■' ' ■ ' <,isl f\ Cornell University Library , . g K 623.B78 1874 ^ Introduction to the study and use 3 1924 021 235 928 VALUABLE LAW WORKS PUBLISHED BT STEVENS AND SO \ (LATE STEVENS AND NOETOJST), 119, CHANCEEY LANE, LO:^DO¥, W.C. Wharton's Law Lexicon, or Dictionary; of Jiirisprudence, explaining the Technical Words and Phrases employed 'by the se4ra] Departments of English Law, including the various legal terms used in oommercal business ; with an explanatory as well as literal Translation of the Latin MaxiiJs contained in the writings of the ancient and modern Commentator^. Sixth ifiition Eevised in accordance with the Judicatdee Acts, by J. SHIRBSS WILL, *£ the Middle Temple, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Super-royal Suo. 1876, Price£2 2s.ploih. Dart's Vendors and Purchasers.— A Treatise on the Law and Practice relating to Tenders and Purchasers of Real Estate. By J. HENRY DABT, of Lincoln's Inn, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, one of the Six Conveyancing Counsel of the High Court of Chancery. Fifti, Edition. By the AUTHOR and WILLIAM BARBER, of Lincoln's Inn, Esq., Bamster-at-Law. 2 vols. Royal &vo. 1876. Price £3 13s. 6d. doth. Pollock's Principles of Contract at Law and in Equity; being a Treatise on the General Principles relating, to the Validity of Agreements, with a special view to the comparison of Law and Equity ; and with references to the Indian Contract Act, and occasionally to American and Foreign i.aw. By FREDERICK POLLOCK, of Lincohi's Inn, Esq.,' B»irister-at-Law. 8vo. 1876. Price £1 4s. cloth. Browne's (G.) Principles and Practice of the Court for Divorce, &c. Third Edition. By GEORGE BROFV^NE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Svo. 1876. Price £1 4s. cloth. Leeming and Cross's General and Quarter Sessions of the Peace. — Their Jurisdiction in other than Criminal matters. 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'■^ ■«pfilH?SP;'^ ^ r=l-«is: i " " T ^ ' ^ ^ ^ rr" QJnrttpll ffiam ^rljnnl Sjibtaty "Wilson's Notes ar a CoMPL Temple, V A Large P notes), ii "Mr Wi the referer very cart-fi ness, and 1 titionevB o' — Solicitor " We ha^ will inaiut it deala."- *'Mr. Wii "which we ! there is a i " Mr. Ar( Kules of I Magazine, '• Aa Mrj to speak I and time i Clowes' Judicata CLOWI with the and Enl *** The abov: Kulea is£ lecuther. The Lely anc containi a Pkaci Esqrs., ] Stephen's dated. | f Her MajB'styTCounsel. I'ZTtui. 1875. rnceis. Gd. cloth. Leys' Complete Time Table to the Eules under the Judi- cature Act, 1875. Showing all the periods fixed by the Kules within or after which any proceedings may be taken. By J. K. LEYS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Royal 8to, 1876. Price Is. M. sewed. Morris' Solicitors' Fees and Court Fees under the Judica- ture Acts. With a Copious Index. By "W. MOEfiltf, Solicitor. Royal 12mo. 1876. Price 4s. cloth. Addison on Contracts.— Being a Treatise on the Law of Contracts. 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Digitized by Microsoft® This book was digitized by Microsoft Corporation in cooperation witli Cornell University Libraries, 2007. You may use and print this copy in limited quantity for your personal purposes, but may not distribute or provide access to it (or modified or partial versions of it) for revenue-generating or other commercial purposes. Digitized by Microsoft® INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEM CIVIL LAW. SIR GEOEGE BOWYER, Baronet, M.P., D.C.L., APTHOB OF "commentaries OH THE OONSTITIJTIONAL LAW OP ENGLAND," " C0MMENTAEIS3 ON UNIVERSAL PUBLIC LAW," " READINSS BEFORE THE HONOURABLE SOCIETY OF THE MIBBLB TEMPLE," &C. LONDON : STEVENS AND SONS, 119, CHANCERY LANE, fata ^eohsclltrs anb Jnblis^trs. 1874. \- Digitized by Microsoft® ^/ 3/ fr ^ Cornell UNlVERSITYi UBRARVx/ LONDON : BRADBURY, AGNEW, h CO., PKINTERS, WHITEFRIARS. Digitized by Microsoft® TO THE EIGHT HONOUEABLE THE LORD CAIUNS, LOED HIGH CHANCELLOE OF GEEAT BEITAIN, ETC., ETC., ETC. Digitized by Microsoft® Digitized by Microsoft® INTEODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND USE OF THE CIYIL LAWS, AND TO COMMENTAEIES ON THE MODEM CIVIL LAWS. Since the publication of these Commentaries, the study and cultivation of the Civil Law, and of what is termed Jurisprudence, have increased in this country; and that development of legal studies suggests important matters for mature consideration. While English lawyers and judges confined themselves to the vias antiquas of their own law, feebly assisted from European sources, writers could only compile text-books, which were little more than statements of Acts of Parliament and cases, and legal science was restricted within the narrow bounds of practice. The creation of lectureships of Civil Law and Jurisprudence in the Inns of Court has opened a wider view of education, of study and of knowledge. The old institution of Readers was no doubt derived from the universities, and through them from Irnerius and the school of Bologna. But the readings were always of the most narrow, technical, and municipal description, and they had fallen for some time into complete decay. To Blackstone is due the high honour of suggesting a more liberal view of legal cultivation. His commentaries are to be ascribed, not to the Inns of Court, but to the University of Oxford, where the traditional recollection of Vacarius, and the degree of Doctor, kept alive the idea of academic cultiva- tion of Law and of the Roman Civil Law, though deprived of its younger sister the Canon Law, which is universally acknowledged by the learned to be a valuable part of the science of law. That Digitized by Microsoft® 2 INTRODUCTION TO THE idea has been revived in the Inns of Court by the institution of lecturers. But it may be questioned whether that revival has been as useful and as fruitful as it ought to have been. This subject well deserves examination. The Civil Law may be looked upon in two different aspects, which must be distinguished one from the other, with reference to the mode of studying and cultivating it, and the various uses to be derived therefrom. The Civil Law, in its positive and historical aspect, is the body of laws of the greatest European nation of antiquity, whose history, language, literature, and institutions, legal and political, are the causes of a multitude of things which exist in modern Europe, and necessary or useful for their full comprehension. Many things in the writings of the ancients are unintelligible without the study of the antiquities of the Roman Law. The fable of the discovery of the Pandects at Amalphi has been exploded, and Savigni has shown, in his History of the Roman Law in the Middle Ages, what an immense power and influence it had over the origin and formation of institutions, municipal, political, and judicial, of modern Europe. Even the feudal system of Europe cannot be understood without the Roman Law, as any one must see who looks into the Liber Feudorum, or ihe JDigressio de Feudis, of Voet.* The Roman Law is a necessary part of the general history of legislation, that is to say, the laws by- which successive generations have been governed, and the relations and affairs of mankind, both public and private, regulated. For this use of the Roman Law a profound study of texts is required, and the investigation of knowledge, historical, antiquarian, and literary, whereby the meaning, objects, and spirit of particular laws may be discovered, and ancient institutions and usages explained. Such is the method of the modern German historical school. It has its own value, which must not be under- rated ; but its results comprise much which, like a dead language, is of no utility for the business and interests of mankind in the present day. In this method the moral reasons, the truth and justice of the principles on which each law is based, and on which the connexion of the laws with each other depends, are secondary to the consideration ol' the law as a positive system established to govern a particular ancient people, the reasons and the spirit of which are to " Yoet ad Pandectas, lib. xxxviii. Digressio de Feudis. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 3 be sought in the history, usages, and institutions of that people. An example from the English Law will make this distinction clear. The historical ground of the law of mortmain is, not that for a large quantity of land to be withdrawn from commerce, and the common uses and changes of mankind, is prejudicial to society, but that vesting land in mortmain defeated the incidents of feudal tenure and the interest of lords. So the historical reason and spirit of the law against perpetuities is, that they tended to interfere with the rights of the crown to forfeitures and escheat. Thus, in the laws of all countries, the modern reason and policy of a law seems to be an afterthought, and the law draws its origin and primary reason from something very different, which can only be explained by history and antiquarian research. This distinction is very important for the purpose of studying the spirit of laws, and the classification of the reasons on which the several sorts of laws are grounded. We find an exemplification of the value of this distinction in the books on the law of real property, such as Fearne. There we see a great deal of difficulty caused, and complicated arguments and systems based on the rule that there must always be a tenant of the freehold to perform the feudal services to the lord. Yet those services had been abolished by the statute of Charles II., which abolished military tenures, and reduced all tenures (with unimportant excep- tions), to the nominal and quasi emphytentical tenure of common socage. Thus, the neglect of the distinction above indicated, caused great injury to the law of real property and conveyancing. The historical reason of the law ought to have been eliminated from living law, and relegated to the province of history. But the imperfect state of legal science prevented this. We come now to the second aspect of the Civil Law. This is the juridical and scientific aspect. Here the historical element must not be neglected, for it is useful, and sometimes necessary, for the explanation of texts, and also to determine the purely positive or arbitrary part of the law. But that element occupies a secondary and servile position. Under this ajspect, the corpus of Civil Law is a juridical compi- lation, which contains the whole substance of the science of jurispru- dence. It comprises the doctrines, principles and rules and laws constituting the knowledge of justice and injustice, which is correctly called jurisprudence. For Ulpian, says: — " Jurisprudence is B 2 Digitized by Microsoft® 4 INTRODUCTION TO THE the knowledge of things human and divine, the science of justice and injustice," (Pand. Ub. 1. tit. 1. L. 10. §. 2). And Cujacius, commenting on this law, shews that it means that jurisprudence is t^e wisdom which by the investigation of things, both human and divine, determines the rules of justice.^ This very law exemplifies the distinction between the historical and the juridical view or aspect of law. For the part of this text which refers to things divine, may no doubt be explained by the public law of the Romans, for Ulpian says : " jus publicum in sacerdotibus in sacris et in magiatratibus condstit."" But it must also be understood as teaching that jurisprudence, even temporal, is derived not only from human nature and human affairs taken by themselves, but from the obligatory force of natural law, which is a divine law, springing from the will and authority of God, who has enabled us to judge and discriminate between right and wrong — between justice and injustice. And thence arises the connexion between law and theology, though each has a separate province. The juridical view of the Roman Law, or the scientific aspect, presents it to us as a great mine of jurisprudence, and teaches its use for the regulation of human affairs, and the determination of all questions between man and man. This way of studying the Roman Law is calculated to produce great practical results, and it has a bearing on all legislation and law reforms in this country. But it is not in accordance with the peculiarities of the English Law, nor with the habits of mind and way of thinking of English lawyers. And this is one reason of the sterility of the study of the Roman Law and Jurisprudence in the Inns of Court. Its sterility cannot be denied ; for in more than twenty years it has not produced one civilian or jurist, and it is unable to shew one book or any contribu- tion to legal literature. Still less can it point out that it has done anything for Law Reform, or the improvement of the law of this country. This is discouraging. It is not much like the school of Bologna, the parent of all universities, and of the Modern Civil Law, The results of that school are so great, that it is difficult to limit all that modern Europe owes to it, as the commencement of the academic teaching of jurisprudence, out of which the laws of the whole con- b Cujac. Op. torn 7, col. 54. ' Voet ad Pand., lib. i. tit. i. § 4, 7. L. 1, § 2, ff. de just, et jur. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. tinent of Europe were formed. But there is no indication that the cultivation of the Civil Law in the Inns of Court has produced, or is likely to produce, any result practically useful either to the legal science or to the improvement of the English Law. The learned and able lecturers in the Inns of Court are not to be blamed for this.'' They have taught the Civil Law as their brethren teach the English Law, and according to a method in conformity with the ideas of English lawyers ; and for this purpose the German historical school of writers have been used, and the Civil Law has been con- sidered chiefly under the historical aspect, and as a system of positive law. It has, no doubt, become an important part of legal education, but it has brought forth no fruit. It has not enlarged men's minds, so as to enable them to see what is defective or wanting in English Law; and, therefore, it has shed no light on the fusion of law and equity, and the making of a code or a digest, the use and abuse of case law or precedents, and other important questions of law reform. Before the institution of lecturers in the Inns of Court, we had writers on what in this country is called jurisprudence. The chief of these writers are Bentham and Austen. The former was a man of original thought, but not learned. He was like a man writing on astronomy without having studied the discoveries of Galileo and Newton. He is a purely theoretical writer, and more a philanthro- pist and a philosopher than a lawyer, but some of his ideas of law were in advance of the English lawyers of his day. Austen differs from Bentham. He was appointed to teach what was called juris- prudence, as distinguished from Law, in the New University of London, in 1826", and he studied German law books at Bonn. But his studies seem to have been confined to the modern German writers and philosophers. His book, called the "Province of Jurisprudence Determined," shows an imperfect knowledge of the Civil Law. Of this it is sufficient to cite a proof in p. 133 of vol. iii, in which he gives a definition of quasi contracts, which only includes negotiorurn gestio, one of the five obligations quasi ex contractu, and in the next d In the first place, they are not sufficiently remunerated to enable them to make the office of a law professor the object of their lives, and the cultivation of the Civil Law their sole profession. Therefore they have not been able to strike out a method of their own, and they have been obliged to adapt themselves to the pre- valent, and somewhat naixow, opinions and views regarding legal studies. Digitized by Microsoft® 6 INTRODUCTION TO THE page he seeks to enlarge it by another deEnition applicable to solutio indebiti. He never saw the error of Trebonian's adoption of the term quasi contractus, derived from Gajus,- which I have briefly pointed out in the eleventh chapter in these Commentaries on Modern Civil Law. Yet that error has produced important political effects, by introducing a false theory into Public Law; ^of which we see a striking instance in Kousseau's " Contrat Social " \ The solution of the difficulty is to be found in Domat's "Traite des Loix." He shews that it is necessary that men should be bound legally without their consent, by the eflFect of the law either acting by itself or operating on some act of their own, and constituting an obligation not quasi ex contractu, for the word contract implies consent or agreement, but independently of any consent expressed or implied. K Austen had studied Suarez de Legibus and Domat's " Traits des Loix," he would have found the solution of all his difficulties, and a clear system of legal knowledge, embracing his entire subject. For want of that guidance his works consist of diffuse treatises, contain- ing theories, often confused, which have little or no bearing on prac- tical law, but which are supposed to be what, in this country, is called jurisprudence. He had studied the Civil Law simply with a view to the duties of his professorship, and he had not made it a long and solid study, embracing the great works of the sixteenth and seven- teenth centuries. These two writers have exercised an influence over the legal studies in the Inns of Court, which has not had any tendency to correct the deficiencies of the historical and antiquarian methods. They have given rise to what is called in this country jurisprudence, which consists of the theories and reflections of acute and ingenious minds, without sufficient knowledge of the results arrived at before them, and necessarily, therefore, crude and imperfect. This juris- prudence has no relation to the historical method of Civil Law study, and is still less productive of useful practical results. It may be philosophy, but it is not law, though Austen describes juris- prudence as "the philosophy of law." This is very different from " Pand. lib. xliv. tit. xiv. § 2. De Obligat. et Action, L. 5, § 1. ' See my Commentaries on Uuivereal Public Law, pp. 55, 56, 57. Rousseau's Contrat Social, chap. iv. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 7 the definition of Ulpian, already referred to.s That definition is sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole science of law. For he does not only say that jurisprudence is. the science of justice and injustice, but he also includes the knowledge of things human and divine. By those words he refers to the Divine Natural Law and Ecclesiastical Law, and he also means all the legal relations of men in human life, which depend not only on justice and injustice, but on a multitude of positive and arbitrary laws based on various reasons, and intended for various purposes. To this definition we may add the celebrated three precepts of UJpian — Juris prcecepta hcec sunt : honeste vivere, neminem Icedere suum cuiqiie tribuere — on which Savigny makes the following comment : — " Honeste vivere is the maintenance of the moral dignity " of the individual regarding his exterior acts ; neminem Icedere is " the respect of other men as persons, or the recognition of all the " vested rights of our fellow-creatures. But are these truly rules " of law ? Though these precepts, except the first, appear to be " rules of law, they are in reality principles of morality qualified to be " the foundations of rules of law. Thus, the third precept is evidently " the moral law of justice which is identical with the aggregate of '' vested rights. And this is the reason why justice is usually " defined to be voluntas suum cuique tribuendi. It is also evident " that several of the most important rules of law are derived from the " second precept. But the first precept, in which this characteristic " seems doubtful, is nevertheless the source of more than one rule of " law, and it is, therefore, a veeA juris prceceptuni in the sense under- " stood by Ulpian. In fact, from this principle flow all the laws " protecting ioni mores and repressing the turpe. To it are also " attached the numerous rules of law which regard sincerity and " honesty as characters inherent in contracts ; thus, also, the extensive " influence exercised by dolus over matters of private law. It " may be said of these last rules that they appertain at the same time " to be first and second precept, for each of them, taken by itself, " serves as a justification of them. Thus the three precepts of Ulpian " are not rules of law but general principles, calculated to create for " the rules of law so many categories. But those categories can never " be taken as the basis of a classification of law. s Jurispriidentia est divinarum atque humananun renim notitia ; justi atque injusti sciuntia. L. 10 § De Just, et .Jiir. Digitized by Microsoft® IXTROBUCTION TO THE " If it is sought to class the three precepts according to their " cEsence, the first must be placed at the head as the most profound " and as comprehending the germ of the two others. The second " has an exterior character, which shows itself still more in the third. " Thus these two last may be observed independently of the " morality of the agent. If we look at the three precepts as to " their importance to law, the relation becomes precisely reversed, " for the third is the most fertile source of rules ; then the second, " and then the first. And this results from the nature of law " which is called upon to govern the external relations of common " life." ^ Savigny is so much a follower of the historical school that he depreciates the classification under the three heads of persons, things, and actions, because it cannot be traced to a period more remote than that of Gajus; but in the passage just cited he exem- plifies the uses to be derived from the Roman Law, when its texts are considered with scientific analysis. The three precepts are principles of moral philosophy rather than rules of law, and yet to them may be traced the whole science of jurisprudence, rightly understood, by means of which every question that can arise between man and man, in the affairs of human life, can be justly and usefully settled. The reader will now see the real and useful method and principle of the study of the Roman Civil Law. We must seek in it, above all things, the profound reason and wonderful common sense of which it is a rich and, apparently, inexhaustible mine. That great judge. Lord Justice Bruce, used to say that the decisions in the Pandects were such as any acute, sound, wise, practical men would, after mature consideration, come to by the use of that most uncommon thing — common sense. Yet common sense is disparaged by lawyers as opposed to learning. And so, when Lord Coke says, that the Common Law of England is the perfection of reason, he qualifies the assertion by adding, that the reason of the law is not ordinary reason, but a reason to be acquired only by a long course of study of ancient records, authorities, and precedents. Thus we have known lawyers in Parliament, and in Westminster Hall, rely and decide on grounds and arguments, the absurdity of which *■ S;ivigiiy's Traito du Droit Romain, torn, i, pp. 402-3-4. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 9 they would themselves have perceived at once, if those arguments or reasons were applied to the ordinary affairs of life. The law of England is chiefly historical, being based on precedents. The judges in our time have been, and are, striving to do justice, by endeavour- ing to extricate themselves from the errors of their predecessors, and even of Parliament, and from the consequences of dead law. But that process has produced an extent of arbitrary judicial power, of which the civilized world has no other example. Thus the genius of the English Law and that of the Civil Law are different in principle. No man, and no number of men living, could invent the science of common sense contained in the Civil Law, any more than they could invent any other great science, which requires ages to be brought to perfection. Yet the results of the Civil Law, and its solution of practical questions, commend themselves to the reason of mankind, so that they appear quite easy ; and any sensible, clever man of business, may say — this is precisely the opinion which I should have come to myself. These reflections are intended to give the key to the study of the Civil Roman Law for the practical purpiree of modern life and society, and they partly explain the words. Modern Civil Law, used in the frontispiece of these commentaries — that is to say, the Civil Law with reference to its use in our times and in the future. But the words Modern Civil Law have another meaning also, which requires full consideration. The Roman Law had gone through several phases of development before the days of Justinian — some of which bear a remarkable analogy to the history of the Eiiglish Law — though the latter has not yet reached that stage of development which the former attained in the reign of Hadrian, when the Perpetual Edict was compiled by Salvius Julianus, a .code so important that it was termed Edictum Perpetuum by the Emperors Diocletian and Maximian, and com- mented upon by Furius Antheanus, Pomponius, Callistratus, Paulus, and other jurisconsulti.^ The story of the revival of the Roman Civil Law, by the discovery of the Pandect of Amalphi, is rejected by the learned, and Savigny has shown that the Roman Civil Law and its institutions were never i Terrasson's Histoire de la Jurisprudence Eomaine, pp. 258, 259. Panzirolus de Claris Leguin Interpretibus, p. 12. Digitized by Microsoft® 10 INTRODUCTION TO THE extinguished. But for a considerable time they were barren. That law had great importance for the present, and an enormous value for the future. The Koman municipal institutions — especially in Italy (from which all others are derived) — contributed much to preserve the Civil Law. But it wanted the academic and scientific element. For the state of society was not sufficiently advanced, as regards commerce and business of all kinds, to give the law that practical life which springs from the wants of raanliind. Then came the school of Bologna, commenced by Irnerius, the first of the glossators. It prepared for that augmentation of legal knowledge which the gradual and progressive improvement of human society rendered necessary. The Irnerian glossators were mere expounders and expositors of the text of the law, and they were succeeded by the school of Accursius, who adopted a more enlarged and free method of interpretation. The third school was that of Bartolus (born 1313), the first who commented copiously on the Civil Law, and applied to jurisprudence the method and philosophy of Aris- totle. He was the most learned man of his day, and his authority was unbounded. "We come now to the fourth school, that of Alciatus, a lawyer and statesman, who held high ofi&ces under the Emperor Charles V., and Francis L, king of France, and died in 1500. He brought to bear on the interpretation and development of legal texts and doctrines very profound learning, and accomplished and highly cultivated scholarship. He was the founder of what has been termed the Erudita jurisprudentia, which opened a new era in the pro- gress of law. But his fame is overshadowed by that of his successor, Cujacius, who is acknowledged to be the greatest of all commen- tators. Cujacius was a giant in all that constitutes a great lawyer, a great legal writer, and a profound and accomplished scholar. His works were a wonderful step in advance, and prepared the way for the subsequent high development and progress of legal science and legislation. To enumerate those who came after him in aU parts of the Continent — in France, Italy, Spain, and Germany would be too long a task. In France he was succeeded by Domat, D'Aguesseau, Pothier, and a multitude of eminent juridical writers and judges, whose reputation extends as far as science and civilisa- tion ; and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Germany produced Voet, Vinnius, Bynkershoek, Heineccius, and a splendid series of great masters of jurisprudence. In the mean while Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OP THE CIVIL LAW. 11 Grrotius built on the foundation laid about the year 1550 by Albe- ricus Gentilis, the new fabric of International Law ; Public Law in all its branches was assidiously studied in Germany; Puflfendorf further extended and developed the. system of Grotius ; and legal science reached a very high pitch of polished and cultivated great- ness and completeness in the eighteenth century. Then, with the Code Napoleon, commenced the era of Codes, which constituted a new phase of legal progress. I say nothing of the Canonists, who undoubtedly contributed much to the improvement of legal science. The result of this rapid historical sketch is to show that the Civil Law, as we have it now, is not the produce of any one period, nor of any one country. During eight centuries, and by the inde- fatigable labours of the most learned, acute, and profound legal thinkers of all countries in Europe, the Civil Law has passed through a process of minute analysis and progressive cultivation. Thereby the true interpretation of the texts of the Civil Law has been obtained, and the written reason, the justice, and the common sense contained in those texts, have been reduced to a scientific system. That system may be properly described as the Modem Civil Law. It is the Civil Law as used for practical purposes throughout the civHized world. It constitutes, in the form of Codes, or otherwise, the body of European Law, both public and private, and exercises great authority even in International Law, because it is mainly based on pure reason and justice,'' and also because nations cannot refuse to respect, in matters arising between each other, those rules which they observe in their own countries. Such are the views of practical use with which these Commen- taries on the Modern Civil Law have been written, and the reasons why the term Modern Civil Law has been adopted. The laws of a nation cannot be brought to perfection, nor, indeed, to a high state of completeness and progress, without two things — the practice of the Courts ; that is to say, the actual administration of justice, and theoretical and scientific cultiva- tion by academical teaching and by commentators. This is well explained by Savigny. He shows that the success of the first school of glossators was owing to the combination of practical "^ Grot. (Barbeyrac) Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix. Disc. Prelim, § 54, 55. Digitized by Microsoft® 12 INTRODUCTION TO THE with theoretical science. He observes, that the distinction between legal theory and practice may be traced to those times ; and that the life and death of both depends on the spirit which governs that distinction and the division between those two branches of science. Considered in a purely theoretical point of view, the glossators might have derived nothing from their labours beyond intellectual exercise; but the active part which they took in judicial and political affairs saved them from that danger. When, in the middle of the thirteenth century, the scientific spirit of legal studies was extinguished, the progress of science became impos- sible, and it fell into a sterile condition. This shows how important the science of law must be to its practice.' Thus, the practical and the theoretical processes each supply a necessary element for the progress and improvement of the law. But, to do so, they must have a certain relation with each other. Thus, if the academical teachers and the writers are too abstract and metaphysical, or encumbered or overlaid with history and antiquities, that relation does not exist, and their labours are sterile and unimportant, or, perhaps, useless, or even prejudicial. Practice will gradually extinguish them, because it is a necessity, and because it brings gain. The science and the scientific study of true jurisprudence must be brought to bear on the actual business of life, and on the laws and obligations by which human society is regulated, and on which it is constructed. Science shows by analysis the different sorts of laMS, their nature, the classes into which they are divided, their various uses, and their application to every case that may arise, and to all the wants and interests of civil life. Science shows the correct interpretation of laws, and all the consequences to which they lead, so as to decide rightly every case within their meaning, or within the principle on which they are grounded ; and in this practice and science concur, assisting each other. But practice does not supply scientific analysis and classifi- cation. This subject deserves consideration, because it will show a deficiency in the study of the Civil Law in this country, and help to discover the advantages which we may derive from the adoption of a different method. I have fully explained the subject in my Commentaries on I Savigny Hiat. ilu Droit, Rom. torn, iii, chap. xli. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE C^LVIL LAW. 13 Universal Public Law, and more briefly treat it in these Commentaries (p. 36-7-8). We must now look at it under a somewhat different aspect. In order to understand completely and usefully that multitude of laws, principles, and doctrines which constitute the Civil Law, it is necessary to distinguish the various sorts of laws and rules -which it contains, and their uses, from which their spirit may be seen, together with their application and the consequences which flow from them. The most useful scientific analysis of laws with these views is that which comprehends them all within two classes. One is the laws which are immutable, and the other those which are arbi- trary.™ Without a correct and analytic knowledge of this classifi- cation, the spirit of laws cannot be understood. Domat, who wrote under the eye of the great Chancellor D'Aguessean, deduces his system of human society from the two fundamental laws, the obligation to love God and love our fellow creatures, and from these laws he derives all others. Those two primary laws have a remarkable analogy with the three precepts of Ulpian, which comprehend the same principles. Immutable laws are called so because they are naturally so just, always and every- where, that they cannot be changed without violating justice, whereas arbitrary laws are those which a lawful authority can establish, change, and abolish, according to circumstances. These immutable or natural laws are necessary consequences of the two primary laws, and so essential to the engagements or obligations which form the order of society, that they could not be altered without injuring or destroying the foundations of that order. But arbitrary laws are those which may be differently established, changed, or even abolished, without violating the spirit of the two primary laws, and without wounding the principles of the order of society." Perhaps it may be argued that immutable laws, that is to say, natural laws, should be sufiicient for the purposes of mankind, because no others are necessary consequences of the two primary ■" Domat's Loix Civiles. Trait6 des Loix. Suarez de Leg. lib. i, chap, iii, § 6, 7. Pand. lib. i. tit. i, ix. " Domat. Traits des Loix, chap, -xi., § 1. ' Sees, full exposition of the subject in my Commentaries on Universal Public Law. Digitized by Microsoft® 14 INTRODUCTION TO THE laws on which the order of society is founded. But, as we see in the whole economy of the world, that some things are given to man, while others are left to be devised by his invention, and executed by his skill, so it is with laws also. And a mutable addition or supplement to immutable lavrs is required, commanding or for- bidding certain things beyond what is commanded and forbidden by immutable law. But this will appear clearly by examining the nature and uses of positive, that is to say, arbitrary laws. Two general causes have rendered necessary the use of positive or arbitrary laws in human society, and those causes show the division of those laws into two classes, which must be carefully distinguished from each other. St. Thomas Aquinas observes that tbere are two modes whereby a law may be deduced from natural law. One is by way of conclu- sion from a general principle of natural law, and the other is by way of determination (per modum determinationis), because the law of nature commands something generally, as, for instance, that imposts are to be paid and crimes punished. A nd, from that general precept, it follows that the amount of the impost, and the specific nature of the punishment, must be determined by the legislator by an arbitrary law.° This is the first of the two causes of arbitrary law. That cause is the necessity of regulating certain difficulties in the application of immutable laws, where the difficulty is such that it can only be provided for by a law, and yet no immutable law regulates it.P A few examples will show the nature of those diffi- culties, and of this sort or class of arbitrary laws. It is an immutable law (belonging to secondary natural law) that whoever is the absolute owner of anything, should remain so until he voluntarily divests himself of his property, or it is alienated from him by some just and lawful means.i And it is another immutable law that possessors should not always be in danger of being dis- turbed, and that he who has possessed for a long time should be held to be the owner, because men are naturally careful not to give up what belongs to them, and no one should, without proof, be presumed an usurper."' ° Suarez de Legib. lib. iii. cbap. xxi. § 10. P Domat Loix Civ. Trait des Loix, chap. xi. § 6. 1 L. 11. S. de Reg. Jur. Petri Fabri Comment, ad tit. de Reg. Jur. L. 11. ■" Febeus de Reg. Jur. Canon, tit. iii, reg. ii, pp. 45, 46. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CTVTL LAW. 15 If, as Domat says, the first of these laws is too much extended, which requires that no man should be deprived of his right to property except by a good title, it will follow that whoever can show that he, or those through whom he claims, have been owners of the property, though for more than a century they have been out of possession, will recover it from the possessor, unless the latter can prove a good title, which divested the right of the former owner. If, on the contrary, the rule which presumes possessors to be owners be too far extended, those who are not in possession will be unjustly deprived of their right. It is evident that the conflict which would be produced by those two laws, one of which would reinstate the former owner to the prejudice of the old possessor, while the other would maintain the new possessor against the true proprietor, requires regulation by an arbitrary law, providing that those who are not possessors, but claim as owners, be required to prove their right within a certain time ; and that, after the lapse of such time, possessors, who have not been disturbed, be maintained. And this is done by arbitrary laws, which regulate the time required for prescription and limitations of action.^ The spirit of those laws is well explained by Pufendorf, who says, that, as the institution of property has been introduced for the peace of mankind, it follows that, after a certain time, bond fide possessors ought to have an incontestable right to what they hold ; and this prescription in itself, and separate from the precise time limited by law, is a dependance and a consequence of the law of property.* Another illustration of the subject may be useful. "It is an immutable law," says Domat, " that persons, who have not yet sufficient use of their reason, for want of age, knowledge, and experience, should not have the management of their property and affairs ; and that, after they acquire those qualifications, they should have such management. But, as nature does not give to all, at the same age, the full reason required for that purpose, the use of this law has rendered necessary that of an arbitrary law, making a rule for all cases. Thus the laws of some countries have left to fathers the power to decide to what age their children shall be under the guidance of a guardian, while others have determined the age s Domat Loix'Civ. Traite des Loix, chap, xi, § 9. t Piifend. Droit m the extivnio diiKoulty of dealing- with the materials before them. They weiv like the Isi-aelites, making brieks withont sta-jwv. And the result of their labours was useless. The Conuuissiou ivporttxl in favour of a Digest of Law, but the fivling among'st Couimissionors was that the attempt made in that direetion was a failure. The subject has dixipped and has not since been iv\ ivod. Hero it must be remarked that the treatment received by the learned draftsmeu \nider the C'ommission was such that if another attempt be made to prejxvre a Digest or a Code, it will be very ditlicult to obtain the ser- vices of competent pei-sons to do the work. No doubt the Oovcrn- ment felt a difiBcultj' in asking the House of Commons for snrticieut supply to continue the Digest, tlie value of which was ipiestionable. There was a feeling of disappointment on the ywrt of the Oommis- sionei-s, and probably on that of the Government : but this was from no fault of the leaiued dounsel employed, some of whom showed great ability. The failure should be attributed to the impossibility of making a Digest deserving the name and worth its cost, out of the reports of the cases decided in the Courts. And the impossi- bilitj' of making a Code of the same niaterials is still more evident. Let us consider this important subject more in detail. The duty of a court of justice is, not to advance logtil science or jurisprudence, but to dispose of its business by deciding each Civso that comes before it on the merits of tlve points of haw, fai't, or prac- tice on which the decision of the case depenils. Former Cf\ses ai"0 referred to, and thus a certain connection is formed and maintained between the decisions. But the tptestiou whether the Court will follow or overrule a former case is very ai"biti"tu'y. Sometimes the Court holds itself bound by a former case, though coudenuuug or regretting it. At other times one or n\ovo ca.ses ai'o overruled. Or a distinction, often very refined, ingenious, and ditWcult, is drawn to avoid overruling a case or a series of oases, and at the same time to avoid injustice in the pai'ticular case before tlio Court (>ther decisions are so special that a rule of law cannot be e.xtrncted fi-om tht>m. And where cases are contrailictory, the whole labour of the Court is to iMuleavour by ingenuity to reconcile them, which is sometinies impiis- sible. All these things arise unavoidably out of the exigences of the daily work ol' the courts for the administi'ation of jxistice. The value Digitized by Microsoft® KTUDY AND USR OF THE CIVIL LAW. 31 of roportod ciisoa cannot be denied. And it must bo admitted — Cldnsucliuliiuun aut rerum perpetuo similiter judicatoruni anctori- t;Ui'iii, vim Icgis dbtiiioro debmui' But to iniike the body of law in tlu^ lonn of a Digost or a Code solely out of decided cases is a thing whicli nover has bcou done in any country in the world, and which cannot be successfully accomplished. The Common Law and Equity llc'poits fuvnisli valuable materials for a Digest and for a Codo. But their very nature precludes the possibility of their being suflScieut by themselves. The miscellaneous and fragmentary character of a collection of judicial decisions would suffice to establish this proposi- Lioii. K.xperieuce shows that in every Digest of Cases there must bo important lacunm. The existing Case law has grown within the last two hundred years, and that is too short a "space to form a system of juris|ivudonce. The iiiconiplctencss of our law has been exemplified iu a sliikiiig manner in the two arbitrations in the cases of the European Asstu-ance Company and the Albert. There the question arose whether a novation can be inferred, or whether it must be exjiresst'd. Lord Westbury following the Civil Law said, " The inten- " tion must be proved ; it cannot be inferred from the reading of a " receipt. The obligation, the onus probandi lies on the company " that alleges the novation. It is a question of intent to bo evidenced •' in the clearest manner, and unless that intent is so evidenced, the " simple payment of the premium will be referred to the old contract, " and the old rule." But there was no case in the books settling the (piestion, though it is decided by the Civil Law. And accordingly Lord Cairns in the case of the Albert Company decided the reverse of Lord Westbury 's judgment, and contrary to the Civil Law. Another instance is given in the speech of the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords, 12tli June, 18(i.S, of a new case which could not be decnded by any precedent in the books, I refer to the question of tlie liability of provisional committees of railways. There was a lacuna in the Case Law, and for want of science, the judges decided by analogy, and full into an error which distressed or ruined many. They ima.gineil an analogy to partnership, and so they made members of provisional committees liable for each other's acts. Their decision was manifestly unjust, and it was overruled by the House of Tjords. Many more instances could be given to show how incomjilete our C^ase Law is. ' L. xxxviii. IV. Do Li'}»ih. Minimo sunt rautaudn ^iw iulevpiolationcirt ccrUnan mnii|n'r Imlmuiunt. lli, L. xxiii. Digitized by Microsoft® 32 INTEODUCTION TO THE It is true that the Kesponsa contained in the Pandects are in the nature of decisions. But they are supplemented by extracts from scientific juridical treatises of the ancient Roman jurisconsulti. Some of the most important laws in the Pandects are of the latter description. Such, for instance, is the celebrated Law Contractus, of Ulpian,^ on which the doctrine of the liability of bailees is founded. Another instance is to be found in the Law Origo emendi, from Ulpian's Commentary Ad Edictum, with which the 18th Book of the Pandects commences. There Ulpian shows the origin of the contract of sale, and at the same time gives a masterly view of the nature and essence of that contract. No doubt Justinian'a Commis- sioners extracted the pith and marrow of the two thousand volumes which formed the materials of the Pandects. Thus Cujacus com- menting on L. 75, De Cond. et demonstr., taken from the 34th Book of the QuEestiones Papiniani, says : Misera sors libri quod hie tantum ex eo versiculus supersit, quod scilicet, ut veresimile est, cffitera essent antiquata et obsoleta. Id enim tantum voluit Justi- nianus ex veterum scriptis referri in suis Digestis quod, ut ipse loquitur, in ipsis rerum argumentis obtinent.