\iiUi'ti&^i ■'''-'■ y '■':'■'■ ^ : '-' : ;t' HV WW A .5" QfacneU Iniueraitg fflibrarg 3tl?aca, Neui |)ork BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF HENRY W. SAGE 1891 Cornell University Library HV8138.F74 A5 American police systems. oiin 3 1924 030 326 999 GUU LIBRARY. - CIRCULATION DATE DUE ^^^U^^, CAY LORD ritlNTEOINU.S.A The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030326999 American Police Systems PUBLISHED IN THE SAME SERIES WITH THIS BOOK European Police Systems By Raymond B. Fosdick 8vo, 442 pages Commercialized Prostitution in New York City By George J. Kneeland With a supplementary chapter by Katherine Bement Davis 8vo, 334 pages Prostitution in Europe By Abraham Flexner 8vo, 455 pages Published by THE CENTURY CO., NEW YORK publications ot tbe ffiuteau ot Social Dealene American Police Systems BY RAYMOND B. FOSDICK Author of "European Police Systems" NEW YORK THE CENTURY CO, 1920 7 , V Copyright, 1920, by The Centuby Co. 2I S ion 3,048 11,045 1912 2 ,974 ">"2 1913 2,9H ",166 1914 2,352 9,844 1915 i,4S9 6,737 *5 American Police Systems more burglaries per annum than London, although Lon- don is seven or eight times larger. In each of these two cities in 1917 and 1918 the number of burglaries aver- aged one-fourth the number committed in all England and Wales. The annual burglaries in St. Louis always exceed those in London. A table of burglaries follows : Burglary, including housebreaking by day or night, shop-breaking, sacrilege, etc. 1 1916 1917 I 9 l8 England and Wales.... 7,809 9,453 10,331 Scotland 3,977 5>°73 * London 1,581 2,164 2 >777 Liverpool 1,135 1.361 M36 New York * 9*45° 7 A™ Chicago 2,1 13 5,623 3,643 Detroit 2,736 3,080 2,047 Cleveland * 2,752 2,608 St. Louis 3,212 2,483 2,989 * Figures not available. The disproportionate number of burglaries occurring in American cities as compared with English cities is re- flected in the prevailing burglary insurance rates of the two countries. Due to differences in insurance practices 1 The American figures in this table are taken from police depart- ment records. Their accuracy cannot be vouched for, because in many of our departments, complaints of crime are deliberately and systematically concealed. It can safely be assumed, however, that these figures represent an under-statement rather than an over*- statement. The English statistics, on the other hand, are kept with meticulous care, and after a careful study of the records and meth- ods at Scotland Yard and elsewhere in Great Britain, I do not be- lieve that complaints of crime are ever concealed to avoid unfavor- able appearances. 16 The American Problem and methods, exact comparisons are impossible, but enough has been gathered from careful investigation to warrant the general conclusion that burglary rates in American municipalities are from fifteen to twenty times higher than in the principal cities of England. 1 Comparative Statistics — Robbery. Even more startling are the statistics of robbery. 2 New York City in 191 5 reported 838 robberies and as- saults with intent to rob where London had 20, and Eng- land, Wales and Scotland together had 102. In 19 16 New York had 886 such crimes to London's nineteen, and England, Wales and Scotland's 227. In 191 7 New York reported 864 to London's 38, while England, Wales and Scotland reported 233. In 19 18 New York had 849, while London had 63 and England and Wales had 100. This contrast is by no means ascribable to war conditions, although such conditions undoubtedly height- ened it. In each of the four years from 191 5 to 1918 inclusive, New York City had from four to five times more robberies than occurred in all England and Wales in any one of the five years preceding the war. iThis statement is based on quite a detailed study of burglary insurance in London and New York and I am indebted to various insurance company representatives in both cities for their courtesy and assistance. An interesting comparison in burglary insurance rates for private residences is possible between different American cities The rates prevailing in June, 1920, for seven municipalities are as follows: Chicago arid San Francisco, $19.80 per thousand; New York, St. Louis and Detroit, $16.50 per thousand; Atlanta, $13.75 per thousand; Boston, $11.00 per thousand. 2 The astonishing discrepancy in these statistics led to a careful investigation The legal definitions of robbery are practically identi- cal on both sides of the Atlantic. The fact remains that highway robberies or "hold-ups" do not occur in Great Britain with any- thing like the frequency they do in America. 17 American Police Systems Practically the same proportion exists between Chi- cago's robberies and those in Great Britain. In 1918, for example, Chicago had 22 robberies for every one robbery in London and 14 robberies for every one robbery in England and ,Wales. Washington, D. C, in 191 6 had four times the number of robberies that London reported; in 1917 three times the number; and in 1918 one and one- half times the number. Los Angeles in 1916 had 64 more robberies than all of England, Wales and Scot- land put together; in 19 17 she had 126 more than these three countries. Cities like St. Louis and Detroit, in their statistics of robbery and assault with intent to rob, frequently show annual totals varying from three times to five times greater than the number of such crimes re- ported for the whole of Great Britain. Liverpool is about one and a third times larger than Cleveland, and yet in 1919 Cleveland reported 31 robberies for every one reported in Liverpool. Comparative Statistics — Miscellaneous. Differences in definition and classification of crime be- tween England and America make it difficult to push the comparison much further. One or two illustrations, however, may be noted to emphasize the contrast devel- oped in the foregoing statistics. Automobile thefts are much more prevalent in America than in Great Britain, as is shown by the following table : Thefts of automobiles reported in 1919 1 New York 5527 Chicago 4316 1 Figures in all cases obtained from the police records. I am 18 The American Problem Detroit 3482 St. Louis 1244 Cleveland 2327 Buffalo 986 London 290 Liverpool 10 Comparative statistics as to the number of automo- biles in American and English cities are impossible to ob- tain, but it is probably a fair assumption that the pro- portionate excess of thefts in the United States far ex- ceeds the admittedly larger supply of machines in our communities as compared with the communities of Great Britain. Similarly in comparing the total number of arrests for all crimes and offenses in the United States and Great Britain, one is struck by the high figures in American cities. 1 The number of arrests in Boston for the year 191 7 exceeded the number of arrests in London for the same year by 32,520. Philadelphia's arrests for 1917 exceeded London's by 20,005. Chicago's arrests for 191 7 exceeded London's by 61,874. New York's ar- rests for this same period exceeded London's by 111,- 877. Indeed New York had almost two and a half times especially indebted to the Honorable Trevor Bigham, assistant com- missioner at Scotland Yard, for his courtesy in aiding me to obtain the London figures. 1 Figures of arrests must always be taken with some qualification, as they are subject to various interpretations. They may denote crime conditions, or excessive zeal on the part of the police, or too many laws and regulations to be observed, or any one of half a dozen other situations. Because in this case the American arrests exceed the English arrests by such large figures, I have felt free to use the comparison as at least throwing some further light on crimi- nality in the United States. 19 American Police Systems as many arrests in 191 7 as were made in London. Glas- gow with an estimated population of a third of a million larger than either St. Louis or Boston, recorded in 19 18 22,290 arrests and summonses, while St. Louis in the same period showed 54,400 and Boston 90,293. This same disproportion is to be found in cities of lesser size. Relation of Heterogeneity to Crime. To what extent the excessive volume of crime in Amer- ica is attributable to the heterogeneity of our population cannot be precisely determined. Even where they exist at all, our criminal statistics are so crude and incomplete that deductions are difficult to make and when made are little better than rough estimates. The number of ar- rests in the course of a year is practically the only classi- fication available for our purposes, and the fact that this basis of measurement makes no allowance for unsolved crimes or for cases subsequently discharged in court, shows its unsatisfactory character. However as an indi- cation of the causal connection between the presence in America of large numbers of foreign races, uprooted and often adrift, and our overwhelming preponderance of crime, the figures of arrest may profitably be studied. They show, for example, that Irish-born inhabitants of Boston, constituting 9.8% of the population, are charged with 15% of the total arrests. 1 In New York City the Russian-born inhabitants, constituting 10.15% of the population, are credited with 20% of the total arraign- ments before the magistrates' courts, while the Italian- 1 Calculation based on U. S. Census report and Annual Report of the 'Police Department for 1918. 20 667 85 In England the situation is far different. Any volume of judicial statistics or any report of the Police Commis- sioner of London bears out the contrast. In 1904, for example, in London — to pick up a random report — there were twenty cases of premeditated murder. In six the perpetrators committed suicide; one man was sent immediately to an asylum, and one escaped to Italy. Of the twelve persons arrested and brought to trial, one was acquitted, five were adjudged insane and confined in an asylum, and six were sentenced to death. In 19 17 in the same city, there were 19 premeditated murders. Three cases remained unsolved ; five perpetrators committed sui- cide, and eleven were arrested. Of the eleven arrests, there were eight convictions. In the whole of England and Wales for 191 6, 85 murders were committed and 59 people arrested in connection therewith were committed for trial. Fifty-three trials resulted during the year. Twelve of the accused were found insane on arraignment and were confined; sixteen were found guilty but were adjudged insane and confined; ten were acquitted, and fifteen were sentenced to death. 1 It was from England that we borrowed the foundations Vol. XCV, No. 26). No more emphatic commentary could be made upon the lamentable condition of criminal statistics in the United States than the bare statement that calculations such as these are not based upon exact information. 1 Judicial Statistics for England and Wales, 1916. 33 American Police Systems of our criminal system. The special position of the ac- cused, the assumption of innocence until guilt is proved, our jury system, in fact our whole attitude and point of view in regard to the man on trial, are of English origin, and were handed down from generation to generation be- fore they were carried to America. It is an inescapable conclusion, however, that the English machine works smoothly and effectively while ours does not. A para- sitic growth of technicality and intricacy has thwarted and choked our whole criminal process. The Delays of Justice. The delays of the courts furnish another reason for the failure of our administration of justice. A random ex- amination of almost any volume of appellate court de- cisions will fully substantiate this charge. For example, in Illinois one Sam Siracusa was tried for murder in October, 19 13, and pleaded guilty. On a writ of error the case was carried to the Supreme Court of Illinois where judgment was affirmed exactly three years from the date of conviction. The case was not finally disposed of until three months later when a rehearing was denied. 1 Dominick Delfino was convicted of murder in Pennsyl- vania in October, 19 16. One year and three months later the judgment was affirmed. 2 In New York Charles Sprague was convicted of murder on February 8, 1912. Judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals four years and one month later. 3 Oresto Shilitano in the same state was convicted of murder on March 6, 19 14. 1 275 111. 457. 3217 N. Y. 373. 2 259 Pa. State 272. 34 The American Problem Judgment was affirmed two years and two months later. 1 Similarly, Leo Urban was found guilty in New York of robbery in the first degree on December 14, 191 5. Judg- ment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals July 3, 1917. 2 These are not unusual cases. They are picked at random from miscellaneous law reports. A study of criminal court dockets brings similar re- sults. For example — to cite a single case out of many at hand — one Ben Kuzios was indicted in Chicago on May 16, 1917, for assault with intent to rob. He was found guilty on July 25, 1917, a motion for a new trial was over-ruled, and he was sentenced to the penitentiary. A week later his attorney entered another motion for a new trial and the prisoner was released on bail. The transcript from the docket tells the rest of the story : Aug. 24, 1917 — motion for new trial continued to Octo- ber term. Nov. 3, 1917 — motion for new trial continued to Nov. 7, 1917. Nov. 7, 1917 — motion for new trial continued to Nov. 14, 1917. Nov. 14, 1917 — motion for new trial continued to Nov. 28, 1917. Nov. 28, 1917 — bail forfeiture and capias issued. Oct. 22, 1918 — motion for new trial continued to Nov. 12, 1918. Nov. 26, 1918 — order of court, cause off call. Jan. 29, 1919 — order of court, cause set for Feb. 1, 1919. Feb. 1, 1919 — motion new trial granted. Prisoner re- leased on $500.00 bail. 1 2i8 N. Y. 161. 2 36 N. Y. Crim. 70. 35 American Police Systems Feb. 18, 1919 — judgment in bond forfeiture, heretofore entered, set aside by order of county commissioners; costs paid. Sept. 22, 1919 — on motion of defendant, cause continued to October 21, 19 19. Oct. 22, 1919 — by agreement cause continued to Oct. 30, 1919. Nov. 6, 1919 — former verdict of guilty set aside. 1 Records of this kind are not exceptional. They are commonplace occurrences with which every prosecuting attorney is familiar. Radically different is the situation in Great Britain. Under the English law appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal must be taken within ten days after conviction. Ordinarily the court renders its decision in from seven- teen to twenty-one days, although in murder cases in- volving the death penalty this period is often shortened. An appeal never postpones execution in a capital case by more than three weeks. Thus, William Wright was convicted of murder at the London Assizes on Febru- ary 2, 1920; his appeal was filed on February 10, was denied on February 23, and he was hanged on March 10. George Lucas was convicted of murder on January 15, 1920; his appeal was filed on January 17 and was dismissed on February 2. Andrew Fraser was convicted of murder on February 19, 1920; his appeal was filed on February 27 and was denied on March 8. 2 1 Records of the clerk of the Criminal Court, Docket 11,413. This transcript and many others of similar nature have been published in the bulletins of the Chicago Crime Commission during 1919 and 1920. 2 The Court of Criminal Appeal, which was established in 1907, sits in London with jurisdiction over England and Wales. (7 Edw. 36 The American Problem In this fashion it would be possible to quote case after case from the records which the Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal kindly placed at the writer's disposal. One gets the impression of a swiftly moving, silent ma- chine — the embodiment of the certainty of justice in England. The same impression is gained by one who watches the conduct of English criminal trials. The business of choosing a jury is a matter of minutes only. 1 The judge 7. ch. 23). It is composed of the Lord Chief Justice of England and eight judges of the King's Bench Division of the High Court. The following table shows convictions quashed and sentences re- duced by the Court of Criminal Appeal from its inauguration to date. The figures for 1915' and 1916 are not available. Convictions Sentences Year Appellants quashed reduced 1909 627 27 39 1910 706 39 42 1911 679 25 3i 1912 664 30 17 1913 655 31 47 1914 554 25 35 1917 299 16 16 1918 285. 10 21 1919 355 17 17 The word " appellants " includes all persons who have appealed either against their conviction on a point of law or against their sentence as of right, or who have applied to the court for leave to appeal against conviction or against sentence, or against both conviction and sentence. There have been a very few cases where the sentence has been increased by order of the Court of Criminal Appeal, although in most cases where an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal is made to the court, the time from the signing of the notice of appeal to the final refusal of leave to appeal does not count as part of the sentence of the appellant, and so his term of imprisonment is auto- matically increased to that extent. 1 In New York when Thaw was tried, and in Tennessee when the murderers of Senator Carmack were at the bar, weeks elapsed in choosing a jury. In the selection of a jury to try Calhoun in San Francisco, 91 days were consumed. To obtain a jury to try Cor- nelius Shea in Chicago, 9,425 jurymen were summoned, of whom 4,821 were examined, the cost of jury fees alone being more than $13,000. See Storey, loc. cit., p. 210. 37 American Police Systems takes an astonishingly prominent part in the proceedings in a manner that an American judge would scarcely dare do, examining witnesses, instructing counsel and openly exerting his influence to guide the jury. He does not hesitate to comment upon the failure of a defendant to take the stand in his own behalf, and his general conduct of the case is such that in almost any state in the Union there would be no difficulty in securing a reversal by an appellate court on any one of a dozen technical points. The unrestricted flow of objections to questions by op- posing counsel on the grounds of irrelevancy, incompe- tency and immateriality which forms so conspicuous a part of an American trial, is surprisingly absent. The proceedings are direct, simple and even colloquial. They would be intelligible to a layman. There are no hypo- thetical questions, no haggling over the admission of evi- dence. Counsel on both sides give the appearance of striving to arrive at the truth by the quickest and most direct route. On direct examination the questions of the attorneys are often " leading " questions and are put with- out objection. Thus they do not hesitate to ask their witnesses such questions as this : " Did you look through the door and see the defendant speaking with Williams, and after a few seconds did you see him fire a shot? " In an American trial it would take a dozen questions and answers to elicit this information, and each of them would likely involve objection and argument. Briefly, our criminal procedure not only -makes delay possible but encourages it. Our methods are formal, diffuse, and inflexible ; we are enmeshed in technicalities which we revere as the attributes of justice, confusing 38 The American Problem them with the essentials of a criminal system. We do not seem to realize that simplicity, directness and a mod- erate degree of speed are consistent with fair, impartial trials. Faulty Personnel. Another contributing factor in the failure of our ad- ministration of justice lies in the poor quality of some of our magistrates and prosecuting officers. On no point are policemen throughout the country so unanimous as in their emphatically expressed opinion that they are not fairly or properly supported by the prosecuting attorneys and the courts. And it must be admitted that the charge is not without considerable substantiation. From Massa- chusetts comes the authenticated story of the county at- torney who on the last day of his term quashed 200 cases without consulting the complainant officers. From the police in many other states there are allegations, often with specifications, of prosecuting attorneys conniving at the acquittal or inadequate punishment of criminals. In- dictments remain untried and accumulate on the calendars of the courts, often dating back as far as three and four years, with the result that witnesses leave the jurisdiction and evidence disappears. The abuse and misuse of the bail system are notorious. 1 Cases -are often postponed to 1 As illustrative of the abuse of the bail system, the Grand Jury of Cook County, 111., in May, 1919, handed down a presentment in part as follows : " One of the most aggravated cases we have handled was the case of three notorious criminals who were indicted by this grand jury for robbery and hold-ups committed while out on bail. We fixed the bail at $25,000.00 in each case. When we handed these indictments to the judge we also requested him to prevent any reduction in the amount of the bail. In addition to the above, we asked the state attorney's office to fight any reduction of the bail 39 American Police Systems wear out the patience of the police. " There are in- stances on record," said former Police Commissioner Woods of New York, " where a case has been postponed and re-postponed until the patrolman has been obliged to come to court twenty-six times before it actually was called to trial." 1 Illustrations of this laxity and neglect are legion. For example, on February io, 191 1, Thomas Chap, a bar- tender in Chicago, shot and killed a seventeen year old boy. Chap admitted the shooting and justified his act by accusing his victim of striking matches on the bar-top and of kicking a dog. He was indicted for murder on March 4, 191 1. On April 7, 191 1, he was released on $10,000 bail. No further record of his case appears until 1916, when the docket shows the following : March 20, 1916 — case continued to April 17, 1916. April 17, 1916 — continued to May term. (Another gap in the record.) Jan. 23, 1918 — continued to March 4, 1918. March 28, 1918 — continued to April 22, 1918. April 22, 1918 — continued to May 13, 1918. May 13, 1918 — cause off call, order of court. Sept. 23, 1919 — on motion of State's Attorney, cause re- instated. Sept. 23, 1919 — capias order issued. of these notorious criminals. Two members of the state's attorney's office fought this reduction to the limit. Notwithstanding our rec- ommendations and their efforts, within a day or two we learned that the amount of the bond had been reduced from $25,000.00 to $10,000.00 in each of the three cases, and that these men were again at large in the community and able to continue their depredations on the public. We believe that bail for persons having a record of crime should be made extremely difficult." 1 In a public address delivered in 1916. Manuscript unpublished. 40 The American Problem Nov. 12, 1919 — on. motion of State's Attorney continued to Nov. 17, 1919. Nov. 13, 1919 — by agreement bond reduced to $7,500. Nov. 17, 1919 — on motion of State's Attorney set for December 1, 1919. Dec. 1, 1919 — plea of not guilty entered, jury trial. Jury sworn ; testimony heard in part. Dec. 2, 1919 — further testimony heard ; jury returns ver- dict of " not guilty." x In some jurisdictions, moreover, it is not unusual for committing magistrates to throw cases out of court for frivolous and sometimes capricious reasons — because the officer is late, or because his hand-writing on the com- plaint is poor, or because his coat is unbuttoned. Often, too, the sentences imposed are absurdly inadequate. Dan- gerous criminals with long records are returned to civil life after undergoing minimum punishment. Sometimes they escape punishment altogether. Occasionally this is the work of politics; 2 more often it is due to haste and carelessness or to a failure on the part of the magis- trates to realize the true significance of the struggle of society against crime. " One of the most discouraging things about police work," former Commissioner O'Meara of Boston told me, " is to work for weeks and months getting evidence on a particular case only to have 1 Grand Jury No. 137; P. G. D. No. 95,897; Term No- 2,459; and General No. 84. This and other similar cases taken from the rec- ords of the Criminal Court Clerk in Chicago are published in the Bulletin of the Chicago Crime Commission of Dec. 20, 1919. _ 2 Anyone who would see the American judicial system at its worst and lowest should read the report of the Congressional investigation of the negro riots in East St. Louis. (65th Congress, 2nd Session, Document 1,231, July 5, 1918.) 41 American Police Systems the court let the defendant off with a $25 fine. Then we have to begin our work all over again." The annual report of the General Superintendent of Police of Chicago for 1910 carries a paragraph equally significant : " An honest effort has been made to reduce all gam- bling to a minimum, and many arrests and raids have been made, and the best results have been obtained that were possible under existing conditions. The average fine for gambling was $4.20." 1 Moreover the decisions of the courts are often based on ignorance. In New York in 19 15 a man well known to the police was arrested for having concealed on his person a burglar's " jimmy " and a flashlight. He was immediately discharged by the magistrate on the ground that intent to use these tools was not established. An- other suspicious person, arrested with skeleton keys in his possession, was similarly discharged. 2 Cases of this kind can be duplicated in other cities. In 191 1 in New York, a judge of the Court of General Sessions frequently di- rected juries to acquit defendants because of the alleged misconduct of the prosecuting attorney or of witnesses. For example, in one such case, in which two men were on trial for burglary, the district attorney wanted to show that when arrested the men had dropped a " jimmy " which was later found exactly to fit the marks on the door of the premises in question. The following col- loquy ensued : 1 P. 8. The italics are mine. 2 Cases of Proctor and Rentz in the Magistrate's Court in Janu- ary, 1915. 42 The American Problem The District Attorney : Q. (To Detective Murray) Did you ever take this jimmy upstairs into the building? The Court: How is that material? I will sustain an objection. The District Attorney : I want to show that the jimmy marks fitted into the door. The Court : In view of the statement made by you I will direct the jury to render a verdict of not guilty. The District Attorney: I stated it in my opening. I could n't prove it in any other way. The officer went back and fitted it. The Court: The officer did not go back in time. You have no right to repeat that now so I sustain the objec- tion. Sit down. I direct a verdict of acquittal for im- proper conduct of the district attorney in the trial of the case. 1 Comment in cases such as these is superfluous. They are cited only because they illustrate some of the diffi- culties under which our police are laboring in their un- equal fight with crime. Attitude of the Public. The weak sentimentality of the community in relation to crime and the criminal is a final factor in the failure of our administration of justice which cannot be overlooked. Offenders go unpunished and the laws are used as a shield for crime because such laxity is after all in sub- stantial accord with public opinion, or at least with that element of public opinion which follows the daily news- 1 People vs. Ristino, p. 18. For a discussion of this and other cases, see report dated May 23, 1912, submitted to the Mayor of New York by the present writer when serving as Commissioner of Ac- counts of New York. 43 American Police Systems paper stories of our criminal courts. Our hereditary- sympathies are for the under-dog, for the man who is down aijid out, and the criminal is too frequently pictured as being only the victim of hard luck or a bad environ- ment, fighting for his life or freedom against the power- fully organized, impersonal forces of the commonwealth. Sometimes this sentiment is little short of maudlin, and the man whose crime has been picturesque or unusual be- comes in public imagination, if not a hero, at least a very interesting character, in the discussion of whose case the rights of society and the claims of justice are lost sight of. Sensational publicity whets the popular interest ; the sor- did details of the crime and its motive are blazoned in hysterical headlines. The attorneys issue or inspire state- ments in the press, presenting their proofs of innocence or innuendoes of guilt, and long before the case is tried, public sympathy is vociferously arrayed on one side or the other. In three different parts of the country I was told by prosecuting attorneys that it was impossible to secure the conviction of a woman for murder, no mat- ter how conclusive the evidence. " It is not considered a fair sporting proposition," one such official said. " Every important case in which a conviction is obtained brings me a flood of letters urging clemency," a western judge told me. And he added : " Often the letters pre- cede the conviction." This false perspective — this irrational public attitude which first shrieks for the punishment of the perpetrator and then seeks to find excuses for his act and reasons for his pardon — has done much to vitiate the restraints of 44 The American Problem the law and weaken its administration. " The evidence shows that Anton Jindra's treatment of her was most tantalizing, annoying and brutal; and because of this we believe the said Pauline Plotka should be given the benefit of the doubt, and we, the jury, recommend that she be released from custody." 1 This verdict, handed down by a coroner's jury in Chicago in the case of the murder of a man by his sweetheart, is typical of the atmosphere of false public sentiment in which criminal justice is ad- ministered in the United States. In Indianapolis in 1919 a negro shot and killed another following a quarrel over a girl. Upon apprehension the perpetrator admitted the act, but was freed by the Grand Jury presumably upon the ground of justification in shooting a trespassing rival. Upon release from custody he called at the coroner's office to get his pistol which he had left beside the body of his victim and which had been held as evidence. 2 These are not isolated instances. While more preva- lent in some parts of the country than in others, they can be duplicated in almost every jurisdiction. They are typical of the maladjustment of our attitude toward crime. " We have three classes of homicide," I was told by the chief of detectives in a large southern city. " If a nigger kills a white man, that 's murder. If a white man kills a nigger, that's justifiable homicide. If a nigger kills another nigger, that 's one less nigger." While of course brutally exaggerated, the statement is none the less 1 New York Times, February 28, 1918. 2 Personally communicated by the coroner of Marion County, In- diana. The investigator happened to be in the coroner's office at the moment when the negro called for his pistol. 45 American Police Systems too nearly a correct portrayal of the actual condition of public opinion in many parts of the country to be alto- gether or even largely discounted. Crime is an offense not only against the individual vic- tim but against the whole structure of society. Until public opinion adjusts its own point of view on these matters we cannot expect our courts to reflect anything better. In discussing these four phases of the administration of justice in America — our technical criminal procedure, the long delays and the uncertainty of punishment, the badly chosen personnel on the bench and in the depart- ment of the prosecuting attorney, and finally the unhealthy state of public opinion toward crime and the criminal — the aim has been to emphasize the point, too often over- looked, that our police suffer from connection with a system that has all but broken down. From time to time, in our indignation at the obvious growth of crime, we rise up and cry out at the police. Why are they not at their business? Why do they not succeed? The an- swer is obvious. The task before us is far greater than the regeneration of our police. It is the regeneration of our whole system of administering justice and the cre- ation of a sound public attitude toward crime. IV. UNENFORCEABLE LAWS A final disadvantage under which American police de- partments are laboring is to be found in the presence on our statute books of laws which, because they interfere with customs widely practised and widely regarded as 46 The American Problem innocent, are fundamentally unenforceable. The willing- ness with which we undertake to regulate by law the per- sonal habits of private citizens is a source of perpetual astonishment to Europeans. In no country in Europe, with the exception of Germany, is an attempt ever made to enforce standards of conduct which do not meet with general public approval, or, at the behest of what may be a minority, to bring a particular code of behavior within the scope of criminal legislation. With us, how- ever, every year adds its accretion to our sumptuary laws. It suits the judgment of some and the temper of others to convert into crimes practices which they deem mischie- vous or unethical. They resort to law to supply the de- ficiencies of other agencies of social control. They at- tempt to govern by means of law things which in their nature do not admit of objective treatment and external coercion. " Nothing is more attractive to the benevolent vanity of men," said James Coolidge Carter, " than the notion that they can effect great improvement in society by the simple process of forbidding all wrong conduct, or conduct which they think is wrong, by law, and of enjoining all good conduct by the same means." x It is to this temptation and to this fallacy that our legis- latures habitually succumb. The views of particular groups of people on questions of private conduct are made the legal requirements of the State. We are sur- rounded by penal laws whose only purpose is to enforce 1 Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function. New York, 1900, p. 221. See, too, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, an address by Roscoe Pound before the Pennsylvania Bar Association, June 27, 1916 (a pamphlet) ; and The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, by the same author, in 27 Harvard L. Rev. 195. 47 American Police Systems by threat certain standards of morality. We are hedged about by arbitrary regulations, which, while they may have at one time perhaps satisfied the consciences of those responsible for them, no longer represent community pub- lic opinion, or at best represent only a portion of it. These regulations have not grown as we have grown and they do not ease up as we push the whole social weight against them. Indeed this presents one of the strange anomalies in American life: with an intolerance for au- thority and an emphasis upon individual rights, more pro- nounced, perhaps, than in any other nation, we are, of all people, not even excepting the Germans, pre-eminently addicted to the habit of standardizing by law the lives and morals of our citizens. Nowhere in the world is there so great an anxiety to place the moral regulation of social affairs in the hands of the police, and nowhere are the police so incapable of carrying out such regula- tion. Our concern, moreover, is for externals, for re- sults that are formal and apparent rather than essential. We are less anxious about preventing a man from doing wrong to others than in preventing him from doing what we consider harm to himself. We like to pass laws to compel the individual to do as we think he ought to do for his own good. We attack symptoms rather than causes and in doing so we create a species of moralistic despotism which overrides the private conscience and de- stroys liberty where liberty is most precious. From this condition arises one of the most embarrass- ing phases of the whole question of law enforcement. Mayors, administrations and police forces are more often and more successfully .attacked from this point than from 48 The American Problem any other, and the consequences are corrupted policemen and shuffling executives who give the best excuse they can think of at the moment for failing to do the impossi- ble, but are able to add nothing to the situation but a sense of their own perplexity. Of all the cities visited by the writer, there was scarcely one that did not bear evidence of demoralization arising from attempts to en- force laws which instead of representing the will of the community, represented hardly anybody's will. " I am always between two fires," the chief of police in New Orleans told me. " If I should enforce the law against selling tobacco on Sunday, I would be run out of office in twenty-four hours. But I am in constant danger of being run out of office because I don't enforce it." At the time of my visit to New Orleans the enforcement of this particular law was in a state of compromise by which green curtains were hung to conceal the tobacco stands on Sunday. The curtains served the double purpose of ad- vertising the location of the stands and of protecting the virtue of the citizens from visions of evil! It is this sort of hypocrisy that one encounters every- where, and the number of such statutes is legion, most of them honored in the breach or perhaps in some compro- mise that brings the law and its administration into public contempt. " There has never been serious attempt to modify our strict Sunday laws," I was told by the prose- cuting attorney in a large southern city. " In the first place it is n't necessary because the laws are n't enforced, and in the second place any attempt to modify them would meet with determined opposition from our good people." This happy philosophy fails to take account of the spas- 49 American Police Systems modic efforts on the part of the good people to enforce the laws. One constantly comes across such situations as the following newspaper item portrays : " Aberdeen, Miss., April 15.— The W. C. T. U. is seeking to have all soda fountains closed on Sunday in the future. This was done once before but it did not last. The W. C. T. U. officials say they are going to hold this time and that they intend to see that the law is carried out to the letter and that every violator is prosecuted to full extent." * Most chiefs of police confess frankly that in these cases they do not act except upon specific complaint. " And then we have to act," said one chief, " but of course nothing ever comes of it because judges and juries will not convict." Said a criminal court judge in Ken- tucky : " On ample evidence furnished by a Church Fed- eration I placed several cases of Sunday violations before the Grand Juries of March, April, May, June, Septem- ber, October and November, 19 15. Not a single indict- ment was returned. It is my experience that prosecutors, judges and juries will not convict people of crime for doing things that are the community habit and prac- tice." 2 A county solicitor from Alabama writes me as follows : " While we have a statute making it unlawful to play ten- nis and golf on Sunday there is no effort made to enforce it. A great deal of effort has been made in the past to convict negroes for playing cards on Sunday, but this has 1 Birmingham Age-Herald, April 16, 1915. 2 Personally communicated. So The American Problem been due to the fee system, and has been looked upon with disfavor by both courts and juries." 1 Clearly it is a bungling arrangement which leaves a borderland between the live and the dead law to be ex- plored at the discretion of individual officers. Our police departments are torn apart by constant controversies as to the existence and location of this shadowy area. Re- cently in Baltimore, the police suddenly descended in a series of raids to arrest all violators of the Sunday law. One hundred and thirteen people were taken into custody in one day and 223 summonses were served. Those ar- rested included druggists, drivers of ice-cream trucks, barbers, and bakery-shop keepers. Two men were ar- rested for balancing their books in their own homes. Selling a child a stick of candy constituted a heinous offense and the buying of a piece of chewing gum or a loaf of bread caused the arrest of the store-keeper. One man was arrested for painting the gate in his back yard. Policemen did not hesitate to approach a man who hap- pened to be smoking a cigar and question him as to how he came in its possession. If satisfactory answers were not forthcoming the man was arrested. Efforts were made to persuade the police to allow a few men to con- tinue working in a garage on the ground that a hundred motor trucks stored there would freeze if not attended to. The police, however, refused, and two arrests were made of men who attempted to preserve their property. 2 " This satire upon religious observance," said the Balti- more American, " bore no fruit of holiness, but on the 1 Letter dated May 8, 1915'. 2 See Baltimore newspapers for December 1, 1919. 51 American Police Systems contrary fermented bitter feeling and vindictiveness. The public was strained almost to the verge of physical violence. The arrests were a disgrace to the city, and even the policemen who under orders made them, and the magistrates who held the preliminary hearings, shrank with disgust from the tasks that were laid upon them." * Equally ludicrous results follow everywhere from legis- lative incursions into the sphere of morals. In Massa- chusetts where golf-playing on Sunday is illegal, a cer- tain golf course lies partly in one township and partly in another. The authorities in one jurisdiction enforce the law; the authorities in the other do not. Consequently on Sunday the members are limited in their play to the holes in the " liberal " township. In Tennessee the law against the sale of cigarettes is enforced in Nashville and disregarded in Memphis. In Alabama the law against Sunday golf and tennis is nowhere enforced, while the law against Sunday baseball is enforced only in Birming- ham. In New Orleans at the time of my visit a police- man was stationed every evening in each of fourteen cabarets where liquor was sold. These officers were on duty from 8 p. m. to 4 a. m. except on Saturday nights, when they were withdrawn at midnight for the reason, as stated to me by the commissioner, that their presence in the cabarets after midnight " might seem to counte- nance the violation of the Sunday liquor law " ! Often the laws are such as to defy enforcement even if they had behind them a substantial body of public opinion. Thus there are laws against kissing, laws against face powder and rouge, laws against ear-rings, laws regulating 1 December 1, 1919. '52 The American Problem the length of women's skirts, laws fixing the size of hat- pins. In Massachusetts one may not play cards for stakes even with friends in the privacy of one's home. In Texas, card-playing on trains is illegal. One would have to scan the ordinances published by the Police Presi- dent of Berlin to find any parallel to the arbitrary regu- lations in regard to private conduct with which American citizens are surrounded. 1 The argument of those who hold the police responsible for our lax observance of these sumptuary laws marches with a stately tread. " The police," they say, " are sworn to enforce all laws. It is not for them to use discretion in determining what laws shall be enforced and what shall not be." This argument fails to take account of the practical situation in which the police find themselves. It is estimated that there are on the average something like 16,000 statutes, federal, state and local, applicable to a given city. 2 To enforce all of them, absolutely, all the time, is of course to any mind but that of the theorist 1 Statutes such as these are frequently enacted apparently on the theory that the function of law is to register the protest of society against wrong. Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School, makes the following comment on this theory : " It is said that Hunt, the agitator, appeared on one occasion before Lord Ellen- borough at circuit, apropos of nothing upon the calendar, to make one of his harangues. After the Chief Justice had explained to him that he was not in a tribunal of general jurisdiction to inquire into every species of wrong throughout the kingdom but only in a court of assize and jail delivery to deliver the jail of that particular county, Hunt exclaimed, ' But, my Lord, I desire to protest.' ' Oh, certainly,' said Lord Ellenborough. ' By all means. Usher ! Take Mr. Hunt into the corridor and allow him to protest as much as he pleases.' Our statute books are full of protests of society against wrong which are as efficacious for practical purposes as the decla- mations of Mr. Hunt in the corridor of Lord Ellenborough's court." (Address before Pennsylvania Bar Association, June 27, 1916.) 2 See Brand Whitlock : Enforcement of Laws in Cities, Indian- apolis, 191°. P- 79- 53 American Police Systems and doctrinaire utterly impossible. With ten times the number of policemen it could not be done. Arthur Woods, formerly police commissioner in New York, put the case as follows : " Those who lightly advise that every law should be vigorously enforced cannot have in contemplation what such a policy would involve : police spies prowling around every household over which a scandal hovers, men and women shadowed by detectives, many respectable people accused unjustly by officious functionaries, immense sums of money spent in putting the entire community under police surveillance. All this would be necessary." * Whether it squares with our ideals or not, the police are forced by practical circum- stances to determine where they shall put the emphasis in the enforcement of the law. Under such circumstances, therefore, it is not surpris- ing that they are disinclined to enforce statutes which lie in the region where public opinion is either uncertain or frankly antagonistic in its attitude toward the things sought to be required or repressed. Mr. Brand Whit- lock defines the situation with admirable clearness : " When the act which violates the law is merely malum prohibitum and would not be wrong in itself, when large numbers of the people, or a majority of the people wish to commit that act or have no objection to others com- mitting it, — such an act, for instance, as playing ball, going to a theatre, trimming a window, running a train, or having ice-cream delivered for the Sunday dinner, — then it becomes impossible to enforce the law without re- 1 From a public address delivered in 1916, the manuscript of which lies before me. 54 The American Problem sorting to violence, namely, by rushing policemen here and there in patrol wagons, and forcibly carrying away men and women to police stations, courts and prisons, and when they are out, doing the same thing over again. This process, when attempted on a large scale, is called a ' crusade,' and is invariably accompanied by disorder and tumult, sometimes by riot, and always engenders hatred and bad feeling. Its results are harmful and it being found to be impossible to sustain the high pitch of excite- ment and even hysteria which are necessary to conduct a crusade properly, the enthusiasm of crusading officials soon subsides, other duties are found to demand atten- tion, and so the crusade dies out, is abandoned, and things are worse than before," 1 Those who would push the enforcement of their ideas to such extremes as these overlook the fact so succinctly stated by former Mayor Jones of Toledo, that law in America is what the people will back up. 2 Its life is its enforcement. Victorious upon paper, it is powerless else- where. The test of its validity is the strength of the social reaction which supports it. " The true liberty of law," said Elihu Root, " is to be found in its development from the life of the people. The enforcement upon the people of law which has its origin only in the mind of a law-maker, has the essence of tyranny and its imposition is the mandate of a conqueror." 3 Said Emerson : " The law is only a memorandum. We are superstitious 1 Whitlock, loc. cit., p. 20, quotation slightly abridged. 2 Ibid., p. 55- 3 From a speech delivered before the Harvard Law School Asso- ciation of New York City, April 1, 1915, the stenographic transcript of which is before me. 55 American Police Systems and esteem the statute somewhat; so much life as it has in the character of living men is its force." * One final adage is always hurled at this position. " The best way to repeal a bad law is to enforce it." This statement is largely fallacious. It is true only when those upon whom the obnoxious law is enforced have the power, through representatives that they themselves elect, to repeal it. When the case is otherwise it is not true. For years it has been the practice of state legislatures, largely representative of rural districts, to attempt the regulation by law of the customs, diversions, sports and appetites of city populations. The city police could en- force these statutes to the continuous discomfort and an- noyance of all the inhabitants without effecting a repeal, because most city populations are represented in their legislatures by minorities. Only too often have these minorities sought in vain to obtain release from laws that are not adapted to the life and habits of the city and that in the nature of things cannot be adapted to them. Meanwhile our police are caught in an embarrassing dilemma, and there is little hope of a sound and healthy basis of police work until our law-making bodies face the fact that men cannot be made good by force. The at- tempt to coerce men to render unto Caesar the things that are God's must always end in failure. The law can- not take the place of the home, the school, the church and other influences by which moral ends are achieved. It cannot be made to assume the whole burden of social control. Permanent advance in human society will not be brought about by night-sticks and patrol wagons, but 1 Essay on Politics. 56 The American Problem by the cultivation, in neighborliness and sympathy, of a public opinion which will reflect its' soundness in the laws it enacts and in the approval it gives to their enforce- ment. 1 1 See Newton D. Baker : Law, Police and Social Problems, Atlantic Monthly, July, 1915 ; Chap. IX of Havelock Ellis' The Task of Social Hygiene, London, 1913 ; Chap. VIII of Fuld's Police Administration, New York, 1910; and Chap. VII of Wodds' Policeman and Public, Yale University Press, 1919. 57 CHAPTER II THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLICE CONTROL The early beginnings: Btoston, New York, Philadelphia, Cincin- nati. — The intermediate period. — Opposition to uniforms. — Mob rule. — The rise of police boards. — The development of state control in police systems. — The New York example of 1857. — The exten- sion of state control systems.— The bi-partisan board. — The passing of the police board. — The character of the development. — The search for mechanical perfection. — Politics in the development of the police. Before considering the present organization of our po- lice machinery it is necessary to trace its development in some detail through the many changing forms it has as- sumed. From no other approach can the different types of control which we find in American municipalities to- day be understood. The Early Beginnings. The beginnings of police organization in America are traceable in the colonial period. Bringing with them the methods of local administration which existed at that time in England, the colonists on the Atlantic seaboard appointed their parish constables * and their civilian 1 On January 1, 1634, Joshua Pratt was " chosen to the office of Constable for Plymouth and sworne to faithfulnes in the same." (Plymouth Colonial Records, 1, 21.) This officer not only served as jailer but executed punishment and penalties and gave warning of marriages approved by civil authority. He furthermore, acted as Sealer of Weights and Measures and Surveyor of Land.' For an 58 Development of American Police Control watch. As early as 1636 a night watch was established in Boston, 1 and thereafter hardly an important settlement existed in New England that did not have, in addition to its military guard, a few ununiformed watchmen. 2 In New York the Sellout 3 and Rattle Watch * of the Dutch Colonists were superseded by the Constables' Watch of the English regime, and the complete English system of local government, including a High Constable, sub-con- stables and watchmen, was imposed by the Dongan Char- ter of i686. B In Philadelphia a night watchman was appointed by the provincial council in 1 700 and the system was begun by which all citizens were obliged to take their turns in the duty of watch and ward. 6 excellent article on early constables in New England and their func- tions see Norman Constables in America by Herbert Baxter Adams, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Sci- ence, No. 8, Baltimore, 1883. 1 By town meeting held February 27, 1636. See Police Records and Recollections by E. H. Savage, Boston, 1865. 2 In 1699 the Province of Massachusetts standardized the custom by passing an act " for keeping watches in Towns," which provided that "in cases where no military watch is established justices of the peace acting with selectmen of the Town, or in case the Town has no justices of the peace, the selectmen alone, shall have authority to appoint and regulate the watch and preserve a ward." (Province Laws, Chap. 65.) 3 An official whose duty it was to watch for infractions of laws and ordinances. * Ratelwacht: So called from the rattles which the watchmen carried to warn of their approach. Rattles were subsequently used in many towns. The Rattle Watch of the Dutch regime was formed in October, 1658, and placed under the control of the Burgomasters. A description of this Watch is found in Our Police Protectors by A. E. Costello, New York, 1885, Chap. 1, and in Memorial History of the City of New York by James Grant Wilson, New York, 1892, Vol. 1, Chap. VII. 5 Under this system the watchmen were supervised by the con- stables elected from the wards. See Philadelphia, 1681-1887, A History of Municipal Develop- ment, by Allinson and Penrose in the Johns Hopkins Studies in His- torical and Political Science, Extra Volume II, Baltimore, 1887. 59 American Police Systems By the early part of the eighteenth century the " night watch " as an institution was well established in the existing towns and cities. Thereafter for nearly a cen- tury and a half it continued as a feature of the urban community and became in time a distinct branch of mu- nicipal administration. 1 Its function was simply the pa- trol of the streets. " Watchmen are required to walk their rounds slowly and silently and now and then stand still and listen " were the orders issued in Boston. 2 In many towns the watch was charged with the additional duty of crying the time of night and the state of the weather — " in a moderate tone," according to the Boston regulations. 3 In some towns, such as Philadelphia and Baltimore, it had the care of the street lamps. From the beginning it appears to have been no more efficient than the Dogberry and Verges type on which it was modeled. As early as 1642 the town government of New Haven issued a proclamation as follows : " Itt is ordered by the court that, from hence forwarde, none of the watchmen shall have liberty to sleep during the watch." 4 The town 1 Under the Montgomerie charter of 1730 the common council of New York was given power to appoint watchmen " and to displace all or any of them and put others in their room, and to add or di- minish the number of them as often as the said common council, or the major part of them, shall think fit." In 1762 the town of Boston petitioned the general court for authority to appoint its own watch, and an act was passed giving the selectmen the right to choose a number of the inhabitants, not exceeding thirty, to serve as watch- men. This was re-enacted in 1801 and remained in force until Bos- ton became a city in 1822. (Savage, loc. cit.) 2 Ibid., p. 24. 3 Ibid., p. 26. * New Haven Town Records II, 31. Quoted in The Republic of New Haven, by Chas. H. Levermore in the Johns Hopkins Univer- sity Studies in Historical and. Political Science, Extra Volume, Baltimore, 1886. 60 Development of American Police Control records of Boston tell a story of similar difficulties. A report of a committee of the Selectmen made in 1819, reads as follows: "January 12: Find too many watchmen doing duty inside. Feb. 3 : At one o'clock visited South Watch: constable asleep. One and one-half o'clock at Center Watch found constable and doorman asleep. Two o'clock at North Watch found constable and door- man asleep and a drunken man kicking at the door to get in." * In Philadelphia the difficulty experienced in inducing the citizens to serve their turn as watchmen led to fre- quent grand jury investigations and presentments. 2 In New York the professional watchmen of the early nine- teenth century were objects of constant ridicule; no drgy among the young men of the town was complete which did not end in upsetting a watch-box and its sleeping occupant or in lassoing an unwary " Leatherhead " as he dozed on his beat. 3 As the nineteenth century progressed and urban popu- lations grew in density the inadequacy of the night watch became increasingly apparent. The character of its per- sonnel and its organization by wards and districts, each more or less independent of the other, prevented its adap- tation to the growing needs of the time. Its ranks were made up for the most part of men who pursued regular 1 Quoted in Savage, loc. cit., p. 58. 2 Allinson and Penrose, loc. cit. The watch became a paid body early in the nineteenth century. 3 Costello, loc. cit., p. 72. The term " Leatherhead " was given on account of the leather helmets worn by some members of the watch. 6l American Police Systems occupations during the day and who added to their in- comes by serving the city at night. " Jaded stevedores, teamsters and mechanics " comprised the New York force. 1 No standards except those of a political nature were applied in selection. One Matthew Young was ap- pointed watchman in Boston " in order that he and his children do not become a Town charge." 2 An investi- gating committee of the Board of Aldermen in New York made the finding that the incumbents were selected for political opinions and not for personal merit and that the term of service of the incumbent was uncertain and often very brief, depending on the change of political party. 3 Another investigation in 1838 showed that watchmen dismissed from one ward for neglect or drunk- enness found service in another. 4 Moreover, such police protection as the watch system afforded was provided only by night — generally between the hours of nine o'clock in the evening and sunrise. At all other times there was no police service of any kind. Even the hours of night serv- ice were not uniform for a whole city. In New York the captains of the watch in the different districts interpreted the word " sunrise '' as varying between three o'clock and five o'clock in the morning. 5 This situation was first met in several towns and cities by the formation of a day police force independent of the night watch. Boston adopted this plan in 1838, es- tablishing a force of six men for day duty. By 1846 1 Costello, loc. cit., p. 72. 2 Quoted from Savage, loc. cit., p. 26. 3 Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1843-44, Doc. No. 53. * Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1838, Doc. No. 62. B Costello, loc. cit. 62 Development of American Police Control this force had grown to thirty men, of whom eight were on duty at night, although there was no connection, di- rect or indirect, with the night-watch. 1 Similar arrange- ments were made in New York. In 1844 the day force in that city consisted of sixteen officers appointed by the mayor, in addition to 108 Sunday officers. 2 The night watch was a separate institution, consisting of twelve captains, twenty-four assistant captains and 1096 watch- men, under the control of the city council. 3 In Cincin- nati a day watch was created in 1842, consisting of two persons selected by the council. Eight years later the council provided for the election by popular vote of six day watchmen for each of the wards of the city. 4 In Philadelphia the will of Stephen Girard, in which he left a large sum to the city to provide for " a competent po- lice " B stimulated more than usual interest in the subject, 1 Savage, loc. cit., pp. 77-87. The night watch at this time con- sisted of ISO men. 2 There was also a force of 100 '" mayor's marshals " who, with the thirty-four constables (two elected from each ward) acted as general peace officers, serving in the courts and doing whatever de- tective work was done at that time. This force was also independ- ent of the night watch. 3 Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1843-44, Doc. No. S3- New York City at this time was divided into six districts, each in charge of a captain and two assistant captains. These men, however, and the force of watchmen under them, served only an alternate nights, one complete company following another, with the acknowl- edged intent of distributing the patronage as widely as possible. Thus one-half the full force was on duty every night. The watch- men patrolled in two-hour shifts, so that only one quarter of the force was on duty at a given time. Watchmen were paid $1.00 a night in summer and $1.25 in winter. The captains received $2.23 a night. 4 Centennial History of Cincinnati by Charles Theodore Greve, Chicago, Biographical Publishing Co., 1904, p. 664. 5 The clause in the will representing this peculiar bequest read as follows : " Second. — To enable the corporation of the city of Philadel- 63 American Police Systems with the result that in 1833 an ordinance was passed pro- viding for 24 policemen to serve by day as well as 120 watchmen by night. 1 This ordinance represented a dis- tinct advance over previous police legislation in any city. It placed the appointing power in the hands of the mayor and provided that vacancies in the higher ranks should be filled as far as practicable " by promoting those who have distinguished themselves by diligence, integrity and skill in an inferior grade." Moreover, it centralized the con- trol of the police force in a single officer known as the " captain," thus eliminating the chaotic district autonomy which had prevailed up to that time. 2 In 1835, however, phia to provide more effectually than they now do for the security of the persons and property of the inhabitants of the said city by a competent police, including a sufficient number of watchmen really suited to the purpose; and to this end I recommend a divi- sion of the city into watch districts of four parts, each under a proper head; and that at least two watchmen shall in each round or station patrol together." To illustrate the way in which this money was applied, the following transcript from the police budget of 1838 is illuminating : Budget for the year $149,266. Amount payable from the Girard Estate 33, 190. Amount required from the City Treasury.... $116,076. (From the Journal of the Select Council, 1838, Appendix No. 20.) 1 Ordinances, 1833, Chap. 552. 2 Five years later a similar endeavor was made in New York to end the chaos resulting from the independence of the watch in the separate districts and an ordinance was passed putting the entire department under a superintendent. (Ordinances of 1838.) This attempt at centralization met with no greater success than in Phila- delphia, and 18 months later the position of superintendent was abol- ished and the old system of twelve independent captains re-estab- lished. The report of the council committee, upon which this step was taken, is significant of the political influences which lay be- hind it: " The change recommended by your Committee appears to be in accordance with the wishes of the Department, a consideration of no small importance to the prosperity, union and harmony of the 64 Development of American Police Control this ordinance was repealed and the old system of district independence was re-established. Thirteen years later, following the example that had been set in Boston and New York, an independent day police force was estab- lished, consisting of 34 policemen, while the old night watch was maintained in its original form. 1 It was soon found that a system of two police forces, one for day and one for night, was from every point of view an impossible arrangement. It not only led to fric- tion and conflict but it failed to correct the conspicuous evils which had developed in the night watch. In mes- sage after message the mayors of Boston, New York and Philadelphia called attention to the need of a new system. This need was emphasized by the increasing disorder of the times and the evident inability of the existing police forces to cope with it. Beginning in 1835 a series of mob riots swept the country. A fight in Boston in 1837 between the fire companies and the Irish involved 15,000 persons and was suppressed only by drastic action of the militia. 2 In Philadelphia the negro riots of 1838 re- sulted in the burning of Pennsylvania Hall and the death of many citizens. 3 These riots again broke out in 1842 and negro churches and meeting places were burned. In 1844 the native American riots lasted for three months, during which large numbers of people were city Watch." Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1839, Doc. No. 16. 1 Ordinances, 1848, Chap. 1157. Providence, R. L, adopted a sepa- rate day police force in 1851 (Ordinance of December 23, 1850) ; Newark in 1852 (Ordinance of August 6, 1852). 2 Savage, loc. cit., p. 77. 3 Philadelphia Journal of the Select Council, 1838 — Appendix No. 61. 65 American Police Systems killed and wounded and much property, including churches and public buildings, was destroyed by the mobs. 1 Riots of a similar nature were of continuous occurrence in Baltimore and New York. In the latter city mob violence due to racial and political differences frequently necessitated the presence of the militia. The Croton riots and the flour and election riots were typical of the lawlessness of the time. In the face of such difficulties the police machinery went utterly to pieces. A handful of unorganized " day policemen " or a few ward watchmen could not hope to contend with serious conditions of disorder. New York took the first practical step to remedy the situation. In 1844 the legislature passed a law creating " a day and night police," which forms the basis of modern police organization in America. This act abolished the watch 'system altogether and established a force of 800 men under the direction of a chief of police appointed by the mayor with the consent of the council. 2 The example set by New York was followed by Boston in 1854 when the old organization of the Watch Department, after an existence of over 200 years, was consolidated with the 1 The Journal of the Select Council contains much information bearing on these riots. 2 Laws of 1844, Chap. 315. The act was put into effect by ordi- nance on May 23, 1845. During the interim the state act was ig- nored by the mayor and common council, whose authority was neces- sary to give it legal effect, and an ordinance was passed providing for a " night and day watch " of 200 men under a superintendent. This ordinance did not affect the original night watch, which was allowed to continue its existence as a separate institution. Mayor Harper's insistence on this new arrangement earned for the " night and day watch " the name " Harper's Police." Their career, which lasted but five months, was terminated when the common council finally agreed to the state act of the previous year. 66 Development of American Police Control day police force, and an organization of 250 men created under the control of a chief appointed by the mayor and council. 1 In the same year the police forces of Phila- delphia and the districts included within the county were consolidated under a marshal elected by the people for two years. 2 Similarly, police forces under a single head were organized in Chicago in 185 1, 3 in New Orleans 4 and Cincinnati in 1852, 5 in Baltimore 6 and Newark 7 in 1857, and in Providence in 1864. 8 The Intermediate Period. The movement toward consolidation and the creation 1 Ordinance of May 17, 1855, printed on p. 391 of Laws and Ordi- nances, Boston, 1856. 2 Laws of Penn., Acts of Assembly, 1854, No. 21. Two years later an act was passed abolishing the office of marshal and in- vesting his powers in a chief of police appointed by the mayor with the approval of the select council (Laws of Penn., 1856, No. 587.) The first attempt to consolidate the police forces of Phila- delphia was made in 1850, when an act was passed (Laws of Penn., 1850, Acts of General Assembly, No. 390) creating an elected marshal of police for the " Philadelphia police district," which included the separately incorporated districts within the county of Philadelphia, to wit: Northern Liberties, Spring Garden, Ken- sington, Richmond, Penn, Southwark and Moyamensing. The marshal was given power to appoint policemen from the lists of nominees submitted by the select and common councils of the city and the commissioners of each of the incorporated districts. The act was faulty in that it failed to give the marshal control of all police bodies within his jurisdiction. The city of Philadelphia still insisted on maintaining its old day and night police. This fault was corrected by the thoroughgoing consolidation act of 1854, above cited. 3 Charter of 1851, Private Laws of 111., 1851, p. 132. 4 Laws of La., 1852, No. 71. 5 Laws of Ohio, 1852, p. 223. 6 Ordinances : 1857, No. 4. It provided for the amalgamation of the night watch and the day police under a marshal appointed an- nually by the mayor with the consent of the councils. 7 Revised Ordinances, 1857, Chap. XII, Sec. 3. 8 Ordinance of August 12, 1864. 6 7 American Police Systems of an executive head in the person of the chief or mar- shal marked a long step forward in the development of municipal police organization. Many difficulties, how- ever, were still to be overcome in shaping the police forces thus formed into effective instruments for public protec- tion. The spoils system had taken a firm grip on popu- lar imagination, and the legislation of the period reflected its sordid point of view. In New York under the Law of 1844 the captains, assistant captains and policemen were appointed for one year only, upon the nomination of the aldermen and assistant aldermen of the wards in which they belonged. In other words the police depart- ment was still a ward affair, used to satisfy the demands for district patronage, and the chief of police was a fig- urehead with no authority and little honor. Said the district attorney of New York County : " There is really no head of police at all, but each captain is a head in his own district, and discipline varies in different wards ac- cording to the attention or skill and tact." x It is small wonder that the new force was the object of vicious at- tack and that some despairing if misguided citizens sought the return of the old watch system. 2 In Baltimore the new force organized in 1857 became the prey of the Know-Nothing party and was employed principally as an instrument of the political faction in power to control elections. " Ruffianism " and " bloody tyranny " were among the milder offenses charged against the force. 3 1 From a letter quoted in New York State Assembly Document 127, 1857- 2 The records of the common council during this period are filled with reports of charges and investigations. 3 Baltimore Sun, November 14, 1859. 68 Development of American Police Control Similar use of the police was made in Cincinnati. Even in Boston, where the spoils system was late in developing, it was not without its early disciples in the police depart- ment. An officer on the force wrote the following sig- nificant paragraph in his published memoirs : " The Marshal seemed to think that things looked a bit squally, and under his direction we very quietly dabbled a little in politics at the election. Our choice was successful and we were in very good spirits at the close of the year, in anticipation of a longer job." 1 That the police force under such conditions should de- velop into an undisciplined, untrained group of place- seekers is not to be wondered at. Indeed, perhaps the most serious difficulty encountered by the police executive was the attempt to apply the regulations of the depart- ment to its own members. The departmental reports of the time indicate a condition of utter lawlessness on the part of the police themselves. Assaulting superior offi- cers, refusing to go on patrol, releasing prisoners from the custody of other policemen, drunkenness, extorting money from prisoners — these were offenses of daily occurrence, committed often with impunity under the pro- tection of a political over-lord. 2 Mayor Fernando Wood of New York in his message to the common council in 1856 emphasized the lack of discipline in the department. " A recollection of former prowess," he said, " or of successful political combats with the laurel still green pre- 1 Savage, loc. cit., p. 91. 2 For example, see list of complaints against the police force for the year 1852. Documents of the N. Y. Board of Aldermen, Doc. No. 53, PP- 1047 ff. 69 American Police Systems vents that submission to the rules and regulations neces- sary in a well organized police corps." 1 In nothing was the undisciplined attitude of the police more clearly shown than in their refusal to wear uni- forms. Although by 1855 a beginning had been made by a few communities in the shape of regulation hats and caps, no city had at this time a completely uniformed force. " Un-American," " undemocratic," " militarism," " King's livery," " a badge of degradation and servitude," " an imitation of royalty " — ideas of this kind formed the basis of opposition to putting policemen in uniform. 2 In New York the policemen were simply guards in citi- zen's clothes, armed with 33-inch clubs. " Every watch- man " — so ran the regulations — " shall wear a medal inside his clothes, suspended round his neck, both day and night when on duty, and shall expose the same when about restoring peace, or on making an arrest, or when performing any duty of that kind." 3 Said a writer in 1S53, referring to the New York police: " If you want one suddenly by night or by day, where will you look for him? And look at their style of dress, some with 1 Documents of the Board of Councilmen, 1856, Doc. No. 5. 2 See Mayor Fernando Wood's address to the police of New York in 1855, in which he tried to win them over to a uniform. Among other arguments was the following; " You draw from the city treasury as pay in the aggregate nearly one million dollars per annum, besides what is given to in- dividuals as presents, which last year amounted, according to the books in the Mayor's office, to about $15,000, and so far this year to about $4,000, not including many valuable presents not to be estimated by money." (Address of May 26, 1855, printed in the council reports of that year.) 3 Documents of the Board of Aldermen — New York City, 1844-45, Doc. No. 30, Sec. 14. 70 Development of American Police Control hats, some with caps, some with coats like Joseph's of old, parti-colored. If they were mustered together they would look like Falstaff's regiment." x Even when the New York police finally adopted a uniform early in 1856, it was not standardized for the whole force. Each ward had its own uniform as it saw fit. The summer uniform in some wards consisted of white duck suits ; other wards adopted colors; some wore straw hats and some felt. 2 In Philadelphia in 1856 the attempt to make the police even wear badges outside their coats met with bitter oppo- sition. Only after much persuasion did Mayor Conrad induce them to adopt regulation caps, and not until late in i860 did they put on complete uniforms. With such lack of discipline the police could hardly be expected to make much impression upon the disorderly conditions which so characterized city life in the decade preceding the Civil War. " They inspire no respect, they create no fear," said a writer in 1853 in relation to the New York police. " Hardly a day passes but the thief or felon turns round and attacks the policeman." 3 Indeed, in many of the larger cities a state of terrorism existed, due to the inability of the authorities to curb the gangs and " clubs " which existed at that time. The mob riots which characterized the forties increased in fury and violence during the fifties. In Philadelphia or- ganized bands of ruffians and thieves were associated under such names as " The Blood Cubs," " The Rats," and " The Schuylkill Rangers," and rioting was of con- 1 London and New York: Their Crime and Police, a pamphlet by J. W. Gerard, New York, 18S3, p. Vj- 2 Costello, loc. cit., p. 129. 3 Gerard, loc. cit., p. 18. 71 American Police Systems tinual occurrence. In some cases houses were fired for purposes of pillage, and the firemen were forcibly pre- vented from attending. Sunday was given over to con- stant street fighting, in which the volunteer fire companies played a prominent and generally provocative part. Sim- ilar conditions existed in Baltimore. In 1859 the Balti- more Sun commented guardedly as follows : " The ' club ' organization in this city . . . can con- centrate a formidable demonstration in any quarter against unorganized individuals and peaceable citizens. It is known to possess a variety of arms, such as mus- kets, revolvers, ' bob-tails,' billies and knuckles, includ- ing everything serviceable in the roughest and deadli- est conflict. . . . The reproach to which our citizens are exposed is that of cowardice. . . . Why, if ruffian- ism is confined to a few, do not the many drive it out or destroy it ? " 1 In Cincinnati the Bedini riots of 1853 were followed by the Know-Nothing riots of 1855. ^ n New York con- ditions were even worse. The composition of the local police force, largely Irish, provoked deep antagonisms, which were enhanced by the bitterness with which local political campaigns were waged. 2 The city was becoming increasingly cosmopolitan, and racial differences were set- 1 Baltimore Sun, November 10, 1859. 2 In 1855 Chief of Police Matsell of New York reported to the Board of Aldermen that 303 out of 1,149 policemen on the force had been born in Ireland. This was probably an understatement, as Mat- sell was at that time under fire for "Irishizing" his force. (See Documents of the Board of Aldermen, 1855.) Strong feeling developed against the foreign composition of the police force in many cities. In Cleveland in 1872 an investigation 72 Development of American Police Control tied in vicious and often fatal gang fights. The Astor Place riots of 185 1, due to jealousy between the followers of the actors Forrest and Macready, resulted in the death of scores of people. Gangs known as " The Bowery Boys " and " The Dead Rabbits," centering in a district called " Five Points," terrorized the city. In 1858 a mob attacked and burned the public hospitals at the quar- antine station, with no interference from the police, de- spite the fact that the intentions of the mob had been openly advertised. Conditions such as these were common, to a greater or less extent, in all American cities in the middle of the nineteenth century. The strong hand of a well organized police was required, but in no city had the difficulties in the way of creating such an organization been overcome. Indeed, there seemed to be little appreciation of the na- ture of the difficulties or of the elementary steps to be taken in building up an effective police force. The citi- zens of that day were groping in the dark. No prece- dents existed to serve as guides or warnings. City popu- lations had grown like magic. Municipal government had suddenly become a complex mechanism with no one skilled enough to handle it or even to grasp its implica- tions. The task of creating rational municipal arrange- ments was obscured by the social and political movements which swept across the middle decades of the nineteenth showed the force to be made up of the following nationalities (Cleveland Daily Herald, Feb. 5, 1872) : American 46 English 9 German 35 Scotch 3 Irish 31 Bohemian 1 Austrian ' 1 73 American Police Systems century with peculiar force. Democracy was rising in a new strength, conscious of power, but vague and uncer- tain as to program and method. The early reaction from the doubt and conservatism of the Federalists had been continued and accentuated by the political theories of Jackson and his followers, and was now reaching its cul- mination. Universal suffrage without property qualifi- cations had become an established fact; religious and property requirements for office holding had been aban- doned ; terms of office had been shortened ; the principle of " rotation in office " had been accepted; even the judiciary had not been spared in the triumphant progress of the newly awakened democratic sentiment. Among the many changes wrought by this tidal wave was the increased participation of the people in the direct election of their officers. Where hitherto the city council had chosen the mayor and other executive officers of local government, they were now chosen by popular elec- tion. This movement, which swept rapidly over the en- tire country, did not spare the police department. As early as 1840 members of the night watch of Cincinnati were elected by citizens of the ward in which they served. 