(1914-1918)' : H,H;S argent 530^ SB4- (i50i:nEU Imueraitg Slibtatg Jtifata. ^eto Inrk BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF HENRY W. SAGE 1831 Cornell University Library D 530.S84 3 1924 027 944 788 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027944788 The Strategy on the Western Front PREVIOUS BOOKS By Colonel H. H. Sargent NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. With Comments. Ninth Edition. Crown 8vo, with Maps. THE CAMPAIGN OP MARENGO. With Comments. Seventh Edition. Crown 8vo, with Maps. THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DB CUBA. In three volumes. Crown 8vo, with 12 Maps. A. C. McCLURG & CO. CHICAGO THE STRATEGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT {igi4-igi8^ BY Herbert Rowland Sargent LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED; COLONEL FIFTH UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER INFANTRY DURING SPANISH-AMERI- CAN WAR; LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TWENTY-NINTH UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER INFANTRY DURING PHILIPPINE INSUR- RECTION; LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UNITED STATES NA- TIONAL ARMY, DURING GREAT WORLD WAR; MEMBER OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS: AUTHOR OF "NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAM- PAIGN," "the campaign OF MA- RENGO," AND " THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA " With Maps CHICAGO A. C. McCLURG & CO. 1920 Copyright A. C. McCLURG & CO. 1920 Published November, 1920 Copyrighted in Great Britain M. A, DONOHUB ft COMPANY. PRINTERS AND BINDBRS, CHICAGO TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DANIEL CROSBY PEARSON UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR IN REMEMBRANCE OF OUR ARMY SERVICE TOGETHER AND OF A LONG- ABIDING FRIENDSHIP PREFACE MOST of the chapters in this book were published in the North American Re- view in a series of articles beginning with the February issue of 1919 and ending with the October issue of the same year. They have been revised, certain omitted parts restored, and are now published in book form. For suggestions and criticisms in the Eng- lish of the text my thanks are due to Lieutenant Raymond H. Fuller, United States National Army, who was one of my assistants while I was on duty in the War Plans Division of the General Staff, United States Army, at Army War College, Washington, D. C, during the summer and fall of 1918. H. H. S. Jacksonville, Okegon May 7, 192Q CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I Germany 's First Great Mistake .... 1 II Germany's Second Great Mistake ... 16 III Germany's Third Great Mistake ... 35 IV Germany's Great Thrusts 68 V Foeh's Great Counter-Off ensive .... 93 VI The Fight for the Hindenburg Line . . 123 VII Allied Victories in the East 149 VIII Germany's Scheme for "World Dominion 163 IX Ludendorff's Great Retreat 182 Appendix A — Fourth Memorandum on the Strategy of the War 209 Appendix B — Why the Salonica Army Was Powerless 233 Bibliography 251 Index 257 MAPS MAP PAGE A The Western Front .... End of volume B The Theater of War .... End of volume C Showing Amiens, Lys, and Chateau-Thierry Salients 76 D Showing Salients after Last Great German Thrust 80 E Sketch of Palestine Theater of War . . .150 F Sketch of Balkan Theater of War .... 152 War is a business of positions. — Napoleon The Strategy on the Western Front CHAPTEE I geemany's fiest great mistake PEELIMINAEY to any discussion of tlie strategy of the war, it will not be out of place to remark that in this war the enormous numbers of the opposing armies, the wonderful improvements in artillery and in small arms, the use of noxious and poisonous gases, and of steam engines, gas engines, railroads, tanks, motor trucks, motorcycles, automobiles, electric telegraphy, wireless telegraphy, telephones, searchlights, submarines, aeroplanes, and other inventions and discoveries, have had a far- reaching effect in modifying and changing the application of strategical principles. In some cases they have made their application much easier, and in others much more difiBcult, but in 1 2 The Strategy on the Western Front no case have they had any effect whatever in changing the principles themselves. These principles are immutable. They are the same today as in the days of Alexander, of Hannibal, of Caesar, and of Napoleon. To operate offensively, when practicable to do so; to bring superior forces against the enemy at the point of attack; to maneuver upon inte- rior lines when possible ; to surprise and deceive the enemy as to the plans of operation and place of attack ; to divide the forces of the enemy and beat them in detail ; to operate or attack in such a direction as to threaten or destroy the com- munications of the enemy without exposing your own : these are the main unchangeable principles of strategy. It is by their observance that the main object of all battles, the defeat and anni- hilation or capture of the enemy, can best be obtained. They are the foundation rocks upon which all great military successes are built. Their observance shows good generalship ; their violation, poor. No commander can long disre- gard or transgress them without bringing dis- aster and ruin upon his army. During the war Germany took, or tried to Germany's First Great Mistake 3 take, the offensive three times on the Western Front. She began the war with a great offen- sive there and continued it until she was forced to take up a defensive role as a result of the battle of the Mame. In February, 1916, at Ver- dun, she began her second great effort to break through the Allied lines, but this also was a com- plete failure. And on March 21, 1918, she tried for the third time to smash through the lines and to resume a war of movement, but utterly- failed in her efforts. In each of these offen- sives Germany made a great strategical mis- take; and it is the purpose here to show why this was so, and to analyze somewhat in detail the operations on the Western Front from a strategical point of view. Although it may not have been Germany's intention at the outset to take the offensive on both her East and West fronts at the same time, nevertheless this is exactly what she did. At the very time that the German armies were overrunning Belgium and invading France, Hindenburg was engaged in East Prussia in a great offensive which culminated in the battle of Tannenberg. 4 The Strategy on the Western Front When Napoleon made war in a single theater of operations it was his invariable rule to take the offensive/ but to take it along but one line at a time ; and had Grermany followed this rule and held defensively the French front from Luxemburg to Switzerland, and then united the remainder of her forces with those of Austria offensively, first against Eussia, then against Serbia, she could have defeated and crushed the armies of both in a short while, and then have returned to the Western Front and with over- whelming forces, flushed with victory, have speedily invaded France via Belgium, as she had originally planned, or overrun both Bel- gium and Holland and' conquered France. And in the meantime, while she was disposing of her enemies outside of France, had Great Britain 1 It is a well-established maxim, or principle of war that THE OFPENSIVB ALONE PROMISES DECISIVE EESULTS ; but there is another principle just as well established, which limits the application of this principle when war is made within a single theater of operations, and that is, to operate offen- sively AND IN FOKCE ALONG BUT ONE LINE AT A TIME. These two principles, which were almost universally followed by Napoleon in his remarkable military career, were several times enunciated by him during his life. In fact, it has been largely through a study of his campaigns and of the m.ethods fol- lowed by him in gaining his victories, that these two principles have come to be almost universally accepted by military, men as true guides for conducting campaigns. Germany's First Great Mistake 5 and Belgium declared war against her, she could easily have held her Western Front against them, since neither, at that time, had any army of consequence ; and then, upon her return, could have gone through Belgium without bringing upon herself the odium of violating a neutral country. Since the front between Germany and France was only one hundred and fifty miles in length, and was protected on the German side by the river MoseUe and the fortifications of Metz, and just back of them by the river Rhine and the fortress of Strassburg; and since the front could not have been turned by France without her violating the neutrality of either Belgium or Switzerland, or both, which it is certain she would not have done, it could have been held by Germany with a small part of her combatant forces, while she was destroying her enemies in other parts of Europe. Had she followed this plan, the war at most would have lasted but two years, and probably not so long as that. Had she followed this plan, Great Britain in all probability would not have declared war against her at the beginning; for it was the violation of 6 The Strategy on the Western Front Belgium's neutrality which, brought Great Britain immediately into the war. Had Ger- many followed this plan, she would not have turned the good opinion of the world against her at the start. And it was all so easy, had Germany had any strategical foresight; but being obsessed with the idea that she must take the offensive at the very start against France ; and having worked out plans along these lines for years ; and believing that she could conquer France in this way as she had done in 1870 ; and failing to see that Eussia's entrance into the war ia 1914 made the strategical situation vastly different from what it was in 1870, she swept forward to her ultimate defeat. This mis- take, this lack of strategical foresight, this stu- pendous blunder by the German General Staff was appalling, calamitous, for the Central Pow- ers. It turned what should have been a short war into a long one. It cost the Central Powers billions of dollars and millions of men. It brought the young giant, America, into the war against them, and arrayed against them a world in arms. And, what from a German point of view is most catastrophic of all, it has, along ^ Germany's F irst Great Mistake 7 witli several subsequent strategical blunders, resulted in Germany's practical annihilation as a great military power. It is interesting to note that notwithstanding the fact that Germany took the offensive on both her Western and Eastern fronts at the outset of the war, she came very close to being victorious on both fronts. In East Prussia she won against the Eussians the great battle of Tannenberg, and on the Western Front, had she not been forced to detach two corps from her army just before the battle of the Mame, she probably would have won that battle, cap- tured Paris, and perhaps conquered France before the end of the year. This goes to show that however strong, well trained, well dis- ciplined, and well prepared an army may be, its conaanander cannot violate a strategical prin- ciple, even unintentionally, without running great risk of serious consequences. It is true, of course, that mere chance, or the fortune of war, often plays a great part in determining results; and that as a consequence victory not infrequently may be obtained in spite of a violation of some strategical principle; but it 8 The Strategy on the Western Front is also true that failure may result, as in the present case, solely because of its violation.* 1 Since writing this chapter I have learned that no less a person than Field Marshal von Moltke himself approved of the defensive strategy on the Western Front in case Ger- many was involved in war with Bussia and France at the same time. His view, reported by Bismarck in the Samhurger Naclirichten and quoted by Munroe Smith (Militarism and Statecraft, pp. 125 and 127), is as follows: In view of our fortifications in Strassburg, Metz, Mayenee, and Coblenz, Field Marshal Moltke was so convinced of the strength of our military position on the western front that he regarded it as possible, in ease war should break out on two fronts, that we should limit ourselves to the defensive on the western frontier until the Eussian war was conducted to an end. He was of the opinion that, with our railroad communications and fortifications on the western frontier, the French could not so conduct the war as to break through our lines; and he accordingly believed that we could carry the Eussian war to a conclusion and then first, as against France, pass over from the defensive to the attack. This revelation of Bismarck, published on January 9, 1893, aroused considerable controversy in Germany; whereupon one week later he replied and at the same time set forth his own opinion: It is an indisputable fact that Count Moltke expressed himself in this sense, and that he was of the opinion that Germany, in possession of Metz and Strassburg, with Mayenee, Cologne, and Coblenz behind, could, in case of a double war, maintain the defensive against France for an indefinite time and meanwhile employ itSrChief force in tlie East We should regard it as presumptuous to attempt to support the views of' the great strategist with our own opinion; but in face of the skeptical articles pub- lished in the Nationalzeitung and other similar utterances in the press we should like to add that, so long as we are in possession of Metz and Strassburg and so long as we remain covered by the neutral Belgian and Luxemburg territory, a defensive conduct by Germany of the war against France would not deprive the left bank of the l3iine, but only a part of Alsace, of protection by German troops. Commenting on these statements, Professor Munroe Smith Germany 's First Great Mistake 9 As to the German defeat at the Marne, Lieu- tenant-General Baron von Freytag-Loring- hoven, Deputy Chief of the German Imperial Staff, in his book entitled Deductions from the World War, page 94, says : Thus the German offensive at the beginning of September, 1914, was not powerful enough to effect the overthrow of the enemy. The intention was to effect an envelopment from two sides. The envelop- ment by the left wing of the army was, however, brought to a standstill before the fortifications of the French eastern frontier, which, in view of the prompt success achieved against the Belgian fortifications, it had been hoped to overcome. The envelopment of the French left wing was successful up to in front of Paris and across the Marne, but here the German troops found their frontal advance arrested, while they in. their turn were threatened with an envelop- ment. And again, page 91, he says : "When the German "Western Army engaged in the battle of the Marne, its original first line troops had says: " In 1914 tie German General Staff, -with another Moltke at its head, put into execution an opposite plan. It was stated to be self-evident that France must be crushed before the ' slow-moving Eussian masses ' eonld make any effective attack upon the Central Empires. To achieve this object, the cover of Belgian neutrality was sacrificed. The attack on France was launched across that neutral territory, as offering the line of least resistance." 10 The Strategy on the Western Front been reduced not only by two army corps which had been sent to the East, but also by two further army corps which it had been necessary to leave behind at Antwerp and Maubeuge. Thus we see that the German plan was to envelop both flanks of the French Anny^ and that it failed because of the " fortifications of the French eastern frontier." That is to say, it failed because of the natural fortification of the Vosges Mountains and the fortresses of Ver- dun, Toul, Epinal, and Belf ort ; but particularly because of Belfort, which commands the narrow pass into France between the Vosges and Jura range of mountains. Had the Germans been able to capture this fortress, the way would have been opened for turning the Vosges Moun- tains and the fortresses of Epinal, Toul, and Verdun, and for the envelopment of the French 1 The plan of an envelopment of both flanks was one of which Count Sehlieffen, the elder Moltke's successor as Chief of Staff, had been the leading proponent in Germany. He held that this was the only kind of plan which would ensure the tatal destruc- tion of the enemy. Thus it became a favorite with German strategists. Strategically it was sound, provided conditiona were favorable, but for its success it was necessary, first, that the configuration of the theater of operations should permit of its execution; and, secondly, that there should be a sufficiently preponderating force to make the envelopments without weak- ening, and thereby endangering, the center of the attacking army. But in the great German offensive on the Western Front, neither of these conditions was fulfilled. Germany's First Great Mistake 11 right wing, which, with the left wing and the little British and Belgian armies already en- veloped, would no doubt have resulted in the final surrender of the French Army and the capture of Paris. This accomplished, their next step would have been to cross the English Channel. With their submarines, aeroplanes, and Zeppelins, to protect their transports from attack in cross- ing, and with no army of any consequence in Great Britain at that time to repel the invaders, it seems not improbable that they would have been successful, although their losses might have been considerable. In Great Britain's poor state of preparedness at that time, and with the flower of her regular troops already destroyed in France, probably less than half a million vet- eran German troops would have been able to overrun the island, capture London, and con- quer Great Britain. Then, of course, they would have taken over the British Navy; and with the French Navy already taken over, and their own navy and submarines, they probably would have pro- voked war with the United States and made 12 The Strategy on the Western Front short work of the American Navy. With it out of the way there would have been nothing to prevent their transports, loaded with their best troops, from crossing the Atlantic; and with practicall}'' no army in the United States to meet them they could easily have taken posses- sion of a good part of the North Atlantic Sea- board States, captured New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington, and compelled these cities to indemnify Germany for the entire cost of the war. It is easy to see now that at the battle of the Marne Germany was within a hair's breadth of conquering France ; and that this most probably would have speedily led to her conquering Great Britain and the United States and her domina- tion of the world. But Belfort stood in the way. So important was this fact, so fraught was it with momentous consequences, that it may be interesting to inquire how it happened that Ger- many did not insist on taking over the French fortress of Belfort at the end of the Franco- Prussian War of 1870-71 ; for had she held it in 1914, victory would certainly have crowned her efforts in the first great battle of the Marne. Germawy's First Great Mistake 13 The circumstances were these: Paris capitu- lated on January 28, 1871, and an armistice of twenty-one days was signed, to date from Jan- uary 31; it was later extended to midnight of February 26, During the armistice, the Ger- man Army was not to enter Paris. Heroically, Belfort was stiU holding out. On February 21, Thiers, representing France, went to Versailles to get the best terms he could from Bismarck. Bismarck's terms were, that France was to pay an indemnity of six thousand million francs; to give up the whole of Alsace and a considerable part of Lorraine, including the fortresses of Strassburg, Metz, and Belfort ; and that the German Army was to enter Paris and to remain there until the ratification of peace.^ To these terms Thiers strongly pro- tested, claiming that the indemnity was exorbi- tant and that the cession of Metz would make the two nations enemies forever. He particu- larly objected to the German troops entering Paris and insisted on France keeping Belfort if Strassburg had to be given up. The discussion lasted several days. Bismarck was obdurate; 1 Simon, The Government of M. TMers, vol. 1, p. 133. 14 The Strategy on the Western Front but finally Thiers' eloquence, emotion, zeal, patriotism, and fire moved Mm to consult the Emperor and von Moltke as to a slight modifica- tion of the terms. The Emperor consented to a reduction of the indemnity from six to five thou- sand million francs,^ but von Moltke insisted that Germany must have Metz, as it would be worth one hundred thousand men to her in case of a war with France.^ As to the entrance of the troops into Paris, Bismarck offered to yield this, if Thiers would consent to give up Belfort without further objection. But Thiers persisted in retaining Belfort. Feeling that to yield it would leave the eastern frontier of France open to invasion, he fought for it most strenu- ously, offering even to consent to the German troops entering Paris provided Belfort could be retained by France. "Nothing," said Thiers, in the course of his long and eloquent plea, ' ' can equal the grief which Paris must feel in opening the gates of its unconquered walls to the enemy who has been unable to force them. Therefore we have besought you, and do 1 The Government of M. Thiers, vol. 1, p. 137. 2 Memoirs of M. de Blowitz, p. 144. Germmiy's First Great Mistake 15 still beseech you, not to inflict this unmerited humiliation upon the city. Nevertheless it is ready to drink the cup to the dregs, so that one bit of its soil and an heroic city may be pre- served to the country. We thank you, Count, for having afforded Paris the opportunity of ennobling its sacrifice. The mourning of Paris shall be the ransom of Belfort." ^ On this point Bismarck finally yielded and Belfort was re- tained by France. Thiers ' pleadings saved the day. With the fire of a great patriot in his soul, his eloquence, nearly fifty years ago, saved his beloved France from destruction in 1914. It did more — it changed the destinies of many peoples and many nations, crashed out autoc- racy, and crumbled into dust most of the thrones pf Europe. 1 Pavre, Gouvernement de la Defense Nationale, vol. 3, p. 106. CHAPTEE II gebmany's second geeat mistake OF COURSE, at the time of this writing, early in the year, 1919, no accurate fig- ures as to the strength of the armies on the Western Front at various periods can be ob- taiaed; nevertheless, an approximation, which will answer the purpose for an analysis and a discussion of the strategy on the Western Front, may be obtained by a comparison of dif- ferent estimates and statements. It is generally admitted by both sides that at the battle of the Marne the Allies considerably outnumbered the Oermans. The Times History of the War, volume u, page 51, estimates the Al- lies at rather more than two million and the Ger- mans at rather less than two million, and states that of combatants actually enga,ged in the battle there were probably three million in all. Lieutenant-General Baron von Freytag-Lor- inghoven. Deputy Chief of the German Imperial 16 Germany's Second Great Mistake 17 Staff, in Ms book, Deductions from the World War, pages 90 and 91, says: At the beginning of the war of 1914 the armed force of France alone was slightly in excess of the whole mobilized strength of Germany, while if we deduct the German forces employed in the Bast and those which were in the first instance kept at home for coast defense, the French, English, and Belgians pos- sessed a numerical superiority of something like three- quarters of a million men. After the battle of the Marne the strength, of the field forces of the Allies on the Western Front was increased and of Crermany decreased up to September 1, 1915, when the numbers, according to the estimate of Frank H. Simonds in the American Review of Reviews for October, 1915, were as follows : Allies Germans French 2,000,000 British 750,000 1,500,000 Belgian 100,000 , 2,850,000 But if such a great inequality in numbers between the Allies and the Germans did exist at that time, it was not continued long; for, some time afterwards, but prior to the attack on Ver- 18 The Strategy on the Western Front dun in the following February, a number of German divisions were transferred from the Eastern to the "Western Front. Just how many is not accurately known, but probably about a quarter million of men. But, at any rate, it seems to be generally admitted that there was not a sufficient number transferred to make Germany's strength on the Western Front any- where near equal to that of the Allies at the time of the attack on Verdun. Indeed, it would seem that at the time of this attack the Allies must have outnumbered the Germans by at least half a million men. For a year and a half following the attack at Verdun, the Allies seem to have outnumbered the Germans by several hundred thousand ; but the total collapse of Russia in November, 1917, permitted Germany to strengthen greatly her forces on the Western Front early in the year 1918. On March 16, 1918, just five days prior to the great attack begun by the Germ'kns towards Amiens, Colonel Herbert Slocum, Mil- itary Attache at London, reported the number of combatant forces on the Western Front to be: Germany's Second Great Mistahe 19 Divi- Battal- Rifle sions ions Strength Artillery British 58 555 600,000 5,892 French 97 1 915 764,000 9,806 American , 4 2 48 49,000 316 Belgian 6 108 64,000 598 Portuguese 2 24 26,000 68 Total Allies. . . 167 1,650 1,503,000 16,680 Total Enemy. . 186 1,700 1,370,000 15,734 But evidently a number of German divisions that had recently arrived or were en route were not included in this report; for on May 25, Colonel Slocum reported the numbers as follows : Divi- Battal- Rifle sions ions Strength Artillery British 50 495 520,000 6,247 French 103 964 674,000 10,103 American 5 60 65,000 458 Belgian 6 108 56,000 699 Italian 2 24 16,000 100 Total AUies. . . 166 1,651 1,331,000 17,607 Total Enemy. . 208 1,914 1,654,926 17,168 1 Two Trencli dismounted cavalry divisions were not included. . . . 2 There were at that time 5% American divisions in France ; 3 of the 4 referred to above were still under instruction. 20 The Strategy on the Western Front This would indicate that on May 25, 1918, Ger- many had on the line a preponderance of about 300,000 trained fighting men; but this only takes into account 65,000 Americans out of more than 700,000 then in France. Of the 1,019,115 which Secretary Baker reported as having been sent to France prior to July, 1918, fully half were ready to take their places on the firing line by the end of August. In August, September, and October nearly a million more men were sent to France; so that by November 1 there were nearly two million American soldiers in France, of whom probably one-half or thereabouts were ready to take their places on the firing line. All of which clearly indicates that the Allies had a considerable preponderance of fighting men and guns on the Western Front since July 1, 1918.1 1 " On April 1, 1918, the Germans had an actual superiority of 324,000 riflemen on the Western Front. Their strength in- creased during the next two months but began to drop during June. At the same time the Allied strength, with the constantly growing American forces, was showing a steady increase, so that the two lines [lines drawn to show the rifle strength of Allied and German Armies on the Western Front] crossed dur- ing June. From that time on Allied strength was always in the ascendency and since the French and British forces were weaker in October and November than they were in April and May, this growing ascendency of the Allies was due entirely to the Americans. By November Tthe AUied rifle strength had a Germany's Second Great Mistake 21 As a result of the battle of the Mame the German Army was halted, turned back, forced to dig in and take up a defensive role, which brought Germany's offensive on the Western Front to an end for the time being. For about a year and a half she continued to act defen- sively there ; and although she was considerably outnumbered by the Allies during this period, she held the front easily. In the meantime she took the offensive in force against her enemies in other parts of the theater of war. And having in these operations made a gigantic and successful campaign against the Russians and a marvelously success- ful one against the Serbians, she determined to make another powerful effort to break through the Western Front and resume a war of move- ment. Just why she changed her plan from the defensive to the offensive on the Western Front before she had entirely disposed of her enemies in Eussia, Serbia, and Italy is not fully under- superiority over the Gennan of more than 600,000 riflea. ' ' — Colonel Leonard P. Ayres, Chief of the Statistical Branch of the General Staff, U. S. Army, in The War with Germany; A Statistical Summary, pp. 104 and 105. 22 The Strategy on the Western Front stood. But the probable reason is that she felt the necessity of making another great effort there before Great Britain could complete the organization and training of h«r great army and make it ready for operations in France. And since Germany's victories in the East and in the Balkans had greatly encouraged her and would enable her to transport a number of the veteran and victorious divisions of her East- em armies to the Western Front ; and since the fall of the fortresses of Liege, Antwerp, and Maubeuge, resulting from the fire of the big Austrian and German guns, had demonstrated that fortresses in this war were of little account in the reckoning;' and not knowiBg that the French had already learned this lesson and moved their great guns from their forts to con- cealed positions, she hoped to meet with better success this time in breaking through on the Western Front. At any rate, she purposed try- ing it, and, in February, 1916, began her great attack against Verdun. This attack was one of the most sustained and formidable in history. For five months the Ger- man Crown Prince tried to break through the Germany's Second Great Mistake 23 line at this point. In repeated and most des- perate assaults, at tlie expense of enormous losses in life, lie hurled his divisions against the French; but all his efforts were in vain. The line held. Verdun remained in possession of the French, and all the blood spilt by the Ger- man soldiers in that mighty effort went for naught. And it was all a mistake, another great blun- der; for with the same effort here spent, and probably a far less loss of life, Germaify could in turn have completed her victories on the Eastern Front, destroyed the army at Salonica, and captured that important seaport ; then with greatly superior forces have struck and crushed the Italian Army; and then, with all her ene- mies disposed of outside of France and Belgium, have returned to the Western Front with an enormous preponderance of forces, elated by great victories, for a campaign against her ene- mies there. And even had she not been able to do all this, she would have been able to do a great part of it ; which would have brought her just so much nearer to a final victory, instead of having been brought, as she actually was, by 24 The Strategy on the Western Front her great failure and sacrifices at Verdun, just so much nearer to final defeat. The two fundamental facts upon which all strategy is based are, first, that an army in order to live and fight must have food, clothing, equipment, ammunition, weapons, and rein- forcements; and secondly, that these supplies and men must be brought to it over its lines of communication. These lines of communication running from its front to its bases of operation and supply are its nerves and its arteries and veins ; sever them, and you destroy the army ; even threaten them, and serious consequences are apt to follow. Hence it follows that the commander-in-chief of an army must ever keep a watchful eye upon them and be ever ready to protect them against any attack or threatened attack. But simply the protection of his own communications is not enough. If he expects to accomplish anything great in war, he must do much more than this: he must, if possible, so plan his operations, so direct his attacks, as to threaten or destroy his adversary's communi- catrons. It is then that a victory on the battle- field will bring with it momentous results. Germany's Sec ond Great Mistake 25 But on the Western Front it was impossible for either army to turn or outflank the other and strike its communications, since the fronts of each rested on the neutral country of Switzer- land at one end and on the English Channel at the other. Hence it was by frontal attack only that either army could hope to break throu'gh and resume a war of movement ; and since each was determined to prevent the other from breaking through, each constructed strong lines of intrenchments, with machine-gun emplace- ments, wire entanglements, and other acces- sories. The difficulty of breaking through these strongly entrenched lines was increased by the employment on each side of the new war weapon, the aeroplane, which enabled the air scouts to sail over and beyond the enemy's line and to see and report any concentration of his forces. This knowledge enabled the com- manding general of the opposing army to as- semble his reserves opposite the threatened sector of his line in order to repulse the attack. In other words, the element of surprise, which in so many of the great battles of history has 26 The Strategy on the Western Front been such an important factor in determining results, could not, as formerly, be made use of in the face of these new war weapons. Of course, the aeroplane has not entirely eliminated the chance of surprise, but it has made it, even in a small way, very difficult of attainment. ^ A glance at the map. of the railways of Ger- many, France, and Belgium shows that the most numerous and most important lines are those that traverse the country from east to west. Fourteen lines of track cross the Ehine between Switzerland and Holland. In addition to these main lines, two parallel lines, separated by the Rhine, follow its course north and south and many other cross lines connect the towns of the east and west lines with each other. Ih Ger- many the double track lines are much more numerous than in France and Belgium; some railways, indeed, having four parallel tracks. The chief difference between the countries is es- pecially noticeable in the extraordinary develop- ment that the Germans had given to their con- necting and crossing railways between stations and to platforms for loading and to the num- ber of strategic railways near the frontier that Germany's Second Great Mistake 27 they had built largely for purely military pur- poses. The most important lines of communication of the combatant armies as they stood on the Western Front from Belfort on the border of Switzerland, through Verdun, Eeims, and St. Quentin, to Nieuport on the English Channel, were the east and west railways which run from Paris in turn to Vienna, to Prague, to Berlin, and to Hamburg. They lie in a direction gen- erally at right angles to the Western Front and cross the Ehiue at Neuenburg, Breisach, Strass- burg, Germersheim, Speyer (Spires), Mann- heim, Mayence (Mainz), Coblenz, Bonn, Cologne, Diisseldorf, Eheinhausen, Euhrort, Wesel, and other places. Numbered from the south, the main railways are: First : The line from Paris to Vienna via Bel- fort, Miilhausen, Schaffhausen, Ulm, Augs- burg, and Munich. Second: The line from Paris to Vienna via Chalons, Nancy, Strassburg, Karlsruhe, Stutt- gart, and Munich. . Third: The line from Paris to Prague via 28 The Strategy on the Western Front Chalons, Verdun, Metz, Saarbriicken, Germers- heim, Heilbronn, and Nuremberg. Fourth: The line from Paris to Dresden via Chateau-Thierry, Verdun, Metz, Mayence, Frankfurt, and Leipzig. Fifth: The line from Paris to Berlin via Laon, Mezieres, Thionville (Diedenhofen), Treves, Coblenz, Giessen, Cassel, and Magde- burg. The part of this line -which passes through the winding valley of the Moselle from Thionville to Coblenz is a strategic railway con- structed since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 for the purpose of transporting German troops and material in case of war with France. It joins the network of lines that the German Military Staff has built about Metz in the past few years and is the last in the series of com- munications by which Germany was able to penetrate France without traversing Luxem- burg or Belgium. Sixth: The line from Paris to Berlin via Laon, Mezieres, Maubeuge, Namur, Liege, Aix- la-Chapelle, Cologne, Barmen, "Warden, and Magdeburg. Seventh: The line from Paris to Berlin via Germany's Second G reat Mistake 29 Laoii, Hirson, Maubeuge, Namur, Liege, Aix- la-Chapelle, Diisseldorf, Hamm, and Magde- burg. Eigbth: The line from Paris to Berlin via Compiegne, St. Quentin, Manbeuge, Namur, Liege, Aix-la-Chapelle, Duisburg, Essen, Hamm, and Hanover. Ninth : The line from Paris to Hamburg via Montdidier, Cambrai, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, Liege, Aix-la-Chapelle, Wesel, and Bremen. As to these last four lines, it will be noted that all merge into one line in passing through Namur, Liege, and Aix-la-Chapelle; and that there is no other east and west line to the south- ward until the Mezieres-Sedan-Thionville Eail- way south of the Ardennes is reached. Various important railway lines also connect the principal towns of France and Belgium with Calais, Boulogne, and other Channel ports. The Germans obtained their supplies, muni- tions, and reinforcements over the railways extending eastward from the "Western Front into Germany; the French, theirs over those extending westward and south-westward from the Western Front to Paris, which was their 30 The Strategy on the Western Front great manufacturing and distributing center; and the English, theirs over those leading back from their lines on the Western Front to Calais and Boulogne and other Channel ports. Sup- plies landed at Le Havre and Brest and a num- ber of other French ports, for the use of the Allied armies, were mostly sent to Paris for distribution. After America came into the war in April, 1917, other new lines of communication and supply were established for the American forces. They extended from behind the Western Front in the vicinity of St. Mihiel, just south of Verdun, westward, southwestward, and south- ward across France to the principal Ameri- can points of debarkation at St. Nazaire, La Eochelle, Bordeaux, and Marseille. For three years and a half after the battle of the Marne, the line of the Western Front sepa- rating the opposing armies in France and Bel- gium was, with the exception of a slight change made in it as a result of the battle of the Somme, practically stationary; and was in shape like an elongated letter S, the upper part northwest of Verdun, bulging towards Paris, the lower Germany's Second Great Mistahe 31 part southeast of Verdun, towards Strassburg. Such was the shape of the Western Front when the great attack was made at Verdun in Feb- ruary, 1916. Inasmuch as Verdun was one of the strongest points of the entire front, and well known to be such by the Germans, the question naturally arises why did the German General Staff select that point for attack, and why did they sacrifice so many men in repeated and fruitless efforts to break through the French front there ? The answer is, that the French front from Verdun to Eeims, was the only sector of the whole line where the Germans could by break- ing through cut off the communications of a large part of the French Army with Paris. Strategically then this sector of the line was the place to strike. It might appear that had the attempt been made to break through westward of Verdun, near Reims, it would have met with better suc- cess ; but even if it had, so long as Verdun itself held out, it is evident that the break could not have been sufficiently widened to make it safe for a German army to pass through. In order. 