted gold as the basis of their currenoy, and certainly no proposal will ever be taken into consideration, which possibly may prejudice a system, about the thorough efficacy of which no difference of opinion has ever become manifest. The only fear with regard to currency matters, by which people ^in Holland are preoccupied, is the possibility of silver being sent home from the colonies, as since 1875 has been the case to an amount of about f 60.000.000, and the opening of the Utrecht Mint to free coinage of silver in behalf of our Eastern Possessions, would in the long run have exactly the same effect, as allowing free coinage of silver for home purposes, so long at least as no measures should be taken for the total demonetisation of silver in the mother country. 43. Last but not least, another aspect of the question deserves attention, namely the possibility that silver once more will reconquer the place it formerly occupied in the currencies of the world, or to use the words of Sir Auckland Golvin in his Financial Statement for 1886/87, § 25, that- //the relation be- tween gold and silver will be replaced on a footing analogous to that which formerly existed." When it comes to this, — and according to the views expressed by the Government of India them- selves, in their despatch to the Secretary of State for India of the 2""^ February 1 886, „the adoption sooner or later by international agreement of measures, which will bring about a stable ratio between gold and silver, can be only a question of time", — • the position of Netherlands India in its present development will certainly become a privileged one, as it will then be able to compete on equal terms with other countries, where a rise in the value of silver, and a corresponding rise in the rate of exchange, will act as contrary to the interests of producers and exporters, as the fall of exchange during the last twenty years has been in their favor. Thus a stop will be put at once to any further abnormal exten- sion of production in those countries, where silver continued to be the only standard of value; a more healthy state of affairs over the whole of the world will ensue; and Netherlands India will be amongst the first to recoup itself from the hardships to which it stood exposed to the fullest extent under the working of a currency system, introduced at the time with the best intentions, but which in many respects has crippled the development of the country, as a comparison between the depression in our colony and the prosperity in adjacent colonies but too clearly shows. — 39 — It' cettaiuly would be gross exaggeration to ascribe the present unsatisfactory state of affairs in our colony to the effect of the currency system alone; a good deal of the actual depression no doubt may be brought home also to overtaxation , the indispensable consequence of a policy — quite unexampled in any country, if I am not mistaken, — which by charging to the current revenue the capital outlay for the construction of railways and other public works, makes the present generation pay for profits to be reaped only by a future one ; — but unless all that I have stated above should be found incorrect ^), it may be taken for granted , that the gold Standard, till now at least, has not had the beneficent effect on the welfare of the country, that was hoped for at the time of its adoption, and in which I myself for many years have been a strong believer. Having shown however, as I venture to think, that searching for a remedy is altogether out of the question, the only thing left for Netherlands India is to endure the present evil, and to await the ulti- mate cure, which certainly will be brought about as soon as the bimetallic theory wiU have found its practical application. 43. It would, of course , be out of place to conclude my present remarks by a digression on the great problem of the day , the gold and silver question, about which the Eoyal Gold and Silver Com- mission in their Pinal Eeport of October 1888 have given all the information procurable; but by the way, I cannot help expressing my unconditional sympathy with the Opinion held by the Government of India, as stated in their despatch to the Secretary of State quoted above, that the universal adoption of a fixed ratio between gold and silver would be of incalculable benefit, not only to India, but to all the world. Keeping up such a ratio, it is argued by the opponents of the bimetallic theory, would be an utter impossibility, it being contrary to the nature of things that legislative action, instead of the ordi- nary action of the law of supply and demand, should regulate the relative value of two different commo- dities. For the moment I do not dispute the force of the argument, but at all events it passes my under- standing how any reasoning being can fail to see, that the outlawry of silver, by means of legislative action on the part of nearly all civilised nations , has much more disturbed the working of the great eco- nomical causes, by which the world is ruled, than ever would have been the case if a universal arrange- ment to open all the mints in the old and the new world to free coinage of gold and silver, at the ratio Prance and its neighbours have kept up for more than seventy years, had been made at the time. The production of silver, no doubt, has been on the increase since 1870; the quantity however has only trebled, as compared with the annual average in the preceding period (1801 — 1870), whilst the average production of gold after the discoveries of the Californian and Australian mines soon became more than eight times the amount on which the world had to depend in former years ^); — and now, what ') As has teen maintained on reliable and trustworthy authorities by Mr. Kensington, Deputy Secretary to the Govern- ment of India, whose very interesting Note on the present working of the Gold Standard in Java will be found repro- duced in extenso in Supplement III. 2) Annual production of Gold: 1801—1850, 23.697 kilogr. Annual production of Silver: 1801—1870 833.743 kilogr. d°. d°. 1851—1870, 195.149 „ d". d°. 1871—1890 2.720.000 „ or as 1 : 8.25 or as 1 : 3.26 Di'. A. SoETBEEE, Litteraturnachweis uber Geld- und Munzwesen; Berlin, 1892. — 40 — else but the discarding of silver for currency purposes, can possibly have been the cause that, although the immense increase in the production of gold hardly affected the relative value of both metals, the comparatively insignificant development of the production of silver has within a cowple of years brought about a disturbance, unexampled since the construction of the Pyramids. We stand in face of a pheno- menon without precedent in the history of mankind ^) ; and the argument that no remedy in the shape of bimetallism can succeed in doing away with the evil from which the world is actually suffering, because whatever has been done in that direction has till now proved unsuccesful , can in no wise be maintained. Never, so long as the world has existed, has a universal understanding been come to amongst nations to use gold and silver conjointly for currency purposes at a stable ratio , and every argument against such a course, based on isolated trials and isolated experiments, must necessarily remain incomplete and fallacious. Whatever effect increased production of silver may have had till now, it is a well-known fact that any available stock of the metal is nowhere to be found. All the output of the mines has been brought to market and disposed of, either for industrial purposes, for coining standard dollars in America accor- ding to the Bland bill, and subsidiary coins in Europe, or for export to India and China. Now, the effect of a universal bimetallic league could have been no other than to slightly alter the distribution of silver amongst the various nations , without causing however any sensible difference in the monetary situa- tion from the one actually in view. It may be that Europe would have absorbed a little more, and the East somewhat less silver, but on the other hand to quote the words of a well known American author ^), //there would have been no cause for uncertainty as to the future value of either half of the world's money relatively to the other ; no actual divergence of the market ratio of the metals , which would , on ') In the Journal of the Stalist:cal Society, September 1886, p. 582, the following synopsis of the relative exchange value of gold and silver since the year 1600 before Christ has been given : Prom 1600 BC to 400 BC 1 part gold equal to about 13| parts silver. „ 400 „ „ 1600 AD 1 „ 12 „ 1600 AD „ 1640 „ 1 „ 13i „ 1641 „ „ 1790 „ 1 „ 14i-15 „ „ 1791 „ „ 1870 „ 1 „ 15i and since then, according to Soetbeer's figures: From 1871 to 1875, 1 part gold equal to 15.°^ parts silver. „ 1876 „ 1880, 1 „ 17."= „ 1881 „ 1885, 1 „ 18." „ 1886 „ 1890, 1 „ 20."° „ 1891 „ 1892, 1 „ 22." „ 1893 „ 1894, 1 „ 29.°' Thus in the last 20 years a greater change has come over the ratio between gold and silver than has ever been the case in the preceding 3400 years! Examples of a depreciating currency through over-issue of inconvertible paper on the other hand, have been numerous in the world's financial history, but a depreciation on this account has quite another effect on trade than^a cheapening of the precious metals, as demonstrated in chapter X of Bagehot's articles On silver, quoted p. 31. 2) S. Dana Horton, Silver before Congress, in the October number of the Quarterly Journal of Economics ; Boston. 1886, p. 50. — 41 — the contrary, have remained more firmly grown or welded together; no undermining of gold values by competing silver prices made artificially lower; no ^silver question," in fine, would have existed to chill confidence , to distract the present and cloud the future of individual or of corporate or national finance." I hope with the above to have met the desire of the Government of India and with the assurance that any further information, if wished for, will readily be given, I remain. Dear Sir, Yours sincerely N. P. VAN DEN BERG. &TJ T>1P Ij E ls/L:EJSr T. See p. 25. An abstract puom the pamphlet: //The Money maiiket and Papee, cuiiiiENCY OP BiUTTsH India" ; Batavia, 1884; p. 7 — 18. It is beyond question that the paper currency established by the British Indian legislator fully answers the purpose , so far as business requires an easier means of exchange than gold or silver coins; but no connection whatever exists between the issue of the fiduciary currency and the wants of the public to have their bills and other commo- dities converted into a current medium of exchange. The bullion stored in the vaults of the Currency- Department is a sufficient guarantee for the public at large , that the notes in their hands can at any time be convertible into hard cash; but it does not add in the least to the operating power of the Banks , which only can come to the rescue of trade in times of pressure , and this is the sole cause of the unexpected convulsions and sudden transitions in the money market, so utterly detrimental to bu- siness, to which British Indian trade is constantly exposed : — impediments which , as a rule , are unkwown in Netherlands India, owing to the man- ner in which currency and banking have been re- gulated here. Not at once however did Netherlands India get the benefiit of the banking system which at the present moment is working so remarkably well. Ever since the year 1828, when the Java Bank was first established , it has held the exclusive pri- vilege of the issue of banknotes for all the posses- sions of the Dutch in the Eastern Archipelago; but the rules to be observed with regard to the note issue have been subject to various alterations, and it was only in 1875, after an existence of nearly fifty years, that the Java Bank was empowered to regulate its operations according to the saine prin- ciples on which the Netherlands Bank in Amster- dam is working , _ and which for many years have proved highly beneficial to all the interests con- cerned. In the original charter of the Java Bank the clause was inserted , '/that the total amount of notes to be issued should be regulated by the Bank's own capital, inclusive of all discounts, loans, de- posits, bullion and credits"; but no provisions whatever were made with regard to the amount of coin or bullion to be kept in reserve as a guaran- tee for the convertibility of the note-circulation , and as the l')irectors of the Bank in their first re- port to the shareholders were obliged to make the artless confession, //that they had not succeeded in obtaining the necessary information for the in- vestigation of the principles on which similar es- tablishments were conducted elsewhere", it is not — 43 — surprising that before long the affairs of the Bank became hopelessly involved, and that its specie ebbed away, whilst the credit and loan operations were extended to an unreasonable degree through an inconsiderate issue of uncovered notes. After the Bank had been in existence for ten years, in 1839, it became evident that it was vir- tually insolvent, not being able any longer to cash the notes held by the public. The fault of the awkward position in which the Bank had been broiight unquestionably rested with the mismana- gement of the Directors, but part of the blame must fall upon the Government itself, which for years had been busy in wilfully perverting the currency of the colony. Judging that the wants of the native population were on too limited a scale to require precious metals for a general medium of exchange, and on the other hand that it was in the interest of //the good people of these countries to increase the cir- culation of copper coins as much as possible" (Decree of the Governor-General of Netherlands- India of 25^^ June 1818, No. 46), the Govern- ment continued for years to effect the bulk of its payments in copper, the so called doits {duiten), which were imported in large quantities from Hol- land, with the unavoidable result, in accordance with Gresham's law , that all the good money for. merly issued was driven out of the country. Silver was still the legal standard , virtually however no- thing but copper remained as the general circu- lating medium for the whoJe community, and to facilitate matters, the Government devised the in- troduction of a copper-representing paper currency, which the Java Bank, notwithstanding the reite- rated protests of its Directors , was forced to issue against the copper coins deposited with the Bank for account of the Government up to an amount of six millions of guilders. In many respects, however, the remedy proved worse than the disease. The multiplication of the currency, by means of the issue of the copper- notes, as they were called, caused fresh derange- ment and confusion, as the notes were not always taken at par with the copper circulating under various forms, and so the copper coins were often at a premium against paper, whilst certain coins were only convertible at a discount against other copper coins. Eor years the colony had been suffering severely under this miserable condition of the currency, and it was not until the year 1844 that the Govern- ment became aware that the state of things could no longer be endured , and that measures of a most efficient character had to be taken to resettle cur- rency matters on a satisfactory basis. The first step in that direction was taken in 1845 by the issue of the so-called recepissen, a paper money issued by Government in exchange for the circulating copper and copper-notes, and rea- dily taken by the public, although every one was aware, that for the moment no standard coins were available for the final payment of the recepissen. They were however accepted at the Government treasury in full payment of bills of exchange drawn by the Governor General on the Home Government at the fixed rate of 95 guilders Dutch currency for every 100 guilders recepis. In this manner a farther depreciation of the currency, which at one moment , according to the quoted rates of exchange (70 per cent on Holland and_/15i per £ St. on London), had reached 30 per cent, was not only prevented, but ere long its value was brought up again pretty nearly to the level of the standard currency in the mother-country, and so the way was paved for the introduction in Netherlands Lidia of the monetary system of the Netherlands as it had