f!^ Cornell University Law Library The Moak Collection PURCHASED FOR The School of Law of Cornell University And Presented February 14, 1893 IN HEnORY OP JUDGE DOUGLASS BOARDJVIAN FIRST DEAN OF THE SCHOOL . By his Wife and Daugliter A. M. BOARDMAN and ELLEN D. WILLIAMS Cornell University Library KF1284.T47 "' The law of negligence in relations not r 3 1924 019 316 144 QJnrnpU ICam ^rl^nnl ICibrary Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924019316144 THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE EELATIONS NOT RESTING IN CONTEACT. ILLUSTPATBD BY LEADING CASES AND NOTES. SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, Author of "Liability of Stockholders," "Homesteads and Exemptions,' "Cases on Self-Defence," etc. 11^ TWO VOLUMES. VOL. L ST. LOUIS: F. H. THOMAS AND COMPANY. 18 80. lyntered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1880, by SEYMOUE D. THOMPSON, In the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. St, Louis: Press of O. I. Jones cmd Company. MEMORIAL. To the Hon. Charles D. Dkake, of the District of Columbia; the Hon. Montgomery Bladi, of Maryland; and the Hons. John F. Daebt, Alexander Hamilton, Logan Hdnton, and Warrick Tunstall, of Missouri. Gentlemen: I take the liberty of inscribing these volumes to you. In doing so, I desire to make a memorial of the fact that forty-two years ago you and fifteen other members of the St. Louis Bar, who have gone to their rest before you, founded the Library in which these volumes were compiled and written. The names of your associates were Henry S. Geyee, Hamilton R. Gamble, Josiah Spalding, Beverly Allen, P. Dbxtbk Tiffany, John Davis, Wilson Pkimm, Bryan Mcllanphy, Peter A. Walsh, Louis V. Bogy, Thomas B. Hudson, A. J. Davis, Ferdinand W. Risque, Harms L. Sproat, and Arthur L. Magenis. The little beginning which you then made has, under the fostering care of yourselves, your associates, and your successors, and with the liberal aid of St. Louis County and City, grown into a noble treas- ury of learning, without the aid of which, justice could not be suitably adminis- tered, nor useful and accurate books of the law written. Moreover, a grateful opportunity is here offered me of testifying to the high estimation in which, as lawyers and citizens, you are held by your professional brethren. Your lives have been conspicuous examples of the fact that the study and practice of a profession which intimately concerns the administration of justice and the repose of society, though presenting peculiar temptations, to which some unfortunately yield, yet tend in the main to strengthen the principles of honor and to uphold the dignity of human character. Nor can I let this occasion pass without tendering my grateful acknowledgments to my brethren, the present members of this Library, for the forbearance which for some years past has permitted to me and to my associates the constant use of the Library and its facilities, no doubt at times to the inconvenience of other members. In conclusion, gentlemen, may I hope that we shall meet all of you at our- annual reunions for many years to come ; and may I in the meantime remain,. Your obliged humble servant, SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON. PREFACE. The preface of a book ought to be a brief advertisement of its eon- tents and purposes, from the author's point of view. These volumes embody an attempt to classify and present the case-law of England and America on the subject of Negligence, in relations not springing out of contract, in a form which it was thought would prove most useful and convenient to practising lawyers. Dismissing the definitions of negli- gence which are usually given in the law-books, the writer came to the conclusion that its proper legal meaning is a failure of duty, generally unintentional, but sometimes intentional. i The foundation of every action for negligence is, therefore, a duty on the part of the defendant toward the plaintiff to abstain from doing what he did, or to do what he failed to do. This duty must in all cases arise in one of two ways: either (1) out of the ordinary relations of civil society, or (2) it may be voluntarily assumed by contract. In the former case, the duty may be either implied or imposed by law. It maybe implied from the situa- tion of the parties, in confoiinity with the rules of the common law, or it may be imposed by a positive act of the legislature. In neither of these last cases can it be said that the duty is voluntarily assumed. Here, then, we have two great classes of duties: those which are imposed upon every one by the rules of civil society, and those which a person may or may not voluntarily assume by contract. A failure or violation of a duty of the first class is, in the language which usually obtains among lawyers, denominated a tort; while a failure or violation 1 Thus, there is a statute in Kentucky giv- result, and ignores the psychological condi- ing damages for death produced by "wilful tions which produce the result. Accord- neglect" (j)ost, Vol. II., p. 1277) ; and so the ingly we find that in an action for a negligent courts frequently speak of wilful negligence. injury an allegation that it was maliciously In civil cases, except upon a question done may be rejected as surplusage, and of exemplary damages, the law pays little the declaration will still be good. Pantonj). regard to the state of mind of the person Holland, post, p. 249. guilty of the failure of duty. It looks to the («) f PREFACE. of a duty of the second class we are accustomed to speak of as a breach of contract. Now, if the rules of the law could be made to conform to the standards of strict logic and sound philosophy, no sub- stantial difference would be discovered between a failure of a duty of the former class and a failure of a duty of the latter class. But, fortu- nately or unfortunately, this is not so. In respect of ordinary social or civil duties the law imposes a standard of duty, — not, indeed, fixed and inflexible, but varying with the exigencies of each particular situation, yet nevei-theless in some sense a standard, — denominated ordinary or reasonable care. But when we pass into relations springing out of con- tract, this standard fails. In some relations the law imposes the highest degree of care and foresight of which men are capable, while in others it gives damages only for a degree of negligence so gross as to be deemed equivalent to malice or fraud. Let us illustrate this by three cases: 1. The engine-driver in charge of a railway train runs his train upon a traveller at a highway-crossing and injures him. 2. The dispatcher of a railway passenger-train orders the train to pro- ceed forward to the next station, without knowing whether the track is clear. It collides with another train and a passenger is injured. 3. The directors of a corporation mismanage its affairs, whereby loss happens to its shareholders and creditors. In the first ease, the railway company must or must not pay damages to the traveller accordingly as its engine-driver was or was not guilty of a want of ordinary or rea- sonable care.i In the second place, the railway company must or must not pay damages to the passenger accordingly as its train-dispatcher was or was not wanting in what is termed extraordinarj' care ; that is to say, it must pay damages if he was guilty of very slight negligence.^ In the third case, the directors are not liable to pay damages unless they have been guilty of such gross negligence, non-attendance, and" inatten- tion as the law deems equivalent to actual fraud. ^ I am aware that eminent writers have argued cogently against these distinctions, insist- ing that negligence cannot be divided into degrees. I know that there is also a tendency on the part of courts toward the same conclusion ; 1 Post, p. 417. ' Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11; Overend 2 Kent's Comm. 602; Ang. on Oar., § 523; v. Gibb, L. R. 5 H. L. 480 (affirming s. c, L. R Phila., etc., R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 486, and 4 Ch. 701). many other cases. PREFACE. but nevertheless they remain down' to this time a part of the settled law. For a court, in instructing juries, to apply the same standard of care to a failure of duty not resting in contract, to the failure of such a duty as that assumed by a carrier towards his passengers in respect of their safety, and to the failui-e of such a duty as that assumed by a mere mandatory, would be to ignore the settled distinctions of the law. These views determined the writer to confine the present work to a consideration of the liability which accrues from the failure of those duties in the performance of which the law exacts what is termed ordi. nary or reasonable care. A consideration of the other classes of duties would, it seemed to him, involve an incongruous mixing up, in a single work, of subjects relating to the law of torts, and subjects which relate to the law of contracts. In the execution of this task two unimportant deviations from this plan were made : A theoretical chapter was added on the subject of negligence by public officers (Chap. XVII.), and a chapter was also prepared on the subject of negligence by telegraph companies in transmitting messages (Chap. XVIII. ). With these excep- tions, the subject of negligence in agents, bailees, and mandatories has been entirelj^ omitted. In this work, as in his former works, the writer has made an attempt to collate and cite all the cases bearing upon the subjects discussed. In justification of this course, he asks attention to the fact that there is little or nothing which can be distinctively termed American law. Our judge-made law is the product of the work of the judicial courts in some forty independent sovereignties.! If we except the single fact that the State courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on what are termed "Federal questions," the courts of none of these sovereignties are bound by the decisions of the courts of the others. Such decisions have only persuasive authority, and will be followed or not according to the weight which is attached to the judgments of the particular tribunal, or to the reasoning of the particular case. The first effort of the practitioner is to determine I Thirty-nine, counting the United States and distinct judicial systems, from the as one, and adding the thirty-eight States. judgments of whose courts there is only a To these may be added several Territories, limited right of appeal to the Supreme ■which have distinct bodies of statute law Court of the United States. PREFACE. what the highest court within the particular jurisdiction where he practises has decided upon the particular question. It follows that the law-writer cannot supply a work which will be in the proper degree useful to the profession throughout the whole country without citing all the decisions of the courts whose judgments have the force of authority within each of the different jurisdictions. Suppose, for instance, a practitioner lately settled in Iowa is called upon to bring an action for a client who has been injured by the breaking down of a bridge. He takes up a book on Torts which cites only New England cases, and he there learns that the duty of keeping bridges in repair rests upon the town and not upon the county. Supposing this to be the law of Iowa, he brings an action against the particular township in which the particular bridge was situated, and is non- suited. Before another actibn can be brought against the county, the statute of limitations has barred his client's demand and left him without remedy. This is putting an extreme case, and one not likely to occur. But we may with less improbability suppose that the same practitioner is requested to bring a suit in behalf of a railway brakeman who has been injured by the alleged negligence of some other servant of the company. He looks in a book on Negligence, whose author has not been diligent in collating the decisions and stat- utes of all the States, and he there finds the rule laid down that an action does not lie by a servant against his master for an injury received through the negligence of a fellow-servant engaged in the same com- mon employment. The book does not tell him that a statute of Iowa has abolished this rule so far as it relates to the servants of railway companies ; and he advises his client that he has no cause of action. The latter does not discover that the advice was erroneous until the statute of limitations has barred his demand. We think these considerations fully justify an effort on the part of a writer whose purpose it is to furnish books of practical utility to the legal profession to cite at least all the American cases. To this it may be added that the decisions of the EngKsh courts on questions governed by the rules of the common law receive such high considera- tion in the courts of this country, that an exacting profession will not, and ought not, to excuse such a writer, if he fails to cite all the English PREFACE. cases. With this end in view, the present writer, adopting the best plan of search which he could devise, has succeeded in classifying and citing 5,843 cases. If he has omitted any, it is owing to the very great diflS- culty of carrying out such a plan without any failures. In vindication of the plan adopted of presenting this matter in the form of leading cases and notes, the writer may say that his attempt has been to construct the work in such a manner that, rejecting the cases altogether, the notes would still stand as a complete treatise upon the subject under consideration. His effort has been to combine with this treatise, by way of an introduction to each chapter, a number of cases printed without abridgment, so that the practitioner might have the double advantage of the results of the labor of the author, and a collection of the best judgments of the authoritative courts. If it is thought by any that this plan has been adopted merely to swell into two volumes what might otherwise have been compressed into one, the writer will state that the notes alone would, if printed in the type ordi- narily used in law treatises, together with the index and table of cases, make two volumes as large as these. He therefore may be pardoned a bit of shop-talk if he claims that he is giving the profession a law treatise in two volumes at the usual price of two volumes, to which a collec- tion of sixty-eight authoritative cases, printed in full, is added without extra charge. In carrying out this plan, it became necessary to determine what the leading cases really were, and this could only be done by discovering what cases had been most frequently cited and followed by subsequent courts. In order to do this, it became necessary to take the collec- tion of cases originally made, and from it make a concordance of subsequent citations, indicating where each particular case had been subsequently cited by judges in their opinions, where it had been doubted or distinguished on the facts, and where it had been denied, overruled, or reversed. The result of this labor is seen in the Table of Cases. Its value to the practitioner need scarcely be suggested. Suppose the opposing counsel in a particular case were in his brief to cite and rely upon the case of Davies v. Mann. By turning to this table you would see at a glance that this case has received the general approbation of the courts of this country, and therefore you would not PREFACE. attempt In your argument to controvert the doctrines there laid down. Suppose, again, the opposing counsel should cite and rely upon the case of BusJi V. Steinman. By turning to this table you would discover that it has been very frequently denied in England and in this country ; and after examining the cases themselves in which it is cited, you would con- clude that it is one of the most distinctively overruled cases to be found in the books. Suppose, again, the opposing counsel should cite and rely upon the case of Fletcher v. Rylands. A study of all the cases in ■which that great case has been cited, as shown by the table, would show you that its authorit}' has been denied in New Hampshire, New York, and New Jersey, though it has been recognized in Massachusetts and Minnesota. Suppose, again, that the opposing counsel were to cite the case of Radley v. London, etc.. Railway Company, L. R. 10 Exch. 100. This table of cases would furnish you with the means of dis- covering that the case as there reported has been reversed by a higher court, and is, therefore, not law.' In determining the selection of cases which we have printed in full, we have not in every instance made use of those which have been most frequently cited with approval by subsequent courts. Although this was the general principle of selection, it has in several cases been mod- ified by other considerations. Some cases which have been greatly cited by subsequent courts were not printed in full, because, on exam- ination, they were found to embrace a variety of questions, so that their exact value as authority on any given point could not well be seen. Others have been rejected because they were too long. The wheat was buried in too great a mass of chaff. And other very excellent cases were rejected merely upon a balance of their value and availability for the purposes of this work with others that were included, — the space at our disposal not being sufficient to print all. The case of Fletcher v. Bylands is given in full, including the arguments of counsel and the judgments which were delivered in all the courts through which it went. This was done with full knowledge of the fact that the rule laid down has been denied by several of the American courts. It was printed for ' The reader is cautioned against relying ing "cited," tlie particular case has really Implicitly on the classification ol this table. been denied, though not in direct terms. In many cases where the subsequent refer- The main object was tocoUeetalistof subse- ence is classified under the letter c, mean- quent citations. PREFACE. Tc the reason that there is not to be found in any other case so thorough and able a discussion of the grounds of actionable negligence. In this respect we think that the case of Brown v. Collins,^ which denies the authority of Fletcher v. Bylands, is the only case entitled to be men- tioned with it. The grateful privilege is now afforded me of returning public thanks to those who have assisted me in what has proved a long and arduous task. Mr. Edwin G. Merriam has been the faithful and efficient part- ner of my labors, with but a brief interval, for the last four years. Mr. William L. Murfree, Jr., and Mr. Frank W. Peebles have rendered important assistance upon tliis work. I may add that the note on Fires (Chap. II.) was contributed by Mr. Lawson, the learned editor of the Central Law Journal. S. D. T. St. Louis, April, 1880. 1 Post, p. 61. TABLE OF CONTENTS. VOLUME I. CHAPTEE I. Page Grounds of Actionable Negligence — Liability fob Failing TO Restrain Noxious Agents 1-1 1^ CHAPTER II. Liability for Damages caused by Fire 116-172 CHAPTER III. Liability for Injuries committed by Animals .... 173-22S CHAPTER IV. Liability for Vending, Shipping, or Letting Dangerous Goods or Machines 224-237 CHAPTER V. Injuries prom the Negligent Use of Fire-arms .... 238-248 CHAPTER VI. Liability for Removing the Support op Land .... 249-282 (i) II CONTENTS. CHAPTER VII. Page Liability for Defects in Real PROPERxr injuring Per- sons OR Animals coming upon the Premises .... 283-325 CHAPTER VIII. Liability for Obstructing or Endangering Travel on Highway 326-363 CHAPTER IX. The Law of the Road 364-391 CHAPTER X. Collisions between Travellers and the Teams of Horse- Railways 392-400 CHAPTER XI. Collisions at Crossings between Travellers and Railway Trains 401-432 CHAPTER XII. Injuries to Persons on Railway Tracks at other Places TpAN AT Highway- Crossings 433-462 CHAPTER XIII. Liability op Railway Companies for Injuries to Domestic Animals 463-540 CHAPTER XIV. Negligence of Private Corporations owning Public Works 541-574 CONTENTS. Ill CHAPTEK XV. Page Negligence of Counties, of Incorporated Public Boards, AND OTHER Quasi-Municipal Corporations .... 575-624 YOLUME II. CHAPTEE XVI. Liability of Municipal Corporations for Negligence . 625-806 CHAPTER XVII. Personal Liability of Public Officers for Negligence . 807-827 CHAPTEE XVIII. Liability of Telegraph Companies for Negligence . . 828-860 CHAPTEE XIX. Respondeat Superior 861-916 CHAPTEE XX. Liability of Master to Servant 917-1056 CHAPTEE XXI. Personal Liability of Servant for Negligence . . . 1057-1062 CHAPTEE XXII. Proximate and Remote Cause 1063-1101 IV CONTKNTS. CHAPTER XXIII. Page CONTKIBUTOET NeGLIGBNCK 1102-1216 CHAPTER XXIV. Remedies, Peocedure, and Damages 1217-1309 TABLE OF CASES PRINTED IN FULL. Page Bailey v. City of New York 652 Bonnell v. Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad Com- pany 404 Brown v. Collins 61 Burrows v. March Gas and Coke Company 1070 Butterfleld v. Forrester 1104 Cotton V. Wood 364 Coupland v. Hardingham 327 Davies v. Mann 1105 Dean v. McCarty 116 Dygert v. Sehenck 328 Earl V. Van Alstine 182 Farwell v. Boston and Worcester Railroad Corporation . . . 924 Fent V. Toledo, Peoria, and Warsaw Railway Company . . . 136 Fletcher v. Rylands 2 Garland v. Towne 333 Gibson v. Pacific Railroad 944 Gilmore ?;. DriscoU 254 Gregory v. Piper 862 Hai-tan v. St. Louis, Kansas City, and Northern Railway Com- pany, 439 Harriman v. Stone 1057 Hartfleld v. Roper 1121 Hay V. Cohoes Company 72 Henley v. Mayor and Burgesses of Lyme Regis 626 Hill y. City of Boston 698 Hilliard v. Richardson 868 VI TABLE OF CASES PRINTED IN FULL. Page Holmes v. Clarke 953 Humphries v. Brogden 263 Indermauer v. Dames 283 Kearney v. London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Com- pany 1220 Kennard v. Burton 368 Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati Railway Company 472 Laning v. New York Central Railroad Company 932 Loomis V. Terry 192 Lords Bailiff-Jurats of Romney Marsh v. Corporation of Trin- ity House 1063 Losee v. Buchanan 47 Lynch v. Nurdin 1140 May V. Burdett 174 McManus v. Crickett 865 Mersey Docks Trustees D. Gibbs and Penhallow 581 Metallic Compression Casting Company v. Fitchburg Railroad Company 1079 Morgan v. Cox 238 Moss V. Pacific Railroad 951 Nitro-Glycerine Case (The) 42 North Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Heileman .... 401 Northern Transportation Company v. City of Chicago . . . 692 Nowell V. Wright 812 Panton v. Holland 249 Parker v. Adams 376 Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal Company 541 Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company v. Hummell . . . 433 Priestley v. Fowler 919 Radley v. London and North-Western Railway Company . . . 1108 Railroad Company v. Houston 444 Railroad Companj' v. Skinner 465 Robinson v. Cone 1129 Rochester White-Lead Company v. City of Rochester .... 673 TABLE OF CASES FEINTED IN FULL. VU Page Russell V. The Men dwelling in the County of Devon .... 575 Salisbury v. Herchenroder 1067 Sutton V. Clarke 807 Sweeny v. Old Colony and Newport Railroad Company . . . 408 Thomas v. Winchester 224 Tremain v. Cohoes Company 76 Unger v. Forty-second Street and Grand Street Ferry Railroad Company 392 Van Leuven v. Lyke 188 Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Company 122 Weet V. Trustees of the Village of Brockport 678 Welch V. Wesson 1077 Western Union Telegraph Company v. Carew 828 TABLE OF CASES. ■In this table the letters c, d, and the interrogation point (?) indicate as follows: — c — That the foregoing case is cited in judicial opinions at the pages of the reports following. ? — That its authority is there questioned. cl — That its authority is there denied, or the case overruled. The cases printed in italic are published in full in these volumes. Aaron v. The State, 31 Ga. 167. p. 71. Abbott V. Macfie, 2 Hurl. & Colt. 74i ; 10 Jur. (n. s.) 682; 33 L. J. (Exch.) 177; 12 Week. Kep. 315. pp. 306, 1192. c IS Ohio St. 411; 3 Q.B. Div.333; 7 Gent. L. J. 13 ; 17 Alb. L. J. 506 ; 21 Minn. 213 ; 111 Mass. 141 ; 55 How. Pr. 171; 27 Ind. 515 ; 98 Mass. 569. Abbott V. Wolcott, 38 Vt. 666. p. 797. c 47 Vt. 36. Aboles V. Bransfield, 19 Kan. 16. p. 1242. Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 Hurl. & N. 143 ; 6 Jur. (n. s.) 53 ; 8 Week, Rep. 181. pp. 959, 969, 1040, 1041. f 15 Minn. 537; 3 C. P. Div. 494; 14 Minn. 364 ; 49 Miss. 287 ; 2 C. P. Div. 207, 208 ; 25 N. Y. 665. ? 1 C. P. Div. 557, 560, 661. «l 44 Cal. 82. Achtenhagen v. Watertown, 18 Wis. 331. pp. 1177, 1181. c 33 Wis. 72 ; 22 Wis. 248 ; 42 Wis. 600 ; 41 Wis. 109 ; 19 Wis. 497 ; 39 Wis. 137. ? 34 Wis. 362, 363. Ackert o. Lansing, 59 N. Y. 646; 48 How. Pr. 374. pp. 308, 1239. Acton V. Blundell, 12 Mee. & W. 324. pp. 33, 104, 106, 222, 749. Adams v. Adams, 13 Pick. 384. p. 217. Adams v. Carlisle, 21 Pick. 146. pp. 378, 754, 804, 1176. c 110 Mass. 50; 1 Bradw. 422; 4 Gray, ISO; 4 Gray, 335 ; 19 Conn. 576 ; 10 Mete. 365 ; 18 N. Y. 252; 15 Gray, 580; 1 Allen, 190; 8 Gray, 132; 13Meto.299; 2 Woodb.&M.345; 27Vt.465; 20 N. Y. 72 ; 4 Gray, 401 ; 26 Me. 240 ; 32 Me. 53 ; 3 La. An. 646 ; 35 N. H. 276 ; 12 Meto. 418 ; 7 Gray, 97; 11 Mete. 463; 40 N. H. 416; 5 Gray, 73. Adams v. Emerson, 6 Pick. 57. p. 342. Adams v. Hall, 2 Vt. 9. p. 198. <■ 6 Duer, 427; 20 Barb. 480; 17 Wend. 564. Adams v. McKinney, Add. 258. p. 215. Adams v. Minneapolis, 20 Minn. 484. p. 1246. Adams i;. Natiok, 13 Allen, 429. p. 771. cl05 Mass. 601; 105 Mass. 473; 122 Mass. 391; 112 Mass. 367, 368. Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Me. 361. pp. 620, 704. Administratrix of Dunhene v. Ohio Life, etc., Co., 1 Disney, 257. pp. 1277, 1291. Adolph V. Central Park, etc., R. Co., 65 N. Y. 554; s. c, 1 Jones & Sp. 186; 11 Jones & Sp. 199. pp. 396, 397, 398. Adsit V. Brady, 4 Hill, 630. pp. 312, 686, 687, 758, 819, 821, 900. o 5 Dans. 348; 10 Bos w. 28; 1 Hun, 572; 4N. T. S. C. (T. & C.) 125 ; 21 Mich. HO ; 16 Abb. Pr. 345 ; 15 Barb. 443 ; 50 K. 1'. 239 ; 9 N. Y. 169 ; 5 Sandf . S. C. 29S, 300, 305, 317. 325 ; 44 Barb. 391 ; 8 Bosw. 353; 32 Barb. 639; 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 41S; 1 Disney, 536; 6 Hill, 466; 12 Hun, 210; 13 Hun, 429, 430; 5 Lans. 296; 57 N. Y. 498; 42 N. Y. 53; 44 N. Y. 118, 121, 123, 125 ; 46 N. Y. 196 ; 34 N. Y. 390, 391, 393, 397. ? 16 N. Y. 168, 169, note ; 29 N. Y. 311, 312. Agricola, The, 7 Jur. 157. p. 669. Aiken v. Telegraph Co., 5 So. Car. 358. pp. 836, 843, 844, 846, 848. Akron v. McComb, 18 Ohio, 229 ; s. c, 15 Ohio, 474. p. 744. c 4 Ohio St. 94; 36 N. H. 296; 55 N. H. 136; 91 U. S. 551; 17 111. 143; 7 Ohio St. 464,465, (ix) X TABLE OF C:AiSKIS. 471 ; 31 Ala. 477. 7, 737. c- ?A Wis. '290; 4 Midi. 441;' 36 N. H. 293; 15 Barb. 431, 438, 443;5 S.didf.S.C. 301, 305; .51 N. T. 496 ; 42 How. I'l-. 396 ; 2« Barb. 625 ; 39 Barb. 336 ; 5 Duer, 500, 501 ; 1 llilt. 444 ; 37 N. Y. 260. Albee o. Floyd County, 46 Iowa, 177. pp. 563, 760. 792, 12"i.i. Albert v. Bleecker Street, etc., R. Co , 2 Daly, 389. pp. 389. 397, 398, 399, 1202. c44Md. 128; 6 Daly, 214. Albertsoii ,-. Keokuk, etc., R. Co., 48 Iowa, 202. p. 1191. Albro V. Agavvam Canal Co., 6 Cush. 75. pp. 1028, 10.J5. c 29 Conn. 560 ; 119 Ma.ss. 421 ; 86 Pa. St. 440 ; 4 Gray, 100; 53 Pa. St. 458; 43 Me. 270; 31 Iiid. 182; 49 Barb. 326; 14 Minn. ;i63, 384; 13 Allen, 440; 10 Allen, 237; 10 Cush. 2.il; 9 Cush. 114; 6 Reporter, 126 ; 51 Miss. 642 ; 49 Miss. 287 ; 120 Mass. 228; 59 Pa. St. 251; 46 Texas, 550; 23 Pa. St. 386 ; 17 N. Y. 156 ; 39 N. Y. in ; 25 N. Y. 565 ; 44 Cal. 82 ; 43 Me. 270 ; 69 Pa. St. 251 ; 10 Cush. 231. Albro V. Jaquith, 4 Gray, 99. p. 1062. c 63 Pa. St. 458; 58 Ind. 126. Alden v. New York, etc., R. Co., 26 N. Y. 102. p. 1228. Alders >n v. V/aitsell, 1 Car. & Kir. 358. pp. 72, 1234. c 47 Ind. 271 ; 53 N. H. 451 ; IS Am. L. Eeg. 375. Aldred's Case, 9 Coke, 576. pp. 5, 18, 22, 74, 84, 107. Aldrich v. Cheshire R. Co., 21 N. H. 359. p. 569. Aldrich v. Pelhara, 1 Gray, 570. p. 801. c 16 Gray, 184 ; 52 N. H. 414, 415 ; 109 Mass. 127 ; 11 Gray, 344 ; 43 Conn. 42 ; 33 N. J. L. 264 ; 33 Conn. 60; 35 N.H.59. Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 R. 1. 141. p. 734. Aldridge v. Great Western R. Co., 1 Dowl. (n. s.) 247 ; 4 Scott N. R. 156 ; 3 Ms^n. & G. 515. pp. 126, 131, 152, 158, 469. c41Ind. 241,257; 3 Barb. 48; 19Pa. St. 302; 18 Barb. 86, 87; 4 So. Car. 68, 69; 37 Mo. 296; 30 Wis. 121; 31 Miss. 190; 4 Rich. L. 337; 14 N. Y. 224. Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247. pp. 729, 748, 744. c 122 Mass. 379 ; 41 Wis. 148. Alexander v. Mount Sterling, 71 111. 366. pp. 762, 800. Alger V. Lowell, 3 Allen, 402. pp. 362, 772, 773, 1175, 1203. r58 Me. 204; 38 Md. 585; 110 Jlass. 132; 53 Mo. 3;U; 10 R. I. 308; 5 Hun, 167; 3 Hun, 710; 6 X. Y. S. 0. (T. & 0.) 94; 43 Ind. 597; 105 Mass. 472 ; 52 N. H. 224; 110 Mass. 132. Alger II. .Mississippi, etc., R. Co., 10 Iowa, 268. pp. 211, 496, 502. o 21 Iowa, 103; 20 lown, 194; 63 Mo. 304; 22 Minn. 405; 45 Iowa, 493; 20 Iowa, 221, 222; 35 Iowa, 491 ; 34 Iowa, 508 ; 21 Iowa, 105 ; 21 Iowa, 376. Algier v. Str. Maria, 14 Cal. 167 p. 156. Allan V. Hundred of Kirton, 2 W. Black. 842. p. 574. Allegheny, etc., R. Co. v. f indley (Sup. Ct. Pa.), 6 Cent. L. J. 236 ; 4 W. N. C. 438. pp. 462,497. Allen !/. Atlanta Street R. Co., 54 Ga. 503. pp.400, 12S2, 1291. f67Ga. 360; .95 Ga. 144. Allen V. Dcming, 14 N. H. 138. p. 1090. Allen ,.. Hancock, 16 Vt. 280. pp. 1147, 1208. c 9 Kan. 658 ; 22 Wis. 679 ; 43 Vt. 458 ; 29 Wis. 304 ; 35 3Sr. H. 276 ; 24 \t. 496 ; 42 N. H. 216. Allen V. Hay ward, 7 Q. B. 960 ; 10 Jur. 92; 15 L. J. (Q. B.) 99; 4 Eng. Rail. Cas. 104. pp. 35, 471, 879, 900. c 17 Mo. 125, 126, 128, 8 Cal. 496; 35 N. J. L. 22; 3 Gray, 362; 66 X. Y. 184; 25 N. J. L. 371; 22 Mo. 547 ; 46 Pa. St. 223 ; 4 Exch. 255 ; 6 Eng. Rail. Cas. 189; 11 Bush, 480; 3 Hurl. & N. 312; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 359; 19 N. H. 442, 443; 52 N. H. 122, 125. Allen V. McKean, 1 Sumn. 297. p. 657. Allen V. New G.is Co., 1 Exch. Div. 251 ; 45 L. J. 668. pp. 1028, 1032, 1058. c 5 lleporter, 272; 123 Mass. 488. Allen V. Willard, 57 Pa. St. S/'4. pp. 899, 902, 903, 910, 1177. c 85 Pa. St. 254 ; 29 Iowa, 48 ; 51 Ala. 570 ; 48 How. Pr. 48; 61 X. Y. 184; 79 Pa. St. 302; 40 Iowa, 345; 86 Pa. St. 159. Allentown v. Kramer, 73 Pa. St. 406. pp. 733, 747, 753. c 77 Pa. St. 112. Allerton Packing Co. v. Egan, 86 111. 253. pp. 982, 990, 1017. Allison V. Western, etc., R. Co., 64 N. C. 382. p. 979. Allnut V. Inglis, 5 East, 527. pp. 547, 552. TABLE OF CASES. XI AUyu V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 105 Mass. 77. pp. 426, 428, 1176. c 21 Minn. 297; 67 Me. IM; « Iowa, 231; 12 Bush, 17; 105 Mass. 207; 116 Mass. 541; 1 Bradw. 432. Alston V. Grant, 3 El. & Bl. 128. pp. 5, 8, 324. Althorf J). Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355 ; s. c, 2 Hilt. 344. pp. 890, 933, 1271, 1294. e 38 Wis. 624; 43 Vt. 642; 42 How. Pr. 394; 49 N. Y. 425, 525; 23 Ind. 557; 29 Gratt. 446. ? 37 Barb. 18 ; 14 Abb. Pr. 202. Alton V. Hope, 68 111. 167. pp. 753, 754. c 85 111. 381; 5 Cent. L. J. 386. Alton, etc., E. Co. «. Baugh, 14 111. 211. p. 210. Altreuter v. Hudson Eiver E. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 151. p. 416. Amick V. O'Hara, 6 Blackf. 258. pp. 217, 739. c 16 Mo. 511 ; 2 Col. 164; 16 Ark. 318. Anderson v. Bath, 42 Me. 346. pp. 780, 1086. c22 Wis^ 679; 29 Wis. 303; 51 Me. 128; 13 Hun, 85. Anderson v. Buckton, 1 Stra. 192. p. 206. Anderson v. Cape Pear Steam. Co., 64 N. C. 399. pp. 154, 155, 156. Anderson v. Dickie, 1 Eobt. 238 ; s. c, 26 How. Pr. 105. pp. 318, 344, 346, 1235, c 4 Robt. 147, 149; 51 N. Y. 230. Anderson v. Fitzgerald, 4 H. L. Gas. 484, p. 591. Anderson v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 274. pp, 976, 979. Anderson v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 7 Eobt. 611. pp. 971, 994, 1051. Anderson u. The State, 23 Miss. 459. p. 619. Andre v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 80 Iowa, 107. p. 522. Andrews v. Hartford, etc., E. Co., 84 Conn. 57. pp. 1284, 1294. Andrews v. The State, 3 Heisk. 165. p. 242. Angus V. Eadin, 5 N. J. L. 815. pp. 191, 209. c48Mo. 399;1N. Y. 518. Annapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Gantt, 89 Md. 11.5. pp. 162, 170. c- 16 Kan. 256; 39 Md. 158, 159; 42 Md. 139; 39 Md. 257. Annapolis, The, 1 Lush. 295. p. 895. Anne Arundel County v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468. pp. 619, 727. c 36 Md. 235, 236; 21 Mich. 116, 122; 40 Md. 320; 44 Md. 8; 91 U. S. 551; 7 Cent. L. J. 129. ? 122 Mass. 377. Annet v. Poster, 1 Daly, 502. pp. 894, 895. Anonymous, 1 Ld. Eaym. 739. p. 199. Anonymous, Moore, 180. p. 700. Anonymous, Dyer, 25 b, pi. 162. p. 175. Anthony u. Adams, 1 Mete. 284. pp. 710, 731, 737, 749, 752. c 36 N. H. 295 ; 55 N. H. 136 ; 122 Mass. 358 ; 102 Mass. 500; 11 Gray, 358; 12 Cush. 106; 5 La. An. 660. Antisdel v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 26 Wis. 115. p. 536. c 43 Wis. 673, 675, 679, 680, 681 ; 33 Wis. 645 ; 39 Wis. 134. Applebee v. Percy, L. E. 9 C. P. 647 ; s. c, 22 Week. Eep. 704 ; 43 L. J. (C. P.) 365 ; 30 L. T. (n. s.) 785. pp. 205, 890. c 8 Cent. L. J. iU. Appleton V. Nantucket, 121 Mass. 161. pp. 754, 775, 776. Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson,'63 Pa. St. 146. pp. 971, 974, 991, 1031. c 86 Pa. St. 440; 82 Pa. St. 124; 6 Reporter, 126; 46 Texas, 539. Arimond v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 31 Wis. 316. p. 744. Arkerson ». Dennison, 117 Mass. 407. pp. 973, 1034, 1055. c5 Reporter, 272; 123 Mass. 488; 6 Re- porter, 779; 122 Mass. 405; 121 Mass. 509; 14 Hun, 447. Armstrong v. Cooley, 10 111. 509. pp. 150, 884. c 18 HI. 260. Armstrong v. Smith, 44 Barb. 120. p. 218. c 38 Iowa, 522. Armsworth v. South-Eastern E. Co., 11 Jur. 758. p. 1290. c 35 Iowa, 436 ; 26 Ga. 263 ; 23 Pa. St. 529. Arnold v. Norton, 25 Conn. 92. p. 202. Arthur v. The Cassius, 2 Story, 81. p. 895. Artz V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 44 Iowa, 284 ; s. c, 34 Iowa, 153 ; 38 Iowa, 293. pp. 418, 419, 423. 425, 1151, 1152, 1164. c37 Iowa, 323; 28 Ohio St. 351; 38 Iowa, 128; 39 Iowa, 46; 41 Iowa, 231; 39 Iowa, 526. Xll TABLE OF CASES. Ashby 1). Erie, 85 Pa. St. 286. p. 733. Ashby V. White, 1 Smith's Ld. Cas. 342. p. 81. Ashley v. Eastern K. Co., 5 Mete. 368. p. 749. Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48. pp. 1084, 1101. Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296. pp. 742, 744. Ashley v. Wolcott, 11 Gush. 192. pp. 749, 751. Ashworth v. Stanwix, 3 El. & El. 701 ; a. c, 7 Jur. {n. s.) 4)7; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 183; 4 L. T. (n. s.) 85. pp. 964, 974, 975, 1048. c 61 Mo. 495 ; 1 Best & S. U2, 443, 445 ; 7 Jur. (N. s.) 845, 846; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 334, 335, 336; 70 N. Y. 93. Assop V. Yates, 2 Hurl. & N. 768 ; s. c, 27 L. J. (Exch.) 156. pp. 941, 959, 9B2, 1008. c 20 Mich. 127; 3 Dill. 325; 42 N. H. 240; 63 N. T. 453; 119 Mass. 414; 3 Eobt. 83; 49 N. Y. 634. Aston V. Heaven, 2 Esp. 533. pp. 1098, 1161. Astor V. Wells," 4 Wheat. 466. p. 890. Atehisc/n v. King, 9 Kan. 550. pp. 753, 781, 1085. c 20 Kan. 456. Atchison v. Twine, 9 Kan. 350. p. 1290. Atchison, etc., K. Co. v. Bales, 16 Kan. 252. pp. 158, 170. Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37. p. 540. c 7 Cent. L. J. 429. Atchison, etc., K. Co. «. Campbell, 16 Kan. 200. p. 158. c 16 Kan. 253. Atchison, etc., K. Co. v. Edwards, 20 Kan. 531 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 196, 197. pp. 495, 532. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Harper, 19 Kan. 529. pp. 539, 540. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 20 Kan. 527. p. 532. Atchison, etc., li. Co. v. Loree, 4 Neb. 446. p. 350. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354. pp. 154, 158, 161, 170, 1083. c 16 Kan. 203, 253, 255, 256; 4 Neb. 276; 39 H". J. L. 307; 17 Kan. 332; 57 N. H. 91. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Yates, 8 Cent. L. J. 459. p. 523. Atkinson v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 63 Mo. 367. p. 1262. c 63 Mo. 311; 64 Mo. 543. Atkinson v. Newcastle, etc.. Water Co., L. R. 6 Exch. 405 ; s. c, 2 Exch. Div. 441. pp. 5.57, 10S2. c40 Md. 328; 54 N. H. 502; 109 Mass. 282; 123 Mass. 317; 6 Cent. L. J. 409. Atlanta b. Perdue, 53 Ga. 607. pp. 561, 753, 763, 764, 796. c55 Ga. 18; 68 Ga. 239. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Ayers, 53 G-a. 12. pp. 1152, 1163, 1280, 1290. <• 52 Ga. 468. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Campbell, 56 G-a. 586; i,-. c, 53 Ga. 488. p. 1058. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Burt, 49 Ga. 606. pp. 496, 503. Attorney-General v. Case, 3 Price, 302. p. 895. Attorney-General v. Sheffield Gas Con- sumers' Assn., 19 Eng. Law & Eq. 639 ; 17 Jur. 677; 22 L. J. (Ch.) 811. pp. 355, 356. Aubuohon v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 52 Mo. 522. p. 534. c 54 Mo. 226 ; 55 Mo. 39 ; 59 Mo. 246. Auchmuty v. Ham, 1 Denio, 495. pp. 198, 219, 1088. c 4 Denio, 501; 4 N. Y. S. C. (T. &C.) 132; 49 Barb. 146; 64 N. Y. 147; 6 Duer, 407, 426, 427; 20 Barb. 480. Audige V. Gaillard, 8 La. An. 71. p. 1210. Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. MoElmurry, 24 Ga. 75. pp. 419, 424, 425, 1168. c 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 491. Aurora ■;;. Colshire, 55 Ind. 484. pp. 362, 759, 770, 772. c 58 Ind. 232. Aurora v. Gillett, 56 111. 132. pp. 747, 748, 751. <• 68 111. 169; 57 111. 33; 77 111. 195; 7 Re- porter, 83, 84; 85 111. 381 ; 5 Cent. L. J. 386. Aurora v. Pulfer, 56 111. 270. pp. 732, 760, 1085. c 64 111. 23 ; 81 111. 303. Aurora v. Reed, 57 111. 29. pp. 741, 747, 748, 749, 751. c 77 111. 195; 46 Iowa, 659, 660; 02 IH. 521; 7 Eeporter, 83, 84; 85 111. 381; 5 Cent. I,. J. TABLE OF CASES. Xlll Aurora, etc., E. Co. v. Grimes, 13 111. 585. pp. 299, 1147, 1186. c 37 111. 340 ; 5 Kan. 201 ; 81 111. 454 ; 46 111. 83; 16 111. 202; 64 111.517; 16 111.301; 20111. 488, 496; 71 111. 507, 509; 58 111. 306; 16 lU. 570. Austin's Case, 1 Vent. 183. pp. 699, 805. c 122 Mass. 345. Austin V. Hudson River E. Co., 25 N. T. 334. p. 276. e 60 Mo. 234. Austin V. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 43 N. Y. 75. pp. 1085, 1157. Austin V. Wilson, 4 Conn. 273. p. 1256. Avegno v. Hurt, 25 La. An. 235. p. 1150. Averitt v. Murrell, 4 Jones L. 323. pp. 148, 150. c 5 Jones L. 80. Avery v. Maxwell, 4 N. H. 36. pp. 209, 213. c 4 Mete. 593 ; 37 N. H. 335, 336 ; 4 N. H. 513 ; 49 Pa. St. 106, 108; 28 N". H. 166; 21 N. H. 366; 19 N. H. 270; 7 N. H. 521; 23 N. H. 93. Avilla V. Nash, 117 Mass. 318. p. 1239. Ayoook V. Wilmington, etc., E. Co., 6 Jones L. 281. pp. 506, 507. c 8 Jones L. 341. Ayer v. Norwich, 39 Conn. 376. pp. 75-5, 778. c 39 Conn. 440, 445 ; 65 Me. 551 ; 42 Conn. 305. Ayer v. Starkey, 30 Conn. 304. p. 151. Aylesworth v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 30 Iowa, 459. p. 524. c 31 Iowa, 376; 42 Iowa, 237; 39 Iowa, 223; 32 Iowa, 152; 41 Iowa, 195; 6 Cent. L. J. 315; 8 Cent. L. J.'277, 280 ; 40 Iowa, 294 ; 68 Me. 105. Aylesworth v. Herrington, 17 Mich. 417. p. 213. c 41 Wis. 683. Aymette v. The State, 2 Humph. 154. p. 242. B. Babcock v. Guilford, 47 Vt. 519. p. 798. Jiabcock V. Western E. Co., 9 Mete. 553. p. 749. c 6 Gray, 547. Babson v. Eockport, 101 Mass. 93. pp. 362, 772, 773, 780, 1207. c 105 Mass. 313 ; 114 Mass. 508, 509 ; 107 Mass. 349; 6 Reporter, 719; 107 Mass. 346; 30 Wis. 406 ; 119 Mass. 573. ? 52 N. H. 413. Bachelder v. Heagan, 18 Me. 32. pp. 55, 106, 148, 149, 150. C63 Me. 291; 30 Me. 179; 68 Me. 165; 15 Conn. 131; 18 Minn. 345; 2 G. Greene, 463; 41 Ind. 251; 26 Wis. 235, 272; 51 N. Y. 487; 11 Cush. 226 ; 36 Mo. 32 ; 37 Mo. 295 ; 11 W. Va. 38; 51 Me. 338; 54 Me. 259. Bacheller v. Pinkham, 68 Me. 253. p. 1061. Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503 ; »-. u., 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 181 ; 7 Jur. (n. s.) 809 ; 9 Week. Eep. 769 ; 4 L. T. (n. s.) 754; 27 Q. B. 378; 4 Jur. (n. s.)1182; 5 Jur. (N-. s.) 1345; 28 L. J. (Q. B.) 378; El. Bl. & El. 622, 646. pp. 7, 8, 10, 15, 17, 22, 23, 36, 260, 274, 276, 280, 282. <■ 1 Q. B. Div. 325; 18 Minn. 337; 3 Hurl. & Colt. 786, 789, 790; 42 Md. 133; L. E. 1 C. P. 566; 13 Jur. (N. s.) 546, 547; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 277; 20 Gratt.372; 10 C. B. (N. s.) 785, 786, 787; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 312; 123 Mass. 206; 8 0. B. (N.s.) 383. Baekwell's Case, 1 Vern. 152. p. 547. Bacon v. Boston, 3 Cush. 174. pp. 345, 770, 781, 782, 787, 788. c 42 Me. 527 ; 33 N. J. L. 362 ; 35 N. H. 314 ; 58 Ind. 232; 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 136; 17 How. 167. Bagnall v. London, etc , E. Co., 7 Hurl. 6 N. 423; 8 Jur. (n. s.) 16; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 121; 10 Week. Eep. 232; on appeal, 1 Hurl. & Colt. 544; 9 Jur. (n. s.) 2.54; 9 L. T. (n. s.) 419; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 480; 10 Week. Eep. 802. pp. 5, 8, 18, 22, 34, 77, 106. c 18 Minn. 346 ; 39 K. J. L. 312 ; L. R. 7 Q. B. 266, 267, 274, 278, 279 ; 3 Huvl. & Colt. 787. Bagley v. Ludlow, 41 Vt. 425. pp. 754, 759, 761, 775, 776. c 30 Wis. 406. Bahrenburgh v. Brooklyn City E. Co., 56 N. Y. 652. p. 1188. Bailey v. Fairfield, Brayt. 126. p. 1242. c 27 Vt. 454, 456 ; 37 Vt. 150, 151. Bailey v. New Haven, etc., E. Co., 107 Mass. 496. p. 424. BaiU}/ V. New York, 3 Hill, 531 ; a. g., 2 Denio, 433. pp. 55, 102, 675, 676, 677, 711, 725, 732, 733, 734, 788, 740, 745, 746, 777, 881, 882. (In full, p. 652.) f 5 Lans. 533 ; 61 Barl). 520 ; 5 N. Y. 371, 374 ; 51 N. Y. 487 ; 5 N. Y. 64 ; 8 Cal. 497, 498 ; 8 Barb. 379; 14 Barb. Ill; 18 Minn. 342; 20Md. 477; 11 R. 1. 145 ; 4 Ohio St. 97 ; 1 Sandf. S. C. 226, 227; 21 Mich. 108, 114; 9 Mich. 186; 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 505 ; 3 Daly, 67 ; 36 N. H. 292, 296 ; 62 Mo. 318 ; 122 Mass. 359 ; 122 Mass. 374 ; 3 Gray, 364, 365; 10 Cal. 418; 5 Sandi. S. C. 303, 323; 26 Pa. XIV TABLE OF CASES. St. 120 ; 9 Iowa, 2:i.5, 236 ; 44 Iowa, 282 ; 36 N. H. 294: 29Cal. 2o0; 55N. H. 57; 3Bai-b. 46; 15 Barb. 43.5,438; 11 N. Y. 436; 21 Iowa, 577; 3 Duer, 414, 415, 418; McCahon, 133; 62 N. Y. 170; 2 Hun, 267; 61 N. Y. 199; 25 N. J. L. 371; 9 Ired. L. 85; 8 Barb. 434; 8 Hosw. 353; 41 111. 513; 46 Texas, 628; 3 Hill, 618; 26 Barb. 624; 103 Mass. 601; 1 Daly, 430; 8 Pa. St. :J75; 27 Barb. 523; 3 N. Y. 466, 467, 468; 1 Ind. 284; 56 N. Y. 294; 29 Barb. 424; 8 Barb. 368; 8 Bosw. 509; 28 Barb. 198; 42 Iowa, 311; 49 Me. 124; 4 G. Greene, 75; 39 Barb. 336; 91 U. S. 552, 554; 12 Heisk. 1.39; 25 N. Y. 340; 17 HI. 143 ; 1 Hilt. 443 ; SI Ala. 476 ; 104 Mass. 15 ; 5 Bosw. 503; 5 Bosw. 455; 107 Mass. 493; 13 Hun,217; 56Pa. St.453; 35N. Y.523; 17Gratt. 879; 2Denio, 482; 8 Minn. 161; 13 Mo. 420; 9 La. An. 462; 26 N. J. L. 164; 71 N. Y. 84; 12 Ohio St. 379 ; 53 N. H. 123 ; 3 Daly, 398. 7 5 Sandf. S. C. 324. Bailey v. Trumbull, 31 Conn. 58L pp. 801, 802. c 52 ST. H. 415; 33 N. J. L. 265. Bain u. Whitehaven, 3 H. L. Cas. 1. p. 591. Baird „. Pettit, 70 Pa. St. 477. pp. 1034, 1037, 1046. Baird v. Williamson, 15 C. B. {ar. s.) 376 ; s. c.., 33 L. J. {C. P.) 101 ; 12 Week. Rep. 150; 9 h. T. (n. s.) 412; 10 Jur. (n. s.) 1.52. pp. 6, 18, 22, 35, 39, 40, 41, 77, 81, 99, 103. c 2 0. P. Div. 244; L. E. 3 H. L. 341, 399; 37 L. J. (Exch.) 164, 165 ; 99 Mass. 684. Baker's Case, cited Hale's P. C. 430. p. 182. Baker v. Bailey, 16 Barb. 54. pp. 1276, 1277, 1289. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493. pp. 1272, 1273. Baker v. Byrne, 58 Barb. 438. p. 810. Baker v. Dedhara, 16 Gray, 393. pp. 757, 760. Baker t). Pendergast(Sup. Ct. Com. Ohio), 8 Cent. L. J. 334. pp. 1172, 1173. Baker v. Pope, 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 102. p. 1211. Baker v. Portland, 58 Me. 199. p. 1202. c 12 West. Jur. 478; 29 Wis. 26; 68 Me. 658. Baker v. The State, 27 Ind. 4S5. p. 817. Balcom v. Dubuque, etc., E. Co., 21 Iowa, 102. pp. 497, 520. c 37 Iowa, 332; 26 Iowa, 552; 36 Iowa, 492; 21 Iowa, 105. Baldwin v. Casella, 41 L. J. (Exch.) 167 ; :>. c, L. R. 7 Exch. :«5; 21 Week. Rep. 16 ; 26 L. T. (n". s.) 707. pp. :i04, 890. »■ L. R. 9 0. P. 650, 656, 657; 43 L. J. (0. P.) 368, 369. Baldwin v. Greenwoods Turnpike Co., 40 Conn. 238. pp. 781, 108-3, 1037, 1208. c 43 Conn. 165 ; 13 Hun, 86. Baldwin v. United States Tel. Co., 44 N. Y. 744.' pp. 836, 837, 838, 839, 845, 848, 857. c 21 Minn. 161, 163 ; 30 Ohio St. 566 ; 33 Wis. 565. Baldwin v. Western R. Co., 4 Gray, 333. pp. 426, 1 '250. c 11 Gray, 3.58; 11 Allen, 79. Ball 0. Ny(;, 99 .Ma^s. 58i. pp. 99, 103, 257. c 123 Mass. 303, 203 ; 6 Eeporter, 460 ; 68 Me. 166 ; 108 Mass. 266. Ball V. Wincnester, 32 N. H. 435. pp. 340, 520, 621, 735, 737, 820. . Stevens, 2 Aik. 427. p. 818. Barnes v. Chapin, 4 Allen, 444. p. 216. C65 Me. 552; 26 Wis. 280; 111 Mass. 141; 14 Allen, 297; 105 Mass. 77; 28 Ind. 347; 68 Me. 668. Barnes v. Cole, 21 Wend. 188. pp. 468, 1134. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540 ; 3 Cent. L. J. 512. pp. 722, 724, 727, 730, 740, 753. c 7 Reporter, 479. d 122 Mass. 372, 374, 377,380; 46 Texas, 533. Barnes v. Hurd, 11 Mass. 59. p. 1240. Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240. p. 1241. Barnes v. Newton, 46 Iowa, 567. pp. 760, 763, 781, 799, 1249. Barnes v. Ward, 2 Car. & Kir. 661 ; s. c, 9 C. B. 392; 14 Jur. 334; 19 L. J. (C. P.) 195. pp. 287, 361, 413, 1275. c 38 Md. 585 ; 68 N. Y. 290, 292; 3 Best & 8. 254; 4 0. B. (N. s.) 561; 4 Hurl. & N. 70, 74; 5 Jur. (N. s.) 1.50; 28 L. J. (Exch.) 140; L. E. 1 0. P. 54, 65; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 980; 7 C. B. (N. s.) 742, 744, 745 ; 6 Jur. (N. s.) 898, 899 ; 29 L. J. (C. P.) 206, 207; 9 Allen, 562; 15 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 323; 35 N. H. 278; 2 O. P. Div. 371; 48 Vt. 130; 16 0. B. (N. s.) 240; 33 L. J. (0. P.) 5; 29 Wis. 26 ; 10 Allen, 375 ; 33 N. J. L. 264 ; 60 Barb. 363 ; 12 0. B. (N. s.) 6; 5 Duer, 499; 2 Best & S. 779; 31 L. J. (Q. B.) 218; 5 Reporter, 345; 86 Pa. St. 80; 34 N. J. L. 471, 472; 4 Best & S. 157; 32 L. J. (Q. B.) 240. Barnett v. Lucas, L R. 6 C. L. 247. p. 1286. Barney v. Burstenbinder, 7 Lans. 210 ; s. c, 64 Barb. 212. pp. 230, 231, 232. c 8 Hun, 258. Barney v. Lowell, 98 Mass 570. pp. 737, 738. c 11 K. 1. 143; 21 Mich. 113; 46 Texas, 527; 38 Conn. 381; 104 Mass. 95. Barnum u. Vandusen, 16 Conn. 200. pp. 196, 206, 209, 210. 479. c 33 Ind. 500; 105 Mass. 77; 3 Ohio St. 181; 70 111. 294. Barrett v. Black, 56 Me. 498. p. 316. c 59 Me. 188. Barrett u. Brooks, 21 Iowa, 144. pp. 617, 793. Barrett v. Maiden, etc., R. Co., 3 Allen, 101. pp. 197, 198, 219. c 62 N. H 369. Barrett v. Singer Man. Co., 1 Sweeny, 545. p. 900. clN.Y. S. C. (T. &C.)455. Barrett u. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290. p. 762. Barrett v. Third Avenue K. Co., 45 N. Y. 628. p. 1088. Barrington v. Turner, 3 Lev. 28. p. 221. Barron v. Baltimore, 2 Am. Jur. 201. p. 340. c9Md. 178; 19 Pick. 158. Barry v. Lowell, 8 Allen, 127. pp. 732, 749, 751. c 110 Mass. 220; 13 Allen, 293; 104 Mass. 17. Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121. pp. 740, 899, 908, 914, 1058. C67 Pa. St. 381", 3aMo. 218; 9 Mich. 188; 45 Mo. 98; 22 Mo. 547; 46 Pa. St. 221, 222; 2 Mo. App. 579; 57 Mo. 98; 86 Pa. St. 159. Barstow v. Augusta, 17 Me. 199. p. 787. Barstow v. Berlin, 34 Wis. 357. pp. 764, 1198, 1238, 1245. Bartholomew v. Dighton, Cro. Eliz. 424. p. 1242. Bartle v. Des Moines, 38 Iowa, 414. pp. 748, 758. c 40 Iowa, 646. Bartlett v. Baker, 3 Hurl. & Colt. 153 ; s. c, 34 L. J. (Exch.) 8. p. 909. Bartlett v. Boston Gas-Light Co., 117 Mass. 533; 122 Mass. 209. pp. 109, 110, 112. c 122 Mass. 227. Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439 ; a. c, 15 Johns. 250. pp. 331, 332, 574, 701, 704, 813, 814, 820. c 20 Md. 478, 480, 481; 44 N. Y. 119, 121, 124; 29 N. Y. 306, 307; 6 111. 671; 8 Barb. 652; 3 N. H. 53; 2 -Hill, 619; 21 Mich. 113; 23 Wend. TABLE OP CASES. XVU 450, 452 ; 22 Pa. Bt. 388 ; 40 Md. 321 ; 3 Allen, 168, 169; 4 Hun, 699; 26 Iowa, 268, 269; 17 111. 144, 146; 18 N. J. L. 119; 7 Conn. 93, 93, 94; 51 Barb. 413; 15 Barb. 441,443; 46 Texas, 528; 63 Pa. St. 297; 4 Pick. 345; 16 Pick. 550; 122 Mass. 347, 351 ; 5 Sandf. S. C. 397, 331 ; 44 Barb. 391 ; 45 Mo. 473 ; 8 Barb. 653 ; 33 Barb. 641, 645, 646 ; 55 111. .3.50 ; 5 Watts & S. 546 ; 7 Wend. 477. Bartlett v. Dubuque, etc., K. Co., 20 Iowa, • 188. p. 519. c21 Iowa, 103, 105, 376; 26 Iowa, 552; 43 Iowa, 209. Bartlett v. Hooksett, 48 N. H. 18. p. 779. c 65 Me. 551 ; 53 N. H. 403 ; 30 Wis. 405 ; 39 Conn. 379. Bartlett v. Kittery, 68 Me. 358. pp. 766, 776. c 7 Reporter, 464. Bartlett v. Western Union Tel. Co., 62 Me. 217. pp. 835, 836, 838. c 44 Iowa, 462. Bartlett, etc.. Coal Co. v. Koach, 68 HI. 174. p. 999. Barton v. Montpelier, 30 Vt. 650. pp. 860, 760, 786, 787. c 47 Vt. 524. Barton v. New York, etc., K. Co., 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 297; 56 N. Y. 660. p. 461. c 4 Hun, 162, 163. Barton v. Springfield, 110 Mass. 131. pp. 1199, 1204 c 120 Mass. 583 ; 110 Mass. 339. Barton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 52 Mo. 253. p. 1238. Barton i: Syracuse, 37 Barb. 292 ; 36 N. Y. 54. pp. 725, 732, 733, 750. c 66 N. Y. 341 ; 5 Lans. 349 ; 31 Mich. 108 ; 20 Minn. 123 ; 50 N. Y. 238 ; 46 Barb. 269 ; 32 N. Y. 600; 3 Daly, 151; 66 N. Y. 297; 4 Keyes, 269; 91 U. S. 551 : 104 Mass. 16 ; 42 N. Y. 53 ; 13 Hun, 294; 46 N. Y. 196, 198; 3 Daly, 67; 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. &C.) 7; 59N. Y'. 508. Barton's Hill Coal Co. v. McGuire, 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 266 : s. c, 4 Jur. (n. s.) 772 ; 1 Pat. Sc. App. 785. pp. 969, 1035. c 5 Best & S. 581 ; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 365 ; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1076; 2 Hurl. & Colt. 107, 111, 113; 9 Jur. (N. S.) .502; 32 L. J. (Exch.) 209; 37 Mich. 213; 19 Alb. L. J. 160. Barton's Hill Coal Co. v. Keid, 3 Macq. H. L. Gas. 266; 4 .Tur. (n. s.) 767; 1 Pat. Sc. App. 796. pp. 884, 958, 961, 964, 968, 969, 1035, 1053. c 1 Excli. Div. 254 ; :i TCI. & El. 707; 7 Jur. (N. s.) 468; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 185; 7 Hurl. & N. 938, 943, 948; 8 Jur. (K. S.) 994, 995; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 368, 361; 102 Mass. 687; 3 DiU. 333; 10 Allen, 337, 238; 55 Ind. 60; 1 Best & S. 441; 5 Best & S. 582; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 266; 46 Texas, 538; 56 Ind. 530; 11 C. B. (N. S.) 438; 8 Jur. (N. s.) 748; 31 L. J. (C. P.) 109; 1 El. & El. 391; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 173; 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 143; L. R. 6 Q. B. 76; 40 L. J. (Q- B.) 79; 8 Kau. 650; 1 Q. B. Div. 257; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 772; L. B. 1 Sc. App. 330. Barwell v. Kensey, 35 Car. H., 3 Lev. 171. p. 257. Bass V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 28 HI. 9. pp. 153, 158, 162, 166, 1264. c 7 Heisk. 462 ; 39 N. J. L 305 ; 47 111. 506 ; 43 lU. 413; 26 Wis. 229; 47 111. 502; 26 Wis. 640; 37 Mo. 296; 30 Wis. 121; 71 111. 496; 48 Ind. 476; 21 Minn. 64; 47 111. 602. ? 30 Iowa, 423. Bassett v. Pish, 12 Hun, 209 ; reversed in Court of Appeals, 19 Alb. L. J. 160. pp. 313, 824. Bassett v. Norwich, etc., R. Co., 9 Am. L. Rep. 551. p. 941. Bassett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290. pp. 753, 772, 1249. c63 Mo. 419; U Bush, 555; 54 Mo. 600; 3 Mo. App. 581 ; 57 Mo. 158. Bast V. Leonard, 15 Minn. 304. p. 909. c 19 Minn. 350; 31 Minn. 65. Bateraan v. Kuth, 3 Daly, 378. pp. 354, 1199, 1204, 1238. Bates V. Sharon, 45 Vt. 474. pp. 775, 800. Bateson v. Green, 5 Term Rep. 411. p. 268. Bath V. Caton, 6 Reporter, 335 ; 37 Mich. 199. pp. 888, 889, 890, 10;il. Battle V. W. & W. R. K., 66 N. 0. 343. pp. 508, 513. c 75 N. 0. 58. Batty V. Duxbury, 24 Vt. 155. pp. 760. 766, 768, 77.5, 787, 882. c 37 Vt. 68; 45 Vt. 114, 116; 27 N". H. 209; 40 Wis. 41 ; 3 (iray, 365 ; 27 Vt. 461, 462, 463, 464, 468; 24 Vt. 484; 40 Me. 101; 45 N. Y. 135; 35 N. H. 313; 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 136; 52 N. H. 125. Baxter o. Boston, etc., R. Co., 102 Mass. 383. pp. 515, 557. ' Baxter c. Roberts, 44 Cal. 187. p. 993. c 30 'Wis. 679. Baxter v. Second .\ venue R. Co.. :! Robt. 510; n. c, 30 How. Pr. 219. pp. 399, 1147, 1149. 1212. 123.1. e 1 Jones & Sp. 189. XVIH TABLE OF CASES. Baxter v. Troy, etc., E. Co., 41 N. Y. 502. p. 420. Cl05 Mass. 79; 45 N. Y. 193; 14 Abb. Pr. (N. 8.) 30; 33 Ind. 363; 34 Iowa, 160; 25 Mich. 291 ; 58 N. Y. 455 ; 6 Or. 424 ; 59 N. Y. 472. Ba.xter ». AVarner, 6 Hun, 585. pp. 344, 354, 1235. Baxter ti. Winooski Turnpike Co., 22 Vt. 114. pp. 840, 342, 343, 565, 566. c 35 Jf. H. 541; 36 N. H. 298; 44 N. H. 249; 27Vfc. 457; 47 Vt. 36; 53 Me. 502; 63 Pa. St. 296: 30 Vt. 740; 55 III. .■550; 17111. 146; 2 Dis- ney, 537 ; 34 Conn. 13 ; 52 Me. 123. Baj' City, etc., R. Co. o. Austin, 21 Mich. 390. pp. 509, 516, 539, 540. c 18 Am. L. Eeg. 31; 31 Mich. 277; 65 lU. 369. Biiyley v. Manchester, etc., K. Co., L. E. 8 C. P. 148. p. 886. Bayley v. Wolverhampton Water Co., 6 Hurl. & N. 241; 30 L. J. (Exch.) 57. pp. 557, 559. Baylor v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 40 N. J. L. 23; 18 Alb. L. J. 73. p. 987, 1083. Bayntine v. Sharp, 1 Lutw. 90. p. 176. Beach v. Bay State, etc., Co., 30 Barb. 433. pp. i272, 1276, 1282. Beach v. Frankeuberger, 4 W. Va. 712. pp. 345, 363, 759. Beach v. Parmenter, 23 Pa. St. 196. pp. 389, 1234. Bean t>. Concord, 48 Vt. 30. p. 798. Beard v. Connecticut, etc., E. Co., 48 Vt. 101. p. 315. Beard v. Murphy, 37 Vt. 99. p. 261. Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368. p. 703. Beardsley v. Swann, 4 McLean, 333. pp. 345, 1177, 12-56, 12.57, 1258. Bears u. Ambler, 9 Pa. St. 193. p. 319. c 21 Mich. 23 ; 17 Am. L. Reg. 456. Beatty v. Gilraore, 16 Pa. St. 463. pp. 345, 799, 800, 1177, 1178. c 12 Otilo St. 496 ; 22 Pa. St. 388; 72 Pa. St. 140; 34 Cal. 164; 2 Disney, 50; 46 Pa. St. 319; 42 Ind. 343. Beaufort c. Danner, 1 Strobh. 176. p. 497. Beaulieu v. Finglam, 2 Hen. IV., fol. 18, pi. 16. pp. 125, 147. Beaulieu v. Portland Co., 48 Me. 291. pp. 970, 1053, 1237. c 7 Cent. L. J. 305 ; 62 Me. 465, 466. Beaumon «. EUice, 4 Car. & P. 585. p. 801. Beaupr^ «. Pacific, etc., Tel. Co., 21 Minn. 155. pp. 838, 853. Beavers v. Trimmer, 25 N. J. L. 97. p. 818. Beck V. Carter, 68 N. Y. 288 ; 6 Hun, 604. pp. 35 K 361. c 55 How. Pr. 173. Beck V. Dyson, 4 Camp. 198. p. 204. c 7 Ala. 170; 22 Ala. 571; 5 Tyrw. 1091. Becker v. Crow, 7 Bush, 198. p. 1288. Beckett v. Beckett, 48 Mo. 896. p. 209. Beckwith v. Shordike, 4 Burr. 2092. pp. 190, 220. Beckwith v. Whalen, 5 Lans. 876. pp. 759, 795. c 3 Hun, 502; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 595. Bedell v. Long Island E. Co., 44 N. Y. 367. p. 156. c 48 Ind. 479; 5 Hun, 77; 13 Hun, 257. Bedford .... Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 46 Mo. 456. p. 153. c 53 Mo. 369 ; 60 Mo. 235 ; 48 Ind. 476. Beecher v. The Derby Bridge Co., 24 Conn. 491. pp. 761, 796, 1266. c 36 Conn. 185. Beers v. Housatonic E. Co., 19 Conn. 566. pp. 1150, 1166, 1176, 1237. c 13 111. 583 ; 45 Md. 492 ; 3 Daly, 385 ; 10 Iowa, 271 ; 24 N. J. L. 831 ; 19 Conn. 511 ; 26 Conn. 597 ; 17 Mich. 122 ; 29 Conn. 209 ; 36 Md. 377 ; 1 Iowa, 110; 19 How. Pr. 224; 24 N. J. L. 271, 277; 101 Mass. 465; 21 Iowa, 108; 8 Minn. ']61; 45 Ala. 441 ; 23 Conn. 443, 444 ; 35 N. H. 277 ; 29 Md. 440 ; 24 Vt. 496; 31 Miss. 193, 197, 198; 15 Ind. 489; 23 Conn. 347; 18 Cal. 356; 37 Mo. 294; 61 Mo. 591 ; 9 Wis. 217 ; 5 Kan. 182 ; Miss. 386 ; 52 Mo. 258 ; 33 Iowa, 568 ; 29 Md. 294 ; 37 Mo. 550 ; 9 Rich. L. 92 ; 17 111. 413 ; 34 N. Y. 14. ? 30 Pa. St. 464. Beisiegel v. New York, etc., K. Co., 33 Barb. 429 ; s. c, 34 N. Y. 622 ; 40 N. Y. 9 ; 14 Abb. Pr. (n. s.) 29. pp. 115, 426, 1177. c 33 Ind. 362 ; 34 Iowa, 158, 161 ; 22 Minn. 172 ; 63 111. 179 ; 3 Keyes, 479 ; 1 Abb. App. Dec. 438 ; 70 N. Y. 123 ; 34 Iowa, 279 ; 32 Wis. 275 ; 49 Cal. 257 ; 45 N. Y. 664 ; 39 How. Pr. 414, 415 ; 7 Lans. 14 ; 42 N. Y. 473 ; 3 Lans. 85 ; 44 Ind. 82 ; 25 Mich. 291 ; 64 N. Y. 532 ; 6 Hun, 319 ; 63 N. Y. 525, 530 ; 2 Hun, 538 ; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 125 ; 38 N. Y. 449 ; 36 N. J. L. 536, 537 ; 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 646; 45 N.Y. 850; 6 Jones & Sp. 135; 50 Ind. 45; 58 N.Y. 458, 459; 40 Barb. 208;, 39 N. Y. 362, 363; 7 Hun, 554 ; 72 N. Y. 30, 69 ; e'oaly, 496 ; 71 N. Y. 231 ; 59 N. Y. 472 ; 36 N. Y. 43. Belair v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 43 Iowa, 662. pp. 1010, 1020, 1257, 1268. TABLE OF CASES. XIX Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 ISI. Y. 166. p. 846. Bell V. Poutch, 21 Iowa, 119. pp. 617, 793. Bell V. Josselyn, 3 Gray, 309. pp. 262, 813. c 3 Allen, 16S; 122 Mass. 208. Bell V. MoClintook, 9 Watts, 119. pp. 101, 102. c 6 Nev. 89. Bell V. Morrisett, 6 Jones L. 178. p. 799. Bell V. Twentyman, 1 Q. B. 766. pp. 82, 90. Bell V. "West Point, 51 Miss. 262. p. 753. Bell V. Wooten, 58 Ga. 684. p. 1291. Bellefontiiine K. Co. o. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335. pp. 425, 426, 427, 1054. c 22 Minn. 172 ; 21 Minn. 2a7 ; 64 J\Io. 490 ; 41 Iowa, 231 ; 9 Kan. 631 ; 25 .Mich. 291 ; 50 Ind. 45, 68, 82; 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 82, 489 ; 47 Iowa, 551. Bellefontaine E. Co. v. Reed, 33 Ind. 476. pp. 511, 521, 529, 535. c36 Ind. 373; 37 Ind. .WO; 46 Ind. 217; 38 Ind. 451 ; 47 Ind. 318. Bellefontaine, etc., K. Co. v. Bailey, 11 Ohio St. 333. pp. 496, 513. Bellefontaine, etc., K. Co. v. Schruyhart, 10 Ohio St. 116. p. 507. c 21 Ohio St. 429. Bellefontaine, fete. B. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399; 24 Ohio St. 670. pp. 1184, 1191. c 12 Bush, 40 ; 30 Ohio St. 470. Bellefontaine, etc., E. Co. v. Suraan, 29 Ind. 40. p. 586. c 48 Ind. 288; 46 lud. 217. Bellinger v. New York, etc., E. Co., 23 N. Y. 42. pp. 50, 51, 57, 104, 822. c 51 N. Y. 480; -60 Barb. Ill; 5 Eobt. 489; 45 Md. 135; 35 N. Y. 524; 29 X. Y. 642; 71 N. Y. 84. Bellows V. Sackett, 15 Barb. 96. pp. 105, 318, 348. c 67 N. Y. 272 ; 58 N. X. 37 ; 25 N. Y. 338, 339. Belton B. Baxter, 54 N. Y. 245 ; s. c, 58 N. Y. 411 ; 2 Sweeny, 339. pp. 387, 388, 1201, 1239. c 1 Jones & Sp. 189; 8 Jones & Sp. 375; 41 Ind. 254. Belun u. Western Union Tel. Co., 7 Ee- porter, 710. pp. 838, 857. Bemis v. Arlington, 114 Mass. 507. p. 779. c 6 Reporter, 719; 119 Mass. 573. Bemis v. Connecticut, etc., E. Co., 42 Vt. 375. pp. 215, 506, 507, 517. c 22 Ohio St. 245, 246 ; 91 tJ. S. 471 ; 45 Ala. 441. Benagam «. Plassam, 15 La. An. 703. p. 1270. Benden v. Nashua, 17 N. H. 477. p. 747. Benedict v. Fond du Lac, 7 Cent. L. J. 258 ; s. c, 6 Eeporter, 799. pp. 761, 799, 800. Benedict v. Martin, 26 Barb. 288. pp. 900, 902, 1238. C57X. Y. 392. Benjamin v. Wheeler, 8 Gray, 409. pp. 739, 749. c 13 Allen, 2n3 ; 104 Mass. 17. Bennett v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 19 Wis. 14.5. pp. 500, 503, 538. c 22 Wif.. 248; 43 Wis. 675 ; 38 Ind. 560; 20 Wis. 261; 47 Mn. 249. Bennett v. Fail, 26 Ala. 605. p. 799. Bennett v. Ford, 47 Ind. 264. pp. 216, 1234. Bennett v. Lockwood, 20 AVend. 223. p. 1033. Bennett v. Lovell, 7 Eeporter, 442. pp. 349, 850. Bennett v. Moita, 7 Taun. 258. p. 895. Bennett u. New Jersey, etc., E. Co., 36 N. J. L. 225. c 43 Wis. 527; 6 Cent. L. J. 430; 120 Mass. 492. Bennett o. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 120. pp. 731, 739. Bennett c. Scutt, 18 Barb. 347. pp. 148, 149. Benson v. Suarez, 43 Barb. 408. p. 317. Bent u. Haddon, Cro. Jae. 5-55. p. 317. Benton v. Central E. E., 42 Iowa, 192. p. 426. c 44 Iowa, 292; 42 Iowa, 081. Berea Stone Co. u. Kraft, 31 Ohio St. 287 ; s. c, 5 Eeporter, 625. pp. 974, 975, 1028. Berger v. Jacobs 21 Mich. 215. p. 1241. Bernhardt v. Eensselaer, etc., E. Co., 32 Barb. 165; ;,. v., 19 How. Pr. 199; 18 How. Pr. 427 ; 1 Abb. App. Dec. 131. pp. 428,429. o 3 Daly, 3S,'i ; 49 Barb. 534; 32 How. Pr. 267; 35 X. Y. 39; 46 Barb. 209; 58 N. Y. 455; 33 Barb. 509; 24 N. Y. 445 ; 60 X. Y. 331. Berry v. Iowa Central K. Co., 40 Iowa, 564. p. 1021. XX TABLE OF CASES. Berry v. Montgomery, etc., E. Co., 39 Ga. 554. p. 1282. Berry v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 65 Mo. 172. p. 527. Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 8 Hun, 16. p. 1211. Beseueclcer v. Sale (MS.), St. Louis Court of Appeals, pp. 1290, 1294. Besel i>. New York, etc., E. Co., 70 N. Y. 171 (reversing 9 Hun, 457). pp. 461, 1039. Besozzi V. Harris, 1 Fost. & Fin. 92. p. 208. Bessant v. Great Western R Co., 8 C. B. (n. s.) 368. pp. 523, 558. Bethea v. Taylor, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 482. p. 1210. Bethje v. Houston, etc., R. Co., 26 Texas, 605. p. 512. Bettys V. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 37 Wis. 323. p. 533. Bevier v. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co!, 13 Hun, 254. pp. 155, 158, 167, 1262. Bibby v. Carter, 4 Hurl. & N. 153 ; s. c, 28 L. J. (Exch.) 182. p. 275. Bigelow V. North Missouri R. Co., 48 Mo. 510. p. 534. c 60 Mo. 213. Bigelow D. Randolpb, 14 Gray, 543. pp. 312, 618, 704, 706, 734, 737, 738. c 4 Allen , 52 ; 21 Mich. 113, 123 ; 30 Ohio St. 49; 13 Bush, 229; 62 Mo. 316, 317; 122 Mass. 351, 353; 57 Me. 378; 102 Mass. 500; 66 N". H. 295 ; 98 Mass. 571 ; 101 Mass. 15, 93 ; 34 Conn. 14,16, 26; 52 Me. 123. Bigelow V. Reed, 51 Me. 325. pp. 363, 389, 780, 1085, 1093, 1200. c 58 Me. 206; 65 Me. 550; 12 West. Jur. 478; 9 Wis. 26; 65 Me. 462; 6 Daly, 215; 68 Me. 558; 13 I-Iun, 85 ; 65 N. Y. 119. Bigelow V. Rutland, 4 Cush. 247. pp. 1176, 1200, ]238. c 42 Me. 335; 22 Wis. 679, 680; 35 Me. 104; 35 N.H. 276; 3 Allen, 179; 42 N. H. 216; 17 How. 167. Bigelow V. Weston, 3 Pick. 267. pp. 754, 775, 776, 782. <• 65 Me. 552; 42 Me. 527, 538; 33 Iowa, 399; 11 Me. 275; 13 jUlen, 188 ; 19 Vt. 478; 1 Oush. 447; 30 Wis. 402. Bignell a. Clarke, 5 Hurl. & N. 485. p. 217. Bilbee v. London, etc., R. Co., 18 C. B. (u. s.) 584; s. t., 11 Jur. (n. s.) 745; 34 L. J. (C. P.) 182; 13 Week. Rep. 779; 13 L. T. (n. s.) 146. pp. 419, 420. e 49 X. Y. 25, 30; L. E. 5 Q. B. 263, 264, 266 ; 101 Mass. 203 ; 100 Mass. 215 ; 40 N. Y. 48, 49, 56 ; 38 X. Y. 448; 2 Jones & Sp. 486; 43 How. Pr. 411 ; 36 >f . J. L. 535 ; L. E. 2 C. P. 637 ; 36 L J. (C. P.) 254; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 101; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 056; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 11. ? L. E. 1 Exch. 18, 19, 20; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 90, 91, 92; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 957; 35 L.J. (Exch.) 5, 6. Biles V. Holmes, 11 Ired. L. 16. p. 1236. c 1 Jones L. 246. Bill V. Norwich, 39 Conn. 222. pp. 762, 763, 764. c 40 Conn. 460. Billings V. Worcester, 102 Mass. 329. pp. 360, 770, 785. c 109 Mass. 205; 110 Mass. 511; 113 Mass. 505 ; 104 Mass. 83 ; 105 Mass. 85 ; 109 Mass. 286. ? 52 N. H. 413. Biiiks V. South Yorkshire, etc., R. Co., 32 L. J. (Q. B. ) 26 ; s. c, 3 Best & S. 244 ; 11 Week. Rep. 66; 7 L. T. (n. s.) 350. pp. 361, 413, 556. c 68 N. Y. 290, 291; 59 Pa. St. 142; 47 Ind. 48 ; 46 Md. 218 ; 10 Allen, 375 ; 33 N. J. L. 264 ; 50 Barb. 363 ; 34 N. J. L. 471 , 472. d 6 Hun, 608. Binney v. Hull, 5 Pick. 503. p. 212. Bird V. Great Northern R. Co., 28 L. J. (Exch.) 3. pp. 131, 1222. Bird V. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628. pp. 194, 301, 302, 486, 1145. c 13 111. 588; 9 C. B. 420; 19 Conn. 674, 575 ; 14 Jur. 336; 19 L. J. (C. P.) 200; 3 Q. B. Div. 333; 7 Cent. L. J. 13; 17 Alb. L. J. 606; 1 Denio, 99; 26 Conn. 601; 1 Hurl. &N. 780; S Jur. (N. s.) 396; 26 L. J. (Exch.) 173; 20 111. 493; 59 Pa. St. 141; 16 Pa. St. 193; 27 Conn. 411; 25Vt.l60; 47 Ind. 48; 5Hun,480; 3 Ohio St. 191; 4 Eobt. 209; 17 Wend. 499; 9 Allen, 662; 4 Per. & Dav. 677; 1 Q. B. 37; 5 Jur. 798; 19 How. Pr. 225; 32 Me. 51, 53; 5 Denio, 266; 35 N. H. 276 ; 18 Oal. 357 ; 12 West. Jur. 476 ; 9 Wis. 218; 29 Wis. 26; 50 Barb. 363; 31 Miss. 193; 1 Head, 623; 37 Iowa, 616; 8 Mee. & W. 789; 17 WaU. 661; 58 N". Y. 136. Birge v. Gardiner, 19 Conn. 507. pp. 305, 306, 486, 1149, 1165, 1181, 1184, 1195. c 18 Ohio St. 413 ; 50 Mo. 468, 469 ; 28 Mich. 41, 42 ; 30 Conn. 546 ; 64 Mo. 438 ; 55 Ind. 50 ; 22 Ind. 382; 27 Conn. 408; 66 Pa. St. 276; 21 Minn. 212, 213; 54 111. 484; 1 Head, 622; 3 Ohio St. 189 ; 18 Ga. 686 ; 63 N. 0. 349 ; 66 Barb. 51; 101 Mass. 466; 35 1Sr. H. 279; 56 Ind. 518; 48 Pa. St. 221; 52 N. H. 556; 50 Barb. 363; 8 Minn. 169; 17 WaU. 660; 60N. Y. 336; 37 Mo. 633 ; 66 Md. 695. TABLE OF CASES. XXI Birmingham v. Dorer, 3 Brews. 69. pp. 76(5, 767, 787, 1191, 1192. Birne.y v. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 18 Md. 341. pp. 836, 840, 841, 84-5, 846. c 13 Allen, 238 ; 113 Mass. 30" ; «0 Me. IS, 20 ; «0I11. 430; 29 Md. 247; 33 Ind. 439; 1 Col. 236. Bishop V. Barton, 2 Hun, 436. p. 821. Bishop V. Bedford Charity, 1 El. & El. 697. p. 317. c 21 Mich. 23. Bishop u. Williamson, 11 Me. 495. p. 898. Bissell V. Southworth, 1 Boot, 269. p. 210. Bizzell V. Booker, 16 Ark. 308. pp. 57, 1235. c 51 N. Y. 490. Black V. Baltimore, 7 Keporter, 398. p. 733. Black V. Burlington, etc., K. Co., 38 Iowa, 515. pp. 416, 418. Blackman v. Simmons, 3 Car. & P. 138. pp. 176, 180, 195, 208, 222. c 11 Ired. L. 270 ; 27 Pa. St. 333 ; 16 N. H. 81 ; 17 Weiid. 500; 5 Denio, 266; 31 N. L. J. 240; 2 B. I. 408; 38 Wis. 309; 1 Duer, 583. Blackwell v. Wiswall, 24 Barb. 355. pp. 320, 892, 896. c 26 Barb. 628; 4 Bosw. 146, 147. Blackwell's Case, 1 Vern. 152. p. 547. Blagrave v. Bristol Water- Works Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 357. pp. 341, 1096. Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136. p. 221. Blair u. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 20 Wis. 254. pp. 515, 517, 523. c 16 Kan. 676, 577 ; 23 Wis. 193. Blaisdell v. Portland, 39 Me. 113. p. 759. BlMke V. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48. pp. 363, 740, 882, 893. 899, 906, 914. e 57 Pa. St. 381 ; 22 N. Y. 365 ; 1 Sweeny, 548 ; 59 N. Y. 38 ; 1 Daly, 128 ; 28 Barb. 198 ; 72 N. Y- 214 ; 48 Barb. 343; 8 Gal. 489, 492, 498; 2 Hilt. 355; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 636; 24 Barb. 359, 360; 7 N. Y. 496; 8 Ohio St. ,383; 36 Mo. 218; 7 Cent. L. J. 494; 29 N. Y. 693, 594, 695; 8 N". Y. 225, 22(3, 227 ; 5 Duer, 498 ; 6 Daly, 471, 476 ; 35 N. J. L. 23, 24, 26; 9 Midi. 191; 6 Jones & Sp. 199, 200, 202 ; 2 E. D. Smith , 255, 266 ; 7 Bosw. 613 ; 38 Barb. 665 ; 39 Bai-b. 336 ; 23 Ind. 656 ; 86 Pa. St. 169; 39 Tex.as, 669; 3 Gray, 364; 5 Sandf. S. C. 324; 11 N. Y. 435; 4 E. D. Smith, 293, 294; 26 Barb. 621 ; 3 Minn. 307; 69 Me. 527; 3 Duer, 34; 30 Conn. 560; 21 Iowa, 678; 66 N. Y. 184; 2 Hilt. 67 ; 62 N. Y. 163 ; 48 How. Pr. 182 ; 6 Phila. 257; 46 Pa. St. 221; 4 Duer, 427, 430; 5 Bosw. 448, 449; 61 X. Y. 182, 186, 200, 201; 4 Bosw. 146, 147, 148; 11 Bush, 472, 480. ? 17 N. Y. 106, 107. Blake v. Midland R. Co., 18 Q. B. 93 ; s. c, 16 Jur. 562 ; 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 233. pp. 1277, 1289. c 26 111. 403 ; 3 Hurl. & N. 214; 32 Barb. 29, 31 ; 34 N. J. L. 167 ; 33 Pa. St. 328 ; 24 Md. 105 ; .30 N. J. L. 200; 1 Handy, 489, 490; 26 111. 403; L. K. 3 Adm. 480 ; 1. R. 6 0. L. 2ji ; 6 Xev. 231. Blake v. Newfield, 68 Me. 365. p. 769. Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569. pp. 753, 761. c 63 Mo. 296 ; 2 Mo. App. 579 ; 46 Mo. 452 ; 51 Mo. 462. Blake v. Thirst, 2 Hurl. & Colt. 20 ; s. c, 32 L. J. (Exch.) 189; 11 Week. Kep. 1034; 8 L. T. (n. s.) 251. p. 915. c 57 Pa. St. 381. Blakemore v. Bristol, etc., K. Co., 8 El. & Bl. 1035; s. c, 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 167. p. 237. c 6 Hurl. & N. 336 ; 30 L. J. (Exch.) 230 ; 19 C. B. (N. S.) 220. Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Co., 3 You. & .1. 60. pp. 548, 552. Blenkiron v. Great Central Gas Consum- ers' Co., 3 L. T. (n. s.) 317 ; s. c, 2 Post. & Pin. 437. p. 109. Blin II. Campbell, 14 Johns. 433. p. 1251. c 3N. H. 466; 42 How. Pr. 393; 6 Cow. 344, 345, 346 ; 6 Duer, 405 ; 50 N. H. 428. Bliss V. The Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90. p. 242. Bliss V. Deerfield, 13 Pick. 102. p. 759. c39 Me. 117; 5 Gush. 6; 22 N. H. 563; 21 Pick. 49; 18 Conn. 49. Bliss V. London, etc., E. Co., 2 Post. & Pin. 341. p. 163. Bliss V. Schaub, 48 Barb. 339. p. 363. Bliss V. Wilbraham, 8 Allen, 564. pp. 780, 799, 1207. c 110 Mass. 513. Blizzard v. Walker, 32 Ind. 437. p. 211. Blodgett V. Boston, 8 Allen, 237. pp. 755, 1201. c 14 Allen, 483; 47 Vt. 36; 6 Eeporter, .304; 67 Me. 169; 110 Mass. 23; 119 Mass. 472. ? 52 N. H.413. Blodgett V. Eoyalton, 14 Vt. 288. p. 759. C36 Vt. 687; 27 Vt. 454, 456, 464, 468; 29 Iowa, 91 ; IS Vt. 496 ; 29 Conn. 171 ; 46 N. H. 196. Blood V. Bangor, 66 Me. 124. p. 750. Blood V. Hubbardston, 121 Mass. 233. pp. 764, 765. c 5 Reporter, 529 ; 121 Mass. 446. XXII TABLE or CASES. Hlood V. Nashua, etc., R. Co., 2 Gray, 140. p. 755. Blood V. Tyngsborough, 103 Mass. 509. p. 1205. o 30 Wis. 415. Bloodgood V. Mohawk, etc., R. Co., 18 Wend. 9. pp. 6(12, 888. Bloomiiiston -. Bay, 42 111. 503. p. 781. c 66 III. 27C.; 53 111. 408; 20 Minn. 118, 124; 55 III. :',23: 01 111. 161 ; 49 111. 479; 60 111. 266; .">5 111. 350 ; (M 111. 323. Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 111. 194. pp. 747, 748, 751. Bloomington o. Read, 2 Bradw. 542. ' pp. 761, 783. Blunt V. Aiken, 15 "Wend. 522. p. 317. Bly V. Haverhill, 110 Mass. 520. p. 1200. c 65 Me. 552. Blyth V. Birmingham Water-Works Co., 11 Exch. 781; „. c, 2 Jur. (n. s.) 833; 25 L. J. (Exch.) 212. pp. 45, 101, 125, 126, 131, 74ii, 122';, 1234, 1236. c30 Md. 207; 322 Mass. 221; 2 Abb. 0. C. 215 ; 1 Sawyer, 442 ; 37 X. H. 137 ; L. R. 5 C. P. 102, 106; 39 L. J. (C. P.) 70; L. R. 6 C. P. 21; 5 Kan. 178; 123 Mass. 27; 24 N. V. 187. Blyth c. Topham, 1 Roll. Abr. 88; Cro. .lac. 158. pp. 298, 361, 468. c 9 C. B. 419 ; 68 N. Y. 2!)0, 291 ; 14 Jur. 335 ; 19 L. J. (C. P.) 199; 1 Cow. 78; 5 Kan. 201 ; 1 Handy, 200, 201 ; 41 Ind. 2.'i0; 20 III. 490; 32 L. .1. (Q. B.) 240; 4 Hurl. & N. 75; 28 L. J. (Exch.) 140; 25 Vt. 160; 7 C. B. (N. s. i 742, 744; 6 Jur. (x. s.) 898, 899; 29 L. J. (C. P.) 206, 207 ; 67 Me. 377 ; 4 Jv'. Y. 360 ; 5 Denio, 265; 48 Vt. 130; 31 N. J.L. 239; 9 Wis. 216; 22Barb. 533 ; 2 R. I. 409, 411 ; 50 Barb. 363 ; 5 Hill, 283 ; 7Taun. 504, 512, 53ii, 532; 5 Reporter, 345 ; 8 Mee. & W. 788; 2 Bradw. 39; 10 111. 164; 86 Pa. St. 78; 4 Best & S. 157; 32 L. J. (Q. B.) 210; IDuer, 583. Board of Internal Improvements v. Scearce, 2 Duv. -576. pp. 1025, 1234, 1276, 1278. Boggs I. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 29 Iowa, 57^7. p. 946. Bogle e. Winslovv, 5 Phila. 136. p. 1215. Bolan V. Williamson, 1 Brev. 181. pp. 819, 898. Boland ... Missouri R. Co., 36 Mo. 484. pp. 398, 400, 431, 1181, 1184, 1189, 1196, 1197. c 40 Mo. 1.35, 137 ; 40 Mo. 518; 45 JNto. 73. Boleh V. Smith, 7 Hurl. <& N. 736; s. c, 8 Jur. (n. s.) 197 ; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 201 ; 10 Week. Rep. 387 ; 6 L. T. (n. s.) 158. pp. 2b9, 290, 294, 303, 304, 413. c 21 Minn. 210; 46 Md. 218, 222; 41 N. Y. 532,534; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 3; 10 Allen, 375; 67 N. Y. 370; 2 C. P. Div. 310; 5 Cent. L. J. 281. Boldt V. New York, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 432. pp. 971, 1039. <■ 86 Pa. St. 440; 53 Pa. St. 457; 6 Reporter,. 126; 49 Miss. 287; 13 Ind. 369; 46 Texas, 539; 5 Hun, 495 ; 18 Ind. 230 ; 25 N. Y. 565 ; 30 Barb. 235 ; 6 liobt. 93. Bolingbroke v. Swindon Local Board, L. R. 9 C. P. 575. p. 889. Bolton 0. Colder, 1 Watts, 360. pp. 383, 387. Bond V. Ward, 7 Mass. 123. p. 889. Bonnell \. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 39 N, J. L. 189. p. 429. (In full, p. 404.) Booth V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 67 N. Y. 593 ; s. c, 73 N. Y. 38; 18 Alb. L. J. 98; 6 Reporter, 313. pp. 973, 981, 1040. Booth V. Mister, 7 Car. & P. 66. p. 88-1. C22N.Y. 361; 2 Hilt. 354. Boothby v. Androscoggin R. Co., 51 Me. 318. p. 276. Borden v. Vincent, 24 Pick. 301. p. 340. Bordentown, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Cam- den, etc., R. Co., '17 N. J. L. 314. pp. 566, 567. Borradaile v. Brunton, 8 Taun. 585. p, 1084. I orst ij. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 4 Hun, 346. pp. 351, 3.52. c 10 Jones & Sp. 232, 234. Bosch r. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 44 Iowa, 402. pp. 734, 1098. Boss V. Litton, 5 Car. & P. 407. pp. 388, 1135, 1198, 1201. C36 Mo. 491; 2 Gush. 544; 8 Barb. 380; 1 Denio, 99; 42 Me. 335, 338; 6 Oush. 530; 22 Vt. 224; 9 Wis. 217; 1 Head, 622. Boston V. Worthington, 10 Gray, 496. pp. 319, 789, 790. <• 122 Mass. 237; 9 Allen, 21, 23; 109 Mass. 285 ; 122 Mass. 104 ; 47 N". Y. 481, 486 ; 72 X. Y. 67. Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Shanly, 107 Mass. 568. pp. 230, 231. c 8 Hun, 258. Bostwick V. Barlow, 14 Hun, 177. p. 820. Boswell V. Laird. 8 Cal. 469. pp. 899, 902, 903. c 38 Cal. 692 ; 29 Ual. 249 ; 18 Kan. 38 ; 2 Neb. 342; 6 Phila. 257; 11 Bush, 475, 480; 6 Re- porter, 4B1. TABLE OF CASES. xxin Bosworth V. Brand, 1 Dana, 377. p. 1088. c 17 B. Mon. 731, 733. Bosworth V. Swansey, 10 Mete. 363. pp. 1093, 1094, 1095, 1161, 1176, 1203. c 22 N. H. 564; 117 Mass. 65; 3 Allen, 408; 42 Me. 93 ; 47 N. Y. 33 ; 10 Allen, 21 ; 120 Mass. 492 ; 37 Baiib. 299 ; 36 N. Y. 58 ; 39 Me. 197, 198 ; 119 Mass. 278 ; 7 Gray, 459. cl 29 Wis. 24. Botslord V. Michigan, etc., K. Co., 33 Mich. 2-56. pp. 973, 983. Boucher v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 4-56. pp. 762, 763. Boughton V. Carter, 18 Johns. 40-5. p. 471. Boulston's Case, 5 Coke, 105. p. 202. Boulter v. Webster, 13 Week. liep. 289. p. 1293. Boulton V. Banks, Cro. Car. 254. p. 208. c3 Keyes,2T0; 2Abb. App. Dec. 499. Boulton V. Crowther, 2 Barn. & Cress. 703 ; s. c, 4 Dow. & By. 195. pp. 549, 567, 690, 656, 694, 744, 747, 822. c 15 Conn. 129 ; 5 Best & S. 450 ; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1021; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 285; 11 C. B. (N. s.) 207; 8 Jur. (N. s.) 81; 30 L.J. (O. P.) 364; 3 HUl, 538 ; 25 N. J. L. 373 ; 10 C. B. (N. s.) 780 ; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 310 ; 4 Ohio St. 465 ; 14 Conn. 165 ; 11 Ch. Leg. N. 256; 19 Alb. L. J. 298; 7 Re- porter, 386; 4 N. Y. 204; 13 La. An. 428; 26 ST. J. L. 160. Boutiller v. Steamboat Milwaukee, 8 Minn. 97. pp 1276, 1283, 1287. c 3 Dill. 126. Bow-Bridge v. Le Prior, 1 Koll. Abr. 308. p. 343. Bowcher v. Noidstrom, 1 Taun. 567. pp. 669, 895. Bowen o. Luke Erie Tel. Co., 1 Am. L. Keg. 68.5. pp. 850, 854. Bower v. Peate, 1 Q. B. Div. 321 ; s. c, 45 L. J. 446. pp. 99, 278, 346, 901, 902, 906, 910. c 6 Eeporter, 461. Bowers v. Pitzrandolph, Add. 215. pp. 195, 221. Bowie u. Kansas City, 51 Mo. 454. pp. 753, 766, 1255. c 53 Mo. 296. Bowler u. Lane, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 311. pp. 1265, 1294. c 9 Bush, 737; 42 Cal. 218. Bowlsby ■o. Speer, 31 N. J. L. 351. p. 751. Bowlston V. Hardy, Cro. Eliz;. 547 ; s. c, sub nom. Boulston's Case, 5 Coke, 105. p. 202. ■ Bowman v. Boston, 5 Cush. 1. pp. 759, 760. c 19 Minn. 248. Bowman v. Troy, etc., R. Co., 37 Barb. 516. p. 503. c 38 Ind. 560. Bowyer v. Anderson, 2 Leigh, 550. pp. 320, 896. Bowyer v. Burlew, 3 N. T. S. C. (T. & C.) 362. p. 216. Box V. Jubb, 4 Exch. Div. 76 ; s. v., 27 Week. Kep. 415 ; 8 Cent. L. J. 289. p. 89. Boyce v. Chesiiire R. Co., 42 N. H. 97 ; a. c, 43 N. H. 627. p. 162. Boyd V. Brown, 17 Pick. 461. p. 1270. Boyland v. New York, 1 Sandf. S. C. 27. pp. 732, 776. c 53 Ala. 530. Boyle V. Mowry, 122 Mass. 251. p. 992. Boyle V. Tamlyn, 9 Dow. & Ry. 430; c. v., 6 Barn. & Cress. 329. p. 317. c 12 C. B. 174; 7 C. B. 562; 13 Jur. 365; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 824; 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 216. Boynton v. Rees, 9 Pick. 528. p. 103. c 11 Cush. 226. Boynton v. Turner, 13 Mass. 391. p. 390. c 29 Me. 311. Brabbits v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Wis. 289. pp. 971, 994. 995, 1032. c 40 Wis. 593; 42 Wis. 528; 41 Wis. 482. Brabham v. Hinds County, 54 Miss. 363, p. 617. Brace v. New York, etc., R. Co., 27 N. Y. 269. p. 521. c 3 X. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 540; 38 N. Y. 437 16 Kan. 576. Bracken v. Miller, 4 Watts & S. 102. p, 890. Brackett v. Lubke, 4 Allen, 138. pp. 347, 897, 904, 909, 910, 912. e 7 Cent. L. J. 493 ; 11 Allen, 422; 12 Allen, 470; 13 Allen, 59; 112 Mass. 98. Bradbee v. Ciirist's Hospital, 2 Dowl. (n. s. ) 164 ; s. c, 4 Man. & G. 714 ; 6 Scott N. R. 79. p. 342. Bradbury v. Falmouth, 18 Me. 64. pp. 763, 1238. Bradburn v. Great Western R. Co., L. R. 10 Exch. 1 ; s. c, 31 L. T. (n. s.) 464; 23 Week. Rep. 48 ; 44 L. J. (Exch.) 9. pp. 1271, 1294. XXIV TABLE OF CASES. Bradley v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 2 Cush. 539. pp. 419, 421,424. c 107 Mass. 497; 4 Md. 258; 40 N. T. 16, 25, 28, 64; 101 Mass. 202; 17 Mich. 118; 10 Cush. 569; 113 Mass. 369; 67 Mo. 134; 97 Mass. 368. Bradley v. New York, etc., R. Co., 21 Conn. 294. p. 105. Bradley v. New York, etc., R. Co., 62 N. Y. 99; s. <;., 3 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 288. pp. 97.5, 1040. Bradshaw v. Lancashire, etc., R. Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 189; s. c, 44 L. J. (C. P.) 148; 31 L. T. (s. s.) 847. pp. 1272, 1286. Bradt v. Albany, 5 Hun, 591. p. 740. c 5 Hun, 604. Brady v. Ball, 14 Ind. 317. pp. 198, 209, 210. Brady i7. Chicago, 4 Biss. 448. pp. 565, 798, 1204, 1289. Brady v. Lowell, 3 Cush. 121. pp. 620, 709, 757. c 36 N. H. 297; 122 Mass. 357; 7 Cush. 492; 17 lU. 146; 34 Conn. 14; 17,How. 167. Brady «. Rensselaer, etc., R. Co., 1 Hun, 378; s. c, 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 537. pp. 521, 523. 524. Bragg 1-. Bangor, 51 Me. 532. p. 763. c 57 Me. 185. Brailey v. Southborough, 6 Cush. 141. pp. 340, 755. c 32 N. H. 444 ; 4 Mich. 561 ; 44 N. H. 248 ; 11 E. I. 453 ; 17 How. 167. Brainard v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co., 7 Cush. 50S. pp. 646, 755. Brand v. Troy, etc., R. Co., 8 Barb. 368. pp. 418, 455. c 24 Md. 121; 25 Md. 337; 18 N. T. 258; 1 B. D. Smith, 272; 6 Duer, 641; 20 Ohio, 447; 2 Hilt. 33; 8 Barb. 435; 40 Miss. 453; 48 Miss. 12i, 125,127; 2iMd.l03; 22 Barb. 583, 584; 13 Biii'b. 15, 496; 57 Mo. 214; 18 N. Y. 258; 32 Barb. 659. Brannan v. May, 17 Ga. 136. pp. 1165, 1167. Brass v. Mnitland, 6 El. & Bl. 470; s. c, 26 L. J. (Q. B.) 49. pp. 44, 230, 231, 291. c 2 Abb. C. C. 222 ; 1 Sawyer, 448 ; 15 Wall. 535; 7 L:ins. 213; 107 Mass. ,576; 64 Barb. 213; IIC.B. (N. S.) 562,563; 2 Cliff. 27; 2 Spragae, 36. Bray v. Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416. p. 619. Brazier v. Polytechnic Institute, 1 Fost. & Fin. 507. pp. 311, 312. c 61 N. Y. 194, 195 ; L. E. 5 Q. B. 189, 196, 607; L. E. 4 Q. B. 386. Brearly v. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co., 20 N. J. L. 236. pp. 570, 571. Breese v. United States Tel. Co., 45 Barb. 274. pp. 834, 837, 840, 841, 842, 846, 847, 852. c 1 Lans. 136 ; 62 Me. 216 ; 113 Mass. JOS, 307; 112 Mass. 74; 27 Iowa, 455; 60 Me. 30; 60 111. 431; 15 Mich. 538; 65 N. Y. 167. Brendell v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 27 Barb. • 534, note. p. 427. Brennan v. Carpenter, 1 R. I. 474. p. 12.51. Brennan v. Fairhaven, etc., R. Co. (Sup. Ct. Conn.), 7 Reporter, 40. p. 1188. Brent v. Kimball, 60 111. 211. p. 221. Brett V. Cumberland, Cro. Jac. 521. pp. 637, 642, 647. Brewer v. Crosby, 11 Gray, 29. p. 219. c 104 Mass. 70. Brewster v. De Fremery, 33 Cal. 341. p. 323. Brickner v. New York, etc., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 672 ; s. c, 2 Lans. 506. p. 1031. c 53 N. Y. 552; 47 Mo. 681; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. &C.) 323,350; 62 Barb. 222. Brickman v. South Carolina R. Co., 8 So. Car. 173. p. 973. Bridge v. Grand Junction, etc., R. Co., 3 Mee. & W. 244. pp. 374, 378, 469, 662, 1089, 1107, 1134, 1136, .1137, 1141, 1142, 1166, 1186, 1240. c 6 Cent. L. J. 46; 16 Pa. St. 466; 19 Conn. 575; 31 Barb. 383; 18 N. Y. 252; 17 Barb. 97; 10 Ch. Leg. N. 121; 10 Mee. & W. 548, 549; 6 Jur. 955; 12 L. J. (Exch.) 11; 20 111. 493; 3 C. B. 15; 10 Jur.- 884; 16 L. J. (C. P.) 304; 25 Vt. 123; 5 Duer, 26; 26 Me. 48; 13 Ga. 88; 26 Ga. 270 ; 24 N. J. L. 270, 283 ; 101 Mass. 465 ; 37 Cal. 423; 19 Pa. St. 301; 29 Md. 437; 15 Ind. 489; 12 Meto. 418 ; 95 U. S. 442 ; 2 0. P. Div. 373 ; 47 Pa. St. 304 ; 22 Vt. 222, 223 ; 6 Iowa, 462 ; 61 Mo. 590 ; 52 N. H. 554 ; 9 W^is. 218, 219 ; 47 Miss. 222 ; 2 Col. 154, 159 ; 12 0. B. (N. s.) 9 ; 2 Denio, 439 ; 8 C. B. 130, 131; 15 Q. B. 283; 5 El. & Bl. 201; 38 Ala. 86, 88; 46 Pa. St. 159; 6 Gray, 72; 13 Baib. 497; 6 Ohio St. 109; 4 Am. L. Eeg. (N. s.) 17; 9 La. An. 442; 6 Cent. L. J. 46; 18 N. Y. 252; 20 Wis. 635; 29 Vt. 428; L. E. 10 Exch. 53; tt L. J. (Exch.) 93. 574, 902, 910. Brown v. Windsor, 1 Cromp. & J. 20. pp. 275, 276. c 25 N. J. L. 367 ; 7 0. B. 562 ; 13 Jur. 365 ; 21 Barb. 422. Brown County v. Butt, 2 Ohio, 348. p. 618. Browne v. Providence, etc., R. Co., 12 Gray, 55. p. 528. c 14 Allen, 154; 98 Mass. 564 ; 61 X. V. 198; 1 Allen, 18. Brownell v. Flagler, 5 Hill, 282. pp. 1146, 1160, 1167. c 8 Barb. 383; 17 Barb. 97; 11 Barb. 115; 1 E. D. Smith, 273; 27 Barb. 228: 20 111. 496; 21 Iowa, 26; 10 Ind. 417; 5 Deiiiu, 266; 6 Ind. 145; 13 Ga. 88; 2 Hilt. 38; 37 C^iU. 422; 33 N. J. L. 440 ; 6 Iowa, 452 ; 24 Vt. 495 ; 22 N. J. L. 189 ; 2 Mich. 265; 29 Me. 310; 5 Barb. 338; 4 Ind. 98 ; 37 Mo. 552. Browning v. Handford, 5 Hill, 591. p. 826. Browning v. Springfield, 17 111. 14o. pp. 729, 753, 754. c42 111. 507; 32 Wis. 328; 43 111. 408; 21 Mich. 122; 21 Iowa, 414; 54 111.86; 5 Neb. 452; 61 111. 161; 26 Iowa, 268; 49 111. 479; 55 111. 349, 350, 3.'>1; IBlacIi, 53; 91 U. S. 551; 60 111. 323; 16 Wall. 374. . Carter, 20 111. 390. p. 536. c 24 111 . 632 ; 36 lU. 283 ; 23 III. 96 ; 71 111. 523. Chicago, etc., E. Co. o. Cauffman, 28 III. 513; s. ,,., 38 111. 424. p. .50J. c 4B 111. 81 ; 72 111. 238 ; 67 111. 110 ; 73 lU. 61. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Clamplt, 63 111. 95. pp. 157, 171. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Clark, 70 111. 276 ; 2 Bradw. 116. p. 462. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Coleman, 18 111. 297. p. 1054. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Coss, 73 111. 394. pp. 450, 1168. c 2 Bradw. 43. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Damerell, 81 111. 450 ; s. c, 3 Cent. L. J. 768. pp. 417, 426. c 2 Bradw. 123, 313. Chicago, etc., E. Co. o. Dewey, 26 HI. 255. pp. 450, 1168, 1187, 1196. c 73 111. 397 ; 81 lU. 454 ; 46 111. 83 ; 71 111. 607 ; 49111.503,504; 52 111. 330; 28 Mich. 42; 72111. 388, 397; 54 111. 484; 37 111. 341; 2 Bradw. 38. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Dickson, 63 111. 151. p. 887. c 73 111. 61. Chicago, etc., E. Co. o. Dignan, 56 111. 487. pp. 423, 452, 462. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Donahue, 75 111. 106. p. 1171. c 44 Wis. 643. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Doyle, 18 Kan. 58. pp. 974, 1026. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Dunn, 61 111. 385; 52 111. 451. pp. 351, 352, 1168, 1170, 1241. c 72 111. 569 ; 82 111. 201 ; 80 111. 257. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Elmore, 67 HI. 176. p. 507. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Engle, 84 111. 397 ; s. c, 76 111. 317 ; 68 111. 381. pp. 502, 505, 525. c 66 111. 46. Chicago, etc., E. Co. u. Pears, 53 HI. 115. pp. 419, 424. c 34 Iowa, 160; 6 Or. 424. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Pell, 22 HI. 333. p. 888. Chicago, etc., E. Co. 8, 904. o 63 m. 546. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson, 63 HI. 167. pp. 314, 315, 1256, 1257, 1264, 12(57. Chichester v. Lethbridge, Willes, 71. p. 340. Chick V. South- Western R. Co., 57 Ga. 357. pp. 1282, 1286. Chickering v. Robinson, 3 Cush. 543. p. 817. Chidsey B. Canton, 17 Conn. 475. pp. 704, 7o5. 756, 1241, 1259. c 4 Mich. 561; 36 N. H. 29S; i Cosh. 314; 122 Mass. 351; 36 Wis. 158; 5 Sandf. S. C. 320; 27 Vt. 457 ; 8 Barb. 651 ; 30 Wis. 617 ; 26 lon-a, 269 ; 11 E. 1. 453; 39 Conn. 37S; 34 Conn. 13. 142, 143; S Bai-b. 651. Child i\ Boston, 4 Allen, 41. pp. 711, 717, 725, 731, 732, 733, 735, 736, 737, 738, 750, 751. c 124 Mass. 567 ; 6 Allen, 456 ; 68 Me. Ill ; 34 Mich. 127, 128; 104 Mass. 15; 11 E. 1. 145; 21 Mich. 108,114; 122 Mass. 359, 365, 374, 373; 102 Mass. 500 ; 56 X. H. 293, 2;U, 239 ; 110 Mass. 221; 3 Mo. Ap|j.26-2: 10 AIlen,604; 9S Mass. 371; 8 Allen, 12S. d 91 U. S. 551, 553. Child t. Hearn. L. R. 9 Exch. 176: s. c, 43 L. J. (Exch.) 100. pp. 2m. 222, 532. Chiles P. Drnke. 2 iletc. (Ky.) 146. pp. 24.S, 1246, 1250, 1256, 1264, 1278. 1279, 1283, 1289. China ;•. Southwicli, 12 Me. 238. pp. 101, 102. 104. c6Xev.88; 2 Allen, 358; 65 Me. 463; 35 Me. 524, 326. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 413. p. 668. Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196. p. 730. Chunot t. Larson, 43 Wis. 536; s. c, 6 Cent L. .J. 359. p. 220. Churchill v. Evans, 1 Taun. 529. p. 209. e 12 0. B. 174. Churchill r. Rosebeck, 15 Conn. 359. pp. 1151, 1161. Churchman u. Tunstall, Hard. 163. pp. 635, 641, 642, 650. Cincinnati v. Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499. pp. 275, 279. 745, 747, 750. Cincinnati v. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38. pp. 738, 740, 889, 900, 915. c 7 Cent. L. J. 4M ; 17 Am. L. Reg. (s. s.) 457; 11 R. I. 455; 23 Ind. 557. Cincinnati i-. White, 6 Pet. 431. p. 759. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Bartlett, 58 Ind. 572. p. 509. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. i . Chester, 57 Ind. 297. pp. 1241, 1289. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. c. Eaton, 53 Ind. 307. p. 449. c 5 Reporter, 631 ; 8 Cent. L. J. 245. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. u. Smith, 22 Ohio St. 227. p. 408. c9W. Va. 296. - Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. u. Street, 50 Ind. 225. pp. 499, 500. Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. !■. Waterson, 4 Ohio St. 424. pp. 214, 525, -526. c29 Ind. 42; 13 Ohio St. 69, 72; -22 Ohio St. 245; 4 Ohio St. 477; 26 Mo. 449: 27 Ohio SI. 250; 25 Ind. 414; 17Inil. 297; 115 Mass. 460; 53 Ala. 597; 26 Ohio St. 127; 9 Wis. 220. City of Brussels, 6 Ben. 370. p. 1287. XXXVIU TABLE OF CASES. Citizens' R. Co. v. Carey, 56 Ind. 396. pp. 398, 400, 1197. Claflin V. Wilpox, 18 Vt. 605. p. 1251. c 46 Vt. 668. Clancy v. Byrne, 56 N. T. 129 ; c. c, 65 Bark 344; 58 Barb. 449. pp. 317, 319. Clapp u. Kemp. 122 Mass. 481. p. 890. Clare v. National City Bank, 1 Sweeny, 539; s. G., 3 Jones & Sp. 2i)l ; 8 Jones 6 Sp. lOi. pp. 347, 910, 914. Clarissey v. Metropolitan Fire-Depart- ment, 1 Sweeny, 224. p. 735. c 4!) How. Pr. 68; 55 How. I'r. 186. Clark V. Adams, 18 Vt. 42-"). p. 217. c 23 Vt. 239; 25 Vt. 122; 9 Mich. 161. Clark (I. Bari'ington, 41 N. H. 44. pp. 781, 1085, 1203. c22 Wis. 680; 29 Wis. 304; 51 Me. 140; 43 N. H. 268; 41 N. H. 321; 42 N. H. 213, 215; 13 Hun, 86; 48 N. H. 316. Clark V. Brown, 18 Wend. 213. p. 214. c 1 Robt. 593 ; 3 Hill, 41. Clark K. Chambers, 3 Q. B. Div. 327 ; a. c, 7 Cent. L. J. 11 ; 17 Alb. L. J. 505. pp. 306, 307, 1085, 1089, 1194, 120S, 1239. Clark V. Chicago, 4 Biss. 486. , pp. 783, 785. Clark V. Commonwealth (The), 4 Pick. 125. p. 386. c 28 Mich. 44; 8 Mete. 216. Clark i;. Corinth, 41 Vt. 449. p. 762. C47 Vt. 700; 24 Wis. 345. Clark V. Corporation of "Washington, 12 Wheat. 40. pp. 657, 668, 669. Clark V. Fisher, 1 Paige, 174. p. 799. Clark V. Foot, 8 Johns. 421. pp. 56, 75, 148, 149, 1-50, 253, 1124. cl8 Md. 34; 15 Conn. 131; 1 Cow. 78; }^ Minn. 341; 2 G. Greene, 463; 1 E. D. Smith, 46; 8 Wis. 257; 21 Wend. 618; 2 N, Y. 162; 6 Hun, 324; 51 N. Y. 113, 487; 42 Barb. 393; 9 Bush, 533 ; 41 Wis. 73 ; 2 Robt. 331 ; 17 Job ns. 100; 8 Pa. St. 374; 22 Barb. 621, 622; 49 N. Y. 425 ; 25 N. Y 346 ; 10 Mete. 374; 4 N. Y. 200. Clark i;. Fry, 8 C'hio St. 358. pp. 353, 354, 740, 900, 910. c2BIacJc, 424, 426; 9 Mich. 191; 21 Mich. 21; 47 Ind. 395; 12 Ohio St. 98; 36 Wis. 37, 38; 6 Phila. 257; 5 Neb. 142, 143; 17 Am. L. Reg. IN. s.) 457; 2 Col. 164; 2 Duv. 133. Clark V. Kirwan, 4 E. D. Smith, 21. p. 11.52. c U Cal. 164; 35 Ind. 466; 25 Ind. 198; 8 Minn. 165. Clark K.Lebanon, 63 Me. 393; a. c, 2 Cent. L. J. 594. p. 1097. c 65 Me. 553. Clark V. Lockport, 49 Barb. 580. pp. 361, 786, 78',, 1198. c 61 Barb. 595 ; 61 N. Y. 509. Clark u. Lowell, 1 Allen, 180. p. 787. Clark a. Miller, 54 N. Y. 528. p. 312. Clark K.'Peckham, 9 11. 1. 455. p. 733. Clark V. Syracuse, etc., K. Co., 11 Barb. 112. pp. 497, 500, §03. c 12 Md. 262; 16 111. 202, 203; 25 Vt. 123, 162; 6 Ind. 144; 2 Mete. (Ky.) 182; 21 Barb. 341; 9' Wis. 206, 208; 22 Barb. 584; 12 Hun, 210. Clark V. Union Ferry Co., 35 N. Y. 485. p. 781. Clark V. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 28 Vt. 103. pp. 519, 900, 911. c48 Mo. 616; 7 Cent. L. J. 494; 30 Vt. 306; 59 Me. 528. Clark V. Webster, 1 Car. &. P. 104. p. 221. Clark u. Western, etc., R. Co., 1 Winst. (N. (.:) 109. p. 513. C66N. C. 344; 75 N. C. 58. Clark V. Wilmington, 5 Harr. (Del.) 243. p. 749. Clark V. Worthington, 12 Pick. 571. p. 1246. c 16 Pick. 549. Clarke v. Gray, 6 East, 568. p. 784. Clarke v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 36 Mo. 202. pp. 515, 518, 899, 903, 911, 913, 1058. c 40 Mo. 137 ; 41 M o. 274 ; 37 Mo. 290 ; 42 Mo. 196; 67 Mo. 98; 30 Me. 179. Cla7'ke V. Holmes, 7 Hurl. & N. 937 ; o. c.,. 8 Jur. (n. s.) 992; 31 L. .J. (Exch.).356; 10 Week. Rep. 405; 6 Hurl. & N. 349 ^ 30 L. J. (Exch.) 135. pp. 291, 294. (See Hohnes v. Clarke, in full, p. 953.) e 7 Reporter, 61, 560; 62 Mo. 38; 102 Mass. 586; 3 Dill. 324, 325; 110 Mass. 261; 20 Mmn. 19, 20; 19 Alb. L. J. 160; 49 X. Y. 533; 16 C. B.. (N. s.) 694; 33 L. .J. (C. P.) 335; 63 N. Y. 452; 10 Allen, 238; 59 Mo. 607; L. R, 7 Exch. 136,. 138; 41 L. J. (E.xch.) 101, 102; 44 Md, 293; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 186, 189; L. R. 1 C. P. 283, 287; 12. Jur. (N. S.) 433; 76 Pa. St. 393; 41 Wis. 482; 3 Col. 503, 505, 507; 3 Sawyer, 447; 1 Daly, 436; 119 Mass. 414. Claxton's Administrator v. Lexington,, etc., R. Co., 13 Bush, 636. pp. 1003, 1004, 1024, 1025. TABLE Ol- CASES. XXXIX Clay V. Wood, 5 Esp. 44. pp. 383, 1127, 1135, 1166. c 21 Wend. 622. Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q. B. 437. pp. 958, 963, 1206, 1238, 1239. c 6 Cent. L. J. 46 ; 3 Daly, 383 ; 18 N. Y. 252 ; 17 r.avb. 97; 10 Ch. Leg. N. 121; 39 M(1.250; 26 Wis. 255, 256; 29 Md.437; 95 U. S. 442; BBest & S. 720, 722; 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 211, 212; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 829; 2Lans. 438; 10 Mich. 198; « Gray, 72; 4 Gent. L. J. 83; 2 Best & S. 114, 118; 18 N. Y. 252. Clayburgh v. Chicago, 25 111. 535. pp. 729, 1252. c 42 111. 507; 49 111. 478; 91 U. S. 551; 60 Mo. 159. a 122 Mass. 379. Cleaveland v. Chicago, etc., li. Co., 35 Iowa, 220. p. 523. c 40 Iowa, 339. Cleaveland v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 42 Vt. 449. pp. 140, 161, 171. C39 Md. 136; 59 111. 355; 91 U. S. 470; 26 Wis. 236; 11 W. Va. 39; 30 Wis. 121. Cleland v. Thornton, 43 Cal. 437. pp. 149, 1260, 1262. Clemence v. Auburn, 66 N. Y. 334 ; s. u., 4 Hun, 386. pp. 733, 736, 753, 781. c 13 Hun, 83; 12 Hun, 304. Clemens v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 56 M.o. 366. pp. 153, 170, 1100. c 4 Neb. 276; GO Mo. 235; SO Pa. St. 190, 379. Clement v. Canfield, 28 Vt. 302. pp. 509, 510. c 21 Mich. 401; 39 111. 278; 10 Jones & Sp. 234 ; 63 N. Y. 531 ; 20 Kan. 518. Cleveland v. Spier, 16 C. B. (n. s.) 399. pp. 1046, 1200. Cleveland v. St. Paul, 18 Minn. 279. pp. 753, 763, 766, 773. c20 Minn. 118; 19 Minn. ^9, 250, 302; 21 Minn. 68. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Ind. 90. p. 524. c 55 Ind. 571. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 631. pp. 428, 1149, 1212. c 74 N. C. 659; 24 Ohio St. 666. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Crossley, 36 Ind. 370. pp. 514, 521, 527, 540. c 45 Ind. 498. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Elliott, 4 Ohio St. 474. p. 214. c 13 Ohio St. 69, 72; 2 Mete. (Ky.) 79; 52 N. H. 556; 20 Minn. 135. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Elliott, 28 Ohio St. 340. pp. 426, 498, 502, 1158. c 27 Conn. 407; 43 Miss. 281; 37 Cal. 423; 21 Iowa, 106; 9 W. Va. 237. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201. pp. 971, 1028, 1029. c 5 Reporter, 626 ; 11 Wis. 251, 253 ; 12 Ohio St. 487; 3 Ohio St. 96; 42 N. H. 236; 3 Sawyer, 440; 32 Iowa, 365; 9 Ileisk. 872; 9 Bush, 568; 5 Ohio St. 559, 561, 567 ; 4 Ohio St. 575 ; 49 Miss. 283; 17 Ohio St. 210; 11 Iowa, 424; 31 Miss. 196; 47 Miss. 418,419; 8 Ohio St. 253; 3 Col. 502, 503 ; 3 Coldw. 225. cl 46 Te-xas, 540. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Manson, 30 Ohio St. 451. p. 1184. Cleveland, etc., R Co. v. MoConnell, 26 Ohio St. 57. p. 521. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. «. Rowan, 66 Pa. St. 393. pp. 1293, 1294. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St. 325. p. 567. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. <;. Swift, 42 Ind. 119. p. 525. c 46 Ind. 281. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Terry, 3 Ohio St, 570. pp. 417, 430, 1173. c 3 Daly, 383; 34 Iowa, 161; 35 lud. 463; 22 Ohio St. 19; 18 Ohio St. 261; 43 Wis. 527; 6 Cent. L. J. 430 ; 48 Cal. 421 ; 25 Ind. 197 ; 5 Kan. 323; 46 Pa. St. 161; 4 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 19. Cleves V. Willoughby, 7 Hill, 83. p. 823. Cliff V. Midland R. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 258 ; s. c, 18 Week. Rep. 456 ; 22 L. T. (n. s.) .382. p. 419. c 33 Ind. set ; L. E. 9 C. P. 555, 556 ; 43 L. J. (C. P.) 309, 310; 25 Mich. 2;)1; 36 N. J. L. 5.15. Clifford V. Dam (H. Y. Ct. App.), 19 Alb. L. J. 57. p. 344. Clinton v. Howard, 42 Conn. 294. p. 349. Clothier v. Webster, 12 C. B. [s. s.) 790 ; ii. o., 9 Jur. (n. s.) 231 ; 31 L. J. (C. P.) 126. pp. 279, 557, 606, 622, 822, 909. cL. R. 1 H. L. 118; 11 H. L. Cas. 721; 12 Jur. (N. S.) 576; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 235. Clussman v. Long Island, etc., R. Co., 9 Hun, 618. p. 313. Coale V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 60 Mo. 227. pp. 153, 162. Coates V. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 61 Mo. 38 ; s. c, 3 Cent. L. .1.209. pp.153, 164,170. c 16 Kan. 255 ; 17 Kan. 389 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 255. Cobb V. Standish, 14 Me. 198. pp. 770, 1200. c 65 Me. 552 ; 42 Me. 527 ; 57 Me. 534 ; 43 Ind. 506; 42 Ind. 343; 6 Iowa, 452; 56 N. H. 430; 35 xl TABLE OF CASES. N. H. 313 ; 17 111. U6; 39 Me. 197; 38 Wis. 460. ? 19 Vt. 476. Coekburn v. Erewash Canal, 11 Week. Rep. 34. pp. 556, 569. Cockerham v. Nixon, 11 Ired. L. 269. p. 202. Codiier v. Bradford, 3 Finney, 259 ; s. c, 3 Chand. 291. pp. 759, 760. e 34 Wis. 619. Coe V. Piatt, 7 Bxch. 460 ; ». c, 16 Jur. 174; 21 L. J. (Exch.) 146 (affirming ^. c, 6 Exch. 752 ; 2 L. M. & P. 488 ; 15 Jur. 732; 20 L. J. (Exch.) 407). pp. 963, 966, 1007. c 7 Hurl. & N. 946; 8 Jur. (N. s.) 994; 31 L. J. (Excli.) 359; 55 How. Pr. 173; 25 Midi. 7. Coe V. Wise, 7 Best & S. 831 ; s. o., L. R. 1 Q. B. 711; 14 L. T. (n. S.) 891; 37 L. J. (Q. B.) 262 (reversing s. c, 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 281 ; 12 Week. Rep. 1036 ; 10 L. T. (n. s.) 666; 5 Best & S. 440; 10 Jur. (k. s.) 1019). pp. 558, 591, 593, 598, 622, 624, 717, 720, 823. c 122 Mass. 366, 368, 369; L. E. 1 H. L. 107; 11 H. L. Gas. 707; 12 Jur. (n. s.) 573; 36 L. J. (Exch.) 229. Coffin V. Plymouth, 49 N. H. 173. pp. 759, 802. c 53 N. H. 334. Cofran v. Sanbornton, 56 N. H. 12. p. 757. Coggs V. Bernard, 2 Ld. Kayra. 909. p. 556. Coggswell V. Baldwin, 15 Vt. 404. p. 202. c 2 Daly, 296; 36 How. Pr. 258. Coggswell u. Lexington, 4 Cush. 307. pp. 754, 769, 770, 775, 776. c- 38 Md. 585 ; 11 Alien, 320; 41 N. H. 334; 2 Sneed, 272; 43 Ind. 697, 598; 7 Gray, 315; 9 Hun, 685; 56 N. H. 430; 1 Allen, 32; 52 N. H. 223; 30 Wis. 403; 35 N. H. 314; 64 Me. 61; 39 Me. 197 ; 37 Conn. 313. < Coggswell V. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 6 Or. 417. p. 450. Cohen v. Dry Dock, etc., K. Co., 69 N. Y. l70 ; s. u., 8 Jones & Sp. 368. pp. 200, 397, 398, 887, 890. Colby V. Beaver Dam, 34 Wis. 285. pp. 759, 762, 781, 782. Colby V. Westbrook, 57 Me. 181. pp. 763, 1238. Colby V. Wiscasset, 61 Me. 304. p. 1257. c 47 N. Y. 646 ; 56 N. H. 296. Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 339. pp. 1179, 1186, 1240. c 1 Handy, 202; 27 Conn. 412; 37 Cal. 423; 52 N. H. 554; 9 Wis. 218; 24 Vt. 495; 31 Miss. 192; 62 Mo. 440; 98 Mass. 568; 15 Q. B. 283; 68 Me. 558; 2 C. B. (N. s.) 751; 2 Sawyer, 29; 1 Duer, 584. Colden v. Eldred, 15 Johns. 220. p. 214. c 33 Ind. 498. Cole w.^Fisher, 11 Mass. 137. pp. 241, 245. c 42 How. Pr. 393; 22 Mo. 377; 8 Barb. 433; 61 Me. 337; 9 Pick. 3; 50 N. H. 429. Cole V. Hindson, 6 Term Rep. 234. p. 825. Cole V. Medina, 27 Barb. 218. pp. 731, 781. c51 N. H. 139; 16 Abb. Pr. 346; 44 Barb. 393; 32 N. Y. 497; 32 Barb. 635, 636, 647. Cole I). Nashville, 4 Sneed (Tenn.), 162. pp. 732, 733. Cole V. Muscatine, 14 Iowa, 296. p. 747. Colegrove v. New Tork, etc., R. Co., 20 N. Y. 492 ; ^. u., 6 Duer, 382. p. 1088. c 32 N. Y. 601; 11 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 420; 35 N. Y. 25; 34 N. Y. 677; 35 Pa. St. 129; 46 Barb. 269,270; 2Jones&Sp. 12; 65 Barb. 154; 2 Ben. 237; 11 Abb. Pr. [a. s.) iXS; 8 Bosw. 354; 43 Wis. 527 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 430 ; 64 N. Y. 147 ; 46 Pa. St. 161; 56 N. Y. 205; 38 N. Y. 262; 4 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 19; 51 111. 498. ? 6 Eobt. 87. Coleman v. South-Eastern E. Co., 4 Hurl. & Colt. 699. p. 1181. Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45. p. 1267. CoUen V. Wright, 7 El. & Bl. 301. p. 236. Collier V. Arrington, Phill. L. 356. pp. 1274, 1287, 1289. Collier v. Steinhart, 51 Cal. 116. pp. 997, 1052. c 51 Cal. 258. Collins ii. Albany, etc., R. Co., 12 Barb. 492. p. 1146. X Collins V. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 65 Mo. 230. pp. 534, 538. Collins V. Council Bluffs, 32 Iowa, 324; s. c, 35 Iowa, 432. pp. 360, 617, 753, 785, 793, 1091, 1257, 1258, 1263, 1268, 1270. c 44 Iowa, 290; 43 Iowa, 676, 677; 38 Iowa, 598 ; 45 Iowa, 417 ; 77 Pa. St. 113 ; 40 Iowa, 644, 218; 37 Iowa, 269. Collins V. Dorchester, 6 Cush. 396. pp. 362, 770, 771, 772, 801, 802. c 33 Conn. 60; 35 K. H. 69; 37 Conn. 313; 1 TABLE OF CASES. xli Gray, 511; lOB. I. 308; 109 Mass. 137; 1 Allen, 32; 11 Gray, SU; 43 Conn. 42; 33 N. J. L. 264; 12 CuBh. 287 ; 38 Ind. 315. ? 52 N. H. 412, 413, 414, 415. Collins V. East Tennessee E. Co., 9 Heisk. 841. p. 1291. c 9 Heiek. 838. Collins V. Ferral, 1 Smed. & M. 383. p. 826. Collins V. Groseclose, 40 Ind. 414. p. 150. Collins V. Lefevre, 1 Fost. & Fin. 436. p. 1259. Collins V. Middle Levee Commissioners, L. B. 4 C. P. 279 ; s. c, 38 L. J. (C. P.) 236; 20 L. T. (n. s.) 442. p. lO'Jl. C3 Q. B. Div. 334; 7 Cent. L. J. 13; 17 Alb. L. J. 507 ; 39 N. J. L. 309. Collins u. New York, etc., R Co., 5 Hun, 503. pp. 154, 157, 104, 1271. c 8 Hun, 600. Collis V. Selden, L. P.. 3 C. P. 495 ; 37 L. J. (C. P.) 233. p. 311., c L. R. 5 Q. B. 190 ; 57 N. Y. 387. Colorado Central K. Co. ■„. Ogden, 3 Col. 499. pp. 970, 982, 994, 1010, 1032, 1053. Colton V. Richards, 123 Mass. 484; s. v., 6 Cent. L. J. 255; 5 Reporter, 271. p. 1034. Columbus V. Howard, 6 Ga. 219. p. 979. Columbus, etc., K. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174. pp. 970, 972, 973, 991, 992, 1028, 1033, 1038, 1051. c 46 Texas, 538, 650; 2 Col. 488; 5 Kan. 6.50; 8 Cent. L. J. 14; 58 Ind. 28. «1 49Cal. 130. Columbus, etc., R Co. v. Troesch, 68 111. 545 ; s. c, 57 111. 155. pp. 970, 984, 990, 993, 994, 1053, 1055. c 1 Bradw. 518. Columbus, etc., B. Co. v. Webb, 12 Ohio St. 475. pp. 973, 1033. c 3 Col. 510. d 65 Mo. 229. Colvin V. Holbrook, 2 N. Y. 126. p. 1059. Commonwealth u. Allen, 11 Mete. 403. pp. 386, 1245. ? 28 Mich. 44, 45. Commonwealth «. Boston, 97 Mass. 555. p. 789. Commonwealth u. Boston, 16 Pick. 442. p. 760. Commonwealth v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 101 Mass. 201. p. 416. Commonwealth u. Boston, etc., B. Co., 11 Cush. 512. p. 1283. Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 1 Pick. 180. pp. 620, 793, 805. c 24 Vt. 165. Commonwealth v. Day, 19 Ind. 450. p. 619. Commonwealth v. Deerfield, 6 Allen, 449. pp. 563, 564, 775, 792, 797. c 97 Mass. 432 ; 117 Mass. 513 ; 12 Allen, 259. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. St. 9. p. 1092. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 1 Penn. 462. pp. 567, 568. Commonwealth v. Fitchburg E. Co , 10 Allen, 189. pp. 419, 420. c 115 Mass. 199. Commonwealth v. Gammons, 23 Pick. 201. p. 386. c 8 Mete. 217. Commonwealth v. Harmer, 6 Phila. 90. pp. 825, 827. Commonwealth v. Josselyn, 97 Mass. 411. p. 1094. Commonwealth v. Knox, 6 Mass. 76. p. 1094. Commonwealth u. Metropolitan R. Co., 107 Mass. 236. p. 398. Commonwealth v. Miliraan, 3 Serg. & B. 408. p. 776. Commonwealth v. Nashua, etc., B. Co., 2 Gray, 54. p. S57. Commonwealth i\ Newburyport, 129 Mass. 136. pp. 620, 793. Commonwealth u. Passmore, 1 Serg. & R. 217. pp. 350, 353, 355. Commonwealth v. Petersham, 4 Pick. 119. pp. 759, 805. Commonwealih v. Reed, 34 Pa. St. 275. p. 743. Commonwealth v. Boxbury, 9 Gray, 451. p. 702. Commonwealth u. Sampson, 97 Mass. 407. p. 1094. Commonwealth v. Sanford, 12 Gray, 174. p. 1283. Commonwealth v. Selfridge, Hor. & Thomp. on Self-Defence, 1 ; s. c, "Whart. on Homicide, App. 417. p. 1092. Commonwealth v. Springfield, 7 Mass. 9. pp. 805, 808. c 16 Gray, 230; 13 Pick. 347. Commonwealth v. Vermont, etc., B. Co., 4 Gray, 22. p. 357. xlii TABLE OF CASES. Commonwealth v. Watson, 97 Mass. 562. p. 360. Commonwealth v. Wilmington, 105 Mass. 599. pp. 770, 771. c 122 Mass. 391. Commissioners of Anne Arundel County ■0. Duckett, 20 Md. 468. pp. 619, 727. (See Anne Arundel County c. Duckett.) Commissioners of Baltimore County v. Baker, 41 Md. 1. p. 619. Commissioners of Calvert County v. Gibson, 36 Md. 229. p. 619. Comerford v. Dupuy, 17 Cal. 308. p. 210. Comings v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 48 Mo. 512. pp. 518, 519. c 59 Ind. 445. Comstock V. Des Moines, etc., R. Co., 32 Iowa, 376. p. 537. Conant v. Griffin, 48 111. 410. pp. 1288, 1289, 1291, 12J3. c 52 111. 295 ; 82 111. 199 ; 81 111. 248. Condon v. Great Southern R. Co., 16 I. R. C. L. (n. s.) 415. p. 1291. Congdon v. Cooper, 15 Mass. 10. p. 899. Congdon v. Norwich, 37 Conn. 414. pp. 361, 786, 787. c 81 111. 306. Congress, etc.. Spring Co. v. Edgar (Sup. Ct. U. S.), 19 Alb. L. J. 413; 11 Ch. Leg. N. 295. p. 208. Congreve v. Morgan, 18 N. Y. 84. pp. 318, 344, 346, 1088, 1235. cl Robt. 245; 26 How. Pr. 117; 2 Black, 424; 30 Md. 206; 16 Abb. Pr. 352; 21 Mich. 20; 47 Ind. 397; 26 Barb. 625, 626; 54 Me. 47; 4 Bosw. 147; 44 N. Y. 422; 56 Barb. 121; 28 Barb. 198; 4 Keyes, 268; 39 Barb. 336; 5 Bosw. 503; 4 Robt. 143, 146, 150; 51 N. Y. 228. Congreve v. Smith, 18 N. Y. 79 ; s. c, 5 Duer, 495. pp. 318, 344, 346, 901, 1235. c 1 Robt. 245 ; 6 Hun, 587 ; 26 How. Pr. 117 ; 2 Black, 427; 29 N. Y. 594, 595; 8 Bosw. 128; 37 N. Y. 572, 573; 16 Abb. Pr. 352; 21 Mich. 20; 5 Lans. 61; 9 Hun, 676; 53 Baib. 642; 4 Hun, 700; 54 Me. 47; 33 How. Pr. 35; 44 N. Y. 422; 56 Barb. 121; 4 Keyes, 268; 39 Barb. 336; 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & O.) 137; 4 Hun, 27; ,3 Hun, 512; 5 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 581; 4 Hobt. 143, 146, 564; 51 N. Y. 228; 4 Abb. N. C. 36; 40 Barb. 382. Conlin u. Charleston, 15 Rich. L. 201. pp. 902, 908. Conn i>. May, 36 Iowa, 241. p. 151. c 6 Cent. L. J. 312. Conner v. Paul, 12 Bush, 140. p. 1285. Connecticut, etc., Ins. Co. v. New York, etc., R. Co., 25 Conn. 265. pp. 1272, 1274. Connolly v. Boston, 117 Mass. 64. pp. 1093, 1094, 1203. c 120 Mass. 492. Connolly v. Davidson, 16 Minn. 519. p. 1049. Connolly v. Poillon, 41 Barb. 366 ; s. v., 41 N. Y. 619, note. pp. 973, 975, 982. c 8 Hun, 257 ; 70 N. Y. 93. Connor v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 59 Mo. 285; 0,. c, 2 Cent. L. J. 201. pp. 974, 1005, 1027, 1280. C 64 Mo. 126, 129, 136. Connors v. Adams, 13 Hun, 427. p. 821. Connors v. Hennessey, 112 Mass. 96. pp. 900, 910, 1042. cl22 Mass. 404; 6 Reporter? 752, 461; 6 Daly, 475. Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158. pp. 726, 733, 742, 753, 781. c36N. Y. 65; 37 Barb. 296; 14 Gray, 544; 49 Barb. 582; 1 Black, 53; 34 Conn. 14, 17, 27; 66 N. Y. 341; 37 N. Y. 572; 10 Bosw. 29; 21 Mich. 108, 121; 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 7, 505; 3 Hun, 612; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 581; 61 N. Y. 509; 51 N. Y. 513; 3 Daly, 67; 16 Abb. Pr. 345; 7 Lans. 43S; 36 Barb. 227; 91 U. S. 651 ; 40 N. Y. 447 ; 5 Lans. 22, 23, 51 ; 51 Barb- 411; 60 Barb. 384, 385; 41 How. Pr. 460, 451; 16 Wall. 574; 44 Barb. 393, 394; McCahon (Kan.), 133; 62 N. Y. 170; 32 N. Y. 600; 61 111. 161; 55 111. 351; 91 U. S. 652; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 540; 6] Barb. 595; 10 Hun, 479; 32 Barb. 637, 639; 45 N. Y. 131; 17 Minn. 313; 4 Keyes, 270 ; 39 Barb. 336, 337. d 122 Mass. 376 Conrad v. Pacific Ins. Co., 6 Pet. 262. p. 77. Conroy ■v. Gale, 47 N. Y. 665; s. c, 5 Lans. 844. pp. 821, 900. c 6 Lans. 263 ; 5 Lans. 295, 296 ; 57 N. Y. 500. Conroy v. Twenty-third Street R. Co., 52 How. Pr. 49. p. 360. Conroy v. Vulcan Iron -Works, 62 Mo. 35. pp. 973, 1009, 1011, 1014, 1239. c 66 Mo. 521 ; 5 Reporter, 178. Continental Improvement Co. v. Ives, 30 Mich. 448. p. 519. c 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 31; 31 Mich. 277. Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 Cr. S. 161 ; s. o., 10 Ch. Leg. N. 121. p. 428. c 87 111. 457. TABLE OF CASES. xliii Conway v. Belfast, etc., K. Co., I. R. 9 C. L. 498. pp. 969, 1028, 1032, 1038. Conway v. Jefferson, 46 N. H. 521. pp. 756, 759. c 67 N. H. 28, 29 ; 49 N. H. 393. Conwell V. Bmrie, 4 Ind. 209. p. 824. c 24 Iowa, 346. Cook V. Champlain Trans. Co., 1 Denio, 91. pp. 167, 489. c 8 Barb. 383 ; 7 Heisk. 465 ; 4 Neb. 276 ; 60 Mo. 234 ; 39 N. J. li. 312 ; 22 N. Y. 215 ; 1 Denio, 469 ; 91 U. S. 473; 23 Pa. St. 374; 30 Me. 179;1 E. D. Smith, 272; 17 Kan. 389; 26 Wis. 231; 3 Ohio St. 193; 46 Barb. 269; 30 Iowa, 83; 51 N. Y. 488; 8 Barb. 434; 5 Uenio, 266; 1 Deadj', 409; 2 Abb. 0. C. 207 ; 1 Sawyer; 435 ; 8 Pa. St. 375 ; 57 N. H. 137; 11 Kan. 56; 11 W. Va. 38; 2 Col. 160; 5 Hun, 502; 43 Barb. 409; 19 Abb. Pr. 65; 25 N. Y. 341, 344; 38 Ala. 87; 1 Duer, 583. Cook V. Charlostown, 13 Allen, 190, note; a. i>., 98 Mass. 80. p. 779. c 114 Mass. 509; 117 Mass. 210; 65 Me. 552, 554; 115 Mass. 572; 39 Conn. 445; 59 Ind. 86. ?52N. H. 413; 41 Vt. 442; 39 Conn. 379,380. d 48 N. H. 20. Cook D. New York Floating Dry-Dock Co., 1 Hilt. 436 ; s. c, 18 N. Y. 229. p. 237. c 1 Sweeny, 549. Cook ». Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 63 Mo. 397. pp. 1029, 1237. , c 63 Mo. 313. Cook V. Metropolitan E. Co., 98 Mass. 361. p. 399. Cook V. Milwaukee, 24 "Wis. 270; a. c, 27 Wis. 191. pp. 360, 729, 784, 785. c 78 111. 352; 32 Iowa, 328; 21 Mich. 122; 24 Wis. 550; 122 Mass. 379; 34 Wis. 442; 81 lU. 306 ; 91 U. S. 551. Cook V. Montague, 115 Mass. 571. p. 779. c 117 Mass. 210; 65 Me. 552. Cook V. Morea, 33 Ind. 497. pp. 196, 206. Cook V. New York, etc., E. Co., 5 Lans. a. c, 401; 3 Keyes, 476; 1 Abb. App. Dec. 432 ; 10 Hun, 426. p. 420. c 40 N. Y. 27, 31; 56 N. Y. 128; 55 Ind. 50; 58 N. Y. 462. Cook V. Parham, 24 Ala. 21. pp. 884, 996, 1174. c 46 Texas, 538 ; 42 Ala. 714, 721. Cooke V. Illinois, etc., E. Co., 30 Iowa, 202. pp. 496, 886. c 44 Iowa, 317. Cooke 1). Waring, 2 Hurl. & Colt. 332; s. c, 32 L. J. (Exch.) 262. pp. 5, 204, 206. c 14 Allen, 298. Cool t>. Crommet, 13 Me. 250. p. 212. Cooley ti. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 394. p. 534. Cooley V. Essex, 27 N. J. L. 415. p. 734. c 21 Mich. 116; 122 Mass. 352; 29 N. J. L. 246 ; 31 N. J. L. 508 ; 32 N. J. L. 397, 398. Cooley V. Freeholders of Essex, 27 N. J. L. 415. pp. 620, 705. Coolidge V. Brookline, 114 Mass. 592. p, 709. Coombs V. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572. pp. 971, 978, 980, 1015. c 117 Mass. 411 ; 110 Mass. 25, 259 ; 55 Ind. 48 ; 121 Mass. 256, 509; 119 Mass. 414; 62 Me. 467; 64 N. Y.12; 39 Iowa, 621; 10 Hun, 536; 46 Texas,. 538; 66 Me. 424, 426, 428, 429; 113 Mass. 398; 37 Mich. 212; 12 Hun, 292; 7 Eeporter, 61. Coombs o. Purrington, 42 Me. 832. pp, 1146, 1201. c 42 Ind. 343. Coombs V. Topsham, 38 Me. 204. pp. 899, 916. c 22 Wis. 679 ; 29 Wis. 303 ; 51 Me. 128. d 42: N. H. 214. Coon V. North Carolina E. Co., 65 N. C. 507. p. 574. Coon V. Syracuse, etc., E. Co., 5 N. Y. 492 ; s. c, 6 Barb. 231. pp. 971, 1034, 103-5, 1039. C29 Conn. 500; 53 Pa. St. 457; 43 Me. 270 ^ 3 Ohio St. 212,216; 31 Ind. 182; 8 Ohio St. 256; 30 Barb. 235 ; 24 N. Y. 220 ; 24 Ala. 36 ; 49 Barb. 326 ; 53 N. Y'. 552, 553 ; 14 Mimi. 363, 364 ; 22 Ala. 309,313; 5 Ind. 347; 3Bosw. 598; 9 Cush. 114,- 20 Ohio, 444, 447, 451; 6 Ind. 207; 25 N. Y. 564, 565; 51 Miss. 642; 49 Miss. 285, 2S6; 28Vt. 63> 20 Md. 221, 222; 46 Texas, 550; 28 Barb. 85; 43 Me. 270; 5 Hun, 495; 23 Pa. St. 386; 17 N. Y. 155,158; 6Duer,230; 11 Iowa, 427; 39N.Y.471. d 30 Barb. 235. Cooper V. Barber, 3 Taun. 99. p. 104. Cooper V. Iowa Central E. Co., 44 Iowa, 134. pp. 982, 988, 1029. Cooper V. Marshall, 1 Burr. 259. p. 202. Cooper V. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 23 Wis. 668. p. 971. c 37 Wis. 322. d49Cal. 130. Cooper 13. Mullins, 30 Ga. 146. pp. 1026, 1255, 12-59. c 59 Mo. 299; 9 Bush, 568; II Nev. 369. Cooper (J. Withara, 1 Sid. 375 ; s. c, 1 Lev. 247. pp. 1272, 1281. Coover v. Moore, 31 Mo. 574. p. 1285. xliv TABLE OF CASES. Copeland v. Marine Ins. Co., 2 Mete. 440. p. 928. Corbin u. American Mills, 27 Conn. 274. p. 913. c7 Cent. L. J. 49i ; 11 Bush, 480; 34 Conn. 481; 86 Pa. St. 159. Corby v. Hill, 4 C. B. (n. s.) 556 ; s. c, 4 Jur. (n. s.) 512; 27 L. J. (C. P.) 318. pp. 287, 289, 304, 307, 361, 412. c 68 N. Y. 292 ; 7 Hurl. & N. 743, 744 ; 8 Jur. (N. s.) 198; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 203, 204; 56 N. Y. 133; 41 Ind. 250; L. R. 2 C. P. 375; 36 L. J. (C. P.) 191; L. R. 3 C. P. 333; 7 C. B. (N. s.) 744; 6 Jur. (N.s.) 899; 29 L.J. (C.P.) 207; 21 Minn. 210 ; 66 3Sr. Y. 188 ; 46 Md. 223, 224 ; 41 N. Y. 537 ; 10 C. B. (N. s.) 479; 48 Vt. 130; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 3 ; 10 Allen, 374 ; 59 N. Y. 32 ; 3 App. Cas. 1206 ; 34 K. J. L. 472, 473 ; 2 C. P. Div. 310 ; 5 Cent. L. J. 281 ; 56 Me. 244, 506. Cordell v. New York, etc., R. Co., 70 N. Y. 119; 64 N. Y. .535; 6 Hlih, 461; 19 Alb. L. J. 134. pp. 417, 420, 421, 423, 426. Corey v. Bath, 35 N. H.- 530. pp. 756, 1096, 1250, 1253. c 57 N. H. 28 ; 52 N. H. 555, 558, 563 ; 29 Wis. 26. Cornelius v. Appleton, 22 Wis. 635. pp. 772, 774, 1207. c 61 Mo. 591. Corner v. Champneys (MS.), cited in 2 Marsh. (Eng. C. P.) 584. p. 221. Cornman v. Eastern, etc., E. Co., 4 Hurl. & N. 781 ; ^. c. , 29 L. J. (Exch. ) 94. pp. 314, 368, 1237. c 8 O. B. (N. s.) 572; 7 Jur. (N. s.) 169; 39 L,. J. (0. P.) 335; 6 Hurl. & N. 56D; 6 Gent. L. J. 427; 36 L. J. (C. P.) 23; 48 Me. 2.,J. Cornwall u. Sullivan R. R., 28 N. H. 161. pp. 213, 214, 517. c 55 N. H. 553; 16 Kan. 575; 37 N. H. 336; 35 N. H. 172. Cornwell v. Metropolitan Commissioners, 10 Exch. 771. p. 363. c 2 Best & S. 781; 31 L. J. (Q. B.) 218. Correll v. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 38 Iowa, 120. pp. 420, 506, 558. c 22 Minn. 406 ; 42 Iowa, 446. Corwin v. New York, etc., R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42. pp. 498, 517, 526, 527, 530. c 20 Iowa, 193; 37 Barb. 518, 519; 27 N. Y. ^73,275; 25 Iowa, 142; 32 Iowa,5j2; 16 Ind. 104; 12 Gray, 59; 1 Hun, 380; 3 N. Y. S. O. (T. & C.) 539; 34 N. Y. 432; 67 N. Y. 157; 4 Hun, 764; 42 Mo. 197; 20 Wis. 2.57; 43 Wis. 681, 683; 27 Barb. 228, 229; 2 Hilt. 498; 98 Mass. oBl; 3 Keyes, 201; 55 Barb. 533; 12 Ind. 5, 7; 43 N. T. 507; 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 586; 28 Mich. 515; 26 N. Y. 432; 35 N. Y. 643, 645; 4 Keyes, 131, lU; 4 Abb. App. Dec. 292, 352, 355; 13 Hun, 669; 10 Ind. 39; 16 Kan. 576; 13 Wis. 639; 37 Barb. 198; 32 Barb. 575; 20 Wis. 257; 29 Barb. 649; 21 Ohio St. 594; 18 Cal. 355; 2 N. Y. S. O. (T. & C.) 389. Cory V. Little, 6 N. H. 213. p. 217. Cosgrove v. New York, etc., R. Co., 13 Hun, 329. pp. 416, 420, 421. Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 N Y. 255. pp. 884, 1182, 1185, 1188, 1195. c2 Hun, 268; 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 329; 12 Hun, 468; 70 N. Y. 591; 13 Hun, 74. Costello V. Landwehr, 28 Wis. 522. pp. 1236, 1290, 1291. Costello V. Syracuse, etc., R. Co., 66 Barb. 92. pp. 418, 430, 1181. c 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 256 ; 5 Hun, 481 ; 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 646 ; 56 Ind. 520 ; 7 Hun, 554. Cotes o. Davenport, 9 Iowa, 227. pp. 738, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 889, 12.55. C48 Iowa, 610, 659; 24 Iowa, 346, 612, 614; 30 Iowa, 267; 14 Iowa, 60; 34 Mich. 128; 9 Iowa, 465; 34 Iowa, 271. Cotterill v. Starkey, 8 Car. & P. 691. pp. 381, 387, 1136. c 8 Barb. 381; 6 Cush. 630; 22 Vt. 222. Cotton V. Brown, 3 Ad. & E. 312. p. 552. Cotton V. Pooasset Co., 13 Mete. 429. p. 742. Ooiton V. Wood, 8 C. B. (n. s.) 568 ; s. c, 7 Jur. (n. s.) 168; 29 L. J. (C. P.) 333. pp. 381, 382, 10.33, 1222, 1230, 1237. (In full, p. 364.) c 1 Exch. Div. 255; 57 Pa. St. 379; 45 N. Y. 196; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 406,408; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 165; 17 Mich. 118, 120; 16 C. B. (N. s.) 692; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 335; 11 C. B (N. S.) 594, 596; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 797; 31 L. J. (C. P.) 130; 6 Cent. L. J. 427; 36 L. J. (0. P.) 24; L. E. 2 C. P. 10; 6 Daly, 214, 215; 34 N. Y. 14; 3 Allen, 22. Couch V. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402; s. c, 23 L. J. (Q. B.) 121. pp. 557, 957, 964, 1082. c 40 Md. 327, 330; 38 Pa. St. 110; 3 Sawyer, 564; 51 Miss. 642; 109 Mass. 282; 28 Vt. 62, 63; L. R. 6 Exch. 407, 409; 42 Ala. 717; L. E. 1 So. App. 340. ? 2 Exch. Div. 447, 448, 449. Couch V. The Watson Coal Co., 46 Iowa, 17 ; d. c, 5 Cent. L. J. 108. p. 974. Coughtry v. Globe Woollen Co., 56 N. Y. 124; s. c, 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 452. pp. 311, 907. c 4 Hun, 163, 771,774; 66 N. Y. 187; 56 N. Y. 400; 6 Reporter, 752. TABLE OF CASES. xlv Coulter V. American Merchants' Union Express Co., 56 N. Y. 585 ; s. c, 5 Lans. 67. p. 1092. Counter v. Couch, 8 Allen, 436. pp. 242, 383, 1093, 1202. Coupla.nd v. Hardinghani, 3 Camp. 398. pp. 317, 344, 363. (In full, p. 327.) c 9 0. B. il7; 9 Pa. St. 194; 14 Jur. 335; 19 L. J. (C. P.) 199; 2 Black, 424; 10 Exch. 775; 29 N. Y. 595; ,30 Ala. 327, 328; 47 Ind. 397; 114 • Mass. 153; 1 Head, 618; 2 Best &S. 781; 31 L. J. (Q. B.) 218; 4 Rich. L. 233; 6 GiD, 206, 297 ; 30 Conn. 550. Coursen v. Ely, 37 111. 338. pp. 382, 1170. c 46 111. 83; 25 Mich. 278. Courtney v. Baker, 60 N. T. 1 ; s. c, 5 Jones & Sp. 249. p. 884. c 18 Alb. L. J. 91 ; 6 Reporter, 404. Cousins V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 66 Mo. 572; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 294. pp. 496, 520, 885. Covington v. Bryant, 7 Bush, 248. p. 766. Covington County u. Kinney, 45 Ala. 176. p. 617. c 49 Ala. 114, 115 ; 48 Ala. 575. Covington Street R. Co. v. Packer, 9 Bush, 455. pp. 400, 1290, 1294. Cowden v. Wright, 24 Wend. 429. p. 1242. Cowles V. Balzer, 47 Barb. 462. p. 209. Cowley V. Sunderland, 6 Hurl. & N. 565; s. c, 30 L. J. (Exch.) 127. pp. 592, 593, 717, 962. c 122 Mass. 366. Cox V. Burbridge, 13 C. B. (n. s.)430; s. c, 9 Jur. (n. s.) 970; 32 L. J. (C. P.) 89; 11 Week. Rep. 435. pp. 27, 28, 209, 1234. c6 Reporter, 460; 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 363; L. R 9 Exch. 179; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 268, 273, 274, 275; L. R. 1 Exch. 281,282; 12 Jur. (N. 8.) 605; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 157; 34 L. J. (C. P.) 215; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 528; 14 Allen, 298; 6 Daly, 215. Cox V. Westchester Turnpike Road, 33 Barb. 414. pp. 559, 1149, 1198. c 13 Hun, 88. Coxe V. Robbins, 9 N. J. L. 384. p. 214. c22 N. J. L. 188; IS N. J. L. 368; 4 Mete. 593. Coy V. Utiea, etc., E. Co., 23 Barb. 643. pp. 351,352. c 44 Mo. 294; 46 Ala. 441. Coyle V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 11 W. Va. 94. p. 495. Grafter v. Metropolitan R. Co., 1 Harr. & R. 164; L. E. 1 C. P. 300; 12 Jur. (n. s.) 272; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 132; 14 Week. Rep. 344. p. 314. c 52 N. H. 415. Crafton u. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 55 Mo. 580. p. 509. Craig V. New York, etc., R. Co., 118 Mass. 431. pp. 407, 420, 423, 429. c 39 N. J. L. 193 ; 120 Mass. 263, 265. Craig V. Sedalia, 63 Mo. 417. pp. 761, 1205. Grain v. Petrie, 6 Hill, 522. p. 207. c 35 N. J. L. 30, 32; 35 N. Y. 211. Craker v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 36 Wis. 657. p. 887. Cramer v. Burlington, 39 Iowa, 512 ; «. c, 42 Iowa, 315 ; 45 Iowa, 627. pp. 764^ 1054, 1175, 1203. Crane v. Northfield, 33 Vt. 124. p. 799. Cranston v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 1 Handy, 193. pp. 214, 502, 503. c 43 Miss. 281. Cratty v. Bangor, 57 Me. 423. p. 1093. Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459. p. 744. c 12 Ohio St. 378. Crawford v. Maxwell, 3 Humph. 476. p. 215. c 20 Iowa, 224. Crawfordsville R. Co. ». Wright, 5 Ind. 252. p. 888. Creal v. Keokuk, 4 G. Greene, 47. pp. 745, 747. c 24 Iowa, 346; 30 Iowa, 267; 4 G. Greene, 375 ; 9 Iowa, 465 ; 34 Iowa, 271. Creed v. Hartmann, 29 N. Y. 591 ; s. <;., 8 Bosw. 123. pp. 318, 344, 391, 901, 1235. c 3 Daly, 385; 6 Hun, 587; 6 Jones & Sp. 200; 11 Hun, 556; 53 Barb. 642; 10 Hun, 536; 2 Jones & Sp. 486; 43 How. Pr. 411; 4 Hun, 700 ; 44 N. Y. 432 ; 56 Barb. 121 ; 4 Robt. 143, 146 ; 4 Abb. N. C. 36 ; 23 "Wis. 290. Cremer v. Portland, 36 Wis. 92. pp. 1149, 1193, 1238, 1248. c39 Wis. 136,677; 43 Wis. 523; 6 Cent. L. J. 428. Crisn-ian v. Masters, 23 Ind. 319. p. 210. c 33 Ind. 498. Crissey v. Hestonville, etc., R. Co., 75 Pa. St. 83. p. 407. xlvi TABLE OF CASES. Crist V. Erie R. Co., 1 N. T. S. C. (T. & C.) 435. pp. 154, 1239. Crittenden v. Wilson, 5 Cow. 165. pp. 105, 568. c 27 Barb. 522. Crocker i>. New London, etc., R. Co., 24 Conn. 249. p. 888. Crocker v. Springfield, 110 Mass. 135. p. 765. ♦ Crockett v. Calvert, 8 Ind. 127. pp. 893, 899. c 53 Ind. 555. Crockett v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 52 Mo. 457. pp. 1285, 1288. Croft V. Alison, 4 Barn. & Aid. 590. pp. 887, 888. c 12 Iowa, 349 ; 18 Mo. 368 ; 1 Ired. L. 243 ; 29 Me. 311; 6 Eeporter, 404; 18 Alb. L. J. 91; 2 N. H. 550; 19 Wend. 345; 43 N. Y. 570; 12 AUen, 55; 5 Barn. & Cress 573, 575; 1 Hurl. & Colt. 535, 538; 30 L. J. (Exch.) 328; 7 Hurl. AN. 358; 3 Cliff. 423. Crommelin v. Coxe, 30 Ala. 318. pp. 318, 1149. Cropper v. Matthews, 2 Sid. 127. p. 117. Crosby i;. Boston, 118 Mass. 71. pp. 762, 763, 764, 765, 782. Crosby v. Long, 12 East, 409. p. 1281. Crosman u. Lynn, 121 Mass. 301. p. 1094. Cross V. Guthery, 2 Root, 90. pp. 1272, 1273. Crouch I/. London, etc., R. Co., 14 C. B. 291. p. 44. c 31 Cal. 53,55, 61; 24 111. 337. Crowell V. Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 313. p. 618. c 5 Neb. 497; 45 Cal. 38. Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board, 4 Exch. Div. 5 ; s. c, 27 Week. Rep. 95 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 465; 18 Alb. L. J. 514. pp. 83, 299. Crowley v. Panama R. Co., 30 Barb. 99. p. 1272, 1282. Crumpton v. Solon, 11 Me. 335. p. 1205. Crutchfield v. Richmond, etc., R Co., 76 N. C. 320 ; s. c, 78 N. C. 300. pp. 981, 989, 1008, 1009, 1010, 1014, 1017. Crutchfield v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 64 Mo. 255. pp. 514. 5.34. c 66 Mo. 569; 6 Cent. L. J. 277. Cruty V. Erie R. Co., 3 N. T. S. C. (T. & C.) 244. pp. 971, 1044. Cufl" V. Newark, etc., R. Co., 35 N. J. L. 17, 574. pp. 899, 900, 902, 909. c7Cent.L. J. 494; 39 N.J. L. 308; 11 Bush, 472,480; 59 Me. 528,533. Culhane v. New York, etc., R. Co., 60 N. Y. 133 ; s. c, 67 Barb. 562. pp. 431, 432. c 71 N. Y. 237. Culp 1;. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 17 Kan. 475. p. 351. Cumberland Coal and Iron Co. v. Scaliy, 27 Md. 589. pp. 970, 1028, 1038, 1237. c 46 Md. 287; 5 Eeporter, 698. Cumberland, etc., R. Co. ». Hughes, 1 Pa. St. 141. p. 556. Cumberland, etc., R. Co. v. The State, use of Hogan, 45 Md. 229. pp. 973, 991, 1031, 1032, 1239. Cumberland, etc., R. Co. u. The State, use of Pazenbaker, 37 Md. lo6. pp. 1239, 1279. Cumberland, etc., R. Co. v. The State, use of Moran, 44 Md. 283. pp. 973, 974, 991, 1031, 1032. c 46 Md. 287; 45 Md. 239; 5 Eeporter, 698. Cummins v. Presley, 4 Harr. (Del.) 315. pp. 1151, 1152, 1157, 1214. Cummings v. Center Harbor, 57 N. H. 17. p. 1238. Cummings v. Collins, 61 Mo. 520. pp. 971, 976, 1052. c 63 Mo. 459. Cummings v. Riley, 52 N. H. 368. p. 197. Cunningham v. Bucklin, 8 Cow. 178. p. 817. Cunningham v. Lyness, 22 Wis. 245. pp. 1097, 1179. c 39 Wis. 136. Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen, 112. p. 1148. c 49 Barb. 327. Curran v. Warren Chemical Man. Co., 36 N. Y. 153. pp. 1177, 1179, 1211, 1279. C 42 N. Y. 361. Currier v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 34 N. H. 508. p. 799. Currier v. Lowell, 16 Pick. 170. pp. 773, 774, 787, 871. c 3 Gray, 352; 117 Mass. B90; 11 Gray, 156; 3 Cush. 120; 40 Me. 100; 112 Mass. 48; 49 Me. 124; 7 Gray, 423; 22 Vt. 464; 35 N. H. 313; 46 N. H. 26. Curry v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 43 Wis. TABLE OF CASES. xlvii 665; s. c, 6 Keporter, 736. pp. 501, 531. c 20 Kan. 365. Curtis V. Mills, 5 Car. & P. 489. pp. 176, 180, 203, 220, 222. c 27 Pa. St. 333 ; 2 Abb. C. C. 225 ; 1 Sawyer, 451. Curtis V. Noonan, 10 Alleu, 406. p. 750. Curtis V. K(_>chester, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534. p. 113. Gushing u. Bedford (Sup. Qt. Mass.), 6 Reporter, 718. p. 776. Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247. p. T<14. Cusick V. Norwich, 40 Conn. 376. p. 763. Cutiinger v. The Commonwealth, 7 Cush. 392. p. 242. Cutter V. Cambridge, 6 Allen, 20. p. 212. Cutting V. Seabury, 1 Sprague, 522. pp. 1272, 1273. D. Daegling v. Gilmore, 49 111. 248. p. 900. Dafer v. Cully, 3 Or. 377. p. 209. Dale V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 63 Mo. 455. pp. 973, 1008, 1009, 1012. c 7 Cent. L. J. 306. Daley v. Norwich, etc., R. Co., 26 Conn. 591. pp. 453, 1149, 1184, 1191, 1196. cl7 Wall. 660; 60 N. Y. 336; 18 Ohio St. 413; 29 Conn. 209; 30 Conn. 314; 27 Conn. 409; 9 Bush, 531; 38 N. Y. 457, 488; 48 Pa. St. 221; 52 N. H. 556 ; 34 N. Y. 14. d 4 Allen, 287. Dalton V. Bachelor, 1 Post. & Fin. 15. p. 896. Dalton V. Beers, 38 Conn. 529. p. 1266. c 11 Nev. 364. Dalton V. Favour, 8 N. H. 465. pp. 246, 1251. c 50 N. H. 428. Dalton V. S(^th-Easterii R. Co., 4 Jur. (N. s.) 711; 27 L. J. (C. P.) 227; 4 C. B. (n. s.) 296. p. 1293. c 37 Mich. 215 ; 16 Ir. O. L. (N. S.) 420 ; 38 Wis. €24; 34 N. J. L. 157; 21 Wis. 375; 4 Best & S. 406; 10 Jur. (N.S.) 200; 32 L. J. (Q.B.)379; 24 Md. 281. Dalyell v. Tyrer, El. Bl. & El. 906. pp. 893, 894. Damon v. Scituate, 119 Mass. 66. pp. 1093, 1202. c 119 Mass. 137; 121 Mass. 219. Damont v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 9 La. An. 441. p. 1238. Damour v. Lyons, 44 Iowa, 276. pp. 733, 741, 748, 751, 776, 1173. Danforth v. Durell, 8 Allen, 242. p. 380. Daniel v. Metropolitan R. Co., L. R. 5 H. L. 4'.; s. c, 20 Week, Rep. 87; 40 L. J. (C. P.) 121 ; 24 L. T. (n. s.) 815. pp. 900, 901. c8 Hun, 602; L. E. 9 Exoh. 161; 43 L. J. (Exch.) 107. ♦ Daniels v. Athens, 55 Ga. 609 ; 54 Ga. 79. pp. 563, 759, 760, 792, 793. Daniels a. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32. pp. 383, 386, 1149. c 37 Mich. 363; 6 Reporter, 175. Daniels v. Hilgard, 77 111. 640. p. 998. Daniels v. Potter, 4 Car. & P. 262. pp. 346, 1141, 1142. c 18 Ohio St. 411; 3 Q. B. Div. 332; 7 Cent. L. J. 12; 17 Alb. L. J. 506; 35 N. J. L. 32; 18 N. Y. 86. Danner v. South Carolina R. Co., 4 Rich. L. 329. pp. 215, 512. c 3 Stew. 605; 19 Wis. 609; 26 Mo. 449; 53 Ala. 597; 10 Rich. L. 53, 54, 231; 4 So. Car. 61, 62,63,64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72; 35 N. H. 363; 9 Wis. 220; 5 So. Car. 223; 9 Rich. L. 93. Danville, etc., R. Co. v. Collins, 2 Duv. 114. p. 1024. Danville, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Stewart, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 122. pp. 562, 1266. c 9 Bush, 735. d 46 Pa. St. 162; 4 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 20. D' Arey v. Miller, 86 HI. 102. pp. 209, 210. Dargan v. Mobile, 31 Ala. 469. pp. 734, 753. c 33 Ala. 130; 45 Ala. 184; 13 Bush, 229; 36 Ala. 367; 53 Ala. 531; 17 Gratt. 382. Darling v. Bangor, 68 Me. 108 ; s. u., 18 Alb. L. J. 295. pp. 735, 736, 750, 752, 1093. Darling v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 121 Mass. 118. pp. 500, 506. c 124 Mass. 104. Darling v. Rogers, 7 Kan. 592. p. 211. Darmay v. Borradaile, 5 C. B. 380. p. 72. Darmstaetter v. Moynahan, 27 Mich. 188. pp. 900, 913. c 7 Cent. L. J. 495 ; 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 31. Dartmouth College u. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 668. p. 657. Dascomb v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 27 Barb. 221. pp. 427, 1236. c34 N. Y. 629; 33 Ind. 359, 367; 32 Barb. xlviii TABLE OF CASES. 168; 19 How. Pr. 203; 49 Cal. 258; 21 Ohio St. 593; 36 Vt. 359; 7 Robt. 617; 25 Ind. 197; 14 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 77; 40 Bai-b. 208; 39 N. Y. 364. Daubert v. Piokel, 4 Mo. App. 590. pp. 971, 982, 1028. Davenport v. Euckman, 37 N. Y. 568 ; s. c, 10 Bosw. 20; 16 Abb. Pr. 341. pp. 319, 344, 346, 726, 753, 781, 1203, 1235. c 1 Robt. 245; 26 How. Pr. 117; '21 Mich. 110; 3 X. Y. S. C. (T. & O.) 420, 606; 5 N. V. S. C. (T. & C.) 581; 3 Hun, 512, 711; 21 Mich. 20; 5 Lans. 51; 6 N. Y. S. O. (T. & C.) 95, 137; 12 Heisk. 686 ; 58 Ind. 232 ; 50 N. Y. 238 ; 16 Kan. 382; 38 N. Y. 449; 10 Hun, 480, 536; 4 Hun, 27; 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 133, 135 ; 13 Hun, 85 ; 42 Ind. 343; 45 N. Y. 131; 4 Robt. 564; 33 How. Pr. 35 ; 91 U. S. 551 ; 4 Robt. 143, 145, 150 ; 51 N. Y. 230. d 122 aiass. 376. Davey u. Chamberlain, 4 Esp. 229. p. 390". c 2 Speers, 499 ; 5 Wis. 59. David V. South- Western E. Co., 41 Ga. 223. pp. 19.S6, 1290. Davidson v. Nichols, 11 Allen, 514. pp. 236, 1089. c 14 Allen, 296; 104 Mass. 68. Davies v. Mann, 10 Mee. & W. 546; 6 Jur. 954 ; 12 L. J. (Exch.) 10. pp. 279, 383, 490, 1109, 1111, 1112, 1114, 1115, 1119, 1120, 1134, 1137, 1152, 1155, 1156, 1157, 1165, 1166, 1179, 1186, 1201, 1240. (In full, p. 1103.) c 6 Gray, 72; 6 Ohio St. 109; 2 0. B. (N. s.) 756; 4 Ind. 98; 2 Sawyer, 29; 6 Cent. L. J. 46; 45 Md. 491; 16 Pa. St. 466; 22 Vt. 223; L. R. 4 C. P. 621; 19 Conn. 576; 18 N. Y. 258; 7 La. An. 324; 17 Barb. 97; 6 Iowa, 452; 38 Ala. 85, 86; 10 Ch. Leg. N. 121; 1 Handy, 202; 20 111. 494; L. R. 9 Exch. 74; 52 N". H. 553, 554; 5 El. & Bl. 202 ; 43 L. J. (Exch. ) 75 ; L. R. 10 Exch. 107; 44 L. J. (Exch.) 78, 93; 1 App. Cas. 759; 9 Wis. 218; 31 Miss. 193; 15 Q. B. 283; 27 Conn. 406; 5 Duer, 27; 5 Hun, 480; 3 Ohio St. 194; 44 Md. 127 ; 24 Vt. 495 ; 6 Ind. 145 ; 13 Ga. 88 ; 24 N. J, L. 270, 283 ; 45 Iowa, 32 ; 37 Cal. 423 ; 22 N. J. L. 189; 12 C. B. (N. s.) 9; 10 C. B. (N. s.) 575; 29 Md. 436; 15 Ind. 489; 95 0. S. 442; 8 Rich. L. 126; 62 Mo. 439; 2 Col. 159; 37 Mo. 550. Davis V. Allamakee, 40 Iowa, 217. pp. 617, 793. c 40 Iowa, 397. Davis V. Bangor, 42 Me. 522. pp. 757, 776, 779, 805. c 48 N. H. 19; 65 Me. 653; 46 N. H. 60, 61; 64 Me. 61 ; 7 Reporter, 63. Davis V. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 26 Iowa, 549. pp. 520, 522, 523, 524. c30 Iowa, 109, 475; 32 Iowa, .378, 379; 28 Mich. 614; 38 Iowa, 251; 26 Iowa, 559; 6 Cent. L.J. 315; 34 Iowa, 508. Davis V. Central R., etc., Co., 17 Ga. 323. p. 533. Davis V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 40 Iowa, 292. pp. 516, 540. Davis V. Curling, 8 Q. B. 286 ; 4-. c, 10 Jur. 69; 15 L. .J. (Q. B.) 56. pp. 622, 799. c 6 El. & Bl. 123 ; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 850; 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 339; L. R. 3 Exch. 120. Davis V. Detroit, etc., E. Co., 20 Mich. 105. pp. 994, 996, 1008, 1016, 1017, 1053, 1237. c 3 Dill. 325; 33 Mich. 135; 57 Miss. 642; 35 Mich. 513, 514; 46 Texas, 539; 2 Col. 488. Davis V. Dudley, 4 Allen, 557. pp. 780, 1086, 1207. c 101 Mass. 98; 106 Mass. 280; 98 Mass. 581; 81 Pa. St. 51; 29 Wis. 306; 105 Mass. 344; 97 Mass. 265. «1 25 Iowa, 111, 112, 113, 114. Davis V. Fish, 1 G. Greene, 406. p. 1159. Davis V. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716. p. lOBl. Davis V. Hill, 41 N. H. 329. p. 1255. c 38 Md. 585 ; 43 Ind. 597 : 29 Iowa, 88 ; 52 N. H. 223; 30 Wis. 404; 49 N. H. 392; 37 Conn. 313. Davis V. Lamoille County Plank-road Co., 27 Vt. 602. p. 556. c 56 Pa. St. 452. Davis V. Leominster, 1 Allen, 182. pp_ 560, 788, 789, 794. c 8 Allen, 563 ; 116 Mass. 423 ; 109 Mass. 626, 527 ; 97 Mass. 431 ; 104 Mass. 87. Davis V. London, etc., E. Co., 2 Scott N. E. 74 ; s. c, 1 Man. & G. 799 ; 2 Eng. Eail. Cas. 308 ; 1 Drink. 1. p. 276. Davis V. Missouri, etc., E. Co., 65 Mo. 441. p. 535. Davis V. Montgomery, 51 Ala. 139. p. 732. c 53 Ala. 631. Davis v. New York, etc., E. Co., 47 N. Y. 400. p. 428. c 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 417, 419; 59 N. Y. 471; 32 Wis. 275; 54 N. Y. 471; 10 Jones & Sp. 231; 64 N. Y. 529; 62 N. Y.656; 2 Hun, 638; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 124; 7 Hun, 561, 562; 58 N. Y. 25, 456, 457. Davis V. Providence, etc., E. Co., 121 Mass. 134. p. 171. Davis V. Saunders, 2 Chit. 639. p. 72. Davis V. "Western Union Tel. Co., 1 Cin. Superior Ct. 100. pp. 838, 851. TABLE OF CASES. xlix Dawkes v. Coveneigh, Style, 346. p. 1281. Dawson v. Midland R. Co., L. R. 8 Exeh. 8 ; s. c, 42 L. J. (Exch.) 49. p. 516. Dawtry v. Huggins, Clayt. 33. p. 197. Day u. Brooklyn City R. Co., 12 Hun, 435. p. 884. Day V. Crossman, 1 Hun, 570 ; s. c, 4 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 122. pp. 758, 820, 821, 1151, 1209. Day V. Edwards, 5 Term Rep. 648. pp. 222, 390, 868, 1252. c 18 Vt. 611; 1 East, 110; 2 Hen. & M. Ul, 443 ; 1 N. J. L. 340 ; 10 Bing. 116 ; 3 East, 599. Day V. Milford, 5 Allen, 98. pp. 346, 764, 777. ell Allen, 320; 45 Ind.432,434; 9Han,684; 104 Mass. 76, 77; 41 Vt. 441; 105 Mass. 35; 110 Mass. 51S ; 121 Mass. 445. ? 52 N. H. 413. Dayton u. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80. pp. 786, 740, 745. c 32 Iowa, 328; 30 Ohio St. 48; 21 Iowa, 414; 26 Iowa, 268; 2 Disney, 540; 25 Ind. 515. Dean v. Branthwaite, 5 Esp. 35. p. 894. c 5 Barn. & Cress. 557, 565, 573, 577. Dean v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 43 Wis. 805; «. G., 5 Reporter, 608. p. 539. Dean v. Gridley, 10 Wend. 254. p. 898. Dean v. Hogg, 10 Bing. 345. p. 894. Dean v. Keate, 8 Camp. 4. p. 1091. Dean v. McCarty, 2 Upper Canada Q. B. 448. p. 149. (In full, p. 116.) c 62 Me. 291. Dean o. New Milford, 5 Watts & S. 545. pp. 622, 727, 758. c 22 Pa. St. 388; 77 Pa. St. 112; 7 Cent. L. J. 129 ; 79 Pa. St. 417 ; 68 Pa. St. 407. 1 4 Mich. 561,662; 122 Mass. 376. Dean v. Sullivan R. R., 22 N. H. 816. pp. 218, 518. c 39 N. H. 57 ; 28 N. H. 164, 168 ; 16 Kan. 575, 579; 37 N. H. 335; 35 N. H. 172. Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taun. 489; s. c, 1 J. B. Moo. 208 ; 2 Marsh. 577. pp. 193, 194, 195, 217, 300, 488, 114-5. c 13 m. 589; 68 N. Y. 290; 19 Conn. 575; 17 Am. L. Eeg. (N. s.) 511; 1 Handy, 197,204; 26 Conn. 601 ; 30 Barb. 154, 155; 72 N. T. 57; 59 Pa. St. 141; 15 Pa. St. 193; 27 Conn. 409, 412; 25 Vt. 160; 6 Reporter, 55; 47 Ind. 48; 3 Ohio St. 192; 17 Wend. 498, 499, 500; 31 Miss. 193; 4 Per. & DaT. 677; 1 Q. B. 37; 5 Jar. 798; 46 Md. 213; 4 Bing. 642, 643, 645; 14 Conn. 1] ; 8 Mee. & W. 788. Dearborn u. Boston, etc., R. Co., 24 N. H. 179. p. 569. Dearth v. Baker, 22 Wis. 78. p. 218. c 28 Wis. 432. De Benedetti v. Mauchin, 1 Hilt. 218. p. 1177. c 43 Vt. 206. De Camp v. Mississippi, etc., R. Co., 12 Iowa, 848. pp. 496, 886. c 44 Iowa, 317. Decatur v. Fisher, 58 111. 407. p. 1269. c 69 111. 477; 35 Iowa, 440, 441. Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 822. p. 209. c 105 Mass. 77. Deford v. The State, use of Keyser, 80 Md. 179. pp. 349, 900, 910, 1288. c 11 Bush, 477. De Forrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368. pp. 882, 896. c 9 Mich. 191; 3 Gray, 365; 2 Daly, 277; 8 Gray, 149; 23 Ind. 557; 52 N. H. 125. De France v. Spencer, 2 G. Greene, 462. pp. 150, 151. c 1 Iowa, 110; 4 Iowa, 506, 507; 3 Iowa, 82, S3; 6 Cent. L. J. 312; 36 Iowa, 242. Degg V. Midland R. Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 773; s. c, 8 Jur. (n. s.) 395; 26 L. J. (Exch.) 171. pp. 969, 1045. c 10 Mich. 199 ; 68 Me. 51 ; 5 Hurl. & N. 150 ; 4 Jur. (^f. s.) 773; 6 Jur. (N. 8.) 54; 18 Iowa, 287; 14 Minn. 363; 21 111. 26; 4 Eobt. 209, 210, 214; 10 Mich. 199; 6 Eeporter, 111; 1 Best & S. 806, 807; 8 Jur. (N. s.) 260; 31 L. J. (Q. B.) 32; 3 Hurl. & N. 313, 318; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 359, 361; 17 N. Y. 156; 3 Exch. Div. 351; 18 0. B. 805; 1 Q. B. Div. 254, 256, 257 ; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 773. De Graff v. New York, etc., R. Co., 19 Alb. L. J. 134 ; s. c, 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. &C.)2.55. pp. 971, 1003. De La Grange v. South- Western Tel. Co., 25 La. An. 283. pp. 889, 848, 844, ' 846, 848. Delaney v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 38 Wis. 67. p. 417. c 41 Wis. 50, 653. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co. v. The Com- monwealth, 60 Pa. St. 367. p. 556. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co. v. Lee, 22 N. J. L. 243. pp. 568, 569, 570. c 39 N. J. L. 312. Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Salmon, 38 N. J. L. 5 ; s. v., 39 N. J. L. 299. pp. 162, 168, 166, 170, 171, 1262. c 17 Kan. 389; 11 W. Va. 27. Delaware, etc., R. Co. i;. Toffey, 38 N. J. L. 526. pp. 422, 429. TABLE OF CASES. Delmonico v. New York, 1 Sandf. S. C. 222. pp. 733, 738, 740, 889, 908. c 33 Ala. 130; 21 Mich. 110; 36 N. H. 295; 55 N. H. 136 ; 3 Duer, 418, 414 ; 9 Md. 178 ; 31 Ala. 476. Delogny v. Rentoul, 2 Mart. (La.) 175. p. 102. Delzell V. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 32 Ind. 45. pp. 340, 356, 505, 556, 574, 788. Den Blaker's Executrix u. New Jersey, etc., R. Co., 7 Reporter, 626. p. 426. Denny v. Correll, 9 Ind. 72. p. 198. Denny v. Manhattan County, 2 Denio, 118. p. 1059. Dent V. Smith, L. R. 4 Q. B. 414. p. 1066. Deppe V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa, 592 ; s. c, 36 Iowa, 52. pp. 1000, 1001, 1268. c44 Iowa, 291; 36 Iowa, 376; 43 Iowa, 409; 17 Am.L. Reg. (N. s.) 126; 6 Cent. L.J. 50; 41 Iowa, 347; 47 Iowa, 384. Dermont v. Detroit, 4 Mich. 435. p. 752. c 21 Mioh. 106, 108; 34 Mich. 129. De Rutte v. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 30 How. Pr. 413. pp. 835, 836, 839, 841, 843, 848, 851. c 1 Lans. 130, 132; 62 Me. 222; 13 Allen, 238; 6 Daly, 203 ; 60 Me. 27, 31. Detroit v. Beckman, 34 Mich. 125 ; o. c, 3 Cent. L. J. 462. pp. 731, 735, 736, 767. c 37 Mich. 153, 154. Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84. pp. 710, 735, 787, 738, 753. c45 Ind. 431; 122 Mass. 357; 16 Kan. 382; 5 Neb. 452; 46 Texas, 533, 535; 7 Reporter, 479; 51 Ala. 148; 55 111.351. d 91 U. S. 551. Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165. pp. 733, . 736, 740, 751, 753, 766, 767, 899, 912. c 32 Iowa, 328; 7 Cent. L. J. 495; 21 Mich. 106, 107; 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 31; 31 Mich. 277; 27 Mich. 189; 104 JIass. 16; 37 Mich. 153. Detroit, etc., E. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99. pp. 429, 1236, 1237. c 67 Me. 107, 109 ; 14 Kan. 54 ; 26 Wis. 257 ; 25 Mich. *2, 295, 296; 66 Me. 381; 17WaU. 665. Devany «. Vulcan Iron-Works, 4 Mo. App. 236. p. 1030. Deville v. Southern, etc., R. Co., 50 Cal. 383. p. 453. Devitt V. Pacific R. R., 50 Mo. 302. pp. 973, 983, 987, 1008, 1009, 1013. c 59 Mo. 301, 302, 309 ; 62 Mo. 37 ; 63 Mo. 459 ; 7 Cent. L.J. 306; 49 Texas, 539; 52 Mo. 259. Devlin u.Grallagher, 6 Daly, 494. p. 115. Dewey v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 31 Iowa, 373. p. 1213. c 37 Iowa, 322; 32 Iowa, 149; 40 Iowa, 295. Dewey v. Detroit, 15 Mich. 307. pp. 731, 732, 753, 761, 781. c 32 Iowa, 328; 21 Mich. 106; 33 Iowa, 399; 40 Ind. 65; 19 Minn. 249; 26 Iowa, 268; IWils. (Indianapolis) 138. Dewey v. Leonard, 14 Minn. 153. pp. 148, 149. De Witt V. Barley, 17 N. Y. 340. p. 799. Doyo V. Stewart, 4 Denio, 101. p. 214. c 37 N. H. 335 ; 13 Barb. 497. Deyoe a. Saratoga Springs, 1 Hun, 341 ; s. c, 3 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 504. pp. 738, 766, 889. c 12 Hun, 304. Diana (The), 1 W. Rob. 131. p. 895. Dibble v. New York, etc., R. Co., 25 Barb. 18.3. p. 1286. Diblin ■;. Murphy, 3 Sandf. S. C. 19. p. 1271. c 47 Barb. 201. Dicas V. Brougham, 6 Car. & P. 249. p. 817. Dickens u. New York, etc., R. Co., 23 N. Y. 158. pp. 1277, 129L Dickenson v. Watson, Sir T. Jones, 205. p. 867. Dickey v. Maine Tel. Co., 46 Me. 483. pp. 349, 769, 1176, 1209. c 62 Me. 471; 51 Me. 334; 68 Me. 154, 366. Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225. p. 72. Dickinson v. Boyle, 17 Pick. 78. pp. 1069, 1082, 1087. c 106 Mass. 460. Dickinson v. Canal Co., 7 Bxch. 282. p, 104. Dickinson v. London, etc., E.'"Co., 1 Harr, & E. 399. p. 499. Dickinson u. North-Eastern R. Co., 2 Hurl, & Colt. 735. p. 1277. Dickinson «. Rockingham, 45 Vt. 99. p, 760. Dickinson v. Worcester, 7 Allen, 19. pp, 749, 751. clO Allen, 109; 13 AUen, 293; 31 N. J. L 354; 13 AUen, 212. Dickson v. Broadway, etc., E. Co., 47 N. Y. 507. p. 393. Dickson v. McCoy, 39 N. Y. 400. pp. 205, 209, 216. c 2 N. T. S. 0. (T. & 0.) 289. TABLE OF CASES. Dickson v. Parker, 3 How. (Miss.) 219. p. 213. c 31 Miss. 188, 193. Dickson v. Keuter's Tel. Co., 3 C. P. Div. 1. pp. 835, 836, 847. Digby V. Kenton Iron Co., 8 Bush, 166. . pp. 1003, 1024. Dillard v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 58 Mo. 69. p. 535. Dillon V. Union Pacific E. Co., 3 Dill. 319. pp. 973, 1008, 1015, 1177. c 119 Mass. iU; 7 Reporter, 61. Dillon V. Washington Gas-Light Co., 1 McArthur, 626. pp. 343, 363, 557, 574. Dilts «. Kinney, 15 N. J. L. 130. p. 221. Dimes v. Petley, 15 Q. B. 276. pp. 1109, 1179. c 25 Vt. 123 ; 52 N. H. 554 ; 24 Vt. 496 ; 6 Best &S. 716; 5 El. & Bl. 201. Dimick v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., -80 111. 338. p. 423. Dimmock v. North Staffordshire R. Co., 4 Fost. & Fin. 1058. pp. 154, 156, 157. c 30 Wis. 121. Dimock u. Suffield, 30 Conn. 129. p. 778. C48 N. H. 20; 65 Me. 551; 75 III. 532; 42 Conu. 305; 41 Vt. 444; 39 Conn. 378, 379, 445; 34 Conn. 143; 37 Conn. 312. Dingle v. Hare, 7 C. B. (n. s.) 145. p. 236. Dinsman v. Wilkes, 12 How. 403. p. 824. Dinwiddie Justices v. Chesterfield Jus- tices, 5 Call, 556. p. 795. Directors v. Kisch, L. E. 2 H. L. 99. pp. 888, 1174. Ditchett V. Spuyten Duyvil, etc., K. Co., 67 N. Y. 425 ; s. c, 5 Hun, 165. pp. 319, 1174, 1203. Dixon V. Baker, 65 HI. 518. pp. 747, 748, 1260. c 85 IU. 381; 5 Cent. L. J. 386. Dixon V. Bell, 5 Mau. & Sel. 198 ; s. c, 1 Stark. 287. pp. 176, 229, 235, 246, 489, 1134, 1141, 1142. p. 18 Ohio St. 411; 11 Hun, 357; 3 Q. B. Div. 330; 7 Cent. L. J. 12; 17 Alb. L.. J. 506; 27 Conn. 412; 3 Ohio St. 193 ; 11 Mass. 141; 14 Allen, 299; 35 N. Y. 211; 6 N. Y. 410; 31 Miss. 197; 1 Head, 621; 98 Mass. 567; 11 Allen, 519; 6 Exch. 768; 19 C. B. (N. s.) 227. Dixon v. Eanken, 14 Scotch Sess. Cas. 420. p. 948. Dixon 17. Wilkinson, 2 McArthur, 425. pp. 275, 276. Dobson V. Blackmore, 9 Q. B. 991. p. 340. Dodd V. Holme, 3 Nev. & Man. 739 ; s. c, 1 Ad. & E. 493. pp. 269, 276, 279, 280. c 4 Hurl. & N. 155 ; 4 Man. & G. 759 ; 2 Dowl. (N. s.') 195; 5 Scott N". E. 120; 4 Abb. N. C. 295; 41 Ind. 251; 9 Exch. 708; 23 L. J. (Exch.) 207; 15 Jur. 127; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 14; 25 N. J. L. 361; 42 Md. 130; 7 C. B. 562; 13 Juv. 365; 27 Gratt. 89; 25 N. Y. 338, 346; 72 N. Y. 310; 4 N. Y. 202. Dodd V. Williams, 3 Mo. App. 278. pp. 279, 568. Dodge V. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 34 Iowa, 276. pp". 5-58, 1152. c 37 Iowa, 286, 322; 38 Iowa, 122, 123, 126, 297; 41 Iowa, 231; 42 Iowa, 446; 44 Iowa, 238. Dodge V. County Commissioners, 3 Mete. 380. pp. 114, 569, 572. c 61 N. Y. 196, 197, 199 ; 4 Gray, 302 ; 9 Mete. 555 ; 6 Gray, 547 ; 25 Vt. 371 ; 52 Me. 209. Dodson V. Mock, 4 Dev. & B. 146. p. 221. Dodwell V. Burford, 1 Modern, 24. p. 216. Doedt V. Wiswall, 15 How. Pr. 128. p. 1288. Doel V. Sheppard, 5 El. & Bl. 856 ; s. c, 2 Jur. (n. s.) 118; 25 L. J. (Q. B.) 124. p. 1007. Doggett V. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 34 Iowa, 284. pp. 1152, 1213. c 6 Cent. L. J. 47 ; 34 Iowa, 297 ; 10 Oh. Leg. N. 12L Doggett V. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 78 N. C. 305. pp. 169, 170, 1083, 1089, 1098, 1151. Doherty v. Thayer, 31 Cal. 140. p. 210. Doherty v. Waltham, 4 Gray, 596. pp. 762, 766, 774, 1090. cll6 Mass. 576; 117 Mass. 590; 112 Mass. 490; 10 Han, 534, 536; 112 Mass. 48. Dolan V. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co., 71 N. Y. 285 ;s.c., 17 Alb. L. J. 36. p. 429. Dolfinger v. Pishbiick, 12 Bush, 474. p. 216. Dolph V. Ferris, 7 Watts & S. 367. pp. 191, 209. c 48 Mo. 399; 15 Pa. St. 194; 46 Pa. St. 150; 49 Pa. St. 106; 31 Pa. St. 526; 1 N. Y. 518; 16 Ark. 318; 44 Me. 329; 7 Pa. St. 265; 1 Q. B. Div. lii TABLE OF CASES. Donald v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 44 Iowa, 157. pp. 518, 1262. Donfildson v. Bof?ton, 16 Gray, 508. pp. 763, 764, 765, 803. c 39 Iowa, 515; 114 Mass. 245; 101 Mass. lOO; 19 Minn. 249; 118 Mass. 73. Donaldson o. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 21 Minn. 293. pp. 449, 450, 455, 1179. C22 Minn. 166; 29 Iowa, 40, 47; 45 Iowa, 664 ; 32 Iowa, 149. Donaldson v. Mississippi, etc., R. Co., 18 Iowa, 280. pp. 884, 888, 1152, 1272, 1276, 1290. c 38 Iowa, 280, 297, 547; .37 Iowa, 322; 36 Iowa, 468; 33 Iowa, 49, 50; 29 Iowa, 58; 20 Iowa, 215; 19 Iowa, 28. Donohue v. New York, 3 Daly, 65. pp. 731, 733. Donovan v. Board of Education, 55 How. Pr. 176. p. 312. Donovan v. New Orleans, 11 La. An. 711. p. 743. Dorian v. Brooklyn, 46 Barb. 604. pp. 733, 762. Dorman v. Kane, 5 Allen, 38. p. 827. Dorn V. South wark Man. Co., 11 Cush. 205. p. 1054. Dorrity v. Rapp, 72 N. Y. 307 ; s. c, 11 Hun, 374 ; 4 Abb. N. C. 292. pp. 275, 278. Dorsey v. Phillips, etc., Co., 42 Wis. 583 ; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 19. pp. 973, 986, 1008, 1013, 1015, 1239. Dougan v. Champlain Transp. Co., 56 M. Y. 1 ; B Lans. 430. p. 803, 1147. Dougherty v. Bunting, 1 Sandf. S. C. 1. p. 340. Dougherty v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 86 111. 467. p. 1238. Doulon V. Clinton, 33 Iowa, 397. pp. 762, 763. c 39 Iowa, 515. Douglass V. Stephens, 18 Mo. 362. pp. ' 885, 1058, 1159. o 50 Mo. 109; 41 Wis. 73. Doupe V. Genin, 45 N. Y. 119. p. 323. Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. Black. 527. p. 209. c 39 N. H. 57; 28 N. H. 167; 25 Vt. 158; 37 N. H. 336; 4 N. H. 514; 49 Pa. St. 106, 108; 7 Eng. Rail. Cas. 299; 12 C. B. 176; 21 L. J. (C. P.) 204; 16 Jiir. 1074; 4 N. H. 37; 16 Q. B. 617; 15 Jur. 175; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 225; 16 Mass. 37, 38; 23 X. H. 93; 3 Wend. 147. Dow V. Kansas, etc., R. Co., 8 Kan. 642. pp. 642, 970, 1052, 1254. c 11 Kan. 91; 14 Kan. 522; 8 Kan. 652. Dowd V. Chicopee, 116 Mass. 93. p. 761- c 124 Mass. 58 ; 6 Reporter, 528 ; 120 Mass. 588. Dowell V. General Steam Nav. Co., 5 El. & Bl. 195. pp. 1146, 1214. c 12 0. B. CN. s.) 7; 38 Ala. 85; 2 C. B. (N. s.) 754, 756, 757, 758; 18 N. Y. 255, 256; 7 Bosw. 135. Downs V. New York, etc., R. Co., 47 N. Y. 83. p. 1181. Dox V. Postmaster-General, 1 Pet. 318. p. 898. Doyle V. Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 353. p. 8"l8. Doyle V. Mulrein, 1 Sweeny, 51^ ; s. c, 7 Abb. Pr. (n. s.) 258. p. 362. Doyle V. Vinalhaven, 66 Me. 348. p. 759. Doyle X). Wragg, 1 Post. & Pin. 7. p. 381. Drake v. Gilmore, 52 N. Y. 389. pp. 1277, 1294. Drake v. Hudson River R. Co., 7 Barb. 508. pp. 358, 776. Drake v. Lowell, 13 Mete. 292. pp. 346, 777. c 11 Allen, 320; 42 Me. 527; 5 Alien, 99; 45 Ind. 432, 433; 13 Gray, 62, 64; 9 Hun, 684; 104 Mass. 76, 77; 2 Allen, 553; 110 Mass. 518; 34 Conn. 144; 12 Gray, 163. ? 52 N. H. 413. Drake v. Mount, 33 N. J. L. 441. pp. 196, 382, 1154. c 33 N. J. L. 438. Drake v. Phila., etc., R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 240. pp. 500, 504. Draper v. Ironton, 42 Wis. 696 ; s. c, 5 Reporter, 223. p. 761. Dreher v. Pitchburg, 22 Wis. 675. pp. 781, 801, 1149, 1208. c 36 Wis. 100; 43 Wis. 512, 524; 40 Wis. 42; 29 Wis. 148, 152, 302, 304; 41 Wis. 73; 6 Cent. L. J. 429. Dressier v. Davis, 7 Wis. 527. pp. 381, 1177, 1178. c 41 Wis. 109 ; 6 Daly, 214 ; 11 Wis. 169. Drew V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 5 Ch. Leg. N. 314. p. 1272. Drew V. New River Co., 6 Car. & P. 754. pp. 343, 557. c 16 Pa. St. 469; 49 Me. 122. Drew V. Sixth Avenue R. Co., 26 N. T. TABLE OF CASES. liii 49; s. c, 3 Keyes, 429; 1 Abb. App. Dec. 556. pp. 400, 1182. 1188, 1242. c 49 Barb. 533, 533; 67 N. Y. 431; 66 Barb. Si, 56 ; 38 N. Y. 450 ; 47 N. Y. 322 ; 68 Me. 556 ; 60 Mo. 333 ; 57 Barb. 651 ; 3 Jones & Sp. 128. DriscoU V. Newark, etc., Cement Co., 37 N. Y. 637. pp. 58, 113. c 51 N". Y. 490 ; 41 N. Y. 532, 537 ; 4 Hun, 761, 762, 764 ; 53 Ind. 342 ; 57 N. Y. 397. DriscoU V. New York, 11 Hun, 101. p. 1198. c 4 Abb. N. C. 40. Driver v. Maxwell, 56 Ga. 11. p. 323. Drury v. Worcester, 21 Pick. 44. p. 789. c39 3Ie. 117; 5 Gush. 6; 51 Me. 5.38; 22 N. H. 563; 18 Conn. 49. Dryburg v. Telegraph Co., 3 Phila. 408; Pa. St. p. 850. Dublin, etc., R. Co. v. Slattery, I. K. 8 C. L. 531 ; s c, I. R. 10 0. L. 256; 3 App. Cas. 1155; 39 L. T. (n. s.) 265; 19 Alb. L. J. 70. pp. 428, 429, 432, 453. 455, 1236, 1237. Duckworth v. Johnson, 4 Hurl. & N. 653. p. 1293. Dudley v. Bolles. 24 Wend. 465. p. 387. c 42 How. Pr. 393. Dudley v. Weston, 1 Mete. 477. p. 803. c 6 Cush. 398 ; 12 Oush. 287. Dudley Canal Nav. Co. v. Grazebrook, 1 Barn. & Adol. 59. p. 568. Duffy V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 32 Wis. 269. pp. 343, 357, 422, 426, 428. c 35 Wis. 684; 38 Wis. 592. Duffy V. New York, etc., K. Co., 2 Hilt. 496. pp. 526, 528. c 14 Ohio St. 52. Duffy 0. Upton, 113 Mass. 544. p. 1053. c 119 Mass. 413. Duggins V. Watson, 15 Ark. 118. pp. 887, 889. Duncan v. Pindlater, 6 CI. & Fin. 894. pp. 590, 593, 604, 606, 608, 609, 615. 623, 820, 899. c 52 N. H. 122; 5 Best & S. 454, 455, 462, 467, 472, 473, 478; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 1022, 1024, 1025, 1026; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 287, 290, 292, 296, 298; 63 N. Y. 286, 287; lie. B. (N. s.)204; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 80; 30 L. J. (0. P.) 363; 61 N. Y. 194; 25 N. J. L. 373; 5 Best & S. 747; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1049; ■3 Hurl. .«: X. 320; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 363; 4 Jur (N. s.) 1299; 28 L. J. CQ. B.) 43, 44; 19 N. H. 442 ; 1 Q. B. Div. 528, 529. ? L. R. 1 H. L. 113, 116, 119, 136 ; 11 H. L. Cas. 715, 718, 732 ; 12 Jur. . Nelson, 2 Barn. & Cress. 302. p. 651. Earle v. Hall, 2 Mete. 353. pp. 870, 872, 873, 896, c 2 Phila. 228; 2 Mich. 372; 3 Gray, 351, 353^ 354; 22 Mo. 547; 2 Pa. St. 396; 12 Allen, 470; 4 Duer, 430; 52 N. H. 124. EarleviUe v. Carter, 2 Bradw. 34. pp. 425, 622, 1205. Easter t. Little Miami K Co., 14 Ohio St. 48. p. 526. c 27 Ohio St. 250. Easterbrook v. Erie R. Co., 51 Barb. 94. pp. 104, 1260. Eastman v. Amoskeag Man. Co., 44 N. H. 143. p. 72. Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284. pp. 340, 620, 621, 704, 706, 731, 733. c 14 Gray, .543, .544, 545, 646; 4 Allen, 53; 21 Mich. 113, 114; 65 N H. 135, 137; 13 Bush, 229; 44 N. H. 218; 62 Mo. 316; 122 Mass. 351, 3,53; 62 N. Y. 165; 57 Me. .378; 102 Mass. .500; 5 Neb. 452; 42 X H. 363; 56 N. H. 293, 296, 297; 26; Iowa, 268; 55 111. ;;50; 104 Mass. 93; 34 Conn. 13, 14, 15, 26; 52 Me. 124; 47 Me. 281. Eastman v. Rice, 14 Me. 419. p. 202. Eastman v. Sanborn, 3 Allen, 594. p> 1091. East Saginaw City R. Co. o. Bohn, 27 Mich. 503. pp. 1180, 1182, 1188, 1190. East St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. G-erber, 82: 111. 632. p. 509. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. St. John,. 5 Sneed, 524. p. 451. Eaton V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 51 N. H. 504. pp. 695, 1088. Eaton V. Erie R. Co., 51 N. T. 544. pp. 419, 424, 429. c 58 N. Y. 458; 71 N. Y. 231. Eaton V. European, etc., R. Co., 59 Me. 520. pp. 911, 913. c 7 Cent. L. J. 494, 495; 62 Me. 438. Eaton 'v. Hill, 50 N. H. 235. p. 1252. Eaton V. Winnie, 20 Mich. 157. pp. 207,. 1174. Eckert V. Long Island R. Co., 43 N. T- 502 ; s. c, 57 Barb. 555. pp. 453, 1174, 1186. c 53 Ala. 77, 78; 6 Jones & Sp. 418; 13 Hun, 331 ; 68 Me. 556 ; 8 Cent. L. J. 444. Eckert u. St. Louis Transfer Co., 2 Mo. App. 36. p. 887. Echols V. Dodd, 20 Texas, 190. p. 887. Edelmann v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 3 Mo. App. 603. pp. 916, 1264. Eden v. Lexington, etc., R. Co., 14 B. Mon. 204. pp. 1272, 1281, 1293. c 2 Handy, 119; 9 Bush, 468, 460, 733; 5 Ch. Leg. JSr. 314; L. R. S Exch. 93, 98, 99; 42 L. J. (Exch.)55,58,69; 1 Handy, 485, 489. d 3 Dill. ■iiO. Edinburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Phillips, 2: ilacq. H. L. Cas. 514. p. 558, TABLE OF CASES. Iv Bdson V. Central K. Co., 40 Iowa, 47. pp. 496, 503, 506, 507, 509. Edwards v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 66 Mo. 567 ; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 277. pp. 520, 534. c 66 Mo. 575, 684. Edwards v. Union Bank, 1 Fla. 136. p. 888. Elder v. Adams, 2 Meto. 599. p. 824. Elder t,. Bemis, 2 Mete. 599. pp. 822, 823. Elgin V. Eenwick, 86 111. 498 ; 18 Alb. L. J. 295. p. 1199. Elkins V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 115 Mass. 190. p. 431. c 116 Mass. 96 ; 120 Mass. 5S8. Elliott V. Aiken, 45 N. H. SO. p. 323. Elliot V. Concord, 27 N. H. 204. pp. 339, 756, 775, 787, 788. c 57 N. H. 28; 55 N. H. 61; 40 Me. 101; 56 N. H. 430; 46N. H. 453; 35N. H. 313; 2 Disney, 537. Elliott V. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 66 Mo. 683. pp. 520, 522. c 66 Mo. 575. Elliott V. Herz, 29 Mich. 202. pp. 218, 219. Elliott V. Lisbon, 57 N. H. 27. p. 756. Elliott V. Pray, 10 Allen, 378. pp. 309, 319, 324, 907. c99 Mass. 217; 102 Mass. 584; 100 Mass. 215; 42 Ind. 343; 25 Mich. 6; 6 Reporter, 752; 56 Me. 244. Elliott V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 67 Mo. 272 ; s. c, 7 Cent. L. J. 305 ; 7 Eeporter, 84. pp. 993, 1279. Ellis V. American Tel. Co., 13 Allen, 226. pp. 836, 837, 841, 842, 844, 845! c45 N. Y. 752; 5 So. Car. 374; 62 Mo. 215; 113 Mass. 302, 303, 306; 78 Pa. St. 246; 112 Mass. 73; 98 Mass. 238; 60 Me. 20, 33; 60 111. 429; 30 Ind. 438; 1 Col. 233, 235, 243. ? 27 Iowa, 452. Ellis V. Great Western, etc., E. Co., L. E. 9 C. P. 551 ; 43 L. J. (C. P.) 304 ; 31 L. T. (n. s.) 874. p. 432. c 55 X. H. 554 ; 2 Exch. Div. 396 ; 46 L. J. 523. Ellis ,;. Iowa City, 29 Iowa, 229. pp. 747, 748. c 46 Iowa, 659, 611; 42 Iowa, 313; 34 Iowa, 271. Ellis V. Loftus Iron Co., L. E. 10 C. P. 10 ; s. o., 44 L. J. (C. P.) 24 ; 23 Week. Eep. 246. p. 209. Ellis V. London, etc , E. Co., 2 Hurl. & N. 424; s. c, 3 Jur. {n. s.) 1008; 26 L. J. (Exch.) 349. pp. 499, 501, 528. Ellis V. Lowville, 7 Lans. 434. p. 781. c 4 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 124. Ellis V. Portsmouth, etc., E. Co., 2 Ired. L. 138. pp. 150, 152, 154. C12 Kan. 372; 1 Sweony,542; 2 G. (Jreene, 463 ; 7 Heisk. 462, 463 ; 10 Ired. L. 402 ; 1 Cold w. 75; 14 Cal. 388; 11 Kan. 55; 4 Jones L. 433; 35 N.,H. 363; 30 Wis. 121; 30 N. H. 207; 4 Kich. L. 337 ; 2 Strobh. L. 358. ? 30 Iowa, 422 ; 37 Mo. 297. Ellis V. Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co., 2 El. & Bl. 767; 18 Jur. 146. pp. 557, 740, 880, 900, 901. c 57 Pa. St. 381 ; 6 Hun, 586 ; 32 L. J. (Exch.) 190; 7 Hurl. &N". S31; 4 Ohio St. 416; 5 Duer, 499; 59 Me. 534; 2 Duv. 139; 2 Black, 436; 4 Wall. 679; 35 N. J. L. 22; 30 Md. 204, 206; 21 Mich. 20; 47 Ind. 395; 5 Best & S. 977; 3 Gray, 363; 6Hurl. &X. 497, 500; SOL. J. (Exch.) 83, 85; 18 Kan. 38; 61 N. Y. 190; 26 Barb. 625, 638; 52N. F. 135; 4E1. &B1. 577; IJur. (N. s.)678; 24 L.J. (Q. B.) 140; 39 Barb. 336; 4Duer,430. Ells V. Pacific E. Co., 48 My. 231. pp. 520, 526, 528. c 66 Mo. 570, 571, 572; 7 Cent. L. J. 277. El Paso i;. Causey, 1 Bradw. 531. p. 761. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152. p. 730. Elwood V. New York, etc., E. Co., 4 Hun, 808. pp. 450, 452. Elwood V. Western Union Tel. Co., 45 N. Y. 549. p. 848. c 52 Cal. 288; p Cent. L. J. 206; 60 111. 429. Ely D. Parsons. 2 Conn. 384. p. 781. Emblen v. Mj-ers, 6 Hurl. & N. 54; .s. c, 30 L. .;. (Exch.) 71. p. 1264. c49 N. H. 394; 44 Miss. 494; 57 Me. 219. Emerson v. Lowell Gas-Light Co.. 3 Allen, 410 ; ». c, 6 Allen, 146. pp. 10 ', 111, 112. c 8 Allen, 171; 122 Mass. 222. Emerson v. Washington, 9 Me. 88. p. 610. Emery v. Clark, 2 Moo. & E. 260. p. 1253. Emery D. Lowell, 104 Mass. 13. pp.711, 717, 72."), 731, 733, 742. c55 N. H. 134; 122 Mass. 359, 365, 374; 110 Mass. 221; 104 Mass. 95; 124 Mass. 567. English V. The State, 35 Texas, 473. p. 242. Enos V. Hamilton, 24 Wis. 658. p. 884. Ivi TABLE OF CASES. Entwhistle ... Feighner, 60 Mo. 214. p. 1289. Eppes u. Commissioners, 25 Ala. 460. p. 619. Erd u. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Wis. 65. p. 165. Erd V. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 443. p. 734. Erie u. Caulkins, 85 Pa. St. 247. pp. 740, 889, 908, 910, 913, 914, 915. Erie R. Co. v. Decker, 78 Pa. St. 293. p. 160. Erie v. Schwingle, 22 Pa. St. 384. pp. 559, 623, 727, 753, 768, 1177, 1209, 1249. c 7 Cent. L. J. 129 ; 79 Pa. St. 416 ; 56 Pa. St. 461; 68 Pa. St. 407; 73 Pa. St. 409; 9 Md. 178; 91 U. S. mi; 1 Disney, 5-2] ; 21 Iowa, 414; 67 Pa. St. 367; 63 Pa. .St. 289; 79 Pa. St. 416; 32 Iowa, 32S; 20 Md. 480; 31 Mich. 122; 122 Mass. 376; 71 Pa. St. loS; 17 Minn. 314; 26 Iowa, 2<58 ; 1 Black, 53 ; 16 Wall. 574. ? 4 Mich. B62. Ernst V. Hudson River R. Co., 35 N. Y. 9 ; s. li., 39 N. Y. 61 ; 32 Barb. 159 ; 24 How. Pr. 97; 32 How. Pr. 262; 19 How. Pr. 205. pp. 399, 407, 408, 420, 426, 459, 1173. c 3 Daly, 385; 34 N. T. 633; 40 K. Y. 11, 31; 14 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 30; 43 Mo. 194; 39 N. Y. 363, 363; 33 Ind. 360; 39 N, J. L. W,?,, 194; 34 Iowa, 158, 160; 34 How. Pr. 249; 4 Robt. 346; 7Robt. 616; 49 Barb. 531, 532, 535; 3 Keyes, 479; 1 Abb. App. Dec. 438; 7 Hun, 560, 563; 1 AVils. (Indianapolis) 491; 6 Hun, 466; 37 N. Y. 574; 17 Mich. 118, 123; 34 Iowa, 279; 21 Minn. 395; 50 Ind. 45; 32 Wis. 275; 20 Mich. 166; 45 N. Y. 664; 54 N. Y. 471; 38 N. Y. 443, 443 ; 40 Barb. 310 ; 39 How. Pr. 414, 423 ; 7 Lans. 13; 42 N. Y. 473; 41 N, y. 299; 26 Wis. 255; 38 N. Y. 51 ; 2 Lans. 437 ; 45 Mo. 262 ; 44 Mo. 294 ; 25 Mich. 295; 1 N. V. S. C. (T. & C.) 246; 38 N. Y. 449; 44 N. Y. 469, 474, 477; 2 .Jones & Sp. 486; 43 How. Pr. 411; 21 Ohio St. 593; 36 N. y. 133, 134. Erskine o. Adeane, L. R. 8 Ch. 758; 21 Week. Rep. 802. p. 85. Estes V. Atlantic, etc.; R. Co., 63 Me. 308. pp. 496, 501, 623, 525. Estes V. China, 56 Me. 407. pp. 733, 748, 751. Estes I!. Troy, 5 Me. 368. p. 760. c 34 Wis. 617; 27 Vt. 454; 56 Me. 366. Estes V. Williams, Cooke (Tenn.), 413. p. 899. Evans ». Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 62 Mo. 49. pp. 4-0, 444, 1039. c 65 Mo. 26; 6 Cent. L. J. 230, 231. Evans v. Newland, 34 Ind. 112. p. 1277. Evans u. Utica, 69 N. Y. 166. pp. 361, 786, 787, 1206. Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Dexter, 24 Ind. 411. pp. 1176, 12.54. c 47 Ind. 45 4.56 ; 29 Ind. 529; 35 Ind. 466; 42 Ind. 341; 26 Ind. 444. Evansville, etc., R. Co. u. Epperson, 59 Ind. 438. p. 533. Evansville, etc., R. Co. u. Hiatt, 17 Ind. 102. pp. 4")3, 1176. c 43 Md. 4' 2 ; 34 Iowa, 161 ; 43 N. Y. 508 ; 23 Ind. 135; 22 Ind. 29, 383; 37 Ind. 647, 648; 25 Mich. 282; 35 Ind. 466; 42 Ind. 342; 50 Ind. 84; 25 Ind. 197. Evansville, etc., R. Co. u. Kargus, 10 Ind. 182. p. 540. Evansville, etc., R. Co. ■». Lowdermilk, 15 Ind. 121. pp. 416, 425, 1279. V 34 Iowa, 161; 17 Ind. 105; 37 Ind. .547, 548; 4 Robt. 213; 35 Ind. 466; 50 Ind. 83; 46 Ind. 243, 246; 23 Ind. 197. Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Wolf, 59 Ind. 89. pp. 449, 1181, 1184. Everett u. Hydraulic, etc., Co., 23 Cal. 225. pp. 56, 101, 102. c 51 N. Y. 487. Evven v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Wis. 613. p. 1181. o 41 Wis. 60; 37 Mich. 216. Ewing V. Chicai^o, etc., R. Co., 72 111. 25. pp. 497, 498, 514. .">16, 521, .537. C 82 111. 78; 72 111. 405; 83 111. 373. Exchange Fire Ins. Co. v. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 4 Robt. 234. pp. 561, 563. F. Eahey u. Harvard, 62 111. 28. pp. 762, 790, 791. Fahn u. Richart, 8 Wis. 255. pp. 148, 14.1. c 41 Wis. 73. Pair V. Philadelphia (Sup. Ct. Pa.), 19 Alb. L. ,1. 340 ; s. o., 8 Cent. L. J, 365 ; 6 Phila. 534. pp. 733, 7-50, 752. Pairbank v. Haentzsche, 73 111. 236. pp. 970, 973, 976, 1015, 1017, 1022, 1024. Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 86. pp. 1083, 1096, 1239. o 62 Me. 243 ; 57 N. H. 93. Pairbury p. Rogers, 2 Bradw. 96; 11 Ch. Leg. N. 111. p. 784. TABLE OF CASES. Ivii Pairchiia v. Bentley, 30 Barb. 147. pp. 202, 218, 220. c 48 Me. 398. Fairchild v. Keith, 29 Ohio St. 156. p. 817. Fairfield v. Amherst, 57 N. H. 479. v. 757. Fales V. Dearborn, 1 Pick. 345. pp. 380, 385, 386, 1202. c 11 Me. 340. ? 10 Cush. 497; 12 Mete. 420. Fall River Iron-Works v. Old Colony K. Co., 5 Allen, 221. p. 646. Fallon V. Central Park, etc., K. Co., 64 N. Y. 13 ; 6 Daly, 8. pp. 1181, 1188. Fanjoy v. Seales, 29 Cal. 243. p. 899. c 38 Cal. 692. Fanning v. Long Island, etc., K. Co., 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 585. p. 530. Farley v. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 42 Iowa, 234. p. 357. Farmers', etc.. Bank v. Chestei-, 6 Humph. 458. p. 898. Farnum v. Concord, 2 N. H. 392. pp. b40, 362, 620, 704, 754, 768, 769, 1209. c 2 Ind. 587; 8 Minn. 163; 32 N. H. 444; 38 Md. 584; 22 N. H. 564; 41 N. H. 50; 36 N. H. 298 ; 44 N. H. 248 ; 122 Mass. 351 ; 35 N. H. 276 ; 2 Cush. 610; 41 N. H. 322; 55 111. 350; 20 N. H. 79 ; 35 N. H. 312 ; 17 111. 144, 146 ; 2 Disney, 520 ; 52 Mo. 123; 17 How. 167; 23 N. H. 94; 41 N. H. 50. Farrant v. Barnes, 11 C. B. (n. s.) 553 ; 31 L. J. (C. P.) 137. pp. 230, 231, 287, 288, 290, 293. c 104 Mass. 68 ; L. E. 2 C. P. 373 ; 36 L. J. (0. P.) 192; L. R. 1 C. P. 278, 279, 286; ,35 L. J. (C.P.)186; 12Jur. (N.s.) 4.33; 2 Abb. C. C. 222; 1 Sawyer, 448; 7Lans. 213; 107 Mass. 576; 64 Barb. 213 ; 98 Mass. 568. Parriind v. Marshall, 21 Barb. 409; s. c, 19 Barb. 380. pp. 274, 275, 280. c 18 Minn. 348; 67 N. Y. 273; 51 N. Y. 479; 61 Barb. 107; 6 Lans. 131 ; 25 N. J. L. 366, 367; 76 III. 235, 236 ; 25 N. Y. 345. Farrar v. Greene, 32 Me. 574. pp. 780, 1208. c 22 Wis. 679; 29 Wis. 303; 13 Hun, 85. Farrell v. Oldtown, 7 Keporter, 463. p. 769. Farrelly v. Cincinnati, 2 Disney, 576. pp. 342, 754, 755. Farwell v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 4 Mete. 49. pp. 485, 939, 970, 1034, 1035, 1038. (In full, p. 924.) c3 Col. 501; 25 JId. 479; 29 Conn. 560; 49 ■N". Y. 532; 10 Mich. 199; 30 Barb. 234, 2.35, 236; 34 Conn. 479; 10 Gray, 281; ll9 Mass. 421; 62 Mo. 328; 2 Mich. 265; 42Md.418; 25N. Y.564; 44 Cal. 82; 2 Hurl. & Colt. Ill; 9 Jur. (N. s.) 502; 32 L. J. (Exch.) 209; 49 Barb. 577; 8 Ohio St. 256; 5 Hun, 493; 27 Md. 601; 25 Md. 479; 17 N. Y. 157; 8 Allen, 444; 11 Iowa, 427; 76 111. 397; 8 Kan. 650; 22 Ala. 308, 311, 312; 5 Best & S. 578; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 264, 268; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 1076; 59 Pa. St. 247, 248, 251; 28 Ind. 377; 6 Jones L. 248; 64 Mo. 118; 46 Texas, 538; 23 Pa. St. 386; 6 Cush. 76; 4 'Gray, 101 ; 53 Ga. 16; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 772; 53 N. Y. 5,r2; 6 Cal. 210; 9 Cush. 114; 1 Am. L. Reg. 718; 20 Md. 221, 222; 6 Hill, 594; 7 La. An. 324, 332; 43 Me. 270; n Wis. 254; 14 Minn. 363, 364; 15 111. 551; 21 111. 26; 51 Miss. 642; 10 Mich. 199; 43 Mo. 193; 3 Ohio St. 212, 215, 223; 12 Ohio St. 491; 59 Mo. 300; 15 Minn. 537; 10 Allen, 237, 238; 10 Cush. 231; 3 Cush. 273; 6 Ind. 207,208; 30 Mo. 116; 24 Ala. 36; 102 Mass. 583; 5 N. Y. 494, 496; 6 Barb. 236, 240, 243; 3 Ohio St. 188; 3 Sawyer, 442; 20 Ohio, 441, 443,445,447; 9 HeLsk. 869 ; 18 Iowa, 287 ; 49 Barb. 326 ; 42 N. H. 236 ;49 Texas, 189; 28 Ind. 377; 1 Ga. 198; 44 Cal. 82; 44 Miss. 485 ; 1 Woods, 403 ; 38 Miss. 275 ; 97 Mass. 368 ; 4 Iowa, 549; 24 N. Y. 220; 11 Wis. 254; 58 N. Y. 134. ? 5 Ind. 343, 344, 345, 346, 347; 9 Bush, 565; 6 Busli, 579. d 20 Ohio, 435; 1 Am. L. Reg. 399; 2 Am. L. T. 120; 14 How. 489. Fash u. Third Avenue K. Co., 1 Daly, 148. p. 359. c 50 N. Y. 205; 3 Daly, 281; 4 Abb. N. 0. 35. Faulkner v. Erie R. Co., 49 Barb. 324. pp. 971, 99.3, 994, 1028, 1033. c 1 Lans. 110; 62 Barb. 220; 14 Hun, 448. Favor v. Bostdn, etc., R. Co., 114 Mass. 350. p. 351. Fawcett w. York, etc., R. Co., 16 Q. B. 610; s. c, 15 Jur. 173 ; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 222 ; 2 Eng. Law & Eq. 289. pp. 501, 521. c 13 Barb. 597; 12 Gray, 59; 13 N. Y. 51, 52, 55; 16 Kan. 575; 13 Wis. 641; 27 Vt. 53; 49 Pa. St. 107; 7 Eng. Bail. Cas. 299; 21 L. J. (C. P.) 203, 204; 16 C. B. 175, 176; 16 Jur. 1073, 1074; 27 Vt. 148; 12 Gray, 59; 12 Ind. 7. Fay V. Davidson, 13 Minn. .523. p. 113. c 15 Minn. 529. Fay V. Prentice, 1 C. B. 828. p. 348. Fehr v. Schuylkill Nav. Co., 69 Pa. St. 161. pp. 569, 570. Pelch V. Allen, 98 Mass. 572. pp. 970, 972, 1035. c 62 Me. 467 ; 51 Miss. 642. Felder v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 2 McMull. 403. p. 450. cl3 Ga. 88; 8 Rich. L. 127, 128; 1 Duer, 584; 7 Rich. L. 93. Iviii TABLE OF CASES. Feltham v. England, L. K. 2 Q. B. 33; s. c, 4 Post. & Pin. 460 ; 7 Best & S. 676. pp. 1028, 1053. c 13 Allen, 441 ; 62 Mc. 466; 64 N. T. 9, 11; 32 Md. 418 ; L. R. 1 Sc. App. 339 ; 59 Pa. St. 252 ; lExch. Div. 255; 49 Barb. 336. Felton V. Deidl, 22 Vt. 170. pp. 320, 896. Pent V. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 59 111. 349. (In full, p. 136.). c 12 Kan. 379 ; 39 N. J. L. 307, 311 ; 94 U. S. 474; 6 Cent. L. J. 313; 80 Pa. St. 379; 85 111. 14; 71111.574; 57 N. H. 91. Penton v. Dublin Steam Packet Co., 8 Ad. & E. 835; s. c, 1 Per. & Dav. 103. pp. 669, 671, 893, 894. Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital f. Ross, 12 CI. & Pin. 507. pp. 590, 593. Pernandes u. Sacramento City E. R., 52 Cal. 45; s. ,,., 4 Cent. L. J. 82. pp. 1236, 1237, 1239, 1240. Pernow v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 22 Iowa, 528. p. 504. c 34 Iowa, 338 ; 25 Iowa, 142 ; 27 Iowa, 284. Fera v. Child, 115 Mass. 32. p. 323. Ferguson v. Earl of Kinnoull, 9 CI. & Pin. 279. pp. 669, 817. Fero V. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 22 N. Y. 209. pp. 153, 163, 167. c 34 N. Y. 628; 4 Neb. 276; 35 N. Y. 37; 41 Ind. 242; 30 Iowa, 422; 91 XJ. S. 473; 17 Kan. 389; 26 Wis. 235; 18 "Wis. 81; 52 Pa. St. 381; 42 How. Pr. 394; 57 N. H. 137; 11 Kan. 56; 11 W. Va. 38; 58 N. Y. 463, 463; 2 Col. 159; 7 Hun, 554; 5 Hun, 503; 9Nev. 295. Picken v. Jones, 28 Cal. 618. p. 216. c 44 Cal. 84; 2 Montana, 533, 525. Pickle u. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 54 Mo. 219. p. 538. c 55 Mo. 89, 276. Field V. New York, etc., E. Co., 32 N. Y. 339 ; 29 Barb. 176. pp. 142, 160, 161. c9 Nev. 286, 290, 291, 301; 39 Md. 144; 12 Kan. 370, 372; 1 Sweeny, 542; 42 Vt. 457, 458; 69 111. 358; 41 Ind. 239, 254:, 257; 30 Iowa, 422; 91 U. S. 470; 50 Cal. 184; 11 Hun, 184; 30 Mich. 190; 31 Iowa, 178; 26 Wis. 235, 239; 8 Hun, 600; 66 Barb. 340; 11 Hun, 320; 35 N. Y. 211; 11 Kan. 55, 58; 11 W. Va. 38; 3 Lans. 454, 456; 49 N. Y. 435; 5 Hun, 77; 21 Minn. 64; 59 Barb. 650. Fields V. The State, 1 Yerg. 156. p. 1282. Fifield V. Northern E. E., 42 N. H. 225. pp. 949, 973. c59 Mo. 300; 14 Minn. 363; 46 Mo. 172; 13 Allen, 442; 39 Iowa, 621; 44 Texas, 539; 48 Me. 121. Pilliter v. Phippard, 11 Q. B. 347 ; =. c, 12 Jur. 202; 17 L. J. (Q. B.) 89. pp. 9, 21, 67, 125, 126, 147, 148. CIS Minn. 342; 3 Hurl. & Colt, 787; 107 Mass. 496 ; 23 Pa. St. 374 ; 30 Wis. liJ ; 49 N. Y. 425, 427 ; 53 N. H. 447; 13 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 370. Fineux v. Hovenden, Cro. Eliz. 664. p. 340. Pinlayson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 1 Dill. 579. pp. 448, 453. c 21 Minn. 298. Pinley v. Langston, 12 Mo. 120. p. 150. Pirmstone u. Wheeley, 2 Dowl. & L. 203 ; s. u., 13 L. J. (Exch.) 361. p. 106. C7C. B. 564; 13 Jur. 366. First Baptist Church v. Schenectady, etc., R. Co., 5 Barb. 79. p. 107. First National Bank v. Western Union Tel. Co., 30 Ohio St. 555. pp. 838, 851. First Parish in Sutton u. Cole, 3 Pick. 232. p. 703. Firth u. Bowling Iron Co., 3 C. P. Div. 254; o. li., 6 Cent. L. J. 421; 18 Alb. L. J. -"e. pp. 85, 299, 1096. C.4 Eich. Div. 13; 27 Week. Rep. 96; 7 Cent. L. J. 466 ; 18 Alb. L. J. 516. Pish u. Bassett, 19 Alb. L. J. 160. p. 617. Pish V. Dodge, 4 Denio, 311. pp. 107, 318. Fish V. Skut, 21 Barb. 833. p. 219. Fisher v. Beard, 32 Iowa, 346. p. 280. Fisher w. Boston, 104 Mass. 87. pp. 723, 735. c 33 Wis. 318; 122 Mass. 372; 62 N. Y. 165; 123 Mass. 316; 6 Cent. L. J. 408, 409; 38 Conn. 382; 49 How. Pr. 68; 13 Hun, 218. Fisher v. Clark, 41 Barb. 329. p. 206. Fisher u. Farmers' Loan, etc., Co., 21 Wis. 73. pp. 497, 500. Fisher v. Kyle, 27 Mich. 454. p. 979. Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 45. p. 824. Fisher v. Prowse, 2 Best & S. 770 ; s. c, 31 L. J. (Q. B.) 212. p. 363. Fisher v. Thirkill, 21 Mich. 1. pp. 321, 343, 346. c 17 Am. Z,. Reg. (N. s.) 457 ; 25 Mich. 4. Pishkill V. Fishkill Plank-road Co., 22 Barb. 634. p. 621. TABLE OF CASES. lix riske V. Farmingham Man. Co., 14 Pick. 491. pp. 320, 896. Pitch V. Buffiilo, etc., E. Co., 13 Hun, 668. p. 529. Fitch V. Pacific R. Co., 45 Mo. 325. pp. 153, 168, 167, 169. c 16 Kan. 255; 46 Mo. 458, 459; 53 Mo. 369, 370; 61 Mo. 44; 60 Mo. 269; 65 Mo. 333; 9 Nev. 293, 294, 295. Fitzgerald v. Woburn, 109 Mass. 204. pp. 360, 785. c 109 Mass. 449. Fitzpatrick v. New Albany, etc., R. Co., 7 Ind. 436. pp. 1038, 1039. c53 Ga. 16; 11 Wis. 250,251; 10 Ind. 657; 11 Ohio St. 424; 13 Ind. 369; 23 Ind. 83; 22 Ind. 29; 8 Ohio St. 254; 57 N. Y. 392. ? 