OfnrttfU Ittioeraita ffiihrarg 3tl(ata, JStm lark BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE sage' ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF HENRY W. SAGE r89i Cornell University Library arV14481 A text-book in psycholo 3 1924 031 387 131 olin.anx Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031387131 EDITED BY WILLIAM T. HAREIS, A.M., LL.D. Volume XVIII. INTEENATIONAL EDUCATION SEEIES. Edited by W. T. Harris. It ia proposed to publish, under the above title, a library tor teachers and school managers, and text-books for normal classes. The aim will be to provide works of a useful practical character in the troadest sense. The following conspectus will show the ground to be covered by the series : I. — History of Education, (a.) Original systems as ex- pounded by their founders, (b.) Critical histories which set forth the customs of the past and point out their advantages and defects, explain- ing the grounds of their adoption, and also of their final disuse. II. — Educational Criticism, (a.) The noteworthy arraign ments which educational reformers have put forth against existing sye tems : these compose the classics of pedagogy, (b.) The critical histories above mentioned, III.— Systematic Treatises on the Theory of Edu- cation, (a.) Works written from the historical standpoint; these, for the most part, show a tendency to justify the traditional course of study and to defend the prevailing methods of instruction, (b.) Works written from critical standpoints, and to a greater or less degree revolu- tionary in their tendency. IV. — The Art of Education, (a.) Works on instruction and discipline, and the practical details of the school-room, (b.) Works on the organization and supervision of schools. Practical insight into the educational methods in vogue can not be attained without a knowledge of the process by which they have come to be established. For this reason it is proposed to give special prominence to the history of the systems that have prevailed. Again, since history is incompetent to furnish the ideal of the future, it is necessary to devote large space to works of educational criticism. Criticism is the purifying process by which ideals are rendered clear and potent, so that progress becomes possible. History and criticism combined make possible a theory of the whole. For, with an ideal toward which the entire movement tends, and an ac- count of the phases that have appeared in time, the connected develop- ment of the whole can be shown, and all united into one system. Lastly, after the science, comes the practice. The art of education is treated in special works devoted to the devices and technical details use- ful in the school-room. It is believed that the teacher does not need authority so much as in • sight in matters of education. When he understands the theory of edu- cation and the history of its growth, and has matured his own point of view by careful study of the critical literature of education, then he is competent to select or invent such practical devices as are best adapted to his own wants. The series will contain works from European as well as American authors, and will be under the editorship of W. T. Harris, A. M., LL. D Vol. I. The Philosophy of Education. By JouAmi Kabl Fbibd- BIOH BOSENEBANZ. $1.50. Vol. 11. A History of Education. By Professor F. V. N. Paikteb, of Eoanoke, Virginia. $1.50. Vol. III. The Rise and Early Constitution of Universities. With a Survey of MedioeTal Education. By S. S. Laiteib, LL. D., Professor of the Institutes and History of Education in the University of Edinburgh. $1.50. Vol. IV. The Ventilation and Warming of School Buildings. By GiLBEBT B. 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A., Assistant Master in University College Scliool, London. With an Introduction by Eev. E. H. Qnioz, M. A. $1.50. Vol. XV. School Supervision. By J. L. Piokaed, LL. D. $1.00. Vol. XVI. Higher Education of Women in Europe. By Helene Lange, Berlin. Translated and accompanied by Comparative Statis- tics, by L. li. Klemm, Ph. D. $1.00. Vol. XVII. Essays on Educational Reformers. By Eobebt He- beet Quick, M. A. Trin. Coll., Cambridge, Formerly Assistant Master at Harrow, and Lecturer on the History of EduoatiOQ at Cambridge, late Vioar of Sedhergh. Only authorizea edition of the work as rewrit- ten in 1890. $1.50. INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION SERIES A TEXT-BOOK IN PSYCHOLOGY AN ATTEMPT TO FOUND THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY ON EXPEfilENCE, METAPHYSICS, AND MATHEMATICS BY JOHANN FEIEDKICH HEKBAET TEANSLATED TEOM THE 0EI6INAL OBEMAN By MAEGAEET K. SMITH TEACHER IN THB STIATE NORMAL SCHOOL AT OSVEGO, NEW YORK NEW YORK D. APPLBTON AND COMPANY 1891 COPTBIGHT, 1891, bt d. applbton and company. EDITOR'S PEEFACE. The present work is a translation o Johann Fried- rich Herbart's Lehrbuch zur Psychologic, from the second revised edition published in 1834 — the date of the first edition being 181 C* The fact that Herbart's philosophical writings have given a great impulse to scientific study and experi- ment in education is a sufficient reason for including this volume in the International Education Series. He succeeded Krug in 1809, and filled for a quar- ter of a century afterward the chair long occupied by the celebrated Kant at the University of Konigsberg, supplementing his philosophical labors by founding and directing a pedagogical seminary (or normal school, as we call it in the United States). It is interesting to note that Herbart's successor at Konigsberg was Karl Eosenkranz, also eminent in the philosophy of pedagogy. Although a German philosopher and occupying the chair of Kant, Herbart set out from an entirely differ- ent basis, and produced a system nnlike those of the great geniuses who have made German philosophy for ever memorable. So unlike them^ indeed, is his sys- * G-. Hartenstein's edition, Hamburg and Leipsic, 1886. yi EDITOR'S PREPACK tem that one has great difficulty to trace their influ- ence upon his thoughts. Strange to say, however, his system becomes fruitful in the following generation, in two directions : first, in the line of physiological psychology, especially in the attempt to reduce the facts of the mind to mathematical statements ; and, secondly, in the line of the philosophy and art of edu- cation. A careful examination of the pedagogical writings of the followers of Herbart shows that the important thought which has become so fruitful is that of " a£; perception ." This is specially named or referred to in §§ 26, 40, 41, 43, 59, 123, 182, 183, and in many other places in the following work. It is, in fact, the central thought from which the author proceeds and to which he always returns. To explain this idea we contrast perception with apperception. In perception we have an object pre- sented to our senses, but in apperception we identify the object or those features of it which were familiar to us before ; we recognize it ; we explain it ; we in- terpret the new by our previous knowledge, and thus are enabled to proceed from the known to the un- known and make new acquisitions ; in recognizing the object we classify it under various general classes ; in identifying it with what we have seen before, we note also differences which characterize the new object and lead to the definition of new species or varieties. All this and much more belong to the process called ap- perception, and we see at once that it is the chief busi- ness of school instruction to build up the process of apperception. By it we re-enforce the perception of the present moment by the aggregate of our own past EDITOR'S PREFACE. , vii sense-perception, and by all that we have learned of the experience of mankind. Here, then, is the great good that comes from the Herbartian pedagogics ; it lifts up the so-called " New Education " from its first step where it was left by Pestalozzi to a second step which retains all that was valuable in the new education, and at the same time unites with it the permanent good that remained in the old education. For Pestalozzianism laid great stress on sense- perception (Anschauung) without considering what it is that makes sense-perception fruitful. It is n ot wh at we see and hear and feel^ hnt' '"'^^^ "^^ inwardly digest or assimilate — what wej2?£emiVe^hat^je8Uy^ adds^q_a!^know]Mge. As soon as instruction mounts to this second step it ceases to talk about the cultivation of outer percep- tion — as if mere acuteness of sense were in itself the end of instruction — and turns its attention upon the systematic building up of the inner faculty of per- ception — the recognizing faculty. It accordingly in- vestigates carefully the course of study. What shall one study to give him most assimilative power ? What shall he study to make him at home in the world of Man and the world of Nature, so that he may readily comprehend all that comes into his experience ? What items shall enter the course of study, is a question that concerns vitally the practical success of the school. But it is equally important to fix the true order of studies. The knowledge of appercep- tion gives the clew to the order in which the separate branches and disciplines should follow one another. Those studies should precede which furnish the data viii EDITOR'S PREFACE. for apperceiving the elements of the studies that fol- low. Those studies should come later which presup- pose the results reached in the earlier branches. The interesting experiments in " concentric instruction," wherein Grimm's Fairy Stories or Eobinson Crusoe is used as the central theme of interest and all the other studies of the course are brought into connection with it for purposes of apperception, may be referred to here * as illustrating the mode and manner in which the idea is applied in some parts of Germany. Each class is to have its Gesinntmgsstoff, or subject-matter that interests all the pupils and appeals to their imag- ination and feelings. This furnishes a center of inter- est for everything else — geography, history, arithmetic, language-study, etc. It is obvious that the pedagogy of all lands will take a great step forward when it leaves the crude first stage of work that is characterized by bald verbal memorizing or by equally defective training of sense- perception by object-lessons, and takes its stand on the theory of apperception. It will then subordinate verbal memorizing and aimless lessons in sense-per- ception for really nourishing instruction and inward growth. HeRBART's ScAFPOLDIIfG TO THE DoCTRINE OF Apperceptioit. The idea of apperception underlies, as we have said, the entire treatise presented in this book. The other matter may be regarded as scafEolding erected for the purpose of explaining the operations of this act. * See Dr. L. R. Klemm's European Schools, pp. 184, 211. EDITOR'S PEEP ACE. > ix There must be, it is evident, ideas stored up in the mind from former experience, and these ideas may be in the mind but out of consciousness at any given moment. This gives us the theory of the threshold of consciousnes s (p. 13), and of the ideas that rise from unconsciousness above that threshold into conscious- ness when incited by other ideas which are kindred to them. The doctrine of coviplexes and Mendings (p. 17) gives his notion of the close association of ideas in the case of thing and properties, or of the union of opposites. These views he grounds in a theory of the unity and simplicity of the soul and an interrelation between one simple essence (Wesen) or monad and another, in which relation one monad acts upon another, which reacts again upon it (p. 119). This action and reaction is a process of self-preservation. The self- preservations, or the results of this reaction, are ideas or concepts ( Vorstellung means mental image, or con- cept, or representation, or presentation — in short, any and all mental products included under the English word idea in its widest application). Then there naturally follows a consideration of the mathematical relation ^, pf the rising and sinking of these ideas in consciousness (pp. 18-32). Here the doctrine of series is suggested; for, since one idea calls up another complicated or blended with it, it must be clear that ideas are always to be found as members of series or groups ; and, moreover, the same idea will like- ly enough form a link in each one of several different series. Hence the complexity of association becomes apparent. The interaction between mind and body (p. 34) is an element to be considered in the mathe- matical calculations. The classification of the mental X EDITOR'S PREFACE. phenomsna and the old theory of faculties can not be passed without notice, and the author discusses it throughout Part Second of the work. Herbart's scaffoldings of explanation may be true or false, but even if false his investigation is of perma- nent value, because it singles out for its object this problem of apperception. Thus few will find what he says in regard to the will (pp. 83, £E.) satisfactory, be- cause the will is included under desire : " The will is desire, accompanied with the conviction that the ob- ject desired can be attained." But the comparative psychology of the will may trace desire and will to one root in creatures below man. So, too, intellect and feeling have one root in the same lower order of creatures. Mathematics in Psychology. In this Text-book of Psychology Herbart indicates the mathematical application that may be made in psychology, but does not develop it so fully as in a sub- sequent work published in 1824 entitled " Psychology as a Science founded for the First Time on Experience, Metaphysics, and Mathematics." There are three im- portant mathematical formulae treated : (1) Of two concepts, no matter how unequal their respective strength, the one can never quite obscure or arrest the other (i. e., drive it out of consciousness) ; but of three or more concepts, it may happen that one is so weak as to be entirely arrested by the other two (p. 12). This is proved in the Psychology as Science, by show- ing of two concepts a and 5, that the amount of arrest is expressed in the proportion a -j- S : a : : J : . . • EDITOR'S PREFACE. xi V So that a has a remainder = a — —j—t > while t has a remainder after arrest = 1 — — tt: = ■ — r-i '■> ^''^^ '^^ '^^ a-\-o a-\- b ohvious that this can become zero only when a is in- finite. The case in which there are three concepts, a, h, and c, giye for the remainder of c the expression alii + c) c — T , I , » and the conclusion that there may he zero for result — where, for example, a and h are equal and their sum is equal to three times the value of c. (Psychol, als. Wiss., §§ 44, 45.) The second mathematical formula (p. 13, § 17) states that, while the arrested portion of the concept sinks, the sinking portion is at every moment propor- tional to the part not arrested. Herhart gives the in- tegrated expression for this, namely, ex- n p presses the mode in which the influence of P on n to bring up a new part of p into consciousness is condi- tioned by the amount remaining of that part after subtracting the part already become conscious (i. e., p — 0) whose ratio to the total remainder of n is ). The integral equation m = p II — e j wherein e is tlie base of the natural system of logarithms, as Her- bart remarks (Psychology as Science, § 86), " shows us in a perfectly clear manner how a depends on p, r, t, and n " ; or, in other words, how the amount of an idea or concept that is recalled to consciousness, de- pends on (a) its total amount = 11, (J) the size of the part of it = p, which can blend with P, the assisting concept ; (c) the portion of P = r which may blend with n, and on {d) the time elapsed during the opera- tion. Vaultin-g and Tapeeinq. This doctrine of the help given by one concept to another involves the curious phenomenon that Her- bart describes (§ 26, p. 21) as vaulting ( Wolbunc/) and tapering (Zuspitzung). The first effect of the EDITOR'S PREFACE. xiii conscious idea, P, on the unconscious one allied to it, n, is to bring the latter into consciousness in general without accurate discrimination of the part p which may blend with the part r. But time being given, the other portions of n incongruent with r are arrested and sent back, and thus the assisted idea is arched, figuratively speaking, in such a manner that its part P is the top of the arch and extends into consciousness. By the further action of separating p from the re- mainder of n,the arch becomes more and more pointed, until finally, only p remains in consciousness and all the rest of n has been arrested and sunk from view. The reader, therefore, will find it necessary to learn how to interpret readily this figurative expression which Herbart uses, technically, into the description of the process of apperception — the first part of the process identifying wholes which do not perfectly blend, and the later steps of the process eliminating more and more the portions which can not blend, and thus* " arching " the portion of n which can blend, until at last there is left only the pure p which unites com- pletely with r, and the pointing is accomplished. Herbart's Place ik the Histokt of Philosophy. From the point of view of apperception the anom- alous position of Herbart's system in the history of philosophy may be explained — or rather the anomaly may be removed. All modem philosophy in general has for its prob- lem the exploration of the subjective factor in knowl- edge, as the Greek philosophy sought to discover the objective factor. Thus modern philosophy has a psy- chological tendency, while ancient philosophy had xiv EDITOR'S PREFACE. an ontological tendency. The former asks for the subjective coeflBlcient in cognition, while the latter asks the necessary conditions of true being. If apperception be divided into two kinds — first, that dependent on the nature of the mind itself, and, second, that dependent on the acquired experience of the mind* — then we may say that Herbart under- takes to explore the second field of apperception, while Kant explores the first. Kant seeks to ex- plain the apperception which arises through the logical structure of intelligence itself — that is to say, through i^ie. forms of the mind. These forms of the mind are the a priori intuitions of time and space and the categories of quantity, quality, relation (includ- ing inherence and causality), and modality. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and others followed the lead of Kant, and in the sequel there arose as complete a view of the world from the subjective standpoint as there had been from the objective standpoint of the Greeks. The psychologic theory of the world duplicated the onto- logic theory, and the insight of Hegel into this identity of the two world-solutions is the greatest triumph in the entire history of human thought. Herbart, rising in the midst of the great ferment of thought that surrounds the advent of Kantianism, seems to be unaffected by it. This, however, is seem- ing rather than truth. For he deals with the problem of his time, and takes the Kantian question back to the place where Leibnitz had left it. "Nothing in the intellect that was not previously in sense-perception " had been the motto of the psychologists who like Locke * See Lazarus's Das Leben der Seele, EDITOR'S PREFACE. XV explained all thinking as a modified sensation. But Leibnitz added the limitation, "Nothing except the intellect itself "—that is to say, the structure of the mind itself is not and can not be derived from sense- perception, but must be there before in order to render such perception possible. The knowing faculty must have a structure or constitution of its own, and this structure must furnish an element or factor in the product of knowledge. Leibnitz was the first to use the word apperception in a philosophic sense. The French verb apercevoir signifies to perceive, and s'apercevoir signifies to notice with attention. But Leibnitz distinguishes perception from apperception in the fact that the latter is a knowledge that brings with it a reflection upon the interior nature of the soul, and he explains this reflection {actes reflexifs) as having for its object " the ego, substance, self-existence (monade), soul, and spirit, in a word immaterial things and truths." Such knowledge he calls self-conscious- ness.* Self -consciousness ("conscience") he explains as that reflective act which gives us a knowledge of the Ego and of the true being of God — in short, a knowl- edge of the structure of mind, or Eeason. Here we see that Leibnitz meant by apperception almost exactly what Kant describes as the " transcendental unity of apperception," making allowance for the acute and protracted analysis of Kant, who expands the brief mention of Leibnitz into three extensive treatises. Herbart starts with the fertile suggestion of Leib- * See Principles of Nature and Grace, gf^ 4, 5 ; also The Monadology, § 14, and especially §§ 29, 30, in which he explains the object of la conscience, 2 xvi EDITOR'S PBEFACE. nitz and moves off in the direction of the sensation- alists, who like Locke explain all by means of sense- perception. But Herbart takes with him also Leibnitz's idea of the soul as a monad ; omitting, however, the important attribute of self-activity, which endows Leibnitz's monad (" natural changes that proceed from an internal principle," " which change is perception " — Monadology, §§ 11, 13). In the place of this self- activity Herbart places a sort of mechanical action and reaction {Druck and Oegendruck) in direct oppo- sition to the doctrine of Leibnitz (Monadology, § 7), who denies the possibility of mechanical interaction between independent beings. In the history of philosophy all systems are profit- able lessons in the comprehension of human thought. If true systems, they help us to see the positive road ; if false, they stand as guide-posts which warn the traveler not to take the by-paths leading ad dbsurdum.. Herbart's system may undertake to explain too much by the ideas of mechanical action and reaction ; or perhaps, on the other hand, it may be truly said that he never intended his " pressure, counter-pressure, and self-preservation " to be taken in a mechanical sense. But whatever he has done is worthy of being faith- fully studied and mastered, if for no other reason than for the discipline that he gives us in the habit of re- ferring all mental phenomena to the act of appercep- tion for their explanation. In conclusion, I present the analysis of Steinthal (one of the ablest of the thinkers who have followed Herbart), in which he gives the essential elements of the act of apperception in its four stages : 1. Identification — as in the case where we recog- EDITOR'S PREFACE. xvii nize the person before us to be the same we haye known. 2. Classification — as in the case where we recog- nize the object before us to be an individual of a class well known to us. 3. Harmonizing or reconciling apperception — wherever we unite two opposed or incongruent con- cepts (as, for example, the concept of something that has existed and served our purposes with the concept of the same thing as changed and destroyed — a friend who has died; a house that has been burned, etc.). 4. Creative or formative apperception — which makes combinations, poetic or scientific — inductive or deductive discoveries, solutions of enigmas, illusions and hallucinations. In this sort of apperception the mind creates the apperceiving factor. The old doctrine of " association of ideas," which, since the time of Locke, has furnished one of the most dismal chapters in "mental philosophy," so- called, is to be supplanted by this new doctrine of ap- perception. It has been asked. Why employ this bizarre techni- cal term for what we can express in terms already fa- miliar to us ? The answer is, that the word appercep- tion has no synonym already become familiar to us. It is a term for a new idea — a synthesis of many other ideas variously expressed already by such words as as- similate, associate, identify, recognize, explain, inter- pret, comprehend, classify, subsume, conception, elabo- ration, thought, etc. The association of ideas looks merely to their con- nection, which may be a matter of accident. But ap- perception looks to the modification of ideas one xviii EDITOR'S PREFACE. througli the other, and hence leads to the process of formation of ideas, which is the central point of in- terest in psychology and education. I append a note giving some information as to the bibliography of this subject. W. T. Harris. Washington, D. C, August, 1891. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The student who desires to pursue this subject further may be referred to the following lists of books selected out of the immense literature that has grown up round the theme : I. I%e Philosophers : M. W. Drobisch: Empirisehe Psychologic nachnaturwissen- schaf tUcher Methode. [Drobisch has labored with most success on the mathematical phase of Herbart's system.] M. Lazarus : Das Leben der Seele, etc. H. Steinthal : Binleitung in die Psychologic und Sprach- wissenschaft. [Messrs. Lazarus and Steinthal have applied Her- bart's ideas of apperception with distinguished success in the province of comparative philology, and their grasp of this im- portant thought seems to me a great advance in philosophic clearness over the exposition made by Herbart himself.] W. WuNDT : Grundziige der Physiologischen Psychologic. [For independent criticism of Herbart's doctrines and an able restatement of doctrines approved by him.] T. Fechnee : Revision der Hauptpunkte der Psychophysik. [This contains Feohner's review of the existing status of scien- tific investigation into the quantitative measurement of the intensity of sensations by reference to the force of difEerent stimuli, and was written on the occasion of G. E. Milller's critique of his earlier works.] II. Works on Education : Th. Waitz : AUgemeine PSdagogik (1833). [Republished and enlarged by Dr. 0. Willman in 1875.] EDITOR'S PREFACE, xix K. V. Stot ; in Jena : Bncyclopadle der Padagogik (1861), and in the " Allgemeine Schulzeitung." Tdisko Ziller, in Leipzig : Grundlegung der Padagogik (1865). " Vorlesungen fiber allgemeine Padagogik " (1876), " Leipziger Seminarbuch," and " Jahrbilcher des Vereins fur wissenschaf tliche Padagogik.'' H. Keen, in Berlin : Grundriss der Padagogik (1873). W. Rein, in Jena : Padagogisehe Studien (1889-90). W. Rein, A. Pickel, und E. Schellee : Theorie und Praxis des Volksschulunterrichts nach Herbartischen GrundsStzen. 8 vols. (1888). G. A. Lindnee, in Prag : Lehrbuch der empirischen Psy- chologie (English translation by Charles de Garmo, 1889), und Grundriss der Padagogik als Wissenschaf t (1889). EliEL Lange : Ueber Apperception (1887). 0. Willmann : Didaktik als Bildungslehre (1883 und 1888). Ed. Wiessnee : Herbart's Padagogik, dargestellt in ihrer Entwicklung und Anwendung (1885). G. WiQET : Die formalen Stufen des Unterrichts ; Einfuh- rung in das Studium der Herbart-Zillerschen Padagogik (1886). Kael Richtee: Die Herbart-Zillerschen formalen Stufen (1888). T. G. RooPEE : Apperception, or the Essential Mental Op- eration in the Act of Learning. [The original title to this essay was A Pot of Green Feathers]. Published by C. W. Bardeen, Syracuse, N. Y. INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. At the time of Herbart's death, August 11, 1841, it was said of him that he was a man to be appreciated only after centuries had passed away. The world has moved more rapidly than was anticipated, so that, after a lapse of barely fifty years, a very general apprecia- tion of Herbart's psychological and pedagogical work prevails. Since the time of Locke no man has done so much for psychology. In America, it is true, the number of educators who have any useful knowledge concerning the Her- bartian system is somewhat limited ; yet in the cur- rent philosophical and educational literature may be found occasionally a brief mention, which is probably an indication of the broader study that is yet to follow. The design of the present translation is not so much to furnish information as to awaken an interest which may develop a desire for a clearer insight into principles that seem to form the best foundation that has yet been discovered for a rational system of sci- entific pedagogy. Herbart believed that a knowledge of psychology is of the first importance to the teacher. To igno- rance of the subject he attributed the many errors and gaps existing in pedagogical knowledge and practice. He opposed the theory that the soul is composed of xxii IKTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. faculties which are born with the child and which constitute a great part of its mental organization. This, as well as the theory of the higher and lower inherent capabilities of the soul, he regarded as be- longing to that which might be termed psychological myth rather than to scientific psychology. He held _that the doctrine of the faculties is proved through metaphysics to be untenable. He argued that the fun- damental principle upon which a possibility for psy- chological investigation rests lies in the fact that at the bottom of all psychological phenomena is a real ex- istence, the soul, which he regarded as an absolutely simple existence, without any inherent powers or tal- jnts. He believed representations or concepts * to be the elements of the united psychical life, and regarded them as the soul's acts of self-preservation. Owing to the simplicity or singleness of the soul, its separate acts of self-preservation must be single as well. All the remaining facts or manifestations of consciousness he regarded as the results of the combinations of con- cepts, and of their alternate action and reaction upon one another. He believed that the effective forces of the mental life consist, not in fictitious faculties, but in concepts in the soul. To concepts, in their action and interaction upon one another, he ascribed all the capacities usually attributed of faculties. Concepts working in combi- * The term concept as employed here does not, as is usual with the English metaphysicians, indicate the general notion, but the individual presentation formed through the process of perception — e. g., the concept of a house, a tree, etc. INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. xxm nation with, and in opposition to one another furnish explanations of the phenomena of thinking, feeling, desiring, willing, etc. The general principles under- lying the above-mentioned operations may be illus- trated or indicated by mathematical calculations. Upon the theory of the existence of concepts in the soul, which are susceptible of a variety of combi- nations, Herbart's psychology treats first of presenta- tions or sensations — e. g. of size, form, color, etc.; and, secondly, of concepts formed through the combi- nations of these sensations — e. g., concepts of a house, a tree, a man, etc. This is to be distinguished from the general notion — house, tree, man, etc. In connection with the above may be considered psychical states — e. g., thought, feeling, desire, inter- est, etc. — which are the results of the action and inter- action of concepts, and which are determined by laws that may be indicated through mathematical formulae. The unity of the soul is the easily comprehensible metaphysical explanation of the tendency of concepts, in meeting together, to resist or arrest one another, and, so far as they are not opposed to one another, to combine into a whole. This resistance or arrest implies neither distinction from nor change in the concept. The effect is merely that the weaker presentation, or concept, is partially or totally removed out of consciousness, while the stronger is raised into clearness. The word con- sciousness here indicates the totality of all simultane- ous concepts. As soon as the resistance weakens, or, through an opposing force, becomes inefEective, the removed concept has_ a tendency within itself to re- turn into consciousness. xxiv INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. Concepts are said to be in equilibrium when there occurs among them a sufi&ciency of force to place them equally in a condition of arrest. This condition indi- cates a very gradual change from clearness to obscurity. The change in the grade of obscurity to which it is subject is called the movement of the concept. In a so-called " statics and mechanics " of the mind, Herbart has indicated the equilibrium and movement of concepts by mathematical formulae, with a view to illustrating the simplest psychical laws with scientific exactness. The result of the arrest of concepts must be subject to modifications on account of the different degrees of strength possessed by concepts, as well as of their dif- ferent grades of resistance, together with the conse- quent differences in their combinations. By computation, Herbart reached the conclusion that, in the case of two concepts, one can never become entirely obscured by the other, but in the case of three or four, etc., one may become obscured very easily, and its constant effort to recover itself being unobserved, it may be as ineffective as if it were not present. Concepts are said to combine in two ways : those which are not opposed to one another, so far as they are unrestricted, unite in what is called a complex; while those which are opposed become blended or fused together, so far as they do not suffer from recip- rocal arrest. Through this tendency to blend, concepts entering consciousness in succession become connected, and thus longer or shorter concept series are formed. The law according to which a concept released from arrest, as it returns to consciousness, strives to bring with it INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR, xxv those with which it is connected, is of special impor- tance. The theory of the mechanism of memory is largely based upon the construction of the concept series. Though Herbart did so much for the development of' psychology, he was convinced that all possible in- vestigations are quite insufficient to furnish a thorough knowledge of the subject, and seems to have believed that psychology can only be regarded as a science on condition that a large part of it be " relegated to the unknown." He also held that psychology must re- main incomplete and inadequate so long as it considers merely the psychical phenomena of the individual man. He believed that society wherever organized is subject to psychical laws peculiar to itself. In society the in- dividual in his relations to the whole corresponds to the concept in its relation to the psychical organism of which it is a member. Upon this assumption he for- mulated a statics and mechanics of the state in a way corresponding to the statics and mechanics of the men- tal life. To the mere reader of psychology, the Herbartian theories may at first appear peculiar, and in the minds of some may verge upon the absurd ; but the careful student will probably find no psychological theories that are so well calculated to stand the test of actual experience. The HERBARTiAif Pedagogy. Herbart regarded concepts in their action and re- action upon one another as the source of the psychi- cal life, and believed that, without regular systematic instruction, mental activity must be irregular and in- xxvi INTKODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. definite, while the results are more or less worthless. The mental processes, the laws of which the teacher should thoroughly understand, are : perception, repro- duction, and apperception. A rule upon these pro- cesses has been given, which enjoins clear perception, exact reproduction, and thorough apperception. In this connection these processes are exercised in the four steps of instruction, viz. : 1. Clearness. 2. Comparison (association). 3. System. 4. Philosophical method or application. According to Herbart, the aim of education is ethi- cal — i. e., the moral development of the individual. Everything lower than this is valueless except as it serves to secure this end. This end is to be secured through discipline, train- ing, and instruction. Discipline has a twofold task: First, negative; the suppression of the natural impatience of restraint and wildness of the child. Second, positive ; the care of the soul in its intellectual, moral, and spiritual devel- opment. Training consists in directing the attention to de- sirable objects of study, and in fixing the results of that which is learned. Instruction does not merely imply putting the child in possession of technical skill, but it rather im- plies the training of the child in the observation of relations, and must result in power to recognize under- lying principles, and to appreciate sesthetic and eth- ical relations. One of the tasks of instruction is to awaken in the INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR, xxvii child a many-sided interest which will fit th'e future man to make himself at home in any society or in any country, and will enable him to adapt iimself to any change of circumstances, as well as make him ready in resources that will be equal to any emergency. This many-sided interest may be secured through the: development of two groups of interests : First, the in- terests of knowledge, viz., empirical, speculative, and aesthetic interests; second, the interests of participa- tion, viz., sympathetic, social, and religious interests. The development of the interests of the first group depends largely upon the child's experience in connec- tion with material objects, or with the world around him, while the development of the interests of the sec- ond group depends upon the child's experience in connection with his fellow-creatures. The first condition of instruction in any subject is attention, which is almost synonymous with interest. Attention is of two kinds, involuntary and voluntary. Involuntary attention is classified into primitive and apperceiving attention. The course of instruction is either analytic or syn- thetic. Here we shall leave the description of Herbart and his work, with the hope that the teachers of Amer- ica may have an early opportunity of availing them- selves of a system at once clear, simple, and rational, and in every respect calculated to supply our lack in the direction of philosophical pedagogy. To those who may be still uncertain regarding a system of which so little is as yet known, Herbart's declaration of his fundamental principle may be pre- sented : " I stand, not upon the single point of the xxviii INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. Ego, but upon a foundation as broad as universal ex- perience." In closing, the translator takes this opportunity to acknowledge her indebtedness to Dr. William T. Har- ris. But for his kindly patience the publication of the book must have been deferred to a much later date. Also thanks are due to Prof. Otto H. L. Schwetzky, who always readily gave such aid as could only be ren- dered by one possessing a thorough knowledge of German language and thought. Margaket K. Smith. Oswego, New York, April S, 1891, CONTENTS. PAGE Editor's Preface v Introduction by the Translator xxi Introduction by the Author 1 PART FIRST. cnAPTER FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. I. — Condition op Concepts when they act as Forces 9 II. — Equilibrium and Movement of Concepts . . 11 III. — Complications and Blendinos 16 IV. — Concepts as the Source op Mental States . . 26 V. — The Co-operation op Several Masses op Concepts OF Unequal Strength 30 VI. — A Glance over the Connection between Body and Soul 32 PART SECOND. EMPIRICAL PSTCnOLOGT. FIRST division. — PSTCHOLOOICAL PHENOMENA ACCORDING TO THE HYPOTHESIS OF MENTAL FACULTIES. I. — A Survey op the Assumed Mental Faculties . 36 II. — The Boundary-Line between the Lower and Higher Faculties 45 III. — Faculty op Representation 53 IV. — The Faculty op Feeling 74 XXX CONTENTS. CHAPTER PAGE V. — The Faculty of Desire 82 VI. — The Co-operation and Cultivation of the Mental Faculties 93 second division. — mental conditions. I. — The General Variability op Conditions . . 97 II. — Natural Talents 99 III. — External Influences 104 IV. — Anomalous Conditions 108 PART THIRD. BATIONAL PSYCHOLOGT. section first. — theorems from metaphysics and natural philosophy. I. — The Soul and Matter 119 IL— The Vital Forces 122 III. — The Connection between Soul and Body . . 125 section second — explanations op phenomena. I.— Concepts of Space and Time 129 II. — The Development op Ideas 140 III. — Our Comprehension of Things and of Ourselves 150 IV. — The Ungoverned Play of the Psychical Mech- anism 163 V. — Self-control and especlally Duty as a Psychical Phenomenon 178 VI. — Psychological Observations upon the Destiny of Man 190 ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR (p. 1).-^ 1. Ma- terial and work of psychology. § 2. Concepts in regard to the senses. Memory and imagination. Manifestations of intelli- gence and rationality. Opinions in regard to faculties. § 3. Self-observation. {Note. — In psychology the general ideas are clearest ; the particular most obscure.) § 4. Empirical physics has discovered certain laws. Psychology can not experiment with men. § 5. Comparison of representation, feeling, and desire with the psychological states of vegetation, sensibility, and irri- tability respectively. § 6. Man an aggregate of contradictions. All mental life a constant change. § 7. Solution of many of the problems of mental life to be found in metaphysics and higher mathematics. § 8. The old hypothesis of mental facul- ties is a tradition reflecting the total impression of psychologi- cal observation, hence can not be dispensed with. (Note 1. — The present treatise divided into — Part I. Fundamental Princi- ples ; Pait II. Empirical Psychology : Part HI. Rational Psy- chology. Note 2. — In modern times, psychology has rather gone backward than forward. Psychology can not deal with the beautiful.) PART FIRST.— Chapter I.— The Condition of Concepts when they act as Forces (p. 9). § 10. Resistance between con- cepts. Resistance an expression of force. § 11. Do concepts destroy one another, or do they remain unchanged? §12. A concept which has in part become transformed into an effort must not be regarded as a severed portion of the whole concept. Chapter II. — Equilibrium and Movement of Concepts 3 xxxii ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. (p. 11). § 13. Equilibrium depends upon a sufficiency of oppo- sition between concepts. § 14. The sum of the resistances and the ratio of their limitations are considered in investigations into the statics of the mind. § 15. The sum and ratio of the mutual limitation depend upon the strength of the individual concepts. § 16. Two concepts never entirely obscure each other. " Threshold of Consciousness.'' (Note. — A distinction between " A concept is in consciousness " and " 1 am conscious of my concepts." g 17. Law underlying the movement of concepts. § 18. Effect of a new concept coming upon concept near equi- librium. § 19. " The mechanical threshold." § 30. Extension of time during which concepts linger on the mechanical thresh- old. § SI. Cause of changes in the laws of reciprocal move- ment. (Note. — Concepts which rise simultaneously.) Chapter HI.— Complications and Blendings (p. 16). § 23. Why opposed concepts resist one another. (Note. — Partially complete complexes.) § 33. An aggregate of force furnished by the complication or blending of several concepts. § 24 Prob- lem : The encounter between two concepts and the blending of the remainders. § 35. Principles upon which the blending of concepts is based. § 26. Mediate and immediate reproduction. § 27. Mediate reproduction. § 38. Application of the theories of mediate and immediate reproduction. § 29. Keproduotion, or memory. Blendings existing between concepts in a series. § 30. Several series may cross one another. The same number may be held as a common point of intersection for many hun- dred series. § 31. Dependence of the foregoing upon the pre- supposed difference in the remainders. § 33. The blending of free-rising concepts. The conflict between things as we perceive them and as we think them. Chapter IV. — Concepts as the Source of Mental States (p. 36). § 33. Objections against mathematical psychology. The soul as mind. The emotional nature. § 34. Esthetic judg- ment. (Note. — The series of true relations may be presented here. Conditions under which disharmony and harmony may arise.) § 35. A principle of contrast to be found in the com- plexes. § 36. The source of unpleasant feeling and of desire. § 37. The source of pleasant feeling, f? 38. The sources of feel- ings and desires always in particular concepts. ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. xxxiii Chapter V. — The Co-operation of Several Masses of Concepts of Unequal Strength (p. 30). g 39. The effect of a new act of perception upon combinations of concepts. § 40. Inner percep- tion analogous to the outer. § 41. Inner perception always ac- tive. § 43. Difference between concepts in an active and in an inactive state. § 48. Conditions under which inner perception is interrupted. The inner perception seldom rises to its second power. Chapter VI. — A Glance over the Connection between the Body and Soul (p. 32). § 44. Hitherto no question concerning the origin of concepts. § 45. Time required for each act of perception. Limit to the strength of a concept. § 46. Every human concept consists of infinitely small elementary apprehen- sion. § 47. The largest supply of sense-concepts generated in early childhood. The susceptibility of the senses never entirely extinguished. § 48. The foregoing relates to concepts of the same kind. § 49. Influence of the body upon psychical mani- festations shown in three ways. § 50. Conditions under which physiological pressure arises. This pressure often merely a retarding force. Oftener an arresting force. § 51. Conditions of physiological reaction. § 53. Origin of the co-operation of soul and body. PART SECOND.— Empirical Psychology.— i^Vrsi Divis- ion : Psychological Phenomena according to the Hypothesis oj Mental Faculties. Chapter I. — A Survey of the Assumed Mental Faculties (p. 36). § 53. Explanation of fundamental facts from the forego- ing. A separation of that which does not admit of union im- plied in the effort to bring together a manifold. An original and essential differentiation of the human mind considered in the first division of the second part of this manual. § 54. The teachers of psychology present the social, the educated man. All higher mental activity potentially present in children and sav- ages. A limited condition of man to be described. § 55. The division into higher and lower faculties. § 56. The extremes of the lowest and highest mental faculties ; sensuousness and reason. § 57. In the faculty of representation, we find imagi- nation and memory; in reason, imagination and judgment. Esthetic and moral feelings and the emotions in the faculty of xxxiv ANALYSIS OP CONTENTS. feeling. In desire on the one side, willing ; on the other, pas- sion. § 58. (o.) These classifications were empirical groupings. The emotions not to be classified with the feelings. Morals and aesthetics are felt, cognized, and desired. (6.) The classifi- cations made merely preliminary. The emotions not to be classified with the passions, (c.) The classified mental faculties exist side by side and in relation to one another. The work of memory, fantasy (or imagination), and desire upon the same material. The causal relation of the different faculties to one another. § 59. The first treatment of sensuous presentations. The lower sensuous phase of mental life to be met most fre- quently. The true Ego appears to us by a so-called process of apperception. Signification of apperception. The relation of a moral volition to free will. Assumption of transcendental freedom. Reason quite different from sensuousness. Reason and sensuousness the beginning points of two series. Idea of the Ego and of transcendental freedom contradictory. A fac- ulty of reason not consistent with tnith. (Note. — The four principal kinds of mental diseases. The notions of mental soundness.) Chapter II. — The Boundary-line between the Higher and Lower Faculties (p. 45). § 60. The line of demarkation in the representative faculties can not be drawn with precision. Ms- thetic faculty is wanting in uncivilized men. § 61. If a lower faculty be attributed to brutes, it is to be regarded as defective, arrested, or suppressed. We are not authorized regarding the human mind as an aggregate of higher and lower faculties. The educated man has power to apportion his attention to different acts. § 63. Wolff places voluntary attention between the higher and lower faculties of representation. Attention makes a notion distinct. Understanding is the faculty by which our thoughts are united, etc. § 63. All combination is a spontaneous act of the power of presentation. Kant's service to speculative philosophy. The combination of a manifold is the immediate result of unity in the soul. When thinking in- tensely, we feel ourselves active. Activity neither an attribute of the understanding nor a source of combinations. The con- cepts of space and time. The power to distinguish character- istics from the substance to which they are attributed belongs ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. xxxr to the higher faculties. § 64 The abstracting of the general notions from concrete examples belongs to the work of the higher faculties, as does the distinction between object and space, event and time. § 65. In savages sesthetic and moral apprehensions rare. The brute depends upon instinct. § 66. No series of fixed differences between humanity and animality, or between the higher and lower faculties. Very little is known of brutes. The brute receives training according to the inner laws of its nature. The differences between men more easily explained than those between brutes. Man has needed tools. Human activity not to be regarded as complete. Chapter III. — Faculty of Representation (p. 53). § 67. Conspectus showing the aspects belonging to the faculty of representation. § 68. The work of touch, taste, smell, hearing, seeing. Classes of sense-impressions greater in number than the organs of sense. § 69. Pressure, warmth, cold. Touch originally feeling. § 70. Taste furnishes distinguishable sensa- tion. § 71. Apparatus of smell less under our control than that of the other senses. Odors mostly pleasant or unpleasant. § 72. Hearing richest of all the senses in variety of sensations. Probably every musical tone has its own peculiar place in the organ. § 73. Sight distinguishes colors. The color-sense is sometimes wanting. (iVo/e.— Every sense has its acuteness and delicacy, its extent and duration.) § 74. The inner sense an assumption from analogy with the outer sense ; the inner sense a somewhat defective invention of psychologists; the inner sense not able long to endure the strain of intentional effort ; the inner sense rises to higher and higher powers. {Note.— Question whether there are concepts without consciousness.) § 75. Theory of space and time incorrect. The tone-series ; the color-surface. Whether the color-realm requires a third dimension. (Note.— In the difference between high and dark, as well as between high and low tones, a concept of succession to be perceived. The series in every logical arrangement where the varieties are opposed and at the same time united in the species. The theory of intelligible space.) g 76. Concept of a series shown in the notions of integral positive numbers. Arith- metic an example of a series constantly becoming more ab- stracted. § 77. The geometrical concept of space not original xxxvi ANALYSIS OP CONTENTS, in man. We habitually carry a standard of measurement with us. § 78. Philosophers in difficult cases copy the procedure of logic ; Kant's categories warning examples of this. Understand- ing, judgment, and reason correspond to notions, judgment, and syllogisms. Whether notions are logical ideals, § 79. What dictionaries and grammars reveal concerning notions. General notions can not be shown to exist, g 80, Human thought assumes the form of judgment. § 81. A wonderful psychological phenomenon. The representation as a copy should resemble the object itself; the painter in a sketch gives a more exact knowledge of an object than one who tries to de- scribe it in words. The principles of logic only applied to judgments. (Note. — The ideal of an intuiting cognition.) § 83. The passive attitude of the subject. Judgment is manifested only in speech ; inclination to communicate with others influ- ences the form of one's thought ; expression often a necessity : preference and rejection special kinds of judgments ; the union of the new with that which is already known ; the general often to be explained by the particular. (Note. — School formulas. Arching and pointing. Pleasure in judging injures construct- ive power.) § 83. Syllogisms progressive unfoldings of the steps of a thought ; such progressive unfoldings only met with in ordinary speech. Creations of thought rarely possess the accuracy of the syllogism. § 84. Power to infer an attribute of reason. § 85. Logical approval different from sesthetic ap- proval. § 86. Difficult to detei-mine what transcends experi- ence. Notion of substance not the same as notion of thing; notion of force depends upon the notion of substance, g 87. Notions of force and substance comprehending space and time, g 88. Pure geometric notions of bodies, g 89. Psychologists careless in regard to the question of reproduction. § 90. Viv- idness and accuracy of reproduction, g 91. Accuracy and viv- idness of reproduction seldom found at the same time in equal proportions. (Note. — With some psychologists memory implies reproduction and recollection.) § 93. Upon the association of . concepts and the way in which they reproduce one another, (Note. — In inventions, creation the essential element.) g 93. Agreement between memory and imagination, g 94. Difference between memory and imagination. ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. xxxvii Chapter IV.— The Faculty of Feeling (p. 74). § 95. Neces- sity for assuming faculties in addition to the representing fac- ulty, g 96. Boundary-line between feeling and desire drawn near representation. (i\^oie.— Explanation of feeling.) § 97. Difficult to separate feelings from desires and aversions. Three kinds of feelings ; indifferent feelings. § 98. Peelings which depend upon the nature of that which is felt. § 99. Difference between unpleasant feelings of this kind. § 100. Analogy of the above feelings to iesthetic feeling. (iVb/e.— Sense of the sub- lime; sense of the ridiculous; comic sensations; laughter.) t? 101. Peeling the source of desire and aversion. Desires which are independent of the pleasure or pain of their object. § 102. Intermediate feelings. § 103. Mixed feelings. (Mote 1.— False speculations in regard to feelings. Note 2. — Poets mingle feel- ings in their works of art.) g 104. Emotions not merely stronger feelings. § 105. Kant's classification of the emotions. § 106. Emotions to be regarded physiologically as well as psychologic- ally. (Note 1. — Action and reaction between soul and body. Note 3. — Effect of emotion upon physical organs.) Chapter V.— The Faculty of Desire (p. 82). § 107. The faculties of representation, feeling, and desire should furnish an exhaustive classification of mental activities. Difference be- tween a strong will and a strong desire, g 108. Desires to bo distinguished according to the above classification of feelings. g 109. The most important distinction is between the lower and higher faculties of desire, g 110. Impulses and instincts implied in the lower faculties of desire, g 111. Psychologists have placed the impulses of self-love, imitation, etc., side by side with the organic impulses. The assumption of special faculties frequent in the theory of desire. § 112. Inclinations different in different people, g 113. The passions the most striking spec- tacle in psychology, g 114. Deliberation precedes judgment and action. § 115. Reason is not a source of willing nor of knowledge, g 116. The connection between means and ends complicates moral deliberation, g 117. Circumspection the mental condition of a man who reflects. The work of delibera- tion is to make prominent the assthetic judgment upon the will. The ideas of inner freedom, of perfection, of benevolence, of right, and of equity. § 118. Freedom of the will. A man's xxxviii ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. choice a co-operation of reason and desire. {Note 1. — The ground for illusion is in regard to freedom. An act is respon- sible in proportion as it discloses a weak or a strong will.) (Note Z. — Transcendental freedom a stranger in psychology.) § 119. Reason regarded as the seat of freedom. The passionate man a slave. Chapter VI. — The Co-operation and Cultivation of the Men- tal Faculties (p. 92). § 130. The assumption of faculties defective. § 131. Reproduction the chief seat of mental life next to the senses, g 133. Value of reproduction in regard to habits and accomplishments. § 133. The two directions of cultivation de- termined by the inner sense and the outer action. Self -con- sciousness necessary to self-control. External action includes desires, observation, and judgment. Effect of external deeds upon a man's character. Employment pursued determines character. § 134. Permanent feelings rise from inner think- ing and external action. § 135. Disastrous effect of passions upon development, upon imagination, and understanding. Second Division : Mental Conditions. Chapter I. — The General Variability of Conditions (p. 97). § 136. No one condition of human life resembles another. § 137. Reproduction proves that no concept once found is ever lost. § 138. A change of concepts in consciousness a necessity to man. The need of change increases through gratification. § 139. Hunger and satiety, waking and sleep, have a well-known cycle. § 130. The physical life has its period of growth, full strength, and decline. Variations to be observed throughout the life of the child, the boy, the man. Chapter II. — Natural Talents (p. 99). g 131. The course of life modified through difference of sex. Girls develop earlier than boys. § 133. The temperaments in connection with the feel- ings and the emotions. The mingling of temperaments. (Note. — A physiological view of temperament.) § 133. The emotions strengthened or weakened by the responsiveness or the imper- turbability of the body. (Note. — Physiognomy and craniology too indefinite at present to have any value in psychology.) § 134. The natural talents of humanity, g 135. The question concerning the races comes between those concerning the tal- ents of the individual and of humanity. -ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. xxxix Chapter III. — ^External influences (p. 104). § 136, Prom the empirical standpoint no decision concerning the original talents of human nature. § 137. Influences of climate, soil, etc., upon man. § 138. The nation has a predominating tem- perament and a history. § 139. Difference of ranks or castes in every civilized nation. § 140. The youth is influenced by his family, his education, his surroundings, etc. § 141. The free- dom that remains to a man in the midst of external influences- Kant endeavored to secure responsibility. The force with which a man works on himself or against himself. Chapter IV. — Anomalous Conditions (p. 108). § 143. Man subjected to anomalous conditions. Difficulty in contrasting the well man with the mentally diseased. § 143. Anomalous condi- tions to be compared with the mental disorders, illusion, madness, dementia, idiocy. § 144. Illusion depends upon a flxed idea. In- tervals of sound health in a diseased imagination. In delusions the disorder not purely mental. § 145. Madness an impulse to bodily action without aim. In healthy men, action occasionally appears at the same time voluntary and involuntary. (Note. — Madness without delusion.) § 146. In dementia, a mingling of concepts without regular connection. The fool resembles the stupid child. The proper cure of dementia is bodily. § 147. Idiocy or imbecility is general weakness of the mind. § 148. The classes of mental disorders are extremes under which modi- fied disorders may be subsumed. § 149. Anomalous mental states analogous to mental disorders, The peculiarities of the dream. Concluding Remarks. — The opposite of mental disor- der is a healthy mental condition. The same degree of mental health not to be found in all mental faculties. Comparison be- tween insanity and the passions. No passion is a pure force. The kinds of passions belonging to the different kinds of insan- ity. Concepts manifest themselves at one time as passions, at another as reason. PART THIRD.— Rational Psychology.— ySecfo'on First: Theorems from Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy. Chapter I.— The Soul and Matter (p. 119). § 150. Notion of the soul to be restored. The soul a simple essence with no space relations. § 151. The soul has no time relations. § 153. The soul has no immediate natural talents. § 153. The nature of xl ANALYSIS OP CONTENTS. the soul unknown. § 154. Eesistance' among essences. §155. The self-preservations of the soul. § 156. The difference be- tween soul and matter. Space conditions belong to essences. Matter does not fill space as a geometric. Matter always pene- trable by its solvent. Chapter 11.— Vital Forces (p. 122). § 157. Vital forces. § 158. Each element has its own vital force. (Note. — No matter entirely inorganic.) § 159. The source of vital force referred to Providence. § 160. The soul an example of the internal devel- opment of a simple essence. The relation between psychology and physiology. (Note. — A characteristic of vitality is assimila- tion.) § 161. Vital forces differ in kind as well as in degree. The difference between parts of the body nourished by the same kind of food. Causality depends upon the dissimilarity of the elements. Chapter III. — The Connection between Soul and Body (p. 135). § 163. Connection between mind and matter in brutes and in man. § 163. The location of the soul. (Note 1. — The spheres of the physiologist and metaphysician differ. Note S. — No reason for assuming the soul of brutes and man to be in the same place. § 164. The nervous system in the human body serves a single soul. § 165. The dependence of the mind upon the body not to be regarded as strange. § 166. The theory con- cerning a general organic connection of the whole universe. Section Second : Expla/iiafion of Phenomena. Chapter I.— Concepts of Space and Time (p. 129). g 167. A psychological disclosure needed as to how the world and we ouTselves appear to ourselves. § 168. Investigations into the nature of series of concepts necessary to explain things in the relation of time and space. § 169. The limitation of the repro- duction depends upon accompanying conditions. The relation of intermediate concept between two others will never be changed. § 170. The general form of the concept depends upon a definite starting-point. § 171. If the beginning point be dispensed with, the perception and the reproduction seen constantly in one direction. § 178. In the soul the concept of space is intensive. The fimdamental idea of number is that of more or less. True and complete symbols for the notion of number. § 173. The original apprehension of the eye not spa- ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. xli tial. The movement of the eye furnishes the spatial concepts. § 174. The concept of space relations depends upon reproduc- tions just occurring. (1.) Succession in representation not a rep- resented succession. (3.) Only an imperceptibly short interval of time required to furnish a concept of space relations. § 175. Distinction between time and space perceptions. Propositions 1 and 3 in § 174 apply to the representation of the temporal. § 176. Only educated people can comprehend long extensions in time, g 177. In a psychological sense everything temporal and spiritual is infinitely divisible. {Note 1. — Geometry needed in commensurable quantities on account of the infinite divisibility of space and time. Note Z. — Spatial and temporal relations not dependent on space and time. Note S. — The beautiful in space.) § 178. Concepts of intensive magnitudes. Origin of the stand- ard by which we characterize our sensations of strong and weak. Supplement. — The Difference between Series (p. 1S8). The differences in the series in general. 1. The series are longer or shorter. 3. Degree of union among the terms stronger or weaker. 3. The series similar or not in regard to strength of terms as ■well as in degree of combination. 4. Several series often serve for one. 5. Many series return into themselves. 6. Strong among dissimilar often form a series among themselves. 7. A term often has a side series. 8. Side series may progress simul- taneously. 9. Bach element of a complex may be the beginning point of a series. 10. Series may start simply, and later may form a complex. Reproduction fluctuates between two kinds of opposed possible influences. Chapter II.— The Development of Notions (p. 140). § 179. All concepts subject to the laws of blending, etc. Notions, as such, exist only in our abstraction. The union of the practical with the theoretical understanding, g 180. That notions are a peculiar class of concepts, a delusion. General notions and logi- cal ideals. How are they constructed^ § 181. Why do con- cepts so often occur in the form of judgments % Judgments not mere complexes or blendings. § 183. Collective impressions from similar perceptions. § 183. Reproduction of concepts through similarity. § 184. Collective concepts in which series lie infolded to be regarded as subjects, etc. § 185. The place of the subject. § 186. Each word in the language fitted to be the xlii ANALYSIS OP CONTENTS. subject of a judgment. § 187. In an expressed judgment, for the hearer, two cases possible. § 188. Intelligible speech must be connected. (Note. — In music, distinctions between the intel- ligible and the senseless to be made. The intelligible not also the beautiful.) § 189. The deyelopment of ideas the result of continuous judgment, § 190. The relation between a genus and its species. § 191. The determination of the content of com- plexes, or the definition of ideas. § 193. The definition and separation of general notions are problems to be solved, etc. Chapter III. — Our Comprehension of Things and Ourselves (p. 150). § 194. Concepts become combined so far as they are not arrested. For a child there are no individual objects. The first chaos of concepts subjected to a separation. Movement of objects aids in making distinctions. § 195. Objects separated into individual things ; things separated into their properties. The question concerning substance, g 196. Contradictions in the notion of the thing with several properties. § 197. Differences in the human apprehension of things to be considered prepara- tory to the theory of self-consciousness. The object in motion occupies more attention than the object at rest. § 198. The brute as well as man occupies himself less with the inanimate than with the living object. (Note. — That the Ego opposes to itself a non-Ego, an error of idealism.) ij 199. The origin of the concept of a concept. § 300. The concept of self-knowledge. The possibility of apprehending two opposite concepts, the rep- resenting and the represented, as one and the same. The iden- tity of self. § 201. The concept of the Ego. Man the movable central point of things. (iVbfe — The concept of the we.) § 203. The unity of personality depends upon the Mendings of all the concepts which in the course of life are added to the complex which makes up the self of each person. The Ego develops differently in different concept masses. § 203. A correct notion of ourselves to be obtained through the notion of the soul. (iVoie.— The Ego as a metaphysical principle. § 204 The meaning of intuition. Intuition a complicated process. Pas- sivity in intuition. Chapter IV.— The Ungoverned Play of the Psychical Mech- anism (p. 163). § 305. The mental activity may originate in concepts themselves in the psychical organism or in external ANAliYSlS OF CONTliNTS. xliii impressions. § 206. A small number of concepts would soon approach a statical point. This movement toward the statical point is influenced by the number of concepts. § 207. Changes in the arrest of concepts occur in consequence of new complica- tions. Hence changes in mental conditions. § 208. The stat- ical threshold is developed from the mechanical. § 209. Older (earlier) concepts are stronger than later ones. § 210. The pur- pose of the reproduction determines the purpose of the elabora- tion. {I^ote. — Distinction between analytic and synthetic in- struction.) S 211. Concepts become more firmly and more vari- ously interwoven in following the tendency toward equilibrium. The intelligence has its seat in the general connection among concepts. § 212. Conversation is the ordinary stimulant to the imagination. § 213. A man's sense-perception and attention depend upon his imagination and thought. Attention partly involuntary, partly voluntary. Pour circumstances to be ob- served during the act of attention. Keproduced concepts may be unfavorable to involuntary observation. {Note. — Attention belongs to the fundamental notions of general pedagogy.) § 214. Every physical feeling is in a condition to bring the series of concepts complicated with it into consciousness. § 215. Changes in the physical condition must correspond to changes in the mental state. (Note. — An increased velocity in the changes of bodily conditions renders the play of the psychical mechanism diflScult of control.) § 216. The effect of emotion should not be apparent upon the healthy body. A system of possible emotions exists in every human organism. The effects of physiological pressure are to be ascertained from a knowl- edge of the psychical mechanism. (1.) Under physiological pressure obscurity arises. (2.) This pressure retards the vault- ing and tapering of a series of concepts. (3.) With many this pressure is not constantly effective. (4.) A constant pressure acting upon free-rising concepts disarranges their movement. § 217. Different concept masses depend upon outside impres- sions. § 218. The external world regarded as the sphere of action. The functions of body and soul combined in move- ments in different parts of the body and the feelings arising therefrom. § 219. Illustration of § 218 by a series of concepts, a, b, c, d, etc. § 220. The position of a hindrance often repre- xliv ANALYSIS OF COl^TBNTS. sents merely something lacking in an ordinary environment. § aai. Effect of a tissue of series. § 332. The first essential of a man's character furnished in the object and manner of his love, g 233. The nature of will. § 234. The will has its imagi- nation and its memory. § 225. How the will is strengthened. § 226. Desires may meet and oppose one another. {Note. — The greater the number of concept masses so much the more har- moniously do they work together.) § 237. The external life often hinders a man from turning his whole will inward, Chaptee V. — Self-control, especially Duty, as a Psychical Phenomenon (p. 178), § 238. Self-control to be distinguished from that which a man exacts of himself. § 329. The child controls himself when he delays an action which serves as a means to an end. § 230. Experiences showing the inconsistency of the will more striking in great than in small things. The sign of a good law. § 331. Conscience follows from self-con- sciousness. A fixed law preceding cases to be decided, necessity as security against partiality. § 233. In the beginning practical principles are individual. § 383. The basis of duty in practical (moral) philosophy. § 334. Actual self-control depends upon the co-operation of several concept masses. The demands of Jabor upon the will. {Note. — Necessity for guarding against theories representing one's freedom greater than it really is.) § 385. Self-control conformed to an end or purpose. {Note 1. — The assumption of a transcendental freedom of the will. Note S. — Discussion concerning the mental condition of criminals.) § 286. "Where the conditions of self-control are to be found. The cultured man and savages have hardly any faculty of the understanding except the passions. We can not speak of sev- eral understandings, several imaginations. § 337. The consid- eration of moral self-control. Moral feeling arises from moral judgments. § 388. A purely moral self-control an ideal. § 239. No particular time of life can be held as decisive in regard to the power of self-control. Chapter VI. — Psychological Observations upon the Destiny of Man (p. 190). § 340. Man not to be considered as standing alone. The individuals of a social whole related to one another in almost the same way as the concepts in the soul of an indi- vidual. § 241. A science of politics similar to the empirical ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. xlv psychology of this work. § 243. Philosophy of history depends upon psychology. No history of known countries can furnish a history of the world. The statesman demands of the philos- ophy of history that which the educator demands of psychology. § 243. Comparison of mental diseases with social desires and delusions. Man assigns to himself the place he would like to occupy in an ideal society. The importance of the will in ma- turing character. § 245. To fill his place in the social whole is the highest aim of the individual. § 246. The career of the in- dividual man not to be confined to the earthly life. Death is rejuvenescence. § 247. Revolutions among concepts may be necessary after death. § 248. The product created by concepts striving after equilibrium not the same in any two souls. § 249. Eternal life a gentle fluctuation of concepts. § 250. The soul's knowledge of its former career upon earth. § 251. The differ- ences between individuals may be lessened after death. § 252. The future as seen from the standpoint of science. HERBAET'S PSTOHOLOGT. INTRODUCTION". 1. The material of psychology may be gained from inner perception, intercourse with men of difEerent degrees of development, the observations of educators and statesmen, the writings of travelers, historians, poets, and moralists, and finally from observations on insane people, sick people, and the lower animals. The work of psychology is not merely to collect this material, but to make the total of inner experience comprehensible, while it is the work of the philosophy of nature to accomplish the same in regard to outer ex- perience limited as it is by space-conditions. As the two circles of experience are different and yet united, so also are the two sciences. In respect to their funda- mental ideas, they depend in common upon general metaphysics, yet psychology has this peculiar relation to the latter, that many questions, which upon occasion arise in metaphysics and then must be postponed, are answered in psychology. For this reason the trea- tise on psychology may very well be allowed to pre- cede that on metaphysics, and in this way the meta- physical idea of the soul (the substance of the mind) may be dispensed with at first. By this the beginner lightens his task, partly because he can tarry longer in 4 2 INTRODUCTION. the circle of experience, and partly because the mani- fold relations of psychology to morals, pedagogy, poli- tics, philosophy of history, and to art, heighten the interest of the study. 2. That concepts {VorsteUungen=i6iea,3 or repre- sentations) are receiTed through the senses, preserved by the memory, reproduced by the imagination, and anew combined ; that the understanding ( Verstand) shows itself in the understanding of a language or an art ; the Season ( Vernunft) in perceiving reasons and counter-reasons ; this generally received opinion has been adopted and carried out by psychologists, and the distinction between the beautiful and the ugly has been assigned to the^eestheticjudgment, the passions to the fa culty of desire, the emotions to the_ faculty^ of feeling. The opinion is, that these faculties are al- ways to be found together in every man ; but the great contest over the explanation and classification of facul- ties must long ago have brought to notice the fact that psychology needs another branch of investigation in which at the beginning the attention must be directed toward changing conditions. These changes (but not those faculties) we experience directly in ourselves. 3. A preliminary comparison of psychology with the three principal branches of natural science is use- ful. N"atural history may firsst present individual ex- amples of the objects which it afterward classifies ; it may enumerate definitely the characteristics perceived. Now, inasmuch as a regular process of abstraction is possible, beginning with the individuals and ascending toward the species and genera [by omitting one after another the characteristics that differentiate the indi- viduals from the species, and the lower classes from UNCERTAINTY OF MENTAL PACTS. 3 the higher], it follows that we have before us these characteristics [omitted in the process of rising to the abstract classes], and can add them as we descend to the concrete. When these logical operations are prop- erly performed, and ascent is made from the concrete to the abstract, and descent from the abstract to the concrete, no one is misled into supposing the abstract to be anything real. Everybody knows the abstract terms to be mere devices of thought, invented by it for the purpose of conveniently surveying at a glance the manifold objects of nature. On the contrary, no material of facts lies at the foundation of psychology, spread out before the eyes so that it can be definitely shown and classified into subordinate and higher classes without any gaps in the series. Self-observation mutilates the facts of con- sciousness even in the act of seizing them ; it wrests them from their natural combinations and delivers them over to a restless process of abstraction which finds a point of repose only when it has reached the ultimate species — namely, conception, feeling, and de- sire. Under these three general classes, by definitions (a method precisely opposite to that of empirical science), it subsumes the mental facts observed so far as it can be done. Now, if to these vague and unscientific classifications there be added a theory of mental facul- ties which we are supposed to possess, then psychology is changed into a mythology in which no one will con- fess a serious belief, but upon which the most impor- tant investigations are made dependent, so that, if this foundation were removed, nothing clear would remain. Note. — It is noteworthy that in psychology the highest ideas are the clearest ; the lower, however, are always obscure. Thus 4 INTRODUCTION. for some time we have been tolerably (though not entirely) united in regarding the three classes, conception, feeling, desire, as the ultimate species of mental faculties, but the discrimination of the emotions from the passions is of later origin, and even yet has not thoroughly penetrated the usages of speech : if we ask exhaustively about the kinds of memory, as memory of place, memory of names, memory of things, etc., no one undertakes to name for us in reply all the classes, nor are the poetic, the mathematical, and the military imaginations discriminated from one another, although manifest diflferences are to be found among men In this respect. By this indefiniteness in the subordinate classes, it may be perceived at once that the original apprehen- sion of psychological facts is so inexact that it admits of no pure natural history of the mind. Nevertheless, on account of the customs of speech already established, in our logical review of empirical psychology we shall sometimes make use of the cus- tomary names. 4. Empirical physics, though it has not aa,yet dis- covered the real forces of nature, has learned certain laws according to which phenomena take place. By recalling the latter, a connection in the variety of phe- nomena is perceived. Experiments with artificial ap- paratus and the aj^plication of mathematics aid greatly in the discovery of these laws. Psychology can not experiment with men, and there is no apparatus for this purpose. So much the more carefully must we make use of mathematics ; by it sci- entific accuracy is gained for the fundamental ideas ; then the work of referring individual cases to the law begins. Suppose, for example, that one has the idea of the tension of opposed concepts ; then we go back to the different conditions possible in this, among others to the difference in mental states. In this way the rules of reproduction are first learned, ac- cording to which, in the concept series, every concept PHYSIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 5 presents itself between others ; then we go back to the space-and-time constitution of sensuous objects and to the logical aspect of ideas. 5. In the observation of animal life, physiology makes use of three principal ideas, viz., yegetation [i. e., nutrition or assimilation], irritability [i. e., reac- tion against foreign influences], and sensibility. We may attempt to compare the faculty of feeling with sen- sibility, the faculty of desire with irritability, the faculty of concepts with vegetation ; then we see that this analo- gy gives a little light inasmuch as vegetation continues during sleep while sensibility disappears, and through the refreshment (of sleep) the irritability of the mus- cles gains new force. Duration also belongs to con- cepts. When they are once perfected to the extent of definite knowledge they remain to old age, while feel- ings and desires change and weaken. Moreover, vege- tation is the foundation of bodily life, as concepts are the foundation of the mental life. But the analogy must not be carried too far. In plants only vegetation exists, there being no perceptible sensibility and irri- tability (or reaction against environment) save with the rarest and most imperfect exceptions. On the con- trary, representation, feeling, and willing, are constant- ly to be found in combination. And, besides this, the whole mental existence of man is immeasurably more changeable than any object of physiology whatever. 6. If we regard man with a speculative glance sharp- ened by the fundamental ideas of metaphysics, we find him to be an aggregate of contradictions. Inner expe- rience has not the least claim to more value than the outer, notwithstanding all that enthusiasm for inner observation has imagined and may still imagine to be of 6 INTRODUCTION. special truth and value, and which it is impossible to wrest from those who wish to believe therein. On the other hand, a field of investigation is disclosed by which empirical material is elaborated into true knowl- edge, a result which in empirical psychology, on ac- count of its indefiniteness and instability, is more dif- ficult to accomplish than in many other parts of hu- man experience. AU mental . Jif e,-as _ we_obserye_it_ in ^nr selyes_and others, is shqvmjtpbe^an , occmTence Jn a con- stant ^ange,^ a manifold of unlike conditions com- bined in one, finally a consciousness of the Ego and the^npn-Egp, all of which belong to the form of expe- rience and are unthinkable [as its content]. Even the difficulties in regard to material existence are not far away, for we know the mind of man only in combi- nation with the body, and mere experience can not determine whether the separation of the one from the other actually occurs. 7. The readiest solution of these problems is found in general metaphysics, but further elaboration from a psychological standpoint demands, besides this, higher mathematics, inasmuch as the concepts must be re- garded as forces whose effectiveness depends upon their strength, their oppositions, and their combinations, all of which are different in degree. 8. In such a simple, almost popular, presentation as is proposed here, the old hypothesis of mental facul- ties can not be entirely dispensed with, for that hy- pothesis is a work of ages, and indicates the nearest approach attainable by natural effort to bring together the mental life of man into one picture. It is a tradi- tion which reflects the total impression of all psycho- CLASSIFICATIONS OP FACULTIES. Y logical observations ; guided by it, we shall sketch the outlines of empirical psychology, and, in order to make the necessity for an explanation of the facts percepti- ble, shall note its most striking effects. Note. — The whole treatise will be divided into the following principal parts : Part I. Fundamental Theories. Part II. Empirical Psychology. Part III. Rational Psychology. 9. A work of Carus is extant upon the history of psychology, the third volume. of which is composed of his posthumous writings. Note. — It may be briefly stated here, but not shown in detail, that in modern times psychology has rather gone backward than forward. In regard to this science, Locke and Leibnitz were both upon a better path than that along which we have been led by Wolff and Kant. The two latter advocate in a peculiar manner the discrimination of mental faculties, and for this reason must be classed together, however much they differ from each other in other respects. Wolff had in mind the logical task of classifying mental phenomena, without troubling himself more closely with their inner origination, and for this reason he is un- equaled in the thoughtlessness with which he covers up the greatest difficulties with mere verbal definitions. Kant makes use of the hypothetical mental faculties to present his investiga- tions clearly according to form, that he might accompany human knowledge in its progress from the senses to the understanding and the reason, and it is not easy to rid his writings of this hypothesis. It is not our purpose to mention here later errors, since in empirical psychology one will be inclined to relate a second time, facts which every person knows already, or, with a pretended gift for observation into his own inner life, will have made dis- coveries which others can not find in themselves, or will have effaced from psychology here a metaphysical, there an ethical, here a religious, there a physiological color by which either the 8 INTRODUCTION. mutual limitations or the combinations of science are disre- garded, while the source of the psychical mechanism remains entirely hidden. But this one thing may be said, that psycholo- gy can not portray the beautiful. Its work is not to admire, but to explain ; not to exhibit curiosities, but to make man as he is generally comprehensible ; neither to raise him to heaven, nor to fix him immovably in the dust ; not to close the lines of inves- tigation, but to open them. PAET FIEST. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. CHAPTEK I. THE CONDITIOif OF CON-CEPTS, WHEif THET ACT AS EOECES. 10. CoycEPTS become forc es^when they resist one^ an other . This resistance occurs when two or more opposed concep ts encounter^n^another. At first let us tiike this proposition as simply as possible. In this connection, therefore, we shall not think of complex nor of compound concepts of any kind whatever ; nor of such as indicate an object with several characteristics, neither of anything in time nor space, but of entirely simple concepts or sensations — e. g., red, blue, sour, sweet, etc. It is not our purpose to consider the general notions of the above-mentioned sensations, but to consider such representations as may result from an instantaneous act of sense-perception. Again, the question concerning the origin of the sensations mentioned does not belong here, much less has the discussion to do with the consideration of any- thing else that might have previously existed or oc- curred in the soul. The proposition as it stands is that opposed con- cepts resist one another. Concepts that are not op- 10 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. posed — e. g., a tone and a color — may exist, in which case it will be assumed that such concepts ofEer no resistance to one another. (Exceptions to this latter proposition may occur, of which more here- after.) Eesistance isan expression of force. To the re- sistingjconcept, however, its actiwi js j[uite accidental ; it adjusts itself to the attack which is mutual among concepts, and which is determined by the degree of opposition existing between them. This opposition may be regarded as that by which they are affected coUectiTely. In themselves, however, concepts are not forces. 