been regulated by the law of 26"' November 1847. The scheme for the reorganisation of the Indian currency on the same basis as the one adopted at home, was sanctioned by the law of 1^' May 1854, and since then the Government has left nothing undone to secure to the colony the benefit of a thoroughly efficient currency. For some consecutive years large shipments of silver coin from Holland — 44 to Java , to an aggregate amount of nearly 90 mil- lions of guilders between the years 1854 and 1860, were made on Government account; everywhere the opportunity was afforded of getting silver coins in exchange for the circulating doits , which in that way gradually returned into the hands of the Gov- ernment to be reshipped to Holland, where the metal was sold and partly used for the manufacture of the new copper coins to be issued to a maxi- mum amount of 10 millions of guilders, according to the provisions of the new currency regulations. Ever since that period the state of the currency in Netherlands India has been as satisfactory, nay as perfect, as in the mother-country itself; even the recent silver crisis leaving it altogether unaffect- ed in consequence of the measures taken by the Gov- ernment to keep the currency at the standard value by closing the Mint at Utrecht for any further coin- age of silver money. Having no Mint of its own, the colony has always been supplied with the mo- ney, required for circulation, by specie imports from Holland, — a system which, during the thirty years of its existence, has fidly answered the re- quirements of the country. It united the circula- tion of Java and the other islands of the Archi- pelago with the circulation in the mother-country ; and experience has fully shown that the esta- blishment of a Mint in Java , which some years ago (in 1862 and 1863) had been warmly advo- cated by the commercial community , but as strong- ly opposed by the author of the present pamphlet, would have been of no use whatever, so long as the main source for the supply of the material to be coined , i. e. silver , was to be found in Europe, and more particularly in the London market. With the currency reform of 1854 a new fa- ture dawned upon the Java Bank, and for the first time since its establishment, a quarter of a century back, it was enabled to continue business on sound and correct principles. A good deal of course of the Government silverimports accumulat- ed in its vaults, and the ready convertibility of its notes soon becoming unquestionable , their cir- culation gradually spread over the whole Archipel- ago, even in those parts where no agencies of the Bank had till then been established. Eor some years however the regular working of the Bank was rather to be attributed to the more prudent policy of its Directors than to the rules laid down for its management by Government. In 1848 the charter had been renewed, with the clause that the issue of notes was never to exceed a certain amount fixed by the Governor General, but no limitations were made as to the amount of bullion to be kept in reserve against the issue. Not until 1859, when the charter was again pro- longed for another period of ten years , was the existing deficiency in the rules of the Bank pro- vided for by the stipulation (clause 30), //that no //emission of notes was to take place unless the //Bank should at least have three tenths of the //amount to be issued disposable in legal currency", and (clause 31), //that the maximum to be issued //on that footing should be fixed according to cir- //cumstances by the Governor General, on Royal //authority"; it being left to the Bank's own com- petency (clause 32) //to issue notes above that //maximum, provided the full equivalent in legal //currency is and remains available at the Bank" for any note to be issued above that sum. Originally fixed at 7 millions of guilders, the maximum was raised to 10 millions by Decree of 31"* July 1860; but on account of the steady growth and development of private trade and in- dustry it was found necessary to gradually extend the limit. From 15 millions in December 1864 it was brought to 20 millions in September 1866, and this lasted till 1874, when a furter extension of the maximum to 25 millions was granted by Decree of 19* September, pending the decision of the Home Government on a proposal of the Directors of the Bank to withdraw all restrictions on the amount of notes to be issued , and to have the paper currency in Netherlands India regulated in conformity with the system having force of law at home, and which during a number of years had 45 — proved perfectly to suit the social and oommercial requirements of the country. Of the successful working of the Bank of the Netherlands, since its establishment in 1814, not too much can be said. During the seventy years of its existence it has proved an undeniable bene- fit to the community. Never for a single moment has it been in default with regard to its obliga- tions to secure the ready convertibility into specie of the notes, the issue of wich has always remain- ed a monopoly entrusted to its care. Even in the worst periods of pressure , when the surrounding money markets were suffering under a state of crisis, which, not the least in England itself, often proved so utterly disastrous not only to the commercial interests but to the whole social body, the Netherlands Bank has succeeded in keeping the Dutch money market free from every panic, always being able to assist the public, without resorting to any of the artificial measures which other banks have so often used to put a limit to the draip on their resources. Moreover the Neth- erlands Bank has always kept free from any State intervention, or any meddling with State finances, and it consequently enjoys general confi- dence in a measure, which may be equaled else- where, but certainly can not be surpassed. It may be deemed very strange therefore, that so little is known abroad about the organisation and the working of the Bank of the Netherlands. Even in the most recent publications about bank- ing and banks written by Englishmen, frequent mention is made of the account given by Adam Smith in his immortal work of the old Amster- dam Bank, which was found to be utterly insolv- ent when the Dutch Eepublic was overrun by the armies of the Erench in 1795; but tiU now we have never met with any account of the present Bank '), notwithstanding its working as a bank ') Mac Cullocli's Commercial .Dictionary i. v. Batavia , gives some tolerably correct information about tbe history of the Java Bank (the Bank of Batavia as it is called er- roneously) but with regard to the Bank of the Nether- of issue is of much more consequence to the com- mercial community at large than the existence of an establishment , which , to quote Adam Smith's own words, //lends out no part of what is depos- //ited with it, but, for every guilder for which //it gives credit in its books, keeps in its reposi- //tories the value of a guilder either in money or //bullion." [Wealt/i of Nations; ed. Rogers; Ox- ford, 1869; II. 60.) The Bank of the Netherlands is operating on quite another basis. It assists the public with its notes , which may be issued to an unlimited amount, provided only that four tenths of the total amount issued, together with the amount of the deposits (account-current-balances) and bank-post bills, or, in other words, of the total amount of the Bank's liabilities, be available in coin or bullion. The statutory reserve therefore is never to fall below 40 percent of the liabilities , but the first class standing the Bank has been able to acquire, is certainly owing chiefly to the traditional custom of keeping aloof from the legal limit of issue by timely raising the rate of discount, and so we find an average proportion between liabilities and the stock of specie and bullion lands, i. v. Bank-Banking, Section XI, no mention what- ever is made of its actual mode of operating, stating only: „/C is alleged that the Bank of the Netherlands „has a considerably greater supply of bullion in propor- „tion to its circulation than any other bank." The same remark is repeated in F. A. Walker's Money; London 1878 ; p. 513, adding that „sound banking principles have „long been traditional in Holland, and the Bank of the „Netherlands maintains a reputation hardly second to „any"- Professor Stanley Jeyous in this treatise on Money and the Mechanism of Exchange often speaks of the old Amsterdam Bank (p. 200, 221 and 254), but he does not mention the Netherlands Bank. In E. H. Patterson's Science of Finance a whole chapter is devoted to „Foreign systems of banking", only relating however to banking in France, Belgium, Hamburg and the United States, — whilst R. H. Inglis Palgrave in his Notes on Banking, London 1870, only treats of the banks of England, Swe- den, Denmark and Hamburg. 46 — in tbe year 1881/82 of 58 per cent and // // // 1882/83 „ 55 // // whilst the lowest proportion ever reached has been 45"/, (, per cent on the 6"^ August 1870, during the panic of the Franco-Cxerman war. But even at that moment the available metallic reserve or surplus was more than _/' \\\ millions in excess of the legal limit, and it was only for a short time found necessary to raise the rate of discount to 6 per cent. It is unquestionable that the banking system and the paper-currency of Holland may be taken as a model of the kind and a safe guide for the orga- nisation of any other similar institution. To the Bank of the Netherlands of course the Directors of the Java Bank have ever looked, since cur- rency matters in the colony were placed upon a more regular footing, and nothing was therefore more natural than their desire to be empowered to operate on the same principles, and more espe- cially to be liberated from the clause about the holding of a full reserve for the notes issued in excess of the legal maximum, a clause which more than once had paralysed the operating power of the Java Bank at moments when its assistance was urgently needed by the commercial community. It was a long time however before the Govern- ment decided to lend a willing ear to the propo- sals of the Bank, but by a Government decree of the 18"" March 1875 matters were definitively settled in the wished-for way, and the Bank ob- tained what it had hitherto been denied, viz. the power to enlarge the issue when an increase oc- curs in the temporary requirements of the public The importance of this reform is evident. Like everywhere else the trade demand for money is very fluctuating in the commercial centres of Netherlands India. As a rule it is on the increase during the shipping season, beginning in June of each year, to reach its highest point in the months of Septem- ber and October, and subsiding again in the months following. In the first six months the demand for banking accommodation is much slacker than in the second half year , and now supposing a Java Bank empowered to meet the increasing demand by the issue of notes not to exist, it would be indispens- able to order specie from abroad, with the perfect certainty that after a certain lapse of time the specie imported would again become quite superfluous. Now- a-days however the circulation can be expanded in accordance with the exact wants of the moment by the issue of Java Bank notes, and the beneficial effect of the reform inaugurated in 1875 was never more strikingly brought to light than during the year 1883, it being beyond question that during the first weeks of the last shipping season the means of the Bank would have already been nearly exhausted if the limitations existing before the reform of 1875 had not been removed. Nothing can be more convincing is this respect than the figures ofthe Bank's balance-sheet, published weekly in the Official Gazette. According to the balance of the 25"^ of July 1883 fo'r instance, the liabilities, i.e. the circulating notes, deposits, post - bills, etc. amounted to/'42.438. 000 against a stock of specie of/25.031.000, leaving available a metallic reserve of /' 8.055.000 for further discount and loan operation. Had the former regulations about the issue of notes still been in force, there should have been in stock the difference between the amount of the liabilities ad / 42.438.000 and the legal maximum of / 25.000.000 say/ 17.438.000^^* the three tenths of that maximum ad / 7. 500.000 or together / 24.938.000, and there being on hand / 25.031.000, an amount of/ 92.000 only would have been at the diposal of the Bank for further assistance to the public. Now the different operations of the Bank at that date amounted to/ 21.583.000 to extend shortly afterwards to/ 2 5. 00 0.0 00, and once even to more than/26.000.000, being three millions in excess of the highest amount on record since the establishment of the Bank (namely / 23.186.000 on the 20'''' September 1876), and it is manifest therefore that if the Bank had been as powerless as before 1875 In regard to the credit- wants of the public , a period of pres.sure and crisis in the money 47 — market might have ensued, necessitating perhaps the raising of the rate of discount to 10 or 12 per cent , or even higher still, in order to deter the public as much as possible from applying to the Bank for further accommodations. Now however the greatest ease and steadiness continued to prevail in the Java money-market, notwithstanding the trade demand for money was brisker than in any former year. It is true that at the end of July last the bank-rate was raised one per cent, fixing the rate for private bills running longer than 30 and shorter than 90 days at 7 per cent p. a., bat no one can assert that this measure created any uneasiness or disturbance. It was silently submitted to as a matter of course by the public , and it is not improbable that even a further rise was expected, but other steps in that direction could be avoided, the application for credit accommodation not being coupled with any demand for silver for export. If there had been any probability of a demand of this nature, matters most likely would have taken a different course, but as things have gone, they form a striking illustration of the benefits derived from the existing regulations on paper-cur- rency in Netherlands India, — provisions by which the Bank has been enabled to meet a really extra- ordinary demand for money without disturbing busi- ness in the slightest way. Such have been the beneficial results of the reform of 1875; and it is only to this measure that the trade of Java and of Netherlands India in general, including the commercial interests of Padang and Macassar, is indebted for the steadiness of the money market during recent years, — a steadiness which, no doubt, would also have been the leading feature in the British-Indian money market, if its credit and banking system rested on the principles by which the Netherlands Indian legislator has been guided. See p 32. S XJ 1= I* 3L E Is/L E UST T. II. MeMOUANDUM on the PllESENT STATE OP THE CuUUENCY QUESTION IN Holland and Java; Bat a via, 1879. As a rule people out of Holland have got but very scanty information about the measures taken by the Dutch Government with regard to currency matters in Holland and Java. In the valuable Heport from, the Select Committee on the Depreciation of Silver^ ordered , by the House of Commons , to be printed 5 July, 1867, it is stated (p.XLYI), that//asto Hol- //land the Committee have to regret that they have //been left almost without any information ; which //is the more to be regretted, as her trade with her //Eastern possessions, where there is an exclusive //silver currency, renders her position peculiarly //interesting, as being in many respects analogous to //that of the United Kingdom;" — and it is not therefore to be wondered at that in the copious Ap- pendix of the Handbooh on Gold and Silver by an Indian Official, published in 1878 by Longmans, Green & Co., London, readers are told //that nothing //has been done with regard to Netherlands India", whUe as early as in 1873 the coinage of silver money on behalf of the Dutch East Indies was stopped, and gold had been made the regulator of the Indian cur- rency in the first semester of 1877. Consequently the following memoranda may be of some use to the student of the monetary question, to whom the official documents published in Holland are not available. Seven years ago, iu October 