32 The Strategy on the Western Front therefore, to carry out this plan successfully, it was absolutely necessary that Verdun itself be taken ; and had it been taken, the gap towards Reims easily could have been widened. It is evident that had this plan been success- fully carried out, it would have produced momentous results; for a break through this sector of the line and an advance through Cha- lons and Ste. Menehould towards Troyes and Chaumont, would have severed the communica- tions with Paris of the entire right wing of the French Army, which was occupying the line from Verdun to Belfort. Having broken through it, the Germans might have taken either of two courses: They might have left a con- taining force ^ to hold the right wing of the French Army, while they moved westward with their remaining forces to envelop Paris ; or they might have left a containing force to hold the French forces towards Paris, while they closed in with their remaining forces on the French 1" Containing Force: " A body of troops charged with the duty of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against another portion, of the hostile forces. — Wagnee. Germany's Second Great Mistake 33 right wJDg and captured it. They would prob- ably have followed the latter plan, since the whole right wing of the French Army, with its communications severed and a powerful Ger- man force pressing it in front, could not have escaped capture. This accomplished, practically all the German forces in front of, as well as in rear of, the French right wing would then have been released to assist in enveloping and cap- turing the French forces about Paris. The consequences of a German victory at Verdun would have been immense, for it would have meant the destruction of France, perhaps the conquering of the world. Thus it was that the Germans made such mighty efforts to break through the French front there. At first their formidable blows proved irresistible and led to the capture of a large part of the fortified area about Verdun and of the important outlying forts of Douaumont and Vaux. They were most persistent ; again and again for a period of five months they brought their troops to the attack, until the very ravines ran red with blood. It seemed as if they might succeed in spite of their immense losses; for they appeared 34 The Strategy on the Western Front ready and willing to sacrifice any number of men in order to gain a few yards of ground. It was a critical period in the world's history ; the outlook was portentous; free government was trembling in the balance. And to those who understood the strategy of the situation, the mighty assaults on Verdun filled their hearts with dread aldn to despair, lest the Germans should break through and all would be lost. But the French soldiers, the indomitable French soldiers, inspired by their great fighter, Petain, barred the way and hurled them back; and France was saved; and the friends of freedom once more took courage. CHAPTER in gekmany's thied gkeat mistake SINCE Germany saw, after the failure of her great attack at Verdun, that there was no longer any hope of breaking through the Western Front and resuming a war of move- ment, she again reverted to her former plan of holding the front defensively with a svifficient force to prevent the Allies from breaking through, and with her available forces took the offensive successively against Russia, Rou- mania, Italy, and again against Russia; and, largely as a result of carrying out this plan, was wholly or partly successful against each. Had she continued in this way to mass her forces in turn against the Allied armies at Salonica and in Italy, she would most probably, with consid- erably less effort than she later spent in at- tempting to break through on the Western Front, have conquered or annihilated or cap- tured both armies. 35 36 The Strategy on the Western Front With, tlie Salonica Army defeated, tlie Ger- man and Austrian armies could have quickly overrun and occupied Greece; and with, the Italian Army defeated, they could have occu- pied the valley of the Po, rich in agriculture and manufactories, and have pushed forward to the French and Maritime Alps; and might have been able to break through the Maritime Alps and invade France via Nice. And even had Germany been stopped there, she easily could have held temporarily the line of the French Alps, and thence southward to the sea, as well as the line of the Western Front, while she was organizing and bringing into her system all the conquered countries. Master of Italy, Greece, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Roumania, Bul- garia, Austria, Russia, and the greater part of Turkey, her dominion would have been mightier than was that of Napoleon at the height of his power. Having reached such success as here set forth, she would have been in a position to forestall the landing of any expedition in the Balkans from the Aegean Sea, in Austria from the Adriatic, or in Turkey from the eastern Medi Germany's Third Great Mistake 37 terranean; or, had it been landed, would have been favorably situated militarily for concen- trating a greatly superior force against it and destroying it before it could have gained a foot- hold and advanced into the interior. For some reason Germany did not continue to carry out this plan ; but decided to renew the offensive on the Western Front; and with this end in view began on March 21, 1918, a little more than two years from the time of beginning the attack on Verdun, a powerful attack against the Allied line opposite Amiens, and then fol- lowed it up by a like attack against the British line in the vicinity of Ypres, and two other similar attacks against the French line between Reims and Montdidier, towards Chateau- Thierry. By massing overwhelming forces against sectors of the line in these attacks, Ger- many succeeded in pushing it back thirty-five miles opposite Amiens, thirty miles to Chateau- Thierry, and about ten miles in the vicinity of Ypres; but in no case was she able to break completely through the line and resume a war of movement. Just why Germany made such a complete and 38 The Strategy on the Western Front momentous change in her whole strategical plan in March, 1918, is not now fnlly known ; but the principal reasons for the change are probably as follows : First: Because she felt that sh« must make a supreme effort for victory on the Western Front before the American troops arrived there in large numbers. Second: Because the German commanders, having discovered that the British had built very few if any lines of entrenchments behind certain sectors of their line, and had very few reserves behind them, hoped by attacking these weak sectors with greatly superior forces, which had become available as a result of the collapse and disintegration of the Russian armies, to be able to break through them and resume a war of movement. Third : Because the military authorities, by a study of General von Hutier's plan of attack- ing, based upon his experience in the capture of Riga, and their easy success in driving back the British troops after the British victory at Cam- brai, had become convinced that the best way to break through an entrenched line was not to Germany's Third Great Mist ah e 39 pound themselves forward by a succession of small attacks, as they had attempted to do at Verdun, and as the British had done at the Somme, but to assemble their divisions in over- whelming force against a long sector of the enemy's line and gathering up all their imple- ments and methods of destruction, to move for- ward on an extended front and strike with their utmost power. Since the strategical situation on the Western Front during this time had not changed, the question arises: Why did not Germany make the second effort to break the Allied front along the Verdun-Eeims sector, instead of making it along the Somme sector from La Fere to Arras? The answer is, that although strategically the Verdun-Reims sector was the better place to break through, tactically it was the more diffi- cult. Bitter experience had already taught Ger- many that it would be impossible to break through this sector of the line. Then, again, Germany must have known that a large portion of the French reserves were at this time in Champagne south of Reims and that very few, if any, were in rea* of the Somme sector. And 40 The Strategy on the Western Front she doubtless knew, too, that the British had constructed few, if any, lines of intrenchments behind this sector after the battle of the Somme ; and that they had taken over only re- cently that portion of the sector south of St. Quentin ; and, as yet, had not had time to make complete arrangements for holding it. Then, too, the Germans knew that the dividing line separating the French from the British armies crossed |;his sector at its southern end ; and that there was as yet no commander-in-chief of the Allied armies on the Western Front, each army having thus far in. the war acted to a great extent independently; facts which could not but 'prevent that full unity of command between them, so essential to success. AU of these con- siderations no doubt led the Germans to choose this sector for their great attack. Their plan evidently was to throw an enor- mous force against this fifty miles of British front and to open a gap between the British and French armies, forcing, if possible, the British back on the English Channel and the French back upon Paris ; then to contain one army while they settled with the other. Germany's Third Gr eat Mistake 41 As to whether, if successful, they would have proceeded first against the British and at- tempted to throw them back on the Channel ports and captured them; or against the French and attempted to envelop, defeat, and capture them and the French capital, is not now known ; and, perhaps, was not known by them at the time; for they may have intended awaiting future developments before making a decision. But it may be remarked here that it probably would have been better for the Germans to settle with the British first; since to proceed against the French about Paris while this large British Army was in their rear and threatening their lines of communication back through France and Belgium would have been highly dangerous. Although the great attack begun by the Ger- mans on March 21, 1918, failed to separate the British from the French armies, it forced the Allied line back a distance of about thirty-five miles, producing an immense salient opposite Amiens whose base was about fifty miles in ex- tent; and it had the immediate effect also of changing the slightly curved front between Ver- 42 The Strategy on the Western Front dun and the English Channel into an angular front which extended from Verdun ill a gener- ally western direction past Noyon to a point about one mile south of Montdidier and thence in a generally northern direction to Nieuport on the English Channel. This change from a curved to an angular front, as well as the creation of the salient opposite Amiens, not only made a vast difference in the strategical situation of the combatant armies, but it had the immediate effect of bringing about greater unity of action between the Allies, by causing them to select General Ferdinand Foeh as commander-in-chief. It is purposed to discuss each of these changes separately and in detail under the headings: An Angular Front; A Salient; and Unity of Command. AN ANGTJLAE FRONT Occupying that portion of the theater of war within the angular front, the Germans had the advantage of interior lines, which enabled them to mass a superior force upon either the western or southern portion of their front much more quickly and easily than could the Allies on the Germany's Third Great Mistake 43 outside of tlie angular front assemble a suffi- cient force to meet it. But, on the other hand, this angular front gave to the Allies a great strategical advantage, in that,*if they should break through on either part of the front it would so threaten the com- munications of the Germans attacking on. the other as to compel them to turn back to save their communications. In other words, it gave the Allies the opportunity of carrying out that great principle of strategy of striking at their adversary's communications without exposing their own; for it mattered not whether they should strike northward from the Reims-Ver- dun front toward Mezieres and Sedan or east- ward from the Amiens- Arras-Lens front toward Hirson and Maubeuge, in either case they would sever a considerable number of the German lines of communication and threaten seriously the remainder without in the least exposing their own to a German attack. This advantage which the Allies possessed, had they had the strength or genius to make use of it, far surpassed the advantage which the Germans possessed as a result of their 44 Tlie Strategy on the Western Front central position and interior lines. The rea- son for tMs is that an attack made directly through the lines upon the German commu- nications would not only have effectually put a stop at once to their advance, but would have placed them in a most precarious situation and compelled them to turn back to fight for the recovery of their lost or threatened communi- cations. To illustrate: Suppose that at the time the Germans began their great attack of March 21, or a day or two afterwards, the French with their reserves massed in Champagne had been prepared to make a great attack northward from the Eeims-Verdun front and had broken through a considerable distance, very much as the Germans broke through in their great push toward Amiens, and had cut the east and west railways south of the Ardennes Mountains, what would have been the result? The answer is, that the Germans would have been compelled to stop their advance, turn back, and either fight to recover the lost railways or try to es- cape from the pocket in which this maneuver had placed them, by retreating northeastward Germany's Third Great Mistake 45 and gaining the Charleroi-Namur-Liege-Aix-la- Chapelle Eailway. If to this the reply be made that the Argonne Forest, just north of the Eeims-Verdun front, was such a difficult country to operate in, and so strongly fortified and held, that little head- way could have been made through it, the answer is that the Americans afterwards forced themselves through it in the face of a most desperate resistance; and that a powerful at- tack on this vital part of the angular front, even if it had not made much headway, would never- theless have compelled the Germans to halt their leading divisions and send back many of them to stop the French advance, just as a few months later they were forced to send them back to try to stop the onrush of the American soldiers. The maxim or principle of war which applies in these cases is, that where two armies are maneuvering against e^ch other's communica- tions, or are attacking each other, that army whose communications are the more seriously threatened will invariably abandon any effort to press on and will fall back to fight for its com- 46 The Strategy on the Western Front munications. " The importance of this fact," says Hamley, " is immense ; for the conamander who finds himself on his enemy's rear, while his own is still beyond his adversary's reach, may cast aside all anxiety for his own commu- nications, and call up every detachment to the decisive point, certain that the enemy will aban- don his own designs in order, if possible, to retrieve his position. ' ' ^ There are, it is believed, no exceptions in his- tory to this maxim, save in a few cases where the commanding general had decided to give up his communications because he had established, or planned to establish, new ones ; as Napoleon did at Austerlitz,^ where he made no effort to fight to preserve his threatened communications back southward through Vienna, because he had already prepared new ones westward through Bohemia, which he could have used in case of defeat ; or as Sherman did in the Atlanta campaign, where he made no effort to fight for his communications back to Chattanooga, upon Hood's marching rearward from Sherman's '- Hamley, TTie Operations of War, p. 93. 2 Sargent, Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign, pp. 186 and 187. Germany's Thi rd Great Mistake 47 front to cut them, because he had decided to cut loose from them and march to the sea, where he would establish, and did establish, a new base for future operations. It would appear that had the Allies been in a condition to strike at the communications of the Germans by breaking through the line on one side or the other of the angular front, there was offered them strategically a most favorable op- portunity for success, since the Germans in their great attacks invariably selected the front behind which there were few Allied reserves for massing their own reserves preparatory to making the attempt to break through, thus necessarily weakening proportionately their own front behind which the Allied reserves were massed, and thereby making it the very front on which an Allied offensive would most prob- ably succeed. But, as a matter of fact, nothing of this kind was attempted. On the contrary, when the Ger- mans made their attack on March 21, 1918, the Allied reserves in Champagne, and such other reserves as could be collected, were hurried around the angular front with all possible speed 48 The Strategy on the Western Front to stop the German advance on Amiens ; then when the Germans made their second great at- tack sroiith of Tpres on April 9, the reserves were hurried northward to that point to help save the British, who in a critical situation with " their backs to the wall "were fighting desper- ately to keep themselves from being driven into the sea; then when the Germans made their third great attack on May 27, upon Chateau- Thierry, and for the second time in the war reached the Marne, the reserves were hurriedly sent to that front to check the Germans and keep them from cutting off the French right wing and from finally reaching Paris. Why were all the Allied efforts to stop the Germans during these four months, from March 21 until July 18, when Foch began his great offensive, confined entirely to defensive opera- tions? Until fuller details of the situation be- come known this question cannot be satisfac- torily answered ; but probably the failure of the Allies to appoint a commander-in-chief prior to the great German offensive of March 21 had much to do with it ; for it must be remembered! that it takes time to prepare for an offensive. Germany's Third Great Mistake 49 and that ' ' the transition from the defensive to the offensive is," according to Napoleon, " one of the most delicate operations of war."^ Of course, the aim of the Allies during these four critical months was to hold the Germans until America could transport sufficient men to France to give the Allies a preponderance of fighting troops. But whether this purely de- fensive strategy, which seems to have been the Allied plan up to the counter-attack begun by General Foch on July 18, was as effective in gaining the result sought as defensive-offensive strategy would have been is questionable. As to waiting for preponderating forces be- fore beginning an offensive, there is this to be said in its favor: since the Americans were sending to France on an average of more than two hundred thousand soldiers a month the Al- lies would soon considerably outnumber the Germans. But did this justify their waiting during these critical months for preponderating forces? Perhaps so ! At any rate, it succeeded. Nevertheless, it is well to remember that great soldiers have seldom deemed it necessary, even 1 General Burnod, Napoleon's Maxims of War, p. 50. 50 The Strategy on the Western Front in critical times, to wait for preponderating forces before undertaking offensive operations ; and that, not infrequently, such operations have led to the greatest victories. A vastly pre- ponderating force against Eobert E. Lee did not prevent him and his great lieutenant, " Stonewall " Jackson, from winning the battle of ChancellorsviUe ; nor did it prevent Bona- parte in his first Italian campaign, although greatly outnumbered at all times in the theater of war, from bringing a superior force upon practically every battlefield and by so doing de- feating and crushing one Sardinian and six Austrian armies sent successively against him.^ But untU the facts are more fully known it is not safe to pronounce definite criticism on any of the operations of the Allies during these four critical months. Nevertheless, from what is known, and judging from the strategical ability shown by Marshal Foch in his subsequent oper- ations on the Western Front and elsewhere as commander-in-chief, I am of the opinion that, had he been appointed commander-in-chief of the Allied armies a sufficient time prior to the 1- Napoleon Bonaparte's first CampcAgn, pp. 168 and 169. Germany's Third Great Mistake 51 great thrust toward Amiens,, begun on March 21, 1918, to have formulated and worked out his plans for meeting the attacks, he would have put a stop to them much earlier than he did. A SALIENT "VVe have seen how the Grermans by massing overwhelming forces against weak sectors of the Allied front succeeded in forcing it back, in three cases, from ten to thirty-five miles, but in no place were they able to break completely through the line. The reason for this was, that in each instance, as they moved forward through the enemy's entrenched lines, they cre- ated a situation which made their own lines more and more vulnerable and harder and harder to defend. In other words, they created a salient. A salient is vulnerable; its weak points strategically are along its sides near its base, because an attack in force there, by threatening the communications of the occupying troops, would, if successful, force their retreat. Then, too, any advantage of a central posi- tion — of interior lines — that may be possessed 52 TTie Str«bte§y »n the Western Front by troops occupying a salient is overbalanced by the advantage whicb the enemy has of inte- rior lines within the angular fronts on each side of the salient. To illustrate: Let the line ABODE represent the front between the two op- posing armies. Now if, on account of their central position, the troops occupying the salient bod have an advantage of interior lines, French / \ French Germans it must be evident that such advantage is more than counter-balanced by the advantage of in- terior lines possessed by the opposing troops occupying the angles or counter-salients abc and CDS. But as a matter of fact, where a salient is small, or is well filled with troops, there is no strategical advantage for troops occupying it; on the contrary, there is a great strategical dis- advantage; first, because they have too limited a space in which to maneuver; and secondly, because they are subject to a converging fire Germany's Third Great Mistake 53 from the enemy occupying the counter-salients. Troops within a salient are not infrequently so situated that long-range guns from one or the other side of it can enfilade or take them in reverse. Then, too, the numerous roads and railways within a salient, although absolutely necessary for the movement of men and supplies, are strategically a source of weakness to the occu- pying troops, principally because they can be fired upon from many angles and often be enfiladed throughout long stretches by the guns of the troops occupying the counter-salients or by the guns at the nose of the salient. And the nature of the terrain, and direction and position of the roads within a salient, of course, influence greatly the strategical situation of the occupy- ing troops, but these are special cases which would call for a special analysis. Then, again, a salient is per se not only weak, but it weakens the whole front by greatly lengthening it, thus making it necessary to use many more troops to defend it. Thus the sides BC and cd would require more than twice the number of troops to defend them than would 54 The Strategy on the Western Front the base bd, whicli was the line of the original front. And, naturally, when these salients are multiplied, the strength of the front becomes much weakened since its length becomes propor- tionately greatly increased. But, on the other hand, it should be borne in miud that the weak- ening is not confined to one side, since the front of the opposing army is correspondingly length- ened and likewise weakened. It should, perhaps, be remarked here that the foregoing discussion of a salient has reference more particularly to what may be termed a strategical salient; that is to say, a salient large enough to include within it, roads, rail- ways, and other means of communication, thus making it possible, and often practicable, for outside troops to make strategical moves and combinations against the troops occupying it. It is only in the past war that such salients have been developed; for the reason that then only have battle lines extended to such great lengths as to permit the development of great salients. In former wars, the salients have been small and, consequently, their weakness has been due almost solely to tactical consid- Germany's Third Great Mistake 55 erations. Tactically, other things being equal, the weakness of the salient to troops occupy- ing it is in the main part due to the mathe- matical fact that you can put more men and guns on the outside of an angle to shoot into it than you can put on the inside to fire out. This is the chief reason why the " Peach Orchard " salient at Gettysburg was a weak point in the Federal line; the " Bloody Angle " at Spottsyl- vania a weak point in the Confederate line ; and the nose of the great strategical salient of Chateau-Thierry a weak point in thie German line. Tactically, each of the great German salients was weak at its nose ; strategically, each was weak at its base. Having pointed out the weakness of a salient to the side occupying it, attention is invited to the fact that, after the great German attack of March 21, 1918, upon Amiens had been checked, and prior to the German attack south of Ypres on April 9, 1918, there was offered a splendid opportunity for striking a telling blow at the base of the Amiens salient. Such a blow, could it have been made in sufficient force, would have threatened the communications of the troops 56 The Strategy on the Western Front occupying it, and compelled them either to re- tire or to fight desperately to prevent the Allies from breaking through the salient at its base. In either case, the result would, no doubt, have put a stop to the attack south of Tpres, as well as to any further offensive by the Germans upon either side of the angular front. But the failure of General Foch to take ad- vantage of this opportunity to attack at the time, was no indication that he did not fully appreciate the vulnerability of the Amiens salient to an AlUed attack. On the contrary, his subsequent masterly operations, beginning with his great counter-offensive against the Chateau- Thierry salient on July 18, 1918, and continuing until every German salient, including that of St. Mihiel, had been ironed out and the Germans driven back to the Hindenburg Line and even beyond, were indisputable proofs that he appre- ciated fully the weak points of the salients and knew where and how to attack them. UNITY OF COMMAND Up to and including the beginning of the great attack by the Germans in March, 1918, Germany's Third Great Mistake 57 there was no supreme commander of the Allied armies. Each army acted more or less independ- ently; and as there was little or no co-ordina- tion of their movements, serious consequences threatened. Especially was this true in the great German offensive in March. Then and there was seen the absolute necessity of a com- mander-in-chief of the Allied armies. As a re- sult, on March 28, just one week after the be- ginning of this great offensive. General Ferdi- nand Foch, of the French Army, was appointed commander-in-chief. Prior to this time there had been much opposition to such an appointment. As early as 1915, Lord Kitchener had suggested Allied co-ordination, but nothing was do»e in the mat- ter. In July, 1917, at a conference of the chiefs of the Allied staffs of Great Britain, France, and Italy, a resolution was passed urging the necessity of unity of action, if success was to be achieved; but no commander-in-chief was ap- pointed. Then in November, 1917, at a confer- ence of the premiers of Great Britain, France, and Italy and the chiefs of staff of the Allied armies, held at Eapallo, near Genoa, Italy, the 58 The Strategy on the Western Front appointment of a generalissimo, who should control all the Allied armies, was proposed ; but Lloyd George, the British Premier, stated that he was utterly opposed to this plan. Accord- ingly, and as a sort of compromise, an Inter- Allied strategic board, to be known as the Supreme War Council, was created. It was to consist of the Prime Minister and a member of the government of each of the great Powers whose armies were fighting on the Western Fronts. Its first act was the creation of an Inter-Allied General Staff, consisting of Gen- eral Foch of the French Army, Wilson of the British Army, and Cadorna of the Italian Army. There was strong opposition in Great Britain and in the British Army to the creation of this Supreme War Council, principally on the ground that the proposals therein for obtaining unity of action would not only subordinate the military chiefs to political control, but were bound to be unworkable and militarily ineffec- tive ; and in the House of Commons on Novem- ber 14, 1917, Lloyd George made this state- ment: Germany's Third Great Mistake 59 The Council will have no executive power, and final decision in the matter of strategy and the distribution and movements of the various ai-mies in the field will rest with the several governments of the Allies. There will therefore be no operations department. On November 18, 1917, President Wilson made public a cablegram to Colonel Edward M. House, in whicli he stated emphatically that the United States Grovernment considers " unity of plan and control between the Allies and the United States essential," and asked him, with General Tasker H. Bliss, U. S. Army, as mili- tary adviser, to attend the first meeting of the Supreme "War Council at Versailles, France, on December 1, 1917. This action of the President was understood as removing any doubts as to this Government's attitude towards the Su- preme War Council. It was practically equiva- lent to giving it its unqualified endorsement. On December 6, 1917, General Foch was re- lieved as French representative on the Inter- Allied General Staff of the Supreme War Coun- cil to become the military adviser of the French Premier, Clemenceau, and General Weygand was appointed in his place. 60 The Strategy on the Western Front The third session of the Supreme War Coun- cil was held January 30 to February 2, 1918, at Versailles. From the ofl&cial statement of the ^proceedings issued February 3, it appears that the decisions taken by the Council at this meet- ing ' ' embrace not only a general military policy to be carried out by the Allies in all the princi- pal theaters of war; but more particularly a closer and more effective co-ordination, under the Council, of all the efforts of the Powers engaged in the struggle against the Central Powers. ' ' In the House of Commons on February 5, Andrew Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Ex- chequer, in reply to an inquiry, announced that no generalissimo had been appointed by the Council at this meeting; and on the same day it was announced from "Washington that * ' for the present no assent to any policy or declara- tion involving considerations other than those purely military will be given by any American representative sitting with the Council until it first has been submitted to this Government and received its approval." Thus it is seen that, notwithstanding the state- Germ any's Third Great Mistake 61 ment of the British Premier, the Supreme War Council at this meeting proceeded to formulate the military policy which was to be carried out and that it was anxious for a closer and inore effective co-ordination, not through the appoint- ment of a generalissimo, but ' ' under the Coun- cil ' ' itself ; and that the United States Govern- ment by implication gave its consent to any policy or declaration of the Council involving purely military considerations; but withheld its assent as to other considerations until they had been submitted to and approved by it. But the important point of the whole matter is that no generalissimo, no commander-in-chief, was appointed ; and that the supreme control of the Allied armies continued to remain in the hands of this Council and would probably have so remained indefinitely had not the great at- tack of the Germans in March made absolutely necessary the immediate appointment of a com- mander-in-chief. Major-General Sir Frederick B. Maurice, of the British Army, says that at this session the Council " vested the supreme control of the Allied forces on the Western Front in an execu- 62 The Strategy on the Western Front tive board composed of the representatives of the American, French, Italian, and British armies under the presidency of General Foch ; ' ' and that ' ' this was in effect putting the higher command of the Allied operations in the hands of a committee. ' ' ^ But whether the higher command was to re- main in the hands of the Supreme War Council itself or in the hands of the executive board appointed by it, matters not; for in eithei* case failure was bound to result. History proves this: invariably when the supreme control of armies has been vested in a council, or commit- tee, failure has resulted; for a decision by a council, or committee, means delay, discussion, compromise; and these are fatal in war. It must be evident that no party to a compromised decision could, if called upon to execute it, have full confidence in the result, since he would be certain to feel that his own proposal would be much better. In war there must be promptness of decision, singleness of purpose, boldness of action, confidence in one's own plan; to delay, to discuss, to compromise is to court defeat. 1 Maurice, in BeiHew of Beiiiews, August, 1918, p. 158. Germany's Third Great Mistake 63 " To the Aulic Council," said Jomini in 1804, "Austria owes all her reverses since the time of Prince Eugene of Savoy." It was fortunate for the Allies that they were wise enough to appoint General Foch com- mander-in-chief at the time they did, and not to leave the conduct of the campaign to this Supreme "War Council. And it was unfortu- nate that they had not been wise enough to appoint him commander-in-chief when the ques- tion of unity of command was first raised; or, at least, to have appointed him before March 21, 1918, and by so doing have given him a chance to formulate his plans and make ready to meet that great attack. In this connection. Napoleon's views upon the supreme importance of unity of command may not be out of place. In one of his maxims he has said : ' ' Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command." And in his first Italian campaign, the most- wonderful in many respects that has ever been fought, when the Directory, which was jealous of his brilliant success in Italy, proposed to put a check on his career by sending General Kellerman to share 64 The Strategy on the Western Front with him the command of his victorious army, he submitted his resignation and wrote the Directory : It is in the highest degree impolitic to divide the army of Italy ; and it is equally contrary to the inter- ests of the Republic to put over it two generals If you weaken your means by dividing your forces; if you break in Italy the unity of military thought, I tell you with sorrow, you wiU lose the finest oppor- tunity that ever occurred of imposing laws on Italy. . . . . Every one has his method of carrying on war. Kellerman has had more experience and may do it better than I. Together we should do nothing but harm. Your decision in this matter is of more impor- tance than the fifteen thousand men the Emperor of Austria has sent to Beaulieu. And to Carnot he wrote : To associate Kellerman with me is to desire to lose all. I cannot serve willingly with a man who believes himself to be the best tactician of Europe ; moreover, I believe one bad general to be preferable to two good ones. War is like government — a thing of tact. Thus we see that Napoleon looked upon unity of command as the supreme essential in win- ning a war; that he regarded it of more im- portance than the reinforcements sent his ad- versary; and that so strong was his belief on Germany's Third Great Mistake 65 this point tliat lie even declared that one bad general in command of an army was better than two good ones. In no campaign in history has unity of com- mand played a more important part than in this great World War. The operations of the Cen- tral Powers were directed by Germany. The supreme authority was the commander-in-ehief of the German armies, who was advised and as- sisted by the German General Staff and his im- mediate staff officers. The Austrian, Turkish, and Bulgarian armies all obeyed this supreme authority. In consequence, there was among the Central Powers unity of command, resulting in unity of thought, unity of purpose, and unity of action. The result was that whenever a plan of operations was decided upon, all the re- sources and available military strength of the Central Powers were brought to bear to make it a success. To this unity of command was largely due the fact that Germany won such great victories in Russia, Italy, and the Balkans and, despite her stupendous strategical blun- ders, came near, on five occasions, to winning the war on the Western Front. 