11. Now, what is the result of the resistance men- tioned ? Do concepts partially or wholly destroy one another, or, notwithstanding the resistance, do they remain un- changed ? Destroyed concepts are the same as none at all. However, if, notwithstanding the mutual attack, con- cepts remain unchanged, then one could not be re- moved or suppressed by another (as we see every moment that they are). Finally, if all that is con- ceived of each concept were changed by the contest, then this would signify nothing more than, at the be- ginning, quite another concept had been present in consciousness. The presentation (concept), then, must jield with- out being destroyed — i. e., the real concept is changed into an effort to present itself. Here it is in effect stated that, as soon as the hin- drance yields, the concept byits own effort will again make Hs appearance in consciousness. In this Ties the EQUILIBRIUM AND MOVEMENT OP CONCEPTS. H possibility (although not for all cases the only ground) of reproduction. 12. When a concept becomes not entirely, but only in part, transformed into an effort, we must guard against considering this part as a seTcred portion of the whole concept. It has certainly a definite magni- tude (upon the knowledge of which much depends)} but this magnitude indicates only a degree of the ob- scuration of the whole concept. If the question be in regard to several parts of one and the same concept, these parts must not be regarded as different, severed portions, but the smaller divisions may be regarded as being contained in the larger. The same is true of the remainders after the collisions — i. e., of those parts of a concept which remain unobscured, for those parts are also degrees of the real concept. OHAPTEE II. EQUILIBRIUM AND MOVEMENT OF CONCEPTS. 13. When a sufficiency;^ of opposition exists be- tween concepts, the latter are in equilibrium. They come only gradually to this point. The continuous change of their degree of obscuration may be called their movement. The statics and mechanics of the mind have to do with the calculation of the equilibrium and movement of the concepts. 14. All investigations into the statics of the mind 12 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. begin with two different quantitative factors, viz., the_suin (or the aggregate, anigunt)jpJLthe resistances and_the ratioof their limitation, The former is the quantity which rises from their encounter, to he divided between the opposing concepts. If one knows how to state it, and knows also the ratio in which the different concepts yield in the encounter, then, by a simple cal- culation in proportion, the statical point of each con- cept — i. e., the degree of its obscuration in equilibrium — may be found. 15. The sum as well as the ratio of the mutual limitation depends upon the strength of each indi- vidual concept which is affected in inverse ratio to its strength, and upon the degree of opposition between the two concepts. For their JsflMnc^uponeach other stands in direct rati£ to the strength of each^ The p rinciple determining^ the sum of the^mutual limitation is, that it shall j)e_ considered, as smjil_a§ possible, because all_ concepts striveagaiiist suppres- siqn,. and certainly submit^ to no more of it than is absolutely necessary. 16. By actual calculation, the remarkable result is obtained that, in the case of the two concepts, the one never entirely obscures the other, but, in the case of three or more, one is very easily obscured, and can be made as ineffective — notwithstanding its continuous struggle — as if it were not present at all. Indeed, this obscuration may happen to a large number of con- cepts as well as to one, and may be effected through the agency of two, and even through the combined in- fluence of concepts less strong than those which are suppressed. Here the expression " threshold of consciousness " EQUILIBKIUM AND MOVEMENT OP CONCEPTS. 13 must be explained, as we shall have occasion to use it. I A c oncept is in_ jiaa.sck)^Bess in so far as .it is .mxt suppressed, but is an actual^ repjgsentation. Jffhen jt__ jrises out of a condit ion _of complgte suppjession, it enters into consciousness.^ Here, then, it is oh the — ! ■ ■ Ilium ■„ j.-n, LLU-n^ijxmiLn'i i iL I I •• —""^ I -i th resho'Id^Tconsmusness. It is very important to determine by calculation the degree of strength which a concept must attain in order to be able to stand beside two or more stronger ones exactly on the threshold of consciousness, so that, at the slightest yielding of the hindrance, it would begin to rise into consciousness, j Note. — The expression " A concept is in consciousness " must be distinguished from that, " I am conscious of my concept." To the latter belongs inner perception ; to the former not. In psychology, we need a word that will indicate the totality of all simultaneous actual presentations. No word except conscious- ness can be found for this purpose. Here we are obliged to be content with a circumlocution — and this all the more, because the inner perception which is usually attributed to consciousness has no fixed limit where it begins or ceases, and, moreover, the act of perceiving is not itself per- ceived ; so that, since we are not conscious of it in ourselves, we must exclude it from consciousness, although it is an active knowing, and in no way a restricted or suppressed concept. 17. Among the many, and, for the most part, very complicated laws underlying the movement of con- cepts, the following is the simplest : While the arrested portion (Hemmungssumme) of _ the_^concepjt sinks, the sinking part is at every mo- ment proportional to the part unsuppressed. By this it is possible to calculate the whole course of the sinking even to the statical point. Note. — Mathematically, the above law may be expressed: = p L ~ — J, if instead of one r we substitute difEerent '^ \l — 6 n/ smaller and greater, r, r', r", etc. But the more exact calcula- tion mentioned in 25 shows that the n, n', n", etc., blended with them, not only rise, but sink again, as it were, to make place for each other, and in the order of r, r,' r", etc. 39. Here is discovered the ground of the genuine reproduction or of memory so far as it brings to us a series of concepts in the same order in which they were first received. In order to comprehend this, we must consider what union arises among several con- cepts that are successively given. Let a series, a, b, c, d, be given by perception ; then, from the first movement of the perception and during its continuance, a is exposed to an arrest from other concepts already in consciousness. In the mean time, a, already partially sunken in consciousness, became more and more obscured when b came to it. This b at first, unobscured, blended with the sinking a j then followed c, which itself unobscured, united with b, which was becoming obscured, and also with a, which was still more obscured. Similarly followed d, to be- come united in difEerent degrees with a, h, c. Prom this arises a law for each of these concepts that states how, after the whole series has been, for a time, removed out of consciousness, upon the re-emergence of one of OF COMPLEXES AND BLENDINGS. 23 the concepts of such a series into consciousness, every other concept of the same series is called up. Let it be assumed that a rises first, then it is united more with b, less with c, and still less with d ; backward, however, h, c, and d are blended collectively in an unobscured condition with the remainders of a ; hence a seeks to bring them all again into an unobscured condition [i. e., into full consciousness]. But a acts the most quickly and strongly upon b, more slowly upon c, still more slowly upon d, etc., by which close investiga- tion shows that b sinks again, while c rises, even as c sinks when d rises; in short, the series follows in the same order as first given. On the contrary, let us assume that c is originally reproduced, then c acts upon d and the following members of the series ex- actly in the same way as was indicated in the case of a — i. e., the series c, d, etc., unfolds gradually in the order of its succession. On the contrary, b and a experience quite another influence. The unobscured c was blended with their different remainders. Then c acts upon them with its whole strength, and without delay, but only to call back the remainders of a and b united with it, to bring a part of b and a smaller part of a into consciousness. Thus it happens that when we remember something in the middle of a known series, the preceding part of the series presents itself all at once in a lessened degree of clearness, while the por- tion following comes before the mind in the same order as the series it brings with it. But the series never runs backward ; an anagram from a well-comprehended word never originates without intentional effort. 30. Several series may cross one another, e. g., a, b, c, d, e, and a, p, c, S, c, in which c is common to the two 24 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, series. If c were reproduced alone, it would striye to call up d and e as well as S and c. If, however, b comes into consciousness first, then the first series comes decidedly forward on account of the united help of b and c, yet the oppositions among the members of both series, in this case, have each their own influence. We may remark that, to the simple type or model here given, a variety of complicated psychological oc- currences may be adjusted. The same c can be held as the common point of intersection for many hun- dred series. On account of the manifold oppositions in these series, the common c may cause none of the members to rise perceptibly, but so soon as b and a come forward, determining c more closely, the inde- cision will disappear, and the uppermost series will really come before the mind. 31. The foregoing depends upon the difference presupposed in the remainders r, r', r", etc. (38). But in order that this difference may have its influence, the concept to which these remainders belong must come forward sufQciently into consciousness. Let it be granted that it is arrested to such a degree that its active representation amounts to no more than that of the smallest among the remainders r, r', r", etc., then it works equally on the whole series of concepts blended with it so that a vague total impression of all comes into consciousness. The reason for this is ex- plained in sections 27 and 13. The remainders are not different parts severed from one and the same concept ; hence if a little of the latter is in consciousness, we must not first question whether this little may be one and perhaps quite the smallest among those remainders, but we must assume that it really is so, although at OP COMPLEXES AND BLENDINGS, 25 the same time it may be a part of every other greater remainder. If the active concept gradually rises into consciousness, then the remainders, from the smaller to the greater, one after the other, gain a special law of action. By this the above vague impression of the whole rises, in which lies a whole series of concepts, and these are gradually developed out of one another. Note. — Here, among others, must be compared the phenom- ena resulting from exercise and skill ; that, moreover, not every course of thought repeats faithfully the series constructed ; and upon that is based, in part, the ground of the inequalities in the quantities n and p (35), with whose possible difference we can not deal further here. Additional facts may be deduced from the following • 32. If free-rising concepts (of which mention was made in the closing remarks of the last chapter) should blend in regular gradation, they would be subject to other laws of reproduction which originate out of the blending, and are distinguished and determined ac- cording to their difEerences. Upon occasion, likewise arises a process of construction and formation of series which differ from the form of analogous concepts in case the latter are given and then sink out of con- sciousness. Prom this may be explained the conflict between things as we perceive them and as we think them, as well as the tendency to regard them otherwise than as they first present themselves; consequently the modifying action of the self-activity upon that which lies before the perception. This may be ob- served especially in the case of children who can have no set purpose in the matter. 26 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. CHAPTEE IV. CONCEPTS AS THE SOURCE OF MENTAL STATES. 33. One of the objections against mathematical psychology is that mathematics defines only quantity, while psychology must especially consider quality. It is now time to meet this objection, and to collect the explanations of those mental states which the forego- ing presents. Here we must first remark that the peculiar striv- ing of concepts for representation (11) never appears immediately in consciousness, for, just so far as con- cepts change into striving, they are removed out of consciousness. Also, the gradual sinking of concepts can not be perceived. A special instance of this is, that no one is able to observe his own falling asleep. So far as it represents or conceives, the soul is called mind ; so far as it feels and desires, it is called the heart or disposition (Gemilth). The disposition of the heart, however, has its source in the mind — in other words, feeHng_ftM.desiiing.^are conditions,, an^^^^ for the most^ part, changeable conditions of jconcepts. The emotions indicate this, while experience, upon the whole, confirms it : the man feels little of the joys and sorrows of his youth ; but what the boy learns correct- ly, the graybeard still knows. The extent, however, to which a steadfast disposition and, above all, character can be given, will be shown later in the explanations of the principles above presented. 34. First, there is a blending of concepts not only after the arrest (23), but quite a different one before it, provided the degree of opposition (15) be CONCEPTS, SOURCE OP ALL MENTAL STATES. 27 sufficiently small. A principle of aesthetic judgment lies in this. Pleasant feelings in their narrowest sense, together with their opposites, must be regarded as analogous to these esthetic judgments — i. e., as spring- ing from the relation of many concepts which do not assert themselves individually, but rather which per- haps, for psychological reasons, can not be perceived when separated. Note.— In carrying out this investigation, the series of tone relations upon which music depends may be presented as a sub- ject of experiment. Among simple tones, the degree of arrest (the interval of tones), entirely alone and without means, deter- mines the aesthetic character of its relation. It is also certain that the psychological explanation (widely different from the acoustical) of all harmony is to be sought in the difference be- tween the degrees of arrest, and that it must be found there. The necessary calculations for this are, for the most part, to be found in the second volume of the KSnigsberg Archives for Philosophy. Of the somewhat extensive investigations, only the principal ones which experience decidedly confirms Can be given here : When the forces, into which concepts, through their similarity and their contrasts, separate one another, are equally strong, there arises disharmony. If, how- ever, one of these forces be opposed to the others in such a relation that it is driven to the statical threshold {16) by them, then a harmonious relation tvill prevail. 35. Second, a principle of contrast is to be found in the complexes (32), which we here consider com- plete. The complexes a-^a and 5 -|- j8 are similar, provided a : a = 5 : /3 ; if not, they are dissimilar. Let the degree of arrest between a and b equal p, and that between a and ^ equal tt. Now, if in similar com- plexes, p = Tr, then, and then only, will the individual 2S FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. concepts be arrested, exactly as if they had not been in any combination ; also no feeling of contrast arises, inasmuch as the arrest is successful only when the op- posing forces bring the feeling of contrast with them ; but, in every variation from the case presented, the less opposed concepts are affected by their combination with the other two, but in this very way a part of the arrest will be withheld from the latter ; consequently, notwithstanding the opposition, something remains in consciousness that resists, and in this lies the feeling of contrast. If ir p, the case is reversed. When ir =: 0, the contrast be- tween a and h is the greatest. 36. Third, a complex « + o is reproduced by a concept furnished by a new act of perception similar to a (26). Now, when o, on account of its combina- tion with a, comes forward, it meets in consciousness a concept opposed to it, p. Then a will ie, at the same time, driven forward and held back. In this situation, it is the source of an unpleasant feeling which may give rise to desire, viz., for the object rep- resented by a provided the opposition offered by ^8 is weaker than the force which a brings with it. This is ordinarily the case ; desires are excited by a remembrance of their object. When the remembrance is strengthened by several incidental concepts, the im- pulses of desire are renewed. As often as the oppos- ing concepts (i. e., concepts of the hindrances which stand in the way of the longing) attain preponderance, they produce a painful feeling of privation. 37. Fourth, a concept comes forward into con- sciousness by its own strength (perhaps reproduced CONCEPTS, SOURCE OF ALL MENTAL STATES. 29 according to the method described in 26), at the same time being called forward by several helping concepts (34). Since each of these helps has its own measure of time in which it acts (according to the formula in 25), then the helps may strengthen one another against a possible resistance, but they can not increase their own velocity. The movement in advancing takes place only with that velocity which is the greatest among several concepts meeting together, iut it is favored iy all the rest. This favoring is part of the process which takes place in consciousness, but in no way is it any- thing represented or conceived. Hence it can only be called a feeling — without doubt a feeling of pleasure. Here is the source of the cheerful disposition, es- pecially of joy in successful activity. Here belong various movements, instigated from without, which do not accelei'ate but favor one another as in the case of dancing and music. Of the same character is the action according to several centering motives, and such too is the insight based on understanding several reasons which confirm one another. 38. In general, it may be observed that feelings and desires have not their source in the process or act of conception in general, but always in certain par- ticular" concepts. Hence there may be at the same time many different feelings and desires, and these may either agree or entirely disagree one with the_ other. 30 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. CHAPTER V, THE CO-OPEKATION OP SEVERAL MASSES OF COIfCEPTS OE UNEQUAL SXEENQTH. 39. Fkom the foregoing, it may, in a way, be per- ceived that after a considerable number of concepts in all kinds of combinations is present, every new act of perception must work as an excitant by which some will be arrested, others called forward and strength- ened, progressing series interrupted or set again in mo- tion, and this or that mental state occasioned. These manifestations must become more complex if, as is usual, the concept received by the new act of percep- tion contains in itself a multiplicity or variety, that at the same time enables it to hold its place in several combinations and series, and gives them a fresh im- pulse which brings them into new relations of opposi- tion or blending with one another. By this, the con- cepts brought by the new act of perception are assimi- lated to the older concepts in such a way as to sufEer somewhat after the first excitation has worked to the extent of its power, because the old concepts — on account of their combinations with one another — are much stronger than the new individuals which are ^dded. 40. If, however, already very strong complexes and blendings with many members have been formed, then the same relation which existed between the old and the new concepts may be repeated within between the old concepts. Weaker concepts, which, according to any kind of law, enter into consciousness, act as ex- citants upon those masses before mentioned, and are CO-OPERATION OF UNEQUAL CONCEPTS. 31 received and appropriated by them (apperceived) jnst as in the case of a new sense-impression ; hence the inner perception is analogous to the outer. Self-con- sciousness is not the subject of discussion here, al- though it is very often combined with the above. 41. In what has been said, lies that which experi- ence confirms, viz., that the inner perception is never a passive apprehension, but always (even against the will) active. The apperceived concepts do not con- tinue rising or sinking according to their own laws, but they are interrupted in their movements by the more powerful masses which drive back whatever is opposed to them although it is inclined to rise ; and in the case of that which is similar to them although it is on the point of sinking, they take hold of it anj., blend it with themselves. 42. It is worth the trouble to indicate how far this difference among concepts — which we might be in- clined to divide into dead and living — may be carried. Let us recall the concepts on the statical thresh- old (16). These are, indeed, in effect nothing less than dead; for, in the condition of arrest in which they stand, they are not able by their own effort to effect anything whatever [toward rising into consciousness]. Nevertheless, through the combination in which they stand, they may be reproduced, and, besides, they will often be driven back in whole heaps and series by those more powerful masses, as when the leaves of a book are turned hurriedly. 43. If the apperceived concepts — or at least some of them — are not on the statical threshold, then the ap- perceiving concepts suffer some violence from them ; also the latter may be subject to arrest from another 32 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. side, in which case the inner perception is interrupted ; through this, uncertainty and irresolution may be ex- plained. The apperceiving mass may be, in its turn apper- ceived by another mass ; but for this to occur, there must be present several concept masses of distinctly different degrees of strength. Hence it is somewhat seldom that the inner perception rises to this second power [the apperception of apperception], and only in the case of philosophical ideas is this series considered as one which might be prolonged into infinity. CHAPTER VI. A GLAIICE OVER THE CONNECTION BETWEEN BODY AND SOUL. 44. Up to the present chapter, concepts have been considered as present in the soul without any question concerning their origin or concerning foreign influ- ences. This has been done for simplicity. Now, sense- perception in part and physiological influences in part, together with concepts already present, must be con- sidered. 45. Even from experience it may be assumed that each act of perception of any considerable strength re- quires a short space of time for its creation ; but expe- rience and metaphysics at the same time teach that by delaying longer, the strength of the perception in no way increases in proportion to the time, but, the THE CONNECTION BETWEEN BODY AND SOUL. 33 stronger the perception already is, so much the less does it increase, and from this it follows, by an easy calcula- tion, that there is a final limit to its strength which the attained concept very soon reaches, and above which even by an infinite delay the same perception will not be able to rise. This is the law of dinmiish- ing susceptibility, and the strength of the sense-im- pression is quite indifEerent in regard to this limit. The weakest sense-perception may give the concept quite as much strength as the strongest, only it re- quires for this a somewhat longer time. 46. Every human concept really consists of infi- nitely small elementary apprehensions very unlike one another, which in the different moments of time dur- ing the continuance of the act of perception were created little by little. However, if during the con- tinuance of the perception an arrest caused by old opposed concepts did not occur, these apprehensions would be all necessarily blended into a single, undi- vided total force. For this reason the total force will be perceptibly less than the sum of all the elementary apprehensions. 47. In early childhood a much larger supply of simple sense-concepts is generated than in all the fol- lowing years. Indeed, the work of the after-years con- sists in making the greatest possible number of com- binations from this supply. Although this suscepti- bility is never entirely extinguished, yet, if there were not a kind of renewal of it, the age of manhood would be more indifferent and more unfruitful in sense-im- pressions than it really is. Though concepts on the statical threshold are quite without influence for that which goes on in con- 6 34 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. Bciousness (16), they can not weaken the susceptibility to new perceptions similar to themselves. Hence this receptivity would be completely re-established if the earlier ratio of arrest were not quite changed by the new acts of perception, and a certain freedom to re- produce themselves directly given to the older con- cepts (26). When this happens, the receptivity de- creases. The greater the number of old concepts of the same kind present in consciousness — this means usually the longer one has lived — so much greater is the number of concepts which upon a given occasion enter at the same time into consciousness ; and thus with years the renewal of receptivity diminishes. 48. The above statements refer not only to con- cepts of exactly the same kind, but to all whose de- gree of opposition is a fraction. This can not be developed here, since in the foregoing nothing exact could be said of the difference between the degrees of opposition. 49. It is to be especially observed that thejnflu- ence oi the. body_ upon psycMca.! manifestations is shown in three ways^t^jrepressionJZJrMc^), ils_ex:u citation (Resonanz), and,lts^jcocoperatioa in action. Upon this are the following preliminary remarks : 50. Physiological repression arises when the accom- panying conditions, which should correspond to the changes in the soul, can not follow without hin- drance ; hence the hindrance will also be felt as such in the soul because the conditions of each affect both. This repression is often merely a retarding force, to suit which the mental movements must pro- ceed more slowly, as is the case with slow minds that consume time and are stupefied by quick changes. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN BODY AND SOUL. 35 Often, however, repression is similar to an arresting force, and as such it can be mathematically calculated, as when it increases the number of opposed concepts by one or more. By it all active concepts may be driven to the statical threshold ; and here we have the explanation of sleep. In this case it would be a deep and complete sleep. 51. Physiological excitation (Besonanz) arises when the accompanying bodily conditions change more quickly or become stronger than would be necessary to merely cause no hindrance to the mental movements. Then the soul, again in response to the body, will act more quickly and more vigorously. The soul must also share the resulting relaxations of the body, as in intoxication and passion. 52. The co-operaiion(rfjthe_soul and body in ex- ternal action can not-iJriginjilly.prQpeed from the soul, ffirjhe will does not Jmaw.in the least what influence it really ex_erts_upoii.ihe nerves and muscles. But in the child exists an organic necessity for movement- At first the soul accompanies this and the active move- ments arising from it, with its feelings. The feelings, however, become connected with perceptions of the members moved. If, in the result, the concept arising from such a perception acts as a means of arousing desire (16), then the feeling connected with it arises, and to this latter as accompanying bodily condition belong all those phenomena in the nerves and muscles by which organic movement is actually determined or defined. Thus_it_happensJ;hat concepts com.e.±g- ap- pear as a , source of mechanical forces in the J3uter world. PAET SECOND. EMPIRICAL PSTCHOLOQT. FIRST DIVISION : (I) PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA ACCORDING TO THE HYPOTHESIS OF MENTAL FACULTIES. CHAPTEK I. A SURVEY OF THE ASSUMED MENTAL EACULTIES. 53. Feom the foregoing fundamental principles many known facts are to be explained, while many others still remain obscure. It is not necessary at present to define this difference more closely. The question how far the proposed explanations reach may silently accompany the following exposition until the facts are examined, for then the thread of investiga- tion may be more conveniently taken up ; but the commonly accepted mental faculties need now a criti- cal elucidation which must advance gradually with the observation of the facts themselves. Combined with the effort to bring together a mani- fold is naturally implied a separation of that which manifestly does not admit of union, since it is either excluded or else makes its appearance only under un- usual circumstances. Inasmuch as the teachers of psychology have undertaken to show the human mind THE ASSUMED MENTAL FACULTIES. 37 in the form of a picture, they have -at first omitted those features which constitute the -distinguishing characteristics of the individual, as well as the chang- ing conditions of human nature. We reserve these for the second division, and keep for the first only that which is considered an original and essential differ- entiation of the human mind into various functions. 54. Eight here, however, on account of the peculiar indefiniteness of psychological facts, it is impossible to draw a dividing line. The man presented by the teachers of psychology is the social, the educated man, who stands on the summit of the whole past history of his race. In this man the various functions are found apparently in combination, and under the name of mental faculties are regarded as a universal inher- itance of mankind. Facts are silent as to whether this variety be originally found together or whether it be a manifold. The savage and the infant give us much less opportunity to admire the compass of their minds than the nobler among the brutes. Here^ psychologist s help th emselves by the evasive assumg:; tion that all higherm ental"^^Yny"Tsl3oteiitially pres- . ent, not inTrutes, BuT In "chirdreiTand ^saxages^ aud ■ "may be regarded as undeveloped talents or as_Bga3hic,„a faculties ; and the most insignificant resemblances be- tween the demeanor of the savage or the child, and that of the educated man, are valued by them as per- ceptible traces of awakening intelligence, awakening reasoning, or awakening moral sense. But the ob- servation must not escape us that in the following discussion a special and accurately limited condition of man will be described, according to the total im- pression which those men whom we call by the vague 38 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. expression "educated" have made upon us. Great uncertainty inTegard to this total impression can not be avoided. There are no universal facts. Purely psychological facts lie in the region of transitory con- ditions of individuals, and are immeasurably far re- moved from the height of the general notion of man in general. 55. The comparison just mentioned between man and the lower animals occasions the first division into what is considered the original manifold of mental faculties. In so far as man rises perceptibly above the brute, higher faculties, and, in so far as he is similar to the brute, lower faculties are attributed to him. This classification crosses the one already mentioned, viz., presentation, feeling, and desire, each one of these being divided into an upper and a lower faculty. As an aid in the survey of empirical psychology the two classifications are equally useful, and we shall use both. 56. Since in psychology one activity passes gradu- ally into another, we shall not begin at the very equiv- ocal line of demarkation between the two, but shall at first place the extremes opposite each other. For the lowest mental state, sensuousness ; for the highest, rea- son will be assumed. The two are similar in that they both appear in the several members of the second division. We speak of a sensuous representation ( Vor- stellen), a sensuous feeling, and a sensuous desire ; we speak also of a theoretic and a practical reason — i. e., of a conceptive reason and of a willing or regulative reason ; but we are careful not to speak of a feeling reason, because we think of reason never as passive, but always as active, since it is to be regarded as THE ASSUMED MENTAL FACULTIES. 39 the highest faculty of man. The signification of the expression used here is, according to the common usages of speech, after al sort intelligible to every one. This is not the right place for nicer distinctions, as they themselves become the points in dispute. 57. If we go from the two extremes toward the middle, first of all, in the faculty of representation, in the region near sensuousness, we find imagination and memory ; in the region of reason, we find understand- ing and power of judgment. Secondly, in the faculty of feeling, over against the sensuous feelings of pleasure and pain, we find the aesthetic and moral feelings, and the emotions. Thirdly, in the faculty of desire oppo- site the sensuous appetites and instincts, we find, on the one hand, intelligent and rational willing ; on the other, the passions. 58. Before we lay out this rough sketch of the psychological field more in detail, we must observe the following : (a.) These classifications are mere empirical groupings without any indication of completeness, without any fixed, definite, and authorized division; hence, it will be no matter for wonder if, upon a closer investigation of the facts, subjects are discovered which either belong in more than one of the departments already made, or which can not be classified in any one of them whatever. Here are a few examples : In "Wolff's exposition, the faculty of feeling is not distinguished from the faculty of desire, nor, conse- quently, the emotions from the passions. We shall show hereafter that the emotions do not belong in the class of feelings, much less in the other classes ; hence they do not belong in any one of the classes made, although feelings accompany the emotions, as well as 40 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. emotions the passions. Morals arid sestlietics are, according to experience, felt, cognized, and desired, notwithstanding which we are not inclined, as perhaps in the case of sensuousness, to allow them to extend through all three principal faculties, as if moral feel- ings, cognitions, and volitions existed co-ordinate, equally independent of one another ; but it is a dis- puted question whether morality has its origin in a command, in a cognition, or in a feeling. If we ask experience, the answer is undeniably this : morality is most often felt, more seldom rightly perceived, and most seldom willed In this, however, there is nothing evident excepting insecurity and fluctuation on the part of empirical psychology, and on the part of every investigation which has no better foundation. (b.) The classifications made can be used only in the preliminary examination, but in no way can they be used as an exact description of that which takes. place in man, for they separate that which in reality is con- stantly united. Whether there can be a presentation in consciousness without feeling and desire, experience does not indicate ; these movements of the emotional nature pass over incessantly one into another. It is evident that to every feeling, something felt, and to every desire something desired, belong, but whether in every case each must be a representation in con- sciousness, experience neither denies nor affirms, for a representation may be so vagne as to be impossible of recognition. The affirmative answer has, however, the advantage, because in most cases it is manifestly the right one. The emotions (Affecten) do not belong in a class with the passions, yet we can by no means think of an entirely emotionless passion. Whoever describes THE ASSUMED MENTAL FACULTIES. 41 the history of only a single passionate outbreak must regard it, with all the emotions aroused by it, as a single transaction or occurrence. The continuous flow of this occurrence does not admit of its being pre- sented as a mosaic painting, the individual bits of which might be collected from the several divisions of empirical psychology. (c.) That the classified mental faculties exist not only side by side with one another, but in relation to one another, empirical psychology acknowledges, in the fact that it employs them throughout in the elaboration of one and the same material. This material is supposed to be received by the sensory [Sinnlichkeit = sensuous phase of the mind], and this gives rise to the question relating to the causal action of the outer world upon man. If this should be denied, then sensuousness must be regarded rather as a creative faculty. Memory, according to it, preserves this same material, but, unmodified by this preservation, fantasy makes it into new forms ; and again unmodified by these new forms, understanding constructs notions from it ; also the faculty of desire transforms it into an object of desire or aversion; and again fantasies, ideas, desires, etc., are to be pre- served by the memory and upon occasion replaced with fresh material, and again subjected to the elabo- rating faculties, or, in case this appears inconceivable, is it perhaps only a part of the material which mem- ory holds fast in its storehouse, and to fantasy will be surrendered another part, still another to the under- standing, still another to the faculty of desire, etc. ? Concerning this question we ask in vain of experience. So much the more necessary is it that we perceive 42 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. , and acknowledge the indispensable, metaphysical pre- supposition of some kind of a manifold and compli- cated causal relation .of the different faculties to one another, as well as to the alleged material which they are to elaborate in common. 59. By_the admission of the causal relationjust mentioned, psychology has hitherto fixed the order pf presenting its doctrines. Sensuous presentations are first treated according to the statement, " Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu," and for the others an order is given which makes them proceed gradually from the former. The gradual development of individual man and of peoples, likewise the differ- ence between the brute and man, furnish a guide here. Experience shows that we meet with the lower sensuous phase much more frequently than with any other phases of the mental life, in reality, however, the latter never without the former ; indeed, this is so much the case that we have great trouble in giving even a tolerably definite meaning to the expression " pure reason." Nevertheless, there are two important psychological facts which we can not understand oth- erwise than as incompatible with the causal gelation between sense and reason, viz., pure self-consciousness and moral volition. What we, in the current of time, observe always as shifting accidents, that must we dis- tinguish from our true Ego ; we know the latter appears to us, independent even of the inner sense, by.asg-called pure^apperception. In its general acceptation, apper- ception signifies the knowing of that which takes place in our own minds ; and a volition shows itself more clearly as genuinely moral when it scorns consideration of advantages and disadvantages as they lie before one THE ASSUMED MENTAL FACULTIES. 43 in experience, in whicli case the mind rises above sen- suous feelings and directly opposes them. How is this eleyation possible ? The answer, through free-will, is one quite commensurable to the inner perception which is generally conceded in such cases. Hence a so-called transcendental freedom, indepeadent of all ^usality, will Jbe_assumed, an assumption parallel with that of pure apperception. Now, if we attribute both to reason, as to that which in man stands the farthest removed from sensuousness, then in this signification reason is not so much something higher than sen- suousness, but rather something quite different from it; and jensuousness can no longer be considered a basis,, nor even as a condition jjf all the rest. Upon this supposition, psychology in the arrange- ment of its material ought not to present a progress from sensuousness to reasonj but ought to present two series of^ observations prigina,lly parallel, of which reason and sensuousness constitute the beginning points ; the meeting-place of the two, however, in its manifold modifications, would be the highest region, and, as it were, the goal. Empirical psychology can oppose nothing to this demand. In my Introduction to Philosophy (103 and 107), however, i^_is_already shown^that the idea of the Ego and of transcendental freedom are contradictory. Hence,^aLso, the idea just advanced, of a faculty of reason, is not consistent with truth. The_cqinmon idea^of sensuousness, however, especially when considered^ as the source of evilj is not more correctT' ThT greatest evil is quite as little purely sensuous as sensuousness is pure evil. Note. — When in common life we hear it said that one man has more understanding, another more memory, a third more 44 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. imagination, a fourth a sounder judgment, and yet, upon the whole, no greater nor less degree of mental health can be attributed to the one than to the other, then the conjecture arises that all this distinction of the so-called mental faculties has more to do with the^products of mental activTtyThan with the internal nature of the latter, whether this nature be sound or diseased. Of the mental diseases, the four principal kinds or species empirically known — idiocy, dementia, madness, hallucination — will be more closely defined hereafter. It may be useful, how- ever, to construct here the notion of mental soundness from the opposites of these terms, namely, susceptibility to reaction, concentration, repose, and mutual adjustment of all concepts through one another, since a lack in any one of these four requisites indicates an approach to mental disease much more directly than a defect in imagination, memory, or understand- ing, etc. The requisites mentioned, however, refer plainly enough to the previously mentioned theory of concepts as forces whose readiness to move upon tlie least change in their strength or combination is quite as perceptible as their ten- dency to remain at rest in equilibrium. By this theoiy, the collection of concepts of the same kind and of those already in combination, quite as much as every kind of possible recip- rocal influence, are completely secured by the laws of reproduc- tion, provided that no foreign influence on the part of the body disturbs the mental state. Nevertheless, the relation of the body to the mind can not be more closely estimated without mentioning some principles of the philosophy of nature, which, at this point, would be premature. To begin with, the first of the above-mentioned classifications (55) must be, if not freed from its indeflniteness, at least recognized in its many signiflcalions. LOWER AND HIGHER FACULTIES. 4,5 CHAPTER II. THE BOUNDARY-LISTB BETWEEJS' THE LOWEK AND HIGHER FACULTIES. 