QJornell Itiiuetsttg Siihracg atljaca, JJeiii f ni-lt THE JAMES VERNER SCAIFE COLLECTION CIVIL WAR LITERATURE THE GIFT OF JAMES VERNER SCAIFE CLASS OF 1889 1919 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030921542 Cornell University Llbrsry E547.M8 D87 1906 olin 3 1924 030 921 542 MORGAN'S CAVALRY c::<>^ MORGAN'S CAVALRY By BASIL W. DUKE ILLUSTRATED New York and Washington THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY 1906 A. 3^^207 Copyright, 1906, by THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY TO THE WOMEN OF KENTUCKY, FRIENDS AND RELATIVES OP THE GALLANT MEN WHOSE HEROISM HAS BECOME PART OF THE HISTORIC ' HERITAGE OF THE STATE, and Tq the Noble Women of the South, WHOSE KINDNESS ALLEVIATED THE HARDSHIPS WHICH THESE MEN SO LONG ENDURED, AND FOR WHOSE SAKE THEY WERE PROUD TO SUFFER AND BLEED, THIS BOOK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED ILLUSTRATIONS. John H. Morgan, ^ . . . ., Frontispiece John H. Morgan, lieutenant in the war with Mexico, 15 Map showing the military situation in Kentucky and Tennessee, 1861, 28 Map showing route taken by General Morgan in his first raid into the "Blue Grass Region" of Kentucky, July, 1862, 114 Map showing scene of General Morgan's operations previous to his raid across the Ohio, • 212 Basil W. Duke commanding ist Brigade, Morgan's Division, .... 228 Adam R. Johnson commanding 2nd Brigade, Morgan's Division, 291 Map showing route taken by General Morgan through Kentucky and Indiana, July, 1863, 294 Map showing route taken by General Morgan through Ohio, July, 1863, 322 Map showing route through Virginia of those who made their es- cape from Ohio in July and August, 1863, 374 Map showing route taken by General Morgan on his last raid into Kentucky 384 Map showing those portions of East Tennessee and West Vir- ginia, operated in by General Morgan's brigade, under com- mand of Brig. Gen. B. W. Duke, winter of 1864-65, 402 Map of route of General B. W. Duke, commanding General Morgan's cavalry, from southwest Virginia to Gen. J. E. John- ston's army at Charlotte, N. C., April, 1864, and route while with President Davis from Charlotte to the South Carolina line, 434 CONTENTS I. Personawty 0-e Generai, Morgan and His Qualities as a Commander — His Rapid Creation oe an EeeiciEnt Cavai^ry Com- mand, AND Discovery oe New Uses eor THAT Arm oe the Service, - 1 1 II. PouTiCAi, Sentiment and Conditions in Kentucky in i86i — Why She Faii^ed to Secede — Military Situation in the West — Confederate Occupation oe BowiviNG Green — Organization and Equipment oe Coneederate Troops at That Date — Their Military Character- istics, , 20 III. Morgan Leaves Home eor the Army — Scouting and Skirmishing on Green River — Organization oE "Morgan's Squadron" — Terry's Rangers — Retreat erom Bowling Green — Evacuation oe Nashville — Active and Exciting Service About L'Auvergne, MurereEsboro and Gallatin — Concentration oe Army at Corinth eor Battle, 38 IV. Battle oe Shiloh — Death oe Albert Sid- ney Johnston — Morgan made Colonel — Expedition into Tennessee — Success at Pulaski Followed by Defeat at Lebanon — "Black Bess" — Dash on Cave City, . . 75 V. Reorganization at Chattanooga — First Raid into Kentucky — Fight at Tomp- KiNSviLLE — Capture oe Lebanon — In the Heart oe the "Blue Grass" — Strategic Use oe the Telegraph — Fight at Cyn- CONTENTS IX THiANA — Return to Tennessee — Dash INTO MiDDi^ Tennessee and Service in The Vicinity oe Nashviei^e — Capture oe Boone's Regiment — Constant Skirmish- ing, Many Prisoners Taken and ParoeEd — Destruction oe the Raieroad — Sharp Combats at Gaelatin and Cairo, 105 VI. Bragg's Invasion oe Kentucky — Morgan Joins Him — "Bushwhackers" — Service IN Front oe Covington and in the Moun- tains — Beoody Combat at Augusta — Command GrEatey Increased Numericae- EY — Retreat oe Confederate Army erom Kentucky, 157 VII. Morgan Attacks and Deeeats Federaes at Lexington — Marches to Western Ken- tucky AND Thence to Gaeeatin Again — Active Service between Murereesboro AND Nashvieee — Battee' oe HartvieeE — December Raid into Kentucky — Whole- sale Destruction oe Railroad Tracks AND Bridges — Capture oe Elizabeth- town — Fight at the Rolling Fork — Midwinter Campaigning — Combats at Woodbury, Milton and Snow's Hill — Cluke's Expedition into Kentucky — Fight at Mt. Sterling, 197 VIII. Service Around Alexandria and Liber- ty — Fight at Greasy Creek — Start on The Great Raid — Passage oe the Cum- berland — Fighting at BurkesvillE, Col- umbia, Green River Bridge and Lebanon -t-Crossing the Ohio — Through Indiana AND Ohio — Constant Collisions with THE Militia — Marching around Cincin- nati — Morgan Deeeated at Bueeington, HimselE and Greater Part oe His Com- X CONTENTS. MAND Captured — In the Ohio Peniten- tiary — Morgan's Escape, 280 IX. Remnant oe Morgan's Men Serve Faith- EULtY WHILE Their Leader is in Prison — Their Conduct at Chickamauga — Mor- gan's Own Service aeter His Escape — Fights With Averii,!. and at Dubein Depot and Crockett's Cave — Last Raid INTO Kentucky — March through the Mountains — ^Beoody Combat at Mt. Sterling — Capture oe Lexington — Mor- gan Wins a Victory at Cynthiana — On The Next Day is Defeated — Retreats PROM Kentucky — Death oe Morgan — Subsequent Service op His Oed Command — Battee oe Buli^'s Gap — A Battee by MooNEiGHT — The Stoneman Raid — Bat- tle op Marion — After Lee's Surrender — Escorts Jepferson Davis from Charlotte, N. C, to Washington, Ga. — Last Coun- cil OF War — Surrender at Woodstock, . . 374 CHAPTER I. Personality of Genbrai, Morgan and His Qualities as a Com- mander—His Rapid Creation op an Efficient Cavaijiy Com- mand, and Discovery of new Uses for that Arm of the Ser- vice. In undertaking to write the history of General Morgan's services and of the command which he created, it is but fair that I acknowledge myself influenced, in a great measure, by the feelings of the friend and the follower ; that I desire, if I can do so by relating facts, of most of which I am per- sonally cognizant, to perpetuate his fame, and at the same time establish the true character of a body of men who, re- cruited and inured to war by him, served bravely and faith- fully to the close of the great struggle. General Morgan's career during the late war was 3o re- markable that it is not surprising that the public, accustomed to the contradictory newspaper versions of his exploits, should be disposed to receive all accounts of it with some incredulity. It was so rapid, so crowded with exciting in- cidents, appealed so strongly to the passions and elicited so constantly the comments of both sides, that contemporary accounts of his operations were filled with mistakes and ex- aggerations, and it is natural that some should be expected in any history of his cfimpaigns, although written after the strife is over. A narrative of the operations of a command composed, in great part, of Kentuckians, must possess some interest for the people of their own State. So. general and intense was the interest which Morgan excited among the young men of the State that he obtained recruits from every county, numbers running every risk to join him when no other leader could enlist a man. The whole State was rep- resented in his command. Many Kentuckians who had en- listed in regiments from other States procured transfers to 12 morgan's cavalry. his command, and it frequently happened that men, the bulk of whose regiments were in prison, or who had become ir- regularly detached from them by some of the many acci- dents of which the volunteer, weary of monotony, is prompt to take advantage, would attach themselves to and serve temporarily with it. Probably every native citizen of Ken- tucky who will read these lines will think of some relative or friend who at some time served with Morgan. It is a prevalent opinion that his troops were totally un- disciplined and unaccustomed to the instruction and re- straint which form the soldier. They were, to be sure, far below the standard of regular troops in these respects, and doubtless they were inferior in many particulars of drill and organization to some carefully-trained bodies of cavalry, Confederate and Federal, which were less constantly and actively engaged in service on the front. But these essential requisites to efficiency were by no means neglected or in a great degree lacking. The utmost care was exercised in the organization of every regiment to place the best men in office. No opportunity was neglected to attain proficiency in the tactics which experience had induced us to adopt, and among officers and men there was a perfect appreciation of the necessity of strict subordination, prompt, unquestioning obedience to superiors, and an active, vigilant discharge of all the duties which devolve upon the soldier in the vicinity or presence of the enemy. I do not hesitate to say that "Morgan's Division," in its best days, would have lost nothing (in points of discipline and instruction) by comparison with any of the fine cavalry commands, which