1 In 1850 day watchmen were similarly chosen.? In the same year, as we have seen, the principle of a popularly elected marshal at the head of a police force was estab- lished in Philadelphia. 3 In 1850, also, San Francisco provided for an elective city marshal 4 and six years later 1 Local Laws of Ohio, 1839, p. 157. 2 Greve, loc. cit., p. 664. 3 See ante, p. 67. 4 Laws of Cal., 1850, Chap. 98. 74 Development of American Police Control for an elective chief of police. 1 These examples were followed in Chicago in 185 1, 2 in Cleveland in 1852 3 and in many other towns and cities. Brooklyn elected not only its chief of police but its captains of police as well. 4 These arrangements were not evolved as relating particu- larly to the police department. They represented a phase of the political philosophy of the time. The charter of the city of Cleveland of 1852, which provided for the election of a city marshal, provided also for the election of a civil engineer, a fire engineer, a treasurer, an auditor, a solicitor, a police judge, a superintendent of markets, trustees of the board of water works and three street com- missioners. The pure democracy of a New England town meeting became the ideal of local government B and the. widening scope of popular elections represented the attempt to adapt what had proved successful in small, homogeneous villages to rapidly growing cosmopolitan cities. It would be difficult to overestimate the marked effect 1 Laws of Cal., 1856, Chap. 125. 2 Private Laws of 111., 1851, p. 132. 3 Laws of Ohio, 1852, p. 223. A marshal was elected as early as 1827 in Cincinnati under the city charter that went into effect at that time, but the principle was given up some years before its initiation in Philadelphia. 25 O. L. 40. 4 N. Y. Assembly documents of 1857, No. 127, p. 3. 5 Jefferson's influence contributed to this end. He recommended for Virginia a system of local government modeled on the New England plan. (See his Works, VII, Washington edition, p. 357; also V, 524.) Naturally, he did not foresee the extraordinary growth of city populations which followed later in the century. He insisted that the Americans would continue to be virtuous and retain their democratic form of government as long as they remained an agricultural people, but " when they get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt, as in Europe." (Works, IV, 479.) 75 American Police Systems of this movement upon police organization and municipal government generally. For years it retarded the natural growth of police function in many sections of the United States. Developing into the idea that the choice of ad- ministrative heads of specialized departments can wisely be left to the exigencies of popular elections, it became increasingly difficult of application as city populations grew larger and more complex ; and while today its influ- ence has been for the most part spent, its results are still visible, as we shall see in a later chapter, in the form and structure of many police forces throughout the country. Meanwhile, attention must be turned to another devel- opment of the middle nineteenth century, whose effect upon police organization today is even more pronounced. The Rise of Police Boards. Prior to the formation of modern police forces, initi- ated, as we have seen, in the decade between 1845 and 1855, police arrangements were largely in the control of city councils. The office of mayor had not yet been asso- ciated with broad executive powers, and appointments, as well as administrative responsibilities were lodged in the common council. The decade just referred to, however, witnessed a pronounced decay in these wide powers and the waning influence of the council as an administrative body. This change was undoubtedly due in part to the rising democratic sentiment which brought with it a pro- nounced distrust of the legislative departments of the government, both state and local. It was due, too, to the growing complexity of municipal functions and the increasing difficulties of supervision through committees 76 Development of American Police Control of council. Whatever the cause, council control gave way to an institution which came into instant and wide- spread favor and which has characterized American local government to the present day — the independent admin- istrative board. The origin of this novel experiment, particularly in its relation to police organization, cannot be exactly deter- mined. School boards and poor relief boards had ex- isted prior to this period and it is possible that the new movement was merely a wider application. It is just possible, too, that the English municipal reform bill of !835, with its provision for " watch committees " of the local council, may have suggested a special board of police administrators. Again, it may be that the old council committee which for years had been practically responsi- ble for the police, was the pattern for the new form of control. Apparently the earliest reference to such an ar- rangement was contained in an ordinance proposed in New York in 1844, to effect a reorganization of the police department. This ordinance, which subsequently failed of passage, 1 provided for a " board of police " consisting of the superintendent, the two sub-superintendents and the four directors, one for each of the subdivision dis- tricts. The board was charged with general adminis- trative functions. 2 Somewhat similar arrangements were carried through in Philadelphia in 1850, when under the police act of that year 3 the marshal and the several 1 Instead, an ordinance was passed providing for " Harper's Po- lice." (See note 2, page 66.) 2 The text of this proposed ordinance is noted in the Proceedings of the New York Board of Aldermen, 1843-44 3 Laws of Penn., 1850, No. 239. 71 American Police Systems lieutenants formed a board of police to " make such use- ful rules and regulations as may be required and to keep a chief police station in the city of Philadelphia." Later in the same year another act was passed providing that the police board should consist of the marshal of police, and the presidents of the respective town boards of the communities within the police district. 1 This arrangement was copied in New York in 1853. 2 An administrative body was created, called the " board of police commissioners," consisting of the mayor, the recorder and the city judge. Apart from the fact that the chief of police was selected by the mayor with the board's approval, the board had full powers of appoint- ment and dismissal of all members of the force and was charged with general administrative duties. There- after for forty-eight years the police department of New York was in the hands of some form of police board. As the example set by New York in 1844 of consoli- dating the day and night police under a single head had been followed by all the large cities in the country, so now the Philadelphia board of 1850 and the New York board of 1853 became the general patterns which many communities took pains to copy, although the idea was subjected to endless modification. New Orleans adopted the plan in 1853, creating a board consisting of the mayor and the recorders of the city. 3 Cincinnati adopted it in 1859 providing for a board of four appointed 1 Laws of Perm., 1850, No. 240. This arrangement lasted until 1854. (See note 2, on page 67.) 2 Laws of N. Y., 1853, Chap. 228. 3 Acts of La., 1853, No. 115. 78 Development of American Police Control by the mayor, the police judge, and the city auditor. 1 In the same year San Francisco established a board of three, consisting of the police judge, the president of the board of supervisors and the chief of police 2 serving ex officio. Detroit's board was established in 1861, made up of the mayor and two persons appointed by the com- mon council. 3 Boards were established in St. Louis 4 and Kansas City 5 in 1861, in Buffalo 6 and Cleveland 7 in 1866, in Richmond, 8 Atlanta 9 and other southern cities in the decade beginning 1870. In the years that followed, with the exception of Philadelphia, there was hardly an important city in the country but that experi- mented in some fashion or other with a police board. The modifications of the plan were of infinite vaTiety. Boards were made up of local officers serving ex officio or of outsiders. They ranged in size from boards of two, as in Cleveland 10 to boards of twelve as in Atlanta. 11 They were chosen by popular elections, by district elec- 1 Laws of Ohio, 1859, p. 48. 2 Statutes of Cal., 1859, Chap. 135. This board was given no real functions except to act as a check upon the members of the force in receiving presents and following other professions. 3 Laws of Mich., No. 136. Under this act the board was given disciplinary powers over the members of the force. The chief, however, was appointed and removed by the common council. 4 Laws of Mo., 1861, p. 446. 5 Local Laws of Mo., 1861, p. 63 (Called Session). 6 Laws of N. Y., 1866, Chap. 484. This was the so-called " Niagara Frontier Police Bill," which incorporated Buffalo, Tonawanda and La Salle under the control of a board of police commissioners. Tonawanda and La Salle, however, refused to enter the arrangement and the act took effect for Buffalo alone. It lasted until 1872. 7 Laws of Ohio, 1866, p. 104. 8 Acts of Va., Ses. 1869-70, Chap. 101. 9 Local and Private Laws of Ga., 1874, No. in, Sec. 72. 10 Municipal Code of 1902 : Laws of 1902, Extraordinary Session, PP- 68 ff. . ,. A „ "Laws of Ga., 1908, Part III — Title I, Act No. SIS- 79 American Police Systems tions, by council elections, and by appointment at the hands of mayors, governors, judges, or groups of offi- cials. Occasionally the law named the specific persons to serve on the board, as in New York in 1864 1 and De- troit in 1865. 2 In political complexion, boards were par- tisan, non-partisan, or bi-partisan. In some cases they constituted an integral part of the city government, rising and falling with an administration; in other cases they were independent of any municipal official or their terms of office were not coincident with an existing political regime. The powers of the boards ranged from mere advisory duties to absolute authority. In some cities these powers were measured by the responsibilities im- posed; in others, full responsibility was exacted, while powers were shared with different branches of the mu- nicipal government. In the kaleidoscopic variations and adaptations which followed upon the adoption of the board plan of control, it is difficult to trace the line of police development. A clue presents itself, however, in a movement, initiated in New York in 1857, to introduce in America Sir Robert Peel's method of police control which had been adopted for the metropolitan district of London in 1829. The Rise of State-controlled Police Systems. The law of 1853, as we have seen, gave to New York a board of police commissioners consisting of the mayor, the recorder and the city judge. In taking this step the legislature had hoped to eliminate the political favoritism 1 Laws of N. Y., 1864, Chap. 41. 3 Laws of Mich., 1865, No. 78. 80 Development of American Police Control and ward control which prior to that time had dominated the department. This hope, however, was justified only in part. The recorder and the city judge, serving ex officio, took little interest in the affairs of the force, and control was gradually assumed by the mayor. Police- men were still appointed for one year only and political faithfulness was the single standard imposed. " There is no incentive to promotion," wrote the district attorney of New York County in 1857. " O n the contrary, cap- tains are taken from citizens and placed over lieutenants and sergeants of ten years' experience." 1 The news- papers of the time were filled with similar expressions. " Vicious and inefficient " was the characterization of the New York Times in regard to the police force. 2 Said the New York Tribune: " We all know that at present the police seem pow- erless for good ; that bold and dangerous criminals were never so bold and dangerous; that life and property were never so insecure ; that gambling and prostitution and illegal trade were never so open and shameless ; that the public sentiment of danger from violence was never so acute, nor with so much reason. And why is it? Because the policemen are politicians, getting the places as the reward of political service; because they dare not or will not offend the fellows who have fought shoulder to shoulder with them at the polls." 3 In 1856 a legislative investigating committee — the 1 Assembly Documents of 1857, No. 127, p. 2-3. 2 New York Times, February 28, 1857. 3 New York Tribune, February 5, 1857. 8l American Police Systems first of a long line of such committees to overhaul the municipal affairs of New York — reported on the scan- dalous practices existing in the department and recom- mended that the board of police commissioners be re- organized so that the mayor as ex officio member would serve with four to six competent persons to be elected by the people. 1 This recommendation, which was in line with the democratic sentiment of the time, was not adopted. In 1857, however, the legislature passed the so- called Metropolitan police bill, modeled after " the world renowned Police Act of London and its suburbs." 2 This act 3 consolidated the police districts of the cities of New York and Brooklyn and the counties of Kings, Westchester, and Richmond 4 under a board of five com- missioners appointed by the governor — three from New York, one from Kings, and one from Richmond or West- chester, together with the mayors of New York and Brooklyn. It represented an attempt, more or less in- duced by partisan considerations, to do what the English parliament had done twenty-eight years before when it cre- ated out of a number of small, separate local constabula- 1 Senate Documents of 1856, No. 97. 2 Report of Assembly Committee on Cities and Villages, Assembly Documents of 1857, No. 127, p. 4. 3 Laws of N. Y., 1857, Chap. 569. The bill as reported from the Assembly Committee provided for seven police commissioners — one from each of the counties of Richmond and Westchester, two from Kings county, and three from New York, with the mayors of New York and Brooklyn ex oMcio, " placing the great city in a mi- nority, where her wealth and increasing importance may well per- mit her to be without injury, and which may be useful to check any tendency to extravagant expenditure." (Report of Assembly Com- mittee on Cities and Villages, Assembly Document No. 127.) 4 The towns of Flushing, Jamaica and Newtown, in Queens County, were added to the Metropolitan district by Laws of i860, Chap. 259. 82 Development of American Police Control ries the Metropolitan police force of London. 1 As that force had been placed under the control of a state official, the Home Secretary, so the legislature of 1857 made the governor the appointing power, modifying the grant in characteristic American fashion by requiring the consent of the senate to the appointments. In other respects, how- ever, the analogy between the two laws breaks down. The board form of control had by this time taken a firm hold on official imagination in America and Sir Robert Peel's provision for two commissioners, later changed to a single headed commission, 2 was abandoned in New York for a board of seven members. The New York act, too, reflected the democratic sentiment of the period in limiting the terms of the commissioners to three years, either in fear of the bugaboo of " an office-holding class," or in frank acceptance of Jackson's theory that offices should be " passed around." In Peel's act, on the other hand, no term was fixed for the commissioners, and that parliament intended the administrative head of the force to remain during good behavior was evidenced by the fact that the first incumbent, Sir Richard Mayne, served 39 years as chief of the metropolitan police, building up by his own initiative and statesmanship what is probably, even today, the most efficient police organization in Eu- rope. 3 In still another important respect did the New York act of 1857 differ from the English act from which it 1 10 Geo. IV, Chap. 44. See the author's European Police Sys- tems, Chap.. II. 2 In 1856. 19 and 20 Vict. c. 2. The heads of police under Peel's original act were called "justices." The title "commissioner" was not used until the act of 1839. (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47.) 3 See European Police Systems, Chap. IV. 83 American Police Systems was patterned. It provided that all policemen to be eligible for appointment must have lived at least five years within the limits of the metropolitan district. This clause, which remains to the present time one of the guid- ing principles of American municipal civil service, was written into the act in the interests of party patronage, on the theory that " the jobs belong at home." Sir Rich- ard Mayne, on the other hand, was left free to develop his force as he saw fit, and early in his regime he estab- lished the principle which has effected so vitally the de- velopment of the London force of recruiting the major part of his men outside the metropolitan district. One further dissimilarity between the two acts remains to be pointed out : the widely different spirit in which they were conceived. The English act of 1829 was a non- partisan attempt, scientifically based, to remedy an in- efficient system. The New York act, on the other hand, represented the manoeuvering of a Republican legislature to obtain control over the affairs and particularly the pat- ronage of a Democratic city. 1 To be sure, the situation in New York was desperate and cried for relief. " Mur- ders have increased," said the report of the Assembly Committee. " Highway robberies have multiplied. The escaped convicts of other states and cities and countries and foreign lands have been allowed to congregate to- gether and agree upon schemes to plunder." 2 At the same time a law conceived in a spirit of party advantage 1 The Republicans had swept the state in the elections of 1856, when Governor King was chosen. They repeated their success in 1858 in electing Governor Morgan. 2 Report of Assembly Committee on Cities and Villages, Assem- bly Documents of 1857, Doc. No. 127, p. 2. 84 Development of American Police Control can seldom become an instrument of permanent public benefit. Whatever the merit of the law of 1857, its use- fulness in the development of New York's police force was handicapped by the crass partisanship to which it owed its birth. Of the five members whom the governor appointed on the first board, four were strong Republican party men, while the fifth belonged to the American party. 1 The adoption of state control of local police aroused a storm of bitter protest in New York City. " It is ab- horrent to our pride, adverse to our well-being and good government, and an insult to our intelligence," cried the mayor. 2 " The state authorities treat us as if we were an ignorant province with no rights which they are bound to respect," was the declaration of the board of aldermen. " When will the legislature at Albany cease to consider the functions of our municipal government as mere spoils to satiate the greediness of the followers of a temporary po- litical majority? " 3 Mass meetings were held and suits were brought to test the constitutionality of the new act. 4 1 See New York Times, April 16, 1857. 2 Mayor Fernando Wood in the New York Times, February 19, I857- 3 Board of Aldermen Reports, Vol. 134, p. 456. * The act was held constitutional in 15 N. Y. 532. The opinion of Justice Shankland reads in part as follows: "How has the local authority of that great city (New York) discharged its duty of local government to its citizens of the state at large in protecting them in their liberty, life and property? Let the statistics of crime answer and convict that authority either of remissness in duty or the system of police hitherto in force as radically defective. But let the cause be what it may, which has paralyzed the arm of criminal law, the state is bound to protect the citizen in his life and property irrespective of locality; and if in the judgment of its representa- tives the local authorities have failed to accomplish this object, it was their duty to substitute another system more effectual in exe- cution." (P. 556.) 85 American Police Systems "It lays the axe to the great principle of self-govern- ment " ; " it poisons the very springs of our democratic institutions " ; " it is the invention and device of an un- scrupulous political party" — these were the charges brought against the plan by the indignant citizens of New York. 1 Especially incensed was the electorate that a foreign pattern had been followed in framing the law. " The originators of this act," said one of its critics, " cast their eyes toward the British metropolis and there . . . found the desired example for enslaving American citizens." 2 Even the titles " superintendent " and " inspector," which had been adopted in the new act from the London force, came in for savage criticism. The minority report of the assembly committee stated the case as follows : " As yielding to a desire entertained by many per- sons to copy the exploded ideas of English aristocracy, and who constitute in themselves a bad imitation of the same class of society in Europe, the minority of the Committee cannot permit this opportunity to pass of protesting against the adoption of the worn-out and peculiar official names borne by officers in England and other portions of Europe, as indicative of the par- 1 Assembly Documents of 1858, No. 40, and Senate Documents, No. 46. In a petition presented to the legislature in 1858 the repeal of the law was demanded in the following words : " The people of the Metropolitan police district appeal to the legislature to restore to them their ancient rights. They have been deprived of them against their earnest remonstrance and without cause — rights which have been enjoyed without interruption for a period beyond the memory of living men have been taken away for no higher purpose than to swell partisan triumph and gratify partisan ambition." (Senate Documents of 1858, No. 46, pp. 12 and 13.) 2 Assembly documents of 1858, No. 40, p. 4. 86 Development of American Police Control tiality of such persons to degrade the simplicity of the straightforward and honest use of the English lan- guage by our forefathers, and characteristic of repub- lican institutions." 1 Despite the protests of New York, which culminated in rioting and bloodshed, 2 the metropolitan police force was organized. Thereafter for thirteen years the state con- trolled the policing of New York and Brooklyn and the territory in the surrounding counties. The unhappy po- litical auspices under which this method of control was launched continued for some years a source of friction and misunderstanding. In 1859 a special committee ap- pointed by the senate reported that the force was organ- ized "less with regard to its public duties than to its efficiency as a political machine." 3 The commissioners appointed by the governor were found to be " distin- guished above their fellows as biter partisans." 4 Dur- ing the first half of the following decade, however, the 1 Assembly documents of 1857, No. 149, p. 7. Similar feeling was aroused in Boston when a Metropolitan police measure for that city- was introduced in the Massachusetts legislature in 1863. " The proposers of this measure," said one of its opponents, " hold up for our example the system of London. In monarchies, however, the police force is less the watchdog of the cottage than the bloodhound of authority, ever ready to strike its fangs into the feeble and needy." (Argument of Thomas C. Amory before the Joint Committee of the Legislature, March 15, 1863 — a pamphlet.) 2 Mayor Wood refused to recognize the authority of the commis- sioners appointed by the governor and insisted on maintaining his own municipal police. A series of serious clashes between the two police bodies ensued and it became necessary to call out the militia to put down the riots. The mayor finally submitted to the metro- politan board. A vivid picture of -this period is shown in George W. Waiting's Recollections of a New York Chief of Police, New York, 1887, Chap. 4. 3 Senate documents of 1859, No. 113, p. 4. 4 Ibid., p. 7. 87 American Police Systems new appointments to the police board made by New York's war governor, General Morgan, raised the force to a level of efficiency which it had not previously reached. In 1863 the district attorney of New York county wrote of the police as being " entirely popularized, all local jealousy having subsided." x In his annual message of 1862 Governor Morgan spoke of the metropolitan force as a " system of police which has proved itself under try- ing circumstances and careful scrutiny equal to the ob- jects sought in its establishment." 2 In 1864 Recorder Hoffman in a charge to the Grand Jury of New York County expressed himself as follows: "We have one of the most complete police forces in the world — a force that is approaching as near to perfection as ever can be attained in this city and county of ours." 3 The news- papers of the time reflect similar opinions. The New York Tribune said in 1864: " The police force is loyal to the commissioners be- cause the commissioners are faithful to their duties, without fear or favor. Every man among them knows that his political character has nothing to do with his standing, which depends solely upon the way in which he discharges his duty as a policeman. . . . The com- missioners are respected without regard to their politics 1 This, with other letters, was printed in Massachusetts Senate Documents of 1865, No. 171, at the time when it was proposed in the legislature to adopt state control for Boston's police force. Two years earlier a similar but equally fruitless attempt had the support of Wendell Phillips. (See his speech "On a Metropolitan Police," printed in pamphlet form from the Boston Traveller, April 5, 1863.) 2 Journal of the Senate of the State of New York, January 7, 1862. 3 Mass. Senate Documents of 1865, No. 171. 88 Development of American Police Control because they are devoted to the duties of their office and are fearless and energetic in their performance." * Despite this favorable situation a change in the organ- ization of the board was made in 1864. In i860 the membership of the board had been reduced from five to three and the ex officio participancy of the mayors of New York and Brooklyn had been eliminated. 2 The new law of 1864 increased the membership to four and took the appointing power out of the hands of the governor altogether, vesting it in the entire legislature. This change was due both to the desire of a Republican legis- lature to curb the power of a Democratic governor 3 and to the growing feeling that the political complexion of the board should be bi-partisan. In this latter respect this act marked the beginning of a movement which spread throughout the United States wherever the board form of control had been adopted. The act itself did not directly specify, as was later done in so many cases, that the board should be bi-partisan in membership; it was, however, a gentleman's agreement, thoroughly un- derstood by both political parties, and from that time until state control of police was abolished in 1870 4 the board was composed of two Republicans and two Democrats elected by the legislature. " The satisfaction at this re- sult is very general," said the New York Tribune when 1 New York Tribune, January 4 and 12, 1864. 2 Laws of N. Y., i860, Chap. 259. . s Governor Seymour. He attempted to remove the appointees ot his predecessor, Governor Morgan, alleging as justification the fail- ure of the police properly to handle the draft riots of 1863. *Laws of N. Y., 1870, Chap. 137. 89 American Police Systems the act was passed. " Both parties are represented . . . and the organization of the police will be used, we hope and believe, for the purposes for which it was created, uninfluenced by partisan bias, and for the protection of the life and property of citizens." x The Extension of State-controlled Systems. The development of the state-controlled police force in New York City has been shown in considerable detail because of its pronounced influence upon police organiza- tion and municipal government generally throughout the United States. Following the precedent established in 1857 the state legislature invaded function after function of New York City's government. The park commission, the fire brigade, the health department and other branches of local service were placed under state boards and the example was widely followed in all parts of the country, so that in many cities the duties and powers of the mayor and council were materially circumscribed and reduced. State control of local police bodies became especially popular. The plan was adopted for Baltimore in i860, with a board of four commissioners chosen by the state legislature. 2 With the exception of an interregnum dur- ing the Civil War, when the city was under martial law, 3 1 New York Tribune, March 16, 1864. 2 Laws of Md., i860, Chap. 7. The mayor was also a mem- ber ex officio. The act provided among other things that " no Black Republican or endorser or approver of the Helper Book {The Im- pending Crisis 'by Hinton R. Helper) shall be appointed to any office under said board." The constitutionality of the act was up- held in Baltimore v. State Board of Police, 15 Md. 376. 3 In June, 1861, General Banks of the Federal forces arrested the police commissioners and the marshal of police, Colonel Kane, and himself appointed a board of nine commissioners to manage the force of the department. This condition lasted for more than a year. 90 Development of American Police Control the police department has ever since been controlled by a state board, although the form of the board has several times been altered. 1 A similar arrangement was made for St. Louis in 1861, when the police force was placed under the management of a board of four commissioners appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. 2 Kansas City's board of three commissioners under simi- lar control was instituted in the same year. 3 In the case of both cities the step was influenced by the necessity, arising from the location of Missouri as a border state during the war, of maintaining a strong, centralized con- trol over the forces of order. This arrangement of 1861 has remained practically unaltered to the present day. 4 In the same year, too, the legislature of Illinois provided Chicago with a board of three police commissioners ap- pointed by the governor with the consent of the senate for terms of two, four and six years respectively, their successors to be elected by the citizens of the city. 5 This act was prompted solely by partisan politics. TMe Repub- 1 A board of two citizens elected by the legislature, serving with the mayor ex officio, was established in 1862 (Laws of Md., 1862, Chap. 131). In 1867 a board of three commissioners was established, elected by the legislature, the participancy of the mayor as an ex officio member being omitted (Laws of Md., 1867, Chap. 367)- In 1900 the law was amended so as to provide for a board of three, ap- pointed by the governor with the consent of the senate, not more than two of the three being allowed from the same political party (Laws of Md., 1900, Chap. 15). 2 Laws of Mo., 1861, p. 446. „ x , „ „ , 8 Laws of Mo., 1861 (Gen. Laws, p. 44°; Local Laws of Called Session, p. 63). In both St. Louis and Kansas City the mayor was ex officio a member of the board. 4 The St. Louis law underwent slight amendment in 1899 (Laws of Mo., 1899, p. Si) but the principles remained the same. The Kansas City act was amended the same year (Laws of Mo, 1899, p. 65), the board of three being changed to two, with the mayor ex officio. s Public Laws of 111., 1861, p. 151. 9 1 American Police Systems licans controlled the state government while the city of Chicago was in the hands of the Democrats. The board appointed by the governor in compliance with the act was entirely Republican in complexion and the force for the next two years was managed entirely in the interests of the party. In 1863, however, the Democrats gained con- trol of the legislature and the police act was amended, re- ducing the terms of the commissioners from six to three years and providing for their election at large by the voters of Chicago. 1 Under this arrangement the board passed into the hands of the Democrats and state control in the shape of gubernatorial appointment was elimi- nated. 2 Detroit was the next important city to which a state controlled police board was given. In 1865, against the protests of a large section of the city, a Republican legis- lature passed an act creating a board of four commis- sioners appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. 3 " There is no necessity of any such law as is asked for by some of our Republican politicians," said the Detroit Free Press. " We think the people of the city of Detroit are quite as competent to manage their own affairs as the people of any of the cities and villages of the interior (of the state)." 4 State police control, how- 1 Private Laws of 111., 1863, p. 40. 2 In 1865 the Republicans regained control of the legislature and the police act was again amended, so that the members of the police board were chosen by the electors of Cook County rather than by the electors of the city of Chicago, on the theory that Cook County would be less likely to return a Democratic board. The six-year term was restored. (Private Laws of 111., 1865, p. 284.) 3 Laws of Mich., 1865, No. 78. 4 Detroit Free Press, January 12, and January 20, 1865. A vigor- ous attack was made on the metropolitan bill in the state legislature, on the ground that " such legislation as this is a fatal assault upon 92 Development of American Police Control ever, was instituted and continued in effect in Detroit for twenty-six years. 1 This example was .followed by Cleveland in 1866. 2 The Cleveland law, however, grew out of a wide-spread dissatisfaction with existing police conditions and ap- pears to have been warmly supported by the city's elec- torate. "The Police Department was a huge political machine," said the Cleveland Herald ten years later in reviewing the history of the force. " The chief of po- lice was elected by popular vote. With the election can- vass dawned the halcyon days of the thieves and bum- mers who had votes to give or who could control votes. They were the masters of the police instead of the police being their masters." 3 To correct these conditions the metropolitan system was instituted. It lasted, however, but two years. Skilfully engineered by a political clique, popular prejudice rose against " government from Co- lumbus," and with a change of party control in the legis- lature, local management of police was re-established in the shape of a board of four commissioners elected by the people. 4 the great principle of American freedom." (Detroit Free Press, January 20, 1865.) 1 It was superseded by a board of four commissioners appointed by the mayor. (Local Acts of Mich., 1891, No. 349). In 1871, as a result of a political quarrel, the legislature amended the act so as to take the appointments out of the hands of the governor tem- porarily by specifically designating four men to serve as commis- sioners. This act provided, however, that vacancies thereafter were to be filled by the governor as before. (Laws of Mich., 1871, No. 479.) 2 Laws of Ohio, 1866, p. 104. The act provided for a board of four commissioners appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate, serving with the mayor ex officio. 3 Cleveland Herald, Jan. 17, 1876. 4 Laws of Ohio, 1868, p. 45. This law provided for the election 93 American Police Systems By this time state control of police forces had become a popular principle of government. There was scarcely an important city in the country in which this system was not tried or its adoption strongly urged. Following the example of the northern cities the plan was instituted in New Orleans in 1868 and was maintained for nine years. 1 Cincinnati's force was controlled by a state board from 1877 to 1880 2 and from 1886 to 1902. 3 Indianapolis had a similar system from 1883 to 1S91. 4 Omaha's state board plan was established in 1887 and with some modi- fications lasted for ten years. 5 San Francisco had what virtually amounted to state control through the creation in 1877 of a board appointed by the three judges of the 4th, 12th and 15th judicial districts of California. 8 The of a police commissioner from each of four districts to be estab- lished by the city council. The city council, however, failed to estab- lish the districts, and for the next four years the mayor assumed temporary charge of the force. In 1872 a law was passed providing for a board of four commissioners elected at large (Laws of Ohio, 1872, page 28). Thereafter until 1891, the Cleveland police force was managed by an elective board. 1 Acts of La., 1868, No. 1, as amended by Acts of 1869, No. g2. This law which was drawn by a Republican legislature to control the city of New Orleans enabled the governor to appoint a board of five police commissioners. The police district included not only the city of New Orleans but the parishes of Orleans, Jeffer- son and St. Bernard. The commissioners were given broad powers of subpoena and the right to call out the military. The metropolitan police force created under this act was splen- didly manned and equipped and organized as a military body. Its members were armed with rifles. Growing out of the conditions arising from the Civil War, its evident intent was to over-awe the people of New Orleans. It gave way in 1877 to a police board of four commissioners appointed by the mayor. (Acts of La., 1877, E. S., No. 35-) 2 Laws of Ohio, 1876, p. 70. 3 Laws of Ohio, 1886, p. 47. 4 Laws of Ind., 1883, Chap. 74. 5 Laws of Neb., 1887, Chap. 10. 6 Statutes of Cal., 1877-78, Chap. 558. 94 Development of American Police Control failure of this law to provide for vacancies on the board threw subsequent appointments into the hands of the governor 1 who exercised the power until the "eternal board," as it was called, was superseded by municipal control under the San Francisco Charter of 1900. 2 The police force of Charleston, S. C, was under the control of a state board for one year, 1896-1897. 3 A similar system was in force in fourteen cities of Indiana during the years 1897-1909. 4 Of the large cities in the United States with state ap- pointed police commissions Boston was among the last to adopt the system. It was instituted in 1885 under the belief — frankly avowed at the time — that the laws against the illegal sale of liquor could in no other way be impartially executed.? Since 1878 Boston had had a board of three commissioners appointed by the mayor with the approval of the council. 6 To this board was given the right to license liquor saloons under a law which limited the number of such places in Boston. As licenses were for one year only it was possible to confine them to those applicants who, through campaign contributions or otherwise, stood well with the administration. So close was the relation between the politicians and the po- lice department that a nominee to the board of commis- 1 Under Article V, Sec. 8, of the state constitution, giving the governor power to fill offices for which no other provision was made. 2 Statutes of Cal., 1899, Concurrent and Joint Resolutions, Chap. II. 3 Acts of S. C, 1894, No. 533. *Laws of Ind., 1897, Chap. LIX. The cities were Anderson, Elkhart, Elwood, Hammond, Jeffersonville, Kokomo, Lafayette, Lo- gansport, Marion, Muncie, Michigan City, New Albany, Richmond, Vincennes. 5 See Boston Evening Transcript, Feb. 6, 1885. "Acts of Mass., 1878, Chap. 244. 95 American Police Systems sioners could not be confirmed by the common council without an exact understanding of his attitude toward the liquor interests. 1 This situation gave rise to a demand for a board of police appointed by the governor, and through the instrumentality of a Republican legislature the measure was introduced. Democratic Boston met the proposal with bitter opposition. " To say that Bos- ton has not the intelligence and the will to regulate her own immediate concerns is an insult to her citizens," cried the Globe. " The metropolis of the Commonwealth is robbed of one of the most important functions of self- government in order to gratify the malice of some, the fanatical notions of others, and the political interests of many more." 2 Despite the opposition which was largely political in character the measure was passed 3 and Bos- ton's police department has ever since been under state control. In 1906 the board of three was reduced to a single commissioner 4 — a significant step representative of a broad tendency throughout the country. This de- velopment will be discussed in a later section. The Decline of State Control. In the foregoing survey we have traced the develop- ment of the boards of police appointed by state authority, 1 My authorities are the Evening Transcript for January, February and March, 1885, and the testimony before the Joint Committee of the legislature on the subject of the state board. (See Testimony upon Petition of Amos A. Lawrence and others to establish a Metro- politan Police Commission in the State House, Boston.) 2 March 20 and April 17, 1885. The Boston Evening Transcript supported the measure. _ 3 Acts of Mass., 1885, Chap. 323. This provided for three commis- sioners appointed by the governor and confirmed by the executive council. *Acts of Mass., 1906, Chap. 291. 96 Development of American Police Control noting the subsequent abandonment of the plan which followed in many communities. Of the twenty-three cities in the United States whose populations exceeded 250,000 according to the census estimates of 1915, state controlled police systems had at different times been tried in twelve. 1 In only four of these twelve cities do such sys- tems survive to the present day. 2 The rejection of this type of police management was due in nearly every case to one of two factors: political manoeuvering for party advantage or a belief, more or less sincerely held, in the principle of home rule. Often these two factors were combined, as in Cleveland, for example, where, as we have seen, the cry for home rule was skilfully incited by the local Democratic machine in 1868 to further its own interests. New York's experience with a state board was abruptly terminated in 1870 by the charter through which Tweed fastened his grip on the city's treasury. The state-controlled police force stood in his way and so supine was the public opinion of the time that despite the attacks of the newspapers he swept it aside with an arrogance unsurpassed in American municipal history. " Our in- dependent police department," said the New York Times, " which has given us a disciplined and uniformed force in place of a vagabond band of ragamuffins, will yield obedience to that power which demands free rum and votes and gives us police justices who regularly set free fully one-half of all the villains the police properly ar- rest." 3 " By the passage of the Tweed charter," said 1 Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, In- dianapolis, Kansas City, Mo., New Orleans, New York, San Fran- cisco, St. Louis. 2 Baltimore, Boston, Kansas City and St. Louis. 3 Feb. 9, 1870. 97 American Police Systems the Sun, " New York has become a free city — that is to say, free to be plundered more than ever by Tweed, Sweeny and their chosen friends." 1 Under such circum- stances, New York returned to a municipally controlled police force. Detroit's change from state control to local control after an experience of twenty-six years was due largely to the dissatisfaction which tends to accumulate against any kind or form of governmental mechanism. The ir- resistible temptation of the state authorities to use the police force for political purposes, the occasional weak- nesses which the department displayed, the unpopularity which it incurred in many quarters in its attempts to en- force the sumptuary laws — all these things, consciously and unconsciously, were laid to the form of control. Moreover, the feeling was growing that home rule repre- sented the better principle of municipal management and the new law of 1891 which eliminated a number of state appointed boards was welcomed as an intelligent effort to give the people of Detroit an effective and symmetrical system of self-government. 2 In New Orleans, the metropolitan police force was from the first deeply resented as a Republican measure to overawe a conquered city, and more than one armed clash occurred between its members and the citizens. 3 On sev- eral occasions the Republican legislature was obliged to come to the rescue of the department when the local au- 1 April 8, 1870. 2 See Detroit Evening News, June 3, 1891. 3 A monument in New Orleans commemorates the pitched hattle between the metropolitan police and the citizens which occurred Sept. 14, 1874, in which the former were put to flight. 98 Development of American Police Control thorities of the city or the parishes included within the police jurisdiction failed to supply the necessary funds which the law had assessed. 1 On at least one occasion the protest of the local officers on the question of expense was so vigorous and determined that the legislature passed an act directing the board of commissioners " to reduce the metropolitan police force in such manner and to such extent as economy and the limitations of expenditures empowered by law may require." 2 With the Democrats once again in full control of the legislature short work was made of the metropolitan system. Cincinnati experimented twice with a state-controlled board, the first period covering three years and the second sixteen years. The first experiment was rejected in 1880 without fair trial for reasons which were purely and openly political. The mayor of Cincinnati, under the guise of home rule, sought control of the police to carry the primaries and elections for his party. 3 Once re-estab- lished under municipal management the police entered upon a career of graft and peculation which has made vivid the recollection of the " Boodle Board " even to the present time. The return to state control represented the reaction against the conditions which left so black a page in Cincinnati's municipal history. The second experi- ment with a state board, therefore, beginning in 1886, was given a far better opportunity to prove itself. The end, which came in 1902, was due to circumstances not immediately connected with Cincinnati. The political iSee Acts of La., 1873, No. 64; Acts of 1874, No. 33; Acts of 1875, No. 16. 2 Acts of La., 1874, No. 60. 3 See Cincinnati Enquirer for January and February, 1880. 99 American Police Systems manoeuvering resulting from the fight against the traction interests in Cleveland, together with the attempt to saddle a state police board on the city of Toledo, had led to the revolutionary decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio under which the old mechanical classification of cities was done away with, and almost the entire legal foundation of local government in the state destroyed. 1 The legisla- ture, hastily summoned to meet the extraordinary situ- ation, passed a uniform charter applicable to every city in the state. 2 Under this charter the police department of Cincinnati passed again into the hands of the municipal authorities. In other words, the question of the advan- tages or disadvantages of a state-controlled police force in a particular city was lost sight of in the demand for a uniform system of local government. In this manner it would be possible to show in city after city the abandonment of the plan of state-controlled police boards. Never popular at any time, the system fell before the demand of the cities that they be allowed to handle their own affairs even if they handled them badly. Whatever its merits — and we shall try to ap- praise them in the next chapter in connection with those cities in which the plan still survives — the discrimination which it marked in powers of self-government as between 1 State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones, 66 Ohio State, 453. 2 Laws of Ohio, 1902. Extraordinary Session, pp. 66 ff. The new law called " The municipal code," provided for a police department under two or four " directors " as the local council might determine, not more than half from the same political party. They were ap- pointed by the mayor with the consent of two-thirds of the council for a term of four years. The Cleveland council chose a board of two; the Cincinnati council, a board of four. The law which was palpably designed to keep the police of the cities of Ohio in Re- publican hands represented a perversion to low partisan ends of a great opportunity in municipal reform. IOO Development of American Police Control city and country districts created in the former a rankling sense of injury. Not even the increased efficiency of the police, when it followed under the state-controlled plan, could overcome the stigma which attached to a form of control based, impliedly at least, on the theory that city populations could not be trusted by country legislators to run their own affairs. This idea, not always ex- pressed perhaps, was the underlying objection which in the end proved fatal to the wide adoption of state-con- trolled boards. But it is by no means certain that state control of local police in those cities where it was temporarily tried ac- complished what its sponsors professed in advance to believe, that is, the elimination of politics in the manage- ment of the force. Indeed the evidence indicates just the reverse. The police department was merely lifted from one set of political influences into another. Title was transferred to a new group of political overlords. Con- trol of the police was a prize to be fought for and owned — the legitimate spoils of victory. As we shall see in the next chapter, political considerations can enter through state management as readily as through municipal man- agement, and no mechanical organization or form of ad- ministrative machinery can be made proof against parti- san practices if partisans themselves are set to run it. When the Denver department was under state control in 1893 the governor of Colorado removed the commissioner of police for the openly avowed reason that " the good of the Populist party in Colorado demanded it." x Den- 1 See History of the Government of Denver by Clyde Lyndon King. Denver, 1911, pp. 211-213. IOI American Police Systems ver had long been irretrievably Republican and little sym- pathy existed between the city and the state administra- tion. In the bitter struggle which subsequently developed the governor was obliged to call out the militia to enforce his decrees. State control of police in Providence, Rhode Island, was marked by continuous political skirmishes be- tween the Democratic governor and the Republican senate over the appointments to the police board. Similarly, under state control in Minneapolis from 1889 to 1891 political bargaining and party advancement were the chief factors in the administration of the force. In other words, there was little to choose between state board and municipal board. One was as permeated with politics as the other. The question was a matter not of principle but of party victory. State control represented the tactics employed by one party to seize the elections, and municipal control, the tactics of the other party, and, as in Cincinnati for example, the type of board see-sawed back and forth as party victory alternated. The matter was never fought out on its merits, never tested from an unbiased, disinterested standpoint. Seldom if ever were the people of a city given an opportunity to pass fairly and directly upon the question of retaining after trial the state controlled form of organization. In most cases, as we have seen, the question was complicated by political cross- currents and obscured by extraneous and irrelevant con- troversies, and changes were made from state control to local control without adequate discussion and with no at- tempt to ascertain whether the former system had or had not proved a success. 102 Development of American Police Control The Bi-partisan Board. The state controlled board was ostensibly a method for taking the police department out of politics. Another method, devised for the same end and applied alike to state and municipal boards, was the so-called bi-partisan principle. This principle was instituted, as we have seen, in New York in 1864 when the state board of police was increased from three members to four members on the understanding that two should be appointed from the Re- publican party and two from the Democratic. This ar- rangement was continued through the Tweed charter of 1870 until 1873 when an act was passed increasing the board to five members. 1 The following year, however, the number was restored to four, 2 and thereafter for 27 years this form of control was in effect. Until 1895 no mention was made in the law of the bi-partisan principle, although, with the exception of two or three instances, 3 it was rigorously adhered to as an unwritten understand- ing. Upon the recommendation of the Lexow Commis- sion in 1895, however, the bi-partisan theory was written iLaws of N. Y., 1873, Chap. 335- The provision was savagely assailed by the New York newspapers. " The only defense for the provision," said the New York Times, " is that it will afford places for additional dependents on political patronage. (April 2, 187-3J 2 Laws of N. Y., 1874, Chap. 300. "As for the 'fifth commis- sioner,'" said the New York Times, "he is only a battle ground for parties, and it will be an excellent plan to get rid of him alto- gether. ... To insure equal justice for both sides let both be equally represented." (April 23, 1874.) , , _ ... .. „„ m « In 1892, for example, when the term of a Republican police com- missioner expired, Mayor Grant filled the vacancy by the selection of a Democrat, and until 1894 the commission consisted ot a Re- publican commissioner, an Independent Democrat commissioner, and two Tammany commissioners. (See report of the Lexow Commis- sion, page 66.) 103 American Police Systems into the law, 1 remaining in effect until the present single commissioner system was adopted in 1901. 2 The bi-partisan principle was eagerly seized upon throughout the country wherever the board form of con- trol was in force. Based upon the theory that politics can never be eliminated from the management of the po- lice department it was adopted as a fair and practical ar- rangement of minimizing the effects of politics by set- ting one partisan administrator to watch another. The fact that the machinery of elections was largely under the jurisdiction of the police gave the argument for the bi- partisan system additional force. It was hoped that natural distrust of each other by the different party repre- sentatives on the board would breed a vigilance fatal to the political manoeuvering of any one of them, and that from this condition a genuinely non-partisan management of the force could be secured. As the re- port of the Lexow Commission in New York expressed it : "A bi-partisan board conveys a distinct declaration to its subordinates that they must conduct themselves upon non-partisan lines, and that neither favor, reward, nor promotion may be expected from aggressive parti- sanship." 3 Upon this theory, therefore, the bi-partisan principle was widely adopted — at first, in the form of a tacit un- derstanding not recognized by law, as in New York and Baltimore, but later written into the law itself. Such an *Laws of N. Y., 1895, Chap. 569. Section 1 read as follows: "At no time shall more than two such commissioners belong to the same political party, nor be of the same political opinion on state and national issues." 2 Laws of N. Y., 1901, Chap. 33. 3 Report of the Lexow Commission, p. 58. IO4 Development of American Police Control act was passed for Indianapolis 1 in 1883. Boston, 2 Mil- waukee, 3 and Newark 4 followed in 1885. Cincinnati's state board of 1886 B was bi-partisan and the plan was continued in the municipal boards established in all the cities of Ohio by the general code of 1902. 6 Similarly the bi-partisan principle was adopted in Minneapolis in the municipal board of 1887 7 and the state board of 1889. 8 Omaha adopted the system in her state board of 1887. 9 San Francisco's bi-partisan board was in- augurated in 1899 10 and Baltimore's in 1900. u The bi-partisan principle proved in most cases an un- successful experiment. Indeed the theory that police ad- ministrators are to be selected not on the grounds of fit- ness but because they are party favorites had far-reaching and often disastrous consequences. Under this system the boards were composed of extreme and often un- scrupulous representatives, chosen equally from the two dominant parties, and subservient to the bosses to whom they owed their appointments. Representing on the board not the public but their political organizations they were regarded as under obligation to gain for their par- ties all possible advantages in the way of patronage and power. When Mayor Van Wyck of New York in 1898 1 Laws of Ind., 1883, Chap. 74- 2 Acts of Mass., 1885, Chap. 323. 3 Laws of Wis., 1885, Vol. II, Chap. 378. * General Public Laws of N. J., 1885, Chap. 250. 5 Laws of Ohio, 1886, p. 47- 6 Laws of Ohio, 1902, Extraordinary Session, p. 66. 7 Special Laws of Minn., 1887, Chap. g. 8 Special Laws of Minn., 1889, Chap. 51. 9 Laws of Neb., 1887, Chap. 10. 10 Statutes of Cal., 1899, Concurrent and Joint Resolutions, Chap. II. 11 Laws of Md., 1900, Chap. 15. 105 American Police Systems appointed on the police board two Tammany district leaders and two Republican district leaders he followed a custom well established not only in his own city but wherever the bi-partisan principle was in effect. It was the logical outcome of the theory that non-partisan ad- ministration can be secured only through conflicting par- tisan interests. The chaos and corruption which fol- lowed in the New York police department during the Van Wyck administration were directly traceable to the fact that the police commissioners had been appointed not to cooperate for public advantage but to fight each other for party gain. The bi-partisan board failed in its principal object. It aimed to eliminate politics by taking the police depart- ment out of the hands of a single party; it actually strengthened the grip of politics on the department by turning it over to the keeping of both parties. Instead of a non-partisan administration it resulted in a pooling of interests and spoils by the party representatives on the board and a subsequent division highly advantageous to both political organizations. In many cases the commis- sioners did not hesitate to combine against public inter- ests for party gain. For years in New York under the bi-partisan system appointments and promotions were officially " credited " to the commissioners responsible for them and no one commissioner was allowed to have more than his share. 1 The glamor of justice about the ar- rangement hid its vicious aspects and concealed the ob- vious truth that there is essentially no Republican way and no Democratic way of managing a police department. 1 Personally communicated. 106 Development of American Police Control The bi-partisan plan of police control has been largely discarded throughout the United States. New York, Boston, Cleveland, Toledo, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, Buf- falo, Albany and Omaha have all relinquished it, and at the present time it is retained in only four of the larger cities : Baltimore, San Francisco, Milwaukee and Indian- apolis. The Passing of the Police Board. The abandonment of the bi-partisan system of control, which we have discussed in the preceding section, was due not alone to the glaring weaknesses which it developed. The whole plan of administrative control through special boards fell gradually into disuse and the bi-partisan prin- ciple as a phase or outgrowth of that system shared the same fate. The conception of a multiple-headed executive, to which the board method of management easily lends itself, was foredoomed to failure. In its attempt to make a group of people jointly answerable for the supervision of exacting details of administration, it violates the cardi- nal principle of effective control. Ultimate executive responsibility is not readily divisible among officers of equal rank and authority, nor can the burden of leader- ship be distributed among a group. This is the point of weakness in the board plan as related to municipal enter- prise. Resulting from a confused attempt to apply legis- lative analogies to executive functions, it fails to develop the responsible leadership essential to successful manage- ment. Divided in its counsels, decentralized in its au- thority, with no unity of policy or solidarity of action, it 107 American Police Systems has gradually given place to a more effective method of control. In its adaptation to police departments the board form of management has shown perhaps its greatest faults. The function of police administration is seldom deliber- ative in the sense in which the word is used to denote the legitimate activities of a board of directors or other pol- icy-forming organ of control. On the contrary, proper police management involves a degree of initiative, de- cisiveness and vigor which can be displayed only in single- headed leadership. " It is a matter of historical and gov- ernmental experience," said Governor Guild of Massa- chusetts, in his message to the legislature advocating a single police commissioner for Boston, " that inefficiency, if not disaster, follows divided responsibility in the con- trol of any organized body of men, where discipline and esprit de corps must be the mainspring of success." x The growing belief in the effectiveness of single-headed leadership has gradually undermined the board system of management in American police departments. In only 14 of the 52 cities over 100,000 population which at one time had the board form of police control does that form exist at the present time. In all other cases the one-man-control system has been substituted, generally in the shape of a commissioner or chief appointed by local authority, or, in the case of commission-governed cities, elected by the people. New York 2 and Detroit 3 abol- 1 Massachusetts Senate Documents of 1906, No. 1, p. 28. It can- not be denied that political considerations may have had some influ- ence on this opinion. 2 Laws of N. Y., 1901, Chap. 33. 3 Charter of 1901, Chap. 227. I08 Development of American Police Control ished their police boards and adopted the one commis- sioner plan in 1901, Boston in 1906, 1 Cleveland in 1908, 2 Cincinnati in 1908, 3 Birmingham, Alabama, in 191 1, 4 Omaha in 1912, 5 St. Paul in 1914, 6 Buffalo in 1916. 7 Philadelphia as we have already seen, is the one large city which, with the exception of a nondescript type of board from 1850 to 1854, has consistently clung to the principle of single-headed leadership in the management of her po- lice department. 8 A similar plan of control has been maintained in Chicago since the adoption of the present charter in 1875. 9 The Character of the Development. The history of the development of American police or- ganization which we have briefly discussed in the fore- going sections presents one characteristic of outstanding prominence : the machinery of management and control has been subjected to endless experiment and modifica- tion. Change rather than stability has marked its course. With the exception of one or two cities, no carefully thought out plan of supervision has been fixed upon and maintained as a type most likely to meet legitimate de- 1 Acts of Mass., 1906, Chap. 291. 2 Laws of Ohio, 1908, p. 562. Cleveland previously had single- headed management under the so-called " Federal " plan which went into effect in 1891 (Laws of Ohio, 1891, p. 105) providing for a "Director of Police" appointed by the Mayor. This arrangement was superseded by the board form of control which the ill-advised Municipal Code of 1902 made necessary. (See ante, p. 100.) 3 Laws of Ohio, 1908, p. 562. * General Laws of Ala., 1911, No. 163. 5 Laws of Neb., 191 1, Chap. 24. 6 Charter of 1912, Chap. 18. 7 Laws of N. Y., 1914, Chap. 217. 8 See ante, pp. 77-78. 9 Laws of 111., 1875, p. 43- IO9 American Police Systems mands for years to come. Instead, American cities, as if in panic, have rushed from one device to another, allow- ing little or no time for the experiment last installed to prove itself, apparently under the belief that somewhere or in some fashion a form of machinery could be found or developed which would ensure perpetual efficiency and guarantee the lasting integrity of its operators. With this idea, cities have tried partisan boards, bi-partisan boards, and non-partisan boards; they have lodged the appoint- ment of their heads of police in the hands of governors, legislatures, mayors, common councils, boards of public works, attorney generals, judges of the circuit court, pro- bate judges, state auditors, state commissioners of "public buildings, and the people themselves; they have labori- ously written int<"> their laws elaborately devised checks and balances, covering every possible contingency of ad- ministration and every item of probable expense; they have borrowed the plans of other cities which happened at the time to have honest police executives, or they have combined the plans of a number of communities in fanci- ful arrangements of their own, in which, as likely as not, an elaborately chosen board of commissioners with full responsibility and no powers was superimposed on a chief of police with wide powers and no responsibility. For some years in Dayton, Ohio, the police department was administered by a bi-partisan board of four police direc- tors appointed by a bi-partisan board of six tax commis- sioners, who in turn were appointed by the judges of the circuit court, these last officials being elected by the peo- ple! 1 1 Sg O. L. 106. no Development of American Police Control In this blind search for the " ideal system," this belief in the efficacy of checks and balances, if only the proper combination can be discovered, continuity has been sacri- ficed, and the existing arrangements have again and again been overturned. In the 91 years in which the Metro- politan police organization of London has been in exist- ence, but one substantial change has been made in its ma- chinery of control, and that was in 1856, when, after six years of trial with a single-headed commission the act of 1829 providing for two commissioners was altered to fit the new condition. In the 75 years in which New York City may legitimately be said to have had a regular police force nine fundamental changes, involving distinct breaks with the past, have occurred in the framework of her or- ganization. Aldermanic control gave way to local board- control which in turn was superseded by a state board of seven; the membership of seven was reduced to three and then increased to four ; the board was returned to munici- pal control and later its membership increased to five; the following year it was reduced again to four; later still, it was made bi-partisan and finally the single commis- sioner plan was adopted. Comparisons of this kind could be drawn without num- ber. Amid all the vicissitudes of empire, kingdom and republic, the control of the Paris police organization has remained practically without change from the hour it was established by Napoleon over a century ago. Its prefect is today appointed by the Ministry of the Interior with the approval of the head of the state as he was in Fouche's time. The same principle of continuity holds for Berlin and Vienna. Similarly the machinery of police control in American Police Systems in the provincial cities of England — Liverpool, Man- chester, Birmingham, Bristol — has been left substantially without modification since the Municipal Reform Act of 1853. In Cincinnati, on the other hand — to pick out an American city at random — ten fundamental organic changes have occurred in a little over fifty years. Their nature is shown in the following table : Prior to 1859 — Police under control of mayor. 1859 — Board of four commissioners appointed by mayor, police judge, and city auditor. i860 — Board abolished — chief of police appointed by mayor. 1873 — Board of four commissioners elected by people. 1874 — Control by mayor re-established. 1877 — Board of five commissioners appointed by gov- ernor. 1880 — Control by mayor re-established. 1885 — Board of three commissioners appointed by local Board of Public Works. 1886 — Board of four commissioners appointed by gov- ernor. 1902 — Board of four commissioners appointed by mayor and council. 1910 — Director of Public Safety appointed by mayor. New Orleans, another typical city, shows the following changes in the frame work of the police management: Prior to 1868 — Police under control of mayor. 1868 — Board of five commissioners appointed by gov- ernor. 1877 — Board of four commissioners appointed by mayor. 112 Development of American Police Control 1888 — Board of six commissioners elected by common council. 1898 — Board of seven commissioners elected by common council. ' 1904 — Board of two commissioners appointed by mayor, serving with mayor. I9 12 — Board of three commissioners consisting of mayor, commissioner of public safety and civil- ian chosen by common council. For this continuous alteration of the police machinery, this willingness to experiment with new forms and de- vices, one factor, as we have already suggested, is in part responsible — the apparently ineradicable belief of the American people that in the right mechanical arrangement of a municipal department, if only it can be discovered, lies the solution of the ills that trouble us. If scandal occurs in the police department, if the force becomes the tool of the politician in carrying elections, if headquarters is remiss in enforcing laws against crime and vice, the belief gains ground that something is wrong with the machinery of organization, some necessary check miss- ing, some element of responsibility inaccurately placed. The law makers, therefore, under public pressure, begin to tinker with the mechanism. A patch is added here, a cog-wheel inserted there. If the force has been under the control of the municipal authorities it is handed over to the governor; if under the control of the governor, it is given to the municipal authorities. If the board has had large powers, they are taken away and shared with the chief, or vice versa the chief's powers are conferred ex- clusively upon the board. If the common council is ii3 American Police Systems under suspicion its authority over the police is given to the board of public works or to the judge of the circuit court or to any other body or officer temporarily possess- ing public confidence. The reports of investigating com- missioners the country over, notably the Lexow Commis- sion in New York in 1895, furnish striking examples of this kind of thinking. Whatever the arrangement of the police machinery, it is wrong and must be changed, and an ideal new system installed. This belief in the occult qualities of mechanical or- ganization leaves strangely out of consideration the char- acter and ingenuity of men. It is a trite remark, but it- must be repeated, that no form or arrangement of or- ganization is proof against corruption or inefficiency if corrupt or inefficient men are allowed to operate it. The character of the administrator is of far greater conse- quence in the upbuilding of a police force than the kind of administrative machinery through which he works. A dishonest or incompetent police executive will ruin the best of organizations just as an able executive will make his effectiveness felt in spite of the handicaps of poor mechanism. State control of police generally works well in Baltimore and wretchedly in Kansas City ; at this mo- ment municipal control is a success in Los Angeles and a disgrace in Chicago. It must not be forgotten, of course, that there are both good and bad forms of organization. As we have al- ready seen in this chapter, responsibility may be dissi- pated and power and authority lost or scattered through ineffective administrative machinery. It is, indeed, highly important that leadership be established and re- 114 Development of American Police Control sponsibility definitized, and constructive thought is neces- sary to build a machine in which these ends are accom- plished. But in the long run it is the quality of leader- ship that counts. No system of control is guaranteed to produce adequate results without relation to the men who operate it. No automatic type of organization exists through which competency and effectiveness are assured. In our continued search for such a self -regulating ar- rangement we have been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. Another factor, perhaps more important, is responsible for the constant alteration in our police machinery. It is summed up in the word politics. Enough has been said of it in this chapter, doubtless, to disclose its relation to our phenomenon of change. There is scarcely a city in the United States in which the police department has not been used as the ladder by which political organizations have crawled to power. Obstacles in the way of com- plete dominance by party machines have been overcome by the easy processes of law, and police departments have been revamped and reshaped, not in the interests of public service, but to facilitate the operation of the spoils system or strengthen the grip of some political machine. Exam- ples of this are legion; no state in the country has been free of it. Of the nine fundamental changes in New York's police organization in 75 years scarcely half were made in good faith. The struggle for party dominance, the desire of " jobs " for the faithful, the determination to control the machinery of elections were the contribut- ing motives in the principal alterations. This remark is equally true of Chicago, San Francisco, New Orleans, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Omaha, and a dozen others. In 115 American Police Systems many cities, indeed, no attempt has been made to conceal the real purpose of proposed changes, and violent alter- ations have been carried through on the open and ac- knowledged basis of party interest. Of this kind not a dozen but literally scores of instances could be cited, gath- ered from every city visited. In many of these instances, the cities have been perhaps more sinned against than sinning; they have been victims of party rivalry in the legislature, pawns in the clash of party interests for the control of the state. Our political history discloses noth- ing more sinister than the continuous legislative interfer- ence in municipal arrangements for partisan advantage. On the theory that what the state has given the state can take away, the administrative machinery of city govern- ment has periodically been pulled apart and rearranged, as party interests have dictated. The effect of this treatment on police organization has been peculiarly disastrous. The department has been stunted and dwarfed, with no opportunity for rational development. It has been shaped as a tool of party success rather than an instrument of public service. Regarded as the legitimate spoils of vic- tory at the polls, it has been prostituted to base and selfish purposes. One looks in vain for parallel conditions in the cities of England, France, or Switzerland. In these countries the mechanism of the police department is the prod- uct not of political expediency but of painstaking care and deliberation. It has been thoughtfully put together as an instrument of vast public usefulness. The best brains obtainable have been devoted to the task. When the growing needs of the department have indicated 116 Development of American Police Control the necessity for change it has been brought about care- fully and conscientiously, with the single idea of pro- ducing a better machine. As a result we find such ad- mirably articulated organizations as Scotland Yard in London, and the Praesidium in Vienna, with years of efficient police service to their credit. No tinkering patch- work has checked their development ; no sacrifice to politi- cal necessity has interfered with the orderly operation of their administrative machinery. Planned deliberately on a basis of efficiency, the product of excellent workman- ship and unselfish ideals of public service, they have run for years without hitch or breakdown. The contrast between the old world and the new in re- spect to the evolution of local government leaves little to the credit of America. One turns from the history of our municipal development with the wish that most of its sordid story could be blotted out. 117 CHAPTER III THE PRESENT STATE OF POLICE CONTROL State versus municipal control. — Successes of state control. — Failures of state control. — State control in relation to home rule problems. — Applicability of state control. — Board control versus single-headed control. — Weaknesses of board control.— Board ad- ministration a part time task. — Lack of unity in board administra- tion. — Conflict of authority in board administration. — Politics in board administration. — Elective boards. — Bi-partisan boards. — The development of single headed control. In the foregoing chapter we have followed the develop- ment of police organization in America from the simple night watch of early days to the elaborated forms of ad- ministration which were evolved during the latter half of the nineteenth century. We have seen the rise of that anomalous instrument of supervision, the executive board, with its many and often capricious modifications, superseded in part within recent years by the responsible leadership of single-headed management. We have ob- served the wide popularity of direct state control of local forces and its subsequent abandonment, except in a few instances, in favor of home rule. The line of progress has led toward concentrated responsibility under local rather than state supervision. This development, however, has been by no means uni- form or consistent. Rather, the cities have straggled along unsymmetrically and without plan, following first 118 The Present State of Police Control one path and then another, undiscouraged in attempting new courses by the previous failures of other munici- palities. While, therefore, it is possible to perceive a general trend in the evolution of police control, one can- not classify the development according to sharply defined periods. The progress has been too irregular and dis- torted for orderly cross section analysis. Today police organizations are to be found in every stage of growth. Archaic and modern forms exist side by side in the same state and reversions to older types are often encountered. The historical survey which we have been making has shown us something of the relation and development of these forms of control. Our present task is to examine their practical working and operation in the cities in which they are now in effect. I. STATE VERSUS MUNICIPAL CONTROL Of the ten largest cities in the United States, the police departments of three — Boston, Baltimore, and St. Louis — are under direct state control and their heads are ap- pointed by the state governors. Kansas City and St. Joseph in Missouri, Fall River in Massachusetts, Lewis- ton in Maine, 1 and a few cities and towns in New Hamp- shire 2 and Rhode Island 3 are under similar control. In Montgomery, Ala., the police department is administered by a board of public safety elected by the State Senate of Alabama. 4 In none of the larger of these cities does 1 Private and Special Laws of Me., 1917, Chap. 37. 2 Berlin, Dover, Exeter, Laconia, Manchester, Nashua, Ports- mouth and Somersworth. ' Laws of N. H., 1913, Chap. 148. s Cumberland (Acts and Resolves of R. I., 1913, Chap. 993). 4 General Laws of Ala., 1915, Act No. 29, sec. 27. 119 American Police Systems the arrangement represent an experiment recently under- taken. It has been in effect in Baltimore, St. Louis and Kansas City since the outbreak of the Civil War; in Bos- ton since 1885. The theoretical argument for state control has been many times repeated. The police are engaged primarily in the enforcement of laws enacted by the legislature and intended to operate uniformly throughout the state. In the performance of this function, therefore, they are agents not of the municipality which hires them but of the state whose laws they are sworn to execute. This point has been made repeatedly by our courts. " Police officers can in no sense be regarded as agents or servants of the city," said the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. " Their duties are of a public nature. Their appointment is devolved on cities and towns by the legislature as a convenient mode of exercising a function of govern- ment." 1 In other words, the interest of the state in efficient police administration is vital and permanent and its right to see that its mandates are enforced is of fun- damental importance. 2 Back of this theoretical justification of state control lies the consideration of necessity. Officers under local supervision have been easily reached by local influence. State control is more detached and inaccessible and pres- 1 Buttrick v. The City of Lowell, I Allen (Mass.) 172. See also Culver v. Streator, 130 Illinois, 238, and Prather v. Lexington, 13 B. Monroe, 559. These cases are discussed by Dr. Goodnow in his Municipal Home Rule, New York, 1906. 