60. In the representative faculties, the line of de- markation between the lower and higher runs between the imagination and the understanding ; in the faculty of feeling, between sensuous pleasure and aesthetic feeling ; in the faculty of desire, between the passions and deliberate choice. On account of the uncertainty in the definition of these faculties the line can not be drawn with precision ; psychologists, too, admit that it can not be sharply defined ; at least, so says "Wolff, in his Empirical Psychology (333). This is so much the more evident because an analogon rationis is at- tributed even to the brutes, while no one concedes to them imagination similar to that possessed by human beings. The brutes would have, according to this, a share in the higher faculty of representation, and, on the contrary, would lack in something that is to be attributed to the lower faculty. The view held in regard to the faculty of feeling seems to be some- what more satisfactory, as no one expects aesthetic judgment from brutes. Also in uncivilized men the aesthetic faculty seems to be wanting, and appears to be a higher degree of culture rather than a faculty peculiar to human nature. Finally, in regard to the passions we shall find some, and very wicked ones they are, which with the noblest have their origin in the highest regions of human thought, so that it is impos- sible to reckon them among the lower faculties, or 4-6 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. among those attributed to brutes. The subject must then be treated in some other way. 61. To attribute a lower faculty to the brutes in comparison with man, means to regard the mental power of the former either as defective, arrested, or suppressed. Granted, first, that it is defective in itself in com- parison with the more complete, wider-reaching, power of man • for this there are very significant reasons in the lack of hands and speech. Because of this, the opportunity of the brute to get concepts from objects is very much more limited than that of man, and while the understanding and intelligence of man are most closely related to speech, the brute at the most can at- tain to the understanding of only a few signs. The child, however, in the lowest grades of its education is in the same state at first ; its knowledge of the use of its hands is quite as limited as of the use of speech. Granted, secondly, that this mental power is ar- rested — as it originally might have been greater — then it is also arrested in the brutes, and, indeed, in a two- fold manner ; for first, with them, some disturbing eler ment enters into their circle of concepts which does not oppress man so much. In the case of brutes with mechanical instincts, it is quite clear that this disturb*- ing element is an organic excitation which they obey ; in the case of others, premature puberty comes into consideration. Besides this, however, on account of the comparative smallness of the brain of the brute, the physical organism probably may not yield to men- tal excitations as in the case of man. Granted, thirdly, that this mental power or faculty be considered suppressed, this may be a faculty sub-; LOWER AND HIGHER FACULTIES. 47 jected to service, or one entirely subdued ; in that case this designation is not generally appropriate to brutes, but rather to the lower faculty of inan so far as he controls himself. But, again, the control is so very dependent upon the degree of education already ob- tained, that it fluctuates, according to the kind, be- tween cunning and morality, according to the degree to which the uncultured or sick man is proportion- ately incapable of exercising judgment. Finally, if exceptions are of any value, among trained animals there are so many cases of self-control acquired by practice that a distinction in the mental faculty which naturally would hold good in all cases can not be shown; we must rather fall back upon distinctions which are based upon favoring or hindering the growth of faculties or upon the training acquired. Consequently, jEg^are neither necessitated nor author- i^d to regard the human mind as an aggregate of two jpeciflcally diSerent faculties, fitted,- as it were into each other. But it appears that the mental excita- bility, according to the difference in the combinations and obstructions of concepts, is expressed in an in- finite variety of forms. All these observations are independent of metaphysics. The question, however, whether if once metaphysics be called in, these ob- servations would be refuted or established, is not to be discussed here. To the man who rises to a higher degree of educa- tion we shall attribute empirically, not merely a sim- ple, but a versatile capacity to apportion his attention, as it were, to many different acts — now intentionally to direct his thoughts, now to change the tone of his feelings, and again to prescribe for himself at one time 48 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. intomkswrLjffvaJLanQtherjr^^ It is known that among brutes little or no trace of this appears. In regard to the human faculty, attention has already been drawn to this point in the first part of this work (40- 43). I n thi s sense we shall recognize a higher and a lower faculty. 63. Between the lower and higher faculties of rep- resentation, Wolff places attention (however, only the voluntary, while the involuntary is perhaps even more important). According to him, the higher faculty begins with the distinguishing of notions whose char- acteristics the attention analyzes. This definition is, indeed, more limited in its compass than is indicated by ordinary language in the words, understanding and intelligent, yet it coincides in part with this distinction in a remarkable manner. Inasmuch as attention makes a notion distinct it brings forward in succession with equal emphasis the partial concepts existing in it. It levels or evens, as it were, the notion whose character- istics were heretofore projected unevenly and acci- dentally. Thus it is according to the nature of the thing thought, all of whose properties are independent of the differences which individual thinking brings into it, that more attention is exercised upon this than upon that characteristic. Also, it accords with the ex- planation (given elsewhere) of the understanding, which accounts for the meaning that the ordinary custom of speech associates with that word, viz., un- derstanding is the faculty by which our thoughts are united according to the nature of the object thought. Sufiicient examples of disproportionate individual thinking are to be found in common life. Such is the fragmentary knowledge of the routinist compared LOWER AND HIGHER FACULTIES. 49 with the symmetrically elaborated knowledge of the true scholar. The latter is without doubt a work of progressive attention. 63. In regard to the boundaries between the lower and the higher faculties, Kant was guided by the fun- damental thought : " The union of a manifold can never occur through the senses. . . . All combination is a spontaneous [or self-active] act of the power of representation, which, in order to be distinguished from sensuousness, must be called understanding" {Ver- stand) (see Krit. d. R. V., § 15). This very plausible assertion is, from its nature, speculative. (It occasions the higher Skepsis, which is described in my Intro- duction to Philosophy, 23-29 ; also, 98-103.) In strongly emphasizing this thought Kant has rendered a great service to speculative philosophy, but he has only begun the most important investigations growing out of the above; in no wise has he com- pleted them, and, while they necessarily must always hold their place as the foundation of general meta- physics, everything like this Kantian assertion must disappear completely from the dogmas of psychology, for the end of investigation is exactly the opposite of that which its beginning seems to indicate. The com- bination_of a ma;nifold,(of concepts) does ncit take place by any process that could be called an act — :at least, a „spontaneous act ; it is the immediate result of unity in the soul. Further, the combination of the mani- fold depends upon the manner in which the sense- impressions meet, and this is determined by external conditions, as already intimated in my Introduction to Philosophy. Finally, Kant's assertion can not in any way be supported by empirical psychology. 50 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. When thinking intensely we feel ourselves active, and then are sometimes conscious of intentionally group- ing notions according to their characteristics, but, where we originally unite the manifold of a given in- tuition {Anschauung) into the notion of an object, we iind ourselves obliged to take the object as it presents itself; we are limited to this, and know nothing of acts of spontaneity. While activity is neither an attribute of the under- standing nor the source of combinations, the under- standing^ha^oji. the contxary, its jeatjn a cert ain kin d of combination ; indeed, the whole higher faculty en- croaches upon sensuousness, memory, and imagination (which are usually reckoned among the lower facul- ties). So that in educated men it is manifested in such elaborate combinations as are not to be expected in savages and brutes. Here, first of all, belongs the ex- tension of the concepts of space and time, which ex- tend far beyond the sphere of sensuous impressions, even into infinity. By this we especially recognize the fact that power to look resolutely into the past and to anticipate a somewhat remote future is wanting in the brute and the savage. Furthermore, there is a great difference between the mere meeting together of the characteristics of an object and the distinguishing of these characteristics from the substance to which they are attributed ; like- wise between the mere apprehension of a limited series of occurrences and the deduction of the same from causes and forces. The second power, but not the first, belongs to the higher faculties. This remark, although occasioned by Kant's theory, belongs to the following : LOWER AND HIGHER FACULTIES. 51 64. Little as tlie logical polish of ideas can serve for the measure of the intelligence (we have but to think of the understanding of women, artists, states- men, merchants) it constitutes, nevertheless, a part of the difference which we seek. The savage and the brute also have, without doubt, total impressions of objects that resemble one another, complex concepts of trees, houses, men, etc., but in this case the contrast between the abstract and the concrete is wanting. The general_notion has not been separated from its exam- ples. This separation belongs to the higher faculty, aFdoes also the difference between object and space, event and time, as likewise the difference between our Ego and our changing conditions ; while one brute cer- tainly distinguishes itself from the other with which it contends for food. 65. ^Esthetic and moral apprehensions in savages are rare and limited ; in brutes they seem to be en- tirely wanting. Choice is much less deliberate, and upon the whole appears not to be so persistent as in the case of cultured men. The brute has here, side by side with the lack of higher powers, a positive peculiarity, viz., a visibly greater dependence upon- instinct, which is in part periodical, and stands in the closest connection with the physical organism. 66. All that has been cited gives no conclusive series of fixed differences either between humanity and animality, or between the higher and lower facul- ties. But we have no reason to demand causes and fixed differences where we meet transient ones suffi- cient to explain satisfactorily how one could have come to ask about the difference which is everywhere assumed to be one and the same. However, if it 52 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. should be thought that the brute is brought too near to man, the following remarks are of weight on the opposite side : "We know very little of brutes. We distinguish their different classes much too little. In the training of brutes, from which we learn to recognize a percep- tible versatility of talent, we find in most cases, at the foundation, that quite as false a notion exists as in the case of the defective education of the child. The brute can receive no training save that which is according to the inner laws of its nature; and, even when we intend to use the brute only as a brute, the greatest part of the applied force, even if it was necessary for the attainment of the aim, is without doubt coarse abuse. Whoever has observed young brutes, must have remarked how often they strive to use their fore-feet as hands — a vain effort to overcome the limitations of their organization. To man, however, instead of in- solence, a little more gratitude for the advantage of education, in the possession of which he especially re- joices, is to be recommended. Besides, while manifold differences in the mental activity of different brutes re- main a secret to us, the differences between men are much more plainly to be perceived. To the question whether concepts can completely manifest themselves as forces in man, or whether here, perhaps, something of the limitation observed in the brutes remains, the following may furnish a general answer : The hands of man have been obliged to furnish themselves with innumerable tools. Language has needed the print- ing-press. Geniuses reveal the great extent to which free mental activity is lacking in an ordinary man, and idiots show how closely in the human form the bands FACULTY OP EEPRESENTATION. ,53 "(vhicli the physical places upon the mental life may be tied. Finally, self-control, a work of higher edu- cation, suffers in every failure in training and educa- tion. Hence it is sufficiently clear that the human ac- tivity, as hitherto known, is not to he regarded as a complete, conclusive exposition of what concepts act- ing as forces, may be able to accomplish, and the con- jecture quickly rises that in the other heavenly bodies, under other conditions of gravitation, atmosphere, illumination, etc., may be found physical organizations furnishing much better opportunity for the develop- ment of the mental activity. . %. CHAPTEE III. FACULTY 01? EEPKESENTATIOIJ. 67. The following conspectus shows those aspects which are considered to belong to the faculty of repre- sentation : r { {aa) According to matter. A. Production ] (^^ °* experience: | ^jj^ According to form. ( (3) of ideas which transcend experience. B. Keproduction : According to this outline, we shall examine the faculty of representation, and in doing so shall con- sider the usual classification of the assumed mental faculties. 54: EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. A. The Outer Sense. 68. The production of the material of experience is principally the work of the outer senses, of touch, taste, smell, hearing, and seeing. What is called the material and form of experience is dis- cussed in my Introduction to Philosophy (35-29). The five senses mentioned are enumerated accord- ing to the organs of sense. There is a larger number of the difEerent classes of sensuous impressions. More- over, the organs themselves contain sensitive surfaces, hence innumerable sensitive places ; with the remark- able difference that in the case of some senses only a total sensation arises, while in the case of others every single spot of the sensitive surface furnishes a separate presentation. 69. The feeling of pressure, and that of warmth and cold, has its organ extended over the whole sur- face of the body. Pressure is perceived in very many different ways, according as it is uniform or not uni- form in the difEerent parts of the sensitive surface and in the successive moments of time during the con- tinuance of the sensation. Thus we distinguish sharp, smooth, rough, elastic, etc. Warmth and cold are perhaps perceived more in the inner parts of the nerves, pressure more in the outer. The sense of touch is originally feeling, but this feeling has a special application by which it helps to determine the form of the experience. At the begin- ning we may remark that in touching, several fingers, several parts of the tongue — in a word, several por- tions of the sensitive surface — are brought into play. 70. Taste furnishes very many distinguishable sen- THE OUTER SENSE. 55 sations, which, however, coming, simultaneously, inter- fere with one another. The tongue is, at the same time, an excellent organ of feeling of every kind. It receives different kinds of nerves. 71. Odors, like tones, are obtrusive; but they do not, like the latter, admit of being distinguished into separate elements. The apparatus of smell is less un- der our control than the organs of the other senses ; even when in our power, it suffers much in its func- tions. Odors may cause death, and may propagate infectious diseases. They are mostly pleasant or un- pleasant, seldom indifferent, but none can be long per- ceived ; each quickly blunts or overtaxes the organ. In comparison with the savage, and with many brutes, the susceptibility of the civilized man in regard to this sense seems to be blunted. 72. Of all the senses, hearing is the richest in the variety of sensations which it furnishes. Musical tones are distinguishable, even coming simultaneously. The distinguishing of vowels is independent of them, and in addition to these two classes comes the perception of consonants which appear to belong to the class of complex noises. The unrhythmical and yet intelligible speech of man is a noteworthy phenomenon; those who from birth are quite unmusical yet hear vej^ well what is said to them. Probably every musical tone has its own peculiar place in the organ. Unless this is so, it is not easy to comprehend how simultaneous tones remain separate, and why they do not pro- duce a third mixed tone which would destroy the Eesthetic ap- prehension of the interval. 73. Sight distinguishes colors, and, independently of these, the degrees of light and shade. Every spot 56 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. of the retina of the eye sees individually, and furnishes a separate sensation. In many eyes which otherwise possess keen sight, the color-sense is in part iranting, while in others it fails entirely. The greatest mo- bility, the capacity to adapt itself to near and remote objects, to strong and faint light, finally to cover itself voluntarily with the eyelid, are peculiarities of this organ. It will be shown hereafter that mobility aids most especially the apprehension of the space forms. This apprehension is by no means so original as it appears; it is learned and passes through very different steps of development. Note. — Every sense has its degree of acuteness and delicacy, its extent and duration. Up to this time, everything that has been said refers only to sensations, not to perceptions, which latter presuppose the concept of an object opposed to other ob- jects and to the subject, and hence bring into play at the same time most of the so-called mental faculties (by no means merely those of sense). He who forgets himself and becomes absorbed in sensuous contemplation (^Ansehawvmg), as it is called, is only in a condition for the reception of mere sensations. B. The Inner Sense. 74. No perceptible organ of the body indicates an inner sense ; but, from analogy with the outer senses, it has been assumed, in order that we may attribute to it the apprehension of our own conditions in their actual succession. The inner sense, so far as it is held to be a special component of our mental constitution (the explanation is to be found in The Principles above discussed, see sections 40-43), is consequently entirely an invention of psychologists, and indeed a somewhat defective invention ; for they know neither how to reckon definitely the classes of concepts which THE INNER SENSE. 57 it fumistes, nor how to point out any semblance of a law, according to which the extreme irregularity of its working might be explained. The outer senses perform their functions, if they can, and, in case they fail to do so, we know the reason for the failure ; but the inner sense, at times watching sharply every- thing that occurs in the innermost recesses of tlis heart (also, indeed, inventing much there) is at other times so dull and so idle that, although we may be conscious of having had a thought, we feel ourselves incapable of finding it again. The inner sense is not able long to endure the strain of intentional effort; that which we wish to see accurately in ourselves becomes obscured during the observation. Besides, wonderful as is that material of experience which the inner sense furnishes us, just as wonderful does the mental activity ascribed to it sometimes appear. Not seldom the self-apprehension seizes upon the most violent emotions and tames them. Sometimes in the midst of the most intense labor in the outer world, a man restrains himself notwithstanding the pressure, in order to complete his work rightly. The actor, who represents a cunning deceiver, is conscious, first, of his own person; second, of the character of his rSlej third, of the art of simulation and of the appearance assumed, which are attributed to this character as the means of the deception. Indeed, the inner sense rises in a scale of higher and higher powers ad infinitum j e. g., we may observe our self-observation and again an observation of that, and so on forever. Note. — In the controversy between the Cartesians, on the one hand, and Locke and Leibnitz on the other, the disputed question is, whether there are concepts without consciousness. 58 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. The simplest and shortest answer is, that if all representation had to be again represented, then the inner sense would be obliged to rise in an unbroken series to an infinitely higher power. In the Leibnitz theory, however, the assertion of uncon- scious concepts is made to depend on the metaphysical idea of substance. C. Forms of Series. 75. Space and time have been explained by a very incorrect theory, inasmuch as they are regarded as existing forms of sensuousness which are individual, single, and independent of one another. Space is the only completely elaborated series-form. It is produced especially in connection with sensations of sight and feeling; it is, however, not by any means limited to these sensations, but quite a similar kind of produc- tion, either complete or within certain limits, occurs from many other causes, either clearly or vaguely thought ; sometimes with characteristic accompanying conditions which cause other series connected with it to be distinguished from space. Such a series is time. Another is number. Another is degree or intensive magnitude. Less distinct, but nevertheless indispensable, is the series produced by the putting together of sensations of the same kind according to the possibility of tran- sition one to another. From this we have the tone series (to be distinguished from the scale, which de- pends upon sesthetic conditions). Similar to it would be the color surface between the three primary colors, yellow, red, and blue, if we knew certainly whether all the colors were connected with the grades of difference between light and dark (perhaps we should say black and white), and could be traced back to those three ; FORMS OF SERIES, 59 or whether the color realm does not rather require a third dimension. Note. — In the difference between light and dark, as well as in the tone-series in the contrast between high and low tones, a concept of succession in the ascent is to be perceived, which dis- closes the fact that the process of arching and pointing (see § 26) moves more slowly in the lower and darker, and, on the con- trary, more quickly in the higher (tones) and lighter (shades). In music, the bass voice generally moves more slowly than the treble. Still less distinct, but quite as indispensable, is the series in every logical arrangement where the varieties are opposed to one another, and are, at the same time, united in the species. Not merely the expressions here are space symbols. In the thing itself there is something through which such expressions as the circumference or sphere of a notion is called up, although these words, so far as they are borrowed from space which is the elaborated series, are only metaphysical. Quite as necessary in metaphysics is the theory of intelligible space, which, with perfect clearness, is construed according to all three dimensions, merely for the convenience of metaphysical thought without mingling anything sensuous, 76. The concept of a series is shown most compre- hensively in the notions of integral positive numbers. But these notions, gradually created and extended (savages and children have not a little trouble with them), do not sufl&ce in themselves to express all vari- eties of progression increasing or decreasing, the pro- duction of the series in numbers becomes constantly more artificial and complicated : e. g., between whole numbers continuous transitions are made by means of fractions ; also a backward prolongation of the series may be made by nieans of minus numbers. Again, the ideas of surd roots, logarithms, and exponential quantities, are developed ; finally, we have the count- less functions resulting from integration, at the foun- 60 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. dation of which lies a difEerential — i. e., the idea of a certain ratio of increase or decrease. Briefly, for psychologists, arithmetic furnishes the remarkable example of a concept of a series constantly becoming more abstracted, which may be traversed in both directions and by infinitely minute steps. 77. Now, by analogy with this undeniable fact, one is expected to find it at least probable that also the geometrical concept of space in which are infinite quantity and divisibility is a result of a process of pro- ducing or drawing out {Production) that has gradually become stationary, but which is in no wise something original in man. This is so much the more true, in- asmuch as the infinite plasticity of space notions is shown continually in that which geometry, in its con- tinued onward progress, makes out of it. The princi- ples for the explanation of this production of space will be found in the third division of this book. Here we may especially call attention to the notion of a middle between two opposed sides. This is charac- teristic of every series. A number lies between num- bers, a place in space between other places, a point of time between two points of time, a degree between a higher and lower degree, a tone between other tones, etc. Further, we may remark the psychological fact that we habitually carry with us a certain standard of measurement, a unit of distance, be it full or empty, in space, in time, and in the tone-series, and also some- thing of the same kind in dealing with intensive magnitudes, as is noticeable in the case of measuring by the eye, and of beating time. LOGICAL FORMS. 61 D. Logical Forms. 78. Philosophers have a bad habit of leaning heav- ily on logic in difficult cases — not for the purpose of following its prescriptions with special care — which would be very laudable — but to imitate or copy its procedure, which they have observed in its scientific development. "Warning examples of this are Kant's categories, put together according to a very defective table of logical judgments, and also his categorical imperative which contains nothing but a reminiscence of the logical relation of the general to the particu- lar. Therefore, in psychology, one has found it un- necessary to say anything upon notions, judgments, and syllogisms, except that to each logical operation there is doubtless a corresponding faculty in the soul ; and because logic in order to proceed from the simple to the complex, treats first of notions, then of judg- ments, and finally of syllogisms, the psychologist has unhesitatingly treated the so-called faculties of these things, viz., understanding, judgment, and reason, in the same order. But several circumstances make the fact doubtful whether notions, in the strict logical sense, really occur in human thinking, and it is a question whether they are not rather logical ideals which our actual thinking strives more and more to approach. In the third division of this book this question will be answered affirmatively ; besides this, it will be shown that it is through judgments that no- tions more and more nearly approach the ideal ; hence, in a certain sense, judgments precede notions. It will finally be made clear that from this influence of judgments very important results, especially for meta- physical notions, will be found. 62 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 79. For information regarding those ideas which we call notions we may inquire ol dictionaries and grammars. For each word, the dictionaries show us a thought which fluctuates between a mass of different characteristics that are sometimes hardly reconcilable. The grammars reveal the fact that, wherever strictly logical demands do not require it, instead of general notions (as man, tree), we generally think but one in- dividual, and indicate it by the indefinite article (a man, a tree). Hence, it is no wonder that most men, when they are asked what they mean by this or that word, have not a good verbal definition ready. Hence, too, men do not present each general notion according to its content (as ought to be the case in logic) and then proceed to regard the application to the extent as something accidental to the notion itself. On the contrary, they indicate certain total impressions of many similar objects by means of words, and the sig- nification of these words, which is in no case firmly fixed, must, in the use, suggest the connection every time to such a degree that one may recall prominent- ly certain characteristics of an otherwise indefinite thought. From this we can see how we should burden psy- chology with a problem based upon misconception if we should propose to explain the source of truly gen- eral notions in the human soul. General notions can not Jbe_ shown to actually exist, except in the^^iences,JKhfixe,an.e can^ plainly see how they are formed— ^viz^ by -positive and-negatiye judg- ments which affirm alLthe kiiids of characteristics that belong to the deflnijiqn we seek, and deny all others. 80. Now, on the contrary, it is a fact not to be LOaiCAL FORMS. 63 doubted that human thought very often (although not always) assumes the form of judgments. The combi- nation of a subject and predicate lies at the founda- tion of nearly all forms of speech in the languages of civilized peoples. It must not be forgotten, however, that the logical demand that the subject and predicate shall be clearly defined notions, is not complied with in actual usage. 81. The fact just mentioned may appear a won- derful psychological phenomenon. Upon the suppo- sition that a being that forms ideas should recognize a real or only an apparent world, or even only think a world as possible, it does not by any means follow that this thinking and recognition must assume ex- actly the form of judgments, but one may be tempted to consider such a remarkable condition as a peculiar trait in the constitution of human nature. The representation, considered as a copy of the objects presented, should resemble the objects them- selves, and should correspond to them in the most exact manner ; but no one will consider the connection of subjects and (for the most part negative) predicates to be a combination that takes place in the objects. The painter who sketches for us the person about whom we inquire, gives us a much more exact knowl- edge than he who, with words, should enumerate all the predicates which are perceived by a single glance at the sketch. Moreover the whole scaffolding of va- rieties and species which, according to the principles laid down in the introduction to logic, we may be able to build into notions, is entirely foreign to reality, and is never used^excejptjn^Plir pogiiitions expressed in the form of judgments. 6i EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOaT. 'Note. — To the mind of many a philosopher (e. g., Spinoza) has occurred the ideal of an intuiting cognition, for which, in- deed, if it were a reality, a so-called intellectual intuition, non- sensuous in its origin, and beholding the truth directly, would be demanded. If contradictory notions were taken for the ob- jects actually intuited, and as such recommended to us, the result would be such as has already been in part experienced by the present age. If we do not desist from following artifi- cially the cutn ratione insanire, psychology may, however, still be enriched with quite as sad as remarkable facts. On the con- trary, if we understood how to place false systems at a distance and to observe them from the right standpoint, we should learn something from them. 82. The main question which we have to put to speculative psychology is, Whence comes the passive attitude of the subject — viz., that thought to which a determination must be given by the predicate? Inas- much as, in thinking, the subject and predicate come together in the relation of substantive and adjective, why are they not so placed at once ? Why^ dpes^j^t appear that a real psychic faculty caUed judgment mustjflrst connect them ? ~ ~ In view of facts, the following observations are to be made : (a.) It is a begging of the question to assert that all human thought is an unconscious judgment. In reality, judgment is manifested only in speech, but a man has many thoughts which he can not express in language. (5.) A. man's inclination to communicate with oth- ers has a great influence upon the development of his thought in expressed judgments. Perhaps the con- verse of this is also true ; the reserved man may be one whose concepts do not readily assume the form of LOGICAL FORMS. 65 judgments. Among children may be observed very striking differences in regard to talkativeness and re- serve, even when the latter does not arise from shy- ness or indolence. (c.) Expression is often a necessity, and gives re- lief. The judging in this case is connected with in- stinct and feeling. (d.) The decisions which express preference and rejection are special kinds of judgment in which sub- ject and predicate are very sharply separated. The tendency to these is so great that one believes readily in omens— i. e., he is inclined to consider every event as threatening or favorable. From the repeated at- tempts of philosophers to refer good and bad to afiBlr- mation and negation, it may be supposed that between the judgment on one side, and desire and repulsion on the other, no fundamental, natural, but rather a psy- chological, relation must exist. (e.) Another principal kind of judgment in which the separation and the fusion of the two component elements are very observable, presents itself in the union of the new with that which is already known. Either that which is known is the subject here, and the new constitutes the predicate, with changes which we observe in the things — e. g., the tree blooms ; or the new is the subject, and is subsumed under a known predicate — e. g., in all answers to the question, "What is that ? The latter remarks are, it is true, only an enumera- tion of instances, but, taken psychologically, the gen- eral is often only to be explained by the particular, becausejveryjfrequently particular concepts are^ made general by tra^isferring^them to others, As the notions 66 EMPIEICAL PSYCHOLOGY. of irrational quantities arise while the concept of a division into equal factors is transferred to those num- bers which do not consist of several equal factors, so also universal custom, in order to bring all speech into the form of judgments, may have had a very special beginning, and we are in no way justified in supposing that all thoughts which now appear in the form of a combination of subject and predicate contain in them- selves the reason for such an arrangement. Note. — Judgments, such as A = A, or, The stone is not sweet, are school formulas and school examples. But if the judgment made be original, then the standpoint of the one making the judgment is disclosed. Children judge and question where the adult no longer separates his already united substan- tive and adjective, and where he is restrained partly by knowing the limits of human knowledge, partly by custom, and partly by his inclination to regard things only from a business point of view. The process of arching and pointing (see sec. 36) is easily to be recognized where an answer is given to the question, " What is that?" "It is nothing but snow," said a child to whom a snow-cake was ofEered. Here the cake was the subject, the ap- prehension of which occasioned the arching. What kind of a cake? until the pointing left only the snow remaining. The final propositions, This cake is not edible ; it will melt, are of a similar kind. The predicates here come from within — i. e., they are contained in the nature of the subject. The case would be reversed when a person, who hitherto has been accustomed to see dogs run free, for the first time sees and expresses the judg- ment that the dog carries goods to the market. He would have passed by a wagon drawn by horses without expressing any judgment. The arching causes tension^ Jlie pointing satisfies : hence there is _a pleasurejn judgment; hence we haveTiaity judgments and chatter, which injure observation and thinking. The observer would have remarked more if he had not gone away satisfied with one kind of pointing. In the case of the thinker, the arching would have been more complete and its LOGICAL POEMS. 67 elevation greater. Besides this, the pleasure in Judging injures the constructive power. Critical minds are seldom creative. /"' The observer goes successively from one arching to another; he forms series of judgments. Mere sense-perception does not separate the predicates ; it is less acute : the arching is defective, and therefore the pointing is also defective. Often inaccurate repetition follows upon this. Language, with its many signifi- cations attached to words, exerts an influence here, provided no effort be made to secure a constant correction. 83. Logic considers syllogisms to be progressive unf oldings of the steps of a thought. Upon this point only two observations are suggested : (a.) Very rarely in ordinary speech is such a pro- gressive development presented in the form of a com- plete syllogism. The syllogism has nearly always something tedious in it, unless it be abridged, as in the enthymeme. This is in no way a fault in the syllogism (as it is often considered), but merely a re- minder that logic and psychology are different things. The concept series, for the most part, deal with the minor premises, while they only touch the major pre- mises in passing — so to speak. (b.) Very rarely have the creations of thought originally (in the act of invention) the accuracy of the syllogism. In most cases they are attempts to unite into one a pair of notions which relate to the same middle term, even before the necessary quantities of the propositions and the precise form of their identity with the middle term are proved. Correct conclusion and correct measuring are closely related. The middle term as the standard of measurement must be firmly held. 84. Hence, if the power to infer be attributed to the faculty of reason, then, again, an inadmissible 68 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. limitation of the faculties of the soul becomes visible. To form syllogisms and to test and confirm them are two quite different things, which, in reality, are for the most part widely separated. The first may be ascribed to imagination, the second to reason. 85. Finally, mention must be made here of logical approval, which is very different from aesthetic ap- proval. The former, unlike the latter, does not con- sist in a preference, the opposite of which is rejec- tion, but in a recognition by which, upon the whole, one is pleased with the object as it is ; but with the recognition is combined a peculiar kind of feeling in which the pressure of evidence and the gratifica- tion of a claim are mingled, and the question as to whether it is more pleasant or unpleasant can only be determined by the circumstances. The principal thing here is to observe how the alleged faculties of recognition and feelings are related, or, as the psy- chologists prefer to say, flow into one another, with which they are contented and do not trouble them- selves to inquire further concerning the causal rela- tion existing in this influx. E. Transcendental Notions. 86. It is not easy to determine what belongs to ex- perience and what transcends it. Kant reckons the notions of substance and force as belonging to that which enters into experience as a condition of the latter, and, according to him, there is a substantia phcBnomenon. In this we must differ from him on the grounds which have in part been presented in my Introduction to Philosophy, and which will be further developed in the General Metaphysics — that is to say, TRANSCENDKNTAL NOTIONS. 69 thejnotion of substance is not tlie same as the notion of „thing3^but has arisen from it. Thing is conceived as a complex of characteristics without calling up the question of the real unity of those characteristics which are therein blindly presupposed. Subst ance is the bearer of_alLthe characteristics, and something difer- ent_from them, a notion which first arises when we perceive Jhat we must distinguish the characteristics from their unity. This notion is contradictory ; Jt must be transformed into the juotion of ^ an essence which, by virtue of disturbances and jelf -adjustments, presents to us the phenomenon of a complex.of charac- teristics which in truth do not by any means belong to it. The notion of force depends upon that of sub- stance, and is developed in almost the same way with it, viz., out of the notion of a changing thing ; also, it is to be subjected to a similar metaphysical correc- tion. Both notions arise at the outermost limit of experience as contradictions which extend into the department of metaphysics— i. e., which oblige us to go beyond experience, and to establish beliefs or con- victions in us whose objects can not be furnished by any experience. 87. Furnished with the notions of substance and force (however obscure and incorrect the thought of them may otherwise be), the human mind penetrates into all parts of space and time, both into the infin- itesimally small terms of the same series, and also into the maxima in order to find the highest and most sublime. Thus arise questions concerning the infinity of the world, concerning the constituent ele- ments of matter (either masses or atoms), concerning the world of spirits and of God. 70 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. Note. — It is highly inopportune at this point to raise psy- chological questions upon subjects of this kind, as has been the tendency of late, under the mistaken notion that in this way we may gain a certain, soientiflc basis. Invariably the notions of the mental faculties by which these subjects are to be recog- nized are formed according to the opinions upon the subjects themselves ; and, first, one must have sufficient metaphysics to enable one to correct these opinions before one can even ask what (;p,pa,citj for the knowledge which lies beyond the senses may dwell in man. If one could invent a false logic for the pleasure of false speculation, then one might also venture the same thing with psychology ; but experience will not yield. 88. Here belong the purified geometric notions of bodies as uniform productions of pure surfaces, lines, and points. Moreover, they transcend experience, or rather experience transcends them, because each sen- suous object adds something to these notions by which it specializes them. The question concerning the men- tal faculties which furnish the fundamental notions of geometry is so much the less necessary because at the first glance one can see that these notions (by the pre- supposed production of the space series) are obtained from experience, provided it be possible to analyze that which the senses present in a confused condition ; an operation which is not dissimilar to the formation of scientific general notions. F. Reproduction. 89. In the case of reproduction which refers en- tirely to the temporal life of man, viz., to the continu- ance of concepts once created, we again find on the part of psychologists a carelessness in regard to the real question. Our concepts recede from consciousness and return again. For which shall we first seek reason REPRODUCTION OF CONCEPTS. 71 — the receding or the returning ? The question must first be directed toward the former, although, in fact, it is usual to discuss only the latter. 