1872, the Dutch Government, fully aware of the difficulties with which Holland might have to contend by reason of the monetary reform in Germany, appointed a spe- cial commis^iion to consider the subject and to advise about the measures to be taken with regard to the interests of the country. In a most valuable report, dated .December 28, 1872, — a document of great interest for the study of tlie monetary question in Europe, — the com- missioners pointed out that it would be impossible for Holland to retain the silver standard, establish- ed by the Act dated Wovember 26, 1847, were all its neighbours to adopt gold as their standard of value. According to their views the most desir- able solution of the question for Europe in general would be the adoption of the double standard by the leading monetary powers on the Continent, admitting both gold and silver as legal tender at the same fixed ratio of value. A great stability 49 of value for both metals would be the result of the compensative action of that system, if introduced •through the whole of Europe. But Holland alone would be powerless to force circumstances, and the Report therefore decided that it would be indis- pensable for the country to adopt the single gold standard, should Germany decide upon that line of action. The hope however remaining that it would still be found advisable in Germany not to exclude silver altogether as legal tender, the commission finally recommended for Holland the provisional adoption of a double standard, without abrogating the law of 1847, it being thought sufficient under existing circumstances' that the further coinage of silver should be at once restricted or stopped altogether. To this end measures were immediately taken by the Government, a Bill being passed, empower- ing the Executive to suspend the coinage of sil- ver for private persons; but the principal question remained in statu quo, it gradually becoming more evident that Germany was determined upon the introduction of a uniform gold currency through- out the whole of the new Empire, silver to be admitted only as token currency for an amount not to exceed 10 marks per head of the popula- tion. Taking into consideration the altered state of affairs an additional report, dated June 26, 1873, was issued by the Dutch currency commission, in which the necessity was proved of taking a further decided step towards a gold standard for Holland. Government agreeing with the recommendation of its commissioners, a Bill was submitted to the Chambers, proposing the introduction of a legal tender currency of 10 and 5 florin pieces in gold, and the withdrawal of the silver standard coins issued by the Mint under the working of the cur- I rency regulations of 1847. This measure however did not meet with the approval of the States Ge- neral, the majority of the Second Chamber deeming it premature, the greater part of its members being moreover of opinion that no thorough reform of the currency in Holland should be undertaken without providing at the same time for the cur- rency of its Eastern possessions, where the mone- tary system of the mother country had been intro- duced since the 1^* of May 1854. For the moment therefore Holland had really no standard of value. Gold was of no use, and the Mint being closed to the coinage of silver, the offer of foreign bills could not be counterbalanced by the import of this metal. A heavy fall in the exchanges was the natural' consequence of this abnormal state of affairs, the balance of trade being at the moment largely in favor of Holland. Rates gradually declined from 12 florins per 1 jg to 11.65 a 11.60, and the uncertainty of the exchange market rendered every transaction with foreign countries, where gold was the basis of the mone- tary system, in the highest degree dangerous. Naturally the commercial community dit not re- main quiet. The principal Chambers of Commerce, the Netherlands Bank and other private banking institutions sent in their complaints to Government and finally the Minister of Finance presented a Bill, dated April 18, 1875, to the Second Chamber of the States General with the view of adopting gold as standard coin, in order to check the fall of fo- reign exchanges, and to facilitate the importation of gold for the balance which the neighbouring countries owed to Holland. Fortunately for the interests of the country the new proposal was sanctioned by the Legislature (law of June 6, 1875) and from the 1'* of July 1875 the Mint was opened to the public for the coinage of golden 10-guilder pieces of 9/10 fine, to be legal tender concurrently with the silver florin at the ratio of 1 to 15.625, being the rela- tive value of gold to silver by a quotation of 60^° d. pr. oz. of standard silver. A rise in the exchange to the ordinary par of about 12 florins per 1 £ was the immediate result of the measure. But it soon became evident that another circumstance required the most careful con- sideration. The flew law had put a stop to the 50 fall of the rates of exchange, hut there was no limit against a further rise. Gold, being underva- lued with regard to the market price of silver, was of course kept back by the public and the Bank, and no gold therefore being available for export in case of a turn in the balance of trade with foreign countries, rates in consequence might go np to the parity of bar silver in the London market, which of course would inevitably cause a serious loss to the greater part of the commu- nity. In order to protect the general interests of the country against the serious dangers eventually to result from 'such an unsettled state of affairs, Gov- ernment, in conformity with the general opinion of all the authorities in the matter, thought it ad- visable to undertake the complete reorganisation of the existing monetary system. On the 9*'' of May 1876 a Bill was presented to the States Ge- neral, proposing the introduction of the exclusive gold standard and the withdrawal or conver- sion .of the larger silver coins into small mo- ney, with authorisation to the Minister of Fi- nance to melt down into bars and to sell a por- tion of the existing silver coinage in order to procure the gold wanted for the purpose of the gold coinage. This proposal however met with serious opposi- tion from the part of Ihe Second Chamber. Accord- ing to their Preliminary Eeport of July 13, 1876, they considered it unadvisable to abandon the ex- pectant attitude adopted in June 1875, so long as there was any chance left of coming to an inter- national understanding with regard to the general adoption of the double standard by the leading monetary states. The Government, admitting that since the Bill was brought forward the increased movement in the United States of North America in favor of the silver standard had greatly altered the general state of affairs, willingly entered into the views laid down in the above mentioned report, and declared (in the reply of the Minister of Fi- nace, dated October 6, 1876) its willingness to postpone for the present the final regulation of the monetary system, provided that measures were adopted for guarding the country against the dan- gers, to which it stood exposed by maintaining the statu quo. An amended Bill was accordingly submitted to the Second Chamber, in which the paragraph declaring gold to be henceforth the only standard of the currency was suppressed and a new paragraph was introduced by wich the exist- ing silver currency was maintained as standard money of the realm, concurrently with the gold coins issued in virtue of the provisional arrange- ment of June 1875. But in order to counteract the depreciation of the currency, i, e. the rise of the rates of exchange with other countries above the point which would allow of the exportation of the gold coinage, the Minister thought it indispens- able to insert into the amended Bill the clause of the original Bill, by which authority was given to the Executive, not only to coin gold, but also to withdraw silver from circulation and to sell it, in such a manner and to such an extent as might be deemed necessary. After a prolonged debate the new Bill was car- ried through the Lower House by a vote of 37 to 25, but when it came on for discussion in the First Chamber it was rejected, the majority pf the Upper House strongly objecting to an eventual demonestisation and sale of silver, and deeming it the proper course not to enter into any fresh legis- lation on the subject, but simply to prolong the provisional monetary law passed in June 1875, which, if not renewed, was to expire at the end of 1876. Under these circumstances no other alternative was left to Government but to follow the advice of the First Chamber, and a short Bill to that I effect was accordingly laid before the Legislature , proposing the renewal for a further twelve months of the law of June 1875. The Bill was at once agreed to by both Chambers, the Government- giv- ing them to understand -that in the course of that further twelve months a fresh attempt would — 51 — be made to bring in a Bill with a view to the final settlement of the question. But no striking events occurring in the money market Government gradually changed its policy. Throughout the whole of 1877 rates of exchange fluctuated but little, and a final arrangement of the monetary system therefore not being considered, urgent, it was thought suiUcient for the moment to prolong the suspension of the coinage of silver, not for another year however, but until otherwise determined upon by law. A Bill to that effect was adopted without -any opposition by both Chambers (law of December 9, 1877), and since then the matter remained in the same position in which it had been brought by the measure of 1875: the introduction of gold as standard coin of the realm concurrently with the silver coins issued before the law of June 1875 had been passed. Thus the system of the Stolon hoiteux has been working in Holland for these four years, and it cannot be denied that as a rule it has been doing wonderfully well, in the same manner as in France. But the danger remains for both countries, that they may suddenly be placed before an unexpected and most serious rise in the exchange so long as the reform of their currency is not carried through, and the final introduction of the exclusive gold standard therefore can only be a question of time for the Dutch legislators. In the meantime another question called for the most serious consideration from the part of the Gov- ernment. Like England, Holland has a vast Indian Empire where silver has nearly always been the only standard of value, not to mention the miser- able copper and paper period through which Ne- therlands India passed before the introduction, by law of May 1854, of the same monetary system adopted by the mother-country in 1847. Having no Mint of its own, however, Netherlands India has been supplied with the money required for cir- culation by specie-imports from Holland, — a system which, during the tweuty-five years of its existence, has fully answered the requirements of the country. It united the circulation of Java and the other islands of the Archipelago with the cir- culation in the mother-country, and experience has fully shown that the establishment of a mint in Java, which some years ago (in 1862 and 1863) was strongly advocated by the commercial com- munity, would have been of no use whatever, so long as the main source for the supply of the material to be coined, i, e. silver, was to be found in Europe. Thus a very narrow link united the currency of Java and the other Dutch possessions in this part of the world with the currency of Holland, and from the moment it was thought necessary to take into consideration a reform of the latter, the ques- tion arose what was to be done with the former. No hesitation however prevailed in Holland about the answer to be given. Already in the first Eeport of December 1873, the Dutch currency commis- sion stated, that the single silver standard ought to remain in force in the Eastern possessions of the Kingdom, it being a fact that India preferred silver to gold, and that only silver was able to provide for the real wants of the people there. //The annual exports of silver standard coins to //our Eastern possessions," the commission remarked, //represent a value of several millions and will to //a great extent assist Holland in getting rid of //part of the silver currency against the time that //the demonetisation of the silver coins (still re- //maining in Holland) must be decided upon." In the subsequent Eeport of June 1873 the commis- sion expressed their opinion still more strongly regarding the future of the currency of Nether- lands India. They again stated, //that silver was //to remain the only legal tender in the East, //whatever reforms might be introduced in the mo- //netary system of the mother-country," and ac- cording to these views a draft Bill was submitted by the commissioners to the consideration of Gov- ernment, directing that the Dutch guilder, tlie two-and-a-half guilder , and the half-guilder piece — 52 were to remain legal tender in Java, even after their demonetisation in Holland. As a temporary measure it was recommended to stop the coinage of silver for private account even on behalf of the East Indies until the withdrawal of the standard silver money circulating in Holland had been completed. According to the views therefore of the Govern- ment commissioners the Indian currency was to remain unaltered, and it may be deemed certain that the opinions expressed in their Eeports were shared by the large majority of those who had made a study of the subject in Holland. The idea of introducing gold as a legal tender in the Eastern possessions of the Kingdom was thought almost absurd. It was stated that no sane Government would think of introducing such a measure , and consequently the Government Bill of October 1873, which in conformity with the views of the com- mission proposed that gold should be adopted as the exclusive standard in Holland and silver should be used for small change only, stipulated at the same time that no alteration should be made in the monetary system of Netherlands India. As stated above the Bill just mentioned was re- jected by the Second Chamber in March 1874, but the result of the debate would doubtless have been different, had the Government been able to inform Parliament more exactly about their inten- tions with regard to the ultimate regulation of the Indian currency question. Though generally accepted in Holland, the con- clusions of the Government commission with re- gard to that question met with serious opposition in Java. It was shown , that in the face of a con- tinuous fall in the value of silver the difficult and threatening situation, created by the existence in Holland of an exclusive silver currency, would be felt in exactly the same manner in Java, when no provision was taken by the Government to keep the currency at the standard value. The local press was almost unanimous in deprecating the adoption of the measures proposed by the commission so long as affairs in India remained unaltered , it being evident that India would not be able to defend itself singly against the fluctuations in the value of silver, which must inevitably follow its aban- donment as standard of value by the leading mo- netary powers in Europe , and it may be taken for granted that the expression of public opinion in Java had a most decided influence on the vote of the Lower House, by which the Bill of October 1873 was rejected. Erom the moment the question was brought for- ward the author of the present memoranda has done his utmost to convince his countrymen, that equally with the people in Holland the Indian subjects of the King of the Netherlands were en- titled to protection from the ruin and disaster in which the action of a depreciating currency must necessarily involve them. After mature consideration the Indian authorities also entered into the same views, and the Home Government finally agreeing with the proposals received from the Governor- General of Netherlands India, a Bill was present- ed on the 1^' of June 1876 to the Second Cham- ber for the introduction of gold as standard money in India, concurrently with the existing silver currency, further coining of silver money to be suspended at the same time, whilst the Governor- General