did constant service, of the Confederate army, and the testimony of more than one inspecting officer can be cited to that effect. More credit, too, has been given General Morgan for qualities and ability which constitute a successful partisan to lead a handful of men than for the very decided military talents which he possessed. An even cursory study of Morgan's record will convince the military reader that the character he bore with those who served with him was deserved. That, while circumspect and MORGAN S CAVAI^RY. 1 3 neglectful of no precaution to insure success or avert disas- ter, he was extremely bold in thought and action ; that using every means to obtain extensive and accurate information (attempting no enterprise of importance without it), and careful in the consideration of every contingency, he was yet marvelously quick to combine and to revolve, and so rapid and sudden in execution as frequently to confound both friends and enemies. And above all, once convinced, he never hesitated to act ; he would back his judgment against every hazard and with every resource at his command. Whatever merit be allowed or denied General Morgan, he is beyond all question entitled to the credit of having dis- covered uses for cavalry, or rather mounted infantry, to which that arm was never applied before. While other cav- alry officers were adhering to the traditions of former wars and the systems of the schools, however inapplicable to the demands of their day and the nature of the struggle, he originated and perfected, not only a system of tactics, a method of fighting and handling men in the presence of the enemy, but also a strategy as effective as it was novel. To- tally ignorant of the art of war as learned from the books and in the academies ; an imitator in nothing ; self taught in all that he knew and did, his success was not more marked than his genius. The creator and organizer of his own little army — with a force which at no time reached four thousand -—-he killed and wounded nearly as many of the enemy and captured more than fifteen thousand. The author of the far- reaching "raid," so different from the mere cavalry dash, he accomplished with his handful of men results which would otherwise have required armies and the costly preparations of regular and extensive campaigns. I shall endeavor to show the intimate connection between his operations and those of the main army in each depart- ment where he served, and the strategic importance of even his apparently rashest and most purposeless raids, when considered with reference to their bearing upon the grand campaigns of the West. When the means at his disposal, the difficulties with which he had to contend, and the results 14 morgan's cavalry. he effected, are well understood, it will be conceded that his reputation with the Southern soldiery was not undeserved, and that to rank with the best of the many active and excel- lent cavalry officers of the West, to have had, confessedly, no equal among them except in Forrest, argues him to have possessed no common ability. For the spirit in which it is written, I have only to say that I have striven to be candid and accurate ; to that sort of impartiality which is acquired at the expense of a total divestiture of natural feeling I can lay no claim. A Southern man, once a Confederate soldier — always thoroughly Southern in sentiments and feeling — I can, of course, write only a Southern account of what I saw in the late war, and as such what is herein written must be re- ceived. John Hunt Morgan was born at Huntsville, Ala., on the 1st day of June, 1825. His father, Calvin C. Morgan, was a native of Virginia. In early manhood Mr. Morgan fol- lowed the tide of emigration flowing from Virginia to the West and began life in Alabama. In 1823 he married the daughter of John W. Hunt, of Lexington, Ky., one of the wealthiest and most successful men of the State, and one whose influence and efforts did much to develop the pros- perity of that part of it in which he resided. Mr. Morgan is described by all who knew him as a gentleman whom it was impossible to know and not to respect and esteem. His character was at once firm and attractive, but he possessed neither the robust constitution nor the adventurous and im- petuous spirit which characterized other members of his family. He was quiet and studious in his habits, and al- though fond of the society of his friends, shunned every kind of excitement. When failing health forced him to leave Alabama, he removed with his family to Kentucky and resided in Lexington for the remainder of his life. John H. Morgan's maternal grandfather, Mr. Hunt, came to Kentucky from New Jersey. His family which was of old and excellent English stock, settled originally at New- ton, Long Island, of which place his ancestor, Ralph Hunt, JOHN H. Morgan Lieutenant in the Mexican War morgan's cavai^ry. is was one of the founders. The General's mother, Mrs. Hen- rietta Hunt Morgan, was universally beloved. Exception- ally amiable and unselfish in disposition, she yet possessed very determined traits of character and positive convictions. Her son inherited from her those qualities which command- ed the perfect devotion of his followers. John H. Morgan was reared in Kentucky. When nine- teen years of age he enlisted for the Mexican War and was elected first lieutenant of Captain Perry Beard's company of Colonel Humphrey Marshall's regiment of Kentucky cavalry. His brother Calvin and his uncle Alexander G. Morgan were members of the same company. His uncle was killed at Buena Vista, in which battle Colonel Mar- shall's regiment was hotly engaged. Soon after his return home he married Miss Bruce, of Lexington, a sweet and lovely lady, who, almost from the day of her wedding, was a confirmed and patient invalid and suflferer. Immediately after his marriage, he entered energetically into business; was industrious, enterprising and prosperous, and at the breaking out of the war, in 1 86 1, he was conducting in Lex- ington two successful manufactories. Every speculation ana business enterprise in which he engaged succeeded, and he had acquired a very handsome property. This he left, when he went South, to the mercy of his enemies, making no provision whatever for its protection, and apparently caring not at all what became of it. The qualities in General Morgan which would have at- tracted most attention in private life were an exceeding gen- tleness of disposition and unbounded generosity. His kind- ness and goodness of heart were proverbial. His manner, even after he had become accustomed to command, was gentle and kind, and no doubt greatly contributed to acquire him the singular popularity which he enjoyed long before he had made his military reputation. The strong will and energy which he always displayed might not have elicited much notice had not the circumstances in which the war placed him developed and given them scope for exercise. But his aflfection for the members of his family and his 1 6 morgan's cavalry. friends, the generosity which prompted him to consult their wishes at the expense of any sacrifice of his own, his sensi- tive regard for the feehngs of others, even of those in whom he felt least interest, and his rare charity for the failings of the weak, made up a character which, even without an un- common destiny, would have been illustrious. His benevolence was so well known in Lexington that to "go to Captain Morgan" was the first thought of every orie who wished to inaugurate a charitable enterprise, and his business house was a rendezvous for all the distressed and a sort of "intelligence office" for the poor seeking employ- ment. His temper was cheerful and frequently gay; no man more relished pleasantry and mirth in the society of his friends, with whom his manner was free and even at times jovial. There was never a more sanguine man ; with him to live was to hope and to dare. Yet while rarely feeling despondency and never despair, he did not deceive himself with false or impossible expectations. He was quick to per- ceive the real and the practical, and while enterprising in the extreme he was not in the least visionary. His nerve, his powers of discrimination, the readiness with which he could surrender schemes found to be impracticable, if by chance he became involved in them, and his energy and close atten- tion to his affairs, made him very successful in business, and undoubtedly the same qualities, intensified by the demand that war made upon them, contributed greatly to his mili- tary success. He could, with more accuracy than any one, divine the plans and wishes of an enemy. This was universally re- marked, and he exhibited it, not only in correctly surmising the intentions of his own immediate opponents, but also in the opinions which he gave regarding the movements of the grand armies. He sought all the information which could, however remotely, affect his interests and designs with un- tiring avidity, and the novel and ingenious