66 The Strategy on the Western Front But on the side of the Allies there was for nearly four years neither a commander-in-chief nor any unity of action. Each of the Allied' armies acted to a great extent independently of the others. There was little co-ordination be- tween them, and such as there was, came about through mutual consent and not because it was in any way obligatory upon them. The result was that' for four years the Allies were com- pelled to fight almost entirely on the defensive ; and at the Marne, at Verdun, and in the great German thrusts of March 21, May 27, and July 15, 1918, came close to final defeat, although during much of that time they had a numerical superiority in fighting forces. Of course the successes of the Central Powers cannot be attributed entirely to unity of com- mand nor the reverses of the Allies entirely to a lack of it, but unquestionably it had much to do in determining these results; so much, in- deed, that it is doubtful whether the war could have been won by the Allies without the ap- pointment of a commander-in-chief. One of the remarkable facts connected with this war is that it should have continued nearly Germany's Third Great Mistake 67 four years without a commander-in-cliief of the Allied armies; and that in less than eight months after his appointment, it should have been brought to a close. Still more remark- able, perhaps, is the fact that the Allies should have permitted the war to continue for almost four years without making any serious attempt to appoint a commander-in-chief. The appoint- ment, it is true, was considered and discussed by those in authority, but when they came to act, the nearest approach to it — until it was, so to speak, actually forced upon them by the great German drive of March 21 — was to ap- point a Supreme War Council. But it does not necessarily follow that, had a commander-in-chief been appointed earlier, the war would have been ended sooner ; for that would have depended upon the commander-in- chief selected. It is war that develops the genius of command and of generalship ; and the selection of an Allied commander at the begin- ning of the war would have been no easy task. And yet, General Foch's brilliant operations in the first battle of the Mame clearly indicated that he would have been a most suitable man. CHAPTER IV GERMANY'S GREAT THRUSTS BEFORE proceeding to a further analysis of the strategy of the operations on the Western Front, a brief reference to the num- bers of the opposing armies will not be out of place. On March 21, 1918, the fighting strength of the Germans probably outnumbered that of the Allies by about three hundred thousand men; but as the weeks and months went by and more and more American troops were made ready and brought into the firing line, this inequality between them was overcome; and by July 18, 1918, when Foch began his great counter-of- fensive, the fighting strength of the Allies on the Western Front probably exceeded that of the Germans as much as that of the Germans had exceeded that of the Allies on March 21 . But it should be constantly borne in mind that a preponderance of fighting forces on either 68 Germany's Great Thrusts 69 side was not necessary to the carrying out of Napoleon's principle of bringing superior forces against the enemy at the point of attack ; for by surprise, or by swifter concentration, or by greater skill in maneuvering, an expert com- mander will not infrequently be able to accom- plish this, regardless of whether his own or his adversary's forces are numerically superior within the theater of operations. Right here, perhaps, is a good place for point- ing out the fact that during more than four years of fierce and bloody fighting on the West- ern Front, the constant purpose of the com- manding generals on both sides, whether they aimed a blow at some weak point of the enemy's line, struck fiercely at the bases of his salients, or attempted to break through his line on a wide front and resume a war of movement, was to bring outnumbering and greatly superior forces upon their chosen objectives, the imme- diate battlefields. General Foch, in his book, The Principles of War, refers to this principle as, " the use of numerical superiority to obtain a definite re suit," and illustrates it by citing a conversation 70 The Strategy on the Western Front that took place between Bonaparte and Moreau in 1799 at the home of Gohier, who gives the following account of it : The two generals, who had never seen each other, seemed equally pleased to meet. It was noticed that each looked at the other silently for a moment. Bona- parte spoke first, told Moreau how he had long desired to know him: " You arrive victorious from Egypt," answered Moreau, "and I from Italy after a great defeat . . . ." After a few explanations of the causes of the defeat, he added : "It was impc«sible for our brave army not to be overcome by so much strength against it. It is always the greater number who defeat the smaller." " You are right," said Napoleon, " it is always the greater number who defeat the smaller." " But, General, with small armies you have often defeated big ones," I told Napoleon. " Even then," he said, " it was always the smaller number who were defeated by the greater. ' ' Which caused him to explain his method to us -. ' ' "When, with smaller forces, I was in the presence of a great army, I rapidly grouped my own and fell like lightning on one of the wings which I destroyed. I then took advantage of the disorder which such a maneuver always caused in the enemy's ranks to attack him at another point, always with all my forces. I defeated him thus piecemeal, and the resulting vie- Germany's Great Thrusts 71 tory was always, as you see, a triumph of the greater number over the smaller. "^ After a week's bitter fighting tlie onrush of the Germans in their great thrust towards Amiens, which began on March 21, 1918, was finally checked by the French reserves who were hurried to that front mainly from Champagne ; and the first day after General Foeh assumed supreme command of the Allied armies, he an- nounced that Amiens was safe.^ Then, after a pause of eleven days, the Ger- mans, on April 9, 1918, began their great thrust south of Ypres ; and it was continued with hard fighting and varying success until their final effort on April 29, which, resulting in extremely heavy losses, caused them to abandon their at- tempts to break through the British line on that front. As at Amiens, so at Ypres, it was the arrival of the French reserves that turned the scale in favor of the British and enabled thena to stop the Germans. From April 29 to May 27, the Germans again 1 Foeh, The Principles of War, pp. 97 and 98. 2 Frank H. Simonds in Beview of Beviews, June, 1918, p. 593. 72 The Strategy on the Western Front paused in their efforts, in order to prepare for their third great thrust. The question was where would they strike. Would it be on the west side of the angular front somewhere be- tween Montdidier and Ypres — or on the south side somewhere between Noyon and Verdun? There were several reasons why they would choose, and did choose, to strike on the south side: First : The French reserves were being held along the west side, some as far north as Ypres, but mainly concentrated about Amiens, cover- ing the point of junction of the British and French armies. Second : The fact that the reserves were being held on the west side indicated that the French and British commanders expected the next at- tack on that side and were prepared for it. Third : By making their break-through on the south side and extending it between Paris and Nancy and beyond, they would not only separate the French right wing occupying Verdun and the line of the Vosges from the French left wing in front and northeast of Paris, but would sever the communications of the French right Germany's Great Thrusts 73 wing and be in an advantageous position to force its capture or destruction. Moreover, such a thrust as this would threaten the commu- nications of the American forces between their camps south of the St. Mihiel salient and their ports of debarkation on the west and south coasts of France ; and make it very difficult for them to fall back without abandoning a good part of the great collection of munitions and supplies which they had accumulated in that vicinity. Thus we see that while a break-through on either front would have given the Germans the opportunity to carry out that principle of strat- egy of defeating separately the divided forces of the enemy, by holding one with a containing force while they massed superior numbers against the other and crushed or captured it, and then concentrated their whole strength on the remaining force, it was only on the south front that the Germans could also at the same time carry out that other great principle of strategy of striking at the communications of the enemy without exposing their own to his attack. 74 The Strategy on the Western Front Accordingly, on May 27, 1918, the Germans began thpir third great thrust against the Allied line on a front of about thirty miles, from the point where it crossed the Aisne, some ten or twelve miles north of Reims, to the point where it crossed the Soissons-Laon Eailway, about seven miles northeast of Soissons. The attack on this front was a great surprise to the Allies ; and for a while was remarkably successful. The French were literally swept from the Chemin-des-Dames, forced over the Aisne, and thence across the Vesle. Four French divisions were practically annihilated; and the British troops north of Eeims, having their flank uncovered, were forced back towards that city. This practically left the way open to a further advance ; and the Germans, taking immediate advantage of it, rushed forward al- most unopposed. It was a serious time for j&en- eral Foch; for he had only the wreck of the four French divisions and such local reserves as he could collect to stay the German advance. The onrush continued for about a week. The Germans took Soissons, got possession of the Soissons - Chateau - Thierry Eailway, pushed Germany's Great Thrusts 75 south to Chateau-Thierry and the north bank of the Marne, and succeeded in cutting the Paris-Chateau-Thierry-Chalons- Verdun Rail- way, one of the important lines of communica- tion of the French right wing with Paris. But at Chateau-Thierry and along the Marne they were finally checked by the French and American reserves that were rushed to the threatened front from other sections of the Al- lied line. Here at the bridge which crosses the Marne opposite Chateau-Thierry, at Boures- ches, in Belleau Wood, and at Vaux, the Third and Second American divisions, by their superb fighting, helped, to bring the extreme German advance to a standstill and gained for themselves an imperishable fame. Already the First American Division had distinguished it- self by capturing Cantigny, near Montdidier, on May 28, the day following the beginning of this great thrust. On the whole, this thrust was a success for the Germans. They had pushed back the Allied line a distance of thirty miles at its farthest point. But it was not the complete success they had hoped for, since it was stopped before 76 The Strategy on the Western Front they could break completely through the line and resume a war of movement. And what was of the utmost importance to the Allies was that the Germans did not succeed in pushing back the Allied line more than four or five miles west- ward of Soissons ; or succeed in taking Eeims or even the high ground about that city. As a con- sequence, they were left in possession of the long, narrow, dangerous Chateau-Thierry sali- ent. But it was not alone this salient that gave them concern. The Amiens salient was also long, narrow, and dangerous. Both were ex- tremely vulnerable. Both offered the Allies a splendid opportunity for striking the Germans a telling blow. In this precarious and dangerous situation the Germans saw that they must attempt to widen the bases of these two narrow salients and render them less vulnerable and dangerous before making any further attempt to break through on the south side. This could best be done by an attack in force from the Noyon- Montdidier section on the west side of the Oise River towards Compiegne; for, should this ob- jective be reached, it would force the French to Germany's Great Thrusts 77 withdraw from the high ground and woods in the narrow salient, Compiegne-Noyon-Soissons, in the angle between the Oise and Aisne rivers, and practically obliterate the Amiens and Cha- teau-Thierry salients. Or, to speak more accu- rately, such an attack, if successful, would en- tirely obliterate the Amiens salient and change the narrow Chateau-Thierry salient into a much larger, broader, and less vulnerable one, whose general outline would run from Montdidier through Compiegne to Chateau-Thierry on one side, and from Chateau-Thierry to Eeims on the other. On June 9, 1918, just two weeks froin the day the Germans began their thrust on Chateau- Thierry, they struck with great force on the Noyon-Montdidier front. But the Allies were not surprised as they had been on May 27. Ex- pecting the attack, they had reserves near at hand to meet it. Nevertheless, by desperate fighting and through the sacrifice of many men, the Germans met with some success. They drove the French from the environs of Noyon some five or six miles down the valley on the west side of the Oise; and this advance, by 78 The Strategy on the Western Front threatening the communications of the French on the east side of the river, made it necessary for them also to retire down the stream. But despite their most strenuous efforts the Ger- mans failed to reach their objective. On June 13 they were still making slight advances here and there in the face of enormous losses; but by June 15 the fourth great German thrust had been practically brought to a halt, with the Ger- man advance lines still some sis miles from Compiegne. The total outcome of these seven days' fierce fighting was that the Germans had advanced their lines five or six miles between the two salients and had gained some valuable ground, but had fallen far short of reaching their ob- jective; nevertheless, the advance in this por- tion of their front was of great importance to them, since it considerably widened the bases and diminished the vulnerability of the Amiens and Chateau-Thierry salients. Then there followed a pause of a month, in which the Germans prepared for their fifth great thrust, and the Allies were content to re- main on the defensive, since every day's delay Germany's Great Thrusts 79 was adding, on an average, from seven to eight thousand men to the strength of the American Army in France. There was no change in the general strate- gical situation. To break through the south front, push through between Paris and Nancy and sever the communications of the French right wing occupying the line of the Vosges, was still strategically the best plan, as it had been from the first. And since the German advance on Chateau-Thierry had created a French sali- ent — although a broad one — with Reims as its apes, this was an additional reason for striking on this front; for it was evident to all that should the Germans break through between Reims and the Argonne Forest on one side of this salient, and between Reims and Chateau- Thierry on the other side, they would cut or threaten the communications of the troops oc- cupying it and force their capture or retirement. Moreover, such an attack would at the same time greatly widen the Chateau-Thierry salient and make it much less vulnerable to an Allied attack. Then again, with the French holding Reims, 80 The Strategy on the Western Front Foch could launch a counter-attack from that city northward and westward and cut the roads and railways so vital to the existence of the German troops occupying the Chateau-Thierry salient. A thrust northward to the Aisne would cut the Soissons-Neufchatel-Eethel-Mezieres Railway; a thrust westward to Fismes would cut the Chateau-Thierry-Fismes Railway. These reasons, evidently, were patent to the Allies ; for they were expecting the Germans to make the thrust along these very lines; and, consequently, when the attack came, it did not take them by surprise as did the great thrust of May 27 on Chateau-Thierry. Of equal impor- tance was the month's delay which gave Foch time to prepare to meet the attack. On July 15, 1918, the Germans launched their fifth and last great thrust against the. Allied line on a front of about seventy-five miles, ex- tending from the western edge of the Argonne Forest on their left, past Reims, to Chateau- Thierry on their right ; and as the action devel- oped the front was extended northward from Chateau-Thierry some twenty-five miles to Sois- sons. Germany's Great Thrusts 81 From tlie start the Germans made but little headway between the Argonne Forest and Eeims. General Gouraud who commanded this portion of the French line had ascertained only a few days previously just when the Germans would begin their attack, and he made his dis- positions so skillfully to meet it that a good part of the German Army in his front was practi- cally annihilated. In repulsing the attack he was ably assisted by the Forty-second American Division which fought with great valor near Perthes. Still, near the Reims salient on its east side, the Germans by a concentrated attack made a little advance. Here they captured Moronvil- liers Heights; and, in the earlier rushes, even succeeded in reaching Prunay and in cutting the Reims-Chalons Railway at this point; but the French, realizing the importance of holding this line of railway, strongly counter-attacked and retook the town. However, the Germans in this vicinity held most of their gains, their line hav- ing been advanced some three or four miles southwestward in the direction of Epernay; and this was of the utmost importance to them, 82 The Strategy on the Western Front since it was a thrust into the very base of the Eeims salient. Between Chateau-Thierry and Eeims the Ger- mans made a better beginning. On the whole Marne front, they forced the crossing of the river, driving back the French, and a consider- able American contingent of the Third Division which was on outpost duty a few miles east of Chateau-Thierry. But the Americans by a bril- liant series of counter-attacks at Mezy and at the mouth of the Surmelin drove back the enemy and finally succeeded in re-establishing their line in their immediate front.^ But the Germans, despite these reverses and in the face of spirited French attacks, held their position on the south side of the Marne for five or six miles on either side of Dormans and be- gan slowly to push forward up the valley of the Marne on a front of about twelve miles; and, by the evening of July 17, their advance was within eight miles of Epernay and extended 1 " It was on this occasion," says General Pershing in his report to the Secretary of War, " that a single regiment of the Third wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals." The regiment rfeferred to was the Thirty-eighth XT. S. Infantry, commanded by Colonel U. G. McAlexander, TJ. S. Army. Germany's Great Thrusts 83 northward to the western edge of the Mountain of Eeims, just north of Epernay. i The situation had reached a critical period. Although the Germans had been successfully checked throughout a good portion of their long battle front, they had, by massing superior forces and making stupendous efforts on each side of the base of the Reims salient, met with considerable success. And it is evident that if they could have pushed forward a few miles farther up the Marne Valley, captured Epernay, and seized the Mountain of Eeims, they would have gained possession of a considerable part of the Epernay-Eeims Eailway, which would have forced the Allies to withdraw immediately from the Eeims salient over the Eeims-Chalons Eailway; and this would have been attended with great difficulties, since the German line was very close to the railway in the vicinity of Prunay. Then, a further advance of the Germans southward from the Argonne Forest-Eeims front, and southeastward from the Epernay- Eeims front up the Marne Valley to and beyond Chalons, would have severed or threatened the 84 The Strategy on the Western Front communications of the Allied troops occupying the Argonne Forest and the great Verdun sali- ent and forced them either to surrender or re- tire. These operations, it is readily seen, would have wiped out the vulnerable German salients of Chateau-Thierry and St. Mihiel and left the Oermans in a most favorable position for taking in reverse the Allied troops occupying the line of the Vosges. Thus, Germany's original inten- tion of turning the Vosges and the French fortresses along that front would have been accomplished; not by the south, but by the north ; not by passing through the Belf ort gap, but by ironing out the Eeims and Verdun salients. Here, then, was the turning point of this great battle; for one more successful push up the valley of the Marne to Epernay would have changed the whole conduct of the campaign and most probably have produced astounding results. Strategically and psychologically the time had arrived for Foch to strike. First: -Because there was every indication, every probability, that there would be left no Germany's Great Thrusts 85 vulnerable German salients to attack, should he delay a few days longer. Second: Because the Germans in their fifth great thrust, although partially successful, had met with great discouragement and terrible losses. It was evident that they could no longer expect, even with a month's preparation, to break through the Allied line on an extended front and advance some thirty or thirty-five miles into the enemy's territory as they had done on March 21 and on May 27. And to win the war required them to do even more than this; for unless they could eventually break through the Allied line and resume a war of movement, there was no hope of final success. Third : Because the French had been greatly encouraged by the fact that along the entire fighting line they had been able, with the assist- ance of the Americans, to hold the Germans in their original positions, or to check them in the few places where they had bent in the Allied line. After months of falling back, after years of defensive fighting, to be able to check the on- rush of the Germans in one of their great thrusts, and to take the offensive here and there 86 The Strategy on the Western Front and force them back, force them to retire, brought encouragement to every French heart and raised the spirits of the entire French Army. Fourth : Because the American troops, wher- ever employed in the fighting, had demonstrated their fitness and bravery. At Cantigny, at Cha- teau-Thierry, at Bouresches, in Belleau Wood, at Vaux, at Perthes, at Mezy, and the mouth of the Surmelin, they had fought with extraordi- nary dash, determination, and courage. They were no longer untried troops. Foch knew from the way they had fought that they could be de- pended upon, that he could put them into the front line beside the veteran and indomitable French troops, and that they would not fail him. Young, enthusiastic, energetic, brave, and with their very souls yearning for the fray, there was no task too difficult for them, no veteran Ger- man troops whom they feared to face. Just how Greneral Foch, at this very crisis of the war, took advantage of the situation to strike the blow which stopped completely the onrush of the Germans and soon turned the tide of battle against them along their whole far- Germany's Great Thrusts 87 flung battle line will be described in the next chapter. But before closing the discussion it will be in- structive and interesting to inquire, what would most probably have been the outcome, had the Germans, as herein supposititiously described, been able to push south between Paris and Nancy and take the French and Americans in reverse along the line of the Vosges? There are two contingencies that might have arisen. First: The Germans might have pushed far enough south to sever not only the communica- tions of the French with Paris, but also the com- munications of the Americans with their ports of debarkation at St. Nazaire, La Eochelle, and Bordeaux on the west coast of France and at Marseille on the south coast; in which case neither the French right wing nor the American Army could have escaped capture; for with their supplies cut off, and a German army clos- ing in on their rear, while another was pressing them closely on their original front, there would have been no alternative but to surrender. Had these events taken place, substantially as here outlined — and it requires no stretch of the 88 The Strategy on the Western Front imagination to see that they easily could have happened — they might have led to the speedy ending of the war ia Germany 's favor ; for with the greater part of the American Army and a considerable part of the French Army out of the fighting, the German armies in Eastern France, with new communications established directly across the Vosges into South Germany, could have safely pushed forward and enveloped Paris and the French Army defending it, and thence, moving northward, could have struck a decisive blow against the British Army. Second : The French and Americans along the Vosges from Verdun to Belf ort might have seen sufficiently early the danger of losing their com- munications and have attempted a retirement to avoid the disaster which would have inev- itably resulted from their loss. But with the Germans pushing south from Epemay and Chalons upon Troyes and Chaumont, this re- tirement along the roads and railways to Paris and the American ports of debarkation on the west coast of France would have been directly across the front of the German advance, which would have exposed them to a flank attack and Germany's Great Thrusts 89 compelled them to form front to a flank,^ one of the most dangerous positions for an army when it fights a battle. " Nothing," says Na- poleon, " is so rash or contrary to principle as to make a flank march before an army in posi- tion. "^ But let us take the most favorable view of the case for the Allies, and suppose that the retire- ment of their right wing could have been made past the front of the German Army without any great loss or disaster, what would have been the tb 1 An army forms front to a flanle when it operates on a front parallel to the line communicating with its 'base. To illustrate the danger of fighting a battle in this posi- tion : Suppose an army, AB is marching south perpendicular to its communications a.b, and the opposing army, which is march- ing west along its communications c.d, is forced to form front to a flank, CD, and engage ab in battle. Now it is evident that a single defeat of CD by ab would drive CD from its communications and disaster would follow; whereas, if ab is defeated by CD, AB can fall back and fight again and again, without any chance of losing its communications. 2 Napoleon's Maxims of War, p. 66. 90 The Strategy on the Western Front outcome ? Evidently the French and Americans of the Allied right wing could then have formed battle line, extending, say, approximately south- ward from Chateau-Thierry to the Seine and thence along the upper stretches of that river toward Dijon, which would have covered di- rectly their communications with Paris and the ports of American debarkation on the western coast of France, and which would have put a stop to any German envelopment of the Allied right wing and enabled the French and Ameri- cans to make a prolonged resistance ; for, unless some unforeseen or unusual disaster had over- taken them, they could hardly have been con- quered without first being driven entirely across North Central France to the ports of American debarkation. But before leaving this phase of the discus- sion, there is another point worthy of attention. It will be remembered that one of the ports of debarkation for American troops was Mar- seille, and that the line of railway running thence to the American headquarters at Chau- mont was an almost due north and south line; so that, had the German advance been such as to Germany's Great Thrusts 91 prevent the French and Americans from falling back towards Paris and the western coast of France, they might have retired towards Mar- seille. The establishment of Marseille for a point of debarkation and an American base of opera- tions may be looked upon, strategically, as a measure of safety taken against the worst that might have happened; since it is evident that, had Paris been taken and a large part of the French and English armies been cut off and cap- tured, the American Army, reinforced by a good part of the right wing of the French Army, might have been able to fall back slowly along the railways towards its base of operations at Marseille and, by fighting defensive and de- laying battles, have become a rallying point for all Allied troops that were able to escape cap- ture or to free themselves from the clutch of fhe German armies in Northern France. And, perhaps, by this means, the Allies might have been able eventually to turn the tide of battle ; for the uncertainty of war is proverbial, and so long as an army can maintain its conununica- tions and obtain food, ammunition, and equip- 92 The Strategy on the Western Front ments there is always a possibility of eventual victory. I It is not the purpose here to carry this dis- cussion further, however interesting it might be to point out some of the strategical problems that would have arisen had it been necessary for the Allies to take this course, but simply to say that the selection of Marseille for a point of debarkation and an American base of opera- tions was a wise choice; because no one could foresee what turn the campaign might take; and because it is always wise to consider all contingencies and provide for the worst. ' * In forming the plan of a campaign," says Napo- leon, "it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the nec- essary means to counteract it."^ Again he says : ' ' Eeserve to yourself every possible chance of success. ' ' ^ 1 Napoleon 's Maxims of War, p. 6. 2 Napoleon's Maxims of War, p. 68. CHAPTER V POOH 'S GEEAT COUNTER-OFFENSIVE DUEING the 15th, 16th, and 17th of July, 1918, the tremendous battle of the fifth great German thrust had raged over a seventy- five-mile front extending from the Argonne For- est to Chateau-Thierry. It was the supreme and last effort of the Germans for a military deci- sion on the Western Front. For a month they had prepared and planned and were now strik- ing with aU their power. Although they had been held by the desperate fighting of the French and Americans throughout the greater part of their long battle line, they had with overwhelming forces and stupendous efforts succeeded in driving a wedge into the base of the Eeims salient up the valley of the Mame towards Epernay. Another day's advance, one more blow upon the wedge, would obliterate the Reims salient, decrease greatly the vulnerabil- ity of the Chateau-Thierry salient, and lead, 93 94 The Strategy on the Western Front very probably, in the end to a G-erman victory. The time had come to strike. Where to strike was the question. Ever since the formation of the Chateau- Thierry salient, it had been evident that its sides near its base were most vulnerable to an Allied attack; not only because of the narrow- ness of the salient, but because of the direction and extent of the lines of communication of the troops occupying it. Examining it, we notice the following distinguishing features : The Sois- sons-Fismes-Reims Railway cuts directly across its base ; and for the greater part of the distance it parallels the Vesle River. On the western side, and parallel to it, one of the main high- ways of the salient joins Soissons with Chateau- Thierry, and is itself paralleled throughout by a narrow-gauge railway ; both of which lie only four or five miles from the line which separated the fronts of the opposing armies. The Reims- Fismes-Paris Railway crosses the highway at about its middle point and is practically at right angles to it. Over the highway and railway connecting Soissons with Chateau-Thierry, the Germans Foch's Great Counter-Offensive 95 along the Marne and in tlie nose of the salient, obtained practically all their munitions and other supplies ; very few, if any, came by way of Fismes, for the reason that there was no line of railway connecting that town with the main German supply lines to the northward. In this situation, in which the Germans, while holding the west face of the salient, had, of ne- cessity to maintain continually a front to a flank position, it is evident that an advance of only a few miles by the Allies on this side would sever the communications of the Germans in the nose of the salient and compel them to retire. It is also evident that an advance made at the same time by the French and Americans on the other side of the salient towards Fismes would hasten the retirement of the enemy and might result in their capture, since it would threaten the Fismes-Paris Eailway and, if pushed far enough, deprive the Germans of its use in with- drawing their troops and supplies from the salient back behind the line of the Vesle. An- other feature which favored the Allies was that there were woods along the west side of the sa- lient where the Allied divisions could be assem- 96 The Strategy on the Western Front bled out of sight of the enemy until the moment for opening the attack arrived. General Foch had foreseen all this; and in preparation for an attack on the west side of the salient had assembled, under the command of General Mangin of the French Army, eight or nine French and American combat divisions in and near the Villers-Cotterets Forest, among which were the First and Second American di- visions and the famous Moroccan Division of the French Army. Early on the morning of July 18, 1918, he ordered Mangin forward against the Germans on a front of about twenty- five miles, from the outskirts of Chateau- Thierry to the Aisne, some six miles northwest of Soissons. In the advance, the Moroccan Di- vision occupied an intermediate position be- tween the two American divisions. The Allied attack was a surprise to the Ger- mans, and for the first two days was highly successful. On the first day the French and Americans forced back, or drove through, the German line, capturing many thousand pris- oners and many guns and villages. By the aft- ernoon of July 19 the French artillery from the Foch's Great Counter-Offensive 97 hills overlooking Soissons were sweeping that city and the railway and highway leading thence to Chateau-Thierry; and the French cavalry and tanks had crossed these lines of communi- cation, making it absolutely necessary for the Germans to withdraw immediately from the sa- lient. Coincident with these great successes, the French and Americans on the other side of the salient had completely checked the move- ment of the Germans on Epernay. Immediately the result of Foch's counter- thrust became apparent. On the evening of July 17, the Allies were on the point of losing the Reims salient, a loss almost certain to bring disastrous consequences. On the evening of July 19 all had changed, the Germans were about to lose the Chateau-Thierry salient; and with it all hope of final victory. Realizing fully their perilous position, the Germans saw that they must at all hazards hold open the gap between Soissons and Reims through which their guns, supplies, and troops had to be withdrawn, if they were to escape capture. For this purpose they massed their troops in great strength near Soissons on one 98 The Strategy on the Western Front side and near Eeims on the other ; and for the next week or ten days fought desperately to keep the gap open; while the French and Amer- icans fought with equal determination to close it. The Germans were successful in keeping open the gap; and, aided by the skillful and fierce fighting of their rear guards, were able to with- draw from the salient to the Vesle and, ulti- mately, to the Aisne with an inconsiderable loss of men and guns. But on July 18 and 19 they had already lost some 700 guns and 35,000 men. However, these great losses were of little mo- ment compared to the immense consequences of their defeat. On March 21, 1918, they had launched a great thrust to obtain a military decision on the West- ern Front, and had followed it by four other great thrusts, in each of which they, had made considerable progress towards accomplishing their purpose. But in the fifth and last thrust they were checked, turned back, and forced to retire some thirty miles. It was the turning point of that tremendous battle. It was more than that; it was the su- Foch's Great Counter-Offensive 99 preme crisis of the great World War. And it was all brought about by a counter-offensive upon the most vulnerable front of the German line. Such a counter-offensive upon any other front of the long line would have produced no remarkable results; but here, whfere the thrust in the very first stages of the onset cut. the main highway and railway leading into the Chateau-Thierry salient, it was at once pro- ductive of mighty consequences. Immediately the Germans had to abandon their great of- fensive and to fight with desperation to save from capture or annihilation the troops occu- pying the salient. Immediately the whole char- acter of the war was changed. In the twinkling of an eye, so to speak, the initiative was lost by the Germans and gained by the Allies. Fight- ing now on the defensive, the Germans could no longer dominate the situation. No longer could they choose their point of attack and mass over- whelming forces against a sector of the Allied line. Already they were outnumbered ; and, ow- ing to the rapidity with which the Americans were crossing the Atlantic and being brought into active operations, were certain of being 100 The Strategy on the Western Front confronted in the near future with still greater outnumbering forces. Here we have a splendid illustration of the application of that principle of strategy of striking at the communications of the enemy without exposing your own to his attack; and of that other principle closely related to it, that where two armies are in such a position that an attack from either cuts the communications of the other, that army whose communications are cut, or even seriously threatened, will invari- ably turn back to fight for its communications rather than press forward along its original front. Hardly had the Germans been driven across the Vesle and the Chateau-Thierry salient been wiped out when General (now Marshal) Foch * turned his attention to the Amiens salient. On August 8 the Fourth British Army under Gen- eral Eawlinson launched a terrific attack south of Albert and towards Chaulnes, along the flank of the Amiens salient and across the German lines of communication, while the French First 1 General Foch, commander-in-eliief of the Allied forces, was made a marshal of France on August 6, 1918. Foch's Great Counter-Off eyisive 101 Army under General Debeney made a similar assault along the Montdidier front towards Las- signy and Roye. In these assaults, in which many small, swift tanks were used by the British to smash through the enemy's line, the Germans were surprised ; their loss in prisoners was nearly 30,000 ; in guns more than 700 ; and their front was forced back some twelve miles to the Albert-Chaulnes-Eoye-Lassigny line. Thus we see that by attacking the Germans on each flank of the salient the Allies here forced them back in much the same way as they had done in the Chateau-Thierry salient ; but as this was a much broader salient and the attacks were made much nearer its nose, only a part of it was wiped out. It was necessary to strike again. Accordingly, Marshal Foch brought Mangin's army, which had been operating about Soissons, into the angle of the Aisne and Oise, northeast of Compiegne, and threw it against the German line towards Noyon ; and at about the same time on the other flank he threw Byng's Third Brit- ish army towards Bapaume on a front between Arras and Albert. Both attacks were decisive ; 102 The Strategy on the Western Front each army took from twenty to thirty thousand prisoners and penetrated deeply the flanks of the German position. This penetration, which compelled the Germans to fall back again to- wards the Hindenburg Line, virtually wiped out the Amiens salient. Meanwhile during these operations the Ger- mans were gradually and methodically with- drawing from the narrow Lys salient just south of Tpres. Knowing its extreme vulnerability, they did not purpose giving Marshal Foch the opportunity to attack it in force. Foch's next offensive was to strike eastward from Arras with Home 's British army towards Cambrai and Douai. This thrust was very ably executed by General Home, who forced the Germans back, took about 20,000 prisoners and a considerable quantity of guns and material, and even succeeded in breaking through in places some of the permanent German defenses in the vicinity of the Hindenburg Line and in reaching country that had been held by the Ger- mans since 1914. But the principal strategical value which this thrust had on the situation was that, taken in Foch's Great Counter-Offensive 103 connection with. Mangin's thrust towards Noyon in the preceding operations, it created a sort of salient of the intervening territory occupied by the Germans' west of the Hindenburg Line aiid made it much more vulnerable to future attack ; and as Mangin's thrust had also exposed the flank of the Germans occupying the terri- tory between the Vesle and the Aisne, General Ludendorff, who at this time was directing the operations of the German armies, saw the futil- ity of trying further to hold the German line in these positions, and decided to fall back to the Hindenburg Line from the Cambrai front to Eeims. By September 8, one month after Eaw- linson had struck eastward from, Amiens, all this was decided and in the course of being car- ried out. In that one month the German pris- oners taken numbered 115,000; and since the beginning of Foch's counter-offensive on July 18, the captures exceeded 150,000 and included 2,500 guns and vast quantities of munitions and supplies.