was to be authorised if necessary, to cause silver coins to he sold after withdrawing them from circulation. The Bill passed, after a very short debate, by a vote of 59 to I , though not until an amend- ment had been carried by 47 to 14 against Gov- ernment, to leave out the clause authorising the Governor-General to demonetise and sell silver coin. But in consequence of the rejection by the Eirst Chamber of the monetary bill for the Netherlands mentioned above, the special Bill for the regula- tion of the monetary system in the East-Indies was not proceeded with, as some of its clauses, drawn in contemplation of the monetary Bill for the mother-country becoming law , contained a direct reference to certain clauses of the latter. — 53 The subject however was not abandoned by Gov- ernment, and in the beginning of 1877 an amend- ed Bill for the regulation of the Indian currency was reintroduced by the Ministry. It was a re- production (with only the necessary verbal altera- tions) of the old Bill in the form in which it had been passed by the Second Chamber in November 1876, its principal features being the establishment in the Dutch East Indies of the double standard on the same basis as in Holland, i. e. with the formal suspension of further coinage of silver. Without a division the Bill was adopted by both Chambers, and it became law on the 28**' of March 1877. An exact translation of the docu- ment, as it has been promulgated in Java on the 7"^ of June 1877, will be found below. The adoption of the measures proposed for re- gulating the monetary system of Netherlands India cannot be too highly estimated by the colonial com- munity. The new Bill is the unequivocal acknow- ledgement oi the principle , that fixity of value is the indispensable quality of a monetary standard , in India as well as in Holland , and that it is one of the first duties of every Government that has imposed a standard upon its subjects, to take any reasonable precaution in its power to prevent that standard fluctuating. Certainly, the abandonment by Netherlands India of the single silver standard which for years has always admirably answered the purpose, is for various reasons sincerely to be. deplored; — but the most important is the most pressing, and looking at the state of affairs in adjacent countries it is quite evident , that a metal, the value of which is subject to such violent fluc- tuations as has been the case with silver during the V last five or six years , can be of no further use as a standard measure of value.. As long as silver is proscribed by the leading monetary states in Europe , gold alone offers the necessary guaran- tees of great fixity of value a monetary standard ought to possess, and it therefore does credit to the Dutch Government, that instead of leaving the Indian currency to its own fate, as proposed by the currency commission, and of imitating the //masterly inactivity" of the rulers of British India, it has made gold the regulator also of the cur- rency in the Eastern possessions of the realm. The present lack of gold is of no consequence so long as the circulating silver money fetches the full value of gold for payments in Holland. Dur- ing the last years Java has repeatedly had to face an unfavourable balance of trade , which made the export of specie unavoidable , but rates of exchange never exceeded the bullion point of gold , since silver could always be used as a remittance to Holland in order to effect payments there, or to purchase sterling bills in Amsterdam for payments in England. The fact must not however be lost sight of, that notwithstanding the present satisfactory state of affairs the whole structure must inevitably collapse as soon as Holland is forced by circumstances to complete its monetary reform by the demonetisation of the silver money still in circulation. A little sooner or later it must come to this, and then Java must follow, for no country, either in the West or in the East, can possibly prosper, whose standard of value lacks the principal quality it ought to possess, ■ — a great relative fixity of value. It is not at all impossible therefore that at no remote period even the Eastern Archipelago may appear in the market for the sale of silver and the purchase of gold, unless it may still be pos- sible to arrive at an international understanding about the rehabilitation of silver as proposed ori- ginally in the Eeport of the Dutch currency com- mission of 1872. N. P. Van den Berg. Bat A VIA, 24"' June 1879. 54. ACT POU THE UEGOLATION OF THE MONETARY SySTEM IN NeTHEELANDS IndIA. We WILLIAM III, by the Grace of God, King of the Netherlands, etc., etc. Whereas we have considered it necessary to further modify the law of the 1st of May 1854, for the regulation of the monetary system- in Netherlands India, which was already modified by laws of 24th April 1855, 24th December 1857, aSth June 1862, 27th December 1863, 15th September 1866 and 27th November 1873; Therefore , after having consulted the Council of State and in common accord with the States Gener- al , We order as follows : Akticle [. The 1st article of the law of the 1st of May 1854 is modified as follows: //The unit of account of the monetary system in Netherlands India is the florin, divided into 100 cents. //The legal coins of the State in Netherlands India are gold and silver standard coins, silver and //copper fractional coins, and gold commercial coins." Akticle 2. The 2nd article of that law is modified as follows: „The gold standard coin is the 10-florin piece, as described in the law of 6th June 1875 ," (weigh- ing 6,720 grammes with a standard fineness of 0.900.) //The silver standard coins are the following: the florin, // rix-dollar, or piece of 2^ florins, // half florin , //as they where defined by the law of 26th November 1847" (weight of the silver florin 10 grammes with a standard fineness of 0.945.) Article 3. The 5th article of the law of the 1st of May 1854 is modified as follows: //The commercial coins are: the gold ducat, and the double ducat, as they were defined by the law of 26th November 1847". (weight of the ducat 3.494 grammes with a standard fineness of 0.983 ) — 55 Article 4. The 12th article, of the law of the 1st of May 1854, modified by law of the 27th of November 1873, is furter modified as follows: //Foreign gold and silver coins, the current value of which shall have been fixed by the Govemor- //General, shall be accepted at such public treasury offices, as may be designated by him." Order and command , etc. , etc. Done at the Hagiie, 28th March, 1877. STJI^FLEilVIElSrT III. See p. 39. !NoTE ON THE PfiESENT WORKING OF THE GoLD StaNDAUD IN JaVA, BY Mr. KENSINGTON, DePDTY Secketauy to the Government of India in the Financial Depautmbnt. During my recent privilege leave I spent three weeks in Java, and took the opportunity of inquiring into the working of the gold standard and its effects as regards the four main classes of the country, namely: — (1) the Government; (2) the native population; (3) the merchants; and (4) the European planters. 2. On the way to Java I read carefully the collection of papers written for the Government of India in 1886 by Mr. Van den Berg, the then President of the Java Bank. These papers dealt with the financial and economical condition of Netherlands • India during the previous 15 years, and specially with the effect of the currency system as finally organized in 1877. In addition, 1 had by me the book //Java, or how to manage a Colony," written by Mr. Money in 1861, and a slight sketch of the history and condition of the island, entitled //Some Notes on Java," written by Mr. H. S. Boys, late of the Indian Civil Service, after a short visit to the island in 1889. Mr. Money's book is still the standard English work on modern Java, though necessarily out of date in some important particulars, especially as regards the question of land administration. The sketch by Mr. Boys does not go into so much detail, but it substantially supports what had been said by Mr. Money nearly 30 years before regarding the great prosperity among the native population. My own time in the island was too short for an extended tour, but I visited several places in the western half of Java up to about 200 miles from Batavia, and saw much of the country and people in this section of the island. Beyond this, I had long conversations with Mr. Lavino, the Dutch Consul in Singapore; Mr. Lankester, the English Consul in Batavia; Mr. Van den Berg, a merchant in Batavia and brother of the author of the 1886 papers; Mr. Zeveriin, the present head of the Java Bank ; other Dutch, English, and Italian men of business whom I met in Java; the officers of the Dutch steamers between Singapore and Batavia, and planters from Sumatra whom I came across between Pejiang and Singapore. 3. The general impression from all sources of information was that the trade and planting interests of — 57 — Java are now in a flourishing condition, and that the level of prosperity among the cultivating classes is remarkably high. The standard ot comparison which I had constantly in mind was the condition of the agricultural and labouring classes in the richer of our Punjab districts. I have no hesitation in saying that the comparison is, on the whole, distinctly favourable to Java. There are fewer rich farmers; but on the other hand , there is more all-round prosperity. The people as a whole are better fed, better clothed, and better housed, than the corresponding classes that I have known in India. There is, com- paratively speaking, little or no debt among the agriculturists, and the general air of contentment and absence of indications of squalid poverty are simply astonishing. Much of this may be attributed to favourable conditions of climate and soil, and much to the easy-going disposition of the native population; but much more, I believe, to the fact that the Dutch system of administration is in many respects better adapted thaTi our own to the simple wants of an Eastern people. It is unnecessary to say more ou this subject here than that my own observation, so far as it went, fully confirmed what has been already writ- ten by Messrs. Money and Boys regarding the thriving condition of all classes of Javanesse and Malays in the island, notwithstanding a density of population almost, if not quite, as great as we have to deal with in the congested tracts of India. The important point to notice is that I could find nothing to indicate that the currency system established in 1877 has in any way prejudicially affected the people of the country. The people do not seem to be aware that any change was made. Mr. Zeverijn explained this by saying that the Dutch were fortunate in introducing a gold standard before the really serious fall in the price of silver took place. The explanation is reasonable enough. Silver prices have varied very slowly even in India, and in Java the currency question was settled before the altered conditions of 1873 — 77 made themselves felt by the people, and a guilder is still to them very much what it has been at any time within, say, the last 30 years; that is, since full effect was given to the measures adopted for Dutch India by the Netherlands Government after the consolidating legislation of 1854i. 4. When Mr. Van den Berg (who has now left Java on appointment as Director of the Bank of Holland) wrote in 1886, the Colony was passing through a serious mercantile crisis. The two principal industries of the country — sugar and coffee — were threatened with extinction, and the general tendency of Mr. Van den Berg's remarks was to convey a warning that the difficulties of both planters and mer- chants were directly attributable to the introduction of a gold standard This warning -was all the more impressive, as Mr. Van den Berg had himself been one of the principal movers in support of a gold standard, and had written much more hopefully of the success of his measures in his earlier papers of 1879 and 1884. The conclusion from his 1886 papers appeared to be that he had serious doubts wheth- er the gold standard had not, on the whole, done more harm than good to Dutch India; that, if he refrained from advocating a return to a silver standard, it was more from consideration of the difficulties attending disturbance of the monetary system of the mother country than from regard to the true inter- ests of the Java community; and that, at any rate, he strongly recommended any Eastern Government which had stuck to its silver standard to hold fast and brave out the difficulties of a falling exchange. So far as I am aware, information regarding Java in India has not advanced beyond the stage at which Mr. Van den Berg wrote in 1886; and it has been tacitly assumed by currency correspondents in the Press of India, when referring to the experience of Java, that Mr. Van den Berg's somewhat gloomy anticipations have been necessarily fulfilled, and that, in short, the country has been going from bad to worse. I took special pains to ascertain how far this was the case, and arrived at the conclusion that the situation has been since again entirely changed. Mr. Lankester, Mr. Van den Bergs brother, and — 58 — Mr. Zeveriin alike assured me that the crisis of 1884 — 86 has been quite got over; that both the sugar and coffee industries have recovered; and that it is a mistake to suppose that the difficulties of 1884 —86 were primarily or even largely due to currency legislation. Mr. Zeverijn's words were: //When we read //what reply had been sent to the Government of India in 1886 , we said to ourselves, Van den Berg //is playing with fire." By the //we" in this I understood him to refer to the authorities in Holland, where Mr. Zeverip was at the time living, and, judging by results, the Home Government appears to have been right and Mr. Van den Berg wrong. The circumstances of Java trade in 1886 are briefly stated in Mr. P. P. Tidman's evidence of the 18th February 1887 before the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver, Questions 2900 to 2914 (especially Question 2912) of the First Report')- There had been up to 1886 a series of bad years and calamities of a nature to account for general depression, and in addi- tion the sugar industry, the most important of all in the island, had been for the time almost destroyed by competition with bountyfed beetroot sugar grown elsewhere. The trade of Java is at the best of times largely dependent on a very few principal items of export, and in a country so situated the sudden anni- hilation of the chief among these naturally reacted on the trade of the Colony as a whole. The severity of the crisis through which Java was then passing was not exaggerated by Mr. Van den Berg; but he seems to have been misled into attributing mainly to the permanent condition of the currency what was really due to a number of causes, some of them more or less accidental. 