2 The argument is admirably expressed in The Control of Police, by A. R. Hatton, printed in Western Reserve University Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 3. See also Principles and Methods of Municipal Administration by William Bennett Munro, New York, 1916, pp. 268-273. I20 The Present State of Police Control sure cannot be so immediately or directly applied. The very propinquity of the law-enforcing machinery to the people affected by its operation has often been a source of weakness. Moreover, city populations have in many cases been apathetic and contented, and municipal ad- ministrations have consequently remained in unwise and dishonest hands. Under such circumstances, anything approaching effective police arrangements has been im- possible. Mismanagement and corruption have left life and property inadequately protected. The excise laws to which greater importance has generally been attached by country than by city legislative representatives have been dishonestly enforced or unenforced altogether and other sumptuary statutes have been disregarded. The state, therefore, has been obliged to supersede its derelict agents and through direct control to insure the execution of its will. Such, at least, is the argument by which those in favor of state control have supported their claims. Successes of State Control. That the application of this principle has in a number of instances proved successful — at least that it has brought about more satisfactory police conditions — can- not be disputed. Of this point Boston furnishes a strik- ing example. The Boston force has recently been dis- credited by the unfortunate strike which terminated the careers of most of its members. It must not be forgot- ten, however 1 , that for many years Boston maintained a police department, under state control, which in point of personnel and the general satisfaction which its operation 121 American Police Systems' afforded stood well in the lead of police organizations throughout the country. During thirty years it was prac- tically alone among American police d«partments in its freedom from scandal. Particularly after the creation of single-headed management in 1906, the administration of the police force was conducted with a disregard for po- litical considerations rarely encountered in American cities. " In my ten years of service (as commissioner) under five governors representing the two leading politi- cal parties," said the police commissioner in 19 16, "I have never received from any of them a request or an in- timation designed to influence my official action, through favor towards them or their friends, on any subject what- ever. On the contrary, they have uniformly assured me of their desire that I should maintain the independence of judgment and conduct which was the basic condition of my acceptance of office." * That such conditions could have been achieved under municipal control in Boston is difficult to believe. The city administration has for years been dominated by par- tisan politics and marked by many of the unhappy fea- tures too often typical of our municipal government. Under such control the police department could not have maintained the public confidence which it long enjoyed. The condition of the Boston police force in this en- vironment is explicable simply on the basis of the average superior quality of the state government. Whether du£ to a large foreign population, or some condition of civic 1 Boston Police Department, General Order No. 1,063, June 5, 1916. Issued by Stephen O'Meara upon the completion of ten years of continual service as police commissioner. 122 The Present State of Police Control inertia, or factors peculiarly local — whatever the cause may be — the government elected by the city of Boston has generally been below the level of the government elected by the state of Massachusetts. For many years men of larger capacity have been secured for the adminis- tration of the state than of the city. As a result, better appointments have been made to the police commission- ership and political interference is less pronounced than could have been expected under local supervision. The matter centers entirely around the character of the ap- pointing officers, and state control is acquiesced in, even with its somewhat invidious implication, because in the long run the chances seem better of electing good gover- nors of Massachusetts than of electing good mayors in Boston. The case is even more strikingly illustrated in connec- tion with the police department of Fall River, in the same state, which has been under state control since 1894. Only thirteen per cent of the population of this city of 120,000 are native born of native parentage; the bal- ance, attracted by the textile industry to which the city owes its rapid growth, is made up of French Canadians, Irish, Poles and Portuguese. Prior to 1894, under the control of the mayor and an aldermanic committee, the police department was corrupt and disorganized. Poli- tics ran riot. Gambling dens and disorderly houses were shielded, the liquor laws were habitually violated, and the city was plagued with a disproportionate amount of crime. With a police board of able men appointed by the governor, however, under the Act of 1S94, the situation was rapidly changed and for over twenty years the de- 123 American Police Systems partment has been effectively administered. In spite of a forty per cent increase in population, largely foreign born, crime has been reduced below the figures of 1894; 1 disorderly houses have been eliminated; and the police force is held in public confidence to a degree rarely en- countered. " I have had many pastorates in many cities," said a clergyman to the writer, " and I have never seen such a clean and orderly city as Fall River." This testimony was widely supported. Baltimore is another city in which good results are ob- tained from a state-controlled police force. Since 1900, when the right to appoint police commissioners was taken from the legislature, where it had lodged for forty years, and given to the governor, the department has been in the hands of men of excellent repute. Prominent repre- sentatives of the bar and leading business men have held places on the board, and the administration of the force has been characterized by an absence of political ma- noeuvring and intrigue. Under such control the depart- ment has made marked progress and has gained for itself the respect and support of the citizens of Baltimore. In this case, as in the other cases which we have cited, the merit of state control depends upon the probability of securing better appointments from the governor than can be secured from local officers. Baltimore has enjoyed the advantage of having her affairs administered by high- minded, public spirited men because the governors mak- ing these appointments have acted upon their obligation to choose the best men available for so important a task. 1 See the annual reports of the police department for the years 1894, 1895 and 1915. 124 The Present State of Police Control No guarantee exists, however, that future governors will see the obligation with equal clarity. Nothing about the present arrangement warrants the forecast that the police department of Baltimore will always be free from parti- san politics. A governor could alter the situation any time he chose. A board composed of unfit men, ap- pointed perhaps for reasons of political expediency, would shortly plunge the department into the old conditions when political expediency was its ruling principle. Simi- larly in Fall River a designation by the governor of com- missioners unsuited for their tasks might undermine in a week the public confidence which it has taken years to establish. At best, the situation is one of chance, and the practical question which confronts these cities and others contemplating a similar form of control is whether appointments by state officers are of higher character and less attended by political considerations than appoint- ments by local officers. Failures of State Control. That this question is one to which a ready answer can- not be given for all cities or even for a single city, is shown by the situation in St. Louis, where, as we have noted, state control has long been in operation. The po- lice administration has been both good and bad, but re- cently more good than bad. The appointments to the police board by Governors Folk and Hadley ten years ago were particularly creditable, and hard, conscientious work was done to make the organization effective. Prior to 1905, however, under exactly the same method of con- trol, a far different situation existed. The Democratic i 2 5 American Police Systems boss of the city was president of the board. Two of his fellow commissioners were brewers. The city was wide open and corruption and politics ruled the department. Citizens of outlying counties without qualification or merit were placed on the force through the influence of the governor. The police were the tools by which vic- tory was enforced at the polls. In the investigation by the prosecuting attorney which marked the end of the notorious " Hawes board," four police officers committed suicide rather than face the results of their acts. 1 In other words, ten to fifteen years ago state control in St. Louis was a complete failure. Obviously, the explana- tion must lie in the changing character of the state govern- ment. Police administration under state control encoun- ters the same pitfalls as under municipal control. The ideals and wisdom of 'the governor or mayor determine the level of the administration. Another example may illuminate the point. Probably no large police department in the country is so permeated with politics, and consequently so demoralized, as the de- partment in Kansas City, Missouri, where state control has been in effect for over fifty years. Always an ad- junct to the political party in power, the police boards appointed for this city by the various governors have been strictly partisan in character — sometimes fairly good, never first class, often downright bad. The de- partment has for years been the center of the perennial feud existing between the two factions of the local Demo- cratic party. The chief, with the backing of the gover- 1 See speech of ex-Governor Joseph W. Folk before the City Club of St. Louis, printed in the St. Louis Star, December 19, 1912. 126 The Present State of Police Control nor, is often the creature of one faction, while the board with its constantly shifting personnel is often representa- tive of the other. The various governors, out of touch and out of sympathy with local conditions, have assumed no positive leadership, with the result that the rank and file of the force have aligned themselves with one of the two political " bosses " whose backing seemed to promise the greater security. Under such conditions demoraliza- tion has been wide-spread. Similarly in St. Joseph, Missouri, a city of 77,000 population, state control of the police force has been at- tended with unhappy results. At the time of my visit, the board appointed by the governor consisted of a den- tist, a baker and a lawyer, and the department was the creature of the dominant political faction. With no civil service system the appointments to the force were notori- ous, and suspicions existed of more serious conditions. Two of the commissioners were under indictment by a grand jury for oppression and malfeasance in office ; * and the charge was openly made that licenses were with- held from saloons whose proprietors criticised the gover- nor or the political party he represented, and that brew- eries were forbidden to advertise in a newspaper antago- nistic to the department, under penalty of drastic action against the saloons which they controlled. State control as a supervisory method possesses no in- herent superiority. Without relation to the quality of the state government it guarantees nothing in the way of effectiveness. As a bare arrangement of organization it 1 These indictments were subsequently quashed, but the commis- sioners in question were later removed from office. 127 American Police Systems contains no greater promise of integrity than municipal control. The efficiency or inefficiency of a police force depends largely — one might almost say exclusively — ■ upon the character and ability of the men who run it, and governors, like mayors, can make bad appointments. If this were the only angle from which the subject could be approached, therefore, the problem would involve, as I have pointed out, merely the determination in a given state of the source from which better appointments could in the long run be reasonably expected. State Control in Relation to Home Rule Problems. The problem, however, is not so easily disposed of. Indeed, it is vastly complicated by the troublesome ques- tions involved in the principle of local self government. The inevitable friction and discord arising from a situ- ation in which the public functions of a community are partly under state and partly under local control ; the con- ception of absentee management and responsibility im- plied in a system of state supervision; the requisition by state authorities of funds raised by municipal taxation without vote or check on the part of local officers; the invidious inference attaching to state-controlled police that in respect to this one function at least the people of a locality are unfit to govern themselves — considerations of this kind, often more intangible than practical, must be carefully weighed even against the efficient results which state management may in some instances make possible. Many of these considerations, which militate against the public satisfaction that state control of police is in 128 l 1 The Present State of Police Control some quarters expected to afford, are bound up in the question of finance. In establishing metropolitan police systems the legislatures have generally found it necessary to make the requisitions of the state appointed police executives mandatory upon the local councils. Other- wise by refusing to grant funds or by granting them in insufficient amounts the communities might nullify the purpose and operation of the acts. Thus in St. Louis the law provides that the board of police commissioners ap- pointed by the governor shall annually prepare and certify to the municipal assembly an estimate of monies neces- sary for the ensuing year and the latter body is " hereby required to set apart and appropriate the amount so cer- tified, payable out of the revenue of said city." 1 Any member of the municipal assembly resisting the enforce- ment of this provision is liable to a penalty of $1,000, and may further be disqualified " forever " from " hold- ing or exercising any office or employment under the mayor or municipal assembly." 2 Similarly, in Balti- more the board of police commissioners appointed by the governor makes an estimate of expense for the current fiscal year and certifies it to the mayor and city council, " who are required without delay specifically to assess and levy such amount as shall be sufficient to raise the same, clear of all expenses and discounts, upon all the assess- able property of the City of Baltimore." 3 To cover in- i Laws of Mo., 1899, p. 57, Sec. 13. 2 Ibid., Sec. 14. This provision was inserted in the law to pre- vent the' practice of members of the municipal assembly of holding up the police appropriation while they bargained with the commis- sioners for "jobs" for their henchmen. 3 Laws of Md., 1898, Chap. 123, Sec. 747. 129 American Police Systems sufficient estimates the police board is empowered to issue certificates of indebtedness not to exceed $50,000 in any one year, the amounts of which are added to the munici- pal tax levy for the year next ensuing. 1 In Boston, where the police commissioner is also appointed by the governor, the law provides that all the expenses of the department shall be paid by the city " upon the requisition of said police commissioner." 2 In Kansas City under similar arrangements the common council is obliged to set aside, as its initial appropriation, the amount of money asked for by the police board. Additional expenditures for extra police work, unforeseen at the time of the first estimate, must be granted by the municipal authorities as requested by the board. 3 The effect of these acts, to be sure, is often tempered by further provisions fixing the approximate numbers to be employed in each rank of the police force, so that a state-appointed police executive can not arbitrarily add to the municipal budget by greatly extending his department. In Boston, indeed, the commissioner may not employ ad- ditional patrolmen, " except as authorized by the mayor," nor may the salaries of the force be increased except by the concurrent action of the mayor and commissioner, 4 There still remains, however, a large margin of expense, over and above the mere salary budget, the necessity for which is not debatable by local fiscal officers, but rests entirely in the discretion of men in no way responsible to the municipal government. 1 Laws of Md., 1898, Chap. 123, Sec. 747. 2 Acts of Mass., 1906, Chap. 291, Sec. 8. 8 Laws of Mo., p. 68, Sees. 15-16. 4 Acts of Mass., 1906, Chap. 291, Sec. 13. 130 The Present State of Police Control Such a situation inevitably breeds resentment and even bitterness. Other city departments must take their chances in their requests for funds ; their appeals must be weighed with other appeals and the issue settled on the basis of comparative urgency. The police estimates alone go unchallenged. As a result, health, charity, pub- lic works and a score of other municipal functions are subordinated to the unquestioned and unanalyzed needs of the police. In St. Louis considerable feeling on this point has frequently developed. In 1899 the common council refused to pay the claims of the police board in- volving the salaries of extra policemen until forced by a decision of the Supreme Court. 1 In Boston, in 1914, the police commissioner successfully defied the mayor and the Finance Commission in a contest over increased rates of pay for officers of rank. The increases in question had been made on the basis of a small unappropriated bal- ance in the remaining days of the former city administra- tion, and the new mayor's appeal to the commissioner to consent to a restoration of the former rates of pay so as not to impair the efficiency of other branches of the mu- nicipal service was disregarded on the ground that such a step would work injury to the morale of his department. 2 Whatever the merit of the commissioner's position, it served not only to emphasize the lack of unity in the gov- ernmental functions of Boston but to throw into relief the rankling implication of the law that in respect to the man- 1 153 Mo. 23 : People ex rel. Hawes v . Mason. The entire police force went without pay for three months while the case was in the courts. 2 The reports dealing with this case are printed in the annual re- port of the Boston police department for 1914. !3 1 American Police Systems agement of the police force the citizens of Boston must be protected against themselves. Fuel such as this keeps home rule agitation continually smoldering. The financial detachment of state-controlled police forces shows in their expenditures. In the cities in which such control exists, a larger proportion of the municipal budget is given to the police departments than in cities of the same class in which the police are under local man- agement. This fact is shown by a comparison of the ratio of police cost to total municipal cost, in St. Louis and in Philadelphia, the city next larger in size. In the former city in 1915, 14.8% of the annual municipal ap- propriation, exclusive of public service enterprises, went for police purposes ; in the latter, with a population nearly a million greater and hence with police functions rela- tively more complex and expensive, 13.8% of the budget was devoted to the police during the same period. 1 Simi- lar comparisons for the years 1910, 191 j and 1912 bear out the same divergence. 2 Equal results are obtained by comparing ratios of cost in Boston and Baltimore on the one hand, representing state-controlled police forces, with Cleveland and Pittsburgh on the other, representing mu- nicipally controlled police forces. The latter cities are chosen because in population they most closely approxi- mate the former. The following table embodies the fiscal year of 1915 : 1 Figures obtained from the U. S. Census publication, " Financial statistics of cities having a population of over 30,000 — 1915." New York and Chicago, because of their vast size, cannot fairly be com- pared with St. Louis. The same remark holds true of the smaller cities. It is obvious that the larger the city the greater must be the relative cost for police purposes. 2 Figures for 1913 and 191 4 are not obtainable. 132 The Present State of Police Control Ratio of police cost to City Population total municipal cost * State | Boston ... 734,747 11.3% Police |_ Baltimore . 579,590 13. Municipal f Cleveland . 639,431 9.2 Police { Pittsburgh . 564,878 7.8 The comparatively greater expense of state-controlled police forces is shown by an examination of the costs per capita of population, as follows : 2 Cost per capita City of population St. Louis 2.90 Boston 3.47 Baltimore 2.20 State Police Municipal Police Philadelphia 2.68 Cleveland 1.59 Pittsburgh 1.78 If figures were lacking, the superior material equip- ment of the police departments of St. Louis and Balti- more would substantiate the point that more money is spent by a city for police under state control than under municipal control. In the former city particularly, the physical property of the department is indicative of un- cramped financial conditions. The station houses are models of their kind, splendidly built and equipped. The headquarters building is perhaps the most complete in America; and throughout there is every evidence that 1 Figures obtained from the U. S. Census publication, " Financial statistics of cities having a population of over 30,000 — 1915." 2 Ibid. 133 American Police Systems ■' the department has not been obliged to compete with other departments in a scramble for funds. What the police want they are legally bound to obtain. " For four years," said a former member of the municipal council of St. Louis, " I was obliged by law to vote unquestion- ingly the requisitions of the police board. We had to cut down on health, on parks, and on public improve- ments. For the sake of economy we slashed a hundred public needs that should never have been slashed. But our economy measures could not touch the police depart- ment." 1 That under such circumstances home rule sentiment smolders constantly beneath the surface is scarcely to be wondered at. Of the four large cities with state-con- trolled police, Boston is perhaps most committed to the plan. Even the recent police strike apparently did not shake her faith in this method of management, which has become too firmly established in public estimation to be easily overthrown. " It 's a habit," said a prominent citi- zen of Boston. " We are used to it and it works." The same opinion was encountered in Baltimore. In St. Louis and Kansas City, on the other hand, dissatisfaction 1 Personally communicated. That larger expenditure inevitably follows state-controlled police departments is shown in the experi- ence of German cities. When the burgomasters and local authorities are in control, economy is the guiding rule because of the immediate presence of the taxpayers. Economy is not, however, so pressing a matter with the officials of a state-controlled force, for the tax- payers are far removed from the scene of action and the incentive is not so direct or compelling. In Saxony, for example, Dresden annually spends 20% more for its state police force than Leipzig does for its municipal force, although the population of Leipzig is larger by 40,000. For. further discussion see European Police Sys- tems, pp. 72-73 ff. 134 The Present State of Police Control is continually expressed, and the feeling for home rule will not down. In St. Louis, indeed, in 1914, a home rule police bill, passed by the legislature and submitted to the entire state on referendum, received in the city a ma- jority of 7,000 votes, although in the remainder of the state the measure was buried under an avalanche of 175,000. The Democratic rural districts of Missouri are suspicious of any bill conferring larger powers on the Republican cities. The situation is complicated, too, by the fact that the home rule movement, at least in St. Louis, has not been discussed from the point of view of more effective enforcement of law and the selection of better police officials. It has been largely a protest, more or less sentimentally founded, against rural domination. Oftentimes, too — as in the case of the 1914 measure — home rule has been merely a partisan .movement, deco- rated to attract the unwary, and engineered by special interests. " Last summer when these measures were first proposed," said ex-Governor Folk in an address before the City Club of St. Louis on the home rule police bills, " it was freely stated in the public press that the object was to make St. Louis a wide-open city. Without im- puting these motives to those who now advocate these measures, I believe it is clear that they were born of that desire." 1 In the struggle which culminated in the final overthrow of the proposition at the polls, St. Louis was treated to the spectacle of the better civic elements of the city fighting the home rule which theoretically at least they approved, while the brewery interests were listed as its 1 Quoted in the St. Louis Star, Dec. 19, 1912. 135 American Police Systems chief champions. " Real home rule and not brewery- rule — this is the issue," said ex-Governor Folk. 1 The Applicability of State Control. In the last analysis the choice between state and mu- nicipal control as a method of police administration can be made only in the light of local conditions. Not only must the comparative average quality of the state and the municipal government be considered, but the genuineness and extent of the demand for home rule — however vaguely conceived — must enter into the solution as an indispensable element. Popular content or discontent is, in a democracy, of all forms of government, a factor of vital significance. A city accustomed to its own manage- ment in matters relating to its own well-being cannot readily be saddled with a form of exterior control. Moreover, the feeling of irresponsibility for police con- ditions, often bred in the local citizenship as a result of such absentee management, is a hurt not ordinarily com- pensated by any possible advantage in the greater effi- ciency of the force. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that only serious conditions of demoralization, denot- ing not only present but future inability effectively to manage its police department, would initially justify a state in superseding the police arrangements of a given city. On the other hand, he would be a hasty critic who would advise Boston or Baltimore to return to municipal control. The present method of police organization in those cities has been tested practically. The adjustment of public opinion has been made. The arrangement now ilbid. 136 The Present State of Police Control meets with fairly constant popular support. To root it out merely to satisfy some abstract ideal of local self gov- ernment would be the course of unwisdom. Cities, like men, are shaped and controlled by different combinations of psychological and material circum- stances. Only through the appreciation of its own spe- cial tastes and needs can a local government find its most effective form. II. BOARD CONTROL VS. SINGLE-HEADED CONTROL Of the 63 cities of the United States whose popula- tions, according to the census estimates of 191 5, exceed 100,000 seventeen have their police organizations under the control of boards of police commissioners or boards of public safety. The police departments of the remaining cities are under single-headed management, either cortv missioners or chiefs appointed by local or state authority, or in the somewhat anomalous guise of the commission form of government. The principal cities in which po- lice boards are found are St. Louis, Baltimore, Los An- geles, San Francisco, Milwaukee, New Orleans, Kansas City, Indianapolis, Providence, Louisville, and Atlanta. 1 Single-headed police control is found in New York, Chi- cago, Philadelphia, Boston, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, De- troit, Buffalo, Newark, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, Seattle, Jersey City, and Portland, Oregon. 2 !The other cities of the 63 over 100,000 population which have police boards are as follows: New Haven, Paterson, Fall River, Bridgeport, Hartford, Springfield (Mass.). 2 The other cities of the 63 over 100,000 population which have single-headed management are as follows: Washington, Denver, Rochester, St. Paul, Columbus, Oakland, Toledo, Birmingham, Omaha, Worcester, Richmond, Syracuse, Spokane, Memphis, Scran- 137 American Police Systems The boards of police commissioners vary widely as to source of appointment, size and functions. In St. Louis, Baltimore and Kansas City, as we have seen, the boards are appointed by the governors of the respective states; in other cases they are appointed by local authority, gen- erally the mayor, with or without the confirmation of the common council. Often the mayor is himself ex officio an officer of the board. In Atlanta and other southern cities the board members are elected by the municipal council, one member being chosen from each of the wards into which the cities are divided. 1 New Orleans curi- ously combines a police board with a commission form of government, the board consisting of the mayor, the com- missioner of public safety and a civilian member elected by the commission. 2 The size of the boards in the differ- ent cities varies from three members, as in Kansas City, Indianapolis, Baltimore, Los Angeles, Louisville and Providence, to twelve members in Atlanta. 3 St. Louis and San Francisco have boards of four; Milwaukee, a board of five; New Haven, a board of six. The police boards are for the most part charged with complete responsibility for the enforcement of law. Most of them, too, are given full powers over the depart- ments which they control, including the right, under oc- ton, Grand Rapids, Dallas, San Antonio, Dayton, Salt Lake City, New Bedford, Nashville, Tacoma, Houston, . Cambridge, Trenton, Lowell, Youngstown, Reading, Albany, Camden, Lynn. This list in- cludes commission governed cities. 1 See Laws of Ga., 1908, Part III, Title I. ' 2 Laws of La., 912, No. 159. 3 In Kansas City and Los Angeles the membership of three is in- clusive of the mayor ex officio. In Atlanta the mayor and chairman of the police committee of the council are ex officio members of the board of twelve. 138 The Present State of Police Control casional civil service restrictions, of appointment and dis- missal of members of the force. This is true of such cities as St. Louis, Baltimore, Indianapolis and Louis- ville. There are, however, one or two notable exceptions. In Los Angeles the chief of police is appointed and re- moved not by the police board but by the mayor. Fur- ther — in the words of the act — "the chief of police shall have the supervision and control of the police force of the city and in that connection he shall be subject only to the orders of the mayor." x As a result the board is little more than an advisory body. 2 Because it has no control over the chief it lacks contact with the department and is obliged to confine itself to such perfunctory duties as the issuance of licenses. In Milwaukee the police board 3 is given no administrative powers whatever. Indeed, it has little to do with the police department ex- cept to appoint the chief — and if necessary remove him under charges reviewable by the courts — and act as a civil service commission for the appointment and promo- tion of officers in the department. Having once ap- pointed a suitable chief, it has no responsibility for the enforcement of law. All powers as regards discipline, transfer and removal are lodged exclusively with the chief. 4 Even in financial matters the board has no func- tions whatever. In making up the departmental budget the chief deals directly with the municipal council with- out the intervention either of the mayor or the police 1 Los Angeles Charter as amended April, 1913, Sec. 53. 2 The anomaly is accentuated by the fact that the police surgeon is appointed by the common council. 3 Called Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. 4 In cases of actual removal, police officers may take an appeal to the board of commissioners. 139 American Police Systems board. Further, he makes all rules governing the con- duct of his force and is given " custody and control of all public property pertaining to said department and everything connected therewith and belonging thereto." * Throughout the act and in its operation emphasis is laid upon the conception of the chief as the " head " of the department, responsible to the public for its efficiency and general good conduct, while the board is relegated to a relatively obscure and insignificant position. The Weaknesses of Board Control. This curious arrangement in Los Angeles and Mil- waukee, by which a board is created and then shorn of its powers, represents an attempt — crude, perhaps, and clumsily put into operation — to protect the police de- partment against the excesses of board control. As was pointed out in the last chapter, police boards were estab- lished, not because they were fitted for police administra- tion, but because the board system was supposed to be the proper form of municipal government. Los Angeles and Milwaukee, therefore, with the difficulties of other cities in mind, have erected bulwarks against possible abuses by their police boards, although they have some- what naively accepted them as essential parts of their po- lice machinery. That the fears of these cities are justified not only by the history of past boards but by present conditions in municipalities which retain this form of control is ob- vious to any student. With the exception of Baltimore, where the high character of the appointees has often out- 1 Laws of Wis., 191 1, Chap. 586, Sec. 23. 140 The Present State of Police Contiol weighed the inherent ineffectiveness of board manage- ment, most of the cities in the United States with police boards are experiencing difficulties traceable to no other source than the decentralization of authority which that, form of control inevitably tends to develop. 1 The ab- sence of individualized responsibility, the ready excuse with which a single member can shift blame for joint failure or neglect, the sense of protection furnished by mere corporate entity — these factors create an atmos- phere in which shiftlessness is encouraged and personal rather than public ends are easily served. Even in Bal- timore, among the members themselves of present and past boards, there is no little sentiment for single-headed management. " No business would attempt to conduct its affairs under the supervision of three heads of equal power," said one of the commissioners. Said another: " For the money spent on this board we could obtain the services of an excellent administrator who could give his entire time to the direction of the department and the study of its problems. Wherever we three commission- ers have accomplished good results, one man might have done even better." 2 Board Administration a Part-time Task. This suggests one of the practical objections to board administration even at its best. It is a part-time task. Three or four estimable citizens, preoccupied with their own affairs, are asked to devote some fraction of their iNew Haven and Fall River should perhaps be mentioned with Baltimore as noteworthy exceptions to the general rule. 2 Personally communicated. The members of this board have since been superseded. 141 American Police Systems attention to the management of an enterprise with which, except through newspapers, they have had no previous acquaintance. Often their acceptance of the appoint- ment is conditioned upon the understanding that they will not be called upon to give more than a specific amount of time — perhaps only to attend board meetings. Otherwise commissioners of adequate calibre could not be obtained. With no appreciation of the fact that po- lice management is a highly specialized business demand- ing an intimate and often technical knowledge of mat- ters not common to other enterprises, the commissioners attempt, with the help of the clerks whom they find at headquarters but without really expert advice, to exercise some form of control. In most cases such control con- sists solely in the disposal of routine matters, such as ap- pointments, transfers, and disciplinary trials at the stated meetings of the board. Policies looking toward the in- creased efficiency of the department, and the extension of its usefulness as an instrument of public good, are neg- lected. Indeed, they are not thought of. The commis- sioners have no time to exercise the same degree and quality of initiative and imagination that would be neces- sary in the successful operation of a private business. Technical questions relating to the proper organization of a detective bureau, to the policy to be followed in the identification of criminals, to the method of determining the comparative efficiency of members of the uniformed force, are passed over without consideration, either be- cause the board members have not had time to think of them, or because they do not feel themselves competent to pass upon them. The chief of the department, com- 142 The Present State of Police Control ing from the ranks, is seldom gifted with constructive ability; and in the absence of other expert advice no pro- gressive steps are taken. In some cases the board does not meet often enough to give even routine matters more than a superficial and perfunctory oversight. In St. Louis and San Francisco it meets once a week; in New Haven and Paterson, twice a month. 1 Under such cir- cumstances it is impossible for the commissioners to con- tribute anything of .real value to a progressive manage- ment of the force. Of the many police commissioners whom I met and talked with, from California to Maine, scarcely half a dozen showed any thorough grasp either of the technique of police business or of the principles underlying the effective management of a police force. Indeed, in most cases they made no pretense of knowl- edge. They were very busy men, who devoted such spare moments as they could wrench from their own af- fairs to the more or less thankless task of " looking after " the police department. Their conception of police administration, often frankly expressed, was merely to maintain the status quo of things as they found them. Lack of Unity in Board Administration. Another difficulty attends the board form of manage- ment even at its best. The inevitable lack of unity in its x The laws regulating some of the police departments obviously contemplate only a part-time participancy by the commissioners. In San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Kansas City they are obliged to meet "at least once a week." (San Francisco Charter, Art. VIII, Chap. II, Sec. 4; Los Angeles Charter, Sec. 96; Laws of Mo., 1899, p 65.) The Atlanta ordinances provide that the board " shall hold a stated meeting each month and such other meetings as the public interest may from time to time require." (Ordinances of Atlanta, Sec. 400.) H3 American Police Systems opinions and decisions curtails its effectiveness as an ad- ministrative instrument. " We were so split in our in- terests and enthusiasms," said a former board member of a large city in explaining the disruption of a really ex- cellent administration in which he had served, " that we never really centered on anything. I was interested, for. example, in traffic regulation, but the other two members cared little about it. When the superintendent (chief) saw how we were divided he did nothing." * Such a situation is the logical result of a multiple-headed execu- tive. The lack of decisiveness creates an uncertainty in the uniformed force, and the fear of offending either party results in a policy of inaction. Moreover, the di- verse membership of the board affords an opportunity, seldom overlooked by the force, to interest individual commissioners, either through their own efforts or the efforts of their friends, political and otherwise, in their grievances and claims. This gives rise to a situation in which, in the absence of any definite policy or standard, the recommendations of a commissioner are apt to be accepted by the board without reference to other claims of perhaps equal merit, on the principle of " courtesy " so often enunciated in legislative bodies. A commis- sioner voting against the recommendation of another member might find his own suggestions vetoed at a future date. Occasionally disagreements within the board produce results almost ludicrous. In the trial of two sergeants in Kansas City before the police board in 1915, one com- missioner admitted certain questions in evidence which 1 Personally communicated. 144 The Present State of Police Control the other commissioner declined to admit. The proceed- ings degenerated into an acrimonious wrangle. 1 During the Ruef-Schmitz regime in San Francisco in 1905, the police board stood two to two on the question of licensing the notorious " French Restaurants," and Schmitz was unable to put through his vicious plans until he had re- moved one of the members. Before the recent change in Newark to commission government, the police board was deadlocked for many months over the appointment of an inspector and the question of recommending an increase in the force. Indeed, the " deadlock " has been characteristic of many boards throughout the country, particularly those with membership of even numbers. But even in those with odd numbers, the objections of the minority have often produced confusion and delay, and the departments have suffered from lack of definite leader- ship. Conflict of Authority in Board Administration. Another difficulty to which the police board lends itself is even more serious. The members of a board, in the absence of definite administrative plans, are continually tempted to encroach upon the proper functions of the chief. The theory of the board form of management, whether in business or government, is that it creates a deliberative council, presumably representative of vari- ous points of view, concerned primarily with policies of operation and procedure and the maintenance of general regulative oversight. In the application of its rules and policies to specific cases it has no direct or immediate in- 1 Kansas City Star, January 30, I9IS- 145 American Police Systems terest. These things are matters of detail for which its business executive or superintendent is solely responsible. This distinction in function between a deliberative or regulative body and its executive arm furnishes the only possible justification for the existence of a board. With- out it nothing is left but an uncoordinated executive of many heads. When, therefore, a police board infringes upon the proper activities of the chief and attempts itself to handle the detail of administration, it undermines its only basis of support. Unfortunately, most of the police boards in the United States are in this situation. Neither in law nor in prac- tice has their true function been denned. Indeed, the laws have often loaded the boards with duties which by no process of reasoning can properly belong to any de- liberative body. Even in those departments in which the prescriptions of laws and ordinances are not definite or detailed there is little attempt at clear-cut differentiation, and the distinction between the board's duties and the chief's duties is a vague, uncertain line, varying from week to week and even from day to day, dependent largely upon the activity and attention of the commis- sioners and their interest in particular cases. Often the chief's proper functions are deliberately raided by the board because, ignorant of the formulation of construc- tive policies or the principles of administration, it hastens to lay hands upon certain routine affairs whose nature it understands. While holding the chief responsible for the management of the department, it nevertheless ap- propriates enough of his functions to render him practi- cally powerless. The most trivial details of police busi- 146 The Present State of Police Control ness come before it for determination. It spends hours in deciding whether a given patrolman was off his beat as charged by his sergeant. It will take days to determine whether the chief's recommendation for the dismissal of a drunken officer is justified. Most of its time is given to the consideration of details that would not be consid- ered for a moment by the board of directors of a busi- ness concern. In some cities the police boards so far usurp the functions of the chief that they even exclude him from their deliberations, as if what they did with his men was none of his affair. In Newark, during the life of the board, it handled all transfers, promotions, and special assignments of policemen, occasionally without the knowledge, often without the recommendation, of the chief of police. 1 A situation largely similar prevails in other municipalities, notably in Kansas City. " I am not consulted on such matters," said the chief of police of an important southern city in talking to me confidentially of his work. " I hear of the orders of the commission through the secretary of the board. I have very little to do. The board decides all." 2 This frank statement is significant of a wide-spread condition. There are but few chiefs in the United States serving under a board, who will not in confidential mo- ments admit the continual interference on the part of board members in matters properly within the functions of the uniformed force. " I really do not know what my duties are," said the chief of a large city. "On paper I have a great many, but most of them are per- 1 Personally communicated. 2 Ibid. U7 American Police Systems formed by the board." 1 So flagrant did this situation become in Atlanta that the following ordinance — more forceful than grammatical — was passed by the general council: "The board shall discharge hereafter the duties of an administrative board and shall not be per- mitted nor shall they designate any of their members to carry out the orders or direction of the board as to mat- ters over and about which the city has selected officers or patrolmen to cover or perform, and compensates them therefor." 2 This failing to correct the evil, another ordinance was passed to the effect that the head of the police department (meaning the chief) "shall be not only the nominal but the actual executive head." 3 Even this ordinance had little result. At the time of my visit to Atlanta the board was attempting to determine what disorderly houses should be raided and what clubs closed. The police boards of the United States have practically ceased to be deliberative, policy-forming bodies, if in- deed they ever were. The difficulty of drawing practical lines of differentiation, the mandatory provisions of the law, and above all, the limited scope for the deliberative function in police administration, have driven them into other fields, and they perforce have become simply mul- tiple-headed executives. In some cases, undoubtedly this is what the law intended them to be. It is, moreover, their true status as many people conceive it. Indeed, if the boards did not usurp some of the proper duties of their chiefs they would have little to do. For police 1 Personally communicated. 2 Ordinances of Atlanta (Compilation of 1910), No. 1,931. 3 Ordinance of June 2, 1913. I48 The Present State of Police Control management, as I have previously pointed out, is a mat- ter not so much of deliberation as of initiative, decisive- ness, and vigor. There are but few broad general poli- cies arising and none that one responsible man cannot determine. There is little need of a council to consider and discuss. Even the judicial aspects of the board's work, the trial of offenses and the determination of pun- ishments, can be handled by the head of the department, as in Milwaukee, or by a disciplinary tribunal within the force itself, as in Boston and elsewhere. This func- tion alone does not justify the existence of a separate ad- ministrative body. In brief, a board, unless scrupu- lously limited in its function, is a fifth wheel, an incum- brance rather than a help. The essential qualities in police administration are those which a single-headed executive can best bring to the task. Politics and Board Administration. Thus far I have spoken of the operation of the police board at its best — on the supposition that with all its inherent administrative weaknesses its personnel repre- sented the ablest citizens obtainable. Unfortunately, ex- cept in a few cities, this supposition is without foundation in fact. Because of its multiple membership the board seems to lend itself peculiarly to the unhappy incidents of American municipal politics. " Give him a place on the police board. Any harm that he can do will be counter- balanced by the other members." This principle has led to more than one evil appointment, even by execu- tives above the usual average. One can go through the list of commissioners of all the board-controlled de- 149 American Police Systems partments and find but few who on the basis of educa- tion and general ability alone, not to mention technical qualifications, are even moderately fitted for the task. Too often, indeed, the boards are composed of political hacks to whom the post is a " job," bestowed without re- gard for fitness, as a reward for party service. In some cities appointments of such a character constitute an es- tablished tradition, supported by a public opinion apathetic and quiescent. " Police business is nothing but politics anyway," said a cynical citizen of Kansas City when I expressed amazement at the unperturbed public attitude with which the political appointments to the police board were received. A furniture dealer who subsequently used his position to advertise his private business and a " personal appointee " of the governor, allied with one of the warring political factions — this was the police board unquestioningly accepted by the citizens of Kansas City because it seemed neither better nor worse than its predecessors. It was barely ten years ago in San Fran- cisco that the president of the police board was one of the Democratic bosses of the city, a saloon-keeper by pro- fession, whose principal official act was " to open up the town," so that San Francisco might become " the Paris of America." Even today, politics plays no little part in the constitution of San Francisco's police board. St. Louis, as we have already seen, has suffered severely from the character of its police administrators, and the " spoils " idea has too often marked the appointments. In recent years there has been considerable improvement in this city, but as late as 19 16 an attempt was made by the 150 The Present State of Police Control governor to appoint as commissioner a man previously convicted of murder. Elective Boards. Conditions appear even more discouraging when, as in Atlanta and other southern cities, the police boards are elected by the common councils rather than appointed by executive authority. 1 In the latter contingency there is at least the hope, justified by occasional experience, that a governor or mayor will act upon his public obligation to appoint effective and intelligent police commissioners. In the former contingency there is no such hope, for the very method of selection, at least in the present stage of municipal development, vitiates the results. In Atlanta, as I have already pointed out, the members of the police board, to the number of twelve, are elected on the basis of district representation, one member from each of the wards into which the city is divided. The practice is for the two councilmen and the alderman from each ward to agree upon a candidate for police commissioner. The nomination is thereupon accepted by the general council without debate or discussion, because the representatives of the other wards wish the same privilege of choosing their candidates. Until recently, similar arrangements were in vogue in Richmond (Va.). While no such definite understanding existed, the elections to the police board were purely matters of ward politics, in which the man who had the most friends and could command the largest number of votes won the place, i This is true in Durham, N. C, Greenville, S. C, and Macon, Ga. American Police Systems This method of selection is based upon certain con- fused analogies which are not without defenders in some quarters in the cities above mentioned and elsewhere : first, that ward representation on the police board is de- sirable because ours is a representative government; and second, that election rather than appointment to a police board is in accordance with democratic principles. Mu- nicipal government in the United States has been wrecked by adherence to analogies of this kind. In the same class is the idea that city councils must be bicameral because the legislative branch of the federal government is bi- cameral, and that the town fathers must have the right to veto the appointments of the mayor because the con- sent of the United States Senate is necessary to the ap- pointments of the president. In framing these analogies little thought has been given to the distinction in func- tion between federal and municipal government. The former was organized primarily with a view to legisla- tive efficiency; the latter is a matter of administrative efficiency. The peculiar activities of a city, involving the guardianship, health and education of a population stratified by racial, economic and religious lines, while compressed within narrow geographical limits, present a unique governmental problem comparable only to a lim- ited degree with the problem of national organization. The test of a form of government to be applied to such a situation is its serviceability and not its resemblance to forms adapted to other purposes. The question to be asked is not whether it adheres to an eighteenth century political ideal, but does it work? Under such a test as this, a police board of ward repre- 152 The Present State of Police Control sentatives becomes an absurdity. Instead of serving the interests of efficient police organization the boards of At- lanta and other southern cities serve the interests of ward politics, with all the elements of barter and trade which such an arrangement involves. Some years ago in Rich- mond the board passed a resolution under which appoint- ments to the force were distributed evenly among the wards, each commissioner taking his turn (arranged on a basis of seniority in service with the board !) in naming his candidate. This resolution was later rescinded and not even a gentleman's agreement took its place. " They scrap it out among themselves," said one of the officials of the board, " each commissioner fighting for the candi- dates from his own ward." 1 In Atlanta, in 1914, against the bitter opposition of the chief, the police board rein- stated three patrolmen who had been dismissed, one for habitual drunkenness, one for assaulting a citizen while drunk, and one for entering a house of assignation while drunk. 2 The only explanation for this step which I Could obtain was that the three officers in question " had put the matter up to their ward representatives on the board and had been taken care of." Other examples of this kind were brought to my attention in both Atlanta and elsewhere. When the elective method of choosing police commis- sioners is added to ward representation on the board, the results are peculiarly disastrous. In the scramble for office, ideas of administrative experience or personal fit- 1 Personally communicated. 2 So bitter was the opposition of the chief that the board put him out of the meeting before taking action. The chief was later dis- missed on charges preferred by the board. 153 American Police Systems ness, not to mention expert service, are forgotten. The issue becomes a matter of " influence " and " trade " or is smothered by some larger political question. For years the boards of Atlanta and elsewhere have too largely represented not only less desirable but occasionally vicious elements. The better class of citizens holds itself aloof from the sordid give and take of ward politics, and the police department is consequently abandoned to those who want it. At the time of my visit to Atlanta and Rich- mond the police boards of the two cities were under grave suspicion. It was charged that one member was interested in the cigar business which had the contract for tobacco with the disorderly houses, and that another was the agent for the liquor concern that supplied these houses with liquor. One member had been warned by the courts for gambling; one had been under indictment for im- morality and cruelty ; another had at one time operated a bar-room ; another engaged in the small-loan business and was known as a " loan shark " ; against two others the charge was openly made that they were financially inter- ested in houses of prostitution. These men had been chosen by a so-called " democratic " method to administer the police departments, and in both cities good citizens were asking why their police affairs should be so continu- ally in a tangle ! Bi-partisan Boards. Results equally unhappy if not so demoralizing are often found when boards are constituted on the bi-parti- san principle. 1 This principle, as we have seen, is based 1 Bi-partisan police boards are legally required in Baltimore, San 154 The Present State of Police Control on the theory that the action of two opposing forces will create a sort of neutral zone favorable to the development of an adequate brand of administration. It is an elab- orated check and balance system that sets one group of party representatives to watch another. The groups may be equal in strength, as in San Francisco, where the board is composed of an even number ; or they may be unequal in strength, as in Baltimore, Fall River, and Indianapolis, where there are boards of three. In either case, the ad- ministration of the police department tends to become a matter of bargain and trade, and further, in odd-num- bered boards, the minority is often ruthlessly overridden and the very purpose of the arrangement vitiated. In this latter case the results are apt to be peculiarly de- plorable to the service, because the board members who have seized the reins have been chosen not because they were expert administrators but because they were party representatives. The anomaly of the bi-partisan board as a scheme of administration is shown in the very laws creating it. Elaborate and often highly technical provisions are writ- ten into the statutes to keep the police department out of politics, while in the same paragraphs the commissioners are drafted from the political parties whose influence the law is avowedly attempting to destroy. Thus, in Balti- more the charter provides that the commissioners shall take oath before the Judge of the Superior Court that they " will in no case and under no pretext appoint, promote, Francisco, Milwaukee, Indianapolis, New Haven Fall River, and Bridgeport Occasionally the principle is followed in other cities, on the basis of some political understanding or otherwise. 155 American Police Systems reduce in rank or remove any policeman or officer of police or detective, or any other person under them, for or on account of the political opinions or affiliations of such policeman, officer, detective, or other person, or for any other cause or reason than the fitness or unfitness of such person." x In the same section of the law it is pro- vided that " two of said commissioners shall always be adherents of the two leading political parties of the state, one of each of said parties." 2 Similar provisions ap- pear in other charters, and out of the attempt to make the contradiction work grow some of the most serious evils of board management. Until it was recently abolished Newark's police board furnished perhaps the best example of the practical oper- ation of the bi-partisan principle. It was composed of two Democrats and two Republicans, appointed by the mayor, with the consent of the city council. At the time of my first visit to the Newark department 3 the board consisted of a photographer, an architect, a contractor for steamheating plants, and an employee of a telephone company. This board had appointed as its administra- tive secretary an attache of a bowling alley. From the very first the board was deadlocked on matters of current business. For example, the rank of inspector in the uni- formed force was created, and pending a civil service examination a Republican police captain was appointed pro tern. When the examination was held a Democratic captain headed the list, the Republican captain in question standing third. The Republicans on the board insisted 1 Baltimore Charter, Revised Edition, 1915, Sec. 740. 2 Ibid. 3 In October, 191 6. 156 The Present State of Police Control on passing the first two names on the list and appointing their own party man. The Democrats, on the other hand, with their belief in civil service principles stimulated by- visions of a Democratic inspector, refused to accede to this plan, and the post was unfilled for over a year. Ulti- mately the deadlock was broken by creating two places and appointing both inspectors. Again, the Democratic commissioners estimated that twenty-five additional po- licemen were needed on the force. This was agreed to by the board as a whole and the necessary civil service examinations were held. When the matter had reached the stage of appointments, however, the Republican com- missioners refused to take action, charging that the mo- tive of the Democrats in attempting to add to the force was to embarrass the Republican city administration by increasing the budget. This deadlock was not broken until the end of the administration. Illustrations quite similar could be given of police boards in San Francisco and Indianapolis. The same kind of bargaining, the same trading of support has char- acterized police management in these two cities at one time or another. For years in Indianapolis there was not even a pretense of non-partisanship in the work of the board. Everything from the appointment of a patrol- man to the dismissal of a chief was on a frankly political basis. It was a game in which the minority representa- tive on the board got what he could for his own party. Board Administration and the New Development. Whether bi-partisan, uni-partisan, or professedly non- partisan — whatever its form or arrangement — the 157 American Police Systems board plan of police control, with its divided powers and scattered responsibilities, plays into the hands of the most sinister influences in American politics. Occasionally, to be sure, the high character of the commissioners gives an appearance of effectiveness to board organization, and the results are credited in many quarters to the mechanical arrangement and not to the men behind it. But board organization in such cases reflects a glory not its own. Based on the principle of decentralized administration and designed to prevent an abuse of power, it exhausts the efforts of the best-intentioned commissioners and nul- lifies the positive qualities of leadership which constitute the secret of successful police management. It is therefore encouraging to note the trend of con- temporary opinion toward responsiblejeadetship. The checks and balances of earlier days are being cast aside in the belief that men count more than machinery and that an arrangement to prevent arbitrary action serves only to impede positive action when public interest de- mands it. The application of this principle to police or-> ganization has resulted in single-headed leadership, now in effect, as we have seen, in many important cities of the United States, including the three largest. But single- headed leadership, as a bare arrangement of control, guar- antees nothing in the way of better police methods. It means that responsibility for bad management is defini- tized, and that the public can more readily assess the blame for evil conditions ; it means that a type of admin- istrative machinery has been devised, which will secure the best results for a skilled administrator. Whether such an administrator has been found, and if found, 158 The Present State of Police Control whether he has been permitted to manage his department without political hindrance, are questions for local de- termination. In the same breath in which we praise the accomplishments of the Boston department under Com- missioner O'Meara and the New York department under Commissioner Woods, we would have to admit that un- der the same type of single-headed control the Chicago force reached a depth of demoralization seldom sounded even in American cities. Obviously, other factors than mechanical organization must enter into the solution of the police problem. Of these factors, the type of admin- istrator is perhaps the most important, and to the con- sideration of this question we return in a later chapter.- For the present we can only note the improving charac- ter of the framework of police control, which, in line with modern business organization, is based upon the propo- sition that responsibility cannot be centered without cor- responding concentration of power. 159 CHAPTER IV SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF POLICE CONTROL The principle of responsible leadership. — Appointments of police heads. — Removals of police heads. — The jurisdiction of the police department. — Growth of suburbs. — Disadvantages of conflicting po- lice systems. — Advantages of metropolitan areas. — Lack of stand- ards in police methods as between states. — Commission government and the police force. — Personnel of commissions.' — Commission gov- ernment wrong in principle. — Commission government and transient management. — Commission government and irresponsible adminis- tration. — The effect of commission government on the police force. — City manager plan. Several incidental questions growing out of the gen- eral topic of police control and management remain to be discussed in this chapter. These include an examina- tion of one of the factors of responsible leadership, a con- sideration of the proper jurisdiction. of a police depart-' ment, and an outline of the police problem as affected by the widely adopted commission form of government. For the sake of clearness these topics are discussed under appropriate heads. I. THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP The necessity of definite responsibility through single- headed leadership involves a further principle to which attention should be called. It is equally essential that the responsibility of the appointing agent in the selection of the police head should be clearly and sharply defined. 1 60 Special Problems of Police Control If such responsibility is shared by some legislative body or council which otherwise has no jurisdiction over the administrative branches of the city government, the lines of control are confused and public opinion is consequently unable to establish accountability for unsatisfactory po- lice conditions. This point of view frankly clashes with the principle of legislative confirmation widely held in many parts of the United States. Copied along with other " check and balance " devices from the pattern of the federal govern- ment, the principle was applied to municipal affairs, not because of any need which it supplied, but because at the time it was supposed to be the " correct " governmental arrangement. It was predicated on a fear of the execu- tive, a belief that leadership would develop into tyranny. It was an outgrowth of our early inhibitory conceptions of government and of the theory that charters of liberty could not at the same time be charters of powers. It was one of many expedients which, designed to guard against the abuse of authority in high places, has nullified the possibility of constructive action on the part of re- sponsible officials, and by emphasis on limitations of power rather than on impositions of duty has often crip- pled the machinery of positive government service. Whatever may be thought of the principle of legis- lative confirmation in higher governmental positions as a check upon the discretion of the executive, it is certainly superfluous and confusing in the compact administration of the city. Abolished in some municipalities as a relic of outworn political theories, it is still retained in many of our large communties, more, perhaps, as a concession 161 American Police Systems to tradition and conservative influences than because of any conscious support behind it. The tradition is per- haps more tenaciously guarded in its relation to the police department than to any other branch of municipal ac- tivity, probably because of the belief that the right of life, liberty, and property can be seriously affected by the po- lice authorities and that adequate barriers should be erected against a possible abuse of their powers. It is common, therefore, to find the appointment of the police head conditioned upon confirmation by the legislative council. This is true under both state and municipal control of police organization. Thus, in Baltimore, St. Louis, and Kansas City, the governor's appointments to the police boards must have the concurrence of the state senate. In Boston and Fall River the governor appoints the police heads with the approval of the governor's coun- cil. In cities like Chicago, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Providence, Pittsburgh, Springfield (Mass.), Worcester, and Cambridge (Mass.) the police heads are appointed by the mayor with the consent of the city council. Simi- larly in many of the commission governed municipalities, as we shall see, such as Buffalo, Memphis, Nashville, and Dallas, the appointments of the director of public safety must be confirmed by the commission. In some few cities the nominations of the appointing officer are accepted without question. In others, by far the greater number, the theory that the council refuses its confirmation only in cases of unfitness is frankly thrown aside, and the power is used for partisan purposes, either to embarrass or coerce the executive, or as a basis for political trade. The situation is especially confused and 162 Special Problems of Police Control the results particularly demoralizing when the mayor rep- resents one political party and the council another. In Newark in 19 15 the two Democrats nominated for the police board by the Republican mayor were turned down by the council because, in the words of the mayor, " Nu- gent (the ' boss ' of Essex County) said they were not good Democrats." * Thereupon two others more ac- ceptable for their faith were appointed. In 19 17, in the same city under the same circumstances, confirmation was refused by the council to seventeen out of eighteen names submitted by the mayor as members of the police, fire and health boards. No reason was given for the sum- mary action, but the mayor's attempt to force an investi- gation of the council was undoubtedly responsible. The one nominee successful in obtaining confirmation was a collector for a brewery, whose brother was a member of the council. Examples of this kind could be multiplied at length. The departments of many cities are today suffering from the lack of definite responsibility for police management. It is doubtful whether the confirmation principle has ever proved an effective check upon the exercise of the mayor's discretion or has in any way safeguarded the cities against the selection of incompetents. In too many cases, indeed, it has served as a cloak to allow the mayor to escape with inferior appointments. The same conditions of confused responsibility follow the principle of legislative approval of removals. I am here referring not to the separate powers of removal sometimes lodged in different agencies of government — 1 Personally communicated. 163 American Police Systems as, for example, the right of removal of New York's po- lice commissioner by either the mayor or the governor — but to the joint responsibility in this matter of executive and legislative branches. Thus in Cambridge " the mayor may, with the approval of a majority of the mem- bers of the city council, remove any head of a department or member of a board before expiration of his term of office." 1 Similar provisions affecting members of the police boards are found in Providence 2 and in Spring- field (Mass.). 3 In Chicago, the council can, by a two- thirds vote, restore to office any official, including the su- perintendent of police, removed by the mayor. 4 In Worcester (Mass.) the head of the police force can be reinstated by a three-fourths vote of the board of alder- men. 5 In Hartford (Conn.) the concurrence of four members of the board of aldermen is necessary to re- moval. 6 In Boston 7 and Fall River 8 the removal of police commissioners by the governor requires the consent of the council. 9 Cambridge (Mass.) furnishes an excellent illustration 1 Genera^ Acts of Mass., 1915, Chap. 267, Part III. This provision is uniform in all Massachusetts cities having Plan B charters. 2 Acts of R. I., 1906, Chap. 1379. 3 Ordinance of August 2, 1902. 4 Laws of 111., 1875, p. 41. 5 City Ordinances, Chap. XXXI, Sec. 1. 6 City Charter 1907, Chap, 9, Sec. 101. 7 Acts of Mass., 1906, Chap. 291, Sec. 7. 8 Acts of Mass., 1894, Chap. 351. 9 The executive council has not hesitated to interfere with the governor's management of Boston's police force. In 1891 the gov- ernor's attempt to remove a police commissioner on serious charges was thwarted by the council, the vote being unanimous against the proposal (Executive council records for 1891, p. 45). Again in 1897 the council prevented the removal of, a commissioner against whom charges had been filed (Records for 1897, p. 6). 164 Special Problems of Police Control of the practical operation of this principle. Without war- rant in necessity, the position of director of public safety was created in 19 12; its subsequent history completely demonstrated the uselessness of the post. The efforts of a new mayor, elected in 1916 on a reform ticket, to abol- ish the position were thwarted by a majority of the coun- cil representing another political party. The council it- self assumed no responsibility for the management of the force, and did not hesitate to criticize the mayor in his struggles to reorganize it; on the other hand, the action of the council effectively prevented the mayor from exer- cising his responsibility for the efficient administration of an executive department. It is, of course, an open question how far a mayor or governor or other executive officer should be allowed to go in removing at will the heads of departments. As we shall see in a later chapter, administrative efficiency is largely predicated on continuity of service, and there is little hope for a specialized function of government like health or police so long as it is under the direction of a periodically shifting body of officials, drawn for political motives from an inexperienced public. Whether the rem- edy for such periodic removals is to be found in legisla- tion, or whether it is a matter that must be left to the slow processes of education is beyond the limits of this present discussion. 1 One principle, however, can be defi- nitely stated: If removals are to be made, the responsi- bility should not be scattered ; it should be sharply defined, single and not joint. Our too frequent assumption that iThe matter is discussed in Chap. VI, under the heading: The Chief and Civil Service, p. 259. 16S American Police Systems an executive, obliged to share his powers with an entirely separate branch of government, can be held solely answer- able for administrative results, is an irreconcilable para- dox. II. THE JURISDICTION OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT Policing in America, as we have seen, has generally been regarded as a function of the municipality. Even when controlled by state authorities its operation has been confined to a particular city rather than to a district em- bracing perhaps a number of cities and towns. This policy was the natural development of a period when cities were widely scattered and when little was to be gained from combination and centralization. Within two decades, however, radical changes have been wrought by the concentration of population in metro- politan districts or sections, irrespective of established city boundaries. Not only have cities enlarged their lim- its, but the intervening towns and villages have grown to fill in the gaps, so that what is in reality one vast city is often made up of a dozen or more municipalities, each with its own system of government and its own laws. This situation is illustrated, for example, by the condition in eastern Massachusetts. Within a radius of approxi- mately twelve miles of the center of the business district of Boston are 38 cities and towns, all except six exceeding 5,000 in population, with a total population of over 840,000. That is, while the city of Boston has a popula- tion of 745,000, the metropolitan district of Boston, con- sisting of practically unbroken urban development, has a 166 Special Problems of Police Control population of i, 588,000. * Within this territory which, geographically speaking, is not extensive, and which has already been consolidated into a single district for pur- poses of metropolitan park administration, are 39 differ- ent police forces, each with exclusive jurisdiction over a portion of the field, and each independent of any common superior authority. 2 A similar situation is shown in connection with the vast, continuous population bordering on and stretching back from the western bank of the Hudson River oppo- site New York City. Here we have within approxi- mately thirty square miles nine cities, towns, and town- ships: Jersey City with a population of 270,000, Ho- boken with 67,000, West Hoboken with 38,000, Bayonne with 64,000, West New York with 22,000, Union with 21,000, North Bergen with 20,000, Weehawken with 13,000, and Guttenberg with 6,000. Altogether they comprise a composite city of 527,ooo. 3 Each of these places, separated from its neighbors by boundary lines long since outworn, maintains its own police force under standards good, bad, or indifferent. Illustrations such as this could be multiplied at length. Most of the large cities of the country are fringed by 1 These figures are obtained from the state census of Massachu- setts, 1915. 2 In 1917 a bill was introduced into the Massachusetts legislature, creating five police districts in the state, one of which was to include Boston and adjacent territory; each district was placed under the control of a district commissioner, who should have general super- vision over all city and town forces within his jurisdiction, and be answerable for his acts to a state commissioner of police. The bill failed of passage. (See House Document No. 539, January, 1917.) 3 These figures are obtained from the state census of New Jersey, 1915. 167 American Police Systems municipalities and townships separated from their com- mon centers by fictitious boundaries rather than by any real divergence of interest or population. 1 In conse- quence, the function of policing, instead of being unified and coordinated under single management for a single people, is broken up and scattered in patch-work fashion among irregularly formed groups. This criticism is of course true of other government functions, such as public works and the health service. It is particularly applicable, however, to the police and fire forces. The management of these forces is con- cerned primarily with the protection of lives and prop- erty. It is a matter of finding the factors which will promote the most efficient service. There are but few questions of broad general policy to be considered, such as relate to the management of local public works, for example, the determination of which must necessarily be left to the individual community. Rather, police and fire management is a distinctly technical problem offering little legitimate opportunity for differences of opinion based on local or parochial grounds. Policing in Ho- boken demands the same intelligent methods and adminis- trative oversight as in West Hoboken. These two services, moreover, fire and police, gain much from coordination and amalgamation. The police and fire forces of Greater New York, each now under single management, are far more effective today than they were when Manhattan, Brooklyn, Long Island City, 1 In Detroit three separate villages, Highland Park, Hamtramck, and St. Clair Heights are completely within the city limits. Each village, however, has its own distinct municipal government. 