^ Having practically obliterated the Chateau- 1 Frank H. Simonds, in Beview of Bemews, October, 1918, p. 375. 104 The Strategy on the Western Front Thierry, Amiens, and Lys salients, Foch. now turned Ms attention to the St. Mihiel salient, the only German salient still remaining. Even here, Ludendorff already had begun to make preparations for an early withdrawal. The operations against this salient were un- der the direct command of General Pershing, who, having made the necessary preliminary and secret preparations, launched his attacks early on the morning of September 12. They were highly successful. The Americans from the south side of the salient and the French and Americans from the west side each forced their way through the German lines, and in two days had closed the gap and were in possession of the salient. During these- operations the Amer- icans, at the cost of only 7,000 casualties, mostly light, took 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns, be- sides a great quantity of munitions and sup- plies. In all these counter-offensives the plan invari- ably followed by Marshal Foch was to make in each case a double thrust against the salient, one on each side of it ; and in such a direction as to cut or threaten the communications of the Foch's Great Gounter-Ofensive 105 troops occupying it. It was this that produced the great results, for an army's communications are vital to its being. Destroy them and the battle is lost; even threaten them and disaster will frequently follow. Hence it is that the com- munications of an army are of such vital con- cern to a commander-in-chief. Not only his ad- versary's but his own ; for if he would strike at his adversary's communications he should first make sure of the safety of his own. If an able soldier, he will give the most careful considera- tion to their protection, direction, and extent. "While distant spectators," says Hamley, ** imagine a general to be intent only on strik- ing or parrying a blow, he probably directs a hundred glances, a hundred anxious thoughts, to the communications in his rear, for one that he bestows on his adversary's front. "^ But this, General Ludendorff failed to do. He was intent on striking his blows, but seemed to have little concern as to the vulnerability of his communications. After his great thrust of March 21, 1918, which created the Amiens sa- lient, he continued to make other great thrusts 1 The Operations of War, p. 40. i 106 The Strategy on the Western Front creating other salients, each, thrust greatly lengthening the German line and making it more and more vulnerable, until, finally, when the time came for Foch to strike, there were four great German salients in all of which the com- munications of the troops occupying them were vulnerable to Allied attacks. Seeing all this, Foch began his great offensive of July 18, and continued to follow it up with swift and power- ful blows until all the salients were wiped out. But these victories cannot be explained solely on the ground of the vulnerability of the sali- ents. There were other causes, the most impor- tant of which were : The change in the morale of the opposing armies; the surprise with which Foch carried out his attacks; and the use of small tanks by the Allies in their offensives. "Writing to his brother Joseph in 1808, Na- poleon said : * ' The moral forces are three- fourths of war; the material forces but one- fourth." {"A la guerre les trois quarts sont des affaires morales; la balance des forces reelles n'est que pour um, autre quart.") ^ The uninterrupted successes of the Prussian 1 Napier, Peninsula War, vol. 1, p. 452. Foch's Great Counter-Offensive 107 Army on the battlefields of Europe during the war with Denmark in 1864, with Austria in 1866, and with France in 1870-71, had given it a moral influence greatly exceeding its actual size. And, in this great war, the Germans had been every- where victorious, except on the Western Front ; and even here had met with much success and a number of times been close to final victory. For more than fifty years they never had met with a defeat, nor ever experienced on any bat- tlefield more than a temporary setback. There is nothing that encourages the morale of an army like victory. With this record of victories inscribed on its banners, the German Army had come to feel that it could not be beaten. It had, it is true, been checked at the Marne, at Verdun, and at the Somme ; but it regarded these as no more than temporary setbacks; and now in July, 1918, after four years of persistent fight- ing, with spirits still high and flushed with the success of its four great thrusts, it was making a supreme effort for final victory on the West- em Front. On the other hand, the French and British had no victories to encourage them. For four 108 The Strategy on the Western Front years they had fought bravely, brilliantly, de- terminedly on the defensive ; and although they had succeeded a few times in taking the offen- sive for brief periods, their whole campaign was one of defense, in which the French and British armies had made, and were still making, every effort in their power to stay the progress of the Germans. During all this time they never lost their grip, never became completely dis- couraged. Their fighting spirit — their morale — was always good. But it was not the morale of victorious armies pressing on from one suc- cess to another; it was the morale of armies driven to bay, fighting for their lives; the morale of the defensive; the morale that per- sisted in the face of discouragement, that welled up from the hearts of desperate and determined men, inspired by love of country and the right- eousness of their cause. Such was the situation when the Americans came actively into the fighting. For more than a year they had been getting ready to help. It was a slow process ; because, at the outbreak of the war with Germany, the United States, so far as her land forces were concerned, was totally Foch's Great Counter-Offensive 109 unprepared. Laws had to be passed; civilians had to be made into soldiers; companies, regi- ments, brigades, and divisions had to be organ- ized, mobilized, and trained, and then sent three thousand miles by water to the theater of war. But soon troops began to arrive in France ; and as fast as they came they were given thorough training, especial attention being given to target practice and the tactics of open warfare, in ad- dition to careful instruction in trench fighting. But their arrival was necessarily slow at first and their training took much time ; so that many months elapsed before Generals Foch and Pershing felt that the American divisions were sufficiently well trained and disciplined to take their places side by side with the veteran French and British troops. At the start, the trained divisions were given sectors of the French front to defend in the Lorraine district ; later, other divisions, for practically like pur- poses, and to help stem the tide of any German advance, were placed temporarily under the or- ders of British and French generals and made a part of their immediate commands. But the time came when they were to take a 110 The Strategy on the Western Fr ont still greater and more independent part in as- sisting to pnt a stop to the great German thrusts. On May 28, the day following the be- ginning of the third great German thrust, the First American Division launched an attack against the Germans at Cantigny in Picardy and with splendid dash took the town. It was the first independent, offensive action partici- pated in by the Americans. Strategically it was of little importance, but from a psychological point of view it was of the utmost importance ; for it brought great encouragement to the French and British people and their hard- pressed armies. A week later, another and more dramatic event brought still more cheer to the French and British, when the Second and Third American divisions put a stop to the Ger- man advance at Chateau-Thierry.* 1 There has recently been some controversy between of- ficers of the Third American Division and the Marines as to whether the Marines, who were a part of the Second Ameri- can Division, actually fought at C3iateau-Thierry. The truth seems to be that the Marines were not actually in the town itself, but fought at Bouresches, in Belleau Wood, and at other places near CJhateau-Thierry ; and that these actions and those fought immediately in and about the town by the Third Amer- ican Division are generally spoken of and known as the battle of Chateau- Thierry. Certain it is that both these American divisions fought in the Chateau- Thierry sector to stop the Germans. Foch's Great Counter-Offensive 111 The moral effect of these two actions, coming as they did at this critical period, when the Ger- mans seemed just on the point of breaking through the Allied line, was immense. Their ef- fect on the rank and file of the French and Brit- ish armies can hardly be overestimated. The Americans had arrived. They had shown them- selves to be heroic fighters. With splendid dash, bravery, and persistence they had taken Can- tigny and had even met and hurled back at Chateau-Thierry the Prussian Guards, the very flower of the German Army. They had the push, the punch. They could not be denied. And awaiting their turn were other divisions ready and keen for the conflict ; and behind them American soldiers pouring into France at the rate of a quarter million a month. All this was the greatest encouragement the Allies had received during the war. It was a guaranty to them that the tide of battle would soon turn. It was the herald of victory; and as their spirits rose, their morale was enor- mously increased. But of no less importance ' to them was the correspondingly depressing ef- fect which all this must have had on the Ger- 112 The Strategy on the Western Front mans in shattering their hopes and in weaken- ing their fighting spirit. With rapidly dimin- ishing numbers, they had to look forward to meeting the rapidly increasing nunabers of the Allies. In such a situation only the fortune of war 1 or a great military genius could save them. The real crisis of the war was to come later, on July 18, when Foch began his great offen- sive; but the beginning of the great change in the morale of the opposing armies, the psycho- logical turn in the tide of the war, was on May 28, 1918, at Cantigny, when the First American Division captured that town — a date and a name ever to be memorable in the history of the war. As the campaign progressed, the morale of the Allied armies continued of course to increase with their victories. Much of this increase was 1 ' ' Yet -who can foretell what the ' Fortune of War, ' on any given oeeasion, may ordain? When everything has been arranged that genius can inspire, and that skill and forethought can suggest, how much must always depend upon ' chance,' an indeterminate factor that enters largely into all the prob- lems of war, and which no general can afford to ignore. . . . . In every campaign there have been incidents which no foresight could have foretold. They come into the category of the Fortune of War, and the most consummate generalship can neither avert them, nor always neutralize their effects." — Colonel E. C. Hart, in Beflections on the Art of War, pp. 41 and 44. Foch's Great Gounter-Offensive 113 brought kbout by tbe skill displayed in tlie ar- rangement of tbe different nationalities on the battle line, and much was due to the friendly rivalry between the French, British, and Amer- ican armies, and the several American divisions. An example or two in illustration will suf- fice : When General Mangin arranged his bat- tle line for Foch's great counter-offensive of July 18, he placed the famous French Moroc- can Division between the First and Second American divisions. Picture to yourself the situation! Here were two American divisions, both of which had already in their very first action won for themselves an imperishable fame, side by side with the illustrious Moroc- can Division, which in brilliant action again and again had written its name in blood and gained for itself an immortal renown. What must have been the feelings of both? The French of course felt that under no cir- cumstances would they allow themselves to be surpassed in courage and dash by the Ameri- cans; and the Anaericans felt to a man that they would show this veteran and brave French division that they, too, even though young and 114 The Strategy on the Western Front new to the game, could fight as valiantly and, if need be, die as bravely as the bravest. The British, too, after Foch's great success- ful counter-offensive of July 18, could not but feel that they must not be surpassed by the French and Americans; and with renewed courage they again demonstrated what British soldiers could do. And when the Second American Division in Belleau Wood and the Third at Chateau-Thierry covered themselves with glory, the officers and men of every other American division were determined that, if the opportunity came to them, they, too, would prove to the world that they were no less valiant. So the Forty-second tried to equal the Third ; and the First tried to equal the Second ; and the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth vied with each other and tried to equal or surpass the First; and so it went through the American Expeditionary Forces, increasing enormously the esprit de corps and morale of every combat American division. The surprise attacks planned and carried out by the commander-in-chief of the Allies had also much to do with winning the victories. We Foch's Great Counter-Offensive 115 have seen how he took advantage of the woods of Villers-Cotterets to conceal and concentrate his troops for the counter-offensive of July 18, and from this cover suddenly burst upon the Germans in a surprise attack. But it was per- haps not so much the surprise due to the con- cealment of his forces prior to attack that de- serves mention, as it was the surprise caused by the rapidity of the blows which he struck and the unexpected places where they fell. Hardly had the Germans been driven from the Chateau-Thierry salient when Eawlinson attacked from the British front towards Chaulnes, and Debeney from the Montdidier front towards Lassigny and Eoye. These at- tacks were soon followed by Mangin's attack toward Noyon and Byng's towards Bapaume. Then came Home's great attack from Arras towards Cambrai and Douai, followed shortly afterwards by Pershing's double attack against the St. Mihiel salient. Thus, so rapid and unexpected were Foch's blows that the Germans kncAy not which way to turn. They were being hammered all along the line ; and if they weakened one portion of 116 The Strategy on the Western Front their line tq strengthen another, the weakened portion might at any moment be attacked in force. In nearly all the great battles and campaigns of history, surprise has played an important and, often, a determining part. But on the Western Front, with the enemy's aeroplanes always hovering over the battle line, it was ex- tremely difficult for either side to make any great concentration of troops at any particular point of the line and surprise the other side; nevertheless, by taking advantage of the lie of the land and its topographical features, and by moving troops at night and concealing them as much as possible in the daytime, it occasionally happened that each side was enabled to sur- prise the other. Thus the Allies were surprised by the great German thrusts of March 21 and May 27 and the Germans were surprised by Foch's counter-offensive of July 18 and by the subsequent attacks of the British, French, and Americans. But on both sides there were other surprises, such as the gas attack and tank at- tack surprises, which had an important bearing on the outcome. Foch's Great C ounter-Off ensive 117 The campaign on the Western Front had not progressed many months before each side had come to feel that there was little or no hope of breaking through the intrenched lines of the other, unless there should be found some much more powerful instruments of destruction than those already in use. It was with this idea in mind that the Germans worked out their gas attacks ; and, later, the Allies their tank attacks. Poisonous gas was first used by the Germans on April 22, 1915, in an attack against the British and French near Ypres. As first used, it was in the form of chlorine clouds driven by the wind across the enemy's trenches. But soon afterwards the Germans began the development and manufacture of gas shells, in which poison- ous gases of various kinds were to be used. By this means they purposed to break through the enemy's lines. Heretofore, their plan had been to destroy first, with high explosive shells, the intrenchments and wire entanglements of the enemy, then to press forward and drive back the defenders; but this method having failed, they hoped by the use of poisonous gases to destroy first the defenders, then to advance 118 The Strategy on the Western Front witli their infantry, destroy quickly tlie enemy's intrenchments and barbed-wire entanglements, and push rapidly forward to the open country beyond. With this end in view, they kept on perfecting their gas shells and improving their methods of making gas attacks. It was with rolling barrage fire, alternating poisonous gas shells at intervals with shrap- nel, that they launched their great thrusts against the AUies during the spring and sum- mer of 1918. This method of attack was used with great success. The defenders of the ad- vanced positions were in nearly every case practically annihilated. The almost universal success with which the Germans, in their great thrusts, broke through the Allies' intrenched lines, was largely due to these gas attacks. But no sooner was it seen by the Allies that the Germans had begun to develop this method of attack than they, too, as a means of self-pro- tection, turned their attention to the manufac- ture of poisonous gases, gas shells, and gas masks. As they did not at first have the same facilities for manufacturing them as the Ger- mans, it was a long time before they could meet Foch's Great Counter-Offensive 119 the Grermans on even terms in the use of this frightful method of warfare. However, they finally succeeded; and by July 18, 1918, when Foch began his great counter-offensive, they were surprising the Germans with gas attacks about as frequently as the Germans were sur- prising them ; and, later, towards the end of the fighting on the "Western Front, they had begun to outdo the Germans in the use of this destruc- tive element. During the three and a half years prior to the great German thrust of March 21, 1918, the almost invariable practice of either combatant, in making an attack against the other, was to precede it by a great artillery bombardment of high explosive shells, in order to destroy the intrenchments and barbed-wire entanglements, preparatory to the advance of the infantry. But in such an attack there was little oppor- tunity for surprise; because the defenders, al- ways forewarned by the artillery bombardment, knew that the main attack would follow, and were able to concentrate a sufficient force to meet it. In the tank, the Allies found a partial solution of the problem. 120 The Strategy on the Western Front General Byng of the British Army had con- ceived the idea of omitting altogether the usual artillery bombardment which heretofore had invariably preceded the attack and of substi- tuting in its place a great number of tanks, which, having been assembled secretly behind the line, were to be launched upon the enemy and open a way through the barbed-wire en- tanglements and intrenchments, and drive out the machine-gun nests. By this plan he hoped to surprise the Germans, since there would be nothing to indicate to them that an attack was abou t to be made. At Cambrai in November, 1917, General Byng carried out this method of attack with complete success. He broke through the Hindenburg Line on a front of some ten or twelve miles; and although shortly afterwards the Germans counter-attacked and recovered their lines, the lesson was not lost on the Allies. They saw at once that here was a powerful weapon of of- fense that could be used in surprise attacks to smash through the enemy's line and destroy his machine-gun fire. Accordingly, the Allies at once began secret- Foch's Great Counter-Offensive 121 ly the construction of a large number of tanks of both large and small size. This took time; and although a good many had b'een con- structed, and might have been used to assist in stopping the great German thrusts, General Foch preferred to wait until more were con- structed before launching them against the Ger- man lines. He desired to keep the matter of their construction secret until a sufficient num- ber could be used effectively in his own offen- sives. In this way he hoped to sui-prise the Germans, who had constructed only a few tanks, which were known to be very unwieldy and greatly inferior to those of the Allies. This plan was carried out. The tanks were used by General Mangin in the great offensive of July 18, and, subsequently, by the other Allied Army commanders in their offensives. They were a great surprise to the Germans; and, from the start, were remarkably successful; especially the smaller ones, which, being impervious to machine-gun fire and having a speed of twelve miles an hour, were able, after crossing the line of the enemy's intrenchments, and destroying his machine-gun nests, to drive ahead of the 122 The Strategy on the Western Front infantry along with the cavalry and do most effective work in capturing field guns and in rounding up the retreating and disorganized enemy. CHAPTER VI THE FIGHT FOB THE HINDENBXJEG LINE /yPTER the St. Mihiel salient had been ■L \. wiped out and there were no more Grer- man salients to attack, it was evident that the Allies would encounter much greater difficulties in forcing the Germans still farther back, par- ticularly since Ludendorff had decided to make a determined stand along the old Hindenburg Line, which, during three years of war, had "been developed into an intricate and powerful system of defenses, heretofore practically im- pregnable to Allied attacks. Indeed, save at the second battle of Cambrai, it had not been seriously breached throughout its entire length. It was the middle of September, 1918, and there were only about six or eight weeks more of actual campaigning before the weather would put a stop to the fighting. It was the purpose of Ludendorff to hold the Allies substantially along the strongly intrenched positions of the 133 124 The Strategy on the Western Front Hindenburg Line until the coming of winter would permit him to rest, recuperate, and re- construct his already shattered armies. If he could stop the onward rush of the Allied armies along this line and the armies of the Central Powers in other theaters of operations held their own, he could get his own armies again into shape for a renewal of the campaign in the spring of 1919, which he purposed doing, should the German peace offensive, which was already under way, not produce satisfactory results during the winter months. On the other hand, Foch's purpose and hope was not to let these strongly fortified defenses stop the progress of his armies, but to break through them and continue his victories. How to meet the difficult situation? where to strike? what plans, what strategy to adopt and carry out? were important and vital questions to be decided. That portion of the line along which the con- tending powers struggled for the mastery in this great fight ran westward from a point about eight miles north of Verdun to a point about two miles north of Reims, thence north- The Fight for the Hindenburg Line 125 westward through St. Quentin, Cambrai, and Lens to Nieuport on the English Channel. Southward from Verdun to Switzerland the French and Americans on one side and the Ger- mans on the other stood inactively facing each other in their intrenchments during the great fight for the Hindenburg Line. Tactically, on account of the Argonne Forest and its strong defenses, the most difficult por- tion of the whole line to break through was the Verdun-Reims sector; but strategically it of- fered greater advantages than any other. The reason was this : An attack pushed northward from this sector to Mezieres and Sedan would cut every east and west line of railway south of the Ardennes Mountains, upon which the Germans were depending to a great extent for their supplies and munitions of war ; and would leave remaining but one east and west line; namely, the Charleroi-Namur-Liege-Aix-la- Chapelle Eailway, which passes to the north- ward of the Ardennes and just south of the southeast extremity of Holland. Such an at- tack, if successful, could not but produce stu- pendous results ; for with all the east and west 126 The Strategy on the Western Front lines cut, except the Charleroi-Namur-Liege- Aix-la-Chapelle Railway, there would at once be a mighty effort on the part of the Grerman Army to retire along this line as far east as the Meuse River, before the Allies could push for- ward from Mezieres to Namur, sever this line of railway, and capture a good part of the Ger- man Army.^ 1 It may, perhaps, be of interest to the reader to know that the author of this book, who was on duty with the Gen- eral Staff of the TJ. S. Army at the War College, Washing- ton, D. C, during these battles on the Western Front, wrote on September 12, 1918, the day General Pershing began his attack on the St. Mihiel salient, and just two weeks prior to the beginning of the great thrust through the Argonne Forest towards MeziSres and Sedan, the following memoran- dum and handed it at the time to Brigadier-General Lytle Brown, TJ. S. Army, President of the Army War College. MEMORANDUM "Although I am firmly convinced that this war cannot be won solely on the Western and Italian fronts, and have al- ready, in my Fourth Memorandum on the Strategy of the War, given my reasons for so believing, yet I do believe that when all the salients, including that of St. Mihiel, are ironed out of the German front by the Allies and the Germans driven back to the Hindenburg Line, an attack can be made on a large scale by the Allies from a certain sector of their front which will straighten out the curved German front bulging towards Paris, compel the Germans to evacuate the greater part of France and Belgium, which they now occupy, and force them back to the line of the Meuse. A successful attack on a large scale pushed northward from the Verdun-Eeims sector as far as MeziSres would do this; for it would sever all the German lines of communication south of the Ardennes Mountains and seriously threaten the Cdarleroi-Namur-Liege- Aix-la-Chapelle Railway, the only remaining line leading into Germany. Such an attack as here outlined could not but produce stupendous results; for with all the east and west The Fight for the Hind enhurg Line 127 However, it is e-\^dent that such a thrust as here outlined would be impossible of execution unless the Germans along other portions of the Hindenburg Line were kept occupied by Allied attacks ; since, otherwise, German reserve divi- sions along the line could be withdrawn to the threatened flank in such numbers as to put a stop to the thrust. On the other flank, too, there were strategical considerations of importance. It will be noticed that an Allied thrust eastward through West lines of railway cut, except the line whieh passes just south of the southeast extremity of Holland through Namur, Liege, and Aix-la-Chapelle, there would at once be a mighty effort on the part of the German Army to retire along this line as far east as the Meuse Eiver before the Allies could push north- ward from MSziSres, cut this line of railway and perhaps capture a good part of the German Army. In other words, a successful thrust northward from the Verdun-Eeims sector as far as MSzieres, would be bound to cause the evacuation of the greater part of France and Belgium by the Germans; and if pushed still farther northward might result in the capture of a considerable part of the German Army now in France and Belgium. ' ' Of course, in breaking through the German line from this sector and pushing northward, as here outlined, the Allies would create for themselves an immense salient, vulnerable to German attack; but in this case, as the salient would itself cut through several important lines of communication of the Germans, depriving them from obtaining supplies and muni- tions, and would point in a most threatening way to their only other remaining line of communication, their great con- cern would be, not in striking to destroy the salient, but in fighting to hold open their only line of retreat, so as to enable them to get out of the great pocket in which this strategical thrust had placed them before they were forced to surrender. ' ' 128 The Strategy on the Western Front Flanders towards Brussels would threaten not only the communications of the Grerman troops along the Belgian coast and compel their retire- ment eastward towards Antwerp, but would threaten also the communications of the Ger- man troops occupying the Lille region; and, if pushed far enough, would likewise seriously threaten the Charleroi-Namur-Liege-Aix-la- Chapelle Railway. Evidently, such a thrust, taken in conjunction with the thrust northward from the Verdun-Reims sector, would be the first step towards making of the German front an immense salient; and the farther these thrusts penetrated into German occupied terri- tory, the greater the salient would become and the more vulnerable and dangerous it would be. But the two attacks on the flanks were not enough. It was necessary for Foch to attack also some intermediate sectors of the line in order to prevent Ludendorff from withdrawing his reserve divisions in great numbers from these sectors to the menaced flanks. But where was he to strike in order to do this and at the same time produce the greatest strategical re- sults? The Fight for the Hindenhurg Line 129 Examining the theaters of operations, we find that a thrust northeastward from the St. Quen- tin-Cambrai front to Maubeuge and Valen- ciennes, and thence eastward and northeast- ward towards Dinant, Charleroi, and Mons, would, taken in connection with the Flanders thrust, create a dangerous German salient in the Lille region; and, taken in connection with the Meuse-Argonne thrust, create a dangerous German salient in the Laon region. Moreover, such a thrust would sever the Metz-Sedan- Mezieres-Hirson-Maubeuge Railway leading into the Lille district and make necessary the immediate retirement of the Germans from that salient; and it would also threaten the Aix-la- Chapelle-Liege-Namur-Charleroi Railway upon which the German troops in Western Belgium were almost wholly dependent' for their supplies and reinforcements ; and should it reach Dinant, would cut in two the German armies and pre- vent any retirement of German troops north- ward from Mezieres and northeastward from Hirson to Namur. Inasmuch as an Allied thrust northward from the Verdun-Reims front towards Sedan and 130 The Strategy on the Western Front Mezieres would cut all the railway lines south of the Ardennes Mountains ; and a thrust east- ward from the Flanders front towards Brus- sels and northeastward from the St. Quentin- Cambrai front towards Charleroi and Mons, would threaten the single remaining east and west line to the. north of these mountains; and inasmuch as the thrust from the St. Quentin- Cambrai front would also, if pushed eastward from Maubeuge to Dinant, cut the German armies in two, we can appreciate how extremely important, strategically, such a plan of opera- tions would be. And we can appreciate also the importance to the strategical situation of the fact that the Ardennes Mountains form a barrier across a considerable part of the en- trance from Germany into Northern France and Belgium, and that this barrier has necessitated building the east and west railway lines on each side of them. Of course, in breaking through the German lines from the Verdun-Reims, Flanders, and St, Quentin-Cambrai fronts, the Allies would create three salients more or less vulnerable to Ger- man attack ; but since each would threaten seri- The Fight for the Eindenburg Line 131 ously the communications of the Germans oc- cupying Northern France and Belgium, Luden- dorff 's great concern would be, not to strike to destroy the Allied salients, but to fight to hold open the railways so that his armies could with- draw behind the Meuse before they were cut off and forced to surrender. Here, again, that principle of strategy would apply, that when an army makes a thrust in such a direction as to cut or seriously threaten the communications of the other, that army whose communications are first cut or seriously threatened will invariably turn back to fight for them rather than strike at the communications of the adversary. Hence, it followed that Mar- shal Foch need not have had and, seemingly, as the sequel will show, did not have, any great concern about the communications of his own troops occupying these salients. Accordingly, he was able to give almost his entire attention to the offensive operations against Ludendorff. Then, again, there were other reasons, mainly on account of location, why the vulnerability of these three Allied salients would be slight. In the thrust towards Sedan from the Verdun- 132 The Strategy on the Western Front Reims front, tlie Americans would be protected on tlie east side of the salient by the Meuse River; and, on the west side, by the French, who were to advance on the left of the Amer- icans. In the thrust from the St. Quentin-Cam- brai front towards Charleroi and Mons, the British would be protected on their right by the Sambre River and Canal. And, in the Flanders district, the push eastward must of necessity cause the evacuation by the Germans of the coast country; and this would give to the Flanders salient on the north side the protec- tion of the English Channel. Observant of all these things, Marshal Foch made his plans accordingly, and in the last week in September opened his campaign against the Hindenburg Line with these three great thrusts. Practically at the same time, or very soon after- wards,* other attacks were also made from in- termediate sectors, where there seemed to be favorable chances of success; but these three major thrusts were the ones that had the prin- cipal strategical bearing upon the conduct of the campaign. An American army under General Pershing The Fight for the Hindenburg Line 133 having been assembled as secretly as possible along the Meuse-Argonne sector between Ver- dun and Eeims, quietly, on the night of Septem- ber 25, took the place of the French who had held this portion of the line for a long period ; and on the morning of September 26 began the attack, which, in the face of most desperate re- sistance, was to continue during the next six weeks to force back the Germans slowly but surely to the very gates of Sedan. On the first day of the attack the Americans pushed through the first line of defenses, and on the two following days penetrated the Ger- man position to a depth of from three to seven miles, taking Haucourt, Malancourt, Varennes, Charpentry, Very, Montfaucon, Gercourt, and other villages. East of the Meuse the Twenty- sixth American Division, which was with the Second Colonial French Corps, captured at the same time Marcheville and Rieville,^ thus giving further protection to the right flank of Persh- ing's army. At the same time the French, on the left of the Americans, west of the Argonne, 1 General Pershing, in Annual Seport of Secretary of War, 1918, p. 77. 