5. The Dutch planters, men of great resource, and with large capital at their backs, set themselv- es heartily to face the 1886 situation, reorganized their whole system of sugar planting and manufacture, cut down the expenses of manufacture from about 11 to 7 guilders a pica], and have now largely recov- ered from their temporary difficulties. Mr. Lankester destinctly stated tlia,t the difficulties are now, looking back to the crisis, recognized as having been due to wasteful processes and inefficient management, and not to the system of currency. The planters have learnt wisdom, and have firmly re-established their business on a footing which enables them to cope with variations in price elsewhere caused by decline in the value of silver, and, what is more important to them, to defy competition with beetroot sugar. Mr. Lankester, indeed, went further, and said that the change had actually benefited the native population engaged on the sugar estates. In order to assist in cutting down the cost of sugar manufacture, they have been compelled to work harder and have acquired habits of industry which a Malay or semi-Malay popiilation is always slow to learn ; so that their own prosperity has increased, while they have at the same time aided in restoring the fortunes of the planters and merchants. I did not myself see the sugar estates, which lie in the north and east of the ') ,,2912. Daring the last five years Java has been subjected to a series of most fearful natural calamities. They have had cattle plague, which destroyed almost the whole cattle in parts of the island; they have had cholera; they have had earthquakes of an unpreoedenting character, and they have further had an extraordinary fall in the values of their principal exports, sugar and coffee, owing in the first place to the competition of beetroot sugar in Europe, and in the second place to the fact that the silver using countries have been able to export coffee more favourablv than from Java. That has been the result in the last five years of natural causes, without any question of currency at all. Mr. Van den Berg distinguishes here between other causes and currency causes, and, from what I can see, what he says about currency is fair enough. If you had such a state of things as in British -India , i. e. a depreciating standard, it would have stimulated productions of all sorts . If, on the other hand, you were to introduce it now , you would have the natives suffer from the increased price of their goods, and he puts it, weighing one set of conditions against the other, that you had better leave things alone, i. e. with gold and silver both legal tender." Mr. P. F. Tidman's evi- dence before the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver, given on the 18th February 1887. (If I am not mistaken Mr. Tidman was at the time partner in the Batavia iirm of Tidman Balfour and C° — v. d. B.). — 59 — island; but I came across a member of a large Scotch engineering firm (Messrs. Watson, Laidlaw, & C°., of Glasgow), who had been travelling for some months in the sugar country, pushing his business in the supply of machinery to the factories. This firm supplies machinery for //sugar fabrieks" in all parts of the world, and one member of the firm is always traveling to supervise the working of the machines and establish new connections. Their business in Java is not yet fully developed; but this gentleman inform- ed me that he was much impressed with the suitability of Java as a sugar-producing country, with the business even under existing conditions, when, for want of local mechanical skill, the machines are not worked up to anything like their true capacity, and generally with the flourishing condition of all that he had seen of the estates. This information was to the point, as bearing out what the Batavia authorities had previously said to me on the subject. 6. So far as I could make out, the revival of the sugar industry has been followed by a revival of trade generally in Java. The information on this point was not so precise; but I was struck with the change, coming from Singapore, where (as in India) every one was complaining of dull trade, breaking firms, and the turning of business -into mere speculation, to Batavia, where business of all kinds appeared to be going on steadily in even grooves. Mr. Lankester, the head of the English mercantile community in Batavia, spoke well of the place, and laid stress on the immense advantage of a stable currency. Mr. Zeverijn said the same. He declared that, with the experience of the Straits Settlements and British India before them, the silver party in Java was now absolutely silenced, and that he himself would never remain in the country if the gold standard should be given up. I?oth these gentlemen turned up the report of the Java Bank for 1891 — 93, and pointed significantly to a table contained in Appendix J. showing the course of exchange monthly between Batavia, Holland, England, and Singapore, and again between London and Singapore and Calcutta. The variation between Baiavia and Holland during the year was from 99^/4 to 100 '/g , and in only two months was there a greater variation than ^4 per cent. Similarly, the exchange on England varied only from 12 to 12.07^ guilders to the ]/., while the variation on Singapore was from 1.80 to 2.05| guilders to the dollar, and between Calcutta and London from 1«. 3%^ d. to \s. 5% d. to the rupee. The figures quoted are for bills in some cases at sight, in others at four months, and in others at six, but this difference in form does not afi'ect the conclusion. Whether the total volume of the Java trade is large or small with reference to the size of the country is a matter on which 1 did not obtain any statistics ; but there could be little doubt that the greater security attending business transactions was thorougly appreciated, and that the Batavia people themselves are well satisfied with the way things are goinsc. As regards the sugar trade especially , Mr. Zeverijn informed me that it would have been impossible for merchants and banks to conduct the business at all on present lines if they had been exposed to the risk involved in fluctuations in the price of silver. This was explained by saying that much of the business depends on advances made months before the crop comes into the market. With a stable currency the financing agencies are able to control the exports and distribute the shipments of sugar evenly over a considerable period of the year, thereby avoiding a glut in the market and difiiculties with the shipping trade as well as the additional expense involved to themselves or the planters in insur- ance against exchange risks. 7. As regards the practical working of the gold standard in Java, it is interesting to find how little gold is either employed or demanded. Appendix G. of the bank report for 1891 — 92 gives the details of cash in the Bank on 31st March 1892, including the head oflice at Batavia, branches in five principal — 60 — towns of Java, one each in Sumatra and Celebes, and a small branch in Amsterdam. The total cash accounted for amounts to 6,754,477^., divided as follows: — £ Notes . . . .3,608,898] These are the amounts Silver ....:. . . . 2,773,050 I expressed in sterling cou- Gold ... ... . . . . 372,422 verted at the common rate Other money . . . . 1 07 1 of 12 guilders to 11. The total gold stock in hand represents 5^ per cent, only of the whole, and this is lodged almost entirely in the head office at Batavia, which accouTits for 82 per' cent of the gold as against only 60 per cent . of the total cash. I understood from Mr. Zeverijn that the gold in Batavia is practically lying idle, and that it was either contemplated or had been recently arranged to remit three -fourths of it back to Holland. I am not sure that I correctly understood Mr. Zeverijn on this point, and possibly he was referring to some transaction already carried out before 1891 — 92; but it is clear that gold is used rarely under any circumstauces, and practically never in the interior of the Island. -Mr. Zeveripi mentioned that, when travelling in the interior last year, he had tendered gold pieces (ten guilders each) in payment of a charge for G-overiiment post horses, and that the coins were actually refused. From" curiosity I obtained a few gold pieces to try the result. I found that they were accepted at railway stations without demur; that they were accepted, but with exclamations of astonishment, at a Dutch shop in the principal street of Batavia; and that they were altogether declined at a native shop in a bazaar at Garoet, 200 miles up country, though a Java bank-note for ten guilders was at once taken without question. There seems no doubt that tlie great mass of the people neither know nor feel the existence of the gold standard in any way. 8. The silver coins used by the people are the rix-dollar of 2-| guilders, the guilder and half guilder, and 25 and 10 cent pieces. The uuit is the guilder valued at Is. Sd., weighing ten grammes 0.945 fine, or 9.45 grammes silver fine as against 10.692 grammes in our Indian rupee. The whole of these silver coins are minted in Holland, but only the rix-dollar, guilder, and half-guilder are standard Dutch coins, the smaller pieces of 25 and 10 cents being minted especially for Netherlands India, and marked in tlie native characters as well as in Dutch. Java bank-notes pass freely everywhere, and there is the ordinary copper coinage for small payments, the only copper coins I saw being of 2^ cents and 1 cent, though there may possibly be others current. The prices of Eui'opean goods are rather high, though not percep- tibly Iiigher than the corresponding prices in the Straits Settlement converted into sterling at current rates of exchange. Java guilders are accepted by banks and native money changers in Singapore at the rate of 12'//, to 12^ guilders to the 1^. for small sums. For larger transactions a better rate would no doubt be given. Banks in Java usually allow 12 guilders to the 1^. for small sums, independently of petty variations in the quoted rates of exchange, 9. The conclusion appears to be that the gold standard works well in Java as regards the trade and the people of the country. It has also, on the whole, proved beneficial to the planters, especially to those who avoid speculative crops. The Government is not so prosperous, and, though there is difBculty in getting at the actual figures for recent years, I imderstand that annual deficits are still common in Nether- lands India as a whole. This is, however, attributed not to the currency settlement, but to the continued — 61 — drain of military expenditure, especially in Achin. There is mncli to admire in the succesful administration of the country; and, though unfavourable criticism of the Dutch Government is still common enough among the English of Singapore, and among certain classes of the Dutch residents in Java, it is doubtful whether the stock charges of oppression, over-taxation, and corruption, really rest upon solid grounds. If they did , it would be difficult to account for the general prosperity and obvious contentment of both Europeans and natives. The origin of some of the more serious charges against the Government is well known, and statements of the kind may well be accepted with great reserve. 10. In discussing the possibility of a gold standard in India, many writers have suggested that the country would run a serious risk of being flooded with spurious silver coinage as soon as the rupee ac- quired an artificially high value. It has been repeatedly shown that this danger is imaginary, or at any- rate that the risk is not serious. The experience of Java is interesting as showing that the latter is the correct view. With a silver currency there, based on a ratio of 15.625 to 1, spurious coinage seems to be unknown. In Singapore, on the other hand, where the standard coin is the Mexican silver dollar, varying in value with the market price of silver, bad dollars and the necessity for ringing every coin are a frequent trouble to travellers. This is a good illustration in support of the view that a strong and well-organised government finds comparatively little difficulty in detecting and dealing with false coiners, however great the temptation may be to the latter. ') A. Kensington. 21st September 1892. ') (Since the above was writteu tilings have taken quite another turn than Mr. Kensington anticipated. Already at the meeting of the International Bimetallic Conference held in London in May 1894 I drew attention to the fact that spurious coinage of silver money of full weight was being put into practice on a rather alarming scale, and now in the Times of the 21st August last we read the following: „Our Singapore Correspondent, writing under date of July 24, says that an object lesson in one disadvantage of a silver coin with an artificial value may .be found in the Netherlands Indies. There the silver guilder is retained by legislation at its old value , while the silver of which it is made is worth only about a half of what it used to be. As a consequence coining factories have been established in China to export guilders to the Netherlands Indies. They turn out coins of exactly the same fineness and weight as the mintcoined guilder, and dispose of these in the Netherlands Indies at a great profit. It is estimated that nearly two millions of such counterfeit coins have been put in circulation in recent years, and the evil threatens to increase." Although the amount of t-vio millions can only be a loose cs-limate, it is not to be denied that the Government already experiences great diificulties on account of the circulation of spurious coins, extremely well made, and even con- taining a greater percentage of fine silver than the genuine ones, v d. B.) APPENDICES. Appendix A. Geneual Statement of the Revenue and Expenuituue of the Goveunment of Netheulands India fob, the yeaus 1871 — 1893 showing the yeably suuvlus oe deficit. 1871 : Home revenue. Indian do Home expenditure. Indian do. 1872 : Home revenue. . . Indian do Home expenditure. Indian do. 1873 : Home revenue. . . . Indian do Home expenditure. Indian do. 1874 : Home revenue-. . Indian do Home expenditure Indian do. 1875 : Home revenue. . . . Indian do Home expenditure, Indian do f 61.509.526 >, 74.021.443 / 19.643.479 // 85.893.258 Surplus / 56.839.531 „ 75.871.005 f 19.006.626 // 93.045.732 Surplus / 56.403.380 // 78.147.490 / 24.598.422 ,/ 97.870.854 Surplus / 59.461.193 // 84.961.414 / 21.170.623 // 105.323.388 Surplus / 58.575.798 // 89.092.260 / 23.905.524 // 105.184.208 Surplus / 135.530.969 // 105.536.737 / 132.710.536 // 112.052.358 / 134.550.870 // 122.469.276 / 144.422.607 // 126.494.011 / 147.668.058 // 129.089.732 / 29.994.232 ,20.658.178 12.081.594 17.928.596 18.578.326 9 II 1876 : Home revenue. . . . Indian do Home expenditure. Indian do. 1877 : Home revenue. . . . Indian do Home expenditure. Indian do. 1878 : Home revenue. . . . Indian do Home expenditure. Indian do. 1879 : Home revenue. . . . Indian do. Home expenditure. Indian do. 1880 : Home revenue . . . . Indian do Home expenditure. Indian do. 1881 ; Home revenue. . . . Indian do Home expenditure. Indian do. 1882 : Home revenue . . . Indian do, . . . . Home expenditure. Indian do. / 53. 665.167 230.410 / 26, // 129. 104.650 714.108 f 63. // 91. Deficit 366 . 642 475.582 /■ 29. // 127. 180.654 599.900 / 55 // 89, Deficit 222.982 206.758 / 24. // 123. 928.682 800.790 / 49. // 94. Deficit 640.554 875.391 / 24. // 131, 321.211 722.209 / 52. // 94, Deficit 000.404 837.704 / 24. // 122, 808 . 940 127.163 / 4<5 , // 92 Deficit 162.522 639.838 f 23 // 127 565.387 667.279 / 37, // 92 Deficit 493.892 821.274 / 24. // 124. 872.806 710.091 Deficit / 139.895.577 // 155.818.758 / 154.842.224 // 156.780.554 / 144.429.740 // 148.729.472 / 144.515.945 ,/ 156.043 420 / 146.838.108 // 146.936.103 / 137.802.360 // 151.232.666 / 130.315.166 // 149.582.897 / 15.923.181 // 1.938.330 // 4.299.732 // 11.527.475 97.995 // 13.430.306 // J 9. 267. 731 Ill 1883 : Home revenue. . . . Indian dp. . . . Home expenditure. Indian do. 1884 : Home revenue. . . . Indian do . . . . Home expenditure. Indian do. 1885 : Home revenue. . . . Indian do. . . . . Home expenditure. Indian do. 1886 : Home revenue. . . . Indian do Home expenditure . Indian do. 1887 : Home revenue . . . Indian do Home expenditure . Indian do. 1888 : Home revenue . . Indian do Home expenditure . Indian do. 1889 : Home revenue. . . . Indian do. Home expenditure. Indian do. ./■ 43 . 235.879 391.161 / 24 // 125 552.250 411.455 ./ 40 . // 101. Defiicit 709.151 557.208 '/ 119. 247.515 326.217 / 33, V 100, Deficit 597.265 384.188 / 23 ., 107 768.274 104.693 / 34. // 96. Surplus 405.287 853.966 / 22, // 106 552.077 332.836 / 43 „ 99 Surplus 897.252 453.491 / 21, // 96, 298.324 597.850 / 23 // 95, Surplus 876.395 813.722 / 22 , // 105, 419.326 929.407 / 35, // 95 Deficit 657.481 174.701 / 23 // 105 ,654.724 ,478.484 Surplus / 141.627.040 // 149.963.705 / 142.266.359 // 143.573.732 / 133.981.453 // 130.872.967 / 131.259.253 // 128.884.913 / 143.350.743 // 117.896.174 / 119.690.117 // 128.348.733 / 130.832.182 // 129.133.208 / 8.336.665 '/ 1.307.373 // 3.108.486 // 2.374.340 // 25.454.569 // 8.658.616 ,/ 1.698.974 IV 1890 : Home revenue . . . . Indian do Home expenditure . Indian do. 1891 : Home revenue . . . Indian do Home expenditure . Indian do. 1892 : Home revenue . Indian do. Home expenditure . Indian do. 1893 : Home revenue . . . . Indian do Home expenditure. Indian do. f 38 // 97, 352.175 937.307 / 26 // 101, 135.4.56 601.282 / 16, Surplus 934.414 732.518 / 24. // 105, 938.590 700.240 / 24. // 102. Deficit 597.329 120.885 / 24 . // 111. 132.729 860.437 / 33 u 101, Deficit 427 ; 323 748.966 / 24. // 102. 