31 Ind. 182; 5 Hun, 496; 42 Ala. 723; 7 Ind. 477. Fitzsimons v. Inglis, 5 Taun. 534. p. 1100. c 35 N. J. L. 32; 1 Dow. & B.J. 503; 11 Picli. 110. Flagg V. Millbury, 4 Cush. 243. p. 1094. c 44 Vt. 118 ; 14 Allen, 486. Flagg V. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601. pp. 743, 748, 749, 751. c 46 Iowa, 613; 110 Mass. 220; 13 Allen, 212, 293; 10 Allen, 603; 8 Allen, 129; 68 Me. 110, HI; 104 Mass. 16; 7 Reporter, 83. Flanagan u. Wilmington, 4 Houst. (Del.) 548. pp. 1289, 1297. Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358. p. 1163. Flansburg v. Basin, 11 Ch. Leg. N. 282. p. 203. Flattes V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 35 Iowa, 191. pp. 507, 514. c 40 Iowa, 206, 339. Fleeming v. Orr, 2 Macq. H. L. Cas. 141 ; 1 Week. Rep. 339 ; 29 Eng. Law & Eq. 16: 1 Pat. Sc. App. 496. p. 202. Fleming v. Beck, 48 Pa. St. 309. p. 1034. Fleming v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 1 Abb. N. C.'433. pp. 400, 1197. Fleming v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 34 Iowa, 353. p. 569. Fleming v. Ramsey, 46 Pa. St. 252. p. 215. Flemming v. Western Pacific R. Co., 49 Cal.253. pp. 1146, 1179, 1213, 1236. Fletcher v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 64 Mo. 484. pp. 419, 420, 424, 426, 444. c 65 Mo. 26; 6 Cent. L. J. 231; 4 Mo. App. 48S. Fletcher v. Auburn, etc., R. Co., 25 Wend. 462. pp. 859, 556, 776. c 4 Abh. N. C. 36. Fletcher v. Barnet, 43 Vt. 192. p. 1208. Fletcher v. Boston, etc., R. R., 1 Allen, 9. p. 462. c 3 Allen, 39, 566; 23 Ind. 557. Fletcher v. Braddish, 2 Bos. & Pul. 182. pp. 669, 894. Fletcher v. Great Western R. Co., 4 Hurl. & N. 242; ». u., 28 L. J. (Exch.) 147. p. 280. c L. E. 7 Q. B. 260; L. E. 2 H. L. 37. Fletcher \. Ry lands, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 ; K. u., 4 Hurl. & Colt. 263; L. R. 1 Exch. 265 ; 3 Hurl. & Colt. 774 ; 12 Jur. (n. s.) 603; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 154; 14 Week. Kep. 799; 14 L. T. (n. s.) 523; 37 L. J. (Exch.) 161. pp. 54, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 108, 275, 346, 1234. (In full, p. 2.) c 2 C. P. Div. 244 ; 3 0. P. Div. 174 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 368; e Reporter, 460; 68 Me. 165; 33 Mich. 238; L. R. 7 Exch. 809, 310, 311; 27 Week. Rep. 96, 416; 4 Exch. Div. 10, 11; 7 Cent. L. J. 466; 18 Alb. L. J. 515, 516; L. R. 7 Q. B. 33; 41 L. J. (Q. B.) 32; 18 Minn. 333, 334, 336, 337, .346; L. R. 10 Q. B. 456, 457; 41 L. J. (Q. B.) 272; L. R. 7 Q. B. 666; 41 L. J. (Exch.) 195, 196; 2 App. Cas. 99; L. E. 9 Exch. 183; 43 L. J. (Exch.) 104; 42 L. J. (Q. B.) 36, 52; 11 Bush, 477; 101 Mass. 253; L. R. 6 C. P. 17; 108 Mass. 266; L. R. 7 Q. B. 258, 2,59, 260, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 384 ; 40 L. J. (Exch.) 177, 178 ; 2 Abb. C. C. 210, 212, 213; 1 Sawyer, 439, 440; 99 Mass. 584; L. R. 3 Q. B. 736, 738; 9 Best & S. 841, 843; 37 L. J. (Q. B.) 215, 316; 45 Md. 135; 61 N. Y. 187, 194; L. R. 10 Exch. 360; 44 L. J. (Exch.) 135, 136 ; 2 Exch. Div. 4, 5. ? 55 N. H. 56, 57, 58, 59; 38 N. J. L. 340, 341; 53 N. H. 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 450; 13 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 366, 368, 309, 371, 372, 374. «l 51 N. Y. 485, 486. Fletcher v. Smith, 2 App. Cas. 781 (affirming L. R. 7 Exch. 305). pp. 77, 90. Flike v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 53 N. T. 549. pp. 1032, 1033, 1040, 1213. c 9 Hun, 460 ; 70 N. Y. 173 ; 55 N. Y. 583, 601 ; 59 N. Y. 359, 520, 521 ; 11 Hun, 593 ; 19 Kan. 272; 6 Reporter, 200 ; 14 Kan. 524; 59 Mo. 506, 508; 65 Mo. 220; 64 N. Y. 10, 13; 5 Hun, 494; 42 Wis. 526; 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & G.) 57; 58 N. Y. 58, 59, 61 ; 14 Hun, 448; 49 Texas, 187. Flint V. Gloucester Gas-Light Co., 3 Ix TABLE OF CASES. Allen, 343; a. c, 9 Allen, 552. pp. 109, 110. Flint, etc., R. Co. v. Lull, 28 Mich. 510; s. c, 1 Cent. L. J. 131. pp. 521, 530, 537. Flint, etc., Co. v. "Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99. p. 818. Plovi V. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App. 231. pp. 733, 1180, 1205, 1237. Flower V. Adam, 2 Taun. 314. pp. 373, 549, 1098, 1151, 1166. c6 GUI, 206; 21 Pick. 147; 19 Conn. 573; 2 McMull. 108; 20 111. 490; 25 Me. 47; 4 Gray, 401; 2 Oush. 605; 2 Pick. 624; 18 Wend. 239. Flynn v. Beebe, 98 Mass. 575. p. 1055. Flynn v. Canton Co., 40 Md. 312. p. 360. Flynn v. Hatlon, 43 How. Pr. 333. p. 323. Flynn v. San Francisco, etc., R. Co., 40 Cal. 14. pp. 162, 1151, 1158. c 39 N. J. L. 305, 312; 50 Cal, \81; 80 Pa. St. 190; 48 Ind. 480; 9 Nev. 298. Fogg V. Nahant, 106 Mass. 278 ; ;>. c, 98 Mass. 578. pp. 780, 1207. c 55 Ind. 50 ; 29 Wis. 308 ; 67 N. T. 603 ; 3 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 419; 105 Mass. 344; 100 Mass. 55. ? 52 N. H. 413. Foley V. Wyeth, 2 Allen, 131. pp. 259, 260, 261, 262, 275, 276. c 18 Mirni. 341 ; 4 Abb. N. C. 295 ; 76 111. 241 ; 72 N. Y. 310; 122 Mass. 204, 205, 206, 208. Folkes i;. Chad, 3 Doug. (K. B.) 157, 340. p. 330. Folsom V. UnderhiU, 36 Vt. 580. pp. 759. 760, 803, 1205, 1257. c 2 Br&d-f 42; 46 N. H. 196. Foot V. Bronson, 4 Lans. 47. p. 104. Foot D. Wiswall, 14 Johns. 304. p. 1236. Foppiano v. Baker, 3 Mo. App. 560. pp. 1290, 1294. Forbes v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 76 E. C. 454. p. 495. Ford V. Fitchburg R. Co., 110 Mass. 240. pp. 982, 991, 1' 1 , 1032, 1034. c 117 Mass. 412; 5 lleporter, 272; 123 Mass. 483; 6 Keporter, 779; 122 Mass. 405; 19 Kan. 272; 6 Reporter, 200; 121 Mas.s. 509; 3 Sawyer, 445, 447, 448; 119 Mass. 413; 59 Mo. 504; 65 Mo. 229; 64 N. Y. 12; 3 Hun, 340; 5 X. Y. .'<. C. (T. &0.) 560; 66 Me. 425,436; 42 Wis. 536; 49 Texas, 189. Ford V. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210. pp. 1272, 1292. clCush.478; 14 B.Mon. -207; IE. D. Smith, 460, 461; 67 N. Y. 434; 3 N. V. 493; 3 Dill. 341; 30 ST. J. L. 201. ? 9 Busb, 458; L. E. 8 Exch. 100; 1 Handy, 487, 488; 1 Oush. 478. Ford V. Parker, 4 Ohio St. 556. p. 898. Foreman v. Bigelow, 7 Cent. L. J. 430. p. 1173. Foreman v. Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214; s. c, 40 L. J. (Q. B.) 138; 24 L. T. (n. s.) 385. pp. 622, 623, 716, 844. c 132 Jlass. 364; 1 Q. B. Div. 40, Forks Township v. King, 84 Pa. St. 230. pp. 1206, 1242. Forsyth v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 103 Mass. 510. pp. 316, 460. Forsyth v. Hooper, 11 Allen, 419. p. 899. cl02 Mass. 313; 98 Mass. 579; 110 Mass. 260; 55 Ind. 60; 120 Mass. 587; 13 Allen, 69; 112 Mass. 98; 6 Reporter, 752; 86 Pa. St. 159. Forster's Case, 1 Lew. C. C. 187. p. 1002. Fort t.. Whipple, 11 Hun, 586. pp. 975, 1060, 1239. Fort Scott V. Brothers, 20 Kan. 455. p. 781. Fort Wayne v. De Witt, 47 Ind. 391. pp. 762^ 763, 1254. Fort Wayne, etc., R. Co. u. Gildersleeve, 33 Mich. 133. pp. 973, 982, 9j3, 986, 989, 1008. c 33 Mich. 257; 6 Reporter, 111; 68 Me. 51. Fort Wayne, etc., R. Co. v. Hinebaugh, 43 Ind. 354. p. 510. c 51 Ind. 371. Fort Wayne, etc., R. Co. a. Musseter, 48 Ind. 286. p. 535. Foshay v. Glen Haven, 25 Wis. 288. pp. 778, 779. C65 Me. 551; 31 Wis. 189; 41 Wis. 415; 39 Conn. 379. Foster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 84 111. 164. pp. 1022, 1024. Foster v. Dixfield, 18 Me. 380. p. 1176. c 26 Me. 340; 6 Iowa, 452; 25 Iowa, 110. Foster v. Goddard, 40 Me. 64. p. 387. Foster i. Holly, 38 Ala. 76. pp. 1151, 1214. c 62 N. H. 556. Foster v. Minnesota, etc., E. Co., 14 Minn. 360. pp. 970, 1026, 1034. Foster v. Peyser, 9 Cash. 242. p. 323. Fowle V. Alexandria, 3 Pet. 398. pp. 720, 732, 735. c 122 Mass. 369; 3 Sawyer, 438; 48 Ala. 575; 7 Ohio St. 124; 4 La. An. 440; 17 Gratt. 381. TABLE OF CASES. Ixi Towle V. New Haven, etc., R. Co., 107 Mass. 352. p. 569. Fowler v. Lock, L. E. 10 C. P. 90 ; s. c, L. E. 7 C. P. 272; 31 L. T. (n. s.) 844; 23 Week. Eep. 415; 41 L. J. (C. P.) 99, p. 793. c 2 Q. B. Div. 282. Fowler v. Sanders, Cro. Jao. 446. pp. 107. 340, 363. c 13 Mete. 299. Fowlkes V. Nashville, etc., E. Co., 9 Heisk. 829. pp. 1283, 1284. Fox V. Glastenbury, 29 Conn. 204. pp. 1149, 1176, 1205. c3Eobt.514; 37 Conn. 203, 204; 2 Daly, 297; 36 How. Pr. 257 ; 61 Mo. 591 ; 24 N. Y. 434 ; 34 N. T.14. Fox V. Sackett, 10 Allen, 535. pp. 341, 1015, 1172, 1238. c 100 Mass. 212; 99 Mass. 167. Fox V. Sandford, 4 Sneed, 36. p. 971. c 6 Heisk. 355 ; 46 Texas, 539. Foy V. London, etc., E. Co., 18 C. B. 225. p. 315. Fralor v. Sears, etc., Water Co., 12 Cal. 555. p. 1173. Frammell v. Little, 16 Ind. 251. p. 196. France v. Erie E. Co., 2 Hun, 513; s. c, 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 12. p. 1233. Francis v. Cockrell, L. E. 5 Q. B. 184, 501. pp. 311, 907. c 61 N. Y. 194; 1 Q. B. Div. 318; 25 Mich. 8; L. E. 5 C. P. 439, 443, 444. Frandsen v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 36 Iowa, 372. pp. 1001, 1002. c 45 Iowa, 78 ; 47 Iowa, 690. Frank v. New Orleans, etc., E. Co., 20 La. An. 25. p. 1277. Frankford, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Phila., etc., E. Co., 54 Pa. St. 345. pp. 152, 153, 15.5, 157, 158, 1239. c42Vt. 458; 65 Pa. St. 273; 2 Neb. 336; 80 Pa. St. 190; 78 Pa. St. 3-25; 7 Reporter, 24; 9 Nev. 295 ; 68 Pa. St. 408. Frankfort Bridge Co. «. Williams, 9 Dana, 403. pp.3n,317, 561, 562. Franklin v. Fisk, 13 Allen, 211. p. 749. Franklin v. Low, 1 Johns. 396. p. 898. Franklin Wharf Co. v. Portland, 67 Me. 46. p. 776. Franklin v. South-Eastern E. Co., 3 Hurl. &N. 211. pp. 1242, 1293. c 4 C. 15. {^. s.) 305 ; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 712; 27 L. J. (C. P.) 230; 32 Barb. 32; ICin. Superior Ct. 267; 34 N. J. L. 157; 21 Wis. 375; 24 Md. 281; 4 Best & S. 406; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 200; 32 L. J. (Q. B.) 379; 44 L. J. (C. P.) 192; 37 Mich. 215; L. E. 10 Exch. 3. Franklin Turnpike Co. v. Crockett, 2 Sneed, 263. pp. 562, 573. c 12 Heisk. 638. Fraser v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 566. p. 886. c 18 Alb. L. J. 91; 6 Eeporter, 404; 12 Hun, 468 ; 47 N. Y. 128. Fraser v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 409. pp. 148, 149. C 33 Vt. 126. Frazer v. Kimler, 2 Hun, 514 ; a. c, 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 16. pp. 199, 216. Frazer i;. Marsh, 2 Camp. 517. p. 894. Frazer v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 38 Pa. St. 104. pp. 939, 992, 994, 1008, 1031, 1054, 1055. c 49 Texas, 189; 38 Ind. 314; 86 Pa. St. 440; 63 Pa. St. 150, 151; 53 Pa. St. 457; 12 Ohio St. 492; 46 Iowa, 21, 22, 23; 3 Dill. 325; 14 Minn. 363; 82 Pa. St. 124; 6 Eeporter, 126; 64 N. Y. 12; 39 Iowa, 621; 49 Miss. 283; 76 Pa. St. 393, 394; 46 Tc-ias, 539; 8 How. 650; 49 Barb. 568; 59 K. Y. 361 ; 49 N. Y. 531. Freeh u. Phila., etc., E. Co., 39 Md. 574. pp. 450, 1177. c 43 Md. 552. Fredericks v. Taylor, 14 Abb. Pr. 77. p. 1209. Freeholders of Sussex i;. Strader, 18 N. J. L. 108. pp. 563, 620, 792. (See Sussex County v. Strader.) Freeland v. Muscatine, 9 Iowa, 461. pp. 743, 745, 750, 1262. c 24 Iowa, 346. Freeport v. Isbell, 83 111. 440. pp. 732, 733, 766, 775. c 2 Bradw. 100. Freer v. Cameron, 4 Eich. L. 228. pp. 308, 309, C56N. Y. 133; 59 N. Y. 32. Fremantle v. London, etc., E. Co., 10 C. B. (N. s.) 89; 31 L. J (C. P.) 12; 2 Fost. &Fin. 337. p. 156. c 7 Heisk. 462; 45 Mo. 327; 54 Pa. St. 3.52; 41 Ind. 241, 254, iMi: 26 Wis. 235; 52 Pa. St. 381; 11 W, Va. 38, 54 Pa. St. 353; 9 Nev. 393. French v. Brunswick, 21 Me. 29. pp. 7.54, 764, 775, 776, 782, 1176, 1178. c 11 Allen, 320; 42 Me. 527; 45 Ind. 433; 9 Hun, 685; 35 N. H. 276; 6 Iowa. 452; 1 Cush. 447. French v. Camp, 18 Me. 433. p. 444. Ixii TABLE OF CASES. French v. Donaldson, 5 Lans. 293 ; a. c, 57 N. Y. 496. p. 900. French v. Taunton, etc., E. Co., 116 Mass. 537. pp. 407, 423. C39 N. J. L. 193; 120 Mass. 263, 265, 588. Prick V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 6 Cent. L. J. 317. pp. 452, 1192. Frink v. Potter, 11 111. 406. p. 1174. Fritz V. First Division, etc., E. Co., 22 Minn. 404. p. 503. Fritz V. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 34 Iowa, 337. pp. 498, 499, 516. c 4S Iowa, 529. Frost V. Grand Trunk E. Co., 10 Allen, 387. pp. 303, 315. Frost V. Hull, 4 N. H. 153. p. 1096. Frost V. Portland, 11 Me. 271. pp. 754, 768, 775, 776, 782, 787. c42 Me. 510; 52 N. H. 377; 43 N. H. 269; 1 Oush. 447 ; 15 Me. 99, 407. Frost II. Waltham, 12 Allen, 85. p. 1015. c 107 Mass. 346. Fry V. Derstler, 2 Teates, 278. p. 1240. Fry V. Dubuque, etc., E. Co., 45 Iowa, 416. p. 1263. Frye v. Moor, 53 Me. 583. p. 102. Fuller V. Bennett, 2 Hare, 402. p. 890. Fuller V. Chicopee Man. Co., 16 Gray, 46. p. 103. Fuller V. Naugatuck E. Co., 21 Conn. 557. p. 1241. Fulton V. Hampton, 5 Conn. 417. p. 802. Fulton V. Tucker, 3 Hun, 529 ; 5 N". T. S. C. (T. & C.) 621. p. 343. Fulton Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 37 N. Y. 648. pp. 821, 900, 1243. c 5 Lans. 294, 346 ; 6 Lans. 263 ; 42 N. T. 53 ; 44 N. T. 124; 46 N. Y. 196. Fultz V. Wycoff, 25 Ind. 321. p. 209. Furlong i;. Broadway, etc., E. Co., cited in 6 Daly, 14. p. 103. Furst V. Second Avenue E. Co., 72 N. Y. 542. p. 398. Furze v. New York, 3 Hill, 612. pp. 677, 680. (See New York v. Furze.) G. Gage V. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 14 Hun, 446. p. 994. Gagg V. Vetter, 41 Ind. 228. pp. 151, 153, 155, 159, 1236. c 51 Ind. 151. Gahagan v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 1 Allen, 187. pp. 429, 450, 804. c 3 Bosw. 514; 108 Mass. 275; 17 Mich. 118, 120, 123; 100 Mass. 212; 29 Iowa, 38; 37 Vt. 609; 104 Mass. 142; 48 Miss. 122; 8 Allen, 230, 235, 448; 38 Ind. 318, 321; 34 N. Y. 14; 3 Allen, 22; 24 N. Y. 434; 4 Allen, 290; 110 Mass. 50. Gailor v. Herrick, 42 Barb. 79. p. 621. Gale V. Lisbon, 52 N. H. 174. p. 1093. c 52 N. H. 555. Gale V. New York, etc., E. Co., 13 Hun, 1 ; ». c, 53 How. Pr. 385. pp. 1257, 1258, 1266, 1270. Galen v. Clyde Plank-road Co., 27 IJarb. 543. p. 621. Galena, etc., E. Co. v. Crawford, 25 111. 529. pp. 502, 515. c 38 111. 413; 20 Iowa, 222. Galena, etc., E. Co. v. Dill, 22 111. 264. pp. 419, 424. c33 Ind. 362; 34 Iowa, 161; 81 111. 455; 46 III. 82; 49 111. 503; 28 Ohio St. 350; 83 111. 515; 63 111. 120; 62111. 316; 50 III. 153; 43111. 417; 76 111. 314; 25 ni. 145; 33 Iowa, 569. Galena, etc., E. Co. u. Fay, 16 111. 558. p. 1176. Galena, etc., E. Co. ^. Griffin, 31 111. 303. pp. 508, 520, 523. c 26 Iowa, 657; 73111.61. Galena, etc., E. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 111. 478. pp. 425, 448, 453, 1149, 1168, 1169, 1176. c 58 111. 282; 46 111. S3; 49 111. 503; 19 111. 510; 52 111. 330; 64 111. 516; 72 111. 226, 388; 71 111. 509; 58 111. 306; SO 111. 267; 9 Wis. 220; 5 Kan. 179 ; 6 Or. 424 ; 37 111. 340, 341 ; 2 Bradw. 38. Galena, etc., E. Co. v. Loomis, 13 111. 548. pp. 419, 424. c 33 Ind. 362 ; 34 Iowa, 157 ; 67 111. 116 ; 63 111. 125; 16 111. 202; 35 Iowa, 194; 68 111. 318; 63 111. 120; 25 Mich. 291; 21 Ohio St. 593; 41 Iowa, 304; 27 Vt. 155; 63 111. 94; 25 111. 145; 18 111. 468. Galena, etc., E. Co. v. Sumner, 24 HI. 631. p. 536. Galesburg o. Higley, 61 111. 287. pp. 763, 781, 784. Gallagher v. Humphrey, 10 Week. Eep. 664; s. <;., 6 L. T. (n. s.) 684. p. 829. c 41 Ind. 250; 98 Mass. 578. Gallagher v. Piper, 16 C. B. (n. s.) 669 ; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 329. pp. 939, 969, 1028. c49 N. Y. 531; L. R. 1 So. App. 338, 339; L. R. 9 0. P. 652 ; 2 Lans. 517 ; 7 Best & S. 681 ; TABLE OF CASES. Ixiii 3 Hurl. & Coit. 593; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 180; 62 Me. 466; 64 N. T. 11; 19 C. B. (N. s.) 366. Galloway v. Western, etc., R. Co., 57 Ga. 512. p. 1025. Galpin v. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 19 Wis. e04. pp. 497, 500, 512. c 32 Minn. 404 ; 30 Wis. 122. Gandy v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 30 Iowa, 420. p. 154. c 12 Kan. 370; 33 Iowa, 188, 398; 8 Cent. L. J. 277 ; 36 lowii, 122. Gandy v. Jubher, 5 Best & S. 485 ; s. c, 13 Week. Eep. 1022. p. 318. c 17 Am. L. Eeg. (N. S.) 453. ? L. R. 10 0. P. 662. Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen, 106. p. 749. Gardner v. Bennett, 6 Jones & Sp. 197. pp. 900, 914. Gardner v. Grace, 1 Fost. & Pin. 359. pp. 1183, 1192. c 19 Ohio St. ill. Gardner v. Heartt, 1 Denio, 466. p. 1212. C24N. J. L. 285; 5 Denio, 267; 29 Barb. 424; 2 Col. 165 ; 25 N. Y. .346 ; 30 Me. 179. Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162. Garland v. Towne, 55 N. H. 55; s. c, 2 Cent. L. J. 442. pp. 96, 99, 348. (In full, p. 333.) Garlinghouse v. Jaoobos, 29 N. T. 297. pp. 819, 826. c 1 Hun, 571, 572; 4 N. Y. S. C. (T. &0.) 124, 125; 7 Lans. 438; 51 Bart). 413; 60 Barb. 384 ; 5 Lans. 22 ; 41 How. Pr. 450 ; a N. Y. 121 ; 34 N. Y. 390. Garmon v. Bangor, 38 Me. 443. p. 1205. c 42 Me. 335; 68 Me. 658. Garner v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 34 Mo. 235. p. 534. c 45 Mo. 24. Garnett v. Hamblin, 11 Smed. & M. 219. p. 826. Garrett v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 36 Iowa, 121. p. 154. c 17 Kan. 389 ; 4J. Iowa, 196. Garrett o. Freeman, 5 Jones L. 78. pp. 148, 150. Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104. pp. 889, 1058. c 66 Mo. 576, 595 ; 2 Mo. App. 46 ; 60 Mo. 416 ; 57 Mo. 98. Garrigan v. Berry, 12 Allen, 84. p. 385. Garris v. Portsmouth, etc., E. Co., 2 Ired. L. 324. p. 496. c 18 Cal. 358 ; 23 N. J. L. 188 ; 8 Nev. 114. Garrison v. New York, 5 Bosw. 497. p. 734. c 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 138. Gartland v. Toledo, etc., E. Co., 67 111. 498. p. 977. Garvey v. Dung, 30 How. Pr. 315. p. 886. Gaskill V. Dudley, 6 Mete. 546. p. 703. Gates V. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 39 Iowa, 45. pp. 497, 507, 1018. c 46 Iowa, 113 ; 12 West. Jur. 477. Gates V. Miles, 3 Conn. 64. pp. 1251, 1252. Gautret v. Egerton, L. E. 2 C. P. 371 ; ... G., 36 L. J. (C. P.) 191 ; 15 Week. Eep. 638; 16 L. T. (n. s.) 17. pp. 303, 304. c 62 Mo. 561 ; 59 Mo. 30 ; 41 Ind. 250 ; 47 Ind. 48; 46 Md. 218; 55 How. Pr. 173; 41 N. Y. 533; 98 Mass. 578 ; 25 Mich. 9 ; 34 N. J. L. 472 ; 2 Cent. L. J. 540. Gavett V. Manchester, etc., E. Co., 16 Gray, 501. p. 1238. Gay V. Winter, 34 Cal. 153. pp. 1146, 1175, 1177, 1179, 1279, 1293. c 37 Cal. 419. ? 4 Cent. L. J. 84. Gayford v. Nicholls, 9 Exoh. 702 ; s. »., 23 L. J. (Exch.) 205. pp. 262, 275, 276, 278. c 12 C. B. (N. s.) 791; 61 N. Y. 186; 25 N. J. L. 362; 27 Gratt. 88. Gaylor v. Hunt, 23 Ohio St. 255. p. 817. Gaynor o. Old Colony, etc., E. Co., 100 Mass. 208. pp. 316, 453, 460, 1176, 1237, 1239. c 105 Mass. 79 ; 103 Mass. 514 ; 55 Ind. 50 ; 120 Ma^s. 265 ; 123 Mass. 515 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 138 ; 5 Eeporter, 238 ; 104 Mass. 116, 141 ; 56 Ind. 520 ;• 4 Cent. L. J. 84 ; 8 Cent. L. J. 444. Gear v. C. C. & D. E. Co., 43 Iowa, 83. pp. 569, 570. Geiselman u. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 86. p. 121.5. General Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sherwood, 14 How. 351. p. 1101. General Steam Nav. Co. v. British and Colonial Steam Nav. Co., L. R. 3 Exch. 330. p. 895. Gent V. New York, Seld. Notes, 240. pp. 740, 900, 908. George v. Haverhill, 110 Mass. 506. pp. 782, 783, 805, 1198, 1204, 1257. c 110 Mass. 339. Ixiv TABLE OF CASES. George i\ Skivington, L. R. 5 Exch. 1. pp. 235, 236. c 39 N. J. L. 309 ; 104 Mass. 68 ; £,. E. 5 Q. B. 615. Georgia R., etc., Co. V.Anderson, 33 Ga. 110. pp. 496, 502. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Garr, 57 Ga. 277. p. 1286. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Goldwire, 56 Ga. 196. p. 898. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Kenney, 58 Ga. 485. pp. 980, 1008. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Monroe, 49 Ga. 373. p. 513. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Neely, 56 Ga. 540. p. 498. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Oaks, 52 Ga. 410. p. 1290. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Rhodes, 56 Ga. 645. pp. 970, 998, 1021. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Wynn, 42 Ga. 331. pp. 419, 1272, 1277, 1286. c 54 Ga. 504; 57 Ga, 357; 55 Ga. 144. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Willis, 23 Ga. 317. p. 514. Gerald v. Boston, 108 Mass. 580. pp. 361, 786, 787, 1198. c 120 Mass. 588. Gerren v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 60 Mo. 405. p. 522. Gerrish v. Sweetser, 4 Pick. 374. p. 802. Ghenn v. Provincetown, 105 Mass. 313. pp. 761, 804. c 116 Mass. 96. Gibbons v. Pepper, 4 Modern, 405 ; s. c, 2 Salk. 637. p. 1234. cl7 Barb. 99; 7 Conn. 95; 3 Gal. & Dav. 13; Lalor, 195; 7 Vt. 65; 3 Wils. ill. Gibbs V. Liverpool Docks. (See Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs.) pp. 588, 589, 594, 600, 773. Gibson v. Erie R. Co., 63 N. Y. 449 ; s. u., 5 Hun, 31. pp. 972, 987, 1008. c6 Eeporter, 111; 12 Hun, 291, 293 ; 7 Ke- porter, 61 ; 68 Me. 51. Gibson v. Inglis, 4 Camp. 72. p. 556. c 29 Me. 309. Gibson v. Pacific E. Co., 46 Mo. 163. pp. 970, 972, 973, 985, 994. (In full, p. . 944.) C52 Mo. 375; 59 Mo. 295, 301, 302, 504; 63 Mo. 459 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 306 ; 46 Mo. 576, 578 ; 19 Kan. 272; 6 Eeporter, 200 ; 65 Mo. 229; 3 Mo. App. 307; 60 Mo. 162; 47 Miss. 414, 416. Gibson v. Preston, L. R. 5 Q. B. 218. pp. 701, 715, 716. c 132 Mass. 347, 363, 364,365; 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 116; L. K. 10 Q. B. 223. Gibson v. South-Eastern R. Co., 1 Fost. & Pin. 23. pp. 125, 153. c 30 Wis. 121. Gidley v. Lord Palmerston, 3 Brod. & B. 275. p. 669. Gilbert v. Beach, 5 Duer, 423; s. »., 16 N. Y. 606 ; 5 Bosw. 445, 454. pp. 903, 910, 913. c 1 Eobt. 436; 6 Phna. 257; 57 N. Y. 392. Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117. pp. 1260, 1261, 1263. Gilbert u. Nagle, 118 Mass. 278. pp. 308, 309, 907. c 6 Eeporter, 752. Gilbert u. Roxbury, 100 Mass. 185. pp. 360, 785. c 104 Mass. 83 ; 81 111. 308. ? 52 N. H. 413. Gilbert v. Stone, Stylo, 72. p. 63. Gilbertson v. Richardson, 5 C. B. 502. p. 1082. c 109 Mass. 282. Giles V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 55 N. H. 552. pp. 500, 529, 531. c 20 Kan. 364. Giles V. Taflf Vale R. Co., 2 El. & Bl. 822. p. 888. Gill V. Atlantic, etc., R. Co», 27 Ohio St. 240. p. 254. Gill V. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477. p. 823. Gillespie v. Newburgh, 54 N. Y. 468. pp. 1177, 1198, 1238. Gillett V. Missouri Valley R. Co., 55 Mo. 315. p. 887. Gillett V. Western R. Co., 8 Allen, 563. p. 357. c 116 Mass. 423 ; 105 Mass. 83. Gilligan v. New York, etc., R. Co., 1 E. D. Smith, 453. pp. 397, 1242, 1251. Gilljs V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 59 Pa St. 129. p. 314. c 35 N. J. L. 25 ; 59 Mo. 36 ; 71 111. 507, 509 ; 47 Ind. 46; 65 Pa. St. 275; 21 Minn. 213, 314; 4 Hun, 763; 67 111. 264; 5 Eeporter, 345; 86 Pa. St. 79. Gillshannon v. Stony Brook R. Co., 10 Cash. 228. pp. 1035, 1038. c 119 Mass. 421 ; 28 Ind. 377 ; 86 Pa. St. 440 ; 8 Kan. 517; 53 Ga. 16; 18 N. Y. 434; 53 Pa. St. 456; 43 Me. 270; 102 Mass. 583; 49 Barb. 326; 14 Minu. 364 ; 38 Pa. St. 110 ; 10 Allen, 237. 238 ; TABLE OF CASES. Ixv U Kan. 93; 62 Me. 466; 6 Eeporter, 126; 59 Pa. St. 246, 2.51; 13 Ind. 369; 28 Ind. 377; 46 Texas, 538; 17 N. Y. 156; 76 lU. 398; 18 Ind. 230; 25 N. Y. 565; 43 Me. 270; 10 Gray, 281; 36 Mo. 433. d 9 Heisk. 868. Qillson V. North Gray R. Co., 33 Upper Canada Q. B. 129. p. 149. Gilman v. Deerfield, 15 Gray, 577. pp. 803, 1204. c 103 Mass. 510 ; 1 Allen, 190 ; 42 Ind. 342 ; 110 Mass. 339 ; 30 Wis. 414; 4 Allen, 289 ; 8 Allen, 525. Gilman v. Eastern E. Co., 13 Allen, 433; s. ,;., 10 Allen, 233. pp. 939, 941, 970, 972, 974, 1035, 1096. c 49 N. Y. 631; 38 Ind. 322; 86 Pa. St. 440; 117 Mass. 411, 412; 5 Lans. 442; 2 Lans. 513; 53 Pa. St. 456; 102 Mass. 584, 699; 14 Allen, 196; 20 Mich. 122, 124; 3 Dill. 323; 49 Barb. 327; 110 Mass. 259; 14 Minn. 363, 364; 46 Mo. 678; 55 Ind. 50; 106 Mass. 284; 119 Mass. 412, 421 ; 62 Me. 466 ; 6 Eeporter, 126 ; 59 Pa. St. 248, 252; 46 Texas, 538; 5 Hun, 494; 56 Ind. 520; 66 Me. 425; 49 Texas, 189; 6 Ben. 45. Gilman v. European, etc., R. Co., 60 Me. 235. pp. 515, 517, 527, 1096. c 33 Wis. 647 ; 65 Me. 339. Gilman v. Laconia, 65 N. H. 130. pp. 733, 737, 740, 741, 743, 756. Gilman, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer, 76 111. 192. pp. 495, 507, 519. ' Gilmartin v. New York, 55 Barb. 239. pp. 739, 884. Qilmore v. DHscoll, 122 Mass. 199. pp. 275, 276. (In full, p. 254.) Gilmore v. Moore, 30 Ga. 628. p. 826. Gilpatrick v. Biddeford, 51 Me. 182 ; s. t., 54 Me. 93. pp. 759, 760. c 66 Mo. 349. Ginna o. Second Avenue R. Co., 8 Hun, 494; s. o., 67 N. Y. 596. p. 1280. Ginnon v. New York, etc., R. Co., 3 Robt. 25. p. 1238. Gladman v. Johnson, 36 L. J. (C. P.) 153 ; s. u., 15 Week. Rep. 313 ; 15 L. T. (n. s.) 476. pp. 204, 890. c L. E. 9 0. P. 650, 652, 653, 656, 657; 43 L. J. (C. P.) 368, 369, 370. Gladwell v. Steggall, 8 Scott, 60. p. 235. Glaholm v. ^^arker, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 223 ; s. c, L. R. 2 Eq. 598. p. 1287. Glassey v. Hestonville, etc., R. Co., 57 Pa. St. 172. pp. 1184, 1191. c 18 Ohio St. 414; 59 Pa. St. 263; 72 Pa. St. 171; 67 Pa. St. 315; 75 Pa. St. 86, 376; I Cent. L. J. 374. Gleason v. Bremen, 50 Me. 222. pp. 1176, 1268. Glickauf v. Maurer, 75 111. 289. p. 324. Glidden u. Reading, 38 Vt. 52. p. 1184. C41 Vt. 441; 13 Hun, 83. Glidden v. Towle, 31 N. H. 147. p. 213. Glover v. North StafTordshire E. Co., 5 Eng. Law & Eq. 335. p. 556. Goddard v. Grand Trunk E. Co., 57 Me. 202. p. 887. Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. St. 387. p. 319. c63 Pa. St. 151; 2 Phila. 228; 26 Pa. St. 115; 56 N. T. 128; 6 Phila. 256, 257; 59 N. Y. 33; 1 Hilt. 445; 56 N". Y. 401; 56 Pa. St. 451. Goff V. Great Northern R. Co., 30 L. T. (n. s.) 148. pp. 885, 888. Goheen v. Texas, etc., K. Co., 3 Cent. L. J. 382. pp. 982, 985, 1012. Goldstein v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 8 Cent. L. J. 367. p. 1207. Goldthorp v. Hardman, 2 Dow. & L. 442 ; 13 Mee. & W. 377; 14 L. J. (Exch.) 61. p. 1253. Goltz V. Winona, etc., R. Co., 22 Minn. 55. p. 1148. Gonyeau v. Milton, 48 Vt. 172. p. 798. Gonzales v. New York, etc., E. Co., 6 Eobt. 93, 297; a. c, 38 N. Y. 440; 1 Sweeny, 506 ; 39 How. Pr. 408 ; 1 Jones & Sp. 57 ; 50 How. Pr. 126. pp. 424, 450, 460, 1238. c 14 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) ,30, 76 ; 34 Iowa, 160; 54, N. Y. 471; 29 Iowa, 38; 7 Lans. 13; 42 N. Y. 473; 3 Lans. 85; 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 646. Gooch V. Stephenson, 13 Me. 371. p. 212. Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 459. pp. 104, 749. Goodall V. Milwaukee, 5 Wis. 32. p. 744. Goodfellow V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 106 Mass. 461. pp. 461, 1021. c 4 Hun, 163. Goodhue v. Dix, 2 Gray, 181. pp. 383, 385, 890. c 28 Mich. 45; 100 Mass. 315. Goodloe V. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio, 500. pp. 668, 747. c 15 Ohio, 476 ; 2 Denio, 447 ; 7 Ohio St. 463; 4 N. Y. 204; 12 Mo. 422; 12 Ohio St. 378. Goodman v. Gay, 15 Pa. St. 188. pp. 209, 216. c 44 Me. 329. Ixvi TABLE OF CASES. Goodman v. Kennell, 1 Moo. & P. 241 ; s. c, 3 Car. & P. 167. p. 885. Goodman v. Taylor, 5 Car. & P. 410. p. 389. c 17 Barb. 99; 2 Ired. I/. 326; 7 Vt. 65; 51 Me. 333; 6 Ualy, 2U. Goodno V. Oshkosh, 24 Wis. 549 ; s. c, 28 Wis. 300. pp. 762, 763, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1269. c :M Wis. 291; 33 Iowa, 399; 32 Wis. 536; 30 Wis. 616, 620 ; 26 Wis. 57 ; 29 Wis. 585. Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 111. 445. pp. 731, 733. c 18 Wis. 86. Goodsell V. Hartford, etc., E. Co., 33 Conn. 56. p. 1290. Goodwin v. Cheveley, 4 Hurl. & N. 631 ; s. c, 28 L. J. (Exch.) 298. p. 209. Gordon v. Kolt, 4 Exch. 365 ; s. c, 7 Dow. & L. 87; 18 L. J. (Exch.) 432. pp. 890, 891. c i Exch. 587; U Jur. 24; 7 Dovr. »■ L. 218; 6 Eng. Rail. Cas. 245 ; 20 L. (Exch ) 187 Gorham v. Cooperstown, 5t. K. Y. 660. p. 790. c 10 Hun, 533. Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232 ; s. c, 6 Reporter, 459. p. 100. c 6 Eeporter, 751. Gorman v. Lowell, 117 Mass. 65. p. 1094. Gorman v. Pacific R. R., 26 Mo. 441. pp. 213, 501, 502, 504, 514, 515. c 60 Mo. 213 ; 36 Mo. 219, 221 ; 41 Mo. 273. 274 ; 37 Mo. 293 ; 16 Kan. 576 ; 45 Mo. 26 ; 53 Ala. 597 ; 41 Iowa, 303; 42 Mo. 196; 9 Nev. 295; 7 Cent. li. J. 429. Gormly v. Vulcan Iron-Works, 61 Mo. 492. p. 1030. c 63 Mo. 311; 4 Mo. App. 243, 244. Gorton v. Erie R. Co., 45 N. Y. 660. pp. 420, 426, 461. c 64 N. Y. 538; 49 Oal. 258; 64 Mo. 489; 50 How. Pr. 129; 67 Me. 104; 41 Iowa, 231; 48 N". y. 675; 64 N. Y. 529; 6 Hun, 319; 2 Hun, 538; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 125 ; 65 Barb. 492 ; 7 Hun, 561, 562; 53 N. Y. 455; 59 N. Y. 471, 472. Goshen, etc.. Turnpike Co. a. Sears, 7 Conn. 86. pp. 1085, 1249. c 36 N. H. 294. Goslin V. Agricultural Hall Co., 1 C. P. Div. 482. p. 900. Gottwald V. Bernlieimer, 6 Daly, 212. p. 389. Gough V. Brysin, 2 Mee. & W. 770. pp. 1252, 1253. c 18 N. Y. 252;6Duer, 26; 19 C. B. (N. 8.) 236; 20 Wis. 535. Gould V. McKenna, 86 Pa. St. 297 ; s. c, 6 Reporter, 343. p. 1271. Gourdier v. Cormack, 2 E. D. Smith, 254 ; K. c, 2 E. D. Smith, 200. pp. 114, 900, 903. c 4 E. D. Smith, 293 ; 4 Bosw. 147. Goverjiment Street R. Co. v. Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70. pp. 397, 400, 1184, 1192. Governor, etc., v. Meredith. (See British Cast-Plate Manufacturers i>. Meredith.) Grace v. Adams, 100 Mass. 505. p. 846. Grady v. Wolsner, 46 Ala. 381. p. 318. Graeber v. Derwin, 43 Cal. 495. p. 1257. Graff V. Baltimore, 10 Md. 544. p. 733. Gramlich v. Railroad Co., 9 Phila. 78. pp. 422, 1236. Gramlich v. Wurst, 86 Pa. St. 74; s. c, 5 Reporter, 344. pp. 307, 361. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308. p. 744. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Judson, 35 Mich. 506. p. 512. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Southwiok, 30 Mich. 444. p. 536. e 38 Am. T,. Ecg. (N. s.) 31; 31 Mich. 277. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 ; s. c, 3 Cent. L. J. 353. pp. 161, 171, 172. c 39 M. J. L. 307; 16 Kan. 580; 11 W. Va. 36, 41. Grannis v. Cummings, 25 Conn. 165. pp. 148, 151. Grant v. Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381. pp. 773, 774, 1256. c 58 N. Y. 395 ; ID Hun, 536. Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St. 420. p. 734. c 123 Mass. 317; 6 Cent. L. J. 409. Grant v. Mosely, 29 Ala. 302. p. 1151. Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 456. p. 781. Graves o. Shattuck, 35 N. H. 257. pp. 353, 355, 3.56, 761. c 43 N. H. 361, 362; 30 Wis. 397; 42 N. H. 203,217; 40N. H. 416. Graw V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 54 Mo. 240. p. 518. Gray v. Boston Gas-Light Co., 114 Mass. 149. pp. 105, 347. c 68 Me. 164. Gray u. Combs, 7 J. J. Marsh. 478. p. 303. Gray v. Harris, 107 Mass. 492. p. 103. c 123 Mass. 23; 65 Me. 463; 6 Eeporter, 460. TABLE OF CASES. Ixvii Gray v. Pullen, 5 Best & S. 970 ; «. c, 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 265; 13 Week. Kep. 257; 11 L. T. (n. s.) 569. pp. 558, 905, 908. c L. R. 1 Q. B. 327, 328 ; 30 Md. 206 ; 6 Hun, 586; 36 L. J. (Q. B.) 166; L. R. 2 Q. B. 266; 8 Best & S. 274; 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 23; L. R. 4 Q. B. 141 ; 46 Pa. St. 221 ; 11 R. I. 455 ; 86 Pa. St. 159; L. R. 1 Sc. App. 340. Gray v. Second Avenue E. Co., 2 Jones & Sp. 519. p. 1212. Grayville v. "Whitaker, 85 III. 439 ; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 97. pp. 561, 564, 761, 775, 796, 797. Greasley v. Codling, 2 Bing. 263. pp. 340, 341, 342, 621. Great Western R. Co. v. Bacon, 30 HI. 347. pp. 536, 537. C 36 111. 283, 284. Great Western R. Co. v. Bennett, L. K. 2 H. L. 27. p. 275. c L. B. 7 Q. B. 266, 277. Great Western R. Co. v. Braid, 1 Moo. P. C. (n. s.) 101. p. 1227. Great Western R. Co. v. Geddis, 33 111. 304. pp. 495, 507. c 55 Mo. 38, 39; 68 111. 318; 46 Ala. 396; 50 111. 153. Great Western R. Co. v. Hanks, 36 111. 282. pp. 536, 537. c 47 Mo. 2.19. Great Western R. Co. v. Haworth, 39 111. 346. pp. 163, 166. c 46 lU. 499. Great Western E. Co. a. Helm, 27 HI. 198. p. 536. c 20 Iowa, 194, 222; 27 Ohio St. 249; 47 111. 174. Great Western R. Co. -v. Morthland, 30 HI. 451. pp. 510, 520, 538. c 68 111. 383 ; 47 Mo. 249. Great Western E. Co. v. Thompson, 17 111. 131. pp. 496, 497. c20 111. 489; 39 111. 192; 2 Mete. (Ky.) 182, 183 ; 9 Wis. 220 ; 42 111. 451. ? 46 111. 498. Green v. Bridge Creek, 38 Wis. 449. pp. 755, 759, 771, 794. c 43 Wis. 522; 6 Cent. L. J. 428. Green v. Burke, 23 Wend. 490. p. 898. Green v. Canaan, 29 Conn. 157. p. 759. c 29 Iowa, 91 ; 31 Conn. 321. Green v. Danby, 12 Vt. 338. pp. 755, 1209, 1238. c 22 N. H. 663; 19 Vt. 476; 23 Vt. 12. Green v. Elmslie, Peak. N. P. C. 278. p. 1101. Green v. Erie R. Co., 11 Hun, 333. pp. 449, 450, 460. Green v. Hern, 2 Penn. 167. p. 826. Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 32 Barb. 25. pp. 1272, 1277, 1280, 1287, 1289, 1290. Green v. Kennedy, 46 Barb. 16. p. 824. Green o. New River Co., 4 Term Rep. 589. p. 1060. c 1 Coldw. 77. Green v. Reading, 9 Watts, 383. p. 694, 747. c 8 Pa. St. .375; 42 Cal. 438; 10 Pa. St. 96; 4 Watts & S. 616; 11 Ch. Leg. N. 2.56; 19 Alb. L. J. 298; 7 Reporter, 386; 18 Pa. St. 189; 4 N. Y. 204 ; 13 La. An. 428 ; 12 Mo. 421. d 51 Mo. 516. Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 243. pp. 138, 1162. c 18 Ohio St. 410, 411 ; 3 Q. B. Div. 336 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 14; 17 Alb. L. J. 507; 59 111. 352; 63 Ind. 155; 14 Allen, 298; 101 Mass. 465; 75111. 98; 38 Ala. 86; 62 Me. 24;^; 46 Pa. St. 161. Greenleaf u. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 33 Iowa, 52. pp. 1009, 1014, 1015. Greenleaf u. Eranois, 18 Pick. 117. pp. 103, 261, 749. Greenleaf J). Illinois, etc., E. Co., 29 Iowa, 14. pp. 973, 988, 989, 994, 996, 1053, 1237. c43 Iowa, 671; 37 Iowa, 325; 44 Iowa, 137; 41 Ind. 254 ; 33 Iowa, 57; 32 Iowa, 363 ; 39 Iowa, 621; 45 Iowa, 664; 3 Mo. App. 307; 38 Iowa, 281 ; 40 Iowa, 344, 345 ; 3 Ool . 602, 505 ; 36 Iowa, 38 ; 7 Reporter, 560. Greenville o. Louisville, 13 Bush, 226. p. 735. Greenwood v. Callahan, 111 Mass. 298. p. 1202. Gregg V. Gregg, 55 Pa. St. 227. p. 215. Gregg V. Wyman, 4 Cusb. 322. pp. 979, 1078, 1094, 1095, 1161. Gregorys. Adams, 14 Gray, 242. p. 1201. c 109 Mass. 127 ; 8 Allen, 239. Gregory v. Piper, 9 Barn. & Cress. 591 ; s. c, 4 Man. & E. 500. pp. 10, 12, 21, 885, 889. (In full, p. 862.) c 2 Mete. (Ky.) 122; IS Minn. 368; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 267; L. B. 1 B.xoh. 276; 4 Man. & G. 59; 4 Scott N". B. 664; 16 Mo. 513; 4 Exch. 586; 14 Jur. 24 ; 7 Dow. & L. 217, 218 ; 6 Eng. Rail. Cas. 243, 244; 20 L. J. (Exch.) 187; 16 Ark. 318. Gresham v. Taylor, 51 Ala. 505. p. 218. TABLE OF CASES. Grew V. Hill, 6 Dow. & L. 664; s. c, 3 Exch. 801 ; 18 L. J. (Exch.) 317. p. 1252. Gribble v. Sioux City, 38 Iowa, 390. pp. 768, 1201, 1210. c 42 Iowa, 424. Gridley v. Bloomington, 68 111. 51. p. 317. Gries v. Zci-k, 24 Ohio St. 329. p. 219. Griffin v. Ci>lvp.r, 16 N. Y. 489. p. 849. Griffin V. JIartin, 7 Bi\rb. 297. p. 214. c 24 Vt. 494. Griffin .;. New York, 9 N. Y. 456 ; s. c, Seld. Notes, 223. pp. 731, 732, 764, 787, 1152, 1206. c 36 X. Y. 5S; 37 Barb. 299; 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 33 ; 4 E. D. Smith, 24 ; 15 Mich. 313 ; 33 Iowa, 399; 29 Conn. 209; 42 N. T. 473; 5 Sandf. S. C. 303, 304; 15 Barb. 443; 9 Hun, 685; 47 N. Y. 647; 40 Ind. 65; 1 Daly, 430, 431; 1 Disney, 638 ; 10 Hun, 535 ; 55 N. Y. 667 ; 42 Ind. 342, 343 ; 46 N. Y. 135 ; 3 Daly, 150, 1.51 ; 66 JT. Y. 297 ; 2 Hilt. 451; 9 Abb. Pr. 44; 18 How. Pr. 175; 40 Barb. 207; 4 Keyes, 267; 50 X. Y. 205; 36 N. Y. 58; 33 Iowa, 399. Griffin v. Sanbornton, 44 N. H. 246. pp. 340, 754, 755. c 11 K. I. 453. Griffin v. Williamstown, 6 W. Va. 312. pp. 753, 761. Griffin V. Willow, 43 Wis. 509. pp. 799, 1149. c 43 Wis. 525; 6 Cent. L. J. 429. Griffiths V. Gidlow, 3 Hurl. & N. 648 ; s. c, 27 L. J. (Exch.) 404. pp. 973, 1008. c20 Mich. 127; 3 Dill. 325; 38 Pa. St. 110; 119 Mass. 414; 3 Eobt. 84; 28 How. Pr. 475 ; 39 Iowa, 620; 31 Cal. 381; 4 Or. 57; 25 N. Y. 566, 567,570; 29 Conn. 560. Griffiths V. Wolfram, 22 Minn. 183. p. 913. Griggs V. Pleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81. pp. 216, 389, 1088, 1089, 1160, 1202, 1239. c75 111.98; 6 Daly, 214. Grimsby v. Chappell, 5 Rich. L. 443. pp. 556, 559, 561, 1236. c 53 Me. 502. Grill V. General, etc., Collier Co., L. K. 1 C. P. 600. pp. 844, 1101. Grimes v. Keene, 52 N. H. 330. pp. 766, 802. Grinde v. ililwaukee, etc., K. Co., 42 Iowa, 276. pp. 1245, 1247. Grinnell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299. pp. 840, 841, 845, 848, 1242. Grippen v. New York, etc., Il.,Co., 40 N, Y. 34. pp. 423, 424, 425, 430. c 4 Daly , 331 ; 34 Iowa, 160, 281 ; 7 Lans. 14 ; 3 Lans. 85 ; 25 Mich. 291 ; 63 N. Y. 526 ; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. &C.)245; 2N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 64fi; 14 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 76; 58 X. Y. 458, 459. Griswold v. Sedgwick, 6 Cow. 456. pp. 825, 826. Grizzle v. Frost, 3 Fost. & Fin. 622. pp. 976, 978, 1029. cl02 Mass. 599; 55 Ind. 50; 78 Pa. St. 25, 32 ; 98 Mass. 568; 37 Mich. 212; 19 Alb. L. J. 160; 7 Eeporter, 61. Grocers' Co. u. Donne, 3 Scott, 356 ; s. c, 3 Bing. N. C. 34; 2 Hodges, 120. pp. 279, 822. Groenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Ld. Raym. 454. p. 817. Grotenkemper v. Harris, 25 Ohio St. 510. p. 1291. Groton v. Haines, 36 N. H. 388. p. 749. c 55 N, H. 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138. Grove v. Port Wayne, 45 Ind. 429. pp. 346, 777, 778. C 9 Hun, 685. Grows V. Maine, etc., R. Co., 67 Me. 100. pp. 429, 430. Guerry v. Kerton, 2 Rich. L. 507. p. 1270. Guest V. Reynolds, 68 111. 478. p. 274. Gurnsey v. Lovell, 9 Wend. 319. p. 825. Guy V. Livesey, Cro. Jac. 501. p. 1241. Gwathney v. Little Miami R. Co., 12 Ohio St. 92. p. 319. c 7 Cent. L. J. 494 ; 17 Am. L. Eeg. (N. s.) 467. Gwinnell v. Eamer, L. R. 10 C. P. 658. p. 332. c 17 Am. li. Eeg. (N. s.) 466. H. Haack !>. Fearing, 5 Robt. 528 ; s. c, 35 How. Pr. 459. pp. 885, 889. Haas V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 41 Wis. 44. p. 431. Hackett ;;. Middlesex Man. Co., 101 Mass. 101. pp. 973, 1022, 1054. c 102 Mjvss. 600; 106 Mass. 462. Hackford v. New York, etc., R. Co., 53 N. Y. 654; s. c, 6 Lans. 381; 43 How. Pr. 222. pp. 428, 430, 1177, 1253. c 8 Jones & Sp. 375; 64 N. Y. 529; 65 Barb. 148, 154 ; 67 N. Y. 587 ; 7 Hun, 556 ; 60 N. Y. 332. Hadley u. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341. p. 849. TABLE OF CASES. Ixix Eadley v. Taylor, L. R. 1 C. P. 53; s. c, 11 Jur. (n. s.) 979; 14 Week. Eep. 59; 13 L. T. (n. s.) 368. pp. 287, 321, 349, 361. c 68 N". Y. 291 ; 58 N. Y. 133 ; 114 Mass. 153 ; 16 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 323; 17 Am. L. Eeg. (N. s.) 456 ; 33 N. J. L. 264 ; 50 Bavb. 364. Haffc.i-d V. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297. pp. 621, 735, 737, 738. c 52 Me. 122; 1 Allen, 101, 173; 98 Mass. 571; 13 Han, 218; 11 E. I. 143; 13 Bxish, 229; 33 Wis. 318; 62 N. Y. 165; 38 Conn. 380, 381, 382, ■395; 49 How. Pr. 68; 104 Mass. 93, 95. Hagan's Petition, 7 Cent. L. J 311; s. c, 6 Reporter, 707. pp. 357, 1188, 1258. HaRHdorn v. Whitmore, 1 Stark. N. P. 157. p. 1101. Hagen v. Kean, 3 Dill. 124. p. 1282. -Haggerty v. Central E. Co., 31 N. J. L. 349. pp. 1276, 1277. Hahn v. Corbett, 2 Bing. 205. p. 1101. Hahn v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 51 Cal. 605. pp. 351, 352. Haigh V. London, etc., R. Co., 1 Fost. & Fin. 646 ; s. c, 8 Week. Rep. 6. pp. 497, 528. JHaight V. New York, etc., E. Co., 7 Lans. 11. p. 424. c 2 Hun, 539; 5 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & O.) 124. Haines v. Illinois, etc., E. Co., 41 Iowa, 227. p. 428. JIaire v. Reese, 7 Phila. 138. p. 1216. Halderman v, Beokwith, 4 McLean, 286. p. 1214. Hale V. Dutant, 39 Texas, 667. pp. 318, 1199. Hale V. Johnson, 80 111. 185; s. c, 4 Cent. L. J. 462. pp. 900, 910. c 7 Cent. L. J. 494. Haley v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 21 Iowa, 15." p. 1152. c 38 Iowa, 296 ; 32 Iowa, 149 ; 29 Iowa, 58; 36 Iowa, 40. Haley v. Earle, 30 N. Y. 208. p. 1157. Haley u. New York, etc., E. Co., 7 Hun, 84. pp. 423, 452, 461, 1213. Hall V. Cootmire, 2 Vt. 9. p. 218. Hall V. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251. pp. 1093, 1005. Ball V. Fearnley, 3 Q. B. 919; s. c, 3 Gal. & Dav. 10; 7 Jur. 61; 12 L. J. (Q. B.) 22. pp. 1100, 1252. c 8 Jur. (N. s.) 797. Hall V. Fond du Lac, 42 Wis. 274. pp. 763, 764, 1257. Hall V. Hollander, 4 Barn. & Cress. 660. pp. 372, 1123, 1242. c 25 Me. 45; 15 Ga. .356; 2 Cush. 351; 117 Mass. 544; 19 0. B. (If. S.) 236; 34 L. J. (C. P.) 296. ? 21 Wend. 617. Hall V. Johnson, 3 Hurl. & Colt. 589 ; s. c, 11 Jur. (n. s.) 180; 34 L. .]. (Exch.) •2-2-2 ■ 13 Week. Rep. 411 ; 11 L. T. (u. s.) 779. pp. 970, 1035. c 53 Pa. St. 456; 13 Allen, 443; 6 Reporter, 126. Hall V. Lowell, 10 Cush. 260. p. 1238. c 102 Mass. 334; 24 Wis. 274; 37 Conn. 420; 12 Allen, 570. Hall V. Manchester, 39 N. H. 302 ; s. c, 40 N. H. 410. pp. 759, 7B1, 783. c 52 N. H. 378; 43 N. H. 268; 46 N. H. 195. Hall V. Pickard, 3 Camp. 187. p. 390. Hall V. Ripley, 119 Mass. 135. pp. 388, 1202. Hall V. Smith, 2 Bing. 156; s. u., 9 J. B. Moo. 228. pp. 590, 592, 604, 605, 606, 623, 056, 668, 669, 670, 820, 876, 899. c 3 Hill, 538 ; 5 Best & S. 450, 454, 405, 467, 471 ; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 1021, 1022, 1024, 1025, 1036; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 285, 287, 291, 292; 63 N. Y. 286, 287, 288 ; 6 CI. & Fin. 903, 904 ; 3 Gray, 358 ; 11 C. B. (N. s.) 204, 205, 208; 8 Jur. (N. s.) 80; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 363; 1 Man. & E. 190; 5 Sandt. S. C. 332; 11 Hun, 557; 61 N. Y. 194; 25 N. J. L. 373; 3Allen,168; 2 Denio,-448, 450; 17 Gratt. 241, 212, 243 ; 1 Denio, 598 ; 52 N. H. 125. ? L. E. 1 H. L. Il3, 115, 116; 11 H. L. Cas. 715, 717, 718; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 575, 576; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 232, 233 ; 1 Hurl. & N. 60. Hall V. Unity, 57 Me. 529. pp. 362, 769, 770. c 63 Me. 479. Hall V. Warner, 60 Barb. 198. p. 199. Halley (The), L. R. 2 P. C. 193. p. 895. Halloran v. New York, etc., E. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257. pp. 500, 503, 521, 529, 1158. c 37 Barb. 520; 1 Hilt. 427. Hallowell Bank v. Howard, 14 Mass. 181. p. 826. Hallower v. Henly, 6 Cal. 209. p. 973. c 12 Ohio St. 491; 31 Cal. 382; 46 Texas, 538. Halpin v. Third Avenue E. Co., 8 Jones & Sp. 175 p. 400. Halty V. Markel, 44 111. 225. p. 886. Halverson u. Nisen, 3 Sawyer, 562. pp. 1028, 1035. Ixx TABLE OF CASES. Ham V. Wales, 58 Me. 222. p. 764. Hnmblett v. Hamblett, 6 N. H. 342. p. 802. Hamilton a. Boston, 14 Allen, 475. pp. 1093, 1094. c 57 Me. 42.) ; 4 Mo. App. 242, 243 ; 65 Me. 39, 40; 109 Mass. 404; 14 Allen, 486. 752N.H.413. Hamilton w. Cutts, 4 Mass. 349. p. 790. Hamilton v. Des Moines, etc., R. Co., 36 Iowa, 31. p. 1002. c 43 Iowa, 667; 36 Iowa, 473. Hamilton v. Iron Mountain Co., 4 Mo. App. 564. p. 1028. Hamilton v. McPhei-son, 28 N. T. 72. p, 858. Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109. pp. 618, 706, 733, 734. c 122 Mass. 353; 5 Neb. 497; 7 Cent. L. J, 130. Hammack v. White, 11 C. B. (n. s.) 588 ; s. v., 8 Jur. (n. s.) 796 : 31 L. J. (C. P.) 129; lOWeek. Eep. 230; 5L. T. (n. s.) 676. pp. 21, 81, 56, 69, 98, 216, 1222, 1234. . c 6 Daly, 214 ; 57 Pa. St. 379 ; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 279; li. R. 1 Exch. 286; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 606; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 160; L. E. 7 0. P. 2S6; 44 L. J. (Exch.) 177, 178; 51 N. Y. 488; 36 L. J. (C. P.) 24; li. K. 2 C. P. 10; 53 N. H. 449; 13 Am. L. Eeg. (N. s.) 372. Hammersmith, etc., R. Co. v. Brand, L. E. 4 H. L. 171. p: 152. Hammon v. South-Eastern R. Co., Wolf. on Rys., J 239, note e. p. 163. Hammond u. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 43 Iowa, 168. pp. 518, 524, 525, 528. Hammond v. ^lukwa, 40 W^is. 35. pp. 787, 1149, 1208, 1238, 1257, 1258. , c 43 Wis. 512, 526; 6 Cent. L. J. 429. Hammond v. St. Paneras Vestry, L. R. 9 C. P. 316; s. c, 43 L. J. (C. P.) 157; 22 Week. Rep. 826; 80 L. T. (n. s.) 492. p. 82. c 2 C. P. Div. 245. Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 87. p. 619. Hance v. Cayuga, etc., R. Co., 26 Ift. Y. 428- pp. 528, 530. c 21 Wis. 42 ; 43 Wis. 577. Handaysyde v. Wilson, 3 Car. & P. 528. p. 1166. Hanks v. Northampton, 116 Mass. 420. pp. 777, 787, 788. Hanlon v. Ingram, 3 Iowa, 81; s. e., 1 Iowa, 108. pp. 151, 1239. c 4 Iowa, 507; 36 Iowa, 242. Hanlon v. Keokuk, 7 Iowa, 488. p. 1204. c 29 Iowa, 47 ; 44 Iowa, 675 ; 40 Iowa, 642. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. Kenney, 41 Mo. 271. pp. 501, 532. c 42 Mo. 197. Hannon v. County of St. Louis, 62 Mo. 313 ; n. c, sub nom. Harrison v. County of St. Louis, 3 Cent. L. J. 592. pp- 618, 908. Hanover R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. St. 396. pp. 431, 1212, 1256. c 78 Pa. St. 33; 73 Pa. St. 509; 76 Pa. St. 170.. Hanse v. Cowing, 1 Lans. 288. p. 318. Hansford's Administrator v. Payne, II Bush, 380. pp. 1278, 1285. Hanvey .;. Rochester, 35 Barb. 177. pp. 739, 743, 888. Hanrathy v. Northern, etc., R. Co., 46- Md. 280 ; <,. c, 5 Reporter, 698. p. 535. Hansberger v. Pacific R. Co., 43 Mo. 196. pp. 970, 972, 1008, 1033, 1035. c 64 Mo. 544. Hard u. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 32 Vt. 473. pp. 473, 971, 991, 1033, 1035, 1037. c 14 Minn. 364; 14 Allen, 442; 50 Miss. 190; 62 Me. 466 ; 49 Miss. 285 ; 20 Md. 221 ; 46 Texas, 539, 650; 27 Md. 601; 39 N. Y. 478; .'52 Md. 418; 44Cal. 82; 48 Me. 206; 3 Col. 610; 49N.Y. 531;. 42 Ala. 718. a 49 Texas, 187. Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire R. Co., 4 Hurl. & N. 67 ; s. c, 5 Jur. (n. s.) 150; 28 L. J. (Exch.) 139; 7 Week. Eep. 326. pp. 361, 413. c 38 Md. 585; 68 N. Y. 290; 3 Best & S. 252, 254; 32 L. J. (Q. B.) 29; 41 Ind. 2.50; 7 C. B. (N. s.) 742, 745; 6 Jur. (N. s.) 898, 839; 29 L. J. (C. P.) 206, 207; 65 How. Pr. 173; 2 G. P. Div. 371; 4S Vt. 130; 10 Allen, 375; 33 X. J. L. 264; 50 Barb. 364; 5 Ecporter, 315; 30 Conn. 548; 86 Pa. St. 79; 34 N. J. L. 471. Hardison v. .Jordan, Cam. & N. (N. C.) 454. p. 817. Hardrop v. Callagher, 2 E. D. Smith, 523. pp. 114, 325. Hardwick v. Moss, 7 Hurl. & N. 136; s. c, 31 L. J. (Exch.) 205; 7 Jur. (n. s.) 804. pp. 622, 799. e L. E. 2 C. P. 452. Hardy v. Carolina, etc., R. Co., 74 N. C. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxi 743 ; a. c, 76 N. C. 5. pp. 971, 973, 974. c 76 N. 0. 324. Hardy v. Keene, 52 N. H. 870. pp. 785, 737, 775, 776, 787. C57N. H. 18; 55N. H. 132. Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1. p. 808. Hiiring v. New York, etc., R. Co., 13 Barb. 9. pp. 426, 480. c 27 Barb. 282, 534, note; 32 Barb. 168; 19 How. Pr. 203; 1 Abb. App. Dec. 241; 25 Barb. 602; 36 Mo. 32; 21 Barb. 341; 41 Barb. 380; 17 Abb. Pr. 311 ; 18 N. Y. 425 ; 36 Vt. 359 ; 22 Barb. 585; 24N. Y. 446; 16 lU. 568, 570 ; 34N. Y. 13. Harkins v. Standard Sugar Refinery, 122 Mass. 400. pp. 899, 1043. c 123 Mass. 154. Harlan v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 64 Mo. 480 ; s. c, 5 Cent. L. J. 221 ; 65 Mo. 22 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 229. pp. 422, 424, 425, 448, 449, 450, 1279. (In full, p. 439.) c 64 Mo. 490; 7 Cent. L. J. 108, 109; 6 Ke- porter, 371; 4 Mo. App. 488. Harlow v. Berger, 30 111. 625. p. 817. Harlow v. Humiston, 6 Cow. 189. pp. 329, 333, 373, 559, 563, 890, 1134, 1166, 1167, 1176. c 18 N. Y. 251 ; 33 Barb. 416 ; 23 Wend. 447, 452; 20 111. 490; 55 Barb. 246; 5 Duer, 25; 25 Me. 47; 12 Pick. 177; 24 N. J. L. 269, 2iJ4; 2 Hilt. 38; 6 Iowa, 452; 8 Nev. 114; -21 Barb. 79; 40 Barb. 382; 29 Me. 309; 4 Barb. 338; 7 Bosw. 135. Harms v. Sullivan, 1 Bradw. 251. pp. 970, 976, 1022. Harpell v. Curtis, 1 E. D. Smith, 78. pp. 382, 1173. C35N. Y. 28; 40 N. H. 416. Harper v. Erie R. Co., 32 N. J. L. 88. p. 408. Harper v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 44 Mo. 488; u. g., 47 Mo. 587. pp. 952, 974. c 52 Mo. 376 ; 59 Mo. 295, 301, 507 ; 61 Mo. 494; 19 Kan. 272; 6 Reporter, 200; 62 Me. 466; 46 Texas, 539; 65 Mo. 520; 5 Eeporter, 17S. Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365. pp. 738, 740, 755, 756, 762, 903, 914. c 36 Wis. 40; 43 Wis. 522; 6 Cent. L. J. 428. Harpswell v. Phipsburg, 29 Me. 313. p 802. Harriman v. Boston, 114 Mass. 241. pp. 762, 763, 764, 765. c li8 Mass. 73. Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93 ; a. c, 1 Cent. L. .7. 400. pp. 823, 1060. (In full, p. 1057.) c 62 Mo. 168. Harris v. Baker, 4 Mau. & Sel. 27. pp. 849, 546, 549, 552, 590, 592, 641, 656, 669, 775, 820, 876, 899. c 52 N. H. 125 ; 6 CI. & Fin. 903 ; 3 Hill, 538 ; 3 Gray, 358; 2 Bing. 162; 11 C. B. (N. s.) 205; 5 Sandf. S. 0. 322; 3 Hurl. & N. 165; 6 Me. 100; 9 J. B. Moo. 237 ; 3 Nev. & P. 530 ; 19 N. H. 439. Harris v. Ryding, 5 Mee. & W. 60. pp. 270, 276, 281. c 12 Q. B. 751; 15 Jur. 127; 20 h. J. (Q. B.) 15; 25 N. J. L. 370; 6 El. & Bl. 603; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 739; 25 L. J. (Q. B.) 367; 8 El. & Bl. 149, 151, 157; 5 El. & Bl. 46, 47, 48; 1 Jar. (N. s.) 827, 828; 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 265, 266. Harris v. Stevens, 81 Vt. 79. p. 314. Harris v. Western Union Tel. Co., 9 Phila. 88. pp. 844, 848. Harrison o. Berkeley, 1 Strobh. L. 525. p. 1084. c 51 Me. 441 ; 62 Pa. St. 364. Harrison v. Central R. Co., 31 N. J. L. 293. pp. 971, 982, 1012. c 39 N. J. L. 120 ; 5 Eeporter, 121 ; 34 N. J. L. 153 ; 3 Col. 502. Harrison o. Collins, 86 Pa. St. 153 ; s. u., 6 Cent. L. J. 401 ; 5 Reporter, 760. pp. 346, 900, 1090. Harrison v. Great Northern R. Co., 3 Hurl. & Colt. 231 ; s. c, 10 Jur. (n. s.) 992; 33 L. J. (Exch.) 266; 12 Week. Rep. 1081 ; 10 L. T. (n. s.) 621. pp. 5, 556, 557, 559, 1076. c 3 Q. B. Div. 335; 7 Cent. L. J. 13; 17 Alb. L. J. 507. Harriss v. Mabry, 1 Ired. L. 240. p. 884. Hart V. Albany, 9 Wend. 607. p. 329. Hart V. Bassett, Sir T. Jones, 156. pp. 340, 341. Hart I'. Brooklyn, 36 Barb. 226. pp. 762, 763, 766, 781. c 18 Wall. 2S7 ; 33 Iowa, 399 ; 16 Abb. Pr. 245, 346, 347; 40 Ind. 64; 39 Barb. 336; 41 Barb. 381; 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 138; 61 N. Y. 509. Hart V. Crawley, 12 Ad. & E. 378. p. 1253. Hart V. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 12 Ind. 478. p. 517. Hart V. New Orleans, 1 Rob. (La.) 180. p. 893. ' Hart V. Western R. Co., 13 Mete. 99. pp. 139, 170, 171. c 39 Md. 142; 39 N. J. L. 307; 59 111. 354; 91 Ixxii TABLE OF CASES. U. S. 473 ; 38 X. H. 245 ; 8 Allen, 441 ; 16 Kan. 580 ; % Wis. '2:io ; 21 X. J. Eq. Ill ; 98 Mass. 417 ; 105 M.1SS. 203; 6 Allen, 90; 103 Mass. 586; 11 Kan. 53; 11 W. Va. 38; J Allen, 333; 42 Me. 586; 37 Me. 95; 35 Conn. 278. Hart B. Windsor, 12 ilee. & W. 523. p. 323. HaHfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615. pp. 37.5, 468, 1134, 1135, 1139, 1180, 1181, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186, 1187, 1189. (In full, p. 1121.) c 13 111. 590 ; 24 M(J. 12,) ; 45 X. Y. 193 ; 2 Mich. 265; 14 Barb. .592, 593; 4 Allen, 2i7; 13 Barb. 15; 29 Jle. 310; 60 N. Y. 333; 37 Bai-b. 619; 8 Barb. 383; 25 Barb. 602; 11 Barb. 116; 18 X. Y. 425 ; 6 Hill, 593, 594 ; 49 Barb. 532 ; 18 N. Y.2ol; 17 Barb. 98; 7 Wis. 431; 16 III. 203; 48 Miss. 127; 5 Hill, 2S;!: 8 Minn. 166; 27 Barb. 228; 10 Bosw.' 33; 16 Abb. Pr. 349; 43 X. Y. 507; 20 111. 495; 39 How. Pr. 414, 415; 19 How. Pr. 224; 4 X. Y. .359; 33 X. J. L. 439; 1 Keyes, 572; 33 How. Pr. 199; 2 Abb. App. Dec. 381; 2 Woodb. & M. .345; IE. D. Smitb, 77, 372; 63 N. Y.106,107; 24 X. J.L.3A5; 66 Barb. 51, 53; 25 Me. 49 ; 46 Barb. 270, 271 ; 9 Bush, 531 ; 38 X. Y. 456, 457, 459; 36 Barb. 1V,\ 17 Iowa, 46J; 7 Jones & Sp. :i51; 2 Hilt. 39; 5 Barb. 339. A 1 Head, 619,620; 31 Pa. St. 370; 36 Mo. 490; 18 Ohio .St. 411 ; 27 Gratt. 476 ; 33 X. H. 277 ; 31 Pa. St. 377, 378; 22 Vt. 225, 226; 48 Pa. St. 221; 6 Phila. 248. Hartford Bridge v. Granger, 4 Conn. 142. p. 802. Hartford, etc., E. Co. o. Andrews, 36 Conn. 213. p. -1283. Hai-tleib i. Lane's Administrators, 44 Pa. St. 510. p. 826. Hartley ... Harriman, 1 Barn. & Aid. 620 ; s. c, 2 Stark. 212 ; Holt, N. P. 617. pp. 179, 184, 202. ell Ired. L. 270; 8 Barb. 632; L. E. 2 C. P. 3. Hartnall v. R3'de Coramissioneis, 4 Best & S. 361; s. c, 10 .Jiir. (.v. s.) 2-57: 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 39. pp. 622. e23, 714, 715. c L. U. 5 Q. B. 221, 223 ; L. R. 3 C. P. 60 ; L. E. 3 Exch. 119; 7 Best & S. 7.50; 10 Jur. (x. s.) 1049 ; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 298. ? 122 Mass. 362, 363, 364. Hartshorn u. South Reading, 3 Allen, 501. pp. 646, 755. Hartshorn t. AVorcester, 113 Mass. 111. p. 260. Harty u. Central R. Co., 42 N. -Y. 468. pp. 424, 450, 452. 453, 461. c 45 X'. Y. 193; 34 Iowa, 279; 21 Minn. 298; 50 How. Pr. 129; 41 Iowa, 331; 62 Mo. 58. Harvard College ». Stearns, 15 Uray, 1. pp. 646, 755. c 3 Allen, 304. Harvey v. Dunlop, Lalor, 193. pp. 47, 56, 1234. c 51 N. Y. 488; 42 N. T. 393; 15 WaU. 539; 59 Ind. 134. Harvvood v. Lowell, 4 Gush. 310. pp. 340, 709, 756, 1241. c 6 Cash. 142 ; 4 Mich. 561; 44 N. H. 248 ; 122 Mass. 357; 36 \Vi3. 158; 58 Me. 401; 30 Wis. 617; 7 Cnsh. 492; 37 Vt. 151; 11 R. I. 453. Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208. pp. 710, 717, 742. Haskell v. Penn Yan, 5 Lans. 43. p. 1253. c 3 Hun, 532; 5 X'. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 623. Haskin u. New York, etc., R. Co., 65 Barb. 129 ; a. u., 56 N. Y. 608. pp. 989, 1008, 1056. Hassa v. Junger, 15 Wis. 598. pp. 1152, ' 1159. c 42 Miss. 614. Hatch V. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 25 Vt. 42. pp. 566, 567, 558, 569, 570. Hathaway v. Hinton, 1 Jones L. 343. p. 340. Hathaway v. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 46 Ind. 25. pp. 424, 1176. c .53 Ind. HI; 47 Ind. 456; 49 Ind. 97. Havens v. Erie R. Co., 41 X. Y. 296 ; s. c, 53 Barb. 328. pp. 420, 424. c 33 Ind. 362; 34 Iowa, 157, 160, 279; 5 Lans. 405 ; 51 X. Y. 548; 49 Cal. 238; 45 X. Y. 664; 25 Mich. 291; 59 X. Y. 472. Hawes !•. Fox Lake, 33 Wis. 438. pp. 781, 1083, 1243. c 39 Wis, 163 ; 43 Wis. 523 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 429 ; 13 Hun, 87. Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518. pp. 887, 12^4. Hawkes v. Kennebec, 7 Mass. 461. pp. Bin, 703. Hawkesworth v. Thompson, 98 Mass. 77. p. 750. Hawkins v. Cooper, 8 Car. & P. 473. pp. 382, 1151. c 19 Conn. 573; 8 Barb. 381, 382, 383; 18 X. Y. 237; 17 Barb. 98; 26 Ind. 373; 33 X. J. L. 4:^9; 9 Wis. 217. Hnwkins v. Riley, 17 B. Mon. 101. pp. 387, 887. e .36 Mo. :363. Hawks V. Hawley, 123 Mass. 210. p. 757. TABLE OB" CASES. Ixxiii Hinvks V. Northampton, 116 Mass. 420; s. c, 121 Mhss. 10. p. 1198. c 116 Mass. 424, note. Hay V. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159 ; 3 Barb. 42. pp. 49, 76, 104, 105, 107, 114, 261, 262, 325, 745, 821, 888. (In full, p. 72.) o 35 N. y. 323 ; 25 Vt. 471 ; 58 N. Y. 421, 423 ; 24 Barb. .364; 18 Minn. 333,343; 9 Iowa, 235; 2 E. D. Smith, 202; 122 Mass. 207; 46 Iowa, 660; 67 N. Y. 273 ; 51 N. Y. 479 ; 61 Bavb. 105, 106, 111 ; 15 Mo. 656; 42 Barb. 392; 48 How. Pr. 49; 61 N. Y. 185, 187, 188, 195, 196, 197, 201; 25 N. J. L. 362, 365; 16 Mo. 513; 2 Abb. C. C. 211; 1 Sawyer, 439; 3M(1. 446; 2Eobfc. 306; 53 Ind. 341; 22 Barb. 308; 4 Oliio St. 417; 19 Barb. 383, 385 ; 21 Barb. 414, 419 ; 4 N. Y. 199. Hay V. Pennsylvania K Co., 65 Pa. St. 269. p. 452. Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 East, 92. p. 739. Hay croft v. Lake Shore, etc., K. Co., 2 Hun, 489 ; s. c, 64 N. Y. 636. pp. 430, 1181, 1239. c7 Hun, 556. Hayden v. Attleborough, 7 Gray, 338. pp. 362, 760, 769, 770, 771, 773. , c 37 Conn. 313; 10 E. I. 307; 41 N. H. 334, 335; 43 Ind. 597, 599; 34 Wis. 618; 44 Barb. 391; 1 Allen, 32; 52 N. H. 223; 41 N. H. 321; 30 Wis. 404; 64 Me. 61; 49 N. H. 392. Hayden v. Smithville Man. Co., 29 Conn. 548. pp. 941, 9-50, 971, 972, 973, 977, 983, 993, 1008, 1050, 1239. «• 53 Pa. St. 457; 71 111. 420; 08 111. 550; 12 Ohio St. 492; 50 Mich. 127; 50 Mo. 305; 3 Dill. 325 ; 14 Minn. 363 ; 63 N. Y. 453 ; 46 Mo. 173 ; 13 Allen, 442; 59 Mo. 504; 34 Conn. 138; 39 Iowa, 620; 31 Cal. 380; 4iOr. 57; 49 Me. 124; 7 Re- porter, 61 ; 25 N. Y. 566, 567, 570 ; 48 Me. 121 ; 3 Col. 504; 49N. Y. 534. Hayes v. New York, etc., K. Co., 9 Hun, 63. pp. 556, 563, 573. Hayes o. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314. p. 735. Hayes v. Porter, 22 Me. 371. p. 825. Hayes v. Western E. Co., 3 Cush. 270. pp. 981, 1038. c 10 Gray, 281; 10 Mich. 199; 6 Cush. 76; 43 Me. 270; 3 Ohio St. 212, 216; 24 Ala. 36; 5 X. Y. 496; 49 Barb. 326; 53 N. Y. 555; 5 Ind. 347; 10 Allen, 237; 10 Cush. 231; 9 Cush. 114; 20 Ohio, 444 ; 9 Heisk. 869 ; 51 Miss. 642 ; 10 Mich. 199 ; 49 Miss. 287 ; 20 Md. 221 ; 23 Pa. St. 386 ; 43 Me. 270; 72 111. 261; 42 Md. 418;. 25 N. Y. 565, 567, 569; 2J Conn. 560; 119 Mass. 421; 59 Pa. St. 251. Haynes v. East Tennessee, etc., K. Co., 3 Coldw. 222. p. 971. c 9 Heisk. 871 ; 6 Heisk. 365; 59 Tenn. 428. Hays V. Gallagher, 72 Pa. St. 136. pp. 343, 357, 1177, 1231. Hays V. Miller, 70 N. Y. 112 ; 6 Hun, 320. pp. 150, 1242. Hazard v. Israel, 1 Binn. 240. p. 889. Hazard v. Wolfram, 31 Wis. 194. p. 215. Hazen v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 2 Gray, 574. p. 888. Heaeocli v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. pp. 330, 556, 565. c 23 Wend. 449; 2 Ind. 164; 37 Me. 457. Headen v. Eust, 39 111. 186. p. 502. C 71 111. 570; 66111.328. Healy v. New York, 3 Hun, 708 ; s. c, 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 92. pp. 1174, 1203. Heard v. Hall, 16 Pick. 457. p. 1232. Hearne v. Southern Pacific E. Co., 50 Cal. 482. pp. 1146, 1151. Heath v. Coltenback, 5 Iowa, 490. p. 211. c 35 Iowa, 491 ; 34 Iowa, 508. Heath v. Eicker, 2 ile. 408. p. 212. Heathcock v. Pennington, 11 Ired L. 640. p. 982. c I Jones, 246. Hedges v. Madison, 6 111. 567. pp. 617, 6 IS, 705. c 132 Mass. 35-2; 26 Iowa, 269; 55 111. 349; 17 111. 1«; 7 Ohio SI. 116, 124; 53 111. 298. Heffernan v. Benkard, 1 Eobt. 432. p. 913. Hegan v. Eighth Avenue E. Co., 15 N. Y. 380. pp. 396, 399. c 4 Daly, 276 ; 35 N. Y. 28, 39; 19 How. Pr. 224; 57 Barb. 652; 7 Bosw. 138. Hegarty v. Shine (Irish High Court of Justice), 7 Cent. L. J. 291 (affirmed in Court of Appeals, 8 Cent. L. J. 111). p. 115. Hegeman v. Western E. Co., 13 N. Y. 9. pp. 395, 98-3, 1228. Heil V. Glanding, 42 Pa. St. 493. pp. 449, 1147, 1264. Heitjistreet v. Howland, 5 Denio, 68. p. 896. Heirn v. McCaughan, 32 Miss. 17. p. 1241. Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 40?. pp. 1093, 1202. c 58 Me. 203; 36 N. Y. 58; 119 Mass. 278. Heller a. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159. p. 735. Helwig V. Jordan, 53 Lid. 21. p. 318. Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES. Hemphill u. Boston, 8 Cush. 195. p. 759. c 8 Allen, 244; 7 Gray, 344 ; 102 Mass. 495. Hendershott v. Ottumwa, 46 Iowa, 658. pp. 747, 749. Henderson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 43 Iowa, 620 ; s.c, 39 Iowa, 220. pp. 523, 524, 525. Henderson v. Sandefur, 11 Bush, 550; «. t., 2 Cent. L. J. 767. pp. 731, 732. Hendricks v. Western, etc., B. Co., 52 Ga. 467. pp. 1025, 1280. Senlej/ V.Lyme Regis, SMoo.&F. 278; s. c, 5 Bing. 91 (in error to King's Bench, 3 Barn. & Adol. 77; in the House of Lords, 1 Bing. N. C. 222 ; 2 CI. & Fin. 331 ; 8 Bli. N. R. 690 ; 1 Scott, 29). pp. 623, 658, 678, 681, 683, 685, 689, 711, 712, 721, 724, 758. (In full, p. 626.) c 2 N. Y. 173; 11 E. 1. 144; 3 Hill, 541, 616, 618; 51 Miss. 288; 70 111. 126; 15 Conn. 130; 20 Md. 481; 4 Mich. 662; 21 Mich. 119, 122; 36 N. H. 291, 294; 9 X. Y, 462; 15 Bnrb. 434; 122 Mass. 359, 360, 370, 373; 5 Sandf. S. C. 304, 305, 308, 322, 323, 324 ; 44 Barb. 393 ; 8 Exch. 327; 102 Mass. 600; 32 Barb. 639,645; 22 Pa. St. 64; 3 N. Y. 469; 56 N. H. 294; 27 Vt. 379; 1 Disney, 535, 537; 55 111. 351; 16 X. Y. 163, 165, 168, 171, note ; 1 Black, 52, 53 ; 12 Gray, 496; 7 Reporter, 479; 9 Md. 178; 91 U. S. 551; 17 lU. 145; 2 Disney, 527; 5 Bosw. 504, 505; 44 N. Y. 123, 124; 34 Conn. 14, 25, 26, 27; 17 B. Men. 728 ; 37 N. Y. 260 ; 34 N. Y. 390, 393, 397; 19 Pick. 157; 6 Hill, 296; 16 Wall. 574. d 46 Texas, 628, 529, 630. Hennies v. Vogel, 66 111. 401. p. 1241. Henry v. Pittsburgh, etc.. Bridge Co., 8 Watts & S. 85. pp. 567, 747. Henry v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 50 Cal. 176. pp. 154, 159, 162, 170, 1083, 10t8. c 60 Cal. 681. Hentz V. Long Island R. Co., 13 Barb. 646. pp. 569, 572. Herbert v. Pagett, 1 Lev. 61. pp. 635, 642. Herold v. Meyers, 20 Iowa, 378. p. 209. Herrick v. Gary, 65 111. 101 ; a. <;., 83 111. 85. p. 206. Herring v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 10 Ired. L. 402. pp. 449, 450. c 64 N. C. 409; 14 Cal. 389; 74 N. C. 668; 8 Jones L. 341; 8 Eich. L. 128; 4 Jones L. 423; 37 Mo. 295; 30 Wis. 121; 11 Ired. L. 19; 9 Eich L. 94. Harrington v. Corning, 51 Barb. 396. p. 781. c 5 Lans. 49. Hess V. Lupton, 7 Ohio, 216. p. 229. Hestonville, etc., K. Co. v. Connell, 6 W. N. C. 514; s. c, 8 Cent. L. J. 306. p. 1197. Hewes v. McNamara, 106 Mass. 281. p. 216. c 8 Cent. L. J. 444. Hewett V. New York, etc., R. Co., 3 Lans. 83. p. 424. Hewett V. Swift, 3 Allen, 420. pp. 887, 888, 891, 892, 1061. c53Ind. 339; 12 Allen, 56; 6 Eeporter, 753; 30 N. Y. 79; 104 Mass. 120; 38 Ind. 126; S Cliff. 429. Hewey v. Nourse, 54 Me. 256. pp. 148, 149. c 41 Ind. 251 ; 26 Wis. 235 ; 11 W. Va. 38 ; 62 Me. 291; 68 Me. 165. Hewiston v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475 ; s. c, 34 Conn. 136. pp. 710, 725. 752. c 45 Ind. 434; 122 Mass. 357, 374; 9 Hun, 684 ; 41 Vt. 444 ; 39 Conn. 378; 37 Conn. 312. Hey V. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. St 44. pp. 362, 753, 772, 781, 1085, 1208. c 13 Hun, 87. Hibbard v. Thompson, 109 Mass. 286. p. 1215. Hibbard v. Western Union Tel. Co., 33 Wis. 558. pp. 846, 852. Hickey u. Boston, etc., R. Co., 14 Allen, 429. pp. 1176, 1238. Hickok u. Plattsburgh, 16 N. T. 161, note; s. c, 15 Barb. 427. pp. 687, 726. c 49 Barb. 583, 583 ; 4 Mich, 561 ; 16 N. Y. 160, 161, 169; 10 Bosw. 29; 21 Mich. 109, 110, 115; 9 Mich. 193; 16 Abb. Pr. 345, 346, 347; 7 Lans. 438 ; 60 Barb. 384, 385 ; 5 Lans. 22, 23 ; 41 How. Pr. 450, 451 ; 40 N. Y. 447, 451 ; 44 Barb. 393 ; 32 Barb. 637, 638, 642, 646, 647 ; 17 N. Y. 109 ; 29 N. Y. 310; 1 Black, 53; 4 Keyes, 270; 39 Barb. 335, 337. «i 122 Mass. 376; 46 Texas, 532. Hicks V. Chaffee, 13 Hun, 293. pp. 561, 761, 798. Hicks V. Dorn, 42 N. T. 47. pp. 821, 824. c 5 Lans. 349; 3 N". Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 7. Hicks 0. Newport, etc., R. Co., 4 Best & S. 403, note. p. 1294. cl 43 Vt. 541. Hicks V. Pacific R. R., 64 Mo. 430. pp. 442, 444, 449, 1177, 1196. c 65 Mo. 23, 24, 26 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 230. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxv Hide V. Thornborough, 2 Car. & Kir. 250. pp. 261, 269, 275. c 12 Q. B. 749; 15 Jur. 127; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 14 ; 76 111. 242 ; 27 Gratt. 88. ? 4 Hurl. & N. 598. Higert v. Greencastle, 43 Ind. 574. p. 781. <• 47 Ind. 396, 398, 399 ; 45 Ind. 430. Higgins D. Butcher, Yelv. 89; s. c, 1 Brownl. 205. pp. 1272, 1273. Hisgins V. Chesapeake, etc.. Canal Co., 3 Harr. (Del.) 411. pp. 101, 886. Higgins V. Dewey, 107 Mass. 494. pp. i4S, 150. <-39Md. 159; 94 U. S, 474. Higgins i;. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 36 Mo. 4i8. pp. 1003, 1021, 1046, 1279. c 8 Kan. 517. Higgins V. JeflFersonville, etc., K. Co., 52 ind. 110. p. 1254. c 53 Ind. 309 ; 58 Ind. 28. Higgins 6). Watervliet, etc., B. Co., 46 N. Y. 28. p. 889. Higgs V. Maynard, 12 Jur. (n. s.) 705; s. c, 1 Harr. & R. 581 ; 14 Week. Rep. 610; 14 L. T. (n. s.) 332. p. 1232. Highland Light (The), 2 Am. L. T. 118. p. 1279. Hildebrand v. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 47 Ind. 399. p. 1254. c 8 Cent. L. J. 15. Hildreth v. LowpU, 11 Gray, 345. p. 710. Hill 0. Balls, 2 Hurl. & N. 299. pp. 207, 286. Hill V. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. pp. 812, 783, 734, 787, 798, 824. (In full, p. 698. ) V 123 Mass. 317; 6 Cent. L. J. 409; 124 Mass. 567. Hill IK Caverly, 7 N. H. 215. p. 1060. Hill V. Gust, 55 Ind. 45. pp. 978, 979. c 56 Ind. 520; 7 lleporter, 61. Hill a. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 9 Heisk. 823. pp. 451, 1279. Hill* V. New Haven, 37 Vt- 501. pp. 1177, 1203, 12-53, 12-55. Hill V. New River Co., 9 Best & S. 303. pp. 349, 900. c L. R. 9 Exch. 18'?; 43 L. J. (Excli.) 104; 3 Q. U. Div. 3:J4; 7 Cent. L. J. 13; 17 Alb- L. J. 507- Hill a. Portland, etc., R. Co., 55 Me. 438. pp. 351, 352. c 52 X. II. 415 ; 113 Mass. 368. Hill V. Seekonk, 119 Mass. 85. pp. 757, 1198. c 121 Mass.338. Hill V. The State, 4 Sneed, 443. p. 742. Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Gray, 349. pp. 263, 523, 524, 740, 893, 899, 902, 904, 910. (In full, p. 868.) c 52 N. H. 124, 126; 57 Pa. St. 381; 4 Allen, 140; 2 Black, 427, 428; 102 Mass. 213; 7 Cent. L. J. 494, 495 ; 35 N. J. L. 22 ; 9 Mich. 187 ; 11 Allen, 422; 118 Mass. 117; 61 N. T. 186; 6 Phila. 257; 46 Pa. St. 221; 5 Neb. 143; 70 III. 54; 11 Bush, 480; 49 Me- 12); 12 Allen, 470; 11 E. I. 455 ; 112 Mass. 99 ; 59 Me. 531 ; 132 Mass. 208; 8 Gray, 148, 149; 6 Keporter, 461, 752; 30 Conn. 550; 23 Ind. 557; 86 Pa. St. 159. Hilsdorf v. Bt. Louis, 45 Mo. 94. pp. 738, 739, 740, 884, 889, 908. Hilton V. Lord Granville, 5 Q. B. 701. pp. 272, 281. c 12 Q. B. 753; 15 Jur. 127; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 16; 8E1. &B1. 152; 27 L. J. (Q.B,)67. ? 6 El. & BI. 602, 603; 2 Jur. (N. s.) 739; 25 L. J. (Q. B.) 367; 27 L.J. (Q. B.) 67. Hilton !). Whitehead, 12 Q. B. 734. p. 275. c 2 Hurl. & N. 835, 836; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 176. Hinckley v. Barnstable, 109 Mass. 126. pp. 804, 1204. Hinckley v. Cape Cod R. Co., 120 Mass. 257. pp. 428, 424, 1176. Hinckley !>. Emerson, 4 Cow. 851. pp. 190, 195, 218, 221. Hinckley v. Hastings, 2 Pick. 162. p. 759. Hinckley v. Penobscot, 42 Me. 89. pp. 1093, 1094. c 57 Me. 424; 47 Vt. .33. Hinde o. Wabash Nav. Co., 15 111. 72. pp. 888, 904. c 63 111. 546 ; So 111. 373 ; 20 111. 388. Hinds V. Barton, 25 N Y. 544. pp. 56, 151, 157, 1-59. 1262. c 1 Sweeny, 542 ; 30 Mich- 190; 51 X. Y. 488; 11 Hun, 230 ; 37 Mo. 295 ; 9 Nev. 286. Hinds 0. Harbou, 58 Ind. 121. p. 892, 1062. Hine u. Wooding, 37 Conn. 123. p. 210. Hines v. Lockport, 50 N. Y. 236 ; .5. t., 60 Barb. 378; 5 Lans. 16; 41 How. Pr. 435. pp. 628, 73i. 753, 753, 784. « 66 N. Y. 342 ; 7 Lans. 438, 440 ; 1 Hun, 511 ; 4N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 134; 10 Hun, 479, 480; 43 How. Pr. 366, 367 ; 59 N. Y. 508. Hinman v. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 28 Iowa, 491. p. 418. c 43 Iowa, 171, 529 ; 29 Iowa, 244. Ixxvi TABLE OV CASES. Hinsley v. Wilkinson, Cro. Car. 387. p. 202. Hipkins v. Birmingham, etc.. Gas Co., 6 Hurl. & N. 250 ; ^. u., 7 Jur. (n. s.) 213 ; 30 L. J. (Exch.) 60 (affirming 5 Hurl. & N. 74). p. 108. Hite V. Blandford, 45 111. 9. p. 207. Hixon u. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59. pp. 346, 709, 778. o 11 Allen, 320; 114 Mass. 609; 45 Ind. 432, 433, 434; 122 J[ass. 357; 104 Mass. 76, 77; 2 Allen, 5.i3, 554, 555; 13 Allen, 18S; 46 N. H. 60; 8 E. I. 352; 34 Conn. 140, 144. ? 52 N. H. 413. Hoag V. Lake Shore, etc., R Co., 18 Am. L. Keg. 214; s. u., 6 Cent. L. J. 95; 5 Eeporter, 80. pp. 1100, 1101. c 67 Me. 104 ; 78 N. C. SOS. Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. 202. p. 1241. Hobbitt V. London, etc., R. Co., 4 Exch. 254 ; s. v., 6 Eng. Rail. Cas. 188. p. 879. c 5 X. Y. 56 ; 8 Cal. 491 ; 7 N. Y. 496 ; 15 Rich. L. 211; 35 N. J. L. 22; 2 Mich. 372; 21 Iowa, 578; 66 X. Y. 185; 62 N. Y. 163; 61 N. Y. 181; 48 How. Pr. 45; 29 Barb. 424; 59 Me. 533; 23 Ind. 556. Hobbs V. Lowell, 19 Pick. 405. p. 759. c 7 Gray, 343, 34-1 ; 27 Vt. 4,55 ; 56 Me. 129, 354; 29 Conn. 170; 6 Wis. 390; 46 N. H. 196; 122 Mass. 64. Hoben v. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 20 Iowa, 562. pp. 1002, 1152. c 38 Iowa, 297; 29 Iowa, 58. Hocum V. Weitherick, 22 Minn. 152. pp. 1177, 1178. Hodge V. Bennington, 43 Vt. 450. pp. 1208, 1247. c 31 Wis. 189. Hodgkins v. Eastern K. Co., 119 Mass. 419. p. 1036. Hodgkins v. Rockport, 116 Mass. 573. pp. 764, 766. 768. c 121 Mass. 445. Hodgkinson o. Ennor, 4 Best & S. 229; s. c, 32 L. J. (Q. B.) 231. pp. 5, 8, 10, 18, 20, 36, 77, 82. Hoey V. Dublin, etc., B. Co., 18 Week. Rep. 930. p. 943. Hoffman v. New York, etc., K. Co., 13 Hun, 589. p. 460. Hott'man v. St. Louis, 15 Mo. 651. p. 733. c 4 U. Greene, 53. Hoffman u. Tuolumne, etc.. Water Co., 10 Cal. 413. pp. 101, 102, 100, 1246. c 2 Abb. C. C. 215; 1 Sawyer, 442; 10 Cal. 544; 35 Cal. GS3; 23 Cal. 225; 17 Cal. 98. Hofnagle v. New York, etc., R. Co., 55 N. Y. 608 ; i,-. c, 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 346. pp. 971, 1028, 1031. <• 04 N. Y. 8; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 560. Hogan V. Central, etc., R. Co., 49 Cal. 128. p. 970. c 2 Jones & Sp. 486 ; 43 How. Pr. 411. Hoitt 0. Moulton, 2 N. H. 586. p. 799. Holbi-ook V. McBride, 4 Gray, 215. p. 212, Holbrook v. Utica, etc., R, Co., 12 N. Y. 236. pp. 113, 1177, 1228, 1238. Holden v. Liverpool Gas-Light Co., 3 C. B. 1 : «. c, 10 Jur. 883 ; 15 L. J. (C. P.) 301. pp. 109, 1072, 1179, 1253. c 2 Hurl; & N. 431; S Jur. (N. s.) 1010; 26 L. J. (Exch.) ;J52; 71 N. Y. 33. Holden v. Rutland, etc., R. Co., 30 Vt. 297. pp. 518, 523, 1248, 1255. c 48 Mo. 507 ; 59 Ind. 445 ; 57 N. Y. 93. Holden ,;. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336. p. 215. c 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & G.) 363. Hole V. Sittingbourne, etc., R. Co., 6 Hurl. & N. 488; s. c, 30 L. J. (Exch.) 81 ; 9 Week. Rep. 274 ; 3 L. T. (n. s.) 750. pp. 740, 900, 905, 908. o 2 Hurl. & Colt. 24; 32 L, J. (Exch.) 190; 4 Wall. 679; 12 C. B. (N. s.) 793; 35 N. J. L. 22; 30 Md. 205; 5 Best & S. 977, 978, 980, 984; 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 266; 61 N. Y. 190, 202; 11 B. I. 455 ; 6 Eeporter, 461. ? 11 Bush, 478, 479. Holladay v. Marsh, 3 Wend. 142. p. 214. c25 Vt. 162; 5 Denio, 264; 22 Barb. 679; 18 Wend. 221; 7 Barb. 301, 303, 308; 10 111. 167. Holland v. Cranston, 1 Curt. 497. p. 798. Hollenbeck v. Berkshire R. Co., 9 Cush. 478. pp. 1272, 1283. Holley V. Winooski Turnpike Co., 1 Aik. 74. pp. 564, 761, 1085. c 15 Vt. 715, 716 ; 6 Vt. 247. ? 22 Vt. 12. Holliday v. St. Leonard's Shoreditch, 11 C. B. (n-. s.) 192 ; s. c, 8 Jur. (n. s.) 79; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 361; 9 Week. Rep. 694; 4 L. T. (dt. s.) 408. pp. 590, 592, 593, 604, 609, 623, 889. c 5 Best & S. 454, 455, 461, 467, 469, 471, 472, 478; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 1022, 10>4, 1025, 1026, 1027; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 287, 290, 292, 293, 294, 296 ; 35 N. J. L. 22; L. E. 1 H. L. 113, 119; 11 H. L. Cas. 715, 723; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 575, 577; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 232, 235; 5 Best & S. 746; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 297; )6 O. B. (N. s.) 561; 17 Gratt. 241. H. 20; 10 Mete. 365; 65 Me. 551; 22 X. H. 663; 105 Mass. 600, 601; 63 Mo. 419; 8 Minn. 161; 26 Mo. 240 42 Me. 529 ; 4 Allen, 561 ; 14 Gray, 247 ; 43 Ind, 589, 595; 2 AUen, 554; 4 Gray, 69; 35 N. H. 276 40 N. H. 416; 25 Iowa, 110, 111, 112; 2 Cush. 606, 609; 19 Vt. 477; 6 Iowa, 455 ; 13 Mete. 59 110 Mass. 337; 35 N. H. 312; 42 N. H. 216; 3 Gush. 180; 68 Me. 366. Howard v. Tyler, 46 Vt. 683. pp. 390, 1251. Howd V. Mississippi Central E. Co., 50 Miss. 178. p. 790. Howden v. Standish, 18 L. J. (C. P.) 33 ; s. c, 12 Jur. 1052 ; 6 Dow. & L. 312. p. 1253. Howe V. Lowell, 101 Mass. 99. p. 763. c 114 Mass. 246 ; 19 Minn. 249 ; 118 Mass. 73. Howe V. Newmarch, 12 Allen, 49. p. 887. C50 Mo. 121; 114 Mass. .519; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 483; 3 Hun, 337; 33 Ind. 339; 57 Me. 214; 104 Mass. 120; 38 Ind. 126; 3 Cliff. 429; 106 Mdss. 188. Howe V. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 481. pp. 732, 778, 787, 788. c 21 Mich. 114; 12 Ohio St. 379. ? 45 Ind. 436. Howe V. Plainfield, 41 N. H. 135. pp. 762, 763. c 33 Iowa, 399; 57 N. H. 481; 52 N. H. 378, TABLE OF CASES. Ixxix 379; 40 Ind. 65; 43 N. H. 268; 5B N. H. 296; 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 138. Howell V. McCoy, 3 Kawle, 256. p. 108. Howells V. Landore, etc., (^o., L. R. 10 Q. B. 62; s. c, 31 L. T. (n. s.) 433; 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 25 ; 32 L. T. (sr. s.) 19 ; 23 "Week. Kep. 336. pp. 970, 1008, 1028, 1032. c 6 Reporter, 126 ; 86 Pa. St. 440. Howenstein v. Pacific K. R., 55 Mo. 33. p. 507. «• 58 Mo. 392, 505, 506 ; 62 Mo. 664. Howland v. Vincent, 10 Mete. 373. pp. 106, 361, 772. c 38 Md. 684 ; 50 Barb. 363, 364 ; 5 Denio, 266 ; 41 Ind. 250; 31 N. J. L. 239; 11 Cusb. 226; 30 Conn. 584 ; 30 Me. 179 ; 29 Me. 310 ; 1 Du er, 538. d 6 Hun, 608. Hoyt V. Gelston, 13 Johns. 139. p. 77. Hoyt V. Hudson, 41 Wis. 105. pp. 1177, 1178, 1237. c 43 Wis. 624, 675 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 429 ; 41 Wis. 148; 7 Reporter, 83, 84. Hoyt u. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656. pp. 744, 747. c 46 Iowa, 614. Hoyt «. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181. pp. 151, 155, 156, 159, 170, 1098. Hubbard v. Concord, 35 N. H. 52. pp. 361, 551, 747, 762, 763, 786, 804, 1204. c 43 N. H. 268, 269, 362; 41 N. H. 52; 66 K. H. 13 ; 5 N. H. 270 ; 62 N. H. 335, 378, 379, 413 ; 41 N. H. 137, 322 ; 34 Wis. 443 ; 46 N. H. 60 ; 30 Wis. 397; 42 N. H. 202, 203, 204; 40 N. H. 416. Hubbard v. Eussell, 24 Barb. 404. p. 318. Hubener v. New Orleans, etc., E. Co., 23 La. An. 492. p. 1183. Hubgh V. New Orleans, etc., E. Co., 6 La. An. 495 pp. 970, 972, 1019, 1272, 1279. c 7 La. An. 324, 327 ; 39 Iowa, 621 ; 46 Texas, 538; 23 La. An. 464. Huddleston v. Lowell Machine-Shop, 106 Mass. 282. pp. 943, 970, 973, 1055. c 117 Mass. 411; 3 Dill. 324; 110 Mass. 259; 119 Mass. 414; 3 Col. 608; 49 N. Y. 537. Hudson V. Missouri, etc., E. Co., 16 Kan. 470. p. 885. Hudson V. Eoberts, 6 Exch. 697 ; s. c, 20 L. J. (Exch.) 299. pp. 204, 216. c 43 L. J. (C. P.) 367; 13 C. B. (N. S.) 437: 9 Jur. (N. S.) 971; 32 L. J. (C. P.) 91; 13 Ohio St. 493; 8 Cent. L. J. 444. H;idson V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., .53 Mo. 525. p. 534. c 64 Mo. 225; 62 Mo. 232; 63 Mo. 287; 7 Cent. L. J. 429. Hudson v. Tabor, 1 Q. B. Div. 225. p. 106. Huey V. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co., 45 Ind. 320. p. 510. Huffman v. San Joaquin Co., 21 Cal. 426. p. 617. c 45 Cal. 38 ; 25 Cal. 315. Huggett V. Montgomery, 2 Bos. & Pul. (N. E.) 446. p. 390. Hughes V. Baltimore, Taney's Dec. 243. p. 732. Hughes V. County of Muscatine, 44 Iowa, 672. pp. 797, 800, 1149, 1150. Hughes V. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 66 Mo. 325 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 338. p. 299. Hughes V. Macfle, 2 Hurl. & Colt. 744; s. c, sub nom. Abbott v. Macfie. pp. 305, 306, 1090, 1183, 1192, 1195, 1196. c 18 Ohio St. 411 ; 3 Q. B. Div. 333 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 13 ; 17 Alb. L. J. 506 ; 21 Minn. 213 ; 111 Mass. 141 ; 55 How. Pr. 171 ; 27 Ind. 615 ; 97 Mass. 569. Hughes V. Quentin, 8 Car. & P. 703. pp. 1260, 1261. Hulbert v. New York, etc., E. Co., 40 N. y. 145. p. 315. Hulett V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 67 Mo. 239. pp. 996, 1020. Hull V. Kansas City, 54 Mo. 598 ; s. <;., 1 Cent. L. J. 204. pp. 1085, 1208. Hull V. Eichmond, 2 Woodb. & M. 387. pp. 362, 759, 760, 761, 769, 798, 1177, 1264. clOurt. 501; 35N. H. 276. Hull b. Sacramento, etc., E. Co., 14 Cal. 387. p. 154. c 12 Kan. 372; 50 Cal. 182; 30 Wis. 121. ? 37 Mo. 297. €l 30 Iowa, 422. Hume V. New York, 9 Hun, 674; s. c, 47 N. Y. 639. pp. 346, 761, 762, 763, 777, 1238. c 56 X. H. 295. Humes v. Knoxville, 1 Humph. 403. pp. 745, 747. c 4 G. Greene, 51. Hummell v. Webster, Bright. 133. pp. 199, 21B, 389. Humphrey v. Douglass, 10 Vt. 71. p. 1134. Humphreys v. Armstrong County, 56 Pa. Ixxx TABLE OF CASES. St. 204. pp. 561, 727, 753, 773, 774, 796, 1-204. o 77 Pa. St. 313; 71 Pa. St. 158; 73 Pa. St. 409 ; 68 Pa. St. 407, 408. 7 122 Mass. 376, 377. Humphreys v. Jlears, 1 Man. & R. 187. pp. 656,' 820, 899. o 3 HiU,538; 6 CI. & Fin. 903; 11 C. B. (N. S.) 205. Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739 ; s. c, 15 Jur. 124; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 10. pp. 93, 20-2, 275, 280, 2S1. (In full, p. 263.) c 18 Minn. 337; 4 Abb. N. O. 295; 2 Allen, 132; 72 N. Y. 309, 310; 25 X. J. L. 362, 365, 367; 76 111. 235, 236; 42 Md. 130; 2 Hurl. & N. 834, 836; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 176; 6 El. & Bl. 601; 2 Jur. (N. s.) 739; 25 L. J. (Q. B.) 367; 122 Mass. 208; 8 El. & Bl. 142, 149, 151, 153; 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 63,65, 66, 67; 19 Barb. 3S3; 21 Barb. 414; 5 El. & Bl. 46; 1 Jur. (N. s.) 827; 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 265; L. E. 7 Q. B. 722; 42 L. J. (Q. B.) 144; 27 Gratt. 87, 88; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 1185; 65 lU. 489; 8 C. B. (X. s.) 382; 4 Best & S. 157; 4 Hurl. & X. 598. Humphries v. Cousins, 2 C. P. Div. 239. pp. 80, 90, 217. c 3 C. P. Div. 259; 6 Cent. L. J. 421; 18 Alb. L. J. 16; 6 Keportev, 460. Hundhausen v. Bond, 36 Wis. 29. pp. 340, 353, 354, 355, 900, 903. Hunsaker v. Borden, 5 Cal. 288. p. 619. Hunt V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 26 Iowa, 363. pp. 1002, 12-2. c 38 Iowa, 297; 32 Iowa, 360; 49 Miss. 286; 29 Iowa, 58 ; 36 Iowa, 39. Hunt V. Hoyt, 20 111. 544. pp. 347, 1259. c 49 lU. 246. Hunt (Aaron) v. Lowell Gas-Light Co., 1 Allen, 343. p. 111. Hunt (George L.) v. Lowell Gas-Light Co., 8 Allen, 169. p. 109. c 117 Mass. 538 ; 68 Me. 165. Hunt V. Peake, 2 Johns. (Bng. Ch.) 705. pp. 261, 274, 275, 276, 2S0. Hunt u. Pennsylvania R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 475. pp. 900, 911, 914. c 57 Pa. St. 381 ; 63 Pa. St. 151; 85 Pa. St. 254; 59 Pa. St. 247; 86 Pa. St. 159. Hunt V. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411. pp. 781, 1085, 1086, 1208. c 9 Kan. 558; 40 Conn. 246; 41 X. H. 52; 23 Wis. 679; 43 Vt. 459; 29 Wis. 304; 54 Mo. 601; 35 111. 65; 15 Vt. 716; 41 Vt. 442; 51 Me. 140; 35 N. H. 276; 2 Cush. 610; 39 Vt. 259; 36 Vt. 357; 42 N. H. 216; 25 Iowa, 110; 13 Hun, 86, 87; 43 Vt. 675. a 51 Me. 128. Hunt i;. Salem, 121 Mass. 294. p. 1200. c 121 Mass. 338. Hunt 0.. Winfield, 36 Wis. 154. p. 1241. Huntington, etc., R. Co. v. Decker, 84 Pa. St. 419 : s. c, 82 Pa. St. 119. pp. 1054, 1285, 1289. Hurd V. Rutland, etc., E. Co., 25 Vt. 116. pp. 527, 533. c26 Iowa, 557; 37 Vt. 336; 13 Wis. 639; 27 Vt. 379; 35 N. H. 363 ; 7 Mich. 421. Hurdman v. North-Eastern R. Co., 3 C. P. Div. 168; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 367. p. 94. c 3 0. P. Div. 258; 6 Cent. L. J. 421. Hurley «. Jeffersonville, etc., E. Co., 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 295. p. 357. Hurley v. Manchester, 37 N. H. 289. p. 1245. Husen v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 60 Mo. 226 ; s. c, 95 U. S. 465 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 170. p. 208. Huston V. Iowa County, 43 Iowa, 456. pp. 617, 793. Hutchins v. Boston, 12 Allen, 571, note; 97 Mass. 272, note. pp. 360, 770, 784, 785. c 102 Mass. 339; 24 Wis. 274; 100 Mass. 57, 186, 187 ; 13 AUen, 188 ; 113 Mass. 505 ; 14 Allen, 510; 104 Mass. 83; 81 Iowa, 306; 105 Mass. 85. Hutchins v. Littleton, 124 Mass. 289 ; i-. c;., 5 Reporter, 528 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 137. p. 765. Hutchinson v. Boston Gas Light Co., 122 Mass. 219. pp. 109, 110. Hutchinson <;. Concord, 41 Vt. 271. p. 776. Hutchison v. Methuen, 1 Allen, 33. p. 779. Hutchison a. Tork, etc., R. Co., 5 Exch. 343 ; i. <;., 14 Jur. 837 ; 6 Eng. Rail. Cas. 588; 19 L. J. (Exch.) 296. pp. 884, 959, 970, 1038, 1279. c 6 Cush. 77; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 767, 769, 771, 773 ; 2 Lans. 512; 7 La. An. 324, 327; 18 C. B. 803; L. R. 1 C. P. 296: 43 Me. 270; 3 Ohio St. 211; 24 Ala. 36; 5N. Y. 496; 53 N. Y. 552; 14 Minn. 362 ; 23 Pa. St. 386 ; 22 Ala. 309, 312 ; 43 Me. 270 ; 11 Exch. 838; 5 Hun, 33; 6 Cal. 210; 6 La. An. 498; 21 lU. 26; 9 Cush. 114; 51 Miss. 642; 10 Mich. 199 ; 76 111. 397 ; 25 N. Y. 565 ; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 773; 10 Mich. 199; 1 Am. L. Reg. 719, 720; 5 Best & S. 57; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 262, 264, 265, 266; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1076, 1077; 3 Exch. Div. 343; 5 E-xch. 357, 358 ; 14 Jur. 841 ; 19 L. J. (Exch.) 303 ; 109 Mass. 449; 49 Miss. 283, 2S7; 28 Vt. ft!; 17 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxi Ohio St. 210 ; 6 Jones L. 246 ; 46 Texas, 538 ; 15 Ga. 358; 1 Hurl. & N. 250; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 956; 25 L. J. (Exch.) 193. Hutson 0. New Yoi-k, 9 N. T. 163 ; s. c, 5 Sandf. S. C. 289; Seld. Notes, 208. pp. 023, 686, 687, 688, 689, 726, 731, 753. 754, 758, 781. c 37 Barb. 296; 66 N. T. 341; 18 Minn. 286; 16 N. y. 173; 39 Barb. 335; 5 Bosw. 505; 44 N. Y. 123; 22 Wis. 646; 37 N. Y. 572; 10 Bosw. 28, 29; 21 Micli. 110, 111, 131; 4 Mich. 562; 3 Hun, 512; 5N. Y. S. C. (T. & O.) 580,581; 16 Wall. 574; 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 506; 51 N. Y. 513; 33 Iowa, 399; 16 Abl). Pr. 345, 347; 1 Disney, 536; 50 N. Y. 205; 37 Barb. 296; 27 Barb. 630; 9 N. Y. 457; 6 Lans. 21, 51; 11 Bush, 553; 15 Barb. 443; 43 Ind. 688, .590; 2 Hilt. 450; 9 Abb. Pr. 43; 18 How. Pr. 174; 46 N. Y. 196; 50 N. Y. 238, 239; 60 Barb. 384; 41 How. Pr. 449; 9 Hun, 685; 26 Barb. 627; 16 N. Y. 167' 169,170; 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 135; 44 Barb. 393, 394; 32 N. Y. 498, 500; 8 Bosw. 353; 46 Texas, 530; 17 Minn. 314; 55 111. 361; 1 Black, 53; 17 111. 145. * 122 Mass. 376. Hutton V. Windsor, 34 Upper Canada Q. B. 487. p. 1291. Huyett V. Philadelphia, etc., K. Co., 23 Pa. St. 373. pp. 152, 154, 160, 569, 572. c 12 Kan. 370, 372; 30 Iowa, 422; 30 Mich. 190; 14 Cal. 389; 31 Iowa, 17S; 65 Pa. St. 274; 52 Pa. St. 381; 80 Pa. St. 189; 11 Kan. 65; 37 Mo. 295; 30 Wis. 121; 9 Cal. 257. Hyams v. Webster, L. K. 2 Q. B. 264 ; s. c, 36 L. J. (Q. B.) 166 ; 15 Week. Kep. 619; 16 L. T. (n. s.) 118; 8 Best & S. 272 ; 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 21 ; L. B. 4 Q. B. 138; 17 Week. Rep. 232. p. 343. Hyatt V. Adams, 16 Mich. 180. pp. 1272, 1274, 1289. Hyatt V. Rondout, 44 Barb. 385 ; ts. c, 41 N. Y. 619. pp. 362, 623, 758, 770, 772, 773, 803. c 32 Iowa, 328; 51 N. Y. 513; 52 How. Pr. 234; 26 Iowa, 368; 61 N. Y. 509. Hyde v. Jamaica, 27 Vt 443. pp. 704, 756, 759, 1092, 1177, 1209. c 21 Mich. 113 ; 36 Vt. 587 ; 29 Conn. 209 ; 36 X. H. 298; ]'23 Mass. 351; 29 Iowa, 90; 42 Ind. 343; 30 Vt. 740; 34 Conn. 13; 8 Minn. 166. Hyde v. Stone, 7 Wend. 354. p. 802. Hyde v. Scyssor, Cro. Jac. 538; 8 Bla. Comm. 140. p. 1240. Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. St. 332. pp. 305, 307, 1195. c 5 Reporter, 345; 86 Pa. St. 79, 80. Iba V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 45 Mo. 469. p. 520. c66 Mo. 669; 48 Mo. 233; 49 Mo. 202; 48 Mo. 669; 47 Mo. 249; 48 Mo. 389; 7 Cent. L. J. 429. ? 60 Mo. 410. Ihl V. Forty-second Street R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317. pp. 400, 1182, 1187, 1188, 1277, 1291, 1293. c 65 Barb. 103 ; 38 Wis. 625, 639 ; 63 N. Y. 631; 3 Hun, 711; 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 95; 63 N. Y. 106, 107; 7 Jones & Sp. 351; 16 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 329; 9 Hei.sk. 16; 8 Jones & Sp. 359; 68 Me. 556; 60 X. Y. 336. Illidge V. Goodwin, 5 Car. & P. 190. pp. 138, 216, 229, 1085, 1088, 1134, 1141, 1142, 1144, 1208. c 3 Q. B. Div. 331 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 13 ; 17 Alb. L. J. 506; 69 111. 353; 111 Mass. 141 ; 4 Per. & Dav. 676; 1 Q. B. 36; 5 Jur. 798; 4 Gray, 405, 411 ; 37 Cal. 423 ; 41 N. Y. 46 ; 15 Ind. 489 ; 35 N. Y. 311; 6 X. Y. 410; 75 111. 97; 1 Head, 621; 61 iMe. 333; 15 I. E. O. L. 346; 11 Allen, 519; 37 Mo. 549. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Arnold, 47 111. 173. pp. 524, 528. c 54 111. 530, 531. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Baches, 55 111. 379. pp. 423, 452, 1289, 1291. «• 70 111. 279 ; 80 111. 92, 257 ; 83 111. 615 ; 82 111. 201. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Baker, 47 HI. 295. pp. 497, 498. c 76 111. 194 ; 72 III. 406 ; 73 111. 61 ; 58 111. 122. Illinois, etc., R. Co. o. Benton, 69 111. 174. pp. 416, 417, 420, 422, 423, 425. c 82 111. 200. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Bull, 72 111. 587. p. 520. Illinois, etc., R. Co. o. Carraher, 47 HI. 333. p. 299. C66 Mo. 326; 66 Bl. 328. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Cox, 21 111. 20. pp. 970, 1039, 1042. c 53 Pa. St. 457; 75 111. 110; 58 111. 284, 287; 47 III. 109; 45 lU. 201; 63 111. 295; 69 III. 464; 68 111. 560 ; 14 Minn. 363 ; 22 111. 642 ; 46 Texas, 539; 72 111. 259; 76 111. 397; 52 111. 402, 403. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 111. 177. pp. 1168, 1175, 1276, 1280, 1282. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Dickinson, 27 111. 55. p. 524. ■c 43 lU. 122; 33 111. 294; 20 Iowa, 232. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Downe}^ 18 111. 259. pp. 886, 890, 1251, 1252." ixxxu TABLE OF CASES. Illinois, etc., K. Co. l: Dutton, 53 HI. 397. p. 1258. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Ebert, 74 111. 399. pp. 424, 431. Illinois, etc , R. Co. v. Finnigan, 21 111^ 646. pp. 510, 539, 904, 1159. C41 Wis. 73; 65 111.369. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Prazier, 47 HI. 505. pp. 162, 166. c 39 N. J. L. 305; 38 N. J. L. 12; 77 111. 224; 54 III. 606. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Gillis, 68 HI. 317. pp. 496, 507. Illinois, etc., R. Co. •«. Goddard, 72 111. 567. pp. 425, 1280. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Godfrey, 71 111. 500. pp. 453, 454, 1012. c72 111. 570; 83 111. 514, 515; 81 111. 696; 71 Ul. 642; 2Bradw. 313. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Goodwin, 30 111. 117. pp. 497, 498, 507. c 33 111. 307; 73 111. 61; 50 111. 153; 42 lU. 452. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hall, 72 HI. 222. p. 450. c 2 Bradw. 310. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hammer, 72 111. 347 ;s.e., 85 111. 526. pp. 423, 425, 452, 453, 454, 1170, 1171, 1265. c 2 Bradw. 310. Illinois, etc., R. Co. u. Hetherington, 83 HI. 510. pp. 450, 453, 454, 459, 1171. c 2 Bradw. 40, 310, 433. niinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hoffman, 67 HI. 287. p. 1280. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Houck, 72 111. 285. p. 1019. c 72 111. 512. niinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hutchinson, 47 111. 408. p. 450. c 63 111. 440. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Jewell, 46 HI. 99. pp. 974, 1017. c 65 lU. 495, 497; 60 111. 174; 45 lU. 201; 69 111. 465; 68 111. 550; 47 Mo. 577; 72 lU. 140, 261; 76 111. 397. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Kanouse, 39 HI. 272. p. 904. o 10 Jones & Sp. 234; 63 N. T. 531; 40 111. 145; 63 111. 546; 86 111. 446; 20 Kan. 518. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Maffit, 67 111. 431, pp. 425, 1168, 1170. c 80 lU. 91, 257; 82 m. 201; 1 Bradw. 516. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. McClelland, 42 HI. 355. pp. 156, 1.57, 169. c41Ind. 212;41\Vls. 73. ' Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. McKee, 43 111. 119. pp. 528, 536. c 71 111. 510. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Middlesworth,43ni. 64 ; s. c, 46 HI. 494. pp. 497, 538, 1171. c58 111. 51; 62 111. .330; 22 Ohio St. 245; 76 111. 194; 47 111. 297; 2 Neb. 348; 59 Mo. 231; 72 111.406; 73111.62. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Mills, 42 HI. 407. pp. 152, 153, 162, 166. c 12 Kan. 372; 7 Heisk. 462; 58 111. 391, 398; 39 N. J. L. 305 ; 46 Mo. 326 ; 7 Kan. 318, 319 ; 26 Wis. 229 ; 47 111. 500, 502 ; 50 Cal. 581 ; 11 Kan. 55; 30 Wis, 121; 21 Minn. 64; 56 111. 31; 54 lU. 606. a 30 Iowa, 422. Illinois, etc., R. Co. . McKinney, 24 Ind. 283. pp. 498, 515, 517, 520, 522, 529. c 33 Ind. 479 ; 26 Iowa, 557 ; 29 Ind. 428. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Means, 14 Ind. 30. pp. 512, 537. c 35 Ind. 381; 37 Ind. 549; 17 Ind. 570; 44 Ind. 411; 8 Nev. 115. Indi '.iiapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Mustard, 34 Ind. 50. p. 539. c 35 Ind. 174. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Oestel, 20 Ind. 231. pp. 520, 522, 523. c 29 Ind. 472 ; 36 Ind. 20 ; 49 Mo. 202 ; 45 Ind. 498 ; 58 Ind. 366 ; 26 Iowa, 557. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. u. Paramore, 31 Ind. 143. pp. 152, 1.54, 163. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Paramore, 12 Ind. 408. p. 517. c 37 Ind. 549; 7 Kan. 318; 33 Iowa, 188; 51 Ind. 155. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Parker, 29 Ind. 471. pp. 515, 520, .521. c 28 Mich. 514, 513 ; 43 Ind. 144 ; 37 Ind. 550 ; 46 Ind. 231 ; 38 Ind. 451 ; 58 Ind. 366. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. u. Penry, 48 Ind. 128. p. 537. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Petty, 30 Ind. 261 ; s. u., 25 Ind. 413. pp. 512, 526, 527, 528, 529, 536, 1246, 12.54. C48 Mo. 233; 48 Ind. 233; 37 Ind. 550; 46 Ind. 231. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Peyton, 76 111. 340. pp. 506, 507. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. u. Renner, 17 Ind. 13-5. p. 533. c 20 Ind. 229 ; 52 Ind. 507. ? 23 Ind. 535. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Robinson, 35 Ind. 380. pp. 1246, 12-54. c48 Ind. 121; 40 Ind. 230, 231; 44 Ind. 410, TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxv 411 ; 49 Ind. 212 ; 57 Ind. 248 ; 51 Ind. 68 ; 49 N. Y. 121. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Kay, 51 Ind. 269. p. 510. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Eutherford, 29 Ind. 82. p. 1238. Indinnapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Shimer, 17 Ind. 295. pp. 525, 528, 529. c 20 Iowa, 194, 222; 29 Ind. 42; 54 Ind. 43; 48 Ind. 228; 23 Ind. 344; 3.i Ind. 414; 37 Ind. .550 ; 43 Iowa, 209. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Smith, 78 HI. 112. p. 423. c 82 111. 124. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Snelling, 16 Ind. 435. pp. 515, 521. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Solomon, 23 Ind. 534. pp. 509, 533. c 36 Ind. .380; 43 Ind. S.'iB; .53 Ind. 507, 508. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. u. Sparr, 15 Ind. 440. p. 535. o 17 Ind. 570. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Stables, 62 111. 313. pp. 418, 419, 421, 422, 1168, 12.5'^. c 76 111. 314. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Stout, 58 Ind. 143; s. c, 41 Ind 149. pp. 421, 422, 428, 1149, 1175, 1212, 1276, 1279, 1286. c 59 Ind. 92. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Taffe, 11 Ind. 458. p. 534. Indianapolis, etc., E Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38. pp. 498, 515, 517, 529. c 16 Ind. 104; 65 Me. .339; 13 Ind. 407, 479; ■28 Mich. 515; 24 Ind. 223; 10 Ind. 50; 29 Ind. -428; 37 Ind. 549; 16 Kan. 576; 46 Ind. 280. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Truitt, 24 Ind. 162. p. 1246. c 36 Wis. 150; 45 Ind. 92; 26 Ind. 150. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Warner, 35 Ind. 516. pp. 509, 521. c 46 Ind. 2S1. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Williams, 15 Ind. 486. p. 1246. c 35 Ind. 381 ; 37 Ind. 549 ; 44 Ind. 411. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. u. Wilsey, 20 Ind. 229. p. 538. c 52 Ind. 507. ? 23 Ind. 535. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. o. Wright, 22 Ind. 376. pp. 497, 49S. c 35 Ind. 466; 50 Ind. 84; 16 Ind. 104. Ingalls t. Bills, 9 Mete. 1. pp. 812, 562, 1092, 1228. Ingersoll u. New York, etc., E. Co., 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 416. p. 423. c 10 Jones & Sp. 231, 232. Ingersoll v. Stockbridge, etc., E. Co., 8 Allen, 438. pp. 170, 171, 172. Cl21 Mass. 136; 91 U. S. 472; 16 Kan. 580; 26 Wis. 235 ; 98 Mass. 418 ; 11 W. Va. 38, 39 ; 118 Mass. 545. Inman v. Punk, 7 B. Men. 538. p. 1214. c 10 Ind. 417 ; 6 Ind. 145 ; 4 Ind. 99. Inman i=. Tripp, 11 E. I. 520; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 75; 17 Alb. L. J. 12. p. 747. Innocent v. Peto, 4 Post. & Pin. 8. pp. 900, 911. Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 IT. S. 754. p. 1272. Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44. pp. 138, 1101. c 39 Md. 143; 44 Iowa, 404; 39 N. J. L. 308; 26 Wis. 284; 62 Pa. St. 368. International, etc., E. Co. v. Doyle, 49 Texas, 190; s. c, 5 Eeporter, 631. pp. 971, 978, 981, 982, lOOS. lonides v. Universal Ins. Co., 14 C. B. (n. s.) 259. pp. 1065, 1101. Ireland v. Oswego Plank-road Co., 13 N. Y. 526. pp. 556, 771. c 3 Daly, 383, 385 ; 49 Barb. 534 ; 10 E. 1. 308 ; 10 Bosw. .32 ; 17 Mich. 123 ; 16 Abb. Pr. 348, 349 ; 35 N. Y. 39, 47 ; 39 How. Pr. 419 ; 19 How. Pr. 224 ; 4 Eobt. 346 ; 37 Conn. 312, 313 ; 8 Minn. 165; 4 Cent. L. J. 84; 57 Barb. 6.52. Irvin V. Fowler, 5 Eobt. 482. pp. 818, 344, 345, 1088. c 21 Mich. 20. Irvine ... Wood, 51 N. Y. 224; s. c, 4 Eobt. 188. pp. 317, 818, 344. c 9 Hun, 676; 4 Robt. 239. Irwin V. Commissioners, 1 Serg. & R. 505. p. 619. Irwin V. Sprigg, 6 Gill, 200. pp. 844, 1149, 1152, 1177. c 30 Ala. 327. Isabel u. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 60 Mo. 475; s. c, 2 Cent. L. J. 590. pp. 417, 431, 448, 452, 1187, 1191, 1197. c 64 Mo. 4, 37, 276. Isbell V. New York, etc., R. Co., 27 Conn. 393. pp. 501, 1151, 1158. c 23 Ohio St. 245; 17 Mich. 122; 45 Iowa, 32; 37 Cal. 420; 52 N. H. 5.55; 4 IIiin,764; 12 Gray, 60; 9 Nev. 294, 298; 6SMc. 558; 30 Minn. 134, 135. Itchin Bridge Co. v. Southampton Board Ixxxvi TABLE OF CASES. of Health, 8 El. & Bl. 801. pp. 591, 592, 59H, 607, 608, 622. Iveson V. iloore, 1 Ld. Eaym. 486. pp. 340, 341, 577. Jack v. Hudnall, 25 Ohio St. 255. p. 198. JacUman u. Garland, 64 Me. 133. p. 757. Jackson v. Belleview, 30 Wis. 250. pp. 780, 1036, 1207. c 43 Wis. 523. Jackson o. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 31 Iowa, 176. pp. 152, 156. c 9 Nev. 293. Jackson o. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 36 Iowa, 451. p. 507. c 39 Iowa, 46. Jackson v. Commissioners of Greene County, 76 N. C. 282. pp. 617, 1209. Jackson v. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co., 47 Ind. 454. pp. 1176, 1254. c 6S Ind. 28. Jackson v. Leek, 19 Wend. 339. p. 890. Jackson v. Metropolitan R. Co., 3 App. Cas. 193 ; s. c, 26 Week. Rep. 10 ; 5 Reporter, 636. p. 1237. Jackson o. Pesked, 1 Mau. & Sel. 234. p. 649. Jackson u. Portland, 63 Me. 55. p. 569. Jackson u. Richmond, 14 La. An. 806. p. 1264. Jackson «. Rutland, etc., R. Co., 25 Vt. 150. pp. 215, 500, 517. c 10 Iowa, 271 ; 42 Vt. 378; 65 Mo. 175; 17 111. 550 ; 28 N. ir. 172 ; 55 >f. H. 553 ; 27 Vt. 53, 379 ; 21 Ohio St. 594 ; 9 Wis. 209, 220 ; 23 Gratt. 647; 8 Nev. 114, 117; 20 Kan. 363. Jackson v. Schmidt, 14 La. An. 806. pp. 348, 1264. c 49 N. H. 394. Jackson u. Sharp, 9 Johns. 162. p. 890. Jackson v. Smithson, 15 Mee. & W. 563 ; «. u., 15 L. J. (Exch.) 311. pp. 132, 208. <■ 5 C. 15. 629, 630, 631, 633 ; 5 Dow. & L. 511, 513 ; 12 Jur. 249 ; 17 L. J. (0. P.) 125, 126 ; 13 C. B. (N. s.)437; 40Vt. 351; 10 Ciisli. 511; 38 Wis. 309; 45 L. J. 125; 1 Q. B. Div. S3. Jackson o. AVinslow, 9 Cow. 13. p. 890. Jacksonville o. Lambert, 62 111. 519. p. 751. Jacobs i'. .\ndrews, 4 Iowa, 506. p. 151. c 36 Iowa, 242. Jacobs ,j. Bangor, 16 Me. 187. pp. 768, 1205, 1266. c 35 N. H. 276 ; 6 Wis. 390. Jacobs V. Duke, 1 E. D. Smith, 271. p. 1149. Jacobs's Administrator V. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 10 Bush, 2i3. pp. 1003, 1004, 1024, 102'), 1234, 1243, 1264, 1278, 1294. c 5 lleijorter, 720; 13 Bush, 642; 10 Bush, 680. Jaffe V. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398 ; s. c, 14 Abb. Pr. (n. s.)263: p. 323. Jager v. Adams, 123 Mass. 26. p. 348. Jalie V. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118. pp. 1178, 1215. James v. Campbell, 5 Car. & P. 372. pp. 72, 1235. c 3 Barb. 46; 57 Pa. St. 192; 53 N. H. 451^ 13 Am. L. Eeg. CN. s.) 375. James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162. pp. 1272, 1290. James v. Great Western R. Co., L. E. Z C. P. 635, note. p. 423. c 40 N. Y. 49; L. R. 2 C. P. 637; 36 L. J. (0. P.) 254. James v. Jones, Abb. on Ship. 44. p. 894. Jansen u. Atchison, 16 Kan. 358. pp. 762, 781, 782. c 20 Kan. 456. Janson v. Brown, 1 Camp. 41. p. 221. Jaquish v. Ithaca, 36 Wis. 108. pp. 561, 764, 796, 1257, 1268. Jaquitl-^o. Richardson, 8 Mete. 213. p. 386. Jarmain v. Hooper, 6 Man. & G. 827.. p. 826. Jarvis v. Dean, 11 J. B. Moo. 354 ; 6. c, 3 Bing. 447. pp. 344, 759. c 9 C. B. 417; 14 Jnr. 335; 19 L. J. (0. P.> 199. Jay V. Whitfield, cited in 3 Barn. & Aid. 308. pp. 301, 1145. c 18 Ohio St. 411; 3 Q. B. Div. 334; 7 Cent. L. J. 13; 17 Alb. L. J. 507 ; 4 Bing. 644. Jean v. Sandiford, 39 Ala. 311. p. 210. .Jefferis v. Phila., etc., R. Co., 3 Houst. (Del.) 447. pp. 154, 157, 164. Jeffersonville i;. Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 100. p. 557. Jeffersiinville, etc., R. Co. v. Adams, 4.?; Ind. 403. p. 499. c 55 Inil. 482 ; 48 Iiul. 391 ; ,58 Ind. 367. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxvii Jeffersonville, etc., K. Co. v. Applegate, 10 Ind. 49. pp. 498, 515, 517. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Avery, 31 Ind. 277. p. 523. c 37 Ind. 550; 46 Ind. 216, 217. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Beatty, 36 Ind. 15. p. 522. c43 Ind. 144; 45 Ind. 498; 58 Ind. 367. Jeft'ersonville, etc., R. Co. i.. Bowen, 49 Ind. 154; .s. u., 40 Ind. 545. pp. 1181, 1184. c 46 Ind. 30 ; 52 Ind. Ill ; 50 Ind. 45 ; 59 Ind. 92 ; 58 Ind. 28. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Brevoort, 30 Ind. 324. pp. .520, 533, 535, 537. c 48 Ind. 289 ; 58 Ind. 368 ; 47 Ind. 318. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Chenoweth, 30 Ind. 366. p. 124H. c 46 Ind. 281 ; 44 Ind. 410. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Dougherty, 10 Ind. 549. p. 540. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Dunlap, 29 Ind. 426. pp. 512, 533, 1247. c 36 Ind. 373; 47 Ind. 480. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Goldsmith, 47 Ind. 43. pp. 449, 453, 1254. c 49 Ind. 97; 53 Ind. 310. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Hendricks's Administrator, 26 Ind. 228. pp.1176, 1238, 1254, 1279, 12S3, 1285, 1288. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Lyon, 55 Ind. 477. pp. 534, 535, 1254. c 58 Ind. 415. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. t;. Martin, 10 Ind. 416. p. 1246. c 19 Ind. 43; 11 Ind. 459. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Morgan, 38 Ind. 190. p. 497. c 42 Ind. 540. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Nichols, 30 Ind. 321. p. 524. c 36 Ind. 373; 28 Mich. 515; 48 Ind. 287; 37 Ind. 5)50. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. O'Connor, 37 Ind. 95. pp. 521, 537. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Piirkhurst, 34 Ind. 501. pp. 520, 521. c 23 Mich. 514, 515 ; 46 Ind. 281; 43 Ind. 410; 58 Ind. 367. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568. pp. 1279, 1291. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Rodgers, 38 Ind. 116. p. 887. ? 8 Hun, 581. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Ross, 37 Ind. 545. pp. 528, 529. <• 47 Ind. 251 ; 46 Ind. 281. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan, 38 Ind. 262. p. 526 c 46 Ind. 281. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Sweeney, 32 Ind. 430. p. 522. c 37 Ind. 550. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Underhill, 40 Ind. 229 ; s. c, 48 Ind. 389. pp. 499, 500, 520, 1246, 1254. c50 Ind. 238; 43 Ind. 404; 55 Ind. 482; 48 Ind. 121; 46 Ind. 281; 44 Ind. 411; 53 Ind. 489. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Vancant, 40 Ind. 233. p. 1247. c 48 Ind. 289; 47 Ind. 318. Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. 518. pp. 205, 207, 890. c 8 Hun, 528; 7 Lans. 213; 64 Barb. 213; 26 N. Y. 528. Jeffries v. Williams, 5 Exch. 792; s. c, 20 L, J. (Exch.) 14. p. 275. c 4 Hurl. & N. 157; 26 L. J. (Exch.) 184; 25 N. J. L. 370. Jenkins v. Pahey, 11 Hun, 351. p. 360. Jenkins w. Little Miami R. Co., 2 Disney, 49. p. 1237. c 41 Ind. 254. Jenkins v. Turner, 1 Ld. Raym. 109 ; s. c, 2 Salk. 662. pp. 175, 190, 202, 203, 208, 209. c 11 Ired. L. 270; 16 N. H. 80; 1 N. Y. 516; 4 Denio, 128. Jenks 0. Wilbraham, 11 Gray, 142. pp. 1090, 1091. c 14 Allen, 292. .lenner v. JoUiffe, 6 Johns. 9. p. 827. Jennings v. Fundeburg, 4 MoCord, 161. p. 12:^4. c 4 Eicli. L. 335. Jennings v. Randall, 8 Term Rep. 337. p. 1126. Jennings v. Tisbury, 5 Gray, 73. p. 760. c 7 Gray, 344; 29 Iowa, 82, 92; 56 Me. 3.56; 12 Gray, 418; 3 Allen, 401; 46 N. H. 199; 122 Mass. 64. Jennings v. Wayne, 63 Me. 468. p. 1093. Jentry v. Hunt, 2 McCord, 410. p. 889. Jetter v. New York, etc., R. Co., 2 Keyes, 154 ; s. c, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 458. pp. 115, 398, 399, 400, 418, 558, 1180. c 14 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 33; 38 Iowa, 123, 125; 39 How. Pr. 420; 55 Ind. 50; 26 Wis. 2.")5; 64 Ixxxviii TABLE OF CASES. N. Y. 631, 3«2; 6 Hun, 319; 63 N. Y. 530; 2 Abb. C. C. 325; 1 Sawyer, 451; 6 Jones & Sp. 135 ; 6 Daly, 496. Jewell V. Parr, 13 C. B. 916. p. 1237. Jewett V. Gage, 55 Me. 538. p. 205. c 65 Me. 553. Jewett V. New Haven, 88 Conn. 368. p. 735. <• 38 Conn. 227, 230; 49 How. Pr. 68; 51 Ala. 148; 13 Hun, 218. Jewett 1'. Somerset, 1 Me. 125. p. 619. Job V. Ilirlan, 13 Ohio St. 485. p. 219. Joch o. Uankwardt, 85 111. 331. pp. 12of), 12.5S. Joel V. Morrison, 6 Car. & P. 501. p. 885. c L. R. S C. P. 567 ; 42 L. J. (0. P.) 303 ; 5 Eobt. .5,58: ;« How. Pr. 462; 13 C. B. 246; 17 Jur. 71S; 2-2 L. J. (C. P.) 103; 6 Daly, 341; L. K. 3 C. P. 424. John V. Bacon, L. R. 5 C. P. 437. p. 557. e 25 Mich. 9 Johnson «. Barber, 10 111. 425. pp. 150, 886. c 1 Iowa, 110 ; 3 Iowa, S3 ; 28 111. 435 ; 10 111. 612; 13 111.285. Johnson v. Belden, 47 N. Y. 130; a. c, 12 Lans. 4.S3. p. 821. c 20 Wis. 266. Johnson v. Boston, 118 Mass. 114. pp. 970, 1041, 1042. c 122 Mass. 404; 123 Mass. 154; 119 Mass. 421; 6 -Reporter, 752. Johnson v. Bruner, 61 Pa. St. 58 (revers- ing 6 Phila. 554). pp. 973, 1022. c 59 Pa. St. 264 ; 46 Texas, 539 ; 67 Pa. St. 315; 74 Pa. St. 223; 4 Cent. L. J. 84; 75 Pa. St. 86. Johnson v. Canal, etc., K. Co., 27 La. An. 53. pp. 309, 1146. Johnson v. Dixon, 1 Daly, 178. p. 323. Johnson v. Haverhill, 35 N. H. 74. pp. 761, 763, 1238. c 43 X, H. 268, 269, 362 ; 41 N. H. 52, 137 ; 35 N. H. 270 ; 62 N. H. 378, 379 ; 46 N. H. 60 ; 66 N. H. 295, 296, 431 ; 30 Wis. 397 ; 42 N. H. 202, 203, 204; 40 N. H. 416; 57 N. H. 93. Johnson v. Hudson River R. Co., 20 N. Y. 65 ; s. c, 5 Duer, 21 ; 6 Duer, 633. pp. 397, 1146, 1161, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1239, 1290. c 30 N. Y. 79 ; 34 N". Y. 13, 627 ; 100 Mass. 215 ; 48 X. H. 21 ; 3 Daly, 385 ; 3 Eobt. 614 ; 33 Barb. 431; 40 Barb. 209, 211; 40 N. Y. 28, 32; 25 Md. 388 ; 1 Sweeny, 642 ; 9 Bosw. 539 ; 10 Bosw. 33 ; 18 Iowa, 289 ; 35 N. Y. 28 ; 22 X. Y. 213 ; 41 lud. 242; 13 Hun, 330; 34 Cal. 164; 39 How. Pr. 420; 8 Jones & Sp. 183; 44 N. Y. 471; 55 Ind. 50 ; 41 Wis. 110 ; 2 Keyes, 159 ; 2 Abb. App. Dec. 460 ; 24 N. Y. 433 ; IS Wis. 81 ; 64 N. Y. 656 ; 101 Mass. 465; 29 Md. 438; 2 Bosw. 378; 58 N. Y. 251, 461 ; 15 Wall. 407; 32 Iowa, 149; 65 Barb. 149, 150, 164; 48 Cal. 426; 56 Ind. 520; 4 Jones & Sp. 448; 14 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 75 ; 34 Barb. 270. Johnson v. Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28. pp. 1093, 1094. Johnson v. Lewis, 13 Conn. 303. p. 318. Johnson v. liowell, 12 Allen, 572, note. pp. 360, 784. c 102 Mass. 339; 24 Wis. 274; 100 Mass. 67; 12 Allen, 670. Johnson v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 19 Wis. 137. pp. 515, 527. Johnson v. Municipality No. 1, 5 La. An. 100. pp. 734, 735. a 31 Ala. 474, 477, 478. Johnson u. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1. p. 302. c 19 Conn. 612; 27 Conn. 410; 25 Vt. 160; 52 N. H. .556; 9 Wis. 218; 5 Reporter, 345; 86 Pa. St. 80; 31 Conn. 131, 482. Johnson v. Salem Turnpike Co., 109 Mass. 522. pp. 560, 561. c 116 Mass. 423. Johnson o. Western, etc., R. Co., 55 6a. 133. p. 1003. c 58 Ga. 490. Johnson v. Whitefleld, 18 Me. 286. pp. 754, 775, 776, 789. c 42 Me. 627, 538; 46 Me. 486; 19 Vt. 477; 40 Me. 178; 17 111. 146; 68 Ind. 232; 13 N. Y. 531; 68 Me. 154. Johnson v. Wing, 3 Mich. 163. p. 213. Johnston v. Charleston, 3 So. Car. 232. pp. 761, 781, 782, 783. Joliet V. Seward, 88 111. 402. pp. 425, 740, 776. Joliet V. Verley, 35 111. 58. pp. 782, 753, 1085. c 68 111. 169; 58 111. 273, 276; 53 Mo. 301; 42 111.608; 63 111.408; 83111. 442; 48 111. 600; 55 111.322,350; 61 111. 158. Joliet, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 20 111. 221. pp. 497, 504. c 20 Iowa, 222. Jones V. Andover, 6 Pick. 59. p. 757. c 40 N, II. 414 ; 119 Mass. 278. Jones V. Andover, 10 Allen, 18. pp. 383, 1098, 1094, 1208. c 104 Mass. 61; 117 Mass. 65; 119 Mass. 68; 47 Vt. 33 ; 120 Mass. 492. d 29 Wis. 24. Jones V. Bird, 1 Dow. & Ry. 497 ; s. c, 5 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxix Barn. & Aid. 837. pp. 279, 549, 592, 743, 813. 82.3. c 15 Conn. 130; L. R. 1 H. L. 113 ; 11 H. L. Cas. 714; 13 Jur. (n. s.) 575; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 232; 3 Allen, 168; 2 Barn. & Cress. 711; 4 Dow. & Ry. 202; 25 N. Y. 338; 2 Bing. 161; 9 J. B. Moo. 236. Jones V. Blum, 2 Rich. L. 475. p. 895. Jones V. Boston, 104 Mass. 75. pp. 346, 777. C 45 Ina. 433; 9 Hun, 684. ? 52 N. H. 413. Jones V. Boyce, 1 Stark. 493. pp. 373, 1166. Jones V. Chantry, 4 N. T. S. C. (T. & C.) 63. pp. 908, 918. « 4 Hun, 27, 700; 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 137. Jones V. Festiniog K. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 733 ; ;,. c, 17 Week. Rep. 28 ; 37 L. J. (Q. B. ) 214 ; 18 L. T. (n. s. ) 902 ; 9 Best & S. 835. pp. 152, 569, 571. c 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 140; L. R. 4 H. L. 188, 199. .Jones V. G-rimite Mills Co., 7 Reporter, 146. pp. 982, 983, 1055. Jones 1). Hart, 2 Salk. 440. pp. 885, 886. c 12 Iowa, 349 ; 52 N. H. 122. Jones V. Housatonic R. Co., 107 Mass. 261. pp. 349, 350, 353. c 65 iMe. 552. Jones V. Mersey Docks Trustees, 11 H. L. Cas. 443. pp. 599, 602, 60-3, 614, 719. Jones V New Haven, 34 Conn. 1. pp. 710, 724, 731, 732, 733, 753. c34 Conn. 138; 27 Mich. 116, 122; 45 Ind. 434; 122 Mass. 357, 374; 9 Hun, 685; 62 N. Y. 169; 38 Conn. 377, 382; 91 U. S. 551. Jones V. North Carolina R. R., 70 N. C. 626. pp. 506, 507, 512. Jones V. Perry, 2 Esp. 482. pp. 179, 195, 203, 218. c 16 N. H. 80; 17 Wend. 500. Jones V. Powell, Hutton, 135. p. 107. Jones V. Roach, 9 Jones & Sp. 248. pp. 1008, 1009, 1021. Jones V. Sheboygan, etc., R. Co., 42 "Wis. 306. p. 351. c 43 Wis. 680, 681, 682. ? 42 Wis. 328. Jones V. Sherwood, 37 Conn. 466. p. 219. Jones V. Sims, 6 Port. 138. p. 895. Jones V. Wagner, 66 Pa. St. 429. p. 281. Jones V. Waltham, 4 Cush. 299. pp. 560, 775. c41 N. H. 334; 1 Allen, 185; 8 Allen, 563; 116 Mass. 423; 43 Ind. 597; 109 Mass. 528; 30 Wis. 404; 35N. H. 314. Jones V. Yeager, 2 Dill. 64 ; s. v., 5 Ch. Leg. N. 25. pp. 970, 973, 982, 990, 992, 995, 1008. c 3 Dill. 324; 3 Col. 502. Jordan v. Lassiter, 6 Jones L. 130. p. 150. Jordan i^. Wyatt, 4 G-ratt. 151. pp. 148, 149, 1252. c 16 Ark. 318, 321 ; 50 N. H. 429. Jordin v. Crump, 8 Jlee. & W. 782. p. 179, 301, 302. c 9 0. B. 419, 421; 14 Jar. 335, 336; 19 L. J. (C. P.) 199, 200;5C. B. (N. s.) 561;3Q. B.Div. 331; 7 Cent. L. J. 12; 17 Alb. L. J. 506; 25 Vt. 160; 19 How. Pr. 225; 5 Dcnio, 266; 35 X. H. 279; 48 Vt. 130; 31 N. J. L. 240; 50 Barb. 363. Joy V. Oxford, 3 Me. 131. p. 619. Joyce (1. De Giverville, 2 Mo. App. 596. p. 323. Joyner v. Great Barrington, 118 Mass. 463. pp. 733, 1209. Judd V. Fargo, 107 Mass. 264. pp. 349, 350. Judge V. Cox, 1 Stark. 285. pp. 184, 203. c 8 Barb. 6.32; L. R, 2 C. P. 3. Jutte «. Hughes, 67 N. Y. 267 ; s. u., 8 Jones & Sp. 126. pp. 104, 1260. K. Kahn v. Love, 3 Or. 206. p. 323. Kaiser v. Hirth, 4 Jones & Sp. 344 ; s. c, 46 How. Pr. 161. pp. 320, 324. Kalb V. O'Brien, 86 111. 210. p. 735. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Ball, 19 Kan. 535. p. 537. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Brady, 17 Kan. 380. p. 1178. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Butts, 7 Kan. 308. pp. 152, 154, 157, 162. c 12 Kan. 370; 17 Kan. 384; 18 Kan. 254; 14 Kan. 351. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Cutter, 19 Kan. 83. pp. 1283, 1294. Kansas, etc., R. Co. u. Fitzsimmons, 18 Kan. 34. pp. 899, 911. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 267 ; s. c, 6 Reporter, 199 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 60. pp. 982, 1030, 1032, 1054. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 2 Col. 442. pp. 1289, 1290, 1294. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Mower, 16 Kan. 573 ; s. c, 3 Cent. L. J. 641. pp. 515, 540. c 17 Kan. 570 xc TABLE OF CASES. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Pointer, 9 Kan. 620; s. c, 14 Kan. 38. pp. 453, 1149, 1172, 1177. c 19 Kan. 493, 495. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Salmon, 11 Kan. 83 ; s. a., 14 Kan. 512. pp. 974, 1053, 1279, 1285, 1288. c 19 Kan. 272, 493 ; 6 Reporter, 200. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor, 17 Kan. 566. pp. 511, 534, 535. Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Twombly, 3 Col. 125. p. 429. Karl V. Maillard, 3 Bosw. 591. p. 971. Karle v. Kansas, etc., R. Co., 55 Mo. 476. pp. 418, 421, 426, 1232, 1239, 1279. c 59 Mo. 230, 231, 371; 64 Mo. 276; 56 Mo. 352; 5SMo. 505; 62 Mo. 58. Karr v. Parks, 40 Cal. 188 ; s. u., 44 Cal. 46. pp. 1242, 1260, 1282, 1284, 1286. c 15 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 329; 49 Cal. 238; 2 Cent. L. J. 475; 7 Ch. Leg. N. 347; 3 Sawyer, 404. Kastor v. Newhouse, 4 E. D. Smith, 20. p. 317. C 65 111. 165. Kavanaugh v. Brooklyn, 38 Barb. 232. pp. 731, 747. c32X. T. 497; 51 N. H. 139. Kavanaua;h v. Janesville, 24 "Wis. 618. pp. 1240, 1241, 1259, 1270. Kay 1. Pennsylvania R. Co., 65 Pa. St. 269. pp. 423, 452, 453, 454, 1184, 1188, 1192, 1196, 1240. c 53 Ala. 80 ; 21 Minn. 214 ; 38 Iowa, 547 ; 75 Pa. St. 86, 266, 876; 1 Cent. L. J. 374; 70 Pa. St. 363, .366; 72 Pa. St. 172; 4 Hun, 762, 764; 69 Pa. St. 215. Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Black. 511. p. 977. Kearney v. Boston, etc., K. Co., 9 Cush. 108. pp. 1272, 1283. c 9 Cush. 480; 118 Mass. 235; 6 Eeporter, 461. Kearney v. London, etc., R. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 411; s. c, 39 L. J. (Q. B.) 200; 18 Week. Rep. 1000 ; 22 L. T. (n. s.) 886; 40 L. J. (Q. B.) 285; L. R. 6 Q. B. 759 ; 24 L. T. (n. s.) 913 ; 20 Week. Rep. 24. pp. 334, 349, 1277. (In full, p. 1217.) c 55 N. H. 56 ; 114 Mass. 153 ; 57 N". Y. 570, 571. Kearns v. Snowden, 104 Mass. 63, note. pp. 1093, 1202. c 44 Md. 128; 112 Mass. 469; 52 N. H. 554. Keats V. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204. p. 216. Keech v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 17 Md. 32. pp. 499, 500. c 45 Md, 493 ; 21 Ohio St. 594 ; 24 Md. 104 ; 20 Kan. 364; 21 Md. 294. Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230. pp. 973, 974, 975, 1011. c 3 Mo. App. 307; 65 Mo. 520; 5 Reporter, 178. Keegan v. Western R. Co., 8 N. Y. 175 ; s. c, Seld. Notes, 44. pp. 887, 900, 948, 971, 973, 991. c 5 Lans. 442; 26 Barb. 40; 28 Ind. 31; 45 m. 202 ; 68 111. 550 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 306 ; 49 Barb. 327; 3SPa. St. Ill; 48 Mo. 172; 13 Allen, 442; 10 Allen, 238; 60 Miss. 191; 10 Ind. 557; 3 Eobt. 82; 28 How. Pr, 474; 5 Ohio St. 561 ; 30 Mo. 117 ; 12 Minn. 372 ; 28 Vt. 64 ; 24 N. Y. 413 ; 17 N. Y. I,i6; 6 Duer, 230; 8 Hun, 257; 1 Daly, 128; 39 N. Y. 477; 28 Barb. 86; 25 N. Y. 666, 567; 24 N. Y. 220; 48 Me. 120; 70 N". Y. 93; 20 Barb. 462, 454; 42 Ala. 718. Keenan v. Cavanaugh, 44 Vt. 268. p. 215. Keese v. New York, etc., R. Co., 67 Barb. 205. p. 429. Keife v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 21 Minn. 207; s. v., 2 Cent. L. J. 170. pp. 305, 1195. c 53 Ala. 80; 65 How. Pr. 174. Keighley's Case, 10 Coke, 139. pp. 628, 635, 641, 643, 1234. c 1 Q. B. Div. 231 ; Dar. & Mer. 373. Keightlinger v. Egan, 65 111. 235. pp. 203, 21 a Keith V. Easton, 2 Allen, 552. p. 779. c 11 Allen, 320; 65 Me. 551, 564; 114 Mass. 509 ; 98 Mass. 81 ; 115 Mass. 572 ; 13 Allen, 188 ; 59 Ind. 86. ? 62 ST. H. 413; 41 Vt. 442; 46 N. H. 60; 39 Conn. 379. Keliher v. Connecticut R. Co., 107 Mass. 411. pp. 209, 523. c 115 Mass. 566. Keller v. New York, etc., R. Co., 24 How. Pr. 172. pp. 459, 460, 1288, 1291. c 3 Daly, 383, 385 ; 49 Barb. 634 ; 35 N. Y. 39 ; 39 How, Pr. 419, 421, 423, 425 ; 94 U, S. 473 ; 2 Jones & Sp. 486; 43 How. Pr. 411; 52 Mo. 258. Kelley v. Pond du Lac, 31 Wis. 179 ; s. c., 36 Wis. 307. pp. 362, 769, 778, 779, 1086, 1204, 120.5, 1207, 1209. c 43 Wis. 511, 523 ; 33 Wis. 444 ; 41 Wis. 415, 654; 30 Wis. 257, 408; 39 Wis. 677; 6 Cent. L. J. 429. Kelley v. Madison, 43 Wis. 638. p. 798. TABLE OF CASES. XCl Kelley i;. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 83. pp. 731, 732, 742. c 32 Wis. 318. Kelley v. Norcross, 121 Mass. 508. p. 1034. c 5 Reporter, 272; 123 Mass. 154, 488. Kelley v. Silver Spring, etc., Co., 7 Re- porter, 60. pp. 983, 984, 1008, 1009. Kellinger v. Forty-second Street R. Co., 50 N. Y. 206. pp. 356, 358, 359, 776. Kellion v. Power, 61 Pa. St. 429. p. 324. Kellogg V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 26 Wis. 223! pp. 162, 164, 169, 382, 1172. c 80 Pa. St. 379 ; 12 Kan. 379 ; 4 Neb. 276 ; 53 Mo. 371; 39 X. J. L. 305, 307, 311, 312; 78 N. C. 307, 312; U Wis. 67, 73, 273; 17 Kan. 384, 389; 94 U. .S. 474; 80 Pa. St. 190; 34 Wis. 318; 41 Iowa, 310; 57 N. H. 138, 139; 11 Kan. 56, 58; 6 Cent. L. J. 313 ; 11 W. Va. 27, 37 ; 30 Wis. 116, 120; 38 Wis. 592; 48 Ind. 479; 65 Me. 340. Kellog!!; V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 94 XJ. S. 469 ; s. c, 1 Cent. L. J. 278 ; 5 Cent. L. J. 305. pp. 153, 1.56, 157. c 39 N. J. L. 307, 308, 309, 311; 8 Cent. L. J. 279. Kellogg V. Northampton, 4 Gray, 69. pp. 362, 769, 1248. c38 Vt. 56; 13 Allei^, 188; 63 Me. 471 ; 57 Me. 376; 110 Mass. 337; 30 Wis. 403; 68 Me. 367. Kellogg V. Payne, 21 Iowa, 575. pp. 899, 901, 902, 911. c 33 Iowa, 565. Kelly V. Baker, 10 Minn. 154. p. 268. Kelly V. Detroit Bridge Works, 17 Kan. 558. p. 1055. Kelly V. Hendrie, 26 Mich. 255. pp. 396, 399. c 35 Micli. 471 ; 28 Mich. 447. Kelly V. New York, 11 N. Y. 432; s. c, 4 E D. Smith, 291. pp. 740, 900, 908, 914. c 12 Hun, :W4 ; 36 Barb. 390 ; 48 Barb. 343 ; 8 Cal. 493; 7 Cent. L. J. 494; 29 N. Y. ,595, 596; 35 X. J. L 26 ; 9 Mich. 191 ; 6 Jones & Si). 200 ; 62 N. Y. 10.!; 18 Kan. 38; 21 Iowa, 578; 66 X. Y. 185 ; 2 Hilt. 67 ; 61 N. Y. 183, 186, 200, 202 ; 48 How. Pr. 46 ; 36 Barb. 633 ; 7 Bosw. 513 ; 46 Pa. .St. 232; 15 Wall. 657; 38 Barb. 655; 17 X. Y. 106; 1 Daly, 138; 38 Barb. 198; ;W Barb. 336; 34 Conn. 481; 59 Me. 538, 533; 5 Bosw. 449; 33 Ind. 556; 6 Daly, 472, 475. Kelly V. Tilton, 3 Keyes, 263; s. c, 2 Abb. .\pp. Deo. 495. pp. 208, 220, 222. Kelsey v. Glover, 15 Vt. 708. pp. 761, 781, 1085, 1238. c 13 Hun, 86, 87 ; 8 Minn. 163 ; 22 Wis. 679 43 Vt. 459; 39 Wis. 304; 37 Vt. 466; 35 111, 66 41 Vt. 441; 51 Me. 140; 35 X. H. 376; 19 Vt. 475 33 Vt. 13; 43 N. H. 216; 35 Iowa, 110; 17 How. 167. Kempinger v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 3 Mo. App. 581. p. 1181. Kendall v. Lucas County, 26 Iowa, 395. pp. 617, 793. c 40 Iowa, 318, 397; 7 Cent. L. J. 139. Kendall u. Stokes, 3 How. 87. p. 669. Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39. pp. 879, 382, 386, 1151, 1152, 1176, 1202. (In full, p. 368.) c 13 111. 588 ; 19 Conn. 576 ; 18 N. Y. 252 ; 38 Mich. 45; 40 Me. 65; 2 VVoodb. & M. 345; 32 Me. 53; 12 Mete. 420; 30 Me. 179; 29 Me. 310. Kennayde n. Pacific R. Co., 45 Mo. 255. pp. 420, 425, 1288. c34 Iowa, 161; 55 Mo. 483; 64 Mo. 544; 46 Mo. 356. Kennedy v. Burrier, 36 Mo. 128. p. 1285. Kennedy v. New York, 73 N. Y. 365 ; s. c, 17 Alb. L. J. 454. pp. 734, 775, 1207. Kennedy v. North Missouri R. Co., 36 Mo. 351. pp. 424, 426. c 49 111. 245 ; 3 Mo. App. 507; 40 Mo. 518; 59 Ind. 330; 66 Mo. 544. Kennedy v. Way, Bright. 186. p. 389. Kenney v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 63 Mo, 99; s. c, 3 Cent. L. J. 399. p. 158. c 63 Mo. 311, 367 ; 64 Mo. 543. Kensington v. Wood, 10 Pa. St. 93. pp. 747, 748, 753. c 73 Pa. St. 408, 409 ; 56 Pa. St. 451. Kent V. Elstob, 3 East, 18. p. 1147. Kent u. Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591. pp. 801, 1245. c 41 Vt. 434 ; 53 N. H. 415 ; 40 Vt. 338, 339. Kenworthy v. Ironton, 41 Wis. 647. pp. 362, 770, 772, 805, 1203. Kenyoji v. New York, etc., R. Co., 5 Hun, 479. pp. 449, 450, 452, 1157, 1188. c 11 Hun, 335; 13 Hun, 331. Kepperly u. Rannsden, 83 111. 354. pp. 900, 1093, 1176. c 3 Bradw. 40. Kerr v. Forgue, 54 111. 482. pp. 1168, 1181, 1195. o 84 111. 486 ; 28 Mich. 42; 55 Ind. 50; 56 Ind. 518; 75 111.99. xcu TABLE OF CASES. Kerr v. O'Connor, 63 Pa. St. 341. pp. 199, 219. Kerr u. Pennsylvania R. Co., 62 Pa. St. 353. p. 142. Kertschacke v. Ludwig, 28 Wis. 430. pp. 218. 219. Kei'whacker v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172. pp. 214, 498, 502, 504, 506, 1186. (Infull, p. 472.) e 9 W. Va. 287 ; 38 Ala. S5, 86 ; 6 Ohio St. 109 ; 9 Rich. L. S9, 93 ; 13 West. .Jur. 47-) ; i.j Ind. 246 ; 53 X. H. 553 ; 9 Wis. 220 ; 29 Wis. 26 ; 1 Daly, 143 ; 31 Miss. 184 ; 21 Iowa, 106 ; 66 JIo. 595 ; 10 Iowa, 270; 45 .Md. 492; 43 Vt. SST ; .50 Mo. 464; 26 Mo. 449 ; 53 Ala. 597 ; 35 X. H. 279 ; 15 Ind. 489 ; 22 Ohio St. 20 ; 18 X. Y. 258 ; 13 Ohio St. 69 ; 16 111. 203; 4 Ohio St. 95, 424, 477; 43 Miss. 381; 48 Miss. 119; 29 Md.436; 41 Mo. 374; 64 Mo. 4:36; 23 Ind. 380; 37 Conn. 407, 413; 9 Allen, 563; 74 N. C. 660; 19 How. Pr. 224; 45 Iowa, 32; 37 Oal. 423. d 5 Kan. 188. Kesee ;;. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 30 Iowa, 78. pp. 160. 1152. c 3S Iowa, 297 ; 37 Iowa, 323 ; 17 Wis. 3S4, 389 ; 41 Iowa, 196 ; 41 Wis. 73 ; U W. Va. 37 ; 8 Cent. L. J. 279 ; 38 Iowa, 124. Keshan o. G-ates, 2 N.Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 288. p. 217. Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154. p. 1289. Kessel i.. Butler, 53 N.Y. 612. pp.340, 341, 356, 1256. Kessler v. Leeds, 51 Ind. 212. p. 1247. Kewanee v. Depew, 80 111. 119. pp. 1158, 1168, 1204. Kidder v. Dunstable, 11 Gray, 342 ; s. c, 7 Gray, 104. pp. 242, 383, 755, 1093. c 11 Allen, 321; 8 Allen, 437; 53 X. H. 413, 414; 119 Mass. 492; 46 X. H. 60; 4 Allen, 114; 121 Mass. 219; 43 Conn. 42; 33 N. J. L. 261; 41 Me. 339; 33 Conn. 61. Kielley v. Belcher, etc., Mining Co., 3 Sawyer, 437, 500 ; s. c, 2 Cent. L. J. 705. pp. 970, 972, 1008, 1035, 1037. c 3 Sawyer, 448. Killarney (The), 1 Lush. 247. p. 895. Killea v. Faxon, 125 Mass. 425 ; s. c, 6 Re- porter, 778. p. 1034. Kimball u. Bath, 38 Me. 219. pp. 766, 768, 1266. Kimball v. Boston, 1 Allen, 417. p. 1242. Kimball v. Cushman, 103 Mass. 194. pp. 893, 899. c lis Mass. 117. Kimmell a. Burfeind, 2 Daly, 155. p. 324. King V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 9 Cush. 112. pp. 970, 977. 982. clO Gray, 381; 72 X. Y. 216; 28 Ind. 377; 13 Hun, 297; 4 Gray, 101; 43 Me. 270; 102 Mass. 683 ; 49 Barb. 326 ; 43 X'. H. 236 ; 14 Minn. 363 ; 38 Pa. St. 110 ; 13 Allen, 441 ; 10 Allen, 237 ; 119 Mass. 413 ; 51 Miss. 643 ; 59 Pa. St. 251 ; 23 Ind. 377; 17 X. Y. 156; 25 X. Y. 565 ; 12 Hun, 292. King t. Iowa, etc., R. Co., 34 Iowa, 458. p. 569. King ii. Kline, 6 Pa. St. 318. p. 221. King t. Morris, etc., R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 397. p. 152. King c. New York, etc., E. Co., 72 N. Y. 607; s. c, 66 N. Y. 181 (reversing 4 Hun, 769). pp. 900, 903, 934. c 7 Cent. L. J. 494. King V. Peach, 1 Lil. Ent. 29. p. 177. Kinghorne v Montreal Tel. Co., 18 Up- per Canada Q. B. 60. pp. 838, 853, 854. c 21 Minn. 161 ; 1 Daly, 583. Kingsburjf v. Dedharn, 13 Allen, 186. pp. 770, 779. c 114 Mass. 509; 65 Me. 551; 93 Mass. 81, 82; 115 Mass. 573; 105 Mass. 85; 5) Ind. 86. ? 53 X. H. 413; 41 Vt. 442; 39 Conn. 379. d 48 N. H. 30. Kinney v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 74. p. 421. c 40 X. Y. 15. Kirby a. Boylston Market Assn., 14 Gray, 249. pp. 10-5, 321, 340, 348, 360. c97 -Mass. 563, 564; 123 Mass. 227; 40 Md. :«0; 115 Mass. 89; 9 Allen, 21,22; 57 X. Y. 569; 101 Mass. 233, 254; 116 Mass. 69; 68 Me. 164; 12 Allen, 570. Kirk V. Nowill, 1 Term Rep. 118. p 580. Kissenger v. New York, etc., E. Co., 56 N. Y. 538. p. 422. c 67 N. Y. 423. Kittredge v. Elliott, 16 N. H. 77. p. 202. Kittredge v. Milwaukee, 26 Wis. 46. pp. 756, 788, 12.54. Klauder v. McGrath, 35 Pa. St. 128. p. 346. Kline v. Central, etc., R. Co., 37 Cal. 400 ; s. c, 39 Cal. 587. p. 1151. c40 Cal. 19; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 480; 3 Hun, 334; 48 Miss. 117, 118, 123. Klipper v. Coffey, 44 Md. 117. pp. 349, 1202. Knapp V. Salsbury, 2 Camp. 500. pp. 373, 1252, 1253. c 5 Car. & P. 409; 32 Me. 50. TABLE OF CASES. XClll Knight V. Abert, 6 Pa. St. 472. pp. 209, 21.5, 299, 470. e 16 111. 201, 202 ; 30 Md. 203 ; 51 Pa. St. 248 ; 59 Pa. St. 142; 66 Mo. 326, 327; 25 Vt. 122; 47 Ind. 48 ; 63 Pa. St. 352 ; 19 Pa. St. 302 ; 49 Pa. St. 106, 107; 16 Ark. 319; 5 Reporter, 345 ; 86 Pa. St. 79. Knight V. Fox, 5 Exch. 721 ; s. c, 14 .Tur. 96.3; 20 L. J. (Exch.) 9. pp. 880, 889, 909. c 23 Ind. 556; 52 N. H. 122, 125; 17 Mo. 125, 127 ; 8 Cal. 49] ; 7 Cent. L. J. 493; 35 N. J. L. 22, 28; .30 Md. 203; 3 Gray, 362; 18 Kan. 38; 15 Wall. 658; 11 C. B. 870, 872, 873, 874; 16 Jur. 66, 67; 21 L. J. (O. P.) .53, 54; 13 O. B. 185; 17 Jur. 764; 22 L. J. (O. P.) 82; 4 Ohio St. 415. Knight V. Groodyear India Kubber Co., 38 Conn. 438. p. 353. c 42 (Jonn. 402. Knight V. Pontchartrain R. Co., 23 La. An. 462. pp. 1146, 1279. Knight V. Portland, etc., E. Co., 56 Me. 234. p. 315. Knight V. Toledo, etc.) K. Co., 24 Ind. 402. pp. 497, 529. c5 Kan. 201; 8 Ohio St. 382; 29 Ind. 428, 430; 37 Ind. 547, 548; 35 Ind. 466; 28 Ind. 347. Knottj). Diggs, 6 Md. 230. p. 217. Knour v. Wagoner, 10 Ind. 414. p. 217. Knowlton v. Bartlett, 1 Pick. 271. p. 899. Knox V. Sterling, 73 111. 214. p. 790. Kobs V. Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 159. pp. 731, 732, 733, 740, 741. Koch V. Edge water, 14 Hun, 544. pp. 1198, 1205. Koester v. Ottumwa, 34 Iowa, 41. pp. 766, 768. c 21 Minn. 65. Kohn V. Lovett, 44 G-a. 251. pp. 303, 304. c 5 Reporter, 345 ; 86 Pa. St. 78. Koney v. Ward, 2 Daly, 295; s. c, 36 How. Pr. 255. p. 208. Koons V. St. Louis E. Co., 65 JIo. 592. pp. 1191, 1195. c 7 Cent. L. J. 108; 6 Reporter, 371. Korah v. Ottawa, 32 111. 121. p. 895. Kountz V. Brown, 16 B. Men. 577. pp. • 1252, 1264, 1269. Koutz V. Toledo, etc., E. Co., 54 Ind. 515. pp. 528, 529. Kramer v. San Francisco, etc., R. Co., 25 Cal. 484. pp. 1272, 1276. Kramer v. "Waymark, 4 Hurl. & Colt. 427 ; s. c, L. E. 1 Exch. 241 ; 12 .lur. (n. s.) 395; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 148; 14 Week. Rep. 659; 14 L. T. (n. s.) 368. p. 1287. Krause v. Davis County, 44 Iowa, 141. p. 793. Kreig a. Wells, 1 E. D. Smith, 74. pp. 1181, 1185. Kroon v. Sohoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647. p. 72. Kroy V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 32 Iowa, 357. p. 1009. c 84 111. 574; 33 Iowa, 58; 39 Iowa, 620; 36 Iowa, 470, 471; 40 Iowa, 344; 7 Reporter, 61. Kuhn V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 42 Iowa, 420. pp. 496, 498. Kunz V. Stewart, 1 Daly, 431. p. 994. Labussier-'e v. New York, etc., E. Co., 10 Abb. Pr. .98,- note. pp. 509, 530. Lack V. Seward, 4 Car. & P. 106. pp. 373, 1134, 1147, 1214. Lackawanna, etc., E. Co. v. Doak, 52 Pa. St. 379. pp. 156, 1239. c 44 N. Y. 369; 31 Iowa, 178; 65 Pa. St. 274; C2 Pa. St. 366. Lackland v. North Missouri E. Co., 31 Mo. 180. pp. 748, 776. Lacon v. Page, 48 111. 499. pp. 781, 1085. c 53 Mo. 301. Lacour v. New York, 3 Duer, 406. pp. 731, 744, 746, 747. c 9 Iowa, 236, 237; 24 Iowa, 345; 6 Nev. 93; 32 N. Y. 500 ; 41 111. 513 ; 34 Mich. 127 ; 4 Duer, 430. Ladd u. Chotard, Minor, 366. pp. 320, 896. Ladd V. New Bedford E. Co., 119 Mass. 412. pp. 972, 1008. c 7 Reporter, 61. Lafayette v. Blood, 40 Ind. 62. pp. 782, 783. Lafayette, etc., E. Co. i). Adams, 26 Ind. 76. pp. 417, 425, 12.54. c 30 Ind. 262; 50 Ind. 83; 53 Ind. 310. Lafayette, etc., R. Co. v. Ehman, 30 Ind. 83. p. 1054. Lafayette, etc., R. Co. v. Huffman, 28 Ind. 287. pp. 449, 1181, 1184. c 33 Ind. 356; 18 Ohio St. 413; 34 Iowa, 160; 46 Ind. 30; 52 Ind. 110; 40 Ind. 551; 5 Bush, 7. WW TABLE OF CASES. Liifavette, etc., R. Co. v. Shriner, 6 Ind. 141. pp. 209, 49'.l, 500, 520. «■ 29 Ind. 42, 472 ; 26 Iowa, 1)5 1 , ,"1.57 ; 28 Mich. 513; 10 Ind. 293, 417; 9 Wis. -220; 58 Ind. ?66; 38 Ind. 359: 18 Ind. 175; 8 Ind. 404; 26 Ind. 372; 9 W. Va. 2S2, 283 ; 36 Ind. 20, 23 ; 37 Ind. 549 ; 27 Ind. 97; 9 Ind. 292; 7 Ind. 319; 43 Miss. 241. Liitt'erty v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 44 Mo. 291. p. 5.32. e 66 Mo. 326; 44 Iowa, 173, 175. Laicher v. New Orleans, etc., E. Co., 28 La. An. 320. pp. 450, 1146. Lake v. Jlilliken, 62 Me. 240. pp. 349, 1033, 1100, 1101. c 65 Me. 550. Lake Shore, etc., E. Co. v. Berlink, 2 Brad-w. 427. p. 425. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Pitzpatrick, 31 Ohio St. 479. p. 1239. Lake Shore, etc.. R. Co. v. Hart, 87 111. 529. pp. 448, 450. Lake Slvore, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274. p. 426. c 28 Mich. 41, 447, S15; 21 Minn. 297; 41 Iowa, 231; 35 Midi. 471; 43Wi«. 531; 6 Cent. L.J. 4.31; 2Bradw. 313. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Sunderland, 2 Bradw. 307. p. 426. Lalor V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 52 111. 401. pp. 975, 976, 1030. c 47 Miss. 417; 37 Mich. 213; 53 111. 339; 60 111. 174 ; 48 Miss. 123. ? 5 Hun, 496. Lamb v. Hicks, 1 Mete. 49.5. p. 212. Lamb v. Lady Palk, 9 Car. & P. 629. pp. 885, 889. c5Robt.53S; 36 How. Pr. 462 ; 14How.487; 1 Am. L. Eeg. 402. d 7 Best & S. 139. Lambert v. Bessej', Sir T. Raym. 421, 467. pp. 17, 22, 36, 40, 62, 63, 75, 82, 84. Lamphear v. Buckingham, 38 Conn. 237. p. 1276. Lamporter v. Walbaun, 45 111. 444. p. 1212. Lancaster Canal Co. v. Parnaby, 11 Ad. & E. 223. pp. 94, 717, 718. (See Far- naby v. Lancaster Canal Co., in full, p. 541.) Landolt v. Norwich, 37 Conn. 615. p. 785. Landsberger v. Magnetic Tel. Co., 32 Barb. 530. pp. 854, 855. c 45 N". Y. 750; 1 Lans. 138; 1 Daly, 582, 585; 30 Ohio St. 566; 29 Md. 250; 55 Pa. St. 267. - Lane v. Atlantic Works, 107 Mass. 104; s. c, 111 Mass. 136. pp. 1090, 1176, 1196. c 115 Mass. 200; 118 Mass. 259; 120 Mass. 592; 64X. Y. 529, 532; 63X. Y. 530; 75111.98; 8 Cent. L. J. 444. Lane u. Bryant, 9 Gray, 245. pp. 382, 1054. Lane x7. Cotton, 12 Modern, 472 ; s. c, 1 Ld. Raym. 646. pp. 590, 602, 613, 635, 642, 684, 685, 686, 823, 898, 1059. Lane i>. Cameron, 38 Wis. 603. p. STg. Lane v. Crombie, 12 Picjc. 177. pp. 375, 377, 381, 1134, 1166, 1176. c 29 Me. 310; 54 Miss. 395; 8 Xev. 114; 7 Wis. 53l; 6 Gill, 206; 6 Gray 70; 4 Gray, 180; 14 Allen, 431; 21 Pick. 147; 13 III. 587; 19 Conn. 576; 10 Meto. 365; 24 N. J. L. 270, 284; 18 N. Y. 252; 22 N. H. 563; 7 Wis. 431; 17 Mich. 119; 3 La. An. 646; 7 Wis. 531; 20 111. 490; 2 Woodb. & M. 345 ; 2 Hilt. 39; 7 Wis. 431; 34 Cal. 164; 25 Me. 49; 16 Pa. St. 468; 20 Ohio, 446; 11 Mete. 444; 4 X. Y. 360; 4 Gray, 180; 2 Cush. 605; 12 Mete. 417; 42 Ind. 343; 7 Gray, 97 ; 6 Iowa, 452, 453. ? 20 N. Y. 71. d 5 Duer, 24, 25, 27. Lane v. Montreal Tel. Co., 7 Upper Can- ada C. P. 23. p. 852. Lane v. Salter, 4 Robt. 239. p. 1232. Lang V. Holiday Creek R. Co., 42 Iowa, 677. p. 1002. Langan v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 6 Cent. L. J. 175. p. 424. Langforth Bridge Case, Cro. Car. 365. pp. 563, 792. c 18 N. J. L. 116 ; 30 N. J. L. 138 ; 2 N. H. 514. Langhoff v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 19 Wis. 489. p. 429. c 28 Wis. 501; 38 Iowa, 125; 22 Wis. 248; 43 Wis. 684, 685; 33 Wis. 72; 17 Mich. 118, 123; 42 Wis. 600; 38 Wis. 467, 468, 628; 41 Wis. 50; 39 Wis. 126; 17 Wall. 665; 1 WUs. (Indianapolis) 491. Langlois v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 19 Barb. 364. p. 517. Langridge v. Levy, Murph. &H. 134 ; s. c, 2 Mee. & W. 519 ; Horn & H. 325 ; 4 Mee. &W. 337. pp. 94, 233, 235, 311, 906. , c 19 C. B. (N. s.) 227, 238, 243; 34 L. J. (0. P.) 296, 298; 15 Jur. 1054; 16 Q. B. 987; 20. L. J. (Q. B.) 413; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 674; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 454; 27 Vt. 378; 10 Mee. & W. 113, 115 ; 1 HUt. 439 ; 11 Allen, 519 ; 6 Exoh. 766 ; L. E. 5 Exch. 4, 5 ; 8 El. & Bl. 1052, 1053 ; 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 1049, 1052. TABLE OF CASES. xcv Lanigan ^. New York Gas Co., 71 N. Y. 29. p. 110. Laning v. New York, etc., R. Co., 49 N.Y. 521. pp. 973, 974, 984, 1008, 1009, 1033, 1054. (In full, p. 932.) c 9 Hun, 460 ; 70 N. Y. 173 ; 55 N. Y. 583, 610 ; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 323, 324, 350, 529 ; 3 X. Y. S. C. (T. &C.)257; 3 Dill. 325; 53 N.Y. 552; 11 Hun, 590; 53 How. Pr. 392; 63 N. Y. 453; 42 Wis. 526; 19 Kan. 272; 6 Reporter, 200; 14 Kan. 524; 4 Hun, 770; 64 X. Y. 9, 12, 13; 46 Texas, 639; 5 Hun, 494; 3 Hun, 340; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 560; 2 Col. 487; 59 N. Y. 359; 3 Col. 502, 505; 14 Hun, 448; 7 Eeporter, 61; 49 Texas, 187. Lankford's Administrator v. Barrett, 29 Ala. 700. p. 1282. Lannen u. Albany Gas Co., 44 N. Y. 459 ; ^-. t., 46 Barb. 264. pp. 109, 110, 884, 1097, 1151, 11.57, 1187, 1189. c 18 Ohio St. 412; 5 Hun, 480; 71 N". Y. 33; 42 Miss. 614. Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146. pp. 329, 340, 341, 567, 744. Lansing v. Stone, 37 Barb. 15; s. c, 14 Abb. Pr. 199. pp. 56, 148, 149. c 26 Wis. 272 ; 51 N, Y. 487 ; 41 Wis. 73 ; 4 N. y. 206. Lansing v. Toolan, 37 Mich. 1-52. pp. 731, 73-5, 736, 767. Lantz V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 54 Mo. 228. p. 514. Lapliam v. Curtis, 5 Vt. 371. pp. 55, 101, 102. c 41 Ind. 237, 239 ; 10 Cal. 418 ; 51 N. Y. 487 ; 107 Mass. 493. Lapine v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 20 La. An. 158. pp. .506, 507, 5.S9. Laramie i>. Albany, 92 U. S. 307. p. 730. Larkin v. Saginaw County, 11 Mich. 88. p. 617. c 21 Mich. 106; 34 Mich. 129. Larkin v. Taylor, 5 Kan. 433. pp. 211, 1147. c 13 Kan. 76. Larrabee v. Sewall, 66 Me. 376. pp. 883, c 67 Me. 109, 110. Larue v. Parren Hotel Co., 116 Mass. 67. p. 321. c 122 Mass. 227. Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige, 169. pp. 261, 275, 277, 697. c 15 Barb. 101; 18 Minn. 341, 347; 2 Allen, 1.32; 2 N.Y. 162; 3 Barb. 50; 6 Lans. 131; 25 N. J. L. .362; 41 111. 509; 76 111. 237, 239, 242; 44 Md. 281; 43 Barb. 409; 19 Abb. Pr. 65; 122 Mass. 207 ; 19 Barb. 383 ; 21 Barb. 414, 419, 422; 65 111. 489 ; 11 Ch. Leg. N. 256 ; 7 Reporter, 388 ; 4 N. Y. 201. Latham v. Roach, 72 111. 179. p. 311. Latty V. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa, 250. pp. 506, 523. c 40 Iowa, 206. Laude i;. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 33 Wis. 640. p. 501. ' c 43 Wis. 678, 679, 680. ? 42 Wis. 327. Laugher v. Pointer, 5 Barn. & Cress. 547; a. c, 8 Dow. & Ry. 556. pp. 670, 878, 879, 885, 894, 902, 1048. c 4 Per. & Dav. 716; 31 Pa. St. 367; 4 C. B. 802 ; 19 N. H. 437 ; 17 Mo. 127 ; 5 N. Y. 54, 55, 56, 58, 63; 8 Cal. 495, 496, 498; 4 Man. & G. 61; 10 Jur, 94; 15 L.J. (Q. B.) 102; 4Eng.Eail. Cas. Ill ; 25 N. J. L. 371 ; 20 Vt. 534 ; 7 N. Y. 496 ; 30 Ga. 151; 30 Md. 201; 2 Mich. 370, 372; 2 Mete. 357, 359 ; 3 Gray, 360, 361 ; 21 Iowa, 578 ; 66 N. Y. 184; 62 N. Y. 163; 4 Scott N. R. 668; 2 Daly, 276; 22 Mo. 546, 547; 6 Mee. & W. 507, 509; 4 Jur. 969, 970; 9 Mee. & W. 714; 6 Jur. 607; 4 Exch. 256, 257; 6 Eng. Rail. Cas. 189, 190, 192; 2 Man. & E. 2; 6 N. Y. 442; 42 Iowa, 249; 3 Duer, 362; 2 Denio, 450; 9 Allen, 53; 15 111. 74; 8 Gray, 148; 12 Ad. & E. 739, 740, 741; 8 Ind. 129; 11 Wend. 583; 1 Phila. 267; 52 N. H. 122, 125; 10 Ired. L. 557, 559, 563, 565, 572, 573 ; 20 Pa. St. 503. 1 1 Moo. & R. 495. Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156. p. 1240. Laverone v. Mangianti, 41 Cal. 140. p. 209. Lawler v. Androscoggin R. Co., 62 Me. 463. pp. 978, 1028. c 68 Me. 50; 63 Mo. 314; 46 Texas, 538, 539; 66 Me. 425 ; 6 Eeporter, 111. Lawler v. Northampton Gas-Light Co., 2 Allen, 307. p. 1181. Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian, etc., Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 262. p. 888. ! Lawrence v. Birney, 40 Iowa, 377. p. 1291. Lawrence v. Combs, 37 N. H. 331. p. 214. Lawrence v. Pairhaven, 5 Gray, 110. pp. 710, 733, 740, 741, 748. c 38 Vt. 360; 122 Mass. 358; 11 Gray, 358; 10 Allen, 605. Lawrence v. Great Northern, etc., R. Co., 16 Q. B. 643 ; s. c, 6 Eng. Rail. Cas. 656. pp. 8, 569, 909. c 23 N. Y. 51 ; 12 C. B. (N. S.) 796 ; 31 L. J. (C. P.) 318; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 232; 7 Best* S. 834; XCVl TABLE OF CASES. L. R. 1 Q. B. 721 ; 37 L. J. (Q. B.) 264; 3 Hurl. & Colt. 7S6; 4-2 Md. 1:10; 20 (iratt. 37;). Lawrence ». Housatonic R. Co., 29 Oonn. 390. p. 1159. c 40 Iowa, 644 ; 44 Iowa, S2i ; 6 Nev. 233. Lawrence v. .Jenkins, L. R. 8 Q. B. 274; ii. c, 42 L. .1. (Q. B.J 147. pp. 85, 1096. CL. R. 9 Q. B. 267; 43 L. J. (Q. B.) 72; 4 Exch. Div. 12; 27 Week. Rep. 96; 7 Cent. L. J. 466 ; 18 Alb. L. J. 516. Lawrence u. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 42 AVi?. :S22. p. 531. c 6 Ueporter, 736; 43 Wis. 680, 681, 682, 684. Lawrence v. Mount Vernon, 35 Me. 100. p. 759. c 65 Me. 552; 17 How. 167. Lawrence v. Pendleton Street R. Co., 1 Cin. Superior Ct. 180. p. 398. Laws u. N"orth Carolina, etc., R. Co., 7 Jones L. 468. p. 200. Lawson v. Price, 45 Md. 123. p. 106. Leader v. Moxon, 2 W. Black. 924 ; s. c, 3 Wils. 461. pp. 549, 551, 603, 740, 743, 811, 822, 823. Learae u. Bray, 3 East, 593. pp. 10, 12, 132, 179, 221, 241, 1099, 1223, 1251, 1252. c 3 Wend. 393; 4 Allen, 445; 3 N. H. 466; 3 Hurl. & Colt. 7S9, 792; 7 Dow. & L. 83; 18 L. J. (Exch.) 4.33; 21 Wend. 618; 3 Barb. 46; L. R. 10 Exch. 369; 44 L. J. (Exch.) 179; 16 B. Men. 584; 45 .Md. 135; 42 How. Pr. 393; 13 Ga. 88; 4 Man. & G. 56; 4 Scott X. R. 662; 6 Dow. & Ry. 27S ; 4 Barn. & Cress. 226, 227 ; 4 So. Car. 66; 3 Hen. & M. 442; 7 Vt. 65; 10 Bing. 115, 116; 6 Cush. 29.5; 4 Barb. 593; 2 Keyes, 174; 6 Duer, 404; 4 Rich. L. 3;!4; 8 Wend. 472; 19 Johns.383; 1 Der. 187; 4 Whart. 147. ? 2 Bos. & Pul. (N. R.) 118. a 18 Vt. 610, 611. Leavenworth v. Casey, McCahon (Kan.) 124. pp. 731, 733, 746, 748. c 16 Kan. 381. Leavenworth, etc., R. Co. v. Cook, 18 Kan. 261. p. 152. Leavenworth, etc., R. Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan. 426. pp. 416, 424, 426, 1264. c 18 Kan. 523, 525 ; 14 Kan. 64 ; 20 Kan. 12, 14. Lebanon v. Olcott, 1 N. H. 339. pp. 569, 1166. Le Clair v. First Division, etc., R. Co., 20 Minn. 9. pp. 973, 989, 1011. Leduke v. Iron Mountain, etc., R. Co., 4 Mo. App. 485. p. 426. Lee V. Detroit Bridge Works, 62 Mo. 565. p. 970. c 63 Mo. 312. Lee V. Miller, 2 Mee. & W. 824. p. 548. Lee V. Pembroke Iron Co., 57 Me. 487. p. 744. Lee ,;. Riley, 18 C. B. (.v. s.) 722 ; a. c, 12 L. T. (n. s.) 388; 34 L. J. (C. P.) 212; 11 Jur. (y. s.) 527; 13 Week. Rep. 751. pp. 209, 1086, 1082, 1096. c 45 L. J. 1-24; 1 Q. B. Div. 83; L. R. IOC. P. 12, 14, 15 ; 50 N". H. 146 ; 44 L. J. (C. P.) 25, 26; 41 Ind. 250; 14 AUen, 298; 109 Mass. 282; 43 Vt. 206. Lee V. Sandy Hill, 40 N. T. 442. pp. 737, 739, 743, 888. C55I11. 351;3Lans. 49, 50;1N. T. S. C. (T. & C.) 539; 13 Hun, 216, 218. Leech v. North Staffordshire R. Co., 29 L. J. (M. C.) 150. p. 357. Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109. p. 218. Lehey v. Hudson, etc., R. Co., 4 Robt. 204. p. 451. Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., 4 Rawle, 9. pp. 101, 1()2. Lehigh, etc., R. Co. v. Hall, 61 Pa. St. 361. p. 429. Lehigh, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. St. 432 ; s. c, 6 Reporter, 125 ; 17 Alb. L. J. 513. pp. 971, 1028, 1034, 103-5, 1179. Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 234. pp. 1181, 1185, 1187, 1237, 1276, 1289, 1291, 1292, 1293. C.30 Md. 54; IS Ohio St. 411; 10 Bosw. 33; 16 Abb. Pr. 349; 57 Pa. St. 379; 36 Barb. 239; 4 Allen, 257. d 41 Iowa, 80. Leicester v. Pittsford, 6 Vt. 245. pp. 362, 761, 770, 772, 1238. c 23 Vt. 12. Lemmon v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 32 Iowa, 151. pp. 523, 524. c 40 Iowa, 295. Leonard v. Collins, 70 N. Y. 90. p. 983. Leonard v. New York, etc., R. Co., 10 Jones & Sp. 225; s. c, 8 Abb. N. C. 572. p. 428. Leonard v. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 41 N. Y. 544. pp. 836, 839, 848, 849, 850, 859. c 45 N. Y. 750, 779 ; 1 Lans. 133 ; 30 Ohio St. 565 ; 113 Mass. 305 ; 44 N. Y. 265 ; 6 Daly, 203 ; 60 Me. 25, 27, 35 ; 1 Col. 243. Leonard o. Storer, 115 Mass. 86 ; s. c, 1 Am. L. T. (n. s.) 414. pp. 321, 322, 348. c 123 Mass. 227; 17 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 456; 68 Me. 164. U 59 N. Y. 39. TABLE OF CASKS. XCVU Leonard v. Wilkins, 9 Johns. 232. p. 221. Leoni v. Taylor, 20 Mich. 148. p. 621. c 21 Mich. 106, 109. Leseman v. South Carolina R. Co., 4 Rich. L. 413. p. 299. Lesher v. "Wabash Nav. Co., 14 111. 85. pp. 882, 888, 904. • c 63 lU. 546 ; 52 N. H. 125. Leslie v. Lewiston, 62 Me. 468. pp. 362, 765, 769, 1189, 1209. c 5 Reporter, 304; 67 Me. 169; 63 Me. 480; 68 Me. 367; 65 Me. 37. Leslie v. Pounds, 4 Taun. 649. pp. 319, 670, 881. c 2 Mete. 360; 3 Gray, 364; 15 Conn. 235; 2 N. H. 549; 2 Denio, 450; 4 Rich. L. 233; 5 Barn. & Cress. 561 ; 4 C. B. 802; 52 N". H. 125. Lesley v. Commissioners, 1 Spears (So. Car.), 31. p. 619. Lester v. Kansas City R. Co., 60 Mo. 265 ; u. c, 2 Cent. L. J. 641. p. 162. Lester v. Pittsford, 7 Vt. 158. pp. 799, 1177. c 33 Vt. 126; 12 Vt. 341; 37 Vt. 508; 27 Vt. 465, 466 ; 38 Vt. 51. Leviness v. Post, 6 Daly, 321. pp. 884, 885, 839. Levy V. Great Western E. Co., 48 N. T. 675. p. 424. c 7 Hun, 561. Levy u. New York, 1 Sandf. S. C. 465. pp. 732, 742. c 21 Mich. 114; 9 N. T. 459; 5 Sandf. S. C. 303, 323; 1 Daly, 431; 2 Hilt. 451; 9 Abb. Pr. 44; 18 How. Pr. 175. Lewenthal v. New Tork, 5 Lans. 532 ; s. c, 61 Barb. 511. p. 733. Lewis V. Babcock, 18 Johns. 443. p. 1241. Lewis V. Baltimore, etc., E. Co., 38 Md. 588. pp. 429, 450. c 43 Md. 552; 45 Md. 494; 39 Md. 343, 449, 676; 47Ind. 50. Lewis V. Great Western E. Co., 5 Hurl. & N. 867. pp. 834, 846. Lewis u. London, etc., R. Co., L. E. 9 Q. B. 66. p. 1238. Lewis V. McAfee, 32 Ga. 465. pp. 997, 1027. Lewis u. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 59 Mo. 495. pp. 973, 982, 986, 994, 1032. c 61 Mo. 494 ; 65 Mo. 229 ; 63 Mo. 312. Lexington v. Lewis's Administrator, 10 Bush, 677. pp. 1234, 1276, 1278, 1288. e 6 Reporter, 720. Liddle v. Keokuk, etc., R Co., 23 Iowa, 378. p. 509. c 27 Iowa, 284. Liddy v. St. Louis E. Co., 40 Mo. 506. p. 397. c 43 Mo. 527. Lillie V. Price, 6 Barn. & Adol. 646. p. 1084. Limpus D.London General Omnibus Co., 1 Hurl. & Colt. 526; c. u., 32 L. J. (Exch.) 34. pp. 884, 889. c L. R. 8 C. P. 569, 570 ; 42 L. J. (0. P.) 305 ; 50 Mo. Ill; 6 Reporter, 404; 47 N. T. 126; 18 Alb. L. J. 91, 92; 46 N. T. 29; 19 Ohio St. 131; L. R. 2 Q. B. 540; 21 Ohio St. 524. Lincoln v. Barre, 5 Cash. 590. pp. 799, 800, 801. c 1 Alien, 33. Lincoln v. Prince, 2 Mass. 544. p. 619. Lincoln v. Taunton Copper Man. Co., 9 Allen, 181. p. 107. Lindholm v. St. Paul, 19 Minn. 245. pp. 732, 753, 754, 760, 763. c 20 Minn. 124; 21 Minn. 68. Lindsay v. Griffin, 22 Ala. 629. pp. 886, 890. c 46 Ala. 394. Lindsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225. pp. 340, 1266. c 24 Conn. 497; 29 Conn. 499; 36 Conn. 184; 48 N. H. 545. Line ,;. Taylor, 3 Post. & Pin. 31. pp. 202, 206. Linfield ,;. Old Colony E. Co., 10 Cush. 562. pp. 421, 424, 426. c40 N. T. 25; 101 Mass. 202; 17 Mich. 118; 115 Mass. 201; 114 Mass. 352; 13 Wis. 641; 113 Mass. 369. Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 606 ; s. c, 8 Cent. L. J. 442. pp. 463, 1174, 1186. Linton v. Smith, 8 Gray, 147. pp. 899, 911. c 4 Allen, 140 ; 102 Mass. 213 ; 11 Allen, 422 ; 12 Allen, 470 ; 112 Mass. 99. Lion (The), L. E. 2 P. C. 525. p. 895. Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553. p. 70. Liscomb v. New Jersey, etc., Transfer Co., 6 Lans. 76. p. 318. Litchfield Coal Co. v. Taylor, 81 El. 590. pp. 999, 1012. Little 1). Brockton, 123 Mass. 611 ; s. c, 6 Cent L. J. 138; 5 Eeporter, 237. p. 1205. XCVlll TABLE OF CASES. Little i;. Lathrop, 5 Me 356. p. 212. c 28 X. H. 166, 167; 35 Vt. 162; 37 N. H. 335; 9 ^Y. Va. 283; 18 Wend. 221; 29 Me. 286, 310; 10 lU. U5 ; 7 N. H. 521 ; i Mete. 593. Little V. McGuire, 43 Iowa, 447 ; s. c, 38 Iowa, 560. pp. 211, 1149. c 42 Iowa, 307. Littledale v. Lonsdale, 2 H. Black. 267. p. 265. (See Lonsdale v. Littledale.) Littlefield v. Norwich, 40 Conn. 406. p. 753. Little Miami R. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio, 415. pp. 1028, 1029, 1177. c 5 Ind. 347 ; 15 111. 553 ; 10 Ind. 557 ; 3 Dis- ney, 50 ; 3 Coldw. 225 ; 3 Sawyer, 442 ; 32 Iowa, 364; 9 Bush, 568; 6 Ind. 207; 11 Iowa, 434; 5 Ohio St. 659; 49 Miss. 283; 17 Ohio St. 210; 6 Jones L. 247; 23 Pa. St. 386; 47 Miss. 418; 8 Ohio St. 253; 34 Conn. 479; 32 Vt. 479; 5 Reporter, 626; 11 Wis. 251; 3 Ohio St. 203, 219. d 46 Texas, 540; 2 Col. 488; 42 Ala. 722. Littleton v. Richardson, 32 N. H. 59; s. c, 34 N. H. 179. pp. 789, 1240, 1263. c 44 N. H. Ill; 41 Vt. 444; 35 N. H. 276; 57 N. H. 92, 93. Livermore v. Camden, 29 N. J. L. 245; 6-. c, 31 N. J. L. 507. pp. 620, 705, 734, 750. c 21 Mich. 109, 116; 132 Mass. 352; 32 M. J. L. 397; 40N. J. L. 50. Livie u. Janson, 12 East, 648. pp. 1065, liOl. Livingston u. Adams, 8 Cow. 175. pp. 55, 101, 102. c 18 Minn. 342; 3 Iowa, S3 ; 51 N. T. 487 ; 42 How. Pr. 393; 9 Bush, 533; 2 Abb. C. C. 215; 1 Sawyer, 442; 8 Pa. St. 374; 22 Barb. 621; 30 Conn. 179. Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 551. p. 568. Lloyd V. New York, 5 N. Y. 369. pp. 725, 733, 734, 736, 738, 889, 960. c 11 E. 1. 145 ; 37 Barb. 296 ; 33 Ala. 130; 32 Iowa, 328; 16 Wall. 574; 4 Ohio St. 99; 21 Mich. 109 ; 36 K. H. 293 ; 62 Mo. 319 ; 1 Black, 53; 44 Barb. 393; 62 N. Y. 164; 24 Iowa, 346; 1 Daly, 430; 104 Mass. 16; 33 Barb. 638; 26 Iowa, 268; 64 Mo. 75, 76; 16 N. T. 172, note; 9 E. I. 473; 25 Ind. 515; 39 Barb. 335; 37 Barb. 296; 36 Barb. 55 ; 29 Ind. 190; 17 Ul. 146; 2 Disney, 537. ? 31 Ala. 426. d 122 Mass. 375. Lloyd V. Pacific E. Co., 49 Mo. 199. pp. 521, 528. c66 Mo. 569; 7 Cent. L. J. 277; 58 Mo. 81, 82; 64 X. Y 414. Loan V. Boston, 106 Mass. 450. pp. 781, 784. Lobdell v. New Bedford, 1 Mass. 153. pp. 672, 1271. c 33 Iowa, 399 ; 21 Me. 32 ; 114 Mass. 245 ; 3 AUen, 193 ; 40 Me. 179 ; 7 Me. 445 ; 3 N. H. 54. Lobenstein u. MoGraw, 11 Kan. 645. p. 350. Locke v. First Division, etc., R. Co., 15 Minn. 350. pp. 500, 1157, 1158. c 22 Minn. 172; 6 Cent. L. J. 374; 5 Ee- porter, 698. Locke V. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 46 Iowa, 109. pp. 982, 1018, 1239. c 46 Iowa, 638. Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. St. 152. pp. 1088, 1089. c 36 X. J. L. 329; 11 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 420; 57 Pa. St. 193. ? 43 Wis. 537 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 430. Lockwood V. New York, 2 Hilt. 66. pp. 740, 900, 901, 908. c 18 Kan. 38. Lofton V. Vogles, 17 Ind. 105. pp. 1279, 1281. Logansport, etc., E. Co. u. Caldwell, 38 m. 280. p. 520. Logansport v. Wright, 25 Ind. 512. p. 733. c 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 133. Logue V. The Commonwealth, 38 Pa. St. 265. p. 1092. Logue V. Link, 4 B. D. Smith, 63. pp. 209, 220, 223. Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343. pp. 360, 759, 786. c 40 N. H. 416; 17 How. 167; 8 Alien, 56. Loker v. Damon, 17 Pick. 284. pp. 218, 222, 1159, 1262. Lombard v. Chicago, 4 Biss. 460. pp. 753, 761, 781, 1198, 1256, 1258. Lombard u. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 47 Iowa, 494. p. 1002. Long V. Doxey, 50 Ind. 385. p. 1289. Long V. Morrison, 14 Ind. 495. pp. 1240, 1272, 1276, 1290. Long o. Pacific R. Co., 65 Mo. 225. p. 1033. Longabaugh a. Virginia, etc., R. Co., 9 Nev. 271. pp. 153, 154, 15j, 160, 161. c 91 U. S. 470. Longman v. Grand Junction Canal Co., 3 Fost & Fin. 736. p. 154. c 6 Phlla. 327. Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 Exch. 761. pp. 229, 235. c 56 N. T. 136, 128; 1 N. T. S. C. (T. & C.) TABLE OF CASES. XCIX 456; 27 Vt. 378; 19 N. Y. 130; 6 N. Y. 410; 98 Mass. M8; 11 Allen, 520; 26 Conn. 276; L. B. 8 Q. B. 278; L. E. 5 Exch. 4; L. R. 6 Q. B. 194. Longmore v. Great Western K. Co., 19 C. B. (n. s.) 183. pp. 315, 565. c ly. R. 1 C. P. 303, 304, 305; 12 Juv. (N. s.) ^73; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 135. Lonsdale v. Littledale, 2 H. Black. 267, 299. pp. 873, 874, 875. c 14 Barb. 108; 1 Bos. & Pul. 407, 408, 410; 2 Mete. 357, 359; 3 Gray, 355, 356; 12 Q. B. 742; 16 Jnr. 125; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 11; 17 Johns. 99; 8 El. &B1. 142; 27 L.J. (Q. B.) 63; 5 Bain. & Cress. 561, 576; 19 N. H. 436; 52 N. H. Ii3; 7 East, 572. Loomis V. Tei-ry, 17 Wend. 496. pp. 202, 208, 217, 220, 222. (In full, p. 192.) c 4 Denio, 501; 27 Conn. 409; 3 Keyes, 270; 3 Abb. App. Dec. 499; 12 West. Jur. 476; 37 Iowa, 616; 38 Wis. 309; 31 Conn. 131; 58 N. Y. 136. Loonam v. Brockway, 3 Kobt. 74 ; s. c, 28 How. Pr. 472. p. 1009. c 1 Sweeny, 548; 39 Iowa, 621. Loop !). Litchfield, 42 N. Y. 351. p. 233. c 56 N. Y. 126 ; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 455 ; 51 N. Y. 497. Lord o. Fifth Massachusetts Turnpike Co., 16 Mass. 54. p. 574. c 3 N. H. 54. • Lord V. Wormwood, 29 Me. 282. p. 212. c 28 N. H. 167; 55 N. H. 553; 25 Vt. 162; 37 N. H. 336 ; 115 Mass. 566. Lords Bailiff-Jurats of Romney Marsh V. Trinity Bouse, L. R. 5 Exch. 204 (affirmed, L. E. 7 Exch. 247). p. 1085. (In full, p. 1063.) Lorillard v. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392. p. 621. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476 (affirm- ing s. G., 42 How. Pr, 335; reversing a. c, 61 Barb. 86). pp. 68, 69, 72, 112, 990,1234. (In full, p. 47.) c 68 Me. 165; 47 Ind. 271; 56 N. Y. 126; 1 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 455; 6 Him, 324; 38 N. J. L. 346; 41 Wis. 73; 67 N. Y. 572; 53 N. H. 448; 13 Am. L. Keg. (N. S.) 371. Losee v. Clute, 51 N. Y. 494. p. 233. Lotan V. Cross, 2 Camp. 464. pp. 390, 1252. c 5 Barn. & Cress. 565. Lottmann v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 159. pp. 1060, 1285. Loubz V. Hafner, 1 Dev. 185. p. 350. c 8 Barb. 433. Louisville, etc., Canal Co. v. Murphy, 9 Bush, 522. pp. 565, 1025, 1177, 1236, 1243, 1253. C5 Reporter, 720; 13 Bush, 642; 10 Bash, 273 ; 9 Bush, 731 ; 12 Bush, 47. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Mete, (Ky.) 177. pp. 500, 503, 505, 506. 507. C38 Ind. 560; 15 Minn. 360; 115 Mass. 460; 38 Iowa, 89 ; 8 Nev. 114 ; 8 Bush, 361, 353. Louisville, etc., R. Co. o. Boland, 53 Ind. 898. p. 1254. c 58 Ind. 28. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Bowler, 9 Heisk. 866. p. 1030. Louisville, etc., R. Co. ii. Brown, 13 Bush, 475. p. 531. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Burke, 6 Coldw. 45. pp. 451, 1276, 1279, 1283. c 9 Heisk. 828. d 2 Heisk. 587; 11 Heisk. 407. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Case's Admin- istrator, 9 Bush, 728. pp. 1025, 1234, 1291, 1294. c 13 Bush, 639 ; 10 Bush, 273 ; 9 Bush, 534. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cavens's Ad- ministrator, 9 Bush, 559. pp. 970, 1026, 1027. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cauble, 46 Ind. 277. pp. 510, 534. c 61 Ind. 271. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. The Common- wealth, 13 Bush, 388; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 86. p. 419. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Collins, 2 Duv. 114. pp. 888, 1023, 1028, 1030. 1279. c 68 111. 550 ; 3 Sawyer, 440 ; 9 Heisk. 32, 869 ; 9 Bush, 91, 566, 568; 7 Bush, 10, 239; 4 Bush, 508, 509 ; 6 Bush, 579 ; 11 R. 1. 1.56 ; 49 Miss. 284 ; 52 N. H. 556 ; 37 Mich. 213 ; 3 Coldw. 225 ; 59 Mo. 299; 6 Heisk. 363, 365; 49 Barb. 577; 38 Ind. 312, 318. d 49 Cal. 130; 46 Texas, 539; 42 Ala. 722. Louisville, etc., R. Co. u. Connor, 9 Heisk. 19. pp. 451, 1277, 1293. Louisville, etc., K. Co. v. Filbern's Ad- ministratrix, 6 Bush, 574. pp. 1003, 1004, 1024. c 7 Bush, 239. d 46 Texas, 539. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Francis, 58 Ind. 389. pp. 520, 521. Louisville, etc., R. Co. «- Mahony's Ad- ministratrix, 7 Bush, 235. pp. 1003, 1024, 1290. c 5 Reporter, 720; 13 Bush, 642; 9 Bush, 568. TABLE OF CASES. Louisville, etc., E. Co. u. Milton, 14 B. Men. 75. pp. 498, 505, 506. c 2 Mete. (Ky.) 183, 184; 9 Wis. 220. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Robertson, 9 Heisk. 276. p. 988. Louisville, etc., R. Co. u. Robinson, 4 Bush, 507. pp. 1024, 1027, 1038, 1039. <• 9 Bush, 91, 668; 7 Bush, 239; 6 Bush, 579, 580. d 46 Texas, 579. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Sickings, 5 Bush, 1. pp. 1024, 1238. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 58 Ind. 575. pp. 512, 531. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Stone, 7 Heisk. 468. p. 519. c 9 Heisk. 828. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. "Wainscott, 3 Bush, 149. p. 496. c 22 Ohio St. 246 ; 9 W. Va. 237. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Tandell, 17 B. Mon. 586. pp. 1024, 1027. Loupe V. Wood, 51 Cal. 586. p. 323. Lovegrove v. London, etc., R. Co., 16 C. B. (N. s.) 669 ; a. c, 10 Jur. (n. s.) 879 ; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 329; 12 Week. Bep. 988; 10 L. T. (n. s.) 718. pp. 969, 1039, 1053. c 53 111. 340 ; 1 Exch. Div. 255 ; 13 Allen, 443 ; 59 Pa. St. 252. Lovejoy v. Dolan, 10 Cush. 495. p. 385. Lovell V. Howell, 1 C. P. Div. 161 ; s. v., 45 L. J. 387. pp. 970, 1035. c 1 C. P. Div. 561; 3 Exch. Div. 344. Lovenguth v. Bloomington, 71 111. 238. p. 1206. Lovett V. Salem, etc., E. Co., 9 Allen, 557. pp. 1182, 1184, 1185. c 55 Ind. 50; 37 Cal. 405; 48 Miss. 117, 118, 123; 28 Ohio St. 30; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 480; 3 Hun, 334; 64 N. T. 138; 56 Ind. 518; 52 N. H. 554. Lovett V. South- Western R. Co., 55 Ga. 143. p. 1279. Lowell V. Boston, etc., K. Co., 23 Pick. 24. pp. 357, 556, 740, 789, 791, 870, 871, 872, 882, 902, 904. c 22 Vt. 465; 59 Me. 531; 52 N. H. 122, 124, 125; 17 Mo. 128; 10 Gray, 491; 8 Cal. 497; 14 Barb. 104, 106, 108; 3 WaU. 679; 8 Ohio St. 382: 36 Mo. 218; 7 Cent. L. J. 494, 495; 9 Mich. 187; 114 Mass. 154; 3 Gray, 351, 352, 353, 365; 35 X. H. 313 ; 38 Ind. 371 ; 32 N. H. 63 ; 61 N. Y. 195; 25 X. J. L. 371; 6 Phila. 257; i Cush. 277; 22 Mo. 547; 54 Me. 48; 9 Hun, 396; 8 Allen, 443; 16 Gray, 304; 47 N. Y. 481, 487; 49 Me. 122, 124 ; 109 Mass. 285 ; 102 Mass. 343 ; 122 Mass. 107; 11 E. I. 465; 30 Conn. 646; 29 Me. 309; 56 Pa. St. 452; 19 N. H. 444. d4Duer, 429, 430. Lowell V. Moscow, 12 Me. 300. p. 759. c 24 Vt. 164. Lowell V. Proprietors, 104 Mass. 118. p. 777. Lowell V. Short, 4 Cush. 275. pp. 789, 791. c 10 Gray, 499; 114 Mass. 154; 4 Cush. 278; 54 Me. 48; 16 Gray, 304; 109 Mass. 285; 102 Mass. 343; 72 N. Y. 67. Lowell V. Spaulding, 4 Cush. 277. pp. 317, 349, 787, 789. c 10 Gray, 499; 21 Mich. 23; 9 Allen, 21, 23; 57 N. Y. 569; 11 Cush. 302; 17 Am. L. Eeg. (N. S.) 454; 47 N. Y. 483; 30 Conn. 550; 37 N. Y. 260. Lower Macungie Township «. Merkhof- fer, 71 Pa. St. 276. pp. 362, 772, 781, 1085, 1208. c 81 Pa. St. 50; 13 Hun, 87. Lowery v. Western Union Tel. Co., 60 N. Y. 198. p. 851. c 30 Ohio St. 568. Lowrey v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 4 Abb. N. C. 32. pp. 357, 359. Lowrey v. Delpki, 55 Ind. 250. pp. 753, 1254. c 57 Ind. 195; 58 Ind. 232. Luby V. Hudson, etc., R. Co., 17 N. T. 131. pp. 398, 1054. c 6 Reporter, 174; 37 Mich. 362; 50 Barb. 44; 2 Montana, 520. Lucas o. New Bedford, etc., R. Co., 6 Gray, 64. pp. 117ri, 1238. cl06 Mass. 275; 17 Mich. 119, 120; 69 Mo. 34; 1 Allen, 190; 104 Mass. 141; 101 Mass. 466 8 Allen, 230, 448; 4 Allen, 289; 8 Kan. 517. Lucas V. New York, etc., R. Co., 21 Barb, 245. pp. 1277, 1289. Lucas V. Trumbull, 15 Gray, 306. p. 979. Lucey v. Ingram, 6 Mee. & M. 302. pp. 669, 895. Luckie v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 67 Mo. 245. p. 534. Luddington v. Miller, 4 Jones & Sp. 1 p. 308. Ludlow V. Hudson, etc., E. Co., 4 Hun, 239 ; s. c, 6 Lans. 128. p. 276. Ludlow V. Yonkers, 43 Barb. 493. p, 1261. c 42 111. 171. TABLE OF CASES. CI Luke V. Calhoun County, 52 Ala. 115. p. 1289. Lukin V. Godsall, Peak. Ad. Cas. 15. p. 276. Lumley v. Caswell, 47 Iowa, 159 ; s. v., 7 Reporter, 559. pp. lOOS, 1009, 1017. Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216 ; s. <-., 22 L. J. (Q. B.) 463. pp. 94, 884. Lund V. Tyngsboro, 9 Cush. 36 ; o. c, 11 Oush. 563. pp. 800, 1092, 1100, 1174, 120i. c 65 Me. 550, 554 ; 98 Mass. 82; 13 Allen, 189; ■9 Gray, 247; 41 Vt. 443; 64 Mo. 53; 105 Mass. 513; 49 N. H. 393; 46 Pa. St. 196; 100 Mass. 158; 46N. H. 26. Lunt V. London, etc., E. Co., L. R. 1 Q. B. 277; s. c, 12 Jur. (n. s.j 409; 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 105; 14 Week. Rep. 497 ; 14 L. T. (n. s.) 225. pp. 418, 419, 428. c 2 Jones & Sp. 48S; 43 How. Pr. 411; 25 Mich. 8. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 46. p. 824. Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 9 Cush. 171. pp. 749, 751. c 13 Gray, 607 ; 10 Gray, 29. Luther v. Worcester, 97 Mass. 268. pp. 360, 785. c 31 N. J: L. 354 ; 102 Mass. 333, 340 ; 24 Wis. 274; 113 Mass. 505; 109 Mass. 449; 81 111.306; 105 Mass. 85 ; 100 Mass. 57. ? 52 N. H. 413. Luterell v. Eeynell, 1 Modern, 282. p. 12S1. Luttrell V. Hazen, 3 Sneed, 20. pp. 885, 889. Luxford V. Large, 5 Car. & P. 4:i. pp. 373, 1107, 1131, 1142, 1147, 1165, 1166, 1215. Lydon a. Manion, 8 Mo. App. 602. p. 1030. Lyell V. St. Clair County, 3 McLean, 580. p. 619. Lygo V. Newbold, 9 Exch. 302. pp. 1192, 1210. c 19 Ohio St. 411 ; 59 Pa. St. 142, 143 ; 47 Ind. 48; 55 How. Pr. 173; 48 Pa. St. 221; 4 Allen, 386 ; 25 Mich. 7 ; 6 Gray, 70 ; 68 Me. 558. Lyke w. Yim Leuven, 4 Denio, 127 ; s. c, 1 JSf. Y. 515. p. 209. (See Van Leuven V. Lyke, in full, p. 188.) c 48 Mo. 397. Lyman v. Amherst, 107 Mass. 339. pp. 362, 772, 773, 1203. c 120 Mass. 588. Lyman v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 4 Cush. 288. p. 171. c 26 Mo. 452; 8 Allen, 439; 16 Kan. 580, 582; 105 Mass. 203; 41 Iowa, 309; 18 Barb. 85; 97 Mass. 433 ; 108 Mass. 267. Lyman v. Bridge Co., 2 Aik. 225. p. 888. Lyman v. Gipson, 18 Pick. 422. p. 212. Lyman v. Redman, 23- Me. 289. p. 895. Lyme Regis o. Henley, 2 CI. & Pin. .SSI. p. 592. (See Henley v. Lyme Regis.) Lynam v. Union R. Co., 114 Mass. 83. pp. 396, 398, 399. Lynch v. Dafis, 12 How. Pr. 323. pp. 1272, 1280, 1285. Lynch v. MoNally, 17 Alb. L. J. 414. p. 220. Lynch v. Nicrdin, 1 Q. B. 29 ; o. u., 4 Per. & Dav. 672; 5 Jur. 797. pp. 138, 216, 229, 241, 306, 487, 1088, 1107, 1134, 1138, 1150, 1105, 1169, 1180, 1183, 1192, 1194, 1195, 1208. (In full, p. 1140.) ' c69 Pa. St. 215; 6 Gray, 71; 17 Wall. 660; 1 Head, 619, 620 ; 51 Me. 333 ; 15 I. R. C. L. 345 ; 24 N. J. L. 832; 8 Minn. 168; 31 Miss. 193, 197, 198 ; 47 Miss. 422 ; 62 Mo. 439, 440 ; 75 111. 97 ; 52 N. H. 654; 9 Wis. 212, 219; 6 N. Y. 410; 24 Vt. 496 ; 22 N". J. L. 189 ; 18 Cal. 356 ; 22 Vt. 225, 226 ; 35 N. Y. 211; 48 Pa. St. 221, 223; 60 Mo. 418, 420; 35 N. H. 279; 15 Ind. 489; 31 Pa. St. 378; 47 Pa. St. 304; 3 Cush. 305; 13 111. SSd, 589; 24 Md. 125; 9 0. B. 420; 19 Conn. 511, 512, 572, 573, 574 ; 5 El. & Bl. 856 ; 2 Jur. (N. s.) 118 ; 25 L. J. (Q. B.) 124; 18 Ohio St. 410; 36 Mo. 491; 2 Cush. 543; 60 Mo. 468; 14 Jur. 336; 19 L. J. (0. P.l 200 ; 18 N. Y'. 252 ; 16 111. 202 ; 20 111. 494, 496 ; 1 Sweeny, .542; 3 Q. B. Div. 331; 7 Cent. L. J. 12; 17 Alb. L. J. 506; 1 Denio, 99; 26 Conn. 600; 1 Hurl. & N. 780; 3 Jur. (N. S.i 396; 26 L. J. (Exch.) 172; 47 Ind. 48; 17 Mich. 118; 6 Daly, 11 ; 12 Cal. 559; 20 111. 496; 59 Pa. St. 142, 143; 53 Ala. 79; 14 Minn. 96; 65 Pa. St. 276; 21 Minn. 212, 213; 1 Keyes, 573; 33 How. Pr. 200; 2 Abb. App. Dec. 381; 27 Conn. 409; 9 E.xch. 305, 306; 18 Ga. 688; 13 Ga. 88; 33 N. Y. 458; 4 Gray, 405, 407, 410; 55 How. Pr. 172; 17 Iowa, 463; 14 Allen, 298; 32 Me. 51,53; 24 N. J. L. 271 ; 22 Mo. 378 ; 63 X. C. 349 ; 66 Barb. 50 ; 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 323; 27 Gratt. 476; 41 N. Y. 46 ; 9 Exch. 304 ; 18 N. Y. 252 ; 23 Upper Canada C. P. 551; 37 Mo. 5.50, 553. ? 60 N. Y. 334; 27 Ind. 515, 516; 4 Allen, 286, 287; 11 Allen, 519. Lynch v. Smith, 101 Mass. 52. pp. 1181, 1182, 1184, 1187, 1188. c 116 Mass. 96; 124 Mass. 58; 5 Reporter, 528; 42 Ind. 343; 115 Mass. 200; 68 Me. 556. Lyndsay v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co., 27 •Vt. 643. p. 512. cu TABLE OF CASES. Lynn v. Lisbee, 67 111. 75. p. 799. Lynn u. Nahant, 113 Mass. 433. p. 702. Ljon 17. Adams, 4 Serg. & E. 443. p. 619. Lyon V. Detroit, etc., K. Co., 31 Mich. '429. p. 1018. Lyon V. Fairfield Co., 2 Boot, 30. p. 618. Lyons ?'. Bronklinp, 119 Mass. 491. pp. 75.5, 780, 1196, 1201. Lyons v. Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387; s. c, 5 Keporter, 723. pp. 1095, 1203. Lyons p. Martin, 8 Ad. & E. 512; s. c, 3 Nev. & Per. 509. p. 885. c 48 Miss. 125; L. E. 7 C. P. 420; 64 N. T. 135. Lyons v. Merrick, 105 Mass. 71. pp. 196, 209. c 8 Cent. L. J. 444. Lyons v. Kosenthal, 11 Hun, 46. p. 1230. Lyons v. Woodward, 49 Me. 29. p. 1272. M. Mabley v. Kittleberger, 37 Mich. 360; s. <,., 6 Keporter, 174. pp. 382, 801, 1149. Macauley v. New York, 67 N. T. 602. pp. 316, 734, 1085, 1207. MacCarthy v. Young, 6 Hurl. & N. 329 ; s. c. 30 L. J. (Exch.) 227. p. 293. c L. B. 1 C. P. 286; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 189; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 433. Maccarty v. Brookline, 114 Mass. 527. pp. 764, 765. Mack V. Salem, 6 Or. 275. p. 762. Mackay v. Commercial Bank of Bruns- wick, L. R. 5 P. C. 394. pp. 888, 889. Mackay v. New York, etc., K Co., 35 N. Y. 75; c. G., 27 Barb. 528. pp. 423, 1179. c41 N. T. 504; 34 N. Y. 629; 40 N. Y. 33; 3 Keyes, 479; 1 Abb. App. Dec. 436; 70 N. Y. 123; 6 Hun, 466; :52 ^Vis. 275; 53 Ind. 145; 35 Ind. 466; 45 S. Y. 851; 36 Vt. 359; 25 Ind. 196, 199 ; 58 N. Y. 458 ; 39 N. Y. 365 ; 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 419. Macomber v. Taunton, 100 Mass. 255. pp. 31.2, 769, 770. c 121 Mass. 164; 105 Mass. 601; 116 Mass. 95, 96; 104 Mass. 77; 110 Mass. 337, 526 ; 106 Mass. 377 ; 64 Me. 62. Macon, etc., B. Co. u. Baber, 42 Ga. 300. pp. 498, 502. Macon, etc., K. Co. v. Davis, 27 Ga. 113; s. c, 18 Ga. 679 ; 13 Ga. 68. pp. 425, 430, 502, 1165, 1166, 1167. c 19 Ga. 438; 17 Mich. 118; 36 Mo. 364; 26 Ga. 269; 15 Ind. 489, 490; 28 Ga. 114; 17 WaU. 665. Macon, etc., R. Co v. Johnson, 38 Ga, 408. pp. 1280, 1290. c53Ga. 16,17; 52 Ga. 468. Macon, etc., R. Co. v. McConnell, 31 Ga. 133 ; s. c, 27 Ga. 481. p. 164. c 33 Ga. 112; 12 Kan. 379; 30 Iowa, 422; 37 Mo. 295. Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Vaughn, 48 Ga. 464. pp. 498, 503. c 56 Ga. 460. Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250. s. c, 19 Ga. 440. pp. 1163, 1166, 1263, 1267. c 28 Ga. 114 ; 38 Ga. 432. Macy u. Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267. p. 731. Madison, etc., E. Co. o. Bacon, 6 Ind. 205. pp. 970, 1279. c21 III. 26; 49 Miss. 283; 13 Ind. 369; 46 Texas, 538; 76 111. 397; 8 Ohio St. 253; 8 Cent. L. J. 14; 58 Ind. 28; 15 Ind. 122. Madison, etc., R. Co. v. Herod, 10 Ind. 2. pp. 539, 540. • c 46 Ind. 280. Madison, etc., R. Co. v. Kane, 11 Ind. 375. p. 521. c 36 Ind. 23; 37 Ind. 549. Madison, etc., R. Co. v. Taffe, 37 Ind. 361. pp. 416, 415, 420. c41 Ind. 259; 50 Ind. 68; 2 Col. 168; 1 WUs. (Indianapolis) 491. Madison, etc., R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8- Ind. 217. p. 540. c 10 Ind. 3, 39, 292, 717; 24 Ind. 223; 16 Ind. 436; 29 Ind. 428; 16 Kan. 576; 46 Ind. 280; 13 Ind. 412; 12 Ind. 4, 7; 15 Ind. 119. Madras E. Co. v. Zemindar of Carvetina- garura (decided July 3, 1874), 30 L. T. (n. s.) 770. p. 63. Mad River, etc., R. Co. v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541. pp. 941, 973, 982, 1009, 1016, 1050, 1052. c 5 Reporter, 626; 71 111. 420; 75 111. 110; 28 Ind. 31; 12 Ohio St. 487; 20 Mich. 125; 3 Dill. 325; 7 Cent. L. J. 306; 38 Pa. St. 11; 46 Mo. 172; 32 Iowa, 362, 364; 49 Miss. 283; 8 Kan. 650; 47 Miss. 414, 416; 8 Ohio St. 253; 48 Me. 120; 3 Col. 502; 29 Conn. 560; 49N. Y. 534; 1 Woods, 403 ; 50 Mo. 305. Maenner v. Carroll, 46 Md. 193. p. 1248. Maggi V. Cutts, 123 Mass. 535. p. 804. TABLE OP CASES. cm Maginnis v. ISTew York, etc., R. Co., 52 N. Y. 215. p. 424. c 58 N. Y. 463. Mahanoy v. SohoUy, 84 Pa. St. 136. p. 622. Maher v. Atlantic, etc., B. Co., 64 Mo. 267. pp. 450, 1279. c 64 Mo. 437, 488 ; 4 Mo. App. 489. Maher v. Central Park R. Co., 67 N. Y. 52. p. 1181. Mahler v. Norwich, etc.. Trans. Co., 45 Barb. 226 ; s. v., 35 N. Y. 352. p. 1282. Mahoney v. Metropolitan R. Co., 104 Mass. 73. p. 1206. c no Mass. 132, 514 ; 31 Wis. 187 ; 120 Mass. 588; 105 Mass. 86. Makepeace v. Worden, 1 N. H. 16. p. 213. Maiden, etc., R. Co. v. Charlestown, 8 Allen, 245. p. 758. c 103 Mass. 136. Malecek v. Tower Grove, etc., B. Co., 57 Mo. 17. p. 887. Mali V. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381. p. 885. c 18 Alb. L. J. 91 ; 6 Reporter, 404 ; 64 N. T. 135 ; 47 N. Y. 127. Mallory v. Griffey, 85 Pa. St. 275 ; s. c, 17 Alb. L. J. 36. pp. 350, 353, 1177. Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 5 ; s. c, 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 664. pp. 1028, 1030, 1031, 1033. c 11 Hun, 591 ; 63 Mo. 313 ; 14 Hun, 448. Malone v. Western Trans. Co., 5 Biss; 315. pp. 970, 972. Maloy V. New York, etc., R. Co., 58 Barb. 182 ; s. c, 40 How. Pr. 274. pp. 1199, 1238, 1267. c 41 Ind. 254 ; 2 Jones & Sp. 486 ; 43 How. Pr. 411. Maltby v. Dihel, 5 Kan. 430. p. 299. Mamer v. Lussem, 65 111. 484. pp. 275, 278. c 76 111. 239. Manchester v. Hartford, 30 Conn. 118. pp. 78, 763, 781, 782. C39 Conn. 228; 40 Conn. 377, 460; 22 Wis. 646 ; 33 Iowa, 399 ; 20 Minn. 118, 123. Manchester, etc., R. Co. v. FuUerton, 14 C. B. (N. s.) 54; s. c, 11 Week. Rep. 754. pp. 351, 352. Manchester, etc., R. Co. a. Wallis, 14 C. B. 213. p. 517. c 17 0. B. 129; 25 L. J.-(C. P.) 73; 49 Pa. St. 107. Manderschid ». Dubuque, 29 Iowa, 73; ». G., 25 Iowa, 108. pp. 753, 781, 803. c 53 Mo. 301 ; 32 Iowa, 327 ; 11 Hun, 631 ; 13 Hun, 87. Mangam v. Brooklyn R. Co., 88 N. Y. 455 ; a. c, 36 Barb. 230. pp. 398, 400, 1180, 1181, 1185, 1186, 1188, 1191, 1239, 1240. c 47 N. Y. 322, 324; 68 Me. 656; 17 Wall. 665; 60 N. Y. 333 ; 38 Wis. 629; 64 N. Y. 18; 55 Iiid. 50; 5 Hun, 481; 66 Me. 381; 2 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 646; 9 Bush, 531; 63 N. Y. 106, 107; 48 How. Pr. 81; 7 Jones & Sp. 351; 3 Abb. App. Dec. 277; 56 Ind. 518; 66 Barb. 56; 15 Abb. Pr. {N. S.) 328; 45 Mo. 74; 2 Jones & Sp. 485; 43 How. Pr. 410; 15 N. Y. 408; 40 Barb. 207, 208. Mangan v. Atterton, L. R. 1 Exoh. 239 ; s. L.., 35 L. J. (Exch.) 161; 14 Week. Rep. 771 ; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 388. pp. 305, 806, 1090, 1183, 1192, 1193, 1196. c 18 Ohio St. 411; 35 N. J. L. 32; 21 Minn. 213; 111 Mass. 141; 65 How. Pr. 171, 172; 14 Allen, 298; 27 Ind. 516; 98 Mass. 569; 25 Mich. 9. ?3 Q. B. Div. 338; 7 Cent. L. J. 14; 17 Alb. L. J. 508. Manley v. St. Helens Canal Co., 2 Hurl. & N. 840; a. <;., 27 L. J. (Exch.) 159. pp. 126, 131, 340, 341, 348, 556, 564, 793. c 63 Pa. St. 296; 42 Md. 130; 3 Hurl. & N. 749; 28 L.J. (Exch.) 350. Manly ii. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 74 N. C. 655. pp. 450, 1197. Mann u. Boston, etc., R. Co., 9 Cush. 108. pp. 1272, 1288. Mann v. Oriental Print Works, 11 R. I. 152. pp. 975, 1029. Mann ». Wiland, 34 Leg. Int. 77 ; s. u., 3 W. N. O. 6. pp. 201, 209. Manser v. Northern R. Co., 2 Eng. Rail. Cas. 380. p. 569. Manville v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 11 Ohio St. 417. pp. 982, 1038, 1035, 1038, 1047. c 53 Pa. St. 457 ; 31 Ind. 183 ; 12 Ohio St. 495 ; 59 Mo. 299; 23 Ind. 84, 85. Manville v. Western Union Tel. Co., 37 Iowa, 214. pp. 840, 841, 845, 851. Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44 ; s. c, 5 Re- porter, 596 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 157. pp. 208, 222, 1149, 1162, 1164. c 6 Reporter, 460. Marble t>. Worcester, 4 Gray, 395. pp. 144, 1083, 1037. c9 Kan. 558; 114 Mass. 509; 63 Me. 395; 4 AUen, 560; 14 Allen, 292; 59 111. 357; 29 Wis. OIV TABLE OF CASES. 305, 306 ; 11 Gray, 143 ; 26 Wis. 263 ; 51 Me. 13-2 ; 42 Md. 137; S3 III. 250; 1 Allen, 193; 52 N. H. 552; 51 Jle. 332; 107 Mass. 577. March v. Walker, 48 Texas, 372. pp. 1263, 1279, 1286, 1290. Jlarfell u. South Wales K. Co., 8 C. B. (tf. s.) 525; s. a., 7 Jur. (n. s.) 240; 29 L. J. (C. P.) 315; 8 Week. Rep. 765; 2 L. T. (N. s.) 629. pp. 521, 522. Maria (The), 2 Kob. Adm. 95; s. c, 1 W. Kob. 10-3. pp. 669, 670, 895, 896. Marietta, etc., R. Co. u. Picksley, 24 Ohio St. 654. p. 428. c 24 Ohio St. 638 ; 3 Col. 132. Marietta, etc., E. Co. v. Stephenson, 24 Ohio St. 48. pp. 502, 517. c 27 Ohio St. 249. Mark v. Hudson River Bridge Co., 56 How. Pr. 108. p. 1158. Market v. St. Louis, 56 Mo. 189. p. 764. Markham v. Cob, Latch, 144. p. 1281. Marquette v. Cleary, 37 Mich. 296 ; s. c, 7 Reporter, 81; 17 Alb. L. J. 114. pp. 735, 736, 781, 788. Marquette, etc., R. Co. v. Taft, 28 Mich. 289. p. 970. c 19 Kan. 258. Marriott v. Stanley, 1 Man. & G-. 568 ; a. <;., 4 .Jur. 320. ipp. 127, 373, 488, 1134, 1136, 1202. c 19 Conn. 573 ; 20 111. 493 ; 27 Conn. 412 ; 25 Me.47; 30hio St. 193; 13Ga.88; 17 Iowa, 463; 22 Vt. 221, 222; 9 Wis. 217; 24 Vt. 495, 496; 10 Mich. 198. Marsden v. Cambridge, 114 Mass. 490. p. 260. Marsh v. Branch Road, 17 N. H. 444. pp. 560, 561. Marsh v. Gold, 2 Pick. 285. p. 802. Marsh v. Jones, 21 Vt. 378. p. 197. Marsh v. New ■ York, etc., R. Co., 14 Barb. 364. pp. 500, 503, 528, 530. c 16 111. 202, 203; 28 N. H. 174; 13 S^. T. 51; 2 E. D. Smith, 258; 9 Wis. 210; 12 Md. 262; 6 Ind. 143; 35 X. H. 362, 363; 18 Barb. 385; 1 Hilt. 437. Marsh v. South Carolina E. Co., 56 Ga. 274. pp. 998, 1019. Marshall v. Cohen, 44 Ga. 489. p. 324. Marshall v. Hosmer, 4 Mass. 60. p. 899. Marshall v. Ipswich, 110 Mass. 522. pp. 771, 1209. c 112 Mass. 368. Marsliall v. Schricker, 63 Mo. 308. pp. 970, 1028, 1237. Marshall v. Stewart, 2 Macq. H. L. Cas. 30 ; s. t., 1 Pat. Sc. App. 447 ; 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 1. pp. 947, 973, 1018, 1279. c 49 Barb. 327, 569 ; 46 Mo. 170 ; 50 Miss. 191 ; 24 N. Y. 413, 416; 25 N. Y. 566; 48 Me. 118; 37 Mich. 211 ; 42 Ala. 717. Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. L. 339. pp. 68, 69, 112. Marshalsea (Case of), 10 Coke, 8. p. 817. Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545. pp. 668, 676, 731, 732. Martin v. Riddle, 26 Pa. St. 415, note. p. 104. Martin v. Simpson, 6 Allen, 103. p. 1211. Martin v. Temperley, 4 Q. B. 298. pp. 669, 895, 897. c 10 Ired. L. 560, 576, 577. Martin v. Wallace, 40 Ga. 52. p. 1280. Martin v. Western Union E. Co., 23 Wis. 437. pp. 157, 159, 164, 313. c 38 Wis.-635; 41 Wis. 50; 26 Wis. 235, 247; 11 W. Va. 38. Mascheck v. St. Louis R. Co., 3 M!o. App. 600. p. 1181. Mason o. Birkenhead, etc.. Commission- ers, 6 Hurl. & N. 72 ; i>. c, 29 L. J. (Exch.) 407. p. 799. Mason v. Ellsworth, 32 Me. 271. pp. 764, 1258. c 6 Nev. 233. ? 39 Iowa, 515. Mason v. Keeling, 12 Modern, 332 ; s. c, 1 Ld. Raym. 606. pp. 176, 179, 181, 190, 202, 208, 209. c 48 Mo. 398 ; 9 Q. B. Ill ; 10 Jur. 694 ; 16 L. J. (Q. B.) 67; 44 Me. 328, 329; I N. Y. 516. ? 13 C. B. (N. s.) 440; 9 Jur. (N. s.) 971; 32 L. J. (C. P.) 91. Mason v. Kennebec, etc., R. Co., 31 Me. 215. pp. 509, 572. Massey v. Goyder, 4 Car. & P. 161. p. 277. c 15 Conn. 130; 25 N. J. L. 362; 8 B. Mon. 458; 4 Paige, 173; 30 Me. 179. Massoth V. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co., 64 N. Y. 524; s. c, 6 Hun, 314. pp. 418, 1279. c 72 N. Y. 69; 4 Abb. K. C. 39. Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 293. p. 1259. c 33 Conn. 55; 44 Iowa, 322; 6 Nev. 281, 233. ' TABLE OF CASES. CV Masterton v. Mount Vernon, 58 N. T. 391. pp. 767, 788, 1256. Matheny v. Wolffs, 2 Duv. 137. p. 903. c 11 Bush, 480. Mather v. Crawford, 36 Barb. 564. p. 622. Mather v. Hood, 8 Johns. 44. p. 817. Mathews v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 18 Minn. 434. p. 512. Mathews v. Winooski Turnpike Co., 24 Vt. 480. p. 560. c 27 Vt. 463, 464; 63 Me. 503. Matson v. Baird, 3 App. Cas. 1082. p. 522. Matteson v. New York, etc., K Co., 35 N. T. 487. p. 1241. Matthews v. Baraboo, 39 Wis. 674. pp. 1249, 1255. Matthews v. Discount Corp., L. K. 4 C. P. 228. p. 1065. Matthews v. Fiestel, 2 E. D. Smith, 90. p. 221. Matthews v. Warner's Administrator, 29 Gratt. 570 ; s. c, 17 Alb. L. J. 114. p. 1271. Mattiiews v. West London, etc., K. Co., 3 Camp. 403. pp. 551, 557, 876. c 20 Vt. 534 ; 14 Barb. 109 ; 52 N. H. 125. ? 3 Gray, 358. dll 0. B. 872 ; 16 Jur. 66 ; 21 L. J. (C. P.) 54. Matthie v. Barton, 40 Vt. 288. p. 1245. Matze V. New York, etc., R., Co., 1 Hun, • 417; s. c, 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 513. p. 418. c 4 Hun, 762. Maull V. Wilson, 2 Harr. (Del.) 443. p. 148. c 4 Harr. (Del.) 252; 37 Mo. 295. Maumus v. Champion, 40 Cal. 121. p. 1160. Maund v. Monmouthshire Nav. Co., 3 Eng. Rail. Cas. 159. pp. 662, 888. Maximilian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160 ; s. <;., 2 Hun, 263. pp. 735, 737, 738. c 55 How. Pr. 183; 13 Hun, 217. Maxwell v. McXlvoy, 2 Bibb, 211. p. 898. Maxwell v. Palmerton, 21 Wend. 407. p. 221. Maxwell v. Philadelphia, 7 Phila. 137. pp. 316, 734. May V. Burden, 9 Q. B. 101 ; s. c, 10 Jur. 692; 16 L. J. (Q. B.) 64. pp. 27, 132, 186, 208. (In full, p. 174.) c 5 C. B. 629, 630, 631, 633; 5 Dow. & L. 511, 512, 513; 12 Jur. 248, 249; 17 L. J. (0. P.) 125, 126; 8 Barb. 634; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 273; L. E. 1 Exch. 281 ; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 605 ; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 157; 3 Keyes, 269, 270; 2 Abb. App. Dec. 498, 499; 10 Cush. 510, 511; 32 L. J. (Exch.j 263; 44 Me. 328; 15 Mee. & W. 566; 33 Wis. 309; 45 L. J. 125; 1 Q. B. Div. 83; 31 Conn. 130. May V. Princeton, 11 Meto. 442. p_ 1253. c 35 N". H. 276, 541, 543, 548; 4 Gray, 401; 6 Cush. 628; 52 X.H. 559. May V. Proby, Cro. Jac. 419. p. 826. Mayberry v. Concord R. Co., 47 N. H. 391. pp. 500, 529, 580. c 66 N. H. 553. Mayberry v. Standish, 56 Me. 342. p. 759. Mayhew v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 423. pp. 387, 1166. Maynard v. Boston, etc., R. R., 115 Mass. 458. pp. 500, 506, 517. cl21 Mass. 121; 55 N. H. 553; 116 Mass. 566. Mayo V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 104 Mass. 137. pp. 460, 1176, 1178. cl09 Mass. 521; 115 Mass. 199; 106 Mass. 462; 120 Mass. 262, 266; 107 Mass. 108; 123 Mass. 616; 6 Cent. L. J. 108; 5 Reporter, 238; 114 Mass. 87, 88; 112 Mass. 47; 110 Mass. 339; 6 Cent. L. J. 138; 5 Reporter, 238; 121 Mass. 338; 8 Cent. L. J. 444. Mayor v. Randolph, 4 Watts & S. 514. pp. 747, 748. c 10 Pa. St. 96; 18 Pa. St. 189; 12 Mo. 421. Mayor v. SheflBeld, 4 Wall. 189; pp. 722, 730, 759. c 18 Minn. 286; 33 Iowa, 399; 29 Wis. 619; 9 Hun, 685; 47 N. Y. 646; 19 Minn. 249; 122 Mass. 371, 380; 45 N. Y. 136; 17 Minn. 312; 91 U. S. 551; 33 Iowa, 399; 6 Or. 279. Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 339. p. 488. Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, Cowp. 86. pp. 628, 635, 641, 642, 644, 650, 658, 668, 676, 682, 689. 702, 707. Mazetti v. New York, etc., E. Co., 3 E. D. Smith, 98. p. 359. MoAdams v. Sutton, 24 Ohio St. 333. pp. 198. 219. McAllister v. Hammond, 6 Cow. 342. pp. 1123, 1251. McAlpin V. Powell, 1 Abb. N. C. 427 (reversed in 55 How. Pr. 163). pp. 324, 1195. McAndrew v. Electric Tel. Co., 17 C. B. CVl TABLE OF CASES. 3 ; s. c, 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 180. pp. 834, 841, 842, 843, 848. c 45 N. Y. 752; 5 So. Car. 373; 62 Mo. 215; 45 Barb. 293; 13 Allen, 238; 113 Mass. 307; 18 Upper Canada Q. B. 65, 67; 112 Mass. 71; 60 Me. 29, 31; 60 III. 427; 29 Md. 248; 37 Me. 482; 35 Ind. 437 ; 15 Mich. 536. ? 27 Iowa, 462. McAndrews v. Burns, 39 N. J. L. 117 ; s. c, 5 Reporter, 120. pp. 971, 1033, 1034, 1040. McAuley v. Boston, 113 Mass. 503. pp. 360, 785. c 113 Mass. 507, note. McAunich v. Mississippi, etc., E. Co., 20 Iowa, 338. pp. 1000, 1002, 1151, 1152, 1276. c 38 Iowa, 296 ; 36 Iowa, 54, 55, 376 ; 32 Iowa, 149 ; 31 Iowa, 347 ; 29 Iowa, 58. McCabe v. Hammond, 34 Wis. 590. pp. 763, 764. McCaffevty v. Spuyten Duyvil, etc., K. Co., 61 N. T. 178; s. c, 48 How. Pr. 44. pp. 114, 900, 902, 903, 911. c 10 Jones & Sp. 299; 13 Hun, 298; 12 Hun, 304. McCaffrey v. Albany, 11 Hun, 613. p. 752. McCahill v. Kipp, 2 E. D. Smith, 413. pp. 199, 884, 1088. c 1 Robt. 244 ; 26 How. Pr. 117 ; 61 Barb. 114 ; 42 How. Pr. 393. McCaig V. Erie E. Co., 8 Hun, 599. p. 154. McCall V. Chamberlain, 13 Wis. 637. pp. 509, 515, 516, 517, 519. c 19 Wis. 149 ; 43 Wis. 672, 673, 675, 680, 683, 684; 28 Mich. 515; 41 Iowa, 231; 20 Wis. 258; 38 Wis. 467. ? 42 Wis. 327; 39 Wis. 134, 136. McCalla v. Multnomah County, 3 Or. 424. pp. 616, 617, 793. McCandless v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 45 Wis. 365; s. c, 18 Am. L. Eeg. (n. s.) 133. pp. 501, 1216. McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. St. 261. p. 1216. McCardle (Ex parte), 7 Wall. 506. p. 818. McCarraher v. The Commonwealth, 9 Watts & S. 21. p. 825. McCarthy v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 18 Kan. 46. p. 1283. McCarthy v. Guild, 12 Mete. 291. p. 218. c 11 Gray, 30; 117 Mass. 543. McCarthy v. Portland, 67 Me, 167 ; s. c, 5 Eeporter, 303. p. 1201. McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194. pp. 312, 733. c 51 N. T. 229, 513; 20 Minn. 123; 50 N. T. 238; 3 K. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 7; 66 N. Y. 297; 6 Lans. 264; 3 Mo. App. 262; 12 Hun, 210; 14 Hun, 179; 13 Hun, 294; 59 N. Y. 503. McCaskill o. Elliott, 5 Strobh. L. 196. pp. 203, 208. McCIary v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116. p. 1094. McCleary v. Kent, 3 Duer, 27. p. 907. c 4 Bosw. 148; 6 Daly, 479. McClellan v. Graves, 19 Md. 351. p. 733. McClenaghan v. Brock, 5 Eich. L. 17. p. 885. c 50 Mo. 108. McCombs V. Akron, 15 Ohio, 474; s. v., 18 Ohio, 229. pp. 678, 728, 744, 747. c 40hioSt.94; McCahon (Kan.), 133; 3 N. Y. 469; 1 Ind. 284; 7 Eeporter, 83. d 122 Mass. 378 ; 41 111. 514. McCool V. Galena, etc., E. Co., 17 Iowa, 461. p. 498. c 20 Iowa, 221 ; 21 Iowa, 105. McCord V. High, 24 Iowa, 336. pp. 621, 741, 819, 820, 823, 824, 1247, 1249. McCormack v. Patchin, 53 Mo. 33. p. 731. McCormick t>. Bishop, 28 Iowa, 233. p. 268. McCormick v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Iowa, 193. pp. 496, 524. c 6 Cent. L. J. 315 ; 8 Cent. L. J. 277, 280. McCormick v. Kansas, etc., E. Co., 57 Mo. 433. p. 569. McCormick v. Penn., etc., E. Co., 49 N. Y. 303. p. 887. McCormick v. Tate, 20 HI. 334. p. 210. c 39 111. 193; 86 m. 104. McCoun V. New York, etc., E. Co., 66 Barb. 338. p. 157. McCoy V. California, etc., E. Co., 40 Cal. 532. pp. 512, 1158. c 65 Me. 340. McCoy V. McKowen, 26 Miss. 487. pp. 885, 886. c 48 Miss. 117, 118, 125 ; 38 Miss. 278. McCready v. South Carolina E. Co., 2 Strobh. L. 356. pp. 152, 165. c 30 Iowa, 422; 26 Wis. 236; 11 W. Va. 39; 30 Wis. 121. McGuUom V. Blackhawk County, 21 Iowa, 409, pp. 617, 793, 794. c 43 Iowa, 59, 60; 32 Iowa, 328; 24 Iowa, 350; 40 Iowa, 218, 397; 26 Iowa, 268, 269. TABLE OF CASES. evil McCully V. Clarke, 40 Pa. St. 399. pp. 148, 1147, 1236, 1239. c 52 Pa. St. 381, 390; 59 Pa. St. 264; 66 Pa. St. 31 ; 78 Pa. St. 225 ; 67 Pa. St. 317 ; 75 Pa. St. 86, 376, 377 ; 1 Cent. L. J. 374. McCummons v. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 83 Iowa, 187. p. 154. McDermott v. Pacific R. Co., 30 Mo. 115. pp. 940, 946, 970, 1038. c 52 Mo. 375; 59 Mo. 294,295,391; 7 Cent. L. J. 305,306; 14 Minn. 363; 46 Mo. 169; 47 Mo. 576; 64 Mo. 133; 43 Mo. 192; 36 Mo. 29. McDonald v. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 26 Iowa, 124. p. 313. McDonald v. Pittsfield, etc., R. Co., 115 Mass. 564. pp. 209, 212, 500, 506, 517, 529, 530. c 121 Mass. 121 ; 55 N. H. 553 ; 20 Kan. 364. McDonald v. Savoy, 110 Mass. 49. p. 804. McDonald v. Snelling, 14 Allen, 290. pp. 885, 1099. C26 Wis. 27S; HI Mass. 141; 105 Mass. 77; 113 Mass. 370; 107 Mass. 578; 98 Mass. 568; 104 Mass. 63. McDonough V. Virginia City, 6 Nev. 90. pp. 732, 733, 754, 761. c 34 Wis. 620. McDougall V. Salem, 110 Mass. 21. pp. 755, 797. c 40 N. J. L. 50. McDowell V. New York, etc., R. Co., 37 Barb. 195. pp. 519, 523, 524, 530. c 67 N. y. 156. McDowell V. Van Deusen, 12 Johns. 356. p. 817. McFadden a. Kingsbur}', 11 Wend. 667. pp. 331, 823. c 23 Wend. 450. McC-arry v. Loomis, 63 N. T. 104. pp. 1181, 1185, 1187. McGary v. Lafayette, 12 Rob. (La.) 668 ; 3. c, 4 La. An. 440. pp. 739, 743, 888, 1267. cUI^a.An. 120;5La An. 660; 12 La. An. 15; ^10 La. An. 45. McGatrick v. Nason, 4 Ohio St. 566. pp. 949, 971, 973. c 12 Ohio St. 4S7 ; 46 Mo. 172 ; 31 Cal. 380; i Or. 57 ; 47 Miss. 414, 417 ; 48 Me. 121 ; 3 Col. 504 ; 42 Ala. 719. McGinity v. New York, 5 Duer, 674. p. 762. c 37 Barb. 300; 33 Iowa, 399; 40 Ind. 65 ; 10 Hun, 534; 5 Bosw. 505; 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 138. McGlynn v. Brodie, 31 Cal. 376. pp. 995, 1013. c 3 Sawyer, 504, 505; 39 Iowa, 621; 3 Col. 504. McG.vern v. New York, etc., R. Co., 67 N. Y. 417. pp. 424, 431, 1181, 1272, 1286, 1291. McGowan v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 61 Mo. 528. pp. 970, 1028, 1037, 1038, 1237. c 63 Mo. 311. McGrath v. Hudson, etc., R. Co., 32 Barb. 144 ; ;,. c, 19 How. Pr. 211. pp. 428, 431, 1237. c 3 Daly, 385; 32 Barb. 164; 35 N. Y. 37; 29 Md. 439; 2 Jones & Sp. 486; 43 How. Pr. 411; 33 Barb. 609. McGrath v. Merwin, 112 Mass. 467. p. 1095. c 120 Mass. 492; 124 Mass. 389; 5 Reporter, 724. McGrath v. New York, etc., R. Co., 63 N. Y. 522; s. <;., 59 N. Y. 468; 1 Hun, 437; 3 N.Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 776; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 243. p. 419. c 81 111. 455; 6 Hun, 468; 10 Jones & Sp. 233; 64 N. Y. 532; 7 Ilun, 561, 562; 9 Jones & Sp. 29; 57 Barb. 651. McGregor v. Boyle, 34 Iowa, 268. pp. 732, 741,, 749. c 42 Iowa, 313. McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. St. 436. pp. 1083, 1097. c 52 N. H. 552 ; 38 Wis. 590 ; 49 N. Y. 431 ; 98 Mass. 568; 70 Pa. St. 90; 59 N". Y. 118. McGuffin V. Cohoes, 11 Hun, 531. p. 757. McGuinness v. New York, 52 How. Pr. 452. pp. 316, 734. McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J. L. 356. pp. 261, 263, 275, 276, 279, 892. c 18 Minn. 338; 35 N. J. L. 22, 24; 122 Mass. 207. McGuire v. Hudson, etc., R. Co., 2 Daly, 76. p. 428. McHugh V. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 41 "Wis. 78. p. 152. Mclntire v. Plaisted, 57 N. H. 606. p. 217. Mcintosh V. Slade, 6 Barn. & Cress. 657. pp. 669, 895. Mclntyre v. New York, etc., R. Co., 37 N. Y. 287. p. 1291. McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Pa. St. 218. pp. 309, 1239. c 21 Minn. 297; 75 Pa. St. 86. cvm TABLE OF CASES. McKenzie v. McLeod.lO Bing. 385. p. 885. c 5 Jones & Sp. 255; 50 Mo. 109; 86 Pa. St. 420. McKinley v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 47 Iowa, 76. p. 251. McKinley v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 44 Iowa, 314. pp. 1266, 1270. McKinney v. Ohio, etc., E. Co., 22 Ind. 99. p. 510. c51 Ind. 270, 271; 37 Ind. 550; 46 Ind. 281; 23 Ind. 561. McKinney v. Western Stage Co., 4 Iowa, 420. p. 1240. McKinnon v. Penson, 8 Exch. 319 ; s. u., 9 Exch. 609. pp. 624, 700, 713, 715, 716, 819. c i Mich. 559; 122 Mass. 347, 361, 363, 364 ; L. E. 5 Q. B. 222. McKnight v. Iowa, etc., E. Co., 43 Iowa, 406. p. 1001. MoKone i>. Wood, 5 Car. & P. 1. p. 197. McKonkey v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 40 Iowa, 205. p. 505. c 67 Me. 105 ; 45 Iowa, 526. McLain v. Van Zandt, 48 How. Pr. 80; s. c, 7 Jones & Sp. 347. pp. 1181, 1185, 1236. McLane ... Sharpe, 2 Harr. (Del.) 481. p. 383. c 4 Harr. (Del.) 252. McLaughlin v. Bangor, 58 Me. 398. pp. 1261, 1271. McLaughlin v. Corry, 77 Pa. St. 109. pp. 361, 753, 754, 763, 775, 785, 1257, 1258, 1263. c 81 111. 306. McLaughlin v. Municipality No. 2, 5 La. An. 504. p. 743. McLaughlin v. Pryor, 4 Man. & G. 48 ; s. c, 4 Scott N. E. 655; Car. & M. 354. pp. 391, 915. c 1 C. B. 589; 4 Exch. 366; 7 Dow. & L. 88; 18 L. J. (Exch.) 433; L. K. 10 Exch. 269; 44 L. J. (Exoh.) 179. McLean v.'Blue Point, etc., Co., 51 Cal. 255. pp. 970, 997, 1028. McLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn. 277. p. 1280. McLean v. McCarthy, *6 West. Law Mag. 489. p. 214. McMahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn. 357. pp. 113, 1088. cl3 Minn. 34, 525, 537; 15 Minn. 529; 14 Minn. 94; 46 Texas, 539. McMahon .;. New York, 33 N. T. 642. pp. 1181, 1277. c 38 N. Y. 450, 459 ; 46 Iowa, 233 : 21 Wis. 375 ; 41 Iowa, 80 ; 47 N. T. 323 ; 60 N. Y. 333. McMahon v. Northern, etc., E. Co., 39 Md. 438. pp. 429, 450, 1180, 1184. c 43 Md. 551, 552. McMahon v. Walsh, 11 Jones & Sp. 96. p. 974. McManus v. Oi-ichett, 1 East, 106. pp. 200, 886, 891, 926. (In full, p. 8B5.) c 22 N. Y. 367 ; 2 Har. & G. 319 ; 3 Head, 473 ; 12 Iowa, 349; 18 Mo. 368; 4 Meto. 65; 50 Mo. 103; 20 Ohio, 441; 26 Miss. 490; 4 Man. & G. 53; 12 Minn. 373; 6 Reporter, 404; 18 Alb. L. J. 91; 48 Miss. 118, 125; 5 Cush. 594; 31 X. J. L. 231; 4 So. Car. 68; 64X. Y. 134; 7 Cush. 386; 19 Wend. 345, 347; 43 N. Y. 569; 12 Allen, 53; 3 East, 602; 6 Hurl. & N. 364, 365; 13 111. 285; 47 N. Y. 127; 7 Yerg. 379; 24 Conn. 266; 46 N. H. 233 ; 46 N. Y. 27 ; 57 Me. 233 ; 38 Miss. 278 ; 3 Cliff. 423. ? 2 Mo. App. 45 ; 36 Wis. 669 ; 30 L. J. (Exch.) 191. McManus v. Finan, 4 Iowa, 283. p. 211. McMaugh u. Milwaukee, 32 Wis. 200. pp. 761, 1238. McMillan v. Burlington, etc., E. Co. 46 Iowa, 231. pp. 450, 1181. McMillan v. Saratoga, etc., E. Co., 20 Barb. 449. pp. 973, 994, 1017, 1050, 1051, 1279. c 7 Eobt. 612; 5 Lans. 442; 20 Mich. 127; 7 Cent. L. J. 306; 38 Pa. St. Ill; 39 Iowa, 620. MciluUeu V. Hoyt, 2 Daly, 271. p. 896. McNamara «. Northern Pacific E. Co., 50 Cal. 581. p. 1239. McNarra ».' Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Wis. 69. p. 161. c 41 Wis. 78. MoPheeters v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 45 Mo. 22. pp. 213, 501, 511, 520. C 3 Mo. App. 508. McQuiliken v. Central Pacific E. Co., 50 Cal. 7. pp. 1177, 1179. Mc Williams v. Detroit Central Mills Co., 31 Mich. 274. p. 461. cl8 Am. L. Eeg. (N. s.) 31. Mead v. Derby, 40 Conn. 205. pp. 755, 757. Mead v. Hawes, 7 Conn. 232. p. 825. Meadville v. Erie Canal Co., 18 Pa. St. 66. pp. 343, 793. Meany v. Abbott, 6 Phila. 256. p. 907. TABLE Ol? CASES. CIX Meares v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. 73. pp. 728, 745, 750. c 33 Ala. 130; 21 Mich. 122; 122 Mass. 377; 56 N. H. 294, ; 24 Ala. 122 ; 55 111. 351 ; 91 U. S. 551. Mechanics' Bank v. Seaton, 1 Pet. 309. p. 890. Mechanicsburg v. Meredith, 64 111. 84. pp. 753, 1255. Meek u. Whitechapel Board of Works, 2 Fost. & Fin. 144. pp. 622, 746, 751, 1253. ? L. R. 9 C. P. 323; 43 L. J. (0. P.) 160. Meeker v. Van Kensselaer, 15 Wend. 397. p. 107. Meeks v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 52 Cal. 602. pp. 1181, 1183, 1184, 1197. Mehan v. Syracuse, etc., E. Co., 73 N. Y. 585 ; s. c, 17 Alb. L. J. 874. pp. 1012, 1239. Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300. pp. 208, 218, 220, 223. c 124 Mass. 59; 5 Eeporter, 529. Mellen v. Western E. Co., 4 Gray, 301. p. 752. c 10 Allen, 603, 604; 13 Gray, 607. Mellors v. Shaw, 1 Best, & S. 437 ; s. c, 7 Jur. (n. s.) 845; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 333. pp. 961, 964. c 3 Hurl. & Colt. 515; 7 Hurl. & N. 938; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 993; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 1236; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 323 ; L. E. 6 Exch. 78 ; 40 L. J. (Exch.) 46 ; li. R. 7 Exch. 138 ; 37 Mich. 211. Melody v. Reab, 4 Mass. 471. p. 212. Memphis v. Kimbrough, 12 Heisk. 133. p. 734. Memphis v. Lasser, 9 Humph. 757. pp. 736, 766, 767, 902. c 9 Heisk. 6, 8, 11; 12 Heisk. 138, 688; 13 B. Men. 561. Memphis, etc., E Co. v. Blakeney, 43 Miss. 218. pp. 501, 502. c 43 Miss. 287, 288; 50 Miss. 574. Memphis, etc., E. Co. v. Dean, 5 Sneed, 291. p. 495. c 7 Heisk. 471. Memphis, etc., E. Co. v. Jones, 2 Head, 517. pp. 979, 1025, 1027. c 6 Heisk. 361. Memphis, etc., E. Co. v. Orr,*43 Miss. 279. p. 504. Memphis, etc., E. Go. a. Smith, 9 Heisk. 860. p. 507. Memphis, etc., E. Co. v. Thomas, 51 Miss. 637. pp. 970, 1018. Mendell v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 20 Iowa, 9. p. 1271. Mendota v. Fay, 1 Bradw. 418. p. 753. Mentges v. New York, etc., E. Co., 1 Hilt. 425. pp. 497, 528, 530, 1158. c 58 Barb. 445. Mentz V. Second Avenue E. Co., 3 Abb. App. Dec. 274 ; s. c, 2 Eobt. 356. pp. 397, 398, 399, 400. c 2 Jones & Sp. 486; 43 How. Pr. 411. Mercer v. Jackson, 54 111. 397. p. 1055. Mercier v. New Orleans E. Co., 23 La. An. 264. pp. 399, 426. Meredith v. The Commonwealth, 18 B. Mon. 49. p. 1092. Meredith v. Eeed, 26 Ind. 334. p. 216. Merrifield v. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216. pp. 711, 733, 735, 743. c 55 N. H. 138; 122 Mass. 359. Merrill v. Hampden, 26 Me. 234. pp. 757, 761, 778, 1176. c 65 Me. 552; 27 Vt. 465; 35 Me. 104; 35 N. H. 276; 37 Me. 252. Merrill v. Wilbraham, 11 Gray, 154. pp. 787, 788. c 11 Allen, 320; 106 Mass. 453. Merritt v. Brinkerhoff, 17 Johns. 306. p. 104. Mersey Docks Trustees v. Oibbs, L. E. 1 H. L. 93 ; s. c, 11 H. L. Cas. 686 ; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 225; 12 Jur. (n. s.) 571; 14 Week. Eep. 872; 14 L. T. (n. s.) 677; 3 Hurl. & N. 164; 4 Jur. (n. s.) 636; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 321; 1 Hurl. & N. 439. pp. 557, 558, 567, 582, 614, 622, 623, 624, 718, 720, 721, 723, 724, 820, 899, 1060. (In full, p. 581.) c 7 Best & S. 833; L. R. 1 Q. B. 720; 37 L. J. (Q. B.) 263; 5 Best & S. 453, 463, 476; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1022, 1024, 1027; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 286, 295; 21 Mich. 112; 30 Ohio St. 47; L. R. 6 Q. B. 218; 40 L. J. (Q. B.) 140; 55 N. H. 134; 122 Mass. 366, 368, 372, 373; 11 C. B. (N. s.) 201 ; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 80; SOL. J. (C.P.) 363, 364; 56 Pa. St. 209; 56 N. H. 298; 16 Kan. 384; 61 N". Y. 193,194,198,199; 5 Best & S. 740; 102 Mass. 501 ; 32 N. J. L. 395 ; 3 Hurl. & N. 316 ; 32 L. J. (Exch.) 208; 91 U. S. 651; 1 Sweeny, 235; 68 Me. 110; 104 Mass. 16; 8 El. & Bl. 808; 2 Best & S. 116; 8 Jur. (N. s.) 991; 31 L. J. (Q. B.) 195 ; 4 Hurl. & N. 351 ; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 739; 1 Q. B. Div. 528. Mersey Docks Trustees v. Penhallow, L. E. 1 H. L. 93 ; s. c, 11 H. L. Cas. 686 ; 7 Hurl. & N. 329; 8 Jur. (n. s.) 486; ex TABLE OF CASES. 30 L. J. (Exch.) 329; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 225; 5 L. J. (N. s.) 112. p. 614. (In full, p. 581.) c 7 Best & S. 833; L. E. 1 Q. B. 720; 37 L. J. (Q. B.) 263 ; 5 Best & S. 433, 454, 463, 476 ; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1022, 1024, 1027, 1200; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 286, 295; 21 Mich. 112; 30 Ohio St. 47; 122 Mass. 366, 373; 32 N. J. L. 395; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 312; 91 U. S. 551; 17 Gratt. 380, 383. Mersey Docks Trustees v. Jones and Cameron, 11 H. L. Cas. 443. pp. 582, 610, 612, 614. Messenger v. Pate, 42 Iowa, 443. pp. 558, 1254. Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co., 109 Mass. 277. (In full, p. 1079.) c 44 Iowa, 405; 64 N. H. 503 ; 120 Mass. 593. Metcalfe v. Hetherington, 11 Exch. 259; s. c, 5 Hurl. & N. 719 ; 8 Week. Rep. 475. pp. 585, 590, 592, 597, 6C4, 609, 610, 622. c 4 Best & S. 367; 10 Juv. (N. s.) 258; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 40; 1 Hurl. & N. 451; 3 Hurl. & N. 175, 315; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 642; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 324, 359 ; 17 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 458. ? L. E. 1 H. L. 105, 113, 120, 126; 11 H. L. Cas. 704, 715, 723, 730; 12 Jnr. (N. S.) 573, 576, 677, 579; 35 L.J. (Exch.) 228. 236, 238 ; 7 Hurl. & N. 336 ; 30 L. J. (Exch.) 331 ; 5 Best & S. 746. d 10 C. B. (N. s.) 777. Meyer v. Lindell K. Co., 6 Cent. L. J. 425. p. 424. Meyer v. Midland E. Co., 2 Neb. 319. pp. 4-50, 903, 911, 1184. c 18 Kan. 38. Me3'er v. North Missouri R. Co., 35 Mo. 352. pp. 520, 522, 539. c 66 Mo. 669; 48 Mo. 233, 559; 60 Mo. 410; 45 Mo. 24, 473; 49 Mo. 202. Meyer v. People's E. Co., 43 Mo. 523. p. 1151. Meyers v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 59 Mo. 223. pp. 422, 1157. Meynell v. Saltmarsh, 1 Keb. 847. p. 340. Michael u. Alestree, 2 Lev. 172; s. c, sub nom. Michell v. AUestry, 1 Vent. 295; sub nom. Mitchil ,v. Alestree, 3 Keb. 650. pp. 176, 177, 178, 199, 210, 867, 875, 892. c 7 N. H. 218; 3 Gray, 356; 1 East, 109; 5 Cash. 594, 695 ; 3 C. B. 240 ; 2 Hen. & M. 440 ; 3 East, 601; 3 E. D. Smith, 594; 2 W. Blacli, 899. Michael v. Stanton, 3 Hun, 462 ; s. c, 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 634. pp. 893, 894. Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson, 20 Mich. 244. p. 153. Michigan, etc., R. Co. ». Austin, 40 Mich. 247 ; s. c, 7 Reporter, 784. p. 996. Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Campau, 35 Mich. 468. p. 450. Michigan, etc., R. Co. u. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440. p. 1241. Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Dolau, 32 Mich. 510. pp. 970, 972, 984, 1054. Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Fisher, 27 Ind. 96. pp. 497, 499, 503. c 38 Ind. 559. Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Lantz, 29 Ind. 528. pp. 1176, 1254. c 47 Ind. 45 ; 37 Ind. 547 ; 35 Ind. 466 ; 43 Ind. 341. d 48 Cal. 426. Middleton v. Fowler, 1 Salk. 282. pp. 200, 866, 885. cl Ga. 227; 3 Barb. 390. ? 2 Exch. DIt. 258 ; 36 Wis. 668. d 44 N. H. 330. Midland R. Co. ». Daykin, 17 C. B. 126 ; «. c, 25 L. J. (C. P.) 73. p. 501. c 55 N. H. 553, 654. Miles V. Boyden, 3 Pick. 213. p. 1242. Miles V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 31 Mo. 407. p. 534. Milford V. Holbrook, 9 Allen, 17. pp. 321, 349, 789, 790. c97 Mass. 664; 114 Mass. 163,154; M Me. 47; 101 Mass. 262; 109 Mass. 286; 102 Mass. 343; 122 Mass. 104. Milk o. Middlesex R. Co., 96 Mass. 167. p. 400. Millard v. Jenkins, 9 Wend. 298. p. 817. Milledgeville v. Cooley, 55 Ga. 17. pp. 623, 753, 758. Millen v. Faudrye, Popham, 161. pp. 209, 220. c 18 Vt. 429 ; 9 Mich. 161. Miller v. Auburn, etc., E. Co., 6 Hill, 61. p. 560. Miller v. Falconer, 1 Camp. 468. p. 1060. c 24 Wend. 468. Miller v. Kimbray, 16 L. T. (n. s.) 360. p. 204. Miller b. Long Island R. Co., 9 Hun, 194. p. 152. Miller v. Martin, 16 Mo. 508. pp. 148, 149. c 53 Mo. 370. TABLE OF CASES. CXI Miller v. South-Western B. Co., 55 Ga. 143. pp. 1277, 1286. Milligan v. Wedge, 12 Ad. & E. 737 ; s. c, 4 Per. & Dav. 714. pp. 201, 669, 670, 879, 896, 897, 929. c 7 Q. B. 975; 17 Mo. 125, 128; 6 Reporter, 335 ; 5 N. Y. 53, 54, 57, 59, 63 ; 8 Cal. 489, 496 ; 10 Jur. 94 ; 15 L. J. (Q. B.) 102 ; 4 Eng. Bail. Cas. Ill; 20 Vt. 5.35; 7 N. Y. 496; 35 N. J. L. 22, 25; 30 Md. 202 ; 2 Mich. 370 ; 3 Gray, 361 ; 21 Iowa, 578; 25 N. J. Ij. 371 ; 2 Daly, 275 ; 22 Mo. 547, 549 ; 46 Pa. St. 223 ; 9 Mee & "W. 714 ; 6 Jur. 607 ; 4 Exch. 255; 6 Eng. Bail. Cas. 189; 11 Bush, 480; 4 El. & Bl. 576; 1 Jur. (N. s.) 678; 6 N. Y. 442; 2 Denio, 449; 72 N.Y. 216; 8 Gray, 148, 149; 19 N. H. 440, 441; 52 N. H. 122, 125; 10 Ired. L. 560, 561, 575, 577. Milligan v. Wehinger, 68 Pa. St. 235. p. 215. Mills V. Alexandria, etc., E. Co., 2 McAr- thur, 314. p. 1044. Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489. pp. 726, 731, 732, 733, 750. c 68 Me. 110; 37 Mich. 128; 104 Mass. 16; 34 Conn. 14; 36 N. Y. 55; 49 Barb. 583; 21 Mich. 122 ; 3 Daily, 67, 69 ; 122 Mass. 375 ; 50 N. Y. 238 ; 5 Lans. 533 ; 61 Barb. 520 ; 6 Nev. 93 ; 41 111. 512 ; 46 fowa, 614; 3 Mo. App. 262; 42 Iowa, 313; 55 111. 351; 36 N.Y. 55; 60 Mo. 159; 46 N. Y. 196; 3N.Y. S.O. (T.&C.) 7; 59N.Y.509; 51 N. H. 139. Mills V. Hall, 9 Wend. 315. p. 340. Mills V. New York, etc., K. Co., 2 Kobt. 326 ; s. c, 41 N. Y. 619. p. 206. Mills V. Orange, etc., E. Co., 2 McArthur, 814. pp. 970, 1019. Mills V. Stark, 4 N. H. 513. p. 213. c 49 Pa. St. 106, 109; 21 N. H. 366; 7 N. H. S21; 23N. H. 93. Milne v. Smith, 2 Dow H. L. Cas., 390. p. 1089. Milton o. Rowland, 11 Ala. 732. p. 799. Milwaukee v. Davis, 6 Wis. 377. pp. 733, 756, 759. c 43 Wis. 524; 6 Cent. L. J. 429; 38 Wis. 462. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co. v. Hunter, 11 Wis. 160. pp. 422, 423, 1177. c 18 Wis. 332 ; 34 Iowa, 161 ; 41 Wis. 108, 109. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; s. c, 5 Cent. L. J. 305. pp. 153, 156, 157. c 39 N. J. li. 307, 308, 309, 311; 8 Cent. L. J. 279. Minor v. Deland, 18 Pick. 266. p. 212. Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477. p. 324. Minot V. West Eoxbury, 112 Mass. 1. p, 709. Minter v. Pacific E. -51., 41 Mo. 503. pp, 884, 1058. Misner v. Lighthall, 13 111. 609. p. 210. c 39 111. 192. Mississippi, etc., E. Co. ii. Fort, 44 Miss, 423. p. 511. Mississippi, etc., E. Co. v. Miller, 40 Miss, 45. p. 495. c 43 Miss. 240, 281, 282, 287; 50 Miss. 574; 40 Miss. 384, 459; 42 Miss. 607; 46 Miss. 578. Missouri, etc., 11. Co. v. Davidson, 14 Kan. 349. p. 171. c 17 Kan. ,384; 18 Kan. 264. Missouri, etc., E. Co. v. Shirley, 20 Kan. 660. p. 540. c 20 Kan. 669. Mitchell V. Clapp, 12 Cush. 278. p. 218. Mitchell w. The Commonwealth, 37 Pa. St. 187. p. 826. Mitchell u. Crassweller, 13 C. B. 237 ; s. t., 17 Jur. 716; 22 L. J. (C. P.) 100. pp. 884, 885, 886, 1244, 1253. c L. E. 8 O. P. 568, 569; 42 L. J. (C. P.) 304, 305; 66 Mo. 577; 5 Kobt. 538; 35 How. Pr. 462; L. E. 4 Q. B. 479, 480; 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 224; 10 Best & S. 339, 340; 3 Hurl. & Colt. 613; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 845; 6 Hurl. & N. 362; 86 Pa. St. 420; 4 Daly, 341, 342; 34 Upper Canada Q. B. 461; 23 Upper Canada C. P. 549. Mitchell V. New York, etc., E. Co., 64 N. Y. 655 ; s. c, 2 Hun, 535 ; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 122. pp. 424, 426, 1279, 1291. Mitchell u. Pennsylvania E. Co., 1 Am. L. Eeg. 717. pp. 971, 1025. Mitchell V. Eockland, 41 Me. 363 ; s. c, 45 Me. 496 ; 52 Me. 118. pp. 735, 738, 739. c21 Mich. 113; 57 Me. 378; 46 Texas, 527; 71 Pa. St. 157. Mitchell V. Wolf, 46 Pa. St. 147. p. 215. Mitchil V, Alestree. (See s. c, sub nom. Michael v. Alestree.) Mites V. Sherwood, 8 East, 8. p. 574. Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 15. p. 1266. Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. Hudson, 50 Miss. 572. pp. 501, 512. Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. Malone, 46 Ala. 391. p. 507. Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. Smith, 6 Eeporter, 264; s. c, 7 Cent. L. J. 212. p. 970. CXll TABLE OF CASES. Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas, 42 Ala. 672. pp. 970. 994. 995, 996, 1053, 1237. c4S Ala. 463; 6 Eeporter, 264; 46 Texas, 538; 4 Or. 56. Mobile, etc., E. Co. w. "Williams, 53 Ala. 595. pp. 498, 502, 507, 511, 512. Mochler v. Shaftsbury, 46 Vt. 580. p. 769. Jloheny a. Cook, 26 Pa. St. 342. pp. 1093, 1095. !Monahaii a. Keokuk, etc., E. Co., 45 Iowa, 523. p. 506. Monies v. Lynn, 119 Mass. 273; a. c, 121 Mass. 442. pp. 762, 764, 766. c 5 Reporter, 529. Monkton v. Pashley, 2 Salk. 638. p. 342. Monongabela Nav. Co. v. Coon, 6 Pa. St. 379 ; s. c, 6 Watts & S. 101. pp. 104, 567." Montfort v. Hughes, 3 E. D. Smith, 591. pp. 823, 892, 1059. c 57 Mo. 99; SON. T. 79. Montgomery v. Gilmer, 33 Ala. 116. pp. 732, 733, 742, 750, 753, 777. c 45 Ala. 184; 33 Iowa, 399. Montgomery v. Scott, 34 Wis. 338. pp. 799, 800, 1207. c 39 Wis. 136. Montgomery v. Wilmington, etc., E. Co., 6 Jones L. 464. p. 496. Monroe v. Leach, 7 Mete. 274. p. 382. Monson, etc., Man. Co. v. Puller, 15 Pick. 554. p. 103. Montoya v. London Assurance Co., 6 Exch. 451. p. 138. Moodalay v. East India Co., 1 Bro. C. C. 469. pp. 657, 668. Moody V. New York, 43 Barb. 282 ; s. t., 84 How. Pr. 288. pp. 316, 317, 322. c 52 How. Pr. 452. Moody V. Osgood, 54 K T. 488 ; s. v., 50 Barb. 628. pp. 382, 1263. Moody V. Ward, 13 Mass. 299. p. 245. c 51 Me. 131. Moore v. Abbot, 32 Me. 46. pp. 780, 1086, 1208. c 54 Miss. 395; 9 Kan. 558; 53 Mo. 301; 38 Me. 207; 2-2 Wis. 679; 16 HI. 570; 40 Me. 65; 29 Wis. 303; 51 Me. 128, 133,337, 339, 441; 35N. H. 80, 276 ; 13 Hun, 85. d 42 N. H. 214. Moore v. Central E. K., 47 Iowa, 688. p. 1003. Moore v. Central E. Co., 24 N. J. L. 268. pp. 407, 427, 1150, 1153, 1177. c 39 N. J. L. 192; 18 N. T. 252; 35 Ind. 466; 25 X. J. L. 558; SON. J. L. 199; 25 Ind. 198; 6 Gray, 72. Moore v. Dawney, 3 Hen. & M. 127. p. 899. Moore v. Pitchburg E. Co., 4 Gray, 455. pp. 887, 888. 892. Moore v. Goedel, 34 N. T. 527 ; s. u., 7 Bosw. 591. p. 324. c 4 Jones & Sp. 349; 46 How. Pr. 163; 46 Barb. 269; 68 Me. 166. Moore v. Metropolitan E. Co., L. E. 8 Q. B. 36. pp. 885, 888. Moore v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 300. pp. 753, 754, 763. c 20 Minn. 118, 121, 124; 19 Minn. 249. Moore v. Mobile, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 284. p. 761. Moore v. Morgue, Cowper, 480. p. 475. Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519. pp. 886, 9n. c 7 Cent. L. J. 494; 9 Mich. 191; 6 PhUa. 257; 7 Mich. 422. Moore v. Shreveport, 3 La. An. 645. pp. 753, 1177, 120>. Moore v. Westervelt, 27 N. T. 235. p. 827. Moorish v. Poote, 8 Taun. 453. p. 1060. c 24 Wend. 468, 469, 470, 471. Moran v. Nashville, etc., E. Co., 58 Tenn. 879. p. 449. Moran v. New York, etc., E. Co., 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 770; ». t., 67 Barb. 96. p. 1038. Morel V. Mississippi Ins. Co., 4 Bush, 535. p. 1238. Moreland v. Mitchell County, 40 Iowa, 394. pp. 563, 617, 760, 792, 793. c46 Iowa, 178; 42 Iowa, 59; 43 Iowa, 4S9. Moreton v. Hardern, 6 Dow. & Ey. 275 ; s. u., 4 Barn. & Cress. 223. pp. 390, 891, 1049. c 3 El. & El. 708; 7 Jur. (N. B.) 468; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 186; 5 Cash. 593; 10 Bing. U7; 19 Wend. 344; 3 E. D. Smith, 594. Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645. pp. 621, 727. c4 Mich. 561; 16 Abb. Pr. 346; 122 Mass. 376; 7 Ohio St. 12i; 17 Gratt. 381; 21 Mich. 113; 15 Barb. 440; 5 Sandf. 320. Morford v. Woodworth, 7 Ind. 83. 1254, 1264. c 49 N. H. 394. Morgan v. Bowman, 22 Mo. 538. pp. 893, 899, 912, 1058. c 2 Mo. App. 578; 57 Mo. 98. pp. TABLE OF CASES. cxm Morgan v. Cox, 22 Mo. 373. (In full, p. 238.) c 66 Mo. 351, 35.1. Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. — . pp. 1277, 1290. Morgan v. Hallo well, 57 Me. 375. pp. 362, 709, 755, 769, 771. c 122 Mass. 357; 63 Me. 480; 30 Wis. 403; 5 Reporter, 345 ; 86 Pa. St. 79. Morgan v. Hughes, 2 Term Rep. 225. p. 817. Morgan i;. Vale of Neath E. Co., 5 Best & S. 736; s. c, L. K. 1 Q. B. 149; 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 23; 13 L. T. (n. s.) 564; 14 Week. Rep. 144 (affirming s. o., 5 Best & S. 570; 10 Jur. (tf. s.) 1074; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 260; 13 Week. Rep. 1031.) pp. 970, 1032, 1037, 1038. C L. K. 10 Q. B. 138; 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 61, 62; 86 Pa. St. 440; 2 Exoh. DIt. 397; 46 L. J. 528; 45 L. J. 389, 390; 28 Ittd. 376; L. R. 1 C. P. 296; L. R. 2 Exoli. 32, 33; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 699; 36 L. J. (Exch.) 10; 53 Pa. St. 456, 459; 15 Rich. L. 210; 7 Cent. L. J. 453; 18 Alb. L. J. 135, 136; 53111. 340; 49 Barb. 326; 28 Ind. 376; 3 Exch. Div. 344; 7 Best & S. 681; 3 C. P. Div. 494, 498; 13 Allen, 444; 44 Md. 292; 62 Me. 465; 6 Reporter, 126; 1 O. P. Div. 167, 168; 59 Pa. St. 247, 252. Morley v. Gaisford, 2 H. Black. 442. pp. 863, 890. c 15 Conn. 132; 4 Harr. (Del.) 232; 18 Vt. 612; 3 Barb. 48; 4 Man. & G. 58; 4 So. Car. 68; 4 Exch. 585; 14 Jur. 24; 7 Dow. & L. 216; 20 L. J. (Exch. ) 187 ; 6 Eng. Rail. Cas. 213 ; 2 Hen. & M. 441; 2 N. H. 549; 4 Whart. 147. Morley v. Pragnell, Cro. Car. 510. pp. 75, 107. Morrill v. Deering, 3 N. H. 53. p. 763. c 41 N. H. 137. Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 45 Iowa, 29. pp. 1157, 1256, 1257, 1258. Morris t>. Gleason, 1 Bradw. 510. pp. 971, 972, 990, 1008. Morris ». Nugent, 7 Car. & P. 572. p. 221. Morris v. Phelps, 2 Hilt. 38. pp. 1146, 1209. Morris v. Piatt, 32 Conn. 75. p. 71. Morris v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 58 Mo. 78. p. 521. c 64 Mo. 75, 414. Morris Canal Co. ». Seward, 23 N. J. L. 219. p. 744. Morris, etc., Co. ». Ryerson, 27 N. J. L. 457. pp. 101, 317, 570. Morris, etc., R. Co. v. Haslan, 38 N. J. L. 147. pp. 480, 1212. c 34 Iowa, 160 ; 64 Mo. 490. Morris, etc., R. Co. «. The State, 36 N. J. L. 553. p. 152. Morrison u. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171. p. 1083. Morrison v. Drew, 20 Pa. St. 121. p. 1097. Morrison v. Erie, etc., R. Co., 63 N. T. 648. pp. 1189, 1238. Morrison v. (Jeneral Steam Nav. Co., 8 Exeh. 731. p. 1093. Morrison v. New York, etc., R. Co., 32 Barb. 568. pp. 537, 538. c 47 Mo. 249. Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 43 Mo. 388. p. 1151. Morse v. Boston, 109 Mass. 446. pp. 360, 785. c 113 Mass. 505, 507, note. Morse i>. Connecticut River E. Co., 6 Gray, 450. p. 1054. Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499. p. 72. Morse v. Erie R. Co., 65 Barb. 490. p. 426. Morse v. Nixon, 6 Jones L. 293. p. 221. Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt. 435. pp. 778, 779, 781, 1085. c 65 Me. 551 ; 25 Wis. 290 ; 31 Wis. 189 ; 39 Conn. 379, 445; 25 Wis. 290; 13 Hun, 83. Morse v. Rutland, etc., R. Co., 27 Vt. 49. pp. 496, 505, 517. c 65 Mo. 175 ; 9 Wis. 220. Morse v. The State, 6 Conn. 9. p. 799. Morss i). Boston, etc., R. Co., 2 Cush. 536. p. 504. c 25 Vt. 133 ; 1 Allen, 494 ; 27 Vt. 148. Morton v. Frankfort, 55 Me. 46. pp. 766, 768. c 58 Me. 389. Morton v. Gloster, 46 Me. 520. pp. 388, 1093, 1095. Mose V. Hastings and St. Leonards Gas- Light Co., 4 Post. & Fin. 324. p. 109. Moseley d. Chamberlain, 18 Wis. 700. p. 971. c37 Wis. 322; 14 Minn. 363; 46 Texas, 539; 2 Col. 488; 8 Kan. 650. d 49 Cal. 130. Moses V. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 21 111. 516. pp. 747, 776. ? 85 lU. 381; 5 Cent. L. J. 386. CXIV TABLE OF CASES. Mosey v. Troy, 61 Barb. 580. pp. 763, 763, 785. C 11 Hun, 104. Moshier v. Utioa, etc., E. Co., 8 Barb. 427. pp. 152, 352, 532. c 42 Miss. 614. d 44 Mo. 294 ; 23 Barb. 649, 650. Moss V. Johnson, 22 111. 633. pp. 972, 1008. c 53 Pa. St. 457; 75 111. 109; 47 111. 109; 69 111. 464; 14 Minn. 364; 39 Iowa, 621; 7'2 111. 259, 261; 76 111. 397; 8 Kan. 618; 4 Ch. Leg. N. 83; 42 Miss. 614. Moss V. Pacific R. S., 49 Mo. 167. pp. 972, 974. (In full, p. 951.) c 69 Mo. 301 ; 62 Me. 466. Mottu. Consumers' Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543 ; s. c, 6 Reporter, 404; 18 Alb. L. J. 90. pp. 884, 887, 890. Moulton V. Sanford, 51 Me. 127. pp. 772, 880, 1086, 1207. c 9 Kan. 558; 53 Mo. 301; 29 Wis. 303; 51 Me. 339; 68 Me. 154; 13 Hun, 85. Mount V. Hunter, 58 111. 246. p. 206. c 66 111. 105. Mount Vernon «. Dusouchett, 2 Ind. 586. pp. 768, 1176, 1254. c 17 Ind. 105 ; 23 Ind. 134 ; 7 Ind. 83 ; 42 Ind. 343; 6 Ind. 290; 12 Ind. 623; 2 Disney, 521; 7 Iowa, 489 ; 10 Ind. 401. d 7 Iowa, 489. Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247. pp. 618, 620, 704. c 32 N. H. 443 ; 14 Gray, 543 ; 4 AUen, 52 ; 16 Gray, 126, 230; 17 lU. 144, 146; 34 Conn. 13, 16; 4 Mich. 561; 21 Mich. 113; 36 N. H. 297, 298; 2 N. H. 393; 8 Allen, 128; 17 Conn. 478; 62 Mo. 316,317,320; 15 Barb. 441; 122 Mass. 351; IS Meto. 300; 10 Mete. 110; 7 Ohio St. 123; 17 Gratt. 381 ; 5 Sandf . S. C. 320 ; 27 Vt. 457 ; 45 Mo. 473 ; 3 La. An. 646 ; 8 Barb. 650, 651, 652 ; I Wils. (Indianapolis) 138; 3 N". H. 53; 46 Texas, 527; 102 Mass. 499; 36 Mo. 562; 20 Me. 248; 56 N. H. 294; 20 N. H. 79; 13 Pick. 346; 7 Cush. 494; 26 Iowa, 268; 1 Disney, 638; 55 111. 350. Mowrey v. Central Park E. Co., 51 N. Y. 666 ; o. G., 66 Barb. 43. p. 1181. c 2 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & O.) 640 ; 58 N. Y. 252; 60 N. Y. 336. Mowry v. Chaney, 43 Iowa, 609. p. 1241. Muhl's Administrator v. Michigan, etc., E. Co., 10 Ohio St. 272. p. 1277. Mulchey v, Methodist Religious Society, 6 Reporter, 751. p. 907. Muldowney v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 39 Iowa, 615 ; s. c, 36 Iowa, 462 ; 32 Iowa, 176. pp. 973, 1009, 1019, 1020, 1166, 1277, 1291. c 43 Iowa, 667; 33 Iowa, 60; 40 Iowa, 343, 344, 346, 402; 45 Iowa, 664; 3S Iowa, 280; 44 Iowa, 320; 68 Me. 105. Mulherrin v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 81 Pa. St. 366. pp. 448, 450, 459. c 83 111. 516. MulhoUand ii. Brownrigg, 2 Hawks (N.C.), 349. p. 573. MuUan v. Phila., etc., Steam Co., 78 Pa. St. 25. pp. 973, 1030, 1032, 1050, 1054. c 6 Reporter, 126; 86 Pa. St. 440, 441. MuUaney v. Spence, 15 Abb. Pr. {n. s.) 319. pp. 303, 1185, 1195. c 1 Abb. N. 0. 432. Mullen V. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567. pp. 347, 349, 1231, 1232. c 11 Hun, 48; 6 Reporter, 461. Muller V. McKesson, 10 Hun, 44; s. c, 18 Alb. L. J. 75. p. 222. Muller V. Stone, 27 La. An. 123. p. 318. Mullett V. Mason, L. E. 1 C. P. 559. pp. 207, 236. Mulligan v. Curtis, 100 Mass. 512. pp. 1181, 1182, 1184, 1188. c 107 Mass. 238; 104 Mass. 57; 68 Me. 596. Mumford u. Brown, 6 Cow. 475. p. 323. Mumpower v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 69 Mo. 245. pp. 498, 523, 534. Munch V. New York, etc., R. Co., 29 Barb. 647. pp. 524, 530. c 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 539; 21 Ind. 259. Munger v. Tonawauda E. Co. (See Ton- awanda E. Co. v. Munger.) pp. 1146, 1158. Munn V. Reed, 4 Allen, 431. pp. 219, 223, 1185. c 104 Mass. 58; 124 Mass. 58; 6 Reporter, 528; 98 Mass. 670; 38 Wis. 308. Munroe v. Leach, 7 Mete. 274. p. 458. c 3 Daly, 386; 21 Iowa, 26; 3 Ohio St. 188; 24 N. J. L. 277; 37 Oal. 422; 9 Wis. 217; 24 Vt. 495; 2 Mich. 265. Murch V. Concord, etc., R. Co., 29 N. H. 9. p. 315. Murdock v. Warwick, 4 Gray, 178. pp. 1086, 1207. c 114 Mass. 509; 43 Vt. 459; 29 Wis. 506; 51 Me. 133, 339; 8 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 419. d 42 N. H. 214. Murphy v. .Brooks, 109 Mass. 202. p. 354. Murphy v. Caralli, 3 Hurl. & Colt. 462 ; s. c, 10 Jur. (n. s.) 1207; 34 L. J. TABLE OF CASES. CXV (Exch.) 14; 13 Week. Rep. 165. pp. 890, 897, 1043. c L. E. 6 C. P. 25 ; 40 L. J. (0. P.) 28. Murphy v. Chicago, 29 111. 279. pp. 747, 776. ? 67 ni. 480; 85 111. 381; 5 Cent. L. J. 386. Mui-phy V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 45 Iowa, 661 ; ji. c, 38 Iowa, 539. pp. 423, 450, 452, 453, 1176. e 42 Iowa, 446. Murphy V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 4 N. W. Rep. 81. p. 165. Murphy u. Deane, 101 Mass. 455. pp. 1147, 1176. c 105 Mass. 78; 120 Mass. 262; 74 N. C. 658; 42Ind. 343; 68 Me. 558. Murphy v. Grlouoestor, 105 Mass. 470. p. 771. c 105 Mass. 601 ; 43 Ind. 597 ; 122 Mass. 391 ; 112 Mass. 368; 64 Me. 62. Murphy v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio St. 137. p. 1049. Murphy v. Lowell, 124 Mass. 564. p. 778. Murphy v. New Tork, etc., R. Co., 29 Conn. 496. pp. 1264, 1283, 1290. Murphy v. Smith, 19 C. B. (n. s.) 361; s. c, 12 L. T. (n. s.) 605. pp. 970, 977, 979, 1028. c 64 N. Y. 11; 61 Mo. 533 ; 1 Cent. L. J. 479. Murphy v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 4 Mo. App. 565. p. 1058. Murphy v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 70 N. C. 437. p. 1212. c 74 N. 0. 658. Murray v. Currie, L. R. 6 C. P. 24 ; o. c, 40 L. J. (C. P.) 26 ; 19 Week. Kep. 104; 23 L. T. (sr. s.) 557. pp. 970, 1043. c 1 C. P. Uiv. 560, 561, 562. Murray v. Hudson, etc., li. Co., 47 Barb. 196 ; s. c, 48 N. Y. 655. p. 556. c 28 Wis. 304, 306. Murray v. McLean, 57 111. 378. pp. 308, 309. Murray v. New York, etc., R. Co., 4 Keyes, 274; s. c, 3 Abb. App. Dec. 339. pp. 524, 528. c 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 636. Murraj' v. South Carolina R. Co., 1 McMull. 385. pp. 927, 971. c 7 La. An. 324, 333; 3 Ohio St. 211, 215, 216; 24 Ala. 36; 5 N. Y. 494, 4%; 6 Barb. 237; 18 Iowa, 287; 4 Mete. 57; 53 N. Y. 552; 21 111. 26; 3 Sawyer, 441 ; 20 Ohio, 444, 445 ; 6 Ind. 207, 208; 49 Miss. 282, 283; 46 Texas, 539; 43 Mo. 193; 23 Pa. St. 386; 76 111. 397; 22 Ala. 309, 311 ; 42 Ala. 717 ; 1 Ga. 198 ; 59 Pa. St. 251. ? 5 Ind. 343, 347. d Ohio, 435; 9 Bush, 565, 566; 6 Bush, 579. Murray v. South Carolina R. Co., 10 Rich. L. 227. pp. 358, 502, 505, 512, 514. c 5 So. Car. 57; 43 Wis. 683; 13 Wis. 640; 4 So. Car. 62. Murray v. Van Derlyn, 24 Wis. 67. p. 215. Musgrave v. Smith, 26 Week. Rep. 83. p. 90. Musick V. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 57 Mo. 134. p. 535. c 65 Mo. 442. Musselman v. Gallagher, 32 Iowa, 383. p. 1241. Myers v. Dixon, 3 Jones & Sp. 390; ^. c, 45 How. Pr. 48. pp. 387, 1239. Myers v. Dodd, 9 Ind. 290. p. 210. cl4 Ind. 319; 23 Ind. 319; 33 Ind. 498; 38 Ind. 559; 22 Ind. 319. Myers v. Malcolm, 6 Hill, 292. p. 340. c 31 Conn. 487. Myers v. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 215. pp. 1285, 1266, 1269, 1294. Myers v. Springfield, 112 Mass. 489. pp. 766, 778, 774. c 116 Mass. 576; 117 Mass. 590. N. Nagle V. Allegheny Valley R. Co., 6 Week. N. C. 510; 8. c, 8 Cent. L. J. 307. p. 1181. Nail V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 59 Mo. 112. p. 114. Napier v. Bulwinkle, 5 Rich. L. 311. p. 261. Nashville v. Brown, 9 Heisk. 1. pp. 740, 753, 766, 781. c 12 Heisk. 138. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Anthony, 7 Re- porter, 699. p. 497. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 847. pp. 1027, 1035, 1048, 1149, 1152. c 9 Heisk. 31, 279, 282, 868 ; 59 Tenn. 427, 428. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Comans, 45 Ala. 4.37. p. 506. c46 Ala. 394; 53 Al.a. 599. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Eakin, 6 Coldw. 582. p. 1282. CXVl TABLE OP CASES. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Elliott, 1 Coldw. 611. pp. 973, 977, 986, 994. c 6 Heisk. 358 ; 9 Heisk. 38, 41, 42 ; 49 Texas, 189. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Fugett, 3 Coldw. 402. p. 513. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 9 Heisk. 27. pp. 973, 982, 990, 991, 1026, 1027, 1030. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Prince, 2 Heisk. 580. pp. 451, 452, 1271, 1282, 1291, 1294. c 6 Heisk. 179; 9 Heisk. 18; 11 Heisk. 407. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 6 Heisk. 174. pp. 1156, 1165, 1269, 1270, 1271, 1280, 1292. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Starnes, 9 Heisk. 52. pp. 351, 352. Nashville, etc., R. Co. u. Stevens, 9 Heisk. 12. pp. 1290, 1291. c 9 Heisk. 852. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas, 5 Heisk. 262. p. 507. Nason v. Boston, 14 Allen, 508. pp. 360, 784, 785. c 102 Mass. 334, 339, 340 ; 78 lU. 352 ; 24 Wis. 274; 104 Mass. 83; 100 Mass. 57. ? 52 N. H. 413. National Exchange Co. of Glasgow v. Drew, 2 JIacq. H. L. Cas. 103 ; s. c, 1 Pat. Sc. App. 482 ; 32 Eng. Law & Eq. 1. p. 888. Navasota v. Pearce, 46 Texas, 526, pp. 735, 738, 753. Neal V. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555. p. 1282. Neal V. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437. p. 1164. c 29 Conn. 209 ; 15 Ind. 489 ; 34 N. T. 14. Neanow v. Uttech, 46 Wis. 581. p. 1202. Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black, 590. pp. 721, 730, 753, 1256. c 32 Iowa, 328; 122 Mass. 370, 380; 58 N. T. 395; 102 Mass. 500; 5 Neb. 452; 26 Iowa, 268; 2 Col. 160; 11 Allen, 79; 91 U. S. 551; 63 Barb. 266. Nebraska City v. Lampkin, 6 Neb. 27. p. 747. Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 38 Vt. 294. pp. 1272, 1276, 1282, 1284, 1285, 1294. Needham v. San Francisco R. Co., 37 Cal. 409. pp. 1146, 1151. c 40 Cal. 19, 453; 50 Cal. 484; 37 Cal. 406; 48 Cal. 421, 424; 4 Cent. L. J. 84. Neighbor v. Trimmer, 16 N. J. L. 58. p. 817. Neiminster ». Dubuque, 12 West. Juf. 213. pp. 1242, 1259. Nelson v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 68 Mo. 593. p. 1157. Nelson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa, 564. pp. 1176, 1178. c 27 Vt. 379; 28 Vt. 304, 305. Nelson ;;. Godfrey, 12 111. 20. p. 344. c 2 Black, 427. Nelson v. Liverpool Brewing Co., 2 C. P. Div. 311 ; s. c, 5 Cent. L. J. 312 ; 25 Week. Rep. 877. pp. 317, 319, 323. c 17 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 456. Nelson v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 26 Vt. 717. pp. 320, 515. c 16 Kan. 576; 26 Barb. 626, 627; 27 Vt. 149; 39 Barb. 336. Nelson County Court v. Washington County Court, 14 B. Mon. 42. p. 795. Neptune the Second, 1 Dod. 467. p. 895. Neuert v. Boston, 120 Mass. 338. pp. 346, 776, 778. c 13 Hun, 217. Neumeister v. Dubuque, 47 Iowa, 465 ; s. c, sub nom. Neiminster v. Dubuque, 12 West. Jur. 213. pp. 1242, 1259. Nevin v. Rochester (N. Y. Ct. App.), 19 Alb. L. J. 315. pp. 753, 764. Nevins v. Peoria, 41 111. 502. pp. 740, 744, 747, 748, 751, 824, 908, 914. c 68 111. 169 ; 56 111. 137 ; 57 111. 33 ; 77 lU. 104 ; 65 lU. 520; 62 111. 521; 67 lU. 479, 480; 76 lU. 234, 239; 86111. 395; 7 Reporter, S3; So 111. 380, 381; 5 Cent. L. J. 386. New Albany, etc., R. Co. v. Maiden, 12 Ind. 10. "pp. 515, 517, 524, 526. c20 Iowa, 195; 54 Ind. 43; 12 Ind. 479; 24 Ind. 223; 29 Ind. 428; 46 Ind. 280; 13 Ind. 374; 16 Ind. 104 ; 59 Ind. 189. New Albany, etc., R. Co. v. McNamara, 11 Ind. 543. pp. 519, 533. New Albany, etc., R. Co. v. Pace, 13 Ind. 411. p. 526. c20Iowa, 195;26Iowa, 556; 46 Ind. 280; 28 Ind. 480. New Albany, etc., R. Co. ». Powell, 13 Ind. 373. p. 533. c 37 Ind. 549. New Albany, etc., R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3. pp. 499, 515, 516, 533. c24 Ind. 233; 29 Ind. 428; 16 Kan. 576; 46 Ind. 280; 13 Ind. 374; 22 Ind. 319; 12 Ind. H; 66 Pa. St. 168. Newberry v. Colvin, 7 Bing. 190. p. 894. Newbit V. Appleton, 63 Me. 491. p. 757. TABLE OF CASES. CXVU New Brunswick, etc., R. Co. v. Mugge- ridge, 1 Drew. & Sm. 363. p. 1174. Newbury v. Connecticut, etc., K. Co., 25 Vt. 377. pp. 753, 1241. c 41 Vt. 439. New Haven, etc., Trans. Co. v. Vander- bilt, 16 Conn. 420. p. 486. Newhouse v. Miller, 35 Ind. 464. pp. 1151, 1207. New Jersey Express Co. v. Nichols, 32 N. J. L. 166 ; s. c, 33 N. J. L. 434. pp. 407, 1154, 1160, 1177, 1178, 1179, 1257. c 39 jSr. J. L. 192; 38 N. J. L. 529; 36 Ma. 361. New Jersey, etc.. Trans. Co. v. West, 32 N. J. L. 91 ; s. c, 33 N. J. L. 430. pp. 407, 417, 419, 421, 430. c 39 X. J. L. 192 ; 38 N. J. L. 529 ; 33 Wis. 75 ; 33 N. J. L. 439. Newlin V. Davis, 77 Pa. St. 317. pp. 564, 622, 761, 775, 793, 797. c 81 Pa. St. 50; 84 Pa. St. 140. Newman (Ex parte), 9 Cal. 502. p. 818. New Orleans, etc., E. Co. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395. p. 462. c 49 111. 215; 44 Miss. 492; 19 Ohio St. 168. New Orleans, etc., E. Co. v. Enochs, 42 Miss. 603. p. 512. c 43 Miss. 240, 283 ; 50 Miss. 574. New Orleans, etc., E. Co. v. Field, 46 Miss. 573. pp. 501, 502, 503, 504, 505. New Orleans, etc., E. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112. p. 886. c 46 Texas, 439. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell, 52 Miss. 808. p. 426. Newson v. New York, etc., E. Co., 29 N. T. 383. p. 462. c 35 N. Y. 2S, 44 ; 26 Wis. 255 ; 45 Mo. 262 ; 64 N. Y. 533; 2 Lans. 437; 2 Sawyer, 28. Newton v. Ellis, 5 El. & Bl. 115; s. c, 1 Jur. (n. s.) 850; 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 337. pp. 740, 799, 915. c 2 Blaci;:, 427; 3 Wall. 679; L. E. 2 0. P. 451, 452. New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433. pp. 103, 104, 336, 902. (See Bailey v. New York, in full, p. 652.) New York v. Corlies, 2 Sandf. B. C. 303. p. 317. New York v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612. pp. 725, 731, 732, 733, 754, 960. c 17 Gratt. 379; 1 Denio, 600, 601; 1 WUs. 133; 25 Ind. 514; 59N.Y.509; 13B.Mon.561; 36 N. Y. 55; 29 Ind. 191; 17 111. 146; 31 Ala. 476; 104 Mass. 16; 16 N. Y. 162, 163, 171, note, 173; 1 Black, 53; 39 Barb. 335; 2 Denio, 458; 2 Hilt. 450; 9 Abb. Pr. 43; 18 How. Pr. 174; 4 G. Greene, 376; 4 Allen, 53; 33 Ala. 130; 41 lU. 513; 3 Bosw. 468; 61 lU. 161; 46 Iowa, 611; 56 N. H. 293, 299; 17 Minn. 313; 26 Ind. 21, 22 ; 2 N". Y. 173 ; 11 E. I. 145 ; 36 N. Y. 55; 37 Barb. 295; 14 Barb. 107, 108; 15 Barb. 434; 9 N. Y. 168, 169, 458, 461; 5 Sandf. S. C. 301, 305, 324; 44 Barb. 393, 394; 18 Minn. 286; 9 Iowa, 237; 27 Barb. 220, 221; 20Md. 477; 10 Bosw. 28, 30; 50 N. Y. 239; 60 Barb. 384; 5 Lans. 31; 41 How. Pr. 450; McCahon, 131; 1 Sandf. S. C. 226; 21 Mich. 108; 33 Iowa, 399 ; 16 Abb. Pr. 345, 346 ; 36 N. H. 291 ; 5 Lans. 533; 61 Barb. 520; 32 N. Y. 499; 10 Hun, 536; 20 Minn. 124; 55 N. H. 134; 11 Bush, 552; 122 Mass. 375 ; 5 N. Y. 370, 371 ; 6 Nev. 94 ; 32 Barb. 644, 645. €l 46 Texas, 529, 530; 55 Mo. 127. New York v. Pentz, 24 Wend. 668. p. 799. New York, etc.. Lumber Co. v. Brook- lyn, 71 N. Y. 580; ^. v., 17 Alb. L. J. 133. p. 737. New York, etc., Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. St. 302. pp. 835, 836, 841, 842, 843, 845, 847, 850. c 25 La. An. 384; 13 Allen, 238; 113 Mass. 305; 9 Phila. 89; 45 N, Y. 563; 37 Iowa, 218; 78 Pa. St. 242; 60 111. 428; 35 Ind. 440; 63 Pa. St. 88. A 3 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 413; 34 How. Pr. 314. Ney V. Dubuque, etc., E. Co., 20 Iowa, 347. p. 1000. Niblett V. Nashville, 12 Heisk. 684. p. 772. NichoU V. Allen, 1 Best & S. 915. pp. 556, 558. Nichols V. Athens, 66 Me. 402. p. 778. c 7 Eeporter, 463. Nichols, V. Brunswick, 3 Cliff. 81. pp. 362, 772, 773, 1208, 1257. Nichols V. Marsland, L. E. 10 Exch. 255; o. .;., 44 L. J. (Exch.) 134; 33 L. T. (n. s.) 265; 23 Week. Eep. 693; 2 Cent. Ij. J. 523. On appeal, 2 Exch. Div. 1 ; 46 L. J. 174 ; 4 Cent. L. J. 319. pp. 86, 90, 101, 746. c 133 Mass. 23; 6 Eeporter, 460; 68 Me. 165. Nicholson v. Erie E. Co., 41 N. Y. 525. pp. 420, 455. c 45 X. Y. 193; 6 Hun, 603; 34 Iowa, 160; 21 Minn. 298 ; 3 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 517 ; 1 Hun, 420; 55 How. Pr. 172; 59 Barb. 504; 66 N. T. 249;57N. Y. 387, 397, 398. CXVlll TABLE OF CASES. Nicholson v. Lancashire, 3 Hurl. & Colt. 534. p. 315. Nicholson v. Mounsey, 15 East, 384. pp. 590, 602, 669, 897, 1061. Nickerson v. Harriman, 38 Me. 277. pp. 1272, 1280. Nicklin v. Williams, 10 Exch. 259 ; s. c, 23 L. J. (Exch.) 335. pp. 259, 280, 282. c 9 H. L. Cas. 509; 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 186; 7 Jur. (N. s.) 803; 10 C. B. (N. s.) 785; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 312; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 1184, 1185, 1187; 122 Mass. 208. . Selby, 47 Ind. 471. p. 1247. Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Shanefelt, 47 HI. 497. pp. 162, 166, 169, 1168. c 45 Mo. 323, 329 ; 47 111. 505 ; 51 lU. 83 ; 7 Kan. 318, 319; 38 N. J. L. 12; 54 lU. 506; 5 Hun, 503; 30 Iowa, 81, 85. Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Stratton, 78 111. 88. pp. 1189, 1190, 1238. Ohio, etc., R. Co. i. Tindall, 13 Ind. 866. pp. 1035, 1039, 1276, 1279, 1290. c 53 Pa. St. 457, 459 ; 31 Ind. 183 ; 9 Bush, 458; 14 Minn. 363, 364; 18 Wis. 705; 27Ind.517; 46 Texas, 538; 23 Ind. 83; 76 111. 398; 18 Ind. 229; 8 Cent. L. J. 14; 58 Ind. 28. Ohrby ». Eyde Commissioners, 10 Jur. (n. s.) 1048; s. c, 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 296; 12 Week. Eep. 1099 ; 5 Best & S. 743. pp. 622, 623, 714, 821. ? 122 Mass. 362, 363. O'Keefe v. Chicago, etc., R Co., 32 Iowa, 467. pp. 425, 1152, 1156, 1157, 1164, 116-5, 1175. c 42 Iowa, 195, 681; 38 Iowa, 297; 37 Iowa, 322. O'Laughlin v. Dubuque, 42 Iowa, 539. pp. 362, 769. Oldfield V. NewTork, etc., E. Co., 14 N. Y. 310; c!. c, 3 E. D. Smith, 103. pp. 898, 400, 1177, 1182, 1188, 124-5, 1277, 1280, 1288, 1291. c 17 Mich. 123; 35 N.T. 47; 39 Md. 576; 32 Barb. 32; 53 Ind. 156, 157; 19 How. Pr. 224; 33 N. Y. 647 ; 9 Heisk. 15 ; 1 Daly, 207 ; 12 Bush, 47 ; 22 Wis. 618, 619; 15 N. T. 434; 5 WaU.106; 15 WaU. 407; 41 Iowa, 80; 47 N.T. 321; 2i How. Pr. 182, 183; 8 Minn. 169, 171. Oleson u. Brown, 41 Wis. 413. pp. 1261, 1262. Oleson V. Tolford, 37 Wis. 327. pp. 799, 800. O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 292. pp. 342, 343, 350, 353. Oliver !). La Valle, 36 Wis. 592. pp. 1239, 1259. c 38 Wis. 591. Oliver V. North-Eastern E. Co., L. R 9 Q. B. 409. p. 357. TABLE OF CASES. CXXl Oliver u. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489. pp. 709, 711, 725, 734, 759. c 11 E. 1. 145 ; 43 Ind. 590 ; 122 Mass. 357, 359, 374; 82 N. Y. 167; 110 Mass. 23, 218; 12 Heisk. 688; 104 Mass. 15, 93; 13 Hun, 217. Omaha v. Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446. p. 753. O'Mara v. Hudson Eiver R. Co., 38 N. Y. 445. pp. 431, 1181, 1187, 1191. c 34 Iowa, 161, 281; 65 Barb. 101; 17 Kan. 139; 28 Wis, 628, 629; 39 How. Pr. 431; 5 Hun, 480, 481; 3 Abb. App. Dec. 277; 2 Jones & Sp. 486; 43 How. Pr. 411; 15 Wall. 408; 2 X. Y. S. C. (T. &C.) 646; 58 N. X. 252; 44 N. Y. 474; 47 N. Y. 331 ; 60 N. Y. 336 ; 3 Lans. 473. O'JNFeara v. New York, 1 Daly, 425. p. 735. C5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 13; 38 Conn. 379; 13 Hua, 318. Ominger v. New York, etc., E. Co., 4 Hun, 159. p. 462. O'Neill V. Keokuk, etc., E. Co., 45 Iowa, 546. p. 1213. O'Neill V. Lowell, 6 Allen, 110. pp. 786, 805. Orcutt V. Kittery Point Bridge Co., 53 Me. 500. pp. 564, 1200. c 47 Vt. 36 ; 5 Reporter, 304 ; 67 Me. 169. Oregon, etc., R. Co. v. Barlow, 3 Or. 311. pp. 569, 570. Ormond v. Holland, Bl. Bl. & El. 102. pp. 970, 972. c 5 Reporter, 626 ; 12 Ohio St. 489 ; 14 Minn. 363; L. E. 7 C. P. 283; 10 Allen, 238; 44 Mo. 491; 1 Best & S. 444; 7 Jar. CN. 8.) 846; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 336; 24 N. Y. 413, 414; 46 BarU. 668; 32 Md. 417; 35 N. Y. 566; 59 N. Y. 360; 48 Me. 130 ; 3 Col. 510. Orne v. Roberts, 51 N. H. 110. p. 218. O'Eourke v. Hart, 7 Bosw. 571 ; s. c, 9 Bosw. 301. pp. 900, 903. c 51 Ala. 570; 6 Phila. 257; 23 Ind. 556; 6 Daly, 481. Ortmayer v. Johnson, 45 111. 469. p. lies! Osborn v. Gillett, L. E. 8 Exch. 88 ; s. c, 42 L. J. (Exch.) 53; 21 Week. Eep. 409; 28 L. J. (n. s.) 197. pp. 1272, 1282. c 52 N. H. 548. d 3 Dill. 339, 340. Osborn v. Lenox, 2 Allen, 207. p. 219. Osborn v. Union Perry Co., 53 Barb. 629. p. 903. Osborne v. Knox, 68 Me. 49 ; s. c, 6 Re- porter, 110. p. 1045. Osincup V. Nichols, 49 Barb. 145. p. 219. Ostertag v. Pacific E. E., 64 Mo. 421. p. 450, 1197. Ottawa V. Washabaugh, 11 Kan. 124. pp. 755, 781. c 20 Kan. 456. Ottumwa V. Parka, 73 Iowa, 119. pp. 351, 574, 791. Overseers of the Poor v. Sears, 22 Pick. 122. p. 708. Overton v. Freeman, 11 0. B. 867; s. c, 16 Jur. 65; 21 L. J. (0. P.) 52; 3 Car. & Kir. 52. pp. 876, 880, 909. c33 L. J. (Exch.) 190; 8 Ohio St. 381; 7 Cent. L. J. 493, 495; 35 N. J. L. 32, 28; 3 Gray, 362; 61 N. Y. 186; 2 Daly, 276; 46 Pa. St. 221; 13 C. B. 184, 185; 17 Jur. 764; 22 L. J. (C. P.) 82; 59 Me. 537; 23 Ind. 556; 52 N. H. 125. Owen V. Brocksohmidt, 54 Mo. 285. pp. 1265, 1269, 1290, 1298, 1294. Owen u. Hudson Eiver E. Co., 35 N. Y. 516 ; n. G., 7 Bosw. 329 ; 2 Bosw. 378. p. 1179. c 46 Barb. 269 ; 42 N. Y. 361 ; 35 Ind. 446 ; 25 Ind. 198. Owen V. New York, etc., R. Co., 1 Lans. 108 ; s. c, 47 N. Y. 670. p. 1013. Owen V. The State, 31 Ala. 387. p. 242. Owens V. Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 62 Mo. 49. p. 417. Owens V. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 58 Mo. ;;3u. pp. 496, 498, 506, 507. c 62 Mo. 564. Owings V. Jones, 9 Md. 108. pp. 318, 344. c31 Mich. 23; 40 Md. 326; 46 Md. 216; 17 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 453, 456. Owners of Steamboat v. McCraw, 26 Ala. 189. p. 1214. Ozburn v. Adams, 70 111. 291. pp. 196, 198, 210. c 86 111. 105. Ozier v. Hinesburgh, 44 Vt. 220. pp. 762, 1209. Pacific E. Co. V. Brown, 14 Kan. 469. p. 501. Pacific E. Co. u. Houts, 12 Kan. 328. pp. 497, 505. Pack V. New York, 8 N. Y. 222 ; s. c, 3 N. Y. 489 ; Seld. Notes, 94. pp. 113, 363, 740, 776, 900, 902, 908, 914. c 12 Hun, 303; 86 Pa. St. 159; 5 Bosw. 449; CXXll TABLE OF CASES. 23 Ind. 656; 5 Ch. Leg. N. 413; 6 Daly, 472, 475; 24 Barb. 357; 5 Duer, 498; 31 Ala. 476; 59 Me. 528, 533; 1 Daly, 127; 28 Barb. 198; 39 Barb. 336; 1 Handy, 488; 72 N. Y. 214; 3 Minn. 306, 307, 310; 3 DUl. 341; 17 N. Y. 106, 107; 30 N. J. L. 201; 36 Barb. 290; 48 Barb. 343; 8 Cal. 493; 7 Bosvr. 313; 46 Pa. St. 221; 4 Bosw. 147, 148; 15 Wall. 658; U Bush, 480; 38 Barb. 665; 7 Cent'. L. J. 494; 29 N. Y. 593, 593; 33 N. J. L. 22, 26, 27 ; 21 Mich. 113 ; 21 Iowa, 578 ; 48 How. Pr. 46; 61 N. Y. 182, 183, 200, 201; 26 Barb. 623; 9 Mich. 191; 6 Jones & Sp. 202; 1 E. D. Smith, 460; 2 E. D. Smith, 253, 256 ; UN. y. 435, 436; 4 E. D. Smith, 293, 294; 66 N. Y. 186; 2 Hilt. 67; 62N. Y. 163. Packard u. Illinois, etc., E. Oo., 30 Iowa, 474. p. 523. c 40 Iowa, 338. Packar^ v. New Bedford, 9 Allen, 200. p. 804. c 52 N. H. 413 ; 110 Mass. 513 ; 109 Mass. 127. Packet Co. v. McCue, 17 Wall. 508. p. 1279. Paducah, etc., E. Co. v. Hoehl, 12 Bush, 41. pp. 417, 418, 431, 1157, 1177, 1181. PafiF V. Slack, 7 Pa. St. 254. p. 219. c 19 Pa. St. 361; 15 Pa. St. 193, 194; 31 Pa. St. 526. Page V. Buoksport, 64 Me. 51. pp. 1083, 1092. c 65 Me. 530.' Page V. Defries, 7 Best & S. 137. p. 889. Page V. HoUingsworth, 7 Ind. 317. p. 209. c 38 Ind. 559; 9 Ind. 291, 293. Page V. North Carolina E. Co., 71 N. C. 222. pp. 506, 507, 509. Page V. Olcott, 13 N. H. 899. p. 214. c 37 N. H. 355. Page V. Weathersfield, 13 Vt. 424. pp. 759, 760, 761. c 27 Vt. 454; 29 Iowa, 91; 29 Conn. 170. Page V. Wells, 6 Eeporter, 754. p. 1062. Paine v. Commissioners, Wright, 417. p. 619. Paine v. Patrick, Carth. 193. p. 340. Painter v. Pittsburg, 46 Pa. St. 213. pp. 562, 740, 900, 902, 908, 914. c 57 Pa. St. 381; 63 Pa. St. 150, 298; 7 Cent. L. J. 494; 35 N. J. L. 22; 85 Pa. St. 252, 254; 71 Pa. St. 158; 15 Wall. 658; 79 Pa. St. 302; 30 Ind. 57 ; 80 Pa. St. 105 ; 23 Ind. 557 ; 56 Pa. St. 452 ; 86 Pa. St. 159. ? 9 Heisk. 8, 9, 10. d49 lU. 479. Palfrey v. Portland, etc., E. Co., 4 Allen, 55. p. 1272. Palmer v. Andover, 2 Cush. 600, pp. 362, 770, 771, 772, 773, 780, 1086, 1208. c 1 Allen, 32; 25 Iowa, 110, HI, 112, 114, 115; 13 Hun, 83; 3 Allen, 405 ; 9 Kan. 638; 63 Mo. 301; 7 Gray, 102, 103, 343; 117 Mass. 710; 10 K. L 308; 41 N. H. 52, 334; 6 Eeporter, 719; 97 Mass. 265; 22 Wis. 679; 43 Ind. 597; 10 Allen, 27; 12 Allen, 261; 44 Barb. 391; 36 111. 66; 34 N. H. 188; 61 Me. 140; 35 N. H, 276; 42 N H. 216. ? 29 Wis. 304, 305. d 51 Me. 128, 130, 132. Palmer v. Barker, 11 Me. 338. pp. 375, 383, 386. c 2 Woodb. & M. 345; 25 Me. 49. Palmer v. Fleshees, Sid. 167 ; s. c, sub nom. Palmer v. Plessier, 1 Keb. 625. p. 257. Palmer v. Lawrence Man. Co., 12 Allen, 69. p. 995. Palmer v. Lincoln, 5 Neb. 136. pp. 740, 908. Palmer v. Portsmouth, 43 N. H. 265. pp. 761, 775, 787, 1199, 1242. c 48 N". H. 20, 21, 406 ; 56 N. H. 13 ; 52 N. H. 378, .379; 46 N. H. 60, 463; 67 N. H. 93, 94. Palmer v. Silverthorn, 32 Pa. St. 65. pp. 217, 353. c 83 Pa. St. 277. Pantam v. Isham, 1 Salk. 19. p. 148. c 26 Wis. 235 ; 98 Mass. 418 ; 11 W. Va. 33 ; 49 N. Y. 425. Panion v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92. pp. 75, 106, 261, 275, 276, 739, 1124, 1247, 1249. (In full, p. 249.) c 1 Daly, 443; 72 N. Y. 309, 310; 122 Mass. 207; 15 Barb. 101; 15 Conn. 131; 18 Minn. 341, 343 ; 4 Abb. N. C. 293 ; 8 Wis. 257 ; 21 Wend. 618 ; 2 N. Y. 162 ; 3 Barb. 49, 50 ; 3 Iowa, 83 ; 20 Ohio, 446; 24 Iowa, 347; 23 N. J. L. .361, 362, 370; 8 Pa. St. 374, 376; 11 Cush. 226; 2 N. H. 534, 333; 43 Mo. 372; 7 Cal. 340; 22 Barb. 308; 43 Barb. 409; 19 Abb. Pr. 65; 1 Humph. 407 ; 10 Mete. 373 ; 4 Paige, 172 ; 4 N. Y. 201 ; 1 Pick. 434. Paris V. The People, 27 111. 74. p. 742. Paris, etc., E. Co. v. Mullins, 66 111. 526. p. 506. Parish v. Crawford, Stra. 1251. p. 894. Parish u. Missouri, etc., E. Co., 63 Mo. 284. p. 514. c 7 Cent. L. J. 429. Park V. O'Brien, 23 Conn. 339. pp. 216, 1176, 1178, 1211, 1239. c 45 How. Pr. 89 ; 17 Mich. 120, 122 ; 29 Conn. 209 ; 14 Minn. 96 ; 34 N. Y. 14 ; 21 Md. 294. Parker v. Adams, 12 Mote. 415. pp. 380, 381, 386, 1176, 1202. (In full, p. 370.) cl9 Conn. 576; 18 N. Y. 252; 7 Wis. 431; 42 TABLE OF CASES. CXXIU Me. 336; 21 Iowa, 26; 10 Gush. 496, 497; 24 N. J. L. 284; 37 Cal. 422; 21 Ohio St. 593; 52 N. H. 554 ; 24 Vt. 495 ; 47 Miss. 421 ; 6 Gray, 71, 72 ; 104 Mass. 62; 37 Mo. 552. Parker v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 3 Cush. 107. pp. 563, 564, 573, 592, 749, 775, 794, 797. c 6 Gray, 547; 12 Allen, 259; 36 Mo. 222'; 7 Cush. 497; 4 Gray, 302; 6 Allen, 455; 22 N. Y. 278. Parker v. Cohoes, 10 Hun, 531. pp. 1089, 1090. Parker v. Dubuque, etc., E. Co., 34 Iowa, 399. pp. 495, 513. c 43 Iowa, 670. Parker i>. Jenkins, 3 Bush, 587. pp. 1256, 1264. c 9 Bush, 736. Parker v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 353. pp. 710, 733, 742, 749, 752, 1261. c55N. H. 134; 38 Vt. 360; 122 Mass. 358. Parker v. Macon, 39 Ga. 725. pp. 346, 777. c 45 Ind. 435. Parker v. Rensselaer E. Co., 16 Barb. 315. pp. 509, 521, 536. c 37 Barb. 519; 57 Barb. 590, 591; 1 N. T. S. 0. (T. & C.) 246. ? 39 111. 276. Parker v. Union Woollen Co., 42 Conn. 399. pp. 353, 1085. Parks V. Alta California Tel. Co., 13 Cal. 422. pp. 835, 836, 850. c 21 Minn. 162 ; 1 Daly, 589, 590 ; 30 Ohio St. 566, 568 ; 37 Iowa, 218 ; 60 Me. 27 ; 60 111 . 427 ; 35 Ind. 440. ? 1 Daly, 586. • Parks V. Newburyport, 10 Gray, 28. pp. 748, 749, 751. c 31 jST. J. L. 354 ; 104 Mass. 17 ; 13 Gray, 603 ; 13 Allen, 212. Pamaby v. Lancaster Canal Co., 11 Ad. & E. 223 ; s. u., 3 Nev. & P. 523 ; 3 Per. & Dav. 162. pp. 556, 586, 588, 591, 592, 595, 610, 612, 717, 724. (In full, p. 541.) c 122 Mass. 366, 367, 373; L. R. 1 0. P. 2S7; 35 L. J. (0. P.) 189; 11 C. B. (N. s.) 206; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 433, 572, 578; L. E. 1 H. L. 103, 123; 11 H. L. Oas. 701,727; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 227, 237; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 642; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 324; 7 Hurl. & N 336, 339; 30 L. J. (Exch.) 332; 8 Jur. (N. s.) 491, 492, 991; 59 N. Y. 32; 7 Re- porter, 479; 91 U. S. 551; 5 C. B. 615; 11 Exch. 270; 4 Hurl. & N. 351; 2 Best & S. 117; 31 L. J. (Q. B.) 195; 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 90; L. E. 10 Q. B. 215; L. E. 4Q. B. 385. Parrot v. Barney, 2 Abb. C. C. 197 ; «. t., 1 Deady, 405 ; 1 Sawver. 423 ; 15 Wall. 524. pp. 100, 324. (See Nitro-Gly- cei-ine Case (Parrot v. Wells), in full, p. 42.) c 47 Ind. 271 ; 53 N. H. 451; 13 Am. L. Eeg. (N. s.) 376. Parrott v. Dearborn, 104 Mass. 104. p. 827. Parrott v. Hartsfield, 4 Dev. & B. 110. p. 221. Parrott v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 15 Wall. 524. pp. 42, 72, 100, 231, 324. (See Nitro-Glycerine Case, in ful', p. 42.) Parry v. Croydon Commercial Gas and Coke Co., 11 C. B. (n. s.) 578 (affirmed in 15 C. B. (N. s.) 568). p. 103. Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396. p. 737. Parsons -o. Vestry of St. Matthew, Jj. R. 3 C. P. 56. pp. 624, 715, 716. c 122 Mass. 363, 365; L. E. 10 Q. B. 222, 223; 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 116; L. E. 3 Exch. 119. Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592. pp. 875, 891. c 6 Reporter, 753 ; 57 Me. 236 ; 62 Me. 566 ; 98 Mass. 79; 3 Allen, 425; 3 Gray, 356. Partenheimer v. Van Order, 20 Barb. 479. pp. 198, 199, 1088. Partlow u. Haggarty, 35 Ind. 178. p. 208- Partridge v. Scott, 3 Mee. & W. 220. pp. 35, 260, 270, 275, 278. c 4 Hurl. & N. 155, 598 ; 15 Barb. 101 ; 22 Mo. 572; 12 Q. B. 750; 15 Jur. 127; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 14; 25 N. J. L. 362; 41 111. 509; 4 Jur. (N. 8.) 1185; 122 Mass. 206; 4 N". Y. 200. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 51. p. 234. Passmore v. Western Union Tel. Co., 78 Pa. St. 242. pp. 835, 836, 837, 840, 841, 842. e 9 Phila. 89. Pastene v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87. pp. 308, 1089. Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 3 Pet. 222. p. 1101. Patch V. Covington, 17 B. Mon. 722. p. 731. c 53 Mo. 161. Paterson v. Wallace, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 748 ; 3. c, 1 Pat. Sc. App. 388 ; 28 Eng. Law & Eq. 48. pp. 947, 958, 961, 962, 973, 994, 1009, 1239. c 2 Laus. 516; 28 Ind. 31; 7 Hurl. & ST. 938; 12 Ohio St. 488; 17 Wall. 664; 3 DiU. 325; 49 Barb. 327, 569; 11 Hun, 594; L. E. 7 C. P. 280; 5 Hun, 33 ; 46 Mo. 170 ; 3 Hurl. & N. 655 ; 27 L. CXXIV TABLE OF CASES. J. (Exch.) 406; 67 Me. 107; 50 Miss. 191; 106 Mass. 285 ; 62 Me. 467 ; 3 Eobt. 84 ; 28 How. Pr. 475; 36 Pa. St. 304; 24 N. Y. 413, 414, 445; 8 Hun, 238, 359; 5 Kan. 182; 2 Hurl. & N. 732; 57 Me. 131; 25 N. T. 566, 567; 48 Me. 118; 29 Conn. 660. Patrick v. Commercial Ins. Co., 11 Johns. 14. p. 1101. Patrick v. Pote, 117 Mass. 297. p. 1239. c 120 Mass. 588; 68 Me. 556. Patten v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 32 Wis. 824. pp. 315, 1100, 1229, 1268. Patten v. Kea, 2 C. B. (x. s.) 608; s. c, 3 Jur. (n. s.) 892; 26 L. J. (C. P.) 235- p. 885. c 15 Upper Canada C. P. 438; 34 Upper Canada Q. B. 461. Patterson v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa, 279. p. 1176. c 45 Iowa, 663, 664 ; 38 Iowa, 567, 568. Patterson v. Colebrook, 29 N. H. 94. pp. 753, 799. c 46 N. H. 26. Patterson v. Pittsburgh, etc., B. Co., 76 Pa. St. 389 ; s. c, 2 Cent. L. J. 639. pp. 973, 975, 994, 1010, 1011, 1014, 1017, 1031, 1239. c 62 Mo. 38; 82 Pa. St. 124; 119 Mass. 414; 6 Eeporter, 126 ; 37 Mich. 212 ; 3 Col. 603, 507, 508; 7 Eeporter, 61; 86 Pa. St. 440. Paulmier v. Erie E. Co., 34 N. J. L. 151. pp. 881, 889, 1279, 1290, 1291, 1294. c 46 Texas, 539. Pawlet V. Rutland, etc., R. Co., 28 Vt. 297. pp. 892, 899, 903, 911. c 7 Cent. L. J. 494, 495 ; 59 Me. 528. Payne v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 39 Iowa, 523 ; ». c, 44 Iowa, 236 ; 47 Iowa, 605. pp. 419, 427, 1212. Payne v. Lowell, 10 Allen, 147. pp. 361, 786. c 102 Mass. 334; 24 Wis. 24; 12 Allen, 670. Payne v. Partridge, Show. 255. pp. 635, 637, 641, 642, 650, 682. Payne v. Rogers, 2 H. Black. 349. pp. 317, 624, 667. c9 Pa. St. 194; 66 lU. 1G.5; 1 B. D. Smith, 45; 21 Mich. 23; 4 Cush. 379; 9 Heisk. 7; 9 Humph. 761; 17 Am. L. Eeg. (N. s.) 453; 2 Denio, 443; 47 N. Y. 483; 1 Hilt. 443; L. E. 10 C. P. 660; 4 E. D. Smith, 21; 2 C. P. Div. 313; 8 C. B. (N. S.) 389; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 24. Payne v. Troy, etc., R. Co., 9 Hun, 526. p. 422. Peach V. Utica, 10 Hun, 477. pp. 623, 753, 758, 764, 1203. Peachey v. Rowland, 13 C. B. 182; s. c, 17 Jur. 764; 22 L. J. (C. P.) 81. pp. 35, 880, 899, 903, 911. c 8 Cal. 492 ; 8 Ohio St. 382 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 493 ; 35 N. J. L. 2-2; 39 Texas, 669; 3 Gray, 363; 18 Kan. 3S; 25 X. J. L. 371; 46 Pa. St. 221; 4 El. & Bl. .577; 1 Jur. (N. s.) 678; 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 140 ; 63 y. H. 126 ; 26 L. J. (Exch.) 133 ; 5 Duer, 493; 59 Me. 327; 23 Ind. 666. Pearson v. Cox, 2 C. P. Div. 369. pp. 348, 901, 915. Pearson v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 45 Iowa, 497. p. 499. Peck V. Batavia, 32 Barb. 634 pp. 733, 781. c 49 Barb. 5S2 ; 34 Wis. 290 ; 10 Bosw. 29, 30, 31 ; 16 Abb. Pr. 345 ; 36 Barb. 228 ; 51 Barb. 413 ; 44 Barb. 393. Peck V. Ellsworth, 36 Me. 393. pp. 752, 755, ,756. c 38 Vt. 361 ; 42 Me. 254 ; 65 Me 37. Peck V. Neil, 3 McLean, 26. pp. 1088, 10^9. c 50 N. H. 433. Peckham v. Burlington, Brayton (Vt.), 134. p. 795. c 35 Pa. St. 129. Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161. pp. 346, 777. c 11 Allen, 320. Pekin v. Br^eton, 67 HI. 477. pp. 340, 750, 824. c 86 lU. 396 ; 86 lU. 381 ; 5 Cent. L. J. 386. Pekin v. Newell, 26 111. 320. pp. 729, 737. c 122 Mass. 379; 3 Mo. App. 299. Pelham v. Pickersgill, 1 Term Rep. 660. p. 632. Pendlebury v, Greenhalgh, 1 Q. B. Div. 36. p. 716. c 123 Mass. 366. Pendleton v. Kinsley, 3 Cliff. 416. p. 887. Pendleton Street R. Co. v. Shires, 18 Ohio SL 255. p. 397. Pendleton Street E. Co. u. Stallmann, 22 Ohio St. 1. p. 397. Pendril v. Second Avenue R. Co., 2 Jones & Sp. 481; s. c, 43 How. Pr. 399. pp. 381, 400, 1181, 1239. Pennsylvania Canal Co v. Bentley, 66 Pa. St. 30. pp. 426, 1177, 1235, 1237. c 41 Ind. 254; 67 Me. 107; 41 Iowa, 231; 72 TABLE OF CASES. cxxv Pa. St. Ul; 48 Cal. 426; 70 Pa. St. 363; 75 Pa. St. 86, 376; 1 Cent. L. J. 374. Pennsylvania, etc., Canal Co. v. Graham, 63 Pa. St. 290. pp. 340, 556, 559, 562, 793, 1256, 1258. c 73 Pa. St. 409; 68 Pa. St. 407; U Nev. 369; 44 Iowa, 320. Pennsylvania K. Co. v. Ackerman, 74 Pa. St. 265. pp. 428, 1212. c 5 Eeporter, 377. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Adams, 55 Pa. St. 499. pp. 1272, 1288. Penns3'lvania E. Co. v. Allen, 53 Pa. St. 276. p. 1258. Pennsylvania K. Co. v. Bantom, 54 Pa. St. 495. pp. 1292, 1293. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. St. 259. pp. 351, 352, 353, 419, 1097. c 78 Pa. St. 225; 67 Pa. St. 315; 7 Reporter, 441 ; 74 Pa. St. 223 ; 75 Pa. St. 86. Pennsylvania E. Co. u. Beale, 73 Pa. St. 504. pp. 504, 1212. c 81 111. 455 ; 41 Iowa, 231 ; 74 Pa. St. 269 ; 5 Importer, 377 ; 50 Ind. 45. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. St. 389. p. 1054. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Butler, 57 Pa. St. 335. pp. 1289, 1290. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Duquesne, 46 Pa. St. 223. .p. 793. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. St. 329. pp. 1212, 1289, 1290. « 76 Pa. St. 170. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. St. 315. pp. 1271, 1290, 1294. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. St. 373; s. c.,1 Law & Eq. Eeporter, 272. p. 171. c 16 Kan. 256 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 95 ; 94 U. S. 474 ; 78 N. C. 308, 310. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Keller, 67 Pa. St. 300. p. 1291. Pennsylvania E. Co. i/. Kelly, 31 Pa. St. 372. pp. 1181, 1184, 1197, 1242, 1260. c 18 Ohio St. 413, 414; 53 Pa. St. 459; 65 Pa. St. 276; 33 Pa. St. 329; 47 Pa. St. 304; 48 Pa. St. 221 ; 24 Md. 107 ; 69 Pa. St. 215 ; 75 Pa. St. 86; 2 Col. 467; 42 Miss. 626; 44 Miss. 499; 6 Nev. 238 ; 8 Am. L. Reg. 38. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353. p. 171. c 6 Cent. L. J. 95; 49 N. T. 427; 70 Pa. St. 91 ; 80 ra. St. 377, 379. 7 12 Kan. 379; 53 Mo. 371; 91 U. S. 471 ; 94 U. S. 474. d 39 Md. 141 ; 39 N. J. L. 306 ; 69 111. 357 ; 26 Wis. 238, 258, 260, 270, 271, 274, 277, 280, 281. Pennsylvania E. Co. u. Krick, 47 Ind. 368. pp. 416, 417, 421, 507. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. St. 33. pp. 390, 453, 455. c 38 Wis. 311. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Mahoney, 57 Pa- . St. 187. p. 1181. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Matthews, 36 N. J. L. 531. pp. 406, 421, 423, 430. c 39 N. J. L. 192; 38 N. J. L. 529, 530; 26 N. J. Eq. 479. Pennsylvania, etc., E. Co. v. McCloskey's Administrator, 23 Pa. St. 526. pp. 1275, 1289, 1290. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. McHugo, 5 Ee- porter (Sup. Ot. Penn.), 342. p. 462. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. MoTighe, 46 Pa. St. 316. pp. 1177, 1205, 1238. c 3 Daly, 382 ; 15 Wall. 408. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Morgan, 82 Pa. St. 184. pp. 450, 452, 1187. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Ogier, 35 Pa. St. 60. pp. 404, 420, 1183, 1256, 1289, 1290. c 34 N. Y. 627 ; 17 Mich. 118, 123 ; 20 Mich. 166 ; 26 Wis. 255 ; 49 Pa. St. 64 ; 5 Reporter, 344 ; 2 Lans. 437; 74 Pa. St. 223; 56 Pa. St. 279; 1 Cent. L. J. 374; 75 Pa. St. 376. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Patterson, 78 Pa. St. 491. pp. 556, 559, 561. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Eobinson, 44 Pa. St. 175. p. 1294. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Sinclair, 62 Ind. 301 ; s. c, 7 Eeporter, 558. p. 449. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Stranahan, 79 Pa. St. 405. p. 158. Pennsylvania E. Co. o. Vandever, 36 Pa. St. 298. pp. 1276, 1289. c 53 Pa. St. 457 ; 44 Miss. 499. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Weber, 76 Pa. St. 157 ; s. c, 72 Pa. St. 27. pp. 429, 1177. c 5 Reporter, 377 ; 79 Pa. St. 390. Pennsylvania E. Co. i7. Zebe, 33 Pa. St, 318 ; s. c, 37 Pa. St. 420. pp. 316, 459, 1191, 1238, 1279, 1289. c 53 Pa. St. 457, 459 ; 100 Mass. 215 ; 29 Iowa, 38 ; 44 Pa. St. 178 ; 13 Ind. 371 ; 35 Pa. St. 71, 72, 73; 36 Pa. St. 303; 21 Wis. 375; 24 Md. 107; 37 Mich. 215. Pennsylvania, etc., Steam Nav. Co. v. Hungerford, 6 Gill & J. 291. p. 884. Penrose v. Curren, 3 Eawle, 351. p. 1126. CXXVl TABLE OF CASES. Pentar v. Murdock, 18 Week. Rep. 382 ; s. c, 22 L. T. (n. s.) 371. p. 207. People V. Albany, 11 Wend. 539. pp. 678, 690, 734, 740, 742, 754. e9 Iowa, 237; U Barb. 393; 16 N.T. 171, note ; 39 Barb. 335 ; 37 Barb. 295 ; 3 Fla. 24 ; 34 N.T. 389; 6Duer, 408. People u. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 2 Am. Ry. Rep. 66. p. 357. People V. Cooper, 6 Hill, 516. p. 805. c 2 ST. T. 173. People V. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524 pp. 340, 350, 353, 354, 776. People V. Eastwood, 14 N. T. 562. p. 799. People V. Esopus, 10 Hun, 551. pp. 621, 622. People V. Hudson, 7 Wend. 474. pp. 820, 821. c 15 Barb. 441; 44 Barb. 391; 8 Barb. 650; 17111.144; 29N. T. 303; 2 Hill, 619; 27 Barb. 628. People V. Kerr, 27 N. T. 188. pp. 358, 776. People V. Little Valley (N. Y. Ct. App.), 19 Alb. L. J. 16. p. 622. People V. Morris, 13 Wend. 331. p. 657. People V. New York Gas Co., 64 Barb. 55. pp. 557, 743. People V. JSew York Hospital, 3 Abb. N. C. 229. p. 1216. People u. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396. p. 1092. Peoppers v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 67 Mo. 715; s. u., 7 Cent. L. J. 252. pp. 170, 1239, 1240. Peoria Bridge Assn. a. Loomis, 20 HI. 235. pp. 559, 1233, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1265. C 49 m. 246; 40 111. 233, 235, 239; 62 HI. 320. Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Barton, 80 111. 72. pp. 514, 519, 520. Peoria, etc., K. Co. v. Champ, 75 HI. 577. pp. 496, 497, 498, 509. c 20 Kan. 363. Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. McClenahan, 74 HI. 435. p. 505. Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Siltman, 67 HI. 72. pp. 419, 420. Percival v. Jones, 2 Johns. Cas. 49. p. 817. Perkins v. Concord R. Co., 44 N. H. 223. p. 802. Perkins v. Eastern, etc., R. Co., 29 Me. 307. pp. 212, 1176. c 28 N. H. 174; 60 Me. 243; 25 Vt. 123, 162; 49 Pa. St. 107; 9 Wis. 220; 20 Kan. 363; 42 Ala. 715. Perkins v. Eayette, 68 Me. 152. pp. 769, 772, 1086, 1207. c 7 Reporter, 464. Perkins u. Pond du Lac, 34 Wis. 435. pp. 360, 361, 755, 784, 785, 786, 804, 1199. c 39 Wis. 136. Perkins v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 55 Mo. 201. p. 915. Perkins v. Oxford, 66 Me. 545. pp. 795, 798. Perkins v. Perkins, 44 Barb. 134. p. 214. Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 454. p. 343. Perley v. Eastern, etc., R. Co., 98 Mass. 414. pp. 139, 170, 171, 172. c 39 Md. 142; 12 Kan. 379; 53 Mo. 371; 39 X. J. L. 307; 59 lU. 354; 107 Mass. 496; 16 Kan. 580; 26 Wis. 235, 236, 239; 94 U. S. 474; 105 Mass. 202; 21 Ohio St. 594; 103 Mass. 586; 11 Kan. 58; 6 Cent. L. J. 313; 11 W. Va. 39; 118 Mass. 544 ; 78 N. C. 310 ; 80 Pa. St. 379. Perley v. Poster, 9 Mass. 112. p. 899. Perley v. Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464. p. 738. c 1 Allen, 174. Perreau v. Bevan, 5 Bam. & Cress. 284. p. 628. Perrj' v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 36 Iowa, 102. pp. .524, 525. c 41 Iowa, 195; 6 Cent. L. J. 315; 8 Cent. L. J. 277, 280; 40 Iowa, 295. Perry v. Marsh, 25 Ala. 659. pp. 972, 1052. c 2S Ind. 31; 45 ni. 202; 38 Vt. Ill; 53 Ala. 76; 6 Reporter, 264; 24 X. T. 417; 43 Ala. 714, 719. Perry v. Phipps, 10 Ired. L. 259. p. 221. Perry v. Ricketts, 55 HI. 234. pp. 973, 1018. c 69 lU. 465. Perry v. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544. pp. 731, 733, 742, 743, 748, 749, 752. C55 N. H. 134, 138; 38 Vt. 360; 122 Mass. 358; 11 Gray, 358; 13 Gray, 195, 603, 605, 6OT; 110 Mass. 221; 10 Allen, 603; 34 Mich. 137. Perry Township v. John, 79 Pa. St. 412. pp 758, 762, 1207, 1238. Peru V. French, 55 HL 317. pp. 753, 762, 781, 1241, 1259. c 66 111. 351, 364. TABLE OF CASES. CXXVll Peru, etc., R. Co. u. Bradshaw, 6 Ind. 146. p. 1272. o 15 Ind. 122; 6 Ind. 209. Peru, etc., E. Co. v. Hasket, 10 Ind. 409. pp. 351, 5.31, 1097. C46 Ind. 231; 44 Mo. 293; 41 Ind. ^32; 44 Iowa, 173. Peter v. Kendal, 6 Barn. & Cress. 703. pp. 628, 642. Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 233. pp. 744, 747. Pettingill v. Porter, 3 Allen, 349. p. 212. Peyton o. Eichards, 11 La. An. 62. pp. 900, 914. Peyton v. St. Thomas Hospital, 4 Man. & K. 625; s. c, sub nom. Peyton v. London, 9 Barn. & Cress. 725 ; 3 Car. & P. 363. pp. 269, 275, 278. clOromp. & J. 26; 12 Q. B. 748; 15 Jnr. 126; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 14; 1 Allen, 349; 5 Exch. 801; 20 L. J. (Exch.) 18; 25 N. J. L. 370; 41 111. .509; 2 Hurl. & N. 636; 8 B. Mon. 453; 4 Paige, 173; 4 N. Y. 201; 4 Hurl. & N. 598. Pfau V. Eeynolds, 53 111. 212. pp. 242, 844, 354, 1093, 1235. e 17 Wall. 664. Pfau 1'. Williamson, 63 111. 16. pp. 900, 910. c 83 111. 359. Phalen v. Clark, 19 Conn. 421. pp. 1076, 1161. Phelps V. Cousins, 29 Ohio St. 135. p. 214. Phelps V. Mankato, 23 Minn. 276. p. 759. Phelps V. Eooney, 9 Wis. 70. p. 268. Phelps •«. Wait, 30 N. T. 78. pp. 823, 892, 1059. c 57 Mo. 99. Philadelphia v. Collins, 68 Pa. St. 106. pp. 733, 740, 741. Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 71 Pa. St. 140. pp. 733, 741. Philadelphia v. Waller, 4 Brews. 24. i pp. 787, 1088. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co. v. Constable, 39 Md. 149. p. 170. c 42 Md. 139. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 568. pp. 452, 887, 889. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co. v. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. St. 182. pp. 157, 163, 167. c 39 N. J. L. 312. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co. v. Hogan, 47 Pa. St. 244. pp. 422, 429, 1173. Philadelphia, etc., JR. Co. v. Hummel, 44 Pa. St. 375. pp. 453, 454, 1197. (In full, p. 433.) c 10 Allen, 533 ; 17 Mich. 120; 21 Minn. 288 ; 59 Pa. St. 142; 71 III. 507, 509; 47 Ind. 47; 65 Pa. St. 275, 277 ; 21 Minn. 213 ; 1 Hun, 420 ; 3 N". Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 517; 79 Pa. St. 43, 44; 47 Pa. St. 303, 305; 4 Hun, 762, 764; 5 Beporter, 345; 86 Pa. St. 79; 75 Pa. St. 376; 1 Cent. L. J. 374. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Killip (Sup. Ct. Pa.), 7 Eeporter, 440. pp. 419, 422. Philadelphia, etc., E Co. v. Long, 75 Pa. St. 257. pp. 1184, 1191, 1240. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co. o. Philadelphia, etc., Towboat Co., 23 How. 209. pp. 1093, 1095, 1203. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202. p. 888. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co. v. Spearen, 47 Pa. St. 300. pp. 431, 444, 450, 451, 452, 1181, 1183, 1187, 1239. c 3 Daly, 385; 33 Ind. 359; 18 Ohio St. 414; 39 Md. 580 ; 65 Pa. St. 273, 274, 276 ; 2 Neb. 340 ; 82 Pa. St. 141; 37 Mo. 294; 69 Pa. St. 215; 33 Iowa, 568. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co. v. Stinger, 78 Pa. St. 219 ; s. c, 2 Cent. L. J. 555. pp. 351, 352, 419. c 67 Me. 105 ; 7 Eeporter, 441 ; 2 Bradw. 123. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co.' u. Wilt, 4 Whart. 143. pp. 817, 886, 891, 1251. c26 Mo. 449; 12 Iowa, 349; 40 Ala. 241; 86 Pa. St. 421. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co. o. Yerger, 73 Pa. St. 121. pp. 152, 157. Philbrick v. Pittston, 63 Me. 477. pp. 362, 756, 769. Philips V. Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. 5. p. 657. Phillips V. Dickerson, 85 111. 11. pp. 1083, 1099. Phillips V. Lamar, 27 Ga. 228. p. 826. Phillips V. Oystee, 32 Iowa, 257. p. 211. c 37 Iowa, 445. Phillips V. Veazie, 40 Me. 96. pp. 766, 768, 775, 787. c 40 Wis. 41. Philo V. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 33 Iowa, 47. p. 1280. Philpot V. Swann, 11 C. B. (n. s.) 270. p. 1066. Phcenixville v. Phoenix Iron Co., 45 Pa. St. 135. pp. 343, 344, 793. c 72 Pa. St. 140. Piccard v. Collins, 23 Barb. 444. p. 318. CXXVlll TABLE OF CASES. Pickard v. Smith, 10 C. B. [s. s.) 740; s. c, 4 L. T. (n. s.) 470. pp. 22, 37, 813, 604, 884, 890, 907. c 6 Hun, 586; a Q. B.Div.337; 4 Allen, 140; 12 C. B. (s. s.) 793; 35 N. J. L. 22; 30 Md. 206; L. E. 1 Exch. 377 ; 5 Best & S. 985 ; 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 267 ; 61 N. Y. 192, 196 ; L. E. 1 H. L. 114 ; 11 H. L. Cas. 715; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 575; 35 L. J. (Exch.) -2^1 ; L. E. 4 Q. B. 699; 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 244, 24.i ; 2 Q. B. DiT. 278, 279; L. E. 5 C. P. 441; 6 Eeporter, 7.52; L. E. 4 Q. B. 699; 56 Me. 244. Pickens v. Diecker, 21 Ohio St. 212. pp. 884, 1238. Pickering .;. Orange, 2 m. 338. p. 202. Pickett V. Crook, 20 Wis. 358. p. 218. c 38 Wis. 309. Pierce v. Concord K. Co., 51 N. H. 132. p. 171. Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow. 609. p. 340. Pierce «. Whitcomb, 49 Vt. 127. p. 310. Pierce v. Winsor, 2 Cliff. 18: s. c, 2 Sprague, 35. pp. 45, 231. c 2 Abb. 0. C. 2-^ 224 • 1 Sawyer, 448, 449; 15 Wall. 537; 7 Lans. 213; 64 Barb. 213. Pierce u. Worcester, etc., K. Co., 105 Mass. 199. p. 153. c 16 Kan. 580; 55 N. H. 418. Pierrepont v. Loveless, 72 N. Y. 211 ; s. c, 4 Hun, 696. pp. 899, 901, 911. Pierson t;. Glean, 14 N. J. L. 36. p. 318. Piggott V. Eastern, etc., E. Co., 8 C. B. 229; s. c, 10 Jur. 571. pp. 126, 131, 140, 152, 153, 154, 156, 159, 169. c 39 Md. 136, 142; 12 Kan. 372; 28 lU. 17; 7 Heisk. 462; 4 Xeb. 272; 1 Sweeny, 542; 59 lU. 355; 41 Ind. 241, 257; 40 Pa. St. 408; 91 U. S. 470; 10 Ired. L. 402; 30 Mich. 190; 7 Kan. 317; 26 Wis. 235; 4 So. Car. 68, 69; 11 Kan. 55; 4 Jones L. 433; 37 Mo. 296; 11 W. Va. 38; 30 Wis J 121; 22 N. J. L. 188; 21 Minn. 64; 14 Cal. 389; 4 Eich. L. 336; 63 I'a. St. 369; 14 IST. T. 234. ? 32 N. Y. 349 ; 30 Iowa, 432. Pike V. Polytechnic Institute, 1 Post & Fin. 712. pp. 311, 312. c L. E. 5 Q. B. 189; L. E. 4 Q. B. 385. Pillsbury v. Moore, 44 Me. 154. p. 317. Pinkham v. Topsfield, 104 Mass. 78. pp. 360, 785. c 109 Mass. 205. Piper V. New York, etc., E. Co., 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 290 ; c. c, 56 N. Y. 630. pp. 983, 986. c 3 Hun, 339; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 561. Pippen V. Wilmington, etc., E. Co., 75 N. C. 54. p. 513. Pippin V. Shepherd, 11 Price, 400. p. 235. Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35. p. 567. Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54. pp. 316, 557, 727, 734, 753, 1069, 1092, 1152, 1164. c 56 Pa. St. 451; 68 Pa. St. 407; 31 Pa. St. 369; 46 Pa. St. 196; 11 E. I. 145; 62 Me. 564; 21 Mich. 122; 36 N. H. 394; 81 Pa. St. 51; 122 Mass. 376 ; 77 Pa. St. 112 ; 102 Mass. 501 ; 5 Xeb. 452; 63 Pa. St. 297; 71 Pa. St. 158; 106 Mass. 461; 55 111. 351; 12 Gray, 496, 497; 9 JId. 175, 178; 91 U. S. 551; 12 Heisk. 138, 140; 17 HI. 146. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Andrews, 39 Md. 329. p. 1238. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Bowyer, 45 Ind. 496. p. 521. c 58 Ind. 367. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. u. Bingham. 29 Ohio St. 364. p. 313. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Oo. v. Brigham, 29 Ohio St. 374. p. 314. Pittsburgh, 3tc., E. Co. v. Brown, 44 Ind. 409. p. 1246. c 48 Ind. 121; 49 Ind. 212; 47 Ind. 318. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. u. Bumstead, 48 HI. 221. pp. 1186, 1187, 1188. 1196. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Caldwell, 74 Pa. St. 421. pp. 1181, 1188, 1190, 1197. c 21 Minn. 214. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Campbell, 86 m. 443. pp. 153, 171. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Collins (Sup. Ct. Pa.), 7 Eeporter, 153. p. 449. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Culver (Sup. Ct. Ind.), 6 Cent. L. J. 498. p. 152. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Donahue, 70 Pa. St. 119. pp. 887, 1258, 1263. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Devinney, 17 Ohio St 197. pp. 1038, 1039. c5 Eeporter, 626; 3 Sawyer, 410; 2 Col. 488. d 46 Texas, 540. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Dunn, 56 Pa. St 280. pp. 416, 422, 1212. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. u. Eby, 55 Ind. 567. p. 526. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Ehrhart, 36 Ind. 168. p. 521. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Evans, 53 Pa. St 250. p. 1236. c 46 Ind. 48; 4 Or. 55; 38 Ind. 306. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Pleming, 30 Ohio St 480. p. 497. TABLE OP CASES. CXXIX Pittsburgh, etc., B. Co. u. Gilleland, 56 Pa. St. 446. pp. 569, 572. C41 Ind. 237, 239; 20 Gratt. 374; 73 Pa. St. 409; 6 Reporter, 344; 86 Pa. St. 302. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Hannon, 60 Ind. 417. pp. 510, 511. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Karns, 13 Ind. 87. p. 353. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. «. Keller, 49 Ind. 211. p. 1246. c 17 Kan. 670. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Knutson, 69 111. 103. pp. 429, 430, 1168. c 77 111. 395; 2 Bradw. 432. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Maurer, 21 Ohio St. 421. p. 357. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. McClurg, 56 Pa. St. 294. p. 1238. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Methven, 21 Ohio St. 586. pp. 517, 528. c 20 Kan. 361 ; 24 Ohio St. 56. Pittsburgh, etc., 11. Co. v. Nelson, 57 Ind. 150. pp. 155, 162, 1213, 1247. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Peai'son, 72 Pa. St. 169. pp. 1188, 1191, 1240. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Euby, 38 Ind. 294. p. 888. c 46 Iowa, 22; 46 Texas, 538; 8 Cent. L. J. 14; 58Ind. 2S. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Powers, 74 111. 341. p. 1263. Pittsburgh, etc., K. Co. v. Smith, 26 Ohio St. 124. p. 526. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Theobald, 61 Ind. 246. p. 887. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Thompson, 56 111. 138. p. 986. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Troxell, 57 Ind. 246. p. 1244. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Vining's Ad- ministrator, 27 Ind. 573. pp. 1176, 1181, 1184, 1192, 1276, 1277. c 18 Ohio St. 413; 34 Iowa, 160; 46 Ind. 30; 52 Ind. Ill; 40Ind.552; 28 Ind. 288; 39 Ind. 92. Pittsfield V. Barnstead, 40 N. H. 495. p. 802. Pitzner v. Shinnick, 41 Wis. 676; s. e., 39 Wis. 129. pp. 215, 524. c 43 Wis. 679, 681, 683, 684; 42 Wis. 309, 310; 20 Kan. 362. Pixley V. Clark, 35 N. Y. 620. pp. 33, 50, 55, 103, 104, 821. c 51 N. Y. 481, 487; 58 N. T. 423; 108 Mass. Place V. Taylor, 22 Ohio St. 317. p. 817. Plank V. New York, etc., E. Co., 60 N. Y. 607; ^. <;., 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 319. pp. 973, 1055. c 9 Jones & Sp. 255; 14 Hun, 448. Plaster v. Illinois, etc., B. Co., 35 Iowa, 449. pp. 507, 523, 1176. c 44 Iowa, 285 ; 38 Iowa, 252 ; 40 Iowa, 339. Piatt V. Forty-second Street E. Co., 2 Hun, 124. p. 400. Piatt V. Johnson, 15 Johns. 213. p. 252. Playford v. United Kingdom Tel. Co., L. B. 4 Q. B. 706 ; s. <;., 10 Best & S. 759 ; 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 249; 17 L. T. (n. s.) 242. pp. 835, 847. c 2 O. P. Div. 67, 69, 70; 60 Me. 29, 34. Pluckwell !). Wilson, 5 Cur. & P. 375. pp. 374, 379, 383, 385, 468, 1107, 1134, 1150, 1151, 1166, 1202. c 13 111. 590 ; 19 Conn. 511, 572 ; 2 Oush. 544 ; 6 Hill, 593; 18 N. Y. 258; 17 Barb. 98; 20 111. 491; 2 Woodb. & M. 345; 25 Me. 48; 17 Iowa, 463 ; 32 Me . 50 ; 29 N. J. L. 270, 283 ; 4 N. Y. 360 ; 12 Mete. 420 ; 9 Wis. 217 ; 8 Barb. 395 ; 2 Bradw- 39; 29 Me. 310; 19 Wend. 401; 13 Barb. 497. Plumley v. Birge, 124 Mass. 67 ; s. c, 5 Eeporter, 527. p. 223. Plummer v. Webb, Ware, 75. pp. 1242, 1272, 1287. Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 586. p. 898. Polack II. Pioche, 36 Cal. 416. p. 1069. Poler V. New York, etc., E. Co., 16 N. Y. 476. pp. 527, 528, 529, 530. C32 Barb. 169, 575; 3 Abb. App. Deo. 343; 35 N. Y. 646; 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 636; 8 Minn. 161; 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 539; 19 How. Pr. 203. Polk V. Lane, 4 Yerg. 36. p. 215. Pollard V. Woburn, 104 Mass. 84. pp. 757, 787, 788, 789, 1204. Pollett t>. Long, 66 N. Y. 200. pp. 102, 1098. c 39 N. J. L. 307, 310; 4 Hun, 700. Pollock 0. Eastern E. E., 124 Mass. 168. p. 420. Pollock's Administrator v, Louisville, 13 Bush, 221 ; a. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 120. p. 734. Pomfret v. Eicroft, 1 Wms. Saund. 321. p. 93. C28N.H.166; 13N. Y.46. Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 164. pp. 731, 747. cxxx TABLE OF CASES. Ponton V. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 6 Jones L. 245. p. 971. c 46 Texas, 5:19 ; 76 X. C. 8. Pool V. Alger, 11 Gray, 489. p. 212. Poole V. North Carolina, etc., R. Co., 8 Jones L. 340. p. 450. Popham V. Prior of Breamore, 11 Hen. IV. 82. pp. 628, 641. Popplewell V. Pierce, 10 Cush. 509. p. 208. oiOVt. 352; 38 Wis. 309. Porter v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Iowa, 3.58. p. 885. Porter u. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 60 Mo. 160; ;.. c, 2 Cent. L. J. 884. pp. 973, 1012. Porter v. North Missouri R. Co., 38 Mo. 128. pp. 748, 776. Porter v. Sullivan, 7 Gray, 441. p. 702. Porter's Case, 1 Coke, 25. p. 635. Portland v. Richardson, 54 Me. 46. pp. 789, 790. c 59 Me. 188. Post r.Vetter, 2 E. D. Smith, 248. p. 323. Potter V. Bunnell, 20 Ohio St. 150. p. 357. Potter V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 46 Iowa, 399. pp. 1000, 1001, 1237. Potter V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 22 Wis. 615 ; s. c, 21 Wis. 372. pp. 1177, 1291. c 28 Wis. 305, 306, 532; 22 Wis. 248, 251; 38 Wis. 622, 635 ; 37 Mich. 215. ? 29 Wis. 151. Potter V. Faulkner, 1 Best & S. 800 ; s. c, 8 Jur. (x. s.) 259; 31 L. J. (Q. B.) 30; 10 Week. Rep. 93; 5 L. T. (n. s.) 455. pp. 970, 1046, 1050. cL. E. 6 Q. B. 76; 40 L. J. i.Q. B.) 80; 1 Q. B. Div. 256, 257. Potter V. SejTBour, 4 Bosw. 140. p. 900. c 7 Bosw. 514. Potts V. Plunkett, 7 Am. L. Reg. 555. pp. 1050, 1051. c 3 Robt. 82; 28 How. Pr. 473; 39 Iowa, 620; 13 Ind. 369. Poulsum V. Thirst, L. R. 2 C. P. 449. p. 799. Powell V. Deveney, 3 Cush. 300. pp. 139, 889, 1090. c 59 111, 354; 111 Mass. 141; 39 N. J. L. 310; 26 Wis. 280; 4 Gray, 407, 410; 14 Alien, 297; 75 111. 9S. Powell V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 35 Mo. 457. pp. 514, 534. Powell o. Salisbury, 2 You. & J. 391. pp. 209, 1096. c 50 X. H. 146; 14 Allen, 298; 20 Iowa, 223; L. E. 8 Q. B. 279. Powers V. Kindt, 13 Kan. 74. pp. 199, 211. Prairie State Loan and Trust Co. v. Doig, 70 111. 52. p. 899. c 7 Cent. L. J. 494. Prather o. Lexington, 13 B. Mon. 559. p. 732. c 53 Ala. 531 ; 17 B. Mon. 728 ; 17 Gratt. 382 ; 12 Ohio St. .379. Pratt V. Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 42 Me. 579. pp. 171, 172. c 16 Kan. 580; 6 Allen, 91. Pratt i: Gardner, 2 Cush. 68. p. 817. Pray v. Jersey City, 32 :?f . J. L. 394. pp. 710, 734, 735, 753, 754, 775. c 21 Mich. 116; 122 Mass. 357 ; 3« N. J. L. 22. Prendergast v. New York, etc., R. Co., 58 N. Y. 652. p. 1188. Prentiss u. Boston, 112 Mass. 43. pp. 766, 767, 773, 774, 787, 788. c 120 Mass. 266. Prescott V. Duquesne, 48 Pa. St. 118. p. 557. Prescott V. Eastern K. Co., 113 Mass. 370, note. p. 370. c 124 Mass. 159. Prescott V. Knowles, 62 Me. 277. p. 218. Pressey v. Wirth, 3 Allen, 191. p. 219. Pretty v. Bickmore, L. E. 8 C. P. 401. pp. 321, 322. c 17 Am. L. Reg. (x. s.) 455 ; L. E. 10 C. P. 661, 662 ; 2 C. P. Div. 313. d 59 N, T. 38, 39. Prewitt v. Neal, Minor (Ala.), 386. p. 899. Price B. Houston, etc., Nav. Co., 46 Texas, 535. p. 971. Price V. New Jersey R. Co., 31 N. J. L. 229 ; s. <;., 32 N. J. L. 19. pp. 214, 500. Price V. Sacramento, 6 Cal. 254. p. 619. Prideaux v. 3Iineral Point, 48 Wis. 513 ; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 428. pp. 862, 736, 758, 761, 702, 770, 771, 772, 773, 1177, 1287, 1288. o 43 Wis. 675. Priest V. Nichols, 116 Mass. 401. pp. 105, 324. Priestley v. Fowler, 3 Mee. & W. 1 ; s. c, Murph. & H. 305; 1 Jur. 987. pp. TABLE OF CASES. CXXX] 927, 947, 957, 959, 960, 961, 963, 967, 970, 971. (In full, p. 919.) c 7 Am. L. Eeg. 560, 561; 1 Ga. 198; 11 Bxoh. S39; 1 Cent. L. J. 479; 29 Conn. 559,561; 34 Conn. 138; 20 Bavb. 454; llExch. 270; 1 Hilt. 443 ; 3 El . & Bl. 408, 409 ; 32 Vt. 478 ; 26 Md. 479 ; 42 Ala. 717 ; 46 L. J. 529; 25 N. T. 666, 567, 570; 6 C. B. 616; 3 Col. 501; 2 Jur. (N. s.) 956; 25 L. J. (Exch.) 193; 5 Exch. 357, 3.5S; 19 L. J. (Exoh.) ,302; 2 Exch. Div. 397; 2 Hurl. & Colt. Ill, 112; 9 Jur. (N. s.) 502; 32 L. J. (Exch.) 209; 49 Barb. 326, 577; L. R. 1 C. P. 296; 2 Hurl. &N. 734; 22 Ala. 309, 311; 39 N. Y. 471, 477; 25 Md. 479; 17 N. Y. 157; 15 Ga. 358; 1 Hurl. & N. 249; 3 Exch. Div. 343; 23 Pa. St. 386; IIC.B. (N.s.) 439; SJur. (N s.) 748,994; 31 L. J. (C. P.) 109; 6 Hnrl. & N. 448; 30 L. J. (Exch.) 89; 46 Texas, 550; 43 Mo. 193; 1 C. P. Div. 559, 560, 561, 562; IBest & S. 441, 443, 445, 446; 7 Jur. (N. 8.) 845, 846; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 335, 336, 337; 1 Am. L. Eeg. 718; 49 Miss. 282; 28 Vt. 62; 20 Md. 221; 6 Jones L. 246; 6 Cush. 77; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 769, 773; 71 111. 420; 7 La. An. 324; 31 Ind. 182; 4 Sneed, 47; 28 How. Pr. ■473; 64 N. Y. 8; 39 Iowa, 620; 11 Wis. 255; 7 Hurl. & N. 946; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 359, 360; 3 Ohio St. 211, 212, 213, 216,217,219, 222, 223, 225; 1 C. P. Div. 168; 6 Ind. 207; 12 Ohio St. 488; 69 Mo. 300 ; 24 Ala. 36 ; 102 Mass. 586 ; 5 X. Y. 494, 496 ; 6 Barb. 236, 239 ; 6 Hurl. & N. 358 ; 18 Iowa, 287 ; 62 Me. 465 ; 3 Robt. 82; 15 Jur. 724; 26 L. J. (Exch.) 221; 4 Mete. 67; 42 N. H. 241; 53 N. y. iJ.H; 14 Minn. 362; L. R. 7 C. P. 278, 282, 285; 119 Mass. 413; 20 Ohio, 442, 449; 16 0. B. (N. a.) 683, 690, 693; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 334, 335; 63 N. Y. 453; 46 Mo. 170; 10 Allen, 236; 6 1,1. An. 497; 106 Mass. 285; 5 Exch. 349; 6 Eng. Rail. Oas. 585; 14 Jur. 840; 2 Am. L. T. 119; 11 Wis. 255; .59 Pa. St. 250, 251; 5 Ired.L. 343. ? 5 Ind. .343, 344, 345, 347. Pritchard u. Keefer, 53 111. 117. p. 886. Pritchard v. La Crosse, etc., B. Co., 7 Wis. 2.32. p. 496. c 43 Wis. 684. Proctor V. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 64 Mo. 112 ; s. t., 4 Cent. L. J. 229. pp. 1005, 1280, 1285. Proctor !). Harris, 4 Car. & P. 337. p. 345. c 30 Me. 179. Proctor V. Jennings, 6 Nev. 83. pp. 102, 1083, 1085, 1090. Proctor r. Wilmington, etc., K. Co., 72 N. C. 579. p.- 495. Proprietors of Locks and Canals v. Liow- ell, 7 Gray, 223. pp. 710, 742. Proprietors of Loclcs and Canals v. Low- ell Horse R. Co., 109 Mass. 221. p. 777. Proprietors of Locks and Canals v. Nashua, etc., K Co., 10 Cush. 385. pp. 340, 560. Protector (The), 1 W. Rob. 45. p. 895. Protheroe v. Mathews, 5 Car. & P. 581. p. 221. Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161. pp. 360, 720, 756, 781, 783, 787, 793. c 24 Wis. 274; 42 Me. 527; 21 Mich. 116; 43 Ind. 689; 122 Mass. 369; 77 Pa. St. 113; 102 Mass. 499 ; 81 111. 306 ; 1 Cliff . 526 ; 1 Black, 51 ; 9 Md. 178; 2 Disney, 537; 12 Allen, 570. Provost V. Jackson, 13 Lower Canada Jur. 170. p. 1289. Pryor v. Valer, 9 Phila. 95. p. 1201. Puffer u. Orange, 122 Mass. 389. pp. 362, 771. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166. pp. 695, 744. Puryear v. Thompson, 5 Hun, 397. pp. 886, 887. c 3 Head, 474. Putnam v. Payne, 13 Johns. 312. pp. 195, 221. Pym V. Great Northern R. Co., 4 Best & S. 396; s. c, 10 Jur. (n. s.) 199; 32 L. J. (Q. B.) 377; 11 Week. Rep. 922; 8 L. T. (n. s.) 734. p. 1290. c 16 Ir. C. L. (N. s.) 418; ICin. Superior Ct. 267 ; 43 Vt. 541 ; 34 N. J. L. 158. Q. Quaid V. Cornwall, 13 Bush, 601 ; s. c, 5 Reporter, 693. p. 973. Quarman v. Burnett, 6 Mee. & W. 499; s. c, 4 Jur. 969. pp. 604, 607, 669, 878, 879, 894, 902. cl Hilt. 443; 15111.74; 23 Ind. 556; .31 Pa. St. 367, 368; 4 C. B. 802; 19N. H. 444; 7 Q. B. 974; 17 Mo. 125, 126, 127, 129; 9 Mee. & W. 713, 714, 715 ; 6 Jur. 607 ; 18 Ohio St. 411 ; 6 N. Y. 55, 57, 68, 80, 63 ; 8 Cal. 496, 498 ; 10 Jur. 94 ; 41 N. Y. 46 ; 6N.Y'.442; 12 Ad. & E. 740, 741 ; 15L.J. (Q.B.) 102; 4 Eng. Rail. Cas.ni; 20 Vt. 635, 536 ; 7N. Y. 496 ; 14 Barb. 109, 110 ; 2 Daly, 277 ; 9 Allen, 53 ; 52 N. H. 122, 123, 125 ; 1 C. B. 591 ; 14 L. J. (0. P.) 187; S Ohio St. 379, 381; 35 N. J. L. 22, 23, 25; 30 Md. 201; 2 Mich. 370, 372; 3 Duer, 362 ; 2 Denio, 448 ; 10 Ired. L. 559, 561, 666, 574 ; 3 Gray, 361 ; 4 E. D. Smith, 294 ; 21 Iowa, 578 ; 62 N. Y. 164; 4 Man. & G. 56, 61; 4 Scott N. E. 662, 668; 3 Hurl. & Colt. 610; 11 Jur. (N. s.) 844; L. E. 1 H. L. 114; 11 H. L. Cas. 716; 12 Jur. (N. 8.) 575; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 233; 22 Mo. 548; 4 Exch. 255; 6 Eng. EaU. Oas. 189, 192; 8 Gray, 148. CXXXll TABLE OF CASES. Quick I). Hannibal, etc., B. Co., 31 Mo. 399. pp. 1243, 1246. c 34 Mo. 129. Quimby v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 23 Vt. 387. pp. 492, 495, 496, 504. c 3 Ohio St. 197; 27 Vt. 148; 24 Vt. 492; 38 Ind. 318; 17 Wall. 664. Quin V. Moore, 15 X. Y. 432. pp. 1272, 1277, 1286, 1289, 1292, 1293, 1294. o 3:5 X. Y. 647; 38 X. T. 450; 30 N. J. L. 200; 30 Bail). 106. Quincv 1'. Barker, 81 HI. 300. pp. 360, 361, 785, 786, 787. c 2 Bradw. 40. Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231. pp. 275, 276, 279. 747. Quincy Canal v. Newcomb, 7 Mete. 276. pp. 640, 755. Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 HI. 68. pp. 1277, 1288, 1294. Quincy, etc., E. Co. v. "Wellhoener. 72 111. 60 ; s. c, 2 Cent. L. J. 622. p. 507. Quinlan v. Sixth Avenue E. Co., 4 Daly, 487. p. 389. Quinlan v. ITtica, 11 Hun, 217. p. 801. Quinn v. Illinois, etc., E. Co., 51 111. 495. p. 1238. Quinn v. Paterson, 27 N. J. L. 35. pp. 739. 743, 747, 888. Quirk V. Holt, 99 Mass. 164. pp. 387, 1201, 1239. c 106 Mass. 462; 4 Cent. L. J. 84. E. Eace V. Snyder, 30 Leg. Int. 361. p. 215. Eadeliflf's Executors v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195. pp. 49, 104, 275, 336, 745, 746, 747, 750, 822. c9 Cal. 256; 35 N.Y. 522; 13 La. An. 427, 428; 15 Barb. 101; 9 Iowa, 236, 237; 3 Daly, 67, 69; 29 N. Y. 6i2 ; 26 N. J. L. 160, 164; 41 Barb. 330 ; 2 Allen, 133 ; 30 Iowa, 421 ; 65 X. H. 58 ; 2 E. D. Smith, 202; 46 Iowa, 669; 3 Duer, 414; 51 X. Y. 105, 479; 58 X. Y. 423; 60 Barb. HI; 9 Bush, 53;5 ; 61 N. Y. 200 ; 41 111. 509 ; 27 N. J. L. 36 ; 76 ni. 239 ; 2 Kobt. 307 ; 4 Eobt. 345 ; 28 Md. 528; 23 N. Y. 48; 5 Hun, 604; 22 Barb. 308; 19 Barb. 383, 384. ? 4 Ohio St. 94 ; 25 X. J. L. 367 ; 19 Barb. 384 ; 21 Barb. 414, 415, 424. d 7 Ohio St. 465, 468; 7 Reporter, 83. Radley v. London, etc., R. Co., L. E. 9 Exch. 71 ; s. c, 43 L. J. (Exch.) 73 (re- versed in Exchequer Chamber, L. E. 10 Exch. 100; 44 L. J. (Exch.) 73; 33 L. T. (n. s.) 209 ; judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber reversed, 1 App. Cas. 754). pp. 1151, 11-52, 1155, 1157, 1186,. 1240. (In full, p. 1108.) c 44 L. J. (Exch.) 91 ; 11 Hun, 335 ; 13 Hun, 331 ; 68 Me. 557. Radway v. Briggs, 37 N. Y. 2-56 ; s. c, 35 How. Pr. 422. pp. 316, 317, :^28, 557. c 70 111. 126 ; 65 Barb. 346 ; 59 X. Y. 37 ; 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 137 ; 4 Hun, 27. Eagsdale v. Memphis, etc., E. Co., 59 Tenn. 426. p. 1039. Eaiford i-. Mississippi Central E. Co., 43 Miss. 233. pp. 496, 501. c 43 Miss. 222, 223; 50 Miss. 574. Railroad v. Mitchell, 11 Heisk. 400. p. 1291. Eailroad u. Norton, 24 Pa. St. 465. pp. 437, 448, 449, 454, 1147, 1160. c 24 Md. 121, 122; 49 Pa. St. 193; 42 Pa. St. 498; 83 111. 516; 81 Pa. St. 375; 15 Ind. 489; 44 Pa. St. 378; 47 Pa. St. 303, 305; 52 Pa. St. 385; 30 Pa. St. 239, 241; 6 Am. L. Reg. 344, 346. Eailroad v. Walker, 11 Heisk. 383. p. 451. Eailroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147. p. 1238. Eailroad Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90. pp. 1290, 1291, 1294. c 38 Wis. 625; 53 Ind. 157; 22 Wis. 617; 13 Hun, 75 ; 6 Nev. 234. Eailroad Co. v. Port, 17 Wall. 5-53; . Husen, 95 TJ. S. 465. p. 208. Eailroad Co. u. Jones, 95 U. S. 439 ; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 45. p. 1213. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXlll Kailroad Co. v. Lyon (Sup. Ct Ala.), 7 Keporter, 556. p. 556. Mailroad Co. v. Skinne?; 19 Pa. St. 298. pp. 437, 500. (In full, p. 465.) c 66 Pa. St. 166; 17 Dl. 550; 12 Md. 262; 16 111. 201, 202, 203; 1 Handy, 200; 17 111. 650; 51 Pa. St. 241, 242, 243; 25 Vt. 123, 162; 2 Mete. (Ky.) 183; 14 Barb. 367; 115 Mass. 460; 45 Ala. 441; 28 X. H. 174; 5 Phila. 451; 49 Pa. St. 105, 106, 110; 12 Bash, 47; 44 Pa. St. 378; 47 Pa. St. .303; 7 Wis. 235; 4 So. Car. Bl; 33 Wis. 591; 9 Wis. 211; 2 B. I. 409. ? 14 B. Mon. 82; 23 •Gratt. 645. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 ; s. c.., 2 Dill. 294; 1 Cent. L. J. 202; 11 Am. L. Keg. (n. s.) 226. pp. 305, 1033, 1180, 1194, 12.36, 1237. c 53 Ala. 80, 81 ; 67 Me. 108, 109 ; 14 Kan. 54, ■68; 21 Minn. 213; 65 Mo. 595, 596; 66 Me. 381; 55 How. Pr. 173; 15 Abb. Pr. (n. s.) 326; 56 Mo. 352 ; 64 Mo. 425 ; 3 Col. 129 ; 60 N. Y. 335, 336. Kiilroad Co. v. Yeiser, 8 Pa. St. 366. pp. 152, 154, 160, 168, 469, 569, 572. C30 Iowa, 422; 50 Cal. 184; 23 Pa. St. 374; 7 Kan. 318; 73 Pa. St. 126; 18 Barb. 86, 87; 7 Keporter, 24; 36 Mo. 32; 37 Mo. 295; 9 Wis. 213; 14N. Y. 225. Railway Co. o. Whitton's Administrator, 13 Wall. 270. pp. 1276, 1287. c 14 Kan. 66 ; 4 Hun, 771. Raisin v. Mitchell, 9 Car. & P. 617. pp. 373, 488, 1169. Ealeigh R. Co. u. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. 451. p. 568. Eamsay v. Quinn (Irish Ct. of Com. Pleas), 1 Cent. L. J. 478. p. 1031. Eamsden v. Boston, etc., K. Co., 104 Mass. 117. p. 887. Ramsey v. Riley, 13 Ohio, 157. p. 827. Randal v. Elder, 12 Kan. 257. p. 782. Randall v. Cheshire Turnpike, 6 N. H. 147. p. 562. c 2 Lans. 438. Handall v. Eastern R. Co., 106 Mass. 276. p. 775. c 119 Mass. 274; 110 Mass. 526. Randall v. McLaughlin, 6 Allen, 201. p. 750. Randall v. Roper, 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 266. p. 236. Randleson v. Murray, 3 Nev. & P. 239 ; s. c, 8 Ad. & E. 109 ; 2 Jur. 324. pp. 670, 877, 897, 902. c 19 N. H. 439, 440, 441; 52 N. H. 123, 125; 7 <}. B. 975; 10 Jur. 94; 15 L. J. (Q. B.) 102; 4 Eng. Eail. Cas. Ill; 4 C. B. 800; 2 Hilt. 354; 20 Vt. 536 ; 14 Barb. 109, 110 ; 36 Pa. St. 119 ; 35 N. J. L. 24; 4 Per. & Dav. 717; 11 Allen, 121; 2 Mich. 371; 3 Gray, 359; 15 111. 74; 12 Ad. &E. 739, 740, 741,742; 13 C. B. 186; 17 Jur. 765; 22 L. J. (O. P.) 82, 83 ; 10 C. B. (N. S.) 476 ; 6 Mee. & W. 510; 4 Jur. 970; 9 Mee. & W. 714; 6 Jur. 607; 8 Barb. 368; 2 Denio, 449; 8 Gray, 149. ? 3 Hurl. & Colt. 466; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 1208; 34 L. J. (Exch.) 16. Ranger v. Great Western R. Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 72. p. 888. Rangier v. McCreight, 27 Pa. St. 95. p. 215. Ranlett v. Lowell (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.), 8 Cent. L. J. 365. p. 752. Ranson v. Labranche, 16 La. An. 121. p. 1246. Raphe V. Moore, 68 Pa. St. 404. pp. 561, 662, 727, 761, 793, 795, 796. 16 Kan. 383, 384; 79 Pa. St. 417; 73 Pa. St. 409. ? 122 Mass. 377. Kapson v. Cubitt, 9 Mee. & W. 710 : n. u., Car. & M. 64 ; 6 Jur. 606. pp. 670, 879, 902, 909, 1257. c 7 Q. B. 975 ; 19 Mo. 125, 126 ; 6 N. Y. .56, 57, 60, 63; 8 Cal. 490, 498; 3 Duer, 362; 15 III. 74; 10 Ired. L. 560, 566, 571 ; 10 Jur. 94; 15 L. J. (Q. B.)103; 4 Eng. Hall. Cas. Ill; 20 Vt. 535;7N. Y. 496 ; 8 N. Y. 226 ; 6 N. Y. 442 ; 23 Ind. 556 ; 14 Barb. 109; 8 Ohio St. 381; 35 N. J. L. 22, 28; 30 Md. 202, 205 ; 2 Mich. 371 ; 4 Bosw. 147 ; 64 N. Y. 146; 2 Denio, 449; 3 Gray, 361; 21 Iowa, 678; 25 N. J. L. 371 ; 11 0. B. 873 ; 16 Jur. 67 ; 21 L. J. (C. P.) 54; 46 Pa. St. 221; 4 Exch. 255; 6 Eng. Kail. Cas. 189; 53 N. H. 125. Rathbun o. Payne, 19 Wend. 399. pp. 373, 381, 1124, 1127, 1131, 1167. c 21 Wend. 619, 622; 2 Woodb. & M. 345; 1 E. D. Smith, 272 ; 35 Me. 47 ; 20 Ohio, 451 ; 13 Ga. 88; 14 Barb. 370; 17 Iowa, 463; 19 How. Pr. 334; 24 N. J. L. 271; 2 Hilt. 39; 4 N. Y. 360; 2 Bosw. 378; 22 N. J. L. 189; 8 Barb. 395; 3 Mich. 265; 5 Hill, 283; 38 Ala. 85, 87; 13 Barb. 15; 29 Me. 310; 18 N. Y. 351; 43 Miss. 614; 7 Bosw. 315. Rauch V. Lloyd, 31 Pa. St. 358. pp. 1181, 1181, 1197. c 18 Ohio St. 414 ; 29 Iowa, 38 ; 65 Pa. St. 276 ; 31 Pa. SL 376 ; 47 Pa. St. 304 ; 48 Pa. St. 231 ; 69 Pa. St. 215 ; 75 Pa. St. 86. d 4 Allen, 287. Ivavary v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 6 Lower Canada Jur. 49. p. 1290. Rawstron v. Taylor, 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 428. p. 104. Ray V. Manchester, 46 N. H. 59. p. 779. c 48 N. H. 19, 20; 52 N H. 379. cxxxiv TABLE OF CASES. Raymond v. BoUes, 11 Cush. 315. p. 817. Kaymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524. pp. 3ei, 756, 761, 770, 784, 786, 787, 793, 804, 815, 1198, 1201. c 42 Me. 335, 338; 52 N. H. 413; 116 Mass. 95; 110 Muss. 511, 513; 103 Mass. 584; 109 Mass. 127; 3 Allen, 170; 9 Allen, 202; 105 Mass. 85; IDisney, r,:',! ■ S Allen, 565; 35 N. H. 61; 17 How. 167 ; 64 Miss. 396. €l 50 111. 66. Eayner v. Mitchell, 2 C. P. Div. 357. p. 885. Bead v. Chelmsford, 16 Pick. 128. pp. 544, 546, 547, 12-55. c 35 N. H. 366. Kead v. Edwards, 17 C. B. (n. s.) 245; s. c, 11 L. T. (n. s.) 311 ; 34 L. J. (C. P.) 31. pp. 218, 220. c 34 L. J. ,C. P.) 214; 14 Allen, 298. Eead v. Ureat Eastern R. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555. p. 1286. Eead v. Morse, 34 Wis. 315. pp. 151, 153, 155, 1239. c 36 Wis. 100; 41 Wis. 73; 44 Wis. 643. Eeadhead v. Midland R. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 412; s. c, L. R. 4 Q. B. 379. pp. 312, 562, 617, 618, 122S. Ream v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 49 Ind. 93. pp. 449, 1254. c 44 Iowa, 31; 1 Hilt. 443; 29 Me. 309. Rector v. Pierce, 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 416. pp. 820, 1199. c 3 Hun, 711 ; 6 JT. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 95. Rector of Church of Ascension v. Buck- hart, 3 Hill, 193. p. 349. Redpath v. Western Union Tel. Co., 112 Mass. 71. pp. 841, 842, 844, 846. c 34 Wis. 476; 113 Mass. 303, mi. Reed v. Allegheny City, 70 Pa. St. 300. pp. 740, 750, 900, 908, 914. c 85 Pa. St. 252, 253. Reed o. Belfast, 20 Jle. 246. pp. 371, 620, 704, 753. c 4 Mich. 561; 36 N. H. 298; 4 Cush. 314; 15 Barb. 441; 122 Mass. 351; 36 Wis. 158; 27 Vt. 457 ; 25 Me. 45 ; 58 Me. 401 ; 8 Barb. 651 ; 36 Me. 398; 30 Wis. 617; 32 Me. 538; 11 E. I. 453; 17 Conn. 478, 480. Reed v. Calais, 48 Vt. 7. p. 798. c 48 vt. 30. Reed v. Deerfield, 8 Allen, 522. pp. 1200, 1238. c 115 Mass. 199; 11 Allen, 421; 10 Allen, 536; 100 Mass. 212. Reed o. Drake, 29 Mich. 222. p. 213. Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. 94. pp. 361, 759, 762, 763, 786, 787, 1015, 1204. c51 Me. 538; 102 Mass. 585; 37 Conn. 420; 33 Iowa, 399; 12 Allen, 86; 29 Iowa, 48; 114 Mass. 245; 65 Ind. 60; 12 Cush. 279, 493; 4 Gray, 404; 35 X. H. 27«, 311; 16 Pick. 1.31; 45- N. T. 136 ; 66 Me. 429; 8 Allen, 450; 118 Mass. 544; 46 N. H. 198. Reedie o. London, etc., R. Co., 4 Exch. 244 ; s. c , 6 Eng. Rail. Gas. 184. pp. 879, 884, 899, 902, 911, 913, 915. c 17 Mo. 125, 126, 128; 18 Ohio St. 411; 5 N. Y. 57, 63; 8 Cal. 496, 498; 16 Gratt. 242; 14 Barb. Ill; 7 Hurl. & N. 834; 8 Ohio St. 381; 7 Cent. L. J. 493 ; 35 N. J. L. 22, 27 ; 59 Me. .526 ; 52 X. H. 123, 125; ;W Md. 202; 2 Mich. 372; 9 Mich. 188; 3 Gray, 362; 51 Ala. 570; 4 Ohio St. 415; 23 Ind. 556; 18 Kan. 38; 66 X. Y. 185; 48 How. Pr. 48; 61 N. Y. 184, 203; 6 Phila. 257; 29 Barb. 424; 30 L. J. (Exch.) 223; 22 Mo.547; 11 C. B. 871, 873; 16 Jur. 67; 21 L. J. (C. P.) 53, 54; 46 Pa. St. 231, 223; 11 Bush, 472, 475; 4 Duer, 430. Reed's Appeal, 34 Pa. St. 207. p. 890. Reeves t-. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 30 Pa, St. 454. pp. 403, 418, 422, 438, 497, 500, 505. c 17 Mich. 120 ; 65 Pa. St. 273 ; 49 Pa. St. 64; 36 Pa. St. 71; 44 Pa. St. 379; 47 Pa. St. .305; 5i N. H. 553. Reeves v. Larkin, 19 Mo. 192. p. 343. c 53 Mo. 304. Regina i.. Allen, 2 Car. & P. 153. p. 1234. Regina v. Ashhy Folville, L. R. 1 Q. B. 213; s. c, 12 Jur. (n. s.) .520; 35 L. J. (M. C.) 154. p. 806. Regina v. Bamber, Dav. & Mer. 367 ; s. c, 5Q. B. 279; 8 Jur. 309; 13 L. J. (M. C.) 13. p. 806. Regina v. Barrett, 2 Car. & Kir. 343. p. 1234. Regina v. Bennett, Bell's C. C. 1 ; s. c, 4 Jur. (N. s.) 1088; 28 L. J. (M. C.) 27; p. 1087. Regina v. Bennett, 4 Post. & Pin. 1105. p. 115. Reginai). Brightside Bierlow, 13 Q. B. 933. p. 805. Regina v. Bristol R. Co., 2 Eng. Rail. Cas. 99. p. 569. Regina v. Bucknall, 2 Ld. Raym. 814. p. 317. Regina v. Cluworth, 1 Salk. 359. p. 701. Regina ... Colling, 2 Cox C. C. 184. p. 806. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXV Eegina v. Dant, 10 Cox 0. C. 102 ; o. c, Leigh & C. 567. p. 208. Regina v. Delamere, 13 "Week. Eep. 717. p. 558. Regina u. Duchess of Bucklugh, 1 Salk. 358. p. 640. Regina i\ Eastern E. Co., 10 Ad. & E. 531. pp. 548, 566. Regina v. Ely, 15 Q. B. 827 ; s. ^., 19 L. J. (M. 0.) 150. pp. 357, 573. Eegina v. Haines, 2 Car. &Kir. 368. pp. 228, 1234. c 6 N. Y. 409. Eegina v. Heage, 1 Gale & Dav. 548 ; s. c, 2 Q. B. 128; 6.Jur. 367. p. 808. Regina v. Hornsea, Dears. C. C. 291 ; s. u., 18 Jur. 315; 23 L. J. (M. C.) 59. p. 806. Eegina v. Justices of St. Peter's, 2 Ld. Raym. 1249. p. 700. c 122 Mass. 346. Regina v. Midville, 3 Gale & Dav.' 522; »■. c., 4 Q. B. 240. p. 805. Regina v. Paul, 2 Moo. & R. 307. p. 806. c Dav. & Mer. 373. Regina v. Polwart, 1 Q. B. 818. p. 1275. Eegina v. Stephens, L. R. 1 Q. B. 702 ; s. c, 7 Best & S. 710 ; 14 Week. Rep. 859 ; 14 L. T. (N-. s.) 593. pp. 889, 890, 904. Regina v. Swindall, 2 Car. & Kir. 232. pp. 228, 389. c 6 N. Y. 409. Regina v. United Kingdom, etc., Tel. Co., 9 Cox C. C. 174. p. 789. c 97 Mass. 557 ; 4 Abb. N. O. 36. Regina v. Watson, 2 Ld. Raym. 856. p. 317. Regina ■«. Watts, 1 Salk. 357; s. c, sub nom. Regina v. Watson, 2 Ld. Raym. 856 ; 3 Ld. Eaym. 18. pp. 317, 349, 666. Eegina v. Wigg, 2 Salk. 460. p. 107. Eegina v. Wilts, 6 Modern, 191, 307 ; s. c, 1 Salk. 359. pp. 701, 794. c 122 Mass. 348; 26 Ind. 25; 30 N. J. L. 143; 2 N. H. 513; 37 Mo. 456. Eegina v. York E. Co., 1 El. & Bl. 178. p. 558. Eeinhardt v. New York, 2 Daly, 243. pp. 732, 753, 763, 781. c 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 137; 4 Hun, 27. Eiesti). Goshen, 42 Ind. 339. pp. 45, 1176, 1204, 1254. c 47 Ind. 394, 456. Eensselaer, etc., E. Co. (In re), 4 Paige, 553. pp. 492, 504. Eenwick v. New York, etc., E. Co., 36 N. Y. 132. pp. 429, 432. c 14 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 33; 34 Iowa, 161; 6 Hun, 465; 64 N.Y. 538; 37 N. Y. 574; 17 Micb. 118; 71-ans. 14; 39 N.Y. 365; 17 Wall. 665. Eequa v. Eochester. 45 N. Y. 129. pp. 726, 753, 760, 763. c 61 N. Y. 509 ; 50 X. Y'. 238 ; 9 Hun, 685 ; 19 Minn. 219; 56 Mo. 191; ,55 N. Y. 667; 43 How. Pr. 367 ; 91 U. S. 651 ; 38 Wis. 460. d 122 Mass. 376. Eex V. Antrobus, 2 Ad. & E. 788. p. 823. c 4 El. & Bl. 545; 1 Jur. (N. s.) 210; 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 85. Eex V. Arundel, 4 Mau. & Sel. 257. p. 977. Eex V. Bailitfs and Corporation of Eye, 1 Barn. & Cress. 85. p. 547. Eex V. Barlow, 2 Salk. 609. p. 547. Rex V. Barr, 4 Camp. 16. p. 759. Eex V. Birmingham Canal Nav., 2 W. Black. 708. p. 558. Eex V. Bristol Dock Co., 12 East, 429. p. 340. Eex V. Broderip, 5 Barn. & Cress. 239. p. 547. Eex u. Broughton, 5 Burr. 2201. p. 635. Eex V. Carlisle, 3 Car. & P. 636. p. 776. Eex V. Chillesford, 4 Barn. & Cress. 94. p. 977. Eex V. Clifton, 5 Term Eep. 498. p. 806. Eex V. Commissioners of the Flockwood Inclosure, 2 Chit. Rep. 251. p. 547. Eex V. Commissioners of Llandilo Eoads, 2 Term Rep. 232. p. 549. Eex V. Commissioners of Sewers for Es- sex, 1 Barn. & Cress. 477. p. 634. Eex V. Corporation of Maidenhead, Pal- mer, 82. p. 635. Eex V. Cox, 2 Burr. 785. p. 1094. Eex V. Cross, 3 Camp. 326. p. 776. Eex V. Cumberworth, 3 Barn. & Adol. 108. p. 552. Eex i: Devon, 1 Ey. & M. 144. p. 759. c 18 N. J. L. 112. Eex t'. Devon, 14 East, 477. p. 712. c 18 N. J. L. 116; 122 Mass. 360. Eex V. Earl of Exeter, 6 Term Eep. 373. p. 628. Eex V. Ecclesfield, 1 Barn. & Aid. 348. p. 806. <• L. E. 1 Q. B. 215; 12 Jur. (N. 8.) 521; 36 L.'J. CM. C.) 156. CXXXVl TABLE OF CASES. Eex V. Edge Lane, 4 Ad. & E. 723. p. 552. Eex ». Edgerly, 3 Siilk. 183. p. TTtf. Rex V. Edmonton, 1 Moo. & K. 26. p. 805. Eex V. Everett, 8 Barn. & Cress. 113. p. 1244. Rex V. Gardner, Cowp. 79. p. 658. Eex c. Glamorganshire, 2 East, 356, note. p. 331. Eex V. Great Broughton, 5 Burr. 2700. pp. 628, 805, 806. « 18 N. J. L. 116. Rex V. Hall, 1 Term Eep. 322. p. 574. Eex V. Hatfield, 4 Barn. & Aid. 75. p. 805. Rex V. Haj-man, Moo. & M. 401. p. 806. Eex V. Huggins, 2 Ld. Raym. 1574. pp. 176, 178, 185, 190, 208, 209. Rex V. Jones, 3 Camp. 229. p. 340. Rex V. Kent, 13 East, 220. pp. 343, 556, 557, 640, 789. c 2 Ind. 164; 9 Hun, 67; 45 Pa. St. 140; 2 East, 386, note; 4 Barn. & Cress. 197, 198; 26 Ind. 25; 3 Barn. & Adol. 94; 6 Hill, 517; 2 N. H. 514; 37 Me. 456. Rex I'. Kent, 2 Man. & Sel. 513. p. 571. c IS N. J. L. 112; 9 Hun, 67; 3 Mau. & Sel. 531, 532. Rex u. Kerrison, 1 Mau. & Sel. 435 ; s. <;., 3 Mau. & Sel. 527. pp. 357, 576, 628, 635, 638, 640, 648, 789. c 2 Ind. 165 ; L. R. 9 Q. B. 410, 411 ; 3 Barn. & Adol. 94. Rex V. Kingmore, 3 Dow. & Ry. 398 ; s. c, 2 Barn. & Cress. 190. p. 398. Eex V. Landulph, 1 Moo. & E. 393. p. 806. Rex V. Leake, 2 Nev. & M. 583 ; ;;. c, 5 Barn. & Adol. 469. pp. 769, 805. <• 33 L. J. CO. P.) 4; 15 0. B. (N. s.) 230; 29 Conn. 164; 46 N. H. 197. Rex V. Lindsey, 14 East, 317. pp. 343, 357, 552, 556, 673, 638, 640, 789. c 2 Ind. 164; 9 Hun, 67; 45 P.a. St. 140; 4 Barn. & Cress. 197, 198; 3 Barn. & Adol. 74. Rex V. Liverpool, 3 East, 86. pp. 599, 635, 640, 641, 644. Rex V. Lloyd, 1 Camp. 260. p. 759. Rex V. Mayor of Stratford, 14 East, 348. p. 628. Rex V. Medley, 6 Car. & P. 292. pp. 888, 889, 904. Eex I'. Netherthong, 2 Barn. & Aid. 179. p. 806. c 4 Barn. & Cress. 197, 199. Eex V. Nottingham, 2 Lev. 112. p. 805. c 2 N. H. 513 ; 37 Me. 456. Eex V. Owen, 4 Car. & P. 236. p. 1141. Rex V. Oxfordshire, 1 Barn. & Adol. 289. pp. 563, 793. c 18 N. J. L. 122; 4Nev. & M. 597; 3 Ad. & E. 72. Eex V. Oxfordshire, 4 Barn. & Cress. 194. p. 573. c 9 Hun, 67. Rex V. Pappineau, Stra. 686. p. 549. Rex V. Pease, 1 Nev. & M. 690 ; s. c, 4 Barn. & Adol. 30. pp. 126, 131, 'l32, 134, 135, 152, 566, 567, 603. c 2 Hurl. & N. 856 ; 27 L. T. (N. s.) 161 ; 61 N. Y. 198 ; 22 N. J. L. 246 ; L. E. 1 H. L. 112 ; 11 H. L. Gas. 713; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 575; 35 L. J. (Exch.)232; 7Eng.Ilail.Cas. 299; 21L.J.(C. P.) 204 ; 12 C. B. 176 ; 18 Jur. 1074 ; 36 X. J. L. 555 ; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 9; 3 Hurl. &N. 747; 5 Hurl. & N. 685, 686, 688; 6 Jur. (ST. s.) 900; 29 L. J. (Exch.) 247, 248; L. R. 4 H. L. 189, 194, 197, 201, 202; Dudley (S. C.) 140; 16 Q. B. 654; 26 N. J. L. 167; 13 Bush, 390; 6 Cent. L. J. 87. Rex V. Pedley, 1 Ad. & E. 822. pp. 318, 322. Rex V. Pemberton, 2 Burr. 1035. p. 574. Rex V. Penderryn, 2 Terjii Rep. 513. p. 806. c 3 Dow. & Ey. 400. Eex V. Eagley, 12 Modern, 409. pp. 805, 806. c L. R. 1 Q. B. 215; 13 Jur. (N. s.) 521; 36 L. J. (M. C.) 156. Eex V. Severn, etc., E. Co., 2 Barn. & Aid. 646. pp. 551, 558. Eex V. Sheffield, 2 Term Eep. 108. pp. 628, 805. c 4 Bai-n. & Cress. 198 ; 8 Barb. 648. Rex V. Skinner, 5 Esp. 219. p. 805. Eex V. Stoughton, 2 Saund. 160. pp. 638, 640. Rex V. St. Benedict, 4 Barn. & Aid. 447. p. 759. c 29 Conn. 169 ; 46 X. H. 197. d 2 Nev. & M. 597; 5 Barn. & Adol. 482. Rex V. St. Giles, 5 Mau. & Sel. 260. p. 806. e L. E. 1 Q. B. 216; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 521; 35 L. J. (M. C.) 166 ; 1 Barn. & Aid. 354, 356, 360, 361. Rex V. St. Pelrox, 4 Term Rep. 196. p. 977. Rex V. Timmins, 7 Car. & P. 499. pp. 342, 389. c 6 Daly, 214. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXVll Kex V. Trafford, 1 Barn. & Adol. 874. pp. 550, 804. Bex V. Watts, 2 Esp. 675. pp. 549, 1065. Kex V. Weston, 4 Burr. 2507. p. 806. c 18 N. J. L. 116; 5 Burr. 2702. d 5 Term Eep. 602, 503, 504, 505, 506. Kex V. West Kiding of Yorkshire, 5 Burr. 2594; s. o., 2 W. Black. 685. pp. 563, 673, 792, 805. c 18 N. J. L. Ill; 9 Hun, 67; 7 East, 597; 1 Salk. 359; 2 East, 349, 350, 351, 352, 354; 30 N. J. L. 138 ; U Wend. 60 ; 2 N. H. 513, 514 ; 37 Me. 458. Kex V. West Riding of Yorkshire, 2 East, 342. pp. 331, 332, 759, 794, 805. c 18 N. J. L. 112; 4 Barn. & Cress. 197; 30 N. J. L. 138; 38 Wis. 459, 460; 2 N. H. 514; 37 Me. 456. Kex V. West Riding of Yorkshire, 2 East, 353, note. p. 331. Rex V. West Riding of Yorkshire, 7 East, 588 (affirmed in House of Lords, 5 Taun. 284). p. 792. c 18 N. J. L. 115; 6 Allen, 454; 2 N. H. 514. Rex V. Westwood, 4 Barn. & Cress. 781. p. 642. Bex V. White, 1 Burr. 333. p. 107. Kex V. Whitney, 7 Car. & P. 208. p. 363. Kex V. Younger, 5 Term Rep. 449. p. 1094. Reynolds «. Clark, 2 Ld. Kaym. 1399. pp. 348, 390. Reynolds v. Hanrahan, 100 Mass. 313. p. 890. Reynolds v. Hindman, 32 Iowa, 146. pp. 556, 1152, 1175, 1176. c 38 Iowa, 122, 123, 280,297; 34 Iowa, 157, 279; 37 Iowa, 322. Reynolds v. New York, etc. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 248 (reversing 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 644). pp. 42-5, 426, 42T, 1181. c 8 Jones & Sp. 182; 64 X. Y. 529, 656; 6 Hun, 317; 9 Jones & Sp. 29, 352; 67 N. Y. 421; 6 N". Y. S. C. (T. &0.) 125; 62 N. Y. 255; 11 Hun, 544; 13 Hun, 332; 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 418; 60N. Y. 336. Reynolds v. Shanks, 23 Wis. 307. p. 799. Reynolds v. Shreveport, 13 La. An. 426. p. 747. Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio, 160. pp. 728, 744, 747. c 4 Ohio St. 94; 36 N. H. 296; 55 N. H. 136; McCahon (Kan.) 133; 15 Ohio, 477, 478, 479, 481; 41 111. 514; 7 Ohio St. 464; 18 Ohio, 231; 91 U. S. 551; 7 Reporter, 83, 84; 12 Mo. 427; 12 Ohio St. 378. d 16 Wis. 256 ; 122 Mass. 378 ; 18 Pa. St. 189; 4 N. Y. 205; 12 Mo. 423. Rhodes v. Roberts, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 145. pp. 1251, 1264. c 46 Ala. 394. Rhodes v. TJtioa, etc., R. Co., 5 Hun, 344. pp. 515, 517, 530. Bice V. Des Moines, 40 Iowa, 638. pp. 762, 763, 1091, 1204. Rice V. Montpelier, 19 Vt. 470. pp. 362, 769, 770, 771, 772, 1209, 1238. c 46 Vt. 586; 41 Vt. 439; 35 ST. H. 80, 81, 277; 23 Vt. 12 ; 43 Vt. 449 ; 30 Wis. 405 ; 38 Vt. 55, 276 ; 17 111. 146 ; 13 N. Y. 531 ; 17 How. 167 ; 8 Minn. 162, 163 ; 38 Md. 583 ; 21 Vt. 397 ; 43 Ind. 589, 694. Rice V. Nagle, 14 Kan. 498. p. 211. Rich V. Basterfield, 4 C. B. 783. p. 318. c 56 N. Y. 135 ; 35 N. J. L. 32 ; 21 Mich. 23 ; 46 Md. 216 ; 4 Exch. 257 ; 6 E ng. Rail. Gas. 191 ; 17 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 453 ; 3 Md. 446 ; 29 N. Y. 34, 35; 9 Md. 117; 9 C. B. (N. s.) 380, 389; 30 L. J. (0. P.) a. Richards v. Enfield, 13 Gray, 344. pp. 780, 1201. c 14 Allen, 483; 47 Vt. 36; 101 Mass. 98; 105 Mass. 601; 8 Allen, 239; 58 Ind. 232; 3 Allen, 377. Richards v. Hayward, 2 Man. & Gr. 574. p. 35. Richards v. Rose, 9 Exch. 218 ; s. c, 23 L. J. (Exch.) 3. p. 276. c 27 Gratt. 88. Richards o. Sperry, 2 Wis. 216. p. 299. Richardson v. Boston, 19 How. 253. pp. 721, 733. e 9 R. I. 472. Richardson v. Kier, 84 Cal. 63. pp. 101, 1233. c 35 Cal. 633. Richardson v. Milburn, 11 Md. 340. p. 209. Richardson v. New York, etc., R. Co., 45 N. Y. 846. pp. 419, 422. C70N. Y. 123; 32 Wis. 275; 53 Ind. 145; 10 Jones & Sp. 231 ; 36 N. J. L. 536; 71N.Y. 231;6 N. Y. S C. (T. & C.) 419. Richardson v. New York, etc., R. Co., 98 Mass. 85. pp. 1272, 1282. Richardson v. Northrup, 66 Barb. 85. pp. 214, 218, 1262. Richardson v. Spencer, 6 Ohio, 113. p. 618. Richardson v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 25 Vt. 465. pp. 261, 262, 275. c 2 Allen, 133 ; 25 N. J. L. 366 ; 122 Mass. 207. cxxxvin TABLE OF CASES. Richardson v. Wilmington, etc., K. Co., 8 Rich. L. 120. p. 450. Eichart v. Scott, 7 Watts, 460. pp. 261, 279. c 122 Maes. 207. Eichmond v. Long's Administrators, 17 Gratt. 375. pp. 727, 734, 735. c 21 Mich. 122; 122 Mass. 377; 91 U. S. 551; 12 Heisk. 137. Eichmond v. Sacrameito, etc., R. Co., 18 Cal. 351. pp. 210, 498, 1158. c 20 Minn. 135. Richmond u. Smith, 15 Wall. 429. p. 730. Eicker v. Freeman, 50 N. H. 420. pp. 1088, 1100. c 62 Me. 242. Ricket V. Metropolitan R. Co., 5 Best & S. 156. p. 840. Eicketts v. East and West India Docks, etc., R. Co., 7 Eng. Rail. Cas. 295 ; s. c, 12 C. B. 160 ; 16 Jur. 1072 ; 21 L. J. (C. P.) 201. pp. 499, 517. C42 Vt. 378; 28 N. H. 172; 13 N. Y. 52; 1 Handy, 197, 202; 25 Vt. 161; 27 Vt. 53; 6 E. I. 214; 9 Wis. 220. Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks and Canals, 7 Mass. 169. pp. 555, 559, 704, 707, 717, 1166. c 122 Mass. 350, 354, .358, 366 ; 45 Mo. 473, 474; 13 Ga. 88; 8 Barb. 652; 102 Mass. 499; 36 Mo. 662 ; 56 N. H. 294 ; 41 Ga. 231 ; 14 Me. 204 ; 7 Re ■ porter, 479; 6 Me. 99; 17 111. 144, 146; 3 Fla. 23; 7 Ohio St. 123; 2 Hill, 573; 6 111. 570; 34 Conn. 14, 16; 62 Me. 123; 47 Me. 282; 8 Barb. 652; 29 Me. 309; 7 Meto. 284; 17 Gratt. 381; 6 Duer, 408. Eider v. Smith, 3 Term Rep. 766. pp. 196, 574. c35N. H 547; 7 Conn. 93. Rider v. White, 65 N. Y. 54. pp. 202, 222. Eigby V. Hewitt, 5 Exch. 240. pp. 137, 138, 1088, 1202. C39 Md. 143; 18 Ohio St. 410; 59 111. 351, 352; 14 Allen, 298.; 20 Iowa, 224; 51 Me. 441, 442; 46 Pa. St. 161. Riley v. Baxendale, 6 Hurl. & N. 445; s. c, 80 L. J. (Exch.) 87 ; 9 Week. Rep. 347. p. 1013. c 32 Md. 417. Rindge v. Coleraine, 11 Gray, 157. pp. 1205, 1242. c 17 Mich. 118; 17 Wall. 665; 105 Mass. 81. Ring o. Cohoes, 13 Hun, 76: s. c, in Court of Appeals, 7 Reporter, 725 ; 19 Alb. L. J. 472. pp. 753, 761, 781, 1208. Eipley v. Min& Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. 136. p. 846. Ripley v. Essex & Hudson, 40 N. J. L. 45. pp. 795, 798. Ripley v. Freeholders, 27 N. J. L. 415. p. 620. Ripon V. Bittel, 30 Wis. 614. p. 1256. c 16 Kan. 384. Rittenhouse v. Independent Tel. Co., 44 N. Y. 263. pp. 838, 843, 856, 859. c 5 So. Car. 377; 62 Me. 222; 34 Wis. 482; 6 Daly, 202; 60 Me. 26. Rixford v. Smith, 52 jST. H. 355. p. 70. Roach V. New York, etc., Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. 546. p. 846. Roath V. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533. p. 104. Robbins v. Borman, 1 Pick. 122. p. 342. Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657; s. c, 2 Black, 418. pp. 740, 782, 787, 790, 900, 902, 903, 910. (See Chicago v. Rob- bins.) Bobbins v. Jones, 15 C. B. (n. s.) 221 ; s. c, 33 L. J. (C. P.) 1 ; 12 Week. Rep. 248 ; 9 L. T. (n. s.) 523. pp. 318, 823, 361, 363. c li. B. 2 C. P. 375; 36 L. J. (C. P.) 193; L. E. 1 0. P. 55. Robbins o. Mount, 4 Robt. 553; s. c, 33 How. Pr. 24. pp. 823, 324, 890. c 4 Jones & Sp. 350; 46 How. Pr. 164. Roberts v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 35 Wis. 679. pp. 348, 857, 422. Roberts v. Great Western R. Co., 4 C. B. (n. s.) 506; s. c, 4 Jur. {s. s.) 1240; 27 L. J. (C. P.) 266 ; 1 Fost. & Fin. 29. pp. 520, 522, 1244. Roberts v. Read, 16 East, 215. pp. 745, 750, 823. c 4 Jur. (N. s.) 1185. Roberts v. Smith, 2 Hurl. & N. 213 ; s. c, 3 Jur. (n. s.) 469 ; 26 L. J. (Exch.) 319. pp. 948, 962, 964, 974, 975. c 12 Ohio St. 489; L. E. 7 C. P. 286; 16 C. B. (N. s.) 693; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 335; 46 Mo. 171; 3 Hurl. & N. 654; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 406; El. Bl. & El. 106; 1 Best & S. 444, 446; 7 Jur. (s. s.) 845; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 335. 336; 3 Hurl. & X. ogo; 37 L.J. (Exch.) 251, 325; 2 Hurl. & N. 732 ; 4Jur. (N. s.) 364; 25 N. Y. 566; 48 Me. 118. Robertson v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 64 Mo. 412. pp. 521, 528. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXIX Eobertson v. Kirby, 7 Jones L. 477. p. 150. Eobertson v. Stark, 15 N. H. 109. p. 799. Robinson v. Chamberlain, 34 N. Y. 389. pp. 312, 360, 820, 821, 900. c 5 Lans. 294, 846, 349; 1 Hun, 571; 4 N. T. S. O. (T. & O.) 124; 51 Barb. 413; 11 Hun, 360; 3 N. Y. si C. (T. & C.) 7, 418; 6 Lans. 263; 12 Hun, 210; 13 Hun, 293, 429, 430 ; 57N. Y,498; 37 N. Y. 649 ; 42 N. Y. 63 ; 47 N. Y. 131 ; 46 N. Y. 196; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 596; 1 Deady, 408, 409, 412. Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 218. pp. 1165, 1181, 1185. (In full, p. 1129.) c 26 Conn. 601; 28 Mich. 41; 66 Pa. St. 276; 54 111. 484; 18 Ga. 686; 38 N. Y. 458; 101 Mass. 466 ; 47 Pa. St. 304 ; 48 Pa. St. 221 ; 52 N. H. 566; 9 Wis. 219; 2 R. I. 412; 1 Head, 619, 621; 6 Gray, 71; 31 Pa. St. 370; 8 Minn. 168; 60 N". Y. 336; 29 Vt. 428; 31 Mo. 649, 553 ; 16 Pa. St. 466 ; 18 Ohio St. 413 ; 36 Mo. 491 ; 50 Mo. 468 ; . v., 27 L. J. (Exch.) 173. p. 281. Kohback v. Pacific R. K., 43 Mo. 187. pp. 946, 970, 972. c 52 Mo. 375 ; 59 JIo. 295, 301, 307 ; 46 Mo. 169 ; 47 Mo. 576 ; 44 Mo. 294 ; 64 Mo. 123, 136 ; 62 Mo. 58. Koike V. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 26 Wis. 537. p. 158. Kome V. Dodd, 58 Ga. 238. pp. 561, 796, 1168. Rome 0. Omberg, 28 Ga. 46. pp. 745, 750. c 46 Iowa, 661. Komney Marsh v. Trinity House. (See Lords-JBailiff Jurats of Romney Marsh V. Ti-inity House, in full, p. 1063.) Kood V. New York, etc., K. Co., 18 Barb. 80. pp. 154, 157, 1242. c 32 N. T. 350; 30 Iowa, 422; 6 Hun, 326; 7 Kan. 318; 6 Lans. 132; 8 Hun, 601; 22 X. Y. 212; 7 Eeportcr, 24; 36 Mo. 32; 37 Mo. 295; 8 Cent. L. J. 278 ; 5 Hun, 506 ; 9 Cal. 257 ; 9 Nev. 297. Koof V. Railroad Co., 4 So. Car. 61. p. 512. Eooth V. Wilson, 1 Barn. & Aid. 59. p. 1096. c 44 N. Y. 465 ; L. E. S Q. B. 279. Eose u. Des Moines, etc., R. Co., 39 Iowa, 246. pp. 1270, 1291, 1292. Eose ». Groves, 5 Man. & G. 613. p. 340. Rose «. Miles, 4 Mau. & Sel. 101. pp. 340, 341, 551, 628. Rose V. St. Charles, 49 Mo. 510. pp. 749, 752. Rose o. United States Tel. Co., 3 Abb. Pr. 409. p. 848. Kosewell a. Prior, 2 Salk. 459. pp. 317, 318, 322, 874. Ross V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 6 Allen, 86. pp. 160, 166, 172 c41 Ind. 257; 98 Mass. 418; 67 N. H. 138; B Hun, 502; 118 Mass. 544; 7 Heisk. 465. Eoss V. Clinton, 46 Iowa, 606. pp. 733, 747, 748, 749, 1243, 1244. Ross V. Fedden, L. R. 7 Q. B. 661 ; s. c, 41 L. J. (Q. B ) 270 ; 26 L. T. (n. s.) 966. pp. 82, 90, 91, 324. c 27 Week. Eep. 416; 2 C. P. Div. 246. Ross u. Madison, 1 Ind. 281. pp. 738, 739, 741, 745, 748, 889. c 9 Iowa, 235; 21 Mich. 122; 26 Ind. 22, 25; 17 111. 146 ; 25 Ind. 515 ; 13 B. Mon. 561. Ross V. New York, etc.,- R. Co., 5 Hun, 488. pp. 971, 1035. Kossell V. Cottom, 31 Pa. St. 525. pp. 196, 197. c 70 111. 293; 64111.310. Rothe V. Milwaukee, etc., K Co., 21 Wis. 256. pp. 416, 424, 450. c 28 Wis. 503; 22 Wis. 248; 33 Wis. 72; 21 Minn. 297; 32 Wis. 275. Eoulston o. Clark, 8 E. D. Smith, 366. pp. 303, 304. c 58 Barb. 455. Rounds V. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 64 N. Y. 129 ; s. c, 3 Hun, 329 ; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 475. pp. 886, 887. c 18 Alb. L. J. 91; 6 Eeporter, 404; 69 JST. T. 173; 12 Hun, 438, 468. Rowbotham i;." Wilson, 6 El. & Bl. 593; s. c, 8 H. L. Cas. 348; 2 Jur. (n. s.) 736; 25 L. J. (Q. B.) 362; 8 El. & Bl. 123 ; 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 61. pp. 274, 281. c 4 Hurl. & X. 189, 697 ; 18 Minn. 337 ; 42 Md. 135 ; L. E. 7 Q. B. 722, 726 ; 42 L. J. (Q. B.) 144 ; 28 L. J. (Q. B.) 380; 5 Jur. (N. s.) 1346; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1185. Rowe V. Beal, 15 Pick. 123. p. 212. Rowe V. Granite Bridge, 21 Pick. 344. p. 752. e 4 Gray, 302; 10 Allen, 605; 15 Gray, 9; 14 Conn. 160. TABLE OF CASES. cxli Kowe V. Portsmouth, 56 N. H. 291 ; s. c, 3 Cent. L. J. 762. pp. 733, 751, 762, 768. Rowell V. Lowell, 7 Gray, 100. pp. 780, 1086. c58 Ind. 232; 3 Allen, 405; 11 Allen, 320; 101 Mass. 98; 29 Wis. 305; 7 Gray, 104; 51 Me. 133, 339 ; 13 Gray, 346 ; 4 Allen, 114 ; 8 E. I. 352. Rowell V. Montville, 4 Me. 270. pp. 759, 760. c 12 Me. 303 ; 66 Me. 355 ; 64 Me. 62 ; 5 Me. 369. Eowell 0. Railroad Co., 57 N. H. 132. pp. 164, 172. Rowell u. Williams, 29 Iowa, 210. pp. 753, 762, 781, 782, 1258, 1268. c 44 loiva, 291; 32 Iowa, 327; 38 Iowa, 598; 33 Iowa, 399. Rowland v. Cannon, 85 Ga. 105. p. 1279. c 53 Ga. 15. Rowley v. London, etc., R. Co., L. R. 8 Exch. 221 ; s. c, 42 L. J. (Exch.) 158. p. 1290. Rowning v. G-oodchild, 3 Wils. 443. p. 898. Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201. p. 323. Ruck V. Williams, 3 Hurl. & N. 308 ; s. o., 27 L. J. (Exch.) 357. pp. 77, 591, 592, 622, 714. C5 Best & S. 463,469; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 1024; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 290; 122 Mass. 362; L. E. 1 H. L. 118; 11 H. L. Gas. 721; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 577; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 235; 5 Hurl. & N. 723; 9 Jur. (N. s.) 341 ; 1 Moo. P. C. C. 119. Rudolphy v. Euchs, 44 How. Pr. 155. p. 1236. c 4 Daly, 332 ; 4 Cent. L. J. 84. Ruffner w. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 96 ; <,. v., 7 Reporter, 23 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 316. p. 154. Rughy Charity v. Merryweather, 11 East, 376, note a. p. 759. Rumford School District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193. p. 703. Runyon v. Central R. Co., 25 N. J. L. 556. pp. 406, 427, 1163, 1154. c 39 N. J. L. 192 ; 34 Iowa, 160 ; 64 Mo. 490 ; 33 N. J. L. 151, 438; 35 Ind. 466; 15 Ind. 490; 30 N. J. L. 199; 25 Ind. 196, 200. Rusch u. Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443. pp. 561, 617, 770, 792, 796, 797, 1176. c 16 Iowa, 346; 32 Iowa, 327; 17 Mich. 118; 29 Iowa, 47; 44 Iowa, 675; 21 Iowa, 414; 38 Iowa, 567; 26 Iowa, 268; i Or. 65; 54 Miss. 395; 9 Iowa, 203. Rushton V. Aspinwall, 2 Doug. 679. p. 574. Russell V. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 262. p. 799. c 34 Iowa, 271. Russell V. Corne, 1 Salk. 119. p. 1241. Russell V. Eabyan, 34 N. H. 218. p. 67. Russell V. Hanley, 20 Iowa, 219. pp. 524, 525. C20 Iowa, 193; 26 Iowa, 552; 27 Ohio St. 249; 39 Iowa, 223; 23 Iowa, 380; 25 Iowa, 142; 43 Iowa, 209 ; 21 Iowa, 376. Russell V. Hudson, etc., R. Co., 17 N. T. 134. pp. 1033, 1035. c 18 N. Y. 433 ; 53 Pa. St. 457 ; 12 Ohio St. 495 ; 49 Barb. 326; 14 Minn. 364; 38 Pa. St. Ill; 10 Allen, 238; 11 Kan. 93; 6 Eeporter, 126; 46 Texas, 539; 76 111. 398; 16 N. Y. 165,167; 5 Neb. 497; 18 Ind. 230; 25 N.T. 565, 667; 44 Oal. 82; 30 Barb. 235; 86 Pa. St. 440; 8 Kan. 617. Russell V. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667. pp. 590, 617, 618, 628, 635, 641, 643, 683, 684, 685, 700, 702, 704, 705, 712, 713, 716. (In full, p. 676.) c 7 Cent. L. J. 129; 47 Me. 281; 7 Mass. 187; 9 Iowa, 203 ; 32 N. H. 442 ; 22 Vt. 124 ; 2 Handy, 116; 20 Md. 479; 8 Barb. 651, 652; 4 Mich. 559; 36 N. I-I. 297, 298; 2 N. H. 393; 18 N. J. L. 116, 121 ; 5 Watts & S. 545 ; 7 Conn. 94 ; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 39; 122 Mass. 346, 348, 350, 360, 364; 1 Sweeny, 236; 2 Woodb. & M. 342; 27 Vt. 457; 8 Exch. .322; 9 Exch. 610, 613; 3 Fla. 24; 3 La. An. 646; 9 Mass. 260; 46 Texas, 629; 36 Mo. 562; 17 Minn. 313; 65 111. 349, 360; 1 Black, 52, 63; 20 N. H. 79; 91 U. S. 552; 17 Johns. 454; 15 Johns. 254; 17 HI. 143, 144; 29 N. Y. 311; L. R. 5 Q. B. 221, 222; 7 Ohio St. 122, 123; 6 HI. 570, 571; 2Nott&M. 537. Russell V. Shenton, 3 Q. B. 449. pp. 82, 83, 317. Russell V. Tomlinson, 2 Conn. 206. p. 198. C20 Pick. 479; 107 Mass. 678; 6 Duer, 427; 20 Barb. 480; 17 Wend. 563. Rust V. Low, 6 Mass. 90. pp. 209, 312. c 28 Mass. 166, 167; 98 Mass. 562; 55 N. H. 553; 25 Vt. 122, 125, 160; 37 N. H. 335, 336; 15 Minn. 357; 105 Mass. 76; 115 Mass. 566; 5 Denio, 259 ; 6 E. I. 214 ; 7 Ind. 319 ; 41 Wis. 683 ; 9 Wis. 209; 86 111. 104; 9 W. Va. 283; 18 Wend. 221; 7 Barb. 300, 306; 5 Me. 359, 360; 29 Me. 286, 310; 13 N. H. 400; 10 111. 145, 162, 165; 8 Mete. 287; 14 Conn. 297; 3 Wend. 145, 147; 4 Mete. 590, 592, 593, 594. Ruter V. Poy, 46 Iowa,. 132. p. 1160. Ryall V. Kennedy, 8 Jones & Sp. 347. pp. 884, 1276, 1287. cxlii TABLE OP CASES. Ryan v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 60 111. 171. p. 1028. ? 5 Hun, 496. Ryan v. Cumberland, etc., R. Co., 23 Pa. St. 384. pp. 971, 1039. c 63 Pa. St. 151 ; 53 Ga. 16 ; 53 Pa. St. 457 ; 38 Pa. St. 110; 21 111. 26; 3 Sawyer, 441; 6 Ee- porter, 126; 49 Miss. 283; 20 Md. 221, 222; 59 Pa. St. 246, 247; 28 Ind. 377; 46 Texas, 539, 550; 27 Md. 601; 76 111. 397; 32 Md. 418; 44 Oal. 82; 42 Ala. 719; 86 Pa. St. UO. Ryan v. Fowler, 24 N. T. 410. pp. 950, 973, 974, 994, 996. c 1 Sweeny, 548 ; 5 Lans. 442 ; 2 Lans. 613 ; 41 Barb. 368, 369; 3 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 247; 49 Barb. 327, 568, 573; 5 Hun, 33, 493; 46 Mo. 174; 13 Allen, 442; 46 Barb. 269; 1 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 323; 8 Hun, 257; 39 N. T. 477; 6 Eobt. 93 ; 37 Mich. 211. Ryan v. Hudson, etc., R. Co., 1 Jones & Sp. 139. pp. 886, 1177. Ryan v. Lewis, 3 Hun, 429. pp. 1260, 1262. Ryant). New York, etc., R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210. pp. 142, 171. c 35 N. T. 237, 238, 246; 7 Kan. 318; 59 Mo. 504; 42 N. T. 487; 3 Lans. 455, 466; 62 Pa. St. 368; 66 N. T. 206; 9 Hun, 673. ? 12 Kan. 379; 53 Mo. 371; 91 U". S. 471; 94 U. S. 474; 50 Cal. 183; 98 Mass. 419. d 39 Md. 141, 144; 39 N. J. L. 306; 59 111. 357; 26 Wis. 238, 239, 240, 258, 259, 270, 271, 274, 277, 280. Ryan v. Thompson, 6 Jones & Sp. 133. p. 308. c 9 Jones & Sp. 28. Ryder v. Thomas, 13 Hun, 296. pp. 900, 902, 903, 910, 1201. Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 4 Exch. 32. pp. 1226, 1237. Ryerson v. Abington, 102 Mass. 526. pp. 764, 765, 799, 801. c 114 Mass. 245 ; 116 Mass. 576 ; 6 Reporter, 529 ; 31 Wis. 186 ; 121 Mass. 444. d 41 Wis. 108. Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 8 H. L. 380. pp. 65, 70, 84, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 98, 103, 335, 337, 848. (See Fletcher v. Ry- lands, in full, p. 2.) s. Sabin v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 25 Vt 868. pp. 114, 569. c 61 N. T. 196, 197; 52 Me. 209. Sadler v. Henlock, 4 El. & Bl. 570 ; s. c, 1 Jur. (n. s.) 677; 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 138. pp. 878, 884, 905, 909, 912. c 4 Alien, 140; 35 N. J. L. 24; 3 Gray, 360; 4 Bosw. 146 ; 2 Jur. (jr. s.) 956 ; 25 L. J. (Exch.) 192; 23 Ind. 556; 52 N. H. 125. Safford v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 103 Mass. 583. p. 171. c 16 Kan. 580. Safford v. Drew, 8 Duer, 627. pp. 1272, 1277, 1288. Salisbury v. Herehenroder, 106 Mass. 458. pp. 844, 347, 558, 1087. (In full, p. 1067.) Salmon v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., N. J. L 5. (See Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Salmon.) pp. 162, 163, 166. Salter v. Utica, etc., R. Co., 59 N. Y. 631 ; s. c, 13 Hun, 187. p. 430. c 67 N. T. 687. Salters v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 3 Hun, 838; ». u., 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 559. pp. 983, 986. c 9 Hun, 526. Saltmarsh v. Bow, 56 N. H. 428. p. 766. Saltonstallv. Banker, 8 Gray, 195. p. 318. Sammel v. Wright, 5 Esp. 263. pp. 885, 894. c 5 Barn. & Cress. 557, 565, 673, 577. Sammon v. New York, etc., R. Co., 62 N. Y. 251 ; s. c, 6 Jones & Sp. 414 ; 49 How. Pr. 348. pp. 971, 1017, 1036, 1213. c 6 Reporter, 111 ; 68 Me. 50. Sampson v. The Goochland Justices, 5 , Gratt. 241. p. 759. Sanborn v. Neilson, 4 N. H. 508. p. 802. Sanders v. Stuart, 1 C. P. Div. 826. p. 857. Sandford v. Eighth Avenue R. Co., 23 N. Y. 343. p. 1012. Sandusky, etc., R. Co. v. Sloan, 27 Ohio St. 841. p. 528. Sanford v. Augusta, 32 Me. 536. p. 1259. c36N. H. 298; 11 R. I. 453. Sarch v. Blackburn, Moo. & M. 505 ; s. c, 4 Car. & P. 297. pp. 194, 220, 222. c 16 N. H. 31; 17 Wend. 498; 17 Iowa, 463; 4 N. Y. 360 ; 1 Duer, 582 ; 5 Denio, 266 ; 31 N. J. L. 240; 9 Wis. 217; 2E. I. 408; 38 Wis. 309. Sarenberger v. Houghton, 40 Vt. 150. p. 215. Sater v. Burlington, etc., Plank-road Co., 1 Iowa, 886. p. 569. Satterly v. Hallock, 5 Hun, 178. p. 1158. Sauter v. New York, etc., R. Co., 66 N. Y. 50. pp. 1281, 1290. TABLE OF CASES. cxliii Savage v. Bangor, 40 Me. 176. pp. 360, 361, 769, 787. c 57 Me. 186 ; 56 Me. 22 ; 38 Wis. 460 ; 58 Ind. 232. Savignac v. Roome, 6 Term Eep. 125. pp. 867, 868, 891. c 1 Bast, 109 ; 2 Hen. & M. Ul, 4i3 ; 10 Bing. 116; 2 N. H. 549; 12 Allen, 54; 46 N. H. 228. Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. 230. pp. 727, 819, 898. c 122 Mass. 377 ; 7 Reporter, 479 ; 91 U. S. 551. Sawyer v. Jackson, 5 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 380. p. 220. Sawyer v. Naples, 66 Me. 453. p. 757. Sawyer v. Northfield, 7 Gush. 490. pp. 560, 704, 757, 788, 789, 794. c 1 Allen, 183 ; 122 Mass. 351 ; 109 Mass. 626 ; U Gray, 156; 4 Mich. 661; 52 How. Pr. 235; 10 Allen, 604; 97 Mass. 431; SAUen, 128; 6 Allen, 455; 37 Me. 459. Sawyer v. Kutland, etc., K. Co., 27 Vt. 370. pp. 1043, 1044. c 26 Iowa, 146. Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 466. pp. 1149, 1151, 1172. Saxton V. Bacon, 31 Vt. 540. pp. 215, 1100, 1101, 1239, 1240. c 50 N. H. 144, 149, 150; 57 N. H. 93. Sa.\ton V. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153. p. 731. c 4 Mo. App. 194. Saylor v. Smith, 2 Week. N. C. 687. p. 556. Scales V. Chattahoochee County, 41 Ga. 225. p. 617. Scales V. Pickering, 4 Bing. 448. p. 552. Scammon v. Chicago, 25 111. 424. pp. 740, 89^, 908, 910. c 42 111. 507; 2 Black, 428; 7 Cent. L. J. 494; 35 N. J. L. 22; 75 111. 290; 83 lU. 359; 5 Neb. 143; 63 111. 18; 70 111. 54; 45 111. 457; 80 lU. 186. Scandover v. Warne, 2 Camp. 270. p. 826. Scetchet v. Eltham, 1 Freem. (K. B.) 534. pp. 176, 209. Schaahs u. Woodburu, etc., Co., 56 Mo. 173. p. 1151. Schaefler v. Sandusky, 33 Ohio St. 246. p. 1205. Schattner v. Kansas City, 53 Mo. 162. pp. 732, 747. c 3 Mo. App. 261; 55 Mo. 125. Schauck v. Northern Central R. Co., 25 Md. 462. pp. 970, 1028, 1033. c 5 Reporter, 698. Schell V. Second National Bank, 14 Minn. 43. p. 346. Schell V. Stein, 76 Pa. St. 398. p. 827. Schermerhorn v. Hudson, etc., K. Co., 88 N. Y. 103. p. 523. Schienfeldt v. Norris, 115 Mass. 17. p. 382. Schierhold v. North Beach, etc., K. Co., 40 Cal. 447. pp. 1184, 1188, 1243. Schinotti c. Bumsted, 6 Term Eep.' 646. pp. 668, 814. c 3 Allen, 168. Schmid v. Humphi-ey (Sup. Ct. Iowa), 12 West. Jar. 475. pp. 216, 851, 383, 1093, 1094, 1096. Schmidt v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 83 HI. 405. pp. 763, 1092, 1168, 1280. Schmidt V. Harkness, 3 Mo. App. 585. pp. 277, 381. c 3 Mo. App. 278. Schmidt v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 23 Wis. 186. pp. 1192, 1197. c 60 Mo. 484 ; 43 Wis. 677 ; 28 Wis. 305. Schnelr v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 40 Iowa, 337. pp. 512, 520. Schnier v. The People, 23 111. 17. p. 1092. Schoolbred v. Charleston, 2 Bay, 63. p. 753. Schooner Norway v. Jensen, 52 111. 373. pp. 971, 973, 994. e 67 111. 465; 68 111. 552; 60 111. 173; 37 Mich. 211. Schroederu. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Iowa, 344 ; s. c, 47 Iowa, 875 ; 19 Alb. L. J. 234; 6 Cent. L. J. 47; 17 Am. L. Eeg. 119. pp. 1000, 1001. c 46 Iowa, 401. Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts, 453. pp. 819, 898. Schuerman v. Missouri E. Co., 3 Mo. App. 565. p. 1177. Schular u. Hudson, etc., E. Co., 38 Barb. 653. pp. 899, 911, 912, 915. c 7 Cent. L. J. 494; 23 Ind. 560. Schultz V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 44 Wis. 638. pp. 461, 462, 1021, 1026. Schultz V. Pacific E. E., 36 Mo. 13. pp. 1005, 1280. c 59 Mo. 296; 45 Mo. 260; 3 Mo. App. 305; 64 Mo. 127, 136 ; 43 Mo. 194 ; 37 Mo. 294. d 59 Mo. 290, 292, 294, 302, 309; 64 Mo. 126. Schultz V. Pennsylvania E. Co., 5 Ee- porter, 876. pp. 426, 1212. cxliv TABLE OF CASES. Schumacher v. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App. 297. pp. 737, 743. Schuyler County v. Mercer County, 9 HI. 20. p. 619. Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. McDonough, 38 Pa. St.'78. pp. 556, 567, 569, 570. Schwartz v. G-ilmore, 45 HI. 455. pp. 740, 908, 914. Schwartz v. Hudson, etc., E. Co., 4 Kobt. 847. p. 416. Schwarz v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 58 Mo. 207. p. 499. c 58 Mo. 392. Schweickhardt v. St. Louis, 2 Mo. App. 571. pp. 762, 787, 900. Scotch Mining Co. v. Lead Mills Co., 84 L. T. (n. s.) 39. p. 77. Scott V. Bay, 3 Md. 431. pp. 114, 320, 1252. c 45 Md. 135. Scott V. Dickinson, 14 Pick. 276. p. 212. Scott V. Dublin, etc., E. Co., 11 Irish C. L. (n. s.) 377. p. 1152. Scott V. Ely, 4 Wend. 555. pp. 825, 826. Scott V. Hale, 16 Me. 326. pp. 148, 149. Scott V. Hunter, 46 Pa. St. 192. pp. 1069, 1083, 1100, 1101. c 81 Pa. St. 51 ; 53 Pa. St. 442 ; 106 Mass. 461 ; 49 N. Y. 431. Scott V. London Docks Co., 3 Hurl. & Colt. 596; s. c, 11 Jur. (n. s.) 204; 84 L. J. (Exch.) 17, 220; 11 Week. Eep. 410 ; 11 L. T. (n. s.) 148 ; 10 Jur. (n. s.) 1107. pp. 21, 31, 69, 98, 418, 1221, 1229, 1230. c 4 Hurl. & Colt. 279, 407; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 160, 164; L. E. 1 Exch. 286; 40 L. J. (Q. B.) 195, 196; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 606, 706; 11 Hun, 48; L. E. 6 Q. B. 391, 392 ; 67 N. T. 571 ; 36 L. J. (C. P.) 24; L. E. 2 0. P. 11; 10 Allen, 375; 53 N. H. 449; 13 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 372; 4 Barb. 598; 17 Gratt. 379; L. E. 3 P. C. 122. Scott V. Manchester, 1 Hurl. & N. 59; s. c, 26 L. J. (Exch.) 132 ; 2 Hurl. & N. 204; 3 Jur. (if. s.) 590; 26 L. J. (Exch.) 406. pp. 592, 606, 711, 717, 724, 783. cllR. 1. 144; 63 N.Y. 287,288; 36N.H.295; 55 N. H. 136; 122 Mass. 359, 366, 373; 62 N. Y. 164; 3 Hurl. & N. 166; 10 Mich. 199; 11 C. B. (N. s.) 206, 208; 8 Jur. (N. s.) 80, 81; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 363, 364 ; 4 Bosw. 146 ; L. E. 1 H. L. 115 ; 11 H. Ii. Cas. 718; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 576; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 233 ; 91 U. S. 551 ; 23 Ind. 556 ; 17 Gratt. 242. Scott V. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403 ; s. c, 2 W. Black. 892. pp. 1065, 1084, 1099, 1251. c 3 Q. B. Div. 330; 7 Cent. L. J. 12; 17 Alb. L. J. 505; L. E. 3 Adm. 476; 18 Vt. 613; 39 N. J. L. 309; 59 111. 352; 7 Conn. 95; 3 Barb. 49; 4 Gratt. 154; 26 Wis. 268; 4 Gray, 405, 411; 4 Man. & G. 57 ; 4 Scott N. E. 663 ; 109 Mass. 282 ; 42 Md. 138; 4 So. Car. 67; 35 N. Y. 213; L. E. 9 Q. B. 267; 2 Hen. & M. 440, 441, 442, 445; 75 111. 97 ; 15 I. R. C. L. 339, 345 ; 66 Mo. 352 ; 11 Allen, 519; 5 C. B. 504; 19 Johns. 382; 3 East, 596, 599, 601 ; 62 Pa. St. 365 ; 4 Whart. 147 ; 50 N. H. 428, 429; 6 Hurl. &N. 364; 55 N. Y. 119. Scott V. Simons, 54 N. H. 430. pp. 323, 324. Scott V. Wilmington, etc., E. Co., 4 Jones L. 432. p. 512. c 8 Nev. 115. Soribner v. Kelley, 38 Barb. 14. pp. 201, 209. Scudderj). Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195. p. 979. c 34 Ga. 424; 59 Mo. 299; 30 Ga. 150; 15 Ga. 358. ScuUin V. Dolan, 4 Daly, 163. p. 349. Seabrook v. Hecker, 2 Eobt. 291 ; s. t., 4 Eobt, 344. pp. 346, 1289. Seaman v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 15 Wis. 578. p. 1291. Seaman v. New York, 8 Daly, 147. pp. 557, 762. Seamans v. Smith, 46 Barb. 320. p. 218. c 38 Iowa, 522. Searle v. Fowler, 11 C. B. (n. s.) 429. p. 970. Searle v. Lindsay, 11 C. B. (n. s.) 429 ; s. c, 8 Jur. (n. s.) 746; 31 L. J. (C. P.) 106 ; 10 Week. Eep. 89 ; 5 L. T. (n. s.) 427. p. 1033. c 16 C. B. (N. s.) 680, 690; 13 Allen, 443; 6 Reporter, 111 ; 32 Md. 418 ; 68 Me. 51. Searles v. Ladd, 123 Mass. 580. p. 219. Searles v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 35 Iowa, 490. pp. 497, 498, 506, 507. Sears v. Central E., etc., Co., 53 G-a. 630. pp. 1017, 1020, 1280. c 56 Ga. 277. Sears v. Charlemont, 6 Allen, 437. p. 202. Sears i>. Dennis, 105 Mass. 310. pp. 1092, 1206. c 119 Mass. 239. Seaver v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 14 Gray, 466. pp. 946, 982, 1038. c 102 Mass. 584; 49 Barb. 326; 14 Minn. 364; TABLE or CASES. cxlv 46 Mo. 169 ; 10 Allen, 237, 238 ; 55 Ind. 49 ; 11 Kan. 93; 59 Pa. St. 261; 8 Allen, 446; 3 Col. 610; 119 Mass. 421; 41 Ala. 717; 8 Kan. 517. Seeley v. Peters, 10 111. 130. pp. 210, 429, 602. c 16 111. 201; 1 Handy, 196; 39 111. 189, 190, 191, 192, 194 ; 3 Ohio St. 181 ; 42 111. 451 ; 31 Miss. 184; 38 111. 429; 20 lU. 338; 13 lU. 610; 3 Iowa, 402, 404. Seger v. Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290. pp. 1204, 1247, 1259. c 33 Conn. 65; 27 Conn. 300; 44 Iowa, 322; 48 N. H. 545 ; 6 Nev. 231, 233. Seigel V. Eisen, 41 Gal. 109. pp. 1085, 1178, 1201. Seller v. Western Union Tel. Co., 3 Am. L. Eev. 777. p. 841. Selden v. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 29 N. Y. 634; =. u., 24 Barb. 362. pp. 51, 105, 744. e 5 Eobt. 489. ? 51 N. Y. 481. Selma, etc., R. Co. v. Fleming, 48 Ga. 514. pp. 496, 540. Selma, etc., E. Co. v. Keith, 53 Ga. 178. p. 569. Selma, etc., K. Co. v. Lacy, 43 Ga. 461 ; s. u., 49 Ga. 106. pp. 1272, 1283, 1285. Selma, etc., E. Co. v. Webb, 49 Ala. 240. p. 1251. Senior v. Ward, 1 El. & El. 385; s. c, 5 Jur. (N. s.) 172; 28 L. J. (Q. B.) 139; 7 Week. Kep. 261. pp. 958, 959, 962, 963, 964, 967, 970, 974, 1279. c 7 Hurl. & N. 947; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 994; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 360; 3 Dill. 326. Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio, 423. p. 477. Serrot v. Omaha, 1 Dill. 312. pp. 766, 1245. Sessions v. Newport, 23 Vt. 9. pp. 761, 1238. c21 Vt. 397; 37 Vt. 510. Severin v. Eddy. 52 111. 189. p. 789. c 32 Iowa, 328 ; 73 111. 216. Severy ■«. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306. p. 310. c 48 Vt. 130. Seward v. Milford, 21 Wis. 485. pp. 766, 768. c 43 Wis. 522 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 428 ; 42 Ind. 343 ; 38 Wis. 46'i. Sewell V. Cohoes, 11 Hun, 626. pp. 760, 803. Sewell V. Mattoon, 9 Mass. 535. p. 827. Sexton V. Zett, 44 N. T. 430 ; s. c, 56 Barb. 119. pp. 344, 354, 1235. c 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & G.) 137; 4 Hun, 27; 4 Cent. L. J. 84. Seymour v. Greenwood, 6 Hurl. & N. 359. p. 887. c 12 Allen, 55. Seymour v. Maddox, 16 Q. B. 326 ; s c, 15 Jur. 723 ; 20 L. .J. (Q. B.) 327. pp. 286, 290, 293, 313, 962, 964, 971, 984, 995, 1008, 1235. c 8 Jur. (N. s.) 198; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 203; 7 N. Y. 499 ; L. E. 3 C. P. 498 ; 37 L. J. (0. P.) 234 ; 38 Pa. St. 110; 63 N. Y. 452; 106 Mass. 286; L. E. 1 0. P. 286; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 189; 12 Jar. (N. S.) 433; 29 Ind. 429; 9 Gush. 114; 119 Mass. 414; 39 Iowa, 630; 51 Miss. 642; 28 Vt. 62; 48 Vt. 1.30; 17 Vt. 156; 3 El. & Bl. 409; 29 Conn. 559, 561; 34 Conn. 138; 11 Exch. 270; 42 Ala. 717. d 24 N. Y'. 415, 416, 417. Shadgett v. Clipson, 8 East, 328. p. 825. Shafer v. Wilson, 44 Md. 268. pp. 275, 276, 277. Shanchan v. New York E. Co., 10 Abb. Pr. 398. p. 530. Shanny v. Androscoggin Mills, 66 Me. 420. pp. 973, 980, 984, 985, 1010, 1015, 1018, 1032. Sharp V. Grey, 9 Bing. 457. p. 562. Sharp V. Powell, L. E. 7 C. P. 253 ; 41 L. J. (C. P.) 95; 20 Week. Eep. 584; 26 L. T. (k. s.) 436. p. 1037. c 3 Q. B. Div. 336; 7 Cent. L. J. 114; 17 Alb. L. J. 507; 38 Wis. 590; 85 111. 13; 55 N. Y. 119. Sharrod v. London, etc., E. Co., 4 Exch. 580; s. c, 6 Eng. Eail. Cas. 239; 7 Dow. & L. 213 ; 14 Jur. 23 ; 20 L. J. (Exch.) 185. pp. 499, 890. c 12 Gray, 59; L. E. 10 Exoh. 269, 270; 44 L. J. (Exch.) 179; 25 Vt. 124, 371; 39 Me. 278; 31 N.J. L. 231; 12 C. B. 169; 16 Q. B. 617. Shartle i/. Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 308. pp. 753, 758, 760, 761, 793, 1099, 1243, 1249, 1253, 1266. c 19 Minn. 260, 302; 21 Minn. 67, 68. Shaw V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 8 Gray, 45. pp. 423, 424. c 107 Mass. 497; 10 Allen, 532; 101 Mass. 202; 114 Mass. 352; 53 How. Pr. 392; 55 Me. 441; 9 Kan. 629; 57 Me. 130, 135; 97 Mass. 368; 48 N. H. 645. Shaw V. Crocker, 42 Cal. 435. pp. 743, 900. Shaw ^. Eeed, 9 Watts & S. 72. p. 895. cxlvi TABLE OF CASES. Shawhan v. Clarke, 24 La. An. 300. p. 216. Shea V. Lowell, 8 Allen, 136. pp. 361, 786. c 102 Mass. 334; 24 Wis. 274; 12 Allen, 670; 52N. H. 413. Shea V. Potrero, etc., R. Co., 44 Cal. 414. pp. 897, 399, 1173. Shea V. Sixth Avenue R. Co., 62 N. T. 180. p. 887. c 37 Mich. 213. Sheaf V. Utica, etc., R. Co., 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 388. p. 530. Sheehan v. Edgar, 58 N. Y. 631. pp. 382, 388, 1256, 1257. Sheehy v. Burger, 62 N. Y. 558. p. 1198. Sheffield v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 21 Barb. 339. pp. 431, 1147. c34 N. Y. 629; 34 Iowa, 160, 161; 18 N. Y. 253 ; 40 111. 234 ; 27 Barb. 228, 541 ; 39 N. Y. 364 ; 33 Iowa, 668. Shehan v. Cornwall, 29 Iowa, 99. p. 222. Shelbyville, etc., R. Co. v. Lewark, 4 Ind. 471. pp. 1260, 1261. Sheldon v. Cox, 2 Eden, 224. p. 890. Sheldon v. Hudson, etc., R. Co., 14 N. Y. 218 ; IS. c, 29 Barb. 226. pp. 154, 160. c 39 Md. 136 ; 12 Kan. 370, 372 ; 7 Heisk. 462 ; 42 Vt. 457 ; 32 X. Y. 347, 348, 350 ; 41 Ind. 257 ; 30 Iowa, 422; 91 U. S. 470; 50 Cal. 184; 25 X. Y. 646; 11 Hun, 184, 185, 220; 30 Mich. 190; 7 Kan. 318; 8 Hun, 600; 7 Eeporter, 24; 11 Kan. 55; 37 Mo. 295; 3 Lans. 455; 5 Hun, 76; 21 Minn. 64; 5 Hun, 605; 9 Nev. 286, 291. Sheldon v. Litchfield County, 1 Root, 158. p. 618. Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484; s. v., 42 Barb. 368. p. 55. c 51 N. Y. 487. Shelton v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 60 Mo. 412. p. 518. Shepard v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 35 N. Y. 641. pp. 524, 526, 531. c 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 539; 2 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 389; 25 Iowa, 142; 38 N. Y. 437. Shepardson v. Colerain, 13 Mete. 55. pp. 362, 766, 786. c 38 Vt. 56; 43 Ind. 589, 694; 4 Gray, 69; 57 Me. 376; 35 N. H. 276, 312; 7 Cush. 500; 30 Wis. 403; 68 Me. 367; 39 Me. 197; 13 N. Y. 631. Shepherd v. Chelsea, 4 Allen, 113. pp. 732, 776, 1086, 1089. « 11 AUen, 321; 61 Me. 339. Shepherd v. Hees, 12 Johns. 433. pp. 209, -214. c 20 111. 491; 5 Denio, 260; 22 Barb. 579; 86 ni. 104; 7 Barb. 301; 13 Barb. 497. Shepherd v. Lincoln, 17 Wend. 250. pp. 821, 823, 824. c 4 HUl, 6.33; 29 N. Y. 303; 42 N. Y. 53; 34 N. Y. 390. Sherbourne v. Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113. p. 618. Sherfey v. Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58. pp. 218, 220, 222. c 37 Iowa, 616; 31 Conn. 131. Sheridan v. Bean, 8 Mete. 284. p. 197. c 16 Mo. 611; 29 Me. 288. Sheridan v. Brooklyn, etc., E. Co., 36 N. Y. 39. pp. 1181, 1280. Sherley v. Billings, 8 Bush, 147. p. 887. Sherman v. Barnes, 1 Moo. & R. 69. p. 1060. c 24 Wend. 469. Sherman v. Fall River Iron- Works Co., 2 Allen, 524; s. c, 5 Allen, 213. p. 107. c 117 Mass. 538. Sherman v. Favour, 1 Allen, 191. pp. 218, 1085. Sherman u. Kortright, 52 Barb. 267. p. 802. c 52 N. H. 415 ; H Hun, 219. Sherman v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 17 N. Y. 153; s. i;., 15 Barb. 574. pp. 1028, 1039. c 7 Eobt. 611; 18 N. Y. 433; 53 Pa. St. 457; 49 Barb. 326; 1 Lans. 110; 46 Texas, 539; 23 Pa. St. 386 ; 22 Ind. 29 ; 18 Ind. 230 ; 32 Md. 418 ; 25 N. Y. 665 ; 30 Barb. 236 ; 6 Eobt. 93. Sherman v. Western Stage Co., 24 Iowa, 516. pp. 1152, 1280, 1283, 1291. Sherwood v. Hamilton, 37 Upper Canada Q. B. 410. p. 1208. Sherwood v. Seaman, 2 Bosw. 127. p. 323. Sherwood B. Weston, 18 Conn. 32. p. 759. c 27 Conn. 64, 68. Shields v. Washington Tel. Co., 9 West L. J. 5. p. 854. Shields v. Yoage, 15 Ga. 349. pp. 970, 1272, 1281. c 54 Ga. 505 ; 34 Ga. 4^; 57 Ga. 358, 359, 360 ; 69 Mo. 299; 21 111. 26; 76111. 397. Shiells V. Blackburne, 1 H. Black. 158. p. 475. TABLE OF CASES. cxlvii Shindelbeck v. Moon, 32 Ohio St. 264. p. 317. Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass. 251. s. c, 106 Mass. 194. pp. 99, 321, 337, 340, 348, 349. c 17 Am. L. Beg. (N. 8.) 456 ; 6 Reporter, 460, 461; 68 Me. 164; 122 Mass. 227; 114 Mass. 153; 104 Mass. 78 ; 115 -Mass. 89. . ? 55 N. H. 58. Short V. Knapp, 2 Daly, 150. p. 1152. Shorter v. The People, '2- N. Y. 193. p. 1092. ' ■ Shrewsbury v. Smith, 12 Gush. 177. pp. 55, 101, 1233. c 51 N. r. 4S7 ; 107 Mass.' 493. Shriever v. Stokes, 8 B. Mon. 454. pp.. 261, 276, 278. c 18 Minn. 344, 345; 25 N. J. L. 370; 16 Ark. 318; 122 Mass. 207. Shrunk u. Schuylkill Nav. Co., 14 Serg. & R. 71. pp. 567, 568. Shugart v. Halliday, 11 Oh. Leg. N. 111. p. 759. Shultz V. Chicago, etc., E. Co.; 48 Wis. 589. p. 1049. Siegel V. Schantz, 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 353. p. 978. Sika V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 21 Wis. 370. pp. 516, 531. d 43 Wis. 675, 677, 679, 681 ; 24 Wis. 582. Sikes V. Johnson, 16 Mass. 389. p. 1134. Sills V. Brown, 9 Car. & P. 601. pp. 373, 471. Silvers v. Nerdlinger, 30 Ind. 53. pp. 354, 910. c 43 Ind. 590; 42 Ind. 343, 345. Simmer v. St. Paul, 23 Minn. 408. pp. 731, 733, 1263. Simmonson v. Stellenmerf, Edm. Sel. Cas. 194. pp., 383, 387, 1161. Simons v. Monier, 29 Barb. 419. pp. 884, 890. c 61 Barb. 113; 42 How. Pr. 393; 23 Ind. 557. Simpson v. Bloss, 7 Taun. 246. pp. 1076, 1161. ' Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. 311. pp. 468, 471. , c 46Pa. St. 163; 4 Am. L. Keg. (N. s.) 21. Simpson «. Keokuk, 34 Iowa, 568. p. 1159. ■ . c 42 Iowa, 307 ; 38 Iowa, 417, 522. Simpson v. The State, 5 Yerg. 856. p. 242. Sims V. Butler County, 49 Ala. 110. p. 617. Sims V. Macon, etc., E. Co., 28 Ga. 93. p. 1280. Simson v. London General Omnibus Co., L. E. 8 C. P. 390. p. 203. Sincram v. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co., 28 Ind. 244. p. 211. c 37 Ind. 547, 549. Singleton v. Eastern Counties E. Co., 7 C. B. (n. s.) 287. pp. 1187, 1197. c60 Mo. 485; 27 Ind. 515; 23 Wis. 194; 18 Ohio St. 411; 98 Mass. 569. Singleton v. Williamson, 7 Hurl. & N. 410 ; s. c, 8 Jur. (n. s. ) 60 ; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 17; 10 Week. Eep. 174; 5 L. T. (n. s.) 644. p. 209. c 2 Hurl. & Colt. 336. Sinnickson u. Johnson, 17 N. J. L. 129. pp. 566, 568. Sizer v. Syracuse, etc., E. Co., 7 Lans. 67. p. 794. Skelton v. London, etc., E. Co., L. E. 2 C. P. 631; s.c, 36 L. J. (C. P.) 249; 16 L. T. (n. s.) 563; 15 Week. Eep. 925. p. 419. c 34 Iowa, 158; 40 N. Y. 48; 3 App. Cas. 1196, 1211, 1212 ; 59 N. Y. 472; L. E. 3 C. P. 370. Skinner v. Housatonic E. Co., 1 Cush. 475; s. c, sicb nom. Carey v. Berkshire E. Co. p. 1272. c 5 Ch. Leg. N. 314; 14 B. Mon. 207; 21 Barb. 246; L. E. 8 Exoh. 97; 42 L. J. (Exch.) 56; 9 Cush. 109. Skipp V. Eastern Counties E. Co., 9 Exoh. 223 ; s. c, 23 L. J. (Exch.) 23. pp. 941, 959, 962, 1008. c 49 N. Y. 534; 10 Mich. 199; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 769; 20 Mich. 127; 7 Best & S. 681; 42 N. H: 240; 14 Minn. 363; .38 Pa. St. 110, 111 ; -21 111. 26; 119 Mass. 413, 414; 3 Eobt. 84; 28 How. Pr. 475; 6 Ind. 207; 31 Cal. 382'; 10 Mich. 199; 49 Miss. 283 ; 17 K. Y. 156 ; 4 Or. 57 ; 76 Ul. 397 ; 25 N. Y. 567, 570. Slack V. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612. p. 318. Slater v. Mersereau, 64 N. Y. 138 ; s. c, 5 Daly, 445. pp. 907, 914, 915, 1088. c 7 Cent. L. J. 494; 13 Hun, 88. Slattery v. Dublin, etc., E. Co., 3 App. Cas. 1155. p. 1253. Slattery's Administrator v. Toledo, etc., E. Co., 23 Ind. 81. pp. 1035, 1039, 1052, 1279. c 31 Ind. 183; 14 Minn. 363, 364; 49 Mo. 285; 28 Ind. -377; 8 Cent. L. J. 14; 58 Ind. 28. cxlviii TABLE OF CASES. Sleath V. Wilson, 9 Car. & P. 607; s. c, sub nom. Heath v. Wilson, p. 885. c 4 Daly, 341 ; U How. 486 ; 3 Cliff. 425. d L. E. 4 Q. B. 479; 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 224; 10 Best & S. 339. Sleeper v. Sandown, 52 N. H. 244. p. 1203. c 13 Hun, 85. Slinger v. Henneman, 38 Wis. 504. p. 218. Slingsby v. Barnard, 1 Eoll. 430. pp. 257, 275. c 1 Oromp. & J. 28 ; 6 Exch. 797 ; 25 N. J. L. 362; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 1185; 25 X. T. 338; 21 Barb. 422. cl 17 Johns. 101 ; 12 Mass. 227 ; 122 Mass. 202. Sloane v. Elmer, 64 N. Y. 201 ; s. c, 1 Hun, 310. p. 893. Sly V. Edgeley, 6 Esp. 6. pp. 670, 876, 902. c 20 Vt. 534 ; 14 Barb. 110 ; 6 Mee. & W. 510 ; 4 Jur. 970; 9 Mee. & W. 714; 6 Jur. 607; 2 Denio, 450; 15 111. 74; 5 Barn. & Cress. 559; 62 N. H. 125. «l 6 N. Y. 63; 8 Cal. 495, 498; 3 Gray, 357 ; 21 Iowa, 577 ; 22 Mo. 546 ; 4 Ohio St. 415. Sly v. Finch, Cro. Jac. 514. p. 826. Small V. Chicago, etc., K. Co. (Sup. Ct. Iowa), 6 Cent. L. J. 310 (reversed in 8 Cent. L. J. 276). pp. 15.5, 170, 171. Smart v. Morton, 5 El. & Bl. 30 ; s. c, 1 Jur. (n. s.) 825; 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 260. p. 281. c 4 Hurl. & N. 190; 2 Hurl. & N. 834; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 176; 27 L. J. (Q. B.)66; 6 El. &B1. 603; 2 Jur. (N. s.) 739; 25 L. J. (Q. B.) 367; 8 El. & BI. 151 ; L. K. 7 Q. B. 726. Smith V. Agawam Canal Co., 2 Allen, 355. p. 104. Smith V. Birmingham Gas Co., 1 Ad. & B. 526. p. 888. Smith V. Boston, 7 Cush. 255. p. 646. Smith V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 120 Mass. 490. pp. 416, 1094, 1203. c 124 Mass. 388; 5 Reporter, 724. Smith V. Brampton, 2 Salk. 644; s. c, sub nom. Smith v. Frampton, 2 Salk. 644 ; 1 Ld. Kaym. 62 ; 5 Modern, 87. p. 146. Smith V. Brown, L. R. 6 Q. B. 729. p. 1287. Smith V. Causey, 22 Ala. 568. p. 219. Smith V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 42 Wis. 520; s. c, 5 Cent. L. J. 424. p. 1055. Smith V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa, 518. pp. 518, 1159. c 44 Iowa, 159. Smith V. Chicago, etc., K Co., 34 Iowa, 506. pp. 506, 520, 523. c 42 Iowa, 423; 38 Iowa, 251. Smith V. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio, 514. p. 747. c 15 Ohio, 477; 7 Ohio St. 463; 12 Ohio St. 378. Smith V. Clark, 3 Lans. 208. p. 1239. Smith V. Condry, 1 How. 28. p. 895. Smith V. Conway, 121 Mass. 216. p. 1093. c 68 Me. 558. Smith V. Cook, 1 Q. B. Div. 79 ; s. <;., 45 L. J. 122 , 3 Cent. L. J. 190. p. 201. Smith V. Corporation of Washington, 20 How. 135. pp. 694, 728. Smith V. Darby, 42 L. J. (Q. B.) 140; «. c, L. E. 7 Q.' B. 716. ' p. 281. Smith V. Dedham, 8 Cush. 522. pp. 754, 755, 756, 775. c 11 K. I. 453. Smith V. Dobson, 3 Scott N. E. 366. p. 1088. Smith V. Dygert, 12 Barb. 613. p. 386. Smith V. Eastern E. E., 35 N. H. 356 pp. 512, 514, 534. c 35 N. H. 548; 55 N. H. 554; 16 Kan. 575, 576; 52 N. H. 558; 7 Mich. 421. Smith V. Fletcher, L. E. 7 Exch. 305 ; s. c, 41 L. J. (Exch,) 193; 20 Week. Eep. 987; 27 L. T. (w. s.) 164 (affirmed in 2 App. Cas. 781). p. 55. c 18 Minn. 332, 334, 337 ; 11 Bush, 477; 2 App. Oas. 98. Smith V. Frampton, 1 Ld. Eaym. 62. p. 146. Smith V. Gardner, 11 Gray, 418. pp. 383, 385. c 119 Mass. 68; 114 Mass. 88. Smith V. Great Eastern E. Co., L. E. 2 C. P. 4; s. v., 36 L. J. (C. P.) 22; 15 Week. Eep. 131 ; 15 L. T. (n. s.) 246. pp. 197, 1222. Smith u. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 37 Mo. 287. pp. 153, 160, 168. c 16 Kan. 255; 12 Kan. 370; 46 Mo. 4B9; 7 Heisk. 462; 40 Mo. 135, 137; 53 Mo. 369; 45 Mo. 326; 30 Iowa, 422; 7 Kan. 318; 30 Wis. 126; 5 Hun, 503; 9 Nev. 296. Smith V. Independent Line of Telegraph, Scott & Jar. on Tel., § 412, note. p. 860. Smith V. Jacques, 6 Conn. 530. p. 196. TABLE OF CASES. cxlix Smith V. Joiner, 1 D. Chip. 62. p. 899. Smith V. Kenrick, 7 0. B. 515 ; s. c, 13 Jur. 362; 18L. J. (C. P.)172. pp. 5, 6, 8, 18, 22, 3.3, 3.5, 38, 39, 40, 41, 77, 79, 81, 108, 273, 275. C 15 C. B. (N. S.) 390, 392; 33 L. J. (O. P.) 105, 106; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 154; 18 Minn. 337, 338; L. E. 3 H. L. 3.39, 342; 3 Hurl. & Colt. 787; 37 L. J. (Exch. 164, 165; 12 Q. B. 754; 15 Jur. 128; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 16 ; L. E. 7 Exch. 311 ; 41 L. J. (Exch.) 196; 2 C. P. Div. 243, 244. Smith V. Leavenworth, 15 Kan. 81. pp. 753, 781, 782, 783. c 16 Kan. 381, 385. Smith V. London, etc., Docks Co., L. E. 3 C. P. 326; s. c, 18 L. T. (n. s.) 403; 16 Week. Rep. 728 ; 37 L. J. (0. P.) 217. pp. 316, 556. c 62 Me. 563; 41 N. Y. 536; 59 N. Y.32; 35 N. J. li. 25 ; 4 Hun, 163. Smith V. London, etc., E. Co., L. K. 5 C. P. 98; s. v., 39 L. J. (C. P.) 68; 18 Week. Kep. 343; 21 L. T. (n. s.) 668; 19 Week. Kep. 230; L. R. 6 0. P. 14; 40 L. J. (C. P.) 21; 23 L. T. (n. s.) 678. pp. 140, 153, 154, 162, 169. c 39 Md. 142; 28 Wis. 487; 39 N. J. L. 305, 307; 59 111. 355; 26 Wis. 235, 274; 38 N. J. L. 9; 11 W. Va. 29, 38;, 49 N. Y. 425; 21 Minn. 63; ^ Mich. 9;. 62 Pa. St. 369; 56 Me. 505. Smith V. Lowell, 6 Allen, 39. p. 1204. c 13 Allen, 86 ; 29 Iowa, 48 ; 8 Allen, 450 ; 30 Wis. 415. Smith V. Lowell Man. Co., 124 Mass. 114 ; s. e., 5 Reporter, 397 ; 6 Cent. L. J. ■ 298. pp. 970, 1033, 1035. Smith V. Marrable, 11 Mee. & W. 5. p. 323. Smith V. Martin, 2 Saund. 400. pp. 257, 262, 275. Smith V. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 63. p. 741. «• 41 Wis. 148. Smith V. Montgomery, 52 Me. 178. pp. 197, 218. Smith D. Nashville, etc., E. Co., 6 Heisk. 174;s. o.,.6 Coldw. 589. p. 451. c 9 Heisk. 828. Smith V. New York, 66 N. Y. 295; s. c, 4 Hun, 637. p. 753. Smith V. New York, etc., E. Co., 19 N. Y. 127: s. c, 6 Duer, 22-5. pp. 983, 1040, 1041, 1013, 1279. c 1 Sweeny, 548; 65 B.arb. 106; 12 Ohio St. S81; 12 Minn. 372; 56 Ind. 519; 57 N. Y. 112; 30 Barb. 237. Smith 0. O'Connor, 48 Pa. St. 218. pp. 1181, 1184, 1187, 1192. c 18 Ohio St. 414; 57 Pa. St. 174; 55 Ind. 50; 65 Pa. St. 273, 274, 276; 75 Pa. St. 86; 6 Phila. 243; 15 Wall. 408; 56 Ind. 618; 69 Pa. St. 215. Smith V. Old Colony, etc., E. Co., 10 E. L 22. p. 153. Smith V. Pelah, 2 Stra. 1264. pp. 175, 178, 181, 195, 202, 20S, 220. c 4 Denio, 501 ; 7 Ala. 170 ; 20 111. 493 ; 23 Pa. St. 374; 13 Ohio St. 493; 3 Keyes, 269, 270; 2 Abb. App. Dec. 498, 499; 16 N. H. 80; 2 Daly, 297; 36 How. Pr. 257; 17 Wend'. 500; 9 Q. B. 112; 10 Jur. 694; 16 L. J. (Q. B.) 67; 3 C. B. 240, 241; 22 Ala. 571; 37 Mo. 296; 4 Sneed, 61; 38 Wis. 209 ; 31 Conn. 131. Smith V. Place, 11 Pitts. L. J. 45. p. 220. Smith V. Eeese Eiver, etc., Co., L. E. 2 Eq. 234. p. 888. Smith V. Eochester, 13 Hun, 214; s. c, 19 Alb. L. J. 455. p. 735. Smith V. Smith, 2 Pick. 621. pp. 340, 371, 373, 377, 1134, 1176, 1205. c 21 Pick. 147; 19 Conn. 576; 10 Mete. 365; 18 N. Y. 252; 4 Gray, 180; 11 Me. 337; 20 111. 490 ; 8 Gray, 132 ; 5 Duer, 25 ; 25 Me. 47 ; 25 Ind. 197 ; 46 Pa. St. 161, 163 ; 4 Am. L. Keg. (N. s.) 19; 14 Gray, 251; 11 Mete. 444; 17 Iowa, 463 ; 6 Iowa, 452 ; 7 Pick. 190 ; 3 Fla. 26 ; 32 Me. 52 ; 24 N. J. L. 270, 283, 285 ; 2 Hilt. 39 ; 4 N. Y. 360 ; 12 Mete. 417 ; 43 Wis. 527 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 430 ; 12 Pick. 117 ; 36 Ind. 466 ; 33 N. J. L. 439 ; 35 N. H. 276; 2Cush. 605. Smith V. Steele, L. E. 10 Q. B. 125 ; a. c, U L. J. (Q. B.) 60. pp. 1040, 1279. Smith V. St. Joseph, 45 Mo. 449. pp. 753, 1203, 1240, 1241. c 53 Mo. 296; 63 Mo. 420; 2 Mo. App. 579; 51 Mo. 462. Smith i>. Stokes, 4 Best & S. 84 ; s. c, 32 L. J. (M. C.) 199; 11 Week. Eep. 753; 8 L. T. (n. s.) 425. p. 351. Smith V. Sykes, Freem. (K. B.) 224. p. 1272. Smith V. Thackerah, L. E. 1 C. P. 564; ^. u , 12 Jur. (n. s.) .545 ; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 276 ; 1 Harr. & E. 615 ; 14 Week. Rep. 832 ; 14 L. T. (n. s.) 761. pp. 261, 276. c 42 Md. 133 ; 122 Mass. 207. Smith V. Trawl, 1 Root, 165. p. 817. Smith V. Union R. Co., 61 Mo. 588. p. 1011. c 63 Mo. 420; 65 Mo. 521; 5 Eeporter, 178. Smith V. Wakefield, 105 Mass. 473. p. 770. c 64 Me. 62. cl TABLE OF CASES. Smith V. Waldorf, 13 Hun, 127. p. 217. Smith V. Wendell, 7 Gush. 498. pp. 362, 766, 769, 770, 772. c 38 Vt. 66 ; 43 Vt. 689, 593 ; 2 Allen, 554 ; 4 Gray, 69; 57 Me. 376; 26 Ind. 25; 30 Wis. 403; 68 Me. 367 ; 39 Me. 196, 197. Smitli V. West Derby Local Board, 8 C. P. Div. 423. pp. 622, 799. Smith V. Wright, 27 Barb. 621. pp. 623, 820, 821. c 44 Barb. 391 ; 34 N. Y. 390. ? 29 N. Y. 306. Smithson v. United States Tel. Co., 29 Md. 162. p. 850. Smoot V. Wetumpka, 24 Ala. 112. pp. 728, 753, 754, 1177, 1253. c 33 Ala. 130, 132 ; 32 Iowa, 328 ; 4 Mich. 562 ; 45 Ala. 184; 21 Mich. 122; 132 Mass. 37S; 21 Iowa, 414; 91 U. S. 551; 48 Cal. 426; 26 Iowa, 268; 1 Black, 53; 36 Ala. 367; 17 HI. 146; 53 Ala. 529 ; 51 Ala. 145, 148. Snap V. The People, 19 111. 80. p. 217. Sneesby v. Lancashire, etc., R. Co., L. K. 9 Q. B. 263; =. o., 43 L. J. (Q. B.) 69; 30 L. T. (n. s.) 492; 1 Cent. L.J. 297. (On appeal, 1 Q. B. Div. 42; 3 Cent. L. J. 141.) pp. 508, 1085. c 39 N. J. L. 309. Snell V. Greenfield, 2 Swan, 344. p. 827. Snell V. Rich, 1 Johns. 305. pp. 669, 895, 898. Snodgrass u. Bradley, 2 Grant Cas. 43. p. 886. Snow V. Adams, 1 Cush. 443. pp. 362, 754, 772, 773, 775, 776, 782, 1245. c 11 Allen, 320; 3 Sneed, 272; 13 Allen, 188; 41 Vt. 439; 1 Allen, 32; 105 Mass. 85; 35 N. H. 313 ; 39 Me. 197. 