1 68 Special Problems of Police Control and the many scattered towns in Queens County had their own departments, each more or less self-sufficient and jealous oi\ its own prestige. Standardization of method under single leadership has lifted both services to a de- gree of effectiveness impossible under diverse manage- ment. In not a few of the towns and cities in the neigh- borhood of Jersey City and of Boston, police conditions are distinctly inferior, sometimes demoralized, because of a lack of means adequately to maintain a separate estab- lishment, with all the heavy overhead charges which such independence involves. Moreover, separation in man- agement is a serious handicap to the effectiveness of po- lice work, in that it renders impossible a single policy and a united front against crime. Under modern conditions of life the traveling professional criminal has come to play a predominant part in the police problem, and the success of any endeavor to counteract his work depends in large measure upon harmonious cooperation, over a wide area, of the forces of law and order. London faced the question of divided police jurisdic- tion within a metropolitan area, when, in 1829, out of a number of boroughs and counties, supporting several in- effective and conflicting constabulary systems, she carved the metropolitan police district, which today embraces 700 square miles and supports the largest and undoubt- edly the best local force in the world. Prior to 1829 the same combination existed of parochial jealousies, lack of cooperation, and general demoralization typical today of the situation in northern New Jersey and elsewhere in the United States. 1 1 See European Police Systems, p. 100. 169 American Police Systems Similarly in Berlin the district over which the police president presides was in 1900 enlarged to include the neighboring suburbs of Charlottenburg, Schoneberg, Neukolln and Lichtenberg. 1 In Paris the authority of the prefect of police extends over the whole department of the Seine, including the communes of St. Cloud, Sevres, and Meudon. 2 Police consolidation for metropolitan areas would un- doubtedly produce beneficial results in the United States. The increase of crime in urban districts, traceable in many cases to the isolation of small police departments in heavily populated sections would seem to make neces- sary some form of cooperation as yet untried. The diffi- culty of creating an administrative district for the exer- cise of a single government function is admittedly for- midable although precedents for such action exist. 3 Where the police commissioner is appointed by the gov- ernor, as in Boston, it would seem that his jurisdiction could easily be extended by act of legislature, without violent wrench to principles of local autonomy. In the Jersey City district, however, where no state control of police forces exists, consolidation would involve either the creation of some new machinery of supervision, based perhaps on a federalized or representative system, or a frank return to the metropolitan police arrangement un- der state control. Either Course would be fraught with difficulty. Of the growing need of some such action, however, there can be no question. In many urban ceri- 1 Ibid., p. log. 2 Ibid., p. 88. 3 As for example, the Metropolitan Park Commission and the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board in Massachusetts. 170 Special Problems of Police Control ters, particularly where communities more or less para- sitic have developed around the original city, the diffi- culty could be solved by extending the geographical limits of the municipality for the exercise not only of the police function, but of other local governmental functions as well. We cannot leave the consideration of this subject with- out at least a passing reference to a perplexing problem which it uncovers. In all our populous states are literally scores of police forces, maintained not only by cities, towns and villages but occasionally by park area adminis- trations and other governmental units. Except in occa- sional matters of insignificant detail, these police forces are independent of any common superior authority and uncoordinated by any single agency of supervision. Within a given state, therefore, it is possible to find po- lice departments of widely varying degrees of efficiency, representing all sorts of standards, high and low. Ef- fective cooperation between these forces is not only non- existent but practically impossible, with the result that crime and lawlessness are difficult to prevent and still more difficult to punish. The formation of state constabulary systems will in part remedy this condition by eliminating many of the village forces and by providing a single agency for the apprehension of criminals in country districts and in small communities. There still remains a large part of the problem, however, which the state constabulary sys- tem will not touch. Why in New York State, for exam- ple, should it be possible to find such marked variations in police efficiency, to say nothing of police practices and 171 American Police Systems methods, as exist between the departments of New York City and Buffalo or of Rochester and Albany? Why in a state like Ohio should there not be some uniformity in police procedure, some standardization in the technique of police work, which will bring the weaker forces up to higher levels and make* possible some degree of effective cooperation ? The experience of Europe in the solution of this prob- lem is worthy of consideration. In England, after a long period of demoralization, similar to that which exists in many of our states today, Parliament passed, in 1856, the Rural Police Act which standardized the system of police administration for the entire country. This act provided for the appointment of Inspectors of Constabu- lary under the Home Office with authority to visit and inquire into the state and general efficiency of the police in the various towns and counties 1 of England and Wales. It further provided that on certificates from the Home Secretary to the effect that the police force of a locality is efficient in point of numbers and discipline, a sum not exceeding one-half part of the total cost of the pay and clothing of the force was to be contributed from the national treasury. Through the operation of this act there was established a complete system of national su- pervision over all the police forces of England and Wales, which, while it in no way robs the cities and counties of the right of local control, stimulates their efforts to main- 1 Each county in England has its own police force with complete jurisdiction except in the municipalities that have their own forces; but municipalities with a population of less than 20,000 are debarred from having separate police departments. (See European Police Systems, pp. 61-64.) 172 Special Problems of Police Control tain an efficient standard and introduce uniformity into their organization and management. To be sure, the Home Office, particularly as far as the towns and cities are concerned, has no positive authority over the police force. It cannot remove an official or compel the adop- tion of any improvements. It acts only in the capacity of friendly guide. Its sole lever is the national subven- tion or grant in aid, which may be withheld if the report of the supervising inspector indicates unsatisfactory con- ditions. 1 While it is probable that the English plan in its entirety could not easily be adapted to a state like New York or Ohio, it is nevertheless suggestive of a method of super- vision and coordination in no way fatal to the principle of local autonomy. Some such plan would undoubtedly prove of great benefit to our states. It is encouraging, therefore, to note the report of the special commission on police appointed in 1916 by the governor of Massa- chusetts in which the establishment of a system of super- vision through a state commissioner of police was strongly urged. It is possible that the particular method sug- gested by the commission was faulty and {hat the details of the proposed organization would not stand the test of practical operation. The idea underlying the plan, how- ever, points the way toward a uniformity of police prac- tice and method and a standardization of work without which no real progress can be made in the positive devel- opment of police effectiveness. 1 For a discussion of the operation of this plan, see European Po- lice Systems, pp. 48-64. 173 American Police Systems III. COMMISSION GOVERNMENT AND THE POLICE FORCE The commission form of government has been so widely adopted and presents so many interesting admin- istrative problems, that its relation to the police depart- ment deserves separate consideration. It is now in force in 27 of the 69 cities in the United States over 100,000 population, 1 and in 105 cities over 30,ooo, 2 while of cities of all classes it is installed in over 500. 3 It represents a reaction against the inefficiency of the mayor and council plan of city government, and its success in stimulating official effort and in creating a new and better civic spirit has been attested by competent observers. 4 1 According to U. S. Census publication, " Financial Statistics of Cities;" — 1917, there were 26 cities as follows: Birmingham (Ala.), Buffalo, Dallas, Dayton, Des Moines, Fort Worth, Houston, Jersey City, Kansas City (Kan.), Lawrence, Lowell, Lynn, Memphis, Nash- ville, New Orleans, Oakland (Cal.), Omaha, Portland (Ore.), Read- ing, St. Paul, Salt Lake City, San Antonio, Spokane, Tacoma, Tren- ton, Washington (D. C). Since the beginning of 1917 Newark has adopted the commission form of government and Grand Rapids has adopted the commission manager plan, while Lynn has aban- doned commission government. 2 Ibid. The U. S. statistics show 91 cities but since 1917 East St. Louis, 111., Jacksonville, Fla., Bay City, Mich., and Charlotte, N. C, have adopted commission government, and the commission manager form has been adopted in the following cities : Akron, O., Auburn, N. Y., Charleston, W. Va., Fresno, Cal., Kalamazoo, Mich., Lynch- burg, Va., Norfolk, Va., Roanoke, Va., Waltham, Mass., Wheeling, W. Va. 3 These figures include city manager and commission governed cities. 4 See City Government by Commission, edited by Clinton Rogers Woodruff, New York, 1911; Commission Government in American Cities, by Ernest S. Bradford, New York, 191 1; Commission Gov-i ernment in American Cities, printed in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 191 1; The New City Gov- ernment, by Henry Bruere, New York, 1912; Municipal Freedom, by Oswald Ryan, New York, 1915; History and Analysis of the Commission and City Manager Plans of Municipal Government in 174 Special Problems of Police Control The Personnel of Commissions. Our interest lies in the relation of commission govern- ment to the particular function of policing. Briefly, the commission consists of a board, generally of five mem- bers elected at large, combining in itself all the legislative and administrative functions of the municipality. Each commissioner assumes charge of a particular department of the city government ; and ordinarily he is paid a salary which enables him to devote his entire time to the work. 1 He is thus not only a director in city affairs but an active administrator of a city department. In some cities the assignment of departments is a matter of board action, the commissioners themselves determining what depart- ment each shall head; in others, a candidate for election designates in advance the particular department he wishes to administer, and the electors at the polls are asked to pass upon his qualifications for the post. In twelve of the twenty-seven commission cities over 100,000 popula- tion, this latter method is in effect; and the choice of administrative heads of particular departments is thus left to the exigencies of a popular election. In Buffalo Portland (Ore.), Houston, Birmingham (Ala.), Nash- ville and other important municipalities, the director of public safety and his colleagues are chosen by a method which, as we have already seen, is utterly unadapted to the United States, by Tso-Shuen Chang, University of Iowa, Iowa City, 1018. . . M 1 In Buffalo the mayor-commissioner s salary is $8,000 a year, and that of the other commissioners is $7,000 each; the commissioners in Birmingham (Ala.) receive $7,000; in Memphis the mayor-com- missioner's salary is $6,000, and the others receive $3,000; in Spo- kane the salary is $5,000 to all alike; St. Paul -pays $5,000 to the mayor-commissioner and $4,5°° to the others. 175 American Police Systems the selection of trained administrators. Its results are shown by an analysis of the personnel of some of the boards. Barbers, undertakers, dentists, stone-masons, carpenters, and bakers have been elected to manage the affairs of city departments. In Elgin, Illinois, the com- missioner of health was recently a harness maker. Ig- norant of the meaning or significance of typhoid fever reports turned in by the doctors, he allowed them to accu- mulate on his desk until an epidemic swept the town. In Houston, Texas, the commissioner of streets and bridges was a horse-shoer, the commissioner of finance a ma- chinist, and the commissioner of health a printer. In Topeka, Kansas, the commissioner of public utilities was a barber, and the commissioner of parks and sanitation a house-mover. Jersey City had an undertaker as a com- missioner of health. Kansas City, Kansas, had a gro- ceryman as commissioner of streets, and Lynn, Massa- chusetts, a pressman from a newspaper office as com- missioner of finance. The point, of course, is not that these various employments ought not to be represented in municipal government, but that they do not fit a man for an occupation demanding technical, administrative ability. Commission Government Wrong in Principle. Even when the assignment to departments is left to the judgment of the board, the results are but little changed. A commissioner may be given a department for which he has no special talent; or his lack of training and ex- perience may unfit him to serve as an administrator of any department. The difficulty with the situation is rooted in 176 Special Problems of Police Control the very conception of the commission plan. It confuses the deliberative or policy- forming function of city govern- ment with its technical, administrative function. One is the determination of community plans in the light of public opinion; the other is the management of specialized lines of business by competent experts. The former in republican government must necessarily be based on some kind of representative principle; in the latter the repre- sentative principle has no proper place. It is quite pos- sible that the carpenters or iron-workers or doctors of a community might feel that either their own professions or the broader interests they typify should be represented in the city's regulative machinery; on the other hand, it is impossible to conceive of a carpenter's way or an iron-worker's way or a doctor's way of managing a po- lice force or a department of public works. The com- mission plan was framed with only the administrative necessities of a city in mind, on the theory that the peo- ple at the polls would choose their commissioners for administrative ability, and that these commissioners could incidentally be entrusted with the legislative, policy-form- ing functions of the city government. While the old idea of sectional or geographical representation was wisely omitted from the plan, no provision was made for the representation of different points of view in regard to city policy or of different groups or classes. By impli- cation, at least, the commission plan limits the people in their selection of commissioners to men of the employer type, competent to hire and direct the labor of other men. With an instinct, however, more deep-seated and far truer than the instinct of charter-makers, the citizens of 177 American Police Systems most commission cities have elected their commissioners, not for their administrative abilities, but because they were representative of a group, a policy, or a principle. The basic administrative feature of the plan has been largely neglected or else, under the lingering spell of Jacksonian principles, the voters have argued that any honest man of average ability, regardless of his previous experience, is fitted to run a city department. In other words, although commission government fails to provide for the principle of representation, the public at the polls sweeps aside the intent of the charter and makes that principle its gauge and standard. When 'Wichita, Kan- sas, elected a railway switchman on its commission, or when Topeka, Kansas, elected a barber, it was not be- cause these men were regarded as administrative experts, but because they were representative of particular groups with particular points of view. As members of the com- mission, their ideas were worthy contributions to the joint discussion of municipal projects. In one of these cases, indeed, no opinion on city policy of any of the commissioners was more anxiously awaited or more thor- oughly respected. The absurdity of the situation lay in the fact that these two public servants, valuable in a rep- resentative capacity, should be called upon to reorganize and manage specific city departments — one a water de- partment and the other a department of public works — without any qualifications whatsoever for the task. This situation is clearly evident in the management of the police force. Prior to his election, the director of public safety in New Orleans was engaged in the insur- ance business; in Newark he was the business agent of 178 Special Problems of Police Control the Stationary Firemen's Union ; in Salt Lake City he was a city auditor. In Memphis the commissioner of fire and police was a manufacturer of mixed feeds ; in Nash- ville, a merchant. These commissioners or directors are many of them men of character, and some have real ad- ministrative ability. In only a few cases, however, is their ability adapted to the highly specialized require- ments of either police management or city management generally. They can maintain the status of their depart- ments as they have inherited it, but they are seldom able to reorganize and reconstruct on new, progressive lines. To meet the difficulties inherent in this situation, the apologists of the commission plan sometimes conceive the commissioner as a kind of supervisor whose function it is, not to assume direct administrative charge of the details of his department, but to hold himself responsible for its general policies, and advise with the permanent expert officials under him. This conception, however, does not square with the facts. Almost without exception, in the cities visited, the commissioners regard themselves as the actual administrators of their departments. All the inti- mate detail of departmental business, the means and methods by which ends are achieved, come before them for determination. Transfers, promotions, assignments, and questions involving technical points of organization and procedure are their immediate concern. Indeed, in most cases, this conception is in accordance with the intent of the commission charters. As we have seen, the commissioners are paid substantial salaries, and many of them are obliged to give full time to their tasks. Under such circumstances it is not practicable to have expert 179 American Police Systems administrators of high grade serving under the commis- sioners. As President Lowell points out, such an ar- rangement would be playing false to the public by taking pay for work unperformed, even if the double charge of full salaries to both commissioner and administrator were not prohibitive. 1 Commission Government and Transient Management. Not only does the commission form of government in- troduce police administrators inexperienced and unfitted for their tasks, but, because of the recurrent elections naturally involved in the plan, it subjects the departments to the demoralizing influences of transient management. The value of permanence in high executive positions is ignored. Here again we see the confusion arising from the attempt to confer upon a policy-forming body, sub- ject to the uncertainties of popular control, specialized administrative functions in which success is based alone upon security and continuity in office. In many commis- sion cities the commissioners serve for two years; in some, for three; and in some for four. The elections, in cases of candidates standing to succeed themselves, are 1 Public Opinion and Popular Government, New York, 1913, p. 287. In Newark, New Jersey, an effort has been made to provide expert administrators for the several divisions included in the department of public safety. The elected director of public safety appoints a board of three members known as the board of public safety. One member is given charge of administering the police department with the title of police commissioner, one serves as fire commissioner and the other as commissioner of licenses. In so far as the law de- fining the duties of elected city commissioners permits, adminis- trative functions are delegated to the respective subordinate com- missioners in charge of the fire, police, and license departments. They are responsible to the director for the management of their departments ; their term of office is at the pleasure of the director. 180 Special Problems of Police Control seldom contested on the basis of administrative ability; the issue is formed by political questions or by contro- versies arising from the activities of the commissioners in their legislative capacities. In consequence, the di- rector of public safety and his associates are not long enough in office to learn even the meaning or possibilities of their departments. In Omaha there have been three directors of public safety in eight years; in Dallas, Texas, six in thirteen years ; in Memphis, ten in ten years. The tenure is so insecure that serious attention cannot be paid to policies which take time to develop. What new projects are initiated are often abandoned by a fresh ad- ministration, and the department, instead of sailing on a definite course carefully mapped out, merely drifts in vacillation and uncertainty. The periodic elections of administrative heads often prove an incentive to political activity within the depart- ment. The members of a police force will work for the election or reelection of a " good " commissioner, while they will oppose the candidacy of one whose point of view they regard as hostile to their own interests. In Omaha in 1914, the commissioner of police, running for reelection, received the solid support of the entire depart- ment. " We worked our heads off for him," an officer of the force told me. " He had treated us square." Said the secretary of the department : " The police are more mixed up in the political game now, under commission government, than they were under the old regime." This situation, paralleled in some other commission cities, notably St. Paul and Birmingham, is the inevitable conse- quence of an elective, administrative head. 181 American Police Systems Commission Government and Irresponsible Administra- tion. Another weakness of the commission plan, reflected in the management of the police force, lies in the fact that in many cities employees cannot be dismissed by the di- . rector in charge of the department without the approval of the commission. This is true in Buffalo, Jersey City, St. Paul, Birmingham, Omaha, Salt Lake City, San An- tonio, and many other municipalities. In some cities all disciplinary fines and penalties and all appointments must have the sanction of the commission. In other words, in so far as this interference is prevalent, commission government represents in its relation to the police force nothing else than the multiple management and divided responsibility of the old type of police board. 1 With the commission exercising its right to check the director in the handling of his men, no one official can be held solely answerable for the conduct of the department — an ar- rangement productive of all the vicious results of scatter- / ing control. In Jersey City in 1915, the director of public safety attempted to remove the chief of police on charges of drunkenness and insubordination. By a vote 1 In at least one city — East St. Louis, Illinois — the commission form of government has not eliminated the old system of board control. The law creating the commission provides that the boards of fire and police commissioners shall not be disturbed (Laws of 111., 1910.) Consequently, in this city the elected commissioner of public health and safety, charged with the administration of the police department, yields his authority to a board of fire and police commissioners appointed by the mayor with the consent of the city commission, of which the commissioner of public health and safety is himself a member. To add to the chaos of this situation, re- movals from the police department are effected by a trial board consisting of the county , judge, the circuit judge, and the county probate judge! 182 Special Problems of Police Control of three to two, the commission refused to sustain the di- rector, and the chief was reinstated in full power. At the time of the investigator's visit to Jersey City, the di- rector was manoeuvering to discipline a lieutenant of the force without incurring the disapproval of the board. " My colleagues are not concerned with me or my de- partment," he said. " If it will bring them any votes to be lenient with ' John Brown ' of the police force when he is on trial, ' John Brown ' will undoubtedly get off easy. They will play the political game straight through and win as much favor as possible before concerning themselves with the discipline of my department." Similarly, in San Antonio the attempt of the director pf public safety to remove the chief of police was frus- trated by the commission. In this case, to be sure, the commission acted in the public interest, for the director's move was prompted by his desire to secure the position for a friend — an iceman by profession. At the same time, the director of public safety had been elected by the people to manage the police department, and the inter- ference by the commission tangled the lines of responsi- bility. The Effect of Commission Government on the Police Force. It is difficult to appraise the commission form of gov- ernment in its relation to a particular branch of municipal service. Police duty in America has been to so large an extent an unimaginative, perfunctory routine that it would probably be the last phase of city government to feel the stimulus of a new movement. Certainly, of any 183 American Police Systems positive effect of commission government upon the work and administrative mechanism of the police department, little can be seen at the present time. Indeed, a survey of a number of commission cities seems to justify the conclusion that the plan has made no impression whatever upon the business of policing. In some cities commission government is little more than an ornamental device, superimposed upon old methods and worn out practices — a more or less elaborate machine of control, without contact or connection with the real working of the de- partment. In Omaha, for example, at the time of my visit, the same political boss who ran the police force under the old regime was running it under commission government. Similarly in Jersey City the same political influences that wrecked police administrations in other years were in active operation. In St. Paul commission government had not shaken the grip of the political ring on the police department. Birmingham, Alabama, with eight or nine years of commission government to its credit, has perhaps one of the shabbiest police organiza j tions of any large city in the United States. With no civil service, with no standards for appointment or pro- motion, with no modern equipment, with nothing to stim- ulate effectiveness or punish slackness, its affairs through- out are governed by the petty politics of the commission. In none of these police departments is there any knowl- edge of progressive methods in police work, or any genu- ine desire for change. Down-at-the-heel and contented, with no vision and no constructive policies, they follow in the rut of previous administrations. I asked a well- 184 Special Problems of Police Control known citizen of Omaha what effect commission govern- ment had had upon the police administration of his city. " It has not even made a dent in it," he replied. This re- mark could truthfully be applied to many of the commis- sion cities visited. I do not mean to imply, of course, that the police de- partments of commission cities are worse than those of the mayor and council type. Probably they are better. In some of the smaller cities, such as Cedar Rapids and Des Moines, Iowa, they are decidedly better. The stimu- lated civic spirit which brought the commission plan into being would necessarily be transmuted at least into a tem- porarily improved attitude on the part of public officials. Indeed, one is led to suspect that the good results credited to commission government are due not so much to any particular merit in the plan itself as to the " new broom " enthusiasm which accompanies the introduction of any civic novelty. Commission government is given the ap- pearance of efficiency because in many cases the reins of control are in new hands. But without a program of administrative reorganization, without trained men as executives to manage the details of the work, without imagination in the development of departmental func- tions; — in brief, without constructive leadership to study and anticipate community requirements, — the results of the new plan, or of any other plan, cannot be permanent.. Commission government provides for none of these things. It is a mere reshaping of the governmental ma- chine, with serious inherent defects. Unless it can bring to its service the effective, united leadership which its 185 American Police Systems very construction seems to bar, it will go the way of other artificial arrangements, equally promising at the start. » City Manager Plan. A word in conclusion is necessary as to the operation of the city manager plan — a modification of commission government. This plan has grown in recognition of the fact that the commission government scheme does not pro- vide administrators trained in municipal affairs. Under the commission manager plan, the elected city commis- sioners constitute the city's legislative body, and are charged with the responsibility for laying down the gen- eral policies to be followed in the various branches of municipal administration. The city commission appoints the manager who takes over all purely administrative functions. The commission is simply a board of ad- visers or directors, devoting its energies to plans and policies, and maintaining its contact with the city govern- ment through its business representative. 1 In Dayton the city manager appoints a director of pub- lic safety subject to the approval of the city commission. 1 At the present writing, January, 1920, 165 communities, notably Dayton and Akron> Ohio, and Grand Rapids, Michigan, are oper- ating under or pledged to the commission manager plan. Of the 165 cities and towns, 105 have approved city manager charters, ten have charters with some standard feature of the manager plan lack- ing, and in 50 communities the position of manager has been created by ordinance. (See National Municipal Review, January, 1920.) In the past seven years the plan has become effective in the following seven cities having a population ranging from 50,000 to 100,000: Akron, Ohio ; Altoona, Penn. ; Kalamazoo, Mich. ; Norfolk, Va. ; San Diego, Cat.; Springfield, Ohio; Wichita, Kan. Twelve cities from 30,000 to 50,000 have the commission manager plan at the present time. 186 Special Problems of Police Control The director has immediate control of the police and fire departments and the bureau of weights and measures. In smaller cities having the commission manager plan, there is no officer between the city manager and the pro- fessional head of the police force. The results achieved by the city manager scheme de- pend largely upon the skill of the manager and the pres- ence or absence of politics in the board. Certainly in freeing the elected commissioners from the necessity of administering particular departments, the city manager arrangement contains a degree of promise which cannot be looked for in the regular commission form of govern- ment. It is still too early to appraise the effect of this plan upon the police department. As we shall see in a later chapter, its installation in the largest city in which it is now in operation, Dayton, Ohio, has been attended with some administrative confusion. In other cities the vi- cious play of politics has not been eliminated in spite of the theoretic merits of the plan. Whether this scheme by itself offers any permanent solution of the evils with which our police departments have long been associated, has yet to be proven. 187 CHAPTER V THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT General organization.— Relation between supervision and work. — Examples. — Adjustment of the machinery to its task. — Examples. — Adaptation of the machinery to its work. — Faulty mechanism due to inelastic legal restrictions. — Illustrations. — European departments far more elastic. — Faulty mechanism due to unnecessary functions. — Faulty mechanism due to inadequate leadership. The organization of American police departments shows little divergence from a standard type. In most of the larger cities a civilian commissioner or director, or a civilian board, controls the force through a chief or superintendent. The same director or board may also control other municipal functions, such as fire and health. 1 In smaller cities the civilian administrative agencies are often omitted, and the chief as head of the 1 In Philadelphia, for example, the director of public safety has under his jurisdiction the fire and police forces of the city as well as the bureau for the inspection of buildings. Arrangements largely similar prevail in Milwaukee, Louisville, Indianapolis, and in most of the commission governed cities. Sometimes a miscellaneous as- sortment of activities is brought under the control of a single ad- ministrator or board. In Louisville the charter provides that the board of public safety shall have exclusive jurisdiction of "the fire department, the police department, the health department, the depart- ment of buildings, of the pounds, and prisons, and market places, and of all the charitable, reformatory and penal institutions of the city." (Charter of Louisville, Sec. 2,861.) Mobile (Ala.) has a department known as the "Department of health, justice, sanitation, pounds, police, cemeteries, meat and milk, weights and measures." 188 The Organization of the Department force is responsible to the mayor or other appointing officer. The structure of the department includes, as its two main branches, the uniformed force and the detective bu- reau. The cities are generally divided into precincts or districts in charge of a ranking officer, usually a captain. In larger cities the precincts are grouped into several ter- ritorial divisions under an inspector or other official, or occasionally they may have subdivisions of their own. The precincts have their " beats " for patrol purposes and their fixed posts, and there is the usual accompani- ment of mounted men and bicycle squads, sometimes at- tached to headquarters, sometimes to the precincts. In larger cities an independent traffic squad, responsible to the head of the department or one of his representatives, covers important traffic points. Detective work is han- dled either by headquarters or the precincts, or both, or by specially arranged detective districts. Such in barest outline is the internal organization of the department. The charts included in this book will, it is hoped, convey a general idea of local arrangements, for it is impossible to cover the subject descriptively within the limits of a chapter. It is scarcely less diffi- cult to examine the arrangements critically. Their weak- nesses are so complex and often so interwoven with fac- tors of personnel that the dissection is neither simple nor easy. Generally speaking, sound mechanical organization must fulfill three conditions: first, the relation between supervision and work must be well-balanced ; second, the different parts of the mechanism must be adjusted to each 189 American Police Systems other ; and 'third, the whole machine must be adapted to its task. There are undoubtedly other standards that could be applied, but none more important than these. By their aid we are able briefly to examine some of the more obvious mechanical faults of our police systems. Supervision and the Police Force. In the first place, the relation between supervision and the police force is in many cities poorly balanced. Strangely enough this condition is as often the conse- quence of too much supervision as too little. Of recent years, indeed, the frequent attempts to reorganize the departments have resulted, in not a few cases, in the mere addition of supervisory agencies without sharp distinc- tions in function. Some departments, therefore, give the impression of being overloaded and top-heavy. The small, commission governed cities, with their directors of public safety and chiefs of police, are perhaps the best illustrations of this condition. The forces are small and the responsibilities in quiet communities are not onerous. There is nothing that one well-equipped executive could not adequately handle. Yet in such cities there are really two executives, with duties poorly defined or not defined at all, both of them under the more or less direct super- vision of a board. In consequence, as we shall see in a later chapter, one of the executives, generally the chief, is often crowded into comparative obscurity, while the other manages the department. The top-heavy condition of police supervision can be illustrated — perhaps in exaggerated form — by the situ- ation in Dayton, Ohio, in 19 16. Here we had, in se- 190 The Organization of the Department quence of authority, a commission, a city manager, a director of public safety, and a chief of police, governing a police force of 128 men. To be sure, Dayton is an industrial city of 125,000, with a rather large and con- stantly increasing foreign population. The duties of the force are not, however, such as make necessary an elab- orate scheme of supervision. Indeed, between 7 A. m. and 3 p. m., in addition to the traffic force, there were but eight uniformed men on patrol to be supervised. Under such an arrangement, a considerable degree of crowding in the administrative branch could logically be looked for. The city manager is the general executive head of all the municipal machinery, responsible for the policies and ef- fective operation of the departments. But why should there be two executives under him to carry out his wishes in regard to the police? A study of the situation in Dayton indicated that either the office of director of pub- lic safety or the office of chief could have been abolished without detriment to the force. The director was the official who really managed the department. At the time of the investigator's visit this official with the assistance of his secretary, who acted as a sort of deputy-director, was making assignments of men for a coming parade, and was handling the details of policing a strike then in progress. Uniformed men and detectives came to him for orders. The duties of the chief, meanwhile, seemed to be confined to opening such mail as was directed to him, and acting as a rubber stamp for his superior officer. He had no independent function whatever, and no as- signed function which could not easily and quickly have been handled by the director. The impression created by 191 American Police Systems the situation was that the office of chief had been retained out of respect to convention rather than from any dictates of necessity. Poorly balanced relations between supervision and work show themselves with perhaps equal force in inade- quate administrative machinery. There occurs no more glaring illustration of this than the Chicago police de- partment, where for years the heavy administrative bur- dens attending the management of a force of 4,500 in a city exceeding two million population have been given to a chief of police customarily promoted from, the ranks. The continuously demoralized condition of the force is undoubtedly due in no small degree to the city's failure to supplement the technically-equipped uniformed head of the department with a trained executive of broad ad- ministrative experience and social outlook. As we shall see in the next chapter, Chicago could profitably employ a civilian commissioner to whom the chief of police would be a subordinate officer. A condition of under-supervision of a slightly differ- ent variety is shown in the Philadelphia department, where the civilian director of public safety, occasionally a man of wide training and genuine ability, is given too many diverse functions to control. His department em- braces not only the bureau of police, but the fire depart- ment, the bureau of fire prevention, the bureau of build- ings, the inspection of electrical service and other mis- cellaneous activities more or less related. In a smaller city such an arrangement might not prove ineffective; that is, a community of from 25,000 to 50,000, or even larger, might well group a number of functions or bureaus 192 The Organization of the Department under the control of a single administrator, without loss of efficiency. Thus, the association in smaller cities of the fire department with the police department under the same supervision cannot be condemned off-hand as a faulty plan. In a city of Philadelphia's size, however, with its diversified population and its complex social and industrial organization, the function of policing needs the undivided attention of the best administrator obtainable. The director of public safety at present is so weighed down by his many administrative responsibilities that he cannot give the police department the continuous thought and oversight which its importance demands. Hundreds of papers and documents, relating to other activities and demanding perusal or signature, cross his desk every day ; intricate questions of public safety regarding the fire- fighting force or the inspection of buildings consume much of his time and energy — with the result that there is not the close and intimate touch with police affairs from which alone successful management can develop. Under the Blankenburg administration, the director of public safety, a man of ideals and ability, was unable to effect the much-needed reorganization of the detective bureau, solely because of the pressure of other public business. Admitting that it was in critical shape, he was, to use his own words, " sheerly unable to get at it." x This condition is true not only of Philadelphia, but of certain large commission governed cities where functions have been similarly grouped. In Buffalo, for example, a city of 400,000 population, the supervision of the di- rector of public safety covers not only the police depart- 1 Personally communicated. 193 American Police Systems ment, but the fire department and the bureau of health. Moreover, by charter the director is the mayor of the city, with the large executive responsibilities which the post entails. Consequently his time is absorbed in other duties to the exclusion of department matters. The chances are that the machinery for managing a city of 50,000 will be entirely unsuited to a city of 500,000. Difficulties in government increase with size. Cedar Rapids may successfully place its police and fire depart- ments, and other miscellaneous functions, under the su- pervision of a single director. In the very nature of things, Buffalo cannot. The Adjustment of the Machinery. The second condition which good organization must fulfill is the harmonious adjustment of its various parts. The application of this standard to American police de- partments is distinctly discouraging. As we have seen in a preceding chapter, the departments are the products of haphazard growth — as often the result of expediency and circumstances as of deliberate counsel and plan. One seldom encounters, therefore, any considerable degree of orderly or systematic relationship between the various bu- reaus and divisions. This condition shows itself, for example, in the man- ner in which in many departments a long line of specific activities is placed directly under the chief, instead of being broken up and grouped under subordinate officials. In Los Angeles — to pick out a police department almost at random — a number of small and relatively unim- portant branches of the service, dignified in most cases 194 The Organization of the Department by the title of bureau, are appended to the office of chief of police, with the result that the effectiveness of that official as a general supervisor is hampered by the petty details with which he is constantly confronted. The property bureau, the accounting bureau, the municipal farm, the printing and publishing bureau, the chain-gang, the juvenile bureau, the metropolitan squad, the China- town squad, the probation bureau, and the identification bureau are placed under his direct and immediate con- trol. In other words, the department is not organized at all, in the strict sense of the word. Its parts are merely strung together like beads. There is no conception of the organic relationship which one function or division logically bears to another. The identification bureau, for example, in any well-conceived organization would be a branch of the detective division. Its purpose is to estab- lish the identity of those arrested for crime, and in ful- filling this mission it is at once the right arm and the most effective tool of the plain-clothes service. No Eu- ropean police department has ever established its bureau of identification in any other relation than as a definite part of the detective branch. Indeed that relation would suggest itself to any one familiar with problems of busi- ness organization. Yet in Los Angeles and in a dozen other cities the mere fact that the identification bureau was created subsequent to the detective bureau seems to jus- tify its independent existence. It is admitted on an equal footing with its fellow-bureaus, and in many cases is even assigned office space remote from the detective branch which it serves. In consequence, through friction or disuse, it falls short of its possibilities, while the chief 195 American Police Systems of the department is burdened with additional detail, the nature or significance of which he may not be technically equipped to comprehend. Similarly in the Chicago department until 1912, the telegraph bureau, the ambulance bureau, the detective bureau, the record bureau, the printing bureau, the bu- reau of identification, the matrons, the stables, the con- struction department, the dog pound, and the uniformed force were all considered independent units, each di- rectly responsible to the superintendent of police. 1 Each branch jealously guarded its own separate existence and defied attempts at coordination. In an endeavor to rem- edy this situation and relieve the superintendent of some of the burden of administration, the reorganization ordi- nance of 191 2 2 clumsily grouped the bureaus under two deputy superintendents, with little regard to similarity or relationship in function ; and while the rearrangement, on paper at least, was undoubtedly an improvement, it cannot be said that any substantial degree of coherency or co- hesiveness was achieved. A plan which placed under a single specialized administrator such diverse activities as the construction and repair of police stations, the su- pervision of the vice squad, the bureau of records, the drill and inspection of the uniformed force, and the cen- sorship of moving pictures, could hardly be expected to work harmoniously. Faulty adjustment of the parts or branches of police 1 See report of the committee on schools, fire, police and civil serv- ice of the city council of Chicago on the question of a reorganization of the police department, printed in the Journal of the proceedings of the city council, November 25, 1912, pp. 2,416-2,433. 2 Ordinance of December 30, 1912. 196 The Organization of the Department organization is shown not only in these bad arrangements for distributing the administrative burden, but in the op- posite practice of giving the head of the force incomplete oversight of the work of his department. In guarding against the direct responsibility which often swamps a chief or commissioner with irrelevant detail, the funda- mental necessity of ultimate responsibility should not be lost sight of. In too many police departments the nomi- nal head is entrusted with only part of the oversight, while the remainder is shared by other officials of perhaps lesser rank. This situation is due as often to circum- stances as to charter arrangements. An aggressive mayor, perhaps, eagerly seizes the reins of authority; the heads of bureaus or subdivisions begin to report di- rectly to him, and the authority of the chief or commis- sioner is gradually reduced lower and lower. Examples of this are frequent. Perhaps the most illuminating is found in the relations of the uniformed force with the detective bureau. Between these two branches of the service the closest degree of cooperation should prevail. Experience both here and abroad has repeatedly shown that without the aid of the uniformed men substantial and permanent success is impossible for the detective force. The harmonious relationship essential to this cooperation is obviously the result of common management. In other words, the chief of police, as the head of the force, should be clothed with ultimate responsibility for the operation of the detective bureau. Yet in a large number of cities the detective bureau is run as an independent organiza- tion, apparently on the theory that the chief of police has no proper place in its counsels. In Pittsburgh, for ex- 197 American Police Systems ample, the superintendent of police and the chief of de- tectives are independent of each other. They are equal in rank, appointed practically by the same authority, 1 and receive the same salary. At the time of the investiga- tor's visit, friction and misunderstanding marked the relations between the two bureaus. The two heads were politically antagonistic, and in consequence the depart- ment was divided into rival camps. Similarly in Cleveland the head of the detective bureau, designated by the director of public safety without con- sultation with the chief, managed his specialty as an inde- pendent unit. More and more the chief was relegated to the background as the responsible administrator of his de- partment. Maladjustments of this kind, due to vague conceptions of the meaning of organization, are obviously fatal to effective police service. The Adaptability of the Machine. The third characteristic of good organization to which we called attention is the adaptability of the machine to its work. It is undoubtedly in this respect that the Amer- ican police department shows its greatest weakness. As the community's instrument for the protection of life and property and the promotion of orderly relations, it seems primitive and crude. It has developed without plan or design, its purposes never accurately determined, often vaguely conceived. It has seldom been modeled from the point of view of what it was intended to accomplish. 1 According to the ordinance of December 28, 1915, the chief of detectives is "the civilian aide to the director of the department of public safety.'' This official is appointed by the director of public safety, who also appoints the superintendent of police. 198 The Organization of the Department Little exact study has been given, for example, to the relation between patrol duty and crime conditions. In city after city visited by the investigator no revision of patrol posts has occurred in years, in spite of constantly shifting populations. Old patrol arrangements sanctioned by time and tradition are accepted without examination. Because fifty men have been detailed by preceding ad- ministrations to patrol a given precinct it is assumed that fifty men are necessary today. That an analysis of patrol posts, based on present conditions, might show the neces- sity of seventy-five men or twenty-five seems seldom to occur to most police administrators. In Seattle the dis- covery was made that twelve square blocks in the heart of the city had for years been unpatrolled by day or night, while seven-eighths of the city was without police protection between four a. m. and twelve noon. 1 I was told by the chief of the Salt Lake City department that the residential section of his city never sees an officer during the 365 days of the year, unless one is specially detailed to a particular case. In cities like New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia little attempt has been made to vary the methods of patrol to suit the needs of different neighborhoods. 2 Not infrequently one finds an Italian section or a Russian Jewish section patrolled exactly as it was before the influx of the foreign population. Patrol arrangements originally planned for the business and 1 Personally communicated by police officials. 2 An examination in 1916 by Commissioner Woods showed that precinct boundary lines ran through the middle of streets, with the result that such streets were doubly patrolled by officers of the two contiguous precincts. By the simple expedient of running the boundary lines to a given street, instead of including one side of it, many patrolmen were released for other work. 199 American Police Systems populous residential districts have in many cases been extended, theoretically at least; to the suburban districts, regardless of the fact that the police problem is here radi- cally different, while the very size of the territory to be covered makes the adaptation utterly impracticable. In Seattle at the time of my visit two patrol posts in the suburbs were respectively 49J4 miles long and 90 miles long. On each post there were two signal boxes, at which the officer on beat had to report hourly, with the result that the well-marked path from one box to another con- stituted the extent of his actual patrol. In Denver at the time of my visit the patrol posts on well-lighted and busy thoroughfares were only two and three blocks long, while in the dimly lighted suburbs, where by night police pro- tection is especially needed, they were often two miles long. This lack of careful study and analysis of the task which the police are called upon to do makes it impossible to gauge the number of men needed on a force. The matter is apt to be judged by the existing size of the force rather than by a first-hand survey of requirements. The standard applied is simply traditional practice. One hears increases in the force advocated on the ground that " there has been no increase in five years," or that there are seri- ous outbreaks of crime in particular neighborhoods. It is entirely possible even under these circumstances that the force is too large rather than too small. What is at- tributed to inadequacy of force may be ascribable to faulty methods of patrol or improper distribution. The fact-basis for judgment is missing. In consequence there are wide discrepancies in size between our police depart- 200 The Organization of the Department ments, which cannot be accounted for alone by divergent conditions of disorder. New Orleans and Birmingham have eleven policemen of all classes for each ten thousand of population; Cleveland, twelve; Milwaukee, fourteen; Boston and Philadelphia, twenty-three; New York, twenty; and Pittsburgh, sixteen. Little relationship ap- pears to exist between the size of the police department in these cities and the general character of police work. Generally speaking, Cleveland, with one officef to every 796 inhabitants, is a better policed city than Philadelphia, with one to every 431 ; Milwaukee, with one to every 722, is certainly better policed than Pittsburgh, with one to every 626. In brief, one gets the impression in many American cities that police organization is merely a conventional arrangement, sanctioned by usage and tradition, but with little relation to needs or neighborhoods. It looks too often like an importation — as if it had / been wrenched from widely different surroundings and poorly fitted to its new environment. The admirable adaptation of means to end, of machinery to purposes, which one finds in many European departments, is conspicuously lacking. The Italian Carabinieri use a system of patrol adjusted to the peculiar crime conditions of Italian cities. The arrondissements and quartiers of the Parisian organiza- tion in charge of commissaires de police, represent a suc- cessful arrangement for handling the disorder and occa- sional turbulence of the French capital. The unique sys- tem of decentralization at Scotland Yard is adapted to the wide territory covered by the metropolitan police. In American cities, on the other hand, the extraordi- 201 American Police Systems nary crime conditions which confront us have stimulated little invention in the way of new and comprehensive police methods. With some notable improvements in equipment, Philadelphia and Chicago are patrolled today in much the same fashion as they were thirty years ago. Irish detectives still predominate in New York's detective bureau, in spite of the fact that the prevailing nationality of the criminal is no longer Irish. The police of Boston, Baltimore, and San Francisco follow the same general practices as regards the use of reserves and the publica- tion of alarms that were in vogue before the influx of a complex foreign population. To be sure, modern appli- ances have greatly improved the technique of the depart- ments in such matters as the identification of criminals and the control of traffic, but only occasionally does one observe a thorough-going adaptation of police methods and organization arrangements to social or criminal con- ditions. For the most part cities are content to copy the patterns of their neighbors, regardless of fit or suitability. Indianapolis, with a homogeneous population of 265,000, is policed in very much the same fashion as Chicago, with a heterogeneous population of 2,500,000. The police arrangements of Trenton (N. J.) and Bridgeport (Conn.) are shaped not by local necessities but by the conventional model furnished long ago by New York. Throughout the country there is little evidence of system- atic plan or thought in adapting the police department to its work. To the construction of the police mechanism no real creative intelligence has been devoted. 202 The Organization of the Department II The faulty mechanism which we have just been dis- cussing is the final outcome of many causes. We have space to comment upon only a few of them. Inelastic Legal Restrictions. Instead of being free to build their own municipal structures on the basis of their particular municipal re- quirements, our cities have been saddled by legislatures with stereotyped forms of organization ill-fitted to local conditions, and with methods of operation ill-adapted to local needs. In the determination of the framework of management the authorities immediately concerned have had little voice. I am here referring not to the distinc- tion between state control and local control discussed in previous pages, but to the legislative prescriptions which have rendered immobile the internal arrangements of municipal departments. The state legislators rather than the local authorities have determined not only the gen- eral form of departmental organization, but the minutest details of the administrative machinery. One has only to look at the charters or special laws to realize how the inventiveness and imagination of local executives in fram- ing administrative processes have been checked and thwarted, and their opportunities for wholesome experi- ment with municipal methods cramped in the straight- jacket of detailed legislation imposed by the state. In the police department this condition runs back to an early period. The law of 1857, creating a metropolitan police system for New York, established the complete 203 American Police Systems administrative framework of the new department. The method of listing stolen property, the kind of books that should be kept, the manner in which reports should be rendered, the precise circumstances under which gambling houses might be raided, the location of the superintend- ent's office, the number of police surgeons — in brief, the entire machinery of administration — was prescribed in elaborate detail. 1 This precedent was followed through- out the country. In 1866 the Ohio legislature decreed that Cleveland should have " a superintendent of police, a captain of police, and one captain in addition for each 50 patrolmen called into service more than the first 50, and a sergeant of police to each twelve patrolmen." 2 This same ratio, couched in identical language, was en> ployed by the Michigan legislature for Detroit in 1867. 3 The form of police organization adopted by the Con- necticut legislature for New Haven in 1881 is typical of limitations imposed by law-making bodies the country over. " There shall be a police department," said the law, " which shall consist of one chief of police, not more than two captains, not more than two lieutenants, not more than three sergeants (one of whom shall act as an inspector of licensed public vehicles), not more than three doormen, and not more than 50 supernumerary police- men." 4 Inelastic restrictions of this kind still encumber the po- lice organizations of most of the cities of the United States. In only a few has any appreciable freedom .of 1 Laws of N. Y., 1857, Chap. 569. 2 Laws of Ohio, 1866, p, 104. 3 Laws of Mich., 1867, No. 312. 4 Special Acts of Conn., 1881, p. 294. 204 The Organization of the Department action been achieved. In New York the rigid provisions of the charter have for years been a handicap to efficient administration. So inflexible is the organization in this city that a former commissioner was obliged literally to take the stump and conduct a wide campaign of publicity in order to induce the legislature to give him the right to reduce to the rank of captain the police inspectors whom he knew to be notoriously unfit. Similar activity secured for the commissioner the power to appoint as first grade detectives the men whom he regarded best qualified for the positions. The request of the city administration in 191 5 that it be allowed to appoint such additional deputy commissioners as the executive burdens of the department might make necessary was denied by the legislature at Albany, although after considerable delay and not a little opposition consent was given to the appointment of one additional deputy. Yet in respect to the inelasticity of its organization New York is by no means in the worst position. The rigidity of the Baltimore charter is even more pronounced. It prescribes the number of officers in each police district, as well as the number of turnkeys and telephone operators. There shall be " two additional captains, one of whom shall be assigned to have charge of the detective office, and one ... to have charge of the police patrol boats; five additional lieutenants, one of whom shall be assigned to have charge of the bureau of identification, one of whom shall be assigned to the said police patrol boats, one of whom shall be assigned to have charge of the police department horses, wagons, motor vehicles and stables, one of whom shall be superintendent of the police signal 205 , American Police Systems and telephone service, one of whom shall be assigned to night duty at police headquarters." x Further, the meth- ods of appointment, promotion, and dismissal, the salaries to be paid, and the precise duties and powers of the board of police commissioners are set forth in great detail. In Buffalo the recently adopted charter provides that " the tours of duty of sergeants and patrolmen ... on the streets or other public places of the city shall be changed at least once in each calendar month." 2 It fur- ther specifies that " policemen while on reserve duty . . . shall not be required to render any service except in the case of an emergency, and shall be free to retire for sleep during reserve duty in their station house. 3 . . . Mem- bers of the police force shall not be required to wear a uniform when not on actual patrol duty." 4 The charter also prescribes the number of platoons into which the force shall be divided, the hours of duty, and the length of leaves of absence. Such leaves of absence must begin at six o'clock in the evening of one day and end at six o'clock in the evening of the following day. 5 The pro- visions governing the detail of police management cover twenty-three pages of the charter, and show throughout the anxiety of the uniformed men to prevent possible encroachments upon their rights by their superiors. Similarly in San Francisco the administrative methods of the department are prescribed at length, even to the 1 Charter of Baltimore, Section 745. 2 Buffalo Charter, Sec. 250 A. 3 Ibid., Sec. 250 B. 4 Ibid., Sec. 250 D. 6 Ibid., Sec. 250 D. 206 The Organization of the Department point of requiring the chief to keep in his office "the statutes of the state and of the United States and all . necessary works on criminal law." x According to the Missouri law, the board of police commissioners of St. Louis " shall establish the Bertillon system of identifica- tion of criminals and others by means of anthropometric indications." 2 As illustrative of the. folly of a legislative body assuming to determine administrative policies and details, it may be pointed out that at the time this provi- sion was written into the law by the legislature of Mis- souri the Bertillon system of identification was being dis- carded in most European police departments. Under limitations of this kind rational development of police organization cannot be looked for. The machine cannot be made to adjust itself to the widely contrasting social and economic conditions found in every city, while the constant flux and change in population and racial habit leave practices and methods soon out of date. The initiative and imagination of the average police admin- istrator are strangled at the start. Experimentation with new ideas is practically impossible. Innovations calcu- lated to increase the quality of the service are barred. Official activity is so curbed and hedged about that the new administrator, with perhaps a genuine desire to serve the public, soon finds himself little more than a machine, doing the things the law tells him to do in the way the law prescribes. Under such circumstances, unless pos- sessed of unusual force and originality, he soon settles 1 Charter of San Francisco, Art. VIII, Chap. IV, Sec. 4. 2 Laws of Mo., 1899, p. 51, Sec. 479. 207 American Police Systems back into the old rut, content to maintain his department as he inherited it. Meanwhile the city's necessities de- velop while the police force stands still. This rigid predetermination by statute of police or- ganization and methods is in marked contrast to the flexi- bility of European police legislation. Police executives in England and on the continent are given wide powers in shaping their instruments of control and in adapting administrative processes to local conditions. Instead of the minute charter prescriptions which one finds in such cities as New York, Buffalo, and Baltimore, the statute governing the municipalities of England and Wales, for example, leaves the local authorities free to develop their own police departments. " The Watch Committee," ac- cording to the terse provision of the law, " shall from time to time appoint a sufficient number of fit men to be borough constables." l The special laws governing Lon- don's police force are equally free of regulative detail. Sir Robert Peel's act of 1829 begins with this simple declaration: "A sufficient number/ of fit and able men shall from time to time, by the direction of one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, be appointed as a police force." 2 In the words of the act the commis- sioner of police, with the approbation of the Home Secre- tary, is given power "to frame such orders. and regula- tions as (he) may deem expedient relative to the gen- eral government of the members of the police force; the places of their residence; their classification, rank, and particular service ; their distribution and inspection ; . . . 1 Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, Part IX, Sec. 191. 2 10 Geo. IV. c. 44. 208 The Organization of the Department and all such orders and regulations as (he) shall deem expedient for preventing neglect or abuse or for render- ing such force efficient in the discharge of all its duties; and (he) may at any time suspend or dismiss from em- ployment any man belonging to the police force whom (he) shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or otherwise unfit for the same." 1 Apart from the question of pensions and financial support, where per- missive legislation would obviously be necessary, no at- tempt has been made in the eighty-eight years of Lon- don's police force to determine by statute the limitations of the executive in the administration of his department. In England, as well as in France and Switzerland, em- phasis is centered upon the character and experience of the police commissioner. It is assumed that a trained administrator will be found and there is no disposition to hamper such an incumbent with restrictions or to erect barriers against the possible abuse of his powers. The development of the organization and its adjustment to shifting necessities are his responsibility. Answerable to his superiors and to the public for the success and pro- priety of his methods, he shapes his administrative tools to the work to be accomplished, unimpeded by the arbi- trary rules of an uninformed legislative body. This point of view is gaining some ground in American cities. The present law governing the police force of Boston, for example, while irritatingly detailed in certain sections, represents a substantial improvement over the laws which it superseded. According to its provisions 1 Ibid. The act was originally framed with two commissioners as executives. In 1856 these powers were vested in a single commis- sioner. 209 American Police Systems the police commissioner has authority " to appoint, estab- lish, and organize the police of the city, and to make all needful rules and regulations for its efficiency. . . . He may employ such clerks, stenographers, and other em- ployees as he may deem necessary for the proper per- formance of the duties of his office." 1 So, too, in cer- tain states where the doctrine of home rule has been accepted in some form or other — notably in Ohio — the temptation to establish by law the administrative machin- ery of the police department has been discouraged, and charters have been framed, as in Cleveland and Toledo, conferring wide discretion upon the police executives in the management of their forces. Home rule, however, is not in itself a remedy for the evil of inelastic administra- tive processes decreed by law. A charter framed by a community under grant of full powers of local self-gov- ernment may be just as effective in tying the hands of a police administrator as a charter framed by a legislature. The same thing is true of ordinances passed by local as- semblies. Detailed prescriptions as to methods and prac- tices will create rigidity in any departmental machinery, and block intelligent efforts to make it produce the best results, no matter whether the prescriptions are framed at the city hall or in the state capital. The sole advantage of home rule in this regard lies in the fact that the re- sponsibility for bad machinery rests with the people af- fected by its operation, and a remedy is consequently more easily obtained. An executive whose effectiveness is cir- cumscribed by unnecessary limitations, or thwarted by foolish mandatory decrees, can free himself by an appeal 1 Acts of Mass., 1906, Chap. 291, Sees. 8-10. 2IO The Organization of the Department to his community more readily than he can by appealing to the representatives of the entire state. Unnecessary Functions. The irrational development of American police organi- zation is not ascribable alone to legislative interference with the details of administration. Another causal fac- tor, perhaps equally important, is found in the willingness of charter-makers to complicate the police machinery by the addition of extraneous and unrelated functions. In- stead of building an organization around the single duty of maintaining law and order — a duty in itself onerous enough — in many states the attempt is made to employ the machinery for all sorts of governmental purposes. This indiscriminate use of the police department is not characteristic of America alone. It is even more pro- nounced in continental Europe, particularly in Germany and Austria. In these countries, however, it has devel- oped not through any haphazard distribution of functions, but rather from the peculiar continental conception of police power as comprehending all activities of govern- ment which have not been directly transferred to other branches of the administration. 1 This conception, with its historical basis in the necessities of autocratic gov- ernment, never gained a foot-hold in Great Britain, with the result that English police machinery is singularly free from complicating factors. 2 Indeed such a conception would find little place in any liberal government. In America the tendency to load the police force with irrele- 1 See European Police Systems, pp. 18-24. 2 Ibid., pp. 140-148. 211 American Police Systems vant functions is largely a matter of careless and untidy governmental housekeeping. The department has been made a sort of catch-all for such miscellaneous activities as cannot easily be accommodated elsewhere. Thus, the police in many American cities have had given them the judicial responsibility of issuing licenses for saloons, res- taurants, taverns, ice-cream parlors, masque balls, mar- kets, and lodging houses. So, too, they license hawkers, peddlers, junk gatherers, employment house " runners," newsboys, boot-blacks, dog-breeders, auctioneers, and other special professions. In New York city the police department is charged with the duty of inspecting steam- boilers and fixing the maximum pressure allowed for each; it also licenses and passes upon the qualifications of steam engineers. 1 In Chicago the department has charge of dog-catching and the pound 2 and the censorship of moving pictures; 3 in Baltimore it takes the yearly census of school children; 4 in Washington, D. C, it has charge of the inspection of pharmacies; 5 in Milwaukee it col- lects arrears in personal taxes ; 6 in Detroit a member of the force performs the duties of sealer of weights and measures, and the commissioner appoints the city scaven- gers ; 7 in Boston the commissioner establishes rates of interest for pawnbrokers, 8 and investigates the qualifica- tions of jurors; 9 in Philadelphia the fire marshal's office 1 New York City Charter, Chap. 8, Sees. 342-345. 2 Chicago Code of Ordinances, 191 1, Chap. 20, Sec. 771. 3 Chicago Code of Ordinances, 191 1, Chap. 46. 4 Laws of Md., 1914, Chap. 90. 5 34 U. S. Statutes at Large, p. 182. 6 Wisconsin Statutes, Sec. 925-148. 7 Detroit Charter, Sec. 665. 8 Revised Laws of Mass., Chap. 102, Sec. 41. 9 Mass. Stats., 1907, Chap. 348. 212 The Organization of the Department is under the superintendent of police, who is thus responsi- ble for the inspection and storage of combustibles and the condition of fire escapes and exits. 1 For years in New York the cleaning of the streets was under the super- vision of the police department. In consequence of this confusion with irrelevant ac- tivities, the primary function of the police has often been left to drift along with little guidance or oversight by the administrators. In their endeavors to accommodate themselves to such judicial functions as issuing licenses, or to such spectacular functions as managing elections, the commissioners and directors have neglected their weightier responsibilities. This confusing use of the police machinery, particu- larly for excise licenses and election purposes, has often led to sinister results. The wide powers thus conferred upon the police force have made it the prize of every municipal contest. A department for the maintenance of order would in itself be a tempting bait to politicians; but when the control of licenses and of the election ma- chinery is added, the department becomes practically in- dispensable to the success of a political party. To this unwise and unsound partnership between the police force and unrelated functions of government much of the cor- ruption and demoralization in American municipalities can be traced. In New York, for example, a law passed in 1872 2 and maintained for 29 years 3 gave the police commissioners full charge of the election machinery. 1 Laws of Penn., 191 1, p. 7°5'- 2 Laws of N. Y., 1872, Chap. 675. 3 Repealed by Laws of N. Y., 1901, Chap. 95. For an interest- ing review of the development of the electoral machinery in New 213 American Police Systems Every important step in the conduct of elections, both prior to and after the polling of the vote, was under their supervision and largely under their control. They ap- pointed the inspectors of election and the poll, clerks ; they passed upon the certificates of nomination of candidates; they received and were charged with the custody of elec- tion returns. At the same time their subordinates, the members of the uniformed force, were assigned to main- tain order at the polling places. The practical operation of this partnership under a board of police commission- ers dominated by Tammany influence is described in the following excerpt from the report of the Lexow investi- gating commission of 1894: " It may be stated as characteristic of the conditions shown to exist by a cloud of witnesses that the police conducted themselves at the several polling places upon the principle that they were there not as guardians of the public peace to enforce law and order, but for the purpose of acting as agents of Tammany Hall in se- curing to the candidates of that organization, by means fair or foul, the largest possible majorities." * Conditions of the same kind if not of the same degree York, see William M. Ivin's On the Electoral System of the State of New York — a paper read before the New York State Bar Associa- tion, January, 1906, and published in pamphlet form. 1 From the majority report, pp. 15-16. In spite of this condition, the separation of the police department and the bureau of elections was not recommended in the majority report, the members of the commission clinging to the idea of a bi-partisan board as an effective remedy. Such a separation, however, was urged in the minority report, which at the same time argued for a single-headed police department rather than a bi-partisan board. With a bureau of elec- tions independent of the police force, one of the chief arguments commonly used for a bi-partisan board falls to the ground. 