134 The Strategy on the Western Front also succeeded in. pushing well to the front. In this attack by the Americans, as well as in prac- tically all subsequent ones against the Hinden- burg Line by the Allies, tanks played an im- portant and often a determining part. The attack had taken Ludendorff by surprise ; but seeing at once his peril, he immediately ordered a number of reserve divisions to the threatened front ; and began a series of counter- attacks, supported by heavy artillery fire con- taining many gas shells. By these means the Americans and French, after a few days ' fight- ing, were temporarily checked; nevertheless, they continued to exercise such strong pres- sure on the Germans, pushing forward here and there in the face of most determined and desperate resistance, that Ludendorff was com- pelled to continue ordering more and more divisions from other parts of his line to this menaced flank. Meanwhile, at the other end of the line the Belgians and British from Dixmude southward to the Lys Eiver had taken the offensive and, driving eastward, had swept the Germans across the Passchendaele Eidge into the Flan- The Fight for th e Hindenburg Line 135 ders plain below. This thrust, reaching in its first push almost to Roulers and Menin, made it necessary for the Germans to retire eastward forthwith from the Belgian coast and seriously threatened their communications in the Lille region to the southward. Seeing, as before, the great peril to his troops, should this thrust of the Belgians and British not be stopped, Ludendorff at once hur- ried reserves to this front also from other parts of his line and, finally, succeeded in cheeking it temporarily, just as he had checked the great American Meuse-Argonne thrust. But scarcely had these thrusts got well un- der way when Foch launched the attack from the Cambrai-St. Quentin front. This attack was made by Byng's and Rawlinson's British armies, assisted by the Second American Corps, composed of the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth divisions.^ The attack began on September 27 1 Of the fighting done by these two American divisions in this attack Generai Pershing, in hia report to the Secretary of War, says: " It was the fortune of our Second Corps, composed of the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth divisions, which had remained with the British, to have a place of honor in cooperation with the Australian Corps on Septentber 29 and October 1 in the assault on the Hindenburg Line where the St. Quentin Canal 136 The Strategy on the Western Front' in the vicinity of Cambrai, and on the two fol- lowing days extended southward to St. Quentin on a front of about twenty-five miles. The fighting about Le Catelet, midway between Cambrai and St. Quentin, was severe, but suc- cess finally crowned the efforts of the British along the whole line. St. Quentin and Cambrai were both captured and the Hindenburg Line completely broken through. Nor did the thrust stop there. On October 5 the British captured a large number of prisoners and advanced some four or five miles ; and on October 8 they struck a decisive blow, which, in the next four days, carried them into the open country about Le Cateau, some fourteen miles east of the Hin- denburg Line. Every mile of this advance deepened and made more vulnerable the Lille passes through, a tunnel under a ridge. The Thirtieth Divi- sion speedily broke through the main line of defense for all its objectives, while the Twenty-seventh pushed on impetuously through the main line until some of its elements reached Gouy. In the midst of the maze of trenehea and shell craters and under cross fire from machine guns the other elements fought desperately against odds. In this and in later actions, from October 6 to October 19, our Second Corps captured over six thousand prisoners and advanced over thirteen miles. The spirit and aggressiveness of these divisiona have been highly praised by the British Army commander under whom they served." — ^Annual Eeport of Secretary of War, 1918, pp. 77 and 78. The Fight for the Hindenhurg Line 137 and Laon salients. Maubeuge and Valenciennes now became the new objectives of the British along this front. Meanwhile, along other sectors of the line the Allies had made much progress, ^outh of St. Quentin, Debeney's French army had pushed forward on the right of the British. Mangin's army, assisted by an Italian division, had driven the Germans from the Chemin-des-Dames. The armies of Gouraud and Berthelot, assisted by the Second and Thirty-sixth American divi- sions had advanced north of Eeims.^ And the Americans had swept the Germans out of the Argonne Forest. In short, Foch had won the great fight for the Hindenburg Line. 1 In his report of the fighting of these two American divi- sions in this attack General Pershing says: " On October 2-9 our Second and Thirty-sixth divisions were sent to assist the French in an important attack against the old German positions before Reims. The Second conquered the complicated defense works on their front against a persistent defense worthy of the grimmest period of trench warfare and attacked the strongly held wooded hill of Blanc Mont, which they captured in a second assault, sweeping over it with consummate dash and skill. This division then repulsed strong counter-attacks before the village and cemetery of Ste. :6tienne and took the town, forcing the Germans to fall back before Reims and yield positions they had held since September, 1914. On October 9 the Thirty-sixth Division relieved the Second and, in its first experience under fire, withstood very severe artiUery bom- bardment and rapidly took up the pursuit of the enemy, now retiring behind the Aiane." — Annual Report of Secretary of War, 1918, p. 78. 138 The Strategy on the Western Front This great fight, which was begun by the Americans and French on September 26, 1918, and which practically ended on or about Octo- ber 5, 1918, when the British broke through the Cambrai-St. Quentin front, may be looked upon as one of the great steps in that greatest of all battles in the world's history, which began with Foch's counter-offensive of July 18, 1918, and did not end until the armistice of November 11, 1918, and which has been appropriately named by General Malleterre of the French Army, the Battle of Liberation. N The fact that for more than four years the A Germans had held the Hindenburg Line against repeated and determined efforts of the Allies to take it; and then within ten days in the fall of 1918 had lost it ; leads one to inquire how it was that Foch accomplished all this in so short a time. It was not that the Germans had shown any diminution in their fighting qualities; for they had never fought harder or more desper- ately. How then did he win such success? The answer is that he won it by his tank attacks; by the superior morale of his troops, which had been enormously increased by previous victo- Tlie Fight for the Hindenhurg Line 139 ries ; by taking advantage of the strategy of the situation to attack the Germans in such direc- tions as to threaten their communications; by bringing a preponderating force against his ad- versary on every battle front ; by continuing to maintain the offensive after he had assumed it in his great counter-attack of July 18, 1918; and by hard blows and terrific fighting all along the line. The tanks were an enormous help in break- ing through the barbed-wire entanglements and defenses of the Htndenburg Line, and in put- ting the machine guns of the enemy out of ac- tion. Indeed, they were of such immense help that it may with truth be said that without them the Hindenburg Line probably would never have been breached and taken. This leads to the conjecture that if Germany had been as suc- cessful in developing this new and tremendously effective implement of war as were the Allies, the tanks on each side would to a great extent have neutralized each other ; in which case the Germans most probably would have been able to hold the line, since, even with the help of the tanks, the Allies were able to break through only 140 The Strategy on the Western Front after the hardest fighting involving an enor- mous sacrifice of life. There were in this war many surprising things relating to weapons of combat ; but there was none, perhaps, more surprising than that the deciding factor in this great battle was the tank, an implement of destruction which no man ever had dreamed of prior to the war, and which was not developed until long after the war's beginning nor perfected until just a few months before its close. The morale of the Allied soldiers at this stage of the campaign was at its highest. Their vic- tories already won had aroused in them great enthusiasm. Obstacles, which a few weeks be- fore might have seemed insurmountable, ap- peared, after these victories, insignificant to them. Their hopes had arisen; their blood had quickened ; they had begun to feel that nothing could check them in their victories, nothing stop them in their progress. Marshal Foch saw deeply into the strategy of the situation. Having ironed out all the Ger- man salients, he began operations against the Hindenburg Line with two powerful attacks on The Fight for the Hindenburg Line 141 the flanks, which threatened at once the com- munications of the German armies occupying Northern France and Belgium; and he imme- diately followed these attacks with a great blow from the Cambrai-St. Quentin front, which threatened stUl further the German communi- cations. The attack on the flanks made of the German line an immense salient and the attack between the flanks divided this immertse salient into two salients. Where there were no salients, Foch attacked in such directions as to make them; where there was Kttle vulnerability in the line, he attacked in such directions as to make it much more vulnerable. In each case he looked beyond the tactical victory into the strat- egy of the campaign. In each case he looked to the communications of the enem y. Every thrust and nearly every attack from the begin- ning of his counter-offensive against the Chateau-Thierry salient to the driving of the Germans out of and beyond the Hindenburg Line were in such directions as to cut or threaten the communications of the enemy and produce important strategical results. Even when, as in the Argonne, the tactical difficulties 142 The Strategy on the Western Front were greater than along any other portion of the line, he chose this sector from which to make the great American thrust, knowing that a break-through here would produce the great- est strategical results. Indeed, a break in the line here and an advance to Sedan and Mezieres would have necessitated the immediate with- drawal of the Germans from Northern France and Belgium, regardless of whether there were any successful attacks made along other por- tions of the Hindenburg Line. In fact, if when the Americans and French had reached Sedan and Mezieres, the Germans had still held the Hindenburg Line, from, say, midway between Reims and St. Quentin northward through St. Quentin, Cambrai, and Lens to Nieuport, their position, strategically, would have been much more dangerous than it was on the day of the armistice, when they were occupying a line ap- proximately parallel to this, but some forty miles farther eastward. The reason for this is, that the Germans at the time of the armistice, being some forty miles nearer the line of the Meuse than they would have been along the Hindenburg Line from the vicinity of St. Quen- The Fight for the Hindenhurg Line 143 tin northward to the coast, were in a much more favorable position for withdrawing behind that river before their communications were severed. Or, to state the reason a little differently, the Americans and French at Sedan and Mezieres were much nearer Namur on the Charleroi- Namur-Liege-Aix-la-Chapelle Eailway than the Germans would have been along the Hinden- hurg Line northward from St. Quentin. However, it should not be inferred from this reasoning that Foch's attacks along other por- tions of the Hindenburg Line than the Meuse- Argonne front were unnecessary. On the con- trary, they were necessary and of the greatest importance, for without these attacks to hold the enemy in front, the Germans would have been able to mass such overwhelming forces in the Meuse-Argonne region as to prevent any Allied advance there, which would have put a stop to the carrying out of Foch's strategical plan. During this great fight for the Hindenburg Line Marshal Foch brought greatly superior numbers against his adversary on every battle front, thus carrying out that principle of 144 The Strategy on the Western Front strategy of always being stronger than the enemy when possible at the point of attack. It was due in no inconsiderable measure to the carrying out of this principle which enabled him to break through the Hindenburg Line in so many places. But he was able to do this only by reason of the fact that during this period he had on the Western Front a prepon- derating force over his adversary of approxi- mately 371,000 fighting men out of a total of 1,594,000.1 From July 18, 1918, when Foch began his great counter-offensive, until the armistice of November 11, the fighting on the Western Front never ceased. It was one continuous battle composed of many smaller battles, in which Foch having got the offensive at the start con- tinued to maintain it to the end. He was a thorough believer in offensive warfare. He knew that the offensive alone promises decisive results. On the offensive, a general can follow his own plan; on the defensive, he must con- form to that of his adversary. On the offen- sive, the parts of an army can be concentrated, 1 The War with Germany; A Statistical Summary, p. 104. The Fight for the Hindenburg Line 145 and tlie enemy may be surprised and defeated before be can collect tbe necessary forces to re- pel an attack ; on tbe defensive, tbe parts of an army must be kept separate in order to guard all tbreatened points till tbe enemy's point of attack is developed. Tben, again, only by act- ing on tbe offensive is a commander in a posi- tion to bring a superior force upon tbe battle- field. Ludendorff also believed in tbe offensive ; but tbere was tbis difference between tbem, Luden- dorff made long pauses between bis tbrusts, wbicb gave tbe Frencb time in eacb case to pre- pare for tbe next attack ; and, finally, gave Foch time to prepare for bis great counter-offensive of July 18. On tbe other band, Foch, once baving ob- tained tbe offensive, struck so rapidly and in such unexpected places that Ludendorff bad no time to restore bis shattered armies and pre- pare for offensive operations. In tbe rapidity witb wbich Focb struck and in tbe persistency witb wbicb be continued to maintain tbe offen- sive, bis operations were very similar to those of Bonaparte in bis first Italian campaign. 146 The Strategy on the Western Front There was, however, this great difference. Bonaparte in that wonderful campaign never at any time had within the theater of opera- tions a preponderating force over his adver- sary, while Foch's forces at this time outnum- bered those of Ludendorff by from a quarter to a half million fighting men.^ Then, again, this striking in many places — this attacking all along the line — prevented Ludendorff from concentrating his reserves in great numbers upon menaced points, since the weakening of any portion of his line for that purpose might allow the Allies to break through along that front. This method of preventing the sending of reserves to threatened or men- aced points was one which General Grant had employed with signal success in the great Civil War in America. Bearing in mind that the commander-in-chief of the Allied armies not only hammered away continuously on the West- ern Front from July 18 until November 11, but was responsible in great measure for the active operations of the Allied armies in Palestine and, especially, in the Balkans during this 1 The War with Germamy; A Statistical Summary, p. 104. The Fight for the Eindenburg Line 147 period,^ there will be seen a great similarity between tbe strategy of Foch and that of our own great soldier, U. S. Grant. Indeed, the following extracts from General Grant's report of the operations during the time he was com- mander-in-chief of the United States armies iia the Civil War might be used almost word for word to describe accurately Marshal Foch's strategy. Grant says: From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were nec- essary to a speedy termination of the war. ... I therefore determined, first: to use the greatest num- ber of troops practicable against the armed force of 1 ' ' But the battle was not limited to the Western Front. We must remember that Marshal Foch had command of all the Allied armies on all the fronts and that, except in the case of Italy, he succeeded in planning an ensemble of operations calculated to strike and demoralize the enemy at every point. What happened in the East, then, during September and Octo- ber was an integral part of the Battle of Liberation Marshal Foch is a leader who has a comprehensive vision, developed by years of teaching at the ifecole de Guerre and by a life of study and reflection. He did not forget that the war had begun in the East and kept constantly in mind the repercussions of the Eastern campaign upon, the military situation of Germany in the West and upon the internal moral situation in the German and Austro-Hungarian empires." — General Malleterre, Governor of the Musfie des Invalides and Military Critic of the Paris Temps, in " How the War Was Won," Barper's Magazine, AprU, 1919, p. 609. 1-48 The Strategy on the Western Front the enemy ; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refit- ting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his re- sources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal sub- mission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land. In other respects, too, was Marshal Foeli very- much, like General Grant. In campaign and battle both were distinguished for good judg- ment, clearness of vision, and coolness of head. Not to be anxious ; not to change countenance ; not to be perturbed by unfavorable events, nor to be puffed up by victory; to be always cool and collected ; to avoid confusion in commands ; to give orders in the midst of battle with per- fect composure, these were some of the similar, distinguishing characteristics of these two great soldiers. CHAPTER VII ALLIED VICTORIES IN THE EAST MEANWHILE, during the great fight for the Hindenburg Line, there were taking place in Palestine and the Balkans certain events which were destined to have a far-reach- ing effect upon the strategical situation and conduct of the war on the Western Front. On September 19, 1918, General AUenby, in command of British, Indian, Australian, and a few French troops in Palestine, attacked the Turks from the Jordan Eiver to the Mediter- ranean Sea. East of the Jordan he was as- sisted by an Arabian army. In this attack, known as the battle of Samaria, AUenby broke through the Turkish line between that town and the sea and, having pushed his cavalry north- ward and eastward, succeeded, in the next few days, in cutting the Damascus Railway in rear of the, Turks and in seizing the passages of the Jordan, thereby closing their last avenue of 149 150 The Strategy on the Western Front escape. The result was tliat a large part of the Turkish Army was enveloped and captured. Map E SCALE OF MILES 15 ^Yhere AUenby Annihilated the Turkish Armies What remained was routed and dissipated, a few thousand incapahle of further resistance, Allied Victories in the East 151 escaping towards Aleppo. These operations annihilated the Turkish Army in Palestine and put AUenby's army in a position where, by a rapid march northward, it could reach Aleppo ahead of the retreating Turkish Mesopotamian Army, sever its communications at that pdint, and compel its surrender. On September 25, the day before Foch opened his great attack on the Hindenburg Line along the Meuse-Argonne front, the British War Office announced that General AUenby had taken more than 40,000 prisoners and 265 guns in the Palestine offen- sive. While these stirring events were happening in Palestine and Syria, the Allied forces were meeting with similar success in the Balkans. On September 15, 1918, General Franchet d'Esperey, commanding the Allied armies on the Salonica front in Macedonia, attacked the center of the Bulgarian line across the high ground in the angle formed by the Vardar and Cema rivers, broke through the line, and pushed northward some twelve or fifteen miles up the Vardar Valley. This attack, followed a few days later by other attacks against the Bui- 152 The Strategy on the Western Front garian line east of the Vardar in the vicinity of Lake Doiran, opened a great gap through the center of the Bulgarian line across the Var- dar Valley, along^which passes the Nish-Uskub- Veles-Saloniea Railway. Upon this railway the Bulgarians and Austrians in Macedonia de- pended almost entirely for their supplies, nauni- tions, and reinforcements. Consequently, when the Allied forces pushed into this gap, seized the railway, and ascended the valley towards Uskub, they cut the communications, not only of the Bulgarians east of the Vardar, but of the Bulgarians and Austrians west of that river, and thus placed them in an extremely perilous position. On September 26, the day that Foch began his great offensive along the Meuse-Argonne front, the Serbians reported an advance of seventy-five miles up the Vardar Valley and the capture of the fortress and railway center of Veles; and, on the same day, the French "War Office stated that the Allied troops on the Salonica front had captured in this offensive more than ten thousand Bulgarians. On the fol- lowing day the Bulgarians asked for an armi- Allied Victories in the East 153 stice and, two days later, on September 29, 1918, withdrew from the war by accepting the purely military terms dictated by General d'Esperey which were to be effective until the peace con- ference should determine the exact conditions of peace. By the terms agreed upon, the Bul- garian Army was to withdraw from Greek and Serbian territory and demobilize, and Allied troops were permitted to use strategic points in Bulgaria and all means of communication. The Austrian Army on the right of the Bul- garians, having lost their communications also via Uskub, were forced to make their way, as best they could, by irregular trails over the hills and mountains of Albania back to their own territory. The Allied victory in the Balkans not only disposed of Bulgaria but it separated Turkey from Germany and Austria, severed the Berlia- Constantinople-Bagdad Eailway, cut in two the great theater of operations of the Central Pow- ers, and laid open to attack the communications of the Austrian Army in Italy and of the Ger- man Army on the Western Front. Coming as it did right on the heels of General AUenby's 154 The Strategy on the Western Front great victory in Palestine against the Turks and just at tlie time when Foch on the Western Front was beginning to make great breaches in the Hindenburg Line, it was g. lethal blow to Germany which sealed the fate of the Central Powers. It meant that Germany had lost the war ; ^ for from the beginning the strategical and vital center of the whole tteater of war had been in the Balkans; and jnst as soon as the Salonica Army was sufficiently reinforced to make a successful campaign against the Bul- garians,^ and cut the Berlin-Constantinople- Bagdad Eailway, over which the Turks were obtaining munitions of war from Germany, while Germany and Austria were getting cotton and other supplies from Asia Minor, the entire 1 ' ' Whatever resistance the Germans might have been aWe to make in the West, their military defeat was inevitable after the victories in the Orient over the Bulgarians and Turlss. " — ^General Malleterre, in " How the War Was Won," Harper's Magazine, April, 1919, p. 609. 2 ' ' Marshal Foeh knew what was happening in Bulgaria. General Guillaumat had pointed out to him that a brisk attack had serious chances of succeeding, and, if successful would bring about the defection of Bulgaria. The moment the tide had turned in the West, and Marshal Foch knew that Germany would be unable to send fresh troops to Bulgaria, he gave the order for the advance from Salonica. The offensive succeeded in a way perhaps more decisive, and certainly more quickly, than was hoped for. — General Malleterre, in " How the War Was Won," Harper's Magazine, April, 1919, p. 610. Allied Victories in the East 155 scheme of defense of the Central Powers fell to pieces like a house of cards. The reasons were these: With the Turks deprived of munitions of war, and this dep- rivation coming immediately after General Allenby's masterly movements against them in Palestine, they had no alternative but to with- draw from the war and seek such favorable terms as they could obtain. This left the Sa- lonica Army free to move northward into Aus- tria, where it was certain to be reinforced by many Jugo-Slavs and Roumanians, who were ready and anxious to join with the Allies in striking a powerful blow against Austria and Germany. Such an advance into Austria through Budapest to Vienna would cut the com- munications of the Austrian Army in Italy — the only army of any consequence left to Aus- tria — deprive it of its supplies, and compel its surrender. Indeed, the mere threat of such an advance upon its comriunications kept it in such a demoralized state that, when attacked about three weeks later by the Italian Army, it was easily driven from its strong defensive positions, and almost destroyed. 156 The Strategy on the Western Front In this connection, it is worthy of notice that Napoleon 's march down the Danube in 1805 and seizure of the Austrian capital, after capturing an Austrian army under General Mack at "Dim, paralyzed the operations of the Austrian Army under the Archduke Charles in Italy and caused him to fall back before Massena upon Vienna ; and that Napoleon's great victory over the Aus- trian and Russian armies at Austerlitz a few days later, not only resulted in the reconquer- ing of Italy, but compelled both Austria and Eussia to sue for peace. So in this war, as in the days of Napoleon, a successful battle fought by the Allies in the vicinity of Vienna would have conquered for them all Northern Italy. Austria once defeated and out of the war, the way would be left open for the Salonica and Italian armies to unite and attack Germany from the south. Such an attack would not only deprive her of the wheat, oil, platinum, and other supplies, which she was obtaining from Roumania and Ukraine; but, when pushed northward, would destroy or threaten the com- munications of her army on the Western Front with Berlin and other important German cities. Allied Victories in the East 157 Moreover, an advance from Vienna througli the friendly territory of Bohemia would bring the Allied Army almost to Dresden and within one hundred and twenty-five miles of Berlin. Such an invasion of her territory would mean, of course, the destruction of her railways, canals, and cities; the blowing up of her bridges and munition plants; and the laying waste of her fields. And there was no way to prevent it; for she could not detach for this purpose any troops from the Western Front, since she was not then even able to hold her own there. Even had troops been available, she could not continue to feed them and her own people, with the British blockading her northern coasts and her sources of supply to the south de- stroyed. Seeing that all this woulcl mean the bringing home to her people the ruin and deso- lation of war and, finally, the inevitable anni- hilation or capture of her great army on the Western Front, she realized that there was nothing to do but to make terms with the Allies. On September 28, the day following the re- quest made by the Bulgarian Army for an armistice, Field Marshal Hindenburg and Gen- 158 The Strategy on the Western Front eral Ludendorff considered the situation and decided that the need for immediate action had become imperative. Accordingly, on Septem- ber 29, they dispatched their representative. Major Baron von dem Busche, to Berlin to acquaint the German authorities of their deci- sion. On September 30 the Major met the Chancellor, Prince Maximilian of Baden, and the Vice-Chancellor, von Payer, in Berlin and explained to them Hindenburg's and Luden- dorff 's views. On October 2, he appeared be- fore the assembled Eeichstag leaders and in a speech made clear to them the military situa- tion and concluded with these words : We can carry on the war for a substantial further period, we can cause the enemy further heavy losses, we can lay waste his country as we retire, but we can- not win the war. Eealizing this fact, and in view of the course of events in general, the Field Marshal and General Ludendorff have resolved to propose to His Majesty that we bring the fighting to a close, in order to avoid further sacrifice on the part of the German people and their allies. Just as our great offensive was brought to a stop on July 15, immediately it was seen that its continua- tion would involve undue sacrifice of life, so now we Allied Victories in the East 159 must make up our minds to abandon the further prosecution of the war as hopeless. There is still time for this. The German Army has still the strength to keep the enemy at bay for months, to achieve local successes, and to cause further losses to the Entente. But each new day brings the enemy nearer to his aim, and makes him the less ready to conclude a reasonable peace with us. "We must accordingly lose no time. Every twenty- four hours that pass may make our position worse, and give the enemy a clearer view of oiir present weakness. That might have the most disastrous consequences both for the prospects of peace and for the military position. Neither the army nor the people should do anything that might betray weakness. "While the peace offer is made, you at home must show a firm front, to prove that you have the unbreakable will to continue the fight if the enemy refuse us peace or offer only humiliating conditions. If this should prove to be the case, the army's power to resist will depend on a firm spirit being maintained at home, and on the good morale that will permeate from home to the front. ^ On the next day, October 3, Hindenburg him- self appeared before a meeting of the German cabinet at Berlin and in the following signed 1 Ludendorff's Own Story, vol. ii, pp. 380 and 381. 160 The Strategy on the Western Front statement set forth the views of the General Headquarters of the German Army: General Headquarters holds to the demand made by it on Monday, the 29th of September of this year, for an immediate offer of peace to the enemy. As a result of the collapse of the Macedonian front and of the weakening of our reserves in the "West, which this has necessitated, and in view of the impos- sibility of making good the very heavy losses of the last few days, there appears to be now no possibility, to the best of human judgment, of winning peace from our enemies by force of arms. The enemy, on the other hand, is continually throw- ing new and fresh reserves into the fight. The German Army still holds firmly together, and beats off victoriously all the enemy's attacks, -but the position grows more acute day by day, and may at any time compel us to take desperate measures. In these circumstances the only right course is to give up the fight, in order to spare useless sacrifices for the German people and their allies. Every day wasted costs the lives of thousands of brave Germans. ^ Accordingly, on October 4, 1918, jnst five days after Bulgaria withdrew from the war, the Ger- man Government requested ' ' the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water, and in the air."^ 1-Ludenaorff's Own Story, vol. il, p. 386. 2Biielian, Nelson's History of the War, vol. xsiv, pp. 11 and 127. Allied Victories in the East 161 This, then, was the situation : Bulgaria had been defeated and had withdrawn from the war. Turkey, as a result of the annihilation of her Palestine army and the victory of the Allies in the Balkans, had become absolutely power- less to continue the struggle and was making preparations to surrender. Austria, with her whole southern boundary open to attack and the communications of her army in Italy seri- ously threatened, was on the verge of complete collapse. There was needed only one more thrust of the Italian Army against her already partially demoralized troops on the Piave to defeat, rout, and dissipate them and force her, too, out of the war. And Germany, her armies short of food and her people threatened with starvation, her supplies from overseas and out- side countries cut off, and her territory open to invasion from the south and no available troops with which to stop it, knew that she was beaten, not through the defeat of her great army on the Western Front, for that was still fighting without showing the least sign of de- moralization, and was to continue to fight des- perately, for a period of five weeks through a 162 The Strategy on the Western Front most skillfully conducted retreat;^ but never- theless beaten — beaten by the collapse of her rear,2 brought about by the great blow in the Balkans. 1 ' ' Whatever reports were sent out to the contrary, we know absolutely that the Boehe military machine worked with precision to the last. ' ' — George Pattullo, in Saturday Evemng Post, February 22, 1919. Prank H. Simonds, in November, 1918, Beview of Beviems, writing under date of October 21, 1918, p. 482, says: " If she [Germany] battles on there will be hard fighting and grave sacrifices, for even in defeat her armies continue to flght well and her military machine has, as yet, shown no sign of disintegration. ' ' 2 ' ' While the army still stood, the nation collapsed behind it. ' ' — Prank H. Simonds, in Beview of Beviews, December, 1918, p. 592. CHAPTER VIII gekmany's scheme fob wokld dominion IN OEDER to appreciate more fully the stag- gering effect which the defeat of the Bul- garian Army in the Balkans had upon Ger- many, and to gain in addition a clearer concep- tion of the general strategical situation, not only on the "Western Front but throughout the whole theater of war, it is necessary, before taking up Ludendorff's great retreat from the Hindenburg Line, to describe briefly the origin, progress, plan, and characteristics of the great German scheme of world dominion. The one central fact around which cluster all the causes, consequences, and events of the war, is that the German Emperor, William n, with his army and by the help of his allies and their armies, purposed to build up a mighty empire, extending the influence and power of Germany beyond Europe into Asia and Africa and even, perchance, into America — a mighty empire 163 164 The Strategy on the Western Front which, stretching from the North and Baltic seas through the very heart of Europe iato the Balkans, and thence through Asia Minor to Egypt and the Persian Gulf, should dominate all Europe and, through Europe, perhaps all the world. THE BAGDAD EAILWAY The first steps in this push to the East {Drang nach 0_sten) were taken as early as 1888 when a German company obtained from the Sultan of Turkey a ninety-nine year concession to ex- ploit the Haidar-Pasha ( Scutari) -Ismid Rail- way and to build and operate an extension from Ismid to Angora. In February, 1893, this com- pany — The Anatolian Railway Company — ob- tained a concession to build and operate an- other extension from Ismid to Konia. This ex- tension was completed in 1896. Then, in 1898, there was obtained from the Sultan by Emperor William himself, who was then making his famous visit to Constantinople and thence to the Holy Land, a promise of a concession for the continuation of this railway from Konia to Basra (Bassora), at the head of the Persian Gulf. These concessions, which were followed Germany's Scheme for World Dominion 165 by others, covered what is known as the Bag- dad Eailway project which, when finished, was to extend from Haidar-Pasha (Scutari) oppo- site Constantinople, through Konia, Aleppo, and Bagdad, to Basra on the Persian Gulf. By these concessions the Bagdad Eailway Company was also authorized not only to build and operate a number of branch lines, the most important of which was the line from Aleppo running down the Syrian coast through Damas- cus to Jerusalem, but to establish steamship service on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, to build docks and deepen harbors at Alesan- dretta, Bagdad, and Basra, to exploit certain mines and forests, to make use of natural water power, to build electric power plants, to have a monopoly of the brick and tile works in the region of the railways, and to pipe water from the Taurus Mountain gorges to the arid plains of Karaman and Konia.^ When completed, this railway with its branch line from Aleppo to Jerusalem would extend the Hamburg-Berlin-Prague- Vienna-Budapest- iG^raud, "A New German Empire: The Story of the Baghdad Railwaj," in Nineteenth Century, May, 1914, p. 960. 166 The Strategy on the Western Front Belgrade-Sofia-Constantinople Eailway through. Asia Minor to Basra at the head of the Per- sian Gulf, and to Palestine on the east Med- iterranean shore. This line, passing entirely through Europe and Asia Minor from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, would form one of the greatest railway systems of the world. The Bagdad Eailway was promoted by the Deutsche Bank and was to be built by the Krupps and Mannesmanns.'^ Its purpose was to provide an outlet in Asiatic Turkey for West- phalian and other German industries and to become the entering wedge that would even- tually, perhaps, split the British Empire asun- der. Here were millions of industrious people but little given to manufacturing who offered a market for German wares.