206; 8 Jur. (x. s.) 80; SOL. J. (0. P.) 363; L. E. 1 H. L. 104, 117, 118 ; 11 H. L. Oas. 703, 720, 721; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 572, 576, 677; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 227, 234, 235; 3 Hurl. & N. 316, 319^ 322; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 360, 362; 1 Sweeny, 235; 5 Hurl. & N. 723. Southeote d. Stanley, 1 Hurl. & N. 247 ,- s. c, 25 L. J. (Exch.) 339. pp. 287,, 288, 289, 293, 294, 304, 1062. c53 Pa. St. 459; 5 C. B. (N. s.) 565; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 513; 27 L. J. (C. P.) 321; El. Bl. & El. 170; L. K. 1 C. P. 286; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 189; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 433; 41 N. Y. 533, 533; L. E. 6- Exch. 77; 40 L. J. (Exch.) 45; 25 Mich. 7; 58 Ind. 136; 40 L. J. (Q. B.) 80; L. E. 6 Q. B. 76. Southern Express Co. v. Caldwell, 20 Wall. 264. p. 846. South Ottawa v. Foster, 20 111. 296. p. 622. d 65 111. 347, 349; 68 111. 298. Southside R. Co. v. Daniel, 20 Gratt. 344. pp. 569, 572. South-Western R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356. pp. 1276, 1289, 1290, 1294. Southwick V. Estes, 7 Cush. 385. p. 889. c 48 Miss. 119; 12 Allen, 63; .57 Me. 236. Southworth v. Lathrop, 5 Day, 237. p. 556. Southworth v. Old Colony R. Co., 105 Mass. 342. p. 499. c 67 N. Y. 605 ; 2 Montana, 520. ? 52 N. H_ 413. TABLE OF CASES. cli Soward v. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 30 Iowa, 551. p. 521. c 40 Iowa, 338. Sowerby v. Wadsworth, 3 Fost. & Fiu. 734. p. 342. Span V. Ely, 8 Hun, 255. p. 115. ell Hun, 594. Sparhawk v. Salem, 1 Allen, 30. pp. 212, 770, 771, 772. c 13 Allen, 433; 10 E. I. 309, 310 '; 105 Mass. 472, 601 ; 43 Ind. 596 ; 110 Mass. 526 ; 122 Mass. 391; 106 Mass. 277; 10 Allen, 27; 8 Allen, 353; 64 Me. 62. Sparhawk v. Twitchell, 1 Allen, 450. p. 212. Spauldingu. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 33 Wis. 582; s. c, 30 Wis. 110. pp. 152, 153, 155, 157, 1239. c 4 Neb. 272, 274; 34 Wis. 319, 320; 21 Minn. 64. Spear v. Lowell, 47 Vt. 692. p. 805. Spear v. Eichardson, 34 N. H. 428. p. 799. Spelman u. Fisher Iron Co., 56 Barb. 151. pp. 973, 993, 1030, 1033, 1050. Spelman v. Portage, 41 Wis. 144. p. 748. Spence v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 25 Iowa, 139. p. 139. c 34 Iowa, 338; 6 Cent. L. J. 312; 27 Iowa, 284; 32 Iowa, 562, 563; 8 Cent. L. J. 280. Spencer v. Campbell, 9 Watts & S. 32. pp. 58, 112, TiOJ. c 26 Pa. St. 120; 51 N. Y. 490; 51 Me. 338. Spencer v. Hartford, etc., E. Co., 10 K. I. 14. pp. 569, 570. Spencer v. Illinois, etc., E. Co., 29 Iowa, 55. pp. 425, 428, 1147, 1151, 1152, 1212. c38 Iowa, 297; 34 Iowa, 157, 281; 28 Oliio St. 352; 44 Iowa, 138; 29 Iowa, 47; 37 Iowa, 322; 12 Bush, 48; 32 Iowa, 149. Spencer v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 17 Wis. 487. p. 1238. Spencer v. Utica, etc., E. Co., 5 Barb. 337. pp. 424, 429, 1166, 1177. c 27 Barb. 228, 534, note; 1 Abb. App. Dec. 214; 25 Barb. 602; 18 N. Y. 252; 17 Barb. 98; 7 Wis. 431; 11 Barb. 115; 29 Conn. 209; 39 How. Pr. 414, 415 ; 6 Duer, 641 ; 1 Keyes, 572 ; 33 How. Pr. 199; 2 Abb. App. Dec. 381; 27 Vt. 465; 13 Ga. 88; 2 HUt. 38; 99 Mass. 166, 167; 21 Barb. 341 ; 22 Barb. 583 ; 29 N. Y. 381 ; 13 Barb. 15 ; 34 N. Y. 14. Spiers i>. Parker, 1 Term Eep. 141. p. 574. Spinner v. New York, etc., E. Co., 67 N. y. 153; s. c, 6 Hun, 600; 2 Hun, 421. p. 525. Spoilbrd v. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176. pp. 383, 1093, 1161, 1198, 1202. c 119 Mass. 68 ; 112 Mass. 469 ; 121 Mass. 219 ; 52 N. H. 654; SBeporter, 345; 104 Mass. 63; 86 Pa. St. 80; 8 Allen, 237. Sprague v. Baker, 17 Mass. 586. p. 790. Sprague v. Western Union Tel. Co., 6 Daly, 209. pp. 838, 845, 851, "856. Sprague v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 193. pp. 731, 733, 743, 746. c 44 Iowa, 282; 55 N. H. 134, 138; 110 Mass. 221 ; 10 Allen, 603, 605 ; 13 Gray, 607. Spray v. Ammerman, 66 111. 309. pp. 208, 221. Springer ». Bowdoinham, 7 Me. 442. p. 763. c 42 Me. 527, 538 ; 21 Me. 32, 33 ; 11 Me. 275 ; 43 N. H. 269 ; 17 How. 167. Springett v. Ball, 4 Fost. & Fin. 472. pp. 381, 382, 387, 1149, 1280. Springfield v. Doyle, 76 111. 202. pp. 763, 1248. Spring6eld v. Lie Claire, 49 HI. 476. pp. 729, 753, 762, 766. c 91 U. S. 551; 60 111. 266, 323; 71 111. 369; 53 111. 95; 55 111, 350. tl 122 Mass. 378. Spring's Administrator v. Grlenn, 12 Bush, 172. p. 1277. Sprong V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 58 N. Y. 56; s. c, 3 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) -54; 60 Barb. 30. p. 1213. c 62 Barb. 222. Squire v. Central, etc., E. Co., 4 Jones & Sp. 436. pp. 400, 424, 1177, 1181. c 50 How. Pr. 128 ; 8 Jones & Sp. 182. Squire v. Western Union Tel. Co., 98 Mass. 232. pp. 839, 848. c 45 N. Y. 749, 750; 21 Minn. 158; 1 Col. 142; 30 Ohio St. 566 ; 113 Mass. 305 ; 45 N. Y. 568 ; 60 Me. 25, 26. Staats w. Hudson Elver E. Co., 3 Keyes, 196 ; s. c, 4 Abb. App. Dec. 287. pp. 515, 529. c 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 586; 16 Kan. 576. Stables v. Eley, 1 Csir. & P. 614. p. 898. Stack V. Bangs, 6 Lans. 262. p. 821. Stack V. East St. Louis, 85 111. 377 ; s. c, 5 Cent. L. J. 385. p. 741. Stack V. Patterson, 6 Phila. 225. p. 983. Stack V. Portsmouth, 52 N. H. 221. pp. 766, 768, 1238. f 57 N. H. 92, 95. clii TABLE OF CASES. Stackhouse v. Lafaj'ette, 26 Ind. 17. pp. 731, 741, 768, 776. c 21 Mich. 122; 38 Ind. 370; 29 Ind. 189; 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 132, 134. Stackpole v. Healey, 16 Mass. 33. p. 212. c 65 Me. 539; 37 N. H. 336; 115 Mass. 566; 4 N. H. 38, 513; 5 Denio, 259, 264; 42 Me. 254; 24 Vt. 494; 22 N. J. L. 189; 7 Barb. 302, 305, 308; 34 Vt. 342; 10 111. 167; 23 N. H. 93. Stackus i. New York, etc., R. Co., 7 Hun, 559. pp. 420, 1212. StaiFord v. Coyney, 7 Barn. & Cress. 257. p. 759. Stafford v. IngersoU, 3 Hill, 38. p. 209. c 22 Barb. 579; 22 N. J. L. 189. Stallcup V. Bradley, 3 Coldw. 408. p. 215. Stallknecht v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 53 How. Pr. 305 ; s. c, 13 Hun, 451. pp. 1272, 12S3. Stamm v. Southern K Co., 1 Abb. N. C. 438. pp. 351, 352. Standish v. Washburn, 21 Pick. 237. p. 801. Stanley v. Gaylord, 1 Cash. 536, 551. p. 71. Stansell v. JoUard, 1 Selw. N. P. 457. pp. 261, 269, 275. St. Anthony, etc., Co. v. Eastman, 20 Minn. 277. pp. 101, 1179. c 22 Minn. 166. Stanton v. Metropolitan K. Co., 14 Allen, 485. p. 1095. Stanton v. Springfield, 12 Allen, 566. p. 784. c 102 Mass. 333, 338, 3,39; 78 111. 352; 24 Wis. 274; 109 Mass. 205; 13 Allen, 188; 14 Allen, 510 ; 104 Mass. 83 ; 100 Mass. 57. ? 52 N. H. 413. Stanton v. Staten Island K. Co., 58 N. T. 126. p. 1095. Staple V. Spring, 10 Mass. 72. p. 317. Stapley v. London, etc., R. Co., 4 Hurl. & Colt. 93 ; s. c, L. R. 1 Exch. 21 ; 11 Jur. (n. s.) 954; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 7; 14 Week. Rep. 132; 13 L. T. (n. s.) 406. pp. 419, 422. c 40 N. Y. 30, 48, 56 ; L. E. 1 Q. B. 283, 284, 286, 287 ; L. E. 2 C. P. 637 ; 36 L. J. (C. P.) 254 ; 36 L. J. (Q. B.) 108, 109; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 411, 412; 38 N. Y. 448; 2 Jones & Sp. 486; 43 How. Pr. 411; L. R. 6 Q. B. 488, 492, 493. Star V. Rookesby, 1 Salk. 588. pp. 222, 628, 635. Stark V. Lancaster, 57 N. H. 88. pp. 759, 1083, 1100, 1238. Starr v. Moore, 3 McLean, 354. p. 827. State V. Alburgh, 23 Vt. 462. p. 805. State V. Bangor, 30 Me. 341. p. 805. c 10 Hun, 535, 530. State V. Barksdale, 5 Humph. 154. p. 805. State V. Burlington, 36 Vt. 521. pp. 704, 742. State V. Campton, 2 N. H. 513. p. 794, c 45 N. Y. 134. State V. Canterbury, 28 N. H. 196. pp. 795, 805. State V. Chandler, 5 La. An. 489. p, 242. State V. Concord, 20 N. H. 295. p, 805. State V. Consolidated R. Co., 67 Me. 479, p. 1289. State u. Council, 1 Tenn. (Overton) 305, p. 215. State V. Cumberland, 6 R. L 496 ; s. c, 7 R. I. 75. pp. 753, 760, 761, 805, 806. State V. Dover, 46 N. H. 452. pp. 568, 788, 805. State V. Pagan, 22 La. An. 545. p. 818. State V. Fletcher, 13 Vt. 124. p. 805. State V. Pryeburg, 15 Me. 405. pp. 805, 806. c 15 Me. 538; 43 N. H. 269; 45 N. Y. 136. State V. Gilnianton, 14 N. H. 467. pp. 795, 805. State V. Gorham, 37 Me. 451. pp. 766, 768, 787, 793, 805. c 26 Ind. 25 ; 49 Me. 124. State I'. Grand Trunk R. Co., 60 Me. 145. p. 1288. State V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 58 Me. 176. pp. 1272, 1289. State 1.. Grand Trunk R. Co., 61 Me. 114. p. 1283. State V. Grand Trunk R. Co.. 59 Me. 189. p. 358. State V. Hampton, 2 N. H. 22. p. 761. c 24 Vt. 164; 23 N. H. 93, 95, 98. State V. Jones, Walk. 83. p. 1282. State u. Jumel, 13 La. An. 399. p. 242. State V. Kittery, 5 Me. 254. p. 805. State 1). Kuntz, 28 Ohio St. 191. p. 1277. State V. Loudon, 3 Head, 263. p. 805. State V. Maine, etc., R. Co., 60 Me. 490. p. 1283. State u. Manchester, etc., R. E., 52 N. TABLE or CASES. cliii H. 529. pp. 417, 426, 1083, 1151, 1237, 1240, 1283, 1289. c 45 Md. 492; 45 Iowa, 32; 68 Me. 558; 57 N. H. 9.3. State V. Milo, 32 Me. 57. p. 805. State V. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229. p. 242. State V. Moore, 31 Conn. 479. p. 303. e 86 Pa. St. 80. State V. Moran, 6 Hill, 33. p. 668. State V. Morris K. Co., 25 N. J. L. 437. pp. 357, 358. State o. Murfreesboro, 11 Humph. 217. p. 805. State V. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 108. p. 1092. State V. Nelson, 1 Ind. 522. p. 827. State V. Northumberland, 44 N. H. 628. p. 805. State V. Pittsburgh, etc, R. Co., 45 Md. 41. p. 1282. State V. Raymond, 27 N. H. 388. p. 805. State V. Shelbyville, 4 Sneed, 176. p. 742. State V. Smith, 11 La. An. 633. p. 242. State V. Strong, 25 Me. 297. pp. 753, 805. State V. Tupper, Dudley (S. C), 135. p. 152. State V. Whitingham, 7 Vt. 391. p. 805. State Railroad-Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575. p. 730. State, use of Coughlan, v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 24 Md. 84. pp. 1180, 1279, 1289. c 29 Md. 259; 30 Md. 53; 24 Md. 121, 123; 42 Vt. 387; 25 Md. 387; 21 Iowa, 24. Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522. p. 1287. Stearns v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 46 Me. 95. p. 171. Stearns v. Old Colony, etc., R. Co., 1 Allen, 493. pp. 500, 515. c 102 Mass. 385 ; 14 Allen, 153 ; 98 Mass. 565 ; 15 Minn. 356; 97 Mass. 433. Stedman v. Southbridge, 17 Pick. 162. p. 759. Steele ». Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59. pp. 383, 1093, 1161, 1202. c 119 Mass. 68; 53 Ala. 76; 111 Mass. 300; 44 Md. 128; 104 Mass. 56, 58; 112 Mass. 469; 78 N. C. 307; 68 Me. 558. Steele v. Central R. Co., 43 Iowa, 109. pp. 1002, 1022, 1150. Steele v. Kurtz, 28 Ohio St. 191. pp. 1277. 1294. Steele v. Smith, 3 E. D. Smith, 321. pp. 200, 886. Steele .;. South-Eastern R. Co., 16 C. B. 550. pp. 911, 915. c 23 Iowa, 566; 61 N. T. 203; 7 Cent. L. J. 493; 35 N. J. L. 22, 26; 30 L. J. (Exch.) 85; 18 Kan. 38; 15 VTaU. 658; 59 Me. 533; 23 Ind. 556; 15 Gratt. 242. Steele u. Western Inland Lock Nav., 2 Johns. 283. pp. 556, 569, 570, 746, 1166. c 9 Iowa, 236. Steinmeyer v. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App. 256. pp. 732, 737, 741, 752. c 4 Mo. App. 194. Steinson v. Heath, 3 Lev. 400. pp. 628, 635. Steinweg v. Erie R. Co., 43 N. Y. 123. pp. 154, 155. Stennell v. Hogg, 1 Wms. Saund. 2286. p. 552. Stephani v. Brown, 40 111. 428. pp. 317, 345. Stephens v. Shriver, 25 Pa. St. 78. p. 215. Stephenson v. Grand Trunk, R. Co., 35 Mich. 323. pp. 523, 524. Sterling v. Thomas, 60 111. 264. pp. 753, 766, 781, 783, 784, 1090. c 60 111. 323. Sterling Bridge Co. v. Baker, 75 111. 139. p. 890. Sterling Bridge Co. v. Pearl, 80 HI. 251. p. 799. Stetson V. Eaxon, 19 Pick. 147. pp. 340, 646, 744, 775. c 8 Cash. 524, 525; 11 R. I. 453; 16 Wis. 256; 9 Md. 178 ; 7 Gush. 511 ; 7 Gray, 272 ; 2 Disney, 533 ; 19 Pick. 513 ; 23 N. H. 94. Stetson u. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272. p. 737. Stettin (The), 1 Bro. & Lush. 199. p. 895. Stevens v. Armstrong, 6 N. Y. 435. pp. 882, 893, 897. c 3 Gray, 365; 21 Iowa, 578; 28 Barb. 198; 24 Barb. 357; 5 Bosw. 449; 23 Ind. 556; 52 N. H. 125; 13N. T.30. Stevens v. Boxford, 10 Allen, 25. pp. 362, 772, 1092, 1200, 1238. c 122 Mass. 391; 105 Mass. 313. Stevens v. Brown, 58 111. 289. p. 208. Stevens v. Hartwell, 11 Mete. 542. p. 1101. cliv TABLE OF CASES. Stevens v. Middlesex Canal Co., 12 Mass. 466. pp. 567, 568, 569. Stevens v. Midland R. Co., 10 Exch. 352. p. 888. Stevens v. Nashua, 46 N. H. 192. p. 759. Stevens v. Whistler, 11 Bast, 61. p. 209. c 24 Vt. 494. Stevenson v. Montreal Tel. Co., 16 Tipper Canada Q. B. 530. p. 839. c 21 Minn. 161; 30 Ohio St. 565, 567; 45 N. Y. 570; 18 Upper Canada Q. B. 64. Stevenson v. Wallace, 27 Gratt. 77. pp. 274, 275, 276, 278, 279, 280. Steves V. Oswego, etc., E. Co., 18 N. T. 422. pp. 424, 431. c 30 N. Y. 79; 34 N. Y. 12, 13, 629; 58 Me. 389; 34 Iowa, 157, 160, 279; 10 Allen, 532; 37 Iowa, 323; 6 Bosw. 22: 40 111. 2.34; 28 Ohio St. 350; 36 N. Y. 44; 1 Keyes, 572; 33 How. Pr. 199; 2Abb. App. Dec.381; ISInd. 89; 21 Ohio St. 593; 40 Barb. 207; 39 N. Y. 365; 29 N. Y. 331; 24 N. Y. 434, 439, 440. Stewart v. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 32 Iowa, 561. p. 516. c 34 Iowa, 338; 6 Cent. L. J. 312; 8 Cent. L. J. 280. Stewart v. Carleton, 31 Mich. 270. p. 213. Stewart v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 27 Iowa, 282. pp. 499, 509. c 34 Iowa, 339. Stewart v. Davis, 31 Ark. 518. p. 979. Stewart v. Harvard College, 12 Allen, 58. p. ;21. c 98 Mass. 575, 578. Stewart v. New Orleans, 9 La. An. 461. pp. 731, 734. c 31 Ala. 477 ; 17 Gratt. 382. Stewart v. Nunemaker, 2 Ind. 47. p. 827. Stewart v. Eipon, 38 Wis. 584. pp. 1099, 1257, 1258, 1260, 1263. St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. Cas. 642. p. 276. Stiokney v. Maidstone, 30 Vt. 738. pp. 1083, 1092. c 64 Mo. 54. Stickney v. Salem, 3 Allen, 374. pp. 564, 755, 780, 1086, 1200. cl3 Allen, 438; 107 Mass. 349; 101 Mass. 98; ia5 Mass. 601; 14 Allen, 483; 47 Vt. 36; 5 Ee- porter, 304; 67 Me. 169; 110 Mass. 23; 53 Me. 504 ; 49 Vt. 393 ; 8 Allen, 239. ? 52 N. H. 413. Stier V. Oskaloosa, 41 Iowa, 353. pp. 1199, 1249. Stiles V. Cardiff Steam Nav. Co., 10 Jur. (n. s.) 1199; s. c, 12 Week. Kep. 1080; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 310; 20 L. T. (n. s.) 844. pp. 198, 205. c L. E. 9 C. P. 651, 652, 656; L. R. 7 Exch. 326; 43 L. J. (C. P.) 368, 369; 41 L. J. (Exoh.) 168. Stiles V. Geesey, 71 Pa. St. 439. pp. 383, 1147, 1153. Stillson V. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 67 Mo. 671 ; s. c, 7 Cent. L. J. 107 ; 6 Reporter, 370. pp. 450, 1184, 1189, 1240. Stinson v. Gardiner, 42 Me. 248. pp. 564, 755, 781, 1200. C46 Me. 485; 47 Vt. 36; 5 Eeporter, 304; 67 Me. 169; 53 Me. 505; 66 Me. 37. Stinson a. New York, etc., R. Co., 32 N. Y. 333. p. 461. St. John V. New York, 3 Bosw. 483 ; s. c, 6 Duer, 315. pp. 754, 759, 776. St. Joseph, etc., E. Co. v. Chase, 11 Kan. 47. pp. 157, 158, 159, 163, 170. c 12 Kan. 369; 17 Kan. 389. St. Joseph, etc., E. Co. v. Grover, 11 Kan. 302. pp. 514, 517. c 20 Kan. 366. St. Louis V. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414. pp. 733, 747. c 17 Mo. 128; 53 Mo. 165; 42 Cal. 438; 3 Mo. App. 61; 51 Mo. 517, 518; 4 G. Greene, 51; 31 Ala. 477; 15 Mo. 653, 656; 55 Mo. 125, 127; 14 Mo. 23. d 51 Mo. 513, 515. St. Louis V. Kaime, 2 Mo. App. 66. p. 319. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Bell, 81 111. 76. p. 1195. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Britz, 72 111. 256. pp. 1008, 1022, 1037, 1038, 1039. C 84 111. 574. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Dalby, 19 111. 353. pp. 886, 887, 888, 890, 891, 1251, 1252. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. u. Dunn, 78 111. 197. pp. 417, 418, 420. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. o. Gilham, 39 111. 455. p. 155. c 48 Ind. 476. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Manly, 58 111. 300. pp. 417, 426, 1093, 1168, 1171, 1212. c 69 111. 430 ; 81 111. 463, 455 ; 68 111. 581, 586 ; 62 HI. 330 ; 64 111. 516 ; 74 111. 93 ; 39 Md. 580 ; 41 Iowa, 231; 72 111. 589, 570; 83 111. 368; 76 ni 280,316; 70111.106. TABLE OP CASES. clv St. Louis, etc., B. Co. v. Mathias, 50 Ind. 65. pp. 418, 427, 1212, 1247. c 7 Reporter, 658. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Terhune, 50 111. 151. p. 419. c 68 HI. 318. St, Louis, etc., E. Co. o. Todd, 36 111. 409. pp. 497, 526, 1170. c 46 111. 83 ; 48 111. 109 ; 38 Wis. 29, 31 ; 71 111. 609; 25 Mich. 278; 65 Me. 339; 51 111. 340. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Valirius, 56 Ind. 511. pp. 973, 978, 982, 983. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Washburn, 7 Eeporter, 142. pp. 526, 537. Stockdale v. The State, 32 Ga. 225. p. 242. Stoddard v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 65 Mo. 514 ; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 16 ; 5 Eeporter, 177. pp. 973, 1011, 1030, 1031, 1237. Stolces V. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 191. pp. 562, 1174. Stone V. Augusta, 46 Me. 127. pp. 731, 732, 733, 740, 741, 747, 752. c55 N. H. 134; 65 Me. 463. Stone V. Cartwright, 6 Term Eep. 411. pp. 670, 873, 874, 875, 1061 c 6 Eeporter, 335 ; 2 Hilt. 354 ; 2U Vt. .533 ; 14 Barb. 108; 1 Bos. & Pul. 407, 410; 26 Pa. St. 119 ; 2 Mete. 357, 358 ; 7 N. H. 219 ; 3 Gray, 355, 356; 17 Johns. 99; 2 N. H. 549; 3 Denio, 450; 6 Barn. & Cress. 558, 574, 576 ; 19 N. H. 435, 437, 438; 53 N. H. 132. Stone V. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214. p. 709. Stone V. Cheshire E. Co., 19 N. H. 427. pp. 902, 904, 911. c 61 N. Y. 195 ; 53 N. H. 133. ? 7 Cent. L. J. 495. Stone V. Codman, 15 Pick. 297. pp. 870, 912. c 8 Ohio St. 382; 2 Mich. 371; 3 Gray, 351; 21 Iowa, 578; 4 Allen, 140; 2 Mete. 357; 6 Pliila. 257 ; 53 N. H. 124, 125, 126. Stone V. Hubbardston, 100 Mass. 49. pp. 360, 780, 784, 785, 803, 1092. c 114 Mass. 508; 102 Mass. 338; 6 Eeporter, 719 ; 100 Mass. 186 ; 104 Mass. 83 ; 119 Mass. 278. ? 63 N. H. 413. Stone o. Jackson, 16 C. B. 199; s. u., 32 Eng. Law. & Eq. 349. pp. 303, 304. c 55 How. Pr. 173; 5 Duer, 499; 25 Mich. 8; 34 N. J. L. 472. Stone V. Oregon City Man. Co., 4 Or. 52. pp. 994, 99-5. Stoneraau v. Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 58 Mo. 503. p. 507. c 62 Mo. 563. Stoner v. Shugart, 45 111. 76. pp. 209, 210. Storey v. Ashton, L. E. 4 Q. B. 476 ; s. c, 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 223 ; 17 Week. Eep. 727 ; 10 Best & S. 337. pp. 200, 885. c L. E. 8 C. P. 665, 567, 569 ; 42 L. J. (C. P.) 303, 304 ; 12 Hun, 468 ; 86 Pa. St. 431 ; 34 Upper Canada Q. B. 461. Storm V. Augusta, 46 Me. 127. p. 749. Storrs V. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104. pp. 344, 726, 740, 773, 774, 906, 908, 1235. c 13 Hun, 304 ; 16 Wall. 575 ; 40 N. Y. 447, 451; 57 Pa. St. 381; 6 Hun, 587; 2 Black, 424; 1 Black, 53 ; 5 Bosw. 448 ; 3 Wall. 679 ; 49 Barb. 683 ; 39 N. Y. 593, 596 ; 8 Bosw. 128 ; 89 Barb. 335, 337 ; 38 Barb. 237 ; 35 N. J. L. 22, 25 ; 21 Mich. 109, 131, 122 ; 9 Mich. 187, 193 ; 6 Jones & Sp. 200; 3.1 E. I. 455; 6 Daly, 472; 36 Wis. 37, 40 ; 44 Barb. 394 ; 66 N. Y. 186 ; 48 How. Pr. 46 ; 10 Hun, 636; 55 111. 361; 61 N. Y. 183,187; 31 Iowa, 414; 7 Bosw. 514; 63 Barb. 640, 641; 44 N. Y. 433; 49 111. 479; 5 Neb. 143; 4 Hun, 700; 15 Wall. 658; 11 Bush, 480; 3 Minn. 304, 307, 308 ; 30 Ind. 58, 61. d 122 Mass. 376. Story V. Odin, 12 Mass. 157. p. 275. Stoughton V. Parker, 13 Allen, 191. p. 803. Stourbridge Canal Co. ». Wheeley, 2 Barn. & Adol. 792. p. 552. Stourbridge Nav. Co. v. Dudley, 3 El. & El. 409. p. 281. c L. E. 7 Q. B. 265. Stout V. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co., 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 80. pp. 430, 1286. c IWils. (Indianapolis) 489. Stover V. Bluehill, 51 Me. 439. pp. 1083, 1091. c 40 Iowa, 644 ; 64 Me. 54. Stowell V. Plagg, 11 Mass. 364. pp. 567, 569. Stowell V. Zoueh, Plowd. Comm. 364. p. 1126. St. Paul V. Kuby, 8 Minn. 154. pp. 783, 1182. c 14 Minn. 96; 15 Minn. 59. St. Paul V. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297. pp. 731, 733, 738, 740, 889, 908, 915. St. Peter v. Denison, 58 N. Y. 416. pp. 345, 821, 823. c45Md. 135; 5 Hun, 604. Stvahlendorf t>. Eosenthal, 30 Wis. 674. p. 993. c 46 Texas, 539; 40 Wis. 593; 41 Wis. 482; 37 Mich. 212; 44 Wis. 643. clvi TABLE OF CASES. Strange v. MoCormick, 1 Phila. 156. pp. 971, 973, 1053. c 7 La. An. 324. 333; 24 Ala. 36; 22 Ala. 309, 313. Strasburger v. Western Union Tel. Co., Sedgw. on Dam. (4th ed.) 411, note, p. 856. Stratton v. Staples, 59 Me. 94. pp. 318, 355, 356. c 62 Me. 562. Street v. Holyoke, 105 Mass. 82. pp. 360, 785, 78B, 787, 1205. c 109 Mass. 205, 449; 113 Haas. 505; 81 111. 306. Streett v. Laumier, 34 Mo. 469. pp. 199, 355, 383, 389, 1202, 1260. Strouse ». Whittlesey, 41 Conn. 559. p. 384. Stroyan v. Knowles, 6 Hurl. & N. 454; s. c, 30 L. J. (Exch.) 102. pp. 261, 276. c 18 Minn. 340; 27 Gratt. 87; 122 Mass. 206. Stuart V. Hawley, 22 Barb. 619. pp. 56, 148, 149. c 9 Cal. 257; 44 Barb. 425, 427; 51 N. Y. 487; 61 Barb. 113; 42 How. Pr. 393; 9 Busli, 633; 41 Wis. 73; 36 Mo. 32. ? 6 Hun, 323, 324, 325. Stuart V. Machias Port, 48 Me. 477. pp. 1175, 1203. c 58 Me. 205; 5 Hun, 167. Stubley V. London, etc., R. Co., 4 Hurl. & Colt. 83 ; s. c, L. E. 1 Exch. 13 ; 11 Jur. (n. s.) 954; 85 L. J. (Exch.) 13; 14 Week. Kep. 133 ; 13 L. T. (n. s.) 376. c 40 N. Y. 20, 49, 50, 58 ; 33 Ind. 363 ; 101 Mass. 203; 41 Iowa, 231; 42 N. i. 473; 25 Mich. 290, 291; 38 N. Y. 448; 2 Jones & Sp. 486; 43 How. Pr. 411; L. K. 2 0. P. 636; 36 L. J. (0. P.) 252, 253; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 100; L. R. 1 Exch. 26; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 966. Stucke V. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 9 Wis. 202. pp. 497, 498, 500, 501. c 19 Wis. 147; 17 Wis. 433; 22 Wis. 248; 43 Wis. 673 ; 47 Pa. St. 303 ; 21 Wis. 76. ? 42 Wis. 328. Studwell V. Eitch, 14 Conn. 293. pp. 209, 210, 479. c 1 Handy, 198; 10 111. 147, 168; 3 Ohio St. 181 ; 31 Miss. 184. a 4 Mete. 593. Stumps V. Kelley, 22 111. 140. p. 201. Sturgis V. Eobbins, 62 Me. 289. pp. 148, 149. Sullivan v. India Man. Co., 113 Mass. 396. pp. 977, 978, 980. c 119 Mass. 414; 66 Me. 427 ; 7 Reporter, 62. Sullivan v. Jones, 2 Gray, 570. p. 817. Sullivan 'v. Mississippi, etc., E. Co., 11 Iowa, 421. pp. 1000, 1006. c 59 Mo. 306 ; 36 Iowa, 64 ; 26 Iowa, 370, 371 ; 20 Iowa, 344 ; 49 Miss. 285 ; 33 Iowa, 48, 49 ; 46 Iowa, 401 ; 46 Texas, 538. Sullivan v. Scripture, 3 Allen, 564. pp. 200, 216, 885, 1234. c 6 Allen, 214. Sullivan v. Toledo, etc., E. Co., 58 Ind. 26. pp. 970, 1052, 1280. c 8 Cent. L. J. 14. Sullivan v. Union Pacific K. Co., 3 Dill. 334 ; s. c, 1 Cent. L. J. 595. p. 1272. Sullivan k. Waters, 14 Irish C. L. (n. s.) 460. pp. 288, 995. cL. R. 3 0. P. 497; 98 Mass. 578; 2 C. P. Div. 310; 5 Cent. L. J. 281. Sullivan's Administrator v. Louisville Bridge Co., 9 Bush, 81. pp. 971, 972, 973, 994, 1003, 1008, 1024, 1149, 1152, 1157. c 7 Reporter, 16. Sulzbacher v. Dickie, 6 Daly, 469. p. 907. Summerhays v. Kansas, etc., E. Co., 2 Col. 484. pp. 1039, 1053. Summersell u. Eish, 117 Mass. 312. pp. 970, 972, 1028. c 122 Mass. 405; 63 Mo. 313; 120 Mass. 228; 123 Mass. 154. Sunbury, etc., E. Co. «. Cooper, 33 Pa. St. 278. p. 818. Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall. 435. p. 703. Sury V. Piggott, Popham, 166. p. 257. Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Wright, 9 Watts & S. 9. p. 567. Sussex County v. Strader, 18 N. J. L. 108. pp. 701, 705, 706, 734. c21 Mich. 116; 9 Hun, 68; 122 Mass. 347, 352, 353; 29 N. J. L. 246, 247, 249; 31 N. J. L. 608; 46 Texas, 528; 32 N. J. L. 396, 398; 27 N. J. L. 415 ; 7 Ohio St. 116, 123 ; 20 N. J. L. 325. Sutherland v. New York, etc., E. Co., 9 Jones & Sp. 17. p. 421. c 10 Jones & Sp. 232. Sutton u. Carroll County, 41 Miss. 236. p. 822. c 55 111. 351. Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taun. 29 ; 1 Marsh. 429. 'pp. 6, 8, 18, 22, 31, 35, 36, 65, 106, 549, 567, 592, 603, 694, 696, 747, 822, 1166. (In full, p. 807.) TABLE OF CASES. clvii c 1 Mete. 285; 15 Conn. 129; 12 C. B. (N. S.) 795 ; 5 Best & S. 450 ; 10 Jur. (N. 8.) 1031 ; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 285 ; L. R. 1 Exch. 286; 3 Hurl. & Colt. 787; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 675, 606; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 160, 232; 12 Mo. 424; 11 C. B. (N. s.) 207; 8 Jur. (N. 8.) 81; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 364; 5 Barn. & Aid. 846; 1 Dow. & Ry. 505; 25 N. J. L. 373; L. R. 1 H. L. 113; 11 H. L. Cas. 713: 11 Cush. 237 ; 7 C. B. 562 ; 13 Jur. 365 ; 9 Watts, 385; 10 C. B. (N. 8.) 777, 780; 30 L. J. (0. P.) 310; 4 Jur. (N. s.) 1185; 2 Bing. 161; 2 Barn. & Cress. 708, 711 ; 4 Dow. & Ry. 200, 201 ; 53 N. H. 446; 9 J. B. Moo. 236; 13 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 368; 4 G. Greene, 51; 14 Conn. 164; 28 Ga. 48 ; 11 Ch. Leg. N. 256 ; 19 Alb. L. J. 298 ; 7 Reporter, 386 ; 26 N. J. L. 160 ; 10 Exoh. 269; 23 L. J. (Exch.) 337; 1 Denio, 598. Sutton V. Johnstone, 1 Term Kep. 784. pp. 683, 684. Sutton V. New York, etc., R. Co., 66 N. Y. 243; s. c, 4 Hun, 760. pp. 423, 452, 455. c 70 N. Y. 124. Sutton V. Temple, 12 Mee. & W. 52. p. 323. Sutton V. Wauwatosa, 29 Wis. 21. pp. 1093, 1094, 1203. c 33 Wis. 383 ; 41 Wis. 651, 652 ; 47 Vt. 33. Suydam v. Grand Street, etc., R. Co.. 17 Abb. Pr. 304 ; s. c, 41 Barb. 375. pp. 399, 1177. c 36 Mo. 32; 25 Ind. 197. Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358. pp. 515, 516, 823, 892, 1059, 1060. c 3 N. T. S. C. (T. & O.) 539; 13 N. Y. 50; 26 Mo. 451, 452; 14 Barb. 368, 372; 35 Ind. 466; 18 Cal. 354; 35 N. H. 363; 27 Vt. 154; 30 N. H. 207; 57 Mo. 99; 14 Barb. 368, 372; 30 N. Y. 79; 13 Barb. 497, 501. Svenson v. Atlantic Mail Steamship Co., 1 Jones & Sp. 277 ; s. c, 57 N. Y. 108. pp. 1040, 1041. Swalnson v. North-Eastern E. Co., 3 Exch. Div. 341 ; s. c, 26 Week. Kep. 413 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 355. pp. 1041, 12 re. Swansey v. Chace, 16 Gray, 303. pp. 789, 790, 791. c 114 Mass. 114, 115; 109 Mass. 285; 102 Mass. 343. Swearingen v. Missouri K. Co., 64 Mo. 73. pp. 521, 523. c 64 Mo. 414. Bweatland v. Illinois, etc., Tel. Co., 27 Iowa, 483. pp. 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 848. c 62 Me. 216; 113 Mass. 307; 37 Iowa, 218; 60 Me. 462 ; 60 111. 433 ; 52 Ind. 6. T 5 So. Car. 376; 113 Mass. 305. Sweeny v. Old Colony, etc., R. Co., 10 Allen, 368. pp. 304, 416, 417, 419, 428. (In full, p. 408.) c 99 Mass. 217 ; 102 Mass. 584 ; 21 Minn. 298 ; 10 Allen, 384, 386; 30 Ohio St. 234, 238; 71 111. 507; 31 Minn. 210; 48 Vt. 131; 42 Ind. .343; 120 Mass. 307; 53 Mo. 43; 4 Hun, 762; 98 Mass. 578; 35 Mich. 6; 116 Mass. 68 ; 34 N. J. L. 472. Sweet u. Gloversville, 12 Hun, 302. p. 762. Swift V. Applebone, 23 M=ch. 252. p. 219. c 30 Mich. 191. Swift V. Newbury, 36 Vt. 355. pp. 1199, 1238. Swift V. North Missouri, etc., E. Co., 29 Iowa, 243. p. 514. Swineford v. Franklin County, 6 Cent. L. J. 434. p. 617. Swords V. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28 ; s. c, 44 How. Pr. 189; 1 N. Y. S. C. (Add.) 23. pp. 316, 317, 322. c 48 How. Pr. 380 ; 67 N. Y. 427 ; 17 Am. L. Keg. (N. 8.) 455; 6 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 137; 4 Hun, 28. Sybray v. "White, 1 Mee. & "W. 435 ; s. c, Tyrw. & G. 746 ; 5 L. J. (Exch.) 173. pp. 299, 300. c 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 238, 240; 4 Best & S. 158. Sykes v. Pawlet, 43 Vt. 446. pp. 362, 755 756, 769, 770, 771, 1209. c 10 K. I. 308; 47 Vt. 36; 31 Wis. 187. Tabor v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 46 Mo. 853. p. 507. c 34 Iowa, 161. Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 311 ; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 408. pp. 731, 734. Tallahassee u. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19. pp. 741, 753. c 17 111. 146; 2 Disney, 537. Tallman u. Syracuse, etc., R. Co., 4 Keyes, 128; s. c, 4 Abb. App. Dec. 351. p. 523. Tally V. Ayres, 3 Sneed, 677. pp. 248, 1235. Talmadge u. Rensselaer, etc., R. Co., 13 Barb. 493. p. 527. c 16 111. 202, 203 ; 2 Mete. (Ky.) 182 ; 3 B. D. Smith, 372, 373; 9 Wis. 210; 22 Barb. 585. Tanner v. Albion, 5 Hill, 121. p. 380. clviii TABLE OF CASES. Tardos v. Bozant, 1 La. An. 199. p. 825. Tamer v. Walker, L. K. 2 Q. B. 301. pp. 100.5, 1101. Tarrant v. Webb, 18 C. B. 797 ; s. c, 2-5 L. J. (C. P.) 261. pp. 970, 973, 984. c 2 Lans. 513 ; « Me. 270 ; 28 Ind. 31 ; 3 Dill. 323 ; U Minn. 363 ; 33 L, J. (0. P.) 331 ; 13 Allen, U3; 10 Allen, 238; 50 Miss. 191; 30 Mo. 116; 1 Best & S. 444; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 336; 51 Miss. 642; 10 Mich. 199; 22 III. 642; 17 N. Y. 156; 1 Daly, 128 ; 8 Kan. 649 ; 39 N. Y. 477 ; 32 Md. 417 ; 59 N. Y. 360 ; 48 Me. 119 ; L. R. 1 Sc. App. 332. Tarry v. Ashton, 1 Q. B. Div. 314; s. c, 45 L. J. 260 ; 3 Cent. L. J. 431. pp. 99, 317, 346, 347, 902, 904. c 1 Q. B. Div. 329; 6 Reporter, 461. Tarwater v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 42 Mo. 193. pp. 213, 501. Tate V. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 64 Mo. 149. pp. 359, 747, 748, 776. Taverner v. Little, 5 Bing. K C. 678 ; s. c, 7 Scott, 796 ; 3 Jur. 702. p. 1253. Taylor v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 2 Bosw. 106. p. 1244. Taylor v. Boston Water-Power Co., 12 Gray, 415. p. 760. Taylor v. Davis County, 40 Iowa, 295. pp. 617, 794. c 42 Iowa, 59 ; 40 Iowa, 397. Taylor v. Dunbar, L. E. 1 C. P. 206. p. 1101. Taylor v. Goodwin (Q. B. Div.), 27 Week. Kep. 489. p. 388. Taylor v. Greenhalgh, L. E. 9 Q. B. 487; s. c, 31 L. T. (n. s.) 184. pp. 716,824. c 122 Mass. 365. Taylor v. Holman, 45 Mo. 371. pp. 1247, 1249. Taylor v. Mexican Gulf E. Co., 2 La. , An. 654. p. 914. Taylor v. Monroe, 43 Conn. 36. pp. 342, 755, 800, 801. . Taylor. t.. New York, 4 E. D. Smith, 559. pp. 316, 323, 734. . c 52 How. Pr. 452 ; 59 N. T. 37. Taylor v. Peckham, 8 E. L 349. pp. 346, 704, 777. , c 122 Mass. 351. Taylor v. Plymoutb, 8 Mete. 462. p. 1080. Taylor v. Rainbow, 2 Hen. & M. 423. p. 1251. cl3Ga. 88; 3Md. 443. Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 20. pp. 733, 747. c 46 Iowa, 660; 51 Mo. 518; 4 G. Greene, 51; 15 Mo. 653, 656. €l 51 Mo. 513, 515. Taylor a. Trask, 7 Cow. 249. p. 817. Taylor v. Western Paciflc E. Co., 45 Cal. 323. pp. 893, 974, 1044, 1291, 1294. Teall V. Barton, 40 Barb. 137. pp. 56, 151. c 41 Ind. 250; 30 Mich. 191 ; 51 K. Y. 438. Tearney v. Smith, 86 111. 391 ; ^. v., lO Ch. Leg. N. 169. p. 823. Tebbett v. Bristol, etc., E. Co., L. E. 6 Q. B. 73; s. c, 19 Week. Rep. 383 ; 40 L. J. (Q. B.) 78. p. 884. Telfer v. Northern E. E., 30 N. J. L. 189. pp. 407, 431, 1153, 1154, 1272, 1279, 1289, 1291. c 33 Ind. 357; 39 N. J. L. 192; 34 Iowa, 161; 69 111. 430 ; 37 Vt. 509 ; 25 Mich. 291, 300 ; 64 Mo. 276; 33 N. J. L. 151, 439; 21 Wis. 375. Temora (The), 1 Lush. 17. p. 895. Temperance Hall Assn. v. Giles, 33 N. J. L. 260. p. 345. C62N. H. 415. Terapleman v. Haydon, 12 C. B. 507. ' p. 382. Templin u. Iowa City, 14 Iowa, 59. pp. 738, 747, 748, 889. c 24 Iowa, 346 ; 46 Iowa, 611. Tenant v. Goldwin, 1 Salk. 21; 360; s. c, 2 Ld. Raym. 1089 ; 6 Modern, 311. pp. 5, 8, 10, 15, 17, 22, 23, 26, 28, 31, 34, 36, 81, 82, 84, 86, 97, 99, 104, 106, 257. c 4 Hurl. & Colt. 275, 276, 277, 279; L. E. I Exoh. 275, 280, 282, 286; 3 Hurl. & Oolt. 786, 790, 797; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 605, 606; 33 L. J. ,Exch.) 157, 158, 160; 7 Conn. 93; 12 C. B. 174; 2 N. H. 534; 7 C. B. 565; 13 Jur. 362, 565; 4 Exoh. Div. 11; 27 Week. Rep. 96; 7 Cent. L. J. 466; 18 Alb. L. J. 515; L. R. 7 Q. B. 33; 41 L. J. (Q. B.) 32 ; 122 Mass. 203 ; 2 0. P. Div. 244, 245; 6 Reporter, 460; 3 Term Rep. 768; 8 C. B. (N. S.) 388; 30 L. J. (0. P.) 24. Ten Eyck v. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co. , 18 N. J. L. 200. p. 568. Tenney v. Leuz, 16 Wis. 566. p. 219. Tenney v. Miners' Ditch Co., 7 Cal. 335. p. 101. Tenney v. Tuttle, 1 Allen, 185. p. 804. c 1 Allen, 189; 110 Mass. 60. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Augustus, 21 m. 186. p. 534. TABLE OF CASES. clix Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. G-raham, 46 Ind. 239. p. 450. c 5 lleporter, 660; « Ind. 46; 43 Ind. 96; 8 Cent. L. J. 245; 63 Ind. 310; 7 Reporter, 558; 51 Ind. 248. Terre Haute, etc., E. Co. v. McKinley, 33 Ind. 274. pp. 569, 572. c 41 Ind. 244. Terre Haute, etc., E. Co. v. Smith, 16 Ind. 102. pp. 527, 1246. c 54 Ind. 43 ; 48 Ind. 288; 16 Ind. 435. Terry u. New York, 8 Bosw. 504. pp. 733, 1260. Terry v. New York, etc., E. Co., 22 Barb. 574. pp. 497, 500, 512, 531, 1158, 1159. c37 Barb. 618; 2 Meto. (Ky.) 182; 36 Mo. 32; 9 Wis. 210. Tessymond's Case, Lew. C. C. 169. p. 228. Tewksbury v. Bucklin, 7 N. H. 518. pp. 196, 197, 213. c 28 N. H. 166; 37 N. H. 335; 57 N. H. 608; 49 Pa. St. 107 ; 30 N. H. 163 ; 21 N. H. 366 ; 19 N. H. 270; 4 Mete. 593. Thayer v. Arnold, 4 Mete. 589. p. 212. c 28 N". H. 167 ; 37 N. H. 335 ; 29 Me. 288. Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511. p. 640. c 18 Ohio 231; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 540; 9 E. I. 472; 31 Ala. 474; 13 Hun, 216, 218; 4 La. An. 440 ; 41 Me. 368 ; 52 Me. 127 ; 13 B. Mon. 560 ; 12 Mo. 422; 3 Mo. App. 299. d 91 IT. S. 551, 555. Thayer v. Jarvis, 44 Wis. 388 ; a. c, 7 Cent. L. J. 166. pp. 356, 759. Thayer u. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 22 Ind. 26. pp. 973, 974, 1028. c 20 Mich. 127 ; 50 Mo. 305 ; 18 Iowa, 284 ; 14 Minn. 363; 50 Ind. 84; 23 Ind. 83; 34 Ind. 299; 8 Cent. L. J. 14; 58 Ind. 28; 40 N. T. 449. Thicknesse v. Lancaster Canal Co., 4Mee. &W.472. p. 548. Thomas v. Georgia E., etc., Co., 38 Ga. 222. p. 998. Thomas v. Hook, 4 Phila. 119. p. 1085. Thomas v. Kenyon, 1 Daly, 132. pp. 105, 1162. Thomas u. Morgan, 2 Cromp. M. &E. 496 ; s. c, 4 Dowl. P. C. 223 ; 1 Gale & Dav. 172 ; 5 Tyrw. 1085. pp. 177, 181, 202, 204, 218. c 9 Ad. & E. Ill; 10 Jur. 694; 16 L. J. (Q. B.) 67. Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaugh. 330. p. 701. Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Mass. 156. pp. 349, 1205, 1206, 1211, 1231, 1232. c 110 Mass. 614 ; 31 Wis. 187 ; 104 Mass. 75 ; 2 Col. 162. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397. pp. 232, 233, 884. (In full, p. 224.) c 1 Eobt. 244; 1 Sweeny, 548; 26 How.Pr. 117 ; 11 Hun, 357 ; 56 N. Y. 128 ; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 455 ; 39 N. J. L. 310 ; 26 Wis. 267 ; 42 N. Y. 357, 359 ; 6 Duer, 410, 434 ; 51 N. Y. 497 ; 14 Allen, 295 ; 26 Barb. 627 ; 35 N. Y. 211 ; 19 N. Y. 130 ; 8 Hun, 258; 7 Lans. 213, 214; 24 Barb. 361; 64 Barb. 213, 214; 1 Hilt. 445; 11 Allen, 519; 110 Mass. 68 ; 29 N. H. 35. Thompson a. Bridgewater, 7 Pick. 188. pp. 378, 1166, 1205. c 19 Conn. 576 ; 22 N". H. 563 ; 11 Me. 337 ; 29 Conn. 209; 21 N. J. L. 270, 284; 35 N. H. 276; 2 Cush. 605; 12 Mete. 418; 6 Iowa, 454; 6 Wis. 390. Thompson v. Central E., etc., Co., 54 Ga. 509. p. 1163. e 56 Ga. 588; 68 Ga. 114; 5 Reporter, 495. Thompson v. North-Eastern E. Co., 2 Best & S. 106 ; s. c, 8 Jur. (if. s.) 991 ; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 67 ; 31 L. J. (Q. B.) 194; 10 Week. Eep. 404; 6 L. T. (n. s.) 127. p. 964. c 59 N. Y. 32; 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 207; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 826. Thompson v. North Missouri' E. Co., 51 Mo. 190. p. 1177. Thompson v. Snow, 4 Me. 264. p. 895. Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 0. B. 115. pp. 1076, 1089, 1280. c 105 Mass. 79 ; 31 Barb. 388 ; 17 Barb. 97 ; L. E. 9 Exch. 182; 43 L. J. (Exch.) 103, 104; 5 Exch. 346 ; 19 L. J. (Exch.) 298 ; 24 Md. 104 ; 44 L. J. (Exch.') 92, 93; 15 Irish C. L. (N. s.) 343; 46 Pa. St. 169, ,160, 161; 6 Gray, 72; 38 N. Y. 262. ? 2 C. B. (N. s.) 750; El. Bl. & El. 728. d 43 Wis. 626 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 430 ; 19 N. Y. 343 ; 36 N. J. L. 226. Thorp V. Brookfield, 36 Conn. 320. pp. 564, 773, 774, 775, 797, 1175, 1203. c 37 Conn. 312. Thorpe u. Eutland, etc., E. Co., 27 Vt. 140. p. 515. c 26 Mo. 451; 16 Kan. 576, 582; 41 Iowa, 302, 304,306; 5 Ch. Leg. N. 123. Thrings v. Central Park K. Co., 7 Eoht. 616. pp. 1146, 1179, 1236. Thurber v. Harlem, etc., E. Co., 60 N. Y. 326. pp. 407, 429, 431, 1181. c 39 N. J. L. 193 ; 70 K. Y. 116, 117 ; 10 Jones & Sp. 232; 10 Hun, 479; 67 N. Y. 64. clx TABLE OF CASES. Thurn v. Alta California Tel. Co., 15 Cal. 472. pp. 838, 848, 852. c 56 Barb. 63 ; 36 Ind. 436. Thursfield v. Jones, Sir T. Jones, 187. p. 658. Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220. pp. 106, 253, 2-58, 259, 260, 261, 275. c 15 Barb. 101 ; 15 Conn. 131 ; 18 Mian. 338, .139, 3«, 345; 22 Mo. 572; 4 Abb. N. 0. 295; 8 Wis. 257; 2 Allen, 132; 3 Barb. 60; 46 Iowa, 659, 661 ; 3 Iowa, 83 ; 25 N. J. L. 362, 365, 370 ; 41 111.509; 17 Johns. 100; 8Pa. 8t. 376; 76IU.236; 11 Cush. 226; 2 ST. H. 535; 1 Humph. 407; 72 N. T. 309, 310; 19 Barb. 386; 21 Barb. 414, 420, 422; 122 Mass. 203, 204, 206, 206; 10 Mete. 373; 4 Paige, 172; 66 111. 489; 4 N. Y. 201, 202, 205; 26Vt. 471; 1 Pick. 434. Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510. pp. 732, 733, 751. c 56 Mo. 128. ? 3 Mo. App. 261. Tiarks v. St. Louis, etc., K. Co., 58 Mo. 45. pp. 514, 518. c 65 Mo. 233; 66 Mo. 571; 7 Cent. L. J. 277; 64 Mo. 76. Tibbetts v. Knox, etc., E. Co., 62 Me. 437. p. 911. Ticonderoga (The), Swa. Adm. 215. p. 895. Tifft V. Tifft, 4 Denio, 175. p. 200. Tift V. Jones, 52 Ga. 538. pp. 556, 562. Tighe V. Lowell, 119 Mass. 472. pp. 775, 1201. c 119 Mass. 492. Tilley v. Hudson Eiver E. Co., 28 N. Y. 52. p. 1291. Tillock V. Webb, 56 Me. 100. p. 1094. Timm v. Bear, 29 Wis. 256. p. 804. Timmons v. Central, etc., E. Co., 6 Ohio St. 105. pp. 1014, 1019, 1056. c 74 N. C. 659 ; 22 Ohio St. 21 ; 24 Ohio St. 639- Tinker v. Eussell, 14 Pick. 279. p. 761. c 27 Vt. 68; 24 Vt. 164; 11 Gray, 156. Tinney v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 52 N. T. 632 ; s. c, 62 Barb. 218. pp. 971, 972, 1036. c 14 Hun, 448. Tinsman v. Belvidere, etc., E. Co., 26 N. J. L. 148. p. 745. c 27 N. J. L. .36. Tipping V. St. Helens Smelting Co., 11 H. L. Cas. 642; s. c, 4 Best & S. 608. p, 36. Tisdale v. Norton, 8 Mete. 388. pp. 340, 620, 754, 769, 772, 1093. c32N. H.444; 53M0.299; 65 Me. 551; 22 N. H. 564; 36 N. H. 297; 44 X. H. 248; 13 Meto. 59, 299 ; 4 Gray, 100, 413 ; 19 Vt. 477 ; 51 Me. 332 ; 68 Me. 367. Titcomb v. Fitchburg E. Co., 12 Allen, 254. pp. 563, 564^ 565, 775, 792, 794, 797, 1085. c 105 Mass. 344 ; 97 Mass. 431. Titus V. Northbridge, 97 Mass. 258. pp. 780, 1086, 1207. c 53 Mo. 301; 101 Mass. 98; 6 Reporter, 719; 106 Mass. 280; 98 Mass. .581; 97Mass. 267, note; 29 Wis. 306, 306, 307; 67 N. Y. 603; 105 Mass. 344; 100 Mass. 56; 67 Mo. 165. Tobin V. Portland, etc., E. Co., 59 Me. 183. p. 313. c 62 Me. 562. Todd V. Cochell, 17-Cal. 97. pp. 55, 102. c 61 N. Y. 487. Todd V. Flight, 9 C. B. (n. s.) 377; s. c, 30 L. J. (0. P.) 21. pp. 318, 322. c 56 N. Y. 133; 17 Am. L. Eeg. (N. s.) 462; 59 ST. Y. 34, 38, 39; L. R. 10 C. P. 662; 2 0. P. DiT. 313 ; L. K. 8 C. P. 404, 405. Todd V. Old Colony E. Co., 3 Allen, 18; s. c, 7 Allen, 207. p. 1238. Todd V. Eome, 2 Me. 51. pp. 759, 760. C27 Vt. 464; 14 Me. 303; 29 Iowa, 93; 66 Me. 355; 4 Me. 273; 34 Wis. 617; 5 Me. 369. Todd V. Eowley, 8 Allen, 51. pp. 762, 763, 1207, 1243. c 123 Mass. 537. Todd V. Troy, 61 K T. 506. pp. 759, 802, 804. c 9 Hun, 685 ; 19 Alb. L. J. 315 ; 12 Hun, 304. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Arnold, 43 111, 418. pp. 539, 540, 1262, 1267. c 49 111. 246. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Asbury, 84 111. 429. pp. 973, 986, 1008, 1015, 1020. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Barlow, 71 111. 640. pp. 505, 520. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Bevin, 26 Ind. 443. pp. 512, 1176, 1254. c 26 Ind. 375 ; 35 Ind. 382, 466. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Brooks, 81 HI. 245. pp. 1280, 1289. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Gary, 37 Ind. 172. p 521. c 38 Ind. 451. Toledo, etc., R. Co. u. Chapin, 66 111. 504. p. 521. c 71 111. 569. Toledo, etc., E. Co. «. Cohen, 44 Ind. 444. p. 524. c 45 Ind. 92 ; 55 Ind. 571. TABLE OF CASES. clxi Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Cole, 50 111. 184. pp. 511, 516. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Conroy, 68 111. 560 ; i>. c, 61 111. 162. pp. 973, 987, 993, 994, 1038, 1279. c 72 111. MO; 77 m. 313. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Corn, 71 111. 493. p. 155. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Cory, 39 Ind. 218. pp. 514, 522, 523. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Crane, 68 111. 355. p. 514. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Daniels, 21 Ind. 256. p. 1247. c 45 Ind. 92 ; 24 Ind. 163 ; 37 Ind. 550 ; 22 Ind. 319. Toledo, etc., R. Co. o. Deacon, 68 111. 91. pi 506. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Delehanty, 71 111. 615. p. 538. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Durkin, 76 111. 395. p. 970. c 84111. 573. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Eddy, 72 111. 138. p. 1017. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Eidson, 51 Ind. 67. p. 1246. cl7Kan. 570; 58 Ind. 415. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Eergusson, 42 HI. 449. pp. 502, 507. c 63 111. 94. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Eowler, 22 Ind. 316. pp. 524, 529, 538. c 20 Iowa, 194. A 29 Ind. 203, 204; 35 Ind. 381, 382. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Fredericks, 71 El. 294. pp. 973, 989. c 73 111. 240; 77111.371. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. G-oddard, 25 Ind. 185. p. 421. c 33 Ind. 356, 367; 34 Iowa, 160; 49 N. T. 258; 46 Ind. 30; 37 Ind. 547, 549; 35 Ind. 466; 50 Ind. 45; 1 Wils. (Indianapolis) 299, 489; 58 Ind. 28. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Grable, 88 m. 441. pp. 1181, 1184. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Grush, 67 111. 262. p. 313. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Harmon, 47 111. 298. pp. 351, 352, 887, 889. c 63 111. 152; 17 Kan. 477. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Harris, 49 Ind. 119. pp. 512, 534. c 68 Ind. 28. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Howell, 38 Ind. 447. p. 521. c 46 Ind. 216; 43 Ind. 410. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Johnston, 74 HI. 83. pp. 501, 539, 540, 1262. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 76 111. 311. p. 427. c 81 111. 453, 455; 80 111. 91; 74 111. 93. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Larmon, 67 111. 68. p. Ii3. c 72 111. 97, 99; 1 Bradw. 516. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Lavery, 71 111. 522. pp. 514, 536. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Logan, 71 111. 191. p. 587. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Lurch, 23 Ind. 10. p. 536. c 17 Kan. 570; 57 Ind. 247; 39 Ind. 219; 51 Ind. 68; 34 Ind. 299; 58 Ind. 415. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Maine, 67 111. 298. p. 885. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Maxfield, 72 HI. 95. p. 164. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. MoGinnis, 71 111. 346. pp. 497, 498, 502, 506. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Miller, 76 111. 278. p. 1181. c 81 111. 455. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Milligan, 52 Ind. 505. pp. 506, 524, 583. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Moore, 77 111. 217. pp. 1034, 1279. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 111. 391. pp. 462, 1022, 1024, 1026, 1027, 1166. Toledo, etc., E. Co. u. Owen, 43 Ind. 405. p. 621. c 55 Ind. 483 ; 58 Ind. 367 ; 15 Alb. L. J. 62. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Parker, 49 111. 385. p. 1159. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Pence, 68 111. 524. pp. 516, 519, 537. c 71 111. 192. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Pindar, 53 111. 447. pp. 146, 155, 157, 166, 169, 1100. c 53 Mo. 371 ; 53 111. 451 ; 71 lU. 496. Toledo, etc., E. Co. u. Eeed, 23 Ind. 101. p. 536. c37 Ind. 550; 17 Ind. 570; 57 Ind. 247; 34 Ind. 299. Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Riley, 47 111. 514. pp. 424, 431. c 81 111. 455 ; 79 111. 139 ; 80 111. 91 ; 63 111. 179. clxii TABLE OF CASES. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Rumbold, 40 111. 143. pp. 509, 904. c 82 111. 633 ; 63 HI. 546 ; 86 HI. 645. Toledo, etc., R. Go. v. Shuckman, 50 Ind. 42. p. 427. <• 59 Ind. 92. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 25 Ind. 288. p. 539. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Ppangler, 71 111. 568. p. 520. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer, 66 111. 528. p. 1168. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas, 18 Ind. 215. pp. 497, -523, 528, 529. c 37 Ind. 547, 548, 550; 35 Ind. 466; 22 Ind. 28; 25 Ind. 197. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Tllton, 27 Ind. 71. p. 533. c 30 Ind. 327. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Wand, 48 Ind. 476. pp. 157, 162, 983. c51Ind. 156; 56 Ind. 519. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Weaver, 34 Ind. 298. pp. 1244, 1246. c 57 Ind. 247 ; 39 Ind. 219, 228 ; 68 Ind. 415. Tombs V. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 18 Barb. 583. p. 527. Tomlinson v. Derby, 43 Conn. 663. pp. 340, 342, 754, 755, 804, 1250. Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend. 462. pp. 669, 817. Tonawanda R. Co. v. Hunger, 5 Denio, 255; C-. c, 4 N. T. 349. pp. 214, 299, 468, 480, 483, 500, 501, 503, 528, 529. c 1 Duer, 681 ; 49 Barb. 531 ; 17 Barb. 98 ; 16 lU. 202, 203; 11 Barb. 114, 116; 22 Barb. 683; 2 E. I. 409 ; 5 Kan. 17S, 185 ; 2 Sawyer, 28 ; 57 N, T. 396; 28 N. H. 174; 13 N. Y. 46; 1 Handy, 197, 198, 199; 43 N. Y. 508; 3 E. D. Smith, 373: 9 Wis. 210, 211, 214; 98 Mass. 569; 13 Barb. 497, 34 N. Y. 11; 35 N. Y. 36; 25 Vt. 123, 162; 71 lU, 509 ; 1 E. D. Smith, 272 ; 49 Pa. St. 107 ; 2 Bosvy. 378; 67 N. Y. 166; 14 Barb. 370, 593; 8 Minn. 161; 3 Ohio St. 182, 186; 81 lU. 595; 2 Meto, (Ey.) 179, 182; 13 Ga. 88; 39 How. Pr 414, 415 42 Ind. 343 ; 2 Mich. 263 ; 20 Kan. 364 ; 115 Mass. 460 ; 17 Iowa, 463 ; 43 Miss. 281 ; 24 N. J. L. 285 ; 46 Barb. 270,271; 10 Iowa, 271; 2 Col. 165; 9 W. Va. 283; 1 Hilt. 426; 8 Eobt. 513; 37 Barb. 518 ; 20 111. 496 ; 26 N. Y. 432 ; 1 Keyes, 572 ; 33 How. Pr. 199, 200; 2 Abb. App. Dec. 381; 40 Barb. 207. ? 37 Cal. 417, 418, 419. d 35 N. H. 276; 31 Pa. St. 370. Toole V. Beckett, 67 Me. 544. p. 105. Toomey v. London, etc., R. Co., 3 0. B. (n. s.) 146; s. c, 27 L. J. (C. P.) 39. pp. 290, 314, 367, 1237. c 4 Hurl. & N. 786; 29 L. J. (Exoh.) 97; 8 C. B. (N. s.) 572; 7 Jur. (N. s.) 169; 29 L. J. (C. P.) 336; 36 N. J. L. 33; L. E. 1 0. P. 282; .35 L. J. (C. P.) 187; 73 Pa. St. 125; 36 L. J. (C. P.) 23; L. E. 2 C. P. 10; 9 Jones & Sp. 28; 59 N. Y. 366; 10 Allen, 192; 3 App. Cas. 1171. Topeka v. Tuttle, 5 Kan. 311. pp. 753, 781, 1087, 1097. c 16 Kan. 381 ; 20 Kan. 456. Topsham v. Lisbon, 65 Me. 449. pp. 759, 1263. Torbush v. Norwich, 38 Conn. 225. p. 735. c 51 Ala. 148. Totten V. Cole, 33 Mo. 138. p. 217. Totten V. Phipps, 52 N. Y. 354. pp. 363, 324. Tourtellot u. Rosebrook, 11 Mete. 460. pp. 56, 106, 148, 149. c 18 Minn. 345 ; 41 Ind. 261 ; 51 N. Y. 437 ; 41 Wis. 73; 11 Cu8h. 226; 6 Cush. 297; 54 Me. 259; 62 Me. 291. Towanda Coal Co. v. Heeman, 86 Pa. St. 418. p. 886. Tower v. Providence, etc., R. Co., 2 R. I. 404. p. 526. c 1 Handy, 200, 201; 116 Mass. 460; 21 Barb. 79. Town V. Dodge, 2 Dane's Abr. 658. p. 212. Town V. Lamphire, 31 Vt. 540. p. 215. Towne v. Nashua, etc., R. Co., 124 Mass. 101. p. 501. Towns V. Cheshire R. Co., 21 N. H. 363. pp. 517, 529, 531. c 28 N. H. 164, 168; 66 N. H. 563; 35 N. H. 172. Townsend v. Des Moines, 42 Iowa, 657. p. 763. Townsend v. Radcliffe, 44 111. 446. p. 1277. Townsend v. Susquehanna Turnpike Co., 6 Johns. 90. pp. 317, 561, 662, 796. c 9 Dana, 406; 22 Pa. St. 388; 18 N. J. L. 119; 7 Conn. 94; 45 Mo. 474; 20 Ohio, 446; 7 Gal. 340; 6 Me. 99; 2 Denio, 440; 16 Johns. 256; 1 Hilt. 443.; 3 Hill, 194; 20 N. J. L. 325. Townsend v. Wathen, 9 East, 277. pp. 176, 299, 302, 305, 1194. c 1 Cow. 78; 2 Blaokf. 98; 25 Vt. 160; 21 Minn. 211; 98 Mass. 569; 10 HI. 164. Tracy v. Troy, etc., R. Co., 38 N. T. 433 ; TABLE OF CASES. clxiii 5. c, 55 Barb. 529. pp. 509, 516, 521, 522. c 21 Mich. 400; 57 Barb. 591 ; 2 N. Y. S. O. . B. 736, 737; 9 Best & S. 841, Sl>; 37 L. J. (Q. B.) 216; 26 Wis. 231, 254; 80 Pa. St. 190, 379; 57 N. H. 137; 38 X. J. L. 9 ; 37 Mo. 296 ; L. K. 5 C. P. 103 ; 39 L. J. (C. P.) 71; L. E. 6 C. P. 71 ; 40 L. J. (C. P.) 25; 11 W. Va. 29, 38; 49 N. Y. 429, 430; 21 Minn. 64. Vaugbn v. Scade, 30 Mo. 600. pp. 380, 1282. Veazie v. Penobscot R. Co., 49 Me. 119. pp. 357, 787, 790, 791. C22 Wis. 646; 54 Me. 47; 59 Me. 532; 20 Ohio St. 162. Veazie v. Rockland, 68 Me. 511 p. 798. Venables v. Smith, 2 Q. B. Div. 279. p. 884. Vennall v. Garner, 1 Cromp. & M. 21. pp. 373, 1147, 1166, 1215. Vere v. Lord Cawdor, 11 East, 567. pp. 221, 488. Verrill v. Mine*, 31 Me. 299. pp. 780, 803. c 32 Me. 273, 539; 25 Iowa, 110; 6 Nev. 234. Verry v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 47 Iowa, 549. p. 1054. Vicars v. Wilcox, 8 Bast, 1. pp. 1066, 1084, 1101. Vicksburg o. Hennessey, 54 Miss. 391. pp. 761, 784, 1176. Vicksburg, etc., E. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 156. pp. 213, 495, 498, 501, 502,' 504, 513, 540. e 45 Md. 492 ; 49 111. 245 ; 43 Miss. 239, 281, 282, 287; 50 Miss. 573; 40 Miss. 48, 386, 459; 46 Miss. 578; 29 Md. 436; 47 Miss. 422; 33 Miss. 278 ; 44 Miss. 490, 491, 494. Vicksburg, etc., E. Co. i^. Wilkins, 47 Miss. 404. p. 1018. c 51 Miss. 641. Victory v. Baker, 67 N. Y. 866. p. 309. c 55 How. Pr. 171. Vinal V. Dorchester, 7 Gray, 421. pp. 788, 7 -9. ell Allen, 321; 13 Gray. 63; 2 Allen, 554; 13 Allen, 188; 46 N. H. 60; 10 Allen, 604. Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Gush. 103. p. 735. c 52 Me. 125. ,■«> clxvi TABLE OF CASES. "Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62. pp. 71, 72, 248, 382, 1234. c 47 Vt. 271; 15 Conn. 131; 18 Minn. 345; 17 Barb. 99 ; 16 Ark. 318 ; 53 N. H. 451 ; 13 Am. L. Eeg. (N. s.) 375; 6 Cash. 296; 50 Vt. 135. Viiicett V. Cook, 4 Hun, 318. pp. 349, 1231. c 13 Hun, 87. Vinton V. Bradford, 13 Mass. 114. p. 899. Vinton K.Schwab, 32 Vt. 612. p. 1237. c 17 Mich. 118, 123; 100 Mass. 215. Viscount Canterbury u. Attorney-Gene- ral, 1 Phill. Eq. 306. pp. 126, 132, 148. Vivian b. Mersey Docks Trustees, L. K. 5 C.P. 19. p. 1065. Von Pragstein v. Windier, 2 Mo. App. 598. pp. 218, 126.5. Voorhees v. Martin, 12 Barb. 508. p. 817. Vosburgh v. Moak, 1 Cush. 453. p. 390. Vose V. Lancashire, etc., R. Co., 2 Hurl. & N. 728; ». <;., 4 Jur. (n. s.) 864; 27 L. J. (Exch.) 249. p. 989. c 3 Hurl. & N. 656; 27 L. J. (E.xoh.) 406; 32 Iowa, 364; 3 Robt. 82; 28 How. Pr. 473; 3 Exch. Div. 344; 49 N. Y. 426; 48 Me. 118. Vreeland v. New Jersey Stone Co., 29 N. ,T. Eq. 190. p. 888. Vrooman v. Lawyer, 13 Johns. 339. pp. 188, 190, 201. c 48 Mo. 397; 22 Wis. 73; 8 Barb. 636; 13 Ohio St. 493 ; 16 N. H. 79 ; 7 Ind. 318 ; 1 N. T. 516; 44 Me. 329. w. Wabash Canal v. Spears, 16 Ind. 441, p. 744. Wabash, etc., Canal v. Mayer, 10 Ind. 400. p. 1176. c 42 Ind. 342 ; 12 Ind. 523. Wabash R. Co. u. Brown, 2 Bnidw. 516. pp. 536, 537. Wadhurst o. Damme, Cro. Jac. 45. p. 221. Waggoner v. Jermiane, 3 Denio, 306. pp. 317, 318. Wagner v. Bissell, 3 Iowa, 396. p. 211. c 34 Iowa, 508. Wagner v. Woolsey, 1 Heisk. 235. p. 1280. Waits V. North-Eastern R. Co., El. Bl. & El. 719. pp. 1180, 1182, 1183, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1240. Wake V. Lock, 5 Car. & P. 454. p. 1060. c 24 Wend. 469. Wakefield v. Connecticut, etc., Co., 37 Vt. 330. pp. 852, 353. c 54 N. H. 503 ; 113 Mass. 368 ; 23 Vt. 193, 194. Wakeman i/. Robinson, 8 J. B. Moo. 63; s. u., 1 Bing. 213. pp. 72, 209, 216, 382. c 47 Ind. 371 ; 3 Wend. 393 ; 17 Barb. 98, 99 ; 8 Car. & F. 695 ; 2 Ired. L. 326 ; 3 Q. B. 922 ; 3 Gale & Dav. 14 ; 7 Jur. 62 ; 12 L. J. (Q. B.) 23 ; Lalor, 195; 3 Barb. 46; 16 Mo. .510; 57 JPa. St. 192; 7 Vt. 65; 16 Ark. 318; 53 N. H. 451; 13 Am. L. Eeg. (X. s.) 375; 6 Cush. 296; 6 Duer, 405; 66 Mo. 354 ; 59 Ind. 135 ; 8 W^end. 472, 473. Walcott V. Swampscott, 1 Allen, 101. pp. 621, 723, 738. c 1 Allen, 173; 104 Mass. 95; 62 Me. 122; 11 E. 1. 143 ; 21 Mich. 113 ; 122 Mass. 372 ; 38 Conn. 381. a 91 U. S.-555. Waldo V. Goodsell, 33 Conn. 452. p. 1287. Waldron v. Hopper, 1 N. J. L. 889. pp. 222, 1252. Waldron v. Portland, etc., K. Co., 35 Me. 422. p. 497. c 1 Handy, 204 ; 14 Allen, 153 ; 36 Mo. 32. Waldron v. Rensselaer, etc., R. Co., 8 Barb. 390. pp. 497, 513, 515. cl3 Barb. 496, 501,596; 13 N.Y.60; 26 Mo. 452 ; 16 Kan , 576 ; 14 Barb. 368, 372 ; 18 Cal. 355 ; SBosw. 511; 27 Vt. 154. Wales V. Ford, 8 N. J. L. 267. p. 197. Walker v. Boiling, 22 Ala. 294. pp. 939, 970, 974, 1027, 1030, 1034. c 24 Ala. 33, 35, 36; 6 Reporter, 264; 46- Texas, 638; 49 N. Y. 532; 42 Ala 71i, 719, 721, 722 ; 49 Texas, 189. Walker v. G-oe, 4 Hurl. & N. 350; is. c, 5 Jur. (n. s.) 737 ; 28 L. J. (Exch.) 184. p. 556. c 35 X. J. L. 26, 32. Walker v. Herron, 22 Texas, 55. pp. 204, 1177. Walker v. Lockport, 43 How. Pr. 366. p. 784. Walker v. Maitland, 5 Barn. & Aid. 171. p. 1101. Walker v. SpuUock, 23 Ga. 436. p. 998. c34~Ga. 424. Wall V. McNamara (M. S.) cited in 1 Term Rep. 502, 536. p. 824. Wallace v. Cannon, 88 Ga. 199. pp. 1162, 1280. Wallace v. Douglass, 10 Ired. L. 79. p. 219. Wallace v. Muscatine, 4 G. Greene, 373. pp. 738, 74.5, 751. c 9 Iowa, 235 ; 46 Iowa, 659 ; 34 Iowa, 346. TABLE OF CASES. clxvii Wallace v. New York, 2 Hilt. 440 ; s. c, 18 How. Pr. 169 ; 9 Abb. Pr. 41. pp. 753, 764, 1265, 1266. c 5 Lans. 349; 22 Wis. 646; 10 Bosw. 31, 32; 16 Abb. Pr. 347, 348 ; 49 N. H. 394 ; 44 Miss. 494. Wallace ,;. Small, 1 Moo. & M. 446. p. 802. Waller v. South-Eastern E. Co., 2 Hurl. & Colt. 102 ; s. c, 9 Jur. (n. s.) 501 ; 32 L. J. (Exch.) 205 ; 11 Week. Eep. 731 ; 8 L. T. (n. s.) 325. pp. 970, 1033, 1089. C 16 C. B. (N. S.) 688, 690; 33 L. J. (0. P.) 333; 13 Allen, 443; 3 Sawyer, 441; 65 Mo. 229; 11 E. I. 16B; 5 Best & S. 582, 583; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 266; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 1077; 59 Pa, St. 252. Walling V. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 660. pp. 739, 743, 888. C 14 La. An. 120, 121. Walls V. The State, 7 Blackf. 572. p. 242. Wall's Case, How. St. Tr. 144. p. 824. Walsh V. Mississippi, etc., Trans. Co., 52 Mo. 434. p. 1151. c 55 Mo. 483. Walsh V. Peet Valve Co., 110 Mass. 23. pp. 971, 994, 995. c 49 Texas, 538; 37 Mich. 212. Walsh U.Virginia, etc., K. Co., 8 Nev. 110. pp. 512, 517. Walter v. Wicomico County, 35 Md. 385. pp. 619, 741, 752, 820. Walters v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 41 Iowa, 71. pp. 1187, 1188, 1191, 1192, 1290, 1291. Walters v. Pfeil, Moo. & M. 362. pp. 276, 279. c 22 Mo. 572; 4 Paige, 173; 15 Conn. 130; 1 Demo,/99; 41 Ind. 251; 25 N. J. L. 361. Waltham v. Kemper, 55 111. 346. pp. 622, 705. c 57 111. 35 ; 123 Mass. 352 ; 58 111 . 298. Walther v. Pacific E. E., 55 Mo. 271. pp. 514, 523, 538. c 64 Mo. 415 ; 58 Mo. 48. Walton V. Gavin, 16 Q. B. 52. p. 824. Walton V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 67 Mo. 56. p. 519. Wanless v. North-Eastern R. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 481 ; «. g., 25 L. T. (n. s.) 103. p. 428. Wann v. Western Union Tel. Co., 37 Mo. 481. pp. 835, 836, 840, 841, 842, 844. c 112 Mass. 74; 60 III. 430; 35 Ind. 438. 27 Iowa, 452. Waples V. Bassett, 8 Modern, 241. p. 682. Warburton v. Great Western R. Co., L. E. 2 Exch. SO; o. o., 36 L. J. (Exch.) 9 ; 4 Hurl. & Colt. 695 ; 15 Week. Eep. 108; 15 L. T. (n. s.) 361. p. 1044. c 53 Pa. St. 457 ; 1 0. P. DiT. 561 ; 3 Exch. Div. 344, 345, 347; 34 Upper Canada Q. B. 464. Ward V. Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co., 71 N. Y. 81. p. 556. Ward V. Andrews, 3 Mo. App. 275. p. 277. Ward V. Brown, 64 111. 307. p. 196. c 70 111. 394. Ward V. Hartford Co., 12 Conn. 404. pp. 618, 619. Ward V. Jefferson, 24 Wis. 342. pp. 561, 729, 758, 761, 762, 763, 796. e 26 Wis. 149; 32 Wis. 610; 72 111. 352; 24 Wis. 650; 122 Mass. 379; 36 Wis, 111; 39 Wis. 135; 43 Wis. 522; 6 Cent. L. J. 428; 91 U. S. 551. Ward V. Lee, 7 El. & Bl. 426; s. ..., 3 Jur. (n. s.) 557; 26 L. J. (Q. B.) 142. pp. 608, 622, 822. c L. E. 1 H. L. 118; 11 H. L. Cas. 721; 12 Jur. (N. s.) 576; 35 L. J. (Exch.) 235; 3 Hurl. &N. 316; 27 L.J, (Exch.) 360; 8E1. &B1. 808; 28 L. J. (Q. B.) 43. ! Ward v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 29 Wis. 144. pp. 165, 1149. c 36 Wis. 100; 43 Wis. 512, 525 ; 29 Wis. 302; 41 Wis. 73; 6 Cent. h. J. 429; 34 Wis. 318. Ward V. North Haven, 43 Conn. 148. pp. 780, 781, 1083, 1098. c 13 Hun, 87. Ward V. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211. pp. 1072, 1084. Ware v. St. Paul Water Co., 1 Dill. 465 ; 6-. c, 3 Ch. Leg. N. 41 ; 16 Wall. 566. pp. 345, 557, 900, 903, 906, 1257, 1258, 1264. Warner v. Erie R. Co., 39 N. Y. 468; s. u., 49 Barb. 558. pp. 936, 938, 972, 984. c 2 Lans. 511, 515, 517; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 538, 530; 31 Ind. 183, 185, 186, 187; 3 N. Y. S, C. (T. &C.) 257; 49 Barb. 339; 53 N. Y.553; 47 Mo. 577; 65 Barb. 133; 50 Miss. 190; 4 Hun, 770, 775 ; 62 Me. 466; 64 N. Y. 9; 67 Barb. 99; 1 Lans. Ill; 46 Textvs, 550; 5 Hun, 494; 7 Lans. 70; 8 Hun, 257; 62 Barb. 219, 330; 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 75 ; 3 Col. 502, 510 ; 49 N. Y. 528, 631. d 49 Texas, 187. Warner u. New York, etc., E. Co., 45 clxviii TABLE OF CASES. Barb. 299 ; s. c, 44 N. Y. 465. pp. 416, 418, 1177. c 44 Ind. 80; 25 Mich. 2S2; 7 Jones & Sp. 350,352; 11 Hun, 219; 4 Jones & Sp. 448; 65 Barb. 102; 50 How. Pr. 108; S8 Iowa, 517; 1 Bradw. 422 ; 8 Jones & Sp. 183. ? 65 Barb. 149. Warner v. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 362. pp. 761, 770, 772. c 122 Mass. 391. Warner v. Kailroad Co., 6 Phila. 537. p. 431. c 56 Ind. 520. Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84. p. 708. Warren v. Fitchburg K Co., 8 Allen, 227. pp. 428, 460. c 105 Mass. 78, 207; 34 N. T. 27; 10 Allen, 532; 17 Mich. 120; 35 N. Y. 37; 103 Mass. 514; 100 Mass. 212, 215 ; 42 N. Y. 473 ; 104 Mass. 116, 141 ; 29 Md. 439. Warren v. Kauffman, 2 Phila. 259. p. 1231. Wash V. Mead, 8 Hun, 389. p. 348. Washburn u. Nashville, etc., R Co., 3 Head, 638. pp. 638, 971, 1021, 1031, 1046. c 6 Heisk. 357; 59 Tenn. 427; 86 Pa. St. 145. Washburn v. Tracy, 2 D. Chip. 128. pp. 378, 1134, 1166. Washington «. Applegate, 22 N. J. L. 42. p. 219. Washington, etc., Tel. Co. v. Hobson, 15 Gratt. 122. pp. 836, 859. c 3 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 13; 34 How. Pr. 313; 60 III. 429. Wasson v. Canfield, 6 Blaekf. 406. p. 817. Waterbury v. Clark, 4 Day, 198. p. 559. Water Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall. 566 ; s. c, I Dill. 465; 3. Gh. L. N. 41. pp. 345; 557, 900, 903, 906, 1257, 1258, 1264. c 48 How. Pr. 46; 61 N. Y. 183, 202; 11 B. I. 455. Waterhouse v. Jamieson, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. App. 29. p. 1173. Waterhouse v. Waite, 11 Mass. 207. p. 899. Waterman v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co., 33 Vt. 610. pp. 569, 572. Waters v. Merchants' Louisville Ins. Co., II Pet. 213. p. 1101. Waters v. Moss, 12 Gal. 535. pp. 209, 210. Waters v. Wing, 59 Pa. St. 211. p. 1177. c 72 Pa. St. 140, 141 ; 66 Pa. St. 33, 34. Watkins (Ex parte), 3 Pet. 20A p. 824. Watkins v. Reddin, 2 Post. & Pin. 629. pp. 349, 350. c 27 Week. Eep. 155. Watling V. Oastler, L. R. 6 Exch. 73; .,. u., 23 L. T. (tf. s.) 815; 19 Week. Rep. 388 ; 40 L. J. (Exch.) 43. p. 1051. Watson u. Lisbon Bridge, 14 Me. 201. pp. 556, 563, 1262. c 9 Hun, 68; 51 Me. 341. Watson V. McGuire, 17 B. Mon. 31. p. 381. Watson V. Todd, 5 Mass. 271. p. 899. Wattson V. Railroad, 7 Phila. 249. p. 509. Way V. Poster, 1 Allen, 408. p. 1161. Way V. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 40 Iowa, 341 ; s. c, 35 Iowa, 585. pp. 1009, 1053, 1176. c 38 Iowa, 102. Way V. Townsend, 4 Allen, 114. p. 817. Wayde v. Lady Carr, 2 Dow. & Ry. 255. pp. 380, 383, 113-5. c 19 Conn. 573; 2 Gush. 543; 6 Vt. 247; 12 Meto. 420 ; 11 J. B. Moo. 138. Waylarid v. Ellcins, 1 Stark. 272. p. 893. c 4 Oush. 40;i ; 11 Weud. 582. Wayne County Turnpike Co. v. Berry, 5 Ind. 286. pp. 556, 559, 560, 573, 1176, 1178, 1255. c 17 Ind. 105; 42 Ind. 342; 26 Ind. 23. Weare v. Pitchburg, 110 Mass. 33. pp. 759, 1204. c 120 Mass. 588; 119 Mass. 574. Weatherspoon u. Woodey, 5 Coldw. 149. p. 1060. Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134. pp. 63, 72, 241, 243, 739, 867, 1125, 1234. c 3 Wend. 393 ; 15 Conn. 131 ; 17 Barb. 99 ; 11 Mass. 138; 7 Jur. 62; 12 L. J. (Q. B.) 23; 21 Wend. 620; Lalor, 195; 1 Bast, 109; 16 Mo. 510; 22 Mo. 377 ; 57 Pa. St. 192 ; 4 So. Car. 66 ; 2 Hen. & M. 442; 6 Blaekf. 259; 2 Keyes, 174; 53 N. H. 443, 444; 13 Am, L. Reg. (N. s.) 366 ; 66 Mo. 353; 4 Rich. L. 336; 8 Wend. 472; 14 Conn. 157 ; 3 East, 595, 599 ; 1 Dev. 186 ; 50 N. H. 428 ; 3 Wils. 408; 2 W. Black. 893. Webb V. Pierce, 1 Curt. 104. p. 895. Webb V. Portland, etc., R. Co., 57 Me. 117. p. 416. c 67 Me. 107, 111 ; 66 Hie. 381 ; 10 Jones & Sp. 234 ; 63 N. Y. 630 ; 20 Kan. 518. Webb V. Rome, etc., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 420 ; s. c, 3 Lans. 453. pp. 153, 161, 171. c 16 Kan. 256 ; 39 N. J. L. 305, 307, 311 ; 91 U. TABLE OF CASES. clxix S. 470; 6 Hun, 324, 325; 50 Cal. 183; 11 Hun, 184; 26 Wis. 274; 66 Barb. 340; 94 TJ. S. 474; 80 Pa. St. 189, 379; 78 N. 0. 310; 9 Nev. 287; 56 N T. 206. "Weber v. New York, etc., K. Co., 58 N. Y. 451 ; s. c, 67 N. Y. 587. pp. 407, 419, 421, 428. c 39 N. J. L. 193; 9 Jones & Sp. 251; 10 Jones & Sp. 231 ; 64 N. Y. 529 ; 6 Hun, 316, 317; 63 N. Y. 526; 7 Hun, 56J, 562; 71 N. Y. 230. Wedgwood v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 41 Wis. 478 ; =. c, 44 Wis. 44. pp. 973, 989, 990. c 42 Wis. 526. Weeks v. Cottingham, 58 G-a. 559. pp. 1277, 1282. Weeks t. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242. pp. 741, 744. Weet V. Broekport, 16 N. Y. 161, note. pp. 701, 726, 733, 753, 781. (In full, p. 678.) c 66 N. Y. 341; 32 Iowa, 328; 37 N. Y. 572; 1 Hun, 572 ; 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 540 ; 40 N. Y. 447,451; 4N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 125 ; 21 Mioli. UO, 111, 120, 121, 122; 16 Abb. Pr. 346; 7 Reporter, 478; 7Lan3. 438; 5 Lans. 22, 51; 60 Barb. 384, 385; 41 How. Pr. 450; 13 Hun, 429, 430; 49 Barb. 339; 44 Barb. 392, 393; 16 Kan. 382; 61 Barb. 595; 46 Texas, 528, 529; 102 Mass. 500; 5 Neb. 452; 10 Hun, 479; 32 Barb. 638, 645, 646; 61 HI. 161; 17 Minn. 313; 91 U. S. 552; 34 Conn. 14; 26 Iowa, 268; 55 111. 351; 39 Barb. 335; 3 Hun, 512; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & 0.) 581; 29 N. Y. 307, 310; 34 N. Y. 391, 394, 396. ? 44 N. Y. 121 ; 49 Barb. 582. d 122 Mass. 347, 376; 46 Texas, 632. Weger v. Pennsj'lvania E. Co., 55 Pa. St. 460. pp. 971, 1028, 1039. c 6 Eeporter, 126; 51 Miss. 642; 46 Texas, 639 ; 69 Pa. St. 215 ; 86 Pa. St. 440 ; 59 Pa. St. 248. Wegmann v. Jefferson City, 61 Mo. 65. p. 747. c 3 Mo. App. 261. Wehn o. Gage County, 5 Neb. 494. p. 618. Weick V. Lander, 75 111. 93. pp. 340, 354, 1087, 1098. 1181. Weightman'i). Washington, 1 Black, 39. pp. 721, 722, 723, 724, 730, 753, 761, 763. c 17 Gratt. 242; 16 Wall. 574; 11 K. I. 145; 32 Iowa, 328 ; 10 Bosw. 31 ; 21 Mich. 122 ; 16 Abb. Pr. 347; 41 Ind. 237; 13 Bush, 229; 53 Mo. 161; 122 Mass. 370, 371, 373, 374, 380; 16 Kan. 382; 3 So. Car. 241 ; 21 Iowa, 414 ; 2 Black, 592 ; 102 Mass. 500; 5 Neb. 452; 17 Minn. 314; 26 Iowa, 268; 7 Reporter, 479; 91 U. S. 551; 53 Ala. 529; 104 Mass. 94; 6 Or. 279; 17 Gratt. 379. Weisenberg u. Appleton, 26 Wis. 56. pp. 1198, 1263, 1266. c 34 Wis. 362; 16 Kan. 384; 26 Wis. 286; 42 Ind. 343. Weiss V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 79 Pa. St. 387. pp. 429, 1177. Weitner c. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co., 4 Eobt. 234. pp. 556, 561. Welch V. Durand, 36 Conn. 182. pp. 1264. 1266. Welch v. Wesson, 6 Gray, 505. pp. 382, 1161, 1201. (In full, p. 1077.) c 52 N. H. 554; 51 Me. 335; 104 Mass. 63. Weld V. Gas-Light Co., 1 Stark. 189. pp. 551, 557. Weld V. Hornby, 7 East, 199. p. 330. Welddes v. Edaell, 2 McLean, 366. p. 899. Weldon u. Harlem R. Co., 5 Bosw. 576. p. 200. Welfare v. London, etc., R. Co., L. E. 4 Q. B. 693 ; s. c, 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 241 ; 17 Week. Rep. 1065 ; 20 L. T. (n. s.) 743. pp. 314, 349, 1221. c 114 Mass. 153. Wellcome v. Leeds, 57 Me. 313. pp. 357, 787. Welling V. Judge, 40 Barb. 193. p. 1239. Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64. pp. 2-30, 232, 1082. c 109 Mass. 283 ; 107 Mass. 577. Wells V. Abrahams, L. R. 7 Q. B. 554. p. 1281. Wells V. Head, 4 Car. & P. 568. p. 221. Wells V. Howell, 19 Johns. 385. pp. 209, 214. c 2B N. H. 167; 6 Cow. 191; 25 Vt. 122, 162; 6 Ind. 145; 37 N. H. 336: 4 N. H. 514; 5 Denio, 259; 22 Barb. 579; 9 W. Va. 282; 7 Barb. 301, 306; 3 Wend. 145, 147. Wells V. New York, etc., E. Co., 24 N. Y. 181. p. 1164. Welsh u. Lawrence, 2 Chit. 262. p. 381. Wendell v. Baxter, 12 Gray, 494. pp. 316, 557. c 62 Me. 562; 99 Mass. 217; 42 Ind. 343; 56 Me. 504. Wendell u. Pratt, 12 Allen, 464. p. 102. Wendell v. Troy, 4 Keyes, 261 ; s. c, 39 Barb. 329. pp. 741, 761, 766, 767. c 6 W. Va. 314 ; 3 So. Oar. 239 ; 58 N. Y. 394 ; 17 Minn. 313; 3 Hun, 514; 5 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 583; 4 Robt. 143; 1 WUs. (Indianapolis) 136, 138. clxx TABLE OF CASES. "Wertheimer v. Howard, 30 Mo. 420. p. 817. Wesley City Coal Co. v. Healer, 84 Dl. 12') ; s. c, 5 Cent. L. J. 180. pp. 1000, 1174. Wesson V. Seaboard, etc., E. Co., 4 Jones L. 379. p. 886. Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen, 95. p. 646. West V. Forrest, 22 Mo. 844. p. 1235. West V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 34 Mo. 177. p. 1243. West V. Lynn, 110 Mass. 514. pp. 346, 777. c 110 Mass. 339. West V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 63 111. 545. pp. 899, 911. West Boylston o. Mason, 102 Mass. 341 ; s. c, 97 Mass. 273. p. 789. c lU Mass. 154; 109 Mass. 285. West Chester u. Apple, 35 Pa. St. 284. pp. 766, 767, 787, 788. West Chester, etc., B. Co. v. McElwee, 67 Pa. St. 311. pp. 407, 1286, 1239. c 39 N. J. L. 193 ; 9 Phila. 79 ; 67 Me. 108 ; 21 Minn. 69; 74 Pa. St. 225; 75 Pa. St. 86, 376; 1 Cent. L. J. 374; 2 Col. 409. Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie, L. E. 1 H. L. Sc. App. 145. p. 888. Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 395. pp. 728, 782. Western, etc., R. Co. v. Bishop, 50 6a. 465. pp. 983, 1008, 1020, 1025. c 52 Ga. 467. Western, etc., E. Co. v. Pulton, 64111. 271. p. 420. Western, etc., E. Co. v. Strong, 52 Ga. 461. pp. 1025, 1272, 1276, 1279, 1280, 1288. c 52 Ga. 468. Western E. Co. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409. p. 1152. Western Saving Fund v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 185. p. 711. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, 35 Ind. 429. pp. 840, 841, 844, 846. c 113 Mass. 305; 52 Ind. 6; 49 Ind. 56. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525. pp. 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 844, 846. (In full, p. 828.) c 113 Mass. 303, 307; 27 Iowa, 455; 60 Me. 30, 33 ; 60 111. 430 ; 35 Ind. 439. Western Union Tel. Co. u. Eyser, 2 Col. 141; s. c, 91 U. S. 495, note. p. 849. c 18 Kan. 525. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fenton, 52 Ind. 1. pp. 838, 840, 841, 845, 848, 851. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 57 Ind. 495. p. 888. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fontaine, 58 Ga. 433. pp. 836, 840, 843, 846. Western Union Tel. Co. u. Graham, 1 Col. 230 pp. 840, 845, 852. c6DMe. 18; 52 Ind. 5. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hamilton, 50 Ind. 181. p. 838. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 49 Ind. 227. p. 838. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Meek, 49 Ind. 53. pp. 840, 841. c 52 Ind. 6. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ward, 23 Ind. 377. p. 838. C35 Ind. 426; 49 Ind. 56. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tyler, 74 HI. 168. p. 843. Westfall V. Erie E. Co., 5 Hun, 75. pp. 162, 163. c 11 Hun, 220. Westfield v. Mayo, 122 Mass. 100. pp. 789, 790, 791. Westgate v. Carr, 43 LI. 450. p. 198. West Philadelphia E. Co. v. Mulhair (Sup. Ct. Pa.), 7 Eeporter, 661. p. 398. West Eoxbury v. Stoddard, 7 Allen, 158. p. 702. Wettor V. Dunk, 4 Fost. & Fin. 298. p. 362. Weyant v. New York, etc., E. Co., 3 Duer, 860. p. 398. c 2 Daly, 277. Whaalen v. Mad Eiver, etc., E. Co., 8 Ohio St. 249. pp. 971, 1029, 1035, 1039. c 5 Eeporter, 626 ; 59 Mo. 299 ; 14 Minn. 363, 364; 38 Pa. St. HI; 11 Ohio St. 425; 18 Wis'. 705; 49 Miss. 287; 13 Ind. 369; 17 Oliio St. 210; 43 Mo. 193; 11 Iowa, 424, 427; 18 Ind. 230 d 49 Gal. 130. Whalen v. Centenary Church, 62 Mo. 326. pp. 970, 982, 1029, 1237. c 63 Mo. 312, 403; 4 Mo. App. 243. Whalen v. Gloucester, 4 Hun, 24 ; s. c, 6 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 135. pp. 319, 323, 344, 349. c 17 Am. L. Beg. (n. s.) 456. TABLE OF CASES. clxxi Whalen v. St. louis E. Co., fiO Mo. 323. pp. 426, 1151, 1175. "Whalon v. Blackburn, 14 Wis. 432. p. 215. Whatman v. Pearson, L. R. 3 C. P. 422. pp. 452, 884, 885, 890, 899. c L. B. 8 C. P. 565, 567, 570 ; 42 L. J. (G. P.) 304, 305 ; 29 Md. 442 ; 34 Upper Canada Q. B. 4fil. Wheatley v. Patrick, 2 jMee. & W. 650. p. 391. Wheeler v. Brant, 23 Barb. 324. pp. 202, 221. Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19- p. 371. c 11 B. 1. 144; 53 Mo. 161; 38 Conn. 380; 13 Hun, 218. Wheeler v.Erie K. Co., 2 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 634. p. 524. Wheeler v. Pramingham, 12 Cash. 287. p. 802. Wheeler v. Townshend, 42 Vt. 15. p. 126'1. Wheeler v. Troy, 20 N. H. 77. pp. 620, 621, 756. c 7 Cent. L. J. 129; 57 N. H. 28; 55 N. H. 137, 138. ? 36 N. H. 299, 300. Wheeler v. Westport, 30 Wis. 392. pp. 755, 761, 1204, 1209. c 34 Wis. 362; 32 Wis. fl3; 36 Wis. 99; 33 Wis. 444 ; 39 Wis. 136 ; 43 Wis. 523 ; 6 Cent. L. J. 429. Wheeleru. Worcester, 10 Allen, 591. pp. 710, 733, 752, 1088. Wheelock v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 105 Mass. 203. pp. 429, 460, 461. c67Me. 104; 120 Mass. 266; 116 Mass. 541; '3 Col. 132; 106 Mass. 462. Wheelock v. Hardwick, 48 Vt. 19. p. 801. Wheelock v. Wheelwright, 5 Mass. 104. p. 979. Whipple V. Walpole, 10 N. H. 130. pp. 620, 1262, 1264, 1266. e 49 111. 245 ; 20 N. H. 80 ; 48 N. H. 318, 320. is in the plaintiff's favor. GiBBS, C. J., in delivering judgment there, said that an individual 1 15 C. B. (N. s.) 376. • i Best & S. 149. 2 7 0. B. 516. '6Bing. N. C. 1. s Broom's Leg. Max. (4th ed.) 368, and the « 4 Jixch. 163. cases there cited. i 6 Taun. 29, 44. RESTRAINT OF WATER ARTIFICIALLY COLLECTED. 7 In the Exchequer — Argument of Mellish, for defendants. •" who, for Ms own benefit, makes an improvement on his own land, •according to his best skill and diligence, and not foreseeing it will produce any injury to his neighbor," is answerable if he thereby ■unwittingly injures his neighbor. A direct analogy may be drawn from the common-law rule as to fire, viz., that one who kindled a fire, whether in his house or in his field, must see that it did no harm, and answer for damages done." Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Railway Company^ has no bearing on the point under discussion, for the ground of decision there was that the legislature had sanctioned the use made of a dangerous instrument. They also referred to Back- ihouse V. Bonomi.^ Mellish ( T. Jones with him), for the defendants. — The question before the court must be decided on principle, since there is no decision •directly in point. The question is substantially this : The plaintiff, on his own land, does a secret act, the doing of which was not naturally to be anticipated ; the defendants, on their land, do an act lawful in itself, and not apparently likely to produce damage, but which, by reason of the plaintiff's secret act, becomes dangerous to the plaintiff 's land ; are the defendants responsible, without negligence, for the damage which ■ensues? Such a liability, if it exists, must, in most cases, necessarily entail considerable hardship. The argument on the other side is, that the plaintiff has a right to be free from the water coming from the ■defendants' reservoir, and that this right is of an absolute character. Precisely the same may be said of the right which every one has to be free from damage to his person ; and yet, where a collision takes place without negligence, no action will lie for the injury resulting from it. The maxim. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non Icedas, is not absolute in its application. By virtue of it a man is, no doubt, responsible for acts which he knows, or has the means of knowing, will cause injury, and also for acts which cause injury from the negligent mode in which he performs them. But, on the other hand, if he uses due care, and the ■consequences of his acts are such as could not be foreseen, then it is submitted that he is not responsible. Now, the essence of this case is, that the possibility of the defendants' act causing the damage it did Avas unknown to the defendants. It has been argued, indeed, that, in trespass, knowledge is imifiaterial, and that here there was a trespass by the defendants. But that is not so. The circumstance of water escap- ing from the defendants' reservoir by means of a defect, of which the ■defendants neither did nor could know, cannot be treated as the defend- 1 Tubervil v. Stamp, 1 Salk. 13. ' 9 H. L. Cas. 503. s 6 Hurl. & N. 679. GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Pletcber v. Kylands. ants' trespass. The defendants did not themselves bring the water to their land ; the water coming to their land naturally, they used it, when there, for an ordinary purpose. If trespass will not lie, neither will an action on the case ; for that involves the violation of some duty. To- support that form of action, negligence must be made out ; or, at all events, a knowledge on the defendants' part that their act was dan- gerous. The cases cited on the other side are distinguishable. To- most of them the observation applies, that the person sought to be made responsible was aware, when he did the act which caused damage, of the probability that damage would result. On that ground. Tenant v. Goldwin,'^ Alston v. Gfrant,^ Hodgkinson v. Ennor,^ and BacTchoiise v. Bonomi'^ are distinguishable. Moreover, in Tenant v. Goldwin, the declaration contained an averment that the wall which kept in the filth ought, of right, to be repaired by the defendants ; and the question arose after verdict, on a motion in arrest of judgment. In Alston v. Grant, the defendant was rightly held liable for damage arising from the con- tinued use of a defectively constructed sewer, with knowledge of its defective state. In Lawrence v. The Great Northern Railway Com- pany,^ the water was turned on to the plaintiff's land by the direct act of the defendants ; and Bagnall v. The London and North- Western Rail- way Company^ proceeded upon the same principle. In Smith v. ^en- ncfc, ' Ceesswell, J., in delivering judgment, after reviewing the authori- ties, and pointing out that in each of them " negligence was imputed to the defendants in doing the act on his own land, which proved injurious to his neighbor," distinguished the case under discussion, on the ground that, inasmuch as there was no negligence in the defendant, he was not responsible. In Chauntler v. Robinson,^ the only point decided was, that no obligation was cast by law on the owner of a house, as such, to- keep it in substantial repair. It is true that Sutton v. Clarice * contains a dictum unfavorable to the defendants, but that dictum was not neces- sary for the decision of the case. The only instances which are to be found of a liability analogous to that which it is sought to impose on the defendants are instances of an exceptional liability, which is founded on the custom of the realm. Instances of such liability occur in the case of carriers and innkeepers. So, also, prior to the 6 Anne, c. 31, aa action upon the case lay, upon the general custom of the realm, ao-ainst the master of a house, if a fire were kindled there and consumed the- 1 1 Salk. 21, 360 ; 2 Ld. Eaym. 1089. « 7 Hui-I. & N. 433. 2 3 El. & Bl. 128. '7 0. B. 515. 8 i Best & S. ?29. 8 4 E.KCh. 163. ■» 9 H. L. Cas. 503. » 6 Taun. 29. 6 16 Q. B. 613. RESTRAINT OF WATER ARTIFICIALLY COLLECTED. 9 In the Exchequer — Opinion of Bramwell, B. house or goods of another.^ The fair inference from those exceptions is, that, where the custom of the realm did not extend, the rule of the common law was, that negligence must be shown. As regards the second question, viz., whether thei-e was, in fact, negligence for which the defendants are responsible, Chadwick v. Trower ^ is in point to show that, without the means of knowing that peculiar care is requisite, there is no negligence in not using it. The facts stated in this case show that neither the engineer nor the contractors had the means of knowing the danger they caused to the plaintiff's mines. If they had that means^ however, that circumstance would not, in itself, be sufficient to fix the defendants.' Manisty replied. Cur. adv. vult. The learned judges having differed in opinion, the following judg- ments were delivered in the ensuing Trinity Vacation (June 23) : — Beamwell, B. — The facts on which, as it seems to me, the question here depends, are as follows : The plaintiff is the occupier of mines,, which he has worked to the boundary of the property in or under which they are. The defendants have made a reservoir, and filled it with water, on the surface of property separated from the plaintiff's by property of an intervening owner. The water has escaped down, old shafts into old workings on the defendants' premises ; has passed through other old workings in the intermediate premises ; has reached the plaintiff's workings, and done him damage. The defendants were not aware of the old underground workings, nor of the communication between them. I agree with Mr. Mellish, the case is singularly wanting in authority ; and, therefore, while it is always desirable to ascertain the principle upon which a case depends, it is especially so here. Now, what is the plaintiff's right? He had the right to work hi& mines to their extent, leaving no boundary between himself and the next owner. By so doing, he subjected himself to all consequences- resulting from natural causes ; among others, to the influx of all water naturally flowing in. But he had a right to be free fron* what has been called "foreign" water; that is, water artificially brought or sent to him directly, or indirectly by its being sent ta where it would flow to him. The defendants had no right to pour or send water on to the plaintiff's works. Had they done so knowingly, it is admitted an action would lie; and that it would if they did it again. That is also proved by the case of Sodgkinson v. Ennor.* 1 Com. Dig., tit. "Action upon the Case ' 6 Bing. IT. C. 1. for Negligence," A, 6; Tubervil v. Stamp, 1 « Butler u. Hunter, 7 Hurl. &K. 826. Salk. 13 ; Filliter v. Phippard, 11 Q. B. 347. * i Best & S. 229. 10 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Fletcher v. Kylands. The plaintiff's right, then, has been infringed; the defendants, in ■causing water to flow to the plaintiff, have done that which they had no right to do. What difference, in point of law, does it make that they have done it unwittingly? I think none; and, consequently, that the action is maintainable. The plaintiff's case is: You have violated my rights ; j'ou have done what you have no right to do, and have done me damage. If the plaintiff has the right I mention, the action is maintainable. If he has it not, it is because his right is only to have his mines free from foreign water by the act of those who know what they are doing. I think this is not so. I know no case of a right so limited. As a rule, the knowledge or ignorance of the damage done is im- material. The burden of proof of this proposition is not on the plaintiff. I proceed to deal with the arguments the other way. It is said, there must be a trespass, a nuisance, or negligence. I do not agree, and I think Backhotise v. Bonomi i shows the contrary. But why is not this a trespass?® Wilfulness is not material.' Why is it not a nuisance? The nuisance is not in the reservoir, but in the water •escaping. As in Backhouse v. Bonomi, the act was lawful, the mischievous consequence is a wrong. Where two carriages come in collision, if there is no negligence in either, it is as much the act of one driver as of the other that they meet. The cases of carriers and innkeepers are really cases of contract, and, though exceptional, furnish no evidence that the general law, in matters wholly independent of contract, is not what I have stated. The old common-law liability for :fire created a liability beyond what I contend for here. I cannot think Chadwick v. Trower * opposed to this view. The court held the count bad. They laid stress on the defendants not having notice; but I think the decision would have been, and properly been, the same had they had notice : because it was not shown that there was any right in the plaintiff to have his vaults so built as to impose on the defend- ants the burden of pulling down their premises in any particular way, or with any particular care. On the other hand, the cases of Back- house V. Bonomi,^ Hodgkinsonv. Ennor,^ and Tenant v. Goldwin '' seem, in principle, in point for the plaintiff. It is clear that in the latter case the court decided that the defendant must, at his peril, keep his filth irom injuring his neighbor; for "'tis a charge of common right," Sic utere tuo lU alienum non laedas. 1 9 H. L. Cas. 503. * 6 Bing. K. C. 1. 5 See Gregory v. Piper, 9 Barn. &. Cress. ' 9 H. I,. Cas. 503. ■691. « 4 Best & S. 229. 3 Leame v. Bray, 3 East, 693. J 1 Salk. 22, 360; 2 Ld. Raym. 1090. RESTRAINT OF WATER ARTIFICIALLY COLLECTED. 11 In- the Exchequer — Opinion of Martin, B. I think, therefore, on the plain ground that the defendants have caused water to flow into the plaintiff's mines, which, but for their (the defendants') act, would not have gone there, this action is maintainable. I think that the defendants' innocence, whatever may be its moral bear- ing on the case, is immaterial in point of law. But I may as well add, that if the defendants did not know what would happen, their agents knew that there were old shafts on their land ; knew, therefore, that they must lead to old workings ; knew that those old workings might extend in any direction ; and, consequently, knew damage might happen. The defendants, surely, are as liable as their agents would be ; why should not they and the defendants be held to act at their peril ? But, I own, this seems to me rather to enforce the rule that knowledge and wil- fulness are not necessary to make the defendants liable, than to give the plaintiff a separate ground of action. Mabtin, B. — The circumstances of this case raise two questions. First : Assuming the plaintiff and defendants to be the owners of two adjoining closes of land, and at some time or other, beyond living memory, coal had been worked under both closes, and that the workings under the close of the defendants communicated with the workings under the close of the plaintiff, but of the existence of such workings both plaintiff and defendants were ignorant, and that defendants, without any negligence or default whatever, made a reservoir upon their own land, for the purpose of collecting water to supply a manufactory, and that the water escaped from an old shaft at the bottom of the reservoir into the old workings below the defendants' close, and thence into the plaintiff's close, and did damage there, — are the defendants responsible? The second question is : Assuming the defendants not to be responsible upon the above state of facts, does it make any difference that the defendants employed a competent engineer and competent contractors, who were ignorant of the existence of the old workings, and who selected the site of the reservoir, and planned and constructed it, and on the part of defendants themselves there was no personal negligence or default whatever, but, in point of fact, reasonable and proper care and skill were not exercised by and on behalf of the persons so employed, with refer- ence to the old shafts found at the bottom of the reservoir, to provide for the sufficiency of the reservoir to bear the pressure of the water which, when filled to the height proposed, it would have to bear? It has been contended, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the first ques- tion ought to be decided in- the affirmative. Several cases were cited in support of this view, but it was admitted that none of them were direct authorities. Several dicta and opinions of judges were also cited, but it 12 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Fletcher v. Eylands. seems to me that it cannot be aflSi-med that in any one of them the judge had clearly in his contemplation the state of things supposed by the first question to exist. If, therefore, there was no authority the other way, the case would have to be decided upon principle and legal analogy. First, I think there was no trespass. In the judgment of my brother Bramwell, to which I shall hereafter refer, he seems to think the act of the defendants was a trespass ; but I cannot concur, and I own it seems to me that the cases cited by him, viz., Leame v. Bray^ and Chegory v. Piper,'^ prove the contrary. I think the true criterion of trespass is laid down in the judgments in the former case, viz., that, to constitute tres- pass, the act doing the damage must be immediate, and that if the damage be mediate, or consequential (which I think the present was), it is not a trespass. Secondly, I think there was no nuisance, in the ordinary and generally understood meaning of that word, — that is to say, something hurtful or injurious to the senses. The making a pond for holding water is a nuisance to no one. The digging a reservoir in a man's own land is a lawful act. It does not appear that there was any embankment, or that the water in the reservoir was ever above the level of the natural surface of the land ; and the water escaped from the bottom of the reservoir, and in ordinary course would descend by gravi- tation into the defendants' own land, and they did not know of the existence of the old workings. To hold the defendants liable would, therefore, make them insurers against the consequence of a lawful act upon their own land, when they had no reason to believe or suspect that any damage was likely to ensue. No case was cited in which the question has arisen as to real property ; but as to personal property the question arises every day, and there is no better established rule of law than that where damage is done to per- sonal property, and even to the person, by collision, either upon the road or at sea, there must be negligence in the party doing the damage, to render him legally responsible, and if there be no negligence, the party sustaining the damage must bear with it. The existence of this rule is proved by the exceptions to it, viz., the cases of the innkeeper and common carrier of goods for hire, who are quasi insurers. These cases are said to be by the custom of the realm, treating them as excep- tions from the ordinary rule of law. In the absence of authoritj' to the contrary, I can see no reason why damage to real property should be governed by a different rule or principle than damage to personal property. There is an instance, also, of damage to real property, when ' 3 East, 593. ' 9 Bam. & Cress. 591. RESTRAINT OF WATER ARTIFICIALLY COLLECTED. 13 In the Exchequer — Opinion of Martin, B. the party causing it was at common law liable, upon the custom of the realm, as a quasi insurer, viz., the master of a house, if a fire had kindled there and consumed the house of another. In such case, the master of the house was liable at common law, without proof of negli- gence on his part.i This seems to be an exception from the ordinary- rule of law, and, in my opinion, affords an argument that, in other cases such as the present, there must be negligence, to create a liability. For these reasons, I think the first question ought to be answered in favor of the defendants. Then arises the second question, viz. , Does it make any difference that reasonable and proper care and skill were not exercised by the engineer and contractors employed by the defendants (they being competent per- sons), with reference to the shafts, which were five old shafts running vertically downwards in the portion of the land selected for the reser- voir, but which were not known or suspected by any one to be, as they afterwards proved to be, shafts which had been made for the purpose of getting coal under the land beneath the reservoir, or that they led to coal under it? Now, assuming that the want of reasonable and proper care and skill by the engineer and contractors constituted, in point of law, want of reasonable and proper skill by the defendants themselves (which is by no means a clear proposition), I nevertheless think that the defendants are not responsible. The assumed facts are these: The defendants dig a reservoir in their own land ; they do not know or suspect that their doing it in the manner they did would do any damage to their neighbor. Is there any authority to show that the law casts upon them a liability for damage, should it occur? In my opinion, there is authority to the contrary. Prima facie, a man may excavate a reser- voir for water in his own land. Whether he does so carefully and skilfully would seem to be his own concern ; and if he be ignorant that any fact exists which makes it dangerous to his neighbor, it is difficult to see what duty is imposed upon him to take any pecuUar care or use any particular skill in the matter. When a man does an act upon his own close, which of itself is lawful, but is alleged to be wrongful towards an adjoining neighbor by reason of the existence of some underground openings between their two closes, reason and good sense would seem to require that he should know, or have the means of knowledge, of the existence of the openings. How can a man be said to be negligent, when he is ignorant of the existence of the circumstance which requires the exercise of care ? But, as I have before said, I think 1 Com. Dig., tit. "Action upon the Case lor Negligence," A, 6, 14 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Fletcher v. Eylands. the second question, and therefore necessarily the first, is concluded by authority. The case of Trowerv. Chadioick^ was an action in the Common Pleas. A cause of action alleged in the declaration was that the defendant was owner and occupier of a vault and walls, and was about to pull them down, and that it was his duty to use due care and skill in puUing^ them down ; but that he did not do so, and thereby plaintiff 's vault and walls were damaged. The Court of Common Pleas held that this duty was imposed by law, and that a breach which alleges that the de- fendant conducted himself so carelessly, negligently, and unskilfully in pulling down his vault and walls as thereby to injure the plaintiff's vault and walls afforded and was a good cause of action. Error was brought, and the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber is reported in 6 Bing. N. C. 1. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas was declared to be erroneous, in the most direct and express terms. The judgment was delivered by Baron Pakke. He said the duty alleged was, to use due care and skill in pulling down the vault and walls adjoining the plaintiff 's vault and walls, so that for want of such care and skill the plaintiff's vault and walls should not be damaged ; and the breach was, that the defendant did not use due care and skill, and that by reason thereof damage ensued. He then proceeded thus : " The question is, whether the law imposes upon the defendant an obligation to take such care in pulling down his vault and walls as that the adjoin- ing vault shall not be injured. Supposing that to be so where the party is cognizant of the existence of the vault, we are all of opinion that no such obligation can arise where there is no averment that the defendant had notice of its existence ; — for one degree of care would be required where no vault exists, but the soil is left in its natural and solid state ; another, where there is a vault ; and another and still greater degree of care would be required where the adjoining vault was in a weak and fragile condi- tion. How is the defendant to ascertain the precise degree of care and caution the law requires of him, if he has no notice of the existence or of the nature of the structure? We think that no such obligation as that alleged exists, in the absence of notice." Now, substituting defendants' reservoir for defendant's vault and walls in Trowery. Chad- wick, and plaintiff's close and coal-mine for the plaintiff's vault, the cases seem to be identical. I can perceive no distinction. I therefore think both questions ought to be answered in the negative, and that the defendants are entitled to our judgment. 1 S Bing. N. C. 334. RESTRAINT OF WATER ARTIFICIALLY COLLECTED. 15 In the Exchequer — Opinion of Pollock, 0. B. I have already referred to tbe judgment of my brother Bramwell, which I have carefully read and considered, but cannot concur in it. I entertain no doubt that if the defendants directly, and by their imme- diate act, east water upon the plaintiff's land, it would have been a trespass, and that they would be liable to an action for it. But this they did not do. What they did was this : they dug a reservoir in their own land, and put water in it, which, by underground openings of which they were ignorant, escaped into the plaintiff's land. I think this a very different thing from a direct casting of water upon the land, and that the legal liabilities consequent upon it are governed by a different principle. So, also, I do not think that the cases cited by him as in point of principle in favor of the plaintiff really are so. In Backhouse v. Bonomi, the act done by the defendant was removing the natural and rightful support of his neighbor's land, which at the time he must have known might, and probably would, do damage. This seems to me a very different thing from making a reservoir and filling it with water, from which no one supposed any damage would arise. As to the case of Tenant v. Goldwin, reported twice in Salkeld,i and also in Lord Ray- mond's Reports,® I cannot understand what diflSculty there was in it, or how it can be an authority in the present case. Judgment had gone by default. The motion was in arrest of judgment, and the declaration contained an averment that the defendant '■' debuit et solebai" to repair a wall between the plaintiff's and defendant's closes, and that by reason of the want of repair of the wall the damage ensued. This averment was admitted to be true by the form of the proceeding, and, being admitted, I cannot myself see where the difficulty was as to the defendant's liability, or how the case can be an authority when no such liability to repair is admitted to exist. It is not alleged in the present case that the defendant was under a liability to stop up the opening in his own land from the adjoining land. I still retain the opinion I originally formed. I think the case is governed by OhadmcJc v. Trower; and that to hold the defendant liable without negligence, would be to constitute him an insurer, which, in my opinion, would be contrary to legal analogy and principle. Pollock, C. B. — The question in this case is, in my judgment, one of great difficulty, and therefore of much doubt. Apparently it has never before been the subject of litigation ; for the reports are without any 1 1 Salk. 21, 360. ' 2 Ld. Eaym. 1089. 16 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Fletcher v. Rylands. ■decided case in point, and the boolcs of authority are silent on the immediate matter, and afford only indirect assistance. The general question is, For what acts done on his own land (and apparently quite lawful) is the owner of an estate liable, if it should turn out in the result that damage is thereby occasioned to the estate of another (who may be an immediate or distant neighbor), on account of some circumstance ■entirely unknown to the proprietor who causes the act to be done ? I quite agree with my brother Bramwell, that in a case like the present it is most important to ascertain the principle on which a ■decision should proceed. As one mode of doing so, I will assume that the communication by which the water escaped from the defendants' to the plaintiff's estate was a natural one. There are several counties in England (Derbyshire especially) where this might occur, — where a natural communication might cause water to pass underground to a distant property, such communication being wholly unknown and unsuspected by either party. Now, in such a case, would the distant neighbor have a right of action if, in consequence of an attempt to form an artificial piece of water, whether for utility or ornament, it escaped into an underground channel, and did damage beyond the limits of the property on which the reservoir was formed ? I see no ground on which an action could be maintained for the damage arising under such cir- cumstances. Well, then, if the underground communication be the result of the complaining party having exercised his right to take the minerals, does that give him a better right to complain ? I own I think not, and I agree with my brother Maetin that no action will lie. It appears to me that my brother Bkamwell assumes too strongly that the complainant "had a right to be free from what is called 'foreign water.' " That may be so with reference to surface-rights, but I am not prepared to hold that this applies to every possible way in which water may happen to come. There being, therefore, no authority for bringing such an action, I think the safer course is to decide in favor of the defendants. With respect to the negligence of the engineer employed to make the reservoir, it is not stated in what it consisted, nor is it shown that it is such as would make the owner of the land responsible; and any liability arising from the acts of the engineer is more a question of fact than of law. Channell, B. — I only heard a part of the argument, and therefore express no opinion. Judgment for the defendants. RESTRAINT OF WATER ARTIFICIALLY COLLECTED. 17 In the Exchequer Chamber — Argument of Manisty, Q. C, for pUiintiff. [In the Exchequer Chamber, L. E. 1 Exch. 263.] This case having been taken on error to the Exchequer Chamber, it was there argued, February 8, 1866, by Manisty, Q. C. (J. A. Russell with him), for the plaintiff. — First, omitting the consideration that the defendants became tenants of Lord Wilton, the plaintiff's land- lord, subsequently to the demise to the plaintiff and to the making of the works connecting the underground passages, and dealing with the matter as if they were mere strangers, the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. The principle of law which governs the case is, that he who does upon his own land acts which, though lawful in themselves, may become sources of mischief to his neighbors, is bound to prevent the mischief from occurring, or, in the alternative, to make compensation to the persons injured. This will be peculiarly the case when the act done consists in the construction and use of artificial works for the purpose of collecting and impounding in vast quantities an element which will certainly cause mischief if it escapes. The case does not resemble that of a servient and a dominant tenement which acquires rights, as seems to have been thought by Maktin, B., in his comment upon Tenant v. Gold- win,'^ and the duty is independent of the immediate neighborhood of the lands. Neither is the circumstance material, which is relied on by the Chief Baron, that the communication by which the water passed was underground and unseen; for the plaintiff's right of action is founded on his absolute right to enjoy his property undisturbed by the acts of his neighbors, and is independent of the amount of care exer- cised by them, or of their means of knowledge. This is the effect of Lambert v. Bessey,^ and the opinions there pronounced. [Blackburn, J. — In the cases put, there the things done were aR prima facie yfiong ; but the difficulty here is, in saying that what was rightful in the first doing became wrongful in the continuance. The other side will contend that their duty was to take care, but not to take successful care. J The duty is the same as that of rendering support to the neighboring land, from which the land-owner is not excused by his ignorance of the state of adjoining land, which may contribute to the injury, or of the position of the strata, which he cannot know ; he is absolutely bound not to injure his neighbor by the withdrawal of support.^ Similarly, the mine-owner who works to the edge of his land subjects himself to the natural flow of water into his mine, but not to the flow of water artifi- 1 2 L Beported below, 61 Barb. 86. a 42 How. 385. EXPLOSIOH^ OF STEAM-BOILERS. 49 Commission of Appeals of New York — Opinion of Earl, C. as he did upon the first trial, that the defendants were liable without the proof of any negligence, and requested the justice so to rule ; and the refusal of the justice to comply with this request raises the principal question for our consideration upon this appeal. Upon the last appeal, the majority of the court held the law to be as it had been held upon the first appeal, but a new trial was granted for certain alleged errors in the charge of the justice, which will hereafter be considered. The claim on the part of the plaintiff is, that the casting of the boiler upon his premises by the explosion was a direct trespass upon his right to the undisturbed possession and occupation of his premises, and that the defendants are liable, just as they would have been for any other wrong- ful entry and trespass upon his premises. I do not believe this claim to be well founded, and I will briefly examine the authorities upon which, mainly, an attempt is made to sustain it. In Farrand v. Marshall,^ it was held that a man may dig on his own land, but not so near that of his neighbor as to cause the land of the latter to fall into his pit, thus transferring a portion of another man's land to his own. This is upon the principle that every man has the natural right to the use of his land in the situation in which it was placed by nature, surrounded and protected by the soil of the adjacent lots. He has a right to the support of the adjoining soil, and to that extent has an easement in his neighbor's soil ; and when the soil is removed, his ease- ment is directly interfered with. "When one adjoining owner thus removes the soil, he is not doing simply what he may with his own, but he is interfering with the right which his neighbor has in the same soil. This rule, however, as stated by Judge Bronson, in Baddiff's Executors V. Mayor, etc., of BrooMyn,^ must undoubtedly be somewhat modified in its application to cities and villages. In Hay v. The Cohoes Com- pany,^ the defendant, a corporation, dug a canal upon its own land for the purposes authorized by its charter. In so doing, it was necessary to blast rocks with gunpowder, and the fragments were thrown against and injured the plaintiff's dwelling, upon lands adjoining. It was held that the defendant was liable for the injury, although no negligence or want of skill in executing the work was alleged or proved. This decision was well supported by the clearest principles. The acts of the defendant in casting the rocks upon plaintiff's premises were direct and immediate. The damage was the necessary consequence of just what the defendant was doing, and it was just as much liable as if it had caused the rocks to be taken by hand, or any other means, and throwa ■ 21 Barb. 409. ' ' 2 Comst. 159. 2 i Comst. 203. GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Losee v. Buchanan. directly upon plaintiff's land. This is far from an authority for holdings that the defendants, who placed a steam-boiler upon their lands, and operated the same with care and skill, should be liable for the damages caused by the explosion, without their fault, or any direct or immediate act of theirs. It is true that Judge Gakdiner, in writing the opinion of the court, lays down broadly the principle that " every individual is- entitled to the undisturbed possession and lawful enjoyment of his own property," citing the maxim Sic utere tuo, etc. But this principle, as well as the maxim, as will be seen, has many exceptions and limitations, made necessary by the exigencies of business and society. In Bellinger v. The New York Central Bailroad Company,'^ it was decided that where one interferes with the current of a running stream, and causes damage to those who are entitled to have the water flow in its natural channel, but such interference is in pursuance of legislative authority, granted for the purpose of constructing a work of public utility, upon making compensation, he is liable only for such injury as results from the want of due skill and care in so arranging the necessary works as to avoid any danger reasonably to be anticipated from the habits of the stream and its liability to floods. Judge Denio, in his opinion, referring to the maxim Aqua currit et debet currere, says' it "absolutely prohibits an individual from interfering with the natural flow of water, to the prejudice of another riparian owner, upon any pretence, and subjects him to damages at the suit of any party injured, without regard to any question of negligence or want of care." The liability, in such cases, is based upon the principle that the interference is an immediate and direct violation of the right of the other riparian owners to have the water flow in its natural channel. No one has an absolute property in the water of a running stream. He may use it, but he must not, by his use of it, interfere with the equal right which other riparian owners have also to use it, and have it flow in its natural way in its natural channel. In Plxley v. Olark,^ it was held that if one raises the water in a natural stream above its natural banks, and, to prevent its overflow, constructs embankments which answer the purpose perfectly, but, by the pressure of the water upon the natural banks of the stream, perco- lation takes place so as to drown the adjoining lands of another, an action will lie for the damages occasioned thereby ; and that it matters not whether the damage is occasioned by the overflow of, or the perco- lation through, the natural banks, so long as the result is occasioned 1 23 K. Y. 47. 2 35 N. Y. 520. EXPLOSION OF STEAM-BOILERS. 51 Commission of Appeals of New Tork — Opinion of Earl, C. by an improper interference with the natural flow of the stream. This decision was an application of the maxim Aqua currit et debet currere to the facts of that case. It was held that the liability was the same, whether the water was dammed up and caused to overflow, or to per- colate through the banks of the stream. It was a case of flooding lands by damming up the water of a stream, and the liability of a wrong-doer in such a case has never been disputed. In the case of Selden v. The Delaware and Hudson Canal Company,^ it was held that the defendant had the power, under its charter, to enlarge its canal ; but that, though it possessed this power, and, upon making compensation therefor, to take private property for that purpose, it was liable to remunerate individuals in damages for any injuries they might sustain as the consequence of such improvement; and that, if by means of the enlargement, a lawful act in itself, the lands of an individual were inundated, even though the work may have been per- formed with all reasonable care and skill, it was a legal injury, for which the owner was entitled to redress. It may well be doubted if this decision can stand, in view of the principles laid down in the case of Bellinger v. The New York Central Railroad Company. '^ Within the principles of that case, if the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company exercised a power conferred upon it by law in a lawful and proper manner, it could not be held liable for the consequential damages necessarily occasioned to the owners of adjoining lands. But if we assume, as was assumed at the General Term in that case, that the defendant did not have the protection of the law for the damages which it occasioned, then it was clearly liable. Its acts were necessarily and directly injurious to the plaintiff. It kept the water in its canal when it knew that the necessary consequence was to flood the plaintiff's premises. The damage to plaintiff was not accidental, but continuous, direct, and necessary. In such a case, the wrong-doer must be held to have intended the consequence of his acts, and must be treated like one keeping upon his premises a nuisance doing constant damage to his neighbor's property. In the case of McEeon v.iee,^ it was held that the defendant had no right to operate a steam-engine and other machinery upon his premises so as to cause the vibration and shaking of plaintiff's adjoining buildings to such an extent as to endanger and injure them. This case was decided upon the law of nuisance. It was held that the engine and machinery, in the mode in which they were operated, were a nuisance, 1 24 Barb. 362. » i Kobt. 449. s 28 N. Y. 47. 52 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Losee v. Buchanan. and the decision has been aflBrmed at this term of this court. ^ The decision in this case, and in scores of similar cases to be found in the books, is far from an authority that one should be held liable for the accidental explosion of a steam-boiler which was in no sense a nuisance. "We are also cited to a class of cases holding the owners of animals responsible for injuries done by them. There is supposed to be a dif- ference as to responsibility between animals viansuetxe nuturce and ferm naturae. As to the former, in which there can be an absolute right of property, the owner is bound at common law to take care that they do not stray upon the lands of another, and he is liable for any trespass they may commit ; and it is altogether immaterial whether their escape is purely accidental, or due to negligence. As to the latter, which are of a fierce nature, the owner is bound to take care of them and keep them under control, so that they can do no injury. But the liability in each case is upon the same principle. The former have a known natural disposition to stray; and hence the owner, knowing this disposition, is supposed to be in fault if he do not restrain them and keep them under control. The latter are known to be fierce, savage, and dangerous, and their nature is known to their owner ; and hence the owner, for the same reason, is bound to keep them under control. As to the former, the owner is not responsible for such injuries as they are not accustomed to do, by the exercise of vicious propensities which they do not usually have, unless it can be shown that he has knowledge of the vicious habit and propensity. As to all animals, the owner can usually restrain and keep them under control, and if he will keep them he must do so. If he does not, he is responsible for any damage which their well-known disposition leads them to commit. I believe the liability to be based upon the fault which the law attributes to him, and no further actual negligence need be proved than the fact that they are at large, unre- strained. But if I am mistaken as to the true basis of liability in such cases, the body of laws in reference to live animals, which is supposed to be just and wise, considering the nature of the animals and the mutual rights and interests of the owners and others, does not furnish analogies absolutely controlling in reference to inanimate property. Blackstone^ says, " that whenever an act is directly and immediately injurious to the person or property of another, and therefore necessarily accompanied with some force, an action of trespass vi et armis will lie ; " for, "the right of meum and tuum, or property in lands, being once established, it follows as a necessary consequence that this right must » 51 N. T. 494. a Tol. 3, p. 209. EXPLOSION OF STEAM-BOILERS. 53 Commission of Appeals of New York — Opinion of Earl, 0. be exclusive, — that is, that the owner may retain to himself the sole use and occupation of his soil. Every entry, therefore, thereon without the owner's leave, and especially contrary to his express order, is a trespass or transgression." The learned author was here laying down the distinction between an action of trespass and trespass on the case, and asserting the rule that in the former action the injury must be direct and immediate, and accompanied with some force, whereas in the latter action it could be indirect and consequential. He was also, manifestly, speaking of a direct entrance by one upon the lands of another. He was laying down a general rule that every unauthorized entrance upon the land of another is a trespass. This was sufficiently accurate for the enunciation of a general rule. Judges and legal writers do not always find it convenient, practicable, or important, in laying down general rules, to specify all the limitations and exceptions to such rules. The rule as thus announced has many exceptions, even when one makes a personal entry upon the lands of another. I may enter my neighbor's close to succor his beast whose life is in danger ; to prevent his beasts from being stolen ; or to prevent his grain from being consumed or spoiled by cattle ; or to carry away my tree which has been blown down upon his land ; or to pick up my apples which have fallen from my trees upon his land ; or to take my personal property which another has wrongfully taken and placed there ; or to escape from one who threatens my life.^ Other illustrations will be given hereafter. By becoming a member of civilized society I am compelled to give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a compensation from the surrender of every other man of the same rights, and the security, advantage, and protection which the laws give me. So, too, the general rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed use and possession of my real estate, and that I must so use my real estate as not to injure my neighbor, are much modified by the exigencies of the social state. We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals, and railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of all our civilization. If I have any of these upon my lands, and they are not a nuisance, and are not so managed as to become such, I am not responsible for any damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor. He receives his compensation for such damage by the general good, in which he shares, and the right which he ias to place the same things upon his lands. I may not place or keep a nuisance upon my land to the damage of my ueigh- ' Bao. Abr., tit. "Trespass," F. 54 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Losee v. Buchanan. bor, and I have my compensation for the surrender of this right to use my own as I will by the similar restriction imposed upon my neighbor for my benefit. I hold my property subject to the risk that it may be unavoidably or accidentally injured by those who live near me ; and as I move about upon the public highways, and in all places where other persons may lawfully be, I take the risk of being accidentally injured in my person by them, without fault on their part. Most of the rights of property, as well as of person, in the social state, are not absolute, but relative ; and they must be so arranged and modified, not unnecessarily infringing upon natural rights, as, upon the whole, to promote the general welfare. I have so far found no authorities and no principles which fairly sus- tain the broad claim made by the plaintiff, that the defendants are liable in this action without fault or negligence on their part to which the explosion of the boiler could be attributed. But our attention is called to a recent English case, decided in the Exchequer Chamber, which seems to uphold the claim made. In the case of Fletcher v. Bylands,^ the defendants constructed a reservoir on land separated from the plaintiff 's colliery by intervening land. Mines, under the site of the reservoir and under part of the intervening land, had been formerly worked ; and the plaintiff had, by workings lawfully made in his own colliery and in the intervening land, opened an under- ground communication between his colliery and the old workings under the reservoir. It was not known to the defendants, nor to any person employed by them in the construction of the reservoir, that such com- munication existed, or that there were any old workings under the site of the reservoir, and the defendants were not personally guilty of any negligence ; but, in fact, the reservoir was constructed over five old shafts leading down to the workings. On the reservoir being filled, the water burst down these shafts, and flowed, by the underground com- munication, into the plaintiff's mines. It was held, reversing the judg- ment of the Court of Exchequer, that the defendants were liable for the damage so caused, upon the broad doctrine that one who, for his own purposes, brings upon his land, and collects and keeps there, any thing likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequencfe of its escape. Mr. Justice Blackburn, writing the opinion of the court, says : " The question of law; therefore, arises, What is the obligation which the law casts on a person who, like the > L. S. 1 Exch. 265, ante, p. 2. EXPLOSION or STEAM-BOILEKS. 55 Commission of Appeals of New Tork — Opinion of Earl, 0. •defendants, lawfully brings on his land something which, though harmless whilst it remains there, will naturally do mischief if it escapes out of his land ? It is agreed on all hands that he must take care to keep in that which he has brought on the land and keeps there, in order that it may not escape and damage his neighbors ; but the question arises whether the duty which the law casts upon him under such circumstances is an absolute duty to keep it in at his peril, or is, as the majority of the Court of Exchequer have thought, merely a duty to take all reasonable and prudent precautions in order to keep it in, but no more ; " and he reaches the conclusion that it is an absolute duty, and that the liability for damage from the escape attaches without any proof of negligence. This conclusion is reached by the learned judge mainly by applying to the case the same rule of liability to which owners are subjected by the •escape of their live animals. As I have shown above, the rules of law applicable to live animals should not be applied to inanimate property. That case was appealed to the House of Lords and affirmed, i and was followed in Smith v. Fletcher.^ It is sufficient, however, to say that the law as laid down in those cases is in direct conflict with the law as settled in this country. Here, if one builds a dam upon his own premises, and thus holds back and accumulates the water for his benefit, or if he brings water upon his premises into a reservoir, in case the dam or the banks of the reservoir give way, and the lands of a neighbor are thus flooded, he is not liable for the damage, without proof of some fault or negligence on his part.^ The true rule is laid down in the case of Livingston v. Adams, as follows: "Where one builds a mill-dam upon a proper model, and the work is well and substantially done, he is not liable to an action though it break away, in consequence of which his neighbor's dam and mill below are destroyed. Negligence should be shown, in order to make Mm liable." In conflict with the rule as laid down in the English cases is a class of cases in reference to damage from fire communicated from the adjoin- ing premises. Fire, like water or steam, is hkely to produce mischief if it escapes and goes beyond control ; and yet it has never been held in this country that one building a fire upon his own premises can be made liable if it escapes upon his neighbor's premises and does him damage, ^ L. E. 3 H. L. 330, ante, p. 32. Shrewsbuiy v. Smith, 12 Cnsli. 177; Living- 2 L. R. 7 Exoh. 305 ; 20 Vf eek. Eep. 987 ;7)os«, stou v. Adams, 8 Cow. 175 ; Bailey v. Mayor, p, 77. etc., of New Vork, 3 Hill, 531 ; s. c, 2 Denio, s Ang. on Watercourses, § 336; Lapham 433; Pixley r. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520,524; Shel- -V. Curtis, 5 Vt. 371; Todd v. Cochell, 17 Cal. don v. Slierman, 42 N. Y. 484. :97; Kverettr. Hydraulic, etc., Co., 23 Cal. 225; 56 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Losee v. Buchanan. without proof of negligence. Tlie rule, as laid down in Clark v. Foot,^ is as follows : " If A. sets fire to his own fallow ground, as he maj' law- fully do, which communicates to and fires the woodland of B., his neighbor, no action lies against A. unless there was some negligence or misconduct in him or his servant." And this is the rule throughout this country, except where it has been modified by statute. Tourtellot V. Mosebrook was an action to I'ecover damages caused by a fire commu- nicated to the plaintiff's land from a coal-pit which the defendant law- fully set on fire upon his own land, and it was held that the burden was- on the plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the defendant. In Hinds v. Barton,^ and Teall v. Barton,'^ sparks were emitted from a steam-dredge used upon the Erie Canal ; they set fire to neighboring^ buildings, and, although the sparks were thrown directly upon the buildings, it was held that the defendant could be made liable only by- proof of negligence. In Cook v. Tlte Ghamplain Transportation Com- pany,'^ the buildings of the plaintiff were fired by sparks thrown thereon from defendant's steamboat, upon Lake Champlain, and it was held that the defendant could be made liable only by proof of negligence. All these cases, and the class of cases to which they belong, are in conflict, with the rule as claimed by the plaintiff. A man may build a fire in his- house, or his steam-boiler, and he does not become liable, without proof of negligence, if sparks accidentally pass directly from his chimnev or smoke-stack to the buildings of his neighbor. The maxim Sic utere- tioo, etc., only requires, in such a case, the exercise of adequate skilL and care. The same rule applies to injuries to the person. No one, in such case, is made liable without some fault or negligence on his part, how- ever serious the injury may be which he may accidentally cause; and, there can be no reason for holding one liable for accidental injuries to property when he is exempt from liability for such injuries to the person. It is settled in numerous cases, that if one driving along a highway accidentally injures another, he is not liable without proof of negligence.^ In Harvey v. Dunlop,'^ the action was for throwing a stone at plain- tiff's daughter, and putting out her eye. It did not appear that the 1 Clark V. Foot, 8 Johns. 422 ; Stuart v. « 40 Barb. 137. Hawley, 22 Barb. 619; Calkins v. Barger, 44 < 1 Denio, 91. Barb. 424 ; Lansing v. Stone, 37 Barb. 15 ; Bar- 6 Center v. Finney, 17 Bavb. 94 ; Haramaci nard v. Poor, 21 Pick. 378; Tourtellot v. v. White, 103 Eng. Com. Law, 587; 11 C. B.. Eosebrook, 11 Mete. 460; Bachelder v. (x. S.) 588; 8 Jur. (n. s.) 796; 31 L. J. (0. P.) Heagan, 18 Me. 32. 129 ; 10 Week. Uop. 230 ; 5 L. T. (N. s.) 676. 2 25 X. Y. 544. Lalor, 193. EXPLOSION OF STEAM-BOILERS. 57 Commission of Appeals of New York — Opinion of Earl, C. injury was inflicted by design or carelessness, but did appear that it was accidental ; and the court held that the plaintiff could not recover, laying down the broad rule that no liability results from the commis- sion of an act arising from inevitable accident, or which ordinary human care and foresight could not guard against. In Dygert v. Bradley,^ the action was for running one boat against another in the Erie Canal, and the court held that if the injury was occasioned by unavoidable accident, no action would lie for it, but if any blame was imputable to the defendant, he would be liable. In Brown v. Kendall,^ the defendant having interfered to part his dog and the plaintiff's, which were fighting, in raising his stick for that purpose, accidentally struck the plaintiff and severely injured him; it was held that he was not liable. la writing the opinion of the court. Chief Justice Shaw says: "It is frequently stated by judges, that where one receives injury from the direct act of another, trespass will lie. But we think this is said in reference to the question whether trespass, and not case, will lie, assuming that the facts are such that some action will lie. These dicta are no authority, we think, for holding that damage received by a direct act of force from another will be sufficient to maintain an action of trespass, whether the act was lawful or unlawful, and neither wilful, intentional, or careless." " We think, as the result of all the authorities, that the rule is, that the plaintiff must come prepared with evidence to show that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant was in fault; for, if the injury was unavoidable, and the conduct of the defendant was free from blame, he will not be held liable. If, in the prosecution of a lawful act, a casualty purely accidental arises, no action can be supported for an injury arising therefrom." So, too, contrary to what was held in an early English case, if one raise a stick in self-defence, to defend himself against an assault, and accidentally hit a third person, he cannot, in my opinion, be made liable for the injury thus, without fault or negli- gence, inflicted." In RocJcwood v. Wilson,^ Mr. Justice Thomas says: "Nothing can be better settled than that if one do a lawful act upon his own premises he cannot be held responsible for injurious consequences that may result from it, unless it was so done as to constitute actionable negli- gence." In Bizzell v. Booker,^ it was held that one who is hunting in a wilder- ness is not bound to anticipate the presence, within range of his shot, 1 8 TVend. 469. ' 11 Cush. 221. s 6 Cush. 292. * 16 Ark. 308. 58 GROUNDS or ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Losee v. Buchanan. of another man, and that he is not liable for an injury caused uninten- tionally by him to a person of whose presence he was not aware. ^ In Spencer v. Campbell,^ a man drove a horse to defendant's steam gi-ist-mill to get some grist which he had had ground, and he was thus lawfully upon defendant's premises, and was just as much entitled to protection there as if he had been upon his own premises. While there, the steam-boiler exploded and killed his horse, and the action was brought for the value of the horse ; and it was held that, to entitle the plaintiff to recover, he was bound to show the want of ordinary care, skill, and diligence. I am unable to see how that case differs in prin- ciple from the one at bar. To sustain the broad claim of the plaintiff here, it should have been held in that case that the owner of the steam- boiler was absolutely liable, irrespective of any care, skill, or diligence on his part, for any damage which the boiler, by its explosion, occa- sioned to any property lawfully in the vicinity. Within the rules laid down by these authorities, the defendants in this case could not, without proof of negligence, be made liable for injuries caused to the persons of those who were near at the time of the explosion ; and it would be quite illogical to hold them liable for injuries to property, while they were not liable for injuries to persons by the same accident. In support of the plaintiff's claim in this action, the rule has been invoked that, where one of two innocent parties must suffer, he who puts in motion the cause of the injury must bear the loss. But, as will be seen by the numerous cases above cited, it has no application what- ever to a case like this. This examination has gone far enough to show that the rule is, at least in this country, a universal one, — which, so far as I can discern, has no exceptions or limitations, — that no one can be made liable for injuries to the person or property of another, without some fault or negligence on his part. In this case, the defendants had the right to place the steam-boiler upon their premises. It was in no sense a nuisance, and the jury have found that they, were not guilty of any negligence. The judgment in their favor should, therefore, have been affirmed at the General Term, unless there were errors in the charge, or refusal to charge, of the judge who presided at the trial; and these alleged errors I will now briefly examine. It is alleged that the judge erred in charging the jury that "defendants are not liable for negligence or want of skill on the part of the manuf ac- 1 See also the cases of DriscoU v. The » 9 Watts & S. 32. Newark & Rosendale Co., 37 N. T. 637. EXPLOSION OF STEAM-BOILEES. 59 Commission of Appeals of New York — Opinion of Earl, C. turers of the boiler in question, not known to them ; " " that defendants are not liable except upon proof of negligence or unskilfulness on the part of the authorized servants or agents of the company;" "that there is no proof of any relation between the plaintiff and defendant Buchanan creating any obligation or duty on the part of the latter toward the former;" "that defendant Buchanan is not liable for any negligence or unskilfulness on the part of the Saratoga Company, or on the part of the manufacturers of the boiler in question." These are not found in the charge, but were decisions made upon the motion for a nonsuit, and were not excepted to. The judge charged the jury "that if they were of opinion that the reduction by Goddard (the engineer and agent of the paper company, who had charge of the boiler) of the steam pressure from 120 to 110 was a proper, prudent, and sufHcient exercise of care and skill under the circumstances, that the defendants were not liable on account of leakage ; " " that the cold shut in the head that previously gave out was no evidence of the cold shut in the head that did give out;" " that if Goddard told BuUard that it would be prudent to run the steam-boiler at 110, and if Bullard believed that and acted upon it, then he was not liable;" "that if the jury found from the evidence that Goddard came to the conclusion that to reduce the pressure from 120 to 110 would render the use of the boiler prudent and safe, and communicated that idea to Bullard, he, Bullard, was not personally liable." These charges were excepted to by plaintiff 's counsel. These were requests to charge on the part of the defendants, acceded to by the judge. Some of them should properly have been somewhat qualified and explained, and are, therefore, liable to some criticism. But we must look at the whole charge, and judge of it from its whole scope ; and if, taking it altogether, it presented the questions of law fairly to the jury, so as not to mislead them, exceptions to separate propositions in it, or to detached portions of it, will not be upheld. As said by Chief Judge Church, in Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Company,^ "If the charge, as a whole, conveyed to the jury the correct rule of law on a given question, the judgment will not be reversed although detached sentences may be erroneous ; and if the language employed is capable of different con- structions, that construction will be adopted which will lead to an aflarm- ance of the judgment, unless it fairly appears that the jury were, or at least might have been, misled." The judge, in his charge, submitted the whole question of negligence ' 47 N. Y. 282. 60 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Losee v. Buchanan. to the jury. He charged that the defendants were liable for the omis- sion of such care as men of ordinary prudence, engaged in the use of such a steam-boiler in such business, would exercise, and that they were liable for any imperfections in the boiler, which contributed to the explosion, which were known to them ; but that if the explosion was caused by the cold shut in the head of the boiler, which was impercep- tible to the defendants, or undiscoverable on examination or by the application of known tests, they were not liable. He charged the jury fully in reference to the leakage of the boiler, and his charge upon that subject was fully as favorable to the plaintiff as he could claim. He called the attention of the jury to all the facts connected with it, and to what Goddard had told BuUard about it, and stated to them that they had a right to say, from all the facts, whether or not BuUard was chargeable with negligence in the use of the boiler, under the circum- stances. I think, from the charge as made, the jury could not have failed to understand that the defendants were to be held liable for any defect in the manufacture of the boiler which they knew or ought to have known, and for any negligence in the use of the boiler which could be attributed to them. The plaintiff requested the court to charge " that the defendants can- not excuse or justify themselves in the use of the boiler in question on the ground that the same was purchased of reputable manufacturers." This the judge refused to charge, and the plaintiff excepted. The prin- ciple of law involved in this request was fairly covered by the charge as made, and yet it may well be doubted whether the judge would have been justified in charging in the language of the request. The fact that the defendants bought the boiler of reputable manufacturers was one of the facts tending to a justification which the jury were to consider. It was not of itself a conclusive justification, and the judge did not charge that it was. If he had refused to charge that they could not justify on the sole ground that they had purchased it of reputable manufacturers, it would have been error. A charge in the very language of the request might have misled the jury, by taking from their consideration the fact that the boiler was bought from reputable manufacturers, upon whose judgment, skill, and integrity the defendants had the right to place some reliance. I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that no error was committed upon the trial of this action ; and it follows that the order of the General Term must be reversed, and the judgment entered upon the verdict must be affirmed, with costs. All concur. Order reversed, and judgment accordingly. INJUEIES THROUGH INEVITABLE ACCIDENT. 61 Statement of the case. 4. UIABILITT OF TEAVELLEE FOE DAMAGE CAUSED BY HIS HOESE escaping conteol. Beown v. Collins.* Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire, 1873. Hon. JoNATHAH- Everett Sabgent, Chief Justice. " William Lawrence Foster, *' Ellert Albee Hibbard, " Charles Dob, " William Spencer Ladd, " Jeremiah Smith, " Isaac William Smith, Associate Justices. 1. General Rule as to aotionatile Neglieenoe.— H, in the prosecution of alawlul act, a casualty purely accidental arises, no action can be supported for an injury arising therefrom. 2. Ulustration— Injury from Fright of Traveller's Horse.— A person whose horse, frightened by a locomotive, became uncontrollable, ran away with him, went upon land of another, and broke a post there, is not liable for the damage, if it was not caused by any fault on his part. Teespass, by Albert H. Brown against Lester Collins, to recover the value of a stone post, on which was a street-lamp, situated in front of his place of business, in the village of Tilton. The post stood upon the plaintiff's land, but near the southerly line of the main highway leading through the village, and within four feet of said line. There was nothing to indicate the line of the highway, nor any fence or other obstruction between the highway, as travelled, and the post. The highway crosses the railroad near the place of accident, and the stone post stood about fifty feet from the railroad track, at the crossing. The defendant was in the highway, at or near the railroad-crossing, with a pair of horses loaded with grain, going to the grist-mill in Tilton village. The horses became frightened by an engine on the railroad, near the crossing, and by reason thereof became unmanageable, and ran, striking the post with the end of the pole and breaking it off near the ground, destroying the lamp with the post. No other injury was done by the accident. The shock produced by the collision with the post threw the defendant from his seat in the wagon, and he struck on the ground between the horses, but suffered no injury except a slight concussion. The defendant was in the use of ordinary care and skill in managing his team, until they became frightened as aforesaid. • Eeported 53 N. H. 442. 62 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCB. Brown v. Collins. The foregoing facts were agreed upon for the purpose of raising the question of the right of the plaintiff to recover in this action. Rogers, for the plaintiff ; Barnard and Sanborn, for the defendant. Doe, J. — It is agreed that the defendant was in the use of ordinary care and skill in managing his horses, until they were frightened, and that they then became unmanageable, and ran against and broke a post on the plaintiff's land. It is not explicitlj' stated that the defendant was without actual fault, — that he was not guilty of any malice, or unreasonable unskilfulness, or negligence ; but it is to be inferred that the fact was so, and we decide the case on that ground. We take the case as one where, without actual fault in the defendant, his horses broke from his control, ran away with him, went upon the plaintiff's land, and did damage there, against the will, intent, and desire of the defendant. Sir Thomas Eaymond's report of Lambert & Olliot v. Bessey,^ and Bessey v. Olliot & Lambert,^ is: "The question was this, a jailer takes from the bailiff a prisoner arrested by him out of the bailiff's juris- diction, whether the jailer be liable to an action of false imprisonment. And the judges of the Common Pleas did all hold that he was ; and of that opinion I am, for these reasons : — " 1. In all civil acts, the law doth not so much regard the intent of the actor as the loss and damage of the party suffering ; and, therefore, Mich. 6 E. 4, 7 a, pi. 18. Trespass quare vi et armis clausum fregit, et her- bam suam pedibus con culcando consumpsit in six acres. The defendant pleads that he hath an acre lying next the said six acres, and upon it a hedge of thorns, and he cut the thorns, and they, ipso invito, fell upon the plaintiff's land, and the defendant took them off as soon as he could, which is the same trespass ; and the plaintiff demurred ; and adjudged for the plaintiff ; for though a man doth a lawful thing, yet, if any damage do thereby befall another, he shall answer for it if he could have avoided it. As, if a man lop a tree, and the boughs fall upon another, ipso invito, yet an action lies. If a man shoot at butts, and hurt another unawares, an action lies. I have land through which a river runs to your mill, and I lop the fallows growing upon the river side, which accidentally stop the water, so as your mill is hindered, an action lies. If I am building my own house, and a piece of timber falls on my neighbor's house, and breaks part of it, an action lies. If a man assault me, and I lift up my staff to defend myself, and, in lifting it up, hit another, an action lies by that person, and yet I did a lawful ' Sir T. Eaym. 421. a sir T. Eaym. 467. INJUEtES THKOUGH INEVITABLE ACCIDENT. 63 Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire — Opinion of Doe, J. thing. And the reason of all these cases is, because he that is damaged ought to be recompensed. But otherwise it is in criminal cases, for there actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. "Mich. 23 Car. 1, B. R., Style, 72, GuilbeH v. Stone. Trespass for entering his close and taking away his horse. The defendant pleads that he, for fear of his life, by threats of twelve men, went into the plaintiff 's house and took the horse. The plaintiff demurred ; and adjudged for the plaintiff, because threats could not excuse the defend- ant and make satisfaction to the plaintiff. "Hob. 134, Weaver Y. Ward. Trespass of assault and battery. The defendant pleads that he was a trained soldier in London, and he and the plaintiff were skirmishing with their company, and the defendant, with his musket, casualiter et per infortunium et contra voluntatem suam, in discharging of his gun, hurt the plaintiff ; and resolved, no good plea. So here, though the defendant knew not of the wrongful taking of the plaintiff, yet that will not make any recompense for the wrong the plaintiff hath sustained. * * * But the three other judges resolved that the defendant, the jailer, could not be charged, because he could not have notice whether the prisoner was legally arrested or not." In Fletcher v. Rylands.} Lord CRAinvoRTH said: "In considering whether a defendant is liable to a plaintiff for damage which the plaintiff may have sustained, the question, in general, is not whether the defendant has acted with due care and caution, but whether his acts have occasioned the damage. This is all well explained in the old case of Lambert v. Bessey,^ reported by Sir Thomas Raymond, and the doctrine is founded on good sense. For when one person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer." ^ The head-note of Weaver v. Ward* is: "If one trained soldier wound another, in skirmishing for exercise, an action of trespass will lie, unless it shall appear, from the defendant's plea, that he was guilty of no negligence, and that the injury was inevitable." The reason of the decision, as reported, was this: "For though it were agreed that if men tilt or tourney in the presence of the king, or if two masters of defence, playing their prizes, kill one another, that this shall be no fel- ony ; or if a lunatic kill a man, or the like ; because felony must be done animo felonico; yet, in trespass, which tends only to give dam- 1 L. K. 3 H. L. 330. Sec Cahill v. East- " Sir T. Raym. 421. man, 18 Minn. 324; Madras R. Co. v. Zem- ' Ante, p. 40. indar of Carvetinagarum (decided July 3, * Hob. 134. 1874), 30 L. T. (N. S.) 770. 64 GROUNDS OP ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Brown v, Collins. ages according to hurt or loss, it is not so ; and therefore if a lunatic hurt a man, he shall be answerable in trespass ; and therefore no man shall be excused of a trespass (for this is the nature of an excuse, and not of a justification, prout ei bene licuit), except it may be judged utterly without his fault, — as, if a man by force take my hand and strike you; or, if here the defendant had said that the plaintiff ran cross his piece when it was discharging, — or had set forth the case, with the circumstances, so as it had appeared to the court that it had been inevitable, and that the defendant had committed no negligence to give occasion to the hurt." There may be some ground to argue that " utterly without his fault," " inevitable," and " no negligence," in the sense intended in that case, mean no more than the modern phrase, " ordinary and reasonable care and prudence ;" and that, in such a case, at the present time, to hold a plea good that alleges the exercise of reasonable care, without setting forth all "the circumstances" or evidence sustaining the plea, would be substantially in compliance with the law of that case, due allowance being made for the difference of legal language used at different periods, and the difference in the forms of pleading. But the drift of the ancient English authorities on the law of torts seems to differ materially from the view now prevailing in this country. Formerly, in England, there seems to have been no well-deflned test of an actionable tort. Defendants were often held liable "because," as Raymond says, "he that is damaged ought to be recompensed;" and not because, upon some clearly stated principle of law, founded on actual culpa- bility, public policy, or natural justice, he was entitled to compensation from the defendant. The law was supposed to regard "the loss and damage of the party suffering," more than the negligence and blame- worthiness of the defendant ; but how much more it regarded the former than the latter was a question not settled, and very little investigated. "The loss and damage of the party suffering," if without relief, would be a hardship to him ; relief compulsorily furnished by the other party would often be a hardship to him; when and why the " loss and dam- age " should, and when and why they should not, be transferred from one to the other, by process of law, were problems not solved in a phil- osophical manner. There were precedents established upon superficial, crude, and undigested notions, but no application of the general sys- tem of legal reason to this subject. Mr. Holmes says: "It may safely be stated that aU the more ancient examples are traceable to conceptions of a much ruder soi-t [than actual fault], and in modern times to more or less definitely INJURIES THROUGH INEVITABLE ACCIDENT. 65 Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire — Opinion of Doe, J. thought-out views of public policy. The old writs in trespass did not allege, nor was it necessary to show, any thing savoring of culpability. It was enough that a certain event had happened, and it was not even necessary that the act should be done intentionally, though innocently. An accidental blow was as good a cause of action as an intentional one. On the other hand, when, as in Bylands v. Fletcher, modern courts hold a man liable for the escape of water from a reservoir which he has built upon his land, or for the escape of cattle, although he is not alleged to have been negligent, they do not proceed upon the ground that there is an element of culpability in making such a reser- voir, or in keeping cattle, sufficient to charge the defendant as soon as a damnum occurs, but on the principle that it is politic to make those who go into extra-hazardous employments take the risk on their own shoulders." He alludes to the fact that "there is no certainty what will be thought extra-hazardous in a certain jurisdiction at a certain time," but suggests that many particular instances point to the general principle of liability for the consequences of extra-hazardous under- takings as the tacitly assumed ground of decision. ^ If the hazardous nature of things or of acts is adopted as the test, or one of the tests, and the English authorities are taken as the standard of what is to be regarded as hazardous, "it will be necessary to go the length of saying that an owner of real property is liable for all damage resulting to his neighbor's property from any thing done upon his own land," ® and that an individual is answerable "who, for his own benefit, makes an im- provement on his own land, according to his best skill and diligence, and not foreseeing it will produce any injury to his neighbor, if he thereby unwittingly injure his neighbor." 3 If danger is adopted as a test, and the English authorities are aban- doned, the fact of danger, controverted in each case, will present a question for the jury, and expand the issue of tort or no tort into a question of reasonableness, in a form much broader than has been generally used ; or, courts will be left to devise tests of peril, under varying influences of time and place, that may not immediately produce a uniform, consistent, and permanent rule. It would seem that some of the early English decisions were based on a view as narrow as that which regards nothing but the hardship *'of the party suffering;" disregards the question whether, by trans- 1 7 Am. L. Ecv. 652, 653, 662; 2 Kent's s Gibbs, 0. J., in Sutton r. Clarke, 6 Taun. Conim. (12th ed.) 5B1, note 1; 4 id. llO.notel. 44; approved by Blackburn, J., in Fletcher - Mellish's argument in Fletcher v. Ey- v. Eylands, L. E. 1 Exoh. 286, ante, p. 24. lands, L. E. 1 Exch. 272, ante, p. 7. 66 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Brown v. Collins. ferring the hardship to the other party, any thing more will be done than substitute one suffering party for another ; and does not consider what legal reason can be given for relieving the party who has suffered, by making another suffer the expense of his relief. For some of those decisions better reasons may now be given than were thought of when the decisions were announced ; but whether a satisfactory test of an actionable tort can be extracted from the ancient authorities, and whether the few modern cases that carry out the doctrine of those authorities as far as it is carried in Fletcher v. Rylands ^ can be sus- tained, is very doubtful. The current of American authority is very strongly against some of the leading English cases. One of the strongest presentations of the extreme English view is by Blackburn, J., who says, in Fletcher v. Hylands:^ "We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his lands and collects and keeps there any thing likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril ; and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural conse- quence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default ; or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God ; but, as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. The general rule as above stated seems, on principle, just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbor, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neigh- bor's reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbor's privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapors of his neighbor's alkali- works, is damnified without any fault of his own ; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbor who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor's, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there, no mischief could have accrued ; and it seems but just that he should, at his peril, keep it there so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think, is established to be the law, whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches. The case that has most commonly occurred, and which is most frequently to be found in the books, is as to 1 3 Hurl. & Colt. 774 ; L. E. 1 Exch. 265 ; L. 2 L. E. 1 Exch. 279-282. E. 3 H. L. 330; ante, p. 2. INJUEIES THROUGH INEVITABLE ACCIDENT. 67 Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire — Opinion of Doe, J. the obligation of the owner of cattle which he has brought on his land to prevent their escaping and doing mischief. The law as to them seems to be perfectly settled from early times : the owner must keep them in at his peril, or he will be answerable for the natural consequences of their escape, — that is, with regard to tame beasts, for the grass they eat and trample upon, though not for any injury to the person of others, for our ancestors have settled that it is not the general nature of horses to kick, or bulls to gore [or, he might have added, dogs to bite] ; but if the owner knows that the beast has a vicious propensity to attack man, he will be answerable for that too. * * * in these latter authorities [relating to animals called mischievous or ferocious] the point under consideration was damage to the person ; and what was decided was, that where it was known that hurt to the person was the natural conse- quence of the animal being loose, the owner should be responsible in damages for such hurt, though where it was not known to be so, the owner was not responsible for such damages ; but where the damage is like eating grass, or other ordinary ingredients in damage feasant, the natural consequence of the escape, the rule as to keeping in the animal is the same. * * * There does not appear to be any difference, in principle, between the extent of the duty cast on him who brings cattle on his land to keep them in, and the extent of the duty imposed on him who brings on his land water, filth, or stenches, or any other thing which will, if it escape, naturally do damage, to prevent their escaping and injuring his neighbor." This seems to be substantially an adoption of the early authorities, and an extension of the ancient practice of holding the defendant liable, in some cases, on the partial view that regarded the misfortune of the plaintiff upon whom a damage had fallen, and required no legal reason for transferring the damage to the defendant. The ancient rule was, that a person in whose house or on whose land a fire accidentally originated, which spread to his neighbor's property and destroyed it, must make good the loss.^ No inquiry was made into the reason of putting upon him his neighbor's loss as well as his own. The rule of such cases is applied by Blackburn to every thing which a man brings on his land, which will, if it escape, naturally do damage. One result of such a doctrine is, that every one building a fire on his own hearth, for necessary purposes, with the utmost care, does so at the peril, not only of losing his own house, but of being irretrievably ruined if a 1 Filliter v. Phippard, 11 Ad. & E. (N. S.) gence," A, 6; 1 Arch. N. P. 539; Fletcher v. 347, 354; Tub^rvil v. Stamp, 1 Salk. 13; Com. Kylands, 3 Hurl. & Colt. 790, 793; Kusaell v. Dig., "Action upon the Case lor NegU- Fabyan, 34 N. H. 218, 225. 68 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Brown v. Collins. spark from his chimney starts a conflagration which lays waste the neighborhood. "In conflict with the rule as laid down in the English cases is a class of cases in reference to damage from fire communicated from the adjoining premises. Fire, like water or steam, is likely to produce mischief if it escapes and goes beyond control; and yet it has never been held in this country that one building a fire upon his own premises can be made liable if it escape upon his neighbor's prem- ises, and does him damage, without proof of negligence." ^ Every thing that a man can bring on his land is capable of escaping, — against his will, and without his fault, with or without assistance, in some form, solid, liquid, or gaseous, changed or unchanged by the transforming processes of nature or art, — and of doing damage after its escape. Moreover, if there is a legal principle that makes a man liable for the natural consequences of the escape of things which he brings on his land, the application of such a principle cannot be limited to those things : it must be applied to all his acts that disturb the original order of creation ; or, at least, to all things which he undertakes to possess or control anywhere, and which were not used and enjoyed in what is called the natural or primitive condition of mankind, whatever that may have been. This is going back a long way for a standard of legal rights, and adopting an arbitrary test of responsibility that con- founds all degrees of danger, pays no heed to the essential elements of actual fault, puts a clog upon natural and reasonably necessary uses of matter, and tends to embarrass and obstruct much of the work which it seems to be man's duty carefully to do. The distinction made by Lord Caikns ^ between a natural and a non-natural use of land, if he meant any thing more than the difference between a reasonable use and an unreasonable one, is not established in the law. Even if the arbitrary test were applied only to things which a man brings on his land, it would still recognize the peculiar rights of savage life in a wilderness, ignore the rights growing out of a civilized state of society, and make a distinction not warranted by the enlightened spirit of the common law. It would impose a penalty upon efforts, made in a reasonable, skilful, and careful manner, to rise above a condition of barbarism. It is impossible that legal principle can throw so serious an obstacle in the way of progress and improvement. Natural rights are, in general, legal rights; and the rights of civilization are, in a legal sense, as natural as any others. " Most of the rights of prop- erty, as well as of person, in the social state, are not absolute, but rela- 1 Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. T. 476. 487, ante s Fletcher v. Bylanda. L. B. 3 H. L 330 p. 55 ; Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. L. 339. „„;g_ p_ 32. INJURIES THROUGH INEVITABLE ACCIDENT. 69 Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire — Opinion of Doe, J. tive ; " 1 and if men ever were in any other than the social state, it is neither necessary nor expedient that they should now govern themselves on the theory that they ought to live in some other state. The com- mon law does not usually establish tests of responsibility on any other basis than the propriety of their living in the social state, and the relative and qualified character of the rights incident to that state. In Fletcher v. Eylands,^ Mr. Justice Blackburn, commenting upon the remark of Mr. Baron Maktin, "that when damage is done to per- sonal property, or even to the person, by collision, either upon land or at sea, there must be negligence in the party doing the damage to render him legally responsible," says, "this is no doubt true; and, as was pointed out by Mr. Mellish during his argument before us, this is not confined to cases of collision, for there are many cases in which proof of negligence is essential; as, for instance, where an unruly horse gets on the foot-path of a public street and kills a passenger ; 3 or where a person in a dock is struck by the falling of a bale of cotton which the defendant's servants are lowering;'* and many other similar cases may be found. But we think these cases distinguishable from the present. Traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, cannot be conducted without exposing those whose persons or property are near it to some inevitable risk ; and that being so, those who go on the highway, or have their property adjacent to it, may well be held to do so subject to their taking upon themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger; and persons who, by the license of the owner, pass near to warehouses where goods are being raised or lowered, certainly do so subject to the inevitable risk of accident. In neither case, therefore, can they recover without proof of want of care or skill occasioning the accident ; and it is believed that all the cases in which inevitable accident has been held an excuse for what prima facie was a trespass can be explained on the same principle, viz., that the circumstances were such as to show that the plaintiff had taken that risk upon himself." This would be authority for holding, in the present case, that the plaintiff, by having his post near the street, took upon himself the risk of its being broken by an inevitable accident carrying a traveller off the street. But such a doctrine would open more questions, and more difficult ones, than it would settle. At what distance from a highway would an object be near, it? What part of London is not near a street? And then, as the defendant had as good a right to be at home with his horses as to be in the I Loseer. Buchanan,51Sr.T.485,a7> 7 Am. L. EeT. 652, note; 1 Domat's Civil 2 Rixlord v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355, 359. Law (Strahau's trans., -id ed.), 304-308, 312, a Libsoii v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553, 508, 569, 313; Exodus,xxi.,2S-32,3S; xxii., 5,6,9. 574,575. INJURIES THROUGH INEVITABLE ACCIDENT. 71 Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire — Opinion of Doe, J. reduced by the abolition of witness disabilities, the present case is not one of that class. There are many cases where a man is held liable for taking, convert- ing, i or destroying property, or doing something else, or causing it to be done, intentionally, under a claim of right, and without any actual fault. "Probably one-half of the cases in which trespass de bonis •asportatis is maintained arise from a mere misapprehension of legal rights." 2 When a defendant erroneously supposed, without any fault •of either party, that he had a right to do what he did, and his act, done in the assertion of his supposed right, turns out to have been an inter- ference with the plaintiff's property, he is generally held to have assumed the risk of maintaining the right which he asserted, and the responsibility of the natural consequences of his voluntary act. But when there was no fault on his part, and the damage was not caused by his voluntary and intended act ; nor by an act of which he knew, or ought to have known, the damage would be a necessary, probable, or natural consequence ; nor by an act which he knew, or ought to have known, to be unlawful, — we understand the general rule to be that he is not liable. 3 In Brown v. Kendall,^ the defendant, having interfered to part his dog and the plaintiff's, which were fighting, in raising a stick for that purpose, accidentally struck the plaintiff and injured him. It wras held that parting the dogs was a lawful and proper act, which the ■defendant might do by the use of proper and safe means ; and that if the plaintiff's injury was caused by such an act, done with due care and all proper precautions, the defendant was not liable. In the decision, there is the important suggestion that some of the apparent confusion in the authorities has arisen from discussions of the question whether a party's remedy is in trespass or case, and from the statement that when the injury comes from a direct act, trespass lies, and when the •damage is consequential, case is the proper form of action; the remark concerning the immediate effect of an act, being made with reference to damage for which it is admitted there is a remedy of some kind, and on the question of the proper remedy, not on the general question of liability. Judge Shaw, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "We think, as the result of all the authorities, the rule is cor- rectly stated by Mr. Greenleaf, that the plaintiff must come prepared with evidence to show, either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant was in fault; for, if the injury was unavoidable, and the I Chesire E. Co. v. Foster, 51 N. H. 940. 75, and Judge Redfleld's note to that case, SMetoalf, J., in Stanley v. Gaylord, 1 in4 Am.L. Eeg. (N. s.) 532; Towns. onSlau- Cush. 536, 551. del- (id ed.), 128, §§ 67, 88, note 1. 3 Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62; Aavon v. * 6 Cush. 292. State, 31 Ga. 167 ; Morris v. Plan, 32 Conn. 72 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Hay o. The Cohoes Company. conduct of the defendant was free from blame, he will not be liable.* If, in the prosecution of a lawful act, a casualty purely accidental arises, no action can be supported for an injury arising therefrom. ^ Whatever may be the rule or the exception, or the reason of it, in cases of insamty,^ and whatever may be the full legal definitions of necessity, inevitable danger, and unavoidable accident, the occurrence complained of in this case was one for which the defendant is not liable, unless every one is liable for all damage done by superior force overpowering him, and using him or his property as an instrument of violence. The defendant, being without fault, was as innocent as if the pole of his wagon had been hurled on the plaintiff's land by a whirlwind ; or he himself, by a stronger man, had been thrown through the plaintiff's window. Upon the facts stated, taken in the sense in. which we understand them, the defendant is entitled to judgment.'* Case discharged. 5. LIABILITY OF PKOPEIETOK FOR DAMAGES TO ADJACENT PEOP- EETY CAUSED BY BLASTING- EOCKS. Hay v. The Cohoes Company.* Court of Appeals of New York, 1849. Hon. Preebokn G. Jewbtt, " GkBEIIK C. BKONSOlf, " Charles H. Eugqles, " Addison Gaediner, " Daniel Cadt, " Selah B. Strong, " W. H. Shanbxaut), " James G. Hoyt, ■ Judges. Justices of the Supreme Court, and ex officio Judges of the Court of Appeals. It the owner of land, in excavating for a canal thereon, blast rocks so as to cast them upoa the premises of another, injuring his property, he must pay damages, irrespective of the question of negligence. * Reported 2 N. T. 159. 1 2 Greenl. on Ev., §§ 85-92; Wakeman v. Eobinson, 1 Bing. 213. 2 Davis «. Saunders, 2 Chit. Rep. 639 ; Com. Dig. (Day's ed.), tit. "Battery," A, and notes ; Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62; James V. Campbell, 5 Car. & P. 372; Alderson v. Waistcll, 1 Car. & Kir. 358. ' Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134; Com. Dig. (Hammond's ed.), tit. "Battery," A, note d; Darmay v. BorradaUe, 5 O. B. 380; Sedgw. on Dam. (2d ed.) 455, 456 ; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225;. Krom V. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647 ; Horner V. Marshall, 5 Munf. 466; Yeates v. Eeed, 4 Blackf. 463. * 1 Hill, on Torts (33 ed.), chap. 3; Losee V. Buchanan, 61 N. Y. 476; Parrot v. Wells, 15 Wall. 524, 537; Roche v. Milwaukee, etc, Co., 5 Wis. 55; Eastman ». Amoskeag Man, Co., 44 N. H. 143, 156. WRONGFUL, INVASIONS OF ANOTHER'S FREEHOLD. 