expedients he sometimes resorted to in order to obtain it would perhaps furnish materials for the most interesting chapter of his his- tory. MORGAN S CAVAI^RY. 1 7 He had another faculty which is very essential to military success; indispensably necessary, at any rate, to a cavalry commander who acts independently and at such distances from any base or support as he almost constantly did. I be- lieve the English term it having "a good eye for a coun- try." It is the faculty of rapidly acquiring a correct idea of the nature and peculiar features of any country in which mil- itary operations are to be conducted. He neglected nothing that a close study of maps and careful inquiry could furnish of this sort of knowledge, but after a brief investigation or experience, he generally had a better understanding of the subject than either map-makers or natives could give him. However imperfect might be his acquaintance with a country, it was nearly impossible for a guide to deceive him. What he had once learned in this respect he never forgot. A road once traveled was always afterward familiar to him, with distances, localities and the adjacent country. Thus, always having in his mind a perfect idea of the region where he principally operated, he could move with as much facility and confidence (when there) without maps and guides as with them. His favorite strategy on his important expeditions or "raids" was to place himself by long and swift marches — moving sometimes for days and nights without a halt except to feed the horses — in the very heart of the territory where were the objects of his enterprise. He relied upon this method to confuse if not to surprise his enemy, and prevent a concentration of his forces. He would then strike right and left. He rarely declined upon such expeditions to fight when advancing, for it was his theory that then a concentra- tion of superior forces against him was more difficult, and that the vigor of his enemy was to a certain extent paralyzed by the celerity of his own movements and the mystery which involved them. But after commencing his retreat, he would use every effort and strategem to avoid battle, fearing that while fighting one enemy others might overtake him, and believing that at such times the morale of his own troops was somewhat impaired. No leader could make more skill- 1 8 morgan's cavalry. ful use of detachments. He would throw them out to great distances, even when surrounded by superior and active forces, and yet rarely was one of them (commanded by a competent officer who obeyed instructions) overwhelmed or cut off. It very seldom happened that they failed to accom- plish the purposes for which they were dispatched, or to re- join the main body in time to assist in decisive action. He could widely separate and apparently scatter his forces and yet maintain such a disposition of them as to have all well in hand. When pushing into the enemy's lineshe would send these detachments in every direction, until it was im- possible to conjecture his real intentions — causing, gener- ally, the shifting of troops from point to point as each was threatened, until the one he wished to attack was weakened, when he would strike at it like lightning. He knew how to thoroughly confuse and deceive an enemy, and induce in him (as he desired) false confidence or undue caution; how to isolate and persuade or compel him to surrender without giving battle; and he could usually manage, although inferior to the aggregate of the hostile forces around him, to be stronger or as strong at the point and moment of encounter. He seldom failed to discern and to take advantage of the ruling characteristics of those who approached him, and he could subsidize the knowledge and talents of other men with rare skill. He especially excelled in judging men collect- ively. He knew exactly how to appeal to the feelings of his men, to excite their enthusiasm, and stimulate them to dare any danger and endure any fatigue and hardship. But he sometimes committed the gravest errors in his estimation of individual character. General Morgan had more of those personal qualities which make a man's friends devoted to him than any one I have ever known. He was himself very warm and constant in the friendships which he formed. It seemed impossible for him to do enough for those to whom he was attached, or to ever give them up. His manner, when he wished, pre- possessed every one in his favor. He was generally more morgan's cavalry. 19 courteous and attentive to his inferiors than to his equals and superiors. This may have proceeded in a great measure from his jealousy of dictation and impatience of restraint, but was the result also of warm and generous feeling. His greatest faults arose out of his kindness and easiness of dis- position, which rendered it impossible for him to say or do unpleasant things, unless when under the influence of strong prejudice or resentment. This temperament made him a too lax disciplinarian, and caused him to be frequently imposed upon. He was exceedingly and unfeignedly modest. For a long time he sought, in every way, to avoid the applause and ovations which met him every where in the South, and he never learned to keep a bold countenance when receiving them. His personal appearance and carriage were striking and graceful. His features were eminently handsome and adapted to the most pleasing expressions. His eyes were small, of a grayish blue color, and their glances keen and thoughtful. His figure on foot or on horseback was superb. He was exactly six feet in height, and although not at all corpulent, weighed one hundred and eighty-five pounds. His form was perfect and the rarest combination of strength, activity, and grace. His constitution seemed impervious to the effects of privation and exposure, and it was scarcely possible to perceive that he suffered from fatigue or lack of sleep. Men are not often born who can wield such an influence as he exerted, apparently without an effort ; who can so win men's hearts and stir their blood. He will, at least, be re- membered until the Western cavalrymen and their children have all died. The bold riders who live in the border-land, whose every acre he made historic, will leave many a story of his audacity and wily skill. CHAPTER II. Political Sentiment and Conditions i'n Kentucky in i86i — ^Why She Failed to Secede — MiuTARY Situation in the West — Con- FEDESATE Occupation of Bowling GkSEn — Organization and Equipment of Confederate Troops at that Date— Their Mili- tary Characteristics. ThB position assumed by Kentucky at the inception of the great struggle, and her conduct throughout it, excited the surprise and, in no small degree, incurred the ill-will of both the contending parties. But while both North and South, at some time, doubted her good faith and complained of her action, such sentiment has been forgotten by the lat- ter and became intensified into undisguised animosity upon the part of a large share of the population of the former section. The reason is patent. It is the same which induced the Confederates to hope confidently for substantial assistance from Kentucky, if once enabled to obtain foothold upon her territory ; and caused the Federals, on the other hand, to re- gard even the loudest and most zealous professors of loy- alty as Secessionists in disguise, or at best Unionists only to save their property. It is the instinctive feeling that the people of Kentucky, on account of kindred blood, common interests and identity of ideas in all that relates to political rights and objects of political institutions, might be supposed likely to sympathize and act with the people of the South. A number of causes and influences combined to prevent Kentucky from taking a decided and consistent stand with either of the combatants, and produced the vacillation which so notably characterized her councils and paralyzed her efforts in either direction. Her geographical situation, presenting a frontier of several hundreds of miles to an as- sailant coming from either the North or South, caused her people grave apprehension; especially as it was accounted an absolute certainty that her territory, if she sided with the morgan's CAVAI,RY. 21 South, would be made the battleground and subjected to all the horrors and desolations of war. This feeling became stronger and more controlling because of the apparent in- certitude of some of the Southern States, and their delay and seeming hesitation to enter the Confederacy. The po- litical education of the Kentuckians, also, disposed them to enter upon such a contest with extreme reluctance. Origin- ally a part of Virginia and chiefly settled by immigration from that State, her earlier population partook of the char- acteristics and were imbued with the sentiments which so strongly prevailed in the mother Commonwealth. From Virginia the first generation of Kentucky statesmen derived the opinions which became the political creed of the people of the South, and were