90. Eeproduction offers two special points for dis- cussion — its vividness and its accuracy. The former is ascribed to imagination, the latter to memory. Thus two mental faculties are invented for one and the same thing which is regarded from two different sides ; for this there is, however, an excuse which is easily recog- nizable in that which directly follows. 91. A high degree of accuracy and vividness of re- production, at the same time and in equal proportions, is very seldom found. Accuracy depends mainly upon the fact that a concept reappears in the same connec- tion with others as that in which it first appeared — i. e., with the same characteristics of a thing, the same circumstances of a transaction, the same combination of time and place relations, etc. This requirement .will very seldom be fulfilled in cases where the vividness of the reproduction allows the return almost simul- taneously into consciousness of many concepts which are connected with one another, and which cross one another in various ways. Thus it is found that men of much imagination possess but little accuracy of memory, although in this respect there are exceptions. Note. — Several psychologists include, under memory, repro- duction with recollection. The latter is to express the judgment that one has had the same concept before. From this some- times a special faculty of memory is very unnecessarily assumed. But the judgment mentioned, by which subject and predicate are really separated, can be very seldom proved to take place, and the whole theory is in nowise accordant with the usages of language. We say of a man who easily learns a speech by rote, and without taking it out of its connection repeats it accurately, 72 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. he has a good memory, even if he does not remember during the repetition that it is the same discourse which is written on this or that paper, and which he memorized at this or that hour. 92. Psychological writings are full of remarks, wMch it is not necessary to record here, upon the association of concepts or ideas ; in other words, upon the manner in which the latter call one another up, not only according to perceived combinations of time and space, but also according to resemblances, and even apparently according to contrast. Eather we may men- tion here the varied complicated course which repro- duction often takes — e. g., he who finds coals and ashes in a forest thinks immediately of burning wood which (farther backward) may have lain dry in the forest, then (forward) of men who may have encamped there and who may have set fire to it. But how came the men there? (This question goes backward.) What has become of them ? (Forward.) What fire might have originated had a storm arisen? (Sidewise into the region of possibility, at the same time looking back upon the storm and forward to the injury.) Or a man finds old coins in the ground. How do they come there ? To what time do they belong ? Where- fore were they buried ? To whom does the treasure belong ? Every seed recalls the plant from which it started, and points forward to that which may arise from it, while at the same time it suggests the use which may perhaps be made of it without planting it. It is a useful exercise to observe in many such exam- ples as the above the changing directions and ramifi- cations of a course of thought. Besides, it is well known that in the case of association, according to resemblances, one thing is put in the place of the BKPRODUCTION OF COMCiSPTS. 73 other many times, out of which arise many new com- plications, or inventions, for which an inventive fac- ulty has been found. Note. — In all inventions creation in its broadest sense is the most essential element. Quite as much imagination belongs to original seientifle thinking as to poetic creation, and it is very doubtful whether Newton or Shakespeare possessed the more imagination. 93. Memory and imagination agree in this, that in every man their special strength is limited to certain classes of subjects. For him who wishes geometrical imagination, exercise in the so-called art of poetry would be quite useless ; and he who retains, without any trouble, the technical terms of a science which interests him, has often a bad memory for village gos- sip. Here we find that reproduction, as well in regard to its vividness as to its faithfulness, is most closely related to other mental activity, and that the assump- tion of peculiar psychical faculties which take care of reproduction as a means only of grouping manifesta- tions satisfactorily is in the highest degree awkward. 94. Memory and imagination differ from one an- other in that the former appears to bring up only rep- resented and, as it were, dead pictures, while the lat- ter appears to be employed in the process of active representing. The transition of concepts from one condition into another is very perceptible in the re- reading of something which one has one's self written ; also, in verifying what one has one's self thought out. 74 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. CHAPTEE IV. THE FACULTY OF PEELIKG (GEEUHLVERMOGEK).* 95. If we begin to assume psychic faculties, there arises the necessity for assuming one or more additional besides the representing faculty, lor the reason that, by an account of that which we represent, or of how the representation arises in us, we are by no means able to indicate all that goes on in our minds. Especially is it to be seen that in us are manifested manifold phases of preference and rejection, on account of which the faculties of desire and aversion have been set up side by side with the faculty of representation. 96. Now, in the broad and dim space near repre- sentation, the boundary between feeling and desire has recently been drawn. But if psychologists are asked concerning the origin of this boundary, they say that desire relates to objects, and feeling to conditions or states ; yet their explanations move in a circle, or at least do not touch the question as to whether perhaps feeling and desire are one kind of occurrence, which we in our representation observe from different sides, and hence call by two different names. Note. — Maass, in his work upon feelings, explains feeling through desire (" A feeling is pleasant, in so far as it is desired for its own sake ") ; but, in his work upon the passions, he says that it is a well-known law of Nature to desire that which is con- ceived as good, and to detest that which is represented as bad. From this the question arises. What is good and what is bad ? To * The reader will observe that the word feeling is restricted here to the meaning implied by the German word GefuM, and is not used indiscriminately to indicate feeling, emotion, and desire. THE FACULTY OP FEELING. 75 this we receive the answer, Sensuousness represents as good that by which it is pleasantly affected, etc., and here we find our- selves in a circle. Hoffbauer, in his Outlines of Empirical Psy- chology, begins the chapter upon faculties of feeling and desire thus : " We are conscious of many conditions in our minds which we try to reproduce ; these we call pleasant. Certain concepts create in us the effort to malce their object real ;, this we call desire.'' Here is one and the same basis, viz., effort, un- derlying feelings and desires, and, if the distinction be in the objects and conditions, then the question is, whether perhaps the feelings, consequently the conditions, which were expected from the objects, may not be what is really desired. This important point appears to be ti'eated no better by other authors. They ought to have noticed the excellent remark by Locke, in his work on the Human Understanding. It does not exhaust the , subject, but proceeds in the right way, and shows that many desires (if not all) are independent of feelings, although they may have the latter as results. That which Locke calls dissatis- faction is no feeling, but the first movement of desire. 97. ISTow, as tlie facts wliich we call feelings can only with the greatest difficulty be separated from those called desires and aversions, to enumerate the kinds of feelings is a very uncertain undertaking. Three kinds are prominent : sensuous comfort and pain; feeling of the beautiful and the ugly (with wliich the sublime and trivial may be included) ; and the emotions which as yet we are accustomed to discuss under the subject of the feelings. But with this the subject is not exhausted. In the first place, we must observe that the feelings are doubled through sym- pathy with that which others feel. In the next place, we may remark that ejch kind of outer and inner ac- tivity, according as it succeeds or fails (i. e., according as the desire underlying the activity is satisfied or not), carries with it comfort or discomfort. Furthermore, 76 EMPIRICAL PSyCHOLOGY. that feelings mingle in various ways (a disputed point like the following). Finally, there are conditions of feeling which, if not indifEerent, are, nevertheless, so constituted that pleasure and discomfort are not char- acteristic of them, and theii strength can not be meas- ured by those sensations 98. In order to have at least a fixed standpoint, we shall divide feelings into those which depend upon the nature of what is felt, and into others which depend upon accidental mental conditions ; here a third class may be mentioned as existing between them, viz., a class which depends upon a certain mental condition, so that this, in connection with the nature of the ob- ject felt, gives rise to a corresponding feeling. Next we must speak of the intermediate condition between the pleasant and the unpleasant ; and, lastly, the emo- tions will come in their turn. A. Feelings ivMcli arise from the Nature of that tvhich IS felt. 99. That there are such feelings is an evident fact. Every bodily pain, as such, is unpleasant, without re- gard to the question how much ado we make about it, or how patiently we bear it. Moreover, unpleasant feel- ings of this kind are specifically different. Burning, cutting, electric shock, aching teeth, each of these ex- cites its own peculiar pain, which may be distinguished from every other, although a mere imaginary pain that in itself would be neither pleasant nor unpleasant, does not admit of being separated ; rather the sensation and its opposite are one and the same. Sweet viands, soft tones, a mild temperature, furnish examples of pleasant sensations of this kind, the pleasure of which THE FACULTY OP PEELING. 77 is understood, ■without regard to the question as to its yalue, or whether by it one is inclined to seek their continuance or to give one's self up to these sensations. 100. These feelings are analogous to all aesthetic feeling, from which they differ only in this, that in the latter case the object presented is made the subject of a predicate, which expresses approbation or blame ; hence the aesthetic feeling is brought into the form of a judgment and is scientifically treated, which from a practical standpoint is infinitely superior. Note. — When, in the beautiful, size predominates, a sense of the sublime arises. This is a genuine species of beauty, because relations of magnitude themselves belong to the elements of beauty. But we seek in vain for the definition of the ridiculous, which has its origin in the possibility of laughing, and which can not be considered without reference to a human body and its organic vital sensations. The most purely comic sensations would to the pure intellect amount to mere contrast. Laugh- ing belongs to the emotions ; like the latter, it shakes the body, and again, in reversed order through the latter, it shakes the mind. Like the emotions, it is a mental condition of short duration, for which, according to the whim of the moment, we find ourselves in readiness or not. Besides, the ridiculous is an example of that which is strongly felt, without either pleasure £rjhe reverse being a characteristic of it. As we know, there is a joyous and a bitter laugh, and between the two a certain in- diSerence toward the ridiculous, as in the case of the comedian, whose serious business it is to arouse laughter in others. B. Feelings that depend upon the Mental Conditions. 101. In connection with the above first class of feelings, it may be correctly stated that feeling is the source and (at least in part) the ground of explanation of the corresponding desire and aversion. In the sec- ond class, just to be considered, desire, on the contrary. Y8 EMPIKICAL PSYCHOLOGY. must be regarded as sometliing original, and the feel- ing is not to be considered an efEect, but the associate and follower of the desire. We may mention here the numerous desires which are either independent of the pleasure or pain of their object, or which have no relation to the latter. All the things which are wished for to-day and despised to-morrow, everything whose value decreases and aug- ments according to individual caprice and partiality, furnish us striking examples here. The desire for these things is, as is known, accompanied by much unpleasant feeling, and, in the case of gratification, by a brief pleasure. Such pleasant and unpleasant feel- ings can be called neither sensuous nor rational. It is connected with the arousing of our activity, just as the object of our deed may be so constituted as to affect our activity. Whether a child wishes to untie a knot in a string, or a mathematician wishes to solve a prob- lem in numbers and geometrical figures, the feeling of exertion and of ineffective effort remains always of the same kind. The restless activity of man (con- trasted with the natural effort of the brute) is generally of this kind. Here belong also the feelings which appear to entirely lack an object, as in the case of anxiety, or in that of comfortable repose. G. Intermediate and Mixed Feelings. 103. All feelings of contrast, and of amazement, which latter are in a way related to the former, may be regarded as intermediate feelings — i. e., such as can neither be described nor estimated by the pleas- ure or the pain which they bring with them. Amaze- ment may be pleasant quite as well as unpleasant. In :fHE FACULTY OP PEELING. 79 all beautiful art, contrasts are indispensable, and yet they are very seldom connected with essentially aesthetic relations; rather they serve, first of all, to hold the manifold asunder, and thereby to promote the intelli- gibility of the aesthetic relations. 103. That there may be mixed feelings follows in any case from the difference between the two classes before mentioned. An example of this is curiosity, which desires to see something foreign to itself, and which is satisfied by a sensation which has become in part really unpleasant to itself. Besides, no one who studies experimentally can be willing to deny mixed feelings, inasmuch as cases daily occur where one and the same event affects our feelings in different respects, and very often in opposite ways. Note 1. — False speculations have succeeded in obscuring these simple facts. People fancy that they have discovered a twofold delusion : first, an exchange of the feeling itself for its manifold causes ; second, a misapprehension of the transition from one feeling into another. These remarks may not make the facts doubtful, but will still less establish the opposite assertion. It has already been shown (see sections 34-38) that the feeling and the willing of man are founded in the concept masses, and not by any means directly in the soul. Hence the variety and conflict of feeling, as well as of willing, are given in experience quite as intelligibly as certainly. Note 2. — Only too often poets are moved to mingle feelings in their works of art. Thus they may reach the piquant, but not the beautiful. Great masterpieces may frequently be misun- derstood. Shakespeare introduces the comic into his tragedies, but, if by this he for the moment relaxes a tense condition in order so much the more certainly to increase it again, he is careful never to allow the ridiculous to become attached to his principal characters. In his narration of the journey of Odys- seus, Homer is romantic ; but that is a narration of extraordi- 80 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. nary sufferings, and portrays the character of Odysseus himself, from whom no one would expect a purely serious and faithful account. D. The Emotions {Affecten). 104. After the emotions (transitory Tariations from the condition of equanimity) have been separated from the passions (rooted desires), a prevailing opinion has arisen that the emotions are nothing but stronger feel- ings. But there are very strong enduring feelings which have grown into the deepest recesses in the foundation of human character (e. g., adherence to one's own people and to the fatherland), with which the most complete equanimity exists so long as nothing of an opposite nature' which may disturb them appears. The moment of danger to one's own, or to the father- land, may arouse emotion, but this emotion is widely different from feeling itself. In the same way, a man may possess a strong and lasting feeling of honor with- out being in a condition of emotion from it. So far from emotions being feelings, they rather make feeling tame or dull. The moralist and the artist have great cause to guard against insipidity, which arises when one from pure emotion finally no longer knows at what he weeps or laughs. 105. Kant's classification of the emotions into melt- ing (i. e., paralyzing to activity) and stirring {rilstige = arousing to activity) throws light upon the subject. Variation from equanimity may occur from two causes : either there^ is too much or _toq little present in con- sciousness. To the first class belong mental shock, sadness, fear ; to the second, joy and anger. 106. The emotions are not merely a psychological but also a physiological subject, for they act upon the THE EMOTIONS. SI body with remarkable, often dangerous power, and by this means, in reverse order, make the mind dependent upon the body, partly from the continuance of the bodily condition (which does not cease so quickly as would the mental state by itself), partly from the tend- ency of the body to yield to emotion. Thus courage and timidity are very often dependent upon health and sickness. It is a remarkable circumstance that different bodily conditions belong to different emotions. For example, shame drives the blood to the cheeks, fear makes one pale, anger and despair increase the strength of the muscles, etc. From this we see that it would be wrong to enu- merate and distinguish the possible emotions accord- ing to a merely psychological principle. Note. — Without presenting here the theory ol the union between soul and body, according to the laws of natural philosophy, we may make further use of the two preceding observations : 1. Every gradual excitation of one system by another works by reflex action in such a manner that from the part of the system excited the disturbance is extended into the exciting part. Under the excitement of emotion, not only the body is dis- turbed, but the mind suffers a prolonged uneasiness, and indeed the different systems of the bodily organism must be disturbed in the same way. The excitation goes from the soul to the brain, from the brain to the spinal marrow, from the spinal marrow to the ganglia, from there io the circulatory system, from there to the individual organs, and thence to the nutritive system — and then the influence returns in reversed order [from the nutritive system to the soul], and not suddenly but succes- sively, just as the excitation proceeded, which latter may be regarded as an accelerating force (according to the technique of mechanics). 9 82 EiiIPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 2. The partial effect upon definite organs, of which the emotions give proof, must also occur where we do not observe it. In the reproduction of visual concepts arises an excitation of the optic nerve, in that of auditory concepts an excitation of the auditory nerve, etc. ; but, in the concept of a movement, the nerves of motion are excited, so that the special act of holding back is necessary, if the movement is not to follow. If we combine these two explanations just given, then the most varied tendencies are explicable without any occasion for the current theory which confounds life and soul, thus giving rise to the error of materialism, so called, which in regard to matter is still more preposterous than in regard to souL CHAPTER V. THE FACULTY OF DESIRE. 107. In regard to the word desire, we must, at the very first, correct a wrong use of speech which ob- tains generally in treatises on psychology. The fac- ulty of desire, together with those of representation and feeling, should furnish an exhaustive classification of the mental activities. It jnust, therefore, include wishes, instincts, and every species of longing, inas- much as they belong neither to feelings nor to rejpre^ sentations. In works upon psychology is to be found the assertion that that which is desired must be rep- resented as attainable ; the belief in the impossibility of attainment kills the desire. This statement is true in regard to.willing, which is a desire combined with the supposition that it can be fulfilled. Hence there is a great difference between a strong will and a strong THE FACULTY OP DESIRE. 83 desire. Napoleon willed when emperor, and desired when at St. Helena. The expression desire must not be so limited as to exclude those wishes which remain, though they may be vain or so-called pious wishes, and which, for the very reason that they do remain, con- stantly incite men to new efforts, because through them the thought of a possibility is ever anew suggested in spite of all reasons which appear to prove the impossi- bility of attainment. It is very important to give to the concept of the unattainability of the wished-for object strength enough so that a peaceful renunciation may take the place of the desire. A man dreams of a desirable future for himself, even when he knows it will never come. 108. According to the classification of feelings made above, we must now distinguish among desires (the word taken in its widest sense) those which have for object something pleasant as such (aversions having something unpleasant as such) from others whose di- rection is determined by no feeling, but merely by the present mental condition. Note. — Usually the latter kind of desires is misunderstood. We think that the object desired must necessarily be represented as a good thing. This is either a tautology — if good means the same as the thing desired — or it is an error which, from an empirical point of view, belongs to the numberless gratuitous assumptions of psychologists. In Alexander Baumgarten's Metaphysics (665) is to be found the statement : " Quse placentia prsBvidens exstitura nisu meo prsesagio, nitor producere. Quae displicentia prsevidens impedienda nisu meo prsesagio, eorum opposita appeto.'' This is given as the law of the faculty of desire (lex facultatis appetitivee). But regarded as a general law this theory of that otherwise valuable work is defectiTe in every point, ^acere, so far as it means anticipation of something 84: EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. pleasant or beautiful, is not necessary. PrcBvidere has likewise crept in. It is true that whoever represents to himself a desire, will find his concept develop time conditions. But the lowest animals also desire, and yet we can not assume that they sepa- rate the present from the future. Exstitura niau meo presup- poses the concept of the Ego, or at least a feeling of self, which has a much later origin than the simple desires of brutes and of young children. 109. The most important distinction, however, is that between the lower and higher faculties of desire. For the two separate into hostile classes, while feelings exist side by side, or mingle together ; and, in regard to concepts, most people, even cultured men and scholars, remain at the sensuous standpoint without being seriously troubled by the metaphysical protest against sense- knowledge. A. The Lozver Faculties of Desire. 110. Here we are first met by imgulses,^nd_in^ stinc ts. Of the latter, man has only a fragment ; we find them existing in the brutes in more perfect form and in greater variety, where it is clearly shown that by means of them the organic structure constitutes the essential and governing principle. The construct- ive art-impulses of brutes are .special examples of in- stincts. But the most important and the most general of the impulses is that for movement and change, the rest- less activity which is especially displayed in children and young animals, in which we find much vitality with little mind. Such examples afford practice in distinguishing between life and soul. Since this ac- tivity varies according to age, and, besides, is different in individuals from birth, we may believe that it is a THE LOWER FACULTIES OP DESIRE. 85 result of the organism, hence rather a physiological than a psychological subject. 111. Now, as psychologists have made their discov- eries by the analogy which the outer sense bears to the inner, side by side with the organic impulses they place several others, such as self-love, the impulse of imita- tion and of exaggeration, the social instincts, etc. Yes, they even assume a general instinct to seek happiness, although no one can specify definitely the object of this latter instinct, as it differs in different individ- uals. It is clear that nothing but psychological abstrac- tion, under the name of instinct, has given the very indefinite idea of happiness a foundation. But in regard to self-love and the social instincts, the case is no better. Desire here precedes all thought of I, thou, he. Experience shows plainly enough that egoistic prudence as well as resolution to sacrifice something for others is only formed gradually, according as the knowledge of the collisions that take place between selfish and altruistic interests is more deeply impressed. The insidious introduction of real forces, or at least of special talents and native germs, is particularly fre- quent in the theory of faculties of desire, because man shows himself active in his desire, and is, above all, inclined to assume as many forces as classes of real or apparent activities. 113. The inclinations, or those lasting mental con- ditions which are favorable to the rise of certain kinds of desires, show themselves more than the so-called instincts to be different in different people. They are for the most part results of the habit which appears to extend from the faculty of representation into the 86 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. faculty of desire. For there are, first, the thoughts which follow the accustomed direction, and which, if no hindrance intervenes before there is opportunity for perceptible feeling and desire, pass directly into action ; but if something is placed in the way, then the desire, accompanied by a feeling of efEort and fatiguing activity, increases. 113. The most striking, and, next to madness, the saddest spectacle in psychology is furnished by the passions. In his Anthropology, Kant has delineated them excellently well. They are not inclinations or mental conditions, but are desires, and e very desire, without exception, the noblest as well as the worst, rnay^becggi_e_a.passioiis. It becomes such in so far as it__attains Jijminion to .such _,an .extent .that moral de- liberation Js..fiut_o.f JHie £uestiqn. A tendency to at- tach undue importance to trifles is the peculiar sign of the passions. Hence, they can only be defined and described in contrast with practical reason. A perfect classification of the passions is quite impossible, for the reason that every desire, strengthened by circum- stances and habit, may give a perverted direction to internal deliberation. Every classification of passions is at the same time a classification of desires in general. In history, the passions play a conspicuous part. One should beware of attributing this part to Providence ; by doing so one would resemble Mephistopheles too much, and finally, like him, would fall out of his part. B. Tlie Higher Faculties of Desire. 114. Deliberation precedes judgment and action, when a man, before he joins a predicate to a subject, THE HIGHER FACULTIES OP DESIRE. 87 and before he changes the present places of things, compares other possible ways of thought and action. In deliberation lie deferring and delay, as well as con- centration and pondering. Deliberation is supposed to obviate revocation and repentance. It accomplishes this in so far as every one among the possible kinds of representation, each desire that might come into col- lision with another, is allowed to enter fully into con- sciousness, and as strongly as possible to work against the others, or to co-operate with them. If in this pro- cess something is forgotten — if during a period of de- liberation something is hindered in manifesting its full value, then there is danger that another mental state will follow, and the decision of the former mental state be found objectionable. Hence deliberation is an inner experiment, the result of which must be ac- cepted with entire submission; from this, reason in thought and action has its names [i. e., the " theoreti- cal reason " and the " practical reason "]. 115. Hence, reason is originally neither commiind- iugjior law-giving; above all, it is not the source of wiUing^ iFis quite as little a source of knowledge. ISTevertheless, it is regarded as such; indeed, it is thought to be the highest judge and authority, which is a very natural result, inasmuch as (with the custom- ary habit of making gratuitous assumptions) the dan- ger of having to repent— if one does not act according to the results of reflection— leads one, in connection with the threat, to think of a command, and, in con- nection with the command, of one who gives the com- mand. 116. Moral (PraktiscJie) deliberation becomes more complicated by reason of the connection between means 88 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. and ends. It has not indeed to weigh a manifold immediate desire against another (in order to choose among several ends), but also to go through the series of possible results which are connected with the ends, and which make their attainability probable. In the latter respect, deliberation is ascribed to practical un- derstanding, which is the faculty of adjusting itself to the nature of the thing thought, independent of imagi- nation and passion. When this kind of deliberation is completely perfected it creates plans. The choice among ends, however, is restricted by practical reason. 117. Circumspection is the mental condition of a man who reflects. If it becomes a habit, deliberation is extended continuously in every direction ; finally, an effort is made to include every possible desire in one act of deliberation, while more and more one's wishes are constantly limited and subordinated. The ques- tion is concerning the ultimate aim of all human action and impulse — viz., the highest good. In this, delibera- tion makes use of general notions. Maxims (very dif- ferent from plans) and principles are originated, and, these being collected, a science of morals is developed. In practical philosophy it is shown that after set- ting aside all changeable desires depending upon the momentary inclination, only the non-arbitrary prefer- ence and rejection can hold the highest rank, and such is in fact assigned in the aesthetic judgments upon the will. For this reason the work of deliberation (or if one prefers, of practical [moral] reason) is to bring forward those judgments, and the ideas arising from them — viz., of inner freedom, of perfection, of benevolence, of right, and of equity. These ideas must be disentangled FREEDOM OP THE WILL. 89 from their complication with all other thinking and willing wherein they lie, at first hidden, and they must be placed at the summit of all wisdom, while desires and wishes are collectively made subordinate to them. C. Freedom of the Will. 118. When a decision, the result of a completed act of deliberation, is on the point of presenting itself, it often happens that a desire arises and opposes this decision. In that case a man does not know what he wishes — he regards himself as standing between two forces which draw him toward opposite sides. In this act of self-consideration he places reason and desire opposite each other, as if they were foreign counselors, and regards himself as a third, who listens to the two and then decides. He believes himself to be free to decide as he will. He finds himself sufiiciently rational to compre- hend what reason may say to him, and sufiiciently sus- ceptible to allow the enticements of desire to influence him. If this were not so, his freedom would have no value ; he would only be able to incline blindly in this or that direction, but he could not choose. Now, how- ever, the reason to which he gives heed, and the desire which excites and entices him, are not really outside of him, but within him, and he himself is not a third, on a level with those two, but his own mental life lies in each and works in each. Hence, when he finally chooses, this choice is nothing Jbul a co-operation of those two factors, reason and desire, between which he thought he stood free. When a man finds that reason and desire in their co-operation have decided over him, he seems to him- 90 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. self not to be free, but rather subjected to foreign arts and influences. Manifestly, this is again an illusion, and from ex- actly the same source as the first. Just because reason and desire are nothing outside of him, and he nothing outside of them, the decision which arises from them is not foreign, but his own. He has chosen only with self-activity, yet not with a force different from his reason and from his desire, and which could give a result different from those two. Note 1.— Here is the principle ground for psychological illusions in regard to freedom. We can not here consider the deeper lying metaphysical and moral misapprehensions mingled with the illusions mentioned. It may be very briefly stated that the diflSculties that are found in responsibility are the easiest of all to remove. An act is held to be responsible so far as it can be regarded as a product of a will ; it is more or less responsible the more or less it discloses weak or strong ■will. So far every- thing is clearly and generally well understood. Now, however, all this is thrown away if the will itself may in turn be deter- mined by something else, for this is no better than if the stand- ard by which everything else is to be measured should itself be subjected to a measurement. Thus the fear arises that if the will has had other causes from which it unavoidably proceeded, these causes should bear the blame, since not only the will but the actions arising from it should be imputed to them. Hence we prefer to ascribe to the will a self-determination. Prom this arises an infinite series (compare Introduction to Philosophy, g 107). But that fear is quite groundless : responsibility stops with the actor, just as soon as the action is referred to the will ; for this is at once subjected to a " practical [or moral] judg- ment " (Kant's " categorical imperative "), which remains in per- fect self -identity and independence whatever may be mentioned as the causes and occasion of the will. However, if it be found that the will had an earlier will as its source, the responsibility begins again anew. The depraved man after he has become en- FREEDOM OP THE WILL. 91 tirely bad, will be held to be completely responsible for his crimes, but these again may be laid as a burden upon his corrupter, and so on backward as long as somewhere a will may be pointed out as the originator of those crimes. Note 3. — Transcendental freedom, which Kant wished to be assumed as a necessary article of faith for the sake of the cate- gorical imperative (because he had failed in finding the right foundation for practical philosophy) is an entire stranger in psy- chology. Let him who does not perceive this, study Kant's two Critiques of Pure and Practical Reason, and learn from them to treat this subject with caution. Kant has taken great pains to create in himself a clear conviction upon this point ; he has, how- ever, produced the confusion that adheres to his categorical im- perative, but which with his followers took on quite other forms, 119. Now, while the consciousness of freedom, so far as it is to stand between reason and desire, rests upon no better facts than have been given above, quite another result is reached if reason itself be considered the seat of freedom. Nothing is more evident than that the passionate man is a slave. His incapacity to consider motives of advantage or duty, his ruin through his own fault, are clearly evident. In contrast with him, the reasojiing man who represses his desires as soon as they are opposed by considerations of good, may^rightly be called free, and, the stronger he is in this power of repression, the freer he is. But, whether such a strength may be increased ad infinitum, can not be determined by existing cases, for these indicate only a limited power. 92 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. CHAPTEE VI., THE CO-OPEKA.TION" AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 120. The hypothetical assumption of faculties, in the foregoing discussion, has been shown to be so de- fective that the attempt to give an exhaustiye survey of their mutual influence in all their combinations would necessarily appear useless. However, before we observe the human mind in its changing conditions more closely, a few remarks will be useful in facilitat- ing the summing up of the preceding discussion. 131. Next to the outer senses, whose indispensa- bility is at first glance evident (what would a man be, born blind, deaf, and without hands ?), reproduction in its forms of memory and imagination is without doubt the chief seat of the mental life. The exercise of the senses, confined as it is to the present moment, gives very little, and we should be limited to mere animal existence if 'the past did not remain to us, as a treasure into which we are constantly dipping. At the time when the flow of unsought thoughts is weak, or quite stopped, we best realize the poverty of feelings, the crudity of desires, the inactivity or ineffective effort of the understanding and reason without the imagina- tion. The work of imagination ripens into permanent products in myths and traditions, which are elevated into objects of faith by the art-power of representation. 132. This is the place to mention habits and ac- complishments. For these reproduction is especially necessary ; we can secure them in permanent form by DEVELOPMENT OP THE FACULTIES. 93 no other means, and the same may also be said of the necessity of the exercise of the understanding, of rea- son, and of moral culture. For the facts that may be cited for this indicate that earlier formed ideas, judg- ments, feelings, volitions, quite as well as sensuous representations, are reproduced, and that they obtain a new influence by means of this reproduction ; they show also that reproduction occurs the more quickly, surely, and accurately the oftener and more carefully the attention has been occupied with those notions. Moreover, facts show that habit has much less to do with memory and imagination than with the concepts that are reproduced. To the person who learns much by rote, memorizing will become gradually easier, though this facility is restricted to the circle of con- cepts to which he is accustomed. Let the person who has a great memory for music attempt to commit to memory a series of names or numbers, and he will soon see of how little benefit to him the previous exercise of the memory is to him in this field. 123. Cultivation takes place in two principal direc- tions, which are determined first by the inner sense and secondly the outer action. Eeflection is connected with both, which fact occasions the first remark that this reflection (the bending back of the course of thought to a definite point) sometimes intentionally revives and forms concepts (in work), and at others it is employed in the apperception of the object given in experience ; therefore, that in the first case the activity proceeds from it, and is controlled by it ; in the second case, on the contrary, the excitation lies in the object presented. But the two cases are never entirely separated. More- over, the work of reflection creates a new object every 94: EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. moment, inasmuch as the work advances and comes under observation, and just here reflection connects itself with it. Conversely, experience leads us to com- parison and judgment, but with these comes further reflection which deals with the notions, or opinions, or caprices present, as the objects fixed upon by reflection, according to the peculiarity of each. Eeflection upon an object which exists merely in thought is of a difEer- ent character. Here the movement lies in the reflect- ing mass of concepts themselves. The continuous fix- ing of this object of pure thought, however, to which the observation is to confine its attention, still costs not a little effort. The inner sense, which is usually placed on a par with the outer sense, on account of this similarity, is in this case quite out of its natural relation. It is rather the great principle which lies at the bottom of all regular activity, especially of artistic fancy and of practical reason. Without self-consciousness man could control neither himself in general nor his ac- tivity in particular. External action which objectifies a man's thought and embodies it for him, but at the same time gives an opportunity for various distortions, always includes within its compass desires, observation, and judgment. In so far as it succeeds or fails, it changes desire either into express volition or into a mere wish, accompanied by pleasure or pain, by which the foundation is laid for the habitual disposition of the man. New condi- tions of life often furnish new incentives to action; thus, a man often appears to change all at once. This is most striking in a case where a common need occa- sions a new common action, and from the isolated DEVELOPMENT OF THE FACULTIES. 95 " I's " a new " we " is created. Yet it is perhaps more remarkable to observe how after a time a person appa- rently changed becomes again the same as formerly. The deepest impressions are given to a man's char- acter through his external deeds when they belong to his vocation or his daily occupation. Here we see in the clearest manner both the conflict and the co-opera- tion that exist in the dominant masses of concepts that belong to the series which is actually passing through the mind. During labor these masses of con- cepts are in equipoise in consciousness, and every indi- vidual act depends on the flowing series for its place and time, and it must be undertaken at the point fixed by the stage of advancement of the work. Very important determinations of character flow from the peculiarity of the employment pursued. The series of concepts that determine the life of the gar- dener, or of the farmer, move slowly with disturbances through natural causes which often necessitate his watching and waiting. The series of the musician, actor, etc., have, on the contrary, their distinct rhythm. Again, the concept series of the fencer, juggler, etc., move quite differently and require that without definite rhythm the right moment must be most accurately perceived. One of the most important directions for the practical educator and teacher is that he observe as accurately as possible how the concept series ought to proceed among his pupils, and how they can and actually do proceed. Important differences which de- mand attention are to be found here. 124. Whatever a man by inner thinking or exter- nal action may attempt, certain permanent feelings rise more and more out of the fluctuating mental con- 96 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. ditions, and these feelings become decisive criteria for him in his actual deliheration, and consequently in his understanding and in his reason. They become these special criteria, provided he possesses a deliberation of sufficient strength to resist changing desires. This is especially true in the aesthetic apprehension of the world peculiar to every person (which in many respects may be one-sided, and consequently even be- come morally perverted), according to which every per- son habitually determines his relations with the world. The impression which family and fatherland, human- ity and human history make upon the individual is explained by this. This impression is compounded of all that involuntarily pleases or displeases him. Hence everything that hinders a man in seeing clearly and in judging fairly works injuriously upon his in- nermost character. 