73 Court of Appeals of New York — Opinion of Gardiner, J. The defendants, a corporation, dug a canal upon their own land, for the purposes authorized by their charter. In so doing, it was necessary to blast rocks with gunpowder, and the fragments were thrown against and injured the plaintiff 's dwelling, upon lands adjoining. Held, that the defendants were liable for the injury, although no negligence or want of skill in executing the work was alleged or proved. Hay sued the Cohoes Company, a corporation chartered by act of the Legislature,! in the Court of Common Pleas of Albany County. The declaration, which was in case, alleged, among other things, that the defendants, at, etc., by their agents and servants, wrongfully and unjustly blasted and threw large quantities of earth, gravel, slate, and stones upon the dwelling-house and premises of the plaintiff, and shut and darkened the windows of said house, obstructed the light, and broke the windows, doors, etc., to the damage of the said plaintiff. Plea, not guilty. On the trial, the plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove his declaration, and, among other things, that the agents of the defendants, in excavating a canal upon land of which they claimed to be owners, knocked down the stoop to his house, and part of his chim- ney, and, as it appeared, for the purpose of protection, placed boards, or rough window-blinds, on all the front windows of the plaintiff's house, by which the light was obstructed, etc. The defendants moved for a nonsuit, and, among other things, insisted that to make them liable it was incumbent on the plaintiff both to aver and prove that there was negligence, unskilfulness, wantonness, or delay, and this the plaintiff had failed to do. The Court of Common Pleas nonsuited the plaintiff, to which an exception was taken. On error brought, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment, and granted a new trial ; ^ from which decision the defendants appealed to this court. D. Wright, for appellants ; E. F. Bullard, for respondent. Gardiner, J. , delivered the opinion of the court. — The defendants insist that they had the right to excavate the canal upon their own land, and were not responsible for injuries to third persons, unless they occurred through their negligence and want of skill, or that of their agents and servants. It is an elementary principle, in reference to private rights, that every individual is entitled to the undisturbed possession and lawful enjoy- ment of his own property. The mode of enjoyment is necessarily limited by the rights of others ; otherwise it might be made destructive of their rights altogether. Hence the maxim. Sic utere tuo, etc. The 1 Stat. 1826, p. 72. ' See 3 Barb. 42. 74 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Hay V. The Cohoes Company. defendants had the right to dig the canal. The plaintiff had the right to the undisturbed possession of his property. If these rights conflict, the former must yield to the latter, as the more important of the two ; since, upon grounds of public policy, it is better that one man should surrender a particular use of his land, than that another should be deprived of the beneficial use of his property altogether, which might be the consequence if the privilege of the former should be wholly unre- stricted. The case before us illustrates this principle. For if the defendants, in excavating their canal, in itself a lawful use of their land, could, in the manner mentioned by the witnesses, demolish the stoop of the plaintiff with impunity, they might for the same purpose, on the exercise of reasonable care, demolish his house, and thus deprive him of aU use of his property. The use of land by the proprietor is not, therefore, an absolute right, but qualified and limited by the higher right of others to the lawful possession of their property. To this possession the law prohibits all direct injury, without regard to its extent or the motives of the aggressor. A man may prosecute such business as he chooses upon his premises ; but he cannot erect a nuisance, to the annoyance of the adjoining proprietor, even for the purpose of a lawful trade, i He may excavate a canal ; but he cannot cast the dirt or stones upon the land of his neighbor, either by human agency or the force of gunpowder. If he cannot construct the work without the adoption of such means, he must abandon that mode of using his property, or be held responsible for all damages resulting therefrom. He will not be permitted to accomplish a legal object in an unlawful manner. In Eolle's Abridgment, .565, it is said that, if A. erects a new house upon the confines of his land, and next adjoining the land of B., and B. afterwards dig his laud so near the land of A. that it falls, no action can be sustained by A. The purpose of B., in the case cited, in dig- ging upon his own land, was lawful ; and so, for aught that appears, ■were the means taken to accomplish it. The right of A. to occupy and use his land in a particular manner was qualified and limited by a simi- lar right in B. No action, consequently, could be sustained. "A man, however, cannot dig his land so near mine," the reporter adds, *'as to cause mine to slide into the pit." In the last case, the injury would consist in depriving the owner of a part of the soil to which his right was absolute. No degree of care in the excavation by the pit- owner would, I apprehend, justify the transfer of a portion of another man's land to his own. 1 Aldred's Case, 9 Co. 57 b. ■WEONQFtTL INVASIONS OF ANOTHEE'S FREEHOLD. 75 Court of Appeals of New York — Opinion of Gardiner, J. So, in all that class of cases where the mode of enjoyment is turned into an absolute right by custom, grant, or prescription, the party is entitled to protection against any alteration of the adjacent premises by which he may in any way be injured. ^ In Panton v. Holland,^ the parties were owners of. contiguous building-lots in the city of New York. The defendant, in order to lay a foundation for a dwelling- house, dug below the foundation of the plaintiff's house, in conse- quence of which it settled and the walls cracked. Held, that the defendant was not liable without proof of negligence. In other words, the plaintiff was bound to show that the means adopted by the defend- ant were illegal. Clark v. Foot ^ is to the same effect. If, with the same purpose in view, the defendant had placed earth upon, or transported it across, the plaintiff's lot, the means, per se, would be wrongful. In this case, the plaintiff was in the lawful possession and use of his own property. The land was bis, and, as against the defendant, by an absolute right, from the centre usque ad caelum. The defendants could not directly infringe that right by any means or for any purpose. They could not pollute the air upon the plaintiff's premises,* nor abstract any portion of the soil,^ nor cast any thing upon the land,^ by any act of their agents, neglect, or otherwise ; for this would violate the right of domain. Subject to this qualification, the defendants were at liberty to use their land in a reasonable manner, according to their pleasure. If the exercise of such a right upon their part operated to restrict the plaintiff in some particular mode of enjoying his property, they would not be liable. It would be damnum absque injuria. No one questions that the improvement contemplated by the de- fendants upon their own premises was proper and lawful. The means by which it was prosecuted were ilkgal, notwithstanding ; for they disturbed the rightful possession of the plaintiff, and caused a direct and immediate injury to his property. For the damages thus resulting, the defendants are liable. Without determining the other questions discussed upon the argument, we think, upon the ground above stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. 1 Lasala v. Holbrook, i Paige, 173, and * Morley «. PragneU, Cro. Car. 510. cases cited. ' Ko"- A"-^" «««' '"""'^ '■'^''- ^''^- ,„ 2 17 Johns. 92. ° Lambert v. Bcssey, Sir T. Eaym. *21. 3 8 Johns. ^1. 76 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Tremain v. The Cohoes Company. Teemain v. The Cohoes Company.* Court of Appeals of New York, March, 1849. The defendants dug a canal upon their own land, and, in executing the work, hiasted the rocks so as to cast the fragments against the plaintiff's house, on contiguous lands. Beld, in an action on the case brought to recover damages for the injury, that evidence to show that the work was done in the most careful manner was inadmissible, there being no claim to recover exemplary damages, and the jury having been instructed on the trial to render their verdict for actual damages only. Tremain sued the Cohoes Company in the Common Pleas of Albany County. The pleadings and evidence were substantially like those in Hay V. The Cohoes Company.'^ After the plaintiff had closed his evi- dence, the defendants offered to prove "that the work of excavating their canal was done in the most careful manner." This evidence was objected to by the plaintiff, and the objection sustained by the Court of Common Pleas ; and the defendant excepted. The judge charged the jury that if they believed that the defendants authorized and directed the construction of the canal, and that the plaintiff's house was injured by the blasting of rock for that purpose, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the actual damage done to his house, and those (if any) he might have sustained in the usual occu- pancy and possession thereof ; and that the plaintiff was not entitled to exemplary damages, nor to damages for obstructing the street men- tioned in the declaration. The defendants excepted to the charge. The Supreme Court, on error to the Common Pleas, gave judgment for the defendants, upon the ground that the above exception was well taken. The plaintiff appealed to this court. E. F. Bullard, for appellant ; D. Wright, for respondent. Gardiner, J., delivered the opinion of the court. — The evidence offered by the defendants to prove " that the work was done in the best and most careful manner" was deemed by the court below relevant on the question of damages. The action was case. The declaration lays no foundation for exemplary damages ; it does not aver that the injury was wilful, or even that it arose from the negligence of the defendants. No claim to them was made upon the trial, and the jury were expressly instructed to limit their verdict to a compensation for the actual injury sustained by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff's windows were darkened one-half the day, the incon- * Reported 2 N. T. 163. 1 2 N. Y. 159, ante, p. 72. APPLICATIONS OF FLETCHER V. ETLANDS. 77 Water escaping from Mines. venience to him would be the same whether the light was obstructed by accident or design, with an intent to injure him, or from an anxious wish to preserve his property. The actual damage to the plaintiff would be the same whatever might be the motive for the act which caused it. How the defendants performed their work was, in this view, of no consequence; what they did to the plaintiff's injury was the sole ques- tion. And upon that issue evidence offered was calculated to mis- lead, instead of enlightening, the jury.i We therefore think the Common Pleas right in excluding it, and that the judgment of the Supreme Court must be reversed. Judgment reversed. NOTES. ? 1. Application of the Rule in Pletclier v. Rylands —"Water escaping into Mines — Pletclier v. Smith. — The rule in Fletcher v. Ry lands was applied in Fletcher v. Smith,'' determined in the Court of Exchequer, in 1872, upon the fol- lowing facts : The defendants' mines adjoined and communicated with the plaintiff's, and in the surface of the defendants' land were certain hollows and openings, partly- caused by and partly made to facilitate the defendants' workings. Across the surface of their lands there ran a watercourse. In November, 1871, the banks of the water- course (which were sufficient for all ordinary occasions) burst, in consequence of exceptionally heavy rains, and the water escaped into and accumulated in the hollows and openings, where the rains had already caused an unusual amount of water to collect, and thence, by fissures and cracks, water passed into the defendants', and 60 into the plaintiff's mines. If the land had been in its natural condition, the water would have spread itself over the surface, and have been innocuous. The defendants were not guilty of any actual negligence in the management of their mines. In an action by the plaintiff to recover the damage he had sustained, the court held, on the principle of Fletcher v. Rylands, that the defendants were liable although they were not guilty of any personal negligence, and although the accident arose from excep- tional causes. Herschell, Q. C, and G. Cumpton, for the plaintiff; ' Holker, Q. C, and Kay, Q. C, for the defendants.* 1 HoytK. Gel8ton,13 Johns. 152; Conrad ». 480; Williams v. Groncott, 4 Best & S. 149; Pacific Ins. Co., 6 Pet. 262, 282; 3 Pet. 69; 10 Hodgkiusou v. Eunor, 4 Beat & S. 229. Pet. 80 86. * They argued that the case was distin- 2 L. B. 7 Exch. 305 (affirmed in 2 App. Oas. guishable from Eletcher v. Eylands, and 781) . cited Williams v. Groucott, 4 Best & S. 149 ; 8 They relied on Fletcher v. Eylands, ante, Hodgkinsou v. Ennor, 4 Best & S. 239 ; Smith p. 2, and also cited Baird v. Williamson, 15 0. v. Kenriok, 7 0. B. 515 ; Scotch Mining Co. o. B. (N. s.) 375; Rack v. Williams, 3 Hurl & N. Lead Mills Co., 34 L. T. 39; Gale on Ease. 308; Bagnall v. London, etc., R. Co., 7 Hurl. & (4th ed.) 404. JJ. 423; 1 Hurl. & Colt. 544; 31 L. J. (Exch.) 78 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. After advisement, the judgment of the court (Maktut, Br amtvbll, and Chamubll, BB.) was delivered by Bramwell, B. — I am of opinion that our judgment must he for the plaintiff. I can- not distinguish this case from Fletcher v. Rylands {supra).^ The defendants have, for their own purposes, caused water to come to collect and stay in a place where, by their operations also, it would sink, as it has sunk, into their mine, and then get, as it has got, into the plaintiff's, and damage it. The defendants have artificially caused foreign water to get into the plaintiff's mine ; water which did not arise there, nor get there by mere natural causes ; water which got there, not by the defendants not preventing, but by their causing it. I have no desire to quote my own judgment in Fletcher v. Rylands,''- but I abide by what I there said. It seems applicable to this case, and I do not know how to amend it. But I will examine this case more particularly. The defendants are the owners of land in which there is, or was, iron ore ; a portion of the ore came to the surface, a portion was subterranean. The latter was got by mining ; the former, by quarrying. The quarrying caused a large hollow, of various depths. Whether this hollow ever communicated with the underground works, I know not. The underground works, by removing the support of the surface, caused, as I understand, subsidence, and so cracked the surface of the hollow, and made fissures, down which water could escape, as I understand. Be this as it may, the result of the defendants' operations was a hollow, to the lowest part or parts of which water, if it got into the hollow, would flow, and which lowest part or parts was and were not water-tight. A flood came, a brook (I omit here to notice its diversion by the defendants) overflowed, and instead of the water passing over the surface and getting away, as it would have done, it got into the hollow so made by the defendants, and, of course, could not escape, except through the fissures or cracks, and, of course, did escape through them into the defendants' mine, and thence to the plaintiff's. How does this differ from Fletcher v. Rylands? The defendants here did not, indeed, make a reservoir. But suppose they had made the hollow, originally exca- vated for other purposes, into a reservoir, or fish-pond, or ornamental water, would the fact that it was originally for another purpose than holding water have made any difference? That cannot be. But it is said they did not bring the water there, as in Fletcher v. Rylands. Nor did they, in one sense ; but in another they did. They so dealt with the soil that, if a flood came, the water, instead of spreading itself over the surface and getting away to the proper watercourses innocuously, collected and stopped in the hollow with no outlet but the fissures and cracks. Suppose the rain, without a flood, falling in this hollow, had made, as it will, pools in the lower part, and the water so collected had gone through the fissures and cracks into the mine, instead of being left on the surface to evaporate and percolate naturally, and that the damage to the plaintiff had been sensible ; could the defendants say they were not liable because they did not cause the rain to fall? So, again, can they say they did not cause this flood-water to collect where it did, with no outlet except to the mines, because it came there by the attraction of gravitation? It is said the flood was extraordinary, and they could not foresee it. I repeat my remark, that that may take away moral blame from them, but how does it affect their legal responsibility? If, for their own purposes, they had diverted this flood into the hollow, when it came, then, though not knowing what would happen, it is clear they would be liable. "Why are they not if it comes, because it must come, from natural causes ? It is to be observed, the mischief the defendants have done is not merely in causing 1 Ante, p. 2. 2 Ante, p. 9. APPLICATIONS OF PLETCHEE V. ETLANDS. 79 Water escaping from Mines. the water to come, but to stay, and stay in a leaky toUow. If it had come, and could have got away, as before the hollow existed, there would have been no harm ; nor would there have been if the hollow had been water-tight. Lord Cairns says, in Fletcher v. Rylanda : i " The defendants, treating them as the owners or occupiers of the close on which the reservoir was constructed, might lawfully have used that close for any purpose for which it might, in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of the land, be used ; and if, in what I term the natural user of that land, there had been any accumulation of water, either on the surface or underground ; and if, by the operation of the laws of nature, that accumulation of water had passed off into the close occupied by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not have complained that that result had taken place. On the other hand, if the defendants, not stopping at the natural use of their close, had desired to use it for any purpose which I may term a non-natural use; for the purpose of introducing into the close that which, in its natural condition, was not in or upon it; for the purpose of introducing water, either above or below ground, in quantities and in a manner not the result of any work or operation on or under the land ; and if, in consequence of their doing so, the water came to escape and to pass off into the close of the plaintiff, then it appears to me that that which the defendants were doing they were doing at their own peril." Surely, in this case the accumulation of water without its natural outlet is not by the natural use of the land, and it is not by operation of the laws of nature alone that water has passed into the plaintiff's mine. And though what the defendants have done was not for the purpose, yet it had the result of introducing water in quantities and in a manner not the result of any work or operation on or under the land. So Lord Cranwobth, in the same case, speaking of Smith v. Kenrick,^ with which I wholly agree, says, at p. 341 : » " The damage sustained by the plaintiff was occasioned by the natural flow or percolation of water from the upper strata." The water was only left by the defendant to flow in its natural course. And at page 342 he says : * "If water naturally rising in the defendant's land had by percolation found its way down to the plaintiff's mine through the old workings, that would not have afforded any ground of complaint." If it should be said this water naturally came to the defendant's land, the answer is, it did not naturally come to the lowest parts of the hollow, and it did not naturally stay there, except by reason of the defendants' having artificially made that hollow, and did not naturally escape by the hollow not being water-tight. _ If the similitude to responsibility of a dangerous animal is looked for m this case, it will be found the defendants did not indeed keep, but they created one for their own purposes, and let it go loose. It is as though they had bred a savage animal and turned it out on the world. , j j- j t I have hitherto dealt with the case without mentioning the fact that the defendants had diverted the brook, and that the water escaped from the artificial channel they had made, and so got to the hollow, and thence to the mines. Such are the facte; and the defendants, therefore, for their own purposes, brought the water to the nlace whence it escaped and did the mischief. They brought it there, without providing the means of its getting away without hurt. This undoubtedly makes a case gainst them that calls for an answer. The answer they make is this: They say "We brought the water there, indeed, and did not provide sufficient IL. K. 3 H. L. 338, ante, p. 38. ' ^"<«. P- «• MC.B.516. *^» 3 Hurl. & Colt. 774, ante, p. 2. * 3 Hurl. & Colt. 774, ante, p. 2. Ji 2 Ch. Div. 692. 82 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. instance. But, even if this is not to be taken as proved, we are of opinion that, as between the plaintiif and the defendant, it was the defendant's duty to keep- the sewage which he was himself bound to receive from passing from his own premises to the plaintiiF's premises otherwise than along the old accustomed channeL This duty is incidental to the defendant's possession of land,' and is the necessary consequeace of the right of the plaintiff. That duty, like its correlative right, is independent of negligence on the part of the defendant, and independent of his knowledge or ignorance of the existence of the drain. The duty of the defendant himself to receive the sewage evidently did not depend on such knowledge, and the- fact that he unknowingly received it affords no justification for allowing it to escape in a manner in which he had no right to let it pass. Fletcher v. Rylands ^ is a strong- authority to show that this conclusion is correct; for, although in that case the- defendant knew of the existence of his reservoir, he did not know that the ground underneath it was in such a state as to render its existence dangerous ; and it was strenuously, but ineffectually, urged that he could not be liable In respect of damage caused by a state of things of which he knew nothing. Bell v. Twentyman * is a strong authority to the like effect. Indeed, if it be once established that the plaintiff's rights have been infringed by the defendant, and that the plaintiff has been thereby damnified, the fact that the defendant infringed them unknowingly, and. without negligence, cannot avail him as a defence to an action by the plaintiff.* In. short, we think that the true doctrine is contained in the following passage of the judgment of Blackburn, J., in the case of Hodgkinson v. Ennor : ^ "I take the law to- be, as stated in Tenant v. Goldwin,^ that you must not injure the property of your neighbor; and consequently, if filth is created on any man's land, then, in the quaint language of the report in Salkeld, 361, 'he whose dirt it is must keep it, that it may not trespass.' The case of Sammond v. St. Paneras Vestry,'' which was relied upon by the counsel for the defendant, appears to us to have no real bearing upon the- present case, inasmuch as the whole argument and decision of that case turned upon the effect of the clauses of a particular act of Parliament, imposing certain duties- upon a public body, and no question arose as to the common-law liability of the occupiers of adjoining premises.* It was contended that the present case was gov- erned by Ross V. Fedden,^ but that was a case in which the plaintiff and the defendant occupied separate stories in the same house; and it was expressly dis- tinguished from a case like the present, which depends simply on those principles of law which regulate the rights and duties of occupiers of adjacent pieces of land. The case of Carstairs v. Taylor'^" is also clearly distinguishable on the same ground. The question whether the defendant was bound, as between himself and the plaintiff, to repair the drain, or so much of it as ran under the defendant's land, was much discussed, but does not really arise; for the plaintiff's cause of action, as finally relied upon, is, not that the defendant omitted to repair the drain, but that he omitted to prevent the sewage on his land from coming on the plaintiff's land otherwise than as the plaintiff was bound to receive it. If the defendant had prevented the sewage from so coming, the plaintiff would have had no cause of action, whether the drain 1 See Eussell v. Shenton, 3 Q. B. 449. ' L. E. 9 C. P. 316. 2 3 Hurl. & Colt. 774, ante, p. 2. 8 See the judgment ot Brett, J., L. E. » = 1 Q. B. 766. C. P. 323. * See Lambert t'. Bes&ey, SirT. Raym. 421. ' L. R. 7 Q. B. 661. » 4 Best & S. 241 ; 32 L. J. (Q. B.) 236. lo L. E. 6 Exch. 217. « 2 Ld. Raym. 10S9; 1 Salk. 21, 361; 6 Mod- ern, 311; Holt, 500. APPLICATIONS OF FLETCHER V. EYLANDS. 83 Injuries from noxious Trees. ■was repaired by the defendant or not. The defendant may, perhaps, he entitled, as hetween himself and the owners and occupiers of the other dominant tenements, to call upon them to contribute to the expenses of keeping his and their common drain in repair ; and it may be that the plaintiff might have sued all the owners or occu- piers (including the defendant) for the damage which he has sustained by reason of such non-repair. But even if the plaintiff could have sued them all, he was not, in our opinion, hound to do so ; he was not bound to rest his case on his ability to establish a duty on them to repair the drain, and a breach of such duty by all who used it. Lastly, it was contended that, as the defendant was only a tenant, and not an owner, he was not responsible ; but he was, in point of law, tenant in possession, not only of the surface, but of whatever was beneath it, and, as such, responsible to the plaintiff, "^ and he could himself have maintained an action for any invasion of such possession. For these reasons, our judgment is for the plaintiff." I 3. Another Application of the same Rule — Injuries from noxious Trees. — A novel application of the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands is found in the case of Crowhurat v. Amersham Bm-ial Board,'^ delivered in the English Court of Appeal, in 1878, where it was ruled that if a man knowingly plant in his own land, ;, and suffer to grow over the land of his neighbor, a noxious tree, by which his neigh- bor's cattle are injured, an action will lie against him at the suit of such neighbor. The material facts of this case were as follows: The defendants, some seventeen years ago, obtained a piece of land for the purposes of their cemetery, and fenced it round with a dwarf wall, in which, at two places, there were openings filled up with iron railings about two feet high. Where these railings occurred, the defendants planted two yew trees, at a distance of about four feet from the railing. These grew through and beyond the railings, so as to project over an adjoining meadow. The plaintiff, two years before the alleged cause of action, hired this meadow to pasture his horses, for a term of three years. After the plaintiff had occupied the field for two years, his horse, which was feeding in the meadow, ate of that portion of the yew tree which projected over the field, the walls and rails not being sufficiently high to prevent a horse from so eating, and died from the effects of the poison contained in what he ate. After stating these facts, Kelly, 0. B., delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal upon the case, using the following language : — " The question seems to resolve itself into this : Was the act of the defendants in originally planting the tree, or the omission to keep it within their own boundary, a legal wrong against the occupiers of the adjoining field, which, when damage arose from it, would give the latter a cause of action? On the part of the defendants, it may be said that the planting of a yew tree in or near to a fence, and permitting it to grow in its natural course, is so usual and ordinary that a court of law ought not to decide that it can be made the subject of an action, especially when an adjoining land-owner, over whose property it grew, would, according to the authorities, have the remedy in his own hands by clipping. On the other hand, the plaintiff may fairly argue that what was done was a curtailment of his rights, which, had he known of it, would prevent his using the field for the purpose for which he had hired it, or would impose upon him the unusual burden of tethering or watching his cattle, or of trimming the trees in question ; and although the right to so trim may be conceded, 1 See Eussell v. Shenton, L. K. 3 Q. B. 449. » 4 Exch. Div. 5 ; 27 Week. Eep. 95 ; 7 Cent. L. J. 465; 18 Alb. L. J. 514. 84 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. this does not dispose of the case, as the watching to see when trimming would be nec- essary, and the operation of trimming, are burdens which ought not to be cast upon a neighbor by the acts of an adjoining owner. It may also be said that if the tree were innocuous it might well be held, from grounds of general convenience, that the occupier of the land projected over would have no right of action, but should be left to protect himself by clipping. Such projections are innumerable throughout the country, and no such action has ever been maintained ; but the occupier ought, from similar grounds of general convenience, to be allowed to turn out his cattle, acting upon the assumption that none but innocuous trees are permitted to project over his land. The principle by which such a case is to be governed is carefully expressed in the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, in Fletcher v. Ry lands,'- where it is said: ' We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his lands, and collects and keeps there, any thing likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril ; and, if he does not do so, is primd facie answer- able for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.' This state- ment of the law was cited and approved of in the judgment of the House of Lords in the same case. In Fletcher v. Rylands, the act of the defendants complained of was the collecting in a reservoir a large quantity of water, which burst its bounds and flowed into the plaintiffs mine ; but though the degree of caution required may vary in each particular case, the principle upon which the duty depends must be the same, and it has been applied under many and varied circumstances of a more ordinary kind, as in Aldred's Case,^ where the wrong complained of was the building of a house for hogs, so near to the plaintiff's premises as to be a nuisance ; Tenant v. Goldwin,^ and others which are cited in Comyns's Digest, tit. 'Action on the Case for Nui- sance ; ' and in the judgment in Fletcher v. Rylands ; in all which cases the maxim Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas was considered to apply, and those who so inter- fered with the enjojrment by their neighbors of their premises were held liable. Other cases of a similar kind may be found in the books. Thus, in Tubervil v. Stamp,* it was held that an action lay by one whose corn was burnt by the negligent management of a flre upon his neighbor's ground, although one of the judges did not agree in the decision, upon the ground that it was usual for farmers to burn stubble. In Lambert v. Bessey,^ the action was in trespass quare clausum fregit. The defend- ant pleaded that he had laud adjoining the plaintiff's close, and upon it a hedge of thorns ; that he cut the thorns, and that they ipso invito fell upon the plaintiff's land, and the defendant took them off as soon as he could. On demurrer, judgment was given for the plaintiff, on the ground that though a man do a lawful thing, yet, if any damage thereby befalls another, he shall be answerable if he could have avoided it. This case was alluded to and approved of by Lord Cranworth, in his judgment in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, in the House of Lords,* where he says : 'The doctrine is founded on good sense. For when one person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer.' It does not appear from the case what evidence was given in the County Court to prove either that the defendants knew that yew trees were poisonous to cattle, or that the fact was common knowledge amongst persons who have to do with cattle. As to the defendants' knowledge, it would be immaterial, as, whether they knew it or not, they must be held responsible for the 1 AnU, p. 25. < 1 Sa!k. 13. » 9 Rep. 57 b. 6 Sir T. Eaym. 421. » 1 Salt. 360. 1 Ante, p. 40. APPLICATIONS OF FLETCHER V. EYLANDS. 85 Injuries from noxious Trees. natural consequences of tlieir own act. It is, however, distinctly found by the judge, ' The fact that cattle frequently browse on the leaves and branches of yew trees when within reach, and not unfrequently are poisoned thereby, is generally known ; ' and by this finding, which certainly is in accordance with experience, we are bound. Several cases were cited during the ai-gument. In two of them, Lawrence v. Jenkins ' and Firth v. Bowling Iron Company,'' the liability of the defendant was based upon his duty to fence. These, therefore, as I have already said, throw no light upon the present question. In Wilson v. Newberry,^ which arose upon demur- rer to a declaration, the court merely decided that an averment that clippings from the defendants' yew tree got upon the plaintiff's land was insufficient without showing that they were placed there by or with the knowledge of the defendant Mr. Justice Mellor, however, in giving judgment, says, after alluding to Fletcher v. Rylands : ' If a person brings on to his land things which have a tendency to escape and to do mischief, he must take care that they do not get on his neighbor's land.' Another case which was cited during the argument was that of Erskine v. Adeane,* in which the Court of Appeal held that a warranty could not be applied by the lessor of land let for agricultural purposes, that there were no plants likely to be injurious to cattle, such as yew trees, growing on the premises demised. This decision obviously rests upon grounds foreign to those by which the present case should be determined. I notice it, therefore, only that I may not appear to have overlooked it. In the result, I think that the judgment of the County Court [for the plaintiff] was correct, and that it should be affirmed, with costs." In the case of Wilson v. Newberry,^ determined in the Queen's Bench in 1871, referred to by Chief Baron Kelly in the preceding case, the declaration was that the defendant was possessed of yew trees, the clippings of which he knew to be poison- ous, and that it was the duty of the defendant to prevent the clippings from being placed on land not occupied by hira ; that the defendant took so little care of the clippings that the same were placed upon land not occupied by him, whereby the horses of the plaintiff were poisoned. Held, on demurrer, that the declaration dis- closed no facts from which a duty could be inferred in the defendant to take care of the clippings. Mellor, J., in giving judgment, said: "The duty alleged does not result from the facts stated. The facts upon which this duty is said to be founded are these : The defendant was possessed of certain yew trees then being in and upon certain lands of the defendant in his occupation, the clippings off which yew trees were, to the knowledge of the defendant, poisonous. These are the only facts from which the duty charged is to be inferred, and it is alleged in the following terms : 'Whereupon it became and was the duty of the defendant to take due and proper care to prevent the said clippings off the said yew trees from being put or placed in or upon land other than land of the defendant, or in his occupation, where the horses and cattle of his neighbors, and others, might be enabled to eat them.' Now, it is not alleged that the defendant clipped the yew trees ; it is not alleged that he knew the yew trees were clipped; and it is not alleged that he had any thing to do with the escape of the yew clippings on to his neighbor's land. It is quite consistent with the averments of this declaration that the cutting may have been done by a stranger, without the defendant's knowledge. I cannot think that the duty charged can be deduced from the facts stated; and, therefore, in my opinion, the declaration is bad. 1 21 Week. Kep. 577; L. K. 8 Q. B. 274. ' 21 Week. Eep. 802 ; L. K. 8 Ch. 756. ! 26 Week. Eep. 558 ; 3 C. P. Div. 254. » L. E. 7 Q. B. 31 ; 20 Week. Eep. HI. » 20 Week. Eep. Ill; L. E. 7 Q. B. 31. 86 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. The case ot Fletcher v. Rylands^ has no analogy to this case. The foundation of the doctrine there laid down is derived from an old case in Salkeld, Tenant v. Qoldwin,^ in which it was determined that it was the duty of a man to keep his own filth on his own ground. If a person bring on to his own land things which have a tendency to escape and do mischief, he must take care that they do not get on to his neighbor's land. This is a very different proposition from that which has been contended for on behalf of the plaintiff; it is that where a person has yew trees growing on his land, which are clipped by some means, he must prevent the clippings from escaping on to his neighbor's land, and from being placed there by a stranger. I do not think that the facts alleged cast any duty of this kind upon the defendant." Lush and Hannbn, JJ., concurred. Judgment was given for the defendant. J 4. Limitations of the Rule in Fletcher v. Rylands — Escape of 'Water stored in Reservoirs in Consequence of ezitraordinary Floods — Nichols V. Marsland. — The first distinct limitation of the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands to be met with in the English books is found in Nichols v. Marsland,^ decided in the English Court of Exchequer in 1875, and affirmed in the Court of Appeal in 1876. This was an action brought by a county surve3-or, under 43 Geo. III., c. 59, § 4, against the defendant, to recover damages on account of the destruction of four county bridges, which had been carried away by the bursting of some reservoirs. At the trial, before Cockbtjrn, C. J., it appeared that the defendant was the owner of a series of artificial ornamental lakes, which had existed for a great number of years, and had never, previous to the eighteenth day of June, 1872, caused any damage. On that day, however, after a most unusual fall of rain, the lakes overflowed, the dams at their end gave way, and the water out of the lakes carried away the county bridges, lower down the stream. The jury found that there was no negligence either in the construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that, if the flood could have been anticipated, the effect might have been prevented. Upon these facts, after the case had been for some time under advisement, Bram- WELL, a., delivered the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, as follows: "In this case, I understand the jury to have found that all reasonable care had been taken by the defendant; that the banks were fit for all events to be anticipated, and the weirs broad enough ; that the storm was of such violence as to be properly called the ' act of God,' or vis major: No doubt, as was said by the counsel for the plaintiff, a shower is the act of God as much as a storm ; so is an earthquake in this country ; yet every one understands that a storm, supernatural in one sense, may properly, like an earthquake in this country, be called the ' act of God,' or vis major, — no doubt, not the act of God, or vis major, in the sense that it was physically impossible to resist, but in the same sense that it was practically impossible to do so. Had the banks been twice as strong, or, if that would not do, ten times as strong, and ten times as high, and the weirs ten times as wide, the mischief might not have happened ; but those are not practical conditions ; they are such that to enforce them would prevent the reasonable use of property in the way most beneficial to the community. So understanding the finding of the jury, I am of opinion the defendant is not liable. What has the defendant done wrong? What right of the plaintiff has he infringed? He has done nothing wrong ; he has infringed no right. It was not the defendant who » Ante, p. 2. 23 Week. Eep. 693 ; 33 L. T. (N. 8.) 265 ; 2 Cent. 2 1 Salk. 360. L. J. 533; on appeal, 2 Exch. Div. 1; 46 L ' L. E. 10 Excli. 255; 44 L. J. (Exch.) 134; J. 174; i Cent. L. J. 319. LIMITATIONS OF FLETCHER V. KTLANDS. 87 Bursting of Keservoirs. let loose the water and set it to destroy the bridges. He did, indeed, store it, and stored it in such quantities that, if it were let loose, it would do, as it did, mischief. But suppose a stranger let it loose, would the defendant be liable? If so, then if a mischievous boy bored a hole in a cistern in any London house, and the water did mischief to a neighbor, the occupier would be liable ; but that cannot be. Then why is the defendant liable, if some agent over which he has no control lets the water ■out? It was contended by the counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant would be liable in all cases of the water being let out, whether by a stranger, or the queen's enemies, or by natural causes, or lightning, or an earthquake. Why? What is the •difference between a reservoir and a stack of chimneys, for such a question as this? Here the defendant stored a lot of water for his own purpose ; in the case of chimneys, :Some one has put a ton of brick fifty feet high for his own purposes, —both equally harmless if they stay where placed, and equally mischievous if they do not. The •water is no more a wild or savage animal than the bricks, while at rest, nor more so when in motion ; both have the same property, and obey the laws of gravitation. ■Could it be said that no one could have a stack of chimneys except on the terms of being liable for any damage done by their being overthrown by a hurricane or an earth- quake? If so, it would be dangerous to have a tree, for a wind might come so strong AS to blow it out of the ground into a neighbor's land, and cause it to do damage ; or, «gain, it would be dangerous to have a field of ripe wheat, which might be fired by lightning and do mischief. I admit that it is not a question of negligence. A man may use all care to keep the water in, or the stack of chimneys standing, but still he would be liable if, through any defect, even though latent, the water escaped or the bricks fell. This case differs wholly from Rylands v. Fletcher.^ There, the defendant poured the water into the plaintiff's mine; he did not know he was ■doing so, but he did it as much as though he had poured it into an open channel, which led to the mine without his knowing it. Here, the defendant merely brought the water to a place whence another agent let it loose, but that act is that of an agent he cannot control. I am by no means sure that the comparison of water to a wild animal is exact; I am by no means sure that if a man kept a tiger, and lightning broke his chain, and he got loose and did mischief, that the man who kept him would not be liable. But this case, and the case I have put of the chimneys, are not cases of keeping a dangerous beast for amusement, but of a reasonable use of property in A way beneficial to the community. I think this analogy has made some of the difficulty in this case. Water stored in a reservoir may be the only practical mode of supplying a district, and so adapting it for habitation. I refer to my judgment in Fletcher v. Rylands,'^ and I repeat that here no right of the plaintiflF's has been infringed, and I am of opinion that the defendant has done no wrong. The plaintiflF's right is, to say to the defendant, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non Icedas; and the defend- ant has done this, and no more. The Lokd Chief Bakon and my brother Clkasby agree in this judgment. As to the plaintiflF's application for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict of the jury was against evidence, we have spoken to the Lord Chief Justice, and he is not dissatisfied with the verdict, and we cannot see that it is wrong. The rule will, therefore, be absolute to enter the verdict for the defendant. Rule absolute." Prom this decision an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeal, the judgment of which court, consisting of Cockburn, C. J., Mellish, L. J., and Bagallay, J. A., 1 ^„tg^ p, 2. - 13 Week. Kep. 932; 3 Hurl. & Colt. 774; ante, 1). 0. 88 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. was delivered by Mellish, L. J. (after stating the facts), as follows : " The appel- lant relied upon the decision in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, supra.^ In that ease^ the rule of law on which the case was decided was thus laid down by Mr. Justice Blackburn, in the Exchequer Chamber : ' We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his lands, and collects and keeps there, any thing likelj' to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril ; and, if he does not do so, is prim& facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape wa» owing to the plaintiff's default; or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God ; but as nothing of the sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.' It appears to us that we have two questions to consider : First, the question of law, which was left undecided in Ry- lands V. Fletcher, Can the defendant excuse herself by showing that the escape of the water was owing to vis major, or, as it is termed in the law-books, the act of God? And secondly, if she can, did she in fact make out that the escape was so occasioned ? Now, with respect to the first question, the ordinary rule of law is, that, when the law creates a duty, and the party is disabled from performing it, without any default of his own, by the act of God or the king's enemies, the law will excuse- him ; but when a party, by his own contract, creates a duty, he is bound to make it good, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity. We can see no good reason why that rule should not be applied to the case before us. The duty of keeping the water in and preventing its escape is a duty imposed by the law, and not one created by contract. If, indeed, the making of a reservoir was a vrrongful act in itself, it might be right to hold that a person could not escape from the con- sequences of his own wrongful act. But it seems to us absurd to hold that the making or the keeping a reservoir is a wrongful act in itself. The wrongful act is- not the making or keeping the reservoir, but the allowing or causing the water to- escape. If, indeed, the damages were occasioned by the act of a party, without more, as where » man accumulates water on his own land, but, owing to the pe- culiar nature or condition of the soil, the water escapes and does damage to his neighbor, the case of Rylands v. Fletcher establishes that he must be held liable. The accumulation of water in a reservoir is not in itself -wrongful ; but the making- it, and suffering the water to escape, if damage ensue, constitute a wrong. But the present case is distinguished from that of Rylands v. Fletcher in this : that it is. not the act of the defendant in keeping this reservoir, — an act in itself lawful, — which alone leads to the escape of the water, and so renders wrongful that which, but for such escape, would have been lawful. It is the supervening vis m,ajor of the water caused bj' the flood, which, superadded to the water in the reservoir, — which of itself would have been innocuous, — causes the disaster. A defendant can- not, in our opinion, be properly said to have caused or allowed the water to escape, ■'if the act of God or the queen's enemies were the real cause of its escaping, without any fault on the part of the defendant. If a reservoir was destroyed by an earthquake, or the queen's enemies destroyed it in conducting some warlike opera- tion, it would be contrary to all reason and justice to hold the owner of the reservoir liable for any damage that might be done by the escape of the water. We are of opinion, therefore, that the defendant was entitled to excuse herself by proving that the water escaped through the act of God. The remaining question is. Did the defendant make out that this escape of the water was owing to the act of God? 1 L. E. 3 H. L. 330, ante, p. 32. lilMITATIONS OF FLETCHER V. KYLANDS. 89 Bestraint of Water in Reservoir. Now, the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great that it could not reasonably have been anticipated, although, if it had been antici- pated, the eflfect might have been prevented ; and this seems to us, in substance, a finding that the escape of the water was owing to the act of God. However great the flood had been, if it had not been greater than floods that had happened before, and might be expected to occur again, the defendant might not have made out that she was free from guilt ; but we thinli she ought not to be held liable because she did not prevent the effect of an extraordinary act of nature, which she could not anticipate. In the late case of Nugent v. Smith,^ we held that a carrier might be protected from liability for a loss occasioned by the act of God, if the loss by no reasonable precaution could be prevented, although it was not absolutely impossible to prevent it. It was, indeed, ingeniously argued for the appellant, that at any rate the escape of the water was not owing solely to the act of God, because the weight of the water originally in the reservoirs must have contributed to break down the dams, as well as the extraordinary water brought in by the flood. We think, how- ever, that the extraordinary quantity of water brought in by the flood is, in point of law, the sole proximate cause of the escape of the water. It is the last drop which makes the cup overflow. On the whole, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Exchequer ought to be aifirmed. I 5. Another Limitation of the same Rule— Water stored in Reser- voir released by Act of third Person — Box v. Jubb.— Another distinct limitation of the rule in Fletcher v. Rylands is found in the case of Box v. Jubh,'^ determined in the English High Court of Justice, Exchequer Division, in 1879. In this case the following facts were admitted by both parties : The defendants were the owners and occupiers of a cloth-mill, for the necessary supply of water to which there was a reservoir, also belonging to them. The mill and reservoir had been built and used as such and in the same manner for many years. The plaintiff was tenant of the premises adjoining the mill. The reservoir was supplied with water from a main drain or watercourse which passed by the reservoir. There was an inlet and also an outlet, at both of which there were proper doors or sluices, so as (when required) to close the communications between the reservoir and the main drain. The defendants had a right to use the main drain for obtaining water for the reservoir, and also for carrying off their surplus water, but had otherwise no control over the main drain, which did not belong to them. In December, 1877, the plaintiff's prem- ises were flooded by the overflowing of defendant's reservoir. The overfl-owing was caused by the emptying of a large quantity of water from a reservoir, the property of a third person, into the main drain, at a point considerably above the defendants' premises, bv an obstruction at a point in the main drain, below the defendant's res- ervoir, whereby the water was forced back through the doors or sluices of the reservoir (which were closed at the time), and caused the reservoir to overflow on to the plaintiff's premises. The obstruction was caused by circumstances over which the defendants had no control, and without their knowledge ; and had it not been for such obstruction, the overflowing of the reservoir would not have happened. The doors or sluices between the main drain and the reservoir were constructed and maintained m a proper manner, so as to prevent the overflowing of the reservoir under all ordinary circum- 1 1 C. P. Div. 423. ' 27 Week. Eep. 415. 90 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. stances, and no negligence or wrongful act was attributable to either party. Damages were admitted to be £75. The County Court judge decided that the defendants were liable, and gave judgment in the plaintiff 's favor for £75. The question for the opin- ion of the court was whether the defendants were, under these circumstances, liable. Gully, Q. C. {George C. Thompson with him), for the appellants, distinguished this case from Ry lands v. Fletcher ^ on the ground that in that case there were old work- ings on the land, which it was the duty of the defendant to protect; the defendant there also brought a mischievous thing on to his land, for his own purpose. The defendants in this case did not construct the reservoir, and there was vis major, narael}', an act of a man over whom the defendants had no control, which was primarily the cause of the damage which ensued. This case is on all fours with Nichols v. Marsland.'' Bray, for the respondent. — The case is within Ry lands v. Fletcher. The defend- ants are in possession of a reservoir and the communications between it and the drain, and though they may not have been made by them, yet they are there for their purposes. If they have sluice-gates, they must be made as strong as the channel itself. The whole question turns on whether this was occasioned by vis major ; but nothing that can reasonably be anticipated can be vis major.^ Kelly, C. B. — The defendants in this case, it appears, had been in possession of this reservoir and the communications between it and the main drain for a number of years ; there was no defect in their construction ; moreover, the case finds that the inlet and outlet were furnished with proper doors. The question is. What was the cause of the overflow? was it any thing for which the defendants were responsible? was there any act or default of theirs? Now, it is found by the case that the obstruction was caused by circumstances over which the defendants had no control, namely, by the act of a third party. I care not whether it is called vis major, or a wrongful act of a third party. Then, it is contended that the defendants ought to have anticipated the possibility of such a vast quantity of water pressing on these gates; but the case does not find that any amount of strengthening in the gates could have resisted the great pressure suddenly brought to bear on them. I am of opinion, for these reasons, that the defendants are entitled to our judgment. Pollock, B. — This is a case deserving of great consideration; and I should, per- haps, have liked further consideration of it if all the authorities bearing on the sub- ject had not been cited for the plaintiflT. What wrong has the defendant in this case done ? If a man builds his mill-dam of good material, and constructs it properly, as was here the case, for what is he to be liable ? Ry lands v. Fletcher, if read carefully, has no analogy to the present case ; in that case, the House of Lords, in the judgment of Lord Chancellor Cairns, adopted the accurate language of Mr. Justice Black- BTTKN in the court below. This case bears no analogy to the case of a common carrier, who is only excused by the act of God or the queen's enemies. The case of Ross V. Fedden is, to a certain extent, applicable ; but I do not rest my judgment on . that case. Judgment was given for the appellants. I I/. E. 3 H. L. 330; 17 Week. Eep., H. L. Eep. 83; ». c, sub nam. Fletcher v. Smith, 2 Dig. 17, ante, p. 33. App. Cas. 781 ; Humphreys o. Cousins, 25 25 Week. Eep. 173; 2 Exch. Div. 1; ante, Week. Eep. 371; 2 0. P. Div. 239; Bell v. p. 86. Twentyman, 1 Q. B. 766; Boss v. Fedden, L. 3 Carstairs v. Taylor, 19 Week. Eep. 733 ; L. E. 7 Q. B. 661; 20 Week. Eep., C. L. Dig. 53. U. 6 Exch. 217; Musgrave v. Smith, 26 Week. LIMITATIONS OP FLETCHER V. RTLAND8. 91 Escape of Water from upper Floor of Building. J 6. Another Limitation of the same Rule — Adjoining Occupiers of the same Building — Escape of Water from the upper to the lower Floor. — Another distinct limitation of the rule in Fletcher v. Rylands was made by the Court of Queen's Bench, in 1872, in the case of Ross v. Fedden,^ where It was held that the tenant of an upper floor of a building is not liable, in the absence of negligence, for damages caused by water escaping from his water-closet to the lower floor. In that case, the plaintiff was tenant from year to year of the ground floor of a building, where he carried on business as an ironmonger. The defendants were tenants from year to year of the second floor of the same house, which they occupied as offices. Some time between the evening of Saturday, the 26th of November, and the morning of Monday, the 28th of November, 1870, water escaped from a water-closet in the defendants' premises, found its way down through the first floor to the ground floor, and there did damage to the plaintifi''s premises and goods to the extent of £79 5s. Zd. This damage the plaintiff sought to recover in an action. This case was first tried by a deputy County Court judge, without a jury, who, after stating the above facts, gave the following opinion : — "The plaintift''3 claim to recover is put upon two grounds. Krst, it is said that the mischief arose from the negligence of the defendants. Now, upon this matter the evidence is very slight, and there is no inconsistency in it. The closet was inside the defendants' private ofiice, and no one had access to it but the two partners in the defendants' firm, and it was for their exclusive use. One of the partners was from home at the time of the occurrence. The other partner, who was called as a witness, stated that the closet had, previously to the Saturday, been in good order; that he believed he had used it on Saturday morning, and found nothing amiss, and no one could have used it afterwards; that on Saturday evening, at about 6 or 6.30, he washed his hands at the wash-hand stand in the same room with the closet, and noth- ing then appeared to be the matter with it. He then left the office, and no one appears to have entered it again until Monday morning. On the Monday morning, when the plaintiff came to his shop, he found the damage done of which he now complains. Together with a plumber, whom he had sent for, he traced the escape of water upwards to the second floor. They obtained access to the defendants' offices and the closet inside, and found that the water had overflowed the pan. On exami- nation, it appeared the cause of this was that the valve admitting the supply of water to the pan had given way and failed to close, and the overflow-pipe had become stuffed with paper. The valve, the defect in which was the real cause of the mis- chief, was under the seat of the closet, and could only be reached or seen by removing the woodwork. Upon this evidence, I think the defendants are not shown to have been guilty of any negligence. Up to Saturday evening there was no reason to suspect that the valve had given way, or was in any danger of giving way, or that any thing was wrong with the closet; and I see no negligence in not guarding against a danger which there is no reason to anticipate. Upon the first question, therefore, which is one of fact, my opinion is in favor of the defendants. But it has been argued, secondly, on behalf of the plaintifi; that he is entitled to recover, even in the absence of any negligence on the part of the defendants, upon the authority of Rylands v. Fletcher,'^ and other cases similar in principle. In that case it was decided that, as between adjoining owners, one who diverted water from its natural fiow, and accumulated it on his own land for his own purposes, is bound at all hazards to 1 L. K. 7 Q. B. 661. a L. E. S H. L. 330, ante, p. 32. 92 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLK NEGLIGENCE. Notes. prevent its escape ; and If it does escape, negligence or no negligence, he is responsible to his neighbor for the consequences. It is contended that the same rule applies to this case. On the other hand, the case of Garstairs v. Taylor ' has been cited. In that case the plaintiff was the occupier of the ground floor of a warehouse, and the defendant of the upper part. The water from the roof was collected by gutters into a box, from which it was discharged by a pipe into the drains. A rat made a hole in the box, the water escaped, and injured the plaintiff's goods in his warehouse below ; and it was held that the defendant was not liable for this damage. That case is not, I think, at all a direct authority for the decision of the present; it differs in two im- portant particulars. The apparatus for conducting the water was there as much for the benefit of the plaintiff as of the defendant, — a fact upon which much stress is laid in the judgment of Bbamwell, B., — whilst here the water-closet was solely for the defendants' benefit; and, further, in that case the circumstance that caused the damage was one falling under the head of vis major, a fact to which much weight is given by the Lord Chief Bakon and Martin, B. This cannot be said in the present case. I think, however, that the judgment in Garstairs v. Taylor^ leaves it very doubtful whether the rule of law laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher,'^ in the case of adjacent owners, applies to the case of two persons occupying two floors of the same house. But, assuming the rule to apply, is the present case within it? As between the occupiers of parts of a house, — a thing wholly artificial, — it is rather a straining of language to speak of any one state of things as more natural than another. But I think that, in the words of Martin, B., in the case already referred to, ' one who takes a floor of a house must be held to take the premises as they are.' As far as he is concerned, I think the state of things then existing may be treated as the natural state of things, and the flow of water through cisterns and pipes then in operation as equivalent to the natural flow of water ; I think he takes subject to the ordinary risks arising from the use of the rest of the house as it stands ; and that one who merely continues to use the rest of the house as it stands, and in the ordinary manner, does not fall within the rule laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher,'' and, in the absence of neg- ligence, is not liable for the consequences ; and in the present case there is nothing to show, nor has it been suggested, that the water-closet, or any thing connected with it, has been in any way altered by the defendants since they came into occupation. There is nothing to show, nor has it been suggested, that it has been in any way altered since the plaintiff' became tenant of the ground floor, or that it has been used in any but the ordinary manner. The question is one of some difficulty, but my opinion is that, under the circumstances of the case, in the absence of negligence on the part of the defendants, they are not liable for the damage which the plaintiff has sustained." The questions for the opinion of the court were : 1. Was not the judge wrong in ruling that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants? 2. If negligence was proved, ought not the judgment of the court to have been for the plaintiff? 3. Even in the absence of negligence, was it not the duty of the defendants so to use their premises that they should not injure those of the plaintiff; and, therefore, should not the judgment have been for the plaintiff? Lastly, whether or not, on the whole case, the judgment of the learned judge was not wrong in point of law. G. Bruce, for the plaintiff. — The principle of Rylands v. Fletcher^ applies to this 1 L. K. 6 Exch. 217. « L. R. 3 H. L. 330, ante, p. 32. LIMITATIONS OP FLETCHEH V. EYLANDS. 93 Escape of Water from upper Floor of Building. case. The plaintiff and defendants are in the relative position of adjoining occupiers ; and if one for his own use has accumulated water upon his premises, he must keep it in at his peril. In Caratairs v. Taylor, ' the water was only that which accumulated from natural causes, viz., the rain. The present is the converse of Humphries v. Brogden.^ Just as in that case the occupier of the underground was held hound to leave support for the surface, so here the occupier of the upper floor is under an obligation to see that the landlord's water-pipe is in good order (for the landlord cannot do so), or to recoup the landlord or his tenants for the consequences. [Blackburn, J. The cases are not analogous. Suppose the under walls, not obviously in a dilapidated or dan- gerous state, fall ; according to the argument for the plaintiff, the upper man would have a right of action against the under man for not keeping up the upper walls.] C. Hall, for the defendants, referred to the note to Fomfret v. Ricroft,^ and GhaurMer V. Robinson,^ and was then stopped by the court. Blackburn, J. — It was very proper on the part of Mr. Bruce to read the judgment of the deputy county judge; the judgment is very well argued out, and I was pre- pared to agree with it as soon as I heard it read. I think it is impossible to say that defendants, as occupiers of the upper story of a house, were liable to the plaintiff, under the circumstances found in the case. The water-closet and the supply-pipe are for their convenience and use, but I cannot think there is any obligation on them at all hazards to keep the pipe from bursting, or otherwise getting out of order. The cause of the overflow was the valve of the supply-pipe getting out of order and the escape-pipe being choked with paper, and the judge has expressly found that there was no negligence ; and the only ground taken by the plaintiff is that, plaintiff and defendants being occupiers under the same landlord, the defendants, being the occupiers of the upper story, contracted an obligation binding them in favor of the plaintiff, the occupier of the lower story, to keep the water in at their peril. I do not agree to that ; I do not think the maxim " Sic utere tuo ut alienum non Imdas " applies. Negligence is negatived ; and, probably, if the defendants had got notice of the state of the valve and pipe, and had done nothing, there might have been ground for the argument that they were liable for the consequences ; but I do not think the law casts on the defendants any such obligation as the plaintiff contends for. The judg- ment must, therefore, be affirmed. Mkllor, J. — I am of the same opinion. I was prepared to listen to any authority in favor of the plaintiff, but none has been found. In the absence of negligence, there is nothing in the relative position of the parties which would make the defend- ants liable. The statement in the case rendered the ground of the judge's decision doubtful, but this was cleared up when the judgment was read. I was very glad that this was done. I am quite satisfied with the reasoning in it. Ry lands v. Fletcher^ does not apply ; and Carstairs v. Taylor'^ ia a much stronger case than the present, as it seems to me, in favor of the defendants. LuBH, J. — I am of the same opinion. I go along with the judgment of the learned deputy judge, which I think sound and well reasoned. Judgment was given for the defendants. g 7. Other English Cases applying and limiting the Doctrine of Fletcher ▼. Rylanda. — Still other cases are found in the English books applymg and illus- 1 L. E. 6 Exch. 217. < 4 Exch. 163. > 12 Q. B, 739 ; 20 L. J. (Q. B.i 10. 6 1,. R. 8 H. L. 830, ante, p. 32. > 1 Wms. Sannd. 321, note 1. 94 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Note3. trating the doctrine of Fletcher v. MylandsA A statement of a claim alleged that the surface of the defendants' land had heen artificially raised hy earth placed thereon, and that, in consequence, rain-water falling on the defendants' land made its way through the defendants' wall into the adjoining house of the plaintiff, and caused substantial damage. It was held, upon demurrer, that the statement of claim dis- closed a good cause of action. ^ In another case,' a water-works company had a main in a turnpike. An adjoining occupier employed a contractor to make a tunnel through the turnpike. In conse" quence of a leak in the main, his work was delayed and his contract rendered less profitable. It was held that he could not recover damages against the company, whatever may have been the rights of the proprietor for whom be was doing the work. Blackburn, J., stated the reasons on which the judgment of the court pro- ceeded, in the following language : "In the present case the objection is technical, and against the merits, and we should be glad to avoid giving it eflTect. But, if we did so, we should establish an authority for saying that in such a case as that of Fletcher v. Rylands ' the defendant would be liable, not only to an action by the owner of the drowned mine, and by such of his workmen as had their tools or clothes destroyed, but also to an action by every workman and person employed in the mine, who, in consequence of its stoppage, made less wages than he would other- wise have done. And many similar cases to which this would apply might be sug- gested. It may be said that it is just that all such persons should have compensation for such a loss, and that, if the law does not give them redress, it is imperfect. Perhaps it may be so. But, as was pointed out by Colekidgb, J., in Lumley v. Gyc,* courts of justice should not ' allow themselves, in the pursuit of perfectly com- plete remedies for all wrongful acts, to transgress the bounds which our law, in a wise consciousness, as I conceive, of its limited powers, has imposed on itself, of redressing only the proximate and direct consequences of wrongful acts.' In this we quite agree. No authority in favor of the plaintiflF's right to sue was cited, and, as far as our knowledge goes, there was none that could have been cited. "The two cases which go furthest in allowing aright of action to one injured in consequence of a breach of a contract with a third person, or of a breach of duty to a third person, are Langridge v. Levy" and Lumley v. Gyefi In the first, the plaintiff was a son whose hand was shattered by the bursting of a gun which had been sold to the father for his, (the son's) use, with a false and fraudulent representation that it was a safe one. But the court below and the court in error both carefully point out, as the ground of their judgment, that, ' as there was fraud, and damage, the result of that fraud, not from an act remote and consequential, but one contemplated by the defendant at the time as one of its results, the party guilty of the fraud is responsiblp to the party injured.' In Lumley v. Oye, the majority of the court held that an action would lie for maliciously procuring a third person to break her con- tract with the plaintiff. But all three of the judges who gave judgment for the plaintiff relied upon malicious intention. It would be a waste of time to do more than refer to the elaborate judgments in that case for the law and authorities on this branch of the law. 1 L. E. 1 Exch. 265 ; L. E. S H. L. 830 ; aate, * 2 El. & Bl. 252 ; 22 L. J. (Q. B.) 479. pp. % 32. 6 2 Mee. & W. 619 (affirmed in error, 4 Mee. 2 Hmdmanc.TheNortli-EastemEw. Co., ftW. 337). 3 C. P. Div. 168. « 2 Bl. &B1. 216i 22 L. J. (Q. B.) 463. s Cattle V. Stockton Water- Works, L. E. 10 Q. B. 453. LIMITATIONS OF FLETCHER V. RYLANDS. 95 Other English Cases. " In the present case there is no pretence for saying that the defendants were mali- cious, or had any intention to injure any one. They were, at most, guilty of a neglect of duty, which occasioned injury to the property of Knight, but which did not injur© any property of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's claim is, to recover the damage which he has sustained by his contract with Knight becoming less profitable, or, it may be, a losing contract, in consequence of this injury to Knight's property. We think this does not give any right of action."' In a very elaborate judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, in 1872, involving the right of a mine-owner to recover damages for a flooding of his mine by the waters of a canal, it appeared that the canal was constructed under an act of Parliament, by which the canal was to be open for use by the public on payment of tolls. The defendants were authorized to take land compulsorily, and construct the canal, doing as little damage as might be, and to do all things necessary for making and preserv- ing and using the canal, making satisfaction for all damages to be sustained by the owners of lands and hereditaments taken or prejudiced by the execution of the powers of the act. Commissioners were appointed, who were to determine, from time to time, what sum should be paid for the purchase of lands, and also to determine what other distinct svtm should be paid by defendants as recompense for any damages which might be, at any time whatsoever, sustained by owners of lands or hereditaments by reason of the making or maintaining the canal. The minerals under the canal were expressly reserved to the owners, who were to be at liberty, subject to the provisions of the act, to work the minerals, provided that no injury be done to the navigation. By another clause, the owners were not to work the minerals without giving three months' notice to the defendants, who might inspect the mines, and might, if they thought proper, prevent the working of the mines, paying to the owners the value. On failure of the defendants to inspect the mines, the owners were authorized to work them. The plaintiff was owner of mines under the canal, and gave defendants proper notice of his intention to work them ; the defendants did not inspect, and refused to purchase. The plaintiff proceeded to work the mines, without regard to the surface, and without attempting to support it, and knowing that the effect would be to let down the surface, and probably disturb the strata, and that there was danger of the water escaping from the canal into the mines ; but, except as above, plaintiff did not work his mines in any negligent, or unskilful, or improper manner, but got the coal in the manner in which that vein of coal is ordinarily gotten, and without doing so he could not have obtained the full benefit of his coal. The canal was in good order when the plaintiff commenced working his coal; and the defendants did all they could to keep the canal water-tight, by puddling, etc. During part of the time, while plaintiff's working was going on, they had dammed back the water, and so emptied the water out of that part of the canal; but they refused to do so for the three months necessary for plaintiff to work out his coal. The defendants were guilty of no actual carelessness in the management of their canal, unless it was carelessness to allow the water to be in it while the mines were worked. The result of the work- ing was that the strata became dislocated, and the water of the canal escaped through the cracks and flooded the workings, and plaintiff was obliged to abandon his coal. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action, charging that defendants, having brought water into the canal, so improperly managed the canal and the water that it escaped and flooded plaintiff's mine. On the above facts, the court having power to draw inferences, it was held, distinguishing Fletcher v. Rylands, that an action of > Cattle V. Stockton Water-Works, L. E. 10 Q. B. 453, 457. 96 GROUNDS OF ACTIOXABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. tort could not be maintained; but the judges were of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation, under the act, for the loss of his coal. But HAinnsN, J., was of a contrary opinion on both points.' 5 8. The Value of Fletcher v. Rylands. — From the foregoing cases it will be seen that Fletcher v. Rylands has been several times either distinguished or limited by the English courts, and that it has been doubted and denied in this country. Other American cases could be cited where its doctrine has been impeached. In Oarland v. Towne^^ Ladd, J., said that he was not aware that any court in this country had gone so far. In Marshall v. Welwood,^ determined in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in 1876, it was criticised by Bbaslby, C. J., in forcible lan- guage. The question was, whether the owner of a steam-boiler, which he kept and used on his own premises, was responsible, in the absence of negligence, for damages caused by its explosion. Bbasley, C. J., after referring to the doctrine of Fletcher V. Rylands, said: "This principle would evidently apply to and rule the present case ; for water is no more likely to escape from a reservoir and do damage than steam is from a boiler ; and, therefore, if he who collects the former force upon his property, and seeks, with care and skill, to keep it there, is answerable for his want of success, so is he who, under similar conditions, endeavors to deal with the latter. There is nothing unlawful in introducing water into a properly constructed reservoir on a person's own land, nor in raising steam in a boiler of proper quality ; neither act, when performed, is a nuisance pei' se ; and the Inquiry consequently is, whether in the doing of such lawful act the party who does it is an insurer against all flaws in the apparatus employed, no matter how secret, or unascertainable by the use of every reasonable test, such flaws may be. This English adjudication takes the aflSrma- tive side of the question, conceding, however, that the subject is not controlled by any express decision, and that it is to be investigated with reference to the general grounds of jurisprudence. I have said the doctrine involved has been learnedly treated, and the decision is of great weight, and yet its reasoning has failed to con- vince me of the correctness of the result to which it leads ; and such result is clearly opposed to the course which judicial opinion has taken in this country. The fallacy in the process of argument by which judgment is reached in this case of Fletcher v. Rylands appears to me to consist in this : that the rule, mainly applicable to a class of cases which, I think, should be regarded as in a great degree exceptional, is amplified and extended into a general, if not universal principle. The principal instance upon which reliance Is placed Is the well-known obligation of the owner of cattle to prevent them from escaping from his land and doing mischief. The law as to this point is perfectly settled, and has been settled from the earliest times, and is to the effect that the owner must take charge of his cattle at his peril, and if they evade his custody, he is, in some measure, responsible for the consequences. This is the doctrine of the Tear Books, but I do not find that it is grounded on any theoretical principle making a man answerable for his acts or omissions without regard to his culpability. That, in this particular case of escaping cattle, so stringent an obligation upon the owner should grow up was not unnatural. That the beasts of the land- owner should be successfully restrained was a condition of considerable Importance to the unmolested enjoyment of property, and the right to plead that the escape had 1 Dann v. Birmingham Canal Nav. Oo., L. » 65 N. H. 57. E. 7 Q. B. 244 (affirmed in Exoh. Cham., L. E. « 38 N. J. L. 339. 8Q. B. 42; L. J. (Q. B.) 34). VALUE OF FLETCHER V. EYLANDS. 97 Kemarks of Beasley, C. J., m Marshall v. Welwood. occurred by inevitable accident would have seriously impaired, if it did not entirely frustrate, the process of distress damage feasant. Custom has had much to do in giving shape to the law, and what is highly convenient readily runs into usage, and is accepted as a rule. It would but rarely occur that cattle would escape from a vigilant owner; and in this instance such rare exceptions seem to have passed unnoticed, for there appears to be no example of the point having been presented for judicial consideration; for the conclusion of the liability of the unnegligent ■owner rests in dicta, and not in express decision. But, waiving this, there is a coil- sideration which seems to me to show that this obligation which is put upon the owner of errant cattle should not be taken to be a principle applicable, in a general way, to the use or ownership of property, which is this : that the owner of such cattle is, after all, liable only sub modo for the injury done by them ; that is, he is responsible, with regard to tame beasts who have no exceptionally vicious disposition, so far as is known, for the grass they eat, and such like injuries, but not for the hurt they may inflict on the person of others, — a restriction on liability which is hardly consistent with the notion that this class of cases proceeds from a principle so wide as to embrace all persons whose lawful acts produce, without fault in them, and in an Indirect manner, ill results which disastrously affect innocent persons. If the prin- ciple ruling these cases was so broad as this, conformity to it would require that the person being the cause of the mischief should stand as an indemnifier against the whole of the damage. It appears to me, therefore, that this rule which applies to damages done by straying cattle was carried beyond its true bounds when it was appealed to as proof that a person, in law, is answerable for the natural consequences of his acts, such acts being lawful in themselves, and having been done with proper care and skill. "The only other cases which were referred to in support of the judgment under consideration were those of a man who was sued for not keeping the wall of his privy in repair, to the detriment of his neighbor, being the case of Tenant v. Golding,''- and several actions which it is said had been brought against the owners of some alkali- works for damages alleged to have been caused by the chlorine fumes escaping from their works, which works, the case showed, had been erected upon the best scientific principles. But I am compelled to think that these cases are but a slender basis for the large structure put upon it. The case of Tenant v. Golding presented merely the question whether a land-owner is bound, in favor of his neighbor, to keep the wall of his privy in repair ; and the court held that he was, and that he was responsible if, for want of such reparation, the filth escaped on the adjoining land. No question was mooted as to his liability in case the privy had been constructed with care and skill, with a view to prevent the escape of its contents, and had been kept in a state of repair. Not to repair a receptacle of this kind, when it was in want of repairs, was in itself a primS, facie case of negligence, and it seems to me that all the court ■decided was to hold so. " But this consideration is also to be noticed, both with respect to this last case and that of the injurious fumes from the alkali-works, that in truth they stand somewhat by themselves, and having this peculiarity : that the things in their nature partake largely of the character of nuisances. Take the alkali-works as an example. Placed in a town, under ordinary circumstances they would be a nuisance. When the attempt is made, by scientific methods, to prevent the escape of the fumes. It is an attempt to legalize that which is illegal, and the consequence is, it may well be » 1 Salk. 21; s.c.,«u5 nom. Tenant i'. Goldwin,! Salt. 360; 2 Ld.Raym. 1089; 6 Modern, 311. 7 98 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. held that, failing in the attempt, the nuisance remains. I cannot agree that, from these indications, the broad doctrine is to be drawn that a man, in law, is an insurer that the acts which he does, such acts being lawful and done with care, shall not injuriously affect others. The decisions cited are not so much examples of legal maxims as of exceptions to such maxims ; for they stand opposed and in contrast to principles which, it seems to me, must be considered much more general in their operation and elementary in their nature. The common rule, quite institutional in Its character, is that, in order to sustain an action for tort, the damage complained of must have come from a wrongful act. Mr. Addison, in his work on Torts,' very correctly states" this rule. He says: 'A man may, however, sustain grevious damage at the hands of another, and yet, if it be the result of inevitable acci- dent, or a lawful act done in a lawful manner, without any carelessness or negli- gence, there is no legal injury, and no tort giving rise to an action for damages.' Among other examples, he refers to an act of force, done in necessary self-defence, causing injury to an innocent by-stander, which he characterizes as damnum sine in- juria, — 'for no man does wrong or contracts guilt in defending himself against an aggressor.' Other instances of a like kind are noted, such as the lawful obstruction of the view from the windows of dwelling-houses ; or the turning aside, to the detri- ment of another, the current of the sea or river, by means of walls or dykes. Many illustrations, of the same bearing, are to be found scattered through the books of reports. Thus, Dyer ^ says, ' that, if a man have a dog which has killed sheep, the master of the dog being ignorant of such quality and property of the dog, the master shall not be punished for that killing.' This case belongs to a numerous, well-known class, where animals which are usually harmless do damage, the decisions being that, under such conditions, the owners of the animals are not responsible. Akin to these, in principle, are cases of injuries done to innocent persons by horses, in the charge of their owners, becoming ungovernable by reason of unexpected causes ; or where a person in a dock was struck by the falling of a bale of cotton which the defendants' servants were lowering ; ' or in cases of collision, either on land or sea.* " It is true that these cases of injury done to personal property or to persons are, in the case of Fletcher v. Rylands, sought to be distinguished from other damages, on the ground that they are done in the course of traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, which cannot be conducted without exposing those whose persons or property are near it to some inevitable risk. But this explanation is not sufficiently comprehensive ; for, if a frightened horse should, in his flight, break into an enclosure, no matter how far removed from the highway, the owner would not be answerable for the damage done. Nor is the reason upon which it rests satisfactory; for, if traffic cannot be carried on without some risk, why can it not be said with the same truth that the other affairs of life, though they be transacted away from the high- ways, cannot be carried on without some risk ; and if such risk is, in the one case, to be borne by innocent persons, why not in the other? Business done upon private property may be a part of traffic, as well as that done by the means of the highway, and no reason Is perceived why the same favor Is not to be extended to it in both situations. But, besides this, the reason thus assigned for the immunity of him who is the unwilling producer of the damage has not been the ground on which the de- > Vol. I., p. 3. 8 Scott V. X-ondon Docks Co., 3 Hurl. & S25b. Colt. 596. < Hammack v. White, 11 C. B. (N. s.) 588. VALUE OP FLETCHEE V. RYLANDS. 99 Conclusions of the Massachusetts Court. cisions illustrative of the rule have been put; that ground has been that the person sought to be charged had not done any unlawful act. Everywhere, in all the branches of the law, the general principle that blame must be imputable as a ground of responsibility for damage proceeding from a lawful act is apparent. A passenger is injured by the breaking of an axle of a public conveyance; the carrier is not liable unless negligence can be shown. A man's guest is hurt by the falling of a chandelier ; a suit will not lie against the host without proof that he knew, or ought to have known, of the existence of the danger. If the steam-engine which did the mischief in the present case had been in use in driving a train of cars on a railroad, and had in that situation exploded, and had inflicted injuries on travellers or by-standers, it could not have been pretended that such damage was actionable, in the absence of the element of negligence or unskilfulness. By changing the place of the accident to private property, I cannot agree that a different rule obtains. "It seems to me, therefore, that in this case it was necessary to submit the matter, as a question of fact for the jury, whether the occurrence doing the damage com- plained of was the product of pure accident, or the result of want of care or skill on the part of the defendant or his agents." On the other hand, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has applied the rule in Fletcher v. Rylands to the case of the proprietor of a building suffering snow and ice to accumulate on its roof in such quantities that it slid off, injuring a traveller.* But this application of it was obviously misconceived, since snow and ice, accumulated on one's roof by the natural action of the weather, cannot be treated as a dangerous substance which one has artificially collected on his land for his own purpose.^ The same court has, moreover, following Fletcher v. Rylands, Baird v. Williamson,^ and Tenant v. Golding,*' held that, "to suffer filthy water from a vault to percolate or filter through the soil into the land of a contiguous proprietor, to the injury of his well and cellar, where it is done habitually, and to the knowledge of the party who maintains the vault, whether it passes above ground or below, is of itself an actionable tort." "Under such circumstances," say the court, "the reasonable precaution which the law requires is, effectually to exclude the filth from the neighbor's land; and not to do so is of itself negligence." It was, therefore, held proper, in a case where there was no pretence of unavoidable accident, for the judge to tell the jury that "the defendant was bound so to construct his vault that the contents thereof should not percolate through the plaintiff's cellar and well, and, it being conceded that percola^ tions did pass through, to the plaintiff's injury, such percolations were evidence of negligence, upon which the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict." ^ The same court, reaffirming the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands, has lately applied it to a case where a wall, built by one person on his own land, falls upon the land of his neighbor, doing damage. In this case, Q-bat, 0. J., is reported to have said : "An owner of land has the same duty to keep on his own land a house or wall built thereon, as the filth in his cesspool, or the water in his reservoir, or the snow upon his roo£ His duty is, in the words of Baron Pabkb, ' to keep it in such a state that his neighbor may not be injured by its fall.' ' The present case does not require us to decide whether it is more accurate to say that it is not a question of negligence, 1 Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass. 251. win, 1 Salt. 360 ; 2 Ld. Baym. 1089 ; 6 Modem, 2 Garland v. Towne, 65 N. H. 67, per 311. Ladd, J. 5 Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 682. 3 15 C. B. (N. 8.) 376. 6 Citing Chauntler v. Robinson, 4 Exoh. . 32. 104 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. mine. Lord Ckanworth, in delivering his opinion, said: 'If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land any thing which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbor, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and cause damage, he is respon- sible, however careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken: to prevent the damage.' He distinguishes between natural percolation and that which is caused artificially. On this point he says: 'If water naturally rising in the defendants' land had, by percolation, found its way down to the plaintiff's mine through the old workings, and so had impeded his operations, that would not have afforded him any ground of complaint. * * * But that is not the real state of the case. The defendants, in order to effect an object of their own, brought on to their land, or on to land which for this purpose may be treated as being theirs, a large accumulated mass of water, and stored it up in a reservoir. The consequence of this was damage to the plaintiff, and for that damage, however skilfully and carefully the accumulation was made, the defendants, according to the principles and authori- ties to which I have adverted, were certainly responsible.' "The cases cited from Vermont are, to some extent, in apparent conflict with these authorities. They do not seem to distinguish, as these authorities do, between natural and artificial causes of injury. "We think the petitioner's claim is not only sustained by authority, but is founded on justice. He ought to be compensated for such an injury as the petition describes, and the law would be defective if it failed to give him a remedy." So, the Court of Appeals of New York has -held, upon a careful examination of the authorities,' that if by raising the water in a natural stream above its natural banks, and to prevent its overfiow artificial embankments are constructed which answer the purpose perfectly, but which nevertheless produce such a pressure upon the natural banks of the stream that percolation takes place to such an extent as to drown the lands of an adjacent proprietor, an action will lie for the damage thua occasioned.^ In conformity with this view, and with the law as laid down in Tenant V. Golding,^ the same court has lately held that a person who had paved his yard, thus causing the water to accumulate, — the soil being thus rendered less penetra- ble, — and who had conducted from the roofs of his houses into his privy, in leaders^ and drains, a quantity of water beyond the capacity of his drains to carry away, must pay damages to an adjacent property-owner for any injury done by the escape of such water, irrespective of any question of negligence.* In like manner it has 1 Ang. on 'Watercourses, §§ 330, 340; ale r. Tattle, 29 N. T. 459; Chatfleld i7. Wil- Washb. on Ease. 259; 3 Kent's Comm. 439, son, 28 Vt. 49; Ch.asemore v. Richards, 7 H_ 440; Rex v. Trafford, 1 Barn. & Add. 874; L. Cas. 349; Dickiiisou v. Canal Co., 7 Exch.. Brown v. Cayuga, etc., R. Co., 12 if. Y. 486; 282; Cooper v. Barber, 3 Taun. 99; Earl v. Williams v. Nelson, 23 Pick. 142; Badcliff's De Hart, 12 N. J. Eq. 280. Executors v. Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 195 ; Tremaiu 2 pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520. V. echoes Co., 2 N. Y. 163, ante, p. 76; Hay a 1 Salk. 21. V. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159, ante, p. 72; Bel- * Jutte v. Hughes, 67 N. Y. 267 (reversing linger u. New York, etc., R. Co., 23 N. Y. s. c.,8 JonesA Sp. 126). So, no person has the 47; New York v. Bailey, 2 Deulo, 433 ; Chi- right to relieve his own land from standing na V. Southwick, 12 Me. 238; Tyler v. Wil- water, or prevent its accumulation thereon,, kinson, 4 JMason,400; Merritt «. Brinkerhoff, by discharging it through ditches or drains. 17 Johns. 306; Smith v. Agawam Canal Co., upon the land of his neighbor. Bellows », 2 Allen, 355; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coou, Sackatt, 15 Barb. 96; Foot c. Bronson,4Lans. 6 Pa. St. 379; Acton v. Bluudell, 12 Mee. & 47. Compare Rawstron v. Taylor, 11 Exch. W. 324; Roath v. DrisooU, 20 Conn. 533; Mar- 369; Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 469; Woffle tin V. Riddle, 2 Casey, 415, n.; Broadbeut v. v. New York Central R. Co., 3 Alb. L. J. 131 ^ Ramsbotham, 34 Eng. Law & Eq. 553; Raw- Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, 11 Exch. 602;. itronj;. Taylor, 33 Eng. L.iw&Eq. 428; Good- Easterbrook u. Erie R. Co., 51 Barb. 94. INJURIES FKOM ESCAPE OF WATER. 105 The American Doctrine. been held that, although a land-owner will not be held responsible for the effect of water flowing over the plaintiff's lot in consequence of the natural formation of the soil, yet if the volume of water on his land has been greatly augmented by the lawful cutting off of a drain and culvert by other lot-owners over whose lots it passed, and by the filling In of adjacent sunken lots by their owners, this will impose an obli- gation upon such a land-owner to adopt reasonable measures to prevent the water from thus accumulating on his land to the injury of a neighbor, and he will not be discharged of this duty by the fact that the water thus accumulated is in some degree augmented by the act of such neighbor in so constructing the roofs of his buildings as to cast water on to it.' Upon like grounds it has been held, upon the principle of Say v. Th,e Cohoes Company,'' — a principle declared to be elemen- tary, — that if a canal company, in enlarging its canal, flood the lands of an adjacent owner, it must pay damages, although it has prosecuted its work with care and skill; nor is such proprietor limited to the remedy for the assessing of such damages pointed out in the charter of the canal company, as for the taking of private prop- erty for public use, but he may bring an ordinary action therefor.* So, it has been held in the same State that a statute authorizing one to build a dam upon his own land, upon a creek or river which is a public highway, merely protects him from an indictment for a nuisance. If in doing this he flow his neighbor's land, he is liable to an action, even though the statute provide a summary mode of appraising and paying the damages arising from such a consequence.* The tenant of the lower por- tion of a building, the landlord reserving control over the roof, may maintain an action against the landlord for an injury to his goods, sustained by water descending upon them from the roof, if the injury happened through the negligence of the land- lord in not keeping the roof in repair.^ As between different tenants under a common landlord, the question of liability for injuries arising from the condition of the prem- ises is said to be always one of negligence in their use. Accordingly, it has been held that the tenant of the second floor of a building, not being guilty of negligence or malfeasance, was not responsible for damages caused to the tenant of the lower floor by water escaping from a reservoir of Croton water, built upon the second floor, in consequence of its being suffered to get out of order.^ In such a case, the rule is said to be this: "Negligence is the foundation of the action. If the injury result from the negligence of the owner, either in constructing or upholding the free- hold, he is responsible ; but he is not, in general, responsible for the negligence of the tenant in the use of it. If it result from the negligence of the tenant in any man- ner, he is liable. Both landlord and tenant may be liable for the same injury, — the landlord for the negligent construction, and the tenant for the negligent use of the premises so negligently constructed." ' It has been held in Massachusetts, that where one properly and lawfully opened a covered drain on his own land, and it became his duty to close it again in order to prevent the water from setting back and overflowing the adjoining land, he is bound to use ordinary care and prudence in closing such drain ; and if he did so, he was not responsible for any damage caused to his neighbor's land by its overflow.* The case was referred to the well-settled principle that where Thomas v. Kenyon, 1 Daly, 132. Priest v. Nichols, 116 Mass. 401 ; Kirby v. ' Ante, p. 72. Boylston Market Assn., 14 Gray, 249; Gray s Selden v. Delaware & Hudson Canal v. Boston Gas-Light Co., 114 Mass. 149; Co., 34 Barb. 363 (affirmed in 29 N. Y. 631). Noroross v. Thoms, 51 Me. 503. To the same principle, see Bradley v. New " Ealiin v. Brown, 1 E. D. Smith, 36. York, etc., K. Co., 21 Conn. 294. ' Ibid., per Woodruff, J. * Crittenden v. Wilson, 5 Cow. 165. ' Kookwood v. Wilson, 11 Cush. 221. » Toole V. Beckett, 67 Me. 544. Compare 106 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. one does a lawful act upon his own premises, he cannot he held responsible for injuri- ous consequences that may result from it, unless it was so done as to constitute action- able negligence.' The court say that the remark of &ibbs, C. J., in Sutton v. ClarJc,'^ "that a person who, for his own benefit, makes an improvement on his own land according to his best skill and diligence, and not foreseeing that it will produce injury to his neighbor, yet, if he thereby injure his neighbor, he will be answerable," is not only strictly an obiter dictum, but cannot be sustained upon principle or author- ity." So, the owner of a mine at a higher level than an adjoining mine has a right to work the whole of his mine, in the usual and proper manner, for the purpose of getting out the minerals in any part of his mine ; and if he so conduct his works, he will not be liable for damages caused by water which flows by gravitation into such adjoining mine. For damages thus accruing, such mine-owner can only be made liable on proof of negligence.* But the rule stops here. The occupier of the higher mine has no right to be an active agent in sending water into the lower mine ; nor is the occu- pier of the lower mine subject to the servitude of receiving water conducted by man from the higher mine. "Each mine-owner has all the rights of property in his mine, and among them the right to get- all minerals therefrom, provided he works with skill, and in the usual manner. And if, while the occupier of the higher mine exer- cises that right, nature causes water to flow to a lower mine, he is not responsible for this operation of nature. If the owner of the lower mine intends to guard against this operation, he must leave a barrier at the upper part of his mine to keep back the water of his higher neighbor. The law imposing these regulations for the enjoy- ment of somewhat conflicting interests does not authorize the occupier of the higher mine to interfere with the gravitation of the water, so as to make it more injurious to the lower mine or advantageous to himself." ^ Accordingly, if A. and B. own adja- cent mines, and A. knocks down the barrier of coal between them, so that water pours in from his mine and floods the mine of B., he must pay damages to B.' So, recur- ring to the principle that damage caused by the negligent or improper exercise of the powers conferred by an act of the legislature may be the subject of an action, we find that it has been held, after much consideration, that if a railway companj- so negligently construct and maintain their road that water will penetrate therefrom into a mine below, which would not have got there but for such negligence, they must pay damages to the subjacent mine-owner.' If one person obstructs the flow of a stream of water, to the use of which another person is entitled, — such as a mill- race, — he must pay damages, irrespective of any question of negligence.' 1 10. Liability for Damages caused by Escape of noxious Gases and Iiiquids. — Noxious gases and liquids arising from the carrying on of lawful and necessary occupations are not nuisances in all situations and under all circumstances, 1 Boynton v. Eees, 9 Pick. 528 ; Howland ° Pirmstone v. Wheeley, 2 Dow. & L. 203. V. Vincent, 10 Mete. 371; Tourtellot v. Rose- ' Bagnall v. London, etc., R. Co., 7 Hurl. &, brook, 11 Meto. 460 ; Thurston v. Hancock, N. 423 ; s. c, 8 Jur. (N. s.) 16 ; 31 L. J. Exch. 12 Mass. 220; Bachelder v. Heagan, IS Me. 121; 10 Week. Rep. 232 (affirmed in the 32; Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92; Brown Exchequer Chamber, 1 Hurl. & Colt. 644) ; 9 V. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292. Jur. (N. s.) 264; 9 L. T. (N. s.) 419; 31 L. J. » 6 Taun. 29. (Exch.) 480; 10 Week. Rep. 802. As to the 8 Eockwood V. Wilson, 11 Cush. 221. liability ol a frontager to one owning land 4 Smith V. Kenrick, 7 C. B. 515 ; Baird u. in the rear of him for failing to repair a Williamson, 15 C. B. (N. s.) 376. sea-wall, whereby the lands of both were 6 Baird v. Williamson, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 375, flooded, see Hudson v. Tabor, 1 Q. B. Div. 391; Smith v. Kenrick, 7 C. B. 515; Acton v. 225. Blundell, 12 Mee. & W. 334. ' Lawson v. Price, 45 Md. 123, 145. ESCAPE OP NOXIOUS GASES AND LIQUIDS. 107 Contamination of Water. but may become such by reason of the trade being carried on in improper localities.^ or by reason of their being negligently suffered to escape. In the last case, the gist of the action consists, not in the doing of the work, but in the manner in which it is done. Thus, in Massachusetts, a lessee may maintain an action against one who has laid gas-pipes in neighboring streets so imperfectly that gas escapes therefrom through the ground and into the water of a well upon premises hired and used by him for a livery-stable, and thereby renders it unfit for use, and makes the enjoyment of his estate less beneficial, although the nuisance may have existed in a less degree when the premises were hired ; and may recover for the inconvenience to which he has been thereby subjected, and expenses incurred in reasonable and proper attempts to exclude the gas from the well, but not for injury caused by allowing his horses to drink the water after he knew that it was corrupted by the gas.' If such a livery- stable keeper is unlicensed, he cannot recover damages for an injury to his business caused by the escape of gas through the ground into his well ; for an injury to a business carried on in violation of law will not be redressed in a court of justice ; but he may recover for a nuisance to his real estate.' It has been held, in Con- necticut, that where a person leaves noxious substances upon his land, which are washed by the rain along the surface of the ground into his neighbor's well, corrupting the water, he is liable for the injury; and it makes no difi'erence that the noxious substances are carried along under the surface of the ground, by means of water diffusing itself according to natural laws. But when such noxious sub- stances, by penetrating, or being buried within the soil, have affected subterraneous currents by which such well is supplied, and have corrupted the water only in that mode, the person placing such substances on or within Ivis soil is not liable unless he has acted maliciously ; and it makes no difference, in the case last named, that the defendant has been notified of the injury, and could prevent it by the exercise of reasonable care.* The Supreme Court of New York has, however, held a gas com- pany liable for permitting noxious substances to escape so as to contaminate the waters of a river, to the damage of an inferior proprietor, although they may have escaped by percolation through the soil, and without negligence.^ This and other like cases proceed on the idea that a riparian owner has a right, in the nature of property, to the use of the water of a stream, which he is entitled to receive without artificial contamination by another proprietor, and that this right is of a character so positive that it is not affected by the skilfulness, the diligence, or even by the 1 Whitney v. Bartholomew, 21 Conn. 213. escaping Into a well by percolation through Certain occupations, deemed lawful and the soU, and by following the course of an harmless in the country, may become nui- underground stream, is destitute of sense, sances in the city. Fowler v. Sanders, Cro. and incapable of practical application. Jac. 446; Keg. ». Wigg, 2 Salk. 460; Aldred's Upon this point Ellsworth, J., forcibly Case, 9 Co. 67 b; Jones v. Powell, Hut. 135; dissented. In a, snlt for an injnry of this Moiley «. Pragnell, Cro. Car. 410; Uex v. nature, evidence of a non-expert, to the ef- Wliite, 1 Burr. 333; Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio, feet that other land belonging to another 31'3 ; Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. person had been injured from the escape of 398; First Baptist Church -u. Schenectady, the same substances, has been hold Inad- etc. E. Co., S Barb. 79; Hay v. Cohoes Co., missible. Lincoln v. Taunton Copper Man. 2 N. Y. 159, ante, p. 72. Co., 9 Allen, 181. This, It will be seen here- 2 Shermant>. Fall Eiver Iron-Works Co., 2 after, does not correspond to the rule of Allen, 524. evidence in case of fires set by railway looo- > Sherman v. Fall Riverj 5 Allen, 213. motives. 4 Brown «. Hlius, 27 Conn. 84. The dis- ' Carhart v. Auburn Gas-Light Co., 22 tinction between the cases of noxious liquids Barb. 297. 108 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. motive of another person by whom the water may be contaminated.' In an im- portant English ease, which had the concurrence of ten judges, it appeared that the statute 6 Geo. XV., c. 79, incorporated a company for the purpose of supplying the town of Birmingham with gas. By the 8 & 9 Vict., c. 66, J 160, it is enacted, "that if the company shall at any time cause or suffer to be conveyed or to flow into any stream, reservoir, aqueduct, pond, or place for water, within the limits of the said act, any washing, substance, or thing which shall be produced by making or sup- plying gas," they shall forfeit £200. In 1854, the company erected a gas-tank about forty-five yards from the plaintiff's well. The site was selected by an engineer on behalf of the company, and the tank was erected on solid sandstone, and with proper materials. The company knew that mines in the neighborhood had been worked, but they did not know that mines had been worked under or near to any part of their land. In 1838, there were workings under half the company's land; and from 1848 to 1855, these workings were brought to within about sixty yards of the tank, in consequence of which the floor of the tank cracked, and the washings in It flowed out and percolated to the plaintiff's well, thereby rendering the water unfit for domestic purposes. It was held, in the Exchequer Chamber (affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer), that the company had suffered the washings to flow into the plaintiff's well, within the meaning of the 8 & 9 Vict., c. 66, and, conse- quently, were liable to the penalty of £200.^ There is so palpable a disregard of social duty manifested by one proprietor in depositing on his own ground a noxious substance near the well of his neighbor, so that it is liable to contaminate its waters, that he will be held liable to pay damages if such a result takes place, even by the concurrence of an extraordinary all of rain.' ? 11. Continued — Liability of Gas-Light Companies for Damages caused by Escape of illuminating Gas. — Carburetted hydrogen gas, man- ufactured at some point in a large city by companies organized for that pur- pose, and distributed by means of mains and smaller pipes over large and thickly inhabited districts, for the purpose of lighting streets, halls, places of business, and private dwellings; considerably lighter than atmospheric air, and hence of its own force constantly pressing outward and upward, and seeking to diffuse itself in all directions ; highly combustible when ignited in the presence of atmos- pheric air, and, when combined with it, highly explosive, — is an agent certainly more dangerous than water, and requiring for its due restraint and management greater vigilance and skill. Applying, by a natural generalization, the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands * to this substance, the conclusion would be that a company which manufactures and vends it for its own profit must keep it restrained at its peril.5 But, in the absence of statute, we find no suggestion in any book, English or American, that such a company is responsible for damages caused by escaping gas, on any other principle than a want of ordinary care and skill in its man- 1 Howell V. McCoy, 3 Rawle, 256. '» Woodward v. Atom, 35 Me. 271. s Hipkins v. BiMningham, etc., Gas-Light < Ante., p. 2. Co., 6 Hurl. & N. 250; 7 Jur. (N. s.) 213; 30 L. ' Such as received construction in Hip- J. (Exch.) 60 (affirming 8 Hurl. & N. 74). kins v Birmingham, etc., Gas-Light Co., 6 There is another English case involving Hurl. & K. 250 ; 7 Jur. (N. s.) 213 ; 30 L. J. questions as to the construction of similar (Exch.) 60 (affirming 5 Hurl. &, N. 74) ; PariT statutes. Parry v. Croydon Commercial Gas v. Croydon Commercial Gas and Coke Co. and Coke Co., 11 C. B. (N. s.) 578 (affirmed in 11 C. B. (n. s.) 578 (affirmed in Exch. Cham.' Exch. Cham., 15 0. B. (N. S.) 668). IS 0. B. (N. S.) 588). ' LIABILITY OF GAS-LIGHT COMPANIES. 109 Escape of illuminating Gas. agement, — terms -whicli exact a degree of vigilance and technical knowledge in proportion to the dangerous character of the substance in which they deal, and according to the circumstances of each case.^ On the contrary, there are many cases in which they are held liable on the principle of negligence,^ and others in which, in the absence of negligence, they have been absolved from liability.^ The law exacts of them, in the care of an agency so dangerous, an active vigilance, and a frequent supervision of the districts through which their mains and pipes extend ; and, while it would perhaps be going too far to require them to send inspectors over the entire district each day, yet there obviously ought to be some system of supervision. Accordingly, where a main had been leaking for several days, causing a perceptible smell, and finally producing an explosion in the plaintiff's house, the company was held liable, although, upon receiving notice of the leak, they had sent a workman to repair it, who had arrived too late.* But the mere unexplained fact that gas leaks in an untenanted house, from which it has been shut off at the request of the owner, will not be evidence of negligence, to charge the company for resulting damages, if the internal fittings are the property of the owner, and if there is a stop-cock in the house under the control of such occupant, constituting the only means of shutting off the gas.^ Nor will the fact that gas leaked from a hole in a main which had been opened to admit a service-pipe, and found its way into an adjacent house through an open window nearly level with the trench from the main, be of itself sufficient to charge the company with resulting damages : the jury must believe that the workmen of the company might reasonably have foreseen the danger, and that they were bound to have the window closed.* But such a company, in managing an element so dangerous, is bound not only to due care on the part of itself and its servants, but it must also use due care in pre- venting injury from the careless or wrongful intermeddling with its works on the part of others. While it cannot prevent the city from breaking the ground where its pipes are laid, for the purpose of building a sewer, nor interfere with the pros- ecution of the work, yet it has a right to and is bound to see that in restoring the earth to its proper place its own pipes are not injured, or, if injured, that they are repaired as soon as practicable. Where the pipes of a gas company were thus injured, so that the escaping gas injured plants in the plaintiff's green-house, the company was compelled to pay damages.' Moreover, it has been held, but upon grounds not entirely clear, that if such a company, negligently, and in Ireach of its contract, allow gas to escape in a cellar with which its pipes connect, it must pay the damages caused by an explosion, although the explosion was immediately produced by the intervening negligence of a third person, the servant of a plumber, 1 Holly V. Boston Gae-Light Co., 8 Gray, sumers' Co., 2 Fost. & Fin. 437; Flint v. 123, 131; Hutchinson u. Boston Gas-Light GloucesterGas-LightCo.,9Allen,552; Holly Co., 122 Mass. 219,222. u. Boston Gas-Light Co., 8 Gray, :23;Hutch- 2 Holden D. Liverpool New Gas and Coke inson v. Boston Gas-Light Co., 122 Mass. Co., 3 C. B. 1; Mose v. Hastings, etc., Gas 219; B.artlett v. Boston Gas-Light Co., 117 Co., 4 Fost. & Fin. 324 ; Burrows -o. March Mass. 533. Gas and Coke Co., L. E. 7 Exch. 96; Lannen * Mose v. Hastings, etc., Gas Co., 4 Fost. V. Albany Gas Co., 44 N. T. 459 (afiBrniing 46 & Fin. 324. Barb. 264) ; Butcher v. Providence Gas Co., ' Holden v. Liverpool New Gas and Coke 18 Alb. L. J. 372; Emerson v. Lowell Gas- Co., 3 C. B. 1. Light Co., 3 Allen, 410; Hunt (George L.)». « Blenkiron v. Great Central Gas-Con- Lowell Gas-Light Co., 8 Allen, 169; Bartlett sumers' Co., 2 Fost. & Fin. 437. V. Boston Gas-Light Co., 122 Mass. 209. ' Butcher v. Providence Gas Co., 18 Alb. s Blenkiron v. Great Central Gas Con- L. J. 372. 110 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. in going into the cellar with a lighted candle.' Where a leak was produced in a service-pipe by the negligence of the tenant of the apartment, and the company, being notified of that fact, sent a workman to repair it, by whom an explosion was produced, injuring the daughter of the tenant, it was held, in a suit by the person injured, that the workman was the agent of the company, and not of the tenant; that the company was answerable for his incompetency or negligence, and liable for his gross negligence, even if the service was gratuitous ; and that the contrib- utory negligence of the tenant, if proved, was remote and immaterial.' If a person employed by a gas-light company to let on gas in the houses of its consumers has severed his connection with the company, of which fact the plaintiff has knowledge, but the company nevertheless permit him, at the request of consumers, to let on gas in their houses, and in letting on the gas in the plaintiff's house he leaves a pipe open, which causes an explosion, he will not be deemed the agent of the company, and the company will not be liable.' The measures of precaution to be taken by a gas-light company, in case of an unprecedented fire consuming a large portion of a city, underwent investigation in a recent case in Massachusetts, with the result that the company was exonerated from liability for the particular in- jury. If any rule could be extracted from the case, it would be that a gas-light company in such a situation would not be justified in shutting off its supply of gas from those portions of the city not within the limits of the conflagration; nor would the fact that it continued to manufacture gas, knowing that it was constantly escaping, with frequent explosions, throughout the burnt district, be of itself evi- dence of negligence. It must be shown that it might, by the exercise of the degree of care required by so great an emergency, and not rendered impracticable by a situation so peculiar, have cut off the flow of gas within the limits of the confla- gration, while fulfilling its duty of keeping the other portions of the city lighted.* The negligence of the occupant of a building in igniting gas which has escaped in a cellar, will, on familiar grounds, bar a recovery of damages from the company.* If the occupant of a building, knowing that the gas has been for some time escaping, sends his servants into the cellar with a light, whereby an explosion is produced, this will be evidence of contributory negligence sufficient to support the finding of a referee (or the verdict of a jury, if the case were tried by jury) in favor of the defendant, though it would not warrant a judge in directing a nonsuit.^ The negli- gence or recklessness of the tenant of the building in entering with a light a cellar in which gas is escaping is a question for the jury, under proper instructions, and the manner of directing them on this point is well illustrated by a recent case in Massa- chusetts.^ The negligence of the tenant, in such a case, is imputable to the landlord, and will bar a recovery by him for damages to the building.^ So, the negligence of the father of a child in failing to notify the company of the leak, or in not withdraw- ing his child from the effects of the escaping gas by removing it out of the building, or otherwise, will be imputed to the child, and will bar a recovery of damages by it, •Burrows v. March Gas and Coke Co., * Hutchinson*. Boston Gas-Light Co., 122 L. B. 5 Exch. 67 ; 39 L. J. (Exch.) 33 (affirmed Mass. 219. on appeal, 41 L. J. (Exch.) 46; L. K. 7 Exch. ' Lanigan v. New York Gas-Light Co., 71 96; 20 Week. Eep. 493; 26 L. T. (N. 8.) N. T. 29; Holly t). Boston Gas-Light Co., 8 318). Gray, 123. 2 Lannen v. Albany Gas-Light Co., 44 N. ' Bartlett v. Boston Gas-Light Co., 117 Y. 459 (affirming 46 Barb. 264) . Mass. B33 ; 122 Mass. 209. 3 Flint V. Gloucester Gas-Light Co., 3 Al- len, 343; 9 Allen, 552. LIABILITY OF GAS-LIGHT COMPANIES. Ill Escape of illuminating Gas. althougli the company may have been negligent.' If, through the negligence of a gas-light company, gas from their pipes is permitted to escape into a sewer and drain, and, in its course through such sewer and drain, takes up other gases which are nox- ious, and carries them into an adjacent house, the company must answer in damages for sickness to the inmates, caused thereby ; for the negligence of the gas company is deemed as much the proximate cause of the injury as though their own gas had occa- sioned it. "It would be like that of a mill-owner who should negligently suffer his dam to give way, whereby the meadow of his neighbor below him is overflowed. If the flood should, in its course, take up stones and gravel, and carry them upon the meadow, the mill-owner would be liable as well for the damage caused by the stones and gravel as for the damage caused by the water, on the ground that the whole injury was the proximate cause of his fault." ^ Some interesting questions of evidence have arisen in actions against gas-light com- panies for injuries caused by escaping gas. Where an inmate of a house sued a gas- light company for injuries caused by inhaling gas which had escaped into the house, it was held competent to prove that the occupant and his family had been in perfect health up to the time when the gas began to escape into the house, and that imme- diately afterwards every member of the family became seriously ill.' But evidence of the particulars of the sickness of these persons was not admitted; for their sick- ness was deemed a collateral fact, evidence of which was admitted for the purpose of showing the nature of the gas which came into the house aflTecting all the inmates alike.* But evidence that the inmates of another house were made sick in conse- quence of inhaling the gas that escaped into their house from the same defect in the defendant's pipes has been held to be inadmissible.* In such an action, the plaintiff may show, in connection with evidence tending to show that the gas company did not, after notice, use diligence in finding and stopping the leak, to what extent the gas escaped into the street. It was also held competent for the plaintiff to show that gas escaped into the same sewer from which it penetrated the plaintiff's house, into other houses at points beyond, if the company had notice of the existence of the gas in such houses, but not otherwise. These inquiries were deemed material upon the question of the diligence employed by the company after discovering the leak.* But it was not error to refuse to allow evidence of the escape of gas into other houses at the time alleged, before it had been shown that gas escaped into the plaintiff's house.^ Upon the question whether the company had used due diligence in finding and stop- ping the leak, it was competent to prove, by a person who had had experience in digging holes through frozen earth, how long and how much labor it would take to dig such holes as were made by the defendant in searching for the leak.' In such an action, the defendants may show that the plaintiff made no claim on them for dam- ages for more than two years after the injury complained of; but they may not show that the plaintiff, while sick in bed, in conversation about his sickness, did not then ascribe it to the effects of gas, and said nothing as to the cause of it. So, in such 1 Holly V. Boston Gas-Light Co., 8 Gray, * Hunt (George L.) v. Lowell Gas-Light 123. Co.,8 Allen, 171. 2 Hunt (George L.) v. Lowell Gas-Light * Emerson v. Lowell Gas-Light Co., 3 Co., 8 Allen, 169. Allen, 410. 3 Hunt (George L.) v. Lowell Gas-Light " Emerson v. Lowell Gas-Light Co., 6 Co., 8 Allen, 171; Hunt (Aaron) u. Lowell Allen, U6. Gas-Light Co., 1 Allen, 343. ' Emerson v. Lowell Gas-Light Co., 3 Allen, 410. 112 GKOUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. an action, if it is established that the inhalation of gas is noxious to health, the belief of the defendants' agent upon the subject is unimportant, for the purpose of affecting the question of the care and diligence which it was the defendants' duty to exercise, in order to guard against its deleterious effects. But it is not admissible, in such an action, for the plaintiff, in order to prove due care on his part, to show that the defendants' agent advised the occupants of a neighboring house, into which gas had escaped from the same leak, what to do to avoid ill consequences from it, and that he did the same things so advised, if such agent gave directions to the plaintiff respect- ing the matter.^ In such an action, a physician who has been in practice for several years, but who has had no experience as to the effects upon the health of breathing illuminating gas, is not competent to testify in relation thereto as an expert. Nor does the fact that he witnessed the effects, upon other persons, of gas alleged to have come from the same leak, qualify him as such a witness.* In such an action, the company may show, upon the question whether it used due diligence in repairing the leak after complaint made, its system and course of business in regard to com- plaints of leaks generally.' It may, for this purpose, introduce its printed regula- tions, and, where these are ambiguous, explain them by parol.' ^ 12. Liability for Damages caused by the Explosion of Steam-Boilera. — The cases of Losee v. Buchanan * and Marshall v. Welwood,^ where the same con- clusion was reached upon similar facts, undoubtedly proceed upon the true ground. Steam has come into such general use as a motive power, not only in the operations of commerce and manufactures, but even in those of agriculture, that a rule of law making those who employ it insurers of the safety of others against damages arising from its use would not only be contrary to the analogies of the law, but would impose serious restraints upon the most necessary and beneficial industries. Both the pro- prietor of machinery propelled by steam, and the engineer in charge of such machinery, have the strongest motives for watching over its safety. The property of the one and the life of the other depend upon constant vigilance in this regard. These motives will, ordinarily, secure that degree of skill and attention which the safety of the public demands, without the aid of a rule making the proprietor liable, in any event, for damages resulting from an explosion. The Supreme Court of Penn- sylvania, in a case earlier than either of the above, put the liability of the proprietors of a steam mill, for damages caused to a customer by the bursting of its boiler, upon the true ground, — want of ordinary care and skill in its management Whether they had been negligent in using it, was made to turn on the question whether they had notice of its insufficiency, or, what was the same thing, whether the circumstances were such that they were bound to know it ; and it was ruled, with obvious propriety under the circumstances, that they could not shelter themselves from responsibility under the plea that they were unacquainted with such machinery ; that they applied to a competent and good machinist for the machine, paid him a sound price for it, and that he represented it as sufficient ; "if they chose to make his opinion the rule of their conduct, in opposition to the evidence of their own senses, they had no right to visit the consequences of their folly upon their customers." ' An early English case 1 Emerson v, Lowell Gas-Light Co., 3 < Bartlett v. Boston Gas-Light Co., 117 AUen, 410. Mass. 533. 2 Emerson v. Lowell Gas-Light Co., 6 ^ 51 N.Y. 476; 61 Barb. 86; 42 How. Pr. 385; Allen, 146. ante, p. 47. 3 HoUy V. Boston Gas-Light Co., 8 Gray, ^ 38 N. J. L. 339. 123. ' Spencer v. Campbell, 9 Watts & S. 32. INJURIES FROM EXPLOSION OF STEAM-BOILERS. 113 Injuries from blasting Kocks. proceeds on the same ground. A steam-boiler and engine had been newly set up in » building of a sugar-refinery, upon which the defendant and his servants (not the owners of the worlts) were experimenting, with a view to perfect a process for refining £Ugar. While the boiler was thus under the management of the defendant and his servants, owing to some mismanagement of the latter, and to some defect in the materials of which it was composed, it exploded, tearing down an adjacent building. It was held that the owner of this building might recover damages; that the action was properly brought against the person in charge of the boiler at the time of the explosion, and that it was not necessary to bring it against the owner of the building in which the boiler was.' A statute (since repealed) of the United States, "to provide for the better security of passengers on board vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam," recited that "in all suits or actions against the pro- prietors of steamboats, for injuries arising to person or property from the bursting of the boiler of any steamboat, * * * the fact of such bursting * * * shall be taken as full ^Wmi /aci5 evidence sufficient to charge the defendant, or those in his employment, with negligence, until he shall show that no negligence has been com- mitted by him, or those in his employment." ' This statute was construed as em- bracing injuries to a deck-hand on board the boat whose boiler exploded,' and also injuries to a passenger on another boat.* But, independently of this statute, the Supreme Court of Minnesota expressed the view that the fact that the boiler of a steamboat exploded is of itself evidence of negligence suflScient to charge the owner of such boat with responsibility on the ground of negligence. It is said to be a caie where the fact of the accident itself implies culpability, which the defendant must excuse, or pay damages.' J 13. Liability for Damages caused by blasting Rocks. — KecoUecting that " ordinary care " is a relative term, exacting that a person shall take for the safety of others whatever precautions the nature of his employment suggests, we find that it has been held that the fact that a corporation blasting rocks on its own land, in a quarry forty feet below the surface of the ground, with sand-blasts, — which are not ordinarily dangerous, — failed to warn persons passing by over its land that a blast was about to be fired, was evidence of negligence to go to a jury ; and that the fact that the person injured received the injury from the blast while passing along a footpath over the defendant's land, as he for years had been accustomed to do, was not evidence of contributory negligence sufficient to warrant a nonsuit.* Upon the question whether due care was used by the persons setting and firing the blast, it has been held, apparently in conformity with the maxim Mes ipsa loquitur, that the fact that the plaintiff's house was injured by the firing of the blast, in the absence of contrary proof, created the presumption that the blast was not properly 1 Wittc V. Hagne, 2 Dow. & Ey. 33. death of th« plaintiff's child, caused by the « 6 U. S. Stat, at Large, 304, chap. 191, § IS. employees of the defendant Wasting rocks » McMahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn. 357. in a street of the city. A charge from the < Fay V. Davidson, 13 Minn. 623, 537. blast threw a rock through a window of the ^ Ibid. Compare Carpue ». London, etc., plaintiff 's house, killing the child. Ajudg- R. Co., 6 Q. B. 747; Holbrook v. Utica, etc., ment for the plaintiff was recovered, but on E. Co., 12 N. Y. 236 ; Curtis v. Rochester, etc., grounds not touching the merits. A second E. Co., 18 N. T. 534. judgment, for the defendant, was recovered, Driscoll V. Newark, etc., Co., 37 N. T. 637. on the ground that the blasting was done by The case of Pack v. New York, 3 N. Y. 489, an independent contractor, and that the city was au action against New York City for the was therefore not Uable. 8 N. Y. 222. 114 GROUNDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. Notes. covered.' But if the resulting injury is to the freehold or possession of another, it has been seen that the question of negligence does not arise. A man may claim an immunity from such invasions of his right of property or possession, irrespective of the question whether the person making such invasion was in the exercise of ordinary care or not.^ But it does not follow from this that an owner of land, e.g., a railway company, will be liable for injuries to another's freehold or possession by blasting done on his land by an independent contractor ; the act is not a nuisance in the sense which makes the proprietor of the premises on which it is committed liable for its consequences.' It has been held by some of the New England courts that injuries to adjacent houses, and other real property, caused by a railway com- pany in blasting rocks, in the necessary work of constructing its road, fall within the- category of lawful acts authorized by its charter, and are not to be deemed wrongful acts for which an action will lie as for a tort; but that the damages thereby occa- sioned are to be assessed by commissioners, under the statute providing for the assess- ment of damages caused by the taking and damaging of property in the making and) maintaining of such roads.* But this does not include those damages which are not necessarily jjicident to the doing of the act thus authorized and made lawful. Thus, if such a company, in so blasting rocks, scatters loose stones upon the land of an adjacent proprietor, it owes him the duty of removing them. A jury, in assessing his land-damages upon the laying out of the road, may well anticipate that the com- pany will perform this duty, and hence may not include damages for its non-perform- ance in their award ; and it has been held that they cannot so include them.' It is rea- sonable, therefore, that a failure to perform this duty is to be ascribed to the class of negligent or otherwise wrongful acts which are to be redressed by actions of tort ; and it has been so held.^ Evidence that the defendant superintended the blasting, and gave orders concerning it, has been held sufficient, pnmd facie, to sustain a judg- ment for damages against him, without proof respecting the contract or capacity under or in which he acted.' A written notice given by the owner of an adjacent lot to the- I plaintiff, of an intention to blast rock thereon, was held primd facie evidence to charge the sender of such notice with liability for an injury to the plaintiff's posses- sion subsequently caused by rocks being bitted thereon, so as to cast upon him the burden of showing that the mischief was the work of others, for whom he was not responsible, if such were the fact' Where a house is injured from such a cause, the action may be brought either by the owner or the tenant, — the former for the injury to his property,' the latter for the injury to his possession.' The courts of New York have lately emphasized the doctrine that every person, while violating an express statute, is, ex necessitate, negligent in the eye of the law; and that every innocent person who is injured by such an act is entitled to a civil remedy there- for, notwithstanding the fact that the act may be the subject of a criminal prose- ' XJlrich D. MoCalie, 1 Hilt. 251. Me. 208; SaWn ». Vermont, etc., E. Co., 25- « Hay V. Oohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159 (affirming Vt. 363. «. t., 3 Barb. 42, ante, p. 72; Tremain v. Co- ' Whitehouse v. Androscoggin E. Co., 62 hoes Co., 2 N. Y. 163, ante, p. 76; Scott v. Me. 208. Bay, 3 Mo. 431 ; Gourdier v. Cormack, 2 E. D. « Sabin v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 25 Vt. 363. Smitli, 200. ' Hardrop v. Gall.igher, 2 E. D. Smith, 623. 3 McCafferty v. Spnjten Duyvil, etc., R, ' Gourdier v. Cormaclc, 2 E. D. Smitli, 200. Co., 61 N. Y. 178 (N. Y. Com. of Appeals, Compare Brown v. Lent, 20 Vt. 629. Dwight, C, dissenting). » Gourdier v. Cormaclt, 2 E. D. Smith, 200 J * Dodge ti. County Commissioners, 3 Mete. Hardrop v. Gallagher, 2 E. D. Smith, 523. 3S0; ■\Vliilohouse v. Androscoggin R. Co., 52 SPREADINa CONTAGIOUS DISEASES. 115 Infecting through illicit sexual Intercourse. cutiou.i As we shall have occasion to see in another part of this work, this rule, properly understood, makes the violator of law liahle only for those injuries which are the natural and probable consequences of the unlawful act in which he is engaged* and not for an injury which may happen at the time of, and yet be collateral to, the unlawful act. Applying this doctrine, the New York Court of Common Pleas has held that if a person engaged in blasting rocks fails to take such precautions against accidents as are required by the city ordinances, this will be primd facie evidence of negligence sufficient to sustain an action by one injured by a blast thus made.' J 14. Iiiability for Damages caused by spreading contagious Diseases. — A landlord who lets premises, knowing that they are infected with a contagious disease, without notifying the lessee, is liable to the latter, in case the disease is com- municated to him, for the damages thereby sustained.' In a recent case in the Supreme Court ef New York, ably reasoned by Bockes, J., the defendant, a physi- cian, attended a woman who died of small-pox, and subsequently employed the plaintiff to whitewash the house in which the death occurred. The plaintiff, who knew the woman had died of the small-pox, entered and whitewashed the house, relying upon the assurances of the defendant that the house had been thoroughly dis- infected, and that he would be entirely safe in so doing ; but plaintiff having con- tracted the disease in the house, he subsequently brought an action to recover the damages sustained thereby. It was held, that the relation between the parties was that of master and servant ; and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in case the jury should find, on all the facts, that the plaintiff did not act rashly and inexcusably in entering the house under the employment; and further, that the defendant had not acted towards the plaintiff with due care and prudence.* In an English case at Nisi Frius a man was convicted upon an indictment for an indecent assault upon his niece, a girl thirteen years of age, who had voluntarily occupied the same bed with him. He had given her liquor before going to bed, and had infected her with a venereal disease. The conviction was put upon the ground that he had concealed from her the fact that he was so infected, and that the fraud vitiates consent^ An attempt was lately made in the Irish High Court of Justice to invoke the same principle in a civil action by a female plaintiff, who, having con- sented to sexual intercourse with the defendant, he concealing from her the fact that he was venereally diseased, had been by him infected with such a disease. It was held, that, since the Injury complained of arose from a wilful act of immorality on her part, she could not recover damages on account of it.' 1 Jetter v. New York, etc , R. Co., 2 Abb. * Span v. Ely, 8 Hun, 256. App. Dec. 458 ; s.c.,2 Keyes, 154 ; Beisegel v. ' Eegina v. Bennett, 4 Fost. & Fin. 1105. New York, etc., H. Co., 14 Abb. Pr. (N. 6.) « Hegarty v. Shine, 7 Cent. L. J. 291. This 29 (overraling, on his point, Brown v. Buf- decision was afterwards affirmed, upon thor- falo, etc., R. Co., 22 N. Y. 191). ough argument, in the Irish Court of Ap- " Devlin v. Gallagher, 6 Daly, 494. peals, December, 1878. See 8 Cent. L. J. 111. • Cesar v. Karutz, 60 N. Y. 229. CHAPTEE II. LIABILITY FOE DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. LsADiifa Cases : 1. Dean v. McCariy. — Liability of one wio sets out fires on his own land whioli extend to those of his neighbor. 2. Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Company. — Liability of rail- way companies for damage caused by fires communicated by their locomotives. 3. Fenty. Toledo, etc., Railway Company. — The same subject. Bemoteness of the damages Where fires are communicated from one house or field to another. NoTBS : I 1. The common-law liability for causing fires. 2. This onerous rule limited. 3. The rule in America. 4. The use of fire in clearing land. 5. The subject of negligence in this jrespect illustrated. 6. The statutory liability in North Carolina, Missouri, Iowa, and Connecticut. 7. The use of fire for mechanical or manufacturing purposes. 8. The use of fire by railroads. (1.) The general principles stated. (2.) The degree of care required. (3.) Pire from locomotives as evidence of negligence. (4.) Duty in construction of engine. (5.) Duty in management of engine. (6.) Evidence of negligence. (7.) Evidence of other and distinct fires. (8.) The duty of a railroad as to its right of way. (9.) Contributory negligence. (10.) Proximate and remote cause. (11.) The statutory liability. 1. tj ability op one who sets out fires on his own land which extend to those oe his neighbor. Dean v. McCartt.* Court of Queen's Bench of Upper Canada, 1846, Eon. John Bevbklet Robinson, Chief Justice. " Jambs Buchanan Macatjlat, " " Jonas Jones, « Akchibald McLean, [ •^"'^J"- " Chkistopheb a. Hagerman, (U6) * Beported 2 Upper Canada Q. B. 448. USE OF FIRE IN CLEARING LAND. 117 Court of Queen's Bench of Upper Canada — Opinion of Kobinson, C. J. A person kindling Are on his own land, for the purpose of clearing it, is not liable, at all risks, for any injurious oonsequenees that may ensue to the property of Ms neighbors. This was an action on the case for negligently keeping flre which the defendant had kindled on his own field in order to clear his land, by reason whereof it spread to the adjoining land of the plaintiff, and destroyed his wood, fences, etc. Plea, general issue. It was proved at the trial, which took place at Coburg, before Mr. Justice McLean, that the defendant was clearing his land, and had set flre to his log- heaps at a favorable time ; but, a high wind springing up, the flre unfortunately spread, running through the grass, notwithstanding such efforts as could be used to stop it, and some cord-wood and rails belonging to the plaintiff were destroyed. The plaintiff's witnesses acquitted the defendant of blame, and the case was left to the jury upon the question of fact : whether the defendant had or had not acted with due care and caution in setting the flre as he did, under the cir- cumstances; and whether he did all in his power to prevent injury to his neighbors. The jury found for the defendant. J. Hillyard Cameron moved, last term, for a rule «isi for a new trial, for misdirection ; contending that the act of the defendant was of such a nature as made him responsible for the consequences, as it might have been prevented, and that he was bound to protect his neighbor's property from any injurious consequences from the flre which he had kindled for purposes which were beneflcial to himself.^ Robinson, C. J. — In a case in this court, some years ago, of Boulton V. Cooper, of the same description as the present, we considered that the liability of the defendant must, in such cases, turn upon the act of negli- gence. And I recollect that at least in one other case, tried also, I believe, at Coburg, some years ago, the question of liability was held to turn upon the same point. I am not sure that in that case the verdict was reviewed in banc. There had been, however, many years before that, a case, in which Spelraan was defendant, tried in the same district, in which the verdict was reviewed in banc; and, according to my recol- lection, it was assumed there that the question to be considered was, whether the defendant had used all due care in setting flre to his clear- ing and in guarding against accident. If, however, there is really any room for doubt upon the legal question whether the party setting fire upon his own premises, in order to clear his land, is or is not liable for all the consequences to his neighbor, without regard to circum- stances, then certainly we should allow full opportunity to discuss that 1 He cited Turbervil v. Stamp, 12 Modern, 153 ; Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N. C. 476. 118 LIABILITY FOB DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Dean v. McCarty. question ; for, In a country like this, it is of very great importance that the rights and liabilities of parties, in this particular, should be known, and we should be unwilling to abide by one or more decisions of the court upon such a question, if we could be convinced that they were in opposition to well-settled principles of law. It is sought here to hold the defendant liable upon a rigorous and indiscriminating application of what is undoubtedly a legal maxim. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non Icedas. But this maxim is rather to be applied to those cases in which a man, not under the pressure of any necessity, deliberately, and in view of the consequences, seeks an advantage to himself at the expense of a certain injury to his neighbor; as, for instance, in the use he makes of a stream of water passing through his land, which he is at liberty to apply to his own purposes, but he must not so use it as to diminish the value of the stream to his neighbor unless he has a prescriptive right. But when we come to apply the maxim to the acts of parties on other occasions, where accident has part in producing the injury, we must see that a great part of the busi- ness of life could not be carried on under the risks to which parties would then be exposed. For instance, a man has a right to drive his carriage along the highway, and it may be granted that he must in one sense exercise his right so as not to injure others, — that is, he must not intentionally injure others, nor injure them by his neglect; but if we were to hold that he must at all events take care, at his peril, that he do them no injury, then, if his horses should be frightened by a flash of lightning, and become ungovernable, he must answer, civilly at least, for all the damages they may commit, though it might be to his rnin. So, again, a ship might be riding at anchor with others, well secured, and carefully attended to by a competent crew ; and yet, if by the violence of a tempest she should be driven from her anchorage against another ship, and occasion her loss and injury, it could not be held that the owners were liable, on the principle that they must at their peril so use their own ship as not to injure others. In these cases, the taking the horse into the highway and the bringing the ship to an anchor are as much the voluntary acts of the party as the kindling the fire was, in the case before us ; but it is indispensable that allowance should be made for the necessity people are under for doing such acts, and that misfortune and neglect should not be confounded. We cannot go so far as to hold that, in all such cases, -whether an act has been imprudent or not must be taken to be proved by the result alone; though we cannot but feel that cases of great hardship may arise, and in which the inclination of a court might generally be to throw USE OP FIEE IN CLEARING LAND. 119 Court of Queen's Bench of Tipper Canada — Opinion of Eobinson, C. J. the loss upon the party kindling the fire, even when there might appear no clear ground for ascribing a want of due caution to him. For ■example, a man may have a very valuable mill, and a neighbor having a small piece of wood adjoining to it, of trifling value compared to the mill, in the process of clearing sets fire, which, unfortunately, by a sudden rise or change of wind, spreads so as to consume the mill, in spite of all the exertion that can be used. It may be said, here is a case in which one of two innocent men must bear a serious loss, and that the misfortune would more properlj' fall upon the one who was a voluntary agent in setting the cause of the injury in motion, than upon him who had no share whatever in producing it. And we might perhaps be right in l)elieving that it would have been possible for the party clearing the land to have done it at such a time, and in such a manner, as would certainly have prevented the accident occurring. Still, I apprehend that such a ■case must go to the jury, like all other cases of the kind, upon the ■question of negligence. If the principle is a sound one, it must be applied throughout; though indeed it might seem reasonable, where very valuable property might be endangered, to apply an extraordinary degree of caution and diligence ; but that consideration would only affect the determination of the jury upon the fact of what was reason- able care under the circumstances. We must consider, on the other hand, in examining the soundness of what we assume to be the prin- ciple, v?hat would be the state of things if the person kindling the fire were to be inevitably and in all cases liable for the consequences. It is not very long since this country was altogether a wilderness, as by far the greater part still is. Till the land is cleared, it can produce nothing, and the burning of the wood upon the ground is a necessary part of the •operation of clearing. To hold that what is so indispensable, not merely to individual interests, but to the public good, must be done wholly at the risk of the party doing it, without allowance for any casualties which the act of God may occasion, and which no human care could ■certainly prevent, would be to depart from a principle which, in other business of mankind, is plainly settled and always upheld. If it could be shown that this business of clearing land could, by means which we can suppose to be within the reach of those employed in it, be done at a time, or in a manner, that would make it wholly independent of any accident beyond the control of the party, then perhaps the here fact of not having taken those certain means might be held to consti- tute negligence ; in which case, the liability for damages would always, as a matter of course, follow the injury. Bat as we cannot, I think, venture to hold that there are any certain means of avoiding such acci^ 120 LIABILITY POK DAMAGES CAUSED BT FIRE. Dean v. McCarty. dents, it must, in such case, be a question of fact for the jury whether the defendant has any negligence to answer for or not. In Comyns's ZJtgresf,! the law is thus laid down: "So, an action upon the case lies upon the general custom of the nation (in other words, by the common law), against the master of a house, if a fire be kindled there and con- sume the house or goods of another." "So, if a fire be kindled in a yard or close to a barn or stable, and by negligence it burns corn, etc., in an adjoining close." As to the first part of what is here said, applying to accidental fires in houses, we know that the law has, by act of Parliament, been placed on a different footing,^ and that it has been thought reasonable to exempt persons from answering in damages for injuries occasioned to others in such cases, even where there has been a want of due care. But as to the latter part of the doctrine laid down, but which applies to the ease of a fii-e spreading which has been kindled in a field to burn stubble, I do not feel that the law is anywhere denied to be such as Chief Baron Comtns assumes it to be. It has not, in this respect, been altered by statute, nor does it seem to have been, in more modern authorities, laid down differently ; neither has it been made a question whether this principle, thus laid down, had been carefully con- sidered and correctly stated. We see, then, that it is when by negli- gence the fire spreads to an adjoining close that an action lies. And the same very learned author adds: " So, it lies not if it appears that afire lighted for the burning of stubble, etc., by a sudden wind, or other inevitable accident, without the fault of the defendant, or his servants, burns the cora of another." Though there are many other cases which would supply reasoning from analogy in support of the principle thus laid down, yet the single case relied upon by the Chief Bakon is that of Turbervil v. Stamp, reported by himself,^ Lord Ray- mond, Salkeld, Holt, and in several other reports.* And this case is certainly expressly to the point, and warrants the doctrine laid down ; and, unless it can be shown to have been overruled, it must govern in this case. It is reported in 12 Modern, 152, in a clear and concise man- ner, and stripped of any thing extraneous to the main point which is the question here. On that account, only, I refer to the case as it is there given; for, if the report differed materiall}'^ in its effect from the account of the case given by the other reporters, we should doubtless feel more safe in relying upon some of them. The action was upon the ' Tit. "Action upon the Case for Negli- * 1 Salk. 13; 2 Salk. 726; Comb. 459; Skin, gence," A, 6. 681; Carth. 425; 12 Modern, 162; 1 Ld. Eaym. = 6 Anne, c. 31 ; 14 Geo. III., c. 78, §§ 85, 86. 264. s Com. 32. USE OF FIRE IN CLEAEINa LAND. 121 Court of Queen's Bench of Upper Canada — Opinion of Eobinson, C. J. case for negligently keeping defendant's fire, and the declaration charged that defendant so carelessly kept the fire in his close that it burnt the plaintiff 's heath in his field. After verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved, in arrest of judgment, that the action would only lie on the special circumstances of the case for actual negligence, whereas here it was grounded on a supposed general custom of the nation ; and, as I understand the case, the objection intended to be urged was that the plaintiff, by so stating his grievances, relied upon the custom of the nation as supplying the presumption of negligence, in such cases, from the mere occurrence of the accident, and when there might, in fact, have been no negligence ; in short, that it placed the' defendant on the same footing, in that respect, as a common carrier. Tueton, J., observed: "There is a difference between fire in a man's house and in the field ; in some counties it is a necessary part of husbandry to make fire in the ground, and some unavoidable accident may carry it into a neighbor's ground and do injury there ; and this fire not being so properly in his custody as the fire in his house, I think this is not actionable as it is laid." But by Holt, C. J., and the other judges: "Every man must so use his own as not to injure another. The law is general ; the fire which a man makes in his fields is as much his fire as the fire in his house ; it is made on his grounds, with his materials, and by his order, and he must at his peril take care that it does not through his neglect injure his neighbor ; if he kindle it at a proper time and place, and the violence of the wind carry it into his neighbor's ground, and prejudice him, this is fit to be given in evidence. But now here, it is found to have been by his negligence, and it is the same as if it had been in his house." It was after verdict, and negligence was charged in the declaration; and therefore they held they could not arrest the judgment. This contains all the doctrine under consid- eration. "We cannot distinguish the case from the one before us. The court did not then hold that the person lighting the fire must take care at all events that it does not injure his neighbor, but that he must take care that it shall not do so "through his neglect." And this doctrine, and the authority of this case, was most fully recognized in the recent case of Vaughan v. Menlove.'^ What would be neglect, and what not, under the circumstances of each case, may sometimes give rise to nice questions, some of which may be considered not to rest wholly with the jury^ — such as the necessity and suflSciency of notice to the parties whose lands adjoin, of the intention to set fire. But, in this case, the objection taken is the broad one that the defendants must be liable at all events, — 1 3 Bing. N. C. 476. 122 LIABILITY FOE DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Vaaghan v. The Taff Vale Eailway Company. a doctrine which cannot, in our opinion, be maintained. The verdict is not moved against as being against the weight of evidence ; and if it were, we should require a strong case, when the verdict is for the defendant, to grant a second trial in such an action. We ought not, indeed, do it unless we were clearly of opinion that the jury, upon the evidence before them, ought to have found a verdict for the other party. Bule refused. 2. LIABILITY OF'KATLWAT COMPANIES FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY FIRES COMMUNICATED BY THEIE LOCOMOTIVES. Vaughan V. The Taff Vale Railway Compa]st.* Oase in Judgment. — A wood adjoining the defendants' railroad was set on fire and de- stroyed by sparks from tlieir locomotives. On several previous occasions it Iiad been set on fire, and the company had paid for the damage. It appeared that the defendants had done every thing practicable to render the locomotives safe; but it was admitted that, notwithstanding all possible precaution, they would occasionally emit sparks. Beld, by the Court of Exchequer, (1) that the defendants were liable ; (2) that it was no defence that the plaintiff had allowed his wood to become peculiarly liable to take fire by neglect- ing to clear away combustible matter thereon. On appeal to the Court of Exchequer Chamber: Seld (reversing the Court of Exchequer on the first point), that a railway company authorized by the legislature to use locomotive engines is not responsible for damage from fire occasioned by sparks emitted therefrom, provided it has taken every precaution in its power, and adopted every means which science can suggest to prevent injury from fire, and is not guilty of negligence in the management of the engine. The first count stated that the plaintiff was possessed of a wood near to a railway used by the defendants for the purpose of propelling along the same divers locomotives and steam-engines containing fire and igneous matter ; that the defendants, by their servants, so negligently and improperly managed a certain locomotive or steam-engine which was then being by them propelled along the said railway near to the said wood, and the fire and igneous matter therein, and so negligently con- ducted themselves in and about providing and managing the proper means for retaining the fire and igneous matter in the said locomotive, whilst the same was being propelled along the railway, that by such negligence and improper management divers sparks of fire and igneous matter escaped and flew out of the said locomotive and settled in the said wood, and the land adjoining thereto, of the plaintiff ; and by means thereof the said wood became and was ignited, and eight acres of the trees were consumed, etc. Second count: That the plaintiff was possessed as in the first count * In the English Court of Exchequer, 1858, reported 3 Hurl. & N. 742; in the Exchequer Chamber, 1860, 5 Hurl. & N. 678. FIRES COMMUNICATED BY RAILWAY LOCOMOTIVES. 123 Statement of the Case, mentioned, and the defendants were possessed of a certain bank which separated the railway from the wood, upon which bank, grass, herbage, and other combustible matters were growing, and upon which bank, from time to time, fell and settled, as the defendants well knew, large quantities of red-hot ashes and cinders, which, from time to time, escaped and flew from and out of the said locomotives, in the course of the same being propelled along the railway by the defendants and their servants; and there was, by reason thereof, at the times when such locomotives were being propelled along the railway, and by and near the said bank, as the defendants well knew, great danger that the grass, herbage, and combustible matters upon the said bank would be ignited, and that a fire would be thereby occasioned which would be in great danger of extending to the plaintiff's wood and setting Are to the same, unless the said bank were kept in such a state and condition that the grass, etc., on the same should not be liable to be ignited by the means aforesaid, or unless due and reasonable precautions were taken by the defendants to prevent any fire upon the bank, occasioned by the means aforesaid, extending to the wood ; and thereupon it became the duty of the defendants, when locomotives were being propelled along the rail- way, and near the said bank and wood, to preserve and keep the bank in such a state and condition that fire should not be occasioned by reason of the ashes, etc., falling and settling thereon from and out of the locomotives, and to take all necessary precautions to prevent any fire which might be occasioned from extending to and burning the wood of the plaintiff. That at the time of the grievances, the defendants, by their servants, were propelling locomotives containing hot ashes, along the railway near to the said bank and wood ; that a quantity of red-hot ashes escaped out of the locomotives, and fell on the bank ; that the defendants so negligently and improperly kept the bank, and suffered the same to be in such^a bad and improper state, that in con- sequence thereof the grass, herbage, and combustible matters on the bank caught fire ; and by reason of the defendants not having taken any due or reasonable precaution to prevent the said fire, or any fire that might be occasioned as aforesaid, from extending from the said bank to the plaintiff's wood, but having negligently and improperly omitted to do so, the said fire, so occasioned as aforesaid, did extend to the plaintiff's wood, and burnt eight acres thereof, etc. Plea : Not guilty. At the trial before Bkamwbix, B., at the Glamorganshire Spring Assizes, it appeared that the action was brought to recover damages for the burning of a wood on the Aberdare Branch of the Taff Vale Rail- 124 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIEE. Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Kailway Company. way. When the fire was discovered, at noon on the 14th of March, 1856, several trains had recently passed. The bank, which consisted of peat, was burning. There were traces of fire from the bank to the wood, and the long grass on the bank was burnt. In the plaintiff's wood there was a great quantity of dry grass, of a highly inflammable nature. The wood had frequently been set on fire by sparks from the locomotives, and on four occasions the defendants had paid for the damage. In 1853, the plaintiff wrote to the secretary of the company: "No fire was known, in the memory of man, in the wood, before the Aberdare Railway was made. Since it has been made, four or five times the wood has been ignited. Any one looking at it can easily satisfy himself that in a dry season the wood is in just about as safe a state as a barrel of gunpowder at Cyfartha RoUing-Miil." The plaintiff had taken no steps to clear away the accumulation of dry grass and fallen branches in the wood. The defendants gave evidence to show that they had taken every precaution in their power to prevent the engines from emitting sparks, which they could take consistently with the working of the line. On these facts, the defendants' counsel submitted that there was no negligence on the part of the company ; but the learned judge told the jury that he should be prepared to decide that the defendants were liable ; and he directed them that if, to serve his own purposes, a man does a dangerous thing, whether he take precautions or not, and mis- chief ensues, he must bear the consequences ; that running engines which cast forth sparks is a thing intrinsically dangerous ; and that if a railway engine is used, which, in spite of the utmost care and skill on the part of the company and their servants, is dangerous, the owners must pay for any damage occasioned thereby. His lordship pointed out to them that by keeping the grass on the banks of the railway close cut, or by having the banks formed of gravel or sand, so as to make a non-inflammable belt, all danger might be avoided ; and he asked them whether they did not think that there was inevitable negligence in the use of a dangerous thing, calculated to do and which did cause mis- chief. The plaintiff's counsel asked that a question should be left to the jury, whether the plaintiff had not been guilty of negligence in permitting the wood to be in a combustible state by not properly clear- ing it. The learned judge refused, saying that he thought that there was no duty on the part of the plaintiff to keep his wood in any par- ticular state. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. J. Evans, in Easter Term, had obtained a rule for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence, and that the learned jud^e FIRES COMMUNICATED BT RAILWAY LOCOMOTIVES. 125 In the Exchequer — Argument of Grove and G-iffard, for plaintiff. misdirected the jury in telling them that no care or skill used in pre- venting the escape of fire from the engine would be an answer to the charge of negligence, provided they did not succeed in preventing it ; and also in telling the jury that the conduct of the plaintiff in allowing his wood to be in such a combustible state was not material. Grove and Giffard showed cause. The position of the defendants is analogous to that of a person who keeps a dangerous animal, such as a tiger, with a knowledge of its propensities. Such a person is bound to secure it at his peril ; and if it does mischief, negligence is presumed. [Pollock, C. B. — In that case, the keeping of such an animal, after notice, is negligence. Here, however, the company are empowered to run locomotives on the line, which is an important distinction, i] In Gib- son V. The South-Eastern Railway,^ Matson, B., ruled that, in an action against a railway company for carelessly letting sparks fly from their engines so as to set fire to the herbage, it is not necessary to prove any specific act of negligence. That accords with the opinion of Martin, B., in Blyth v. The Birmingham Water-Works Company.^ In Oomyns's Digest^ it is said, "An action lies, upon the general custom of the realm, against the master of a house if a fire be kindled there and consume the goods of another." ^ In Tubervil v. Stamp,^ the court say of the fire in a man's field, " He must see it does no harm, and answer damage if it does. ' ' [Bramwbll, B. — The observation appears to be extra-judicial.] The question arose after verdict, on a declaration which stated that the defendant negligenter custodivit ignem suum in clauso 8U0. That allegation does not mean more than that the defendant did not keep his fire within his close. To put that sense on the decla- ration is to construe it in accordance with the ruling in Beaulieu v. Finglam,'' because, if the law is as there stated, the allegation of negli- gence is a mere form, as it is in an action on the case against a carrier. Filliter v. Phippard^ shows that the statute 14 Geo. III., c. 78, § 86, does not affect the liability of a person on whose estate a fire is pro- duced by negligence, or lighted intentionally. Nor, by parity of reasoning, does it apply where the fire is occasioned in consequence of the use of a dangerous instrument by the owner or his servants. [Pol- 1 Rex ». Pease, 4 Bam. &Adol. 30. • 1 Salk. 13; «. c, sub nom. TurbeiTil v. « 1 Fost. & Fin. 23. Stamp, 2 Salt. 726; Comyna, 32; Skin. 681; 8 11 Excli. 781. Garth. 425 ; 12 Modern, 152; 1 Ld. Eaym. 264; 4 Tit. "Action on the Case for Negll- Comb. 459. genoe," A, 6. '2 Hen. IV., fol. 18, pL 8, 6 Citing Beaulieu v. Finglam, 2 Hen. IV., « 11 Q. B. S47. toL 18, pi. 6. 126 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Kailway Company. LOCK, C. B., referred to 1 Blackstone' s Commentaries, 431; and Mab- TM, B., to Viscount Canterbury v. The Attorney-General.^J J. Evans and F. Lloyd, in support of the rule. — First : Assuming that sparks from the engine set fire to the wood, the ruling amounts to this, — that the railway company, having taken every precaution to pre- vent accidents, are to be made responsible if sparks from their engines set fire to crops on the adjacent lands. But the negligence which alone would have rendered the defendants liable was thus defined by AxDERSON, B., in Blyth v. The Birmingham Water -Works Company:^ "Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or, doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do." [Bramwell, B. — Suppose a person galloping through a public street to fetch a surgeon, in a case of emer- gency, rode against another ; that would be negligence for which the rider would be responsible, though perhaps unavoidable, and though he would be acting as a reasonable man would.] Piggot v. The East- ern Counties Railway,^ and Aldridge v. The Great Western Railway,* lead to the inference that, as precautions had been adopted by the company, reasonably sufficient to prevent accidents, they were not liable. Rex v. Pease ^ shows that the legislature must be taken to have contemplated the possibility that accidents would arise in consequence of the exercise of the powers conferred on railway companies. The case is not analogous to that of keeping a tiger, because there the wrongful act, if any, is in keeping the animal at all; here, in the use of an engine which the legislature has authorized the defendants to run on their line.* [Brajtwell, B. — In Mauley v. The St. Helens Railway and Canal Company,'' Pollock, C. B., said: "Though the legislature permits the company to do the various acts described in their statutes, they are to be considered as persons doing them for their own private advantage, and are therefore personally responsible if mischief arises from their not doing all they ought."] Secondly: Assuming the fire to have commenced on the defendants' banks, and from thence to have communicated to the plaintiff's wood, the defendants are not liable except for negligence. If there was no actual negligence in producing or keeping such fire, the case la within the 14 Geo. III., c 78, § 86.* 1 1 Phillips, 306, S15. » 4 Barn. & Adol. SO. ' 11 Bxch. 781. • 8 & 9 Vict., c. 20, § 86. 8 3 C. B. 229. ' 2 Hurl. & N. 840, 848. * S Man. Butterfleld v. Forrester, 11 East, 60 ; Marriot v. Stanley, 1 Man. & G. 568, 128 lilABILITT FOB DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIEB. Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Railway Company. their land and the plaintiff's, — as, for instance, a line of gravel or stone, — the mischief, in all probability, would not have happened ; and it may be taken that the case was put to the jury in the strongest way in favor of the plaintiff. Still, the question was left to them, and, unless a verdict ought to have been directed for the defendants, there is no misdirection. The first question, then, is, Was there evidence for the jury? And, as they may have found on either count, was there evidence in support of each ? Next, Was the evidence such as to warrant the strong opin- ion of the learned judge ? We are of opinion, on both these questions, in favor of the plaintiff. Here is, confessedly, the use of an instrument likely to produce damage, and producing it. This, according to general rules, would make the defendants liable. But two answers were sug- gested on their behalf. The first was, that, if the fire originated on their own land, they were protected by the 14 Geo. III., c. 78, § 84. But we are of opinion that the statute does not apply where the fire originates in the use of a dangerous instrument, knowingly used by the owner of the land in which the fire breaks out. It is impossible to sup- pose that the engine-driver is liable to eighteen months' imprisonmen t, under § 84, and equally impossible to suppose that there is no remedy against either master or servant for what is a wrong by one or both. We are of opinion, therefore, that this answer fails. The next answer was, that the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845,1 afforded a defence to this action. Whether it would if there was no negligence other than the use of a dangerous instrument, it is not necessary to say. But here there was abundance of such evidence, if the fire broke out in the defendants' lands, for the reasons before given. So, indeed, there was if it broke out in the plaintiff's land ; but anyhow, it cannot be contended that the statute gives the railway com- pany a right to throw lighted coals on adjoining land. That would be a trespass. It remains to notice another point made by the defendants. It was said that the plaintiff's land was covered with very combustible vegeta- tion, and that he contributed to his own loss ; and Mr. Lloyd very ingeniously likened the case to that of an overloaded barge swamped by a steamer. We are of opinion this objection fails. The plaintiff used his land in a natural and proper way for the purposes for which it was fit. The defendants come to it, he being passive, and do it a mis- chief. In the case of the overloaded barge, the owner uses it in an 8 Vict., c. 20, § 86. riRES COMMUNICATED BY BAILWAY LOCOMOTIVES. 129 In the Exchequer Chamber — Statement of the Case. unnatural and improper way, and goes in search of the danger, having no right to impede another natural and proper way of using a public highway. We therefore think the direction was right, the verdict satis- factory, and the rule must be discharged. The learned judge added that he abided by the opinion he expressed at the trial. Hule discharged. [In the Exchequer Chamber, 5 Hurl. & N. 679.] This was appealed by the defendants against the judgment of the Court of Exchequer in discharging a rule for a new trial, as reported. The case stated on appeal was as follows: The defendants are a company, who, under their special acts and the General Railway Acts incorporated therewith, are proprietors of, and use and work, the Taff Vale Railway, with locomotive engines, as a passenger and goods line. The plaintiff is the owner of a wood or plantation adjoining the em- bankment of the railway. On the 14th of March, 1856, the plaintiff 's wood was discovered to be on fire, and eight acres of it were burnt. The flre may be taken to have originated from a spark or coal from one of the defendants' locomotive engines, in the ordinary course of its working. This action was brought by the plaintiff for the damage he sustained by the flre. [The case then set out the pleadings, which sufficiently appear in the report, i] From the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses, it appeared that the fire in the plaintiff's wood was first seen at a place fifty yards from the railway ; that there were traces of flre extending continuously all the way between the railway and the wood, and that the railway bank was burning ; that the grass on the bank had been cut three or four months before, but that there was grass of a very combustible nature growing on the bank just previous to the flre, and that it was all burned ; that there was a great deal of long grass growing in the wood, which was extremely combustible; that the wood was also full of small dry branches, — the remains of a former cutting, — and was described by the plaintiff to be in just about as safe a state as an open barrel of gunpowder would be in the Cyfartha EoUing-Mill. The wood, however, was in an ordinary and natural condition, and as it had been before and since the railway was made. Whether the injury was caused by the grass on the embankment being first set fire to, or whether by lighted matter being thrown from the locomotive on to the 1 3 Hurl. & N. 743. 9 130 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY EIKB. Vaughan v. The Taflf Vale Railway Company. plaintiff 's land, was not left to or determined by the jury. The defend- ants' counsel did not, at the trial, make any objection on this ground. On the part of the defendants, it was sworn that every thing which was practicable had been done to the locomotive to make it safe ; that a cap had been put to its chimney ; that its ash-pan had been secured ; that it travelled at the slowest pace consistent with practical utility ; and that if its funnel had been more guarded, or its ash-pan less free, or its- pace slower, it could not have been advantageously used. And it must be taken to be the fact that the defendants had taken every precaution and adopted every means in their power, and which science could suggest^ to prevent their engines from emitting sparks ; but the witness added» " We do occasionally burn our own banks now." The learned judge left the question of negligence and improper conduct by the defendant* to the jury, saying there was evidence thereof, even though the jury believed the evidence that every thing which was practicable had been done to the locomotive to render it safe, and though it travelled at the slowest pace consistent with practical utility. He refused to leave to- the jury any question arising out of the combustible character of the plaintiff 's wood. The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff, the damages being agreed upon at £27 10s. The judge did not direct the jury, as stated in the rule of Exchequer,. " that no care or skilled use in preventing the escape of fire from the- engine would be an answer to the charge of negligence, provided the defendants did not succeed in preventing it; " but left the question of negligence and improper conduct as above. The question whether there was evidence to both or either count was entertained and dealt with by the Court of Exchequer as though open to the defendants on the rule, and without requiring any amendment thereof. The question for the decision of the Court of Appeals is, whether or not the defendants are entitled to have a new trial on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence to go to the jury under the first count of the declaration, assuming it was true, as sworn, that every thing had been done, etc. ; the plaintiff contending that there was such evidence, and also that, if not, the question is not open to the defend- ants, and also the judge was wrong in not leaving to the jury any question arising out of the combustible character of the plaintiff' s- wood. If the court shall be of opinion in the affirmative, then the ver- dict for the plaintiff is to be set aside and a new trial had. If the court shall be of opinion in the negative, then the verdict for the plaintiff i& to stand, and judgment to be entered for £27 10s. FIEES COMMUNICATED BY RAILWAY LOCOMOTIVES. 131 In the Exchequer Chamber — Argument of Lloyd, for defendants. F. Lloyd argued for the defendants. — First, there was no evidence of negligence to support the first count of the declaration. The direc- tion of the learned judge conveyed to the jury the erroneous impres- sion that it was negligence to set fire to the wood, whatever precautions were taken. But the first count charges the defendants with negligence in managing the steam-engine and providing the proper means for retaining the fire ; therefore, the gist of the action being negligence, the material question is, whether the defendants adopted all reasonable care to prevent accident. If so, they performed the duty which the law imposes on them. Railway companies are not insurers, and in order to render them liable for Injury, there must be some evidence of negli- gence. Assuming that the fact of the wood being on fire is prima, facie evidence of negligence, that may be rebutted by proof that the defend- ants adopted every precaution consistent with the working of the line. Aldridge v. The Great Western Railway Company ^ shows that the defendants are not liable for injuries arising from the use of the engine, without any negligence on their part. That case was followed by Piggot v. The Eastern Counties Railway Company,^ where Tindal, C. J., said: "The defendants are a company intrusted by the legisla- ture with an agent of an extremely dangerous character, for their own private and particular advantage ; and the law requires of them that they shall, in the exercise of the rights and powers so conferred upon them, adopt such precautions as may reasonably prevent damages to the property of third persons, through or near which their railway passes." Here the case finds that such precautions have been adopted. No doubt, in the absence of precautions against fire, the defendants would be liable at common law.^ But the fact of an accident, even if prima facie evidence of negligence, is not conclusive proof of it.* The case does not fall within the definition of negligence in Blyth v. The Birmingham Water- Works Company,^ for there is no evidence that the defendants have omitted any thing which a reasonable man would do, or done any thing which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The legislature has conferred on the defendants certain powers, and they are only responsible for a negligent exercise of them. They are not bound to abstain from using locomotive engines because, notwithstanding every precaution, sparks fly from them.^ [Btles, J. — > 3 Man. & G. 515. * Bird v. Great Northern E. Co., 28 L. J. s 3 C. B. 229. (Exoh.) 3. 3 Manley v. The St. Helens, etc., K. Co., = 11 Exch. 781. 2 Hurl. & N. 840. ^ Eex v. Pease, i Barn. & Adol. 30. 132 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Eailway Company. Is there any difference in principle between a locomotive engine travel- ling on a railway and a carriage travelling on a crowded thoroughfare ?] If the defendants were liable at all, they would be liable in trespass, not case, the injury being immediate. ^ He also referred to White- house v. The Birmingham Canal Company. '^ With respect to the second count, the question under that count was virtually withdrawn from the jury. It should have been left to them to say whether the fire originated in the wood or on the bank. If on the bank, it being their own land, by the 14 Geo. III., c. 78, § 86, the defendants are not liable unless they were guilty of actual negligence. Grove (_Giffard with him), for the plaintiff. — The question was properly left to the jury. The setting fire to the wood is of itself negligence, for which the defendants are responsible. As regards the public generally, the defendants cannot be indicted for a nuisance in employing locomotive engines which emit fire ; but since they use for their own profit that which causes injury to individuals, they are liable to them for the damage. In Tubervil v. Stamp,^ the majority of the court were of opinion that there was no difference between fire in a field and fire in a house. If the defendants, in drawing their engines at a rate advantageous to themselves, destroy the property of others, they are bound to pay for it. A person is not presumed to know that an animal is dangerous, and therefore it is necessary to allege a scienter; but, by the custom of the realm, every person is bound to keep his fire so as to prevent it from injuring his neighbor.* If a fire broke out and burnt an adjoining dwelling, negligence was presumed. ^ In this case, the common-law liability is not affected by the 14 Geo. III., c. 78, § 86, because that enactment only applies to " any person on whose house, chamber, stable, barn, or other building, or on whose estate, any fire shall accidentally begin." F. Lloyd, in reply, cited Jackson v. Smithson.^ Willes, J., referred to May V. BurdettJ CocKBURN, C. J. — We are all of opinion that the decision of the Court of Exchequer cannot be upheld, and that the case must go down for a new trial. I collect, from the reasons given by my brother Bbamwell in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, that the ground 1 Leame v. Bray, 3 East, 693. < 2 Hen. IV., lol. 18. 2 27 L. J. (Exch.) 25. 6 Viscount Canterbury v. The Attorney- s 1 Salk. 13; *. c, sub nom. Turbervil v. General,! Phillips, 306, 316. Stamp, Com. 32; Comb. 459; Skin. 681; Garth. " 15 Mee. & W 863. 425 ; 12 Modern, 152 ; 2 Salk. 726 ; 1 Ld. Kaym. ' 9 Q. B. 101. 264. FIEES COMMUNICATED BY EAILWAT LOCOMOTIVES. 133 In the Exchequer Chamber — Opinion of Cockburn, C. J. upon which that court discharged the rule was this: Whereas acci- dents occasionally arise from the use of fire as a means of propelling locomotive engines on railways, the happening of such accidents must be taken to be the natural and necessary use of fire for that purpose ; and therefore railway companies, by using fire, are responsible for any accident which may result from its use, although they have taken every precaution in their power. So far as I can gather from the language of the judgment, that is the view taken by the court of the law applicable to the first count. I cannot adopt that view : it is at variance with the principle on which the Court of Queen's Bench proceeded in the case of Bex V. Pease,^ which we are prepared to uphold. Although it may be true that if a person keep an animal of known dangerous propen- sities, or a dangerous instrument, he will be responsible to those who are thereby injured, independently of any negligence in the mode of dealing with the animal or using the instrument ; yet, when the legis- lature has sanctioned and authorized the use of a particular thing, and it is used for the purpose for which it was authorized, and every precau- tion has been observed to prevent injury, the sanction of the legislature carries with it this consequence : that if damage results from the use of such thing, independently of negligence, the party using it is not responsible. It is consistent with policy and justice that it should be BO ; and for this reason, so far as regards the first count, I think the judgment of the court below is wrong. It is admitted that the defend- ants used fire for the purpose of propelling locomotive engines, and no doubt they were bound to take proper precaution to prevent injury to persons through whose lands they passed ; but the mere use of fire in such engines does not make them liable for injury resulting from such use, without any negligence on their part. As regards the second count, if the facts alleged in that count had been established by the verdict of the jury, the defendants would have been liable ; but inasmuch as the learned judge, in substance, told the jury that (independently of the facts alleged in the second count) if they were satisfied the accident arose from the use of fire, the defend- ants were responsible, there is nothing from which we may not suppose that the jury found their verdict upon the first count only. Indeed, the questions raised for our determination tend to show that, in the opinion of the learned judge, the counsel, and all parties, the verdict proceeded on the first count ; and, therefore, the question of negligence 1 4 Barn. & Adol. 80. 134 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIBE. Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Railway Company. under the second count was improperly withdrawn from the jury. It may be that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on that count; or it may be that the mischief arose from the sparks not being carried to the bank, but directly to the wood, which was of a combustible nature, — in which case the defendants would not be liable. For these reasons, I am of opinion that there ought to be a new trial. Williams, J. — I am of the same opinion. We cannot confirm the decision of the Court of Exchequer without affirming that the defend- ants are liable for accidents caused by the use of locomotive engines, although they were guilty of no negligence, and took every precaution to guard against accident. Bex v. Fease i shows that such is not the law. Crompton, J. — I am of the same opinion. It seems to me that there was no negligence to support the first count. It is found that the defendants took all practicable precautions that science could suggest to prevent accident. That is substantially a finding that there was no negligence to support the second count, and may have proceeded upon the ground that the defendants were liable under the first count without actual negligence. Bex v. Pease decides this matter, for it shows that although the use of a locomotive engine must have been accounted a nuisance unless authorized by the legislature, yet, being so authorized, the use of it is lawful ; and the defendants are not liable for an accident caused by such use, without any negligence on their part. It is said that where a person keeps an animal of a ferocious nature, it is not necessary to allege a scienter; but that is very properly the law, be- cause the negligence is the unlawful act of keeping such an animal. If the animal be tame, it is not unlawful to keep it, unless it is known to be of dangerous habits. My judgment proceeds upon the ground that the legislature has made the use of locomotive engines not an unlawful act ; and, therefore, it is lawful for the defendants to use them, so long as they do so without negligence. WiLLES, J. — I am entirely of the same opinion, though I have had considerable reluctance in coming to that conclusion, because, looking at the report of this case in 3 Hurl. & N. 743, 1 feel that we are obliged to reverse the judgment of the court below, although we do not, in point of law, differ in opinion from that court. There was evidence that the defendants had taken every precaution, and adopted every means in their power, and which science could suggest, to prevent i i Barn. & Adol. 30. riEES COMMUNICATED BT RAILWAY LOCOMOTIVES. 135 In the Exchequer Chamber — Opinion of Blackburn, J. injury. It would have been a question for the jury whether they believed that evidence ; but the question submitted to them was not tipon the whole evidence, but, taking it as a fact that the defendants had used every precaution which they could consistently with the work- ing of the line, whether the jury did not think that they were guilty of negligence. Now, the definition of negligence is the absence of care, according to circumstances. But it is found as a fact that the defend- ants took all the care which they could under the circumstances. Therefore, upon that — taken as a fact, and not merely as evidence of the fact — there is a finding that the defendants only did that which the act of Parliament allowed them to do, and took all possible care to prevent injury. I therefore think that the judgment ought to be reversed. Btles, J. — I am of the same opinion. It is diflJcult to distinguish this case from Rex v. Pease. The case states that the engine travelled at the slowest pace consistent with utility, which is tantamount to say- ing that it travelled at the proper pace. That being so, this case cannot be distinguished from that of a stationary chimney, which the legisla- ture has not only authorized, but required to be kept with proper care ; and who would say that, in such case, if an accident occurred without any negligence on the part of the persons using the chimney, they would be held responsible ? Blackbukn, J. — At first it would seem that there was evidence of negligence in the use of the engine, for the fact of sparks coming from it would be some evidence of negligence ; but then the case says that it is to be taken as a fact that the defendants adopted every precaution that science could suggest to prevent injury. That reduces the ques- tion to whether the defendants are responsible for an accident arising from the use of fire, when they are guilty of no neghgence in using it. That might have been a difficult question ; but Bex v. Pease has settled that when the legislature has sanctioned the use of a locomotive engine there is no liability for injury caused by using it, so long as every pre- caution is taken consistent with use. Here it is found as a fact that the defendants were guilty of no negligence, except in using a locomo- tive engine as they were authorized to do. Upon the rest of the case it is not necessary to say any thing. Judgment reversed. 136 LIABILITY FOE DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Fent V. Toledo, etc., Railway Company. 8. THE SAME SUBJECT — REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES WHERE FIRES ARE COMMUNICATED FROM. ONE HOUSE OR FIELD TO AN- OTHER. Fent v. Toledo, etc., Eailway Company.* Supreme Court of Illinois, 1871. Hon. Charles B. Lawkbnce, Chief Justice. PiNKNET H. WaLKEB, John M. Scott, AifTHONY Thornton, Sidney Brebse, William K. McAllister, Benjamin R. Sheldon, Associate Justices. Case in Judgrment. — The defendant's locomotive, in passing througli a village, tlirew out great quantities of unusually large cinders, which set on Are two buildings and ^ lumber-yard. The weather was very dry, and the wind blowing freely from the south. One of the buildings thus ignited was a warehouse near the track. From this the heat and flames speedily communicated to a building of the plaintiffs', situated about two- hundred feet distant, whereby it and most of its contents were consumed. There wa& evidence of negligence on the part of the servants of the defendant. On demurrer to the evidence, .It was held that the negligence of the servants of the defendant was the proximate cause of the loss sustained by the plaintiffs. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County; the Hon, Chables H. Wood, Judge, presiding. Messrs. Straights, Young, Harding, and Payson, for the appellants -y Messrs. Ingersoll and McCune for the appellee. Mr. Chief Justice Lawrence delivered the opinion of the court. — On the 1st of October, 1867, a locomotive with a train of freight- cars belonging to the appellee, in passing eastwardly through the village of Fairburg, threw out great quantities of unusually large cinders, and set on fire two buildings and a lumber-yard. The weather at the time was very dry, and the wind blowing freely from the south. One of the buildings ignited by the sparks was a warehouse near the track. The heat and flames from this structure speedily set on fire th& building of plaintiffs, situated about two hundred feet from the ware- house, and destroyed it and most of its contents. To recover damages, for this loss, the plaintiffs have brought this suit. The defendant in the Circuit Court demurred to the plaintiffs' evidence, and the court sus- * Eeported 59 lU. 349. FIEES COMMUNICATED BT EAILWAY LOCOMOTIVES. 137 Supreme Court of Illinois — Opinion of Lawrence, C. J. tained the demurrer. To reverse this judgment, the plaintiffs bring up the record. The evidence shows great negligence on the part of defendant, but it is unnecessary to discuss this question. Where a demurrer is inter- posed to the evidence, the rule is that the demurrer admits not only all that the plaintiff's testimony has proved, but all that it tends to prove. In this case, therefore, the defendant's negligence must be regarded as admitted. It is not, indeed, controverted; but the counsel rely for defence solely upon the ground that the plaintiffs' building was not set on fire directly by sparks from the defendant's locomotive, but by the burning of the intermediate warehouse, and that therefore the defend- ant is to be held harmless, under the maxim Causa proxima, non remota, spectatur. There are not many of the maxims of the law which touch so closely upon metaphysical speculation. The rule itself is one of universal application, but the difficulty lies in establishing a criterion by which to determine when the cause of an injury is to be considered proximate, and when merely remote. ' Greenleaf i lays down the rule that "the damage to be recovered must always be the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained of." But this seems little more than the substitution of one form of general expression for another. Parsons, in his work on Contracts, ^ after alluding to the con- fusion in which the adjudged cases leave this question, says: "We have been disposed to think that there is a principle derivable on the one hand from the general reason and justice of the question, and on the other applicable as a test in many cases, and perhaps useful, if not decisive, in all. It is, that every defendant shall be held liable for all of those consequences which might have been foreseen and expected as the results of his conduct, but not for those which he could not have foreseen, and was therefore under no moral obligation to take into consideration." We are disposed to regard this explanation of the rule as clearer, and capable of more precise application, than any other we have met with in our examination of this subject, and it is in substan- tial accord with what is said by Pollock, C. B., in Rigby v. Hewitt.^ The counsel upon both sides have furnished us with a very elaborate review of the decided cases. We have not the time, and it would be unnecessary labor, to go over them in detail. With the exception of two recent cases decided in this country upon the precise question before us, it cannot be denied that the great current of English and American authorities would bring the defendant in this case within the 1 ZGreenl.Ev., §256. s 5 Excli. 240. = Vol. n. (1st ed.), p. 456. 138 LIABILITY rOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Fent V. Toledo, etc., Railway Company. category of proximate causes. The great effort of the counsel for defendant has been to explain away, as far as possible, the effect of these authorities, and to draw a distinction between them and the case at bar. However successful they may have been in showing a difference between some of the cases cited by appellants' counsel and that under consideration, on the other hand, they cite no English case, and but two American cases, in which a wrong-doer has been excused from liability under circumstances analogous to those disclosed by this record, on the ground that he was a remote, and not a proximate, cause of the injury done. From the oft-quoted squib case of Scott v. Shep- herd,^ down to our own day, the English reports abound with instances in which causes more remote than the cause in this case have been held sufficiently direct and proximate to be made a ground of damages. As illustrative of this, we content ourselves with citing Illidge v. Good- win,^ Lynch v. Nurdin,^ Rigiy v. Hewitt,^ Cheenland v. Chaplin,^ and Montoya v. London Assurance Company.^ In this last case, the defendant had insured the plaintiff 's tobacco against perils of the sea. Hides were shipped in the same vessel. The vessel shipped sea-water, which, coming in contact with the hides, caused them to ferment. The fermentation created a noxious vapor which acted on the tobacco and spoiled its flavor. Suit was brought against the company, and the defence was the same relied upon in this ease. The court held the defendant responsible, and said in its opinion: "The sea-water having caused the hides to ferment, and thereby the tobacco to be spoiled, it is merely playing with terms to say the injury is not occasioned by the sea-water. The action of the sea-water, which had been shipped in consequence of bad weather, occasioned the fermentation, and is the proximate cause." If we turn to the American courts, we shall find the general current of authorities to be in harmony with the English precedents. A late case, and one in which a cause much more remote than the flre from the locomotive, in the case before us, was held the proximate cause, is Insurance Company v. Tweed.'' It was an action brought against an insurance company to recover for cotton stored in a warehouse, and insured against fire, except loss by fire caused by explosion, invasion, etc. An explosion occurred in another warehouse, from which explosion fire was communicated to the Eagle Mills, situated on the opposite > 2 W. Black. 892. * 5 Exch. 240. s 24 Eng. Com. Law, 272; 5 Car. & P. 190. s 5 Kxch. 243. » 41 Eng. Com. Law, 422 ; 1 Q. B. 29 ; 4 Per- « 6 Exch. 451. rj- & Day. 672. ' 7 Wall. 44. FIRES COMMUNICATED BY RAILWAY LOCOMOTIVES. 139 Supreme Court of Illinois — Opinion of Lawrence, C. J. diagonal corner, and from thence to the warehouse in which the cotton was stored. In the Circuit Court, a judgment was obtained against the company, on the ground that the immediate cause of the loss was the fire from the Eagle Mills, and the case was not, therefore, within the exception of the policy. This would seem not an unreasonable view ; but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment, and, in delivering their opinion, use the following language. "One of the most valuable of the criteria furnished us by the authorities is to ascertain whether any new cause has intervened between the fact ac- complished and the alleged cause. If a new force or power has inter- vened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the mischief, the other must be considered too remote. In the present pase, we think, there is no such new cause. The explosion undoubtedly produced, or set in operation, the fire which burned the plaintiff's cotton. The fact that it was carried to the cotton by first burning another mill, supplies no new force or power which caused the burning." That case was far stronger for the plaintiff than the one at bar is for the defendant. Powell V. Deveney^ and Vanderbury v. Truax^ are cases in which the court went back further for the proximate and responsible cause than we are asked by the plaintiffs to go in the present instance. The case of Hart V. Western Railroad Company ^ presented precisely the same question with that before us. The locomotive set fire to a shop, and the fire crossed the street and destroyed a dwelling-house. The court held the company liable. In Perley v. Eastern Railway,'^ a similar judg- ment was pronounced upon a similar state of facts. Counsel for appellee seek to weaken the authority of these cases by adverting to the fact that they were decided under a statute of Massachusetts making railway companies liable for all losses by fire communicated from their locomotives, and authorizing them to insure against such risks. But the statute does not in the least degree affect the common- law principle under consideration, and was not so regarded by the court in these decisions. It simply makes the companies liable for fires caused by them, irrespective of the question of negligence. But if the loco- motive was the remote, instead of the proximate, cause, in the sense of the maxim we are now discussing, there would have been no liability under the statute any more than at common law. Upon this question of cause, the cases are as much in point as if there had been no statute. The court, in the last case, in discussing this very objection that the cause was not proximate, say: " The fact, therefore, that the fire passes 1 3 Cush. 300. » 13 Mete. 99. 2 4 Dunio. 4B4. * 98 Mass. 414. 140 liiABiLirr FOB damages caused by fire. Pent V. Toledo, etc., Railway Company. through the air, driven by a high wind, and that it is communicated to the plaintiff's property from other intermediate property of other men, does not make his loss a remote consequence of the escape of the fire from the engine." And in another part of the opinion we find the following language: "If, when the cinder escapes through the air, the effect which it produces upon the first combustible substance against which it strikes is proximate, the effect must continue to be proximate as to every thing which the fire consumes in its direct course. This is so, whether we regard the fire as a combination of the burning sub- stance with the oxygen of the air, or look merely at its visible action and effect. As matter of fact, the injury to the plaintiff was as imme- diate and direct as an injury would have been which was caused by a bullet fired from the train passing over the intermediate lots, and wound- ing the plaintiff as he stood upon his own lot. It is as much so as pain and disability are proximate effects of an injury, though they occur at intervals through successive years after the injury was received. Yet these are called proximate effects, though the actual effects of the injury may be greatly modified, in every case, by bodily constitution, habits of life, and accidental circumstances. " In Cleaveland v. Grand Trunk Railway Company,^ a like rule was applied, without discussion, to similar fires occasioned by locomotives. The same rule has also been enforced in two recent English cases.® In the first case, the fire was communicated from the first buildincr destroyed to several other frame buildings belonging to the plaintiff. He was allowed to recover, and the counsel for the company obtained a rule nisi for a new trial. The rule was subsequently argued before the Common Pleas, and discharged, all the judges concurring. The precise point under consideration was not ruled by the court, and we cite the case because the question of proximate cause seems never to have occurred to the counsel or court, all of whom have names familiar to the profession. It was not suggested that a recovery could not be had for all the buildings as well as for tiiat immediately set on fire by the locomotive. In the last case, the servants of the railway company had cut the grass, trimmed a hedge bordering the railway, placed the trim- mings and grass in heaps near the line, and allowed them to remain there fourteen days, during very hot weather, in the month of August. Fire from a passing engine ignited one of these heaps, burned the hedge, and was thence carried by a high wind across a stubble-field and a public road, and burned the plaintiff's cottage, situated two hundred 1 43 Vt.449. 64 Eng. Com. Law, 3 C. P. 239; Smith v. 2 Piggot V. The Eastern Counties E. Co., liOndon, etc., E. Co., L. E. 6 0. P. 98. FIEES COMMUNICATED BY EAILWAT LOCOMOTIVES. 141 Supreme Court of Illinois — Opinion of Lawrence, C. J. yards from the railway. There was no evidence of negligence in the construction or management of the engines, the negligence alleged con- sisting in leaving the hedge trimmings in dry weather near the railway line, where they would be liable to be ignited. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and leave given to the defendants to move for a nonsuit. On the argument of the motion before the Common Pleas, it was con- tended, in support of the rule, that the defendant's servants cut the grass and trimmed the hedge in the ordinary course of their duty, and but for the great heat of the weather and the high wind prevailing at the time of the fire, a combination of circumstances which the defend- ants could not have foreseen, the burning of the cottage would not have occurred. It was urged that this was a result which no reasonable per- • son could have anticipated. This was a very far weaker case against the company than the one at bar, and the position of the counsel for the defendant was adopted by one of the judges. But the other mem- bers of the court were of opinion the evidence sustained the verdict, and they discharged the rule. The chief justice, in giving his opinion, uses the following language: " It is said no reasonable man could have supposed that, even if the fire did communicate to the hedge, it would run across a stubble-fleld and a public road, and so reach a building at the distance of two hundred yards from the railway. But, seeing that the defendants were using dangerous machines, that they allowed the cuttings and trimmings to remain on the banks of their railway in a season of unusual heat and dryness, and for a time which, under these circumstances, might be fairly called unreasonable, and that there was evidence from which it might reasonably be presumed that their engines caused the ignition of these combustible materials, and that the fire did, in fact, extend to the cottage, I think it impossible to say there ■was not evidence from which a jury might be justified in concluding that there was negligence as regards the plaintiff, and that the destruction of the cottage in which the plaintiff's goods were was the natural conse- quence of their negligence; what the defendant's servants ought, as reasonable men, to have contemplated as the result of leaving the accumulation of cuttings and trimmings where and as they did, must depend on all the circumstances." Counsel for appellee rely upon three adjudged cases in support of the decision of the Circuit Court. The first is Marble v. Worcester.^ That was a case in which it was sought to recover damages from the city by a person who had been thrown down and injured by a horse that had 1 4 Gray, 395. 142 LIABILITT FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Fent V. Toledo, etc., Railway Company. become frightened, freed himself from the vehicle to which he was attached, and ran away. The recovery was sought against the city on the ground that the horse had been frightened by the striking of a vehicle against a defect in the highway. The plaintiff had nothing to do with the horse, and was fifty rods distant. The facts presented the question of proximate cause in a difficult and very debatable form, but it was held, by a divided court, that the city was not liable. The case bears but a faint analogy to the present one, and the subsequent case, in 98 Mass. 414, above cited, shows that the decision in Marble v. Wor- cester was not considered, by the court that pronounced it, as bearing upon the question presented by this record. We now come to the two cases chiefly relied upon by appellee's counsel. They are quite in point, but we are wholly unable to agree with their conclusions. One is Ryan v. The New York Central Rail- road Company,^ and the other is Kerr v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at its May Term, 1870.^ These two cases stand alone, and we believe they are directly in conflict with every English or American case, as yet reported, involving this question. As we understand these cases, they hold that where the fire is communicated by the locomotive to the house of A., and thence to the house of B., there can be no recovery by the latter. It is immaterial, according to the doctrine of these cases, how narrow may be the space between the two houses, or whether the destruction of the second would be the natural consequence of the burning of the first. The principle laid down by these authorities, and urged by counsel in this case, is, that in order to a recovery, the fire which destroys the plaintiff's property must be communicated directly from the railway, and not through the burning of intermediate property. With all our respect for these courts, we cannot adopt this principle ; and it is admitted by the judges who delivered the opinions to have no precedent for its support, and to be absolutely in conflict with former adjudications. Indeed, only one year prior to the decision in New York, the same court, in Field v. New York Central Railroad Com- pany,^ pronounced a judgment which we cannot reconcile with the later case. It has often been held by this and various other courts, that if fire is communicated to the dried grass in an adjoining field, through the carelessness of the persons managing a railway locomotive, and spreads over the field, no matter to what extent, destroying hay- stacks, fences, and houses, the company is liable. The correctness of i 36 N. T. 2U. 8 32 X. Y. 39. 2 62 Pa. St. 353. FIRES COMMUNICATED BT EAILWAT LOCOMOTIVES. 143 Supreme Court of Illinois — Opinion of Lawrence, C. J. these decisions is not assailed by appellee's counsel, and we have no doubt the same rule would be applied by the courts that decided the cases upon which counsel rely. But if these two decisions, in New York and Pennsylvania, are correct law, it must be held that, if fire is communicated from the locomotive to the field of A., and spreads through his field to the adjoining field of B., while A. must be reim- bursed by the company, B. must set his loss down as due to a remote cause, and suffer in uncomplaining silence. Would there not be in such a decision a sense of palpable wrong, which would justly shock the public conscience, and impair the confidence of the community in the administration of the law? While the law to be administered by the courts should not be a mere reflex of uneducated public opinion, at the same time it should be the expression of a masculine common-sense, and its decisions should not be founded on distinctions so subtle that they might have afforded fitting topics to the schoolmen. If the field of A. contain forty acres, and the whole is overrun by fire, he may recover for the whole. But if A. owns twenty acres next to the rail- way, and B. the remaining twenty acres of the same field, A. shall recover, according to the doctrine of these cases, but B. shall not. Yet the test question is, what is the proximate cause of the fire, and this ruling makes the proximate cause depend upon whether the field of forty acres is owned by one person or by two. Let us suppose another case. Both these opinions upon which we are commenting expressly admit, as both courts have decided, that if, through the negligence of a railway company, fire is communicated to the building of A., he may recover. But suppose the building is a wooden tenement, one hundred feet in length, extending from the railway. In the Pennsylvania case, the second building was only thirty-nine feet from the first. We pre- sume that court would hold, and appellee's counsel would admit, that A. might recover for the value of his entire building, one hundred feet in length. But suppose B. owns the most remote fifty feet of the build- ing, could he recover? We suppose not, under the rule announced in these cases. But why should he not, under any definition of proximate cause that has ever been given by any court or text- writer? Take that of Greenleaf, with which counsel for appellee claim to be content. He says the damage must be " the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained of." Is not the burning of the second fifty feet of the building, in the ease supposed, the natural and proximate conse- quence of the act complained of, to wit, the careless ignition of the first fifty feet? If it is admitted that there may be a recovery for the second fifty feet of the building, as well as for the first, when there is one 144 LIABILITY FOB DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Pent V. Toledo, etc., Railway Company. continuous building, and whether owned by one person or by two, is it possible that where the second fifty is removed a short space from the first, but still is so near that the burning of the one makes almost certain the destruction of the other, there can be no recovery? Is not the burning of the second building still '' the natural and proximate conse- quence of the act complained of?" It seems to us that the arbitrary rule enforced in these two cases, which is simply this, that when there is negligence, there may be a recovery for the first house or field, but in no event for the second, rests on no maintainable ground, and would involve the administration of the law in cases of this character in absurd inconsistencies. We believe there is no other just or reasonable rule than to determine in every instance whether the loss was one which might reasonably have been anticipated from the careless setting of the fire, under all the circumstances surrounding the careless act at the time of its performance. If loss has been caused by the act, and it was, under the circumstances, a natural consequence which any reasonable person could have anticipated, then the act is a proximate cause, whether the house burned was the first or the tenth, — the latter being so situated that its destruction is a consequence reasonably to be anticipated from setting the first on fire. If, on the other hand, the fire has spread beyond its natural limits by means of a new agency, — if, for example, after its ignition, a high wind should arise, and carry burning brands to a great distance, by which a fire is caused in a place that would have been safe but for the wind, — such a loss might fairly be set down as a remote consequence, for which the railway company should not be held responsible. The Court of Appeals of New York and the Supreme Court of Penn- sylvania seem, from their opinions, to have attached great weight to an argument urged upon us by the counsel for appellee ; and, indeed, that argument seems to have been the chief reason for announcing a rule which both courts struggle in vain to show is not in confiict with all prior adjudications. That argument is, in brief, that an entire village or town is liable to be burned down by the passing of the fire from house to house, and if the railway company whose locomotive has emitted the cinders that caused the fire is to be charged with all the damages, these companies would be in constant danger of bankruptcy, and of being obliged to suspend their operations. We confess our- selves wholly unable to see the overpowering force of this argument. It proceeds upon the assumption that, if a great loss is to be suffered, it had better be distributed among a hundred innocent victims than wholly visited upon the wrong-doer. As a question of law or ethics, FIRES COMMUNICATED BY EAILWAT LOCOMOTIVES. 145 Supreme Court of Illinois — Opinion of Lawrence, 0. J. the proposition does not commend itself to our reason. We must still cling to the ancient doctrine, that the wanton -wrong-doer must take the consequences of his own acts, whether measured by a thousand ■dollars or a hundred thousand. As to the railroads, however useful they may be to the regions they traverse, they are not operated by their owners for benevolent purposes, or to promote the public welfare. Their object is pecuniary profit. It is a perfectly legitimate object, but we do not see why they should be exempted from tlie moral duty of indemnification for injuries committed by the careless or wanton spread of fire along their track, because such indemnity may sometimes amount to so large a sum as to sweep away all their profits. The simple question is, whether a loss that must be borne somewhere is to be visited on the head of the innocent or the guilty. If, in placing it ■where it belongs, the consequence will be the bankruptcy of a railway company, we may regret it, but we should not for that reason hesitate in the application of a rule of such palpable justice. But is it true that railroads cannot thrive under such a rule ? They have now been in operation many years, and extend over very many thousand miles, and we have never yet heard of town or village that has been destroyed by a fire ignited by their locomotives. Improved methods of construc- tion and a vigilant care in the management of locomotives have made the probability of loss from this cause so slight that we cannot but regard the fears of the disastrous consequences to the railway compa- nies, which may follow from an adherence to the ancient rule, as in a large degree chimerical. A case may occur, at long intervals, in which they will be required to respond in heavy damages ; but better this, than that they should be permitted to evade the just responsibilities of their own negligence, under the pretence that the existence of the road may be endangered. It were better that a railway company should be reduced to bankruptcy, and even suspend its operations, than that the courts should establish for its benefit a rule intrinsically unjust, and repugnant not merely to ancient precedent, but to the universal sense of right and wrong. Our position on this subject is briefly this: We do not desire to impose upon the railway companies unreasonable obligations, or to subject them to unreasonable danger of great pecuniary loss. We do not wish to make them insurers against all damages by fire that may result from the passage of their trains, without reference to the question of remote and proximate cause. But, on the other hand, we do insist on applying to them the same rule that has been held through all the administration of the common law, with the exception 10 146 LIABILITY FOR DAilAGES CAUSED BY FIKE. Pent u. Toledo, etc., Eailway Company. of the two cases upon which we have been commenting. As already stated, we understand the doctrine of those two cases and the position of counsel for appellee to be, that, if fire is communicated from a. locomotive to the house of A., and thence to the house of B., it is a conclusion of law that the fire sent forth by the locomotive is to be regarded as the remote, and not the proximate, cause of the injury to B. ; and the railway company is, for this reason alone, to be held not responsible. This rule we repudiate as in the teeth of almost number- less decisions, and as unsupported by that reason which is the life of the law. "We hold, on the contrary, as we held in reference to this same fire in the case of The Toledo, Peoria, and Warsaw Railroad Company v. Pindar,^ that it is in each case a question of fact to be determined by the jury under the instructions of the court. Those instructions should be, in substance, what we have already stated. If the fire is the consequence of the carelessness of the railway company, and the question of remote or proximate cause is raised, the jury should be instructed that, so far as the case turns upon that issue, the company is to be held responsible if the loss is a natural consequence of its alleged carelessness which might have been foreseen by any reasonable person, but is not to be held responsible for injuries which could not have been foreseen or expected as the results of its negligence or misconduct. In the case before us, owing to the distance of the plaintiffs' building from the one first set on fire, this question might not have been one of easy determination. The defendant, however, thought it better not to take the risks of this issue, but, by a demurrer to the evidence, to rest his defence upon the theory that, even admitting all that the evidence tends to prove, there is still no liability. In this court, the counsel for the company have not discussed the evidence. Tliey place the case on the single ground that the company is free from liability, because the plaintiffs' house was set on fire, not immediately by cinders thrown from the locomotive, but by the burning of another house. Their position is, that this alone exonerates the company, without any ref- erence whatever to the question whether the second house was so near the first that, in the then state of the wind and weather, its destruction was a natural consequence of the burning of the first, which any reasonable person could have foreseen and would have expected. This question they have not discussed. On the legal question upon which appellee's counsel thus rest the case, we cannot adopt their views. On the demurrer to the evidence, we must hold that it tended to > 53 111. 457. THE COMMON-LAW LIABILITY FOB FIRES. 147 This onerous Liability restricted. prove that the fire escaped through the carelessness of the defendant, and that the destruction of the plaintiffs' house was its natural con- sequence, which any reasonable person could have foreseen. The demurrer should, therefore, have been overruled. The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for trial. Judgment reversed. NOTES. g 1. The Common-Law Liability for Fires. — In Rolle's Abridgment (Action on the Case, B, tit., "Fire,") it is said: "If my fire, by misfortune, burns the goods of another man, he shall have his action on the case against me. If a fire breaks out suddenly in my house, I not knowing it, and it burns my goods, and also my neigh- bor's house, he shall have his action on the case against me. So if the fire is caused by a servant, or a guest, or any person who enters the house with my consent. But otherwise if it is caused by a stranger who enters the house against my will." Thus, by the common law of England, a person in whose house a fire originated, which afterwards spread to his neighbor's property and destroyed it, was forced to make good his loss.i This principle was soon extended in an action for negligently keep- ing a fire in the close of the defendant, whereby it burned the corn of the plaintiff in his close. After verdict, it was objected that the custom invoked extended only to fire in his house or curtilage, which are in his power. But, said the court, " Non alloc. Por the fire In his field is his fire, as well as that in his house ; he made it, and must see it does no harm, and answer the damage if it does. Every man must use his own so as not to hurt another; but if a sudden storm had risen, which he could not stop, it was matter of evidence, and he should have showed it." One judge dis- sented on the ground of the difference between a fire in a house, which is in a man's custody and power, and fire in a field, which is not strictly so.' 2 2. This onerous Liability restricted. — By two statutes, passed at an early day, this liability was considerably modified.' A somewhat strange result of the relaxation by Parliament of this stringent rule is to be noted in the construction put upon the first of these acts by the courts in several cases, — a construction which it 1 Lord Denman, C. J., in FiUiter v. Phip- a harsh one by the judges. This may be pard, 11 Q.B.347. In an old case in the Tear seeu by two brief reports ot these actions Book (Beauheu «. Finglam, 2 Hen. IV., lol. in Salkeld: "Case lor negligently keep- 18, pi. 16; see 22 N.T. 366), it is said: "Aman ing his Are; verdict pro de/. Though the is held to answer for the deed of his servant, verdict was against evidence, a new trial or of one of his household in such case ; for was denied, because it is a hard action." if my servant, or one of my family, puts a Smith v. Brampston, 2 Salk. 644. "In case candle in a bracket, and the candle falls for negligently keeping his fire per quod the into the straw and bums up my house, and plaintiff's house was burnt; the verdict was the house of my neighbor also, in such case for the defendaat. And, after great de- I shall answer to my neighbor for the dam- bate and consideration, a new trial was de- age he has received; "which was allowed by nied, because it is a hard action, and the the court. jurors are judges of the fact." S. v., tub 2 Tubervil v. Stamp, 1 Salk. 13. nom. Smith v. Frampton, 2 Salk. 644; 1 Ld. > The common-law rule was considered Bay m. 62; 5 Modern, 87. 148 LIABILIXr FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BT FIRE. Notes. would be difficult to explain, and for which no less a person than Sir "William Black- stone seems to have been mainly responsible. By a statute of 6 Anne, c. 31, substan- tially reenacted by 14 Geo. ITT., c. 78, it was provided that " no action, suit, or process whatever shall be had against any person In whose house, chamber, stable, barn, or other building, or on whose estate, any fire shall, after the 24th day of June, 1774, accidentally begin ; nor shall any recompense be made by such person for any dam- age thereby, any law, usage, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding." Black- stone,' after the passage of the first of these statutes, laid down the law as follows : "By the common law, if a servant kept his master's fire negligently, so that his neighbor's house was burned down thereby, an action lay against the master because this negligence happened In his service ; otherwise if the servant, going along the street with a torch, by negligence sets fire to a house, for there he is not in his mas- ter's immediate service, and must himself answer the damage personally. But now the common law is, in the former case, altered by statute 6 Anne, c. 31, which ordains that no action shall be maintained against any person in whose house or chamber any fire shall accidentally begin, for their own loss is sufficient punishment for their own or their servant's carelessness." From this, it is clear that, in the opinion of Blackstone, a fire caused by negligence was an accidental fire, and that, for a fire originating in the negligence of himself or his servant, the master was, under this statute, not re- Bponsible.2 Lord Chancellor Ltudhitest, in Viscount Canterbury v. Attorney-Gen- eral,' decided in 1843, remarked, obiter, that though the work of the learned author had gone through many editions, and been subject to much criticism, no observation, to his knowledge, had been made upon the passage in question, or any objection urged against it. But, although in Vaughan v. Menlove* (1837), and in a case at Msi Frius a year earlier, actions for negligently suffering fire to escape had been sustained, no mention was made, in those cases, of the statute in question. The question was, however, set finally at rest by the Court of Queen's Bench, in the case of Filliter v. Fhippard,' decided in 1847, where it was expressly ruled that the statute did not include the case of a fire caused by negligence.* I 3. The Rule in America. —The common-law rule, which seems to have been founded on some presumed negligence or carelessness not susceptible of proof,' has never been recognized in this country. Though the statutes of 6 Anne and 14 Geo. m. have been held by the New York courts to be a part of the common law of that State, and have also, in some of their provisions, been placed on the statute-books of other States,* the decisions in this country are uniform that negligence or misconduct is the gist of the, liability,^ and that the burden of proof of negligence or misconduct 1 1 Oooley'B Bla. 431. 347; Stuart v. Hawley, 22 Barb. 619; Caltins 2 See remarks of Lord Chancellor Lynrt- v. Barger, 44 Barb. 424; Barnard v. Poor, 21 hurst in Canterbury ». Attorney-General, 1 Pick. 378; Dewey v. Leonard, 14 Minn. 163; Phillips, 306, and of Balcom, J., in Lansing Jordan v. Wyatt, 4 Gratt. 1.51; Higgins v. V. Stone, 37 Barb. 15. Dewey, 107 Mass. 494; Grannis v. Cummins, ' 1 Phillips, 306. 25 Conn. 165; McCully v. Clarke, 40 Pa. St. * 4 Scott, 244. 6 11Q. B. 347. 399; MiUer v. Martin, 16 Mo. 508; Fahn r. • And see Vaughan v. Menlove, i Scott, Eeichart, 8 Wis. 265 ; Garrett v. Freeman, 6 244; Pantam v. Isham, 1 Salk. 19. Jones (N. C), 78; Averitt v. Murrell, 4 Jones ' Bachelder v. Heagan, 18 Me. 32. (N. C.) 323; Sturgis v. Bobbins, 62 Me. 289; e Taylor's Landlord & Tenant, § 196; Eev. Hewey». Nourse,54Me. 257; Scott n.Hale, 16 Stat. Me., chap. 25, § 21. Me. 326; Tourtellot v. Eosebrook, 11 Mete » Clarke. Foot, 8 Johns. 422; Bachelder u. 460; Maul v. Wilson, 2 HaiT. 443; Fraser v. Heagan, 18 Me. 32 ; Bennett v. Seutt, 18 Barb. Tupper, 29 Vt. 409. USE OP FIRE IN CLEARING LAND. 149 The Question of Negligence illustrated. is on the plaintiff.^ The destruction of property by fire does not raise a presumption of negligence.'^ 2 i. Use of Fire in clearing Land. — Consonant with this principle, to set flre to stubble, wood, timber, grass, or other material which may encumber one's land is a lawful act, for which no liability can be incurred, unless the flre were kindled at an improper time, were carelessly managed, or something of negligence can be shown. A proprietor setting fire on his own land is not an insurer that no injury shall happen to his neighbor.' The rule is well and tersely stated in a late case in Maine, in these words: "Every person has a right to kindle fire on his own land for the purposes of husbandry, if he does it at a proper time and in a suitable manner, and uses reasonable care and diligence to prevent it spreading and doing injury to the property of others. The time may be suitable and the manner prudent, and yet, if he is guilty of negli- gence in taking care of it, and it spreads and injures the property of another in con- sequence of such negligence, he is liable in damages for the injury done. The gist of the action is negligence, and if that exists in either of these particulars, and injury is done in consequence thereof, the liability attaches ; and it is immaterial whether the proof establishes gross negligence, or only a want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant." * 2 5. The Question of Negligence illustrated. — Whether the acts of the defendant are negligent or not determines his liability. His general character as to carefulness in regard to fire is irrelevant.^ The following cases in which a party's conduct has been considered on the question of negligence are given as pertinent to this topic : A. entered a house with a lighted candle ; the house was soon after destroyed by fire.' B. set out a fire for the purpose of clearing his land, the weather being warm and the land dry.' 0. started a fire on his farm, and left it apparently safe ; an unlooked- for change in the weather ensued ; a strong wind sprang up, and carried the fire to the adjoining premises.* D. set fire to a heap of logs, under circumstances similar to those in C.'s case, and the same consequences followed. In all these cases, these facts, standing alone, were held not sufBoient to raise a presumption of negligence in A., B., C, or D. On the other hand, E., while driving a herd of sheep through the country, encamped near plaintiff's premises, and started a fire near his house and barn ; there was a quantity of dry brush and other material scattered around ; B- continued his journey without extinguishing the fire.' P., having given the plaintiff permission to cut wood on his land, started a fire very near one of his piles, which escaped from his control and consumed it.'" G., intending to burn up the brush on his own land, set fire to it within six feet of the plaintiff's land, which was also 1 Baclielderv. Heagen, 18Me. 32;Higgin8 Calkins u. Barger, 44 Barb. 424; Dewey «. V. Dewey, 107 Mass. 494; Stnrgis v. Eobbins, Leonard, 14 Minn. 153; Miller v. Martin, 16 62 Me. 289; TourteUot v. Eosebrook, 11 Mete. Mo. 508; Fahn v. Eeichart, 8 Wis. 255; Dean 460. V. McCart}', 2 Up. Can. Q. B. 448, ante, p. 116; 2 Bi-yan v. Fowler, 70 N. C. 596. In the Gillson v. Xorth Gray E. Co., 33 Up. Can. Q. case of railroad fli-es, on account ot the evi- B. 129 ; Fraser r. Tapper, 29 Vt. 409. donee of negligence or care being almost * Hewey v. Xourse, .54 Me. 256. entirely in the possession of the company or 6 Scott c. Hale, 16 Me. 336. its servants, a different rule has been estab- « Lansing r. Stone, .37 Barb. 15. lished in many of the States. Seepos*,§8 (3). ' Stuart u. H,"iwley, 22 Barb. 619. sBachelder v. Heagan, 18 Me. 32; Clark « Calkins v. B.irger, 44 Barb. 424. V. Foot, 8 Johns. 422; Bennett v. Sontt, 18 9 cieland v. Thornton, 43 Cal. 437. Barb. 347; Stuart v. Hawley, 22 Barb. 619; i» Jordan v. ^yyatt, 4 Gratt. 151. 150 LIABILirr FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIBE. Notes. covered with brush.* H., on the morning of a very dry day, set fire to a heap of logs within five yards of his neighbor's fence, a dead pine tree and much combustible matter being between the log-pile and the fence.' In all these cases negligence was held to be present, and E., P., G-., and H. were obliged to respond in damages. L., in an unusually dry summer season, set fire to logs on his fallow, adjoining the woodland of H. ; the fallow and the woodland were both covered with combustible matter ; the day before the fire was set, there had been a heavy shower, but it afterward became dry and hot, and a high wind carried the fire to the land of H.' M., having stacked his hay in too green a condition, was warned by his neighbors that it would be liable to generate fire; subsequently, observing it smoking, he remarked that he would "chance it;" ultimately it burst into aflame, which spread to V.'s property.* P. was engaged in threshing wheat in a field with a steam machine; while thus engaged, the wind increased so as to make it dangerous to continue to run the machine, but he kept on, and damage to the proprietor of the field ensued.^ L., M., and P. were held chargeable with negligence. i 6. Statutory Liability in North Carolina, lOissourl, Illinois, Iowa, and Connecticut. — In some of the States, on account of the great danger attending the building of fires on prairies, in dry woods, and marshes, statutes are in force making the liability for such fires absolute, under certain circumstances. In North Carolina, for instance, a person must give notice in writing of his intention to set out a fire on his lands, or bear the consequences of its spread.* This notice being for the protec- tion of the adjoining owners, may be waived by them.' In Missouri and Illinois, a person wilfully setting on fire any marshes, woods, or prairies is liable without negligence being shown.* A necessity for the act is an excuse, the burden of proving which is on the defendant.' As used in these statutes, the word " woods " is restricted to forest lands in their natural state.^" In Iowa, there has been some difficulty in con- struing the statutes. An early law provided that if any person or persons " shall set on fire, or cause to be set on fire, any woods, prairies, or other grounds whatever, other than his own, or shall permit the fire set out by him to pass from his own prairie or woods, to the injury of any person or persons, * * * he shall be liable to an action to the party injured, for all damages which he, she, or they may have sustained in consequence of such fire." " In De France v. Spencer," it was held that ordinary caution and honest motives in setting fire to a prairie, and due diligence in preventing it from spreading, was a good defence under this statute. The court say : "Does our statute change this rule,*' and make an individual responsible for damages done by fire passing from his own premises, when it was not within his power to prevent it? We think not. The meaning of the statute is, that a person shall not willingly or carelessly permit or suflFer the fire to pass so as to injure another; or, if he does, that ■ Higgins V. Dewey, 107 Mass. 49i. And see 638; Eev. Stat. 111. 1879, § 158; Armstrong v Barnai-d v. Poor, 21 Pick. 378. Cooley, 10 111. 509; Finley v. Langston, 12 Mo. 2 Garrett v. Freeman, 5 Jones (N. C), 78. 120. 3 Hays V. Miller, 6 Hun, 323 (affirmed in " Johnson v. Barber, 10 111. 425; Burton v. 70 N. Y. 112). McClellan, 3 111. iU. * Vaughan v. Menlove, i Scott, 244 ; 3 Bing. i" Averitt v. Murrell, 4 Jones, 322. N. C. 468. Ji Laws 1846, p. 3, § 1. ' Collins V. Groseclose, 40 Ind. 414. '^ 2 Greene (Iowa), 462. « Eev. Code, chap 16, § 2. " As laid down in Clark v. Foot, 8 Johns. ' Eoberson v. Kirby, 7 Jones (N. C), 477; 433; Biichelder v. Heagan, 18 Me. 32; Ellis v. Jordan v. Lassiter, 6 Jones, 130. Portsmouth, etc., E. Co., 2 Ired. 138. 8 Eev. Stat. Mo. 1835, p. 624; 1 Wag. Stat. STATUTORY LIABILITY. 151 TJse of Pire for mechanical Purposes. Tie should he liahle to the party injured. If a person does all in his power to prevent ■the fire from passing; but if, in opposition to all of his efforts, it still passes on to the premises of another, he does not, in contemplation of the statute, permit it to pass. It encroaches upon his neighbor against his best efforts, without his consent or per- mission, and he should not be held liable for any damage which it may occasion. While a person has a right to set fire to his own grounds, yet if he does so when, "from their contiguity to those near him, or from high wind, or other cause, the result ■would lead to mischief, in such case he would be liable if injury is done to his neigh- bor's property; because he could not exercise diligence to prevent the fire with that ■success as if the fire had been prudently set out. But when from good motives, and under prudential circumstances, a person sets fire to his prairie or woods, and uses such care and diligence to prevent it from spreading as a man of ordinary caution would use to prevent it from injuring his own property, he is not liable for the damage -which it may do the premises or property of others." The statute of 1846 was subsequently amended so as to read, "If any person wilfully, or without using proper •caution, set fire to and burn, or cause to be burned, any prairie or timbered land, by which the property of another is destroyed, he shall," etc. In Hanlon v. Ingram,^ an ■instruction that, before the plaintiflf could recover, he must prove that the defendant had been guilty of gross negligence in setting out the fire or permitting it to escape, was held erroneous, the chief justice who delivered the opinion of the court asking the question, "Would he not be liable in the absence of any negligence?" When the same case subsequently came again before the court, the ruling in De France v. Spencer'^ was followed, though apparently with reluctance;^ yet, in a still later case, it was once more followed.* But when, in 1862, a statute was passed which omitted the words "without using proper caution," contained in the previous act, and which applied to fires set out between the first days of September and May, the court held ■that the liability of a person under this statute was absolute, and entirely regardless of the question of negligence.^ A statute of Connecticut provided that "every per- son who shall set fire on any land, that shall run upon the land of any other person, shall pay to the owner all damages done by such fire." The provisions of this statute have been held to apply only to the kindling of fire on one's land "to destroy bushes, ■or for any like purpose," and would consequently, it seems, not apply to a fire made in a, dwelling-house for domestic purposes. To come within this statute, it is not necessary that the fire should run along the ground in a continuous or traceable ■course, but its spread in any ordinary mode, through natural causes (such as the wind conveying the sparks), is sufficient.^ But the statute does not apply where the fire is set upon the land injured. It must begin on the land of one person and "run nipon the land of another." ' 2 7. The use of Fire for mechanical and manufacturing Purposes. —The principle stated in ^ 3 applies to the use of fire for mechanical or manufactur- ing purposes ; if used without negligence, and with proper safeguards, no liability ■attaches for damage caused by its escape.^ But the use of fire for the purpose of locomotion has been most fruitful of litigation of this character. The cases in which 1 1 Iowa, 108. I Grannis v. Cummins, 25 Conn. 165. » 2 Greene (Iowa), 462. s Gagg v. Vetter, 41 Ind. 228; Hoyt v. » Hanloa v. Ingram, S Iowa, 81. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181 ; Teall v. Barton, 40 < Jacobs V. Andrews, 4 Iowa, 506. Barb. 137 ; Kead v. Morse, 34 Wis. 315 ; Hinds ' Conn V. May, 36 Iowa, 211. v. Barton, 25 N. T. 545. ■• Ayer v. Starkey, 30 Conn. 304. 152 LIABILIXr FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Notes. railroads and steamboat companies have been called upon, to respond to claims for the setting-out of fires are much more numerous than those already considered. The remainder of this note will, therefore, be confined to this portion of the subject. 2 8. The Use of Fire by Railway Companies. — (1.) The General PrincipU stated. — The statutes of 6 Anne and 14 Geo. III. could hardly be construed so as to include railroads, which were unknown at the time of the passage of the later of the two, and for half a century afterwards.! The common-law rule as to the use of danger- ous agencies would certainly render him liable for all the consequences, who, know- ing the likelihood of fire escaping from a furnace, should propel such a machine, through populous cities or combustible forests. He would be liable for the daraaga resulting from the escape of the fire.* But a railroad company chartered by the- legislature, and permitted to use fire, is relieved from this extreme liability by virtue of this power. ' In Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Company, '^ the Court of Exchequer held that, as accidents occasionally arise from the use of fire as a means of propelling, engines on railroads, the happening of such accidents must be taken to be the natural and necessary consequence of the use of fire for such purpose ; and that, therefore, railroad companies, by using fire, are responsible for any accident which may result- from its use, although they have taken every precaution in their power. But on appeal to the Court of Exchequer Chamber this ruling was reversed, and the doctrine, now undisputed both in England and America, established, that when the legislature has sanctioned and authorized the use of a particular thing, and it is used for the purpose- for which it was authorized, and every reasonable precaution is observed to prevent injury, the sanction of the legislature carries with it this consequence : that if damage result from the use of such thing, the party using it is not responsible.* Therefore, in the case of railroads authorized to propel their cars by steam, the gist of their liability for injuries caused by the escape of fire is negligence. This is now the law of England,^ and of every State in the Union,' except where altered by statute.^ (2.) The Degree of Care Required. — The use of locomotive engines, even whea carefully managed, is known to be dangerous, and this fact alone devolves upon those- using them as a motive power a high degree of care. But this term is relative ; and ordinary or reasonable care— which is, after all, the most that the law requires — means, when used in this connection, that degree of care which prudent men, skilled 1 Spaulding v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 30 54 Pa. St. 345; Phila., etc., R. Co. v. Terger,. Wis. 110 ; Vaughan v. Taff Vale R. Co. , 3 Hurl. 73 Pa. St. 121 ; Indiana, etc., E. Co. i;. Para - &N. 742; 5 Hurl. &N. 678; ante, p. 122. more, 31 Ind. 143; Huyett v. Phila., etc., E. 2 Jones V. Festiniog E. Co., L. E. 3 Q. B. Co., 23 Pa. St. 373; Jaclvson v. Chicago, etc., 735; Hammersmith E. Co. v. Brand, L. E. 4 E. Co., 31 Iowa, 176; Kansas, etc., R. Co. v.. H. L. 171; Mosher „. Utica, etc., E. Co., 8 Butts, 7 Kan. 308; Ellis v. Portsmouth, etc.. Barb. 427. E. Co., 2 Ired. 140; Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. a Eex u. Pease, 4 Barn. & Add. 30. v. Culver (Ind.), 6 Cent. L.J. 498; Mor- ■* ^ni!e, p. 122. ris, etc., E. Co. v. The State, 36 N". J. 553; 6 See also Eex v. Pease, 4 Barn. & Adol. McCready v. Eailroad Co., 2 Strobh. 356; 30; The State u. Tupper, Dudley, 135; King Burroughs v. Housatonio, etc., E. Co., 15> D.Morris, etc., E. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 397; Ham- Conn. 124; Miller w. Long Island, etc., E. Co., mersmith R. Co. v. Brand, L. E. 4 H. L. 711. 9 Hun, 194; Home Insurance Co. v. Penn., « Aldridge ». Great Western E. Co., 3 etc., E. Co., 11 Hun, 182; McHugh «. Chi- Man. & G. 517; Piggot v. Eastern, etc., E. cago, etc., E. Co., 41 Wis. 78; Woodson Co., 3 C. B. 229. V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 21 Minn. 60j I Illinois', etc., R. Co. v. Mills, 42 111. 407; Leavenworth, etc., E. Co. v. Cook, 18 Kan. Eailroad Co. v. Yeiser, 8 Pa. St. 366; Frank- 261. lord, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Phila., etc., E. Co., « Post, (11). USE OF FIEE BY RAILWAY COMPANIES. 15S Presumption of Negligence — Res ipsa loquitur. in the particular business, would be lilcely to exercise under the circumstances. The care must be proportionate to the danger. What is oi-dinary care in a case of extra- ordinary danger would be extraordinary care in a case of ordinary danger, and what would be ordinary care in a case of little danger would be much below this in a case of great danger. What would be reasonable care in winter, with the ground covered with snow, or in rainy weather, with the country flooded with water, would not be reasonable care in summer, or daring a drought. So a higher degree of care is re- quired when trains are passing through or standing in the streets of a thickly built city, than when running in the open country; when the wind is high, than when it is calm. In a recent case in one of the Pederal courts, the jury found the defendant guilty of negligence for having landed its steamer near a high elevator while a gale of wind was blowing in that direction.' The principles just stated are announced in a number of cases, among which those given below may be best consulted.^ (3.) Fire from Locomotives as Evidence of Negligence. — The rule in cases of ordi- nary fire, that the destruction of property by this means does not of itself raise a presumption of negligence,' finds an exception in the case of fires caused by steam- engines. All information as to the construction and working of its engines, and of the particular one in fault, is in the possession of the company, as are also the means of rebutting the charge of negligence entirely in its power. An outsider can hardly be expected to prove that in the construction of the engine, or in the use of it at the time the injury occurred, the company was guilty of negligence. He can only prove that his property was destroyed by one of the company's locomotives ; and, having done this, it is but proper to call on the defendant to show that he was not negligent, that he employed careful and competent servants, and that he had used the most im- proved appliances to prevent the escape of fire from his engines. These considera- tions have induced the courts of England,* of Missouri," Illinois,^ Tennessee,' Wisconsin,^ Nebraska,' Nevada,'" and perhaps J\iinnesota," to adopt the presumption of negligence from proof of escape of fire from a locomotive. On the other hand, in 1 Kellogg V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 1 iord i7. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 46 Mo. 156; Cent. L. J. 778 (affirmed in U. S. Sup. Ct., 94 Clemens v. Hannibal, etc.R. Co., 53 Mo. 366; U. S. 469; 5 Cent. L. J. 305). Coale v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 60 Mo. 227; 2 Franktord, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Phila., Coates v. Missouri, etc., E. Co., 61 Mo. 38 etc., E. Co., 54Pa.St.345; Smiths). Old Colony (overruling Smith «. Hannibal, etc., K. Co., E. Co., 10 E. I. 22 ; Fero v. Buffalo, etc., E. Co., S7 Mo. 287). 22 N. Y. 209; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Quain- « Bass v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 28 111. 9; tance, 5S 111. 389 ; Pierce v. Worcester, etc., E. Hlinois, etc., E. Co. v. Mills, 42 111. 407 ; To- Co.,105 Mass. 199; Gaggu. Vetter, 41Ind. 228; ledo, etc.E. Co. u. Larmon, 67 111. 68. Since Eead ti. Morse, 34 Wis. 315 ; Webb u. Eome, adopted by statute. Eev. Stat. 111. 1877, chap. etc., E. Co., 49 N. Y. 420; Michigan, etc., 114, §89; Chicago, etc., R. Co. ti. McCahill, 56 E. Co. V. Anderson, 20 Mich. 244. " Now, the 111. 28 ; Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Campbell, 86 definition of negligence is the absence of 111. 443. care, according to circumstances." WiUes, ' Burke v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 7 Heisk. J., in the leading case of Vaughan v. TafiE 451. Vale E. Co., 5 Hurl. &N. 679; ante, p. 122. 8 spaulding v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 3a » Ante, I 3. Wis. 110. * Aldridgec. Great Western E. Co., SMan. « Burlington, etc., E. Co. v. Westover, 4 & G. 515; Piggot v. Eastern, etc., E. Co., 3 C. Neb. 268. B. 229; Smith v. London, etc., E. Co., L. E. 6 » Longabaugh ». Virginia City, etc.,B. Co., 0. P. 14; Gibson v. SouthEastern E. Co., 1 9 Nev. 271. Fost. & Fin. 23. '' Woodson v. Milwaukee, etc., B. Co., 21 s Fitch ». Pacific E. Co., 45 Mo. 325; Bed- Minn. 60. 154 LIABILITY FOB DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Notes. Connecticut,' Indiana,' New York,' Kansas,* Pennsylvania,^ California,* North Car- olina,' Delaware,' Iowa,' and Ohio '" some additional evidence of negligence is required of the plaintiff. Prom a fire being discovered near the company's right of way, shortly after an engine has passed, it may he presumed that it originated in sparks from the engine, it heing a matter of common knowledge that engines do emit sparks. Such a fire may have arisen from a cigar thrown from a car window, or from a spark dropped from a workman's pipe. But the former cause is much the more probable." (4.) Duty in Construction of Engines. — Were it, as a matter of fact, possible to efiectually prevent the escape of sparks from a locomotive or other steam-engine, the escape of fire would then raise an irrebuttable presumption of negligence, and the rules governing the liability of railroad companies in this respect would be few. Expert evidence, it may be remarked, is to be found in the reports, to the effect that by the use of proper appliances the escape of sparks from a locomotive may be rendered impossible. '^ So, too, several judges have expressed themselves to a similar effect. " The evidence, I think, shows," says Maulb, J., in an English case,'' " that it is perfectly practicable to adopt precautions that will render such accidents next to impossible, by travelling at a rate of speed, or with a load, proportioned to the power of the engine." "Experience has demonstrated," says Scott, J.," "that railway companies, by the use of certain mechanical inventions and contrivances, can prevent the emission of fire-sparks from locomotive engines, in such quantities, at least, as would not be at all dangerous to property in the immediate vicinity." In a very late case in Iowa, Beck, J., says : " We are of opinion that contrivances may he applied to engines that would prove just as effectual in preventing the escape of fire as a fence is in preventing cattle going upon a railroad track. Whether such contrivances are in use, we know not, and it is not important to inquire ; that they may be applied, cannot be doubted, when we contemplate the resources which science brings to the aid of machinists. At all events, the law, in holding railroad com- panies liable for damage resulting from fires set out by their engines, presumes I BorroTighs v. Housatonic, etc., R. Co., 15 ° Gandy v. Chicago, etc., B. Co., 30 Iowa, Conn. 124. 420; McCummons v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 33 ' Indiana, etc.E. Co. ». Paramore, 31 Ind. Iowa, 187; Garrett r. Chicago, eto.,K. Co., 36 143. Iowa, 121. But this rule has since been al- » Sheldon v. Hudson Eiver E. Co., 14 N. T. tered by statute. See ante, § 6. 318; McCaigu. ErieE. Co.,8Huii, 599; Eood '» Euflner v. Cincinnati, etc., E. Co., 7 V. New York, etc., E. Co., 18 Barb. 80 ; Collins Cent. L. J. 316; 34 Ohio St. 96. ». New York, etc., E. Co., 5 Hun, 503. But see " Smith v. London, etc., E. Co., L. E. 6 O. Case B. Northern, etc., E. Co., 59 Barb. 644. P. 14; Burke v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 7 4 Kansas, etc., E. Co. v. Butts, 7 Kan. 308; Heisk. 4S1. Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 12 Anderson v. Cape Fear S. Co., 64 N. C. 354. 399; Steinweg v. Erie Ey., 43 N. Y. 123; Case 6 Eailroad Co. r. Yeiser, 8 Pa. St. 366. And ». Northern Central E. Co., 69 Barb. 644; see Huyett v. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co., 23 Dimmock v. North Staffordshire E. Co., 4 Pa. St. 373. Post. & Fin. 1058; Longabaugh „. Virginia « Hulli). Sacramento, etc., E. Co., 14 Cal. City, etc., E. Co., 9 Nev. 271; Longman v. 387; Henry J). Southern Pacific E. Co., 50 Cal. Grand Junction, etc., E. Co., 3 Fost. & Fin. 176. 736; Crist v. Erie, etc., E. Co., 1 N. Y. S. 0. ' EUis V. Portsmouth, etc., E. Co., 2 Ired. (T. & C.) 435. 138. '3 piggot V. Eastern, etc., E. Co., 3 C.B. 230. 8 Jefferis v. PhMa., etc., E. Co., 3 Houst. " Chicago, etc., K. Co. i/. Quaintance, 68 447. Dl. 389. USE OF PIEE BY RAILWAY COMPANIES. 155 Duty in Construction of Engines. they may prevent injuries resulting in that way." ^ But these expressions are mis- leading. The duty imposed upon persons using steam-engines, and railroad com- panies using locomotives, is only that they shall take all the precautions which are within their means, and which science and invention have offered. By this is meant only the most improved machinery which is practicable, and not any thing which mechanical skill and ingenuity can devise, whether known or not, or able to be obtained or not. An instruction that the defendant was guilty of negligence " unless provided with all the means and appliances which science has discovered to prevent the escape of fire " is erroneous.'' A private person or a railroad company is not hound to purchase a patent for every invention which is claimed to be an im- provement. To be approved, such appliances must be shown, both by use and the experience of men, to be superior and effectual.' But if a particular safeguard has been tested, and found to meet the purpose, the railroad is required to adopt the better machinery.* "If," it is said in a New York case,^ "there was known and in use any apparatus which, applied to an engine, would enable it to consume its own sparks, and thus prevent the emission of them, to the consequent ignition of com- bustible property, it was negligent if it did not avail itself of such apparatus. But it was not bound to use every possible precaution which the highest scientific skill might have suggested, nor to adopt an untried machine or mode of construction.'^ The Supreme Court of Indiana state the rule thus : " If the company, by availing itself of all the discoveries which science and experience have put within its reach, could have constructed its machinery so perfect as to prevent the emission of sparks or the dropping of coal, and if the machinery used in this case was not so perfect as to accomplish this purpose, the fact that the machinery used was such as was in common and general use, and had been approved by experience, did not relieve the appellant from liability." " In Gagg v. Vetter,'' where the fire causing the damage escaped from the defendant's brewery, the same court said on this point: "A mere difference of opinion among men of science and experience, as to the best plan to construct the chimney, furnace, and flues, did not justify the selection of any well- supported theory, without further inquiry, for they were bound to use all due care and vigilance to ascertain which theory was correct arid which was incorrect ; and for that purpose they were bound to avail themselves of all the discoveries which science and experience had put within their reach. While the law does not require absolute scientific perfection in the construction of such works, it does require the exercise of a high degree of care and skill to ascertain, as near as may be, the best plan for the structures ; and it requires not only that skilful and experienced workmen shall be employed in their construction, but that due skill was exercised in the particular instance." The duty of a railroad company in this respect is more liberally stated by an English judge ; and as his charge does not conflict with the American decisions, it is here given : " The company, in the construction of their engines, are bound not > Small V. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 6 Cent. L. City, etc., H. Co., 9 Nev. 271 ; Bevier v. Dela- J. 310. ware, etc., E. Co., 13 Hun, 254; Hoyt v. Jet- 2 Head v. Morse, 34 Wis. 315. fers, 30 Mich. 18(1. 3 Spaulding v. Cliicago, etc., R. Co., 30 Wis. « Toledo, etc., E. Co. ■;;. Com, 71 lU. 493. 110 ; Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Pindar, 53 111. 447 ; 6 steinweg v. Erie Ey., 43 N. Y. 123. Franklord etc., Turnpike Co. v. Phila., etc., 6 Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Nelson,61Ind. E. Co., 54 Pa. St. 346; Anderson v. Cape Fear 150. S. Co., 64 N. C. 399; St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. ' 41 Ind. 228. Oilham, 39 111. 455; Longabaugh ». Virginia 156 LIABILITT rOE DAMAGES CAUSED BY TIKE. Notes. only to employ all due care and skill for tlie prevention of mischief arising to the property of others by the emission of sparks, or any other cause, hut they are hound to avail themselves of all the discoveries which science has put within their reach for that purpose, provided they are such as, under the circumstances, it is reasonable to require the company to adopt. But if the dangers to be avoided were insignifi- cant, or not very likely to occur, and the remedy suggested was very costly and troublesome, or such as interfered materially with the efficient working of the engine, you will say whether it could raasonably be expected that the company should adopt it. On the other hand, if the risk was considerable, and the expense, or trouble, or inconvenience of providing the remedy was not great in proportion to the risk, then you will have to say whether the company would reasonably be excused from availing themselves of such remedy because it might to some extent be attended with expense or other disadvantage to themselves." ' Chief Justice TiNDAL, in an early case,^ compared the use of a perforated cap on the chimney of a locomotive to the muzzling of a dog known by his owner to be accustomed to bite, and the absence of which precaution was, according to an old case, negli- gence in the latter. Failing to use a " spark-arrester " is negligence per se, and it is no answer that its use would have choked the smoke-stack and impeded the speed of the engine.' An engine which throws burning brands to the distance of one hundred feet has been declared, as a matter of law, not to have such safeguards as the law requires.* There is, however, a disposition in the courts to leave this ques- tion to be decided as one of fact by the jury.* In Kellogg v. Milwaukee, etc., Rail- road Company,^ where the defendant was the owner of a steamboat which ran on the Mississippi River, which set fire to an elevator at one of its landings, and a pre- ponderance of evidence given at the trial showed that the spark-arresters could not be successfully used on boats navigating the Mississippi, and for that reason were generally in disuse, Mr. Justice Millkk, in charging the jury, said : " On that subject, I hesitated a good deal whether I should have to say to you that there was no negligence in that regard, — that is to say, that the owners of the boat were not bound to use their spark-extinguishers or arresters ; but, upon further reflection, I do not think, on the evidence, I am authorized to declare as a matter of law that that is so. But I must leave you to say, from the testimony, whether in this respect the owners of the boat were guilty of negligence." The jury found for the plaintiff, and the verdict was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.' In an English case, the judge having left it to the jury to say whether the defendants were negligent in not having adopted "the perforated grating, the Venetian blinds, or the American spark-catcher," and the issue being found for the plaintiff, the court, on appeal, refused to disturb the verdict, although the weight of evidence went to show that the use of these contrivances was impracticable.' A finding, then, that the company has taken all practicable precautions that science could suggest and the 1 Fremantle v. London, etc., E. Co., 2 * Jackson ». Chicago, etc., E. Co., 31 Iowa, Tost. &Fin. 340 (affirmed on appeal, 10 C. B. 176; lUinols, etc., E. Co. -v. McClelland, 42 (N. 9.) 89). See also Dimmock v. North Staf- 111. 355. fordshire E. Co., i Fost. & Fin. 1058; Hoyt ' Lackawanna, etc., E. Co. v. Doak, 52 Pa. V, Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181. St. 379 ; Algier v. Str. Maria, U Cal. 167. 2 Piggot V. Eastern, etc., R. Co., 3 C. B. 229. « 1 Cent. L. J. 278. ' Anderson v. Cape Fear S. Co., 64 N. C. '5 Cent. L. J. 305 ; 94 TJ. S. 278. 399; BedeE v. Long Island B. Co., 44 N. T. 8 Fremantle v. London, etc., E. Co., 10 0. 367. B. (N. S.) 89. USE OF FIRE BY RAILWAY COMPANIES. 157 Duty in Management of Engines. circumstances would permit is a finding that there was no negligence, and frees it from liability.' (5.) Duty in Management of Engines. — A locomotive or other steam-engine may, of course, be properly constructed and equipped, and yet cause fires through negli- gence in its management ; in which case, the liability is the same as stated in the pre- ceding section.' Overloading the locomotive may amount to negligence.' The engine may have the means of retaining the sparks, and yet there may be negligence in not properly managing the safeguards.' Therefore, not only is it required that the locomotives of a railroad company were originally constructed with the best and most approved appliances to prevent the escape of fire, but, if one of them has caused damage, it will devolve upon the defendant to show that its engine was, at the time of the accident, both in good order, and in the care of competent persons.* Proof that its engines were properly constructed and equipped, and were carefully inspected by a competent person every other day, and found to be in good order, was held to rebut the presumption of negligence, even though the inspection was no* shown to have continued down to the moment when the fire escaped.* But this must be proved by direct evidence ; a usage to this effect will not do." Negligence may be inferred from using wood in a coal-burning engine,* or from carrying more steam than necessary, whereby an undue quantity of sparks are emitted. But a railroad company has a right to use the fuel in ordinary use ; and it is not liable for using an inferior quantity, unless its use was known to be hazardous.' The following acts in the management of the engine have been held not to be negligence, on the evidence : Putting an undue amount of coal into the fire-box, and running backwards and forwards while at a water-station;'" shutting ofiT steam,'' and emitting steam through the smoke-stack." The danger to buildings and other property caused by the emission of sparks from engines while in rapid motion, is one of the mischiefs which the statutes limiting the rate of speed of trains through cities and towns were passed to prevent ; therefore, for a fire occurring while the locomotive is running in violation of these statutes the company will be liable." Where a burning brand was thrown from a passing locomotive by a servant of the company, the latter was held liable for the damage which it caused.'* Where a fire started by sparks from a loco- 1 Vaugban v. Taff Vale E. Co., 5 Hurl & N. Wis. 110; Baltimore, etc., E. Co. v. Shipley, 679, ante, p. 122 ; Kansas, etc. , E. Co. v. Butts, 39 Md. 251. 7 Kan. 308 ; Burke v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 7 ' Baltimore, etc., E. Co. v. Shipley, 39 Md. Heisk. 451; Kood v. New York, etc.,E. Co., 251. But see Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Quaiu- 18 13:ub. 80; Phila., etc., E. Co. v. Hendrict- tance, 58 111. 389. son, 80 Pa. St. 182; Burlington, etc., E. Co. « st. Joseph, etc., E. Co. v. Chase, 11 Kan. V. ^\^estover, 4 Neb. 268; Jefleris v. Phila., 47; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Quaintance, 58 etc. , R. Co., 3 Houst. 447 ; Illinois, etc., E. Co. 111. 389. V. McClelland, 42 111. 355; Frankford, etc., » Collins v. New York, etc., E. Co., 5 Hun, Turnpike Co. v. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co., 499. 54 Pa. St. 345. '" Phila., etc., E. Co. v. Yerger, 73 Pa. St. 2 Hinds .;. Barton, 25 N. Y. 544; Toledo, 121. etc. , E. Co. t/. Wand , 48 Ind. 476 ; Baltimore, " Burke v. Louisville, etc. , E. Co., 7 Heisk. etc., E. Co. 17. Dorsey, 37 Md. 19. 451. s Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Pindar, 53 111. 447. " Kellogg v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 1 Cent. < Dimmook v. North Staffordshire, etc., L. J. 279. E. Co., 4 Fost. & Fin. 1058. " Martin v. Western, etc., E. Co., 23 Wis. 6 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Quaintance, 58 437. lU. 389; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Olampit, 63 '* McCoun v. New York, etc., E. Co., 68 HI. 96. Barb. 338. • Spaulding v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 30 158 LIABILITY FOK DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIEE. Notes. motive on the defendant's right of way was seen by employees of the company in time to have extinguished it before it had gone very far, and they, notwithstanding this, permitted it to burn, whereby it spread to and consumed the plaintiff's premises, the company was held liable, although the escape of the fire from the locomotive was accidental and without negligence.^ So, also, where sparks from a construction-train set fire to combustibles on the track, which, spreading, burned the plaintiff 's prop- erty ; and the defendant's servants on the train, though having notice of the fire, did not stop and attempt to extinguish it. Had the train been a passenger-train, the duty might not have been the same.^ (6.) Evidence of Negligence. — Direct evidence of defects in the construction or negligence in the management of the engines of the company causing the damage could hardly be expected of a stranger, and, indeed, is not required. The necessities of the case seem to have compelled the courts to trench somewhat on the general rules regarding the relevancy of evidence in actions of this kind; the most important example of this will be noticed in the next section. "The engines," it has been well said, " are all alike to him. He does not know them apart. Nor does he know when any particular engine is used, or who manages it. And when it passes at the rate of fifteen or twenty miles an hour, he could not see enough of it to afterwards Identify it What the engine is, and how it is managed, is peculiarly within the knowledge of the company." ' The plaintiff, therefore, is not bound to prove which one of the defendant's engines set out the fire.* To show negligence in the company, evidence that sparks were frequently emitted from its engines is admissible,* as, to show negli- gence in a particular engine is evidence that while the one in question, on the par- ticular day, set out other fires, other engines of the same line, and running on the same route, did not.^ "Such evidence," it is said in the last case, "would lead irre- sistibly to the conclusion that there was negligence somewhere. Of course, it would not locate the negligence. It would not show whether the fault was with the engine or with the engineer ; whether the engine was good, but was out of order, or bad, though in order ; whether the engineer was competent, but acted carelessly, or Incom- petent, though he acted as well as he knew. And if the engine was bad or out of order, it would not show in what particular it was bad or out of order. And if the engineer acted unskilfully or carelessly, it would not show in what particular he acted unskilfully or carelessly. Yet such evidence is competent, and it would be about the best that the plaintiff could, from the nature of the ease, produce." Evidence of the use of the stack by others is admissible upon the question of the safety of the stack ; ' that the company, after the accident, changed the stack of the engine which caused the damage is likewise relevant.^ "Where it was proved that all the engines belonging to the defendant's road were coal-burners, and that it was more dangerous to burn wood in a coal-burner than to burn coal, it was held competent for the plaintiff, a stranger to the company, to show that the defendant was burning wood • Kenuey c. Hannibal, etc., B. Co., 63 Mo. ^ Penn. E. Co. v. Stranahan, 79 Pa. St. 99; 3 Cent. L. J. 399; Bass v. Chicago, etc., 405. E. Co., 28 111. 9. 6 Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Bales, 16 Kan. 2 Eolke V. Chicago, etc.E. Co., 26 Wis. 252; Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Campbell, 16 637. Kan. 201. 3 Atchison, etc., E. Co. -u. Stanford, 12 ' Frankford, etc., Turnpike Co. «. PhHa., K.in. 354. etc., E. Co, 54 Pa. St. 345. * Bevier v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 13 Hun, » St. Joseph, etc., K. Co. v. Chase, 11 Kan. 264. 47 ; Bevier v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 13 Hun, 254. USE OF PIKE BY EAILWAY COMPANIES. 159 Evidence of other and distinct Fires. in all its engines in general, without shewing more particularly that wood was burned in the particular engine which caused the fire.' Negligence may he inferred, sufScient to sustain the action, from the failure to comply with a statutory duty.' Thus, in Martin v. Western Union Railroad Com- pany,' where the complaint alleged negligence in running the train within the city limits, where the fire occurred, at an unlawful rate of speed, and in carelessly opening the grates and flues of the boiler, whereby burning cinders escaped, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, although no proof of the latter allegation was offered. "We have no doubt," said the court, "that the danger of buildings and other adjacent property liable to injury and destruction by fire, caused by the emission of coals and sparks from the engine when in rapid motion, was one of the mischiefs which the statute limiting the rate of speed through cities and villages was designed to prevent, and are consequently of opinion that for losses so occasioned by trains moving at a greater rate of speed than the statute prescribes, the company is respon- sible." (7.) Evidence of other and distinct Fires. — The business of running railroad trains suggests a unity of management and a general similarity in the construction of the engines. For this reason, and on account of the difficulty of proving negligence in these cases, as before pointed out, the admission of evidence as to other and distinct fires from the one alleged to have caused the injury is permitted. This rule is adopted in England, and prevails in all the States, with one, or possibly two, excep- tions. More particularly, it may be stated as follows : That, in actions for damages caused by the negligent escape of fire from locomotive engines, it is competent for the plaintiff to show that, about the time when the fire in question happened, the trains which the company were running past the location of the fire were so managed in respect to their furnaces as to be likely to set on fire objects in the position of the property burned, or to show the emission of sparks or ignited matter from other engines of the defendant passing the spot upon other occasions, either before or after the damage occurred, without showing that they were under the charge of the same driver, or were of the same construction, as the one occasioning the damage.' This rule is not restricted in its application to railway fires.^ In an action for damage to property caused by the escape of fire from the chimney of a manufactory, evidence that smoke, sparks, and flame had been observed coming from the chimney at other times was held admissible on the question of the proper construction of the stack.^ Evidence of this character is admitted for two purposes : First, To show the cause of the injury. Second, To show negligence in the construction or working of the particular engine which caused the damage. 1. On the Cause of the Injury. — "I think it clearly was admissible," said Tindal, C. J., in an early case,' " for the purpose for which it was received, viz., to ascertain the possibility of fire being projected from the engine to such a distance from the railway as the building in question. Whether or not it was admissible for any other purpose, it is not necessary to inquire." And Maule, J., added : " The matter in issue was whether or not the plaintiff's property had been destroyed by fire proceeding 1 St. Joseph, etc., R. Co. v. Chase, 11 Kan. 176; Home Ins. Co. ». Penn., etc., R. Co., 11 47. Hun, 182. 2 Briggs V. New York, etc., R. Co., 72 ST. Y. * Hinds v. Barton, 25 N. Y. 544; Hoyt v. 26. Jetters, 30 Mich. 181. ' 23 Wis. 437. ° Gagg v. Vetter, 41 Ind. 228. ■» Henry v. South Pacific R. Co., 50 Cal. ' Piggot v. Eastern, etc., R. Co., 3 0. B. 230. 160 LIABILITY FOR DA:MAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Notes. from the defendant's engine ; and involved in that issue was the question whether or not the fire could have been so caused. The evidence was offered for the purpose of showing that it could, and for that purpose it was clearly material and admissible." And this rule has been followed in this country.' In a Massachusetts case,' the plaintiff's evidence showed that within a fortnight previous to the fire in question the engine complained of had emitted burning sparlts, that fell upon the building injured. The defendant showed that similarly constructed engines had been in use on its own and other roads for years, and that they did not emit sparks that would set fire to buildings. In reply, plaintiff was permitted to show that similar engines on one of the other roads had emitted sparks which had set fire to objects along the track. " The evidence to which the defendant objected," said the court, " was clearly competent. One of the grounds of the defence was, that no sparks of coal from the engine of the defendant could reach the premises of the plaintiff so as to communi- cate fire. To meet this proposition, it was certainly fit and apposite for the plaintiff to prove the physical possibility that fire could be so communicated, by showing that on a previous occasion the same engine, using the same species of fuel, had emitted burn- ing sparks which fell within the enclosure of the plaintiff. Such evidence would have been open to question If offered solely in support of the plaintiff's case; but it was rendered relevant and material by the ground taken in defence. On the same ground, evidence concerning the emission of sparks from similar engines used on other roads was admissible." If the origin of the fire be admitted, or if the possibility of its being caused by the defendant be not denied, evidence of subsequent fires would be inadmissible, for this purpose at least.' 2. On the Question of Negligence. — That other fires had occurred antecedent to the injury would be a circumstance which should have caused the defendant to be more vigilant, and would be relevant on the question of negligence;' and evidence of other fires, either antecedent or subsequent, would tend to show that the defendant's engines were not in right condition for arresting sparks, — either that they were not properly constructed, or were out of repair.* In a recent and very well-reasoned case, on this question it is said: "What are the facts of this case? Plaintiff's wood caught fire in some manner to him, at the time, unknown. How did the fire originate ? This was the first question to be established in the line of proof. Positive testimony could not be found. The plaintiff was compelled, from the necessities of the case, to rely upon circumstantial evidence. "What does he do ? He first shows, as In the New Tork case, the improbabilities of the fire having originated in any other way except from coals dropping from the defendant's engines. He then shows the presence, in the wood-yard, of one of the engines of the defendant within half an hour prior to the breaking out of the fire ; then proves that fires have been set in the same wood- yard, within a few weeks prior to this time, from sparks emitted from defendant's locomotives. I think such testimony was clearly admissible, under the particular facts of this case, upon the weight of reason as well as of authorities. * * * Upon the question of negligence, it was admissible as tending to prove that if the engines were, as claimed by defendants, properly constructed, and supplied with the best 1 Burke «. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 7 Heisk. Y. 221; Field v. New York, etc., B. Co., 32 451; Field v. New York, etc., E. Co., 32 N. N. Y. 339; Chase v. St. Joseph, etc., E. Co., Y. 339; Longabaugh v. Virginia, etc., E. Co., 11 Kan. 47; Huyett v. Philadelphia, etc., B. 9 Nev. 271. Co., 23 Pa. St. 373; Railroad Co. v. Yeiser, 8 2 Eoss ». Boston, etc., E. Co., 6 AUen, 86. Pa. St. 366. But see Erie E. Co. v. Decker, 3 Smith V. Old Colony E. Co., 10 E. I. 22. 78 Pa. St. 293. * Sheldon v. Hudson Eiver E. Co., 14 N. XJSE OF riRE BY RAILWAY COMPANIES. 161 Duty in Management of Engines. appliances in general use, they could not have been properly managed, else the fires would not have occurred." ^ Proof of fires for four years back was allowed in this •case, the court citing with approval the language of the New York Court of Appeals in an earlier case : ^ " The more frequent these occurrences, and the longer time they had been apparent, the greater the negligence of the defendant; and such proof would disarm the defendant of the excuse that, on the particular occasion, the drop- ping of fire was an unavoidable accident." The same rule of evidence prevails in the Federal courts. In Grand Trunk Railway Company v. Richardson,^ the plaintiff was allowed to prove that at various times during the same summer, before the fire occurred, some of the defendant's locomotives scattered fire when going past the property destroyed, without showing that either of the locomotives which it was claimed caused the fire was among the number, and without showing that the former locomotives were similar in their make, state of repair, or management, to the latter ones. Mr. Justice Strong said: "The question, therefore, is, whether it tended in any degree to show that the burning of the bridge, and the consequent destruction of the plaintiff's property, was caused by any of the defendant's locomotives. The question has often been considered by the courts in this country and in England, and such evidence has, we think, been generally held admissible as tending to prove the possi- bility, and a consequent probability, that some locomotive caused the fire, and as tending to show a negligent habit of the officers and agents of the railroad company. There are, it is true, some cases that seem to assert the opposite rule. It is, of course, indirect evidence, if it be evidence at all. In this case, it was proved that engines run by these defendants had crossed the bridge not long before it took fire. The par- ticular engines were not identified, but their crossing raised at least some probability, in the absence of proof of any other known cause, that they caused the fire. And it seems to us that, under the circumstances, the probability was strengthened by the fact that some engines of the same defendants, at other times during the same season, had scattered fire during their passage." In a recent Kansas case,* it was held that evidence that .other engines, under like circumstances, did not communicate fire at the place where the fire in question occurred was competent as tending to prove negligence on the part of the defendant with regard to the engine which caused the fire, either as to its condition or man- agement. So, in an earlier Vermont case,^ in which it was held that where the evidence tends to show that engines of proper construction and suitable repair would not scatter fire so as to endanger property, the logical conclusion is that the engine which caused the fire was not properly constructed, or was not in suitable repair ; it was also said that, in connection with this testimony, the plaintiff might show that about the time the fire occurred the defendant's engines frequently scattered fire. "Eor the Inference would be from this evidence, in connection with that tending to show that engines which so scatter fire as that it kindles along the roadside are not of proper construction and suitable repair, that the fire in question was caused by one of those defective engines." So, evidence that the defendant's engine, for a month or two before the fire, had dropped quantities of live coal in the locality of the fire ; that there were live coals upon the track at other places at the time of the fire ; and that coal at other times had dropped from the engine in question,^ or from other en- 1 Longabaugh v. Virginia, etc., R. Co., 9 * Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Nev. 271. Kan. 354. 2 Field V. New York, etc., E. Co., 33 N. » Cleaveland v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 42 Y. 339. Vt. 449. 3 91 U. S. 454; 3 Cent. L. J. 353. ' Webb v. Eome, etc., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 420. 11 162 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Notes. gines,' has been held admissible. Evidence of this character, notwithstanding earlier cases seem to announce a different rule, would now be permitted in Maryland ^ and New Hampshire.' But proof of such matters is said by the Supreme Court of Mis- souri to be collateral to the issues in cases of this character, and is, therefore, not admissible in this State.* (8.) The Duty of a Railroad as to its Might of Way. — A railroad company is bound to keep its track and contiguous land clear of materials likely to be ignited from sparks issuing from its locomotives ; and neglect of these precautions will render it liable, even though its appliances were proper, and though it were guilty of no negligence in allowing the fire to escape. This is a, duty which is implied in the grants to corporations to use locomotive engines. A franchise of this nature must be strictly construed ; and it would be unreasonable to presume that, in granting the privilege to use this dangerous agent, the legislature intended to give them the privi- lege of running their engines on premises surrounded and covered with combustible material.^ The removal of such combustible substances is quite as much a means of preventing the communication of fire from their locomotives as the use of inventions for preventing the escape of fire from the locomotives themselves. In Smith v. London and South- Western Railway,^ it appeared that certain work- men employed by the company in cutting the grass and trimming the hedges border- ing its line placed the trimmings in heaps near the track, where they remained for fourteen days in the month of August. One of the heaps was ignited by a passing engine, and the fire spread to a house two hundred yards distant from the track. It was held by the Court of Common Pleas, Brett, J., dissenting, that there was evidence to go to the jury of negligence on the part of the company, although there was no sug- gestion that the engine was improperly constructed or driven. On appeal, this ruling was unanimously approved by the six judges of the Court of Exchequer Chamber.' In a North Carolina case, where the company had allowed a pile of dry, combustible sills to remain near its track, which, being ignited by one of the company's engines, communicated the fire to the plaintiff's fence, this fact was held by the court to be negligence.* And in Flynn v. San Francisco and San Josi Railroad Company,^ it is said : "Nor is the ignition of combustible matter lying on the track of a railroad, by sparks dropped by a passing engine, unavoidable accident. The removal of the com- bustible matter from the road is an obvious and sure protection." In Illinois, after some conflict in the views of the different judges, it seems to be settled that this is not negligence joer se, but merely a fact from which the jury may infer negligence.'" It is competent evidence, bearing on the question of negligence, that after the fire more men were employed by the company to walk and watch the track than were 1 Westfall V. Erie E. Co., 5 Hun, 75. 288; Henry v. Southern, etc., B. Co., 60 Cal. 2 Annapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Gantt, 39 Md. 176; Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. v. Nelson, 51 Ind. 115. Comtra, Baltimore, etc., E. Co. v. Wood- 150. But see Kansas, etc., E. Co. v. Butts, 7 rnff, 4 Md. 242. Kan. 308. 3 Boyce V. Cheshire E. Co., 43 N. H. 627. « L. E. 5 0. P. 98. Contra, s. c, 42 N. H. 98. ' L. E. 6 C. P. 14. 4 Ooale V. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 60 Mo. » Troxler v. Eiohmond, etc., E. Co., 74 K. 227; Lester v. Kansas, etc., E. Co., 60 Mo. C. 377. 265; 2 Cent. L.J. 641. » 40 Cal. 14. s Salmon v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 38N. J. i" Bass v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 28 IlL 9; 5; Delaware, etc., E. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. J. Illinois, etc., E. Co. v. Mills, 42 111. 407; 299; Kellogg u. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 26 Wis. Ohio, etc., E. Co. v. Shanefelt, 47 lU. 497; 223; Toledo, etc., E. Co. r. Wand, 48 Ind. 476; Illinois, etc., E. Co. v. Frazier, 47 III. 505; Burlington, etc., E. Co. v. Westover, 4 Neb. Eocklord, etc., E. Co. o. Eogers, 62 111. 346. USE OF FIRE BY RAILWAY COMPANIES. 163 Contributory Negligence. employed when the damage occurred.^ Yet it is ruled that a railroad company is not bound to keep men stationed along the line of its road, either to guard against or extinguish flres.^ Therefore, where the owner of cordwood had deposited it near a railroad track, in accordance with the directions of an agent of the company, and under an agreement that it was to become the property of the company when meas- ured and paid for by the company, it was held that the latter was under no obliga- tion to provide a watchman to protect it from fire accidentally escaping from its engines.' (9.) Contributory Negligence. — To what extent the law casts upon an owner of property situated near a railroad track the duty of protecting It from the danger of being destroyed by fire negligently permitted to escape from the company's locomo- tives is a question much discussed in the American adjudications on the subject of railroad fires. The leading case of Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Railway Company,^ — the ruling in which upon this point may be seen in the remarks of Mabtdc, B. : "It would require a strong authority to convince me that because a railway runs along my land I am bound to keep it in a particular state ;" and of Bkamwbll, B. : " The plaintifi' used his land in a natural and proper way for the purposes for which it was fit. The defendants come to it, he being passive, and do it a mischief," — has settled the law in England.^ In this country, this defence has been a common one in actions of this character, but has prevailed but seldom. The following illustrations are presented as to the rulings of the courts on this point : — For the owner of a warehouse adjoining a railroad track to permit the windows of a room to remain open and unglazed, in which were stored cobs, husks of com, grain, rags, and other inflammable material, in Illinois, it seems, would amount to contribu- tory negligence.^ But not, it appears, leaving open the doors of an unfinished build- ing situated near the track, although upon the floor were considerable shavings;' nor to suffer the roof of a building to be in such a condition as to be more liable to take fire than if it had a safe and secure roof; ^ nor neglecting to keep down grass ; ' nor permitting grass to accumulate in the fence-corners near the track ; '" nor allowing leaves and combustible matter to accumulate on the land ; '"■ nor, in Tennessee, build- ing a house within thirty yards of the railroad track ; ^'^ nor, in Kansas, to stack hay, on a newly mown meadow, thirty rods from the track ; i' nor, in Nebraska, failing to plough a trench round a hedge and straw ricks ; i' nor failing to remove a barn which stands in dangerous proximity to the track ; ^ nor suffering the roof of a barn which '- WesHall v. Erie R. Co., 5 Hun, 75. » Fero v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 22 N. T. 209. 2 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Shipley, 39 Md. 8 phila., etc., B. Co. v. Hendriokson, 80 251. Pa. St. 183. s Indianapolis, etc.B. Ccv. Paramore, 31 » Smith v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 37 Mo. Ind. 143. 287. 4 Ante, p. 122. lo Fitch v. The Paciflc R. Co., 45 Mo. 322. 6 Vaughan v. Taff Vale R. Co. was the " Salmon ti. Delaware, etc.,B. Co., 38 N. J. first and is the only case in which the ques- L. 5 ; Delaware, etc., B. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. tion oi contributory negligence, as affecting J. 299. these actions, has been considered by a court ^ St. Joseph, etc., B. Co. v. Chase, 11 Kan. of appeal, though it had previously been 47. raised at Nisi Prius. Hammon v. South- i' Burke v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 7 Heisk. Eastern E. Co. ; WaU. on Eys., § 239, note e; 451. Bliss V. London, etc., E. Co., 2 Fost. & Fin. " Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Westover, 4 341. Neb. 268. « Great Westem E. Co. v. Haworth, 39 111. 's Caswell v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 42 Wis. 347. 193. 164 LIABILITr FOB DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIEE. Notes. stood near the track, and which was made of shingles, to become and remain dry and decayed, and peculiarly liable, on a dry and windy day, to he set on fire by a spark from a passing engine.' In Missouri, it has been held that to allow shavings to accu- mulate around an unfinished house, situated about one hundred feet from the track, would be such negligence as to preclude a recovery for its loss.''' In a G-eorgia case, the fire was communicated by sparks from the defendant's engine to a pile of wood in its yard, and from there was carried to the plaintiff's premises, adjacent thereto. It was held that the latter, in building his house so near the wood-yard, had assumed the increased risk.' In an Illinois case,* the plaintiff had placed his house some distance from the railroad track, but subsequently, through the erection by another of a build- ing more contiguous to the track, it was placed in a much more hazardous position, and was a short time afterwards destroyed by fire communicated in the first instance to the later and nearer building, and from thence to the plaintiff's property. It was sought to charge him with contributory negligence, but the court refused to sustain this plea. In a late Wisconsin case,* the fact that a pane of glass was out of the window of plaintift''s house, adjoining the defendant's road, through which sparks from its engine were blown, and destroyed a quantity of goods, was held not to be such contributory negligence as would prevent a recovery. The court very properly thought that occupants of adjacent dwellings were not to be held to such a degree of care in preventing accidents of this kind as would require them, contrary to common usage, to keep their windows closed when it would be more convenient and comfort- able for them to leave them open. Then, if a whole window open would not amount to negligence, a part of a pane could hardly be. In a case decided in the New York Supreme Court,^ the plaintiff's barn, in which he kept his horses, stood within two feet of the line fence. Straw and manure from the barn were thrown outside, and a pile had accumulated during the summer, and had become very dry and combustible. A spark from the defendant's engine set it on fire. The Supreme Court held, revers- ing the ruling of the judge below, that this was such evidence of contributory negli- gence as should have been submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, having examined this question at great length in the case of Kellogg -v. Chicago and North -Western Railway Company,'' had ap- parently established the English rule in that State, until, in a very recent case, decided in November, 1878, and not yet reported in the regular series, they con- cluded — to use a, very handy term — to qualify the doctrine there announced. In the first case, the question of contributory negligence is discussed by the chief justice in two lengthy opinions, a rehearing having been granted, and a conclusion reached which substantially accords with the ruling in Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Company. The facts were these: The plaintiff had permitted weeds, grass, and stubble to remain upon his own land, Immediately adjoining the railroad of the defendant They were dry and very combustible. Upon the defendant's right of way there were also weeds and dry grass, but in greater quantities and of heavier growth. The plaintiff had neither cut nor removed the weeds from his land, nor ploughed or removed the stubble, so as to prevent the spread of fire. These grasses > Jefferis v. Phila., etc., E. Co., 3 Houst. ' Martin v. Western, etc., E. Co., 23 Wis. *47. 437. See Eowell v. Eailroad, 57 N. H. 132. 2 Coates V. Missouri, etc., E. Oc, 61 Mo. 88. « Collins v. New York, etc., R. Co., 5 Hun, s Macon, etc., E. Co. v. McConnell, 27 Ga. 499. 481. 1 26 Wis. 229. * Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Maxfleld, 72 HI. 95. USE OP riRE BY RAILWAY COMPANIES. 165 Contributory l![egl)gence. and weeds catching fire, it was carried, by reason of a strong wind, to the stacks and barns of the plaintiff, situated some distance from the line of the railroad. The fire originated on the defendant's right of way, from some coals having been dropped from one of its engines. The court below charged the jury that it was for them to say whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence ; and If they found that he was, he could not recover. The defendant asked an instruction, which was refused, that it was negligence per se for the plaintiff to leave grass, weeds, and stubble upon his own land, exposed to the fire which might be communicated to them from the burning grass and weeds on the defendant's right of way. The refusal of the trial judge to so charge was upheld by the Supreme Court. This ruling was followed in a subsequent case.' But in Murphy v. Chicago, etc.. Railroad Company,'^ already referred to, the court refused to apply the rule laid down in the Kellogg case to the facts there presented. The doctrine which now prevails in that State may be seen from the following extract from the opinion of the court: "Whilst we do not intend in this case to overrule any case heretofore decided in this court, limiting the decisions to the actual facts of the cases decided, we do intend to hold, and do hold, that the doctrine of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is applicable to the case at bar, as well as to all other cases where a recovery is sought to be had on the ground of the negligent acts of the defendant ; and we further hold that the negli- gent and careless acts of the plaintiff upon his own lands adjoining a railroad, although such acts may be in themselves lawful, may amount to contributory negligence, ac- cording to the circumstances. /"Without deciding that the mere location of a barn, car- penter-shop, planing-mill, or other manufacturing establishment which is, from its nature, easily set on fire, within a few feet of a railroad track, in a city where trains are made up and engines necessarily pass and repass more frequently than on the ordinary line, would in itself be negligence which might defeat an action for their destruction by fire originating from the negligence of the company, we are inclined to hold that, in such case, the manner of constructing such buildings in such place, including the material of which they are constructed and the manner of their use after construction, are matters upon which negligence may be predicated ; and if such buildings are not constructed of such materials and in such manner as a man of ordinary prudence would construct the same, under the circumstances, or if they are not used with the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use them under like circumstances, and the want of such care, either in the construction or use of such buildings, or management of such business, contributed directly to the communica- tion of the fire which destroyed the same, then the owner cannot recover. In other words, if the jury to whom the facts are submitted find that the fire would not have occurred if the plaintiff had used the care in the construction, maintenance, and use of his property which a man of ordinary prudence would have used under like cir- cumstances, then the plaintiff cannot recover ; but if the jury find that the fixe would have been communicated although the plaintiff had used such care, then he can recover, if the defendant was guilty of negligence, notwithstanding the negligence of the plaintiff. This is the rule which we think is well established by the authorities, and accords with justice and common sense. We see no reason why a man who reck- lessly and unnecessarily exposes his property to destruction by fire in the vicinity of a railroad, which from the necessity of the case must use the dangerous element in 1 Erd V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 41 Wis. 65. Wis. 144; McCready v. Railroad Co., 2 Strobh. And see Ward v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 29 356. 2 4 N. W. Rep. 81 (Nov., 1878). 166 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIKE. Notes. carrying on its business, should, as a general rule, be protected, if by the use of ordinary care he could have avoided its destruction, than the man who recklessly^ and unnecessarily places his property upon the track, and it is thereby destroyed. J We have no fault to find with the decisions of this court, which hold that where an owner of lands adjoining a railroad uses them as men in like situation ordinarily use their lands, no negligence can be predicated upon such user. We agree with the case in New Jersey, and the English case cited,' that the owners of woodlands adjoin- ing railroads are not bound to gather up the falling leaves and other combustible material which may accumulate naturally thereon, nor to prevent the winds from car- rying them upon the adjoining lands, and that a neglect to do so is not negligence, because men of ordinary prudence ordinarily permit the same things upon their lands under like circumstances ; but we are inclined to hold that, where a person places a building so constructed as to be easily ignited by fire, or other property of a highly combustible nature, in the immediate vicinity of a railroad, without any protec- tion, and thereby increases the chances of its destruction, or where he carries on a business in the immediate vicinity of such road, which from its nature is extremely hazardous in such vicinity on account of its susceptibility to ignition and combustion from the sparks emitted from the passing engines, and such property is destroyed from fire communicated by such engines, in an action to recover for the value thereof on account of the negligence of the railroad company it necessarily becomes a question whether such building was constructed in such manner as a person of ordinary care and prudence would have constructed it under like circumstances, or, if it be com- bustible property, whether a man of ordinary prudence would have placed the same where it was placed by the plaintiff, and with like protection against fire, and, in the case of a business carried on, whether the business was conducted with that care with which a man of ordinary prudence would have conducted the same under the circumstances. In these cases, the court cannot say, as a matter of law, that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, but the question should be submitted to the jury, under proper instructions." In Illinois, where the doctrine of comparative negligence prevails, it is held that if the plaintiff has been guilty of any negligence in not keeping his field or other prop- erty free from combustible matter, he cannot recover unless his negligence has been slight, and that of the company gross in comparison therewith ; and this question is to be left to the jury to decide.^ In Iowa, the rule in Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Company does not prevail.' But in New Jersey it does. In a recent case in that State, Beaslet, C. J., says: "In the leading case in Illiuois,* it is assumed that the same duty which will compel the railway company to clear its railway of combustibles imposes an equal obligation on the owner of the contig- uous land ; but the distinction between the cases is obvious. The company uses a dangerous agent, and must provide proper safeguards ; the land-owner does nothing of the kind, and has the right to remain quiescent." » So also in Missouri, Massa- 1 Salmon v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 38 Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Pindar, 53 HI. 447- N. J. 5; Vaughan v. Taff Vale E. Co., ante, Bass v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 28 m. 9. P- 123. 3 Kesee v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 30 Iowa, 2 lUinois, etc., E. Co. v. Mills, 43 lU. 407; 78. Illinois, etc., R. Co. d. Frazier, 47 III. 505 ; * Bass v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 78 lU. 9. Illinois, etc., E. Co. o. Nunn, 51 111. 78; Chi- 5 Salmon v. Delaware, etc., E. Co. 38 N. cago, etc., E. Co. v. Simonson, 54 HI. 501; J. 5; Delaware, etc., E. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. Ohio, etc., R. Co. d. Shanelelt, 47 111. 497; J. 299. Great Western E. Co. 17. Haworth, 39 111. 347 ; USE OF FIRE BY RAILWAY COMPANIES. 167 Contributory Negligence. chusetts, West Virginia,^ and Pennsylvania. In Philadelphia, etc.. Railroad Com- pany V. Hendrickson,'' the court, after a lengthy examination of the authorities, say: "The conclusion from the cases is very clear, that a plaintiff is not responsi- ble for the mere condition of his premises lying along a railroad, but, in order to be held for contributory negligence, must have done some act or omitted some duty which is the proximate cause of his injury, concurring with the negligence of the company. Farmers may cultivate, use, and possess their farms and improve- ments in the manner customary among farmers, and are not bound to use unusual means to guard against the negligence of the railroad company; indeed, are not bound to expect that the company will be guilty of negligence." In Fero v. Buffalo, etc.. Railroad Company,^ the court say: "It is difficult to maintain the proposition that one can be guilty of negligence while in the lawful use of his own property, upon his own premises. The principle contended for by the defendant's •counsel, if carried to its logical conclusion, would forbid the erection of any buildings whatever upon premises in such proximity to a railroad track as would expose them to the possibility of danger from that quarter. The rights of persons to the use and enjoyment of their property are held by no such tenure as this. On the con- trary, where one in the lawful use of his property exposes it to accidental injury from the acts of others, he does not thereby lose his remedy for an injury occasioned by the oulpable negligence of such other parties." In Cook v. Champlain Transportation Company,* it is said: "The property destroyed was in an exposed and hazardous position, and therefore in more than ordinary danger from mere accidental fires. This risk the plaintiffs assumed, but not the risk of another's negligence. They were on their own land, and free to use it in any manner and for any purpose which was lawful. As was correctly observed by the circuit judge, the plaintiffs had as good a right to erect their mill on the shore of the lake as the defendants had to sail on its bosom. It must be a startling principle, indeed, that a building placed in an exposed position on one's own land is beyond the protection of the law, and yet it comes to this result upon the argument used in this case. A land-owner builds immediately on the line of a railroad, as he has an unquestionable right to do ; it may be an act of great imprudence, but in no sense is it illegal. Is he remediless if his house is set on fire by the sheer negligence of an engineer in conducting his engine over the railway? There must be some wrongful act or culpable negligence on the part of the plaintiff to bar him on this principle, and neither can be affirmed of any one for simply occupying a position of more or less exposure on his own premises. If the principle urged on the argument is correct, it must be applied in all cases of the same character. The owner of a lot builds upon it, although in close proximity to the shop of a smith. The house is more exposed than it would be at a greater distance from the shop ; but is this to exempt the smith from the obligation of care, and to screen him from the consequences of his own negligence? I certainly think not. A horse or carriage on the open ground of the owner may be more exposed to injury than they would be in a yard or a barn ; but if damaged by the carelessness of a passer-by, is the owner remediless because he chose to leave them in a place of com- parative exposure and hazard? No one, I think, can doubt what the answer to this ■question should be. I refer to no authorities on thisbranch of the case, for, in my 1 Fitch V. Paoiilo R. Co., 45 Mo. 323 ; Boss » 22 N. T. 209. •». Boston, etc., E. Co., 6 Allen, 87; Snyder v. * 1 Denio,91. And see Beviers. Delaware, Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co., 11 W. Va. 13. etc., E. Co., 13 Hun, 254. 2 80 I'a. St. 182. 168 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Notes. opinion, none are requisite. It is but clearly to comprehend the principle on which this species of defence must rest, to see that it has no application to such a case as this. By what criterion are we to determine the hazards of a particular position, and on that ground say that the owner by his own folly has deprived himself of all pro- tection ? In this respect every thing is comparative ; but where is the true standardi to be found ? A house forty feet from a steamboat-landing is in more hazard than one at the distance of forty rods ; but it is less exposed than one immediately on the' wharf. Goods at the window of a shop are less safe than they would be on a shelf at the rear of the room ; but is the owner remediless if they are carelessly soiled or broken by some one in the street? We may run through every imaginary variety of position, some of more and some of less exposure and hazard, and we must at last come to the conclusion that while a person confines himself to a lawful employment on his own premises, his position, however injudicious and imprudent it may be, is- not thereby wrongful ; and that his want of due care or judgment in its selection can never amount to negligence, so as thereby to deprive him of redress for wrong done to hira by others.'' The fact that the land to which the fire is communicated is woodland is said toi have a bearing on the question of the plaintiff's negligence, which should be consid- ered by the court in instructing the jury. The greater difficulty of keeping such land clear of inflammable matter will abate the degree of diligence required of the land-owner.' But where a, land-owner has claimed and obtained damages for the occupation by the company of a certain breadth of his land, and then ran his fence outside of that space, it was held that evidence of that fact should be received as bearing on the question of negligence.^ The reasons given in the oases which adopt the rule in Vaughan v. Taff Vale Rail- way Company are certainly convincing. A person ought not to be charged with negligence because he conducts his business and uses his property as others do, or because he does not change his mode of conducting his affairs in order to accommo- date himself to the negligent or officious conduct of his neighbor. His right to make free use of his own property is not to be curtailed by the fear that his neighbor will make a negligent use of his. He is not required to spend time, money, and labor ia endeavoring to make his property proof against another's careless conduct. If A. builds a fire, or sets free any other dangerous element, on his own land, there is no- principle of law or morals which should compel B. to adapt his affairs, or change the nature of his property, in order that they shall be more secure. A. must be responsi- ble for his acts, and will not be heard to say that B. did not protect himself from the consequences of his negligence as carefully as he might have done. And a railroad, company stands in the same position as an Individual. It uses an agent which it knows to be dangerous. The law properly requires of it the utmost care in its use. Third persons cannot be called upon to supply any want of this care on the part of the company. If damage ensue from the use of this dangerous agent, it isprimS. facie, the fault of the railroad company ; and it must be held responsible for the damage,, unless the person whose property is destroyed has contributed to it by some unlawful or improper act, or has invited the injury. But the ordinary use of one's property can never be considered unlawful or improper ; neither can it be looked upon as an., invitation to others to do it mischief. To the doctrine as stated in Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Company there may 1 Chicago, etc., B. Co. v. Simonson, 54 lU. "■ Railroad Co. u. Yeiser, 8 Pa. St. 366. 505. USE OF PIEE BY RAILWAY COMPANIES. 169 Proximate and remote Cause. be said to be tbree exceptions ; or perhaps it would be more proper to say that there are three cases to which the rule there announced does not extend : — 1. The first is, where the escape of the fire from the locomotive is the result of accident, and in spite of the care and watchfulness of the defendant. Here, if the fire be carried to the property of another on account of accumulation of dry grass, weeds, or other combustibles on the company's right of way, it would certainly be proper that the defendant should be permitted to show that the plaintiff was in this respect equally in fault, — that his lands were in no better condition than were those of the railroad.' 2. The second case is that of a "seen" danger. While as to a mere anticipated or unseen danger the plaintiff may well be permitted to use his property as he desires, in the presence of a " seen " danger he must use his best efforts to prevent it.^ " The distinction is between a known, present, or immediate danger arising from the negli- gence of another, — that which is imminent and certain unless the party does or omits to do some act by which it may be avoided, — and a danger arising in like manner, but which is remote and possible, or probable only, or contingent and uncertain, depend- ing on the course of future events, such as the future conduct of the negligent party, and other, as yet unknown, circumstances. The difference is that between realization and anticipation. A man in his senses, in face of what has been aptly termed a ' seen danger, ' — that is, one which presently threatens and is known to him, — is bound to realize it, and to use all proper care and make all reasonable efforts to avoid it; and if he does not, it is his own fault, and he having thus contributed to his own loss and injury, no damages can be recovered from the other party, however negligent the latter may have been." ' An example of the latter may be seen in a case decided in Illinois, where the plaintiff's son saw the fire in the stubble near his fence, while on his way home, but, instead of endeavoring to extinguish it, went on, so that half an hour later, when he returned, it had extended so far as to be beyond control ; this was held an act of negligence chargeable to the plaintiff, and sufficient to bar a recovery.* 3. The third case is, where the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is the remote, and not the proximate cause of the injury.* (10.) Proximate and remote Cause. — The opinion of Chief Justice Lawrence in Fent V. Toledo, etc.. Railway Company,^ is an exhaustive and learned enunciation of the law as settled by the decisions in England and America, on the question of proximate and remote cause.' Nothing needs to be added to it in this place, ex- cept to show the different cases in which this question has been presented. The doc- trine, in its general principles, is considered more fully in another place. Where fire which has been negligently permitted to escape from the engines of a railroad company does not fall upon the plaintiff's property, but falls on the property of another, setting it on fire, and then spreads by means of dry grass, stubble, and other combustible materials, and passes over the lands of several different persons before it reaches the property of the plaintiff, and finally reaching the property of 1 Fitch V. Pacific R. Co., 45 Mo. 325; Ohio, s yitch v. Pacific R. Co., 45 Mo. 325 ; Dog- etc, E. Co. -u. Shanefelt, 47 lU. 497. gett v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 78 N. C. 305. 2 Snyder v. Pittsburgli, etc., E. Co., 11 "W. « Ante, p. 136. ya. 15. ' Vaughan v. Taff Vale E. Co., ante, p. 122; ' Kellogg V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 26 Wis. Piggot v. Eastern, etc., E. Co., 3 C. B. 229; 223. Smith v. London, etc., E. Co., L. E. 5 C. P. 98 ; 4 niinois, etc., E. Co. v. McCleUand, 42 ni. L. E. 6 C. P. 14. And for cases In this country 355. And see Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Pindar, see this section, posf. 63 111. 447; McNarra v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Wis. 69. 170 LIABILITY FOR DA3IAGES CAUSED BY FIRE. Notes. the plaintiff, at a great distance from where the flre was first kindled, seta it on fire and consumes it, is the negligence of the railroad company, in such a case, too remote from the injury to the plaintiff's property to constitute the hasis of a cause of action against the company! This question is invariably answered by the courts in the negative.' A locomotive set fire to the grass near the track ; the fire crossed the land of B., C, and D. before it reached the property of A.' Sparks escaped from the engine to a carpenter's shop which was close to the track, which was consumed; the fire being carried across a street sixty feet wide, to the dwelling-house of A.^ Fire from a loco- motive having been communicated to the barn of B., it was carried through a shed to the barn of A.* B.'s bridge and A.'s bridge were situated fifty-eight feet apart; B.'s bridge was set on fire by sparks which came from B.'s engine, and the flre was com- municated to A.'s bridge.* A fire commenced on the defendant's track, in some dry grass, and spread up the adjacent bank, over its right of way, to A.'s wood, a part of which was situated within fifty feet and a part within two hundred feet of the track, and destroyed it.^ Sparks escaped from the defendant's locomotive and fell upon the ground of an adjoining proprietor, which was covered with broom-sedge and dry grass; it burned across this lot about one hundred and fifty yards, to the land of A., where it consumed a fence and some dry grass ; and spreading from these, destroyed a quantity of young timber and fence-rails, the property of A.' A quantity of grass on the line of a railroad was set on fire by sparks from a locomotive ; the fire spread until it reached the farm of A., situated nearly a mile from the railroad track, where it destroyed some timber belonging to A.* B.'s elevator, which was situated within twenty feet of the defendant's track, was burned by sparks which escaped from one of its engines ; the fire spread to the elevator of A., situated seventy feet distant, and destroyed it.' A.'s house stood one hundred feet from the railroad track, a quantity of shavings being gathered around it ; sparks were blown by a high wind into the dead grass adjoining the track, from whence they were communicated to the shavings and the building. 1" Fire escaped from a railroad locomotive and fell upon a strip of ground forty or fifty yards wide, which was covered with dry grass and other combustible matter ; it spread from thence and destroyed A.'s fence.'' Sparks from the defend- ant's locomotive set fire to the prairie along its right of way; the grass being dry and the wind high, the fire extended about three miles during the evening and night, burning slowly during the night, when the wind had fallen ; next morning, the wind, rising, carried the fire some five miles further, when it reached A.'s farm and destroyed his property.'" In all these cases, A. was held entitled to recover. 1 Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Bales, 16 Kan. s Hooksett v. Concord, etc., E. E., 38 N- 252; Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Stanford, 12 H. 243. Kan. 354; St. Joseph, etc., E. Co. o. Chase, « Annapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Gantt, 39 Md. 11 Kan. 47; Baltimore, etc., E. Co. «. Ship- 115. ley, 39 Md. 251; Doggett v. Eichmond, etc., ' Phila., etc., E. Co. n. Constable, 39 Md. E. Co., 78 X. C. 305. 149. 2 Parley v. Eastern E. Co., 98 Mass. 418 ; « Burlington, etc., E. Co. v. Westover, 4 Delaware, etc., E. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. J. Neb. 268. 299; Henry «. Southern, etc., E. Co., 50 Cal. « Small v. Chicago, etc., E. Co. (Iowa), 6 176. • Cent. L. J. 310. s Hart B. Western E. Co.,13Meto. 99. See '» Coates «;. Missouri, etc., E. Co., 61 Mo. 38. Hoyt V. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181. " Clemens v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 63 * IngersoU v. Stockbridge, etc., E. Co., 8 Mo. 366. Alien, 438. '^ Poeppers v. Missouri, etc., E. Co., 7 Cent. L. J. 282; 67 Mo. 715. USB OP FIKE BY KAILWAT COMPANIES. 171 Statutory Liability. There are two cases in Pennsylvania and New York which are opposed in prin- ciple to the foregoing.! But as they are condemned in every subsequent case in which they have been cited, outside of those States, and have been so qualified in the States in which they were decided as to be practically overruled,' it is not necessary, in this connection, to do more than simply refer to them. (11.) The statutory Liability, — By the statutes of Vermont,' Maryland,* New Jersey,^ Kansas,' and Iowa,' the setting out of fire by railroads is made prinld facie evidence of negligence. In Illinois, by a recent statute,* the fact of fire being com- municated from an engine raises a presumption of negligence. The use of property by its owner in such a manner as it must have been used by him had no railroad passed through it is not to be regarded as negligence on his part, and the company is required to keep its right of way clear of all combustible matter, under a penalty. By the statutes of other States, the liability is made absolute. In Maine ' and Mas- sachusetts,'" it is provided that when any injury is done to any building or other property of any person, by fire " communicated " '' by a locomotive engine of any railroad company, the latter shall be held responsible in damages to the person or corporation so injured. A railroad company is also given an insurable interest in the property for which it maybe held responsible in damages "along its route," and may procure insurance upon it in its own behalf. New Hampshire has a statute in all respects similar to these, except that the word "from" is used in the place of "communicated by," and the words " on the line of such road" in the place of the phrase "along its route;" consequently, in those States, the liability of a railroad is not dependent on its want of care. These statutes apply to corporations which have obtained their charters before their enactment,''' and a railroad company which has leased its line to another company remains responsible for any damage by the latter, caused by fire," as also does the lessee." To an action under them, the defence of con- 1 Penn., etc., E. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353; 445; CWoago, etc., B. Co. v. Quaintance, 58 Eyan v. Sew York, etc., B. Co., 35 N. T. 210. 111. 389; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Clampit, 63 2 Penn., etc., E. Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. St. 111. 95. 373 ; Webb v. Eome, etc., B. Co., 49 N. T. 420. » Stat. 1842, chap. 9, § 5. 3 Gen. Stat., chap. 28, §§ 78, 79; Grand "Gen. Stat. 1860, chap. 63, § 101; Perleyw. Trunk E. Co. v. Eichardson, 91 U. S. 454;3 Eastern B. Co., 98 Mass. 414; Ingersoll i,. Cent. L. J. 353; Clevelands ». Grand Trunk Stockbridge, eto.,B. Co., 8 Allen, 438. E. Co., 42 Vt. 449. " For a constrnotion of this word, see Hart 4 Code, art. 77, § 2; Baltimore, etc., E. Co. v. Western B. Co., 13 Mete. 99; Safford v. V. Woodruff, 4 Md. 242; Baltimore, etc., E. Boston, etc., E. E., 103 Mass. 583. Co. V. Shipley, 39 Md. 252; Baltimore, etc., '2 Pratt v. Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 42 Me. 578; E. Co. V. Dorsey, 37 Md. 19. IngersoU v. Stockbridge, etc., E. Co., 8 Allen 6 Eev. Stat., chap. 697, §§ 13, 14; Delaware, 438; Lyman v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 4 Cush. etc., E. Co. V. Salmon, 39 N. J. 299. 288. « Gen. Stat. 1122, chap. 118, § 2; Missouri, '« IngersoU v. Stockbridge, etc., E. Co., 8 etc., E. Co. V. Davidson, 14 Kan. 349. Allen, 438. Arailroad company maybe held ' Code, § 1289 ; Bodemacher «. Milwaukee, liable, independent of statute, for injuries etc., E. Co., 41 Iowa, 297. In Small ». Chicago, caused by Are thrown from the locomotive etc., B. Co., 6 Cent. L. J. 310, it was held by of another company permitted to ran over a divided court that the liability of railroad its track, and whose want of proper appli- companies for damages caused by Are from ances is known to its agents. Delaware, their engines was by this section of the etc., E. Co. «. Salmon, 39 N. J. 299; Pierce ». Code made absolute. But, on a rehearing. Concord, etc., E. Co., 51N. H. 690; Steamflu. this decision was overruled. See a. c, 8 Atlantic, etc., B. Co., 46 Me. 96. Cent. L. J. 276. " Pierce v. Concord B. B., 61 N. H. 132; 8 Bev. Stat. 1877, p. 775, § 89. And see Davis v. Providence, etc., E. Co., 121 Mass. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. McCahiU, 56 III. 28; 134. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Campbell, 86 111. 172 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY FIEE. Notes. tributory negligence is not good.' They embrace in their provisions both real and personal property, provided it be permanently existing and capable of being insured. Growing timber,' mechanics' tools,' and fences' are within them. But not cedar posts that were deposited temporarily near the track, and which were intended to be used elsewhere.* Property is " along the route " of the road when it is so near as to be exposed to the danger of fire; the actual distance is immaterial.* It is not necessary that the railroad company shall have had actual notice of the presence of the property along its line.' 1 Rowell V. Railroad Co., 57 F. H. 132; * Chapman ». Atlantic, etc., H. Co., 37 Me. Ingersollr. Stockbridge, etc.,B.Co.,8Allen, 92. 438. 5 Pratt v. Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 42 Me. 579; s Pratt V. Atlantic, etc., B. Co., 42 Me. 579. Perley v. Eastern, etc., E. Co., 98 Mass. 414; » Trask v. Hartford, etc., E. Co., 16 Gray, Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Kichardson, 91 U. S. 71. ' 454; 3 Cent. I.. J. 353. ' Eosa V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 6 Allen, 87. CHAPTER III. LIABILITY FOR INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Leading Oases : 1. May -v. Burdett. — Liability for injuries committed by animals fercB naturcB. 2. Earl v. Van Alstine. — The same subject. 3. Van Leuven v. Lyke, — Liability for trespasses of animals mansuetcB naturcB. 4. Loomis V. Terry. — Liability for injuries committed by savage dogs kept for defence of one's premises. Notes : ^ 1. The owner or keeper of animals liable. 2. "Who is the owner or keeper? 3. Joint-owners liable jointly. 4. Actual custody not necessary to establish liability. 5. Are both owner and keeper liable? 6. He who harbors an animal liable as owner. 7. Servant keeping dog. 8. A corporation may keep a dog. 9. Separate owners not liable jointly. 10. Identification of animal doing mischief. 11. Master liable for his servant's negligent care or use of the master's animals. 12. Master not liable for all acts of servant. 13. Relation of master and servant must exist. 14. Common-law classification. 15. Negligence may be either actual or presumed 16. Proof of scienter. 17. Not always necessary to show previous instances of injuries inflicted. 18. Knowledge of agent, knowledge of owner. 19. The act for which the owner is liable need not be one of ferocity. 20. Keeping diseased animals. 21. Trespasses by diseased animals. 22. Sale of diseased animals. 23. Measure of damages for animals infecting animals. 24. Importation of diseased cattle. 25. "What is the rule as to liability of keepers of vicious animals? 26. "What as to cattle, horses, sheep, etc. ? 27. Liability for trespasses of such animals imder various statutes. (1.) Alabama. (2.) California. (8.) Connecticut (4.) Illinois. (6.) Indiana. (178) 174 LIABILITr FOR INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMAIiS. May V. Burdett. Notes : 2 27 — Continued, Iowa. Kansas. Maine. Massachusetts. Michigan. Mississippi. Missouri. New Hampshire. New Jersey. New York. Ohio. Pennsylvania. South Carolina. Tennessee. Vermont. Wisconsin. 28. Degree of care required of owner. 29. Kemoving trespassing animals from one's premises. 80. Owner of animal bound to disclose vicious propensities in transferring to another. 81. Measure of damages for injuries committed by domestic animals trespassing. 32. Dogs. 33. Involuntary trespasses by dogs. 84. Keeping watch-dogs. 35. What will justify killing another's animals. 36. form of action. 37. Contributory negligence. 88. Imputed negligence — servant — children. (6. (7. (8. (9. (10. (11. (12. (13. (14. (15. (16. (17. (18. (19. (20. (21 1. LIABHJTY FOE INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS FEE^ NA- Mat v. Burdett.* Court of Queen's Bench, 1846. Eight Hon. Thomas Lokd Dmmxnr, Chief Justice. Sir John PATTBSoif, Kt., •> " John Taylor CoLERrDGB, Kt., > Judges, " William Wiohtman, Kt, J A person who keeps an animal accustomed to attack and bite mankind, with knowledge that it is so accustomed, is primd/acie liable in an action on the case, at the suit of any person attacked and injured by such animal, without any averment, in the declaration, of negligence or default in the seccu-ing or taking care of it. The gist of the action is the keeping of the animal after knowledge of its mischievona propensitieB. • Reported 9 Q. B. 101. INJCKIES BY ANIMALS FBE^ NATURE. 