214 The Organization of the Department existed in other cities where the election machinery was part of the police organization — notably in Buffalo. Disorder, fraud, and continual suspicion followed the wake of this unhappy partnership. As a result, the part- nership has almost universally been dissolved, and the po- lice force has been freed of a demoralizing incumbrance. Equally unhappy was the association of the police with the issuance of liquor licenses. The almost uniform re- sult was misunderstanding, suspicion, and the neglect by the police commissioners of the real function of their de- partments. The question continually before the public was not : " Is this department efficient in maintaining order and preventing crime?" but, "Should a saloon license have been given to this or that neighborhood ? " In consequence the real function of the police, overlooked by the public, was neglected by the commissioners. Po- lice machinery cannot be complicated without losing in effectiveness. Inadequate Leadership. Far more than to any other factor the irrational de- velopment of American police organization is due to inadequate leadership. To the lack of trained and intel- ligent administrators, obtaining and holding office on favorable conditions, much of the confusion and mal- adjustment of our police machinery is ascribable. The crude political conceptions which have allowed such spe- cialized community functions as police and health to be managed by a periodically shifting body of unskilled, unfit, unprofessional executives, have wrought almost irremediable injury not only to our forms of organization 215 American Police Systems but to the whole public life of America. In so far as the police department is concerned, mechanical causes such as we have considered have undoubtedly contributed to this evil result ; but the fundamental factor, underlying all others, is one of personnel. This question is so vital to an understanding of the American police problem that the two succeeding chapters have been devoted to its consid- eration. r 2l6 CHAPTER VI THE COMMISSIONER OR DIRECTOR The task of police administration. — Police administrators pro- moted from the ranks. — Chicago. — Civilian police administrators. — Their handicaps. — Examples. — Police administration and politics. — Limited tenure of office. — Europe and America in this respect. — Residence requirements for commissioners. — 'European and Ameri- can examples. — The dilemma and the approach to its solution. We have already observed the trend toward single- headed management in the police department. The irre- sponsible multiple-headed executive is giving way before the demand for definitized leadership, and the civilian commissioner or director is taking the place of the board. This change has been brought about in most cases without disturbing the position of the chief or superintendent who is still the agent through whom the department is admin- istered. Only in New York, where the commissioner and his deputies are directly in charge of the force, has the office of chief been abolished. In many of the smaller cities, as we have already noted, particularly in those in which the board form of control never obtained a perma- nent foothold, there is no civilian commissioner as an intermediary between the chief and the mayor, and the chief, as head of the force, is the responsible leader. Chicago alone of the larger cities still clings to the small city type, of administration. Indeed Chicago holds the distinction of being the largest city in the world in which 217 American Police Systems the head of the police department has generally been pro- moted from the ranks. This point suggests some interesting questions which may well be considered at the beginning of our discussion. What would justify a city in employing a civilian com- missioner? Why should not the Chicago arrangement be more generally accepted? Assuming that an officer promoted from the ranks can manage successfully the po- lice affairs of a small city, at what point in the city's growth is it desirable to introduce a different type of ad- ministrator ? The Task of Police Administration. One is helped to answer these puzzling questions by a consideration of the task of police administration in a large city. It is far more than a matter of supervising the actual work of men in uniform. It involves quali- ties of leadership which come only from broad adminis- trative training and experience. The New York De- partment costs $18,000,000 a year; the Chicago depart- ment, $7,000,000; the Philadelphia department, $4,500,- 000. Of the 63 cities of the United States with a population of 100,000 or over, twelve have an annual police cost exceeding $1,000,000, and in twenty-five the annual cost is over $400,000. The head of a police de- partment is thus the business manager of a huge concern. He must map out its policies, define its methods, and hold himself responsible for program and performance. He must be able to organize the complex functions of his department into some kind of coherent whole. To insure success, he must be as eager to keep abreast with his 218 The Commissioner or Director profession and as alert to see the possibilities of improve- ment in his force, as if municipal management were a competitive business. . Vision and imagination are as es- sential to him as they are to any administrator. Further- more, he must possess the unimpaired confidence of his hundreds or thousands of men, and be able to meet with firmness and decision the perplexing situations which con- stantly arise in the police affairs of every large city. In brief, he must be accustomed to leading. Moreover, the task of police administration involves the handling of complex and intricate community prob- lems, for which a background of social ideals and experi- ence is essential. The head of a police department is called upon to consider sympathetically, and if possible to reconcile, the widely divergent points of view of all classes. He must be able to meet on their own planes rich and poor, citizen and alien, learned and unlearned. Constantly before him must be the conception of his de- partment as an agency for the prevention of crime, and the consequent relation of his work to all activities, social, economic, and educational, operating to that end. He must approach the problem of racial mixture in his city with a keen appreciation of the contrasting standards of order and conduct which arise from diverse racial habits and traditions. Tact, intuition, and a quick intelligence are indispensable factors in his equipment. He must be able to gauge the drift in public temper, and distinguish between substantial and fictitious public opinion. He must be ready to adjust his organization and its methods of operation to changes in public ideas without compro- mising himself or lessening the influence of his depart- 219 American Police Systems ment. Because his is public business rather than private business, he must know how to popularize it and how to rally public support behind his leadership in times of crisis. Police Administrators Promoted from the Ranks. One perhaps would be something of a superman who could fulfill satisfactorily all the requirements just men- tioned. They represent, however, standards to be consid- ered in the choice of a police administrator. In large cities like New York and Chicago, and in many cities of lesser size, the task is so great and its responsibilities so heavy that the best man obtainable is none too good, and in an endeavor to discover him no search can be too thor- ough. That such a leader can be found in the ranks of a police force is in the highest degree improbable. The officer who has walked his " beat " as a patrolman, inves- tigated crime as a detective, and managed the technical routine of station house activity a£ lieutenant or captain, is not fitted by this experience to administer the complex affairs of a large police department. The chances are rather that he is unfitted for the task. Lacking in admin- istrative experience, with scant appreciation of the larger possibilities of his position, often, indeed, without imagi- nation or resourcefulness, he has little chance of success, and it would be unwise and cruel to saddle him with the responsibility. If police management were merely a mat- ter of assignments, promotions, and discipline, if it had to do only with the ordering of a well-defined routine, any capable man who himself had been through the mill might be well adapted to handle it. But as we have seen, 220 The Commissioner or Director the task, particularly in large cities, is so much broader than routine and involves activities of such vital conse- quence, that only a high order of creative intelligence can cope with it. The idea that effective heads of large police depart- ments cannot often be found in the ranks is frowned upon in some quarters as being somehow or other " undemo- cratic," and the argument is occasionally advanced that this principle clashes with the belief which we Americans hold inviolate: that humble and modest beginnings can be no barrier to ultimate success and reward. This point of view completely misses the issue. Of course humble beginnings do not disqualify a man for service; neither do they qualify him. They simply have no bearing, one way or the other. We are concerned with facts and con- ditions and not with theories or labels. It is not a matter of democracy or lack of democracy, of caste, or birth, or position, or anything else. It is solely a matter of finding the best possible brains to handle a most difficult public task. To the failure to grasp the significance of this point is largely attributable the long demoralized condition of the Chicago department — in size the second police force in the United States. In this city the head of the force has generally been promoted from the ranks, under an ar- rangement by which he can return to duty in his old posi- tion when his services as superintendent are no longer required. In 25 years, eleven different men, only two of whom were chosen from outside the department, have occupied the post of superintendent. Most of the men thus promoted retired after a disastrous and often inglori- 221 American Police Systems ous experience, for the reason that from the very nature of their training they could not measure up to the task. No opportunity to develop qualities of leadership had ever been afforded them. They could not reorganize the de- partment, for they knew nothing about organization. They could not think in terms of progress or possibilities.^ With two or three exceptions, they were dull and ineffec- tive. With little administrative experience to guide them in their new tasks, with no background of general infor-^ mation, they carried out what they conceived to be the duties of their position : meeting visitors, handling per- functory routine, signing their names to official docu- ments, and joining in an occasional spectacular hunt for a murderer or thief. In this last activity they bore out the popular theory — often expressed in Chicago and elsewhere — ^that the head of the police force, whatever other virtues he possesses, must be a " good, practical thief -catcher." Thief-catching is a highly technical and very important phase of police work, and skilled men should be engaged in it. But the training that creates proficiency in this line is not the training to produce an intelligent administrator. Little connection exists ..be- tween the two activities. So far from fitting them for their new work, the previous experience of the Chicago superintendents of police was a positive handicap. They could not get away from the point of view which they had acquired during their years on the force. They were still police sergeants at heart, concerned with small precinct details, or district detectives absorbed in the game of catching thieves. 222 The Commissioner or Director That a high type of intelligence is necessary in police administration has long been recognized in Europe. Only in the smaller cities is it possible for an officer in the ranks to become head of the force. In London, Paris, Marseilles, Geneva, Vienna, Rome, and in scores of cities of lesser importance, the head of the department has never in history been promoted from the ranks. 1 To be sure, in some cities, particularly on the continent, this is in part ascribable to prevailing class distinctions and so- cial cleavages, as a result of which but few in any walk of life can rise from humble to high position. But fun- damentally the arrangement is based upon the conception of the police commissioner as a highly trained adminis- trator. A man of limited education and scant oppor- tunity for development is not likely to be equipped to handle large questions in a large way, or deal adminis- tratively with the intricate business of a complex depart- ment. Our consideration, of course, has nothing to do with chiefs of police promoted from the ranks, who serve under civilian commissioners. In such a relationship the chief is the head of the technical service and is not called upon to assume broad administrative responsibilities. A train- ing in the ranks may exactly fit him for his work; indeed, it would be difficult for him to obtain elsewhere the neces- sary specialized experience. Thus in Boston the uni- formed superintendent of police, with his intimate knowl- edge of the details of police activity, serves as an aide to the commissioner, and the arrangement is satisfactory i See European Police Systems, Chap. IV. 223 American Police Systems because the chief has no duties beyond the limit of his ability or experience. Similarly in Philadelphia the su- perintendent of police is the adviser of the director of public safety, and in New York the chief inspector occu- pies the same position in his relation to the commissioner. The administrative machinery breaks down when, as in Chicago, the superintendent with his technical education is given a responsibility for which he has never been trained. It is obviously unfair and indeed inaccurate to assume that a man who has come through the ranks is thereby un- fitted to serve as the head of a police department. In small cities, where the responsibilities of administration are not heavy and do not call for special gifts, some officer in the force can probably be found who, under right con- ditions, can manage the department- satisfactorily. Even in respect to large cities there is no unvarying principle that can be dogmatically asserted. A police department may contain an officer of broad vision and real adminis- trative ability, well fitted to assume the leadership of a sizeable department. The writer has in mind several such executives, competent to manage large affairs, who worked their way up from the rank of patrolmen. They represent, however, the exception; they are men who would doubtless have succeeded in any profession and in , spite of any handicap. Generally speaking, in most cities exceeding 100,000 in population it would probably be diffi- cult to find in the ranks of the police force an officer of such education and promise that the administration of the entire department could wisely be committed to his hands. 224 The Commissioner or Director Cimlian Police Administrators. It is obvious, therefore, that our police administrators must in many cities be recruited from outside the force. In arriving at this conclusion we are bound to consider grave difficulties whose importance is not to be under- estimated. First of all we are confronted with the lack of any class of trained governmental executives such as one finds on the continent in Europe and to a certain ex- tent in England. In Great Britain the Royal Irish Con- stabulary or the imperial administrative service furnish the principal cities with their police heads. In London, for example, the commissioner who resigned in 1918 1 had spent his life in police work. Entering the Indian civil service as an assistant magistrate, he became suc- cessively inspector general of police in Bengal and com- missioner for the entire southern district of India. Dur- ing the South African War he organized the civil police of Johannesburg and Pretoria, and later came to London as assistant police commissioner. In 1903, after thirty years devoted exclusively to the profession of policing, he was chosen to be head of London's force. He was a thoroughly trained man; no problem arising in connec- tion with his department was beyond his grasp. 2 In America, on the other hand, there is no profession or career of public administration to attract the talent of our schools and universities. No opportunity is afforded to develop through a course of years any particular ability to manage a specialized function of government, such as a police department or a department of health. Indeed, 1 Sir Edward Henry. 2 See European Police Systems, Chap. IV. 225 American Police Systems our political customs and habits of thought run counter to such an arrangement. American democracy has been colored by a distrust of special qualifications in public office; it has always regarded the expert in public life with suspicion and disfavor. Not only does the perma- nent tenure of office which his employment implies con- flict with current ideas of popular control, but his very position in the community clashes with the conception of equality which would give every man a substantial op- portunity to take part in the administration of public affairs. As President Lowell points out, 1 men desire not only to be well governed but to feel that they are governing themselves, and the readiest way of achieving this end is to throw the offices open to all aspirants. Ro- tation in office has been, and to a certain extent still is, a corollary of democracy, and its peculiarly wide accept- ance in America has effectively retarded the science of public administration and prevented the development of a profession of trained government executives. Moreover, in many parts of the country little appreci- ation exists of the need of specially trained men at the head of particular departments of city or state adminis- tration. We seem to assume that an appointment by a governor or mayor confers, without apprenticeship, an immediate capacity to manage public finances, direct schools, or run a police force. The practices of early rural communities, where the common experience of the average man enabled him to deal intelligently with the plain questions that came before the public officer, are often applied as standards to modern government, with 1 Public Opinion and Popular Government, New York, 1913, p. 271. 226 The Commissioner or Director the result, that in this one field alone we ignore the spe- cialization of occupations which the complexity of mod- ern society and the growth of accurate knowledge have made necessary. City administration today is compli- cated by a variety of public services, many of them tech- nical in nature, dependent upon the results of recent study and research in their particular fields. A high bacterial count in the city's water supply — to use the words of a former director of public works in Philadelphia — pre- sents a problem incapable of solution by the political office-holder, even though he can carry every precinct in his ward. Such problems as the treatment of crime, the relation of a community to pauperism, the handling of mendicants, the responsibility of the criminal in the light of modern psychiatry, are matters with which even the intelligent citizen has little acquaintance. They can be mastered only by special study or long experience, and they can be dealt with efficiently only by those who have mastered them. 1 It is idle, therefore, to assume that a successful engineer or lawyer is preeminently fitted to manage a police department or a department of correc- tion. In the pursuit of his ordinary vocation he has probably had no opportunity to familiarize himself with even the rudiments of his new profession, and only by hard, conscientious study, through an uninterrupted tenure of office, can he bring himself abreast of his work. A city, therefore, honestly seeking an efficient police administrator, has a narrow field of choice. New York City in nineteen years has experimented with army offi- cers, lawyers, newspaper men, and professional poli- 1 Ibid. See Chap. XVIII on " Experts in Municipal Government." 227 American Police Systems ticians. Of twelve commissioners only six had had any previous experience with police work, and even this ex- perience was of a limited nature. In two cases the com- missioners, prior to appointment, had never even been inside a police station. In four cases they were without administrative training of any sort. In more than half the cases, they took up the task of managing the second largest police force in the world without the slightest com- prehension of its meaning, its technique, or its vast re- sponsibilities. Similarly the directors of public safety in Philadel- phia in the last 30 odd years have been for the most part untrained and without experience, coming from occupa- tions which in no way fitted them for their new tasks. One was a candy manufacturer, one an insurance broker, one a banker, one a solicitor for an electric light company, and five were lawyers. Detroit in nineteen years has had in the police commissionership two bankers, one of whom was indicted and convicted while in office, a furniture dealer, a judge of the police court, a lawyer, a manufac- turer, an automobile sales agent (the last named having been the campaign manager of the mayor who appointed him), a manufacturer, and a physician. Pittsburgh in twenty years has had in the directorship of public safety a clerk, a traction company official, a weather-bureau ob- server, a real estate man, a small hotej proprietor, a news- paper man, a hardware manufacturer, and a lawyer. Cleveland in recent years has had as directors of pub- lic safety a clergyman, a representative of a roofing business, two attorneys and a jeweler. In Chicago, as we have seen, the superintendent of police is customarily 228 The Commissioner or Director promoted from the ranks. The eight exceptions to this rule, occurring in 49 years, have comprised a stock-yard commissioner, a whiskey distiller, a brewer, a profes- sional politician, a prison warden, a hay and feed mer- chant, two post office officials, one of whom was also an officer in the National Guard. In Salt Lake City, where the head of the force 1 is always a civilian, six more recent incumbents have been respectively a plumber, a merchant, an insurance broker, a stage coach operator, a livery keeper, and a traveling man for a tea and coffee house. At the time of my visit the head of the force was by vocation a fire insurance adjuster. Similarly Los Angeles has had newspaper men, a railroad man, an in- surance broker, and a man engaged in the transfer and express business. The head of the force in San Fran- cisco a few years ago was a laundryman. 2 Investigation ' in other cities shows similar conditions. In the absence of trained men, appointing authorities are forced to make shift with the material they can get, with results often unfortunate, not infrequently disastrous. Such results must inevitably be expected when untrained, inexperienced men are placed in a position where training and experience — or at least the opportunity to develop them — are essential. In many cases, indeed, the ques- tion is not whether the new man will fail, but how quick and complete his failure will be. Occasionally, of course, in spite of a lack of special training, the results are highly 1 His title is chief. 2 New Orleans at one time attempted to shut the door on some professions. According to a statute passed in 1904 " no attorney at law or person engaged in the liquor business " was eligible as police commissioner. (Laws of La., 1004, No. 32.) 229 American Police Systems creditable. Mr. Pullman's administration in Washing- ton, D. C, for example, was marked with ability and pro- gressiveness of an unusual kind. A clean cut young newspaper correspondent, he brought to his task a vigor and a personality that reshaped the Washington force into an effective instrument. Similarly, Commissioner O'Meara of Boston, coming from a long experience in newspaper management which involved wide executive responsibilities, gave his city one of the cleanest police administrations in the United States. In the same breath it must be admitted that his success was in no small meas- ure attributable to his uninterrupted tenure of service. In the twelve years of his commissionership he had the unique opportunity of making himself, by dint of long and patient study, an efficient police executive. In New York the work of Commissioner Woods was little short of brilliant and its effect has been felt throughout the country. In his case, however, success was certainly at- tributable, in some part at least, not only to his previous experience as deputy commissioner, which gave him a broad grasp of the problem, but to the complete lack of interference from the city hall. If some of his prede- cessors had been afforded the same independence, it is possible that long before the department might have en- joyed the distinction it reached under Commissioner Woods. Such instances are exceptional. They stand "out in sharp relief against the poor quality of leadership which one finds in most police organizations. The absence of administrative experience and special training and the lack of facilities for their development have made the 230 The Commissioner or Director task of building up our police departments an exceedingly difficult one. Police Administration and Politics. The situation is complicated by another factor of more ominous significance. Police administration in the United States is a matter of politics. It is organized on the basis not of individual fitness, but of political faith. It is part of. the sordid system of jobs and spoils which so notoriously distinguishes much of our local govern- ment. It depends upon periodic elections, decided in most cases upon issues with which it is not even remotely associated. Although an expert service, whose efficiency is predicated on special ability and continuity of manage- ment, it is tossed about from one party to another as the prize of success at the polls. A Republican victory in Philadelphia means a Republican director of public safety, just as a Tammany victory in New York means a Tam- many commissioner of police. Indeed in many parts of the country there is as yet no conception that politics and administration are separable. Such a view is thought to be somehow undemocratic. The policy-de- termining function of government, controlled in a de- mocracy by popular will, is confused with the technical business procedure by which the policies are put into effect; and because the opinions of one set of officials are subject to popular review, it is held that, indirectly at least, the other set must pass the same test. In conse- quence, the administrative officers of specialized depart- ments are selected primarily on the basis of party alle- 231 American Police Systems giance and political creed, and only secondarily because of particular training and ability. With a few exceptions, therefore, political consider- ations constitute the dominant factor in the management of the police forces of the United States. It is unneces- sary to dwell upon the demoralization which this situ- ation produces or to attempt to catalogue in different cities its forms and ramifications. Essentially it is the same everywhere: the head of the department appointed because he is a Democrat or a Republican or " a personal friend of the mayor " ; transfers and details made at the behest of some district boss or overlord; the force admin- istered with an eye to the next election, and its work dictated by the political necessities of the moment. This is the dreary picture that one sees in all parts of the coun- try and under all types of police management. Of the sixty-three cities in the United States exceeding 100,000 population, one can count on the fingers of both hands the number in which the police departments are administered on a genuinely non-political basis ; and even in these cases there is no guarantee of permanence in the situation. In many places the presence of politics in the administrative service is admitted frankly and accepted with resignation. " You cannot divorce politics and the police," I was told in Kansas City, " at least not until the millennium." This condition is all the more distressing when one ex- amines the operations of European police departments. In London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Vienna — indeed in all the larger cities — politics has nothing to do with the ad- ministration of the police force, directly or indirectly. 1 1 See European Police Systems, Chap. II. 232 The Commissioner or Director The political opinions of the head of the department and his assistants are as irrelevant and immaterial as their opinions on art or literature. The outcome of a popu- lar election has little or no relation to police administra- tion. In other words, the policy and discipline of the force cannot be upset as an incidental consequence of the determination of political issues, with the result that the force is never the spoils of a political party nor the tool of a particular politician. The police departments of cities like Glasgow, Geneva, Liverpool, and Marseilles show no trace of the sordid politics which at the time of my visit frankly dominated the departments of Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, and Omaha. European super- iority in this regard is not, as might easily be believed, the direct consequence of autocratic principles, for these conditions exist in such thoroughgoing democracies as England and Switzerland. It results from the fact that the technical administration of specialized departments is sharply distinguished from questions of public policy giv- ing rise to legitimate political issues. When a man is wanted to head the London Metropolitan police force the sole test is the test of fitness, and the one aim of. the ap- pointing authorities is to obtain for the position the best mind that training and experience can produce. When such a man is found the authorities cling to him as any business concern would cling to an indispensable employee. Similarly in Manchester or Birmingham or in Leipzig or Stuttgart the personnel of the municipal council or of the Gemeinderat may shift a dozen times on ever changing issues, without in any way affecting the head of the po- lice department. He represents the expert administrative 233 American Police Systems arm of government, and, while subject to the control and supervision of some council or superior body, he is not concerned with the character of its membership or with the political issues which divide it. His position is that of a highly trained administrative manager serving under a board of directors: the personnel of the board may change and its policies may be altered ; but the manager remains because the business cannot afford to let him go. Under all types of government this cardinal principle of efficient administration remains the same. The pol- icy-determining functions may be in the hands of a few as in Germany, or may be vested with the people as in England. Whatever the method by which public courses of action are decided, expert administrative service is the best tool for maintaining an efficient government, and in Europe it is employed alike by democracy and autocracy. Limited Tenure of Office. The intrusion of politics in American police adminis- tration brings with it an evil to which passing reference has already been made. It renders brief and uncertain the tenure of office of the commissioner. Indeed the transient character of its leadership is perhaps the most amazing feature of the American municipal department. The business managers of specialized city functions come and go in quick succession, their official life dependent upon political exigencies or personal whims. In some cases they follow one another with such bewildering ra- pidity that even departmental subordinates find it difficult to recall the names of the men under whom they have served in a dozen years. 234 The Commissioner or Director In consequence there is little opportunity to train heads of .departments to even a moderate understanding of their tasks and responsibilities. Without previous experience and with no preparation of any kind, a citizen takes up the administration of a large police force or a bureau of health; before he has had time to discover what his posi- tion really involves or to delve deeply into the intricacies of his organization, his official career is at an end, and another man, equally untried and inexperienced, begins at the point where his many predecessors began. Or again, a man serves long enough as head of a department to make himself fairly effective as its administrator, but through some political shift, generally irrelevant to any matter related to his work, his career is cut off, and his experience and training, gained at public cost, are lost to the community. Thereupon, experiment is made with another untried man, who, perhaps 'finally trained to the point of usefulness, is dismissed like his predecessor to make way for another beginner. In this way the dreary succession goes on, year after year, with little thought of health administration or police administration as a dis- tinct career or profession, entirely removed from the po- litical arena, and with just as little thought of the loss in consequence to public health and security. The police department is peculiarly the victim of this principle of transient management. " Most of the com- missioners are birds of passage," said Commissioner Woods of New York, in testifying before an investigating committee. " The force gets a glimpse of them flying over, but hardly has time to determine their species." 1 1 Curran Aldermanic Committee Report, 1912, p. 3127. 235 American Police Systems This statement is readily borne out by the facts. Whereas London has had seven police commissioners in 91 years, New York has had twelve in nineteen years. The average term of London's police commissioner is nearly fifteen years, 1 although Sir Richard Mayne, the first commissioner, served 39 years and his successor sev- enteen years, while the last incumbent, Sir Edward Henry, served a little over fifteen years. 2 The average term of New York's police commissioner is one year, 1 seven months; the longest that any one succeeded in serving being three years, nine months. Three of New York's twelve commissioners served less than six months each; one incumbent served only 23 days. A change in the commissionership in New York has always involved a change in the deputy commissioners, with the result that where London has had fourteen deputy commissioners in sixty-four years, 3 New York City has had 43 in nineteen years. 4 Comparisons of this kind could be indefinitely extended. It is not at all unusual, for example, to find in Great Britain or on the continent heads of police departments who have served from fifteen to twenty-five years or longer. The chief constable of Glasgow, Scotland, has held his position for eighteen years; the chief constables of Birmingham and Manchester have served sixteen and 1 The present commissioner started his term in 1918. 2 See European Police Systems, Chap. IV. 3 The position of deputy or assistant commissioner was not estab- lished in London until 1856, when there were two assistant commis- sioners ; in 1890 provision was made for three assistant commission- ers and in 1910 the number was increased to four. * There were four deputies from 1901 to 1915 when the number was increased to five. 236 The Commissioner or Director nineteen years respectively. The police president of Hamburg, Germany, held his office for more than seven- teen years ; Vienna's police president, for more than ten years. The police president of Berlin had served eight years, when the exigencies of the war transferred him to another post. Copenhagen's commissioner recently rounded out 28 years of service. Indeed a short term of office for European police commissioners is the exception rather than the rule. It is assumed that they will hold office as long as they can render efficient service, or at least until their conduct proves unsatisfactory to their superiors. 1 Radically different is the situation of America. Phila- delphia has had thirteen directors of public safety in 33 years, an average of two years and a half for each in- cumbent; Cincinnati, four directors in seven years; Cleve- land, five in twelve years. Twenty-five superintendents of police have served Chicago in 49 years, an average term of less than two years ; in the last twenty years there have been nine superintendents, every incoming adminis- tration making at least one change. Detroit has had nine police commissioners in nineteen years. Many of the commission governments, recently inaugurated, are in a fair way to break all records in the number of their police administrators. When one turns to the boards of police commission- ers the succession becomes more rapid and the figures mount appreciably. In St. Louis 48 different commis- sioners have managed the police force in the last 31 years. In other words, the task of administering this technical 1 See European Police Systems, Chap. IV. 237 American Police Systems branch of the city government has been committed to 48 men, inexperienced in police work, many of whom served but a year or two. Newark had 36 police commissioners in 32 years ; San Francisco 41 in twenty years ; Baltimore 50 in 60 years. In the forty-four years from 1857 to 1901 when New York's police force was under the control of a board, 52 different men were charged with the re- sponsibility of management. During the last twenty years of this period 25 commissioners were in office. The transient character of American police administra- tion is not attributable alone to the sordid play of politics. Long tenures of office are repugnant to our political tra- ditions. The fears and prejudices engendered in the early beginnings of our democracy remain a determining influence in our approach to questions of government or- ganization. We have inherited a dread of " a class privi- leged to rule," and rotation rather than permanence in office has been our shield against the intrusion of " autoc- racy." Indeed the antipathy, fostered by our frontier conditions of life, to anything deemed aristocratic has given a strongly marked tone to our conception of popu- lar government. Our attitude toward our representatives in office is one of continual suspicion. Constant fear of removal, and limited terms have been the weapons by which we have endeavored to keep them in touch with public opinion. As President Lowell aptly says, the American citizen is far less attracted by the idea of ex- perienced public servants who retain their positions so long as they are faithful and efficient, than he is repelled by the dread of bureaucracy. 1 1 hoc. cit., p. 106. 238 v The Commissioner or Director This point of view is shown in all our legislation, na- tional, state and municipal, relating to public officers. Their terms of service are, with few exceptions, strictly limited and defined, as if in no other fashion could they be made amenable to public opinion, or responsive to popular control. To this practice the police administrator is no exception. In all our cities the law specifically im- plies that he is a temporary officer. His term ranges from two years in municipalities like Albany and Syra- cuse to five years in New York and Boston. Of the larger cities of the United States, twelve have two year terms for their police administrators; seven have three year terms ; sixteen have four year terms ; and three have five year terms. 1 In some cities, notably those in Ohio, the police executive serves " at the pleasure of the mayor," 2 apparently on the assumption that his position is semi-political in character and that every mayor shouid have the right to appoint " his own man." The same point of view is implied in the statutes governing the cities of Pennsylvania, where the tenure of the director of public safety is made coincident with the term " for which the appointing mayor is elected." 3 Some cities have at- tempted to avoid the implication of such an arrangement by giving the police administrator a longer term than that of the officer who appoints him. Thus the police com- missioner of Boston has a five year term, while the gov- ernor of Massachusetts serves for two years. Similarly, 1 These figures include boards of commissioners as well as single- headed management. 2 See Cleveland City Charter, Sec. 80, and Columbus Charter, 6 3 C See' Philadelphia Charter, 1919, Art. V, Sec. I, and Pittsburgh Charter, Art. XII. 239 American Police Systems the term of the mayor of New York is four years, while his police commissioner serves five years. Again in De- troit, until recently, the mayor was elected for two years and the police commissioner appointed for four. How- ever, in the absence of any restrictions on the appointing officer in removing an incumbent, this expedient has no practical value whatsoever. It is merely a bit of legis- lative jugglery. Every incoming mayor of New York has always appointed his own police commissioner, just as every incoming governor of Massachusetts, could, if he chose, appoint a new head of the police force in Boston. 1 The same result is reached in Chicago, which is the only large city whose charter contains no specific provision regarding the tenure of the police head. For all practi- cal purposes it is coincident with that of the mayor. This custom of pacing off in advance the term of a police administrator and writing it into the law is in direct contrast to the arrangement in European cities. There the police commissionership is always indefinite in tenure. In not a single English or continental city of size or im- portance is the head of the police force appointed for a fixed period. 2 In fact, the idea of establishing by some arbitrary rule the time when the administration of a po- lice commissioner shall come to an end seems never to have occurred to European authorities. As we have seen, 1 The governor has the right to remove the police commissioner with the advice and consent of the council, " for such cause as he shall deem sufficient. Such cause shall be stated jn his order of removal." Acts of Mass., 1906, Chap. 291, Sec. 7. In New York City the police commissioner is removable by the mayor whenever " the public interests shall so require." New York City Charter, Chap. VIII, Sec. 270. 2 See European Police Systems, Chap. IV. 240 The Commissioner or Director they appoint their commissioners as a board of directors selects a general manager or other official, not for a defi- nitely established term, but on the basis of satisfactory work. Their task is to find men capable of serving in- definitely — men who have the ability and the willingness to devote a life-time to the administrative problem. When such a man is found there is no disposition to ex- periment with anybody else. No one would care to as- sume responsibility for jeopardizing an organization in which, as in all forms of business enterprise, continuity of administration is the best guarantee of effectiveness. This, arangement contains nothing inharmonious with democratic principles. As a matter of fact, it has nothing to do with the form of government. It is a method of business management, a principle of administration, ser- viceable in democracies like Switzerland and bureaucracies like Germany. In Switzerland and England the police officials are invariably under popular control. Their poli- cies are shaped and supported by public opinion, and their official acts express the will of the communities they serve. A serious misstep on their part would find short shrift at the hands of the watch committees or other su- perior bodies that supervise them. But their official heads are not periodically cut off just for the sake of cut- ting them off, or for fear that otherwise the police might get out of touch with popular thought. We here in America have been slow to see that popu- lar government can maintain trained administrators in public office without having its wishes strangled or thwarted. The distrust of permanent experts has no real basis if they can be kept in contact with public opinion 241 American Police Systems through the control of representatives of the people. The experience of England and Switzerland is proof of the fact that this is not impossible, nor indeed difficult. 1 Residence Requirements for Commissioners. The difficulty of maintaining efficient police organiza- tions in America is enhanced by another factor which finds its basis partly in politics and partly in the narrow provincialism with which each city regards its own public servants. Instead of selecting department heads on the sole basis of fitness, regardless of their residence at the time of appointment, great stress is laid, both in law and in custom, upon the principle of " local men for local positions." Our cities seem instinctively to resent " gov- ernment by outsiders." It is taken as a reflection upon the community, a slur upon local talent. In the few cases where it has been tried it has met with considerable popu- lar disapproval. The New York board of aldermen has frequently expressed itself in no uncertain tones on the policy of introducing " outside help," even when the " help " consisted of a well-known expert in school or- ganization. In a recent municipal election in Philadel- phia the fact that the outgoing administration had brought from other cities three or four men of technical skill to assist in the management of local affairs was one of the heated points of argument. " Philadelphia jobs for Philadelphians " became the slogan of the day and pa- rades marched with signs and banners bearing the words : " The departure of imported office holders." The conception of public office as a " job " — a reward 1 See Lowell, loc. cit., Chap. XIX. 242 The Commissioner or Director for the faithful — no doubt underlies much of this widely prevalent feeling, although in many cities it is buttressed by local pride — a belief that from the com- munity itself can be recruited all the expert service neces- sary for its management. The principle of a community governing itself is stretched to include the idea that the tools employed by the community in the process shall be of home manufacture. So real is this prejudice against " outside " assistance and so deeply is it imbedded in the political traditions of the country that in most cases it has the sanction of law, and appointing officers are obliged to choose as departmental administrators men who have resided in the city for a prescribed period. Thus in Bos- ton the law provides that the police commissioner shall have resided in the city " for at least two years immedi- ately preceding the date of his appointment." 1 In St. Louis the residential requirement is four years. 2 In Bal- timore the police board consists of three persons " who shall have been registered voters in the City of Baltimore for three consecutive years next preceding the day of their appointment." 3 The San Francisco charter pro- vides that " no person shall be appointed (police) com- missioner who shall not have been an elector of the city and county at least five years next preceding his appoint- ment." * " Qualified elector of the city " is the phrase used in many charters in limiting to home talent the choice of business managers of specialized departments. In this practice we are again confronted by a striking i Acts of Mass., 1906, Chap. 291, Sec. 7. 2 Laws of Mo., 1899, Art. I, Sec. 466. s City Charter (Rev. Ed., 1915), Sec. 74»- * City Charter, Chap. II, Sec. 1. 243 American Police Systems contrast between Europe and America. A European city, whether in England, Switzerland, or Germany, is con- cerned primarily in having its municipal business well ad- ministered and well maintained. Such functions as po- lice, health, and fire control are regarded as technical di- visions of government, for the management of which highly trained men are essential. The task of the ap- pointing officer is to get the best men, and it is a matter of no concern whether at the time of appointment they happen to be living in one city or another. A residential qualification in such cases is as irrelevant as it would be if applied to the managing director of a railroad or the head of a medical school or experimental laboratory. ' Indeed in European cities there has been no thought of applying such a test for the reason that no one would care to limit so narrowly the field of choice. With the talent of Great Britain to draw from, for example, why should Liverpool or Birmingham insist that its chief constable be recruited from its own population? Or what would be gained if Stuttgart was barred from inviting an experi- enced deputy commissioner from Munich to join its staff as commissioner, and had, instead, to employ some in- ferior man from its own citizenship ? This is the conception that governs the public service of European municipalities. In consequence, men are called from one city to another, and the line of promo- tion is often from a lesser community to a greater. The police commissioner of the City of London 1 was twenty 1 The police of the City of London are distinct from the police of the London Metropolitan district. See European Police Systems, p. 39, note 2. 244 The Commissioner or Director years head constable in Liverpool ; Liverpool had enticed him from Leeds, where he had occupied the same posi- tion. The chief constable of Manchester held the same post in Oldham and Canterbury for terms of seven and five years respectively before he was called to his present office. When the authorities of Preston wanted a chief constable they advertised in the newspapers, and of the seventy candidates who applied they selected a man who at that time was superintendent of police in the town of Devizes. Later this same man was called to Liverpool as assistant head constable. Indeed in England and in Scot- land, except in cases of promotion, it is seldom that a police administrator is a resident of the city which chooses him. 1 The same situation is largely true of the continent. The commissioner of police of Rome 2 held similar posi- tions in Ancona and Naples, and was promoted from one city to another. The police commissioner of Amsterdam served in the same capacity in Rotterdam. The assistant to the police president of Dresden was taken from the police department of Munich. Among the smaller Ger- man cities the local councils are continually introducing into the public service departmental administrators whose work in other communities has attracted attention. In brief, the system of employment of public officers abroad is much more elastic than in America ; no narrow parochialism bars the search for talent wherever it can be obtained ; the entire nation contributes to the effective ad- ministration of the city. i Ibid., Chap. IV. 2 His title is Questore di Roma. 245 American Police Systems The Dilemma and the Approach to Its Solution. The facts thus far considered present a perplexing di- lemma. Effective administrators of large police depart- ments are not easily found in the ranks ; indeed, it is not to be supposed that they could be found in the ranks, and this solution of the difficulty contains but little promise. On the other hand, the lack of trained government execu- tives and the barrier which politics and American tradi- tions have erected against their development make prob- lematical any attempt to officer a police force from outside sources. What, then, is the solution for a city with a difficult police situation to handle? That there is no simple or single solution — certainly that there is no immediate solution — must at once be ad- mitted. Political customs cannot be changed over night nor can the fears and superstitions, inherited from fron- tier conditions of life, be sloughed off at will. The solu- tion of the difficulty, therefore, will be a matter of devel- opment. If a solution is reached it will be through application to the problem of government administration of the same common sense principles upon which success in private business depends. A manufacturer who com- mitted his plant to a periodically shifting line of untrained managers could not hope long to keep his business out of bankruptcy. He aims, therefore, to obtain the best abil- ity adapted to his work that can be anywhere secured, and success in handling the plant is the only condition of con- tinued employment. Adapted to police organization this principle would involve the selection of a commissioner on the sole basis of fitness regardless of residence or po- 246 The Commissioner or Director litical belief, and his continuance in office so long as his work is effective, no matter what changes occur in the politics of the city hall. It is possible that public admin- istration as a science will at some period be so far devel- oped in America that a training school for police adminis- trators will be a practicable project. In such a school would be developed the men who, after long apprentice- ship in smaller cities or in the lesser positions of larger cities, might wisely be promoted to posts of heavy re- sponsibility. Such a school, indeed, could be utilized to include not merely the police department but the whole technical administrative service of the country, so that trained ami experienced executives could be readily avail- able to all branches of local government. This plan, however, is for the time being too visionary for considera- tion. In the present state of American politics it has no immediate practical value. In the last analysis, of course, the problern will be solved, if solved at all, not by way of any specially devised machinery or legislative short-cut, but by popular edu- cation. It is idle to think of experts superimposed upon a listless or unsympathetic community. In America, initiative and motive power in any program of govern- mental reform must come from an intelligent electorate; and this way lies the only avenue of approach. The in- creasing demand for efficiency in government, and the growing appreciation that the hindrances to its realization are found not so much in democracy itself as in some of the peculiar methods by which we have attempted to put democracy into effect, promises to create a public opinion perhaps strong enough and intelligent enough to place the 247 American Police Systems administrative service of all specialized departments of government on a permanent, expert basis. In this, as in other perplexing problems of social organization, no prog- ress can be made without steadfast popular support. 248 CHAPTER VII THE CHIEF OF POLICE Inaccurate analogies. — The chief and his relations to the director. — The impermanent tenure of the chief. — Illustrations. — Imperma- nent tenure due to politics. — Examples. — The chief and civil serv- ice. — Difficulties of civil service. — Personnel in the position of chief. — Politics and the chief. The point is sometimes advanced that the commissioner or director of a highly specialized municipal department, like health or the police, is properly a layman, represent- ing the public opinion of the community and answerable for general results. It is urged that such men, chosen from time to time, can establish with the technical heads of their departments, like the chief of police or the chief health specialist, the same relation as exists between a board of directors of a railroad and its executive officer. The board makes no pretense to technical knowledge to manage the railroad; it merely represents the business public. Its function is not to run the railroad, but to see that the railroad is properly run. The executive officer, on the other hand, is a professional expert, thoroughly skilled in the science of railroad administration and re- sponsible under the policies of the directors for its suc- cessful operation. Another analogy often employed to define this conception of the police commissioner is the use of laymen as heads of such divisions of government as our War and Navy Departments. 249 American Police Systems Unfortunately, these analogies cannot be maintained in relation to the management of a police department. As we have already seen in the preceding chapter, the com- missioner is far more than a general business adminis- trator. His acquaintance with police work must be inti- mate and detailed if he is to have any effect upon its effi- ciency. For in the police field there are no easy standards of work-accomplishment such as one finds in other busi- nesses, both public and private. Faults in operation and failures in achievement are readily covered up. A police administrator who is insufficiently acquainted with meth- ods and processes has no way of gauging the adequacy of results. Everything is relative and there are no arbitrary measurements of success or failure that inexperienced di- rectors can apply. For example, arrests may decrease over a period of time ; this may be the result of police effectiveness in preventing the commission of crime or it may be due to ineffectiveness in apprehending criminals. Only a skilled administrator can make the proper inter- pretation and apply the necessary remedy. Again, the in- crease of crime complaints in a given period may or may not have relation to the size of the force. It is a problem for the determination of an experienced director. Simi- larly, an increase of felonies and misdemeanors may be attributable to laxity in the uniformed force, to a poorly managed detective bureau, or to inadequate constructive treatment of the causes of crime. It may be due to none of these factors, but to peculiar economic or social condi- tions. Only training and skill in the head of the depart- ment can diagnose the situation, and the responsibility cannot be delegated to a subordinate officer. 250 The Chief of Police I have emphasized this point because in many quar- ters the chief of police is loosely thought of as the real "expert," responsible to a transitory layman director, and on this theory the department has been built up. From the attempt to maintain this relationship confusion and bad administration have resulted. The Chief and his Relations to the Director. The failures attending the proper adjustment of the relation between commissioner and chief arise in large measure, as we have seen, from the inherent difficulty of dividing the functions of police administration between two different administrators. The position of commis- sioner or director was originally superimposed upon the older position of chief without any clear differentiation as to powers and authority, and for years the lawmakers and the officials themselves have laboriously endeavored to find some rational line of demarcation. 1 Such an at- tempt, however, clashes with the principle of responsible administration. Moreover, no line can be drawn which will practically meet the demands of varying occasions 1 Occasionally, in an attempt to protect the prerogatives of the chief, his powers are elaborately set forth in the charter and hedged about with intricate legal defenses. In some of the Ohio cities, for example, he is given full right to make details and transfers and to suspend his subordinates pending final disciplinary action by his superior. Moreover, he is protected against arbitrary removal at the hands of the director of public safety by a provision which places the power in this matter in the civil service commission. But even these restrictions do not insure a well-balanced relationship between the director and the chief, nor do they necessarily confer upon the latter any appreciable amount of administrative responsi- bility. The civil service commission, like the director, is appointed by the mayor; but even in the absence of any coercive influence such as this arrangement might imply, the wishes of the chief's superior officer in matters of detail customarily prevail. 251 American Police Systems and temperaments. Even more clearly impossible is it to establish such a line generally for all departments. The size and character of the community must determine whether both an administrative expert and an executive officer are needed. Assuming that some degree of perma- nency is assured for the commissioner, a small city may well dispense with the position of chief, or at least the two positions can be merged. In a larger city, where perhaps a number of bureaus are grouped under a single administrator, it may be equally advisable to retain the post. In any event, the matter should rest with the re- sponsible head of the department — the commissioner — free to select such executive agents as he needs or none at all if no necessity arises. If a chief executive officer of some sort is thought essential, the duties of the posi- tion as well as its scope should rest with the commis- sioner. There would thus be avoided the elaborate legal distinctions in function between the two officials which hamper rather than aid the relationship, and render the whole organization rigid and inflexible. This is the plan in operation in Boston, where, under the present adminis- tration, the relations between the civilian commissioner and the uniformed superintendent are well adjusted. The commissioner is under no legal obligation, however, to appoint any superintendent; he could, if he chose, ad- minister the force without one. Practically the same principle has for nineteen years been in operation in New York City; since the position of chief was abolished the successive commissioners have assigned executive duties sometimes to the chief inspector, sometimes to other uni- formed officials. 252 The Chief of Police This suggestion is of course predicated upon the be- lief that ultimate efficiency can be secured only if one man is held completely responsible for the operation of his de- partment. The line of progress in police organization points toward a trained commissioner, holding office for an unlimited term, rather than toward a plan which at- tempts definitely to separate, between two officers, admin- istrative and executive powers. The chief of police should bear to the commissioner or director the same re- lationship which any of the vice presidents of a railroad bear to the president. That is, he should be entrusted with such responsibilities as will relieve the commissioner of the burden of administrative detail, and promote a smooth working organization. The commissioner, how- ever, should at all times be empowered to rearrange his duties, to overrule his decisions, to correct his judgments, and if necessary to abolish his position altogether. As to what sort of work a chief might be entrusted to perform, no definite rule can be laid down. Assignments, details, transfers, the arrangement of shifts and hours would, under ordinary circumstances, form part of his duties. So, too, he could digest for the commissioner the daily reports of crime and the records of unusual occur- rences, presenting his expert opinion and recommenda- tions gained from a careful study of the subjects. Be- cause his connection with the daily operations of the force is intimate and continuous he might well be given a rea- sonably free hand in disposing of minor disciplinary cases. In all these matters, however, he should be merely the agent or representative of the commissioner, exercis- ing only such powers as the latter may delegate to him. 253 American Police Systems The Impermanent Tenure of the Chief. If any single factor were fatal to the position of the chief of police as an expert, in the relationship in which we drew the analogy at the beginning of the chapter, it would lie in his impermanent tenure of office. The suc- cess of a non-professional, transitory head, such as the British cabinet minister, is predicated on the existence un- der him of a permanent administrative manager, and the analogy between the chief of police and the. under-secre- tary of a British department breaks down in the face of the constant shift and change that characterize this branch of police service in the United States. The limited tenure of the chief of police is a matter of both law and custom. In many cities he is appointed under the charter for a prescribed term. Thus in San Francisco he serves four years, in Los Angeles four years, in San Antonio two years, in St. Paul two years, and in Memphis one year. In many more cities it is an accepted custom for an incoming board or administration to appoint its own chief of police, regardless of the fact that the chief's term of office is not legally limited. Oc- casionally a single administration will make two and sometimes three appointments to the position. Conse- quently police management is marked almost as much by a shifting succession of chiefs as by an ever changing line of commissioners. San Francisco in the eleven years between 1900 and 191 1 had eight chiefs; Pittsburgh in the five years between 1901 and 1906 had six; in the last 43 years Los Angeles has had 25 chiefs, making an average term of less than two years. Minneapolis in 32 254 The Chief of Police years has had thirteen ; Seattle in nineteen years has had ten; Des Moines in the sixteen-year period between 1901 and 19 17 had eleven. Denver furnishes a typical illustra- tion of the point, with fifteen chiefs in 38 years, an aver- age of two years and a quarter for eaeh man; of the fifteen incumbents, two were removed on charges of dis- honesty, one for improper conduct in connection with the search of a woman prisoner, one for drunkenness in a disorderly house, and the others for political reasons, gen- erally in connection with changes in the municipal admin- istration. The present chief of police in Denver held the same office on three prior occasions, each time being thrown out by an unfavorable turn of the political wheel. A survey of other cities shows the same situation, al- though in some the rate of change is not as rapid as in Pittsburgh or San Francisco. Philadelphia has had six chiefs in 33 years, an average of over five years apiece. 1 Five chiefs have held office in Cincinnati since 1887, an average term of over six years. Cleveland has had six in 23 years, an average term of four years. Louisville since 1870 has had thirteen chiefs, or an average incum- bency of approximately four years. Since 1885 Balti- more has had five chiefs, 2 St. Louis and Detroit, seven, and Newark, seven. 3 In some few departments, gener- 1 The title is superintendent in Philadelphia. 2 This includes one chief who served at two different periods. The title in Baltimore is marshal. 3 From 1844, when the position of chief was first established, to 1901, when it was abolished, New York City had twelve chiefs of police, an average term of four years, six months. Atlanta in 47 years has had ten chiefs, one of whom served sixteen years, making an average for the others of less than four years apiece. New Or- leans in 68 years, excluding three years of military occupancy, has had 25, an average term of two years, nine months. 255 American Police Systems ally in the smaller cities, one finds chiefs of police hold- ing over creditably long terms. The chief of police of Grand Rapids, recently retired, served 21 years; in Man- chester (N. H.) the chief has served 28 years. Mil- waukee's chief of police, with 31 years of continuous service to his credit, probably holds the record in the United States at the present time. These cases, however, are exceptional ; one must search the records to find them, and they stand out in sharp relief against the common practice of our municipalities. Impermanent Tenure Due to Politics. The impermanent character of the chief's tenure is ascribable, as has been indicated, largely to politics. A Democratic administration wants a Democratic chief, just as a Republican administration insists upon a chief from its own party. It is one of the accepted rules of the game, and the idea of the chief as an expert in a spe- cialized department is subordinated to the conception, dif- ficult to overcome, that the spoils belong to the victors, and that the police department must be kept in line for the next political battle. Consequently the chief is the victim of recurring political changes — appointed to his position, losing it, often reappointed and losing it again, as the political wheel registers success or failure for the party with which he is affiliated. This point is amply borne out by a study of the changes occurring in the position of chief in a city like St. Paul. John Clark, a Republican, was appointed chief in 1883, retired in 1892, reappointed in 1894, retired in 1896. John J. O'Connor, a Democrat, appointed chief of police 256 The Chief of Police in 1900, resigned in 19 12 when the Republicans came into power, but was reappointed in 19 14 when his party was again victorious. In the interval between the Clark regime and the O'Connor regime a varied succession of Republicans and Democrats held the post. Similarly in Minneapolis in 32 years the succession of chiefs has been as follows : two Democrats, two Republicans, two Demo- crats, one Republican, two Democrats, one professedly non-partisan, one Socialist and one Independent Repub- lican. Needless to say, the mayors responsible for these appointments followed in the same political succession. According to a practice which we shall discuss in a later chapter, each change in the head of the department from one party to another was accompanied by wholesale re- movals in the rank and file. The chief of police of a city in Pennsylvania writes me as follows : " I was first appointed chief of police in this city in 1893, and served in that capacity for two years. ... A political change occurred and I worked as superintendent for a private detective agency for six years. I was then reappointed chief of police, serving for six years, when I was again thrown out by a turn of the political wheel. I was again appointed in 191 2 and have been on the job since." The experience of this official has been duplicated in scores of instances. It is not at all unusual for a chief of police at the ex- piration of his service to be returned to the ranks as cap- tain, or in some other subordinate capacity where, with some hope, perhaps, he awaits the return of more aus- picious days. This custom, as we have seen, is practised in Chicago ; at the time that this is written there are two 257 American Police Systems captains in the ranks, who formerly administered the en- tire force. At the time of my visit to Indianapolis two officials in the ranks, one in charge of the detective bureau and the other a desk sergeant, had once held the position of chief. In St. Paul the chief under a Republican regime was made a captain when the Democrats came into power. In Atlanta a former chief was allowed to continue on the force as a patrolman. In Toledo in 1914 the mayor appointed as chief of po- lice a traffic officer who had actively espoused his election. Later, as a result of disagreements the mayor brought charges against him before the civil service commission, forcing his reduction to the rank of patrolman. In the following municipal campaign the officer himself ran for mayor, seeking vindication from the public, as he ex- pressed it, for the unfair treatment which he had received. Defeated at the election, he was reinstated in the depart- ment as a plainclothesman. " We are so riddled with politics," an officer of the Toledo force told me, " that nobody knows who is going to be chief tomorrow." In Birmingham (Ala.) it was the custom a number of years ago, to have the chief run for appointment at the Democratic primary elections, the members of the board of police commissioners pledging themselves to appoint the man thus selected. The term was for two years, and rival candidates for the position took the stump in an endeavor to win the citizens to an appreciation of their respective abilities. Naturally the prize went to the man who had a special gift for catching the fancy of a crowd, or whose promises and favors seemed the more substan- 258 The Chief of Police tial. 1 In twelve years five different chiefs held the post. These examples represent, of course, somewhat unusual cases. Nevertheless they are typical, if not of the actual circumstances, at least of the spirit of many American cities in subordinating conceptions of expert service to the exigencies of politics. The Chief and Civil Service. In some cities definite steps have been taken to counter- act the transient character of the chief's position by plac- ing it under civil service regulations. This is true, for example, of the cities of Ohio, 2 of some of the cities of New Jersey, 3 and many of the municipalities of Massa- chusetts. 4 The Ohio law, which was pased in 191 5, pro- vides that charges against the chief of police must be heard by the municipal civil service commission. Under the New Jersey statute removal of chiefs of police is lodged in the hands of the appointing authorities, but the state civil service commission reviews the action and has the right, after calling witnesses and considering all the evidence, finally to determine the case. 5 In the Massa- chusetts cities which have adopted the act, removals are 1 This system was abolished in 191 1. 2 Ohio Laws of 1915 — " An act to amend sections 486-1 to 486-31 inclusive and to repeal section 4505 of the General Code relating to the civil service of the State of Ohio, the several counties, cities, and city school districts thereof." pp. 400-419. 3 Newark, Trenton, Jersey City, Paterson, East Orange, South Orange, and Elizabeth. In these communities the state civil service law (Laws of N. J., 1908, Chap. 156) was adopted by referendum. * Cambridge, Fall River, Lynn, New Bedford, Newton, Pittsfield, Springfield, Worcester, and twelve others. The civil service law which these cities accepted is Chapter 468 of the Acts of 191 1. 6 In addition a review by the courts could probably be obtained. 259 American Police Systems made by the appointing boards or officers after the presen- tation of written charges and a hearing; and opportunity is afforded for a full review by the courts. 1 In most of the cities where the chief of police is pro- tected by civil service, the law is too recent a development to make possible more than a tentative appraisal. That it will discourage constant changes in the position and lengthen the term of office of the average incumbent is not to be doubted. In so far as this is accomplished the law will represent a worthy and substantial advance over old conditions. It is hardly probable that the cities of' Ohio, for example, will ever again see the long succession of police chiefs that for many years past has filed in and out of the doors of their police departments. On the other hand it is improbable that the law, cer- tainly as it is now framed, will prove an unmixed bless- ing. The trite remark that civil service is the lesser of two evils will doubtless find reinforcement in this new application. In just the proportion that removal is made legally formidable is the difficulty increased of getting rid of unfit men when public interest demands it. -Civil serv- ice has too often proved a bulwark for incompetence and neglect, to justify over sanguine hopes in its extension to this new administrative field. Too often, too, it has served as a respectable cloak for political juggling, de- feating its own purpose, and bringing the whole cause of reform into disrepute. No head of a police depart- ment in Great Britain — indeed no member of a police force — is protected by civil service, and yet removals for political or personal reasons are practically unheard \ Acts of Mass., 191 1, Chap. 624. 260 The Chief of Police of. Custom and public opinion unite to maintain the administration of this department on a high plane. We in America, on the other hand, attempt to substitute law for public opinion, and too often become the victims of its rigidity and inelasticity. At the same time, in choos- ing between two difficulties such as confront us, it is the course of wisdom to select the less formidable. An in- vestigating committee in New York, in reporting a plan to increase the term of office of the police commissioner, aptly expressed the idea as follows : " The purpose of our recommendation is to give fixity of tenure to the commissioner. We believe that this can be accomplished only by making his removal really difficult. The disadvantage of being unable easily to get rid of an inefficient commissioner is evi- dent, but we cannot devise a satisfactory plan to be operated by human beings (the only raw material available) that will give fixity of tenure to a good com- missioner, and still make it easy to remove a bad one. Of the two horns of this dilemma, we prefer fixity of tenure." x A difficulty peculiar to such civil service laws as those we have noticed above lies in the unnecessarily complex machinery by which removals are secured. In an en- deavor to give ample protection to the chief, the laws have surrounded the position with a defense too intricate and elaborate to insure the best results. In the New Jer- sey cities, as we have noticed, discretion in the last analy- 1 Report of the Citizens' Committee appointed at the Cooper Union Mass Meeting, August 14, 1912. 261 American Police Systems sis is vested with the state civil service commission, a body bearing no responsibility to the local government, and probably unfamiliar with the facts and circumstances leading to the removal. In consequence, authority in po- lice management is scattered, and the department, as well as the community it serves, suffers from the lack of sharply defined responsibility. This condition is true of the Ohio cities where the director of public safety, answer- able for the conduct of police business, has no voice whatever in the removal of the chief ; instead, the power is vested with the civil service commission, a body with- out responsibility for police management, and with no vision of the whole police problem of which the removal of the chief is but a single phase. There is danger that in protecting the chief from ca- pricious removal the fundamental principle of responsible leadership will be compromised. In . most cases ample security would be afforded if the officer or board, with power to remove, were required to file written charges, and with due notice give a public hearing at which the defendant would have full opportunity to present his case. A review by the courts could be allowed to determine, not the adequacy of the charges, but merely the regularity of the proceeding. To go further is to rob the community of any right to hold one man responsible for what hap- pens in the police department. Public opinion rather than law must increasingly become the chief corrective of our institutional ills if any substantial improvement is to be looked for. One more difficulty in connection with the civil service laws above cited remains to be noticed. In Ohio, New 262 ) The Chief of Police Jersey, and Massachusetts, the statutes provide that the chief shall be promoted from the next lowest rank, 1 a limi- tation which may seriously cripple the leadership of the department. It is by no means certain that the best ma- terial for the position of chief can invariably be found in the next lowest rank. Indeed, it is possible that men of far better calibre for the post can be obtained either from another rank or from another force or from private life. To narrow the field of choice for an administrative position such as this, in which personality and special ability count for so much, is to deny the department the benefit of the best intelligence obtainable. For a num- ber of years in one of the large cities of Massachusetts, for example, permanent appointment to the position of chief was long deferred because of the lack of promising material in the rank of captain. Four of the captains were far too old for the post, while the remaining two had political affiliations such as to make the appointment of either of them a questionable expedient. Similarly in a New Jersey city at the time of my visit, the retirement of the chief would have opened the position to two offi- cers, one of whom had no administrative capacity what- 1 Ohio civil service rules, January 27, 1916, Rule VIII ; Acts of Mass., 1911, Chap. 408; New Jersey Laws of 1908, Chap. 156 (accepted by East Orange, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Newark, Pater- son, and South' Orange). This restriction is somewhat modified in that persons from any grade may take examination for promotion to the position of chief if there are not the required number of eligibles in the next lower grade. Despite the apparent elasticity of these provisions, the fact remains that in Ohio (except where the state civil service law is superseded by such home rule charters as contain specific provision for civil service, as in the case of Toledo) and in the twenty cities of Massachusetts which have accepted the law of 191 1, it is mandatory that all possible candidates within the force be exhausted before recourse may be had to an original ex- amination for the position of chief. 263 American Police Systems ever, while the integrity of the other was not above sus- picion. Obviously it is unfair to a department to limit the ap- pointment of chief to such undesirable candidates, nor is a restriction of this kind essential to the principle of civil service. Personnel in the Position of Chief. It cannot be said that the average chief of police repre- sents a conspicuous order of ability. In fact only occa- sionally do the incumbents of this rank seem to interpret police work in any other terms than those of handcuffs and the night stick. Frequently possessing genuine abil- ity in such matters as handling traffic or managing crowds, they are often unable to understand involved problems of organization or to conceive of police work in its broader relationships. The common practices of the busi- ness manager in securing administrative control of his plant are frankly beyond their comprehension. Even when their offices are equipped with such mechanical aids as daily reports or statistics of work, these appliances are not used as instruments of management, because such use is not understood. Most of the chiefs have had no opportunity to develop administrative ability. They have served for years as patrolmen, sergeants, and captains, and their experience thus acquired has little relationship to the task of management ; it does not necessarily equip them to obtain maximum results from their subordinates or make them alert to the possibilities of improvement in their organizations. To this situation may perhaps in part be ascribed the 264 The Chief of Police tendency of commissioners and directors to infringe upon the proper functions of the chief. They see in him an official, inadequately trained for his tasks, struggling with more or less intelligence and zeal with what is at best a difficult problem. Their assumption of his duties, with the confusing consequences which we have already noted, is doubtless prompted in many cases by a genuine desire to have the police department well run, and by a belief that this result cannot be secured with so poor an instru- ment. In many cities, too, the chief has the appearance of being more interested in politics than in the administration of his force. He realizes that the length of his service depends upon his ability to maintain political affiliations powerful enough to keep him in office, and his energies are bent in that direction. In consequence his real work is neglected, partly because it is not continuously on his mind, and partly because its active prosecution might an- tagonize the forces upon which he relies for support. His administration is therefore devoted to the mainte- nance of the status quo of his department, and change and innovation are discouraged. To imply that these characterizations are true of all chiefs of police would, of course, be grossly unjust. One finds some officers of this rank splendidly equipped for their work: keen, progressive, eager for new ideas. In Berkeley, California, for instance, the chief is capable to an unusual degree and his influence is felt throughout the West. 1 Chief Quigley of Rochester, N. Y., may be mentioned in the same breath. One finds many more 1 August Vollmer. 