125. The passions act most disastrously upon all development. They are the extreme opposite of the aesthetic judgment ; moreover, through them all versa- tility of effort is destroyed. Through their influence imagination and understanding receive a one-sided direction. They themselves, in case they find gratifi- cation, result in weariness and vacuity to mind and heart, and in case they remain ungratified they end in sorrow and illness. Those who boast as to what they have willed to become through passionate excitement deceive themselves ; they ought to rejoice that, in their shipwreck, they have not lost everything, and many are to be commended, inasmuch as they make a better use of the goods saved than they did formerly of their whole fortune. SECOND DIVISION— MENTAL CONDITIONS. CHAPTEE I. THE GBIfEKAL VAEIABILITY OF CONDITIONS. 136. AccuBATELY Considered, no one condition of human life exactly resembles another. Everything which is presented to the inner perception is wavering and fluctuating. This remark which discloses the impossibility of a fixed and definite psychological ex- perience, was made at the beginning of the present treatise, and must now be further elaborated. With it is connected the observation of the different conditions of life as every person passes through them ; further, it suggests the sketch of the most striking differences in human habits and human development under the influence of external conditions ; and, finally, it calls for a brief description of anomalous mental conditions. 127. Reproduction through memory and imagina- tion proves (see section 90) .that no concept once created is ever lost, and that a meeting of concepts which has once occurred can hardly be without results. But when, with the multitude of concepts that the mind of a mature man has accumulated, we compare that which he is conscious of doing each individual moment — we must be astonished at the disproportion between the riches of the former and the poverty of the latter. By way of comparison, we might ascribe to the human mind an eye which possessed an extremely 10 98 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. small pupil but the highest degree of movability. The explanation of this lies directly in what has heretofore been taught concerning the threshold of consciousness (16-19). Besides, the small number of concepts which we are able to take in at any one time is often grasped in a moment of quick transition, and by this it is pos- sible for the intellectual man to bring his concepts into the most varied relations, and to modify them through one another. 138. Certain incitements resulting in a change of concepts, by means of external impressions, are a ne- cessity to man. The lonely man seeks social inter- course, and if no means have been taken to keep the mind in activity, a long stay in one place is painful on account of the monotony of the surroundings. If this necessity remains long unsatisfied, human life gradually narrows down in a degree to correspond with the slow periodical changes to be observed. Converse- ly, the need increases through gratification. Those who make history (like Napoleon) for this reason al- ways find enough men ready to devote themselves to their service just because they are restless. Even be- hind the stove one complains of empty newspapers. 139, By virtue of the arrangement of the human body, hunger and satiety, waking and sleep, have every day their well-known cycle, and, in addition, seasons bring with them their variety of gratifications and of augmentations of bodily needs. It is not necessary to discuss here the tension and relaxation, the reflection, resolution, action, and rest which follow therefrom. Note. — The noteworthy modification of sleep through dreams may be deferred more conveniently to the discussion of anoma- lous conditions. NATURAL TALENTS. 99 130. The earthly life, taken as a whole, has its period of growth, of full strength, and of decline. The child, from psychological reasons, if it be well, moves restlessly, pursues simple, artless fancies and plays ; it is indisposed to think connectedly, but is in the highest degree susceptible to everything new. Hence it is not capable of freeing itself from mo- mentary feelings. The boy, though still very weak in this respect, can, nevertheless, be elevated through education without undue haste to a significant de- gree of true insight and self-control. The youth receives an increase of strength, but also of unrest. If he can not act, he dreams. The man to whom these powers are no longer new, but to whom the dif- ficulties of human action are known, makes a judicious use of what he has, if his childhood and youth have not been spoiled. He acts more, and therefore he dreams less. The later years retain as much manli- ness as the body permits, with great individual varia- tions. In the most favorable examples thinking takes the place of dreaming and of action, even though it is too late to accomplish much. Every age atones for the sins, and suffers for the misfortunes, of the pre- ceding one. CHAPTER II. NATURAL TALENTS. 131. The course of life is, in the first place, modi- fied through difference of sex. This is often observa- ble in early youth. Girls develop worldly wisdom at an 100 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. earlier age than boys, and are earlier inclined to hold themselves within the bounds of propriety. On the contrary, their period of education is shorter than that of boys. Hence they collect less mental material, but they elaborate it more quickly and with less variety and specialization. The result is. to be seen in the whole life. The female sex depends upon its feelings. The man acts more from knowledge, principles, and relations. This explains the great variety of callings which men follow. 133. In connection with the so-called tempera- ment, every man has another original peculiarity, that is to be explained by physiological predisposition in re- gard to feelings and emotions. Of the four known temperaments, the joyous and the sad (sanguine and melancholy) relate to the feelings ; the excitable and the slow (choleric and phlegmatic) to the^excitability of the emotions. The rationale of these temperaments is generally easy to perceive ; for the common state of feeling which the body brings with it, and which accom- panies a man through his whole life, can not easily oc- cupy exactly the middle place between the pleasant and the unpleasant; according as it inclines toward this or that side, a man becomes sanguine or melancholy. He can not be both at the same time, but he has his place somewhere on the line which runs in the two directions. However, a fluctuating temperament is not only conceivable, but is sometimes to be met with in experience, by virtue of which a man is disposed to change from joyousness to sadness without special cause. Furthermore, as the emotions call the physical organism into play, and find in it, as it were, the sounding-board through which they are strengthened NATURAL TALENTS. 101 and made more lasting, there must be a degree of adaptability in this organism by virtue of which a man is either more choleric or more phlegmatic, so that he may not be both at the same time, but may fluctuate between the two. From this arises the possible mingling of temper- aments according to the combinations of these two series. The sanguine temperament is either choleric or phlegmatic, and so, too, the melancholy may be choleric or phlegmatic. It is conceivable that one may be neither sanguine nor melancholy, for the zero-point lies just between the two. But it is inconceivable that one should be indifferent in regard to the choleric and phlegmatic temperament, for to have no excitability whatever of the emotions would indicate an extreme phlegmatic temperament. Here the zero-point lies at one of the extremes. The middle is the accustomed excitability — an arithmetical mean, which is to be found by experience, almost like the average stature of the human body. Note. — The names of the temperaments may also be other- wise derived; and if the expression, choleric temperament, be applied to a persistent tendency to anger, then the foregoing does not hold good. As the subject is not purely psychological, a physiological view may be in place here. Of the three systems or factors in animal life, a concealed defect in any one of them may influence the mind. If irritability (i. e., reaction against the environment) and sensibility are uninjured, and if the nutri- tive system sufEers only in so far as to cause a constant discom- fort in the general feeling, a choleric bitterness of temperament may arise. This is to be perceived in a few sad cases in chil- dren. If the irritability suffers, good-nature, and, perhaps, talent may exist, but a suffieiently strong external life will be wanting. If the sensibility suffers generally, the difficulty ap- pears to proceed from a so-called Boeotian or peasant tempera- 102 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. ment. If only the sensibility of the brain suffers relatively, or, to use a clearer expression, the ganglionic system predominates, this may be the cause of the sanguine temperament. If the nutritive system and irritability are both at the same time weak, we find the phlegmatic temperament. Thus it appears that all temperaments perceptibly prominent imply some defect. 133. As the body strengthens the emotions by means of its responsiveness, or by its imperturbability weakens their outbreaks, even so it mingles in all the changes of feeling and of thought — sometimes like the fly-wheel, which prolongs the motion receiTed ; and at other times like an inert weight, which delays the motion or renders it quite impossible. At least, it is known that the waking of a man is not always or merely an indication that he has done sleeping. That narrow pupil which in a foregoing section (137) we attributed to the human mind in general, is in the case of individuals more or less narrow, and the mobility of the concepts which come and go in con- sciousness is in such cases less or greater. If to this we add the special tendency of many persons for this or that kind of thinking and feeling, then we have a scale of differences, the extremes of which are called genius and imbecility. The latter is classed with anomalous conditions, because it is often found with them, and like them renders a man useless in society. Note. — That which is connected with physiognomy and cra- niology is too uncertain and too indefinite to have at present any value in psychology beyond that of being a curiosity. Many singular facts (no matter from what department of knowledge) may be true, but to be of scientific importance they must be re- lated in a demonstrable manner to what is already known and tried ; if they remain alone, they are of no value. To wish to subordinate psychology entirely to physiology means to exactly KATURAL TALENTS. 103 reverse the true relation of the two sciences, a mistake that has often been made in both modern and ancient times. In the third part of this book the true relation will in a measure be indicated. 134. The question may be asked, What talents hu- manity is endowed with by nature. It is known that long experience and careful study of the human dispo- sition serves to detract much from the good opinion which a youth may have formed from an outside view of cultivated society ; he does not yet know how much that is bad is hidden in men and secretly nourished by them. But this fact shows less against the natural talents of humanity than against the coarse treatment which up to the present time has been generally ap- plied where an effort has been made to educate men. Inasmuch as this treatment, especially on account of the imperfections of church and state, has from early times influenced the external demeanor of men, for centuries a disproportion has arisen between seeming and being, which in ancient and mediaeval times could hardly have been known to such a degree as at present, as in those former times there was much less of trans- planted and imitated culture than at present. Besides, the talent of humanity is quite different from the talent of the individual man. The former has to do with social development in general ; hence it has to do quite especially with the relation between the rare great minds that make epochs in history, and the multitude of common men who can only receive and carry for- ward culture. Our history of humanity, which in- cludes only a few thousand years, is much too short to enable us to judge with any degree of certainty con- cerning facts upon this question. Eegardless of the 104: EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. old saying, " Nothing new under the sun," much, too much that is new occurs, to render possible a general survey of the earthly path of humanity. 135. Between the questions concerning the talents of the individual and concerning those of humanity we should have to place that concerning the races of mankind, if observation furnished anything certain in a psychological connection. But that which might perhaps be said upon this has a closer connection with the following subject. CHAPTEK III. EXTEKN'AL INFLUENCES. 136. Prom the empirical standpoint, no decision has been reached in regard to what may have origi- nated in human nature, and what maybe produced by influence from without. Our introduction to meta- physics has warned us not to trust much to either kind of concepts, inasmuch as the idea of a manifold of tal- ents in the individual, as well as that of causes and influences of every kind, belong to those concepts that can not be retained as they are first presented to us by experience. Here, therefore, we can only consider the most striking phenomena as we find them vary in the external conditions of man. 137. First, we have to consider the place where the man lives, with all the numerous and wide-reaching influences of climate, the nature of the ground and EXTERNAL INFLUENCES. ](J5 soil, the situation and neighborhood. This will be more fully developed in our historical lectures. 138. The nation to which the individual belongs has not merely a predominating temperament, but it has also its history, and the individual enters this his- tory at a certain point of time. With it is united a degree of culture, a national feeling and conscience to which the individual at all points in the course of his life is linked, and through it elevated and repressed. 139. In every nation that has freed itself from bar- barism there is a difference of ranks or castes (merely transplanted in the case of the women, in the case of the men original). This difference of rank is partly a work of violence and necessity, partly a result of natural talents, and partly a consequence of the divis- ion of labor. A rank is assigned to the individual, provided one is conceded him, only in so far as he himself can produce a conformity of his action to the special function marked out for his province (not in so far as be is active for his own aims, for in the idea of division of labor it is plain that he works for all, or at least for many). Now, inasmuch as the man seeks to concentrate his whole action into con- formity to the specific function proposed, an outside form that is impressed on each arises, together with a standard of honor for each order, by which not only (as may happen) the means used causes even the aim to be displaced, and in part forgotten, but also the thoughts and intentions of the man are adjusted to his action ; they vanish together in the circle of their utility, and the efforts which remain are divided into two parts, one of which belongs to the demands of one's rank or station, while the other in spite of the 106 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. rank seeks its individual gratification. In case this contest increases, the man and his station are of no value to each other, and injure each other mutually. The less one has to produce conformity of his action to the end in view — i. e., the more he is the employee of another — so much the less does he trouble himself with his actions and so much the less honor is there for him; so much the more weight, however, falls upon that second part of the effort which, notwith- standing the limited position, seeks gratification. For the sake of this individual gratification, if a mild and, at the same time, firm treatment on the part of the employer does not obviate the evil, all oppor- tunities are made use of, and the arts of falsity are exerted. As a rule, we find the better class in each nation among those who have undertaken a share of the gen- eral labor, and who manage it according to their own judgment. 140. As his rank influences the mature man, so the family to which the youth belongs, as well as the education which he receives, together with the exam- ples, and all his surroundings, influence him. One seldom trains himself in opposition to his environ- ment, never independently of it. 141. The principal question is how much and what freedom remains to man in the midst of all the ex- ternal influences. It is easy to carry out these reflec- tions to such a point that, when one yields to the im- pression made on him by the contemplation of the facts, the conviction arises that man either becomes what he is through external influences combined with natural talent which precedes his will, or at least that EXTERNAL INFLUENCES. 107 the circle of freedom is so small that its value must be insignificant. Kant admitted that the whole temporal existence of man comes under the law of natural necessity. In order to save Freedom he placed it in the intelligible world as an article of faith for the moral man. If one may presume to understand a man better than he understood himself, then it is very easy to show what Kant intended. Responsibility was to be secured. But that is secured without any theory of freedom (see note to section 118). Then, practically to reach the essential idea of the Kantian yiew, we need neither metaphysics nor speculative psychology, nor even a critique of reason, but only on the one side an untrammeled search for facts ; on the other, a cor- rect concept of practical philosophy. But it is very important to go beyond this, in order to recognize more completely the force with which a man often with great results works on himself, or even against himself. This is especially important at an age when one stands between the education just ended and the vestibule opening into the future rank or station. At this period the self-determination may be greater, or at least richer in results, than before and after. Explanations upon this point will be found in the third part of this book. 108 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. CHAPTEK IV. ANOMALOUS CONDITIONS. 142. For the most part, we see man subjected to anomalous conditions, among which the dream even in the healthy man may be reckoned. But the born imbecile is lost beyond ordinary measure in simplicity and mediocrity of talent. Also in the other kinds of mental disorder are to be found many a resemblance (quite as striking as sad) to errors, emotions, and pas- sions, so that it is difficult to contrast closely the well man with the mentally diseased. 143. In all cases where an empirical manifold does not easily admit of accurate analysis, we are safest in beginning with the most manifest differences, with the extremes, and afterward comparing the interven- ing members with them. Upon this ground we begin with peculiar mental disorders, and later shall mention conditions of illness similar to them, together with phenomena which are associated with sleep. Mental disorders which make their appearance in waking hours, and in, at least apparent, bodily health, come under four classes (according to Eeil and Pinel, the latter of whom has found some valid grounds for assuming a fifth) — illusion, madness, dementia, idiocy. 144. Mental illusion ( WaJinsinn) depends upon a so-called fixed idea, upon a wrong concept which af- fects a part of the circle of thought, while in other respects the thinking remains in its due course and proceeds consistently from that concept. It is there- fore self-evident that the wrong concept must really deceive and will not be recognized as a delusion ; like- INSANITY. 109 wise that it contains a groundless error from 'which one can not successfully disengage the sound part of the knowledge which he possesses. If an assumption of mental faculties is to be based on this, then the source of insane delusion is to be regarded as a dis- eased imagination which in most cases has suffered through an injurious influence of the faculty of de- sire, or sometimes of the understanding or reason, and sometimes also it has suffered merely from bodily causes. With the disease of imagination is combined a weakness of judgment and of power to reason, so that the clearest refutations of the delusion are not under- stood by the person who is ill. Furthermore, the dis- ease acts upon emotions, desires, opinions, etc The same diseased imagination, however, shows itself to have intervals of sound health and often a genial, exalted activity in everything that is not con- nected with a fixed idea. Likewise the other mental faculties show clearly that they are not weak, but are disposed to regular activity. If the hypothesis of the mental faculties be set aside, the occasion for surprise at this disappears. Moreover, the following kinds of delusions may be marked : Imagined change of body, or of person ; im- agined influence of the devil, etc. ; imagined inspira- tion, especially religious fanaticism, a morbid desire to make one's self known by self-sacrifices ; fixed re- proaches with which a man torments himself ; amorous illusions ; weariness of life ; fear of death ; fear of pov- erty and hunger ; and finally stupid as well as restless insanity. The explanation of all these phenomena is not far to seek. First, the disorder of the mind is not always purely mental, for in the psychical mechanism 110 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. there is to be found no reason for the unyielding op- position against plain experience. Further, in_all mental disorder an emotion is unmistakable. The latter is a paralysis in the nervous system. Hence the concept mass in which the emotion has its seat can_ not undergo such a change as is necessary to affect the body in an opposite way. From the innumerable cases which are narrated as very remarkable, the psycholo- gist, as soon as he has recognized the psychical mech- anism and its possible arrests, learns little or nothing new whatever. 145. Madness ( Wutli) or frenzy ( TobsucJit), prop- erly delirium, consists in an impulse to bodily actions without aim; indeed, even against the will. Very generally it is an impulse to destructive acts with ex- treme and dangerous violence. That bodily disease lies at the foundation of this is clear enough, for in the intellect is to be found no principle of unity for these conditions. Yet, as a pure psychological phenomenon in healthy men, action {Handeln) occasionally appears to be at the same time voluntary and involuntary. Hence, we can not by any means regard the actions of a delirious (raving) man as merely automatic if he tries to resist them. The difficulty lies in the error of regarding the will as a mental faculty which appears to oppose itself, inasmuch as the same person will and at the same time will not. Note. — The strange question, whether there can be madness without delusion, might be answered by the phenomenon of hydrophobia. Certainly the stormy agitation ot the vascular system proceeding from the abdomen may give rise to raving actions without proportionate injury to the brain, just as in INSANITY. Ill cholera the blood stops and becomes almost stiffened through nervous influence, while the sensibility of the dying man is but little troubled. In discussing the emotions we have already called attention to the partial action of certain mental states upon certain organs ; the converse action also takes place. The question here is not concerning the possible resistance of the will, but concerning the attack upon the mind which proceeds from the body. 146. In dementia (JVarrJieit) the connection be- tween the concepts ceases, while the latter, without regard to any rule whatever, mingle together gro- tesquely. Moreover, here in the realm of mind every principle of unity is wanting. The reason for the change of concepts is no longer psychological, it must be physiological. According to the hypothesis of the mental facul- ties, the principal seat of the evil would be in the understanding, and really the fool bears some resem- blance to the stupid, unintelligent child. But the lawlessness of the other mental faculties in dementia would long ago have been noticed if one had ever ventured to think of an exact conformity to law in that faculty. The essential point is, here, that every long series of concepts is hindered in its passage be- cause the nervous system opposes itself to the kind of tension involved in such a train of thought. It is clearly evident that such a disease is much more general and much more certainly incurable than the torpidity of an individual emotion in insanity. The psychical cure of delusion or insanity proper is es- sentially protection and prevention lest the emotion reach a state of fury, and the delusion attain an in- creased power. The proper cure is bodily, though often merely Nature's cure. Discipline (punishment) 112 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. can effect something pedagogically, and in many cases responsibility is not entirely wanting, especially in actions which do not follow directly from the delu- sion; the responsibility is, however, lessened by un- fortunate ill-humor, which has in it no essentially fixed delusion. Of infinitely greater importance than all the insane asylums and psychical cures would be prevention of that fanaticism which may lead to in- sanity. 147. Idiocy or imbecility (Blodsinn) which alone of all the mental disorders appears to be inborn, and which in the foregoing we have indicated as the opposite extreme of genius, is general weakness of mind, without admitting the mention of one mental faculty as sy^perior to the other. It does not differ so much in quality as in degree, and may go so far that the man almost resembles a plant, but as such grows and is healthy. 148. The classes of mental disorders above given serve not so much for immediate classification of ac- tual cases (which for the most part present themselves as hybrid or complex) as for the definition of simple characteristics under which the admitted mental dis- eases are to be subsumed. Mental delusion and demen- tia, madness and idiocy, are extremes between which the middle conditions lie. Delusion may be united with madness, and with lesser degrees of idiocy ; also with dementia. The collection of notions here is simi- lar to that in the temperaments. 149. Nearly all anomalous states of mind are analo- gous to mental disorders. The dream resembles insani- ty, especially in the imagining of persistent embarrass- ment in which one does not escape from the situation. INSANITY. 113 The frenzy of fever appears as delirium. Dizziness, fainting, and such conditions are similar to idiocy. Intoxication causes a man to waver between dementia and madness. It is, however, manifest that we mi;st not extend these comparisons too far. The delusion of the dream is much more varied and changeable than in the corresponding mental disorder. Dreams possess a certain kind of unity, viz., unity of feeling. A dream of thieves in the night, where the scene • suddenly changes to a room lighted by the sun, and is filled with many strangers who ofEer congratulations upon the attainment of a high honor — such a dream one perceives was not really dreamed, but invented as a psychological example (Maass upon the Passions, Part I, p. 171). Similar changes from a painful to a much-desired condition will often occur during the dream when the bodily position suddenly changes. The duplication of self-consciousness into different parties is one of the most remarkable peculiarities of the dream and its af&liated states. The dreamer often ascribes to others his own thoughts, sometimes feeling ashamed that he himself has not perceived or has not known them. In changing states of dreaming and waking, of paroxysms and of intervals of quiet, there is often a double personality without that memory of a former state that is retained on passing out of one into the other when waking from a dream. There are examples of violent fright, after which persons ask, " Who am I ? " and must be reminded again of their own name, position, calling, etc., by some circumstance. In this comparative study of the fundamental forms of mental disorders there seem to be excluded from the anomalous conditions only the facts of so-called 11 114 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. animal magnetism, which are too little understood. These facts indicate a change in the bond of union between the body and soul — a change which, however, may be quickly reversed, and the former state re-estab- lished. (Compare 163.) Concluding Remarlcs. If from mental disorders we turn back again to ordinary psychological phenomena, and compare the different orders, mental delusion recalls the passions ; madness, the emotions ; dementia, mental distraction ; and idiocy, indolence and idleness (the latter recalls also stupidity; but this itself is a degree of idiocy). Passions, emotions, mental distraction, and indolence are also diseased conditions of the mind, only less stub- born than insanity itself. The opposite of them all is the healthy condition of 'the mind : {a.) Hence, as the opposite of mental delusion and of passions, the sound mind involves mutual determi- nation of all concepts and desires through one another, or freedom from fixed ideas and fixed desires. (5.) As the opposite of madness and emotion, it involves repose and equanimity. (c.) As the opposite of dementia and distraction, it involves coherence and concentration of thought. {d.) As an opposite of idiocy and indolence, it in- volves excitability and sprightliness. We do not seek for the same degree of mental health in all mental faculties, but we find current in language such expressions as sound understanding, sound judgment, and sound reason. The nature of reason, understanding, and judgment will be more SANITY AND INSANITY. 115 clearly understood through a comparatiye study of the alleged characteristics of mental health. Of this, more in the third part of this book. The comparison between insanity and the passions may be carried somewhat further. The most similar to the iixed ideas of the former are the objective pas- sions, or those which aim at definite objects of desire. As we can classify (with Maass) the latter into those which refer to one's own individuality, those which refer to other men, and those which have to do with things, so also we may find that insanity differs in re- spect to its object. The imagined transformations into princes and kings, or even into persons of the Deity, coiTespond to pride. The fear of death and of imagi- nary adversaries and persecutors is joined to egoism or selfishness. Desire for liberty recalls the intractability of most insane people, and the necessity of governing them by force and authority. Love, hate, jealousy, often pass into insanity. Ambition, become insanity, seeks to make itself known by self-sacrifices of an un- usual kind, while the desire to govern often erects for itself a throne in an insane asylum ; the desire for en- joyment sometimes partakes of a crazy state of blessed- ness, which believes that it has direct communication with heaven. Avarice, on the contrary, labors under a foolish anxiety about poverty and hunger. As to what concerns the subjective passions — desire for pleasure, dread of disgust and emptiness (accord- ing to Maass) — it may be remarked that the common usages of speech furnish no words for this mental phase, which can not be exactly indicated by the expression, passion {Leidenschaft). Where there is no definite object, there is also no definite act of attention, but a 116 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. fluctuating mental condition which is not in harmony with itself, and is for this reason weak ; so that if rea- son can not govern it the cause does not proceed so much from the opposition which it meets as from in- capacity to come to a fixed resolution at the command of reason. Hence, it appears that we can not consider the states of mind here mentioned among the passions. But the ideas of empirical psychology are too fluctu- ating to admit of flrm reliance on such conclusions. No passion is a pure force or strength. Each carries with it its weakness, its misery, its pitiably helpless condition. And, on the other hand, it is not to be denied that the desire for pleasure, even the most com- mon, which frequently changes with objects — and so, too, the dread of disgust and of the feeling of emptiness — often by its continuous strength can fill only too well the place of an objective passion. Various excitations of desire for this or that pleasure, or of aversion for this or that discomfort, are capable of a combination, and, as it were, of an accumulated intensity, by which they [neutralize one another and] are changed into a complex force which drives men in a middle direction. If we ask here for analogous kinds of insanity, it may be remarked, first, that after shame has disap- peared, together with intelligence, all pleasures have a tendency to express themselves freely and boldly. Moreover, it is remarkable that stupid insanity, which, in case it is not quite idiocy, expresses itself in every movement only as an abhorrence of uncomfortable feeling ; and therefore it shows itself in a very general dread of pain. Eestless insanity implies more dis- tinctly dread of emptiness ; it likewise implies weari- ness of life, which leads to suicide. SANITY AND INSANITY. 117 Now, as we have searched for kinds of illusion similar to the passions (inasmuch as we followed the classification of passions made by Maass), so, converse- ly, we must be allowed to investigate the kinds of passions corresponding to the different kinds of illu- sion. Whichever of these is exhaustively presented, in a complete tabular view, will furnish, without doubt, a complete classification of the other. A supernumerary member of the one list, however, will indicate a miss- ing term in the other. Among the kinds of illusion we find, imagined re- proaches against one's self, pretended suggestions of the devil, doubt in the mercy of God, etc. In the se- ries of passions, what corresponds to these mental aberrations? Very manifestly a moral and religious enthusiasm, which passes over into self-torture. And furthermore, this recalls political and learned passions, as well as all kinds of fanaticism. The true nature of these passions must necessarily have escaped previous psychologists (and not Maass alone), because they were resolved to carry out consistently the theory that the passions belonged to sensuousness, and hence were to be entirely separated from reason. The source of moral and religious concepts is ascribed to reason. These concepts, together with the scientific thoughts and theories collectively related to them, may become objects of passionate search. Nothing is so sacred that it can not inflame the human mind in an unholy way. Just as hunger and thirst, those lowest wants may change the unfortunate man into a thief, a robber, and a murderer, so may the thirst of knowl- edge, so may higher efforts of every kind, lead to crim- inal acts. Indeed, reason (if such a mental faculty 118 EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. really exists) not infrequently enters into peaceful coalition with passionate sensuousness. This is seen most clearly in the idea of right, to which men very generally allow only a restricted sphere, inasmuch as outside of and in spite of it they permit themselves every gratification of their desires. The robber-cap- tain administers justice to his band. The fundamental principle, Tiwreticis non est ser- vanda fides, had force at one time in the one holy Church ; a multitude of similar examples is to be found in common life, where men find it necessary to act uprightly only toward those whom they consider their equals, while they regard all others as strangers and enemies. Would one seriously admit that reason, negating itself, had in this concluded a disgraceful treaty with sensuousness, to which it gave up the whole foreign territory ? All these and many other difficulties disappear at once as soon as it is perceived how concepts manifest themselves, now as passion, now as reason ; while they are in themselves neither the one nor the other, and, moreover, contain nothing as a previously - formed germ similar to either. Hence, also, they contain no idea of justice, nor any other idea or category. PAET THIED. RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. SECTION FIRST.— THEOREMS PROM METAPHYSICS AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. CHAPTER I. THE SOUL AND MATTER. « 150. The notion of the soul which some modem systems have unreasonably subjected to suspicion must be restored, although under characteristics hitherto unknown. The^ul is a simple essence ( Wesen), not merely without. parts,_bnt also without any kind of diversity or_ niultiglicity in its quality ; hence it has no space relations. In think ing it,, however, with other es- sences^ it is included necessarily in space, and for every moment of time it is located in a definite place. This place is the simple in space, or, what is the same, the nothing in space, a mathematical point. Note. — For certain theories of natural philosophy and physiology, but not for psychology, necessary fictions are le- gitimate, in which the simple is regarded as if it admitted of separation into parts. Such fictions must be employed with reference to the soul's union with the body, but without, for that reason, ascribing to the soul itself any real space conditions whatever. The fictions of geometricians are in some respects 120 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. similar when they regard the curve as consisting of indefinitely short straight lines. 151. Furthermore the soul has no time relations. In thinking, however, wherein it is included with other essences, it must be conceived as in time and indeed as in eternity, although this eternity, and still more the temporal duration, must not be predicated of the soul. (Introd. to Phil., 115 ) 153. The soul has no innate natural talents nor faculties whatever, either for the purpose of receiving or for the purpose of producing. It is, therefore, no tabula rasa in the sense that impressions foreign to itself may be made upon it ; moreover, in the sense indicated by Leibnitz, it is not a substance which in- cludes in itself original activity. It has originally neither concepts, nor feelings, nor desires. It knows nothing of itself, and nothing of other things ; also in it lie no forms of perception and thought, no laws of willing and action, and not even a remote predisposi- tion to any of these. 153. The simple nature {Das einfacTie Was) of the soul is totally unknown and will forever remain so. It is as little an object of speculative as of empirical psychology. 154. Between several dissimilar simple essences exists a relation which, with the help of a comparison from the physical world, may be described as pressure and resistance. For the reason that pressure is the retardation of movement, the relation mentioned con- sists in the capacity of the simple quality of each exist- ence to he changed through the other, if each did not resist and maintain itself in its quality against the disturbance. Self-preservations of this kind are the THE SOUL AND MATTER. 121 only events which really occur in nature, and this is the combination of event with being. 155. The self-preservations of the soul are (at least in part and so far as we know them) concepts and in- deed simple concepts, for the act of self-preserva- tion is as simple as is the essence which is preserved. Hence there exists an infinite manifold of other such acts of self-preservation, which differ as the disturb- ances differ. With this explanation the manifold of concepts and their infinitely varied complexes present no difficulty whatever. This is not the place to discuss feelings and de- sires. They appear to be composed of something objective, added to a preference and rejection, which will be explained later. Nor can we at this point dis- cuss self-consciousness, or anything whatever that may be considered as belonging to the inner sense. 156. The difference between soul and matter is not a difference in the nature of the simple essences, but it is a difference in the manner of our apprehending them. Matter, represented as a spatial reality with spatial forces, as we are accustomed to think it, be- longs neither in the realm of essence (Sein) nor in that of actual events, but is merely an appearance. This matter is real, however, as an aggregate of simple essences, and in these essences something really occurs which results in the phenomenon of a space exist- ence. The explanation of matter depends entirely upon showing how to' the inner states of the essences (self- preservations) certain space-conditions belong, as means necessary for the act of comprehension by the specta- tor, which space-conditions, just because they are noth- 122 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. ing real, must be adjusted to those inner conditions ; and by this an appearance of attraction and repulsion arises. The equilibrium of the two latter (attraction and repulsion) determines for matter, its degree of density, likewise its elasticity, its form of crystalization in free condensation, in a word its essential properties, which in this form are originally based upon the quali- ties of simple essences. Matter never fills space as a geometric continuum (it can not be composed of simple parts), but with im- perfect mutual penetration of its adjacent simple parts. (Concerning this contradiction compare the remark in section 150.) Matter is impenetrable only for those substances which are not capable of changing the equilibrium of attraction and repulsion that exists in it. It is always penetrable for that agent which is capable of dissolv- ing it. Note. — Concerning the foregoing and what follows, refer- ence must be made to the author's Metaphysics, in which is found his Philosophy of Nature. CHAPTEE II. VITAL FOECES. 157. Vital forces are nothing original (I have named them in the plural because they can neither originate nor act alone), and there is nothing similar to them in the nature of essences. VITAL FORCES, 123 Only a system of self-preservations in one and the same essence is capable of creating them, and they are to be regarded as the inner development of simple essences. Generally, they originate in the elements of organic bodies whose arrangement is fitted for pro- ducing systems of self-preservation in the individ- ual elements. This is shown in the assimilation of food. 158. Once acquired, there remains with each ele- ment its own vital force, even though the element be separated from the organic body to which it belonged. This is shown in the sustenance of the higher organ- ism by the lower, and of the vegetable organism by decayed parts of other organic bodies. Note. — To this belongs the explanation of all generation, without exception, including that of some lower organisms from apparently crude material — i. e., from such material as pos- sesses no organic structure (structure is a space-predicate)— but from this deficiency of structure the lack of vital force can by no means be inferred. To assume, however, an original vital force in this is an unwarranted procedure. In our circle of ex- perience there is no matter whatever of which it could with cer- tainty be asserted that it is entirely inorganic. The whole at- mosphere is full of elements which have already gained vital force in some organic body or other, and the number of such elements is constantly increasing in nature. Indeed, we do not know whether the same mutual exchange of vital force does not occur among the stars. 