175 In the Queen's Bench — Argument of "Watson and Couch, for plaintiff. The declaration stated that defendant, "before and at the time of the damage and injury, hereinafter mentioned, to the said Sophia, the wife of the said Stephen May, wrongfully and injuriously kept a certain monkey, he, the defendant, well knowing that the said monkey was of a mischievous and ferocious nature, and was used and accustomed to attack and bite mankind, and that it was dangerous and improper to allow the monkey to be at large and unconflned ; which said monkey, whilst the said defendant kept the same as aforesaid, heretofore and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the 2d of September, 1844, did attack, bite, wound, lacerate, and injure the said Sophia, then and still being the wife of said Stephen May, whereby the said Sophia became and was greatly terrified and alarmed, and became and was sick, sore, lame, and disordered, and so remained and con- tinued for a long time, to wit, from the day and year last aforesaid to the time of the commencement of this suit; whereby, and in conse- quence of the alarm and fright occasioned by the said monkey so attacking, biting, wounding, lacerating, and injuring her as aforesaid, the said Sophia has been greatly injured in her health," etc. Plea, not guilty. Issue thereon. On the trial, before Wightman, J., at the sittings in Middlesex, after Hilary Term, 1845, a verdict was found for the' plaintiff , with £50 dam- ages. Cockburn, in the ensuing term, obtained a rule to show cause why judgment should not be arrested. In last Hilary Term,i Watson and Couch showed cause. The only question is, whether the declaration is bad because it does not state that the defendant kept the animal negligently. The present form is consistent with the law and the precedents. The wrong on which an action of this kind proceeds is the knowingly keeping an animal accustomed to do mischief. " In evidence to an inquest, it was agreed by Fitzherbert and Shelley, that if a man have a dog which has killed sheep, the master of the dog being ignorant of such quality and property of the dog, the master shall not be punished for that killing ; otherwise is it, if he have notice of the quality of the dog."^ "An action upon the case will lie for keeping a dog used to bite sheep, and which has killed sheep belonging to the plaintiff ; but in such case it must be proved that the defendant knew that he would bite sheep." * The author cites Smith v. Pelah,'^ and Jenkins v. Turner,^ where the 1 January 13, 15, and 26, 1846. Before » Bull. K. P. 77. Lord Denman, O. J., Pattesou, Coleridge, * 2 Stra. 1264. and Wightman, JJ. ^ 1 Ld. Kaym. 109. « Anon., 1 Dyer, 23 b, pi. 162. 176 LIABILITT FOK INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. May V. Burdett. gist of the action is stated in the same manner. And he adds: "There is a difference between things ferce naturae, as lions, bears, etc., which a man must keep up at his peril, and beasts that are mansuetce naturae,, and break through the tameness of their nature ; in the latter case, the owner must have notice ; in the former, an action lies without notice." ^ The Mosaic law,^ referred to in the margin of the placitum in Dyer, agrees with ours. The wrong consists in keeping the animal, even though it be mansuetce naturae, if the owner knows that it has been used to do mischief, and if injury results from the keeping. The scienter, not negligence in keeping, consti- tutes the tort. The doctrine stated in Dyer is adopted in Comyns's Digest,'^ and Comyns observes: "It is sufficient to say, Canem ad Tnordendum consuetum scienter retinuit. ' ' [Colekidge, J. — You cannot suppose that that is meant as giving the complete form of a declaration. J In 1 Viner's Abridgment* it is said: "If a man has a dog that kills sheep, the master of the dog being ignorant of such quality, the master shall not be punished for this killing ; but if he has notice of such quality, it is otherwise." Declarations averring misconduct in the keeping of a horse, a dog, or a bull, but omitting the scienter, have been held in- sufflcient.5 The case of Michael v. Alestree, 2 Lev. 172, cited in moving for the present rule, is no authority to the contrary. There, a scienter was held unnecessary ; but the complaint was not of a mere improper keeping, but that the defendant, by his servant, carelessly drove un- governable horses, for the purpose of breaking them, in a public place. [Lord Denman, C. J. — He brought the horses to a place where people were.] The case of keeping a vicious animal is analogous to those in which persons merely keeping dangerous weapons or instruments have been held liable if mischief resulted from their being kept.^ In BlacTc- man v. Simmons,'' the mere keeping a dangerous bull, with knowledge, appears to have been considered a ground of action, mischief having ensued. The same conclusion may be drawn from Curtis v. Mills.^ [Patteson, J. — It does not appear, in the present case, that the monkey may not have been chained up, and have unexpectedly escaped. But you say that if a party keeps such an animal chained, he runs the risk of its breaking loose.] That is the law. [Patteson, J. — Sup- 1 Hex 17. Hugging, 2 Ld. Eaym. 1574,1583. Maaon v. Keeling, 12 Modern, 332 ; s.c.lLd. 2 Exodus, xxi., 28, 29, 36. Bay. 606; Bayntine ». Sharp, ILutw. 90. See ' Tit " Action upon tlie Case for Negli- Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 SaXk.. 662. gence," A, 6. « Dixon v. Bell, 6 Mau. & Sel. 198; Towns- * P. 234, tit. " Actions," [MJschiel by Dogs, end v. Wathen, 9 East, 277. etc.] H, pi. 3. ' 3 Car. & P. 138. ^ Scetchet v. Eltham, I^eem. C. B. 534; ° 5 Car. &P. 489. INJURIES BY ANIMALS FEE^ NATUKiE. 177 In the Queen's Bench — Argument of Cockburn and Pickering, for defendant. pose it had been confined in a cage, and the plaintiff's wife had put her hand in. J Actual misconduct in the plaintiff might be a defence under the general issue or special plea.^ The present form of declaration agrees with the precedent in 2 Ghitty's Pleading (7th ed.), 430. [Pat- TESON, J. — Mr. Chitty observes that, before the new rules prohibiting more than one count on the same transaction, it was usual to add other counts, one of which was for not keeping the dog properly secured.] A form like the present was used in Thomas v. Morgan.^ The older precedents are similar. ^ ( Watson also stated that the present form accorded with manuscript precedents of the late Mr. Sergeant Williams and Mr. Justice Richakdson, and with precedents extracted by himself from the books of Mr. Justice Baylet.) The averment here that the ■defendant knew it to be dangerous " to allow the said monkey to be at large " is not material, and does not render it necessary to show that the monkey was in fact allowed to be at large. Cockburn and Pickering, contra. — The question in this case is impor- tant, inasmuch as the plaintiff assumes that it is illegal even to keep a destructive animal, as is done at the gardens of the Zoological Society and other menageries ; and that, however carefully such animal may be kept, yet if he escapes, without any fault on the owner's part, and does damage, or even if an incautious person be hurt, or an excessively timid person terrified, by the animal, while under proper restraint, the owner is answerable. No decision has gone that length ; and, in the present ■case, the declaration alleges nothing inconsistent with a strictly proper keeping. In Gomyns's Digest, tit. "Action upon the Case for Negli- gence," the division (A, 5) referred to on the other side is headed, "For a neglect in taking care of his dog, horse, cattle," etc., and the first instance given is, if a man ride an unruly horse in Lincoln's Inn Fields (or other public place of resort), to tame him, and he break loose and strike the plaintiff ; on which point Michael v. Alestree * is cited. In Ventris's report of that case, the court is stated to have said : "Lately, in this court, an action was brought against a butcher, who had made an ox run from his stall, and gored the plaintiff ; and this was alleged, in the declaration, to be in default of penning of him." And in Keble's 1 Patteson, J., alluded here to the case seems a mistake ; see Eeg. Brev. Ill a) ; of a person going into a place where he had East. Ent. 616b; Plead. Assist. 105, 117; King no business to be at the time, and being there i;. Peach, 1 Lll. Ent. 29 ; Lib. PI. 40, pi. 56 ; bitten by a dog, — probably Brock v. Dope- Morg. Prec, b. 443 (Morgan's Precedents, land, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 203. from vol. 3 of the Attorney's Vade Mecum) ; s 2 Cromp. M. & R. 496; s. c, 5 Tyi-w. 1085. 8 Wentw. PI. 437. 3 Keg. Brev. 110 b, cited and relied upon * 2 Lev. 172; ». c, mb nom. Michell v. by the court in Cropper v. Matthews, 2 Sid. AUestry, 1 Vent. 295; sub nom. MitchU v. 127, where Eeg. Brev. is also cited (but this Alestree, 3 Keb. 650. 12 178 LIABILITY FOR INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. May V. Burdett. report of Michael v. Alestree, reference is made to a case " where a monkey escaped and did hurt, by default of the owner." Neglect, and not merely the having such animals, was essential to the action in each of the cases. This remark applies also to the placita in the division of Comyns's Digest before cited, as to a mad bull ; and the case in which, if a dog has once bit a man, and the owner, having notice, keeps him, " and lets him go about or lie at his door," a person bitten by the dog may bring an action. ^ It is true that the scienter is also a necessary averment; but that is because knowledge is an ingredient of negli- gence ; and for that reason it is laid down in Comyns's Digest,^ that "a declaration for a neglect in keeping his dog," etc., " must say that the defendant was sciens of the mischievous quality." In Brock v. Copeland,^ where the declaration stated " that the defendant knowingly kept a dog used to bite," and by which the plaintiff was bitten, Loid KEinroN ruled that the action would not lie. He said "that every man had a right to keep a dog for the protection of his yard or house ; that the injury which this action was calculated to redress was where an animal known to be mischievous was permitted to go at large, and the injury therefore arose from the fault of the owner in not securing such animal, so as not to endanger or injure the public ; that here the dog had been properly let loose ; and the injury had arisen from the plaintiff's own fault, in incautiously going into the defendant's yard after it had been shut up." The only plea was, not guilty. [Cole- ridge, J. — " Not guilty," then, had not the same effect as the plea of not guilty in modern times.] There is no instance of a special plea that the injury done by the animal resulted from the plaintiff's own negligence. In the passage cited on the other side, from the judgment in Bex v. Huggins,* the question discussed is, in what cases notice of the mischievous quality of the animal is essential to the owner's Uability ; and the difference stated on that point is, whether the animal be orig- inally mansuetce or ferce naturce. But in neither case does it appear that liability attaches without any negligence in the owner. Even where death has ensued, the court says: "If the owner have notice of the mischievous quality of the ox, etc., and he uses all proper diligence to keep him up, and he happens to break loose, and kills a man, it would be very hard to make the owner guilty of felony. But if through negligence the beast goes abroad, after warning or notice of his condi- tion, it is the opinion of Haie that it is manslaughter in the owner. And if he did purposely let him loose, and wander abroad, with a 1 Smith V. Pelah, 2 Stra. 1264. « 1 Esp. N. P. C. 203. ' Tit. " Pleader, " 2 P, 2. < 2 Ld. Eaym. 1574. INJUEIES BY ANIMALS FEKiE NATURE. 179 In the Queen's Bench — Argument of Cookbum and Pickering, for defendant. design to do mischief, nay, though it were but with a design to fright people and make sport, and he kills a man, it is murder in the owner." In Justinian's Institutes,^ it is said (after distinguishing between dam- age done by animals which are naturally ferocious, and by those which act against their nature in doing damage), si ursus fugerit a domino, et sic nocuerit, non potest quondam dominus conveniri, quia desiit dominus esse, uhi fera evasit. In that case, there is no longer a power Of control, and therefore no room for negligence, nor any ground for liability. A monkey is naturally a wild animal ; and there is no averment, in this case, that it was tame when the mischief happened. If, therefore, it escaped without the owner's fault, and did damage, he would not be liable. Thus it is said, in Comyns's Digest,^ that " if a man has a tame fox, which escapes and becomes wild, and does mischief, the owner shall not answer for the damage done afterwards." ^ If, indeed, he wilfully or carelessly set the animal at liberty, he would be liable, according to the dictum of Lord Ellbnborough in Leame v. Bray:* "If I put in motion a dangerous thing, as if I let loose a dangerous animal, and leave to hazard what may happen, and mischief ensue to any person, I am answerable in trespass." The principle by which cases like this must be governed is, that a man may do on his own land what he thinks proper, so that he does not thereby interfere with the rights of others. A man may set dog-spears in his own ground, even without giving notice to others ; * so, he may keep a dangerous animal there ; and, the act being legal, he is not answerable for a misfortune which results from it, unless caused by misconduct of his own. Here it is consistent with all the averments that the plaintiff, and not the defend- ant, may have been in fault. The course of precedents, at least since the date of the older entries cited on the other side, has not been uniform ; and, as is stated in 2 Chitty's PI. (7th ed.) 430, before the new rules it was usual to draw a separate count, averring negligence in not keeping the animal secured ; Jones V. Perry ^ and Hartley v. Harriman "^ afford instances. In the case of the butcher, cited in Ventris's report of Michael v. Alestree,^ negligence was charged ; and the same averment appears to have been made in the action for mischief done by a monkey, referred to in Keble's report of the same case.^ In Mason v. Keeling,^'^ where the 1 B. i, tit. IX. • 2 Esp. N. P. C. 482. » Tit. "Action upon the Case lor Negli- ' 1 Bam. & Aid. 620. gence," A, 5. * 1 Vent. 295, sub nom. Michell v. AUes- 8 See 1 lid. Raym. 606 (in Mason v. Keel- fay. ing). 9 3 Eeb. 650, sub nom. Mitchil v. Alestree. 4 3 East, 593, 595. " 1 Ld. Baym. 606; s. t., 12 Modern, 332. s Jordin v. Crump, 8 Mee. & W. 782. 180 LIABILITY FOR IJS'JUIMES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. May V. Burdett. validity of the declaration was discussed on demurrer, the count alleged that the dog attacked the plaintiff pro defectu debitce curce et custodice by the defendant, who permitted the dog libere et ad larguna ire. In Blackman v. Simmons,^ negligence was expressly averred. And in Curtis V. Mills,^ the materiality of such an allegation appears from the stress laid by Tindal, C. J., on the question whether or not the dog was placed- in such a situation that by common care the plaintiff might have avoided him. A precedent in 8 Wentworth's Pleading, 581, of a declaration for mischief done by unruly rams belonging to the defendant, alleges not only a scienter, but negligence in permitting them to go at large. Even in the present case, the framer of the declaration seems to admit that the owner, to be liable, must have contributed, by some neg- lect or permission, to the animal's escape, since the count avers knowl- edge by him "that it was dangerous and improper to allow the said monkey to be at large and unconfined ;" in which respect it unquestion- ably departs from the precedents cited on the other side. Cur. adv. vult. Lord Denman, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the court. — This was a motion to arrest the judgment in an action on the case for keeping a monkey which the defendant knew to be accustomed to bite people, and which bit the female plaintiff. The declaration stated that the defendant wrongfully kept a monkey, well knowing that it was of a mischievous and ferocious nature, and used and accustomed to attack and bite mankind, and that it was dangerous to allow it to be at large ; and that the monkey, whilst the defendant kept the same as aforesaid, did attack, bite, and injure the female plaintiff, whereby, etc. It was objected, on the part of the defendant, that the declara- tion was bad for not alleging negligence or some default of the defend- ant in not properly or securely keeping the animal ; and it was said that, consistently with this declaration, the monkey might have been kept with due and proper caution, and that the injury might have been entirely occasioned by the carelessness and want of caution of the plaintiff herself. A great many cases and precedents were cited upon the argument, and the conclusion to be drawn from them appears to us to be, that the declaration is good upon the face of it ; and that who- ever keeps an animal accustomed to attack and bite mankind, with knowledge that it is so accustomed, is prima facie liable in an action on the case at the suit of any person attacked and injured by the animal, ■without any averment of negligence or default in the securing or taking 1 soar. &P. 138. « B Oar. & P. 489. rSTJXJEIES BY ANIMALS FERJB NATURE. 181 In the Queen's Bench — Opinion of Lord Denman, C. J. care of it. The gist of the action is the "keeping the animal after hnowl- edge of its mischievous propensities. The precedents, both ancient and modern, with scarcely an exception, merely state the ferocity of the animal and the knowledge of the defendant, without any allegation of negligence or want of care. A great many were referred to upon the argument, commencing with the Register and ending with Thomas v. Morgan; ^ and all in the same form, or nearly so. In the Register, 110, 111, two precedents of writs are given, — one for keeping a dog accustomed to bite sheep, and the other for keeping a boar accustomed to attack and wound other animals. The cause of action, as stated in both these precedents, is the propensity of the animals, the knowledge of the defendant, and the injury to the plaintiff ; but there is no allegation of negligence or want of care. In the case of Mason v. Keeling, reported in 1 Ld. Eaym. and 12 Modern, and much rehed upon on the part of the defendant, want of due care was alleged, but the scienter was omitted ; and the question was, not whether the declaration would be good without the allegation of want of care, but whether it was good without the allega- tion of knowledge, which it was held that it was not. No case was cited in which it had been decided that a declaration stating the ferocity of the animal and the knowledge of the defendant was bad for not averring negligence also ; but various dicta in the books were cited to show that this is an action founded on negligence, and therefore not maintainable unless some negligence or want of care is alleged. In Comyns's Digest,^ it is said that " an action upon the case lies for a neglect in taking care of his cattle, dog," etc. ; and passages were cited from the other authorities, and also from some cases at Nisi Prius, in which expressions were used showing that, if persons suffered animals to go at large, knowing them to be disposed to do mischief, they were liable in case any mischief was actually done ; and it was attempted to be inferred from this that the liability only attached in case they were suffered to go at large, or to be otherwise ill-secured. But the conclusion to be drawn from an examination of all the authori- ties appears to us to be this: that a person keeping a mischievous animal, with knowledge of its propensities, is bound to keep it secure at his peril; and that, if it does mischief, negligence is presumed, with- out express averment. The precedents, as well as the authorities, fully warrant this conclusion. The negligence is in keeping such an ani- mal after notice. The case of Smith v. Pelah,^ and a passage in 1 « 2 Cromp. M. & E. 496; s. e., 5 Tyrw. 10S5. « 2 Stra. 1264. « Tit. "Action upon the Case for Negligence," A, 6. 182 LIABILIXr FOE INJUEIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Earl V. Van Alstine. Sode's Pleas of the Crown, 430, i put the liability on the true ground. It may be that if the injury was solely occasioned by the wilfulness of the plaintiff, after warning, that may be a ground of defence, by plea in confession and avoidance ; but it is unnecessary to give any opinion in this, for we think that the declaration is good upon the face of it, and shows & prima, facie liability in the defendant. It was said, indeed, further, on the part of the defendant, that, the monkey being an animal ferce naturae, he would not be answerable for injuries committed by it, if it escaped and went at large without any default on the part of the defendant, during the time it had so escaped and was at large, because at that time it would not be in his keeping, nor under his control ; but we cannot allow any weight to this objection ; for, in the first place, there is no statement in the declaration that the monkey had escaped, and it is expressly averred that the injury occurred whilst the defendant kept it ; we are, besides, of the opinion, as already stated, that the defendant, if he would keep it, was bound to keep it secure at all events. The rule, therefore, will be discharged. Bule discharged. 2. the same sijbjeot. Earl v. Van Alstine.* Supreme Court of Neio York, Monroe General Term, 1850. Hon. Hbitbt Welles, Presiding Justice. " Samtjel L. Selden, \ j . " Thomas A. Johnson, J 1. Grounds of Liability for Injuries by Animals. — One who owns or keeps an animal, ol any kind, becomes liable for any injury the animal may do, only on the ground of some actual or presumed negligence on his part. * Reported 8 Barb. 630. ' After stating that " if a man have a get loose and do harm to any person, the beast, as a bull, a cow, horse, or dog, used owner is liable to an action for the damage; to hurt people, if the owner know not his and so I knew it adjudged in Andrew Baier'i quality, he is not punishable," etc.. Hale Cme, whose child was bit by a monkey that adds (citing authorities) that " these things broke its chain and got loose, seem to be agreeable to law: — " 3. And, therefore, in case of such a wild " 1. If the owner have notice of the quality beast, or in case of a buU or cow, that doth of his beast, and it doth anybody hurt, he is damage, where the owner knows of it he chargeable with an action for it. must, at his peril, keep him up safe from "2. Though he have no particular notice doing hurt; for though he use his diligence that he did any such thing before, yet if it to keep him up, if he escape and do harm, be a beast that is fera ncUurce, as a lion, a, the owner is liable to answer damages." 1 bear, a wolf, yea, an ape or monkey, if he Hale's P. C. 430, pt. 1, c. 33. INJURIES BY ANIMALS FER^ NATURE. 183 Supreme Court of New York — Opinion of Selden, J. '2. ITotice of Animal's Vice is Bvidenca of ITeg'liseixce. —It Is essential to the proof of negligence, and sufficient eTidence thereof, that the owner be shown to have had notice of the propensity of the animal to do mischief. 3. When Notice of such "Vice presumed. — Proof that the animal is of a savage and ferocious nature is equivalent to proof of express notice. In such cases notice is presumed. i. The Owner of Bees is not liable, at all events, for any accidental injuiy they may do. ■6. Injuries by Bees — Case in Judgrment. — Where, in an action against the owner of bees for an injury done by them to the plaintiff's horses while travelling along the highway past the place where the bees were kept, it appeared that the bees had been kept in the same situation for eight or nine years, and there was no proof of any injury ever having been done by them; but, on the contrary, witnesses residing in the neighborhood testified that they had been in the habit of passing and repass- ing the place frequently, without having been molested; it was held, that this re- butted the idea of any notice to the defendant, either from the nature of bees or otherwise, that it would be dangerous to keep them in that situation; and that he could not be made liable. This action was commenced in a justice's court. The complaint :alleged that the defendant was the owner of fifteen hives of bees, which lie wrongfully kept in his yard, adjoining the public highway ; and that the plaintiff's horses, while travelling along the highway and passing ihe place where the bees were kept, were attacked and stung so se- verely that one of them died and the other was greatly injured, etc. The answer denied the charge contained in the complaint. Upon the trial, the keeping of the bees as alleged, and the injury to the horses, were proved, and the plaintiff recovered judgment for $70.25 and ■costs. Upon appeal to the County Court of Wayne County, this judg- ment was reversed ; and the cause was brought to this court by appeal from the judgment of the County Court. By the court, Selden, J. — This case presents two questions: 1. Is :any one who keeps bees liable, at all events, for the injuries they may •do? 2. Did the defendant keep these bees in an improper manner or place, so as to render him liable on that account ? It is insisted by the plaintiff that while the proprietor of animals of a tame or domestic nature (domitce naturce) is liable for injuries done by them (aside from trespasses upon the soil) only after notice of some vicious habit or propensity of such animal, that one who keeps animals ferce naturce is responsible at all events for any injuries they may do ; and that as bees belong to the latter class, it follows of course -that the defendant is liable. In order to determine this question, upon •which no direct or controlling authority exists, that I have been able to find, it becomes necessary to look into the principles upon which one •who owns or keeps animals is held liable for their vicious acts. It will be found, on examination of the authorities upon the subject, that this classification of animals by the common law into animals ferce naturce 18i LIABILITr FOR INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Earl V. Van Alstine. and domitcB natarce has reference mainly, if not exclusively, to the' rights of property which may be acquired in them ; those of the latter class being the subjects of absolute and permanent ownership, \vhil& in regard to the former only a qualified property can exist ; and the distinction is based upon the extent to which they can be domesticated or brought under the control and dominion of man, and not at all upoa the ferocity of their disposition or their proneness to mischief. For instance, the dog, some species of which are extremely savage and ferocious, is uniformly classed among animals domitce naturce, while the hare, the rabbit, and the dove are termed feroe naturce, although com- paratively harmless. It would not be rational to suppose that a classi- fication adopted with exclusive reference to one quality of animals could be safely used to define and regulate responsibilities growing out of other and different qualities; nor would it accord with that just analysis and logical accuracy which distinguish the common law, that it should be resorted to for that purpose. And although some dicta- may be found in the books which might seem to countenance the idea, the decided cases do not lead to any such conclusion. It is unnecessary to enter into any examination of the cases which establish one branch of the proposition contended for, to wit, that in, order to make the owner of domestic animals liable for any violent- injury done by them, unless connected with a trespass upon land, it- must be averred and proved that the defendant had notice or knowledge of the mischievous nature of the animal. This, as a general rule, is- settled by a series of decisions which have been entirely uniform from: the earliest days to the present time. But although in many of these cases, most of which are cases of injuries done by dogs, the words- domitce naturae,, or equivalent words, are used to describe the animals, for the mischief done by which their owners would not be liable without, notice, yet it is not alone because they belong to that class that the exemption arises, but because animals of that class are usually of a^ harmless disposition. I apprehend that if a person chooses to keep a. domestic animal, as a dog, which is naturally savage and dangerous, he- does so at his peril, and that he would be liable for any injury done by such dog, without evidence that he had ever done mischief before. This position is not without authority to support it, although it does not rest upon any adjudged case. In Judge v. Cox,^ Abbott, J., suggests- the question, but expressly reserves his opinion upon it as unnecessary to the decision of that case. But in Hartley v. Harriman,^ which was. 1 1 stark. 285. 2 1 Barn. & Aid. 620. INJURIES BY ANIMALS FEE^ NATUEiE. 185 Supreme Court of New York — Opinion of Selden, J. an action for an injury done to sheep by dogs, the declaration contained a special averment that the dogs were accustomed to worry and bite sheep ; and the court held that this averment was not supported by proof that the dogs were of a ferocious and mischievous disposition. But Lord Ellenboeoitgh and Mr. Justice Batlet both said that it would have been sufficient to allege generally that the dogs were of a ferocious nature, and unsafe to be left at large, and that evidence of that fact would support the action. These dicta are so obviously in accordance with common sense and reason, that they will undoubtedly be sustained whenever the question shall arise. It is true that in a case of injuries done to sheep, our statute makes the owner liable without notice, pro- vided the sheep are killed, but the principle would apply to any other injury. But while, as I have said, the cases which define the responsibilities of the owners of domestic animals are very numerous, those which relate to the liability of the proprietor of wild animals are rare. It has been assumed, rather than decided, that the latter class are kept at the peril of their owners. In Rex v. Huggins,^ it is said: "There is a difference between things ferce naturae, as lions, bears, etc., which a man must keep up at his peril, and beasts that are mansuetce naturoB, and break through the tameness of their nature, such as oxen and horses. In the latter case, the owner must have notice ; in the former, an action lies against the owner without notice." The case in which this was said was an indictment for murder, but the language here given is copied and adopted by Buller, in his Nisi Prius.® It will be observed that while these authorities speak of a whole class, " things feroe naturce," yet the example given is that of lions, bears, etc. So, in a late case in our own courts, Van Leuven v. LyJce,^ Judge Jewett, after stating the rule in respect to domestic animals, saj's : " But as to animals ferce naturae, such as lions, tigers, and the like, the person who keeps them is liable for any damage they may do, without notice, on the ground that by nature such animals are fierce and dan- gerous." Here the learned judge, although adopting the same classi- fication, yet states the true ground of the owner's responsibility. The substance of the rule as given by him is, that one who keeps lions, tigers, or other fierce and dangerous animals, is liable at all events for any injury they may do. The words ferce naturce add nothing of any value to the rule, but rather tend to mislead, as they are descriptive of many animals that are not ferocious or dangerous. 1 2 Ld. Eaym. 1583. « 1 X. Y. 516; infra, case 3. « Bull. N. P. 77. 186 LIABILITY FOR INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Earl V. Van Alstine. Peake, in his work on Evidence, under the head of "Actions Founded in Negligence," has the following: "If one man keep a lion, bear, or any other wild and ferocious animal, and such animal escape from his confinement and do mischief to another, the owner is liable to make satisfaction for the mischief so done, without further evidence of negli- gence in him ; for every person who keeps such noxious and useless animals must keep them at his peril. On the contrary, if a man has a dog, a bull, or any other domestic animal such as are usually kept and are indeed necessary to the existence of man, no action is maintainable without proof of knowledge, etc. ; for without such knowledge no neg- ligence or fault is imputable to the defendant, "i Three things are worthy of notice in this extract. In the first place, the author men- tions animals that are not only wild but ferocious, and speaks of them as not only noxious but useless. In speaking of domestic animals, he dwells upon their utility and value. And lastly, he makes negligence the foundation of the liability of the owner. Again, Chitty, under the head of "Actions on the Case for Negli- gence," gives the rule as follows: "The owner of domestic or other animals, not naiurally inclined to do mischief as dogs, horses, and oxen, is not liable for any injury committed by them to the person or personal property, unless it can be shown that he previously had notice of the animal's mischievous propensity. " ^ This accurate elementary writer did not fall into the error of applying the rule to the whole class of animals domitce naturae, but adds the qualification, "not naturally inclined to do mischief." By his arrangement of the subject, too, he confirms the view of Peake, that the liabiUty is based upon negligence. These authorities seem to me to point to the following conclusions : (1.) That one who owns or keeps an animal of any kind becomes liable for any injury the animal may do, only on the ground of some actual or presumed negligence on his part. (2.) That it is essential to the proof of negligence, and suflBcient evidence thereof, that the owner be shown to have had notice of the propensity of the animal to do mis- chief. (3.) That proof that the animal is of a savage and ferocious nature is equivalent to proof of express notice. In such cases, notice is presumed. These views derive some support from the case of May and wife t. Burdett.^ That was an action on the case for an injury done to the wife by the bite of a monkey. The declaration alleged that the defend- ant kept the monkey wrongfully, well knowing that it was of a mis- 1 Korris's Peake, 486. • 9 Q. B. 101. a Chitty's PI. 82. INJURIES BY ANIMALS FERM NATURE. 187 Supreme Court of New York — Opinion of Selden, J. chievous and ferocious nature, and accustomed to bite, etc., but did not aver that the defendant had been guilty of any negligence. A verdict ■was found for the plaintiff ; and the defendant moved in arrest of judg- ment, on the ground that, as the action was founded in negligence, the declaration was defective in not containing any averment that the defendant had been guilty of negligence. The motion was overruled, being after verdict. Chief Justice Denman said : " But the conclusion to be drawn from an examination of all the authorities appears to us to be this : that a person keeping a mischievous animal, with knowledge of its propensities, is bound to keep it secure at his peril, and that if it does mischief, negligence is presumed. The negligence is in keeping such an animal after notice." The injury for which this action was brought was done by an animal clearly ferce naturae, and yet it was deemed necessary to aver the mischievous nature of the animal, together with knowledge on the part of the owner ; and the question which arose and was very elaborately discussed was, whether the plaintiff should not have gone still further, and inserted an averment of negligence. Having shown, then, as I think, clearly, that the liability does not depend upon the classification of the animal doing the injury, but upon its propensity to do mischief, it remains to be considered whether bees are animals of so ferocious a disposition that every one who keeps them, under any circumstances, does so at his peril. If it is necessary for the plaintiff to aver and prove the mischievous nature of the animal, nothing of the kind was done in this case ; but if courts are to take judicial notice of the nature of things so familiar to man as bees, which I suppose they would be justified in doing, then I would observe that, however it may have been anciently, in modern days the bee has become almost as completely domesticated as the ox or the cow. Its habits and its instincts have been studied, and through the knowledge thus acquired, it can be controlled and managed with nearly as much certainty as any of the domestic animals ; and, although it may be proper still to class it among those ferae naturae, it must, nevertheless, be regarded as com- ing very near the dividing line ; and, in regard to its propensity to mis- chief, I apprehend that such a thing as a serious injury to persons or property from its attacks is very rare, not occurring in a ratio more frequent certainly than injuries arising from the kick of a horse or the bite of a dog. There is one rule to be extracted from the authorities to which I have referred, not yet noticed, and that is that the law looks with more favor upon the keeping of animals that ai-e useful to man, than such as are purely noxious and useless. And the keeping of the one, although in some rare instances it may do injury, will be tolerated and encouraged, 188 LIABILITY FOE INJURIES COMMITTBD BY ANIMALS. Earl V. Van Alstine. while there is nothing to excuse the keeping of the other. In the case of VroomanY. Lawyer,^ ihe court say: "If damage be done by any domestic animal kept for use or convenience, the owner is not liable to an action without notice." The utility of bees no one will question, and hence there is nothing to call for the application of a very stringent rule to the case. Upon the whole, therefore, I am clearly of the opinion that the owner of bees is not liable, at all events, for any accidental injury they may do. The question is still left, whether the keeping of these bees so near the highway subjects the defendant to a responsibility which would not otherwise rest upon him. I consider this question as substantially dis- posed of by the evidence in the case. It appears that bees had been kept in the same situation for some eight or nine years, and no proof was offered of the slightest injury ever having been done by them. On the contrary, some of the witnesses testify that they had lived in the neighborhood, and had been in the habit of passing and repassing fre- quently, with teams and otherwise, without ever having been molested. This rebuts the idea of any notice to the defendant, either from the nature of bees, or otherwise, that it would be dangerous to keep them in that situation ; and, of course, upon the principles already settled, he could not be held liable. The judgment of the County Court must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. 3. liabelilty pok teesp asses 0¥ animals mansuet^ nature. Van Leuven v. Ltke.* Court of Appeals of New Torh, 1848. Hon. Erbbbokn G. Jewutt, Chief Judge. Greene C. Bronson, Addison Gardiner, Charles H. Rugglbs, Samuel Jonbs, William B. Wright, Thomas A. Johnson, Charlbs Gray, Judges. Judges of the Supreme Court, and ex officio Judges of the Court of Appeals. 1. Liability for Injury by Domestic Animal— Scienter.— The owner ol a domestic animal is not, in general, liable lor an injury committed by sucb animal, unless it be alleged and shown that the defendant had notice of its Ticions propensities. * Eeported 1 N. Y. 515. 1 13 Johns. 339. TEESPASSKS OF AXIJtALS MAXSUETiE XATUKiE. 189 Court of Appeals of New York — Opinion of Jewett, C. J. 2. Xizception — Domestic Animal breaking: another's Close. —But 11 the animal is unlawiully in the close ol another, and commits mischief there, it seems that the owner is liable without alleging or proving a scienter; and in such cases the declaration should be lor breaking and entering the close, and the particular mischief, e.g., the killing ol another domestic animal, should be alleged in aggraration of the trespass. 8. Illustration. — A declaration in a justice's court alleged that the defendant's sow and pigs mangled and tore a cow and call of the plaintiff so that they died. The evidence tended to show that the injury was committed as alleged, and that it was done while the sow and pigs were trespassing in the plaintiff 's close. It was held that the plaintiff could not recover, lor the reason that there was no allegation or proof ol a scienter, and no allegation ol a breach ol the plaintiff 's close. Van Leuven sued Lyke and Dumond in a justice's court, and recov- ered judgment ; which was affirmed by the Common Pleas on certiorari, and reversed by the Supreme Court on error. ^ The plaintiff brought error to this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court, as delivered by Jewett, C. J. M. SchoonmaJcer, for the plaintiff in error ; T. B. WestbrooJc, for the defendants in error. Jewett, C. J. — It is alleged in the plaintiff's declaration, "that on the 27th day of November, 1844, at, etc., the defendants were the owners of a certain sow and pigs, which sow and pigs, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, to wit, at the place aforesaid, bit, damaged, and mutilated and mangled a certain cow and calf of the plaintiff, while the said cow was in the act of calving, so that said cow and calf both died, to the plaintiff's damage $50." To which the defendants pleaded the general issue. There was evidence given on the trial sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the plaintiff's cow and calf were de- stroyed by the defendants' sow and pigs in the manner set forth in the declaration, upon the land of the plaintiff, where the sow and pigs were at the time of committing the said injury. But there is no allegation in the declaration, or evidence given on the trial, that swine possess natural propensities which lead them, instinctively, to attack or destroy animals in the condition of the plaintiff's cow and calf. Nor is there any allegation or evidence that the defendants previously knew, or had notice, that their swine were accustomed to do such or similar mischief, or that the swine broke and entered the plaintiff's close, and there com- mitted the mischief complained of. It is a well-settled principle that in all cases where an action of tres- pass or case is brought for mischief done to the person or personal property of another by animals mansuetce natures, such as horses, oxen, cows, sheep, swine, and the like, the owner must be shown to have had notice of their viciousness before he can be charged, because 1 See i Denio, 137. 190 LIABILirr FOR INJUEIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Van Leuven v. Lyke. such animals are not by nature fierce or dangerous, and such notice must be alleged in the declaration ; but as to animals ferce naturce, such as lions, tigers, and the like, the person who keeps them is liable for any damage they may do, without notice, on the gi'ound that by nature such animals a.re fierce and dangerous.'^ But this rule does not apply where the mischief is done by such animals while committing a trespass upon the close of another. The common law holds a man answerable not only for his own tres- pass, but also for that of his domestic animals ; and as it is the natural and notorious propensity of many of such animals, such as horses, oxen, sheep, swine, and the like, to rove, the owner is bound at his peril to confine them on his own land ; and if they escape and commit a trespass on the lands of another, unless through defect of fences which the latter ought to repair, the owner is liable to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, though he had no notice, in fact, of such propen- sity.^ And where the owner of such animals does not confine them on his own land, and they escape and commit a trespass on the lands of another, without the fault of the latter, the law deems the owner him- self a trespasser for having permitted his animals to break into the enclosure of the former under such circumstances. And in declaring against the defendant in an action for such trespass, it is competent for the plaintiff to allege the breaking and entering his close by such animals of the defendant, and there committing particular mischief or injury to the person or property of the plaintiff ; and, upon proof of the allegation, to recover as well for the damage for the unlawful entry as for the other injuries so alleged, by way of aggravation of the trespass, without alleging or proving that the defendant had notice that his animals had been accustomed to do such or similar mischief. The breaking and entering the close, in such action, is the substantive allega- tion, and the rest is laid as matter of aggravation only. This principle is recognized as sound by several adjudged cases. In the case of Beckwith v. Shordike and Hateh,^ the action was trespass for entering the plaintiff's close with guns and dogs, and killing his deer. The evidence showed that the defendants entered with guns and dogs into a close of the plaintiff adjoining to his paddock, and that their dog pulled down and killed one of the plaintiff's deer. It was held to be sufficient evidence to prove the defendants trespassers, and they were 1 9 Bao. Abr., tit. " Trespass," 1, 505 ; Jen- PI. (ed. 1812) 69, 79 ; Vrooman v. Lawyer, IS kins V. Turner, 1 Ld. Raym. 109; Mason v. Johns. 339; Hinckley ». Emerson, 4 Cow. 361. Keellng.lIxl.Eaym. 603;«. c.,12Modern,332; * sBla. Comm. 211; Chltty's PL 70. Bex V. Huggins, 2 Id. Kaym. 1583; 1 Ohitty's ' 4 Burr. 2092. TRESPASSES OF ANIMALS MANSXJET^ NATTIER. 191 Court of Appeals of New York — Opinion of Jewett, C. J. held liable for the injury done by their dog, although it was not shown that they had any knowledge or notice of the propensity of the dog to do such or similar injury. In Angus v. Badin,^ the action was trespass for the defendant's oxen breaking into the enclosure of the plaintiff, and there goring his cow so as to kiU her ; and upon the ground that the defendant had neglected to confine his oxen on his own land, and that they were trespassing on the land of the plaintiff, he was held liable for the injury done, although it was not alleged or proved that he knew or had notice of the propensity of his oxen to commit such an injury. And so in Dolph v. Ferris,^ where the action was trespass, before a justice of the peace, and there tried without any declaration having been filed ; therefore the court held that the case must be considered as if the case had been tried on the most favorable declaration for the plaintiff which the evidence would have warranted. The evidence was that the bull of the defendant, which was running at large, broke and entered into the enclosure of the plaintiff, where his horse was feeding on the grass growing therein, and gored him so that he died by reason thereof in a few days. The court held it to be clear from the evidence that the defendant might have been declared against for having broken and entered the close of the plaintiff, and the grass and herbage of the plaintiff there lately growing with his bull eaten up, trod down, and consumed ; and might also have been charged in the same declara- tion with having killed or destroyed the plaintiff's horse or colt with his bull. But in the case under consideration there is no allegation charging the defendants' swine with doing any act for which the law holds the defendants accountable to the plaintiff without alleging and proving a scienter. Had the plaintiff stated in his declaration such ground of liability, or charged that the swine broke and entered his close and there committed the mischief complained of, and sustained his decla- ration by evidence, I am of opinion that he would have been entitled to recover all the damages thus sustained ; but as he has not stated in his declaration either ground of liability, the defendants ought not to be deemed to have waived the objection by not making it, specifically, before the justice. I think the judgment should be aflSrmed. Judgment affirmed. > S K. J. 815. 7 WattB & S. 367. 192 LIABILITY FOB INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Loorais V. Terry. 4. LIABILITy FOR INJTJRIES COMMITTED BY SAVAGE DOGS, KEPT FOR DEPENCE OF ONE'S PREMISES. LooMis V. Terry.* Supreme Court of New York, 1837. Hon. Samttei. Nblsoit, Chief Justice. \ Justices. Greene C. Bkonsok, | " ESBK COWEN, I 1. Liability for Injuries by mischievous Hog kept for Defence of One's Premi- ses. — A man may keep a dog for the necessary defence of his house, his garden, or his fields, and may cautiously use him for that purpose in the night-time; but if he permit a mischievous dog to be at large on his premises, and a person is bitten by him in the day-time, the owner is liable in damages, though the person injured be at the time tres- passing on the grounds of the owner by hunting in his woods without license. 2. Ibid. — Right to use dangerous Agrencies for Defence of Property. — It seems that a person is not permitted, for the protection of property, in his absence, against a mere trespasser, to use means endaagerlng the life or safety of a human being, whatever he may do where the entry upon his premises is to commit a felony or breach of the peace; and where such means are used, the nature and value of the property sought to be protected must be such as to justify the proceeding. Full notice of the mischief to be encountered must be given, and the principles of humanity must not be violated, or the owner wiU be subjected to damages for any injury wliich ensues. Error from the Oneida Common Pleas. Terry sued Loomis in a justice's court, and declared against him in an action on the case, for keeping dogs accustomed to bite mankind, and that the dogs thus kept had bit the son and servant of the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice that he would prove on the trial that the plaintiff's son was at the time trespassing on his grounds. The cause was tried before a jury. It appeared that the plaintiff's son, aged sixteen, and a number of other boys were hunting in the woods of the defendant on a Sunday, where the plaintiff's son was attacked by a dog (a hound), who sprang upon him and brought him to the ground, and, when down, another dog (a slut) also came upon him, and he was severely bitten by the dogs, and held down five or six minutes, until the other boys came to his rescue. The slut had puppies, and a day or two previous to the injury the plaintiff's son had been cautioned not to go where they were, as the slut was cross, and might bite him. The puppies were in a hollow log in the woods, about twenty-five rods from the place where the boy was attacked. He did not go near the place where they were. On being informed of the injury done to the boy, • Reported 17 Wend. 496. INJURIES BY SAVAGE DOGS. 193 Supreme Court of New Tork — Opinion of Cowen, J. the plaintiff observed, he wished his dogs had eaten him up. Previous to this occurrence, the hound attacked a man on horseback, caught him by the foot, and left the print of his teeth in the boot which he had seized upon, of which the defendant had notice. The defendant proved that he ha4 sold the slut to a person of the name of Monro, upwards of a year previous to the injury; but it also appeared that she had returned to the premises of the defendant, and had been harbored by him. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, with $15 damages, on which judgment was rendered, and which judgment was affirmed in the Common Pleas on certiorari. The defendant sued out a writ of €rror. The cause was submitted on written arguments, by W. G. Nbyes, for the plaintiff in error, and P. Gridley, for the defendant in error. By the court, Cowen, J. — No doubt the plaintiff's son was a tres- passer on the defendant's premises. It is said the general practice of entering on another's grounds to hunt for wild animals would warrant the jury in finding a license. No evidence was given of that practice ; and the jury must, I think, have found as matter of law that a tres- passer is not without protection from a ferocious dog on the prem- ises. Whether he forfeits all protection from the mere circumstance of being wrongfully there, is the question, and, I think, the only question of law which the plaintiff in error can raise upon the justice's return. The counsel for the defendant in error is doubtless right when he says that a wilful and wanton injury by the owner, done to a man or even his beast which i? trespassing, cannot be justified. ^ All necessary force to resist the entry, or eject the trespasser after he shall have intruded into the premises, is the utmost remedy which the law allows by the act of the party injured. But that is a different question. May a man knowingly keep on his premises a ferocious dog, in such a way that he will worry ordinary trespassers in the day-time, without notice of the fact? I think we must take the case thus strongly against the defendant below, on the finding of the jury. The distinction between acts done by the owner to repel a trespass, he being present, and his taking measures for the general protection of his rights during his absence, appears to me to be very well considered by Dallas, J., in Deane v. Clayton.^ In the former case, he can fibs, himself, the necessary measure of violence ; in the latter, he can only provide the means with 1 Per Burrongh, J., in Deane v. Clayton, 7 '1 Taun. 519, 520. Taun. 196-498, 505; Park, J., id. 510. 13 194 LIABILITY FOE INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Loomis V. Terry. a measure of prudence adapted to his general purpose, and the tres- passer must act at his peril. But the case before us is not one of a man keeping a dog for the necessary defence of his garden, his house, or his field, and cautiously- using him for that purpose in the night-time. i It is not the case of keeping a useful domestic animal — a mischievous buU, for instance — in a remote enclosure.® It is not Uke setting spring-guns, with public notice of the fact ; for even that has been held warrantable as being necessary.* Other like instances are put in that case.* Where a dog is lawfully kept for the purposes of protection, a trespasser cannot maintain an action for an injury, if he come in the way of the dog.^ And there can be no doubt that, as against a trespasser, a man may make any defensive erection, or keep any defensive animal, which may be neces- sary to the protection of his grounds, provided he take due care to confine himself to necessity. But it has been held that in these, and the like cases, the defendant shall not be justified, even as against a trespasser, unless he give notice that the instrument of mischief is in the way. That has been held of spring-guns, ^ and it goes on the prin- ciple that secrecy is not necessary to the object ; or, at least, not so necessary that the means may be used to the hazard of human life or human safety. This doctrine was much discussed in the case of Deane V. Clayton.'' The arguments of counsel are to be found only in Mar- shall. There, the defensive erection was spikes or dog-spears, fixed along hare-paths, for the destruction of dogs upon the defendant's premises. The plaintiff's dog being decoyed by a hare, and killed, the judges of the Common Pleas were equally divided on the question whether an action lay by the owner of the trespassing dog. But I understand them all to agree that the case would have been different were the life, or even the safety, of a human being thus put to hazard. Dallas, J., who was against the action in that case, yet admitted that " the law distinguishes to many and most essential purposes between property and the life of a man." In respect to such defences thus applied. Best, C. J., said, both in Ilott \. Wilkes and Bird v. Solbrook, " humanity requires that the fullest notice possible should be given, and the law of England wiU not sanction what is inconsistent with human- 1 Brock V. Copeland, 1 Esp. 203; Sarch v. « Sarch ji. Blackburn, i Car. &P. 297- » &, Blackburn, 4 Car. & P. 297. 1 Moo. & M. 505. • • • 2 Per Lord Eenyon in Brock v. Copeland, « Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628. 1 ^^P- 2M- ' 1 Taun. 489; 2 Marsh. 577; s. c, 1 Moo. s Ilott V. Wilkes, 3 Barn. & Aid. 304. J. B. 203. « And see 7 Taun. 497, per Burrough, J. ENJUEIES BY SAVAGE DOOS. 195 Supreme Court of New York — Opinion of Cowen, J. ity." Much reliance, in Deane v. Clayton, was placed on the want of notice, by Bdekough, J. Pake, J., said that, with notice, the plaintiff did all he could to keep his dog away. But what shall we say of a case involving human safety, perhaps human life (for, I think, had not others ran to the rescue of the boy, the dogs would have killed him), where a fierce dog is kept without semblance of necessity ; a dog which the defendant insisted, as a main point of defence, he had sold to Monro, and therefore did not want, but still kept about him on his premises? The law of self-defence and defence of property are out of the case, and the dog comes to be an idle nuisance. He is neither chained, nor is any effort made to restrain his attacks upon the neighbors. So far from it, a regret is expressed that he had not eaten them up. Here is no criminal wrong- doer entering for the purpose of committing felony or a breach of the peace ; no entry into a dwelling or enclosed yard ; ^ but the mildest of all technical trespasses, done not secretly, but openly, in company with a number of others. Any person might have killed such a fierce dog kept loose, his vicious disposition being known to the man who kept him.2 He comes within the rule that every man may abate a public nuisance.3 In Smith v. Pelah* Lee, C. J., ruled "that if a dog has once bit a man, and the owner, having notice thereof, keeps the dog, and lets him go about or lie at his door, an action will lie against him at the suit of a person who is bit, though it happened by such person's treading on the dog's toes ; for it was owing to his not hanging the dog on the first notice. And the safety of the king's subjects ought not afterwards to be endangered." Hanging is put only by way of ex- ample, but in some way such an animal must be properly secured from doing mischief.^ This case of Jones v. Perry was by the father for an injury to his son; and the report in Peake says the child first irritated the dog. He was tied, but by so long a string that he could reach the curb-stone on the opposite side of the street.® In short, a man must be governed in these things, even as against trespassers, by the nature and object of the article which is kept upon his premises. The business of life must go forward, and the fruits of industry must be protected. A man's gravel-pit is fallen into by tres- passing cattle, his corn eaten, or his sap drunk, whereby the cattle are killed ; his unruly bull gores the intruder, or his trusty watch-dog, prop- 1 Burrongli, J., 7 Tann. 497, 498. ^ Jones v. Perry, 2 Esp. 482; s. c, Norrls's " Putnam v. Payne, 13 Johns. 312 ; Hinckley Peake, 487. V. Emerson, 4 Cow. 351. « And see Blackman v. Simmons, 3 Car. » Bowers v. Fitzrandolph, Add. 215. & P. 138. 1 2 Stra. 1264. 196 LIABILITY FOK INJUKIES COMMITTBD BY ANEttALS. Kotes. eriy and honestly kept for protection, worries the unseasonable tres- passer. Such consequences cannot be absolutely avoided. Yet, so long as he keeps upon the side of humanity, there is little danger that a jury of his neighbors will not place a correct construction upon his acts. With them it must lie, in nice cases, to mark the boundaries of his conduct. In the case before us, we think the defendant below transgressed the plainest outlines of his duty. He put his neighbors in danger without the semblance of benefit to himself. The judgment against him must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. NOTES. 1 1. The Owner or Keeper of Animals liable. — The owner or keeper of animals is liable for any injuries which, by his negligence, he allows them to inflict, except where the fault of the party injured proximately contributes to the injury sustained.' § 2. Who is an Owner or Keeper? — The reason of liability in such cases arises out of the legal requirements to talie the necessary care and control of them, so as to prevent injury, which implies not only the duty but the right of control.' Hence, he who has the care, control, and custody of animals, such as the depasturer of sheep,' or the agister of cattle and horses,* is equally liable with the owner for their trespasses on the land of another ; the occupier of a close, and not the owner, being bound to keep the fences in repair.* And it does not relieve the party of liability for injuries committed by an animal because he suffered it, at the request of the owner, to remain with his cattle.* g 3. Joint Owners liable jointly. — It has also been decided in Connecti- cut, under a statute which requires that " all damage done by cattle, horses, sheep, or swine, when the fence is sufficient, shall he paid by the owners of them," that if the cattle and horses were jointly used and possessed by the defendants living together, and occupying the same farm, they were the owners of them within the meaning of the statute.' No distinction can be made as to the duty of controlling animals, between sole and joint owners, as to the public ;8 it being an incident of the relation existing between them that either might have the custody of the animals, the custody of one being, as to third persons, the custody of both. But where a statute provides' that every owner or keeper of any dog shall forfeit, etc., and the 1 Drake ». Monnt, 33 N. J. L. 441. r. Smitb, 8 Term Eep. 768; Cheetham ». » EoBsell V. Oottom, 31 Pa. St. 525. Hampson, 4 Term Eep. 318. » Barnam v. Van Dnsen, 16 Conn. 200. « Frammell v. Little, 16 Ind. 251. * Tewksbnry v. BuckUn, 7 N. H. 518; Ly- ' Smith v. Jacqnes, 6 Conn. 530. ons V. Merrick, 105 Mass. 71 ; Ward v. Brown, » Oakes v. Spaulding, 40 Vt. 347. 64 lU. 307 (sustained m Ozbum v. Adams, 70 » Eev. Stat. Mass. 1836, chap. 58, § 13 ; Eev. rU. 291) ; Cook v. Morea, 33 Ind. 497. Stat. Me. 1871, chap. 30, § 1. 6 Tewksbnry c.Buoklin, 7 N.H. 618; Eider WHO LIABLE AS O^V^■EK OR KEEPER. 197 Joint Liability. plaintiff alleges that the defendants were owners and Iceepers, the plaintiffs must prove that defendants were hoth owners and keepers.^ ? 4. Actual Custody not necessary to establish Liability. — But the cus- tody of the animal, necessary to establish the liabilitj', need not be actual custody at the time the injury complained of Is done. Thus, in a case where defendant's father testified that he owned the dog which had bitten plaintiff, but had put him in the hands of his son to avoid his creditors, the court said:'' "If, as between the defendant and his father, the dog was the defendant's, the father having surrendered his right to defendant, and at the time the plaintiff was bitten the defendant had a right to the control of the dog, and he was only temporarilj' and casually out of his actual cus- tody, as any one's dog might be at a neighbor's house, and the defendant's father, as between them, had no right to any custody and control of the dog, the defendant was liable in this action; and that if the defendant's father put the dog into defendant's hands for the purpose of keeping him from being attached by his creditors, it would not excuse defendant." ^ 5. Are both O'wner and Keeper liable? — Prom the reason of the rule, that is, that he alone should be liable for injuries by animals who has the power of control over them, it would seem that the general owner will not be liable for the trespasses of animals while they are in the possession of a bailee, — for instance, when a horse is hired or loaned, or when cattle or sheep are agisted, and generally it is so held;' but it has also been held that the common law gave the plaintiff his election to pursue either the owner or the agister of cattle for trespasses committed by them.* g 6. He who harbors an Animal liable as Owner. — For the purpose of maintaining an action for injuries received from the bite of a vicious dog, it is not material whether the defendant was the owner or not; harboring a dog about one's premises, or allowing him to be or resort there, is a suflBcient keeping of the dog to sup- port the action.* But the party who shall be held responsible for an injury committed by a dog must not be one who harbors him and permits him to remain temporarily upon his premises, as in the case of one who keeps boarders for pay, and permits such boarders to have or keep on his premises a dog; but he is liable who, having the possession and control of a house or premises, suffers and permits a dog to be kept on the premises in the way such domestic animals are usually kept, — as a member of the family, so to speak.^ And it has been held, where a passenger was bitten at a railway station, while waiting for a train, by a stray dog which had, about one hour and a half before that time, attacked another passenger and torn her dress, and had, a few minutes before the injury complained of, been kicked out of the signal- box by one of the employees of the company, that this was not such a keeping of the dog as would justify the leaving of the question of negligence to the jury.' 1 Buddington v. Shearer, 20 Pick. i77 ; s. < Sheridan v. Bean, 8 Mete. 28i. Compare c, 22 Pick. 427 ; Smith v. Montgomery, 52 Me. Eossell v. Cottom, 31 Pa. St. 525. 178. 5 McKone v. Wood, 5 Car. & P.l; Wilkin- 2 Marsh v. Jones, 21 Vt. 378. son v. Parrott, 32 Oal. 102 ; Barrett v. Maiden, s Tewksbury v. Bncklin, 7 N. H. 518 ; Kos- etc., E. Co., 3 AMen, 101. seU V. Cottom, 31 Pa. St. B25 ; Wales ». Ford, « Cummings v. Riley, 52 N. H. 368. 8 N. J. L. 267; 1 Bsp. N. P. 387 (citing Daw- ' Smith v. Great Eastern R. Co., 36 L. J. try ».Huggin8,Clay.33;Trials per Pais, 201). (C. P.) 22; s. c, L. R. 2 C. P. 4; 15 L. T. (N. S.) 246. 198 LIABILITY FOR INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Notes. ? 7. Servant keeping Dog. — It has been held under a statute,' by a provision of which a person in possession of a dog, or one who shall suffer a dog to remain about his house, is liable as owner for his mischievous acts, that an employer was not liable for mischief done by the dog of his hired laborer, where the dog was in tlie habit of following his master daily to his work, on the farm of his employer, and of returning each night and staying with his master at his own house, which was distinct from that of the employer.' But in a case against a horse-railroad com- pany,5 where the evidence at the trial was that the dog which inflicted the injury on the plaintiff was kept on the premises of the defendants for several weeks, by a person in their employment, who had charge and superintendence of their stables, and that this was done with the knowledge and implied assent of their general agent or super- intendent, it was held that this was clearly sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the dog was kept by the defendants. ^ 8. A Corporation may keep a Dog. — In the same case, the court says : "It is impossible for us to determine, as a matter of law, that a corporation established for the purpose of building and running a railroad by horse-power would be going ultra vires in either o^vning or keeping a dog. On the contrary, it would seem to come quite within the scope of the power and authority granted to it, to keep dogs to pro- tect its stables and other property from incendiaries and thieves. And it is equally chargeable with notice of the vicious propensity of a dog which is kept by it as is an individual." * g 9. Separate Owners not liable jointly. — At common law, a joint action will not lie against separate owners of animals which unite in doing mischief.* "Where a joint action will lie, either may be made accountable for the whole injury. The reason which makes one liable who personally joins in, or aids, or abets the wrong done by another, does not apply. That is a case of intention or volition in the offender; and the man who advises or countenances a trespass is the real cause. Not so in the case of animals which happen to unite in perpetrating mischief; for one of the animals may be young and feeble, and incapable of mischief by himself.^ And the difficulty in accurately estimating the separate injury done by each animal fur- nishes no reason why one man should be liable for the mischief done by another's animal. And in actions under statutes, in several of the States,' making owners of animals liable for injuries committed by them, this rule has been adopted ; * and it has been further held, that the jury are at liberty to adopt any reasonable rule in fixing the amount of damages done by each animal. Thus, where the animals are > 1 Rev. Stat. N. T. 706, § 20. trol, they may be sued jointly. See Ozburn 2 Auchrauty v. Ham, 1 Denio, 495. v. Adams, 70 111. 291. 8 Barrett v. Maiden, etc., K. Co., 3 Allen, i Van Steenburgh v. Tobias, 17 Wend. 562; 101. Partenheimer v. Van Order, 20 Barb. 479. * See also Stiles v. Tlie Cardiff Steam Nav. But see Brady v. Ball, 14 Ind. 317. Co., 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 310; 10 Jur. (N. s.) 1199; s Denny v. Correll, 9 Ind. 72. This case, 12 Week. Rep. 1080; 20 L. T. (N. s.) 844. which was an action under a statute lor 5 Russell V. Tomlinson, 2 Conn. 206; Van damages done by a dog to sheep, suggests Steenburgh «. Tobias, 17 Wend. 562 ; Carroll another reason for the distinction: that at V. Weiler, 4 N. T. S. C. (T. & C.) 131; «. c, 1 common law the owner is not liable for Hun, 605; Westgate ». Carr, 43 lU. 450. trespasses upon land committed by his dog. ' Van Steenburgh v. Tobias, 17 Wend. 562. Adams v. Hall, 2 Vt. 9 ; Auchmuty v. Ham, Where the separate owners have iornt con- 1 Denio, 495. But see Jack v. Hudnall, 25 Ohio St. 255; McAdams v. Sutton, 24 Ohio, 333. WHO LIABLE AS OWNEE OR KEEPER. 199 Liability of Master for Servant. about equal in capacity for mischief, in the absence of proof the jury might conclude they did equal damage; ' and in case of one being apparently of less capacity for mis- chief than another of two which had done the injury, the jury had the right to say that it did less damage than the other." But in another case,' under a statute * pro- viding that the owner or owners of dogs accustomed to kill sheep shall be liable for all damages done by them, it was decided that a joint action will lie against all the owners of several dogs which, at one time, kill and wound sheep, and each owner is answerable for the whole damage done, in which his dog is jointly engaged. 2 10. Identification of Animal doing Mischief. — For the purpose of identi- fying dogs which are charged with killing sheep at night, it has been held that ■evidence may be admitted that two dogs had been seen in company with each other at another time, one of which was known to have taken part in the sheep-killing, as a basis for the presumption that they were together engaged in the killing ;* and that the testimony of a witness as to hearing the dog bark, and thereby recognizing it, may properly be given to the jury.* g 11. Master liable for his Servant's negligent Care or Use of the Mas- ter's Animals. — The liability of the master for the negligent care or use of animals is based upon the general rule that a master is liable for all acts done by the servant in the execution of his master's business, within the scope of his employment, and for all acts of the servant done by the express orders or direction of the master. Therefore it has been held that the owner of a horse is liable for injuries inflicted on an innocent party by its running away, it appearing that the owner's servant was negligent in not properly securing and restraining it' And where a hostler at an inn negligently omitted to put the bits in the mouth of a guest's horse, and in con- sequence the horse became unmanageable, and damaged the plaintifl' and his buggy, the master was held chargeable.* So, where a servant was sent by his master to Lin- •coln's-Inn Fields, a place where people are always going about, with two ungovern- able horses attached to a coach, and the servant there drove them to make them tractable and fit them for the coach, and the horses, because of their ferocity, ran upon the plaintiff and hurt and grievously wounded him, the master, as well as the servant, was held liable in case.' And trespass lies against a master for the act of his servant where, while the servant drives his master in a gig, the horse runs away and does damage.'" So in the case of the servants of a carman, who negligently ran over a boy in the streets and maimed him ; and where servants of a man, with his cart, ran against the cart of the plaintiff, in which there was a pipe of wine, which was thereby spoiled, the masters of the respective servants were held liable.^' And it is actionable negligence upon the part of the owner of a horse accustomed to run away, to leave it in a public street unhitched, in charge of a boy fourteen years old, who was not well, and incapable of managing the horse, by reason of which the horse, having become frightened, ran away and committed an injury. •^ 1 Buddington v. Shearer, 20 Pick. 477; «. Street v. Laumier, 34 Mo. 469; Huminell». «., 22 Pick. 427 ; Partenheimer v. Van Order, Webster, Bright. 133. 20 Barb. 479 ; Powers v. Kindt, 13 Kan. 74. « Hall v. Warner, 60 Barb. 198. s Wilbur V. Hnbbard, 35 Barb. 303. ' Michael v. Alestree, 2 Lev. 172; s. c, siib » Kerr ». O'Connor, 63 Pa. St. 341. nom. Michell v. Allestry, 1 Vent. 295; sub * Pa. Act of April 14, 1851. nom. Mitchil v. Alestree, 3 Keb. 650. 6 Carroll v. Weiler, 4 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C), '» Chandler v. Broughton, 3 Tyrw. 220. 131 ; s. c, 1 Hun, 605. " Anon., 1 Ld. Eaym. 739. « Wilbur V. Hubbard, 35 Barb. 303. '= Frazer v. Kimler, 2 Hun, 514; s. c, 5 N. » McCahiU v. Kipp, 2 E. D. Smith, 413; Y. S. C. (T. &C.) 16. 200 LIABILITY FOR INJUEIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Notes. 1 12. Master not liable for all Acts of Servant. — But a master is not chargeable witli the acts of his servant if the servant acts outside of the authority given him, and not within the scope of his employment.' Therefore the owner of a dog is not liable for the wilful act of his servant in setting his dog upon the cattle of another.^ And where a span of horses, detached from a railroad car, were driven through a public street by the defendant's servant, in a manner pursued for years without accident, and considered by those engaged in such business as safe and dis- creet, the defendant was held not liable for an injury sustained by a citizen by reason of the horses running away, and over him, where the horses were caused to run away by the wanton assault upon the team by one in the employment of the defendant, who was not then attending to the business of his employer.' And where a servant of defendant wilfully drove the chariot of his master against the plaintiff's chaise, but the master of the servant was not there at the time himself, nor did he in any manner direct or assent to the act of the servant, the master was held not liable.* So it was held that a father was not liable for the wilful act of a minor daughter in setting his dog upon plaintiff's hog, which was thereby bitten and killed, which was done ia defendant's absence, and without his authority or approval.^ And it is said in Brooke's Abridgment, tit. "Trespass," pi. 435: "If my servant, contrary to my will, chase my beasts into the soil of another, I shall not be punished." And in 2 Rolle's Abridgment, 553: " If my servant, without my notice, put my beasts into another's land, my servant is the trespasser, and not I ; because, by the voluntary putting of the beasts there without my assent, he gains a special property for the time, and so to this purpose they are his beasts." But an action of tort to recover damages sus- tained by reason of being run over by defendant's horse, which had broken away from defendant's servants, can only be maintained by showing negligence on th& part of the master or servants; and the defendant may introduce in defence evidence of the directions and declarations of one of the servants to the other, respecting the- care and management of the horse, just before the time of his running away, for the- purpose of showing that they were using due care.* In a recent well-considered case in New York the question is ably discussed.' The syllabus seems to give a correct idea of the law on this subject, as applicable to the facts- there stated. "Plaintiff, while travelling in a buggy along a street in the city of New York, was stopped by a blockade of vehicles just as he had crossed defendant's track. The rear of his buggy was so near the track that a ear could not pass without hitting- it. A car came up, the driver of which, after waiting a moment or two, ordered plaintiff to 'get off the track.' Plaintiff was unable to move either way, and so noti- fied the driver, who replied, with an oath, that he was late, and that if plaintiff did not get off he would put him off; and immediately thereafter drove on, striking and upsetting plaintiff's buggy, and injuring him. In an action to recover damages, it was held that the evidence did not warrant a finding, as a matter of law, that the act of the driver was with a view to injure plaintiff, and not -with a view to his master's service, but that this question was one of fact for the jurj-. A master is liable for the ■wrongful act of his servant, to the injury of a third person, where the servant is engaged at the time in doing his master's business, and is acting within the general scope of his authoritj', although he is reckless in the performance of his duty, or 1 Middleton v. Fowler, 1 Salt. 282; Mc- ' ^eldon c. Harlem K. Co., 5 Bosw. 576. Manns r. Crickett, 1 East, 106; Storey v. * McManus b. Crickett, 1 East, 106. Ashton, Jj. R.4 Q. B. 476. The liability ol a ' Tifft i'. Tifft, 4 Denio, 17.5. master for the acts of his servant will be « Sullivan r. Scriiiture, 3 Allen, 564. fully Siscussed in a subsequent cliapter. ' Colien r. Dry Dock, etc., K. Co., B9 N. Y. 2 Steele v. Smith, 3 E. D. Smith, 321. 170. COMMOM-LAW CLASSIFICATION OF ANIMALS. 201 Negligence Actual or Presumed — Scienter. through lack of judgment or discretion, or from infirmity of temper, or under the influence of passion aroused by the circumstances, goes beyond the strict line of his duty, and inflicts unnecessary and unjustiflable 'injury.' " g 13. Relation of Master and Servant must exist. — In any case of this kind, the relation of master and servant must be established, to hold the defendant liable.' Thus, where the defendant, who was the buyer of a bullock, employed a licensed drover to drive it, the drover hired a boy to do the driving, and mischief was occasioned by the bullock, through the careless driving of the boy, it was decided that the relation of master and servant did not exist between the boy and the owner of the bullock, and therefore the defendant was not liable.' g 14. Common-La'w Classification. — At common law, animals were divided into two classes : animals ferce naturce, and domitce or mansuetce naturae. Animals fercE naturoe are those of a wild nature, or those which are not usually tamed.^ Animals domitce natures, or mansuetce naturoe, are those of a tame or domes- ticated nature.' This classiflcation had reference mainly, if not exclusively, to the rights of property which may be acquired in them ; those of the latter class being the subjects of absolute and permanent ownership, while in regard to the former only a qualified property can exist; and the distinction is based upon the extent to which they can be domesticated or brought under the control and dominion of man, and not at all upon the ferocity of their disposition, or their proneness to mischief. For instance, the dog, some species of which are extremely savage, is uniformly classed among animals domitae naturae; while the hare, the rabbit, and the dove are termed ferce naturae, although comparatively harmless.* Many of the cases cited herein seem to divide animals into the ferocious and non-ferocious. But this division is more seeming than real, and the careful reader will not allow himself to fall into the error of thinking that, because an animal belongs to the class termed ferce naturae, in all cases of injury" inflicted by it scienter need not be proved, and that negligence on the part of the keeper is presumed; or, that in all cases of injuries done by animals mansuetce natures, scienter must be proved, and that actual negligence on the part of the owner must be shown. 2 15. Negligence may be either actual or presumed. — While the liability of the owner or keeper of animals for injuries inflicted by them is based upon his negligence, yet this need not be actual negligence ; it may be presumed.* Where mischief is done, or injuries Inflicted by animals whose generic propensities or habits are neither mischievous nor dangerous, in order to charge the owner for damage done by such animals, it is necessary to allege and prove that such owner knew or had notice that the animals were accustomed to such or similar mischief; or, to speak technically, the scienter must be alleged and proved. In such a case, actual negligence must be shown.^ But if the mischief done is in accordance with the generic propen- 1 Milligan v. Wedge; 12 Ad. & E. 737. 3 W. N. C. 6; Scribner v. Kelley, 38 Barb. 14. = Bouv. L. Die. ; 2 Bla. Comm. 388; Sni- See also Smith v. Cook, 1 Q. B. Div. 79; 45 L, rUl's L. Die. ; Whart. L. Die. J. (Q. B.) 132; 3 Cent. L. J. 190. 8 2 Bla. Comm. 390; Bouv. L. Die; Bur- « Vrooman v. Lawyer, 13 Jolme. 339; rill's L. Die. ; Whart. L. Die. Stumps v. Kelley, 22 111. 140; Wormly v. 4 Earl V. Van Alstine, 8 Barb. 630, ante, Gregg, 05 Ul. 251; Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 Salk. p. 182. 68S. 6 See Mann v. Wiland, 24 Leg Int. 77 is.v., 202 LIABILITY FOE INJURIES COMMITTED BT ANIMALS. Notes. sities of the animal committing it, scienter need not be alleged or proved, but the owner is presumed negligent. An exception to this general rule of common law is found in the case of the escaping of that smaller class of animals which are not usually tamed, such as rabbits, pigeons, etc, from the land of one to that of another. No action could, in general, be supported for damage done by them ; because the instant they escaped from the land of the owner, his property in them ceased.^ g 16. Proof of Scienter. — There is no rule as to the number of instances of pernicious mischief done by an animal, of which the owner must have had notice in order to charge him with knowledge of its mischievous disposition.' One,' or two,* or three^ previous instances of a dog attacking a man, sheep, or other dogs, or a cow hooking a horse,' have been held sufficient for this purpose. Proof of a subse- quent act of viciousness, although known to the owner, is of course immaterial.' And it is no defence to the owner, if it is shown that he knew the animal had been guilty of previous acts of mischief, to prove that the animal was generally inofl'en- fiive.* But in a case where the evidence was conflicting as to whether the plaintiff was injured, and as to whether the alleged previous acts of ferocity on the part of the animal were not mere playful antics, the dog was allowed to he brought into court before the jury, to assist them in judging of his temper and disposition.^ The act complained of need not be exactly similar to former acts of viciousness, to charge the owner; but as soon as he knows, or has good reason to know, that the animal is likely to do mischief, it is his duty to restrain him,' — as in the case of a dog which is accustomed to bite sheep, and which afterwards bites a horse." So, in an action for keeping a dog which was accustomed to worry sheep, and which had worried the plaintiff's sheep, it was held that evidence that the dog was of a fierce and mischiev- ous disposition, and that he had once before attacked a man, was sufficient to charge the defendant." And in an action for damage done to a horse by a bull, evidence of a previous attack by the bull upon a man was held competent evidence to go to the jury.'* Some of the older cases, however, seem to hold that the injury complained of must he precisely similar to former acts which were known to the owner. •' Iiord CocKBTTRN, in speaking of actions for dogs worrying sheep, said " every dog became entitled to at least one worry." And to this remark, in part, is attributed the passing of acts in England, shortly afterwards, dispensing with proof of scienter in cases of action for dogs worrying sheep. Yet the act done, of which there is proof the owner had knowledge, must be such as to furnish a reasonable inference that the 1 Hinsley v. Wilkinsoii, Cro. Car. 387; ' Thomas v. Morgan, 5 Tyrw. 1085 ; 2 Cromp. Cooper i>. Marshall, 1 BmT. 259; Bowlston v. M. & E. 496; Fairchild v. Beutley, 30 Barb. Hardy, Cro. Eliz. 547 ; s. c, sub nom. Bonl- 147. ston's Case, 5 Co. 105 ; Bac. Abr., tit. s j^ing ^_ Taylor, 3 Fost. & Fin. 781. " GJame." s Klttredge v. Elliott, 16 N. H. 77; Picker- 2 Arnold V. Norton, 25 Conn. 93; Charl- ing v. Orange, 2 111. 338, 492; Cockerham v. wood V. Greig, 3 Car. & Kir. 46. Nixon, 11 Ired. L. 270. 2 Woolf V. Chalker, 31 Conn. 131; Loomis i" Jenkins v. Turner, ILd. Baym. 109' s. c. V. Terry, 17 Wend. 496; Smith v. Pelah, 2 2 Salk. 663. Stra. 1264; Kittredge v. EUiott, 16 N. H. 77; " Hartley v. Harriman, 1 Holt, 617; s. c, 2 Fleeming v. Orr, 2 Macq. H. L. Cas. 14; a. Stark. 212; 1 Bam. & Aid. 620. c, 29 Eng Law & Ecj. 16. 12 Coekerham v. Nixon, 11 Ired. L. 269. * Buckley v. Leonard, i Denio, 500. " Mason v. Keeling, 12 Modern, 332; ». c, 1 ' Wheeler «. Brant, 23 Barb. 824. Ld. Eaym. 606. • OoggsweU V. Baldwin, 15 Vt. 404. EVIDENCE OP NEGLIGENCE. 203 Proof of Scienter. animal is likely to commit an act of the kind complained of.^ For instance, it has been held that it will not support an action against the owner of a dog for biting a man, to show that he had knowledge of the dog's propensity to bite animals,^ unless there is an allegation of general ferocity of disposition upon the pait of the dog; for he might very well have courage to attack animals, and yet be entirely harmless as to human beings. And the fact that a dog had chased strange cattle from his master's land, when directed to do so by his master, or one of his family, or that it was his disposition to keep trespassing stock from his master's premises, does not prove a vicious propensity.' J 17. Continued — Not always necessary to shoTir previous Instances of Injuries inflicted. — Yet it is not always necessary to show previous instances of actual injuries committed by animals, known to the owner, to hold him liable. Where it is shown that the animal is of a fierce and dangeroxis disposition, and the attending circumstances indicate knowledge of this disposition on the part of the owner, it will sometimes be sufficient to charge him for damage committed by it.* Thus, in a case in the English Court of Common Pleas (1873), it appeared that a passenger in an omnibus was injured by a blow from the hoof of one of the horses, which had kicked through the front panel of the vehicle. There was no evidence to show that this particular horse was a vicious horse, or a kicker, but it was proved that the panel bore marks of other kicks, and that no precaution had been taken, by the use of a kicking-strap or otherwise, against the possible consequences of a horse striking out, and no explanation was offered on the part of defendants. It was held that there was evidence of negligence proper to be submitted to a jury, BoviLL, C. J., saying: "Proof having been given that the horse in question had misconducted him- self in the way charged, the burden of showing that he was not habitually a kicker, or something to account for his having kicked on this particular occasion, lay on the defendants. The mere fact of his having kicked out, was, I should say, pHmd facie evidence for the jury. But there was further evidence. It was proved that there were marks of other kicks on the omnibus besides that which was made on the occa- sion in question. It was left in doubt how those marks were produced. It was im- possible to withdraw the evidence from the jury. The defendants might, and ought to, have explained it. And when it is said that all horses are prone to kick, and that a single act of kicking may be no fault in a horse, then it becomes a fair question for the jury whether, that being so, it was not the duty of the defendants to provide some means to guard against such a contingency, such as a kicking-strap or board. It is urged that it is not usual for private individuals to apply such contrivances to their carriage-horses ; but the answer to that is, that private individuals generally take care to provide themselves with horses which do not kick. Where a horse, from no assignable cause, kicks out, I think the presumption is that he is a kicker. I think there was clearly evidence for the jury, and that the rule should be discharged." ^ In an American case, — an action for damages caused by an attack by dogs,— there was evidence tending to prove that one of them was kept chained a portion of the time ; that one of the defendants had warned a party to beware of them. It was 1 Jenkins v. Turner, 1 Ld. Eaym. 109; O.P.I; Judge v. Cox, 1 Stark. 285; MoCas- s. c, 2 Salk. 662; Tupper v. Clark, 43 Vt. 200. kill v. EUiott, 5 Strobh. L. 196; Earhart v. 2 Keightlinger u. Egan, 65 111. 235. Toungblood, 27 Pa. St. 331; Flansburg v. 3 Spray v. Ammerman, 66 111. 309. Basin, 11 Ch. Leg. N. 282. * Curtis V. Mills, 5 Car. & P. 489; Jones v. * Simsonu. London General Omnibus Co., Periy, 2 Esp. 482; Worth v. GUling, L. E. 2 L. E. 8 C. P. 39(M9S. 204 LIABILITY FOR LNJUKIES COMMITTED BT ANIMALS. Notes. shown that they were in the habit of running out furiously at passers-by, and indi- cating a disposition to inflict injury upon them, and were occasionally called in by persons in the defendants' employment ; that the defendants had caused to be erected a sign upon the premises, not in sight of the place where the plaintiflf was passing, inscribed, "Beware of the Dogs; " and that the other defendant, when apprised of the injury inflicted by them upon the plaintiflf, after expressing his regret, said : " They were large dogs, and he must have had a serious time." It was held that, upon this evidence, the court properly submitted it to the jury to determine whether the dogs were vicious to an extent that endangered life or limb, and prone to attack persons, and that the defendants had knowledge of this propensity.^ So, in an action for injury done to the plaintiff" by a bull attacking and goring him while he was walking along the street, wearing a red handkerchief, where defendant was driving the bull, it having been proven that after the accident the defendant said the red handkerchief was the cause of the accident, for that he knew that the bull would run at any thing red, and that on another occasion he said he knew a bull would run at any thing red, it was held this was evidence of scienter.'' But, of course, such admis- sions on the part of the defendant that he was aware of the peculiar propensity of the animal, in order to go to the jury, must refer to a time prior to the committing of the injury.' An offer by the defendant to make compensation to the plaintifl" for his injuries would be very slight evidence of scienter, and, if unaccompanied by cumu- lative facts, would hardly be received.* 2 18. Knowledge of Agent, Knowledge of Owner. — "While, as has been stated,* it is required, in order to make an owner liable for special and non-natural tendencies of animals, to show notice on his part of these tendencies, yet, for the purposes of a civil action, knowledge of his agent, acting within the scope of his delegated power, is competent to aflect his master with notice. If the owner of a dog appoint a servant to keep it, tbs servant's knowledge is the knowledge of the master.* In an action for an injury inflicted by the bite of a dog, in order to establish the scienter, it was proved that the wife of the defendant (who was a. milkman) occasionally attended to his business, which was carried on upon his premises, where he kept the dog, and that a person had gone there and made a formal complaint to his wife, for the purpose of its being communicated to her husband, of the dog having bitten such person's nephew. Upon this, it was held that there was evidence of the husband's knowledge of the dog's propensity to bite, Montague, J., saying: "It maybe supposed that the wife did communicate the message to her husband, from the fact that they were not only living together in the same house, but that she was assisting him in his business." ' Although, in an action for injuries resulting from the bite of a dog, notice to the wife may be sufficient evidence of the scienter to fix the husband, yet the converse does not hold, and a notice to the husband will not, taken alone, be sufficient proof of the scienter to render the wife liable after her husband's death.^ In another action for injuries by a dog, where it was proven that two persons, who had upon previous occasions (one of 1 Eider v. White, 65 N. T. 54. 6 Supra, § 15. ' Hndson v. Eoberts, 20 L. J. (Exoh.) 299; 6 Baldwin v. Casella, L. E. 7 Exch. .S25; «. c, 6 Exch. 697. O. h. J. (Exch.) 167; 31 Week. Eep. 16; 26 l! 3 Cooke V. Waring, 2 Hurl. & Colt. 332. T. (N. s.) 707. < Beck V. Dyson, i Camp. 198; Thomas v. ' Gladman v. Johnson, 36 L. J. (C. P.) 153, Morgan, 2 Cromp. M. & E. 496; ». c, 5 Tyrw. » MiUer v. Kimbray, 16 L T (N s ) 360 1085. EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE. 205 Keeping diseased Animals. them twice) been attacked by the dog, had gone to the defendant's public-house and made complaint to two persons who were acting as bar-men, serving customers, and one of them had also complained to the bar-maid, but there was no evidence that these complaints were communicated to the defendant, nor was it shown that either of the two men spoken to had the general management of the defendant's business, or had the care of the dog, Lord Coleridge, C. J., said: "It appears to me that the persons to whom the notice was given might reasonably be presumed to have had authority to receive such notice, and to have made it their duty to convey it to the defendant, and that they did, in fact, do so." And it was held that this was sufficient evidence of scienter to be left to the jury.' So, also, it has been held that where an agent is authorized to sell a flock of sheep, and sells a portion of them with a knowl- edge that the sheep are diseased, and does not communicate that fact to the pur- chaser, his principals, although they have no actual notice of the fraud, are liable civiliter to respond in damages ; and the damages are not limited to the loss of the sheep purchased, but extend to other sheep to which the distemper is communicated.^ But, as before stated, the agent, for whose knowledge the owner is responsible, must be one whose duty it is to receive such knowledge and communicate it to his princi- pal. Therefore, in a case where it appeared that the plaintiff, innocently and without negligence, went into the premises of the defendant, a corporation, where he was bitten by a dog, which was chained in a place in which he could not be seen by the plaintiff; and the dog had previously bitten a person, as was known to some of the servants of the defendant, but who had no control over the affairs of the corporation or over the dog, it was held that there was no evidence to show that the defendant had knowledge of the dog's propensities.' 1 19. The Act for which the Owner is liable need not be one of Fe- rocity. — The act done, for which the owner is held responsible, need not be such only as is caused by the viciousness of the animal ; for if a horse * or a dog^ injure one by playfulness, the owner is equally liable, if he knew, or had good reason to know, the mischievous disposition of the animal, as if the injury were done in a spirit of the most unprovoked ferocity. Thus, it was held, under a statute in Maine prohibiting hogs from running at large, that the defendant, who was the owner of a hog, was liable for injuries to the plaintiff's daughter and carriage by reason of his horse becoming frightened at the appearance of the hog lying at the side of the road with- out a keeper.^ I 20. Keeping diseased Animals. — The keeping of animals having an infec- tious disease is not, per se, culpable negligence. The right of every one to use his own property as he pleases, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied, is unlimited and unqualified up to the point where the particular use be- comes a nuisance. Hence the keeping of animals having an infectious disease on one's own premises, although the adjoining premises have upon them other animals which are likely to be infected by the disease, is not unlawful ; nor will it give the owner of the adjoining premises a cause of action for damage sustained in consequence of the disease being communicated to his animals, unless the person owning the dis- 1 Applebee v. Percy, L. E. 9 C. P. 647 ; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 310 ; 10 Jar. (N. s.) U99 ; 12 Week. L. T. (N. 8.) 785; 43 L. J. (C. P.) 365. Eep. 1080; 20 L. T. (N. s.) 844. » Jeffrey n. Bigelow, 13 Wend. 518. * Dickson v. McCoy, 39 N. T. 400. > Stiles V. The Cardiff Steam Nav. Co., 33 ' Line v. Taylor, 3 Post. & Pin. 731. » Jewett V. Gage, 55 Me. 538. 206 LIABILITY FOR INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Notes. eased animals knows the fact that they are diseased, and is guilty of some negligence in the manner of keeping them.' Even the keeping of diseased animals on the de- fendant's unenclosed lands, to which other animals are in the habit of coming, and where it is no trespass for them to come, is not an act of negligence, if the owner of the healthy animals is duly warned of his danger.^ But there is a statute in Illinois declaring, "If any person shall suffer to run at large, or keep in any place where other creatures can have access to and become infected, any sheep known to the owner or person having the care and possession thereof to be infected with any con- tagious disease, such person shall be liable to pay all damages that may result from the running at large of such diseased sheep." * This statute is held remedial, and not penal ; whence it follows that the proper form of action under it is case, and not debt, for the recovery of a fine, and that actions under it are subject to the statute of limitations of five years, and not to that of one year and six months.* Under it, a person must pay damages for keeping sheep on his own land so that they infect his neighbor's sheep in an adjoining close.^ If the owner of such an infected flock of sheep sufler his partition or division fence to get out of repair, so that some of his infected sheep escape into his neihgbor's pasture, where there are sheep belonging to his neighbor and also to another person, it will be erro- neous to put the inquiry to the jury whether the infection may not have been com- municated to his neighbor!s sheep indirectly through such other sheep ; * and the fact that one of the plaintiS''s sheep communicated the disease to the defendant's flock of sheep will not exonerate the latter from liability to the former if he thereafter per- mit his flock to run where it can do injury to the plaintiff; and it will not relieve the defendant from any part of the entire amount of damages occasioned thereby to show that the plaintiff did not apply the proper remedy in curing his sheep, it being held that the doctrine of contributory negligence has no application in such a case.' It is scarcely necessary to add, that whether a particular disease is contagious is a question of fact for the jury.^ § 21. Trespasses by diseased Animals. — Where animals infected with a con- tagious disease trespass upon the lands of another, thereby infecting healthy animals belonging to the owner of the land so trespassed upon, the owner of the diseased animals is liable for the damages thus occasioned, without proof of scienter on the part of the defendant.' But the plaintiff may prove knowledge of the condition of defendant's animals upon the part of defendant, to enhance the damages, and with- out any allegation to that effect in the declaration.'" And where a person occupying the land of another as a mere licensee, pastures upon it infected sheep, and the owner of the land, relying upon the representations of the licensee as to the absence of dan- 1 Fisher v. Clark, a Barb. 329; IVTillfl v. » Anderson v. Buckton, 1 Stra. 192; Bar- New York, etc., E. Co., 2 Eobt. 326 (affirmed nnm v. Vandusen, 16 Conn. 200. in Court of Appeals, as stated In U N. Y. "> Barnum v. Vandusen, 16 Conn. 200. But 619) . see Cooke v. Waring, 2 Hurl. & Colt. 331, — a s Walker v. Herron, 22 Texas, 65. case wtiere defendant's sheep, being dis- ' HI. Laws 1865, p. 126, § 2. eased, got into the plaintiff 's field where his * Mount V. Hunter, 58 lU. 246. sheep were grazing, and infected them. It 5 Herriok v. Gary, 65 111. 101. See i. c, 83 did not appear how they got there. It was HI. 85. held that, in the absence of negligence, « Herrick ». Gary, 65 m. 101. proof of scienter -was necessary. Also see ' Herrick v. Gary, 83 111. 85. Noyes v. Colby, 30 N. H. 143. e Mount v. Hunter, 68 111. 246. SALE OF DISEASED ANIMALS. 207 Measure of Damages. — Importation of diseased Cattle. ger from contagion, subsequently pastures his own sheep upon the land, and they become diseased thereby, the original occupant of the land is liable in damages.' g 22. Sale of diseased Animals. — The sale of diseased animals has been held not to be unlawful ; and although the seller knew at the time that the animals were infected, and did not disclose it to the buyer, yet he is not liable for injuries occa- sioned by the spread of the disease among the animals of the purchaser; for the maxim of caveat emptor applies to such a case.^ Yet, if there is any fraudulent con- ceal ment or misrepresentation on the part of the seller, he will be held liable.' And where a livery-stable keeper has been induced to receive a horse of the defendant into his stable, upon representations that the horse had recovered from the distemper and could not communicate the disease to other horses, and the livery-stable keeper had two stallions which were injured by the communication of the disease to them, the defendant was held liable.* Yet, in a case where the question of caveat emptor seems not to have been raised, a principal was held liable in damages for injuries inflicted upon sheep from a disease communicated by others which his agent sold, knowing them to be diseased. Prom the report of the case, it does not appear that any repre- sentations as to the condition of the sheep were made.* And in a case where the defendant, with the consent of the plaintiff, put diseased horses into the plaintiff's close, and thereby infected the plaintiff's horses with the disease, it was held not necessary to show deceit upon the part of defendant, when it was shown that he had knowledge of the diseased condition of his horses.* So, it was held that a declaration stating that the defendant knowingly delivered a glandered horse to plaintiff, whereby plaintiff, not knowing it, was induced to put it with his horse, per quod his horse died, is a good declaration, though no concealment, or fraud, or breach of warranty is averred.' J 23. Measure of Damages for Animals infecting Animals. — In assessing damages occasioned by animals being infected by a contagious disease, the special damages asked for must appear to be the legal and natural consequence of the wrong complained of, proceeding exclusively from that, and not from the improper act of a third party. As where, in an action for fraudulently selling diseased sheep as sound and healthy, it appeared that the plaintiff, who followed the business of butchering, engaged a person to take some of the mutton which might be on hand during a certain period and sell it, but, in consequence of a report that the plaintiff had purchased the defendant's diseased sheep, this person refused to perform his contract, it was held that the defendant was not liable for any damages resulting to the plaintiff from this refusal to take the mutton to sell, nor from the refusal of plaintiff's cus- tomers to deal with him because of the report that he purchased the sheep in question.* 2 24. Importation of diseased Cattle. — Several of the Western States have passed acts prohibiting the driving or bringing into those States of any Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle during certain seasons of the year, for the reason that cattle from those regions communicate a disease, known as Texas fever, to native herds, without any symptoms of the disease being apparent in the cattle which bring the infection. The constitutionality of these acts has been questioned, and sustained in 1 Eaton V. Winnie, 20 Mloh. 157. « Hite v. Blandford, 45 lU. 9. s Hill V. Balls, 2 Hm-1. &N. 299. ' Pentar v. Murdook, 18 Week. Eep. 382; s MuUett V. Mason, L. E. 1 C. P. 659. 22 L. T. (N. S.) 371. 4 Fultr V. Wycoff, 25 Ind. 321. » Grain ». Petrie, 6 HUl, 523. 6 Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. 618. 208 LIABILITY FOK INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Notes. the State courts ; • but the United States Supreme Court h as taken a contrary view.' The grounds upon which the opinion of this court rests are, that such a statute is not a legitimate exercise of the police powers of a State; that the latter cannot be exercised over a matter such as interstate transportation of subjects of commerce, confided exclusively to Congress by the Federal Constitution ; that, while a State may enact sanitary laws, and, for the purpose of self-protection, establish quaran- tine and reasonable inspection regulations; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases from entering the State ; yet it cannot interfere with transportation into or through its border, beyond what is absolutely necessary for self-protection ; and that neither the unlimited powers of a State to tax, nor any of its large police powers, can be exercised to such an extent as to work a practical assumption of the powers conferred by the Constitution on Congress.' J 25. VThat is the Rule as to the Liability of Keepers of vicious Ani- mals ? — The books abound in cases holding that the keeper of wild animals, such as lions, tigers, bears, and the like, is an insurer against all injuries they may commit; that, in this respect, there is no distinction between the case of an animal which breaks through the ordinary tameness of its nature, and is fierce, and known to the owner to be so, and one which is, by its generic propensities, of a ferocious disposi- tion ; and that the keeping of the animal after knowledge of its mischievous propen- sities is the gist of the action.* It has been held at common law, that if a person should turn loose a fierce and dangerous wild beast, knowing its savage disposition and the beast kill a man, the party turning it loose would be guilty of murder.^ Latterly, however, there seems to be a disposition upon the part of the authorities to hold the more reasonable rule, that all that should be required of the keeper of such animals is, that he should take that superior caution to prevent their doing mischief which their propensities in that direction justly demand of him. A learned writer on this subject* says : " The keeping of wild animals for many purposes has come to be recognized as proper and useful ; they are exhibited through the country with the public license and approval ; governments and municipal corporations expend large sums in obtaining and providing for them ; and the idea of legal wrong in keeping them and exhibiting them is never indulged. It seems, therefore, safe to say that the liability of the owner or keeper for any injury done by them to the person or prop- 1 Wilson V. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 60 v. Pierce, 10 Gush. 609; KeUey v. Tilton, 3 Mo. 184; Husen ». Hannibal, etc., B. Co., 60 Keyes, 263 ; Partlow v. Haggarty, 35 Ind. 178; Mo. 226; Teazel v. Alexander, 58 Dl. 264; 3Bla. Comm. 153; Koney ». Ward, 2Daly,296; Stevens t). Brown, 58 111. 289; Sommerville s. c, 36 How. Pi-. 256; Blackman v. Simmons, V. Marks, 68 HL 371 ; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. 3 Car. & P. 138 ; Buckley v. Leonard, 4 Denio, Gassaway, 7 Ch. Leg. N. 147. 500; Oakes v. Spauldlng, 40 Vt. 351; Marble 2 EaUroad Co. u. Hnsen, 95 U. S. 465; s. c, v. Eoss, 124 Mass. 44; s. c, 6 Cent. L. J. 157; 6 Cent. L. J. 170. Meibns v. Dodge. 38 Wis. 300 ; Besozzi v. 3 6 Cent. L. J. 121. Harris, 1 Post. & Fin. 92; WooU v. Chalker, 4 Smith V. Pelah, 2 Stra. 1264; Eex v. 31 Conn. 121; Congress, etc., Spring Co. v. Hnggins, 2 Ld. Eaym. 1583; Jenkins v. Edgar (TJ. S. Sup. Ct. May, 1879) , 19 Alb. L. J. Turner, 1 Ld. Eaym. 110; Mason v. Keeling, 413; 11 Ch. Leg. N. 295. 1 Ld. Eaym. 608; 1 Hale's P.O. 430; Bull. N. * Eex ». Huggins, 2 Ld. Eaym. 1583. And P. 77 ; Boulton v. Banks, Cro. Car. 254; May see, as to criminal action lor turning loose a t>. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101; Jackson v. Smith- vicious horse, which kicked and thereby son, 15 Mee. & W. 663; 15 L. J. (Bxch.) killed a person, Begina v. Dant, 10 Cox C. 311; Card v. Case, 5 0. B. 622; 17 L. J. (C. C. 102; s. c, Leigh & Cave's Cr. Cas. 667. P.) 124; Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. 496 ; Mo- « Cooley on Torts, 349. CaskiU V. Elliott, 5 Strobh.L.198; Popplewell GROUNDS OF LIABILITY. 209 In case of Injuries by domestic Animals. €rty of others must rest on the doctrine of negligence. A very high degree of care is demanded of those who have them in charge ; but if, notwithstanding such care, they are enabled to commit mischief, the case should be referred to the category of accidental injuries, for which a civil action will not lie." ' g 26. What as to Cattle, Horses, Sheep, etc. — As it is the natural propensity of such domestic animals as horses, cattle, sheep, swine, and the like, to stray away, at •common law the owner of such animals was bound to confine them on his own prem- ises at all events ; and if they escaped and committed a trespass on the land of another, unless through the defect of fences which the latter was bound to repair,^ the owner was liable to an action of trespass, though he had no notice, in fact, of such pro- pensity.' In other words, the general rule at common law was, that the owner of land ■was under no obligation to fence out the animals of others, but was required to fence in his own. This rule is in force in several of the States ; has been modified in some, and abrogated in others.* It has been held, where the common-law rule prevailed that where a cow, of which the defendant had the general care and control, was turned out of the pasture by a stranger and driven in the direction of the plaintiff's close, and being left, strayed upon it and committed injury, an action of trespass would lie against defendant.^ And at common law, where animals commit a, trespass by breaking and entering the close of another, and while there do mischief the mis- chief thvis done may be alleged and recovered upon as aggravation ; and a knowledge upon the part of the owner, of the propensity of the animal to do the kind of injury committed, need not be shown.^ Thus, where oxen break the plaintiff's close and kill his cow, the owner would be answerable without proving that he knew they were accustomed to gore.' 1 See Scribneri). Eelley, 38 Barb. 14; Earl Herold v. Meyers, 20 Iowa, 378; Stoner v. V. Van Alstine, 8 Barb. 630; Mann v. Wiland, Shugart, 45 111. 76; Waters v. Moss, 12 Cal. 34 Leg. Int. 77 ; s. u., 3 W. N. C. 6 ; Laverone 535 ; Laws v. North Carolina E. Co., 7 Jones II. Mangianti (dissenting opinon of Judge L. 468; Stafford v. IngersoU, 3 Hill, 38; Crockett), 41 Cal. 140; Logue v. Link, 4 E. D. Brady v. Ball, 14 Ind. 317; Lyons v. Merrick, Smith, 65 ; Canelox v. Crenshaw, 24 Mo. 199 ; 105 Mass. 71 ; Campbell v. Bridwell, 5 Or. 311. Ulery v. Jones, 81 111. 403. For English decisions on fences, see Powell 2 Bust V. Low, 6 Mass. 90 ; Keliher w. Con- v. Salisbury, 2 You. & Jer. 391 ; Churchill v. necticut Kiver E. Co., 107 Mass. 411 ; Shep- Evans, 1 Taun. 529 ; Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. herd v. Hees, 12 Johns. 433; McDonnell v. Black. 527; Singleton v. Williamson, 7 Hurl. Pittsfleld, etc., R. Co., 115 Mass. 564; Cowles & N. 410; Goodwin v. Chevely, 4 Hurl. & N. V. Balzer, 47 Barb. 562; D'Arcy i). MUler, 86 631; s. c, 28 L. J. (Exch.) 298; Barber „. III. 102. Whiteley, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 822; Nowell v. 3 Mason v. Keeling, 12 Modern, 335; 1 Ld. Smith, Cro. Eliz. 709; Stevens t. Whistler, Baym. 606; Eex v. Huggins, 2 Ld. Eaym. 11 East, 51; Wakeman v. Eobinson, 1 Bing. 1583; Dyer, 25, pi. 162; 20 Vin. Abr., tit. 213; Child v. Hearn, L. E. 9 Exch. 176. "Trespass," B, 424; Millen v. Fandrye, » Noyes d. Colby, 30 ST. H. 143. Poph. 161; Jones on BaU. 131; Jenkins v. e Beckett ». Beckett, 48 Mo. 396 ; Dolph v. Turner, 2 Salk. 662; Decker v. Gammon, Ferris, 7 Watts & S. 367 ; Lyke «. Van Leuven, 44 Me. 322; Goodman v. Gay, 15 Pa. St. 188; 4 Denio, 137; ». c, 1 N. Y. 515; Barnum v. Dickson v. McCoy, 39 N. Y. 401; Studwell Vandusen, 16 Conn. 200; Lee v. Eiley, 34 V. Eitch, 14 Conn. 292; Com. Dig., tit. L. J. (C. P.) 212; Dunckle v. Kocker, 11 "Droit," M, 2; 3Bla. Comm. 211; Williams Barb. 387. But see Scetchet v. Eltham, 1 V. New Albany E. Co., 6 Ind. Ill; Lafay- Freem. 534; Decker u. Gammon, 44 Me. 322; ette, etc., E. Co. v. Shriner, 6 Ind. 141; Page Dufer v. CuUy, 3 Or. 377. V. Hollingsworth, 7 Ind. 317. ' Angus v. Eadin, 5 N. J. L. 815. And see * Avery v. Maxwell, 4 N. H. 36; Eicbard- Cox v. Burbridge, 13 C. B. (N. s.) 430; 32 L. son V. MUbum, 11 Md. 340; WeUs v. HoweU, J. (C. P.) 89; also, Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., 19 Johns. 385 ; Knight v. Abert, 6 Pa; St. 472 ; L. E. 10 C. P. 10. 14 210 LIABILITY FOR IXJUEIES C03D1ITTED BY ANIMALS. Notes. ^ 27. Liability for Trespasses of such Animals under various Statutes. — Statutes in regard to fences are so various that it would be diflBcult, and a work of supererogation, to attempt to extract from them a harmonious principle, or to classify them ; we shall, therefore, give the decisions which we have found, under the names of the respective States. The same subject, so far as it embraces injuries to cattle by railway trains, is considered in a subsequent chapter. (1.) Alabama. — A lawful fence must be five feet high, and, if made of rails, not more than four inches apart; and if stock trespass upon lands thus fenced, the owner of the stock will be liable.' (2.) California. — It is a "custom of the country to permit domestic animals to roam at large upon the unenclosed commons," and a plaintitf is not guilty of negli- gence in allowing his horse to run at large. So held in an action against a railroad for killing it.^ A party cannot recover for injuries done by cattle breaking into his close, unless the land entered be enclosed by a fence of the character described in the statute ; ' or at least by an enclosure equivalent to the statutory fence in its capacity to exclude cattle.* (3.) Connecticut. — In this State, the rule has been adopted that the owners of lands are obliged to enclose them by a lawful fence, or they can maintain no action for a trespass done thereon by the cattle of another.* Where the defence to an action for trespass by cattle was that they entered through the plaintiff 's defective fence, it was held that this defence might be repelled by showing that the cattle were unruly.* Land-owners are not bound to fence against unruly cattle.' (4.) Illinois. — There is no general law in this State prohibiting cattle from run- ning at large upon the highway. In order to maintain an action for the trespass of cattle upon one's close, the owner of the close must have it surrounded by a good and sufficient fence.* A partition-fence, whether existing by agreement, by acquiescence, or under statute, cannot be removed until the parties interested in its remaining are properly notified of its intended removal.' The common law is in force as to inside fences."" If cattle or hogs trespass upon lands through a division-fence which it is theplaintiff's duty to keep in repair, by reason of its insufficiency, he cannot recover." (5.) Indiana. — It is competent for the Legislature to declare that an action shall not be maintained for a trespass committed by cattle, in favor of the owner of lands, not securely fenced. This portion of the statute only applies to outside fences, parties to a partition-fence being equally bound to repair it.'^ And it makes no difference that the cattle escaped from the field where they were put, into and through the field of another, and from thence through a defective partition-fence into the field of the plaintiff, where they did the injury.'' The owner of cattle who negligently alio ws them to wander upon a railroad track which is properly fenced is liable for injuries 1 Code Ala. 1876, p. 470. See Jean v. etc., B. Co. v. Patohin, 16 HI. 201. And see SandUord, 39 Ala. 317. Alton, etc., R. Co. v. Baugh, U HI. 211; 2 Waters v. Moss, 12 Cal. 535. Stoner v. Shugart, 45 III. 76 ; Misner v. Light- » Stat. AprU 27, 1855. haU, 13 111. 609. * Comerford v. Dupuy, 17 Cal. 308. See ' McCormick v. Tate, 20 lU. 334; Buct- also Doherty v. Thayer, 31 Cal. 141; Eich- master j). Cool, 12 m. 76. mond V. Sacramento, etc., E. Co., 18 Cal. 351. '" Stoner ». Shugart, 45 III. 76; Ozburn t>. s StudweU V. Eitch, 14 Conn. 292; Wright Adams, 70 111. 291. 7j. Wright, 21 Conn. 344. n D'Arcy v. Miller, 86 111. 102. 8 Barnum «. Vandusen, 16 Conn. 200. '^ Myers v. Dodd, 9 Ind. 290. And see ' Hine v. Wooding, 37 Conn. 133. See also Hoover v. Wood, 9 Ind. 286; Cook ». Morea, BisseU i: Sonthwortli, 1 Eoot, 269. 33 Ind. 497; Crismau v. M.isters, 23 Ind. 319. 8 Secley v. Peters, 10 lU. 130; Chicago, w Brady e. Ball, 14 Ind. 319. •LIABILITY UNDER STATUTES FOE TRESPASSES BY ANIMALS. 211 Iowa, Kansas, Maine. to a train that runs over them, if there is no contributory fault on the part of the servants of the road; and the fact that the county commissioners have passed an order allowing cattle to run at large in the county does not affect the rights of the parties. '^ The above-mentioned statute supersedes the common-law rule concerning trespassing animals. It is not competent for the owner of the land to prove that, although the enclosure was not such as good husbandmen generally keep, yet it was such as was kept in the locality where the land was situated, where fences were taken in during the winter to avoid the spring freshets.^ The mere fact that a man cut a tree on his unenclosed land so that it was nearly ready to fall, and set it on fire, and that the tree afterwards fell upon plaintiff's horse and killed it, did not render the owner liable. The injury was not the natural or probable consequence of the act.' (6.) Iowa. — Pormerly, the common-law rule that every man is required to keep his cattle within his own close, under the penalty of answering in damages for injuries arising from their running at large, was not in force in Iowa, and he might lawfully suffer them to run at large on the unenclosed land of another ; * the owner of cattle going upon the unfenced land of another might lawfully enter thereon to drive them off; ^ and it was necessary, to enable a plaintiff to recover for injuries done by cattle upon his land, to show that it was protected by a sufficient fence to turn ordinary stock.^ But, under the statute of 1870, the owner of trespassing stock is liable for the damages done by them, without inquiry as to whether the premises trespassed upon by them were fenced or not.' However, the owner of property injured by cattle is bound to the exercise of ordinary care to prevent damage. What constitutes care, under given circumstances, is a question for the jury.' But a person is not liable to the owner of adjacent property for trespasses thereon, committed by stock which reached it through his premises.' (7.) Kansas. — The law of this State as to enclosures makes the party having a fence insufficient according to law guilty of negligence, and he cannot recover for injuries done his crops by stock running at large and roaming upon his land, through such insufficient fences ; nor can such a party recover, even if the owner of the stock was himself chargeable with negligence, unless it amounts to a wilful, wanton, or malicious want of care.^" The act in relation to fences " so far modifies the common law, that no action will lie for trespasses by cattle on real estate, unless such real estate is enclosed with a sufficient fence." But proof that growing crops were not enclosed by a sufficient fence will not defeat an action for trespass by cattle, if it is shown that the cattle were driven upon the premises by their owners, and that the latter were guilty of wanton and wilful negligence." If roaming cattle break through a lawful fence and commit a trespass, it is no defence that the premises were not entirely surrounded by a lawful fence." (8.) Maine. — Where there is no prescription, agreement, or assignment, under the 1 Sinram v. Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co., 28 32 Iowa, 257, and McManus t). Finan, 4 Iowa, Ind. 2U. 283. 2 Blizzard o. Walker, 32 Ind. 437. ' Little v. McGuIre, 38 Iowa, 560; Halloek « Durham v. Musselman, 2 BlacM. 96. v. Hughes, 42 Iowa, 516. 4 Wagner o. BisseU, 3 Iowa, 396 ; Heath v. ' Little v. McGuire, 38 Iowa, 560. Coltenback, 5 Iowa, 490; Alger v. Mississippi » Little v. McGuire, 43 Iowa, 447. R. Co., 10 Iowa, 268. " Larkin v. Taylor, 5 Kan. 433. 6 Camp V. Flaherty, 28 Iowa, 520. " Gen. Stat. 1868, chap. 40. » Heath v. Coltenback, 6 Iowa, 490. As to ^ Darling v. Kodgers, 7 Kan. 592. what is a lawful fence, see Phillips v. Oystee, " Powers v. Kindt, 13 Kan. 74. " Bice V. Nagle, 14 Kan. 498. 212 LIABILITY FOR INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Notes. statute, whereby the owner of land is bound to maintain a fence, no occupant is obliged to fence against an adjoining close ; but in such a case, there being no fence, each owner is obliged, at his peril, to keep his cattle on his own close. And where a tenant is bound to maintain a fence against an adjoining close, it is only against such cattle as are rightfully on that close. The statute of 1821' is merely in affirm- ance of the common law.' The right to sell beasts taken damage feasant under that statute' is given only in cases where the injury was done to lands enclosed with a legal fence.* Trespass cannot be maintained by the proprietor of unfenced land against one employed in making a road, whose cattle, used in making the road, strayed upon the land against the will of the owner." Since the statute of 1834, no action can be maintained by either of two adjoining owners of land against any owner of cattle lawfully on the opposite side of a division-fence, for breaking into his enclosure through a defect in such fence, if there has been no division of such fence, or assignment of distinct portions of it by fence viewers, by agreement, or by pre- scription.* The cattle of one man are not lawfully upon another's land, except by his consent, even if it be unfenced and they pass directly from the highway upon it, where they were permitted to go at large by a vote of the town.' (9.) Massachusetts. — The statutes are the foundation of all the obligations im- posed on citizens by law to make and repair fences.^ The owner of a close is obliged to fence only against cattle lawfully in the adjoining ground;' and if cattle be turned into his close, he may recover, although his fence be insufficient. i° So, if cattle are turned into the highway to graze, and pass therefrom into an adjoining close through an insufficient fence, the owner of the land may recover for tte tres- pass ; for the defendant's cattle were not lawfully in the highway." Animals which escape from the control of persons having charge of them on a highway, and enter an unfenced lot abutting thereon, without the knowledge or consent of the owner thereof are not lawfully on the lot.'^ Where a party is not bound by prescription, agreement, or assignment to maintain a division-fence, he may sustain an action against the owner of cattle belonging to the adjoining neighbor if they trespass upon his land through the division-fence.'' (10.) Michigan. — The act of 1847," providing that no person shall recover for damages done upon land by beasts, unless in cases where, by the by-laws of the township, beasts are prohibited from running at large, except where such lands are enclosed by a fence four and a half feet high, and in proper repair, or something 1 Chap. 128, § 6. fences, see Eust v. Low, 6 Mass. 90; and for s Little V. Lathrop, 5 Me. 356. cases on fences, see Pool v. Alger, U Gray, ' § 9. 489; Rogers v. Newburyport B. Co., 1 AUen, * Heath u. Bicker, 2 Me. 408. 16; Sparhawk v. Salem, 1 AUen, 30; Spar- 6 Cool V. Crommet, 13 Me. 250. hawk v. TwioheU, 1 Allen, 450; Pettingill v. « Gooch V. Stephenson, 13 Me. 371; Bast- Porter, 3 Allen, 349; Cutter v. Cambridge, 6 man v. Bice, 14 Me. 419. AUen, 20; Sears v. Charlemont, 6 AUen, 437; ' Lord K. Wormwood, 29 Me. 282. See BurreU v. Burrell, 11 Mass. 294; Binney v. also Perkins v. The Eastern E. Co., 29 Me. HuU, 5 Pick. 503; Scott v. Dickinson, 14 Pick. 307. 276; Lamb v. Hicks, 11 Mete. 496; Rowe v. 8 Eust ». Low, 6 Mass. 90. Beale, 15 Pick. 123; Minor v. Deland, 18 » Town V. Dodge, 2 Dane's Abr. 658 (1776) ; Pick. 266. Melody v. Beab, 4 Mass. 471 ; Eust v. Low, 6 '^ McDonneU v. Pittsfleld, etc., E. Co., 115 Mass. 90 ; Stackpole i>. Healy, 16 Mass. 33. Mass. 564. 10 Melody v. Beab, 4 Mass. 471. is Thayer v. Arnold, 4 Mete. 589. See also 11 Stackpole v. Healy, 16 Mass. 33; Lyman Bronsono. Cofln. 108 Mass. 175. V. Gipson, 18 Pick. 422 ; Holbrook v. McBride, " 1 Oomp. Laws 1857, § 628. 4 Gray, 215. For general discussion as to LIABILITY TJNDEE STATUTES FOE TRESPASSES BY ANIMALS. 213 Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire. equivalent thereto, did not require individuals to fence their lands, but only pre- cluded recovery for damages done by beasts thereon if not fenced.' This act had no reference to the land occupied by a railroad company for its track,' and had refer- ence only to exterior fences.' The act of 1861 * only imposes the duty upon a land- owner to build partition-fences for the protection of the adjoining land-owner. He need not keep in repair any particular portion of a partition-fence, unless the adjoin- ing proprietor improves his land and a portion of the partition-fence has been assigned to him to keep in repair. Adjoining proprietors may dispense with any partition-fence. The owner of land upon which cattle come from the adjoining premises of a third person, may maintain trespass therefor without showing that the partition-fence between himself and such third party was of lawful height, or that, if it had been apportioned, he kept up his part.* (11.) Mississippi. — A lawful fence is a strong, sound fence, five feet high, well staked and ridered, or sufficiently locked and so close that beasts breaking into the same cannot creep through.^ The defendant, who had an insufficient fence under the statute, took up a mule which was doing damage in his field, and tied the mule in his stable, and the mule, in a struggle to escape, was choked to death. It was held that the defendant was liable in an action of trespass for the value of the mule.' (12.) Missouri. — The statute concerning enclosures entirely abrogates the princi- ple of the common law which imposed on the owner of animals the duty of confining them to his own premises,^ but it seems the statute does not apply to a domesticated buff'alo bull.9 (13.) New Hampshire. — It is settled in this State, that no man is bound to fence against cattle that are upon the highways, unless they are rightfully there.'" The public have in highways only a mere right of passage." No man has the right to turn his horses or cattle into the highway to graze, except in those parts of it where he is the owner of the soil through which it passes ; and if any person turn his horse into the road where he does not own the soil, and the horse escape into an adjoining close through defect of fences which the owner is bound to repair, the owner of the horse will be liable for the damage.'^ It is the occupier and not the owner of a close that is bound to keep the fences in repair.'' "Where there are adjoining closes, with an undivided partition-fence which each owner is equally bound to keep in repair, each is bound to keep his cattle on his own land at his peril.'* Where sheep of the defendant escaped through a defective portion of a division-fence which the plaintiff was bound to maintain, and thence into a close of the plaintiif, which was sur- rounded by a good fence, it was held that, as the sheep escaped from their owner's ' WiUiams v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 2 Pheeters ». Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 45 Mo. 22; Mich. 259; Wood v. La Rue, 9 Mich. 358. Tarwater v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 42 Mo. - Williams v. Michigan, etc., E. Co., 2 193. Mich. 259. ° Canetox v. Crenshaw, 24 Mo. 199. s Johnson v. Wing, 3 Mich. 163. "> Avery v. Maxwell, 4 N. H. 36 ; Mills v. * Sess. Laws, p. 294. Stark, 4 N. H. 512. See also Cornwall v. Sul- <■ Aylesworth v. HeiTington, 17 Mich. 417. Uvan R. E., 28 N. H. 161. For other cases on fences, see Reed u. Drake, " Makepeaces. Worden, IN. H. 16. 29 Mich. 222; Stewart v. Carleton, 31 Mich. '" Avery v. Maxwell, 4 N. H. 36. 270. " Tewksbury v. Bucklln, 7 N. H. 618. 6 Laws Miss. 1840, p. 203. '< Ibid.; Glidden v. Towle, 31 N. H. 168; 1 Dickson v. Parker, 3 How. (Miss.) 219. Dean v. SuUivan R. Co., 22 N. H. 316. See See Vicksburg, etc., E. Co. v. Patton, 6 Am. York v. Davis, 11 N. H. 241, as to revoca- L. Beg. 457. t'O" o^ parol partition of ience. e Gorman v. Pacific E. E., 26 Mo. 441; Mo- 214 LIABILITY FOR IXJTURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Notes. land through the default of the plaintiff, as between the parties the damage resulting therefrom must be considered as resulting from the same default.' The owner of a close is not bound to fence against any cattle but such as are rightfully on the adjoin- ing land.^ (14.) New Jersey. — The owner is liable where the parties own adjoining closes, between which a statutory fence has never been erected, if his cattle trespass on his neighbor's land.' Owners of land are not bound to erect statutory fences along the highways, to protect themselves from cattle suffered to run at large upon the public roads and pasture there.* The owner of an animal straying upon a railroad track cannot recover for injuries done to it by a locomotive.' To recover damages done by cattle trespassing on his close, the plaintiff must show that his fence was lawful, that cattle broke through the fence, and that the appraisers were appointed as the statute directs.* (15.) New York. — Every unwarrantable entry by a person or his cattle on the land of another is a trespass, though the entry be by cattle coming from the highway, and the land be unfenced.' But if cattle driven along a highway escape into an adjoining field, against the owner's will, the trespass is excused. Where a proprietor of land is bound to maintain a fence by prescription against cattle, he cannot main- tain trespass if they enter through a defect in his fence.^ The statute of 1838 ' has not changed the common-law rule that an adjoining land-owner, in order to excuse trespasses by his cattle through a division-fence, must show that the cattle passed through a portion of the fence which was defective, and which his neighbor was bound to repair.'" (16.) Ohio. — Animals that are not unruly or dangerous may be allowed to run at large without liability being incurred by the owner, provided he exercises ordinary care." The simple fact that animals have strayed upon a railroad track without right does not justify a want of proper care to prevent injury to them by those running a locomotive." Where a field is enclosed by a fence which at some places is, and at others is not, " of sufficient height and strength, and in every respect such as a good husbandman ought to keep,'' and cattle break over a part of the fence which is good, their owner is liable." A part-owner of a division-fence, who fails to keep in repair the part assigned to him, whereby stock from the adjacent close break and enter upon his land, is without remedy unless he can show that the stock was breachy and unruly, and that the defect in the fence was not the proximate cause of the damage." 1 Page ». Olcott, 13 S". H. 399. Barb. 297. And see Clarkj;.Brown,18'Wend. 2 Lawrence v. Combs, 37 N. H. 331; Com- 213; Richardson v. Northrup, 66 Barb. 85; wall V. Sullivan R. R., 28 N. H. 161. Colden v. Eldred, 15 Jolins. 220; Perkins v. ' Coxe V. Robbins, 9 N. J. L. 384. Perkins, 44 Barb. 134; Holladay v. Marsh, 3 4 Chambers v. Matliews, 18 N" J. L. 368. Wend. 162. s Vandegrift v. Rediker, 22 X. J. L. 185; n Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 3 Price V. New Jersey R. Co., 31 N. J. L. 229 ; 32 Ohio St. 172 (1864). N. J. L. 19. See this subject oi cattle killed 12 Cranston v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 1 upon railroad tracks discassed at length Handy, 193 (1854). elsewhere. 13 McLean v. McCarthy, 3 West. Law Mag. 6 Brittin v. Van Camp, 2 N. J. L. 489. 489 (1861) . 1 WcUs V. Howell, 19 Johns. 385. n Phelps v. Cousins, 29 Ohio St. 135. Stat- 8 Tonawanda R. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, ute passed in 1865 prohibiting animals from 355 (affirmed, 4 N. T. 349). running at large. 1 Sayler's Stat. 877. See » SesB. Laws, p. 253. also Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. EUiott, 4 Ohio 10 Deyou. Stewart, 4 Denio, 101; Shepherd St. 474; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Water- V. Hees, 12 Johns. 433; Griffin v. Martin, 7 son, 4 Ohio St. 424. LIABILITY UNDER STATUTES FOE TRESPASSES BY ANIMALS. 215 Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont. (17.) Pennsylvania. — Trespass will lie for throwing down a fence and turning the defendant's horses into the plaintiff's close, though the fence be not a lawful one.' In order to maintain trespass against the breach of cattle, the plaintiff must have a suf- £cient fence.^ But if adjoining land-owners agree not to make any common division- fence, each is liable to the other for the trespass of his cattle.' Where one of two adjoining owners puts up » partition-fence on the boundary line for one-half the •distance, and the other refuses to complete it, he cannot recover for a trespass upon his land by his neighbor's cattle.* ( 18.) South Carolina. — It is not a trespass for cattle to pasture at large upon the unenclosed forest-land in this State ; neither is it trespass if, while roaming at large in pursuit of pasturage, they happen to stray upon the track of a railroad ; and a pi-im& facie case of negligence is made out where it is shown that cattle thus straying are killed by a railroad train.* But the rule does not apply to a case where a dog is killed by a railroad train.* (19.) Tennessee. — Every planter shall make a sufficient fence about his cleared land in cultivation, at least five feet high, and so close for at least three feet from the surface of the earth as to prevent hogs from passing through the same.' All parts of the fence must be five feet high, or no recovery can be had, although it was more than five feet high at the place where the cattle broke over.' This act applies to civil, and not criminal, proceedings ; so, the fact that a fence is not such as the law requires is no defence to an indictment for killing a horse which has broken into defendant's enclosure.' The insufficiency of a fence is no bar to an action for pulling it down, when the act is done without or in abuse of authority.'" ( 20. ) Vei-mont. — The owner of land is under no obligation to fence along the high- way ; his duty in this respect is limited to the restraint of his cattle from trespassing on his neighbor's land." Where the fences are divided, pursuant to statute, and •cattle stray into the plaintiff's close through defect of the plaintiff's part of the fence, he cannot recover; but where not so divided, he can recover. '^ It is no answer to an action for trespass upon occupied lands, by cattle other than those of an adjoining proprietor, that the plaintiff's fences were insufficient." The fact that the plaintiff's part of a division-fence was insufficient, is no bar to a recovery for damages sustained «olely through the insufficiency of the defendant's part of such fence.'* (21.) Wisconsin. — Legal fences must be four and a half feet high.'* 1 Adams v. McKinney, Add. 258. " Holden v. Shattuck, 3i Vt. 336; Keenan s Gregg V. Gregg, 55 Pa. St. 227; Eace v. v. Cavanaugh, 44 Tt. 268; Sorenberger v. Snyder, 30 Leg. Int. 361 ; 21 Pittsb. L. J. 29. Houghton, 40 Vt. 150. 3 MiJligan ». Wehinger, 68 Pa. St. 235. '^ Keenan v. Cavanaugh, 44 Vt. 268; Soreu- < Rangier v. McCveight, 27 Pa. St. 95. See berger v. Houghton, 40 Vt. 150. also Dysart v. Leeds, 2 Pa. St. 488; Knight v. '^ -Wilder v. Wilder, 38 Vt. 678. See Jack- Abert, 6 Pa. St. 472; Mitchell v. Wolf, 46 Pa. son v. Kutland, etc., E. Co., 25 Vt. 150; Bemls St. 147; Stephens v. Shriver, 25 Pa. St. 78; v. Connecticut, etc., E. Co., 42 Vt. 375. Fleming u. Eamsey, 46 Pa. St. 252. " Saxton v. Bacon, 31 Vt. 540. See also <• Banner v. South Carolina, etc., E. Co., Town v. Lamphire, 37 Vt. 52; Tupper v. i Eich. L. 329. Clark, 43 Vt. 200. 8 Wilson B. Wilmington, etc., E. Co., 10 "^ Eev. Stat. 1878, chap. 55, § 1390. As to Eich. L. 52. division-lences, see Muirayr. Van Derlyn, ' Acts 1807, chap. 8, § 1. 24 Wis. 67; Hazard v. Wolfram, 31 Wis. 194; « Polk V. Lane, 4 Yerg. 36. Pitzner v. Shinnick, 41 Wis. 676 See also » The State v. Council, 1 Tenn. 305. Brooks v. Allen, 1 Wis. 127; Butler v. Bar- 10 Crawford v. Maxwell, 3 Humph. 476. low, 2 Wis. 10; Whalon v. Blackburn, 14 See also Stallcup v. Bradly, 3 Coldw. 406. Wis. 432. 21G LIABILITY FOR INJURIES COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Notes. §28. Degree of Care required of O'wner. — The same rule obtains here as- elsewliere. It is the legal duty of every persoa having charge of an animal to apportion the care with which he uses it to the danger to be apprehended from a. failure to keep it constantly under control. He must use such care as is demanded by the circumstances which he knows or may reasonably believe surround him.' It is, therefore, the duty of persons driving animals through the streets of a crowded city to use the utmost care, while it would not be necessary to use the same degree of care in driving them through unfrequented lanes in the country.' The degree of care which the law requires depends upon the circumstances of each case. To per- mit a horse to go loose, unattended, upon the sidewalks of a populous city would be- such negligence as to hold the owner liable for any injuries he might cause by kick- ing a person, even though the owner did not know of a propensity for kicking which the horse had.' And this liability is Imposed by statute in some of the States.' If a man negligently leaves his horse and cart unsecured in the streets, and through the act of some stranger they do damage to the plaintiff, he can recover of the owner.^ And in the case of children being injured by playing upon the cart thus negligently left, the defendant would be liable, although the children were trespassers and contributed to the mischief.^ But usually, whether the leaving of a horse unguarded is negli- gence or not, is a question for the jury to determine.' But where the defendant bought a horse at " Tattersal's," and the next day took him out to "try" him in a> much frequented thoroughfare, and from some unexplained cause the horse became restless, and, notwithstanding the defendant's well-directed efforts to control him, he- ran upon the pavement and killed a man, it was held that these facts disclosed no evidence of negligence which the judge was warranted in submitting to the jury.*' And it has been held that when, in a city, a horse attached to a wagon or carriage is found running on the sidewalk, to the injury of citizens, the law will presume negli- gence on the part of the owner, and it lies upon him to show there was no fault on his- part The presumption in such a case is that there was negligence, unless the con- trary be proved.' § 29. Removing trespassing Animals from one's Premises. — If cattle or horses trespass upon land, the owner of the land may drive them off, and for this purpose may set a dog upon them ; provided he is not in any way wanting in ordinary care and prudence arising from the size and character of the dog, or in the manner of 1 See Frazeri). Kimler, 2 Hun, 514; s. c.,2 v. Chapin, i Allen, 444; Bowyer v. Bmlew, N". T. S- C. (T. & C.) 15; Dolflnger v. Fish- 3N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 362. back, 13 Bush, 474; Meredith v. Keei3,26Ind. ' lUidge v. Goodwin, 5 Car. & P. 190. 384; Sclimid r. Humphrey (Sup. Ct. Iowa, ° Lynch «. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29. June Term, 1878), 12 West. Jur. 475. See ' Bennett v. Ford, 47 Ind. 264; Griggs u. BodwcU (•- Burford, 1 Modern, 24; Wake- Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81; Shawhan v, man ;;- Robinson, 1 Bing. 213. Clarke, 24 La. An. 300; Dolflnger v. Fish- 2 Sullivan v. Scripture, 3 Allen, 664; Hud- back, 12 Bush, 474. And see Park v. O'Brien, son V. Roberts, 6 Exch- 697 ; 20 L. J. (Exch.) 23 Conn. 339. 299; Howes v. McNamara, 106 Mass. 2S1; » Hammack ». White, 11 C. B. (N. s.) 587, Michael v. Alestree, 2 Lev. 172; a. c, sub See Wlnship v. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197. To- nom. Michell v. AUestry, 1 Vent. 295 ; sui nom. prove the bad habits of a horse at the time- Mitcliil V. Alestree, 3 Keb. 650; Ficken ti. ol an accident, evidence of particular in- Jones, 28 Cal. 618. stances of vicious conduct is admissible. 8 Dickson v. McCoy, 39 N. Y. 400. Whittier v. Franklin, 46 N. H. 23. * Goodman v. Gay, 15 Pa. St. 188; Barnes » Humraell v. Wester, 1 Bright. 133. REMOVING TEESPASSING ANIMALS. 217 Letting vicious Animals — Measure of Damages. setting him upon the cattle or horses, and afterwards pursuing them.^ And it makes no difference whether the cattle were trespassing or not ; the care necessary in either case must be reasonable and proper.^ The wilful and wanton injury to a beast which is trespassing cannot be justified.' The owner of the land may drive them to the con- fines of his own premises, and turn them into the highway, and he is not responsible for any injury which may occur to them, or any injury they may commit subse- quently ; * provided they did not get into his close through any defect in his fence, caused by his own negligence.* And while it is not his duty to impound them, unless made so by statute, or to further secure them, he must not drive them any further than to the highway ; and if he does so, and they stray away, he is liable.^ And if he impounds them, he is bound to put them in a pound fit, at that time, for the pur- pose. He cannot relieve himself from liability for injuries suffered by cattle from the unfitness of the pound by showing it was generally in good condition,' or that he did not know of its bad condition,^ or that it was the only pound provided by the parish or town ; for if the town pound is in bad condition, he ought not to put them there ; and he is bound to provide them with suflScient food and drink while they remain in the pound,' but he is not liable for injuries received by the cattle from other animals in the pound without his agency or knowledge.^" J 80. O-wner of Animal bound to disclose vicious Propensities in trans- ferring it to another. — One letting a biting or kicking horse to another for hire," or leaving it with a blacksmith to be shod, or with a hostler to be groomed, is bound to inform the party receiving the horse of his vicious habits of kicking or biting; otherwise he will be liable for the damages which happen in consequence of these habits. But it seems that the vicious habits or propensities which the owner must (when known to him) disclose to a bailee are such as are directly dangerous, — as, kicking and biting in horses, hooking in horned animals, and biting in dogs. Thus, where the evidence was that the defendant owned a mare which had a habit of suddenly "pulling" back upon her halter when excited or restless, and that this habit was known to defendant, who left the mare at a hotel kept by the plaintiff's employer to be cared for, giving the plaintiff no notice of the habit, and while the plaintiff was hitching the mare in the stable, and in doing so had put her halter-rope through a ring, she suddenly pulled back, drawing the rope through the ring, thereby severely Injuring the plaintiff's finger, which was caught between the rope and ring and torn to pieces, it was held that defendant was not bound to notify the plaintiff of this habit of the mare to pull.'* g 31. Measure of Damages for Injuries committed by domestic Animals trespassing. — For injuries inflicted by domestic animals permitted to run at large, 1 Bac. Abr., tit. "Trespass," E; Amick 11. 'Palmer v. Silverthorn, 32 Pa. St. 65; O'Hara, 6 Blackf. 258; Clark v. Adams, 18 Wood v. La Rue, 9 Mich. 158. Vt. 425; Davis ti. Campbell, 23 Vt. 236; Smith « Knott v. Digges, 6 Md. 230; Knouro. V. Waldorf, 13 Hun, 127v Wagoner, 16 Ind. 4U. 2 Mclntire v. Plalsted, 57 N. H. 606; Tot- ' Wilder v. Speer, 8 Ad. & E. 547; Bignell ten V. Cole, 33 Mo. 138. v. Clarke, 5 Hurl. & N. 485. 3 Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taun. 496-498, 505, » Bignell v. Clarke, 5 Hurl. & N. 485. per Parke, J., id. 510; Loomls v. Terry, 17 " Adams v. Adams, 13 Pick. 384. Wend. 496 ; Snap v. The People, 19 111. 80. " Brightman v. Grinnell, 9 Pick. 14. •• Humphrey v. Douglass, 10 Vt. 71; 11 Vt. " Campbell v. Page, 67 Barb. 113; Story on 22; CoiT i>. Little, 6 N. H. 213. Bail., § 391 a. 12 Keshan t>. Gates, 2 N. y. S. C. (T. & C.) 288. 218 LIABILITY FOR INJURIICS COMMITTED BY ANIMALS. Notes. and alleged to have been known by the defendant to be vicious and disposed to injure men and animals, exemplary damages are allowed only on proof of gross and criminal negligence, evincing a wanton disregard of the rights of others, which, in law, is equivalent to malice.' In assessing damages in trespass quare clausum fregitt the immediate consequences of the injurious act are to be regarded, and not remote, speculative, and contingent consequences, which the party injured might easily have avoided by his own act. Thus, where the trespass consisted in removing a few rods of fence, it was held that the proper measure of damages was the cost of repairing it, and not the injury to the subsequent year's crop arising from the defect in the fence, it appearing such defect was known to the plaintiff.^ And in an action against the owner of hogs for injuries done by them to the plaintiff's crops, he cannot be allowed to prove what amount of crop he would have made but for the injury; but the dam- ages would be the value of the crops at the date of their destruction, so far as they were destroyed.' 2 32. Dogs. — At common law, the owner of a dog is not liable for damages result- ing from the vicious or mischievous acts of the animal, unless he had knowledge of its mischievous or vicious propensities. The presumption is that a dog is tame, docile, and harmless, both to persons and property ; and in order to charge the owner for his mischievous acts, scienter must be proven.* But, both in England* and in many of the States of this country, statutes have been passed dispensing with the proof of scienter in actions against the owners and keepers of dogs for injuries com- mitted by them. And generally the statutes enacted on this subject hold the owners of dogs to a more strict liability than was imposed upon them at common law.* 1 Pickett V. Crook, 20 Wis. 358 ; Elliott v. an action, scienter is dispensed with. Ome Herz, 29 Mich. 202; Jones J). Perry, 2 Esp. 482; e. Eoberts, 61 N. H. 110. Action under stat- Keiglitlinger v. Egan, 65 lU. 235 ; Von Frag- ute dispensing with scienter in case of dog fitein V. Windier, 2 Mo. App. 898 ; Meibns v. woriying sheep, will not lie against two Dodge, 38 Wis. 800. separate owners of doga for the injury done s Loker v. Damon, 17 Pick. 284. by them jointly. Hall v. Cootmire, 2 Vt. 9. * Gresham v. Taylor, 51 Ala. 505. See In an action giving person injured by dog Bicbardson v. Northrup, 66 Barb. 85; Sea- double damages, AeW, the statute is remedial mans v. Smith, 46 Barb. 320; Armstrong v. and not penal (Mitchell v. Clapp, 12 Cush. Smith, 44 Barb. 120. 278; see also Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. 94), * Dearth v. Baker, 22 Wis. 73; Kert- and does not apply to injuries committed echacke v. Ludwig, 28 Wis. 430 ; Slinger v. outside of the State. Le Forest v. Tolman, Henneman,38 Wis.504;rairehildB.Bentley, 117 Mass. 109. Where declaration alleges 30 Barb. 147; Eead v. Edwards, 17 C. B. (N. that defendants were owners and keepers, 8.) 245; is. c, 34 li. J. (C. P.) 31; Thomas held, that plaintiff must prove that they C.Morgan, 2 Cromp. M. & E. 496; Hinckley were both owners and keepers. And each V. Emerson, 4 Cow. 351; Durden v. Bar- owner was liable only for the injury com- nett, 7 Ala. 169; Sherfeyo. Bartley, 4 Sneed, mitted by his own dog where the dogs ot 58; Soames v. Barnardiston, 1 Freem. several owners unite in committing mis- (Eng.) 430. chief. Buddington v. Shearer, 20 Pick. 477. ' 26 & 27 Vict, c. 100; 28 & 29 Vict., c. 60; Where parent, by reason of injury by dog Wright V. Pearson, 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 312. to his minor child, loses child's services and « For decisions under these statutes, see is put to expense for his care, he may bring the following cases : Action under statute suit. McCarthy v. Guild, 12 Mete. 291. In- giving double damages for injury done by a jury by dog frightening horse is within the dog does not abate on death of plaintiff. statute; but it seems no action would lie Prescott V. Knowles, 62 Me. 277. Keeper of under the statute, for an accident caused a dog held liable as ownernnderthe statute. by the mere presence or passing of a dog. Smith V. Montgomery, 52 Me. 187. In snch Sherman v. Favour, 1 Allen, 191. Mandamus INJURIES BY DOGS. 219 Decisions under various Statutes. § 33. Involuntary Trespasses by Dogs. — In general, a man is not liable for the involuntary trespass of himself or his dog. If a man is assaulted, and, when in danger, runs through the close of another, not keeping the foot-path, no action lies, it being necessary for his preservation; and it is laid down in 2 Rolle's Abridgment, 566, pi. 1, against selectmen of a town, to cause them to draw an order against a fund created by taxes on dogs, to pay damages to plaintiff suffered by him by reason ol injuries Irom dogs. Osbom v. Lenox, 2 Allen, 207. A cor- poration may be liable lor injuries commit- ted by dog kept in their stables by their con- sent. Barrett v. Maiden, etc., E. Co., 3 Allen, 101. Under the statute, scieTiter is dispensed with ; how to compute the damages. Pres- sey V. Wirth, 3 Allen, 191. Owner ol a dog which has iniUcted Injuries to a child can- not exempt himsell from liability because child did not act with the discretion of a person ol mature years, il there is no want ol ordinary care on the part of the person having charge ol the child. Munn V, Eeed, i Allen, 131. Remedy given by statute to " any person injured " by a do^, against its owner or keeper, includes injuries to property. Brewer v. Crosby, 11 Gray, 29. Where the evidence was conflicting as to whether the dog bit the plaintiff or whether she struck her wrist against the buckles on his muzzle and thereby wounded hersell, it was held she could not recover unless the dog bit her. Searles v. Ladd, 123 Mass. 580. Scienter dispensed with under statute. Wool! V. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121. Injury to sheep by dogs, and notice to selectmen; statute construed. Jones v. Sherwood, 37 Conn. 466. Scienter dispensed with in ac- tion under statute for killing or wounding sheep by dogs. Fish v. Skut, 21 Barb. 333. Statute dispenses with proof of scienter in no other actions for injuries to sheep by dogs excepting where they are either killed or wounded. Osincup v. Nichols, 49 Barb. 145 ; Auchmuty v. Ham, 1 Denio, 495. Who is keeper? Where exemplary damages will be allowed. Each owner is responsible only for the injury done by his own dog, where the dogs of several owners unite in the mis- chief. Auchmuty v. Ham, 1 Denio, 495. Trespass will lie for injuries by dog to sheep, under statute making owner of dogs not keeping them chained or housed at night liable for value ol sheep killed by them. Paff V. Slack, 7 Pa. St. 254. Trespass may be brought under the statute, but, whether trespass under statute, or case at common law, is brought, scienter must be proved ; and in an action under the statute, owner of dog is liable not only for sheep killed by dog, but for such injuries as may befall the flock from Iright. Campbell v. Brown, 19 Pa. St. 359; 1 Grant, 82. Under a later stat- ute, scienter need not be proved ; suit may be brought against all the owners of several dogs which at one and the same time kill and wound sheep. Kerr «. O'Conner, 63 Pa. St. 341. Suit under statute giving double damages for injuries by dogs : held, statute highly penal, and must be strictly construed, and the negligence of defendant's servant will not authorize a recovery under it against his master. Smith v. Causey, 22 Ala. 568. Under statute, scienter need not be proved, but may be in aggravation ol dam- ages ; computing double damages. Swift v. Applebone, 23 Mich. 252. Statute does not apply to injuries by mad dogs; dissenting opinion by Graves, C. J. EUiott v. Herz, 29 Mich. 202. Under statute giving damages for dogs hilling or injuring sheep ; held, that the word "injure" is broad enough to in- clude injuries by means of chasing or wor- rying, although no external hurt was occa- sioned thereby, and proof of scienter not necessary. Job v. Harlan, 13 Ohio St. 485. Person bitten by dog, scienter need not be proven. Gries v. Zeck, 24 Ohio St. 329. Actions against several owners ol dogs, sued jointly where dogs united in injuring sheep, sustained. McAdams v. Sutton, 24 Ohio St. 333. Statute declared constitutional as an exercise ol the police power; it furnishes two remedies; the owner of sheep must elect, — cannot pursue both. Tenney v. Lenz, 16 Wis. 566. Qucere, whether statute dis- penses with proof of scienter in other cases than injuries done by dogs in killing or wor- rying sheep. If act dispensed with proof of scienter, when act is repealed it puts an end to actions under it. Kertschacke v. Ludwig, 28 Wis. 430. Under statute 28 & 29 Vict., c. 60, § 1, which provides that the owner of every dog shall be liable for in- juries done to any caMle or sheep by his dog, and dispensing with proof of scienter, it is held that horses are included under the term " cattle." Wright v. Pearson, L. E. 4 Q. B. 582; 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 312. Construction of statute requiring ov^'ner to kiU a mad dog. Wallace v. Douglas, 10 Ired. L. 79. The owner of sheep destroyed or wounded by dogs is entitled to remuneration from the dog-tax fund of the township, although he resides elsewhere. Washington v. Apple- gate, 23 N. J. L. 42. 220 LIABILITY FOE INJURIES COMMITTED BT ANIMALS. Kotes. that if cattle, in passage on the highway, eat herbs or corn raptim et sparsim, against the will of the owner, it will excuse the trespass. In Millen v. Fandrye,^ the defend- ant's dog chased the plaintiflF's sheep ; the defendant called him off, and it was held that no action lay. The act of a dog jumping into a field without the consent of its master is not such a trespass as will support an action.^ But where a man with dogs and guns entered into plaintiff's close and did not go along the path, and one of the defendant's dogs, escaping from his control, entered plaintiff's paddock, adjoining thereto, and pulled down a deer, it was held that defendant was liable.' An action lies against the owner of a dog, who, knowing the animal to have a propensity for chasing and destroying game, permits it to he at large, and the dog, in consequence, "breaks and enters" the plaintiff's woods, and chases and destroys young pheasants which are being reared under domestic hens.* But it is held in Wisconsin, that one whose dog, while trespassing upon the close of another, kills a domestic animal, is liable for the damages thereby inflicted, though he had no previous knowledge of the vicious propensity of the dog.^ 2 34. Keeping Watch-dogs. — A man may keep a dog for the necessary defence of his house, his garden, or his fields, and may cautiously use him for that purpose in the night-time; but if he permit him to be at large upon the premises, and a person is bitten by him, in the day-time, though the person injured be at the time trespassing on the grounds of the owner, the owner is liable. It seems that a person is not per- mitted, for the protection, in his absence, of property against a mere trespasser, to use means endangering the life or safety of a human being, whatever he may where the entry upon his premises is to commit a felony or breach of the peace ; and where such means are used, the nature and value of the property sought to he protected must be such as to justify the proceeding. The principles of humanity must not be violated, or the owner will be subjected to damages for any inj ury which ensues.* And it is no defence to an action for an injury done by a dog to one who was lawfully approaching a house by an entrance near which a vicious dog, known to the owner as such, was tied, that there were other entrances of a more public description ; ^ or that there was a notice in large letters, "Beware of the dog," if it appear that the party injured could not read. And where a person is lawfully on land by license of the owner, and he invites a stranger in for a lawful purpose, and, through no contributory negligence on his part, he is bitten by a dog which is insecurely fastened, the owner of the dog is liable.^ And the accidental stepping upon a dog's toes,' or the simple act of offering a dog candy, where the plaintiff is not shown to know the dog's vicious qualities,'" is not such contributory negligence as to constitute a defence. J 35. WTiat will justify killing another's Animals. — In order to justify one in killing the dog of another, it must ordinarily be shown that at the time the animal was killed he was either in the act of destroying the defendant's prop- 1 Poph. 161. (Tenn.),58; Kelly v. Tilton, 3 Keyes, 363. 2 Brown v. Giles, 1 Car. & P. 118. See Logue v. Link, 4 E. D. Smith, 63 ; Meibus » Beckwith v. Shordike, 4 Burr. 2092. v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300; Curtis v. Mills, 5 Car. * Eead v. Edwards, 17 C. B. (N. s.) 245; 34 & P. 489; Sawyer v. Jackson, 6 N. Y. Leg. L. J. (C. P.) 31. Obs. 380; Smith v. Place, 11 Pitts. L. J. 145. 5 Ohurnot v. Larson, 43 Wis. 536. See also ' Sarch v. Blackbm-n, 4 Car. & P. 297. Eairchild v. Bentley. 30 Barb. 147. « Kelly t>. Tilton, 3 Keyes, 263 ;». t., 2 Abb. « Loomis V. TeiTy, 17 Wend. 496; Woolf o. App. Dec. 495". Chalker, 31 Conn. 121. And see Brock v. « Smith v. Pelah, 2 Stra. 1264. CoiJelaud, 1 Esp. 203 ; Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 i» Lynch v. McNally, 17 Alb. L. J. 414 Qi. Y. Car. & P. 297; Sherfey v. Bartley, 4 Sneed Ct. App.). "WHAT WILL JUSTIFY KILLING ANOTHER'S ANIMALS. 221 Form of Action for Injuries by Animals. erty,' or that it was absolutely necessary for tbe preservation of Ms property or person.' Not so, however, in the case of a furious dog, accustomed to bite mankind, or a rabid dog. A dog of that kind is a common nuisance, and may be killed by any one.' And it has been held that the inhabitant of a dwelling-house may lawfully kill the dog of another, the owner knowing the dog's habits, where such dog is in the habit of haunting his house, and by barking and howling, by day and by night, disturbing the peace and quiet of his family, if the dog cannot otherwise be pre- vented from annoying him.* So, one may kill a dog which is chasing animals on his land, in order to preserve the lives of the animals thus chased, although they may not belong to the owner of the land.* In the case of valuable domestic animals committing slight injury, such as a hog killing a chicken, the owner is not justified in killing the hog; the injury caused by the death of the hog being considered out of all proportion to the loss of the chicken.^ But where plaintiflF's ass, which he knew to be dangerous, and in the habit of pursuing and injuring stock, and which he permitted to run at large, was found by defendant pursuing his cow, and which he threw down and was in the act of stamping upon, it was held that the defendant was justified in killing the ass, if he believed it was necessary to save the life of the cow.' Putting up a notice that dogs trespassing on his lands will be shot, will not justify one in shooting another's dog coming thereon.* Where the defendants justified shooting a dog, by pleading that he had attacked them, and was accustomed to attack and bite mankind, the court allowed witnesses to be called to prove the general quietness of the dog.' In Massachusetts, it has been held that an act authorizing the killing of unlicensed dogs was constitutional.^" g 36. Form of Action. — Frequent questions have arisen as to the proper form of action for injuries resulting from negligence in the keeping of animals. Where the injury is immediate from an act of force done by the defendant, the remedy is tres- pass; and where the injury is only consequential to an act before done, an action on the case will lie. Where the action is for keeping mischievous animals, having notice of their propensities, case is the proper form." But if the injury is imme- diate, — as, if the defendant incite his dog to bite another, or let loose a dangerous animal, or if an inj ury be committed by cattle to land, — the action should be trespass." 1 If one dog be killed by another, tlie v. Payne, 13 Johns. 312; Perry v. Phipps, 10 owner of the former, in order to recover Ired. L. 259; Brown u. Carpenter, 26 Vt. 638; damages, must show that the latter was the Dunlap v. Snyder, 17 Barb. 561; Woolf d. aggressor, without regard to his general Chalker, .31 Conn. 121; Dodson v. Mock, i habits and character. Wiley v. Slater, 22 Dev. & B. 146; Parrott r. Hartsfleld, 4 Dev. Barb. 506. See Wheeler ». Brant, 23 Barb. 324. & B. 110; MaxweU v. Palmerton, 21 Wend. ■' Janson v. Brown, 1 Camp. 41; Wells v. 407; Bowers v. Fitz Randolph, Add. 215. Head, 4 Car. A P. 568; Barrington v. Turner, * BriU v. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354. 3 liBV. 28; Protheroe v. Mathews, 5 Car. & P. « Leonard v. Wilkins, 9 Johns. 232. B81 ; Vere ». Lord Cawdor, 11 East, 567 ; Wad- ' Morse v. Nixon, 6 Jones, 293. See Mat- hurst V. Damme, Oro. Jac. 45 ; Brown ti. thews v. Fiestel, 2 E. D. Smith, 90. Hoburger, 52 Barb. 15 ; Wright v. Eamscot, 1 ' Williams v. Dixon, 65 N. C. 416. Saund. 84; Perry v. Phipps, 10 Ired. 259; ' Corner o. Champneys (MS.), cited in 2 Morris v. Nugent, 7 Oar & P. 572; Hinckley v. Marsh. 584. Emerson, 4 Cow. 351; King v. Kline, 6 Pa. » Clark v. Webster, 1 Oar. & P. 104. St. 318. See also Canefox v. Crenshaw, 24 » Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136. Mo. 199. See, as to value of dog. Brent v. " Durden v. Barnett, 7 Ala. 169. Kimball, 60 111. 211; Spray v. Ammerman, 66 " Dilts v. Kinney, 16 N. J. L. 130; Leame v, 111. 309. Bray, 3 East, 593. 3 Barrington ti. Turner, 3 Lev. 28 ; Putnam 222 LIABILITY FOR INJURIES COMMITTED BT ANIMALS. Notes. So trespass, and not case, is tbe proper action to recover damages for an injury sus- tained by the negligent driving of the defendant's horse.' In an action wherein the plaintiff declared that he was possessed of a close adjoining the defendant's, that it was the duty of the defendant to repair the division-fence, and that, for want of repair, the defendant's cattle came into the plaintiff's close, it was held that either trespass or case would lie, — tresjjass, because it was the plaintiff's ground; and case because the first wrong was a neglect to repair the fence.' 