formulated in the famous resolutions of '98, giving shape and consistency to the doc- trine of States' rights and popular expression to that con- struction of the relation of the several States to the General Government, under the Federal Constitution, so earnestly insisted on by the master minds of Virginia. The earlier population of Kentucky was peculiarly inclined to adopt and cherish such opinions by the promptings of that nature which seems common to all men descended from the stock of the "Old Dominion;" that craving for the largest indi- vidual independence, and disposition to assert and maintain in full measure every personal right, which has always made the Southern and Western States so jealous of alien inter- ference with their local affairs. It was natural that a people animated by such a spirit should push their preference for self-government even to extremes ; that they should esteem their most valued franchises safe only when entirely under their own custody and control ; that they should insist that their peculiar institutions should be submitted only to do- mestic regulation, and that the personal liberty, valued above all other possessions, should be restrained only by laws en- acted by legislators and executed by magistrates chosen among themselves, and identified with and appreciative of their interests. In short, they were strongly attached to 22 MORGAN S CAVAtRY. their State government, and were not inclined to regard as beneficent or even legitimate any interference with it upon the part of the General Government, whose power and in- fluence they wished restricted to matters pertaining only to the "common defence and general welfare." This decided and almost universal sentiment was first shaken and the opinions of the Kentuckians in this regard underwent a certain change about the time of and doubtless as a consequence of the Burr conspiracy; but the serious change in such political faith was wrought by Henry Clay. He taught his generation to love the "Union" not as an "agency" by means of which certain benefits were to be de- rived, but as an "end" to be adhered to no matter what re- sults might follow. Mr. Clay sincerely believed that in the union of the States was to be found the surest guarantee of the safety, honor, and prosperity of them all, and he contem- plated with horror any thought of its dissolution. But notwithstanding this divergence of opinion between the people of Kentucky and their brethren in Virginia and the Southern States, the ties of blood and interest grew stronger: and, in the stormy period just antedating the Civil War a very general and positive sympathy with the Southern view of the questions in controversy was mani- fested. The troubles in Kansas and the agitation in Con- gress made the Democratic party in the State more deter- mined and aggressive in this respect, and the John Brown affair exasperated her people, in common with those of every slave-holding community, and induced the organiza- tion of the State Guard. Created because of the belief that similar attempts would be repeated, and quite probably Ken- tucky would be a field of future operation, it is not to be wondered at that the State Guard should have expected an enemy only from the North, whence, alone, could come such aggressions, and that it should have conceived an antagon- ism to the Northern and a sympathy for the Southern cause. These sentiments were intensified by the tone of the North- ern press and pulpit, and the commendation of such enter- MORGAN S CAVAI^RY. 23 prises as the Harper's Ferry raid which were heard through- out the North. The difficulty which was felt to be insuperable by all who advocated the secession of Kentucky was her isolated posi- tion. Not only, as has been already suggested, did the long hesitation of Virginia and Tennessee effectually abate the ardor and resolution of the Kentuckians who desired to see their State united with the Southern Confederacy, but, while it lasted, it was an insurmountable physical barrier in the way of such an undertaking. With these States antagonis- tic to the Southern movement, it would have been madness in Kentucky to have attempted to join it. When at length Virginia and Tennessee passed ordinances of secession, Ken- tucky had become infatuated with the idea of "neutrality." With the leaders of the Union party, this policy had already been determined upon as part of their system for the educa- tion of the people to loyalty. The Southern element, which was without organization or recognized leaders, regarded it as something much better than unconditional obedience to the orders and coercive policy of the Federal Government; and the large class of the timid and irresolute, the men who are by nature neutral in times of trouble and danger, accept- ed it joyfully, as such men always accept a compromise which promises to relieve them of immediate responsibility and the necessity of hazardous decision. Disconnected from the views and purposes of those who consented to it, this "neutrality" will scarcely admit of seri- ous discussion. Such a position is certainly little else than rebellion, and the principle or conditions which justified it will also justify secession. If a State has the legal or con- stitutional right to refuse compliance with the requisitions of the General Government, to disobey the laws enacted by Congress and set at defiance the proclamations of the Na- tional Executive, to decide for herself her proper policy in periods of war and insurrection and levy armed forces to prevent the occupation of her territory by the troops of the United States, then she has the right to withdraw from the Union when she chooses to do so and contract any alliance 24 MORGAN S CAVAIvRY. in accordance with her wishes. If it be a revolutionary right, which she may justly exercise under certain condi- tions, the same conditions will justify any other phase or manner of revolution. The practical result of such a position, had it been stub- bornly maintained, would have been to involve Kentucky in more danger than she would have incurred by secession and admission into the Confederacy. A declaration of neu- trality in such a contest was virtually equivalent to a decla- ration of war against both sides ; at any rate it was a proc- lamation of opposition to the Federal Government, while discarding the friendship of the South, and seemed to at once invite assault from both. The Government of the United States, which was arming to coerce the States which had seceded, would certainly not permit its purpose to be frustrated by any such attitude on the part of Kentucky, and it was not at all likely that the States about to be attacked would respect a neutrality which they knew would prove no hindrance to their adversai-y. But few men reason clearly in periods of great excitement, or in situations of peril look steadfastly and intelligently at the dangers which surround them. As has been said, a large class eagerly welcomed the idea that Kentucky should take no part in the great struggle impending, as a relief, however temporary, from a hazard which appalled them. Nine men out of ten will shrink from making up their minds upon a difficult and dangerous issue, and will yet accept gladly, from any one who has the nerve to urge it, a determination however paltry and inconclusive. A great many Union men, who would have earnestly op- posed Kentucky's concurrence in the action of the seceding States, and yet as obstinately opposed the policy of coercion by the Government, thought that they saw in "neutrality" a solution of all the difficulties which embarrassed them. A few of the more sagacious and resolute of the Union leaders, who were not, perhaps, incommoded by a devotion to their State or "flag," but who realized that they could get into power only by crushing the Democratic party, and knew morgan's cavalry. 