159. All human investigation must recognize the fundamental source of vital forces by referring them to that Providence according to whose designs they were originated. No metaphysics and no experience reaches further. Every theory as to the probable crea- tion of lower organisms by a natural process from in- 134 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. organic matter, and the development of higher organ- isms from those of a lower order, can be refuted. 160. In the example of the soul, psychology shows us an excellent internal development of a simple es- sence. According to this type, one must explain the development of all other essences, even those that are not able to represent or conceive. To this may be added a former remark that, where several essences make up a material whole, the inner state determines an adequate external condition for it — i. e., a position in space. For this reason vital forces generally ap- pear moving forces ; just for this reason, however, their movements can not be comprehended through chemi- cal or mechanical laws. With the latter, no inner development comes into consideration. In the above the relation between psychology and physiology is indicated. Psychology is the first, the preceding ; physiology, in case it is to be something more than a mere empirical science, the second ; for it must learn from the former to understand the notion of inner development. We can not have a correct definition of life without the help of psychology. Note. — On this difficulty of deiining life consult among oth- ers Treviranus (Biology, vol. 1, p. 16). The most comprehensive empirical charaeteristio of vitality is assimilation, which, for this reason, is first mentioned in the foregoing. If an organism should be found without this peculiarity, we might doubt whether it could be considered to be living, even if it were granted that it might possess a soul (a case which may very well be admitted in the general notion). 161. From the above it is self-evident that the vital forces may be very different in kind as well as in degree. For a system of self-preservations might be CONNECTION BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY. 125 different in different essences ; in similar essences the self-preservations vary according to the difference in the disturbances; finally, there may be a greater or smaller number of self-preservations belonging to them. From this may be explained the difference in those parts which are nourished by the same kind of food. The elements of which the heart and the nerves con- sist certainly do not differ in their chemical constitu- ents so much as in their internal structure. The causal relation between the different parts of the same living body, likewise that between this body and the outer world, offers upon the whole no difficulty whatever. All causality, and especially all cohesion of matter, depends upon the dissimilarity of the elements. Hence, for example, the action of the nerves upon the muscles can excite no special wonder, much less can it justify hypotheses of electric currents, polarizations, etc., which are empty vagaries that owe their existence to the latest hobbies of the physicist. There might be something true in them, and yet, even then, the most important questions remain unanswered, and in the end one riddle take the place of the other. CHAPTER III THE CONNECTIO]Sr BETWEEJST SOUL AND BODY. 163. The connection between mind and matter in the brutes, and especially in man, has in it much that is surprising, which must be referred to the wisdom of 126 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. Providence ; but this is not where we are accustomed first of all to seek it, because we consider matter real so far as it occupies space, and because we regard the human mind as an original thinking, feeling, and will- ing existence, so that between the two (matter and mind) there is no middle term. We may seek beyond matter, as a spatial manifestation, for the simple es- sences possessing capacity for internal development from which this manifestation arises. We may regard the mind as the soul endowed with power of repre- sentation. We may remember that to the concepts, as self-preservations of the soul, other self-preservations in other essences (in the nervous system) must corre- spond. Thus we perceive that the chain of self-pres- ervations belonging together may indeed extend still further ; that it may run through a whole system of essences which present themselves as one body ; and we shall no longer consider it enigmatic if from the foot to the brain, and even into the soul, a succession of in- ternal states having nothing to do with the lapse of time nor with any movement in space is extended for- ward and backward. Time and space may appear, however, as accompanying phenomena. 163. First of all, the question concerning the loca- tion of the soul, which has been wrongly refused a hearing, presents itself here. It is acknowledged upon physiological grounds that we can not with any degree of probability indicate a place but only a region for it (in the point of junction between the brain and the spinal cord). Ifor is a fixed position necessary, but the soul may move in a certain region without the least indication of it being given in its concepts ; nor can the slightest trace of its movements be found by CONNECTION BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY. 12T making an anatomical investigation. The change of its seat, however, may be regarded as a very fruitful hypothesis for the explanation of its anomalous condi- tions. Note 1.— This statement has aroused much astonishment, yet physiologists may remember that their sphere of observation lies in the regions of space, and they might leave it to the metor physician to see that nothing more be allowed to space than be- longs to it. If they wish, however, to share his cares with him they must earnestly study metaphysics, and then one will be able to talk further with them. Note 3. — We should have no reason for assuming that in all ■ brutes and in man the seat of the sotxl is in the same place Probably in the brutes, especially in the lower orders, it is in the spinal cord. Furthermore, we can not assume that each brute has only one soul. In worms whose severed parts con- tinue to live the opposite assumption is probable. In the hu- man nervous system may be found many elements whose inner development widely surpasses the soul of an animal of the low- er order. (Besides, we must not forget that indications of life are not indications of soul. In organic parts that have been separated from their organism, life may continue for some time without soul.) If we wished, however, to attribute to man several souls in one body, we should beware of thinking of mental activities as divided among them, rather the latter must be regarded as being entire in each soul. Secondly, the most exact harmony among these souls would have to be assumed so that they might serve for identical examples of the same kind. This is, however, in the highest degree improbable, and hence the whole thought is to be rejected. If, in the contest between reason and passion, it sometimes seems to a man that he has several souls, this is a psychical phenomenon which can not be considered in connec- tion with the paradoxical thoughts just mentioned, but which will be explained later. 164. The whole nervous system in the human body serves a single soul, and by means of this system the 128 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. soul is implanted in this body, more a burden than a help to it, for the body lives as a plant for itself, pro- vided nourishment and a suitable place be given it, as sometimes has to be done for idiots. Stories of some who were idiots from birth give rise to the thought that they may be merely vegetating bodies without souls. 165. With the close causal connection of all parts in the whole system which we call man, the varied de- pendence of the mind upon the body can appear in no way strange. So much more wonderful is it that, upon the whole, the nervous system appears to be made al- most entirely to obey the mind. We shall perceive this more and more when we see how little the physiologi- cal conditions are necessary to explain the states and activities of the mind. Yet only in the healthy man is the nervous system a good servant. In illness it shows itself disobedient and obstinate, and in many mental disorders, especially in dementia, the relation between the nerves and the soul is entirely reversed. This is an indication that we are not to regard the healthy condition merely as a natural phenomenon which could not be otherwise, but in it we have to re- vere a beneiicent arrangement of Providence. 166. It would be hardly necessary to mention the intercourse with the outer world which is afforded to the human soul and at the same time limited through its body, were we not obliged to remark in regard to the theory, now very wide-spread, concerning a general or- ganic connection of the whole universe, that we can not bring the latter into relation with the theories advanced here if we do not wish to mix up entirely heterogeneous concepts. SPACE AND TIME. 129 Note. — ^There are no tenable grounds a priori for a universal causal relation, and experience ends with the feeble glimmer of light which remote suns throw on one another. SECTION SECOND.— EXPLANATIONS OP PHENOMENA. CHAPTER I. CONCEPTS OF SPACE AKD TIME. 167. It is as yet too early to explain everything in psychology. Meanwhile much has explained itself in the foregoing, and the comparison of facts with the principles established will gradually lead us to further explanations. How the world, and we ourselves, as phenomena, come to appear to ourselves, is the first point upon which we need a psychological revelation, in order especially to learn to comprehend the origin of meta- physical problems. After that the question must be concerning our position in the world from a practical [moral] standpoint, especially that we may compare that which we can be with that which we ought to be. 168. Why we apprehend things in the world in the relations of space and time, must be answered by an investigation into the nature of series of concepts (39). The following serves as an introduction : In section 28, instead of the definite particular remainders r, r', r", of a single concept P, the infinite multitude of all its possible remainders is given, and these are considered to be blended with innumerable concepts n IT' JI", etc. Thus for the concept P will 12 130 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. arise a continuous succession of reproductions, each of whicli has, howeyer, its own law which depends upon its remainder r, according to the formula in sec- tion 35. Moreover, in section 39, instead of the series a, i, c, d, etc., there is posited a continuous succession, of which each member like P, with all its possible remainders, is blended with other members, but each in a peculiar manner. Besides, let this succession of blended concepts be considered to be extended indefinitely on both sides, and finally let it be remarked that, if it be not made impossible by accompanying conditions, each member of the succession may be such that in it several such successions may cross one another (as in c, section 30). Moreover, when any one member in this whole system of concepts moves even in the slightest degree, the movement is transferred to the next member, and so on, with the inviolable law that if of three remain- ders r, r', r", of one and the same concept, r' lies be- tween r and r", then also the concept n' (between II and n") blended with r' will be reproduced as well as those concepts which are blended with r and r". This relation of intermediary between two others must always be present, even though the degree of repro- duction be very slight. This is the general law in all series. 169. Whether, and in what way, the kind of re- production is limited, depends upon accompanying conditions, as follows : A. If in the sense-perception the series a, 6, c, d, etc., — or rather if, instead of the latter, the conceivable continuum can change its order by all possible trans- SPACE AND TIME. 131 positions (e. g., as va. acbd, a di c, etc.) — then each time, from the perceived succession, a new succession arises in the reproduction. But in this case the laws for reproduction become so involyed that no percepti- ble order remains (as if a number of small arches of different curvatures were attached to one another). B. Let it be assumed, however, that the sense-per- ception is reversed — i. e., the series 5 c is changed into c b and abed into deb a, etc., — the relation of the interme- diate concept between two others will never be changed for any other ; moreover, the series of concepts might begin here or there, and there be no definite starting- point. The law of reproduction arising from this fur- nishes a spatial concept with a progress from each point in the series toward at least the two opposite sides. 170. Let there be a definite starting-point, and for the rest let everything be as heretofore ; then arises the most general form of the concept, namely, that real- ized in the series of numbers. 171. Let the beginning point be dispensed with; then the perception series runs without reversal, con- stantly in one direction ; then also the reproduction can take only this one direction. Now if, while the perception is at d, a is at the same time reproduced, then from d the series ab cd is recalled back to a ; the same series, however, will be held in consciousness by d, according to another law (as in section 29 c re- calls b and a). From this arises the representation of the concept of time. 173. First, for illustration, we may remark that in the soul the concept of space is not itself extended, but is necessarily completely intensive, and that time does not elapse during the representation of the temporal 132 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. to such an amount as to equal the time represented. As for number, its fundamental idea is only that of the more or less ; the one, two, three, etc., together with the inserted fractions, are only transferred to this fun- damental idea. The abscissas of analytical geometry are the true and complete symbols for the notion of number in its universality. 173. The original apprehension of the eye can not be spatial ; for the perceptions of all colored places converge in the unity of the soul and in this every trace is lost of right and left, above and below, etc., which found a place upon the retina of the eye. The same is true of touching with the tongue and the hands. But in seeing the eye moves ; it changes the center of its surface of sight. By this movement there is a constant blending of the concepts gained, an incitation of those which are strengthened by perceptions of what lies outside the middle of the field of vision, and an in- numerable multitude of reproductions interlacing one another — all these are combined, and for them no words could be found if we, educated as we are, were to meet them as new objects. Those born blind who subsequently attain sight, already know space inas- much as touch prepares for them successions of re- productions similar to those which sight furnishes more conveniently and more rapidly. By this we see how two widely differing senses produce the same result. 174. The concept of space relations demands a suc- cession that takes place in the act of representation, for it depends upon reproductions which are just oc- curring. In this connection two points are to be ob- served : SPACE AND TIME. I33 (1.) The succession in representation is not a repre- sented succession. (3.) It does not require a measurable duration of time, but only an imperceptibly short interval, espe- cially as by the movement of the eye in its field of vision numberless apprehensions of colored surfaces at every movement arise simultaneously and act upon the con- cepts previously gained, both strengthening and excit- ing them. The spatial seeing includes in it an infinite variety of extremely weak simultaneous reproductions which are united with the apprehensions actually taking place, which latter in themselves alone would not be considered to be spatial. Since in this spatial seeing it is not necessary that any single reproduction series should require a perceptible length of time to pass be- fore the mind, no measurable duration is necessary for it, and therefore it appears to us as though space intui- tions are quite simultaneous and entirely free from all succession in time. 175. In order to distinguish between time and space perceptions in their origin more accurately, we may suppose the following case : • From a, two series, al c d and aB CD, may begin both of which are presented to the attention simulta- neously. Up to this point in the representation there is nothing temporal nor spatial, nor is there anything of the kind if, after the whole series of perceptions is removed out of consciousness, at some later time a is again brought into consciousness and then both series are simultaneously reproduced. Such a reproduction is rather an example of the kind that we are accustomed to attribute to memory, in which time is consumed, but no time and no space represented. The matter is dif- 134: RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. f erent if, while D and d are still perceived (or thought) a again rises (perhaps on account of a concept similar to it that has just now arisen), and recalls to mind the remaining terms of its series. For then this successive recollection of the several terms occurs during a simul- taneous collective presentation of the whole series as remarked in section 171. Thus the collective survey of the earlier and later moments of time and the view of the time extension would be accomplished, whereas those persons who could not hold together the begin- ning and the end of the series, and could not observe a transition from the former to the latter, would never know anything of time. We should get still another result if a should not immediately rise again, but if a series c ij 8, should enter between D and d which in the perception goes from D to d and also backward, and if, moreover, the perception should return also from D through C and B to a, and from d through e and i to a. By this D and d would diverge, and the differences between that which was the first and that which was the last would be obliterated ; the different series would in the reproduction converge from all points toward one another at any new excitation, and the apprehension would be spatial. Both propositions in section 174 apply to the repi'e- sentation of the temporal. We consume only a short time in representing to ourselves a whole year or even a century, provided the partial concepts in the series here necessary are blended with one another; the time, however, which we consume is not repre- sented in the object. The concept of a period of time arises when one runs through the time series backward and forward with equal facility. SPACE AND TIME. 135 176. It is possible only for educated people to com- prehend long extensions in time. In its earliest years, the child can realize only very short periods of time. The reason lies simply in the necessity for reaction of the later concepts upon the earlier ones in the series (section 171). The child has great susceptibility (sec- tion 47) : for this reason, and, because the complexes and blendings possess little strength, the impression of the present moment throws the one previously ap- prehended too quickly below the threshold of con- sciousness, and thus long series can not be formed. 177. Psychologically considered, eyerything tem- poral and spatial is infinitely divisible ; for it depends upon such remainders of one and the same concept, as r,?"', ?•,",■ etc. (28). If there could be only a definite number of such remainders, then also a corresponding number of different laws of reproduction for the same concept would be possible. But the whole concept is in no way a complex of such parts as those remain- ders ; rather, all obscuration by which the remainders arise is accidental to the concept, and even opposed to it. Since here the whole precedes the parts, so the division has no limits, and the possibility of diiferent laws of reproduction is likewise unlimited. Thus it happens that for the senses and the imagination, in space and in time, the whole appears to precede the parts, and from this arises the contradiction in the notion of matter. (See Introduction to Philosophy, section 119.) Note 1. — Geometry is to be considered in this connection. On account of the infinite divisibility of space and time it needed its incommensurable quantities. Prom this, however, much evil has arisen for metaphysics, which was so incautious 136 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. as to consider this view of space to be the primary and only correct one. • Note 3. — We have proceeded from spatial and temporal re- lations, but not from space and time. To make the former dependent upon the latter is an error which can not be explained here. Empty spaces are seen just as empty intervals (pauses) are heard, viz., by expecting that which is omitted. Concepts already present are in these examples carried further forward ; in the empty spaces or time intervals they sink constantly, how- ever, until something new is given, which now becomes blended with the remainders still in the mind. If the transfer be con- tinued further, and exceed the last conceived limits, then, there being no other limits, infinity is disclosed. Not only the given forms, but also the forms gained through free rising concepts (to which belongs the creation or construction of geometrical figures), offer very rich material for investigation if we consider the difference of their apprehension from different points of view. Note 3. — For the explanation of the beautiful in space, we must take into consideration not only the favoring in the repro- duction of the series which variously unite, but especially we must consider also the effort to blend all things beheld into a one. The latter act has some analogy with the blending before the arrest (section 34). All forms approaching roundness re- spond to this effort, while on the contrary the angular, the ex- tended, the crooked, resist it. Variegated ilourishes please for a time, but we turn again to the more simple. Works of art are for the most part interesting for what they say or signify; the pure space relations with their peculiar beauty are often forgotten. 178. By way of supplement we may add a word upon the origin of concepts of intensive magnitudes. The question here is, What is the origin of the stand- ard which we use when we characterize our simple sensations as strong or weak? The reawakening of similar old concepts alone does not suffice for an ex- planation ; for, in the- first place, the concept does not adjust itself to the strength of that which is reawak- ened, although the awakening occurs through its own SPACE AND TIME. 137 forces ; in the second place, the result is only a blend- ing of the old and new, but it is not a measure of one by the other. We have here one of the numerous ex- amples of that class of psychological problems which are scarcely ever observed on account of their simplici- ty, but which are very difficult to solve. The reason seems to lie in the law of helps (35). These helps have their measure, not merely of time, but also of strength, up to the point to which they endeavor to raise the old similar concepts. If the approaching new percep- tion be too weak to furnish free space enough by re- sistance to the hindrances of the former old concepts (26), then the effort of the helping concepts remains unsatisfied and arouses the disagreeable feeling of weakness, opposed to the pleasant feeling described in section 37. If the new perception be stronger than might be necessary here, then the percipient would feel himself raised out of his accustomed sphere, for the helps can not make it equal to the former old concepts. The pleasantness of this feeling lies, nevertheless, in the favoring of those helps. It is hardly necessary to mention what is presupposed here, viz., that the old similar concept is united with some kind of a helping one. The more there are of these, and the more equally they work together, so much the more accurate will be the valuation of the intensive magnitude. Here belongs the investigation into the time-stand- ard {Zeitmaass). Note. — In my lectures upon general metaphysics 1 shall discuss in detail the three dimensions of space, likewise the de- velopment of the idea of number and its relation to logical gen^ eral notions, which discussion has no place here, though it is indispensable in metaphysics. 138 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. Supplement. — The Difference between Series. In the foregoing, the dependence of the psychical processes upon the form of the series has already been made clear. As the latter will appear still more in the result, it is to the purpose to observe the possible dif- ferences of the series in general : (1.) The series are longer or shorter. In order to bring this comparison back to a definite point of view, let us take the series a,b,c,... q, so that a remainder from a may be blended with jb, but none with q, then a will work so as to reproduce p ; on the other hand, b or c may be combined with q or r; in this way the series may be prolonged indefinitely, but there is no immediate connection between the beginning and the end. (3.) The degree of union among the terms is stronger or weaker. (3.) The series are throughout similar or not, as well in regard to the strength of their terms as to their degree of combination. The strongest terms or com- binations are either at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. (4.) Often several series serve for one — e. g., after frequent repetition. By this the dissimilarities may be lessened, but often the beginnings only are strength- ened. If this should not happen, then the series must not receive additions at the end, but at the beginning — e. g., c d, b c d, a b c d. (5.) Many series return into themselves when either the beginning or one of the later members is repeated. (6.) In the case of dissimilar series the stronger terms often form a series among themselves. It is DIFFERENCES OF SERIES. 139 then in the power of reflection to reproduce the series either in the form of a summary or synopsis or more in detail. (7.) In complicated series often a term (or several terms) has a side series— i. e., a series whose course does not lead into the principal series ; also one term may have several side series, so that either one series or another may proceed from it. (8.) The side series may progress simultaneously, in which case, however, provided they are not to coin- cide, a third series must be interposed between them, just as several radii of a circle have between them the surface of the sector (which contains innumerable pos- sible lines). (9.) In the case of complexes of characteristics (of which kind are all notions of objects that appeal to the senses) each element of the complex (every sen- suous characteristic) may be the beginning point of a series — e. g., a series of changes. (10.) Series which begin simply may later on flow together into a complex. This discussion may be sufficient here to indicate the number of possibilities which must be kept con- stantly in mind at one time in order to study the psychical mechanism accurately. In this we must not overlook the fact that the re- production fluctuates between two kinds of opposed possible influences. Either reflection may be added (this proceeds from a more powerful mass of concepts, generally from free-rising concepts, section 33), or there is present an arrest by which either the reproduction of the principal series or side series is stopped. In the latter case, in dreaming (or in feigning) we combine 140 KATIOKAL PSYCHOLOGY. series which when we are fully awake require many se- ries between them if they do not even neutralize each other, as, for example, in a dialogue of the dead, in which Alexander, Hannibal, Caasar, and Napoleon con- verse with one another. In regard to what concerns free-rising concepts, the latter can not be considered to be such absolutely, but only in relation to the men- tal state and the surroundings. Observations of this kind require a practical experience which can not be taught. CHAPTER II. THE BEVELOPMENT OF NOTION'S. 179. All our concepts without exception are sub- jected to the laws of arrest, of blending, etc. They may constitute the source of the feelings or they may strug- gle for realization as desires, etc. Then where do no- tions {Begriffe) have their seat or whence do they come ? At the beginning of Logic (Introd. to Phil., section 34) it has been said that our concepts collectively are no- tions in regard to that.which is, represented by them. Hence notions exist as such only in our abstraction ; they are in reality quite as little a particular kind'oF concepts as the understanding is a special faculty, out- side, and by the side of the imagination, memory, etc. From this it may be remarked furthermore that, be- cause all concepts without exception may be expressed as desires and feelings, the union of the so-called prac- tical with the theoretical understanding is no mystery, DEVELOPMENT OF NOTIONS. 141 but self-evident, inasmucli as here two kinds which must first be combined are present, rather the practi- cal understanding and the theoretical understanding are two imaginary objects which we have first created through our abstractions and then considered to be something real. 180. The delusion, however, that notions are a pe- culiar class of concepts has its source principally in general notions. (In his Logic, Kant posits the es- sence of notions directly in their generality.) It might occur to one that perhaps under certain circumstances the laws of arrest between concepts might efEect a sep- aration of the dissimilar from the common character- istics of concepts, such as logicians unhesitatingly ascribe to the faculty of abstraction ; but investigation teaches that such a faculty belongs not merely to the creations of fancy, but to impossibilities. From com- plexes and blendings which have once been formed nothing can be separated. Partial concepts in a com- plex or blending carry every arrest in common, and hence remain constantly together; and from simple sensations one can not even in thought separate any- thing and leave anything else remaining. How is the general notion of color to arise from red, blue, and yellow ? What are the specific differences here from which abstraction is made ? No one can give them. jj-eneral notions vfhich are thought merely.through their content without ^thejntroduction of the products of representation for the sake of applications are, as already remarked (78), logical ideals, just as logic as a whole is, so to speak, the ethics of thinking, but not a natural history of the understanding. Hence we can only ask, How is it that we construct 142 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. such ideals and approach nearer and nearer to them ? The answer, by means of the judgment, has been given already, and we must now develop it. In this certain total impressions of similar objects are presup- posed as raw material from which general notions are gradually constructed. These total impressions are, however, nothing but complexes in which the similar characteristics of the partial concepts have a prepon- derance over the different characteristics. Such ex- cess becomes gradually stronger' and more decisive. At first the repeated apprehensions of similar objects form a time series (we remember when and where and in what order we have seen such objects). If the se- ries becomes too long, however, it ceases to develope further ; but the frequently recurring becomes a per- manent concept which remains in a condition of in- volution (31). The arrest among the concepts of dif- ferent characteristics has caused their permanent obscuration, although they have not been entirely sep- arated from the concept of what is of the same kind. 181. What happens to concepts when they unite into judgments, and why do they so often occur in this form ? Judgments can not be mere complexes or blend- ings ; otherwise subject and predicate could not be sep- arated, rather they would flow together in such a way that they would be represented as an undivided unit, without a trace of the union. . The subject, as such, must fluctuate between several conditions, inasmuch as it must stand opposed to the predicate as the one capable of being determined by the latter. If this re- quirement can be complied with in more than one way, then there is more than one source of judgments. DEVELOPMENT OF NOTIONS. 143 183. First, those collective impressions from simi- lar perceptions flit from one to another of the several characteristics. He who has seen a man often in vari- ous attitudes, now standing, now sitting, now working, now resting, has siich a wavering collective concept ; he who sees him now again, decides, by aid of the col- lective concept, as to his present attitude, and thus a judgment is formed. A multitude of negatives (in- dicating the conditions in which he does not find him) are contained in this, though hardly observable, but they will become perceptible in cases where the ex- pectation is contradicted. He who to-day sees a tree from which the storm of last night broke a branch, judges first negatively : the tree has not its branch ; it is broken, splintered in this or that place, etc. 183. Secondly, a multitude of concepts are aroused in a person looking upon an object new to him, which concepts are reproduced, to a limited extent, on ac- count of a partial similarity to the object mentioned. The new concept, as the one to be determined, fluctu- ates between the old concepts, which constitute the determining characteristics. And from this arises the question. What is this object ? 184. Thirdly, those collective concepts in which series lie infolded (31) are to be regarded as subjects whose predicates appear one after the other in the un- folding. 185. Fourthly, the fluctuation between different mental states gives to the concept to which the fluctu- ation is attached the place of the subject. 186. Fifthly, and principally, on account of its fluctuating among several significations, each word in the language is fitted to be the subject of a judgment. 144 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. A sign that was repeatedly aflBxed to the objects indi- cated, with their chiingeable accompanying conditions, carries the total impression of the latter with it ; now, if with it a more definite object is to be designated, then the total impression must be corrected ; this cor- rection occurs through the predicates, which, however, in a developed language are often changed into adjec- tives, or are clothed in other kindred forms of speech, so that only the most important among the corrections are expressed in the form of predicate. Children, on the contrary, speak in short sentences ; they know no full, rounded sentences as yet. Their concepts arrange themselves in the form of judgments shortly after they have learned the words. 187. When one hears a judgment expressed, there are for him two cases possible : either the predicate is found among the several characteristics between which his concept of the subject fluctuates, or it is not. In the first case, there is no doubt but he will understand the judgment as such. We must make further dis- tinctions in the second case. The predicate either agrees with these characteristics or it does not. If the former is the case, then with the act of appre- hending arises a combination of concepts which is no judgment, but plainly a new complex or blending. Thus when something is related to us, we, unperceived, arrange the individual features presented together in a picture, without thinking that the narrator has made use of those forms of speech which are employed to unite the subject with the predicate. If the predicate, however, is opposed to those characteristics, then still another distinction must be made — viz., it is either in contrast or in complete opposition to them. The first DEVELOPMENT OP NOTIONS. 145 requires a certain kind of complexes which were defi- nitely given in the foregoing (35), and the result is that the judgment as such is to be perceived as a paradox or as false. In the case of complete opposition, how- ever, the judgment appears not so much false as 188. On the contrary, intelligible speech, above everything else, must be connected ; it must hold fast a significant portion of the concepts present, and he who holds fast the whole connection will understand best, and will perceive all the reciprocal influences that prevail with it. Hejice the understanding ranks * [The first edition of Herbart's Manual of Psychology dis- cusses as an example :] " Psychology has need of the difEer- ential and integral calculus." This statement should appear acceptable to those who have considered before that all objects of inner experience are presented as changeable magnitudes, and who, besides, know how important it is to be acquainted with the general laws according to which changeable mag- nitudes depend upon one another. Others who have never thought of mathematical calculations in connection with psy- chology will consider this sentence historically, perhaps, indeed, as a literary peculiarity. Those, however, will name it wrongly who have elaborated the differential and integral calculus con- stantly with a view to an application which requires magnitudes that may be measured and sharply observed, which it is true may succeed in the outer but not in the inner experience. Finally, many will find the foregoing sentence quite senseless, because they do not know in the least how to compare mathematics and psychology, but regard the two as opposites, like death and life. (188) The senseless, inasmuch as it fixes the limits for that which is intelligible, teaches us to know the understanding and its operation more accurately. Mere opposition without contrast only causes the opposed concepts to sink, and this is just-the Influence of the senseless— it expels, it kills thought, while con- trast elevates at least some thoughts. 13 14:6 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. as a finer sense. "We say a discourse has sense and intelligence, it is full of meaning, etc. Note.— It is a very important fact that in music also the distinction between the senseless and the inteUigible is made. Those musical composers who strive after contrasts sometimes touch upon the former condition. The inteUigible, however, is not for this reason by any means also the beautiful. Besides, music is so like discourse (with its periods, its premises, and conclusions) that ignorant or enthusiastic people very easily imagine that music says something to which only words are lacking. Thus, in its highest eloquence, music is held to be a dumb creature. What it wishes to say, however, that it expresses perfectly and completely, and translations of its meaning into another language are extremely poor. Music has its understand- ing in itself, and by this it teaches us that the understanding is not to be sought in any kind of category whatever, but in the connection of concepts with one another (of whatever kind the latter may be). 189. The development of ideas is then the slow, gradual result of continuous judgment. It may be observed here that poor languages appear to use many metaphors, which indicates that remote similarities suffice to reproduce old concepts and blend them, to- gether with their names, with the new. From this condition human thought passes to an ever greater and finer division of thoughts. At one time the com- plex A .may serve as subject for the predicate a, at another time for the predicate 6, then in bringing to- gether the two judgments, the contrasts between a and I will not only be felt (section 35), but will ■ also be expressed or clearly thought in the judgments ; this A is a, and that A is l. Here, in the representation occurs an intentional discrimination, by which, how- ever, the representation is in no way divided into two DEVELOPMENT OF NOTIONS. 147 separate acts, but the psychical mechamsm always holds together the separate parts. 190. A multitude of such judgments as A is a, A is b, A is c, A is d, etc., by which not one and the same A is to be taken, but several, with the opposed a, b, c, d, of themselves form a series ; since the a, b, c, d, blend in different degrees according to their lesser or greater contrasts (e. g., the three judgments — this fruit is green, that yellow, a third yellowish green — blend in such a way as to bring with them the colors in their orders — green, yellowish green, and yellow; for between yellow and green the opposition is the strongest, consequently the blending the least). From this arises the relation between the genus A and its species (.4 which is a, A which is b, etc.). At the same time between these species, on account of their diflferences a, b, c, d, there is a variety of reproduction laws, and from this arise the vaguely comprehended series, such as the gamut in music and the spectrum in color. The same A will coincide with a, yS, 7, 8, as here with a, b, c, d, in case the species differ from A not merely in one but in several characteristics. Note. — The construction of a series, pedagogically consid- ered, is of the greatest importance, as upon it depends clear thinking, as well as construction of every kind. 191. The more the series of characteristics form and separate in this way, through the comparison of similarities, and in part of differences, so much the sooner will it be possible, by means of them, to deter- mine the content of the complexes, or to approach the definitions of ideas. For now every element of a com- plex — i. e., every characteristic of a notion — has its 148 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. place in one of the series of characteristics. The la- bor of finding this place is indicated among others in, such questions as : How does the object look ? How large is it ? What is its smell and taste ? But, in order to find the place of all characteristics in the correspond- ing series, a number of reproductions of different series is necessary, which th^ psychical mechanism will not furnish otherwise th^n by yirtue of a dominating con- cept mass. The Platonic dialogues show what labor this costs, and how many partly positive, partly nega- tive judgments are necessary to accomplish it, espe- cially with ideas of the higher kinds ; and we may per- ceive in the limited development of the notions of the majority to what a limited extent this labor can be considered as finished. 193. Thus it is shown in every way that the defi- nition and separation of general notions, clear and distinct thinking, are problems which the psychical mechanism does not solve by really separating its com- plexes, but by allowing each individual element of the same to remain connected with some series o£ charac- teristics already formed. General notions are never really thought through their content, but with regard to their extent, though with intentional distinction from it. 193. The attempt, however, to think the notions merely or at least principally through their content, consequently through a summary of the characteristics of the series (which characteristics are no longer gath- ered directly from experience but from the series of signs already established) — this attempt. I say, effects a remarkable change. It gives rise to philosophizing, and this causes notions to become objects of thought. DEVELOPMENT OF NOTIONS. 