2 37. Contributory Negligence. — The rules relating to contributory negligence apply to injuries committed by animals. The public are entitled to act upon the presumption that all dangerous animals are properly confined; and are therefore exonerated from any special caution against them, except when, without right, they go upon the owner's land, and within the place where they may be lawfully kept. Thus, where a bull was confined, and its character known to a person who carelessly left the gate of its enclosure open, and thereby the animal escaped and injured him, it seems he could not recover damages.' But where there is a public way, or the owner of the mischievous animal suffers a way over his close to be used as a public way, he has no right to keep within the close a bull or other animal he knows to be dangerous to passers-by.' If a man should enter his neighbor's field unlawfully, and leave the gate open, and, before it is known to the owner, cattle enter and destroy the crop, the trespasser is responsible. But if the owner sees the gate open, and fre- quently passes it, and wilfully, obstinately, or through gross negligence leaves it open, and cattle get into it, it is his own folly.' The mere fact that the person injured is technically a trespasser will not exonerate the owner of dangerous animals from lia- bility for injuries inflicted by them, if such owner is negligent in keeping them.* The fault of the party injured must proximately contribute to the injury sustained, to excuse the defendant.' And in a case where the injury sustained was from the bite of a vicious dog kept by plaintiff's employer, and the defence was set up that, as the accident occurred through the negligence of a co-servant in omitting to chain up the dog, the plaintiff could not recover, it was held that the plaintiff did not assume the risk, as one incident to his employment, that a ferocious dog would not be securely fastened.* J 38. Imputed Negligence — Servant — Children. —In certain cases, the servant becomes identified with the master to the extent that he cannot recover for injuries sustained by him where the master's neglect of a duty contributes to the cause of the injury; and this principle has been applied to cases of injuries by animals. Thus, in a case in the Court of Exchequer in England,' where the plaintiff, a plate-layer in the employment of a railway company, was returning from his work along their line, upon a trolly propelled by hand, and pigs of the defendant got through the fence of his land, which adjoined the railway, and upset the trolly by 1 Waldron v. Hopper, 1 N. J. L. 339; Day « Marble v. Boss, 6 Cent. L. J. 187; 134 «i. Edwards, 5 Term Rep. 648. Mass. 44; WooU v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121; s Star V. Rookesby, 1 Salk. 335. Sarch v. Blackbm^,4 Car. 4 P. 297; Kelly r. •Earhart v. Toungblood, 27 Pa. St. 831. TUton, 3 Eeyes, 263; Loomis v. Terry, 17 See Curtis v. Mills, 6 Car. & P. 489; Black- Wend. 496; Sherfey v. Hartley, 4 Sneed, 58; man v. Simmons, 3 Oar. & P. 138. Rider v. White, 65 N. Y. 54. * Brock V. Copeland, 1 Esp. 203. ' See Shehan o. Cornwall, 29 Iowa, 99. s Ix>ker V. Damon, 17 Pick. 284-288; Cate « Mulleru. McKesson, 10 Han, 44. V. Cate, 50 N. H. 147. » Child v. Hearn, L. R. 9 Exch. 176. CONTRIBUTORT NEGLIGENCE, 223 Imputed Negligence — Servant — Children. getting upon the track in front of it, thereby injuring the plaintiff, it was held that, as it was the duty of the railway company, under a statute, to erect and maintain a fence along its line sufficient to turn the cattle (including pigs) of the adjoining land- owners, and as through its neglect to erect and maintain such a fence the accident was caused, the plaintiff could not recover. But the owner of a dog cannot exempt himself from liability in negligently keeping it, in case of an injury inflicted on a child, because it appears the child did not act with the discretion and judgment of a person of mature years.' Thus, where the defendant, knowing the ferocious disposition of his dog, and that it had been accustomed to bite persons, and in particular that when left guarding his team, in a village street, it had attacked persons passing along the highway, afterwards left it unsecured and unmuzzled in or near his sleigh, near a village sidewalk, and a child of seven years, passing on the sidewalk, came to the sleigh and meddled with a whip lying therein, and was thereupon thrown down and bitten by the dog, it was held that defendant was liable for the injury.^ But in cases where children are in the care and custody of their parents, and the parents do not exercise that care and watchfulness over them which a person of mature years having the care and custody of children of that age ordinarily would, having reference to the circumstances of the case, and the children receive injuries from vicious animals in consequence of such want of care on the part of the parents, then the owner or keeper of the animal is not responsihle for the injury.' 1 Mnnn v. Beed, 4 Allen, 131; Plnmley v. ' Mnnn v. Seed, 4 Allen, 431; Logne v. Birge, 124 Mass. 57; 6 Reporter, 527. lank, 4 E. D. Smith, 63. 3 MeibUB V. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300. CHAPTER lY. LIABILITY FOR VENDING, SHIPPING, OR LETTING DAN- GEROUS GOODS OR MACHINES. Leading Case: Thomas label - V. Winchester. — Vending poisonous drug with harmless -Proximate and remote cause. Notes : J 1. Shipping dangerous goods. 2. Vending dangerous goods. 8. Letting or lending dangerous machines. vending poisonous drug with haemless label— pkoximatb and remote cause. Thomas v. Winchester.* Coui-t of Appeals of New York, 1852. Eon. Charles H. Rugglbs, Chief Judge. " Addison Gakdhster, " PEKEBOErr G. Jewett, " Albxandbe S. Johnson, " John W. Edmonds, " Malbone Watson, " Philo Gridlet, " Hbnet Mbllis, Judges. Justices of the Supreme Court, and ex officio Judges of the Court of Appeals. 1. Vending poisonous Drug with harmless Label. — A dealer in drugs and medi- cines who carelessly labels a deadly poison as a harmless medicine, and sends it so labelled into market, is liable to all persons who, without fault on their part, are injured by using it as such medicine in consequence ol the false label. His liability arises, not out of any contract or direct' privity between him and the person injured, but out of the duty which the law imposes upon him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others. He is liable, therefore, though the poisonous drug with such label may have passed through many intermediate sales before it reaches the hands of the person injured. 2. Kespondeat Superior. —Where such negligent act is done by an agent, the principal is liable for the injury caused thereby. Action in the Supreme Court, commenced in August, 1849, against Winchester and Gilbert, for injuries sustained by Mrs. Thomas from the effects of a quantity of extract of belladonna, administered to her by mistake as extract of dandelion. Charles P. Kirkland, for appellant; N. HiU, Jr., for respondent. (224) • Eeported 6 N. T. VENDING POISONOUS DKUG WITH HARMLESS LABEL. 225 Court of Appeals of Ne"W York — Opinion of Ruggles, C. J. RtTGGLES, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. — This is an action brought to recover damages from the defendant for negligently putting up, labelling, and selling as and for the extract of dandelion, which is a simple and harmless medicine, a jar of the extract of belladonna, which is a deadly poison, by means of which the plaintiff Mary Ann Thomas, to whom, being sick, a dose of dandelion was prescribed by a physician, and a portion of the contents of the jar was adminis- tered as and for the extract of dandelion, was greatly injured, etc. The facts proved were, briefly, these: Mrs. Thomas being in ill- health, her physician prescribed for her a dose of dandelion. Her hus- band purchased what was believed to be the medicine prescribed, at the store of Dr. Foord, a physician and druggist in Cazenovia, Madison County, where the plaintiffs reside. A small quantity of the medicine thus purchased was administered to Mrs. Thomas, on whom it produced very alarming effects, such as coldness of the surface and extremities, feebleness of circulation, spasms of the muscles, giddiness of the head, dilation of the pupils of the eyes, and derangement of mind. She recovered, however, after some time, from its effects, although for a short time her life was thought to be in great danger. The medicine administered was belladonna, and not dandelion. The jar from which it was taken was labelled, " JZ&. dandelion, prepared by A. Gilbert, No. 108 John Street, N. Y. Jar, 8 oz." It was sold for and believed by Dr. Foord to be the extract of dandelion as labelled. Dr. Foord pur- chased the article as the extract of dandelion, from James S. Aspin- wall, a druggist at New York. Aspinwall bought it of the defendant as extract of dandelion, believing it to be such. The defendant was en- gaged, at No. 108 John Street, New York, in the manufacture and sale of certain vegetable extracts for medicinal purposes, and in the pur- chase and sale of others. The extracts manufactured by him were put up in jars for sale, and those which he purchased were put up by him in like manner. The jars containing extracts manufactured by himself and those containing extracts purchased by him from others were labelled alike. Both were labelled like the jar in question, as "prepared by A. Gilbert." Gilbert was a person employed by the defendant, at a salary, as an assistant in his business. The jars were labelled in Gil- bert's name, because he had been previously engaged in the same busi- ness on his owH account at No. 108 John Street, and probably because Gilbert's labels rendered the articles more salable. The extract con- tained in the jar sold to Aspinwall, and by him to Foord, was not manu- factured by the defendant, but was purchased by him from another 15 226 VEXDIXG, SHIPPING, OR LETTING DANGEROUS ARTICLES. Thomas v. Winchester. manufacturer or dealer. The extract of dandelion and the extract of belladonna resemble each other in color, consistence, smell, and taste, but may, on careful examination, be distinguished the one from the other by those who are well acquainted with these articles. Gilbert's- labels were paid for by Winchester, and used in his business with his knowledge and assent. The defendant's counsel moved for a nonsuit, on the following- grounds: 1. That the action could not be sustained, as the defendant was the remote vendor of the article in question ; and there was no connection, transaction, or privity between him and the plaintiffs, or either of them. 2. That this action sought to charge the defendant with the consequences of the negligence of Aspinwall and Foord. 3. That the plaintiffs were liable to and chargeable with the negligence- of Aspinwall and Foord, and therefore could not maintain this action. 4. That, according to the testimony, Foord was chargeable with negli- gence, and that the plaintiffs, therefore, could not sustain this suit against the defendant ; if they could sustain a suit at all, it would be- against Foord only. 5. That this suit, being brought for the benefit of the wife, and alleging her as the meritorious cause of action, cannot be- sustained. 6. That there was not sufficient evidence of negligence in the defendant to go to the jury. The judge overruled the motion for a nonsuit, and the defendant's- counsel excepted. The judge, among other things, charged the jury that if they should find from the evidence that either Aspinwall or Foord was guilty of negligence in vending as and for dandelion the extract taken by Mrs. Thomas, or that the plaintiff Thomas, or those who administered it to- Mrs. Thomas, were chargeable with negligence in administering it, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover; but if they were free from negligence, and if the defendant Winchester was guilty of negligence in putting up and vending the extracts in question, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, provided the extract administered to Mrs. Thomas was the same which was put up by the defendant, and sold by him to Aspinwall, and by Aspinwall to Foord; that, if they should find the defendant liable, the plaintiffs in this action were entitled to recover damages only for the personal injury and suffering of the wife, and not for loss of service, medical treatment, or expense to the husband, and that the recovery should be confined to the actual damages suffered by the wife. The action was properly brought in the name of the husband and VENDING POISONOUS DRUG WITH HARMLESS LABEL. 227 Court of Appeals of New York — Opinion of Kuggles, C. J. wife, for the personal injury and suffering of the wife, and the case was left to the jury with the proper directions on that point. ^ The case depends on the first point taken by the defendant on his motion for a nonsuit ; and the question is whether, the defendant being a remote vendor of the medicine, and there being no privity or connec- tion between him and the plaintiffs, the action can be maintained. If, in labelling a poisonous drug with the name of a harmless medicine, for public market, no duty was violated by the defendant, excepting that which he owed to Aspinwall, his immediate vendee, in virtue of his con- tract of sale, this action cannot be maintained. If A. build a wagon and sell it to B., who sells it to C, and C. hires it to D., who, in conse- quence of the gross negligence of A. in building the wagon, is over- turned and injured, D. cannot recover damages against A., the builder. A.'s obligation to build the wagon faithfully arises solely out of his contract with B. The public have nothing to do with it. Misfortune to third persons, not parties to the contract, would not be a natural and necessary consequence of the builder's negligence; and such negli- gence is not an act immediately dangerous to human life. So, for the same reason, if a horse be defectively shod by a smith, and a per- son hiring the horse from the owner is thrown and injured in conse- quence of the smith's negligence in shoeing, the smith is not liable for the injury. The smith's duty, in such case, grows exclusively out of his contract with the owner of the horse; it was a duty which the smith owed to him alone, and to no one else. And although the injury to the rider may have happened in consequence of the negligence of the smith, the latter was not bound, either by his contract or by any consideration of public policy or safety, to respond for his breach of duty to any one except the person he contracted with. This was the ground on which the case of Winterbottom v. Wright ^ was decided. A. contracted with the postmaster-general to provide a coach to convey the mail-bags along a certain line of road, and B. and others also con- tracted to horse the coach along the same line. B. and his co-contrac- tors hired C, who was the plaintiff, to drive the coach. The coach, in consequence of some latent defect, broke down ; the plaintiff was thrown from his seat and lamed. It was held that C. could not main- tain an action against A. for the injury thus sustained. The reason of the decision is best stated by Baron Rolfe. A.'b duty to keep the coach in good condition was a duty to the postmaster-general, with whom he made his contract, and not a duty to the driver employed by the owners of the horses. i Chltty's PI. (ed. of 1828) 62. ' 10 Mee. & W. 100. 228 VENDING, SHlPriNO, OR LETTING DANGEROUS ARTICLES. Thomas v, Winchester. But the case iu hand stands oa a different ground. The defendant was a dealer in poisonous drugs. Gilbert was his agent in preparing them for market. The death or great bodily harm of some person was the natural and almost inevitable consequence of the sale of bella- donna by means of the false label. Gilbert, the defendant's agent, would have been punishable for manslaughter if Mrs. Thomas had died in consequence of taking the falsely-labelled medicine. Every man who, by his culpable negligence, causes the death of another, although without intent to kill, is guilty of manslaughter, i A chemist who neg- ligently sells laudanum in a phial labelled as paregoric, and thereby causes the death of a person to whom it is administered, is guilty of manslaughter.^ "So highly does the law value human life, that it admits of no justification whenever life has been lost, and the careless- ness or negligence of one person has contributed to the death of another." 3 And this rule applies, not only where the death of one is occasioned by the negligent act of another, but where it is caused bj' the negligent omission of a duty of that other.'* Although the defend- ant Winchester may not be answerable criminally for the negligence of his agent, there can be no doubt of his liability in a civil action, in which the act of the agent is to be regarded as the act of the principal. In respect to the wrongful and criminal character of the negligence complained of, this case differs widely from those put by the defend- ant's counsel. No such imminent danger existed in those cases. In the present case, the sale of the poisonous article was made to a dealer in drugs, and not to a consumer. The injury, therefore, was not likely to fall on him or on his vendee, who was also a dealer ; but much more likely to be visited on a remote purchaser, as actually happened. The defendant's negligence put human life in imminent danger. Can it be said that there was no duty on the part of the defendant to avoid the creation of that danger by the exercise of greater caution ? Or that the exercise of that caution was a duty only to his immediate vendee, whose life was not endangered? The defendant's duty arose out of the nature of his business, and the danger to others incident to its mis- management. Nothing but mischief like that which actually happened could have been expected from sending the poison falsely labelled into the market; and the defendant is justly responsible for the probable consequences of the act. The duty of exercising caution in this respect did not arise out of the defendant's contract of sale to Aspin- wall. The wrong done by the defendant was in putting the poison, mis- 1 2 Eev. Stat. 662, § 19. ' Eegina v. Swindall, 2 Car. & Kir. 232, 233. 2 Teasymond's Case, Lew. C. 0. 169. » Begina v. Haines, 2 Car. & Kir. 368, 371. VENDING POISONOUS DRUG WITH HARMLESS LABEL. 229 Court of Appeals of New York — Opinion of Buggies, C. J. labelled, into the hands of Aspinwall as an article of merchandise to be sold and afterwards used as the extract of dandelion, by some person then unknown. The owner of a horse and cart, who leaves them unat- tended in the street, is liable for any damage which may result from his negligence.^ The owner of a loaded gun, who puts it into the hands of a child, by whose indiscretion it is discharged, is liable for the damage occasioned by the discharge.^ The defendant's contract of sale to Aspinwall does not excuse the wrong done to plaintiffs. It was a part of the means by which the wrong was effected. The plaintiffs' injury and their remedy would have stood on the same principle if the defend- ant had given the belladonna to Dr. Foord without price ; or if he had put it in his shop without his knowledge, under circumstances which would probably have led to its sale on the faith of the label. In Long- meid v. Holliday,'^ the distinction is recognized between an act of neg- ligence imminently dangerous to the lives of others, and one that is not so. In the former case, the party guilty of the negligence is liable to the party injured, whether there be a contract between them or not ; in the latter, the negligent party is liable only to the party with whom he contracted, and on the ground that negligence is a breach of the contract. The defendant, on the trial, insisted that Aspinwall and Foord were guilty of negligence in selling the article in question for what it was represented to be in the label ; and that the suit, if it could be sus- tained at all, should have been brought against Foord. The judge charged the jury that if the3', or either of them, were guilty of negli- gence in selling the belladonna for dandelion, the verdict must be for the defendant ; and left the question of their negligence to the jury, who found, on that point, for the plaintiffs. If the case really depended on the point thus raised, the question was properly left to the jury. But I think it did not. The defendant, by affixing the label to the jar, represented its contents to be dandelion, and to have been "pre- pared" by his agent, Gilbert. The word "prepared," on the label, must be understood to mean that the article was manufactured by him, or that it had passed through some process under his hands, which would give him personal knowledge of its true name and quality. Whether Foord was justified in selling the article upon the faith of the defendant's label, would have been an open question in an action by the plaintiffs against him, and I wish to be understood as giving no opinion on that point. But it seems to me to be clear that the defend- » Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; lUidge v. = Dixon v. Bell, 5 Man. & Sel. 198. Goodwin, 5 Car. & P. 190. « 6 Exch. 761. 230 VENDING, SHIPPING, OK LETTING DANGEROUS ABTICLES. Notes. ant cannot, in this case, set up as a defence that Foord sold the con- tents of the jar as and for what the defendant represented it to be. The label conveyed the idea distinctly to Foord that the contents of the jar was the extract of dandelion, and that the defendant knew it to be such. So far as the defendant is concerned, Foord was under no obligation to test the truth of the representation. The charge of the judge in submitting to the jury the question in relation to the negligence of Foord and Aspinwall cannot be complained of by the defendant. G-ARDiNEE, J., concurred in affirming the judgment, on the ground that selling the belladonna without a label indicating that it was poison, was declared a misdemeanor by statute ; ' but expressed no opinion upon the question whether, independent of the statute, the defendant would have been liable to these plaintiffs. Gridlet, J., was not present when the cause was decided. All the other members of the court concurred in the opinion delivered by Rdggles, C. J. Judgment affirmed. NOTES. 2 1. Shipping dangerous Goods. — " It is well settled " — I am quoting the lan- guage of a learned and distinguished judge — "that a man who delivers an article which he knows to he dangerous or noxious, to another person, without notice of its dangerous qualities, is liable for any injury which may reasonably be contemplated as likely to result, and which does in fact result therefrom, to that person or any other who is not himself in fault."'' The rule thus stated is clearly applicable to those who ship dangerous goods without informing the carriers of their character ; but, as we shall see further on, its application to the case of selling dangerous goods is much qualified. There is an implied duty on the part of shippers of dangerous goods, such as nitro-glycerine, to give notice of the dangerous nature of the goods to the ship-owner, or to the person who receives the goods on his behalf.' This duty has been held to amount to an implied undertaking, or warranty, on the part of the shipper, that the goods are not dangerous.* If this be the correct rule, want of knowl- edge on his part that they are so will not excuse him. But the better opinion is, that this implied duty of the shipper does not extend beyond an obligation to take proper care not to deliver dangerous goods without notice. If he ship the goods innocently, without knowing their dangerous character, and without being guilty of negligence 1 2Eev. Stat. 694, §23. & BI. 470; Farrant v. Barnes, H C. B. (w. 2 Gray, J., in Wellington o. Downer Kero- s.) 553; Boston, etc., B. Co. v. Shanly, 107 Bene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 67. Mass. 668. 3 Barney v. Burstenbinder, 7 Lans. 210 ; s. * Brass v. Maitland, 6 El. & Bl. 470, iS5,per c, 64 Barb. 212; Williams v. The East India Ld. Campbell, 0. J., and Wightman, J. Co., 3 East, 192; Brass v. Maitland, 6 El. SHIPPING DANGEROUS GOODS. 231 Liability of Shipper, and Carrier and Shipper. in failing to discover it, he will not be liable.^ If, for want of such notice, injury result to the carrier,'' or to his servant,' the shipper must pay damages. Thus, in an English case, the defendant delivered to the servant of a railway carrier a cnrhoy of nitric acid, to be transported to a distant place, without communicating to him its •dangerous nature, which there was nothing in its appearance to indicate. Whilst it was being carried by the servant, the carboy, from some unexplained cause, burst, and its contents flowed over and severely injured him. It was held that the defendant was liable for the injuries thus occasioned.* So, in a conspicuous case in Massachu- Uietts, it appeared that two substances, manufactured by different manufacturers, were dangerously explosive in combination with one another, and were ordinarily used together. A customer sent separate orders to the manufacturers for quantities of the respective substances, to be forwarded to him by a certain common carrier; and ■directed one of them to make the substance which he was to furnish of greater ■explosive power than usual. The orders were fulfilled, and the substances delivered In apparently harmless packages to the carrier, by the manufacturers, each of whom dieted independently of the other, and was ignorant of the other's proceedings ; and aio notice was given to the carrier of the nature of the substances, or either of them. He stowed them together in his vehicle, and, while he was transporting them with ■due care, they exploded, and injured his property, and property of others in his cus- tody, and also property of a third person, near which the vehicle was standing. The •explosion was practically a single one, and it was impossible to distinguish how much of the damage was produced by either substance. It was held that the manufac- turers, but not the customer, were jointly liable to the carrier and the third person, respectively, in actions of tort for their injuries.^ But the carrier thus ignorant of the dangerous character of the goods will not be liable for damage it may occasion ■io third persons, without negligence on his part.* If the shipper and carrier, or the . Levy. the defendant, the vendor, to use ordinary care in compounding this wash for the hair. Unquestionably there was such a duty towards the purchaser, and it extends, in my judgment, to the person for whose use the vendor knew the compound was purchased." Cleasbt, B., said: "Substitute the word 'negligence' for 'fraud,' and the analogy between Langridge v. Levy and this case is complete." ' This last case, it is thought, must he accepted as overruling the doctrine of a pre- vious case determined in the Exchequer in 1851, where Baron Parke (who, it will be remembered, delivered the yiAgaieTiimLangridgeY. Levy) held, in substance, that the doctrine of Langridge v. Levy did not apply, in the absence of knowledge , on the part of the vendor, of the defect which caused the injury; in other words, it applied in case oi fraud, and not in case of negligence. In this case, Longmeid v. Holliday,' Baron Pakke, in giving the judgment of the court, said: "There is no doubt that if the defendant had been guilty of a fraudulent representation that the lamp was fit and proper to be used, knowing that it was not, and intending it to be used by the _^ plaintiff's wife, or any particular individualjthe wife (joining her husband for con- formity) or that individual would have had an action for the deceit, upon the principle on which all actions for deceitful representations are founded, and which was strongly illustrated in the case of Langridge v. Levy,^ viz., that if any one knowingly tells a falsehood, with intent to induce another to do an act which results in his loss, he is liable to that person in an action for deceit. But the fraud being negatived in this case, the action cannot be maintained on that ground by the party who sustained damage. There are other cases, no doubt, besides those of fraud, in which a third person, though not a party to the contract, may sue for the damage sustained, if it be broken. These cases occur where there has been a wrong done to that person for which he would have had a right of action though no such contract had been made. As, for example, if an apothecary administered improper medicines to his patient, or a surgeon unskilfully treated him, and thereby injured his health, he would be liable to the patient, even where the father or friend of the patient may have been the contracting party with the apothecary or surgeon ; for, though no such contract had been made, the apothecary, if he gave improper medicines, or the sur- geon, if he took him as a patient and unskilfully treated him, would be liable to an action for a misfeasance.* A stage-coach proprietor, who may have contracted with a master to carry his servant, if he is guilty of neglect, and the servant sustained per- sonal damage, is liable to him ; for it is a misfeasance towards him if, after taking him as a passenger, the proprietor or his servant drives without due care, as it is a misfeasance towards any one travelling on the road. So, if a mason contract to erect a bridge or other work in a public road, which he constructs, but not according to the contract, and the defects of which are a nuisance to the highway, he may be responsible for it to a third person, who is injured by the defective construction, and he cannot be saved from the consequences of his illegal act, in committing the nuisance on the highway, by showing that he was also guilty of a breach of contract, and responsible for it. And it may be the same when any one delivers to another, with- out notice, an instrument in its nature dangerous, or under particular circumstances, — as, a loaded gun, which he himself loaded, —and that other person to whom it is delivered is injured thereby, or if he places it in a situation easily accessible to a third person, who sustains damage from it. A very strong case to that effect is Dixon v. Bell.* 1 George'i). Skivington, L. E. 5 Exch. 1. ■* Pippin u. Sheppard, 11 Price, 400; Glad- s 6Exch. 761-765. well v. Steggall, 8 Scott, 60; 5 Bing. N. C. 8 2 Mee. * "•*■ S19; in error, 4 Mee. & W. 733. 33j_ 6 5 Mau. & Sel. 198. 236 VENDING, SHIPPING, OR LETTING DANGEROUS ARTICLES. Notes. But it would be going much too far to say that so much care is required in the ordinary intercourse of life between one individual and another, that if a machine, not in its nature dangerous, — a carriage, for instance, — but which might become so by a latent defect entirely unknown, although discoverable by the exercise of ordi- nary care, should be lent or given by one person, even by the person who manufac- tured it, to another, the former should be answerable to the latter for a subsequent damage accruing by the use of it Could it be contended with justice, in the present case, that if the lamp had been lent or given by the defendant to the plaintiff's wife, and used by her, he would have been answerable for the personal damage which she sustained, the defendant not knowing or having any reason to believe it was not per- fectly safe, although liable to the party to whom he contracted to sell it, upon an implied warranty that it was fit for use, so far as reasonable care could make it, for the breach of that contract, as to all damage sustained by him? We are of opinion, therefore, that if there had been in this case a breach of contract with the plaintiffs, the husband might have sued for it ; but there being no misfeasance towards the wife, independently of the contract, she cannot sue and join herself with her husband. Therefore a nonsuit must be entered." In George v. Skivington,^ Chief Baron Kblly endeavored to distinguish Longmeid v. HoUiday, by stating that the jury found bond fides and no negligence on the part of the vendor. This was an error ; the verdict did not negative the existence of negligence.* If the act or negligence of a responsible agent intervenes to produce the catastrophe, then the act of the defendant in vending the noxious substance or defective machine, without notice of its real character, will not fix his liability to pay damages. Thus, in the case already quoted, where the defendant sold gunpowder to a boy eight years old, the boy was afterwards held not entitled to recover damages caused by its explod- ing, because it appeared that, after purchasing the gunpowder, he had carried it home and put it in the custody of his parents, and that a part of it had been fired off by him, with their permission, before the explosion occurred by which he was injured. The wrongful act of the defendant in selling the gunpowder to the boy was not, therefore, the direct, proximate, or efficient cause of the injury.' So, where a declaration alleged that the defendants, being druggists and chemists, through negli- gence and want of skill, sold and delivered to certain persons an article which the defendants supposed to be black oxide of manganese, but which was, in fact, sulphide of antimony ; that the vendees, acting on the belief that it was oxide of manganese, resold it to the plaintiff, who, influenced by the same belief, mixed it with chlorate of potassia, whereby a dangerous and explosive substance was created, which exploded, damaging the plaintiff; it was held that no cause of action was set forth. The aver- ments, according to the reasoning of Biqblow, C. J., did not disclose any duty or obligation resting on the defendants towards the plaintiff in the sale of the article to the persons from whom the plaintiff purchased it.* ' Supra, L. E. 6 Exch. 1. disease, and the purchaser's horses were - The books disclose other cases of in- thereby infected, it was held that damages juries inflicted in the sale of noxious could not be recovered; the rule of caveat articles; but they turn upon the rules ap- emptor applied. Hilli;. Balls, 2 Hurl. &Jl. 299; plicable to fraud and breach of warranty, 27 L. J. (Exch.) 45. See Randall v. Raper, rather than on those relating to negligence. El. B. & E. 84; s. c, 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 266; Damages were given for selling a diseased Dingle v. Hare, 7 0. B. (N. S.) 145; s. c.,29 animal, whereby others were infected, in L. J. (C. P.) 143; CoUen «. "Wright, 7 El. & Bl. MuUett V. Mason, L. E. 1 0. P. 559. But 301; s..;., 26 L.J. (Q. B.) 147. where a person sold a glandered horse ^ Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass. 507. without disclosing the existence of the * Davidson v. Nichols, 11 Allen, 514. LETTING OR LENDING DANGEROUS MACHINES. 237 Bailor not liable to third Persons. ? 3. Letting or lending dangerous Machines. — Suppose the question to arise in the case of the Im-ing of a machine containing some concealed defect, the result of the negligence of the bailor, and a third person, not privy to the contract of hiring, is injured in consequence of the defect, — will the bailor be answerable to him? This question was answered in the negative in a case determined in the Court of Exchequer, in 1842, by Lord Abinqer, C. B., and ALDBRSOif, Gdrney, and KoLrB, BB. In that case, A. had contracted with the postmaster-general to provide a mail-coach to convey the mail-bags along a certain line of road ; B. and others had agreed to horse the coach along the same line, and B. and his co-contractors hired C. to drive the coach. While 0. was driving the coach, it broke down, from latent defects in its con- struction, and C. was injured. It was held, all the judges being very clear upon the question, that C. could not recover damages of A., because there was no privity of contract between them. The boundary-line excluding this class of actions was said to be this : tfiat where there is no pnvity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant, and no public duty has been broken by the latter, the plaintiff cannot recover.' The same principle has been applied in a case of lending, or gratuitous bailment. A railway company furnished a crane, to be used by customers in unload- ing freight which they were bound to unload at their own expense. Owing to a defect in the crane, of which the company had knowledge, a person called in tempo- rarily to assist a consignee in unloading freight was killed. It was held that his per- sonal representative could not recover damages of the company; whatever might have been their obligation towards the consignee himself, they had not lent the crane to the deceased at all, nor had they placed it there for the purpose of being used by him.^ A similar question was passed upon by the New York Court of Common Pleas, in 1857. There, A. employed B. and C. to repair a ship, and hired the defend- ants' dry- dock for the purpose of making such repairs. B. and 0. erected a scaffold- ing upon standards attached to the dock, which belonged to the defendants, and which, by the rules of the defendants, they were required to use for that purpose. Owing to the insuflSciency of these standards, the scaffolding gave way, whereby D., a workman employed by B. and C. in making such repairs, was injured. D. brought an action against the owners of the dry-dock for this injury and recovered a verdict; but Dalt, J., at Special Term, granted a new trial, on the ground taken in Winterbot- tom V. Wright.^ In his opinion, "the only safe and practicable rule is, to confine the right of action to those who stand in the relation of contracting parties, or to cases where the injury is caused by the disregard or neglect of some obligation or duty which the party causing it owes to the party injured." "As a general rule," said he, in another place, "such actions must be limited to those between whom there is a contract, express or implied, or where a public duty or obligation arises." But this order granting a new trial was reversed at General Term by Ingraham and Brady, JJ. The former of these judges conceded the correctness of the general principle on which the decision of Dalt, J., proceeded, but thought the case not within it ; whilst the latter was of opinion that there was an implied contract between the plain- tiff and defendants, independently of the public duty or obligation imposed by law on the defendants, arising from the character of the machine hired.'' The liability of the vendor of diseased animals has been already considered. 1 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mee. & W. ' Cook v. New York Floating Dry dook 109. Co., 1 Hilt. 436. This case was appealed to 2 Blakemore v. Bristol, etc., K. Co., 8 El. the Court of Appeals, but the appeal was & Bl. 1035. dismissed without reaching the merits. 18 X. Y. 229. CHAPTER y. INJURIES FROM THE NEGLIGENT USE OF FIRE-ARMS. LBADiifa Casb: Morgan v. Cox. — Grounds of liability for injuries caused by the accidental discharge of fire-arms. NoTBS : 2 1. Constitutional right to keep and bear arms. 2. Soldier negligently discharging his piece — Weavers. Ward. 3. Firing at regimental drill — Liability of colonel for accidental death — Castle v. Duryee. 4. Discharging fire-arms near the highway — Form of action. 5. Liability of children. 6. Negligence in leaving gun loaded — Dixon v. Bell. 7. Evidence of negligence in case of accidental discharge of gun — Res ipsa loquitur — Tally v. Ayres. 8. Other cases. grounds of liability for injuries caused by the acci- dental discharge op fire-arms. Morgan v. Cox.* Sup7-eme Court of Missouri, 1856. Hon. William Scott, "1 " John F. Ryland, I Judges. " Abiel Leonard, J 1. Grounds of actionable Negrligrenoe.— Any negligence in the performance of what is lawful, which causes loss to another, is an injury which confers a right of actiou. 2. Beasonable Care defined. — The reasonable care which persons are bound to take, in order to avoid injury to others, is proportionate to the probability of injuiy that may arise to others. He who does what is more than ordinarily dangerous is bound to use more than ordinary care. 3. Grounds of Liability for Injuries caused by accidental discharge of Fire- arms. —Where injury to another is caused by an act that would have amounted to tres- pass vi et armis under the old system of actions, — as, where one, by the negligent handli ug of a loaded gun, kills another's slave, — it is no defence, it wo'ild seem, that the act oc- curred through inadvertence, or without the wrong-doer's intending it; it must appear that the injury done was inevitable, and utterly without fault ou the part ot the alleged wrong-doer. Action to recover, in the form of damages, the value of plaintiff's slave, alleged to have been killed by the accidental discharge of a gun in the hands of the defendant, a minor, by reason of his negligence. • Eeported 22 Mo. 373. (238) MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY. 239 Supreme Court of Missouri — Opinion of Leonard, J. The defendant answered by his guardian ad litem, denying the negli- gence. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff below, and the defendant brings the case here by writ of error. F. P. Wright, for plaintiff in error ; Gardenhire, for defendant in error. Leonard, J. , delivered the opinion of the court. — We see no grounds for disturbing this judgment. The suit was for the negligent sliooting of the plaintiff's slave, and the only question was as to the fact of negligence. The defendant, it seems, had been out with his gun, and was asked by the plaintiff to aid him and his servant in driv- ing an unruly cow across the Osage River ; and while doing so, he punched the cow with his loaded gun, and, in replacing it across his horse, the hammer struck the saddle, as he supposed, and caused it to lire, by which the plaintiff's servant was shot and killed. The court directed the jury that if the killing, although unintentional, was occasioned by the negligence of the defendant, he was liable ; and also instructed, at the instance of the defendant, that if the gun were discharged while the defendant was replacing it across his horse, he was not liable, unless the firing was occasioned by his negligence in replacing it ; but refused to tell the jury that if it were thus discharged, and not while it was being used in punching the cow, the fact of its having been thus used did not render the defendant liable. We think the jury was so instructed, as to the law of the case, as to leave the defendant without any ground of complaint; indeed, the matter was submitted to the jury quite as favorably for him as the law would permit. The plaintiff put his right of recovery upon the ground of negligence, and the jury were told that if it appeared from the evi- dence that the defendant had been guilt}"^ of it, they must find for the plaintiff; and, ordinarily, this would seem to be a sufficient direction that they could not so find unless the proof satisfied them of the required fact. Here, however, the court, at the instance of the defend- ant, also directed that if the accident occurred while the gun was being replaced across the horse, they must find for the defendant, unless the act was done negligently, and without taking proper care. The refused instruction, as to the effect of the previous act of punch- ing the cow upon the subsequent firing, was quite unnecessary for the defendant, except to lead the jury astray ; for the court had already said that if the event occurred while the gun was being replaced, the defendant was not liable, unless he were guilty of negligence in replacing it, — which was going to the very limit of the law, in that par- ticular, for the defendant. 240 INJURIES FEOJI THE NEGLIGENT USE OF FIRE-ARMS. Morgan v. Cox. We are also satisfied that there was quite enough evidence of negli- gence to submit the ease to the jury; and if we were called upon to express an opinion upon it, we should not hesitate to say that it well warranted the vei'dict. If a person be guilty of an unlawful act, he is responsible for all the damage that is thereby occasioned to others. But here, it is true, the defendant had an undoubted right to carry his loaded gun about with him ; and, therefore, tliat alone did not render him responsible for the private damage that resulted from it to the plaintiff, or answerable criminally for the destruction of human life that was thereby occasioned. Upon legal principles it must be, that to the extent to which one person has a right to act, others, of course, are bound to suffer ; and any damage that may accrue to them, while he is thus exercising his rights, affords no valid ground of complaint. The loss occasioned, in such cases, is damnum absque injuria. Every per- son, however, who is performing an act, is bound to take some care in what he is doing. He cannot exercise his own indisputable rights without observing proper precaution not to cause others more damage than can be deemed fairly incident to such exercise. ;Stc utere tuo, ut alienum non Icedas. And, therefore, although the mere exercise of a right is not a wrong, in any case, any negligence in the exercise of it that causes a loss to another is an injury, conferring upon him a right of action. It is correctly said that, generally, between persons stand- ing in no particular relation to each other, that alone is reasonable care which, in the judgment of men in general, is proportionate to the probability of injury to others; and, consequently, he who does what is more than ordinarily dangerous is bound to use more than ordinary care. The defendant here had a dangerous instrument in his hands, and it was his duty to take proportionate care in handling it. The punching of the cow was a careless use of it, surrounded as he was by others ; and although the accident did not then occur, it was no doubt occasioned by accidentally striking the hammer against the saddle, upon returning the gun to the horizontal position in which the defendant had carried it, without elevating the muzzle. The accident, in all probability, would not have occurred had the defendant taken that care of the gun that it was his duty to have taken of it while it was loaded, and he himself was surrounded by those whom it mio-ht injure if it accidentally fired. "We have thus stated how far a party ought to be held responsible upon the principles of law applicable generally to damage occasioned by negligence, which seems to be the ground upon which the plaintiff here placed his right of recovery. It must, however, be admitted that MEASUEE OF EESPONSIBILITr. 241 Supreme Court of Missouri — Opinion of Leonard, J. our law holds a person to a mach stricter responsibility when the act amounts to a trespass vi et arniis, either to property or person. Under the old system of actions, it was no defence, in such cases, that the act occurred by misadventure, and without the wrong-doer's intending it; but the defendant must have shown such circumstances as would make it appear to the court that the injury done to the plaintiff was inevitable, and the defendant was not chargeable with any negligence ; for no man should be excused of a trespass unless it may be adjudged utterly without his fault. This was so determined in an old case,i where the action was against a soldier who had accidentally shot his comrade while exercising: and in Underwood v. Heiuson,^ the defendant was uncocking his gun, when it went off and accidentally wounded a bystander, and the defendant was charged and holden liable in trespass. And in Cole v. Fisher ^ it is said that this decision has never been questioned. The facts of the present case would, under the former system of procedure, have supported an action of trespass, and cannot, we think, be distinguished from the cases cited. In one of them, the party, in uncocking his gun, accidentally discharged it and wounded a bystander. Here, the defendant accidentally struck the hammer of his gun against his saddle, and the same result ensued. In both cases, it was upon the defendants to show that it happened, as the books say, by inevitable accident, and without the least fault ; and the change that has been introduced by the new Code in the remedy, has not changed the rules of law as to the liability of the parties. It is enough, however, that, under any view of the law, the defendant was clearly liable for this damage. In the case cited from the Massachusetts Eeports, the defendant, after washing his gun, went to his shop-door, which was about a rod distant from the highway, and discharged it for the purpose of drying it ; and the plaintiff's horse, being at the time harnessed to his chaise, and fas- tened by his bridle to the fence on the opposite side of the road, was frightened and ran away, and broke the chaise, and the defendant was held answerable for the damage, either in trespass or case, according to the other circumstances of the transaction. In Lynch v. Nurdin,* which was an action for an injury to a child, committed by the defend- ant in leaving his horse and cart standing alone in a street, into which some children had got, and, teasing the horse, the cart went over the ' Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134. and at the time it was held that the plaintiff 2 Stra. 596. The lull report of this case might maintain trespass." is as follows; "The defendant was un- a n jjass. 137. cocking a gun, and the plaintiff was stand- < 2 Steph. N. P. 1017; s. c, 1 Q. B. 29. iug to see it; it Avent off and wounded Mm, 242 INJURIES FROM THE NEGLIGENT USE OF FIEE-AKMS. Notes. plaintiff and broke his leg, Denham, C. J., before whom the ease was tried, held the defendant liable, and said: "If a man were guilty of negligence in leaving any thing dangerous in a street, and an injury- arose, though partly by the conduct of other parties, the sufferer unquestionably had a right to recover. If a game-keeper, returning home from his duty, were to leave his loaded gun in a play-ground, and one of the boys should fire it off and injure another, it could not be doubted but that the game-keeper must answer in damages to the- injured party." I recollect myself a case that occurred, where a per- son in riding through the streets of one of our villages with his loaded rifle before him, lying horizontally across his saddle, it accidentally fired and wounded a person sitting in his own door, and no doubt seemed to be entertained of the responsibility of the party for the dam- age that resulted. The judgment is affirmed. NOTES. § 1. Constitutional Right to keep and bear Arms. — The Constitution of the- United States' recites that, "a well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Similar provisions exist in the constitutions of most of the States. These provisions are generally understood to guarantee the right to keep arms and bear them o-penly ani publicly ; and the courts have generally sustained the constitutionality of statutes- prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, as necessary police regulations," though there are some decisions to the contrary.' If a person, whilst carrying a gun or pistol in violation of one of these statutes, accidentally discharge it, injuring another, there is analogous authority for the conclusion that he would be held liable without proof of actual negligence.* It might, indeed, be urged, upon the analogy of many cases, that the unlawful act of carrying the weapon is an independent col- lateral offence, for which he is answerable to the State criminally ; ^ that the proxi- mate or juridical cause of the injury was not the unlawful act of carrying the weapon, but negligence in the manner of carrying it ; but such an argument would probably be declared inapplicable here. In the actions for damages growing out of the negli- gent use of fire-arms, so far as perceived, the right of recovery has been rested on the 1 Amendments, Art. II. Andrews v. The State, 3 Heisk. 165; English = The State W.Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229; The v. The State, 36 Texas, 473; Walls u. The State V. Reid, 1 Ala. 812; Owen v. The State, State, 7 Blaokf. 572; Cutsinger ». The Com- 31 Ala. 387; Nunn it. The State, 1 Ga. 243; monwealth, 7 Bush, 392. Stockdale d. The State, 32 Ga. 225; The State = Bliss v. The Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90. v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18; The State v. Jumel, 13 See also Simpson v. The State, 5 Yerg. 356. La. An. 399; The State v. Smith, 11 La. An. < Pfau v. Reynolds, 53 111. 212. 633; The State v. Chandler, 5 La. An. 6 Counter j;. Couch, 8 Mete. 436; Kidder 489; Aymette v. The State, 2 Humph. 154, r. Dunstall, 11 Gray, 342. NBQLIGENT USE OF FIRE-ARMS BY THE MILITIA. 243 Weaver v. Ward — Castle v. Duryee. defendant's negligence, and not on the fijct that the carrying of the weapon was unlawful per se. ? 2. Soldier negligently discharging his Piece — Weaver v. Ward. — The modern adjudications on the subject begin with the oft-cited case of Weaver v. Ward,^ decided in the Common Pleas by Lord Chief Justice Hobakt, some time be- tween the years 1614 and 1625. The full report of this case is as follows: "Weaver brought an action of trespass of assault and battery against Ward. The defendant pleaded that he was, amongst others, by the commandment of the lords of the council, a trained soldier In London, of the band of one Andrews, a captain, and so was the plaintiff, and that they were skirmishing with their muskets, charged with powder, , for their exercise in re militari, against another captain and his hand ; and as they were so skirmishing, the defendant, casualiter et per infortunium, et contra voluntatem suam, in discharging his piece, did hurt and wound the plaiatifT; which is the same, etc., absque hoc, that he was guilty aliter sine alio modo. And upon demurrer by the plaintiff, judgment was given for him ; for, though it were agreed that if men tilt or tourney in the presence of the king, or if two masters of defence, playing their prizes, kill one another, that this shall be no felony ; or if a limatic kill a man, or the like ; because felony must he done animo felonico ; yet in trespass, which tends only to give damages according to hurt or loss, it is not so ; and therefore if a lunatic hurt a man, he shall be answerable in trespass ; and therefore no man shall be excused of a trespass (for this is the nature of an excuse, and not of a justification, prout ei bene licuit), except it may be judged utterly without his fault; as, if a man, by force, take my hand and strike you, or if the defendant had said that the plaintiff ran cross his piece when it was discharging, or had set forth the case, with the circumstances, so as it had appeared to the court that it had been inevitable, and that the defendant had committed no negligence to give occasion to the hurt." J 3. Firing at regimental Drill— Liability of Colonel for accidental Death — Castle v. Duryee. — A very interesting and instructive case on this sub- ject was decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, in 1865. At a parade of the Seventh Regiment of New York State militia, called the "National Guard," a part of the exercise was to fire with blank-cartridges. About three hundred and fifty yards in front of the regimental line, in front of a row of other spectators, of whom there were a great many, a woman was sitting with her infant child on her lap. At the third discharge, a ball hit her and her child, wounding her and killing the latter. The regiment was under the immediate command of its colonel, and the orders to fire were given by him personally. It appears from the statement of the case that he had caused to be taken all the precautions usual on such occasions, to prevent the possi- bility of any piece being discharged with a ball-cartridge. But he was held liable to pay damages ; Dknio, C. J., being of opinion that he was liable under the old law of trespass detailed in cases already cited,' and all the judges concurring in the view that the fact that he ordered his regiment to fire towards a crowd of people, with- out knowing that there was no one gun in the line loaded otherwise than with a blank- cartridge, was evidence of negligence to go to the jury. Dbnio, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, containing the following language: "No question is made but that the plaintiff was injured by the discharge of a musket, loaded with a ball-ciir- I Hob. 134. er v. Ward, Hob. 134; Leame v. Bray, 3 East, s Underwood v. Hewson, Stra. 596; Weav- 593. 244 INJURIES FROM THE NEGLIGENT USE OF FIRE-ARMS. Notes. tridge, by one of the men in the ranks of the regiment ; and the command to fire was given by the defendant, personally, to all the men ; and the discharge was pursuant to and in obedience of that direction. These facts constitute the defendant, primd facie, a trespasser to the same extent as though the musket was fired by his own hand. The case does not arise out of negligence, for the injury was direct and immediate, and not consequential. On the other hand, no question can arise but that the assemblage of the men for drill and military exercise was perfectly legal; nor, but that there was an utter absence of any intent to injure the plaintiflC, or any other human being. The circumstance that one of the guns was loaded with a ball, was, as far as the defendant was concerned, purely accidental. In a moral point of view, and upon the amount 4 of dumages to be recovered.it was a great alleviation that the defendant had taken all the usual precautions, and all which were deemed necessary to guard against such an accident. The fact, however, remains, that the plaintiff was shot by the discharge of a loaded gun, and that its discharge was ordered by the defendant. If it had occurred in the discharge of any public duty which belonged to the defendant to perform, and which he had no other means of performing, the question would have arisen which the judge put to the jury, whether all the precautions had been taken which the cir- cumstances of the case required. For instance, if the defendant and his regiment had been called upon by the civil authority to quell a riot, and an innocent person had been shot, the question would have been whether, under all the circumstances, all the precautions to prevent injury to innocent third pei'sons which the case admitted of had been taken. But the defendant was not required by any public duty to cause his men to discharge their fire-arms at all, while people were within musket-range. The manner in which he was to drill and instruct them depended essentially upon his judgment and discretion. He could have directed the firing to take place in the ravine where the target exercise occurred, or he could have stationed guards to keep off spectators at limits so remote from the parade that no injury could possibly ensue. If he could have been sure that only blank-cartridges would be used, he might safely order the firing to take place as it did. It is not the law that if one, supposing a musket to be unloaded, or to be charged only with powder, snaps it at another, and he is wounded, he is irresponsible in a civil action; and it is of no consequence, so far as maintaining the action is concerned, that he acted upon the most plausible or the most reasonable grounds, and fully believed that the gun was not charged with any thing which could injure another. * * * I am of opinion, therefore, that the judge might properly have instructed the jury that the evidence that the defendant had commanded the firing, and that one of the men fired a gun charged with a ball, by the discharge of which the plaintiff was wounded, was sufficient to sustain the action, whatever precautions the defendant and his subordinate ofiicers had taken to provide against such an accident. I am, moreover, of opinion that the judgment can be sustained upon the theory adopted by the judge. He put the case on the ground of want of due care and proper precaution; and charged, in effect, that there could be no recovery imless the defendant had been guilty of negligence. " The defendant's exception to this instruction is based upon the assumption that the facts, which were clearly proved and were not contradicted, conclusively rebutted the imputation of negligence. These facts were certainly very strong. The defend- ant, in the nature of the case, was obliged to act by the agency of his subordinates. The measures taken by his direction appear to have been very judicious, and well calcu- lated to secure what was aimed at, namely, that none of the muskets should be charged with ball. But they failed, as all such precautions sometimes do. Some officer or man neglected his duty, or some ear failed in catching the true sound of the rammer, DISCHARGE OF FIRE-AEMS JSEAR HIGHWAY. 245 Form of Action. and a lamentable accident was tte result. The negligence, in my opinion, consisted in tiring at all into a crowd of people, without positive knowledge that no one musket in the whole regiment contained any thing more than a blank-cartridge. Let us see what chances there were for a mistake. Ball-cartridges had, that day, certainly been in the hands of a part of the men, and in their boxes. It was designed that they should all be taken out ; but the duty of doing it had to be intrusted to a number of men of an average, or perhaps more than an average, grade of intelligence and prudence. General evidence was given that all the officers and men were sober; but there may have been an absent-minded man, or an excitable or excited man, or one whose sense of hearing was not ordinarily acute, among them. The occasion was of the nature of a holiday, and some of the men had been engaged in rivalry as to their skill in firing. Under such circumstances, it was easy to make a slip in that thorough and perfect examination which was necessarj' to secure absolute safety. We know that such a slip was made by somebody, and we can see that it was not very remark- able that it should have been made. When the question was as to the prudence of firing point-blank at a crowd of people, I think the defendant was deficient in the care required by the circumstances, in ordering it to be done. But, if some minds should differ as to this, the judge, I think, was right in submitting the question to the jury. If the defendant had been bound by any law, or by public duty, to order that discharge of musketry, probably what was done by way of precaution would have been all that military usage required ; but there was no such law, and he was under no such duty." '■ § 4. Discharging Fire-arms near the Highway — Form of Action. — We find an early case in Massachusetts where the court sustained an action of trespass vi et armis for firing a gun, whereby the plaintiff's horse, being frightened, ran away, and broke his chaise. The principal question was whether the proper form of action was trespass, but no question was made as to a right to recover either in trespass or case. In giving the judgment of the court, Sbwall, C. J., took occasion to observe upon the dangers to which travellers were subjected by the prac- tice of discharging fire-arms near the highway, and said: "The extreme inconsider- ateness, and sometimes the purposes of wanton mischief, discoverable in acts of this description are to be corrected and punished. The party injured either in his per- son or property, by the discharge of a gun, even when the act is lawful, as at a mili- tary muster and parade, and under the orders of a commanding officer, is entitled to redress in a civil action, to the extent of his damage ; and where the act is unneces- sary, a matter of idle sport, and negligence, and still more when the act is accom- panied with purposes of wanton or deliberate mischief, and any hurt or damage ensues, the guilty party is liable, not only in a civil action, but as an offender against the public peace and security; is liable to be indicted, and, upon conviction, to be fined and imprisoned, and indeed to worse consequences, where loss of limb or life is the consequence of this inhuman negligence and sport." ^ Two years later (1816) the same court ruled that the colonel of a regiment of militia, who has dismissed his command after a parade, is not liable to pay damages to a person who, while passing along the higbway, is injured by his men discharging their pieces, although the captain of the particular company which did the firing might be." In 1826, we come to a case in New Hampshire where it was ruled that where A., through carelessness 1 Ca-itle V. Duryee, 2 Keyes, 169; s. c, stib » Cole v. Fisher, 11 Mass. 137. nom. Castle v. Daryea, 32 Barb. 480. » Moody v. Ward, 13 Mass. 299. 246 INJURIES FEOM THE NEGLIGENT USE OF FIKE-AEMS. Notes. and negligence, but undesignedly, discharges a firelock in such a manner as to wound B., the latter has his election to treat the negligence of A. as the cause of the injury, and declare in case, or to treat the act itself as the cause of the injury, and declare in trespass.^ §5. Liability of Children. — We next meet a case, decided in the Supreme Court of New York in 1829, where a school-boy about twelve years of age discharged an arrow from a bow, with which he and his fellows were playing, towards the plain- tiff, a school-mate, and thereby put out one of his eyes. It was held that the boy was liable to pay damages. The court ruled that infants are liable in the same manner as adults, for trespass and assault ; that where an injury is not the effect of an unavoid- able accident, the person by whom it is inflicted is liable to respond in damages to the sufferer; but that an injury might probably be considered an unavoidable accident in the case of infants which would not be so considered in the case of adults.* g 6. Negligence in leaving Gun loaded — Dizon v. Bell. — "We must go back to England, and to the year 1816, for the first intelligent discussion of the law applicable to this subject. In a case then determined in the King's Bench, it appeared that the defendant, being possessed of a loaded gun, sent a young girl to fetch it, with directions to take the priming out, which was accordingly done, and a damage occurred to the plaintiff's son, in consequence of the girl's presenting the gun at him and draw- ing the trigger, whereby the gun was discharged. It appeared that the plaintiff and defendant both lodged at the house of one Leman, where the defendant kept a gun loaded with types, in consequence of several robberies having been committed in the neighborhood. The defendant left the house on the 10th of October, and sent a mu- latto girl, his servant, of the age of about thirteen or fourteen, for the gun, desiring Leman to give it to her, and to take the priming out. Leman accordingly took out the priming, told the girl so, and delivered the gun to her. She put it down in the kitchen, resting on the butt, and soon afterwards took it up again, and presented it, in play, at the plaintiff's son, a child between eight and nine, saying* she would shoot him, and drew the trigger. The gun went off, severely wounding the child. There was a verdict for the plaintiff; damages, £100. The attorney-general moved for a new trial, on the ground that the defendant had used every precaution which he could be expected to use on such an occasion, and therefore was not chargeable with any cul- pable negligence. Upon this motion, the judgment of Lord Bllenbokough was as follows : "The defendant might and ought to have gone farther; it was incumbent on him who, by charging the gun, had made it capable of doing mischief, to render it safe and innoxious. This might have been done by the discharge or drawing of the con- tents; and though it was the defendant's intention to prevent all mischief, and he expected that this would be effected by taking out the priming, the event has, unfor- tunatel}', proved that the order to Leman was not sufficient ; consequently, as bv this want of care the instrument was left in a state capable of doing mischief, the law will hold the defendant responsible. It is a hard case, undoubtedly, but I think the action is maintainable." Batlby, J., said: "The gun ought to have been so left as to be out of all reach of doing harm. The mere removal of the priming left the chance of some grains of powder escaping through the touch-hole." The rule was refused.' 1 Dalton V. Favour, 3 N. H. 465. s Dixon v. Bell, 5 Man. & Sel. 198. 2 Bullock V. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391. EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE. 247 Res ipsa loquitur — Tally v. Ayres. ^ 7. Evidence of Negligence in Case of accidental Discharge of Gun — Ees ipsa loquitur — Tally v. Ayrea. — Keturning to the American books, we find an intelligent and instructive case determined by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1855, in which McKinnby, J., stated the facts and delivered the opinion of the court, as follows : " This was an action on the case, brought by Ayres against Tally to recover the value of a mare, the property of the former, which was killed by the accidental discharge of a loaded gun in the hands of the latter. Verdict and judg- ment for the plaintiff for $130, and an appeal in error to this court. It appenrs from the proof that the plaintiff rode his mare to the town of Warrensburg, and hitched her near to a store, one of the usual places for hitching horses in that town. On the ■same day, the defendant happened to go to town, and took with him a loaded rifle- gun. On reaching town, he placed his gun in the store near to which the plaintiff's mare was hitched. In the evening, when about to leave for home, he got his gun, and in the act of placing it upon his arm or shoulder, from some cause not explained in the proof, the gun fired, and the contents passed through the body of plaintitf' s mare, standing at the post where she had been hitched, and killed her. The defendant had been drinking, but was not intoxicated. The proof places it beyond reasonable doubt that the discharge of the gun was accidental, and wholly unintentional on the part of the defendant. The question is, upon the state of facts. Is the defendant liable for the injury to the plaintiif? The circuit judge held that he was, and we concur in opinion with him. The argument for the plaintitf in error resolves itself into this : that in carrying his gun he was in the exercise of a lawful right, and that, as the discharge of the gun which caused the injury was entirely accidental and witli- •out the concurrence of his will, he cannot be held liable for the loss to the plaintitf. The argument is not tenable. In the general class of cases to which the present belongs, there is some contrariety of opinion in respect to the appropriate form of action, whether trespass or case, the criterion being whether the injury arose directly, ■ov followed consequentially, from the act of the defendant. No such question is presented in this case ; nor can any such question arise in an}' case, in the present state of our law, the distinction being, in effect, abolished by a recent legislative •enactment. But there is no conflict of opinion as respects the right of a party, in a •civil action, to recover damages for an injury to his person or property, caused, either ^iirectly or consequentially, by the negligence, inadvertence, or want of proper pre- ■caution on the part of another, although such injury may have been purely acci- dental and unintentional. To constitute an available defence in such cases, it must appear that the injury was unavoidable, or the result of some superior agency, with- out the imputation of any degree of fault to the defendant. The lawfulness of the act from which the injury resulted is no excuse for the negligence, unskilfulness, or reckles.s incaution of the party. Every one, in the exercise of a lawful right, is bound to use such reasonable vigilance and precaution as that no injury may be done to -others. Nor is it material, in a civil action for the recovery of damages, whether the injury was wilful or not. It is no ground of defence that the mind or will did not •• wanton act. The Supreme Court sus- tained these insti'uctions, saying: "It is only injuries from unavoidable accidents that are not actionable."' 1 Tally V. Ayres, 3 SneeiJ, 677. hour, 7 "Vt. 61, where it was ruled that, 2 Chataigne v. Bergeron, 10 La. An. 699. "when a person is doing a voluntary act 3 Chile* V. Drake, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 146, 154. which he is under no obligation to do, he is * 'Wright V. Clark, 50 \'t. 130, 135. The answerable for any injury which may hap- court cited and relied on "Underwood v. pen to another, either by carelessness or- Hewson, Slra. 596, and also Vincent v. Stme- accident." CHAPTER VI. LIABILITY FOR REMOVING THE SUPPORT OF LAND. XiEADtN'G Cases: 1. Pardon y. Holland, — Eemoving lateral support. 2. Gilmore v. Di-iscoU. — The same subject. 3. Humphries v. Brogden. — Eemoving subjacent support. Notes : g 1. Right to lateral support. 2. Negligent deprivation of this right. 3. What if the work is done by an independent contractor. 4. How in case of corporations. 5. Contributory negligence. 6. Kemedy-T- Injunction. 7. Statute of limitations. 8. Removing subjacent support. 1. EEMOVING LATEEAL SUPPOET. Pantox V. Holland.* Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of New YorJc, 1819. Hon. Ambkosk Spkxcer, Chief Justice. " William W. Van Ness, " Joseph C. Yates, " Jonas Platt, " John Woodwokth, Justices. 1. Pleading In Actions for Neglig-enoe — Allegation of Malice rejected as Sur- plusage. — Wliere the plaintiiF, in a special action on the case, declares that the de- fendant, contriving and maliciously intending to injure and aggrieve the plaintiff, dug np the soil of a contiguous lot, whereby the foundation-walls of the i)lainliiE's house were injured, evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant will support the declaration; the allegation of malice being immaterial, as it may be struck out as sur- plusage, and there still he left a good cause of action. 2. Hight to dig' belov? Neighbor's Foundation. — A person, on huUding a house con- tiguous and adjoining to the house of another, may lawfully sink the foundation of his house l>«low the foundation of his neighbor's, and is not liable for any consequential damage, provided he has used due care and diligence to prevent any injury to the house of the other. This was an action on the case. The declaration stated that the plaintiff was lawfully possessed of a certain messuage, or dwelling- house, in the city of New York ; yet that the defendant, well knowing * Eeported 17 Johns. 92. (249) 250 LIABILITY FOR EEMOVING THE SUPPORT OF LAND. Panton v. Holland. the premises, but contriving and maliciously intending to injure and aggrieve the plaintiff, and to deprive him of the use, benefit, and advantage of the said messuage, dug up the soil and earth of a certain lot of ground contiguous and adjoining to the plaintiff's messuage, close to the said messuage, and threw and carried awa}'^ the soil and earth coming thereout, in so much that, by the digging, throwing, and carrying away the earth and soil thereout coming, the fonndaiion- walls of the plaintiff's messuage, and a great part of the plaintiff's messuage, then and there foundered and fell down, and the residue was greatly broken, shattered, and spoiled. The defendant pleaded not guilty. The cause was tried before the late chief justice, at the New York sittings, in November, 1818. The plaintiff was the owner of a house and lot on Warren Street, in the city of New York, and the defendant, in erecting a house on a lot contiguous to the plaintiff's, in order to lay the foundation, dug some distance below the foundation of the plaintiff 's house, in consequence of which one of the corners of the plaintiff's house settled, the walls were cracked, and the house in other respects injured. Evidence was produced on the part of the plaintiff to show a want of proper care and skill in the persons employed by the defendant to lay his founda- tion. When the plaintiff had rested his cause, the defendant's counsel moved for a nonsuit, on the ground that, the declaration being for the malfeasance and not the misfeasance of the defendant, the question of negligence or unskilfulness could not arise ; and that inasmuch as it appeared, from the plaintiff's own showing that the defendant had dug on his own land, for the purpose of erecting a house, which was an act lawful in itself, the right to recover was not made out. The motion, however, was refused. A number of witnesses were then produced on the part of the defendant, to prove that a due degree of care and diligence had been employed in laying his foundation, for the purpose of preventing any damage to the plaintiff's house. The chief justice charged the jury that there was no doubt that the defendant, in building his house, had occasioned a damage to the plaintiff's, and the only question for them to decide was the amount of the damage ; that, in his opinion, they ought to give the difference in value between what the house would have sold for before and after the injury, and not merely tlie expense of repairs, as the injury was permanent, and could not be effectually repaired ; that the plaintiff had first built his house, and, as the testimony showed, had built a good house, with a good foundation; and if the defendant, in building his house, thought proper to sink his foundation below that of the plaintiff. REMOVING LATERAL SUPPORT. 251 Supreme Court of Judicature of New York — Opinion of Woodworth, J. he must take care, in so doing, not to injure the plaintiff 's house, otherwise he would be liable for any damage ; and that there was good reason to conclude, from the evidence, that the defendant was guilty of negligence in not taking all the precautions which might have been taken to prevent the injury. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $1,200 damages. A motion was made to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial. McOoun, for the defendant ; Slosson, contra. Woodworth, J., delivered the opinion of the court. — The plaintiff alleges, in his declaration, that the defendant, "maliciously intend- ing to injure the plaintiff, and to deprive him of the use and ad- vantage of his messuage, dug up the soil of a certain lot contigu- ous, whereby the foundation-walls were subverted, and a great part of the messuage foundered and fell, and the residue was greatly broken and shattered." At the trial, the defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the ground that, the declaration being founded on the malfeasance and not the misfeasance of the defendant, the question of negligence or unskilfulness could not arise ; that the declaration was not supported by the evidence, inasmuch as it appeared that the defendant dug on his own ground, which was lawful in itself, and it did not appear that the act was done maliciously. The motion for a nonsuit was properly denied. If the plaintiff had stated, in his declaration, that the act was done maliciously, further proof would have been necessary. It would then be a case of malfeasance, — an inquiry distinct in its nature from a case where damages are claimed, either on the ground of negligence or unskilfulness, or that the act complained of does, of itself, subject the party to damages, although done with the greatest care. In the exer- cise of a lawful right, a party may become liable to an action, where it appears that the act was done maliciously. Suppose Holland had de- clared that he would exercise his right of digging on his own ground, contiguous to the plaintiff's wall, not to benefit himself, but for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff; and digs, accordingly, below the plaintiff's foundation, but takes care that there be no ground for the charge of negligence or unskilfulness in the exercise of his right ; con- sidering himself safely entrenched within the protection of the law, he desists from further operations ; his object is accomplished, the adjoin- ing foundation is loosened, and the building materially injured ; — is there a question that in such a case the party injured would be entitled to recover damages? The gravamen would, in the case put, arise from the fact that the act was done maliciously, and testimony falling short 252 LIABILITY FOB HEMOVING THE SUPPORT OF LAND. Panton «. Holland. of proving that it was so done would be insufficient to maintain the action, although it might show a just claim to damages had the count been differently drawn. In my opinion, the plaintiff's case is not of this character. The allegation, "maliciously intending," I do not con- sider the essence of the action, or descriptive of the manner of doing the act which occasioned the injury, and it may well be rejected as surplusage, still leaving a good declaration, to support which the proof was competent. In the case of Williamson v. Allison,^ Lawrexce, J., says: " With respect to what averments are necessary to be proved, I take the rule to be, that if the whole of an averment may be struck out without destroying the plaintiff's right of action, it is not necessary to prove it; but otherwise if the whole cannot be struck out without getting rid of a part essential to the cause of action, for then, though the averment be more particular than it need have been, the whole must be proved, or the plaintiff cannot recover." Now, apply this doctrine: if this averment be stricken out, still the declaration is good, and may be supported by proof of negligence or unskilfulness in the manner of doing the act. The plaintiff may declare as in this case, or according to the precedents in 6 Term Rep. 411, 7 East, 368, and 2 H. Black. 267, that the injury was done by reason of negligence. The next and important question is, whether the defendant is liable, on the case made out at the trial, to damages for the injury to the plaintiff's house. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non Icedas is a maxim ad- mitted to be correct ; the extent of its application is to be considered. The plaintiff insists that, without reference to the question of negli- gence, the defendant is answerable for the damages. On reviewing the cases, I am of opinion that no man is answerable in damages for the reasonable exercise of a right, when it is accompanied by a cautious regard for the rights of others, when there is no just ground for the charge of negligence or unskilfulness, and when the act is not done maliciously. Piatt v. Johnson and Boot^ is a case analogous to the present action. It is there decided that a person erecting a mill and dam upon a stream of water running through his own land does not, by the mere prior occupation, .gain an exclusive right, and cannot main- tain an action against a person erecting a mill and dam above his, by which the water is in part diverted, and he is in some degree injured. The court say that the maxim before stated "must be taken and con- strued with an eye to the natural rights of all. Although some con- flict may be produced in the use and enjoyment of such rights, it 1 2 East, 452. ' 15 Johns. 213. REMOVING LATERAL SUPPORT. 253 Supreme Court of Judicature of New York — Opinion of Woodworth, J. cannot be considered, in judgment of law, an infringement of the right. If it becomes less useful to the one, in consequence of the enjoyment by another, it is by accident, and because it is dependent on the exer- cise of the equal rights of others." Baron Comyns lays down the rule generally, that an action on the case does not lie for a reasonable use of one's right, though it be to the annoyance of another ; and he puts the case : " If a man build a house and make cellars upon his soil, whereby a house newly built in an adjoining soil falls down." He refers to 2 Bolle's Abridgment, 565, and 1 Sid. 167, which fully support the doctrine. In 8 Johns. 421, ^ the court have decided that if a man sets fire to his own fallow ground, as he may lawfully do, which communi- cates to and fires the woodland of his neighbor, no action lies, unless there was some negligence or misconduct in him or his servants. All / these cases go on the ground that a possible damage to another, in the cautious and prudent exercise of a lawful right, is not to be regarded, and if a loss is the consequence, it is damnum absque injuria. The case of Thurston v. Hancock ^ is in point. In that case, the plaintiff built a house on his own land, within two feet of the boun- dary line ; and ten years after, the owner of the adjoining land dug so deep into his own land as to endanger the house : and the owner of the house, on that account, left it, and took it down : it was holden, that no action lay for the owner of the house, because the defendants, having the entire dominion, not only of the soil but of the space above and below the surface, could not be restrained in the exercise of their right, unless by covenant or by custom ; that the house in question had not the qualities of an ancient building, so that the plaintiff could prescribe for the privilege of which he had been deprived ; and that a man who builds a house adjoining his neighbor's land, ought to foresee the probable use by his neighbor of the adjoining land. The case from Rolle's Rep. 430, cited by the plaintiff's counsel, is the only one I have met with which goes the length of supporting this action. No objection appears to have been taken, in that case, to the right of action, but only to the form of the declaration ; neither does it appear whether the defendant confined himself, in digging, to his own land. Chief Justice Pakker says : "It seems impossible to main- tain that case upon the facts made to appear, without denying princi- ples which seem to have been deliberately laid down in other books equally respectable as authorities." The result of my opinion is, that the plaintiff has not shown a right 1 Clark V. Foot. ' 12 Mass. 220. 254 LIABILITY FOR EEMOVINO THE 8DPPOET OP LAND. Gilmore v. Driacoll. to recover damages in this case, unless it be on the ground of negli- gence in not taking all reasonable care to prevent the injury. That is a question of fact which has not been submitted to the jury. They were directed to find a verdict for the plaintiff, for the difference in value of the house before the injury and afterwards. The charge was incorrect; a new trial must, therefore, be granted, with costs to abide the event of the suit. New trial granted. 2. THE SAME SUBJECT, GiLMOEE V. DeISCOLL.* Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1877. Hon. Horace Gray, Chief Justice. " James T>. Cott, " William Ekdicott, " Charles Dbvbns, " Otis P. Lord, Judges. 1. Rlg'ht of lateral Support. — A person is entitled, ex jurce natures, to snpport for his land in its natural condition, but not to support for the additional weight of super- incumbent buildings, fences, and trees. 2. Ueasure of Damag-es. — In Massachusetts the rule is, that H A. digs so near the land of B. that it falls into his pit, together with the biiildings and other improyements thereon, B. may recover damages of A. for the actual loss of and injury to his soil, but not for any injury to the superimposed improvements, although the soil would have fallen without the additional weight of such improvements. 8. Action against whom. — For such an injury an action lies against one who has removed the neighboring soil under a license from the owner. ToKT for injuries to the plaintiff's land by the excavation of adjoin- ing land by the defendant. The case was submitted to the Superior Court, and, after judgment for the plaintiff, to this court on appeal, on an agreed statement of facts, as follows : — "The plaintiff was owner of a parcel of land in a populous portion of that part of Boston, lately Eoxbury, as described in her writ, bounded on the south-westerly side by the land of one Webb. On this land of the plaintiff, but immediately adjoining the division line, was a fence, and near to it a few currant bushes and certain modern struc- tures. The two parcels, in their natural condition, made a knoll, the highest part of which was at or near the division line. • Eeported 122 Mass. 199. REMOVING liATEEAL SUPPORT. 255 Statement of the Case. "Webb, the owner of the adjoining lot, under an agreement with one Gillighan, gave him permission to remove the soil of his land down to a grade of the street on its north-westerly side, on which both lots were located. Webb gave Gillighan the right to go up to, but not within two feet of, the plaintiff's fence. Webb had no other connection with the acts complained of. Gillighan, for a consideration, gave permission to the defendant to remove a portion of this said soil, and under that license the defendant removed all the soil that was removed nearest to and along the line of the plaintiff's land, and the removal of which, it was alleged, caused the damage complained of. Gillighan gave the license to the defendant under the same restrictions as to ' not within two feet of the plaintiff's fence ' as Webb had imposed upon him. " The depth to which the grade of this adjoining land was lowered by the defendant against the plaintiff's lot was, at its greatest measure, some ten feet, and at its lowest, some five feet. The soil of the plaintiff's lot fell, along the whole length of her line, to the width of some two or three feet at the top, taking with it the fence and shrub- bery upon it. The weight of the plaintiff's structures near the line did not contribute to the falling away of the soil. The defendant left a bank of earth on the Webb lot against the plaintiff's land, along the whole line, but it was not in all parts two feet wide at the top. There was no falling away of the soil at the time the defendant ceased his work, which was in the fall of the year, about the 23d of October. The bank left by the defendant was rendered insuflScient to hold the soil of the plaintiff in its natural condition by the effect of rains and frost. The bank began to give way under the effect of rains and frost at once, but the soil of the plaintiff was not actually disturbed till the month of March, in the spring following the fall when the work of the defendant was ended. " The damages occasioned to the plaintiff by loss of and Injury to her soil alone, caused by the acts of the defendant, amount to ninety- five dollars. To put the plaintiff's land into its former condition, and so maintain it by means of a retainisg wall (which I find to be the best method of accomplishing that result), would cost the sum of five hundred and seventy -five dollars ; and to replace the fence and shrubs would cost the further sum of forty-five dollars. The difference between the market value of the plaintiff's lot of land as affected by the act of the defendant, and what its market value would be had it not been deprived of its natural supports (without taking into account the unavoidable disadvantage to the plaintiff which must have followed from the lawful cutting down of the adjoining lot, thangh her soil had 256 LIABILITY FOB REMOVING THE SDPPOET OF LAND. Gilmore v. DrisooU. not been disturbed thereby), would be the equivalent of and fully com- pensated by the cost of putting her land back into the same condition it was before, or the sum of the two amounts last named, namely, six hundred and twenty dollai-s." Upon the facts, the court was to enter such judgment as it should deem proper. P. E. Tucker, for the plaintiff ; C. H. Drew, for the defendant. Gray, C. J. — The right of an owner of land to the support of the land adjoining is, jure natures, like the right in a flowing stream. Every owner of land is entitled, as against his neighbor, to have the earth stand and the water flow in its natural condition. In the case of running water, the owner of each estate by which it flows has only the right to the use of the water for reasonable purposes, qualified by a like right in every other owner of land above or below him on the same stream. But in the case of land which is fixed in its place, each owner has the absolute right to have land remain in its natural condition, un- affected by any act of his neighbor ; and, if the neighbor digs upon or improves his own land so as to injure this right, may maintain an action against him, without proof of negligence. But this right of property is only in the land in its natural condition, and the damages in such an action are limited to the injury of the land itself, and do not include any injury to buildings or improvements thereon. While each owner may build upon and improve his own estate at his pleasure, provided he does not infringe upon the natural right of his neighbor, no one can, by his own act, enlarge the liability of his neighbor for an interference with this natural right. If a man is not content to enjoy his land in its natural condition, but wishes to build upon or improve it, he must either make an agreement with his neighbor, or dig his foundations so deep, or take such other precautions, as to insure the stability of his buildings or improvements, whatever excavations the neighbor may afterwards make upon his own land in the exercise of his right. In 2 Bolle's Abridgment, 564, itis stated that in Wilde v. Minsterley, in 15 Car. I., it was decided in the King's Bench, after a verdict for the plaintiff, that "if A. be seised in fee of copyhold land next adjoining to the land of B., and A. erects a new house upon his copyhold land, and some part of the house is erected upon the confines of his land next adjoining to the land of B., and B. afterwards digs his land so near to the foundation of A.'s house, but no part of A.'s land, that thereby the foundation of the house, and the house itself, fall into the pit, yet no action lies by A. against B., because it was A.'s own fault that he built his house so near the land of B. ; for he, by his act, cannot EEMOVTNG LATEEAL StJPPOET. 257 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts — Opinion of Gray, C. J. binder B. from making the best use of his own land that he can. But it seems that a man -who has land next adjoining to my land cannot dig bis land so near my land that thereby my land shall go into his pit ; and, therefore, if the action had been brought for this it would lie." In the same court, in 15 Car. II., Twisden and Windham, JJ., said that it had been adjudged that " if I, being seised of land, lease forty foot thereof to A. to build a house thereon, another forty foot to B. to build a house, and one of them builds a house, and then the other digs a cellar in his land, whereby the wall of the first house adjoining falls, no action lies for that, because each one may make the best advantage of his digging;" " but it seemed to them that the law is otherwise if it was an ancient wall or house that falls by such digging." i In another report, the corresponding statement is, that "it was adjudged that two having ground adjoining, the one built de novo, and the other in his ground digged so near that the other fell, and no remedy, the house being new."^ That adjudication is referred to in Siderfin as "7 Jac. in Piggott and Surie's Case," and in Keble, as " 7 Car." But Sury v. Piggot, decided in " 1 Car. I.," and fully reported in Popham, 166, was upon another point, and is so stated in Keble, uhi supra; and it would seem that the reference intended may have been to the case of Wilde V. Minsterley, above cited. There are, indeed, two or three early cases in which actions appear to have been sustained for undermining houses by digging on adjoining land.^ But in Slingsby v. Barnard, and in Smith v. Martin, the objec- tions made were, not to the right to maintain the action, but only to particulars in the form of the declaration ; and in Barwell v. Kensey the declaration, as construed by the majority of the court, alleged, not merely digging near the plaintiff's foundation, but digging that foun- dation itself. In Tenant v. Goldwin,* Lord Holt and Justice Powell are reported to have " held that a man cannot build so near another man's house as to throw it down." But the only point adjudged was the same as in Ball V. Nye,^ that a man is bound, of common right, to keep a vault upon his own land in repair, so that the filth shall not flow upon his neighbor's land, " for he whose dirt it is must keep it, that it may not trespass." And, upon a comparison of the various reports, it is evi- dent that the digging so near another's wall as to weaken it was not 1 Palmer ». Pleehees, Sid. 167. 400; Barwell v. Kensey, 35 Oar. II., 3 Lev. 2 Palmer v. Plessier, 1 Keb. 625. 171 ; s. c, 1 Mod. Bnt. 195. 3 Slingsby v. Barnard, 14 Jac. I., 1 EoU. * 2Ld. Eaym. 10S9, 1094; ». c, 1 Salk. 360, 430; Smith v. Martin, 23 Car. It., 2 Sannd. 361; 6 Modern, 311; 1 Salk. 21; Holt, 500. '■> 99 Mass. 582. 17 258 LIABILITY rOE REMOVING THE SUPPOET OF LAND. Gilmore v. Driscoll. spoken of as giving a right of action to the owner of the wall, but aa limiting his liability for the escape of filth caused by the new digging. The latest and the most authoritative statement of the law of England upon this point before the American Revolution is that of Chief Baron CoMTNS, who, citing Rolle's Abridgment and Siderfln's Rep., ubi supra, says that an action upon the case lies for a nuisance, "if a man dig a pit in his land, so near that my land falls into the pit; " but does not lie, "if a man build an house, and make cellars upon his soil, whereby an house newly built in an adjoining soil falls down."i In Thurston v. Hancock,'^ which was decided in 1815, and is the leading American case on this subject, the plaintiff, in 1802, bought a parcel of land upon Beacon Hill, in Boston, bounded on the west by land of the town of Boston ; and, in 1804, built a brick dwelling-house thereon, with its rear two feet from this boundary, and its foundation fifteen feet below the ancient surface of the land. The defendants, in 1811, took a deed of the adjoining land from the town, and began to dig and remove the earth therefrom, and, though notified by the plaintiff that his house was endangered, continued to do so to the depth of forty-five feet, and within six feet of the rear of the plaintiff's house, and thereby caused part of the earth on the surface of the plaintiff's land to fall away and slide upon the defendant's land, and rendered the founda- tions of the plaintiff's house insecure, and the occupation thereof dangerous, so that he was obliged to abandon it. The court, after advisement, and upon a review of the earlier English authorities, held that the plaintiff could recover for the loss of or injury to the soil merely, and not for the damage to the house ; and Chief Justice Pakkek, in delivering judgment, said: "It is a common principle of the civil and of the common law that the proprietor of land, unless restrained by covenant or custom, has the entire dominion, not only of the soil, but of the space above and below the surface, to any extent he may choose to occupy it. The law, founded upon prin- ciples of reason and common utility, has admitted a qualification to this dominion, restricting the proprietor so to use his own as not to injure the property or impair any actual existing rights of another. Sic utere tuo utalienum non Icedas." "But this subjection of the use of a man's own property to the convenience of his neighbor is founded upon a supposed preexisting right in his neighbor to have and enjoy the privilege which by such act is impaired." 3 "A man, in digging upon his own land, is to have regard to the position of his neighbor's 1 Com. Big., " Action upon the Case for a 2 12 Mass. 220. Nuisance," A, 0. » 12 Mass. 224. REMOVING LATERAL SUPPORT. 259 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts — Opinion of Gray, C. J. land, and the probable consequences to his neighbor if he digs too near his line ; and if he disturbs the natural state of the soil, he shall answer in damages; but he is answerable only for the natural and necessary consequences of his act, and not for the value of a house put upon or near the line by his neighbor." "The plaintiff built his house within two feet of the western line of the lot, knowing that the town, or those who should hold under it, had a right to build equally near to the line, or to dig down into the soil for any other lawful purpose. He knew also the shape and nature of the ground, and that it was impossible to dig there without causing excavations. He built at his peril ; for it was not possible for him, merely by building upon his own ground, to deprive the other party of such use of his as he should deem most advantageous. There was no right acquired by his ten years' occupation, to keep his neighbor at a convenient distance from him." " It is, in fact, damnum absque injuria." ^ Upon the facts of that case, it was questionable whether the acts of the defendant would not have caused the falling away of the plaintiff's land if no house had been built thereon ; and yet the court held the plaintiff not to be entitled to recover any damages for the fall of his house, without regard to the question whether the weight of the house did or did not contribute to the fall of his soil into the pit digged by the defendant. No claim for like damages was made in this Common- wealth until more than forty years afterwards, when the decision in Tliurston v. Hancock was followed and confirmed. ^ In Foley v. Wyeth, the court, after stating that the right of support from adjoining soil for land in its natural state stands on natural justice, and is essential to the protection and enjoyment of property in the soil, and is a right of property which passes with the soil without any grant for the purpose, said: " It is a necessary consequence from this principle, that for any injury to his soil, resulting from the removal of the natural support to which it is entitled, by means of excavation of an adjoining tract, the owner has a legal remedy in an action at law against the party by whom the work has been done and the mischief thereby occasioned. This does not depend upon negligence or unskilfulness, but upon the violation of a right of property which has been invaded and disturbed. This unqualified rule is limited to injuries caused to the land itself, and does not afford relief for damages by the same means to artificial structures. For an injury to buildings, which is unavoidably incident to the depression or slide of the soil on which they stand, caused by ' 12 Mass. 229. " Foley v. Wyeth, 2 Allen, 131. 260 LIABILITY FOE REMOVING THE SUPPORT OF LAND. Gilmore v. DriscoU. the excavation of a pit on adjoining land, action can only be maintained where a want of due care or skill, or positive negligence, has contributed to produce it." ^ And it was accordingly adjudged that if the defendant in that case, by excavating and carrying away earth on her own land, caused the plaintiff's land to fall and sink into the pit which she had dug, she was liable for the iujury to the soil of the plaintiff; but that, in the absence of any proof of negligence in the execution of the work, the jury could not take into consideration, as an element of damage for which compensation could be recovered, the fact that the foundation of the plaintiff's house had been made to ci-ack and settle, although the weight of his house did not contribute to the sliding or crumbling away of the soil. The decisions in Thurston v. Hancock and Foley v. Wyeth are not affected by those in Hartshorn v. Worcester ^ and Marsden v. Cambridge,^ which related to claims for injuries done in the making of a highway, and were based upon the terms of the statutes upon that subject, and not upon the rale of the common law governing proprietors of adjoining lands. By the modern authorities in Great Britain, it is clear that a right to the support of a building by adjacent land can arise only by grant or prescription.* In Bononii v. Backhouse, in which an action was main- tained by an owner of land and of an ancient house, for damage occurring within six years from the working of coal mines, two hundred and eighty yards from the house, more than six years before the commencement of the action, Mr. Justice Willes, delivering the judgment in the Exchequer Chamber, which was affirmed by the House of Lords, said: "The right to support of land and the right to sup- port of buildings stand upon different footings as to the mode of acquiring them; the former he'wg prima facie a right of property anal- ogous to the flow of a natural river, or of air, though there may be cases in which it would be sustained as matter of grant ; whilst the lat- ter must be founded upon prescription or grant, express or implied ; but the character of the rights, when acquired, is in each case the same." 5 And Lord Wensleydale said: "I think it perfectly clear that the right in this case was not in the nature of an easement, but that the right was to the enjoyment of his own property, and that the obligation was cast upon the owner of the neighboring property not to interrupt that enjoyment."* 1 2 AUen, 133. donian Ey. v. Sprot, 2 Maoq. H. L. Cas. U9; = 113 Mass. 111. Bono mi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. SiEl. 622, 9 H. s lU Mass. 490. L. Cas. 50S. * Wyatt V. Harrison, S Barn. & Aid. 871; ' El. Bl. & El. 664,655. Partridge i,. Scott, 3 Mee. & W. 220; Gale- • 9H. L. Oas. 513. REMOVING LATERAL SUPPORT, 261 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts — Opinion of Gray, 0. J. The cases of Brown v. Robins,^ Hunt v. Peake,^ find Stroyan v. Knowles,^ in which it was held that in an action for causing soil to sink, which would have sunk if there had been no building upon it, the dam- ages recovered might include the injury to the buildings also, are directly opposed to our cases of Thurston v. Hancock and Foley v. Wyeth, in the latter of which, Brown v. Bobins was before the court. Upon a question of this kind, affecting all the lands in the Common- wealth, it would be unjustifiable and mischievous for the court to change a rule of law which has been established and acted upon here for sixty years. Even in England, it is held that for digging upon neighboring land, and thei'eby causing the plaintiff 's land to sink and his building to fall, although the jury find that the land would have sunk if there had been no building upon it, yet no action will lie if no appreciable damage is proved to the land without the building.^ The weight of American authority is in accordance with tlie decisions of this court. It has generally been considered that for an excavation causing an injury to the soil in its natural state, an action would lie ; but that, without proof of a right by grant or prescription in the plain- tiff, or of actual negligence on the part of the defendant, no action would lie for an injury to buildings by excavating adjoining land not previously built upon.^ It is diflflcult to see how the owner of a house can acquire, by pre- scription, a right to have it supported by the adjoining land, inasmuch as he does nothing upon, and has no use of, that land, which can be seen, or known, or interrupted, or sued for by the owner thereof, and therefore no assent of the latter can be presumed to the acquirement of any right in his land by the former. The English cases are founded on an analogy to the doctrine of ancient lights, which is not in force in this country.^ But this case does not require us to determine that question, because there is no evidence that the structures and improve- ments upon the plaintiff's land have been there for twenty years. Nor is it necessary to consider whether negligence on the part of the defendant could enlarge the measure of his liability, because the case 1 i Hnrl. & N. 186. Stokes, 8 B. Mon. 453; Charless v. Rankin, 22 2 Johns. (Eng. Ch.) 705. Mo. 566. 3 6 Hnvl. & N. 454. " Hide v. Thovnbovougli, 2 Car. & K. 250, 4 Smitli V. Tliackerah, L. R. 1 C. P. 564. 255, and Stansell v. Jollard, there cited ; Solo- 6 Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92; Lasala mon v. Vintners' Co., 4 Hurl. & N. 685, 5011, V. Holbrook, 4 Paige, 169 ; Hay i-. Cohoes Co., 602 ; Chasemore v. Eichards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, 2N. y. 159, 162; MoGulre D.Grant, 25. N.J. L. 385, 386; Greenleaf v. Francis, IS Pick. 117, 356 ; Richart v. Scott, 7 Watts, 460 ; Richard- 122 ; Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 215 ; Rich- son V. Vermont Central R. Co., 25 Vt. 465; art v. Scott, 7 Watts, 460, 462; Napier v. Bui- Beard V. Murphy, 37 Vt. 99, 102; Shrieve v. winkle, 5 Rich. L. 311, 324. 262 LIABrLITY FOB EEMOVINa THE SUPPORT OF LAND. Gilmore v. DrisooU. stated does not find that he was negligent, nor set out any facts from which actual negligence can be inferred. The cause of action is, that the plaintiff has an absolute right to have her soil stand in its natural condition, and that any one who injures that right is a wrong-doer in- dependently of any question of negligence. ^ The fact that the defend- ant was not the owner of the adjoining land affords him no exemption. It was never considered necessary, in an action of this kind, to allege that the defendant owned or occupied the land on which the digging was done that injured the plaintiff's soil.^ Even an agent of the owner of the adjoining land would be liable for his own negligence and positive wrongs, for his principal could not confer upon him any authority to commit a tort upon the property or the rights of another.' And upon the case stated, the defendant appears not to have been an agent of the owner of the land, but to have removed the soil therefrom for his own benefit, by permission of Gillighan, who had a like agreement with and license from the owner ; and it is at least doubtful whether the owner of the land could be held responsible for the defendant's acts.* The case finds that the defendant ceased his work towards the end of Octo- ber, and left the bank in such a shape that, by the effect of rains and frost, it was rendered insufficient to hold the soil of the plaintiff in its natural condition, and began to give way at once, although the plain- tiff's soil was not actually disturbed until the month of March follow- ing. The necessary inference is, that by the operation of natural and ordinary causes upon the land as it was left by the excavations of the defendant, and which he took no precaution to guard against, part of the soil of the plaintiff's land slid and fell off; and for the injury so caused to her soil, this action may be maintained. But she cannot maintain an action for the injury to her fences and shrubbery, because her natural right and her corresponding remedy are confined to the land itself, and do not include buildings or other improvements thereon. The remaining question is of the measure of damages. The peculiar form of the case stated, in this respect, as might be inferred from its terms, and as was admitted at the argument, has been occasioned by incorporating into it the substance of the award of an arbitrator. It is agreed that the " damages occasioned to the plaintiff, by loss of and injury to her soil alone, caused by the acts of the defendant, amount 1 Foley V. Wyeth, 2 Allen, 131, 133; Hay v. ^ Bell ti. Josselyn, 3 Gray, 309; Story on Cohoes Co., 2 N. T. 159, 162; Eiohardson v. Ag. § 311. Vermont Central B. Co., 25 Vt. 465, 471 ; Hum- * Gayford v. Nicholls, 9 Exch. 702 ; Hilliard phries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739. v. Kichardson, 3 Gray, 349. 2 Smith V. Martin, 2 Sannd. 400, and note ; Nicklin v. VTiUiams, 10 Exoh. 259. KEMOVING SUBJACENT SUPPOBT. 263 Statement of the Case. to ninety-five dollars." We are of opinion that she is entitled to re- cover that sum, and no more. She is clearly not entitled to recover the cost of putting her land into and maintaining it in its former con- dition, because that is no test of the amount of the injury. ^ She cannot recover the difference in market value, because it does not appear that "that difference is wholly due to the injury to her natural right in the land ; it may depend upon the present shape of the lot, upon the im- provements thereon, or upon other artificial circumstances which have jiothing to do with the natural condition of the soil. ' Judgment for the plaintiff for §95. 8. REMOVING SUBJACENT SUPPOET. Humphries v. Brogden.* English Court of Queen's Bench, 1850. The Right Hon. John Lokd Campbell, Chief Justice. Sir John Patteson, Kt., 1 " John Taylor Coleridge, Kt., f- Judges. " William Erlb, Kt., J Mature of the KiErht of Subjacent Support. — The owner of the surface of land is entitled, of common right, to support from the subjacent strata for his land in its natural state. One owning minerals below the surface may not, therefore, remove them without leaving sufilcient support for the surface, unweighted by artificial means. For damages accruing to the surface-owner through his failure to leave such support, he wUl be answerable in an action, although he worked his mines carefully and according to custom. This was an action against the Durham County Coal Company, sued in the name of their secretary. On the trial before Coleeidge, J., at the Durham Spring Assizes, 1850, the jury, in answer to questions put by the learned judge, found the facts specially. His lordship then •directed a verdict for the plaintiff, giving the defendants leave to move to enter a verdict for them upon the findings of the jury. Knowles, in Easter Term, 1850, obtained a rule nisi accordingly. In Trinity Term, 1850, Watson and Joseph Addison showed cause, and Knowles -and Hugh Hill supported the rule. The judgment of the court states * Reported 12 Q. B. 739, > McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J. L. 356. 264 LIABILITY FOR REMOVING THE SUPPORT OF LAND. Humphries v. Brogden. SO fully the nature of the case, the pleadings, and the arguments and authorities adduced on both sides, as to render any further statement, unnecessary. Cur. adv. vuU. Lord Campbell, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the court. — This is an action on the case. The declaration alleges that the plaintiff was possessed of divers closes of pasture and arable lands, situate, etc., yet that the company so wrongfully, carelessly, negligently, and improperly, and without leaving any proper and sufficient pillars or supports in that behalf, and contrary to the custom and course of practice of mining used and approved of in the country where the- mines thereinafter mentioned are situate, worked certain coal miues- under and contiguous to the said closes, and dug for and got and. moved the coals, minerals, earth, and soil of and in the said mines, that by reason thereof the soil and surface of the said closes sank in, cracked, swagged, and gave way ; and thereby, etc. The only material plea was, not guilty. The cause coming on to be tried before my brother Coleridge, at the- last Spring Assizes for the county of Durham, it appeared that the plaintiff was possessed of the closes described in the declaration, and that the Durham County Coal Company (who may sue and be sued by their secretary) were lessees, under the Bishop of Durham, of the coal mines under them ; but there was no other evidence whatever as to- the tenure or the title, either of the surface or of the minerals. It ap- peared that the company had taken the coals under plaintiff's closes- without leaving any sufficient pillars to support the surface, whereby the closes had swagged and sunk, and had been considerably injured ; but that, supposing the surface and the minerals to have belonged to- the same person, these operations had not been conducted carelessly or negligently, or contrary to the custom of the country. The jury found that the company had worked carefully, and according to the cus- tom of the country, but without leaving sufficient pillars or supports ;. and a verdict was entered for the plaintiff for £110 damages, with leave to move to enter a verdict for the defendant, if the court should be of opinion that under these circumstances the action was not maintainable. The case was very learnedly and ably argued before us in Easter anct Trinity Terms last. On account of the great importance of the ques- tion, we have taken time to consider of our judgment. For the defend- ant it was contended that, after the special finding of the jury, the declaration is defective in not alleging that the plaintiff was entitled to- have his closes supported by the subjacent strata. But we are of EEMOVING SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 265 Court of Queen's Bench — Opinion of Lord Campbell, C. J. opinion that such an allegation is unnecessary to raise the question in this action, whether the company, although they did not work the mines negligently, or contrary to the custom of the country, were bound to leave props to support the surface. If the easement which the plaintiff claims exists, it does not arise from any special grant or reservation, but is of common right, created by the law, so that we are bound to take notice of its existence. In pleading, it is enough to state the facts from which a right or a duty arises. The carefully pre- pared declaration in Littledale v. Lonsdale,^ for disturbing the right of the owner of the surface of lands to the support of the mineral strata belonging to another, contains no express allegation of the right ; and if the omission had been considered important, it probably would have been relied upon, rather than the objection that a peer of Parliament was not liable to be sued in the court of King's Bench by bill. We have, therefore, to consider whether, when the surface of land (by which is here meant the soil lying over the surface of the minerals) belongs to one man, and the minerals belong to another, no evidence of title appearing to regulate or qualify their rights of enjoyment, the owner of the minerals may remove them without leaving support suffi- cient to maintain the surface in its natural state. This case is entirely relieved from the consideration how far the rights and liabilities of the owners of adjoining tenements are affected by the erection of buildings; for the plaintiff claims no greater support for his lands than they must have required and enjoyed since the globe subsisted in its present form. Where portions of the freehold, lying one over another perpen- dicularly, belong to different individuals, and constitute (as it were) separate closes, the degree of support to which the upper is entitled from the lower has as yet by no means been distinctly defined. But in the case of adjoining closes, which belong respectively to different per- sons, from the surface to the centre of the earth, the law of England has long settled the degree of lateral support which each may claim from the other ; and the principle upon which this rests may guide us to a safe solution of the question now before us. In 2 Rolle's Abridgment'^ it is said: "If A., seized in fee of copy- hold land next adjoining land of B., erect a new house on his copy- hold land [I may remark that the circumstance of A.'s land being copy- bold is wholly immaterial], and part of the house is erected on the confines of his land next adjoining the land of B., if B. afterwards digs his land near to the foundation of the house of A. , but not touch- 1 3 H. Black. 267 [The Earl Lonsdale v. - 564, tit. " Trespass," I, pi. 1. Littledale]. 266 LIABILITY FOR REMOVING THK SUPPORT OF LAND. Humphries v. Brogden. ing the land of A., whereby the foundation of the house, and the house itself, fall into the pit, still no action lies at the suit of A. against B., because this was the fault of A. himself, that he built his house so near to the land of B. ; for he could not by his act hinder B. from making the most profitable use of B.'s own land.^ But, semble that a man who has land next adjoining to my land cannot dig his land so near to my land that thereby my land shall fall into his pit, and for this, if an action were brought, it would lie." This doctrine is recog- nized by Lord C. B. Comtns,^ by Lord Tekterden, in Wyatt v. Harri- son,^ and by other eminent judges. It stands on natural justice, and is essential to the protection and enjoyment of property in the soil. Although it places a restraint on what a man may do with his own property, it is in accordance with the precept. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non loedas. As is well observed by a modern writer, ' ' If the neigh- boring owners might excavate their soil on every side, up to the boun- dary line, to an indefinite depth, land thus deprived of support on all sides could not stand by its own coherence alone."* This right to lateral support from the adjoining soil is not, like the support of one building upon another, supposed to be gained by grant, but it is a right of property passing with the soil. If the owner of two adjoining closes conveys away one of them, the alienee, without any grant for that purpose, is entitled to the lateral support of the other close the very instant when the conveyance is executed, as much as after the expiration of twenty years, or any longer period. Pari ratione, where there are separate freeholds, the surface of the land and the minerals belonging to different owners, we are of opinion that the owner of the surface, while unencumbered by buildings and in its natural state, is entitled to have it supported by the subjacent min- eral strata. Those strata may, of course, be removed by the owner of them, so that a sufficient support for the surface is left; but if the sur- face subsides, and is injured by the removal of these strata, although on the supposition that the surface and the minerals belong to the same owner, the operation may not have been conducted negligently, nor contrary to the custom of the country, the owner of the surface may maintain an action against the owner of the minerals for the damage sustained by the subsidence. Unless the surface-close be entitled to this support from the close underneath, corresponding to the lateral sup- 1 Easter Term, 15 Car. B. B., Wilde v. s 3 Barn. & Adol. 871, 876. Minsterley. * Gale on Ease. 216. 2 Com. Dig., " Action upon tlie Case for a Nuisance," A. REMOVING SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 267 Court of Queen's Benoh — Opinion of Lord Campbell, C. J. port to which it is entitled from the adjoining surface-close, it cannot be securely enjoyed as property ; and under certain circumstances, — as, where the mineral strata approach the surface and are of great thick- ness, — it might be entirely destroyed. We likewise think that the rule giving the right of support to the surface upon the minerals, in the absence of any express grant, reservation, or covenant, must be laid down generally, without reference to the nature of the strata, or the difficulty of propping up the surface, or tlie comparative value of the surface and the minerals. We are not aware of any principle upon which qualifications could be added to the rule, and the attempt to introduce them would lead to uncertainty and litigation. Greater inconvenience cannot arise from this rule, in any case, than that which may be experienced where the surface belongs to one owner and the minerals to another, who cannot take any portion of them without the consent of the owner of the surface. In such eases, a hope of recip- rocal advantage wiU bring about a compromise advantageous to the parties and to the public. Something has been said of a right to a reasonable support for the surface ; but we cannot measure out degrees to which the right may extend ; and the only reasonable support is that which will protect the surface from subsidence, and keep it securely at its ancient and natural level. The defendants' counsel have argued that the analogy as to the sup- port to which one superficial close is entitled from the adjoining super- ficial close cannot apply where the surface and the minerals are separate tenements, belonging to different owners, because there must have been unity of title of the surface and the minerals, and the rights of the parties must depend upon the contents of the deeds by which they were severed. But, in contemplation of law, all property in land having been in the crown, it is easy to conceive that, at the same time, the original grant of the surface was made to one, and the minerals under it to another, without any express grant or reservation of any easement. Suppose (what has generally been the fact) that there has been in a subject unity of title from the surface to the centre : if the surface and the minerals are vested in different owners, without any deeds appear- ing to regulate their respective rights, we see no difficulty in presuming that the severance took place in a manner which would confer upon the owner of the surface a right to the support of the minerals. If the owner of the entirety is supposed to have alienated the surface, reserv- ing the minerals, he cannot be presumed to have reserved to himself, in derogation of his grant, the power of removing all the minerals, without 268 LIABILITY FOB REMOVING THE SUPPORT OF LAND. Humphries v. Brogden. leaving a support for the surface ; and, if he is supposed to have alien- ated the minerals, reserving the surface, he cannot be presumed to have parted with the right to that support for the surface, by the minerals, which it had ever before enjoyed. Perhaps it may be said that, if the grantor of the minerals, reserving the surface, seeks to limit the right of the grantee to remove them, he is acting in derogation of his grant, and is seeking to hinder the grantee from doing what he likes with his own ; but, generally speaking, mines may be profitably worked, leaving a support to the surface by pillars or ribs of the minerals, although not so profitably as if the whole of the minerals be removed ; and a man must so use his own as not to injure his neighbor. The books of reports abound with decisions restraining a man's acta upon and with his own property, where the necessary or probable con- sequence of such acts is to do damage to others. The case of common occurrence nearest to the present is, where the upper story of a house belongs to one man, and the lower to another. The owner of the upper story, without any express grant, or enjoyment for any given time, has a right to the support of the lower story. If this arises (as has been said) from an implied grant or covenant, why is not a similar grant or covenant to be implied in favor of the owner of the surface of land against the owner of the minerals? If the owner of an entire house, conveying away the lower story only, is, without any express reservation, entitled to the support of the lower story for the benefit of the upper story, why should not an owner of land, who conveys away the minerals only, be entitled to the support of the minerals for the benefit of the surface ? ^ I will now refer, in chronological order, to the cases which were cited in the argument ; and I think that none of them will be found in any degree to impugn the doctrine on which our decision rests. In Bateson v. Gfreen,^ Bullek, J., says: "Where there are two dis- tinct rights, claimed by different parties, which encroach on each other in the enjoyment of them, the question is. Which of the two rights is subservient to the other? " And it was held that the lord may dig clay- pits on a common, or empower others to do so, without leaving sufficient herbage for the commoners, if such right can be proved to have been always exercised by the lord. So, here, the right of the owner of the minerals to remove them may be subservient to the right of the owner of the surface to have it supported by them. 1 See Rhodes v. McCormick, 4 Iowa, 368; Baker, 10 Minn. 154; Phelps v, Rooney, 9 McCoimick v. Bishop, 28 Iowa, 233; Kelly v. Wis. 70. ' 6 Term Rep. 411. EEMOVING SUBJACENT SUPPOET. 269 Court of Queen's Bench — Opinion of Lord Campbell, 0. J. Peyton v. The Mayor, etc., of London^ was cited to show the neces- sity for introducing into the declaration an averment that the plaintiff was entitled to the easement or right which is the foundation of the action ; but the easement there claimed was a right of support of one building upon another, which could arise only from a grant, actual or implied; and there Lord Tbnteeden says: "The declaration in this case does not allege, as a fact, that the plaintiffs were entitled to have their house supported by the defendants' house, nor does it, in our opinion, contain any allegation from, which a title to such support can he inferred as a matter of law." In the case at bar, we are of opinion that the declaration alleges facts from which the law infers the right of sup- port which the plaintiff claims. Wyatt V. Harrison^ decided that the owner of a house recently erected on the extremity of his land cannot maintain an action against the owner of the adjoining land for digging in his own land so near to the plaintiff's house that the house fell down ; but the reason given is, that the plaintiff could not, by putting an additional weight upon his land, and so increasing the lateral pressure upon the defendant's land, render unlawful any operation in the defendant's land which before would have caused no damage ; and the court intimated an opinion that the action would have been maintainable, not only if the defendant's digging would have made the plaintiff's land crumble down unloaded by any building, but even if the house had stood twenty years. Where a house has been supported more than twenty years by land belonging to another proprietor, with his knowledge, and he digs near the founda- tion of the house, whereby it falls, he is liable to an action at the suit of the owner of the house. ^ Although there may be some diflSculty in discovering whence the grant of the easement in respect of the house is to be presumed, as the owner of the adjoining land cannot prevent its being built, and may not be able to disturb the enjoyment of it without the most serious loss or inconvenience to himself, the law favors the preservation of enjoyments acquired by the labor of one man, and acquiesced in by another who has the power to interrupt them ; and, as on the supposition of a grant, the right to light may be gained from not erecting a wall to obstruct it, the ri^t to support for a new building erected near the extremity of the owner's land may be explained on the same principle. In Dodd V. Holme,* where there is a good deal of discussion respect- » 9 Barn. & Cress. 725. ed.) i57; Hide v. Thornborougli, 2 Oar. & a 3 Barn. & Adol. 871. Kir. 250. » Stansell v. JoHard, 1 Selw. N. P. (lltli < 1 Ad. & E. 493. 270 LIABILITT FOE REMOVINa THE SUPPOET OF LAND. Humphries v. Brogden. ing the rights of owners of adjoining lands or houses, no point of law was determined, as the case turned upon the allegation in the declara- tion that the defendants dug "carelessly, negligently, unskilfully, and improperly," whereby " the foundations and walls" of the plaintiff's house "gave way." The plaintiff's house was proved to have been in a very bad condition, but Lord Denman said that the defendant had no right to accelerate its fall. The Court of Exchequer, in Partridge v. Scott,^ concurred in the law before laid down in this court, that a right to the support of the foundation of a house from adjoining land belonging to another pro- prietor can only be acquired by grant, and that, where the house was built on excavated land, a grant is not to be presumed till the house has stood twenty years after notice of the excavation to the person sup- posed to have made the grant ; but nothing fell from any of the judges questioning the right to support which land, while it remains in its natural state, has been said to be entitled to from the adjoining land of another proprietor. Some land of the plaintiff's, not covered with buildings, had likewise sunk, in consequence of the defendant's opera- tions in his own land; but the court, in directing a verdict to be entered for the defendant on the whole declaration, seems to have thought that the sinking of the plaintiff's land was consequential upon the fall of the houses, or would not have taken place if his own land had not been excavated. The judges in the Exchequer Chamber held, upon a writ of error from the Court of Common Pleas, in Chadwick v. Trower^'^ that the mere circumstance of juxtaposition does not render it necessary for a person who pulls down his wall to give notice of his intention to the owner of an adjoining wall which rests upon it, and that he is not even liable for carelessly pulling down his wall, if he had not notice of the existence of the adjoining wall. But this decision proceeds upon the want of any allegation or proof of a right of the plaintiff to have his wall supported by the defendant's, and does not touch the rights or obligations of conterminous proprietors where the tenement to be sup- ported remains in its natural condition. Next comes the valuable case of Harris v. By ding, ^ which would be a direct authority in favor of the present plaintiff if it did not leave some uncertainty as to the effect of the averment, in the declaration, of working "carelessly, negligently, and improperly," and as to whether the plaintiff was considered absolutely entitled to have his ' 3 Mee. & W. 220. s fi Mee. & W. 60. a 6 Bing. K. C. 1. REMOVING SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 271 Court of Queen's Bench — Opinion of lord Campbell, O. J. land supported by the subjacent strata, to whatever degree the afford- ing of this support might interfere with the defendant's right to work the minerals. There, one seized in fee of land conveyed away the sur- face, reserving to himself the minerals, with power to enter upon the surface to work them ; and it is said to have been held that, under this reservation, he was not entitled to take all the minerals, but only so much " as could be got, leaving a reasonable support to the surface." ^ The case was decided upon a demurrer to certain pleas justifying under the reservation, and the declaration alleged careless, negligent, and improper working, which there must be considered as admitted, whereas here it is negatived by the verdict; but the barons, in the very comprehensive and masterly judgment which they delivered seri- atim, seem all to have thought that the reservation of the minerals would not have justified the defendant in depriving the surface of a complete support, however carefully he might have proceeded in re- moving them. Lord Abinger says : "The plea is no answer, because it does not set forth any sufficient ground to justify the defendants in working the mines in such a manner as not to leave sufficient support for the land above, which is alleged by the declaration to be a careless, negligent, and improper mode of working them." Parke, B., ob- serves, it never could have been in the contemplation of the parties " that, by virtue of this reseivation of the mines, the grantor should be entitled to take the whole of the coal, and let down the surface, or injure the enjoyment of it;" and again, "This plea is clearly bad, because the defendants do not assign that, in taking away the coal, they did leave a sufficient support for the surface in its then state." "The question is," says Alderson, B., "whether the grantor is not to get the minerals which belong to him, and which he has reserved to himself the right of getting, in that reasonable and ordinary mode in which he would be authorized to get them, provided he leaves a proper support for the land which the other party is to enjoy." My brother Maxtle, then a judge of the Court of Exchequer, says, in the course of his luminous judgment: " The right of the defendants to get the mines is the right of the mine-ovraers, as against the owner of the land which is above it. That right appears to me to be very analogous to that of a person having a room in a house over another man's room, or an acre of land adjoining another man's acre of land." Parke, B., that he might not be misunderstood as to the right of the owner of the surface, afterwards adds: " I do not mean to say that all the coal does not be- 1 6 Mee. & W. 70. 272 LIABILITT FOE REMOVING THE SUPPORT OF LAND. Humphries v. Brogden. long to the defendants, but that they cannot get it without leaving suf- ficient support." It seems to have been the unanimous opinion of the court that there existed the natural easement of support for the upper soil from the soil beneath, and that the entire removal of the inferior strata, however skilfully done, would be actionable, if productive of damage by withdrawing that degree of support to which the owner of the surface was entitled, the duty of the owner of the servient tene- ment forbidding him to do any act whereby the enjoyment of the ease- ment could be disturbed. The counsel for the defendants cited and relied much upon the case of Acton V. Blundell,''- in which it was held that a land-owner, who, by mining operations in his own lands, directs a subterraneous current of water, is not liable to an action at the suit of the owner of the ad- joining land, whose well is thereby laid dry. But the right to running water and the right to have land supported are so totally distinct, and depend upon such different principles, that there can be no occasion to show at greater length how the decision is inapplicable. We have now to mention the case of Hilton v. Lord Granville.^ A writ of error may probably be brought in this case, when all the issues of fact have been disposed of ; and nothing which I now say is to pre- clude me from forming any opinion upon it, should I ever hear it argued. If well decided, the plaintiff is justified in relying upon it; for it is strongly in point. This court there held that a prescription or a custom within a manor for tlie lord, who is seised in fee of the mines and collieries therein, to work them under any dwelling-houses, build- ings, and lands, parcel of the manor, doing no unnecessary damage, and paying to the tenants and occupiers of the surface of lands dam- aged thereby a reasonable compensation for the use of the surface of the lands, but without making compensation for any damage occasioned to any dwelling-houses or other buildings within or parcel of the manor, by or for working the said mines and collieries, is void as being unrea- sonable. Lord Denman, C. J., said: "A claim destructive of the sub- ject-matter of the grant cannot be set up by any usage. Even if the grant could be produced in specie, reserving a right in the lord to deprive his grantee of the enjoyment of the thing granted, such a clause must be rejected as repugnant and absurd. That the prescrip- tion or custom here pleaded has this destructive effect, and is so repug- nant and void, appears to us too clear, from the simple statement, to admit of illustration by argument." 1 12 Mee. & W. S24. " 6 Q. B. 701. REMOVING SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 273 Court of Queen's Bench — Opinion of Lord Campbell, C. J. The most recent case referred to was Smith v. Kenrick,^ in which the Court of Common Pleas, after great deliberation, held that it is the right of each of the owners of adjoining mines, where neither mine is subject to any servitude to the other, to work his own mine, as far as the flow of water is concerned, in the manner which he deems most convenient and beneficial to himself, although the natural consequence may be that some prejudice will accrue to the owner of the adjoining mine; so that such prejudice does not arise from the negligent or malicious conduct of his neighbor. But no question arose there re- specting any right to support, the controversy being only respecting the obligation to protect an adjoining mine from water which may flow into it by the force of gravitation. And in the very learned judgment of the court, delivered by my brother Ckesswell, there is nothing laid down to countenance the doctrine that, in a case circumstanced like this which we have to determine, the owner of the minerals may, if not chargeable with malice or negligence, remove them so as to destroy or damage the surface over them which belongs to another. "We have attempted, without success, to obtain from the codes and jurists of other nations information and assistance respecting the rights and obligations of persons to whom sections of the soil, divided hori- zontally, belong as separate properties. This penury, where the subject of servitudes is so copiously and discriminately treated, probably pro- ceeds from the subdivision of the surface of the land and the minerals under it into separate holdings being peculiar to England. Had such subdivisions been known in countries under the jurisdiction of the Eoman civil law, its incidental rights and duties must have been exactly defined, when we discover the right of adjoining proprietors of lands to support from lateral pressure leading to such minute regulations as the following: "jS'i quis sepem ad alienum praeduim fixerit, infoderitque, terminum ne excedito : si maceriam, pedem relinquito : si vero domum, pedes duos : si sepulchrum aut scrobem foderit, quantum profanditatis habuerint, tantum spatii relinquito: si puteum passus latitudinem." ^ The Code Napoleon likewise recognizes the support to which the owners of adjoining lands are reciprocally entitled, but contains nothing which touches the question for our decision more closely than the following arti- cle on " Natural Servitudes : " ^ " Les fonds inferieurs sont assujettis, envers ceux qui sont plus eleves, a recevoir les eaux qui en decoulent natu- rellement sans que la main de I'homme y ait contribue." " Le proprietaire 1 7 C. B. 515, 564. » " Servitudes qui dirivent de la situation - Dig. Lib. X., tit. 1 (,Finium regundorum), des lieux." 18 274 LIABILITY FOR EEMOVIN& THE SUPPORT OF LAND. Notes. superieur ne pent rien faire qui aggrave la servitude du fonds inferieur. ' ' * But reference is here made to adjoining fields on a declivity, not to the surface of land and the minerals being held by different proprietors. The American lawyers write learnedly on the support which may b& claimed for land for lateral pressure, and for buildings which have long rested against each other, but are silent as to the support which the owner of the surface of lands may claim from the subjacent strata when possessed by another.*^ However, in Erskine's Institute of the Law of Scotland, treating of the servitude oneris ferendi, the very learned author has the following passage, which well illustrates the prin- ciple on which our decision is founded: "Where a house is divided into different floors or stories, each floor belonging to a different owner, which| frequently happens in the city of Edinburgh, the proprietor of the ground floor is bound merely by the nature and condition of his- property, without any servitude, not only to bear the weight of the upper story, but to repair his own property, that it may be capable of bearing that weight." " The proprietor of the ground story is obliged to uphold it for the support of the upper, and the owner of the upper must uphold that as a roof or cover to the lower." ^ For these reasons, we are all of opinion that the present action is maintainable, not- withstanding the negation of negligence in the working of the mines, and that the rule to enter a verdict for the defendant must be dis- charged. "We need hardly say that we do not mean to lay down any rule applicable to a case where the prima facie rights and liabilities of the owner of the surface of the land and of the subjacent strata are varied by the production of title-deeds, or by other evidence. Sule discharged. NOTES. ? 1. Right to lateral Support. — The right of the proprietor of land to lateral support from the land of his neighbor is sometimes treated as an easement,* though generally it is viewed as a natural right, and the deprivation of such support, as a nuisance.* As we shall see hereafter, this right is not an absolute, but a qualified 1 Code Civil, liv. 2, tit. 4, chap. 1, art. 640. 77; Backhouse «. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503 j » See 3 Kent's Comm. (ed. 1840) 463, pt. 6, Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Eeaney, 42 Md. 117, leot. 53. 135; Guest v. Reynolds, 68 111. 478; Cooley » Vol. I., b. 2, tit. 9, § 11, p. 433 (ed. 1828). on Torts, 694, 595 ; Wood on Nuis., §§ 173, 213. < Gale on Ease. 365; Washb. on Ease. 437. The nature and origin of this right are dis- 6 See Lord Wensleydale, in Eowbotham cussed in a learned article in 1 Am. L. Eev. V. Wilson, 8 H. L. Cas. 348; Brown v. Robins, 1; but this article is an argument for a par- 4 Hurl. AN. 186; Farrand v. M.nrshall, 19 ticular view of the case. It appears to have Barb. 380; Stevenson ». Wallace, 27 Gratt. been worked over from a brief. RIGHT TO LATEKAIi SUPPOET. 275 When acquired by Prescription. right ; but even in those cases where it does not exist at all, a person proposing to exca- vate his own soil in such a manner that it will probably damage that of his neighbor, owes certain duties to such neighbor, the neglect of which will make him liable to pay damages. It is in this aspect that we propose chiefly to consider the question. The owner of land is said to have a right to lateral support from the soil of his neighbor so far as may be necessary to preserve the integrity of his soil in its natural state ; ^ but if his soil is weighted with buildings, he has no right to such support from the soil of his neighbor as will enable his own soil to sustain such increased weight.^ He may, however, acquire, by prescription for the period of twenty years, a right to the lateral support of his land, together with the superimposed buildings. In such case, a grant of the right of support as an easement is presumed.' He may iHunt V. Peake, Johns. (Eng. Oh.) 705; Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231; MoGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J. L. 357; Eichardson v. Ver- mont, etc., E. Co., 25 Vt. 465 ; Farrand v. Mar- shall, 19 Barb. 380; «. c, 21 Barb. 409; Hum- phries V. Brogden, ante, p. 263 ; Stevenson v. ■Wallace, 27 Gratt. 77; Peyton v. Governors of St. Thomas's Hospital, 4 Man. & E. 625; «. c, sid> nom. Peyton u. London, 3 Oar. & P. 363; 9 Barn. & Cress. 725; Shafer v. WU- Bon, 44 Md. 268, 279; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige, 169; Gilmore v. DriscoU, supra; Mamer v. Lussem, 65 m. 484; Foley v. Wyeth, 2 Allen, 131; Busby v. Holthaus,46 Mo. 161. Contra, Eadoliffi v. Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 202. The language of Woodworth, J., in Panton v. Holland, supra, goes to the extent of holding that a, man may dig as he pleases on his own soil, being answer- able only for a negligent exercise of the right, which may mean much or little, ac- cording to the notions of juries. The right to have one's land supported in its natural condition was not conceded; but this ques- tion did not arise, for it was a case where one lot-owner in New York City had under- mined the house of another, in buUding. In some States, the subject, so far as it relates to excavating on lots adjacent to buildings in cities, is regulated by statute. See N. T. Stat. 1855, chap. 6 ; Dorrity v. Eapp, 11 Hun, 374 (reversed, 72 N. Y. 307 ; s. c, 4 Abb. N. C. 292). The same doctrine in England gov- erns the rights of the owners of adjacent mines. The owner of one coal mine may, for the purpose of obtaining coal, and so work- ing his mine in a manner most advantageous to himself, cut away a partition of coal be- tween his own mine and a body of subter- ranean water; and if his water thereby gets into his neighbor's mine, which has connec- tion with his, he will not be answerable in damages. Smith v. Kenriok, 7 C. B. 615 ; «. c, 13 Jur. 362; 18 L. J. (C. P.) 172. See Fletcher o. Rylands, ante, pp. 38, 40, where this case Is discussed. As to the manner of pleading an injury to a right of this nature, see Jeffries v. Williams, 5 Exch. 792; ». c, 20 L. J. (Exch.) 14; Bibby v. Carter, 4 Hurl. & N. 153; Brown v. Windsor, 1 Cromp. & J. 20; Trower v. Chadwick, 3 Bing. N. C. 334; Hilton u. Whitehead, 12 Q. B. 734. As to the e pleadings in such a suit, see Trower V. Chadwick, 3 Bing. N. C. 334. See also Slingsby v. Barnard, 1 Eoll. Abr. 430; Smith V. Martin, 2 Saund. 394; Great Western E. Co. V. Bennett, L. E. 2 H. L. 27. ' Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231; Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220; Panton v. Holland, supra; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige, 169; O'Connor p. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. St. 187 ; Cin- cinnati V. Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499; McGuire V. Grant, 25 N. J. L. 356; Wyatt v. Harrison, 3 Bam. & Adol. 871; Charless v. EanMn, 22 Mo. 566; Stevenson i>. Wallace, 27 Gratt. 77; Dixon V. Wilkinson, 2 McArthur, 425 ; Peyton V. Mayor and Commonalty of London, 9 Bam. & Cress. 725; Partridge v. Scott, 3 Mee. & W. 220; Gayford v. NichoUs, 9 Exch. 702; Gil- more V. Driscoll, supra; Mamer v. Lussem, 65 lU. 484; Busby v. Holthaus, 46 Mo. 161. » StanseU v. JoUard, 1 Selw. N. P. (11th Eng. ed.) 457; Hide v. Thomborough, 2 Car. & Kir. 250; Story v. Odin, 12 Mass. 167; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige, 169; Stev- enson V. Wallace, 27 Gratt. 77, 88; Quincy ». Jones, 76 lU. 231, 241; Wyatt v. Harrison, 3 Barn. & Adol. 871; Partridge v. Scott, 3 Mee. & W. 220; Brown ». Windsor, 1 Cromp. & J. 20. If A.build a house on his own land, which had previously been excavated for mining purposes, he does not thereby acquire a right of support from the adjoining land of B., at least until twenty years have elapsed since the house first stood on excavated land ; so that if B., within such period, works mines on his own land, whereby the house of A. sinks, B. will not be liable to A. Partridge V. Scott, S Mee. & W. 220. 276 LIABILITY FOR REMOVING THE SUPPORT OF LAND. Notes. ako acquire such a right upon the theory of an implied covenant, or grant of an easement, — as, when the adjoining parcels of A. and B. were formerly the property of a common owner. Here each owes to the other the duty of supporting, not merely his soil, but his buildings standing thereon.' A person may also recover damages for an injury to his soil by removing the lateral support of it, although its sub- sidence was caused by the weight of adjacent buildings belonging to another proprie- tor.* On the other hand, he may be estopped to claim the right by the covenants of his own deed, — as, when a person conveyed land to a railway company " for material * * * to the uses and purposes of said railroad, and for no other or different pur- pose," and the removal of the material deprived other land of its lateral support, so that it fell down some years afterwards.' It does not follow that because houses are built on land, the owner has lost his right to so much lateral support as would have sustained the soil in its natural condition. If his soil would have sunk in con- sequence of the excavation, without the superincumbent weight of the house, he is entitled to damages * for the injury to his soil or to the foundations of his house.' But the right to lateral support not being an absolute right, its infringement is not a cause of action without appreciable damage. Therefore, where A. dug a well near B.'s land, which sank in consequence, and a building erected on it within twenty years fell, and it was proved that if the building had not been on B.'s land, the land would have sank, but the damage would have been inappreciable, it was held that B. had no right of action against A. The act itself being lawful, it is the fact of damages that constitutes the injury.^ 1 2. Negligent Deprivation of this Right. — But whatever may be the right of one land-owner to excavate his own soil so as to deprive his neighbor's land of its support, the authorities are agreed that he must exercise what care and skill he can to prevent injury to his neighbor; and if he inflict an unnecessary injury upon his neighbor through negligence, he must pay the damages.' Thus, the authorities are agreed that one who proposes to excavate, or make other alterations or improvements, 'Harris v. Eydlng, 6 Mee. & W. 60; 181; St. Helen's Smelting Co. ■». Tipping, 11 MoGnire v. Grant, 25 N. J. L. 356 ; Steven- H. L. Gas. 642 ; s. v., 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 66. son V. Wallace, 27 Gratt. 77, 88; Eicharas v. ' Washb. on Base. 437; Gale on Ease. 365; Eose, 9 Exoh. 218; Gayford o. Nicholls, Shaler «. Wilson, 44 Md. 268, 280 ; Baltimore, 9Excli. 702. The same rule applies where etc., E. Co. v. Eeaney, 42 Md. 117; Foley v. several buildings, built by a common owner, Wyetb, 2 Allen, 131 ; Quiuoy v. Jones, 76 ni. so as to support each other, have been after- 231, 241 ; Charless v. Eankin, 22 Mo. 566 ; Wal- wards sold to different vendees. Eiohards ters t,. Pfell, 1 Moo. & M. 364; Shrieve v. V. Eose, 9 Exoh. 218; s. c, 23 L. J. (Exch.) 3. Stokes, 8 B. Mon. 463; Panton v. Holland, 2 Foley V. Wyeth, 2 Allen, 131. eupra; Stevenson v. Wallace, 27 Gratt. 77, s Ludlow o. Hudson Eiver E. Co., 4 Hun, 89; Dixon v. Wilkinson, 2 McArthur, 425; 239. Dodd v. Holme, 3 Nev. & Man. 739 ; Davis v. * Brown v. Bobins, 4 Hurl. & N. 186; ». c, London, etc., E. Co., 2 Scott N. E. 74; s. v., 28 L. J. (Exch.) 250; Stroyan v. Knowles, 8 1 Man. & G. 799; 2 Eng. Ball. Cas. 308; 1 Hurl. &N. 454; s. c, 30 L. J. (Exch.) 102; Drink. 1; Lukin v. GodsaU, Peak. Ad. Cas. Stevenson v. Wallace, 27 Gratt. 77, 87. 15; Trower v. Chadwiok, 3 Bing. N. C. 334; '- Hunt V. Peake, Johns. (Eng. Ch.) 705. Austin v. Hudson Eiver E. Co., 25 N. T. 334; See, on this point, Gilmore v. Driscoll, supra. Boothby v. Androscoggin E. Co., 61 Me. 318. ° Smith V. Thackrah, L. E. 1 C. P. 564 ,s.c.. As to the manner of stating a cause ol action 12 Jur. (N. s.) 545 ; 35 L. J. (0. P.) 276 ; 1 Harr. in such a case, when the gravamen is negli- &E.615;14Week.Eep.832;14L.T. (N. s.)761. gence, see Shrieve «. Stokes, 8 B. Mon. 453; Por the same principle, see Bonomi v. Back- Brown v. Windsor, 1 Cromp. & J. 20. house, 9 H. L. Gas. 503; «. c, 34 L. J. (Q. B.) EIGHT TO LATERAL SUPPORT. 277 Negligent Deprivation of this Right. upon his own land, which may endanger the land or house of his neighhor, is bound to give the latter reasonable notice of what he proposes to do, to enable him to take the necessary measures for the preservation of his own property.^ But after giving such notice, he is bound only to reasonable and ordinary care in the prosecution of the work.^ "Where the excavation was of itself lawful, and the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint was that it was unskilfully done, it was held incumbent on the plaintiff to show negligence by other proof than by the mere fact that the walls of his house cracked and gave way. In the view of the court so deciding, this was not a case for the application of the rule, Res ipsa loquitur.^ It is, however, erroneous to rule that the proprietor doing the excavating is bound to use such care and caution as a prudent man, experienced in such worlc, would have exercised if he had been the owner of such building. This goes beyond the care which the law exacts of a land- owner. In thus excavating, he exercises a right of property with which his neighbor cannot interfere ; and although it is his duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring his neighbor, yet he is not bound to observe the same care that he would have taken had he been the owner of both buildings.* The diligence which will exonerate the owner of the servient tenement has been thus expressed by Chancellor Kent: "If the owner of a house in a compact town finds it necessary to pull it down and remove the foundation of his building, and he gives notice of his intention to the owner of the adjoining house, he is not answerable for the injury which the owner of that house may sustain by the operation, provided he removes his own with reasonable and ordi- nary care."* The rule was thus expressed in a case in Kentucky: "In order to impose upon the defendant the duty of using any extraordinary means for the pro- tection of the plaintiff's house, it must have been apparent, upon common observa- tion, that the digging of his cellar would probably cause the house to fall ; and cer- tainly he should not be subjected to damages for failing to use extraordinary precau- tions, unless it Is reasonably certain that the digging of the cellar did actually cause the destruction of the house, and especially as another cause, deemed by many to have been adequate to produce the effect, is proved to have existed. * * * In this case, the defendant's cellar did not, as stated in the declaration, adjoin the plain- tiff's house, but there was an alley of between two and three feet between them, which did not belong to the defendant. Unless the nature of the intervening earth was such as to render it highly probable that it would give way upon the cellar being dugout, and thus cause the plaintiff's house to fall, there could be no obligation on the defendant to take any precaution, except that he should not disturb or break down the alley. If, as we assume, he had a right to dig his cellar to a proper and convenient depth, he cannot be responsible, except for the consequences of neglect in digging. Nor was he bound to anticipate and provide against a possible danger which the plaintiff, with notice of the facts, did not consider probable. It cannot be admitted that the sole responsibility for all consequences devolved upon the defendant, who was in the exercise of his undoubted right upon his own land. The plaintiff knew what was doing on defendant's open lot, and may be assumed to have known better than the defendant the weakness of his own wall and its foundation. If he might remain passive, without taking or suggesting any measure for the safety of his house, 1 3 Kent's Comm. 437; Massey v. Goyder, " Ward v. Andrews, 3 Mo. App. 275. See i Car. & P. 161 ; Lasala v. Holbi-ook, 4 Paige, Schmidt v. Harkness, 3 Mo. App. 5S5. 169 ; Shafer v. Wilson, U Md. 268, 281 ; Brown « Charless v. Rankin, 2-3 Mo. 566, 574. K. Werner, 40 Md. 15. ' 3 Kent's Comm. 437. 2 Massey v. Goyder, i Cai'. & P. 161. 278 LIABILITY FOR REMOVING THE SUPPORT OF LAND. Notes. and hold the defendant responsible for not taking measures to support it, it seems to us that such responsibilities should rest upon some peculiar ground of right on the one side, or duty on the other, which ought to be clearly set forth in the declaration, and satisfactorily established by the proof. Unless the plaintiff was entitled to have his house supported, not only by the alley, but by the compact earth on the defend- ant's lot adjoining the alley, the mere removal of that earth was not a breach of duty in the defendant. And in that case, he could not be said to have caused the loss to the plaintiff, nor be held liable for it unless he knew, or had good reason to believe, that the removal of the earth upon his own line would occasion the loss before the necessary support should be applied by building up his cellar wall, or unless the loss could be fairly attributed to his want of ordinary skill or care in loosening or removing the earth from his own lot." The proprietor making the excavation cannot be charged with damages for negligence, because he failed to shore up his neighbor's house, in a case where the latter has no right of support in the nature of an easement by grant or prescription; in such case, his neighbor must shore up his own house.' It will be no defence on the part of the proprietor making the excavation that he used such care as his builder and superintendent, a skilful and careful person, deemed necessary, if there was actual negligence.' I 3. What if the Work Is done by an independent Contractor. — Nor, in a case where the plaintiff was entitled to support for his building, as well as for his land, will it be a defence against liability for negligence, to such an action, that the plaintiff contracted with an experienced and skilful excavator to do the work.' These rulings refer themselves to that class of cases which hold that where one does upon his own land an act which of itself is a nuisance, he is answerable to any one who has sustained damage thereby, although the work was done by an independent eon- tractor. But in a case where the plaintiff is not of right entitled to support for his house, and where the gravamen of his action is hence not the unlawfulness of the act itself, but negligence in the manner of performing it, it seems upon principle that the fact that the defendant had let out the work to an independent contractor, skilled in such business and of good repute, would exonerate him ; for the negligence would not he his, hut that of the contractor, and the latter would be liable.* But if there is a duty imposed by statute upon a proprietor who proposes to excavate for the purpose of building, it will be no defence to an action by a conterminous proprietor, injured by a violation of it, that the fornier contracted with another to do the work.* If an excavation result in a trespass upon adjacent property, in consequence of the work being done in conformity with plans furnished by the proprietor, he will be responsible, although the work were done by an independent contractor.^ Upon the question of reasonable care in excavating a cellar which has resulted in injury to an adjoining house, it is admissible to show the measures of safety usually adopted by builders in digging cellars under such circumstances.' g 4. How in Case of Corporations. —We shall hereafter see that, in the opinion of some courts, a municipal corporation, in grading its streets, can excavate the earth 1 Peyton v. Governors of St. Thomas's * Gayford v. Nicholls, 9 Exch. 702. Hospital, i Man. & E. 625; 8. v., mib nom. ' Dorrity ». Eajjp, 72 N". Y. 307 (reversing Peyton v. London, 9 Barn. & Cress. 725; 3 11 Hun, 37i) ; ». c, i Abb. N. C. 292. Car. & P. 363. « Mamer v. Lussem, 65 111. 484. 2 Charless v. Eankin, 22 Mo. 506. ' Shrieve v. Stokes, 8 B Hon. 457. 3 Stevenson v. Wallace, 27 Gratt. 77, 91; 1 Bower v. Peake, 1 Q. B. Div. BIGHT TO LATERAL SUPPORT. 279 Corporations — Contributory Negligence. «o as to deprive abutting owners of the natural support of their soil, without being answerable in damages therefor ; ' whilst other courts place municipal corporations, in respect of such uses of their property, upon the same footing as private persons.^ But such immunity does not extend to a private corporation, such as a railway com- pany, which has been authorized by law to malse for its own profit an extraordinary use of a street of a city, as by excavating a tunnel therein. The principle that •damage cannot be predicated upon the doing of a lawful act, does not there apply ; for the act, although authorized by the legislature, is deemed to become, quoad hoc, •unlawful as soon as damages ensue.' g 5. Contributory Negligence. — If the owner of the building injured by the •excavation or alteration, after notice from the adjacent owner of his intention to make them, fail to take suitable measures, by shoring up his building or otherwise, -to prevent its being injured, he will, on familiar grounds, be bound by his own con- iributary negligence from recovering damages, unless the work of excavating or alter- ing were prosecuted with such reckless or wanton disregard of his rights that such precautions would have been unavailing. The doctrine of Davies v. Mann,* that although A. may have negligently exposed his property to the injury complained of, jet this will not justify B. in injuring it, if such injury could be avoided by the exer- ■cise of ordinary care, is applicable here. Accordingly, although the owner of the dominant tenement* may have been guilty of negligence in failing to take suitable precautions to prevent his tenement being injured by the work which the owner of the servient tenement proposes to do, yet this will not justify the latter in inflicting ■such injury if it can be avoided by the exercise of ordinary care.^ So, if one has built his house so that one of its walls comes to the boundary-line between his lot and his neighbor's, and whilst his neighbor is afterwards excavating on his own ground for the purpose of building, in consequence of which excavating it crumbles and falls, the proprietor making the excavation will not be bound to pay damages if the «xcavating was conducted with due care and skill, so that the wall, if properly built •of suitable materials, would have withstood the removal of the lateral support.' But this application of the doctrine of contributory negligence cannot fairly be made where the owner of the building injured is entitled, on the ground of prescription or of iimplied grant, to support both for his land and his building. In such a case, it has 'been held erroneous to instruct the jury that it devolved upon the plaintiff to protect her building, by providing herself other supports, and that the defendant was not liable if the plaintiff had knowledge of the danger, and could have averted it by prompt action.' In such a case, whether the fact that the building of the dominant 1 Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; O'Con- 117. Contra, Dodd v. 'Williams, S Mo. App. .nori;. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. St. 187; Cincinnati 278. V. Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499; Grocers' Co. v. * lOMce. & W. 546. Donnee, 3 Bing. N. 0. 34; s. c, 3 Scott, 356; 'I am using, lor convenience, terms •2 Hodges, 120; Clothier v. Webster, 12 C. B. which would be applicable if the right were