*' And the fragment is a good example of the species of law which we are considering, as it contains not a decision, but a valuable rule of law. Dies incertus conditionem in Testamentis facit. These statements of the law apart from any case, are indeed the very components of a Code, which must consist not of cases but of the laws or rules and principles by which cases are to be decided. And this is the excellence of the Digest or Pandects of Justinian, that it does not consist entirely of decisions of cases, but it includes also rales, principles, definitions, and doctrines of law in their native form, apart from any statement of a particular case. Without this juridical element, a Digest, or collection of decisions, would want cohesion and .sequence. It would settle a number of particular cases, but it would have no general rules. It would represent the practice of the law, but it would be deprived of the scientific part, which is absolutely necessary. ' L. xxiii. de Reg. Jur. ; Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Eaym. 913 ; Kent Comm., vol. ii. pp. 559, 560, 561. So in the Jewish law in the Talmud, n3tt?a the distinction as to liability is drawn between MrnOBS a gratuitous keeper, and ~1^3tt71J2a; a keeper for hire ; and see Exodus, c. 22, v. 8. ' Cujac, Comment in lib. xxxiv. Qua;st. Papin. Cujac, op. torn. iv. col. 742. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 33 This is one reason of the failure of the Digest of Laws Commis- sion. But it has produced one useful result. It has shown that a Digest of Cases (with or without extracts from Acts of Parliament) is not worth its cost. It is like trying to make timber out of chips. To make a Code of any value out of the same materials is a still more hopeless task. For a Code is not a mere compilation. It is the expression of mature results of legal science in condensed language, together with succinct but complete expression of posi- tive legislation. A Code could not be made out of the decisions of courts during two or three centuries. And if it were made, it would only impede future progress and improvement of the law. There is this further difficulty : the problem of the union of Law and Equity must be completely solved before we can have a Code. But this subject we will examine later. The question remains : How can we obtain either a Digest or a Code ? If we have nothing to work upon but the cases in the Reports, the Digest or the Code must be postponed indefinitely. We must wait until the case law has become far more complete than it is, and we must wait until the cultivation of jurisprudence has been so developed, and has attained such great proportions and results as to supplement the case law, and complete a comprehensive system of national jurisprudence. And this can never be, until there is a body of professors so amply endowed, and so highly placed, as to induce men of eminent ability and learning to devote their whole lives exclusively to the duties of a legal university, and the cultiva- tion of legal science. The lectureships at the Inns of Court are utterly inadequate for this purpose, for the lecturers are not so well remunerated as a police magistrate or a county court judge, and they are mere officers of the benchers. To expect any results from such a system is not reasonable. The lecturers are no doubt useful to the students who attend them, but they cannot form a jurisprudence, or system of laws, nor a legal literature, without which it is impossible to make either a Digest or a Code worthy of a great nation. And they can do nothing for the progress and improvement of the law. Thus there is no scientific cultivation of the law in this country, and there is no legal literature. But the question is this. Is it necessary that to make either a Digest or a Code we should be restricted to our own materials — that is to say. Acts of Parliament and decisions of our Courts of Law and D Digitized by Microsoft® 34 INTRODUCTION TO THE Equity ? In no other science are we restricted to oiir own country : and why should such a restriction exist with regard to law 1 The whole tendency of civilization is to extend knowledge and the culti- vation of science from one country to another, so that all may participate in the progress of learning and improvement. There is no reason why this should not apply to law. No doubt every nation has positive laws adapted more or less to its wants and circumstances. But the immutable laws ought to be the same everywhere. And here we have an example of the use of scientific analysis. Gajus in the Pandects says :" "Omnes populi qui legibus etmoribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium jure utuntur." The latter is the basis of the Law of Nations. But it also comprises all that part of Private Law which Domat describes (as we have seen) under the name of Immutable Law, because it consists of rules or principles of justice which must be the same everywhere, even where the positive or arbitrary laws of the particular state cont;ravenes them by unjust and unreasonable enactments or customs. Thus the rules of contracts, and the dealings between man and man, are, or ought to be, the same in all countries, so far as they depend on justice and not on arbitrary municipal laws, the spirit of which depends on their utility with reference to the particular circumstances of the place where they prevail, or the policy of each country with regard to the arbitrary laws which regulate the use of immutable laws, or deter- mine certain things which those immutable laws do not determine. In these arbitrary laws there is a margin which may without injustice be differently dealt with in different countries. Thus, for instance, it is an immutable law, that all agreements and contracts between parties shall be performed according to their intentions. But in some countries, from motives of utility, certain contracts are not held to be valid unless they are in writing, or unless they are executed with certain formalities intended to prevent abuses or other evils. And there is no injustice in these restrictions, provided all persons are made duly acquainted with the law with which they are to comply, or at least cases of hardship will be so few that they cannot counterbalance the public and general advantages of the restriction. Besides the immutable laws, there are arbitrary or positive laws, the general nature of whose utility is such that they would be advan- tageous in all countries — or at least in more than one. » L. 9, fF. De Just. & Jur. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE . CIVIL LAW. 35 One result of these reflections is, that there is no reason why any nation desiring to have a complete Corpus of Law in the form of a Digest or Code, should be confined to its own native materials. And indeed the progress of civilization and commerce, and the increase of the intercourse of mankind, tends to assimilate the law of all civilized countries. And the influence of the Civil Law has even in this country conduced, and will do so still more, to the same result. In the United States of America the Civil Law has great authority. In one of them, in the new States of Spanish America, and in Lower Canada, it constitutes the principal basis of the Common Law." The continental civilians have called it Jus commune, because it was the law in force, unless altered by statute or custom, throughout the countries which formed the ancient Roman Empire.X It has always had great authority in Scotland, where it has even been designated as the Common Law.^ The Civil Law has thus constituted a bond of union between the laws of all countries. It contains the principal part of that law which — " Om,nes populi — communi omnium jure utuntur." Here there is a common fund from which all nations can supple- ment and improve their national jurisprudence when it is not already the basis of their laws. This has been recognized by the greatest judges in our history, and especially the greatest of all — Lord Mansfield. The Books are full of instances where the judges have made use of the Civil Law, and they would have done so more fre- quently if they had known more of that law. Lord Mansfield was attacked by the bigots of his day — even by the Whig Junius, for using the Civil Law. Afterwards the prejudices of English lawyers gave way to reason, and the Civil Law has been freely resorted to ; and the study of the Civil Law in the Inns of Court will contribute * Kent, Comm. Lect., xxiii. p. 514. ^ Erskine, Instit., pp. II, 18. " Wheaton, Hist, of the Law of Nations, p. 32. Tirabosohi (Storia della Letter.) states that Ed. I., who has been called the English Justinian, being in Italy in (die year 1272, on his way to the Holy Land, attended and admired the lectures of Francis Accursius, the son of the great glossator, who is called by Cujacius " Optimus Accursius " (Cujac. Observ. lib. xii. cap. xvi.), and that the king made him one of his council, and induced him to visit the English court, and twice entrusted him with important foreign missions. Accursius resided eight years at the English court. The doubts of Selden on the subject of his visit to England are disposed of by the writ directed to the Sheriff of Oxfordshire to provide lodgings for the Doctor of Laws Accursius, at the King's charges. D 2 Digitized by Microsoft® 36 INTRODUCTION TO THE nrach to increase its influence and utility in this country. Thus a connexion has been established between the English law and that law which is the basis of the jurisprudence of civilized Europe, and indeed the basis of all legal science. The feudal element of the English law was an obstacle to the Civil Law. But that element has dwindled into something very unimportant, and there is now no reason why the Civil Law should not be largely used in the formation of a Corpus Juris for this country. But the Civil Law should be used for this purpose, not in its ancient condition, but as it has been extended and improved by the learning and the thought of successive centuries, and rendered usefully applicable to all the wants of an advanced civilization. The whole jurisprudence of Europe ought to be used by us to prepare a Corpus Juins. Taking our own. law as a basis, we ought to supplement it from universal jurispru- dence, taking what is best from the laws of all countries, and availing ourselves of all existing practical results of legal science. There is no instance in history of any one nation which has formed for itself a complete system of Jurisprudence sufficient in itself, with- out the assistance of other nations. The science of law is the know- ledge of the rules by which all mankind are to be governed, and it is therefore too vast to be completed by any one of those siibdivi- sions called peoples or nations (an institution of the jus gentium),'* •which have been adopted necessarily for the government of the world. A nation which wants to be governed exclusively by its own laws is absurd. It will suffer financially to an enormous extent by the liti- gation arising from a bad and insufficient system of laws, which constitutes a gi-ievous tax and a diminution of the value of property, and an obstacle to production. And it will suffer still more by the obstruction of business, and the disturbance of the peace of society, arising necessarily from bad or insufficient laws, which afford constant occasions for delay, doubt, difficulty, and dissension. Every considera- tion points out the necessity of adopting a broad view of Law Reform, and using every source from w^hich anything useful can be .derived. Whether we have a Code or a Digest, it ought to be made out of the universal jurisprudence of the whole civilized world. Nothing less can constitute the materials for the CORPUS JuRis of a great nation. No one nation has ever completed any other science, and can it be • L. 5, ff. De Just, and Jur. Ex hoc jure gentium introductoD bella, discrete gentes, regna oondita. — Hermogenianus. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 37 believed that any one nation can form a perfect system of those laws by which nianklad ought to be regulated in all their relations to and dealings with each other ? And we have been under special disad- vantages on account of our insular position and the peculiarly feudal nature of our laws and institutions, which have cut us off from the progress of jurisprudence and legislation in Europe. But that juris- prudence and legislation are at our disposal and ready for our use, and we have only to make the best use of tliem. A Commission appointed to make a Code or a Digest ought to be assisted by the most learned and able foreign lawyers that can be procured by ample remuneration. The English Law should, on each subject, be compared with the Civil Law, as it exists and is taught, and as it is contained in the greatest Books, and with the best foreign Codes. This process, carried on with the assistance of the foreign Assessors, would show ' what portions of the Civil Law and of the foreign Codes are adapted to the objects of the Commission. The Commissioners would consider the suggestions and propositions of the foreign lawyers, and see how far they were useful, and also how they ought to be incorporated with the English Law in a Digest or Code. If this method were adopted, the materials at the disposal of the Commissioners would be so abundant that there would be no reason for losing time and labour by making a Digest. A complete Code might be made, and being the last it ought to be the best in Europe. The Code would be enacted as Law by the Legislature, and all other Laws on the subjects contained in the Code would be repealed. No cases decided before the publication of the Code should be allowed to be cited as authority in the Courts. There would be only one cause of delay and difficulty, and that is the distinction between Law and Equity. This subject now requires consideration. The very same distinction existed in the Ancient Roman Law, and it seems to constitute a necessary pha,se in the history of Jurisprudence. It arises from the want of a remedy for the insufficiency of the ordinary tribunals and the original law. So the technicalities of the ancient Jus Civile, and the narrowness of the forms of actions before the ancient magistrates, engendered the equitable jurisdiction of the Praetor. Tne Prajtorian Equitable Law was formed into a Code, called the Perpetual Edict, by Salvius Julianus. This Code was not a mere compilation, for it contained improvements in the law, and it had full legislative sanction. Tlius Digitized by Microsoft® 38 INTEODUCTION TO THE the fusion of Law and Equity was preparei And in the Modern Civil Law there is no such distinction. A notion commonly exists that, by giving to the same judges both a Common Law and an equitable jurisdiction. Law and Equity would be amalgamated together. This may, however, be questioned. Within not many years, the Court of Exchequer had an Equitable as well as a Common Law jurisdiction. This did not affect the separation of Law and Equity. That end can only be attained by changes in the law itself hitherto administered by the Courts of Law and Equity, calculated to produce one homogeneous .body of Law, to be administered in all the Courts. This is, perhaps, the greatest object of Law reform, and unless it be accomplished, a Code cannot be made. How is this problem to be solved ? Its solution has been attempted in the Judicature Act, by giving the preference to Equity wherever it differs from Law, and by providing for the adoption of a uniform system of procedure, for the purpose of terminating the distinction between an action at Law and a suit in Equity. It will be useful to examine the portion of the Act which relates to this important subject, for the pm-pose of showing what the Act does and what it does not accompKsh, and thereby obtaining a knowledge of what remains to be done t-o bring the law into a consistent homogeneous state- without any distinction between Law and Equity. Clause 24 enacts that Law and Equity are to be concurrently administered. Every Court and Judge is to be competent to give both equitable and legal relief or remedies, and is to recognize and give effect to every equitable estate, right, or ground of relief, and every equitable defence, properly claimed and pleaded. Thus every Court wiU have both an equitable and a legal jurisdiction concurrently administered. And no cause or proceeding shall be restrained by prohibition or injunction. This is in accordance with the recommendation of the Judicature Commissioners. Every Court (for instance) will have the power of awarding damages for the non-performance of a contract, or of making a decree for specific performance. So far the Act does not, nor does it profess to, amalgamate Law and Equity. On the contrary, it requires both the Judges and the practitioners to be acquainted with the two systems, and it thereby n^aterially increases the amount and difficulty of their labour, which wiU be no longer divided. "^ '"' ~ Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 39 Section 25 recites that it is expedient to take occasion of the union of the several Courts whose jurisdiction is thereby transferred to the High Court of Justice, to amend and declare the Law to be hereafter administered in England as to the matters next thereinbefore mentioned, and it then enacts as follows : — (1). In the administra- tion by the Court of the assets of insolvent estates of persona dying after the passing of this Act, the same rules shall prevail as may be in force for the time being under the Bankruptcy Law with regard to the estate of persons adjudged bankrupt.'' (2). The Statutes of Limitation are not to apply to express trusts. (3). Tenant for life without impeachment of waste is not to be entitled at law to commit equitable waste. (4). No estate shall be merged by operation of law the beneficial interest in which would not be deemed to be merged or extinguished in equity. (5). A mortgagor, in possession, may sue in his own name for possession or for recovery of rents, or profits, and to prevent or recover damages in respect of any trespass or wrong relative thereto, unless the mortgagee has given notice of his intention to take possession or enter into receipt of rents and profits.' This is an important amendment of the law, for it is one step towards abolishing the distinction between the legal and the equitable estate. It admits on principle the absurdity of the Mortgage Law, by which the land is conveyed subject to an equity of redemption, but provides no adequate reform, because it still leaves the legal estate vested in the mortgagee, who is_not the owner of the land, and/' who ought only to have a security by. J* ^y_ of. hypothecation. (6). An absolute assignment of a debt or other chose in action, with notice to the debtor, trustee, or other person entitled, is made effectual in Law to pass the legal right, subject to the right of the person liable to interplead, on notice that the assignment is disputed. (7). Stipulations in contracts as to time or otherwise, which would not, before the passing of the Act, have been deemed to ^ A difficulty arises here. This section extends to the administration of the estates of all persons dying after the passing of the Act. But it applies only to administration of assets by the Court, that is to say the High Court. But the High Court will not come into existence until 2nd November, 1874. Therefore the difficulty is not solved by the preliminary section 2. It would seem that the administration of the assets of insolvents dying between the passing of the Act and November 2nd, 1874, must wait until the latter time. • The question will aiise whether the mortgagee may not under this enactment give such notice though the interest is duly paid. Digitized by Microsoft® 40 INTRODUCTION TO THE be or to have become of the essence of such contract in a Court of Equity, shall receive in all Courts the same construction and effect as they would have heretofore received in equity. (8). A mandamus or injunction may be granted by the Court. The intei-pretation clause does not explain the term the Court, and this provision seems open to doubt, as in other parts of the Act these words are used : the said Courts respectively and every Judge thereof. (9). The rules of the Court of Admiralty regarding damages by collisions at sea are extended to the other Courts. (10). In questions relating to the custody and education of infants, the Rules of Equity shall prevail. These amendments, which may be compared to the fifty decisions of Justinian, settle certain questions (except the 9th), on which Law and Equity differed. But the sections 4, 7, and 9 do so, not by directly settling what the law is to be, for they refer to the Rules of Equity, which are to be found only in cases decided in the Court of Chancery. The eleventh and last amendment is more important and re- markable. It enacts that generally in aU matters not before particularly mentioned, in which there is any conflict or variance between the Rules of Equity and the Rules of the Common Law with reference to the same matter, the Rules of Equity shall prevail. According to the principles of Jurisprudence, a conflict of Laws arises where any matter is affected by laws of two countries, which laws are at variance. But a legislative recognition of a Conflict of Laws within the same State is a thing very novel and extraordinary. The effect of this is that, before the amending Law is applied, the conflict must be established. Thus Judges and practitioners must consider both laws, and determine where the conflict, if any, arises. It will be instructive to see how Justinian dealt withj this difficulty. In the constitution, Deo auctore,'^ he says to Trebonian and his colleagues :' — Jubemus igitur vobis antiquorum prudentium quibus auctoritatem conscribendarum interpretun- datumque Legum sacratissimi Principes prsebuerunt, Libros ad Jus ^ This mode of quotation liy the first words, also used by the Canonists, was derived from the custom of the Jews, who designate the books of the Pentateuch in that way. Thus Genesis is called n''tt7N");2 ; Exodus, maU7 ; Leviticus, K^p"*!. Numbers, however, is called ~13^I3^ instead of "IDT^I, because the latter word is a common commencement of parts of the books ; and Deuteronomy is called Q^~l3ln instead of nbS, because for the same reason n7S alone would not be a sufficient designation. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 41 RomaDum pertinentes et legere et elimare : ut ex his omnis materia colligatur, nulla secundum quod possibile est, neque simi- litudine neque discordia derelicta, sed ex his colligi quod unum pro omnibus sufficiat. And in § 8, he adds : — Nulla in omnibus pra^dicti codicis membris antinomia (sic enim a vetustate Grseco vocabulo nuncupatur) aliquem sibi vindicet locum, sed sit una con- cordia, una consequentia, adversario nemine constitute. These remarkable passages show the right principle of law reform applicable to cases where there is a variance of laws or antinomia, such as the differences between Law and Equity. The legislature should not merely decide which of two conflicting laws the Judges are to follow ; but ought to enact specifically what the law is to be on the particular subject to which the conflicting laws apply. This is the only way of abolishing an antinomia, and bringing the Law to a homogeneous system. If a Code is to be made, this course will be necessary. One difficulty exists in this countiy which is peculiar, and it was not to be found in the Eoman Law. This difiiculty arises from trial by Jury in Civil cases. The object of all pleadings is to ascertain the questions for adjudication. But at Common Law the chief ob- ject is to separate as far as may be the Law from the fact, and to bring every question of fact to an issue to be tried by a jury. All pleadings are derived from the Civil, and still more from the Canon Law. Whether they are commenced by Declaration or by Bill, the principle is the same; It is that the plaintiff should state his com- plaint and the defendant his answer, or defence, with a view to determining what points are in dispute. The distinction between pleadings at Law and in Equity, is that the first principle of the former is to bring questions of fact in dispute to specific issues to be tried by a jury, and leaves, on demurrer, the law to be decided by the Court. But there are a class of cases which cannot be subjected to this analytic process, and they have necessarily fallen within the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity, in which (after the model of the Civil Law), the Court decides both fact and Law, and there is no trial by jury. This institution of trial by jury has had an important effect on our legal history. For if it had not existed, the separation between Law and Equity would not have continued to our times. Thus, in the Roman Law, the consolidation of the Praetorian with the Civil Law took place naturally and easily. The abolition of the Digitized by Microsoft® 42 INTRODUCTION TO THE formulse, actiones legis,* or forms of action, produced a uniform mode of proceeding by Libellum and Exceptions or Pleas analogous to the Bill and Answer in Chancery, and thus the Courts were enabled to deal uniformly with all cases, whether Civil or Praetorian, and the distinction between the two became mere matters of history. Thus, in the Canon Law, there never existed any distinction between Law and Equity. So in the laws of France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and indeed of every continental state, this distinction never existed. The Juxiicature Act attempts to deal with this obstacle to the union of Law and Equity. It will be a task of extreme difficulty to frame a system of pleading, to fulfil the purposes of both the Common Law pleadings and the Bill and Answer in Equity. The schedule of the Act provides (section 30) that actions shall be tried and heard either before a judge or judges, or before a judge sitting with assessors, or before a judge and jury, or before an official or special referee. By section 31, the plaintiff may give notice of trial by any of the modes specified in section 30. But the defendant may, by giving notice, have any issues of fact tried by jury. It is probable, that under these enactments, those cases which have hitherto been tried by jury will continue to be so tried. But still the difficulty remains of preparing the case for trial by jury. Section 19 gives the judge power to direct the parties to prepare issues of fact; and, if the parties differ, the judge is to settle the issues. This process will be more dilatory and expensive than the ordinary mode of raising issues by pleadings at Common Law. The power to direct the preparation of issues of fact is confined to cases where the facts are not sufficiently disclosed. But the facts may be sufficiently disclosed, and yet not pleaded in such form as required for trial by juiy. The rules of pleading in the Civil and Canon Law might facilitate a solution of the difficulty. For, by both those systems, the judge has power to compel the parties to clear and explicit state- ments of fact, and he can regulate, of course, the form of the allega- tions.f And in the Civil Law there is the distinction between = Cod., L. ii. tit. Iviii. De formulis et Impetrationibus actionum sublatis, L. i. ii. Devoti Instit. Canon., L. iii tit. v. § 3. Voet ad Pand., L. ii. tit. xiii. § 8. Schmaltzgrueber Jua Eccles., torn. ii. par. i. tit. iii. § 1, num. vi. p. 193. The subdivisiona in Schmaltzgrueber's great work make it difficult of reference. It is best to consult the Index, which is on a simpler method. ' Voet ad Pand., L. iL tit. xiii. § 3 ; Devoti Inst. Canon., L. iii. tit. v. § 2 ; Schmaltzgrueber, Jus Eccles., torn. ii. par. i. tit. iii. num. viii. p. 199. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 43 exceptions (plea) of fact and of law.s although the mode of trying both is the same. Voet thus describes the libellum : Libellus est scriptura futurse litis speciem demonstrans, ac constans narratione et conclusione : sic ut continent enthymema, ut logici loquuntur, seu syllogismum altera propositione et quidem majore, truncatum. Supposita quippe juris dispositione quae majorem in syllogismo propositionem facit, quseque judici jurisperito nota prsesumitur, pro assumto seu minore propositione est narratio facti, comprehendens et ipsam agendi causam ; ex quibus duobus, altera subaudita, expressa altera, tandem conclusio syllogismi formatur.'' The con- clusion is analogous to the prayer of a Bill in Chancery — Conclusio est petitio actoris. As both the libellum and the exception can be amended, there is practically little difficulty in determining what questions are in dispute without proceeding beyond the replication which is the answer to the exception ; though there may be a duplication, a triplication, and a quadruplication.' Each successive allegation must be an answer to the preceding one, and, if not, it is inadmissible. A system of pleading so simple and free from tech- nicalities could be so adapted as to overcome the difficulty which we have been considering, arising from trial by jury in civil cases. In Scotland, trial by jury in civil cases exists in such a modified and limited manner, that it has not had any marked influence over the jurisprudence of that country. By the ancient law of Scotland the greatest part of actions proceeded on breves issued out of Chancery, and were tried by jury. But upon the institution of the College of Justice summonses were introduced in the place of breves, as the foundation of most ordinary actions,'' and the rule of the English Common Law, that issues of fact must be tried by jury, is not contained in the law of Scotland. This is one reason why in Scotland there are no Courts of Equity separate from Courts of Law. A still more important matter remains to be considered with reference to the amalgamation of Law and Equity. I mean uses and ' Voet ad Pand., L. xlix. tit. i. § 4. ' Voet ad Pand., L. ii. tit. xiii. § 2. ' Voet ad Pand., L. xliv. tit. i. ; De exceptionibus, § 10. Cseterum moribus noatris triplicatio aut quadruplicatio in foro regulariter adhiberi non potest, nisi judex ex justS, causS, speciatim in causa consenserit : qualis consensus prEecipue impetratiu cum nova facta duplicatione continentur. ^ Erskine Instit., book iv. tit. i. § 3. Digitized by Microsoft® 44 INTEODUCTION TO THE trusts. The law of England differs from that of other countries, both ancient and modern, in this respect. It allows the permanent or indefinitely protracted separation of the legal from the equitable estate in land. Let us examine the subject historically and critically, with a view to form an accurate notion of the legal nature and effects of this remarkable institution of our Municipal Law, and to ascertain in what way it should be dealt with. And here the Civil Law is of the greatest value and utility. English writers have stated that the general idea of a use or trust answered more to the fidei-commissum than to the usus-fructus of the Civil Law.' This is an error. The fidei-commissum of the Civil Law was probably the origin of entails and limitations in remainder, but not of uses and trusts. The fidei-commissum arose from substitutions. A substitution is a provision in a testament whereby more than one heir is appointed, and in which the heirs are to take not together, but one in default of the other."' One example will suffice : Si Titius heres non' erit, Mfevius heres esto. This is a direct substitution. A fidei-commissum or fidei- commissary substitution is one whereby the heir is required by the testator, by virtue of a trust, to transfer the inheritance to a substi- tuted heir. Vinnius thus very neatly defines a fidei-commissum : — Fidei-commissum est id omne de quo quis suprema defuncti volun- tate rogatus est ut daret vel faceret. I have explained this subject in my " Commentaries on the Modem Civil Law," so as to be intelli- gible even to the unlearned reader. See chap. xxv. and p. 136. Justinian gives in his Institutes, lib. ii. tit. xxiii. § 1, the following account of the establishment of the law regarding fidei-commissum. In former times (says Justinian) all fidei-commissa were ineffectual, because no one was compellable to execute the trust vested in him ; for inheritances were transmitted to persons who could not validly be made heirs, by desiring others who were capable to transfer the inheritance to them. This species of inheritances were called fidei- commissa, because they were sanctioned by no bond of law, but only rested upon the honour and conscience of those to whom the request was addressed. The Emperor Augustus, however, influenced by a desire to favour persons placed in certain situations, or because a solemn abjuration was directed to him by testators, or indignant at ' Steph Com., ch. ix. " Voet ad Pand., L. xxviii. tit. vi. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 45 the gross breach of faith of which some persons were guilty, ordered tlie consuls to interpose their authority in these matters. And as this was both just and popular, there soon arose a permanent juris- diction in matters of fidei-commissum, and that jurisdiction became so great a favourite, that a Prastor was appointed to decide upon those matters, who was called Prastor Fidei-commissarius. — Instit.' lib. ii. tit. xxiii. § 1. Fidei-commissa were invented in Rome for the same general pur- pose for which uses were devised in England ; that is to say, to evade the law. In Rome this evasion was very beneficial, because of the numerous and merely technical and unnecessary, and therefore unjust, disqualifications of persons who were not permitted by the ancient jus civile to be heirs. This is an example of a curious fact to be found in the history of almost every system of legislation, namely, that the legislature does not keep pace with the innovations of time, nor with the growth and changes of the wants of the people ; and it would consequently be difficult to point out many instances of a bad or inconvenient or obsolete law that has not been evaded long before it was abrogated or amended. The ingenious contrivance of the action of ejectment in the English law is an instance of the evasion of the cumbersome forms of a complicated art, which under the specious pretence of providing a remedy for every possible wrong, threw great obstacles in the way of their redress, by rendering it a matter of difficulby in many cases to discover, not indeed the redress promised by the law, but the means provided for its attainment. Many other instances could be given of reforms, or at least changes, which have been effected indirectly by means of fictions and contrivances, because they could not be obtained from the legislature. Justinian, in explaining the unprotected state of fiduciary rights, points out the difference between a legal or civil, and a mere , natural or equitable right : — Fidei fidei-commissa appellata sunt quia uullo vinculo juris sed tantum pudore eorum qui rogabantur conti- nebantur. From the legal sanction given by the Emperor Augustus to fidei-commissa arose fidei-commissary substitutions, which by restraining alienation made a very serious inroad upon the sim- plicity of the Roman law. They consisted in the appointment of several persons, to take successively, so that none of them could alienate except the last. Digitized by Microsoft® 46 INTRODUCTION TO THE It has been supposed that Justinian, by the 159th Novell, restricted fidei-commissary substitutions to four degrees (Co. Litt. 191 a, note 1) ; but that celebrated law was framed to provide for the case of a particular family, so that it cannot be interpreted to operate as a general law. But in almost every countiy on the continent of Europe substitutions were limited by the policy of the modern civilians, who soon discovered the evils caused by entrusting so large a power to the hands of a private citizen as that of making his property inalienable in a particular line of succession established by himself, thereby rendering it less beneficial, not only to the public, but to his heirs themselves. These restrictions of the power of alienating were not in every case effectual, and they are, with one exception, abolished by the French Code, on grounds of public policy (French Code CivU, art. 896). By art. 1048, fathers and mothers may give property to one or more of their children, subject to the obligation of transmitting it to the children born or to be born of the settlers in the first degree only." The inconveniences of these substitutions were materially diminished in many parts of Europe, but especially in France, by the registration of instruments containing them. That precaution pre- vented secret substitutions, which might have been used for fraudulent purposes. This brief account of the law regarding fidei-commissa shows its analogy to the law of entails. But a fidei-commissum did not involve any permanent or lasting separation of the legal title to property from the beneficial interest. This separation is the chief feature of usufruct. Usufruct is thus defined in the Institutes of Justinian. Usufruct is the right of using and enjoying the property of another, the substance thereof being preserved. It is the right over a thing, which thing ceasing to exist, the right is necessarily extinguished. Here we see clearly the distinction between the legal estate and the use. Usufruct is classed by the Roman Law among personal as contradistinguished from real servitudes. Uses in the English Law were similar to usufruct, but they produced very different results. The wisdom of the ancient Eomans saw the danger which the Statute of Uses was intended to meet. Both usufruct and uses and trusts are, no doubt, convenient for various purposes. But the effect of ■■ See Merlin Repertoire, torn, xvi. p. 507. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 47 separating indefinitely or permanently the legal right of ownership from the use or enjoyment, must be to constitute two distinct titles to property, with a separate and different devolution. Therefore, the Civil Law provided that usufruct should terminate by the death of the usufructory or cestui que use, and also by non-use for a certain term defined by law. This extinction of usufruct by the union of the usufruct with the property (the legal estate) was- called consoli- datio. The dominion over the property is dismembered by the usufruct being vested in one person and the property in another. Consequently the union of the two rights merges the servitude with the dominium of which it is a part, and they become consolidated together. A perpetual or indefinite separation of the usufruct from the pro- perty or legal estate is contrary to the policy of the Roman Law. For this reason usufruct is a personal right which finishes by the death, natural or civil, of the person in whom it is vested, and becomes consolidated with the property. But by a special limitation to that effect, a usufruct might be made to descend to the heir of the usufructuary. Justinian, however, by one of his Fifty Decisions, determined that the usufruct should terminate in the person of the first heii' of the usufructuary, though granted to his heirs. On the same principle it was doubted by the ancients whether an usufruct could be held by a city or municipal body ; for periculum esse videbatur ne perpetuus fieret, because those bodies could not suffer natural, and would not probably suffer civil death ; and thus the dominium or property would become illusory. But the law in the Pandects allows a bodj' politic or corporation, a charity, and the like, to hold the usufruct for a hundred years, being the utmost limit of human life. The French Code, art. 619, reduces that time to thirty years. In the old French Law another device was adopted for the same purpose. When a usufruct was vested in a corporation or any other body having a perpetual succession, a life was required to be appointed, termed I'homme vivant et mourant, and the usufruct became re- united with the property on the termination of that life. It is evident that the device adopted in this country to avoid the operation of the law of mortmain would have been defeated if the principles of the Civil Law, which does not permit the perpetual separation of the use or equitable estate from the property or legal Digitized by Microsoft® 48 INTRODUCTION TO THE estate, had been appealed to and applied. The Courts of Common Law in the reign of Edward III., when uses of land were introduced by the clergy, might have said : If you borrow uses from the Civil Law, let them be subject to the principles of Civil Law, which limit their duration, and which totally reject the perpetual separation of the use from the dominion or legal estate in land, and, indeed, in every sort of property, real and personal, as a thing abhorrent to sound principles of legal policy. Why this course was not taken it is difficult to say, unless we conjecture that the knowledge of the Civil Law was confined to the clergy, or that the Common Law judges were imperfectly acquainted with it. If the limitation of the duration of uses had been insisted on and adopted, John of Waltham, Chancellor to Richard II., would not have introduced the writ of subpoena, because the Courts of Law need not have refused to recog- nize and enfore fiduciary rights of the cestui que use, and Parliament need only have limited the duration of uses for the benefit of churches and ecclesiastical bodies, on the principles of the Civil Law, to a short term of years. Thus the Court of Chancery might probably never have existed, and there would now be no distinction between Law or Equity. The statute 15 Rich. II. c. 5, would have been unnecessary ; feoffees to the use of religious houses could only have held during a short term, which, aftei: consolidation, would have brought the property within the operation of the law of mortmain. Blackstone tells us that to the inventions of the clergy, for the purpose of evading the law of mortmain, we are indebted for the introduction of uses and trusts, the foundation of modern conveyancing. It would, I believe, be easy to show that the effect of the introduction of uses and trusts on conveyancing and our law in general has been very pernicious, and that the law of real property and conveyancing cannot be reformed without extirpating the vicious principle of the permanent separation of the equitable from the legal estate. We now come to the Statute of Uses, 27 Henry VIII. c. 10. It is remarkable that this statute operated in a manner the reverse of the Roman Law. For instead of terminating the use, by merging it in the dominion or legal estate, the statute transfers the possession to the use ; that is to say, the legal estate is considered as one in actual seisin and possession which is transferred by the statute to the use, that is, to the cestui que use. This was not correct on scientific principles of jurisprudence, for the usufruct or use is a Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 49 dismemberment of the dominium, and therefore ought to follow and coalesce with the dominium. But the object of the statute was sound ; and if it had been effectual it would have restored the great principle of the unity of title, and have prevented the many and costly complications of our present system of conveyancing. But the statute was defeated by the pedantic narrowness of the judges, who held that no use could be limited on a use. Besides which there are other cases of uses not within the operation of the statute, though not limited on another use. The statute, though grounded on sound principles of legislation, was ineffectual, and trusts sprung up in the place of the old law of uses whenever they were within the statute. The Statute of Uses was defeated, and the permanent separation of the legal from the equitable estate still remained, and became established as a most important part of the law of real property in this country, and an institution unknown to the jurisprudence of all other countries. The reason of this is, that there was no allodial land in England. All England was feudal. The feudal system belonged to public law ; but land was becoming more and more the subject of private law. The tenure of la'nd was part of a. political system founded on military service. But that system was declining, and land was more and more considered, as civilisation and comnaerce progressed, in the light simply of private property. Uses and trusts were allodial, because feudal tenure and all its incidents belonged properly to the legal estate. For this reason uses and trusts were useful and convenient, and they no doubt contributed to the gradual extinction of the feudal system. But now that the feudail system has ceased to exist, uses and trusts are unnecessary. The Civil Law permits no distinction or difference between the legal and the equitable estate, and it allows movable and immovable property to be dealt with freely by contract alike. It only admits the distinction between moveables and immoveables. It allows every sort of property to be dealt with in the most direct and simple way according to the interests and wants of mankind." The question now arises, how we can attain this much-desired simplicity of the law of real property. This can only bey' done by abolishing all artificial laws belonging to or arising from the feudal system, and by considering all property as the same, except so far ° Tills will he more fully explained. s Digitized by Microsoft® 50 INTRODUCTION TO THE as its physical nature causes a diversity in the rules of law which apply to it, or special positive laws regulate certain particular kinds of property for economical and political purposes. The first point is that all dealings with immovable property should be direct and simple, and as little technical as jpossible. The legal estate should be entirely assimilated to the equitable estate, and thus the equitable estate would be unnecessary andTuse- less. Whatever modifications of the dominium or right of property may now be made by means of uses and trusts creating equitable estates, should be mad e directl y and_simply without resorting to uses and trusts, — by conveyance or contract without the intervention of trustees. By this means the legal estate can be moulded, and made to fulfil every purpose ; and conveyances to trustees will be resorted to only where they are necessary to take charge of the property for the purposes intended, such, for instance, as trusts for charitable purposes, or for accumulation, &c. By this amendment of the law, powers would be created without any equitable estate. And at law, as well as is now done in equity, a deferted or future interest could be created in the first instance, so as to limit a remainder, after a fee simple determinable on the happening of a given event ; and the artificial and circuitous practice of creating springing, or shifting uses would be superseded by simple grant of^ihe_ownership of the estate, or by contracts, expressing plainly and in simple language the disposition intended to be made according to the intentions of the parties. The object in view is that, whatever can now be done, by means of uses and trusts, may be done, as in the Civil Law, by contract unilateral or otherwise, without resorting to any indirect, circuitous, artificial method. In all cases in which trustees are necessary for the administration and management or dealing with land, the law should invest them with all the powers required for the fulfilment of their trust ; but no estate nor interest in the property should be vested in them. This part of the subject is easily explained by reference to the Civil Law. The leading principle is to be found in the Institutes, lib. iL tit. i. § 7. Justinian there (in accordance with the ancient jurists) holds things consecrated, religious, or sacred to be res nullius. They are appropriated to a purpose, but they are not the property of any one. On ' the same principle, trust property, strictly so called. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 51 is appropriated to a purpose. And to hold that the trustee has any estate or interest in it is a mere fiction. This doctrine is further illustrated by the title of the Institutes Quibus Alienare Licet vel non Licet, which shows that property may be in some cases alienated by one who has no vested interest of proprietorship, or, as we should say, no estate in it, because the law itself gives him the power of doing so. Thus the hypothecarius has a poyver of sale and can alienate the hypothecated property of his debtor, though it is by contract merely a security for the debt. So, if the trust requires the trustee to alienate, the trust property is not his property. He has only a legal power over it. As for trustees for charities, they ought to be deemed simply public officers, administering property for the objects of the charity. The trustees have simply certain duties to perform. The law should give to them the necessary powers. But they should have no rights of dominium, or estate or interest, either legal or equitable. In common sense, and according to the accurate principles of jurisprudence, they should have simply a power and authority conferred by the law. Let us work out the subject more in detail. If, by reforming legislation, the legal estate be rendered capable of being dealt with in the same way as the equitable estate, and moulded for the same purposes, uses and trusts would become unnecessary in this country as they are in other countries. But this is not sufficient, for no reform of the law can be effectual unless it thoroughly carries into operation the principles of the Statute of Uses, which are analogous to those of the Civil Law, by putting an end for the future to the separation and distinction between the legal and equitable estate in land. This can only be done by preventing for the future limitations to trustees for terms of years in conveyances. We have an example of this in Stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. S, repeated and re-enacted (in substance) by 8 & .9 Vict. c. 106, which provides that no estate in law shall be created by way of contingent remainder, but every estate which, before the passing of the Act, would have taken effect as a contingent remainder, shall take effect, if in a will or codicil, as an executory devise, and if in a deed as an executory estate of the same nature, and having the same properties as an executory devise. To conveyances by will the law? has indulged the creation of future Burton, Real Property, § 280. £ 2 Digitized by Microsoft® 52 INTRODUCTION TO THE and contingent estates under the name of executory devises according to a system analogous in other respects to springing and shifting uses, but with this difference, that the gift by will is allowed to be direct and independent of the interposition of a third person which the Statute of Uses requires, and thus the question of scintdla juris may be avoided. This statute thus rendered unnecessary and abolished the convey- ance to trustees to preserve contingent remainders. It also affords an example of rendering the legal estate capable of being dealt with and moulded to the same purposes as the equitable estate. The abolition of the limitation to trustees to preserve contingent remain- ders, and the well-known provision in the Act preventing the de- struction of contingent remainders existing when the Act came into force, effected a great improvement and simplification of the law, rendering obsolete much of the abstruse law contained in Fearne's celebrated treatise. The statute also illustrates the proposition that the interposition of trustees in conveyances is useless. It is, indeed, strange that lawyers did not see that if trustees to preserve were unnecessary in wills and codicils they were unnecessary in deeds also. The distinction was founded on no principle, either of jurisprudence or of common sense. The stats. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 67 and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106 are in truth a valuable step in law reform. They show that the legal estate may be made equally plastic and practically adaptable to every purpose as the equitable estate, and that limitations to trustees ai'e useless. These are, indeed, most important propositions, for they involve the whole subject of the reform of the law of real property, either directly or consequentially. For if the legal estate can be dealt with in the same way and for the same purposes as the equitable estate, there is no reason for the separation of the legal estate from the equitable estate. And if the interposition of trustees is not necessary, it follows that limitations to trustees, and the interposition of trustees in conveyances is unneces- sary ; and if they be unnecessary, they must be prejudicial, because they complicate the law, rendering it unintelligible to the people ; and they give rise to technical questions ; and they, therefore, cause loss of time, and also much expense in dealing with landed property. Now, let us consider this law of trustees with reference to their obligations and liabilities. We ehall see tliat it is desirable, if Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 53 possible, to abolish the office of trustees, and to deal with property without their intervention, — even without consideration of anything apart from the trustees, themselves. The Law of Ekigland adopting the principles of the celebrated Law Contractus in the Pandects, attaches a less degree of responsibility, where a bailee derives, no benefit, but performs a gratuitous duty for the benefit of another.' This is fair and equitable. But although the office of trustee is gratuitous and often very onerous, the Courts have dealt with trustees in a rigorous manner. There are instances in which trustees have suffered severely in consequence of some error in judgment, often caused by the earnest solicitation of the cestuis que trusts, or some slight omission which anyone but the most care- ful and vigilant person might make, even in his own affairs. It is often very difficult to refuse ta be a trustee, but no prudent person will accept the office if he can fairly avoid it. It is an office fraught with trouble and danger. A trustee is often obliged to refuse to do that which his cestuis que trusts wish, and which would be very con- venient and useful to them, or to expose himself and his family to dangerous liabilities.. And frequently, he cannot act in prudence without legal advice, or even without direction of a Court, and he thereby causes delay and serious expense. These considerations suffice to show that trusteeships are liable to grave inconvenience, and that it would be very desirable, if possible, to dispense with them. Trusts were originally invented and used for technical purposes, and to remedy the defective state of the law of real property. They have been extended to personalty in many cases where they aj-e quite unnecessary. The result has been an enormous amount of litigation in suits and actions, and prosecutions against trustees. Many trustees have been ruined. Many trustees have ruined their cestuis que trusts. And it has been necessary to pass an Act making trustees liable to criminal prosecutions. This Act of Parliament was required to bring fraudulent trustees under the criminal law. But the real and true remedy is. to abolish trusts in all cases in which they are not absolutely necessary. And those cases are comparatively few. A radical reform of the law of trusts of personalty is necessary. But that reform is a matter too extensive to be treated here. On this subject the French Law will furnish a solution of every difficulty. 1 L, 23. ff. De Divers. Reg. Jur. ; Coggs v. Bernajcl, Raymond, 909. Digitized by Microsoft® 54 INTRODUCTION TO THE It is true that in well-drawn deeds there are clauses for the relief of trustees as far as may be. But still cases of gi-eat hardship must and do occur in every class of trusteeships ; and a trusteeship is a thing from which every man who knows its responsibilities recoils, if he possibly can do so with propriety. This is, in many instances, im- possible ; and great hardships occur in those cases by persons being forced into a position of dangerous responsibility. All these inconveniences have been caused by the distinction between equitable and legal interests which, from historical causes, existed in the law of real property, being imported into the law of personalty, where it was unnecessary and absurd. And thus the feudal element of the law of real property introduced a most errone- ous and unscientific principle into the law of personalty- Because real property could not be dealt with for and adapted to certain pur- poses without the interposition of trusts, therefore it was imagined that personalty, even money in the funds, could not be in like manner dealt with, except by means of trusts and trustees. And the law of personalty was thus infected with the vicious and totally unscientific notion of the permanent separation of the legal from the equitable estate, used as a means of dealing with property. Personalty may be settled in the same way as real property, but this is only done by means of trusts which are quite unnecessary. Thus, as personalty is not within the opei'ation of the Statute de Donis, it cannot be entailed. And if personalty is to be settled to follow real property entailed, this can only be effected by means of trusts, and through the interposition of trustees. And in this way the technical principles which govern real property are extended to personalty. If entails are useful, personalty should be capable of being entailed as well as real property. If not, entails should be / forbidden. The distinction between real property and unmoveable I personalty or chattels real, is absolutely foolish^ It is impossible to ' justify the law under which an estate for life in land vested in a man a hundred years old is a freehold, while an estate for ten thousand years is only a chattel and personalty. And so according to the Common Law, a grant to A to hold from Michaelmas next for twenty years is good ; but to hold from Michaelmas next for the term of his natural life is void. For no freehold estate can commence in futuro. There was a reason for this in the old Common Law. But that reason has long ceased to exist. The distinction, therefore, ought to Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 55 be got rid of between personal estate in land and freehold. Nothing is here said regarding the law of entail and the restraint on aliena- tion allowed by the law of settlements. Those are exceptional laws the merits and demerits of which depend on economic, social, and political considerations, and which have no influence on jurisprudence, being arbitrary or positive laws, pot grounded on any rule or principle of jurisprudence. They are primarily and chiefly applicable to lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and may, therefore, be considered as belongitag to the law of real property. And the law of primogeniture, which is a law of the same special nature, belongs exclusively to the law of real property. Apart from these special matters, the most essential reform of the law of real property is (in accordance with the Civil Law) to assimi- late it to that which governs personalty. One evil of the legal distinction which ma,kes estates in land less than freehold personalty, is that they devolve on the executor or administrator, while the freehold passes to the heir. Thus we have two entirely different and separate laws of inheritance affecting pro- perty of the same nature, that is to say, immoveable property, so that even an estate pom~ auter vie will go, on intestacy, to the heir, while an estate for' a million of years, or until the day of judgment, will go to the executor or administrator. This is contrary to common sense. It is obvious that all immove- able property ought to be subject to the same law of inheritance in case of intestacy ; that is to say, it ought without distinction to devolve on the heir, and not on the executor, if, indeed, the distinc- tion between heirs and executors is to exist. Let us now apply the principles already explained to the creation of equitable estates and limitations to trustees in settlements. Let us see first a concise form of settlement on marriage.' The operative part commences with a conveyance by the settlor to trustees and their heirs to the use of the settlor till marriage, and then after marriage, follow limitations in favour of the husband, wife and children. The first question that arises is this : Is there any need for the grant to trustees ? By that grant, the legal estate, if it was in the settlor, or a quasi legal estate, is vested in the trustees and' their ' Davidson, Precedents, No. xxxvii. Digitized by Microsoft® 56 INTRODUCTION TO THE heirs, and all the subsequent limitations are equitable estates; The legal ownership, or dominium is in the trustee ; and thus until the late Judicature Act, the husband and the successive proprietors within the limitations of the settlement could not bring an eject- ment ; and the trustees are burthened with onerous and responsible duties. The powers of sale and exchange are vested not in the pro- prietor of the estate, but in the trustees and the survivor and the executors and administrators of such survivor. The husband and the other persons entitled are usufructuaries, while at law^ the trustees are the owners of the land, though liable to be compelled to fulfil the trusts of the settlement, and this is so, notwithstanding the consolidation of the equitable with the legal jurisdiction by the Judicature Act. Thus a fuU-grown man and woman are put under a sort of curatorship, like infants or lunatics. When the greatest and most powerful territorial lord marries he is obliged to give his estate to trustees. Thus, in the discussions regarding baronies by tenure, one, and a weighty objection was, that the trustees of a settlement, — or the person in whom the legal estate was vested, — a person often very difficult to discover, would sit in the House of Lords as the baron, and not the real lord : and so a money-lender would sit as a baron, as mortgagee with the legal estate, instead of the mortgagor, the real lord of the soil. This illustrates the absurdity of the law, which interposes a stranger between the land and the real land- owner, and this is an essential part of a technical and complicated system, of which no one but a conveyancer can be master, and which places the landowners in the hands of the lawyers. For few landed proprietors are able to understand the title to their own estates, and they cannot deal with their property without legal advice and assist- ance, which are always expensive. In some settlements terms of years are created to raise money. They are satisfied when such money has been raised. The statute 8 & 9 Vict. cap. 112, recites, that the assignment of satisfied terms has been found to be attended with great difficulty, delay and expense, and to operate in many cases to the prejudice of the persons entitled to the land to which they relate. The chief delay, difficulty and expense arose from making out the title. But the same evils are caused by the difficulty of finding the persons in whom the terms are vested, and procuring their execution of the deeds. The statute provides for the cesser of such satisfied terms becoming attendant Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. B7 on the inheritance and reversion. But questions must arise as to whether and when a term is satisfied, and whether and when it is attendant on the inheritance' or reversion by express declaration or construction of law." Therefore the cesser of the term must be in many cases a question of doubt and difficulty, and consequently involve delay and expense. Such terms ought_to_be. entirely dispensed with. The question now arises : What remedy is proposed for the reform of the law on the matters above indicated ? The Civil Law sheds a flood of light on this question. And here we see the use of the Civil Law for the improvement of our own law, and for the solution of every difficulty in legislation. A settlement ought not to be a conveyance. It ought to be only a contract. That is to say, it ought not to transfer the land. It ought only to create obligations and liabilities, and charge them on land by way of hypothecation or lien. Let us now consider some of the usual limitations of a settlement. The first limitation to trustees to the use of the settlor until marriage is useless. For the whole transaction is grounded on this marriage, and if it do not take place the property ought to remain as it was the consideration having totally failed. The only object of this limitation is technical, and founded on the absurd expedient of a con- veyance to trustees. We come now to the estate for life of the settlor. For this a conveyance to trustees is clearly unnecessary. According to the principles of the Civil Law already explained, that land should be dealt with by contract, and not by conveyance (a method derived from the antiquated principle of livery of seisin), the trustees might effectually perform their duty without taking any estate or interest in the land. But the trustees themselves are use- less. It ought to be sufficient for the settlor to bind himself by contract to hold for life. This would be a covenant running with the land, and creating a life interest with all its incidents. The contract should be entered into between the intended husband and wife, or between the intended husband and wife and her father, or some relative or friend, who would act, not as a trustee, but as a protector or curator of her rights, having power to enforce the due performance of the contract. Thus there would be no separation of the legal from the equitable estate, and the simple unity of the title would be preserved intact. ' Davidson, Concise Precedents, p. 75.. Digitized by Microsoft® 58 INTRODUCTION TO THE We come next to the jointure, or other provision for the wife in case she survive her husband. Here again there is no need for trustees. The marriage contract and the law should give the widow a charge on the land, and a right to call on the heir for an account of the rents and profits of the estate, and to compel him to pay her what she is entitled to. This she should be entitled to do by herself, or her protector, curator, or next friend. It is a mistake to suppose that in order to enforce charges on land, some one must have an estate or vested interest in it. Thus, as we have seen, the Civil Law gives us instances where a person may sell property without having any vested interest in it. Justinian says : Accidit aliquando ut qui dominus rei sit alienore non possit : et contra, qui dominus non sit, alienandi rei potestatem habeat.' This is an important principle of jurisprudence and prolific of conse- quences. The power of disposing of land is the creature of the law, and of contract, and the law may give that power to a stranger having no vested or contingent interest in the land. So a stranger — that is to say, a person having no estate or interest in the land — may, in accordance with the principles of jurisprudence, — be invested by the law with a right and power to enforce a charge on land legally created. If the owner of the land gives by contract such a power, the law ought to enforce it. And to create such a power it is un- necessary to transfer the legal ownership of the estate, or to convey the estate to trustees, thereby causing duality of title, and subverting the simplicity of unity of title. Let us now consider the provisions for the application of the rents and profits during the minority of children after the death of the father. Here again the conveyance or limitation to trustees is use- less. The mother is naturally the person who ought to exercise those powers. In case of her death, incapacity, or unfitness, let curators or guardians be appointed by the deed. It may be objected that those curators or guardians would be similar to trustees. But this is not so. For there would be no conveyance of a term or vested interest in the estate to them, and thus the unity of the title would remain unbroken. Then we come to the powers of leasing, sale and exchange. Here again the conveyance or limitation to trustees is unnecessary. Those powers should be exercised by the owner of the estate: and if he is incapable, or unfit to exercise them, or if it ' Instit. L. xi. torn. 8. Quibus Alien. Licet vol Non. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OP THE CIVIL LAW. 59 be desired to prevent him from selling the land without properly securing the purchase-money, some person should be appointed by the deed or the Court to control him, and to protect the interests of other parties. This analysis shows the uselessness and the inconve- nience of those technical and artificial restrictions which the law of real property and conveyancing has imposed upon dealings with, and the management of, land. Here we have to consider two important principles of jurisprudence and legislation. One is the liberty of contracts, and the other is the doctrine that the law regarding immoveable property ought not to differ from that which regulates m.oveables, or personalty, except so far as the immoveability of the former requires ; and also in those respects and exceptional particulars which arise from political reasons and the interests of society, as, for instance, the law of primogeniture, and of entails and settlements. These exceptional and positive laws are founded on the principle of utility which is their reason and the foundation of their justice." I. The principle ofi liberty of contract is in substance this. The law ought to interfere as little as possible with dealings between man and man, and ought to facilitate those dealings. Technical restric- tions and arbitrary rules affecting such dealings and the manage- ment and disposal of property should not exist, except where they are necessary for a clear advantage to the community. This is in accordance not only with jurisprudence, but also with political economy. For any unnecessary interference with, or impediment to dealing with, property and its management diminishes its value. Thus if Consols were subjected to the technical and artificial systems which are known as the Law of Real Property and Conveyancing, they would be depreciated, and the public interest would be injured. And so the great question put by law reformers is this : Why cannot an estate in fee simple be transferred from one man to another as easily and as simply as a bale of goods ? If this could be done, the value of land would be enormously increased. II. Let us examine the second of the two principles, and in doing so we shall throw light on the first. In the Civil Law there is no distinction between moveable and immoveable pro- " Cujacius Op. torn. vii. fol. 9. Edit. Venet. IfUtin. L. ix. ff. de Just, et Jur. Domat, Loix Civ. Traite des Loix, Ch. xi. § 20. Digitized by Microsoft® 60 INTRODUCTION TO THE perty, except those arising from their nature as such. In the Ci^'il Law there is no such thing as estates in land, such as fee simple and the like. The different interests which may be had in land are not defined by any technical rules of law. Conse- quently land may be subjected to all kinds of contracts like move- ables. There is no distinction between freehold and less than freehold, for the distinction of property is only between immoveables and moveables, and there are no executors in the Civil Law. All the estate of the deceased, real and personal, passes to the heir with all the debts and liabilities affecting it. And real property is dealt with by will in the same manner as personalty. The only material difference of the law applicable to the two sorts erf propert}' is that of servitudes real and habitation, and, in practice, hypothecs. There is also the exceptional contract of emphyteusis, from which some of the learned have considered feudal tenures to be derived. In other respects the Civil Law deals with all property alike with iiniform rules except so far as the nature of the property renders special rules necessary. And whatever the nature of the property, whether moveable or immoveable, it may be dealt with by the same contracts, varied in every possible way to suit all the purposes of human life and intercourse! The rules of the Civil Law regaording the Contract of Sale are substantially the same, whether the thing sold is land or moveable property. Sugden's. " Vendors and Purchasers '' would have astonished Cujacius, Donellus, Pothier, Yoet, and the other great Civilians. Compare that work with the Titles of the Pandects, con- taining the Law of the Contract of Sale and Purchase ; that is to sa}', De Contrahenda Emptione, De in Diem addictione, De Lege Com.- missoria, De Hereditate vel actione vendita, De Rescidenda Venditione, De Periculo et Commodo sed Vendita, De Actione Empti et Venditio, and the Commentators and Expositors of those Titles. They contain a homogeneous and uniform system of law applying to every description of property, with such exceptions only as the physical nature of the thing sold requires. The same is to be found in the succeeding title Locati Conducti. The nature and uses of the different things which may be the subject matter of this contract, necessarily cause a diversity of rules. But the principles of the contract itself are the same, and the diversities arise from the vei-y nature of things and not from any artificial law or legal institution. In like manner, the Title De Pignoribus et Hypothecis Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 61 treats pawn and mortgage conjointly, and Voet says : " Conventionali sensu latiori, pignus in specie hypothecam complectitur, adeo ut inter pignus et hypothecam, tanturn nominis sonus differat ut ex utroque actio hypothecaria nascitur .... licet pignus est contractus .... quo possessio in creditorem transit, et hypotheca est pactum .... quo creditori jus in re constituitur in securitatem crediti, non translata in creditore possessione."* Thus if land is the security, and the creditor is in possession, the contract is pignus.^ But generally speaking, hypotheca applies to immoveable property, because the creditor is sufficiently secured without having possession, and this is not so with regard to moveables. In the English law, however, mortgage is totally different from pawn. For it consists of an actual conveyance of the land to the mortgagee, subject to an equity of redemption iu the mortgagor. Here again we find the pernicious system of separating the. legal from the equitable estate, which is the principal cause of the complication of titles to land and the difficulty and expense of conveyancing. The abolition of mortgage and the inti-oduction of the law of hypothec, together with a system of registration of hypothecs, would be a most useful step in the reform of the law. This wo\dd be easily effected by resorting to the Codes of modern Europe where the law of hypothec and registration are brought to great perfection. The principle ought to be fully carried out that lands, tenements, and hereditaments, are to be made a security for a debt according to the same law as personalty, and that in like manner they may be charged with the payment of money without any conveyance to trustees, but by contract or will, creating a lien or hypothecation, with tlie necessary powers for enforcing it. One very important result of the simplification of titles by abolish- ing the separation between the equitable and the legal title, except for a limited period, according to the principles of the Roman Civil Law, is that the establishment of a general registration of deeds will be greatly facilitated. This subject deserves further explanation. It is not necessary here to explain the distinction between registra- tion of titles and registration of deeds. If a general registration of titles were possible so that the register would show who is the owner of the land and what his interest in the land is, no doubt great advantage would be obtained. But the difficulty is that, before the ' Voet ad Panel, lib. xx, tit. i. § 1. 1 1bid. § 2. Digitized by Microsoft® 62 INTRODUCTION TO THE title can be registered, it must be established and proved. Attempts have been made to meet this difficulty, but they have not been successful. No one can be registered as the owner with absolute and indefeasible title unless he is tenant in fee simple of the land not subject to any mortgage or other charge, so that a purchaser would only have to see his name on the register and the description of the property. Such cases are few, and applicable mostly to small estates. And if the legal estate were outstanding it must appear on the register. A proprietor having a limited interest in the land ; such, for instance, as a tenant for life under a settlement, or a tenant in tail, could not be registered as absolute owner. Either the deed or the substance and effect of the deed must be registered. So if there be a mortgage or other charge on the estate, even though it be an estate in fee simple, the deed, or the effect of the deed creating the charge, must appear on the register. So where there are several owners, their names must be registered and the effect of the deed or will under which they hold, showing whether they are joint tenants or tenants in common, or what the nature of their respective interests are. It follows that except in the uncommon case of an absolute tenant in fee simple without charges, the register must in substance be a register of deeds, or of the effect of deeds. If not, it cannot be called a general register, for its use will be very limited. It is pro- posed by the report of the Registration Commission of 1868, that the name of a registered owner should be on the register, and that interests not on the register should be protected by notices or caveats. But this would afford no protection to a purchaser, for he must still investigate the title to ascertain what those interests are, and the sale of the land would not be facilitated. It is therefore best that all the interests should appear on the register, provided the law protects him against all deeds not on the register, whether he had notice of them or not. It is true that in the case of stock, a ti'ustee appears in the books of the Bank of England as owner, and other interests are protected by stop orders or registered notices. To this extent the case resembles that of the proposed registered owner of land, for a purchaser must investigate the title to the stock. But the title to stock is much more simple than the title to land. The bank pays the dividends on stock to the registered proprietors only, or to their properly constituted attorneys, and if there is reason to suspect that the registered proprietors are dead, the bank suspends the further Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 63 payment of dividends. In this way the connection between the real and nominal ownership is constantly maintained in a practical and effectual form. But this cannot be so with a register of title to land, because the rents and profits cannot be paid by the registra- tion office. The transfer of land cannot be as easy as the transfer of 'stock, unless the title to land is made as simple as the title to'stock. For registration cannot make a title better or more simple than it is. In the case even of an absolute and indefeasible title in fee simple, all that registration can do is to record it. But such cases are uncom- mon. In other cases all that registration can do is either to record the deeds affecting the property, or to record a notice to induce the purchaser to require the production of such deeds. And it is better that the deeds should appear on the register, provided no deeds are admitted as against a purchaser unless they are registered. For thus the purchaser is certain of the title. He is not bound to go beyond the register. The deeds should be copied into the register, and the register should be conclusive without the production of the original deeds. Thus a purchaser should not be obliged to compare the deeds with the register, but the deeds would remain in the custody of whoever is entitled to such custody.^ The deeds would be stamped with the seal of the Kegistrar to show that they have been regis- tered, and the date of, and parties to, all the deeds registered, and the page of the register should be endorsed on each deed. This would, in many cases, render it unnecessary to search the registry. For each deed would serve as an index to the registers and show what deeds have been registered. This system would constitute something like a double registration, and would, to a considerable extent, obviate the dangers arising from the loss or destruction of the re- gister or of deeds. Every purchaser of land should be obliged to register his purchase deed. But owners should be allowed to register their deeds in any case. There should be separate registers— of mortgages and leases, other than agricultural leases. * It deserves consideration whether parties should not be allowed the option of regi3tering_printed copies. If so, any requisite number of copies might be struck off, and authentlcatecTby the seal of the Registry. The printed copies of deeds should be numbered, and each printed copy of deed should have the numbers of all the other registered deeds with the pages or other reference to the register. Thus each printed copy would be an index of the register. Digitized by Microsoft® 64 INTRODUCTION TO THE These suggestions are grounded on the systems of registration which exist all over the Continent of Europe. Lord Hatherley said in the House of Lords [5th May, 1874], that he had long regretted that this country was the only one without a Land Reg;istry, that system existing among us only in Middlesex and Yorkshire.' No doubt this is much to he lamented. But the real difficulty was pointed out by the Registration Commissioners appointed in 1868, In their report in 1870, p. xxr., after referring to the foreign re- gistries, they say: "The Continental nations have, we believe, a more simple law." No doubt a perfect system of registration cannot be obtained here without a reform of the cumbersome and compli- cated law of Conveyancing and Real Property, and especially without the abolition of uses and trusts, and of the distinction between the legal and equitable estate, which are unknown to the law of all other civilised countries. These are the real causes why land cannot be dealt with in this country as easily as personalty. No doubt the vicious system of uses and trusts has infected the law of personalty to some extent. And so far the law regarding personalty requires reform. But the general doctrine may safely be laid down, that dealings with land -cannot be as easy as dealings with personalty, unless the law of real property is reformed by the introduction of unity of title, and by assimilating it as much as may be to the law of personalty. Until this reform is effected, the complication and multiplicity of interests in land, and deeds, wills, probates, and administrations affecting it, must greatly impair the utUity of any system of registration, however ingeniously and ably contrived. It has been asserted that a registry of deeds, though it would increase the secuiity of property would not facilitate its transfer and ■ As to the registers of Middlesex and Yorkshire, see Co. Litt. 290, note 1, § xiii. The decision of Lord Hardwicke in Le Neve v. Le Neve, 1 Ves. 64, established this doctrine. If a deed respecting lands in any of the register counties is not regis- tered, and afterwards the same lands are sold or mortgaged by a deed properly registered ; if the person claiming under the second deed has notice of the first deed, the person claiming under the first deed, though it is not registered, shall be preferred to him- This decision, letting in the doctrine of notice, has rendered the r^istries comparatively useless. The French Ordinance of 1747, framed by the Chancellor D'Agnesseau, after taking the opinion of aU the parliaments of the kingdom, decided that a creditor or purchaser having notice of a substitution, before his contract or purchase is to be admitted to plead the want of registration, and this is now the law of France. Thus the doctrine of notice is absolutely excluded. Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OP THE CIVIL LAW. 65 dealings with it. This, however,' may be questioned. For whatever renders the title more secure and clear must enable the owner to deal with the property with less difficulty and expense. The period of limitation ought to be shortened. The statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, is founded on the general principle of giving twenty years' allo^v^ance of time for the recovery of corporeal hereditaments, except in the case of disability. As for personalty, except with respect to instruments under seal, and some other cases not within the stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, with regard to which twenty years are allowed by stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, the period of limitation by the statute of James, is six years. It is difficult to see why the period of six years should not be extended to corporeal hereditaments, with due provisions for cases of disability. Moreover, the distinction between instruments under seal, and those which are not clothed with that formality, is absurd, and founded on antiquated and obsolete ideas ; and one period of limitation should be estab- lished without reference to that distinction. It is indeed strange, that a wafer or a little sealing-wax placed at the'foot of an instru- ment should be supposed to change its legal character, and that such a superstition should have lasted to our times. This shortening of the period of limitation regarding real property would very greatly diminish the expense of all dealings with land, and thereby increase its value very materially. It would] also greatly facilitate the establishment of an effectual system of regis- tration. A separate register should be provided for mortgages or hypo- thecs. Thus it would not be necessary to enter copies of deeds of that nature in the principal register. There a reference to the hypothecary register would be sufficient, and this would relieve and simplify the principal and more important register. The registration of such incumbrances should, for the future, be made compulsory; and purchasers as well as mortgagees should be secured by law against unregistered deeds which ought to have been registered. Thus the doctrine of notice would be excluded. Provision should also be made, as in the French"Law,''to enable a purchaser to clear off incumbrances (purger les hypotheques,) by de- positing, with due notices, the sum required to the credit of^ the register office, which would have an account at the Bank of England for that purpose. Digitized by Microsoft® 6§ INTRODUCTION TO THE A separate registration should be provided for leases, except mere agi'icultural leases and some others. The word Lease in the principal register, with a reference to the register of leases, would be notice, and the register of leases should also have refer- ences to the principal register, so that any one dealing with the lease would be able to find with ease the registered deeds constituting the title of the lessor. The law should define, clearly and simply, what leases must be registered, and the lessee should be bound to see that his lease is registered and the proper notice entered in the principal register, and if he neglects to do so his lease should be void, except against the lessor himself. Thus a purchaser of the land would not be obliged to search the Register of Leases to ascei-tain whether there is a lease, for if he finds no notice in the principal register he has a right to assume that there is no lease, or at any rate no lease binding on him. The same law should be enacted with regard to the registration of mortgages (hypothecs) and thus a purchaser would not be obliged to search the register of mortgages to ascertain whether there are any such charges on the property which ought to have been registered. It is shown in the foregoing pages that the Modem Civil Law is a necessary part, if not the very foundation, of that science which is properly and correctly called jurisprudence — that is to say, the know- ledge, practical as well as theoretical, of the rules or laws by which all the relations of men with each other are, or ought to be, governed, whether those laws are immutable, or positive and arbitrary ; and of the laws on which Civil societies are constructed, and by which they subsist under various forms. And on the same rules, or the principles from which they spring, the relations of bodies of men such as states and nations to each other depend. We have seen how, by analysis, that vast multiplicity of rules and laws constituting universal jurisprudence may be classified so as to give a key to their application and various uses, and a plan of the great system which they constitute. These things are more fully developed in my Commentaries on Universal Public Law. We have seen how the study and cultivation of the Civil Law should be conducted for the purpose of using it to the greatest advantage, not only for intellectual, but for practical purposes. And it has been shown that the use of the Civil Law Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 67 extends to the science of legislation, and that it is required for the improvement of our laws, because it sheds on them the full and resplendent light of the learning, experience, and wisdom of those great civilians and statesmen who, all over the Continent of Europe, for many centuries have cultivated and improved that law, and adapted and applied it to all the wants and the progress of civilised life. Thereby many difficulties may be solved, and the reform of our law may be greatly advanced. These objects cannot be attained by antiquarian and historical investigation of the positive laws and customs of the ancients. They require a liberal and enlightened method directed to practical purposes, and calculated to secure the concurrence of practical men engaged in the administration of the law, and in legislation and government. And the result of that method will be to show how imperfect our law is, and how much it requires to borrow from other legal systems. Much has, no doubt, been done to reform our law. But the task of reform will never be completed unless we examine our law impartially, and apart fromi national prejudices. We shall then see why the administration of justice is more expensive and dilatory here than in other countries, and why we are the only civilised nation without a code. And when once the difficulties in which we are placed have been understood, the proper and effectual remedies will easily be discovered. And the process of simplification and the application of reason and good sense, wiU render the knowledge of the law no longer, as it now is, inacces- sible to those who have not made it their profession. This is of great importance. It may indeed be laid down, that that system of law is best which is most capable of being understood, as far as may be, by the people who are to be governed thereby — or at least the educated part of them, and which most commends itself to their common sense and their knowledge and experience of business. And that system is worst in which a man can do nothing without the advice of lawyers, which he is obliged to receive with implicit faith, because, whatever may be his mental powers, he is not able fully to comprehend it with any well-grounded confidence in his own judgment. This must be so, where, as in this country, the law mainly consists of the daily decisions of judges, and there is no complete body of law or code to which anyone can refer, and in which he can see what the law is. It is true, — the law must always be a science, and there must be cases of doubt under every system. But the object of wise Digitized by Microsoft® 68 INTKODUCTION TO THE legislation must be to restrict those cases, by providing a basis of written law, clearly expressed and as comprehensive as possible. A collateral but important effect of constituting a body of written law is, that it would diminish the arbitrary power of the judges, and check that peculiar spirit of the Law of England which leads the Courts to exercise that power, even over acts of the legislature, to an extent unexampled in the civilised world. One aspect remains under which the simplification of the law, the composition of a Code, and everything that facilitates the adminis- tration of justice ought to be considered. It has been often said with truth, that by rendering justice cheaper, the value of property is increased, and national wealth augmented. In no department of the public service is it more true that Magnum est vectigal parsimonia, if that axiom be applied to the expenditure of those who resort to the Courts of Justice. Indeed, the people of this country seem never to have understood this truth, the practice of which is more important than many of the economical measures by which governments have obtained applause, or incurred, sometimes deserved, censure. The people seem never to have fuUy understood the enormous waste with which the law is in this kingdom adminis- tered in all its branches, including all the management of and dealings with property, as well as administrative and judicial pro- ceedings, both voluntary and contentious. To put an end to that waste would be a greater financial measure and success than ever was achieved. It would practically diminish the national debt, by rendering the burthen of taxation more easy. And that rehef would not be deferred, like that arising from terminable