149 The first notions whicli philosophy discovered were numbers and geometrical figures. Later, the same proceeding extended to all logical general notions. In this province, Plato, who carried out what the Pytha- goreans and Socrates had begun, stands at the head of philosophers. The next step is the philosophy of lan- guage, inasmuch as the notions are shown as objects associated with the words found in the languages. Aristotle, following a Pythagorean track, sought the categories — i. e., the most general notions in language. The influence of this is threefold : (a.) The great majority of educated people to whom philosophy at least in part belongs, refer the ab- stracted notions back again to things. Experience is ar- ranged,,scientifically treated, and in the sciences are to be found firmly fixed points of dispute, where it is asked how things are to be correctly thought through no- tions and indicated through: words. (b.) Philosophers, through the effort, partly in themselves, but in greater part in others, to hold notions fast as objects of thought, are led to overdo the matter by placing notions among the number of real objects. By this the peculiarity of sensuous things (by virtue of which they contain metaphysical problems) aids them in such a way that they are supposed to be real in a much higher sense than the objects of experience. This is a characteristic of the Platonic doctrine of ideas which has its influence even now. Hence the embarrassment of Aristotle, who found sensuous ob- jects, mathematical figures, together with numbers and notions, side by side with one another, and seems never to have succeeded in making their relations -clear. 150 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. (c.) Another delusion is the one peculiar to the school of Kant, which regards the categories as the fundamental notions of understanding taken as a men- tal faculty. Traces of this belief appear in Plato and later in Descartes and Leibnitz. By this the relationship of the categories with the forms of series is obscured, which Relationship, never- theless, is recognized analytically. The categories of the inner apperception are thereby forgotten. We may observe the principal categories — thing, property, relation, negative — at the bottom of which lie the form of judgment and the form of series. The notion "of the negative, the no in general, is the clear- est proof of the existence of such a notion, which in judging arises from experience, although in experience it has no given object. CHAPTEE III. OUK APPKEHENSIOW OF THIN^GS AN'D OP OUK- SELVES. 194. Entirely of themselves, and without the slightest action which could be called an action of syn- thesis (63), our concepts become combined so far as they are not hindered by an arrest. Hence, for a child of tenderest years, there are no individual objects as yet, but entire surroundings which, even as regards space relations, only become separated in successive representations (174). The first chaos of concepts, while it constantly re- THING AND PROPERTIES. 151 ceives new additions, is, at the same time, subjected to a continuous separation. Not that combinations once completed would ever be broken up (180) ; on the con- trary the number of concepts is constantly increased and their inner contents augmented. But, on the one hand, if the number of distinctions increases (189), on the other hand there are more frequent spatial separations of that which in the beginning was seen or in some way perceived as a whole. The objects move, and chiefly because of this the environment is broken up into distinctions ; in this manner a plurality of things originates for man's power of conception. At first the table seems one with the floor, also the table-leaf is one with the table-legs. The table, however, is moved from its place, while the leaf is not separated from the legs. All things that are not removed from one an- other preserve their original unity in the conception. 195. As the surroundings are gradually separated into individual things, so the things again become separated into their properties (191). If it be asked here to which subject the properties really belong, the answer is : The subject is always the total complex of these properties, provided the physical mechanism rep- resents them in one single undivided act. In this there is no difficulty whatever, so long as not all the judgments through which all its properties are ascribed to one and the same thing are united. But when the thought once reaches this degree of maturity (which never happens with most men), then the case is different. The judgments have now quite dissolved the complex and have separated its properties from one another as a manifold, and hence one subject will always be presupposed for the many predicates. 152 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. This notion has lost its content, however, and here a metaphysical abyss yawns, viz., the question concerning substance (86) as an unknown something, the presup- position of which is so much the more necessary, as it is to be not merely that subject, which never becomes predicate while really the judgments have changed their subject into pure predicates ; but the persistent thing which through all change remains self -identical while, in fact, the complex which serves for the ob- ject (in the sensuous world) has not only simultaneous but also successive properties, and hence is in no wise self-identical. 196. The contradictions in the notion of the thing with several properties, and in the notion of change are familiar to us (Introduction to Philosophy, sec- tions 133-135). Here we have only to explain how it happens that the ordinary understanding does not observe these contradictions. The simple explanation upon this point is this : The psychical mechanism pos- sesses originally and quite of itself exactly the unity which the metaphysician loses at the beginning of his investigation, and which the form of experience de- mands, while the matter even of the very same experi- ence does not admit this unity — for this matter includes the many of the simultaneous properties and the contrast of the successive characteristic properties. In order to represent a material object we do not need iiearly so many concepts as sensuous properties, but the unity of the act of representation, which consti- tutes the nature of the complexes, allows no question whatever to arise in the ordinary understanding con- cerning the unity of the object represented. To under- stand this question is always difficult for men, even THEORY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 153 after the acts of judgment have long since separated the complexes. Thus the psychical mechanism con- stantly deceives many who are even philosophers. Note. — It would be quite useless to hope that, in the progress of the sciences, one might perhaps find a more convenient mode of access to metaphysics than that through the contradictions which exist in the form of experience. The unity of the soul is itself the deep source from which that unity enters our act of rep- resentation, and which we afterward lose in the object presented. In this and in the completeness and exhaustiveness of those laws of reproduction which are formed according to the principle laid down in section 168 lies the answer to the question as to how the forms of experience may be given (Introduction to Philosophy, sections 119-133, fourth edition). 197. In order to be able to approach the difficult theory of self-consciousness, we must first mention some of the most important varieties in the human apprehension of things. Objects in motion occupy the spectator more than those which are at rest ; for the observation of an ob- ject in motion is an incessant interchange of an ex- cited and a satisfied desire. Let the object in motion be in any given place; the concept of it is blended with those of the surroundings. Then let it leave this place, and instead of it something of the back- ground becomes visible which was before hidden by it. This latter perception aiTests that concept of the object moved ; at the same time, however, the latter will be driven forward by the concepts of the environ- ment which appears the same as at the beginning. Also the driving forward is for the most part much stronger than the aiTest, for it depends on a much larger aggregate of concepts than the arrest, which 154 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. arises from the view of only a small part of the back- ground ; hence the concept of the thing moved is in the condition of desire (36). This desire, however, is satisfied, for the thing moved has not escaped from the field of vision (or from the circle of perception), but only from the central point of the field of vision, and the full gratification will be reached by a scarcely per- ceptible turning of the eye. Thus the apprehension of the thing moved (of which we have here described the difEerential) proceeds gradually. The reason that the thing moved not merely occu- pies more of the attention but also makes a deeper impression than the object at rest, lies in the multiplici- ty of small helps, which remain from every environ- ment in which the object has been seen. 198. Since the living object, especially a sentient one, is seen in incomparably more and more varied movements than the inanimate object, we may under- stand from this why even in the earliest periods of ex- istence, not only man, but also the brute, troubles him- self much less about the inanimate object than about the living one. Here, however, it may be remarked that originally things were not regarded as being in- animate, but as sentient ; for, upon the sight of an ob- ject which is pounded or beaten, a memory of one's own feeling, upon the occasion of similar suffering in one's own body causes one to attribute similar feeling to the object. Where this fails, we have a sign of stupidity ; the more sensitive the man, so much the more life does he everywhere presuppose before he tests more closely. Note. — It was an error of idealism, violent in its creation, and adhered to with equal violence that the Ego opposes to it- THEORY OP SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 155 self a Non-ego (Fichte), as if the negation of the Ego were inherent in objects. In this way a fhou or a he would never originate — another personality than one's own would never be recognized ; that which has been inwardly perceived is, wherever possible, transferred or imputed to the external object. Hence with the J, the thou is formed at the same time, and, almost simultaneously with the t.wo, the we which idealism forgot, and was obliged to forget, if it would not be awakened out of its dream. For the concept of the we is quite manifestly depend- ent upon the environment ; it originates sometimes in larger, sometimes in smaller circles, and always so that it at the same time includes the Ego within it. This object is exposed more clearly to our analysis than the mysterious Ego. As Plato re- garded the state as a book with large letters legible for weak eyes, in order that one might through it learn to read smaller writing more fluently, so, in order to make a good preparation for the more difficult problem, we ought to investigate the we before the L 199. But whence is the concept of a concept? And whence the concept of concept-forming things or objects ? At first this question must be taken up in its simplest form How it is possible that to some- thing extended in space, and to its other characteris- tics a power of forming concepts may be joined, in- deed may be one with it, this hardly any educated, much less any uneducated man considers ; but, that there are things which have concepts, even the brute knows. It learns this, inasmuch as it sees that these things adjust themselves to others without touching them. The common understanding is ready to believe that the needle has some sort of concept of an attract- ing magnet. In the same way every one is convinced that A contains in it the characteristics of B if the former shows itself to be definitely affected by the lat- 156 • ■ ' RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. ter. .The characteristics of ^ without its actuality constitute the picture of B, or, iii other words, the concept of £. 'N6,w, if A is affected by the properties (movements, etc.) oi, B, G, D, and others in its entire environment, then to A is attributed the power of con- ceiving or representing ; and hence, in special cases, will come such predication as A sees, hears, smells, etc. Note. — It is almost too difficult a subject for the purposes of the present manual to treat of the categories of inner apper- ception — of the object which, entering into the environment (field of vision), interrupts the current of thought by engaging it in the apprehension of this object — and causing it to enter into reciprocal action with it — and which furthermore, in fre- quent repetitions, pointing back to that which preceded, inter- feres with the involved time-series of the feelings, whence arises the concept of the subject. Suffice it to remark that the con- fusions of idealism must be removed by the distinction of the mere subject, as time-existence, from the Ego, although the lat- ter is necessarily connected with the former, inasmuch as, when considered separately, it leads to absurdities. The gradual penetration of sensations into the nerves (as when the child eats a spicy sweet fruit, or the man empties his glass), likewise the penetration of words heard, or of transactions seen, into the masses of concepts — this internal echo does not call up the concept of the Ego, but only the concept of the subject into consciousness. It is otherwise when we surren- der ourselves intentionally to the sensation, in which case the enjoyment enters after and because it is sought. 300. In most cases of the kind just mentioned are A and B, the representing and the represented, mani- festly two different things which in space stand op- posed to one another. It is evident, however, that in THEORY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 157 case the two happen in some way to be one and the same, then the concept of self-knowledge (conscious- ness) must arise. Here let no one ask, how it is possible to appre- hend the two opposite concepts, the representing and the represented, as one and the same. This difficult metaphysical problem is, in a psychological sense, quite as simple as the one mentioned above, viz., how the apprehension of several characteristics together make up the concept of one object ; or, the still earlier one, how the finite space-magnitudes can appear infinitely divisible. In the soul many representations merge into one act of representation when arrests do not prevent; but how can the slightest suspicion exist originally in the soul as to whether this representa- tion can persist when analytical judgments are ap- jilied to it (191), and it is subjected to metaphysical thought ? Let a person look at or touch his own limbs : the spectator, according to ordinary custom of speech, says he has seen himself, he has touched himself. The identity in this self is manifestly not a true one, for the eye and the touching hand are manifestly differ- ent from the arm which was seen and touched. How- ever, in the original, psychological sense, the identity exists, for the whole body is regarded as one, because all partial concepts of it are most closely blended. To see or feel one's self is only a special case of knowing about one's self. 201. All this is, however, only a preparation for the explanation of self-consciousness. In the forego- ing lies only the beginning of the concept of some one Ego ; the concept of me — i. e., of my Ego— is quite 153 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. different from this. The former is, however, the foun- dation of the latter, as experience proves, for at first the child speaks of himself in the third person. On the contrary, the first person, as the first, is the beginning point of a series, and must be explained according to the method of explaining a series (29 and 168-177). Man, as soon as his ideas of space are in a measure matured, finds himself the movable central point of things, from which ray out not only distances but also other obstacles in the way of reaching the thing de- sired, and, on the other hand, toward which the thing moves when it is obtained as desired. Thus, egoism [selfhood] is not the ground of desires, but it is a spe- cies of concept that can be referred to them. However, the egoism [selfhood] will be interrupted in a person if he assumes another central point of things. To this central point he feels himself inevitably drawn : e. g., as in the sense-world, to the capital of his coun- try ; or in the mental world, to the Deity. Note. — The concept of the v)e, which depends upon the pre- supposition of common sensation and apprehension, is of the greatest moral and, in general, of the greatest practical impor- tance. It gives a natural counterpoise to the egoism proper. Also the concept of the wa exists naturally, for no one knows really who he would be if he were to be quite alone. The notion of uprightness and the sense of honor are originated in the cir- cle of the we, when it is resolved into a manifold of egos ; but a you and a they are opposed to the we with all the evils of a corporation soul. The most wonderful thing is that we our- selves are now this, now that society ; upon some one point men agree and are friends, upon another they are enemies. In this inferiors are complained of by superiors, in that both unite and complain about their common superiors. THEORY OP SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 159 302. The complex which makes up the self of each person receives incessant additions in the course of life, which are blended together with it in the closest manner. If this blending did not take place, the unity of the personality would be lost, as in many kinds of insanity really happens, inasmuch as a new ego is created out of a certain mass of concepts which act separately, and when the masses, as a result of a change in the organism, enter consciousness one after the other, a changing personality also arises. The additions are not so much new apprehensions of the individual body for which the susceptibility is already very limited (45) as inner perceptions (40) of concepts, desires, and feelings. Hence the concept of the ego tends constantly more to the notion of a spirit which is completely separated, inasmuch as the ego is considered as abiding uninjured by the mutilations of the body, during the changes of life, and even after death. With every man, the ego develops differently in different concept-masses, and, although, in the person mentally sound, no manifold ego arises, this difference of origination is not insignificant for the formation of character in general and for morality in particular. The boy who is one person at home, another in the school, and still another among his companions, is in danger. The man who has a different tone for per- sons of rank, for his friends, and for people of a lower order, is not so secure morally as the simple man who remains constantly the same. Among different men, difference is unavoidable, inasmuch as one man feels more in enjoyment, another more in sorrow, a third more in action ; and, indeed, some more in inner action 160 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. and others more in outer. The former, inner action, often prepares the plan outlined for the latter. The mystic and the propagandist of liberty are most widely separated here ; the former considers himself obliged to destroy the individual will, to give up the individual ego ; the latter preaches the absolute independence of the ego. Most rarely, however, is to be found the self- delusion of those who, in the midst of mysticism, wish still to assert their personal freedom, in order to com- bine everything that ' has a good sound. It is useless to talk to such people of a middle course. They have from the beginpiiig missed the right way, and, in order to find it, must go the whole way backward. 203. We receive a correct notion of ourselves through the notion of the soul, but not directly through that of the ego just explained. Indeed, the latter must be transformed into the former ; for the ego of the ordinary understanding contains purely accidental characteristics, which ego, by means of analytical judg- ments (of answers to such questions as " Who am I ? "), reveals [its composite character] just as the concepts of material objects are resolved through judgments (195) into pure predicates whose subjectj long a gratui- tous assumption, is finally lost altogether. These judg- ments, inasmuch as they separate from it all that is individual, leave nothing remaining in this ego except the idea of identity of the object and subject. This latter is a contradictory notion whose transformation into that of the soul is the business of general meta- physics, just as the idea of substance, force (196), spatial and temporal things (177) are transformed into the theory of simple essences and of their disturbances and self-preservations. THEORY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 161 Note. — The contradictory notion of the pure ego is the meta- physical principle from which has proceeded all the systematic investigations which lie at the foundation of the present treatise. The ego as a metaphysical principle knows and contains none of the distinctions which are found in the actual ego and which arise according as a man feels himself depressed or elevated, and either stimulated or wearied in his efforts. Now, if it be asked how these distinctions arise, the answer is. Investigation itself, impelled by the principle, demands such variety and such con- trasts, and leads to the path along which we seek them. It is the peculiarity of true metaphysical principles that they point back beyond themselves to the connection of inner- experience. If the connection in experience were known through mere experience, then no metaphysics would be necessary, and such a science would not have arisen at all. The movement of thought, how- ever, which metaphysics secures in different problems is only in the smallest part uniform ; hence a very varied practice is required. The spirit of investigation is not promoted, hut destroyed, by the ruinous tendency to smuggle everything into the four- cornered box of the so-called categories, or into the three- cornered one of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis : one of these mannerisms is of as much value as the other. 204. It is now possible to explain the meaning of in- tuition (Anscliauen = sense-perception), an expression which has been subjected to a wicked misuse. Intui- tion {Anscliauen) means the apprehension of an object when it is presented, as such, and as nothing else. The object must stand over against the subject and also other objects. To find it thus is possible after the ego, as first person, has been assumed spatially as the center of things. Usually the object will be found to be a complex of properties, like sensuous things ; these properties, however, must first have been sep- arated from the whole environment (194), in order that the apprehension may seize the object as this and as no other, By such separation, the object appears, 14 162 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. as it were, upon a background of earlier concepts which it at the same time reproduces and arrests ; itself re- ceiving thereby definite outlines as well in space as in every other respect. For this reason, every intuition (very unlike the mere sensation) has the tendency to burst at once into a variety of judgments (182) which for the most part stifle one another, partly on account of the arrest among their predicates, partly because they can not all find woi-ds at the same time ; often, also, because the apprehension leads from one subject to another. For this reason intuition is a very complicated pro- cess which must be prepared through many earlier acts of production (not through any kind of forms inherent in the mind), and which then, with psychological ne- cessity, results as it can, it being all the same whether an actual object or a delusive form be constructed. To test this is the business of thought, give it what other name we may, and no intuition can anticipate the de- cision of the latter (thought). Finally, passivity in intuition (which is expressed by the word apprehension, viz., the reception of a thing given) is not really a passive condition of the soul by which intuition is produced, although it is without any consciousness of activity ; but those concepts stand in a passive relation and upon them as a background perception draws its outlines, or (without a metaphor) these, by virtue of the similarity which they have with the perception, are reproduced by it, but, on account of dissimilarities, are arrested by it. This peculiarity in sense-perception or intuition by virtue of which the older concepts are acted upon by the new perception, can, however, revert easily and THEORY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 163 rapidly into the opposite if a long succession of observa- tions does not hold the mind in its passive state ; and we have already indicated what occurs in such a case (39). The intuition is then at an end ; instead of it, memory, imagination, thought, begin. CHAPTEE IV. the ungoverifed play oe the psychical mechanism:. 205. Oif account of the limitations of this manual, we shall, to the subject of self-control and its opposite (practically so important), unite the consideration of other points which, in an elaborated treatise, would re- quire to be discussed more in detail. Independently of an internal dominating influence, the mental activity may have its origin either in the concepts themselves, or in the physical organism, or in external impressions. 206. A small number of concepts, if left to them- selves, would very soon approach a statical point, and would retain only a very slow movement toward it, through which it (the statical point) would never be quite reached (17). A considerable change in this movement is effected, however, through the great number of concepts, and the very complicated combinations of them, which a man gains in the course of time. 207. Take a series of concepts in the process of 164 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. elapsing [i. e., passing through consciousness] : every moment there is a change in the arrest, which the con- cepts that are entirely or almost removed out of con- sciousness suffer. Some may become active because they are less restrained by others ; others will be re- produced by such members of the passing series as they resemble. But the reproduced concepts may have their own series, which also now begin to pass through consciousness and thus these series become compli- cated with one another as well as with the first one. There arise from this complication new arrests and blendings. Through such new combinations, however, new total forces (23) are formed, by means of which the statical points become displaced ; consequently new laws of movement are secured. A manifold change of mental conditions (33-38) can by this hardly fail to occur. Such a change brings the physical organism into play, which influence, min- gling with the others (we shall not consider it further here), causes the matter to become still more compli- cated. With this play of the imagination (for it is imagi- nation more or less active) are combined very often actions in the external world ; and the audible expres- sion of thought is only one species of this. With children who have not yet learned to restrain them- selves, such expression of that which goes on in the soul is the rule. To this (expression) is added the per- ception of the product of the expression, and tliis in- fluences the course of the psychological process. 308. The flow of human perceptions, if it is in any way rapid, does not allow to the concepts which it calls up, time to place themselves in equilibrium with THE PLAY OP THE PSYCHICAL MECHANISM. 165 one another : the preceding ones are thrown by the succeeding ones upon the mechanical threshold, with- out forming those combinations which they are capa- ble of making ; and, provided the influx of the new concepts continues still longer, the statical threshold is yery soon developed from the mechanical. On ac- count of these premature arrests, a mass of undigested matter is collected which is gradually elaborated when subsequent reproductions bring it again into con- sciousness.. 209. The later elaboration of the material pre- viously collected is the more important since the older concepts are generally the stronger on account of decreasing susceptibility. The elaboration, however, will be more difficult the longer it is delayed, for the reason that, in consequence of the constant influx of new perceptions, the mental state, together with the corresponding physical condition, constantly changes, so that the older concepts with the combinations that have previously been made become less and less fit for this modification ; consequently, their reproduction is attended with increasing hindrances. In this may be found the explanation of the fact that that which is not frequently recalled to memory sinks further and further into oblivion. Accurately speaking, however, nothing in the soul is lost. 210. The purpose of the elaboration is determined by the purpose of the reproduction, for those concepts which are reproduced simultaneously, and no others, enter into new and closer combination. Note. — Some of the principal pedagogical notions are con- nected with this principle. Among others we may mention first of all the distinction between analytic and synthetic instruction. 166 EATIONAL PSYCHOIiOGY. The former occurs through reproduction for a purpose ; the latter seeks to produce a combination of new concepts in conformity with a purpose. Furthermore in this connection belongs the universal requirement that absorption (Vertiefung) and self- possession (Besirmung) should alternate with each other like a sort of mental respiration. Absorption ( Vertiefung) occurs when some concepts are brought, in their strength and purity, one after the other (as free as possible from arrests), into conscious- ness. Self-possession implies the collecting and combining of these concepts. [ Vertiefung signifies that absorption in the de- tails of some object which is attained when we lose ourselves in its contemplation. Besinnung, on the other hand, is the recov- ery of ourselves which is attained when we subordinate the ob- ject to the unity of our knowledge ; by this we come to ourselves or to our senses.'\ Both take place as well in analytic as in synthetic instruction. The more completely and the more ac- curately these operations are performed, so much the better does the instruction prosper. (See the author's Allgemeine Pfida- gogik, at the beginning and end of the second book.) 311. While, for the reasons above mentioned, con- cepts, when they constantly follow the tendency toward equilibrium, thereby change from one movement into another, they become more firmly and more variously interwoven, so that each excitation of a single one among them is communicated more and more to the remaining ones, thus assuring their reaction. In other words, the play of the imagination partakes more and more of the nature of thinking, and man becomes more and more intelligent. Por the intelligence has its seat in this general connection among concepts, but not in notions and judgments taken individually (188). With this, however, a gradual cultivation of notions and judgments is combined, inasmuch as the circum- stances which were considered above occur in this con- nection (179-192). THE PLAY OF THE PSYCHICAL MECHANISM. 167 212. As no man lives alone, but humanity exists in the form of society, it may be remarked here that conversation is the ordinary stimulant for the imagina- tion ; customs and general opinions, however, are usually the halting-places in which concepts become so crossed and interlaced that, from there on, each movement of the concept receives a determination (or direction) or as we also may say, common understanding is based upon common opinion, which, by the way, may be groundless and untrue, therefore may in a higher sense of the word be strongly opposed to the understanding. 213. A man's sense-perception {Anschauen) and at- tention, in general his interest, depend upon his imagi- nation and thought. Even in the same surroundings every man has his own world. Attention is partly involuntary and passive, partly voluntary and active. The latter, being connected with self-control, will not be considered here. The former has its foundation in part in the momentary attitude of the mind during the act of observing {Merlcen) ; moreover, it is partly determined by the older concepts which the object observed reproduces. (a.) During the act of attention four circumstances are to be observed in the mental state, viz. : the strength of the impression ; the freshness of the sus- ceptibility; the degree of opposition to concepts al- ready present in consciousness; and the extent to which the mind was occupied previous to this act of attention. (&.) In regard to the co-operation of the older con- cepts reproduced, these latter may be unfavorable to the involuntary observation, because of the fact that too little or too much is in consciousness, inasmuch as in 168 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. both of these cases it is impossible for that which is newly apprehended to adjust the mental condition to itself. For, if the new concept finds nothing, or too little, of the old with which to combine, it is of itself generally too weak to resist being overpowered by other concepts which have already proceeded further in collecting and combining. If, howeTer, too many similar old concepts present themselves in conscious- ness, they weaken the susceptibility for the new. On the other hand, the act of observing will be promoted by two circumstances : first, when the new is contrasted with the old, by which the reproduction is strong enough for union without doing serious harm through an excess of susceptibility ; second, when a reproduc- tion of old concepts is promoted by the new, and the old concepts would have striven after this in any case. In this case it establishes new combinations, while it gratifies a desire at the same time, or at least brings up a pleasant feeling. This happens especially with previously aroused expectation. Note. — Attention and expectation, as the two steps of inter- est, belong likewise to the fundamental notions of general peda- gogy- 214. Among these excitations of the psychical mechanism which have their origin in the physical or- ganism, we may be here allowed to pass over such as present more physiological than psychological phe- nomena — i. e., those in which the bodily needs are to be considered. Generally, however, it is very clear that every phys- ical feeling is in a condition to bring the series of con- cepts that are complicated with it into consciousness ; THE PLAY OP THE PSYCHICAL MECHANISM. 169 and that these series of concepts will come up so much the more certainly, since with all other concepts other physical feelings are connected (weak as they may be), and to these physical feelings may correspond other physical conditions which can not be brought up now. Upon this ground, we should expect a greater (rather than a less) dependence of the mind upon the body, than that which experience shows us, 215. Moreover, the changes in the physical condi- tion must correspond to the changes in the mental state, and to the movement and interaction of the concept series. By this the measure of time and the velocity of the mental change may meet a favorable or un- favorable condition of the body which suffices to ex- plain the alternating pleasure in, and inclination toward, this or that occupation, provided no purely psychological reasons influence it besides. Note. — That play of the psychical meohanism is especially an uncontrolled one, or at least one difficult of control, which arises when the velocity in the change of bodily conditions in- creases to an unusual extent and thereby hastens the corre- sponding course of the concepts. Such a phenomenon occurs in the transition from illness to health ; during the development of puberty; in many conditions of sickness, etc. The imagi- nation runs away from the understanding ; in other words, the rapidity of the self-developing concepts increases the violence with which they remove out of consciousness those concepts which could resist them. 216. The foregoing acquires a greater practical im- portance when, behind the manifold and variable color- ing of the Ego (203), we attempt to investigate the persisting individuality of man. That coloring offers itself to the observation of the practical educator, and 170 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. is diflftcult to distingtiish from the Ego. Here belong the following considerations : (a.) In a condition of complete health, at least of the mature body of a man, the influence of emotion upon the body (100) ought not to be apparent at all, or at the most should occur only to a limited degree ; so that no perceptible reaction of the mental activity upon digestion and circulation, or the reverse, should take place. The intrepidity of the warrior in the midst of danger is (not without reason) called cold- bloodedness. (5.) On the contrary, in every human organism ac- tually exists a system of possible emotions predispos- ing it in such a manner that a careful education only delays, rather than removes and avoids, the outbreak of these emotions. For this reason no man can be en- tirely spared the experiences to which he is predisposed, because he will bring them upon himself. (c.) The explanation of the variety of ways in which physiological pressure (50) arises from the organs and systems of the body belongs to physiology, but the changes in the mental activity which this pressure may effect must be ascertained from a knowl- edge of the psychical mechanism and of its manifold possibilities of arrest. The least difficult of these are the following : (1.) Under the influence of this pressure, instead of immediate reproduction taking place, obscurity arises, inasmuch as the new concepts obtained through new acts of perception do not so much create free space for the older similar concepts as that the concepts already present (which had attained equilibrium with the pressure) weaken in the reaction ; so that now the in- THE PLAY OP THE PSYCHICAL MECHANISM. I7I flaence of the pressure increases, and the older con- cepts, which were to receive and appropriate the new, only present themselves in a disturbed, scanty way. Hence, very often, where lively interest would be ex- pected, a stupid astonishment is exhibited. (3.) The same pressure retards much more easily the vaulting, consequently also the pointing or taper- ing ; hence the concepts do not stand out sharp, al- though they are distinguished from others, as in the case of men who intuitively perceive nothing, who comprehend nothing in its full relations, and who have no fine feeling, while they perhaps learn by means of mechanical application. (3.) With many persons the pressure is not con- stantly effective ; it appears only as a reaction in con- sequence of the tension proceeding from the mental activity. Such minds are active and easily aroused, but without depth and sequence. For every moment their thoughts are cut off or separated ; they can only construct short series of concepts. They do not like to be alone, because they are incapable of following a line of thought. (4.) If a constant pressure acts upon free-rising concepts (33), their movement is disarranged, as it enters into conflict with the strongest of the concepts which ought to rise the highest ; and by means of this conflict the weaker concepts become free to enter con- sciousness in place of the former. Under such condi- tions, active and energetic minds show themselves un- even (rhapsodic) in their action. They may be brill- iant, but, unless great care be taken, their culture will have rents and fissures. (5.) "We find the rhythm of mental movements in 172 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. general very different ; hence for this reason some at- tain better that which is quickly, others that which is slowly, done. These indications of very complicated investigations may suffice here. 217. The different concept - masses depend upon outside impressions derived from the environment. Every new environment, indeed every new condition of life, brings its own masses of concepts in great part, but not entirely separated from the others. Among these masses the right relations necessary for self-gov- ernme"nt do not by any means always arise. Here in- struction and all kinds of educational training have their use. We shall first consider here not the recip- rocal action of concept-masses upon one another, but the external relation of the man to his environment. 318. After considering, in the above, the excitation which brings forward new perceptions, we regard the external world here as the sphere of action ; and this is the seat of hindrance to action as the second aspect of the external world in its function of arousing men- tal life. The connection between representation, ac- tion, desire, will (the words are placed in this order intentionally), must now be more accurately developed than before (52). Movements in different parts of the body, and the feelings arising from these movements, are the con- ditions that combine the functions of body and soul. If, with the feeling, some kind of a concept, perhaps of the member moved, or only of an external object, be united, then every excitation of this concept, in case no hindrance intervenes, effects immediately a repro- duction of the former feeling, and of the movement belonging to it. In regard to the latter, it will not be THE PLAY OP THE PSYCHICAL MECHANISM. I73 necessary that the concept be in a condition of desire, but without anything further it will be accompanied by action. (This is the case with the lower animals and with children ; only the mature human being knows the restraining influence of other concept-masses.) Further inyestigation of this requires the aid of the theory of the concept series. 319. In a series, a, b, c, d, let the concept just men- tioned, which is immediately accompanied by an ac- tion, be indicated hj d; if the action meets no hin- drance in the external v/orld, then it occurs without being noticed, and the series runs further on into con- sciousness to e,/, etc., as though no action had occurred. Examples of the above are to be found in the move- ment of the eyeball, also in many movements of the organs of speech, while the movements of the arms and legs, on account of the weight and inertia of these limbs, belong in this respect to the following cases : If the action find a hindrance in the outer world, the feeling belonging to the action is arrested, and by means of it the concept d is also arrested. Since d is blended with a remainder of c, a smaller remainder of h, and with a still smaller remainder of a ; further- more, since the rapidity of the effect of these remain- ders varies according to their magnitude, and is in each case a different one, while the passage of the series is stopped, the smaller remainders gain time to co-operate as helps to d, and to strengthen one another. If no hindrance had existed, then c would have acted first upon d, and the smaller remainders would have had no influence, because that which they could do would already have been done without them. If the hindrance yields upon the co-operation of 5, then a 174 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. does not come to its help ; but if it does not yet yield, then gradually every member, however many may be- long to the series, will give its contribution to the gen- eral activity. So long as this lasts, every member of the series ,up to