879.335 695.497 Surplus / 136.289.482 ,> 127.736.738 / 115.666.932 // 130.638.830 / 126.718.214 // 135.993.166 / 135.176.289 // 127.574.832 / 8.552.744 14.971, 9.274.952 7.601.457 Appendix B. CoMPAiiATivE Statement op taxes and duties levied in Netheelands India in 1871, 1886 and 1895, (Budget Estimate.) isiri. FARMED TAXES: lletail sale of opium, including cost of drug supplied to the farmers , Slaughter of cattle, buffaloes, sheep and goats Slaughter of pigs and sale of pork Retail sale of arrack and other spirits ©ambling licenses for Batavia, Samarang and Soerabaia License for native theatre (Wayang) in Batavia Chinese head money in Batavia ■ Tax on trades and professions of Natives and Chinese in Batavia Retail sale of Javanese and Cliinese tobacco in the residencies Bantam, Batavia and Krawang ...... .... Tolls, sluice money, ferries, etc Bird's nest cliffs Pepper tax in Riouw Nipa palms and brushwood in Krawang Sale of toddy in Amboina and Ternate islands License for gold digging in Borneo Sale of betel in Celebes License for the sale of fish at Makassar Sale of salt in Siak Right of fishing in the Government lake near Makassar Right of cutting wood on and fishing near the Thousand Islands, :Batavia roads Sundry farmed taxes collectively TAXED COLLECTED BY GOVERNMENT DIRECT: Custom duties . Import duty . . .- Export duty Warehouse rent, etc Duty on transport of native tobacco by sea Tax on landed property and houses Tax on public sales Stamp duty Tax on the transfer of real property ^ Harbour dues 1SS6. Carried forward / 12.585.000 625 . 000 '/ 112.500 395,000 372.000 5.000 28.500 135.000 155.000 59.000 67 . 520 40.000 17.000 15.000 14.000 12.500 4.000 4.000 700 5.500 115.250 ,185.000 ,098.000 155.500 116.000 ,055.500 713.000 617.000 379.000 172.000 / 21.376.000 1.458.000 162.000 450.000 833,000 8.000 commuted commuted 235.000 183.000 174.000 90.000 10.000 17.000 9.600 13.000 9.000 12.000 800 3.200 157.000 7.470.000 2.545.000 117.200 commuted 1.773.000 805.000 1. 100.000 600.000 278.000 1S95. / 24.258.470 / 39.888.800 / 17.668:000 " 1.357.500 149 . OOO 374.000 648.000 11.300 commuted commuted 238.900 173.000 // 153.000 43.800 3 . 000 35.000 5.800 13.500 11.300 39.000 commuted 3.000 99 . 000 8.895.000 1.737.000 86.000 commuted 1.898.000 837.000 1.180.000 635.000 291.000 / 36.585.100 VI BrougM forward. Tax on carriages Succession and legacy duty Landrevenue and landtaxes: Landrental of ricefields Tax on rice in the Preanger Regencies do. on rice, salt and sugar in Celebes do. on rice in Borneo Lease of waste-lands to private parties Tax on trades and professions carried on by natives of Java and foreign Asiatics Percentage on receipts of private bazars in Batavia and Krawang Tax on the slaughter of cattle and buffaloes in the Preanger Regencies Bfead money of foreign Asiatics in the native states of Soera- karta and Djokjokarta Family tax in the Palembang district Tax. on //troeboek" fishing in Siak Head money of natives in Banjermasin (Borneo) License on diamond digging in Banjermasin Tribute on gold and bird's nests in Banjermasin . Head-money of foreign Asiatics in Borneo and Amboina. . ... Registration of //pandelingen" (serfs) in Borneo and Celebes. . Ta.)L on houses at Makassar Head-money of natives of Celebes do. do. of Menado do. do. of Amboina Sale of ' Salt NEW TAXES IMPOSED SINCE 1871 : Excise on spirits and tobacco (and petroleum since 1887) .... Tax of 5% on the real value of private residencies and 2% on the value of household furniture, to be levied on Europeans and foreign Asiatics License tax of 2% on all revenues derived by Europeans from commercial, agricultural and mamifacturing enterprise Licenses for keeping pawn-houses (a farmed tax) ; Licenses for Chinese gambling outside the towns of Batavia, Samarang and Sourabaya Head-money from natives of Java (Batavia excepted), as an equi- valent for the repeal of personal services Licenses for retail sale of native tobacco Head-money from the natives of Bencoolen (in commutation of the former compulsory cultivation of pepper and coffee, and the repair of roads and bridges) Carried forward 1S?1. / 24.258.470 / 39.888.800 18S6. 278.500 75.000 13.285.000 1.612.000 224.200 100.000 352.000 1.025.000 4.000 40.000 3.600 390.000 5.000 100.000 28.000 10.000 53.000 2.500 20.000 57.000 142.000 18.000 6.300.000 / 48.383.270 211.000 // 97.000 // 19.675.000 241.000 commuted 821.800 V 3.318.000 3.300 ,/ 50.000 commuted 841.000 12.000 183.000 150 repealed commuted repealed 7.200 75.000 '/ 197.000 46.400 // 7.167.000 / 72.834.650 159.000 758.000 700.000 881.000 38,000 2 . 540 . 000 1.200.000 112.400 189d. / 36.585.100 // 244.000 // 52.000 '/ 17.072.250 // 192.000 commuted // 1.385.500 // 2.770.000 commuted // 74.000 993.000 228.000 500 commuted 159.000 257.000 60.000 8.557.000 / 68.629.350 4.517.000 860.000 853.000 728.800 7.000 2.876.000 repealed 135.200 / 48.383.270 / 79.223.050 / 78.606.350 VII Brought forward Head-money from natives in the Lampong district (Sumatra) . . do. in the island of Billiton Tithes of rice crop in Southern and Eastern division of Borneo. Hassil (produce) tax in Atcheen. ; License for importing opium "into Atcheen Custom duties in Kwala and Leidang (Sumatra's East Coast) . . Registration of labour-contracts in Banka and Sumatra's Eastcoast Tax on sagoe, etc. in Siak (farmed- tax) Sale of opium by Government direct Harbour dues etc. at Tandjong Priok (Batavia harbour) . • Head mony of natives in Ternate .....■••• ISffl. ./ 48.383.270 1886. / 79.223.050 157.000 18.000 200.000 46.000 39.000 20 . 000 18.700 1895. / 78.606.350 94.000 21.000 140.000 100.000 39.000 commuted 56.000 14.700 340 . 000 83.000 12.000 / 48.383.270 / 79.658.750 / 79.569.050 Appendix C. Detailed Statement of the Eevenues and | in each of the undebment;' f, EEVENUE AND KECEIPTS. TAXES AND DUTIES: Landrent Land and house tax Customs, and excise duties Stamps Tax on trades and professions (Natives) do. do. (Europeans) Personal tax (Europeans and foreign Asiatics) . . . . Horse and carriage tax Public sales duty Head money of natives of Java ' Legacy and succession duty Transfer duty Miscellaneous taxes GOVEENMENT MONOPOLIES: Opium Salt SALES OF GOVERNMENT PEODUGE: Coffee Sugar Cinchona Tin Coal FOEESTS ■■■ HAEBOUE DUES AND PILOTAGE POST AND TELEGEAPH SEEVICE EAILWAYS SCHOOL FEES ■ ■ ■ MISCELLANEOUS EECEIPTS 1 S 7 1. In the Netherlands. / In Nether- lands-India. Total. /15. 573. 200 1.052.000 6.438.500 617.000 1.025.000 30 10 ,626.448 ,191.658 6.856.963 57.600 1.020.679 /48. 753.348 /15. 573. 200 1.053.000 6.438.500 617.000 1.025.000 278.5.00 713.000 75.000 379.000 3.175.970 12.585.000 6.300.000 8.625.950 9.243.749 632.346 135.000 623.680 168.000 744.000 197.200 1.971.605 / 70. 553. 700 18 7 6. In the Netherlands. In Nether- lands-India. / 278.500 713.000 75.000 379.000 3.175.970 12.585.000 6.300.000 39.252.398 19.435.407 7.489.809 135.000 623.680 168.000 744.000 57.600 197.200 2.992.284 /119.307.048 Total. /17. 262. 300 1.302.000 8.192.000 658.000 1.174.150 42.917.381 67.720 4.454.120 700.000 588.227 / 48. 727. 448 /17. 262. 300 1.802.000 8.192.000 658.000 1.174.150 320.000 592.500 92.500 389.000 4.077.450 16.420.400 6.210.550 11.533.700 10.886.156 537.090 126.000 505.675 200.000 1.275.000 235.600 ■ 2.176.775 320.000 592.500 92.500 389.000 4.077.450 16.420.400 6.210.550 54.451.081 10.886.156 67.720 4.991.210 126.000, 505.675 200.000 1.275.00Q. 700.000 235.600 2.765.002 / 84. 166. 846/132. 894. 294 \ IX •i^ECEIETS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NeTHEKLANDS InDIA, lONED YEAES (BtJDGIT ESTIMATES). 18 8 1. 18 8 6. 1 8 » 5. In the ffetherlands. In Nether- lands-Ill dia. Total. In the Netherlands. In Nether- lands-India. Total. In the Netherlands. In Nether- lands-India. Total. / 18.377.000 / 18.377.000 / - / 20.737.800 / 20.737.800 / - / 18.649.750 / 18.6-49.750 — 1.719.000 1.719.000 — 1.773.000 1.773.000 — 1.898.000 1.898.000 — 9.060.000 9.060.000 — 10.291.200 10.291.200 — 15.235.000 15.235.000 — 802.000 802.000 — 1.100.000 1.100.000 — 1.180.000 1.180.000 — 2.533.000 2.533.000 — 3.318.000 3.318.000 — 2.770.000 2.770.000 ■— 630.000 630.000 — 700.000 700.000 — 853.000 853.000 — 750.000 750.000 — 758.000 758.000 — 860.000 860.000 — ' 213.000 213.000 — 211.000 211.000 -^ 244.000 244.000 — 834.500 834.500 — - 805.000 805.000 — 837.000 837.000 — — — — 2.540.000 2.540.000 — 2.876.000 2.876.000 — 104.000 104.000 — 97.000 97.000 — 52.000 52.000 — 512.000 512.000 — 600.000 600.000 1 635.000 635.000 — 4.723.100 4.723.100 — 7.876.850 7.876.850 — 7.217.300 7.217.300 — 17.790.800 17.790.800 — 21.376.000 21.376.000 — 17.668.000 17.668.000 — 6.680.500 6.680.500 — 7.167.000 7.167.000 — 8.557.000 8.557.000 43.283.578 11.238:800 54.522.373 23.285.290 7.556.500 30.841.790 11.370.432 9.177.600 20.548.032 — 9.448.080 9.448.080 — 5.682.374 5.682.374 — 423.260 423.260 140.721 — 140.721 244.530 8.000 252.530 143.550 1.000 144.550 4.375.743 566.400 4.942.143 4.351.346 503.100 4.854.446 5.725.127 611.200 6.836.327 — 126.000 126.000 — — — — 1.530.000 1.530.000 — 724.800 724.800 — 831.200 831.200 — 1.779.500 1.779.500 ' — 300.000 300.000 — 450.000 450.000 — 468.000 463.000 — r. 245. 5 00 1.245.500 — 1.338.000 1.338.000 — 1.792.000 1.792.000 765.000 1.625.000 2.390.000 1.015.000 5.027.000 6.042.000 890.000 8.688.000 9.573.000 — 318.122 318.122 — 368.500 368.500 — 422.900 422.900 717.640 2.998.275 3.715.915 876.394 3.329.585 4.205.979 688.534 3.118.451 3.806.985 ■ 49.282.677 / 93.319.877 /142.602.554 / 29.772.560 / 104. 445. 109 / 134. 217. 669 / 18.817.643 /107.533.961 /126.351.604 10 Appendix D. Detailed Statement of the Expenditure ' IN EACH OF the UNDEllMEN'riO^i HEA.DS OP EXPENDITUEE. 1 S ? 1. In the Netherlands. In Nether- lands-India. Total. 1 S 7 6. In the Netherlands. In Nether- liinds-India. Total. 3-ENERAL ADMINISTEATION AUDIT OFFICE DEPAETMENT OF JUSTICE: Cost of department , . Judicial establishments Prisoners and convicts , . Miscellaneous DEPAETMENT OF FINANCE: Cost of department Public treasuries Collection of revenue (including costprice of opium) , . Furlough allowances, pensions, etc Miscellaneous DEPAETMENT OF THE INTEEIOE: Cost of department , . Provincial administration Native administration , . Native princes, ambassadors, etc Public safety Agriculture and cattle breeding Charges of collection of landrent Topographical statistical survey Cost of coffee , . do. of sugar of spices of pepper of cinchona of birds's nests Forests - , . Warehouses and stores Packet service Transport and travelling expenses Miscellaneous DEPAETMENT OF EDUCATION, PUBLIC WOE- SHIP AND INDUSTEY: Cost of department European education . Native education Christian worship.. , . Native worship Arts and sciences . , Civil medical service Veterinary service . , Mines Tin , Coals . Salt, (cost ef production and transport) Miscellaneous / 124.500 / do. do. do. do. 6.100 1.509.500 2.453.852 333.300 2.800 20.000 12.000 4 456.412 2.206.781 60.260 270.000 165.000 8.500 1.000 8.500 40.000 400 9.702 368.480 37.000 702.278 411.740 37.000 1.713.372 1.451.935 101.500 248.840 842.193 1.817.575 1.435.000 212.200 - 187.896 3.673.792 . 4.159.207 2.162.368 636.303 366.558 2.103.167 480.302 .1.5.740.892 9.640.190 250.000 6.350 44.400 31.826 493.830 397.219 326.101 565.000 ,. 354.566 114.110 735.280 343.329 506.159 9.579 134.403 744.884 23.138 256.718 2.227.968 155.770 1.567.672 298.307 / 826.778 411.740 37.000 1.713.372 1.451.935 107.600 248.840 342.193 3.327.075 3.888.852 545.500 187.896 3.676.592 -4.159.207 2.182.368 636.303 366.558 2.103.167 492.302 20.197.804 11.846.971 310.260 6.350 44.400 31.826 493.830 397.219 8-26.101 835.000 . 519.566 114.110 743.780 343.829 507.159 9.579 142.903 784.884 23.588 266.420 2.596.448 155.770 1.567.672 335.307 / 85.000 1.100 100 7.000 6.000 1. 000 1.704.500 2.891.400 862.545 / 2.000 2.000 15.500 5.072.357 8.542 6.300 180.000 95.000 25.000 6.200 1.000 5.200 50.000 17.720 342.534 167.000 788.668 )570.740 .111.680 2.446.862 2.179.071 612.700 203.300 419.861 2.942.382 1.727.000 397.500 194.146 4.644.229 4~. 545. 751 3.078.979 505.484 347.137 1.718.391 493.832 17. .595. 620 6.546.208 52.550 7.826 .473.966 292.173 .569.486 600.000 344.432 118.110 1.028.985 793.420 506.999 9.704 164.713 1.335.014 27.573 805.684 3.449.236 168.118 3. .267. 816 833.970 / 823.668 371.840, 111.780 2.453.862 2.18.6.071 613.700 203.300 419.861 4.646.882 1 4.618.400 i 760.045 194.146 4.646.229 4.545.751 3.080.979 505.484 347. isi l.-713.29l| 508.3221 32.667.977) J 6.554.750 53.550 7.8261 479.266 393.17^ 1.5^9.48< 780. OOi 439. 43S 118. 11«! 1.053.985 799.620 , 5.07.999 9.704 169.913 1.385.014 37.573 323.404( 2.74;.76l) 168.118 3.267.816 49^.970 Carried forward. /12. 094. 087 /57. 210. 917 / 69. 305. 004 /lO. 904. 998 / 63. 710. 196 /• 74. 665. 194 XT THE GOVEKNMENT OF NeTHEKLANDS-InDIA, SEARS. (Budget estijiates). ■ 1 S S 1. 1 S S 6. 1 S 9 d. In the In Nethfi-r Total. In the In Nether- Total. In the In Nether- Total. Netherlands. lands-India. Netherlands. lands-India. Netherlands. lands-India. • 136.000 / 782.508 / 918.508 / 40i.600 / 787.990 / 828.590 / 36.000 / 707.840 / 743.840 1.100 410.840 411.940 — ; 410.140 410.140 — • 390.740 390.740 4.100 112.880 116.980 _ 111.430 111.430 •_ ■ 108.960 108.960 — 2.609.943 2.609.943 3.000 2.802.100 3.805.100 9.100 • 2.952.479 2.961.579 . 2.206.316 2.306.316 65.000 ■2.365.845 3.430.845 106.000 2.260.273 2.366.273 — 100.525 100.525 1.000 100.600 101.600 1.000 100.000 101.000 .. 210.700 •210.700 _ 204 . 100 204.100 _ • ■ 213. 9+0 318.940 -^ 616.783 616.783 — 584.560 58-4.560 — 416.939 416.939 1.219.000 3.277.366 4.496.366 719.800 3.830.863 4.540.6fi8 540.000 3.363.457 3.803.457 •3.997.36.3 2.430.000 6.427.363 5.053.800 3.068.000 8.121.800 6.682.400 ■ ■ 3-.810.000 10.443.400 382.500 757.800 1.140.300 398.800 757.600 1.056.400 325.800 816,700 1.143.500 193.746 ■193.746 _ 193.596 193.596 ■ 193.446 198.446 4.885.381 4.885.381 • — , 5.056.083 5.056.083 ' ■ — 3.484.633 5.434.633 4.353.228 4.353.238 — 6.729.329 '6.729.839 ■ — 7.149.682 7.149.683 2.487.705 2.487.705 — 2.824.014 3.824.014 — 2.893.145 3.893.145 538.038 533.038 — ■1.060.102 1.060.103 24.050 ■ 1.564.724 1.588.774 325.617 325.617 15.350 339.136 354.886 — 272.048 272.043 ■- 1.686.376 1.386.376 — ■1.889.773 1.889.772 — ■ 1.660,646 1.660.646 24.000 552.060 576.060 17.000 607.480 624.480 17:000 • -602.180 619.180 5.090.606 17.654.841 33.745.447 3.582.550 17.356.839 20.938.879 1.012.818 7 019.914 8.032.783 — 5.617.954 5.617.954 — 3.967.678 2.967.678 ^^ . . _ 16.005 66.860 83.865 38.664 134.960 158.634 ' ■ 28:378 ■ 108.040 181.418 5.936 . 5.926 — 5.036 5.026 . . j_j_. . , . — — 3.030 523.276 -526.296 2.180 ■ 727.956 730.136 ■ 13.300 650.156 663.456 ,_ 274.368 274.368 — 340.652 340.653 — ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 247.178 247.178 556.503 556.503 — ■ 379.808 379.308 1.600 720.146 721.746 315.000 758.000 1.073.000 280.000 795.000 1.075.000 320:000 733.000 1.043.000 95.000 267.019 363. .019 26.000 267.519 2^3.519 83.500 665.775 699.375 119.710 119.710 * 119.310 119.310 120.510 120.510 20.000 1.476.960 1.496.960 7.000 1.772.573 1.779.573 15.600 2.839.970 3.355.570 6.200 1.124.079 1.130.379 — 1.033.846 1.032.846 — 1.870.384 1.870.384 1.000 581.760 582.760 7.300 634.060 641.360 9.200 620.400 639.600 6.200 6.300 — 8.700 8.700 — 7.700 7.700 7.500 160.253 167.753 10.500 137.882 138.383 11.500 168.523 175.022 98.500 1.655.308 1.753.808 185.000 1.907.461 2.093.461 170.000 1.949.390 2.119.390 20.600 39.580 60.180 — 12.670 43.670 — 108.185 108.185 43.140 309.734 352.874 34.500 339.089 353.589 29.530 319.669 34it.l99 241.677 2.347.388 2.589.065 273.080 2.168.472 2.441.552 384.944 3.808.496 3.698.440 147.256 147.256 — — — 67.500 1.353.360 1.419.860 2.493.291 2.493.391 — . 2.198.005 2.198.005 — 2.447.515 2.447.515 131.500 342.040 473.540 88.000 889.510 427.510 104.000 339.340 443.840 ' 11.853.811 / 65.061.118 / 76.914.939 / 10.738.924 / 67.857.741 / 78.091.665 / 9.887.220 / 59.392.467 1 / 69.279.687 XIT HEADS OF EXPENDITUEE. In the Netherlands. 1 8 g 1. la Nether- lands-India. Total. In tbe Netherlands. 1 8 g 6. In Nether- lands-India. Total. Brought forward DEPAETMENT OF CIVIL PUBLIC WOEKS : Cost of department Staff of P. W. Dept Plant of do. Eepalrs of buildings do. of roads, bridges, etc New buildings do. roads, bridges, etc Eailways Post and telegraph service Miscellaneous WAE DEPAETMENT : Cost of department . '. Commissariat service Salaries and allowances Ordnance department Military works Medical service Military establishments Food and clothing Transport' and travelling expenses Military expeditions, etc Miscellaneous. .' NAVAL DEPAETMENT: ■ Cost of department Naval establishments and magazines Geographical and hydrographical service. . Harbour establishments Buoys, lights and pilots ^ Salaries and allowances Ships and ordnance Transport and travelling expenses Miscellaneous /12. 