25 that if Kentucky sided with the South, the Democratic ele- ment in the State would inevitably dominate, perceived in this policy of neutrality a means of holding Kentucky in- active until the Federal Government could prepare and pour into her territory an overwhelming force. They trusted, and as the sequel showed, with reason, that they could de- moralize their opponents, having once reduced them to in- action. On the other hand, the Kentuckians, who hoped that their State would become part of the Confederacy, but saw no immediate prospect of it, accepted neutrality as the best that could be done under the circumstances. They knew that if this neutrality should be respected, a vital portion of the Confederacy — a border of five hundred miles — ^would be pro- tected from attack and invasion ; that the forces of the Con- federacy could be the more readily concentrated for the de- fense of the other and threatened lines, and that individual Kentuckians could flock to the Southern armies. They be- lieved that, in such a contingency, Kentucky would furnish more men to the Confederacy than would enlist in the Fed- eral service. The result justified the hopes and calculations of the more astute of the Union leaders. A movement so essentially rev- olutionary as the attempt to protect a State, situated as was Kentucky, into the current of secession, depended for success upon unflagging enthusiasm and prompt, rapid, decisive action. Any convention or policy in the nature of a com- promise impaired, and delay or relaxation of effort de- stroyed, its chances of success. The farce of "neutrality" was maintained, with apparent sincerity, until the uncondi- tional Union men had procured arms for the Home Guard companies, which had been organized; and recruited in Ken- tucky for the Federal army. Then the mask was thrown off. Foirmal legislative notice was served that, while enlistments in the service of the United States would be permitted, severe punishment would be visited on "any person who shall," within the limits of the State, persuade or induce any one to enlist or take service in the army of the so-called Confeder- 26 morgan's cavalry. ate States;" and by "an act to enlarge the powers of the military board of this State," the State Guard was disarmed and virtually disbanded. Thenceforth, and until the close of the war, Kentucky was completely in the grasp of the Fed- eral power. When General Albert Sidney Johnston came to the com- mand of the great Western Department he found but a few thousand troops at his disposal to defend a territory of im- mense extent, and vulnerable at a hundred points. At that time the Trans-Mississippi Confederate States were included in the same department with the States of Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. Missouri on the western side of the Mississippi, and Kentucky on the eastern —respectively the northernmost of the Western and Middle slaveholding States — were debatable ground, and were al- ready occupied, the former by both, the latter by one of the contending forces. General Johnston assumed command about the latter part of August, or first of September, 1861, and at once com- menced his vast labor with a vigor and wisdom which were neither appreciated by his countrymen nor were fruitful of happy results until after his glorious death. Missouri some months previously had become the theater of military opera- tions. The people had partially responded to the proclama- tion of Governor Jackson, issued June 12, 1861, which called on them to resist the military authorities appointed in the State by President Lincoln. Up to the date of General Johnston's taking command the chief difficulty in the way of action and decisive opera- tions in the West (independently of the inferior number and miserable equipment of the troops) was the lack of uniform- ity and concert in the plans and operations of the various commanders. There was no one in supreme military con- trol from whom the subordinate generals could receive defi- nite instructions, and orders which they felt obliged to obey. While an immense extent of country was included in one department, and theoretically under one chief, yet practically every officer, no matter what was the strength or nature of MORGAN S CAVALRY. 27 his command, who happened not to be troubled with a senior immediately at his elbow, planned and acted for himself and with a perfect indifference to the operations of every one else. The President and Secretary of War were too dis- tant to do any good, if such interference ever does any good, and a ruling mind was needed at the theater of events. It is true that General Polk, whose headquarters were at Mem- phis, was senior to the others, he being a major-general, and all the rest but brigadiers, and he was ostensibly in chief command and directed to a certain extent the movements of all. But, whether it was that, in a period when nothing was fairly organized, his authority was not clearly defined, or that he felt some hesitation in vigorously exercising it, it is certain that each of the generals, who have been here mentioned, acted as if he knew himself to be, to all intents and purposes, in independent command. This evil was completely remedied by the appointment to the chief command in the West of General Johnston, and the prompt and decided measures which he instituted. Gen- eral Johnston's whole life had been one of the most thorough military training, and no officer of his years in the old army of the United States had seen more service; but more than that, he was a soldier by instinct, and Nature had intended him for military command. Almost immediately after his arrival at Nashville the troops which had collected at Camp Boone, the rendezvous of the Kentucky regiments, and the Tennessee troops which were available, were pushed into Kentucky. Kentucky's neutrality, for a time recognized provisionally, and so far as a discreet silence upon the subject amounted to recognition by the Federal Government, had already been exploded. The Government of the United States, having made the necessary preparations, was not disposed to abandon a line of invasion which led right to the vitals of the Confederacy, and promised a successful reduction of the rebellion in at least three of the seceded States, because of the partially re- bellious attitude assumed by Kentucky. Camp Dick Robinson had been organized and put into 28 MORGAN''S CAVALRY. successful operation in July. General Anderson took com- mand at Louisville on the 20th of September. The other portions of the State were occupied, and definite lines were established by the opposing forces, nearly about the same time. General Johnston advanced as far as Green river, making it his line of defense for his center, while his right rested on the Cumberland and the rugged ranges of its hills. His line might be said to extend from Columbus through Hopkinsville, Munfordsville and Somerset to the Virginia border somewhere in the vicinity of Pound Gap. The Fed- eral forces were pushed down, almost simultaneously with General Johnston's advance to Green river, to Elizabeth- town, and in a few days afterward to Nolin creek. Their line may be described as running almost directly from Pa- ducah in the west to Prestonburg in the east. This line gave them possession of the mouths of the Tennessee, Cum- berland and Green rivers, of the Blue Grass region, and of a greater share of the central and eastern portions of the State. A single glance at a map will show the importance of Bowling Green as a strategic point. It will be seen that it is admirably adapted for a base of operations, offensive or defensive, in such a campaign as General Johnston was about to inaugurate at the time of its occupation. Situated upon the bank of the Barren river, it has that river and the Green river to protect it against attack from the front. The Barren river empties into the Green some twenty miles from and northwest of Bowling Green, and the Green, flowing in a northwesterly direction, affords an admirable line of de- fense for many miles to the left. There are few fords and ferries of Green river after its junction with the Barren, and those which it has can be easily held. The danger of attack from the extreme left flank was guarded against, but, as the result showed, imperfectly, by Forts Henry and Don- elson, constructed respectively upon the Tennessee and Cum- berland rivers, — the one just upon, the other about ten miles from, the Kentucky and Tennessee border. As there was little danger to be apprehended in that direction, except pilitora hiimim Kentucky aid T^uneasQei morgan's CAVAIrRY. 29 from forces brought up those rivers and established in the i-ear of Bowling Green, these forts, whose strength was overrated, were thought to sufficiently protect that flank. In this advance into Kentucky, the Kentucky regiments under Buckrier, about thirteen hundred strong in all, took the lead; the Second Kentucky Infantry, under Colonel Roger W. Hanson, to which were temporarily attached Byrne's battery, of four pieces, and one company of Tennes- see cavalry, was pushed on to Munfordsville on Green river. The rest of the Kentuckians and two or three thousand Tennesseeans (and some odds and ends) were stopped at Bowling Green. All the cavalry which were available for that purpose were sent to scout the country between the Cumberland and Green rivers, and subsequently Forrest's regiment was sta- tioned at Hopkinsville, watching the country in that vicin- ity. Shortly after he was sent there Forrest attacked and defeated at Sacramento, a little village not far from Hop- kinsville, a regiment of Federal cavalry. This was the first cavalry fight in the west, and the Federals were completely routed. Zollicoffer was sent to take position at Monticello, at or nearly about the same time of the advance to Bowling Green. Thus, it will be seen, that all the important points of the line were almost simultaneously occupied. Columbus was occupied by General Polk on the 4th, some days earlier. In establishing his base at Bowling Green General Johns- ton secured, as has