annuities, but immediate, and extending to the classes of the community who pay a larger amount of taxation. But this cannot be effected by cutting down salaries, nor by dimin- ishing the remuneration of those who earn it with benefit to the public. The object can only be accomplished by the improvement of the law and of the mode of administering it. Uncertainty, difficulty, and delay are expense and waste. Certainty, simplicity, and expe- dition are economy. A defective Act of Parliament costs the country thousands, before its meaning and effect are determined by the opinions of counsel and judicial decisions. And bad law or compli- cated machinery are financially pernicious. Thus the legislation regarding companies — and especially the iniquitous proceedings for Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 69 compulsory liquidation, by ■which the assets are plundered and con- sumed in costs — have caused the loss of enormous sums positively wasted. A good Code would have prevented this, by providing a complete system of law regarding those associations considered as limited partnerships, and not treated piecemeal and exceptionally, but in conjunction with the law of partnership, and systematically on scientific principles of jurispnidence. This is one instance to illus- trate the proposition that the imperfect state and the difficulty of the law are a grievous burthen on the country, and a diminution of its capital. A perfect Code, making the law plain and intelligible, would be a greater financial relief to the country than any retrenchment practicable in the estimates. It would not only be a saving in hard cash, but also a saving by the facilitation of business and the economy of time, the money value of which would be enormous — for time is money. Delay is always loss, often failure, and some- times ruin. That which, in the language of the day, is called law reform, has never been seriously and practically considered in this light, for it has been chiefly looked upon with regard to the grievances of indi- viduals. It ought to be dealt with as a matter of general and national importance, with reference to its effect on the resources, the industry, the revenue, and the capital of the country. Another consideration must now be dealt with. It is the waste of energy, ability, talent, health, and even life, which is caused by the defective state of our law. In no other country have the judges and practitioners of the law so laborious, anxious, and difficult a duty. Many have broken down, especially those who were wanting in physical strength, or in the peculiar faculty of quick perception, which facilitates mental work. They were the victims of a bad system of law. They had to deal with unwritten law based upon, or rather consisting of, judicial decisions. And where they had to construe and apply the written law — that is to say. Acts of Parliamentr— they were again met by decisions — reported cases,— often of the most arbitrary character, because their spirit was analogous to that of the decisions constituting the unwritten law which is in truth judicial legislation. Thus, no one can say what is the meaning of an Act of Parliament without knowing what the Courts have decided thereon. For the Courts have repealed portions of Acts of Parliament, or altered their Digitized by Microsoft® 70 INTEODUCTION TO THE plain grammatical meaning materially. Under a complete system of written law forming a Code, the labours of judges and practitioners would be wonderfully diminished. They would be able to do twice the amount of business with less exertion and in less time, and there- fore it would be better done. Instead of analysing and comparing Cases, the judges would have the written law before them. Decisions on that law would therefore take a subordinate and subsidiary posi- tion. The decisions would not contain the law. They would be used only as explanations of the law. And thus the element of uncertainty would be greatly diminished. Bat this difficulty will, no doubt, be suggested. It will be argued that the decisions of the Judges would accumulate so as to almost supersede the Code, and that therefore the state of the law would become very much as it is now. To this there are two answers. First, though reported cases often overshadow Acts of Parliament, it does not follow that they could do the same with a complete system of written law ; and secondly, it would be desirable that the Code should be periodically revised and compared with the Cases, and aJl disputed points settled by legislation similar to the Fifty Decisions of Justinian. The tendency of a complete system of written law would be to check the arbitrary interpretation of the Couits, even in the administration of that law. For the Judges would feel that they were no longer law-makers. And their responsibility to public opinion would be very different from what it is now, for the general body of educated persons would more and more understand the law, and judge for themselves as to its meaning and effect. This is so in France, where every man has the Code Civil in his hands — with or without Notes. Even there, cases of doubt and difficulty occur ; and decisions, especially those of the Court of Cassation, must be referred to. But still, there is the written law to fall back upon ; and this diminishes the element of uncertainty, and the arbitrium of the Courts. For the rule of the Civil Law prevails : Legihus non exem- plis judicare oportet. And the Judges are bound to decide in obe- dience to the meaning of the words of the written law, in accordance with rules of interpretation and construction laid down by the written law itself. This is very different from deciding on the authority of Cases, which themselves depend on other and anterior Cases based on the doctrines that the law is in the breast of the Judges, and that their decisions are the evidences of what the law is. For under this Digitized by Microsoft® STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. 71 Bystem there is no basis. There is often no law. No doubt a great part of both the Common Law and Equity is so settled by decisions of the Courts that it cannot be disturbed. But still the uncertainty of the law, arising from the power of the Judges to overrule cases and to draw distinctions for the purpose of evading previous cases, is a great evil. It gives rise to great expense and delay, and it is a serious injury to business, and to all transactions and questions between man and man which must be regulated by law. The only remedy is a complete Code of written law. But that Code will be of little advantage without the abrogation of all anterior law of every description relating to the subjects provided for in the Code. This was done by Justinian and NapoleoD, and it is a necessary measure. Another necessary condition for making a Code is, as has already been shown, that its materials must be taken, not from this country alone, but from the laws and the legal science of the whole civilised world. Whether public opinion in this country will entertain such innova- tions as have been sketched out in the foregoing pages remains to be seen. It is difficult to persuade English lawyers to teach or to learn the Civil Law on any method except that which is suggested by the positive and historical spirit of the English law, and therefore based more on authority and history than on the reason and science of law, which are in truth highly cultivated and systematic common sense. But the great value of the Civil Law consists in the fact that it contains more common sense than any other legal system. This is the key both to its Study and its Use. This is the true reason of its adoption throughout the civilised continent of Europe, and its paramount authority — Non ratione vmperii, sed rationis imperio. There may be still greater difficulty to induce the people and the Legislature of this country to see the use of the Civil Law for the solution of our questions in legislating for the amendment of our own law. That use would, as has been shown above, lead to extensive and fundamental changes in our law, in accordance with the Civil Law, beyond any reform that has yet been attempted. It may be many years before these things are accomplished, or even dealt with practically. But the time must and will come when their wisdom, and even their necessity, will be recognised by statesmen, and by the most educated and intellectual classes of the nation. And when Digitized by Microsoft® 7i THE STUDY AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW. those refonus receive that sanction, practical men will wonder why they were not long ago adopted. For one characteristic of truth and wisdom is that, though apparently difficult to discover, like many thii^ in science they seem easy and even obvious when once they have been attained. THE END. BRADDCRV^ Ap^'KW. A CO. Digitized by Microsoft® A c ) A'P A T ,nc\ LJ 111 LAW WORKS, IMi|il,l;i|ll(H |i\ STEVENS AND SONS, I lit. CIlANlMOItV I),\NM. LONhON. \V.(\ ACIS, JUniOATUMB, WOHKS ON, \,' ,li nu An:iiK An^. ,,|,, 1,1 if, AdIS OF I'AUIIAMINI". I'ul.llo nihl Lord AcU :nv iu.1,1 jaiiLilv, luhl lim,V 1"' llMll "I llh' ruMI:lll.'lu ul' Ihl'i ( 'al,'llo|j'U.', \\lhl ll:l\c> IiImo 111! iMilo lliii liii'm>M (Mil,. I'll, .ly of I'l'iMil-,. Ai'tM, ivIaliuH' Im I'IhIjiIi':!, I'liii'liinur,.". KiillwiiMi, UnMiln, iK'iv, ,'ii', ACTION AT 1 AW.— 1 .ynoh'M 'l';\l uiImi' AiimIv'.Im .>r ll\t> Pi-.»H'.>illn\pi In Mil A.'liMii Ml-l .Mw 111 iho SlipiM'lnr I'olll'I'i, 1,11' Ml,' um' ol' MI\hI,miIm, S\o, IS',;!. M''"'''l. .Wit. Is. SuUI ir!M-l"llll ^^■■'> Av'lioll ill. I.MVW All l',l,niii>iil:uv \'li\\ 111' lUo l'iiii',.mliiu;,.i ill n\\ Ai'U.m iil. I.iiw, l!v .lOIIN W 11,1,1 AM SMrni, lv„|. Alltlliirnl' " l.,.rt,lillj;>r:l:.f.,"'",\ C.IU. |i,iiilliuu III' Mmviiulil.i l,;iH," ,'ii>,, ^i', I'lli'vi'Ulli lOilili.iu, iiibiiili'il 1,1 ihii i.r.'«iii\i I'liii'iii'.'. H\ s.uiiMsi, riiMN'nch:, 1i;m.|,, (,>,i'. i'.!i»ii, IS. a, I'.v, li,/. Ai:tMIHAl.lY rni.MiiU-ir,- Ailmlriilly IUu'"'l. A l>k;v.l, 111' till' l,inv mill ry:i.'li.'.' nf 111.' lll,i;ll < '.Mirl nl' .\,liiiiiMll v .if Iviiilliiiiil, with Nnli'ii liiMu 'l'ii\|. Wi'ilovii. :iuil tlio iSimI,,'1i, I'i'imIi, Mini AiiiiMii'.iii lii'imiT., Hv \VII,1.I,\M 'I'.VK'N I'U' ITCH ,\ K I >. I'lMi'liiv 111 I'lii'liir-r I 'iiliililiill'i, ^^.'l'•lllll l'',,lili,Mi, mull I ill!-' I'l'i o mill iMiiiM I'jiN Hv i;oi>i.',in' ,\, riiriHMi \iip. n.ci,,, nr llii- liiiiiM' 'l','iii|.l.., r',iriiNl,'i'al l,:in. iiml W 11,1,1 \M 'I'.VHN l'i;ri'i'll.\i;iV Wllli Ni,|,',,i,i| (\i.,.,-,,.ri-,,iii Imih.Ii M.inlim,- 1,;iw. \\\ \\,{',\:\i\0\ ,H1M',M, ,V\,v;il l^ lik Cuiii' lllllu^Hi^ll' ,li> I'miM. a\,i|a. K,i,\iiKSM,, l.Sii.-i, ;;/. SIllMli'M ('^M!'i>'i lii',inl .'Uiil il,,|,inulii,'il in 111,, \ i.-,- ,\,liiiiv!il| v Ciiiiil 111. i.iu.'li,..', l;i;!ii',.\, l'',,IU,.,l liv (Jl'HMvMil'', OKll,!. S'lTAK'!', l',M\,. i.Vi'. 'Jviiln. Kiniil ,Sui. ' K><.'i.-'< ',-.'i. A',;',', .',,'. ADULTERATION. Tlu- l.tiw of Ailulloi'jili.-iiM. IViii,; iv iiiili'lli'iil lii':i(ir.,> iMi llh' ,\,'l.'i I'l'i' llu' rri'M-iiliiUi ,11' ,\iliilli'i.ili,,i'i „r l'',>|i|l, l'lilll>.!lll,l Prlli;.',, Mllll nil .\|'li,Ml,ll\. i'>,lll:lilll\li; lll,i \,llll(,-VM- tiini ,il IAi,>il .\,'l\ I.MiO ,\" !.'<,-'.', V'.':!,'; v'l \ ii'l. ,'. ,S|, m\,l ,'!,, ,'i. ;!ii \ i,'i |i, ,• n r,\ i^lPM'lN WiUM.K, Kv,i., ol llu' MiiliU,, 'r.'iuiil,', Rin'i;>l,'i-nt 1,!1«. r,"iii,>, l,'<','i ;!.«. li,/. AOENCY, I V>lviriiv<''-< PrUUM|>;il iiinl .A^it-iK. ,\ Miuiuiil ,>f 111!' I.tiw of l~riii,'li'!il ilUil Ai;,'iil. l\v 1;. ('. rl'.'l'ljli U IC. li'mo, i;;.'!,'. r.v. (i,/, ICU'.-ir'll''' 'l'rt*\.^ l.-^,;!. M,'. Digitized by Microsoft® 2 STEVENS AND SONS' LAW PUBLICATION'S. AGRICULTURAL LAW Cooke on Agricultural Law.— The Law and Practice of Agricultural Tenancies, with Numerous Precedents of Tenancy Agreements and Farming Leases, &c., &c. By G. WINGEOVE COOKE, Esq., Barrist6r-at-Law. 8vo. 1851. 18s. Dixon's Farm.— Vide "Farm.'' ARBITRATION.— Levi's Commercial Law.— Fiis "Inter- national Law." Russell's Treatise on the Duty and Power of "an Arbitrator, and. the Law of Submissions and Awards ; with an Appendix of Forms, and of the Statutes relating to Arbitration. By FRANCIS RUSSELL, Esq., Eecorder of Tenterden. Fourth Edition. Koyal 8vo. 1870. 11. 16s. ARTICLED CLERKS.— -Wharton's Articled Clerk's Man- ual. — A Manual for Articled Clerks : being a comprehensive Guide to their successful Examination, Admission, and practice as Attorneys and Solicitors of the Superior Courts. By J. J. S. WHARTON, Esq., M. A., Oxon, Barrister-at-Law, Author of " The Law Lexicon," &o., &c. Ninth Edition. Greatly enlarged, and with the addition of Book-keeping by single and double Entry. By CHARLES HENRY ANDERSON, Senior Prizeman of the Incor- porated Law Society, &c. Pioyal 12mo. 1864. 18s. ATTORNEYS.— PuUing's Law of Attorneys.— A Simimary of the Law and Practice relating to Attorneys, General and Special, Attorneys-at-Law, Solicitors, Notaries, Proctors, Conveyancers, Scriveners, Land Agents, House Agents, &c., and the Offices and Appointments usually held by them. Their several Qualifications and legitimate Province, Paghts, Duties, Privileges, Exemptions, Disabilities, and Liabilities in the General Practice of the Law, in Legal Proceedings, in Legal Negotiations, and Legal Formalities. And the Law of Costs as between Party and Party and Attorney and Client. By ALEXANDER PULLING, Serjeant-at-Law. Third Edition. 8vo. 1862. 18s. " It is a laborious Tvork, a careful work, tlie work of a lawj'ei', and, beyond comparison, the best that h.ns ever b.*cn produced upou this subject "—Law Tim£S. Smith.— The Lawyer and his Profession.— A Series of Letters to a Solicitor commencin"' Business By J ORTON SMITH. 12mo. 1860. is. AVERAGE.— Hopkins' Hand-Book on Average.— Third Edition. 8vo. 1868. lSg_ Lowndes' Law of General Average.— English and jforeign. Second Edition. By RICHARD LOWNDES, Author of "The Admiralty Law of Collisions at Sea." 8vo. 1S74. ISs. authority, that he cinnot fail to bo a Irusnvorthy guide. As a legal text book his " Law ot General Average " deserves the higbett praise for its acute analysis of some of the most important judicial decisions on the subject. — Law Magazine, June 1875. BAILIVlErJTS — Jones on the Law of Bailments —Fourth Edition. By Vf. THEOBALD. 8vo. 1834. iWft gj. BALLOT.— Fitzgerald's Ballot Act, 1872.— With an Intro- duction. Forming a Guide to the Procedure at Parliamentary and •;,.* All standard Law Wons are lipt in Stod;, in law calf and other Undiuns. Digitized by Microsoft® 119, CHANCEEY LANE, LONDOST, W.C. 3 BALLOT-- Continued. Municipal Elections. By aERALD A. E. FITZGERALD, M.A. of Liucoln'a Inn, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Foolscap 8vo. 1872. 3s. 6tf. BANKRUPTCY.— Anderson.— F>& " Criminal Law." Bedford's Final Examination Guide to Bank- ruptcy. — Second Edition. 12nio. 1873. is. Lynch's Tabular Analysis of Proceedings in Bankruptcy, for tlie use of Students for the Incorporated Law Society's Examinations. Second Edition. 8vo. 1874. Nett, Is. Parker's Analysis of the Principal Steps in a Bankruptcy Proceeding, taken from the Bankruptcy Act and Rules ; with an Index to the IJankruptcy, Debtors, Banlc- ruptcy Repeal, and Insolvent Court Acts, 1869, and the various Rules made under those Acts ; to which is added an Alphabetical List of the Eonns published with the Rules. By FRANK K. PARKER, one, &c. Folio. 1870. 5s. Scott's Costs in Bankruptcy. — Ficfe" Costs." Smith's Manual on Bankruptcy. — A Manual relating to Bankruptcy, Insolvency, and Imprisonment for Debt ; comprising the New Statute Law verbatim, in a consolidated and readable form. With the Rules, a Copious Index, and a Supplement of Decisions. By JOSIAH W. SMITH, Esq., B.C.L., Q.C., Judge of County Courts. 12mo. 1873. 10s. "*,(* The Supplement may be had separately, nett, 2s. Qd. Williams' Ne-w Law and Practice in Bank- ruptcy, comprising the Banlo-uptcy Act, the Debtors Act, and the Bankruptcy Repeal and Insolvent Court Act of 1869, and the Rules and Forms made under those Acts, with a comparative Sum- mary of the Cases Decided imder the former Laws. By ROLAND VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, and WALTER VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barristers-at- Law. Second Edition. (In the press.) BILLS OF EXCHANGE— Chitty on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes.— A Treatise on Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, Cheques on Bankers, Bankers' Cash Notes, and Bank Notes ; with References to the Law of Scotland, France, and America. The Tenth Edition. By JOHN A. RUSSELL, LL.B., and DAVID MACLACHLAN, M.A., Barristers-at-Law. Royal 8vo. 1859. U. 8s. EILLS OF SALE.— Millar and Collier's Bills of Sale.— A Treatise on Bills of Sale, with an Appendix containing the Acts for the Registration of Bills of Sale, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, and 29 & 30 Vict. c. 96, and Precedents, &c. Thn-d Edition. By F. C. J. MILLAR, Barrister-at-Law. ]2mo. 1871. 10s. Sd. BOOK-KEEPING.— Bedford's Intermediate Examina- tion Guide to Book-keeping. — Second Edition. 12mo. 1875. Arett, 2s. 6d. CANAL TRAFFIC ACT.— Lely's Rail^Aray and Canal Traf- fic Act, 187S. — And other Railway and Canal Statutes ; with the General Orders, Forms, and Table of Fees. Post 8vo. 1873. 8«, CARRIERS. — Browne on Carriers. — A Treatise on the Law of Carriers of Goods and Passengers by Land and Water. With References to the most recent American Decisions. By J. H. *j^* All standard Zato IVorisarelcqitin Stoci, 'nhno calf and otJiei Inndimjs, An Digitized by Microsoft® STEVENS AND SONS' LAW PUBLICATIONS. CARRIERS-C">''»«^d. BALrOTJR BE.OWNE, Esq., of the llidae Temple, Barrister-at- Law, Registrar to the Railway Commission. 8vo. 1873. 18s, CHANCERY ajwZ Fide " EQUITY." Daniell's Chancery Practice.— The Practice of the High Court of Chancery, with some observations on the Pleadings in that Court. By the late EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, Barrister-at- Law. Pifth Edition, by LEONARD FIELD and EDWARD CLENNELL DUNN, Barristers-at-Law ; with the assistance of JOHN BIDDLE, of the Master of the Rolls' Chambers. 2 vola. 8ro. 1371. U. is. Supplemental volume to the above. The Practice of the High Court of Chancery and the Court of Chan- cery (Funds) Act, 1872, together with Appendices containing the Act, and the Rules and Orders thereunder, and a Collection of Forms. By LEONARD FIELD and EDWARD CLENl^TELL DUNN, Barristers-at-Law. 8vo. 1873. 8s. 6d. It is the merit of Mr. Daniell's ' Practice * that it takes nothing as known. The reader is minutely instructed what he is to do and how he is to do it, and if he closely follows his guide he cannot go wrong." — Law Times. "This completes the new edition of Daniell's Chancery Practice, irhich has become in equity what Tidd was in the common law — emphatically the Practice. With successive editions it has received successive improvements, and of course enlargements. Its merits are well known to every reader, and there are few practitioners in the equity courts who ave not used it as their text-book for many years." — Law Times. Daniell's Chancery Forms.— Forms and Precedents of Pleadings and Proceedings in the High Court of Chancery, with Practical Notes and Observations, and References to the Fourth Edition of Daniell's Chancery Practice ; and incorporating the Forms in Braithwaite's Record and Writ Practice. By LEONARD FIELD and EDWARD CLENNFILL DUNN, Barriaters-at-Law, and JOHN BIDDLE, of the Master of the Rolls' Chambers. Second Edition. By JOHN BIDDLE. 8vo. 1871. \l. 12s. Jarman's Nevir Chancery Practice.— The Practice of the High Court of Chancery in the Conduct of Suits by Bill or Original Summons, including Proceedings in the Judges' Cham- bers, Forms of Costs, and numerous other Forms. The Practice relating to Special Cases and Petitions of Right. Acts concerning Trustees, Executors, Administrators, and Mortgagees, including inter alia the Trustees Act, and the Trustees Relief Acts. Acts relating to Charitable Trusts. The Settled Estates Acts and the Infants' Marriage Settlement Acts, with the General Orders and Decisions of the Court thereunder, and a copious index. By HENRY JAR- MAN. The Third Edition, much enlarged. 12mo. 1864. U. is. Morgan's Chancery Acts and Orders.— The Statutes, General Orders, and Regulations relating to the Practice, Pleading, and Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery ; with Copious Notes,' containing a Summary of every reported Decision thereon. Fourth Edition, considerably enlarged. By GEORGE OSBORNE MOR- GAN, M.A., and CHALONER W. CHUTE, of Lincoln's Inn Barristera-at Law. 8vo. 1868. 1J_ joj' "We have noticed the former Editions of this useful work as they have suoeessivelv appeared. This one has added the many statutes and orders that have heeu promul- gated since the publication of its predecessors. All the cases have been noted and the Index, a most important portion of such a volume, is constructed with great care and Is unusually copious. It will now be required by those who practise in the Ctountv Courts."— ioio Times, Jan. 18, 1868. vvuuiy *^* All standard Law Worhs are Tcept in Stoci, in law ccdf and other bindings, Digitized by Microsoft® 119, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, W.C. 5 CHANCERY.-CoiKinucci. Morgan and Davey's Chancery Costs.— Vide'Vosts." Orders and Rules of the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division.— Published by authority as issued. Smith's Chancery.— The Practice of the Court of Chancery, including the Joint Stock Companies' Acts, with an Appendix of Forms and Precedents of Costs, adapted to the last New Orders. By JOHN SIDNEY SMITH, Esq., M.A., Barrister-at-Law. The Seventh Edition, revised and enlarged by the Author and ALFEED SMITH, Esq., M.A., Barrister-at-Law. 2 vols. 8vo. 1862. 31. Ss. CHURCH AND CLERGY.— Phillimore.— Fac"EcclesiasticalLaw." Stephen's Laws relating to the Clergy. — 2 vols. Koyal Svo. 1848. 21. 18s. CIVIL LAW — Bo-wyer's Commentaries on the Modern Civil Law.— By Sir GEORGE BOWYEE, D.C.L., Eoyal Svo. 1848. 18s. Bowyer's Introduction to the Study and Use of the Civil Law.— By Sir GEOEGE BOWYEE, D.C.L. Eoyal Svo. 1874. 5s. Cumin's Manual of Civil Law.— A Manual of Civil Law, containing a Translation of, and Commentary on, the Fragments of the XII. Tables, and the Institutes of Justinian ; the Text of the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian arranged in parallel columns ; and the Text of the Fragments of XJlpian, and of Selec- tions from Paul's Eeceptas Sententise. By P. CUMIN, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, enlarged. Medium, Svo. .1868. 18s. Greene. — Vide "Eoman Law." Phillimore. — Vide " Eoman Law." COLLISIONS.— Lowndes' Admiralty Law of Collisions at Sea.— Svo. 1867. 7s. 6d. COLONIAL LAW.— Clark's Colonial Law.— A Summary of Colonial Law and Practice of Appeals from the Plantations. Svo. 1834. 1?. 4b. Vanderlinden. — Vide "Dutch Law." COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.— Bowyep.— Vide " Constitutional Law." Broom and Hadley's Commentaries on the Laws of England.— By HEEBERT BEOOM, LL.D., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law; Eeader in Common Law to the Inns of Court ; Author of " A Selection of Legal Maxims," &o. ; and EDWAED A. HADLEY, M.A., of Lincohi's Inn, Barrister-at-Law ; late Fellow of Trinity Coll., Cambridge. 4 vols. Svo. 1869. 31. 