^ Here were har- bors to be deepened; docks, railways, and irri- gation systems to be constructed. Here were vast tracts of waste, arid land which needed only water to make them what they had been in ancient days — the garden spots of the world. And near here, under British control and within iHowe, " The Heart of the War," in Barker's Magazine, April, 1918, p. 729. 2 Howe, Why War?, p. 215. Germany's Scheme for World Dominion 167 but a short distance of the termini of the Bag- dad Railway in Mesopotamia and Palestine, were Southern Persia, Egypt, and the Suez Canal, whose occupation by Germany would permanently end British trade with India and other Oriental countries. From the start William n had interested him- self in the building of the Bagdad Railway. In connection with it he had visited the Sultan in 1889 ; ^ but it was on his dramatic second visit to Constantinople in 1898 and thence to the Holy Land, made with great pomp of power, that he pledged his undying friendship to the san- guinary Sultan, Abdul Hamid n, known in his- tory as the " Red Sultan," and laid the foun- dation for those concessions and conventions, which then or subsequently ratified became vir- tually the charter authorizing the enterprise.^ At the same time he succeeded in having the British and French concessions and interests in the railways of Asia Minor either arbitrarily revoked or reduced to naught.^ 1 Guyot, The Ccmses and Consequences of the War, p. 174. 2 "A New German Empire: The Story of the Baghdad Railway," in Nineteenth Century, May, 1914, pp. 959 and 960. 3 Bracq, The Provocation of France, p. 69. 168 . The Strategy on the Western Front It was on the occasion of this visit, while in Palestine on October 31, 1898, that he appeared in a Protestant church as the central figure of certain ceremonies representing himself as the secular head of the Eeformed Faith in Ger- many ; and, on the same day, raised his imperial flag on Mount Zion as patron and protector of the German Catholics in the Holy Land. And it was on the occasion of the same visit, eight days later at Damascus, that he proclaimed his everlasting friendship for the "Red Sultan" in the following words : * ' Let His Majesty, the Sultan, as well as the three hundred millions of Mohammedans who venerate him as their caliph, be assured that the German Emperor will always remain their friend."^ AU these efforts, ceremonies, and speeches had but one end in view: the development of Germany into an Asiatic-European world power. This railway linking Turkey to Germany through the Balkans was a bridge to the Orient which offered immense opportunities for trade and commerce and a chance to develop one of the richest unexploited portions of the earth, 1 Lewin, The German Boad to the East, pp. 105 and 106. Germany's Scheme for World Dominion 169 where once had flourished the greatest empires of the world. It was the entering wedge which would enable Germany to obtain ultimate con- trol of Turkey and her twenty million people. And the control of Turkey once obtained by Germany, either by this means or by an alliance with her, would, in case of war with the Entente Powers, be of the greatest value to her stra- tegically; since, at the very start, it would not only cut off Eussia through the closing of the Dardanelles from communication with France and Great Britain, but would enable her to strike through Syria at Egypt and the Suez Canal, a vital link connecting the British Isles with Persia, India, and Australia. THE DKEAM OF WORLD EMPIKB A German Empire that should dominate all Europe and, perhaps, the world was the dream of William n. It seems to have been almost constantly in his mind from the first meeting with the Sultan in 1889 until, and even after, the great World War began in 1914. This is shown by his speeches and proclamations. And along with this idea was another, that the Ger- 170 TJie Strategy on the Western Front mans were a " chosen people," superior to all other peoples in culture and intellect and that he was the instrument of the Almighty to lead them, by the help of his army, to the accom- plishment of great deeds — to the foundation of a mighty German World Power. " Remember," said he in his proclamation to the Army of the East in 1914, . . . . that you are the chosen people! The Spirit of the Lord has descended upon me because I am the German Emperor! I am the instrument of the Almighty. I am His sword, His agent. Woe and death to all those who shall oppose my will ! Woe and death to those who do not believe in my mission! Woe and death to the cowards ! Let them perish, all the enemies of the German peo- ple. God demands their destruction, God, who, by my mouth, bids you to do His will ! ^ In 1896, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the German Empire, he stated that the German nation had become . . . , a world power, the inhabitants of which dwell in all quarters of the globe, bearing with them everywhere German knowledge and German culture. 1 Out of Their Own Moutlis, p. 4. Germany's Scheme for World Dominion 171 The time has arrived to link this greater German Empire close to the home country. ^ On another occasion lie said : " The German nation alone has been called upon to defend, cultivate, and develop great ideas; "^ and on still another occasion : ' ' Our German nation shall be the rock of granite on which the Al- mighty shall finish his work of civilizing the world."* On laying the foundation stone of the Roman Museum of Saalburg on October 4, 1900, Wil- liam n said : May our German Fatherland become in the future as strongly united, as powerful, as wonderful as was the Roman universal empire ; may this end be attained by the united cooperation of our princes, of our peo- ples, of our armies, and of our citizens, in order that in times to come it may be said of us as it used to be said of yore: Civis Romanus sum.^ In a speech on March 22, 1905, he said : " God would never have taken such great pains with our German Fatherland and its people if he had not been preparing us for something still 1 The German Boad to the East, p. 12. 2 Chfiradame, The Pan-German Plot Unmasked, p. 6. 172 The Strategy on the Western Front greater. We are the salt of the earth. "^ And in a proclamation of June, 1915, he said : " The triumph of the greater Germany which some day must dominate all Europe is the single end for which we are fighting. ' ' ' But this dream of world power, frequently referred to as the " From Hamburg to the Per- sian Gulf " project, was not confined alone to "William ii. German publicists, captains of in- dustry and of commerce, and many authors, college professors, and officers of the army grasped the importance of it, spoke and wrote in its favor, and extolled the German Emperor for his activity and foresight in promoting it. As early as 1895 ihere was published under the authority of the Alldeutscher Verband, a powerful Pan-German society, a pamphlet en- titled Great Germany and Central Eitrope in the Year 1950 ^ in which the author said : Without doubt the Germans will not alone people the new German Empire thus constituted; but they alone will govern, they alone will exercise all political 1 Out of Their Own Mouths, p. 5. 2 Gross-Deutschland und Mittel-Europa vm, das Jahr 1950, quoted by LewiHj The German Rood to the East, pp. 12 and 13. Germany's Scheme for World Dominion 173 rights; they alone will serve in the navy and the army ; they alone will be able to acquire land. They will thus have, as in the Middle Ages, the sentiment of being a race of masters ; nevertheless they will so far condescend that the less important work shall be done by the foreigners under their domination. In 1911, three years before the beginning of the great World War, Tannenberg, in his book, Greater Germany, the Work of the Twentieth Century,^ set forth a complete program of Ger- man expansion, enumerating countries and areas which he believed it was necessary to seize or dominate if Germany was to become a great world power. This Pan-German plan of 1911 provided for the establishment under Ger- man rule of a vast Confederation of Middle Europe,^ comprising, in the west, Holland, Bel- gium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, and also a broad strip of France northeast of a line drawn from just south of Belfort to the mouth of the Somme; in the east, large areas of Western Russia, including Russian Poland and the Baltic Provinces of Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland ; 1 Tannenberg, Oross-Deutschland, die Arbeit des Zwanisig- sten JahrJmnderts. 2 ChSradame, The United States and Pan-Germania, pp. 11 to 14. 174 The Strategy on the Western Front in the southeast, Austria-Hungary and the Bal- kans. But this great Confederation, which was to have for its basis a great German Empire of Middle Europe, was not to be limited solely to European countries and areas. It was to extend into Asia, Africa, even into America. The control or seizure of Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Southern Persia, Egypt, and the Suez Canal, as well as of cer- tain countries in Africa and a number of islands in the East Indies and Oceania, was also a part of the plan.* After advocating this scheme of world empire Tannenberg says: "It is Ger- many's task today to pass from the position of an European Power to that of a World Power. ' ' 2 Lewin in his introduction to The German Road to the East says : The Pan-German plan for the creation of a great world power, dominating not only Central and South- 1 A detailed and full discussion of this plan may be found in The Fan-German Plot Unmasked, by Andrg Chfiradame; also in The United States and Pan-GermMnia, by the same author. Confirmatory also of the statements in the text much may be found in the book, Out of Thevr Own Mouths. See also Militarism and Statecraft, by Munroe Smith, p. 167. - Out of Their Own Mouths, p. 79. Germany's Scheme for World Dominion 175 eastern Europe, but controlling practically the whole of Africa, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and large portions of the Par East, with a considerable part of South America has been founded upon very exact knowledge acquired by means of an intense applica- tion devoted during twenty-five years to every polit- ical, ethnographic, economic, social, military, and naval problem affecting the interests of practically every country in the world. This work has been car- ried on and perfected either by the agents of the pow- erful and ubiquitous Pan-German League and other similar societies, or by agents of the secret service, which during recent years has undergone a remark- able development. So thoroughly has this systematic study of foreign countries been revealed during the past few months that it is unnecessary to emphasize the importance and all-embracing nature of the mission of these Teutonic reporters and intriguers. Each agent in his own sphere fitted into the mosaic of the Germanic investi- gation. There has been a regular hierarchy of trained investigators and reporters carrying their messages to the Fatherland and influencing, in many obscure but useful directions, the policy and political life of foreign countries ^ . . . . The reports of these numerous agents have been forwarded to the Great General Staff at the Wilhelmstrasse, the operations of which have always been directed so as to correspond 1 For ntteranees of prominent Germans along these lines re- garding America especially, see Out of Their Own Mouths, p. 197, et s.eq.— H. H. S. 176 The Strategy on the Western Front as much to political as to military necessities ; and to the cabinet of the German Emperor, who has not scrupled to gather the threads of this enormous activity into his own hands. In 1906, Klaus Wagner, forecasting a Ger- man world war, wrote : It is quite possible that German regiments may march over .the Indus to the Ganges; that German troops and Turkish divisions under German general- staff officers may block the Suez Canal and passing through English Egypt join hands with the Khedive, now an English protege, for a general revolt of Islam. It is quite possible that in South Africa probabilities may become facts. It is quite possible that the black, white, and red flag may wave on the towers of Rotterdam and of Calais, and that German war taxes and forced loans will be levied from Paris — a world war such as the sun has never shone on.^ In 1914, a few weeks after tlie great World War began, Maximilian Harden wrote in Die Zukunft: Germany has the right to extend the area of her dominion according to her needs, and the power to obtain this right against all contradiction The English, Belgians, French, North and South Slavs, and Japanese are praising one another as pos- sessors and guardians of the most refined human 1 Klaus Wagner, in Krieg (1906), pp. 115 and 116, quoted in Owt of Their Own Mouths, pp. 76 and 77. Germany's Scheme for World Dominionlll civilization and abusing us as barbarians. We should be fools to contradict. To Rome, at the point of death, the Germans who were digging her grave were barbarians. Your civilization, gossips, wafts to us no siweet savor. Get used, as soon as you can, to recognize that on German soil barbarians and war- riors are living. They have no time to waste on small talk. They must thrash your armies, capture your general staffs, strew your cuttle-fish arms over the ocean. When Tangiers and Toulon, Antwerp and Calais are subject to their barbaric power, then they will often be glad to have a friend chat with you Krupp has given us the hope not only of getting at England in her floating castles, but also of camp- ing widely, before her face, wry with envy, on two seas, on the coasts of Belgium, France, and Morocco. That Germans do not fit into the bustle of peaceable nations is the proudest ornament of the German character. Their manhood does' not feminize itself in long peace. War has always been their chief business. .... Germany means to grow, to coin the achievements of its men and its States into rights of sovereignty before which every head must bow in reverent greeting. Germany is striking. Who gave her leave? Her right is in her might. There- fore she is waging a good war For the English things are already going badly From Calais to Dover is not far. Do you doubt our being able to reach them? With such an army any- 178 The Strategy on the Western Front thing can be done. And before they receive their punishment there will be no peace We are not waging war to punish countries, nor to free enslaved peoples and then warm ourselves in the consciousness of our unselfish nobility. "We are waging war because of our solid conviction that Ger- many, in view of her achievements, has the right to demand and must obtain more room on the earth and a broader sphere of action Spain and the Netherlands, Rome and Hapsburg, France and England seized, ruled, settled great expanses of the most fertile soil. Now the hour has struck for German supremacy. A peace that does not secure this wiU leave our efforts unrewarded "We shall stay in the Belgian lowlands, to which we shall add the narrow coast strip to and beyond Calais From Calais to Antwerp, Flan- ders, Limburg, and Brabant, up to and including the chain of forts in the Meuse, are to be Prussian. . . . . The southern triangle, with Alsiace-Lor- raine (and Luxemburg, if it likes), is to be shaped into an independent State of the Empire, intrusted to a Catholic princely house — a new Lotharingia. Then Germany would know for what purpose she has shed her blood. One principle only is to be reckoned with — one which sums up and includes all others — force! Boast of that and scorn all twaddle. Force! that is what rings loud and clear; that is what has distinc- tion and fascination. Force, the fist — that is every- thing Let us drop our pitiable efforts to Germany's Scheme for World Dominion 179 excuse Germany's action; let us cease heaping con- temptible insults upon the enemy. Not against our will were we thrown into this gigantic adventure. It was not imposed on us by surprise. We willed it ; we were bound to will it. We do not appear before the tribunal of Europe; we do not recognize any such jurisdiction. Our force will create a new law in Europe. It is Germany that strikes. When it shall have conquered new fields for its genius, then the priests of all the gods will exalt the war as blessed.^ One might be inclined to think that the speeches of William n, and the writings of Tan- nenberg, Wagner, and other Pan-Germanists, filled as they were with such an exaggerated sense of national glory and of the importance and superiority of their own countrymen and of themselves, would have had but little influ- ence upon the minds of the conservative and hard-thinking German people; but the truth is that these apostles of Pan-Germanism had an 1 Maximilian Harden, in Die Zukimft (August-October, ]914), quoted in Out of Their Own Mouths, pp. 83 and 85. There is much evidence other than that quoted in the text to show that prsictically all the influential classes in Germany, except perhaps the socialists, were enthusiastically in favor of this scheme of world power, which William ii did so maah to promote. See utterances of German rulers, statesmen, savants, publicists, journalists, poets, business men, party leaders, and soldiers, in Out of Their Own, Mouths; see also pages 37, 38. 39, 55, 64 and 65 of German Policy Before the War, by G. W. Prothero. 180 The Strategy on the Western Front immense influence over the German people and were able to direct them and their government whither they wished. Their writings and speeches, widely circulated in Germany, were read by hundreds of thousands of the German people and had an immense influence in shaping the German policies at home and abroad in the direction of wai and world-wide dominion. Such was the scheme of a German world em- pire. Such were the plans, intentions, and aspirations of the German Emperor and the German people. When it is remembered that William ii, from his first meeting with the Sultan of Turkey in 1889, until, and even after, the beginning of the great World War in 1914, had had this grandi- ose scheme of a mighty German empire almost constantly in mind; that on August 4, 1914, Turkey had signed an alliance with Germany^ to assist her in carrying forward this great project; and that from the conquest of Serbia in October, November, and December, 1915, un- til the defeat and overthrow of the Turks and 1 Greek White Book (1917), given as authority in War Cyclo- pedm issued by the Committee on Public Information, XJ. S. Government, pp. 278 and 279. Germany's Scheme for World Dominion 181 Bulgarians in September, 1918, Germany had had substantially complete control, through its entire length, of the Berlin-Constantinople-Bag- dad Railway, as well as control over all the territory in Europe and Asia, save that occu- pied by the Salonica Army, which she deemed essential for the accomplishment of her great plan, one cannot but appreciate the crushing effect which the Allied blow in the Balkans must have had on her purposes and hopes; nor can one fail to appreciate, also, her great strategical mistake in trying to end the war by an attack on the Western Front in the spring of 1918, without first disposing of the Salonica Army, and thereby making strong the strategical and vital center of the great theater of operations of the Central Powers. CHAPTER IX LUDENDOErF 'S GEEAT EETEEAT NO SOONER had the first break-through of the Hindenburg Line been made by the Americans on the Meuse-Argonne front than Ludendorff saw his great peril. At once he realized that unless this thrust could be stopped immediately, he must begin the with- drawal of his armies from Northern France and Belgium. Accordingly, he made every effort to stop it and was for a time partially success- ful. But in the meantime, other break-throughs along the Flanders ' and intermediate fronts of the Hindenburg Line had occurred; and, more- over, he soon saw that the Americans were only temporarily checked in the Argonne. Under these circumstances, there was but one thing for him to do; and that was to withdraw his armies from Northern France and Belgium to the line of the Meuse River. Accordingly, at the beginning of October he gave the order for 183 Ludendorff's Great Betreat 183 a retreat which he had foreseen might be nec- essary and for which he had provided previ- ously.^ A very difficult problem confronted Luden- dorff. It was much the same kind of problem that he had had to face when Foch broke through the west side of the Chateau-Thierry salient, except that it was on a much larger scale. Then, only the portion of his army in the Chateau-Thierry salient had been endan- gered, but in this instance the whole of his army north of Verdun was threatened with de- struction. Not only this, but the great Allied victories which in the meantime had been won in Palestine and the Balkans added to Luden- dorff's situation a still greater peril. With Bulgaria out of the war; with Turkey virtually out ; with Austria certain to withdraw from it as soon as her army on the Piave should again be vigorously attacked; with Germany already asking for an armistice ; with Foch de- livering daily, anvil blows against the only 1 ' ' Tte Germans had foreseen and provided for a retreat on a. large scale in Belgium and the north of France and had started to operate that retreat at the beginning of October." — General Malleterre, in " How the War Was Won," Harper's Magazine, April, 1919, p. 608. 184 The Strategy on the Western Front army of any consequence left to. Germany; with — in short — all the Central Powers in a state of collapse and disintegration, and nothing to stand between Germany and the onrushing vic- torious armies of the Allies but the German Army, which though in retreat, was still un- conquered, Ludendorff had before him one of the most difficult military problems to solve in all history. What could he do? What should he do? What, from a German point of view, was it best for him to do ? Strategically, had it not been for the collapse of the German nation in his rear, the thing for Ludendorff to have done, the moment he saw that it would be impossible for him to hold the Hindenburg Line, would have been to withdraw to the line of the Meuse as quickly as possible ^ without allowing his retreat to degenerate into a rout. Because, once safely there, the river would not only stop the tanks, then a most im- 1 ' ' One thing only, ' ' says Marshal Foeh, ' ' eould have de- layed defeat for them. That was to get all their forces from everywhere back behind the Meuse. That would have been a formidable position. If they had done that — well, we might have been there yet. But they couldn't do it. "Why? Be- cause it would have been an open confession of defeat, and they dared not face the moral effect of that at home." — Literary Digest, June 7, 1919, p. 66. Ludendorff's Great Retreat 185 portant offensive weapon in the hands of the Allies, but would form with the Ardennes Mountains, through which the river cleaves its way, an exceptionally strong defensive posi- tion, whose length was less by one hundred miles than that of the Hindenburg Line from Verdun to the English Channel. In this connection it should not pass unno- ticed that the broad-nosed salient, whose lines run through Liege, Namur, Dinant, Mezieres, and Sedan, which the Germans would have oc- cupied had they fallen back to the Meuse Eiver line, had not the vulnerability to an enemy's attacks characteristic of most salients, for the reason that no important lines of railway pass through or from it into Germany. Then, too, this salient presented the greatest irregularities of surface, being " intersected by numerous ravines and streams with steep and rocky banks, by deep valleys, and by ridges of hills, ' ' ^ which make it a great natural fortification that would have been very easy to defend. But to make a quick retirement to the line of the Meuse, even though the German rear had 1 Encyclopedia Britanmca, ninth edition, vol. ill, p. 513. 186 The Strategy on the Western Front not been in collapse, would have been an ex- ceedingly risky operation, for the reason that it would have been interpreted by the German people, as well as by the Allies, as an open con- fession of defeat; and might have had a de- moralizing effect upon the German Army, which would have led to a great German disaster. And had the great bulk of the German Army learned, in the course of such a hasty retire- ment, what they did not then know, that their whole rear was in a state of collapse, there would have been a great probability of this very thing happening. Then, too, a speedier with- drawal would have necessitated abandoning to the enemy greater quantities of supplies, equip- ments, and guns. It was apparent that if the armistice could be agreed to while the German Army was still unbeaten and on foreign soil, it would lessen for the German people the bitterness of defeat, prevent an Allied invasion and devastation of German territory, and probably result in Ger- many's receiving better terms in the treaty of peace. But these were the only objects for con- tinuing the struggle, since it was evident that Ludendorff's Great Retreat 187 the conditions in Germany at tliat time utterly destroyed all hope of final success. Knowing that Germany was beaten and that the end was near, Ludendorff was nevertheless anxious, of course, to maintain the courage and morale of his army to the last, and to retain in his pos- session upon the signing of the armistice as much of the territory of France and Belgium as possible. Accordingly, he made his plan for a delib- erate retreat. His purpose was to contest every position ; to make the Allies fight for every foot of ground gained; and to fall back only when he was forced to, or when he found it absolutely necessary to prevent the cutting of his com- munications and capture of parts of his army. From October 4 until his resignation on Octo- ber 26 Ludendorff followed this plan. During the withdrawal he brought every possible force to bear against the Americans and French ad- vancing from the Meuse-Argonne front on Se- dan and Mezieres, in order to hold open the line of railway from Hirson through these towns to Metz, so as to facilitate the retirement of the Germans and give them more time to 188 The Strategy on the Western Front withdraw their troops and supplies, especially from the Laon salient.^ But, although he was able to retard greatly their progress, he could not stop them. They had seen the importance of closing the gap and of seizing the railway, and in the face of forty German divisions which Ludendorff had or- dered there to oppose them, as well as in the face of the most discouraging conditions, they continued slowly but surely to press forward to their goal.^ The British, French, and Bel- 1 In these operations Field Marshal Hindenburg was the chief of the General Staff of the German armies and as such was the ostensible commander-in-chief; but the real com- mander was General Ludendorff, " the brains of Germany's war-making power," who was acting as Hindenburg 's Ohief of Staff under the title of First Quartermaster-General. He it was who worked out the plans and directed the operations. Between the time of his resignation on October 26 and the signing of the armistice on November 11, Hindenburg made no change in Ludendorff 's plan. 2 General Pershing, in his report of these operations to the Secretary of War, says : "In all 40 enemy divisions had been used against us in the Meuse-Argonne battle. Between Sep- tember 26 and November 6 we took 26,059 prisoners and 468 guns on this front. Our divisions engaged were the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Thirty- seventh, Forty-seeond, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, Seven- ty-ninth, Eightieth, Eighty-second, Eighty-ninth, Ninetieth, and Ninety-first. Many of our divisions remained in line for a length of time that required nerves of steel, while others were sent in again after only a few days of rest. The First, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Eightieth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth were in line twice. Although some Ludendorff's Great Retreat 189 gians along other portions of the line, imbued also with the same spirit of victory, gradually, but no less surely, forced back the Germans in their front. But their progress was very slow ; for Luden- dorff conducted this difficult operation^ with great skill. His retirement was methodical. There was no rout, no debacle. Up to the very last the discipline and morale of the German troops were good, and their rear guards fought bravely, fiercely, desperately to hold back the onrushing Allies.^ It is not the purpose here to describe in de- tail this great retreat. It will suffice to say that, taking advantage of every known means to de- of the divisions were fighting their first battle, thej soon be- came equal to the best. ' ' The American combat division numbered about 28,000 ofli- cers and men; the German, about 12,000; the French, about 12,000; and the British, about 15,000. 1 " A retreat, on the confession of the greatest soldiers, is the most difficult task which a general can be called upon to undertake." — Buchan, in Nelson's History of tlie War, vol. XII, p. 71. 2 ' ' The resistance of the German rear guard had been stub- born, and had certainly made the victorious advance of the Allied armies slow. But the retreat although methodical and admirably arranged by LudendorfE, had not been able to free the armies completely and remove the immense material accumulated between the sea and the Ardennes." — General Malleterre, in " How the War Was Won," Harper's Magazine, April, 1919, p. 609. 190 The Strategy on the Western Front lay the advance of the Allied armies, Luden- dorff made it extremely difficult for them to push forward ; so difficult, indeed, that although they made what seemed to be almost super- human efforts to drive back the German Army, they succeeded in forcing it back during the last six weeks of almost continuous fighting only a distance of some forty miles behind the Hindenburg Line. By November 1, the Germans had retired from the Belgian coast; the British and Cana- dians had captured Valenciennes and were pushing forward between the Sambre and Scheldt on Mons; the Americans had forced their way northward to Bayonville, Aincreville, and Doulcon, about twenty miles south of Se- dan; and the French on their left had reached Vouziers about twenty-five miles south of Mezieres. By November 11, when the armistice was signed, the dividing line separating the Allies from the Germans southward from Hol- land to a point opposite Metz ran, approxi- mately, from the mouth of the Scheldt, about twelve miles northwebL of Antwerp, up the left bank of that river to Ghent, thence through Ludendorff's Great Retreat 191 Mons past Hirson, through Mezieres, past the southern outskirts of Sedan, and thence along the left bank of the Meuse to a point opposite Mouzay, where it crossed the river, and thence through the northern edge of the Woevre For- est to Bezonvaux, thence to Vandieres, and thence across the Moselle to Port-sur-Seille op- posite Metz. Examining this line, we note that when the end came the Germans were occupying a line through Belgium, which lay approximately forty miles east of the Hindenburg Line, thirty miles west of the Meuse Eiver line opposite Namur, and one hundred miles west of the Ger- man frontier; and that the Americans and French had closed the gap between the Verdun- Eeims front and the Ardennes Mountains, but that the gap northward of these mountains to the Dutch frontier was open and was completely covered by the German Army, which extended from the mouth of the Scheldt through Ghent and Mons to the northern outskirts of Mezieres. It wiU be noticed that the great Maubeuge- Charleroi-Namur-Liege-Aix-la-Chapelle Rail- way, which passes directly through the gap into 192 The Strategy on the Western Front Germany, crossed the German line at rigM an- gles to it and was completely covered by it ; and that the flanks of the German Army occupying the line were protected on the right by Holland and on the left by the Meuse Eiver and Ar- dennes Mountains from Mezieres to Sedan. Thus we see that the great length of time required by the Americans and French to close the gap south of the Ardennes Mountains, brought about by Ludendorff's desperate and terrific fighting to keep it open, had enabled him to withdraw that portion of his army facing the British and the Belgians along the Hindenburg Line eastward through Belgium to a position where it completely covered its line of commu- nications back into Germany and where its flanks rested on practically impassable obsta- cles. Nevertheless, the closing of the gap from Verdun to Sedan would have made it absolutely necessary for him to continue his retreat to the Meuse Eiver line even had the armistice not been signed; for the reason that with such an extended front and only one line of railway behind him he was still in a dangerous position. Ludendorff's Great Retreat 193 Then, too, the Meuse line was much stronger and much shorter ; and would form a water bar- rier between his army and the enemy's tanks. Had it been possible to close this gap earlier, say before the German Army along the Hin- denburg Line from the vicinity of St. Quentin northward to the English Channel had retired so far eastward, the strategical effect in all likelihood would have been much greater ; since, in that case, an Allied thrust northward from Mezieres probably would have resulted in cut- ting the Charleroi-Namur-Liege-Aix-la-Cha- pelle Railway behind the German Army and have forced a large part of that army to sur- render. But, whatever might have been the outcome under such conditions, the point I wish to em- phasize is that at the time the armistice was signed the German Army was in an excellent position from Mezieres northward for complet- ing its withdrawal to the line of the Meuse with- out any great disaster ; and once there it would have been in a very strong and most favorable position for making a determined stand. It is, therefore, my opinion that had the armistice 194 The Strategy on the Weste rn Front not been signed when it was, no great debacle would have overtaken the German Army in the next few weeks or months as a result of the strategical situation on the Western Front.^ There can be no question that Germany never would have signed an armistice before the de- feat of her great army on the Western Front, had not the break in the Balkans exposed her to an attack from the south, threatened the com- munications of her great army, and cut off a large part of her remaining sources of supply. 1 Conflrmatory of the views herein expressed, attention is invited to the following extract from the Literary Digest of June 7, 1919, p. 67, of a reported interview between an English newspaper correspondent of the London Daily Mail and Marshal Foch bearing directly on this point. The Literary Digest says: "In reply to the question, ' Would you not have captured large masses of the enemy if the Germans had not given in when they did?' the Marshal forever laid the ghost of the vride-spread report that the signing of the armistice deprived him of a great opportunity to force a German debacle. According to this interview: " The Marshal took up his pencil again and sketched a rough chart of the battle line. " ' When you are advancing on the whole of a 250-mile front, as we were,' he said, ' great encircling movements are impossible. As your adversary falls back he blows up bridges here, here, and here. He blocks this road, and this, and this. He covers every track and line of pursuit with the litter of the material he abandons. The advance of the pursuing army becomes more and more difS.cult. You cannot get on fast enough to catch him. At the cost of great sacrifice of material he gets away. That is what modern war is like. Ce n'est pas elegant, mais c'est comme fH. (It's not elegant, but it's like that.) ' " Ludendorff's Great Retreat 195 Nor would she have yielded until her great army had been either annihilated, captured, or driven across the Ehine. But would it have been possible for the Allied armies to do this? Let us see. I have already pointed out the great de- fensive strength of the line of the Meuse. But back of it are the Moselle Eiver and Metz with its great system of fortifications, and back of them is the line of the Saar ; then come the fortress of Strassburg and the great river Rhine; and on the east bank of the Ehine, extending from Switzerland almost to Karlsruhe, are the Black Forest Mountains, which, from the days of Caesar, have been considered a most difficult obstruction for armies attempting to move through them from west to east. These are all strong defensive positions; but the Ehine and Black Forest Mountains are more than that; they are formidable obstacles, and would be im- passable if defended by adequate military forces armed with modern weapons. " Of all the operations of war," says Jomini, " there is none more arduous and difficult than the passage of a large river in the face of an 196 The Strategy on the Western Front enemy." When it is remembered that the passage, or attempted passage, of the Ehine in this case ■would have been in the face of a na- tion in arms, and not in the face of an enemy- few in numbers, as were the armies in Jomini 's and Napoleon's day; when it is remembered that the bridges of the Ehine were strongly pro- tected by bridgeheads and field works, and that two railways paralleling the river, and many others near the German frontier, had been con- structed solely with reference to battle lines, permitting quick concentration of troops upon any front of the Rhine or German frontier; and that the defensive positions, forts, and great fortresses along and near the German frontier had for more than forty years preceding the vrar been strengthened in every possible way to prevent an invasion of German territory, one is appalled by the magnitude of the task and cannot but feel that its accomplishment would have been an impossibility — a task be- yond human power. In view of these facts, it is submitted that there would have been no chance of the Allies winning the war on the Western Front, had there been no collapse of the German Ludendorff's Great Retreat 197 rear as a result of the Allied victory in the Balkans. But even supposing, for the sake of the argu- ment, that the war might have been won oh the "Western Front in the following year, after ap- proximately four million American soldiers had been sent there, as was the plan of the War Department,! would it not have been only after an appalling, and unnecessary sacrifice of lif e,^ 1 " An American army of 4,000,000 men in France, work- ing in conjunction with our Allies and under one commander- in-ehief will enable us to go through the German line wherever we please." — General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff V. S. Army, to Senate Military Committee as reported in Washington Times of August 15, 1918. "After a study of the entire situation, including as ac- curate estimate of the potential strength of our Allies on the Western Front and of the probable German strength as pos- sible, I eame to the conclusion that the war might be brought to an end in 1919, provided we were able to land in France by June 30 of that year eighty American divisionskof a strength of 3,360,000."