been shown, a line well adapted to enable him to assume the offensive so soon as his army was suffi- ciently strong to do so with effect. The very fact of his moving into Kentucky at all was a pledge and guarantee to the people of his department, that, if sustained by them, he would keep the war out of their territory, and encouraged his army to hope for an active, dashing campaign. He placed himself where the more enterprising and determined of the Kentucky rebels could join him, and he spared no effort, no appeal, which could stimulate enlistment in his 30 morgan's cavai^ry. army among the young men of Kentucky or of the States of his department. The condition of the Confederate troops was far better, in many respects, at this time than at any subsequent period of the war. There were, then, facihties and means for pro- viding them with necessaries and comforts which more lat- terly did not exist. Provisions were abundant everywhere, and were regularly supplied. The railroads, which were then all in good repair and well provided with rolling stock, afforded sure means of supplying the troops which were stationed in those parts of the country through which they ran. The numerous navigable streams also afforded facili- ties, and practically shortened the routes of supply. In all cases, however, in which neither the railways nor the rivers could be used to supply them, troops were com- pelled to depend for subsistence, in a great measure, upon the country immediately about their cantonments, and as they exhausted the surplus provisions in different neighbor- hoods, they would shift their encampments. This was ow- ing to the great lack of wheel transportation. It was very difficult to procure wagons, except by purchase or impress- ment from the citizens, and the latter were of course inferior. Much less inconvenience was subsequently expe- rienced on this score, after they began to be manufactured in the Confederacy, and were captured in great numbers from the enemy. At this time many articles, such as sugar, coffee, etc., indispensable to the comfort and conducive to the health of troops in the field, were plentifully furnished; after the first year of the war they were known among us only by camp-fire traditions. The men rarely suffered, then, from the want of clothing, blankets, shoes, etc., even when the quartermasters could not furnish them, for they could obtain them from home, or purchase them, wherever they happened to be quartered, at reasonable prices. There was, perhaps, no regiment in the army which had not its full complement of tents; they were manufactured at Memphis and other points in numbers adequate to the wants of all the troops. Cooking utensils, also, could be had in abundance morgan's cavalry. 31 — the marching commands suffered, not from the want of them, but from the lack of transportation for them. It is true that those which were furnished us were not of the kind and pattern which experience has prescribed as most fitting for military use, but they were capital substitutes for flat stones and forked twigs. In the medical department there was almost total lack of the necessary material. The supply of medicines in the South at the outbreak of the war was barely sufficient for the wants of the population at that time. Some medicines were run through the blockade from the North, in small quantities, during the spring and summer of 1861. But the supply thus obtained by no means met the demand. The volunteers collected together in camps and crowded canton-, ments, subjected to a sudden change of diet and mode of living, sickened in great numbers. Diseases which had never before, or but in rare instances, proven dangerous, now assumed alarming types. The systems of the patients may have been relaxed and their vitality partially impaired during the early period of camp life, when they were just foregoing their old habits and were not yet hardened to the new, or it may be that when men are congregated in great numbers, certain diseases, by transmission from one to an- other, are cultivated into extraordinary malignancy — at any rate a large proportion of the inmates of every camp sickened and many died. At Bowling Green in the winter of 1861 and 1862, the mortality was dreadful; measles, typhoid fever, pneumonia and diseases of the bowels carried off a host of victims. Every sickness, however, seemed fatal at that time. There was, consequently, a great and constantly increas- ing need of medicines; and, perhaps, some waste of them when they were collected in large quantities and shipped from point to point was unavoidable. But all these prob- lems, all the difficulties of properly supplying the army, began to be solved and modified, as the genius of adaptation and substitution was developed among the troops them- selves. If a man could not get a blanket he made an old car- 32 MORGAN S CAVALRY. pet, cut tQ the proper size and lined on one side with a piece of strong cotton cloth, serve him instead. The soldier who lacked shoes bid defiance to the rough roads, or the weather, in a pair of ox-hide buskins, or with complicated wrappings of rags about his feet. I have known more than one or- derly sergeant make out his morning report upon a shingle, and the surgeon who lacked a tourniquet used a twisted handkerchief. Of the most necessary military material, arms and ordnance stores, there was the greatest scarcity. Perhaps one-half of the entire western army (of all the troops in the department) were armed (at the time that General Johnston came) with shot-guns and squirrel rifles, and the majority of the other half with scarcely as service- able flint-lock muskets. The troops under General Bragg at Pensacola were per- haps better armed, but the rule held good with regard to the others. A few companies composed of young men from the cities, and of rich planters, were armed with fancy guns, Maynard rifles, etc., altogether unsuitable for the armament of infantry. In September of 1861 there were probably not one thousand Springfield and Enfield rifles in the army which General Johnston was trying to concentrate in Ken- tucky, and it was several months later before these unequaled weapons (the right arms for soldiers who mean to fight) could be supplied in numbers at all adequate to the need of them. In the advance to Bowling Green more than three hundred able-bodied men of the Second Kentucky and an equal if not greater number of the Third Kentucky were left in the rear because arms could not be gotten for them. In November one or two regiments of the Kentucky brigade were given the Belgian in place of the flint-lock musket, and in December flint-lock guns, altered to percussion locks, were given the other regiments of the brigade. Proper ac- coutrements were as scarce as guns. Cartridge-boxes, knapsacks, canteens, when they could be gotten at all, were very inferior. By great industry and effort a considerable quantity of ammunition had been prepared and worked up into cartridges, but there was such a scarcity of lead and MORGAN S CAVALRY. 33 powder in the South and such inferior facilities for the man- ufacture of the latter, that apprehension was felt lest, when the supply on hand was exhausted, it coiild not be replaced. There was scarcely a percussion cap to be had (in the early part of the war) in the department, with the exception of some that were manufactured by an enterprising citizen of Nashville, and zealous Confederate, Mr. S. D. Morgan, an uncle of the General. But while so few of the Confederate soldiers were efficiently armed, almost every man of them, presuming that the Yankees were to be whipped in rough and tumble style, had his bowie-knife and. revolver. The Arkansas and Texas troops, especially, carried enormous knives, that might have made a Malay's blood run cold, but in the end those huge weapons did duty far oftener as cleav- ers than as bayonets. The organization of the troops first put in the field was, of course, to some extent, imperfect. A good deal has been said about the evils of the system of electing officers, and much just censure has been passed upon it. It has been claimed that it gives rise to a laxity of disci- pline, and a disposition on the part of officers, who owe their positions to the suffrages of the men they command, to wink at irregularities and pardon gross neglect of duty. This is undoubtedly true, in a great measure, and what is stranger, but equally as true, is the fact that troops which have been longest in the service, which know best what qual- ities are necessary to constitute a good officer, which appre- ciate perfectly the necessity of having good officers, not only to their efficiency and success in the field, but to their well- being at all times, seem least able to resist the temptation of electing some good-natured fellow, whom they will never respect, and will, perhaps, grow ashamed of, rather than men who will enforce their obedience, but promote alike their effi- ciency and their comfort. At all times