265 American Police Systems chiefs honestly striving with poor equipment and against hostile influence to build up an effective department. On the whole, however, the impression gained from a com- posite picture of chiefs of police would be one of limited resourcefulness and lethargy. The police department of one of the largest industrial cities of the South was, at the time of my visit, demor- alized and chaotic. Uniforms were patched and shabby; policemen patrolled with coats unbuttoned, and often with toothpicks or cigars in their mouths. There was no crim- inal identification system in the detective bureau, and no records of any kind were maintained for control or sta- tistical purposes. Serious crimes were of frequent oc- currence, but except as some one in the department re- membered them there was no way by which the chief or any of his assistants could tell who was handling the cases or what had been done. " The less you say about our police department the better," I was told by the sec- retary of the local chamber of commerce. Who was the chief responsible for these conditions? He was a dull, ignorant, untrained man with no idea of administration, indeed with no conception of what his position meant. Much of his time he spent sitting on a box in an alley back of police headquarters, whittling on a stick and swapping stories with his lieutenants. Again emphasis must be laid on the fact that this pic- ture is by no means true of our chiefs of police as a whole, nor indeed, in its entirety of many of them. It serves to show, however, why the average level of ability in this position is no higher than my previous character- ization would indicate. 266 The Chief of Police Nevertheless in passing judgment such as this, it is well to remember that the average chief of police is more sinned against than sinning. He is the victim of a po- litical system for which he is in no way responsible, often owing his appointment and continuance in office to the sinister forces that control many of our municipalities. With a public opinion on the one hand none too well formed or articulate, and on the other hand the constant pressure of powerful party influences, it is small wonder that many of the chiefs are mediocre in calibre, ambition- less and unimaginative in their work. Rather the won- der is that some of them, without hope of appreciation, are effective and undiscouraged. "If the politicians would keep their hands off I could build up one of the finest departments in the country." This remark, made by the police chief of a large city in Ohio, is typical of what many of them say in confidential moments. In the words of the chief in a western city : " Give us five years without politics and we will revolutionize police or- ganization in the United States." At bottom the police problem is a problem in public edu- cation. American municipalities are not impotent. They are in a position to obtain what they want. That so many of them are content with the rule of the politician and its train of ugly consequences, that highly specialized social functions like policing are thrown into the political arena and battled for as a matter of course, is indicative of low community standards and a public will weak and unde- veloped. Because it demands so much from so many, de- mocracy is the most difficult form of government to work. Its sole hope of success lies in the slow process of popular education — intensive, unremitting, undiscouraged. 267 CHAPTER VIII THE RANK AND FILE The place of the uniformed force in the police department. — Its relation to other branches of the service. — Civil service and the police. — Demoralized conditions without civil service. — Civil service in operation. — Appointments. — Promotions. — Discipline. — The limi- tations of civil service. — A rational civil service needed. — The police school. — Educational activities of the New York department. — The patrol service. — Foot patrol becoming obsolete. — Automobiles in patrol work. — Over-emphasis on the mechanical side of police or- ganization. — The lack of fluidity in mobilization. — Police unions. — Responsibility of the community to the police. — The police and industrial disturbance. In the task which confronts the police — i.e., maintain- ing the security of persons and property and safeguard- ing public morals — the uniformed or patrol force is the first line of defense. Its responsibility is the enforce- ment of laws and ordinances and the protection of the public against physical hazard. It preserves order on the streets and in public places, makes arrests for viola- tion of law, regulates traffic, rescues lives endangered, and renders first aid and assistance to persons who may be injured or ill. In addition it is in respect to such matters the eyes and ears of the community. It discovers and reports unsanitary conditions, fire hazards, defective pave- ments, dangerous buildings and other situations to which official attention should be given. Multifarious as are its duties, the uniformed force 268 The Rank and File alone cannot handle the whole task of the police. It is not possible to have uniformed men in a community in numbers sufficient to guarantee the enforcement of all laws and ordinances or the arrest of all criminals. More- over many violations of law occur in places where the policeman cannot readily go. It is necessary, therefore, to have a second line of defense — a corps of trained in- vestigators or detectives — operating in citizens' dress, so as to work unobserved. These officials are called upon to apprehend lawbreakers whose activities the uniformed force has failed to suppress. Inspector Cornelius Ca- halane of the New York force who has contributed in no small measure to a better understanding of police work expresses the relationship in the following succinct state- ment : " The uniformed force is the infield and the out- field on the home diamond. The detective force gets whatever the crooks bat over the fence." 1 A third line of defense in the police department is the crime prevention service, consisting of miscellaneous squads and units, engaged in discovering conditions that produce crime and in suppressing offenses against public morals. Perhaps a better figure would be to liken this branch of the police to the intelligence service of an army. It gathers information regarding conditions to be attacked by the police department, which would other- wise remain undiscovered. Its work is always positive and aggressive. While it is possible to differentiate thus broadly be- tween these three main branches of police organization, it must be recognized that their functions are not mutually 1 Personally communicated. 269 American Police Systems exclusive. As opportunity arises, each section performs work that receives the special attention of other sections. One of the purposes of the patrol work by the uniformed force is the prevention of crime, and similarly the crime prevention section is frequently engaged in the detection of criminals. But in one form or another, the task of every police force involves these three approaches. In maintaining these three approaches, the question of tools is paramount. With what kind of men are we to work? How are we to get them? How shall they be trained ? How shall we use them to accomplish the ends of police duty? After all, the heart of the police prob- lem is one of personnel, and it is to the many questions involved in personnel management that the next three chapters are devoted. Civil-Service and the Police. A rough classification of police departments in the United States could be made by dividing them into two groups : those that operate under civil service rules, and those that do not. Most of the large forces in the east- ern states and in the far west are now under some form of civil service. In the south and middle west, however, and in some parts of the northwest, it is possible to find many police departments to which these principles have never been applied. Some of these departments are large; many of them are small. Of the 63 cities in the United States having a population of 100,000 or over, ten have no civil service system whatever. These cities include Birmingham, (Ala.), Indianapolis, Kansas City, Louisville, San Antonio and Salt Lake 270 The Rank and File City. 1 In a number of other cities, such as Omaha, civil service regulations have only partially been adopted, generally as regards dismissals rather than appointments. St. Paul and Minneapolis have joined the civil service group within the last few years. New York City adopted the civil service plan in 1883, and Chicago fol- lowed in 1895. On the basis of this classification the generalization easily follows that those forces in which a civil service system is maintained are better administered and better managed than those in which no such system has been adopted. The reason for this is at once apparent. Whatever evil results it may have — and we shall dis- cuss some of them later — civil service tends to exclude the political factors which are peculiarly characteristic of American local government. Without civil service, appointments to the police department are generally a matter of political faith, involving allegiance to the local " boss " and fidelity to the party machine. Consequently, in such departments, the " boss " rather than the com- missioner has the loyalty of the force, for commissioners are temporary creatures, birds of passage, subject to sud- den political decapitation and retirement to private life, while the "boss," representing the permanency of the iThe other four cities are Bridgeport, Camden, Hartford and Reading. In addition to these ten cities, there are three cities in which civil service is maintained in a modified sort of way, ad- ministered exclusively by police authorities: St. Louis, Milwaukee and Providence. In Baltimore civil service is administered by a board of police examiners apart from the authority of the board of police commissioners. In Washington, D. C, civil service is ad- ministered by the city commissioners sitting as a board. Of the 47 cities in which civil service is established, it is controlled by a municipal civil service commission in 35, and by a state civil service commission in twelve. 271 American Police Systems party machine, is always in a position to provide " jobs." In such departments the upset of a party machine at the polls means thorough changes in the personnel of the police force. "It is to be a sweeping housecleaning of everyone who ever smiled at a Republican commissioner," said the Kansas City Star, 1 referring to contemplated changes in the force of Kansas City when the new Major board was appointed in 19 13. The prophecy was true. Within a few weeks eighty Republican patrolmen and sergeants, in addition to the chief of police, had been dropped and Democrats took their places.- With this beginning, the board proceeded leisurely through bureau after bureau, dismissing the politically obnoxious. Out of two hundred Republicans, only thirty were left. Captains and lieutenants were reduced to patrolmen, and the vacancies thus made were filled by " good Major men." By such prescriptive methods a " Democratic force " was created out of what had been a " Republican force." 2 At the time of my visit to Kansas City it was estimated that the Republicans constituted but five per cent of the entire department. " And you bet they are not shouting their affiliations from the housetops," I was told. Similarly in Indianapolis, without the restraining in- fluence of a civil service system, the force is thoroughly political. Indeed it is made so by law. " The force 1 August S, 1913. " We are going to exact the grandfather clause. Any man who can't show that his family has voted straight for three generations need n't try to borrow one of our blue uniforms." This was the way a Democratic worker expressed his view of the situation. See Star for November 14, 1912. 2 The story of this reorganization of the force can be found in the columns of the Kansas City Star from June to September, 1913. 272 The Rank and File shall be as nearly as possible equally divided politically " — this wording of the statute furnishes the guiding prin- ciple of administration. 1 Half the force are Republi- cans and the other half Democrats, and this division runs through all ranks — captains, lieutenants, sergeants and patrolmen. If a vacancy occurs in any rank, due to the death, resignation or dismissal of a Democrat, another Democrat is put in his place. The same is true of Republicans. Moreover an incoming administration generally makes sweeping changes in all the higher ranks. Captains and lieutenants are reduced to patrolmen, and their places rilled by those who, for personal or political reasons, are more acceptable to the appointing power. Not infrequently men are introduced into the higher ranks without passing through the lower grades. I talked with a captain of police in Indianapolis who en- tered the service as a sergeant, skipping the grade of patrolman, and was then promoted tq captain, skipping the grade of lieutenant. Another officer whom I met was brought into the department as a lieutenant, never having been in police service before. As long as the even balance is kept between Democrats and Republi- cans, there is nothing to prevent juggling with the per- sonnel. In Louisville largely similar conditions exist, although not prescribed by law. In 1907 a Republican mayor, un- expectedly acceding to the office, " tore the whole force to pieces, putting in Republicans wherever he could." 2 All the captains were reduced to patrolmen, and Republi- 1 Cities and Towns Act. Laws of Ind., 1905, Sec. 159. 2 Personally communicated. 273 American Police Systems cans took their places, many of them new men without previous police experience, appointed in a single day up through all the ranks. When the Democrats succeeded iri the following election, the Republican policemen were similarly served. Again in 1917 a Republican victory at the polls was followed by the dismissal of more than 300 policemen out of a force of 429. Not a single officer above the rank of sergeant survived. In Salt Lake City changes in police personnel as the result of the accession of a new city commissioner fre- quently run as high as 85%. " For the good of the serv- ice " is the brief formula used in effecting dismissals. In Birmingham, Alabama, there are no requirements for admission to the force, physical, mental, or otherwise — not even a standard of height. " Some places need small men, some places don't," the chielS of police told me. Conditions of this kind typify the management of the police where a civil service system is lacking, and it is no exaggeration to say that civil service stands be- tween the police and utter demoralization in the cities of the United States. It is at this point that we are confronted with an amaz- ing contrast between the police departments of Europe and America. There are no civil service arrangements in European police forces. Discretion as regards ap- pointments and dismissals is invariably lodged in the commissioner or prefect, or whatever title the responsi- ble head of the force may bear. The entire system rests upon his judgment. He " hires and fires " on the basis of standards which he himself creates. It is assumed that politics and favoritism will play no part in the result 274 The Rank and File because it is taken for granted that the commissioner will have a greater interest than any one else in securing and maintaining the best possible personnel. And this as- sumption is well based. Politics has nothing whatever to do with the selection or dismissal of policemen in European cities. The political opinions of members of the force cut no figure whatever. The conception of po- licing as an essential and highly technical public task to be handled only by trained and experienced men makes any other point of view unthinkable to the European, and no formal legal barriers are necessary to protect the police department from the spoilsman. 1 With us, a far lower standard prevails. Ideals of pub- lic service such as obtain in the cities of England and France seem to be utterly lacking, and we are forced to resort to law to secure a measure of control which in a healthier political atmosphere would be furnished by pub- lic opinion and buttressed by sound tradition. Civil Service in Operation. Civil service rules and practices bulk so large in the selection^ promotion and dismissal of police department personnel, that more than passing attention must be given to them. In most cities, indeed, where civil serv- ice has gained a foothold, it has literally taken over al- most the entire problem of personnel management, in so far as if does not relate to the disposition of the forces, re- ducing it to a rigid and more or less perfunctory routine, i For full discussion of European methods in selecting policemen and making promotions see European Police Systems, Chapters VI and VII. 275 American Police Systems in which the police administrator himself has little part to play. The following paragraphs briefly describe its operation in its three principal relations to the police department: appointments, promotions and discipline. (a) Appointments. In most cities where civil service is in operation the entire task of advertising for recruits and of examining and selecting the applicants is lodged in an independent civil service commission. This commission establishes physical and mental standards for entrance to the classi- fied service, of which the police service is but a part, and determines the eligibility of all applicants by means of competitive or qualifying examinations. On the basis of these examinations lists of eligibles are prepared, from which the responsible police authority is obliged to make a choice, generally in the order in which the names ap- pear on the lists. The standards of eligibility and methods of procedure, as well as the schemes for marking and rating, vary in minor details from city to city, but the general practices are similar. The entrance examination is usually in two parts : one, the physical and medical, and the other the mental, which may be either oral or written or both. Provision is generally made, also, for a character investi- gation, sometimes conducted by agents of the civil service commission and sometimes by police officers working under the direction of the commission. Although this phase of the examination is of the utmost importance, in too many American cities it is slighted, if not actually abused, and amounts to little more than a perfuncto'ry 276 The Rank and File checking of the references submitted by the applicant in his application blank. 1 In most civil service schemes the appointees serve a probationary period ranging from three months to a year, during which they may be dropped by authority of the police head without the usual pro- cedure of a trial. In many of these cities, however, police authorities are lax in making any effort to measure the work of the probationers. So long as they do not commit any overt breach of rules there is little likelihood of failure to obtain permanent appointment. A notable contrast between American and European practice is found in the requirement, uniformly in vogue in the cities of the United States, of a residence qualifi- cation in the selection of policemen. That is, an appli- cant for appointment as patrolman must have been a resident of the city in which service is sought for a speci- fied period immediately preceding the date of his appli- cation; In San Francisco and Oakland, California, five years is the residence requirement; in St. Louis four years; in Buffalo, Rochester, Newark, New Orleans and Washington, D. C. two years; in Cleveland, Boston and Pittsburg, six months, although in the last two cities a year's residence in the state is required. In St. Louis, New Orleans and a few other cities the further require- ment is made that applicants must be qualified voters. In Europe, on the other hand, notably in Great Britain, every endeavor is made to secure policemen from outside the community in which they are to serve. Of the Lon- 1 For a discussion of the technique of conducting civil service ex- aminations for police service, .see Fuld's Police Administration, New York, 1910. 277 American Police Systems don policemen only a small proportion come from Lon- don, and the same condition is true in the provincial cities of England and Wales. These communities do not care to have on their forces policemen with local ties and con- nections. One-fourth of the municipalities in England refuse to accept men on their constabularies who for any length of time have lived in their cities, and the rural dis- tricts are searched to provide available material. " Straight from the plow " is the motto of the recruiting agents who are constantly traveling from place to place in the country districts of Great Britain looking for avail- able constables. 1 In America, there is no policy in regard to what occu- pations shall be preferred or what experience is neces- sary as a training for policemen. Civil service stand- ardizes everything. Whoever presents himself and meets the published requirements is welcome to compete in ex- amination. An analysis of the previous occupations of 219 policemen appointed to the New York department in 1916, made from the records of the police training school for recruits, showed the largest number to have been clerks, of whom there were 39 ; general workers and laborers came next with 28; drivers and chauffeurs num- bered 27; plumbers, gas and steam fitters 21 ; motormen and conductors 12. 2 A similar analysis made in 1912 by the Bureau of Municipal Research showed that out of 42 recruits who had held one position for five years or more previous to entering the police department, twelve x For detailed analysis of methods of recruiting in England, see European Police Systems, Chapter VI. 2 Personal investigation. 278 The Rank and File had been drivers, six clerks, three butchers, three plumb- ers, the remaining eighteen falling in classifications of less than three each. 1 These figures represent fairly well the sources of recruits in other American cities. (b) Promotions. Promotions to all ranks of the uniformed force ex- cept the rank of chief 2 are made through the instrumen- tality of civil service examinations in Chicago, Cleveland, Baltimore, San Francisco, Cincinnati, Los Angeles and other cities. In Newark and Jersey City the civil service system for promotions includes the rank of chief of police. In New York promotions are made by civil service examination to the ranks of sergeant, lieutenant and captain, while the ranks of inspector of police and chief inspector are not included in the classified service. Similarly in St. Louis, Boston, Milwaukee and Pittsburgh the civil service is used for promotion to the ranks of ser- geant and lieutenant only. In Detroit and New Orleans the civil service system has nothing to do with promo- tions. 3 Civil service laws in all cities provide of course that promotion shall be effected through successive ranks and generally the examinations are open only to those who 1 These figures are to be found in the Report of the Special Com- mittee (Curran) of the New York Board of Aldermen to investi- gate the Police Department, 1912. ,,,,•■ 2 The title is superintendent in Chicago and marshal of police in Baltimore. . , . . 3 In Detroit examinations for promotion to the various ranks in the uniformed force are conducted by a board of promotions, com- posed of the superintendent, assistant superintendent and chief in- spector. On the basis of these examinations the board makes recom- mendations to the police commissioner. 279 American Police Systems have served in the next lower grade for a specified period of time. The time which a patrolman must serve before he is eligible to compete in an examination for promotion to a sergeantcy varies from five years in New York City to six months in Philadelphia, Boston, Buffalo and Min- neapolis. 1 Before a sergeant is eligible for promotion to the rank of lieutenant he must have served as a ser- geant for a period of from six months to three years. 2 The mental examination, usually written, is the chief factor in determining a candidate's standing on the list of eligibles for promotion. In most cities seniority in service is also given a specific weight in the examina- tion. Physical tests are rated on a competitive basis in Chicago, St. Louis, Los Angeles and Seattle, but in most cities they are employed merely to establish a qualifying standard of health and soundness in physical condition. Another factor commonly employed in promotions is the efficiency or merit test as it is generally called. This is supposedly based on an efficiency record system which under most civil service regulations is kept for each mem- ber of the police force. These records are usually nega- tive in that they show only demerits for infractions of rules or neglect of duty. In no city in the United States is there a real efficiency record system which gives syste- matic credit for the accomplishment of good every-day police work. Wherever a thorough going efficiency rec- 1 The period is four years in Chicago and Los Angeles ; three years in St. Louis, Cleveland and Cincinnati; two years in Milwaukee; one year in Newark, Seattle and Jersey City. 2 The period is three years in Milwaukee ; two years in New York, Cleveland, Los Angeles and Cincinnati; one year in Chicago, St. Louis, Newark, Seattle and Jersey City; six months in Philadelphia, Boston, Buffalo and Minneapolis. 280 The Rank and File ord system has been attempted, to record currently the positive factors of a man's work, it has fallen into disuse or has been carelessly kept after an initial trial. 1 After the examinations are completed and the men are listed in the order in which they have passed, the appoint- ing authority in the police department is generally given the opportunity of selecting for each promotion one out of every three names presented to him from the head of the list. This is true in New York, Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New- ark, Seattle and Jersey City. In Philadelphia the ap- pointing authority may select one out of four eligibles. Selections may be made from any place on the list of eligibles in St. Louis, Boston and Milwaukee. In Balti- more, Cincinnati and Minneapolis, it is the practice to fill vacancies only from the names that appear at the head of the list of eligibles. (c) Discipline. Civil service laws and regulations have gone to ex- treme lengths in the United States in safeguarding po- licemen against unjust disciplinary action. In some cities the civil service commission itself assumes sole re- *The most noteworthy attempt to establish an efficiency record system was in New York under the regime of Commissioner Woods. The scheme was dropped by his successor. The writer has seen in some police departments a so-called efficiency record system in which the same rating, i. e. excellent, was given to every member of the force from the chief of police down to the newest patrolman. The objections which one encounters to rating efficiency by a system of markings are, first, that under such a system there is not an equal opportunity between men on busy and those on quiet posts to make arrests and perform acts of meritorious service, and second, that favoritism may influence a commanding officer in grading his subordinates in the matter of general qualifications. 28l American Police Systems sponsibility for discipline; in others, the commission has the right to review the action of the police administrative authority, and may order reinstatement in case of dis- missals, or lesser penalties than those imposed. 1 In most police departments when disciplinary action is taken, charges must be preferred in writing and the case sub- mitted for trial. The trial may be conducted along the lines of a criminal proceeding as in New York with due regard for legal rules of evidence and all the technicalities of regular court procedure, or it may be a more or less formal method observed by an administrative officer in enforcing discipline. The various practices that are em- ployed differ from city to city, and there is no stand- ardized arrangement. The trial system of New York City is the most elab- orate and the most completely judicial in character of any city in the United States. Minor derelictions may be dis- posed of by inspectors of police without submitting the cases to formal trial, but charges involving more serious offences must be preferred in writing by a commanding officer and are tried before the police commissioner or one of his deputies. The accused member is permitted to be represented by counsel, and may take an appeal to the courts through certiorari or mandamus proceedings against the decision of the police commissioner. 2 1 Extensive powers of review over the disciplinary actions of the police administrative authorities are granted the civil service com- missions in the large cities of Ohio and New Jersey, and in Chicago, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Seattle, Portland (Ore.) and others. Under commission government in Omaha and Memphis a member of the police force who has been removed from office may appeal to the whole city commission. 2 The judicial appeal is employed in varying degrees of frequency in the cities of New York and Massachusetts, with the exception of 282 The Rank and File In Chicago minor charges are handled by the superin- tendent of police but serious offences involving dismissal are tried by the civil service commission. Judgment is rendered by the commission and the superintendent is obliged to enforce it. In Philadelphia under the new charter similar conditions obtain. The civil service com- mission is given full authority to " hear, investigate and determine " all charges against policemen which, if sub- stantiated, would constitute cause for discharge from the service. " The finding and decision of the commission . . . shall be certified to the appointing authority and shall be forthwith enforced by such authority." Even suspen- sion from duty by superior police officers is subject to the review of the commission, which in case of disapproval has the power " to restore pay to the employee so sus- pended." 1 In Cleveland disciplinary action involving removals by the director of public safety is subject to review by the municipal civil service commission which may " affirm, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the director of pub- lic safety and its judgment in the matter shall be final." 2 In some southern cities, notably Augusta, Athens, and Macon, Ga., civil service ideas are carried to such an ex- treme that the commission is the sole administrative head of the police department as regards all matters of disci- pline, while the chief of police is little more than a Boston: in Philadelphia, St. Louis, Chicago, St. Paul and Milwaukee. In some jurisdictions the courts have held that their review is limited to questions of law, while in others, notably in New York, the courts consider questions of fact as well as of law, and pass upon the adequacy both of the charges and the procedure. 1 Charter adopted June, 1919, Article XIX Sec. 18. 2 Cleveland charter Sec. no. 283 American Police Systems dummy, robbed of all power of initiative and leadership. In Boston the law provides for a trial board composed of three captains. The personnel of the board may be changed at the will of the commissioner who may also set aside its findings and order a re-hearing before the same or another board. The action of the commissioner is absolutely final, and in this respect Boston affords the most complete centralization of responsibility for dis- ciplinary action of any city in the United States. The Limitations of Civil Service. In its application to a police department civil service has serious limitations. In the endeavor to guard against abuse of authority, it frequently is carried to such ex- tremes that rigidity takes the place of flexibility in admin- istration, and initiative in effecting essential changes in personnel is crippled and destroyed. Too often, as we have already seen in connection with the chiefs of police, civil service is a bulwark for neglect and incompetence, and one of the prime causes of departmental disorganiza- tion. Too often does the attempt to protect the force against the capricious play of politics compromise the principle of responsible leadership, so that in trying to nullify the effects of incompetence and favoritism, we nullify capacity and intelligence too. The extensive powers of civil service commissions which we have cited above constitute in themselves ample evidence of this situation. The arrangements in Chicago and Philadelphia, for example, by which the members of the force are answerable to an independent body having no responsibility for their work and no direct concern 284 The Rank and File for the morale of the department, result inevitably in divided leadership and demoralization. Similar conse- quences' can be expected when the disciplinary acts of a police executive can be overturned on appeal to a civil service commission or other higher authority. The un- certainty of punishment, the incidental delay, and the loss of respect for the nominal police head on the part of his subordinates — such factors as these go far to out- weigh the value of the protection against the play of poli- tics which such a system affords. As a result of this divided responsibility between police executives and civil service commissions, there are in most large departments many men whose continuance in office is a menace to the force and to the community, but who cannot be dismissed because the proof of in- competence or dishonesty does not satisfy the require- ments of the civil service law. In city after city commissioners and chiefs will freely admit that certain of their officers or men are " crooked." " But what can we do ? " they say, " we can't prove it." One has only to sit with police trial boards or tribunals in cities like Phil- adelphia, Chicago or New York to realize that the forces contain not a few unfit, shiftless and dishonest employees, who would be summarily dismissed by an energetic ad- ministrator endowed with adequate authority. Certainly no business man would attempt to conduct a private busi- ness with such a personnel. He would be foredoomed to failure from the start. Consequently police administrators are forced to resort to such pitiful makeshifts as " transfers " in order to cir- cumvent the recognized dishonesty or incompetence of 285 American Police Systems their subordinates. A man is shifted to a precinct or post where he will have the smallest possible scope for mischief. Instead of devoting their energies to the posi- tive task of building up their forces with the best per- sonnel obtainable, our police heads devote themselves to the negative duty of guarding their departments from ship-wreck at the hands of subordinates through whom they are forced to carry on their work. Commissioner Woods of New York, as well as many of his predeces- sors, was constantly obliged to shift from one post to another men whose utter uselessness and at times dis- honesty were known to the whole force. In Philadelphia a former director of public safety told me that although during his incumbency he knew that most of his de- tectives were " crooked," he was able to get rid of but one — and that was a man caught red-handed while stealing five dollars from a fellow detective who lay asleep in the dormitory. Often such situations as these are due not only to an inability to secure the necessary legal proof of delinquency, but to the conflict which constantly arises between police executives and the higher appellate authorities. The rec- ords of police departments are full of cases where the officials have sought in vain to punish delinquent members against determined opposition from above. The follow- ing disciplinary record of a member of the force in Pitts- burg speaks for itself. " Drunkenness, fined $5. Under influence of liquor while on duty, second offense, discharged — subse- quently reinstated. Under the influence of liquor on 286 The Rank and File duty, third offense, fined $10. Neglect of duty, fourth offense, under the influence of liquor, discharged — subsequently reinstated. Drunk on duty, fifth offense, discharged — subsequently reinstated. Visiting saloon in uniform, sixth offense, discharged — subsequently reinstated. Drunkenness, seventh offense, fined $25. Eighth offense, fined $25 and transferred. Ninth of- fense, suspended for three months. Intoxication, tenth offense, suspended for thirty days. Drunkenness, eleventh offense, no record of punishment." * A record such as this can be duplicated in many cities throughout the country. In Chicago indeed, where the civil service commission has the power to reinstate, with- out the approval of the superintendent, men previously dismissed from service, conditions bordering on chaos have not infrequently resulted. Often this power is viciously abused and men are put back on the force after being dismissed for offenses which would have landed them in the penitentiary, had they been tried in a crim- inal court. 2 Thus two officers who accepted a bribe to drop a case against a chauffeur were dismissed in Febru- ary, 1914, and reinstated in May, 1914. Another officer who, on evidence furnished by the police themselves, was discharged for accepting a bribe from a prostitute, was reinstated a year later by a civil service commission newly appointed. Still another officer, discharged for operating a taxicab business which incidentally catered to 1 This record is among those given in " The City of Pittsburgh, Penn: Report on a Survey of the Department of Public Safety made by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research." (1913). 2 For full discussion of this point see Report of the City Council Committee on Crime, Chicago, March 1915, P- I74ff- 287 American Police ^Systems houses of prostitution, was reinstated by the commission and was a sergeant of police at the time of my visit. It must be recognized that bias and favoritism may influ- ence a politically appointed civil service commission quite as much as it may influence the head of a police depart- ment. Certainly under such a system as Chicago pos- sesses, the allocation of definite responsibility and the op- portunity for positive leadership are alike impossible. Judicial appeals against the disciplinary actions of police executives have led to situations almost equally demoral- izing. In the fourteen years from 1899 to 1913, 683 proceedings were brought in the courts of New York against the police commissioners of New York City to compel the reinstatement of men dismissed for cause. Reversal or modification of the commissioner's deter- mination resulted in 46 cases. Of the 46 cases, 26 were decided against the department because in the judgment of the court the commissioner had decided contrary to the weight of evidence ; nineteen were decided against the department because of what were called serious defects in procedure; one case was decided against the depart- ment on both grounds. 1 Two recent cases of the dismissal of captains of police in New York illustrate the point. After trial before the police commissioner, one captain was found guilty of accepting a bribe for the protection of a person charged with the illegal sale of liquor. The charge was sustained 1 See Report of New York Aldermanic Committee on, Police In- vestigation, 1912. Similarly, during the three years from 1914 to 1916 inclusive, 134 members were dismissed from the New York department. Of this number, 49 obtained writs of certiorai, and eight of these were reinstated. (From the records of the depart- ment.) 288 The Rank and File on the testimony of a patrolman who had been involved in the case. In the court's review, the question turned upon the veracity of the officer dismissed as against that of his accuser, and it was held that the evidence brought forward by this single accuser was insufficient to justify the finding of guilt. 1 Similarly in another case, dis- missal was ordered on the ground that the officer had been guilty of making an improper entry in the station house blotter, and that a belated explanation of the circumstance amounted to false testimony. The court gave weight to the belated explanation, and holding that it was reason- able to believe that the officer had made an honest mis- take, ordered his reinstatement. 2 The unrestricted right of appeal to the courts from the decision of a police administrator is a menace to the proper exercise of discipline. The police executive can- not manage his department according to his knowledge and experience. He is forced into a position which would ruin the management of any private business, and which no European police administrator would tolerate for a moment. But the shortcomings of civil service regulations in the police department are not confined to questions of discipline. In the matter of promotions their defects are almost equally obvious. " Civil service examinations," said Arthur Woods of New York, " even when conducted with intelligence and integrity, are not successful in put- ting at the top of the list the men who have done the best work. Promotion, therefore, which is so desirable to a policeman, is looked upon as something unconnected with 1 169 App. Div. 146. 2 171 App. Div. 684. 289 American Police Systems his success in performing his duty day by day." * One gathers this idea in every city where civil service is closely interwoven in the police department. The civil service standard gives the impression of being an outside stand- ard, ill-adapted to the needs or merits of the police force. It ranks symmetry above real efficiency. It exercises its judgments from long range, and such external factors as seniority and the ability to answer written questions fluently must necessarily play a determining part. Stephen O'Meara, who for many years served cred- itably as police commissioner of Boston, defined the sit- uation as follows : " No written examination can pos- sibly disclose the qualities and habits which are of vital importance in a police officer of rank and can be known only to his superiors. Among them are judgment, cool- ness, moral as well as physical courage, executive ability, capacity for the command of men, sobriety and other moral qualities, standing among his associates and in the community, powers of initiative, temper, integrity, en- ergy, courtesy." 2 Theodore Roosevelt in his Autobiog- 1 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, April, 1915. 2 From a private memorandum which he gave me. In a letter to the Civil Service Commission dated February 12, 1913, he made the following interesting statement : " Length of service as a patrolman beyond a reasonable minimum should have no influence in promoting before a fit man, as sergeant, a man who is less fit. When two men appear to be equally qualified the senior should have the preference again up to a reasonable age maximum, beyond which age becomes a disqualification. But neither this minimum of service nor maxi- mum of age can be made an official fixture without risking the loss from time to time of individual sergeants of especial merit. "For promotion from sergeant to lieutenant or lieutenant to captain all rules as to length of service in the force or in the old grade fail. An exceptionally able sergeant may well be made a lieutenant after a comparatively short service as sergeant, even if for no other reason than the necessity for bringing forward men who may later be made captains while still in their prime. ... In 290 The Rank and File raphy expressed himself in similar vein. " I absolutely- split off from the bulk of my professional Civil Service Reform friends when they advocated written competitive examinations for promotion. In the police department I found these examinations a serious handicap in the way of getting the best men promoted, and never in any office did I find that the written competitive promotion exam- ination did any good. The reason for a written competi- tive entrance examination is that it is impossible for the head of the office, or the candidate's prospective immediate superior, himself to know the average candidate or to test his ability. But when once in office the best way to test any man's ability is by long experience in seeing him actually at work. His promotion should depend upon the judgment formed of him by his superiors." 1 A Rational Civil Service. Civil service ideas have been pushed much too far. They have undermined the whole principle of responsible leadership. They have tied up great police forces like Chicago's and Philadelphia's almost beyond hope of re- organization. Indeed in these two cities and in not a few others there is little chance of sound conditions or effec- tive work in the police department until some strong executive, freed from civil service entanglements, is al- lowed to sweep out the undesirable personnel. It some- times seems doubtful whether these departments can be the promotion of a lieutenant to be a captain in command of a division with from 60 to 120 men under him and serving the varied interests of communities with populations running as high as 100,000, length of service in the case of officers who are conspicuously fit should have no weight whatever.". . . 1 Autobiography, p. 161. 391 American Police Systems completely resuscitated if they are not started afresh. The extremely able performance of the new police force in Boston is a promise of what could be obtained in Pitts- burgh and Chicago if the present civil service regulations could be at least temporarily loosened and faith imposed in an honest executive. A far better balance between civil service protection and effective leadership can be achieved than has been reached up to the present. In our endeavors to eliminate the spoils system we have swung too far toward rigidity, and a rational approach is needed to a compromise which will protect the police force from the politician without robbing the police executive of initiative and leadership. Is such a compromise possible? In the first place, it is doubtful whether any change is desirable in the present civil service practice as far as appointments to the force are concerned. Civil service provisions have done a great deal to raise the standards of eligibility and eliminate the unfit. Moreover they relieve the police administrator of a vast burden of detail. His whole concern is to secure raw material of a kind that can be turned into honest and intelligent policemen, and any plan or machinery which will produce this material upon demand adds to the effectiveness of his administra- tion. Arthur Woods of New York, who cannot be charged with being over-friendly to civil service, defines its application to the problem of police appointments as follows : " It is undoubtedly about as good a method as any other for picking out qualified candidates, for the men come from all walks of life, and seemingly from every profession, trade, and job there is. No compara- 292 The Rank and File tive record could be obtained, nor could the judgment of employers fairly be used to distinguish between one man and another, since there might be a thousand different em- ployers for a thousand applicants, and as many varying standards as employers." 1 If, therefore, civil service could be looked upon as ma- chinery for furnishing raw material, and if the police executive had the unchallenged right to reject, after pro- bation, any candidates who proved unsatisfactory, there would be little in this phase of activity which could in- terfere with the principle of responsible leadership. It might be added, in this connection, that the civil service commission should be free to select the best material available wherever it could be found, regardless of resi- dence or any other factor. The question of promotion, however, furnishes a far different problem, and it is doubtful whether civil service has any proper relation to it except to assist the police administrator, perhaps, in passing upon the qualifications of those whose work and record seem to guarantee their fitness for higher positions. Certainly the civil service cannot of itself determine these qualifications. No writ- ten examinations, set by an external body, can possibly distinguish between faithfulness and unfaithfulness, be- tween honesty and dishonesty, or between workers and shir-kers. The Boston plan of non-competitive examination for promotion, which was in effect for nearly 26 years prior to 1 91 9, seems to be best adapted to the difficulty. Under this system the police commissioner of Boston determined 1 Policeman and Public, New Haven, 1919, p. 107. 293 American Police Systems for himself which of his men were deserving of promo- tion. The names of these men were sent to the civil service commission which thereupon gave them a quali- fying, non-competitive examination to test their general capacity. In other words, the official responsible for the administration of the police department nominated men of long service in whose character and efficiency he had complete confidence, and the civil service commission subjected them to further tests, educational or practical, Avritten or oral, as they chose. The candidates who satis- fied the civil service commission were eligible for promo- tion, but the police commissioner was free to make his own choices from the list. Those candidates who did not satisfy the civil service' commission could not be promoted. 1 1 Commissioner O'Meara in a memorandum dated May ig, 1913, described the detail of the arrangement : " Under the present system the first step when a new list of sergeants is needed is to note the divisions which have been longest without a promotion to sergeant, for although the smaller and less active divisions cannot expect to receive as many promotions as those larger and busier, all divisions should be kept in mind. " The commissioner then decides upon the divisions where promo- tions should be made. The captains of these divisions are instructed to write with their own hands, neither informing nor consulting any other person, and to forward under seal to the Commissioner the names of the patrolmen under them whom they regard on the whole as most deserving and most likely to succeed as sergeants — each captain to send twice as many names as it was intended should go upon the list. " The Commissioner then examines his own memoranda of names — men whose work had attracted attention or much favorable ex- pression. After weeks of inquiry, examination of records, without interference from any source, the Commissioner decides upon the men whom he will nominate to the civil service commission for examination." At the time of my examination of the Boston police force the opinion both within and without the department seemed to be that promotions were absolutely divorced from politics or considerations of favoritism. 294 The Rank and File This scheme of making promotions succeeded the old competitive system which in the seven or eight years of its operation had proved disadvantageous to the whole department. " It worked disastrously," the chief inspec- tor told me. In 191 3 the civil service commission pro- posed the re-establishment of the competitive system for promotion in order to bring the practice of the entire state to a standardized form. The police commissioner successfully opposed the move, and in a series of frank letters to the civil service commission he developed the principle of his position. " Nothing that your commis- sion could do," he said, " would work greater injury than the suggested change from the method of promotion which has produced such good results for so many years. Indeed the proposal involves by far the greatest danger that has threatened this department from any source in my seven years of service as commissioner. 1 . . . The police of every large city in the United States, except Boston, are suffering a public disgrace which would have been spared them if the official personality of their offi- cers of rank had been the first consideration of those who appointed them." 2 The non-competitive system of promotions is the method in vogue in London. There the civil service com- mission enters the situation only upon the invitation of 1 Letters of Commissioner O'Meara to the state civil service com- mission dated February 12, 1913, May 19, 1913, and May 27, 1913. 2 Under Commissioner Curtis, in 1919, the plan of competitive examinations conducted by the civil service commission was re- established for promotion to the ranks of sergeant and lieutenant of the uniformed force. The non-competitive plan still applies to the rank of captain and to the ranks of detective sergeant and in- spector in the detective service. 295 American Police Systems the police commissioner to assist the department in weed- ing out men whose lack of education makes them unfit for promotion, and the examination which it gives is merely to test the general educational capacity of the applicant. A second examination in the elements of po- lice duty, both oral and written, is given by a board of police officials, and those who emerge from these two tests are eligible to promotion, although the commissioner, of course, makes his own choices from the list. 1 Some such system as this is necessary if our police de- partments are to be saved from lifelessness and dry rot. With promotions the result of real excellence in police work under the watchful eye of superiors, much of the present inertia would disappear. The question of discipline is the final factor in regard to which current civil service procedure needs radical modification. There is no chance for progressive im- provement in a police department if the hands of the responsible executive are tied in his dealings with his men. Here again we must turn to Boston for an example of a rational system. As we have seen, complaints against members of the force are heard by a special trial board of three captains appointed by the police commissioner. 2 The commissioner, however, is always 1 For a fuller discussion of the system of promotions in London see European Police Systems, Chapter VII. Some years ago in Boston a somewhat similar arrangement was in force and a private competitive examination was given by the police commissioner' to those applicants who had passed the non-competitive examination of the civil service commission. Past record and general ability counted as points. 2 As a matter of custom only captains who have never had the deliquent member under their commands at any time are chosen to sit as members of the trial board. 296 The Rank and File supreme. He can at any time change the personnel of the trial board, order a new trial, or set aside the recommendations of the board in regard to the punish- ment to be imposed. His word is final and from it there is no appeal to a higher civil authority. 1 On no other basis can responsibility be definitized and a police force be rid of useless or dishonest employees. To divide responsibility with a civil service commission, a mayor, a court, or any other authority, is to sow the seed of demoralization and to make real success impos- sible for any administrator, no matter how able. I am conscious that these views will meet with opposi- tion from those who dread the incursion of the spoils system into our police departments and are honestly frightened at the vicious forces in our municipal gov- ernments which civil service barriers have served, par- tially at least, to keep in check. It must be admitted that this alarm and anxiety are not without basis. One has only to look at Kansas City or Indianapolis to see how the unrestrained play of these forces contributes to the demoralization of a police department. But we shall never solve the police problem in America until we give honest and effective leadership an opportunity to show what it can do. Sometime or other we have got to make a beginning of trusting our public officials. Checks and balances to curb and minimize possible abuses of power have gotten us nowhere. Complex systems to prevent 1 In the history of the department there has been but one appeal to the court from decisions of the police commissioner This appeal failed and the court stated that it would not review questions of fact in cases of this kind, but only the regularity of the procedure. (Welch vs. O'Meara, 195 Mass., 541.) 297 American Police Systems bias and unfairness have brought nothing but confusion. It is time to take off a few of the yokes that have made public administration an impossible task, and put a new emphasis on positive qualities. The problem before us is not how to build up a structure that will circumvent the dishonest and incompetent official, but having found a competent and honest official, to surround him with the conditions in which he can make himself effective. The Police School. Entering upon new tasks for the first time, police re- cruits are raw material to be molded and shaped into efficient police officers. How is this to be accomplished? Two answers to this question are given by Ameri- can municipalities: one group of cities, constituting, it must be confessed, a small proportion of the total, holds that there is need for thorough-going instruction by classes with a prescribed curriculum of studies relat- ing to police methods and procedure. In this group are such cities as New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Newark, Louisville and Berkeley, California. Another group of cities, by far the larger number, holds to the view of the old time police offi- cial, that text-books, classes of instruction and written tests are of little worth in training a recruit for his task. In these cities, therefore, men are turned out on the streets in uniform with no previous preparation, beyond perhaps a little preliminary practice in patrol in company with an older officer. Occasionally this so-called instruc- tion goes hand in hand with physical drill. Of the police training schools there are of course many 298 The Rank and File types, ranging from the well-organized institution operat- ing on a full time basis to the part-time " school " which actually amounts to little more than a periodic assembly of policemen to hear a lecture on some phase of police work. In many cities, particularly those under 100,000 population, the school has only a temporary existence, as substantial periods of time elapse during which no new appointments to the force are made. Probably the most ambitious police school at the present time is in Berkeley, California. Here the class, which meets one hour a day, takes three years to complete the courses included in the curriculum. 1 The New York school involves two months of full time instruction; in Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Detroit and Newark, the training period is four weeks ; in Cleveland it is three. In Cincinnati and Louis- ville only part of the day is devoted to school work, the remainder being spent in the performance of regular duty. The New York police training school was the first to be established as an independent unit of the police de- partment. In point of size, scope, method and equipment it easily takes first rank among the police schools of the United States, and it has served as a model to similar in- 1 The pourses given for the first year are : physics, chemistry, biology, physiology and anatomy; criminology; anthropology and heredity; toxicology. For the second year courses are given in criminal psychology; psychiatry ; theoretical and applied criminology; police organization and administration; police practice and pro- cedure. The third year's courses include microbiology and pari- sitology ; micro-analysis ; public health ; first aid ; elementary and criminal law. For a fuller description of the Berkeley school see article by August Vollmer and Albert Schneider in The Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. VII, No. 6. 299 American Police Systems stitutions established in other municipalities. For that reason it is permissible to follow its operation in some detail. Because of the varied use of the term " school " it is difficult to determine when the New York institution was first inaugurated. If a single instructor, a number of students and a certain amount of time devoted to instruc- tion constitute a school, then the New York department has been equipped with a school for half a century. In earlier times, however, the instruction was of the most elementary kind. Police recruits were taught for a period of thirty days by a sergeant specially detailed for that purpose, and in addition the students were sent out on patrol during certain hours of the day or night. No particular attention was paid to this preparatory work; it was thought sufficient to acquaint the recruit with the rules and regulations of the department and to give him a rudimentary knowledge of the laws and ordinances of the city. Formations, drills and exercises also formed a part of this early training. The development of these educational activities in New York has been irregular and uncertain, dependent upon the interest and enthusiasm of the changing police com- missioners. At times the teaching corps has been en- larged and the instruction broadened, only to be reduced by succeeding commissioners. The elementary prepara- tory instruction in laws, ordinances and rules has for most part remained fairly constant, and has never been dis- carded altogether, although considerable fluctuation has occurred in the amount and variety of physical drill. A general reconstruction of the school occurred in 19 14 300 The Rank and File at the beginning of the administration of Commissioner Woods. The title was changed from " School of Re- cruits " to " The Police Training School,'' indicating that thereafter it would not only offer instruction for the new recruit, but would include specialized courses for older members of the service, with the idea particularly of as- sisting them in preparation for promotional examination. The scope of the school was broadened in every way, necessitating the lengthening of the term for recruits from six weeks to three months. 1 New courses were added to the curriculum, with the consequent enlargement of the teaching staff, and a unit organization was established for the supervision and control of the school's operation. As far as the school for recruits is concerned, the methods instituted by Commissioner Woods remain prac- tically unaltered. The school day begins at 9 :oo a. m. and ends at 5 : 00 p, m. for the first five days of the week, and from 9 : 00 to 12 : 00 on Saturdays. The day is di- vided into periods according to the following schedule : the first period from 9 : 00 to 9 : 30, is spent at the regular detective bureau " lineup "of criminals arrested on the preceding day and night for serious crimes ; 9 : 30 to 1 1 : 00, classroom instruction ; 1 1 : 00 to 12: 00, drills and physical instruction; 12 : 00 to 1 : 00, luncheon hour; 1 : 00 to 3 : 00, classroom instruction ; 3 : 00 to 4 : 00, physical ; 4: 00 to 5 : 00, classroom. The curriculum of classroom instruction includes 22 subjects taken up in the following order: deportment, patrol, observation, crime classifka- 1 In 1917 owing to the war emergency this period was reduced to two months and the time required for the training of recruits has not since been altered. 301 American Police Systems tion, arrests, traffic, animals, fires and accidents, ordi- nances and sanitary code, disorderly conduct, felonies and misdemeanors, assaults and weapons, homicide, larceny and robbery, burglary, children, court procedure, public morals, report making, election law, malicious michief, Sabbath law. Each recruit is supplied with the rules and regulations of the department and a copy of a text-book. 1 In the course of several years of experience the instructors have evolved a practical sort of pedagogy by which they com- bine the lecture method with actual experiments in the classroom. Questions involving legal rights and limi- tations as well as police technique are illustrated by hypo- thetical cases which are worked out by the instructors in the class, a recruit generally acting as a policeman while the instructor poses as a criminal or citizen with whom the policeman has to deal. Every conceivable circum- stance involving police action is illustrated and discussed, and the recruit is enabled to visualize the actual practical situations with which he will be called upon to deal. Ex- tensive use is made of charts and blackboard illustrations, and every effort is made to rivet the attention of the student by vivid example and dramatic incident. This daily course, of instruction is supplemented by a schedule of special talks and lectures given by other mem- bers of the department of various ranks and grades, chosen because of some achievement or proficiency in a particular line of work. Thus lectures are given on the care and purchase of uniforms, on discipline, first aid 1 The text-book used is Police Practice and Procedure by Inspector Cornelius Cahalane of the New York Department. 302 The Rank and File to the injured, finger prints, " trailing," handling of beg- gars, statistical purposes and uses of police reports and the preparation of cases for the magistrates' courts. In addition to the daily class work, a certain amount of home work is assigned for each night, to be submitted in writing on the following day. This work is reviewed by the instructors and briefly discussed at the lecture period. Bi-weekly written tests are held and the papers in these examinations are graded and made a matter of record. The field work, embracing practical demonstrations of methods of patrol, observation and reporting, is a very important part of the recruit's training. Each recruit is assigned to " student patrol " from six p. m. to ten p. m. every Saturday, Sunday and holiday throughout the two months' period. He reports to a different precinct on each assignment, and thus visits during his training course about eighteen or twenty precincts. The patrol is done in the company of an experienced patrolman who is regu- larly attached to the precinct. At the end of such a student tour of patrol, the recruit is required to prepare a written report setting forth the details of what he has seen and learned. Two hours each day are devoted to physical instruc- tion and drills and they serve as a pleasant break in the monotony of classroom work. The methods of training in use in West Point have been introduced in the police school with excellent results. The men are daily put through regulation calisthenic exercises and are taught to keep their bodies in the best possible condition. Self- defense is taught in its several branches, including the 3°3 American Police Systems Japanese system of jiu jitsu. Exercises are given in ladder-scaling, and in carrying persons in rescue work. Every policeman must be able to swim and be able to use the approved methods of life-saving. Swimming is taught in the municipal pools, and in the harbor during the warm season. At the end of the two months' course, the class must be able to execute drills and formations perfectly, and each member must be capable of taking command in the direction of drill work. Prior to 1917, during Commissioner Woods' adminis- tration, the scope of the school, as we have seen, was broadened to include training for superior officers. In- deed, Commissioner Woods' idea was to make the police department a university in which all ranks would con- stantly be "freshening up" — to use his expression — . in police technique. With that end in view, inspectors and captains were given courses of lectures by criminolo- gists, jurists, identification experts, and other specialists in fields relating to police work. So-called " review courses," extending over a period of two weeks, were compulsory for lieutenants, sergeants, " near "-lieu- tenants and " near "-sergeants — the latter being mem- bers of grades that had passed promotional examinations and were on the lists for appointment. The purpose of these courses was to keep the officers from becoming " rusty," lest the recruits, fresh from school, be better versed in special subjects than their superiors. Lectures were also given in these courses on such special phases of police activity as discipline, the preparation of records and the giving of bail. In all this work the men gave full time to their studies, as experience showed that best 304 The Rank and File results were obtained when policemen undergoing these review tests were excused from all other duty. In addition, classes were organized to train regular patrolmen who were applicants for special policy duty. Thus a class was conducted for members desiring to enter the motorcycle squad, and the time was spent between mechanical shop work and road work. Another class was given two weeks' training for mounted traffic duty, while still another was instructed for the same period for foot traffic duty. The men were rated according to proficiency shown in the school and assignment to these special details was made on the basis of a list prepared by the school officers. 1 We have considered at some length the details of the New York school curriculum because it represents the best training system in police work which any American city of size has produced. Surely the experience not only of New York but of other large cities like London and Paris amply demonstrates the fact that a properly equipped and administered school is perhaps the most indispensable single feature of the police force of a mod- ern community. 2 For it must be repeated that the pri- mary problem in police administration is the problem of personnel. The establishment of reporting systems and the building up of organization schemes can not wisely be disregarded or slighted, for they are important and have a definite place in regulating the daily work of the force. But they are aids and means, not ends. The 1 All these advanced and special schools were dropped by Commis- sioner Woods' successor. 2 For a full description of European police schools see European Police Systems, Chapter VI. 305 American Police Systems heart of police work is the contact of the individual police- man with the citizen. There are very few times when the department as a whole or even any large part of it proceeds directly to do police work. Nearly all police activity is initiated in the field away from headquarters and station houses. The action that is first taken by the policeman of lower rank, operating independently, must, in each case, remain the foundation of the department's action. In the final analysis, police business is but the aggregate of personal enterprise, and the quality of a de- partment's work depends on the observation, knowledge, discretion, courage and judgment of the men, acting as individuals, who compose the various units or branches of the organization. The operation of mere organization machinery may achieve a high degree of perfection, but if the members of the force, acting in their individual capacities, go about their tasks without intelligence, tact or public spirit, the " system " counts for little and the whole administration is a failure. Only as the training of the policeman is deliberate and thorough, with emphasis upon the social implications and human aspects of his task, can real success in police work be achieved. Patrol Service. The policeman's work is built largely around the pa- trol system. Indeed the patrol post has become through years of custom the basic unit of police organization, and no discussion of police work would be complete which did not make especial mention of it. No one can examine the methods of patrol employed throughout the country without being struck by the '306 The Rank and File amount of waste which they involve, due largely to the rigid adherence of police authorities to old conventional ideas. In many cities, as we have already pointed out, 1 the same methods of patrol that were in use 30 or 40 years ago have been continued to the present time. 2 It is not at all uncommon to find the boundaries of posts remaining unaltered for years, notwithstanding the fact that the whole character of the district has changed — often with business, warehouse and factory buildings com- pletely taking the place of former residences. Moreover there are many districts in which the night problem, from a police point of view, is entirely different from the day problem, yet the posts in such districts are often policed in exactly the same way during all hours of the day and night. There are several respects in which the whole police problem has been so altered as to lessen the need of foot- patrol or at least to reduce its effectiveness. Public dis- order, such as street fighting, disturbance by intoxicated persons and general rowdiness, while not unknown, does not occur with the same frequency as in earlier days, and even when occurring it is restricted to comparatively small areas where the population is congested. More- over the extensive use of automobiles has rendered foot- patrol a handicapped method of defense, if it has not actually made it obsolete in many situations. If the criminal is equipped with an automobile a patrolman on * See ante, Chap. V. 2 One exception can be noted. Formerly it was the practice to send patrolmen out in pairs. This practice has been almost uni- versally abandoned and a patrolman is now given a post or beat for which he alone is responsible during his tour of duty. . 307 American Police Systems foot has little chance to catch him. Formerly when a patrolman encountered a stranger prowling about by day or night, he watched his actions and followed him if necessary, and if the suspected person was equipped with horse and buggy it was easy to obtain an identifying de- scription. Now that the automobile has made travel by night much more common, identification is difficult and the occupants of vehicles cannot easily be observed. Another factor which is rapidly undermining the use- fulness of foot-patrol is the increasing area of residential districts in large cities. The old type of patrol cannot adequately meet this situation except at a cost which would be prohibitive. To be effective, the foot-patrolman must have a post small enough to enable him to cover it quickly and continuously. In the absence of enough pa- trolmen to man this kind of post, policemen in outlying districts are given beats frequently more than a half mile in length and width. The results are largely negative, as the chance of being at the right place at the right time is the element which determines a patrolman's effective- ness on a large post. Even if cost were not a factor neces- sary to be considered and patrolmen could be employed to any number, this type of patrol is ill adapted to new condi- tions. In the outlying residential districts, made up of detached houses, very little crime or disorder is committed by persons residing there. Most of the crimes take the form of attacks against property, such as robbery, burg- lary and larceny, and are perpetrated by non-residents who plan their crimes in advance and await their opportunity to act. It is obvious that the uniformed patrolman on 308 The Rank and File beat is not fitted to cope with this type of crime. He is simply a signal and a warning, and the criminal waits until the patrolman has passed out of sight and hearing before beginning operations. Police technique in the average city has not kept pace with modern developments, and hundreds of thousands of dollars are annually paid out for services which are largely wasted. Only as mechanical equipment is intro- duced in outlying districts as a substitute for the old foot patrol system can the police department keep abreast of its work. It is encouraging, therefore, to note the use in a few cities of motor vehicles for patrol work, and of other devices such as patrol booths and flashlight signal systems. Creditable beginnings in the use of these me- chanical aids have been made notably in Detroit, Los Angeles, Kansas City, New York and Berkeley, Cali- fornia. New York has had a thorough test of the booth system and has proved its adaptability to the protection of large residential districts. A single booth was established as an experiment by the Detroit department in 19 18; its value was so clearly demonstrated that thirteen additional booths were erected shortly thereafter. 1 The patrol booth is in effect a miniature police station. Its chief advantage lies in the fact that a policeman in a given territory is made immediately available to citizens and headquarters alike. A proper operation of the booth system requires that not less than two men, equipped with motorcycle or automobile, be attached to a booth at the same time. One 1 For an account of the Detroit patrol booth system, see the Annual Report of the Detroit Police Department, 1918. 309 American Police Systems man remains at the booth while the other circulates through the district, returning periodically to the booth. In case the booth man is absent on an emergency call, the other remains at the booth until his return. By this ar- rangement a district is given the benefit of patrol — in point of fact the motorcycle or automobile man gives better patrol service than the foot-patrolman — and at the same time a policeman can be had at once in case of need. Citizens have a far greater feeling of security in knowing that they can get a policeman immediately than in know- ing that a foot-patrolman is somewhere in the district and that there is a chance that he is near enough to hear a call for help. The use of automobiles for patrolling the streets is also gaining in favor and will doubtless soon supersede the present foot-patrol method as far as the outlying sections of our cities are concerned. Kansas City, Mo., and Berkeley, Cal., were the first cities to give the automobile a thorough-going trial. Because of a reduction in the number of policemen in the Kansas City department it be- came necessary to use automobiles so as to enable the small force to cover the whole city. The innovation proved profitable from the beginning. In Berkeley every patrolman in the department is equipped with a small Ford car. Chief Vollmer in speak- ing of the value of automobiles in patrol service made the following report : " Patrolmen thus equipped (with au- tomobiles) travel over one thousand miles of streets per month ; respond promptly to emergency calls ; are in good physical condition when they arrive at the site of trouble; are protected during inclement weather, and able to per- 310 The Rank and File form their duties in a more satisfactory manner." 1 The excellent results that have been achieved by the Berkeley department through the close supervision of the training and work of individual policemen and through the use of motor equipment in patrol are reflected in the statistics of operations covering the seven-year period from 1908 to 191 5 inclusive. In this period the population increased from 37,000 to 64,000. The total membership of the force was increased in this time by but five men. Re- ports and complaints of crime or other conditions requir- ing the attention of the police increased only 14% as against a y2>f° increase in population. The value of property reported stolen was $20,789.47 in 1908 and $14,- 892.91 in 1915, a decrease of 28%. 2 These figures indi- cate the value of corrective and preventive work done by the department in increasing the effectiveness of each member of the organization through improved methods of operation. In April, of 1918 the Detroit department placed over 150 Ford automobiles on the streets to patrol beats for- merly covered by foot-patrolmen. Each machine carries two policemen, one in plain clothes and one in uniform. During the first month of the operation of these machines, felony complaints were reduced from 654 reported in the previous month to 528 ; in the second month there was a further decrease of 65 felony complaints over the prev- ious month. " The innovation of the automobile as a preventive (of crime) has proven a great success," said a From the Annual Report of the Chief of Police, Berkeley, Cal., 1915- 2 Ibid. 311 American Police Systems an official of the Detroit department, " for two men can now do the work that formerly took four or five, and are able to do any kind of work with more success in resi- dential districts than officers on foot." r Similarly other cities, such as St. Louis, Seattle, Los Angeles and Louisville, are making small beginnings in the use of automobiles for patrolling beats. The hesi- tation of many departments in taking up the automobile for patrol purposes is due to the expense involved in the initial outlay and maintenance charges. On the other hand, if two men equipped with an automobile can do the work of five, or perhaps eight men on foot, a re- duction in the patrol force is possible, and the saving in salaries may more than offset the cost of providing the necessary motor equipment. The modern development of patrol service is in the direction of limiting foot-patrol to congested districts where large numbers of people are passing in the streets, where accidents are likely to occur and where public dis- turbances may develop with little warning. Uniformed men patrolling in non-congested districts and in business districts which are closed during the hours of the night may be supplanted for the most part by junior detectives, plain clothes operatives, and men equipped with automo- biles. By the adoption of the booth system and the in- stallation of signal devices, the certainty of police assist- ance will furnish a greater degree of security than can be had by relying on the accidental presence of a patrolman circulating on foot over a large post. 1 Inspector Kinney in the Annual Report of the Detroit Police Department, 1918. 