— General March, in Report to Secretary of War. " The President has finally announced that the American military policy from this time on is centered on the Western Front, and he has declined to be diverted from that one thing. The War Department has now adopted this as a policy, and it is the policy of the United States that the military program is to be centered in France." — Washington Times, Aug. 15. 1918. 2 The battle casualties of the American Expeditionary Forces as reported by War Department on September 26, 1919, were: Killed in action 35,590 Died of wounds received in action 14,747 Wounded in action 205,696 Taken prisoner 4,480 Total 260,513 198 The Strategy on the Western Front since a few thousand soldiers sent into the Bal- kans would, as the sequel has shown, have been a deciding factor in bringing the war to a close ? It is not the purpose in this concluding chap- ter to carry further the discussion of this inter- esting question, except to say that it is the deliberate opinion ,of the writer that, had there been no break in the Balkans and had the cam- paign continued during the spring and summer of 1919, two hundred thousand Americans sent to the Balkans would have had a much greater effect in bringing the war to a speedy end than ten times that number sent to the Western Front.1 Of the 205,696 soldiers " wovmded in action " 113,458 were invalided home. Just what percentage of these have already died as a result of their wounds, many of which were very severe, has not yet been determined, but undoubtedly a large number, Which would increase greatly the number of battle deaths. In order to appreciate more fully the enormous sacriiiee of life which these figures involve attention is invited to the fact that the total battle casualties of the Union soldiers during the four years of our great Civil War as given by Captain Frederick Phisterer. TJ. S. Army, in his Statistical Beeord of the armies of the United States, page 70, were: 93.443, of whom 44,238 were killed in battle and 49,205 died of wounds and injuries. 1 It will no doubt be of interest to the reader to know that the views set forth herein that the war never could have been Ludendorff's Great Retreat 199 For three and a half years prior to the great German thrust of March 21, 1918, the opposing armies on the Western Front had remained practically stationary in their intrenched po- sitions. Although the most strenuous efforts, involving enormous losses of life, were made by both sides, neither side was able to break through the intrenched lines of the other and resume a war of movement. Indeed, with the exception of the small amount of territory yielded to the Allies as a result of what was known as " The Hindenburg rectification of ■won by the Allies solely on the Western Front have not been formed after the events, but have long been held by the ■writer ; and that in several memoranda to the War Department, months before the armistice ■was signed, he set forth in detail these vie^ws and strongly urged the sending of American troops into the Balkans. He ■was at that time and still is of the opinion that had we adopted this plan right at the start and carried it out with anything like the vigor with ■which our troops were after- wards sent to France, Eussia would have been saved to the Allied cause and the war been brought to an end much sooner and with much less loss of life. There were several reasons ■why this was not done, but this matter cannot be discussed now, ©■wing to the fact that ffiie Secretary of War has directed, " that no cablegrams or other such confidential information shall be published, neither verbatim nor in substance, until made public by the War Department or by the Congress of the United States. ' ' For the information of the reader who may be further interested in this matter there will be found in Appendix A to this book a copy of the ■writer's Fourth Memorandum to the War Department advocating this plan. This memorandum was submitted on August 26, 1918; and ■with the exception of a certain confidential cablegram quoted therein, which the War 200 The Strategy on the Western Front the German line," practically no territory had been gained by either side during these three and a half years of terrific fighting. Then there came, as we have seen, the great thrusts of the Germans beginning with that of March 21, in which with the aid of poisonous gases they succeeded in breaking through the Allied lines; and a few months later the great counter-offensive of Foch, beginning with that of July 18, 1918, and followed by the great attacks on the Hindenburg Line, in which with the help of the tanks the Allies succeeded in breaking through the German lines. But in Department would not grant the writer permission to publish, is given in full as written, although this has necessitated some repetition of matter contained in the text of the book. However, since the above was written, Captain tcordon Gordon-Smith of the Eoyal Serbian Army has written an article for the October, 19l9, issue of the Current History Magazine, entitled, " Why the Salonica Army Was Power- less," in which he points out in detail the principal reasons why active operations were not sooner undertaken in the Bal- kans, the sum and substance of which is that Great Britain opposed an active offensive there. When taken in connection with the fact that our own President, Secretary of War, and C!hiefs of StafE had practically from the start — probably in large measure as a result of Great Britain's opposition to an active campaign in the Balkans — adopted the plan that the war was to be won by confining our efforts solely to the Western Front, we appreciate still more fully why it was that Great Britain's stand on this question was not sooner overruled and an earlier effort made by the Allies to strike a telling blow at the vital center of the theater of operations of the Central Powers. See Captain Gordon-Smith's article, Appendix B. Ludendorff's Great Retreat 201 neither case were these break-throughs any more than temporary ; in neither case was either side able to bring about a complete war of movement; for no sooner had one side broken through the lines than the adversary at once fell back to other lines, and there again stood on the defensive. In passing from one posi- tion to another there was, of course, war of movement; but on the whole the character of the war was not greatly changed, since it still continued to be in great part a war of posi- tions. In short, from trench warfare, or war of position, it had been developed by the gas and tank attacks into war of movement only between positions. In fact, neither side, during more than four years of the most terrible fighting the world ever has known, had been able, after breaking through the enemy's lines, to advance more than a few miles. The greatest advance made by the Germans was thirty-five miles; and it took the Allies six weeks after breaking through the Hindenburg Line to force the Germans back a distance of forty miles. Virtually, the cam- paign on the Western Front, from the beginning 202 The Strategy on the Western Front to the end, was a military stalemate ; and had it not been for the temporary advantage gained on one side or the other by the use of gas or tank attacks would have remained during its more than four years ' duration purely a war of positions. The principal reason why neither side on the "Western Front during this long interval of time had been able to bring about a war of move- ment, was because the flanks of the opposing armies were both secured by impassable obsta- cles. With one flank resting on Switzerland and the other on the English Channel, no opportu- nity was offered either army to turn the flank of the other and strike at the main line of its communications, which is equivalent to saying that no opportunity was offered either arniy for extended strategical maneuvers or combina- tions. It must be evident to anyone that, had the opposing armies on the Western Front not had their flanks protected, one or the other would have been turned out of position and one or the other been decisively defeated long, be- fore four years had elapsed. But, protected as they were, each had to limit its operations to Ludendorf's Great Retreat 2 03 frontal attacks against the intrenclaed lines of the other; and frontal attacks against in- trenched lines are most destructive of human life. Here we have the chief reason why this war continued so long and why it was the most san- guinary in all history. The question naturally arises : Could it not have been won by the Al- lies in a shorter period, and with less loss of life? Undoubtedly it could have been, had the Allies, during the first three years of the war, not made blunder after blunder. From the beginning the vital and strategical center of the whole theater of war lay between the Black and Aegean seas, in the vicinity of Constantinople. The Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosporus, the Balkans from Sa- lonica to Constantinople, these were the vital points, and if the Allies could have won an early victory in this region, the first important step towards winning the war would have been accomplished. Strategically, the British attack upon the Dardanelles, which was favored by Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, was 204 The Strategy on the Western Front the right thing to do. But the operation was very badly managed. The authorities seemed to think that with little or no assistance from land forces they could capture the forts of the Dardanelles by a powerful naval attack; where- as had they made the original effort with a con- siderable army, assisted by the navy; or had there been a sufficient army ready to land at the proper moment, the campaign very prob- ably would have succeeded. Granvilte Fortes- cue in his book entitled, What of the Darda- nelles? says : I wish to bring out vividly the fact that a" landing in force, undertaken at the time indicated, would have changed the whole story of the Gallipoli cam- paign Why was no land attack planned in conjunction with the naval assault on the Dardahelles ? Did the originator of the action believe that the fleet alone could force the passage and capture the land forts by the same maneuver? .... The whole ques- tion of the naval fight will be dealt with later. Here we are concerned with the grave error of omitting land operations at a time when in all probability they would have brought partial if not complete success. Ludendorff's Great Retreat 205 After a careful and serious study of the course of events in the Dardanelles, in my opinion the fact that the Allied fleets have not passed into the Sea of Marmora is primarily due to the initial blunder of challenging the passage of the Hellespont with ships alone. Or had the Allies subsequently landed their armies at the head of the Gulf of Saros, just north of the Dardanelles, or on the coast of the Trojan plain in the vicinity of the island of Tenedos just south of the strait, instead of land- ing on the Gallipoli Peninsula, the campaign very probably would have succeeded and the war have been brought to an end at least two years sooner. " Today I believe we are in a position to assert," says General Malleterre, " that if the expedition of the Dardanelles had succeeded in 1915, and if we had taken Con- stantinople, Eussia would have remained a strong military factor, and the war doubtless would have finished two years ago. ' ' ^ Other splendid opportunities, too, were of- fered the Allies for a master stroke in this vital center of the theater of war, especially during 1 General Malleterre, in ' ' How the War Was Won, ' ' Har- per's Magazine, April, 1919, p. 610. 206 The Strategy on the Western Front the first three years of the struggle when the Allies had a preponderating force on the West- ern Front, but one more example will suffice. Had Roumania, when she came ihto the war in 1916, received proper assistance from the Al- lies and not been left practically single-handed to face the armies of Mackensen and Falken- hayn, she would probably have been victorious, or at least would not have been crushed; in which case Eussia could have obtained ammu- nition and guns from the Allies and in all proba- bility would have been saved to the Allied cause. Strategically, the importance of saving Eus- sia to the Allied cause cannot be overesti- mated ; for she had the wheat which the Allies needed and the Allies had the ammunition and guns which she needed. She had the man power also, one of the supreme essentials for winning the war, for the lack of which the Allies came to the verge of final defeat and were saved in the end only by the man power of America. Then, too, in addition to saving Eus- sia, a Roumanian victory would have brought enormous numbers of Jugo-Slavs into the war on the side of the Allies, cut in two the great Ludendorff's Great Retreat 207 theater of operations of the Central Powers, and put an end to Germany's great scheme of world dominion. To strike at the communications of the enemy without exposing your own to his attach, was the one strategical principle, the carrying out of which had more to do with winning the war than any other. And it is a remarkable fact that until Foch was made commander-in-chief scarcely any effort whatsoever, and no success- ful effort, to carry out this great principle of war was made by the Allies in any theater of operations. It was the carrying out of this principle which enabled General Foch to win the Chateau- Thierry salient at the beginning of his great offensive on the Western Front ; which enabled the British Army commanders to drive the Ger- mans from the Amiens salient and force them back to the Hindenburg Line; which enabled General Pershing to obliterate in two days the dangerous St. Mihiel salient that for many months had menaced French communications. It was the carrying out of this principle by the Americans and French in their great thrust 208 The Strategy on the Western Front from the Verdun-Eeims front through the Ar- gonne Forest to Sedan and Mezieres that put the German Army in a precarious situation and forced its retreat through Belgium towards the Meuse Eiver line. It was the carrying out of this principle by General AUenby in Palestine' that enabled him to annihilate the Turkish Army in his front and force the Turkish Gov- ernment to sue for peace. And it was the car- rying out of this principle in the Balkans by General d'Esperey, which not only forced Bul- garia out of the war, but at the same time cut or threatened the communications of the other armies of the Central Powers, and which, taken in connection with the persistent pounding of the Germans by Marshal Foch on the Western Front, brought the great war to an end. APPENDIX A Fourth Memorandum on the Strategy of the War By Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Sargent, TJ. S. Army, Army War College, August 26, 1918 1. Ill the closing paragraphs of my third memo- randum on the strategy of the war which was finished on June 5, 1918, and submitted to the Director of War Plans Division of the General Staff a few days afterwards, I said: ' ' In closing this brief discussion and analysis of the plans here suggested, I should like to add that nothing herein should be considered as in the slight- est way critical of, or unfavorable to, continuing the present plan of rushing troops to France to stop the Germans on the Western Front, which is now being prosecuted with so much vigor by the military author- ities; for it must be evident to anyone that this is now an absolute necessity to save the situation. Moreover, having committed ourselves with our Allies, to this plaji, we must keep inviolate our faith with them. " But, if we continue in this war to raise, organize, and train millions of soldiers, and continue to send them across the sea until the war is won, as now 209 210 The Strategy on the Western Front seems to be the policy and purpose of the whole na- tion, the time will come when we will have enough troops on the "Western Front to make it absolutely safe; and then we shall want to find another front upon which, with reasonable hopes of final victory, we can bring to bear the power of our naval and military forces. And when that time comes, I feel that our Allies will also be ready to give careful con- sideration to other plans; and very probably look with favor upon one of the plans herein outlined, if it receive the sanction and advocacy of our own Government, as I hope it may." And in connection with the above, I would like to invite attention to the following cablegram from . . . . to the Adjutant-General U. S. Army, dated July 9, 1918 : The cablegram is omitted in order to comply with the following endorsement on a request of mine of the "War Department to publish this Memorandum : "War Department, A. G. O., April 10, 1919.— To Lt.-Col. H. H. Sargent, U. S. A. Retired, Jacksonville, Oregon. - " The publication of the enclosed article en- titled ' Fourth Memorandum on the Strategy of the "War, ' is permitted with the omission of cable- gram on page 2. " By order of Secretary of "War. "(Signed) J. C. Ashbubn, ' ' Adjutant-General. ' ' 2. From a further study of the strategical situa- tion in the whole theater of war I am more firmly Appendix A 211 convinced than ever that " the line of least resist- ance to decisive Allied victory is through the Balkan way," and has been from the beginning. And since •we now have, or will shortly have, sufficient troops on the Western Front, along with the troops of our Allies there, to iron out the German salients, and drive the Germans back to their original line, the line of the Aisne, and hold them there, it seems to me the time has come to think seriously of sending an American army to Salonica, either by sea or through France and Italy or both. It seems to me that if a million, or even a half-million, American soldiers could be put into the Balkans this winter to join with the half-million or more Allied troops now there, great results would be sure to follow. Turkey is wavering now, and so is Bulgaria. Both have tied themselves up to Germany and Austria, expecting these powers to win ; but the very moment they feel assured that the Central Powers are going to lose, they will desert them without scruple ; for it was not through principle, but solely in the hope of their own aggrandizement, that >they allied themselves with Germany and Austria. 3. Once a large American army should join the Allies at Salonica and begin operations, not only would Turkey and Bulgaria probably make terms and withdraw from the war, but hundreds of thou- sands of Jugo-Slavs would flock to the Allied stand- ards, to say nothing of the many thousands of Rou- manians who would join the Allied ranks also, since they still have no love for their old enemies, Ger- 212 The Strategy on the Western Front many and Austria. And Austria herself is in sueh desperate straits economically and has become so tired of war, that one big Allied victory on her soil would probably make her come to terms. Germany is most vulnerable through her back door, through Austria, and although she can never be driven across the Rhine by making the great Allied effort solely along that front, yet should the Allied Army advance victoriously through Austria, it would necessitate Germany's detaching many troops from the Western Front to meet the threatened invasion from the south, whereupon the Allies might be able to break through the weakened Western PVont, cross the Rhine, and invade Germany from the west. 4. The only hope of winning the war as it should be won is to annihilate or capture in battle Ger- many's armies; and this cannot be done on the West- em Front. To do it, the Allies must invade her terri- tory and bring the war home to her people; bring her to battle where they can reach not only her armies, but the very resources that maintain her armies; where they can destroy her railroads and canals, cut off her supplies, blow up her munition plants, and lay waste her fields. THE SALONICA PLAN 5. The Saloniea fronfis one of capital importance and a successful offensive there would have immense and far-reaching results. 6. It would cut in two the theater of operations of the Central Powers and destroy at once Germany's Appendix A 213 idea of dominion from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf. 7. It would cut the Berlin-Constantinople-Bagdad Railway and thus deprive Germany of the great quantities of food and raw materials which she is now obtaining from Asia Minor over this road, and also prevent her sending to Turkey immense quanti- ties of munitions, without which the resistance of the Turkish Army before the British Army near Bagdad in Mesopotamia, and the Turkish Army before the British Army in Palestine near Jerusalem, would probably collapse. 8. Deprived of their munitions, the Turks would be forced to retreat before the British, and in the end be compelled to sue for peace, which would open the Dardanelles and Black Sea to British warships and set free a large part of the British forces now in Mesopotamia and Palestine for use elsewhere. 9. Once Bulgaria and Turkey were disposed of, the Allied Army of Salonica could reoccupy Serbia, move on the Danube from Belgrade and threaten Budapest, the Hungarian capital. Such success as this would result in reestablishing Serbia and would greatly encourage and hearten the Serbian race. In passing, it may well be remarked that the Ser- bians make fine soldiers. They are very brave and have great skill in mountain warfare. These quali- ties, and their knowledge of the country, enable them to win battles in the face of superior numbers and under great difficulties. Their recent successful cam- paign against the Bulgarians, in which they forced 214 The Strategy on the Western Front them out of several mountain strongholds and finally captured the intrenched Bulgarian position on Mount Vetrenik, called by them the " Rock of Blood," is hut one of many examples illustrative of their great skill in mountain warfare. 10, And in a discussion of the advantages of this plan, it should not be overlooked that if the Allied Army operated as here outlined, its line of communi cation from Belgrade and the Danube back through Serbia to its base of operations at Salonica would be entirely in friendly territory; that the country northward from Belgrade, the Serbian capital, to Budapest is an immense plain lying in the valley of the Danube, with direct river and railway communi- cation between the two cities and no fortresses of importance about the Hungarian capital; and that Vienna, the Austrian capital, is only one hundred and fifty miles from Budapest, with good river and railway communication between them and no inter- vening mountains. And here it may well be noted that, strategically, a successful campaign upon Budapest would so threaten the Austrian capital and the communica- tions of the Austrian Army in Italy as to compel that army to fall back upon Vienna; whereupon the Italian Army on the Piave could push forward and invade Austria. In this connection it is worthy of notice, that Napoleon's march down the Danube in 1805 and sei- zure of the Austrian capital, after capturing an Aus- trian Army under General Mack at Ulm, paralyzed Appendix A 215 the operations of the Austrian Army under the Arch- dute Charles in Italy and caused him to fall back before Massena upon Vienna; and that Napoleon's great victory over the Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz a few days later, not only resulted in the reconquering of Italy, but compelled both Aus- tria and Russia to sue for peace. 11. One of the arguments against a campaign from the Salonica front is the difficulties of communica- tion ; but the Balkan Railway system is of no incon- siderable extent. The Berlin-Constantinople Railway passes right through Serbia, Bulgaria, and European Turkey. A railway also runs northwest from Salo- nica to Monastir; another runs north from Salonica via Uskub to Nish, one of the principal stations of the Berlin-Constantinople Railway; another from Salonica passes eastward along the littoral of the Aegean Sea until it joins the Berlin-Constantinople Railway, about thirty miles south of Adrianople ; and still another from Uskub runs in a northeasterly direction to Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, where it crosses the Berlin-Constantinople Railway and thence runs east through Bulgaria to Varna on the Black Sea. And it should also be noted that since the be- ginning of the war, many miles of wagon roads and light railways have been, built by the soldiers and the Macedonian peasants, and many of the old wagon roads and railways been repaired and improved. Mountains on which only a few years ago only sheep trails existed are now accessible to heavy guns. 12. Another argument against a campaign from 216 Tlie Strategy on the Western Front the Salonica front is the difficulties arising from the mountainous nature of the country. But these diffi- culties have been greatly exaggerated. The moun- tains do not offer insuperable obstacles to military operations. History proves this; for probably in no country has there been so much fighting as. in the Balkans. And even in recent years, under modem conditions of warfare, campaign after campaign has been won and lost in this theater of operations. The mountainous nature of the country did not prevent the Balkan League from inflicting a crushing defeat on Turkey in the first Balkan War in 1912; neither did it prevent the Serbians, Greeks, Turks, and Rou- manians from decisively defeating the Bulgarian Army in the second Balkan War in 1913; nor did it prevent the Austrians and Bulgarians from driv- ing the Serbian Army out of Serbia into Albania ia 1915, nor prevent the Allied Army of Salonica from forcing the Bulgarians and Austrians out of their intrenched mountain strongholds in 1916 and cap- turing Monastir. 13. The advantages of Salonica for a base of oper- ations lie principally in the fact that the port of Salonica is one of the finest in the world; it is a ' ' land-locked harbor miles in extent, in which the navies of the world could lie at anchor." And al- though there are some submarines in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, nevertheless the sea route to Salonica is kept open by the British and Italian and French navies for the transportation of troops and supplies. Appendix A 217 14. The importance of the city and bay of Salonica to the Allies cannot be overestimated; for if by any chance the Central Powers should gain possession of them, it would be a catastrophe. Once in possession of them, Germany would follow with the invasion of Greece, and no doubt establish in Salonica Bay a submarine base of the most formidable kind; and most probably subsidiary bases in the indented and rocky coast of Greece, or among the hundreds of islands forming the Archipelago. From these bases hundreds of submarines would destroy the ships of the Allies entering the east Mediterranean and Aegean seas, and most probably stop the greater part of the traffic by the Suez Canal. This would cut off the direct communication of Great Britain with India and deprive the British Army in Egypt from obtaining supplies and munitions. It is therefore of supreme importance not only that the Allies main- tain a strong army at Salonica, but that it be strong- ly reinforced as early as possible for an energetic of- fensive in that theater of operations. 15. There are four ways by which troops could be sent to the Balkans, all of which might simultaneous- ly be made use of, if it were deemed advisable. First, by sending them across the Atlantic and through the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. Second, by sending them from .Marseille, France, through the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. Third, by sending them through Prance and Italy across the Ionian Sea to Patras, Corinth, and 218 The Strategy on the Western Front other Greek ports, and thence over the Greek rail- ways to Saloniea. Fourth, by sending them through France and Italy across the Adriatic to Avlona or Santi Quaranta or both, from which places paved high- ways lead to the rear of the Saloniea front. Transports could be sent in a few hours at night from southern Italian ports to these ports and thus avoid the danger of being sunk by sub- marines. 16. In connection with landing troops at Avlona and Santi Quaranta, which are now held by the Allies, it may be pointed out that it would be no un- aecomplishable task for the Italian and French navies to sweep the Adriatic and its Austrian har- bors clear of submarines, torpedo boats, and mines, preparatory to a future landing on the Dalmatian or Istrian coast; and especially so, since the Austrian fleet has, as a result of the daring exploits of Pelle- grini, Rizzo, and Aenizo of the Italian Navy, already lost two of its most powerful battleships and been forced to take shelter in an Austrian harbor. 17. Even a small force landed in Dalmatia, some- where between the Gulf of Cattaro and the Naronta River and moved thence into the interior via the Gastelnuovo-Ragusa-Serajero-Nish Railway against the roads and railways leading from the Saloniea front back to Belgrade, would, if made when the Austrians and Bulgarians were strongly pressed in front, almost certainly compel their retreat. 18. And in this connection it will not be out of Appendix A 219 place to remark that should the Allies be successful in pushing forward to Belgrade and beyond into Aus- trian territory, they would threaten the communica- tions of Fiume with Trieste and Vienna and be in position to take in rear the defenses of that gulf, while the Allied warships attacked them in front, whereupon that fine harbor could be utilized for a new base for future operations in Austria and Ger- many. REASONS WHY THE WAR CANNOT BE WON ON THE WESTERN FRONT 19. Since the plan of attacking in the Balkans, out- lined herein and in previous memoranda, is based upon the supposition that the war cannot be won by confining our efforts solely to the Western and Ital- ian fronts, I desire to give some of my reasons for so believing. 20. For more than four years the armies of the Allies and Germany have been facing each other along the lines of the Western Front ; and although the most stupendous efforts have been made again and again, involving enormous losses of life, neither side has been able to break completely through and resume a war of movement ; and the principal reason why this is so is that neither front can be turned. One flank resting on Switzerland and the other on the English Channel makes it impossible to turn the front of either army, and compels each army to con- fine its operations to attempting to break through the front of the other. But with strongly intrenched 220 The Strategy on the Western Front lines — with, so to speak, zones of intrenchments — on eaeh side, this has been found to be an impossible task, and it will most probably continue to be an im- possible task. Time and time again during the first three and a half years of the war, prior to the great German offensive begun on March 21, one side or the other made attacks by first bringing an overwhelm- ing artillery fire against a limited sector of the enemy's line and following it with great numbers of infantry trained in trench fighting; but at most no more than one or two of the intrenched lines could be captured ; the other lines in rear held, and new in- trenched lines in rear were constructed; and the situation was exactly as before, except that a few hundred yards were perhaps gained on one side and a great number of officers and men killed on both sides. As a result, neither side was any nearer vic- tory, since both sides had been weakened relatively about the same amounts; and if one side had gained a few hundred yards and captured one or two lines of the enemy's intrenchments, it had probably lost in taking the offensive a greater number of officers and men than the other side, and would probably even lose the ground gained, should the other side plan and execute a similar attack against it. 21. Then in March, 1918, the Germans made a great change in their methods of attacking. Th^ abandoned the tactics of trying to pound themselves forward by a succession of small attacks, as they had attempted to do at Verdun, and as the English had done at the battle of the Somme; and, instead, as- Appendix A 221 sembled their divisions in overwhelming force against a long sector of the enemy's line, and, gathering np all their implements and methods of destruction, moved forward on an extended front and struck the enemy's line with their utmost power. By adopting this means, and by selecting sectors of the enemy's line with few lines of intrenchments or few reserves in rear, or both, they succeeded in forcing back the enemy's line in three or four eases from ten to thirty or thirty-five miles, but in no case were they able to break completely through the line. And the reason was that in each case, as they moved forward through the enemy's intrenched lines and beyond they created a situation which made their own lines more and more vulnerable and harder and harder to defend. In other words, they created a salient. DISCUSSION OF A SALIENT 22. A salient is vulnerable; its weak points strategically are the sectors on each side of it near its base ; because an attack in force there by threatening the communications of the occupying troops, would, if successful, force their retreat. Then, too, any advantage of a central position — of interior lines — that may be possessed by troops occupying a salient, is overbalanced by the advan- tage which the enemy has of interior lines within the angular fronts on each side of the salient. To illus- trate: Let the line abode represent the front be- tween the two opposing armies. Now if on account 222 The Strategy on the Western Front French / \ French Germans of their central position the troops occupying the salient bcd have an advantage of interior lines, it must be evident that such advantage is more than counterbalanced by the advantage of interior lines possessed by the opposing troops occupying the angles or counter-salients abc and cde. But as a matter of fact, where a salient is small, or is well filled with troops, there is no strategical ad- vantage for troops occupying it; on the contrary, there is a great strategical disadvantage, first, be- cause they have a too-limited space to maneuver in; and secondly, because they are subject to a converg- ing fire from the enemy occupying the counter- salients. Troops within a salient are not infrequently so situated that long-range guns from one or the other side of it can enfilade or take them in reverse. Then, too, the numerous roads and railways within a salient, although absolutely necessary for the move- ment of men and supplies, are strategically a source of weakness to the occupying troops, principally be- cause they can be fired upon from many angles and often be enfiladed throughout long stretches by the guns of the troops occupying the counter-salients or by the guns at the nose of the salient. And the na- Appendix A 223 tare of the terrain, and direction and position of the roads within a salient, of course, influence greatly the strategical situation of the occupying troops, but these are special cases -which would call for a special analysis. Then, again, a salient is per se not only weak, but it weakens the whole front by greatly lengthening it, making it necessary, of course, to use many more troops to defend it. Thus the sides bc and cd would require more than twice the number of troops to defend them than would the base bd, which was the line of the original front. And of course when these salients are multiplied the strength of the front be- comes much weakened since its length becomes pro- portionately greatly increased. But on the other hand, it should of course be borne in mind that the weakening is not confined to one side, since the front of the opposing army is correspondingly lengthened and likewise weakened. 23. Having pointed out the weakness of a salient to the troops occupying it, mention is made of the fact that the great attacks made by the Germans in March and subsequently, created three salients, known as the Amiens, Chateau-Thierry, and Tpres salients, which placed the Germans occupying them in precarious situations and gave to their adversaries an immense strategical advantage, which General (now Marshal) Foch has been taking full advantage of since he began his great counter-offensive against the Chateau-Thierry salient on July 18. And, mainly because of this advantage, the Allies have been, and 224 The Strat egy on the Western Front still are, forcing back the Germans towards their original position, generally known as the Hindenburg Line. But it should be evident to anyone that when they are driven back to that line and the salients ironed out, much greater difficulties will be encountered in forcing the Germans still farther back; and if the Allies should be successful in forcing their way through the German line, much as the Germans were successful in their great attack towards Amiens in March, 1918, a salient would be created which would place their troops occupying it in a very vulnerable and precarious situation and give to the Germans a great strategical advantage. THE WESTERN FEONT 24. Germany's Western Front is about four hun- dred and sixty miles in length and fortified through- out with line upon line of intrenchments. Or to quote the words of a German officer spoken to a correspond- ent of the Saturday Evening Post six months before the United States came into the war : ' ' The line of the "Western Front is a powerful un- broken fortress. The enemy has persistently been dashing himself to pieces against this fortress for many months. He accomplishes nothing. Here and there he overruns an out- work, a detail of the fortress ; but he never breaks into the stronghold itself, and no matter how brilliant his work or how costly his ven- ture he always finds himself confronted with the neces- sity of starting his task all over again Appendix A 225 ' ' The enemy will never break through the Western Front. This front is impregnable. It is defended by twenty-four complete lines of intrenchments and field works. The reduction of each one of these lines means an exhaustive campaign in itselE — twenty-four blood- drenched campaigns before the line of the Rhine is reached. And, first, at the Rhine the real work of defeating Germany must begin. Meantime we shall have a number of years in which to continue strength- ening, improving, and multiplying the Rhine de- fenses. To win in the west it must cost our enemy his last man and his last shell." 