3s. V MeesrB. Broom and Hadley havo been unsparing in their editorial labours. There are abundant reference notes, so that the diligent student can consult the authorities if he is so disposed. Besides the table ol contents, there are an appendix and a copious index to each volume. Nothing that could be done to make the work useful and handy has been left undone."— iaw Journal, Nov. 19, 1869. *** All standard Law Works tw'C Icept in Stock, in law calf and other Undings, Digitized by Microsoft® STEVENS AND SONS' LAW PUBLICATIONS, COMMERCIAL LAW.— Levi's International Commercial Law. — Being tlie Principles of Mercantile Law of the followiiig and others Countries — viz. : England, Scotland, Ireland, British Imdia, British Colonies, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Buenos Ayres, Den- mark, France, Germany, Greece, Hans Towns, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Prussia, Kussia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Wtirtemburg. By LEONE LEVI, Esq., _F.S.A., F.3.3., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law, Professor of the Principles and Practice of Commerce at King's College, London, &c. Second Edition. 2 vols. Eoyal Svo. 1863. 11. 15s. Smith. — Vide "Mercantile Law." COMMON LAW.— Archbold's Practice of the Court of Queen's Bench in Personal Actions and Eject- ment.— By THOMAS CHITTY, Esq. New Edition. By PEENTICE. Including the Practice of the Courts of Common Pleas and Exchequer. A New and Improved Edition (the Twelfth), embracing the New Eules and Common Law Procedure Acts, 1852, 1854, and 1860. By SAMUEL PEENTICE, Esq., Barrister-at- Law. 2 vols. Eoyal 12mo. 1866. And see " Foi-ms,"— CHITTY. Cole.— Vide "Oaths." Kisher. — Vide " Digests.'' Orders and Rules of the High Court of Justice, Common Law Divisions. — Published by authority, as issued. Smith's Manual of Common Law. — A Manual of Common Law, comprising the fundamental principles and the points most usually occurring in daily life and practice ; for the Prac- titioner, Student, and General Eeader. By JOSIAH W. SMITH, B.C.L., Q.C., Judge of County Courts. Sixth Edition. 12mo. 1874. 14s. " Admirably conceived and executed Eminently lucid and concise . . . . . A pocket-book of pith and essence of common law." — Leguleian. "Mr. Josiah Smith possesses, in an eminent degree, that kind of logical skill which exhibits itself in the simple aiTangement, but exhaustive division, of wide and complicated subjects, and ii?, moreover, gifted with the rare powej of accurate condensation." — Solicitors' Journal, April 30, 1804. " To more advanced students, and to the practitioner, whether barrister or attorney, wo think the 'Manual of Common Law ' a most useful and convenient companion It is compiled with the scrupulous care and the ability which distinguibh Mr, Smith*& previous works." — Jurist, July 30, 18G4. '* S.Tiith's Manuals of Common taw and Equity must he resorted to as the open sesames to the learning requisite in the Final Examination of the Incorporated Law Socieiy." — From Db. Uollit*s Lecture, p. 11. COMMONS AND iNCLOSURES.— Cooke on Inclosures.— The Acts for facilitating the Inclosiu'c of Commons in England and Wales ; with a Treatise on the Law of Eights of Commons, in reference to these Acts, &c., (fee. With Forms as settled by the Inclosure Commissioners. By 6. WINGEO^^E COOKE, Esq., Barri.ster-at-Law. Fourth Edition. 12mo. 1864. 16s. Finlaison on Enclosure of Commons, "Waste Lands, &c. — Svo. 1867. Sewed. Nett, 2s. 6d. "Woolrych's Treatise on the Law of the Rights of Common. — Second Edition. Svo. 1850. 16s. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-Bowyer's Commentaries on the Constitutional Law of England. — By Sir GEOEGB BOWYEE, D.C.L. Second Edition. Eoyal 8vo. 1846. 11. 2s. *,f* All standard Law WorliS are le^it in Stod; in law calf and other hindinys. Digitized by Microsoft® 119, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, W.C. CONTRACTS.— Addison on Contracts.— Being a Treatise on the Law of Contracts. By C. a. ADDISON, Esq., Author of the " Law of Torts." Seventh Edition. By L. W. CAVE, one of Her Majesty's Counsel, Eccorder of Lincoln. Royal Svo, 18/5. IZ. ISs. "At preseut this is by far the best book upon tlio L.aw of Contract po.?3essed by tli9 Profession, and it ia .a tlioi'o'jglily practical book." — Law Tiiw.s, " We cannot speak too highly of the groat amount of well-arranged informadon which is to bo found iu this second book. It is a magazine of leavniiu wliicli the legal piacLi- tioacr will find of very great value." — Solicitoi's' Journal, iMart-li 20, 187-5. " Mr, Cavo, aided by Mr. Horace Smitti, has done more than sustain t!ie reputation of this trealise-he h.as greatly added to it." — Lcm Jourvut, Mareli 27th, 1375. '' Mr. Cave's edition of Addison must prove a great accptisition to every lavvj-er's library. To the practitioner the last book ou the stamp laws will prove of great service." — Law Times, April 3, 1S75. *' Mr. Cave h.as not confined himself to simply noting up the cases. lie has, he tells us iu a somewhat lengthy preface, ' ventured to make very considerable alterations iu the arrangement of the work.' " — Law Times, April 3, 1875. Leake on Contracts. — The Elements of the Law of Con- tracts. Second Edition. By STEPHEN MARTIN LEAKE, of the Middle Temple, Bamster-at-Law. {Preparing for publication). Pollock's Principles of Contract at Law and in Equity ; being a Treatise on the General Principles relating to the Validity of Agreements, &c. By FREDERICK POLLOCK, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Svo. 1876. 2is. Smith's La-w of Contracts. — The Law of Contracts. By the late JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, Esq., Author of " Leading Cases," "A Treatjise on Mercantile Law," &c. Sixth Edition. ISy VINCENT T. THOMPSON, Esq., Barrister-at-L.tw. Svo. 1874. 16s, "We hail with great satisfaction a new Edition of Smith's 'Lectures on the Law of Contracts.' Ever since they were published, these Lectures have been most popular with all brandies of the Profession."— iaic Maijaiine. CONVEYANCINC-Greenv^rood's Manual of Convey- ancing.— A Manual of the Practice of Conveyancing, showing the present Practice relating to the daily routine of Conveyancing in Solicitors' Offices. To which are added Concise Common Eorms and Precedents in Conveyancing ; Conditions of Sale, Conveyances, and aU other Assurances in con.stant use. Eom-th Edition. By H. N. CAPEL, Esq., LL.B. (In the press.) "The information under these heads is just of thst ordinary practical kind which is learned from experience, and is not to be gathered from treatises. .^ ...-,, „ " The work is well done, and will be very useful to the class tor whom it is intended. — ■'''"it is an educational as well as practical compendium, and it conveys that special kind of information which the student has generally the greatest dilBculty in discovering from ''""A careful study of these pages would probably arm a dilligeat clerk with as much useful knowledge as he might otherwise take years of desidtory questioumg and obsorvuiK to -icoufre . All that can be done to put an old head upon young shoulders is effected (so far' as its own subject is concerned) by Mr. Greenwood's lucid aud business- like Manual."— fioft'dtoJj' Journal. Housman's Precedents in Conveyancing.— A Selection of Precedents in Conveyancing ; designed as a Hand-book of Eorms in frequent use, with Practical Notea,,including Notes on the Conveyancing Act of 1860, and the adoption of its provisions m actual practice. By ERANCIS HOUSMAN, Barrister-at-Law. Svo. 1861. '^'■''■ * * All standard Law Worlcs are lept in Stocl.in law calf and other Undings. Digitized by Microsoft® STEVENS AND SONS' LAW PUBLICATIONS. COHVEYkHOmO -Continued. Prideaux's Precedents in Conveyancing. — With Dissertations on its Law and Practice. Seventh Edition. By FBEDERICK PKIDEAUX and JOHN WHITCOMBE, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. 2 vols. Uoyal 8vo. 1873. Nett SI. 3s. " We really can hardly imagine a convej'aucer U^iug required to prepare any instrument ■wliich he will not find sketched out iu the work under notice . . . We can cordially recommend the book to both branches of the Profession. It is cheaper and more por- table than Mr. Davidson's valuable work, and we believe quibe as useful."— iaw Journal. "This is a revised edition of a work to which the moat favourable criticism cannot add reputation." — Law Times. Smith..— Vide " Real Property." CONVICTIONS.— Paley on Summary Convictions.— Fifth Edition. By H. T. J. MACNAMAKA, Esq., Banister-at- Law. Svo. 1866. 11. Is. "Great pains havebeen evidently taken to render the present edition very complete. It is enriched with several excellent notes besides the one to which we have already called attention ; amongst these is one on the subject of wox'ds usedin a statute being compulsory or only directory, and another in which there is a review of decisions nnder the Masters and Servants' Act (4 Geo. 4, c. 34). This edition, of what may be considered a standard work, incorporates all the statutes and decisions from tlie date of the last edition, ^md, as far as we have been able to examine (and we have put it to some test), the work has been prepared with great care and accuracy. It is a good, practical, and valuable treatise, which we can safely recommend to the profession." — 2%e Law Journal. "'Paley on Convictions' has enjoyed a high reputaiion and extensive popularity. Devoted exclusively to the jurisdiction in summary couvictions, it collects and conveys to the magistrate and his clerk the fullest and most accurate information as to the practice to be observed iii the hearing of charges which the magistrate is empowered to dispose of summarily. Ten years have elapsed since the last edition. Daring the interval many important changes have been made in the law, and there has been a general call for a new edition. No better man could have been found for such a work than Mr. Macnamara, &c."— iaw Times, May 5, 1866. COPYHOLDS-Cuddon's Copyhold Acts.~A succinct Trea- tise on the Copyhold Acts, the practical Working rjid Effect thereof, and the mode of Procedure under the same for etfecting Enfranchise- ' ment. By JAMES CUDDON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Boyal 8vo. 1865. K)s. 6t?. OOPYRIGHT.-Phillips' Law of Copyright.~The Law of Copyright in Works of Literature and Art, and in the Appli- cation of Designs. With the Statutes relating thereto. By CHAELES PALMEK PHILLIPS, of Lincohi's Inn, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Svo. 1863. 12s. "Mr. Phillips lias shown not only great diligence in collecting cases bearing upon the various topics which he has treated, but considerable judgment in the manner in which he has dealt with them. He has spared no paius to make liis work reliable as a legal text book,audat the same time equally useful to publishers, authors, artists, azd other persons ■who are interested in works of literature, art, or design. In a word, surh a hook has long been wanted, and Mr. Phillips has given abundant proof of his ability 1o meet the desideratum." — Solicitors' Journal, Nov. 14, 1863. " Mr. Phillips' work is at once an able law-book and a lucid treatise, in a popular form, on the rights of authors and artists. Tbe wants and interests of ihe legal pi-actitioners are consulted by a careful collection and discussior of all the authorities, while the non- professional reader will find in the book a well-written and perlecrly intelhgible statement of the law upon the matter of which it treats."— /«rw(, Jan. 9, 1S64. - CORONERS.— Jervis on the Office and Duties of Coroners. — ^With Forms and Precedents. Third Edition By C. W. LOVESY, Esq., of the Jliddle Temple, Barriater-at-Law- 12mo. 1866. 12s. COSTS.—Carew's Precedents of Bills of Costs, for obtaining Grants of Probate and Letters of Administration in the Principal Registry of the Court of Probate, 1869. gg. %* Ali stmd(f'rd Mw Worhare hept in ^tochj in laxo calf and other Undinos Digitized by Microsoft© 119, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, W.C. COSTS. — Continued. Morgan and Davey's Treatise on Costs in Chancery.— By GEORGE OSBORNE MORGAN, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, late Stowell Fellow of University College, Oxford, and Eldon Scholar ; and HORACE DAVEY, M.A., Barrister-at- Law, late Fellow of University College, Oxford, and Eldon Scholar. With an Appendix, containing Forms and Precedents of Bills of Costa. Svo. 1865. U. Is. Scott's Costs in the Superior Courts of Com- iTlon Law, and Probate and Divorce, and in Conveyancing ; also in Bankruptcy (Act of 1869). Proceedings in the Crown Office, on Circuit and at Sessions, and in the County Court ; together with Costs of Interlocutory Rules and Orders xmder the Common Law Procedure Acts 1852 and 185i, BUla of Exchange Act 1855, &c., &c., and the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854. With an Appendix, containing Costs under Parliamentary Elections Act, 1863. By JOHN SCOTT, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at- Law. Third Edition. Royal 12mo. 1868-73. 2i3. \* The Supplement, containing "Bankruptcy Costs (Act of 1869)," may be had separately. ' A^ett, 3s. ^' Mr. Scott's work is well known to the profession. It is an extensive collection of taxed bills of costs in all branches of practice, supplied to him probably by the taxiug masters. Such a work speaks for itself. Its obvious utility is its best recommenda- tion." — Law Times. " ' Taxation of Costs' — In re Foster — ^Vice-Chancellor Wood said that Mr. Scott's book was a competent authority upon the subject." — Times. "Webster's Parliamentary Costs. — Private Bills, Election Petitions, Appeals, House of Lords. By EDWARD WEBSTER, Esq., of the Taxing Office, House of Commons, and of the Examiners' Office, House of Lords and House of Commons. Third Edition. Post Svo. 1867. 20s. "The object of this work is to give the scale of costs allowed to Solicitors in relation to pi'ivate bills before Parliament, the conduct of Election Petitions and Appeal Causes, and the Allowance to Witnesses. The connection of the author with the Taxinfj Office of the House of Commons gives authority to the work, which has been compiled with some skill, and contains a vei-y useful Index, by which thecosts allowed for attendances, time, drawing, copying, and perusing, in the several p.irliamcntary proceedings may bo easily ascertained." — Solicitor^ Journal. COUNTr COURTS The Consolidated County Court Orders and Rules, Awith Forms and Scales of Costs and Fees, as issued by the Lord Chancellor and Com- mittee of County Court Judges. Authorized Edition. Super-royal Svo. 1875. 3s. "Will's County Courts Act, 1867.— With Notes, New Rules, and Forms ; Practice in Discovery, Interrogatories, Attach- ment of Debts, Equitable Defences, &c. By J. SHIRESS WILL, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Svo. 1368. 15s. CRliVllNAL LAW,— Archbold's Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases. — With the Statutes, Precedents of Indictments, &c., and the Evidence necessary to support them. By JOHN JERVIS, Esq. (late Lord Chief Justice of Her Majesty's Court of Common Pleas). Eighteenth Edition, including the Practice in Criminal Proceedings by Indictment. By WILLIAM BRUCE, of the Middle Temple, Esq., Barrister-at-Lav/, and Stipendiary Magistrate for the Borough of Leeds. Royal 12mo. 1875. 1«. lis. Cd. * * 411 standard Law Woi-Jcs are Jcept in Stoclc, in Imu calf and other Undini/s. A ? Digitized by Microsoft® 10 STEVENS AND SONS' LAW PUBLICATIONS. CRIMINAL \.k^. -Continued. Anderson's Digest of Bankruptcy and Criminal Law.— By 0. H. ANDERSON, Esq., Barriater-at-Law, of the Inner Temple. 8vo. 1867. 7s. 6d. Cole on Criminal Informations and Quo War- ranto.— By W. K. COLE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. 12mo. 1843. 12j. Greaves' Criminal Law Consolidation and Amendment Acts of the 24 & 25 Vict— With Notes, Observations, and Forms for Summary Proceedings. By CHARLES SPEENGEL G-KEAVES, Esq., one of Her Majesty's Counsel, who prepared the Bills and attended the Select Committees of both Houses of Parliament to which the Bills were referred. Second Edition. Post 8vo. 1862. 16s. Roscoe's Digest of the Law- of Evidence in Criminal Cases.— Eighth Edition. By HORACE SMITH, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Royal 12mo. 1874. 12. lis. 6rf. Russell on Crimes and Ivlisdemeanors.— Intended as a Court and Circuit Companion. Fourth Edition. By CHARLES SPEENGEL GREAVES, Esq., one of Her Majesty's Counsel 3 vols. Royal 8vo. 1865. 51. 15s. 6d. In this Edition of " Rusaell " the Editor has endeavoured to malce such a statement each case of the facts, the decision, and the grounds of it, wherever they appear, as may enable the reader to understand what the decision really wiis ; and, although this course has necessarily much increased the size of the work, yet it renders it much more useful, especially to all who may uot be in a position to refer to the original reports of the cases. This course is the same as was adopted in the last Edition, which was found in practice to he so very useful whenever any question suddenly arose in Court, before Magistrates, or elsewhere. This treatise is so much more copious than any other upon all the subjects contained in it, that it affords by far the best means of acquiring a knowledge of the Criminal Law In general, or of any offence in particular ; so that it will be found peculiarly useful as well to those who wish to obtain a complete knowledge of that law, as to those who desire to be informed on any portion of it as occasion may require. This work also contains a very complete treatise on the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases, and in it the manner of taliing the depositions of witnesses, and the examinations of prisoners before magistrates, is fully explained. "What better Digest of Criminal Law could we possibly hope for than 'Eussell on Crimes?* " — Mr. Fitzjames Stephen's Speech on CodiUcation, Dec, 1872. Thring's Criminal Law of the Navy.— The Crimi- nal Law of the Navy, comprising an Introductory Sketch of the Early State and Discipliue of the Navy ; the Naval Discipline Act of 18b0, with Notes ; Criminal Oilences and their Punislmient ; the Constitution and Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial ; the Eorms of Procedure, and Law of Evidence applicable to Trials by Courts- Martial, with the New Regulations of the Admiralty, and a copious Index. By THEODOEE THRING, of the Middle Temple, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. 12mo. 1861. 8s. 6d. DICTIONARY — Wharton's Law Lexicon.— A Law Lexicon, or Dictionary of Jurisprudence, explaining the Technical Words and Phrases employed in the several Departments of English Law ; ivith an Explanatory as well as Literal Translation of the Latin Maaims contained in the Writings of the Ancient and Modem Commentators. Sixth Edition. Revised in accordance with the Judicature Acts by J SHIEESSWILL, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Baa-rister-at-Law. Super royal 8vo. (In the press.) *,* All standarci Law Works are Icept in Stock, in law calf and other Unding^. Digitized by Microsoft® 119, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, W.C. 11 DIARY — -La-wyer's Companion (The), Diary, and La"w Directory. — For the use of the Legal Profession, Public Com- panies, Justices, Merchants, Estate Agents, Auctioneers, &o., &;c. Published Ajjnuallt. The Work is Svo. siu, strongly hound in cloth, and published at the following Prices : — s. d. 1. Two days on a page, plain 5 2. The above, interleaved for Attendances . . .70 3. Two days on a page, ruled, with or without money columns 5 6 4. The above, inteklewed for Attendances . . . .80 5. Whole page for each day, plain 7 6 6. The above, interleaved for Attendances . . .96 7. Whole page for each day, ruled, with or without money columns .......... 8 6 8. The above, interleaved for Attendances . . . 10 6 9. Three days on a page, ruled blue lines, without money columns 5 The La^Aryer's Companion — Is edited by JOHN THOMPSON, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law; andcon- tains a Digest of Kecent Cases on Costs ; an outline of the Judicature Acts; Alphabetical Index to the Practical Statutes ; "Cases affecting Attorneys and Solicitors," brought down to the period of publication ; a Copious Table of Stamp Duties ; Legal Time and other Tables, a London and Provincial Law Directory, and a variety of matters of practical utility. The Diary is printed on paper of superior quality, and contains memoranda of Legal Business throughout the Year. {ThiHieth issue for 1876. Now ready.) '' We observe in this, the thirtieth annual issue, all the merits "whicli have distinguished predecessor.":, added to some novel characteristics of real value. Tlie Editor has been alive to the most recent changes in Judicial matters." — Law Journal, Nov. 13, 1875. ** The ' Lawyer's Companion and Diary ' is a book ttizX ought to he in the possession of eveiy lawyer, and of every man of business." *' The 'Lawyer's Companion' is, indeed, what it is cc'Jed, for it combiues everything required for reference in the lawyer's office." — Law Times. DIGESTS.— Anderson.— FMe "Criminal Law." Bedford. — Vide " Examination Guides." Chambers.— Fide "Public Health." Chitty's Equity Index.— Chitty's Index to all the Pveported Cases, and Statutes, in or relating to the Principles, Pleading, and Practice of Equity and Bankruptcy, in the several Courts of Equity in England and Ireland, the Privy Council, and the House of Lords, from the earliest period. Third Edition. By J. MACAULAY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. 4 vols. Eoyal 8vo. 1853. 71. 7s. Fisher's Digest of the Reported Cases deter- mined in the .House of Lords and Privy Council, and in the Courts of Common Law, Divorce, Probate, Admiralty and Bank- ruptcy, from Michaelmas Term, 1766, to Hilary Term, 1870 ; with Eeferences to the Statutes and Bules of Court. Eounded on the Analytical Digest by Harrison, and adapted to the present practice of the Law. By R. A. FISHER, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Eive large volumes, royal 8vo. 1870. 122. 12s, {Continued AnnvnUy.) "Mr. Fisher's Digest is a wonderful work. It is a miracle of human industry." — Mr, JuUici: Willes. " The fact is, that we have already the best of all possible digests. I do not refer merely to the works which pass under that title — though, I confess, I think it would be very difficult toimprove upon Mr. Fislier's 'Common Law Digest' — Irefer to the innumerable text books of every branch of the law. What better digest of criminal law could we possibly hope for than 'Itussellon Crimes,' and the current Eoscoe and Archbold, to say nothing of the title, 'Criminal Law,' in'Fisher'sDigeLt.'" — Mr. Fitzjamcs Stephen, Q.C.,in his Address to iheLaw Amendment Society on Codijication in India and England, Session 1872-3. *.* All standard Law HVfo are Icept in StocTc, in law calf and other iindinga. Digitized by Microsoft® 12 ST'EVEI^S AND SONS' LAW PUBLICATIONS. D\QE.STS.— Continued. HaPPison. — Vide " Fisher." Leake. — Vide "Keal Property." Notanda Digest in La-w, Equity, BankFuptey, Admiralty, Divorce, and Probate Cases. — By E. S. MASKELYNE, Esq., and CECIL C. M. DALE, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Barristers-at-Law. The NoTAiTDA Digest, from the commencement, October, 1862, to December, 1872. In 1 volume, half-bound. Ifett, Zl. 3s. Ditto, for 1873 and 1874, sewed. Nett, each, 12s. 6d. 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