094. 087 170.000 767.000 222.000 5.000 245.325 .564.000 103.004 .166.127 16.500 330.410 430.500 50.000 /19. 163. 958 /57. 210. 917 110.400 597.234 618.300 1.183.500 910.200 132.500 5.000 715.414 696.638 2 315.528 407.446 6.899.940 1.956.800 942.644 177.633 4.775.261 1.160.774 200.000 771.829 211.431 1.175.113 153.714 172.184 364.198 1.841.096 1.484.000 90.000 212.700 /69. 305. 004 110.400 597.284 170.000 618.300 1.182.500 910.200 2.132.500 772.000 1.937.414 701.638 315.528 407.446 7.145 265 1.564.000 1.956.800 942.644 280.637 4.775.261 2.326.901 200.000 788.329 211.481 1.175.113 153.714 172.184 364.198 8.171.506 2.914.500 90.000 262.700 /lO. 904. 998 4.800 800.000 2.817.000 218.200 5.000 249.857 3.250.000 176.029 1.704.835 71.500 8.000 1.866.524 2.887.000 50.000 / 63. 710. 196 115.290 1.141.264 1.052.485 1.333.141 2.281.636 3.193.187 2.298.680 1.973.274 858.850 432.542 420.036 7.562.027 1.930.300 1.087.846 535.257 5.231.673 1.409.700 1.700.000 1.508.880 229.335 1.631.651 188.7' 149.071 409.095 1.475.920 1.421.000 152.500 226.000 /74. 665. 194 115:290 1.146.064 300.000 1.052.485 1.333.141 2.231.636 3.193.187 5.115.680 2.191.474 863.860 482.542 420.036 7.801.384 3.260.000 1.980.300 1.087.8*6 711.2^' ■ 5.231.61 3.114.5^ 1.700.003 1.580.381 229.335 1.634.651 188.760 149.071 409.095. 3.842.441 4.308.00 15«.50 276. OOq /88. 491. 394 /107.655.347 / 24. 508. 243/106. 599. 596/130. 157. 839 xin 1 S S 1. 1 s s e. 18 9 5. In the In Nether- Total. In the In Nether- Total. In the In Nether- Total. Netherlands. lands-India. Netherlands. lands-India. Netherlands. lands-India. ■ 11.853.811 / 65.061.118 / 76.914.939 / 10.733.934 / 67.357.741 / 78.091.665 / 9.887.220 / 59.393.467 / 69.379.687 _ 113.940 113.940 115.440 115.440 144.180 144.180 — 1.161.636 1.161.626 — 969.734 969.734 — 1.343.333 1.343.332 380.000 — 380.000 400.000 50.000 450.000 841.000 118.000 959.000 1.311.800 1.311.800 — 764.050 764.050 — 844.500 844.500 1.853.000 1.853.000 — 1.573.000 1.573.000 — 1.331.600 1.331.600 — 1.544.000 1.544.000 — 1.143.950 1.143.950 — 3.004.00U 3.004.000 833.000 4.475.000 5.807.000 18.000 2.741.500 2.759.500 — 6.636.300 6.636.300 2.269.550 7.495.770 9.765.330 3.876.000 6.797.900 9.673.900 3.311.300 8.774.600 11.085.800 358.000 1.973.462 3.331.462 179.000 1.940.010 2.119.010 349.000 1.935.230 3.184.330 5.000 1.171.988 1.176.988 5.000 1.160.793 1.165.793 5.000 1.435.833 1.440.833 412.164 413.164 _ 437.334 437.334 _ 477.436 477.426 — 670.500 670.500 — 741.537 741.537 — 919.196 919.196 430.075 7.653.264 8.083.339 355.355 8.313.051 8.668.406 459.965 8.851.607 9.311.573 2.250.000 — . 3.250.000 1.673.000 330.550 1.902.550 2.300.000 352.500 3.653.500 — 1.818.000 1.818.000 — 1.864.500 1.864.500 — 1.691.330 1.691.330 — 1.344.558 1.344.558 — 1.563.187 1.562.187 — 1.560.994 1.560.994 315.844 272.463 588.307 357.472 306.883 664.355 369.236 736.000 1.095.336 — 5.784.000 5.784.000 — 6.163.000 6.162.000 — 5.033.000 5.033.000 1.434.500 1.543.830 2.967.320 1.613.800 3.036.500 3.639.300 1.659.000 3.345.400 3.904.400 — 6.497.000 6.497.000 — 598.813 598.813 — 575.000 575.000 87.500 1.466.300 1.553.700 65.000 2.100.000 3.165.000 66.000 2.136.040 2.203.040 336.400 226.490 , 230.695 330.695 , 205.240 305.340 2.000 1.114.536 1.116.526 1.400 1.181.046 1.183.446 1.900 542.768 544.668 — 141.300 141.200 — 122.438 133.438 32.000 67.960 89.960 — 153.823 153.833 — 149.179 149.179 — 173.673 173.673 — 654.766 654.766 — 540.337 540.337 . — 432.123 433.123 1.866.092 2.153.400 4.018.493 1.896.158 1.963.850 3.860.008 1.743.100 1.637.790 3.369.890 2.962.500 1.431.000 4.393.500 3.220.100 1.332.000 3.443.100 1.331.000 1.679.000 3.010.000 — 152.500 153.500 — 301.000 301.000 — 219.000 319.000 50.000 335.000 285.000 50.000 191.000 341.000 50.000 165.000 315.000 • 24.886.872 /119.784.388 / 144. 671. 160 / 23.442.209 /114.757.897 /137.200.106 / 31.394.631 /113.540.979 /134.835.600 Interest oi I debt and cash advances 2.455.600 — 3.455.600 1.954.000 — 1.954.000 / 24.897.809 /114.757.897 /139.655.706 / 23.249.331 /113.540.379 /136.789.600 Appendix E. E A I L W A Y- HEADINGS. GOVEEXMENT KaILWAYS IN JaTA. Eastern lines. 1883. 1893. Western lines. 1883. 1893. Djokja — Tjilatj ap 1893. Government Eailway in Sumatra. 1898. Lines open 31 Dec tilom. Mean mileage worked do. Number of passengers carried : 1st class ; . 2* class 3d class Total Per kilometer Goods transported.... 1000 kilogr. Passenger receipts Goods receipts Miscellaneous receipts Gross receipts Per kilometer Working expenses Per kilometer Nett receipts Per kilometer Total distance traversed kilom Consumption of coal . . 1000 kilogr, Per kilom. traversed. . . kilogr. / 5 51 1.467 1.525 4 173 1.113. 1.295. 100. 2.509. 8. 1.055. 3. 1.453. 4. 907. 7. 337 312 .687 .789 .985 .461 .890 .159 .281 .371 .389 .042 .048 .602 .386 .439 .662 916 708 8% 14 91 2.596 2.702 5 568 1.526 2.845 303 4.575 // 2.016 / 2.559 5 485i 485A .075 .619 ;614 .308 .566 .492 .363 .708 .867 .938 .435 .537 .158 .401. .277 / 12,445 • 96 82 1.129 7.432 256.195 264.756 3.126 30.873 179.337 182.220 27.453 389.010 4.747 260.147 3.174 128.863 1.572 199.090 1,577 7%o / 33 112. 2.174. 2.320. 8. 184. 519. 766. 61. 1.348. •5. 895. 3. 463. 1. 29 8 J 258i 209 557 660 426 976 716 785 577 767 129 205 009 456 120 749 / 6.903 187i 187i 1.892 18.051 968.947 989.890 246.363 324.395 473.662 84.840 833.897 4.454 546.563 3.923 386.333 1.531 3.566 5Wv 173 170i 43.303 990.389 1.033.691 STATISTICS. XV Pbivate Railways IN Java. SUMATKA Samarang — Djokjatarta. Batavia-^B iiitenzorg. Batavia — K-edo&ng -Gedeh. Tagal— Balapoelang. Deli Eailway. 1883. 1893. 1883. 1893. 1893. 1893. 1893. 203 205 58 56^ 57 .241 102i 203 205 58 56 57 24i •102i 6.494 8.412 20.900 20.398 2.168 — 16.832 31.637 44.356 150. 748 99.946 43.323 909 43.951 917.310 1.119.836 843.014 709.101 935.826 83.953 524.343 965.441 1.172.604 1.013.662 829.4+5 981.317 84.8^ • 585.126 4.706 5.720 17.477 14.810 17.216 .3.464, . .. , 5.757 274.554 296.240 84.510 104.225. 34.891 28.642. . 116.389 f 514. 2S2 / 516.836 / 391.922 > 315.341 / 168.925 ■ / 20.416 / 353.255 2.497.657 // 1.851.615 // 312.155 // 390.562 // 108.731 // 42 . 341' " 534.101 106.010 ■II 124.908 // 34.029 II 36.017 '/ 9.396 '/ 4.561 ■ /' 33.746 3.117.949 II 2.493.359- // 738.107 II 741.920 // 287.052 6 7.. 9.61 . 930.102 15.359 II 12.163 - // 12 . 725 II 13.248 // 5.045 2.718 '/ 8,958 1 . 012 . 360 II 947.040 // ■ '303.598 II 359.947 // 133.642 // 51.924 441.908 4.987 II 4.620 ,/ 5 . 234 II 6.428 // 2 . 345 „ 2.077 • '/ 4.302 2.105.589 II 1.546.319 // 484.509 II 381.973 // 153.410 '/ 16.037 '/ 478; 194 10.372 II 7.543 //, 7.429 II 6.820 II 3.700 . 641 II 4,656 419.120 — 220.712 — — — — " ■■ 4.136 5.812 1.445 1.725 835 3'80 (fuel) 4.851 9%o 8'/io 6Vio 5"7io 3%o 5%o 13%o Appendix F. Quantity, as par as can be asceetaineD, and Valu Private account into Netheblands-Indi ARTICLES. Apparel Arms, ammunition, gunpowder Books, paper and stationery , . . Clocks and watches Coal Cordage Drugs and medicines Dyes Earthenware and porcelain Fireworks Eurniture and carriages Gambler Glass, and manufactures of Gums and resins Haberdashery, toys, matches, etc. . . . Hardware and cutlery Horses and cattle Jewelry, gold and silverware Leather and leatherwork Liquors : Malt Spirits Wine Mineral waters Machinery and mill plant Manufactures : Cotton piece goods. . . do. twist and yarns Woollen goods Silk goods Manure Metals Petroleum . Perfumeiy Playing cards (Chinese and other). . . . Provisions = Bacon and hams Butter Cheese Elour Salted and dried fish .... Miscellaneous . Eice Soap Tea Tobacco Wax Wood, and manufactures of Miscellaneous 1 S 7 5. Quantity. Gimpowder 100.258 kilogr 70.620 tons. 2.944.753 kilogr 132.381 liters. 725.209 do. 140.637 do. 468.802 bottles, 13.573.504 liters. Value. 119.743.272 kilogr 925.907 do. 650.395 do.. 909.059 do. / 1 II 1 ff 1 1 2 3 41 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 11 .268.921 185.410 .274.521 125.011 .765.500 182.238 624.943 536.499 .600.842 548.251 602.048 647.846 .080.314 61.123 .446.734 .757.637 94.858 397.512 586.556 508.277 .449.336 .212.125 103.137 .162.645 .285.421 .918.995 .796.513 .418.667 76.042 .418.711 .714.701 175.270 167.694 177.866 913.008 91.907 .604.443 .390.662 .023.031 .891.736 354.912 925.907 .410.283 .818.118 148.372 ,228.680 Gunpowder 82.735 kilog 372.537 tons. / 108.173.223 18 8 Quantity. 4.235.043 kilog 1.459.219 liters 2.616.586 do 2.582.979 do 859.504 bottl( .401.424 liters 202.220.199 kilog 1.331.806 do. 1.240.622 do. 1.121.609 do. ; THE flllNCIPAL AND OTHEll AUTICLES IMPOllTED ON EACH OF THE^ UNDEllMENTIONED "XEAllS. XVII 18 8 4. 18 9 3. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. / 2.440.208 ./ 2.205.170 / 2.748.317 208.732 Gunpowder 110.683 kilogr. // 267.583 Gunpowder 116.895 kilogr. 284.440 // 1.237.514 — // 1.440.571 — // 1.857.002 // 185.193 — // 202.518 — 305 . 934 // 8.940.888 200.955 tons. It 4.421.010 124.242 tons. /, 1.987.872 // 196.351 — n 219. 2»2- — 206.782 '/ 806.127 — It 977.014 — // 1.258.978 // 406 . 729 — n 477.764 — 522.015 // 2.737.175 — n 2.413.623 — 2.210.469 „ 636.695 — II 475.354 — 712.062 ^, 987.667 — f. 1.253.274 — 1.382.162 n 4.058.761 4.241.735 kilogr. n 1.060.434 4.571.289 kilogr. 1 . 142 . 822 ^, 454.220 „ 643.707 — 663.177 n 66.140 „ 244.713 — 848.983 // 3.900.128 II 4.951.536 — 6.787.057 // 1.445.465 tl 1.813.568 — 1.907.132 '/ 2.348.009 n 932.050 — 1 . 454 . 804 ,, 436.783 II 474.288 — 175.049 // 613.132 .// 831.586 — 574.964 // 727.208 1.684.303 liters. // 757.937 2.307.105 liters. „ 1.133.667 // 2.357.868 2.785.800 do. „ 2.380.791 2.496.496 do. 2.181.258 u 2.537.198 2.294.658 do. // 2.465.878 1 . 854 . 440 do. 1.607.653 300.826 1.334.205 bottles. // 400.262 1.868.595 bottles. 373.719 II 3.079.994 — II 5.963.527 — n 7.122.480 „ 34.333.890 — n 39.836.940 — ■n 37.423.804 // 2.460.881 — ff 4.380.534 — 2.865.045 // 2.098.636 — n 3.119.406 — 2.621.538 // 1.555.984 — ff 1.797:355 — -/ 2.165.744 // 504.844 - — fi 715.236 — 2.354.635 2.245.61-9 — II 4.010.851 — 3.605.553 // 7.968.170 75.262.509 liters. ff 7.526.251 160.379.700 liters. „ 12.830.376 ^1 67.907 — ff 170.460 - — 149.179 II 146 . 845 — n 157.471 — 206 . 832 n 210.950 — II 173.534 — 160.937 If 1.264.014 889.880 kilogr. n 1.970.728 817.961 kilogr. 1.635.922 120.922 II 125.567 - — ■ 144.161 II 1.548.923 n 1.692.891 . — 1.936.893 // 3.346.441 ff 4.171.306 — // 6.271.909 // 5.498.526 fi 6.072.611 — ., 8.202.340 21.014.363 104.854.578 do. n 8.368.774 173.644.646 kilogr. // 17.286.055 // 702.008 „ 478.857 — 302.685 // 1.331.806 1.095.078 do. n 1.095.078 1.249.625 do. 1.249.625 4.290.836 1.182.698 do. ft 4.326.273 1.474.969 do. ,/ 2.847.444 // ] .458.091 1 . 468 . 032 do. ff 1.027.622 2.504.726 do. ,/ 1.753.308 1 . 027 . 348 - — ff 450.202 — 619.149 " 10 992.274 ff 9 . 022 . 649 // 13.382.167 / 145.298.319 f 137.964.066 / 159.464.099 11 Appendix G. Quantity and value of the puincipal auticles expouted ejjom Netheulands-India to fobeign counteibs ON peivate account in each of the undeementioned yeaes. AETICLES. 1 S 7 5. Quantity. Talue. 1 S S O. Quantity. Value. 1S8 4. Quantitv. Value 189 3. Quantity. Value. Arrack Cacoa Cinchona-baiic : . . Cinnamon Coffee Gambier Gums and resins ; benzoe dammer India-rubber. copal getah-pertjah Hides and sliins Indigo Kapoli (silk cotton) Oils : coco nut katjang or earthnut. . . . petroleum Pepper: white black Rattans Rice : cleaned uncleaned Spices : nutmegs mace cloves Sugar Tea Tin Tobacco Miscellaneous liter 3.734.876 kilo 202.654 kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo liter liter 198. 35.671 7.430 774 2.102 76 315 790 3.665 323 472 1.922 .225 .152 .850 .208 .511 .035 .116 .413 .972 .574 .522 130 kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo 209 kilo 2 kilo 3 kilo 13 706.734 733.011 .478.514 .967.523 220.474 283.848 700.974 418.038 .738.814 179.839 179.320 863.589 r 821.673 » 202.654 » 79.346 » 32.104.102 » 1.634-. 633 » 1.239.761 1) 967.014 » 137.721 B 103.979 » 2.008.400 » 2.935.130 » 1.943.832 » 151.224 B 1.538.018 » 52 » 1.450.724 B 1.306.555 » 1.519.290 » 957.309 » 11.024 » 2.675.248 » 2.702.700 » 627.057 » 52.434.703 B 2.179.839 » 3.179.320 B 8.318.153 » 7.539.463 /" 130.768.924 liter 5. 076. 204 kilo 146.. 504 kilo 4.176 kilo 39.945.705 kilo 15.«)3.177 kilo 915.292 kilo 5.451.426 kilo 114 571 kilo 2.470.520 kilo 3.720.615 kilo 373.273 kilo 780.138 liter 735.954 liter 481.555 kilo 1 kilo 4 kilo 13 kilo 9 kilo 7 kilo 1 kilo kilo kilo 222 kilo 2, kilo 4, kilo 10, .458.279 .260. 970 053.903 .436.901 ,223.155 451.540 267.881 19.539 242.491 519.267 616.740 541.368 f 1.015.241- B 128.923 B 1.253 » 27.961.993 B 6.161.271 B 1.372.938 B 3.815.998 B 183.314 B 4.941.040 B 2.232.369 » 2.986.184 1) 280.850 » 588.763 » 144.466 802.054 B 1.278-.272 » 2.610.781 » 1.132.428 B 361.458 9 2.467.618 8 401.821 » 24.423 » 48.893.348 » 1.763.487 » 4.385.903 B 10.541.368 ) 7.415.776 liter kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo Idlo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo liter liter 3.581.783 93.188 249.695 53.527 41.055.889 9 079.362 798.486 4.613.613 130.707 151.840 1.670.152 3.494.243 479.437 1.491.185 968.080 6.308.358 kilo 1 kilo 4 kilo 15 kilo 11 kilo 6, kilo 1. kilo kilo kilo 359. kilo 2, kilo 4. kilo 16. .249.201 .451 733 ,998.767 ,390.447 ,555.770 256.334 284.916 14.637 035.857 533.645 ,144.776 241.008 644.721 83.869 624 237 10.705 19.744.564 2.269.840 1.197.729 3.229.529 196.060 151.840 3.340.304 2.096.546 3.835.496 521.915 774-464 2.523.343 749.521 1.780.693 3.199.753 1.139.045 327.788 1.884.501 427.374 14.637 71.807.171 1.773.552 3.730.298 16.241.008 9.927 363 '■133.893.340 /" 154.247.6 liter 2.107.544 kilo 564.104 kilo 2.710.443 kilo 7.889 kilo 25.360.993 kilo 6.249.905 961.575 1.989,272 117.731 4.361.114 906.059 3.874.416 607.345 1.508.593 1.642.550 5.171.494 liter 11.037.132 kilo 932.591 kilo 8.224.272 kilo 17.620.764 kilo 29.819.667 kilo 2.211.844 kilo 1.400.965 kilo 390.151 kilo 214.240 kilo 507.490.040 kilo 2.712.446 kilo 4.015.064 kilo 28.882.270 kilo idlo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo kilo liter liter 210.754 491.493 813.133 4.733 24.855.930 1.562.476 961.575 994.636 235.462 1.744.446 906.059 2.324.649 2.125.707 377.148 492.765 1.034.299 882.970 466.295 2.467.281 2.643.114 2.981.967 110.592 1.961.351 780.302 128.544 71.048.605 1.898.712 4.515.064 28.882.270 13.082.136 f 170.984.468 Appendix H. Total amount op discounts, loans, notes in ciuculation, etc. op the Java Bank. (Stated in. thousands, i. e. / 1.000 = / 1.000.000) On,ihe last Wednesday" 1875. 1878. 1881. 1884. 1887. 1890. 1891. 1892. 1893. 1894. Januari . . . February.. March April May June July August. . . . September October . . . November. December . January. . . February. . March April May June July August. . . . September October . . . November. December . January . . . February. . March April ...... May June July August.. .. September October . . . November. December . January... February. . March April May ^ . June July....... August September October . . . November . December . DISCOUNTS. 10.756 10.070 10.169 10.533 11.345 12.028 13.219 13.365 14.125 13.360 13.150 12.138 '29.388 29.184 29.664 28.864 27.773 27.723 27.853 26.304 25.890 28.131 28.789 30.285 9.751 9.575 9.002 8.021 8.188 8.415 9.585 10.920 11.961 12.407 12.959 11.332 7.893 8.421 8.767 9.639 10.143 10.8.36 11.286 11.416 10.378 9.250 9.619 8.439 f 10.657 9.363 8.945 9.126 9.647 11.109 13.232 14.453 14.934 14.105 14.933 13.811 4.859 5.031 4.971 5.173 5.194 4.776 5.119 5.073 6.412 7.496 7.995 3.483 3.821 3.670 4.106 4.310 4.023 6.487 6.583 8.791 11.567 10.281 8.922 6.538 4.948 4.738 4.476 4.868 5.217 7.141 10.562 11.193 14.560 14.848 11.908 9.391 7.524 5.757 6.575 7.069 9.104 11.034 12.689 12.544 10.340 8.658 7.318 .6.314 5.649 6.699 6.816 7.529 7.347 7.701 7.810 10.324 9.458 7.051 8.163 NOTES m GlECULATION. SPECIE AND BULLION. 