312 The Rank and File The Rigidity of the Police Department. There is a widely prevailing disposition on the part of police officials to view the force as a mechanism created to operate automatically. More thought is given to the perfection of the organization as a machine of smoothly working parts and to the employment of systematic re- porting schemes than to the primary problem of adjusting individual persons to their tasks. This emphasis upon the mechanical side of organization is accentuated by hard and fast rules and regulations which prescribe, often in great detail, the duties of each member of the department according to his rank and assignment. The idea is to put each member of the force in a place provided by x a " paper " scheme of organization, and then to find means of checking his routine work through supervising officers. Sergeants of police give immediate direction to patrol- men and in turn report to lieutenants or captains; these report to officers of higher rank, and so matters come ultimately to the chief officer. The aim of this hierar- chial arrangement seems to be to provide a set of superior officers who will see to it that members of the next lower rank are performing their duties as required by regula- tions. This mechanical system is deemed a safeguard against the too frequent changes in the office of the administra- tive head of the department. " Commissioners may come and commissioners may go but the ' system ' goes on for- ever." 1 This expression is often heard in explanation of the unchanging character of police organization and 1 The term system is not here used in any sinister sense. 313 American Police Systems of police procedure based on precedent. The implication is that the department performs the great bulk of its routine work automatically and that the machine can and does operate without the aid of administrative super- vision. It would be foolish, of course, to underestimate the value of orderly machinery. But it can be over-emphas- sized to the point of rigidity, so that the organization ceases to be a vital, living thing and becomes merely a mechanical device. As far as the police department is concerned, it is undoubtedly true that this over-emphasis is the result of the old analogy between an army and a police force and the attempt to put this analogy into active operation. But the analogy is largely fallacious. An army does its work through groups of its units — di- visions, brigades, regiments and companies — in all of which the private is little more than a cog. Initiative and imagination not only have no place in his career, but, for the sake of discipline, their exhibition is dis- couraged. The work of a police force, however, de- pends, as we have seen, upon the capacity of the indi- vidual policeman. On his beat or at his post he must do his duty alone, usually dealing with emergencies'by his own unaided action. However difficult or novel the cir- cumstances which confront him, he must decide instantly on his own responsibility whether or not they call for his interference. Only occasionally is there an opportunity for concerted action in connection with his brother offi- cers. For the most part he must depend upon his own resourcefulness and originality, characteristics which in army training remain largely undeveloped. 314 The Rank and File Consequently, the same insistence upon system and procedure which makes an army successful often becomes the cause of defeat in a police force. The organization stands between the police and their objective. The ob- jective is not clearly conceived and the machinery becomes an end in itself. Thus police needs are generally esti- mated in terms of quotas of men prescribed for the va- rious divisions of the department, and policemen are thought of as being more or less standardized units to fill precinct, district or squad quotas. One set of ten men, accordingly, is supposed to be the equivalent of any other set of ten men for ordinary police work. It is the number of standardized units that is chiefly reckoned with, and not the special abilities of individual officers in their contact with crime conditions or the difficulties and perplexities of citizens on the street. Perhaps the chief objection to this over-emphasis on the mechanical side of organization lies in the resulting inability of police departments to mobilize their forces speedily and effectively. They are unable to make sud- den shifts of personnel in attacking pressing problems or to modify the methods of their procedure as necessity may dictate. This immobility is due partly to a fear of dis- rupting the orderly processes of the machine and partly to a lack of appreciation of the value of having a -flexible force. Mobilization of police forces is of two kinds : one con- sists in assembling units of men at designated places at a given time, and the other consists in concentrating the work of several different units of the organization on a single problem irrespective of normal function. 315' American Police Systems The value of the physical mobilization of men is uni- versally recognized, although the provisions for effecting it vary considerably from city to city. In some communi- ties squads of men are kept in station houses on reserve duty. They are subject to call and immediate assign- ment, and by the use of automobiles where districts are large, they can be despatched without delay to a scene of disorder or accident. In other cities no regular reserve system exists, but in cases of emergency men are sum- moned from- patrol posts or from special office assign- ments. The tendency at present is to reduce the num- ber of reserve men who remain idle except during emer- gency service, and to rely more and more on gong or bell signals in day time and flashlights at night for summon- ing men who are on patrol. In the largest cities, how- ever, the congestion of population and the possibility of disturbance make it necessary to maintain some kind of a reserve force at a few, at least, of the station houses. The other type of mobilization to which we referred actually amounts to a temporary readjustment of the de- partment's program by giving special attention to condi- tions calling for immediate correction. It is in this re- spect that the weakness of police departments in general is to be observed. Hard and fast organization lines pre- vent any considerable concentration of the energies of various divisions on a common problem. Police forces cannot readily be shifted from point to point, or rapidly mobilized to meet some new development of crime, vice, or delinquincy; nor can the whole department be bent to aid in the correction of an abnormal situation. To be sure efforts are often made to meet bad conditions by de- 316 The Rank and File tailing members of the force as special investigators apart from their regular routine. For example, when burg- laries or robberies are committed with unusual frequency in a certain residential district, detectives are often sent to operate there on general assignment. Similarly, when- ever complaints of prostitution or gambling begin to multiply, the common practice is to detail, temporarily, an extra number of men from the uniformed force to do duty in plain clothes under the special direction of an officer in charge of the suppression of vice. This practice is a step in the right direction but it is only a step. It could be extended throughout the whole organization. Any unusual crime conditions could be treated in the same way. Juvenile delinquencies, gam- bling, swindling schemes of various sorts, mendicancy, vagrancy, rowdyism, violations of sanitary, regulations, violations of motor vehicle laws — all of these as they developed could be met with especial vigor by the concen- trated effort of all divisions or by temporary enlargement of the special divisions. In Berkeley, Cal., where more than usual intelligence is given to police problems, it is customary to set the whole machinery of the department to work in cleaning up spe- cial crime conditions as they become evident. If vag- rancy or minor trespassing is the immediate problem, uni- formed patrolmen, detectives, plain clothes men and su- perior officers devote especial attention to stamping it out. As quickly as conditions have been remedied the men re- turn to their customary duties, and no organization changes are required. In most cities, however, a temporary aggravation of ^7 American Police Systems some phase of the police problem is held to require an increase in the number of men specializing in that phase of work. Thus if violations of motor vehicle laws be- come unusually numerous and cannot be handled by the traffic squad, no other branch of the service is called tem- porarily to the assignment. Either more members are added to the permanent traffic squad or else the offenses continue to be inadequately handled. The chief fault in the present situation is that the police department is not readily sensitive to changes in its prob- lem. It is only when extreme conditions of crime or delinquency appear and after much damage has been done that the police organization is in any way altered to meet the situation. Even then the department as a whole is not immeditaely responsive to the circumstances nor are its parts concentrated to correct the abnormal situation. The final test of the effectiveness of a police organization is first, its success in acquiring accurate and complete in- formation as to crime conditions in the community, and second, its ability, through the generalship of its officers, to proceed against such conditions with the least delay and with all available forces. The problem of increasing or developing either permanently or temporarily the special branches best fitted for handling emergency situations is one that requires constant study and experiment. Police Unions. The strike of the Boston police and similar difficulties in London, Liverpool and other English cities, have re- sulted in a widely accepted belief that in the public inter- est the right to strike cannot be granted to police bodies, 3i8 The Rank and File nor can they be allowed to affiliate with other labor unions. The policeman, like the soldier, occupies a unique position in the community. He represents the state in its power to compel obedience. As art agent of the government he exercises its ultimate force. In this capacity he is respon- sible solely to the legal representatives of the community, and control cannot be permitted to drift into the hands of any other men. If the armed agency of the state for compelling obedience assumes to determine for itself the conditions under which it will obey the state, then the principle of ordered majority rule is destroyed, and in its place is militarism. The same objections hold in regard to the affiliation of the police with organized labor. The police force is a public instrument. Its allegiance is to the state. It is not the tool of any class or subdivision of the community. If the right to exercise the ultimate force of the state is surrendered to any special interest, if the police depart- ment loses its neutrally minded character and becomes representative of a particular fraction of the community, the state as a public instrument ceases to exist. Indeed such a course would immediately provoke a reaction. Other classes in the community, having lost confidence in the police, would proceed to organize militia, constabu- laries and vigilance committees of their own, and the re- sult would be chaos. The subordination of armed force to the legal state, and the principle that the legal state represents the common interest, without regard to class, lie at the basis of social progress. If this point of view is accepted, if in the public inter- est the right to strike and to affiliate with organized labor 3 X 9 American Police Systems is denied the police, the legal representatives of the com- munity are under peculiar obligations not only to deal sympathetically and generously with the genuine griev- ances of the police, but by continual study and observation to forestall such grievances before they can gain a foot- hold. This is a point which seems to have escaped the attention of many commentators. Five years before the London police strike of 1918, it was palpable to an out- sider that the " Bobby " could not live decently on such wages as he was then receiving. 1 And yet in the ensuing period, through an era of rising prices, his endeavors — tactless and ill-conceived, perhaps — to have his griev- ances considered by his superiors, met with scant courtesy and meagre result. 2 Similarly in many American cities — and among them is Boston — it has been apparent for years that the police were underpaid. They have ap- pealed to their superiors, they have appeared before finance committees and councils, they have taken their claims to the public through the press — too often with no result, sometimes, indeed, meeting with nothing but brusqueness and abuse. There are large cities in the United States today whose policemen are paid less ithan one hundred dollars a month, from which they must pur- chase their uniforms and equipment. There are many other cities where the police work seven days a week or where their hours of employment are inexcusably long. There are cities where the conditions surrounding the life of the men in station houses are a disgrace to the 1 See European Police Systems, pp. 242-244. 2 For discussion, see interesting series of articles (anonymous) appearing in the London Times, April 1st, 2nd and 3rd, 1919. 320 The Rank and File community that tolerates them. If the police may not strike to improve their situation, and if they may not affiliate with organized labor, then the community that employs them owes them a responsibility which up to the present time, certainly, it has not fulfilled. It cannot strip them of the weapons of defense which other workers have, and at the same time ignore their just claims be- cause they are pressed merely by argument. 1 1 Very interesting legislation has recently been passed by the British Parliament as a result of the police strikes in England in the summer of 1919. A Police Federation was created, consisting of all mem- bers of the police forces, both county and municipal, in England and Wales. The members of each separate police force are consti- tuted into three Branch Boards, one for constables, one for sergeants and one for inspectors. Branch Boards may submit their griev- ances or other representations to the chief of police, and also to the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, who is charged with the responsibility for police arrangements in England and Wales. The members of each Board annually elect a delegate or delegates to a Central Conference, made up of representatives elected by the members of the Branch Boards of corresponding rank of all police forces of England and Wales. Thus there are three Central Con- ferences — one for constables, one for sergeants and one for inspec- tors, and their annual meetings are held in November. The mem- bers of each Conference elect a Central Committee of six members, ?nd the three Central Committees, or any two of them, may by agreement, sit together at a Joint Committee. The Central Com- mittee, either separately or as a Joint Committee, may submit rep- resentations in writing to the Secretary of State, and in matters of importance the Secretary of State will give any Committee or a deputation from the Committee a personal hearing. All regulations as regards the government, mutual aid, pay, allowances, pensions, clothing, expenses, and conditions of service of the members of the police forces of England and Wales are submitted for the considera- tion of the Joint Committee before promulgation, and the Secretary of State is bound to consider any representations made by this Committee before putting the regulations into effect. (For a fuller description of the operation of this legislation, see 9 & 10 Geo. 5, Chap. 46, and the schedule attached thereto.) 321 American Police Systems The Police and Industrial Disturbance. We have said that the police force is a public instru- ment for the protection of life and property and the pres- ervation of order, that its allegiance is to all the people, and that it is not the tool of any class or subdivision of the community. Upon this principle we base the objec- tion to the affiliation of the police with organized labor. No one can intensively study the work of the police in American cities, however, without realizing that this same principle is frequently violated in respect to other class interests than those of labor unionism. The police are often used on behalf of employers as against employees in circumstances which do not justify their interference at all. This has been especially true in the handling of strikes. Lawful picketing has been broken up, the peace- ful meetings of strikers have been brutally dispersed, their publicity has been suppressed, and infractions of ordi- nances which would have gone unnoticed had the violators been engaged in another cause, have been ruthlessly pun- ished. Sometimes, too, arrests have been made on charges whose baselessness the police confidentially admit. " We lock them up for disorderly conduct," a chief of police told me when I asked him about his policy in regard to strikes and strikers. " Obstructing the streets " is another elastic charge often used on such occasions. Sometimes the arbitrary conduct of the police passes be- lief. Newspapers favoring the strikers' cause have been confiscated and printing establishments closed on the sup- position that they would " incite to riot." Meetings of workingmen have been prohibited or broken up on the 322 The Rank and File theory that the men were planning a strike, and specific individuals have been denied the right to speak for the reason that they were " labor organizers." " I have this strike broken and I mean to keep it broken," a director of public safety told me, as if breaking strikes were one of the regular functions of the police. I asked the chief of police of a large industrial city on what legal ground he denied the privilege of assembly to the striking op- erators of an extensive plant. " We assume that their meeting-halls are disorderly houses," he replied. " Det- rimental to the public welfare " is the easy generalization with which the rights of citizens are often over-ridden by the police, apparently on the theory that the interests of employers are necessarily identical with public interests. The industrial cities of northern New Jersey, of Penn- sylvania, and of Illinois, furnish ample substantiation of this indictment. The situation in this respect is apt to be at its worst when the mayor or commissioner of public safety is himself an officer of a large industrial plant, or when the chief of police comes under the influence of a commercial association, some of whose members, perhaps, are parties to the conflict. Under such circumstances, strikers have frequently been hounded and punished, often with physi- cal violence, in contravention of all law' and tradition and the principles of a free government. In 1917 Commissioner Woods of New York issued an order to his force in connection with the handling of strikes which has attracted wide attention and may well serve as a model. It reads in part as fol- lows: 323 American Police Systems " The duties of the Police Department in connection with strikes and industrial disturbances are, in the last analysis, as on all other occasions, to protect Life and Property, and to maintain the Public Peace. " Unless otherwise advised by the Courts or Commanding Officers, it is to be assumed that the purposes of a peaceful strike are legal. " Since such affairs are often accompanied by much bit- terness and hard feeling on both sides, it is imperative that the Law be administered with the utmost impartiality. " In so far as this Department is concerned, one or more employees may refuse to work, and one or more employers may refuse to hire any particular person, or persons, for such reasons as may seem to them best, or for no reason at all. The employees who have gone on strike may gather in front of one or any number of places where they were formerly employed and address, within certain limits, such arguments as they may desire to their fellow workmen who are still employed, urging them to go on strike. Similar arguments may be addressed to those who they may have reason to believe are considering taking their former posi- tions of employment either permanently or temporarily as strike-breakers. The strikers or their sympathizers may, also, advise prospective customers of the fact that they are on strike and the nature of their grievances — be they real or supposed. The words used, in all such cases, however, must not be of such a nature as to incite to violence or offend public decency. " While both sides to such a controversy have the right of assembly, no violence or even physical contact between opposing factions shall be permitted. " The right of the strikers to conduct peaceful picketing has been upheld by the Courts, but the numbers so employed 324 The Rank and File must not be so great as to interfere with the free passage of vehicles or pedestrians, nor by their very number to con- stitute an intimidation. The number of pickets that may be lawfully permitted depends upon the circumstances of the case, such as the width of the street and the sidewalk, the number of employees who are working, the number and size of the exits to the building, the size of the building, and the number of neutral persons using the sidewalk or thorough- fare in question. " Members of the police Department have no proper of- ficial interest in the merits of the controversy, and their ac- tion is not to be affected thereby." 1 It must be repeated that the police owe their allegiance to all the people and not to any class or subdivision of the community. To use them in 'behalf of any special in- terest, whether that interest be a labor union, a street- railroad company, or an industrial plant, is to destroy the principle of ordered majority rule upon which democracies depend. 2 1 Circular Order No. 19, June 9, 1917. 2 For further discussion see Woods' Policeman and Public, p. 67 ff., and Police Functions in Labor Disputes, an address by Arthur Woods before the City Club of New York, printed in the New York Evening Post, Nov. 18, 1916. '325 CHAPTER IX THE DETECTIVE FORCE The detective force. — The chief of the detective bureau. — How he is selected. — The personnel of the detective bureau. — Methods of selection. — Civil service versus administrative assignment. — The training of detectives. — The organization of the detective bureau. — Centralization versus decentralization. — Too frequent changes in organization plans. — Illustrations. — Lack of co-ordination in de- tective work. — Lack of business methods in detective work. — Lack of supervision in detective work. — Detective record systems. — Criminal identification. — Finger-prints versus Bertillon system. — Need of national bureau for identification of persons and property. We have now to consider the detective bureau — a branch of the police service as essential to the preserva- tion of public security as the uniformed division itself. Operating for the most part after crimes have been com- mitted, its duty is to apprehend those offenders who have escaped arrest at the hands of the uniformed force. To that end it requires a degree of talent and specialization in its personnel distinct from the qualifications of the uniformed men. How this personnel is commanded, chosen and trained, and how its work is controlled and guided are matters discussed in this chapter. The Chief of the Detective Force. Heads of detective bureaus are chosen in most cases from among the officers of the uniformed forces. In some cities the selection is made by the administrative 326 The Detective Force head of the department ; in a few, by the chief of police subject to confirmation by his superior. Almost invaria- bly, therefore, the appointment is merely an assignment and is subject to change at the discretion of the head of the department. In a few cities, the head of the detective bureau is occasionally appointed from civil life without previous service in the police department. While on its face this arrangement might seem to provide some advantage in the latitude which it gives in selection, in actual practice, due obviously to politics and favoritism, it has yielded poor results. In East St. Louis a few years ago a man who had been running a hat-cleaning establishment was selected to head the detective force. Recently in Pitts- burgh a politician without previous experience in police work was chosen as chief of the bureau of detectives. On the whole better results are observable when the chief of detectives is recruited from the ranks of the detective bureau. The same evils as regards rapid shifts in personnel which we discussed in connection with the chiefs of police are to be found in relation to the heads of detective bureaus. Due to changes in political control, the heads of detective forces often follow one another in rapid succession. In San Francisco, in the last fourteen years, there have been eight different officers commanding the detective force. In Chicago, at the time of my visit, there had been four heads of the detective bureau in as many years. Obviously no consistent development of detective bureaus can be maintained under such circum- stances. Only as a responsible official is given time to 327 American Police Systems shape and mature his policies and work over a term of years can substantial results be looked for. Selection of Personnel. Members of the detective bureau may be chosen from the uniformed force or from outside the police depart- ment altogether. The former course is the rule in most cities of the United States. In only a very few cities, notably Kansas City, Louisville, Pittsburgh, Memphis and Birmingham, are detectives ever chosen from civil life without previous service as uniformed patrolmen. Pittsburgh is the only large civil service city in which detectives may be recruited directly from civil pursuits. Where detectives are chosen from the personnel of the police force the selection may be made either by civil service examination or by direct assignment at the hands of the administrative head of the department. The former practice is followed in Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis, 1 Los Angeles, St. Paul, Dayton, Portland, (Ore.), and a few other cities. The latter method of choosing detectives — whereby the administrative head of the police designates certain members of the uniformed force to serve in this grade — is followed in New York, Cleve- land, Detroit, Boston, Washington, San Francisco, New Orleans and many other cities. The same advantages and disadvantages of civil service as a means of selection and promotion which we noted in connection with the uniformed force are observable in - 1 In St. Louis the examination for detective — title is detective ser- geant — is the same as the examination to the grade of uniformed sergeant of police. 328 The Detective Force relation to the detective force. Indeed, the short-com- ings of civil service are, if possible, even more pronounced in its application to the detective bureau than to the uni- formed rank. For no written examination can fairly test the peculiar qualifications of a successful detective, such .as ability to remember faces, developed habits of observa- tion, aptness in securing evidence from witnesses, and above all, a facility in obtaining the pertinent and essential facts of a given situation. In those cities in which civil service requirements are not in force, many of the most successful detectives, who achieve the best results in iden- tifying and arresting pickpockets, confidence men and other specialists in crime, are without any ability to pass a written examination. The services of these men would be lost to a city in which promotion to the grade of detective was determined by civil service examination. The result of the attempt to apply civil service tests is seen in such cities as Philadelphia and Chicago, where men are selected as detectives often without any of the special qualifications required for the task. In both these cities the heads of the detective bureau, at the time of my visit, were emphatic in denouncing the quality of the personnel through whom they were forced to carry on their work. " Men are appointed detectives who might make good clerks or school teachers/' said the head of the detective bureau of Philadelphia, " but they do not know how to catch crooks." An even greater difficulty is presented by reason of the fact that under civil service regulations a man who obtains the permanent rank of detective is practically " fixed " for the rest of his career, regardless of the 329 American Police Systems results which he may achieve in the prosecution of his work. He is " frozen into his job " — to use the police expression. He may be totally without positive qualifica- tions; he may not possess the enthusiasm for the task so essential in a good detective ; he may be clearly outranked in ability by a score of men in the department who are not. on the detective force ; nevertheless, his position as detect- ive is fixed for the present and future because of his success in answering a series of written questions years before. Only as dishonesty is conclusively proved against him is there any practical prospect of removing him. A former chief of the Chicago department told me that when he assumed his duties in that position he knew that the detective bureau was honey-combed with inefficiency and corruption, but that during his career as chief he did not remove or demote a single detective because he was unable to obtain the necessary proof. " The old gang was still in the saddle when I left," he said. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the lack of civil service standards in the selection of detectives often opens up the entire force to politics of a mean and petty sort. Inasmuch as assignment to detective work carries with it a certain measure of personal freedom as well as the prestige which goes with a higher quality of work and additional compensation, it is much sought after. In San Francisco, at the time of my visit, the entire detective bureau was shot through with politics, and assignments to this grade were the inevitable result of " pull " and fav- oritism. While the rest of the force in this city had been partly freed from politics, these sinister influences had not yet been driven from the detective bureau. Similarly 33° The Detective Force in Atlanta appointments to the detective bureau have all too often been the result of political affiliations recog- nized by the board of police commissioners. In Pitts- burg, where detectives may be chosen from civil life, the results are far from satisfactory. " They are not detect- ives, they are politicians," a high ranking office'r of the uniformed force told the investigator. On the whole, however, in spite of the unhealthy con- ditions which often surround the appointment of detect- ives in departments where no civil service standards are applied in their selection, it cannot be denied that better results are obtained when the administrative head of the force is free to appoint the best men or to demote those incumbents in the detective rank who have not measured up to their tasks. Certainly, in large cities like New York, Boston, Cleveland and Detroit this method has brought a measurable degree of satisfaction. It centers upon the head of the force a responsibility which cannot be evaded. It provides a constant stimulus to the mem- bers of the detective force; and while men are undoubt- edly often demoted for no worthy motive, the fear that such demotion may follow poor work tends to keep the entire bureau constantly on the alert. Training of Detectives. No standardized method obtains in American cities for training detectives. In many departments the men are assigned to their new duties as if no training or special aptitude were necessary at all. In some cities, however, notably Boston, Seattle, Newark and Detroit, an effort is made to establish a period of apprenticeship in which men 331 American Police Systems are assigned to plainclothes duty for the investigation of vice and minor complaints either in their own precincts or as members of special squads operating from head- quarters. In no cities, with the exception of Berkeley, (Cal.), are any efforts made to provide formal specialized instruction as a method of training the personnel of the detective force. The experiment begun under Commis- sioner Woods in New York, of courses of instructions for detectives, was never followed in other cities and has been abandoned even in New York. In a few cities de- tectives are sometimes included in the training courses given for the members of the uniformed force, but they receive no instruction peculiarly applicable to detective ' work. This is in marked contrast with the system followed in Continental Europe, where detective schools and courses are often maintained as part of the machinery of the police department. In Vienna, for example, while the detective school is not allowed to interrupt the regular duties of the men, it involves two hours a day in lectures and recitations, and covers a period of six months. Sim- ilarly in Paris the detectives are obliged each year to attend a series of lectures in connection with their work. In England, on the other hand, the training of detectives takes the form of apprenticeship in plainclothes duty, handling such special problems as betting, street-begging and prostitution. Those who show aptitude and intelli- gence in this line of work are promoted to the detective force. It is doubtful whether in American police departments at the present time any formal school instruction as a 332 The Detective Force method of training detectives is practicable. Most detective forces are too small to justify elaborate arrange- ments, and such courses of instruction as are given in Vienna in physical science, photography, criminology and other subjects would have little applicability to the average American detective bureau in its present state of develop- ment. On the other hand, in large cities which contain colleges or universities it would easily be possible to arrange special courses for detectives and other police officers in subjects adapted to their day-to-day work. Such an arrangement has been effected between the Berk- eley police department and the University of California, and has been proposed for the Chicago force in conjunc- tion with Northwestern University. 1 Organization of the Detective Bureau. There are two prevailing types of internal organization of detective bureaus in American cities : the centralized bureau, operated at headquarters, and the decentralized bureau working largely from precincts or other sub-units. Of these, the decentralized bureau is the more common type in the larger cities where the uniformed force is dis- tributed geographically by precincts or districts. This plan of organization is in effect in such cities as Chicago, Detroit, Boston, Buffalo, San Francisco and others. In each of these cities, however, there is a small central division at headquarters, together with special groups, such as pickpocket, pawn-shop and automobile squads, 1 During Commissioner Woods' regime in New York an interest- ing experiment was made of giving courses in criminal law at Columbia University to such members of the police department as applied. 333 American Police Systems which work from headquarters and operate over jthe whole city; but the bulk of general detective work is done by detectives attached to precincts generally under the com- mand of uniformed officers, who also have charge of the operations of the uniformed forces in those precincts. The precinct detectives are assigned to work on specific complaints arising in their respective territories. In important cases the central division of the detective bureau is called upon to assist or perhaps to take complete charge of the investigation. The completely centralized bureau is found in such cities as Birmingham, Indianapolis, Newark, Baltimore and Denver. In these cities all detectives are assigned to the headquarters' office and the control of their work is centered in the hands of one man who serves as a com- manding officer. Under this plan the work of general criminal investigation and of special squads, is carried on from a single central office. There has been much discussion regarding the relative merits of centralization and decentralization, and no general conclusion can be reached as to the superiority of either of these plans. Aside from considerations of actual detective operations, the geographical size of a city, the number of detectives employed, and the existing or- ganization of the uniformed force are factors which ma- terially influence the question. Those who favor the decentralized bureau point out that detectives should work in comparatively small districts, where they may become thoroughly familiar with neighborhood conditions and with the people residing there. It is claimed also that there are definite advantages to be derived from having 334 The Detective Force the detectives stationed/n precincts with uniformed men, for the reason that this close association makes possible a greater degree of cooperation between the two branches of the police service. Finally it is contended that quicker action can be given on complaints when the men are al- ready distributed throughout the city ready to undertake work in the small areas to which they are assigned. The advocates of centralization, on the other hand, contend that there is need for specialization in criminal investigations which cannot be effected when detectives are distributed throughout precinct units, and that better control of operations results when all the detectitves are included in one unit of organization and under the more immediate direction of the chief detective officer. It is claimed also that uniform standards of detective work can be applied throughout the whole city under the cen- tralized bureau, whereas with decentralization there may be as many ways of conducting criminal investigations as there are precinct commanders. The claims for both plans are largely met in the modi- fied form of centralized bureau which was in effect in New York from 19 14 to 19 18 and is in effect at the pres- ent time in St. Louis. The detective bureau under such a plan consists of a detective headquarters' division and detective branch offices. In New York there were nifle such detective offices, as compared with more than eighty precinct stations; in St. Louis there are six detective branches and thirteen police districts. This arrangement makes possible the concentration of a sufficient number of detectives at the central office to permit of specialization, and at the same time it places men in localities small 335 American Police Systems enough to enable them to become acquainted with local conditions. Even though detectives are distributed over the city, they are subject to the direct control of the central office, and the head of the detective bureau can view in the large the crime problem of the entire city, and can make immediate disposition of his men to meet changing conditions. Under both the centralized and decentralized system, small special squads are maintained at headquarters under the direct supervision of the commanding officer of the detective bureau. These squads devote their attention to the detection and apprehension of pickpockets, bad check passers, automobile thieves and other specialists in crime. In the New York detective bureau the following special squads are organized at headquarters: homicide, safe and loft, pickpocket, automobile theft, gangster, nar- cotic, bomb, truck and wagon, and industrial squad. In Detroit there are Italian, automobile recovery, homicide and pawnshop squads. Similar groupings are to be found in most of the large cities of the country. Detective bureaus often suffer from too frequent alter- ations in the plan of organization. Each new head has his own ideas and changes are of frequent occurrence. Occasionally the centralized and decentralized plans are alternated to suit the notions of each successive incumbent without giving either plan a chance to prove itself. In New York, for example, during the fourteen-year period from 1906 to 1920, the detective bureau was reorganized four times. Prior to 1906 the bureau was centralized at police headquarters. In addition, detectives and plain- clothes men were operating in the precincts but were 336 The Detective Force not under the control of the detective bureau organiza- tion. During General Bingham's incumbency as police commissioner the bureau was decentralized, being divided into sixteen districts to correspond with the inspection districts of the uniformed force organization. Each of the sixteen divisions was under the control of a detective division commander, and the uniformed officers in charge of inspection districts had nothing to do with detective work. In 19 12 Commissioner Waldo abolished the sys- tem of detective divisions and re-established the precinct as the unit of detective work, under the control and im- mediate direction, however, of detective officers. The next change came under Commissioner Woods in 19 14, when the bureau was reorganized with a headquarters' staff and with nine branch offices operating in geograph- ical districts which did not coincide with any scheme of districting used by the uniformed force. The next reor- ganization came under Commissioner Enright in 19 18 when the precinct was again made the unit of detective bureau organization. St. Louis has also made rapid changes from one plan to another. Prior to 1912 plainclothes men or detectives were assigned to patrol districts under uniformed cap- tains of police. In 1912 the city was divided into six detective districts, under the command of detective officers, and the captains of police no longer had precinct detectives. After approximately a year and a half of this regime the detective branch districts were abolished and the precinct plan re-established. In the early part of 19 19 the system of detective branches was again adopted. Arbitrary changes of this kind, generally 337 American Police Systems following upon shifts in political control, make con- structive development of the detective bureau next to impossible. Lack of Co-ordination in Detective Work. In a number of cities some confusion exists in the mat- ter of the relation of the detective bureau to the uni- formed force in handling complaints of crime. This is true notably in Boston, San Francisco and Pittsburgh. In these cities no definite rules of procedure have been established to determine which branch of the service shall be responsible for taking charge of an investigation of particular complaints of crime. Sometimes both branches conduct an investigation of the same complaint. In Bos- ton members of the uniformed force are permitted to complete an investigation begun by them even though the detective bureau may be better equipped to do the work. This practice has been allowed to continue apparently in deference to the professional pride of the uniformed men. A situation directly opposed to the Boston practice pre- vails in San Francisco, where members of the detective bureau are assigned to cases in which arrests di felony charges have been made by members of the uniformed force, the assumption being that a uniformed man is not as well fitted to present a felony case in court as is a detective. In Pittsburgh both the central office detectives and precinct plainclothes men do detective work, but the head of the detective force has no control over the work done by precinct men. Consequently, both plainclothes men from precincts and detectives from headquarters may work on the same case, and there is no rule to determine 338 The Detective Force which group shall supersede the other if any conflict of authority arises. A dual investigation sometimes, indeed, a competitive investigation is the result. This confu- sion of authority and responsibility exists in a lesser degree in a large number of cities in which plainclothes men attached to precincts are assigned to investigate minor complaints of crime, especially where the borderline between minor and major complaints is not clearly drawn. Under such arrangements friction and jealousy between the two major branches of service are bound to occur. Obviously, the department's rules of procedure should establish a clear-cut division of authority and responsibil- ity, and should indicate the method of cooperation be- tween the two branches in the solution of crimes. From the time the complaint is received until the case is pre- sented in court no ambiguity should be allowed to exist as to the precise part which the representatives of either branch will play. Lack of Business Methods in Detective Bureaus. One of the outstanding facts disclosed by an investiga- tion of detective bureaus in America is the amazing lack of ordinary business system in the prosecution of the work. The head of a detective force deals with crimes which come to him generally in the shape of specific com- plaints. It would seem, therefore, that some knowledge of the relation between complaints and arrests — that is, between crimes known to the police and crimes " cleaned up " — was absolutely indispensable to adequate super- vision. In only a few police departments, however, are 339 American Police Systems records maintained upon which this knowledge can be based. Indeed in only a few cases in the course of the investigation were officers encountered who could under- stand why such knowledge was necessary. In most de- partments the records of complaints have no relation to the records of arrests, with the result that it is impossible for the head of the department to establish any standard for measuring the effectiveness of his effort. In city after city the item of arrests, regardless of com- plaints or crimes known to the police, is the only informa- tion at hand. The annual reports of most chiefs of police in the United States solemnly set forth the number of arrests during the preceding year, as if this number, large or small as it may be, were something of a badge of distinction — a certificate that time had not been wasted. In Kansas City the chief of police boasted that in the current year his force had made 15,000 more arrests than during the previous year. It seems unnecessary to point out that the bare figure of arrests, even when classified according to crimes, is utterly meaningless. As we have already seen, 1 it may be interpreted in any one of half a dozen ways. A large figure may mean an excess in crime, or it may mean over-zeal on the part of the police force in making unnecessary arrests. Judging from the activities of the police in many American cities, this latter interpretation is too often true. Similarly, a small num- ber of arrests may mean a low crime rate, or it may be interpreted in terms of negligent police work. To com- pare the number of arrests in 1919 with the number of arrests in 1920 has no significance whatever and is utterly * See ante, p. 250. 340 The Detective Force misleading. It is only as arrests for crime in a given period are balanced against the crimes known to the police in that period that we have any basis for measuring the effectiveness of the force. We have said that in most departments the records of complaints have no relation to the records of arrests. As a matter of fact in many police departments in the United States no records of complaints are kept at all, or if kept they are not compiled in such fashion as to serve the pur- poses of supervision and control. It is literally true that in many cities such as Philadelphia, Seattle, San Fran- cisco, New Orleans, Atlanta and Kansas City, neither the chief of police nor the head of the detective bureau has any idea of the aggregate number of burglaries, rob- beries, larcenies, or any other crime, occurring within his territory from week to week or month to month. Nor are there any records in these departments upon the basis of which such information can be obtained without labor- ious research. In these cities, therefore, it is impossible for the head of the force to know whether crime is increasing or decreasing over a given period, or what success his department is achieving in solving particular classes of crime. In short he has no precise knowledge of the volume of the business he is handling or what results are being obtained. Even in the few cities where an analysis of crime con- dition is currently made — notably in St. Louis, Chicago and Cleveland — it is seldom that the chief of police or the head of the detective bureau makes use of it in the day to day direction of his department. This, is due in most cases to lack of administrative training. The use 341 American Police Systems of such instruments of management as statistics of work, daily reports, and other mechanical aids is not understood, and perfunctory attention to routine takes the place of informed and skillful leadership. Lack of Supervision in Detective Work. The lack of ordinary business system in detective bureaus is further shown in the failure to control the work of the individual operatives. An officer of the New York department has described in the following words the condition that existed in his force, some years ago, before an adequate system of supervision was installed: " When a ' squeal ' came in over ^the telephone the lieu- tenant at the desk wrote it down on a piece of paper and handed it to a detective. ' Here Bill,' he'd say, ' look that up.' Bill took the paper, put it in his pocket, and when the paper wore out the case was closed." i This condition is still true in many police departments in the United States. Indeed, in not a few of them not even " a piece of paper " is used to assign a case, but the matter is given to the detective orally without any subse- quent check or follow-up. Even in many large police departments there is no method of recording currently for purposes of supervision the cases that are being handled by each detective, nor is there any way by which the head of the detective force can keep track of cases pending. The determination of these essential facts, under gener- ally existing arrangements, would involve laborious search through cumbersome documents and journals, even if they could be determined at all. I asked the head 1 Quoted in Woods' Crime Prevention, p. 17. 342 The Detective Force of the Philadelphia bureau, 1 for example, how, in the absence of a " tickler " or other record system, he kept track of the particular cases which each detective was handling. He replied that if he wanted the information he could get it from the journals in which complaints of crime are entered in the order in which they are made. When it was pointed out that this would involve a great deal of work and long delay, he replied that he kept the cases in his head. The fact, that there are thousands of cases pending and that they often run over a period of years shows the absurdity of the answer. Similarly in San Francisco, Seattle, Newark, Buffalo, New Orleans and a dozen other cities of size and import- ance the heads of the detective bureaus have no systematic method for keeping track of or following up the work of their men. Even where reports from the detectives are required they are too often perfunctory and meaningless. In Chicago, for example, at the time of my visit, cases were " closed " as far as the detective bureau was con- cerned, as soon as the detectives filed their first reports. These reports could allege in general terms that progress was being made or that no clues had been discovered. Regardless of what information they gave, they were filed away with the original complaints, and that was the end of the matter. Thereafter, if the dectectives chose to report further, their records were simply added to the original file. " We reopen the case if the complainant hollers," I was frankly told by one of the officers. Alto- gether the system was as shiftless as could be devised, and the wonder was not that thousands of cases remained 1 Since retired. 343 American Police Systems unsolved, but that any criminals at all were ever arrested. It is because of this complete lack of ordinary business system that complaints of crime can be " lost " or " canned " — to use the popular police word. In San Francisco, for example, in 191 5, the records of the coroner's office showed that during the year there were 54 cases of murder, six cases of manslaughter and eleven cases of justifiable homicide. The records in the police department, however, showed but 39 cases of murder, four of manslaughter and seven of justifiable homicide. In other words, the police department had no record of twenty-one homicides occurring during the year. The fifteen cases of murder, of which the police had no record, were all found recorded in the detective bureau as felonious assaults. 1 A similar study in New York, based on comparisons between the records of the police department, the coroner's offices and the district attorneys' offices, brought to light the fact that of the 323 murder and manslaughter cases reported during the year 1913, the police department had records of but 261 ; while in 1914, of 292 such cases the department had record of only 209. Of the 323 cases in 191 3, twenty were carried in the records of the detective bureau under such classifications as " felonious assaults " and " under investigation," and 42 cases were not recorded at all. Of the 292 cases in 1914, 42 were carried as " felonious assaults " or " under investigation," and in 41 cases there was no record. 2 1 See Survey Report of the Government of the City and County of San Francisco, prepared by the Bureau of Municipal Research, New York, 1916, p. 214. 2 See A report of the study of Homicide Records in the New ■ 344 / The Detective Force In 1 9 19 in Chicago, an investigation of the discrep- ancies between crimes reported to precinct stations and the total number of crimes reported to the central depart- ment by the police precincts disclosed the fact that many crimes of violence never got further than the blotters of the local police stations. It was found for instance, that the captain of a certain precinct had carelessly or inten- tionally failed to report to the central office 104 out of 141 crimes reported in that precinct for the month; that is, out of 141 crimes of violence known to the police, a record of only 37 found its way into the central office of the department. In another precinct the investigation disclosed that 40 crimes of violence occurring during a given period were not reported to the central office. When the captain of this precinct was asked for an explan- ation, he gave as his reason for not reporting these crimes the fact that the money stolen could not be identified and that the masked burglars could not be recognized. Appar- York Police Department, 1913-1914, made by the Bureau of Munic- ipal Research, March, 1915'. This report contains the following ad- ditional paragraph on the homicides in 1914: " Of the 292 cases occurring in the year 1914, the records of which were examined, there were 21 cases in which the manner of killing was not disclosed; 94 cases in which no reference to the possible motive for the crime was made; 27 cases in which the age of the persons arrested in connection with the murder was not recorded on the detective bureau's records; 150 cases in which the age or probable age of the persons murdered was not indicated; 38 cases in which the nationality or birthplace of the persons arrested in con- nection with murder cases did not appear; 165 cases in which the nationality of the persons murdered was not entered upon the rec- ords; 143 cases in which there was no description to indicate the place the crime occurred, such as in saloons, in homes, upon streets, etc. ; 49 cases in which persons accused were discharged without any reference as to the possible cause for discharge, such as insuffi- cient evidence, wrong persons arrested, etc., etc. ; 27 cases in which the accused was discharged from custody, of which the records failed to show the authority discharging the prisoners." 345 American Police Systems ently, in his opinion, therefore, no crimes had been com- mitted I 1 A better explanation of the Chicago situation would probably be found in the desire — shared by many pre- cinct heads and even chiefs of police — to return as good a crime record as possible for their particular districts. A reduction of crime is readily accomplished by suppress- ing the record of complaints — " canning the squeals," to use the vivid phraseology o f the police. That this prac- tice is by no means confined to Chicago is evidenced not only by confidential admissions of police officers in vari- ous cities but by the startling reductions in crime statistics which often accompany the installation of a new police administration. 2 Obviously, nothing is gained by a good record system if dishonestly used. Detective Record Systems. It is of course impossible in a book of this kind to discuss in detail the various report and record systems necessary in a well-equipped detective bureau. In several cities, notably St. Louis, Detroit and New York, a num- ber of admirable records are maintained which can be studied with profit, although they vary in thoroughness and practicability with changing administrations. Cer- tainly no record system is complete which does not afford the head of the detective bureau constant control over the work of his men by giving him at a glance a list of the cases which each is handling. To the absence of this 1 See the various reports of the Chicago Crime Commission, par- ticularly the account of this Commission's work in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. XI, No. i. 2 See ante, p. 15, note 2. 346 The Detective Force informatidn and control may be ascribed much of the careless hit-or-miss work which characterizes many of our detective bureaus today. Nor can a record system be called successful which fails to show the cases pending at a given moment, classified according to crimes, so that the head of the bureau, as well as the chief of police, has constantly before him the statistical measure of his accom- plishment or failure. Without this information there is no way of ascertaining the weak spots in the department's work; consequently the force cannot be shifted to meet new problems or mobilized to attack an overwhelming outbreak of crime in a particular precinct. As far as crime records are concerned, it is a safe gener- alization that every scrap of information worthy of being recorded on a precinct police blotter is worthy of perman- ent classification at police headquarters, whether it be a complaint, an arrest, a fire, a lost child or a stray animal. Sooner or later all this information is useful to the police in the prosecution of their work. Upon its careful tab- ulation a great deal of their success depends. Classifica- tions of missing persons, or stolen property, and of all sorts of crimes and criminals are increasingly indispens- able to police forces as social relationships become more complex, and the problem of delinquency more difficult to handle. In the development of criminal files and indexes America has lagged far behind Europe. No city in the United States has the physical equipment in this respect possessed by Dresden, for example, or Vienna or Stuttgart. We have none of the carefully elaborated mechanical aids in the way of criminal registers which one finds in most of the important cities in Continental 347 American Police Systems Europe. All of Europe's intricate appliances for the apprehension of criminals such as the use of chemical and physical analyses, the extensive application of photog- raphy, the infinite number of devices for establishing identification, are largely missing here. At least they are not continuously and systematically employed. 1 In most cities, indeed, they are not known, and a rule-of- thumb method takes the place of scientific attention to details. 2 It may be that we cannot hope for any particular devel- opment in this field until our police departments are better stabilized and the principle of continuity of administration is firmly established. If that is the case we cannot now expect to obtain the same success in the detection of crim- inals with which the police forces of Europe are so often rewarded. Criminal Identification. The importance of an accurate method of identifying criminals which will defeat the invention of an alias, or any other disguise, is well understood. Two systems of identification have been widely accepted in Europe and the United States — the finger-print or dactyloscopic v method and the measurement or Bertillon method. Around the merits of these two principles of identifica- tion a long and heated controversy has raged, with the result that in Europe the Bertillon system is fast being discarded in favor of finger-prints. Only in France today 1 Berkeley, Cal., has made probably the greatest advance in this direction. 2 For a discussion of European methods of crime detection, see European Police Systems, Chap. IX. 348 The Detective Force has the Bertillon method a foothold. American police departments have been slow to understand the significance of the controversy. Uncertain as to the validity of the arguments, and unwilling to lose the advantage of either method, most cities at the cost of convenience and at great expense have adopted both. To maintain two elaborate files, classified on a different basis, when one will ade- quately answer the purpose, is of course to load the department with a cumbersome routine which, particu- larly in a large city, with its many prisoners to examine, is practically impossible to carry out. The time is bound to come in America, therefore — and in some cities a beginning has already been made 1 — when one of these systems will have to be discarded. In point of simplicity and accuracy the finger-print method is so far superior to the Bertillon method that there is no question as to its fitness to survive. These facts seem to be unknown in many of the smaller police departments in the United States. At the very time that European cities were discarding their Ber- tillon cabinets as superfluous, these departments were busy installing them. I visited a number of cities that were inaugurating Bertillon systems for the first time, under the impression that they represented the latest word in the identification of criminals. One cannot escape the im- pression in many cities, particularly in the south and middle west, that both finger-prints and Bertillon meas- urements are looked upon by police officials as something 1 Not a few American cities are willing now to discard the Ber- tillon system except for the fear that it would cut them off from their exchanges with other cities that are reluctant to take the step. 349 American Police Systems of a charm or talisman rather than as scientific methods of identification. Certainly in more than one department that I visited, where not a single officer understood the principles of finger-print classification or knew how to hold a pair of calipers, the boast was made that the force had two identification systems ! 1 America has fallen behind, too, in its failure to develop an adequate national system of criminal identification. Some method is necessary, either of centralization or of distribution, by which the identification records of one city can be available for all. For under modern condi- tions of life the traveling criminal has come to constitute the chief factor in the police problem. The same man will commit burglaries in Detroit, Chicago and Cleve- land; the same pickpocket will operate in San Francisco and Salt Lake City. For lack of certain finger-prints filed in St. Louis, Kansas City may allow a well-known counterfeiter to go free. No single department by itself can cope successfully with the traveling criminal. The problem calls for wide cooperation under national aus- pices. Already a beginning has been made in a number of states; in California, for example, chiefs of police, sheriffs and marshals must file with the Central State Bureau of Identification, copies of all finger-prints which they take. 2 Even more promising is the fact that fifteen western cities, including Seattle, Portland, Tacoma, Van- couver, San Francisco and Oakland, are systematically 1 For a fuller discussion of the systems of identification see The Passing of Bertillon System of Identification by the writer in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. .VI, p. 363. 2 Statutes of Cal., 1917, Chap. 723. For a descrpition of the Cali- fornia State Bureau of Criminal Identification see the National Police Journal, October, 1919. 350 The Detective Force exchanging finger-prints and photographs, and there are groups of cities all over the country where similar cooper- ative arrangements exist. The National Bureau of Criminal Identification, created in Washington by the . International Association of Chiefs of Police is an- other step in the right direction; but it is largely al private enterprise, inadequately financed, and representing only a portion of the police departments of the country. 1 What is needed is an official bureau, amply supported financially and located perhaps in the Attorney General's office, to which, on standardized forms, would be sent all finger-prints taken by any city or county authority in the United States. The United States is practically the last country to inaugurate a system of this kind. A national bureau of identification is maintained for Great Britain at Scotland Yard, London; for France, at the Service de I'identite judiciaire under the Ministry of the Interior in Paris ; for Italy, at the Ministry of the Interior in Rome; for Bel- gium, at police headquarters in Brussels, and for Canada, in the office of the chief of the Canadian police in Ottawa. In all of these countries information as regards the iden- tity of a particular criminal is immediately available, and the police departments are bound together in a common warfare against the profession of crime. A similar cen- tralization of information is necessary in Washington or at least under national official auspices, if our police authorities are to keep abreast of their task. 1 Another agency acting as a clearing house is the Federal prison at Leavenworth, Kansas. The scope of this agency is similarly limited. 351 American Police Systems Other National Indexes Needed. A central bureau of identification, supported and con- trolled by the government, should provide for the identi- fication not only of criminals but of property as well. Property stolen as well as property recovered should be' indexed and classified at some national clearing house on the basis of a system similar to the excellent index devices now employed by the police department of almost every large city. These local systems, however, are useful only in identifying property which is recovered in the same city in which the report of loss has been made. A central bureau would make possible the identification of property reported stolen in one city and recovered in another. Indeed a central bureau can do much more. The estab- lishment of a national modus operandi system which would record and classify information regarding the dis- tinguishing characteristics in the commission of major crimes, would lead to the identification of criminals who cover a wide area in the course of their operations. 1 In addition to maintaining and developing these several branches of identification, a central bureau of this kind could also serve as a clearing house for information of every sort which would be useful to the police depart- ments of all cities. Such a combined identification and information bureau could aid in bringing about standard- ized practices in the keeping of crime records, as well as in methods of transmitting descriptions of persons wanted 1 Such a system is now employed by the California State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. For a detailed dis- cussion of the modus operandi system see European Police Sys- tems, Chap. IX. 352 The Detective Force or of property stolen. A national bureau too, would be in a position to devise and establish an efficient cipher code for use in transmitting messages between police departments. It is to purposes of this kind that Scotland Yard is lending its good offices, and while the size of America, as compared with Great Britain, complicates our task, with patience and ingenuity a solution can be found. 353 CHAPTER X i THE PREVENTION OF ( CRIME 1 Place of crime prevention in work of department. — Attack on the breeding places of crime.— Special conditions making for crime. — Educating the public. — The police and ex'-convicts. — Juvenile de- linquency. — Poverty. — Other crime prevention methods. — The de- velopment of the crime prevention bureau. The activities of the uniformed and detective forces represent our conventional methods of fighting crime. The policeman patrolling the city block! like his prototype, the rattle-watchman of 250 years ago, is there to prevent disorder, and to catch, if he can, any person who breaks the law. Conceivably, therefore, if he is alert and con- scientious, no crimes will be committed in his vicinity. Highway robbers will not operate, burglars will not break in from the street, and pickpockets will be restrained from activity. If it were possible to maintain enough police- men continuously to cover all our city blocks, we could be guaranteed against the commission of crime in our streets. Similarly the detective force, while engaged primarily in ferreting out the criminal who has already committed a crime, exercises a restraining influence upon those who would break the law. The pickpocket is far less apt to succumb to temptation if he feels that his actions may be watched by men in plain clothes who know the ways of the trade. ! 354 The Prevention of Crime All police work has as its goal the prevention of crime. It is a matter for surprise, therefore, to learn that even were we to secure 100% efficiency in our patrol and de- tective work, most crimes would still go unhindered. Arthur Woods, formerly police commissioner in New York, put the case as follows : " Given perfect patrolling work, perfect (if there is such a thing) detective work, along the conventional lines, what proportion of crimes would still be committed? I discussed this at an Inspec- tors' meeting some time ago. One Inspector said it was ' fifty-fifty,' meaning that one-half the crimes that were then being committed in his district could not be pre- vented, even if the regular patrol and detective work were as good as they could be. This Inspector had a dis- trict thickly populated with foreigners. An old experi- enced Inspector, whose district is largely residential; on the west side of Manhattan, said he believed only one per cent of the crime in his district could be prevented by perfect police work. The other estimates varied between these two. If these men were right in their estimates — and they were the highest officers on the New York Force — if from fifty to ninety-nine per cent of crime would be committed in spite of perfect police work along the conventional lines — you can see why it is that we are cudgelling our brains to try to devise new methods, even if unconventional, with which to fight the outlaw." x One cannot review the activities of the police in many cities without realizing that this point of view is the ex- ception rather than the rule. Too many police adminis- trators are content to develop the conventional methods of i Crime Prevention, Princeton University Press, 1918. 355' American Police Systems policing and are inclined to disclaim responsibility for any crimes committed in a way that these methods cannot be expected to meet. If a burglar enters from the rear while the policeman is patrolling the front, if a theft is an " in- side job," committed by a servant, if goods are stolen from a truck left carelessly in a yard, it is assumed that from the standpoint of prevention these are cases with which the police have nothing to do. Indeed so vision- less are some police executives that the more this type of case increases the more do they stress the enlargement of the very conventional methods which have proved use- less in thwarting it. Every crime-wave, therefore, is apt to be met with a request for more policemen, whereas a smaller number of men, working with resourcefulness and imagination might perhaps better handle the new condi- tion. The average police department is still too much merely an agency of law enforcement, divorced from responsi- bility for the causes of crime. Its energies are consumed in defensive measures, in efforts to correct the manifesta- tions of crime rather than attack its roots. So long as this is the case, the policeman will continue to represent, as he does in so many places at present, the city's bewil- dered and futile attempt to beat back the spasmodic out- croppings of disorder which are continually in process of manufacture in the inner currents of city life. There is as much room for crime prevention in our communities as for fire prevention or the prevention of disease, and in this endeavor to limit the opportunities of crime and keep it from claiming its victims the police department must take the leading part. 356 The Prevention of Crime The Breeding Places of Crime. Just as yellow fever was successfully attacked by drain- ing the swamps and morasses where it bred, so the attack on crime is, in part, at least, a matter of eliminating its breeding places. Crime develops from contact and bad environment. Every city has its vicious spots — its points of contagion — distributing their contamination over smaller or larger areas. Often these spots are un- known to the police ; sometimes when known they are not treated. The old " red-light " districts which disgraced our cities for so many years, but which have now grad- ually given way before an aroused public opinion, were flagrant examples of breeding places of crime unmolested by the police. Quite apart from the conditions of im- morality which they fostered, they let loose upon the community an army of pick-pockets, shop-lifters, and petty robbers, of both sexes, who found retreat and stimu- lation in the protected district. " I never knew where that brood of small-fry crooks was coming from," the chief in a southern city told me, in explaining the decrease of crime complaints which followed the closing of the dis- trict in his town. Similarly, gambling and pool-selling places, and the various rendezvous where narcotics are illegally obtained, are breeding grounds of crime to which the conscientious police executive will give careful attention. Particularly is this true of the sale of habit-forming drugs. There is scarcely a city in the country where this insidious practice has not gained a foothold, and the methods employed to evade the law are numerous. It has recently been esti- 357 American Police Systems mated that there are 300,000 persons addicted to the use of narcotic drugs in the city of New York alone. 1 The Inspector of Pharmacy of the police department of Wash- ington, D. C, says : " It is alarming to note the terrible evils of the drug habit and almost impossible to estimate its enormous proportions, as it is fostered in secrecy and is responsible for a large portion of the crimes against the community." 2 Chief of Police Long of Newark in speaking of the relation between the use of drugs and the commission of crime said : " Men and women who ordi- narily commit no crime, when under the influence of their favorite ' dope ' will hesitate at none. When the craving is long unsatisfied it becomes a strong and merciless driver, forcing its victims to take chances of securing the necessary means by methods from which they would shrink when in normal condition." 3 The same remark is true of the existence of gambling rendezvous, which in most cases are nothing but clearing houses for criminals. Commissioner Enright of New York speaks of them as follows : " Such places are in- variably the headquarters of the most dangerous crimi- nals, as the vast majority of society's enemies appear to have a passion for games of hazard, a reflection of their precarious existences, perhaps. Besides, many of the keepers of such resorts are ex-convicts and if not, then 1 From a statement in the Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Nov., 1919, by Albert J. Weber, Foreman of Grand Jurors, Southern District of New York. This estimate is concurred in by other writers. 2 Annual Report of the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia, 1918. 3 From an address before the annual convention of the Interna- tional Association of Chiefs of Police, 1915. 358 The Prevention of Crime they are apt to be surrounded by such men and women and are not at all averse to financing the criminal projects of their hangers-on and the vicious parasites who flock to every gambling house to which access can be had. . . . The suppression of these establishments, no matter what their disguise, is preventive police work of the highest quality." 1 The modern police head will not only attack the swamps and morasses whose existence and location are more or less patent, but he will be zealous to seek out and discover secret sources of infection which lie hidden in the dark places of city life. For example, here is a locality in a city credited with a larger number of crime complaints than circumstances would seem to justify. It may be a matter of poor policing along conventional lines; it may be the work of local or of travelling criminals. How- ever, the question on which the conscientious executive will want to be assured is whether in this particular local- ity specific conditions exist which encourage the commis- sion of crime. These conditions may take the shape of disorderly gangs, unregulated dance-halls and other places of amusement, policy-shops, vicious " back-rooms," or rendezvous for idlers and loafers. They may be trace- able to unnecessary temptations to theft or to any one of a dozen other factors. As important as the arrest of the offenders, in the mind of the zealous police chief, will be the discovery and the elimination, if possible, of the con- ditions which hatched the present crimes, and which, if not treated, will send out a swarm of new offenders. It was this conception that prompted Commissioner 1 Annual Report, New York Police Department, 1918, p. 29. 359 American Police Systems Woods in New York to inaugurate his system of " crime prevention patrolmen." Carefully chosen officers were assigned to the more busy precincts of the city to ferret out conditions which seemed to be having a tendency to lead people astray, particularly boys and girls. Many temptations to petty stealing were discovered which could be eliminated, and other situations were traced through the influence of which thoughtless, growing boys were turned into law-breakers. Commissioner Woods' experi- ment did not have time to prove itself before he left office, but it illustrates the new technique in police work for diminishing the supply of crime. 1 Special Conditions Making for Crime. The prevalence of crime is often traceable to certain special conditions which are controllable by the police. The existence of disorderly gangs, for example, has fre- quently led, particularly in our larger cities, to open de- fiance of the law and a reign of terror among peaceful citizens. In the districts infested by these gangs the mer- chant and the shopkeeper are especially made the prey. The New York police in 19 14 reported that it was a com- mon experience for a small storekeeper to have a member of one of these gangs walk into his place of business, produce a number of tickets for a dance, and demand that they be purchased for fifty dollars. The entertainment perhaps was never/ to be given, but the purchase was quickly made and no questions asked. Ordinary pru- dence dictated prompt compliance. In addition to black- 1 See Annual Report of New York Police Department, 1917, p. 78, issued just before Mr. Woods' retirement from office. 360 The Prevention of Crime mailing shopkeepers, gangsters soon became bold in rob- bing and stealing, holding up citizens on the street and invading restaurants and cafes with drawn pistols. Keepers of disorderly houses have frequently paid them tribute, each gang having its domain and granting protec- tion from other gangs within that sphere of influence. Gunmen of this type have not hesitated to assault or mur- der citizens for hire. Commissioner Woods in reporting upon the situation existing when he took office in New York in 1914, made the following statement : " Strikers would approach gang leaders and hire them to assault men who continued to work in spite of warnings from the strikers to desist. Employers hired men of like character, attached to so-called ' detective agencies,' who used ' strong arm ' methods against the strikers. In various strikes occurring in this city dur- ing the period mentioned, almost every conceivable crime was committed by ' guerillas ' hired by one side or the other, including robbery, extortion, assault, arson, riot, and murder." 