25. Let us now consider for a moment the strong natural defensive positions of this theater of war. First, there is the line of the Aisne, or the Hinden- burg Line ; and back of it the line of the Meuse ; and back of it the Moselle River and the fortification of •Metz; and then come the great river Rhine and the fortress of Strassburg; and on the east bank of the Rhine extending from Switzerland almost to Karls- ruhe are the Black Forest Mountains which from the days of Caesar have been considered a most formid- able obstacle for armies attempting to move through them from west to east. These are aU strong natural positions, but the Rhine and Black Forest Mountains are more than that, they are formidable obstacles, and would be impassable if defended by adequate mili- tary forces as they most certainly will be should the Allied armies ever reach them. 26. " Of all the operations of war," says Jomini, " there is none more hazardous and difficult than the 226 The Strategy on the Western Front passage of a large river in the face of an enemy." Now, when it is remembered that the passage, or at- tempted passage, of the Rhine in this case would be in the face of an enemy comprising a nation in arms, and not in the face of an enemy few in numbers as were the armies in Jomini's and Napoleon's day; and when it is remembered that the bridges of the Rhine are srtrongly protected by bridgeheads and field worlra, and that two railways paralleling the river and many others near the German frontier have been constructed solely with reference to battle lines, permitting quick concentration of troops on any front of the Rhine or German frontier, one is appalled by the veiy magni- tude of the task and cannot but feel that its accom- plishment, under present conditions, would be an im- possibility — a task beyond human power. In view of all these facts it is submitted that there is no chance of the Allies winning the war solely on the Western Front THE AUSTRIAN AND ITALIAN FRONT 27. And much of what has; been said as to the im- pregnability of the "Western Front against an Allied attack is true of the Austrian front as it existed prior to the Italian Army's being driven back to the line of the Piave. The Austrian front was strong because it virtually extended along a chain of mountains throughout its whole length and its flanks could not be turned. But the Italian front was very weak strategically, because of its great length comparative- ly with respect to the amount of territory it defended Appendix A 227 in Northeastern Italy, because it extended into Aus- trian ^territory mucli like a great salient, except that its contour was circular in form, and because the Austriana occupied the Trentino in force ofi the flank of and close to the Italian lines of communioation. In this weak position, even had the Italians been strongly reinforced, they would not, in my opinion, have been able to hold their position against a power- ful German-Austrian attack. And strategically they were not justified in acting offensively along the Julian Alps for the purpose of capturing Trieste and carrying the war into Austria until they had first driven the Austrians from the Trentino and got pos- session of the Camic Alps and valley of the Drave. 28. It will be remembered that when Bonaparte drove the Archduke Charles through the Julian Alps back towards Vienna in his remarkable first Italian campaign in March and April, 1797,^ that he gave General Joubert a powerful army to drive back the Austrians in the Trentino and himself made no effort to cross the mountains until he had made sure of Joubert's success. Then he crossed, and Joubert hav- ing practically annihilated the Austrians in his front joined Bonaparte via the valley of the Drave. And it wiU be remembered also that as a further precaution to protect his rear as he advanced into Austria, he left generals Victor and Kilmaine in Italy with eighteen thousand soldiers, which was a power- ful army in those days, being more than one quarter of Bonaparte's entire strength. 29. Now since the Italian line has been forced back 228 The Strategy on the Western Front to the Piave, it has become very much easier to de- fend ; because it is very much shorter, because it oc- cupies a strong defensive position through mountains and hills and along the Piave ; because its two flanks are protected by formidable obstacles; and because it is in a much safer position for the protection of its line of communications from an Austrian thrust from the Trentino. 30. But from its present position there is no op- portunity whatever for a successful offensive against the Austrians, because the farther eastward the Aus- trian line is forced by the Italian Army, the more exposed and vulperable become the Italian communi- cations to an Austrian attack from the Trentino. And this, by the way, is the main reason why the Italians in their recent great victory against the Austrians on the Piave did not follow up the Austrians and force them farther and farther back towards their frontier. 31. The fact of the matter is that, so long as the Austrians hold the Trentino in force, there is no hope of making a successful offensive campaign in Italy and of driving the Austrians back into their own ter- ritory. And under modem conditions the Austrian troops in the Trentino cannot be forced back and driven out of that mountainous district ; for there are so many fine defensive portions and the roads and trails are so few and narrow that the counti\y is very easily defended. Indeed, when properly held by suf- ficient troops, the whole of the Trentino becomes virtually an impregnable fortress. Appendix A 229 32. It must be evident to anyone that had the great armies that have been facing each other for more than four years along the Western Front not had their flanks protected by Switzerland at one end and by Holland at the other, one or the other army would long ago have flanked or turned the other out of posi- tion, and one or the other long ago have been deci- sively defeated. But in the Balkans or in the plains of Austria where the flanks could not rest on neutral countries or impassable obstacles the opposing armies would not face each other long without one or the other being defeated. And an Allied victory there would mean something worth while, since it would probably lead to severing the enemy's communica- tions and to capturing his army. 33. If to the above line of reasoning, the reply be made that it was Napoleon's rule never to invade a country along but a single line of operations, and that we should confine our efforts to the Western Front rather than seek another line of operations, the answer is that we are not invading Germany along this line of operations ; there is no invasion ; for more than four years we have made no material advance towards Germany ; indeed we have not even held our ovra on the Western Front, for just now, August 26, we are still west of the Hindenburg Line. Evidently Napoleon's rule does not apply here. But since this long and strongly intrenched line, extending from Switzerland to the English Channel, is in fact noth- ing less than an immense, long fortress, as is also the Italian front. Napoleon's rule as to fortresses does 230 The Strategy on the Western Front apply, namely, not to allow them to stop one in his movements, but to leave sufficient containing forces to hold them, and to seek out and bring the enemy's army to battle in the open field of the theater of oper- ations. Why should an American army waste its en- ergy, its substance, and its blood in attacking prac- tically impregnable fortresses, when the same army properly directed against a more vulnerable point of the enemy's forces, would with the same expenditure of energy, substance, and blood most probably be vic- torious? It is not that we want to win the war with- out losses, for we do not; we know that cannot be done; but we want to win it with as few losses as possible and we want our losses to produce results. 34. As to the plan herein outlined, the question will of course be asked : What, if any, assurance have we that if we should undertake a campaign from the Saloniea front that the Central Powers would not be able to stop our advance, entrench against us, and hold us stationary as they have done on the Western Jfl-ont and on the Piave in Italy ? The answer is, that in this war, fighting has resulted almost solely in en- trenched warfare only where the flanks of both armies rest on neutral countries or on impassable obstacles, and that neither in the Balkans nor in Austria is it likely that either of these conditions would prevail. As proof of this statement, attention is invited to the campaigns of this war. In the campaigns between the Germans and Russians or between the Russians and Austrians in the great plains or extended moun- tain regions of Eastern Germany, Russia, and Aus- Appendix A 231 tria, where the flanks of the opposing armies were not protected, war of movement has invariably resulted. It was so also in Eoumania and Serbia. And it was so even in Italy, until the Italian Army was driven back to the line of the Piave, where both flanks rest on formidable, if not impassable obstacles. But as to Italy it is well to note, in passing, that a war of move- ment is still likely to come to pass for the Austrians and Germans should they debouch in force from the west side of Lake Garda upon the communications of the Italian Army. 35. Consider for a moment the Salonica front as it exists today. One flank rests on the Adriatic, the other on the Aegean Sea. But while these two seas, since they are controlled by the Allied navies, would prevent the turning of either Allied flank by the Aus- trians and Bulgarians, they would, for that very rea- son, facilitate the turning of the flanks of the Aus- trians and Bulgarians by the Allies. They are ob- stacles only to the Austrians and Bulgarians. Hav- ing command of these waters, the Allies could at their convenience land an expedition in Albania or Bul- garia to reinforce their own armies or to turn the flank of the Austrians and Bulgarians. 36. To confine our operations solely to the Western and Italian fronts means that the war will drag along indefinitely ; it means an interminable contest in which billions of dollars will be spent and millions of lives be lost. Why should we limit ourselves to the accom- plishment of these impossible tasks? Why should we needlessly sacrifice the lives of our bravest and 232 The Strategy on the Western Front best in trying to break through, these practically im- pregnable lines of the Western and Italian fronts when both the strategy and common sense of the sit- uation clearly point to the plan that we should fol- low, namely : To hold the "Western and Italian fronts with a sufficient containing force to keep the Central Powers from breaking through them, then to direct our efforts into the Balkans and strike Germany through Serbia and Austria — strike her through her back door where she is most vulnerable — strike her not on her strongest but on her weakest front — strike her where a victory will cut in two the theater of operations of the Central Powers and destroy forever Germany's dream of dominion from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf. APPENDIX B Why the Salonica Army Was Powerless^ By GORDON 60ED0N-SMITH [Captain of the Eoyal Serbian Army and AttachS of the Serbian Legation at Washington] Acting as war correspondent for London and New York newspapers, Captain Gordon-Smith was with the Serbian Headquarters Staff in 1915 from the at- tack on Belgrade to the final retreat through Albania. In July, 1916, at the request of M. Pashitch, he re- turned to the Serbian headquarters at Salonica and was with the staff of three Serbian armies up to the fall of Monastir. Toward the end of the war he be- came attached to the Serbian Headquarters Staff with the rank of Captadn of Cavalry and has since been sent on important diplomatic missions to Paris, Lon- don, and Washington. He has here written for "Cur- rent History " the inside facts as to why Sarr ail's army of half a mdUion men stood practically idle until the last months of the war. DUEINGr the "World War just terminated, with its clash of peoples on a score of fronts, it was difficult for the public to follow the various phases and realize their relative importance. Military tac- tics and strategy were often divorced from policy, with the result that the co-ordinatiop of the effort 1 From the Current Eistory Magazine, October, 1919 ; pub- lished by the New York Times Company. 233 234 The Strategy on the Western Front suffered and the war, instead of being waged by the Allies as a whole on a well-defined plan, was split up into a series of water-tight compartments, each of which was regarded by those fighting in it as the crucial one for the decision of the whole war. Some fronts were given undue prominence, others excited little or no interest. An example of the latter was the Saloniea front. The Army of the Orient was the Cinderella of the Allies, as far as treatment was concerned. This front was, in certain quarters, regarded as one of merely secondary importance. The Army of the Orient, under the command of General Sarrail, was considered to have the mission of holding the line from Monastir to the Aegean, so as to exercise pres- sure on the German, Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turk- ish forces defending it, immobilize them, and prevent their utilization elsewhere. But there was no inten- tion of so reinforcing the Allied Army as to permit of its undertaking an energetic offensive and, couie que coute, cutting the Berlin-Constantinople Rail- way. This was, however, a completely false conception of the mission of the Army of the Orient. The Salo- niea front was not one of secondary importance; it was a front of capital importance. On no other front would such immense and far-reaching effects have resulted from a successful offensive. In stating this I am not expressing a merely per- sonal opinion. During the eighteen months I spent with the Headquarters Staff of the Serbian Army I Appendix B 235 had continual opportunity of discussing with ofScers of the highest rank the importance of the whole Bal- kan front, and in the ten months I passed on the Salonica front, of discussing the real mission of the Army of the Orient. I found them unanimous in their opinion as to the importance of the operations in Macedonia. IMPORTANCE OF EAILWAY In their opinion, the objective of the Army of the Orient was the cutting of the Berlin-Constantinople Railway. It was notorious that Germany drew im- mense resources from Asia Minor, and that Bulgaria and Serbia were also laid under contributions. A swarm of German officials had been sent down to these countries, which had been cut up into sections like a chess board, and were swept clean of every- thing that could be made use of. All day and every day trains filled with food were rolling up to Ger- many from the Balkan States and Asia Minor, while the trains traveling from Germany to Constantiaople were filled with munitions, without which the re- sistance of Turkey to the British and Russian armies would at once have collapsed. livi; The possession of the Berlin-Constantinople Rail- road further assured the Central Powers the mastery of the Dardanelles. As Germany controlled the en- trances to the Baltic, Russia was practically isolated from her allies. The only means they had of for- warding war material to her was via Vladivostok or Archangel. In other words " Mittel-Europa '' was 236 The Strategy on the Western Front realized and a situation created which., if it could have been made permanent, would have assured to Germany the domination of Europe, the first step to world dominion. There is not the slightest doubt that the cutting of the railway would have brought about the imme- diate collapse of Turkey. This would have meant the reopening of the Dardenelles, the reproAdsioning of Russia, then still in the field, with munitions, of which she was sorely in need, and the delivery to the Allies of the immense quantities of foodstuffs accu- mulated in Southern Russia after the closing of the strait. At the same time the collapse of Turkey as a military power would have set free the British armies in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Palestine and the Rus- sian Army in the Caucasus for service elsewhere. BLUNDER OP THE ALLIES The appearance of the Allied fleets in the Black Sea would undoubtedly have called a halt to the in- trigues of the Pro-German court camarilla surround- ing the Czar, and even if the Russian revolution had nevertheless taken place, the Kerensky army on the Polish front, as a " force in being," would have been maintained, Bolshevism would have been nipped in the bud, and the whole course of the war might have been changed. The failure to recognize these elemen- tary truths consttitutes the second capital error of the Allies in the Balkans and undoubtedly prolonged the war by at least two years. Once Bulgaria and Turkey were disposed of, the Appendix B 237 Army of the Orient could have reoccupied Serbia, moved on the Danube, and threatened Budapest. The Hungarian capital would then have been menaced from three sides — from the Danube, from the Rou- manian front, and by the Russian Army then operat- ing in the Bukowina. The country around Budapest being one immense plain, on which there are no for- tresses of any importance, the defense of the capital would have called for an immense number of men, which Austria at that moment did not possess. The chief arguments of the opponents of the Salo- nica front were : (1) The excessive demands it made on tonnage, (2) the difficulties of communication, and (3) the mountainous nature of the country. The excessive demands made on tonnage for the transport of troops and war material was due to the failure of the Allies to utilize all the means of trans- port at their disposal. For eighteen long months they only made use of the sea route. As a transport steaming at ten knots (the speed imposed on it by the scarcity of coal) took ten days to make the voyage from Marseille to Salonica, a ship could only de- liver one cargo per month. At the same time the Mediterranean and the Aegean were swarming with submarines, and a large proportion of the transports were sunk. It was only in December, 1917, that someone in the War Office in London perceived that if troops and stores were forwarded by land to , Tar- anto in the south of Italy they could be shipped over to Greece in a single night, thus avoiding the sub- marine danger. One ship going backward and. for- 238 The Strategy on the Western Front ward between Italy and the Greek ports could there- fore do the work of ten running from Marseille to Salanica. MARVELS IN ROAD BUILDING As soon as this was realized, a clause giving the Allies the right to disembark troops and stores at Itea, the Greek railhead in the Gulf of Lepanto, whence they could be forwarded by rail to Salonica, was inserted in one of the many ultimata sent to .King Constantine. The Italians also constructed a " route earossable " from Santi Quaranta to Mona- stir, a marvel of military engineering, by which they were able to send thousands of tons a day of war material by motor truck. As regards the second difficulty — the means of communication in Macedonia itself — an immense im- provement had been made. When the expeditionary force first landed, in 1915, there were only three lines of railway — and those single track — and such roads as had existed under the Turkish regime. But the three hundred thousand men composing General Sar- rail's force, reinforced by thousands of Macedonian peasants, in less than a year and a half constructed thousands of kilometers of roads and hundreds of kilo- meters of light railways. Mountains on which a year before only sheep tracks existed were made accessible to heavy guns. An immense amount of motor transport was accumu- lated,' and hundreds of thousands of pack animals were at the disposal of the Allied Army. The army of Appendix B 239 General Sarrail was, therefore, if reinforced^in' a, position to undertake a successful offensive. The Serbian advanced lines were in January, 1917, only a matter of eighty miles from Nish, one of the principal stations of the Berlin-Constantinople Rail- way. The third objection — the mountainous nature of the country — was greatly exaggerated. It did not offer any insuperable obstacle to military operations. The brilliant campaign of Field Marshal Misitch, which culminated in the capture of Monastir, is a proof of this. He attacked, with inferior numbers, an enemy intrenched in most formidable mountain strongholds and drove them from one position after another. In fact, the superior skill of the Serbians in mountain fighting gave them a distinct advantage over the Germans in a country like the Balkans. Their knowledge of the country enabled them to seize advantages to outmaneuver an enemy who was not accustomed to that kind of warfare. It may further be argued that in no country has there ever been so much fighting as in the Balkans. The mountainous nature of the country did not prevent the states composing the Balkan League from inflicting in 1912 a crushing defeat on Turkey ; neither did it prevent the German-Austrian-Bulga- rian armies in 1915 from driving the Serbian Army into Albania. On that occasion two hundred and fifty thousand Serbs resisted the invasion of seven hundred and fifty thousand Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians for over two months. The fact that they 240 The Strategy on the Western Front were able to do so is only attributable to their su- perior skill in this kind of warfare. salonica's naval value The Salonica front had not only immense military importance, but its naval value could hardly be over- estimated — by this I mean its naval value for the enemy. If, by any chance, the Germans and their allies had driven the Army of the Orient out of Salo- nica and seized the city and bay, the effect would have been simply catastrophic. The port of Salonica is one of the most magnificent in the world ; a land-locked harbor miles in extent, in which the navies of the world could lie at anchor. If this had fallen into the hands of the Germans they would at once have formed it into a submarine base of the most formidable kind. Then would have fol- lowed the invasion of Greece. Qnce the Germans were in firm possession of that country, they would have established other submarine bases in the rocky and indented coast line of Greece and in the hun- dreds of islands forming the Archipelago. Once they were firmly established there, the task of driving them out would have been one of superhuman difS- culty. The result would have been that hundreds of sub- marines and submarine mine layers would have been let loose in the Aegean and the Mediterranean. It would have been perfectly possible for them to stop all traffic by the Suez Canal, thereby cutting Great Britain off from direct communication with India, and Appendix B 241 depriving the large British Army holding Egypt from receiving supplies and munitions. The attack by the Turks on the Suez Canal would then undoubtedly have been resumed, as the difficulty of providing the army defending Egypt with munitions would have rendered the chances of success more than probable. In these circumstances, the Suez Canal being put out of commission, the Germans would have left no stone unturned to bring about trouble in British India. That this was their program is proved by the prose- cution of Hindu conspirators held in 1917 in San Francisco. With the Suez Canal cut, the only means of communication between Great Britain and India would have been the long and difficult voyage via the Cape of Good Hope. It was, therefore, for the Allies a life-and-death question not only to maintain themselves in force on the Salonica front, but it was also of the highest im- portance that this front should be so reinforced as to allow the Army of the Orient to take an energetic of- fensive and cut the Berlin-Constantinople line. There was, iu addition, the danger that the Eussian collapse might any day set free some hundreds of thousands of German troops for service in the Bal- kans. There is no doubt that the Great General Staff at Berlin was thoroughly alive to the immense results which would follow from successful operations at Salonica ; in fact, the loss of Salonica would be irrep- arable. Once Germany was master of the Aegean and the Mediterranean, victory for her would be in sight. That the Great General Staff did not under- 242 The Strategy on the Western Front take operations only proves how hard pressed it was on other fronts. This renders the failure of the Allies to realize their opportunity all the more inex- cusable. ERROR IN BRITISH ATTITUDE On the Saloniea front the only possible policy was, therefore, an energetic offensive. But in certain British circles it was argued that this front could per- fectly weU fulfill its mission by simply defending the intrenched camp of Saloniea. . This, supported by the guns of the fleet, was, they declared, impregnable. There could be no greater error. Any abandon- ment of the line running from the Albanian frontier across the plain of Monastir and along the Moglene Mountain range to Lake Doiran and the Struma Val- ley would have been disastrous. It would have per- mitted the German troops and their allies to seize Greece and threaten Saloniea both by land and sea. Once masters of Greece, Germany would have had little difficulty in rendering the access to Saloniea by sea or land either impossible or a matter of extreme difficulty. The intrenched camp could have been closely in- vested until such time as the Germans and their al- lies had established themselves solidly in Greece and Greek Macedonia and concentrated overwhelmingly superior forces for an attack. With the Aegean Sea swarming with hostile submarines, the position of the force defending the intrenched camp would have been precarious in the extreme. The prize was too Appendix B 243 great for the Germans not to put forward every effort to win it. Such a policy would have cut off all communica- tion between the Italian force in Albania and the Army of the Orient. Shortly after the capture of Monastir the Uaison was successfully established be- tween the Italian Army of occupation in Albania and the forces of General Sarrail, so that the fighting line was continuous from Avlona on the Adriatic to the Gulf of Gavalla on the Aegean. The successful ex- pulsion of the Germans and Bulgarians from Greek Macedonia entailed ten months of hard fighting and cost the Army of the Orient forty thousand men. Its abandonment would have meant the loss of thousands of kilometers of roads and hundreds of kilometers of light railways constructed at a cost of millions of dollars. In addition, the unfortunate population would have been delivered over to the tender mercies of a ruthless and cruel enemy. No more suicidal policy could therefore have been imagined than any abandonment of the conquered territory by the Allies, and the idea of confining the task of the Army of the Orient to the defense of the intrenched camp was, in the opinion of all competent authorities on the spot with whom I discussed the question, strategically and tactically unsound. ABMT OF FIVE I-ITTNDRED THOUSAND PAEALTZED The result of this failure of the Allies to realize the importance of the Salonica front (or perhaps it would be more correct to say their divided opinions 244 The Strategy on the Western Front in regard to it) paralyzed the action of an army of five hundred thousand men. This was more than was required for the mere defense of the intrenched camp of Salonica and not sufficient to undertake an offen- sive. Every time the Army of the Orient undertook a successful operation it was unable to follow it up for want of men. The capture of Fiorina by the French and Serbs on September 18, 1916, was a case in point. The Bul- garians retired with such precipitation that little would have been required to turn their retreat into a rout. But the necessary reserves for this were lacking, with the result that instead of being driven back in confusion to Prilep and Veles the Bulgarians were able to reform their fleeing regiments, " dig them- selves in " a few miles farther back and again arrest the operations of the Allied Army.^ A few weeks later came the second offensive, the brilliant campaign of the army under the command of Field Marshal Misitch, which resulted in the cap- ture of Monastir. But as before he possessed no re- serves, he was unable to follow up his victory with the result that the retreating enemy once more were able to intrench themselves in formidable. mountain positions. And during all this time the Army of the Orient was melting away as the result of the ravages of malaria. The armies sweltering on the plains fell victim to it by tens of thousands. At one time there were not enough hospital ships to repatriate the sick. 1 With sufficient reserves the beginning of the end of the war would probably have come at this time. — H. H. S. Appendix B 245 PRANCE FOE ACTION When the position of the Army of the Orient had thus been reduced to one of stalemate I had, in the early months of 1917, occasion to visit Paris and Lon- don and made it my business to find out the views of the French and British statesmen regarding the Salo- nica front. In Paris I had long conversations with M. Briand, then Prime Minister ; M. Stephen Piehon, the present Minister of Foreign Affairs; General Malleterre, the famous French military writer; M. Humbert, member of the Commission of the Senate on Military Affairs; Colonel Rousset, the eminent military critic of the PetU Parisien, and a score or so of other well-known public men and soldiers. I also had long conversations with M. Sevasto- poula, Counselor of the Russian Embassy, and Colonel Count Ignatieff, the Russian member of the Inter-Allied Military Council. I found that they completely shared the views of their French allies. The latter were unanimously in favor of an energetic offensive on the Salonica front and deplored the short- sightedness of the British military authorities. When I spoke with M. Briand and urged the im- portance of the Salonica front he replied to me: " My dear M. Gordon-Smith, you are preaching to the con- verted. It was I who sent the Army of the Orient to -Salonica and who have kept it there. If you see Lloyd George in London tell him from me that M. Briand is more convinced than' ever of the strategical and political importance of the Salonica front." 246 The Strategy on the Western Front BEITISH FOK WITHDRAWAL A week later I was in London and found myself face to face with a stone wall. The public knew noth- ing about Salonica and cared less. The Daily Mad had, on January 18, published an article proposing purely and simply to withdraw the whole army from Salonica, a repetition of Gallipoli. The impression made in Paris by this article was disastrous, so much so that the censor "got busy" and issued a stern warn- ing to the press to abstain from discussing the situa- tion in Salonica. The military censorship would allow no discussion of the situation in the Balkans. All the correspond- ents of London journals had been expelled from Salonica with the exception of Ward Price, corre- spondent of the Newspaper Proprietors' Association, (a syndicate of the London Journals,) and Mr. Fer- guson of Reuter's Agency. As all their dispatches were strictly censored first in Salonica and a second time in London, no news of any importance was al- lowed to transpire and the word Salonica had prac- tically disappeared from the columns of the London press. It was openly declared that it was on the Western Front alone that the war would be decided and no discussion of this theory was permitted. The only public man who seemed to have under- stood the importance of the Salonica front was John Dillon, the leader of the Irish Party in the House of Commons. He delivered an admirable speech on the subject in the House, but so rigid was the " taboo " Appendix B 247 on everything concerning Salonica that the only publication which had the courage to publish it was the New Europe. It was notorious that General Sir William Robert- son, Chief of the Imperial Staff, and all the men sur- rounding him were out-and-out "westerners" and refused to listen to any proposals to undertake any offensive elsewhere. As a result the Army of the Orient, its ranks ravaged by malaria due to its fail- ure to advance out of the swampy plains surround- ing Salonica, was melting away uselessly in complete inaction.^ It was an open secret that in England the military party had completely got the upper hand and had seized not only the military but also the political conduct of the war. The War Office and the Foreign Office were often in conflict. The Imperial General Staff turned a deaf ear to all counsels which did not square with their particular views. It was at this moment that I had a number of con- versations with Lord Northcliffe. I found him strongly imbued with ' ' western ' ' ideas, but I so far shook his confidence in the infallibility of the " west- em " theory that he gave me permission to state the case for Salonica in a letter addressed to the editor of the Times. This I did in terms of extreme moder- ation, but was informed a day or two later that it had been suppressed by the censor from the first line to the last and returned to the Timss with the order " Not to be published " stamped on every page. 1 NotMngr is more discouraging to soldiers than forced in- action in the presence of an enemy. — H, H. S. 248 The Strategy on the Western Front UNIFIED COMMAND WINS It was only after weeks and weeks of sapping and mining that the civil power was able to assert itself once more. Lloyd George planned in secret the or- ganization of the Supreme War Council in Versailles. When its creation was intimated to General Sir Wil- liam Robertson he at once in protest tendered his resignation as chief of the Imperial General Staff, which, probably much to his surprise, was promptly accepted. Colonel Rapington, the military critic of the Times, also an out-and-out " westerner " to whom the Salonica front was anathema, rushed to the assistance of his chief with such a want of modera- tion of language that he was promptly haled before the courts and fined £100 under the Defense of the Realm act. Then General Maurice, Director of Operations, issued the manifesto which cost him his position. A number of subordinates, known to be out-and-out "westerners," were removed, and the power of the Imperial General Staff to impose its will on the statesmen was at an end. Lloyd George tri- umphed and General Foch was intrusted with the supreme direction of the war. OFFENSIVE BEGUN AT LAST The result was a complete change of policy and strategy in the Balkans. General Sarrail was re- called and replaced by General GuiUaumat, one of the most brilliant commandera from the Western Front. As soon as he had the Army of the Grient reorganized and reinforced, General Franchet d'Es- Appendix B 249 perey, the commander of the Fifth French Army- Group, was sent out to take command at Salonica and an energetic offensive was at once begun. As before, the chief attack was intrusted to the Ser- bian contingent of the Army of the Orient. It at- tacked with splendid elan the Bulgarian intrench- ments on the Dobra Polie, drove in their center, and then rolled the opposing army up right and left. Through the breach thus made poured the French and British contingents; the retreat became a rout, and in five days' time the army of King Ferdinand capitulated. The Serbs continued their triumphant advance, the Berlin-Constantinople Railway was seized and the Danube front reached. In a fortnight's time Tur- key collapsed, the Dardanelles were opened and the Allied fleets entered the Black Sea. Austria saw the game was up and sued for peace. The German Em- pire was therefore menaced from the rear. Field Marshal von Hindenburg saw that under these cir- cumstances nothing could save the situation and begged for an armistice. Thus the war which began in the Balkans, for the Balkans, ended in the Balkans. That this would be the inevitable result of an ener- getic offensive had long been clear to everyone on the spot, but unfortunately the voices of those who advocated it had long been the " voices of those cry- ing in the wilderness." It is only when the histo- rian begins a detailed study of the "World "War in all its phases that the astonishing errors of the Entente in its Near Eastern policy will become apparent. BIBLIOGRAPHY This is a list of books, magazines, and reports which the author has read, either in whole or in part, in connection with the writing of this book. It is not in- tended to be a bibliography of the war; that would require many pages, and would include hundreds of books, many of which are of little value. Atteridge, Captain A. H. The World-wide War. G. Philips & Son, Ltd., London, 1915. Ayres, Colonel Leonard P. The War with Germcmy; A Statistical Summary. U. S. War Department. Baker, Newton D., Secretary of War. Annmil Report, 1918. Beck, J. M. The War and Ewnamity. G. P. Put- nam's Sons. Blowitz, M. de, Memoirs of. Doubleday, Page & Company. Bracq, J. C. The Provocation of France. Oxford University) Press. Buchan, John. Nelson's History of the War (24 volumes). Thomas Nelson & Sons, London, Edin- burgh, and New York. Burnod, General. Napoleon's Maxims of War. Hud- son Kimberly Publishing Co. (Translated by Lieu- tenant-General Sir G. C. d'Aguilar, C. B. David McKay, 1917.) Cheradame, Andre. Pan-Germany: The Disease and Cure, and a Plan for the Allies. The Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston. 251 252 Bibliography Cheradame, Andre. The Essentials of an Endwring Victory. Charles Seribner's Sons. Cheradame, Andre. The Pan-German Plot Unmasked. Charles Seribner's Sons. Cheradame, Andre. The United States and Pan- Germania. Charles Seribner's Sons. Current History Magazine, October, 1919. Davis, W. S. The Boots of the War. The Century Co. De Chambrun and De Marenches. The American Army in the Europ