they will look to and rely upon the good officer, but when they come to elect, the love of doing as they please, unchecked by the irksome restraints of discipline, is apt to make them vote for the man who will indulge them. But I believe that all those who ob^ 3 34 morgan's CAVAIvRY. served these matters carefully will agree that there was far less of this sort of feeling among the men who volunteered at the outbreak of the war than there was later. The officers elected by the regiments first raised were, gen- erally, about the best men that could have been selected. The men, at that time, in good faith, chose those they be- lieved best qualified for the duties of command, and elected individuals who had manifested, or were thought to possess, courage, energy, and good sense. Of course some mistakes were made, and experience disclosed the fact, now well-es- tablished, that many men who figure respectably in times of peace are unfitted for military responsibility, and weaken in the ordeal of military life. No opportunity had been afforded them for testing and discovering those qualified for positions of trust and impor- tance — -it was all a matter of experiment. Many injudicious selections were made, but it quite as often happened that the appointing system (as it was exercised at the beginning of the war) gave incompetent officers to the army. The grad- uates of West Point themselves, and even those officers who had served for years in the "Old Army," knew little or noth- ing of actual war. While the regulations prescribed clear and excellent rules of organization, the strictest conformity was not always had to them, and it was sometimes difficult to strictly apply them. Companies sometimes overran the maximum in a way that rendered them as embarrassing to the regiments in which they were placed as they were painfully unwieldy to the unlearned captains and lieutenants who immediately commanded them. When it was known that a very popular man was recruit- ing, the number of enlistments in his company was limited only by the number of able-bodied men in his district who were inclined to enlist. As each volunteer had the right to select his captain and company, and generally objected very decidedly to being transferred to any other, it was a delicate and difficult task to reduce these overgrown companies fo proper proportions, Regiments frequently, on account of morgan's CAVAIyRY. 35 the popularity of their colonels, or from other causes, swelled out of due bounds also. I knew one regiment which in the early part of September, 1861, had in it seventeen companies and numbered, when all answered to roll call, more than two thousand men. The brigades were from three to seven or eight thousand strong, and all arms of the service were represented in them ;' they included regiments of infantry and cavalry and bat- teries of artillery. It was in a measure necessary that this organization should be adopted, from the fact that, for some months, each brigade commander was entrusted with super- vision and defense of a large tract of territory, and it was impossible to dispense with either of the three arms. Divis- ions were not organized until late in the fall of 1861 — ^the strength of the brigades was then, to some extent, equalized by the reduction of the larger ones ; army corps were of still later creation. A significant custom prevailed of denoting the companies of the first regiments which were raised, riot by letter, but by some company denomination which they had borne in the militia organization, or had assumed as soon as mustered as an indispensable nomr-de-guerre. They seemed to vie with each other in inventing titles of thrilling interest : "The Yel- low Jackets," "The Dead Shots," "The Earthquakes," "The Chickasaha Desperadoes," "The Hell-roarers," are a few which made the newspapers of that day, in recording their movements, read like the pages of popular romance. So fondly did the professors of these appellations cling to them that it was found almost as difficult to compel their exchange for the proper designations as to effect far more harassing and laborious reforms. The spirit which prompted these particular organizations to adopt this method of distinguish- ing and identifying themselves remained to the last charac- teristic of the Southern troops. Regiments, especially in the cavalry service, were quite as often styled by the names of their commanders as by the numbers which they properly bore, and, if the commanders were popular, the former method was always the most agreeable. 2,6 morgan's CAVAtRY. In the latter part of the war, after every effort had been made to do away with this feeling, it was at length adjudged expedient to enjoin such a designation of brigades, by the names of their commanders, by order from the War Depart- ment. This peculiar affectation was but one form in which the temper of the Southern people was manifested — a temper which revolted against complete loss of individuality, and was prone to self-assertion. It is a temper which ought to be characteristic of a free and high-spirited people, which, while for prudential reasons it will consent to severe re- straints, seeks to mark the fact that the restraint is self-im- posed. Few will doubt, upon reflection, that this feeling could have been turned to better account in the Southern army; that to have allowed commands to win distinctive and honorable appellations by extraordinary bravery would haye elevated the standard of morale as much as did promo- tion for personal gallantry and good conduct. The excel- lence of a command mentioned in general orders might be only partially known, but the fame conferred by the title of the "Stonewall Brigade" is universal. For the first year there was, in the true sense of the word, no discipline in the Western army at all. The good sense and strong feeling of duty which pervaded the entire sol- diery made them obedient, zealous, and tolerably patient. High courage and natural resolution made them fight well from the first, and long exposure to the storms of battle taught them coolness in the midst of danger, and the com- parative indifference to it, which become habitual with the veteran, and which are usually confounded with the effects of discipline, although they frequently exist where discipline has never obtained. A spirit of emulation induced them to readily learn the drill and all the more ostentatious duties of the soldier. A fortitude which, until they were put to the test, they were not themselves aware of, enabled them to en- dure, without diminution of spirit, great hardship and priva- tion. Pride and patriotism, in the midst of every suffering and temptation, kept them true and patient to the last. No man who has intimately known the Southern soldiery morgan's cavalry. 37 can escape the conviction, that, while capable of acquiring any degree of instruction, and, if the word may be used, veteranship, they can not be readily disciplined, if by disci- pline be meant the conversion by fear of punishment into un- reasoning machines. The personal character, prowess and reputation of the commander affected more than anything else the morale and efficiency of each command. It will be well for those who read Southern histories of the war to keep in mind that the writers mean, when they use the word "discipline," the pride which stimulated the soldiers to learn their duties rather than incur disgrace, and the subordination which proceeded from self-respect, and respect for an officer whom they thought worthy to com- mand them. CHAPTER III. Morgan Leaves Home for the Army — Scouting and Skirmishing ON Green River — Organization • oS" "Morgan's Squadron" — Terry's Rangers — Retreat from Bowling Green — Evacuation OP Nashviiae — Active and Exciting Service About L'Au- VERGNEj MURFREESBORO AND GaIAATIN — CONCENTRATION OF ArMY AT Corinth for Batti^. In 1857 the company of volunteer militia called the "Lex- ton Rifles" was organized with John H. Morgan as captain; it subsequently, upon the organization of the State Guard, became incorporated in that body. It was composed of the finest and most spirited young men of Lexington, and soon won a high reputation for proficiency in drill and in all the duties taught in the camp of the State Guards, as well as for the intelligence and daring of its members. From the hour of its organization the men of this com- pany seemed to entertain the profounde^t love and admira- tion for their captain, and the influence and control they ac- corded him was not too strongly expressed in the words of their motto, which, written in large letters, framed and hung up in their armory, caught the eye of every visitor and an- nounced "Our laws the commands of our captain." It was with the forty-five or fifty men of this company who unhesitatingly followed his fortune when he went to the Southern army, and a few other kindred spirits who imme- diately attached themselves to him, before he had won rank or fame, that Morgan began his career, and around them as a nucleus he gathered his gallant command. Although thoroughly Southern in sentiment and frank to the last de- gree in its expression, the members of the company, with one or two exceptions, made no effort to go South until Captain Morgan signified his readiness to lead them ; in this, as in all else, they awaited his decision and directions. The extreme illness of his wife, who died in July, 1861, required, during (38) morgan's cavalry. 