1 It was only by a systematic and concentrated attack upon these gangs that certain congested sections of New York City were freed from the terrorizing experiences which had occurred spasmodically for years. Many of the bands were composed of highly trained and highly paid specialists. Some used weapons such as black-jacks, gas-pipes, or bottles containing fluids, but the majority carried pistols. Most of them took their names from their leaders, and the gangs were known by such titles as 1 Annual Report of New York Police Department, 1917, p. 38. 361 American Police Systems " Dopey Benny," " Joe the Greaser," " Hudson Dusters," "Sirocco," "Ownie Madden," " Skush Thomas," " Slaughter House," " Pearl Button," " Little Doggie," " Pansy," " Frog Hollows," and " Jew Murphy." The police concentrated their attention on these gangs one by one, and special squads were formed to familiarize themselves with individual thugs and guerillas, as well as with their habits and places of rendezvous. The so- called " ball rooms " where the criminals congregated were closed, the law forbidding the possession of pistols without permits was strictly enforced, and gradually by careful study and surveillance, the ring was tightened and the bands were broken up. 1 Every city of any size has its heroes of the underworld about whom are gathered weak-willed imitators and hangers-on, who will follow their leaders in vice and crime to almost any extreme. But the customary method of proceeding against these lawless gangs has been to await the commission of some major crime that may offer an opportunity to give these leaders or their associates prison sentences. In this connection the law against the carrying of weapons is worthy of special note. The so-called Sulli- van Law in New York has effectively served to reduce the number of homicides. Unfortunately, however, this law is not applicable to neighboring states, with the result that weapons can readily be purchased within easy dis- tance of New York City. In spite of this disadvantage, x In this campaign, a card catalogue was compiled at police head- quarters of the names and aliases of 1,352 known gangsters. Pre- vious to this time many a gunman had escaped the deterrent effect of a severe sentence by reason of the fact that he had never been finger-printed, and his previous record appeared under some other name. (Annual Report 1917, p. 39.) 362 The Prevention of Crime * squads of detectives in New York are constantly em- ployed in rounding up vicious characters and relieving them of revolvers and other dangerous weapons which they have no right to possess, and the result has undoubt- edly been of great value in preventing the commission of contemplated crime. During 19 iS, the members of the detective force of New York took 336 revolvers from persons not authorized to carry them. 1 Major Pullman, late head of the force of Washington, D. C, in urging a somewhat similar law for the District of Columbia, ex- pressed himself as follows : " At the present time a per- son may purchase a firearm by going into any store or second-hand shop and putting down the money for the weapon, then going out and perhaps killing a person in the next half hour. Many crimes result from persons buying revolvers in this manner and shooting while in a fit of passion." 2 Educating the Public. One of the principal measures which an enterprising police force can adopt in reducing the volume of crime is a systematic education of the public in regard to criminal methods and practices. In a few cities, notably New York, Detroit and Washington, D. C, a very extensive propaganda has been carried on under the direction of the police to educate the citizens for self-protection. Mov- ing picture films, lectures and literature have been used to illustrate the fatal consequences of leaving doors un- locked, handbags easy to open, or notices on the door-bell 1 Annual Report for 1918, p. 41. 2 Report, Metropolitan Police, District of Columbia, for 1918, p. 13. 363 American Police Systems that nobody was home. Campaigns have been conducted against particular forms of carelessness which result in thefts from vans, drays and storage lofts. Because a substantial percentage of crimes in our large cities now- adays is the work of dishonest employees, special empha 7 sis has been laid upon the advisability of requiring care- ful references. The police cannot directly prevent an " inside job," but they can indirectly discourage it by emphasizing in vivid and appealing form the necessity of scrupulous care in hiring servants. 'Similarly, the police have advised with business houses as to the best methods of protecting them, and have sent experts to inspect and suggest; they have emphasized the urgency of safety de- vices on automobiles to prevent their being stolen, and have consulted with insurance people as to more effective measures for avoiding the things they were insuring against. A circular issued by the police of Washington, D. C, and widely distributed to the citizens, contains such perti- nent advice as follows : Do not admit to your home telephone inspectors, water inspectors, gas inspectors, health office inspectors, or any other kind, unless they give proper credentials and show authority. When you leave your home, do not advertise the fact by pulling down the shades or leaving a note in the letterbox saying you will be back at such and such an hour. Sneak thieves profit by such advice, and it is an invitation for them to enter. Do not make your home a safe deposit vault for silver- ware and jewelry while you are away. 364 The Prevention of Crime Women, do not when shopping lay your handbag on coun- ters while looking at goods^ This is an opportunity thieves are always waiting for. Neither strangers nor any one else, for that matter, should expose their money in public unnecessarily ; nor should men carry their wallets in the hip pocket. Pickpockets would have to go out of business if men became careful in handling their money. Four-fifths of all pickpocket jobs are made easy because so many carry their money in their hip pockets and have it lifted while getting on a car or while in a crowd. Keep your coat buttoned up and an eye on your pockets. A large percentage of crime committed in Washington, and all other cities for that matter, may be prevented if the citizens are careful and do not make it easy for the crim- inal to do his work. Always keep your eyes open and your wits about you. Regard the policeman as your best friend. He is paid to serve you by keeping the streets safe and orderly. He is entitled to your help. Such advice as this, if vividly and dramatically set forth, and constantly brought home to the citizens in ways which modern advertising methods suggest, can help ma- terially in reducing crime complaints. Without the co- operation of the public, the police themselves cannot suc- cessfully attack the problem of crime. Education and propaganda are indispensable aids in every modern police department. Men Out of Prison. The bulk of crime, certainly of crime against property, is committed by those who have previously been in the hands of the police. The chief problem of any police or- 365 American Police Systems ganization is furnished by the professional or habitual criminal, by the man upon whom the possibility of an- other prison sentence exercises no restraint. Too often the attitude of society and the police has made any other career than crime impossible for an ex-convict. The handicap of his previous record, his inability to secure employment, and the constant " hounding " by the police, make it difficult for him to rehabilitate himself and easy to continue in a life of crime. Some time after Commis- sioner Woods took office in New York, he spoke to the inmates of Sing Sing prison, and promised them that as long as he was head of the New York police force there was going to be no " hounding " of convicts. He told them that if they came to New York and wanted to earn an honest living and lead an honest life, the police would not merely give them a chance, but would try to assist them to find positions. In response to this invitation, 176 ex-convicts got in touch with police headquarters in New York when their terms at Sing Sing had expired. They had been sentenced for such crimes as homicide, burglary, grand larceny, robbery, forgery, etc., and many had served two and three terms. For these 176 men, 203 positions were obtained. 1 A careful record was kept of every case and at the close of Mr. Woods' term, of the 176 men, 120 were working, nine had been re-sentenced to prison, twenty were lost track of, and 27 cases were pending. 2 1 Only those positions which were actually worked at for a week or more are included in the calculation. 2 For a full discussion of these cases, see Leroy Peterson, loc. cit., p. 18 ff. In placing these men in positions, every effort was made to find work that was really suitable to them and from which they could earn enough money to support themselves and their families. Employers were always told the full facts, and each case was han- 366 The Prevention of Crime There was nothing emotional in the approach of the New York police to this problem. Primarily, they were interested in preventing crime, and the method which they pursued was adapted directly to this end. Juvenile Delinquency. In November, 1916, of the seven people in the death house in Sing Sing, awaiting execution, five were boys under 21 years of age. 1 The following arrests were made in Washington, D. C, in 1919, of children under seven- teen years of age. 2 Crime charged N timber of arrests Murder 4 Robbery 36 Assault with dangerous weapon 7 Forgery 12 Grand larceny 71 House breaking 189 Statistics such as these furnish indisputable evidence that criminals are recruited from the ranks of childhood. The rollicking, mischievous boy of today, uncontrolled and out of hand, is the hardened offender of tomorrow. In their efforts to prevent crime, therefore, the police have no more fruitful field of work than is presented by the boys and girls of our cities. died on its own merits. If a man had been sentenced for grand larceny, he was not given a position where he would be continually tempted. If he seemed to be a weak individual without stamina or backbone, he was placed in a job where he could do real work without being subject to easy chances for continued thieving. 1 From an unpublished report by Leroy Peterson on the social activities of the New York Police Department from 1914 to 1917. 2 Annual Report of the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia for 1919. 367 American Police Systems In this connection it must be admitted at the outset that the path of the police is beset with' difficulty. The police- man seems to be the natural and inveterate enemy of the growing boy. He is the represser of everything that a red-blooded boy instinctively wants to do, such as build bonfires, play ball in the streets, climb trees in the park, and throw snowballs at teams and pedestrians. It must be admitted, too, that the police are often stupid in hand- ling the boy problem. Too often the policeman is a sort of glorified town bully, and boys are arrested as crimi- nals and haled to court for mischief that should have been overlooked or at the most reprimanded. It is dis- couraging to examine in the police stations of some cities the records of juvenile arrests. Boys are locked up for stealing a bottle of milk, for calling a policeman " cop- per," for loafing on street corners, for calling the ice- man " Dago," for boating in the park after hours, or for pulling an old man's beard. True, the boys are generally discharged by the court, but the mischief has been done; the boy has been branded as a criminal and the memory of the brief prison experience remains. The modern police executive realizes that growing boys must be continuously active — that if because of the cramped conditions of city life, bonfires and snowballing have to be forbidden, something else must be substituted in their places. He realizes, too, that in this search for positive opportunities for recreation and the employment of leisure time the police must take a leading part. It was with this idea in mind, therefore, that Commis- sioner Woods in New York established his system of 368 The Prevention of Crime Junior Police. Before he left office there were 6,000 members between the ages of eleven and sixteen, organ- ized in 32 different precincts of the city under the regular police captains. The boys were uniformed and drilled; they were given lessons in first-aid, safety-first, the rules of the road, and law and order ; they had their games and athletic meets — all under the direct control and manage- ment of the police. " We feel that the results have been good," said Mr. Woods in 191 7. "The boy comes to feel that the policeman whom he has considered his nat- ural enemy is really a man whom he can look to for help in doing the things that he most likes to do. We notice a marked falling off in juvenile delinquencies in precincts where there are Junior Police Forces." 1 Similarly Commissioner Woods threw the influence of his department into the development of city playgrounds. In the more congested districts whole blocks were laid out as " play streets," and traffic was excluded between three o'clock and six o'clock every afternoon. Through the help of private agencies " backyard " playgrounds were opened up in those districts where the figures of juvenile delinquency were especially high. Sixteen such play spaces in all were developed with results that proved con- clusively the relationship between delinquency and the lack of a rational opportunity to play. Another method which progressive departments have adopted in establishing a better relationship between the policeman and the children has been to assign policemen in uniform to talk to the children in the public schools. 1 Annual Report of New York Police Department, 1917, p. 81. 3 6 9 American Police Systems In Washington, D. C, a series of addresses by police offi- cers on " Why is a Policeman " has been especially suc- cessful. The plan of Christmas parties in the precinct station houses for the children of the neighborhood was adopted in New York in 191 5 and was followed in other cities, notably in Detroit. Lists of children were made up by precinct commanding officers through information fur- nished them by patrolmen on post. As far as possible these lists were composed of children who would not otherwise be provided for on Christmas day. Each child received one or more useful articles of clothing, a toy, a box of candy and some fruit. The station houses were decorated and each had a large Christmas tree. Instead of prisoners, the cells contained holly and toys and fruit. On Christmas day the stations were filled with happy mothers and laughing children instead of the usual pro- cession of deserted mothers and crying children. The police captain in each precinct acted as Santa Claus and the program of entertainment frequently was run in shifts to take care of all the children in the neighborhood. Over 40,000 children were entertained in this fashion in New York during the Christmas of 1916. It is scarcely too much to say that the event marked almost a revolution in the relation of the policeman to the neighborhood. As one beaming, perspiring patrolman said to Commissioner Woods : " Well, Commissioner, I believe those kids will believe now, when we tell 'em to cut out hitching on wagons, that it 's a friend that 's talking ! " 1 One further method of socializing the relations of the 1 Crime Prevention, p. 120. 370 The Prevention of Crime police department with the children was developed by Commissioner Woods in the institution of so-called " wel- fare-officers." In January, 1917, ten precincts were se- lected for this experiment, a carefully chosen patrolman being assigned in each precinct with the single duty of looking after the boys and girls who seemed to be going wrong. " Think of the gain to the city," said Commis- sioner Woods, " if we can take a boy who would other- wise become a burglar, who has started to master that profession, and turn him into a self-respecting, self-sup- porting citizen. That is what these welfare officers are working for." 1 Gradually the system was extended until forty-seven precincts were thus covered. By the end of I 9 I 7> 9>3°° cases had been investigated and some action had been taken in each instance. These cases often in- volved truancy and were frequently the result of destitute home conditions which could be corrected by enlisting the aid of some private welfare association. Special forms of delinquency among the boys also included petty larceny, crap playing, stone throwing and carrying cans of beer. The girls were mostly charged with loitering around parks and armories. In only two per cent of all these cases was it found necessary to make arrests. The solu- tion of the difficulty was obtained sometimes by the mere friendship of a big brother policeman, sometimes by con- necting the child with the home through the authoritative but kindly influence of a man in uniform. 3 In Chicago during the year 1918 there were 19,019 in- vestigations of cases of delinquency and complaints in- 1 Ibid., p. 112. 2 For discussion, see Report of New York Police, 1914-1917, pp. 76-78. 371 American Police Systems volving children made by 39 patrolmen assigned to juve- nile work at various precinct station houses. 1 Of these cases, 16,320, or 85.8%, were adjusted out of court and delinquency petitions were filed in the remainder. In the nine month period from April to December, 19 18, a single officer working in the sixth and seventh precincts investi- gated 1,141 cases, only 82 of these cases going to court. A juvenile delinquency division was established in De- troit in 1882. Although its personnel is made up of regu- lar policemen, the division operates as an independent bureau and even has headquarters in a building separate from any other police division. A captain is in command of the division and there are ten juvenile officers none of whom are uniformed. Other divisions of the police de- partment refer matters affecting children to the juvenile division which assumes full responsibility for investiga- tion and action. In Los Angeles a juvenile bureau con- stitutes a separate division of the department. It is com- manded by a chief juvenile officer and includes both pa- trolmen and policewomen. The chief juvenile officer described the work of the bureau as follows : " In general this Bureau has to deal with minor chil- dren who are placed under arrest by any officer of the department, or against whom reports are received from parents or other citizens. This Bureau also deals with reports and charges made against adults where children are the victims. Officers of this Bureau are required to inspect dance halls, skating rinks, cafes, penny ar- 1 Following the closing of seven precinct stations during 1918, the number of patrolmen assigned as juvenile officers was reduced from 39 to 24. 372 The Prevention of Crime cades, public parks and other places frequented by- juveniles." * In many cities such as Indianapolis, Newark and Se- attle, it is the practice to detail policemen to assist pro- bation officers attached to juvenile courts. Obviously this work involves the constant association of the welfare or juvenile officers with representatives of other organizations and government departments such as the truant officers, the Children's Society, the probation officers, the Charity Organization Society, the settlements, the Big Brothers, the churches, etc. This is a point of great importance. Police work cannot be isolated from other welfare agencies of the community concerned with social problems. It cannot be divorced from all the or- ganized influences that are working for better conditions in city life. Indeed unless the police are in a position to invoke the cooperation of schools, clinics, churches and other public and private institutions to supplement repres- sion and if possible to supplant it with education and di- version, they cannot effectively handle the task which society has given them. The new policing demands a type of officer interested and trained in social service. With representatives of this character the police depart- ment should presently be able to stimulate every other community agency in dealing aggressively with untoward community conditions. 2 1 Annual Report of the Los Angeles Police Department, 1918-19. 2 In this connection, see an interesting paper by August Vollmer, chief of police in Berkeley, California, in the June, 1919, number of The Policemen's News, entitled The Policeman as a Social Worker. Chief Vollmer's views on this whole question are progressive and stimulating. 373 American Police Systems Destitution. Poverty as a cause of crime is common knowledge to every policeman who patrols the streets in the congested portions of our cities. He sees it on every corner; he deals with it constantly in the jails and police stations. He knows that even when dereliction is not the direct result of want, crime and poverty are often associated. " I have seen many a prisoner," said Commissioner Woods, " who had been inexorably, it almost seemed with deliberate purpose, driven step by step straight into an eddy of fate where there seemed nothing else to do but steal. And one could not help wondering whether the rest of us, caught in the same swirling current, would have done any better." x It cannot be expected, of course, that the police either as individuals or as organizations can grapple with the whole complex social and economic question of poverty. Nevertheless, as social agents dealing with the causes of crime they cannot leave it out of their calculations. Not a few departments in the United States have made a beginning in placing upon the policeman responsibility for reporting conditions of individual distress. Police- men on beat probably come more intimately into contact with the life of the people than any other class of men, and their wide opportunities for observation can be har- nessed to various forms of constructive social work. Commissioner Woods, in the winter of 1914-15, when conditions of industrial disorganization threw thousands of people out of employment, developed a comprehensive system of contact. A small fund was raised among the 1 Crime Prevention, p. 37. 374 The Prevention of Crime police themselves, and a plan was worked out which pro- vided the captain of every precinct with a book of tickets, each marked " ten cents." x The captains made arrange- ments with a grocer, a fuel dealer and a restaurant keeper in their neighborhoods to honor these tickets, sending their accounts to headquarters every week. In any part of the city, therefore, when a policeman came across a case of distress, he took the sufferer to the station house, where the captain or lieutenant in charge would provide at once for his immediate needs and would then put him in touch with some private association or church where help would be continued as long as necessary. " We be- lieved it was the duty of the police," said Commissioner Woods, " to protect society by preventing as much as possible of the crime that might be committed by these unfortunate people in their distress." 2 During the three years in which this plan was in operation in New York, 3,262 families and individuals were thus assisted. 3 In addition, the police constituted themselves an em- ployment agency for people out of work. Frequently it was necessary to create jobs where none existed before. Thus, the people living in a city block would be induced by the police to employ a man to keep the street and side- walks clean around the block, pick up waste paper and other litter, and generally to supplement the work of the Street Cleaning Department. By this plan alone some scores of families were kept together that otherwise would have been reduced to privation and hopelessness. During the three year period from 19 14-17 in which this employ- 1 Supplemented by private funds. The total amount was $2,800. 2 Crime Prevention, p. 39. s Leroy Peterson, loc. cit., p. 4. 375 American Police Systems ment agency plan was in operation, 3,040 men, women and children were placed in positions through the efforts of the police. In this field, as in the field of juvenile delinquency, the work of the police brings them into intimate team-work with all the private agencies that are seeking in various ways to better community conditions. Every officer on the street becomes a representative of a coordinated social service. 1 In New York in the period just noted, it meant that the community had at its disposal 1 1 ,000 trained men enlisted in constructive social work. Other Crime Prevention Methods. It is impossible in a short chapter even to outline all the steps that can be taken by an alert and progressive police force in dealing with the problem of crime. The development of women police, for example, although still in a vague and uncertain stage, is a factor of supreme significance. The possibilities of their work with women and girls along preventive lines, as well as with the con- ditions which affect women and girls, are almost immeas- urable. 2 Similarly, the whole new field of psychiatry 1 During the three years in which this plan was in operation in New York the Police Department cooperated and worked with a total number of 82 relief, charitable and social organizations. In every case, existing machinery was utilized and no attempt was made in any way to duplicate facilities already in operation. 2 In too many departments women police have been installed with no clear idea as to what functions they were to perform. Thus, in some cities they have been used merely as police matrons; in others they have been uniformed and assigned to ordinary patrol duty. In one large city at the time of my visit, the women police who had recently been appointed had been taught to shoot and were then given pistols and blackjacks and assigned to precinct stations! Gradually, however, the peculiar value of women police officers as preventive agents in working with women and girls has come to be 376 The Prevention of Crime lies open for development, and the various questions of handling the mentally defective, so that he may not add his substantial contribution to the total volume of crime, are pressing for solution and action. Again, the use of police as parole officers, and the intimate sympathetic re- lationship between the police machinery and parole and probation systems, are problems that are coming rapidly to the fore in society's attack on crime. 1 In all these mat- ters the police have an important part to play. As the police chief of Berkeley, California, expressed it : " The police must fight for everything that promises a reduction of crime. Society's greatest task with reference to crimi- nals is to protect itself." 2 Ultimately the attention of all police departments and of all police officials will be centered on the prevention of crime. The conventional phases of their work will not be neglected — for they are essential 3 — but no longer recognized. In some cities the women police have proved particu- larly successful as detectives in certain types of cases. 1 In New York, under Commissioner Woods, 84 police sergeants were detailed to act as parole officers in looking after men released from the work-house, the penitentiary and the reformatory. In all, 1,483 men and boys were assigned to the care of these officers, who were under instructions to help them get work and keep in touch with them at least once a week for one year. " Show your paroled prisoner at your first conference that you want to be his friend," ran the instructions to the police sergeants, " that you, as well as the department, stand ready to assist him to do what is right and keep out of jail. He naturally will be suspicious of you and your motives. Put it up to him good and strong that the big thing the department is trying to do is to prevent crime, and that everything that you can do along that line will be good police duty." (Leroy Peterson, loc. cit., p. 32.) The St. Louis department maintains a parole bureau consisting of three officers as part of the organiza- tion of the force. In Los Angeles two probation bureaus are at- tached to the department, one for men and one for women. 2 Personally communicated. 3 " Whatever new methods are tried," said Commissioner Woods, "we must not neglect the old, for the essential basis of all good 377 American Police Systems will the departments be contented to spend their energies in sweeping back the continuous overflow of disorder without regard to its causes or sources. It is possible, indeed, that as this new technique develops, it will be made to constitute a separate branch of the department : a bureau of crime prevention — as distinct and important a division of activity as the detective bureau or the uni- formed force — heading up under its direction all the conscious agencies of the department that are working to diminish the supply of criminals. Up to the present, whatever work the departments have done in this direc- tion has been scattered through a series of squads or bu- reaus, maintaining no conscious or organic relationship with each other. Sometimes these squads are attached to the detective bureau with resulting confusion and inade- quate direction. More often the department has not pro- gressed as far as the formation of any squads, and crime prevention work is handed over as a detail to a few scat- tered patrolmen. Whatever form of organization this new method takes, its basic idea gives shape to the police work of the future : not a conventional system of patrol or a systematized pro- cedure for making arrests — valuable as these activities may be — but an unceasing fight, in cooperation with all the active forces of society, to keep criminals from com- mitting crime and people from becoming criminals. police work is the character and physical power of the individual men. They must be strong of body, stout of soul — sturdy, two- fisted specimens, knowing how to hold themselves in restraint even under severe provocation, yet prompt and powerful to act with force and uncompromising vigor when only that will maintain order and protect the law-abiding." (Crime Prevention, p. 3.) 378 CHAPTER XI CONCLUSION Contrast between American and European police departments. — Europe far in advance. — American progress seen by comparison of present with past. — Irregular character of improvement. — Our achievement sordid and unworthy. — Importance of the police prob- lem. To an American who has intimately studied the oper- ation of European police systems, nothing can be more discouraging than a similar survey of the police of the United States. As he travels from east to west across the continent he is oppressed with the contrasts that meet him on every side. He remembers the conscious pride of European cities in their police, and the atmosphere of public confidence in which they carry on their work. He recalls the unbroken record of rectitude which many of their forces maintain and their endeavor to create, with the aid of expert leadership, a maturing profession. He remembers the infinite pains with which the police admin- istrators are trained and chosen, and the care with which the forces are shielded from political influence. Vivid in his mind is the recollection of the manner in which science and modern business methods are being applied to the detection of crime, so that on the whole the battle with the criminal is being fought with steadily increasing effectiveness. In America, on the other hand, the student of police 379 American Police Systems travels from one political squabble to another, too often from one scandal to another. He finds a shifting leader- ship of mediocre calibre — varied now and then by flashes of real ability which are snuffed out when the political wheel turns. There is little conception of policing as a profession or a science to be matured and developed. It is a job, held, perhaps, by the grace of some mysterious political influence, and conducted in an atmosphere sordid and unhealthy. It is a treadmill, worked without imagi- nation or aim, and with little incentive except the desire to keep out of trouble. Instead of confidence and trust, the attitude of the public toward the police is far more often than not one of cynicism and suspicion, expressing itself, occasionally, in violent attacks which are as unjust as they are ineffective. In the interim between these spasms of publicity the average police force sinks in its rut, while crime and violence flourish. This is not a happy picture, and the contrast between the situation on the two sides of the Atlantic is frankly disillusioning. It is only when we approach the facts from another angle that any ray of encouragement can be seen. A basis of comparison, perhaps fairer than the juxtaposition of European police and our own, is the contrast between what our system is today and what it was ten, twenty and forty years ago. Assuming that our present measurement by European standards is below our hopes, what has our own growth been? It is this perspective which furnishes a substantial basis for encouragement. London's police department had thirty-five years of established tradition and achievement behind it when the draft riots broke out in New York in 380 Conclusion 1863. And what was New York's police force then? It was an undisciplined, half-uniformed mob, armed with clubs. Between that day and this a revolution has been wrought in our police administration. In the early seven- ties the police of San Francisco were little more than a sheriff's posse, and the hue and cry was the method of apprehending criminals. San Francisco's police force to- day, with all its imperfections, represents a new era in, public service. As late as the eighties our police every- where were regarded by the citizens with a resignation bordering on complacence, as the private armies of the political parties in power. Today the open and avowed connection of the police with politics arouses widespread though often futile protest. It was in 1895 that the Lexow Commission in New York unearthed scandals in the police department of a kind and to a degree that would be almost inconceivable today. Such flagrant conditions, in open defiance of public right and decency, may exist here and there even now, but unlike 1895, they represent the exception and not the rule. Birmingham, Alabama, has none too compelling a reason to be proud of her police force, but even she can stand amazed at the recollection of the rival chiefs of police, who, under the political system existing only a dozen years ago, stumped the city for election and sought for votes by open promises of leniency in office. There is hardly a police department in the United States where similar evidences of improvement cannot be found. Only a blind man could fail to see that with all our shuffling incompetence in municipal affairs — and it is ominous enough — the cumulative effort of forty years 38i American Police Systems for a decent standard of local government in the United States is bearing fruit, not so evident as yet, perhaps, in constructive results — although even here it has regis- tered substantial gains — as in the general toning up of our political life, and in a public opinion far more sensi- tive to betrayal and abuse, and increasingly intolerant of laxity and ineptitude. From the influence of these silent but potent forces in American life our police departments have not escaped. Measured against the background of the past they show a real advance. But the advance has been discouragingly irregular — a step forward, a slip back, with a net achievement slight and inadequate. Improvement is not permanent,- we do not hold our gains. The constructive efforts of a pro- gressive administration are likely to be wiped out by a reactionary successor, and carefully laid plans whose in- stallation and development bear promise of good results are abandoned over night. Every police department is a graveyard of projects and improvements which, had they been developed to maturity, would have reconstituted the police work of the city. They have died because the particular administration sponsoring *them has met the fate of all municipal administrations, and the succeeding regime, to justify its existence, has had to discredit the work and aims of its predecessor. In this mean play of politics, this recurring advance and reaction, our gains are often illusory. We have, indeed, little to be proud of. It cannot be denied that our achievement in respect to policing is sordid and unworthy. Contrasted with other countries in this regard we stand ashamed. With all allowances for the 382 Conclusion peculiar conditions which make our task so difficult, we have made a poor job of it. Our progress has fallen far behind our needs. Successful in the organization of busi- ness and commerce, pre-eminent in many lines of activity, we must confess failure in the elemental responsibility laid on all peoples who call themselves civilized, of preserving order in their communities. Surely in the new era upon which we are entering, with its challenge to forms of government and political faiths, the vision of America will not be blind to the grave importance of the problem and the resourcefulness of America will not be baffled in attempting the solution. 383 O^GANIZATiO/f OF THE Cft/CAGO POUCE D£P^^TM£Nr Supa&rfTEffO&iT of Pol tee. r JJGenemi/tdniinisfmtien " HeadCierk De fective Divisi on Captain efDtfcfna 1~ Criminal IderrfificatnSecii? Chief /tferrffl/cefaftfojpecSDr ~-f Pawnshop Section j Automobile Sec f /on Vagrancy Section Genera/ 'Cri/rri/xr/imesfipdrim — Misceifaneous Division Chauffeurs Sec f /on Matron's Section j Marine Sect/on — j Wh/cie Section 4 "pound SecfrorT - Pound Master Tr&ff/c D/V/s/'on Hi St Cross inq Sect/on Mounted Sect/on r—-~p— — j \5/grmf_St£fe/m V&ief ' Opera fen [i Weperfiimf inspector Uniformed Force 27 Police Districts Captains Commanding 34 Precinct Stations Lieutenants CsamawSm —J Secretary cfDept. Sure/eons Bureau Custodian of Lost and tfefen Property School of I nstructio n Dril/master jtfufo Efu/pmenf Sect/or? \^£t^'aa/Sxt/en_^ \Preperfif Division j Manager of Property /Seconds D/vis/bf? inspection Div/£/pn Custodian Diwsioni — \rfmbt/taixe Dms/ori\ — foreman of /torses — ' Detention Pon?es0) 384 0/?GAN/ZAr/o/v or the Detro/t Pouce Department F/nst Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent Adm/nisfrafive inspectors Frec/j 4 POUCE COMM/55/ONER Chief of Detectives and AdminhfrxfrVe inspector U7Ct5 S - ttar&or Masters Diwsion i Genera/ Criminal Work Special Squads Bureau of Criminai identification Auto Recovery Bureau Bureau of Seconds C/ean-up Sauac/ (Wee) Mounted Squad Med/cai Bureau Poiice ■Attorney I Bureau af Statistics Third Depufy Commissioner and Chief inspector inspection D/Ws/bn Traffic D/v/s/on Motor D/'vision Sc/ioof of instruction Auto impound/ny Divis/on Sanitary Sauad Womens Detention rYon?e Sergeants ass/yned fa Courts Second DqxrtjCommiss/onei\ and Secretary \ lfrbinfenance\ [and 'Business Administration I c~ S/ynai Division j Accounting 1 D/V/s/on __L__ I Stack Division Bureau vf Construction \ 1 Oarage and 1 f?epair Shops\ Citu Sea/eri Office JL_. ... i License ColiecforA Office Superannuated Poiice Fund \ 1 Pound \ Janifvrs and Teamsters Property Division 385 ORGANIZATION OF THE LoS AfiGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT _L (JN/POPMED Fc/?C£ frec/'/7cf Stations j T/vffic j D/Visior? \C#//Mzbnye/e\ Division I Boa^d or Pol/ce Ommms/m£f?s j Mayo r ex officio member \ I investigator Chief of Police y")£TEcr/v£: Bureau f of Defect/yes cmmmfmk Sumi/OrCf/M/miS iajT/fr/r/c/fr/o/Y wmvS 70u\ | M/SCELLMEOUS Bu/?E4US AMD D/V/S/OA/S r Genera/ Crinrinai Work /Vying \ Squadron Pawnshop Sauad Accounting Division License & Perm? D/V/sm Property Bureau Secomi-famh yi(/fomo6iie x/idMst^wm WjeffJfuad Protafon Office & Women! Pro bo/ion Bureau b Munic/pai Poiice farm and Grain /Si?/?/? Suppression Juvenile Bureau | City Motfier Bureau Bureau of Lost Property Printing Bureau Po/ice Surgeons of Vice I MeirOj Sac ■po/ifan "■auad Ch/nafow/7 Sfi/ad 386 Ofgawzat/on ofthz Afctv Vo/Fxr Poucz Dzp/j/trAf/r/fr POL/CE COMM/SS/OrtEf? First Deputy Commissioner 5econd Deputy Comm/ssioner Secretary of Department r Un iformed F orce Chief /nspecfor Commanding tfeadi^ uarfers D ivis. Chief /nspecfor Commanding ■on Third Deputy Com miss /oner Fourth _ Deputy Commissioner fifth Depute/ Commissioner Specie/ Deputy Commissioners (6) Poiice Chapfoins Boro inspector for Brooklyn one/ Queens Training Schoo/ ~L Spec/ai Brancaes anc/ ■Sgvaa's ( 7 Distri cts inspectors Commanding S t Precinc ts Captains Commanding Special 'Senxe D/V/s/on Poiice /Reserves fC/vi/ian) Marine Division Tr affic Divisio n S Traffic Precincts Z Bridge Precincts Z fbrk Precincts Moforcyc/e Sec f /on Defective Divis/o n d/ny inspector Com/van \ l Generai Work in Si Precincts Speciof Squads 1 I Bureau of Missing Persons Bureau of /.osfa/TdSfb/en Property 1 1 Bureau of /nformaf/on /Second f^oon? 1 Bureau of Criminaf . [ identification Misce/faneous Divisions and Bureaus Chief Cterk's Office Transportation Division Bureau of Printing heme Service Division PrcperiuCferk's Office Quartermasters Div/s/on Surgeon's Sureau Bureau of Ffecords Wetfare Bureau 387 ORGAMZATfO/i OF THE! P/i/LAD€LPN/A BUREAU OF POLICE L Or£/J ■5ignaiJ>ysfe/n inspection and Confro/ofhvprii, Pa fro/ Wagon & Chief C/erk Property cierk Pawnshop inspector Sanitary Officer 1 Pharmacy inspector Divis/on of Accounts fbiice fiuitefin Serv/ce Women's Sureou fbiice \Surgeon 1 Corresponaknce Division D/Vision of ffiecoros Ch/id labor Law inspectors House of Detention 390 INDEX Aberdeen, Miss., 50 Adams, Herbert Baxter, Norman Constables in America, cited, 57, 58, note Age-Herald, Birmingham, Ala., quoted, 50 Aix la Chapelle, 5 Akron, O., 174, 186, notes Alabama, murder cases in, 30; police control in, 119 Albany, 107, 138, note; 172; ad- ministrator's term of service in, 239 Allinson and Penrose, Philadel- phia, 1681-1887, A History of Municipal Development, 59, note; 61, note Altoona, Penn., 186, note American, Baltimore, quoted on Sunday law, 51, 52 American Bar Association, re- ports of, 30, 32, notes Amory, Thomas C, quoted on state police legislation, 87 Amsterdam, police commission, 245 Ancona, Italy, 245 Annals of the American Acad- emy of Political and Social Science, cited, 31, 174, notes Annuaire Statistique de la Ville de Paris, cited, 5 Annual Report of the Metropoli- tan Police of the District of Columbia, quoted, 358 Appointments, civil service and police, 276 et seq.; 292 Astor Place riots, New York, 73 391 Athens, Ga., 283 Atlanta, negroes in, 7; 79, 137; size of police board, 138; 143, note; 148, 131; politics in po- lice board, 153; political influ- ences in police administration, 233; inadequacy of police rec- ords, 341 Auburn, N. Y., 174, note Augusta, Ga., 283 Austria, unnecessary functions of police department in, 211 Austria-Hungary, population of, 5 Austro-Hungarians, 5, 6, 8 Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt, quoted, on police examinations, 291 Automobiles, thefts of, table, 19; in relation to patrol serv- ice, 307 et seq. Bail system, 39 et seq. Baker, Newton D., cited, 57 Baltimore, negroes in, 7; 51, 67, 90, 104, 105, 107, 114; in rela- tion to state-controlled police, 119, 120, 124, 125, 129, 132, 133, !36, 137; size of police board, 138; 139, 140, 154, note, 155, 162, 202 ; and police legislation, 205, zo8; irrelevant functions of police, 212; residential re- quirements for police commis- sioner, 243 ; police examiners, 271, note; police methods, 279, 281 ; organization of detective bureau, 334 Index Banks, General, 90, note Bay City, Mich., 174, note Bayonne, N. J., population of, 167 Bedini riots, Cincinnati, 72 Berkeley, Cal., chief of police, 265; police training school sys- tem, 298; patrol system, 309- 311 ; detective instruction at, 332; 348, note; in relation to crime prevention, 377 Berlin, foreign element in, 5 ; average of murders, 14; hi ; jurisdiction of police president, 170; 237 Bertillon, Alphonse, system of identification, 207 ; decline of system, 348 et seq. Bicycle squads, 189 Bingham, General, reorganiza- tion of New York detective bureau, 337 Birmingham, Ala., negroes in, 7; 52, 109, 137, note; commis- sioner's salary, 175, note ; com- missioner, 181 ; 182 ; police or- ganization, 184; proportion of police to population, 201 ; chief of police, 258; police system, 270; chief of police quoted on police system, 274; detective bureau, 328, 334; police and politics, 381 Birmingham, Eng., 112; police administration, 233, 236, 244 Blankenburg administration, 193 Board, rise of the police, 76 et seq.; the bi-partisan, 103 et seq.; passing of the police, 107 et seq.; of state commissioners, 129 et seq.; 133; control vs. single-headed control, 137 et seq.; appointment, size and functions of police commis- sioners, 138; weakness of po- lice control, 140; administra- tion a p„rt-time task, 141-143; meetings of, 143; lack of unity in administration, 145 et seq.; politics in administra- tion, 149-151 ; the elective, 151- 154; supposed neutrality of bi- partisan, 154 et seq. See also Commissioners Booth system, operation of, 309, 310 " Boss," the, 184 ; relation of, to police preferment, 271 Boston, foreign element of population, 5 ; genesis of po- lice force, 59; 60, 62, 66, 96, 105, 107, 108, 109; in relation to state-controlled police, 119- 123; 129, 130, 131, 136, 149, 159. 162, 164; suburban develop- ment, 166, 167; 169; police commissioner, 170; 200; pro- portion of police to popula- tion, 201 ; legislation in rela- tion to police, 209, 210; irrele- vant functions of police, 212; 239; police methods, 277; 280, 281, 283, 292; plan of police promotion, 293 et seq.; Com- missioner O'Meara quoted on system of promotion, 294, note; police strike, 318, 320; detective bureau, 328, 331 ; or- ganization of detective bureau, 333; 33% Boulogne, 5 Bradford, Ernest S., Commis- sion Government in American Cities, cited, 174, note Breeding-places of crime, 358 et seq. Bremen, 5 Brigade de Surete, Paris, 4 Bridgeport, 137, note; 155, note; 392 Index police arrangements, 202; po- lice system, 271, note Bribery, 287 et seq. Bristol, Eng., 112 Brooklyn, 75, 82, 168 Bruere, Henry, The New City Government, cited, 174, note Brussels, Belgian national board of identification, 351 Budapest, 5 Buffalo, 79, 107, 109, 137, 162, 172, 174, note; 175; commis- sioner's salary, 175, note ; 182 ; director of public safety, 193, 194; 208; police methods, 27 7; 281 ; organization of detective bureau, 333; method of de- tective supervision, 343 Bureau of Municipal Research, New York, cited, 32, note ; 278, 279." 344, note; 345, note Burglary, comparative statistics, 15 et seq., table, 16 Cahalane, Inspector Cornelius, quoted, 269 Calhoun, Patrick, trial of, 37, note California State Bureau of Criminal Identification and In- vestigation, 352, note Cambridge, 138, note ; 162, 164, 16S Camden, police system in, 271, note Canada bureau of identification, 351 Canterbury, Eng., 24s Carabinieri, 3 ; Italian patrol sys- tem, 201 Carmack, Senator, 37, note Carter, James Coolidge, quoted on unnecessary laws, 47 Centennial History of Cincinnati, Charles Theodore Greve, cited, 63 Centralization vs. decentraliza- tion in detective bureau organ- ization, 333 et seq. Chap, Thomas, case of, 40 Charleston, S. C. : negroes in, 7 ; 95 Charleston, W. Va., 174, note Charlottenburg, 170 Charts, of police department or- ganization, Chicago, 384; De- troit, 385; Los Angeles, 386; New York, 387; Philadelphia, 388; St. Louis, 389; Washing- ton, 390 Charters, city, 203-216, passim Chicago, 4; character of popu- lation, 5; 6, 10; comparative table of murder in, 11; homi- cide, 13; murder record, 24; Tribune, quoted, 27; Taft's speech at, 1909, quoted, 28; homicide calculation of Trib- une quoted, 33; law's de- lay in, 35, 36 ; 37, 41, notes ; 67 ; 75. 114, "5, 137, 162, 164, 192; police department, 196; patrol system, 199; irrelevant func- tions of police, 212; police commission, 217 et seq.; cost of police department, 218; 220; police system, 222; police administrative experiments, 228; police methods, 271, 279, 280, 281-285; civil service en- tanglements in, 291, 292; police training school system, 298 et seq.; detective bureau, 327- 329; organization of detective bureau, 333, 341 ; method of detective supervision, 343; in- adequacy of police records, 345. 346, 35o; chart of police department organization, 384 393 Index Chicago Crime Commission, 36, note; 41, note; cited, 346, note Chief of detective bureau, 326 et seq. Chief constables, terms of office in England and Scotland, 236, 237 Chief of police, and state con- trol, 126, 127; appointment of, 139 ; 142, 143 ; interference of board with functions of, 145 et seq.; 191 et seq., 204, 249 et seq.; term of office of, 254 et seq.; tenure of office, de- pendent upon politics, 256 et seq.; and civil service, 259 et seq.; personnel in position of, 264 et seq.; length of term in different American cities, 279, note; status of, in Georgia towns, 283, 284 Chinese, 8 Cincinnati, riots in, 72; 74, 78, 98, 99, ios, 107, 112, 115, 137; term of chief of police, 255; police methods, 279, 281 ; police training school system, 298 et seq. City manager, 174; plan, 186, 187; 191 et seq. Civil Police of Johannesburg and Pretoria, 225 Civilian police administrators, 225 et seq. Civil service, chief of police and, 259 et seq.; in relation to police, 270 et seq.; limitations of, 284 et seq.; in relation to detec- tive bureau, 328 et seq. Civil War, 120 Clark, John, the case of, 256- 257 Cleveland, O., 6, 72, 7s, 75, 79, 100, 107, 109, 132, 137; head of detective bureau 198; pro- portion of police to popula- tion, 201 ; 204, 210 ; police ad- ministrative experiments, 228; police methods, 277, 279, 280, 281, 283 ; detective bureau, 328, 33i; 341, 350 Codding the Criminal, by Judge Carl Nott, quoted, 31 Columbia University, police course at, 333, note Columbus, 137, note Commissaires de police, Paris, 201 Commission government, the po- lice force and, 174 et seq.; principle of, explained, 176 et seq.; and transient manage- ment, 180 et seq. Commission Government in American Cities, by E. J. Bradford, article cited, 174, note Commissions, municipal coun- cils in relation to state police, 129 et seq.; personnel of, 175 et seq. Commissioner, the, 188-216, pas- sim, 217; personal qualifica- tions of, 219, 220; promotions to position of, 220 et seq.; ten- ure of office of, 234 et seq.; residential requirements for, 242 et seq.: solution of prob- lem regarding, 246 et seq.; re- lation of chief of police to, 251 et seq. See also Director of Public Safety. Commissioners, police, Boston, 123; Fall River, 124; Balti- more, 129; St. Louis, 129; functions of, 138; objections to state control of, 141 et seq. See also Board Competitive system of police promotion, 279 et seq. 394 Index Connecticut, police legislation in, 204 Conrad, Mayor, 71 Constables' Watch, 59 Copenhagen, 3; police commis- sioner, 237 Constabulary, state, system, 171 Constables, English method of recruiting, 277, 278 Coordination, plea for, in de- tective work, 338 et seq. Costello, A. E., Our Police Pro- tectors, cited, 59, note; 71, note Courts, magistrates', laxity in, 41-43; disciplinary, 281 et seq. Crime, preponderance of, in America, 9-27; relation of he- terogeneity of population to, 20 et seq.; tables, 21, 22, 23 ; responsibility of lax magis- trates, 34 et seq.; the public and, 43 et seq.; prevention of, 2I 9> 354 et seq.; breeding places of, 358 et seq.; condi- tions making for, 363 et seq.; public precautions against, 363 et seq.; development of pre- vention bureau, 368 et seq. Crime Prevention, by Arthur Woods, quoted, 342, 355, 374, 375, 378 Criminals, identification of, 142; methods of identification of, 348 et seq. Curtis, Commissioner, in rela- tion to competitive examina- tions, 2gs, note Czechs, 8 Dactyloscopic (finger-print) sys- tem of identification, 348 et seq. Dallas, Tex., 138, note; 162, 174; director of public safety, 181 Danzig, 5 Dayton, O., bi-partisan board in, no; 138, note; 174, note; city manager, 186, 187; police su- pervision in, igo-192; detec- tive bureau, 328 Denver, state control in, 101 ; 137, note ; term of chief of po- lice, 255; organization of de- tective bureau, 334 Des Moines, 174, note; 185; term of chief of police, 255 Destitution. See Poverty Detective bureau, Paris, 3, 142; organization of, 333; plea for more businesslike methods in, 339 et seq. Detective force, 326 et seq.; se- lection of personnel, 328 et seq.; functions of, 354; cam- paign in New York against gangsters, 362, 363 Detective record systems, 340, 341 Detective work, lack of super- vision in, 342 et seq. Detectives, 220; term of chief of, 255; 312; training of, 331 et seq.; precinct, 334 et seq. Detroit, 6, 32, note; 79, 92, 93, 98, 108, 137, 168, note; 204; irrelevant functions of po- lice, 212; police administrative experiments, 228, 255; police methods, 279; police training school system, 298; patrol sys- tem, 309, 311 ; detective bureau, 331; detective record, 346; training of detectives, 350; chart of police department or- ganization, 370, 385 Devizes, Eng., 245 Director of public safety, choice of, 175 et seq.; 178, 179, 181, 395 Index 191 et seq.; responsibility di- vided with city commission, examples, 182, 183. See also Commissioner. Discipline, civil service in rela- tion to, 281 et seq. Dismissal, system in American cities, 287 et seq. Disorderly houses, 123 Draft Riots, 380, 381 Dresden, state-controlled police expenditure, 134, note ; 245 ; detective record system, 347 Drugs, as crime breeders, 357, 358 Durham, N. C, 151, note Dutch Colonists, 59 East St. Louis, 111., Congres- sional investigation of negro riots in, 41, note; 174, note; 182, note; detective force, 327 Edinburgh, chief of police quoted on homicide, 14 Education, of public by police, 364 Efficiency tests, 280, 281 Elgin, 111., personnel of com- mission, 176 Ellis, Havelock, cited, 57, note Emerson, Ralph Waldo, Politics, quoted, 56 End of Law as Developed in Le- gal Rules and Doctrines, The, by Roscoe Pound, 47, note Enforcement of Laws in Cities, by Brand Whitlock, cited, 53, note England, combined population of, and Wales, 10; murders in, and Wales, table. 1 1 ; prompt- ness of justice in, 36 et seq.; 116; standardization of police system in, 172, 173; police leg- islation in, 208 et seq.; police commissioners in, 209; police machinery of, 211; police ex- ecutives in, 225 ; police admin- istration in, 232 et seq.; police control in, 241 ; 242 ; police strikes in, 318; creation of Po- lice Federation in, 321, note; training of detectives in, 332. See also Great Britain. Enquirer, Cincinnati, cited, 99, note Enright, Commissioner, New York, reorganization of detec- tive bureau by, 337; quoted on gambling places, 358, 359 Europe, police of, and America contrasted, 3 et seq.; patrol system in, 201 ; contrast of po- lice legislation in, and Amer- ica, 208 et seq.; extraordinary functions of police departments in, 211 et seq.; in relation to residential qualifications for commissioner, 242 et seq.; po- lice organizations of, and America contrasted, 274 et seq.; detective schools in, 332 ; detective record systems in, 347; identification systems of, 348 et seq.; 379 et seq. European Police Systems, by Raymond B. Fosdick: cited, 83, note; 134; 169, 170, 172, 211, 223, 225, 232, 236, 237, 238, 240, 244, 245, 27s, 296, 305, 320, 348, 352 Evening News, Detroit, cited on self-government, 98, note Evening Post, New York, cited, 325 Evening Transcript, Boston, cited, 95, 96 Evolution of Our Criminal Pro- cedure, by Samuel Scoville, Jr., quoted, 31 Examinations, of candidates for 396 Index promotion, 279; Commissioner Woods quoted on civil service, 289, 290; for detective force, 328 et seq. Ex-convicts, the police and, 366 Fall River, Mass., 6; in relation to state-controlled police, 119; police departmnet, 123; 124, 137, note; 155, 162, 164 Federalists, 74 Finger-print (dactyloscopic) sys- tem of identification, 348 et seq. Flushing, N. Y., 82, note Folk, Joseph W., cited, 126; quoted, 13s, 136 Ford cars, in patrol system, 310, 3ii Fort Worth, Texas, 174, note Fouche, the Paris police and, in France, 116; the police commis- sioner in, 209; criminal identi- fication system of, 348, 349; national bureau of identifica- tion, 351 Free Press, Detroit, quoted on state police legislation, 92 Fresno, Cal., 174, note Fuld, Leonhard Felix, Police Administration, cited, 57, note; cited, 277 Gambling, quotation from Chi- cago superintendent of police on, 42; dens, 123, 357 et seq. Gangsters, police and, 360 et seq. Gemeinderath, 233 Geneva, 223; police administra- tion, 233 Gerard, J. W., quoted, 71 Germans, 8 Germany, 116; state-controlled police expenditures, 134, note; unnecessary functions of po- lice department in, 211; police administration in, 234; police control in, 241 Girard, Stephen, bequest to Philadelphia police, 63 ; clause of will quoted, 63, 64, note Glasgow, homicide record of, 13; police administration, 233; 236 Globe, Boston, quoted, 96 Goodnow, Frank J., Municipal Home Rule, cited, 120, note Government by Commission, by Clinton Rogers Woodruff, cited, 174, note Grand Rapids, 138, 186; term of chief of police, 256 Grant, Mayor, 103 Great Britain, 211, 244; police methods of, 277 et seq.; bu- reau of identification, 351. See also England Greenville, S. C, 151, note Greve, Charles Theodore, cited, 63, note; 74 Guild, Governor, quoted on sin- gle commissioner for Boston, 108 Gunmen, 360 et seq. Guttenberg, N. J., population of, 167 Hague, The, 3 Hamburg, Germany, police pres- ident of, 237 Harper's police, 66, note Hartford, Conn., 161 ; police system of, 271, note Hatton, A. R., The Control of Police, cited, 120, note " Hawes " board, 126 Helper, Hinton R., The Impend- ing Crisis, 90, note Henry, Sir Edward, police com- missioner of London, 225; term of service, 236 397 Index Herald, Cleveland, quoted on his- tory of police force, 93 History and Analysis of the Commissioner and City Mana- ger Plans of Municipal Gov- ernment in the United States, by Tsao-Shuen Chang, cited, 174, 17s, note History of the Government of Denver, by Clyde Lyndon King, quoted, 101 Hoboken, population of, 167; police, 168 Hoffman, Frederick L., cited, 32, note Home rule, state control in re- lation to problem, 128 et seq.; 210 Homicide, comparative table of, 13; 29 et seq. Houston, Texas, 138, note; 174, note; 175; personnel of com- mission, 176 Identification, methods of crim- inal, 348 et seq.; plea for a na- tional system, 350-353 Illinois, delays of justice in, 34 Indianapolis, 7, 107, 115, 137; size of police board, 138; 139, !55> 157 ; jurisdiction of di- rector of public safety, 188, note; politics and police ad- ministration, 233; police sys- tem, 270, 272, 273, 297; or- ganization of detective bureau, 334 International Association of Chiefs of Police, 351, 358, note Italians, 5, 8 Italy, national bureau of identifi- cation in, 351 Ivin, William M., cited, 213, 214, note Jackson, Andrew, 74; quoted, 83 Jacksonville, Fla., 174, note Jamaica, N. ,Y., 82, note Jefferson, Thomas, Works, quoted, 75, note Jersey City, 137; population of, 167; 169, 170, 174, note; per- sonnel of commission, 176; director of public safety, 182, 183; 184; police methods in, 279; 280, 281 Jones, Mayor of Toledo, 55 Journal of the American Insti- tute of Criminal Law and Criminology, quoted on police training course, 299, note; cited, 346, note; cited, 358 Judicial Statistics of Scotland, cited on murders, 11, note Junior police, 368 et seq. Juvenile delinquency, 367 et seq. Juvenile officers, 371 et seq. Kalamazoo, Mich., 174, note; 186, note Kane, Colonel, 90, note Kansas City, Kan., 174, note Kansas City, Mo., 79, 91, 114; in relation to state-controlled police, 119; 120, 137; size of police board, 138, 144, 150, 162 ; personnel of commission, 176; 232 ; police system, 270 ; police superintendent, 272; 297; pa- trol system, 309, 310; detective bureau, 328; arrests in, 340; inadequacy of police records, 341 Kiel, 5 Kiev, 6 King, Clyde Lyndon, quoted, 101 King, Governor of New York, 84 Kinney, Inspector, Detroit, 39* Index quoted on automobiles in pa- ■trol work, 311, 312 Know-Nothing riots, Cincinnati, 72 Konigsberg, 5 Konversationslexikon, Meyer, cited, 5 Kuzios, Ben, docket quoted in case of, 35, 36 La Salle, 79, note Labor unionism, the police and, 322 et seq. Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function, by J. C. Carter, quoted, 47 Law, Police and Social Prob- lems, Newton D. Baker, 57, note Leadership, principle of respon- sible, 160 et seq. *' Leatherhead," defined, 61, note Leavenworth, Kan., 351 Leipzig, state-controlled police expe-iditure, 134, note; police administration, 233 Levermore, Charles H., cited, 60, note Lexow Commission, 103; report on bi-partisan board, quoted, 104; 114; report of, quoted, 214; 381 Lichtenberg, 170 Limits of Effective Legal Action, by Dean Roscoe Pound, cited, 47 Liquor Laws, 123 Liverpool, homicides in, 11; comparative table of homicides in, 13; 112; police administra- tion, 233; 245; police strike, 3i8 London, 3 ; national character Of population, 4; 5; murders in, 11 ; homicides in, compara- tive table, 13; Assizes, mur- der trials in, 36; in; di- vided police jurisdiction, 169; 201, 223; police commissioner, 225 ; police administration, 232; average term of commis- sioner's office tenure, 236; 244, 245; appointments to police department, 277, 278; promo- tion method, 295 et seq.; in relation to police training school, 305'; police strike, 318, 320; national bureau of identi- fication at, 351 ; prestige of po- lice department, 380 London and New York: Their Crime and Police, by James W. Gerard, quoted, 71 Long, Chief of Police, Newark, quoted on relation between drugs and crime, 358 < Long Island City, 168 Los Angeles, homicides in, 13; 114; 137, 162; size of police board, 138; 143; police depart- men , 194 et seq.; police ad- ministrative experiments, 229; term of chief of police, 254; police methods, 279, 280, 281 ; patrol system, 309; detective bureau, 328; juvenile bureau of police department, 372 ; 277 > chart of police department or- ganization, 386 Louisville, negroes in, 7; 137; size of police board, 138; ju- risdiction of director of pub- lic safety, 188, note; police system, 270, 273, 274; police training school system, 298 et seq.; detective bureau, 328 Lowell, President A. Lawrence; 138, note ; 174, note ; cited, 180 : Public Opinion and Popular Government, cited, 238; 242 399 Index Lucas, George, the case of, 36 Lynn, Mass., 174; personnel of commission, 176 Lynchburg, Va., 174, note Machine, the police forec as a, 313 Macon, Ga., 283 Manchester, Eng., 112; police administration, 233; 236; 245 Manchester, N. H., term of chief of police, 256 Marseilles, 223 ; police adminis- tration, 233 Massachusetts, state control, 123 ; 240 Matsell, Chief of Police, New York, "J2, note Mayne, Sir Richard, first chief of Metropolitan Police Force, 83, 84; term of service, 236 Mayor-commissioner, salary of, 175, note Memphis, negroes in, 7; murder record, 25; 52, 137, note; 162, 174, note ; mayor-commis- sioner's salary, 175, note; com- missioner of fire and police, 179, 181 ; term of chief of po- lice, 254 ; 282 ; detective bureau, 328 Metropolitan Police Force, Lon- don, 3, 4, in, 201, 233 Meudon, 170 Michigan, police legislation, 203 Milwaukee, 105 ; 107 ; size of po- lice board, 138; powers of po- lice board, 139; 155, note; other functions combined with police, 188, note; proportion of police to population, 201 ; irrelevant functions of police, 212 ; police methods, 279; 280, 281, 283 Minneapolis, 102, 107, 137, 162; term of chief of police, 254, 255 ; police system, 271 ; 280, 281 Missouri, police control, 119; state-controlled police expen- diture, 135; police legislation, 207 Mobile, board of public safety, 188, note Mobilization, types of police, ex- plained, 215 et seq. Montgomery, Ala., police control in, 119 Morgan, Governor, New York, 84; quoted, 88 Moscow, 6 Motor vehicles, part played in patrol work, 309 et seq. Munich, 244, 245 Municipal Freedom, Oswald Ryan, cited, 174, note Municipal vs state control, 118- 159, passim Munro, William Bennett, Prin- ciples and Methods of Munici- pal Administration, cited, 120, note Murder, comparative statistics, 10 et seq.; trials, 33-37 Naples, 245 Napoleon, establishment of Paris police organization by, 111 ^Nashville, 52; negroes in, 138, note ; 162, 174, note ; 175 ; com- missioner of fire and police, 179 National Bureau of Criminal Identification, 351 National Municipal Review, cited, 186, note National Police Journal, cited, 350, note Negro, relative population, table, 7; criminal record in Washing- ton, D. C, tables, 22, 23 ; riots in East St. Louis, 41, note; 65 400 Index Neukolln, 170 New Bedford, 138, note New City Government, The, by Henry Bruere, cited, 174, note New Hampshire, police control, 119 New Haven, 137, note; size of police board, 138; 141, note; 143, IS5, note; 204 New Jersey, police situation in northern, 169; disciplinary ac- tions in, 282, note New Orleans, negroes in, 7 ; Sun- day law, 49, 52; 78, 94, 98, 115; peculiarities of police control, 133; size of police board, 139; 174, note; director of public safety, 178; proportion of po- lice to population, 201 ; 229, note ; police methods, 277 ; de- tective bureau, 328; inade- quacy of police records, 341 New York, heterogeneous popu- lation of, 4 et seq.; homicides in, comparative table, 13; study of homicide record, 23; delay of justice in, 34, 35; genesis of police force, 59; 62, 66; riots in, 72, 73; example of, 81 et seq.; 105, 107, 108; 159; suburbs of, 167; propor- tion of police to population, 201 ; police arrangements, 202 ; police legislation, 205 ; 208 ; ir- relevant functions of police, 212-214; police commissioner, 217 et seq.; cost of police de- partment, 218; 220; police ad- ministrative experiments, 227, 228; 231; commissioner's ten- ure of office, 235 et seq.; 239; uniformed police in, 269; civil service and police system, 271 ; recruiting system, 278; police methods, 279, 280, 281; trial system, 282 et seq.; 285; dis- missals from force, 288, 289; police training school system, 298 et seq.; patrol system, 309; detective bureau, 328, 331; at- titude toward training de- tectives, 332 ; reorganization of detective bureau, 336, 337; method of detective supervi- sion, 342; police records, 344; detective records, 346; gangs in, 360 et seq.; development of crime prevention bureau, 368 et seq.; parole officers in, 377, note ; police force in 1863, 381 ; chart of police department or- ganization, 387 Newark, N. J., 65, note ; 67, 105 ; director of public safety, 178, 179; commissioner's tenure of office, 238; police methods, 277, 279 ; 281 ; police training school system, 298 et seq.; training of detectives, 331; organization of detective bu- reau, 334; method of detective supervision, 343; in relation to juvenile delinquents, 373 Newtown, N. Y., 82, note Niagara Frontier Police Bill, 79, note Night watch, 60 Norfolk, Va., 174, note; 186, note North Bergen, population of, 167 Nott, Judge Carl, Coddling the Criminal, quoted, 31 Oakland, Cal., 137, note; 174, note ; police methods, 277 ; in relation to criminal identifica- tion, 350 O'Connor, John J., 256, 257 401 Index Odessa, 6 Ohio, police legislation, 204; home rule in, 210; disciplinary actions in, 282, note Oldham, Eng., 245 Omaha, 94, 105, 107, 109, 115, 137, note; director of public safety, 181, 182, 184, 185; po- lice system, 271 ; 282, note O'Meara, Commissioner Stephen, of Boston; quoted on the lax- ity of magistrates, 41, 42; quoted on political freedom re- sulting from state police con- trol, 122; 159, 230; 290; quot- ed, 294, note ; quoted on sys- tem of promotion, 295 Oregon, homicide in, 31, 32 Ottawa, Canadian national bureau of identification at, 351 Our Police Protectors, A. E. Costello, cited, 59, note Paris, foreign-born element in, 5; in, 201, 223; police admin- istration, 232; in relation to police 'training school, 305 ; training of detectives, 377 Parole officers, 377 Party machine, civil service vs., 271 et seq. Passing of the Bertillon System of Identification, The, by Raymond B. Fosdick, cited, 3SO Paterson, 43 Patrol, old system of, 109 et seq.; 306 et seq.; decline of foot, 407, note Patrolmen, politics and, 153, 154; 220; contrast between European and American meth- ods of appointment, 277 et seq.; qualifications of, accord- ing to Commissioner O'Meara, 290, 291 ; " crime prevention," 359, 360; and juvenile delin- quents, 371, 372 Peel, Sir Robert, 83, 208 Pennsylvania, law's delays in, 34; police legislation in, 239 Peterson, Leroy, cited, 367; quoted, 377, note Petrograd, 6 Philadelphia, genesis of police force, 59-65; 66, 77, 78, 109, 132, 137; jurisdiction of di- rector of public safety, 188, note; 192 et seq.; patrol sys- tem, 198 ; proportion of police to population, 201 ; 202 ; irrel- evant functions of police, 212, 213 ; cost of police depart- ment, 218; police administra- tive experiments, 228; 231; commissioner's tenure of of- fice, 237; term of office of chief of police (superinten- dent), 255; 280, 281, 283, 284, 285, 291 ; police training school system, 298 et seq.; detective bureau, 328; police records, 341 ; chart of police depart- ment organization, 388 Phillips, Wendell, speech of, cited, 88, note Pittsburgh, 132, 137, 162; super- intendent of police, 197; pro- portion of police to popula- tion, 201 ; police administrative experiments, 228; police ad- ministration and politics, 233 ; term of chief of police, 254 ; 2 55; police methods, 277, 279; disciplinary record, 286, 287; civil service in, 292; detective bureau, 327, 328; 338 Plainclothes men, 337, 338 402 Index Playgrounds, in relation to crime prevention, 369 Poles, 8 Police, the American problem, 3 et seq.; victims of the law's delay, 27 et seq.; and Sunday laws, 49 et seq.; vexations of early, 59 et seq.; rise of self- controlled system, 80 et seq.; part played by politics in de- velopment of, us et seq.; state- controlled, 128 et seq.; method of appointing and removing of- ficers under state control, 139 et seq.; appointments of heads, 160 et seq.; 161, 165; jurisdic- tion of Berlin president, 170; uniformed police, 268 et seq.; civil service in relation to, 270 et seq.; promotion of uni- formed, 279 et seq.; school, 298 et seq.; types of mobilization explained, 315 et seq.; unions, 316 et seq.; responsibility of public to, 320 et seq.; in relation to crime prevention, 354 et seq.; duty of, in regard to breeding places of crime, 357 et seq.; campaign against gang- sters, 362, 363; ex-convicts and, 366 ; in relation to poverty as a source of crime, 374 et seq.; women, 376, note; prog- ress of American police system, 380 et seq.; summary of prob- lem, 382, 383 Police administration, task of, 218 et seq.; and politics, 231 et seq. Police boards, rise of, 76 et seq.; in commission-governed cities; 182, note Police control, development of American, 58 et seq.; com- mencement of consolidation in, 67 et seq.; changes in, during So years, 112, 113; present state of, 118; state vs. munici- pal, 119 et seq.; financial secur- ity of state control, 133 et seq.; development of single-headed, I S7-iS9; special problems of, 160-187 Police department, jurisdiction of, 166 et seq.; legal restric- tions governing, 203 et seq.; irrelevant functions of, 211 et seq.; organization of, 188- 216 Police force, Greater New York, 168 ; commission government and, 174 et seq. Police Federation created by Parliament, 321, note Police Functions in Labor Dis- putes, by Arthur Woods, cited, 325 Police Practice and Procedure, uses of, 302 Police Records and Recollec- tions, by E. H. Savage, cited, 59, note; 62, 63, notes Policemen, terms of service in early days, 68 et seq. Policemen and the Public, by Arthur Woods; cited, 57, note; quoted, 292, 293; cited, 325 Politi, Copenhagen, 3 Politics, part played by, in de- velopment of police organiza- tion, 115 et seq.; in board ad- ministration, 149-151 ; in rela- tion to chief of police, 256; in relation to detective force, 330; and the police, 381 Pool-selling, 357 et seq. Population, comparative study of European and American, 4 et seq. 403 Index Portland, Ore., 137, 174, note; detective bureau, 327 Posen, 5 Pound, Dean Roscoe, cited, 47; quoted on the function of law, 53, note Poverty, as a source of crime, 374 et seq. Presidium, Vienna, 117 Prague, 5 Pratt, Joshua, 58, note Precautions Against Crime, cir- cular, quoted, 364, 365 Prefect jurisdiction of Paris, 170 ; powers of, in Europe, 274, 275 Prevention of crime, 2ig et seq. Probation officers, 373 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, quoted, 289, 290 Procedure, technicalities of crim- inal, 29 et seq. Promotions, to administrative positions, 220 et seq.; civil service applied to, 279 et seq. Providence, R. I., 65, note; 102; 137; size, police board, 138; 162, 164; police system, 271, note Public, relation of, to police, 43 et seq.; responsibility to police, 320 et seq. Public Opinion and Popular Government, by A. Lawrence Lowell, cited, 180 Pullman, Major, murder statis- tics of Washington, D. C, fur- nished by, 26; 230; quoted on facilities for homicide, 363 Questore di Roma, title of police commissioner at Rome, 245 Quigley, Chief, Rochester, N. Y., 265 Reading, Penn., 138, note; 174, note; police system, 271, note Recollections of a New York Chief of Police, by George W. Walling, cited, 87 Record systems, detective, 346 et seq.; importance of exact, 347, 348 "Red-light" districts, 357 Reform of Legal Procedure, The, by Moorfield Storey, 28, note; quoted, 30, 37, note Reinstatement, methods of, 287 et seq. Republic of New Haven, by Charles H. Levermore, cited, 60, note. Residence, European and Amer- ican qualifications for police- men, 277 et seq. Richmond, Va., negroes in, 7; 79, 137, note Roanoke, Va., 174, note Robbery, comparative statistics, 17, 18 Rochester, 137, note; 172, police methods, 277 Rome, Italy, 223 ; police admin- istration, 232 ; police commis- sion, 245 ; Italian national bu- reau of identification at, 351 Roosevelt, Theodore, Autobiog- raphy, quoted on police exam- inations, 291 Root, Elihu, quoted on the lib- erty of law, 55' Roumanians, 8 Royal Irish Constabulary, 225 Ruef-Schmitz, regime in San Francisco, 145 Russians, 5, 8 Ryan, Oswald, 174 note Saloons, 127 Salt Lake City, 138, note; di- 404 Index rector of public safety, 179; 182; patrol system, 199; police administrative experiments, 229; police system, 274, 350 San Antonio, Texas, 138, note; 174, note; 182; term of chief of police, 254; police system, 270 San Diego, Cal., 186, note San Francisco, 37, note; 74, 75, 94, 95. i°7, US. 143, I4S. ISO, 155', 157 ! police legislation, 206, 207; police administrative ex- periments, 229; commissioner's tenure of office, 238; residence requirements for commis- sioner, 243 ; term of chief of police, 254, 255 ; police meth- ods, 277, 279 ; detective bureau, 327, 328, 330; organization of detective bureau, 333, 338; po- lice records, 341; detective su- pervision, 343; in relation to criminal identification, 350 ; de- velopment of police force, 381 Savage, E. H., Police Records and Recollections, cited, 59, note; 62, 63, notes Savannah, negroes in, 7 Saxony state-controlled police expenditure, 134, note Schneider, Albert, cited, 299, note Schoneberg, 170 Scotland, murders in, compara- tive table, 11; homicides in, 13 Scotland Yard, organization, 1 17 ; 201; identification system, 351; 353 Scoville, Samuel, Jr., Evolution of Our Criminal Procedure, quoted, 31 Scranton, 137, note Seattle, 137; patrol system, 199; 280, 281 ; method of training detectives, 331, 332; police rec- ords, 341 ; method of detective supervision, 343 ; in relation to criminal identification, 350 Self-protection, 363 et seq. Sergeants, promotion of, 280 Servants, police suggestions as to, 364 Service de I'identite judiciaire, Paris, 351 Sevres, 170 Seymour, Horatio, 89, note Shankland, Justice, opinion of, on state control, quoted, 85, note Shea, Cornelius, 37, note Shilitano, Oresto, case of, 34, 35 Sing Sing, Commissioner Woods' assurance to convicts seeking to make an honest living, 366; record of result, 366; 367 Siracusa Sam, case of, 34 Slavs, 8 South African War, 22s Spectator, cited, 32, note Sprague, Charles, case of, 34 Springfield, Mass., 137, note; 162, 164 Springfield, O., 186, note Spokane, 137, note; 174, note; commissioner's salary, 175, note St. Cloud, 170 St. Joseph, Mo., in relation to state police control, 119, 127 St. Louis, 8; homicides in, 13; murder record, 25 ; 79, 91 ; in relation to state-controlled po- lice, 119, 120, 126, 129, 132, 133, 135, 137 ; size of police board, 138; 139, 143, 162; police leg- islation, 207 ; commissioner's tenure of office, 237; residen- 405 Index tial requirements of commis- sioner, 243 ; police system, 271, note ; police methods, 277, 281 ; 283 ; police training school sys- tem, 298 et seq.; detective bu- reau, 328; reorganization of detective bureau, 337, 338; spe- cialization in detective bureau, 33S ; 341 ; detective records, 346; 350; parole bureau, 377, note; chart of police depart- ment organization, 389 St. Paul, 109, 137, note; 174, note ; commissioner's salary, 175, note; 181, 184; term of chief of police, 254; police sys- tem, 270; 283; detective bu- reau, 328 Star, Kansas City, cited, 145; quoted on reorganization of police force, 272 Star, St. Louis, quoted, 135 State control of police, 118 et seq.; successes of, 121 et seq.; failures, 125 et seq.; in relation to home rule problems, 128 et seq.; comparative cost of, ta- bles, 133; applicability of, 136 et seq. Station houses, 133 Statistische Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin, cited, 5 Storey, Moorfield, The Reform of Legal Procedure, 28, note; quoted, 30, 37, note Strikes, the public and, 318 et seq.; and the police, 322 et seq. Stuttgart, police administration, 233; 244; 347 Sullivan Law, 362 Sun, New York, quoted on Tweed Ring, 97, 98 Suburbs, growth of, 166 et seq. Supervision, 190 et seq. Switzerland, 116; police commis- sion, 209; police administra- tion in, 233; police control, 241 ; 244 Syracuse, 137, note; police ad- ministrator's term of service, 239 Tacorna, 138, note; 174; in re- lation to criminal identifica- tion, 350 Taft, William H., quoted, 28 Tammany, 231 Task of Social Hygiene, Have- lock Ellis, 57, note Thaw, Harry, 37, note Thugs, 360 et seq. Times, London, cited, 320 Times, New York, quoted, 45; quoted on New York police force of 1857, 85 ; quoted on state-controlled police, 97 ; quoted on political patronage, 103, note Toledo, 55, 100, 107, 137, note; 210; chief of police, 258 Tonawanda, 79, note Topeka, Kan., personnel of po- lice commission, 176, 178 Traffic, 202 Training school, needed for po- lice administrators, 247 ; for re- cruits and policemen, 298-299; the New York school, 299-305 ; for detectives, 331-333 Trenton, N. J., 138, note; 174, note; police arrangements, 202 Trials, criminal, 33-39; discipli- nary, 281 et seq. Trial board, 285 ; 296, note Tribune, New York, quoted on police force of 1857, 81 ; 88, 89, 90 Tsao-Shuen Chang, cited, 174, 175, note 406 Index Tweed, William, charter of, 97, 98, 103 Uniforms, early attitude of po- lice toward, 70 et seq. University of California, police training at, 333 Urban, Leo, case of, 35 Vancouver, in relation to crim- inal identification, 350 Van Wyck, Mayor, 105, 106 Venice, 5 Vienna, national character of population, 5; murder average, 14; in, 223; police adminis- tration, 232; police president, 237; system of training detec- tives, 332, 333; detective rec- ord system, 347 Vollmer, August, chief of police, Berkeley, Cal., cited, 299, note; quoted on automobile patrol, 310, 311; The Policeman as a Social Worker, by, cited, 373, note; quoted, 377 Waldo, Commissioner, reorgan- ization of the New York de- tective bureau by, 337 Wales, population of England and, 10; police legislation, 208 Walling, George W., cited, 87, note Waltham, Mass., 174, note Warsaw, 6 Washington, D. C, negroes in, 7 ; homicides in, 13 ; negro crimes in, 22, 23; murder rec- ord, 25, 26; 137, note; 174, note; irrelevant functions of police, 212; police system, 271, note; police methods, 277; de- tective bureau, 328; 351, 358, 363; juvenile criminal record, 367; chart of, police depart- ment organization, 390 " Watch Committee, The," 208 Weber, Albert J., cited, 358, note Weehawken, 167 West Hoboken, policing in, 167, 168 West Point, in relation to police school, 203 et seq. West Virginia, 29 Wheeling, W. Va., 174, note Whitlock, Brand, 53, note; quoted on Sunday violations, 54, 55 Wichita, Kan., personnel of po- lice commission, 178; 186, note Wilson, James Grant, cited, 59, note Women police, 376, 377, note Wood, Mayor, quoted on police legislation, 85; 87, note Woodruff, Clinton Rogers, Gov- ernment by Commission, cited, 174, note Woods, Commissioner, Arthur, quoted on law's delays, 40; 159; 229, 230, 235; quoted on tenure of office, 23s; 281; 286; quoted on civil service exam- inations, 289, 290; 292, 293; in relation to New York police training school, 301 ; in rela- tion to police technique, 304,. 305; order by, in regard to strikes, 323; quoted, 324, 325; and detective instruction, 332; 333, note; reorganization of New York detective bureau by, 337; quoted on detective su- pervision, 342; quoted on pre- vention of crime, 355 ; experi- ment of, in crime diminution, 360 ; quoted on gangmen, 361 ; attitude toward ex-convicts 407 Index and result of his efforts, 366; Wright, William, case of, 36 establishes Junior Police, 369; quoted, 369; and city play- Young, Matthew, 62 grounds, 369 ; 370 ; quoted on Youngstown, 138, note poverty, 374; 377, 378, note Worcester, Mass., 137, 162, 164 Zurich, 3 408 m vL.,-- ;_•; - l " ■;.*£