35.485 35.711 35.244 36.019 37.240 37.164 37.416 35.144 32.302 31.041 31.743 32.648 33.392 33.017 33.012 32.613 31.905 30.242 29.647 27.507 27.4fl9 27.366 28.279 29.936 25.871 27.013 28.279 28.381 26.358 26.291 24.341 23.851 22.701 23.119 23.481 24.830 35.073 34.901 35.189 34.816 34.585 34.235 34.800 34.687 34.900 34.858 35.732 35.780 50.209 49.524 50.506 49.458 49.006 49.029 48.374 49.116 48.590 47 830 47.900 48.534 48.497 48.802 49.064 48.399 46.386 42.904 40.146 38.853 36.745 36.373 36.537 37.425 38.360 38.362 38.251 35.134 32.565 28.596- 25.782 23.410 23.192 22.94« 26.256 26.670 27.130 27.800 29.029 28.079 29.328 29.380 29.443 29.921 29.180 29.210 29.790 30.190 6.645 6.475 6.793 7.196 7.219 7.054 6.079 7.289 7.015 6.553 4.322 5.364 LOANS. f 4.177 f 1.380 f 3.612 f 5.537 f 3.313 f 1.676 f 4.411 r 5.041 r 11.225 r 8.234 3.615 939 3.236 5.075 3.808 1.568 3.765 3.554 10.261 7.320 1.648 1.822 2.216 3.525 2.990 753 3.567 3.965 6.558 6.715 1.456 640 1.575 2.795 2.673 958 2.790 5.371 6.283 6.636 1.493 833 1.290 3.227 2.536 687 3.066- 6.154 6.922 6.939 969 1.089 1.328 3.144 2.975 1.203 2.956 8.437 7.772 6.130 1.227 1.009 1.298 3.560 2.570 924 3.317 8.082 7.677 7.184 1.989 1.424 3.376 3.068 2.215 1.087 3.310 8.356 7.859 6.405 3.026 1.212 3.840 4.151 2.545 2.507 4.024 9.854 7.330 7.215 3.148 1.384 5.002 5.580 3.858 3.154 4.619 11.138 10.516 6.944 3.345 1.500 4.565 7.327 3.470 2.438 3.632 12.601 10.557 9.490 2.929 1.380 5.528 7.395 4.306 3.078 4.475 11.147 7.264 6.468 f 37.861 f 39.738 f 40.080 f 40.335 f 41.001 f 50.491 f 57:273 f 54.396 f 45.745 f 46.216 37.218 38.835 40.448 39.923 41.582 51.188 55.596 53.156 45.697 45.108 35.108 41.419 39.126 38.832 40.289 50.811 54.082 50.685 43.678 44.077 34.949 40.106 38.573 38.863 40.038 40.078 51.602 48.062 42.964 44.424 34.325 42.459 38.660 38.350 38.750 49.589 52.085 45.984 42.581 45.325 35.684 42.458 38.074 39.306 38.433 50.908 51.766 45.385 42.454 43.672 36.014 43.358 37.667 39.050 38.228 53.424 52.469 43.800 41.131 42.601 35.443 4). 864 37.601 38.837 37.817 53.941 54.014 42.345 43.749 43.016 38.379 40.776 37.663 39.523 40.105 55.169 54.641 45.531 45.553 43.862 37.238 41.419 37.811 42.262 42.630 57.149 55.694 45.584 47.904 43.773 38.467 41.533 39.291 42.515 43.463 57.807 55.550 45.612 46.150 43.015 39.680 40.683 40.412 42.910 45.019 57.572 55-716 45.423 46.165 44.127 30.749 31.560 32.887 33.731 33.653 33.060 31.879 31.311 30.765 31.410 31.395 32.377 Appendix I. Wholesale piuces (N. q. = Java Coffee (ordins ry). Padang Coffee i) (1^' quality). Sugar N°. 14. O 1 <6 1-5 S January. i •-5 October. / per iDBcul. / per pecul. /per pecul. 1871 32i 35 33i 36 37i 36| 41| 44f 14f 16i Ifii 16f 1872 39^ 40 42 42 421 45 421 45f 17i 144 141 161 1873 43 49i 50i 55 501 53f . 581 68i 161 16 14|J- - 151 1874 58 N.q. 57 51| 57i 60 52 57f 14f 14 14| 161 1875 50 55 60| 621 591 741 66| 61| 15i 14i 141 131 1876 N.q. N.q. 50i 50 531 49| 49f 611 13f 131 13f 14f 1877 60 59 60 N.q. 601 62 55| 56f 191 16f 181 161 1878 54 N.q. • 56 52 50 561 621 551 15i N.q. 15 151 1879 50 53 52| 56 60 58f 59| 661 15 13f 14 151 1880 45i N.q. 441 46 591 53| 52f 451 N.q. N.q. 15 14 1881 39 401 5 If 501 47 47i 44 39f 141 15 15i 14 1882 N.q. N.q. 30 271 44 1 401 38| 381 N.q. 15 15 U 1883 35 30 321 321 ^49| 44i 43f 441 N.q. 15 141 14 1884 301 N.q. 29i 28 451 41i 41f 39 121 12 Hi H 1885 31 N.q. 26 27i m 39f 40 L 421 8i 9 12 111 1886 26 28 321 36 46i 51 531 55| 11* n 8 a 71 81 h' 1887 m N.q. 521 50 57| 601 651 57f 8 a9 9 8} a 9 10^ 1888 50 40 391 45 451 46f 47f 56| 11 H 8^ 8f 1889 52i 52 52 55 64| 591 631 64| H a 91 9 a 10| 11 N.q. 1890 60 60 62 65 701 66f 681 62| 8 8* H H 1891 65 65 60 50 65f 65| 61 681- H 8f a 9 8 a 81 8 a 1 1892 67i 55 55 621 71f 71f 77 72| 8f 8^ 8f 8f 1893 60 60 621 60 nh 651 65f 65| 9^ 9| a 10 10 91 a ! 1894 57i 60 55 571 63| 63| 65 70 H 81- a 8J 7^ a 7 7 1895 55 N.q. N.q. — 74f 75f — — 61 a 7 61 a 61 61 ;\ 6 — ') Average price of the periodica! Government auctions. ? EXPORT ABTICLES. I quotation. XXI Indigo. P E I' p E u (black •) Rice. T (Public IN rBilliton.) sale, average price. ) P 1-5 (Li o P a a, s .1-= o o a ►-a 1 S3 o 1 r-4 < 03 a 1-5 be s a f per i iilogr. /per pecul. /per coy an. /per pecul . 4.40 4.40 4.50 4.60 24| 264 374 32 160 1574 155 160 804 82 8O4 85 87 904 5.10 5.20 5.20 5.— 314 34 344 29| 165 1724 215 217 87J 994 96 96i 91| 82i 4. 35 4.20 3.75 3.85 30 344 35 354 230 225 207 210 88 92f . 844 854 79f 75f 3.85 3.85 3.85 8.80 40 26^ 261- 31| 215 210 205 170 734 55f 634 6 Of 6O4 59| 3.80 3.95 3.95 3.95 30 264 24f 244 1624 172 1824 1724 59^ 55L 534 524 54f 524 3.95 3.95 3.65 3.65 22 21 164 18 1724 1674 1774 185 53 504 474 464 45 48| 3.65 3.65 3.62i 3.75 20 194 18 Hi 225 205 185 210 461 464 454 42f 424 43f N.q. 3.40 3.50 3.50 18 16 N.q. 15 215 200 225 230 41| 41| 4H 401 37 41| N.q. 4.— 4.50 5.— 13 144 144 15 220 180 1974 205 384 46 43f 424 56f 624 5.45 5.50 5.20 N.q. 23 23 21 N.q. 215 205 200 195 634 564 474 58f 584 614 4.90 4.90 5.— 4.25 24 234 28 284 195 1874 1974 195 60f 59| 61| 61| 66| 7 of 4.75 4.75 4.40 4.30 24 284 254 27 190 185 1874 180 774 674 654 701- 70 644 4.50 4.25 4.50 4.50 244 30 324 40 160 150 170 165 64i 66| 64| 63f 63f 564 N.q. 5.50 5.25 4.40 38 85 88 364 1674 1574 1324 1324 55f 584 564 55f 491 504 5i a 4 3 a 4 21 a 3i N.q. 37 N.q. 40 384 1324 1374 1224 185 544 544 60f 61-1 61f 63| i a H 2J a 3i H a 8i N.q. 41 371- 40 4H 120 1274 115 1124 64 64 711 68f 69| 68| Ji a 3 3 a 3A 2f a 34 N.q. 394 38 404 414 1174 1124 105 105 704 71f 70 704 774 954 5 a 8f N.q. 3.— N.q. 41 414 39 86 115 1174 1024 115 98 69 48| 67f 70| 65| i a 8f N.q. 3 a 3i N.q. 371 36f 35 36f 1374 120 130 N.q. 65| 634 60f 61f 6Si 67f N.q. 3.— 24 a 3 : N.q. 274 24| 254 28f 1524 N.q. 170 180 62| 621 Mi 67 674 634 ! a 3J- N.q. 2f a 3 ' N.q. 194 31| 174 m 1624 1574 160 1624 62| 624 63| 631 est 63 N.q. N.q. H a 2f ; N.q. 16f 144 llf 14f 185 180 185 142i 62 6^1 68| 644 654 634 ! a 3f 3i a 4 3i a 3| H a 4^ 14| 14| 13 18f 1624 N.q. 143 1324 634 624 59^ 55 55 524 N.q. 31 a 3f N.q. N.q. 111 10 9 10 N.q. N.q. 135 125 44| 48f 46| 484 454 42 a 3f 3 a 3i 3 a 34 — H 10 11* — 110 105 115 — 404 444 42| — — — Appendix K. Wholesale prices of COnON GOODS, PEE PIECE. Madapollam 6/4 white. Madapollam 6/4 grey. Shirtings 6/4 white. 1871, January. My . . . , 1872, January . July ... 1873, January, July.... 1874, January, July 1875, January July 1876, January July..". 1877, January July . . . 1878, January July. . . 1879, January July... 1880, January July.. . 1881, January July . . . 1882, January July. . . 1883, January July. . . 1884, January July. .'. 1885, January July. . . 1886, January July . . . 1887, January July. . . 1888, January July. .. 1889, January July... 1890, January July... 1891, January July. . . 1892, January July. . . 1893, January July . . . 1894, January July... 1895, January July... / 5.90 6.10 5.75 5.90 5.50 5.45 5.05 5.125 5.20 5.10 4.70 4.55 4.25 4.— 3.85 3.70 3.65 8.70 3.75 4.20 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.60 3.55 3.50 3.375 3.— 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 a. 60 2.85 2.65 2.90 2.80 2.60 2.45 2.65 2.55 2.45 2,40 2.60 2.20 2.15 2.075 1.90 a / 6.05 // 6.80 // 5.95 // 6 . 05 n 5.75 " 5.75 '/ 5.60 '/ 5.8.5 // 5.50 '/ 5.20 // 4.90 // 4.70 // 4.50 // 4.15 '/ 4. — // 8.85 // 3.80 // 4.— // 4. — // 4.25 '/ 4.15 " 4. — // 3.95 // 3.95 // 8.75 // 3 85 // 3.70 '/ 3 . 65 // 8.40 '/ 2.95 // 2.70 '/ 2.85 // 2.90 " 2.90 // 3.10 // 3.15 // 8.15 // 3.10 // 2.95 // 3.— '/ 2.75 // 2.925 // 2.75 // 2.70 // 2.75 // 2.70 // 2.65 // 2.55 2.40 2.20 / 5.80 II 6.20 // 5.80 // 6.— " 5.60 // 5.60 // 5.25 '/ 5.10 .20 .10 .75 .60 .80 .20 5. 5. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4 — 4.— 3.85 3.85 3.75 4.15 3.90 3.80 3.80 .80 ?5 .60 .55 3.50 8.45 3.30 2.80 2.70 2.85 2-. 80 2.75 2.80 2.65 2.80 2.90 2.80 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.50 2.60 2.50 3.50 2.10 2.— 2.15 a / 6.10 6.45 5.95 6.15 5.75 5.80 5.60 5.50 6.50 5.25 4.90 4.70 4.60 4.40 4.15 4.15 4.10 4.15 4.05 4.40 4.— 4.10 8.95 8.95 4.05 8.90 3.80 8.625 8.50 3.40 8.85 3,35 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.225 3.35 3.25 3.15 8.10 3.10 3.10 3.— 3.— 8.— 3.95 3.90 3.80 2.70 3.35 / 9.35 9. — 8.70 9.25 8.75 8.40 8.25 8.40 8.20 8.10 7.75 7.25 7.— 6.60 6.— 6.30 5.80 6.10 6.25 6.75 5.90 5.90 5.90 6.25 6.10 6.10 5.75 5.85 5.60 5.50 4.50 4.70 4.70 4.70 4.70 5.— 4.95 4.80 4.65 4. 55 4.40 4 4.40 4.15 4.25 a/ - // 9.30 II 9.— // 9.60 // 9.— // 8.70 // 8.40 // 8 . 70 // 8.60 // 8.20 //' 8.15 7.60 7.25 II 6.80 II 6.80 // 6.60 // 6 . 10 // 6.80 „ 6.50 // 6.25 II 6.25 // 6 . 30 // 6.30 6.35 5.95 4.50 4.55 5.— 4.85 4.95 5.— 5.10 5.— 4.85 4.70 4.65 4.70 4.20 4.20 4.30 3.70 II 3.80 3.50 3.30 // 3.50 ABTICLES IMPORTED. xxm METALS, PEE PECUL. Petroleum Drills Iron bars, Iron bars, Copper PEE CASE. grey. Swedisli. English. sheating. / 7.50 a / 8.10 ./ 10.- \ f 10.15 / 5.50 a / / 73.— a /7S.— '/ 6.75 " 7.40 '1 9.50 // 10.— /' 6.50 // 7.— // 70.— II 72.— — // 6.90 ,/ 7.40 II 9.50 // 10.— 6.50 // 7.— ,1 75.— „ 80.— — // 8.— II 8.50 II 12.50 // 13.— II 9.— — // 82.— // 84.— — '/ 7.25 II 7.60 II 16.50 — '/ 10. — // 11.— // 85.— " 90.— — // 7 . 35 II 7.50 II 16.75 // 17.— // 11.— // 12.— // 86.— // 90.— — '/ 6.70 II 7.30 II 17.25 // 17.50 // 12.— // 13.— ,/ 86.— // 90.— — . // 6.50 II 7.10 II 18.— — // 12.— — ■ // 82.50 " 86.- — '/ 5.85 II 6.75 II 16.— // 16.50 // 10.50 // 11.— // 81.— '/ 85.— — // 5.75 II 6.40 „ 14.75 — // 9.50 // 10.— // 79.— // 85.— — // 5.50 II 6.20 II 13.50 — // 9.— — „ 77. _ „ 80.— / 6.— a / — " 5.40 II 5.85 It 12.75 — //- 8.— " S.50 " 67.50 II 76. — II 6.50 // 7.— '/ 5.60 II 5.75 II 12.— // 12.50 // 8. — It 9. — // 76.— // 78.— II 9.50 // 10.— // 5.50 II 5.75 II 10.50 — II 7.50 — „ 74.— ,/ 77.— II 6.— II 6.50 1' 5.25 II 5.60 „ 9.50 — '/ 7. — '/ 7.50 „ 73.— „ 74.— II 5.— — // 5.25 II 5.50 II 9.— — // 6.75 — II 70.— // 72.— II 5.— // 5.25 '/ 5.10 II 5.25 II 9.— It 9.25 // 6.— — '/ 66. — // 68. — II 6.— — // 5.— II 5.40 II 9.50 " CtS' ,/ 6 . — '/ 6:50 '/ 62.50 // 65.— It 4.75 — /' 5.— II 5.30 II 9.75 — ■' // 6.25 // 7.— II 62.— // 67.— II 5. — — /' 5.25 II 5 . 55 II 10.— — // 8.— — II 67.— — II 4.25 — '/ 5.— II 5.05 II 10.25 // 11.— // 6.50 — // 66.— — II 4.75 — // 4.85 II 4.90 II 10.25 — '/ 6.75 — // 66.— — II 4.60 — // 4.90 II 5.— II 9.25 II 10.— II 5.— — ■ // 65.— — It 4.10 — // 4.80 II 4.85 II 10.— — // 6.75 // 7.— // 66.50 — II 3.90 — // 4'. 65 It 9.— — // 6.75 — " 65. — " 66. — ■ II 4.40 — // 4.60 II 4.80 II 9.— — // 6.75 — • // 67.— — N. q. — // 4.55 II 4.75 II 8.— // 9.— // 6.50 '/ 6.75 „ 66.— — N. q. — // 4.40 II 4.55 II 9.— — . // 6.50 — ,/ 63.— — II 3.70 — // 4.25 II 4.40 It 9.— — // 5.50 — „ 60.— — II 3.75 — // 4.20 II 8.50 — // 5 . ^^ '/ 6.— // 55.— — It 3.50 — // 3.95 II 4.— II 9.— — '/ 5.— — II 53.— — II 3.625 „ 4.— II 9.— // 4.62^ // 6.— // 50.— — II 3.40 — // 3.— II 4.— II 9.— // 5 . — '/ 5.25 // 49.— II 3.05 '/ 3.25 II 3.85 II 9.— // 5 . — '/ 6.50 48.— II 3.30 // 3.25 II 3.85 II 8.60 // 9.— // 5.75 „ 50.— ,/ 55.— II 3.175 // 3.85 '/ 3.20 II 4.35 II 8.75 // 9.— // 5.50 // 6.75 " 62.50 // 65.— II 3.45 // 3.— II 4.30 II 7.80 // 8.50 // 6.50 " 7.— It 70.— '/ 75.— II 3.85 // 3.55 II 4.30 II 7.50 '/ 8.75 // 6.10 // 7.50 It 54.— '/ 70.— II 2.95 // 3.35 // 3.65 II 4.85 II 8.50 '/ 8.75 II > 7.50 It 52.— '/ 58.- II 3.425 // 3.50 II 4.30 II 9.— // 8. — • * 8.50 It 52.— // 54.— II 3.425 // 3.85 II 4.27^ II 9.— 7.— // 57.— « 60.— " 3.05 // 3.40 II 4.25 II 7.90 // 8.75 // 6.50 // 58.— " 60.— — // 3.20 II 4.25 II 9.— // 6.— " 7.30 // 57.— '/ 60.— — '/ 3.25 II 4.25 II 9.— // 5.75 II 6.— // 53.— -■/ 55.— — // 2.75 II 4.10 II 8.50 // 9.— II 5.50 // 5.70 // 49.— " 55.50 II 2.425 „ 3.55 // 2.80 II 4.10 II 8.— // 5.70 // 5.75 // 51.— II 2.175 // 2.30. // 2.50 II 4.— II 8.25 '/ 8.60 // 5.50 11 5.70 „ 46.— // 50.— II 2.2S5 ,/ 2.275 // 2.60 It 8.825 „ 8.25 II 5.25 '/ 5.50 // 45.— '/ 49.— II 2.20 // 2.25 ' // 2.50 1^ 3.75 „ 7.75 „ 5.70 // 5.75 // 41.25 II 44.— — // 2.55 " 3.57« " 8.— " 5.25 // 5.70 „ 41.— // 42.50 II 2.60 // 2.825 Appendix L. Rates or wages op coolies (labotjeees) and handiceaftsmen (skilled laboueers). (50 ^ 50 cents per day). BAT J ^ V I A. SAMAEANG. S P] R A B A f A. Coolies. Sk. lab. Coolies. Sk. lab. Coolies. Sk. lab. 1 1874 50 100 4.0 h 50 70 h 150 30'tl 80 100 a 150 1879 50 75 h 200 40 // 75 70 // 200 • 35 // 60 80 '/ 200 1884. 25 h 100 60 // 300 25 // 60 60 // 200 35 '/ 60 80 » 200 1889 20 '/ 100 60 V 250 50 // 150 70 . 200 40 // 50 75 // 150 1893 20 „ 100 60 // 250 15 // 40 60 « 200 35 „ 50 75 // 150 PREANGER. SOERAKARTA. PASOEROEAN. Coolies. Sk. lab. Coolies. Sk. lab. Coolies. Sk. lab. 1874 20 h 25 30 ii 50 30 ft 60 75 a 150 30 h. 50 60 a 100 1879 15 // 30 35 // i.jO 30 // 50 60 /. 150 30 " 50 60 // 100 1884 20 // 25 50 " 150 30 » 60 60 // 150 25 // 70 30 V 250 1889 20 // 30 25 // 100 30 // 35 50 „ 100 25 // 40 60 // 150 1893 20 " 30 25 " 125 25 " 35 50 // 100 50 « 70 50 // 150 OO^STTEIsTTS- I. Preface. § 1 — 3 p . 1 . Introductory. § 4" // 2. Statement of Eevenue and Expenditure, and yearly Surpluses or' Deficits. § 5 ri „ Instability of Revenue explained- § 6 // 4. Causes of Deficits explained. § 7 // !i. System of Taxation: new taxes introduced since 1871. § 8 "6. Present financial position. § 9 V 7 . Introductory to details about llevenue and Expenditure . § 10 // 8. Landrevenue. § 11 " 9. Customs Duties: modifications in the tariff'. § 12 '/ 10. Opium and Salt revenue. § 13 -/ 12. Sales of Government produce; Government Coffee plantations. §14 "13. Government interference with Sugar planting. § 15 — 16 '/ 14. Government Tin and Coal sales. § 17 // " I^orest department. § 18 '/ 15. Railway revenue, and railway statistics. § 19 "16. Details about Expenditure. § 20 " " Settlement of Home surplus and Colonial deficit. § 21 ./ 17. System of Trade statistics explained. § 22 '/ 18. General Imports and Exports. § 23 " 19. Statistics of Government Imports and Exports. § 24 '/ 20. Statistics of private Imports and Exports. § 25 " 21. Details about private Imports: rice, cotton piece goods, petroleum, salted and dried fish, etc. § 26 // 22. Details about private Exports: cofi'ee, indigo, sugar, tobacco, tea § 27 " 24. Details about imports and exports of Treasure, Government and private. § 28 '/ 26. Rates of Exchange and Discount: Java Bank statistics. § 29 " 27. Wholesale Prices of exports and imports. § 30 p. 37 Eate of Wages. § 31 // 28. Relative importance. of Native Industry and European Enterprise. § 32 // 29 . Present position of the Sugar industry. § 33 // 30. do. of coffee, indigo, tea, tobacco and cinchona-planting. § 34 // 31 . Temporal decline of prosperity. § 35 // 32. Causes of decline explained: effect of the Currenpy System. § 36 // // Reasons for introducing a gold standard into JSTetherlands-India . § 37 " 33 . Effect of maintaining silver as standard of value on the state of affairs in British-India, Ceylon, the Straits. § 38 // 35 . Benefit derived by the planting interests in British-India, etc. from the fall in exchange. § 39 n 36 . Contrary effect of stability of exchange on the planting interests of Netherlands-India. § 40 — 42 " // Reasons for maintaining intact the Currency System now in force. § 43 " 39 . Some remarks on the Bimetallic theory and the arguments of its opponents , SUPPLEMENT. I. An abstract from the pamphlet: //The Money-market and Paper-currency of British-India" ; Batavia, 1884; p. 42. II. Memorandum on the present state of the Currency Question in Holland and Java; Batavia, 1879; p. 48. III. Note on the present working of the Gold Standard in Java by Mr. Kensington, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in. the Financial Department; p. 56. APPENDICES. A. General statement of the Revenue and Expenditure of the Government of Netherlands-India for the years 1871 — 1893, showing the yearly surplus or deficit. B. Comparative statement of Taxes and Duties levied in Netherlands-India in 1871, 1886 and 189.5. C. Detailed statement of Revenues and Receipts for the years 1871, 1876, 1881, 1886 and 1895. D. Detailed statement of Expenditure for the years 1871, 1876, 1881, 1886 and 1895. E. Railway statistics. P. Quantity, as far as can be ascertained, and value of the principal and other articles imported on private account into Netherlands-India in each of the years 1875, 1880, 1884 and 1893. G. Quantity and value of the principal articles exported from Netherlands- India to foreign countries on- private account in each of the years 1875, 1880, 1884 and 1893. H. Java Bank statistics. I. Wholesale Prices of export articles: 1871 — 1895. K. Wholesale Prices of articles imported 1871 — 1895. L. Wages of labourers and handicraftsmen. '*# t'l' #* Pf^W ''^ ■^'il ^*.^ .if^'*.:^- "I^^I^^^^^H ;#'# pi IE i^l:**|■^%4i^^S%