39 the early summer, his constant presence in Lexington, and he did not determine to act until after the troops, posted at Camp Dick Robinson, and the Home Guard organizations began to give unmistakable evidences of hostility to all per- sons not "loyal." When the order was issued for the disarming of the State Guard Morgan determined to save his guns at all hazards. The State Guard was by this time virtually disbanded. Many of its officers of high rank, elected under the impression that they were Southern men, had declared for the other side and various other influences tended to cripple and demoralize it^ An officer, then, of that body, who decided to resist the edict disarming his men and leaving them defenseless in the reach of armed and bitter political opponents could look for little backing from his comrades. His best chance was to make his way at once to the Confederate lines in Southern Ken- tucky. This Morgan resolved to do. On Friday night, September 20, 1861, he confided to a few of his most reliable and trusted men his determination and plans, and talcing the guns from the armory, loaded them into two wagons and started them out of Lexington on the Versailles road under a small guard. The men composing this guard left on such short notice that few of them had time to prepare and carry with them even necessary cloth- ing; scarcely time to take leave of their families. They marched out of town with their cartridge-boxes belted on, their rifles on their shoulders loaded, and their bayonets fixed. A regiment of Federal troops was encamped that night at the fair ground, about a mile from town, and many of the officers and men werp in town at the time the guns were removed. In order to deceive as to his movements and lull any suspicion that might exist of his design to move the guns. Captain Morgan caused twelve or fifteen men to parade and tramp heavily about the armory for an hour or two after the wagons had been loaded and started, and so created the impression that his company was engaged in drilling. The wagons were not stopped in the town, and only one soldier was encountered, who was made prisoner 40 morgan's cavalry. by the escort, carried off some twenty miles, and then re- leased. The loyal citizens who had calculated upon witnessing the discomfiture of the "Rifles" and of all their backers were dis- appointed. Of course many taunts were flung at the fooled spies and disappointed patriots; and at length the angry discussions brought on a shooting affray between some of the "Rifles" and a part of the troops and Home Guards. The regiment stationed at the fair grounds was brought into town to quell this affair and two pieces of artillery were planted to sweep the principal streets, and from that date, for four years, Lexington was under military rule. Captain Morgan, for whose arrest an order was immedi- ately issued, communicated during the day with such of his men as desired to follow him, and at nightfall left Lexington with them and rejoined those who had gone before. He passed through Anderson county to Nelson and halted a few miles from Bardstown. Here he was joined by Captain John Cripps Wickliffe, subsequently lieutenant-colonel of the Ninth Kentucky Infantry and a very gallant officer. Captain Wickliffe had determined also to save his guns and take his company, or all that would follow him, to the Con- federate army. The greater portion of his company, one of the finest in the State Guards, elected to go with him. De- sirous, while about it, of doing a brisk business in guns he confiscated those of a neighboring Home Guard company, and brought them to Morgan's camp. They were immedi- ately placed in the hands of the unarmed men, who, finding an organized force making for the Confederate lines, at- tached themselves to it. Many such men, anxious to go South, but afraid to go without a leader, came to this camp during the four or five days that it was maintained. On ac- count of the kindness and liberality of the people who lived in that neighborhood, and who supplied its inmates with pro- visions of all kinds, this camp was entitled "Camp Charity." By the common wish and consent, Morgan took command of all the forces, and when, on Saturday evening, September 28th, he resumed his march, he was at the head of some two MORGAN S CAVALRY. 4I hundred men. He encountered no enemy. The Home Guards, who mustered strong in the region through which he passed, thought his force too formidable to attack and kept out of his path. After two days and nights hard marching he reached Green river on Monday evening, Sep- tember 30th. He received an enthusiastic welcome from the Confederate troops stationed there, most of whom were Kentuckians and many of them knew him well. Colonel Roger W. Hanson, the officer in command, was himself from Lexington and was a warm personal friend of Mor- gan. There were, at Green river, encamped on the Southern side of the stream at this date, the Second Kentucky In- fantry (Hanson's own regiment), six or seven hundred strong, Byrne's Battery, and four companies of Tennessee cavalry. Colonel Thomas Hunt, an uncle of Captain Mor- gan, was also there with two companies of the regiment he was then organizing. Of all the general officers which Kentucky gave to the Confederate service least justice had been done by fame to Roger Hanson, and it is strange that such should be the case. Not only was he well known, constantly talked of, greatly loved, and ardently admired by the Kentuckians, but his name was familiar in all parts of the army. It is true that his early death blighted the reputation he was rapidly win- ning, but it is hard for those who knew him to understand how such a man could have failed to attract more general and more lively interest. He had little opportunity, during his military life, to show the stuff that was in him and to prove that he possessed other qualities befiting an officer beside courage and the strictest attention to the instruction, the comfort, and the discipline of his men. Notwithstanding he was a very strict disciplina- rian — and Kentucky troops have little love of discipline — he was very popular with his men. They retaliated by nick- naming him "Bench-leg," or "Old Flintlock," and admired him all the more intensely the more frequently he showed them that they could never deceive him nor attempt it with 42 MORGAN S CAVALRY. impunity. Once, thinking that the health of his regiment was getting too bad, and that many cases of illness reported as severe were but ruses to escape doing duty, he published an order that from that date "there should be but two sick men at the same time in each company." No one who ever saw Hanson can forget him. In stature he was a little un- der the medium height and powerfully but ungracefully built. His bulky and ungainly form indicated great but awkward strength. His shoulders were huge, round and stooping, and he sat on his horse in the attitude in which a sick man bends over the fire. His head was large and per- fectly round. His complexion was fair and florid and his eyes gray and full of light. His strong and marked feat- ures, when he became excited, worked strangely and ap- parently without being moved by the same influences, and the alert movement of his head, at such moments, was in singular contrast with his otherwise heavy inactive manner. His face when he was calm and giving careful attention to anything said to him wore a look of exceeding sternness, en- hanced by a peculiar twitch of the muscles of the mouth and eye. A wound received in a duel had shortened one leg and gave him a singular gait, something between a jerk and a roll. His voice was deep and guttural and his utterance rapid, decided, abrupt, like that of a man who meant all that he said and knew that it would produce an effect. No one could look him in the eye and fail to perceive that he was every inch a man — a strong, brave, manly nature looked out in every lineament of his face. Captain Wickliffe attached his company to the regiment which Colonel Hunt was organizing. Of the stragglers who had come out with Captain Morgan some went one way and some another — only eight or ten remained with him. Although not yet in the Confederate sei'vice, he at once com- menced the active and daring work which laid the founda- tion of his celebrity and brought him at once into general notice. The cavalry which had been stationed there pre- viously to his coming had confined themselves to doing picket duty, and had never sought or been required to do morgan's cavai